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| Child Abuse and Scottish Children sent Overseas through Child Migration Schemes

Report for the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry

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January 2020



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Abbreviations

ACIC: Australian Catholic Immigration Committee

BBM: Big Brother Movement

BICA: British Immigration and Colonization Association

BWEA: British Women's Emigration Association

C, Cd, Cmd, Cmnd: UK Parliamentary Command Papers

CCBOS: Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement

CCWC: Catholic Child Welfare Council

CEMWA: Catholic Episcopal Migration and Welfare Association

CMT: Child Migrants Trust

CORB: Children's Overseas Reception Board

CPR: Canadian Pacific Railway

CRO: Commonwealth Relations Office

CSCSS: Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service

Crossreach: Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland

CVOCE: Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration

CWD: Child Welfare Department

GFS: Girls' Friendly Society

HCPP: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers

HMG: Her Majesty's Government

IICSA: Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse

LAC: Libraries and Archives Canada

LGB: Local Government Board

NAA: National Archives of Australia

NLS: National Library of Scotland

NRS: National Records of Scotland

ODNB: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

OMB: Oversea Migration Board

OHS: Orphan Homes of Scotland

OSC: Oversea Settlement Committee

RFMC: Rhodesian Fairbridge Memorial College

ROSL: Royal Over-Seas League

SCAI: Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry

TNA: The National Archives, Kew.

WGPW: Women's Group on Public Welfare

YMCA: Young Men's Christian Association

Glossary

'Fit persons': This was a legal term, initially from an 1889 Act referring to adults who unlike 'unfit' parents would care for and protect children from cruelty, but by later legislation it came to include not just surrogate parents but, for instance, local authority and voluntary society children's homes.

'LEM3': This form was a post-war administrative document issued by the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration through officials at Australia House to record and process an application for a child migrant's entry into Australia. Although the exact structure of the form was extended in the early 1950s, all versions of the form requested the address from which the child was being sent, basic information about the child, and details of their parent and guardian. The form was meant to be signed off by a representative of the voluntary organisation sponsoring the child's emigration, with another section requiring signed consent from the child's parent or guardian witnessed by a suitable professional. A medical report on the child was also appended to this application. LEM3 forms were sent from Australia House to immigration officials in the States receiving those children in Australia and have, in most cases, been retained in different branches of the National Archives of Australia.

'Section 21': Section 21 of the Inquiries Act 2005 gives the Chair of a Public Inquiry the power to issue a notice requiring the person who receives it to produce relevant evidence, documents or other material to the Inquiry. A section 21 notice can be enforced if the person who receives it does not comply.

1 | Introduction: Definitions, UK Numbers, Terms of Reference.

1.1 It has in recent years become publicly better known that many thousands of children born in the United Kingdom, including some from Scotland, were sent overseas without their parents to what were once known as the 'white' settler societies of the British Empire and Commonwealth. The practice has a long history, but it became well-established from the 1860s, leading to the migration of perhaps as many as 100,000 UK children by the 1960s. In its later phases, especially following the passage of the UK government's Empire Settlement Act in 1922 and its successors, child migration was subsidised and part regulated by UK and overseas governments. These child migration schemes continued after 1945, but increasingly against the grain of accepted UK childcare practice. Many of the UK organisations involved in running these schemes had ended their programmes by the early 1960s. However, some continued to undertake child migration work through that decade. The last cases of which we are aware of UK child migrants being sent overseas unaccompanied by a parent occurred in 1970.¹

1.2 The boys and girls with whom we are concerned were drawn from those commonly referred to as children 'in need' or 'deprived of a normal home life'. Most had been taken into care because of the inability of their parents to maintain for them an adequate home life, particularly because of family poverty, or the death, absence or apparent neglect of their parents. They may be categorised as follows. First, there were children who, for whatever reason, had not been living with their natural parents or with a relative or a legal guardian but had been taken into the care of public authority institutions, at various times called workhouses, poorhouses, orphanages or children's homes, and also reformatories and industrial schools, later known as approved schools. As we shall see, few children who had become the responsibility of such public authorities in Scotland were selected and sent overseas, in this respect paralleling practice in England and Wales, though in Scotland as a proportion of children in local authority care even fewer were sent. Second, in Scotland, as again in England and Wales, rather more children had become the responsibility of voluntary organisations run by churches and other charities, variably called refuges, homes or orphanages, and they provided from among those in their care the bulk of child migrants. It is important to stress that only a minority of

¹ The scholarly and popular literature on the history of child migration has become extensive. Recommended texts are included in the Select Bibliography appended to this report.

children accommodated by public authorities or by most voluntary organisations were subsequently selected for emigration to households or institutions overseas. It should also be kept in mind that arrangements for the migration and resettlement of any child selected by a local authority were actually effected by a voluntary society acting on its behalf. Third, the parents of some children, hoping to provide their offspring with 'better' opportunities overseas than those apparently available in the UK, had requested those few particular voluntary societies, such as Fairbridge, whose only mission was to organise the emigration of children to arrange for their overseas resettlement. Under all these schemes, child migrants were escorted overseas by representatives of the sending organisations but were unaccompanied by parents or relatives.²

1.3 Numbers are uncertain. Of the estimated total of 100,000 UK child migrants, most were dispatched to Canada, about 90,000 between 1869 and 1924, followed by 329 specifically sent by the Fairbridge Society to its farm school in British Columbia between 1935 and 1948. Around 6000 child migrants were sent to Australia between 1912 and 1970, including 3170 from 1947 to 1965 (and an unknown few thereafter). New Zealand received 549 child migrants between 1949 and 1953, and 276 were sent to the Fairbridge Memorial College in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) between 1946 and 1956. Estimating how many of these child migrants had previously been resident in Scotland has been a challenge in writing this report, and this we address later. Most child migration schemes had been run down by the early 1960s, but, as noted above, probably the last child migrants sent overseas departed as late as 1970, including eight from Scotland.³ By then and increasingly thereafter, public knowledge of this practice faded and even childcare professionals became unaware of this history.

² However, between 1957 and 1981, when the number of such child migrants was in decline, around 2900 other children were sent to Australia but with one or both of their parents under separately funded family migration schemes organised by the Fairbridge Society. The children were accommodated at Drapers Hall in South Australia (127 in total, 1962-81), Tresca House in Tasmania (193, 1957-76), Northcote Farm School in Victoria (260, 1961-73), Molong Farm School in New South Wales (391, 1960-66), and especially Pinjarra Farm School in New South Wales (1900 in total, 1960-80): Geoffrey Sherington and Chris Jeffery, *Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration* (Woburn Press, London, 1998), pp.242-243, 264-266.

³ House of Commons Parliamentary Paper (henceforth HCPP), Scottish Education Department, *Social Work in Scotland in 1970*, Cmnd 4834, 1970, LEG-000000001 p.10. These Scottish children were in local authority care and their emigration required the consent of the Secretary of State under Section 17 of the Children Act 1948 – upon which see below para 3.14. They may have been juveniles aged 16 or over.

1.4 But surviving former child migrants did not forget. Now ageing, many began a search in the UK for their family roots and for explanations of how they had come to be ‘transported’ overseas.⁴ Press reports in 1987 followed by a television programme broadcast in the UK and in Australia in 1989 and another in 1992, repeated in 1993, plus several academic and popular history books published in the 1990s, drew public and increasingly political attention to this ‘forgotten history’. Instrumental in this lobbying was Margaret Humphreys, who with her team and the support of Nottinghamshire Social Services established The Child Migrants Trust in 1987 (see paras 8.2-8.3 below). Its mission was and is to assist former child migrants to reconnect with family members in the UK, to secure access where possible to surviving documentation, to provide counselling and support, to lobby governments for public inquiries into the practice of child migration, and not least to provide surviving former child migrants with a ‘voice’.⁵ Substantially due to this publicity and subsequent political pressure, several public inquiries have followed. Their findings will be analysed later in this report.

1.5 Since the terms of reference of previous public inquiries vary and consequently in some respects their findings, it is important to begin this report by considering those set down for the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry (SCAI) as a whole and for those applicable to this module on child migration in particular.⁶ Amongst the eight enumerated duties of SCAI is the obligation ‘To investigate the nature and extent of abuse of children whilst in care in Scotland’. However, it is also specifically required

To consider the extent to which institutions and bodies with legal responsibility for the care of children failed in their duty to protect children in care in Scotland (*or children whose care was arranged in Scotland*) from abuse (*regardless of where that abuse occurred*), and in particular to identify any systemic failures in fulfilling that duty.

⁴ In December 2000, nearly 20 years ago, the average age of a substantial sample of surviving former child migrants was estimated to be 60: Senate Community Affairs References Committee, *Lost Innocents: Righting the Record, Report on Child Migration*, Canberra, August 2001, (henceforth *Lost Innocents, Report*), p.272, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index

⁵ On the origins and operations of the Child Migrants Trust see Margaret Humphreys, *Empty Cradles*, (Doubleday, London, 1994) and Child Migrant Trust, <https://www.childmigrantstrust.com/>.

⁶ Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, Terms of Reference <https://www.childabuseinquiry.scot/media/1754/scai-revised-tofr-june-18-2.pdf>

The phrases we have italicised explain why it was judged necessary to include a case study considering whether child migrants were victims of abuse in places to where they had been sent overseas.

1.6 Abuse is defined by SCAI to mean ‘primarily physical abuse and sexual abuse, with associated psychological and emotional abuse’. Additional specified forms of abuse include two which are relevant to this case study: ‘unacceptable practices (such as deprivation of contact with siblings) and neglect’. It is important to keep definitions in mind because other public inquiries have specifically focussed on sexual abuse, in particular in Australia the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, and for England and Wales the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA)⁷ (See paras 8.41-8.53 below). However, even in these two instances, it was recognised that sexual abuse had been associated with physical, psychological and emotional abuse. The Child Migrants Trust has also reported that former child migrants have suffered from ‘secondary abuse’ when in alleging abuse at the time or later in life they were disbelieved or interrogated unsympathetically.

1.7 Other definitions also govern this Scottish inquiry, of which one is that a child ‘means a person under the age of 18’. However, with respect to child migrants, our upper age range is lower. While child migration was taking place, the conventional understanding of ‘child’ related to those up to the school-leaving age. In Scotland this rose by steps, normally 13 from 1872, 14 from 1883, 15 from 1947 and 16 from 1972. Early on, before the First World War, some among the child migrant parties sent by voluntary societies were older, but that largely changed with the passage of the Empire Settlement Act in 1922. As will be explained later, this legislation provided financial subsidies to offset the costs of travel and the maintenance of children overseas, notionally until they were of school-leaving age. Initially the upper limit was therefore until the child was 14 but later that was increased to until they were 16 (though as will also be explained later, the minimum age for child migrants sent to

⁷ Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 2017 <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/final-report>
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes, Investigation Report, March 2018, (henceforth IICSA, *Child Migration Report*), <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/4265/view/Child%20Migration%20Programmes%20Investigation%20Report%20March%202018.pdf>

farms and families in Canada remained fixed at 14 by agreement between the UK and Canadian governments).

1.8 There were additional schemes specifically for juveniles over school-leaving age. However, their migration and resettlement as young workers in Canada, New Zealand and Australia were separately organised and financed. They were established and operated by, for example, the Big Brother Movement, the Dreadnought Scheme, Boy Scouts, the Barwell Boys scheme, the Salvation Army, the YMCA, and the British Women's Emigration Association. Several thousands had their lives re-ordered in this fashion. One programme with a specific Scottish focus was set up by a wealthy philanthropist, Dr George Carter Cossar. His intention was to train up lads, mainly aged 16 to 19 and mainly from Glasgow, and then assist their migration to farms he had bought in Canada in preparation for their life on the land overseas.⁸ The Canadian Pacific Railway also operated a scheme which led in 1960 to Fairbridge sending two parties of teenage boys to Canada as young adult employees.⁹ Then, in 1961, the chair of the Fairbridge Society was prompted by the decline in the number of child migrants it could attract to state that its work was now more that of an 'emigration society' than an organisation 'engaged in rescue work'.¹⁰ Indeed he suggested co-operating with the Big Brother Movement. The director followed this

⁸ Secondary accounts, illuminating on the politics and economics of such schemes, include Alan Gill, *Likely Lads and Lasses: Youth Migration to Australia 1911-1983* (BBM Ltd, Sydney NSW, 2005), which also draws on some grim oral testimony; Marjory Harper and Stephen Constantine, *Migration and Empire* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), pp.272-273; Marjory Harper, 'Cossar's colonists: Juvenile migration to New Brunswick in the 1920s', *Acadiensis*, vol. 28, 1998, pp.47-65; Marjorie Kohli, *The Golden Bridge: Young Immigrants to Canada, 1833-1939* (Natural Heritage, Toronto, 2003), esp. on Cossar pp.197-199; Esther Daniel, 'British Juvenile Migration to Australia: Case Studies on the Programs of the Big Brother Movement, the Salvation Army and the Church of England between 1920 and 1960', La Trobe University Ph.D, 2004; and her essay ' "Solving an Empire problem": the Salvation Army and British juvenile migration to Australia', *History of Education Review*, vol.36, no.1, 2007, pp.33-48; Stephen Constantine, 'Immigration and the Making of New Zealand', in his (ed.) *Emigrants and Empire: British Settlement in the Dominions between the Wars* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990), which considers young immigrants as a labour force in competing farming or industrial visions of New Zealand's future, esp. pp.137-138. See also National Records of Scotland (henceforth NRS), AF51/174, 'Settlement of British Boys etc in Australia and Other Places', 1925-1930, with references to, for example, Dreadnought, Big Brother, YMCA, and Dr Cossar schemes, SGV.001.003.7293-7362. There was a keen Boy Scouts group at Aberlour, and records provided to SCAI by Aberdeen City Council report on their activities, including some sent to Canada in 1927-29, ABE.001.008.7696, 7697, 7713, 7714, 7717, and 7737. See also ABE.001.008.7697 for one boy who aged 14 was sent to New Zealand in 1931 as an apprentice agricultural worker under what was known as the Flock House scheme: Genebug, 'Flock House': <http://genebug.net/flock.html>.

⁹ Minutes of Fairbridge Executive Committee, 7 April 1960, PRT.001.001.3969.

¹⁰ Minutes Fairbridge Executive Committee, 24 Jan 1961, PRT.001.001.7768.

by referring to recent efforts in Edinburgh and Glasgow to 'step up' the number of teenage migrants.

1.9 We recognise that the experiences of all such young adults, some barely out of childhood, others substantially older, could replicate those of their younger compatriots. They too would be separated from the familiar, might find their identities threatened in initially alien lands, and might suffer from their isolation usually as farmhands or as domestic servants. They could encounter verbal and perhaps physical abuse in the competition for jobs and promotion. Some regarded their labours as slavery. An investigation revealed that in the 1920s the suicide rate among male juvenile migrants brought into Australia was more than ten times higher than among the same age group among Australian males.¹¹ Certainly many prospered, but may still have struggled. Even mature adult migrants, including those with families, are known to have been homesick and found it hard to adapt, and return migration was not uncommon. The experiences of these young men and women need to be registered and remembered, not least because they have not been addressed in other inquiries concerning abuse. Accordingly, we give them separate and special consideration in Appendix 1 of this report.

1.10 The terms of reference also state that 'The Inquiry is to cover that period which is within living memory of any person who suffered such abuse'. For the most part SCAI has therefore taken 1930 as the start date for its investigations. It is very unlikely that more than one or two child migrants sent overseas before 1930 remain alive. However, in order to understand the culture which sustained the practice of child migration until recent times it is important to be alert to its long history, since it helps to explain the ideological and political purchase of child migration as a child care practice into recent times. It is also important for 'voice' to be given to their descendants. Moreover, a longer chronology should help a consideration of whether the abuse of child migrants had occurred earlier and whether those responsible for sending youngsters overseas had become aware of the risk and had taken responsible action to learn and prevent. Our instructions have been modified accordingly.

1.11 Complicating the story of child migration from Scotland is the difficulty of identifying, numbering and even defining the Scots. The 1901 UK census records that

¹¹ Gill, *Likely Lads and Lasses*, p.85.

134,023 of the people enumerated in Scotland had been born in England or Wales. Something similar would be true of many resident north of the border in earlier as in later decades. By the same token, 316,838 people counted in England and Wales in 1901 had been born in Scotland. Of the 100,000 child migrants who left the UK between the 1860s and 1960s, itself a rough estimate, it is therefore difficult to estimate how many had previously been living in Scotland or, alternatively, were Scottish by birth. To complicate matters further, it seems, for example, that the Aberlour Orphanage at Strathspey, Morayshire 'took orphans and destitute children ... from England and Wales', probably because it was a Scottish Episcopalian institution, but whether they (or their parents) were Scottish-born and whether such children became child migrants and if so when is not recorded.¹² Currently we know of two sibling girls, aged 12 and 13, born in London, who were sent to Canada from Aberlour in 1901 (or 1903).¹³ Our working assumption must be that we are in most cases investigating the experiences of children resident in Scotland at the time when they were selected for migration, while noting some instances of Scottish children living in or sent to institutions in England before being migrated.

1.12 It is as well to set out the difficulties of writing a report on the abuse overseas of child migrants from Scotland. On the one hand the wide definition of abuse which we are required to address suggests that this inquiry should be identifying proportionately more victims among Scottish child migrants than, for example, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) which, as its title indicates, had the more precise brief of considering sexual abuse only. On the other hand, IICSA's child migration module was concerned with child migrants from the whole of England and Wales, a far larger cohort than the number of child migrants leaving Scotland. When considering numbers, the report submitted to IICSA on the abuse of child migrants did not need to identify specifically children from England and Wales (though it did disregard, except for comparative purposes, the experiences of child migrants from Northern Ireland). That is not an option this Scottish study can afford. However, while identifying Scottish children among those commonly lumped in among 'UK child migrants' is necessary, the exercise is not straightforward because of insufficiently informative and accessible source material. We will indicate the places to where we know Scottish child migrants were sent, and others to where they were possibly sent. This approach, of course, is likely to overstate the total. Moreover, in

¹² The Orphanage, Charlestown of Aberlour, <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/AberlourOrphanage/>.

¹³ Aberlour, 'List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage', ABE.001.008.7695-7698. The provided data on 'date of birth', 'date at discharge' and 'age of discharge' conflict in this list.

considering abuse and the quality of care they received overseas, we know about locations in which some Scottish child migrants were indeed abused. However, we will also indicate places where others might have been abused. As will be seen, we draw as much as possible on witness statements to indicate the nature and, more impressionistically, the prevalence of abuse. During the course of this inquiry more evidence may be acquired to allow more precise information to be considered.

1.13 In addressing these matters, we have drawn on our previous and now additional research, as well as on other published studies of these schemes and related matters. There are many points in our report where we refer to specific sources. These include published primary and secondary sources, and also archived documents in the UK and overseas. These include material obtained by SCAI by Section 21 authority, and also some documents presented to other child migration inquiries which have been made available to SCAI. Where our sources are publicly available, references are included in footnotes to make possible independent review of the material on which we have drawn. We have tried in this report to distinguish between what is clearly known from source material, possible interpretations of that material, and the limits of our current knowledge.

1.14 Our Report is so structured as to present an unfolding and explanatory analysis of the practice of child migration over roughly a full century. We begin with contexts, agencies, motives and means and conclude with placements, inspections, reporting and evidence of abuse. But we have added four intimately related Appendices. In these we examine at greater length certain issues of importance presented in the body of the Report. Each Appendix analyses more of the sometimes complex evidence upon which we have drawn in reaching our judgements. We trust that the Appendices, listed in the Table of Contents, will therefore be of further assistance to readers.

2 | Contexts: Empire, Demography, Scotland within the UK

2.1 For an understanding of child migration from Scotland it is important to place the practice in its political and social context. During the 19th and 20th centuries the British Empire and Commonwealth was in many respects central to the politics and popular culture of the UK. It was impressed upon consciousness by the geographical size of the formal empire, reputedly constituting at its greatest geographical extent one-quarter of the world's land surface. It seemed to be sustained by a globally distributed British Army, Royal Navy and latterly Royal Air Force, plus the Indian Civil Service and Colonial Service, and by British businesses including shipping and telegraph companies which also spread globally - all of which in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK generated family connections Empire-wide. Glasgow was once commonly described as the 'second city of the Empire'.¹⁴ In addition, while UK emigrants in large numbers crossed the Atlantic to settle in the USA, many thousands decade by decade migrated to the 'white' dominions. Even latterly, between 1948 and 1957, emigrants from the UK were following their predecessors, to Canada totalling 431,993, to Australia 413,836, to New Zealand 108,612 and to South Africa 71,551.¹⁵ Indeed, the process had come to be called not 'emigration' but 'overseas settlement' since notionally such migrants were not going 'abroad' but only to another part of a Greater Britain. In Scotland in particular there was a long history of looking outwards, even when there were opportunities at home in an expanding economy. In the 19th century around two million Scots emigrated and another two million in the 20th century, Scotland losing a greater proportion of its natural increase in population to emigration than any other European country except Ireland and Norway. Of course, large numbers migrated to other parts of the UK, but Scots figured substantially, certainly in proportion to population, among those emigrating to the 'British world' overseas. Indeed the global visibility of the Scots overseas was celebrated.¹⁶ Assisting latterly in these outward movements overseas were the Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts, which from 1922 until they expired in 1972, provided financial encouragement to populate a developing extension of the

¹⁴ John M. MacKenzie, "'The second city of the Empire': Glasgow – imperial municipality', in Felix Driver and David Gilbert (eds), *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999), pp.215-237.

¹⁵ Harper and Constantine, *Migration and Empire*, p.3.

¹⁶ T.M. Devine, 'The paradox of Scottish emigration' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Emigration and Scottish Society* (John Donald: Edinburgh, 1992), pp.1-15. T.M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation, 1700-2000* (Allen Lane: London, 1999), p.468; Marjory Harper, *Scotland No More? The Scots who left Scotland in the twentieth century* (Luath Press: Edinburgh, 2012), pp.12, 231, n.2.

British World. In schools, certainly up to the 1950s, the teaching of history and geography was commonly the history and geography of Empire and Commonwealth. That mapping in the mind of past and present was also reinforced in popular literature and in that new form of entertainment, adventure films set in empire, and by such celebratory events as the British Empire Exhibition of 1924 in London and the Glasgow Empire Exhibition in 1938.¹⁷ In this context, it was instinctive for voluntary organisations and politicians at home and overseas to market the resettlement overseas of 'children in need' as politically as well as philanthropically of self-evident value. In that 'Better Britain' lay opportunities apparently not so readily available in the overcrowded and urban heart of the Empire-Commonwealth, and overseas migration would also consolidate the interests and global status of Nation and Empire.¹⁸

2.2 However, increasingly post-war and certainly by the 1960s there were official concerns in Scotland about such a haemorrhage of population, particularly of the young, and the consequent lowering of the birth rate at home and the effects of that on maintaining a sufficient population of working age. Scotland's population grew by only 57,000 between 1951 and 1961. Following a report on the Scottish economy, an official in the Scottish Office in 1966 was adamant that net emigration from Scotland was at an unacceptably high level.¹⁹ Even earlier, these anxieties are likely to have affected official sensitivity to child migration from Scotland.

2.3 But politicians in Australia were especially keen, even anxious, to populate their under-populated territory with more 'white British stock'. Politically this became a higher priority following the Japanese bombing of Darwin in 1942 and 1943, still

¹⁷ The scholarly literature on the history of the British Empire, on emigration including specifically from Scotland, and on imperialism and popular culture has become very extensive. As indicative, see Harper and Constantine, *Migration and Empire*; Marjory Harper, *Emigration from Scotland between the Wars* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998); Marjory Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles: the Great Scottish Exodus* (Profile Books, London, 2003); John M. MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: the Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880-1960* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984); and for a nuanced assessment Andrew Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the mid-Nineteenth Century* (Pearson Longman, London, 2005).

¹⁸ For the wider context in which to locate child migration see Stephen Constantine, 'Empire migration and social reform 1880-1950' in Colin G. Pooley and Ian D. Whyte (eds), *Migrants, Emigrants and Immigrants: a Social History of Migration* (Routledge, London, 1991), pp.62-83.

¹⁹ NRS, SEP17/101, 'Interdepartmental Committee on Emigration', 1966, esp paper 'Overseas Migration from Scotland' for data on migration and demographic and economic effects, SGV.001.008.1508-1512; 'Report by the Working Party on the Effects on the British Economy of Increased Emigration to Canada, Australia and New Zealand', SGV.001.008.1639-1640; Whitworth to Purcell, 13 July 1966, SGV.001.008.1569.

further fuelling fears of the 'yellow peril', though the 3200 child migrants Australia drew from the UK post-war fell far short of the 50,000 'orphans' the Australian government had aimed to secure from the UK and continental Europe.²⁰ Attracting British migrants, including children, was also an ambition shared with ministers in Canada, initially and especially in the under-populated province of Ontario and latterly in British Columbia, a mission also endorsed by the white minority colonial regime in Southern Rhodesia, and more modestly in New Zealand. There was a 'pull' as well as a 'push'.²¹

2.4 As for the supply of children, some demographic data needs to be kept in mind.²² Because of high birth rates *and* early deaths among adults including young parents, children under 14 made up 38% of the total population of Scotland in 1821, 37% in 1871, 33% in 1901, and 32% in 1911. It was still as high as 27% in 1931 and 26% in 1961. Consequently, many children following loss of parents would have been deprived of a normal home life. These figures were consistently higher than those for England and Wales. To put them into perspective, by 1991 the percentage of children in Scotland, as in England and Wales, had fallen to 19%. But in what follows it is also important to bear in mind that few child migrants were orphans, having no living parent. The term 'orphan' was often used by organisations sending and receiving child migrants, and 'orphanage' might be the name of the sending or receiving institution. The words had an emotive appeal, and hence were loosely employed. As will be indicated later, most child migrants had one parent living and many had both at the moment of migration.

²⁰ *Lost Innocents*, Report, pp.24-25, para 2.60:

https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c02.

²¹ These tables relating to Canada, Statistics Canada, 'Juvenile immigrants and applications for their services, by year, 1901 to 1917' https://www65.statcan.gc.ca/acyb02/1917/acyb02_1917011430-eng.htm and 'Juvenile immigrants and applications for their services, by year, 1901 to 1927', https://www65.statcan.gc.ca/acyb02/1927/acyb02_19270200012-eng.htm reveal the very large number of applications made by Canadian farmers and families to receive 'juvenile immigrants' – a Canadian term *not* limited to those children over school-leaving age. Most, by far, were younger, until 1925 when they were expected to be 14 or over. The war, of course, accounts for the marked drop in numbers between 1916 and 1920. On the ideological 'pull' from self-consciously 'British' politicians in British Columbia see Daniel Vallance, 'Child Immigrants to the "Edge of Empire": Fairbridge Child Migrants and British Columbia's Quest for the Construction of the "White Man's Province"', MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013.

²² Data in N.L. Tranter, *Population and Society 1750-1940* (Longman, Harlow, 1985), p.179, and A.H. Halsey and Josephine Webb (eds), *Twentieth-Century British Social Trends* (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000), p.74.

2.5 The constitutional relationship between the UK government and Scotland is for this inquiry a complication. The UK parliament, with of course Scottish MPs present, debated and then voted repeatedly in favour of the Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts.²³ The UK Treasury drawing on taxes imposed UK-wide provided the financial subsidies supporting child migration. In London, officials in the Dominions Office and its successor the Commonwealth Relations Office, often after consultation in particular with the Home Office, UK High Commissions overseas and Commonwealth governments, recommended UK policy and practice to UK ministers. Moreover, in Australia for example, ministers and officials in the Commonwealth and State governments invariably referred to UK child migrants. Any distinctions by specific place of origin, such as Scotland, were incidental. Scotland, of course, had no external diplomatic representation. The Act of Union in 1707 had allowed Scotland to retain its distinctive educational and legal systems, and its established church, but it had otherwise largely eliminated government offices and officials specifically responsible for Scottish concerns, and had instead centred administration in London. Indeed, in 1828 the Home Secretary was formally put in charge of Scottish affairs. In due course, certain supervisory boards and later government departments were set up north of the border with responsibility locally for poor relief, education, and health, but the post of Secretary for Scotland was only established in 1885, he only sat in the UK Cabinet from 1892, and was only renamed as Secretary of State for Scotland in 1926. In 1939 several government departments already located in Edinburgh were merged to become the Scottish Home Department. However, the Committee of the Privy Council on Education in Scotland, set up in 1923, retained responsibility for child migration, and it remained responsible after it had morphed into becoming the Scottish Education Department by 1928. However, post-war, responsibility was relocated to the Scottish Home Department, before being passed back to the Scottish Education Department in April 1960. As a later development, in 1967, a Social Work Services Group was set up to take on all the childcare responsibilities of the Scottish Education Department and of what by then had become the Scottish Home and Health Department.²⁴ As we shall see, on some matters the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Home Office in

²³ There were 71 Scottish MPs out of totals of 615 from 1922, of 640 in 1945, of 625 from 1950, and of 630 from 1955 to 1970: Michael Kinnear, *The British Voter: an Atlas and a Survey since 1885* (Batsford, London, 1981), pp.40, 55, 58, 62.

²⁴ HCPP, *Report of the Committee of the Privy Council on Education in Scotland, 1923-24*, Cmd.2174, 1924, p.16; Scottish Education Department, *Report of the Committee of Council on Education in Scotland 1927-28*, Cmd.3111, 1928; Scottish Education Department, *Report*, Cmnd.1975, 1963, pp.85-89; Social Work Services Group, *Child Care in Scotland 1967*, Cmnd.3682, 1968, pp.5, 12.

London did consult colleagues in Edinburgh, but ministers in the UK cabinet and officials in UK departments remained principally responsible for policy-making and implementation during the decades in which UK children, including any from Scotland, were being sent overseas.

3 | Local Authorities: Poor Law and Child Care Acts (1845-1968) and Child Migration

3.1 The practice of child migration from the UK has a long history. We begin by considering the role of local authorities and the operations of the Poor Law, particularly in Scotland. The migration of youngsters overseas probably began in 1620 with the dispatch by the Virginia Company of a shipload of so-called 'vagrant boys and girls' to the American colonies, where there was a labour shortage. This was at the expense of the city of London, willing in this fashion to reduce recurrent costs and a perceived threat to social order. Subsequently, Poor Law officials in local parishes in England and Wales followed the precedent, and with the authority of the 1601 Poor Law began to ship out youngsters in unknown numbers who, probably lacking family support and seemingly without job prospects, had become a burden on parish poor rates.²⁵

3.2 It is not clear when the practice began in Scotland, or when it did to what extent, or if it did whether it was even authorised by law, but we know that the same underlying punitive ethics were embedded in Scottish poor law statutes from as early as 1535, with administrative responsibilities delegated to local kirks.²⁶ The system, such as it was, later struggled to cope with the consequences of industrialisation, rural depopulation and urbanisation. Unemployment and low wages and insanitary and overcrowded houses inevitably generated high levels of mortality, poverty and the break-up of families.

3.3 Belatedly, a **Poor Law (Scotland) Act in 1845** (akin to the 1834 Act in England and Wales) was put in place. Managed henceforth by lay parochial boards, this allowed for outdoor relief and accommodation in poorhouses, but it deliberately excluded the able-bodied. Practice was monitored by a Board of Supervision for the Relief of the Poor. This body was replaced by the Local Government Board for

²⁵ Barry M.Coldrey, '..."A place to which idle vagrants may be sent". The first phase of child migration during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', *Children and Society*, vol.13, 1999, pp.32-47.

²⁶ For the Poor Law in Scotland see T.C.Smout, *A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830* (Fontana, London, 1972), pp.84, 86, 262, 376; Audrey Paterson, 'The Poor Law in nineteenth-century Scotland', in Derek Fraser (ed.), *The New Poor Law in the Nineteenth Century* (Macmillan, London, 1976), pp.171-193; Helen J. Macdonald, 'Boarding-out and the Scottish Poor Law, 1815-1914', *Scottish Historical Review*, vol. 75, no.2, 1996, pp.179-220; Lynn Abrams, *The Orphan Country: Children of Scotland's Broken Homes from 1845 to the Present Day* (John Donald, Edinburgh, 1998), pp.10-12.

Scotland in 1894, with the recently created Secretary for Scotland as President. Annual reports of the Board of Supervision and then of the Local Government Board show that 'orphaned' and 'deserted' children in Poor Law care in Scotland numbered over 6000 in 1880.²⁷ The total was still over 3500 in 1919, but to them should be added those categorised from 1890 as 'separated from parents', by 1890 already numbering over 1000 and reaching a peak of 5000 in 1913. In 1913 the overall total of children for whom local authorities in Scotland were responsible was around 9000, falling but only to 7500 by 1919. Then, in 1919, Poor Law duties were passed over from the Scottish Local Government Board to the Scottish Board of Health, itself becoming the Department of Health in 1928 within the Scottish Office. Following the **Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1929**, poor relief was rebranded public assistance, as in England and Wales, and it was made the responsibility of county councils and large burghs. Post-war Welfare State legislation in 1948, in the form of the National Insurance Act, National Assistance Act and Children Act, also applied in Scotland. The Poor Law was formally abolished in 1948, and instead the **1948 Children Act** required local authorities to set up Child Welfare Departments and to appoint Children's Officers to take responsibility for children brought into local authority care. In Scotland in 1949 such children numbered 9068.²⁸ The total had risen to 10,250 in 1952, declined to 9650 by 1958, and averaged 9878 over those ten years, suggesting in its pretty steady totals quite a close match between admissions and departures.

3.4 However, there is little to suggest that children in the care of poor law authorities in Scotland had ever been much at risk of overseas migration. As in England and Wales, child migration had perhaps been an early policy option for those managing poor relief in Scotland, though on a flimsy legal basis if practised, and indeed subsequent legislation strictly controlled the emigration of children placed in local authority institutions by court orders. No reference to children in poor law care in Scotland being sent overseas has been detected in the 49 annual reports of the Board of Supervision for the Relief of the Poor following its establishment in 1845. Indeed, the only relevant comments were that the payment by parishes to assist the emigration of poor persons or children in care would be illegal.²⁹

²⁷ Abrams, *Orphan Country*, p.3.

²⁸ HCPP, Scottish Home Department, *Children in the Care of Local Authorities in Scotland*, Cmnd 779, Nov 1958, p.2.

²⁹ HCPP, *Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Supervision for the Relief of the Poor*, C.236, 1870, p.vi; *Twenty-Seventh Annual Report*, C.681, 1872, p.viii.

Responsibilities were subsequently handed over to the Local Government Board for Scotland in 1894. Then, in September 1911, officials in the Local Government Board in Edinburgh read in *The Scotsman* of the approval by the Local Government Board in London of the recent initiative by Kingsley Fairbridge and the Child Emigration Society to open a farm school in Australia and to select and send children in local authority care. As requested, further details and related correspondence with the Society were forwarded to Edinburgh, but no action seems to have been taken.³⁰ This was followed in October 1912 by the Child Emigration Society raising the matter this time directly with the Scottish Office, then still located in London, but in response, and as instructed by the Secretary of Scotland, the Local Government Board for Scotland informed the Society that Scottish Poor Law authorities had 'no power to emigrate children', unlike those in England and Wales, though parish councils did occasionally pay the cost of passages and thereby assisted the sending of pauper children (age unspecified) overseas.³¹ In fact, the annual reports of the Scottish Board from its first publication for the year 1894-95 to its last for 1919 contain only three references to child migration.

3.5 The first, in 1912, mentions the first report ever received 'from the Colonial Agents' of an unnamed 'Charitable Institution', concerning the 'condition of a girl and her two brothers who had been emigrated under Section 21(6) of the **1908 Children Act** by a Parish Council with the authority of the Scottish Office'.³² These children had been amongst those placed in care because of a need to protect them from cruelty. It simply records the Board's pleasure at the report's 'favourable nature'. However, we know more about this family from a report provided to SCAI by East Dunbartonshire Council. We have no further information about the cruelty, but Kirkintilloch Parish Council evidently judged proper to remove these three children from the mother's care and to place them with Quarriers, the charitable institution at Bridge of Weir. From there they were sent to Canada, but oddly not together: ██████████ ██████████ in ██████████ 1908, age eight; ██████████ in ██████████ 1909, age 10 (or 11) and ██████████ in ██████████ 1909, age 13. It is recorded that ██████████ and ██████████ were keen to go. ██████████ ██████████ 1911 census records their subsequent locations and employment. From this additional source, we also learn that following police action in 1916 a further five

³⁰ The National Archives, Kew [henceforth TNA], MH102/1400, 'Fairbridge Society Child Emigration Scheme. Ministry of Health Papers 1910-1937', Part 1, pp.70-76.

³¹ NRS, AF51/165, 'Emigration: Secretary for Scotland's Correspondence', 7 Oct 1912-20 Nov 1912, SGV.001.008.2930-2935.

³² HCPP, *Eighteenth Annual Report of the Local Government Board for Scotland 1912*, Cd.6720, 1913, p.36.

children from the same family were also taken into local authority care. Three boys were then sent to Quarriers, and one of them, in March 1923, aged 14, was also shipped to Canada in a party of boys, including one other from Kirkintilloch.³³

3.6 The second Scottish Office report, in 1913 refers to a Roman Catholic home in Scotland for 'pauper children of good physique' in which parish councils had placed children and provided financial support; but the same religious organisation (not named) also owned and operated a 'Farm Home' (not named) in British Columbia.³⁴ The Local Government Board was asked whether parish councils would be allowed to continue subsidising their care if children were migrated to this overseas establishment. The Board had reservations about such funding, but since the scheme 'had the welfare of the children at heart' it was willing to approve cases 'after careful inquiry'. But there is no further reference to this initiative in subsequent reports.

3.7 The third reference, in 1914, merely recorded that the Board had rejected a request by the government of the State of Victoria in Australia to supply girls aged 16-20 for training as domestic servants, the Board having been advised that there was a demand for such workers in Scotland.³⁵ The advice to reject the proposal would have come from parishes, certainly including Edinburgh Parish Council. In any event, because of their age, they would not have counted as child migrants.

3.8 Indeed, exhaustive examination of local authority records in response to Section 21 requests rarely suggest that local authorities were keen to support the migration overseas of children for whom they had been made responsible. In 1907, 1911, 1913 and 1923 Edinburgh Parish Council rejected proposals received from the Salvation Army and Fairbridge's Child Emigration Society to send selected children to Canada and Australia.³⁶ It is true that Aberdeen Parish Council in the early 1900s and in the 1920s agreed to pay for the emigration to Canada of children in its care, but

³³ East Dunbartonshire Council, Section 21 response, EDC.001.001.0293-0300. On 1 May 1917, [REDACTED] by then in the Canadian armed forces, was killed in action in France. Born [REDACTED] 1897, he was not yet 20.

³⁴ HCPP, *Nineteenth Annual Report of the Local Government Board for Scotland 1913*, Cd.7327, 1914, pp.43-44.

³⁵ HCPP, *Twentieth Annual Report of the Local Government Board for Scotland 1914*, Cd.8041, 1915, p.32; Edinburgh City Council, Edinburgh Parish Council Minutes, EDI.001.001.8281-8282.

³⁶ Edinburgh City Council, Edinburgh Parish Council Minutes, EDI.001.001.8247, 8254, 8257-8258, 8266-8268.

only if they were assured that the child was joining a family member.³⁷ The council dismissed a request that the parish should fund the migration of a whole family to join a husband already in Saskatchewan. The implication seems to have been that he should himself pay the cost.³⁸ It also set aside an invitation coming from the Superintendent of Neglected Children in Winnipeg in 1911 seeking to recruit 'orphan pauper children' for dispatch to Canada, the girls for domestic work and the boys as farm labourers.³⁹ Similarly, Oldmachar Parish Council showed no interest in a 1913 Salvation Army scheme for the emigration of children in Poor Law care.⁴⁰ Urr Parish Council in 1912 had arranged the transfer of two brothers from its Poor House to Quarriers, but three times in 1914, 1915 and 1916 Quarriers sought consent to send them to Canada and three times consent was not granted.⁴¹ A report supplied by the Highland Council also indicates passive responses to invitations received from the Salvation Army in 1914, the Australian High Commissioner in 1924, the Catholic Enquiry Office in 1947, and Rev Boag in 1950 concerning his scheme to send boys to Dhurringile in the Australian State of Victoria. Indeed, records suggest that only one local authority boy, cared for by Quarriers, was sent to Canada in 1906 and three in 1924, plus one to the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra, Western Australia, in 1936.⁴² Clackmannanshire Council does refer to a boy who was emigrated to Canada, but his date of departure is uncertain: 'on or after 25th May 1924'. He was born in [REDACTED] 1921, and since it is unlikely that he was sent in May 1924, when he would only have been two-years old, his departure would have been much later because after 1924 publicly funded migrants to be sent to Canada had to be of school-leaving age, at that date 14. (See paras 7.3-7.4 below for Bondfield Report) This youngster, when he

³⁷ Aberdeen City Council, Aberdeen Parish Council Minutes 1892-1930, cases recorded 1904, 1905, 1910, 1913, 1914, 1927 and 1928, ABN.001.001.1478-1541.

³⁸ *Ibid*, ABN.001.001.1489-1490.

³⁹ *Ibid*, ABN.001.001.1485-1487. Other cases refer to children receiving parish support migrating with parents or guardians without financial aid. Following a downturn in the economy, Aberdeen council by 1930 was supportive of assisted passages specifically for unemployed single young men drawing poor relief, though some family migrations were also supported: pp.42, 45, 48, 51, 61, and 62. The minutes of Newhills Parish Council, pp.3-5, seem to indicate that children in its care were also migrated to Canada, with a guardian in one case in 1912 and with a mother in a second in 1931, but seemingly at no cost to the council.

⁴⁰ Aberdeen City Council, Oldmachar Parish Council minutes, 15 Feb and 12 May 1913, ABN.001.001.1723-1724.

⁴¹ Dumfries and Galloway Council, Section 21 response, Urr Parish Council Minute Book, DGC.001.001.0151.

⁴² Highland Council, Section 21 response, HIC.001.001.0005-0006, 0019.

left, would have been a juvenile not a child migrant.⁴³ This would also be true of a boy whose emigration to Canada in 1925 was approved by Dunbar Parochial Board at the request of the Catholic Emigration Society. The parish council minutes record that 'Satisfaction was expressed that an opportunity for making good had been provided for this boy'.⁴⁴ Sadly, a good result did not follow from good intentions. The boy ran away from his placement, was judged mentally defective, and was deported back to Scotland.

3.9 In 1919 the Board of Health had been made responsible for the Poor Law, and the **1924 *Poor Law Emergency Provisions Continuance (Scotland) Act*** had empowered parishes to make grants to assist the emigration of unemployed and destitute able-bodied persons. Between May 1928 and May 1929, the migration of 599 persons had been so assisted, but only 24 of these migrants were 'orphan, deserted or separated children', and their ages were not recorded. To put numbers in perspective, 7288 children were in poor law care in Scotland in May 1929.⁴⁵ The total of such emigrated children in 1929-30 was 21,⁴⁶ but just two in 1930-31. Remarkably, from another source, we know that one of the two was a boarded-out boy who had been sent to Canada by a voluntary organisation but at a cost of £16 15s to the Public Assistance Department.⁴⁷ However, as noted, Canada from 1924 was only accepting publicly-funded young migrants age 14 or over, so this youngster also was a juvenile and not a child migrant.

3.10 In the 1920s, annual reports of the Committee of Council on Education in Scotland allude to children being migrated overseas, but only with respect to children (and most likely they were juveniles 14 or over) who had been in industrial schools or reformatories. The report for 1923-24 records that 'Emigration is now receiving more attention, especially in relation to the arrangements made by the

⁴³ Clackmannanshire Council, Section 21 response – supporting documents, CLC.001.001.0021. No references to child migrants (as defined in this report) occur in case summaries of this local authority's records, including those of parishes, from 1907 to recent times: CLC.001.001.0020-0035.

⁴⁴ East Lothian County Council, Section 21 response, ELC.001.001.0036 and 0046.

⁴⁵ HCPP, *First Annual Report of the Department of Health for Scotland 1929*, Cmd 3529, 1930, pp.178, 206.

⁴⁶ HCPP, *Second Annual Report of the Department of Health for Scotland 1930*, Cmd 3860, 1931, p.166.

⁴⁷ HCPP, *Third Annual Report of the Department of Health for Scotland 1931*, Cmd 4080, 1932, p.140; Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response – Parts C and D, Glenallan Children's Home, EDI.001.001.2280-2281, and for the scheme's regulations see Edinburgh Parish Council Minutes, EDI.001.001.8290-8291.

Overseas Settlement Department [in London] in agreement with the Canadian Government'.⁴⁸ However, with Canadian age restrictions in force from 1924, only children aged 14 or over were acceptable in Canada, and that almost certainly characterised the 15 sent to Canada in 1925-26.⁴⁹ Moreover, employment opportunities overseas thereafter diminished and constrained the emigration of young workers, until post-war.

3.11 As recorded earlier, the ***Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1929*** made the administration of poor relief the responsibility of county councils and county boroughs. With respect to the option of sending children overseas, practice varied. The Chief Public Assistance Officer of Aberdeen County Council seems to have persuaded the council in 1937 to support child migration by Fairbridge at least partly on the grounds that the cost to the council of fares and outfit for each child amounted to £19, and that one-off payment was equivalent to the cost of maintaining a child in the county for only ten months.⁵⁰ It seemed financially attractive. However, press reports in 1938 reveal that while Aberdeen County Council was endeavouring to reduce expenses by supplying Fairbridge with children, Banff County Council's Public Assistance Committee objected to the practice, arguing that such children should be boarded out in rural areas so that they could become potential farm workers and offset the rapidly increasing rate of rural depopulation. The conflict of interests is also exemplified in 1938 by responses recorded in those press reports to a recruiting exercise conducted in Scotland by a senior Fairbridge officer.⁵¹

3.12 The consequences of the ***1891 Reformatory and Industrial Schools Act*** and the ***1894 and 1904 Prevention of Cruelty to Children Acts***, followed by the consolidating ***1908 Children Act*** also need to be considered.⁵² These were the first

⁴⁸ HCPP, *Report of the Committee of Council on Education in Scotland 1923-24*, Cmd 2174, 1924, p.16.

⁴⁹ HCPP, *Report of the Committee of Council on Education in Scotland 1925-26*, Cmd 2676, p.24; Scottish Education Department, *Report of the Committee of Council on Education in Scotland 1931*, Cmd 4033, 1932, p.25. Younger children were later sent to the Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School in British Columbia, on which see paras 16.38-16.41 below.

⁵⁰ Aberdeen City Council, Public Assistance Committee minute, 1932-36, ABN.001.001.1216.

⁵¹ *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, 25 Feb 1938, ABN.001.001.1250, and 6 April 1938, ABN.001.001.1251.

⁵² See especially SCAI report provided by Professor Kenneth McK. Norrie, 'Legislative background to the Treatment of Children and Young People Living Apart from Their Parents', (Edinburgh: Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, 2017), https://www.childabuseinquiry.scot/media/1892/norrie_legislative-background-to-the-treatment-of-childrenyoungpeople-bmd-181017.pdf For Reformatories and Industrial Schools see Appendix 1, Section 17.

measures which gave (1) to school managers of reformatories and industrial schools and (2) to 'fit persons' running homes into which courts had placed poor children and also those in need of protection from cruelty, the legal right to send such children overseas – but only if the Secretary of State considered this to be in the interests of the child and gave consent.⁵³ From 1908, the consent of the child to his or her emigration was also required in cases relating to those in reformatories and industrial schools, but not to those being looked after by 'fit persons'. In no cases was the consent of parents legally required. We have evidence that the 1908 Children Act was employed by Glasgow Parish Council. It had been divided on the issue of child migration, but as allowed by the 1908 Act it contributed funds in 1914, 1915, 1922 and 1929 to enable boys (probably juveniles) at a local reformatory to be sent overseas, the attraction being that their departure would lead to budgetary savings.⁵⁴

3.13 The **1932 *Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act*** equalised the obligations to the extent of requiring a child placed in both kinds of establishment to give consent – but parents still only had to be 'consulted'. This limitation was retained in the **1937 *Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act*** with the caveat that such consultation was not required if not 'practicable'.⁵⁵ Post-war local authority reports provide evidence of the use of this 1937 Act to support child migration to Australia. Three brothers had been in the care of the Sisters of Nazareth at Lasswade. Early in 1947 the Mother Superior drew the attention of a sub-committee of East Lothian's Education Committee to the opportunities apparently being presented by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia. To there, by the end of 1947, the brothers had been despatched. As required under the terms of the 1937 Act, the Secretary of State had approved and the mother had been consulted.⁵⁶ These brothers were followed in May 1948 by a boy who had also been the responsibility of East Lothian's Education Committee but in the care of Barnardo's at Cullercoats in Northumberland. Though it is not recorded, the Secretary of State must again have given approval, and the mother been at least consulted.⁵⁷

⁵³ For an explanation of the term 'fit persons' see Glossary.

⁵⁴ Glasgow City Council, Glasgow Parish Council, GLA.001.002.4646-4647, 4649, 4651, concern debates, divisions and a decision about sending ten children to Canada in 1911, but whether they were sent or not is not stated; and Glasgow Parish Council Reports, GLA.001.002.4655-4658 relates to subsidising boys to be dispatched from the Kibble Reformatory, Paisley, probably to Canada.

⁵⁵ Norrie, 'Appendix One: Emigration of Children', pp.338-344.

⁵⁶ East Lothian Council, Section 21 response, Minutes of Education Committee, 6 Feb, 6 March, 8 July, 2 Dec, 4 Dec 1947, ELC.001.001.0050-0051

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 21 July and 9 Oct 1947, 19 July 1948, ELC.001.001.0049.

3.14 The **1948 Children Act** followed the recommendations in the report of the 1946 Curtis Committee (see paras 7.8-7.13 below). Legal constraints on the practice of child migration were precisely specified in Section 17 of the Act, but only with respect to children in local authority care. Each of such cases had still to be formally approved by the Secretary of State for Scotland (or by the Home Secretary in England and Wales), who had to be satisfied that

emigration would benefit the child, and that suitable arrangements have been or will be made for the child's reception and welfare in the country to which he is going, that the parents or guardian of the child have been consulted or that it is not practicable to consult them, and that the child consents.⁵⁸

Evidently, the Secretary of State could refuse to give consent if it was thought that emigration would not be beneficial for the child. In cases where the child was deemed too young to 'form or express a proper opinion' then the Secretary of State could still give consent, provided that the child was to emigrate in the company of a parent, guardian or relative or was going to join a parent, guardian, relative or friend.⁵⁹ We understand that although parents were to be consulted they were not able to withhold consent to prevent emigration.⁶⁰

3.15 The principles of Section 17 guided local authority practice, as the following cases indicate.⁶¹ Following the Act and as authorised by Section 17, two boys in local authority care, with the consent of the Secretary of State, were emigrated from Scotland in 1948, this being 'the first record of emigration for many years'.⁶² Their destination was not reported, but by that date it was almost certainly Australia, and that was true of nearly all the children and juveniles who had been in local authority care whose departure was approved by the Secretary of State between December 1948 and February 1951. A Scottish government file usefully summarises 21 cases in that period, as a guide to 'General Principles to be Followed'.⁶³ They included seven

⁵⁸ Children Act 1948, Section 17: <http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/acts/1948-children-act.pdf>

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Norrie, 'Appendix One: Emigration of Children', p.343.

⁶¹ See Edinburgh City Council, Glenallan Children's Home, Section 21 response – parts C and D, EDI.001.001.2284, para ix.

⁶² HCPP, Scottish Education Department, *Education in Scotland in 1948*, Cmd 7656, 1949, p.46, INQ-000000038.

⁶³ NRS, ED11/410, 'Homeless Children: Consents to Emigration under Section 14 of the Children Act, 1948, 'General Principles to be followed, 1948-51', SGV.001.003.8000-8008.

boys aged 10 to 15 in the care of Glasgow Corporation whose cases were approved in December 1948. They had given their consent, as had their parents. A mother's consent had also been obtained for the migration of her child, aged only five, but to join his elder brother in a children's home in Western Australia. Approval had also been given to the departure of three boys, the youngest not yet 11, provided they travelled together, this with the consent of the father.⁶⁴ Two boys aged eight and six, in the care of Roxburgh County Council, were also allowed to go, under the auspices of Fairbridge and with the consent of the father. Consent to the migration of juveniles, aged 16 or more, was also required and invariably given. But in several cases approval was not granted. The case of an illegitimate child in the care of Wigton County Council provides an example. His mother had given her consent, but the boy, not yet seven-years-old, was judged not able to give informed consent, and he was not emigrating with or joining a parent, guardian, relative or friend.

3.16 Children's Officers for Greenock Corporation and the Port of Glasgow Town Council in the 1950s also sought - but did not always obtain - the consent of the Secretary of State for Scotland for the migration, not only to Commonwealth destinations, of children (and juveniles) in their care.⁶⁵ Similarly, we learn that Edinburgh Children's Committee secured Secretary of State consent in 1949 and 1950 for the emigration of two children, but he refused consent to the dispatch of another child in 1949, because the child was too young to give an informed consent.⁶⁶ Left uncertain is the case of a boy not quite 12, being cared for by Barnardo's at its Residential School for Maladjusted Children at Craigerne, Peebles.⁶⁷ Records indicate that he wanted to go to Australia. His parents had given their consent. The case rested with the Secretary of State. We do not know his decision.

3.17 The limited role of Scottish local authorities in providing child migrants, particularly post-war, may also be indicated by the results of a thorough search of the records of Fife Council and other related bodies.⁶⁸ It located only seven migration cases for certain in the period from 1945 up to 1970. Two were juveniles departing under the Big Brother scheme, two were over 18 and no longer in care (one going to

⁶⁴ Details vary but this is probably the case summarised in para 13.7 below.

⁶⁵ Inverclyde Council, Section 21 response, INC.001.001.1817-1818, 1824-1833.

⁶⁶ Edinburgh City Council, Children's Committee Minutes, EDI.001.001.8174, 8176, 8184, 8186.

⁶⁷ Aberdeen City Council, minutes of Aberdeen Children's Committee, 2 July 1962, pp.276-277, ABN.001.001.1460.

⁶⁸ Fife Council, Section 21 response, FIC.001.001.4689-4690.

the USA, the other to Canada), and two of unknown age but probably juveniles left for New Zealand in 1968. That leaves just one, but age unknown, who went to Australia in 1950. Leading to the same conclusion that local authorities were hesitant about sending children in their care overseas is a parliamentary question in the House of Commons which produced the statement by the Secretary of State for Scotland that (only) 36 child migrants had been sent overseas by local authorities in Scotland between the passage of the Children Act in July 1948 and November 1963.⁶⁹ The point was made that in no case had consent been given where the parents or guardians were known to oppose the emigration, even though their consent was not legally required. Indeed, in case there were supplementary questions (there were none), the minister's briefing note was to say that he would not necessarily refuse his approval if parents did object because his priority was to ensure that emigration would benefit the child – and that meant that before giving consent he had to be satisfied that suitable arrangements would be in place for the child's reception and welfare. He was also prepared to report that by November 1963 consent had been refused with respect to eight children because they were too young.⁷⁰

3.18 We learn from a combination of other sources that those leaving in 1950 were 'a few suitable cases', followed by nine (one boy, eight girls) in 1957; 14 (11 boys and three girls) in 1958; six in 1962; six in 1963; four in 1964; seven in 1965; three in 1966; 10 in 1967, five (two boys, three girls) in 1968; five in 1969; and eight in 1970, totalling 77 plus the 1950 'few'.⁷¹ No information on ages, origins or destinations is

⁶⁹ Hansard, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, vol.684, oral answers, cols.983-4, 20 Nov 1963, LEG-000000007.

⁷⁰ NRS, MH4/62, 'Parliamentary Question, Scottish Administration, Emigration', SGV.001.004.5419-5424. According to the briefing note given to the minister, the prompt for this question may have been a case in which he had refused consent to Argyll's Children's Committee to send three children in their care to Australia. The mother was dead, but though the father was in poor health he was in touch with them and they were fond of him.

⁷¹ HCPP, Scottish Education Department, *Education in Scotland in 1948*, Cmd 7656, 1949, p.46; Scottish Education Department, *Education in Scotland in 1950*, Cmd 8200, 1951, p.71; Scottish Home Department, *Children in the Care of Local Authorities in Scotland, November 1957*, Cmnd 461, 1958, p.4; Scottish Home Department, *Children in the Care of Local Authorities in Scotland, November 1958*, Cmnd 779, 1959, p.5; Scottish Education Department, *Education in Scotland in 1962*, Cmnd 1975, 1963, p.89; Scottish Education Department, *Education in Scotland in 1963*, Cmnd 2307, 1964, p.95; Scottish Education Department, *Education in Scotland in 1964*, Cmnd 2600, 1965, p.85; Scottish Education Department, *Education in Scotland in 1965*, Cmnd 2914, 1966, p.76; Scottish Education Department, *Child Care in Scotland 1966*, Cmnd 3241, 1967, pp.10-11; Social Work Services Group, *Child Care in Scotland 1967*, Cmnd 3682, 1968, pp.12, 20; Social Work Services Group, *Child Care in Scotland 1968*, Cmnd 4069, 1968, pp.13, 21; Scottish Education Department, *Social Work in Scotland*

given. Other reports, employing a different time frame, state that while emigration accounted for the departure of eight boys and five girls from Scotland in 1966-67, 10 of the 13 were emigrated with the consent of the Secretary of State under Section 17 of the 1948 Children Act. Similarly three boys and three girls were emigrated in 1967-68, of whom five also went with the consent of the Secretary of State. The others were possibly old enough not to need his consent. It should be noted that no official files on these individual children have been made available to us, so we are not in a position to comment on the circumstances leading to their migration or, if ever recorded, their subsequent experiences.

3.19 It is however evident that even in aggregate the numbers were small. As in England and Wales, few local authority Children's Officers in Scotland were attracted by child migration as a childcare practice, and for this reluctance they were strongly criticised by child migration enthusiasts, including by some on the UK government's own advisory Oversea Migration Board.⁷² Far more children left Scottish local authority care in these years because they had been adopted: 240 in 1957, 230 in 1958, 703 in 1966, and 754 in 1967.⁷³ Meanwhile, in England and Wales, of the more than 60,000 children in care each year between 1949 and 1966, the number adopted was accumulating to nearly 19,000, whereas between 1952 and 1966 fewer than 400 children had been sent overseas.⁷⁴

3.20 It may be convenient to record here that Section 33 of the 1948 Children Act was concerned with the emigration of children by voluntary organisations, of which more below. Except with respect to children placed in them by court orders, voluntary organisations had otherwise been largely legally free agents, though financially constrained as will be explained later. However, during debates on the

in 1969, Cmnd 4475, 1970, p.11; Scottish Education Department, *Social Work in Scotland in 1970*, Cmnd 4834, 1971, p.18.

⁷² HCPP, *First Annual Report of the Oversea Migration Board*, July 1954, Cmd.9261, 1953-54, pp.17-20, LEG.001.005.5262-5264; *Second Report of the Oversea Migration Board*, August 1956, Cmd.9835, 1955-56, pp.17-21. See also records supplied to SCAI by the Prince's Trust, PRT.001.001.8111-8116, correspondence between Nigel Fisher MP and the Fairbridge Society, June-July 1958, concerning the less than enthusiastic response of the Children's Officer, Surrey County Council, to the invitation to endorse child migration.

⁷³ HCPP, Scottish Home Department, *Children in the Care of Local Authorities in Scotland, November 1957*, Cmnd 461, 1958, p.4; Scottish Home Department, *Children in the Care of Local Authorities in Scotland, November 1958*, Cmnd 779, 1959, p.5; Scottish Education Department, *Child Care in Scotland 1966*, Cmnd 3241, 1967, p.10; Social Work Services Group, *Child Care in Scotland 1967*, Cmnd 3682, 1968, p.11.

⁷⁴ HCPP, annual Home Office reports, *Children in the Care of Local Authorities in England and Wales*.

Children Bill in 1948, ministers in both Houses of Parliament had given assurances to members that regulations would be drawn up to ensure that voluntary organisations in their child migration practices adhered to obligations similar to those expected of public authorities. Importantly, children would not be emigrated unless there was 'absolute satisfaction' that proper arrangements were in place for their care overseas.⁷⁵ Here too we see the obligations promoted by the Curtis Committee - but they were not honoured. Drafting and redrafting regulations occupied the time of Home Office civil servants in London and, when consulted, of colleagues in the Scottish Home Department for over eight years before the enterprise was abandoned in 1954, partly on the grounds that regulations could not be enforced on institutions operating outside British jurisdiction, such as children's homes in Australia.⁷⁶ It remains perplexing why regulations binding on such UK-based matters as selection of children and securing the informed consent of children and parents or guardians could not be drafted and applied. Remarkably, *Emigration of Children (Arrangements by Voluntary Organisations) Regulations* were finally drawn up and brought into force in 1982, long after child migration programmes had been abandoned.⁷⁷ Still more astonishingly, the requirements to be honoured by voluntary societies thereafter concerned identifying the anticipated benefits of migration for the child, making suitable arrangements overseas for the child's reception and welfare, securing the consent of the child when the child was capable of giving consent (implicitly when of an age to give informed consent), consulting parents or guardians whenever possible, and securing their consent when informed consent by the child was not possible (most likely because of age), and all to be done to the

⁷⁵ Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 1947-48, vol.155, col.37, 13 April 1948, by Lord Chancellor; and House of Commons, 1947-48, vol.450, col.1616, 7 May 1948, by Under-Secretary of State, Home Department, and col.1691 by Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland; Vol 452, col.1871, 28 June 1948 by Home Secretary.

⁷⁶ See Appendix 3, Section 2, paras 2.12-2.40 on the attempt to draft these regulations, and Appendix 2, Section 4, para 4.21 for the Scottish Home Department's support for the same UK government control over child migration by voluntary societies as there was over the local authorities.

⁷⁷ Stephen Constantine, 'The British Government, child welfare, and child migration to Australia after 1945', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol 30, no 1, 2002, pp.99-132, esp. p.104, and reference on p.129 to note 33: 'Emigration of Children (Arrangements by Voluntary Organisations) Regulation, *Statutory Instruments 1982*, HMSO, London, 1983, pp.38-40. See also NRS, ED11/306, 'Children Bill, Regulations to be made under Clause 33 (1) Emigration by Voluntary Organisations', SGV.001.003.7363-7550. Minutes and correspondence in the file's 209 pages, June 1948-August 1956, indicate that Scottish Education Department staff were consulted but the lead was taken by the Home Office, SGV.001.004.4306-4514. For the complexities hindering the drafting of regulations see Appendix 3, Section 2, and especially paras 2.28, 2.39-2.40, and summary paras 2.41-2.45.

satisfaction of the Secretary of State. Such requirements pretty closely follow the obligations anticipated by Curtis 36 years earlier.

3.21 To complete the legal narrative relevant to this report, clauses in the **1937 *Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act*** which related to emigration by 'fit persons' and also clauses in the **1948 *Children Act*** relating to emigration by local authorities were replaced by a single clause in the **1968 *Social Work (Scotland) Act***, Section 23. Noticeably (and not paralleled in English legislation) this stated that a voluntary organisation as well as a local authority could only arrange the emigration of a child in care 'with the consent of the Secretary of State'. That consent required him to be satisfied that the child would benefit by migration, that suitable arrangements for the child's reception and welfare would be in place, that the parent had been consulted, that the child had given consent, or that if too young to do so was only emigrating in company with a parent or guardian, or was emigrating to join such a person or a friend.⁷⁸ Parental consent was still not required. As we shall in due course consider, whether parents or guardians in the past, and still more so children, had the necessary information to give 'informed' consent had always been a delicate matter. But in reality, child migration from the UK by any agency had by 1968 almost ceased.

3.22 Scottish local authorities had also early on overwhelmingly opted for the boarding out and fostering of children in need,⁷⁹ perhaps at least partially for the same reason that some local authorities in England and Wales favoured child migration overseas, because it seemed the cheaper option.⁸⁰ Some were assigned as cheap labour to farms or accommodated in boarding houses attached to early textile mills in rural areas. Others became the responsibility of relatives or family friends, but most were sent to foster parents, the majority with strangers in rural areas. They were of course paid for their services. It is recorded that in Scotland in 1880 over 62% of some 8000 children dependent on poor relief were boarded out, the percentage

⁷⁸ Norrie, 'Legislative background to the Treatment of Children and Young People', p.343.

⁷⁹ Macdonald, 'Boarding out and the Scottish Poor Law 1845-1914', p.198, suggests 80-90% of those in long-term need in that period.

⁸⁰ Evidence submitted to the House of Commons Health Committee included a calculation that, in the later 19th century, Poor Law care for 2000 children in Liverpool cost ratepayers £18 per head, £36,000 per annum; but emigrating just 50 children to Canada reduced the bill (permanently) by £5000: House of Commons, Health Committee, Third Report, 1997-98, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, (henceforth *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*), Volume II, HC755-II, Evidence, Document 3, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/8061106.htm>.

thereafter growing.⁸¹ By 1913 86% of Scotland's 8873 pauper children were boarded out, increasing to over 88% of 9200 pauper children in 1933. In 1945, almost 90% of children in local authority care were boarded out. Thereafter, between 1949 and 1958 the annual average was 9878, accounting pretty steadily for around 60% of the children for whom Scottish local authorities were responsible.⁸² The numbers and proportions remained high until the 1970s.⁸³ The ideological presumptions behind these internal relocations strongly resemble those promoted by philanthropic child migrant enthusiasts (see below), confident about the physical and moral benefits of transferring children from debilitating urban environments to supposedly healthy rural locations. In some cases children sent from the slums of big cities like Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen to Gaelic-speaking communities in the highlands and islands may have found themselves more like aliens in a foreign land than many of their English contemporaries dispatched to English-speaking Canada.⁸⁴ But from the review in this chapter of our report it is evident that local authorities in Scotland as in England and Wales rarely regarded overseas child migration as an attractive option.

⁸¹ Abrams, *Orphan Country*, pp.35-77, esp. pp.37-39, 41.

⁸² Calculated from HCPP, Scottish Home Department, *Children in the Care of Local Authorities in Scotland*, Cmnd 779, August 1959, p.2.

⁸³ Abrams, *Orphan Country*, p.38.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp.64-65.

4 | Voluntary Societies and Child Migration: Motives

4.1 At the same time, across the UK, a substantial number of children in need were being catered for in institutions run by a variety of voluntary societies, very often with church affiliations. In Scotland, institutions set up and managed by voluntary organisations numbered at least 275 by the interwar years. Most were small, catering for no more than 30 to 40 children, but two were large, Quarriers Homes at Bridge of Weir near Glasgow and the Aberlour Orphanage, Strathspey. It has been reckoned that between 1880 and 1940 a minimum of 2000 children were resident at any one time in voluntary homes in Scotland, suggesting that over 60,000 passed through such places between those years.⁸⁵ Often they provided temporary accommodation and care, but because of origins and family circumstances many children seemed destined for longer-term residence.

4.2 However, some voluntary childcare providers in Scotland were affected by a wave of philanthropic initiatives across the UK which began early in the 19th century. These regarded migration overseas as an alternative and more constructive welfare intervention for children in need of 'rescue', offering them better economic prospects for their future working lives and sounder environments for their moral and spiritual redemption.⁸⁶ Public appeals for funds strongly emphasised those virtues. As a result, overwhelmingly, child migrants were dispatched by such voluntary societies and not by local authorities. The territories of the British Empire to which children were sent were presented as convenient English-speaking parts of a largely rural 'Greater Britain' where there seemed to be a labour demand and better and healthier prospects for youngsters than in over-populated, over-crowded urban Britain. This was a view which inspired such major and pioneering philanthropic operators as Captain Edward Brenton (1774-1839), founder of the Children's Friend Society, Miss Annie Macpherson (1803-1904) and Miss Maria Rye (1829-1903), who initiated child migration to Canada, Dr Thomas Stephenson (1839-1912), founder of National Children's Homes, and Edward de Montjoie Rudolf (1852 -1933), founder of the Church of England Waifs and Strays Society (later the Church of England Children's Society).

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp.78-87.

⁸⁶ For a representative statement see Annie Croall's text of 1910, quoted in Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.180-181.

4.3 Among those who engaged in child migration and set up branches in Scotland or otherwise recruited from Scotland we should note the following. Dr Thomas Barnardo (1845-1905) first began his child rescue work in London, opening a home for destitute boys in 1870.⁸⁷ Thereafter his ambition grew, and in 1892 he opened a home in Edinburgh, but opposition from Quarriers and the local press soon led to its closure.⁸⁸ Much later, in 1940, Barnardo's again opened a Scottish branch, but before then any children with Scottish origins migrated by Barnardos would have been previously accommodated elsewhere in the UK.⁸⁹ William Booth (1829-1912) was another early operator, the founder in the 1860s of what came to be known as the Salvation Army. He was the author (with W.T. Stead) of *In Darkest England and the Way Out*, published in 1890, a text which powerfully asserted that the solution to many of the nation's spiritual as well as social problems lay in the emigration of the poor and oppressed, including children and juveniles, to that 'Greater Britain' overseas. The Salvation Army established an Emigration Department in 1903. In Scotland the Army had already opened a branch in 1879 and hostels for unmarried mothers by the turn of the century.⁹⁰ As elsewhere in the UK, homes established by the Roman Catholic Church and run by the Sisters of Nazareth and other Catholic organisations in Scotland also sent overseas some of the children in their care.⁹¹ The Fairbridge Society, named after Kingsley Fairbridge (1885-1924), its pioneer, did not have an office in Scotland, but it did recruit up north through the agency of the Scottish Council for Women's Trades and Careers, and it did receive and migrate children sent down to its centre at Knockholt in Kent.⁹² Other Scottish children were sent south to Birmingham before being migrated overseas by the Middlemore Homes which had been founded for boys and girls by John Middlemore (1844-1924)

⁸⁷ Gillian Wagner, 'Barnardo, Thomas John', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004, revised 2017 (henceforth *ODNB*); June Rose, *For the Sake of the Children* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1987).

⁸⁸ Lynn Abrams and Linda Fleming, *Dr Barnardo's Homes (Dr Barnardo's/Barnardo's Scotland): 1930s to 1990s, Report for the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry*, (Edinburgh: Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, forthcoming).

⁸⁹ Barnardo's, Section 21 response – Part C, 4 Sept 2018, Section 4.11, Child Migration, BAR.001.001.0507, states that no children from Scotland were sent to Canada. *The Times*, 27 March 1889, p.5, reported that Barnardo's children from Scotland were among a 'large party' sent to Canada the previous day, but since Barnardo's only opened its Edinburgh office in 1892, these Scottish children would have been living in a Barnardo's home in England, INQ.001.001.8570.

⁹⁰ 'A Guide to the Salvation Army in Scotland': <https://www.salvationarmy.org.uk/scotland-office>; Frank Prochaska, 'Booth, William', *ODNB*; Abrams, *Orphan Country*, pp.15, 133.

⁹¹ Early initiatives are recorded in Sisters of Nazareth files supplied to SCAI, Chapter minutes extracts 1925 and 1928, NAZ.001.007.8914-8916.

⁹² Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*; F.J.Wylie and Robert Brown, 'Fairbridge, Kingsley Ogilvie', *ODNB*, revised 2011; Aberdeen County Council, Committee letter, 12 Nov 1937, ABN.001.001.1225.

in 1872.⁹³ Also to note is the Over-Seas League, founded in 1910, which became the Royal Over-Seas League (ROSL) in 1960.⁹⁴ Based in London, it set up a Migration Committee (later Bureau) in 1926, initially concerned with supporting and encouraging adult migration. From 1927 it established a network of branches across the UK, and these began to sponsor child migrants to be sent to Fairbridge farm schools in Australia, this developing into a 'godparent' scheme from 1929. Annual Reports from 1934 indicate that Scottish branches were much involved.⁹⁵ There was financial support for juveniles being sent to Canada and Australia before and after the Second World War.⁹⁶ In addition, during the war, there had been schemes to evacuate UK including Scottish children to the dominions,⁹⁷ and post-war ROSL assisted the return to Australia of some young evacuees who had been temporarily sent there during the war and wished to return.⁹⁸ Also post-war it arranged the migration of other child migrants. In 1954 boys were selected and sent to Dhurringile farm training school in Victoria, Australia,⁹⁹ and by an agreement with the New Zealand government, ROSL selected children, including some from Scotland, to be sent to New Zealand under a fostering arrangement agreed with the New Zealand government.¹⁰⁰

⁹³ For example, see SCAI statement by Mr Roderick Donaldson Mackay, 12 Jan 2018, WIT.001.001.3450-3485. Born in Edinburgh in 1934, briefly in a Barnardo's Home, he was sent in 1941 aged 7 by Middlemore to the Prince of Wales Fairbridge Farm School in British Columbia.

⁹⁴ What follows draws especially on ROSL Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.0001-0014, and covering letter 26 Sept 2019, ROL.001.001.0123-0136.

⁹⁵ ROSL covering letter, 26 Sept 2019, ROL.001.001.0127, 0129-0130, and Annual Report 1934, ROL.001.001.0101, Annual Report 1938, ROL.001.001.0090, and Annual Report 1956, ROL.001.001.0095.

⁹⁶ ROSL, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.0005-0006, and for collaboration with the YMCA in 1957 see Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.0129, and with the Big Brother Movement in 1964, Annual Report 1964, ROL.001.001.0110. On juvenile migration see Appendix 1.

⁹⁷ TNA, DO131/111, 'Children's Reception Board New Zealand', but the few remaining records in the file name none from Scotland.

⁹⁸ ROSL, Section 21 responses, ROL.001.001.0007, ROL.001.001.0127.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0129.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0007; ROL.001.001.0128. See also TNA, MH102/1564, 'Emigration of Children to New Zealand. Appeal for Foster Parents', 1948, on the opening of the scheme, and DO35/6371, 'New Zealand Government's Child Migration Scheme', 1952-53, on its closure. Also see NRS, ED11/384, Scottish Education Department, 'Homeless Children. Emigration Schemes', *New Zealand Government Child Migration Scheme*, letter from J.Brennan, Chief Migration Officer, undated, SGV.001.004.4549-4550, and *Scotsman*, 28 Dec 1949 for a press report on a departure and for an explanation of the scheme, SGV.001.004.4609. See also IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, pp.109-10. This is further discussed later (see especially paras 10.10 and 18.2-18.5 and Appendix 3, Section 6, paras 6.1-6.17)

4.4 Those organisations with specific Scottish origins which certainly regarded child migration as a legitimate option were the Quarriers Homes, first opened in 1871 by William Quarrier (1829-1903);¹⁰¹ also in 1871 the Orphan and Emigration Home opened in Edinburgh by Mrs Margaret Blaikie (1823-1915);¹⁰² the Aberlour Orphanage in Strathspey, established in 1875 and then enlarged by Canon Jupp (1830-1911) to become a village home in 1882;¹⁰³ the Whinwell Children's Home in Stirling, founded in 1883 by Miss Annie Croall (1854-1927) and run by trustees after her death;¹⁰⁴ and the Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society, founded by Miss Emma Stirling (1838/9-1907), who began child migration in 1886, and to whose reception centre in Nova Scotia Annie Croall also sent some children from Whinwell.¹⁰⁵

4.5 Alongside philanthropic motivations for child migration work, religious factors also played a part. Inevitably, given the culture of the time, all the philanthropic 'rescue' societies claimed a Christian motivation: young souls as well as young bodies were to be saved. In general, of course, the predominant churches in Scotland had for long been the Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland, plus several smaller Presbyterian churches and the Scottish Episcopal Church, and we know that

¹⁰¹ On Quarriers see Anna Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story* (Birlinn, Edinburgh, revised edition 2006); Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.166-177; Abrams, *Orphan Country*, pp.80-84 and esp. 92-3; William MacLean Dunbar, 'Quarrier, William', *ODNB*; and Peter Higginbotham, 'Quarrier's Homes, Bridge of Weir, Renfrewshire, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/Quarriers/>.

¹⁰² On Mrs Blaikie's Home see William Garden Blaikie, *An Autobiography: Recollections of a Busy Life* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1901), upon which all secondary sources largely rely, including Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.177-178, 181-182, 186, because little primary material seems to have survived.

¹⁰³ On Aberlour see Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.181, 189-190, 193; <https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/search/archives/3bae7c19-5cb4-3c17-82a3-8a7068e5a13f> and Aberlour, 'Our History', <https://www.aberlour.org.uk/our-history/> and Peter Higginbotham, 'The Orphanage, Charlestown of Aberlour, Strathspey, Morayshire, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/AberlourOrphanage/>.

¹⁰⁴ On Whinwell see Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.180-181, 187-189, 193; <http://www.smithartgalleryandmuseum.co.uk/annie-croall-stirling-story-no-43-for-23-october-2013/>; and Annie Croall, *Fifty Years on a Scottish Battlefield 1872-1923* (Jamieson and Munro, Stirling, 1923), digitised copy obtained by SCAI, especially pp.33-48 on child migration, copy generously provided by the National Library of Scotland.

¹⁰⁵ On Emma Stirling see Emma M. Stirling, *Our Children in Old Scotland and Nova Scotia* (Speakman, Coatsville, Pennsylvania, 1898), https://ia902503.us.archive.org/25/items/cihm_25487/cihm_25487.pdf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emma_Stirling; Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.178-180, 182-183, 195; Roy Parker, *Uprooted: the Shipment of Poor Children to Canada, 1867-1917* (Policy Press, Bristol, 2008), pp.111-114; Kohli, *The Golden Bridge*, pp.222-225; Philip Girard, 'Stirling, Emma Maitland', *ODNB*.

the founders of some childcare organisations had overt church allegiances. For example, with reference only to individuals known to have operated in Scotland, Canon Jupp at Aberlour was an Episcopalian minister, William Quarrier was an active Baptist, Annie Croall in Stirling had founded the Young Women's Evangelistic Mission; Emma Stirling was a devoted member of the Scottish Episcopal Church; and Mrs Blaikie, married to the Very Rev. William Garden Blaikie, would have been like him a member of the Free Church of Scotland. General Booth may not personally have been active in Scotland, but his evangelical mission would have inspired the Scottish branch of his Salvation Army. The Roman Catholic hierarchy had been restored in England in 1850 but not until 1878 in Scotland, when two archdioceses were established, centred on Edinburgh (later St Andrews and Edinburgh) and Glasgow, plus four dioceses for Aberdeen, Dunkeld, Galloway, and Argyll and the Isles. To these were added the dioceses of Paisley and Motherwell in 1947.¹⁰⁶ It followed that the Catholic Church wished to ensure that children with Catholic backgrounds in need of 'refuge' were nurtured in the Catholic faith. Child migration to Catholic institutions overseas was probably attractive because the limited number of Catholic families in Scotland made fostering in Scotland an insecure way of preserving the faith. There were also complaints by Catholic organisations that William Quarrier was collecting Catholic children, converting them into Protestants, and then emigrating them to Canada, and similarly that Barnardo's were reluctant to release Catholic children from its homes into the care of Catholic residential institutions.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Wikipedia, 'Catholic Church in Scotland', https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Church_in_Scotland#Organisation

¹⁰⁷ Olive Checkland, *Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland* (John Donald, Edinburgh, 1980), p.262; Roger Kershaw and Janet Sacks, *New Lives for Old: the Story of Britain's Child Migrants* (The National Archives, Kew, 2008), pp.63, 125-130; Gordon Lynch, *Remembering Child Migration: Faith, Nation-Building and the Wounds of Charity* (Bloomsbury, London, 2015), p.144, n.79. Concerns that Catholic children in need of care should be protected from loss of faith by ensuring their residence in Catholic homes and institutions in the UK appears as a recurrent item in the minutes and papers of the Catholic Child Welfare Council AGMs, 1946-56. See records provided by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales: BEW.001.001.0093-0196, and for example references between 7 Nov 1946 and 22/23 Oct 1956, BEW.001.001.0113, 0122, 0129-0130, 0138, 0144-0145, 0160, 0164, and 0192. For a summary statement in a 2010 report by Andrew Nicoll, 'Catholic Child Migration to Australia from Scotland and Northern Ireland 1946-50', based on Scottish Catholic Archives and provided to SCAI, see BSC.001.001.0168, para 5.2. See also the worry expressed on 25 October 1955 by Mgr Crennan, Director of the Australian Federal Immigration Committee, that the number of migrants to Australia of British stock needed to be at least 50% of the total, and he asked the help of the Council to find Catholics to populate the country because otherwise there was a 'great danger that the land would be open to millions of pagans from the north': BEW.001.001.0182.

4.6 The fact that child migration schemes to Canada were initially established by Protestant individuals or organisations also raised concerns that these schemes would take insufficient care to ensure that Catholic children were placed in Catholic households or institutions overseas. Catholic organisations therefore developed their own migration work to Canada to ensure the safeguarding of children’s Catholic faith, even if this sometimes meant placement in the predominantly French-speaking households of Quebec.¹⁰⁸ In the 1920s the Sisters of Nazareth in Scotland also favoured sending to Australia girls and boys in their care explicitly to assist the ‘spread of Catholicity’.¹⁰⁹ The determination to maintain distinctively Catholic migration work in Canada and subsequently in Australia led to the creation of the Catholic Emigration Society in 1927, in response to the formation of the Church of England Council for Empire Settlement, and as a body for administering nominations for migration funding under the terms of the 1922 Empire Settlement Act. Rivalry between the Catholic Emigration Society and the earlier Catholic Emigration Association formed in 1904 was resolved in 1939 by the merger of both organisations into the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement (CCBOS).¹¹⁰ To complicate matters, also operating was the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement for Scotland and Northern Ireland, though it is unclear when this was first formed. In addition we need to draw attention to the Catholic Child Welfare Council (CCWC), made up of the administrative officers of diocesan child rescue societies in England and Wales. There do not seem to have been equivalent diocesan societies in Scotland. As further explored in Appendix 3, in the post-war period the CCWC favoured child migration to Australia, though Canon Craven of the Crusade of Rescue (the child rescue society for the Archdiocese of Westminster) had concerns about the quality of care in institutions run by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia.¹¹¹ The intention that Catholic child migration work should be a means of protecting and disseminating Catholicism across Commonwealth territories persisted into the post-war period. As one energetic Catholic organiser of child migration from the UK to Australia put it in 1946, the goal of such work was ‘to prevent Catholic migrants from being taken over by non-Catholic organisations, and also to build up the

¹⁰⁸ Kershaw and Sacks, *New Lives for Old*, pp.119-141; Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.91-109.

¹⁰⁹ Sisters of Nazareth, Chapter Book Minutes, 1925, NAZ.001.007.8914, 8915, 8916. The boys were to be sent to institutions run by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia.

¹¹⁰ Gordon Lynch, ‘British Child Migration Schemes to Australia: A Historical Overview’, (2015), p.9, <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/47772/>

¹¹¹ See Appendix 3, Section 5, paras 5.1-5.8.

Catholic population in Australia'.¹¹² A sectarian response is evident in a 1956 Church of England report which noted with concern the effectiveness of post-war Catholic child migration schemes and the worry that the migration of Catholics to Australia might exceed that of Anglicans.¹¹³

4.7 In addition, not instead, others involved in child migration had more overt imperial agendas, especially John Middlemore who in 1872 had founded what he called the Children's Emigration Homes specifically in order to collect and send children to the Empire overseas.¹¹⁴ Kingsley Fairbridge had the same agenda when in 1909 he set up the Child Emigration Society, which after his early death was renamed the Fairbridge Society. Territories underpopulated with white settlers and therefore deemed economically underdeveloped and strategically vulnerable would be assisted by a transfusion of 'good British stock', and child migrants would make a contribution.¹¹⁵ Both these organisations recruited children from Scotland in uncertain but modest numbers to join their migration parties.

¹¹² Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry Northern Ireland: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme> Day 42, 1 Sept 2014, Evidence, p.27, Conlon to Bishop of Derry, 18 June 1946. Brother Conlon was a Christian Brother from Australia operating in the UK.

¹¹³ Church of England Records Centre, CECES-2-CA1176, *Church Assembly: The Church of England Council for Commonwealth and Empire Settlement, report for the fifteen months, 1 January 1955 to the 31 March 1956*.

¹¹⁴ Michele Langfield, 'Righting the record? British child migration: the case of the Middlemore Homes, 1872-1972', in Kent Fedorowich and Andrew S.Thompson (eds), *Empire, Migration and Identity in the British World* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2013), pp.150-168; Ian Cawood, 'Middlemore, Sir John Throgmorton', *ODNB; One Hundred Years of Child Care: The Story of Middlemore Homes 1872-1972* (Middlemore Homes Committee, n.p., 1972?). James Morrison, 'Assisted Emigration from Birmingham to Canada, 1900 to 1930', University of Birmingham Ph.D, 2004, chaps 7 and 12; Patricia Roberts-Pichette, 'John Throgmorton Middlemore and the Children's Emigration Homes', <https://bifhsgo.ca/upload/files/Articles/JohnThrogmortonMiddlemoreAndTheChildrensEmigrationHomes.pdf>

¹¹⁵ Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration*.

5 | Voluntary Societies and Child Migration: Finance

5.1 Understanding the financial context and funding mechanisms of these philanthropic schemes is also important for making sense of their rationale and scale of operations, and the various relationships in their delivery between voluntary organisations and governments in the UK and overseas. The capital cost (land, buildings, equipment) and recurrent expenses of looking after children long-term (building maintenance, staffing, training, care, education, placements, aftercare) were high in institutions in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK. Given the number of children in need, one attraction of child migration was that it seemed organisationally and financially efficient. Dr Barnardo's policy of never refusing entry into a Barnardo's home to a child in need, of offering an 'ever-open door', required in his view a back door through which children could be placed out with other carers to free up space for a constant stream of in-comers. This had to be something wider than children in the UK leaving the institution only when they were old enough to 'graduate' and become independent. Child migration might ease the problem, not just for Barnardo's but for other cash-strapped voluntary organisations. True, there were the costs of outfitting the children, of employing escorts and of transportation overseas, but upfront expenditure should be followed overseas by more manageable costs of maintenance, monitoring and aftercare.¹¹⁶

5.2 However, until the 1920s, child migration had been largely financed by voluntary donations raised by child care and child migration societies, assisted by the national and provincial or state governments of receiving countries and by ratepayers in the case of those formerly maintained in poor law institutions in the UK. Philanthropic child migration operators raised funds by marketing their schemes as 'good causes', stressing their 'rescue work'. The endorsement of their spiritual as well as material good works by high status clerical, political and other prominent public figures, even members of the royal family, as patrons and board members reassured the public that these were charitable works deserving of public support. The prestige and political punch of Fairbridge were undoubtedly enhanced by its securing of HRH

¹¹⁶ Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry Northern Ireland, Day 42, Transcript, pp.37-38, 100-101: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D42-Transcript-Red-OPT.pdf>. SCAI report from Barnardo's, Section 21 response, December 2018 states that the cost of keeping a child in care in Britain cost £16, presumably a year (but which year is not stated), but only £10 in Canada, BAR.001.005.3332.

the Duke of Gloucester as patron.¹¹⁷ Moreover, published annual reports included audited accounts and meticulously listed the donations voluntarily given, whatever the amount, thereby acknowledging receipt, expressing gratitude and retaining the support of substantial numbers of well-wishers.

5.3 The financial challenge was eased by the UK Government's ***Empire Settlement Act of 1922*** and related financial arrangements. This legislation was principally passed to ease a post-war unemployment problem by subsidising the emigration of adults and of families and at the same time to satisfy a demand by 'white' settler societies in the overseas Empire for more 'white' immigrants from the motherland. It was renewed in 1937 and 1952 and subsequently as the ***Commonwealth Settlement Act in 1957, 1962 and 1967***. It only expired in 1972.¹¹⁸ The Acts, applicable of course in Scotland, also supported child and juvenile migration programmes, and allowed the UK Government to subsidise the equipping, shipping and resettling of child migrants and the cost of their maintenance overseas until they reached the age of 16. Hence its attraction to philanthropic organisations and to a much lesser extent local authorities responsible for the care of children. Moreover, this state funding endorsed the legitimacy of the work in the eyes of philanthropic child migration societies and the public at large, as well as making it financially viable.¹¹⁹

5.4 Estimates presented to IICSA suggest that UK government funding for an estimated 1137 child migrants sent to Fairbridge institutions in Australia between 1947 and 1970, to cover outfitting and maintenance for on average eight years,

¹¹⁷ TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', Costley-White to Shannon, 3 July 1956, p.27.

¹¹⁸ Stephen Constantine, 'Waving goodbye? Australia, assisted passages, and the Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts, 1945-72', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol 26, no 2, 1998, pp.176-195. For representative examples of formal financial agreements between a voluntary society and the UK government, and the obligations upon the society, see those signed by Barnardo's in 1937 and repeated renewals to 1951, TNA, DO35/3380, 'Dr Barnardo's Homes, Australian Aftercare, and Oufits and Maintenance', LEG.001.002.1669-1680, and for subsequent agreements see those contained in SCAI report from Barnardo's, 'Australian Correspondence', BAR.001.006.0027-0348, noting especially the more precise obligations placed on all sending societies in 1957 and thereafter, BAR.001.006.0318-0325. For Fairbridge 1949-53, see TNA, DO35/3398, 'Fairbridge Farm School NSW, Agreements', and for the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee of Australia, 1949-53, LEG.001.003.5290-5299; and TNA, DO35/3385, 'Australian Catholic Immigration Committee. Agreements', LEG.001.002.1681-1700.

¹¹⁹ Constantine, 'The British Government, child welfare, and child migration to Australia after 1945', pp.99-132.

amounted to over £350,000, or at 2018 prices around £5,300,000 – excluding the costs of their Assisted Passages which cannot be distinctively calculated.¹²⁰ Moreover, by agreement, there was additional funding from the governments of receiving territories. The Australian Commonwealth government especially met some capital costs and transport expenses, and also paid a regular maintenance allowance to each receiving institution for each individual child migrant up to the age of 16.¹²¹ State governments also contributed to these per capita maintenance payments, but with levels of payments varying significantly between different States. For example, in 1953 the per capita weekly maintenance payment for a child migrant by the State Government of Western Australia was £1 3s 3d per week, but in New South Wales the State maintenance contribution was 4s 8d per week.¹²² Some receiving organisations may also have offset the expenses of some sending organisations, if the Presbyterian Church of Victoria is representative (and if the accounts presented in the report provided to SCAI by the Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland have been correctly interpreted by the authors of this report): £6123 12s 5d was credited to the account of the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service from 1949-50 to 1962-63.¹²³

5.5 Whether all money from all sources to fund all organisations was actually spent on the well-being of children is of course another matter. It is notable that variations in funding did not correlate with the quality of provision in individual homes. The unpublished confidential reports of the Ross Fact-Finding Mission (see para 7.31 below) were far more critical of material conditions and staffing levels at some residential institutions in Western Australia than of some institutions in New South Wales, despite the former's significantly higher level of state funding.¹²⁴ This may reflect the different financial resources more generally available across the organisations receiving child migrants, or possibly organisational decisions about whether to direct all of this per capita funding into their work with child migrants.

¹²⁰ Estimates provided to IICSA by the authors of this report in 2017, using RPI as the value indicator, now updated to 2018.

¹²¹ HCPP, Commonwealth Relations Office, *Child Migration to Australia: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission* (Ross Report), Cmd.9832, 1956, p.3, para.3, CMT.001.001.0542-0552.

¹²² *Lost Innocents*, Report, pp.29-31, para 2.78, and 2.83, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c02

¹²³ Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (Crossreach), Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0458-0459.

¹²⁴ See confidential reports in TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia'.

Moreover, the combination of funding from the UK Government, the Australian Commonwealth Government and individual State governments meant that residential institutions in Australia would often have received a higher per capita income for a UK child migrant than for Australian-born children in their care. The Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee Report (see paras 8.25-8.30 below) noted that this probably meant that in some instances voluntary organisations in Australia may have seen the recruitment of British child migrants as a valuable revenue stream and used this money to cross-subsidise the care of Australian-born children.¹²⁵

5.6 We know that the sending of child migrants to British Columbia and their maintenance was also subsidised.¹²⁶ Indeed, the scheme was launched only because the UK government in 1935 met half the capital costs to buy the site for the Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School, which amounted to \$25,000 (£15,000) at the time. It also agreed a maintenance cost of \$10 (five shillings) per week per child. Unavoidably, because of costs and only from 1940, the Provincial Government of British Columbia also contributed, with a first contribution of \$12,500. The financing of the scheme to send children to the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College also operated thanks to the UK government meeting half the travel costs and contributing 10 shillings a week for maintenance of pupils until they were 16.¹²⁷ The New Zealand scheme was even more unusual. The Royal Over-Seas League organised the recruiting and selection of children (though final approval of those selected lay with New Zealand Government officials in London), but all other costs were met by the New Zealand government which arranged free passages for child migrants under its fostering scheme, provided foster-carers with the standard family

¹²⁵ *Lost Innocents*, Report, paras 5.17, 5.21, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c05.

¹²⁶ Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, pp.160, 162, and Patrick A. Dunae, 'Waifs: the Fairbridge Society in British Columbia, 1931-51', *Histoire sociale-Social History*, vol.21, no.42, 1998, pp.233, 239: by 1948 annual running costs were close to \$100,000, p.246.

¹²⁷ TNA, MH102/1896, 'Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College: Memo of Visit to Home Office by Mrs Goodenough, wife of S.Rhodesia High Commissioner', who left a glossy recruiting brochure but received an unenthusiastic response, note by McConnell, 22 Jan 1947. Similarly see MH102/1897, 'Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College', and Critchley's disapproving minute of 9 Jan 1948 on Dixon, CRO, to Critchley, Home Office, 4 Jan 1948, with specific reference to new standards set by the Curtis Report. Nevertheless a funding arrangement was put in place: TNA, DO35/6377, 'Increased UK Government Aid to Voluntary Organisations concerned with Child Migration', p.142, *Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College* brochure, p.10.

allowance in New Zealand for children under the age of 16, and granted a standard income tax exemption for dependent children.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Memorandum by the Department of Social Welfare, New Zealand Government, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/755ap03.htm>, p.230, paras 8 and 12.

6 | Child Migration: Obligations and Expectations

6.1 It may be useful here to set out how the practice of child migration was notionally expected to operate. The selection of children and securing their consent and that of - or at least consulting - parents or guardians prior to their migration were the responsibilities of voluntary societies, and similarly, though there were far fewer cases, especially in Scotland, of poor law authorities and their successors. We examine selection and consent practice in more detail in due course. Shipping companies and especially public authorities in the UK representing receiving countries overseas also screened and endeavoured to exclude those children put forward whom they deemed unacceptable, especially following medical examinations. Children were shipped out in parties supervised and accompanied by representatives of sending societies, latterly dispatching them by air.

6.2 With respect to child migrants sent to Canada between the 1860s and 1920s, they arrived at distribution centres in Canada, managed by employees of UK-based voluntary societies. By statutes passed by Canadian provincial governments, the distribution centres became legal guardians and had parental obligations.¹²⁹ It was certainly the view of Andrew Doyle, a senior Local Government inspector from England, following an inquiry he conducted in Canada in 1874, that in accordance with municipal laws in Quebec and Ontario the children were under the 'absolute parental control' of those in the UK who had sent them, but he could not ascertain whether the Canadian or provincial governments had even considered this matter.¹³⁰ The sending societies through the distribution centres were responsible for allocating children often to widely dispersed privately-owned homes and farms. Quarriers reports refer to children over 14 as being 'employees' to be paid a wage, but to those younger being 'adopted', though this did not mean adoption in a legal sense but rather that it was expected that they would be treated as members of the family.¹³¹ Prior and subsequent inspection of these places by the local representatives of sending societies was expected, and those centres also served as

¹²⁹ This certainly was the situation by 7 May 1917: memo by G.Bogue Smart, Chief Inspector of British Immigrant Children and Receiving Homes, BAR.001.005.5260-5261.

¹³⁰ HCPP, Andrew Doyle, *Pauper Children (Canada): Report to the President of the Local Government Board*, February 1875, HC 9, 1875, p.10, and for his doubts about so-called 'adoption' pp.11-12, INQ-000000006. On the Doyle Report see paras 7.1-7.2 below.

¹³¹ For references to 'adoption' and 'pay' see Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story*, p.73, and The Institute for Research and Innovation in Social Services (IRISS), 'The Golden Bridge: Child Migration from Scotland to Canada 1869-1939', <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/index.html>

refuges for children getting into difficulties. UK-based sending societies also expected reports to be sent back to them by their staff at the distribution centres, and they welcomed letters from children. There was also some correspondence by and to some employers. Canadian officials also became involved in inspecting placements.¹³² However, it is not clear how, when or even whether legal guardianship was transferred to Canadian public authorities, although we do know that by 1910 and probably earlier the department of the Superintendent of Immigration and also Canada's provincial governments were legally entitled to act *in loco parentis* until a child migrant had become 18, not least because thereby they retained the right to deport those who had proved to be 'unsatisfactory'.¹³³ Subsequently, when all children (apart from those fostered out in New Zealand) were going into institutional care overseas, the expectation and even requirement should have been that regular reports on children's welfare and progress would be solicited by and submitted to the sending agency.¹³⁴ Even with respect to children sent by the Royal Over-Seas League via the New Zealand government to be cared for by foster parents, the same expectation followed – though the League seems not to have preserved any such reports, and may not even have received any.¹³⁵

6.3 As noted earlier, philanthropic child migration operators had engaged in high publicity marketing in order to raise necessary funds. Many sending societies in their annual reports provided accounts of money raised and spent, and often stories about and especially letters from children now overseas, reporting, of course, on their progress and achievements in order to encourage further donations. For examples pertinent to this inquiry, it is profitable to consult the annual reports published by Quarriers.¹³⁶ They contain references to child and juvenile migration.

¹³² Bogue Smart, in a paper on 'Juvenile Immigration' he read to The Associated Charities Organization Toronto, March 1905, refers, on p.7, to the annual inspection of UK child migrants sent by Boards of Guardians since 1878, and of reports provided to the UK government, presumably to the Local Government Board: copy in possession of Professor Constantine. This reference to reporting was a response to the Doyle Report. However, Bogue Smart's office also carried out inspections of placements to which child migrants had been allocated by voluntary societies: see 7 May 1917 memo by Bogue Smart, BAR.001.005.5258-5266.

¹³³ Barnardo's, Historical Correspondence re Child Migration, Bogue Smart, Inspector of British Immigrant Children, to Superintendent of Immigration, and reply, 21 and 24 Nov 1910, BAR.001.005.4866-4867; and Bogue Smart to Minister, 8 Feb 1921, BAR.001.005.4888.

¹³⁴ On post-war expectations in relation to such reporting see Appendix 3.

¹³⁵ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, p.109. SCAI report from ROSL also refers to limited surviving records, for example ROL.001.001.0005, 0010-0014.

¹³⁶ Quarriers, *Narrative of Facts, 1872-1928*: <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/index.html>; *Narratives of Facts, 1929-1963*, QAR.001.001.2554-4030.

6.4 For the very few children selected by local authorities for dispatch to Canada, using voluntary societies as their agents, money was raised by local authorities and should have been financially accounted for in published reports. Financial aid was also provided by the national and/or provincial or state governments of receiving countries.

6.5 However, the UK government's Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts, 1922-72, did more than subsidise child migration. For obvious reasons, HM Treasury required the expenditure of taxpayers' money on the migration of children overseas to be accounted for. This meant that formal agreements had to be drawn up and approved between the UK government (in practice the Dominions Office, later renamed the Commonwealth Relations Office) and the sending agencies in this country. These legalised the dispatch by migrating agencies of child migrants in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK to specific institutions overseas at public expense. Those agreements needed to be periodically and even annually renewed, thus giving officials in Whitehall repeated opportunities to review past practice before renewal. As a pertinent example, the agreement with the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service was renewed in 1951, 1953, 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1960.¹³⁷ Such obligations would have allowed officials to inquire into such matters as selection and consent, and renewals also provided opportunities to assess and re-assess the suitability of the establishments overseas to which children were being sent. For information on the condition and quality of care at such places, the UK authorities could also solicit information from officials in UK High Commissions overseas. Moreover, because Commonwealth governments receiving child migrants were also subsidising the costs of transfer, care and aftercare, their officials also had responsibilities, to their own governments. Hence they too had a right and indeed an obligation to inspect and assess, and at least an implicit duty to inform officials in the UK of their findings.

6.6 There is more clarity in the post-war years about legal obligations.¹³⁸ Guardianship for child migrants on arrival was transferred from the UK to overseas

¹³⁷ TNA, DO35/10275, 'The Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service. Renewal of Agreement 1957 and 1960', LEG.001.003.2441-2538.

¹³⁸ For correspondence concerning Fairbridge, legal guardianship, and custodianship 1946-47, see SCAI reports from the Prince's Trust, PRT.001.001.3429-3431, PRT.001.001.3432-3435, PRT.001.001.3436, PRT.001.001.3437-3439, and PRT.001.001.3440-3449. See also Professor Shirlee Swain, *History of Child Protection Legislation*, 2012, p.13:

governments, though in the case of Australia and Canada this was devolved down to the government of each state or province, such as, for example, Western Australia and British Columbia. In practice this meant responsibility lay with state or provincial officials concerned with the welfare of local children as well as child migrants. For example, under the terms of the Australian Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946, the Commonwealth Minister for Immigration became the guardian with responsibility for care and over-sight of any child migrant until he or she reached the age of 21, or had already left Australia permanently. However, legally and in practice that responsibility was delegated down to the directors of Child Welfare Departments in the states of Australia and was written in to the agreements made with organisations receiving child migrants into their care. The Ross Committee report, *Child Migration to Australia*, noted that the Commonwealth minister delegated his 'powers and functions' usually to 'the Director of the Child Welfare Department' in each state, and specifically recorded that in addition 'to having the usual powers of a guardian, the officer so designated is responsible for seeing that the arrangements made for a child's accommodation and for his placing in employment, and subsequent welfare up to age twenty-one, are satisfactory'.¹³⁹ As an example, the Director of Children's Services in Queensland became the legal guardian of British child migrants in that state. Furthermore, in Queensland and indeed also in Western Australia it was legally required that institutions and the children in their care were to be inspected every three months, though frequency of visits seems not to have been so specifically required in other states.¹⁴⁰

6.7 Below this level, custodianship – the actual caring for children – ought to have been the responsibility of each home's manager, since they were expected to record each child's progress and to be able to provide reports to their governments and to sending agencies back in the UK.¹⁴¹ However, there were awkward exceptions to this

<https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/b824cad2-d37c-47b8-906d-41274ac2f4a2/History-of-child-protection-legislation>.

¹³⁹ HCPP, *Child Migration to Australia*, Cmd.9832, p.3, para 4 CMT.001.001.0544. For the report see below paras 7.26-7.32.

¹⁴⁰ Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Report of Case Study 26, St Joseph's Orphanage, Neerkol, p.36,

<https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/file-list/Case%20Study%2026%20-%20Findings%20Report%20-%20St%20Josephs%20Orphanage%2C%20Neerkol.pdf>

¹⁴¹ *Lost Innocents*, Report, para 2.72, and see 5.4, 5.8:

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index.

'best practice'.¹⁴² Custodianship in New South Wales was given to a priest without known expertise in child care who, as Director of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, spent a good deal of his time in London encouraging and organising child migration from the UK. The custodians for the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong in New South Wales may also not have had childcare credentials, being either the chair of the Fairbridge Farm School of New South Wales or chair of the school's Board of Governors. The custodian of children sent to St Joseph's, Neerkol, was the Bishop of Rockhampton, and he had no formal authority over the Sisters of Mercy who were responsible for the children in their care. A similar disconnect seems to have been the case with respect to the Catholic Migration and Welfare Association, custodian of children sent to Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, although the association was a quite separate organisation.

6.8 Later in this report, and subject to available data, we consider how in practice this structure of responsibilities operated and how effectively it advanced the interests of child migrants from Scotland and protected them from abuse.

¹⁴² *Lost Innocents*, Report, para 5.3:
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index; Marion Fox, 'British child migrants in New South Wales Catholic Orphanages', *History of Education Review*, vol 25 no 2, 1996, pp.7, 13.

7 | Contemporary Evaluations of Child Migration as a Child Care Practice, 1875-1956

Report to the President of the Local Government Board, 1875 [Doyle Report]

7.1 It is important to stress that child migration even at the time was subject to scrutiny and criticism as a childcare practice. This is indicated in the Doyle Report.¹⁴³ Andrew Doyle, a Local Government Board senior inspector, was responsible for overseeing the administration of the Poor Law in England and Wales.¹⁴⁴ In 1874 he made an official visit to Canada to where child migrants were being dispatched in substantial numbers by voluntary societies, especially by the pioneers of the practice, Annie Macpherson and Maria Rye. These children included some supplied by poor law authorities. Doyle's official brief did not embrace Scotland, but his report took the form of a report to the House of Commons. It was therefore available to Scottish MPs, who may or should have been aware that from 1872 the Scottish philanthropist William Quarrier had also been sending children to Canada. Doyle was critical of the lax and informal manner in which consent to emigration was secured from legal guardians, and the poor facilities and inadequate care of child migrants on board the ships sending them out, on arrival in Canada, and at the distribution centres into which children were received before being dispatched to farms and private homes across Ontario. He was concerned about the inadequate training children had received to prepare them for their new lives before they were sent overseas, and subsequently on arrival in Canada. He was also concerned about the limited information obtained by the organisers concerning the family farms and homes to which children were being sent, and about the people now being made responsible for their care. The doubtful legal basis on which children were supposedly 'indentured' or 'adopted' worried him, as did the work obligations of those placed on farms or recruited as domestic servants, the poor rewards for their labour, and the limited education and religious upbringing the children were receiving. Inspection visits and the aftercare of children distributed over vast distances were also

¹⁴³ HCPP, Andrew Doyle, *Pauper Children (Canada): Report to the President of the Local Government Board*, February 1875, HC 9, 1875, INQ-000000006.

¹⁴⁴ Amongst its responsibilities, the Local Government Board, set up in 1871 for England and Wales, had taken over the functions of the Poor Law Board. A Local Government Board for Scotland was not established until 1894 and became responsible for the Poor Law in Scotland. In 1919 the former became the Ministry of Health and the latter the Scottish Board of Health.

inadequate, epitomised in sending societies losing contact with their young charges. While there are no explicit references in his report to cases of what would now be termed sexual abuse, Doyle does allude to the risk. More explicitly he refers to the harsh treatment of some children.

7.2 Officials in the Local Government Board took Doyle's report seriously, and they were not convinced by what was intended to be a reassuring response by the Canadian government following inspections it had carried out. Indeed, the Local Government Board imposed a moratorium on the sending to Canada of children in Poor Law institutions, although that embargo did not apply to voluntary societies. Moreover, it remained in place until 1887 when, following sustained UK government pressure, Canada introduced safeguards and provided annual reports by inspectors on the well-being of child migrants, but only of those who had previously been in Poor Law care.¹⁴⁵ Subsequently, as will be indicated later in this report, at least some sending societies also better trained their children before sending them overseas, and their inspection and aftercare practices, though still variable, improved. Doyle's criticisms and some robust action by the UK government had had an effect, and that is worth keeping in mind since concerns expressed by Doyle had recurring relevance. Nevertheless, voluntary sector enthusiasm for child migration did not diminish, and indeed the volume of child migration to Canada, post-Doyle, increased.

British Oversea Settlement Delegation to Canada, 1924, Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies [Bondfield Report]

7.3 By the early 1920s, child migration was becoming increasingly criticised by some in the labour movement in the UK, but more particularly in Canada by trade unionists who were hostile to the importation of cheap child labour and by Canadian child welfare professionals who had been infected by eugenicist ideas and wished to protect Canadian stock by excluding 'degenerate' slum children from Britain.¹⁴⁶ There

¹⁴⁵ Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.49-56, 59-63.

¹⁴⁶ Angus McLean, *Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1845-1945* (McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1990) esp. pp.28-29, 46, 63-64; Patricia T. Rooke and R.L.Schnell, *Discarding the Asylum: From Child Rescue to the Welfare State in English-Canada, 1800-1950* (University Press of America, Lanham, 1983), Chap 7: 'British Children for Rural and Domestic Service: the Canadian Response', pp.239-269, and their essay 'Imperial philanthropy and colonial response: British juvenile emigration to Canada, 1896-1930', *The Historian*, May 2003, pp.56-77, BAR.001005.4784-4796. For an example of claimed eugenic deficiencies see Allan M. Dymond, 'Some Angles of Discussion in the Juvenile Immigration Problem in Canada', Canadian Council on Child Welfare, Ottawa, 1924, pp.6-7.

had been earlier reports of child migrants being killed, of killing others, and of killing themselves, but late in 1923 worries and prejudices were heightened by stories, widely reported in Canada and in the UK, of more boys committing suicide. These raised serious concerns among childcare professionals in Canada and among MPs in the Canadian and UK parliaments about the quality of selection, of care, and of official inspections.¹⁴⁷ In response, the Canadian Department of Immigration invited the UK government's Overseas Settlement Committee, the advisory body responsible for child as well as adult migration practice, to investigate. The invitation was accepted by the then Labour government, which dispatched a delegation of three, headed by Margaret Bondfield, parliamentary secretary in the Ministry of Labour and formerly organiser of the Women's Trade Union League, to review and report. The Bondfield Report actually concluded that the practice of child migration in general worked well, but with one extremely important reservation.¹⁴⁸ No serious concerns were raised about the selection, equipping and care of child migrants on the journey, or about their reception, placements and subsequent inspections, and there was no reference to abuse of any kind. Indeed, the tenor of the report was that child migrants sent to live with families in Canada were generally well-treated, and that Canada seemed to offer opportunities lacking in the UK. However, the report was very critical of the use of young child migrants as in effect unpaid or underpaid labour and the consequent disruption of their education. It therefore urged that government assistance (and that related to financial subsidies) should only be provided for children accompanying their parents, or to juveniles already of school-leaving age, that is 14 or over, and therefore potentially young workers. Their

¹⁴⁷ Canadian Council on Child Welfare, *Juvenile Immigration Report No 2*, Ottawa, 1925, esp. pp.3-15, 34-39; Canadian Hansard, House of Commons, 14th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol.2, p.1426, speech by J.S.Woodsworth; UK Hansard, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol.170, cols 57-58, 25 Feb 1924, 'British Emigrants Suicides, Canada', question by George Hardie to William Lunn, Parliamentary Secretary, Overseas Trade Department, cols 57-58, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1924/feb/25/british-emigrants-suicides-canada>; Ellen Boucher, *Empire's Children: Child Emigration, Welfare and the Decline of the British World, 1869-1967* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), pp.84-85.

¹⁴⁸ HCPP, *British Overseas Settlement Delegation to Canada, Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, President of the Overseas Settlement Committee appointed to obtain information regarding the System of Child Migration and Settlement in Canada*, December 1924, Cmd 2285, 1924-25, CMT.001.001.0074-0093. In response to serious criticisms by the Committee on Immigration of the Social Service Council of Canada, reported in *The Manchester Guardian*, 12 March 1925, p.9, Bondfield largely defended past practice, 14 March 1925, p.7, while recording her committee's recommendations.

migration to Canada 'should be definitely encouraged', but the past practice of subsidising agencies to send out children under school-leaving age should cease.

7.4 That recommendation was accepted by the now Conservative UK government, and the Canadian government in 1925 followed up by ruling that children under the age of 14 would not be admitted to Canada unless accompanied by parents. This in effect ended a formerly well-established trans-Atlantic practice, and it showed that an accord on policy between the governments of sending and receiving countries could reduce the risk of children in care from being abused.¹⁴⁹ But it did not end child migration, even to Canada. As noted earlier, the Fairbridge Society in 1935 began to send children under 14 to British Columbia, but into institutional care and not to live with families scattered across Canada. Moreover, child migration to institutions in Australia had already begun, in 1913.

Scottish Home Department, Report of the Committee on Homeless Children, presented to the Secretary of State for Scotland, 1946 [Clyde Report]

7.5 In the UK between the wars there was a shift in professional understanding of children and of their psychological as well as physical needs. The value of family (or surrogate family) was increasingly understood as important for the well-being and futures of children, and emotional bonds as being as important as food and shelter. A reconsideration of children's needs became even more a matter of public concern during the Second World War, when children evacuated from cities at risk of enemy bombing were separated from their parents. While London, the Midlands and the north of England were particularly hard hit, Clydeside was also heavily bombed in March 1941 and children from there and from Edinburgh, Rosyth and Dundee were evacuated.¹⁵⁰ Thereafter, with the Beveridge Report of 1942 and post-war reconstruction in mind, there was a stronger political commitment to welfare reform, evidenced across the UK and noticeably in Scotland where a strong showing at the 1935 general election was topped by further swings to Labour in 1945.¹⁵¹ But already, in 1944, officials in the Ministry of Health in London were discussing with the Home

¹⁴⁹ Gillian Wagner, *Children of the Empire* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982), pp.224-228; Joy Parr, *Labouring Children* (Croom Helm, London, 1980), pp.152-153.

¹⁵⁰ Robert Mackay, *Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2002), p.57; Angus Calder, *The People's War: Britain 1939-1945* (Granada Publishing, London, 1971), p.44.

¹⁵¹ Kinnear, *The British Voter*, pp.52-57.

Office and the Board of Education a report it had drafted on what should replace the Poor Law, and how in particular the care needed to support children deprived of a normal home life should be enhanced. The result early in 1945 was the appointment of two committees of inquiry, one for Scotland, the Clyde Committee, and one for England and Wales, the Curtis Committee.¹⁵²

7.6 Published on 30 July 1946, the Clyde Report was the product of a committee appointed in April 1945 by the Secretary of State for Scotland, chaired by James Clyde QC, and charged to report on children in Scotland 'deprived of a normal home life'.¹⁵³ It consulted Scottish government departments and local authorities, plus representatives of a large number of voluntary organisations who managed child care homes. These included several which we know had been or would be involved in child migration: the Catholic Child Welfare Council, the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service, Dr Barnardo's Homes, Sisters of Nazareth, Quarriers Orphan Homes of Scotland, the Aberlour Orphanage at Strathspey, and the Whinwell Children's Home in Stirling. The report, dated 30 July 1946, had much to say about the three principal means by which children in need in Scotland were cared for: boarding out with foster parents, accommodation in children's homes run by local authorities, and accommodation in children's homes run by voluntary organisations. In addition, the practice of adoption was examined. Each of these practices was reviewed, criticisms aired, and recommendations made. Particular emphasis was placed on the importance of home and family for the upbringing of children, and, accordingly, stress was laid on properly regulated fostering of children in need. While large institutions were considered to be unacceptable, children's homes run by local authorities and voluntary organisations, accommodating children in 'cottage homes' and employing properly trained staff as house mothers, would still be required. However, they should not be located in remote areas but close enough to towns to allow for children's integration into local communities, including for their education, and (to be noted with SCAI's definition of abuse in mind) siblings should not be separated. Proper aftercare also needed to be guaranteed.

¹⁵² TNA, MH102/1378, 'Proposed new system for dealing with children to replace the Poor Law system', 1944. For more documentation on the context, content and consequences of Clyde and Curtis see Appendix 2, esp Section 1, paras 1.1-1.16.

¹⁵³ HCPP, Scottish Home Department, *Report of the Committee on Homeless Children*, Cmd. 6911, 1946.

7.7 Overall, the Clyde Committee's recommendations generally conformed to what was already being advised by child care professionals and indeed was already becoming best practice. It is however noticeable and a puzzle, that nowhere in the report is there a reference to child (or juvenile) migration, even though, as noted, some of those organisations consulted had sent or would be sending children in their care overseas. The silence perhaps indicates either a curious oversight, or how marginal this practice had become in Scotland pre-war, or how unlikely it seemed that the practice would be revived post-war with domestic reform in mind. Accordingly, when we come to look more closely at institutions overseas in which child migrants were placed, it will be worth remembering what the Clyde Committee regarded as essential for children's well-being: small size cottage-style homes, integration into local communities, keeping siblings together, education, trained staff, and proper aftercare. The impact of this report on child care within Scotland is beyond our brief, except that subsequently the Scottish Home Department became the office principally responsible for child care in Scotland. But the absence of reference to child migration in the report suggests it had little direct effect on that practice, particularly in view of responses to what was said on that subject in the report of the Curtis Committee.

Report of the Care of Children Committee, 1946 [Curtis Report]

7.8 The Clyde Committee's expectations about improved child care practices in Scotland were also embedded in the report of the committee simultaneously investigating child care in England and Wales.¹⁵⁴ Chaired by Myra Curtis, a retired senior civil servant and Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, the committee was appointed in March 1945 by the Home Secretary, the Minister of Health and the Minister of Education, and its report was presented to Parliament on 30 September 1946. It too had gathered evidence from a large number of witnesses and institutions concerning children 'deprived of a normal home life', who were similarly being catered for in homes run by local authorities and voluntary organisations, or were

¹⁵⁴ HCPP, *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, Cmd.6922, 1946. On the origins, context, research and impact of the Curtis Report see especially Gordon Lynch, 'Pathways to the 1946 Curtis Report and the post-war reconstruction of children's out-of-home care', *Contemporary British History*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2019.1609947>, published online 27 April 2019. For previous studies see R.A. Parker, 'The gestation of reform: the Children Act 1948', in P.Bean and S.MacPherson (eds), *Approaches to Welfare* (Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1983), pp.196-217; Bob Holman, 'Fifty Years Ago: the Curtis and Clyde reports', *Children and Society*, vol 10, 1996, pp.197-209.

boarded out, or adopted. It too stressed the need to provide children with an upbringing as close as possible to that in a natural family. Hence its recommendations also had much to say about institutional size, staff recruitment, training and aftercare, and about fostering and adoption, keeping siblings together (again worth noting), education and employment, and inspection.

7.9 The focus was of course on England and Wales, whereas our concern is with Scotland, but there are good reasons for considering this report, even though the attention given to the practice of child migration in the Curtis Report was far briefer than the attention it gave to domestic childcare concerns. In part this was due to the Committee assuming, even by September 1946 when the report was published, that child migration, if it did subsequently take place, would only be small scale. They were no doubt influenced by evidence received from many organisations including the Catholic Child Welfare Council, the Church of England Children's Society, and National Children's Homes. All had engaged in child migration pre-war, but they had given no indication that they might resume the practice post-war. Barnardo's did refer to that possibility, but only to Canada and only small-scale - even though pre-war it had received funding from the Dominions Office to buy land at Picton for a farm school, and it was even discussing with officials how to use this asset post-war.¹⁵⁵

7.10 But more immediately, the Curtis Committee was influenced by the Fairbridge Society, whose operations, of course, only concerned child migration. In September 1945, the chair of Fairbridge, Sir Charles Hambro, had written to the Home Office and the Dominions Office to express the Society's concerns, based on pre-war experience, about the limited authority it could exercise over the managers of its farm schools. Fairbridge evidently wished child migration to be resumed post-war but recognised that closer and better management was needed. In a telling phrase, its constitution needed to be revised 'to satisfy new standards for child welfare and education'.¹⁵⁶ This imperative was made even more apparent in a report following a Fairbridge fact-finding mission to Australia which was sent by Gordon Green, Fairbridge's General Secretary, to the Dominions Office on 25 January 1946. This too

¹⁵⁵ TNA, MH102/1451C Pt 3, B.123, 'Memorandum by Dr Barnardo's Homes to the Care of Children Committee', esp. pp.12-13.

¹⁵⁶ TNA, DO35/1139/M1118/1, 'Fairbridge Farm Schools: Review of Society's Constitution', Hambro to Dominions Office and Home Dept, 7 Sept 1945, pp.110-112, LEG.001.002.1088-1090.

stressed the need for an improvement in the care which child migrants should receive. It noted that there was no compulsory government inspection of the farm schools or of after-care by the Australian authorities. As a consequence, these children 'forfeit the shelter of what is (and further, will be) provided by the State in the United Kingdom for the care and protection of homeless children'.¹⁵⁷ Implicit here is an expectation that child care practice in the UK would be improved, and consequently child migrants should find in Australia no less effective State protection, no lower standard of education, and no inferior opportunity for work and equipment for citizenship than they would have enjoyed had they remained in this country. Importantly, a copy of this Fairbridge report was also submitted to the Curtis Committee.¹⁵⁸ This emphasis on equivalent standards of care whether in the UK or overseas seems to have significantly influenced the committee. It is endorsed in paragraph 515 of its report, which we quote below.

7.11 There are, it is true, only three brief references in the Curtis Report to child migration. The first refers to the 1930 Poor Law Act which entitled local authorities, 'subject to the Minister's consent', to arrange among other matters the 'emigration of orphan and deserted children', though 'we are informed that very little use is now made of these powers'.¹⁵⁹ There was no suggestion that these powers would or should be reactivated. More substantially, as a statement of obligations in case child migration were to be resumed, the Report contains a paragraph which is worth quoting in full and keeping in mind. Its wording, endorsing what Fairbridge had urged, provided a benchmark against which post-war child migration could be and by some would be judged.

We understand that organisations for sending deprived children to the Dominions may resume their work in the near future. We have heard evidence as to the arrangements for selecting children for migration, and it is clear to us that their effect is that this opportunity is given only to children of fine physique and good mental equipment. These are precisely the children for whom satisfactory openings could be found in this country, and in present day conditions this particular method of providing for the deprived child is not one that we specially wish to see extended. On the other hand, a fresh start in a new country may, for children with an unfortunate background, be the foundation of a happy life, and the opportunity should therefore in our view remain open to

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, Green to Under-Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, 25 Jan 1946, pp.88-91.

¹⁵⁸ Memorandum, 25 Jan 1946, University of Liverpool Special Collections and Archives, Fairbridge Collection, H6/2/14.

¹⁵⁹ HCPP, *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, para 20.

suitable children who express a desire for it. We should however strongly deprecate their setting out in life under less thorough care and supervision than they would have at home, and we recommend that it should be a condition of consenting to the emigration of deprived children that the arrangements made by the Government of the receiving country for their welfare and after care should be comparable to those proposed in this report for deprived children remaining in this country.¹⁶⁰

In the Report's final list of recommendations this is summarised as follows, that 'The emigration of deprived children should be subject to the condition that the receiving Government makes arrangements for their welfare and supervision comparable to those recommended in this report'.¹⁶¹ In other words, if child migration were to be resumed, the care which children sent overseas should receive should not be compared with *pre-war* child care practice in England and Wales (and perhaps in Scotland), or overseas, but with the standards of care now to be required *post-war* in England and Wales (and perhaps in Scotland). The benchmark for the acceptable was being raised.

7.12 The Curtis Report was accepted by the Labour Government in March 1947. While there were obviously similarities, it was the Curtis Report which seems to have been more important than the Clyde Report in the drafting of the 1948 Children Act, which, with a few modifications, applied to Scotland as well as to England and Wales. Especially it confirmed changed thinking in the Home Office, which from 1947 had been made responsible for child welfare, and it also affected childcare practitioners and their training in the UK. It encouraged fostering and adoption, as already standard practice in Scotland, and also sought to move beyond the care of children in large and impersonal residential institutions, and to improve welfare support for families in need.¹⁶²

7.13 What it did not prevent, because the UK government did not step in to prevent it, was the resumption from 1947 and indeed a post-war increase in the volume of child migration from the UK (though particularly from England and Wales) to Australia. Nor did the UK government ensure that the strong caveat set down in

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, para 515.

¹⁶¹ HCPP, *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, recommendation 61.

¹⁶² Children Act, 11 &12 Geo. 6, ch.43, 1948:

<http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/acts/1948-children-act.pdf>. See also S.M.Cretney, 'The state as a parent: the Children Act 1948 in retrospect', *Law Quarterly Review*, vol 114, 1998, pp.419-459.

the report about the higher quality of care overseas which child migrants should henceforth receive was honoured and enforced. On this point and with explicit reference to the Curtis report and the Children Bill, then being debated in Parliament, the British Federation of Social Workers, represented by its president, chair and secretary, wrote to *The Times*, 24 March 1948.¹⁶³ They urged the setting up of an inter-governmental commission of inquiry, therefore including representatives of overseas governments likely to receive child migrants, 'to examine the whole system of care of deprived children of British origin in the Commonwealth with special attention to after care and employment'. This did not happen. Moreover, on 13 April 1948, during the committee stage debate on the Bill in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor in response to concerns expressed about the selection of child migrants and the quality of care they might receive overseas had made an explicit commitment: 'I can give an assurance that the Home Office intended to secure that children shall not be migrated unless there is absolute satisfaction that proper arrangements have been made for the care and upbringing of each child.'¹⁶⁴ The Home Office's Children's Department expected to be empowered to regulate child migration practice by regulations via Section 33 of the Children Act, but as we shall see this too did not happen.¹⁶⁵

Miss Welsford, Visit to New Zealand and Australia, March - July 1950

7.14 Miss Welsford, representing (in an uncertain capacity) the Women's Voluntary Society, asked the Home Office in January 1950 for contact details of agencies in New Zealand and Australia who were by then receiving child (and juvenile) migrants. Her entirely unofficial tour resulted in a report which she submitted to the Home Office in October.¹⁶⁶ Under the New Zealand guardianship scheme, she wrote, foster parents were selected by the government's Child Welfare Division, a six-months probation period was enforced, and monthly visits, when the child was seen alone, were carried out, though less frequently after the probation period. Generally she

¹⁶³ *The Times*, 24 March 1948, p.5, CMT.001.001.0442.

¹⁶⁴ Hansard, House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates, 1947-48, vol 155, col.37, 13 April 1948, CMT.001.001.0443.

¹⁶⁵ TNA, MH102/1562, 'Emigration of Poor and Deprived Children', minute by Critchley, 5 May 1948, LEG.001.006.0974-0975.

¹⁶⁶ TNA, MH102/2334, 'WVS Miss Welsford, Visit to Australia and New Zealand – Suggested Visits to Children emigrated from UK', Welsford to Lyon 15 Oct 1950, pp.25-27, and to Prestige 17 Oct 1950, pp.5-7, and her 18-page report, pp.8-24, LEG.001.003.1711-1743.

was impressed. She was less sure about the nomination scheme operated by the Royal Over-Seas League, because, she stated, the children were not wards of the State, and they were not visited by the State welfare officers. (In this she seems to have been mistaken, see paras 18.2-18.5 below) What she hoped to see was the opening in New Zealand of a farm school or some other institution such as those she went on to visit, and generally admire, in Australia. The state of the medical care facilities at the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong caused her some concern, and she judged that not enough thought was given to religious teaching, but she was 'very favourably impressed with the freedom and happy atmosphere'. That generally positive assessment of staff and facilities was also her judgement on Pinjarra, and at the Northcote Farm School at Bacchus Marsh, where she was also told that psychologists from Melbourne University provided a 'good deal of help', though how she did not say. It was again only the lack of a religious atmosphere which troubled her. The response to her by the Home Office was that her report would be 'very valuable for future reference, as we are now getting down to the problems of what regulations should be made under the Children Act to control the arrangements by voluntary organisations for the emigration of children'.¹⁶⁷ The report was not published, and since no such regulations were drafted it does not seem that it had discernible consequences.

Miss H.R.Harrison, Visit to Australia, April 8th to June 27th, 1950 [Harrison Report]

7.15 This was another unpublished report, submitted to the Scottish Home Department and copied to the Home Office.¹⁶⁸ It is necessary to keep in mind that the Curtis Committee, albeit briefly, had expressed strong reservations about the practice of child migration and that one of its recommendations had resulted in responsibility for child care being placed with the Home Office, whose views largely reflected recent professional thinking. Miss Harrison had been 'for many years' one of the Scottish Home Department's inspectors of children's homes in Scotland, and had been granted special leave at her request to visit Australia and inspect the homes to which child migrants from Scotland and the rest of the UK were already being or might be sent – this at a time when post-war child migration had already

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, Prestige to Welsford, 19 Oct 1950, p.4.

¹⁶⁸ TNA, MH102/2335, 'Emigration of Children by Voluntary Organisations: Report by Miss H.R.Harrison, Scottish Home Department, on visit to Australia', LEG.001.003.1744-1766. On this see also Appendix 2, Section 4, paras 4.4-4.12.

substantially resumed. The Home Office welcomed the initiative since officials even by 1950 were short of first-hand information about arrangements for the reception and welfare of child migrants in Australia. There was indeed a hope that Miss Harrison's visit might help the Home Office solve the difficulties they were having relating to Section 33 of the Children Act and regulating the practice of voluntary societies.¹⁶⁹

7.16 In her report Miss Harrison listed in detail the numbers of child migrants in the homes she visited (and their capacity) and the child migration organisations which had been approved as sending agencies and receiving homes.¹⁷⁰ Her report also contained generalised factual information about the location of homes (rural/urban), reception arrangements, the legal status of guardians, educational provision, employment and aftercare. She did criticise the quality of the buildings of homes for Protestants and Roman Catholic boys, while admiring those for Roman Catholic girls, and she did note that boarding-out opportunities were limited and that there was a serious shortage of hostels. But most complaints were not hers but had been relayed on to her from her Australian hosts who were critical of the quality of children being sent from the UK and the inadequate information about them with which they had been provided. She herself had been persuaded that the quality of care was being improved: 'the Roman Catholic Immigration Officer, Father Stenson [*sic*: she meant Stinson], is fully alive to the necessity of bringing their homes up to modern standards if they wish more children and the state grants'. Also she stated firmly that 'Inspections are carried out regularly – in Western Australia quarterly and energetically' by State child welfare inspectors. Moreover, inspectors were pressing for more links to be made with outside families and were helping to find foster homes and to arrange 'even a few adoptions'. Miss Harrison concluded that in Australia 'our children's opportunities are quite as good, or better than at home', that 'Australia is a magnificent country for the fit', but 'no really defective child should be sent out'. In sum, 'On the whole, life in Australia is very pleasant for the young', and 'the Immigration Societies are very keen for larger numbers of children'. In particular, 'the Presbyterian Homes...are very keen to get immigrants – Scottish children if possible'.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, pp.22-23, Rowe to Ross, 20 Jan 1950; pp.2-4, minutes of 1 Feb and 20 Sept 1950; p.19, Prestige to Rowe, 20 Sept 1950.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pp.10-12 for her report.

7.17 The only initial Home Office minute on this report in 1950 notes the positive elements, but the tone is unenthusiastic: 'general picture, with few details...some useful information'.¹⁷¹ But in 1955 the report was revisited by Hill, another Home Office official, just prior to the departure of the Ross Committee's Fact-Finding Committee (see paras 7.26-7.32 below): 'My feeling is that Miss Harrison's outlook may be much the same as Mr Moss's – not wholly a recommendation'.¹⁷² (For the Moss Report of 1953 see paras 7.21-7.25 below) 'Has she kept up with the rapid advances of the last six years?' Then, with a pointed reference to that sentence in the report about inspections which only seemed to be concerned with buildings and facilities, Hill continued: 'My own impression of the "energetic inspection" of W.Australia is that it is still in the tap-turning stage and says little about the emotional needs and growth of the children'.¹⁷³ Unfortunately a Scottish Home Department file on this report has not been located. Its minutes might have enabled us to judge whether in 1950 the views of Home Office staff differed from those working in the Scottish Home Department. Given what we know, the Harrison report seems not to have affected subsequent policy or practice.

Women's Group on Public Welfare, *Child Emigration*, 1951

7.18 This report was critical of the practice of child migration.¹⁷⁴ The group (which incidentally Margaret Bondfield had founded in 1938) had already published in 1948 a report on *The Neglected Child and his Family*, based on research carried out in 1946-47.¹⁷⁵ Soon afterwards, in 1948, just a year after child migration to Australia had been resumed, the Group set up a Child Emigration Committee. Its members represented the National Association for Mental Health, the Church of England Moral Welfare Council, the Women's Liberal Federation, the Family Welfare Association, the YWCA and the British Federation of Social Workers, plus one co-opted member. By 1950, the year before the report was published, 1093 child migrants from the UK had already been dispatched post-war to Australia by voluntary societies, including some from Scotland - and by 1965 a further 2077 had followed. This was not an official

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.4, minute by Ratcliffe, 14 Oct 1950.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, p.6, G.H[ill] to Ross, 3 Nov 1955.

¹⁷³ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁴ *Child Emigration, a Study made in 1948-50 by a Committee of the Women's Group on Public Welfare* (National Council of Social Service, London, 1951). [Henceforth WGPW, *Child Emigration*], LIT-000000002.

¹⁷⁵ *The Neglected Child and his Family. A study made in 1946-47 of the problem of the child neglected in his own home, together with recommendations made by a sub-committee of the Women's Group on Public Welfare* (London, Oxford University Press, 1948).

inquiry, but the report it produced, published by the National Council of Social Service, is important because the group had clearly been influenced by wartime and post-war changes in welfare services, new thinking on the needs of children, and a perceived need to review the practice of child migration as 'a matter of social conscience' (p.6). The report did not argue for the prohibition of child migration, but it did strongly recommend changes if it were to continue. It urged that professionally qualified social workers with an understanding of the emotional needs of children should be involved in selecting those suited for emigration, along with a committee made up of people who also had first-hand knowledge of conditions in the receiving countries. Most importantly, the 'main consideration in selection is not only whether the child is suited for emigration but whether emigration is best suited to his particular needs' (p.59).¹⁷⁶ The emphasis in the second part of that statement needs to be noted. If emigration were to be approved, several other matters also needed to be considered. These included the advisability of keeping siblings together (p.42, again note that obligation), the pre-emigration training of children (pp.33-34, 59), the number and training of escorts caring for children on voyages and after arrival (pp.34-35, 41, 60), the accommodation overseas of children in small cottage homes only (pp.41, 60), the education of British child migrants alongside local children to prevent their isolation and institutionalisation (pp.43-44, 60), the careful selection and training of resident staff and of aftercare officers overseas (p.61), and the maintenance and availability to all parties of detailed records for each child before *and* after migration (pp.31-32, 61) – for the sending agencies 'cannot divest themselves of responsibility for that child's subsequent welfare' (p.20). This last obligation, with its implication of continuing contact, is also to be remembered. Moreover, the committee was concerned that voluntary organisations sending child migrants overseas were subject to far less scrutiny than cases in which special licenses were being applied for in the UK for a child to be adopted overseas (pp.64-65). The committee also worried about the legality and practice of fostering and the legal guardianship of children sent overseas (p.62). In sum, while the report did not explicitly criticise the concept of child migration, and risk of abuse was only implied by reference to necessary safeguards, its recommendations are important because they confirm what had been emerging before, during and immediately after the war, that if child migration were to continue then standards and practices needed to be

¹⁷⁶ A very similar statement is contained in British Federation of Social Workers, 'Child Emigration: Importance of Careful Selection', June 1948, one of three papers submitted to the Home Office by organisations represented on the Women's Group during debates on the Children Bill: TNA, MH102/1562, 'Emigration of Deprived and Homeless Children', p.4.

raised to ensure that children sent overseas were not disadvantaged in comparison with how children were expected to be cared for post-war in the UK.

7.19 Had the report's recommendations been adopted and enforced at home and overseas by governments and child migration agencies, the result would have brought future child migration work, and the care of children already sent overseas, more into line with the standards expected by the Curtis Report. *The Times* devoted a leading article to reviewing the report of this 'carefully considered inquiry', acknowledging scandals in the past, improving standards of child welfare today, the tangled state of the law with respect to regulation and guardianship, and the report's insistence on the need for still higher standards in selection and care.¹⁷⁷ But it is not apparent that the report had any immediate impact on the practice of child migration. It may have contributed to Home Office discussions about regulating child migration, though that led nowhere, and some of even its most strongly urged recommendations seem to have been ignored by those involved in child migration, including the UK Government.

Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, 1951-1959

7.20 In gathering evidence and preparing its report the Women's Group had been in touch with organisations involved in child migration, and this may have prompted the formation of CVOCE. Indeed, it perhaps affected or reflected the thinking of at least some representatives on the Council, including Sir Charles Hambro, from Fairbridge, who had initiated its formation.¹⁷⁸ Members represented societies and agencies which were involved in recruiting child migrants in the UK, including some from Scotland, or were in other ways supporting the practice: Fairbridge, Northcote, Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College, Barnardo's, Salvation Army, Middlemore Emigration Homes, Royal Over-Seas League, Church of Scotland Committee of Social Services, Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, and the Catholic Child Welfare Council. One prompt is apparent in the minutes of its first meeting: 'all present were

¹⁷⁷ *The Times*, 12 March 1951, p.7.

¹⁷⁸ Others included some specifically concerned with juvenile migration - the Big Brother Movement and YMCA (on which see Appendix 1 to this Report) - and also the National Children's Homes and the Church of England Advisory Council of Empire Settlement. For SCAI provided material on the formation, constitution and membership of CVOCE in 1951 see PRT.001.001.8285-8291, and for minutes of CVOCE meetings, Jan 1951-April 1959 (in five files), see PRT.001.001.8135-8159, 8160-8185, 8186-8240, 8241-8258, 8259-8283.

unanimous in the wish that such an Association be formed. It was felt that such co-operation would be most valuable especially as regulations governing the emigration of children were about to be issued by the Home Office'.¹⁷⁹ Strikingly, in its constitution it stated in words echoing (quietly) the Curtis Report that

Effort is always made to accept only those children who would not suffer by the break of any beneficial emotional relationships.... The Council welcomes inquiries and if it is felt that a child's interests will best be served by arranging for its emigration, will gladly give advice or refer the application to the particular Organization best able to meet the child's especial needs.¹⁸⁰

It also stated with respect to selection that 'The need of the child is the determining factor', that 'Every profession, trade and industry is open to every child according to ability', and that 'each organisation undertakes to give continuous aftercare in accordance with its official obligations'.¹⁸¹ It is worth noting that at an early meeting of CVOCE in March 1951, representatives considered the detailed recommendations in the Women's Group report.¹⁸² Except in a few instances when it reckoned there were some practical problems, it was agreed that what was recommended was already being practised or would be adopted. Seemingly without dissent, members agreed that 'The main consideration in selection is not only whether the child is suited for emigration but whether emigration is best suited to his particular needs'.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ Minutes of Meetings for Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration: from formation (March 1951) to January 1955, PRT.001.001.8136.

¹⁸⁰ The Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration – Constitution, PRT.001.001.8286.

¹⁸¹ The text was agreed at a CVOCE meeting in Oct 1952: PRT.001.001.8191.

¹⁸² Minutes of Meetings for Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration: from formation (March 1951) to January 1955, PRT.001.001.8148-8151. See also minutes of a sub-committee on best practice concerning selection, living conditions and aftercare, Sept 1951, and a letter summarising comments and commitments sent by CVOCE to the Home Office, Oct 1951, PRT.001.001.8160-8162, 8167-8168. Minutes of other meetings include discussions with the Home Office about regulations (including PRT.001.001.8272 in Jan 1957), with Australia House in 1953 about recruiting and the quality of selected children (PRT.001.001.8211-8212, 8224, 8235-8237, 8251), with John Moss about his report (PRT.001.001.8213-8216), and with local authorities about providing child migrants (PRT.001.001.8248-8249, 8273, this last discouraging), and also about press advertising (PRT.001.001.8226-8227), the Ross Fact-Finding mission (PRT.001.001.8257-8258, 8259-8261, 8263-8264), and new and more specific agreements to which societies must adhere from 1957 (PRT.001.001.8267-8270, 8275). There were even committee deliberations on particular child migrant cases. There were no meetings between May 1957 and January 1959, and none after April 1959 (PRT.001.001.8281-8283) at which members agreed that child migration (though not juvenile or family migration) was largely a 'thing of the past'.

¹⁸³ Minutes of Meetings for Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration from formation (March 1951) to January 1955, PRT.001.001.8148.

In what follows later in this Report it would be reasonable to consider how far its members adhered to these commitments.

John Moss, *Child Migration to Australia*, 1953 [Moss Report]

7.21 Not all contemporary reports were critical. John Moss was of the pre-war generation and had become Kent County Welfare Officer. He was sufficiently respected in his profession to have been appointed a member of the Curtis Committee and then a member of the Central Training Council on Child Care which the Curtis Committee had been instrumental in creating. He did not dissent from the highly principled, cautious and limited endorsement of child migration in the 1946 Curtis Report. However, subsequently in August 1949 he had voluntarily submitted a memorandum to the Home Office following a visit to Canada. In it, while he had doubts about the selection of children for migration, he expressed with perhaps excessive enthusiasm his agreement with Curtis that the opportunity of migration should remain open for suitable children. Moreover, the phrases he used echoed 19th-century 'rescue' terminology: a child 'in a children's home in Britain who is likely to be in a difficulty when he leaves school owing to association with undesirable parents would have a greater opportunity of becoming a good citizen in Canada than in Britain'.¹⁸⁴

7.22 That presumption, somewhat at variance with the tenor of the Curtis principle, also informed his subsequent and entirely voluntary post-retirement review of child migration to Australia. He had planned to make a private visit to Australia, and he volunteered to use his time to inspect and report to the Home Office on the institutions in Australia to which child migrants were by then being sent. As we will see from its response, the Home Office, committed to Curtis Report principles, had perhaps naively expected to receive a critical report following his tour of inspection. This took place between May 1951 and February 1952, and his report, submitted to the Home Office in July 1952, was published in 1953.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ TNA, MH102/2332, 'Canada – Emigration of Children from UK. John Moss', memo, 8 August 1949, pp.4-7, LEG.001.006.2920-2923.

¹⁸⁵ John Moss, *Child Migration to Australia* (HMSO, London, 1953), CMT.001.001.0476-0529. On the report and responses to it see Constantine, 'The British Government, child welfare, and child migration to Australia after 1945', pp.108-110; and documents in TNA, MH102/2046, 'Emigration of children: final report on visit to Australia to discover conditions, etc, by Mr John Moss CBE', LEG.00.003.1246-1428; MH102/2051, 'Emigration of children: proposal by Australia House for assistance in increasing the flow of children under care of local authorities to approved homes in Australia', LEG.001.003.1454-

7.23 As one might expect from his 1949 Canadian report, Moss was in general sympathetic to child migration as being in the best interests of some children in need. Indeed, his detailed comments were in general complimentary on the process of selection (p.3), on the quality of care during voyages (p.4), and on the overall quality of institutional care and aftercare of British child migrants in Australia (p.37). He also approved of most of the institutions he visited, including some, like St Joseph's, Neerkol, Queensland; Clontarf Boys' Town, Perth, Western Australia; St Mary's Agricultural School at Tardun, Western Australia; and St Joseph's Farm and Trade School at Bindoon, Western Australia (pp.9, 12) which have subsequently been much criticised, and to which we know the Sisters of Nazareth in Scotland had sent children in their care.¹⁸⁶ He also defended the practice of not allowing overseas local carers such as house mothers to read files revealing the background of children lest that prejudice (rather than inform) the quality of care which staff would provide (p.4).

7.24 However, Moss was concerned about the lack of trained staff at some places he inspected (pp.18, 19). That might imply his awareness of the risk of abuse, but it is not in itself evidence of abuse. Similarly, he was troubled by inadequate 'ablution and sanitary arrangements' in some institutions (pp.11, 15-16), including St Vincent's Orphanage, Castledare, Western Australia, another destination to which child migrants from Scotland were sent. These conditions would have caused children discomfort and needed to be addressed, but he did not detail them as abuses, whereas by SCAI's definition of abuse they might be interpreted as 'neglect' and therefore as abuse. Moss also regretted the isolation of some institutions, and stressed the need to encourage the integration of British child migrants into the wider community (pp.24-28). Ideally there should be a shift to care in cottage homes rather than in barrack-like institutions, but while favouring the mixing of sexes in cottage homes, he accepted that this was not regarded as acceptable in Roman Catholic institutions (p.22), and he did not recognise that separation by gender might separate siblings. He also wanted more use to be made of employment and vocational guidance services (pp.31-32), particularly to exploit the wider opportunities he saw opening up for girls (pp.30-31, 35). Such matters are recorded not as current failings but as aspirations for improvement. In sum, he insisted that for many in children's homes in the UK there were 'much better prospects in Australia'

1507; and DO 35/10253, 'Attempts to stimulate flow of UK migrant children to approved homes in Australia', LEG.001.002.5065-5375.

¹⁸⁶ Sisters of Nazareth, Report to SCAI, NAZ.001.001.0297.

(p.41). The closest Moss gets to mentioning serious abuse is his reference to a matter raised not by himself but by Sisters at Roman Catholic institutions who were anxious about the arrival of girls over the age of 12 who when placed as domestic servants needed 'careful supervision' (p.6). The Sisters at least seemed conscious of risk.

7.25 The report pleased the Australian authorities, and prompted the chief migration officer at Australia House in London to urge the Home Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office to persuade local authorities especially to be more co-operative.¹⁸⁷ But we also know from minutes in Home Office papers that Moss's endorsement of child migration as a child welfare practice troubled Home Office staff. The head of its Children's Department wrote that if the report were published it was important to avoid the impression that the Home Secretary was sponsoring the emigration of children in public care.¹⁸⁸ The chair of the Oversea Migration Board (OMB), the government's advisory body on such matters and keen on child migration, later recorded that the Moss Report 'was never accepted by the Home Office'.¹⁸⁹ Indeed, as the report stated, it had been published as 'an independent record of Mr Moss's impressions, and is not to be taken as expressing the views of the Home Office' (p.ii). The report had also made matters awkward for the Commonwealth Relations Office, subjected to pressure from both sides. In so far as there was a UK government response to Moss's report, it was fought out between civil servants in two departments and with the OMB, with the last insisting that no decision could be reached about the future of child migration without better and what they assumed to be supportive information about the quality of child migrant care in Australia. The result, eventually, was the dispatch to Australia of a 'fact-finding mission'.

Commonwealth Relations Office, *Child Migration to Australia. Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, Cmd.9832, 1956* [Ross Report]

7.26 This report was prompted not only by the debate generated by the Moss Report but by an inter-departmental UK government review of the terms of the

¹⁸⁷ TNA, MH102/2051, Chief Migration Officer to Home Office, 18 Jan 1954, pp.53-54; and DO35/10253, to Commonwealth Relations Office, 11 July 1955, with report on visits by Chief and Deputy Migration Officers to Manchester and Birmingham local authorities, pp.196-203.

¹⁸⁸ TNA, MH102/2046, minute by Ross, 3 Dec 1952, LEG.001.003.1408-1409.

¹⁸⁹ TNA, DO35/6380, minute Dodds-Parker to Commonwealth Relations Office, 28 July 1955, LEG.001.002.3036.

assisted passage schemes, including for child migrants, which were funded by the Empire Settlement Act.¹⁹⁰ If funding were to continue, the current financial agreements under the Act needed to be renewed before March 1955. The review allowed the Home Office again to present to the Commonwealth Relations Office an account of the changes in childcare practice which were being brought about by the Children Act of 1948.¹⁹¹ The resulting recommendation by the inter-departmental committee was that child migration could continue to be funded, but only if the Curtis caveat was respected and therefore that the care which child migrants should receive overseas would be comparable to that which they would experience if they had remained in the UK.¹⁹² However, following that decision, the OMB were still opposed to restrictions on child migration operations. It insisted that an official fact-finding mission should be sent to Australia to compile a factual description of the institutions in Australia to which child migrants were or might be sent, including of course from Scotland. As the eventual report was to record, 1427 child migrants had already been sent into institutional care in Australia between the resumption of child migration in 1947 and 31 December 1955.

7.27 The membership of the committee then set up made it unlikely to endorse practice which conflicted with the Curtis principles which the Home Office wished to enforce. The committee was appointed in January 1956. John Ross, under-secretary at the Home Office and responsible for the Children's Department, was chair. As an indicator of his views, at a meeting between Home Office staff and members of the Catholic Child Welfare Council in March 1955, John Ross firmly stated that 'Roman Catholic organisations, with many homes that were too big and some that did not provide a good standard of care, had still much to do to bring their residential care abreast of many other voluntary organisations and local authorities'.¹⁹³ He also

¹⁹⁰ On what follows see HCPP, *Child Migration to Australia: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission*, Cmd 9832, 1956, LEG.001.002.3297-3310; TNA, DO 35/10212, DO35/6380-3 and BN29/1325 for origins, the report, the confidential reports and responses, and Constantine, 'The British Government, child welfare, and child migration to Australia after 1945', pp.111-117.

¹⁹¹ TNA, MH102/2055, 'Inter-Departmental Committee to Undertake a Comprehensive Review of the Long-Term Policy of H.M.Government with regard to Migration Expenditure. H.O.Paper on Child Migration', pp.43-46, C.M.E. No.5, 'Emigration of Deprived Children', note by Home Office, and, p.2, minute by Hill, 12 July 1954.

¹⁹² TNA, DO35/4879, 'Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy Report', 19 Oct 1954, pp.21-30, 'Child Migration', and, for Home Office insistence on these terms, MH102/2055, p.4, minute by Hill, 22 Sept 1954.

¹⁹³ Archdiocese of Westminster Archives, G2/64, *Minutes of Meeting at Home Office on 22nd March 1955, with Roman Catholic Diocesan Administrators*, pp.1-9.

emphasised that fostering was now recognised to be far superior to residential care. He was also critical of the limited uptake of professional childcare training by Roman Catholic organisations which, he claimed, contributed to their failure to offer enough opportunities for fostering children in their care. Ross's colleagues were Miss C.M. Wansborough-Jones, Essex County Council's Children's Officer, who had already resisted OMB efforts to convince her of the virtues of child migration,¹⁹⁴ and Walter Garnett, a former deputy British High Commissioner, who had a long history of involvement in relation to child migration work, having served as the Secretary to the 1924 Bondfield delegation to Canada and been involved in policy and operational discussions about child migration to Australia since the mid-1930s.

7.28 The Ross Committee did more than collect 'facts'. It had been agreed by the government departments involved that the committee should also be given a confidential directive to assess whether the care of child migrants in Australia matched - or could be made to match - expected practice in Britain.¹⁹⁵ The point of comparison was made explicit in the published report: 'As the report is concerned with children from the United Kingdom, we have thought it right to take account of child care methods as developed since 1948, when the Children Act passed into law' (para 14), that is eight years earlier. Hence the Ross committee dismissed the notion that children 'already rejected and insecure' would benefit from 'a fresh start' (para 19). They insisted that children 'deprived of a normal home life' should be brought up in circumstances 'approaching as nearly as possible those of a child living in his own home' (para 14). Hence they should be boarded out with foster parents or accommodated in small children's homes (para 40). Moreover, they acknowledged that there was a body of opinion in Australia which already subscribed to similar principles with respect to Australian children (paras 8, 9, 14). Having visited 26 establishments out of the 39 in Australia to which British children had been sent, the reports were largely critical of 'their institutional character' (paras 12, 27), their lack of a 'homely atmosphere' (para 27), the failure even in cottage estates to reproduce anything like a normal family home (para 28), and the location of several places which isolated children from the wider community (para 32-35, 38). Regrettably siblings were sometimes separated (para 20). Education and employment

¹⁹⁴ TNA, MH102/2053, 'Agenda and Minutes of Meetings of the Overseas Migration Board', p.179, minutes of OMB meeting, 7 June 1955, also in DO35/6376.

¹⁹⁵ TNA, DO35/6380, 'Fact-Finding Mission', pp.160-161, Morley [Commonwealth Relations Office] to Drake [Treasury] and Ross [Home Office], 15 Oct 1955; DO35/6381, 'Report of the Fact-Finding Mission', pp.226-227, Ross [from Canberra] to Commonwealth Relations Office, 28 March 1956.

opportunities available to some children were also criticised (para 30, 31). Moreover, not all staff had 'sufficient knowledge of child care methods' (para 26); no specialised scheme of training in childcare work was available in Australia (para 26); and little progress with fostering was possible until Australia produced enough suitably qualified childcare workers (para 40). In addition, while there were legitimate complaints about the selection of some children for migration (para 17), the committee was also concerned that insufficient information about children was being sent from the UK to receiving homes (para 18). Critically, the committee also recommended strongly that the consent of the Home Secretary should be required before children could be sent overseas by voluntary societies, just as was required for those in local authority care (paras 22, 36). All this was in the report published as a government White Paper in August 1956, and therefore available to interested parties in the UK and Australia.¹⁹⁶

7.29 Ross's team had visited only 26 of the 38 institutions which by then had been approved for the admission of UK child migrants. (This limitation was going to cause problems in implementing change.) Child migrants from Scotland may have been accommodated in 18 of the 26, and we focus on what Ross's team had to say about these places. (Only those linked in the UK to the Church of England and the Methodists have been excluded.) To give some sense of scale, at the end of December 1955, 1121 child migrants were in residence at those 18 institutions.¹⁹⁷ If we include the number of institutions not visited but which could have received child migrants from Scotland, we have a total of 27 institutions and the number of child migrants from the UK who were or had been resident in them between the resumption of child migration in 1947 and 31 December 1955 amounted to 1944. We are not, of course, implying that child migrants from Scotland constituted anything more than a small minority, and our evidence of where exactly Scottish children were sent and in what numbers is limited. As recorded earlier, SCAI defines abuse as physical and sexual abuse, plus associated psychological and emotional abuse, but also refers to unacceptable practices such as the 'deprivation of contact with siblings'. It is therefore important to note that the published Ross report contains the following (para 20):

¹⁹⁶ By a singular error, Barnardo's submission to the House of Commons Health Committee, 11 June 1998, Vol II, Minutes of Evidence, p.143, para 3.7, quotes statements strongly endorsing child migration and said to be in the *Ross Report*. They are actually quotations from the *Moss Report*. The mistake is repeated in Barnardo's submission to SCAI: BAR.001.005.8964-8965, para 3.7.

¹⁹⁷ Calculated from Ross, *Child Migration to Australia*, Appendix, pp.12-14.

We heard of isolated cases in which brothers and sisters emigrated together were sent to different establishments, which might be far apart. We think that brothers and sisters should not ordinarily be accepted for emigration unless they can be placed in the same establishment, or in establishments situated sufficiently close together for arrangements to be made for the members of the family to meet regularly.

7.30 The Report also refers to talks that Ross and his colleagues had held with children which revealed that they were 'disturbed' by separation from their parents and that they did not understand the reasons (para 21). It goes further than Moss in criticising inadequate staff training (para 26), the large and institutional character of some establishments, the 'segregation in large measure from the life of the community', the 'lack of homely atmosphere and of sufficient privacy', and the absence 'sometimes of sufficient feminine influence in homes for boys' (para 27). At one place the person in charge of an institution, which accommodated only boys, when asked about the desirability of employing women on the staff 'gave as his opinion that this was not necessary in the upbringing of boys' (para 27).¹⁹⁸ With SCAI definitions of abuse in mind, these comments suggest 'psychological and emotional' deprivation.

7.31 However, the committee also separately submitted unpublished confidential reports on each of the 26 institutions it inspected.¹⁹⁹ Again we focus on those places where Scottish children were or may have been accommodated. Some reports refer to good or at least acceptable practice at some institutions such as two **Dr Barnardo's homes** in New South Wales, the **Northcote Farm School at Bacchus Marsh** in Victoria, **Fairbridge's Hagley Farm School** in Tasmania, and the **Fairbridge Farm School at Molong** in New South Wales – though this last was isolated and not so well-suited for girls.²⁰⁰ But reports on other institutions were scathing in their condemnation of isolated and isolating locations and such deficiencies in material conditions as to constitute neglect and therefore a form of abuse. Even more seriously, with implications for abuse, staff at some institutions were criticised for their childcare views and practices. For example, the Principal at the **Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra** in Western Australia was responsible for 180 child migrants, out of the then total of 275 who had been shipped to Pinjarra since

¹⁹⁸ *Child Migration to Australia*, paras 20-21, 27, 33-35.

¹⁹⁹ TNA, DO36/6382, 'Action Taken on Reports and Confidential Notes of the Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', pp.286-290, LEG.001.002.3761-3765.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, pp.292-295, 296-298, 305-306; 356-357.

1945. The school was 60 miles from Perth, and as Ross and his team saw it the Principal failed 'to recognise the value of outside contacts', and he 'shows a lack of appreciation of current thought on child care'.²⁰¹ **Dhurringile Rural Training Farm** at Tatura in Victoria, recipient of child migrants selected and dispatched there through the auspices of the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service (and the Royal Over-Seas League) and home to 36 child migrants (and 67 since 1945) was not only 'isolated...bare and comfortless', but the 'general attitude to the boys' by committee members at the farm was described as 'deplorable'. Some boys 'appeared unhappy and to be badly in need of sympathy and understanding which were noticeably lacking'.²⁰² The accommodation at the **Salvation Army Riverview Training Farm** at Ipswich, Queensland, fortunately containing only one child migrant at the time of the visit (but it had accommodated 57 since 1945), was described as 'primitive' and staff as 'rigid and narrow in outlook'. Indeed, 'it does not seem that this establishment has anything to offer migrant boys'.²⁰³ Several Catholic institutions came in for criticism, including **St Joseph's Girls' Orphanage in Sydney**, managed by the Sisters of Nazareth, but home to only six child migrants at the time of the visit. It was judged 'deficient in comfort and amenities, in which the girls lead a restricted life'.²⁰⁴ **St John Bosco Boys' Town at Hobart** in Tasmania, recipient of 39 child migrants from 1945, had 26 still in residence at the end of 1955. Staffed by members of the Salesian Order, all were teachers and all were men, but the Principal 'did not consider that there would be any advantage to the boys in having women on the staff who would be concerned with their care'. He also insisted that it was a 'principle of his order that boys should be under constant supervision by day and night, in order to guard them against corruption'. Ross gained 'a most unfavourable impression of the attitude of the Principal, and of the regime described by him'.²⁰⁵ **Nazareth House, East Camberwell**, then home to 52 child migrant girls, was so deficient that the 'general impression is of a place more like a hospital than a home', and 'anything approaching a home atmosphere [was] impossible'. Some of the older girls 'were "presenting sexual difficulties" ' with which the Mother Superior 'felt unable to deal'. The girls in the home 'are clearly not receiving appropriate

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, pp.343-345.

²⁰² *Ibid*, pp.312-314.

²⁰³ *Ibid*, pp.320-321.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, pp.301-302

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, pp.353-355. John Moss too had been 'rather concerned at the lack of female influence' at this establishment: Moss, *Child Migration to Australia*, p.17.

preparation for life outside the shelter of the institution'.²⁰⁶ **St Joseph's Home at Neerkol** in Queensland, then accommodating 32 boys and girls, in separate wings, had received 48 child migrants since 1945. It too was harshly criticised: 'These children are having an institutional upbringing in isolation from the outside world'. The children 'appear to be regimented, and to have little opportunity for independent thought or action. There seems nothing in this regime which can help migrant boys and girls to make roots in a new country'.²⁰⁷ **St Joseph's in Perth** housed 19 child migrant girls and, separately, six boys, but including Australian children it was accommodating 330. There was 'little attempt to fit the girls for independence or to give them experience which will enable them to adjust to life in ordinary households'. Moreover the practice of transferring the boys at the age of six or seven from St Joseph's to St Vincent's, Castledare, 'where they are almost entirely under the care of men, is to be deprecated'.²⁰⁸ **St Vincent's, Castledare** in Western Australia, was home to 72 child migrant boys. It was run by four Christian Brothers as teachers, 'but with no women regularly concerned with the care of the boys it is doubtful whether provision for even their physical welfare can be regarded as adequate. Anything in the nature of individual treatment is clearly out of the question'.²⁰⁹ **Clontarf Boys' Town** in Perth, another Christian Brothers establishment, was again a large institution for boys, home to 142 child migrants at the end of 1955 and accommodating 112 aged 10 to 16 at the time of the visit. Bedwetters were required to sleep outside on a veranda, a humiliating practice, indeed an abuse, which at the very least suggests a lack of understanding of the causes of enuresis. The Principal 'did not think that the boys themselves would ever worry about their parentage', but Ross by contrast wrote that 'no attention is paid to the special needs of boys who have no contact with parents'. The Principal also stated that the boys on leaving 'found life outside strange and difficult', upon which Ross's explanatory observation was that the boys 'lead an institutional life'.²¹⁰ The report on **St Joseph's Farm School at Bindoon** in Western Australia, then containing 114 child migrants, was particularly stark: 'it is hard to find anything good to say of this place, which has the disadvantage of isolation, unsuitable and comfortless accommodation, and a Principal with no understanding of children and no appreciation of their needs as developing individuals'. Perhaps most tellingly, 'The appearance and demeanour of

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, pp.322-323. See also Appendix 3, Section 5, paras 5.37-5.40 for further discussion of the Fact-Finding Mission's visit to this institution.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, pp.317-319.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*, pp.334-335.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, pp.327-328.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp.329-331.

the boys ... did nothing to modify the poor impression that the establishment made on the members of the mission'.²¹¹ It is a matter of judgement as to whether these confidential reports were identifying risks or actual abuses, although at the very least in several instances they seem to indicate emotional and psychological as well as physical deprivation.²¹²

7.32 The Ross Report when published caused protests by the many enthusiasts in the UK and in Australia who were committed to child migration as a constructive child care practice, but the substance of the confidential reports released to the Australian authorities and the sending societies generated a storm.²¹³ The Commonwealth Relations Office reviewed the resulting options with the Scottish Home Department as well as the Home Office. Should all child migration be suspended pending further consultations, improvements overseas, and further inspections? Was it reasonable to renew the agreements with sending societies which were about to expire, but suspend approval for parties of children to be sent to their receiving institutions in Australia until improvements had been made? Should only the worst destinations be black-listed – but allow those not inspected but possibly as bad to receive child migrants? Consultations with the voluntary societies led to one important political retreat: Ross's recommendation that the migration of all children, not just those in local authority homes, should require Secretary of State approval was abandoned.²¹⁴

7.33 Then, following reassurances of doubtful validity about improving quality of care, funding agreements were renewed, and permission granted to allow parties of child migrants to be dispatched.²¹⁵

²¹¹ *Ibid*, pp.336-339

²¹² TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', copy also in former Home Office file, BN29/1325.

²¹³ The following summarising narrative is based on TNA, DO35/6380-3 and BN29/1325. See also Constantine, 'The British Government, child welfare, and child migration to Australia after 1945', pp.115-122, and documents there cited. See also document provided by the Prince's Trust, PRT.001.001.0434-0453, 'Minutes of Fairbridge Council Meeting', 5 Sept 1957, which include a detailed and robustly-worded critique of the Ross Report in a press statement issued by the Australian Minister for Immigration, Athol Townley, 25 July 1957, , PRT.001.001.0447-0448.

²¹⁴ TNA, DO35/6383, 'Discussions with the Voluntary Organisations about the Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', pp.27-28, Shannon to Lord John Hope, 10 Dec 1956.

²¹⁵ TNA, DO35/6382, pp.28-29, 36, minutes by Shannon, 5 July and 27 July 1956; pp.40-42, 54, by Taylor, 9 Oct and 20 Dec 1956; and, p.52, by Gibson, 6 Dec 1956.

7.34 The only important but still partial concession made by the voluntary societies concerned those funding agreements with the Commonwealth Relations Office.²¹⁶ From 1957, the funding agreements, which sending agencies had to sign, more strictly defined their obligations. Amongst other matters they were required to report their intended practice to the Home Office (and possibly to the Scottish Home Department) to show that they would adhere to the 'modernisation principles' which had inspired Curtis and indeed the Home Office. While agencies were authorised to select children under the age of 16 for migration (that is up to what by 1957 was school-leaving age), they were expected to provide the Commonwealth Relations Office with the names and particulars of those selected; to prepare them for permanent settlement in Australia; to be responsible for their subsequent care, maintenance and aftercare; to have staff sufficient in numbers and including women and with knowledge and experience of child care methods; and to provide opportunities for migrated children to assimilate into Australian life. These would be serious obligations, if adherence to them could be enforced through regular monitoring and sanctions applied if there were defaults.

7.35 But otherwise the Home Office seem thereafter to have largely given up their attempts to educate even the Commonwealth Relations Office. At a meeting between senior civil servants from both departments in December 1956, the Home Office representative reluctantly conceded that political pressure in the UK and from Australia to approve applications from voluntary societies to send further parties of child migrants overseas had to take priority over the duty of care for children.²¹⁷ With respect to approving the dispatch of particular child migrant parties, it was also recorded by an official in the Commonwealth Relations Office that the Home Office 'prefer not to be embarrassed by being consulted and are prepared to our disposing of the applications on our own responsibility'.²¹⁸ For the record, from 1957 to 1965, a further 722 child migrants were sent to Australia by seven sending societies, including six which may have (some certainly) recruited children from Scotland.

²¹⁶ For inter-departmental debates leading to the 1957 agreements see TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on Report and Confidential Notes of the Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia'; DO35/4881, 'Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Migration Policy 1956'; and DO35/10254, 'Child Migration. Draft Agreement with Voluntary Organisations 1957'.

²¹⁷ TNA, BN29/1325, 'Addendum to Report of Fact-Finding Mission', minute by Whittick, 5 Dec 1956, LEG.001.003.1817.

²¹⁸ TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on Report of Fact-Finding Mission', minute by Gibson, 13 Dec 1956, LEG.001.002.3529.

7.36 While subsequently there were plenty of inquiries by officials in the UK and overseas into particular practices by sending or receiving organisations, no substantial official or even unofficial consideration of child migration more generally seems to have been conducted thereafter, until British children in care were no longer being sent overseas and child migration had become a fading memory, except for survivors.

8 | Subsequent Public Inquiries, 1996-2018

8.1 In the past twenty years or so and long after the ending of child migration from the UK, and as precedents for this one, there have been eight public inquiries in the UK and in Australia into the abuse of UK child migrants - in some cases also considering the treatment of Australian children in care in the same institutions. Since this report will refer to some of their conclusions and the publicly available evidence they secured, it will be helpful to introduce them here.

The Child Migrants Trust, from 1987²¹⁹

8.2 This organisation has not been instructed to carry out an official inquiry, but it has participated in several, and because of the impact of its work it requires description here. Margaret Humphreys, a social worker employed by Nottinghamshire County Council, was contacted in 1986 by a former child migrant sent to Australia who was anxious to reconnect with any family she might have in the UK. Mrs Humphreys was a trained and experienced social worker, but she was unaware of the history of child migration, so far had it already fallen away from contemporary memory. The stories she began to unearth led her with others to form the Child Migrants Trust (CMT) in 1987. British child migrants, in some numbers, then began to get in touch.²²⁰ Its work has included listening to their stories, providing counselling, and helping survivors connect with family members from whom they had been separated as children. CMT contacts with the media and other agencies also brought the history and consequences of child migration to public and political attention in the UK and overseas.

8.3 Importantly, the CMT, with the backing of former child migrants, also pressed successfully for official inquiries to be held. One of the outcomes of these was that public funds were eventually made available to effect family reunions. Also some agencies formerly involved in child migration were prompted to make public apologies, including the governments of Australia in 2009 and of the United Kingdom in 2010. Given the principal concern of SCAI, it is important to stress that one consequence of the work of the CMT has been to enable former child migrants to submit written or oral evidence to official inquiries in which they have described

²¹⁹ For the Child Migrants Trust see <http://www.childmigrantstrust.com/our-work/child-migration-history/>

²²⁰ For her personal account see Humphreys, *Empty Cradles*.

their experiences when in care. Numerous cases of abuse were thereby brought to light. Such personal accounts, including several provided to SCAI, are summarised later in this Report.

Select Committee into Child Migration, Western Australia, *Interim Report, 1996*²²¹

8.4 The terms of reference of this committee, appointed in July 1996, were to ascertain the number, origins and destination of child migrants brought into the State of Western Australia between the early 1900s and 1967. It also sought to identify what efforts had been made then, or since, to inform child migrants of the existence and whereabouts of their parents or siblings or to assist in the reunification of child migrants with any relatives. The committee also wanted to know what counselling or other services had been provided to former child migrants which might reduce the trauma caused by their migration; and also to determine and assess what action had been taken to address complaints made by them about their migration and about their care in institutions in Western Australia (pp.1, 81). Western Australia was the location of eleven institutions to which, according to the Ross Report, 1100 UK child migrants had been sent between 1947 and 1955. The Ross Committee had visited eight of them.²²² The Select Committee collected written and oral testimony, and on a visit to the UK met with representatives of the UK government, former sending societies, and concerned individuals, including some former child migrants (pp.9-12). From a range of sources, including 18 witness statements to SCAI, we know that many Scottish child migrants were sent into institutional care in Western Australia.

8.5 In its report the Select Committee provided a history of child migration to institutions in Western Australia (pp.15-48), and described the organisations by then concerned to help former child migrants, including the Child Migrants Trust and several others located especially in Western Australia (pp.49-61). It also identified 'significant issues' still to be investigated. These included claims by former child migrants that they had been sent out without parental consent, that they had been separated from their siblings, that letters sent to them by family had been withheld, and that they had been told untruthfully that they had no parents or family in the UK.

²²¹ Legislative Assembly, Western Australia, Select Committee into Child Migration, *Interim Report*, November 1996.

²²² For the data see Ross Report, p.13.

Many former child migrants were distressed by what they saw as gaps in, or falsification of, the records kept on them (pp.42-43). Albeit in general terms, the report noted as common themes emerging from the inquiry the limited education provided for child migrants, their inadequate clothing, their unpaid hard labour, the lack of proper formal inspection of the conditions in which they lived, the absence of aftercare, and subsequently their poor employment histories. It was stated that the deleterious effects of their upbringing included difficulties in forming personal relationships, marital and parenting problems, illness, alcohol abuse, domestic violence, inability to hold down a job, illiteracy and a loss of personal identity (p.43). Services available to deal with these problems were judged to be still too often inadequate (pp.43-44). Notably, some former child migrants had referred to the adverse effects upon them of 'physical, emotional and sexual abuse' (p.2), and the committee identified sexual abuse among other 'further lines of inquiry' (p.69) which needed yet to be pursued. But a general election meant that the current Legislative Assembly was dissolved and with it consequently also the Select Committee, its work incomplete. Knowing this was to happen, the authors of the Interim Report asked for the Select Committee to be converted into an Honorary Royal Commission, not subject to parliamentary schedules, so that a final report containing recommendations and, importantly, the evidence already submitted could be presented one year later, by November 1997 (pp.3-5, 73-74). This did not happen, and no final report was written.²²³

House of Commons Health Committee Report, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, 1998²²⁴

8.6 This investigation, begun in July 1997, was initiated by David Hinchliffe M.P., the Health Select Committee chair, in response to a growing awareness of issues raised by the original operation and continued legacy of the British child migration schemes. The report acknowledges the role of the Child Migrants Trust in drawing public attention to the past practice and lasting consequences of child migration, and in representing the interests of former child migrants, many of whom provided

²²³ Mr Oliver Cosgrove provided SCAI with (amongst other documents) a transcript of his testimony to the Select Committee: WIT.003.002.2933-2957. He had been a child migrant sent from London into the care of Christian Brothers in Western Australia.

²²⁴ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, and Minutes of Evidence and Appendices HC 755-II, 1997-98.
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75502.htm>

testimony.²²⁵ It provides a succinct history of child migration, largely but not entirely post-war, and describes the expected benefits for sending and receiving societies. Reference is made to the absence of effective monitoring of the welfare of child migrants overseas by the UK government and the sending agencies, evident for example in inadequate record-keeping. The testimony of former child migrants refers to their being given misleading information about life in Australia, to claims that parental consent had not been given to their migration, to some being wrongly told that their parents had died, to the deliberate falsification of their records, and to the separation of siblings. The report also insists that because post-war local authorities were less willing to send children in care overseas it is not correct to describe child migration as simply due at the time to ' "a different social climate" ' (para 21), as the Department of Health in its evidence had stated.²²⁶

8.7 The report and the supporting evidence provide accounts of emotional, physical and sexual abuse that former child migrants had commonly suffered, especially in Australia but in some instances also in New Zealand. With reference to institutions run by the Christian Brothers, especially at Bindoon, to which some Scottish children had been sent, the report concludes that 'It is impossible to resist the conclusion that some of what was done there was of a quite exceptional depravity' (para 51). Evidence was also recorded of severe ill-treatment at Dhurringile, run by the Presbyterian Church of Victoria (para 59), another known destination for children sent from Scotland. Details of assaults given by victims are not included in the published report or in the Minutes of Evidence, but they were being made 'available for serious research' in the Library of the House of Commons and in the House of Lords Record Office (para 5).

8.8 Some former child migrants said that they had not been unhappy where they had been sent, and some representatives of organisations once involved in child migration claimed that stories of abuse were being exaggerated. However, from the evidence heard, the Committee concluded that, because of their experiences, many child migrants later in life often had difficulties in forming and maintaining relationships; were troubled by a loss of identity, psychiatric disorders, suicidal tendencies and alcoholism; felt socially handicapped; found it hard to accept

²²⁵ Witness statements were submitted by nine former child migrants from Scotland. For legal reasons we are not able to name them or provide summaries of their statements.

²²⁶ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices HC 755-II, 1997-98, p.1.

authority or hold down a job; and were disadvantageded by poor education and an inadequate preparation for life (paras 66-70). The congruence between this list of problems and those identified in the Western Australia investigation is noticeable.

8.9 The Committee was looking to the future 'welfare' of former child migrants, and hence in its recommendations its first priority was to ensure that a central database should be established, managed by the governments involved, to contain information which would direct former child migrants - and their descendants or representatives - to detailed sources about their family and former lives. It followed that such persons should have access to personal records (paras 102-103, 114). Counselling services should be offered, sending and receiving agencies should help with tracing family members, and the British government should establish a travel fund to enable former child migrants to attend family reunions or visit sites of personal importance (paras 104-106, 110). Other issues needing to be addressed included social security payments during such visits, rights of citizenship, legal aid, and financial support for the Child Migrants Trust and other organisations representing former child migrants (paras 107-109, 112, 117). The Committee did not recommend compensation payments, but amongst its list of recommendations it did believe an apology 'is in order' (paras 111, 118). It also urged the Social Services Select Committee in New Zealand to undertake an inquiry into child migrant experiences which New Zealand's Department of Social Welfare had so far refused to conduct, on the grounds of cost, risk of claims for compensation, and concerns about setting a precedent (para 115). The Committee also stated that 'we would expect the full weight of the law to be felt in cases where physical and sexual abuse against former child migrants can be proven', and if necessary for Statutes of Limitation to be suspended in such cases (para 111). It specifically urged the Federal Government of Australia to initiate an inquiry into allegations of 'physical, mental and sexual abuse' at institutions 'such as Bindoon and Neerkol' and the prosecution of 'any surviving members of staff against whom evidence is available' (para 116).

8.10 The UK Government made a formal response to this report.²²⁷ It stated that child migration policies practised in the past 'were conducted within the relevant laws then current in the United Kingdom and in the receiving countries', but that those policies were 'misguided' and the UK government 'offers sincere regrets' (para

²²⁷ HCPP, Department of Health, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants: Government Response to the Third Report from the Health Committee, Session 1997-98*, Cm.4182, December 1998.

2.2). This led to the formal public apology given by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, but not until 24 February 2010. The Government agreed with the Committee that a financial compensation scheme was 'inappropriate', but was reassuring about prosecutions of criminal cases and about legal aid (paras 2.26-2.28). We are not aware of any related criminal cases subsequently in the UK. As recommended by the Committee, the Government set up a 'support fund' of £1 million and over the next three years it assisted with family reunions, met subsistence costs, and provided support for counselling which it recognised was important (para 2.18-2.20). It also agreed to create a central index of basic information to meet the needs of former child migrants and to set up a website (paras 2.10, 2.31). This was done. It was subsequently taken down, but a copy recorded by National Archives can still be accessed.²²⁸ The Government also agreed to make public all official historical files concerning child migration, though personal files only on a 'privileged access' basis (paras 2.14). This may have happened, if personal files had not been destroyed following the usual weeding process. It would not legislate to ensure this, but it also expected personal records held by former sending agencies to be open to former child migrants and family (para 2.15). Such access may have been granted to such persons, but is problematical for other researchers. In dealing with issues relating to citizenship, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its officials overseas were to show 'flexibility and understanding' (para.2.23). We have no information on any direct consequences of this recommendation. The Government promised 'a significantly increased level of support' for the Child Migrants Trust (para 2.24), and increased funding was subsequently provided. It also agreed that lessons from the past should include reconsideration of children in care being placed long distances from their home environment, even within the UK, and addressing other issues concerning childcare (para 2.4, responding to the Report's para 100 recommendation). We have no information on how or whether this was effected. The Government, not unreasonably, had no comment to make on the Committee's recommendations that required action by governments overseas, stating that this was 'not a matter for the British Government', though it did acknowledge that the Government of Australia had since 1990 been awarding grants to the Child Migrants Trust (paras 2.29-2.30). Moreover, as we shall see below, there have been several subsequent public inquiries in Australia which have addressed the concerns about physical, mental and sexual abuse raised by the Committee in its para 116

²²⁸ Department of Health, 'Information for former British child migrants', 2001: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4006199

recommendation, though not of course as a direct response. However, the New Zealand Government did not respond to the Report's para 115 recommendation that it should undertake an inquiry into the circumstances of former child migrants in New Zealand – but see para 8.54 below.

8.11 The following year, on 19 May 1999, a parliamentary debate on British child migrants took place.²²⁹ During this, the UK Government was urged by the chair of the Select Committee, David Hinchliffe, to increase its funding of the Child Migrants Trust and its Support Fund following a reduction in aid from Nottinghamshire County Council. This was done, and funding continued after responsibility was transferred to the Department of Health in 2007. Hinchliffe also asked for the travel grant fund to be made available for more than three years and to dedicate more of it to researching lost family members, to fund more than one visit, and to allow it to be used not only for visits to close family members. This too was agreed, for the years 1999-2002. Between 1990-91 and 2016-17 the Child Migrants Trust received £7,392,000 in government grants.²³⁰ That for 2016-17 was £684,000. Mr Hinchliffe also requested that the UK Government reconsider holding an international conference, a proposal in the Committee's report which had been rejected by the Government. This last suggestion perhaps resulted in the First International Congress on Child Migration in October 2002, organised by the Child Migrants Trust, held in New Orleans but funded by Nottinghamshire County Council.

Children's Commission of Queensland, Preliminary Report on Allegations of Abuse at St Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol, 1998²³¹

8.12 This report followed a request in September 1996 from Queensland's Minister for Families, Youth and Community Care to the Children's Commission of Queensland for an investigation following allegations of abuse at St Joseph's Orphanage. Two men had been accused of the sexual abuse of boys and girls, one

²²⁹ Hansard, House of Commons, vol 331, cols 979-999, 19 May 1999, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1999/may/19/british-child-migrants#column_980

²³⁰ Details on UK Government funding from 1990-91 to 2016-17 were provided to IICSA, and subsequently made available to SCAL, in a Witness Statement, dated 12 June 2017, by a representative of the Department of Health, ICA.001.001.0074 and 0082. We have no information about subsequent funding arrangements.

²³¹ Children's Commission of Queensland, *A Preliminary Report on Allegations of Abuse of Former Residents of St Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol, Rockhampton, in the 1940's, 50's and 60's*, July 1998. There is no on-line digitised copy of this report.

charged with 40 offences and the other with 69, and about 60 people were seeking damages from the Sisters of Mercy, the Diocese of Rockhampton, and the State of Queensland. The inquiry was inhibited by pending legal proceedings. The Children's Commission was also constrained in drawing up its report by legally restricted access to government records (pp.5-8, 36). The report presented to the Queensland Parliament was therefore only able to provide the historical context in which the alleged abuses had taken place. We know from reports provided to SCAI that twins, a boy and a girl, aged eight, had been sent from Scotland to this institution in 1955.²³²

8.13 Two issues arose which have a bearing on the subject of child abuse and child migration. The first concerns systems for the supervision and monitoring of the well-being of British child migrants in Australia. As noted earlier (see para 6.6 above), whilst guardianship was delegated from the Minister for Immigration to the State's Child Welfare Department, the Bishop of Rockhampton had been made custodian of child migrants at Neerkol, rather than the Sisters of Mercy themselves. The Children's Commission judged that the appointment of custodians who were not members of the organisations directly providing care to child migrants created unclear lines of responsibility between the custodian and the receiving organisation (pp.14, 36).

8.14 Second, the report provides an insight into the process by which a residential institution in Australia, following assessments of its quality carried out locally, had been approved by the UK Government as suitable for the care of British child migrants. There seems to have been confusion in Australia as to who was responsible for approving as suitable the homes to which child migrants could be sent. The Queensland Government clearly believed that this responsibility had been delegated to itself under the Commonwealth Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946, and hence in 1948 it gave its approval to the three institutions in Queensland which had applied for licences. However, Garnett, secretary to the British High Commissioner in Canberra, who was later to be a member of the Ross committee, considered the three Queensland institutions unsuitable (p.42). The Commonwealth Immigration Department thereupon requested a customs officer at Rockhampton to inspect and report specifically on the St. Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol. This officer's report was submitted to his head office, the Commonwealth Immigration Department in Canberra, on 14 October 1948, from where it was passed on to the British High Commission in Canberra. Garnett was not persuaded and asked for more

²³² See below, paras 33.31-33.32.

information before deciding on its suitability. His reservations were then referred to Queensland's Director of the Children's Department, who insisted that St Joseph's had been in existence for more than fifty years, that it was 'one of the best of its kind in Australia', that the standard of education was 'as high as that in any other primary school in the State', that accommodation for child migrants was available, and that as 'this Department will be the legal guardians of any migrant children coming to this State, Mr. Garnett need have no fears regarding their welfare' (pp.43-44). A further inspection at Neerkol in August 1949, this time carried out by an official responsible to the Commonwealth government's Department of Immigration, also reported favourably on St Joseph's, and his recommendation was also sent on to the British High Commission (pp.15-18, 45). Eventually, in August 1950, the British High Commission, acting for the UK Government and with Garnett now being back in London, gave its approval of St Joseph's Orphanage, Neerkol, as suitable for the care of British child migrants (p.46). This information would have been sent on to the Home Office and Commonwealth Relations Office in London, and the latter would have approved St Joseph's as a place to which British children could be sent, and funding followed.

8.15 One of the exchanges during this dispute warrants attention. Mr Heyes, the Secretary of the Department for Immigration in Canberra had reminded, or informed, the Premier of Queensland, that the reason why the Home Office in the UK required full reports on the institutions in Australia bidding to receive British child migrants was because the

Home Office, by virtue of the powers given it under the United Kingdom 'Children's Act' decides whether British children may be allowed to settle [in Australia] and in what institutions. The aim...is to ensure that child migrants will be settled under conditions as good as, if not better than they enjoy in the United Kingdom.²³³

We are not aware that this alert had any effect on subsequent childcare practice in Queensland or indeed of any response.

8.16 We are also not aware of any response to this report on Neerkol by organisations in the UK or by the UK Government.

²³³ Children's Commission, *A Preliminary Report on Allegations of Abuse at St Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol*, 1998, p.45.

Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions, 1999 [Forde Report]²³⁴

8.17 This report, delivered in May 1999 to the Queensland State Government, is known as the Forde Report because Leneen Forde QC was the chair of the commission. It followed an investigation which began in August 1998 as to whether there had been, or indeed still was, 'unsafe, improper or unlawful care or treatment' of children in government and non-government institutions within that State.²³⁵ It was triggered by claims of physical and sexual abuse going back decades. Its focus covered the period from 1911 to the present and the investigation aimed to review practice in more than 150 orphanages and detention centres (p.i). It was that wide brief that led it to inquire into institutions to which British child migrants as well as Australian (including Indigenous) children had been sent (p.32). Altogether over 300 people were witnesses, and these included 135 'ex-residents' who were interviewed and others who gave written evidence (p.i, p.3). The Commission accepted that testimony given often more than fifty years after the event could not be accepted as the 'literal, historical reality' without corroboration by others and/or by documentary support, but the broad thrust of what was claimed was accepted (p.i).

8.18 The Commission judged that there had been widespread emotional, physical and sexual abuse of children in residential institutions in Queensland. They were also said to be victims of 'systems abuse', that is the failure of 'the systems designed to provide care and protection' (p.iv). Included was specific reference to breaches in regulations concerning corporal punishment (p.vi). In Chapter 2 (pp.11-29) the report further described how and why such abuse and such failures could take place. In general, it concluded, children suffered from many failings (p.vii):

- I. The poor understanding of children's needs by members of staff.
- II. The inadequate training and poor support which staff had received.
- III. Poor management and monitoring within the institutions and externally by government.
- IV. The under-funding by Government of the places to which children had been sent. It was concluded that Government dependence on religious

²³⁴ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions [Forde Inquiry], May 1999: <https://www.qld.gov.au/community/documents/getting-support-health-social-issue/forde-comminquiry.pdf>

²³⁵ *Ibid*, Commission of Inquiry Order (no.1) 1998, Table of Provisions, 3.A.(i).

institutions to provide places for children in need, at low cost, had led to a reluctance to subject those institutions to close scrutiny.

- V. Unchecked breaches of regulations relating to food, clothing, education and discipline were all too apparent. Indeed, the report states that until the early 1960s most institutions worked 'on the basis of strict discipline, with little awareness of the developmental needs...of children' (p.iv).

We note that the first cohort of British child migrants was sent to Queensland in 1951, and that 'the early 1960s' were nearly twenty years after the Curtis Committee report had published its recommendations.

8.19 As with previous reports, the Forde report also referred to the lasting trauma of children who had been emotionally, physically and sexually abused - of feeling worthless, unloved and stigmatised, of educational and other opportunities denied, of behavioural and other mental health problems, and of adult lives blighted by poor personal relationships, broken marriages, suicide attempts, and insecurity (pp. xi-xii). The report was aware that over time social attitudes change, but concluded that the abuses disclosed went far beyond what might have been regarded, even in the past, as acceptable.

8.20 The Ross Committee had noted that three institutions in Queensland had been approved by the UK Government to receive British children. None had been sent to one of them, but the committee had visited the other two. Only one child was by the time of their visit in residence at the Salvation Army Riverview Training Farm at Ipswich, though a total of 56 others had been there since the resumption of child migration to Australia in 1947.

8.21 The third was St Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol near Rockhampton. It had already been reviewed critically in 1998 by the Children's Commission of Queensland (see para 8.12 above). The Forde report recognised that responsibility at Neerkol for the well-being of British child migrants sent to Queensland lay with the Commonwealth Minister for Immigration who was their legal guardian, though this responsibility had been delegated to the Director of the Queensland State Children Department. However, custodianship had been awarded to the Bishop of the Diocese of Rockhampton, though the Rockhampton Congregation of the Sisters of Mercy were responsible for the children's care. This follows a pattern referred to earlier (see

para 6.6 above). The Ross Committee had found 32 British child migrants in residence.

8.22 The Forde inquiry confirmed the Ross report that 48 child migrants had been sent there in total, the first group of 22 arriving in February 1951, followed by another 14 in July (p.32). A few arrived thereafter, the last six in February 1955, including the Scottish twins mentioned earlier. However, most of the children were drawn from Father Hudson's Homes in the English Midlands, together with a few from St Anthony's Home in Bedford.²³⁶ The age of these children on arrival ranged from five to 14 years. Most were girls. They had been 'recruited' in a group nomination scheme by the Catholic Migration Organisation.²³⁷ By 1966-67 all had been discharged from State care. However, during the 1950s, when British child migrants were in residence, between 10 and 15 nuns cared for between 300 and 400 children (p.99). One nun was responsible for 45 children in the dormitory for older boys, while another nun with a single assistant had charge of 94 girls, big and little. It was therefore overcrowded and understaffed, and of this the Children Department was aware, but had taken no action. By 31 December 1955, 1427 child migrants had already been sent into institutional care in Australia since child migration had been resumed in 1947. Witnesses to the inquiry could not recall being spoken to by an inspector from the department. What many did recall was the abuse they suffered at Neerkol.

8.23 Because what had occurred at Neerkol had become the subject of litigation, no details were given in the Forde Inquiry Report, but a closed section of the report, dated May 1999, was sent to the Minister and this was released in 2000.²³⁸ This closed section noted a litany of failures. It confirmed the previous 1998 report of the Children's Commission of Queensland, and indeed much of what the Ross Committee had concluded after its inspection of Neerkol in 1956. Only two out of 54 former residents who gave evidence had anything positive to say about the place and their treatment. The report said that State Children Department inspections were known in advance and were conducted by untrained staff. The institution was

²³⁶ We assume that the report actually means St Anthony's Home, near Feltham in Middlesex. For an account of the departure of children from this home to Neerkol, see <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/features/british-orphans-it-broke-our-hearts-to-see-them-go-away-1914210.html>

²³⁷ We have seen no other references to an organisation with this name and it may be a mistake.

²³⁸ *Confidential Closed Report of Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions, Neerkol*, November 2000, 10pp.

isolated, distant from Rockhampton, and the closed section of the report acknowledged that this was particularly hard on British child migrants who had arrived from institutions which were at least integrated into villages or towns. That isolation had generated a closed culture and management practices which had suppressed the individuality of children. (Not even their birthdays, it was said, were recognised). This had also generated a climate of fear, which even affected some nuns as well as children. The place was staffed insufficiently and too often by nuns untrained and unsuited to work with children. Because it was under-equipped, children as well as staff were overworked in their assigned duties. Family relations were discouraged, and, again of note, siblings were separated by age and by gender. Educational standards were 'lamentable', and there was no sex education, leaving children ignorant and vulnerable when they left the institution aged 14. The disciplinary regime did not allow free play. Corporal punishment was excessive, and, in breach of regulations, no punishment register was kept. Psychological abuse was also common, children being derided for their 'gutter' origins. Bedwetters were humiliated.

8.24 The 1999 Forde report included a set of recommendations concerning ways of preventing, reporting and responding to abuse (pp.xiii-xix). We are not aware of any response to this report or its recommendations by organisations in the UK or by the UK Government.

Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee Report, *Lost Innocents*, 2001²³⁹

8.25 By the late 1980s and during the 1990s, the history of child migration and the experiences, distress and anger of many former child migrants were being increasingly presented to the public in the press, in television programmes, and in several books and research papers. Child abuse now figured in such accounts. Official inquiries already conducted in the UK and Australia had inspired organisations like the Child Migrants Trust (led by Margaret Humphreys), VOICES (led by Bruce Blyth and representing former child migrants in Western Australia) and the International Association of Former Child Migrants and their Families (led by Norman Johnston) to press politically for the Australian Senate to institute a substantial investigation. The

²³⁹ Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee Report, *Lost Innocents*, August 2001, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index

context for the *Lost Innocents* report also included a recent investigation of the treatment of Australia's 'stolen generation', the indigenous Australian children removed by force from their parents. Senator Andrew Murray, who chaired the inquiry, had been a Fairbridge boy, shipped to Southern Rhodesia, aged 4.²⁴⁰

8.26 The Committee received over 250 written submissions and collected oral testimony from hearings across Australia as well as in London and Ottawa. The published report, supported by the published evidence, covers the history of British child migration in general and to Australia before and after the Second World War in particular (pp.11-42). It describes the respective legislative and financial involvement of the UK and Australian governments (pp.26-32), and the organisations in the UK and Australia responsible for sending and receiving child migrants (pp.47-69). It reviews the processes by which consent was (or was not) given to migration (pp.53-60), the institutional care and treatment of child migrants in institutions and their consequences (pp.71-105), and the responsibilities that governments and non-government bodies should have exercised, but in the committee's judgement too often did not (pp.107-120).

8.27 Chapter 4 of the report, 'Institutional Care and Treatment', begins by relating the contrasting good and bad memories by former child migrants of their time in British institutions prior to their sending to Australia (p.71), though the focus of concern is with their experiences after arrival. The evidence presented convinced the Committee that sexual abuse as well as physical assault and psychological abuse had been common and frequent in many institutions, over many years, and having lasting consequences (pp.71-105). The nature and effects of all forms of abuse on the young, and especially sexual abuse, were again recognised to be often severe and having lifetime damaging effects (para 4.16). Victims, boys and girls, 'experienced the humiliation and degradation of criminal sexual assault including extreme pain associated with sexual penetration and rape' (para 4.7). The perpetrators of sexual assault included priests and workers at institutions, plus regular visitors, members of families to whom children were sent on holidays or to work, and older children at some institutions (para 4.7). Boys were subjected to 'explicit sexual acts such as fondling and genital touching, of being forced to perform oral sex, of being repeatedly sodomised' (para 4.15). Girls were 'assaulted and raped' (para 4.15). It was

²⁴⁰ Andrew Murray and Marilyn Rock, 'Child migration schemes to Australia: a dark and hidden chapter of Australia's history revealed', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 38, no. 2, May 2003, pp.149-167.

acknowledged that stories of sexual abuse were not new, having been recorded in books and previous reports, including by the UK Health Committee inquiry (para 4.17).

8.28 More specifically, the inquiry became aware of sexual abuse and assault at several named institutions (paras 4.32-4.34). Of the 207 public and confidential submissions received by the Senate inquiry from individual former child migrants, only 38 recounted episodes of sexual assault, but 24 of these related to Christian Brothers institutions in Western Australia: Bindoon, Castledare, Clontarf and Tardun (para 4.18). These were destinations to which we already know child migrants from Scotland were sent. The accounts were 'horrendous' (para 4.20). In sum there had been 'systemic criminal sexual assault and predatory behaviour by a large number of the Brothers over a considerable period of time' (para 4.20). Also as a matter of deep concern, boys who reported abuse or assault were beaten by the Brothers or abused by the Brother to whom they had complained, and, even if the assault was believed, the abuse was 'covered up'. It was suggested that this had been possible because of strong connections between the Christian Brothers and the police (para 4.21). Some of these cases are described in detail later in this report.

8.29 The report sets out at length the responsibilities of governments and of non-government bodies for allowing such abuse to occur, and what action should be taken to make reparations and provide support for those abused. So, for example, records should be made available to former child migrants by sending and receiving organisations to enable victims to recover their identities (pp.137-176); they should be provided with financial assistance to make family reunions possible (pp.177-194); they should be offered counselling and other measures of support (pp.195-216); legal options open to them should be reviewed (pp.217-226); and a public apology should be made and other actions taken in recognition of the suffering which they had endured (pp.227-243).

8.30 The response of the Australian government to this report is not perhaps relevant to SCAI, but it is worth noting that the formal public apology made by the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, eight years later on 16 November 2009, preceded that by the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown on 24 February 2010. We are not aware of any response to this report by organisations in the UK or by the UK Government.

Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Northern Ireland, 2017²⁴¹

8.31 This inquiry, chaired by Sir Anthony Hart, a QC and High Court Judge, was set up in October 2012 to see if there were 'systemic failings by institutions or the state in their duties towards those children in their care' in the years 1922 to 1995.²⁴² Hearings began in January 2014 and the final report was published in January 2017. It concerns particularly the experiences of children while in institutions in Northern Ireland (other than schools), but its bearing on this SCAI investigation is that it included a module on child migration.²⁴³ In addition to the testimony of experts and other interested parties, evidence was presented by fifty witnesses who had been children in Northern Ireland before being sent as child migrants to several institutions in Australia. Once more the contribution of the Child Migrants Trust and of Margaret Humphreys (who testified) in drawing public and political attention to the history and legacy of child migration was acknowledged, as was the work of previous inquiries in the UK and Australia.

8.32 Evidence presented indicated that from the 1920s the possibility of sending children in care overseas was being considered by, especially, Catholic agencies in Northern Ireland and, more sceptically, by local authorities. Some children did go to Canada and Australia before 1939, but the detail suggests that they were all or mainly juveniles, over the age of 14. Altogether approximately 131 young children in the care of Northern Ireland voluntary institutions or state bodies were sent to Australia after 1939: most were under 12, the majority under eight, and some as young as five. A few were sent by county authorities or by voluntary organisations like Barnardo's, but the vast majority, probably 111, were despatched from four homes run by the Sisters of Nazareth in Derry and Belfast. Nearly all these children were relocated to Catholic residential institutions in Australia. The last party left Northern Ireland in December 1956.²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry Northern Ireland: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/>

²⁴² <https://www.hiainquiry.org/terms-reference>

²⁴³ <https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>.

²⁴⁴ Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Evidence, Day 42, Senior Counsel, pp.15, 59, <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D42-Transcript-Red-OPT.pdf> Sister Brenda, witness statement, AUS-11408, <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D49-SrBrendaDocs-Red-OPT.pdf>

8.33 Witness statements and documentary evidence provided are illuminating on the sectarian motives behind Catholic child migration; on the false notion that child migration was representative 'of its time'; on medical inspections; on failures to secure informed parental consent; on inadequate monitoring and aftercare; and on abuse.

8.34 Of particular importance for SCAI are the accounts presented by victims of abuse. Fifty former child migrants in Australia who gave evidence to the inquiry overwhelmingly reported on the psychological and physical abuse (often severe physical abuse) they suffered.²⁴⁵ Twenty-four of them reported incidents of sexual abuse taking place in the institution in Northern Ireland from where they were sent, in the institutions in Australia to which they were sent, and many in both. They constituted a substantial proportion of the recorded total of 131 children sent to Australia. Four out of these twenty-four witnesses were women and the others were men. As recognised by all recent investigations, the psychological, physical and sexual abuse suffered, along with separation from family and the familiar, the loss of identity, and in some cases the lack of and even falsification of personal documents like birth certificates had lasting and life-affecting consequences.²⁴⁶

8.35 The inquiry did not receive or consider any evidence relating to organisational responses to the abuse of child migrants. Of the 24 who gave evidence of sexual abuse, only six had reported what had occurred, others fearing what might happen if they did. Of the six, one boy was not listened to and was warned off by the police (HIA 341), one girl was not believed (HIA 331), one girl was told off for making such a complaint (HIA 350), and one girl was transferred elsewhere (HIA 330). In two cases when boys complained about a specific Christian Brother, those in charge transferred the abuser to another institution (HIA 302, HIA 334). The fact that this Inquiry's remit was limited to abuse experienced by children whilst still in Northern Ireland also meant that it was beyond its scope to consider evidence already established by the Australian Royal Commission about the extent to which senior staff within the Christian Brothers were aware of the sexual abuse of children at their residential institutions in Western Australia.

²⁴⁵ Opening remarks by Chairman, Sir Anthony Hart, pp.2 and 5,
<https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D42-Transcript-Red-OPT.pdf>

²⁴⁶ Opening remarks by Counsel to the Inquiry, Ms Smith, pp.11-14,
<https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D42-Transcript-Red-OPT.pdf>

8.36 The Inquiry's Final Report was published on 25 January 2017,²⁴⁷ and we note here those findings in Chapter 6 relating to the Child Migrant Programme which are pertinent to this report.²⁴⁸ First, the Report criticised the Northern Ireland Government for failing to fulfil its moral responsibility for ensuring that children in the care of voluntary societies were treated in ways that would be expected for children for whom its Ministry of Home Affairs had statutory responsibility. More specifically, it criticised the Ministry for failing to inform itself properly about the methods of child migration work undertaken by voluntary societies in Northern Ireland, for allowing children to be migrated below an age that would have been acceptable for children in statutory care in Northern Ireland, which was suggested within the Ministry to be a minimum of twelve years of age (para 70), and for failing to undertake any follow-up inspections of children sent from Northern Ireland to Australia (paras 62-65, 172).

8.37 The legal position of the Ministry of Home Affairs with respect to child migration schemes run by voluntary societies was analogous to that of the UK Home Office (and by extension to the Scottish Office). The 1950 Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) gave the same powers and responsibilities to the Minister of Home Affairs with regard to being able to authorise the migration of a child in statutory care as those given to the Home Secretary by the 1948 Children Act (para 45). When the Bill for the 1950 Act was being drafted, however, a parliamentary draftsman advised the Ministry of Home Affairs that powers to control the child migration work of voluntary societies could not be added to it because such powers were the preserve of the UK Government (para 52). For different reasons, then, neither the Ministry of Home Affairs in Northern Ireland nor the UK Home Office (nor the Scottish Office) acquired legal powers over voluntary society child migration practice during the period in which they operated. The Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, however, took the view that even though the Ministry of Home Affairs did not have legal responsibility for child migrants sent overseas by voluntary societies, they still had a moral responsibility to ensure the welfare of those children, which it failed to discharge (para 62).

²⁴⁷ *Report of the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry Northern Ireland:*

<https://www.hiainquiry.org/historical-institutional-abuse-inquiry-report-chapters>

²⁴⁸ *Report of the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry Northern Ireland*, Chapter 6, Child Migration Programme: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/Chapter%206%20-%20Module%202%20%E2%80%93%20Child%20Migrant%20Programme%20%28Australia%29.pdf>

8.38 The Inquiry considered evidence in some detail as to whether the necessary parental consent was sought by the Sisters of Nazareth with regard to children being sent overseas (paras 122-129). It noted from a range of evidence that the Sisters understood that securing parental consent for a child's migration was necessary, and yet their written records provide evidence of such consent having been secured in only a minority of cases. It considered 48 of the 111 cases of child migrants sent to Australia from Northern Ireland in which the Sisters argued that evidence of consent did exist. But of these, the Inquiry found that in 20 cases it was recorded that the only known parent was dead, mentally ill or could not be traced. In another 13 cases the mother had handed responsibility for the child to the Sisters or did not want the child - or the parent had indeed given consent. There was less clear information concerning the remaining 15 cases. The Inquiry concluded that the lack of adequate records made it very difficult to judge whether proper parental consent had been sought in the majority of cases. It did recognise, however, that evidence of consent being sought had been found in another of the Inquiry's modules, in which some former residents of Sisters of Nazareth homes said that they had been stopped from going to Australia because their parent had refused to give consent. The Inquiry also noted that eight witnesses had claimed that when their parents had asked the Sisters of Nazareth about the whereabouts of their child the Sisters had 'lied to them' and provided false information. The Inquiry had seen no reason to disbelieve these accounts. Having reviewed this evidence the Inquiry nevertheless concluded that 'there is a considerable body of evidence to show that the Sisters did make [efforts to gain parental consent], although in some cases they may not have been successful' (para 129). However, given the gaps in records of parental consent, and the Inquiry's belief that the Sisters may not have fully informed some parents about the migration of their children overseas, it is not clear why the Inquiry concluded that parental consent was generally sought by the Sisters, rather than their consent procedures being poorly recorded and inconsistently adhered to. In any event, with regard to the issue of consent, the Inquiry also commented that the practice of seeking children's consent to their migration, particularly for children under the age of eight, was meaningless given the idealised images of Australia that were presented to them and the difficulty about them being able to make an informed judgment about the implications of emigration for their lives (para 143).

8.39 The Report also criticised the Sisters of Nazareth for failing to check the adequacy of residential institutions to which they sent children in Australia, for failing to maintain adequate contact with the children they had sent, and for failing to provide detailed, accurate and timely responses to enquiries from former child

migrants attempting to trace their birth families (paras 151-158, 175). Furthermore, the Report generally criticised the many instances it found where children were sent overseas with minimal information about their backgrounds or anything resembling a 'case history'. Whilst identifying this as a notable failing of the Sisters of Nazareth, the Inquiry extended this criticism to all sending organisations that could not demonstrate that such information about the child's background had been sent with them (para 146).

8.40 The Inquiry made a number of recommendations.²⁴⁹ The important ones relating to the experiences of child migrants were that the Northern Ireland Executive and those institutions found guilty of systemic failings should make a formal apology; that a monument should be erected at Stormont; that a Commissioner for Survivors of Institutional Childhood Abuse should be appointed to support those abused, to be assisted by an advisory panel containing those who had been in residential care; that compensation to the abused, subject to particular criteria, should be provided in the form of publicly-funded lump sums, to which institutions found guilty of systemic failings should be required to contribute; that the fund should be administered by an Historic Institutional Abuse Redress Board; and that applicants should be eligible for legal aid. We are not aware of the extent to which these recommendations have been followed up,²⁵⁰ and we do not know whether the UK government has in any way responded, or taken note.

Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Reports, 2014 and 2017²⁵¹

8.41 This Australian Royal Commission, specifically concerned with sexual abuse, was appointed in January 2013 and chaired by Justice Peter McClellan. Senator

²⁴⁹ *Report of the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry*, Chapter 4, Recommendations: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/Chapter%204%20-%20Recommendations.pdf>

²⁵⁰ On the matter of compensation, see this report in *The Irish News*: <http://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2019/07/10/news/karen-bradley-urged-to-introduce-abuse-compensation-legislation-before-parliament-recess-1660219/>

²⁵¹ Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, *Interim Report Volume 1*: <http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/7014dd2f-3832-465e-9345-6e3f94dd40eb/Volume-1>, *Volume 2*: <http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/8fcb1078-a5ca-4750-ad24-052452f15a58/Volume-2>.

Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, *Final Report* <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/final-report>

Andrew Murray, who had chaired the 2001 Australian Senate inquiry, was one of the commissioners. The aim was to assess how institutions such as schools, churches, sports clubs and government organisations in Australia have responded to allegations and instances of child sexual abuse. To achieve its objective, the Royal Commission set out to reveal where systems had failed to protect children so that it could make recommendations on how to improve laws, policies and practices and create a safer future for children. It is therefore retrospective but forward-thinking, like SCAI. Its Interim Report was published in June 2014 and its Final Report in December 2017.

8.42 The Executive Summaries of the Interim and Final Reports contain conclusions about the nature of sexual abuse, its perpetrators, its victims, its consequences, and how it might be better reported and of course prevented. It also noted that sexual abuse was often accompanied by physical and psychological abuse, and that such experiences can have lifelong impacts on health and mental and emotional well-being, on education and careers, on interpersonal relationships, and on faith. It is noted that some children are particularly vulnerable, that repeated abuse and multiple perpetrators are common, that there are major barriers to disclosure and reporting, and that institutions and adults have systematically failed to protect children. These conclusions consolidate those from previous investigations, but this report went further by providing a statistical analysis of information which concluded that most abuse took place in faith-based institutions, that 90% of abusers were male, that they were most likely (but not only) to be in religious ministries or teachers, that on average female victims were aged nine and male aged 10 when abuse started, and that on average it took victims 22 years to disclose that they had been abused, men taking longer than women, a delay which the reports also sought to explain.²⁵² It also noted that abuse was more likely to take place in institutions in which the culture and managerial practices did not give the protection of children a high priority, and stressed that more study was needed to understand 'what creates a perpetrator'.²⁵³ It emphasised the importance of education and training, of screening before employing, of leadership and governance to create the right culture, and of institutions having a physical environment in which staff and children can be continually supervised. The reasons why abused children did not report abuse are

²⁵² *Interim Report Volume 1*, Appendix C, Tables 3, 6, 8, 10, pp.286, 289, 291, 293:
<http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/7014dd2f-3832-465e-9345-6e3f94dd40eb/Volume-1>

²⁵³ *Ibid*, pp.7-8.

identified, and the Commission therefore proposed that effective protection might also require educating children in how to recognise threat and avoid risk. But it is also necessary for institutions to respond effectively to reports of child sexual abuse. The report also discusses law and litigation responses to complaints, as well as redress schemes.

8.43 Separate reports on a series of Case Studies were also published. Three concern sexual abuse at institutions to which UK child migrants, including some from Scotland, were sent: No 5, Salvation Army Riverview Training Farm, Queensland; No 11, Christian Brother's homes at Castledare, Clontarf, Tardun and Bindoon in Western Australia; and No 26, St Joseph's Orphanage, Neerkol. These reports are analysed later in that part of our report dealing specifically with abuse cases.²⁵⁴

8.44 A substantial number of recommendations were made in the Final Report's Executive Summary.²⁵⁵ They include a national strategy to prevent sexual abuse and other forms of maltreatment of children; institutions to uphold the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; child safety to be embedded in institutional leadership, governance and culture; children to participate in decisions affecting them; families and communities to be informed and involved; people working with children to be suitable and supported; responses to complaints of child abuse to be child-focused; physical and online environments created to reduce opportunities for abuse; child safety standards, policies and procedures to be reviewed and improved and upheld by national and state legislation, involving independent oversight bodies; a National Office for Child Safety to be set up, also with online safety in mind; legislative action taken to improve institutional reporting of and responses to complaints of abuse; action taken to improve the recording, preserving and sharing of records; carers to be properly and consistently registered; support services for victims and survivors to be funded and supported; legal advice services, helplines, websites, specialist sexual

²⁵⁴ The following give a flavour of press responses to evidence presented in April 2015:

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-14/child-sex-abuse-inquiry-neerkol-orphanage-rockhampton/6391002>.

<http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/full-horror-of-neerkol-orphanage-revealed-at-hearing-20150423-1ms5sa.html>.

<http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/abuse-at-the-sisters-of-mercyrun-neerkol-orphanage-has-shocked-a-royal-commission/news-story/4358c246e9a899b4d2006f869c4e02d8>

²⁵⁵ For the Final Report and its Executive Summary see

<https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/>, pp.105-165. For its Recommendations see also https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/final_report_-_recommendations.pdf

assault services to be set up; a child sexual abuse education strategy to be developed; and specific recommendations with respect to religious institutions were also presented. We are not aware of how far these recommendations have yet been implemented.

The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes*, March 2018²⁵⁶

8.45 This on-going England and Wales inquiry into child sexual abuse is chaired by Professor Alexis Jay. It opened in March 2015. Its terms of reference are:

to consider the extent to which State and non-State institutions have failed in their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation; to consider the extent to which those failings have since been addressed; to identify further action needed to address any failings identified; to consider the steps which it is necessary for State and non-State institutions to take in order to protect children from such abuse in future; and to publish a report with recommendations.²⁵⁷

8.46 Because so many child migrants were deceased and because survivors are elderly and often frail, it was the decision of the Inquiry to choose as its first module an examination of child migration programmes, including the experiences of child migrants, responses by institutions to allegations of abuse at the time and since, and the responsibilities of the UK government. It considered written and oral evidence from survivors, voluntary organisations (or their successors), the UK government, and the Child Migrants Trust, plus a report and twenty-one addenda submitted by two academic consultants, who are now also responsible (with a third colleague) for this report to SCAI. We have been able to draw on documentary material supplied to the Inquiry and to transcripts of witness testimony.

8.47 The Inquiry's report in March 2018 contains a history of child migration, a record of child migrants' experiences of sexual abuse, a comment on the 'standards of the day issue', a review of how expectations of care and practice evolved, and, at length and one by one, an examination of responses made to the Inquiry by Her Majesty's Government and eleven sending institutions, five of which operated in

²⁵⁶ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse - IICSA, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/> and specifically Child Migration Programmes, Investigation Report, March 2018, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/4265/view/child-migration-programmes-investigation-report-march-2018.pdf>.

²⁵⁷ IICSA, Terms of Reference, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/terms-reference>.

Scotland as well as in England and Wales, namely Barnardo's, Fairbridge, Salvation Army, Sisters of Nazareth, and the Catholic church more generally. It concluded that 'Many of the voluntary organisations involved failed in their duty to exercise proper monitoring or aftercare'.²⁵⁸ However, the

institution primarily to blame for the continued existence of the child migration programmes after the Second World War was Her Majesty's Government (HMG). This was a deeply flawed policy, as HMG now accepts. It was badly executed by many voluntary organisations and local authorities, but was allowed by successive British governments to remain in place, despite a catalogue of evidence which showed that children were suffering ill treatment and abuse, including sexual abuse.²⁵⁹

The blunt conclusion was that 'the main reason for HMG's failure to act was the politics of the day, which were consistently prioritised over the welfare of children'.²⁶⁰

8.48 Its three published recommendations were that those institutions which had been involved in child migration and had not yet apologised should do so; that because of the difficulties in investigating allegations and evidence of abuse and the distress caused to former child migrants trying to access their records and establish their identities, all institutions that had sent children abroad should ensure that their remaining records were preserved and made readily available to them; and, strikingly, that the UK government should establish a Redress Scheme for all surviving former child migrants 'providing for an equal award to every applicant' on the basis that all had been exposed to the risk of sexual abuse.²⁶¹

8.49 In April 2018 this report and its recommendations were then embedded as an appendix in IICSA's Interim Report.²⁶² Covering other investigations and a larger agenda, this explains how the Inquiry had undertaken its work and responses to it so far. It describes in now familiar terms the nature and effects of child sexual abuse on the abused, current responses to tackling child sexual abuse, and the cultural, professional, political, legislative, organisational and financial themes which were

²⁵⁸ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, p.viii.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.ix.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 'Recommendations', pp.150-152.

²⁶² HCPP, HC 954-1, *Interim Report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse*, April 2018, pp.34-40, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/document/full-interim-report-independent-inquiry-child-sexual-abuse>.

emerging from IICSA's investigations. It also made recommendations including - but not only - those derived from its child migration investigation.

8.50 Six months later in December 2018 the UK Government published its first response to this Interim Report.²⁶³ It accepted that the Inquiry's report provided a 'comprehensive history of child migration', that it included a 'careful analysis of the legal and policy frameworks by which child migration was governed and managed and of the role of the different institutions – in the UK and overseas – which were responsible for carrying out child migration' and that 'it is grounded in the real lives and experiences of those children who were sent overseas and who were failed by the organisations and individuals responsible for their care' (para 3).

8.51 HMG's response then addressed the Inquiry's three published recommendations concerning child migration. Sending agencies which had not yet apologised (as the HMG had done in 2010), or made their records securely and freely available (as HMG now promised to ensure), should do so (paras 5, 13). On financial matters, the response refers to the support already given by HMG to the Child Migrants Trust, but it had been decided that funding for the Family Restoration Scheme would be continued. Moreover, in addition, it was accepted that a Redress Scheme should be established (paras 6-12).

In recognition of the exceptional and specific nature of Child Migration, the Government will establish a scheme to ensure that each surviving former child migrant receives a payment as soon as possible.... The Government is mindful of the age and declining health of surviving former child migrants so the ex-gratia payment scheme for former child migrants will be in operation as soon as is practicable. A number of former child migrants have sadly passed away since the Inquiry published its report, so the Government will accept claims in respect of any former child migrant who was alive on 1 March 2018, when the Inquiry's Child Migration report was published.... These ex-gratia payments will be payable as an award to all applicants regardless of their individual circumstances, building upon the national apology to former child migrants and the practical support already provided by the Government. This ex-gratia

²⁶³ HCPP, H.M. Government, 'Government Response to the Interim Report by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse', Cm 9756, Dec 2018:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/765917/CCS207_CCS1218194158-001_Gov_Resp_to_IICSA.PDF.

scheme provides further acknowledgement that the child migration schemes were wrong (para 10).

The amount to be paid in compensation had yet to be determined.

8.52 However, on 31 January 2019, HMG followed this up with a second response.²⁶⁴ The compensation payment was set at £20,000 per person. The statement details the aim of the compensation scheme, the eligibility criteria, and the method of application via the Child Migrants Trust.

8.53 HMG's first response had also addressed a further 13 recommendations contained in the Interim Report. These did not explicitly derive from the child migration investigation but might be interpreted as measures influenced by it and intended to prevent or respond to equivalent bad childcare practices. Those accepted by HMG included investigating how to provide better support for victims of abuse; improvements in inspection procedures informed by the experiences of survivors and victims of child sexual abuse; possible revisions after further study to the criminal injuries compensation scheme; improved training schemes for those involved in child care, protection and policing; and a reconsideration of methods to exclude those who pose a risk to children. In due course a final IICSA report will no doubt be published, recommendations made, HMG responses publicised, and action taken.

Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care

8.54 A Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care has recently opened in New Zealand, covering the years 1950-1999. Whether it will consider the experiences of child migrants is not yet known, and if it does we do not know when it might report.²⁶⁵

8.55 There has to date been no public inquiry into the experiences of child migrants in Canada, to where historically most child migrants from Scotland were

²⁶⁴ Child Migrants Trust, *Ex Gratia Payment Scheme for Former British Child Migrants*, 31 January 2019: <https://www.childmigrantstrust.com/news/2019/1/30/ex-gratia-payment-scheme-for-former-british-child-migrants>.

²⁶⁵ Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care, <https://www.abuseincare.org.nz/>.

sent. Unsurprisingly, there has been no public inquiry in Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia.

9 | Standards of the Day

9.1 It is important to address what might be (and indeed has been) a defensive response to recent allegations of child abuse in the past, namely that one should not judge past practice by current standards. It might therefore be useful to consider not what those responsible for the care of children in Scotland *did know* about the risk of child abuse but, given their responsibilities at the time, what they *should have known*.²⁶⁶ Clearly this has a bearing on whether they took appropriate steps to protect child migrants from abuse before leaving Scotland, while in transit, and after arrival overseas. Certainly it seems reasonable to suppose that those taking on child care responsibilities should have been aware, or should have been made aware, of legislation which was intended to protect children from cruelty, whether inflicted by parents or other adults, including foster parents and surrogate parents employed in institutions in Scotland.²⁶⁷ This is the view expressed by IICSA in its report on child migration programmes.²⁶⁸ Latterly and particularly with the Curtis committee's qualified acceptance of child migration in mind, whatever were expected standards of care in Scotland ought to have applied wherever Scottish children were sent overseas.

²⁶⁶ What follows owes much to historical research prompted by recent exposures of and inquiries into child sexual abuse. See for instance Carol Smart, 'Reconsidering the recent history of child sexual abuse, 1910-1960', *Journal of Social Policy*, vol 29, no.1, 2000, pp.57-71; Louise A. Jackson, 'Child sexual abuse in England and Wales: prosecution and prevalence 1918-1970', *History and Policy*, 18 June 2015 <http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/child-sexual-abuse-in-england-and-wales-prosecution-and-prevalence-1918-1970>; Lucy Delap, 'Child welfare, child prosecution and sexual abuse, 1918-1990', *History and Policy*, 30 July 2015, <http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/child-welfare-child-protection-and-sexual-abuse-1918-1990>; Adrian Bingham and Louise Settle, 'Scandals and silences: the British Press and child sexual abuse', *History and Policy*, 4 August 2015, <http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/scandals-and-silences-the-british-press-and-child-sexual-abuse>; Adrian Bingham *et al*, 'Historical child sexual abuse in England and Wales: the role of historians', *History of Education*, vol.45, no.4, 2016, pp.411-429; Adrian Bingham, ' " It would be better for the newspapers to call a spade a spade": the British press and child sexual abuse, c.1918-90', *History Workshop Journal*, Issue 88, Oct 2019. For child abuse and child protection from the late 19th century see also George K. Behlmer, *Child Abuse and Moral Reform 1870-1908* (Stanford University Press, California, 1982) and his *Friends of the Family: the English Home and its Guardians, 1850-1940* (Stanford University Press, California, 1998), and Alyson Brown and David Barrett, *Knowledge of Evil: Child Prostitution and Child Sexual Abuse in Twentieth Century England* (Willan Publishing, Devon, 2002).

²⁶⁷ See especially SCAI report provided by Professor Kenneth McK. Norrie, 'Legislative background to the Treatment of Children and Young People'.

²⁶⁸ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, Part B.3, 'The Inquiry's approach to the "standards" issues', pp.17-24.

9.2 Even setting aside what one might regard as a moral code concerning children embedded in the New Testament, a key driver for many philanthropists (see especially Matthew 19:13-15), those with responsibilities for children might or should have known of the founding in 1884 of the London Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, which in 1889 became the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC). It was granted a Royal Charter in 1895.²⁶⁹ Meanwhile, branches had been set up throughout Scotland, and in 1889 the Glasgow and Edinburgh organisations joined to form the Scottish National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and it too, in 1921, was granted Royal Charter status and became the Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (RSSPCC).²⁷⁰

9.3 Also in 1889, thanks to political lobbying, the ***Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act*** was passed. Like all Westminster legislation relating to children until recently, this Act was applicable to the whole of the UK and therefore to Scotland. Section 1 of this Act established that:

Any person over sixteen years of age who, having the custody, control, or charge of a child, being a boy under the age of fourteen years, or being a girl under the age of sixteen years, [who] wilfully ill-treats, neglects, abandons, or exposes such child, or causes or procures such child to be ill-treated, neglected, abandoned, or exposed, in a manner likely to cause such child unnecessary suffering, or injury to its health, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.²⁷¹

Moreover, if a child was thought to be in danger the Act authorised the police to enter a home, to arrest anyone found mistreating a child, and to take the child, at least temporarily, to a place of safety. It then allowed the court to remove the child from anyone convicted, including a parent, and for that child instead to be committed to the care of a 'fit person'.²⁷² An amending Act in 1894 added assault and mental harm to the list of mistreatments, and equalised at 16 the age for boys as well as girls to be protected. Further legislation in 1904 widened the range of 'fit persons' to whom a child might be sent for protected care, a shift further developed

²⁶⁹ Wikipedia, 'National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children', https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Society_for_the_Prevention_of_Cruelty_to_Children#Late_nineteenth_century

²⁷⁰ Children 1st, 'Our History', <https://www.children1st.org.uk/who-we-are/about-children-1st/our-history/>.

²⁷¹ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1889: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1889/44/enacted> .

²⁷² For an explanation of the term 'fit person' see the [Glossary](#).

in the Children Act of 1908 along with additions to the list of outlawed practices. Further legislation in 1932 and 1937, while largely concerning juvenile courts, also embraced care and protection cases and 'fit persons', thus indicating that child protection was still on the agenda, a concern further emphasised in the Children Act of 1948.

9.4 The right of parents, and of those *in loco parentis*, to punish children by administering corporal punishment was until recently largely protected by law. However, such punishment was expected to be 'educative' and 'within a moderate and reasonable level of severity'.²⁷³ Excessive punishment, while often difficult to detect and bring to court, had long been a legal offence, and when the evidence of excess was visually evident it could and should have led to criminal proceedings. The method, manner and violence of punishment could be construed as an assault. We know that the chair of Quarriers was concerned in 1937 about 'excessive corporal punishment of boys'.²⁷⁴ The first edition of *The Barnardo Book*, published in 1944 and issued to superintendents of its children's homes, included strict regulations on corporal punishment (and indeed provided advice on sex education).²⁷⁵ It outlawed the slapping of young children, insisted that 'corporal punishment, striking, cuffing, shaking and any other form of physical violence should never in any circumstances be inflicted on girls or threatened'.²⁷⁶ The cane could be used in the corporal punishment of boys, but only as a last resort, and therefore only very seldom. Similar strictures were contained in the 1955 edition of *The Barnardo Book*, and a comparable set of instructions was issued by National Children's Homes in 1954.²⁷⁷

9.5 Corporal punishment was not an issue addressed in the Clyde Report, but a more considered post-war approach to discipline has been detected in some children's residential homes in Scotland.²⁷⁸ The 1946 Curtis Report, which it is reasonable to suppose child care professionals in Scotland had or should have read,

²⁷³ Norrie, 'Legislative Background, Appendix Two: Corporal Punishment of Children'.

²⁷⁴ Quarriers, Report Part B, 25 Jan 2018, QAR.001.001.0283-0284.

²⁷⁵ Barnardo's, *The Barnardo Book*, on corporal punishment, BAR.001.001.0767-0773; on sex education, BAR.001.001.0763; and on the book's publication see Peter Higginbotham, 'The Barnardo's Story', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/DB/rules.shtml>.

²⁷⁶ Barnardo's, *The Barnardo Book*, BAR.001.001.0772.

²⁷⁷ See NRS, ED15/564/2, Social Work Services Group, 'Corporal Punishment in Children's Homes Survey, Feb 1968, Inspector's Returns', pp.87-93 for National Children's Home, *Memorandum on Punishment*; and pp.102-103 for Mrs B.Trembath, Regional Executive Officer, Dr Barnardo's, Edinburgh, in a letter headed 'Corporal Punishment in Children's Homes' sent to Mr McLean, Social Work Services Group, Edinburgh, 6 Feb 1968.

²⁷⁸ Abrams, *Orphan Country*, p.104.

also acknowledged such a shift.²⁷⁹ When summing up its examination of all forms of institutional provision in England and Wales, the report also insisted that

corporal punishment (i.e. caning and birching) should be definitely prohibited in children's Homes for children of all ages and both sexes, as it already is in the Public Assistance Homes for girls and for boys of 14 and over. We think that the time has come when such treatment of boys in these Homes should be as unthinkable as the similar treatment of girls already is, and that the Voluntary Homes should adopt the same principle. It is to be remembered that the children with whom we are concerned are already at a disadvantage in society. One of the first essentials is to nourish their self-respect; another is to make them feel that they are regarded with affection by those in charge of them. Whatever there is to be said for this form of punishment in the case of boys with a happy home and full confidence in life, it may, in our opinion, be disastrous for the child with an unhappy background. It is, moreover, liable to grave abuse. In condemning corporal punishment we do not overlook the fact that there are other means of enforcing control which may have even more harmful effects. We especially deprecate nagging, sneering, taunting, indeed all methods which secure the ascendancy of the person in charge by destroying or lowering the self-esteem of the child.²⁸⁰

These other forms of abuse need to be noted for future reference, and also the following which continues the paragraph: 'There are certain behaviour difficulties, in particular bedwetting (enuresis) for which the punitive approach is in general inappropriate and should be strongly discouraged'.²⁸¹

9.6 With respect specifically to sexual abuse, from 1885 it was intended that the virtue of young girls would be better protected by raising the 'age of consent' from 13 to 16.²⁸² Later, in 1908, sexual abuse in families became a legal matter rather than one for church intervention. 'Moral welfare' campaigns led by feminists, purity campaigners, women doctors, social workers and MPs helped further to publicise

²⁷⁹ HCPP, *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, Cmd.6922, para 417.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid*, para 493 (xviii).

²⁸¹ *Ibid*. Punishment for enuresis was also specifically condemned in the 1944 *Barnardo Book*, and also for 'masturbation, nail-biting, or other nervous affections. The physical or psychological root of the trouble must be sought', BAR.001.001.0768. There is documentary evidence that in the 1940s bedwetting at Quarriers was still treated by some house parents as a 'punishable offence': Quarriers, Report Part B, QAR.001.001.0283.

²⁸² Wikipedia, 'Age of consent reform in the United Kingdom': https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Age_of_consent_reform_in_the_United_Kingdom

and politicise the issue.²⁸³ In July 1923 sexual offences were the subject of a House of Commons debate, at which of course Scottish MPs would have been present.²⁸⁴ This was followed by the appointment in 1924 of a Departmental Committee on Sexual Offences against Children and Young Persons, specifically concerned in England and Wales, which reported to the Home Office in December 1925.²⁸⁵ Moreover, a Departmental Committee on Sexual Offences against Children and Young Persons in Scotland was also appointed in 1924, reporting to the Secretary for Scotland in February 1926.²⁸⁶ Among other matters, while acknowledging under-reporting, the Scottish report recorded an increase in sexual offences against minors leading to proceedings being taken in 1050 cases in the years 1921-1924, and it made 50 recommendations intended to keep young people safe. The subsequent 1932 *Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act* was also designed among other matters to protect them from sexual offences. It introduced supervision orders for children at risk, and it collated all existing child protection legislation into one Act. This piece of legislation later morphed into the 1956 *Sexual Offences Act*, similarly adapted to apply in Scotland, a consolidating and clarifying piece of legislation which specifically included reference to sexual offences against girls and boys under the age of 16. Recent careful analysis of the criminal justice statistics suggests that well over 1000 persons a year were found guilty of sexual offences against minors in England and Wales between the wars, increasing to over 4000 by the 1960s, and Scotland would not have been exempt.²⁸⁷ It is worth stressing that these matters caught the attention of the press. Newspapers recorded the trials of sexual abusers, the concerns of MPs, and the activities of such interest groups as the National Council of Women.²⁸⁸ A substantial 1957 scholarly study by the Department of Criminal Science in the Faculty of Law at the University of Cambridge calculated that the victims of 1178 sexual offenders brought to trial included 242 (21%) children who were under the age of eight and 541 (46%) aged eight to 14. In sum 783 (nearly 67%) were children under 14.²⁸⁹ A review of the book in *The Observer* drew the attention of a wider public to

²⁸³ Smart, 'Recent history of child sexual abuse', pp.60-64; Bingham *et al*, 'Historical child sexual abuse', pp.421, 427.

²⁸⁴ Hansard, House of Commons, cols 1651-1653, 1655-1658, 12 July 1923.

²⁸⁵ HCPP, *Report of the Departmental Committee on Sexual Offences*, Cmd.2561, 1925.

²⁸⁶ HCPP, *Departmental Committee on Sexual Offences against Children and Young Persons in Scotland, Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary for Scotland*, Cmd 2592, 1926.

²⁸⁷ Jackson, 'Child sexual abuse', executive summary, and fig.3.

²⁸⁸ *The Manchester Guardian*, 4 March 1926, p.6; 3 Oct 1934, p.14; *The Times*, 14 May 1930, p.11; 18 June 1930, p.11; 13 Feb 1932, pp.6, 10; 1 March 1935, p.16; 2 July 1954, p.3; 31 Oct 1957, p.7; 27 Oct 1958, p.6; 1 Nov 1958, p.6.

²⁸⁹ L. Radzinowicz, *Sexual Offences* (Macmillan, London, 1957), in particular p.365.

the research and its findings.²⁹⁰ In sum, while the abuse of children was not in the past as publicly prominent as it has become in the present, it is proper to state that those responsible for child care in Scotland ought to have been aware of risk.

²⁹⁰ *The Observer*, 17 March 1957, p.8. See also reference to child sexual abuse in report by British Magistrates Association and British Medical Association: *The Observer*, 20 March 1949, p.4.

10 | Numbers: Child Migrants from Scotland

10.1 When calculating and assessing the number of child migrants dispatched overseas from Scotland we need to remember that England and Wales in 1901 accounted for 85.1% of the population of the UK and 86.8% in 1931, and Scotland only 11.7% in 1901 and 10.5% in 1931 (and Northern Ireland 3.2% in 1901 and 2.7% in 1931).²⁹¹ These percentages help to give us a sense of proportionate contributions. In total, as noted earlier, around 100,000 child migrants from the UK were sent overseas from the 1860s to the 1960s, but certainly only a modest contribution was made by Scotland, perhaps fewer in proportion to Scotland's contribution to the population of the UK as a whole, especially after 1945. Also, while a small number of child migrants had been supplied by local authorities in Scotland, those children would have been handed over to voluntary societies for their migration and are therefore embedded in what would be their aggregated totals – in so far as we are able to locate them.²⁹² Calculating the number of child migrants from Scotland is indeed difficult and compiling accurate figures is not possible, especially because much surviving data only presents us with the number of children dispatched from the UK as a whole.

10.2 SCAI has provided us with a database of 1354 young migrants sent overseas from Scotland. Organised by name it provides details of date of birth, sending institution, date of migration (and sometimes name of ship), age at migration, country of destination, and receiving institution. The earliest recorded year of departure is 1877 and the last 1965. The youngest recorded were two, three, four and five years old. Over a period in which the school-leaving age rose, and setting the age of 15 for the sake of simplicity, we have counted 268 as juveniles among the 1354, mainly but not only heading for Canada. The national destinations of 1315 of these 1354 Scottish migrants are also recorded: 931 went to Canada and 356 to Australia, plus 27 to New Zealand and one to Kenya. Especially in the case of those sent to Australia and British Columbia, we learn of the institutions to which they were sent (but of course not of individual homes and farms in Canada). Forty eight youngsters went to Dhurringile, 138 to Fairbridge institutions, and a further 32 to institutions run by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia, plus ones and twos elsewhere. However, because of limitations on extant and accessible records, we offer

²⁹¹ Halsey and Webb, *Twentieth-Century British Social Trends*, p.72.

²⁹² Abrams, *Orphan Country*, p.125.

below alternative (and certainly in places more speculative) calculations which might legitimately be thought to exaggerate totals – but we suggest for good reasons.

Canada

10.3 We begin by considering children sent to Canada, because historically most child migrants from the UK had been sent there, around 90,000 of them from the 1860s until those schemes ended mainly but not entirely in the 1920s. It is certainly to Canada that Scotland made proportionately its largest contribution to the flow of child migrants overseas. Our estimated total for the number sent from Scotland to Canada is a somewhat deceptively precise **8088**. What follows is an explanation of how we have arrived at this figure.

10.4 **Quarriers Homes** took into care a very large number of children. Only a minority were sent overseas. However, the commitment of William Quarrier and later managers to child migration is evident in its original first title: Orphan and Destitute Children's Emigration Homes, Glasgow. The explicit reference to child migration was removed only in 1899, by when the practice had temporarily ceased.²⁹³ Best estimates indicate that the number of Quarriers children sent to Canada from 1872 to 1897 (when William Quarrier stopped the programme) plus those dispatched between 1904 and 1938 (after the practice had been resumed following his death) totalled **7384** on the highest calculation (though latterly, from 1925, those sent were almost certainly juveniles over the age of 14).²⁹⁴ They total 8.2% of the total number of child migrants sent to Canada from the UK. Of the 20,219 Quarriers children who had been resident at some time between 1871 and 1933, around 35% had been emigrated.²⁹⁵ For comparison, only 26% of the 9429 children who had passed through National Children's Home between 1873 and 1912 had been sent to Canada

²⁹³ See *Narrative of Facts*, <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/index.html>

²⁹⁴ Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0054, subtracting 38 sent to Australia. Kershaw and Sacks, *New Lives for Old*, 2008, p.65, give a total sent to Canada of 7360. Other figures are less precise, but in the same area, for example 'more than 7000', Magnusson, *Quarrier's Story*, pp.87, 197; Alexander Gammie, *William Quarrier and the Story of the Orphan Homes of Scotland* (Pickering and Inglis, London, 1936), p.9. In early years some children sent to Canada by Quarriers had been supplied by other child care homes in Scotland. The 1938 *Narrative of Facts* records, pp.12, 28 and photo p.32, a late and last revival. The photo on p.32 confirms that they were juveniles. Juvenile migrants are certainly incorporated in the total of 7394 child migrants to Canada recorded in Quarriers, Section 21 response, Part C, p.76, 12 Sept 2018, QAR.001.001.0512 on p.71 it is stated that Quarriers by 1932 had raised its age for migration to 16, so that those sent were of working age. This higher age limit did not apply to those sent subsequently to Australia.

²⁹⁵ Abrams, *Orphan Country*, p.135.

(but none from Scotland).²⁹⁶ Indeed, even Barnardo's in the period up to 1907 only sent to Canada each year between 14% and 19% of the children in its care, falling to 11% by 1914 (but in those years none from Scotland).²⁹⁷

10.5 In addition, **46** children (again including some juveniles) seem to have been sent to Canada from the **Aberlour Orphanage**.²⁹⁸ Probably among them were two sisters, originally from London, who were sent to join their uncle in 1901 (or 1903);²⁹⁹ a boy aged 11 sent in 1905; two siblings aged seven and eight, sent in 1913; and a boy aged 14 when he departed in 1911. Three siblings, aged nine to 11, were sent in 1916, to join three others who had already left in 1911, aged 14 and 15, and another, aged 18, who also left in 1916 but on an earlier sailing: they all probably joined their father in Canada. Four other siblings, ranging in age from three to eight, were shipped out in 1912. One girl, whose mother had died and whose father could not support her, left in 1916, when she was 15. From 1924 restrictions by the UK and Canadian governments normally required all unaccompanied young migrants to be 14 or over, and that is evident in the age of those subsequently sent to Canada from Aberlour, except for those joining a parent, younger siblings joining older, or in four cases those among parties of Boy Scouts sent to Canada under a juvenile migration scheme.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁶ NCH, *Annual Report for 1911-12*, cited in Kenneth Mankin, 'Stephenson's Children: Child Migration, Canada and the National Children's Home, 1873-1931', Lancaster University M.Phil. Thesis, 2010, p.135.

²⁹⁷ Barnardo's sent about 25,000 children to Canada, 1882-1915: Parker, *Uprooted*, p.73.

²⁹⁸ Abrams, *Orphan Country*, p.125, suggests about 50 child migrants from Aberlour were sent to *all* overseas destinations. Aberlour Trust's Section 21 response states that the orphanage's ledger books record 44 former residents departing, all but 3 to Canada, ABE.001.008.7710, but the provided 'List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage', ABE.001.008.7695-7699, names 55, and of these the number sent to Canada is 46, plus 3 to Australia, 2 to New Zealand, 3 to South Africa and 1 to Kenya (some aged over 14). However, the migration of some may not have been arranged by Aberlour but, after their discharge, by other organisations. The Aberlour Trust came to manage homes in three locations, in particular The Orphanage at Charlestown of Aberlour in Strathspey, Morayshire, but also, nearby, Quarryhill at Keith in Banff and, further away, Sycamore in Kirkcaldy in Fife. Those migrated may only have been sent from The Orphanage, but in any case aggregated numbers probably included all homes. Aberlour's very brief Annual Reports 1875-81, ABE.001.001.0259-0278, contain no references to child migration, but much about extending accommodation.

²⁹⁹ As noted earlier, footnote 13 above, the provided data on 'date of birth', 'date at discharge' and 'age of discharge' cannot be reconciled: Aberlour, 'List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage', ABE.001.008.7695-7699.

³⁰⁰ Aberlour, List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7695-7698. There is reference also to a destitute woman's three children aged five to 13 being sent to South Africa in 1906, ABE.001.008.7695. There seems to be no available information on why to that destination, to whom they were sent, how they were sent, or how they were funded. However, about

10.6 Surviving records indicate that **102** of the 124 child migrants who left the **Whinwell Home** went to Canada.³⁰¹ It is also recorded (by her husband) that Mrs Blaikie had managed to transfer **301** children from her **Orphan and Emigration Home** in Edinburgh to receiving homes in Canada run by Ellen Billborough, William Quarrier, Annie Macpherson and Maria Rye.³⁰² Emma Stirling's **Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society** sent 25 children to Nova Scotia in 1886 and a further 56, including some juveniles, in 1887. Altogether Stirling may have migrated about **200** children. These in total amount to an uncertain 400, but we do not know the numbers of children who had ever been in the care of these organisations and therefore do not know what proportion had been selected for migration.³⁰³

10.7 As reported earlier, the **Salvation Army** opened an Emigration Department in 1903. It mainly catered for adults and juveniles, but it was selecting and sending UK child migrants to Canada from 1905, numbering 398 from 1905 to 1914. A contemporary source stresses that these were 'of course, all under the age of fourteen', and that they were dispatched first to a receiving home in Toronto before being dispersed.³⁰⁴ There is reference in some sources to young children being not just boarded out but legally adopted, and with guardianship being retained by the Army's Emigration Department until they were 21. However, those sent from the 1920s seem to have been juveniles over 14, destined for farm work, and many were trained at Hadleigh Park in Essex before being shipped to New Zealand or Australia. More detailed research into numbers is handicapped by bomb damage to Army records during the Second World War, so we can only speculate as to how many child migrants sent to Canada were from Scotland, but maybe **30** from Scotland's

another Aberlour boy, [REDACTED], a juvenile, aged 15, ABE.001.008.7698, we know a great deal: see Appendix 1, paras 4.12-4.16.

³⁰¹ Stirling Council's 'Report relating to records held at Stirling Council Archives 1900-1930' gives a figure of 96 sent from Whinwell to Canada out of a total of 114, STC.001.001.0569. However, the names of those known to have been sent overseas as listed in Appendix 1, give a total of 124 (not 114): 102 to Canada (not 96), 19 to Australia (not 14), three destination not known (not four), STC.001.001.0573-0582. The last recorded departure on this list was a boy sent to Australia in 1934. However, NRS, ED57/1398, 'Whinwell Children's Home', pp.6 and 11, *Whinwell Children's Home Annual Report for 1934*, records that three children, a boy and two girls, left for Australia in July 1934 – and that three others having been selected were 'eager' to go. Croall, *Fifty Years on a Scottish Battlefield*, p.47, stated in her 1923 memoir that 'over 150' Whinwell children had been sent abroad out of 600 who had 'passed through' her children's homes.

³⁰² Blaikie, *Autobiography*, p.319.

³⁰³ Kohli, *Golden Bridge*, pp.223 and 225; Girard, 'Stirling, Emma Maitland (1838/9-1907)', *ODNB*.

³⁰⁴ Kohli, *Golden Bridge*, pp.209-211.

inner cities is a possible maximum. The role of the Salvation Army in juvenile migration is examined in Appendix 1, Section 19.

10.8 Still with Canada in mind, we should note that 329 children were sent to the **Fairbridge Society's Prince of Wales Farm School in British Columbia** between 1935 and 1948. Bearing in mind the historic Scottish connection with Canada, it is not surprising that those parties included some children with Scottish roots, even though British Columbia was the most 'English' of provinces. Reports in the Aberdeen press record the departure in 1936 of three orphaned siblings, the despatch in 1937 of one local boy assisted by the local branch of the Royal Over-Seas League, and of a girl in 1938, this time via Middlemore Homes in Birmingham.³⁰⁵ In addition we know of another boy, born in 1934, who was put into care in Fife aged five or six after a parental divorce, then sent to Middlemore, and dispatched from there to Fairbridge in British Columbia in October 1941 aged seven.³⁰⁶ However, the recorded overall Scottish total in Fairbridge's Canadian records is less than one might therefore have expected, just **25**, less than 8% of the total. Geographically most of the 329 came from Newcastle (where the Fairbridge Society had a branch office) and from nearby towns in the distressed areas of Tyneside.³⁰⁷

Southern Rhodesia

10.9 We know that 276 children were sent from the UK to the **Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College** between 1946 and 1956.³⁰⁸ With the encouragement of the colonial government, the scheme was to establish an elite public boarding school in this self-governing British colony, selecting children accordingly. It was not part of the Fairbridge Society's operations. It had been set up and was managed by a

³⁰⁵ Aberdeen City Council, press cuttings from *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, 10 Oct 1936, 3 April 1937, 12 August 1938.

³⁰⁶ SCAI statement by Mr Roderick Mackay, WIT.001.001.3450-3455.

³⁰⁷ Dunae, 'Waifs', p.236; Patrick Dunae, 'Gender, generations and social class: the Fairbridge Society and British child migration to Canada, 1930-1960', in Jon Lawrence and Pat Starkey (eds), *Social Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: International Perspectives* (Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2001), pp.82-100, esp pp.88-89.

³⁰⁸ Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, pp.182-184, 226-227, 241, 244; Ellen Boucher, 'The limits of potential; race, welfare, and the interwar extension of child emigration to Southern Rhodesia', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 48, no.4, 2009, pp.914-934; Katja Uusihakala, 'Rescuing children, reforming the Empire: British child migration to colonial Southern Rhodesia', *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, vol.22, no.3, 2015, pp.273-287. For some primary sources see TNA, DO35/6377, 'Increased UK Government Financial Assistance to Voluntary Organisations concerned with Child Migration', pp.133-150, Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College booklet.

London Council based in Rhodesia House in London. It is unlikely that there were many recruits from Scotland, though we are aware of eight.³⁰⁹ We know that Edinburgh Public Assistance Committee set up a board to select children, but whether any children were sent and if so how many is not recorded.³¹⁰ However, this was a scheme, in that Empire-conscious period, which could have appealed to some Scottish parents seeing this as an opportunity to provide a boarding-school education for their children which they could not otherwise afford, and which might provide them subsequently with prestigious white-collar employment in an African society. In the absence of firm data we suggest **10** as a possible total.

New Zealand

10.10 We know that parties of child migrants were sent from the UK to foster homes in New Zealand between 1949 and 1953, by a scheme almost entirely funded by the New Zealand government. They probably totalled 530. The organising and sending agency in London was the **Over-Seas League (Royal Over-Seas League** from 1960) working with the New Zealand High Commission.³¹¹ ROSL has provided SCAI with

³⁰⁹ (i) [REDACTED] who migrated in 1946, aged 10, <https://www.dorsetecho.co.uk/news/5048868.weymouth-man-receives-deportation-apology/>; (ii) Francis Webster, *Footsteps of a Child Migrant* (Artemis, London, 2011), [REDACTED] (iii) [REDACTED] <https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=DTkpfeTlyUAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=footsteps+of+a+child+migrant+francis+webster&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjv94OmjfbAhWil8AKHRZID4oQ6AEIJAA#v=onepage&q=footsteps%20of%20a%20child%20migrant%20francis%20webster&f=false>; (iv) [REDACTED] and (v) his brother, (vi) [REDACTED] and (vii) his brother, and (viii) [REDACTED] *Windows: Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College Autobiographies*, Fairbridge Marketing Company Limited, Christchurch, New Zealand, 2001, pp.28-29, 121-122,197. A digitised copy of this book has been supplied to SCAI by the Prince's Trust, PRT.001.001.4655-4839. It contains 24 personal accounts by former child migrant residents, reproduced newsletters 1950-91, photographs, and contextualising commentaries.

³¹⁰ NRS, ED11/384, 'Homeless Children. Emigration Schemes', SGV.0001.004.4620 for a press cutting on Edinburgh PAC's interest, 1 April 1948, and SGV.001.004.4630 for a Scottish Home Department description of the scheme, 21 Jan 1948; and see para 13.6 below.

³¹¹ ROSL, Section 21 response, 29 Jan 2019, ROL.001.001.0001-0014, and 26 Sept 2019, ROL.001.001.0123-0136 Surviving records are limited. Other accessed documentary sources are TNA, MH102/1564, 'Emigration of Children to New Zealand. Appeal for Foster Parents', covering the establishment of the scheme, 16 April-16 June 1948; DO35/6371, 'New Zealand Government's Child Migration Scheme', summarising its history and closure, 16 Dec 1952-Nov 1953; and DO35/6377, 'Increased UK Government Financial Assistance to Voluntary Organisations Concerned with Child Migration', pp.88-89, Cyril Bavin, Honorary Migration Secretary, Over-Seas League, 'Statement of Our Migration Activities', 28 Feb 1955. Also see Stuart Young and [REDACTED] 'British child migration to New Zealand, 1949 to 1954: the Royal Over-Seas League Scheme', a paper presented to the First International Congress on Child Migration, New Orleans, Oct 2012; and IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, March 2018, pp.109-112. There are inconsistencies in the data. ROSL's report to SCAI refers to 30 sailings, and the last photographed party is the 25th, dated 23 Jan 1953; but a document in DO35/6371 states that the 'Child Migration Scheme terminated' in Sept 1952, and also that 'A total of

two reports, and also several reproductions of photographs with captions of 16 parties departing between 26 April 1949 and 23 January 1953. Only some of the captions refer explicitly to Scottish youngsters - boys and girls - but they total 30. Ages are not always given, but 20 were child migrants below the school-leaving age, by then 15. Confirming the caption to one of the ROSL photographs, *The Scotsman* newspaper, dated 28 December 1949, recorded that seven Scottish children, aged 10-13 and a juvenile of 16, were about to depart for New Zealand under this scheme (along with others from England).³¹² They were the party which left on 3 January 1950, as reported that day in the *Aberdeen Press and Journal*.³¹³ As for numbers overall, because only 16 of the 30 parties were photographed and because Scottish children and particularly those under the school-leaving age were not consistently identified in the captions, we suggest that the known total of 20 Scottish child migrants (under 15 years old) sent to New Zealand by ROSL should be doubled to a possible total of **40**.

10.11 We know that Aberlour Orphanage had been attracted by this ROSL scheme in 1948. However, the father of one proposed boy had refused to give his consent, and after the examination of another boy a psychologist had not recommended him for selection.³¹⁴

Australia

10.12 Especially from the 1920s to 1970, following restrictions imposed on child migration to Canada, Australia became the principal destination of UK child migrants, receiving around 7000 UK child migrants over those decades. In this period it was largely the Australian connection which occupied the attention of politicians, officials

375 children sailed under the scheme', whereas in his statement Bavin, while confirming that there were 30 sailings, April 1949-Aug 1953, states that 530 children were selected, though the Young and ██████ paper refers to 549 child migrants. We have opted for 530 as the total, in conformity with the figure in IICSA's report, para 2.5.1, p.109. On line see

<https://www.iicsa.org.uk/publications/investigation/child-migration/part-c-detailed-examination-institutional-responses/sending-institutions/25-royal-overseas-league-league>, para 2.5.1, note 2.

³¹² NRS, ED11/384, 'Homeless Children, Emigration Schemes', SGV.001.004.4609.

³¹³ *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, 3 Jan 1950, ABN.001.001.1271.

³¹⁴ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.8077-8080. Aberlour, List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7698, records a mother writing to say that her son, aged nine, had been accepted for emigration to New Zealand, that he had then been discharged from Aberlour, and that he had been emigrated on 6 August 1945. This is a puzzle. The war in the Far East did not end until the Japanese surrender on 15 August, and the first party sent by ROSL to New Zealand did not leave until 26 April 1949.

and sending and receiving organisations in Australia and in the UK, and indeed in Scotland. Total UK numbers were never as high as those sent previously to Canada: around 3900 between the wars and about 3200 from 1947 to the last known departures in 1970. The composition of the interwar UK numbers by source remains uncertain. Best estimates suggest that Barnardo's supplied most, 2340 from 1921 to 1939, though early on some were juveniles (all of the 47 boys in the 1921 party), but from 1931 only those of school age were accepted.³¹⁵ We also know that Fairbridge secured and sent around 1500 from 1912 to 1939. We understand that in those decades the several Catholic religious orders provided a modest 110.³¹⁶ As will be shown below, post-war data is more complete. However, what follows is an explanation of how our estimate for the total number of Scottish child migrants ever sent to Australia is probably at most **369**.

10.13 We consider the pre-First World War and interwar component first. We are not aware of why **Whinwell** seems to have been first off the mark, but sending only **19** children to Australia between 1913 and 1934.³¹⁷ As indicated earlier, **Quarriers** between the wars had dedicated its efforts to migrating children to Canada, but age restrictions from 1924 had largely limited those sent to juveniles,³¹⁸ until even those opportunities were restricted by economic depression in the 1930s. This prompted Quarriers in 1934 to consider Australia as an alternative destination for child migrants, but the first and only inter-war party of 13 boys and 4 girls, totalling **17**, did not leave until April 1939, their destination being the Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Home at Parramatta in New South Wales. Photographs of them in school uniforms confirm that these were child not juvenile migrants. Curiously, Burnside had first raised this possibility with the Church of Scotland Overseas Department in May

³¹⁵ House of Commons Health Select Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, Barnardo's Government Select Committee papers (1998), BAR.001.005.8963, para 2.3.3, and BAR.001.005.8964, paras 2.3.6, 2.3.7.

³¹⁶ *Lost Innocents*, Report, Table 4.2, p.264,

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index

³¹⁷ Possibly 21 [REDACTED] children were sent to Australia: see footnote 301 above for a comment on figures. Stirling Council, *Whinwell's Annual Report* for 1913, STC.001.001.0618, records three boys, aged eight, nine and 10, leaving for Pinjarra. The *Report* for 1914 records the departure of a second contingent of two boys and two girls, age range six to nine, STC.001.001.0624. The *Report* for 1934 explains that because of improved economic conditions, three more children went to Pinjarra that year, and three more were shortly to follow, STC.001.001.0642.

³¹⁸ For evidence of this see Quarriers, 'Children and Information', QAR.001.008.0066-0073. This table relates the dates of birth to the dates of migration of those sent to Canada from 1925, the only exceptions being younger siblings and children joining fathers already in Canada.

1936, but, it is said, the consulted Presbyterian churches had rejected the proposal. Correspondence in 1937 also indicates that parents and guardians were reluctant to respond to the Church of Scotland's efforts to provide children to be sent to Burnside.³¹⁹ In the event it was the YMCA in London, headed by Cyril Bavin (later associated with the Royal Over-Seas League), who seized the opportunity and became the sending agency for those selected by Quarriers.³²⁰

10.14 According to records provided by the **Aberlour Trust**, a juvenile boy, aged 15, was sent with siblings to Australia in 1928, and another, aged 16, also possibly with siblings, was migrated in 1928.³²¹ At those ages, both presumably went straight into employment, and that needs to be noted. We also know from its second report to SCAI that **Royal Over-Seas League** members in Scotland provided some financial support to assist the migration of children to Fairbridge farm schools, beginning in 1927.³²² There is also a 1935 press reference to the Aberdeen branch selecting one 11-year-old boy at the Aberlour Orphanage and subsidising his emigration to a Fairbridge Farm School.³²³ The League, it seems, endeavoured to support the migration of one child each year to Fairbridge in Australia.

10.15 Subsequently, in 1936, **Fairbridge** extended its own recruiting operations into Scotland, with the backing of the Scottish Central Council of Juvenile Organisations and the Scottish Council for Women's Trades and Careers, the latter formally becoming the representative of Fairbridge Farm Schools in Scotland. It claimed in 1937 that it was responsible for the initial selection of children for Fairbridge.³²⁴ However, in August 1938 the Aberlour Orphanage turned down an invitation from a Fairbridge representative to select children under 12 for migration to Australia, but agreed to reconsider if Fairbridge were willing to select children aged 14 or over, in

³¹⁹ For responses to the overture from Burnside by the churches and then by Bavin and the YMCA see NAA, 'Correspondence between the Church of Scotland, Quarriers and Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Homes, Australia, NAA, 001.001.0543-0568. On the difficulties of obtaining children for Burnside reported in 1937 see TNA, DO35/686.7, 'Child Migration. Burnside House, Australia', pp.2-6, 14-15.

³²⁰ The trajectory of change from Canada to Australia is recorded in Quarriers' annual *Narrative of Facts*, especially *Narrative of Facts*, 1934, QAR.001.001.2770, 2779, 2783, 2785, 2792; and 1939, QAR.001.001.3022, 3030-3033; plus Quarriers, Section 21 response – Part C, QAR.001.001.0506, and Magnusson, *Quarriers Story*, p.213.

³²¹ Aberlour, List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7698.

³²² ROSL, Section 21 response – Child Migrants, ROL.001.001.0126-0127.

³²³ *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, 28 Sept 1935, ABN.001.001.1247.

³²⁴ Letters, Scottish Central Council of Juvenile Organisations, 13 Nov 1936, 22 Feb 1937, 3 Nov 1937, and Scottish Council for Women's Trades and Careers, 12 Nov 1937, ABN.001.001.1221-1123, 1225.

other words juvenile migrants above the school-leaving age and fit for employment – as had become by then the standard expectation in migration to Canada.³²⁵

Somewhat unusually for a local authority, Aberdeen County Council was supportive of Fairbridge operations in Australia.³²⁶

10.16 Research into **Salvation Army** operations is again handicapped by the destruction of pre-war records, but we know that a training farm was opened at Riverview in Queensland in 1926, particularly for juveniles. This operation was however closed with the onset of economic depression in the 1930s and then by the war.³²⁷

10.17 Before considering post-war data we need to recall that the school-leaving age had been raised to 15 in 1947, and funding arrangements adjusted accordingly, and we have taken that into account in our consideration of child migration. Table 1 is based on official records of funded child migrants for post-war years up to 1965, after which we know, but have not seen tabulated, only a few children were sent.³²⁸

³²⁵ Aberlour, Section 21 response, ABE.001.008.8062.

³²⁶ See SCAI documents provided by Aberdeen County Council, 1935-39, by or about the operations of Aberdeen Public Assistance Committee, ABN.001.001.1215-1218.

³²⁷ Esther Daniel, ' "Solving an Empire Problem": the Salvation Army and British juvenile migration to Australia', *History of Education Review*, vol.36, no.1, 2007, pp.33-48, and Esther Daniel, 'British Juvenile Migration to Australia: Case Studies on the Programs of the Big Brother Movement, the Salvation Army and the Church of England between 1920 and 1960', La Trobe University Ph.D, 2004, pp.273-360. There is reference to juveniles but not explicitly to child migrants in this Salvation Army blog: <https://www.salvationarmy.org.uk/history/blog122>. See also NAA guide to sources, which refers to young Salvation Army migrants sent to Australia as being at least 14 years old: <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx>.

³²⁸ Constantine, 'The British Government, child welfare, and child migration to Australia after 1945', Appendix, pp.126-127. The data in TNA, DO35/6381, DO35/10253, DO175/38 and DO175/133 contain inaccuracies, notably in the total recorded for 1947 (439 not 411?) and in aggregate for the Fairbridge Society (1031 not 997?) and for the Church of Scotland (81 not 83?). An un-located but small number of additional child migrants left after 1965, probably the last in 1970. Although the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College scheme was subsidised by the Empire Settlement Act and its successors, this was a distinct arrangement and numbers would not be contained in the figures for the Fairbridge Society, a quite separate organisation.

Table 1: Subsidised Child Migrants Sent to Australia by Voluntary Societies 1947-1965

	ACIC	CE	DRB	FS	NCH	NCT	CS	SA	Total
1947	334	16	38	51					411
1948	28	12	22	65		38			165
1949	18	39	24	39		9			129
1950	84	32	50	109	65	13	28	7	388
1951	14	12	36	73	8	14	3	1	161
1952	134	53	44	57	1	4	7	23	323
1953	184	36	18	54		5	1	7	305
1954	82	47	22	52		6	22	12	243
1955	34	35	46	63		12	4	5	199
1956	15	37	31	24		3	2	12	124
1957	1	24	10	36		5	1		82
1958	2	29		42		3	2	5	90
1959		13	30	56				12	103
1960	4	20	8	24			11	4	68
1961	5	1	12	46				1	64
1962	2	1	11	60					74
1963	2		31	38					71
1964	1		8	95					104
1965	2	1	16	47					66
Total	946	408	457	997	74	112	83	91	

Key to organisational initials: ACIC - Australian Catholic Immigration Committee; CE - Church of England Advisory Council of Empire Settlement; DRB - Dr Barnardo's; FS - Fairbridge Society; NCH - National Children's Home; NCT - Northcote Children's Trust; CS - Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service; SA - Salvation Army.

10.18 Given our concern with child migrants from Scotland, we can set aside the 408 funded through the **Church of England Advisory Council of Empire Settlement**. We can also disregard the 74 sent to Australia between 1950 and 1952 by **National Children's Home**, a Methodist organisation which did not operate in Scotland. Of the remaining 2686 child migrants it is still not clear how many were from Scotland.

10.19 Of the 2686, the largest number of children, 997, were sent by the **Fairbridge Society**. Fairbridge post-war was evidently keen to advertise its work in Scotland. In September 1948 it had sought to recruit a social worker by placing an advertisement in *The Scotsman*.³²⁹ Then, in March 1949, representatives of Fairbridge explained at a meeting with officials in the Scottish Home Department that they wished to contact local authorities in Scotland, as they had in England.³³⁰ They also stressed that they had Scottish representatives on their committee. Home Department officials, evidently not opposed to child migration, post-war, post-Clyde, post-Curtis and post-Children Act, offered suggestions on whom they should contact and to whom they should send their literature, and they offered to provide contact details. They also requested for their consideration a copy of the society's memorandum on its selection and care practices. Whatever reservations the officials might have had they were not discouraging. Even though the place of departure for Fairbridge-selected children was in England, in due course at Knockholt in Kent, we know that some had been born in Scotland (or had been living there) and were sent south by parents or guardians before their transfer overseas. However, we have at present no secure figures for the number of young Scots among those from the UK sent post-war to Pinjarra in Western Australia, Molong in New South Wales and Tresca in Tasmania (this last receiving very few from the whole of the UK).³³¹ We speculate that the pre-war and post-war total might be around **80**.

10.20 As for the **Northcote Children's Trust**, a separate but related operation set up in 1937, our information on numbers remains limited. Like Fairbridge it only sent children overseas, to Australia. Northcote too received their young charges directly from parents or guardians, and from feeder organisations like Middlemore and

³²⁹ NRS, ED11/384 'Homeless Children, Emigration Schemes', *Scotsman*, 23 Sept 1948, SGV.001.004.4617.

³³⁰ *Ibid*, 'Discussion on Fairbridge Farm Schools at Fileden House', 2 March 1949, SGV001.004.4615-4616.

³³¹ As noted earlier, footnote 2, around 2900 children were sent by Fairbridge to institutions in Australia under single and then two-parent family migration schemes, and these are disregarded in this analysis.

National Children's Homes, and indeed in a few cases from local authorities. Surprisingly, a pre-war Northcote report, covering only the years 1937-39, lists 151 addresses in the UK to which aftercare reports should be sent. Still more surprisingly, 15 of those reports were to be sent to Aberdeen Public Assistance Committee. Some and probably all of these Scottish children had first been dispatched to Middlemore Homes in Birmingham in preparation for their migration via the Trust.³³² But whether any of the 112 post-war child migrants were also from Scotland we do not know. Our suggested total, again on the principle of maximising numbers and covering pre-war as well as post-war, is **30**.

10.21 We know that even pre-war the Roman Catholic Church in Australia was actively recruiting in Scotland. In September 1938, Canon Griffin, representing the Catholic Emigration Association and based in Birmingham, sent an alluringly attractive illustrated brochure (and several application forms) to the Scottish Home Department.³³³ This advertised the pre-war work of the Christian Brothers at their several institutions in Western Australia and the opportunities provided for 'orphaned and poor boys'.³³⁴ It was an inopportune moment, just before the outbreak of war, but we know from several sources that recruiting quickly resumed post-war. Indeed, the second most numerous contingent of UK child migrants were the 946 sent under the auspices of the **Australian Catholic Immigration Committee** and other Catholic organisations involved in this work.³³⁵ This was an umbrella organisation based in London, which received UK taxpayers' money from the UK Treasury under the Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts to distribute around the UK to approved Catholic institutions supplying child migrants. It had an office in Edinburgh which seems to have had autonomy over the selection of children. The ACIC certainly financed child migration by Catholic institutions in Scotland. Assuming that surviving records of those selected and sent are complete, 71 children were provided by the Sisters of Nazareth, made up of 33 from Aberdeen, 30 from Edinburgh, four from Kilmarnock and only four from Glasgow, which is rather surprising since it had been since 1878 the centre of a Catholic archdiocese and the city contained areas where living standards were low. In addition, 15 were

³³² Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, p.180.

³³³ NRS, ED11/384, 'Homeless Children, Emigration Schemes', pp.138-190.

³³⁴ *Ibid*, p.148.

³³⁵ On the complex organisational structures of post-war Catholic child migration from Scotland see Appendix 3 Section 5, paras 5.1-5.43.

supplied by the Good Shepherd's Woodfield Children's Home at Colinton.³³⁶ That would make a total of **86**.

10.22 A branch of **Dr Barnardo's Homes** had been established in Australia in 1921 initially to cater for the welfare needs of Australian children but in due course also for child migrants sent from the UK. It had its own management committee, though corporate responsibility remained with the Board of Directors in London until 1996. A first party of 47 boys, juveniles over 14, arrived in 1921, and were at once placed on farms. They were followed by a party of 32 girls, aged between 12 and 14, and they too were placed out, as domestic servants. Other child migrants, totalling 408 between 1924 and 1938, were sent to the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra in Western Australia.³³⁷ Barnardo's also emulated Fairbridge practice, and from 1929 began to accommodate boys and girls under 14 at its Mowbray Farm School, Picton, New South Wales. Initially lacking a branch in Scotland, it is unlikely that pre-war any were recruited from north of the border, but it is possible that other agencies might have sent some children in need to Barnardo's institutions in the south and from there they may have been selected and sent to Picton. Post-war Barnardo's had been further funded by 1967 to send an additional 457 children overseas, either to Mowbray or to other Barnardo's homes in New South Wales, and it seems that a few others may have followed.³³⁸ However, Barnardo's records indicate that only **19** had been migrated from Scotland and only between 1947 and 1965: five boys to Mowbray; four boys and two girls to the Greenwood home for boys and girls in Normanhurst; one girl to the girls' home in Burwood near Sydney; and three boys and two girls to a family group home at Belmont, Lithgow - plus two siblings, a boy and a girl, who were migrated with their foster parents. Fourteen of them were under the age of 14, three aged 14 and the other two were juveniles aged 15 and 16.³³⁹

10.23 The economic depression and then the war had stopped the emigration of young people to Australia by the **Salvation Army**, and indeed, as noted earlier, the

³³⁶ Sisters of Nazareth, Section 21 response—Part C, NAZ.001.001.0297; Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, Section 21 response—Parts C and D on Woodfield Children's Home, Colinton, 1945-1970, GSH.001.001.0412.

³³⁷ Barnardo's, Section 21 response, 14 December 2018, BAR.001.005.3330-3331.

³³⁸ Barnardo's, 'Australian Correspondence', Allen to Webber, 16 May 1969, refers to a last 'party' being sent in 1965, but 14 more thereafter including 6 in 1968 and 4 more by May 1969, BAR.001.006.0253.

³³⁹ Barnardo's, Section 21 response, 14 September 2018, BAR.001.001.0512-0514.

Riverview Farm School had been in effect abandoned.³⁴⁰ However, post-war it was revived. Since the Army had become mainly a juvenile (and adult) migrating agency it is necessary to keep in mind the rise in the school-leaving age to 15, so we will regard those as not yet 15 as child migrants. In September 1949 an Australian representative of the Salvation Army visited the Scottish Home Department.³⁴¹ He sketched out some tentative proposals to recruit children, possibly for adoption in Australia, or, if they were 14-year-old boys, for training at the Army's Riverview Training Farm in Queensland. He also told a sceptical official that he had spoken to local authorities in Glasgow, Aberdeen and Ayr about the possibilities for adoption and had gained the impression that children would be available. It is probable, though not certain, that some Scottish children were recruited by the Army and funded to go to Riverview in Queensland. There is reference in 1948 to two brothers from Aberdeen being considered, one aged 12 and the other already a juvenile aged 15, but whether either or both were migrated remains uncertain.³⁴² We also know that renewed maintenance agreements were signed between the Salvation Army and the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1957, and again in 1960.³⁴³ However, there had already been difficulties in securing boys, and there were also objections in Australia in 1959 and 1960 to the prospect of accommodating Australian delinquents alongside UK boys in the same establishment. It was the Army which abandoned the scheme to send boys to Riverview, and also a related one to send children to four homes in New South Wales, again apparently because of its inability to recruit. In 1962 the Army turned down an invitation by the CRO to renew again its maintenance agreement.³⁴⁴ How many of the 91 funded recruits sent to Australia by the Salvation Army between 1950 and 1960 were from Scotland remains another gap in our knowledge. We suggest **20** as a possible maximum.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁰ Daniel, 'Salvation Army', p.46.

³⁴¹ Salvation Army, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service_EM_2_2_2_2, memo to Colonel Culshaw, 15 Nov 1948, SAL.001.002.0460.

³⁴² *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0462-0463, 'Boys for Riverview Farm, Queensland', 2 Dec 1948.

³⁴³ TNA, DO35/10251, 'The Fairbridge Society. Renewal of Agreements, 1957 and 1960'.

³⁴⁴ NRS, ED11/384, 'Homeless Children, Emigration Schemes', pp.97-99, 126; TNA, MH102/2023, 'Recognition of the Salvation Army in New South Wales as an Approved Organisation for Child Migration from the UK', and Salvation Army, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM_2_2_2_4, SAL.001.002.0661-0709. A scheme to send juveniles to Canada was initiated in 1954, but the first sailing did not take place until May 1958: 'Boys for Farming in Canada', SAL.001.002.0710-0866.

³⁴⁵ Again it is helpful to consult NAA, 'Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia. The Salvation Army' <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx> but noting that all over 14 are said to be juveniles (or adults).

10.24 That leaves us with the **Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service (CSCSS)**. Our understanding of how CSCSS operated has benefitted by receipt of a substantial report including copies of two NRS files submitted to SCAI.³⁴⁶ In 1948 Presbyterian churches in Australia and New Zealand, plus the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College, invited CSCSS to supply them with child migrants. After some hesitation a letter was dispatched to parishes which, following responses from local ministers, resulted in twelve children being selected by December. Those responding were put in touch with Presbyterian churches in Australia, but we lack evidence of whether any children were subsequently dispatched. Then, early in 1950, the Rev Andrew Boag, representing the Presbyterian Church in Victoria, arrived in Scotland and made contact with CSCSS. The importance of CSCSS in what followed was increased when in 1951 it became a member of the UK-wide Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration (CVOCE). The Home Office meanwhile had required the Presbyterian Church of Victoria to arrange for a British committee to be formed to act as its official representative. CSCSS therefore set up a recruitment committee headed by its director, Rev Lewis Cameron, and this the church in Victoria regarded as an extension of its committee in Australia and indeed as its agents in Scotland. The CSCSS committee, not as hesitant as it had been, then contacted all local authorities and voluntary homes in Scotland, including those Rev Boag had already visited, and invited them to propose suitable children in their care for migration.³⁴⁷ The initial intention was that the operation would be funded entirely from Australia, but it also came to receive the usual financial support from the UK government. The Presbyterian Church of Victoria and therefore the CSCSS committee in Edinburgh had a particular relationship with the Dhurringile Farm School at Tatura to which all the Scottish children were sent, and that is evident from the sequence of agreements signed by CSCSS with the UK government. However, the funded total in the table above for which it was responsible was a modest 83, and even those contained some who, because of insufficient recruits secured from Scotland, had

³⁴⁶ Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (Crossreach), Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0445-0639, with particular references below, unless otherwise recorded, to the summary report, pp.1-15, COS.001.001.0446-0460, and to accompanying documents, including NRS, ED11/386 'Homeless Children, Emigration Schemes, the Presbyterian Church of Victoria, Australia, Dhurringile Rural Training Farm', SGV.001.003.7861-7972; and ED11/509 'Emigration of Children through the Auspices of the Church of Scotland'. A more legible copy of ED11/386 has been separately provided by SCAI.

³⁴⁷ Under this scheme, Stirling County Council's Children's Committee, with the approval of the Secretary of State under Section 17 of the 1948 Children Act, sent an orphaned 13-year old boy to Australia in November 1950, precise destination not stated: STC.001.001.1268, 1328-1331.

been separately supplied by the Royal Over-Seas League from elsewhere in the UK.³⁴⁸

10.25 However, we should add that information provided to SCAI reveals that **Quarriers** post-war and in response to CSCSS approaches despatched 21 boys to the Dhurringile Training Farm, Victoria, in three parties, eleven in January 1960, five in 1961 and five in 1962. Photographs showing them in school uniforms confirm that they too, like the 1939 party referred to earlier, were child not juvenile migrants. Almost certainly they would all have been funded via CSCSS on behalf of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria, and therefore they all should have been included in the CSCSS figures – but the 10 sent in 1961 and 1962 seem to have been overlooked in official funding records. We also know of a further five in 1963.³⁴⁹ Hence our total figure for **CSCSS** recruits is **98**.

10.26 Finally, we need here to draw attention again to the Royal Over-Seas League, and specifically to the role of its migration secretary, Cyril Bavin.³⁵⁰ The ROSL reports to SCAI refer to his work enabling wartime CORB evacuees, who had been repatriated to the UK post-war, to return to Australia if they wished. However, we know from records obtained by IICSA that Bavin from February 1947 was also keen to supply Australia with additional child migrants. This he seems to have effected by including children who had not been evacuees in the returning CORB parties, and

³⁴⁸ See correspondence in NRS, ED11/386. The Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (Crossreach) Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0456, records the funded total as 83, as on TNA files and as employed in the table above, the last children departing in 1960. However, Quarriers records show that five more were sent in 1961, and five more in 1962, making the total 93: *Narrative of Facts*, 1960, pp.5, 25-26, 45-46; *Narrative of Facts*, 1961, pp.44-45; *Narrative of Facts*, 1963, pp.8, 26. See also Quarriers, Section 21 response – Part C, QAR.001.001.0506-0507. For an elucidation of the curious arrangement with the Royal Over-Seas League, initially opposed by the Home Office, see COS.001.001.0617-0619; TNA, DO35/10276, 'Dhurringile Rural Training Farm School, Tatura, Victoria', LEG.001.002.5951-5986; and TNA, MH102/2049, 'Emigration of Children. Alleged Home Office Objection to the Overseas League acting as a Recruiting Agency for Child Migrants', correspondence 4 Aug-14 Oct 1953 and enclosures, LEG.001.003.1429-1452. ROSL's report to SCAI refers briefly in its 1954 Annual Report to recruiting for Dhurringile, ROL.001.001.0008. See ROL.001.001.0086-0089 for photographs of two parties of boys (with their parents), not from Scotland but destined for Dhurringile, six departing on 8 April 1954 and five on 3 June 1954.

³⁴⁹ NRS, ED11/386, *Evening Citizen*, 5 Jan 1960, p.7, SGV.001.003.7965; *Narrative of Facts*, 1961, p.44; *Narrative of Facts*, 1963, p.26; ED11/509, p.103.

³⁵⁰ See ROL.001.001.0127-0128 in ROSL's second report on Bavin's operations and the Australian government's objections and how they may have been circumvented. On the complexities of understanding ROSL's Australian operations, substantially due to the absence of ROSL records see Appendix 3, Section 6, paras 6.1-6.15. See also Lynch, 11 July 2017, pp.59-82 and IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, pp.109-112.

this was done without the knowledge, let alone the approval, of Australian or UK authorities. When in July 1948 ROSL's development secretary contacted Australian Commonwealth and State officials to propose a child migration adoption scheme his offer was rejected, because of official doubts about the adoption process and about ROSL's ability to manage such a scheme. Thereafter, ROSL operated as a recruiting agency for other sending societies, and accordingly the numbers of child migrants and the financial cost of their migration and subsequent care are embedded in the figures for those sending societies.

10.27 In summary, it seems indeed impossible to provide accurate figures for the number of child migrants dispatched overseas from Scotland. We know that Quarriers had migrated a substantial number to **Canada** from the 1870s into the 1930s, about **7384**, though from 1924 these would mainly have been juveniles aged 14 or over. To these we can add much smaller contributions by those operating at Aberlour, **46**;Whinwell, **102**; Blaikie's Home in Edinburgh, **301**; Stirling's Edinburgh and Leith operation, **200**; plus that small number recruited by Fairbridge, **25**; and possibly another **30** by the Salvation Army. Hence our Canadian total, with reservations, of **8088**.

10.28 Scotland contributed few to child migrant settlement in **Australia**. From Whinwell **19** (possibly 21); only **17** sent directly by Quarriers, in 1939; probably some but an unknown total pre-war and post-war by Fairbridge, perhaps **80**; at least 15 by Northcote pre-war and perhaps another 15 post-war, totalling **30**; by the Sisters of Nazareth and Good Shepherds **86**; by Barnardo's only **19** post-war; maybe some by the Salvation Army, but surely no more than **20**; by the Church of Scotland fewer than **98** (including the 26 supplied by Quarriers post-war). It is indeed a fragile calculation, but it is still unlikely that the total number of child migrants sent from Scotland to Australia even totalled **369**.

10.29 In addition we have suggested that **40** child migrants were sent to **New Zealand** by **ROSL**, and while we know for certain of only eight Scottish children sent to **Southern Rhodesia** we offer **10** as a possible total number.

10.30 In aggregate, and bearing in mind the imprecise data, it is possible that the total number of child migrants ever sent from Scotland numbered at most **8500**, out of the 100,000 or so UK child migrants sent overseas from the 1860s to the 1960s. At around 8.5% of the UK total, they were proportionately fewer than Scotland's 11.7% share of the UK population in 1901.

10.31 Moreover, if we confine our calculations to those migrated after 1930, as SCAl had originally envisaged for our report, the total is considerably reduced. To **Canada**, just **6** from Whinwell 1932-34, none by Quarriers after 1932, and the **25** by Fairbridge to the Prince of Wales Farm School in British Columbia. To **Australia**, **17** by Quarriers in 1939, maybe **80** by Fairbridge and **30** by Northcote; **86** by the Sisters of Nazareth and Good Shepherds; **19** by Barnardo's; fewer than **98** by the Church of Scotland (including the 43 supplied by Quarriers plus those obtained from elsewhere in the UK by the Royal Over-Seas League), and perhaps **20** by the Salvation Army. We can add a possible **40** sent to **New Zealand**, and for certain eight and possibly **10** sent to **Southern Rhodesia**. Keeping in mind that any selected and sent by local authorities would be numbered among these, it is very unlikely that even **430** child migrants left Scotland after 1930.

10.32 There were of course substantially sized urban populations in Scotland which were characterised by the same social problems which in England and Wales and Northern Ireland prompted voluntary organisations, including churches, to set up schemes and to secure state funding for child migration. Scotland, however, was perhaps too securely wedded to relocating children in need to foster parents in the rural hinterlands of those towns to be seduced by the beckoning regions of that Greater Britain overseas.

10.33 A final observation. Of the aggregated total of 3,170 child migrants sent by voluntary societies from the whole of the UK to Australia between 1947 and 1965, it is apparent that only half of the eight sending organisations operated over the entire period. Some children were sent after 1965, but numbers would have been very small. The peak years were 1947 (411 children sent in that single year) and then 1950-55 (1619 in total over six years, averaging 270 a year). The fall-off in participating organisations and in the number of children sent overseas thereafter was noticed at the time and became still more apparent later. Moreover, except possibly by Fairbridge, very few indeed were likely to have been dispatched from Scotland. It was indicative across the UK of the positive impact on family well-being of improvements in living standards, health and welfare provision, but also of a better understanding of the importance of sustaining family and home life or of providing equivalent surrogate care in the upbringing of children. In that respect too, Scotland's noticeable preference for fostering children in need, in spite of its own risks, protected a substantial number of children from the child migrant experience.

11 | Selection: External Constraints

11.1 Only a minority of children in care were sent overseas from the UK, and therefore how selection was effected carried life-determining consequences. As noted earlier, about 90,000 children up to the age of 14 were dispatched to Canada between the 1860s and 1920s and much smaller numbers later, around 5700 to Australia from the 1920s to 1970, and very many fewer to New Zealand and Southern Rhodesia. But all these totals are modest compared with the numbers who at any one time were in the care of voluntary societies and local authorities in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK. Although earlier figures have not been located, official reports show that the annual number in the care of voluntary societies in England and Wales ranged from over 21,000 in 1958 to still nearly 16,000 in 1966, and over 60,000 children were in local authority care in England and Wales each year in the 1950s and 1960s.³⁵¹ As also noted earlier, (para 4.1 above), each year between 1880 and 1940 a minimum of 2000 children were resident in voluntary homes in Scotland. Factoring in turnover - the departure of many from residential care and the arrival of new cases - this suggests that during those five decades over 60,000 children would have passed through their care. We do not have comparable data for the number and turnover of children in Scottish local authority accommodation over those same decades, but we do know that the number of children for whom local authorities in Scotland were responsible in 1913 numbered around 9000, rising to over 10,000 in 1952, so a comparable figure may be imagined over those four decades (see para 3.3 above). Given what we know about child migrant numbers, it is therefore abundantly clear that only a small proportion of children in institutional care in Scotland, as elsewhere in the UK, would have been sent overseas. Hence the questions arise as to how, why, and by whom were some children selected for migration. Given problems of access to the personal files of child migrants, this is difficult to answer, and yet the process and the criteria for selection determined their immediate and long-term futures. Drawing also on material collected by other inquiries, it is however possible to show how only some children came to be selected for migration. The evidence also suggests that the standards of selection and preparation of children for migration varied considerably between different organisations and sometimes fell below standards expected at the time.

³⁵¹ HCPP, Home Office, *Children in Local Authority Care*, Annual Reports 1952-1970; Jean S. Heywood, *Children in Care* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1959), pp.169, 172-173.

11.2 It is first necessary to understand important constraints on selection of which sending organisations were certainly made aware. Child migrants were expected by authorities in receiving countries to be physically and mentally sound. We have, for example, seen forms signed by a doctor in May 1912 and March 1915 certifying the fitness of a party of Quarriers children.³⁵² Educational attainments (and by implication intelligence) also seem to have been taken as indicative of suitability, based on educational progress in a sending institution or at school. To ensure proper assessments, government officials from overseas representing their home governments in the UK and answerable to ministers back home were expected to check and approve the cases of all UK (and therefore Scottish) children selected for migration, more so when, following the Empire Settlement Act, taxpayers back home were also in part subsidising the migration and settlement of the children selected. By the 1920s, child migrants being sent to Canada were interviewed and inspected by a Canadian government emigration agent and a woman officer, and also by a medical officer just before departure. A 'Certificate of Fitness for Emigration' had to be issued.³⁵³ Quarriers claimed in 1928 (by when its migrants would have been juveniles) that for some time it had been lobbying the Canadian authorities to introduce such a practice rather than risk children being excluded on arrival.³⁵⁴ Medical inspections were also required of the child migrants intended for the Prince of Wales Farm School in British Columbia.³⁵⁵ One child migrant's file reveals that in 1937 she had to pass medical examinations and psychological tests, which she did.³⁵⁶ However, of the 176 children selected by the Fairbridge Society to form the first cohort to be sent in 1935, only 41 had passed the examinations conducted by the Canadian authorities in London.³⁵⁷ Forty per cent were rejected on medical grounds, as physically or mentally unfit, and the rest because of a history of tuberculosis or insanity in their families, or because they had 'questionable' backgrounds. Although

³⁵² Quarriers, Official form of medical certificate to be used with the Emigration of Children to Canada, 21 May 1912, QAR.001.009.4102, and 2 March 1915, QAR.001.009.3054.

³⁵³ Mankin, 'Stephenson's Children', pp.173-174.

³⁵⁴ *Narrative of Facts*, 1928, p.20, <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/nof1928.pdf>

³⁵⁵ For a statement of the obligation see correspondence regarding the set up of a branch of the Fairbridge Farm School in British Columbia, 12 March 1934, PRT.001.001.6713, and for the British Columbia requirement see Minutes of Child Care Committee in London, March 1948, PRT.001.001.7508.

³⁵⁶ Prince's Trust, Children's File folder 125, PRT.001.001.6979, 6982, 6989.

³⁵⁷ For the results see Dunae, 'Waifs', pp.234-235. SCAI witness statement by Mr Mackay refers to a medical inspection at Middlemore Homes in Birmingham which he passed and was sent to the Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School in British Columbia, but which his sister seems to have failed (she had a squint), this leading to the separation of siblings, WIT.001.001.3454-3455.

we have not seen the records, or know if they survive, the excluded may have included some from Scotland. Thereafter, more rigorous screening by Fairbridge increased the acceptance rate, but still only up to about 80 per cent. Even so, in March 1948, the Child Care Committee at the Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School were requesting more information about how the children they were receiving had been selected.

11.3 Similarly, from 1921, Australian authorities began to use IQ as well as physical tests in London. Out of a party of 56 children selected by Barnardo's in 1927 from its homes in Liverpool, Australian officials rejected 19, and a similar scrutiny of proposed migrants from Scotland would have occurred.³⁵⁸ Certainly we know that post-war prospective child migrants from Northern Ireland were medically inspected at Australia House or by a local doctor and even by a professor of psychology, and there are many documented references to IQ tests in the evidence presented to the Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry.³⁵⁹ Witness statements provided by two former Quarriers boys sent to Australia also record that they were medically screened, though it is not stated by whom or where. Nevertheless, eyesight, hearing, urine, lung function, blood pressure and IQ were tested (one boy only being accepted after a second inspection).³⁶⁰

11.4 Some children were sent to New Zealand, so it is worth noting the form used by officials in New Zealand House prior to accepting children for immigration and fostering. The following questions had to be answered: '(1) Has the child at any time been subject to fits? (2) Has the child or any member of its family any history of mental disease, tuberculosis or any other physical disability? If so, state fully its nature'.³⁶¹ The government of Southern Rhodesia, determined to maintain the status of white settlers in a black African country, also imposed strict controls on entry to

³⁵⁸ On medical screening and use of IQ tests for entry to Australia see Boucher, *Empire's Children*, pp.126-154, and for the Barnardo's experience p.131. For school and health examinations of a potential child migrant conducted by Middlemore in 1954, followed by a medical examination including an IQ test by the Australian Department of Immigration, see PRT.001.001.7113, 7119, 7120, 7128, 7130. See also Minutes of Child Care Committee, 13 Sept 1950, 8 May 1952, and August 1952, PRT.001.001.7520, 7523, 7525.

³⁵⁹ Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Day 42, pp.61-66, testimony relating to 1947, 1955 and 1956: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D42-Transcript-Red-OPT.pdf>. Also Day 42, Evidence, medical examination reports, pp.30, 32, 34-36, and Day 48, Additional Evidence, pp.81-90: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>.

³⁶⁰ SCAI witness statement from Mr Hugh McGowan, WIT.001.001.7532; SCAI witness statement from Mr QKU WIT.001.002.1880.

³⁶¹ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.20.

exclude 'poor whites', and therefore officials in London scrutinised the racial and social origins as well as health and educational records of children put forward for admission to the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College.³⁶²

11.5 The scrutiny of child migrants from Scotland, as well as from elsewhere, did not end with initial approval. Immigrants, certainly adults and therefore very likely also child migrants, could be refused entry on first arrival overseas. Accordingly, before embarkation it was common for ships' doctors to carry out medical examinations, since the cost of repatriation was borne by shipping companies. Currently we lack examples, but it is possible that child migrants might have been turned away even before setting off. But ship surgeons were also expected to inspect passengers after departure.³⁶³ It is therefore possible that some were turned away on arrival overseas and sent back by immigration officers at ports of entry if they had developed signs of unsuitability, especially medical problems, during the long sea voyages to which they were subjected, although we are not at present aware of any such cases. This was less likely to be an issue later when children were flown out to their destinations and destinies.

11.6 Sending overseas only those described by Dr Barnardo as the 'flower of the flock' was also important since authorities overseas, certainly in Canada, deported some child migrants at the expense of the sending society who after arrival had not 'done well' and had become a burden on Canadian social services. Indeed, we have encountered examples of former child migrants being deported by the Canadian authorities because of bad character, criminal behaviour and other inadequacies.³⁶⁴ In spite of screening, before and after arrival, Australian authorities in the 1930s still complained about 'inferior heredity' and the poor physical and mental health of

³⁶² Boucher, *Empire's Children*, pp.143, 151-152.

³⁶³ See Quarriers, Various letters and reports re. Fairknowe Home and children there, QAR.001.009.3041-3044. This is a [REDACTED] 1915 certificate signed by a ship's surgeon on a vessel which had departed from Liverpool to Canada on [REDACTED] with 41 children under the age of 14 on board, including from Scotland 21 child migrants under 14 plus 9 aged 14 or 15. A letter, QAR.001.009.3060, also dated [REDACTED] 1915, from the Dominion Immigration Agent to the Superintendent of Immigration at Ottawa states that 33 boys had arrived and had passed the 'Medical and Civil Examination'.

³⁶⁴ Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.231-232; Mankin, 'Stephenson's Children', pp.231-236. Two lists, covering the years 1903-22 and 1923-27, do not specifically identify former child migrants but they do give an indication of Canadian readiness to deport the unacceptable: 'Rejected immigrants upon arrival at ocean ports and deportation after admission, by principal causes and by nationalities, 1903 to 1927', https://www65.statcan.gc.ca/acyb02/1927/acyb02_19270199011a-eng.htm

some British child migrants.³⁶⁵ The Australian Senate inquiry also noted that some post-war child migrants from the UK were said to have been in their past particularly deprived, that their educational attainments were below average, and that they included disruptive or troublesome children that the sending institutions found difficulty coping with or disciplining. Receiving homes still took them, although there were official complaints.³⁶⁶

11.7 All this suggests that the principal responsibility lay in the UK for making 'acceptable' selections according to criteria set down overseas as well as in the UK. We know that, formally, Presidents of the Local Government Board and later Home Secretaries, and their equivalents in Scotland and in Northern Ireland, were legally responsible for approving cases for migration put to them by local authorities. However, because the UK government failed to draft binding regulations which might have set down methods and criteria for selection by voluntary societies, the onus remained on those organisations to choose appropriately. That said, we also need to bear in mind not only the scrutiny of selections by overseas governments but also the conflicting pressure upon some sending agencies (Catholic organisations especially) to provide Australia post-war with substantial numbers of children.

³⁶⁵ Boucher, *Empire's Children*, pp.136-138.

³⁶⁶ *Lost Innocents*, Report, paras 2.102-2.106:

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c02. See also Sisters of Nazareth, M.Emmanuel Mary, Superior General, Nazareth House, Hammersmith, to Sisters of Nazareth, 21 March 1952: 'Only normal, well-behaved children from 5 to 10 years of age are to [be] emigrated', NAZ.001.006.2447-2448.

12 | Principles: Selection and Consent

12.1 The presumption behind the selection and sending overseas of Scottish children (those below the school-leaving age) was that the practice was legal if the child and preferably also the parents (or guardians) gave consent, though that meant - or should have meant - informed consent. On this Professor Norrie in his report and his oral evidence to SCAI has cast considerable doubt. Child migration from Scotland began in the 1860s, but he writes that 'parental consent was of doubtful efficacy in providing legal authority to the sending of children abroad, because parental authority was in principle inalienable'. Initially, at least, only boys over 14 and, somewhat surprisingly, girls over 12 were alone 'free to choose their own residence if emancipated or under the guardianship of curators'. However, legislation applicable in Scotland from 1891 seems to have assumed that the sending of younger children overseas by 'fit persons' even without parental consent, or that of the child, was legal. More seriously, because the numbers of children placed in care with philanthropic societies and sent overseas were so much greater, the legality of such practice also remained legally ill-determined, and the failure of the UK government to introduce regulations until 1982 left the matter long uncertain.³⁶⁷

12.2 In his oral testimony Professor Norrie further elaborates on his written submission as follows, with respect to children placed by parents with, for example, Quarriers:

There's a general principle in Scots law that what we call the *patria potestas* is non-delegable: you can't give your children away, you can't give up your own parental responsibilities, it's not lawful, it's not legally competent for a parent to say, 'I transfer all my responsibilities to somebody else'. If that is so, then the parental consent given for at least some children in Quarriers is dubious at best.³⁶⁸

However, if parents were dead or had abandoned their children, Professor Norrie states as follows:

That brings us to the potential second source of legal authority for that, which is the child's own consent. Once you're talking about the child's consent, you have

³⁶⁷ Professor Kenneth McK Norrie, *Legislative Background to the Treatment of Children and Young People living apart from their Parents*, Appendix One, 'Emigration of Children', p.336 and note 3, and pp.338-345.

³⁶⁸ Professor Norrie oral testimony transcript, Day 124, 2 April 2019, pp.50-54, TRN.001.001.6565-6569.

to ask which child is capable of providing that consent in Scots law.... Until 1991, in terms of legal capacity to perform legal transactions, such as give consent to these sorts of things, the common law of Scotland, right up until 1991, drew a distinction and said boys under the age of 14 had no capacity, girls under the age of 12 had no capacity.

He concludes that, with respect to sending such children overseas, Quarriers and by implication other sending agencies, the 'very shaky legal authority that was relied upon was the fact that nobody challenged the practice'.

12.3 From legal principles we turn next to the principles which might or should have determined selection. The principle that children should be selected carefully had become well-established by the late Victorian times. In his 1875 report, Doyle had stressed that poor selection was likely to lead to unsuccessful placements for child migrants.³⁶⁹ The importance of appropriate selection was also stressed in the Bondfield Report in 1924. Recognising that some children displayed a 'temperamental unsuitability' for migration, it recommended that greater attention be paid to their psychological assessment prior to migration. Its broader recommendation that children under school-leaving age should not be sent out to Canada through child migration schemes was also informed, in part, by the view that younger children's emotional suitability for migration was more difficult to assess and that informed consent to migration was more realistic for children over school-leaving age.³⁷⁰ Concerns about the children being selected for migration were still being expressed by the Curtis Committee in 1946. Taking at face value the assurances it had received that only physically fit and psychologically capable children were sent overseas, the committee responded that there were already suitable opportunities for such children in the UK.³⁷¹

12.4 Subsequently, in 1951, and as an indication of its general disquiet about methods of selection, the Women's Group on Public Welfare attempted in its report to encourage better practice. It began by reviewing the current procedures of some child migration organisations. On the basis of this review the Women's Group made a number of recommendations, beginning with the statement quoted earlier that 'the

³⁶⁹ HCPP, *Pauper Children (Canada): Report*, HC 9, pp.7, 14, INQ-000000006.

³⁷⁰ HCPP, *British Overseas Settlement Delegation to Canada Report*, Cmd 2285, pp.7, 13.

³⁷¹ HCPP, *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, Cmd 6922, 1945-46, p.177, para 515; also quoted Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Day 42, 1 Sept 2014, pp.28-29. <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D42-Transcript-Red-OPT.pdf>

main consideration in selection is not only whether the child is suited to emigration but whether emigration is best suited to his particular needs'.³⁷² It then insisted that personal and family histories of the child being considered for emigration should be collected by a qualified social worker, preferably a psychiatric social worker 'with special understanding of the emotional needs of children'.³⁷³ Selection committees should consist of persons with knowledge and experience relevant to different aspects of children's welfare and education, they should be able to study in detail the case histories of each child, and they should reach decisions only after interviewing the children and their parents or guardians. Moreover, one member of the selection committee should have first-hand knowledge of conditions in the receiving country. A matter of importance to SCAI is that the Group insisted that for a child who has brothers and sisters 'careful consideration should be given to the advisability of keeping together the family unit'.³⁷⁴

12.5 We should also recall that from as early as 1948 and lasting right through to 1954 the Home Office struggled to draft regulations which, under Section 33 of the 1948 Children Act, would require voluntary organisations engaged in emigrating children overseas to seek the approval of the Secretaries of State in London and Edinburgh for how they intended to conduct their operations. In the draftings, the Scottish Home Department and the Advisory Councils on Child Care in Scotland as well as in England and Wales were consulted. As we recorded earlier, these regulations were never finalised and imposed, but the Commonwealth Relations Office, the High Commission in Australia, and the Australian authorities were aware of the details and intent. Amongst much else, and indicative of the need for tightening and standardising selection procedures, were two clauses in a 1952 draft.³⁷⁵ These would require the child to be interviewed by an advisory case committee including at least one trained and experienced social worker and if possible one person with first-hand experience of the child's intended destination.

³⁷² WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.59. On this point see also the emphasis on migration and the needs of the individual child in the Home Office memorandum produced in June 1947 which is discussed in Appendix 3, Section 2, para 2.5.

³⁷³ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.59.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁵ TNA, DO35/3439, 'Policy: Government, Child Migration. Home Office Proposed Regulations', LEG.001.002.2299-2458, esp pp.22-26, LEG.001.002.2320-2324; 'Memorandum by the Home Office on Regulations to be made under section 33 of the Children Act, 1948, to control the making and carrying out by voluntary organisations of arrangements for the emigration of children', June 1952, especially paras 7 and 8, pp.24-25. Home Office deliberations on and drafting of this version can be traced back to 1948 in TNA files.

The consent of the child would also have to be obtained, unless the case committee judged the child too young to express an opinion. Parents or guardians should also be interviewed, if practicable, and their consent obtained, but if refused or consultation not practicable and the organisation judged emigration to be in the interests of the child then the case should be referred to the Secretary of State who should be empowered to allow or prohibit the emigration. The medical history of the child and if necessary of the family should be provided, a medical examination held, and, if the case committee or doctor required it, the child should also be assessed by a psychiatrist. Written reports on all these examinations should be supplied. Save where a child was emigrating with or going to join a parent, guardian or relative, the case committee should also have relevant information relating to the child's personal and family history, collected by a person with training and experience in social work. The child's religious persuasion, educational attainments, school medical record and any particular characteristics likely to be affected adversely by emigration were also to be obtained and recorded. Addresses of family members, including siblings, were to be provided, and as a further control it was to be ascertained whether any family members were willing instead to provide a suitable home in the UK, or elsewhere. In dealing with children who had brothers or sisters, due consideration should be given to keeping or bringing the family together. Finally, in familiar terms, the 'paramount consideration' should not be 'whether the child is suitable for emigration, but to the question whether emigration is best suited to the child's individual needs'.³⁷⁶ As a further regulation, if a child after giving consent 'changed his mind' and yet the organisation still considered emigration in the best interests of the child, then the case should be referred to the Secretary of State who should be empowered to prohibit it. It will be seen that there is much in these draft regulations which derive from the Curtis report and professional opinion, as had also informed the report of the Women's Group. These proposals were also broadly assented to by the constituent members of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration (CVOCE), which as noted earlier included Dr Barnardo's Homes, the Catholic Child Welfare Council, the Royal Over-Seas League, the Fairbridge Society, the Salvation Army and the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service, amongst others.³⁷⁷

12.6 We have already indicated that Miss Harrison's 1950 Report relayed back the complaints of receiving institutions about the poor quality of some children

³⁷⁶ *Ibid*, para 8, p.25.

³⁷⁷ This is discussed further in Appendix 3, Section 2, paras 2.29, 2.32, 2.37.

dispatched to Australia by voluntary societies. Six years later, the 1956 Ross Fact-Finding Mission still doubted whether selection processes in the UK were adequately checking children for behavioural, developmental and physical difficulties. Its report also made firmly the point that children who had had difficult early experiences, and therefore were already 'rejected and insecure', would be particularly unsuited emotionally to 'cope with the added strain of migration'.³⁷⁸ Its recommendation that the Home Secretary should approve all cases of child migration, not just those of children sent from local authority care, would have constituted a tightening up of the selection process for prospective child migrants, given doubts within the Home Office about the benefits of migration to vulnerable children. But as we have recorded, the Children Act of 1948 was not amended to allow the Home Office to introduce this requirement, nor were the processes by which the selection of children and the securing of consents subsequently governed by regulations. That said, as we will next explore, the post-war practice of at least some, but certainly not all, voluntary societies engaged in child migration already followed or adopted what was being officially expressed as best practice.

³⁷⁸ HCPP, *Child Migration to Australia, Report of a Fact-Finding Mission*, Cmd 9832, paras.17, 19, 22, CMT.001.001.0547.

13 | Practice: Selection and Consent

13.1 We have already indicated that children selected for migration were a minority of those in care, and also that their migration had life-changing consequences. In the light of principles and criticisms expressed in official and unofficial reports on how children should be selected, if child migration were to be continued, we need to know how in practice selection was effected by local authorities and by voluntary societies. Without enforceable regulations in place, the selection of children by child migrating organisations committed to child migration as an ideal, by other agencies possibly subjected to pressure to supply children by receiving institutions, and by some needing to release space for new arrivals might have affected judgements of suitability.

13.2 Whether selected children and parents or guardians gave informed consent is an important issue. Testimony provided by former child migrants to the Child Migrants Trust and to public inquiries has often stated that they had been sent overseas without their informed consent or that of their parents. Young children in care, subjected to urban deprivation, would likely have had difficulty comprehending their prospects if subjected to a marketing of their futures by adults with interests in persuading. Some former child migrants have reported that they were asked by staff in their homes in the UK whether they would like to go and live in Australia, where there was sunshine, kangaroos and good food. They record that they and their peers often responded enthusiastically, thinking this would be a holiday. They were ignorant about the distance to Australia, conditions in the institutions to which they would be sent, the education and training they would receive, and the reality of their life prospects in Australia – and that they were being offered only a one-way ticket. It is now commonly recognised, as inquiry reports reveal, that many young child migrants were not able to give an informed consent to their migration.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁹ Western Australia, Select Committee into Child Migration, *Interim Report*, November 1996, p.42. *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, Report, para 41:

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75507.htm>;

Historical Institutional Abuses Inquiry Northern Ireland, Day 42, Margaret Humphreys, pp.7-9

[https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-](https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/dr_margaret_humphreys_cbe_oam_witness_statement_redacted.pdf)

[files/dr_margaret_humphreys_cbe_oam_witness_statement_redacted.pdf](https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/dr_margaret_humphreys_cbe_oam_witness_statement_redacted.pdf);

Lost Innocents, Report, paras 3.38 and 3.93:

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index

13.3 While some children had been rescued from abuse and neglect, others we know had been placed in care by parents driven to desperation by poverty, chronic ill-health, single parenthood and other debilitating circumstances, eased but not necessarily removed by post-war welfare provisions. Doing good for one's children by consenting to sending them overseas, and accepting their probably permanent loss, could be a loving sacrifice. But securing the parental consent of all would seem a moral if not always a legal requirement, although giving consent was part of the process by which legal guardianship was transferred to governments overseas. A child migrated without consent was not necessarily more vulnerable to abuse than a child whose migration had the approval of parents or guardians or indeed of the children themselves. Nevertheless, migration without such consent might raise wider questions about transparency and standards of care in sending organisations that could have a bearing on their attitudes and practices with regard to safeguarding children from abuse overseas and responding to allegations of abuse.

13.4 Because of limited sources of information, no review relating to Scottish children can be comprehensive, so what follows can only be regarded as indicative of past practice by some organisations at particular times. With respect to consents, we need to remember that legislation between 1891 and 1968, including most importantly the 1948 Children Act, had required local authorities running children's homes as well as those managing reformatories and industrial schools, plus 'fit persons' caring for children placed in their care, to secure the approval of the Secretary of State before any child could be migrated overseas. However, until 1968, voluntary homes in Scotland were not otherwise so constrained by legislation or regulations in the period during which child migration remained a practice. After 1968 the Secretary of State for Scotland's approval was required, but by then child migration had virtually stopped.

13.5 Nonetheless, in both local authority children's homes and those run by voluntary organisations, improved selection procedures and securing the informed consent of the child and that of parents or guardians even when legally not required seem to have become increasingly an expectation by the late 1940s and, variably, a post-war practice. Advice was being presented by Advisory Councils on Child Welfare, including that in Scotland, and some societies like Fairbridge and Barnardo's were by then consulting the Home Office about best practice.

13.6 We begin with sources relating to cases provided by **Edinburgh Local Authority**.³⁸⁰ The first in 1931 relates to a boarded-out boy under the care of Edinburgh's Public Assistance Committee who was sent to Canada under the terms of the 1924 Poor Law Emergency Provisions (Scotland) Act. We know that this migrant would have been a juvenile, but there is no reported information on why, how or by whom he had been selected or whether parents or guardian had been consulted. We also do not know why in 1946 the Public Assistance Committee considered another child as possibly suitable for emigration, but in the event this did not occur because the child 'suffered from severe chilblains' and the medical report ruled him out. Then in 1948 the Public Assistance Committee in response to solicitations from Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College approved in principle that children in care might be considered for emigration, but the provided records do not explain on what grounds this was regarded as a possibility, or whether anything came of that initiative.

13.7 Other cases followed the passage of the Children's Act with its Section 17 restrictions in place. In 1949 Edinburgh's Children's Committee proposed the emigration to Australia of two boarded-out children, the two to follow an older brother who had already left in 1947.³⁸¹ Among the reasons for recommending these two (but evidently not the earlier) was said to be to keep the siblings together, but the Secretary of State would not initially give his approval because the youngest was 'too young...to give consent or to form or express a proper opinion'. Moreover, he stated that the boy would not be emigrating, as the law required, 'with a parent, guardian or relative or for the purpose of joining a parent, guardian, relative or friend', which seems odd if the eldest brother was already in Australia. It is probably (but not certainly) the same case, but in [REDACTED] 1949 the Secretary of State did give his consent, having been informed that the father of the two wanted them to be sent overseas, though the Secretary of State also insisted that if the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee did migrate the two boys to join their brother then steps should be taken (somehow, by someone) to ensure they were not separated by the Catholic authorities in Australia. In the event, the records suggest that for some unrecorded reason the two did not emigrate.

³⁸⁰ Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response, Glenallan Children's Home, Part C, EDI.001.001.2280-2281. With respect to child migration, the report provided for Edinburgh's Clerwood Children's Home and for Howdenhal are identical, and there seems nothing specific to place in these reports. We deduce that the submitted reports therefore covered all of Edinburgh's children's homes, if there were others. No evidence concerning child migration was contained in reports submitted to SCAI by Motherwell in North Lanarkshire, by Perth and Kinross, or by West Dunbartonshire.

³⁸¹ *Ibid*, EDI.001.001.2281-2282.

13.8 In 1950 the Secretary of State was required to consider the cases of two boarded-out children presented by the Church of Scotland.³⁸² One had been nominated by the Presbyterian Church of Queensland and the other by the Presbyterian Church of Victoria. No information is given in the report about how they came to be chosen or by whom, or whether consents were solicited from whom and supplied, but whatever was disclosed seems to have satisfied the Secretary of State and consents were given.

13.9 Though there are lingering questions about selection and consent, these Edinburgh local authority records suggest that the spirit and letter of applicable laws, and more particularly those following the 1948 Children Act, were followed. We should set aside the last two exceptional cases approved by the Secretary of State, of children being sent to the USA in 1958 and to Ghana in 1960 (Gold Coast had gained independence as Ghana in 1957), neither of which would have qualified for UK government funding and both of which involved restoring children to family overseas.³⁸³ It is therefore worth noting that the last conventional child migration cases recorded in Edinburgh's minutes were in 1950, perhaps suggesting even less interest by then by at least this local authority in sending child migrants into institutional care overseas.

13.10 With respect to the **Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service (CSCSS)**, we learn much from the report supplied by the Church of Scotland.³⁸⁴ While we read that 'we are not aware of any specific policies or procedures relating to child migration in our records', there is evidence of steps taken with respect to selection and consent. It is important to recall that CSCSS had set up a recruitment committee headed by its director, Rev Lewis Cameron, and that this committee contacted all local authorities and voluntary homes in Scotland, and invited them to propose suitable children in their care for migration. Interviews and the completion of forms and certificates are referred to in a letter of 1950 sent by the Rev Boag of the

³⁸² *Ibid*, EDI.001.001.2282.

³⁸³ *Ibid*, EDI.001.001.2282-2283.

³⁸⁴ Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (Crossreach), Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0445-0639, with particular references below, unless otherwise recorded, to the summary report, COS.001.001.0446-0460, and to accompanying documents. (More legible copies of NRS, ED11/386, 'Homeless Children, Emigration Schemes, the Presbyterian Church of Victoria, Australia, Dhurringile Rural Training Farm' and of NRS, ED11/509, 'Emigration of Children through the Auspices of the Church of Scotland' have been separately provided by SCAI.)

Presbyterian Church of Victoria to the Home Office, but the nature of those forms and certificates is not revealed. An annual report records that in 1952 another visitor from Australia, the Rev Alexander Bell, also from the Presbyterian Church of Victoria, visited a Church of Scotland home and showed a filmstrip presenting the work of the farm school at Dhurringile. Such publicity was of course intended to attract volunteers, with selection to follow.³⁸⁵

13.11 All those children selected and sent to Dhurringile were boys, aged 8 to 14. Annual reports indicate that boys had to apply to the scheme, that for 1952 stating that 'The boy's own wish to emigrate is the starting point', to be followed by interviews with a welfare officer, and medical inspections.³⁸⁶ QKU was one, born in ██████████ 1947. He recalls first volunteering to go to Australia when he was 10 or 11, but he only left, after a medical examination, in ██████████ 1961, when he was 13, along with four other Quarrier boys.³⁸⁷ But we also read in Hugh McGowan's witness statement that he had changed his mind and did not want to go – but was sent against his will, consent being signed by a staff member.³⁸⁸

13.12 With respect to selection, an inspector's report on Quarriers in 1965 concluded that there was not 'sufficient information on the Homes' file to judge criteria for selection of possible emigrants'.³⁸⁹ We also read that from time to time and on request, by arrangement with the Home Office and on a voluntary basis (written into outfits and maintenance agreements made with the Commonwealth Relations Office), the CSCSS would provide the Secretary of State with information on, among other matters, the methods and criteria by which children were selected for emigration.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁵ On the UK government's hesitant approval in 1953 of ROSL as a selecting and sending organisation see Appendix 2, Section 3, paras 3.27-3.29.

³⁸⁶ Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (Crossreach), Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0447 and 0488.

³⁸⁷ SCAI witness statement by Mr QKU, WIT.001.002.1879.

³⁸⁸ SCAI witness statement by Mr Hugh McGowan, WIT.001.001.7532.

³⁸⁹ NRS, ED11/708/2, 'Voluntary Homes. Inspectors Reports. Quarriers Homes, Bridge of Weir, Renfrewshire', SGV.001.005.0029.

³⁹⁰ NRS, ED11/509, and COS.001.001.0583-0585. Copies of the 1957 and 1960 agreements are filed in TNA, DO35/10275, 'Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service: renewal of agreement, 1957 and 1960', and that for 1962 to run to 1965 in NRS, ED11/509 and COS.001.001.0607 – though no child was dispatched during that last period.

13.13 As for consent, somewhat obscurely, from 'records and anecdotal evidence', it seems that 'where children did have living relatives/parents who were not in contact with them or were unable to provide a home for them, their permission to be sought'.³⁹¹ However, it was also recorded that Australia House in 1960 was insisting on a search for relatives wherever possible to secure consent to migration.³⁹² Some surviving children's files indicate that parents or social workers were asked to give consent to a child's migration. [QKU] was one – he has a copy of the consent form signed by his mother, and also a discharge letter from Quarriers.³⁹³ Hugh McGowan, however, in his witness statement insists that since his mother had refused to let him be adopted she would not have wanted him to be migrated – though she had not responded to a letter of inquiry from Quarriers, but whether ignored or not received is not known. He also insists that he did not sign a consent form.³⁹⁴

13.14 It is also stated in the Church of Scotland report that consent for a boy's migration was required following an interview with a 'Welfare Officer acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Scotland'.³⁹⁵ This person was 'usually the Chief Inspector of the Scottish Home Department'. It sounds curious since there were no government regulations following the Children Act which gave the Secretary of State the authority to instruct a welfare officer to act on his behalf, but it seems to have been part of the voluntary agreement between CSCSS and the Scottish Home Department, intended to allow officials to be involved in selection and consent procedures. We are not aware of any similar arrangement with other child migration societies. A National Archives of Australia research guide states with respect to CSCSS nominees that consent was 'often withheld in the case of young children on the grounds that they are not old enough to form or express an opinion on the proposal that they should emigrate'.³⁹⁶ It is surprising that experience and the voluntary agreement with the Home Department still led to such setbacks. It is also surprising that CSCSS on two occasions, in breach of its agreement, had failed, supposedly by

³⁹¹ Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (Crossreach), Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0451.

³⁹² NRS, ED11/708/2, 'Voluntary Homes. Inspectors Reports. Quarriers Homes, Bridge of Weir, Renfrewshire', Appendix O, p.87 in file.

³⁹³ SCAI witness statement by Mr [QKU], WIT.001.002.1879, 1886.

³⁹⁴ SCAI witness statement by Mr Hugh McGowan, WIT.001.001.7531.

³⁹⁵ Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (Crossreach), Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0453.

³⁹⁶ Cited in Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (Crossreach), Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0454.

oversight, to inform the office of the Secretary of State that they had arranged the dispatch to Dhurringile of 11 Quarrier boys in 1960 and of six more in 1961.³⁹⁷

13.15 Post-war the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, based in Australia, had opened a London office—the **Australian Catholic Immigration Committee** (ACIC). The word 'Immigration' not 'Emigration' is indicative of its purpose. Unusually, this Australian committee was accepted by the UK government as an approved body for a funding agreement under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act. It was the only case of such an agreement being made with a body outside the UK, and it received the funds for distribution to Catholic organisations in the UK who selected children for migration. In the UK there was also a Catholic Child Welfare Council (CCWC), which as its title indicates had an interest in, among other matters, child migration, and was not best pleased by being marginalised.³⁹⁸ We also know that the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement (CCBOS), a UK body, also operated. This organisation had been formed in 1939 by a merger between an earlier Catholic Emigration Association and a Catholic Emigration Society. As its title suggests, it was concerned generally with assisting the migration of UK citizens to empire destinations, but it established a sub-committee to deal with child migration. Perhaps not surprisingly, with several organisations with interests in child migration operating, even the Women's Group became confused. In its report it regretted that it had not been able to secure adequate information about how CCBOS operated. It understood that it had emigration offices in Scotland as well as in the Midlands, that it co-operated with Catholic agencies overseas, and that these agencies would periodically send representatives to the UK to select children who were then emigrated ' "at their own or their parents wish, in order to make a fresh start in a more favourable environment" ', but the Group was unable to discover the

³⁹⁷ NRS, ED11/386, 'Homeless Children: Emigration Schemes', SGV.001.003.7861-7972; and COS.001.001.0576-0578; NRS, ED11/509, 'Voluntary Homes: Emigration of Children through the auspices of the Church of Scotland, 1961-1963' and COS.001.0583-0598. Quarriers' records say five in 1961. The minutes on NRS, ED11/509 also record that two further boys were sent to Dhurringile in 1962 and five more, probably to Dhurringile, in 1963, SGV.001.003.8099, 8111, 8113. Others sent in these later years needed Secretary of State consent, indicating they were in local authority care, including three to Australia (destination not recorded), three to New Zealand and one to New York in 1965; plus two to Canada and one to New Zealand in 1966; plus four to the USA and six to Southern Rhodesia in 1967 – but they may all have been juveniles or were departing with or to parents or guardians or friends and therefore outside normal child migration practice. Certainly those departing for Southern Rhodesia were not heading for the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College which we know received its last party of child migrants in 1956.

³⁹⁸ *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, Evidence, Document 3:

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/8061106.htm>

qualifications of those who collected reports on the children or whether selection was the work of a committee or of an individual.³⁹⁹ In fact, these observations about CCBOS actually referred to how ACIC operated.

13.16 Our understanding of the process by which children in Catholic institutions in Scotland (and elsewhere in the UK) were selected and whether and if so how consents were obtained for their migration has been assisted by access to sources not considered by previous inquiries. These include material provided to SCAI by the Catholic Bishops Conference of Scotland and by the Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh, the minutes of the annual meetings of Catholic Child Welfare Council and some of their other records, and documents in the National Archives of Australia. These last include, importantly, shipping lists and the LEM3 forms which authorised the transfer overseas of children which, in the cases with which we are here concerned, required signatures by persons with authority in Catholic children's homes and by witnesses to those signatures. Such is the importance and the complexity of this matter that Appendix 4 is dedicated to its detailed examination.

13.17 Here we provide some headline points. In total, ACIC had been funded to relocate 946 UK children by 1965, mainly in the early years from 1947 to 1955. Quite how that number of children were selected and how consents were secured, matters which perplexed the Women's Group, remain perplexing, but we now have a better idea of the pressures to supply. We know that in 1938 Brother Conlon, a Christian Brother from Australia, had already visited the UK and had arranged the migration of a large party of boys to institutions run by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia, but without consulting diocesan child rescue administrators.⁴⁰⁰ Post-war he returned. In June 1946 Conlon wrote to advise the Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh about the (as yet unresumed) child migration scheme and of his intention to visit Scotland as well as Northern Ireland to 'select suitable children'. In April 1947 he was again writing to inquire about the number of children likely to be obtained from homes in Scotland.

13.18 The response from the Archdiocese was to welcome the inquiry, with reference in particular to Catholic children in non-denominational public assistance institutions, since if they were freed to go (and, one might add, to Catholic

³⁹⁹ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.19.

⁴⁰⁰ As noted earlier, para 4.6, such diocesan child rescue societies do not seem to have operated in Scotland.

institutions overseas) this would help with the problem of homeless children.⁴⁰¹ We are here being given an inkling into social as well as religious motives for selecting certain children for migration. Further correspondence followed regarding a circular and a letter to advertise the scheme throughout the diocese (or possibly more widely) and to alert the press. An agreement between Rev Simonds, the Co-adjutor Archbishop of Melbourne (that is the Archbishop-in-Waiting), and Rev Quille, secretary of CCBOS for Scotland and Northern Ireland at the Catholic Inquiry Office in Edinburgh, included supplying information on the scheme to potentially interested parties.

13.19 But a report covering the period June 1947 to March 1948 recorded a decrease in applications, including of child migrants from Scotland (and Northern Ireland).⁴⁰² This is followed by what sounds like a requisition order, detailing the number and ages of girls and boys needed for various places in Australia. Apparently the Secretary of State for Scotland was only prepared to approve the migration of children in local authority care under Section 17 of the Children Act if they were over 10 years old, and if under 10 only if they had a personal guardian or relative in Australia. All this may have made more urgent for Catholic organisations in Scotland supportive of child migration the selecting of those children apparently eligible – but there was also a report that numbers were falling because parents were not giving consent.

13.20 Meanwhile, in 1946, the CCWC had agreed to support Conlon's operations.⁴⁰³ However, as further research has shown, this was not how in practice he regularly operated. Moreover, Father Nicol and Father Stinson, officers of the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee (ACIC), also seemed to understand from meetings with CCWC members in 1948 and in 1952 that they should only recruit child migrants in conjunction with diocesan officials. But this obligation was again not consistently

⁴⁰¹ Bishops Conference of Scotland, Section 21 response, Appendix 4: Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh, BSC.001.001.0480-0484.

⁴⁰² *Ibid*, BSC.001.001.0480-0484.

⁴⁰³ Catholic Bishops Conference England and Wales, Minutes of Catholic Child Welfare Council, 7 Nov 1946, BEW.001.001.0019. For the details of what followed, summarised below, it is essential to consult Appendix 4, Section 2, paras 2.1-2.10. Whether Brother Conlon, Father Stinson and Father Nicol, when recruiting, were aware of physical and sexual abuse at the Christian Brothers institutions in Western Australia, to where many boys were sent, is a concern. See Gordon Lynch, *Possible collusion between individuals alleged to have sexually abused boys at four Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, 1947-1965: a secondary analysis of material collated by historical abuse inquiries*, (2019), <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

respected. Efforts to insist upon it were insufficient in England and Wales, but it remains obscure as to whether diocesan officials in Scotland tried to insist upon or even to recognise an equivalent obligation. There are also particular doubts about recruiting practices at Nazareth House in Carlisle where some boys with Scottish roots were located.

13.21 There were also other anxieties which made recruiting in the UK, including in Scotland, more urgent. An expensive extension to Nazareth House at East Camberwell, Victoria, had been part-funded by the Australian Commonwealth and Victorian State Governments on the basis that it would receive and accommodate one hundred female child migrants.⁴⁰⁴ Assurances to this effect had apparently been given by the Sisters of Nazareth. But there was concern that the low number of girls initially sent there might lead to the Governments requesting that their grants for this building work be re-paid. As a result, decisions about the migration of girls from Nazareth Houses in the UK appear to have been influenced by the desire to fill vacancies at East Camberwell. This may have affected selection and consent procedures for children in care in Scotland.

13.22 We must assume that the Sisters running Catholic child care institutions made initial selections, though we do not know for sure by what criteria, and whether for instance educational reports were considered. Some consideration should have been given to how shipping companies and immigration agencies might react to the arrival of the demonstrably unfit and unsuitable. The Northern Ireland Inquiry was told that for the post-war period there are documented references to prospective child migrants being medically inspected at Australia House or by a local doctor and by a professor of psychology, and given IQ tests.⁴⁰⁵ We have information concerning a particular medical inspection in a Sisters of Nazareth home in Kilmarnock. This and its context are examined in detail in Appendix 4 of this report, but in brief it concerns a girl, LTI.⁴⁰⁶ She had LTI at the age of two and a half, and had spent three and a half years in hospital. She was admitted to Nazareth House on the death of her mother, where she continued to wear callipers. By her own testimony

⁴⁰⁴ It is important also to consider the evidence in Appendix 4, Section 3, paras 3.1-3.10, 3.16-3.17.

⁴⁰⁵ Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Day 42, pp.61-66, testimony relating to 1947, 1955 and 1956: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D42-Transcript-Red-OPT.pdf> Day 42, Evidence, medical examination reports, pp.30, 32, 34-36, and Day 48, Additional Evidence, pp.78-88: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>.

⁴⁰⁶ SCAI statement, Mrs LTI née LTI, WIT.001.002.3278, 3283, 3290-3293; Appendix 4, Section 3, paras 3.11-3.17; 3.20-3.21.

she was not wearing the callipers when the doctor in Kilmarnock examined her, but even so it is remarkable that she was said to be in good health and even more so that the Mother Superior signed the required statement that the girl had never had any serious illness - and she was sent to Australia without her callipers. According to a summary of her Australia House LEM3 form, and following a medical inspection, it was reported that her health 'appears normal' and that she is a 'Healthy and lively little girl'.⁴⁰⁷ This, it seems, was by no means the only case of an unrecorded illness on a LEM3 form.⁴⁰⁸ Only later was it accepted that LTI [REDACTED] was indeed handicapped by [REDACTED]

13.23 It is doubtful whether many children had been made sufficiently informed about their prospects to enable them to provide informed consent. The Northern Ireland Inquiry heard evidence from a number of witnesses that they do not recall giving any meaningful consent as children to being sent to Australia, or they explicitly remember saying to staff at the time that they did not want to go.⁴⁰⁹ Likewise, Scottish child migrants in their witness statements to SCAI frequently assert that they cannot recall giving consent at all, or at their young age they did not grasp that the Australia being presented to them was not just an exciting but temporary holiday destination.⁴¹⁰

13.24 There are also doubts as to whether or how parents or guardians were consulted and consent given. Indeed, the rise in the number of consent forms not signed by parents whose offspring were being accommodated by the Sisters of Nazareth coincided with Brother Conlon urgently seeking children to fill what he expected to be available berth spaces on ships in the spring of 1947. It is notable that in [REDACTED] 1947 eight boys left Nazareth House for Australia. Further contingents followed in 1950, 1952, and 1953.⁴¹¹ The Catholic Children's Society told the House

⁴⁰⁷ Sisters of Nazareth, 'Summary of Australia House Child Migration Form LEM3', NAZ.001.007.8805.

⁴⁰⁸ Note the word of caution in the last paragraph of Appendix 4, Section 3.

⁴⁰⁹ For example see Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Evidence, Day 43, HIA278, p.3; HIA283, p.3; HIA296, p.4; HIA286, p.2; HIA300, p.2; HIA304, p.2:

<https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>

⁴¹⁰ SCAI statement by [REDACTED] p.1, WIT.003.001.9521; BKW [REDACTED] p.5, WIT.001.002.2315; LYF [REDACTED] p.9, WIT.001.002.2920; MIT [REDACTED] p.2, WIT.001.002.4886; Ian Donaldson, p.2, WIT.001.002.2315; MJV [REDACTED] p.4, WIT.001.002.4840; MDK [REDACTED] p.3, WIT.001.002.3018; LTG [REDACTED] p.5, WIT.001.002.4272; MRZ [REDACTED] p.4, WIT.001.002.4292.

⁴¹¹ Documents provided to SCAI by Aberdeen City Council include a spreadsheet 'List of Children Migrated in Care' which notes these clusters of child migrants (all boys) as 'evidence of group migration' by Nazareth House, ABN.001.001.1725.

of Commons Health Committee inquiry in 1997 that it could only find evidence of consent by parents to the migration of Catholic children to Australia in 221 instances, just 19% of the cases on its admittedly incomplete database.⁴¹² It was claimed that in many cases parental consent had not been obtained because parents had not been in contact with their children for many years, and in their eyes this seems to have legitimised the migration of such children. By the time the CCWC reported to the Australian Senate team in 2001, a few more instances of parental consent had been identified, increasing the total to 229 cases in total, but still amounting to only 20 per cent of the 1147 Catholic children migrated from the UK to Australia between 1938 and 1963.⁴¹³ Some witnesses to the 2014 Northern Ireland Inquiry questioned whether the consent of parents was properly sought for the migration of their children, even in cases where family members appear to have still had active contact with the children's home in which they were resident. On the other hand, the Sisters of Nazareth presented evidence of consent being sought, or not being possible to obtain, in the cases of 40 of the 111 children they believe to have been sent to Australia from their children's homes in Northern Ireland. They note that this is a higher proportion than the 20% of cases of consent found more generally across child migrants sent by Catholic agencies.⁴¹⁴ However, in a number of cases, consent forms were signed by a member of the Sisters of Nazareth acting in the role of guardian. The fact that, in a number of cases, consent for children sent from the Sisters of Nazareth was signed by a Mother Superior and witnessed by a representative of Australian Catholic organisations (e.g. Brother Conlon or Father Stinson) also suggests a system could have operated in which children's selection and consent for their migration was managed by a small number of people with little scrutiny or accountability. Indeed, Conlon and Stinson not only exceeded their authority as recruiting agents by signing consent forms, but in some instances they also signed as witnesses to the consent signatures of Mother Superiors authorising a child's emigration, and not a diocesan child care officer as expected by CCWC in England and Wales. The Sisters of Nazareth also claimed that it may be the case that

⁴¹² *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, Evidence, Document 4, Catholic Children's Society, Analysis of Computerised Database, pp.158, 160.

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/8061107.htm>

⁴¹³ *Lost Innocents*, Report, Chapter 3, 'The sending to Australia', paras 3.53-3.55.

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index

⁴¹⁴ Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Evidence, Day 50, Sisters of Nazareth submission, p.21:

https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/sofn_submission_redacted_opt.pdf

parents had consented to migration but that it was left to a member of their order to complete the relevant forms.⁴¹⁵ There does not appear to be any indication, in such cases, of consent having been given in writing by the parent, and it is not clear whether verbal consent would normally have been considered adequate for other forms of transfer of a child's guardianship at that time.

13.25 Documents relating to St Joseph's Orphanage, Neerkol, may illustrate the process by which some Catholic children in care came to be selected for migration after 1945.⁴¹⁶ We are told in the report of a 1998 inquiry concerning Neerkol that the Catholic Church in Australia had established a 'Catholic Migration Committee' (though what was meant was the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee), and that two officers were located in London to facilitate the recruitment of child migrants, among others, for admission into Catholic institutions. On one occasion, these officers passed on the names of approved and available children to the Archbishop of Melbourne, then on a visit to London, and through him these were delivered to the Bishop of Rockhampton and the Sisters of Mercy at Neerkol. The Bishop then signed the nominations and sent them to Queensland's Children's Department, who assessed and approved the nominations. These were then forwarded to Canberra, from where they were sent to London. There is no suggestion that a further assessment was made in London and no detail on whether or how consents were secured.

The report submitted to SCAI by the Sisters of Nazareth adds something to this, though it should be noted that this report is dated January 2017.⁴¹⁷ Sufficient records had been located to provide figures for the number of child migrants sent from each of the four Nazareth Houses in Scotland from 1938 to 1963, a total of 71: Aberdeen 33, Edinburgh 30, Kilmarnock and Glasgow 4 each.⁴¹⁸ However, it was stated that 'there is no documentation held' concerning policy or procedure, and that '[t]here are no records held pertaining to adherence to the government guidelines'.⁴¹⁹ Nevertheless, 'the Congregation adhered to the guidelines relating to child migration

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.24.

⁴¹⁶ Children's Commission of Queensland, *A Preliminary Report on Allegations of Abuse of Former Residents of St Joseph's Orphanage at Neerkol, Rockhampton, in the 1940's, 50's and 60's*, July 1998, p.47. There is no online link to a digitised copy.

⁴¹⁷ Sisters of Nazareth, Section 21 response, Part C, Section 4.11, Child migration, and Section 4.12 Records, pp.461-468, NAZ.001.001.0293-0302.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.001.0297.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.001.0293, 0296.

passed on to them by the British and Australian governments',⁴²⁰ and less firmly that '[t]he Sisters tried to ensure that they adhered to the guidelines given to them with regard to the selection of children'.⁴²¹ Since there were no UK government *regulations* in force, one would like to have seen copies of the *guidelines* issued to the Sisters of Nazareth in Scotland, and indeed to other childcare organisations. Nevertheless, it was understood that the aim was 'to offer children a better future in the new colonies'.⁴²² It was also incorrect to state that the Sisters 'were invited to participate by the British and Australian governments and the Catholic Church'.⁴²³ While certainly the policy was endorsed and subsidised by the two governments and pushed hard by Australia, representatives of the Catholic Church, particularly from Australia, contacted institutions run by Catholic organisations in the UK, including the Sisters of Nazareth in Scotland, and pressed them to provide recruits.⁴²⁴

13.26 Moreover, oral evidence provided to IICSA by a representative of the Sisters acknowledged that the order had become actively involved.⁴²⁵ Indeed, the Sisters had begun selecting children for migration even before the UK government had re-committed itself to such a programme.⁴²⁶ However, perhaps again because policy records do not seem to have survived, no information seems available concerning the criteria employed in making choices, or indeed whether children had been briefed beforehand on the implications of migration and the attractions of Australia, and then volunteered. There is no reference to whether children once approved then gave their consent. We are however told that 'where parents or guardians were known to the Sisters they were asked for their consent to the migration of their children'. But otherwise 'the Local Superior or her delegate would consent in

⁴²⁰ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.001.0295.

⁴²¹ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.001.0296.

⁴²² *Ibid*, NAZ.001.001.0293.

⁴²³ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.001.0294.

⁴²⁴ A brief letter to SCAI from Clyde & Co on behalf of the Sisters, dated 27 Nov 2019, acknowledges that the Congregation had very limited knowledge as to its historic involvement in child migration and accepts that there may not have been adherence to the 'standards of the day' and the recommendations of the Curtis report: NAZ.001.007.8897-8898.

⁴²⁵ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcript of oral testimony by Sister Anna Maria Doolan, 13 July 2017, pp.114-115.

⁴²⁶ The evidence for this includes (1) the Dominions Office in May 1946 discouraging Brother Conlon from taking rapid action to resume Catholic child migration, TNA, DO35/140/M1131-1, pp.42-45; (2) LEM3 forms which show the Sisters of Nazareth proposing children for migration from Sept 1946, for example NAA: PP93/10, 180, 532, 912; (3) Correspondence between the Dominions Office and the UK High Commission in November and December 1946, showing that though they had few details they had become aware from Conlon that he was already recruiting child migrants, TNA, DO35/1140/M.1131-1, pp.9-10.

accordance with their status in *loco parentis*.⁴²⁷ In the absence of documentation it is difficult to know whether this statement is based on archived records, which otherwise seem thin, or on inherited memory of past practice. Indeed, in response to nine particular questions asked by SCAI concerning such matters as selection, consent, provision of information to children and parents, and indeed 'checking the suitability of the places where children were sent', the response to all is a cautious 'Yes, to the best of our knowledge'.⁴²⁸

13.27 However, we have a statement by a witness to the SCAI inquiry and to the Australian Senate Inquiry, Mr Christopher Booth.⁴²⁹ Born in Aberdeen in [REDACTED] 1941, he was placed in September 1941 in Nazareth House in Aberdeen. From there, in April 1952, when he was aged 11, he was sent to Tasmania with two other boys from the home in Aberdeen and a 'couple more from Edinburgh'. His destination was St John Bosco Boys Town in Hobart, run by the Salesians. He writes that his mother later in life said she had not given her consent for him to be sent to Australia. He also states that he had never been asked if he wanted to go, though because of the brutality he suffered at the hands of the Sisters of Nazareth in Aberdeen he 'probably thought any place was going to be better than Nazareth House'. What he does recall is his medical examination.⁴³⁰ That confirms what we had expected from the report to SCAI that the selected children were subjected to routine 'educational, medical and psychological assessments' by an officer from Australia House in London. It would have been interesting to know the figures for those rejected, but that would have required adequate record-keeping to have been practised.

13.28 The report provided by the Good Shepherd home at Colinton is much less informative.⁴³¹ SCAI's standard inquiry was to ask what policies and/or procedures

⁴²⁷ Sisters of Nazareth, Section 21 response, Part C reports, NAZ.001.001.0294.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.001.0296.

⁴²⁹ Mr Booth writes in his 16 Sept 2017 witness statement that he was the only Scottish boy at St John Bosco Boys Town WIT.001.001.3654. His oral witness testimony of 25 April 2018 of course substantially corroborates his witness statement: TRN.001.003.0167-0260. Why he alone was destined for Hobart is not revealed. Remarkably, owing to a major organisational error, all the other Scottish boys from Aberdeen should have been disembarked at Fremantle (along with those from Edinburgh). Their intended destination was Bindoon in Western Australia, to where they were subsequently sent, TRN.001.003.0203 and 0205. Mr Booth submitted a briefer statement to the Australian Senate Inquiry, POA.001.001.0022-0025, also made available to SCAI.

⁴³⁰ SCAI statement by Mr Booth, WIT.001.001.3649-3651.

⁴³¹ Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, Section 21 response, Parts C and D, Woodfield Children's Home, Colinton, 1945-1970, section 4.11, p.10, GSH.001.001.0412.

concerning child migration were in place. The response to the question about Past Policy in 4.11 (a) (i) was simply 'None'. The elaboration in response to the question about Past Practice in 4.11 (b) (i) was '[t]he Organization did not have policies regarding child migration however the Organization was asked to comply with the Ecclesiastical Authorities regarding sending children to Australia', followed by a perplexing response in 4.11 (b) (ii) '[w]e have no knowledge of the policy of the Ecclesiastical Authorities'. As for 'Present Practice' in response to 4.11 (b) (xvii), the answer is that '[w]e understand that the policies and procedures with regard to child migration were put in place at that time to offer children the chance of a better life in Australia. As we do not know exactly what the policies stated it is difficult for us to have a view'. We are told that 17 girls were sent to Australia. Two went with their mother, so we may deduce how they came to be selected and consent given. However, we are left ignorant of how the other fifteen, all leaving between October 1947 and April 1949, were selected and whether and how consents were secured and from whom.

13.29 The first and wide-ranging report submitted to SCAI by **Quarriers** contains information about selection and consent procedures (and other matters).⁴³² Surviving records indicate that from 1910 parents or guardians putting a child into the care of Quarriers were made aware by signing an agreement that among future options Quarriers might send the child to Canada (though we know that the practice began much earlier). From 1927 (probably) the admissions form retained the migration option without specifying the destination, which would come to include Australia. We do not know from this report what information was given to children about destinations and prospects, and whether they were old enough to give informed consent. We are also told in this report that the wishes of parents and guardians were to be respected if they did not agree to emigration, and likewise the wishes of children, even if they changed their minds.

13.30 We also learn from this report that the acceptable age for migration 'increased throughout the years' so that by 1932 those selected and sent overseas had to be 16, and therefore 'eligible for work'.⁴³³ Minutes of the Executive Committee in March 1938 also record 25 boys passing an examination by Canadian medical examiners, and parental consent to their emigration given.⁴³⁴ Accordingly, for the purposes of

⁴³² Quarriers, Section 21 response, Part C, QAR.001.001.0504-0505.

⁴³³ *Ibid*, QAR.001.001.0507.

⁴³⁴ Quarriers, 1938 Executive Committee Minutes, QAR.001.003.2018, 2021.

our report, all those sent in these years would almost certainly have been juveniles, but this would only be with respect to those sent to Canada. The 39 boys and 4 girls sent to Australia in 1939, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 were below the school-leaving age.

13.31 As reported earlier, the Scottish Presbyterian churches in 1937 had turned down the invitation to select and send child migrants to Burnside in New South Wales. However, Quarriers responded to the YMCA's invitation and identified 25 boys and girls for migration, following presumably its standard selection criteria. However, Burnside preferred child migrants between the age of 5 and 10, and certainly no older than 12 on arrival, because they reckoned that older children adapted less easily. This reduced the number in the 1939 party to 17. Those sent had also had to pass 'health and other tests at Australia House' which were described as 'fairly strict' and indeed made Quarriers 'a little impatient'.⁴³⁵ This Quarriers report to SCAI confirms that medical reports were indeed required to show that boys and girls selected for migration were healthy. A puzzling anomaly within Quarriers' processes for seeking consent for this party was that the consent of parents and other organisations to these children's migration was sought on the basis that they were migrating under the auspices of the Fairbridge Society when, in fact, the Burnside Homes had no formal organisational connection with Fairbridge.⁴³⁶ A little more about selection is at least implied in Quarriers' *Narrative of Facts* for 1960, sent to supporters, where it is stated that selection for migration took account of medical history, age, family ties and also 'educational aptitude', and since one witness statement we have seen says that he had an IQ test it is likely that professionally qualified personnel were involved.⁴³⁷

13.32 The second and more detailed report provided by Quarriers, specifically on child migration, has more to say about selection.⁴³⁸ It refers to the 1897 Ontario Act which required child migrants to be medically examined to show that they were fit and healthy. That year's *Narrative of Facts* stressed that 'strict inspection should be

⁴³⁵ NAA, Correspondence between the Church of Scotland, Quarriers and Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Homes, Australia, NAA.001.001.0554, 0557, 0559-0561.

⁴³⁶ This is discussed further in Appendix 3, Section 7, paras 7.3-7.8, and with respect to consents in para 7.13.

⁴³⁷ SCAI statement by Mr Hugh McGowan, WIT.001.001.7532; Quarriers, *Narrative of Facts*, 1960, p.26, and see also paras 13.10 and 13.12-13.13 above for references to Quarriers, CSCSS and selecting and screening.

⁴³⁸ Quarriers, Section 21 response, 31 Jan 2019, QAR.001.008.0014-0018.

made before leaving the mother country as to physical and moral soundness, and an ample guarantee that no boy or girl in the age of childhood will become a burden on the state'.⁴³⁹ We need to recall that after 1924 nearly all children sent to Canada were juveniles over school-leaving age (the exceptions were siblings joining older migrants). Probably following previous practice we learn from the 1929 *Narrative* that 'there was great excitement in the village, for the Canadian Government Emigration agent and Medical Officer spent most of the day interviewing and examining boys whom we expect to sail on [REDACTED]'.⁴⁴⁰ The 1931 *Narrative* further explains that boys selected had previously been examined by Quarriers' own medical staff 'for we wish to maintain the high standard of our reputation with the Canadian Government'.⁴⁴¹ There is also reference to medical inspections on board ship. Nevertheless, in June 1934, after 25 years in the post, the Superintendent at Fairknowe, the home from where Quarriers child (and later juvenile) migrants were distributed after arrival, was writing that 'certain boys were sent who could not be expected to make good and which was evident to us in the day of their arrival or from a study of them on board ship'.⁴⁴²

13.33 The second report is also very illuminating on the way in which post-war the Rev Boag marketed Dhurringile in Australia as providing a 'splendid opportunity in a young, flourishing and fast-developing country', with schooling and farm training available and indeed openings in a variety of other trades and professions.⁴⁴³ To select from those attracted, education reports were obtained and psychological tests, certainly from 1960, were conducted. Following discussions between Quarriers and the Scottish Education Department, there was further elaboration on selection requirements prior to a child's migration, although these were not drawn up until 1963 in which year the last Quarriers child migrants were sent overseas, CSCSS being the sending agency.⁴⁴⁴

13.34 As for consent to migration, we knew from the first Quarriers report that from 1910 parents or guardians placing a child with Quarriers were also agreeing to the possible migration of that child. We learn from the second report that prior to 1930,

⁴³⁹ *Narrative of Facts*, 1897, p.73.

⁴⁴⁰ *Narrative of Facts*, 1929, p.16.

⁴⁴¹ *Narrative of Facts*, 1931, p.25.

⁴⁴² Quarriers, Fairknowe children 1934, Winters to Findlay, 7 June 1934, QAR.001.009.2821.

⁴⁴³ Quarriers, Section 21 response, 31 Jan 2019, QAR.001.008.0013.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0015-0019, 0042-0044; NRS, ED11/509, 'Emigration of Children through the Auspices of the Church of Scotland', pp.97-100.

beyond verbally explaining to the parent or guardian that the child may be migrated at the point of admission, there is no evidence as to what parents or guardians would have been told about a child's transfer overseas, though efforts were made to contact them.⁴⁴⁵ Only after 1930 is there some evidence that Quarriers did more than notify parents/relatives/guardians of a child's upcoming migration, but the information provided was limited.⁴⁴⁶ With some later exceptions, when consent was recorded, they seem only to have been told that their child had been approved for migration, that the child wished to go overseas, and that before departure he could be visited any day (except Sunday). As for children giving informed consent to their migration, particularly doubtful for the very young, the *Narrative of Facts* unsurprisingly record their enthusiastic approval. However, the form quoted in this second report to illustrate a child's consent is misleading since this was signed by youngsters destined for Canada in 1932, when, by Canadian regulations concerning minimum age, they would have been in effect young adults seeking employment. Following 1929 legislation, the consent of Public Assistance Officers was also required for any child in local authority care.⁴⁴⁷

13.35 In its first report to SCAI, Quarriers stated that the organisation did not 'always adhere to its policy/procedures in relation to child migration', but based on more research in its archives, the second report is more convinced from surviving records that the organisation did follow agreed policy and practice with respect to selection and consent.⁴⁴⁸

13.36 Although **Dr Barnardo** had dispatched his first party to Canada in 1882, he had not initially sent children directly from Scotland, only indirectly from elsewhere in the UK. Nevertheless, his charity had gained an immense amount of relevant experience for future guidance concerning selection and the securing of consents. We know that he openly regarded 'philanthropic abduction' as an acceptable practice to 'rescue' children from parents who neglected or abused them (see para 14.10 below), but it is unlikely that the desire to put the space of the Atlantic between parent and child was the only or major criterion for selection.

⁴⁴⁵ Quarriers, Section 21 response, 31 Jan 2019, QAR.001.008.0019.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, QAR.001.005.0019-0021, 0023-0030, 0048.

⁴⁴⁸ Quarriers, Section 21 response, Part C, section 4.11, Child Migration, QAR.001.001.0510-0511; Quarriers, Section 21 response, 31 Jan 2019, *passim*.

13.37 We have a report from Barnardo's dated 15 August 2003 entitled 'Analysis of the files of children emigrated to Canada in the years between 1920 and 1929', based on a 10% sample of children's case files (amounting to 271).⁴⁴⁹ This conveniently refers in detail to the several forms which were to be completed in that decade concerning (i) admissions by children to Barnardo's (including medical reports), (ii) applications to the Canadian authorities for admission of children to Canada (including details about them and reports from their house mothers), and (iii) applications by employers in Canada for their employment (including details on occupations, locations, description of their home, age required, educational and church provision, and contact details of referees) and similarly (iv) applications from intending foster parents. The report notes that case files often lacked referees' reports.⁴⁵⁰

13.38 We are also informed in a separate document provided by Barnardo's that 'from the 1900s' if a child was placed with Barnardo's in the UK by a relative, then the parent or carer signed an agreement on handing over the child which authorised the manager to send the child to Canada or indeed to Australia if the manager thought it desirable.⁴⁵¹ One estimate based on a sample of case files concluded that 6% of the boys and 8% of the girls shipped to Canada between 1882 and 1908 had departed without the consent of parents,⁴⁵² but we are told that practice evolved and came to include consultations with families.⁴⁵³

13.39 Indeed, the Women's Group on Public Welfare in 1951 reported favourably on Barnardo's selection procedures.⁴⁵⁴ It noted that the process of selection began by inviting outside speakers to visit its homes and talk to the children about emigration. Although 'in many cases' those who then volunteered were probably responding to the lecturer who 'may have drawn an over-romantic picture', the 'safeguard' was that

⁴⁴⁹ Barnardo's, Analysis of the file of children migrated to Canada 1920-29, BAR.001.006.2572-2703. We deduce from the first page of the text that this report was generated for Barnardo's in its defence in a court case. As a further reminder, those selected and sent from 1925 would be juveniles (or possibly younger siblings).

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid*, BAR.001.006.2578-2580. Responses are presented in a separate folder, entitled 'Appendices to Support the Analysis of the files of Children migrated to Canada in the period 1930-39' BAR.001.006.2774-2906. The title is misleading since several relate to child migrants in the 1920s. (There were separate forms for juveniles.)

⁴⁵¹ Barnardo's, Section 21 response, 14 December 20018, BAR.001.005.3338.

⁴⁵² Parr, *Labouring Children*, p.67.

⁴⁵³ Barnardo's, Section 21 response, 14 Dec 2018, BAR.001.005.3339.

⁴⁵⁴ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, pp.18-19.

the person making the selection knew 'the full history of the child'. In summary, the Women's Group concluded that Barnardo's took 'great care' in its selection of children from among the volunteers since 'only about 1 in 10' were finally accepted. It was also reported that parents' consent was sought.

13.40 We know that Barnardo's soon after the war was keen to resume child migration to Australia, and as mentioned earlier (see para 4.3 above) a branch had been opened in Scotland in 1940. Moreover, after consideration by the Dominions Office, it was agreed that past practice would be altered so that those sent to Mowbray Park would no longer be trained exclusively for careers in agriculture. Educational provision would cater for the wider range of employment opportunities opening up in Australia.⁴⁵⁵ This, of course, could have a bearing on selection. We have seen the text of a 1952 letter intended to encourage parents of children in Barnardo's care to consider the merits of sending them to Barnardo's homes in New South Wales,⁴⁵⁶ and we assume, though cannot demonstrate, that this would be reflected in how opportunities were presented to potential child migrants. We understand that a chief official from Barnardo's migration department would visit branch homes. Children were shown promotional material about Australia such as films, slides, booklets and posters. Then those interested were interviewed, their histories examined, and checks made to see that they met the requirements of the Australian High Commission. They were expected to have an IQ of at least 80, not be enuretic, and not have a family history of TB or mental illness. And they must be 'white'. Evidence of suitability lay in medical and school reports and a character reference from the home superintendent.⁴⁵⁷ Information was sent to the next of kin once a child had expressed an interest in migration, and written consent was sought prior to departure.⁴⁵⁸ Where a child had been placed with Barnardo's by a local authority or juvenile court, official consent was also required, if necessary by the Secretary of State.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁵ TNA, DO35/1138/M996/1, 'Dr Barnardo's Homes, Mowbray Park Farm School, NSW', pp.50, 54, 59-60. It was also agreed that Mowbray Park would be for boys only, girls being catered for at (probably) Burwood in a suburb of Sydney.

⁴⁵⁶ Barnardo's, Copy of letter sent to parents re emigration, 21 August 1952, BAR.001.006.0071.

⁴⁵⁷ Barnardo's, List of Documents and Forms Used to Determine Suitability for Migration to Australia, BAR.001.005.3539-3566.

⁴⁵⁸ Barnardo's, Letter sent to parents seeking consent to migration to Australia, 21 August 1952, BAR.001.005.3509-3510.

⁴⁵⁹ Barnardo's, Documents relating to the migration of a child, copy of 1951 consent by mother and Secretary of State, BAR.001.005.3502-3508. See also TNA, MH102/1892, 'Migration of Children to Australia – Procedure. Memo and Correspondence with Dr Barnardo's', letters between Maxwell in the

13.41 Moreover, a report provided to IICSA and subsequently to SCAI also states that Barnardo's voluntarily complied with the spirit of the 1948 Act by adopting those principles governing selection and placement by voluntary societies which were intended to be incorporated in regulations, although that was not done until long after Barnardo's had stopped migrating youngsters overseas.⁴⁶⁰ Rather briefly, and with no indication of the expertise of those who would be involved in selecting child migrants, the Barnardo Book published in 1955 as instructions to superintendents of homes states that 'Children must genuinely desire to go and must not be over-persuaded'.⁴⁶¹ It also refers to children aged seven to 12 as the best age for them to be sent, and it stresses that girls between the ages of 13 and 17 should not normally be selected – perhaps implying an awareness that there was a risk of abuse. Following a meeting with Dr Barnardo's senior staff in April 1957, a Home Office report stated that 'Barnardos view the emigration of unaccompanied children already in their care as essentially a transfer from a Barnardo Home in one part of the world to a very similar Barnardo Home in another part; where, on growing up, the young person will have a better chance in life'.⁴⁶²

13.42 As further evidence of selection procedures we can again refer to the Barnardo's report provided to IICSA.⁴⁶³ It revealed that in 1954 as many as 664 children had been nominated for migration by the several Barnardo's homes in the UK, but 138 of them did not want to go, parental consent was refused in the case of 86, 154 failed the medical examination, 68 wanted to stay in the UK with a sibling, 49 were eliminated because they were 'black', and it was decided not to disturb the

Dominions Office and Lucette, Deputy General Superintendent, Dr Barnardo's Homes, London, 28 May-13 Aug 1947, on Secretary of State's role in judging whether a child in the care of a 'fit person', like Barnardo's, would benefit best from migration or restoration in due course to a family member, particularly in the case of parental consent to migration not being given.

⁴⁶⁰ Barnardo's, SCAI copy of IICSA Witness Statement by Sara Clarke, BAR.001.005.3367.

⁴⁶¹ Barnardo's, *The Barnardo Book*, 1955, BAR.001.005.3589-3591. The 1944 edition, the first, contains no reference to selecting and sending child migrants overseas: BAR.001.001.0719-0822.

⁴⁶² Barnardo's, Section 21 Response, Part C, Sept 2018, section 4.11, Child Migration, BAR.001.001.0508-0509, 0511; SCAI copy of IICSA Witness Statement by Sara Clarke, 20 Feb 2017, BAR.001.005.3367, 3372; Report Prepared by Collette Bradford, Head of Aftercare, for Michael Jarman, the Director of Child Care on 31st August 1993, BAR.001.005.3484; *The Barnardo Book*, 1955, BAR.001.005.3589-3591; TNA, HO361/12, 'Dr Barnardo's Homes: Emigration Arrangements, 1957-62', referring to numbers, ages, selection procedures, medical and educational reports, consents, placements and record-keeping.

⁴⁶³ Barnardo's, SCAI copy of IICSA Witness Statement by Sara Clarke, 20 Feb 2017, BAR.001.005.3371-3372.

placements of three who were boarded out. In the event, of the 664 only 18 boys and four girls went overseas. This was not exceptional. In 1955 only 41 boys and five girls out of 790 nominations finally migrated. By the 1960s it is apparent that Barnardo's was still keen to send selected children overseas, but like other organisations it was having difficulty finding sufficient suitable children to send. But Area Executive Officers were also being urged first to screen children discretely to check their suitability for migration, rather than risk them becoming unnecessarily unsettled by raising the prospect prematurely. Criteria relating to health, IQ and skin colour remained as before, and parental or Secretary of State consent would also still be needed.⁴⁶⁴

13.43 Reports on some individual child migrants have been provided by Barnardo's, and there is no reason to question their representativeness. For instance, we have seen the case file of one boy, ██████████ born in Ayr in ██████████ 1924, and placed in the care of Barnardo's in 1938 after his mother had died in ██████████ 1937, aged 34, leaving the father with five children.⁴⁶⁵ He seems to have consented to ██████████ migration to Quebec in ██████████ 1939, when he was 14 and therefore of school-leaving age, conforming to post-1924 regulations, and strictly speaking a juvenile migrant. (Subsequently, and without the knowledge of ██████████, his siblings were also migrated. Reunions took place much later in life.)

13.44 The case of the ██████████ children from Fife also provides indicative detail.⁴⁶⁶ ██████████ and ██████████ ██████████ born ██████████ 1945, and with their ██████████ born ██████████ 1947, they were admitted at the request of their father to Barnardo's on ██████████ 1947, his wife having died the day after the birth of ██████████ (not 1953 as one record in the file states). Their health and IQ levels were assessed, Australia House accepted them as suitable, the children were 'very keen to go', and the father, though having a good relationship with his children, was by then not in good health and felt that it was 'not an opportunity they should miss', and implicitly gave his consent. They left for Australia on ██████████ 1959. By then the school-leaving age was 15, so all three qualified as child migrants.

⁴⁶⁴ Barnardo's, Child Migration Policy June 1964-July 1967, BAR.001.006.0796-0800.

⁴⁶⁵ Barnardo's, Children's file, ██████████ BAR.001.005.2991-3263. See also para 16.21 below on his placement, aftercare and lifetime contacts with Barnardo's.

⁴⁶⁶ Barnardo's, Children's file, ██████████ BAR.001.005.0001-0007, 0015, 0032-0033.

13.45 As another example, we have examined the records of ██████████ born in Elgin on ██████████ 1936, admitted aged 10 to a Barnardo's home in ██████████ 1946 on the recommendation of the NSPCC, and selected and sent to Burwood in ██████████ 1947, aged 11.⁴⁶⁷ Both her parents were by then dead. She had a half-sister, judged to be disreputable, but also two brothers, one of whom was a Bevin boy and later in the army, the other for a period in borstal. Learning that ██████████ was keen to go, Barnardo's nevertheless consulted and secured the consent of all three siblings, and having had a medical check-up and been tested by an educational psychologist she was approved for migration.

13.46 An unusual story indicates the steps which Barnardo's took to serve what they judged to be in the best interests of children.⁴⁶⁸ Two case files relate to ██████████ ██████████, born ██████████ 1952, and his sister ██████████ born ██████████ 1953. (There was an older brother, born in ██████████ 1949, who was not taken into care.) The mother was German and the British father was stationed in Germany, in an unstable relationship leading to a separation. In ██████████ 1957 the father, then living in Edinburgh, placed the two children in the care of Barnardo's. There are references in the children's files to the mother later seeking a divorce, and to a German grandmother who had for a period cared for the children. In ██████████ 1961, when they were aged nine and seven they were boarded out in Falkirk with foster parents, who had a daughter of their own. They all settled in happily together and formed one family. Then the parents opted to migrate to Australia, funded by the Empire Settlement Act, taking their daughter with them. However, their plan, after they had become established in a new home and secured employment, was for the ██████████ siblings to follow, and indeed they hoped to adopt them, and that is what ██████████ and ██████████ also wanted. Securing the consent of the foster parents for the migration of the children was of course not an issue, but steps were taken to secure the consent of an adult family member, and because the natural parents could not be traced this was obtained from the mother's sister. To support the emigration plan, Barnardo's arranged for the ██████████ to be temporarily cared for in a Barnardo's home. Australia House interviewed the children, they passed the medical and other inspections, and they flew to Australia on ██████████ 1965, ██████████ aged 13 and ██████████ 11. The file

⁴⁶⁷ Barnardo's, Children's file ██████████ BAR.001.005.2127-2128, 2131-2137, 2139, 2160-2162, 2164-2169, 2175-2181.

⁴⁶⁸ For the troubled family background see Barnardo's, Children's File, ██████████ BAR.001.005.1446-1448.

contains a press photograph of a party of Barnardo's children by the aircraft, ready to embark, with [REDACTED].⁴⁶⁹

13.47 The **Fairbridge Society**, which was later absorbed into the Prince's Trust, has provided SCAI with informative documents previously supplied to IICSA, and we also know something about its operations from other sources.⁴⁷⁰ From its foundation the Child Emigration Society, as it was originally named, had not operated a childcare home in the UK. Instead it operated a reception centre in Kent to which children chosen by others as potential child migrants were sent for further screening and preparation before dispatch overseas. Applications were received from parents or guardians and also from voluntary societies and even local authorities (including in Scotland) who were willing to use Fairbridge to send their children to farm schools in Australia and also in British Columbia. The Women's Group had initially concluded from the paucity of surviving records that in early days the society had had little by way of a screening process.⁴⁷¹ Only later was a psychiatric social worker appointed and the records then generated impressed the Group.

13.48 In 1938 an eight-year-old girl was sent by Fairbridge to the Prince of Wales Farm School in British Columbia. She was not of Scottish origin, but the distressing consequences of errors in selection are evident in a lengthy report on her case.⁴⁷² It is worth summarising as an example of how poor selection practice impacted on outcomes. She was an illegitimate child who, it is recorded, was adopted by a couple whose own marriage then broke up, after which she was placed in a Middlemore Home in Birmingham. Her case file, provided by the Prince's Trust, contains no medical, psychological or educational reports on her well-being and progress while cared for by Middlemore, and no information on the procedures which led to her being selected for migration. Nor does the file contain reports on how she came to

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid*, BAR.001.005.1341, 1344-1355, 1358, 1362, 1384, and, with much duplication of records, see the file on [REDACTED] beginning BAR.001.005.1494, and in particular 1764 for an education report; BAR.001.005.1769 and BAR.001.005.1819-1824 on securing the aunt's consent in lieu of parents; BAR.001.005.1772-1775 for the LEM3 form; and BAR.001.005.1806-1808 and BAR.001.005.1814-1824 for medical reports. For the subsequent history of the children see para 17.29. For a very detailed appraisal by Barnardo's management and placement committees of the suitability for migration of [REDACTED] a boy who had had learning difficulties, of his sister [REDACTED] and of consent issues see Committee of Management Minutes, various from 1962, BAR.001.005.3908-3912.

⁴⁷⁰ For example, Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*.

⁴⁷¹ WGPW, *Child Migration*, p.19.

⁴⁷² Prince's Trust, Personal file of a child at Fairbridge Farm School, BC, due to be repatriated, PRT.001.001.3247-3266.

be approved for migration by Fairbridge. There are also no reports on any assessment of her suitability as a child migrant by the Canadian authorities in the UK or on her arrival in Canada. It must be assumed that these assessments were made, but if so they did not pick up handicaps which soon became evident after her arrival in British Columbia. Her cottage mother's first report, [REDACTED] 1939, recorded that she had very poor eyesight (20/100; 20/50) and needed new glasses. Although she was 'anxious to please', she was a 'poor mixer', caused problems, and had 'no regard for the truth'.⁴⁷³ She tried very hard at school, but educationally, it seems, she was subnormal. Her conduct subsequently improved, but by [REDACTED] 1941 it was recorded that her educational progress was still below average and that she was not 'developing mentally as were other girls of her age', and as a 12-year old 'she could scarcely read'.⁴⁷⁴ A psychiatric report in [REDACTED] 1944, when she was 14, gave her a mental age of 10.⁴⁷⁵ A similar judgement was recorded in [REDACTED] 1945 by a psychiatric social worker, and in [REDACTED] 1946 it was concluded that 'she will always be a liability as far as useful citizenship is concerned'.⁴⁷⁶ Before then she had said she wanted to go back to England, but instead efforts were made to provide her with safe employment at the farm school. However, in [REDACTED] 1946 she was found to be pregnant. Under pressure she named an Old Fairbridgean visiting the farm school as the father, an accusation he denied. Three boys said they had been witnesses, and had reported this to the Principal, but there were discrepancies in reports and in the medical evidence. Her baby was born in [REDACTED] 1947. The mother was by then aged 17, but the provincial Director of the Child Guidance Clinic reckoned that her mental age was that of a child of twelve.⁴⁷⁷ She was separated against her wishes from her baby. Subsequently there was a suspicion that she was again sexually abused, though a court case was dropped. She was placed in a hospital's psychiatric ward. In [REDACTED] 1947 court hearings concerning a 'charge of incorrigibility' was brought against her, a procedure needed to allow for her deportation.⁴⁷⁸ This seem to have been traumatic for all involved. She was then placed in a mental hospital, while arrangements were made for her repatriation. Without her child but with escorts, this occurred in [REDACTED] 1947. She had to be restrained on the ship from [REDACTED] and then from [REDACTED] during the journey back to Birmingham. On

⁴⁷³ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.3248.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.3249-3250.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.3254.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.3258

arrival it required the police to escort her to hospital, after which she was transferred to a 'Public Assistance Institution'. Her life thereafter is not recorded in this file.⁴⁷⁹

13.49 Other concerns about selection and suitability were raised in ██████████ 1944 after Dr Crease, who was the General Superintendent at the Provincial Mental Hospital in British Columbia, had tested boys and girls at the farm school and discerned psychological as well as physical problems. This was done at the request of the Deputy Provincial Secretary.⁴⁸⁰ We have seen an undated handwritten spreadsheet provided by the British Columbia archives entitled 'Reports by Dr Crease re individual children at Fairbridge, their health, mentality, etc.' Reports on 40 children are set out. The age range is from 11 to 18, and there are comments on 'School Grade', 'School Standing', 'Self Adjustment', 'Social Adjustment', 'Withdrawing Tendencies', 'Sense of Personal Worth', 'Feeling of Belonging', 'Spontaneity & Initiative', 'Physical Condition', 'Enuresis', 'Educational/Physical Disability' and a 'Recommendation'. Under these headings only three of the 41 seem for certain to have achieved at least acceptable scores. Two were described as 'morons'. Two were judged to have a 'schizoid personality'. Four were reckoned to have educational disabilities. Thirteen others were recorded as having physical disabilities, including 'enlarged heart', 'rheumatic heart', 'T.B suspect', 'epileptic', 'cerebral diplegia' (two cases), 'birth injury', and eyesight or hearing or dental or feet problems. In ██████████ 1945 two Fairbridge children were repatriated from the farm school as mentally sub-normal, including one who had been diagnosed as a 'moron' by Dr Crease.⁴⁸¹ It is difficult to reconcile this report with the screening and selection processes conducted by Fairbridge and by the Canadian authorities in the UK and on first arrival in British Columbia.⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁹ The file concludes with two documents relating to the repatriation in 1945 of two other Fairbridge children from British Columbia, one because of 'epileptic fits' and the other 'on account of sub-normality', PRT.001.001.3267-3268.

⁴⁸⁰ File kindly supplied by British Columbia Archives, GR0496, Box 58, File 4, BCA.001.001.0181, 0184, 0186, 0191, 0193-0194.

⁴⁸¹ File kindly supplied by British Columbia Archives, MS2045, Box 1, File 14, Logan to Crogan, 15 Aug 1944, BCA.001.001.0924; Walker to Grogan, 6 Sept 1944, sending him copies of the report, BCA.001.001.0914-0915. A second file, compiled by the Office of the Chief Inspector of Welfare Institutions, dated 29 June 1944, GR0496, Box 58, File 4, with reference to Dr Crease assessments in ██████████ 1942, refers to the mental and physical defects of many Fairbridge children, and naming one boy a 'sex pervert' and another a 'sodomite' BCA.001.001.0265-0269. There were also reports still coming of 'homosexual activities', BCA.001.001.0274. The deportations are recorded in a Provincial Archives file, GR0496, Box 58, File 7, BCA.001.001.0525.

⁴⁸² Further information on this report is provided in para 24.4 below.

13.50 The deportations seem to have prompted the recently appointed Principal, Garnett (not the man of the same name formerly attached to the UK High Commission in Australia) to complain in November 1945 about the poor quality of many children for whose care he was responsible and about the effect of this locally on the school's reputation. Green, Fairbridge's General Secretary in London, protested in response that all children sent had been carefully screened, including by the Canadian authorities, and that it was obviously not in the interests of the children or of Fairbridge to select, approve and send the 'sub-normal'.⁴⁸³ But Garnett's rejoinder was to insist that the school had received children 'far from normal in their physical and mental development', and that his predecessor as Principal concurred.⁴⁸⁴ On 5 December 1945 Garnett wrote again, to say that Dr Crease had advised the Deputy Provincial Secretary that he was willing to assess the mental as well as physical health of Fairbridge children on arrival.⁴⁸⁵ Whether such assessments subsequently took place regularly we do not know.

13.51 In the wake of concerns about standards at the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra, which it first raised with the Dominions Office in 1943, the Fairbridge Society in London sought to consult the UK Government on how appropriate standards might be maintained in the overseas institutions to which it was responsible for sending children. We have referred to this earlier (see para 7.10) and how, as part of this process, in September 1945, Sir Charles Hambro informed the Dominions Office and the Home Office that the Society intended to review its constitution and to address the anticipated new post-war standards of child welfare in order to ensure, amongst other concerns, that 'children who come into the care of the Society may have all the safeguards which will cover children in the United Kingdom who are without the protection of their own family'.⁴⁸⁶ While still committed to its child

⁴⁸³ Prince's Trust, Green to Garnett, 1 Nov 1945, PRT.001.001.3411, and Green to Garnett, 8 Nov 1945, sending description of Fairbridge's selection process, PRT.001.001.3414-3415.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid*, Garnett to Green, 21 Nov and 28 Nov 1945, PRT001.001.3410, 3409.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid*, Garnett to Green, 5 Dec 1945, enclosing Crease to Walker, 30 Nov 1945, PRT001.001.3407-3408. See also file provided by British Columbia Archives, GR0496, Box 58, File 8, Part 2, Crease to Walker, 30 Nov 1945, for an expression of his willingness, BCA.001.001.0681.

⁴⁸⁶ TNA, MH102/1401, 'Emigration of Children to Farm Schools in Australia and Canada', Hambro to S of S Dominions Affairs, and similarly to S of S for Home Department, 7 Sept 1945, LEG.001.004.0335-0336, 0338; MH102/1402, 'Emigration of Children to Fairbridge and Other Farm Schools in Australia and Canada', esp pp.1-4, 12-50, 18 Dec 1945-46 March 1945; DO35/1138/4 (formerly M1007/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School – W.Australia. Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to Pinjarra', 26 Nov 1943-14 Feb 1946. See also DO35/1139/M1118/1, 'Fairbridge Farm Schools: General Series. Review of Society's Constitution regarding Child Welfare etc', 7 Sept 1945-28 Jan 1947, and /M1118/2, 'Memorandum and Articles of Association', 23 Aug-21 Oct 1946, plus DO35/3395, 'Fairbridge Farm Schools: Review of

migration vision, Fairbridge were evidently willing to accept the principles of child care which they felt certain would be embraced by the Home Office (and were expected to be applied by regulations). Hence they consulted the Home Office on selection, appropriate age, and the need for testing children, and also for providing them with some pre-emigration training. They were also made aware by a Home Office memorandum of the need for the regular monitoring of child migrants once overseas and the on-going responsibility of sending organisations.⁴⁸⁷ They may also have been prompted by an initiative taken by the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College which at this time, after contacting the British Federation of Social Workers, was including a professional social worker to assist with its selections.⁴⁸⁸ Certainly it seems to have been these initiatives that attracted the particular attention of the Women's Group since in their 1951 review of Fairbridge they went on to note that more recently a psychiatric social worker had been employed to collect case histories on which selection decisions were based. They were impressed by 'the thoroughness of these records' which they considered would be 'of immense value at the receiving end', provided there was someone 'capable of interpreting them'.⁴⁸⁹ Indeed, records we have seen indicate that between 1953 and 1966 the Fairbridge Child Care Committee was meeting several times a year, usually every two or three months, and among other business it held informed discussions about individual children. Matters arising related to selection, including whether it was or was not in the child's best interests to be separated from its family, medical screening, child and parental consent, and occasionally repatriation.⁴⁹⁰ One girl was not accepted in [REDACTED] 1955 when it was discovered she was a 'coloured' child from Jamaica.⁴⁹¹

Society's Constitution', esp. 30 Jan-17 April 1947, for actions intended to increase London's authority over practice in Australia.

⁴⁸⁷ On further Fairbridge consultations with the Home Office July-Sept 1947 see MH102/1403, 'Emigration of Children to Farm Schools in Australia', pp.19-35 for drafts of a memo 'Emigration of Children Deprived of a Normal Home Life' by the Home Office and minor amendments by Fairbridge and especially p.3 of the memo concerning selection; plus MH102/1404 and MH102/1405, July and September 1948, for Fairbridge again seeking and taking advice from the Home Office on its draft of a document concerning selection standards and such matters as the health and mental fitness and educational progress of each child, the need for co-operation with parents, and the role of social workers.

⁴⁸⁸ Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, p.227.

⁴⁸⁹ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.19.

⁴⁹⁰ Prince's Trust, Minutes of meetings of the Child Care Committee 1953-1966, PRT.001.001.0985-1229.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.1042.

13.52 Concerning consent, we do not know for sure whether children were able to give informed consent, though we have encountered an example of a boy who changed his mind, and his unwillingness to be sent to Australia was respected.⁴⁹² Parents or guardians from the beginning of Fairbridge operations had enrolled children in what was known to be a child emigration scheme, and should have briefed their children. Parents were obliged to sign a form which declared that 'I consent to his/her emigration to Canada/Australia through the Fairbridge Society and I further authorize the said Society and the Officers to exercise in Canada/Australia all the functions of guardian'.⁴⁹³ But this did not imply a legal transfer of guardianship to Fairbridge but to a co-operative partnership with parents or guardians – though Fairbridge would have preferred to obtain legal guardianship and not act only as the custodians of children in their care.⁴⁹⁴ In early years, from 1921 to 1923, of the 97 children migrated, 24 had been provided by Boards of Guardians, 25 by voluntary societies, and just 19 by private individuals, presumably parents or guardians. However, between 1948 and 1954, one or both parents supplied 170 of the 311 children enrolled with Fairbridge for migration to Australia. There is evidence to show that parents or guardians generally knew what they were doing and had given consent.⁴⁹⁵ However, witness testimony to IICSA presented by two former child migrants and the daughter of a third, supported by documentary evidence, indicates that that was not always the case, and indeed that in one case the necessary consent of the Secretary of State had not been secured.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹² *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.1012.

⁴⁹³ Quoted in David Hill, *The Forgotten Children: Fairbridge Farm School and Its Betrayal of Britain's Child Migrants to Australia* (Heinemann, Random House, North Sydney, 2008), p.97. All references are to this paperback edition.

⁴⁹⁴ This is indicated or at least implied in Garnett to Logan, 4 Sept 1947 PRT.001.001.2289, and Garnett to Logan, 10 Sept 1947, PRT.001.001.2287-2288.

⁴⁹⁵ Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, pp.92-97, 131-132, 230-234; Geoffrey Sherington, 'Fairbridge child migrants', in Lawrence and Starkey (eds), *Child Welfare and Social Action*, pp.62-65; *Lost Innocents*, Report, para 3.48:

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index. SCAI witness statement by Mr Mackay records that his father gave consent to his sending to the Fairbridge Farm School in British Columbia, but whether required by Middlemore Homes, to where he was first sent and which collaborated with Fairbridge, or by Fairbridge also is not clear: WIT.001.001.3454. Aged seven when he sailed, he does not record whether he had given consent.

⁴⁹⁶ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcripts of oral testimony by Marcelle O'Brien, 28 Feb 2017, pp.49-50; by A2, written evidence read, 28 Feb 2017, p.94; by A4, 1 March 2017, p.36; by Patricia Skidmore, 9 March 2017, pp.144-147, this last by the daughter of a child migrant.

13.53 It is worth here recalling that the fall in the number of children being proposed for migration by childcare institutions in the UK prompted Fairbridge to launch its one-parent and subsequently two-parents schemes, whereby children would be migrated with their parents.⁴⁹⁷ In November 1956 Fairbridge stated that this was 'the only way by which we can continue to operate'.⁴⁹⁸ Moreover, in May 1957 Sir Charles Hambro, chair of Fairbridge and concerned (mistakenly as it turned out) that the Home Office was about to impose regulations on child migration practice, feared that '[i]t was extremely unlikely that we would be able to function except as far as the Family Scheme was concerned'.⁴⁹⁹ In July 1958 Fairbridge's Executive Committee again concluded that while it would be ready to help suitable individual children 'the future of the Society's work would depend on the development of the family scheme'.⁵⁰⁰ In 1965, Fairbridge was also arranging a scholarship scheme to commence in 1967 to send sponsored students, of course above school-leaving age, to the University of Perth. In 1969 similar schemes to send students to the University of British Columbia and to the University of Adelaide or to a technology college in South Australia were also aired.⁵⁰¹ These statements and subsequent practice suggest that Fairbridge was more driven by a determination to remain more broadly engaged in emigration work, perhaps in its own interests, rather than as an essential response to the needs of children in the UK.

13.54 With respect to the **Northcote Trust**, we have seen a form probably used early post-war which suggests that those making selections had clear ideas of what information they believed was needed to enable them to identify children who would or should benefit from migration.⁵⁰² Those adults applying on their behalf had to provide information about parents and siblings, the family's history of physical and

⁴⁹⁷ See para 1.2 above.

⁴⁹⁸ Prince's Trust, Letter to the Department of Immigration from the Fairbridge Society Director, 6 Nov 1956 PRT.001.001.4243,

⁴⁹⁹ Prince's Trust, Minutes of meeting of Council, 2 May 1957, PRT.001.001.0422.

⁵⁰⁰ Prince's Trust, Fairbridge Society Summary of Discussions and Findings at a Special Meeting of the Executive Committee, 22 July 1958, PRT.001.001.0497. This file also contains a memorandum agreed at that meeting which was to be issued to all members of the Fairbridge Council and Executive in order to ensure that all recognised the effect of the 1948 Children Act on child care practice, the unwillingness of local authority Children's Officers to support child migration, and the support increasingly being given by some voluntary societies to enable families in the UK to remain together or to arrange (ideally temporary) foster care, PRT.001.001.0498-0502. The challenge to Fairbridge, it was stated, was to see how far its practice conformed to new expectations.

⁵⁰¹ Prince's Trust, Report on the Director's Visit to Australia, 1965, PRT.001.001.0784; Minutes of Council meeting at Bush House, London, 6 Aug 1969, PRT.001.001.1635, 1637, 1639, 1641.

⁵⁰² TNA, MH102/1592, 'Northcote Farm School', pp.56-57.

mental health and specifically that of the child (including whether enuretic and if so how seriously), plus the child's religion, character, interests and any special needs, and not least the reason for requesting that the child be migrated. References were also required, so the names and addresses of a clergyman, teacher and doctor had to be provided. The results of intelligence tests and reports by a social worker, a teacher, a representative of a child care society if involved in the proposal, and 'any other suitable person who knows the child well' also came to be required.⁵⁰³ Such documentation was gathered up at head office for consideration by the Northcote trustees, who then made their selection from the nominations. We can add that from 1948 a preference would be given to children between the ages of five and eight. We are not aware of how consent was secured from children, but not only can we assume that parents or guardians knew what they were doing but certainly post-war they were obliged formally to give their consent by completing and signing a form. In addition, of course, Australia's Department of Immigration required answers to similar questions.

13.55 The **Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College** (RFMC), unrelated to the Fairbridge Society, probably received only a modest number of applications from Scotland, but it is worth noting that in 1951 its selection procedures impressed the Women's Group.⁵⁰⁴ Because the objective was to select a 'better class' of child to fit into a white ruling elite in a black African society, careful screening and selection were imperative. It had an arrangement with the British Federation of Social Workers by which a professional social worker in the child's area would assess and produce a case report on each child. Questions asked related to home environment, health, personality ('friendly or shy', partly revealed by membership of clubs and leisure time activities), religion, family history with information required about parents (marital status), the legal custody of the children, family atmosphere (whether harmonious), and parental attitude towards the child being sent to Rhodesia – this last probably implying the securing of consent and that of the child. There would also be a school visit, to solicit further information about the child, and not just about educational progress but about involvement in games and relationships with staff and other pupils. Any concerns would then be raised with a child guidance clinic.⁵⁰⁵ We know

⁵⁰³ TNA, MH102/1593, 'Emigration of Children under Northcote's Child Emigration Fund for Australia', pp.104-105, 108-110.

⁵⁰⁴ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.20. Its practices, and pressure from the Home Office, prompted the Fairbridge Society to improve its selection procedures: Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, p.227

⁵⁰⁵ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, Appendix 2, p.71.

that Australian officials required child migrants to be 'white', physically fit and to have an IQ level of at least 95, but a 1954 RFMC recruiting brochure explicitly stated that applicants must have 'the ability to make good as members of the community', meaning white settler society, and though never made explicit it seems that they were also expected to have an IQ score of at least 130.⁵⁰⁶ Initially, in 1948, the stipulated age range was to be between eight and 14, but by 1954, presumably after experience, the Warden at the college preferred to accept children between the ages of six and eight, but otherwise up to age 10.⁵⁰⁷

13.56 As for consent, the involvement of a parent or guardian, as well as of the child, in the screening process might seem to cover that expectation. However, in the introduction to *Windows*, the book containing autobiographies of former RFMC children, the writer states that the majority had 'not been able to give informed consent', and that is an impression given by a contributor who recalls being asked whether he wanted to go and live in Africa: 'What a question. What seven year old could turn down the chance of seeing lions and elephants, so I agreed.'⁵⁰⁸ One of the eight Scottish child migrants who we know were sent to Rhodesia [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of how, aged 10, abandoned by his parents and living with his aunt in Castle Douglas, he had been woken up in the middle of the night, put on a train to London, housed in a hostel, and then shipped to Africa, seemingly without his consent and with no idea as to why he was being separated from his family and 'deported'.⁵⁰⁹

13.57 We know something about the selection procedures of the **Salvation Army** from a submission by the Army to IICSA.⁵¹⁰ It seems that children were not usually selected from those accommodated in children's homes run by the Army in the UK, rather they had been proposed by families who had expressed an interest in this scheme and in some cases intended to follow the child overseas. We may therefore

⁵⁰⁶ Boucher, *Empire's Children*, p.205, and footnote 33, and her essay 'The limits of potential', esp. p.915. These procedures are referred to in some of the personal accounts in *Windows: Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College Autobiographies*; see ref 309 above.

⁵⁰⁷ MH102/1896, 'Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College', 1947 brochure, p.14 in file; MH102/1897, 'Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College', pp.2, 29 in file; MH102/1898, 'Visit by Mr John Moss to Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College', pp.25, 15, in file.

⁵⁰⁸ *Windows*, pp.5, 59, and similarly p.203.

⁵⁰⁹ [REDACTED]

⁵¹⁰ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcript of oral testimony, Professor Lynch, 21 July 2017, pp.86-99; IICSA *Child Migration Report*, pp.116-119.

presume at least parental consent. Selection involved the family meeting with a local Salvation Army officer and the completion of a form giving details about the child's family background, why the child wished to be considered for migration, what the attitude of their parents was to this, and the child's previous educational and training background. Whilst the process beyond this is somewhat unclear, it is stated that reports on individual children appear to have been sent overseas prior to them being accepted for migration. We may assume that if any had been trained at the Salvation Army's Hadleigh Farm in Essex before dispatch they must have been judged physically fit.⁵¹¹

13.58 In response to Section 21 requests, **The Aberlour Trust** has provided several reports to SCAI concerning child migration, the first set covering the period from 1900 to 1930 and the second from 1930 to 2014.⁵¹² Our purpose here is to consider how children were selected and whether, how and from whom consent to their migration was given. It is acknowledged in both reports that no records of policies or procedures have been located, but some indication of practice can be discerned in contemporary records. We have already established from a file supplied by Aberlour that between 1900 and 1951 probably 46 children had been selected and sent to Canada after 1900, and nine others, not all conventional child migrants, went to other destinations (see para 10.5 above). They mainly migrated in the 1920s, 48 out of the 55. Indeed, the *Orphanage Magazine* declared in June 1933 that 'the door to emigration is closed'.⁵¹³ This presumably relates to economic depression in Canada, but it was not strictly true since there were a couple of later departures and indeed Aberlour did consider other opportunities.

13.59 With respect to selection, it is stated that no child under the age of 14 was sent to a destination outside the UK except as part of a family group – for example young siblings accompanying or following one aged 14 or older. Otherwise, those sent were either juveniles or were joining a parent already overseas, and this needs to be kept in mind. That said, the provided list of child migrants might imply that one boy, [REDACTED] aged 11, was sent to Canada in 1905 unattached to a family group, and four siblings, age range 3 to 8, were also sent to Canada in 1912. In

⁵¹¹ Salvation Army Hadleigh Farm, <http://www.hadleighfarm.org.uk/about-us/history-of-hadleigh-farm>

⁵¹² Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1900-1930, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.7699-7711; and 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.8061-8074.

⁵¹³ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.8061, quoting *Orphanage Magazine*, June 1933.

addition, three brothers, the oldest 13 and the youngest 5, were also migrated in 1906, but to South Africa. Quite what accounts for these apparent exceptions is not known, because in each case we read 'No information on file regarding arrangements for discharge'.⁵¹⁴

13.60 More intriguing is a reference in Aberlour's *Orphanage Magazine* in 1927 to a visit by a 'colonisation agent' resulting in six boys being sent under a 'Canadian Pacific Scheme', which required those accepted to be over five feet tall and weigh over 100 lbs, barriers to some being accepted.⁵¹⁵ However, we understand that these were juveniles. All children more generally seem to have been expected to pass medical examinations, judging by admittedly blank medical report forms in one file relating to the migration of two children; and letters in the files of two other boys.⁵¹⁶

13.61 As for later possibilities, in August 1938 a Fairbridge representative met the management committee to discuss whether Aberlour would be interested in sending children to Fairbridge farm schools in Australia. The report to SCAI on the Orphanage states that the 'organisation decided that it would not be appropriate to send children within its care and under the age of 12 years old to Australia through this scheme', and that there was no further discussion on this matter.⁵¹⁷ Actually, the formal minute of the meeting is a little different, stating, rather obscurely, that it was 'not practicable' to migrate children under twelve, 'but that the scheme might be considered if Fairbridge were willing to receive children at fourteen or upwards',⁵¹⁸ Aberlour was therefore prepared to co-operate if Fairbridge would accept juveniles of the sort it had been sending to Canada from 1926, and indeed in three instances to Australia in 1928 plus one to New Zealand in 1931, and for whom otherwise it would be trying to find placements in Scotland.⁵¹⁹ There is no follow-up reference.

13.62 We learn again from Aberlour committee minutes that in February 1948 the Royal Over-Seas League had applied for the 'nomination of a boy to be a candidate

⁵¹⁴ List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7695-7698.

⁵¹⁵ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1900-1930, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.7700-7703; and 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.8061; *Orphanage Magazine*, April 1927, p.5, ABE.001.008.7712.

⁵¹⁶ Aberlour, Children's files for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ABE.001.008.7943, 7763, 8279.

⁵¹⁷ Aberlour, Section 21 response, Part C and D, The Orphanage, ABE.001.001.0455.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid*, ABE.001.001.0455; 1938 Minute Book 2, ABE.001.008.8076; List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7695-7698.

⁵¹⁹ Aberlour, 1938 Minute Book 2, ABE.001.008.8076.

for adoption overseas', and that the Warden of Aberlour was authorised to look into the matter.⁵²⁰ Though we are not told by what criteria, the Orphanage did select a boy deemed suitable. However, in [REDACTED] 1948 the Warden reported that the boy's father, evidently consulted, had refused consent, and that needs to be remembered. The Warden was then authorised to identify another boy, indicative of Aberlour's continued interest in the scheme. But in [REDACTED] 1948, the Warden reported that 'this matter had disappointingly fallen through'.⁵²¹ The boy selected could not be recommended 'after psychological examination by an expert'. The Orphanage does not seem to have considered further candidates. More generally we are told that no child would have been emigrated 'unless there was a clear benefit to the child'.⁵²²

13.63 As for consent, the two reports we have seen for the periods before and after 1930 acknowledge that no records on policies and procedures relating to consent by children to their migration, or by parents, have been located. However, there are records of a child turning down an invitation to migrate to Kenya, and of another boy, actually a juvenile, being selected instead and giving his consent.⁵²³ It was suggested in the reports to SCAI that subsequent correspondence sent back by children from Canada to Scotland implied that they had gone willingly.⁵²⁴ This may be true, although letters published in the *Orphanage Magazine* were not likely to advertise anything to the contrary. We are also told that no child was emigrated without the consent of parents or guardians, and certainly in the file of one child we have noted a reference to consent given by a mother, but she was already living in Canada, and an analogous case is referred to in Aberlour's 1900-1930 report.⁵²⁵ See also the father's refusal to give consent in the 1948 case already noted in the previous paragraph. We should also record here that Lanark County Council, who had placed a child in the care of Aberlour, required not just the consent of the boy but of the Secretary of State for Scotland, both duly given.⁵²⁶

⁵²⁰ For minutes of the meetings on which the report drew for its account see SCAI report from Aberlour ABE.001.008.8076-8080.

⁵²¹ Aberlour, Section 21 response, Part C and D, The Orphanage, ABE.001.001.0455-0460.

⁵²² *Ibid*, ABE.001.001.0456.

⁵²³ Aberlour, Children's File, [REDACTED] ABE.001.008.8281.

⁵²⁴ For example, Aberlour, Children's file, [REDACTED] ABE.001.008.8009.

⁵²⁵ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1900-1930, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.7703, 7708; *Orphanage Magazine*, 1929, p.66, ABE.001.001.7738; Children's file, [REDACTED] ABE.001.008.7763.

⁵²⁶ Aberlour, Children's file, [REDACTED] ABE.001.008.8221, 8244, 8245, 8257, 8259, 8265, 8278, 8282.

13.64 In brief, limited surviving Aberlour records for the years from 1900 onwards oblige us to pick up clues about selection from fragmentary sources, but perhaps sufficient to indicate Aberlour's commitment to select only juveniles 14 or over for migration except for younger ones accompanying or following older siblings, or travelling to join a parent overseas, and all seem to have had to pass medical examinations to satisfy authorities overseas. As for consent, with still less on which to make a judgement, there are nevertheless grounds for accepting that none were sent without the consent of the child and a responsible family member, and in one case of the Secretary of State.

13.65 With respect to Annie Croall's **Whinwell Children's Home** in Stirling, we have greatly benefitted from a report and documents provided by Stirling Council, which has become the repository of such Whinwell records as have survived.⁵²⁷ The first of the 124 child migrants sent overseas left in 1882. The last recorded child migration occurred in 1940, so evidently Whinwell did not continue the practice post-war. It is apparent that Annie Croall as Superintendent and then her successors made the initial selection. Having examined the files, the archivist concludes:

Selection appears to have been made on a case-by-case basis according to whether the Superintendent felt that it was in the best interests of the child that they be sent abroad. Evidence of this exists in the correspondence in the children's files. There is no statement given in the records of what criteria were used to determine which children were chosen to emigrate.⁵²⁸

13.66 There is a record in the 1888 *Annual Report* of a Whinwell party leaving for Emma Stirling's farm school in Nova Scotia,⁵²⁹ and it is possible that she had been involved in selection, although by then she had been resident in Nova Scotia for some years. There is a slightly fuller account on further parties in the *Annual Report*

⁵²⁷ Stirling Council, Section 21 response, Report relating to records held at Stirling Council Archives 1900-1980, by Pam McNicol, Stirling Council Archivist, October 2018, STC.001.001.0564-0572, plus Appendix 1 for list of those migrated, their personal details, their destinations, whether they had siblings, and if so whether they too were migrated, STC.001.001.0573-0582; but see our doubts about the precise figures in footnote 301 above. See also Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.180-181; Abrams, *Orphan Country*, pp.91-92; Kohli, *Golden Bridge*, p.199; Philip Girard, 'Victorian philanthropy and child rescue: The career of Emma Stirling in Scotland and Nova Scotia, 1860-95' in Marjory Harper and Michael E. Vance (eds), *Myth, Migration and the Making of Memory: Scotia and Nova Scotia, c.1700-1990* (Fernwood Press and John Donald: Halifax, NS, and Edinburgh, 1999), pp.218-231, esp. p.218.

⁵²⁸ Stirling Council, Section 21 response, Report relating to records held at Stirling Council Archives 1900-1980, by Pam McNicol, Stirling Council Archivist, October 2018, STC.001.001.0568.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid*, *Annual Report*, 1888, p.8, cited in the report, STC.001.001.0565.

for 1891.⁵³⁰ There is also a reference in the 1934 *Annual Report* to three children from Whinwell having been sent to Australia by Fairbridge (and possibly three more later), but they were certainly not the first, because Croall herself records, and surviving documents confirm, that some of her boys were sent by Fairbridge to Pinjarra in Western Australia, the Fairbridge Society making the selection from among those proposed.⁵³¹ See also the reference below to Barnardo's involvement in a particular case. We also note from the 1914 *Annual Report* and other correspondence that the sending agency in most cases was the Liverpool Sheltering Homes, operated by Lilian Birt, who had worked closely with Annie Macpherson.⁵³² Birt may have influenced selection since she seems to have set down age criteria, boys between 10 and 14, and, more surprisingly, girls between four and 16. Those chosen were also to be 'trained', but we are not told where, by whom or for what. They were also to be 'thought fit for emigration'. Accordingly, before leaving Stirling, the children were examined by a doctor; before leaving Liverpool they were again medically examined this time by the ship's doctor; and on arrival in Canada they were once more medically checked. Knowledge of such medical inspections, if anticipated, should also have affected final selection of all child migrants leaving Whinwell.⁵³³

13.67 Concerning consent, we do not know whether (or if so how) children themselves were required to give their consent to migration, but the consent of adults to a child's migration became a prerequisite for a child's admission to the Home. The 1903 *Annual Report* carries the explicit alert that

in the event of the child's admission, the child's nearest relative or guardian must sign the agreement, giving the Principal power to send the child to any situation either in this country, or the Continent of Europe, or in our Colonies, or

⁵³⁰ *Ibid*, *Annual Report*, 1891, pp.6-8, cited in the report, STC.001.001.0565.

⁵³¹ NRS, ED57/1398, Educational Trusts, 1890-1954 (Whinwell Children's Home), *Annual Report*, 1934, SGV.001.009.7256, 7261; and Minutes of Evidence, Educational Endowments (Scotland) Commission, 17 June 1935, SGV.001.009.7280, 7294-7295. There are references to a first party going to Pinjarra in 1913 and a second in 1914: STC.001.001.0618 and 0624. Croall, *Fifty Years on a Scottish Battlefield*, p.46, refers to two girls sent to 'Mrs Wright's beautiful Children's Home in New South Wales'. They and this destination are also referred to in the Whinwell Annual Report for 1914, STC.001.001.0624. We have no further information on this institution.

⁵³² Stirling Council, Whinwell Children's Home, *Annual Report*, 1914, p.8, STC.001.001.0564.

⁵³³ See references to medical examinations in NRS, ED57/1398, 'Whinwell Children's Home', pp.44-45, 64, Minutes of Evidence, Educational Endowments (Scotland) Commission, 17 June 1935. But see also a report that a child sent to Canada from Whinwell was returned to Scotland in 1911 because 'the poor little child' was 'so blind': Nolan to Miss Croall, STC.001.001.0728-0729. It is of course possible that this infirmity developed after she had been migrated to Canada.

dispose of the child in any way the Managers think would be for the child's benefit and future good.⁵³⁴

Pretty much the same statement is repeated in the 1914 *Annual Report*,⁵³⁵ and archived Whinwell records provide plenty of examples of such agreements signed by parents in the period 1898 to 1932.⁵³⁶

13.68 As for choice of destinations, the Stirling archivist sensibly suggests that because of Croall's dependence on other agencies in the placing of Whinwell children overseas she (and her successors as Superintendents) may not have made 'the ultimate decision about where the children were to be sent'.⁵³⁷ It would for instance be Birt who determined to where in Canada she relocated Whinwell children, and similarly Fairbridge staff who determined to which of its farm schools they were sent.

13.69 One item posted on line by Stirling Archives concerns the case of the three [REDACTED] children, one a baby, handed over to the Home in 1901 'entirely with no after claim' by a mother, a single parent, in considerable difficulties who could not cope.⁵³⁸ Presumably on handing over her children she had signed the admission form and provided the 'consent' for what subsequently occurred. In 1903 the older two were handed over to Barnardo's in London, and one assumes that that organisation also approved them as suitable for migration since they were boarded out with families in Canada, the boy [REDACTED] in 1906 and the girl [REDACTED] in 1907. Whether the siblings were reconnected following their placements is not revealed.

13.70 In 1903, four Askew brothers were also admitted to Whinwell.⁵³⁹ The eldest two, then aged nine and eight, were selected and sent to Canada almost immediately, the sending agency being Birt's Sheltering Home in Liverpool. The other two boys followed, one in 1906 and the youngest, by then aged seven, in 1909. Miss

⁵³⁴ Stirling Council, Whinwell Children's Home, *Annual Report*, 1903, p.5, STC.001.001.0564,

⁵³⁵ *Ibid*, *Annual Report*, 1914, p.4.

⁵³⁶ Stirling Council, Whinwell Children's Home, STC.001.001.0714, 0721, 0757, 0771, 0793, 0794, 0818, 0929, 0981, 0989, 0994, 1026-1028, 1080, 1109, 1120, 1132, 1152, 1184, 1197-1198.

⁵³⁷ Stirling Council, Section 21 response, Report relating to records held at Stirling Council Archives 1900-1980, by Pam McNicol, Stirling Council Archivist, October 2018, STC.001.001.0568.

⁵³⁸ Stirling Local History Society, Stirling Archives Document of the Month July 2014, <https://www.stirling-lhs.org/sca-whinwell-home.html>

⁵³⁹ Stirling Archives, Stirling Council Archives Blog (12 February 2018), The Askew Brothers – Whinwell Home, 1903, [REDACTED]

Croall had requested Louisa Birt to try and keep the boys together, the eldest 'having a fatherly care over his brothers'. This request comes close to Miss Croall making it her condition of consent, but whether the boys themselves consented is not indicated, though it is likely that it would have been given by the younger three in order to follow the eldest.

13.71 Absent or limited archival records make it even more difficult to assess the selection and consent practice of other sending agencies. With respect to **Mrs Blaikie's Orphan and Emigration Home** in Edinburgh, all we know is derived from William Blaikie's autobiography.⁵⁴⁰ This perhaps implies selection since whereas 708 children had been admitted to the home only 301 were sent to Canada. But there were many reasons other than non-selection of children remaining in care in Scotland, including being returned to parents. Blaikie states that 'the greatest care' was taken to obtain the written consent of parents to their children's emigration and that the right to withdraw consent and demand their re-custody was 'cordially acknowledged'. He also wrote that in 'no case was any pressure brought to bear on respectable parents' to allow their children to be dispatched across the Atlantic. However, that ethical stance contrasts with his further statement that '[i]t was only in cases of drunken and ill-doing parents that the benefits of emigration were strongly pressed', although he acknowledged that he had a 'certain qualm that we were interfering with the law of nature'. However, 'extreme evils require extreme remedies', and on one occasion he records that the Blaikies insisted, even on a railway departure platform, that children were leaving in spite of noisy protests by parents. He even describes a 'more amusing scene' whereby he deceived a mother by giving her money and telling her to return tomorrow to receive a further gift for her husband, by when their child was already on its way to Liverpool.

13.72 Emma Stirling's tendentious memoir provides very little information about how children at the **Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society** were selected to be sent to Canada.⁵⁴¹ It is very probable that she had herself selected those children in the early parties who accompanied her overseas, but the criteria for selection is not revealed. In August 1887 she informed her advisory board of directors that she was herself emigrating to her Hillfoot farm in Nova Scotia, so it was presumably that board or those appointed by it who thereafter did the selecting, but

⁵⁴⁰ Blaikie, *Autobiography*, pp.328-330.

⁵⁴¹ Emma Stirling, *Our Children in Old Scotland and Nova Scotia* (Speakville, Coatesville Pennsylvania, 1898), available from <https://archive.org/details/ourchildreninold00stiruoft/page/n8>.

again the criteria for choice is unknown.⁵⁴² We know from Stirling's memoirs that girls but probably more boys were selected and sent, and that in the 1886 party many were younger than eight, four less than four, and the youngest only two, but the age of older children is not stated.⁵⁴³ Nothing is recorded about their origins, previous experiences, family backgrounds, or educational, physical and emotional suitability.

13.73 Two exceptional legal cases are perhaps indicative of Stirling's motives.⁵⁴⁴ The first, in 1887, concerned a child 'rescued' by her society and sent by her to Nova Scotia against the wishes of the parents. By court order, the child was brought back to Scotland, but following police inquiries the Court decided that the parents were not fit to care for him, and the child remained in Edinburgh, in the Society's care. By then Stirling herself was living in Nova Scotia, and with her away and to avoid a repetition of such an incident, her Society's directors resolved that only parentless true orphans should be emigrated - unless parents had signed a written agreement or unless the children were old enough to have decided for themselves. We have not seen case files to illustrate subsequent practice. The second case relates to three very young children placed in the Home in 1882 by a father whose wife had died, but who had subsequently tried, repeatedly, to recover them. But Stirling without his knowledge, let alone his consent, had sent them to Nova Scotia in 1886. Her motive in this case was not just the claimed (but disputed) neglect of the children but the father's Roman Catholic faith, to which Stirling was hostile, and the involvement of Catholic priests in the matter. Serious and prolonged legal action followed to require them to be brought back, but to no avail. Stirling had lost track of their whereabouts. We do not know whether such episodes were replicated in the case of other children taken away from non-consenting parents.

⁵⁴² NRS, GD 409/1/1, RSSPCC Fonds, Minutes of Meeting of the Directors of the Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society, Minutes of Meeting of 6 October 1887, quoting letter from Miss Stirling of 25 August 1887; Stirling, *Our Children*, p.72; Parker, *Uprooted*, p.112.

⁵⁴³ Stirling, *Our Children*, p.72.

⁵⁴⁴ Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.113-115; Stirling, *Our Children*, pp.122-123, 131-152. For court papers see NRS, CS46/1892/12/55; CS46/1893/6/103; CS46/1893/6/104. The Delaney case is also covered in Philip Girard, 'Children, church, migration and money: three tales of child custody in Nova Scotia', in Hilary Thompson (ed.), *Children's Voices in Atlantic Literature and Culture: Essays on Childhood* (Canadian Children's Press: Guelph, 1995), pp.10-23; and Girard, 'Victorian Philanthropy and Child Rescue'. See also recent press reports following family history research: <https://www.scotsman.com/news/a-family-s-130-year-hunt-for-its-children-missing-in-canada-1-4622540> and <https://www.scotsman.com/lifestyle/ecstatic-end-to-130-year-hunt-for-children-lost-in-canada-1-4668848>, and similarly Pat Dishon's witness statement based on archival research concerning Stirling and the Delaney case, WIT.001.002.5377-5409.

13.74 As noted earlier, the **Royal Over-Seas League** was unusual in that it acted in effect as a recruiting agency for New Zealand and to a lesser extent for Australia, and as already recorded some of those selected had Scottish origins. In May 1948 the Home Office received reports from London County Council concerning evidence its officials had received that ROSL's selection of children for Australia, and prospectively for New Zealand, left much to be desired.⁵⁴⁵ Moreover, while in 1951 the Women's Group had on the whole approved of how it operated, it took the view that ROSL should establish a reception centre for children fostered out through its scheme to New Zealand as a base to which they could return for observation or if their placements broke down for any reason. ROSL advertised its scheme to send children to foster homes in New Zealand, received applications from parents or guardians, and sent these on to New Zealand House, which collected reports (somehow) from the child's local authority area. These were then considered by a selection committee made up of representatives from New Zealand House and ROSL. Representatives from other (unspecified) bodies were invited to attend, but the Women's Group doubted whether their specialist knowledge could be of much use if they had not had an opportunity to study cases beforehand. Since this scheme offered no preparatory training before migration, the Group concluded that special care with selection was needed.⁵⁴⁶ However, because children under this scheme were to be fostered in New Zealand, the Royal Over-Seas League had to apply to the Bow Street Police Court for a formal hearing before a magistrate, even involving some questioning of the children to confirm their consent, before guardianship could be transferred to the Child Welfare Department in New Zealand.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁵ TNA, MH102/1560, 'Overseas League: Emigration of Children to Dominions', Lowndes to Lyon, 6 May 1948, and attachments, pp.21-30, TNA-000000003. Unfortunately, ROSL's second report to SCAI acknowledges that there are no files on selection practice among its records, nor indeed on the securing of consent by children and parents: ROSL, Section 21 Response, Child Migrants, ROL.001.001.0131.

⁵⁴⁶ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, pp.19-20. The WGPW report does not indicate whether staff from the Home Office or Commonwealth Relations Office participated in these selection panels.

⁵⁴⁷ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, para 33: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75506.htm> and Evidence, appendix 1, p.230, para 7: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/755ap03.htm>. Also Stuart Young and ██████████ 'British Child Migration to New Zealand, 1949 to 1954, the Royal Over-Seas League Scheme', paper presented to the First International Congress on Child Migration, 2002.

13.75 Remarkably, ROSL has provided us with a graphic illustration of their child migration programme, as published in the *Daily Mirror* in 1952.⁵⁴⁸ Line-drawings and, later, photography were widely used in the promotional literature of voluntary organisations involved in child migration work, but this is an unusual example of a strip cartoon being employed in this way. It features Mr Bavin, and it is clearly intended to persuade parents that allowing their children to be migrated and fostered in New Zealand was a safe and secure method of improving their life prospects. One of its notable features is that, in addition to presenting the scheme's rationale as giving under-privileged children the opportunity of a better life, it implies the care with which children are selected and approvals obtained. It also anticipates the anxieties of parents being separated from their children. They acknowledge the difficulty in allowing this, but they say that parents are happy knowing that it has given their children a better future. Panels showing a boy happily adapting to farm life and a reference to a girl doing well at a high school become the reassuring focal point of the closing stages of the cartoon.

Conclusions

13.76 In spite of frustrating evidential gaps, it is reasonable to conclude that several sending agencies were aware of, or were made aware of, the need for careful selection of children deemed suitable for emigration from among those in their care (or, like Fairbridge and Northcote, from among those sent to them by other organisations). Post-war, at least, there is evidence that responsible bodies, like Fairbridge, Barnardo's and others, including local authorities in Scotland, were usually careful in making choices. This might have been because of the bruising experiences of some of their previously chosen ones being rejected in the UK by representatives of receiving countries who were responsible for screening those proposed before dispatch, or from subsequent criticisms from governments, distribution centres or receiving institutions overseas. However, it may also be because sending agencies latterly became more conscious of their obligations, post-Clyde and especially post-Curtis. They were subjected to advice (though not binding regulations) by the Home Office and Scottish Home Department and their respective advisory committees, and also the opinion of professional child care professionals and graduates of post-war child care training courses, as reflected for example in the report of the Women's Group on Public Welfare.

⁵⁴⁸ ROSL, Ruggles Strip Cartoon, *Daily Mirror*, 24-29 March 1953, ROL.001.001.0082-0083.

13.77 That said, poor and seemingly irreversible selection decisions were still made by some organisations, as we have noted above, with reference to disabilities not being picked up at medical inspections. Quarriers even set aside the professional judgement of psychologists they employed who had judged some of those put forward to be unsuitable.⁵⁴⁹ Moreover, as is demonstrated in disturbing detail in Appendix 3, some organisations, convinced of the merits of their child migration practices, subjected parents to considerable pressure to give their consent. Organisations were also often under pressure from overseas institutions to supply recruits. For example, as further discussed in Appendix 4, the Sisters of Nazareth post-war were urged by representatives of the Catholic Church in Australia to supply child migrants - especially girls - and they may have been less than careful in their selection practices and less than scrupulous in the securing of consents - though their poor record-keeping can make judgement difficult.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁹ Appendix 3, Section 7, paras 7.14-7.15.

⁵⁵⁰ Appendix 4, Sections 2 and 3.

14 | Selection: Ethnicity, Age, Gender, Siblings, Orphans, Parents, Quotas

14.1 Having considered the processes by which child migrants were to be selected and consent secured, we now consider other criteria determining selection, and the results.

Ethnicity

14.2 Ethnicity was one clear criterion when children in care were being selected. It is true that a 1949 Home Office memorandum drafted for the information of its Advisory Council on Child Care stated that it had been the policy of successive Home Secretaries to avoid any discrimination by reference to race, creed or colour, but that if a child for whom emigration was being considered was not 'of "white" parentage on both sides' then it would be right to permit 'only if it had been ascertained...that there was no risk of the child's welfare in the new country being endangered by colour prejudice'.⁵⁵¹ Given prevailing sentiment in the 'white' settler societies, no children sent to Canada would have had African, Middle Eastern or Asian origins, even in part, though of course children with such origins were in care in the UK, including in Scotland. It is impossible to imagine that any child not of 'white British stock' would be sent to the Fairbridge Memorial College in Southern Rhodesia since their expected destiny was to consolidate white rule in black Africa. Because of Australia's well-known 'whites only' immigration policy, it was not likely that a local authority or voluntary society would contemplate sending any other than a 'white' child to Australia, and that was almost certainly true with respect to child migration to Canada or New Zealand. There are cases that prove the rule. **BKW** was selected to be sent to Australia by Barnardo's but his friend **██████████** was not, 'because he was black'.⁵⁵² Likewise Fairbridge in 1939 would not accept **██████████** for migration because as a 'half caste' (his father was from South Asia) he would not be accepted for entry into Australia or Canada, though his mother described him as 'not so very dark'.⁵⁵³ Barnardo's in 1964 was still advising selection

⁵⁵¹ TNA, MH102/2331, 'Emigration of coloured children – H.O. Policy', p.3.

⁵⁵² SCAI statement by **BKW** WIT.001.002.2316.

⁵⁵³ Stirling Council, Malcolm Jackson, Fairbridge Branch Secretary, to Miss Patterson, Whinwell Homes, 29 July 1939, STC.001.001.0764, and Margaret Milne to Miss Paterson, n.d., STC.001.001.0761.

committees not to consider children to be sent to Australia who were known to be 'very coloured', though those of 'predominantly European features' might be eligible if on 'all other counts they are good candidates'.⁵⁵⁴

Age

14.3 Age mattered. The age of child migrants when sent overseas had a bearing on their experiences and subsequent lives, but securing reliable data is problematic, and more so when trying to focus specifically on those children who had been sent from Scotland. We start with the reminder that the child migrants with whom we are particularly concerned were usually younger than 14 when they departed, thereby setting aside older juvenile migrants, though the post-war raising of the school-leaving age puts that age limit up a notch to include those younger than 15. Of course, during their years in care in institutions or with families overseas many more of those sent would have become teenagers. Nevertheless, the younger child may always have been more vulnerable and least able to resist abuse. There are also accounts in Inquiry reports of older boys being themselves abusers.⁵⁵⁵ The Women's Group on Public Welfare also counselled that 'Although the younger child is more easily assimilated, there is grave responsibility in breaking the personal ties of a child in his early years.'⁵⁵⁶ Some toddlers (and there are references to some as young as two being migrated) were likely to have been siblings of older child migrants, but not necessarily.

14.4 One of the most detailed analyses, dated January 1998, was provided by the Deputy Director of the Catholic Children's Society to the House of Commons Select Committee on Health.⁵⁵⁷ It relates only to the 1147 children sent to Australia by Catholic religious orders and Catholic child care agencies in the UK between 1938 and 1963, and only to those children whose records had been located, and it is acknowledged that 'the accuracy and completeness of information recorded at the

⁵⁵⁴ Barnardo's, Child Migration Policy (June 1964-July 1967), Barnardo's Migration Department to Area Executive Officers, 10 June 1964, BAR.001.006.0796.

⁵⁵⁵ *Lost Innocents*, Report, para 4.7:

https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c04 ; The Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry:

<https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>, Witness Statements, Day 43-47.

⁵⁵⁶ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.59.

⁵⁵⁷ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Evidence, 11 June 1998, Document 4, p.159, 'Former Child Migrants to Australia, Analysis of Computerised Database', 4th edition, January 1998:

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75502.htm>

time varies substantially' – an admission worth keeping in mind.⁵⁵⁸ The report does not distinguish between the constituent parts of the UK, so there is no specific reference to Scottish data. The vast majority of children, 957, were between the ages of five and 13, of whom 673 were aged seven to 11. Fifteen were under five (including one aged two) and 40 were 15 or over (including a 23-year-old woman accompanying her younger sister). The average age works out at 9.4. Ages for 93 of the children are not known. Nevertheless, the ages at departure of 1054 child migrants are probably representative of child migrants sent into institutional care overseas, whatever their place of origin or Catholic sending agency in the UK. Most of these UK child migrants were therefore overwhelmingly of elementary/primary school age, with a bias towards the older, and with a few not technically 'child' migrants. We can add some details derived from Sisters of Nazareth records provided to SCAI.⁵⁵⁹ The age range of the four children migrated from Glasgow was six to 10, all girls. The 33 child migrants dispatched from Aberdeen were aged six to 13 (25 boys, eight girls). The four from Kilmarnock were a rather older cohort, aged nine to 12, also all girls. Finally, the 30 child migrants from Edinburgh had a noticeably wider age range from four to 14, and all were boys.

14.5 Another assessment, this by the Australian Senate Inquiry, reveals that very few children sent to Australia in the post-war period up to June 1961 were under five, only 60 out of the total of 2645 child migrants aged 14 and under. Indeed, 1287 children, nearly 49% of that total, were in the age range nine to 12 on arrival.⁵⁶⁰ These children are noticeably younger than the average age of the 3183 child migrants sent to Canada by National Children's Homes between 1873 and 1931.⁵⁶¹ During this period their average age was 13 years 8 months, though it had risen from 11 years 5 months, 1873-1895, to 15 years 3 months, 1914-1931. Indeed, the average age of 130 children sent in four parties in 1924, 1929, 1930 and 1931 was over 15 years. These older migrants therefore met the age criterion of being at least 14 set down in the Bondfield report. The higher age of NCH child migrants was also likely due to these migrants being placed on farms and homes as young employees, latterly as juvenile rather than child migrants, rather than placed in institutional care as characterised the experience of child migrants sent to Australia. The increased

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p.158.

⁵⁵⁹ Sisters of Nazareth, Section 21 response, Part C reports, NAZ.001.001.0297.

⁵⁶⁰ *Lost Innocents*, Report, appendix 4, table 4.3, and figure 4.2:

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index

⁵⁶¹ Mankin, 'Stephenson's Children', pp.184-186.

local demand for child migrants as workers will also explain why in 1909 the average age of Quarrier's boys sent to Canada was 13.3 years and of girls 12.8, whereas in 1892 nearly half of a party of 120 children sent to Quebec were under 11: seven were aged eight, ten aged seven, six were only aged six and there was a brother and a sister aged five.⁵⁶²

Gender

14.6 Gender too needs to be considered. Child migrants in all periods and to all geographical destinations included girls as well as boys. This too has a bearing on abuse. Girls of all ages were perhaps as vulnerable as, especially, young boys. But they made up a smaller proportion of the whole. While from the 1860s there was a demand from Canadian households for girls to work as live-in domestic servants, there seems to have been a more substantial demand for boys as farm workers. Surviving Whinwell records indicate that of 114 children sent overseas, 72 were male and 42 female.⁵⁶³ By contrast, a sample of parties sent across the Atlantic by National Children's Homes between 1873 and 1931 indicates that girls numbered fewer than 7%.⁵⁶⁴ NCH felt that girls were more vulnerable and in need of greater protection than boys. It has also been sensibly suggested that there were fewer girls than boys put into care in the first place, because girls certainly from the age of six were conventionally regarded as more useful than boys as child minders for younger siblings in struggling families. And of course there was a demand for girls from a young age as domestic servants in Scotland, as well as elsewhere in the UK.

14.7 As for those sent into institutional care in Canada, namely to the Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School in British Columbia, the 25 sent from Scotland were composed of 15 boys and 10 girls.⁵⁶⁵ Figures for Australia contained in the 1953 Moss Report show large numbers of girls in particular institutions in December 1951, but unsurprisingly these were single sex Catholic orphanages taking in only girls, and the reverse was the case where only boys were admitted. But in 1951 where boys and girls could both be admitted, boys outnumbered girls, for example at Fairbridge

⁵⁶² Magnusson, *The Quarrier's Story*, p.84; and see *Narrative of Facts*, 1912, p.38, <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/nof1912.pdf>.

⁵⁶³ Stirling Council, Section 21 response, Report relating to records held at Stirling Council Archives 1900-1980, by Pam McNicol, Stirling Council Archivist, October 2018, STC.001.001.0570. Again, please note footnote 301 with respect to Whinwell child migrant figures.

⁵⁶⁴ Mankin, 'Stephenson's Children', pp.137-138.

⁵⁶⁵ Dunae, 'Waifs', p.236.

institutions like Molong (98 boys, 38 girls) and Pinjarra (139 boys and 39 girls). All in all, the total for child migrant boys in Australian institutions at the end of 1951 was 845 and for girls 395. An unknown few of both totals were over 14 but almost certainly they had arrived when they were younger.⁵⁶⁶ Based on the surviving records of 1,147 child migrants sent by Catholic agencies to Australia between 1938 and 1963, 69% were boys and 31% girls.⁵⁶⁷ More precisely, of the child migrants sent from Scotland by the Sisters of Nazareth, only 16 of the 71 were girls, and of the 43 Quarriers children sent to Australia between 1939 and 1963 only four were girls.⁵⁶⁸ We also know that of the 329 children sent by Fairbridge to British Columbia, 232 were boys and 97 were girls, and that of the 25 specifically leaving from Scotland, 15 were boys and 10 were girls.⁵⁶⁹

Siblings

14.8 As indicated, there is evidence of siblings being selected and sent overseas either together or to join those already sent, for example by Aberlour (see paras 10.5, 10.14), by Fairbridge (10.8), by Barnardo's (10.22) and by Annie Croall at Whinwell (13.69, 13.70). This is not unexpected since such children were likely (though not always) to have been taken into care at the same time. But it is the subsequent separation of those siblings on arrival overseas, by age and by gender, which caused lasting heartache and features prominently in the evidence adduced in recent inquiries.⁵⁷⁰ Such separation is considered an abuse by SCAL.

Orphans

14.9 While children sent overseas may have been referred to as orphans for marketing reasons, strictly that was rarely the case. For example, of the 329 children

⁵⁶⁶ Moss, *Child Migration to Australia*, appendix II, and calculated from figures reproduced in House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Minutes of Evidence, 20 May, appendix II, pp.14-15,
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75502.htm>.

⁵⁶⁷ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Evidence, 11 June, Document 4, p.160:
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75502.htm>

⁵⁶⁸ Sisters of Nazareth, Section 21 response, Part C reports, NAZ.001.001.0297; for Quarriers see para 13.31 above.

⁵⁶⁹ Dunae, 'Waifs', pp.235-236.

⁵⁷⁰ For example, House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, paras 22, 44-45.

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75502.htm>. See also references to the distress caused by separation of siblings in paras 22.2 and 22.3 below

sent by Fairbridge to British Columbia, 164 had two parents living (49.8%) and 147 (44.6%) had one, leaving only 18 truly orphans (5.6%).⁵⁷¹ Indeed, of the 25 children sent from Scotland, only one, a girl, was an orphan, while 12 had one living parent and 12 had both. The fact that some post-war child migrants to Australia recall being referred to, inaccurately, as 'war orphans', probably reflects a wider misunderstanding perpetuated by some parts of the Australian press, in which child migrants were described as 'war orphans' in keeping with the Australian Commonwealth Government's widely publicised plan to attract 50,000 war orphans to the country in the years immediately after the war.⁵⁷² Such a misunderstanding may have benefitted Australian politicians who supported this proposal by giving the impression that this plan was indeed being implemented. When combined with a lack of adequate information about children's family histories from sending organisations, it is not difficult to see how this popular discourse of child migrants as war orphans could have contributed to child migrants being incorrectly told by receiving institutions that they had no surviving family in the United Kingdom.

Parents

14.10 But were children selected for migration in order to separate them, permanently if possible, from what sending societies regarded as bad parents? Dr Barnardo had described such practice as 'philanthropic abduction'.⁵⁷³ A representative publicity leaflet of 1906 stated that 'For many of our children, emigration cuts the cord that in this country would bind them to degraded relatives, and seriously handicap their future'.⁵⁷⁴ William Blaikie's autobiography explicitly stated that the same philosophy determined practice at the Orphan and Emigration Home which he and his wife operated in Edinburgh (see para 13.71 above).⁵⁷⁵ Similar assertions were made by other organisations soliciting public support, for example Birmingham Children's Homes in 1873 and the Manchester and Salford Boys' and

⁵⁷¹ Dunae, 'Waifs', pp.235-236.

⁵⁷² *Sunday Times* (Australia), 21 Sept 1947, p.6, 'Warm Welcome for War Orphans – Big Contingent Arrives Tomorrow'; *The Daily News*, 24 Sept 1947, p.5, 'War Orphans in Geraldton'; *Geraldton Guardian and Express*, 25 Sept 1947, p.2, 'New Little Australians – Arrival of Orphan Children'.

⁵⁷³ Wagner, *Children of the Empire*, p.138, and for examples of such practice see Kershaw and Sacks, *New Lives for Old*, pp.110-111.

⁵⁷⁴ Barnardo's Archives, D239, Publications, Publicity Booklets, A3/17/6, 'From the Streets and Highways', p.12.

⁵⁷⁵ Blaikie, *Autobiography*, pp.319-320, 328.

Girls' Refuges and Homes in 1921.⁵⁷⁶ Less blatantly advertised, that practice probably continued, though there is evidence that Barnardo's post-war was less inclined to migrate children overseas without parental approval. The idea of rescue from risk was never abandoned - it remains today a child welfare imperative - and it may explain the steps taken by some child migration agencies on occasion to discourage and even prevent contact between a child and what might have been regarded as an 'unworthy' family, by distorting records, by withholding letters from parents, and by deliberate deception.⁵⁷⁷ In the case of post-war Catholic organisations, traits of 'unworthiness' in parents of child migrants appear to have included parents who were either separated and living with a new partner, or divorced and re-married, and who as such would have been regarded by members of the Catholic Child Welfare Council as living in sin.⁵⁷⁸

Quotas

14.11 In their opening submission to Northern Ireland's Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, the Child Migrants Trust argued that a significant motivating factor in the selection of children for migration was the desire to reach quotas for the number of child migrants sought by immigration organisations and residential institutions in Australia.⁵⁷⁹ The Child Migrants Trust noted that it had material available to demonstrate that this was the case. Indeed, unfilled vacancies for child migrants in specific receiving institutions is likely to have been a significant factor in driving recruitment of children for these schemes. Moreover, as noted earlier, the actual number of child migrants sent to Australia fell significantly short of the numbers originally envisaged by the Commonwealth Government and for which it had made some capital investment in building work to increase capacity in specific children's

⁵⁷⁶ Birmingham Children's Emigration Homes Reports, *Gutter Children's Homes*, First Report, 1873, p.4; William Edmondson, *Making Rough Places Plain: Fifty Years of Work of the Manchester and Salford Boys' and Girls' Refuges and Homes 1870-1920* (Sherratt and Hughes, Manchester, 1921), p.88.

⁵⁷⁷ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Report, paras 41-42; *Lost Innocents*, Report, para 4.10, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75507.htm>http://www.aiph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index

⁵⁷⁸ See, for example, TNA, MH102/1451D/C14, 'Evidence of Catholic Child Welfare Council to the Care of Children Committee', 26 May 1945.

⁵⁷⁹ Dr Margaret Humphreys' submission to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Day 42, para 4.4 https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/dr_margaret_humphreys_cbe_oam_witness_statement_redacted.pdf. See also, for example, Catholic Bishops Conference of Scotland, 'Up to Date List of Children Required Immediately as at 26th November 1946', BSC.001.001.0256.

homes.⁵⁸⁰ Data on numbers of UK child migrants at residential institutions compiled by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission also show that the numbers actually resident at each institution were, in the great majority of cases, significantly lower than the numbers for which that institution had received approval.⁵⁸¹ Among other consequences there were financial implications, but to that one might add the religious imperative to increase their overseas flocks which we know motivated churches. Meeting the demand for 'requisitions' clearly had the potential to cause a fall below the standards of selection expected in Australia and in the UK. The best interests of the individual child might not be of paramount importance.

Conclusions

14.12 There are perhaps no surprises in this analysis, but with risk and SCAI's definition of abuse in mind, the possible implications of selection identified above need drawing out. For instance, there was an unresolved debate among sending and receiving agencies as to the best age at which children should be sent overseas. It was sometimes argued that children whisked overseas at a young age would adapt best, forgetting their former life and growing up, for example, as young Aussies. But young children deprived of the familiar, including the carers who had nurtured them in their early years, might feel doubly deprived of the security of familiarity – loss of parents, then loss of substitute parents – with painful lasting legacies. Moreover, their early years of education might be disrupted by having to be inducted into a new school with different teachers and curricula. The Bondfield committee in 1924 was adamant that it was the educational disruption of those not yet 14 which outweighed any benefit they might receive from early migration.⁵⁸² On the other hand, children of more mature years might have a stock of experience making them better able to cope with change, though the onset of puberty, sometimes destabilising even of the stable, might have been harder to manage outside the familiar and outside the family. It is a moot point as to whether separation by gender made the transition easier or harder. As we have already indicated, the separation of siblings, of brothers and sisters, could be a hardship, and an abuse in itself, and yet many farms in Canada

⁵⁸⁰ See Appendix 4, Section 3, for a discussion of this issue with regard to recruitment of girls for Nazareth House at East Camberwell, Victoria; and *Lost Innocents*, Report, paras 2.60, 2.86-2.88, 4.71 https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c02; https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c04

⁵⁸¹ Ross, *Child Migration to Australia*, appendix, pp.12-14.

⁵⁸² British Overseas Settlement Delegation to Canada, 1924 (Bondfield Report), pp.13-14, 20.

largely wanted boys as farm workers, and family homes more often wanted girls as domestic servants. Many institutions in Australia, especially Catholic institutions, were single sex. As a related point, picked up by the Ross Committee, what compounded the problem of gender relations was that some male principals at some Catholic institutions could not see the need for having women as staff members (see para 7.31 above). But of course much would always depend on the quality of care which children might receive at the places to which they were sent, and it is to those matters to which we now turn.

15 | Receiving Homes: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports – an Introduction.

15.1 The history of civil society is largely the history of law. Legislation in the UK, varying somewhat with respect to its constituent parts, has evolved in response to need, as perceived by legislators. What commonly followed was a process of inspecting, reporting and approving (or not) subsequent practice. In the light of experience, legislative amendments often followed. The consequent volume of legislation and its application since the early 19th century has been described by historians as an ‘administrative revolution’, expressed not just by law but by the appointment of public servants as independent inspectors to report on whether law was actually being applied and was sufficient.⁵⁸³ Those inspectors have rightly been identified as part of a new and rapidly growing social class, the salaried professional middle class, distinct from the entrepreneurial profit-dependent middle class. Inspections conducted by state-appointed professionals frequently revealed previously unidentified dangers or problems that required further legislation, leading to what has been described as the ‘organic growth’ of government. The authority of the state thereby widened considerably to embrace such matters as public health, food quality, policing, prisons, safety at work, the relief of the poor, and – not least – the care and well-being of children. Noticeably, the earliest factory legislation, the 1802 Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, concerned children working in cotton factories. Laws and inspections relating to the education and protection of children and young people were to follow.

15.2 Governors and then legislators in the increasingly self-governing ‘white settler’ territories of the British Empire naturally derived and then adapted many of their laws from UK precedents. National and provincial or state legislators came to address similar concerns, including the care and upbringing of children. One might expect comparable processes of inspecting, reporting, approving (or not) and amending the law also followed. However, given the size and geography of, especially, Canada and Australia, and given also the devolution of much responsibility to state or provincial governments, it was difficult to ensure comparable expectations and standards

⁵⁸³ The scholarly literature, especially useful on inspectors and ‘organic growth’, includes Arthur J. Taylor, *Laissez-Faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Macmillan, London, 1972); Oliver MacDonagh, *Early Victorian Government 1830-1870* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1977); Ursula R.Q. Henriques, *Before the Welfare State* (Longman, London, 1979).

nationwide, more so than in the UK with (until recently) its very London-centred legislative and administrative structure. Moreover, the emergence of a professional middle class, to be recruited into child welfare work from populations substantially smaller than that of the UK, probably developed more slowly. That said, the abuse of children had become a matter of concern in Australia by the mid-19th century and of legislation from the later 19th century, though with respect to sexual abuse it was not given sufficient legislative attention until the 1960s.⁵⁸⁴

15.3 We should also recall that the UK government, even after the 1948 Children Act, failed to draft regulations binding on child migration sending societies until too late, and it had never had authority over self-governing overseas territories to demand compliance with UK child care law, or even ensure conformity with expectations. It could only attempt, as and when need arose, to influence - or to abandon - the practice. In what follows we also need to bear in mind that the sending societies in Scotland (and similarly elsewhere in the UK) included eminent and well-respected religious organisations (the Church of Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church) and prestigious organisations with prominent patrons (Quarriers, Barnardo's, Fairbridge and so forth). All had reputations to preserve, and they valued their autonomy.

15.4 We have already examined, as best we can from surviving records, how carefully or not children in Scotland (as elsewhere in the UK) were selected and approved for migration, and whether for instance they met acceptable health and educational standards, and whether they and their parents or the guardians or managers of care homes in which they had been placed gave informed consent for the migration of each child overseas. (See especially Chapter 13 above and Appendix 4.) However, we must not assume a correlation between children properly or improperly selected and migrated and those children being properly or improperly cared for overseas. Hence we need to consider the practices of those at home and overseas who were responsible for approving the homes to which child migrants were sent.

⁵⁸⁴ Hayley Boxall, Adam Tomison and Shann Hulme, *Historical Review of Sexual Offence and Child Sexual Abuse Legislation in Australia: 1788-2013* (Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 2014), <https://aic.gov.au/publications/special/007>, pp.5-9 and subseq for State and Commonwealth legislation.

15.5 More precisely, and tracking forward from the 1860s, we need to consider how and by whom the places to which children were sent overseas were approved – whether private homes or farms, as in Canada and New Zealand, or institutions as in Australia, British Columbia and Southern Rhodesia. Closely related are the monitoring responsibilities of the sending agencies in Scotland (and elsewhere in the UK) who ‘cannot divest themselves of responsibility for that child’s subsequent welfare’, according to the child emigration report of Women’s Group on Public Welfare cited earlier.⁵⁸⁵ (See para 7.18 above) Hence it is also important to know whether, how, by whom and applying what criteria the well-being of children once overseas was monitored. We need to make it clear that the UK government, including the Scottish Home Department, did not request or receive routine reports from overseas on the progress and well-being of each individual child migrant, not even of those whose migration had been UK state-subsidised.⁵⁸⁶ However, though not a legal duty, it might seem a reasonable expectation for receiving agencies overseas to send reports on individual children back to their sending partners in the UK. It would seem equally self-evident that such reports would or should enable sending agencies to assess the quality of their selection procedures and the qualities of the places to which they had sent children. This also raises the matter of changing standards and expectations, upon which we have already commented in [Chapter 9](#) and are further examined for the post-war period in Appendix 3. Very evidently, childcare professionals were affecting thinking in some child migration agencies, and also in government departments, and not only in the UK. The report of the Curtis Committee focused attention on the needs of the child and the on-going responsibilities of any agency that had selected and sent children overseas, and much deliberation on means followed, at home and overseas, and there were conflicting opinions.⁵⁸⁷

15.6 This means considering as best we can from the extant and accessible records of children not only up to the age of 14 but their aftercare until adulthood aged 18 or even 21. Also important is to see what action was taken if concerns were raised. Since our principal subject is child abuse, we also need to note whether procedures would allow the voice of children to be heard. As a caution, and as SCAI is also

⁵⁸⁵ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.20.

⁵⁸⁶ From 1957 the UK government did have right of access to reports so received, but we are not aware of any being demanded.

⁵⁸⁷ On these matters see Appendix 2, Section 1, paras 1.3-1.9, and especially Section 2.

revealing, we should also recognise that not all children even in monitored and inspected care homes in Scotland were safe.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁸ See SCAI, Case Study no. 1, *The Provision of Residential Care for Children in Scotland by the Daughters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul between 1917 and 1981, with a particular focus on Smyllum Park Orphanage, Lanark, and Bellevue Children's Home, Rutherglen*, 2018, https://www.childabuseinquiry.scot/media/1890/aps-doc-findings-final-hyperlinked-11_oct.pdf. Also Case Study no. 2, *The Provision of Residential Care for Children in Scotland by the Sisters of Nazareth between 1933 and 1984 in the Nazareth Houses in Aberdeen, Cardonald, Lasswade, and Kilmarnock*, 2018, https://www.childabuseinquiry.scot/media/2146/findings-s0n-case-study-2_p7-190628.pdf

16 | Canada: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports

16.1 We are first concerned with those Scottish child migrants who in considerable numbers were sent not into institutional care overseas but as young workers to farms or as domestic servants to private homes, largely in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Our date range is from 1872 to 1924, later young migrants being almost entirely juveniles. Those sent by Quarriers numbered over 7300, plus maybe 800 sent by those smaller operators, Aberlour, Whinwell, the Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society, Mrs Blaikie's Orphan and Emigration Home, and the Salvation Army.

Canada: Rye, Macpherson and Doyle

16.2 However, we begin by considering the operations of Maria Rye and Annie Macpherson, who had been sending children to Canada since, respectively, 1869 and 1870. Their pioneering of child migration to Canada established practices which other entrepreneurs adopted and adapted. Certainly their work attracted the attention of officials and other child welfare philanthropists with consequences we need to record.

16.3 When child migration by Rye and Macpherson was properly established and other philanthropists began to follow suit, the selected and approved children in the UK were sent first to distribution centres in Canada owned and managed by the sending societies, before being dispersed. It is important to stress that farmers and households seeking a child migrant voluntarily applied to the distribution centres of the sending societies. From early days, those distribution centres were aware of the need to assess the applicants and their locations before dispatching children into their care, and the distribution centres also had aftercare obligations. Here we need to recognise a logistical challenge. The province of Ontario covered more than 400,000 square miles, that of Quebec over 600,000. Children were not equally distributed over those vast areas, but the distances between distributing homes and the places to which children were sent could be considerable and travelling to inspect, especially at particular seasons, was and remained challenging.

16.4 Earlier in this report we introduced Andrew Doyle, a Local Government Board senior inspector. In 1874 he set out across the Atlantic to investigate the practices of Rye and Macpherson, particularly (though not only) with respect to children formerly in poor law care. He reported that he 'had frequently to drive forty or fifty miles a day

through a rough country to see half a dozen children'.⁵⁸⁹ No doubt he had travelled by horse buggy. Distribution centres therefore relied on written applications and on positive references from reputable local people, such as clergymen, to provide endorsement. Since boarding-out was the common practice in Scotland, it is interesting to read what Doyle had to say about boarding-out in Scotland as well as in England, and which he insisted applied with even greater force to Canada. He quotes an 1870 statement by the Poor Law Board:

Experience has conclusively proved that unless the homes are carefully selected by persons who have an intimate knowledge of the locality, and who at the same time take a responsible interest in the children to be placed out, great abuses are quite certain to ensue.⁵⁹⁰

Doyle concluded from his inspection of placing out in Canada that these criteria had not been met, and it is 'very certain that "great abuses" do "ensue"'.⁵⁹¹

16.5 Doyle was also here indicating that the children placed out in these imperfectly assessed locations were also, subsequently, not adequately inspected and nor were proper reports on their well-being received. Children, especially girls, were therefore not sufficiently protected. He judged that Rye and Macpherson knew what was needed, but this they were not providing. He was understandably perturbed that they (especially Rye) lost track of where many of their still young migrants were currently living, so they certainly could not exercise their aftercare responsibilities.⁵⁹² He insisted that what was needed, but Rye and Macpherson had not put in place, was 'close and systematic supervision', initially by 'committees of respectable people' who should take an interest in the children and in whom children would be willing to confide.⁵⁹³ But Doyle, surely having in mind the practice well-established by this time in the UK of appointing official inspectors, wished persons to be 'specially appointed' and 'wholly independent of those who might be engaged in the administration of this system of emigration'.⁵⁹⁴

16.6 This became more explicit in Doyle's dismissive response to how the Canadian government, keen to end the moratorium recently imposed by the UK government,

⁵⁸⁹ HCPP, Doyle, *Pauper Children*, HC 9, 1875, pp.3-4, INQ-000000006.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p.20. For the reference also to Scottish practice see p.22, INQ-000000006.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.20, INQ-000000006

⁵⁹² *Ibid*, pp.22-23, 25-28, INQ-000000006.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid*, p.20, INQ-000000006.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid*, pp.21-22, INQ-000000006.

proposed to deal with Doyle's concerns and thereby allow child migration to continue.⁵⁹⁵ The Canadian Department of Agriculture was responsible (until 1896) for immigration, and it was naturally keen to increase the agricultural labour force, and yet in 1883 it offered to send its immigration officers once a year to inspect those children supplied by poor law authorities (only). Doyle did not believe that such officers, with a vested interest in immigration, even of child migrants, could be disinterested, and he argued that such children 'need better protection'.⁵⁹⁶ A second response by the Canadian authorities in 1883 was little more than a repetition of the first. It is important to keep in mind as a benchmark of 'good practice' this insistence by Doyle back in his 1875 report on the duty to secure assessments by independent inspectors when considering the placement of child migrants in all forms of care overseas, whether with families or in institutions. The Local Government Board's moratorium on sending poor law children to Canada, imposed in 1874, remained in place.

16.7 However, pressure from interested parties in the UK allowed for a restricted form of poor law child migration to resume in 1884, but then the failure to produce reports on children's well-being led to the resumption of the moratorium early in 1885. Not until February 1887 had sufficient and 'on the whole' adequate reports been received to allow the Local Government Board to bow also to domestic pressure and end the moratorium.⁵⁹⁷ LGB officials remained uncomfortable, a precedent perhaps to the discomfort felt by staff in the Home Office with much post-1945 child migration practice. In 1920 even Bogue Smart, Chief Inspector of British Immigrant Children and Receiving Homes in Canada, acknowledged that he had an insufficient number of inspectors under his command, just four. That said, we have seen a batch of 11 reports (one in 1919, the others in 1921) by the Department of Immigration and Colonization, of varying length and value, sent to Miss Birt and forwarded to Whinwell on children transferred by her from Liverpool to Canada, and to other reports drawing Barnardo's attention to matters of concern.⁵⁹⁸

Canada: Quarriers

⁵⁹⁵ Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.49-56.

⁵⁹⁶ HCPP, Doyle, *Pauper Children*, HC 9, 1875, p.54, INQ-000000006.

⁵⁹⁷ Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.59-63.

⁵⁹⁸ Stirling Council, Whinwell Children's Home, Department of Immigration and Colonization to Miss Birt (forwarded to Whinwell), STC.001.001.0905; Barnardo's, 'Federal government inspectors', BAR.001.005.5293; 'Federal government inspections', BAR.001.005.6688-6710.

16.8 We now turn to those voluntary societies based in Scotland which, following and inspired by Rye and Macpherson, included child migration as an option in their package of care. Our sources on placements and inspections and aftercare include two reports submitted to SCAI by Quarriers, the first wide-ranging and submitted in September 2018 and the second in January 2019 specifically on child migration, plus substantial additional documents from Quarriers archives.⁵⁹⁹ Altogether possibly 7384 Scottish children were sent to Canada by Quarriers. William Quarrier particularly admired Annie Macpherson, who offered him the use of her Canadian distribution homes, at Belleville and Galt in Ontario and at Knowlton in Quebec, and it was to those locations that the first Quarrier parties were sent from 1872. Later, however, Quarrier purchased and in 1888 opened his own centre, Fairknowe, in Brockville, in eastern Ontario, to be managed by his daughter and son-in-law.⁶⁰⁰ These centres received applications from farmers and private homes for children to be placed with them. There are references in Quarriers' annual *Narrative of Facts* to 'certificates of character' being received about the applicants from ministers and magistrates.⁶⁰¹ It was very firmly stated in the 1880 report that 'No child is given away without proper inquiry', and also that Quarriers retained the right to remove a child.⁶⁰² That said, Agnes Bilbrough, who was for many years involved in managing Quarriers' distribution centre, described the process of approving the suitability of each home in her own booklet *British Children in Canadian Homes* as little more than talking to the applicant, asking the neighbours, and getting the approval of the local minister, although she did keep a note of where the children were being placed.⁶⁰³ However, a formal requirement was for the applicant to sign a form of indenture for a child when of working age, which among other obligations stated the rate of pay.⁶⁰⁴ That said, younger and supposedly (though not legally) adopted children also worked, though unpaid, as would other young family members on farms. Doyle in his 1875 report

⁵⁹⁹ See Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.001.0437-0524; and Section 21 response, Child Migrants, QAR.001.008.0001-0059.

⁶⁰⁰ Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story*, pp.66-71, photo, p.75; Kohli, *The Golden Bridge*, pp.169-170, 173; Parker, *Uprooted*, p.29; Kershaw and Sacks, *New Lives for Old*, pp.60-65.

⁶⁰¹ See for example *Narrative of Facts*, 1878, QAR.001.008.7160.

⁶⁰² *Narrative of Facts*, 1878, p.12,

https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1878_delivery.pdf *Narrative of Facts*, 1880, p.23, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1880_delivery.pdf; Quarriers, Section 21 response, Child Migrants, QAR.001.008.0009-0011.

⁶⁰³ Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story*, pp.72-73.

⁶⁰⁴ Quarriers, Section 21 response, Child Migrants, QAR.001.008.0005.

quotes one girl by then 16 or 17 and experienced: 'Doption, sir, is when folks gets a girl to work without wages'.⁶⁰⁵

16.9 Quarriers stressed the importance of inspections and reports, for example in the *Narrative of Facts*, which were of course published at least in part to attract and retain charitable supporters.⁶⁰⁶ One report from Fairknowe firmly states that 'By systematic visitation alone can we find out with certainty how the children are getting on'.⁶⁰⁷ We learn from the second Quarriers report that 'a list was kept of homes in which children should not be placed', presumably drawn up after bad experiences, and also that from 1930 the files held by Quarriers contain reports on individual children.⁶⁰⁸ However, there were those logistical difficulties. The implications for close prior and subsequent inspections were indeed challenging. With reference to the original distribution home at Belleville, the first of the annual reports records with delight that applications for children were being received from as far away as 200 miles in all directions. A circle round Belleville with that radius would embrace an area of almost 126,000 square miles. Later reports also refer to difficult travelling conditions. Only 300 or so reports had been sent back to Quarriers in Scotland; a Quarriers inspector was able to visit only 60 children during a ten-day tour; another in seven months travelled over 1300 miles to visit fewer than 600. William Quarrier himself during a two-months tour met only 300 or so children out of more than 3000 children by then placed in Canada, of whom he asserted with confidence that 95% 'continue to do well'.⁶⁰⁹

16.10 Given the purpose of these published reports with their requests for philanthropic cash donations, it is not surprising that in their sections on child migration they largely provide encouraging news about Quarriers children placed out, particularly in the form of letters from children (which as prose often seem

⁶⁰⁵ Doyle, *Pauper Children*, HC 9, 1875, p.12, Parker, INQ-000000006.

⁶⁰⁶ See all the primary sources cited in Quarriers, Section 21 response, Child Migrants, QAR.001.008.0011-0012, 0022, 0038-0039, 0045.

⁶⁰⁷ *Narrative of Facts*, 1892, p.59,

https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1892_delivery.pdf

⁶⁰⁸ Quarriers, Section 21 response, Child Migrants, QAR.001.008.0004, 0041.

⁶⁰⁹ *Narrative of Facts*, 1872, p.14,

https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1872_delivery.pdf *Narrative of Facts*, 1883, p.39, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1883_delivery.pdf *Narrative of Facts*, 1888, pp.46-47, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1888_delivery.pdf *Narrative of Facts*, 1891, p.69, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1891_delivery.pdf *Narrative of Facts*, 1893, p.74, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1893_delivery.pdf; Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story*, pp.73-74.

remarkably polished). However, there is a scattering of references to difficulties of adjustment, of a 'number of inevitable returns' of children sent back to the distribution home, and of some children being removed because of neglect and maltreatment and reallocated elsewhere.⁶¹⁰ Although qualified by those logistical difficulties, this implies monitoring, reporting and child protection, and would reassure supporters.

16.11 Then, in 1897, the Ontario legislature passed an 'Act to regulate the immigration into Ontario of certain classes of children'.⁶¹¹ This was in part a response to trade union objections to cheap child labour imports but also to widespread criticism of the 'quality' of children being brought in. John Kelso, Superintendent of Neglected Children in Ontario, also feared that child migrants were being abused – brutally – though he regarded Quarriers as well run. Hence he pressed successfully for official inspections of all child migration receiving homes and for the visiting and inspecting of children placed out. By the Act, each receiving home had to apply for a licence to operate and to keep accounts on every child for which it was responsible. William Quarrier's reaction was to insist that as far as Quarriers' practice was concerned there was nothing seriously new about the requirement to examine children before leaving the UK, or about the maintaining of homes in Canada, or the keeping of records, or systematic visitation – but he had a serious objection to placing 'voluntary Christian work...under Government officialism'.⁶¹² It was considered a 'piece of gross injustice and unnecessary interference sending a Government official to examine private documents, books, etc' and 'making such use as they think proper of the information so obtained, and dictating as to conduct of work, while not contributing one cent towards its support'.⁶¹³ It was by then being insisted that 98% of Quarrier children were 'doing well' and that 'applications were

⁶¹⁰ *Narrative of Facts*, 1873, p.19, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1873_delivery.pdf *Narrative of Facts*, 1881, p.31, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1881_delivery.pdf *Narrative of Facts*, 1884, p.37, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1884_delivery.pdf *Narrative of Facts*, 1890, p.56, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1890_delivery.pdf

⁶¹¹ Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story*, pp.78-81.

⁶¹² *Narrative of Facts*, 1897, p.48, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1897_delivery.pdf; Quarriers, Fairknowe documents, article by William Quarrier, *Toronto Globe*, 28 Aug 1897, and attached his correspondence with the Attorney-General's Office, QAR.001.009.2991-2993. For an analysis of his criticisms see Barnardo's Canada: Historical migration (1907-1924). Correspondence re child, letter from a Scottish government official in Glasgow to the Deputy Minister of the Interior, 15 Jan 1900, BAR.001.005.4849-4855.

⁶¹³ *Narrative of Facts*, 1897, p.48.

pouring in all the time'.⁶¹⁴ Unlike other philanthropic sending agencies, who accepted the new role for government, William Quarrier at once took the decision not to send more children to Canada. He was, in effect, rejecting what in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK was already the widespread practice of paid officials carrying out independent inspections of certain private businesses as well as public services. Moreover, Quarrier was implicitly dismissive of the official inspections of those poor law children sent to Canada and cared for by philanthropic agencies which since 1887, post-Doyle, were presumably being conducted. Whether scrupulous official inspection ever occurred is of course another matter, and indeed the Bondfield Report in 1924 commented that at least by then a significant number of reports were not up to date.⁶¹⁵

16.12 Quarriers' decision not to send more children did not of course end their responsibilities for children already in Canada. Quarriers staff still assessed applications received for children already migrated, and they still carried out inspections of the children already placed - though without new arrivals the volume of business declined as children 'graduated' and ceased to be a Quarriers responsibility. For a couple of subsequent years there was little to report in the *Narrative of Facts* as numbers on the books continued to fall, except of such cases as children not being sent to school or not being paid reasonable wages.⁶¹⁶ And then there were no published reports at all on child migrants – until after the death of William Quarrier in 1903.

16.13 Almost at once the Quarriers trustees resumed child migration.⁶¹⁷ They had accepted that the 1897 Act could provide better protection for some children. As a result, an independent government official as well as representatives of the various emigration agencies were expected at least once a year to inspect each farm or home to which children were sent. One consequence may also have been the visit in April 1917 to Quarriers Fairknowe distribution home by Bogue Smart, the Chief

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁵ *British Oversea Settlement Delegation to Canada*, 1924 (Bondfield Report), p.10.

⁶¹⁶ *Narrative of Facts*, 1898, p.45,

https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1898_delivery.pdf; *Narrative of Facts*, 1899, p.40,

https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1899_delivery.pdf; *Narrative of Facts*, 1901, p.42,

https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1901_delivery.pdf.

⁶¹⁷ Quarriers, Minutes of Meetings of Trustees, 2 May 1904, 18 Nov 1904, 19 March 1905, QAR.001.008.6881, 6887, 6891, for the decision to resume child migration and dispatch of the first party.

Inspector of British Immigration and Children Receiving Homes. He spent four days there examining 866 of the 'carefully and well kept' records of Quarriers 'immigration activities' for the four years 1913-16.⁶¹⁸ He identified only one case of 'mental deficiency', a little girl then being given hospital treatment. He concluded that the work at Fairknowe was carried on efficiently and that the best interests of the children were safeguarded by careful selection of foster homes recommended by responsible persons, plus regular inspections by Quarriers officials.

16.14 We also learn from an undated but probably 1913 document that the Chief Inspector required persons applying to receive a child to complete a form, upon which a minister of religion was to add his recommendation. This obliged the applicant to ensure that children under 14 years of age would be sent to school for nine months each year, 'according to the regulations of the school law', and that unless applicants can 'conscientiously fulfil this requirement' they should not ask for a child under the age of 14'.⁶¹⁹ The 1913 *Narrative of Facts* states that

The feature of this year that stands out most vividly in our minds is the extra effort to secure more education for our younger children.... Very often the children were reported to the visitor as attending school quite regularly, but we often found out afterwards that the farmers' idea of 'regularly' was quite different from ours. Now with the school reports before us we know exactly what schooling is being given.⁶²⁰

We should also recall that the Bondfield Report (though without reference to Quarriers) insisted in 1924 that the migration of children under 14 should not be supported with public funds because of known disruption to their education.⁶²¹ We do not know what action was taken if school reports were not received regularly.

16.15 Whether inspections of placements were routinely conducted cannot be confirmed from records we have seen, but one effect of the education requirement was to make farmers reluctant to select children under the school leaving age since they would be less available to help on the farm. This was pushing the preferred age towards juveniles rather than children, as was subsequently noticed in *Narrative of*

⁶¹⁸ Quarriers, Bogue Smart, Fairknowe Home, Brookville, 19th April 1917, QAR.001.009.3058.

⁶¹⁹ Quarriers, Section 21 response, Child Migrants, QAR.001.008.0004-0005; Quarriers, various letters and reports re Fairknowe Home and children there, QAR.001.009.3065-3066.

⁶²⁰ *Narrative of Facts*, 1913, p.44, <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/nof1913.pdf>; Quarriers, Section 21 response, Child Migrants, QAR.001.008.0006-0007.

⁶²¹ *British Oversea Settlement Delegation to Canada*, 1924 (Bondfield Report), pp.12, 13, 20.

Facts.⁶²² Under the new order, the first party was dispatched in 1904, the 55 boys being immediately allocated to eager farmers, on average five applications having been received per boy. The report does not indicate the criteria for selection but presumably followed whatever had been past practice.⁶²³ The author of the 1905 report, based on a two-week visit of inspection, reported that all the children, 'or almost all', were happy, well-fed, 'usually' well and kindly treated, and placed in households that had a Church connection, though in some cases 'purely nominal'.⁶²⁴ All the 27 published comments on children visited were, of course, positive about their placements. The 1906 report contained again the reassuring statement that the 'regular and thorough system of visitation of the children' continued until they were 18, thus implying that they honoured their aftercare duty.⁶²⁵ That for 1907 was emphatic that 'We stand *in loco parentis* to every child...at least once every year visit each and make careful inquiry as to their well-doing and well-being'.⁶²⁶ However, by contrast, it was acknowledged in the report for 1909 that 'we are never able to visit nearly so many as we would wish', and that only about 100 had been visited between Quebec in the east and Winnipeg in the west.⁶²⁷ (The driving distance today by car is 1556 miles.) The logistical problems remained, as again acknowledged in 1910 that only 10 or 12 children could be visited in 60 to 100 miles. But 'nearly all' the children inspected in 1909 were said to be in good homes, and immediate arrangements were made (for unspecified reasons) to remove those that were not.⁶²⁸

16.16 Subsequent reports repeat the same messages, stressing the sustained demand for child migrants on farms and in homes, the seeking of references, the success of most placements, the removal and reassignment elsewhere of some children (always for unspecific reasons) and again acknowledgments of the logistical

⁶²² See for example, *Narrative of Facts*, 1909, p.41, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1909_delivery.pdf; *Narrative of Facts*, 1912, p.38, <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/nof1912.pdf>

⁶²³ *Narrative of Facts*, 1904, p.65, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1904_delivery.pdf

⁶²⁴ *Narrative of Facts*, 1905, pp.58-63, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1905_delivery.pdf

⁶²⁵ *Narrative of Facts*, 1906, p.31, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1906_delivery.pdf

⁶²⁶ *Narrative of Facts*, 1907, p.35, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1907_delivery.pdf

⁶²⁷ *Narrative of Facts*, 1909, p.40, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1909_delivery.pdf

⁶²⁸ *Narrative of Facts*, 1910, p.37, https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1910_delivery.pdf

problems of carrying out inspections by Quarriers' staff over considerable distances. Indicative of practice not always in accordance with policy, it was recorded in 1913 that in a journey of 1500 miles only about 300 children had been visited, including some in areas 'where we had not been for a number of years'.⁶²⁹ Interestingly there is no reference to inspections by or reports from Ontario government officials or to Quarriers reporting to them. Not until 1917 did the war stop the flow of children across the Atlantic, but of course staff at Fairknowe remained preoccupied with placements, inspections and aftercare, though details in reports are limited. Post-war we learn that a car was purchased in 1920, but whether that made more visits of inspection possible is not recorded. The report for 1924 records a better relationship with the provincial government of Ontario and with the Federal government,⁶³⁰ but neither in that report nor in succeeding ones is there any reference to the agreement between the UK and the Canadian governments which, following the Bondfield report, restricted child migration to those aged 14 or over.

16.17 Thereafter those sent by Quarriers would have been largely juveniles of school-leaving age, as photographs of migrating parties in *Narrative of Facts* so indicate. These reports in the 1920s refer, but only briefly, to Quarriers' careful selection of the children sent to Canada, then of the selection of homes in Canada from which applications had been received, then of the subsequent inspection of the children in such homes, and then of their lasting aftercare until aged 18, and indeed also of subsequent, frequent and amicable contacts with Fairknowe by those grown-up and often married. In addition to the positives are the absence of negatives: 'Removals are nearly all due to the incompatibility of employer and employee.... Cruelty or unreasonable severity has had no place in our experience for many years'.⁶³¹ But with economic depression in Canada from 1929, Quarriers sent few migrants to Canada, and even juvenile migrants were not admitted from 1933. Moreover, perhaps particularly in these conditions, the Canadian authorities were protesting about the quality of some of the children who had been sent by Quarriers and who had become liabilities.⁶³² There are also references to four boys, who had arrived as juveniles in the 1920s, being deported.⁶³³ The distribution home at

⁶²⁹ *Narrative of Facts*, 1913, p.42,

https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1910_delivery.pdf

⁶³⁰ *Narrative of Facts*, 1924, p.32, <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/nof1924.pdf>

⁶³¹ *Narrative of Facts*, 1925, p.36, <https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/nof1925.pdf>

⁶³² Quarriers, Fairknowe children 1932, Claude Winters to Lord Maclay, 2 March 1932, QAR.001.009.2772.

⁶³³ *Ibid*, Winters to Findlay, 26 July 1933, QAR.001.009.2783-2784.

Fairknowe was sold in 1934, and the only youngsters thereafter sent were siblings of those already in Canada, and even that traffic ended with the outbreak of war in 1939.⁶³⁴ We must assume that by then there would not be many Quarriers children under the age of 18 with whom Quarriers was still obliged to keep in touch.

16.18 In sum, there is little doubt that Quarriers from the beginning of its child migration operations had been aware of its obligations in the selection of farms and private homes to which child migrants could be sent, and understood the need to visit its children regularly to check on their welfare and progress (including spiritual). Moreover, we know that Canadian government officials had also acquired responsibility for inspecting and reporting, though we are uninformed of any interventions. Quarriers officers were prepared to acknowledge to their supporters in Scotland that some children were not always well-treated, that their education could be insufficient, and that some children fell below their expectations or at least hopes. But published reports rarely indicate why some placements failed or indeed how failures were revealed. We do not know whether children spoke privately to these rare visitors from Quarriers, or later to government inspectors if they showed up. It would have taken time, familiarity and trust for children to open up to those who called, and particularly hard if the adults with whom they were living were present at such interviews. And with children scattered around Ontario and Quebec we should not forget the logistical difficulties of travelling long-distance in rural Canada to visit them.

Canada: Barnardo's

16.19 As noted in para 4.3 above, Barnardo's only maintained a branch in Scotland from 1940, but with respect to placements, inspections, supervision and aftercare, Barnardo's had by then learnt much since initiating its Canadian operations in 1882. We understand that farms and homes in Canada were inspected before children were sent to them, that the obligations of carers were spelt out, and that sleeping arrangements were investigated, as were household members.⁶³⁵ This last suggests an awareness of risk, to which Doyle had drawn attention in his 1875 report. The need must have been made even more apparent when in 1889 the manager of a

⁶³⁴ Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story*, p.85.

⁶³⁵ Barnardo's, Section 21 response, Dec 2018, BAR.001.005.3333-3334.

Barnardo's receiving home in Canada was jailed for the sexual abuse of girls.⁶³⁶ According to documents provided by Barnardo's to IICSA (but not subsequently forwarded to SCAI), a female member of staff was then dispatched to Canada to advise employers to whom children were being sent of the need for locks on doors and for chaperones.⁶³⁷ It would seem to follow that, at least in the case of girls, Barnardo's would be alert to the need for close supervision in receiving homes, in placements and in monitoring aftercare.

16.20 We have also learnt by seeing a substantial number of letters and reports on visits dating from 1920 to 1927 that Barnardo's in Canada and in London were made aware of some children unhappy with their placements and of some employers unhappy with those they were employing. Barnardo's did investigate the causes and seem to have taken appropriate action when needed, and also endeavoured to insist that employers honoured their agreements concerning pay and ensuring that those of school age were attending classes.⁶³⁸ The reports deal with placements, attempts to keep siblings together, inspections by Barnardo's and by Canadian government staff, child protection measures (including the monitoring of girls who had boyfriends), health and health care, school and church attendance, wages, money and its management, maintaining contacts with family, responding to complaints by employers and by migrants, providing aftercare, and checking on subsequent careers. The conclusion is that with respect to Barnardo's children sent to Canada in the 1920s there was no 'systemic failure' in its 'fiduciary duty', though evidence was

⁶³⁶ For the abuse, Miss Stent's investigation, and consequent obligations placed upon employers see Barnardo's submission to House of Commons Health Select Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, para 2.2.6, BAR.001.005.8963.

⁶³⁷ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, p.67.

⁶³⁸ Barnardo's, 'Complaints', BAR.001.005.5298-5352, and 'Recruitment, selection, monitoring employers', 5353-5391; 'Child protection', also containing medical reports, BAR.001.005.6711-6736; 'Federal government inspections', containing reports and correspondence with Mr Hobday (the manager in Toronto), and by him to London and with a Barnardo boy in Stratford, Ontario, 16 April 1924-12 March 1925, BAR.001.005.6688-6710. There is also much on these subjects in 'Historic Correspondence 1923-59', BAR.001.005.6737-6853, and also in 'Canadian Staff Correspondence', BAR.001.005.5600-6158, which otherwise are indicative of child migrants into their adulthoods keeping in touch. Bogue Smart in his annual reports 1920-28 records very few placements not being satisfactory and the health, progress and conduct of very few children not being 'good', BAR.001.005.5395-5540. *Ups and Downs*, published in Toronto in Dec 1933 (but evidently dispatched to London) consists of 'Ups': good news from former Barnardo's boys and girls settled in Canada, about marriages, babies and betterment (in spite of economic downturn): BAR.001.005.7685-7716.

lacking concerning the selection, training and supervision of Barnardo's staff in Canada.⁶³⁹

16.21 Post-war most child migrants sent overseas by Barnardo's were placed in institutional care in Australia, but the organisation remained conscious of its obligations to those who pre-war had been sent to Canada. One example is the case of ██████████. He had been dispatched to Quebec in 1939 aged 14.⁶⁴⁰ (See para 13.43). His file bulges with documentation relating to his placement and aftercare inspection visits, his accommodation, progress and well-being, plus letters to and from his employer concerning his jobs and wages – and the occasion in 1941 when unexpectedly he quit his farming job to become a CPR fireman. In the early years Barnardo's monitored the banking and investing of his savings, and authorised his withdrawals. The considerable lifetime correspondence between ██████████ and Barnardo's seems driven by his wish to keep in touch, and while it contains his rueful reflections on his loneliness on first arrival and his disrupted education, the file reveals in exchanged letters and photographs the history of his subsequent life up to 2001, including his Christian faith, his career in the military and afterwards, his marriage, his family life, and indeed a bequest he was to make to Barnardo's.⁶⁴¹ He seems to have prospered, though the late discovery that his siblings had also been sent overseas without his knowledge, leading to a reunion with survivors only late in life, is a disturbing oversight by Barnardo's.

Canada (and New Zealand and Kenya): Aberlour Orphanage, Strathspey

16.22 We now turn to those smaller voluntary societies based in Scotland which contributed far fewer to the flow of child migrants to Canada (or elsewhere). Aberlour was a large establishment catering for an extensive area that provided boarding-out opportunities, and perhaps for that reason it did not feel the pressure to migrate those placed in its care. Probably no more than 46 children were selected and consent secured before their dispatch to Canada between 1901 and 1931, plus nine more to other destinations by 1951 (see para 13.58). With respect to

⁶³⁹ Barnardo's, 'Analysis of the files of children migrated to Canada in the period from 1920 to 1929', BAR.001.006.2584-2590, and for 1920-29 annual analyses, BAR.001.006.2591-2688, and summary BAR.001.006.2689-2702; and 'Appendices to Support the Analysis of the Files of Children Migrated to Canada 1930-1939, for appendices of documentary evidence BAR.001.009.2774-2906.

⁶⁴⁰ Barnardo's, Children's files, ██████████, BAR.001.005.2991-3263.

⁶⁴¹ For Mr ██████████ bequest see BAR.001.005.3253.

placements, we need first to note that several children were migrating to join parents, older siblings or employers, and we have seen reference to Thomas Cook organising their travel, though of course they were not responsible for placements or aftercare.⁶⁴² There is also a 1912 letter from Lilian Birt to Aberlour in which she states that the aunt of two children had been in touch regarding their migration to join her in Canada, but whether or not Birt was employed to arrange their travel she would not have had placement or aftercare responsibilities.⁶⁴³ While the *Orphanage Magazine* in July 1928 may not refer to how placements were chosen, it does claim that an inspector of the British Immigration and Colonization Association (BICA), which we are aware dealt with juvenile migrants in Canada, 'pays visits for inspection', presumably of approved farms and homes, 'every two months'.⁶⁴⁴ This was perhaps a manageable duty since so few Aberlour migrants were sent, but even so only if they were geographically located close together. The *Magazine* also reports that the children are well cared for 'materially and spiritually', and that the Warden at Aberlour was very impressed by results when he met Aberlour boys during a visit to Canada in 1928.⁶⁴⁵ Contacts were also made with Scout groups in Canada 'in order that a hand of fellowship' could be extended to assist Aberlour boys to join and settle in.⁶⁴⁶ Positive letters sent home are frequently published in the *Magazine*, acknowledging receipt of letters and gifts (even of a gramophone) from family and Aberlour staff.⁶⁴⁷ However, none of the 18 children's files we have seen contain formal reports by inspectors, independent or otherwise, official or otherwise, on children's physical, personal or career progress in Canada. Whether more substantial records ever existed is a moot point, but certainly the material we have seen concerning placements, inspections and the aftercare of children once in the care of

⁶⁴² Aberlour, Children's files, [REDACTED], ABE.001.008.8240, 8242, 8254.

⁶⁴³ Aberlour, Children's files, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], ABE.001.008.7946-7947.

⁶⁴⁴ Aberlour, Section 21 response – 1900-1930 Report, ABE.001.008.7701. The *Orphanage Magazine* (or the report) refers to the 'British Immigration and Colonialization Organisation', but the correct title is 'The British Immigration and Colonization Association'. For BICA and juvenile migration see British Immigrants in Montreal, BICA: The British Immigration and Colonization Association', <https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/immigration/immigration-records/home-children-1869-1930/home-children-guide/Pages/british-immigration-colonization-association.aspx> and <https://www.british-immigrants-in-montreal.com/bica.html>. Also see Appendix 1, Section 8.

⁶⁴⁵ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1900-1930 Report, ABE.001.008.7700, quoting *Orphanage Magazine*, 1928.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid*, quoting *Orphanage Magazine*, 1927, ABE.001.008.7700.

⁶⁴⁷ *Orphanage Magazine*, ABE.001.008.7744 and 7746.

Aberlour and subsequently sent to Canada seems limited in volume and substance.⁶⁴⁸ This might be a matter of concern, in view of three case histories.

16.23 The case file of ██████████ contains a March 1932 letter from the London office of Canadian National Railways (which seems to have been part of the Departments of Colonization and Agriculture).⁶⁴⁹ It refers to a letter received from BICA. ██████████ had migrated under its auspices in ██████████ 1929, not quite 14. By 1932 he had a substantial amount to his credit in a Montreal Bank. They wanted his address to contact him. There is no reply in the file, which may or may not mean Aberlour had lost track of him. The other two cases concern juveniles and therefore they are briefly reported here and analysed in more detail in Appendix 1.

16.24 ██████████ aged 14, was sent to New Zealand under the Flock House scheme to train up youngsters to work on sheep farms.⁶⁵⁰ His file indicates that he went with his father's approval, in 1931, but later we find a letter from his sister in Glasgow, unfortunately not dated, asking the Warden at Aberlour whether he knew the whereabouts of ██████████. She had written to him in the previous year, but had had no reply. 'Everybody here is very anxious about him as we think he is lost.'⁶⁵¹ The last she had heard, the previous year, from someone to whom ██████████ had written, was that Flock House boys were 'walking the streets' and 'it would be his turn next'.⁶⁵² Economic depression had hit New Zealand. We do not know whether Aberlour had retained aftercare responsibilities or whether these had been delegated, formally or by default, to the sheepowners organisation which had set up the Flock House scheme. There is no copy of a reply to the sister in the file, or any indication that Aberlour made inquiries, most obviously in New Zealand.

16.25 The other and more extraordinary case relates to ██████████ whose Aberlour file raises important issues concerning selection and consent, and about

⁶⁴⁸ Aberlour, Section 21 response – Part C and D report, ABE.001.001.0455-0460; ABE.001.008.7699-7704, 7707; ABE.001.008.8061-8064; and copies supplied of the *Orphanage Magazine*, and see para 10.5 above.

⁶⁴⁹ Aberlour, children's file, ██████████ children, ABE.001.008.7868-7912, esp 7877.

⁶⁵⁰ Aberlour, children's file, ██████████ children. ABE.001.008.8305-8306. The full title of the organisation was the 'New Zealand Sheepowners Acknowledgement of Debt to British Seamen Fund'. See also Appendix 1, para 4.10.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8305.

⁶⁵² *Ibid*.

placement and aftercare.⁶⁵³ [REDACTED] born in [REDACTED] 1935, had become a responsibility of Lanark County Council's Public Assistance Committee, and he was admitted to Aberlour in [REDACTED] 1942, though still remaining the Council's responsibility. In 1951 he was thought suitable to be migrated to a farm in Kenya, managed by Mr McKillop, a Scot whose philanthropic intentions were to train selected boys from Scotland to become farmers. The Warden at Aberlour, Lanark's Children's Officer, the Scottish Home Department, the Secretary of State, and the Colonial Office were among those involved in the decision to send [REDACTED] overseas. Things went badly wrong. There are anguished letters in the file, particularly from Mr McKillop, when [REDACTED] became increasingly truculent, uninterested, dishonest and lazy – and in one alarming incident 'kicked up an appalling row' among the African workers, telling them how badly he was treated, which McKillop particularly deplored.⁶⁵⁴ There is nothing in the file to indicate whether he was formally expelled from the colony or told by McKillop to leave (the latter seems likely), or who paid for his fare, but he was back in the UK by [REDACTED] 1952 after a year away. This is, clearly, an unusual case, but indicative of systems of care and overseas aftercare not producing desired results.

Canada: Emma Stirling, the Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society, and Hillfoot Farm, Nova Scotia

16.26 The enterprise which Emma Stirling initiated in Canada initially differed from that which organisations like Quarriers were operating.⁶⁵⁵ Quarriers' child migrants may have been first accommodated in a reception home in Canada, but they were rapidly distributed to farms and homes in need of their labour. From inquiries Stirling had made, and perhaps after reading the Doyle report of 1875, she concluded that those who took in child migrants in Canada in this fashion were treating them 'like white slaves', that they were 'overlooked and forgotten' by sending societies, and that there should be official monitoring of their well-being.⁶⁵⁶ Stirling brought to that judgement and her mission her experience of managing the Stockbridge Day Nursery and Infant Home for working mothers and motherless children which she

⁶⁵³ Aberlour, Children's file, [REDACTED] ABE.001.007.8143-8295. For the drama the sources need to be read upwards from the bottom of the file, but also see also Appendix 1, paras. 4.12-4.16.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid*, ABE.001.0087.8180.

⁶⁵⁵ For secondary sources see Girard, 'Victorian philanthropy and child rescue'; Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.111-115; Kohli, *Golden Bridge*, pp.222-225. See also Emma Stirling, *Our Children in Old Scotland and Nova Scotia. Being a history of her work by Emma M. Stirling, the founder of the Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society, founded 1877* (Speakmann, Coatesville, Pennsylvania, 1898). https://ia902503.us.archive.org/25/items/cihm_25487/cihm_25487.pdf.

⁶⁵⁶ As reported in the *Glasgow Herald*, 28 Feb 183, Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.111-112.

had set up in 1877, subsequently renamed by her as the Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society. In 1884 she also opened a Shelter for Cruelty, and by 1886 she was catering for 300 boys and girls in a total of seven institutions, including at a training farm.⁶⁵⁷ In these years, equipped with a substantial financial inheritance, she was looking to Canada for an outlet for the increasing number of children coming into her care in the Homes 'who were rapidly growing up and for whom provision would soon require to be made with the view of setting them out in the world for themselves'.⁶⁵⁸

16.27 It is possible that many of the youngsters who arrived at her farm were ready to be distributed to meet what she described as the 'great request' for them.⁶⁵⁹ However, our impression is that Stirling's initial aim was to provide supervised institutional care and to train up youngsters to fit them for their careers in rural Canada. In that respect it was very similar as an ideal to that which inspired Kingsley Fairbridge to whose farm school at Pinjarra in Western Australia child migrants first arrived in 1913. Following a North American tour in 1885, Stirling purchased Hillfoot Farm in the Annapolis Valley, and to it she herself moved in 1888. She had been encouraged by the Secretary of Agriculture for Nova Scotia, which was one of the Maritime Provinces keen to encourage land settlement in competition with settlement on the prairies. Her staff included James Peggie, a farmer who had been in her service in Scotland for several years, and his role was to develop the farm and, one assumes, provide agricultural training. Peggie's wife and a Mrs Vass, probably with Emma Stirling, presumably provided childcare and carried out domestic duties. Meanwhile, child migrants were arriving. Stirling herself in 1886 had escorted across the Atlantic two parties of children, totalling 61, and a third party of 56 in 1887. Other children, including some supplied by Annie Croall's Whinwell Home (see para 16.32), arrived in 1888. It is reckoned that altogether around 200 children were brought over to Hillfoot farm.

16.28 Since Nova Scotia's Secretary of Agriculture had been responsible for persuading Stirling to establish Hillfoot as a farm school, it is possible that he or his staff routinely or occasionally inspected the place (and the condition of the children), but we have seen no documentary support for that assumption.

⁶⁵⁷ Stirling, *Our Children*, pp.18, 22, 26, 28.

⁶⁵⁸ NRS, GD 409/1, RSSPCC Fonds, Minutes of Meeting of the Directors of the Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society, 6 November 1885.

⁶⁵⁹ Stirling, *Our Children*, p.84.

16.29 As for conditions at Hilltop, what we have is a forceful statement in 1887 which Stirling sent back to the committee in Edinburgh which had been supporting her:

I have now done what I wanted, and made a bridge between [Hilltop] and Scotland to give poor children a safe outlet, and fair chance here – on such terms that I can honestly advise sending them.... The work here prospers wonderfully and children are greatly in request. I have also a large house and means of receiving them comfortably'.⁶⁶⁰

Her memoirs refer to 50 acres of meadow, and 210 acres of tillage land and pasture, and to stables, cow houses, a piggery and a poultry house. She also records buying a sawmill and installing a joiner's shop and other facilities, plus the planting of orchards and a fruit garden. These features were characteristic of farm schools elsewhere intended for the training up of child migrants. She also refers to extensions to the main house, and a kitchen, laundry, bathrooms and church services in a schoolroom (though she says nothing about teachers, the curriculum or school reports).⁶⁶¹ However, one historian has written that the farm school aspect of the enterprise was not sustained, and that children soon after arrival were quickly placed out.⁶⁶²

16.30 With respect to subsequent placements, she refers in her memoirs to the great demand for the children she was bringing out and training. She also writes that they 'went to homes as quickly as the necessary inquiries could be made, which, according to my plan, takes some little time'.⁶⁶³ But beyond that she has little to say about placements, beyond reference to receiving 'good accounts' of children's progress and 'most encouraging' reports, but how obtained and their precise content is not revealed. Instead she quotes letters at length from admirers which are congratulatory and general, but hardly constitute reports. This, for example, is by a Methodist minister:

⁶⁶⁰ NRS, GD 409/1, RSSPCC Fonds, Minutes of Meeting of the Directors of the Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge Society, Minutes of Meeting of 6 October 1887, quoting letter from Miss Stirling of 25 August 1887.

⁶⁶¹ Stirling, *Our Children*, pp.79, 84-85, 88, 92-94, 105, 121-122.

⁶⁶² Parker, *Uprooted*, p.112. The immediate placing out of older children is also stressed by Patricia Dishon in her witness statement: WIT.001.002.5384.

⁶⁶³ Stirling, *Our Children*, p.84.

I am fully persuaded there is no institution of the kind where more ample provision is made for the physical comfort and religious training of the young, and where better facilities are afforded for acquiring all the elementary branches of education. The greatest care is taken to secure the best homes for the children, and in this Miss Stirling has been remarkably successful, as well as most particular and indefatigable in seeing that the conditions made in their interest are carried out by those who adopt them or receive them in charge.⁶⁶⁴

16.31 At first, Stirling seems to have herself taken on aftercare duties, but reports on the children do not seem to have been traced so we cannot judge their nature or the frequency of her visits. It is possible that the logistics of distance hampered her practice as it did that of other organisations. Though long-lived, Stirling suffered from declining health and was unable to cope with increasing numbers, and - another familiar problem - she could not keep track of those who had been placed in employment and then moved from place to place.⁶⁶⁵ Quite what happened to them remains dark. As for Hillfoot Farm, it was mysteriously destroyed by arson in 1895.⁶⁶⁶

Canada: Whinwell Children's Home, Stirling

16.32 This home, established by Annie Croall in 1883, accommodated about 40 children. Its modest size, the challenges of taking in additional children, and the publicity attached to child migration that decade probably in conjunction explain why Miss Croall selected and sent her first group of children to Canada in 1888. Altogether it is reckoned that 124 child migrants were sent from this home, 102 of them to Canada.⁶⁶⁷ However, as reported earlier (see paras 13.65-13.70), instead of opening her own distribution centre, Croall relied on other agencies for determining the destination of Whinwell children sent overseas, such as Lilian Birt's organisation and the homes she serviced, and Emma Stirling's farm in Nova Scotia.

16.33 As for inspections of placements and aftercare reports, we are aware that Annie Croall and perhaps her successor as Superintendent maintained a correspondence with individual children once they had left the Home and were living overseas, but these would not constitute regular reports on placements and aftercare

⁶⁶⁴ Stirling, *Our Children*, pp.96-97, 111-120.

⁶⁶⁵ Parker, *Uprooted*, pp.114-115.

⁶⁶⁶ Stirling claimed it was motivated by local resentment because she was pressing charges against a man whom she alleged had impregnated one of her former pupils in his employment and also the doctor who had allegedly performed an abortion on her: Girard, 'Victorian philanthropy and child rescue', p.222.

⁶⁶⁷ We must refer again to footnote 301 on the uncertainty concerning totals.

following inspections.⁶⁶⁸ Those letters published in Whinwell reports, because selected for a purpose, must be treated with caution, though some provide insights into the concerns of migrated children, such as a wish to be reunited with a sibling.⁶⁶⁹

16.34 More revealing has been a sample of formal care and aftercare reports, albeit over a short period. Barnardo's in 1912, clearly employing an agent to act on behalf of Whinwell, inspected and reported on thirteen Whinwell children placed out in Canada. Though brief (some of them very brief), they provide accounts of care and progress, but also of some negative outcomes.⁶⁷⁰ Lilian Birt's Liverpool Sheltering Homes in 1919 and 1920 also sent on to Whinwell a batch of 28 reports, also of varying length and detail, on 21 children.⁶⁷¹ All these reports must have followed inspection visits by staff employed by the Canadian Department of Immigration and Colonization, even though Bogue Smart, Chief Inspector of British Immigrant Children and Receiving Homes in Canada, complained in 1920 about limited staff resources (see para 16.7 above). Fifteen reports by inspectors explicitly from his department are also in the Stirling archives, one dated 1919, three in 1920 and the rest 1921, and these include two migrants not named in other reports.⁶⁷²

Unsurprisingly, they too record positive stories of care and progress but also cases of serious misbehaviour. We do not know what steps were taken in response to critical reports. One 'success story' concerns a former Scottish child migrant, sent to Quebec, who, aged 19, married the farm owner, a widow, and 'came into a 100-acre farm and seems to be doing well'.⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁸ Stirling Council, Section 21 response, Report relating to records held at Stirling Council Archives 1900-1980, by Pam McNicol, Stirling Council Archivist, October 2018, STC.001.001.0569.

⁶⁶⁹ Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.187-188.

⁶⁷⁰ Stirling Council, Whinwell Children's Home, Reports from Canada 1912, 1919-20, STC.001.001.1338-1340.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid*, List of children sent by Miss Birt, Liverpool, to Canada 1889-1914, STC.001.001.1341-1346, and Reports from Canada 1912, 1919-1920, STC.001.001.1347-1368.

⁶⁷² *Ibid*, Report on ██████████ from Liverpool Sheltering Homes, STC.001.001.0871; Report on ██████████ by Sheltering Homes, Liverpool, STC.001.001.0897-0898; Report on progress of ██████████ STC.001.001.0905; Report on ██████████ from Liverpool Sheltering Homes, STC.001.001.0996; Report on ██████████ from Liverpool Sheltering Homes, STC.001.001.1037-1042; Reports from Canada 1912, 1919-1920, STC.001.001.1381-1384.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid*, Report on ██████████ from Liverpool Sheltering Homes, STC.001.001.0996. The Canadian census for 1921 indicates that ██████████ wife had had three children by her previous husband and one (then five months old) by himself. The return shows that they wished to present themselves as a well-matched couple. He was born in 1902, and was therefore only 19 in 1921, but in the census he recorded 1882 as the year of his birth, making him appear to be 39. Mrs ██████████ formerly Mrs ██████████ was born in 1876, not 1881 as recorded on the census, therefore being 45 in 1921, not 40. (Census research by Nicola Constantine.)

16.35 To conclude we return to sustained informal and personal reporting. The subsequent lives of the Askew brothers admitted to Whinwell in 1903, upon whom we reported earlier (see para 13.70), may almost be told in photographs, since several taken over a number of years are in their file in the Stirling Archives, along with letters. Three had served in the army in the First World War, one by 1919 was living in Quebec, one was married and living in Massachusetts, and a 1941 photograph shows all four together. The contact with Whinwell seems indicative of a sustained relationship with the organisation that had sent them overseas.⁶⁷⁴

16.36 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had been sent to Canada in 1906 and 1907 using Barnardo's as the sending agency. [REDACTED] would have been aged nine, [REDACTED] older. Thereafter the story relates to Barnardo's inspection and aftercare reporting practices. Reports and/or letters were apparently sent to Miss Croall. Indeed, she continued to receive updates on the children's circumstances long after they had left Whinwell. In 1912, [REDACTED] was reported to have left the farm in Widder, Ontario, in which he had been placed, in order to get work in town, saying he did not like farm work. This strongly suggests that he was by then at least 14. [REDACTED] was living with a Mrs Vasey in Ontario and was reported to be 'very much liked. She is not a strong girl but is making good progress'.⁶⁷⁵ It is worth recalling that Barnardo's only opened a home in Scotland in 1940, so prior to dispatch these children must have been sent first to a Barnardo's home in England. Why a Scottish child migration agency, such as Quarriers, was not employed is a puzzle.

Canada: Salvation Army

16.37 The author of a book published in 1915 stated that applicants in Canada seeking to be sent a child who was in a Salvation Army receiving home were required to answer questions concerning the 'habits, character and housekeeping abilities of the farmer's wife', and whether the family owned or only rented its house.⁶⁷⁶ More specifically, Bogue Smart, the Canadian government's Inspector of British Immigrant Children, stated in his 1914 report with respect to Army-sent children that all boys and girls of school age are 'placed where food, clothing and school attendance are

⁶⁷⁴ Stirling Archives, Stirling Council Archives Blog (12 February 2018), The Askew Brothers – Whinwell Home, 1903, <http://www.stirlingarchives.scot/2018/02/12/askew-brothers-whinwell-home-1903/>

⁶⁷⁵ Stirling Local History Society (2014), 'Children of the Whinwell Home, Stirling: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

⁶⁷⁶ Kohli, *Golden Bridge*, p.209, quoting Denis Crane, *John Bull's Surplus Children*,

given until they are at least 13', and when past school age they were employed on a scale of wages 'according to size and ability'.⁶⁷⁷ As always with respect to Canada, it is not evident how those regulations were enforced, or by whom, given the vast distances over which child migrants were scattered. However, one historian's analysis of the case files of 200 child migrants, one sixth of the total brought to Canada by the Army between 1911 and 1927 (after 1924 they would have been juveniles aged 14 or over) concluded that inspection visits were carried out twice a year to the homes in which children were placed, and other sources of information were sufficient to allow detailed personal files on the children to be compiled, until they were 18.⁶⁷⁸ The reports record disappointments, distress and misbehaviour of some, and the successes and achievements of others. We have suggested that perhaps 30 Scottish children were sent to Canada by the Army.

Canada: Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School, British Columbia

16.38 We conclude this Canadian chapter with a very different story.⁶⁷⁹ In February 1934 the Fairbridge Society based in London began negotiations with the Canadian government and the Provincial Government of British Columbia, involving also the UK government, with a view to opening a farm school in the province on the lines of that which Fairbridge was already operating in Australia. Money was raised to buy a site on Vancouver Island, and the Prince of Wales Fairbridge Farm School was opened in 1935. To there a total of 25 Scottish children were sent over subsequent years, among many more children from the UK. We have seen one Fairbridge file which contains half-yearly reports dated 1939-41 and one 1942 aftercare report on a child.⁶⁸⁰ In addition we have been supplied with Fairbridge reports in the archives of Middlemore Homes in Birmingham to where we know some children, including from Scotland, were accommodated before their transfer to British Columbia.⁶⁸¹ These are half-yearly reports, 1942-46, for a boy sent overseas in ██████████ 1941, and similarly for a girl transferred in ██████████ 1936, for the years 1937-46, plus one aftercare report

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p.210.

⁶⁷⁸ Myra Rutherford, "'Canada is no dumping ground': Public discourse and Salvation Army immigrant women and children, 1900-1930', *Histoire sociale/Social History*, vol. 79, May 2007, pp.117, 119, 126-134.

⁶⁷⁹ For what follows see also Dunae, 'Waifs'.

⁶⁸⁰ Prince's Trust, Fairbridge, aftercare reports, Marjorie Arnison, PRT.001.001.6926-6936.

⁶⁸¹ Birmingham City Council, Middlemore Archives, reports on Roderick Mackay, BCC.001.001.0304-0312; and ██████████ BCC.001.001.0356-0396, 0399. For Middlemore Homes and Fairbridge see para 4.3 and footnote above.

dated [REDACTED] 1946. Though brief they seem in accordance with Fairbridge practice elsewhere.

16.39 However, the establishment of an institution exclusively for British child migrants was unprecedented in Canada, and it was contentious. British Columbia's Directors and Superintendents of Social Welfare and many university-trained women social workers in the province regarded institutional care as an anachronism. Indeed, a wartime scheme organised in the UK by the Children's Overseas Reception Board (CORB), by which children were evacuated to Canada and cared for in family homes, had led to criticism of the institutional care provided by Fairbridge in British Columbia, and for the consequent 'segregation' of child migrants from the Canadians among whom it was expected they would spend the rest of their lives and with whom they should come to identify.⁶⁸² Miss Maxse, who carried out the post-war review of the CORB scheme in June 1944, reported that the standard of child welfare in the province of British Columbia, led by Miss Isobel Harvey as Superintendent (about whom more later in our report), was 'undoubtedly the highest in the country.... More child-care legislation has been passed here than in the other Provinces.... It employs trained social-workers who have graduated in Social Science'.⁶⁸³ Their concerns, standards and ambitions lie behind the 1938 Welfare Institutions Licensing Act which empowered the Provincial Government's Child Welfare Branch to subject child care institutions, including the Fairbridge Farm School, to close inspection. It was also liable to public scrutiny because, from 1940, it was receiving a Provincial Government financial subsidy. In 1934, before the school was opened and as part of the agreement with Fairbridge, the Minister of Immigration and Colonization in Ottawa insisted that 'periodical' inspections and reports would be expected on children and on their places of employment after they had left the farm school until the age of 18.⁶⁸⁴ However, we have not seen documentary sources to indicate when or even whether such regular inspections took place, perhaps because the troubled history of this Fairbridge institution prompted inspections and reports which were far from routine. We assume that between its opening in 1935 and its final closure in 1951 licences had been issued

⁶⁸² TNA, DO35/1140/M1156/36, 'Evacuation: Review of the CORB Scheme in Canada, 1940-1944', pp.4-5, 13, 26-27.

⁶⁸³ *Ibid*, pp.26-27.

⁶⁸⁴ Prince's Trust, Correspondence regarding the setting up of a branch of the Fairbridge Farm School in British Columbia, letter from W.A.Conlon to Mr Lumley, 12 March 1934, before the farm school opened, indicates that 'periodical' inspections and reports would be expected on children and their places of employment after they had left the farm school, PRT.001.001.6713.

and renewed, possibly following routine on-site inspections, though these would have been interrupted by special on-site inquiries prompted by deep concerns about institutional practice. We do know from two examples that the Principal at the farm school submitted annual reports to Fairbridge in London, but these are late in its history.⁶⁸⁵ The report for 1943 recorded criminal charges brought against boys and young men formerly at the school, and also of alarming rates of illegitimate pregnancies amongst former Fairbridge girls, and therefore of the need for improved aftercare practice. The main items in a 1945-46 report related to constitutional changes in the governing body at the school, staffing, education and training, placements, successful outcomes, health, farming, aftercare, and employment. It also contains reports which though brief indicated knowledge of the children (including three who had been repatriated).

16.40 At various times on-site inquiries involved British Columbia's Deputy Provincial Secretary, the Superintendent of Neglected Children, the Canadian Welfare Council, the Canadian government's Supervisor of Juvenile Immigration, the Fairbridge Council in London and the local Fairbridge Farm School Board of Governors – who ultimately concluded in 1951 that the school should be closed.⁶⁸⁶ As will be described in a later chapter of this report (see Chapter 24), what prompted so much close scrutiny were allegations and evidence of abuse. Such a conclusion is indicative of what could happen if inspectors equipped with particular professional standards detected what they regarded as unacceptable practices and were determined to assert their authority. It is also abundantly clear from a substantial official file that the Dominions Office knew from 1943 that there were serious grounds for concern. However, the documents indicate that the response of officials and the Secretary of State was largely to diminish the seriousness of the allegations and to encourage Fairbridge in London to replace the current Principal and exercise more authority over practice at the farm school, though the High Commissioner was more troubled

⁶⁸⁵ Prince's Trust, Annual Report by Harry Logan (Principal, Fairbridge Farm School, BC) and correspondence relating to it, Principal Logan's Annual Report, 17 Nov 1943, PRT.001.001.2707-2717, esp. 2709-2712, 2715-2716; and Prince of Wales Fairbridge Farm School (BC), Principal's Report covering the Period July 1st 1945 to December 31st 1946, PRT.001.001.3051-3076; relevant extracts from minutes of meetings of the Child Care Committee 1938-1953, PRT.001.001.7504-7526, Minutes of Child Care Committee, 13 Sept 1950, refer only to reports received, June and July 1950 and Feb 1953. A detailed description of aftercare practice is contained in a 31 October 1945 report in a file kindly provided to SCAI by British Columbia Archives, GR0496, Box 58, File 7, BCA.001.001.0513-0517.

⁶⁸⁶ Prince's Trust, Reports and Correspondence between Fairbridge Farm Schools British Columbia and Department of Child Welfare: accusations of mistreatment and lack of proper care, PRT.001.001.2718-2900, contain a considerable amount of documentation, Feb 1943-Feb 1945, relating to investigations, reports and the future of the Prince of Wales farm school.

by what he had learnt.⁶⁸⁷ The episode might (or should) have made officials and ministers sensitive to the risk of abuse at other institutions overseas to which child migrants had been and would be sent, and indeed, as we next report, concerns were being raised at the same time about the care of child migrants in Australia.

16.41 Prior to its final closure, continuing aftercare services had almost certainly been accepted as a Fairbridge responsibility, but with the closure of the college in 1951 the remaining Fairbridge children were transferred to foster homes. Their care and then aftercare became a state responsibility, assisted by local Children's Aid Societies, but with Fairbridge still having a role *in loco parentis* until the last of these Fairbridgeans, a young man, reached his majority in 1962.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁷ TNA, DO35/1137/M894/1, 'Fairbridge Farm School: Vancouver. Resumption of Migration of Children to Canada for Fairbridge Schools', especially minutes on pp.13-17, 19, 28-29, including references to the hostile Harvey Report, plus the concerned report by the High Commissioner, pp.132-134, and a not uncritical report by Green, pp.223-249.

⁶⁸⁸ Dunae, 'Waifs', p.247.

17 | Australia: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports

17.1 We begin once more with a reminder that the number of child migrants sent from Scotland to institutions in Australia probably numbered 369, made up of 17 sent pre-war by Quarriers to Burnside and post-war fewer than 98 through the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service (who funded migrants to Australia, including 26 supplied by Quarriers, but also some sent to New Zealand), 19 by Whinwell, maybe 20 by the Salvation Army, another 80 by Fairbridge, 30 by Northcote, 19 by Barnardo's, and 86 by Catholic agencies. It was the responsibility of government officials in the UK and Australia to ensure that the quality of care and aftercare for these children was acceptable before children were migrated and subsequently after arrival through repeated and, ideally, frequent inspections. It was the responsibility of staff in the receiving institutions to report regularly to the sending agencies on the well-being of the child migrants they had received, and of the sending agencies to require such reports and to respond appropriately to any concerns they might raise.⁶⁸⁹

17.2 In this chapter of our report, we provide an overview of material concerning placements, inspections, aftercare and reporting in relation to the work of particular sending and receiving organisations in Australia. The story is complex and so, in addition, post-war policies and systems for the inspection and monitoring of institutions receiving child migrants are discussed in more detail in two of the Appendices to this report. Appendix 2 examines approval and inspection systems operated by the UK (including the Scottish Office) and Australian governments (including State as well as Commonwealth officers). It considers whether systemic failures occurred in relation to what could reasonably have been understood at that time to be good practice in safeguarding children from harm. What becomes abundantly clear is that while UK government officials did carry out *ad hoc* inspections, usually prompted by particular events and circumstances, it did not undertake regular routine inspections, though in 1944 these had been considered by UK and Australian officials. Appendix 3 provides an extended discussion of the wider policy standards that could reasonably have been expected of sending organisations

⁶⁸⁹ As an example of what could result see IICSA's report on child migration by National Children's Home. It responded to critical reports received from NCH Sisters in Australia by closing down its child migration programme: <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/4265/view/child-migration-programmes-investigation-report-march-2018.pdf>, pp.104-107. To the best of our knowledge, NCH did not migrate children from Scotland.

and by local authorities in terms of their monitoring of child migrants sent from their care (including standards for this set out in the draft s.33 regulations for the 1948 Children Act), and in some cases considers weaknesses in their practice. In addition, Appendix 4 examines particular issues relating to post-war Catholic child migration practices.

Australia: Fairbridge Farm Schools at Pinjarra, Western Australia, and Molong, New South Wales, and the Northcote Farm School, Bacchus Marsh, Victoria

17.3 The Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra, opened by Kingsley Fairbridge in 1913, pioneered in Australia this form of institutional care of child migrants (as distinct from juveniles).⁶⁹⁰ To acquire a farm and meet child migrant passage and maintenance costs, the operation was initially entirely dependent on voluntary donations to the Child Emigration Society (CES) formed in 1910 by supporters in Oxford, and later by many others more widely in the UK. (It was renamed the Fairbridge Society following the early death of its founder in 1924.) However, Australian government financial support began in 1915. Then, shortly after the First World War, UK government subsidies were secured via the Oversea Settlement Committee and then via a formal funding agreement in 1923 following the passage of the Empire Settlement Act in 1922. In 1938 a second Fairbridge Farm School was opened, this one at Molong in New South Wales. An Australian initiative had secured the site, and funding arrangements with the governments of New South Wales, the Commonwealth of Australia and the UK followed. Meanwhile, in 1937, the Northcote Farm School at Bacchus Marsh in Victoria had opened. A substantial bequest made by Lady Northcote, the widow of a former Governor-General of Australia, was being managed by trustees in London. However, the terms of the bequest did not allow for capital expenditure from the fund, but a farm was gifted by a supporter. This enabled a farm school to be opened, and child migrant passage fares and weekly maintenance costs were again subsidised by agreements with the Australian and UK governments.

17.4 These three operations were closely linked, and we have suggested that 80 child migrants from Scotland were sent to the Fairbridge farm schools and 30 to

⁶⁹⁰ For what follows see Sherington and Jeffrey, *Fairbridge*, who provide documented accounts on the establishing and early financing of the three farm schools, pp.46-57, 71-72, 82-88, 100-105, 107-111, and 164-172, and for a summary on finance to 1957 see appendix 1, pp.260-263.

Northcote. Not only did they share similar aspirations and provide similar farm school care and training, but the Fairbridge Society also selected the children to be sent to the Northcote farm at Bacchus Marsh. It is also reasonable to suppose that all had similar obligations with respect to accounting for expenditure, for allowing and responding to official inspections, and for reporting on children's well-being to their respective sponsoring and supporting committees in Australia and in the UK. Accordingly it is useful to consider all three operations together, particularly since the war years subjected each to difficulties and to changing attitudes in the UK after 1945 to child migration as a childcare practice. We know that supporters of the three operations in Australia formed local committees, and it is probable that farm school activities were monitored by such enthusiasts, but whether they conducted regular inspections, and if so how, is not known.⁶⁹¹ We also know that there was tension between local committees in Australia and the central offices of these societies in the UK over senior appointments, policy and practice.

17.5 With respect to finance, we know that Kingsley Fairbridge from the beginning of his enterprise was obliged to provide reports on progress and accounts of expenditure to the CES committee in the UK.⁶⁹² Presumably the Fairbridge Society and Northcote also had to keep accounts when they began to receive public funding, though we have not seen documentary evidence of this.

17.6 It is reported that from early days the managers at Pinjarra regularly sent school reports on individual children to the Society's headquarters in London.⁶⁹³ Certainly reports, albeit brief, on the educational progress, agricultural training, health, character and other indicators of well-being (or otherwise) were sent on to local authorities who had supplied children before the First World War, and official inspections also seem to have been conducted and reports compiled even in these war years.⁶⁹⁴ We understand that Whinwell migrated at least 19 children to Australia, the first in 1913, the last (so far as we know) in 1934,⁶⁹⁵ and we have seen fifteen

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid*, pp.71, 120-122, 140-147, 181, 200-211, 220-225.

⁶⁹² *Ibid*, pp.50-51, 54, 99.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid*, p.143.

⁶⁹⁴ TNA, MH102/1400, "Fairbridge Society Child Emigration Scheme. Ministry of Health Papers 1910-1937", Part 2, pp.10-19, reports forwarded from Kingston Union to Local Government Board, 9 December 1915. This file also contains, pp.29-32, 36-43, 57-59, copies of reports dated 1914, 1916 and 1917 submitted by an official inspector to the Government of Western Australia. We cannot say whether reports based on inspections were subsequently carried out annually.

⁶⁹⁵ See footnote 317.

progress reports on eight of the children sent to Pinjarra - three brief reports (on one return), undated but probably pre-1914, and the other twelve between November 1924 and August 1930.⁶⁹⁶ Subsequently, an official 1935 inquiry at Whinwell Children's Home was told that annual reports were received from Fairbridge.⁶⁹⁷ Moreover, a selection of documents from the 1950s and 1960s provided to SCAI by the Prince's Trust indicate that medical reports, reports from cottage mothers, comments by the Principals at Pinjarra and Molong, all indicating knowledge of the children (including some not prospering), were usually being supplied half-yearly and added to their files in London.⁶⁹⁸ References to volunteers acting as 'godparents' keeping in touch with children and sending them presents and bequests in wills are also mentioned. However, Woods, when principal at Molong, was reprimanded for not submitting his reports.⁶⁹⁹ Moreover, the London Secretary of the Northcote Farm School assured the Home Office in October 1947 that a full-time aftercare officer was to be appointed in place of a previous person only acting in that capacity, that training for a wider range of careers beyond farming was to be provided, and also that she received biannual reports from the Australian trustees.⁷⁰⁰ We have seen two such reports.⁷⁰¹ The first, written by the Principal and dated January 1949, suggests an informed knowledge of a boy, then aged six, who was sent overseas in May 1948.

⁶⁹⁶ Stirling Council, Fairbridge School, Report on [REDACTED], STC.001.001.0777-0778; Report on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] by Child Emigration Society, STC.001.001.0827-0828; Progress report on [REDACTED] to Miss Croall, STC.001.001.0983-0987; Letter from Gordon Green to Miss Croall, STC.001.001.0966; Progress report on [REDACTED] to Miss Croall, SCT.001.001.0967; Progress Report on [REDACTED], STC.001.001.1098; Progress Report on [REDACTED], STC.001.001.1106. One of the boys, in the 'Australian Imperial Forces', was killed in action in 1944: letter from Gordon Green to Miss Croall, 24 Oct 1944, STC.001.001.0968.

⁶⁹⁷ NRS, ED57/1398, 'Whinwell Children's Home', p.44, Minutes of Evidence, Educational Endowments (Scotland) Commission, 17 June 1935.

⁶⁹⁸ For examples of Pinjarra and Molong school reports and aftercare reports see Prince's Trust, Aftercare reports for CM-A3, PRT.001.001.6834-6854; for CM-A12, PRT.001.001.6855-6870; for CM-A2, PRT.001.001.6871-6887; for CM-A23, PRT.001.001.6888-6905; for CM-A14, PRT.001.001.6906-6925. For the regular arrival of reports see Minutes of Meetings of the Child Care Committee, 1953-1966, PRT.001.001.0985-1229.

⁶⁹⁹ For the negligence of Woods see Minutes of Meetings of the Child Care Committee, 1953-1966, Minutes of Meeting of Child Care Committee, April 27th 1954, PRT.001.001.1104.

⁷⁰⁰ TNA, MH102/1591, 'Northcote Farm School', pp.9-10, memo by Maxwell, 27 Oct 1947.

⁷⁰¹ TNA, MH102/1592, 'Northcote Farm School', p.11. There is also in the file, p.10, a chaplain's report which is so highly complimentary about the staff, the facilities and the children that one official in the Home Office dismisses his statement, p.6, as 'so eulogistic and uncritical that I am quite unimpressed'. The writer is also very doubtful whether the 'wretched little' boy sent overseas aged 5 will be able to cope with 'all this terrific upheaval'. TNA, MH102/1593, 'Emigration of Children under Northcote Children's Emigration Scheme', contains, p.113, the Principal's later report - and exactly the same report from the chaplain, p.115. See also pp.110-112, 114, 116-117 for several pages which in aggregate form a statement of Northcote policy and practice.

It reviews his health, educational progress (with reference to an assessment carried out by an educational psychologist), his play habits and improvements in his behaviour. The second, [REDACTED] 1949, is of similar length and substance.

17.7 With respect to aftercare, the practice of requiring and recording aftercare reports was introduced early at Pinjarra, to monitor the well-being of those who, when old enough, had left the farm school and been placed in employment.⁷⁰² Considering that by the early 1930s some of these young employees were employed on farms and in towns up to 800 miles from Pinjarra, the reporting system might seem to have been robust since we are told that the reports were usually very detailed, covering such matters as living and working conditions, church attendance, savings accounts, and membership of the Old Fairbridgeans Association. We have seen four aftercare reports sent to Whinwell, the earliest in June 1930 and the other three in January and February 1946.⁷⁰³ Some reports were also provided to other child care organisations which had supplied children like Middlemore Homes. Informative reports by aftercare officers appear in the files of children who had left Pinjarra and Molong and, in 1959, in summary form on 104 Fairbridge boys and girls.⁷⁰⁴ Reports on 'Old Fairbridgeans' getting married also appear in some files. Unsatisfactory reports on employers or on the young employees could lead to transfers. By 1938, for various reasons but indicative of the monitoring of their behaviour and experiences, at least 41 Fairbridge children had been repatriated.⁷⁰⁵ The 1959 report records that two boys, aged 19 and 20 had been deported and another 20-year old recommended for 'repatriation'.⁷⁰⁶ In 1953 the Principal at Pinjarra reviewed aftercare provision, and his successor in 1959 submitted an analysis of aftercare reports on former residents in order to guide future aftercare policy.⁷⁰⁷ However, as we will shortly record, no aftercare reports were being routinely received

⁷⁰² Sherington and Jeffrey, *Fairbridge*, pp.142-144, and map p.141; House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Volume II, Evidence, p.200.

⁷⁰³ Stirling Council, Progress report on [REDACTED] STC.001.001.1048; Progress report on [REDACTED] STC.001.001.1106; Progress report on [REDACTED] STC.001.001.1110-1117; Progress report on [REDACTED], STC.001.001.1121.

⁷⁰⁴ Prince's Trust, Kingsley Fairbridge Farm School Half Yearly Aftercare Reports, Feb 1959, PRT.001.001.3676-3686.

⁷⁰⁵ Sherington and Jeffrey, *Fairbridge*, p.147.

⁷⁰⁶ Prince's Trust, Kingsley Fairbridge Farm School Half Yearly Aftercare Reports, Feb 1959, PRT.001.001.3679-3681.

⁷⁰⁷ Prince's Trust, A.E.Ball, 'After-care and Welfare Work of the Society', PRT.001.001.3502-3507; and H.R.H.Allan, Principal of Pinjarra (1958), 'Report on Aftercare', presented to the Fairbridge Society Board of Governors, PRT.001.001.3673-3675.

from the Northcote farm at Bacchus Marsh during the war years, and nor have we picked up evidence that such were sent post-war.

17.8 What also seems doubtful is whether regular official Australian or UK High Commission inspections of these three farm schools were conducted. It might be a reasonable expectation that they would occur, even taking distances into account, since it was not just public money that was subsidising operations but the wellbeing of children was the ostensible purpose of these schemes. We know, for example, that childcare at Pinjarra from the beginning was expected to conform to Western Australia's child welfare legislation, initially an Act of 1907, and the same would be true of later State and Commonwealth legislation for all these institutions.⁷⁰⁸ The UK government also had more than a political and financial interest. But we have not located records of regular inspections.

17.9 The absence of routine inspections by officials representing Australian governments, central or state, or by the UK High Commission, was exposed when in May 1943 the UK High Commission was informed that the Northcote Trust had learnt of alleged malpractice at Bacchus Marsh.⁷⁰⁹ This prompted a visit by Walter Garnett, secretary to the High Commissioner in Canberra.⁷¹⁰ We have more to say about this inquiry and his report later (see para 25.2 below), but we can here record that Garnett was astonished to discover that under the State of Victoria's current legislation the Child Welfare Department had no legal control over children's institutions, so no inspections had been carried out. Powers were only secured with the passing of the 1946 Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act. Prompted by what he had discovered, Garnett also set off later to inspect Pinjarra and Molong, as well as the farm school run by Barnardo's at Picton in New South Wales, the Christian Brothers training school at Tardun in Western Australia, and the home operated by the Sisters of Nazareth at Geraldton. In June the Dominions Office had been alerted

⁷⁰⁸ Sherington and Jeffrey, *Fairbridge*, p.211.

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid*, *Fairbridge*, pp.206-207; TNA, DO35/1138/13 (formerly M1019/1), 'Northcote Farm School, Victoria: Resignation of Col Heath'.

⁷¹⁰ Sherington and Jeffrey, *Fairbridge*, pp.209-211; TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M1007/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School – W.Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra'. See also Prince's Trust, 'Report on Farm Schools in Australia by Mr W.Garnett, Official Secretary to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Australia, 6th October 1944, PRT.001.001.3563. For a commentary on its content by Green see Summary of Conclusions, 31st August 1945, PRT.001.001.3551. See also Report to the Executive Committee, 6th August 1945, PRT.001.001.3552-3559; and copy of letter from Sir Charles Hambro to Mr Joyner, PRT.001.001.3560-3562.

by the High Commission to some of his findings, but his review was not completed until October 1944.

17.10 Meanwhile, Gordon Green, Fairbridge's General Secretary, based in London, had in 1943 begun to compile a dossier of complaints from past and current members of staff at Pinjarra, which he forwarded to the Dominions Office in April 1944.⁷¹¹ Among the matters which deeply troubled officials ('a most disturbing state of affairs', 'a deplorable story'), Green had discovered serious failings at Pinjarra with the aftercare of those sent out into employment. All this raised issues concerning the control which Fairbridge in London could or should try to exercise over those responsible for the management of its farm schools in Australia. It prompted the Fairbridge Executive Committee to propose to the Dominions Office that an official inquiry might be held.

17.11 Meanwhile, the Australian government was planning its post-war immigration strategy, including a strategy to boost substantially the number of child migrant recruits. In this context, in May 1944, the Chief Migration Officer of the Department of the Interior, R.H.Wheeler, also compiled a report on the Northcote farm at Bacchus Marsh and other institutions. He reviewed past difficulties while still identifying positive prospects for the reception of child migrants.⁷¹² But Caroline Kelly, a member of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Sydney, was also commissioned in January 1944 by the Australian Department of Immigration and the Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction to inspect and report on several non-governmental agencies involved in child migration prior to an anticipated resumption of the practice post-war.⁷¹³ She was generally critical of Fairbridge methods, particularly at Pinjarra.

⁷¹¹ TNA, DO35/1330 (formerly M1007/1/3), 'Fairbridge Farm School', for Green's dossier, LEG.001.003.4907-4964.

⁷¹² TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M1107/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School W.Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', Confidential report on visit to Northcote Children's Farm School, 8/9th May, 1944, LEG.001.004.3973-3978; Note of discussion with Wheeler, 6th July 1944, LEG.001.004.3826.

⁷¹³ NAA, A436, 1945/5/54, 'Child Migration Organisations in Australia: Survey by Mrs C.Kelly', pp.44-51, NAA-000000028, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=950258>, and NAA, 1952/13/2684, p.5: <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=75303>

17.12 However, following his tour of inspection, Walter Garnett, though critical of many features of farm schools in his October 1944 report, generally endorsed their value. He recommended, however, that farm schools run by Fairbridge, Northcote and Barnardo's should widen their curriculum to allow child migrants to take up employment other than on farms or in domestic service, and he noted the building skills that pupils were supposed to be acquiring at institutions run by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia.⁷¹⁴ The chairman of Barnardo's executive committee described the report as 'extraordinarily interesting and contains much food for thought'.⁷¹⁵

17.13 All these are striking examples of exceptional and not routine inspections. We have more to say in later chapters about what these non-routine visits revealed with respect specifically to abuse at Pinjarra, Molong and Bacchus Marsh. What we can add are references to other exceptional and not routine reports, these post-war. Prompted by news in August 1948 that Fairbridge was ready to send a large party of child migrants, inspections at Pinjarra were rapidly carried out by representatives of the Government of Western Australia's Department of Lands and Surveys and the Under-Secretary for Lands and Immigration.⁷¹⁶ It might be said that neither officer could be regarded as satisfying Andrew Doyle's insistence on 'disinterested' inspectors. The renewal of the UK government's financial agreement depended on a satisfactory report. A rapid inspection only of the built facilities was carried out to see if they, at least, were fit for purpose, and with some minor caveats they were approved. There was no comment on the quality of the staff or of the local committee, beyond a listing of the latter's educational qualifications, none of which related to childcare. Nor was there an assessment of the children then in residence. Another official report after a further inspection in 1950 did refer to the poor health of some of the children, and also to still on-going building works, and yet it stated that the children were well-cared for and 'happy in their new home'. Home Office officials minuted their concerns, particularly about staffing, and those anxieties remained. Trust was placed in the Fairbridge Society to raise standards, and agreements were renewed.

⁷¹⁴ TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M1007/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School – W.Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', pp.219-241 in file, and for Green's running commentary on it, pp.248-288.

⁷¹⁵ Barnardo's, Report on Farm Schools in Australia, (March 1945), MacAndrew to Delevingne, 12 March 1945, BAR.001.006.0003, followed by a copy of Garnett's report, BAR.001.006.0004-0026.

⁷¹⁶ For what follows see TNA, MH102/1406, 'Fairbridge Farm Schools: Emigration of 100 Children to Pinjarra Western Australia', pp.6-21, 121-127.

17.14 As reviewed earlier (see paras 7.21-7.23), in 1951-52 John Moss voluntarily inspected childcare institutions in Australia to which child migrants were being sent. Before his visit, a questionnaire on matters such as accommodation, staffing, discipline, education, training for farm work and medical care was sent by the Department of Immigration in Western Australia to Pinjarra on behalf of Moss. This obliged the then acting Principal to report, which he did. On the whole Moss was satisfied by what he read and what he saw, though he had concerns, particularly about the staff, the discomfort of some of the children, and their limited outside contacts with families outside the farm school. He also had some critical observations about Molong, but was complimentary about Bacchus Marsh.⁷¹⁷ More acerbic were the 1956 confidential reports of the Ross Committee (see para 7.31). But these criticisms do not imply that the Fairbridge Society itself, post-war, was not concerned to maintain or enhance standards. As recorded earlier (see para 13.53), following the publication of the Curtis report and even before the passage of the 1948 Children Act and the prospect of state regulations being introduced, the London office of the Fairbridge Society was seeking Home Office advice on the enhanced standards of care and of monitoring to which they were willing to adhere – and intended to enforce in its farm schools in Australia. Indeed, in May 1947 Fairbridge in London and Fairbridge in Western Australia signed an agreement setting out not just Fairbridge’s child migration and child care objectives but also the agreed practices whereby the desired results were to be secured.⁷¹⁸ The problem, as always and not only with respect to Fairbridge, was to ensure that what London offices expected and required was implemented overseas.⁷¹⁹

Australia: Salvation Army Riverview Farm Training School, Queensland

17.15 We need to acknowledge that our evidence concerning boys sent from Scotland to Riverview is limited, and as recorded earlier we know only of two

⁷¹⁷ NAA, A445/133/3/7, Healey to Under-Secretary of Immigration, 29 May 1951; TNA, MH102/2041, ‘Emigration of Children to Australia, reports by Mr John Moss’, pp.7-13, 37, 38; see also letter from Henry, Chair of Fairbridge NSW Board, to Hambro, Chair, Fairbridge Society London, 28 June 1951, p.6, on Henry’s meeting with Moss and on what Moss said would be a ‘favourable’ report on Pinjarra.

⁷¹⁸ Prince’s Trust, Fairbridge Farm Schools (Incorporated) Offices in London, Agreement, with the Board of Governors of the Kingsley Fairbridge Farm School of Western Australia, 12 May 1947, PRT.001.001.6512. The agreement was renewed in 1948.

⁷¹⁹ For further analysis of Fairbridge monitoring practices see Appendix 3, Section 4.

brothers from Scotland being considered.⁷²⁰ But it is probable that some went and hence we have suggested 20 as a possible maximum. Pre-war the Army in Australia had acquired a good reputation, though it should be remembered that in the 1930s no child migrants were sent by the Salvation Army in the UK to its partners in Australia. However, in May 1937 the Army in the UK was evidently keen to alert government in Australia to its good works by sending a brochure to the Minister of the Interior.⁷²¹ This prompted R.H.Wheeler, a senior adviser, to comment that 'the Commonwealth was singularly fortunate in the selection of Salvation Army officers who controlled migration activities at this end', and he added that the 'forte of the Army was the attention paid to after-care'.⁷²² Indeed, Gordon Green in his 1945 running commentary on Garnett's 1944 report on farm schools in Australia included the following observation on 'delinquent' children at Pinjarra who had been transferred to the Salvation Army home at Gosnells, that this had 'proved to be a kindly place and the children have found there, in those who are in charge, friends they lacked elsewhere'.⁷²³ Gosnells, in Western Australia, was not a farm training school like Riverview in Queensland, but it does suggest a childcare culture at one Salvation Army institution which might or ought to have been replicated in others.

17.16 The responsibility for ensuring that any post-war child migration by the Salvation Army was properly conducted was even acknowledged by Arthur Calwell, the Australian Immigration Minister.⁷²⁴ Brigadier Winton of the Army's Sydney Office had written to him in August 1948 to say that he had inspected the Army's home at Riverview (by then rundown) and felt that it could be modernised to take boys aged 14 to 18 as farm trainees. Since 1947 the school-leaving age had been 15, so by our age criterion some would qualify as child migrants. Calwell's very striking response in September 1948 was that 'You will appreciate that any scheme of child migration by voluntary organisations must be controlled closely because of the possibility of the

⁷²⁰ Salvation Army, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Services, Boys for Riverview Farm, Queensland, SAL.001.002.0463.

⁷²¹ NAA, Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – The Salvation Army, <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx>, and ref to A1, 1937/10056.

⁷²² *Ibid.*

⁷²³ TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M1007/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School W.Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', p.253.

⁷²⁴ NAA, Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – The Salvation Army, <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx>, <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx>, and ref to A445, 133/2/49.

exploitation of the children'.⁷²⁵ The official Australian response in October 1948 was also quite clear, that

when a voluntary organisation (such as the Salvation Army) revives its interest in child migration after the lapse of a number of years, it is desirable for a report to be submitted as to the present circumstances and capacity of the organisation (now) to accommodate, train and care for its proposed nominees.⁷²⁶

17.17 By then the Salvation Army had sought consent to bring in '36 male farm learners aged up to 15 years' for training at Riverview Farm.⁷²⁷ From 1947 boys up to that age would be child migrants. In response, the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) consulted the Home Office and also Garnett at the UK High Commission.⁷²⁸ An inspection report, conducted by the Australian authorities, was provided, indicating that a new building and renovations were needed, but Garnett was also concerned that some boys currently at Riverview were Australian 'delinquents' or 'intellectually handicapped'. The resolution of this matter, involving the removal of these boys, plus improvements in facilities, held up UK government approval of Riverview as a suitable destination for British child migrants until March 1950. That still left confusion as to the age of the boys to be approved for sending, and in the event it seems juveniles over 15 also came to be approved, and approval still remained conditional upon a satisfactory report being received on the first party of child migrants to be sent there.⁷²⁹

17.18 In fact, the report provided was so perfunctory that the CRO and the Home Office insisted that Australian State officials should provide a more detailed report than the brief one they had been sent. The report then submitted did give more information about the boys' work placements but still only a short paragraph describing the facilities at Riverview.⁷³⁰ However, what followed was a cautiously

⁷²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁸ TNA, MH102/2022, 'Salvation Army: Child Group Nomination, Riverview Farm, Queensland', Carlson, Australia House, to Dixon, CRO, 22 Oct 1948, and Dixon to Garnett, 4 Nov 1948, minutes of 30 Nov 1949 and related correspondence; minutes concerning age, June 1950-Aug 1951.

⁷²⁹ NAA, J25, 1958/3052, Bass to Wheeler, 27 March 1950, p.179; and Majoribanks to Secretary, Commonwealth Department of Immigration, p.145, State Migration Officer to Heyes, 10th July 1951, p.141; MH102/2022, Dixon, CRO, to Macgregor HO, 24 Feb 1950, HO to Dixon, CRO, 8 March 1950.

⁷³⁰ NAA, J25, 1958/3052, Heyes to Longland, 15th October 1951, p.136; Smith to Heyes, 7th November 1951, p.133; MH102/2022, Dixon to Savidge, 18 Aug 1951, Savidge to Dixon, 19 Sept 1951, Dixon to Savidge 4 Dec 1951 and enclosures.

positive report on Riverview from John Moss (one of several reports made by him in his unofficial inspections of Australian institutions), and a report by Mr Crook from the UK High Commission which referred to and agreed with Moss. On this basis, the UK Government confirmed in 1952 that they required no further information, and further parties of child and youth migrants could be sent to Riverview.⁷³¹ Very brief reports on the behaviour, health, and adaptation to working conditions and subsequent placements of some of the boys were subsequently sent to the Army's headquarters in London, but fewer than one might have expected, and largely with correspondence relating to claims to headquarters for their maintenance at Riverview for payment by the CRO (stopped when aged 16).⁷³² Otherwise accessed records in London and in Australia tend to refer to complaints, largely disregarded, on matters somewhat similar to those which the Ross Committee heard during its visit.

17.19 We also know that the 1950 agreement was subsequently and repeatedly renewed by the UK government, the last in 1960 (to run to 1962), allowing funding for more children to be sent to Riverview and for ongoing maintenance payments to be made. From 1957 these agreements followed what had become standard obligations, as described earlier. To recap, it authorised the Army to select and send child migrants overseas, but placed upon it such obligations as providing the Commonwealth Relations Office with the names and particulars of those selected; adhering to agreed care, maintenance and aftercare practices; and employing staff in sufficient numbers and with experience of child care methods. Available documentation in the UK does not indicate whether these obligations were honoured or reveal that they were not.⁷³³

⁷³¹ For Moss's rather equivocal report, especially 29 June 1951, and its review by the Home Office see TNA, MH102/2022, minutes pp.12-17, and related documents, plus UKHC to CRO, 29 Oct 1951, CRO to HO, 4 Dec 1951 and HO to CRO, 7 Jan 1952. For Crook's report see TNA, MH102/2044, 'Visit by Mr K.R.Crook to Eight Homes in Australia', Crook, UKHC, to Dixon, CRO, 7 Aug 1952, p.14 in file; NAA, J25, 1958/3052, Davey to Secretary, Department of Immigration, 5 February 1952, p.130.

⁷³² Salvation Army, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Services, Reports on Migrant Boys, Riverview, 16th March 1960, SAL.001.002.0552; Migrant Report, 20th January 1958, SAL.001.002.0571-0572; letter, 20th May 1958, SAL.001.002.0576; letter, 15th February 1954, SAL.001.0020593; letter, 28th March 1955, SAL.001.002.0605-0606; Report to the Men's Social Secretary from S/Captain A.Chambers, manager, 27th September 1954, SAL.001.002.0615-0617; letter 16th December 1952, SAL.001.002.0647-0648. For more information with references on the monitoring of conditions at Riverview see Appendix 3, Section 9.

⁷³³ See summary in IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, pp.116, 118.

17.20 However, the investigation by the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse concluded that there was no systematic monitoring of children's welfare within Salvation Army homes in Australia, even though the Army's own guidelines required that staff external to the children's homes should conduct such regular inspections.⁷³⁴ Those resident as children at Salvation Army institutions did not remember such inspection visits, or they recalled being forbidden to speak to external staff from the Salvation Army during such inspections. Moreover, the Salvation Army in Australia was unable to provide the Royal Commission with any documentary evidence of inspections. Nor were detailed case files kept on individual boys in the homes, and there was no requirement for managers to provide any written report to the divisional or social services secretary within the Salvation Army beyond statistical and financial information about the homes. As a consequence, it appears that during the period in which child migrants would have been resident at Riverview neither the Salvation Army in Australia nor that in the UK had an effective system of monitoring in place. Whether acceptable standards were nevertheless sustained and abuse prevented we cannot assume, as will be explored later.

17.21 In 1956 the Ross committee report stated that other Salvation Army institutions had also been approved to receive British children, but we are not aware of when or how this occurred. In any event, for our purposes, this seems not to be a matter needing to be further pursued. A summary on the National Archives of Australia website states that 'fewer than one hundred boys' were sent to Riverview, and since we know from UK National Archives records that between 1950 and 1960 altogether 91 Salvation Army child migrants were subsidised and sent to Australia, a few at a time, we may deduce that all had been relocated to Riverview.⁷³⁵

Australia: Barnardo's Homes in New South Wales – Picton, Burwood, Normanhurst

⁷³⁴ Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, *Case Study 5, The Salvation Army*, report pp.68-70, <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/file-list/Case%20Study%205%20-%20Findings%20Report%20-%20The%20Salvation%20Army%20boys%20homes%2C%20Australia%20Eastern%20Territory.pdf>

⁷³⁵ For this account and also for other Salvation Army Homes see TNA, MH102/2023, 'Recognition of the Salvation Army in New South Wales as an Approved Organisation for Child Migration from the UK'.

17.22 Remarkably, correspondence in a Home Office file dating to November 1952 indicates that child migrants had been placed at Normanhurst by Dr Barnardo's Homes without that residential institution having been approved by the UK government.⁷³⁶ In letters between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Home Office, the CRO notes that child migrants appear to have been placed at Normanhurst towards the end of 1951. Although the Australian authorities were apparently happy with standards, the UK High Commission had not been notified about this, nor the usual approval from the UK government sought. The Home Office replied that this might possibly have occurred because Dr Barnardo's Homes had assumed that the approval of their child migration work by the UK government, as at the Mowbray Farm School at Picton, could be automatically extended to any new institution in which they placed child migrants in Australia. And yet in March 1960 the CRO judged it necessary to remind Barnardo's that their new home at Belmont had to be inspected and judged satisfactory by the Australian authorities if it were to be approved by the CRO.⁷³⁷ The lesson seems to have been learnt in that Berwick House, Canberra, an architect-designed home opened in 1968, and its staff, were assessed and approved by an Australian social worker in July 1969. Following the report received, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (as it had by then become) and the Home Office judged it suitable to receive British child migrants, though by that date Barnardo's had ceased to send child migrants to Australia.⁷³⁸

17.23 As noted earlier, the number of child migrants Barnardo's sent from Scotland to Australia was modest, just 19 out of the 457 Barnardo's had dispatched post-war from the UK by 1967. We have already referred (see paras 16.19-16.21 above) to the placement, inspection and aftercare practices of Barnardo's in Canada, and the 1889 episode of the manager of a Barnardo's receiving home in Canada being jailed for the sexual abuse of girls. It would seem to follow that, at least in the case of girls, Barnardo's would be alert to the need for close supervision and aftercare when attention shifted to child migration to Australia. Indeed, we learn that girls between

⁷³⁶ TNA, MH102/1895, 'Dr Barnardo's Home, Greenwood, Normanhurst. Recognition as an Approved Institution', Dixon, CRO, to Oates, HO, 3 Nov 1952; Oates, HO, to Dixon CRO, 14 Nov 1952, pp.18-20; and see also DO35/10259, 'Nominations etc. for Dr Barnardo's Homes Australia' for the exchange of correspondence and pp.46-48 for the belated report on Normanhurst, 4 Feb 1953, provided by the New South Wales Child Welfare Department, via but not by the High Commission.

⁷³⁷ Barnardo's, letter from N.Robinson, Commonwealth Relations Office, to T.Tucker, Assistant General Superintendent, 3 March 1960, BAR.001.006.3883.

⁷³⁸ TNA, BN29/1331, 'Dr Barnardo's Child Emigration Scheme. Report on a New Home, Berwick House in Canberra, 1969'.

the ages of 13 and 17 were not to be considered by Barnardo's for migration to Australia after the Second World War, probably because they were judged to be at risk.⁷³⁹

17.24 Correspondence between the Home Office and Barnardo's in London indicates that receiving homes in Australia had first to be approved by the State's immigration authorities and then through them by the Commonwealth of Australia's Department of Immigration before they could request (in this case) Barnardo's children in the UK to be sent to them.⁷⁴⁰ We are also assured that the Commonwealth of Australia's Department of Immigration carried out inspections, though we have not seen copies of reports to indicate whether these were routine or exceptional.⁷⁴¹ What we have seen in the Australian archives is a report by R.H.Wheeler, Chief Migration Officer, on Barnardo's Mowbray Park Farm School at Pictou.⁷⁴² This seems to have been exceptional, following from a visit he made in May 1944 in the company of Garnett from the UK High Commission, triggered by concerns about wartime conditions. He describes the farm school as well-managed and profitable. In particular he comments on the accommodation, the staff and especially the Principal, the school provided on the site, the recreational facilities, the training the boys received, the good impression they made on him (although they were not as tidy as he had expected on a Sunday), and on aftercare provision. 'There was', he wrote, 'definitely no institutional atmosphere about Mowbray Park.'

17.25 The UK High Commission did not carry out routine inspections. However, in February 1947, Barnardo's informed the Dominions Office that they were preparing a party to send to Mowbray Park and Burwood, and wished to know if the UK government would provide the 'usual' financial assistance as it had pre-war.⁷⁴³ This prompted the Commonwealth Relations Office (as it had just become) to inquire of the High Commission if arrangements for the care of children were 'satisfactory'. The reply was that there had been no recent inspection, but that 'previous experience',

⁷³⁹ Barnardo's, Section 21 response –Part C, BAR.001.001.0508.

⁷⁴⁰ TNA, MH102/1892, 'Migration of Children to Australia – Procedure. Memo and Correspondence with Dr Barnardo's, pp.1-2, 14-15, 17-18. What we have not seen are reports on how these approvals were made.

⁷⁴¹ Barnardo's, Section 21 response, BAR.001.005.3335.

⁷⁴² NAA, A445, 133/2/115, pp.85-87, report by Wheeler.

⁷⁴³ TNA, DO35/3379, 'Dr Barnardo's Homes, Mowbray Park Farm School', Kirkpatrick to Head, 20 June 1947, LEG.001.004.5400; CRO to UKHC, 18 July 1947, LEG.001.004.5398; UKHC to CRO, 15 Aug 1947, LEG.001.004.5396.

presumably pre-war, some eight years earlier, justified resumed funding. There is no record in the file of a new inspection being conducted. However, prior to a renewal of the funding agreements with Barnardo's in 1957, New South Wales state officials, probably on request, carried out inspections, and copies of reports, with brief comments largely on accommodation and facilities but with some reference to education, fostering, assimilation, and aftercare, were received by the UK High Commission and forwarded to London.⁷⁴⁴ We know that exceptional inspections also took place, as for example the inspections of farm schools carried out by Garnett from the High Commission in the company of Wheeler in May 1944, by Crook also from the High Commission in 1951, by Moss in 1951, and by the Ross committee in 1955.⁷⁴⁵ All had positive comments to make. Garnett regarded Picton as the best of the farm schools, noted the frequency of Barnardo's aftercare visits and respected the experience that Barnardo's had built up in the care of children. Crook was impressed by the matron, who had gained the confidence of the girls and whose very good relationship with the New South Wales Child Welfare Department had been advantageous in dealing with 'one or two cases of girls who have tended to stray from the paths of rectitude'. Moss regarded Picton as 'well run' with 'excellent' educational arrangements, and Burwood was an 'excellent home'. Ross was unusually complimentary of Burwood and Normanhurst with regard to care and conditions in the homes and placements and subsequent aftercare.

17.26 With respect to care and aftercare reports, one would imagine that methods practised in Canada pre-war, as in the case of [REDACTED] described above (para 13.43) would have operated in Australia, and that seems to have been the case, and indeed with increasing rigour.⁷⁴⁶ A report from Barnardo's to SCAI states that from 1921 its Australian branch employed a team of trained inspectors to visit children placed out, and it is reasonable to assume that such persons would also inspect the institutional homes to which Barnardo's children were later sent.⁷⁴⁷ Reports on

⁷⁴⁴ TNA, DO35/10261, 'Dr Barnardo's Homes, Renewal of Agreement, 1957 and 1960', LEG.001.002.5670-5676.

⁷⁴⁵ TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M.1107/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School W.Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', LEG.001.002.0191-0192, 0222-0223, 0234-0235; TNA, MH102/2044, 'Visit by Mr K.R.Crook to eight Homes in Australia in which Migrant Children are accommodated', Crook to Dixon, 30 Nov 1951, report on Burwood, LEG.001.003.1229-1231; TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', LEG.001.002.3476-3857; TNA, MH102/2044, 'Visit by Mr K.R.Crook to eight Homes in Australia in which Migrant Children are accommodated', Crook to Dixon, 30 Nov 1951, report on Burwood, p.2.

⁷⁴⁶ See Appendix 3, Section 3.

⁷⁴⁷ Barnardo's, Section 21 response, BAR.001.005.3335.

children soon after arrival and subsequently at least on an annual basis were required. Moreover, a Home Office file records that the General Superintendent of Dr Barnardo's Homes, Mr Kirkpatrick, had told Home Office officials in a meeting on 14 June 1948 that aftercare officers were attached to the charity's Sydney office, that there was a minimum number of visits that they were required to make for each child in training or in work each year, and that copies of aftercare reports from each visit were sent back to the charity's headquarters in London.⁷⁴⁸ However, in 1953 he acknowledged logistical difficulties when 'distance or stress of work' made it difficult for Barnardo's aftercare officers to make a visit. In such cases, he writes, rather than employ more staff, Barnardo's found the state's Child Welfare Department willing to send one of its officers to inspect.⁷⁴⁹ (We have not seen copies of consequent official reports.) A 1949 document on Burwood also refers to aftercare as playing a very important part in the work of Barnardo's.⁷⁵⁰ In the same file is a 1957 copy of the terms and conditions of employment of Barnardo's children of school-leaving age and of the application form which potential employers were obliged to sign, requiring also the contact details of three referees. Wages, clothing, accommodation, savings banks, medical problems, church attendance, holiday periods, reports on conduct, and termination of employment of those proving unsuitable are items covered, as well as an alert that aftercare officers will visit to interview those placed. According to another 1957 report, accommodation and employment are found for every boy leaving Picton, Child Welfare Department officers examine each placement, and aftercare officers keep in touch with each child, frequency of inspections varying from six to every twelve months. Moreover, reports were also sent back to the UK.⁷⁵¹ We have seen a sample of monthly reports on children, 1957-60, sent back to Barnardo's by Superintendents at Mowbray Park, Picton, and at Greenwood, Normanhurst, though they are more about staff, facilities, activities and visitors and

⁷⁴⁸ TNA, MH102/1893, 'Emigration to Australia of Children in Dr Barnardo's Homes: Report of Investigation by Mr Kirkpatrick (Gen Supt)', LEG.001.003.0706.

⁷⁴⁹ Barnardo's, 'Notes on Migration to New South Wales for the consideration of the Committee of Management, Report by Kirkpatrick, 24 April 1953, BAR.001.006.0074-0077; Occupational Prospects for boys in New South Wales, Report by W.B.H.Ladd, 11th February 1946, BAR.001.006.0078-0080. In this report he also refers to the dilapidated condition of the Picton farm – a 'real concern' – and job prospects, on which he attaches a Feb 1948 report.

⁷⁵⁰ TNA, MH102/1894, 'Emigration of Children under Dr Barnardo's Homes Scheme', pp.6, 19-21, 34-36, 41.

⁷⁵¹As examples see Dr Barnardo's Farm School Progress Report, 1952, BAR.001.005.3631, and Boys Aftercare Reports, March 1962, BAR.001.005.3634-3638.

less than one might expect about the well-being and progress of children.⁷⁵² Other monthly reports with which we have been provided for the years 1957-62 are more detailed on numbers of children visited by aftercare officers (and indeed by State child welfare officers) and more indicative of close attention given to those placed in employment, and concern especially about those youngsters having problems.⁷⁵³ By the 1950s and 1960s, again in effect as an aftercare procedure, Barnardo's was endeavouring to maintain family links, providing information on how to maintain contacts, including with members of staff.⁷⁵⁴ We are also informed that 49 child migrants had been repatriated from Australia to the UK from some date but 'by 1949', for reasons variously described as 'immoral... unsettled... unsuitable... health...mental health... restoration with family'.⁷⁵⁵

17.27 In the case of ██████████, upon whose selection for migration and obtaining of consent and dispatch to Burwood we reported earlier (see para 13.45 above), we can add that her London file contains eight school reports sent from Australia twice a year, from December 1947 to June 1951. These are often brief, with marks and position in class recorded, but with a comment by the Superintendent indicating some knowledge of her character and temperament. Also filed are aftercare reports, nine of them from July 1951 to March 1954, which are informative and indicative of a close relationship between ██████████ and the visiting officer. Eighteen years after she had last been in contact with the Barnardo's office in London she told them that she was married to ██████████ and was living in Sydney, but they intended to move ██████████ to be near his family.⁷⁵⁶

17.28 Rather more extensive are the reports on the ██████████ children, on whose selection for migration see para 13.44 above.⁷⁵⁷ These cover their schooling, placements in Australia, employment histories, health records and aftercare reports, submitted roughly every six months. ██████████ training and subsequent

⁷⁵² Examples of Barnardo's monthly reports from Picton Farm School and Normanhurst, BAR.001.005.3960-3967.

⁷⁵³ Barnardo's Girls Aftercare Reports, Jan 1957-Jan 1962, include 28 aftercare reports on two sisters; BAR.001.006.0364-0391. Boy's After Care Reports 1957-1960 include 19 aftercare reports on six boys BAR.001.006.0399-0422.

⁷⁵⁴ Barnardo's Section 21 response, BAR.001.005.3347-8334. See also a 1957 letter from Dr Barnardo's Homes to a boy about contact with parents, BAR.001.005.3942.

⁷⁵⁵ Barnardo's, Section 21 response, BAR.001.005.3345.

⁷⁵⁶ Barnardo's, Children's files, ██████████ BAR.001.005.2182-2199.

⁷⁵⁷ Barnardo's, Children's files, ██████████ BAR.001.005.0016-0024, 0029, 0034, 0036-0037, 0049, 0055, 0058-0060.

employment as a hospital nurse, of her boyfriend and consequent conversion to Roman Catholicism, and of her regular correspondence with her father are all reported. Brother ██████ had acquired a Diploma in Dairy Technology. Of ██████, seemingly the least naturally gifted of the three, there are reports on her hearing difficulties, of problems securing and keeping employment, of her enrolment at a technical college, of her temporary job as a home help in a good family, of her training as a 'ticket clerk', of further employment in a city store, of her retained contacts with family, and of her wish for a boyfriend. We also learn of the on-going relationship between the three, and with the father, and that by 1976 all three, including ██████, were married and had families. There is also supportive correspondence between Barnardo's and the father, who asks after them and to whom photos of his children are sent.

17.29 Following the migration in 1965 of the ██████ siblings to Sydney (see para 13.46 above), their Barnardo's files in London include correspondence to and from the German grandmother, and even with the elder brother wanting to restore a connection, but the most intimate exchanges are with the foster parents.⁷⁵⁸ Because the children were above school-leaving age, there are no school reports after arrival. However, there are substantial aftercare reports on one or other but usually on both, eleven of them from August 1965 to October 1971. These are not just glowing testimonies. They include an account of a serious misdemeanour by ██████ and sympathetic support for her foster parents. But in that for November 1967 we read: 'They belong where they are, and live a normal balanced family life.... Occasionally there are normal family rows, but these only serve to bind them together'.⁷⁵⁹ The files also contain much correspondence generated at a critical time by the acrimonious divorce proceedings of the estranged natural parents and the worry that the mother might seek to reclaim the children she had deserted. This did not take place, but it may have prevented the foster parents from adopting the children.

17.30 Such reports by Barnardo's on children in care suggest a more detailed empathetic interest in children's emotional state as well as their career progress, and

⁷⁵⁸ For what follows see Barnardo's, Children's files, ██████, BAR.001.005.1364-1493; and on ██████ children's files with much duplication, BAR.001.005.1494-1865, but see the latter particularly on the parental divorce proceedings and implications for adoption and children's welfare, BAR.001.005.1689-1741.

⁷⁵⁹ Barnardo's, Children's files, ██████ BAR.001.005.1376.

this perhaps created conditions in which any incidents of abuse experienced by a child migrant could have been disclosed to staff. However, such aftercare monitoring does not appear to have detected any of the cases of sexual abuse of boys in work placements after leaving Picton, as was subsequently discovered in an account of events at Picton later provided by Dr Barnardo's Homes to the Australian authorities. We have more to say about abuse cases later, but here we note that Price, the General Manager at Picton from 1955 to 1976, only learnt about the alleged sexual offences from a friend outside the institution of and not from those involved or from a member of staff.⁷⁶⁰ It certainly does not seem to have been picked up by any formal institutional monitoring system.

17.31 It is possible that wider organisational tensions between the UK and Australia may have had an effect on the parent organisation's capacity to monitor the work of its New South Wales branch. Documents provided by Barnardo's include a letter sent from the General Superintendent's Office in London to Sir Norman Strathie, chair of Dr Barnardo's Homes Management Committee, dated 3 February 1958.⁷⁶¹ It discusses the terms of the new maintenance and outfitting agreement signed in 1957 between the Commonwealth Relations Office and Dr Barnardo's Homes. It notes possible implications of non-compliance with these, ranging from the suspension of funding under the agreement to the possible withdrawal by the Home Secretary of permission for the migration of children. The letter continues by discussing the need for the charity's UK organisation to have the ability to monitor the activities of the New South Wales branch. Concern is expressed that the UK organisation has no power to compel the New South Wales branch to co-operate with this. Indeed, it appears that the New South Wales organisation was resistant to giving such powers to the UK organisation, and that, as the writer puts it, 'they did not want the Officers of the Council to have the right (emphasis in the original) to look at their work, and I must say that is just stupid'. As noted earlier (see para 17.4 above), the Fairbridge Society had similar difficulties monitoring and controlling the work of its farm schools in Australia.

⁷⁶⁰ Barnardo's, SCAI copy of IICSA Witness Statement by Sara Clarke, 10 Feb 2017, BAR.001.005.3386, para 8.7.

⁷⁶¹ Barnardo's, Australian Correspondence between Barnardo's UK, Barnardo's Australia, and the Commonwealth Relations Office UK, 1954-1972, letter from General Superintendent's Office in London to Sir Norman Strathie, chair of Dr Barnardo's Homes Management Committee, 3 Feb 1958, BAR.001.006.0312-0313.

17.32 We also learn from these records that reports composed in Australia and sent to the UK were not routinely passed on for review by senior staff at headquarters in London. In a memorandum from the charity's Deputy General Superintendent to the UK Management Committee, dated 30 August 1963, it is noted that:

Throughout Barnardo's the principle of continuity and concern for the individual child operates everywhere except in migration work, so that although Superintendents or an Executive Officer will know a great deal about a child's progress and development in our Homes in this country, information about them ceases when they go to Australia, as the lengthy reports we receive are merely filed in the Migration Department, except in a few instances where action at this end is called for. The extraction and communication of some information about migrated children to those who were concerned with them here would help to create greater confidence in our Migration Policy, but it is too much for the Migration Department to undertake at present.⁷⁶²

Clearly, this suggests that senior staff in Barnardo's would have a less detailed awareness of the welfare of individual child migrants they sent to Australia than of children who remained in their care in the UK. The lack of such an overview may also have made it harder to detect any wider systemic problems with staffing or standards of care for child migrants overseas.

Australia: Quarriers, YMCA, and Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Homes, New South Wales

17.33 Because of increasing restrictions on child migration to Canada, Quarriers in 1934 began to consider Australia as an alternative destination, but it was not until 1939 that a one-off party of 17 (13 boys, four girls) was sent to the Burnside home in New South Wales, Cyril Bavin and the YMCA being the selecting and sending agency.⁷⁶³ Whereas children sent to Canada had been placed on farms and with families, these children were being sent into institutional care. Burnside was in effect a farm training school, like Pinjarra, made up of 14 cottages, a farm, a hospital, a school, and a gymnasium with a swimming pool.

⁷⁶² Barnardo's, Australian Migration Memos, 1961-1969, Report on the Work of the Migration Department, 30 August 1963, BAR.001.006.0712.

⁷⁶³ NAA, Correspondence between the Church of Scotland, Quarriers and Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Homes, Australia, NAA.001.001.0543-0573; Quarriers, *Narrative of Facts*, 1934, QAR.001.001.2785; and *Narrative of Facts*, 1939, QAR.001.001.3030-3033.

17.34 In Quarriers' first report to SCAI there is little reference to children being sent to Australia before the war, but rather more in its second.⁷⁶⁴ We learn that the chair of Quarriers management committee in November 1938 had referred to the 'proposed emigration of a party of children aged 9 to 11 to Sydney, New South Wales, early in 1939, and that the cost would be free except for outfit'. Correspondence sent to parents of Quarriers children and to local authorities explained that the idea of the scheme was that those children selected would be 'trained under protestant conditions' and that everything would be done 'educationally, morally, physically, and spiritual for their welfare'. At the age of 16, if found suitable for farming, they would be sent to 'well recommended homes within a radius of 100 miles of their Training School', that they would 'earn the standard rate of wages in the district', and that they would be 'visited regularly by After-Care Officers and also by Government Inspectors'.

17.35 We know that Burnside had been approved by the UK High Commission in 1936 as a place fit to receive child migrants,⁷⁶⁵ but the second report from Quarriers to SCAI frankly records that 'we have been unable to determine what efforts were made to determine the suitability of Burnside as a children's home', and also that 'there is no information or reports within the children's files, once they were migrated, which indicates the nature or extent of any follow up visits or inspections'.⁷⁶⁶ However, Quarriers' *Narrative of Facts* for the year 1939 records that 'Good reports have been received concerning these young folk and their adaptability to their new conditions and their new country', shortly after they had arrived.⁷⁶⁷ Post-war *Narrative of Facts* do not refer specifically to the progress of these children, and we do not know why no further Quarriers children were sent to Burnside, all subsequently sent to Australia being destined for Dhurringile.⁷⁶⁸ Moreover, we have

⁷⁶⁴ Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0007 and 0009.

⁷⁶⁵ NAA, Correspondence between the Church of Scotland, Quarriers and Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Homes, Australia, Superintendent to Rev Webster, 4 Nov 1936, NAA.001.001.0546.

⁷⁶⁶ Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0012. For more on how children came to be sent to Burnside see Appendix 3, Section 7, paras 7.3-7.8, and on lack of evidence about inspections and monitoring para.7.18.

⁷⁶⁷ Quarriers, *Narrative of Facts*, 1939, QAR.001.001.3022, 3030-3033.

⁷⁶⁸ NAA, Correspondence between the Church of Scotland, Quarriers and Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Homes, Australia, NAA.001.001.0546, 0557-0560; Quarriers, *Narrative of Facts*, 1939, QAR.001.001.3022.

seen no evidence of any subsequent inspections of Burnside by the UK High Commission or by Australian authorities.⁷⁶⁹

Australia: Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service, Quarriers and Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, Victoria

17.36 As described earlier (see para 10.25 above), the initiative that led to the selection between 1950 and 1963 of 98 child migrant boys, initially from Scotland but some from elsewhere in the UK, and their dispatch to Dhurringile came from the Presbyterian Church of Victoria. The boys, mostly aged eight to 12 but some a year or two older, were selected by the CSCSS (and later the Royal Over-Seas League) or at least approved by them for dispatch, including 26 from Quarriers.⁷⁷⁰

17.37 It is evident that between February and May 1950 the Rev Boag had been lobbying the Children's Welfare Department and the Board of Social Services in Victoria, the Department of Immigration in Canberra, and through it the UK High Commission to persuade them that Dhurringile was, or more accurately would be made, a suitable place to receive and care for child migrants.⁷⁷¹ Much of what was recorded concerned intentions and expectations. Since April 1950, Boag had been pressing hard for the Church of Scotland to co-operate in this venture, and by early September he seems to have persuaded Scottish Home Department officials that the scheme was sound. He stressed that the 'Welfare Department of the State of Victoria were very careful to ensure that there were proper after-care arrangements', and that these would be arranged through the Presbyterian Church. In September 1950, the Scottish Home Department advised the Home Office in London that 'The reports we

⁷⁶⁹ See Appendix 3, Section 7, para 7.18.

⁷⁷⁰ The Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (CrossReach), Section 21 response – Part C, COS.001.001.0445-0639. Clearer copies of two NRS files in that submission have been supplied by SCAI, ED11/386, 'Homeless Children Emigration Schemes, the Presbyterian Church of Victoria. Dhurringile Rural Training Farm', SGV.001.004.4804-4916; and ED11/509, 'Emigration of Children through the Auspices of the Church of Scotland', SGV.001.003.8009-8114. Concerning ages, documents in ED11/386, SGV.001.004.4812, 4845, 4861, 4873, 4903, 4905, 4909, and in ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8099 and 8102, are inconsistent. They suggest that boys were initially expected to be in the age range 8 to 11 on arrival, or 8 to 12, or even 8 to 14, and only exceptionally if a little older. Free passages were available for those under 14. For the record, TNA, MH102/1889 'Proposed Scheme for Emigration of Children to the Presbyterian Children's Homes....' contains correspondence, 1951-52, plus reports by John Moss *not* recommending approval of two Presbyterian homes in Western Australia, Burnbrae and Benmore, as fit places to receive child migrants. None seem to have been sent to either destination and they are therefore not considered in this report.

⁷⁷¹ For what follows see NRS, ED11/386, copies of correspondence, SGV.001.004.4869-4874.

have from Australia and the additional information from Mr Boag seem to us satisfactory', and it was proposed that the Commonwealth Relations Office might be told that the Scottish Home Department and the Home Office had 'no objection to the scheme being approved'. This seems to have been sufficient. Boag was by then actively recruiting, and in [REDACTED] 1950 the first party, of 28 boys, departed.⁷⁷²

17.38 The evidence suggests that Quarriers relied upon assurances from Reverend Boag and the CSCSS in assessing the suitability of Dhurringile as a destination for their boys,⁷⁷³ and certainly we have seen no evidence to suggest that any representative of Quarriers visited, inspected and approved before children were sent.

17.39 We also learn from the second Quarriers report to SCAI that educational and welfare reports were prepared by the Superintendent of Dhurringile and sent to Quarriers 'periodically', and certainly some have been located in children's files.⁷⁷⁴ We may add that other sources of information were in letters sent back by Quarriers boys. These letters, of course selected for a purpose, were published in *Narrative of Facts*.⁷⁷⁵ Similarly, in the *Annual Report of the Committee on Social Service* for 1952 we read that 'Letters received both from boys and from those in charge of the School make it abundantly clear that not only are the boys happily settled for the present but are being carefully prepared for later years'. The *Annual Report* for 1953 records that Dhurringile was 'very favourably commented upon' by the Very Rev.W.White Anderson who that year as Moderator of the General Assembly had made an official visit.⁷⁷⁶

17.40 However, we have not seen reports of any inspections of Dhurringile by any government agency, Australian or British, after the Quarriers migrants had arrived,

⁷⁷² *Ibid*, SGV.001.004.4847, 4849-4852. The UK government's approval was based on a report produced by State immigration and child welfare official before construction work had been completed, and before staff and a local management committee had been appointed: see also Appendix 2, Section 3, para.3.20.

⁷⁷³ Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0013-0014.

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0014, 0041-0042. For the monitoring of the welfare of boys sent to Dhurringile and reports see also Appendix 3, Section 7, paras 7.1-7.2, 7.18-7.20.

⁷⁷⁵ Quarriers, *Narrative of Facts*, 1961, QAR.001.001.3959; and *Narrative of Facts*, 1963, 001.001.005.

⁷⁷⁶ The Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (CrossReach), Indexed footnotes to Section 21 response of 22nd June 2018, COS.001.001.0488, 0500-0501.

until John Moss's report written during his 1951-52 tour of Australia.⁷⁷⁷ He rated highly the Superintendent and the farm manager, and approved of the educational and employment opportunities provided and of the organising of holidays, but even he feared the place might become 'rather institutional'. Not surprisingly, no action was taken following receipt of this report.

17.41 But what we do have in this same file, written half way through the period during which child migrants were dispatched to Dhurringile, is the Ross Committee's unflattering 1956 confidential report (see para 7.31 above).⁷⁷⁸ Not unexpectedly, this hostile assessment troubled at least one member of staff in the Scottish Home Department which had after all been generally supportive. But he reckoned, perhaps naively, that 'If it is a bad home news would have leaked out long ago', which does not seem a sufficient alternative to regular disinterested inspections. Reliance was also placed on the published annual reports of CSCSS containing good accounts about the boys sent.⁷⁷⁹ Also in this file is a copy of a report written by R.H.Wheeler, Assistant Secretary at the Australian government's Department of Immigration, Canberra, and F.E.Graham, the State of Victoria's Children's Welfare Office, in response to the Ross report. Their account of improvements made in facilities implicitly acknowledges that pre-Ross no Australian recent inspection could have occurred and implies also a preoccupation with material matters and not childcare culture.⁷⁸⁰ In any event, the separate and detailed report by Rouse, from the High Commission, agreed with Ross and 'the general findings of the Mission',⁷⁸¹ though this too implies that the UK representatives in Australia had been caught unawares, indicative of its own inability to provide regular monitoring.⁷⁸²

17.42 Certainly one effect of Ross's Fact-Finding Mission was an attempt to raise standards not by regulation but by requiring all sending societies to sign formal

⁷⁷⁷ NRS, ED11/386, 'Homeless Children Emigration Schemes, the Presbyterian Church of Victoria. Dhurringile Rural Training Farm', Copy of rough notes prepared by Mr John Moss during his visit to Australia in 1951/52, Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, Tatura, SGV.001.004.4845-4846.

⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid*, Child Migration Fact-Finding Mission, Note on Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, Victoria (Presbyterian), visited 29th February 1956, SGV.001.004.4837-4838

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid*, Munro to Walker, 2nd July 1956, SGV.001.004.4834.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid*, Report by R.H.Wheeler, Assistant Secretary, Department of Immigration, Canberra, and F.E.Graham, Officer in Charge, Child Migrant Section, Children's Welfare Department, Victoria, on Dhurringile Training Farm, 26th November 1956, SGV.001.004.4832-4833

⁷⁸¹ TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action Taken on Report and Confidential Notes of the Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', pp.167-170.

⁷⁸² *Ibid*, pp.23-27.

agreements with the UK government which more precisely defined what was expected concerning the selection and preparation of children for migration in the UK, and more particularly about policies overseas concerning education, contacts with the wider community, boarding out practice, placements in employment, and aftercare in Australia. CSCSS signed such agreements with the UK government in 1957 and 1960. As a reminder of the need, this file contains copies of the Ross Confidential report and the subsequent reports of Wheeler, Graham and Rouse.⁷⁸³ What is not documented is the extent to which practice subsequently altered, but a further agreement was signed in 1962.⁷⁸⁴ What we do know is that no children were sent to Dhurringile after 1963, though that is more likely due to recruitment difficulties than to tighter inspection and monitoring regimes in Australia.

17.43 Finally, it is worth noting that Counsel at the 2014 Historical Institutional Abuse inquiry in Northern Ireland described the case of a child sent by a local authority about whom welfare officers had in vain sought reports from staff at Dhurringile.⁷⁸⁵ A letter, dated 7 September 1956, sent by the Children's Officer for the County Tyrone Welfare Committee to the Department of Social Services for the Presbyterian Church in Victoria, complained that no progress report had been provided on this boy since 5 September 1951. Three requests for a report from the County Tyrone Welfare Committee to the Superintendent at Dhurringile had gone unanswered. The Children's Officer threatened to notify the UK High Commissioner if a further report was not forthcoming. The Superintendent at Dhurringile, who had been in office since 1954, had no explanation for the previous lack of response, but promptly returned a report to the County Tyrone Welfare Committee. Whilst this case demonstrates a breakdown in the reporting system, it also documents the effort made by a local authority to monitor the well-being of a child whose migration it had organised. We have not seen such demands being issued by the CSCSS, by Quarriers, or by any local authority in Scotland which might have supplied child migrants destined for Dhurringile.

⁷⁸³ TNA, DO35/10275, 'Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service, Renewal of Agreements 1957 and 1960.' LEG.001.003.2441-2538.

⁷⁸⁴ The Social Care Council of the Church of Scotland (CrossReach), Indexed footnotes to Section 21 response of 22nd June 2018, COS.001.001.0606-1639. For an important detailed examination of reports on Dhurringile see Appendix 2, Section 4, paras 4.13-4.21.

⁷⁸⁵ Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Module 2, Day 44 transcript of Counsel's testimony concerning HIA354, pp.85-88: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>.

Australia: Catholic Church institutions

17.44 We indicated earlier in this report that for sectarian reasons the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland, as elsewhere in the UK, had been keen to send Catholic children in need to Catholic farms and homes in Canada, and beginning in the interwar years and specially from 1947 others were dispatched to Catholic-managed institutions in Australia. Hence the earlier formation of the Catholic Emigration Association in 1904 and the Catholic Emigration Society in 1927, their subsequent merger into the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement (CCBOS) in 1939, and the funding arrangements made post-war by the UK government with the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee. We have also referred to the energetic recruiting operations in the UK of Brother Conlon, Father Nicol and Father Stinson. (See paras 13.17, 13.20, 13.24 above)

17.45 Our concern here is to examine, so far as sources allow, what steps the Catholic sending agencies in Scotland took to ensure that the institutions in Australia to which they were sending children were and remained fit for purpose. Also we need to consider whether and how the destinations to which child migrants were sent were judged suitable by UK and Australian government agencies and whether they were routinely inspected. Furthermore we need to know if reports were sent back to the sending institutions so that they could judge if the well-being and development of the children they had sent were being properly catered for by the staff at those places, and subsequently whether aftercare was properly provided for them until they were aged 18.

17.46 The story is complex. It is here treated briefly, and it is therefore important for readers also to consider the extended and detailed account provided in Appendix 3.⁷⁸⁶ It is abundantly clear that the initiative to resume and increase Catholic child migration post-war came from Australian Catholic agents and agencies, though Catholic officers in the UK, after expressing some concerns, were complicit. So far as we can tell, 86 children were sent to Australia from Catholic institutions in Scotland, namely 15 from the Good Shepherd home in Colinton and 71 from the Sisters of Nazareth homes in Aberdeen (33), Edinburgh (30), Glasgow (4) and Kilmarnock (4).

⁷⁸⁶ Appendix 3, Section 5.

17.47 Here we offer a summary of the report provided by the Good Shepherd Home, Woodfield Children's Home, Colinton, in response to SCAI's Section 21 request. This seems to have been the only Good Shepherd home in Scotland which sent children overseas. We learn that 15 children in its care, all girls, aged six to 13, were sent to Australia, but the report does not record their precise destinations. No records appear to have survived which might have indicated what steps, if any, were taken to check that the institutions to which the girls were going to be sent were suitable to receive them. Nor do there seem to be extant reports by any Australian or UK government agency on the quality of care in the institutions to which such children had been sent. No subsequent reports on the welfare, progress and aftercare of Good Shepherd child migrants seem to have been received or at least preserved in Colinton. In truth, there is little of substance in this report with respect to child migration practice and care.⁷⁸⁷

17.48 The Sisters of Nazareth response to its Section 21 request indicates that the 71 Catholic children sent by them to Australia from Scotland between 1947 and 1954 were a mix of boys and girls, aged six to 14.⁷⁸⁸ Most of the boys were sent to establishments run by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia. Girls were more widely dispersed, mostly into the care of the Sisters of Mercy or Poor Sisters of Mercy in Western Australia, Queensland and Victoria. By way of explanation, the report states that 'The Sisters were invited to participate in the emigration scheme which was initiated by the British and Australian Governments and the Catholic Church. Guidelines provided by the governments were followed'. Knowing as we do how Conlon, Nicol and Stinson set about recruiting child migrants in Scotland, this seems an insufficient response. SCAI had also asked whether the organisation adhered in practice to its policies or procedures with respect to 'Identification and checking the suitability of the places where children were sent'. The response is 'Yes, to the best of our knowledge'.⁷⁸⁹ That assertion does not sit comfortably with a further statement, repeated twice, that 'The majority of children were sent to the Congregation's own

⁷⁸⁷ Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, Section 21 response—Parts C and D on Woodfield Children's Home, Colinton, 1945-1970, GSH.001.001.0411-0412. See also Appendix 3, Section 5, para 5.43 on the lack of records on children sent to Australia by contrast with those who remained in Scotland.

⁷⁸⁸ Sisters of Nazareth, Section 21 response – Part C, NAZ.001.001.0297, records 33 from Aberdeen, 30 from Edinburgh, 4 from Glasgow and 4 from Kilmarnock. 'Child migrants from Nazareth Houses 1938-1956', NAZ.001.006.2553-2554, records departures from Aberdeen and Edinburgh in 1947, from Aberdeen in 1950, from Glasgow and Aberdeen in 1953, and from Aberdeen and Kilmarnock in 1954. On the Sisters of Nazareth see also Appendix 3, Section 5, paras 5.29-5.42.

⁷⁸⁹ Sisters of Nazareth, Section 21 Response – Part C, NAZ.001.001.0294

Houses and those of other religious Congregations and Orders within Australia. It was therefore presumed that these would be suitable homes for the children'.⁷⁹⁰ That presumption is worth emphasis since it implies that they did not require reports to be sent to them about the places to which they were expected to send Scottish children, so that they might assess for themselves their suitability for children in their care, and in this response to SCAI there is no reference to reports received by the Sisters after children once in their care had been sent overseas.

17.49 However, testimony to IICSA provided by a senior representative of the Sisters of Nazareth states that the Mother Superior General from England (perhaps also from Scotland), with members of her council conducted inspections of Nazareth Houses in Australia once every three years, and that there was evidence of visits by local child welfare departments, but we are also told that inspections were known of in advance and prepared for accordingly.⁷⁹¹ Nevertheless, the National Archives of Australia contain sometimes critical reports by Australian Child Welfare officials following their inspections of institutions to which child migrants were still being sent post-war by the Sisters of Nazareth, particularly in the years 1948-51.⁷⁹² Evidence provided to SCAI also refers to informal and formal inspection visits.⁷⁹³ However, none of the evidence we have seen indicates that reports were sent back to the Sisters of Nazareth in the UK.

17.50 Father Stinson told the Catholic Child Welfare Council on 21 October 1952 that all homes in Australia were indeed subject to regular and at first unexpected inspections, no previous notice being received beforehand. However, unannounced inspections had been discontinued, but, on hearing of the impending arrival of a visitor from the Home Office (that is John Moss) various interested bodies seem to have met members of the Child Welfare Department, following which it was agreed that visits to each institution by a Review Committee were to occur twice a year.⁷⁹⁴ It is left uncertain as to whether such visits did take place, and if so how regularly, and

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.001.0294, 0297.

⁷⁹¹ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, pp.124-125.

⁷⁹² Coldrey, 'Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia', extract attached to Catholic Bishops' Conference of Scotland, Scottish Catholic Archives, April 2010, 'Catholic Child Migration to Australia from Scotland and Northern Ireland 1946-1950', BSC.001.001.0184-0187. Coldrey's book is also available from <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/index.aspx>.

⁷⁹³ See especially Appendix 3, Section 5, paras 5.34-5.36, concerning documents relating to visits including by officials to Nazareth houses at Geraldton and East Camberwell in Australia.

⁷⁹⁴ Catholic Bishops Conference of England and Wales, CCWC minutes, 21 Oct 1952, BEW.001.001.0158.

whether they were or were not announced, and also whether reports were dispatched back to the UK, and if so to whom. Indeed, Father Flint told the CCWC on 20 October 1953 that the Council had seen only 18 reports, and these had been supplied by a Mother Superior.⁷⁹⁵ Moreover, a year later the minutes of the next AGM held on 26 October 1954 record that Mgr Crennan had been told that welfare reports were still needed on all the children emigrated.⁷⁹⁶ Only on 25 October 1955 do the minutes record the arrival of such reports.⁷⁹⁷ We have not seen and therefore cannot comment on the number or contents of these reports sent back to the UK.

17.51 But we have seen three Child Welfare Department documents kept in Australia concerning institutions in Western Australia.⁷⁹⁸ The first is an inspection report on Clontarf, dated July 1951. It records finances and building renovations, has generally but not entirely positive things to say about the Brothers, and refers to some discontent among the Sisters who are there in support. There is detail about the composition of the boys (79 child migrants), their education (some boys retarded), and about 'working boys' (intellectually a 'poor type', but there were no real concerns about their 'moral rectitude'). The second document, dated February 1954, indicates that the CWD Secretary had just become aware that inspections were not being carried out frequently – every two months seems to have been the expectation. But then in October 1958 the CWD Director discovered that there had been no inspection of Clontarf since August 1955, and he suspected that there had been an 'equal neglect of supervision and inspection' at other institutions, including Castledare and Bindoon. An unannounced visit to Clontarf should take place immediately and thereafter to all institutions every six months. The brief seems restricted since he particularly wanted 'special attention' to be given to 'files and sanitation'.

17.52 Using other sources we have more to say in Chapter 21 about the quality of care in the establishments to which we know Scottish Catholic children were sent. Some of it is not comfortable reading.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 20 Oct 1953, BEW.001.001.0168.

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 20 Oct 1954, BEW.001.001.0174.

⁷⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 25 Oct 1955, BEW.001.001.0183.

⁷⁹⁸ For what follows see documents provided by Mr Oliver Cosgrove, WIT.003.002.2987-2988, and WIT.003.002.2963-2964. A Probation Officer discovered in September 1954 that January 1942 was the last entry in the punishment book, which by CWD regulations needed to be kept up to date: WIT.003.002.2963.

18 | Other Locations: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports

Southern Rhodesia: Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College

18.1 The dispatching of child migrants to the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College was brief, beginning in 1946 and the last party arriving in 1956, though the college itself did not close until the last child migrant graduated in 1962. Our guess is that perhaps 10 children may have been sent there from Scotland, and as reported earlier we know the names of eight (see para 10.9 above) Regrettably, the college's records have disappeared, by one account destroyed in one or more probably accidental fires, or in another by the Warden on instructions from Rhodesia House in London.⁷⁹⁹ The documentation does not seem to exist to show how, by whom or how regularly the college was inspected and what was recorded, and no reference to inspections is made in the published autobiographical accounts of former residents.⁸⁰⁰ But while there are no equivalents to 'Ofsted' reports, it is reasonable to suppose that officers of the Southern Rhodesian government did visit, inspect and report, for that by then would have been 'British' educational practice for publicly-funded schools, if only to reassure parents and sponsors, and the colonial treasurer, that the college was value for money. What we do know is that, privately but with the consent and support of the Home Office, John Moss had visited Indura, the site of the college.⁸⁰¹ He had not been impressed, especially by its aftercare arrangements. The closure of the college may indeed have been because it was too costly to manage, as he suggested, and perhaps because the government of Southern Rhodesia and the organisation in the UK which was its recruiting agency had lost their enthusiasm.⁸⁰² There are no documented grounds to suggest that closure was precipitated or even accelerated by inspections which uncovered (but then suppressed) the incidents of abuse on which we later report.

⁷⁹⁹ Boucher, *Empire's Children*, p.239; *Windows: Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College Autobiographies*, p.15.

⁸⁰⁰ *Windows: Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College Autobiographies*.

⁸⁰¹ TNA, MH102/1898, 'Visit by John Moss to the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College, Indura', minutes of meeting in the Home Office, 2 June 1954, p.28, copy of his report, 18 June 1954, pp.20-23, and pp.15-16, commentary by the government's Secretary of Education, Jan 1955.

⁸⁰² Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, p.241.

New Zealand: The Royal Over-Seas League

18.2 As explained earlier, this scheme was operated by ROSL in conjunction with the New Zealand government.⁸⁰³ As also reported (see para 10.10 above) we know from material supplied to SCAI by ROSL and from press reports that possibly 40 of the 549 UK children sent by ROSL to New Zealand were from Scotland.⁸⁰⁴ It was a programme by which selected children in the UK were migrated at the expense of the New Zealand government. We know, particularly from the 1951 report of the Women's Group on Public Welfare, that on arrival the children became wards of the New Zealand state and that they were allocated to foster homes, chosen from among those who had applied to foster a child.⁸⁰⁵ Guardianship arrangements were set out in the 1948 amendment to the New Zealand Government's Child Welfare Act 1925. Under its terms, when the child migrant arrived in New Zealand their guardianship was transferred to the Superintendent of Child Welfare, head of the Government Child Welfare Department. The Superintendent would then hold this guardianship for a minimum of 6 months. Thereafter guardianship could be transferred to the child migrant's foster carers, if child welfare officials were satisfied with the care being provided, if the child migrant was more than 12 years of age, and if he or she gave his or her consent. It was the on-going responsibility of officials to visit the homes and to check on the progress and well-being of the children even after guardianship had been transferred, and to take steps, including reallocating children to different foster parents, as circumstances required. Guardianship responsibilities were to last until the child was 21.

18.3 However, a research paper submitted to a conference on child migration in 2002 states that while child welfare officers were expected to visit child migrants every three months, the lack of time and limited resources meant that this system did not provide consistently rigorous checks on children's well-being.⁸⁰⁶ A former child

⁸⁰³ ROSL was also responsible for recruiting some children who were sent to Dhurringile in Australia, but their relocation was effected by the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service, and their subsequent care and aftercare is therefore subsumed into our CSCSS account.

⁸⁰⁴ ROSL, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.0001-0014, and accompanying documents, especially photographs; NRS, ED11/384, Scottish Education Department, 'Homeless Children. Emigration Schemes, 1947-1955, *The Scotsman*, 28 Jan 1949, press report, SGV.001.003.7666; Aberdeen City Council, *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, 3 Jan 1950, ABN.001.001.1271. For more on management and monitoring, and the paucity of surviving records, see Appendix 3, Section 6, paras 6.11-6.17.

⁸⁰⁵ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, pp.47-50, 68-70.

⁸⁰⁶ Young and ██████ 'British Child Migration to New Zealand', pp.6-7. Shortcomings casting doubt on Bavin's claim are acknowledged in ROSL, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.0129.

migrant, who co-authored the paper, commented that he remembered being visited by child welfare officers only twice in five years. The report comments more generally that one of the most common criticisms of former child migrants was that they rarely saw their child welfare officers, and those officers did not always speak directly with the child migrants during their visit, or only spoke with them in the presence of their foster-carers. It is worth noting that the Women's Group, referring to the monitoring of children in foster homes in the UK, expected inspection visits to boarded-out children to be not less frequent than once every six weeks.⁸⁰⁷ Even the Superintendent of Child Welfare in 1953 identified shortcomings in the scheme, including the problems that arose when foster-carers volunteered to take children out of a sense of responsibility or enthusiasm for the scheme, but then struggled to fulfil the demands of their fostering role.

18.4 Meanwhile, official ROSL publications spoke of having received very encouraging reports from the children they had sent overseas and very positive commentary on the organisation's child migration work.⁸⁰⁸ Bavin even claimed that ROSL's child migration work was 'one of, if not *the* most, satisfactory Child Emigration scheme in existence'.⁸⁰⁹ But that claim to quality cannot be checked because no records concerning placements, inspections and reports have survived in ROSL archives.⁸¹⁰ It is therefore not possible to consider whether, let alone how, ROSL itself had a role in monitoring the well-being of the children it had dispatched. Indeed, the lack of capacity within ROSL to undertake follow-up monitoring of any children they sent overseas was precisely one reason why in 1951 the Home Office had been reluctant to recognise ROSL as an acceptable sending society with respect to a related ROSL scheme to send children to Australia.⁸¹¹ In fact, evidence presented to IICSA suggested that in New Zealand the League had no such role, but expected the monitoring of the children that it had sent overseas to be conducted by its New Zealand branch (and by New Zealand officials), but how or whether that was done also remains unknown. Certainly, we have seen no evidence of any systematic

⁸⁰⁷ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, pp.47-50.

⁸⁰⁸ ROSL, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.0001-0014.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0129, 0130-0131.

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid*.

⁸¹¹ TNA, MH102/2336, 'Overseas League: Emigration of 40 Children to Australia', Dixon, CRO, to MacGregor, HO, 19 Feb 1951, pp.16-17, Macgregor to Dixon, 15 March 1951, pp.10-12; TNA, MH102/2049, 'Alleged Disapproval of H.O. to Overseas League', Dixon to Davey, 29 March 1951, pp.20-21.

monitoring being operated by ROSL's branch in New Zealand.⁸¹² There is a suggestion that the League intended to encourage contact by sending to the organisation's General Secretary in New Zealand the names and addresses of the children in New Zealand, but we do not know, for instance, whether the New Zealand branch was notified by the London office of the changes of address for 196 children moved to other foster parents, as reported to it by the New Zealand Superintendent of Welfare in 1953.⁸¹³

18.5 In summary, as stated in the IICSA report, 'there appears to have been no proper monitoring, reporting and aftercare of children sent to New Zealand'.⁸¹⁴ ROSL's failure to 'preserve migration records' was not an 'unwitting oversight' but indicative of 'a failure to have the welfare and needs of the children as priorities'.⁸¹⁵ Whilst ROSL refers to support systems operated by the local branches of its organisation overseas, we have seen no corroborating evidence to indicate that these local networks provided systematic or effective monitoring of the well-being of child migrants.⁸¹⁶ Instead there appears to have been a policy of relying on inspections by government child welfare officers. However, questions have also been raised as to how rigorous that system was in practice. For instance, we have no evidence of ROSL engaging in critical reflection on its work in the light of any feedback it received from the overseas monitoring of its child migrants. Moreover, because the vast majority of children sent to New Zealand through this scheme did not come from local authority care, and the funding was not derived from Empire Settlement funds but largely from New Zealand, there was no clear legal framework through which the UK Government could either approve individual children's migration or undertake subsequent monitoring of them. But in that respect there was nothing unique about this limitation.

⁸¹² IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcript of oral testimony by Professor Lynch, 11 July 2017, pp.75-76; IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, p.111.

⁸¹³ Young and ██████ 'British Child Migration to New Zealand', pp.7-8.

⁸¹⁴ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, p.112.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁶ Constantine and Lynch, 13th Addendum to IICSA report, paras 8.4 and 8.6, ICA.001.001.0141-0153.

19 | Conclusion: Placements, Inspections, Aftercare, Reports and Responsibilities

19.1 We begin these reflections by acknowledging that child migration in the past was commonly regarded as an acceptable policy, although as we have indicated this view was also strongly contested, especially in the post-war period. We have already provided an account of, and our observations on, the varied processes and criteria by which some children deprived of a normal home life - or in some cases parents on their behalf hoping to benefit their children - were selected and accepted for migration overseas. Our particular concern here is to reflect on those processes by which the placements to which children were sent were selected, approved and subsequently monitored.

19.2 In the first instance there are UK and Scottish government departments. We know that officials did attempt to protect child migrants overseas. We have tracked investigations from the Doyle report in 1875 to the Ross report in 1956 as indicating that there was contemporaneous official unease in the UK about the quality of care child migrants might receive or were receiving overseas. We have also referred to the (still somewhat inexplicable) failed attempt to implement regulations binding at least on the practice inside the UK of child migrating societies. We have also noted the attempts by the Home Office to persuade sending societies to adhere voluntarily to 'best practice' overseas, made more explicit in funding agreements but only from 1957 by when child migration as a childcare practice was in decline. It might be thought that the dependence of child migrating organisations on financial subsidies provided by UK taxpayers via the Empire Settlement Act of 1922 and its successors might have given leverage to any UK government attempts to enforce 'best practice', but we also know that the prestige and political clout of sending agencies was a countervailing force.

19.3 The other countervailing force was the limited authority which the UK government felt it could exercise over the self-governing dominions of the Commonwealth. This was particularly difficult after an Imperial Conference in 1926 when the political equality of the UK and the dominions was made explicit in the statement that they were all

autonomous communities within the British Empire equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another, in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs

though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.⁸¹⁷

In 1931 this was legally embodied in the Statute of Westminster.⁸¹⁸ We have recorded evidence of High Commission officers carrying out inspections of institutions in Australia and sometimes differing in judgements from their Australian government colleagues. However, emphatic insistence on adherence to professed post-war British standards of childcare was not compatible with the acknowledged rights of the 'white' dominions, as UK High Commissioners in Canada and Australia seem to have acknowledged.

19.4 Moreover, officials in Australia, as previously in Canada, were obliged to adhere to their government's insistence on the need for accelerating population growth, including by child migration. It required very robust objections by childcare professionals in British Columbia to stop child migration into that province.

19.5 We also have to take account of the agendas of those individuals and institutions overseas who were often dependent, including financially, on the receipt of UK child migrants. They were unlikely to reassess their care and aftercare practices and certainly not likely to stop accepting child migrants from their providing partners in the UK. It was and is hard for those wedded to systems to stand back, reassess and change. Institutional self-interest inhibits institutional self-examination.⁸¹⁹ Furthermore, there were also difficulties in attracting qualified and experienced childcare professionals to take up appointments as inspectors or as employees in childcare institutions.

19.6 Committed parties included those organisations who having migrated children overseas allowed them to be placed on farms or in private homes as in Canada and New Zealand, plus those who dispatched them into institutional care in Canada, Australia and Southern Rhodesia. It might be assumed that they would feel the need to review their practice regularly, and for receiving homes and especially institutions to be open to external inspection by disinterested officials in order to maintain or enhance standards, and to report regularly to governments. In addition, one might expect that they would report to the several philanthropic agencies who

⁸¹⁷ Max Beloff, *Dream of Commonwealth 1921-42: Vol 2 of Imperial Sunset* (Macmillan, London, 1989), pp.91-2

⁸¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁹ On this matter see especially Lynch, *Wounds of Charity*.

provided them with the children in order to comment on the appropriateness of their selection procedures and on the progress of children in their care, in order, at the very least, to ensure that more children of the right quality were sent. This was certainly formalised more in post-war policy discussions in which a clear emphasis was placed on the responsibility of sending organisations to maintain an adequate overview of the welfare of children they had sent overseas.⁸²⁰

19.7 As discussed further in Appendices 3 and 4, the overall impression of post-war child migration is that the UK Government – and the Scottish Office as its administrative arm in Scotland – demonstrated systemic failures in maintaining proper scrutiny of the welfare of British child migrants overseas. This was despite clear pre-war evidence from both Australia and Canada of the ways in which child migrants could experience abuse through poor standards of management and care and inadequate training and preparation for adult life in the community. Although wider policy discussions clearly indicated that voluntary organisations and local authorities that sent children overseas had some continued responsibility to check on their welfare, the actual practices of voluntary organisations in this regard varied considerably. In some cases, the failure of some sending organisations to maintain suggested standards for monitoring child migrants overseas could be understood in terms of organisational failings in which the migration of children was pursued without sufficient attention to wider standards of the day or the well-being of the children involved. All that said, political and financial considerations, insufficient inspecting and reporting, and inadequate numbers of properly trained staff did not make child abuse inevitable – but possibly more likely. We reserve to the next chapter of this report our review of abuses which occurred when, manifestly, systems overseas failed to protect child migrants in care.

⁸²⁰ For a detailed exposition of this point see Appendix 3, Section 2.

20 | The Abuse of Scottish Child Migrants: Determining and Defining

20.1 Scottish children who had been ‘deprived of a normal home life’, plus those whose parents intended to better their futures and had subsequently been selected as child migrants, were embarking on journeys that transformed, irreversibly, their futures. We should keep in mind that the Ross Committee was told in Australia that children ‘whom life had treated badly’ would benefit from a ‘fresh start’ in a new country, but the committee insisted that ‘it was precisely such children, already rejected and insecure, who might often be ill-equipped to cope with the added strain of migration’.⁸²¹

20.2 There is evidence that some ‘made good’, and we refer below to Joy Parr’s assessment with respect to child migrants sent to Canada (see para 21.7). Comparing the known with the speculative unknown is a tricky calculation, but it is indeed probable that some led outwardly more successful lives than they might have been able to achieve had they not migrated and had remained in care, before ‘coming of age’ and then starting off their adult lives in Scotland. Nevertheless, there is evidence to indicate that even some outwardly successful child migrants had suffered from their upbringing overseas or remained troubled by the distress they knew others had endured. Later in life and reflecting on the practice of child migration, even the successful have testified to the abuse which they had witnessed and others had experienced.⁸²²

20.3 As calculated earlier, a substantial number of Scottish child migrants had been sent to Canada between the 1870s and the 1930s, but from 1930 the number sent to all destinations and largely to Australia were probably fewer than 390. However, our obligation is to try and establish whether any of these Scottish child migrants, before as well as after 1930, suffered from abuse. The difficulty is that sources currently

⁸²¹ HCPP, Cmd.9832, *Child Migration to Australia*, para 19.

⁸²² As an example of a prominently successful career see his biography in Hill, *The Forgotten Children*. David Hill, a child migrant who went to the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong, New South Wales, became chair then managing director of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, chair of the Australian Football Association, chief executive of the State Rail Authority in New South Wales, chair of Railways of Australia – and then chair of the CREATE Foundation, working to improve the lives of young people and children in the care system. He was a core participant in the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.

available do not regularly identify child migrants from Scotland among those categorised generally as child migrants from the UK.

20.4 We have therefore adopted a two-stage approach. First, we identified those locations overseas to where we know from contemporary or retrospective documentary evidence or from testimony submitted to public inquiries since 1996 that UK child migrants were sent and where child abuse took place. Second, among them, we have then identified for consideration those locations where we know from accessed sources that child migrants from Scotland were or may have been sent and therefore where they were or may have been abused.

20.5 The further obligation is that whereas some public inquiries have been principally concerned only with sexual abuse, the definition of abuse set down by SCAI that we need to keep in mind is 'primarily physical abuse and sexual abuse, with associated psychological and emotional abuse', plus 'unacceptable practices (such as deprivation of contact with siblings) and neglect'.⁸²³

⁸²³ SCAI, Terms of Reference, <https://www.childabuseinquiry.scot/about-us/terms-of-reference/> .

21 | Child Abuse: 'British Home Children' in Canada

21.1 We first consider the over 8000 Scottish children sent to Canada from the 1870s who after arriving at distribution centres were then dispersed, not to institutions but to farms where they were routinely employed, girls as well as boys, as young farm workers or, if girls, also to private homes to work as domestic servants. In what follows we need to keep in mind Doyle's critical report of 1875, the subsequent moratorium until 1883 on the dispatch of poor law children to Canada, and the general restriction, following the 1924 Bondfield report, on the sending of child migrants under the age of 14 by any agency - those sent later being juveniles of working age (or being dispatched into institutional care in British Columbia, which we will consider separately). Most of those from Scotland had previously been cared for by Quarriers, a few from other specifically Scottish care homes, plus an uncertain number by Scottish branches of the Salvation Army (and about their experiences in Canada we have no useful records).

21.2 The phrase 'Home Children' has come to be commonly used in recent years by organisations in Canada insisting that the positive contribution made by British child migrants to the development of Canada should be recognised and respected.⁸²⁴ Websites, life histories and testimony at public inquiries have been emphatic on such matters. Family historians, often tracing descent from multiple ancestors, are pleased to locate a British child migrant in their lineage. 'We as Canadians are fiercely proud of them all', wrote one.⁸²⁵ Their worthiness has been acknowledged by prominent political and church figures in Canada. Memorials have been erected.⁸²⁶ Much is made of the heroism of those who as men fought and in many cases died for Canada and the British Empire in two world wars.⁸²⁷ Most recently what had been in Ontario

⁸²⁴ See for example, British Home Children in Canada (2011), 'Who are the British Home Children?', <https://canadianbritishhomechildren.weebly.com/> and British Home Child Group International (2019), 'Who are the British Home Children?', <http://britishhomechild.com/history/> and British Home Children (2019), 'Researching British Home Children', <http://www.britishhomechildren.com/researchbhb>.

⁸²⁵ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Volume II, Evidence, Memorandum by Home Children Canada, 20 May 1998, p.66.

⁸²⁶ On Their Own: Britain's Child migrants (2010), 'Child migrant memorials', <http://otoweb.cloudapp.net/rememering/memorials.html>; British Home Children in Canada, 'The Hazel Brae Home Memorial', <https://canadianbritishhomechildren.weebly.com/the-hazelbrae-memorial.html>, and 'The Saint George's Home Memorial', <https://canadianbritishhomechildren.weebly.com/the-st-georges-memorial.html>

⁸²⁷ British Home Children in Canada (n.d.), 'The British Home Children who perished in the First World War', <https://canadianbritishhomechildren.weebly.com/first-world-war-causalities.html>, and 'Those

a provincial day of recognition of the positive contribution of British child migrants to Canadian history has become a national day, first commemorated on 28 September 2018.⁸²⁸

21.3 It was not always so. Indeed, it has been a revelation to many Canadians to discover their descent from a child migrant precisely because those ancestors had consciously obscured their roots. The stigma which had been commonly attached to them during their lifetimes had induced a reticence about their origins. Reference has been made earlier to the very public objections of Canadian trade unions to the importation of cheap child labour from across the Atlantic; and we noted the hostile and publicised comments of many in the Canadian medical and child care professions, contaminated by the 'science' of eugenics, who had expressed hostile observations on the supposedly mental, physical and moral quality of child migrants. These were slum kids, 'syphilitic paupers', 'addicted to self-abuse', 'little better than brutes' with 'filthy habits'. Supposedly they accounted disproportionately for juvenile crime. By seducing decent Canadian girls, the boys were bringing about 'the physical corruption of a pure-blooded stock'.⁸²⁹ Cumulatively, these public assaults on self-respect constituted emotional and psychological abuse, internalised by generations of British child migrants scattered in isolation around Canadian provinces.

21.4 It is evident that Canadians in rural society who actively sought a British child migrant to work for them indoors or on a farm had expectations based on what they reckoned boys and girls born and raised in rural Canadian families could manage. Insecure youngsters from inner-city Scotland could find it hard to measure up, and given previous disruptive experiences they might even lack the capacity to respond to expressions of affection. In amongst the good recollections written late in life by former child migrants we also encounter tales of homesickness, loneliness, pining for those in whose care they had been placed in Scotland, not being treated as a

who Served and Died in the Second World War',

<https://canadianbritishhomechildren.weebly.com/second-world-war-service.html>

⁸²⁸ *Nation Valley News*, 'British Home Child Day, Sept 28 enshrined nationally',

<https://nationvalleynews.com/2018/02/09/british-home-child-day-sept-28-enshrined-nationally/>. The 28 September happens to be the day when Mary Scott Pearson, a 13-year-old orphan, arrived in Canada from Scotland – in 1891. In 1994 former Scottish child and juvenile migrants sent to Canada by Quarriers recorded their experiences in radio programmes made by BBC Scotland and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

⁸²⁹ On this topic, and for the source of quotations and their contextual analysis see Stephen Constantine, 'Children as ancestors: child migrants and identity in Canada', *British Journal of Canadian Studies*, vol.16, no.1, 2003, pp.150-159.

member of the Canadian family, the deprivation of education, the climatic extremes, insecurity and hard work, the stigma of being despised as a 'home child', and sometimes the violence.⁸³⁰ One sent from Glasgow in about 1880, aged five, told her daughter that 'you don't know what it is to feel no one cares if you live or die – and wants you only if you can work hard'. Another young Scottish boy recalled an unfriendly welcome from the adults to whom he had been sent, and the limited schooling they allowed him in spite of the written agreement they had signed with Quarriers. Another Quarrier boy, sent out aged 11, also recalled the hard work, barely adequate food, lack of pay and, again, limited education, in aggregate just six months of schooling eked out over two years.⁸³¹ Having met former child migrants in Canada, Anna Magnusson insisted in her book that it was 'only when you read the accounts of the emigrants themselves that you get a real sense of just how overwhelming and potentially grim the experience was'. It could be a fine chance for a better future, or it 'could turn out to be a nightmare'.⁸³²

21.5 Written evidence presented to the House of Commons Health Committee in 1997, derived from a plurality of written records and statements by surviving former child migrants (many more were alive then than there are today, over twenty years later) records a whole range of abuses, from the physical and sexual to the emotional and psychological, and of consequences ranging from deaths (one child froze to death in a barn), to deprivation of earnings, limited education, poor employment prospects, lost identities, silent shame, insensitivity to others, inability to express affection, loneliness.⁸³³

21.6 William Quarrier used to claim publicly that only 5% of the children he sent to Canada turned out 'more or less unsatisfactory', though in 1904 the author of a Quarrier report claimed to have discovered none whose stories were

⁸³⁰ Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.188-192

⁸³¹ Phyllis Harrison (ed), *The Home Children: Their Personal Stories* (Watson and Dyer, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 1979), pp.35, 37-39, 170-173.

⁸³² Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story*, p.87. This revised 2006 edition, p.5, draws substantially on testimony from former migrants, mostly those who arrived as juveniles, but also descendants of child migrants recounting stories they had been told.

⁸³³ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Volume II, Evidence, Memorandum by Home Children Canada, 20 May 1998, pp.52-58, 65-68, reproduced, except for redactions, in Barnardo's, Government Select Committee papers, 1998, BAR.001.005.8978-9001.

unsatisfactory.⁸³⁴ A more systematic analysis has been provided by Joy Parr based on the records of child migration agencies, especially Barnardo's but including Quarriers. Children's experiences are likely to have been similar since both organisations operated similar systems at the same time in equivalent parts of Canada and within the same political and legislative structure. Although the quantitative data analysed is exclusively based on the records of Barnardo's children (none of whom were sent directly from Scotland), Parr's conclusions are indicative also of the likely experiences of Quarriers children. She covers the years 1869-1924 and reveals the difficulties very many child migrants experienced in rural Canada. In amongst positive accounts of affection received, of Sunday school outings and of church services - as recorded in archived letters sent back to the UK and routinely printed in Quarriers annual *Narrative of Facts* - are others referring to loneliness, of missing siblings, of not being treated as a member of the family, and of the monotonous loneliness and tedium of rural life. Their futures were also diminished by denying them adequate education. Magnusson, writing about Quarriers children, acknowledged that a 'child sent to a remote farm in Ontario might be many miles from the nearest neighbour and would certainly have to traverse a considerable distance to attend school'.⁸³⁵ Enuresis was frequently reported as widespread among child migrants, and children were punished for it, as also for bad temper and 'filthy habits'. Based on the selected records of 997 Barnardo's children sent to Canada (every twentieth child out of approximately 20,000 children on the 1882-1908 sailing party lists), Parr concluded that Barnardo's officials judged that 9% of the boys and 15% of girls had suffered from excessive punishment. She also notes that Barnardo's officials set the threshold of excess much higher for boys than for girls - and she also accepts that these recorded cases, based on reported incidents, would underestimate the frequency of such abuse. In her Barnardo's sample, Parr also discovered that 11% of the girls became pregnant while wards of the homes in which they had been placed, with the percentage higher among those who arrived in Canada aged 13 to 15. The rate was not much higher than among Canadian women aged 15 to 19, but the illegitimacy rate was substantially higher than in rural Ontario where most Barnardo's girls had been placed, indicative of their vulnerability to predatory males who would not or could not marry them. Children were also reluctant to report ill-treatment when Canadian inspectors turned up, as they did rarely, for fear of reprisals after those

⁸³⁴ *Narrative of Facts*, 1883, p.13:

https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1883_delivery.pdf; *Narrative of Facts*, 1904, p.63:
https://content.iriss.org.uk/goldenbridge/nof/assets/1904_delivery.pdf.

⁸³⁵ Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story*, p.71.

officials had left. Children's self-respect was hardly helped by being returned to distribution centres as unsuitable. Doyle in his published report as early as 1875 refers to 'the depressing effect upon a child of being sent back to the 'Home' [the distribution centre] disappointed and discouraged by early failure'.⁸³⁶ But there were worse outcomes: some children died of neglect, or worse, and others killed themselves, and others.⁸³⁷

21.7 Joy Parr also offers a cautious assessment of the subsequent careers of child migrants in Canada.⁸³⁸ Caution was required because her assessment was partly based on interviews she conducted in 1974 and 1975 with those who had been sent out in the 1920s, almost certainly as juveniles over 14 and after completing their elementary education in the UK, and shortly before the onset of economic depression. In addition, however, she accessed correspondence in the Barnardo's records amounting to one-third of the women and one-fifth of the men in her sample and over the 20 years after they had left the UK. This correspondence, of course, was written by former child migrants who needed or chose for whatever reason to contact the homes in the UK which had sent them. In her judgement these were the child migrants who had best adapted to the situations in which they had found themselves. What the correspondence indicates is that girls left the countryside and moved to Canadian cities soon after reaching the age when they were freed from their contracts. They rarely entered domestic service, but went to work in hotels, department stores and factories, before mainly marrying in their early twenties. Only a few entered professions. As for boys, they too largely left the land, prompted to shift by their childhood experiences, and by the almost certainty that they would remain agricultural labourers and not become farmers. In this respect they were rejecting the aims and assumptions of child-migrating philanthropists. Instead they became urban labourers, factory workers, artisans and clerks, or drifted into seasonal occupations around Canada. Their often disrupted Canadian education

⁸³⁶ Parr, *Labouring Children*, pp.100-118, 158-161; HCPP, Doyle, *Pauper Children*, p.19, INQ-000000006.

⁸³⁷ On suicides see Barnardo's, *The Bondfield Report and associated papers, 1924-1925*, BAR.001.005.6922-6927. This unexpectedly includes accounts of the suicide of two English boys in 1924. These reports were provided by the Department of Immigration and Colonisation and by the Liverpool Sheltering Home, the latter critical of remarks on the causes of the suicides made by the Coroner's Jury, and defending the Home's practices. Although she does not cite relevant primary sources, Rutherford, "Canada is no dumping ground" reports the suicides of three child migrants in 1923. Documented references to suicides (and killings) can also be found in Boucher, *Empire's Children*, pp.82, 84-85.

⁸³⁸ Parr, *Labouring Children*, pp.123-139.

remained for many a handicap. Given their social origins and family backgrounds, Parr concludes from her analysis that, in terms of employment, child migrants in Canada did better than if they had remained in the UK. Whether that compensated for the abuse many had endured and the stigma with which many subsequently lived is another matter.

21.8 On all such issues it is important to consider whether governments were aware of abuse or the risk of abuse and how, if aware, they reacted. We reported earlier that the UK government's response to Doyle's report in 1875, which had indeed identified bad practice and the risk of abuse, was a moratorium on the sending of poor law children to Canada, though that was lifted following some commitment by the Canadian government to inspect and monitor. With respect to children sent by philanthropic organisations, no action was or could be taken by the UK government without legislation or inter-governmental intervention. The Bondfield Report in 1924 may have been prompted by concerns generated by reports of suicides, but the recommended restricting of all publicly-funded child migration to those aged 14 or over did not even imply, let alone advertise, the risk of abuse, but was required because the education of children under the school-leaving age was not being guaranteed – and the Canadian government for its own reasons concurred.

22 | Child Abuse: Foster Care in New Zealand

22.1 As suggested earlier, possibly 40 Scottish children (out of 549 UK children) were sent to New Zealand under this scheme. Less information is available than one would like because of the failure of the Royal Over-Seas League to preserve its records, because, as far as we aware, no reports on child migrants placed with foster parents were copied to ROSL, and because of what has so far seemed a reluctance on the part of the New Zealand government to investigate. Compounding these difficulties, ROSL and the New Zealand government each asserted that the other party was responsible for initiating the scheme (in fact it was ROSL) and should take responsibility for what some children endured.⁸³⁹ The House of Commons Select Committee on Health travelled to New Zealand and met the Associate Minister of Social Welfare who insisted that overall the experience of the children was 'positive' and that some 'adapted well and enjoyed successful lives'.⁸⁴⁰ Indeed, the Committee accepted that the New Zealand scheme appeared to 'have been better organised than some of the other schemes', and that seemed to have led to 'fewer cases of severe abuse'.⁸⁴¹

22.2 However, a memorandum had been supplied to the Committee by the British Child Migrants Society in New Zealand. Even acknowledging that those responding to the Society's questionnaire were self-selecting, their numerical listing of the degree to which those stating that their lives had been very or moderately adversely affected substantially outnumbered the few who felt that their lives had been bettered. The types of concern arising from their child migration experience echoed those expressed by respondents to other public inquiries, including experience of abuse, ill-treatment and neglect, relationship problems, losing contact with siblings, lost identities, discrimination, and lost opportunities. Perhaps most bleakly, one former child migrant described as an adult the recent receipt of an invitation to seek counselling support from the Department of Child Welfare as being 'like asking a holocaust survivor to get assistance from the Gestapo'.⁸⁴²

⁸³⁹ HC 755-I, House of Commons Health Committee, Third Report, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants* 1997-98, paras 27-31.

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75506.htm>

⁸⁴⁰ *Ibid*, para 34.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid*.

⁸⁴² HC 755-II, Minutes of Evidence, pp.236-241:

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/755ap07.htm> See also ROSL, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.0132, for part of the memorandum.

22.3 Many former child migrants who met the House of Commons Committee clearly resented the way they had been treated. 'Exported like a commodity', 'Exported as free labour', 'No adequate supervision', 'Education stuffed up', 'Cut off', 'Loss of identity', 'Not informed where siblings were', and 'Why?' were some of the comments alleged. Moreover, a number of serious cases of abuse and neglect were described. One woman reported that she was scrubbing floors at the age of 8, and from the age of 9 to 14 she was 'available for the males of the house'.⁸⁴³ Another sent to live on a farm aged 10 was worked hard and beaten for reading books.⁸⁴⁴ She was also sexually abused and raped. Aged 12 she ran away, but was brought back by the police. She also stated that she never saw a Welfare Officer alone. Later in life she managed to educate herself, and as a result 'externally I am living a good life, but not in myself'.⁸⁴⁵

22.4 In 2002, the former child migrant who co-presented the paper delivered to the New Orleans congress on child migration stated that there were ' "lucky" ' ones among the child migrants sent to New Zealand by the Royal Over-Seas League, who were 'treated humanely' and were 'happy with their new lives'.⁸⁴⁶ However, others had shocking experiences of 'physical and sexual abuse causing much mental anguish', and they remain 'very bitter' and 'deeply resentful'.⁸⁴⁷ A survey conducted by the British Child Migrants Society's research officer concluded from his survey of 42 former child migrants that nearly 80 per cent 'had negative experiences, including loss of identity, adjustment problems, separation from family and losing contact with siblings'.⁸⁴⁸

22.5 Apart from evidence of some children having been moved to other foster parents, we are not otherwise aware of any contemporary concern about abuse, or the risk of abuse, by the Government of New Zealand, and certainly we have not encountered anything to suggest that ROSL was alert to the possibility let alone the

⁸⁴³ HC 755-I, House of Commons Health Committee, Third Report, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants 1997-98*, paras 27-36, esp para 36. See also testimony reported in Humphreys, *Empty Cradles*, pp.170-171.

⁸⁴⁴ HC 755-I, House of Commons Health Committee, Third Report, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants 1997-98*, paras 34 and 36.

⁸⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁶ Young and Stuart, 'British Child Migration to New Zealand', p.5.

⁸⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp.5, 10.

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.13.

actuality, and the UK government and Scottish departments do not seem to have been troubled.

23 | Child Abuse: Institutions, an Introduction

23.1 We turn now to those Scottish child migrants who we know from the 1920s to the end of the practice were sent not to live with individual families but were dispatched into institutional care overseas, 25 to British Columbia, perhaps 10 to Southern Rhodesia, and possibly 369 to Australia.

23.2 It is important to remember that most of these children had been taken into care in Scotland because their lives had been disrupted by circumstances which had deprived them of a 'normal family life'. Moreover, we know that children at the institutions to which they were sent overseas frequently ranged from the very young to maturing teenagers. Consequently, among other variants was not just their emotional and physical development but also their sexuality, from the pre-pubescent to sexually self-conscious teenagers. This is an age range posing challenges even for well-trained and experienced carers, and there is substantial evidence that many (not all) of those carers in overseas institutions were not at all or not adequately trained. The challenge was the greater because even the best institutions aspiring to recreate family life in cottage homes headed by house mothers could never replicate conventional families, and staff turnovers also disrupted children's relationships with adults. In such a context it is not surprising that some staff had reasons to be concerned about the well-being of their charges, and complaints were made.

23.3 There were, clearly, instances of abuse, and how they were dealt with, when reported, is an important concern. Sometimes those in charge, fearing for the reputation of the institution for which they worked, attempted to keep such matters in-house and unpublicised, although that was not always successful even if attempted. On the other hand, it was not always an outsider, such as a local minister or other adult, to whom a case was reported, who alerted the police or Child Welfare Departments. There are not that many reported cases, but we know of abusers who contemporaneously were put on trial and of managers of institutions who were obliged to resign.

24 | Child Abuse: Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School, British Columbia

24.1 The Fairbridge Farm School in British Columbia, like the others opened by Fairbridge in Australia, consisted of cottage homes for boys and separately for girls, run by house mothers, plus a school, dining rooms, sports facilities and other communal buildings, set in a rural location with farmland close by. As a reminder, 25 of the 329 child migrants sent from the UK to this farm school between 1935 and 1948 were Scottish boys and girls. Accessed records do not allow us to say that any among those 25 suffered sexual abuse, but, employing SCAI's wider definition of abuse, we can certainly state that at least one suffered from physical abuse and very likely many if not all from neglect and emotional and psychological abuse.⁸⁴⁹

24.2 Quite soon after the farm school opened in 1935 there was a confirmed case of sexual abuse.⁸⁵⁰ In March 1938 a Duties Master at the school had been dismissed after he had admitted 'serious and gross misconduct with ...boys'.⁸⁵¹ Mr Harry Logan, the School Principal, had been concerned to avoid scandal and to protect the reputation of Fairbridge, and he had therefore not reported the case to the police. The Bishop of Victoria, learning of this later, believed the abuser should have been arrested, charged and sent to prison, and that Logan should have been dismissed.

⁸⁴⁹ For what follows see Dunae, 'Waifs', esp. pp.239-246; IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, pp.49-50, 79-82; Fairbridge Society records provided by the Prince's Trust as PRT documents, March 1938-June 1947; documents provided by British Columbia Archives; documents in Libraries and Archives Canada (henceforth LAC), 9 Sept 1935-20 Dec 1944; and witness statement of Mr Roderick Mackay, who was resident at the farm school from November 1941, when he was 7, until he left in 1951 aged 17: WIT.001.001.3450-3485.

⁸⁵⁰ For correspondence and reports see Prince's Trust, Logan to Green, 25 Jan 1937, PRT.001.001.3013-4, indicating how impressed he was by Rogers then in temporary employment at the farm school; Logan to Green, 4 March 1938, PRT.001.001.3016'; and Bishop of Victoria to Green, 5 May 1938, PRT.001.001.3015, concerning the dismissal of Rogers; Logan to Green, 7 Dec 1942, PRT.001.001.3007-3009, Hambro to Logan, 6 Feb 1943, PRT.001.001.3005, concerning the reappointment of Rogers; Park to Green (n.d.), PRT.001.001.3012 and Hambro to Park 22 Sept 1943, PRT.001.001.3011, for correspondence from and to an 'old boy'; Logan to Green, 5 Oct 1943, PRT.001.001.2999-3001; Prince of Wales Fairbridge Farm School, Principal's Report – Annual Meeting, 17 Nov 1943, PRT.001.001.2704-2717; Hambro to Logan, 19 Jan 1944, PRT.001.001.3003-3004; and Green, 'Analysis of Case and Comments', 6 Nov 1944, PRT.001.001.3167, for Green's explanation of reappointment of Rogers in report of meeting of Provincial Government and Fairbridge Executive Committee. For reference to other staff problems see Grogan to Green, 18 May 1942, PRT.001.001.0019-0021, and Green to Grogan, 24 June 1942, PRT.001.001.3017-3018. See also copy of file provided by the British Columbia Archives, MS2045, Box 1, File 14, BCA.001.001.0960-0961.

⁸⁵¹ Prince's Trust, Logan to Green, 4 March 1938, PRT.001.001.3016.

Neither of those outcomes occurred. His successor as Duties Master was a man called Rogers, who had indeed reported the misbehaviour of his predecessor. He in turn was suspected of sexual misconduct by some members of staff and was also dismissed – only for Principal Logan to reappoint him late in 1942, on the basis of references received and because of the difficulty of obtaining trained staff. His decision to reappoint had been controversial with other staff members and with the Canadian Welfare Council, but it became yet more serious when a boy reported the wickedness of Rogers to an Old Fairbridgean who informed the police. It seems he had had immoral relations with three boys. There had also been accusations of his alarming behaviour towards older girls. By October 1943 he had been sacked, tried and imprisoned.⁸⁵² Mr Roderick Mackay, who had arrived in November 1941, provides details of abuse in his witness statement.⁸⁵³

24.3 Then, early in 1944, a report submitted by a disgruntled former employee referred to the poor mental and moral qualities of many of the children, including a reference to a sodomite, and a serious investigation followed.⁸⁵⁴ This was led by the Provincial Government's Superintendent of Neglected Children, Isobel Harvey, a woman trained in and a passionate advocate of new child welfare thinking. On 19 April 1944 she wrote to the Immigration office in Ottawa to report that Fairbridge was in breach of British Columbia's Protection of Children Act, following this up on 20 May with a similar letter of complaint. She also alerted the District Superintendent in British Columbia's Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources. On 28 June he too wrote to the Director of Immigration in Ottawa to say that 'if even half of the information or even one-tenth of it given to me by Miss Harvey verbally is true, then I can only say it is high time that the Provincial Authorities, our Service, or some other organisation, was looking into the conditions at this institution'.⁸⁵⁵

24.4 Harvey's follow-up 'Report on Study made of Fairbridge Farm School during the month of August 1944', based on interviews with children as well as staff, was

⁸⁵² Prince's Trust, Logan to Green, 5 Oct 1943, PRT.001.001.3000.

⁸⁵³ SCAI, statement by Mr Mackay, WIT.001.001.3474, though he seems to place the dismissal, re-hiring, and subsequent sacking and trial of Rogers to a period before his own arrival in November 1941, aged 7.

⁸⁵⁴ The file MS2045, Box 1, File 14, provided by British Columbia Archives, contains much of the relevant correspondence between the farm school and the Provincial Government, plus reports on meetings and press cuttings from 31 Jan 1944 to 20 Feb 1945, BCA.001.001.0885-0958. See also GR0496, Box 58, File 4, for Harvey's 22 June 1944 preliminary critique of the farm school, BCA.001.001.0258-0260.

⁸⁵⁵ LAC, Immigration Branch, RG76, vol.376, file 510340, Pt 4, pp.31, 49, 59.

generally very critical of the quality of care at the school.⁸⁵⁶ Amongst much else she had learnt that yet another Duties Master, **CBC** was said to have acquired a 'name for fooling with the girls', and he had been warned more than once by the Principal.⁸⁵⁷ Mr Mackay records that **CBC** was said to have sexually abused girls.⁸⁵⁸ Harvey took the matter seriously because one 15-year old girl told her that she would not go to his house because he had made unwanted advances and had embraced and kissed her. She alluded to other cases, sufficient for Harvey to consider this too was a matter for the police to investigate. She had also heard reports of boys and girls being found in each other's dormitories. In general she was concerned that the Principal was not addressing irregularities of conduct between boys and girls, or homosexual activities. Then another senior member of staff was charged with gross indecency, two more staff members were dismissed for making sexual advances to older Fairbridge girls, and there was evidence of 'sexual misconduct' between students at the college. Mr Mackay refers to sexual abuse of younger boys by 'bullies' - older boys.⁸⁵⁹

24.5 In August and September 1944, meetings were held between, on the one hand, Walker, British Columbia's Deputy Provincial Secretary as chair, and two child welfare specialists, one being Harvey, and, on the other, three representatives of the local Fairbridge farm school committee, including its president. The minutes of the meetings and the report, which it should be noted was agreed to by the Fairbridge representatives, seriously criticised the institution.⁸⁶⁰ There was apparently a 'suspicion of abortions having taken place in respect of one or more girls'.⁸⁶¹ Among

⁸⁵⁶ On official visits in April 1944 by Government of British Columbia officials, including Harvey, see Prince's Trust, 'Second Report of the Secretary on Relations with the Government of British Columbia', 19 June 1944, which records critical comments made by Harvey on care and conditions, later developed in her August 1944 written report, PRT.001.001.7814-7816. For Isobel Harvey's 'Report' see copies in Prince's Trust, PRT.001.001.2719-2728, and PRT.001.001.7638-7647; and in British Columbia Archives, MS2045, Box 1, File 14, 'Provincial Government Investigation 1938-45', BCA.001.001.0883-1030 and a copy in LAC, Immigration Branch, RG76, vol.376, file 510340, Pt 4, pp.144-153, indicating that it had also been supplied to the Government of Canada.

⁸⁵⁷ Prince's Trust, 'Report on study made of Fairbridge Farm School during the month of August 1944', by Isobel Harvey, PRT.001.001.2725.

⁸⁵⁸ SCAI statement by Mr Mackay, WIT.001.001.3474.

⁸⁵⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.3462-3463.

⁸⁶⁰ Reports of the meetings and related correspondence are also in file provided by British Columbia Archives, MS2045, Box 1, File 14, 'Provincial Government Investigation 1938-45', BCA.001.001.0899-0900, BCA.001.001.0910-0911.

⁸⁶¹ Walker to Taylor, 14 Sept 1944; Walker to Jolliffe, Director Immigration Branch, Ottawa, 10 Nov 1944 enclosing report: LAC, Immigration Branch, RG76, vol.376, file 510340, Pt 4, pp.137-138, 157-159, 164-165.

many specific criticisms of the Principal was that he had arranged or had not reported 'three alleged cases of removal of pregnancy'. Also 'unsupervised contact between children of opposite sexes' needed to be addressed, and greater care should be exercised in future to prevent sexual delinquency 'which has occurred too much in the past, and has given Fairbridge School such an unfavourable reputation'.⁸⁶² On 14 September Walker, as chair of this committee, wrote to his colleague Taylor, at Immigration, sending a copy of Harvey's report 'which I admit is rather shocking', in addition to which he referred to 'charges of homo-perversion and homo-sexuality' and to one former member of the staff at Fairbridge who 'is undergoing a sentence for homo-sexual practices'.⁸⁶³ Then, on 10 November 1944, Walker submitted his report to Taylor. It insisted that greater care was needed to prevent sexual delinquency at the school. A specially commissioned report by a psychiatrist had concluded that a proportion of the children sent from the UK were suffering from major physical or mental disabilities. (This was probably the report prepared by Dr Crease, upon which see para 13.50 above.) The local board of management should have complete authority over the school. The current Principal had failed to administer the school in a satisfactory manner. The policy of training children primarily for farming and domestic service was being applied too rigidly. The children were given too few opportunities to meet others outside the school, making it more difficult for them later to assimilate into the community outside 'in which they will eventually live and earn their living'. Recommendations included not just rectifying these failings, but also the need for closer co-operation between the Provincial Child Welfare Division and Fairbridge.

24.6 Meanwhile, in October 1944 Harvey's report had elicited a defensive response from Principal Logan. He set out a narrative of controversies about staffing, child care and allegations since November 1943, providing copies of related correspondence, and submitting a critique of Harvey's report. Likewise in his response, Gordon Green, Fairbridge's General Secretary, though expressing some concerns, was similarly critical of Harvey, provided a defence of the Principal, and referred to the damage caused by the Rogers case.⁸⁶⁴ But the serious allegations about sexual misconduct by pupils and possible cover-ups by Logan were not addressed.

⁸⁶² LAC, vol 503, Fairbridge Farm School, Jan-Sept 1944, p.22.

⁸⁶³ *Ibid*, pp.31-32.

⁸⁶⁴ See Logan and Green reports and correspondence, Aug-Nov 1944, PRT.001.001.2729-2784, 2824-2828, 2847-2852, 2879-2900, and again by Green, 24 Feb 1945, PRT.001.001.2795-2810. Copies of Green's 6 Nov 1944 critique of Harvey's report may also be found in PRT.001.001.3165-3177, and PRT.001.001.3284-3293, as well as in PRT.001.001.2772-2784. See also PRT.001.001.2884-2887, Harry

24.7 It should be noted that a further report in November 1944 by the Supervisor of Juvenile Immigration in Ottawa (who may have had immigration rather than child care priorities) was generally complimentary about the farm school's amenities, clothing, food, hygiene, medical care, and even aftercare. However, he stated that a strong local board should be put in place and implicitly that a new Principal was needed. And yet, while finding 'no definite evidence of immoral practices among the older boys and girls', he acknowledged cases of girls when placed in employment getting pregnant, of boys thieving, of two cases of 'immoral practice' by male members of staff, and of a cottage mother being dismissed for 'misconduct'. Nevertheless, his conclusions were still positive and 'Miss Harvey's report is an unfair representation of the conditions at Fairbridge'.⁸⁶⁵

24.8 However, by February 1945 Green was acknowledging after consultations in Ottawa with the UK High Commissioner and the Deputy Minister at the Federal Department of Immigration, and subsequently with other officials in British Columbia, that adjustments in the relationship between Fairbridge's London office and the management committee at the farm school were needed and that the authority of the Principal needed to be clarified. Also, because sexuality seemed a problem at the co-education and co-residence school 'we should transfer boys at puberty to Fintry', a separate farm school establishment.⁸⁶⁶

Logan, Principal at the Prince of Wales Farm School, to George Davidson, Director of Social Welfare in British Columbia from 1941 and the Deputy Minister of Welfare Rehabilitation in Ottawa from 1944, 14 June 1944, in which Logan objects to the Provincial Government contemplating more control over Fairbridge practice; and in reply Davidson's friendly but 'frank and outspoken' criticism of Fairbridge practice, 6 July 1944, PRT.001.001.3327-3332. This is followed up on 27 June 1944 by Logan informing Green in London of the exchange and acknowledging Davidson's impressive credentials, while still insisting that the British Columbia Government should recognise and support Fairbridge's distinctive childcare practices: file provided by Provincial Archives of British Columbia, MS2045, Box 1, File 14, pp.47-49. See also PRT.001.001.7712-7714, undated, and PRT.001.001.7715-7730, 11 September 1944, for minutes of the conference between the representatives of the Provincial Government and Fairbridge and related documents. See also file provided by Province of British Columbia's Archive Service, GR0496, Box 58, File 6, containing responses to the inquiry and the Harvey Report by Green and Logan, plus other related correspondence, 3 Oct 1944 -13 Dec 1944. GR0496, Box 58, File 7, follows on from 11 Jan 1945, concerning especially negotiated reforms to administrative practice involving Fairbridge in London and in British Columbia and the Provincial government, but also misbehaviour by Fairbridge girls and boys.

⁸⁶⁵ Letter to Taylor, 29 Nov 1944, referring to Scobie's appointment, and report by Scobie, 28 Dec 1944, LAC, Immigration Branch, RG76, vol.376, file 510340, Pt 4, pp.178, 243-249.

⁸⁶⁶ Prince's Trust, Green to Hendry, 24 Feb 1945, PRT.001.001.7693-7705; and Green's report to Fairbridge Executive Committee, 5 March 1945, minutes of Executive Committee 20 March, and report of further discussions by Green and Sir Charles Hambro with Principal Garnett, the local Board of Governors, and representatives of the Government of British Columbia and the Federal Government,

24.9 With SCAI's broader definition of abuse in mind, we should also note that Harvey had been seriously critical of facilities at the school: inadequate heating, poor toilet facilities, poor hygiene, an uninviting playroom, the poor clothing of the girls, children left dirty ('Some of them had such a heavy body odour that the nurse was sickened'), the poor health of many children, and badly prepared, insufficient and monotonous meals served on metal dishes and with drinks in metal mugs 'reminiscent of an orphanage of the last century' which made children feel 'underprivileged and different'.⁸⁶⁷ Mr Mackay also remembered tin plates – and finding maggots in porridge.⁸⁶⁸

24.10 Harvey in her report states that there 'appeared to be three very adequate cottage mothers as far as discipline, interest in their children and cleanliness are concerned', though all three lacked 'sensitivity to the emotional needs of children' and they 'scream and shout at the children constantly'.⁸⁶⁹ She was told by children that corporal punishment was common, of a cottage mother whipping with a stick an emotionally disturbed 12-year old boy for 'dawdling', and of girls of 12 or over being sent to a man for 'strapping'.⁸⁷⁰

24.11 Mr Mackay records that the cottage mother who first looked after him was 'very gentle and kind' and 'nurturing', but he was then subjected to the care of another cottage mother.⁸⁷¹ In his account he is adamant that 'Ma [REDACTED] ...should never have been near children.... It was a nightmare'. She fell into rages, and called the boys 'filthy little gutter snipes'. They were slapped or hit for trivial faults ('shirt untucked'); he was whipped on 'my bare back or butt'; 'frequently she used a leather belt'; boys were 'beaten up by her'; this 'treatment went on for four years'. Harvey

14 July 1945, PRT.001.001.3294-3306. Much of this related to provincial legislation, powers of the local Board of Governors, the new Principal, aftercare, Flintry, and (optimistically) the dispatch of further child migration parties. Green was back in British Columbia in 1946, producing a still cautiously optimistic account of current practice, developments and the future: 'Special Report to the Executive Committee', 13 Aug 1946, PRT.001.001.3045-3050. Malcolm MacDonald, High Commissioner, had first been alerted to problems at the Fairbridge Farm School in November 1944, and see also MacDonald to Joliffe, Director of Immigration at Ottawa: LAC, Immigration Branch, RG76, vol.376, file 510340, Pt 4, pp.174-175, 188.

⁸⁶⁷ Prince's Trust, Reports and correspondence between Fairbridge Farm Schools British Columbia and Department of Child Welfare, PRT.001.001.2719-2722.

⁸⁶⁸ SCAI, witness statement by Mackay, WIT.001.001.3464, 3467.

⁸⁶⁹ Prince's Trust, Reports and correspondence between Fairbridge Farm Schools British Columbia and Department of Child Welfare, PRT.001.001.2724.

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.2723.

⁸⁷¹ SCAI, statement by Mackay, WIT.001.001.3458, 3462.

also refers to enuresis being accepted in a fatalistic manner. On this Mr Mackay provides stark testimony – of Mrs CBB humiliating a boy for wetting his bed, which he stopped doing shortly after she left. Another cottage mother made a boy stand on a table with his wet sheet around him, and she made him shout: ‘I wet my bed. I wet my bed. I wet my bed’. There are, here, accusations of neglect, and of physical, psychological and emotional abuse.

24.12 All that Mr Mackay reported about CBB appears also in a witness statement by Mr Hugh Taylor. He was born in Gateshead, but to Glasgow parents, and after a spell at Middlemore he was dispatched to British Columbia. As had happened to Mr Mackay, Mr Taylor also initially had a kindly housemother but then had the ‘Ma CBB treatment. She was, he says, a ‘tyrant’ who beat boys’ bare bottoms. The sadistic cruelty of CBB and other adults caused such psychological and emotional distress as to lead to enuresis. Child migration, he concludes, ‘severely traumatized many of the children for life’.⁸⁷²

24.13 Five years later in 1949, much of what had disturbed Harvey in 1944 also alarmed E.M.Carbery, a psychiatric social worker.⁸⁷³ Her report on care and conditions at the farm school and on aftercare practices indicated that there were still serious grounds for concern. She judged that the farm school was in a ‘very isolated position’ and that by ‘Canadian standards’ the buildings were of poor quality and equipment inadequate. The toilet facilities were ‘very primitive’, dormitory arrangements unsuitable, and there were not even washing machines – ‘even the Indians in the reserve have these!’ Placing child migrants in such a place might itself be judged a form of abuse, particularly since, in her professional judgement, few of the children are ‘really normal and well-adjusted’. They had become ‘thoroughly institutionalised’, some having become so in the UK even before their transfer, never having known family life. Poor quality clothing also damaged self-respect, and poor education their futures. She was also critical of inconsistent and inappropriate disciplinary practices, and was concerned about the farm school’s inability to attract enough staff of quality. Children who by 1949 were placed out with foster parents did better, but those sent into employment had limited opportunities and struggled; and aftercare

⁸⁷² SCAI statement by Hugh Taylor, WIT.003.001.3713.

⁸⁷³ Prince’s Trust, Carbery to Irwin, 4 Oct 1949, PRT.001.001.3147-3150; and ‘E.M.Carbery, Report on Visit to the Prince of Wales Fairbridge Farm School, British Columbia, September-November 1949’, 3 Dec 1949, PRT.001.001.3318-3326. Vaughan, Director, to Fairbridge Management Committee, 14 Dec 1949, while expressing dismay, accepts most of what Carbery reports: PRT.001.001.3313-3317.

support was poor. Carbery had concluded that 'sex problems' at the farm school had diminished, but some children had been left affected, and the aftercare of girls was particularly worrying. Records indicated that unmarried former Fairbridge girls had a much higher rate of becoming pregnant than single girls of similar age in the Province. This, Carbery reckoned, was the result of life at Fairbridge with its failure to satisfy emotional needs and the repressive attitude of bad Cottage Mothers, together with a knowledge of sex or in some cases of knowledge gained in the wrong way at Fairbridge or earlier in life, compounded by unsuitable placements. We know that sex education classes had been introduced in 1946, but unmarried Fairbridge girls were still getting pregnant.⁸⁷⁴ Sexual relationships, and not just sexual abuse, were hard things for managers to manage.

24.14 It is proper to add a further insight into abuse. Oral testimony presented to IICSA by the daughter of one girl sent to the school referred to her mother telling her that she knew of boys and girls being sexually abused, but also saying that she would have got into trouble if she had reported what she had experienced, because she knew that her letters home were read and censored.⁸⁷⁵ Keeping silent, not reporting, for fear of punishment on top of abuse, was a way of surviving if not of coping with trauma. Mr Mackay similarly states that neither he nor others dared to report the abuse at the time, and also that what he had endured seriously affected him later in life, sufficient for him to need counselling. The legacy prompted him to become a 'spokesman for the abused' – and for those at risk: 'Vulnerable children need protection'.⁸⁷⁶ There is also a poignant record in the diary of St Martha's convent in Aberdeen, ██████████ 1984, of two sisters, both of them by then grandmothers, who had come over on a visit from Canada. ██████████ and ██████████ had been taken into care at the convent in 1932, one aged 2 and the other just 10 months old. In

⁸⁷⁴ On this see Principal Logan's Annual Report, 17 Nov 1943, PRT.001.001.2709, and copy in file provided by British Columbia Archives, MS2045, Box 1, File 14; W.D.Armitage, 'Report on Illegitimate Pregnancies of Fairbridge Girls', 20 Sept 1948, PRT.001.001.0729-0731; draft letter, chair to Logan, n.d., referring to the ' "casualty rate" amongst our girls', and to Armitage and others 'doing their utmost' to deal with the problem, PRT.001.001.0725-0728,; and PRT.001.001.0707 on two cases reported in June 1948 and PRT.001.001.0718-0724 for related correspondence on how to address this matter.

PRT.001.001.3271-3272, 17 June 1947, and the related PRT.001.001.3273-3278 are reports by the recently appointed Principal Garnett, who was opposed to co-ed; and PRT.001.001.3269-3270, Winona Armitage, Superintendent of Child Welfare, BC (in succession to Harvey) who dismisses his assertions, 18 June 1947. See also MH102/2253, 'John Moss: Fairbridge Farm Schools Scheme in Canada', Armitage to Miss Rosling, Home Office 19 Jan 1949, pp.61-62.

⁸⁷⁵ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcript of oral testimony by Patricia Skidmore, 9 March 2017, pp.149-150.

⁸⁷⁶ SCAI, statement by Mackay, WIT.001.001.3460, 3447, 3479-3481, 3484.

1935, when aged five and four, they had been sent to the Fairbridge Farm School in British Columbia. 'On asking how they remembered St Martha's, ██████ replied it was the only place where I was really happy'.⁸⁷⁷

24.15 Deliberations on the future of the farm school continued. A report dated March 1948 by Dr Leonard Marsh, a member of the Department of Social Work at the University of British Columbia, reckoned that new policies had been initiated recently and there were signs of 'remarkable progress', including in aftercare provision, though educational reforms and amenities still needed improving.⁸⁷⁸ However, faced with financial problems and growing uncertainty about the role of a farm school and the attraction in British Columbia of fostering, in November 1948 the local Board of Governors recommended its closure.⁸⁷⁹ In July 1949 and following his unofficial visit to the farm school and talks with local childcare professionals, who had impressed him, John Moss also advised the Home Office that the way forward was boarding out those children still at the farm school with foster parents.⁸⁸⁰ The London Executive had little choice but to accept, and from July 1949 operations were wound down.⁸⁸¹ The subsequent aftercare of Fairbridge 'graduates' placed out seems not to have been the subject of later inquiry.

24.16 It is obvious from the close involvement in the farm school's troubled history by officers of the Provincial Government of British Columbia, of the Canadian Government and of the Fairbridge Society in London that the closure of the Prince of Wales Farm School was well-known to policy-makers in the UK. There were lessons to be learnt by all involved, especially by Fairbridge and by departments of the UK government who were certainly made aware of what had occurred, including by the

⁸⁷⁷ Aberdeen Council, St Martha's Convent Diary, ██████ 1984, ABN.001.001.1773. It is possible that this record is not quite accurate, if these two elderly ladies were in fact ██████ ' and ██████ who were both in the care of St Martha's in Aberdeen and who both left for British Columbia in ██████ 1936 (not 1935) when ██████ was age six (not five) and ██████ age five (not four). See para 16.38 above and references to Middlemore records.

⁸⁷⁸ Prince's Trust, Leonard Marsh, 'Report on Fairbridge Farm School', March 1948, PRT.001.001.3100-3129. However, Minutes of Child Care Committee in London, 26 March 1948 record concerns by Fairbridge about where responsibility lay for Fairbridge girls by then being placed in foster homes by a local Children's Aid Society, subsidised by Fairbridge, PRT.001.001.7504, 7506, 7510. Copy of Marsh report also provided by British Columbia Archives, MS2045, Box 1, File 15.

⁸⁷⁹ Dunae, 'Waifs', pp.246-247.

⁸⁸⁰ TNA, MH102/2253, 'John Moss, Fairbridge Farm Schools Scheme in Canada', especially Moss to Ross, 15 July 1949, memo by Moss, and Irwin, Fairbridge Society, to Walsh-Atkins, CRO, 26 Aug 1949, pp.33-34, 42-48.

⁸⁸¹ For the closing in Aug 1949 see PRT.001.001.3307-3312.

UK High Commissioner in Ottawa.⁸⁸² However, we have not seen any documents to suggest child abuse in British Columbia affected child care practice by Fairbridge in Australia or made the UK government more alert to risk.

24.17 IICSA's report reviews the presented evidence concerning (only) sexual abuse and concluded that

Fairbridge UK understood the need to respond appropriately to reports of child sexual abuse. By 1945, Fairbridge UK knew that several migrants at Fairbridge BC had been – and potentially were still being – sexually abused. However, Fairbridge UK failed to examine the wider context of these complaints of sexual abuse and general ill-treatment of children, which it knew about. Although in some ways Fairbridge UK sought to respond to the issues raised, it did not, for example, implement the recommendation to have trained social workers on the staff.⁸⁸³

⁸⁸² TNA, DO35/1137, 'Fairbridge Farm School Vancouver - Resumption of Migration of Children to Canada for Fairbridge Schools'; LAC, RG76, vol.376, film 510340, Pt 4, Macdonald to Jolliffe, 20 Dec 1944, p.188; TNA, DO35/10279, 'Prince of Wales Fairbridge Farm School, Vancouver Island, British Columbia, esp. pp.13, 41-49. See also paras 16.38-16.41 above.

⁸⁸³ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, p.82.

25 | Child Abuse: Northcote Farm School, Bacchus Marsh, Victoria

25.1 In 1932, Lady Alice Northcote, wife of a former Governor-General of Australia, had established a trust to assist child migration from 'any part of Great Britain' to Australia. By 1936 a farm, 40 miles from Melbourne, had been gifted to the trust and Fairbridge agreed to operate in Britain as its sending agency. In 1937 the first party of 28 boys arrived at the Northcote Farm School at Glenmore, Bacchus Marsh. By 1958 the total had risen to 273, mainly boys but also girls. They were accommodated in a dozen cottages on site, with the farm and a school close by.⁸⁸⁴ As recorded earlier (para 10.20 above), we know that 15 boys had been sent there by Aberdeen Public Assistance Committee by 1939, and our speculation is that post-war perhaps another 15 children from Scotland may have been transferred to this institution, making 30 in all.

25.2 In May 1943 the UK High Commission was informed, via the Fairbridge Society, that the Northcote Trust had learnt that one of the cottage mothers had alleged serious malpractice at the farm school.⁸⁸⁵ The report was forwarded on to the Dominions Office. It prompted Colonel Heath, the Principal, to resign, at the request of the local trustees, indicating that they took the matter seriously. Subsequently, Garnett at the High Commission paid a visit to the school, following which he reported his findings to the Dominions Office in London.⁸⁸⁶ He had learnt that even the Northcote trustees in Melbourne were concerned. They considered the children received were often badly selected, that the agricultural training provided by the school was inappropriate since future work prospects on farms in this area were limited, and there were scanty opportunities for the children in their care to adapt by meeting Australian children. Garnett was also astonished to discover that under the

⁸⁸⁴ Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, pp.164-166, 171, 364.

⁸⁸⁵ Extracts from the report may be contained in an undated, redacted and poorly reproduced document provided to SCAI by the Prince's Trust. It refers to the poor after-care of girls placed in employment but left at risk of abuse and a lack of health care for an epileptic boy: PRT.001.001.7819-7821. The office may also have been informed by Gordon Green, secretary of the Fairbridge Society. For a more detailed and contextualised examination of abuse at Northcote Farm School, and elsewhere, see Appendix 2, Section 2.

⁸⁸⁶ TNA, DO35/1138/M.1019/1 'Northcote Farm School, Victoria: Resignation of Col Heath', Garnett, High Commission Office, to Wiseman, Dominions Office, 4 June 1943, pp.133-139. For a more detailed and contextualised examination of abuse at Northcote Farm School, and elsewhere, see Appendix 2, Section 2.

State of Victoria's current legislation the Child Welfare Department had no legal control over children's institutions, so no inspections had been carried out. Powers were only secured with the passing of the 1946 Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act. However, Garnett also met the chief inspector of schools whose department did have inspection powers, and they had been 'very shocked' at the behaviour of teachers with girls at the school.⁸⁸⁷ After a police inquiry, those teachers had been dismissed, and criminal procedures were pending.⁸⁸⁸ There were also impressions that the children subsequently placed in employment were not doing well. Garnett also learnt that conditions at the dairy had been so poor that children had fallen sick. In sum, in Garnett's opinion, 'something was radically wrong with the internal management of the Farm School', and the trustees had failed to exercise sufficient supervision.⁸⁸⁹ One of the problems, Garnett concluded, was that the Northcote trustees in London had lost control over Australian operations (and, referring to Molong, he felt that the Fairbridge Society was similarly handicapped).

25.3 Subsequently, in May 1944 there was a further visit to the Northcote Farm School by Garnett, this time accompanying a representative of the Australian Commonwealth Government, R.H. Wheeler. This was part of a wider review of farm schools in Australia. Wheeler's inspection report was submitted on 12 May 1944 and passed on to the Dominions Office.⁸⁹⁰ In this he stated that he had first learned about the sexual abuse allegations from Garnett whilst undertaking this visit. These he described as having involved four girls aged at the time 13 and 14, and the prosecution of a single teacher on four counts of having carnal knowledge of them (although Garnett mentions schoolmasters in the plural in his original 1943 report). The teacher was subsequently acquitted, and immediately moved to another school. The court proceedings are reported to have led to Colonel Heath's resignation. Subsequently, girls involved in the court cases were also reported to have been found in bed in cottage homes with 'old boys' returning to the Farm School, even though the cottage mother also lived in the cottage. Wheeler notes that one of the

⁸⁸⁷ TNA, DO35/1138/M.1019/1, 'Northcote Farm School, Victoria: Resignation of Col Heath', p.136 in the file.

⁸⁸⁸ Under the 1928 Crimes Act in Victoria, operating at that time, it was a serious criminal offence for a man to engage in sexual conduct with a girl under the age of consent – which was 16. Offences committed by a girl's teacher were regarded as an aggravated case, potentially leading to 15 years imprisonment: Boxall *et al*, *Historical Review*, p.73, <https://aic.gov.au/publications/special/007>.

⁸⁸⁹ TNA, DO35/1138/M.1019/1, p.138 in the file.

⁸⁹⁰ TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M.1107/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School W.Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', Confidential report on visit to Northcote Children's Farm School, 8/9th May, 1944, pp.174-179.

girls was reported to have said that a man living next door to her in England had sexual intercourse with her before she came to Australia at the age of 8. Not sharing the view of local school staff that this implies that the girl concerned was 'inherently bad', Wheeler dismissed her story as a fabrication intended to impress her friends, but he also recorded other matters which might qualify as neglect and therefore abuse. While the children looked healthy, the boys especially looked untidy, needed better footwear and overall their general appearance should be improved. Food was satisfactory, but not table manners, and he wished the cottages felt 'more homely'.⁸⁹¹ In wartime there were problems getting suitable staff, but the new Principal was also concerned that too much educational emphasis was still being placed on training for agricultural careers or as domestic servants. It is worth noting that Garnett in his subsequent report on farm schools in October 1944 also recorded that after child migrants 'graduated' from Northcote and were placed out in employment they do not seem to have been well-prepared: the results were said to be too often 'unsatisfactory'.⁸⁹² This may imply youngsters in distress.

25.4 These documents indicate that officials employed by the State of Victoria, at the UK High Commission and in the Dominions Office in 1943 and 1944 were aware of a range of abuses to which child migrants, including any from Scotland, had been exposed when resident at Bacchus Marsh. An inadequate inspection regime had put their health at risk, they were being poorly prepared for futures in Australia, and there had been serious allegations of sexual abuse. Because of wartime conditions, falling numbers and perhaps concerns about children's well-being, in 1944 all the children at Bacchus Marsh were transferred to the Fairbridge farm at Molong, where the 'atmosphere is all that could be desired', according to the High Commissioner, relying on the review of all farm schools in Australia which Garnett had submitted in October 1944.⁸⁹³

25.5 However, a Home Office file indicates that in 1947, when child migration was about to resume and the Northcote Farm School re-opened, the Northcote trustees in London were keen to adapt their child migration practices to bring them into line with post-war thinking on childcare in the UK.⁸⁹⁴ To that effect among other

⁸⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.177.

⁸⁹² *Ibid*, Garnett, 'Report on Farm Schools in Australia', 6 Oct 1944, LEG.001.002.0252.

⁸⁹³ *Ibid*, High Commissioner to Dominions Office, 28 June 1944.

⁸⁹⁴ For what follows see TNA, MH102/1591 'Northcote Farm School', pp.9-10 in file, memo by Janette Maxwell, 27 Oct 1947, following meeting with Miss Grenfell, London secretary of the Northcote Farm School.

strategies and at the organisation's request, an already experienced member of staff at Bacchus Marsh attended a staff training course for house-mothers provided through the Home Office. On her return to Australia in June 1948, Miss Tempe Woods organised a course, bringing in outside expertise as necessary to teach a curriculum based on the Curtis committee report on staff training and including lectures by Miss Woods on the Curtis Report itself. Good reports were received on her work. But it seems a new Principal then rejected the principles she had been teaching and drove her to resign in 1950. In her letter to the Home Office explaining all this, she stated that since her departure she was aware that children, even the emotionally fragile, were being strapped for misdemeanours. She advised the Home Office that it was of the 'utmost importance' to check that practice at institutions overseas was acceptable before allowing child migrants to be sent.⁸⁹⁵

25.6 In spite of the warning, the UK government outfits and maintenance agreements with the Northcote trustees were re-signed in March 1949 and several times subsequently until the last expired, probably in 1961.⁸⁹⁶ But perhaps as an indication of improvement, it should be recalled that among the confidential reports which the Ross Committee sent to the Commonwealth Office and to the government of Australia in 1956 were some recording some good or at least acceptable practice at some institutions - and the Northcote Farm School at Glenmore, Bacchus Marsh, was one of the few.⁸⁹⁷

⁸⁹⁵ TNA, MH102/1594, 'Northcote Farm School – Changes in Administration', especially Tempe Woods to Children's Department, Home Office, 14 June 1950, pp.11-12 in file.

⁸⁹⁶ TNA, DO35/10241, 'Northcote Children's Emigration Fund for Australia', contains these up to an expiry date on 31 May 1957, and TNA, DO35/10243, 'Northcote Children's Emigration Fund for Australia: financial and legal matters', for renewals in 1957 and 1960.

⁸⁹⁷ TNA, DO35/6382, "Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia", pp.305-306. Copy also in TNA, BN29/1325, 'Addendum to Report of 1956 Fact Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia'.

26 | Child Abuse: Fairbridge Farm School, Pinjarra, Western Australia

26.1 The Pinjarra Farm School was the first Fairbridge institution, opened in 1912 but moved to a larger site in 1921. Like all Fairbridge institutions in Australia, child migrants, boys and separately girls, were accommodated in large wooden 'cottage homes' containing a dormitory, bathroom, kitchen and dining/common room. Each cottage was managed by a house mother, and on site was the Principal's house, a school and farm buildings close by.⁸⁹⁸ We are aware that between 1912 and 1960 as many as 1521 children (unaccompanied by parents) had been sent to Pinjarra from the UK, and certainly some were from Scotland.⁸⁹⁹ We have no figures in total for how many Fairbridge child migrants who were sent to Australia had Scottish origins, but have suggested a speculative 80 destined for its two farm schools at Pinjarra and Molong.

26.2 Because Garnett had been concerned about Colonel Heath's poor management of the Northcote Farm School, he also raised doubts in June 1943 about the well-being of children at Pinjarra where Heath had previously been the Principal.⁹⁰⁰ He had reasons for concern. As reported earlier, Gordon Green, a senior Fairbridge Society officer in London, had compiled from correspondence received from past and present members of staff a dossier of complaints and concerns about the poor standards of education, training and aftercare of children at Pinjarra dating back to 1943.⁹⁰¹ These suggested significant problems with its management, and the Fairbridge London office raised these matters with the Dominions Office in November 1943, who in turn proposed to the High Commission that an inspection should be conducted. This is indicative of Fairbridge and the UK government apparently taking seriously their duty of care, but follow-up action was slow (there was a war going on).

26.3 In fact, what eventually occurred on the ground was a comprehensive review by Garnett of farm schools in Australia, completed in October 1944, but he had

⁸⁹⁸ For descriptions of Pinjarra and other Fairbridge institutions see Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, including plan of the site, p.125, and Hill, *Forgotten Children*.

⁸⁹⁹ Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, p.265; Dunae, 'Waifs', p.236

⁹⁰⁰ TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M.1107/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School in Western Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', LEG.001.002.0001-0288.

⁹⁰¹ The dossier is described in Sherington and Jeffrey, *Fairbridge*, pp.202-203, and is included in DO35/1330 (formerly M1107/1/3), 'Fairbridge Farm School'.

evidently provided the High Commissioner with some initial impressions. These were contained in a telegram from the High Commissioner to the Dominions Office in June 1944, in which he revealed that 'Pinjarra has concealed adverse facts, that many boys are in reformatories, and that every possible difficulty has been encountered there'.⁹⁰² He also alluded to 'disturbing stories' concerning unnamed staff and/or pupils. These probably related to extracts he had received from a confidential report undertaken by Caroline Kelly for the Australian Commonwealth Government

... which shows that all charges referred to in the dossier are within knowledge of Commonwealth Government. Report advises that no further children be admitted to Pinjarra until an overhaul of present administration has been made, and states that 'responsible Government officers, members of churches and persons previously on staff' all concurred that grave state of affairs existed, but that knowledge had been concealed for fear that scheme might be damaged and financial backing suffer; that Secretary and Committee were evasive, and latter 'positively ignorant of its responsibilities'; that the acting principal...has not the necessary qualifications; that disturbing stories should be investigated by 'some directly representing Governments who contribute'; that needful changes could quite easily be effected with a minimum of publicity, working on theory that what is past is gone; that a separate investigation should be made of management of such funds as Old Fairbridgean Benevolent Fund and the Principal's Fund.⁹⁰³

Kelly had also commented on what she saw as the lax oversight of a hostel for old boys and girls at Pinjarra (presumably aged 16 and over) which 'stamps the Committee as positively ignorant of its responsibilities'. She continued by saying that:

Delinquency [i.e. sexual activity] is naturally not unknown and there have been many cases of girls becoming unmarried mothers. Of these, Mrs Joyner [the wife of the Chairman of the local Fairbridge committee] explained, 'If a girl disgraces Fairbridge she is expelled'. An easy way, no doubt, of shelving the responsibility.

⁹⁰² TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M.1107/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School W.Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', telegram UK High Commission to Dominions Office, 28 June 1944, esp pp.190-191 in file.

⁹⁰³ *Ibid*, pp.192-193 The material released in confidence to him, for the information of the Dominions Office, is referred to in this NAA file, p.13, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Gallery151/dist/JGalleryViewer.aspx?B=950258&S=1&N=91&R=0#/SearchNRetrieve/NAAMedia/ShowImage.aspx?B=950258&T=P&S=13>

Reliable authority stated that such girls were taken by the Salvation Army or Roman Catholic Foundling Home.⁹⁰⁴

Given that girls usually left Fairbridge at the age of 16 to be placed out with employers as domestic workers, the reference to expulsion here implies a reference to girls still resident at the Pinjarra Farm School under the age of 16. Under the 1913 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act, operative at that time in Western Australia, defilement by men of girls under 16 and indecent dealing with girls under 16 were criminal offences subject to two years' imprisonment if the offender was aged under 21 and up to five years' imprisonment if the offender was older.⁹⁰⁵

26.4 The reporting on practice at Pinjarra that had taken place suggests that the UK and Australian authorities, and indeed the Fairbridge Society in London, were aware of their responsibilities. But there was no follow up to the recommendation of the UK High Commission on 28 June 1944 that a proper investigation should be carried out by representatives of the Fairbridge Society in London and by the UK and Australian governments. Nor are we aware of any further response by the Australian authorities to the Kelly report. And this, in the war years, was before child migration resumed and before political pressure was exerted to increase supply.

26.5 It is worth recording a final comment made by Garnett in his report to the High Commissioner on farm schools in Australia which was endorsed by Gordon Green, representing the Fairbridge organisation. Garnett had written that 'the fact that the children sent to the Farm Schools were children from orphanages and rescue organisations in the United Kingdom has been responsible for the tendency in some quarters in Australia to look upon these children as waifs and strays'.⁹⁰⁶ Green's elaboration is even starker:

Not only have they found themselves despised as outcasts from Britain, but advantage has been taken of their low status to employ them at a lower wage than that given to an Australian doing similar work. An instance which bears out that charge is given by two After-care Officers who finding an Old Fairbridgian doing a skilled and responsible job on a Station for 17/6 a week asked the employer why he paid the young man that wage when he paid his Australians

⁹⁰⁴ NAA, A436, 1945/5/54, 'Child Migration Organisations in Australia: Survey by Mrs C.Kelly', NAA-000000028, quotation on p.51.

⁹⁰⁵ Boxall et al, *Historical Review*, p.85, <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/230ca156-daa5-4877-83cb-c2e92670ba89/Historical-review-of-sexual-offence-and-child-sexu>

⁹⁰⁶ TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M.1107/1/2), report by Garnett, p.264 in file.

£3 a week. The unabashed reply was 'Ah, but he is only a Fairbridge boy'.... The prejudice certainly cannot be overcome until the Farm School and its pupils and proteges are given a place in the community free from the handicaps of the lot of the despised class.⁹⁰⁷

Why this was the case is not of central importance for our purpose. What matters is the emotional and psychological abuse of Fairbridge migrants and the damage suffered to self-respect, reminiscent of that which child migrants to Canada had also too often experienced.

26.6 From other documents we know that post-war two former Fairbridge employees also expressed their concerns about the well-being of Fairbridge children. Mrs Lucy Cole-Hamilton, who had worked at Pinjarra from 1934 to 1945, was prompted in October 1947 to write to the Home Office on hearing that child migration was to be resumed.⁹⁰⁸ She was critical of the accommodation at Pinjarra, the poor equipment and the overcrowding, and she was concerned about the quality of many of the staff. She did not think that the system she knew was conducive to children's happiness, and she asked how supervision and inspection were to be exercised when child migrants were overseas. These were always highly pertinent issues. Indeed, following a visit to Pinjarra by a delegation from London headed by Sir Charles Hambro, he reported to the Fairbridge Executive Committee in London in December 1947 that Pinjarra needed 'extensive reconstruction'.⁹⁰⁹ The cottages in which children were housed needed bringing 'up to modern standards', the farm itself was 'out of date', and the management was disheartened.

26.7 Then in January 1949 the Home Office received an even more authoritative statement of concerns.⁹¹⁰ This came from Mr Dallas Paterson who brought to his criticisms his experiences as a former Principal at Pinjarra, 1936-37. He raised issues concerning selection, welfare, education, integration, employment and the importance of aftercare. This last was a matter upon which he had insisted on improving while at Pinjarra, and had expressed in a report he had written in 1936.⁹¹¹

⁹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* report by Green, p.265 in file.

⁹⁰⁸ TNA, MH102/1557, 'Emigration of Children: Information about Fairbridge Farm School, Western Australia, given to Home Office by Former Worker', letter of 10 Oct 1947, LEG.001.006.0934-0935; and minutes 15 Dec 1947, LEG.001.006.0926-0927.

⁹⁰⁹ Prince's Trust, Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive Committee, 16 Dec 1947, p.5, PRT.001.001.2248.

⁹¹⁰ TNA, MH102/2251, 'Emigration of Children – Fairbridge Farm Scheme: memorandum by a former Principal of Pinjarra, Western Australia'.

⁹¹¹ On Paterson, his career and this 1936 report see Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, pp.145-147.

This had involved an analysis of Pinjarra cases and included mention of 15 girls who had become pregnant presumably soon after leaving. But in 1949 Paterson was particularly fierce about the location of responsibility:

It cannot be overemphasised that those taking responsibility to send British children overseas must retain a sense of direct responsibility. They must never be lulled into trusting any overseas authority to assume their responsibility. It cannot be delegated. Let the Home authority or society commission the higher staff directly to act for the home authority or society to protect the rights and privileges of children sent overseas. Let the behaviour of Perth, W.A. Committee towards Fairbridge children and the failure of a Principal to protect his wards be a warning.⁹¹²

We are not aware of the episode to which he is referring. However, it is pertinent to this Inquiry in emphasising the need for the Principal to be independent of a local committee and the importance of aftercare that he appended to his report the case histories of two girls put at risk of sexual abuse by predators associated with local committee members. Vigilance and the independent authority of the sending society were evidently essential if children were to be properly protected from harm. On the other hand, from what we have recorded so far in our Report, we know it was also very hard for a Principal to be authoritative and obtain local backing and at the same time to secure the informed and rapid support of Fairbridge in London.

26.8 In 1952 as part of his tour of inspection of institutions in Australia, John Moss visited Pinjarra and sent a report on it to the Home Office. He noted with regret that siblings were allocated to separate buildings, but his comments on the poor provision for contacts outside the farm school and the insufficiency, inadequacy and difficulties in getting staff are quite strongly expressed, this last sufficient to cause 'alarm' in the High Commission and indeed in the Department of Immigration.⁹¹³ In his 1953 final report Moss refers to staffing problems as a general problem at cottage homes, but other concerns he had raised earlier are set aside. The Ross Committee report in 1956 did not refer explicitly to child abuse at Pinjarra, not even in its confidential reports, and on the whole they regarded the place as pleasant and generally well-run. But the isolation of the farm school, 60 miles from Perth, was implicitly regarded as detrimental to the well-being of child migrants and yet the Principal failed 'to recognise the value of outside contacts'. Moreover, it was also

⁹¹² TNA, MH102/2251, 'Emigration of Children – Fairbridge Farm Scheme: memorandum by a former Principal of Pinjarra, Western Australia'. p.3 in file, emphases in the original.

⁹¹³ TNA, MH102/2041, 'Emigration of Children: Reports by Mr John Moss'.

implied that the well-being of children was not being secure since he 'shows a lack of appreciation of current thought on child care'.⁹¹⁴

26.9 Later, in May 1981, a former cottage mother at Pinjarra wrote to Fairbridge's London office raising complaining about care practices.⁹¹⁵ By this time, children at the farm school had been admitted under a family scheme, which received UK as well as Australian financial support, by which child migrants were accompanied to Australia by a parent. Her concerns, endorsed by two women colleagues, referred to the poor and even dangerous condition of buildings and facilities at the farm school, to the appointment of unqualified and unsuitable staff, to the terms of her own employment, and to the current Principal's lack of engagement with such matters. More specifically she objected to the way in which a newly appointed Welfare Officer (about whose qualifications for the post she had doubts) was insisting that children in residence should raise only with him any concerns they might have, and not with house mothers, which, she said, had been past practice. She also doubted whether he had the medical qualifications to carry out the physical examination of teenage girls, about which the girls had complained.⁹¹⁶ The three women were interviewed, by Mr Roskill, a senior Fairbridge officer in London, on behalf of the Director, and he took seriously their concerns (though his report makes no reference to the physical examination of the teenage girls).⁹¹⁷ The Fairbridge Society secretary in New South Wales, Mr Gorey, was contacted and requested to carry out an investigation. We can deduce from his eventual response, in October 1981, that he had not initially bothered to reply to London's request, claiming that it had been 'tacitly agreed' that the matter should be 'let to rest'.⁹¹⁸ He still dismissed the matter, claiming that no parents had complained, that Pinjarra was being run down anyway, that although the Principal, Mr Lines, was not good at his job it would not be possible to hire a replacement, and that there was therefore no purpose in pursuing the matter. From these sources it seems that Fairbridge in London was unable to insist that Fairbridge in Western Australia should address London's concerns. By December 1981,

⁹¹⁴ TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', 1949.

⁹¹⁵ Prince's Trust, 'Extracts from minutes of a meeting of the Council of the Fairbridge Society, 31 March 1981' PRT.001.001.7785, and 'Extract from minutes of a meeting of the Council of the Fairbridge Society, 19 May 1981', PRT.001.001.7787.

⁹¹⁶ Prince's Trust, letter by complainant, 24 Aug 1981, PRT.001.001.6540-6544.

⁹¹⁷ Prince's Trust, 'Miss K. Butcher's Complaints about Pinjarra. Memorandum of a meeting at Bush House, 24 August 1981' by A.J.S. Roskill, PRT.001.001.6545-6547.

⁹¹⁸ *Ibid*, minutes of Fairbridge Council meeting, 19 Oct 1981, PRT.001.001.7789-7790; and letter by Gorey, 27 Oct 1981, PRT.001.001.6548-6549.

Fairbridge had decided to cease all activities at Pinjarra, the farm was sold, and assets transferred back to the UK.⁹¹⁹

26.10 Six witnesses at the IICSA inquiry in 2017 spoke of sexual abuse while at Pinjarra.⁹²⁰ There are references to girls being subjected to sexual molestation by older girls, by male members of staff, by a foster parent, by an aftercare officer, and one girl even by her sister-in-law. When put out to work, but still a Fairbridge responsibility, a girl was raped. Boys referred to anal rape and obscene acts by older boys and predatory adults, including a school teacher, an Anglican priest, a farm manager and other employees, and of a cottage mother watching while adolescent boys showered, leaving one boy feeling ashamed. There were damaging life-long legacies of such abuse.

26.11 The first of the four witness statements provided to SCAI by former Scottish child migrants has been provided by Mr MIN [REDACTED] born in [REDACTED] 1944, sent to Pinjarra in 1955 aged 11, and resident there until 1961, leaving when he was 16.⁹²¹ His opening sentence is bleak: 'I rarely speak about my childhood at Fairbridge in any detail because of the darker aspects that coloured my overall experience.... Neither my wife nor any of my close friends have any idea other than the fact that there were some very difficult times.'⁹²²

26.12 He reports that he was subjected to frequent cruelty and deprivation by his cottage mother, Mrs MIO [REDACTED]. She was, he writes, a violent bully. Some cottage mothers would send misbehaving children to the Principal for appropriate corporal punishment, but she chose to do the job herself, using a 3-foot length from a black leather hosepipe. Mr MIN [REDACTED] writes that she kept it in a drawer and used it to 'administer beltings', and they were random and sudden, 'whenever the mood took her', the violence being verbal as well as physical.⁹²³ 'She would grab me by the hair, or by one arm, whilst she flogged me all over my body with the hosepipe, causing bruises, welts and a great deal of pain and humiliation.'⁹²⁴ She was also emotionally

⁹¹⁹ Legislative Assembly, Western Australia, Select Committee into Child Migration, *Interim Report*, November 1996, pp.63-66.

⁹²⁰ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcripts of oral testimony, by Marcelle O'Brien, 28 Feb 2017, pp.11-12, 49-50; by A2, written evidence read, 28 Feb 2017, pp.71-74; by [REDACTED], 28 Feb 2017, pp.87-91; by A4, 1 March 2017, pp.5, 7-21; by A12, written evidence read, 2 March 2017, p.64; by A3, 7 March 2017, pp.151-152, 156-157.

⁹²¹ SCAI statement by Mr MIN [REDACTED] WIT.003.001.2669-2671.

⁹²² *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2669.

⁹²³ *Ibid*.

⁹²⁴ *Ibid*.

abusive. It was offensive that she tried to insist that he called her 'mum', which she was not. Perhaps in response she told the boys in her care that they were there because 'our mothers didn't want us'.⁹²⁵ This was more of an insult because she behaved in a most unmotherly way. She also personally supervised when the boys each morning boys had showers, even when they were teenagers, past puberty: 'I always felt very uncomfortable with her around, felt she was leering inappropriately'.⁹²⁶

26.13 Mr **MIN** was also sexually abused when he was about 13 by an older and violent boy (whom he names). He describes in grim detail how he was raped and forced into horrific sexual activity with this boy in the dormitory and bathroom in the cottage, and he was not the only victim. This boy also did other perverted things, including bestiality with a horse, making young **MIN** a witness. One consequence of all this abuse was that he started wetting the bed. The humiliation of washing his sheets and putting his mattress outside for all to see added to his misery, with Mrs **MIO** being characteristically cold and punitive.

26.14 As a boy, Mr **MIN** reports that he was academically bright. He passed exams easily and qualified to continue into secondary education. But he writes that because he seemed to succeed with little effort he was judged to be lazy, and he was pulled out of school and made to go out to work. He wanted to become a school teacher but he ended up working in non-professional roles until he educated himself later in life. He concludes that his experiences at Pinjarra left him with a burning sense of injustice and an anger which took a heavy toll on his emotional development as a young man. It left him feeling deeply ashamed and traumatised. It is disturbing to read in his summing up that 'It would kill me if my sons, or even my wife were ever to know of the appalling and disgusting things that happened to me'.⁹²⁷

26.15 Mr **MIN** born in **MIN** 1930, arrived in Pinjarra in **MIN** 1937, age six.⁹²⁸ Aged 78 when he wrote his statement, he summarises his treatment as 'abusive, harsh and cruel',⁹²⁹ and he states that he learnt to survive by trusting no one and relying only on himself. By way of explanation of these outcomes he

⁹²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹²⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2670.

⁹²⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2671.

⁹²⁸ SCAI statement by Mr **MIN** WIT.003.001.2753-2757.

⁹²⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2753.

describes several causes. He was, he writes, subjected to serious discomfort. Not allowed to wear shoes, his feet suffered and needed repeated treatment. He also alleges that he was subject to repeated violence. There was no love or nurturing from his house mother, just 'all rules and slapping, a lot of slapping'.⁹³⁰ He was belted by the sports master with a leather strap, which left black and blue welts on legs and buttocks, and the Principal caned him for 'stealing' an apple and an orange from the orchard, the temptation being that the food provided was 'disgusting'.⁹³¹ This was not a safe environment in which to grow up. He refers not just to bullying by older boys, but being forced to take their pants down and touch their genitals, leaving [REDACTED] upset and confused. The stress he experienced at Pinjarra may account for him wetting the bed, until he was 13. Amongst the causes would also be his sense of inferiority, believing he was an orphan because that is what he had been told – though it was not true, as he was much later to discover. Nor was his education even up to basic standards. When he left Fairbridge he says he could barely write a letter, but in what seems to be an aftercare report that he later read he seems to have improved greatly after he left Pinjarra, which as he says seems to indicate that he was 'not a dull boy incapable of learning'.⁹³² But this educational failing, along with others, meant that he did not receive appropriate training to fit him for a future in the world of work. Indeed, he insists that Pinjarra did not even ensure that the working conditions at the places of employment to which he was sent from the age of 14 met the expected standards of the day, let alone ensure that those he worked for would not molest or maltreat a teenage boy, as evidently some did.

26.16 Mrs [REDACTED] was born on [REDACTED] 1945.⁹³³ The premature death of her father left her mother, age 44, struggling to manage her six children. Hoping to do the best for [REDACTED] she was attracted by the 'education and opportunities' in Australia marketed by Fairbridge, though these 'turned out to be lies from beginning to end'.⁹³⁴ [REDACTED] left for Pinjarra in [REDACTED] 1958, when she was 12, arriving in April, and her mother, probably taking advantage of the Fairbridge one-parent scheme, followed, arriving in July, but evidently living and working some distance away. On arrival, [REDACTED] own smart clothes in her suitcase were replaced with hand-me-downs. She was also immediately upset by the housemother, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who insisted that she be addressed as 'auntie', which she was not, and being

⁹³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹³¹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2754.

⁹³² *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2756.

⁹³³ SCAI statement by [REDACTED] WIT.001.002.4152-4169.

⁹³⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4154.

repeatedly disparaged, even by the wife of the then Principal, because of her Scottish accent: 'Can't you speak English?' 'You stupid girl, stupid, speak English'. Mrs MRT writes: 'I think that's where my anxiety started, my stomach would be churning and I was nervous all the time. I felt like I was walking on eggshells from morning till night'.⁹³⁵ At school she was also called 'four eyes' and 'carrot top' because she wore glasses and had freckles.⁹³⁶

26.17 She also recalls that on her thirteenth birthday in 1958 her mother sent her presents in a parcel, but it was opened by her house mother who 'gave me hell' because other children did not get gifts. 'Fairbridge even sent a letter to my mum to rebuke her. They said the parcel was extravagant'.⁹³⁷ She also remembers a letter she had written to her mother urging her to take her away from Pinjarra, but her housemother opened and destroyed it and dictated the letter she was to send reporting how happy she was. Even her mother's letters to MRT were censored by the housemother. 'I felt that I had no liberty and no freedom. I was a nothing'.⁹³⁸

26.18 Subjected to this kind of humiliating treatment, Mrs MRT recalls that the extrovert little girl she had been became quiet because she was 'too scared to speak'.⁹³⁹ Her account does not refer to physical or sexual abuse, but clearly Mrs MRT is detailing emotional and psychological abuse. She also recalls that brothers and sisters were allocated to different cottages: 'They weren't even allowed to sit in church together'.⁹⁴⁰ Because she was academically bright, MRT was sent to Pinjarra High School, which stands to the credit of Fairbridge, but '[i]n general the girls at Fairbridge were being groomed for a life in service or domesticity', and the boys to work on farms or provide cheap labour'.⁹⁴¹ It seems that Mrs MRT with some difficulty, did manage to obtain her daughter's release in MRT 1958, and MRT continued her education elsewhere and qualified as an office worker. For family reasons, MRT and her mother returned to Scotland in 1960, but in 1965, now married, she returned to Australia, had two children, obtained further qualifications, and secured employment, culminating for 30 years as an administrator at Murdoch University.

⁹³⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4159.

⁹³⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4157. 'Carrot top' was also a common tag for those with ginger hair.

⁹³⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4161.

⁹³⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4161.

⁹³⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4157.

⁹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4158.

⁹⁴¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4159.

26.19 Mrs ^{MNH} was born in Edinburgh in 1948.⁹⁴² Her father died, age 34, when she was eight, and when she was 11 she was sent to Pinjarra with her brother then aged six, arriving in 1959. Later, again probably under Fairbridge's one-parent family scheme, their mother followed, and surprisingly even her grandmother. Though they lived some distance away, the family managed monthly meetings.

26.20 As Mrs ^{MRT} had also reported, boys and girls were allocated to different cottages so that ^{MNH} and were separated. 'We weren't allowed in the boys' cottages and vice versa. They broke up that many brothers and sisters. It was incredible how they got away with it. felt abandoned.'⁹⁴³ She saw him when their mother visited, if he was playing in the park, and in the dining room but just to 'say hello'. Such separation, now described by another SCAI witness, may be construed as abuse.

26.21 Mrs ^{MNH} like Mrs ^{MRT} did not like her cottage mother.⁹⁴⁴ Mrs ^{MZB} 'could be a bitch', and young ^{MNH} also resented having to call her 'auntie' even though she was not a relation. 'It would have been a lot better if they made you call her Mrs ^{MZB}. You would know where you stood. But to call somebody you didn't know auntie was just stupid.' That these two women, late in life, still regarded this obligation as offensive suggests that it left an emotional scar. However, in Mrs ^{MNH} case, when moved to another cottage, she remembered her new housemother, Miss Strathearn, as 'gorgeous', 'lovely', 'really nice'.

26.22 Forms of discipline depended on the cottage mother. Some apparently had a 'knack with the kids' and 'the kids absolutely adored them'.⁹⁴⁵ Miss Strathearn was one. 'You had to toe the line but you weren't in fear of getting belted every five minutes if you didn't.' By contrast, Mrs ^{MZB} could use violence, slapping children across the face, picking up anything to hand to hit them with, including a coat hanger. 'She couldn't control the kids. It would be for something trivial, not picking up a t-shirt or not tidying your locker.' She also spoke to children as if they were 'dirt'. If children were sent by cottage mothers for disciplining by ^{MZC} he would give the misbehaving a talking to or, if he judged it necessary, one stroke of the cane, but only for boys, never girls. But other girls could also be violent, and

⁹⁴² SCAI statement by ^{MNH} WIT.001.002.3924-3950.

⁹⁴³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3931-3932.

⁹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3931-3932.

⁹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3943-3944.

Mrs MNH names four in her cottage who as a gang bullied her. At least when in distress she reported this to the Principal who moved her to a different cottage. As for her education, the curriculum was broad, but it included domestic science (ironing, dress-making, even making soap), but 'nothing modern. It was weird'.⁹⁴⁶ However, she liked the maths teacher and she has more criticism of herself than of her teachers. 'I just didn't want to be there at Fairbridge so I just didn't do my best at school.'⁹⁴⁷

26.23 When she was a girl still in Scotland, Mrs MNH had suffered from enuresis, brought on, it was suspected, by the death of her father, and this continued at Pinjarra until she was 15. In Scotland she had attended a clinic to try and solve the problem, but there was no such sympathetic support at Pinjarra. She recalls, as did other child migrants, that she could not remember 'any visits from the welfare while I was there. If they had come they would have been speaking to the cottage mothers not the kids'.⁹⁴⁸ Indeed, she concludes, 'There was no-one you could speak to at Fairbridge'.⁹⁴⁹

⁹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3937.

⁹⁴⁷ *Ibid*. WIT.001.002.3937.

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3940.

⁹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3942.

27 | Child Abuse: Fairbridge Farm School, Molong, New South Wales

27.1 The building of Fairbridge's Molong Farm School began late in 1937, and was similar in layout to that at Pinjarra.⁹⁵⁰ The first party of children arrived in March 1938 when building works were still in progress. By September 1939 and the outbreak of war, 135 children had arrived, and with some going and others coming a further 364 arrived between 1947 and 1960, a total of 526. Currently we have no names of Scottish children or even numbers of those who may have arrived from Scotland, but they are included in our speculative 80 Scottish children sent by Fairbridge to its two farm schools, Pinjarra as well as Molong. After 1960, a further 391 also passed through but under differently funded single-parent and two-parent schemes. One was David Hill, later the author of *The Forgotten Children*, a valuable source on care and conditions at Molong, and a 'core participant' at the IICSA hearings.

27.2 As recorded earlier, Garnett in 1944 conducted a review of farm schools in Australia, and had alerted the High Commissioner in June to some of his findings. In a summary to the Dominions Office, he reported that the 'atmosphere' at the Northcote farm at Bacchus Marsh was inferior to that at Molong 'where atmosphere is all that could be desired'.⁹⁵¹ Indeed, a May 1944 report on Molong by Wheeler, Chief Migration Officer of the Department of the Interior, was highly complimentary, referring to the children as appearing happy, healthy, tidy, well-fed, and well-educated at a recently built local state school.⁹⁵² Whether the subsequent transfer of children from Bacchus Marsh to Molong in 1944 then infected the 'atmosphere' at Molong is doubtful, since there was actually a prehistory of abuse at Molong, and more was to follow.

27.3 Rather surprisingly, in view of what else we now know, even the Ross Committee in 1956 in its confidential report on Molong judged it to be one of the better institutions in Australia. ^{RBA} [REDACTED], the Principal, 'ably assisted by his wife', impressed them as 'a man of good personality, kindly and interested in the children, and with a good knowledge of them', and he had 'created an excellent

⁹⁵⁰ For origins and description see Sherington and Jeffery, *Fairbridge*, and Hill, *Forgotten Children*.

⁹⁵¹ TNA, DO35/1138/4 (formerly M.1107/1/2), 'Fairbridge Farm School W.Australia: Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', p.190 in file.

⁹⁵² *Ibid*, R.H. Wheeler, Report on visit to Fairbridge Farm School, Molong, 22 May 1944, p.183 in file.

atmosphere'.⁹⁵³ He recognised the value of outside contacts, including competitive games with neighbouring schools and the fostering out of children for holidays. The life seemed to suit the boys, but there were not comparable opportunities for girls. There is no indication here of abuse.

27.4 In 1959, three years after the Ross Committee had departed, David Hill arrived. He was so affected by his experiences and those, much worse, which others suffered and their lasting negative effects, that much later in life he set out to explore the archives in Britain and Australia and to consult former Fairbridge boys and girls in order to track the history of Fairbridge in Australia, particularly at Molong.⁹⁵⁴ What he revealed was a long-standing organisational awareness in Australia and in London of serious problems associated with the charity's child care provision.

27.5 These included, for example, an unpublished independent report from 1953 (when RBA was Principal) into children's nutrition at Molong which described the food provided for them as being insufficient, lacking in nutrition, and often contaminated: 'maggots floating in stewed mutton', and such like offences.⁹⁵⁵ Another internal report by the Fairbridge Council in 1955 was concerned that educational outcomes for children at the farm school at Molong were very poor, even in comparison with Fairbridge's farm school at Pinjarra. In Hill's opinion, Fairbridge's failure to provide a decent education was one of its most serious shortcomings, those leaving lacking educational qualifications.⁹⁵⁶

27.6 Deeply disturbing were cases of sexual abuse. Those recorded go back to 1940. Following anxious telegram exchanges, the chair of the Fairbridge Council in Sydney wrote at length on 1 October 1940 to the chair of the Fairbridge Society in London to notify him that they had forced the first Principal appointed to the Farm

⁹⁵³ TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', p.296 in file.

⁹⁵⁴ Hill submitted Witness Statements and supporting documentation to IICSA, and the experiences referred to are included in his book *The Forgotten Children* which gives more details of abuse and how and from whom he obtained personal testimony. Documentary sources provided by the Prince's Trust to IICSA and forwarded to SCAI are cited below as PRT files.

⁹⁵⁵ Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.169-174.

⁹⁵⁶ Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.198-207.

School at Molong, Richard Beauchamp, to resign.⁹⁵⁷ His many managerial failures had caused much disquiet, but more disturbingly

it was now known that immoral and perverted practices have been indulged in on a serious scale, that there have been visits by boys to girls' dormitories in the night, that there have even been visits by boys at night to a female member of the Principal's house staff, and that there had been some free association between boys and girls on the farm lands in at least doubtful circumstances.⁹⁵⁸

A committee which investigated the matter and interviewed staff also heard allegations of homosexual activity. The Fairbridge Society in London did not initially receive a detailed report from the Council in Sydney about the allegations, but their minutes record telegrams from the Sydney Council indicating their view that Beauchamp had failed to manage his staff and had not sufficiently controlled the students at the farm school. Even so, the chair of the Fairbridge Society in London only reluctantly accepted the recommendation to terminate Beauchamp's employment. Hambro wrote to him personally to express his regret at this and to indicate that they would try to find alternative employment for him in the organisation. This ultimately proved not to be possible. We have also seen a telegram from the UK High Commissioner to the Dominions Office which reveals that he too was informed about this matter, and also that he was prepared to accept the local council's judgement.⁹⁵⁹ It is therefore worth noting, alongside what was already known by 1940 about sexual misbehaviour in British Columbia, that officials in the High Commission and in the Dominions Office had now also been alerted to the risk of sexual abuse in institutions in Australia to which child migrants had been and would be sent.

27.7 Beauchamp's successor resigned to move to another post in 1942, and it was then that RBA was appointed acting Principal. He and his wife had worked for Fairbridge since 1939 and he remained in charge until 1962. Hill remembered him as a person who could be tender and considerate, but also capable of insensitive and

⁹⁵⁷ Prince's Trust, W.D. Stewart to Sir Charles Hambro, 1 Oct 1940, and attached Report of Sub-Committee PRT.001.001.3887-3896; Hambro to Stewart, 4 Dec 1940, and a second letter of the same date, PRT.001.001.3881-3886; for correspondence between the local committee and Beauchamp, annotated by the latter and sent to Hambro, PRT.001.001.3897-3906; and Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.109-111, for a summary.

⁹⁵⁸ Prince's Trust, Report of Sub-Committee, PRT.001.001.3892.

⁹⁵⁹ Prince's Trust, Copy of a telegram explaining the situations surrounding Principal Beauchamp, 11 Sept 1940, PRT.001.001.3907.

brutal acts. He earned respect, but was also feared. The Fairbridge Society in London confirmed his permanent appointment in 1945, unaware that at that point the New South Wales Child Welfare Department was investigating allegations of sexually abusing a trainee Fairbridge girl who had domestic duties in the Principal's house.⁹⁶⁰ The Child Welfare Department began its investigation after being notified about these allegations by a local minister who had heard of them, rather than by staff at Molong or by the Fairbridge Council in Sydney. Six months after [RBA] appointment had been confirmed as permanent by the London office, the chair of the Fairbridge Council in Sydney wrote to the chair of the Fairbridge Society in London to notify him that [RBA] had been under investigation by State officials, but had been completely exonerated by this.⁹⁶¹ However, girls who worked as domestic helpers in [RBA] house spoke in later life about their discomfort with [RBA] habit of having them bring him his early morning cup of tea whilst he was naked in bed.⁹⁶²

27.8 Three years later, in 1948, the Fairbridge Council in Sydney themselves approached the Child Welfare Department to investigate [RBA] following a series of allegations made by the recently appointed bursar at the farm school.⁹⁶³ These focused more on issues of [RBA] management and physical punishment of children, although they also alerted the Fairbridge Society in London that they included 'other matters too dreadful to mention'.⁹⁶⁴ Again, the Child Welfare Department largely cleared [RBA], who remained in post. Although critical of some of his methods of physical punishment of children, the Department did not consider these to constitute serious assault. His inappropriate use of a hockey stick with which to beat children was considered no longer an issue as [RBA] having been so

⁹⁶⁰ Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.117-118;

⁹⁶¹ Prince's Trust, Handwritten letter from [RBA] to Elen Hart, 1945-46, PRT.001.001.4117, 4119; on outcome of inquiry, letter concerning the appointment of [RBA] as Principal of Molong School, 5 Feb 1946, PRT.001.001.4110-4111, on London's further confirmation of [RBA] appointment, Letter regarding the decision of the New South Wales Council to endorse the appointment of [RBA] as the Principal of Molong Farm School, 15 Feb 1946, PRT.001.001.4114; Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.112-119.

⁹⁶² Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.150-151.

⁹⁶³ Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.119-120. Prince's Trust, Documents and correspondence relating to allegations made against [RBA] PRT.001.001.4096-4108, is the report of the inquiry, providing details of the allegations, judgements on them, and criticisms of the bursar, the man who had made the allegations. Letter to 'Wells' concerning inquiries into allegations made against [RBA], 8th March 1948, also criticises the bursar, suggesting he had been affected by his treatment as a Japanese POW or that he wanted to replace [RBA] as principal, PRT.001.001.4109.

⁹⁶⁴ Prince's Trust, Documents and correspondence relating to allegations made against [RBA], Report, number 6 in list of allegations, PRT.001.001.4097.

instructed, had agreed not to use this anymore. The investigation of ^{RBA} was understood by the Fairbridge Council to have significant reputational dangers for the organisation, but they indicated to the Fairbridge Society in London that the Child Welfare Department had conducted it with 'care and a minimum of publicity' and that 'there has been no publicity in the papers here and I do not think there will be'.⁹⁶⁵

27.9 But problems remained. In August 1951, at a meeting with colleagues, R.H.Hicks, the Director of the New South Wales Child Welfare Department, felt that the numbers of children at Fairbridge farms were becoming too many for staff to handle, owing to staff shortages.⁹⁶⁶ In particular the arrangements at Molong were below modern standards of care. He described what sound like spartan facilities, no chairs just benches, and unsatisfactory eating arrangements, with cottage mothers, but not the children, having table cloths and eating off crockery. John Moss, whom we have encountered before, had recently been touring round Australia, inspecting child care establishments. Apparently even he had not been impressed by Molong, but Hicks had gained the impression that his report would be 'watered down'.

27.10 Then, in 1959, the New South Wales Child Welfare Department, prompted by the complaints of a parent of two children at Molong, uncovered many instances of cruelty. One concerned a girl who had arrived in 1959, aged four.⁹⁶⁷ Later in life she told Hill that she was first sexually abused when she was five, and by her older half-brother when she was eight. But she also suffered from the brutality of a house mother who had terrorised boys at one cottage and had then been made responsible for girls at another. She told Hill that she was not yet five 'when she started flogging me because I wet the bed'. At the age of six her punishment included having her head pushed down the toilet and then the toilet being flushed. The Child Welfare Department, in its confidential report, confirmed the veracity of what she had later told Hill, including the head down the toilet episode, as well as the house mother whipping small children with a riding crop. Fairbridge in Sydney and in London received a copy of the report, but beyond telling the housemother to stop the whipping, no further action was taken.

⁹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, Hudson, chair, Fairbridge Farm Schools of NSW, to Hambro, chair, Fairbridge Farm Schools, London, PRT.001.001.4104.

⁹⁶⁶ NAA, A446/182, 1960/66719, 1336058, 'Child Migration General Policy Part 4, Informal Discussions Child Welfare Department', 8 Aug 1951, pp.219-224; TNA, MH102/2041, 'Emigration of Children: Reports by Mr John Moss', p.37.

⁹⁶⁷ Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.155-158.

27.11 Drawing on documentary sources, some of which we have also accessed, Hill records other cases of physical or sexual abuse by staff. He also cites personal experience as well as testimony supplied by former Fairbridge boys and girls. There was an After Care officer, sacked in 1962 allegedly for sexual abuse, a dairyman, 'almost universally loathed and feared...who punched and kicked the boys', and a garden supervisor who 'would grab at the boys' genitals as a sick joke that made us all feel dirty and uncomfortable'.⁹⁶⁸ Hill also encountered other instances in which children were savagely punished for bed-wetting or for other misdemeanours. He drew further attention to such abuses in the evidence he presented to IICSA, including a piece he had published in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 May 2013. This referred to a boy who was sodomised by the head cook at Molong, and who then had his back broken when beaten by a staff member for bringing the cows in late for morning milking: 'He spent the next two years lying on his back at Sydney hospital'.⁹⁶⁹

27.12 In 1963, a mother, who had accompanied her children to Molong via Fairbridge's one-parent scheme, withdrew them after just four days, reporting what she had witnessed to the Child Welfare Department and the Fairbridge management: poor meals, amount of bedwetting, inadequate bedding, children barefooted even in the cold, and physical cruelty, including a cottage mother washing out the mouth of a four-year old girl with soapy water because she did not eat her dinner quickly enough. When she drew attention to this last the response of [RBA] she wrote, was that "'Some children can be tiresome and have to be taught a lesson'".⁹⁷⁰ Eventually,

⁹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pp.127, 130, 146.

⁹⁶⁹ David Hill, 'Child abuse action on the one hand...', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 May 2013, <https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/child-abuse-action-on-the-one-hand-apaty-on-the-other-20130515-2jmp.html>

⁹⁷⁰ Hill, *Forgotten Children* pp.158-160; Prince's Trust, Extract from a file of correspondence regarding the future of Molong, Bradfield to Fairbridge Society, London, 10 June 1964, PRT.001.001.7794; Thomas, Under-Secretary, to Secretary, Fairbridge Farm Schools, N.S.W, 17 Jan. 1964, PRT.001.001.8081-8082; Fairbridge Society Minute Book, Child Welfare Department to Fairbridge Farm School, N.S.W, 17 Jan 1964, confirming allegations and indicating their concern, PRT.001.001.8080-8081. Minutes of Fairbridge Executive Committee and Council, 20 Oct 1964, indicates that shutting down operations was seriously considered in 1964 because of poor management, high running costs, and because even the state's Child Welfare Department regarded its operations as unsatisfactory, PRT.001.001.7763, 7765.

PRT.001.001.0792-0795, pp.9-13, records a visit to Molong in November 1965 by the Director of Fairbridge, the decision in London to send no more children, and the retirement of [RBA], plus the immediate sacking of a house mother after a parent complained about the maltreatment of her boys sent under the one-parent scheme.

RBA was obliged to resign, but not until 1966 and largely over personal matters though with a catalogue of mismanagement and misbehaviour going back over 25 years.⁹⁷¹

27.13 Other archived documents relating to sexual abuse that Hill had located concerned the investigation and forced retirement in 1969 of yet another Principal, RAA, following allegations against him of a number of cases of sexual abuse.⁹⁷² It is not clear from Hill's description of this whether or not the Child Welfare Department were involved in the investigation, but if so it was kept out of the public domain. In fact, RAA was cleared of the allegations, although a number of former girls at Molong independently stated in later interviews that he had abused them. However, in 1969, the Fairbridge Society in New South Wales decided that RAA employment should be terminated because, at the age of 64, he was 'too old' for his post, but that may have been a discreet way of disposing of the matter. RAA was given a month's notice, but paid an additional year's salary up to his normal retirement age of 65.

27.14 In summary, the Fairbridge Council of New South Wales and the Fairbridge Society in London were aware of allegations of physical and sexual abuse against members of staff at the farm school at Molong. In one case we know that the Fairbridge Council alerted the State Child Welfare Department, in another that these allegations were reported to the Child Welfare Department by a third party other than Fairbridge, and that in a third case it is not clear whether or not these allegations were reported to, or investigated in conjunction with, the State Child Welfare Department. In a fourth case – in which the involvement of staff in the alleged sexual misconduct at the farm school was unclear – action appears to have been taken entirely within the Fairbridge organisation. In none of these investigations do the police appear to have been contacted or involved in any way. Fairbridge's internal correspondence indicates that a concern about the risks of public scandal were appreciated within the State Child Welfare Department. It is not clear whether the decision to force retirement on RAA for being 'too old' for his post, rather than in relation to allegations of sexual abuse, might be

⁹⁷¹ Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.120-126; Prince's Trust, Minute Book, pp.4-7, PRT.001.001.8078-8084.

⁹⁷² Hill, *Forgotten Children*, pp.127-128, 182-183, 294. Fairbridge in London do not seem to have been consulted and were also concerned about the aftercare of twelve children who were still under the age of 21 (and therefore a Fairbridge responsibility): Chairman of Fairbridge Council to Kingsmill, Fairbridge NSW, 26 June 1969, PRT.001.001.1952.

understood as an attempt to avoid scandal in this case or may have been made for other reasons. Whilst public scandals were avoided, the persistence of allegations of sexual abuse at the farm school suggests that these investigations were not particularly effective.

27.15 Subsequent public inquiries into the abuse of child migrants concluded that Fairbridge child migrants had indeed been abused. The House of Commons Health Committee heard one former resident describe a Fairbridge farm school as 'worse than a prison'.⁹⁷³ The Committee also doubted whether sufficient care was taken in the selection of placements, and there were stories of girls on 'remote farms' being 'subject to a life of sexual abuse'.⁹⁷⁴ Having listened to evidence presented, the Committee also reckoned that a lack of proper education handicapped their futures. The ethos of Fairbridge (at Pinjarra as well as at Molong) was to develop 'boys as farmers and girls as farmers' wives', and while we know this was a limitation which Fairbridge in London wished to erode it is not evident how successful they were.⁹⁷⁵ Allegations of sexual and physical abuse at Fairbridge establishments (and at Northcote) were also presented to and accepted by the Australian Senate Inquiry.⁹⁷⁶ Four IICSA witnesses also referred to sexual abuse at Molong, including of boys by a gardener and of others by a couple of house mothers who ordered them into their beds - one being described as a 'sexual predator towards older girls'. One girl was sexually abused by an aftercare officer. In all such cases there was a reluctance of the abused to report at the time what they had suffered, but some stated that their lives had been permanently damaged by such experiences.⁹⁷⁷

27.16 With respect to Fairbridge operations in Australia, IICSA concluded that:

The pre-War problems arising in Canada should have indicated to Fairbridge UK that the child migrant scheme exposed children to the risk of sexual abuse. This

⁹⁷³ *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, Report, para 48:

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75507.htm>

⁹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, para 70.

⁹⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

⁹⁷⁶ *Lost Innocents*, Report, Chapter 4, paras 4.36-4.37, p.81, footnotes 27, 29, 30:

https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c04

⁹⁷⁷ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcripts of oral testimony, by David Hill, 27 Feb 2017, pp.50-54, 8 March 2017, pp.93-94, 105-116; by ██████████ written evidence read, 2 March 2017, pp.73-83; by A26, written evidence read, 7 March 2017, pp.143-147; A82, written evidence read, 8 March 2017, pp.69-73.

should have led to a more robust response when Fairbridge UK came to know of a series of allegations of sexual abuse of its post-War child migrants in Australia. However, Fairbridge UK failed to respond appropriately to the pattern of the information it was receiving about sexual abuse.

Moreover,

there is no evidence that Fairbridge UK engaged in careful selection of staff or close supervision of staff;...did not always ensure systematic, rigorous and frequent inspections; and...it failed overall to ensure a culture in which children would feel able to approach staff to discuss any experiences of sexual abuse.

In sum,

In the light of all this evidence, the Inquiry concludes that Fairbridge UK did not take sufficient care to protect its child migrants to Canada and Australia from the risk of sexual abuse.... Over many years Fairbridge repeatedly failed to offer any support or reparations to its former child migrants who had suffered sexual abuse.⁹⁷⁸

27.17 There were legal consequences, confirming the reality of what had been contemporaneously identified as abuse. In 2009, a class action was launched by 150 former residents of the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong against the Australian Commonwealth Government, the New South Wales State Government and the Fairbridge Foundation (formerly the Fairbridge Council of New South Wales).⁹⁷⁹ The defendants were sued for failure to uphold their duties to ensure the reasonable care, supervision and welfare of children at the farm school, with particular reference to their failure to protect children from physical and sexual abuse, to ensure that systems were in place to allow children to disclose such abuse, and to facilitate independent investigations of any allegations of abuse, including referring these to the police. Six years later in June 2015 the defendants agreed to an out-of-court settlement of \$A24 million and to make a full and unqualified apology, the largest single settlement of any class action for historical institutional abuse in Australian legal history.

⁹⁷⁸ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, pp.88-89, 91, 94, 97.

⁹⁷⁹ For press reports: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-29/fairbridge-farm-school-child-migrants-paid-24-million/6580104> <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/jun/29/fairbridge-farm-students-receive-record-24m-payout-for-sickening-child-abuse> <https://www.slatergordon.com.au/media/fairbridge-farm-class-action-settlement-scheme-approved>

28 | Child Abuse: Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College

28.1 We know that 276 children were sent from the UK to the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College between 1946 and 1956.⁹⁸⁰ This was a converted former RAF base. Children were accommodated in what had been barrack buildings, initially boys only, presided over by a house mother. Teaching began at the college, and subsequently boys and girls attended local schools and therefore mixed with locals of their own age, and there were sports facilities and a Cub Scout group. Attractive career opportunities were expected to become available. As reported earlier (see para 10.9 above), we know that eight children from Scotland were sent there, and we have suggested in all perhaps ten Scottish children were sent to the college. Unfortunately, for reasons already explained (see para 18.1 above), few contemporary records have survived and so, as IICSA cautiously concluded, there is not 'enough evidence to determine whether or not sufficient care was taken to protect children migrated to the RFMC from the risk of sexual abuse'.⁹⁸¹

28.2 However, we can draw on retrospective autobiographical accounts.⁹⁸² It should be stressed that these commonly refer to the benefits that many former pupils believe they gained by being migrated from difficult and even damaging circumstances in the UK and by being provided with an upbringing and education in Southern Rhodesia. The 24 autobiographical accounts in the collection *Windows* often refer warmly to the headmaster and his wife. However, and with SCAI's broad definition of abuse in mind, we also read of uncomfortable and unhappy memories and lasting ill-effects. Though comparatively few in number, it is unlikely that Scottish children were not in some manner affected.

28.3 Discipline at the college largely conformed to what were then conventional standards of corporal punishment, but exceptional violence has also been alleged. A former pupil reckons that 'the corporal punishment aspect was probably overdone by some of the masters'.⁹⁸³ Another recalls 'a palpable sense of nastiness' in the manner in which some staff 'delivered their punishments', and he refers to 'quite severe bruising, which could sometimes weep'.⁹⁸⁴ One teacher, 'a bear of a man', was

⁹⁸⁰ What follows draws on TNA, MH102/1897, 'Scheme to Establish a Fairbridge Memorial College in Southern Rhodesia'.

⁹⁸¹ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, p.95.

⁹⁸² *Windows: Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College Autobiographies*, PRT.001.001.4655-4839.

⁹⁸³ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4707.

⁹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4772.

'given to fits of red-faced rage', and would sometimes pick up boys with one hand and shake them 'till their teeth rattled'.⁹⁸⁵ Another, 'an austere, distant man who appeared not to like children, beat a boy in the dining room with his fists'.⁹⁸⁶ The headmaster was 'a giant of a man and I don't think knew his own strength when dishing out the cane'.⁹⁸⁷ In summary, one former pupil states that 'I have never been able to accept that the severity of these corporal punishments were warranted by the offences that regularly provoked them.... Neither will I accept that it was simply the times we lived in'. He concludes that those who inflicted such punishments 'let themselves down badly, as did the management of the school for condoning such punishment over what must have been many years'.⁹⁸⁸ It is also alleged that even some house mothers in charge of dormitories did not provide the surrogate motherly care which youngsters needed. Not only were they mostly underpaid spinsters, but they were often unqualified to supervise children. Some were 'outright cruel', including one who went 'out of her way to make life miserable for us'.⁹⁸⁹ One boy who found it impossible to stomach lumpy and burnt porridge was force-fed. A former RFMC boy, now living in Australia, writes with a touch of black humour: 'I work as a Correctional Officer in a private prison, with over 600 inmates. Apart from the odd riot, murder and a few stabbings now and again it is somewhat familiar to the Fairbridge institution'.⁹⁹⁰

28.4 There are references in these personal accounts to holiday placements with families. While some seemed to have been happy experiences that was not always the case. One woman states that 'These home were never vetted by anyone'.⁹⁹¹ As recorded earlier, John Moss paid an informal visit to the college whilst on holiday in South Africa in 1954. On his return he submitted to the Home Office a report of his impressions of the institution.⁹⁹² One of the criticisms Moss made was that children were being sent to private households for weekends and holidays where, in some cases, the household was neither known to the college staff nor had references been obtained about its suitability. The Warden was reported as not being inclined to seek references as householders might not like to be asked to provide such details,

⁹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4695.

⁹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4766.

⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4707.

⁹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4773.

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4801.

⁹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4786.

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4768.

⁹⁹² TNA, MH102/1898, 'Visit by Mr Moss to the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College, Indura'.

though he stated that children would not be sent back to a household if they said they did not like it. Moss reported that this was not a satisfactory arrangement and recommended that, in future, households receiving children which could not be visited by college staff should only be approved on the basis of references provided by the Department of Education or Social Work, or possibly by the Rotary Club. In response, Home Office officials acknowledged that this failure to obtain references on households to which children were being sent was 'perhaps risky' and that this was an issue that should be followed up with the college.⁹⁹³ Six months later, the Secretary for Education for the Southern Rhodesian Government wrote to the UK High Commissioner having discussed issues raised by Moss's report with the college's Warden.⁹⁹⁴ It was reported that the Warden had taken note of Moss's comment on this matter and would be mindful about sending children to appropriate households, but he gave no indication that he would change his approach to requesting references. Noting the Warden's response to this issue, the Home Office said that it would bear this in mind when the UK Government's maintenance agreement with the college was coming up for renewal.⁹⁹⁵ Whilst this implied that the Home Office might make a change of policy on this issue a requirement at the point of the renewal of this agreement, the agreement was renewed in 1956 without any evidence that any such changes in relation to the screening of private households hosting children from the college was either requested by the Home Office or brought into practice by the college.⁹⁹⁶ This left children at risk.

28.5 We need also to consider sexual abuse. The college was co-residential and co-educational. One woman recalls that sex education at the college was lamentable, leaving youngsters 'woefully ignorant', though that was not at all uncommon in the UK in the 1950s.⁹⁹⁷ However, what we are also frequently told in autobiographical accounts is of young love encounters between teenagers, at dances for example, but of these being innocent and chaste. Indeed, the only explicit description of a sexual encounter in *Windows* is provided by a man who as a boy was propositioned by an older boy.⁹⁹⁸ He was not threatened but persuaded to engage in a sexual act. They

⁹⁹³ *Ibid*, minute, 30 July 1954.

⁹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, Secretary for Education to UK High Commissioner, 3 Jan 1955.

⁹⁹⁵ *Ibid*, Oates to Dixon, 9 Feb 1955.

⁹⁹⁶ *Ibid*, Johnson to Olivier, 20 Sept 1956.

⁹⁹⁷ *Windows*, PRT.001.001.4692.

⁹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4780.

compromised on something less than the older desired, 'in the church vestry one evening'.

28.6 Other sources refer to more damaging experiences. An IICSA witness stated that when she was a resident at the college she had been sexually abused by the father of a family to whom she was sent for weekends and holiday placements.⁹⁹⁹ This seems to confirm the risks to which Moss drew attention in 1954. A second case also concerns sexual abuse, of a child migrant boy.¹⁰⁰⁰ He had been sent to the college in 1949, one of the 17 children sent there by the Church of England's Children's Society. The perpetrators were said to have been older boys. He first reported his abuse to the Society in March 1999, and then in 2017 to IICSA. We should also consider the testimony of George Bowley, born in Brighton in 1939, placed by his mother in a local authority home in 1943, and migrated to the college in 1948.¹⁰⁰¹ His memoirs record episodes of violence, of first-formers being hung up by their arms by a fifth-former, and their testicles being smeared in boot polish. But he also recalled the school padre, seemingly an upright religious man and founder of the Fairbridge Cub Scout troop, who was notorious for his sexual molestation of young boys. He was said to have 'a craving for a young penis'. A deputation of boys who told their stories to the headmaster were beaten and warned against telling malicious lies. The padre was later transferred to a school in Northern Rhodesia, where he was jailed for sexually assaulting minors. In his memoirs Bowley also recounts, seemingly for the first time, how he had been molested and then raped by a 16-year old boy. Finally, there is another memoir account by a former pupil, born in London in 1945, who was sent to the college in 1953, following her brother.¹⁰⁰² She recalls being punched by a member of staff for not eating what she described as revolting food. He also hit boys with a chair leg. She also states that while she had evaded a boy's importuning he had raped another girl. These reports do not refer to Scottish children, but at the very least they suggest they were at risk.

⁹⁹⁹ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcripts of oral testimony, by A22, 8 March 2017, pp.18-28, 30-31.

¹⁰⁰⁰ [REDACTED] CSY000105_014-5, provided to IICSA by Mr Matthew Reed, Chief Executive of the Church of England Children's Society, 10 Feb 2017. Copy provided to SCAI by IICSA.

¹⁰⁰¹ George A Bowley, *A Son of the Empire. Britain's Unwanted Children* (Penrose Publishing, Felixstowe, 2013), pp.85-87.

¹⁰⁰² Hilary Farquhar, *Faie to Free: the Extraordinary Spiritual Journey of the Rhodesian Fairbridge Charity Child, Hilary Ann Boyce* (self-published Kindle edition, n.d., https://www.amazon.co.uk/Faie-Free-extraordinary-spiritual-Fairbridge-ebook/dp/B00S49B7PG#reader_B00S49B7PG).

28.7 Emotional and psychological abuse is also a matter with which SCAI is concerned. By contrast with the abusive treatment of children at some institutions, we have seen no reference to RFMC pupils being disparaged as 'slum kids' or 'guttersnipes', or to their mother not loving them or to their country being glad to dispose of them – damaging insults experienced by child migrants at other institutions overseas. But emotional and psychological support seems to have been lacking. This may explain why some girls were so homesick that they never settled and were sent back to the UK. Others felt that there was no one to turn to for help and advice, that there was a lack of love. One man reports that as a boy he repeatedly wet the bed. While he was not 'admonished', he was not offered the reassurance he needed. It remained a 'seemingly ever-present disgrace'.¹⁰⁰³ Others too recall the 'utter absence of individual counselling', of the headmaster not giving time to talk over troubling matters, and indeed of their being nobody on the staff one could confide in.¹⁰⁰⁴ 'We learnt to suppress our emotions'.¹⁰⁰⁵ What was lacking was 'parental love', and on top of personal insecurities from 'pre-Fairbridge years and the toughness of life at Fairbridge' this meant that 'some of us' were not able to cope psychologically and 'still carry inward scars'.¹⁰⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰³ *Windows*, PRT.001.001.4772.

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4781.

¹⁰⁰⁵ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4814.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Ibid*, PRT.001.001.4839.

29 | Child Abuse: Salvation Army, Riverview Training Farm, Queensland

29.1 We have little information on the numbers and still less on the experiences of young migrants sent to Australia by the Salvation Army before 1939, though they were almost certainly mainly juvenile and not child migrants.¹⁰⁰⁷ However, in 1948 the Salvation Army sought to revive the programme and from 1950 to 1960 received funding to send 91 child migrants from the UK to Australia, and we have established that all were sent to Riverview. For a Scottish contingent among them we have suggested a speculative maximum of 20. As mentioned earlier, this was a 386-acres training farm, but it had become run-down and dilapidated in the 1930s and during the war, before being renovated post-war. It catered only for boys, and as its name suggests the intention was indeed to train them for and to find them work on farms. The UK government sought assurances that the institution was fit for purpose, finally granted in 1952, but before then children had been arriving – as John Moss’s report of 1951 indicates.¹⁰⁰⁸ It was described in a confidential report by the Ross Committee in 1956 as a farm with accommodation for up to 60, consisting of ‘dormitories in large wooden army type huts’, about 12 miles from Brisbane, standing back from a main road, with a small village nearby.¹⁰⁰⁹

29.2 In one of his interim reports back to the Home Office in 1951 John Moss regarded the pocket money given to the boys as too little and he suggested that they might benefit by some time at the Salvation Army’s training farm in England before dispatch, but otherwise he regarded the arrangements including for aftercare as ‘very good’ and the manager as ‘clearly a very good man for the job’.¹⁰¹⁰ Criteria for assessments evidently varied. The Ross committee in 1956 put on record their concerns about the quality of care at Riverview.¹⁰¹¹ It might be regarded as abuse that ‘the furnishings are poor, the accommodation is primitive and the ablution and sanitary arrangements most unsatisfactory’, and that ‘rooms are bare and

¹⁰⁰⁷ Daniel, ‘Salvation Army’.

¹⁰⁰⁸ See Appendix 2, Section 3, para 3.21.

¹⁰⁰⁹ TNA, MH102/2022, ‘Emigration of Youths to Australia...Report on Riverview Salvation Army Training Farm, Queensland’; TNA, DO35/6382, ‘Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia’, pp.320-321.

¹⁰¹⁰ TNA, MH102/2041, ‘Emigration of Children: Reports by Mr John Moss’, p.32 in file.

¹⁰¹¹ For what follows see TNA, DO35/6382, ‘Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia’, pp.320-321 in file.

comfortless'. The movement of boys outside the farm was also strictly controlled, a member of staff stating that 'if they were given more freedom they might run away', a comment giving more than a hint of what boys felt about the care they were receiving. The committee judged that 'the staff were rigid and narrow in outlook and to have no particular ability for work of this kind'. In sum, 'it does not seem that this establishment has anything to offer migrant boys'. Before the Ross Committee arrived we know that 55 UK child migrants had been sent there between 1950 and 1955, but they remained only for three months before being placed out on farms, each placement being approved by the State Child Welfare Department. Indeed at the time of the Ross committee's inspection there was only one child migrant in residence (the others being Australian boys aged five and upwards). He was described as an 'intelligent and self-assured boy of a good type'. Tellingly, 'he disliked being there and was longing for the time when he could leave and enter employment'. From 1956 to 1960, a further 34 child migrants were sent to Riverview.¹⁰¹²

29.3 The Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse devoted Case Study no 5 to an examination of Riverview.¹⁰¹³ Testimony was provided by former residents who had been there 'from the late 1950s'. Witnesses referred to physical abuse (excessive corporal punishments and cruelty), emotional and psychological abuse (humiliating treatment for bed wetting, being told their parents did not love them), as well as sexual abuse (by Salvation Army officers, employees, other boys). There are also accounts of the consequences of attempting to report the abuse (physical punishments), and a resulting reluctance to complain. Witnesses also referred to life-long 'devastating' consequences (personality disorders, depression, nervous breakdowns, panic attacks, and relationship difficulties). While no witnesses are identified as former child migrants, this was a time when some were still being sent (last arrivals in 1960) and would therefore have been resident when the current culture of care allowed abuse to occur. We are particularly aware from this case study report that Captain Lawrence Wilson, recognised by the Salvation Army to have been one of the Salvation Army's most

¹⁰¹² This total is based on a sequence of TNA files, though the recorded aggregate is given as 91 not 89. To complicate matters further, though without effect on issues, Australian records give a total of 77.

¹⁰¹³ Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Report Case Study no 5, pp.6-8, 17-24: <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/file-list/Case%20Study%205%20-%20Findings%20Report%20-%20The%20Salvation%20Army%20boys%20homes%2C%20Australia%20Eastern%20Territory.pdf>

serious sexual offenders in Australia, is alleged to have committed sexual offences whilst on the staff at Riverview between 1957 and 1959.

29.4 We need to recall that agreements between all sending societies and the Commonwealth Relations Office were reviewed and revised in 1957. Those signed by the Salvation Army in 1957 and again in 1960, which authorised the Army to select children for migration, also made them responsible for their subsequent care and maintenance. But the officer speaking to IICSA as representative of the Salvation Army stated that the different parts of the Army around the world were ‘independent legal entities’.¹⁰¹⁴ This may have inhibited their management of practice in Australia. However, IICSA also received copies of reports about child migrants sent back to the Army in the UK in 1952, 1954, 1955 and 1960.¹⁰¹⁵ We also learn that in 1956 two child migrants raised concerns about Riverview being ‘a kind of borstal’, which, understandably, was not what they had expected.¹⁰¹⁶ These complaints were reinforced in 1958 when a further seven boys raised matters. This led to Commissioner Ebbs from the Salvation Army in the UK writing to a senior officer in Sydney. Responses may have provided reassurance, but there followed no inspection by anyone from the UK.¹⁰¹⁷ Nevertheless the issues raised may have prompted the Army in the UK no longer to send child migrants into the care of the Army in Australia after 1960 (though those already sent remained).

29.5 IICSA was told that Salvation Army records in the UK do not provide evidence of contemporaneous knowledge of any allegations or incidents of sexual abuse.¹⁰¹⁸ However, IICSA concluded that ‘children were exposed to a risk of sexual abuse’.¹⁰¹⁹ Moreover, if the Army had had in place a ‘more robust process for monitoring the welfare of those children it migrated’ then more might have been known about ‘specific allegations of abuse and about the risk of sexual abuse’.¹⁰²⁰ This would also have been likely to have reduced risks, triggered interventions and protected children. It follows that IICSA’s conclusion on the Salvation Army’s child migration practices was that ‘its limited supervision and aftercare processes meant that it did

¹⁰¹⁴ IICSA, *Child Migration Report*, p.116.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.118.

¹⁰¹⁶ *Ibid*, p.118.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.118.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.117.

¹⁰¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.117.

¹⁰²⁰ *Ibid*, p.117.

not take sufficient care of child migrants to protect them from the risk of sexual abuse'.¹⁰²¹

29.6 An important concern for the Army in Australia in dealing with allegations of abuse may have been to protect its external reputation. It appears to have been aided in this by the relevant State Child Welfare Departments who relied on such voluntary organisations to provide services beyond its own under-funded resources, and whose own inspections of Army children's homes were ineffective. As also noted by the Forde Inquiry in its 1999 report into the abuse of children in Queensland institutions, these external agencies appear to have deferred to the moral authority of religious organisations rather than intervening strongly in their work to protect children.¹⁰²²

¹⁰²¹ *Ibid*, p.119.

¹⁰²² Forde Inquiry, <http://fordefoundation.org.au/u/lib/cms/forde-inquiry-report.pdf>

30 | Child Abuse: Barnardo's Mowbray Park Farm School, Picton, New South Wales

30.1 In the period with which we are concerned, Barnardo's had three receiving homes in New South Wales.¹⁰²³ The Mowbray Park Farm School at Picton, around 60 miles south-west of Sydney, was opened in 1929. Children aged six to fifteen were accommodated in six cottages. It was modelled on the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra. It was originally for boys, destined for farm work, and for girls, to train them for domestic service, but later it became a place for boys only. Moreover, restrictions on future careers for all Barnardo child migrants were removed post-war and they were given a freer choice, according to their skills and interests. Picton was closed in 1959, and those then resident were transferred to a smaller institution.¹⁰²⁴ At Burwood, a suburb of Sydney, another home was opened in 1938 to accommodate around 14 girls. By the time the Ross Committee arrived to inspect it had been expanded to accommodate 22, but at the time of the visit only 13 were in residence. Initially the objective was again to train them for domestic service, and to it were transferred girls from Mowbray Park once they had completed their primary education. It closed in 1957, and those then resident were also transferred to a smaller establishment.¹⁰²⁵ 'Greenwood' at Normanhurst, now in a suburb of Sydney about 10 miles from the city centre, was established in 1951, specifically to care for child migrant siblings, it is said, but the Ross report makes no mention of this arrangement which, for Ross, is an unexpected omission. It accommodated 44 boys and 22 girls, separately housed in a group of homes on an 11-acre site. It closed in 1966.¹⁰²⁶

30.2 We know that some Scottish children were emigrated to Australia by Barnardo's between the wars, but only after they had been sent to England, and

¹⁰²³ For history and records see especially NAA, Research Guides, Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – Dr Barnardo's Homes, <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/Barnardos-homes.aspx>

¹⁰²⁴ Peter Higginbotham, The Farm School, Picton, New South Wales, Australia, <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/PictonDB/>

Find and Connect: <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/ref/nsw/biogs/NE00295b.htm>

¹⁰²⁵ Peter Higginbotham, Barnardo's House, Burwood, New South Wales, Australia, <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/BurwoodDB/>

Find and Connect: <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/ref/nsw/biogs/NE01355b.htm>

¹⁰²⁶ Peter Higginbotham, Fairfax House, Normanhurst, New South Wales, Australia, <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/NormanhurstDB/>

Find and Connect: <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/nsw/NE00299>

before Barnardo's opened its first permanent branch in Scotland in 1940 (see para 4.3 above). National Archives records indicate that between 1947 and 1965 the number of subsidised Barnardo's children sent to Australia from the UK totalled 457, but of these just 19 seem to have originated in Scotland (see para 10.22 above). From material provided by SCAI we know the names of some of them. Two girls were sent to Burwood, but one, ██████████, who arrived in ██████████ 1956, was already aged 15 and remained there for less than a week before being placed as a domestic servant.¹⁰²⁷ Mr ██████████^{BKW} who has provided SCAI with a witness statement, was born in Edinburgh in ██████████ 1943 and arrived in Australia in 1953 aged 9.¹⁰²⁸ He spent 18 months in Normanhurst, and was then transferred to the Picton Farm School in 1955 aged 11, leaving at the age of 16 in 1959, after the school had been sold. We will consider his testimony later.

30.3 Following the Ross Committee's inspection of Barnardo Homes in February 1956, confidential reports on the two homes visited (not Picton) were favourable. At Burwood, furnishings and equipment were of good standard, the rooms pleasant and 'home-like'. Senior staff were 'kindly and sensible' and the girls were 'treated with sympathy and understanding'.¹⁰²⁹ The rooms at Normanhurst were also comfortably and attractively furnished. It was noted that the superintendent and his wife had been recently transferred from a Barnardo's home in England, perhaps implying also a transfer to Australia of Barnardo's values and practices. Children's outside contacts were varied, and 'the children appeared friendly and spontaneous'.¹⁰³⁰ Children leaving were placed as much as possible in occupations they chose, supervised by after-care officers.

30.4 It is unfortunate that Ross and his team did not visit Picton, where there seems to have been a fracas in 1951 between some boys and the Superintendent, but whether this might have been triggered by some form of perceived abuse would require further archival research. What the available account does reveal is that the New South Wales Child Welfare Department was not willing to deal with what seems

¹⁰²⁷ Barnardo's, Children's files, ██████████ BAR.001.005.2125-2199.

¹⁰²⁸ SCAI statement by ██████████^{BKW} WIT.001.002.2311-2325.

¹⁰²⁹ TNA, DO35/6382, Action taken on Report and Confidential Notes of the Fact-Finding Mission, pp.292-293

¹⁰³⁰ *Ibid*, pp.294-295

to have been a difficult juvenile brought to Australia by Barnardo's.¹⁰³¹ Moreover, Tom Price, the General Manager at Picton, had concluded in April 1956 that problems at the farm school were so serious that a replacement superintendent was needed, and even that it should be closed and children accommodated instead in smaller homes on the outskirts of country towns bringing wider employment opportunities.¹⁰³²

30.5 Management inadequacies may well account for the very serious issue which came to light in 1958 – allegations of sexual misconduct possibly at Normanhurst but certainly at Picton.¹⁰³³ Again it is unfortunate that the Ross team had not reported on the culture and staff at Picton two years earlier, though they had had only good things to say about Normanhurst. In May 1958, Price had been alerted by a friend (not a colleague at the farm school) that Picton boys working for a farmer had been sexually abused by him. Price immediately took proper action, alerting the New South Wales Director of Child Welfare on 28 May and stating that 'information gained has proved beyond doubt that certain people have been involved in serious sexual malpractices against a large number of our boys, mainly in the 18-21 age group'.¹⁰³⁴ These were criminal offences. The offences included 'sexual interference, mutual masturbations and sodomy'.¹⁰³⁵ Price later stated in a letter on 4 July that the alleged offences had mostly occurred four years previously. Price also brought in the police. They arrested the farmer, and a second employer. Three former members of staff at Picton were also arrested. They were Walter Etheridge, a sports master at Picton from 1952 to 1955 (who had left having failed to be appointed as the home's aftercare officer) and two former housemasters (one of whom because of suspicions of misbehaviour had been dismissed in November 1955), plus a Barnardo's boy

¹⁰³¹ NAA, Research Guides, Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – Dr Barnardo's Homes, <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/Barnardos-homes.aspx>

¹⁰³² Barnardo's, SCAI copy of IICSA Witness Statement by Sara Clarke, 7 June 2017, para 9.2, BAR.001.005.3414, and see especially related documents BAR001.005.3900, 4005-4008.

¹⁰³³ Although documents supplied have been heavily redacted, a narrative can be constructed from two reports by Sara Clarke submitted to IICSA, 10 Feb and 7 June 2017, and forwarded to SCAI: BAR.001.005.3386-3392, and BAR.001.005.3424-3430; from TNA, DO35/10260, 'Complaints Concerning Dr Barnardo's Homes in Australia', and from National Archives of Australia, file ref A446, 1956/67312. For a summary of contemporary documents, including the naming of some involved plus official and press responses see BAR.001.005.3642-3652, and for copies of key documents BAR.001.005.3640-3641, 3653-3666, 4009-4015. See also *Lost Innocents*, Report, para 4.34, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c04

¹⁰³⁴ Barnardo's, BAR.001.005.3640.

¹⁰³⁵ *Ibid.*

formerly resident at Picton. The Commonwealth Department of Immigration in Canberra was also informed on 11 June, and the Australian authorities informed the Commonwealth Relations Office.¹⁰³⁶

30.6 Barnardo's attorneys in New South Wales had also contacted Barnardo's senior management in London, and, following their recommendation, the dispatch of a party of child migrants destined for New South Wales was immediately suspended by a resolution passed by its Council on 18 June 1958. Moreover, Sir Norman Strathie told Council that on hearing of this abuse he had made it clear to Mr Price and Australian officials that Barnardo's regarded its duty 'to the State and to the Public' as being of more importance than the preservation of 'their own good name'.¹⁰³⁷ A letter confirming this suspension was sent to the Minister for Immigration, along with the news that Mr E.H.Lucette, General Superintendent of Barnardo's, and Mr W.E.Charles, vice-chair and member of Barnardo's Council, were being sent to Sydney (on 10 July).¹⁰³⁸ Meanwhile, Mr Lucette had written to the Home Office on 3 July 1958 (after an interview the previous day), enclosing another copy of his letter for the attention of the Commonwealth Relations Office. He reported that he had learnt that there had been 'serious sexual perversion and malpractice occurring between staff and boys, chiefly at our Picton Farm School in New South Wales, but also between some employers and the boys we have placed with them'.¹⁰³⁹ On 11 July, the Commonwealth Relations Office, concerned about the Secretary of State's responsibilities and parliamentary repercussions, was also robust – not to approve any further applications until 'the whole matter has been satisfactorily cleared up', and the UK High Commission was so informed.¹⁰⁴⁰

¹⁰³⁶ On action by Price and the arrests see TNA, DO35/10260, copies of Hicks letters, 11 and 26 June 1958 and telegram High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office, 15 July 1958, LEG.001.002.8086, 8089-8090. In the event, eight persons were charged. Etheridge was sent to prison, the others given non-custodial sentences: BAR.001.005.3663-3664. Nigel Fisher, MP, felt obliged not to speak in the Commons on the value of child migration on hearing the news of a 'really rather bad case of sodomy between a teacher and boys' at Picton: Fisher to Vaughan, 22 July 1958, PRT.001.001.8111.

¹⁰³⁷ Barnardo's, Council Minutes, 18 June 1958, BAR.001.006.2753.

¹⁰³⁸ Barnardo's, Price to Downer, 4 July 1958, BAR.001.005.3654.

¹⁰³⁹ TNA, DO35/10260, 'Complaints Concerning Dr Barnardo's Homes in Australia', Lucette to McConnell, Home Office, plus copy for Commonwealth Relations Office, 3 July 1958, LEG.001.002.8014.

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Ibid*, CRO to High Commission, 11 July 1958, p.102 on file, and High Commission response in telegram to CRO, 15 July 1958, p.77 in file.

30.7 Meanwhile, when these allegations first became known to Mr A.R.Downer, the Minister of Immigration, he had at once, on 20 June, banned any further child migrants being sent to Picton and Normanhurst. He insisted that 'it would be better to have no child migration at all than to risk corrupting youths possibly for the remainder of their lives'.¹⁰⁴¹ It is clear that the Minister's thinking on this was informed by his understanding of his guardianship responsibilities for British child migrants. By contrast, the initial response of Mr R.Hicks, the Under-Secretary of the New South Wales Child Welfare Department, and even of Mr T.H.E.Heyes, Under-Secretary at the Immigration Department and the minister's most senior civil servant adviser, was that children should continue to be sent to the homes while investigations took place. Heyes claimed that the Picton 'trouble' had been 'thoroughly cleared up' by Price, that detectives were satisfied that Picton was now 'satisfactory', that 'no present member of the staff there would engage in or countenance such malpractices', that a suspension 'would not do any good, could cast aspersions', and that Barnardo's was the 'soundest organisation bringing boys to New South Wales'.¹⁰⁴² Heyes was also concerned that any interruption could 'cast aspersions on the Organisation [Dr Barnardo's Homes in New South Wales] and cause the London Organisation to become more panic stricken than when Mr Price first reported the matter to them'.¹⁰⁴³ Indeed, Heyes urged the Child Welfare Department to 'furnish a report in due time when you feel the Minister would be fully justified in removing the ban'.¹⁰⁴⁴

30.8 On 26 June 1958, the New South Wales Child Welfare Department informed Heyes that the police investigation was proceeding towards arrests and that they had concluded that no current staff at Dr Barnardo's Homes were involved.¹⁰⁴⁵ The UK High Commission and the Commonwealth Relations Office were so informed.¹⁰⁴⁶ On 24 July there followed a meeting at the High Commission attended by Lucette, Charles, Price and Barnardo's attorney, at which they stressed that Barnardo's had taken prompt action, that they had not attempted to conceal the matter, that the

¹⁰⁴¹ Barnardo's, minute by Downer, 20 June 1958, on note from Heyes to Downer, BAR.001.006.2568. Downer informed the Chair of Council of Dr Barnardo's Homes in London of this ban in a letter on 24 June 1958: NAA, file ref. A446, 1956/67312.

¹⁰⁴² Barnardo's, Heyes to Downer, 19 June 1958, which also indicates that Heyes had initially supported a suspension, but reversed his view after discussions with Hicks, BAR.001.006.2567-2568, 2519.

¹⁰⁴³ *Ibid.* Also Heyes to Hicks, 24 June 1958, in NAA. A446, 1956/67312.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁵ TNA, DO35/10260, copy of letter from Child Welfare Dept, N.S.W, to Dept of Immigration, Canberra, 26 June 1958, p.72 in file.

¹⁰⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, copy of Heyes to High Commission, 15 July 1958, p.75 in file.

incidents had taken place after the boys involved had left Picton, and that, because of this, steps would be taken to improve aftercare services.¹⁰⁴⁷ They were also troubled about adverse publicity. The following day the same representatives met with Heyes from the Immigration Department, at which again Lucette expressed his unhappiness at the ban imposed by the Department of Immigration, saying that 'it could interfere with their publicity campaign for funds'.¹⁰⁴⁸ He also stressed, correctly, that his organisation had sought quickly to address this issue and had themselves suspended child migration to these homes. This might imply that Dr Barnardo's Homes felt that they were being penalised for having notified relevant authorities about this case and that they should be credited for recognising that it was 'more important to have exposed such misbehaviour than to try to conceal it'.¹⁰⁴⁹ From his contact with the police investigating this case, Lucette was now confident that the matter had been 'cleared up'. Heyes gave his assurance that he would recommend to the Minister that the ban should be lifted as soon as possible and to that effect he would immediately send his Assistant Secretary, Mr R.H.Wheeler, to visit Picton and Normanhurst with an official from the State Child Welfare Department and the manager for Dr Barnardo's Homes in New South Wales. If their report were satisfactory a recommendation could then be brought to the Minister. Evidently with his immigration responsibilities in mind, Heyes also asked Lucette if there were any ways in which the numbers of child migrants being sent from Britain could be increased.¹⁰⁵⁰

30.9 The promised visit was duly conducted soon after this meeting, and a joint report was submitted to Heyes on 30 July, signed by Wheeler, by the Acting Director of the New South Wales Child Welfare Department, and by Price, as manager of Dr Barnardo's Homes in New South Wales.¹⁰⁵¹ This concluded that there was no reason to maintain the ban any further as staff currently employed at the homes gave no cause for concern, offences at Picton had not taken place any more recently than 18 months ago, and there was no evidence of any specific offences at Normanhurst.

¹⁰⁴⁷ NAA, A446, 1956/67312, Minutes of meeting at Department of Immigration between T.H.E.Heyes and management from Dr Barnardo's Homes, signed by R.H. Wheeler, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Gallery151/dist/JGalleryViewer.aspx?B=1956896&S=1&N=284&R=0#/SearchNRetrieve/NAAMedia/ShowImage.aspx?B=1956896&T=P&S=121>

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Report submitted to Secretary of the Department of Immigration by R.H Wheeler, A.Thomas and T.Price, 30 July 1958.

Two older boys affected by the case still resident at Picton had turned against sexual malpractices 'of their own volition' and would be leaving the farm school within the next year for work placements, thus reducing the risk of them 'contaminating' other boys in the home.¹⁰⁵² The report also argued that boys sent to these institutions were actually more at risk of 'contamination' from sexual misconduct after they had left the scrutiny of residential care – even though, as Wheeler had previously informed Heyes, 'this misconduct has been practised at the Homes over a fairly lengthy period and was probably introduced by certain members of the staff'.¹⁰⁵³

30.10 Following the investigation, all parties agreed on the resumption of child migration to these homes in August 1958. Downer, the Minister, agreed on the basis that both Picton and Normanhurst would be subject to 'a most careful supervision... for a very considerable time to come'.¹⁰⁵⁴ A letter from the Department of Immigration notifying Dr Barnardo's Homes of the lifting of the ban informed them that the Minister had agreed to this on the basis of 'assurances given to him concerning the management, staff and prevailing conduct of the establishments at Picton and Normanhurst'.¹⁰⁵⁵ In his response on 2 September 1958, the Chairman of Council of Dr Barnardo's Homes wrote to the Department of Immigration to express 'sincere thanks' for the lifting of the ban and stressed how concerned his organisation had been at these events.¹⁰⁵⁶ The High Commission had also been so informed on 14 August, and subsequently the Commonwealth Relations Office. Interestingly, the CRO was not willing to authorise the resumption of child migration to Picton until it had received final reports on what had occurred and on steps taken to prevent any recurrence.¹⁰⁵⁷

30.11 Heyes had told Downer that Dr Barnardo's Homes had been anxious that any extension of the (unpublicised) ban increased the risk that it would become public

¹⁰⁵² *Ibid*,

¹⁰⁵³ *Ibid*, Memorandum from R.H. Wheeler to T.H.E. Heyes, 18 June 1958. See also letter from Price, Manager of Dr Barnardo's Homes, New South Wales, to Minister of Immigration, 4 July 1958, which stated that assaults had occurred against boys at Picton, but this had mainly taken place four years previously.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Barnardo's, Copy of Heyes to Downer, 31 July 1958, and added note by Downer, BAR.001.006.2569.

¹⁰⁵⁵ NAA, A446, 1956/67312, Letter from T.H.E.Heyes to A.G.B.Owen, Chairman of Council, Dr Barnardo's Homes, 14 Aug 1958.

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Ibid*, Owen to Heyes, 2 Sept 1958.

¹⁰⁵⁷ TNA, DO35/10260, Heyes to High Commission, 14 Aug; High Commission to CRO, 21 Aug; CRO to High Commission, 17 Sept 1958, pp.63-64, 58-59 in file.

knowledge, thus tarnishing the organisation's reputation with donors.¹⁰⁵⁸ In fact, the case did attract some press attention in Australia. Initially, on 8 June 1958, the *Sydney Truth* had published what reads like a wildly exaggerated story, headlined 'Immorality Rife in Big Charity', and detailing a police investigation of a 'perversion ring' involving dozens of men and boys linked to an un-named major charity, which one source suggested might lead to up to 100 charges being made. On 15 June this was followed by an article claiming that the 'vice ring' may have had its origins in England and that this was a reflection of the far laxer moral standards around homosexuality supposedly indicated by the Wolfenden Report (published in the UK in September 1957). Then, on 20 July, the *Sydney Truth* published a short report on the conviction and imprisonment for five years of Walter Etheridge, who had pleaded guilty to eleven charges involving youths aged between 15 and 19. The report stated that these offences took place after he had been employed at Picton. This was the first time that the paper explicitly named Dr Barnardo's Homes in relation to this case. The press cutting of this report is included in the Australian archives with an accompanying note from a Department of Immigration official to Wheeler stating that it had appeared in an 'inconspicuous' section of the newspaper and that 'undesirable publicity may not result after all'.¹⁰⁵⁹ Given that sexual assaults appear to have taken place at Picton, as stated in Lucette's 3 July letter to the Home Office,¹⁰⁶⁰ it is notable that the actual charges and related press coverage focused only on events outside of the farm school. It is not clear whether the police decided not to press other charges in relation to sexual abuse at Picton and Normanhurst because there were no cases to answer, or because of potential embarrassment this would cause to Barnardo's, or because of other procedural reasons.

30.12 It is worth stressing that Dr Barnardo's Homes in Picton had taken the initiative on this matter in alerting external authorities to instances of abuse, and management in the UK at once became actively involved. Nevertheless and reasonably enough, senior managers in London were concerned about the potential impact of this case on their external reputation and fund-raising. Civil servants in the Department of Immigration were also keen to continue the sending of children to Picton and Normanhurst and to increase the numbers of child migrants being sent

¹⁰⁵⁸ Barnardo's, Heyes to Downer, 31 July 1958, BAR.001.006.2569.

¹⁰⁵⁹ *Ibid.* The 8 June article is described as 'distorted' in a letter from Hicks, New South Wales Child Welfare Department to Heyes, 11 June 1958, BAR.001.005.3653. The High Commission informed the CRO of some of the press coverage: TNA, DO35/10260, telegram, 15 July 1958, p.77 in file.

¹⁰⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Lucette to McConnell, Home Office, 3 July 1958, p.98 in file.

from Britain, but it was primarily the strong stance taken by the Minister of Immigration that had led to a temporary ban being put in place. There appears to have been collaboration between civil servants in the Department of Immigration, the New South Wales Child Welfare Department and senior managers in Dr Barnardo's Homes to ensure that this ban was over-turned as quickly as practically and acceptably possible. It is also worth noting that Wheeler, Assistant Secretary at the Department of Immigration, had previously in the summer of 1956 led the Immigration Department's largely positive review of residential institutions to which child migrants were being sent, following the criticisms made of many of them in the confidential Ross reports, and it was he who undertook the subsequent supportive inspections of Picton and Normanhurst. It is reasonable to ask if, in the case of alleged sexual assaults at Picton and Normanhurst in 1958, the commitment to the policy of child migration amongst civil servants within the Commonwealth Department of Immigration and their concern for protecting the reputation of Dr Barnardo's Homes may have weighed as heavily as concern for the safety and well-being of the children themselves.

30.13 But there is more to add. In October 1958 at a meeting in the Commonwealth Relations Office, Mr Lucette explained that even though Picton was now clear of the 'infection' and aftercare procedures were being reviewed, he was strongly in favour of closing down operations at the home.¹⁰⁶¹ It was too far away from a town, with consequent staff recruiting problems, the local committee was divided over policy issues, and boarding-out was now Barnardo's preferred form of care, although a small home for some children would still be needed – and on that basis he hoped that child migration to Australia could still continue. To that neither Commonwealth Relations Office nor the Home Office raised any objection. As noted earlier, smaller homes catering for fewer children were opened by Barnardo's, and Mowbray Park Farm School at Picton was indeed closed in 1959. The last document in the related National Archives file is a brief report by Miss Harrison, formerly of the Scottish Home Department, following her escorted visit to the new homes: 'The staff seem

¹⁰⁶¹ *Ibid*, Notes of a meeting of representatives of the CRO and HO with Lucette, 23 October; letters from Lucette, 28 and 30 October, and from HO and CRO, 3 Nov and 21 Nov 1958, pp.52-53, 48-50, 43, 42, 32-3. The closure and arguments in its favour are set out in correspondence and minutes in TNA, DO35/10262, 'Closure of Dr Barnardo's Home at Picton, N.S.W. and the Association's Policy for the Future', with its stress on preferences for care in homes in small family groups and fostering, pp.3, 86-92 in file.

adequate and the surroundings all that could be wished. The Superintendent is an ex-Barnardo boy'.¹⁰⁶²

30.14 As for any effects of Barnardo's care on children in the 1950s we have only the testimony by Mr ^{BKW} [REDACTED]. He acknowledges that he did not try hard enough at school in Picton, but he also thinks he was left 'ill-equipped for the outside world' and this had led him to make 'foolish mistakes and getting into trouble with the law'. He reckoned that 'All of us children were considered "pariahs" and "outcasts" '.¹⁰⁶³ But noticeably, he makes no mention of the 1958 crisis which prompted the closure of Picton though he was at the farm school from 1955 to 1959.

¹⁰⁶² DO35/10260, 'Impressions of Miss Harrison', Sept 1958, p.28 in file.

¹⁰⁶³ SCAI statement by ^{BKW} [REDACTED] WIT.001.002.2320, 2322, 2325.

31 | Child Abuse: Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, Tatura, Victoria

31.1 In January 1949 the Presbyterian Church of Victoria launched an appeal for funds to establish an institution to accommodate child migrants from the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁶⁴ As recorded earlier, the Rev Boag operated as its recruiting agent in Scotland (see paras 10.24, 13.33 and 17.37 above). As a result, the Dhurringile Rural Training Farm was opened in Tatura on a 100-acre property in rural Victoria. The large central building had once been used to house German prisoners of war and needed renovation, but in 1950 it was approved by the UK government as a destination fit to receive child migrants. It was to be a training farm, but younger boys were also expected to attend local schools. It was intended to accommodate 100 boys, aged 8 to 14, recruited by Presbyterian churches in Northern Ireland and in Scotland, and also the locally homeless, but in the 1950s those resident totalled around 50, and numbers had further declined by the early 1960s. It was supported financially in Australia as well as by the UK government via the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service (and, latterly, Quarriers, through CSCSS), thereby ensuring that it became a destination for boys from Scotland. It was not officially opened until June 1951, but in December 1950 it was locally reported that 30 'war orphans' from Scotland, aged 7 to 15, were shortly to arrive.¹⁰⁶⁵ However, we know that at least some of them were from Northern Ireland. We also know the names and dates of birth of the 11 Quarriers boys sent in 1960, the five sent in 1961, the five

¹⁰⁶⁴ Find and Connect: *Dhurringile Rural Training Farm*, <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/ref/vic/biogs/E000167b.htm> See also NAA, 'Dhurringile Farm Training School for Migrant Boys', 1948-51, especially p.3: <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=302435> This file mainly concerns the origins of the scheme; connection to CSCSS; Dominions Office and Home Office approval of the institution; and arrival of the first party in December 1950. Also see <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=302443>. Covering 1950-53, this file documents problems of recruiting UK children for migration to Dhurringile, and the involvement of ROSL.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Find and Connect: *Dhurringile Rural Training Farm*, <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/ref/vic/biogs/E000167b.htm> See also NAA, 'Dhurringile Farm Training School for Migrant Boys, 1948-51, esp p.3: <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=302435>. This file mainly concerns the origins of the scheme, connection to CSCSS, Dominions Office and Home Office approval of the institution, and arrival of the first party in Dec 1950. Also see <https://research.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=302443>. Covering 1950-53, this file documents problems of recruiting UK children for migration to Dhurringile, and the involvement of ROSL.

sent in 1962, and the five sent in 1963, a total of 26.¹⁰⁶⁶ When the Ross Committee visited in 1955 there were only 31 child migrants in residence. When the Quarriers party arrived in 1961 there were only about 16 boys at Dhurringile.¹⁰⁶⁷ It closed in 1964.

31.2 The Ross Committee's confidential brief report on Dhurringile, following its inspection in February 1956, considered its location 'isolated', the main building 'rambling and inconvenient', and the showers and lavatories 'inadequate in number and in poor condition'.¹⁰⁶⁸ Since the whole place was described as 'bare and comfortless', that might suggest that placing young boys in such an environment was itself an abuse, even by the standards of the day. The Superintendent seemed to have an interest in the boys and was 'anxious to improve conditions', but Ross regarded the number of staff as too few to cope, consisting only of the Superintendent, another man, a matron, a cook and a laundress. There was little help from a committee made up of elderly farmers 'whose main interest appears to be in the farm'. In sum,

In this Home both material conditions and the general attitude to the boys of the three members of the Committee whom we saw seemed to us deplorable. Some of the boys seen appeared unhappy and to be badly in need of the sympathy and understanding which were noticeably lacking.¹⁰⁶⁹

The Ross report concluded as follows:

It may be worth putting on record that the following entry appears in a booklet published by the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration: 'Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service. These boys are given a splendid opportunity at Dhurringile under ideal conditions under trained experts in social work'.¹⁰⁷⁰

31.3 The Ross committee assessment was of course followed by an inspection nine months later in November 1956, conducted by R.H.Wheeler, from Australia's Department of Immigration, and a colleague, F.H.Graham, from the State of Victoria's Children's Welfare Department. They had been sent to check that the defects

¹⁰⁶⁶ NRS, ED11/708/2, 'Voluntary Homes, Inspectors Reports, Quarriers Homes', appendix, pp.87-88; NRS, ED11/509, 'Emigration of Children through the Auspices of the Church of Scotland', p.103.

¹⁰⁶⁷ SCAI witness statement from Mr QKU, WIT.001.002.1882.

¹⁰⁶⁸ TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', pp.312-314.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.314.

reported by Ross had been remedied. They reported that 'the management have in fact done all that was expected of them and are extremely anxious to obtain some British boys'.¹⁰⁷¹ It should be noted that the defects addressed seem to have been those concerning the fabric and facilities and not the culture of care.

31.4 A Scottish Education Department inspection of Quarriers at Bridge of Weir in 1965 located only one file which contained a report on physical conditions at Dhurringile, dated 25 August 1960.¹⁰⁷² It was written by the wife of a Church of Scotland minister who had accompanied the first party of Quarriers boys. The report sums up what she wrote: the house was an 'old mansion needing paint and a few repairs but providing comfortable living and care for the boys.... The writer was enthusiastic about the care and well-being of the boys'.¹⁰⁷³ This comment suggests that the physical defects had not been properly addressed or that more needed tackling four years after Wheeler and Graham had been on site, but evidently the visitor had been impressed by the care provided.

31.5 However, subsequent public inquiries have recorded allegations of serious abuse at Dhurringile. In 1997, the House of Commons Health Committee was told of abuse at the farm school and of its lasting effects: 'We heard evidence of sometimes severe ill-treatment..., even to the extent of one of our eyewitnesses expressing relief that he was now terminally ill'.¹⁰⁷⁴ In 2001 the Australian Senate Inquiry also named Dhurringile as among the locations where it had been informed that sexual abuse took place.¹⁰⁷⁵ In 2014 all three witnesses to the Northern Ireland Inquiry who had been sent to Dhurringile, arriving in the first batch of child migrants in December 1950, were very critical of the care they received.¹⁰⁷⁶ HIA341 reported sexual abuse by a staff member, by local church ministers and by lay persons, as well as physical abuse by staff and by a school teacher. The effect of this on his later life is graphically detailed, as is how his education poorly equipped him for employment. HIA354

¹⁰⁷¹ Quoted in NRS, ED11/708/2. 'Voluntary Homes. Inspectors Reports. Quarriers Homes', SGV.001.005.0087.

¹⁰⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁴ House of Commons Health Committee, *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC 755-II, Report, para 59 <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75507.htm>

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Lost Innocents*, Report, p.79, para 4.32.

https://www.apf.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c04

¹⁰⁷⁶ Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Module 2, Evidence, Day 44, HIA354, Day 45, HIA341 and HIA346, <https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>.

reported being badly beaten by staff, including by the Superintendent who also sexually abused him. HIA346 reported physical abuse, and stated that the Superintendent had later been prosecuted for sexual abuse.

31.6 In 2017, IICSA heard oral testimony from a witness who was born in 1947 and sent to Dhurringile in 1954, four years after its opening.¹⁰⁷⁷ He described it as 'a brutal, cold place, a terrifying Victorian Gothic mansion like the sort you see in horror movies'.¹⁰⁷⁸ There he was the youngest and smallest boy, and he said he was 'endlessly bullied' by staff and older boys. Amongst the brutal experiences he suffered, was, aged nine, being tied up in barbed wire and then rocks and sticks were thrown at him; he was also tied to a tree and home-made spears were hurled at him; a boy tried to cut off his finger; and he was shot in the leg with a .22 rifle and had to dig out the bullet himself. If he complained he was beaten by staff. He was also locked for days in a dungeon. He also stated in graphic detail how he and other boys were sexually abused, repeatedly, by two adult male teachers at the school. One of them, called 'Creeping Jesus' by the boys, began to abuse him within six months after his arrival, when he would have been seven or eight years old, and thereafter repeatedly and regularly for three or four years. As a boy, he never reported this, but he ascribes his rough unsettled life and failed marriage to its effect upon him.

31.7 The first party of 11 boys was sent out by Quarriers in 1960. There is of course nothing that even hints at concern by the Superintendent, Mr ^{AIO} in an enthusiastic letter printed in Quarriers' *Narrative of Facts* in 1961 about the quality of the boys, or in a similar one from his successor, Mr ^{AIQ} quoted in the *Narrative* for 1963: '...all progressing exceptionally well'.¹⁰⁷⁹ But we know that boys from Scotland were amongst those abused at Dhurringile.

31.8 Mr had been placed in the Ferry Hill Home for Children in Aberdeen when he was two or three years old (date not given), together with his older brother.¹⁰⁸⁰ While brother was allowed to enlist in the Royal Navy, was 'informed' that he was going to Australia (he does not give the year), and the brothers were thus separated. He recalls that he was clothed and fed 'fairly well' at

¹⁰⁷⁷ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcript of oral testimony by , 2 March 2017, pp.90-112, especially p.97.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p.97.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Quarriers Section 21 response, QAR.001.001.0511; *Narrative of Facts*, 1961, QAR.001.001.3959; *Narrative of Facts*, 1963, QAR.001.001.4005.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Australian Senate Inquiry testimony by Mr provided to SCAI, POA.001.001.0060-0061.

Dhurringile, but he 'felt uneasy in the presence of the male superintendent'.¹⁰⁸¹ He contacted the local Presbyterian minister (again it is not clear when) but the minister was not interested. Mr █████ stresses that the lasting effect on him of his time at Dhurringile was due to the lack of a 'caring and loving adult'. He came to realise that there had been no one on whom he could depend, ask questions of, and feel loved by. This absence, he felt, had had an effect on his adult relationships, his marriage, and on the way he related to his children. As a child migrant, he also felt like a second-rate citizen in Australia. He felt more accepted when he described himself as a 'war orphan'. It was serious too that he had been sent to Australia with no documentation, making the practicalities of life more difficult – getting married, taking out insurance policies, travelling. He was aged 50 before he obtained a copy of his birth certificate. And it remained hard to come to terms with separation from his brother.

31.9 Mr ^{CGO} █████ born in Peebles in █████ 1941, was selected and shipped to Dhurringile with boys from England and Ireland as well as from around Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen.¹⁰⁸² He names his brothers █████ and ^{CHC} █████ as his companions, and also █████, █████, █████ and █████, ^{CHC} █████ and █████, and █████. These boys were among the first party of 30 to be sent. The Rev Boag and his wife were their escorts. They arrived in December 1950, when ^{CGO} █████ was aged nine. He acknowledges that Dhurringile Farm School was a beautiful place, that the meals, education, health care and sporting and holiday opportunities provided were good, and there was a pipe band. But his recollections contain much of concern. He recalls that all the boys, including himself, were physically abused. Discipline was 'over the top...quite brutal'.¹⁰⁸³ As a warning to himself and others, he had to witness the thrashing of his older brother █████, then aged 12, and another boy for what seemed to be a minor offence – returning late to the farm. The Superintendent used a leather belt. █████ back and buttocks were left bleeding, and the punishment only stopped when a couple of older boys, aged 16 or so, wrested the belt off the Superintendent. █████ probably needed medical attention. Also

¹⁰⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸² SCAI statement by Mr ^{CGO} █████, WIT.001.002.6899-6928. In a short email dated 11 Dec 2009 to the Scottish Government's Adult Care and Support Division, Mr ^{CGO} █████ brother ^{CHC} █████ (referred to as ^{CHC} █████ in Mr ^{CGO} █████ statement) states that, born in Glasgow in 1943, he was sent to Dhurringile in 1950 and was there for ten years. Most of his time there was 'bad', and he and others were sexually abused: SGV.001.008.3527.

¹⁰⁸³ SCAI statement by Mr ^{CGO} █████, WIT.001.002.6912.

bedwetting 'was dealt with very poorly'.¹⁰⁸⁴ An electric device was attached to the penis of boys who wet the bed, including CGO younger brother CHC. The dampness gave them a shock and woke them up. Presumably it was intended to stop enuresis. 'I think now that it was pretty cruel.'¹⁰⁸⁵ CGO was not sexually abused, but his brother was. Only in 1992, long afterwards, did CHC inform his brother of what had occurred, and he broke down in the telling. CHC knew of nine boys who had been sexually abused while they were at Dhurringile. It seems that most of the boys who wet their beds were also sexually abused, the abusers taking advantage of boys who were timid, like CHC. Mr CGO records the names of two alleged abusers. The abused had told the Presbyterian minister in Tatura, who said that he would look into it, but he never did. At a 50th reunion, a number of Dhurringile boys also spoke of sexual abuse. Mr CGO recalls that the effect of abuse on one Irish boy later in life was mental suffering and a failed marriage.

31.10 Mr MRZ was another early arrival.¹⁰⁸⁶ Born in 1937, his mother was killed in a road accident in 1941, and his father died in 1944 when he was seven. From the age of eight he was cared for in orphanages in Scotland until leaving for Dhurringile, in what he too, like CGO names as the first party of children. They arrived in December 1950. Among them were , (or a name like that), and boys remembered as and two named , and one just recalled as . Curiously, none are also named in CGO statement, or *vice versa*, though they did sail on the same ship . He recalls that his arrival in the Australian summer holidays disrupted his education. Although thereafter he got on 'alright', he never felt he had enough homework to do in comparison with what he had become used to in Scotland. Indeed, the staff at the farm never encouraged homework. Though the food was 'okay', and while boys had a bit of freedom, it was nevertheless 'like living in a prison'.¹⁰⁸⁷ His report implies that he did not enjoy farm work for which boys at Dhurringile seemed destined. He refers to feeding the pigs and milking the cows as 'chores'. He also states emphatically that once he had decided to leave, aged 15 or 16, he was completely on his own. 'There was no preparation for life beyond, you just left. I had not been taught any life skills for managing money or paying bills'.¹⁰⁸⁸ He did get employment, first a job in a local knitting mill, but thereafter he seems to

¹⁰⁸⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.6905.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.6906.

¹⁰⁸⁶ SCAI statement by Mr MRZ WIT.001.002.4289-4298.

¹⁰⁸⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4295.

¹⁰⁸⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4295.

have been a farmworker, which he found 'very hard', until he was 25. He does not say what he did thereafter, though he married and had children and travelled 'a bit'. He does not refer to physical or sexual abuse, but he does state that the authorities had no right to send him to Australia. He had thought he was going on holiday.

31.11 Mr LXU [REDACTED], born in Hawick in 1949, was placed with Quarriers when less than a year old.¹⁰⁸⁹ Aged 10, he was dispatched to Dhurringile in 1960 in a Quarriers party also including [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] QMQ and QMR [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Having already had a mixed experience at Bridge of Weir, LXU [REDACTED] was sexually abused on the ship, and then at Dhurringile. The Superintendent he met on arrival was AIP [REDACTED], 'a well-known paedophile'.¹⁰⁹⁰ Mr LXU [REDACTED] reports that some of the older former child migrants visited the new boys to warn them that AIP [REDACTED] had a reputation for sexually abusing the boys. Mr LXU [REDACTED] 'near miss' was when he was aged 12 and AIP [REDACTED] took him to Melbourne to watch a badminton competition. They had to stay overnight, and AIP [REDACTED] tried, unsuccessfully, to get young LXU [REDACTED] to share a bed with him. 'It seems amazing now that I could be so assertive after being a bullied child in care, but I told him I wouldn't.... I slept on the floor and was not molested.'¹⁰⁹¹ Mr LXU [REDACTED] reports that in the 1990s there were attempts to charge AIP [REDACTED] over sexual abuse at Dhurringile 'but he eventually died without being held to account'.¹⁰⁹² AIP [REDACTED] successor as Superintendent was an ex-police officer, AIQ [REDACTED]. It is unlikely that he had been trained as a child care officer. Mr LXU [REDACTED] alleges physical and psychological abuse at his hands. He says he was violent, and treated the boys as if they were 'small criminals' and would 'use his fists to punch you down'.¹⁰⁹³ The young LXU [REDACTED] was once locked in the 'dungeon' - a windowless vaulted room underneath the main building, a terrifying place with 'iron hooks in the walls and long rusty stains that we were told was the blood from prisoners who'd been tortured down there'.¹⁰⁹⁴ He would also set up mismatched boxing matches so that 'a 14 year-old would beat the pulp from a ten year-old. It seemed to give him sadistic pleasure'.¹⁰⁹⁵ Sometimes he

¹⁰⁸⁹ SCAI statement by Mr LXU [REDACTED] submitted by Child Migration Trust with the consent of Mr LXU [REDACTED] WIT.003.001.2690-2695.

¹⁰⁹⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2692.

¹⁰⁹¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹⁰⁹² *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹⁰⁹³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹⁰⁹⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹⁰⁹⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

would make it more contrived by tying one boy's hand behind his back, a tactic he used to break up alliances between the boys: 'it made us all feel very unsafe and less trusting towards one another, knowing you might get beaten up by your mate any time'.¹⁰⁹⁶ Other practices were also indicators of 'a depraved and brutalised culture'.¹⁰⁹⁷ This included 'nuggeting' by the boys. When 'half asleep in bed, the bedclothes and your pyjamas were pulled down and black boot polish was smeared all over your genitals. It was a humiliating ritual, painful to get the boot polish off'.¹⁰⁹⁸ This was 'a form of sexual intimidation' and there were 'racist elements' in the taunts that went with it.¹⁰⁹⁹ Once again we hear that bed wetting was dealt with harshly. The response was 'a belting and ritual humiliation, being sent to the Superintendent's office as if the act had been one of defiance or an indicator of poor moral calibre'.¹¹⁰⁰ As for the legacy of migration and abusive 'care', Mr LXU writes that 'I could not escape the misery and disorientation of a life without identity'.¹¹⁰¹ It was the Child Migrants Trust who enabled him to learn more about and to meet some family members, but 'I have lived with the continued impact of anxiety'.¹¹⁰² He struggled with issues of self-esteem, had a pessimistic view of himself, and felt angry for what had happened to boys at Dhurringile: 'some couldn't live with themselves and others turned to alcohol'.¹¹⁰³

31.12 Mr Hugh McGowan, born in [REDACTED] 1948, was taken into care by Quarriers when not quite two-years-old.¹¹⁰⁴ While he had critical things to report about his experiences at Bridge of Weir, it is allegations of abuse at Dhurringile that here concern us. He was sent in September 1961, when he was aged 13, along with four other boys. After the arrival of his party there were still only 14 boys at the home, by then aged 12 to 15, with other Quarriers parties, each of five boys, to follow in 1962 and 1963. He stresses that while the Commonwealth of Australia was technically his guardian, the obligation was delegated down and he was a ward of the State of Victoria. But it was the four superintendents at Dhurringile he encountered who were responsible for his care. He states that the regimented system in Dhurringile was not as strict as at Quarriers, and usually involved a verbal telling off, but he was scared of

¹⁰⁹⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2693.

¹¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2694.

¹¹⁰² *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2694.

¹¹⁰³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.2694.

¹¹⁰⁴ SCAI statement by Mr Hugh McGowan, WIT.001.001.7515-7557.

AIO [REDACTED], who 'belted the boys sometimes', though not himself.¹¹⁰⁵ Hugh also 'detested' AIO [REDACTED] the former policeman in his 50s about whom Mr LXU [REDACTED] reported. Mr McGowan writes that AIO [REDACTED] would use psychological abuse on the kids. He told us to put up with things and not complain. He said that was just the way things were'.¹¹⁰⁶ So he did not protect him when other boys picked on the young McGowan, who was small in stature. We are also told of an episode in which AIO [REDACTED] killed a boy's dog. 'We all thought he was a bastard for that'.¹¹⁰⁷ Mr McGowan states that 'We did not get any emotional support from the staff at Dhurringile'.¹¹⁰⁸ That might explain the enuresis from which he suffered. AIP [REDACTED] 'treatment' for enuresis, as reported also by Mr CGO [REDACTED] was to strap a machine to young Hugh's penis which caused an electric shock when he wet the bed: 'The problem with bedwetting was seen as being physical rather than psychological. They never asked why a boy wet the bed. They didn't care for our psychological well-being'.¹¹⁰⁹

31.13 Mr McGowan also reports sexual abuse at Dhurringile. Superintendent AIO [REDACTED] he writes, was a strange man:

He would supervise the boys in the shower and sometimes comment on the boys' genitalia. Occasionally one of the older boys would get an erection, he would laugh at it and found it funny. It was like he was encouraging the boys. I found it really strange. Other times, if a boy got an erection in the shower, AIO [REDACTED] AIO [REDACTED] would get angry and would belt him. He'd call the boy disgusting.¹¹¹⁰

But AIO [REDACTED] soon left. Mr McGowan later learnt that he had been sacked because it had been discovered, by the Convenor of the Presbyterian Church in Victoria, that AIO [REDACTED] was a paedophile. The dismissal should be noted, but whether criminal charges were laid is not recorded in this witness statement. In 1964 AIP [REDACTED] returned as Superintendent It is best to quote Mr McGowan's statement for what followed.

Because I was the farm boy, I had my own little room in Dhurringile.... There were two beds in my room and each had a set of drawers next to it. I had very few possessions but I had found a book in one of the drawers. It was Return to Peyton Place by Grace Metalious which was a fairly raunchy book at the time and referred to sexual encounters of adults. I was reading it one night when

¹¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7541.

¹¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7542.

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7538.

¹¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7539.

¹¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7540.

¹¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7536.

AIP [REDACTED] came into the room without knocking. We talked about the book and sex. He then left. He came back to my room the next night. This time it was more physical. He was talking about sex with women and how a man grows hard. He started to show me and he wanted me to touch him and I did. I was 16 years old at the time. I still feel embarrassed about it. I was very immature. He did some things to me for his sexual gratification. The next night he tried to do it again to me. I said I didn't want to. He tried to talk me into it. I thought he was going to rape me. I said to him that I would report him. He got angry and told me to get dressed. He pulled me downstairs by the arm. He put me in his van and drove off. I was in tears and asked where we were going. He said, 'You just watch'. I knew he was serious. He said he was taking me to Turana which was a youth detention centre. I asked him why and he told me that I was evil and should be put in there. I said I didn't want to go there and wasn't evil. He then said, 'Well you keep your mouth shut'. I said I would. I kept my mouth shut for 44 years until I told my wife. I didn't report the abuse to anyone. I was too scared. It affected me deeply.¹¹¹¹

Mr McGowan also reports that he was told by another boy who had been at Dhurringile that AIP [REDACTED] had put his hand on the boy's leg while they were in a truck together. To escape, the boy had jumped out of the truck while it was moving. Mr McGowan also recalls that after he had been sexually molested in a cinema he had reported the incident to a social worker, employed by the Presbyterian Church, who said 'Don't be silly, men don't do that'.¹¹¹²

31.14 The education that Mr McGowan received at Dhurringile does not seem to have prepared him for anything except as a hard-working farm labourer. He states that:

We were never taught any life skills which would prepare us for adult life.... We had no education about communicating with people. We were told what to do and did not answer back. The lack of life skills was the biggest problem I had. I did not know how to communicate with people, especially females.... The person I became was a man without love.¹¹¹³

¹¹¹¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7542-7543.

¹¹¹² *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7543.

¹¹¹³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7541, 7546, 7547.

The rest of his working life, as related in his statement, records his struggles with relationships at work, in the army, with drink, and in private life - but also his subsequent achievements, including getting an education.¹¹¹⁴

31.15 It is important in any appraisal of child migration to recognise that experiences and recollections were and are varied. Mr MEB born in Dumfries in 1940, was not sent to Dhurringile until 1955, when he was 15, in a party with eleven other Scottish boys.¹¹¹⁵ His elder brother had already been in Australia for three years and that connection and MEB age seems to have made it easier for him to cope. Indeed, because of his age, notionally already too old for the scheme, he only stayed in Dhurringile for seven or eight days, before moving out to work on farms and on the roads until at the age of 19 he joined the Australian navy. The brevity of his stay at Dhurringile may explain the brevity, as well as the content, of his appraisal: 'Dhurringile was very good. You were very well fed. There were proper meals. The staff were all good. I don't have any complaints about that place.'¹¹¹⁶ It is the maltreatment at the Levenhall Orphanage near Musselburgh, run by the Church of Scotland, to which he was sent aged two or three, about which he writes bitterly in his statement.¹¹¹⁷

31.16 Mr QKU was also another Quarriers boy, born in 1947, and therefore only a little older than Hugh McGowan.¹¹¹⁸ He was taken into care by Quarriers from the age of six months. There, much later, he was sexually abused by an older boy. But at the age of 13 he left for Dhurringile in 1961, in the same party as Hugh McGowan. He records that, on arrival, he met up with boys he knew who had previously been at Quarriers, who told him 'the home was great'.¹¹¹⁹ He refers in his witness statement to the three Superintendents also mentioned by Mr McGowan, but only by name, AIO, AIP and AIQ. He says nothing about their behaviour or the regimes they ran. Instead, Mr QKU recalls good food, plenty to do on the farm, his schooling (describing himself as 'average'), playing sports and earning enough money from a Saturday morning job to buy a bike. He does acknowledge that it was 'just luck' that the couple in the home where he was placed on holiday were good folk, whom he came to call 'Papa' and 'Ma' and to whom he remained attached: 'the

¹¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.7548-7550, 7552.

¹¹¹⁵ SCAI statement by Mr MEB WIT.001.002.1488-1504.

¹¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.1500.

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.1496-1497.

¹¹¹⁸ SCAI statement by Mr QKU WIT.001.002.1873-1888.

¹¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.1882.

██████████ were my family'.¹¹²⁰ When he left Dhurringile in 1964 he began a successful career, first in the navy for 12 years as an electrician, then in wholesale food distribution, and then running his own restaurant. He also met his wife when in the navy, and they had three sons. His critical observations concerning his time at Dhurringile are that 'There were no visits from the social work. No one from Scotland ever came to see me. There was no contact from the Church of Scotland to ask how I was doing'.¹¹²¹ He also thinks that Quarriers should have communicated with him about his extended family, something which later in life he had to discover for himself. As for abuse, the only episode he had formally reported, to the 'Time to be Heard' forum, is what had happened to him as a young boy when in the Quarriers home in Scotland. Beyond that - and it is perhaps a telling observation - he writes in his witness statement that 'I would say that my time in care has made me tougher. I wouldn't want other kids to go through what I had to'.¹¹²²

31.17 A Quarriers report to SCAI refers to allegations of abuse made by a man who had been sent to Australia as a boy in 1962.¹¹²³ It is not clear whether he was the victim. The statement may have been made by Mr McGowan. There is also a reference to a report commissioned by the British government, suppressed 'at the time', which had recommended that children should no longer be migrated to a number of establishments, including Dhurringile, but 'Quarriers had no knowledge of that report'. Nor have we - unless, as seems likely, this is a reference to the Ross Committee's 1956 confidential report on Dhurringile.

¹¹²⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.1884.

¹¹²¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.1884.

¹¹²² *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.1885.

¹¹²³ Quarriers, Section 21 response, Part C, QAR.001.001.0511.

32 | Child Abuse: Christian Brothers Institutions for Boys, Western Australia: St Vincent's Junior Orphanage (also known as Castledare Junior Orphanage); St Joseph's Orphanage (more commonly known as Clontarf Boys' Town); St Joseph's Farm and Trade School, Bindoon; St Mary's Agricultural School, Tardun.

32.1 It is advantageous to review child migrant experiences at these four places together since they were intimately linked. Children were transferred from one institution to another, and so were some staff. The Christian Brothers, an international order largely composed of trained teachers, are organised into geographical provinces. Initially one covered the whole of Australia, but this was divided into two in 1953 and then further divided into four in 1957, one of which was the Province of the Holy Spirit, based in Perth in Western Australia. The Provincial leader assisted by four advisers and senior Brothers formed the Provincial Council, which had oversight responsibilities for the order's residential institutions in Western Australia, including these four. Their duties involved carrying out and producing reports after annual visitations. The Child Welfare Department of the State of Western Australia also had care responsibilities for the child migrants sent to these places, as did departments of the UK government, and especially officers in the UK High Commission. In 1938-39, UK child migrants numbering 111 (or possibly 114) had been sent to these four establishments, and post-war others arrived among the 946 child migrants sent to all Catholic care homes in Australia from 1947 to 1965 (very few after 1956). These four institutions only accommodated boys, including at least 49 from Scotland, and almost certainly there were more. Scottish government departments therefore should also have had an interest in their well-being, as did, one might suppose, the Scotland-based Catholic sending agencies, particularly the Sisters of Nazareth.

32.2 **Castledare Junior Orphanage** had been opened in 1929 originally for the care of Australian youngsters with learning difficulties.¹¹²⁴ It was taken over by the Christian Brothers in 1934 and became a children's home providing primary school education, including for the youngest child migrants, until they were old enough to

¹¹²⁴ Find and Connect, Castledare (1934-1983), <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/wa/WE00048>, including photograph.

progress to Clontarf, or, according to aptitudes, to Tardun or Bindoon. The original design, unusual at the time, took the form of cottage homes, plus a classroom block. Other buildings already in the grounds of a large house were adapted to its new purpose, including a farm. **Clontarf Boys Town** had first been opened as a care home in 1901, in an isolated area.¹¹²⁵ There were major refurbishments in the 1930s, and a chapel, built using the boys as labourers, was added in 1940-41. Post-war, the number of boys at Clontarf rose to 280, including child migrants transferred from Castledare Junior Orphanage, before falling to around 150 in the 1960s. Just to re-emphasise a point already made, those in these 'orphanages' were not all, or even mainly, 'orphans'. **St Mary's Agricultural School, Tardun**, 200 miles north of Perth, was opened in 1928 as a home to which initially boys at Clontarf would be transferred in order to learn farming skills, and post-war they came to include child migrants.¹¹²⁶ **St Joseph's Farm and Trade School, Bindoon**, was established by the Christian Brothers in 1936 on a homestead site 60 miles north of Perth.¹¹²⁷ The rural ideal at Pinjarra seems to have been intended as a model. As at Clontarf, boys were used as labourers in constructing the buildings.

32.3 What follows begins by reviewing contemporary official UK government appraisals of care and conditions at these institutions. Next we provide a review of subsequent studies of the quality of the care provided and evidence of abuse. One investigation was conducted by Dr Barry Coldrey, himself a Christian Brother, and others are official inquiries conducted between 1997 and 2016. Finally we summarise witness statements provided to this inquiry. However, this is a complex matter, with serious and disturbing implications, and Prof. Lynch provides a detailed examination and appraisal of available evidence.¹¹²⁸ Only a few contemporary documents have been obtained from the Christian Brothers.

32.4 It is important to note that criticisms of care (with implications for abuse) had been expressed from early days and certainly during the period during which UK

¹¹²⁵ Find and Connect, Clontarf (1901-1983), <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/wa/WE00057>, including photograph.

¹¹²⁶ Find and Connect, Tardun Farm School (1928-2008), <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/wa/WE00216>, including photograph.

¹¹²⁷ Find and Connect, Bindoon (1936-1966), <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/wa/WE00190>, including photograph.

¹¹²⁸ Gordon Lynch, *Possible collusion between individuals alleged to have sexually abused boys at four Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, 1947-1965: a secondary analysis of material collated by historical abuse inquiries*, (2019), <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

child migrants were being sent to them. For example, Sir Richard Cross, the UK High Commissioner in Australia, had not been impressed by what he had seen when he visited **St Mary's Agricultural School, Tardun**, in October 1942.¹¹²⁹ Admittedly, this was during the war when resources were tight and the transfer to Tardun from other Christian Brothers institutions of all the child migrants in the State, as well as other boys, had made it overcrowded. Altogether by 1942 they numbered 248. Cross accepted that most facilities though limited seemed reasonably good, the boys did not seem unhappy, the Brothers seemed keen, and the Sisters were 'models of kindness'.¹¹³⁰ But the boys looked like 'ragamuffins, being barefooted and dressed in extremely old, untidy and dirty looking shirts and shorts', and the accommodation was 'extremely rough'.¹¹³¹ Dormitories and covered balconies were 'crammed to capacity with beds', bedclothes were 'old rugs', linen was not clean, and 'one missed the hand of competent housekeeping'.¹¹³² Indeed, he concluded that it was difficult to see upon what was being spent the weekly subsidies for each boy which were being provided by the governments of Western Australia, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the UK. He was also concerned about inadequate aftercare provision.

32.5 Subsequently, in 1944, Walter Garnett from the High Commission visited and reported on three of the four Christian Brothers establishments in the State.¹¹³³ **St Joseph's Farm and Trade School, Bindoon**, was at this time receiving boys older than school-leaving age, and preparing them for trades. Garnett reckoned the place seemed well-equipped and well-situated for its purpose, and the boys in good spirits, but buildings were still under construction, the boys being used as labourers, 80 already being accommodated there, including 23 from the UK.¹¹³⁴ At **St Mary's Agricultural School, Tardun**, the previous Principal had been removed as unsuitable, but the boys seemed to be happy, healthy, well-fed, intelligent, and well-mannered, their discipline excellent and their schoolwork good. However, here too buildings were still not complete, and it was still overcrowded, with 180 boys resident including 50 from the UK. Living conditions were 'primitive'. There was an 'entire lack of any

¹¹²⁹ TNA, DO35/1138/M1020/1, 'Christian Brothers Tardun Training School Western Australia', LEG.001.004.4488-4491. On wartime conditions and reports see Appendix 2, Section 2, paras 2.1-2.4.

¹¹³⁰ *Ibid*, LEG.001.004.4489.

¹¹³¹ *Ibid*, LEG.001.004.4488.

¹¹³² *Ibid*, LEG.001.004.4490.

¹¹³³ TNA, DO35/1138/4, 'Fairbridge Farm School – W.Australia. Suggested Visit of Mr Garnett to School at Pinjarra', Appendix, The Christian Brothers' Farm Training Schools, LEG.001.002.0242-0245, 0288; and for general comments on the three, LEG001.002.0243-0247.

¹¹³⁴ *Ibid*, LEG.001.002.0242-0243.

comfort': no protection against flies, limited bathing facilities, comfortless dormitories, no library, and a laundry which was too small. Garnett was also concerned about its remote location and limited contact with the outside world, about which the boys seemed 'strikingly ignorant'.¹¹³⁵ As for **Castledare Junior Orphanage**, this was 'very poorly equipped' and accommodation 'of very low standard'. No Sisters were attached to the home, though the Archbishop of Perth was arranging for a supply from the Sisters of Nazareth, but only for after the war ended. In Garnett's opinion, no child migrants should currently be sent there.¹¹³⁶

32.6 Accommodating children in overcrowded places with inadequate facilities and insufficient and inappropriate staff might constitute abuse, and be a cause for concern. But these were wartime circumstances and wartime needs took priority over the well-being of children. However, in 1947 child migrants in very considerable numbers - 344 in three shiploads - were dispatched from Catholic institutions in the UK, including Scotland, to all four institutions run by the Christian Brothers (including the one at Clontarf), and some to Nazareth House, Geraldton, and to St Joseph's Orphanage, Subiaco.¹¹³⁷ This was in spite of critical concerns raised in May and June 1947 by State officials in Western Australia following their inspections of these institutions. They were also sent against the advice of a senior official in the Commonwealth Government's Department of Immigration. The concerns were also shared by Garnett at the High Commission. However, Arthur Calwell, the Commonwealth Government's Minister of Immigration, who had been educated by the Christian Brothers and had close links with its principal recruiter in the UK, Brother Conlon, authorised approval and in such large numbers.

32.7 The reports on the four institutions which John Moss posted to the Home Office from Australia following his inspections of them early in 1952, some five years after child migrants had first been sent there post-war, imply that by then there was no reason for concern.¹¹³⁸ To Moss, the boys at **Castledare Junior Orphanage** seemed cared for and happy, even though the accommodation still needed renovating, work was needed on the kitchen, and classrooms were inadequate. At

¹¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p.243, and see also pp.244-245.

¹¹³⁶ *Ibid*, p.242.

¹¹³⁷ On this and its immediate consequences for childcare see Appendix 2, Section 3, paras 3.1-3.12; and for subsequent and alarming official reports about conditions at these Christian Brothers institutions see para 3.13-3.14.

¹¹³⁸ TNA, MH102/2041, 'Emigration of Children to Australia. Reports by Mr John Moss', pp.15-16; Moss, *Child Migration to Australia*, pp.9, 12.

Clontarf Boys' Town the boys also seemed to Moss to be happy, and the accommodation, equipment, ablutions and educational arrangements good. As for **St Joseph's Farm and Trade School at Bindoon**, Moss judged that the accommodation was very good. He was also impressed that new buildings were being erected by the Brothers *and* by the boys, and he saw no evidence that the boys were being overworked. He acknowledged that it was unfortunate that **St Mary's Agricultural School at Tardun** was so isolated, but there were contacts with outside people, and the accommodation and equipment were good, as was the education the boys were receiving. Unsurprisingly, Moss in the final report he submitted to the Home Office in 1953 repeated his complimentary remarks about these four Christian Brothers institutions.¹¹³⁹

32.8 It is therefore arresting to recall the harsh words about three of these places contained in the Ross Committee's confidential reports, written in 1956, nine years after child migrants had first been sent there post-war.¹¹⁴⁰ **Castledare Junior Orphanage** was home to 117 children at the time of the visit, of whom 70 were from the UK. They were the youngest child migrants, under the age of 11. It was acknowledged that some improvements to facilities had been made in recent years, but toilets had no doors or seats, bedrooms were crowded, and the standard of accommodation was generally uneven. Teaching was done by four Brothers and domestic staff were employed, 'but with no women regularly concerned with the care of the boys it is doubtful whether provision for even their physical welfare can be regarded as adequate'. Presumably because of the few staff engaged, 'individual treatment is clearly out of the question'.¹¹⁴¹ **Clontarf Boys Town** accommodated 112 child migrants among the 190 boys in residence, and staff numbered only 17. Some rooms were well-furnished, but the Christian Brothers were only interested in their teaching. Bedwetters had to sleep on a separate veranda. As we have commented on before, such treatment was a humiliating and abusive practice, and enuresis by boys 11 years of age or older should have been regarded as a cause for concern requiring sensitive investigation. Nor was attention being given to the needs of youngsters 'who have no contact with their parents'.¹¹⁴² There were 114 child migrants at **St Joseph's Farm and Trade School at Bindoon** in 1956, and there they remained until they were 16. The building extensions were still not finished, inside the atmosphere

¹¹³⁹ Moss, *Child Migration to Australia*, pp.9, 12.

¹¹⁴⁰ TNA, DO35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia'.

¹¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, pp.327-328.

¹¹⁴² *Ibid*, pp.329-331.

was 'dreary', and furnishing and equipment scanty and of poor quality. Twelve Christian Brothers were on the staff, plus four Sisters for domestic duties. But the committee's summary judgment bares repetition. Tellingly, the 'appearance and demeanour of the boys ... did nothing to modify the poor impression that the establishment made on the members of the mission'. Indeed, 'It is hard to find anything good to say of this place, which has the disadvantage of isolation, unsuitable and comfortless accommodation, and a Principal with no understanding of children and no appreciation of their needs as developing individuals'.¹¹⁴³ The Principal at the time was Brother MDJ and we have more to say about him below. It is unfortunate, given what we have subsequently learnt, that the Ross team did not visit **St Mary's Agricultural School at Tardun**, from where one of SCAI's Scottish witnesses 'graduated' in the year of the Ross team's report.¹¹⁴⁴

32.9 What now follows are retrospective accounts of conditions and care in all four institutions in Western Australia to where we know Scottish boys had been sent. We begin with the scholarly research of Dr Barry Coldrey, himself a Christian Brother. In addition to several published academic essays on the subject of child migration, he is the author of *The Scheme: The Christian Brothers and Childcare in Western Australia*, published in 1993.¹¹⁴⁵ By this date, the Child Migrants Trust, formed in 1987, had been drawing public, institutional and government attention to the history and experiences of UK child migrants. Coldrey had not served in Western Australia and had no connections with that State, but he had been commissioned to research and write the book, which was published with the Order's endorsement. Drawing on a wealth of material in public and institutional archives in Australia and the UK, including some made available to him by the Christian Brothers, this is a substantial history of the personnel involved in the establishment and the operations of its four institutions in the State. The Brothers were essentially trained as teachers, not as childcare professionals, and therefore particularly relevant to our concerns is a chapter entitled 'The Controversial Issues: Physical and Sexual Abuse'. On the former, Coldrey records that from the 1880s the Order had acquired as teachers a worldwide reputation for inflicting severe physical punishment. In Western Australia this seems to have been brutally exemplified by Brother MDJ, a dominant figure from the

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid*, pp.336-339.

¹¹⁴⁴ Witness statement by Mr Frederick Wooltorton Smith, see para 32.25 below. Though born in England, he always considered himself to be Scottish.

¹¹⁴⁵ Barry M. Coldrey, *The Scheme: The Christian Brothers and Childcare in Western Australia* (Argyle-Pacific Publishing, O'Connor, 1993).

1920s to the 1950s, who externally seems to have earned an admirable reputation, but internal to the institutions which he came to dominate he was a man of ferocious temper, cruelty and violence. Coldrey records numerous episodes recounted by his boy victims at **Clontarf Boys Town** and **St Joseph's Farm and Trade School, Bindoon**, when [MDJ] was in command. Corporal punishment was not illegal and, within limits, it was by contemporary standards acceptable. Coldrey stresses that point, but the manner with which [MDJ] assaulted boys was exceptional. Indeed he was subjected to official investigation, but continued to serve. Some of his victims later recorded their maltreatment and have made statements to public inquiries, including this one.¹¹⁴⁶ [MDJ] was not alone in his use of violence, and Coldrey reports other Brothers who dealt with the recalcitrant by extreme measures.¹¹⁴⁷

32.10 Coldrey also reports on sexual abuse. He acknowledges the problem of sexual activity between pubescent boys and the difficulties for managers in addressing such matters, and he also stresses the problems of distinguishing between credible and malicious allegations against adults. But he also concludes that child migrants were more vulnerable to sexual abuse than Australian-born children in care. He refers to strong evidence that five Brothers were multiple offenders. Six others had also admitted an offence against a teenager but, it seems, did not offend again. He provides details of several credible case histories, from 1920 and up to 1959, including one in 1950 which [MDJ] at Bindoon had raised with the Provincial Council, only for his concerns to be disregarded. Coldrey concludes that the good name and credibility of the Congregation externally was the order's priority.¹¹⁴⁸

32.11 Coldrey's book was a revelation, but he had toned down some of his findings. More graphic and troubling detail is contained in a substantial unpublished manuscript written by Coldrey of which we have been provided a copy. 'Reaping the Whirlwind...the Christian Brothers and Sexual Abuse of Boys in Australia, 1920-1994' (probably completed in 1994) takes the form of a hand-written commentary on pages in the book, plus substantial additions to the published text.¹¹⁴⁹ Some of it queries later accusations in the press and returns to the 'standards of the day' issue. But Coldrey also writes emphatically that 'violence and the abuse of power are

¹¹⁴⁶ For reports of [MDJ] brutality see paras 32.13, 32.15, 32.26, 32.46, 32.48, 32.49, 32.52.

¹¹⁴⁷ Coldrey, *The Scheme*, pp.346, 349-366.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, pp.389-401.

¹¹⁴⁹ Br Barry M. Coldrey, 'Reaping the Whirlwind...the Christian Brothers and Sexual Abuse of Boys in Australia, 1920-1994'.

among the most serious offences known to the criminal law', but 'few, if any, Brothers who offended seriously realised the criminal implications of their behaviour'.¹¹⁵⁰ He also stresses, with references, the biblical insistence on a higher standard of sexual morality, and yet 'apparently more abuse was perpetrated by Christian Brothers in Australia than by members of kindred bodies doing similar works'.¹¹⁵¹ For example, he names Brother **MHZ**, who he reckoned molested at least 50 boys at **Bindoon** and **Clontarf**, some of his assaults being 'of the most revolting kind'.¹¹⁵² He refers also to Brothers **MDF** and **AKL** as abusers at those places.¹¹⁵³ This was in the 1940s and 1950s when we know that Scottish child migrants were accommodated there, and indeed testimony by Mr Smith, on which we report below (paras 32.25-32.26), refers to these three Brothers as among his abusers. More such accounts follow, particularly relating to allegations eventually made in the 1980s and 1990s, many of which Coldrey finds credible. He also acknowledges that he had 'crafted' *The Scheme* 'to make the minimum admissions necessary' and that the situation in the orphanages was worse than the impression he had given in his book.¹¹⁵⁴ He goes on to give yet more examples of alleged sexual abuse, including of a boy who we know, as a man, was a witness at the IICSA inquiry.¹¹⁵⁵ There is also more about what those in the Christian Brothers hierarchy came to know about abuses, not only in Western Australia, and how they reacted: patchy at best; slowly; inadequacy leading to repeated abuse. Coldrey's account also considers the reasons why staff members rarely reported on those they suspected of abuse: staff loyalty; not wanting to get involved; protection of reputations.

32.12 As reviewed above (paras 8.4-8.5), the *Interim Report* in 1996 of the **Select Committee into Child Migration in Western Australia** had also revealed much about the practice and consequences of child migration. Written submissions had been received from 53 former child migrants who had been sent to Catholic institutions in the State, including, though not only, the four Christian Brothers establishments. Surviving records indicate that nearly half (44.5%) of Catholic child migrants sent to Western Australia were consigned to institutions managed by the

¹¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.10.

¹¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, p.9.

¹¹⁵² *Ibid*, p.34 and see also pp.38-41.

¹¹⁵³ *Ibid*, pp.47-51, 55-56.

¹¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.52.

¹¹⁵⁵ IICSA Child Migration Hearings, transcript of oral testimony by Oliver Cosgrove, 1 March 2017, pp.101-107, 123-124.

Christian Brothers.¹¹⁵⁶ The report refers to the traumas and consequences caused by 'physical, emotional or sexual abuse', and the difficulties boys encountered in trying to cope with institutional life and the effects of uprooting and migrating the young. These were matters which the inquiry wished to examine further, but were unable to carry out for political reasons.

32.13 Not surprisingly, subsequent public inquiries also considered abuse at these four Christian Brothers institutions in Western Australia. In 1997 the **House of Commons Health Committee** considered evidence supplied by VOICES, an organisation formed in 1991 to represent and support men who alleged that as child migrants to Australia in the post-war period they had suffered psychological, physical and sexual abuse, and had since struggled with the consequences.¹¹⁵⁷ Brothers and sisters had been separated. It was alleged that mail to parents was censored, and even that boys were wrongly told their parents were dead. Staff referring to the boys as slum kids and their parents as sluts damaged self-esteem. Even official Australian inspectors reported poor conditions in the homes post-war, and the lack of sufficient female members of staff. Those children suffering from enuresis were badly treated. Physical punishments were excessive and illegal. MDJ is again mentioned by name as a perpetrator, as well as others. Educational provision was inadequate. Food was poor and insufficient. Boys were put at risk and suffered injury working as building labourers. As for sexual abuse, 157 men told VOICES that they had been sexually abused. For these abuses the Congregation had made a public apology in 1993.¹¹⁵⁸

32.14 Paragraph 51 of the Committee's report begins as follows: 'It is hard to convey the sheer weight of the testimony we have received. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that some of what was done there was of a quite exceptional depravity, so that terms like "sexual abuse" are too weak to convey it.' It continues:

For example, those of us who heard the account of a man who as a boy was a particular favourite of some Christian Brothers at Tardun who competed as to who could rape him 100 times first, his account of being in terrible pain, bleeding, and bewildered, trying to beat his own eyes so they would cease to be blue as the Brothers liked his blue eyes, or being forced to masturbate animals,

¹¹⁵⁶ Select Committee into Child Migration, *Interim Report*, November 1996, p.1, and its 'Analysis of Computerised Database', p.6.

¹¹⁵⁷ HC 755-I, House of Commons Health Committee, Third Report, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants 1997-98*, and *Minutes of Evidence and Appendices*, appendix 7, Memorandum by VOICES, pp.257-278, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/755ap12.htm>

¹¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75507.htm>

or being held upside down over a well and threatened in case he ever told, will never forget it. But if it were one account it could perhaps be dismissed as exceptional—unfortunately adult after adult described their suffering as children. We heard of being told that ‘whatever a priest did was the Will of God, but if a boy told what a priest did he would commit a mortal sin’. As well as such depravity, though not suffered to the same extent by all, the boys were treated as slave labour. At Bindoon they actually constructed a large building, which one witness has described as having boys’ blood embedded in it. We heard of ‘man’s work with a boy’s body’. We heard many accounts of poor food and boys raiding pig bins, of being badly clothed and unshod.¹¹⁵⁹

32.15 It is not surprising that the **Australian Senate Inquiry** also had much to say in its 2001 report on the experiences of child migrants sent to institutions in Australia.¹¹⁶⁰ A substantial section specifically details abuse at Christian Brothers’ institutions. For instance, 24 of the 38 accounts of sexual abuse provided to the inquiry related to occurrences at their four homes in Western Australia. The evidence presented, some of it transcribed from witness testimony, referred to sexual assault (by priests and others), physical assault (severe beatings), depersonalisation (names changed, personal possessions removed), and psychological abuse (emotional deprivation, humiliating responses to bed-wetting). Boys suffered from excessive labour (including construction work), educational deprivation (with life-time consequences), poor food and clothing (leading to scavenging for food and lack of protective clothing) and poor aftercare (leaving them with limited life skills). The nature and impact of this maltreatment is examined at some length in the report. It was said that boys who reported abuse or assault were ‘beaten by the Brothers or abused by the very Brother to whom they had complained’.¹¹⁶¹ The report also insists that abuses and the names of abusers were known to higher Catholic authorities. A separate section of the Report is devoted to Brother MDJ [REDACTED] ruthless regime at Bindoon.¹¹⁶²

32.16 The Australian Senate inquiry was followed in 2014 by the **Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse**. This was set up to try to gain a better understanding of the circumstances in which sexual abuse

¹¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75507.htm>

¹¹⁶⁰ *Lost Innocents*, Report, pp.71-105.

http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index

¹¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, pp.76-77.

¹¹⁶² *Ibid*, pp.116-117.

occurred in institutions caring for young people, of how institutions responded to allegations, and of how they should respond and provide protection. One of its case studies was of the same four residential institutions run by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia.¹¹⁶³ It received evidence from eleven men who as children had lived in them.¹¹⁶⁴ They made allegations of sexual abuse against sixteen Brothers who had worked at one or more of each of these institutions. Thirteen of these Brothers had at some point worked at Bindoon. Between 1947 and 1959 the named Brothers had consistently made up around half of the staff working at Bindoon in each given year. The investigation received evidence about the working environment, the nature of the abuse, what at the time was known about this abuse by the Christian Brothers and the State Child Welfare Department, and what were the immediate and more recent organisational responses.

32.17 In its analysis of visitation reports and the minutes of Provincial Councils, the investigation established that the Order was in fact aware of numerous incidents in which Christian Brothers were reported to have sexually abused children in their care at the four residential institutions in Western Australia.¹¹⁶⁵ In the 1940s, 17 Brothers were reported for such behaviour and 24 in the 1950s.¹¹⁶⁶ Brothers had sexually abused children within the dormitories in the presence of other children, or had openly taken them from the dormitories to their individual bedrooms.

32.18 Where cases are discussed in visitation reports and Council minutes, sexually abusive behaviour was usually presented in terms of a moral or spiritual failure on the part of the Brother concerned. In some instances, if it was thought that a Brother would be unable to overcome this moral failing, they were then removed to an institution where it was intended they would not have direct contact with children, or they were given dispensation to leave the order, or they were dismissed. The Royal Commission noted four incidents in Christian Brothers' records in the 1940s and 1950s in which an individual Brother had been transferred away from one of these

¹¹⁶³ Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, *Report of Case Study 11, Congregation of Christian Brothers in Western Australia*, December 2014: <http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/27a80b05-2b21-48ec-bd94-2f3f02522596/Report-of-Case-Study-No-11>.

¹¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, pp.20-28, summarises their evidence, names the abusing Brothers, their locations, the emotional, physical, and sexual abuse suffered, where it occurred, abuse also by older boys, and the reporting (or not) of the abuse and the consequences.

¹¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, pp.5-6, 30-38.

¹¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, pp.34-35.

residential institutions in Western Australia because of known or alleged instances of sexual abuse. A fifth case was also noted of the sudden transfer of a Brother whose relations with boys had become a source of concern.¹¹⁶⁷ But in other instances, sexually abusive behaviour was recorded as something to be addressed through their on-going spiritual and moral formation, with the Brother reprimanded for their actions but allowed to continue in their role. Less concern seems to have been shown for their victims.¹¹⁶⁸

32.19 The tendency not to accept children's allegations of sexual abuse as worthy of independent investigation allowed conditions in which collusion between Christian Brothers could prevent effective action being taken. More seriously, witness evidence indicated that Brothers were aware of sexual abuse taking place but did nothing to intervene and protect children. It was reported that some Brothers at Bindoon would comment on a child's sexual contact with another Brother, with one repeatedly commenting that a particular child had become another Brother's 'little girl'.¹¹⁶⁹

32.20 The pervasive culture of staff violence towards children in these Christian Brothers institutions generally discouraged any disclosures of sexual abuse. Despite this, witnesses recalled some instances where they had spoken about their sexual abuse to another Brother. One resident at Bindoon reported being brought before the school's Principal and being so frightened that he retracted his story:

I went and told Father GERARD some of what happened. I only told Father GERARD about Brother LZO hugging me and putting his hand down my pants. Shortly after, I was summonsed to Brother MIY. He asked me about the incident. He seemed furious. He started to question me about Brother LZO. He scared me and I thought I was in trouble. I backtracked and said that Father GERARD must have misunderstood what I had said. I remember I was petrified.¹¹⁷⁰

A few days after this meeting, the victim was unexpectedly sent away to a monastery for 21 months and he assumed that this was because of the initial allegation that he had made. Others reported either being beaten for making disclosures of abuse, or

¹¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, pp.31-34.

¹¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pp.4, 30-36.

¹¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.24

¹¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, witness statement by [REDACTED], STAT.0232.001.0001_R, paras.12-13:
<https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/exhibits/e7ba58da-609c-4854-aa74-c8992ec75d3c/case-study-11,-april-2014,-perth>

being told to seek penance for it, or this leading to further acts of sexual abuse from the person in whom they had confided. As the Royal Commission recorded:

V V said that Brother **MHZ** anally assaulted him at the farm hay shed at Bindoon. At that time he had only been at Bindoon for about two weeks. When he reported the incident to Father **MJC**, he said that Father **MJC** applied cream to the scratches on his legs and then began to fondle his bottom and genitals. V V fled from Father **MJC** and remained in his bed for four or five days.¹¹⁷¹

32.21 There was no other monitoring system that provided effective protection for children in these institutions. Officers from the State Child Welfare Department did make unannounced visits, and the Royal Commission noted that some of its inspection reports made critical comments about the physical conditions and lack of educational provision, particularly at Bindoon. However, these inspection reports tended to focus on discussions of the material conditions at the institution and not the welfare of individual children.¹¹⁷² They were not such that children would have been able to report such abuse. As one witness to the Royal Commission put it:

I also couldn't have really reported it to the Child Welfare Department. Although I understand there were officers from the Department who did inspections, we never knew who they were, or when they were coming, and even if we did it would have been impossible to speak to them anyway. It was just a visitor to the classroom who came in with a Brother, said 'Good morning' and left.¹¹⁷³

However, one State Child Welfare memorandum at least reported the inappropriate sexualised behaviour of a former resident of Castledare in 1950, including 'acting unnaturally with a dog' and getting another child to undress in the lavatories at their school.¹¹⁷⁴ The child had disclosed that he had learnt such behaviour at Castledare and that the older boys there used to come into the younger boys' beds at night, make them take off their pyjama bottoms and then 'do rude things to them'. The

¹¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp.24-25.

¹¹⁷² Digitised copies of these State Child Welfare inspection reports are available on the list of exhibits for this investigation, <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/exhibits/e7ba58da-609c-4854-aa74-c8992ec75d3c/case-study-11,-april-2014,-perth>

¹¹⁷³ Royal Commission, *Report of Case Study 11*, witness statement STAT.0230.001.0001_R para 23: <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/exhibits/e7ba58da-609c-4854-aa74-c8992ec75d3c/case-study-11,-april-2014,-perth>

¹¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, Exhibits: Memorandum from L.Jacks, 27 December 1950, contained in archive bundle 'State Inspection Report regarding Castledare and relevant correspondence', document ID: WA.0009.001.0058_R.

Child Welfare officer to whom the child spoke did not ask for any further details from him. The memorandum noting this conversation was attached to the State Child Welfare Department's file for Castledare, but we have seen no further evidence of any action being taken as a result of this.

32.22 There was no other monitoring system that provided effective protection for children in these institutions from sexual abuse. The custodianship of children was given to the Catholic Episcopal Migration and Welfare Association, rather than to the Christian Brothers themselves, but it is not clear what separate inspection process, if any, that Association had to monitor children in these residential institutions. Moreover, the Royal Commission investigation did not identify any form of monitoring system from sending organisations in the UK that provided any protection or over-sight of child migrants sent to these institutions. It is not known to what extent the Provincial Councils of the Christian Brothers shared their knowledge about sexually abusive behaviour by Brothers with any sending agencies in the UK.

32.23 In contrast to the case reviewed above concerning Dr Barnardo's Home at Picton, the Royal Commission found no evidence that the Christian Brothers notified the State Child Welfare Department or the police in relation to these cases. There does not appear to have been an organisational culture within the Christian Brothers in which they understood the State Child Welfare Department as an organisation with which they were working collaboratively to ensure child well-being and protection. Provincial Council minutes from 1934 describe a Brother at Bindoon as 'not the correct type to be in charge of a Government subsidised Institution which is so closely watched by the Child Welfare Dept and so much under the notice of the public'.¹¹⁷⁵ Only one Christian Brother was later successfully prosecuted in the early 1990s for sexual abuse at a Western Australian residential institution and received a three and a half year custodial sentence.¹¹⁷⁶

32.24 Of the 49 Scottish boys who we know were sent to these Christian Brothers institutions, we know only the names and destinations of 31, but we have been provided with witness statements by the other 18, most submitted directly to SCAI, others forwarded as testimony to other inquiries. We know for certain that eight of

¹¹⁷⁵ Royal Commission, *Report of Case Study 11*: <http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/27a80b05-2b21-48ec-bd94-2f3f02522596/Report-of-Case-Study-No-11>, p.31.

¹¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.27

the 49 were initially sent to **Castledare**.¹¹⁷⁷ Most were then moved on to **Clontarf**, where other boys had been directly sent, and altogether we are aware of 27 boys from Scotland there accommodated, including 11 of our witnesses. We know that 23 boys experienced life at **Bindoon**, including nine of our witnesses, sent there directly or later transferred, one of whom was also later moved to **Tardun**, and uniquely experienced life in all four institutions. One boy, originally sent to St John Bosco's Boys Town in Hobart, Tasmania, was transferred three years later to **Tardun**, giving us there a known total of four, including three witnesses. The statements presented to SCAI by each of the 18 Scottish witnesses substantially allege similar experiences and similar consequences.

32.25 Mr Frederick Woollorton Smith was born on [REDACTED] 1938.¹¹⁷⁸ Aged two months he was placed in the care of the Sisters of Nazareth in their home just across the border in Carlisle. There he remained until at the age of nine he was sent to Western Australia and into the care of Christian Brothers, arriving on 10 December 1947. It may not be unique, but Mr Smith seems to have been unusual in experiencing Christian Brothers 'care' in all four of its institutions in Western Australia. He was not sent first to Castledare, perhaps because it was full, but to **Bindoon**, to where older boys were usually sent. There he remained until July 1949. Then, aged 11, he was moved, briefly, to **Castledare**. This too was unusual for an 11-year-old where most of the boys were younger, age six to eight, in his account. His explanation is that it was because he was 'so small'. This was in any event a temporary move since, early in 1950, he was relocated to **Clontarf**, before being

¹¹⁷⁷ The eight included [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] 1940 to unmarried parents, deserted by father, mother died [REDACTED] 1942; sent by Stirling Burgh Council to Nazareth House, Lasswade, [REDACTED] 1942; recommended [REDACTED] 1947 by a Sister for transfer to the Christian Brothers; reference in report to the regional office for Scotland and Ireland of the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee; transfer approved by the Public Assistance Committee [REDACTED] 1947; left for Castledare [REDACTED] 1947, STC.001.001.1250. There is no witness statement or report on his subsequent experiences.

¹¹⁷⁸ The documents provided by Mr Smith which have been supplied to the writers of this report consist of (1) a letter to SCAI, 23 Nov 2018, WIT.003.001.8668-8670; (2) a summary life history, dated 2 Nov 2018, WIT.003.001.8674-8678; (3) a summary, not dated, of his years at the four institutions to which he was sent, with reference to the names of the Brothers who abused him, the nature of the abuse and its long-term effects, WIT.003.001.8680-8682; (4) a 19-page statement, F.W.Smith 1947-1956, 'Nine Years under the Christian Brothers. The Fifteen Evil Ones', 1996, WIT.003.001.8683-8701; (5) a copy of his Australian Dept of Immigration LEM3 document, authorising his migration, dated 17 Jan 1947, signed by Rev P.A.Conlon, on behalf of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, Birmingham, and by Sister Mary Fidelis, Mother Superior, Nazareth House, Carlisle, as his 'guardian', WIT.003.001.8672. In these documents, Mr Smith twice states that he was sent to Australia aged seven, but elsewhere, including the signed LEM3 form, dated 17 Jan 1947, it is evident that he would have been nine when he arrived at Fremantle on 10 Dec 1947.

moved once more in February 1952, aged 13, nearly 14, to **Tardun**. There he remained until he turned 18 in [REDACTED] 1956, beyond the normal leaving age of 16, but not unique. He writes that he ended his 'school days at the age of sixteen years'. That would be at some date after [REDACTED] 1954. Once they became 16, boys would normally leave to take up – or at least seek – paid employment elsewhere. Fred Smith may have remained at Tardun as a hired hand, before leaving. He then spent six years in the Army and thereafter secured jobs as a labourer and truck driver.

32.26 It is Mr Smith's experiences of abuse at these four institutions and their lasting effects upon him with which we are here concerned. His accounts make for disturbing reading. Particularly informative is his report 'Nine Years Under the Christian Brothers'.¹¹⁷⁹ A handwritten note on the text says it was started in 1964, but the typescript is dated 10 November 1996 and a further handwritten note adds that it was finished in December 1996. The prompt to continue and complete may have been because Mr Smith's intention had been to submit it to the Western Australia Legislative Assembly's Select Committee into Child Migration which had been established in July 1996. Indeed, his testimony may have been among the evidence submitted by 53 former child migrants who had been sent to Catholic institutions in Western Australia, but as we reported earlier the Select Committee was not able to complete its inquiries and make a final report.¹¹⁸⁰ Referring explicitly by name to his abusers, he gave to his 'Nine Years' report the subtitle 'The Fifteen Evil Ones' (though he names sixteen abusers and unnamed others). In his account he acknowledges some good times and making friends, but otherwise his account makes for exceedingly grim reading. There are disturbing allegations of abuse: at Bindoon, Brother **MDJ** brutality and sexual abuse by Brothers **MIU**, **MHZ**, **AKL** and **MDY** at Castledare, sexual abuse by Brother **MDF** and physical abuse (with a hose) by Brother **MYK**; at Clontarf, physical abuse by Brother **MDI**, sexual abuse again by Brother **MHZ** who had been transferred from Bindoon, and physical and sexual abuse by Brother **AKP** at Tardun, not just severe rheumatic fever and medical neglect but physical abuse by Brother **LZG**, physical assault by Brothers **LZE** and **LZF**, and sexual abuse by other unnamed Brothers. He also refers to psychological and emotional abuse, including being falsely told that he was an

¹¹⁷⁹ SCAI documents submitted by Mr Fred Smith: letter, 2 Nov 2018; statement, 2 Nov 2019; F.W.Smith, 'Nine Years under the Christian Brothers', 1996; summary account of abuses and long term effects, n.d. WIT.003.001.8668-8701.

¹¹⁸⁰ Select Committee into Child Migration, *Interim Report*, Nov 1996, pp.1-7; and see above paras 8.4-8.5.

orphan. He writes that his schooling was limited to just three years: 'first and second grades under the Nuns in England [that is in Carlisle], and the third under the Christian Brothers in W.A.'.¹¹⁸¹ In 1956 aged 18 he left Tardun, and 'Thus ended my education in the arts of brutality, sex, religion and violence'.¹¹⁸² But the legacy for him of sexual, physical, psychological and emotional abuse seems to have been chronic. He reports that he suffered from PTSD, chronic anxiety, depression and insomnia, and such other serious medical conditions as bladder problems, severe arthritis, and cancer, requiring periods in hospital. His deficient education confined him to labouring jobs because of his inability to read and write. In sum, 'I have suffered from the impact of abuse throughout my life'.¹¹⁸³

32.27 Several documents concerning Mr LZY [REDACTED] have been supplied to SCAI.¹¹⁸⁴ From these we learn that he was born in Yorkshire in [REDACTED] 1941, but his mother died in 1943, and when he was age five his older sister placed him in care in a Nazareth House in Lasswade near Edinburgh (itself a bad experience). From there, with his sister [REDACTED] he was sent to Australia arriving in [REDACTED] 1947, age six. Remarkably, he had been born cross-eyed, but the infirmity evidently did not lead him to being rejected after a medical examination. He must have been assessed as suitable for migration to Australia, but there he was to undergo three operations which still left him with double vision. Like Mr Smith, he too was moved from place to place. He was initially sent to **Castledare**. Then, in [REDACTED] 1951, age nine, he was forwarded to **Bindoon**, before being moved again in [REDACTED] 1952, age ten, to **Clontarf**. His stay there was also brief. In [REDACTED] 1953 he was sent back to **Bindoon**, still only eleven, and there he remained until [REDACTED] 1957 by when he had become 16.

32.28 On arriving in Australia he had of course been separated from [REDACTED] who had been sent to St Joseph's Orphanage at Subiaco near Perth (upon which see Chapter 33 below). Though St Joseph's was also in Western Australia, Mr LZY [REDACTED] very soon, by 1952, lost touch with her. She was adopted, date not known, and they did not restore contact until 1991. In one document supplied to SCAI, Mr LZY [REDACTED] names Brothers MDJ [REDACTED], MDY [REDACTED] and MBC [REDACTED] as abusers, MDJ [REDACTED] especially for the regime of

¹¹⁸¹ F.W.Smith, 'Nine Years under the Christian Brothers', WIT.003.001.8699.

¹¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, WIT.003.001.8688.

¹¹⁸⁴ Documents and Correspondence provided to SCAI by or relating to Mr LZY [REDACTED]: (1) Affidavit, 29 Jan. 2019, WIT.003.002.2684-2687; (2) JG1, letter by Mr LZY [REDACTED] 29 Sept 1993, WIT.003.002.2698-2670; (3) JG2, statement by Mr LZY [REDACTED] 25 March 2019, WIT.003.002.2701-2703; (4) JG3 letter, LZY [REDACTED] to Lace, WIT.003.002.2688-2696; (5) LZY [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] 5 July 2019, WIT.003.002.2682.

'child slave labour' in the building works he operated and the punishments he inflicted.¹¹⁸⁵ **MDY** inflicted not just physical beatings but caused emotional and psychological damage by publicly mocking the deformity of his eyes. **MBC** terrified young **LZY** with his sexual innuendos. In another submitted document Mr **LZY** also refers to abuse he suffered at Castledare from Brothers **MDF**, **MDH** and **MYK** with a particularly stark account of **MDF** sexually abusing him, a seven-year-old boy. **MDH** inflicted a beating so severe with a strap that the boy **LZY** was black, blue and crimson from buttocks to ankles. No medical attention followed. Young **LZY** and other boys were 'washed' in a bath by **MDF** and others, causing them embarrassment and shame. Mr **LZY** reports that he was also forced to masturbate a teacher named **zLZD**. Brother **MIY** at Bindoon also sexually abused him. The legacy as detailed by Mr **LZY** is what we have come to expect. He experienced difficulties later in life due to a sense of inferiority and an inability to trust people. It was perhaps much later that he learnt that his sister had been well-educated at Subiaco and after she had been adopted. Mr **LZY** reports that his education at the hands of the Christian Brothers, after ten years in their care, was minimal, and that at the age of 16 his ability to read and write was limited. His inadequate education limited his employability. Later in life he attended night school, but his lack of confidence and his embarrassment about an inability to read and write properly led to him not attending. Like others he had a drinking problem and led a life of 'soul destroying loneliness'.¹¹⁸⁶ He found difficulty in forming personal relationships. He did eventually marry, but he feels that his relationship with his son was greatly affected by his inability to be a good role model.

32.29 Mr **LZK** born in Aberdeen on **██████████** 1942, was another who, having been placed in Nazareth House in Aberdeen at 10 months, was subsequently dispatched to **Castledare** in **██████████** 1950 when he was aged seven, and he was sent from there to **Clontarf** in 1952 when he was age 10.¹¹⁸⁷ His recollections of care during the years at Nazareth House are mixed but limited, but he does recall trying to run away. He also remembers Father Stinson and others visitors in 1949 telling the children at Nazareth House how wonderful Australia was and asking who

¹¹⁸⁵ Statement by Mr **LZY** 29th September 1993, WIT.003.002.2700.

¹¹⁸⁶ Statement by Mr **LZY** 1996, WIT.003.002.2696.

¹¹⁸⁷ SCAI statement from Mr **LZK** WIT.001.002.7453-7538. When Mr **LZK** left Castledare for Clontarf he was told by Brother **AKG** that henceforth his date of birth was not to be recorded as **AKG** 1942, which was correct, but as **AKG** 1943, the date he was placed at Nazareth House in Aberdeen. He states that making him seem a year younger was intended to secure for the Christian Brothers an extra year of state funding.

would like to go there. Nobody initially put their hands up, but young [LZK], poked by a nun, did volunteer, as did the other three lads with whom he had run away. It was hardly informed consent, since when he asked a nun where Australia was he recalls being told it was nearby, so he felt that if he did not like it he could come back.

32.30 The reception of his party on arrival at **Castledare** gave him and others their first taste of Brother [MDF] brutality. Bewildered boys were hit with a strap to hurry them up and some were literally kicked off the bus. He refers to primitive conditions, to bedwetters being given cold showers, to poor meals, and to a filthy kitchen (though a nice cook would slip extra and better food to boys). As reported by others, clothing was spartan (no underwear, no shoes), education by untrained Brothers was poor, healthcare 'abominable', birthdays not recognised, and there was no emotional support. He states that there were no official inspectors or visitors. He had no contact with family in Scotland. As for physical abuse, he was to experience worse later, but there were severe and unwarranted punishments at Castledare. Mr [LZK] names Brother [MDH] as an 'out-and-out cruel man', but Brother [MDF] 'the more sadistic...an absolute monster', with a strap which when it 'hit your hand just about ripped your shoulder off'.¹¹⁸⁸ There was also sexual abuse, and again Mr [LZK] names [MDF] 'probably the worst calibre of paedophile you could meet'.¹¹⁸⁹ Brother [MIZ] was another sexual molester. Older boys also abused younger, probably, Mr [LZK] thinks, because they themselves had been 'interfered with' when they were younger. There was, he states, no sex education. Young [LZK] never felt able to report abuse.

32.31 When he was transferred to **Clontarf**, Brother [MDF] followed six months later. Mr [LZK] states categorically that this was because [MDF] had been caught out as a paedophile at Castledare and had been moved on, and that this was not for the first time. He had previously been an abuser at Bindoon, and at Clontarf he was again an abusing paedophile.¹¹⁹⁰ Looking back, Mr [LZK] recognises that the paedophiles had nothing to hide: 'they all had enough on each other not to report it'.¹¹⁹¹ Mr [LZK] names Brothers [MHZ] [MXC] and [MYK] as other paedophiles, and he states that he narrowly escaped being abused by an older boy.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.7480.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.7480.

¹¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, Mr [LZK] had read Br Coldrey's 'Reaping the Whirlwind', WIT.001.002.7527-7528.

¹¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.7501.

He knows now of only one boy who reported to MDI that MDF was sexually abusing boys, and received a whack across the face in response. Mr LZK now believes that all the Brothers knew of this abuse, but did nothing. As for other forms of abuse, Mr LZK also now recognises how under-staffed was Clontarf, about five Brothers to deal with at least 250 boys. As a result, the 'cruelty ... knew no bounds'.¹¹⁹² Bedwetters were pushed out on to a balcony, mattresses not washed, repeat offenders punished, and the electric machine to alert boys wetting the beds was employed, though possibly because it enabled the likes of MDI to fiddle with a boy's penis. Hygiene again was poor, meals awful (looking for something better, boys raided the pig bins and food for cows), clothing still bad, healthcare inadequate, and education very poor (he writes that it was much better in Scotland), most teachers being incompetent. Mr LZK feels he was deliberately held back. Work was mainly on the farm or in the kitchens. Again, birthdays were never acknowledged, and it was hard to have close friends lest they turned out to be the 'pets' of Brothers. Nor were their opportunities to speak to outsiders, since welfare inspections were known in advance, certain boys were told what to say, and false impressions were generated. He also recalls that letters back to Scotland had to be copied from a text on a blackboard, and in any case boys were told that they had been abandoned – a clear case of psychological abuse. But 'brutality at Clontarf was far worse than it had been at Castledare'.¹¹⁹³ Punishments were random, for no reason. Brother LZL did not use a strap. He punched boys on the side of the head, on one occasion knocking a boy's eye out. Brother MXD used a strap, and he would also grab a boy's cheek and almost lift him off the ground. Mr LZK remembers the Principal, Brother MDI punching a boy up against a wall, and even more mercilessly punching a boy in a wheelchair who had lost both legs in a road accident. His weapon was also a cane. MDF was also violent in his punishing of boys. For the boys, school lessons were about avoiding being punished. Mr LZK left Clontarf in March 1959 when he was 16. MDI farewell words were that 'I guess the next time I see you will be in Fremantle jail'.¹¹⁹⁴

32.32 There was no aftercare by the Christian Brothers, and MDI had no interest in Mr LZK progress and well-being on the farm at which he had been dumped and where he stayed, in rough conditions to do hard work, for two and a half years. Only on Mr LZK initiative did 'Welfare' come to the farm. Visiting the shack in

¹¹⁹² *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.7486.

¹¹⁹³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.7498.

¹¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.7509.

which [LZK] was living, and learning of the long hours he worked and the very low wage he was given, and that irregularly, the inspector told [LZK] to hand in his notice, which he did. His placement by Welfare with a kindly couple transformed Mr [LZK] life, and from there, again with the help of Welfare, he joined the army (another kind of institutional care). There he was given an education, at last. Mates gave him his first ever birthday present. He served for 23 years (including in Vietnam), becoming a sergeant-major, and retiring to become an advocate for the Returned Servicemen's League, and his success at that evidently gave him a 'niche' and a sense of achievement. He married, and had three children, but he accepts that the failure of the marriage was due to his problems. He was given psychiatric treatment, and eventually he was diagnosed as having PTSD, not because of his experiences in Vietnam but at Clontarf. Further distress followed, and remains, in his efforts to get to the truth about his family origins, his 'deportation', his experiences 'in care' in Aberdeen and in Western Australia, in meeting family members, in presenting his evidence at public inquiries, and in seeking recognition of what he and others had endured.

32.33 We have four submissions by Mr James Albert McGregor (known as Bert).¹¹⁹⁵ The first, a 136-page autobiographical account, entitled 'With God Behind the Eight Ball' and dated 5 July 2003, he supplied to the Australian Senate inquiry. The second of 23 pages, dated 11 April 2014, is a more formal submission to the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. The third of 47 pages is the transcript of an oral history interview now in the National Archives of Australia. The fourth, 32 pages, dated 26 November 2018, was submitted to SCAI. Mr McGregor (his mother's surname) was illegitimate, born in Aberdeen in [REDACTED] 1941. Age four months his care was delegated to Nazareth House, Aberdeen. He reports that 'Father Stinson' asked children whether they would like to go to Australia, and because other boys did and it sounded good he followed suit. That was, he writes, 'my "rational" consent'.¹¹⁹⁶ He was another much transferred child migrant. In October 1947, still only five, he was sent to **St Joseph's Orphanage, Subiaco**, in Western Australia, arriving after his sixth birthday. He names ten other

¹¹⁹⁵ (1) James Albert McGregor, 'With God Behind the Eight Ball', 2003, WIT.003.001.4430-4610; (2) James Albert McGregor, statement to RCIRCSA, 11 April 2014, STAT.0237.001.0001-0023_R, https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/STAT.0237.001.0001_R.pdf; (3) Oral History Project Transcript, 1 Oct 2010, NAA.001.001.0574-0620. (4) SCAI statement by James Albert McGregor, 26 November 2018, WIT.001.002.3070-3101, annotated by applicant. Material for this report is drawn mainly from (4), where appropriate from (1) and (2), and on his later life from (3).

¹¹⁹⁶ SCAI statement by James Albert McGregor, 26 November 2018, WIT.001.002.3073.

boys from Scotland (out of 15) who travelled with him to Australia (including LZY see above). He was subsequently moved to **Castledare** Junior Orphanage in February 1949 when he was seven, and to **Clontarf** in February 1953 when he was eleven, and there he remained until February 1957, when not yet 16 he was sent to a Christian Brothers school at Stratfield, New South Wales, to be educated and trained to become himself a Christian Brother.

32.34 His recollections of Castledare include familiar references to bed-wetting, to the poor education he received from mainly unqualified teachers, to Christian Brothers using the strap to enforce discipline, and to visiting inspectors who did not talk to the children. At Clontarf the meals were bad, and again we read that boys who wet the bed were forced to sleep outside on the veranda, and that the education was poor. Mr McGregor states that he was still not able to read or write. When visiting Christian Brothers came to inspect they never spoke to the boys. He also recalls his unpaid labour. Always he had been told, like the other boys, that he was a war orphan with no family, which was not true. In fact he even had a younger half-brother (see witness statement by below) who had followed him to Clontarf – but that he was his brother he did not know until much later and it was 1999 before they met as brothers. At Castledare he had been ‘emotionally, physically and sexually abused’ by Brother MDF from when he was eight,¹¹⁹⁷ and he had hoped to escape when he was moved to Clontarf, but to there MDF was also moved. MDF resumed sexual abuse of young Bert caused him to break down, aged 12. He felt that he could not tell anyone, or ‘all hell would have broken loose’.¹¹⁹⁸ The abuse stopped only after his breakdown. He did not know until later that other boys were also being sexually abused by MDF. ‘He was the worst case of a paedophile I have come across and he was completely out of control.’¹¹⁹⁹ Disturbingly, Mr McGregor adds that MDF was untouchable and unaccountable....I think now that the clique known as the Orphanage Brothers made sure that the abuse was kept quiet. At least half of those monks were paedophiles’.¹²⁰⁰

32.35 Mr McGregor’s religious faith and his transfer to Strathfield College and the superior education he there received transformed his life, and he did indeed become

¹¹⁹⁷ James Albert McGregor, statement to RCIRCSA, 11 April 2014, STAT.0237.001.0003-R, and see also 0004-R, https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/STAT.0237.001.0001_R.pdf.

¹¹⁹⁸ SCAI statement by James Albert McGregor, 26 November 2018, WIT.001.002.3089.

¹¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3088.

¹²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, Mr McGregor also provides a grim account of an anonymised sexual predator in his autobiography, ‘With God Behind the Eight Ball’, pp.43-44. It is MDF

a Christian Brother with outwardly a distinguished career in several locations around the world. Abuse allegations were in the news by the 1980s, and he began his own research, but in his findings neither the Christian Brothers nor even higher Catholic agencies, in Rome, seemed interested. He concluded that there was no cure from within the organisation. He suffered another breakdown in 1994. Although he did get back into teaching and educational research his contact with the Brothers ended. Difficulties in forming personal relationships, even with rediscovered family members, has been a legacy of his abuse. In Tasmania, 'I now live the life of a hermit'.¹²⁰¹

32.36 Dr [MDF], formerly [MDF] was born in [MDF] 1947, [MDF]
[MDF]

[MDF]¹²⁰² He too was sent to Nazareth House in Aberdeen. Migrating to Australia 'sounded a lot of fun' when in 1952, aged about five, he was asked with others if he would like to go. He arrived in [MDF] 1953. He thought he was going to be looked after by his natural brothers, and it was a shock to discover he had been delivered into the care of Christian Brothers at **Clontarf**. Sexual and physical abuse soon followed. [MDF] thought at first that the cuddling and stroking by Brother [RBB] was kindness, but it was in fact grooming, and twice young [MDF] was sexually abused, leaving him ashamed, and very scared that it would continue.¹²⁰³ Brother [MDF] 'a sadist and a paedophile', was in charge of the dormitory to which he was next moved and he was also his class teacher.¹²⁰⁴ [MDF] reports that [MDF] would sit next to him in class and stick a pencil down his pants and 'anally rape me', but the worst sexual abuse occurred at night, when he was summoned to [MDF] bedroom, where he was beaten on his bare bottom followed by [MDF] abusing him with his penis.¹²⁰⁵ Brother [MDI] was another abuser - violent, cruel, sadistic. In front of other boys at assembly, he would beat their bare bottoms, either for no apparent reason, or, the boys suspected, because the 'sins' they had 'confessed' to a priest were being passed on to [MDI].¹²⁰⁶ Having been summoned to

¹²⁰¹ See also STAT.0237.001.0006-0007 and 0011-0018, https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/STAT.0237.001.001.001_R.pdf and NAA.001.001.0599-0620 for his later research and attempts to silence him in the interests of 'the Church', and his breakdown. He refers to contacting Barry Coldrey in STAT.0237.001.0016 and NAA.001.001.0603.

¹²⁰² SCAI statement by [MDF] 16 April 2019, WIT.003.001.9521-9531.

¹²⁰³ According to documents provided by Mr Oliver Cosgrove, [RBB] was [RBB]; WIT.003.002.2958 and 2990.

¹²⁰⁴ SCAI statement by Dr [MDF] WIT.003.001.9522.

¹²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9522-9523.

¹²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9523.

MDI office and brutally strapped until he was screaming ('I felt like it was my soul that was coming out with that scream'),¹²⁰⁷ reacted on the next occasion by hitting MDI with a brick and running away. Brought back, his punishment included being made to work all day in the piggery, not being allowed to mix with other boys – and denied any further classroom education. This left him unable to read or write. In addition to all this, suffered from poor eyesight, and he had both legs broken in a notorious road accident (in which one boy was killed). And yet he received little support.

32.37 When he finally left Clontarf, not yet 16, he was ill-equipped to survive, let alone to progress. As so often, this account contains no reference to aftercare. He suffered from the stigma of having been in institutional care, was mocked for his Scottish accent when in one job, and was not paid at another. He resorted to begging on the streets, had anxiety blackouts, contemplated suicide, and stumbled into petty crime. In fact, his first step on the road to redemption then followed, for a couple whose home he had burgled, took him in and cared for him until he was in his mid-20s. But he was still disturbed and confused and was terrified of intimacy. Further steps in his recovery came from care provided by Jesuits, and by working with and for the homeless, the marginalised, and exploited children. He became a respected practitioner, and he demonstrated his formerly denied intellectual quality by studying successfully for a BA, MSc, and PhD in social work and social theory, but all the time he still needed counselling. However, he made a successful marriage to a woman who shared his commitment to social work. Remarkably, when in Scotland, he met the mother he had never known, and she too was working for the homeless and destitute. report suggests that what he has achieved has been in spite of and not because of the Christian Brothers.

32.38 Mr CGW provided two witness statements to the Australian Senate inquiry which have been supplied to SCAI.¹²⁰⁸ Born in Scotland in 1942, Mr CGW was sent first to **Castledare** in 1947 aged five, and he was subsequently moved on to **Clontarf**. His testimony is brief, blunt and to the point. He states that his mother did not know to where he had been sent. He reports that he was 'raped at the age of 7' at Castledare and 'a second time at Clontarf...at the age of 11', by Brother MDF on both occasions. When he reported the rape to the head at

¹²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9524.

¹²⁰⁸ Mr CGW witness statement to the Australian Senate Inquiry, supplied to SCAI: POA.001.001.0043-0044.

Clontarf he was brutally beaten and called a liar. Educationally he was also left handicapped, because he was not supplied with the spectacles he needed and could not see the blackboard from where he was seated at the back of the room. Consequently, after ten years in the care of the Christian Brothers, he could not read or write. Only later, did he teach himself. He manages to conclude that he was 'one of the lucky ones', because subsequently he found his family.¹²⁰⁹

32.39 Mr Walter Kerkhof's account of his experiences is somewhat muddled, but we gather that he was born, illegitimate, in [REDACTED] 1942 (his father, he writes, was a Catholic priest) and he was sent to an unnamed institution in Falkirk.¹²¹⁰ He was there asked if he would like to 'go on a boat', and in 1947 with other boys from Scotland (and Wales and Ireland) he was migrated to Australia.¹²¹¹ Because he was only five he was initially sent to **Subiaco** but he was soon moved to **Castledare** and later to **Clontarf**. He recalls that boys had to manage without shoes (even when it was cold), that they were called 'sons of whores',¹²¹² that Brother **MDF** used violence and also abused him sexually, and that Brother **MDH** and Brother **MDI** were brutal. In his conclusion he lists the damaging effects on him of being 'in Religious Care'. These included the handicap for life of his poor education which he ascribes to Brother **MDF** criminal assault on him; being deliberately held down a year; of no interest being shown in him reaching his full potential; of not being able to learn a trade but being used as cheap labour; of feeling abandoned and an outsider in the company of people; of being affected by the 'brutality of supposed Christians'; and of being taken away from 'my beloved Scotland and family'.¹²¹³

32.40 Four statements have been provided on behalf of Mr **MPD**.¹²¹⁴ Born, illegitimate, in Co. Durham in [REDACTED] 1945, he was placed in Nazareth House in Aberdeen when he was aged three. In 1952, age seven, he was sent to **Castledare** where he stayed for 17 months, from [REDACTED] 1952 to [REDACTED] 1954. Then he was moved to **Clontarf**, age eight, where he remained for over seven years until

¹²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²¹⁰ SCAI witness statement by Mr Walter Kerkhof, WIT.003.001.5097-5102.

¹²¹¹ *Ibid.*, WIT.003.001.5097.

¹²¹² *Ibid.*, WIT.003.001.5098.

¹²¹³ *Ibid.*, WIT.003.001.5102.

¹²¹⁴ Report by Professional Standards Resources Group, 1 Aug 2007, WIT.003.001.5807-5810; Additional Notes, 6 Sept 2007, WIT.003.001.5806; Responses to Questions 14 to 19 in Redress Western Australia Application Form, c. May 2008, WIT.003.001.5814-5819; Statement to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 1 Feb 2018, WIT.003.001.5820-5826.

1961, by when he was 16. After leaving and working on farms, he returned to Clontarf late in 1964, remaining there until 1969. He had ceased to be a ward of the state in 1966 when he became 21.

32.41 His loyalty to the Christian Brothers and his awareness of the effects on him of the abuse he suffered generated an inner conflict and even a tendency to blame himself for some of the neglect and abuse he suffered. His schooling at Castledare and Clontarf was limited. He remembers that the Brothers used to tell him he 'wouldn't even be a street sweeper'.¹²¹⁵ Even by the time he left Clontarf, age 16, he was unable to read or write, and he was ridiculed for even trying – this at a time when he was working full time in the dairy and piggery at Clontarf and fulfilling a demanding adult work load seven days a week, 5am to 8pm in summer time. Emotional, physical and sexual abuse also characterised these institutions. At Castledare, Brother **MXB** punished **MPD** by hitting him across the knuckles with a bunch of keys, causing them to bleed; Brother **MIZ** was very cruel, beating **MPD** with his hands and fists, and kicking him; Brother **MDF** was also violent, using a stick or strap.

32.42 **MPD** was still only eight when he left, for Clontarf. There, instances of abuse included the killing of **MPD** pet dog by Brother **MHZ** because it barked (and he received a severe beating for killing **MHZ** cat in revenge), violence by Brother **LZL** by Brother **MDF** who had also moved to Clontarf, and by Brother **MXC** who broke over his head a plate of stew (pigs' nipples and chunks of fat) which young **MPD** then probably only age eight, judged too revolting to eat. He recalls this incident marking the beginning of the continual fear and anxiety he experienced throughout the years he spent at Clontarf. Brother **MDI** as so often in these accounts, is also remembered as a violent man, who terrorised boys by telling them that they were to receive a beating but then leaving them waiting for hours against a wall in a state of fear, powerless 'like an ant'.¹²¹⁶ He also kicked boys with his heavy boots and would throw things at them. **MPD** was also sexually abused at Clontarf, first by Brother **MPR** and, after he left, by Brother **MPQ**. He was also sexually abused by older boys at the institution. Sexual activity among the boys seems to have been frequent. **MPD** found it difficult and frightening when he left Clontarf,

¹²¹⁵ Statement to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 1 Feb 2018, WIT.003.001.5822.

¹²¹⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.5822.

because he had not been prepared for it, and he was treated with contempt by his first employer because he was an 'orphan'.

32.43 The effects of all this on his later life were serious. Because of his 'grooming' by Brothers **MPR** and **MPQ** he felt complicit and even doubted his own sexuality, and later in life, as a father, he was inhibited in showing his children his affection or to express his love for his wife, in a marriage that ended in divorce. Because of his poor education, he was not able to write to his mother, still alive in Scotland. News of her death then hit him hard. Even in 2008, when preparing his statement, it was acknowledged by the officer assisting him that '**MPD** has limited literacy skills'.¹²¹⁷ Mr **MPD** lists the Christian Brothers who did him harm: Brothers **MXB** and **MIZ** at Castledare; Brother **MDF** at Castledare and then at Clontarf; Brothers **MHZ**, **MDI**, **MPQ**, **MPR**, **LZL** and **MXC** at Clontarf.

32.44 Mr **MHW**, though born in England in **1938** to an Irish mother, was raised in a Nazareth House orphanage in Aberdeen.¹²¹⁸ He writes that with others he volunteered to go to Australia when he was age eight, seemingly in order to escape from Nazareth House. In addition to two girls in the Aberdeen party, there were seven boys whom he names. He probably arrived in 1947 and was sent to **Clontarf**, and he remembers another in the party, **1938** who was sent to Tardun. At Clontarf, Brother Crowley was in charge, and he was 'alright'.¹²¹⁹ There was also Father Gorman who 'cared for the kids'.¹²²⁰ But he remembers Brother **MDI** force-feeding boys who were unwilling to eat what they had been given. Again we read of the humiliation of bedwetters. As other witnesses have acknowledged, there were some enjoyable trips and holidays, but schooling was poor, with 70-odd boys in a class. 'They did not teach us properly',¹²²¹ and **MHW** preferred working with the farm animals. Once more we read that child welfare visitors turned up, but rarely, and they did not speak to the boys. As for discipline, the boys were beaten, as an example to others, and there were casual smacks on the head. Older boys were also abusive. He states that, when he was aged 11 or 12, he was raped five times by an older boy, whose name he mentions, who threatened him not to tell. So he never did,

¹²¹⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.5821

¹²¹⁸ SCAI statement by Mr **MHW**, WIT.001.002.4625-4643.

¹²¹⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4633.

¹²²⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4637.

¹²²¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4636.

until much later when he learnt from other Clontarf boys that they had had the same awful experience. Mr MHW did eventually secure acceptable farm work, and he married, but he writes that the memories of abuse never go away. He had two children, but, affected by his time in care in Aberdeen and in Clontarf, he came to recognise that he was too hard on them. He needed counselling early in his marriage, and he was able to tell his wife, and later his children, what he had endured. 'The kids understood then.'¹²²² It relieved him of 'a lot of stress'.¹²²³

32.45 Mr MIT was born in Glasgow in June 1937.¹²²⁴ His mother deserted the family, and his father was persuaded that it was best for his children to send them to Australia, though his intention was to join them. MIT was 12 when he left, in 1949. He was accompanied by his younger brother MIT. Two boys from Edinburgh, MIT and MIT were also in the party. MIT was separated from his younger sister MIT who was sent to St John's Orphanage, Thurgoona at Albury, a Sisters of Mercy institution in New South Wales. They only met up again years later. That separation of siblings may count as abuse. On arrival he was sent at once to **Bindoon**. He remembers his shock: it was 'like walking into a prison camp', in fact 'worse than a prison camp'.¹²²⁵ He reports emotional and psychological abuse, such as separation from his younger brother in another dormitory, a stripping away of personal possessions, and abusive references by Christian Brothers to his mother as not wanting him. Bedwetters were humiliated. Mr MIT writes that Brother MDJ 'evil and vicious',¹²²⁶ calling the boys 'sons of whores'.¹²²⁷ Facilities were spartan, physical labour hard, and food was bad, the pigs 'being better fed'.¹²²⁸ The education he received was far behind the level he had reached in Glasgow, and medical care was poor. As for sexual as well as physical abuse, Mr MIT names the perpetrators,

¹²²² *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4632.

¹²²³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4632.

¹²²⁴ SCAI statement by Mr MIT WIT.001.002.4885-4907, and associated documents, WIT.003.001.9275-9301. See also his witness statement to the Australian Senate Inquiry, supplied to SCAI: POA.001.001.0046-0051. Attached to it are copies of a letter from his father, desperate to join his MIT children sent without him to Australia against his wishes; the report on MIT by a psychologist at Bindoon, indicating concerns implicitly a consequence of his migration from Scotland, dated April 1956; and a brief but positive reference on MIT qualities by the acting principal Brother Carey at Bindoon, dated MIT 1957, when MIT was nearly 20, prior to what MIT regarded as his release from Bindoon at the age of 21.

¹²²⁵ SCAI statement by Mr MIT WIT.001.002.4888.

¹²²⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4900.

¹²²⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4899.

¹²²⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4891.

the 'bad ones'.¹²²⁹ When Brother MDJ was in charge, they were Brothers MIJ MDY Conlon, MIW and MBC plus Father MJC who molested MIT during confession. Even Keaney 'used to have kids in his bed warming up his sheets'.¹²³⁰ To flog boys he used a strap which 'had hacksaw blades sewn into it'.¹²³¹ Brother MDY regularly hit boys across the face for no apparent reason, and one time he whacked MIT across the legs with a wire 'because I was making too much noise. He took a piece out of my leg'.¹²³² After MDJ died, Brother MIY took over, and he and Brothers MIZ and MDV were then the bad ones. As for Brother MIW he used to poke a stick up your backside and say "you haven't cleaned that well enough".¹²³³ Nor were there opportunities to raise concerns with Welfare Department officers, for they did not speak to boys. Nor could he complain to family back in Scotland, for the Brothers dictated what they could write, and letters from his father were not given to him. Some boys attempted to escape, but Mr MIT was not able to leave Bindoon until he was 21, because, he writes, he was too good a worker. He concludes that the consequences of educational deprivation and maltreatment at Bindoon included his problems with drink, holding down jobs, and difficulties forming and sustaining relationships.

32.46 Mr Ian Donaldson, born in [REDACTED] 1943, was another put into care in Nazareth House in Aberdeen, when three-months old, and there he remained until in [REDACTED] 1953, aged 10, he too was dispatched straight to **Bindoon**.¹²³⁴ He mentions [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as two other boys from Aberdeen who travelled with him. His first reference to Bindoon is that 'We boys built half the place while I was there',¹²³⁵ and his second is that 'Brother MDY was in charge and the other Brothers included Brother MDV Brother MDW Brother MDF and Brother MDY ... Those Brothers were real criminals who should never have been allowed to do what they did'.¹²³⁶ Not surprisingly, 'I couldn't go near the Brothers if I had any worries or concerns, I didn't trust them'.¹²³⁷ Once more we read of poor food, and the treatment of bedwetters: 'If you'd wet your bed you'd get a flogging with a strap. The beds had

¹²²⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4899.

¹²³⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4889.

¹²³¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4900.

¹²³² *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4892.

¹²³³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4899.

¹²³⁴ SCAI statements by Mr Ian Donaldson, WIT.001.002.2994-3010 and WIT.003.001.5442-5445. This summary is based on his first and longer statement.

¹²³⁵ SCAI statement by Mr Ian Donaldson, WIT.001.002.2997.

¹²³⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.2997.

¹²³⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3001.

plastic sheets on them so that the mattress wouldn't get wet and that meant you'd be sleeping in your own urine if you wet the bed'.¹²³⁸ Mr Donaldson writes that on his first night when going to the toilet he was frightened by seeing a Brother in the dark who he thought was going to attack him, and thereafter he regularly, every night, wet the bed, which he had never done before. As for education, 'We only did a bit of school every now and then. In all the years I was at Bindoon, I only did about six months schooling in total. Like every other kid there I was used as slave labour. I was a real dummy when I left because I'd never learnt anything.'¹²³⁹ His report on inspection visits is also familiar:

The Welfare Department would come and inspect the place from time to time, but I never spoke to any of them. The Brothers were cunning, they would have six or seven boys all dressed up to meet them and we would be put away out of sight. The Welfare would see these boys and think we were all getting looked after properly.¹²⁴⁰

Violent physical punishments, which we have already noted, are also described in Mr Donaldson's account:

If the Brothers couldn't keep us in line we'd get a flogging. They all had leather straps hanging from their belts, which were about sixteen inches long and an inch thick, with strips of lead in them. They used to hit us with those straps and it used to hurt really badly. They loved doing it, that's how they were.¹²⁴¹

He mentions familiar names: 'All the Brothers were the same, Brother MDJ, Brother MDV, Brother MDW and Brother MDF. Another Brother, Brother MDY used a wooden cane...that had a steel rod inside'.¹²⁴² On one occasion, Brothers MDJ and MDV 'gave me the biggest flogging of my life. They even booted me in the head. I was black and blue for about four weeks afterwards'.¹²⁴³ (In his second statement Mr Donaldson writes that this followed an incident in which Ian, aged 12, had protected himself with a pitchfork from an assault by MDV. The assault by MDJ and MDV may have left him with a persistent neck injury and migraines.) As for sexual abuse,

¹²³⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.2998.

¹²³⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.2999.

¹²⁴⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3000.

¹²⁴¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3002.

¹²⁴² *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3002.

¹²⁴³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3002.

The Brothers had pet boys who were a bit older.... [and they] would come round our beds at night and touch us sexually to warm us up for the Brothers.... A lot of times I would get out of bed and hide under another bed. Sometimes I would run away to my den in the bush. This went on for about four or five years until I was brave enough to stand up for myself. I saw the older boys going to other boys beds as well.... I wasn't really aware of other boys getting sexually abused, but I know now that they were. A couple of times Brother **MDV** and Brother **MDF** tried to manhandle me sexually, most of the time I managed to get away.¹²⁴⁴

Mr Donaldson writes that in that first week at Bindoon, Brother **MDV** did molest him sexually in the dormitory at night, and that he tried again several times during that first year, but Ian ran away. He also saw other Brothers, and he mentions **MHZ**, also going to boys beds at night. He also states that Brother **MDV** had a 'pet boy' who also molested Ian when he was asleep in the dormitory. With respect to all forms of abuse, 'I never reported anything that happened to me. I couldn't, there was no one to tell. If I had said anything to any of the Brothers I'd be flogged again'.¹²⁴⁵ The friendship forged by Mr Donaldson with **[REDACTED]** at Nazareth House in Aberdeen had endured during their time together at Bindoon, but then **[REDACTED]** aged 13, was killed there in a workplace accident. 'None of the Brothers ever asked me how I was afterwards. I wasn't given any support at all.'¹²⁴⁶ Mr Donaldson left Bindoon in 1959, aged 16, but the legacy of his experiences were harder to shake off. 'I look back now and think my head wasn't screwed on right when I left. I drank a lot and I got into a lot of fights.'¹²⁴⁷

32.47 Mr **LZN** was also sent to **Bindoon**.¹²⁴⁸ He does not say from which Nazareth House he left, or when, but he does have grim memories of the place. What he does recall is his enthusiastic response when (by his account) a Christian Brother from Western Australia described the delights of Bindoon – the fruit trees, the sunshine, the farm animals. The reality was different. Life there was 'pretty tough', older boys bullying younger ones, and 'you would be called a sissy if you cried'.¹²⁴⁹ Moreover, while a couple of the Brothers were kind and soft-natured, they were

¹²⁴⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3002-3003.

¹²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3003.

¹²⁴⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3004.

¹²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3004.

¹²⁴⁸ SCAI statement by Mr **LZN** n.d., WIT.003.002.0482-0486.

¹²⁴⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0482-0486.

'mostly hard cases' who would 'belt you at the slightest provocation'.¹²⁵⁰ They had 'these big straps and would give you six of the best to set an example to the other boys not to misbehave'.¹²⁵¹ He goes on to say, in a rare reference to nuns in these accounts, that they too were 'very tough if you stepped out of line in the classroom'.¹²⁵² He remembers the daily sequence of chapel, breakfast, work on the building site, school, work on the building site. Specifically, age 13, he refers to having to get up early to bring in and milk the cows, and being beaten if he was late. He also recalls after one beating being nearly drowned by Brother MDV in a 44-gallon drum of water. There was also sexual abuse. When he was 11 years old, Brother LZO in the middle of the night, would take him out of the dormitory back to his bedroom and, many times, 'have sex with me. It hurt like anything and I wanted him to stop'.¹²⁵³ LZO told young LZN that he was his 'favourite little boy'.¹²⁵⁴ He was given lollies and instructed not to tell anyone. Age 60, when having his prostate examined, the doctor noted the bad scarring in his rectum, which the doctor judged to be a consequence of what had happened to him at Bindoon. For whispering during grace one morning he was belted so hard by a Brother that it knocked him out of his chair, broke his ear drum, left him in excruciating pain, and boiling with rage. He attacked the Brother with feet and fists. Summoned later for punishment by two Brothers, he was told by the head Brother that he would be belted 'within an inch of his life' – at which point Mr LZN says he threatened to come in the night and cut the man's throat if they touched him. 'I was so angry and shaking with rage I would have smashed his head in with a brick or anything else just to hurt him'.¹²⁵⁵ He was not then flogged. Mr LZN recounts this episode because he says that when he finally left Bindoon he was 'full of anger and rage and I just wanted to hurt people'.¹²⁵⁶ On Saturday nights, 'tanked up' with other lads from Catholic orphanages, he did just that. 'We got a real kick out of hurting people'.¹²⁵⁷ And so it went on, for four years, until in 1964 he had a 'spiritual encounter with God', and became a 'born-again Christian', and 'God took away all the anger, hatred and

¹²⁵⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0484.

¹²⁵¹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0484.

¹²⁵² *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0484.

¹²⁵³ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0485.

¹²⁵⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0486.

¹²⁵⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0486

¹²⁵⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0486.

¹²⁵⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0486.

violence from my life'.¹²⁵⁸

32.48 Mr MEF was another who was sent to Bindoon.¹²⁵⁹ Born in 1936, he was placed in Nazareth House, Lasswade, when he was ten. He does not recall being asked if he wanted to go to Australia, but his mother, who had at least four other children, gave her consent. He travelled with two of his sisters in 1947, though they were separated on the boat and on arrival. (A younger half-sister, MZW followed: see her witness statement below.) He recalls travelling with other boys from Lasswade: and and As others experienced, it was a shock on arrival, Bindoon being only half-built and 'in the middle of nowhere'.¹²⁶⁰ He also recalls, like others, that they were re-dressed in old clothes – and went without shoes. We hear again of boys being belted for wetting the bed and being draped in their wet sheets. He also states that they had only an hour of schooling a week, that the rest of the time was for work on the building site, and that all education stopped at 14. As a consequence (though he was age 11 on arrival), he could only just read and write when he left age 16, and he then had to teach himself – though later in life he was still judged too ill-educated for acceptance into the Army. Birthdays were not recognised, and Christmas barely. Boys were 'treated like slave labour by Brother MDJ'.¹²⁶¹

32.49 Then there was the violence. He states that, with a couple of exceptions, most Brothers 'used sadistic methods' to control the boys.¹²⁶² Brother MDY was terrible. MDJ took great pleasure in hitting boys with his heavy walking stick. MEF on one occasion, not feeling well at breakfast (it turned out he had tonsillitis), gave bread to another boy, for which crime, Mr MEF writes, MDJ hit and kicked him, picked him up by his ears, and shoved his face into the greasy bread and dripping which constituted breakfast at Bindoon. MEF also tried to run away, aged 13, after boys were required to see the mangled body of a boy (his friend), killed in a road accident, an emotional experience which Mr MEF remembers vividly. Boys fainted. In addition, he states that he was sexually abused by Brother MPG and this went on for two years until he was 14. He never reported it at the time.

¹²⁵⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.003.002.0486.

¹²⁵⁹ SCAI witness statement from Mr MEF 15 May 2019, WIT.001.002.6065-6081.

¹²⁶⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.6070.

¹²⁶¹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.6074.

¹²⁶² *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.6074.

32.50 There was no preparation before boys left Bindoon, aged 16, and his early experiences in work were often harsh. He was an alcoholic for a period in his twenties, but he married and together he and his wife raised two boys and an adopted girl. Reflecting back, he writes that nobody complained at Bindoon. 'It could have been worse I suppose. It could have been a lot better too.'¹²⁶³ He also states that:

I believe I am a good Christian person, but I could not stand the sight of a Christian Brother or a priest for a very long time. I have no vendetta against the Catholic Church, it was not the church that did this to me. All these brothers and the priest will be dead now, so I hope God has mercy on their souls'.¹²⁶⁴

32.51 Mr **LTG** has supplied SCAI with two submissions.¹²⁶⁵ The first is his witness statement, upon which we principally draw, but also as needed on a second, which is probably a Western Australia Redress claim. He was born in Edinburgh in **LTG** 1939. Following the early death of his father, the local priest advised his mother to place him, at the age of nine, in the Nazareth House at Lasswade near Edinburgh. The maltreatment he experienced there made him keen to go to Australia, further prompted by idyllic scenes of Australia he was shown in a film presented by 'immigration people'.¹²⁶⁶ Tests including a medical examination followed. Mr **LTG** younger brother was originally with him at Lasswade, but he kept running away, the Sisters eventually would not have him back, and consequently **LTG** went alone to Australia.¹²⁶⁷

32.52 He left for Western Australia in **LTG** 1950 when he was 11 years old, in a party of about 30, including four from Nazareth House (including two he names, **LTG** and **LTG**). On arrival they were graded by age, weight and height, and presumably those boys judged to be suitable were then put on trucks and sent to **Bindoon**, arriving in the dark. 'When we woke up we were in hell. For the next five years that was it in a nutshell. Bindoon was a hundred times worse than Nazareth

¹²⁶³ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.6074.

¹²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.6076.

¹²⁶⁵ SCAI statement from Mr **LTG** **LTG** 18 Feb 2019, WIT.001.002.4268-4288; **LTG**

LTG Claim, n.d., submitted by Child Migrants Trust, WIT.003.001.2741-2747.

¹²⁶⁶ SCAI statement from Mr **LTG** **LTG** 18 Feb 2019, WIT.001.002.4272.

¹²⁶⁷ In 1952, Mr **LTG** mother migrated to Australia, with her younger son, and did meet up with **LTG**

House.... Stalag seventeen'.¹²⁶⁸ Brother MDJ was in charge, and Mr LTG remembers the chores including building work, from when he was about 13 years old. He states that the Brothers ate well, but not the boys. Also the education provided was terrible, and if he had not learnt to read and write before he left Scotland he would be illiterate. There was little health care on site, only a dispensary, and medical treatment, if really essential, required a journey to Perth. We encounter the same stories about the treatment of bedwetters. Mr LTG also refers to casual violence by some Brothers, mentioning MBC and especially MDY – 'a shocker', 'brutal' – and the unwarranted punch in the head he received.¹²⁶⁹ If Brother MIY 'lost it, he'd grab you and violently shake the living hell out of you'.¹²⁷⁰ MDJ also beat him badly with a belt after he heard that LTG had told some local people about the maltreatment they were getting. 'He just went mad'.¹²⁷¹ There was also Brother MIZ who must have been sent 'to a school that trained them to be cruel to children'.¹²⁷² The nuns too, serving in the dining rooms, hit boys with belts. With respect to sexual abuse, LTG even believed, from what some boys told him, that some of the 'Mr Nice Guy' visitors at parties were paedophiles, but he records nothing else about such sexual abusers.¹²⁷³ Mr LTG left Bindoon aged 16, had a struggle securing jobs (and getting paid), and became aware of the psychological damage from which he suffered ('you could not help but feel ratshit'),¹²⁷⁴ but he managed, married and had family. And yet, looking back, he concludes that 'I could've been anything if I'd had a better education'.¹²⁷⁵

32.53 Mr [REDACTED], born in Glasgow in [REDACTED] 1941, was placed in the Nazareth House orphanage in Edinburgh age three or four, with his brother, two years older.¹²⁷⁶ In his account of what subsequently happened to him he makes a point of stressing that at Nazareth House he was well looked after, was given three good meals a day, was properly clothed, had a 'nice warm bed to sleep in', and went to school.¹²⁷⁷ But then in 1948, age seven, with the consent of his mother because she could not support four children, he was packed off with his brother, age eight or

¹²⁶⁸ SCAI statement from Mr LTG [REDACTED] 18 Feb 2019, WIT.001.002.4273-4274.

¹²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4276, 4279.

¹²⁷⁰ LTG [REDACTED] Claim, n.d., submitted by Child Migrants Trust, WIT.003.001.2742.

¹²⁷¹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2742-2743.

¹²⁷² SCAI statement from LTG [REDACTED] 18 Feb 2019, WIT.001.002.4288.

¹²⁷³ SCAI statement from LTG [REDACTED] 18 Feb 2019, WIT.001.002.4277.

¹²⁷⁴ LTG [REDACTED] Claim, n.d., submitted by Child Migrants Trust, WIT.003.001.2744.

¹²⁷⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4285.

¹²⁷⁶ Witness statement to the Australian Senate Inquiry, supplied to SCAI: POA.001.001.0002-0011.

¹²⁷⁷ *Ibid*, POA.001.001.0002.

nine, to Western Australia. The party's arrival left a stark memory, of girls being separated from boys and, traumatically and tearfully, an attempt to send him and his brother to different destinations. He was supposed to go to Castledare, but kicking and screaming he was allowed to go with his brother to **Bindoon**. He arrived as had so many others at a building site. The boys 'were slaves'; school 'took second place'.¹²⁷⁸ He remembers the brutality of older boys. And of the Christian Brothers: Brother **MIZ** sadistic, 'with his leather strap'; Brother **MDV** 'with his fists' and uncontrolled and brutal rages; Brother **MDY** a 'big, brutal thug ... the most feared', who lifted up **██████████** brother by his ears – requiring three months of hospital treatment and leaving **██████████** distraught, unsupported, not allowed to visit.¹²⁷⁹ Compared with such recollections, the bureaucratic consequences later in life of still being legally a British subject, exposed when trying to get a passport, may seem just inconveniences, but it is indicative of the insecure legal status of former child migrants.

32.54 Mr Frank Morrison, born in Aberdeen in **██████████** 1942, was also placed in the care of the Sisters of Nazareth in Aberdeen when he was an infant.¹²⁸⁰ Then, aged nine he was sent to St John Bosco Boys' Town in Hobart, Tasmania. We later report on his experiences there, but here it is sufficient to say that his bad experiences at Boys' Town, as he recalls, are not as grim as his recollections of **Tardun**, to where he was transferred in August 1955 when he was not quite 13. 'It's hard to imagine', he writes, 'a more desolate, remote and god-forsaken place than Tardun.'¹²⁸¹ But much worse, 'From the moment I arrived my life was condemned to daily physical and sexual assaults by the evil, perverted Christian Brothers'.¹²⁸² The place was characterised by 'degrading treatment and perversion'.¹²⁸³ He names Brothers **AOE** and **AOF**, but the main sexual predators at whose hand he suffered most were Brothers **AOC** and **AOJ**. Beginning in the first week after his arrival, sexual assaults by Brother **AOC** began, including, but not only, anal rape. Frank was not the only victim. He was also frequently beaten by **AOC**, with a three-ply leather strap into which hacksaw blades were sown. He was nearly 16 before he was able to resist, but **AOC** threatened to kill him when Frank said he would report the abuse

¹²⁷⁸ *Ibid*, POA.001.001.0004.

¹²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, POA.001.001.0005-0006, 0008.

¹²⁸⁰ Frank Morrison, Statement of Historic Institutional Abuse for the National Redress Scheme, WIT.003.001.9749-9753.

¹²⁸¹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9750.

¹²⁸² *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9749.

¹²⁸³ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9750.

to the Principal. Brother **AOJ** also sexually abused Frank, and he too was violent and terrifying. In addition, when other Christian Brothers came to Tardun 'on retreat' from Clontarf and Castledare, they would 'pray all day and come to us at night'.¹²⁸⁴ Mr Morrison states that he was raped by Brothers **MDI** and **MHZ**. 'One of the hypocrisies that's always stayed with me was remembering those same Christian Brothers teaching the Catechism classes.'¹²⁸⁵ While boys were being indoctrinated with the dire consequences of sin - 'images of wicked sinners burning in Hell and the Lord's judgement' - these 'paedophiles were picking us off one by one'.¹²⁸⁶ Although he knows none of this was his fault, the legacy, he states, includes nightmares, anger, fear of exposure and an 'overwhelming sense of shame'.¹²⁸⁷

32.55 In summary, it is evident from witness statements by former child migrants from Scotland (and elsewhere), and from the reports of other recent inquiries, that Christian Brothers including those with senior responsibility in their institutions in Western Australia were aware of cases of child abuse in all its forms, and others should have been made aware. Senior figures knew about crimes committed and some were deeply concerned by what they heard, but such action as was taken was limited and remained discreet, to avoid public scandal. Such responses to known cases of abuse do not even suggest that the Order's organisational culture meant that abuse was understood primarily as moral and spiritual failings by Brothers, to be addressed within the pastoral framework of their organisation. In any case such a response would have marginalised the needs of victims.¹²⁸⁸

32.56 Moreover, although crimes had been committed, they were not reported to the police by staff members. Indeed, on the rare occasions when boys themselves attempted to report sexual abuse to the police they were either disbelieved and/or reported to the Christian Brothers, and were subsequently punished. There is indeed evidence of collusion and cover-up by local police and Christian Brothers.¹²⁸⁹ Nor was

¹²⁸⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9752.

¹²⁸⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9752.

¹²⁸⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9752.

¹²⁸⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.9753.

¹²⁸⁸ For a careful analysis of these witness statements see A Gordon Lynch, *Possible collusion between individuals alleged to have sexually abused boys at four Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, 1947-1965: a secondary analysis of material collated by historical abuse inquiries*, (2019), <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

¹²⁸⁹ On reporting by children and police responses see Gordon Lynch, *Possible collusion between individuals alleged to have sexually abused boys at four Christian Brothers' institutions in Western*

the attention of State Child Welfare officers drawn to such abuses by the Principals of those institutions, though Child Welfare was ultimately responsible for the well-being of children in care. Moreover, the limitations of routine Child Welfare Department inspections meant that they did not provide an effective means through which emotional, psychological, physical or sexual abuse could be disclosed by children. And there appears to have been no other systems of monitoring in place by other organisations in Australia or in the UK that might have provided effective protection and support for these children.

32.57 In sum, children who attempted to disclose abuse faced disbelief, punishment and, in some cases, even renewed sexual abuse from the person in whom they had confided. There was little or no prospect that any intervention would take place to protect children if a group of Brothers colluded together to commit, tolerate or ignore abuse. Some of the children were serially abused sexually at more than one of the four institutions. Indeed, we know that some abusers were moved from place to place precisely because they were known abusers, and in some instances they again abused the same boys who had been transferred to the same institution. Coldrey has also noticed that some boys seemed ignorant of the abuse suffered by others in the same place, suggesting how knowingly, cautiously and discreetly the abusers targeted their victims. Coldrey's examination of the evidence led him to conclude that a 'sex ring' operated within and between these Christian Brother institutions, with members known to and providing cover for each other.¹²⁹⁰ A further analysis by Professor Lynch of thirty-five witness statements published by other recent Inquiries has also indicated that there appears to have been a high proportion of staff about whom allegations of sexual abuse have been made working at Bindoon in the entire post-war period when child migrants were sent there, at Clontarf in the mid- to late-1950s, and at Castledare around 1960, periods of concern that had been independently highlighted by Coldrey.¹²⁹¹ Lynch's analysis has also suggested that the twenty-one Brothers working at these institutions against whom allegations of sexual abuse have been made for the period 1947-65 were far more likely to be transferred between these institutions than Brothers working there against whom no allegations have been made. One of the effects of such transfers was that Brothers

Australia, 1947-1965: a secondary analysis of material collated by historical abuse inquiries, (2019), <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

¹²⁹⁰ Coldrey, 'Whirlwind', pp.41, 93-97.

¹²⁹¹ Gordon Lynch, *Possible collusion between individuals alleged to have sexually abused boys at four Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, 1947-1965: a secondary analysis of material collated by historical abuse inquiries*, (2019), <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

against whom allegations have been made were likely to know other alleged abusers by working in the same institution, with one of the worst alleged serial offenders, Br MHZ likely to have known seventeen other alleged abusers through his history of institutional transfers. Given other prima facie indications of collusion between alleged abusers at these institutions, serious concerns therefore remain about the systemic nature of abuse within these institutions.

33 | Child Abuse: Other Catholic Institutions in Australia: St John Bosco Boys Town, Hobart, Tasmania; St Vincent de Paul Orphanage, Millswood, South Australia (also known as the Goodwood Orphanage); St Joseph's Orphanage, Subiaco, Perth, Western Australia; Nazareth House, Geraldton, Western Australia; Nazareth House, East Camberwell, Melbourne, Victoria; St Joseph's Orphanage, Neerkol, Queensland

33.1 We are aware that child migrants from Scotland were also sent to six other Catholic institutions in Australia, and we are able to draw on twelve witness statements recording their experiences.¹²⁹² More may have been sent elsewhere, but of those at present we have no trace. We have little information about numbers sent to **St John Bosco Boys Town**, Tasmania, but we know from a SCAI witness statement that at least two Scottish boys, Christopher Booth and Frank Morrison, were sent there.¹²⁹³ We also learn from other witness statements that in [REDACTED] 1948 ^{MJV} [REDACTED], her older sister [REDACTED] and five other girls were dispatched from the Good Shepherds Orphanage at Colinton to be cared for by the Sisters of Mercy at **St Vincent de Paul Orphanage, Millswood**, South Australia. They would have been among the first of three parties of girls, totalling 46, who arrived from the UK (and Malta) between January 1949 and January 1950.¹²⁹⁴ One of them was [REDACTED] born in Glasgow in [REDACTED] 1933, placed in the Good Shepherd's Convent in Edinburgh, and sent to Millswood in 1949, aged 15.¹²⁹⁵ ^{LYF} [REDACTED] and ^{MDK} [REDACTED] ^{MDK} [REDACTED] were among others who had been in care at Colinton, but in 1947 with

¹²⁹² We do not have a witness statement from [REDACTED] but we know from a report by her brother ^{MIT} [REDACTED] who was sent to Bindoon with his brother [REDACTED] that she had been sent to St John's Orphanage, Thurgoona, at Albury in New South Wales, run by the Sisters of Mercy. This placed her far away from her brothers in Western Australia: 'It was years before I met up with her': SCAI witness statement by ^{MIT} [REDACTED] WIT.001.002.4887.

¹²⁹³ As noted earlier in footnote 429, Mr Christopher Booth's witness statement refers to other boys from Aberdeen in his party sent to Tasmania by mistake, and then of himself as the only Scottish boy at St John Bosco Boys Town.

¹²⁹⁴ SCAI statement by ^{MJV} [REDACTED] WIT.001.002.4841, and WIT.003.001.2679; for St Vincent de Paul Orphanage see, Find and Connect, St Vincent de Paul Orphanage (1866-1975), <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/ref/sa/biogs/SE00049b.htm>.

¹²⁹⁵ Witness statement by ^{MJV} [REDACTED] 1 Dec 2000, POA.001.001.0034-0039, submitted to the Australian Senate Inquiry, and supplied to SCAI.

other girls, perhaps seven in total, they were then migrated to **St Joseph's Orphanage, Subiaco** in Perth, to be cared for by the Sisters of Mercy, and we are aware of other Scottish girls also sent to that institution. Astonishingly, one of them was **MZW** also from Colinton and also sent to Subiaco but in 1949, age six, who did not know until much later that two of her sisters, including **MDK** had already been sent to Subiaco in 1947, along with an unnamed brother (who we know to be **MEF** who was later sent to Bindoon and from whom we have a witness statement). SCAI would regard this separation of siblings as an abuse.¹²⁹⁶ We know of four Scottish girls sent to **Nazareth House Geraldton**, Western Australia, run by the Poor Sisters of Nazareth, but there may have been others.¹²⁹⁷ Four other girls from Scotland – **LST** her sister **LSU** **LTI** and one other were among 53, very likely including other girls from Scotland, who between 1953 and 1956 were assigned to **Nazareth House, East Camberwell, Victoria**, also run by the Poor Sisters of Nazareth.¹²⁹⁸ Finally, children from the UK were sent to **St Joseph's Orphanage Neerkol**, Queensland, another Sisters of Mercy home. This establishment was unusual in that it accommodated boys and girls from a very early age. In total 48 child migrants were sent there, including [redacted] from Scotland, [redacted] and his sister **LZJ**.¹²⁹⁹ The 4000-acre site included a convent, dining room, dormitories, nursery, bakery, laundry, school and even a farm.¹³⁰⁰ Initially opened to accommodate Australian-born children, the Rockhampton Congregation of the Sisters of Mercy had applied to receive child migrants in 1947, but the UK High Commissioner had been concerned about its suitability and approval was only given in 1950.

¹²⁹⁶ SCAI witness statements by **LYF** [redacted] WIT.001.002.2912-2933 and by **MDK** [redacted] WIT.001.002.3016-3033. For Subiaco see Find and Connect, St Joseph's Girls' Orphanage (1901-1971), <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/wa/WE00191>

¹²⁹⁷ SCAI witness statements by **LHY** [redacted] WIT.001.002.4873-4884, and WIT.003.001.2696-2705, and by Mrs Yvonne Radzevicious, WIT.003.001.4619. For Nazareth House Geraldton see Find and Connect, Nazareth House (1941-1979), <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/wa/WE00157>

¹²⁹⁸ SCAI statements by **LST** [redacted] WIT.003.001.2672, her sister **LSU** [redacted] WIT.003.001.2686, and **LTI** [redacted] WIT.001.002.3278, 3285; for Nazareth House, East Camberwell, see Find and Connect, Nazareth House, Camberwell (1929-1975) <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/vic/E000165>. **LTI** [redacted] refers to three other girls from Nazareth House, Kilmarnock, who went with her: WIT.003.001.2709.

¹²⁹⁹ SCAI statement concerning [redacted] supplied by the Child Migrants Trust, WIT.003.001.8660-8662, and statement by **LZJ** [redacted] POA.001.001.0029, submitted to the Australian Senate Inquiry, and supplied to SCAI.

¹³⁰⁰ For St Joseph's Home Neerkol see Find and Connect, St Joseph's Home, Neerkol (1885-1978), <https://www.findandconnect.gov.au/guide/qld/QE00151>

33.2 Of the 31 Scottish children sent for certain to these six institutions we know of several who have alleged that they were seriously abused. We have no information on whether the others were maltreated, or indeed whether other unrecorded child migrants from Scotland sent to the same destinations also suffered. But we are aware that UK child migrants had been placed in all of them and that conditions at some were such as to imply neglect, and emotional and psychological abuse, and in some cases we know that more explicit forms of physical and sexual abuse were also inflicted.

33.3 An Australian report in 1947 on the home at Subiaco did not provide the information on staffing that UK officials might legitimately had expected, but it was officially approved, as was the St Vincent de Paul Orphanage by Walter Garnett but only on the basis of reports sent by State immigration and child welfare officials. As for Nazareth House, Geraldton, the UK authorities did not even know that from 1947 child migrant girls were being sent there. It was only in 1949 that the Commonwealth Relations Office became aware - and then gave retrospective approval, at least 18 months after the first party had arrived.¹³⁰¹

33.4 Subsequently, John Moss submitted very brief but positive observations upon all six of these institutions during his 1951 tour of Australia.¹³⁰² St John Bosco Boys Town Hobart: 'I was quite satisfied about this Home after very exhaustive enquiries and discussion'.¹³⁰³ St Vincent de Paul Orphanage Millswood: 'This is a nice home'.¹³⁰⁴ St Joseph's Orphanage Subiaco: 'Accommodation, equipment and ablutionary arrangements good, children free and happy'.¹³⁰⁵ Nazareth House Geraldton: 'This is an excellent institution, well constructed and equipped in every way'.¹³⁰⁶ Nazareth House East Camberwell: 'This is quite a good scheme'.¹³⁰⁷ St Joseph's Orphanage Neerkol: 'Even although this is a very large Home, I was very pleased with it and was quite satisfied that migrants would do well here. The staff, encouraged by Bishop Tynan, have an excellent outlook. I saw a group of migrant children there and they were obviously very happy – open and free.... The educational arrangements are

¹³⁰¹ Important here is Appendix 2, Section 3, paras.3.4, 3.15-3.16.

¹³⁰² TNA, MH102/2041, 'Emigration of Children to Australia. Reports by Mr John Moss', with the following references to pages in the file.

¹³⁰³ *Ibid*, p.35

¹³⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p.18.

¹³⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.15.

¹³⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p.15.

¹³⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p.38.

excellent'.¹³⁰⁸ In a letter to Garnett at the High Commission he writes that St Joseph's 'is very good in all respects...migrant children could be sent there with every confidence'.¹³⁰⁹

33.5 Unfortunately, the Ross Committee in 1956 visited only four of these six institutions. In the batch of 1956 confidential reports they submitted, their assessments while often favourable revealed overall judgements less positive than those of Moss.¹³¹⁰ At St John Bosco Boys Town, the team derived a 'most unfavourable impression of the attitude of the Principal, and of the regime as described by him'.¹³¹¹ At the time of the visit to St Vincent de Paul Orphanage Millswood, only five of the 108 girls in residence at this large institution were child migrants. Generally rooms seemed well-equipped. The Sister Superior 'spoke sensibly and sympathetically' about the girls and seemed to have their confidence.¹³¹² Some of the Sisters were trained teachers, and other teachers and domestic staff came in daily to help. However, and this is a repeated theme, the girls were receiving an institutional upbringing which was not preparing them for life outside.¹³¹³ At Nazareth House in East Camberwell, 51 child migrant girls were in residence. Some of the Sisters were trained teachers, but all teaching until the age of 14 was in-house, though the girls went on outings and some had holidays with foster parents. Rooms and facilities were good, but the Committee felt that anything approaching a home atmosphere was 'impossible', and the place seemed 'more like a hospital than a home'. The girls were not receiving preparation 'for life outside the shelter of an institution'.¹³¹⁴ At St Joseph's Orphanage Neerkol there were then 32 child migrants among about 200 resident children. True, the resident chaplain seemed to know them all and was liked by them, and the newly arrived Mother Superior was kindly, but she seemed to have 'little understanding of the children's needs'.¹³¹⁵ The children did have outings and seaside holidays, but though the boys and girls were taught together all education until the age of 14 was within the institution, and many older girls subsequently remained in the Home as domestic helpers. Moreover, the location

¹³⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p.34.

¹³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p.65.

¹³¹⁰ TNA, DO 35/6382, 'Action taken on report of Fact-Finding Mission on Child Migration to Australia', and with the following references to pages in the file.

¹³¹¹ *Ibid*, p.355.

¹³¹² *Ibid*, p.324.

¹³¹³ *Ibid*, p.325.

¹³¹⁴ *Ibid*, pp.322-323.

¹³¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.318.

was isolated, dormitories overcrowded with too many beds, and recreation rooms were bare. What especially troubled the Ross Committee was that the children seemed to be 'regimented', with little opportunity for independent thought or action. They were having 'an institutional upbringing in isolation from the outside world'.¹³¹⁶ But at none of these institutions had the Committee been alerted to any signs of physical abuse – or worse. It is then disturbing to read that subsequent public inquiries revealed very serious abuses at two of them and possibly at the others.

33.6 Although specific institutions are not named, several female child migrants told the House of Commons Health Committee in 1997 that they had received 'severe floggings with "thick leather straps"', that they had had their hair shaved off, that they had suffered severe punishments for bedwetting, and that when they saw a welfare inspector they had been inhibited from reporting such abuses because nuns were always present.¹³¹⁷ The Sisters of Mercy at the St Vincent de Paul Orphanage, Millswood, 'were frequently described to us as the "Sisters without mercy"'.¹³¹⁸ The report of the Australian Senate inquiry in 2001 also refers to allegations of sexual abuse at the Millswood Orphanage and at St John Bosco Boys Town Hobart.¹³¹⁹

33.7 We can now bring in witness statements submitted to SCAI. Mr Christopher Booth was sent to **St John Bosco Boys' Town, Hobart**, in 1952, aged 11.¹³²⁰ In his statement he acknowledges that the food was fresh and 'generally okay', that he was not aware of any punishment for bed-wetting, and there was much else that was satisfactory about Boys Town, including recreational activity and health care. However, he had doubts about the education he received from what he felt were unqualified priests and brothers. Discipline was also 'very harsh',¹³²¹ and he refers to the favourite weapons wielded by priests - a rubber hose, a leather strap - and being kicked. He recalls that as a punishment he was made to scrub the floor of the toilet

¹³¹⁶ *Ibid*, p.319.

¹³¹⁷ *Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC755-I, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhealth/755/75507.htm>, paras 49, 57.

¹³¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹³¹⁹ *Lost Innocents*, Report, p.79, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/c04

¹³²⁰ SCAI statement by Mr Booth, WIT.001.001.3642-3676; and his oral testimony TRN.001.003.0223-0237. As mentioned earlier, Mr Booth had submitted a briefer statement to the Australian Senate Inquiry, POA.001.001.0022-0025.

¹³²¹ SCAI statement by Mr Booth, WIT.001.001.3661, 3663; and statement to the Australian Senate Inquiry POA.001.001.0024.

block with a toothbrush, and he was thrashed for supposedly talking in the dormitory, which was forbidden. In response to an inquiry from a visiting dignitary he gave the unexpected reply that indeed he did want to go back to the UK because “I don't like it here, you don't get treated very nice”.¹³²² It proved his point when he got ‘a hell of a thrashing from one of the priests because you weren’t supposed to say whether you liked or disliked it’.¹³²³ There was also emotional and psychological abuse. There was no-one ‘that gave me any love or affection and there was no-one that I could confide in or look to for any type of care, support or advice’.¹³²⁴ He also recalls that a favourite saying of priests and brothers was that “Your mother doesn't want you, your country doesn't want you, you're only garbage.” I don't know how many times we were told that but it was a hell of a lot. All the priests said that’.¹³²⁵ Mr Booth also records sexual abuse, including penetration, on average once a month for three years, even while in the home’s infirmary after he had had his tonsils removed.

33.8 Mr Frank Morrison in 1952 at the age of nine was also sent from Nazareth House in Aberdeen to Hobart, along with Christopher Booth, and similarly into the care of the Salesians at **St John Bosco Boys’ Town**.¹³²⁶ In his testimony he does refer to humiliating punishments for wetting the bed. He later learnt from the Child Migrants Trust that Father **LHE** who was in charge, was intolerant of bedwetters, and he was later criticised by the Tasmanian state authorities for his poor child care practices. There was bullying, Frank was unhappy, and, with lasting consequences, his education suffered. But, as we have recorded already, he reports having suffered much worse at the hands of the Christian Brothers after he had been sent to Tardun in 1955 aged 13.

33.9 We reckon that at least eight Scottish child migrants experienced care at the **St Vincent de Paul Orphanage, Millswood**, and we have two witness statements. On arrival Ms **MJV** recalls her first impression that this was a bleak not

¹³²² SCAI, Transcript of Day 48, TRN.001.003.0223.

¹³²³ SCAI statement by Mr Booth, WIT.001.001.3663.

¹³²⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.3661.

¹³²⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.001.3664.

¹³²⁶ Frank Morrison, Statement of Historic Institutional Abuse for the National Redress Scheme, WIT.003.001.9749-9753.

welcoming place.¹³²⁷ She thought she was going to be fostered, and institutional care came as a shock, and she never felt happy at Millswood. She disliked the food provided and remembered health care as poor. She was also distressed by the manner in which bedwetters were treated, and while some nuns were nice, discipline was brutal. She was falsely told her parents were dead. The education she received also compared badly with what she had been used to in Scotland, and her older sister [REDACTED] education had stopped because she was 14. Unlike at Colinton there were no outside contacts, and no opportunities to talk to visitors. This was, she writes, 'a total institution'.¹³²⁸

33.10 The testimony of Ms [REDACTED] is equally stark. She too was dispatched to **St Vincent de Paul Orphanage, Millswood**, in 1949.¹³²⁹ By then she was aged 15. She writes that she was repeatedly told that she was 'no good', that she was fat and ugly, and that it was no wonder that her parents had left her to the nuns - to make her 'a good person'.¹³³⁰ She refers to the bodily and mental abuse that she and other girls suffered, and the sexual abuse of some girls. As teenagers, growing into young women, they were told nothing about the physical or sexual side of their life. Raped by four boys she became pregnant. That the nuns did not report this to the police was doubly a crime, since she was a minor. Instead she was blamed, called a slut and beaten. And she was separated from her baby. In the home she worked with babies, and may unknowingly have fed and held him, not knowing he was hers. (Her statement describing this deprivation is written in capital letters.) Her life in care 'was the most humiliating, degrading, soul destroying and cruel experience one could imagine'.¹³³¹ She also writes that she 'thought many a time that I wanted to kill myself'.¹³³² The legacy with which she was left was that she was 'worthless and unworthy'.¹³³³

¹³²⁷ SCAI witness statement by Ms [REDACTED] MJV WIT.001.002.4837-4853. See also her second submission, to the Australian Senate Inquiry, covering some of the same matters, WIT.003.001.2678-2685, including three documents.

¹³²⁸ SCAI witness statement by Ms [REDACTED] MJV WIT.001.001.4845. For the phrase 'total institution', derived from social science theory, see the thesis by Dianne Parker, para 33.11 below.

¹³²⁹ Statement by Ms [REDACTED] 1 Dec 2000, POA.001.001.0034-0039.

¹³³⁰ *Ibid*, POA.001.001.0034.

¹³³¹ *Ibid*, POA.001.001.0034.

¹³³² *Ibid*, POA.001.001.0037.

¹³³³ *Ibid*, POA.001.001.0034.

33.11 The experiences of female child migrants at **St Joseph's Orphanage Subiaco**, run by the Sisters of Mercy, has been the subject of a research thesis.¹³³⁴ As a rare and welcome contribution to consideration of children in care, this study, among other theoretical approaches, is informed by the concept of 'total institutions' devised and debated by social science theorists since the 1950s. It therefore addresses issues of control, surveillance, punishment, institutionalisation and identity. The thesis uses such few archived records of the institution as have survived and to which the author was allowed access, but it also and especially derives from individual and group interviews with eight women, by then in their seventies, who when aged between six and 14 had been sent to Australia and had spent at least three years in the orphanage between the years 1947 and 1955. The author's mother had been one. Another, referred to as [REDACTED] before being sent to Australia had been cared for in Scotland by the Sisters of Nazareth though she seems to have been migrated from a Good Shepherds home. She was one of the eight Scottish girls we know were sent to St Joseph's.

33.12 In the period under consideration, about 25 nuns were responsible for the care of some 200 children and they operated to strict routines and guidelines. The interviewees described the nuns, with some exceptions, as being very stern and showing little compassion. As were the nuns at Millswood, they were referred to as 'Sisters of No Mercy'.¹³³⁵ The children were obliged to work hard at physically exhausting tasks, including at the age of 12 working on nightshifts in the associated foundling home, and having bad experiences changing nappies, and worse. One of the responses refers to such chores as girls working in the kitchen, but 'I was not that unlucky'.¹³³⁶ There were complaints that the girls, unlike the nuns, ate badly and were always hungry. They also had bad memories of bathing, the ablutions, and their maltreatment when they began their periods. As for their education, it was limited and institutionalised, and ill-prepared them for life outside. Particularly grim are recollections of their self-identities becoming confused by their last names only being used and of discovering only later that the first name by which they knew themselves had been changed from what it was. Fear was induced by the institution's

¹³³⁴ Diane Parker, 'Institutional Experiences of Female Child Migrants in Western Australia, 1947-55', Master of Education by Research thesis, Edith Cowan University, 2013, <https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/681/>. For the abstract and chapter titles see pp.i, iv-vi; Introduction and Overview pp.1-4; chapter summaries pp.24, 38-39, 51-52 (including photograph of first party), 67-68, 76-77, 87-88, 94-95, 103, 114-115; and Conclusions, 116-124.

¹³³⁵ *Ibid*, p.57.

¹³³⁶ *Ibid*, p.36.

disciplinary practices. Harsh and humiliating punishments were meted out, and there was cruelty: 'we got the cane, we got the strap'; 'This nun put her ... hand on the stove ... and burnt her...just for being naughty'.¹³³⁷ Personal possessions were denied, loved toys maliciously destroyed. There was also psychological and emotional abuse, including humiliating girls for wetting their beds. Most of the interviewees came to perceive their identity as child migrants as one of shame - 'they were always calling us dirty migrants' – and the stigma was internalised, for life.¹³³⁸

33.13 As for lifetime legacies and lessons to be learnt, the author of this thesis writes as follows:

One of the most important findings was that the Orphanage's institutional practices with its underpinning of religious teachings, ensured a lack of suitable social experiences and interactions. This shaped the way the participants viewed the world; which in turn impacted upon their life choices. The findings suggest that access to a wide variety of social situations is a necessary feature in a child's socialisation and the accumulation of necessary social skills.¹³³⁹

33.14 This was of course an intensely Catholic institution. The author quotes an interviewee who remembers a nun telling her that she was 'being punished by God, that I was just like my mother, dirty, and that I was filth, that I was going to die...', this was true as God is my witness'.¹³⁴⁰ Indeed, deeply instilled into the children was fear of God's retribution and of having to spend eternity in hell. That lifetime fear remained with some as elderly women. Two respondents who had initially participated willingly in the research project and had agreed to have their interviews recorded, then withdrew having read the transcripts sent to them. On inquiry, they referred to a 'fear of getting into trouble'. Their fear, it seems, was of being punished by God 'in retaliation for the negative things they had said in regards to Catholicism, the nuns and the clergy'.¹³⁴¹ The transcript and the recordings were accordingly destroyed and not used in the thesis.

33.15 Mrs LYF [REDACTED] born in [REDACTED] 1933, sent to **St Joseph's Orphanage, Subiaco** and a witness to this Inquiry, provides similar testimony.¹³⁴² For

¹³³⁷ *Ibid*, p.36.

¹³³⁸ *Ibid*, p.36.

¹³³⁹ *Ibid*, p.i.

¹³⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.36.

¹³⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.28.

¹³⁴² SCAI statement by Mrs LYF [REDACTED] WIT.001.002.2922-2928.

instance, she recalls the humiliation of bedwetters, the failure to provide sex education or reassurance for girls starting periods, the poor equipment, the lack of books and toys, and Sisters slapping girls in the face. Because on arrival she was aged 14, she was put to work, unpaid, her education coming to a stop. Inspectors did turn up, but such visits were known in advance, the place was spruced up, dolls were put, temporarily, on the beds, and the girls were not interviewed. She left when she was 18.

33.16 Mrs ^{MDK} [REDACTED] tells a similar story.¹³⁴³ She was born in [REDACTED] 1938 and was sent to **St Joseph's Orphanage, Subiaco** aged nine in 1947, where 'We all suffered mental and physical abuse'.¹³⁴⁴ She too refers to the Sisters of Mercy having no mercy. There was physical violence, girls being beaten with straps. Again we hear of bedwetters being humiliated, and inspectors not speaking to the girls when they called, though at least on that day the girls got a good lunch. Instead of emotional support, the girls were told by the nuns, falsely, that they had no parents, that they were slum kids and should be grateful, and even that 'our periods was us getting punished by God'.¹³⁴⁵ As for the lasting effects of her 'care', she refers to a loss of her religious faith, a failed marriage, and bouts of depression and anxiety.

33.17 A statement provided by Mrs ^{LHY} [REDACTED] provides a graphic account of conditions at **Nazareth House Geraldton** to where she and two other Scottish girls were sent in 1952 when she was aged five.¹³⁴⁶ It was, she writes, 'a place of violence and fear', 'with so much cruelty, back breaking labour and hardship'.¹³⁴⁷ The nuns were 'cruel and brutal', 'poisonous women' who 'should never have been allowed near children'.¹³⁴⁸ As for religious instruction, the nuns 'would threaten us with terrible punishments from God. They would tell us that He was watching us and knew the dirty things that we were thinking. You could name any sin and the nuns would say that we were guilty of it'.¹³⁴⁹ Sister ^{LXW} [REDACTED] abused her by mocking her Scottish accent, and she was sent to work on menial tasks in the kitchen, laundry and scullery. Cleaning out the green-slimed swimming pool, she slipped and broke her

¹³⁴³ SCAI statement by Mrs ^{MDK} [REDACTED], WIT.001.002.3016-3033

¹³⁴⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3027.

¹³⁴⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3024.

¹³⁴⁶ SCAI statements by Mrs ^{LHY} [REDACTED] WIT.001.002.4873-4884 and WIT.003.001.2696-2705.

¹³⁴⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4875

¹³⁴⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4875, 4876.

¹³⁴⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4876.

legs, but the nuns did not even call a doctor and left her in agony until eventually taking her to hospital. Aged 13 her schooling was ended, and she was sent to work with a Sister in a hostel dealing with old men who were incontinent, suffered from dementia, and exposed themselves, and she was obliged to wash them. 'This was', she writes, 'a lot for a young girl to take on.'¹³⁵⁰ She was not able to escape until she was 19. Her education had suffered so much that her reading and writing was poor and she was only able to secure menial jobs. She did marry, but having always had problems with relationships the marriage failed. She believes that it was not the 'beatings or canings' that did the worst damage to her but 'the deliberate terrorising of a little girl' which left her 'traumatised' and anxious.¹³⁵¹

33.18 A witness statement by Mrs Yvonne Radzevicius, née O'Donnell, is disturbingly similar.¹³⁵² Born in Glasgow in ██████████ 1942, the youngest of six, and placed aged nine months with the Sisters of Nazareth in Cardonald, of which her memories are positive, she was then sent in February 1953 aged 10 to Nazareth House at Geraldton, about which her memories are negative. The discipline was often harsh. She was terrified by one Sister who hit her on the back of the head to force her to eat unpalatable food, and who pushed her head through a window, leaving her cut. She says no doctor was called, nor when she was badly burnt by a steam press. She was also punished for not keeping clean, and was forced to strip and change in front of others, and feeling degraded. Young Yvonne evidently had ability, for she was sent to a quality local college, but she had to suffer emotional abuse by local girls calling her a 'Nazzie House bastard'.¹³⁵³ In the home she had to work hard after school, for no pay. Visits by Child Welfare Department staff were known in advance. The girls were spruced up to create a good impression, but there was no opportunity for girls to speak of grievances. Her separation from family in Scotland, and attempts to reconnect with them, were frustrating and unsuccessful. Because of her experiences she had not learnt 'about love' and parenting skills. Her inability to express affection strained her relationship with her own children. 'Where do I belong?', she asks in conclusion, 'I have never felt that I fitted in anywhere.'¹³⁵⁴

¹³⁵⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.4877.

¹³⁵¹ WIT.001.002.4883.

¹³⁵² SCAI statement by Mrs Yvonne Radzevicius, née O'Donnell, WIT.003.001.4619-4621.

¹³⁵³ WIT.003.001.4619.

¹³⁵⁴ WIT.003.001.4620.

33.19 At least four Scottish girls were sent to **Nazareth House, East Camberwell**, and we have witness testimony from three. We begin with Mrs LTI [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] 1944. We referred earlier to the extraordinary circumstances in which LTI [REDACTED] (as she then was), who had had infantile paralysis and usually wore calipers, passed a medical examination in Scotland and was shipped to Australia (see above para 13.22).¹³⁵⁵ Judging by her two witness statements, her life opportunities continued to be constrained, and not just by her physical disability. She writes that 'We were like garbage, being pushed around'.¹³⁵⁶ While she remembers one nun with affection, she reports on violent punishments inflicted by others, including with a cricket stump. One nun broke a bone in LTI [REDACTED] hand by hitting her with a cane. She records another episode of exceptional violence, during which LTI [REDACTED] passed out. Girls were not helped when they had their periods. Any who wet the bed were humiliated, as so often by carers. The nuns refused to believe that she had been handicapped by her childhood illness. After she had been stripped to be examined by doctors, to her embarrassment, she was subsequently slapped across the face by a nun for 'parading herself' in front of those men.¹³⁵⁷ Once again we read of child welfare visitors not speaking to the girls and of a letter intended for her father being ripped up by a nun because she had written that she hated the orphanage and wanted to go back home. Mrs LTI [REDACTED] writes that there was almost no sex education, and she was terrified when her periods began. Her school studies suffered because of other duties, but she was not told she had passed a government public service exam which would have provided her with a career opening: the letter was later retrieved from a Sister's rubbish bin. She was required to leave the orphanage aged 15 and not allowed to finish the academic year, but she did get employment. However, the legacy of her mistreatment was low self-esteem, lack of self-confidence, and bouts of depression from the age of 22, needing medication. 'We weren't brought up at the convent. We were like garbage being pushed up. I felt like we were the rubbish sent out like the convicts.'¹³⁵⁸

33.20 Mrs LST [REDACTED] born in [REDACTED] 1943, was selected and dispatched from Nazareth House, Kilmarnock, to **Nazareth House, East**

¹³⁵⁵ SCAI two statements by Mrs LTI [REDACTED]. The first, WIT.001.002.3278-3303, is dated 13 Dec 2018. The second, WIT.003.001.2706-2717, undated and entitled 'My Story', covers similar ground, and it is probably the account she gave to the Child Migrants Trust to which she refers in an email she sent to the First Minister, 17 May 2018, SGV.001.008.3126-3127.

¹³⁵⁶ SCAI statement by Mrs LTI [REDACTED] WIT.001.002.3302.

¹³⁵⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3291.

¹³⁵⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.001.002.3302.

Camberwell, in [REDACTED] 1954, aged 10, along with her younger sister [REDACTED] LSU who was a year younger.¹³⁵⁹ She writes that this 'awful decision cost us both our families and our identities'.¹³⁶⁰ Although she tried to be obedient and keep out of trouble, the system, she says, was brutal and they were worked like slaves. The Sisters of Nazareth 'treated us like dirt and were very nasty'.¹³⁶¹ She witnessed many assaults, including tearing lumps out of the hair of defiant girls (including her sister). 'I think they were disturbed, sadistic.'¹³⁶² Her education suffered once she had arrived in Australia, because she was sent to work in the laundry and in the old ladies' hostel upstairs, 'doing work that was completely unsuitable for children'.¹³⁶³ At the age of 13, at night, she was made to lay out the body of an elderly lady who had just died. This was an experience, along with others, she remembered and describes in grim and graphic detail. All this badly prepared her for secondary school, and she struggled. In sum, 'I suffered a hard, harsh childhood under control of the Sisters of Nazareth'.¹³⁶⁴ She was never given information about her family or identity, and she was made to feel ashamed about her family origins, 'calling me names and saying to us all that we were nothing, our mothers didn't want us. They were cruel to children who already had nothing'.¹³⁶⁵

33.21 The testimony of [REDACTED] LST sister, Mrs [REDACTED] LSU born in [REDACTED] 1944 and travelling with her to **Nazareth House, East Camberwell**, extends some of what was reported by her sister, including poor education and preparation for life after leaving the institution.¹³⁶⁶ She refers to the terrible food and to the beatings and humiliations inflicted on girls who wet their beds (including herself, until into her teens). Self-esteem was damaged because 'we were always told by the nuns that we had no family - or on occasions that our mothers were whores who didn't want us and we should be grateful to the nuns'.¹³⁶⁷ Children were treated as 'lowly scum...beneath contempt. It makes my blood boil to think about their

¹³⁵⁹ SCAI statement by Mrs [REDACTED] LST WIT.003.001.2672-2677. For the summary version of the LEM3 forms of [REDACTED] LST and of [REDACTED] LSU with the Mother Superior at Nazareth House, Kilmarnock, named as 'Guardian' and as giving 'Consent' to their migration see NAZ.001.007.8874, and NAZ.001.007.8885.

¹³⁶⁰ SCAI statement by Mrs [REDACTED] LST WIT.003.001.2672.

¹³⁶¹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2672.

¹³⁶² *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2673.

¹³⁶³ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2674.

¹³⁶⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2675.

¹³⁶⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2675.

¹³⁶⁶ SCAI statement by Mrs [REDACTED] LSU, WIT.003.001.2686-2689.

¹³⁶⁷ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2686.

patronising, hypocritical “Christian’ attitudes” when all the while they showed nothing but continual cruelty towards vulnerable young children.¹³⁶⁸ Mrs **LSU** also states that they were subjected to ‘rampant racism from mostly ignorant Irish nuns towards Scottish and English girls’.¹³⁶⁹ She too has dark memories of the elderly men and women also housed in Nazareth House. ‘Most were suffering from various forms of dementia, many were incontinent and the wards were frightening places for children.’¹³⁷⁰ The violence of the nuns, the worst being Sister **LSV** and Sister **LSW** features much in her account. They were emotionally cruel and physically violent, ‘big nasty women’, who hit her with sticks, leather belts, canes, wooden rulers and fists.¹³⁷¹ ‘There was a punishment room up on the roof.... That is where we would be taken for really serious thrashings, where nobody could hear your screams’, and ‘there was nobody to tell, nobody on our side’.¹³⁷² Mrs **LSU** also claims that the nuns were ‘permanently fixated on sex and sin’, and the girls were ‘daily accused of all manner of evils’.¹³⁷³ Indeed, they were not being prepared for puberty. ‘You were treated like a harlot (and told you were exactly that) if you needed a menstrual pad. God help you if you needed a bra.’¹³⁷⁴ They were made to beg for basic sanitary supplies and were then told ‘we were dirty’.¹³⁷⁵ Occasionally, **LSU** and other girls met some local boys, and though this was entirely innocent they were reported to the nuns by an office worker at Nazareth House. The girls were then subjected, screaming, one by one, to a violent virginity test by a doctor in the presence of a priest and Sister **LSV**.

I was sexually assaulted by the doctor aided by the Sisters of Nazareth.... I have never recovered from the horror of that brutal assault. I was taken out of school and lost my one chance for an education. I was labelled a ‘slut’ and have lived with this terrible injustice all my life. It was nothing less than a deliberate attack on my confidence and self-esteem.¹³⁷⁶

33.22 As for **St Joseph’s Orphanage Neerkol**, there is much more to record, largely as a result of allegations concerning Neerkol and other institutions which have led to several Australian investigations and reports. We reported earlier (see paras 8.12-8.15

¹³⁶⁸ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2687.

¹³⁶⁹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2687.

¹³⁷⁰ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2687.

¹³⁷¹ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2687.

¹³⁷² *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2687.

¹³⁷³ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2688.

¹³⁷⁴ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2688.

¹³⁷⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2688.

¹³⁷⁶ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.2688.

above) that in July 1998 the Children's Commission of Queensland had reported on abuse at Neerkol, but it is appropriate to review its substance again here.¹³⁷⁷ Copies of four inspection reports had been examined by the Commission, dating to 1949-59. Three of these inspections had been carried out by State officials and one by a Commonwealth government officer. They were positive about care and conditions.¹³⁷⁸ However, among approximately 100 former residents who had contacted the inquiry, 'the vast majority' were 'alleging abuse and neglect'.¹³⁷⁹ Reminiscences published in 1987 by a British child migrant sent to Neerkol in 1951 refers to the children's hard work on the farm and in the laundry, the lack of food, 'so many beltings...for the smallest of things', 'No affection...no one to turn to', and even to the neglect and abuse of the sick. She accepted that some children had 'no bitterness', but 'many of us carried the scars all our life'.¹³⁸⁰

33.23 That investigation was followed by a specific report on allegations concerning Neerkol by the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions (the Forde Inquiry). This was completed in May 1999 but because of pending legal action it was not published until 2000.¹³⁸¹ We provided some information earlier about the content of the report (see paras 8.21-8.23), though in the current context it may carry additional resonance. Only two of 54 former residents who submitted testimony offered positive accounts. The report, somewhat on the lines of the Ross confidential report, judged Neerkol to be an inappropriate location for an orphanage, being too isolated and distant from Rockhampton, the nearest town, thus depriving the children of any opportunity to integrate into the local community. It was stressed that the effects of 'isolation and loneliness were particularly severe' for British child migrants who 'suffered the dual dislocations of uprooting from their country of birth and removal from a familiar community environment'.¹³⁸² The consequence at Neerkol was 'a closed community with a culture of its own', in which individuality was suppressed.¹³⁸³ Children's personal possessions were removed from them, including their own clothes. They were

¹³⁷⁷ Children's Commission of Queensland, *A Preliminary Report on Allegations of Abuse of Former Residents of St Joseph's Orphanage, at Neerkol, Rockhampton, in the 1940s, 50s and 60s*, July 1998. There is no on-line digitised copy of this report.

¹³⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pp.15-21.

¹³⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p.12.

¹³⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pp.22-24.

¹³⁸¹ *Confidential Closed Report of Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions: Neerkol*, May 1999, pp.1-10. There is no on-line digitised copy of this report.

¹³⁸² *Ibid*, p.1.

¹³⁸³ *Ibid*, p.2.

assigned numbers, were referred to by surnames, and individual birthdays were not acknowledged. Toys were rare, and free play discouraged. Again we read of the hard work which these children in care were required to perform. Even though boys and girls were accommodated, brothers and sisters were still separated, and there are reports of some being punished for attempting to restore contact. Some children were told, wrongly, that their parents were dead. Teachers and teaching were poor, the former brutal, instilling fear into children, the latter leaving a legacy for life. As for physical abuse, 'punishments administered at Neerkol...were excessive by any standard'.¹³⁸⁴ They were in breach of State regulations, and not only because no punishment register was maintained. Runaways (their flight perhaps indicative of abuse) 'were treated with particular brutality', male workers using stock whips.¹³⁸⁵ 'No punishment register, as required by the Regulations, was maintained.'¹³⁸⁶ In addition to the lack of individualised care, psychological abuse included disparaging their origins and parentage. 'I was made, by the degrading way they treated me, to feel a worthless piece of rubbish that nobody wanted and this feeling, engendered in me, by them, followed and affected me long into my adult life.'¹³⁸⁷ Again we read of children being humiliated for bed-wetting. There was also testimony concerning sexual abuse by male workers at the orphanage, by visitors, and by priests – and a general unwillingness by listeners, when allegations were made, that a priest could behave improperly. Some who complained were beaten. One girl who had tried to escape records the consequences.

I said to [the inspector] 'I don't want to go back there!... You know they lock me up, you know!' And I'm there cracking it and crying. I said 'The [staff member] hurts me and everyone else.' And then I told him about [the sexual abuse]; and do you know what he did when I told him? He turned around and said, 'Don't you dare talk so vulgar, you vulgar little girl', and he slapped me across the face. Then I turned around and started kicking the seat, and he said, 'You're the one they pulled out of the bloody gutter'. And when we got back I was put over the friggin' desk of [a staff member] and I got a flogging.'¹³⁸⁸

33.24 This report on Neerkol concludes by considering factors contributing to such neglect and abuse. In addition to its isolation, there was a lack of funding, excessive and arduous workloads of staff, grossly inadequate staff-child ratios, and nuns

¹³⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p.3.

¹³⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p.3.

¹³⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p.3.

¹³⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.4.

¹³⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.5.

untrained and not suited to the work. But particular stress is placed on the failure of State officials to carry out the required monthly inspections, rarely speaking to children when they did attend, prior knowledge of inspections being given which allowed staff to tidy up, and the department's toleration of those inadequate staff-child ratios. Inquiry would have revealed that one nun was responsible for 45 boys in one dormitory, and another nun, with just one assistant, was in charge of 94 girls. It seems that staff at the State Children's Department were too few and untrained. The State therefore failed in its duty of care for children of whom, through the Director of the Department, it was legally their guardian.

33.25 By the time this initially closed report had been published, the more wide-ranging report of the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions had already been published, in May 1999.¹³⁸⁹ Again we referred to this earlier (see paras 8.17-8.24 above). It addressed allegations of abuse at more than 150 institutions in the State, about which over 300 people had provided information, including accounts of abuse and 'irreparable damage' to lives. The intention of this inquiry was to investigate institutional abuse in the past and also current practice. Accordingly, it contains much about emotional, physical and sexual abuse, and also what it defines as systems abuse, caused by ignorance by providers, failures in the monitoring and tracking of the needs of children, and a failure of government to provide adequate resources to care for children's well-being. It provides a list of statutory obligations which had been breached, relating to such matters as food, clothing, education and the inflicting of corporal punishment, and it examines the reasons for these failures and how abuse was allowed to happen. It also examines the consequences for victims of abuse, before concluding with 42 recommendations concerning what is required to provide improved childcare.

33.26 Finally we come to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse in 2014 (see paras 8.41-8.44 above) and especially to its Case Study 26, an inquiry into childcare at Neerkol.¹³⁹⁰ The report largely confirms findings previously reached by the earlier inquiries about the nature and context of abuse and neglect at the orphanage. Again it is concluded that its isolation contributed to a

¹³⁸⁹ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions [Forde Inquiry], May 1999: <https://www.qld.gov.au/community/documents/getting-support-health-social-issue/forde-comminquiry.pdf>.

¹³⁹⁰ Royal Commission, *Report of Case 26*, <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/case-studies/case-study-26-st-josephs-orphanage-neerkol>, pp.4-30, 45-61.

closed culture in which some staff exerted particular power and which also made contact with and scrutiny by people outside of the institution much harder. Like the Forde Inquiry, the Royal Commission recognised that some nuns and employees inflicted cruel and excessive punishments of children in their care. Former residents stated that they were generally too afraid to report instances of abuse, or did not have an individual member of staff in whom they felt they could confide. They also recalled either never seeing State child welfare inspectors or not being allowed or encouraged to speak to them if they did. They also reported that when they had sensitive interviews with such inspectors, for example in the context of having run away from the orphanage, they were often interviewed with a priest or nun present.

33.27 Twelve individuals reported the sexual abuse at Neerkol they had experienced. The abusers included priests associated with the orphanage, as well as nuns and employees. In some cases, abusers were reported to have made use of their religious authority to prevent disclosures of abuse, telling the children that they had abused that it must be okay because God had allowed it, or that telling anyone about the abuse would be a mortal sin that would condemn the child to hell. Former residents noted various occasions in which they had, as children, disclosed abuse to the nuns and priests at the orphanage (including in one instance to a priest who has himself been alleged to have engaged in a number of acts of sexual abuse), and to State child welfare inspectors. Those making these complaints reported that they were disbelieved, were given penances to perform, and/or were punished for making such allegations. In some cases, State child welfare inspectors responded critically to children's allegations of abuse, and then passed details of these allegations back to staff at the orphanage, who then gave additional punishments to the child.

33.28 One former resident, who reported having been anally raped on a regular basis over two or three years by a priest associated with the orphanage, informed the Royal Commission that he had told one of the Sisters that he was bleeding following such an assault. He was cleaned up and given a nappy to wear to capture the bleeding. He alleged that this happened on a number of occasions. He also alleged that the senior local Child Welfare inspector was also aware of this, and merely told him that he could not go back to his work placement until the rectal bleeding stopped. He was also concerned because this inspector appeared to have a close friendship with the priest who had regularly abused him.¹³⁹¹

¹³⁹¹ *Ibid*, pp.52, 60.

33.29 Another former resident reported that a priest who had regularly assaulted her sexually gave her a necklace on her birthday, calling her, 'his special girl'.¹³⁹² This phrase, and the habit of giving jewellery to someone he had sexually abused, was also reported to the Commission by someone else who as a girl had been raped by him over a number of years. When she showed this necklace to a younger nun at the orphanage, the nun became very upset and told her that she should no longer spend time alone with this priest again. This former resident took this to indicate that there was a wider awareness at the orphanage of this priest's abusive behaviour.¹³⁹³

33.30 Given the *prima facie* evidence both of numerous cases of psychological, physical and sexual abuse at Neerkol, and of awareness of such abuse amongst staff at the orphanage and by local child welfare inspectors, it is notable that neither the Forde Inquiry nor the Royal Commission were able to locate any relevant historical documents concerning such abuse. It is possible that such records were made, but were subsequently lost or destroyed. Alternatively, it may be that there was not a consistent approach to recording or responding to allegations of sexual abuse, and that there were variations in practice depending on the particular relationships between staff in the State child welfare department and staff at the residential institution.

33.31 What we can add is a copy of the testimony provided by the Child Migrants Trust to SCAI on behalf of Mr [REDACTED] who with [LZJ] [REDACTED] was sent to Neerkol from Scotland in [REDACTED] 1955, [REDACTED]¹³⁹⁴ The testimony, written by Ian Thwaites, CMT's service manager, is dated April 2008, by when CMT had provided therapeutic services to 29 of the 48 UK child migrants sent to Neerkol.¹³⁹⁵ Mr Thwaites writes that

There is a devastating consistency in their accounts of severe physical assaults by the Sisters of Mercy, deprivation to the point of constant gnawing hunger, a regime of strenuous physical labour, bullying and emotional trauma, sexual

¹³⁹² *Ibid*, p.45.

¹³⁹³ *Ibid*, p.55.

¹³⁹⁴ Ian Thwaites, CMT, to Redress Services, Brisbane, on behalf of [REDACTED] 17 April 2008, copy to SCAI, WIT.003.001.8660-8662.

¹³⁹⁵ *Ibid*, WIT.003.001.8661.

predation by 'workers' employed at Neerkol, inadequate clothing and other forms of neglect.¹³⁹⁶

Sisters of Nazareth are alleged to have referred to child migrants in their care as 'pommie bastards' and 'sons of whores'.¹³⁹⁷ The separation of the [LZJ-Family Name] 'had a devastating impact on their childhood'.¹³⁹⁸ Mr [redacted] described his experience at Neerkol as 'torture'.¹³⁹⁹ He reported physical and sexual abuse, being told he was 'a devil, born in sin'.¹⁴⁰⁰ When upset he was dressed as a girl to humiliate him. He says he survived by being clever, doing well at school and training as a teacher, but the legacy was 'a pain you can never get over'.¹⁴⁰¹ Indeed, he was never able to sustain a career, he became homeless, an alcoholic and suicidal, and he needed psychiatric care. Following a stroke in 2004 (when he would have been 58), he needed full-time residential care.

33.32 [redacted] Ms [LZJ] [redacted] also provides troubling testimony.¹⁴⁰² Although she was in the same institution, she and her brother, like all girls and boys, were separated except for school lessons, so they were not able to maintain their relationship. She writes that children were in constant fear of the nuns and were caned for trivial misdeeds. It did not help her schooling that she had lost her glasses during the voyage to Australia (a child threw them overboard), but the nuns would not replace them, saying she should be like the other children, so she did not again have glasses until she was 17. Unsurprisingly, this affected her education. Instead of going to a secondary school, the nuns said she had poor vision and 'was not very brainy',¹⁴⁰³ so she worked in the nunnery from the age of 13 until she left aged 18, with no life skills and no understanding of the world.

¹³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰² Ms [LZJ] [redacted] witness statement to Australian Senate Inquiry, provided to SCAI, POA.001.001.0029.

¹⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

34 | Child Migration and Child Abuse: Conclusions

34.1 A study of child migration and child abuse may bring to mind the proverb that ‘the road to Hell is paved with good intentions’. That would be misleading for three reasons.

34.2 First, it does not acknowledge that child migrants from Scotland and elsewhere in the UK, did not go ‘to Hell’ but to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Southern Rhodesia. Many are (or were) convinced that they were indeed ‘rescued’ from the poverty or neglect or abuse or poor prospects that they feel (or felt) they would have faced had they remained in Scotland or elsewhere in the UK. Whatever scepticism may be felt about the veracity and typicality of their accounts, the voices of the grateful and successful can be discerned in the archived records and contemporary reports of sending agencies and even, though usually as brief acknowledgements, in the reports of recent public inquiries into child migration.¹⁴⁰⁴ That the recorded voices and accounts of the satisfied are less numerous in the reports of those public inquiries than those recording abuse suffered and legacies endured is not surprising. The focus of those inquiries, and of the organisations formed in the UK and overseas to provide victims with support, has very properly and necessarily been to solicit and gather up the accounts of the damaged, to represent them, to give them voice, to obtain explanations, to secure apologies and, in some instances, to obtain compensation. We cannot re-run the lives of the satisfied and successful or the lives of the abused and damaged and compare alternative counter-factual outcomes.

34.3 Second, it is true that philanthropic sending agencies had ‘good intentions’. As indicated early in this report, their founders were highly motivated. Most believed that they were engaged in God’s work, rescuing God’s children from misfortune and providing opportunities overseas which would mend their bodies and save their souls. Not all organisations were as conspicuously religious in their self-promotions as those aligned in Scotland with the Presbyterians and Roman Catholics, but religious faith was ostensibly a motivation of all. Religious worship was a practice at the institutions overseas to which they sent child migrants, and church attendance by child migrants was also an obligation placed upon the families in Canada to which

¹⁴⁰⁴ For sensible comments on the positive as well as negative judgements of their experiences by child migrants, at the time and later in life, in this instance on those sent to British Columbia, see Vallance, ‘Child Immigrants to the “Edge of Empire”’, pp.42-51.

children were allocated. However, perhaps – or perhaps not – a qualification to this assessment is the evident competition between different creeds including the determination of the Catholic church to populate Australia with those of the Catholic faith and to protect them from other competing churches. The souls of children, it might seem, were as important as their bodies. It has also been argued that the righteousness of the cause obscured understanding of the consequences of inadequate care.¹⁴⁰⁵ Moreover, ‘good intentions’ also included the secular and political ambition of populating the ‘white’ Empire, no doubt a secondary concern for those primarily motivated by faith but embraced more prominently by others. Certainly, populating the Empire and reinforcing Commonwealth relationships were of primary importance to the political classes in the UK and overseas who endorsed and funded child migration, as it was of inter-war and post-war legislation to assist adult emigration with substantial amounts of public money. The ‘good intentions’ of those so focused made the well-being of children ‘deprived of a normal home life’ a secondary consideration. It is arresting to recall that such children were being sent overseas in 1970, nearly 25 years after the Curtis Committee had warned against the practice.

34.4 Third, even ‘good intentions’ do not excuse bad practice. It should be abundantly clear from our Report that, in the first instance, those whose intentions were honourable or at least comprehensible failed to set and enforce benchmarks for standards of care overseas which would even match pre-war ‘standards of the day’ – let alone those which the UK government post-Curtis and post-1948 Children Act were expected to put in place and enforce, overseas as well as at home. The dismal tale of the failure to impose the regulations promised during debate on the Children Bill has been rehearsed above. The failure even to regulate the organisational practice of child migration domestically is particularly lamentable, and puzzlingly incomprehensible in the knowledge that in 1982 such statutory regulations were eventually set, long after the forms of child migration as reviewed in this report had ceased. Only local authorities, who contributed few to the stream of child migrants, were regulated. Voluntary childcare organisations in activities internal to Scotland as elsewhere in the UK were also subject to inspection and regulation. However, whether the selection of children and the securing of child, parental or guardian consent for their migration overseas was professionally and adequately done

¹⁴⁰⁵ See in particular Lynch, *Remembering Child Migration*, and note the words ‘*the Wounds of Charity*’ in its sub-title.

depended on the internal practice of the sending societies, and also how susceptible they were to pressure from external agents, representing the Catholic church in Australia for example. Noticeably, the Home Office attempted to achieve by persuasion what it could not secure by regulation, and only eventually with sufficient effect, alongside domestic childcare improvements, to reduce the flow of child migrants overseas by particular agencies, including the Catholic church. But there were glaring exceptions of organisations whose only *raison d'être* was child migration. Moreover, the tale told in this report exposes the problems faced by even the most caring of sending agencies, confronted with the logistical difficulties of assessing the suitability of families and institutions overseas which were bidding to receive child migrants. Equally problematical was monitoring the well-being of child migrants once dispatched. The dispersal of child migrants over the vast spaces of Canada and Australia always posed huge inspection challenges, for government officials locally and for officers of UK High Commissions. Compounding the problem were deficiencies in the number and training and standards of childcare staff overseas, in government and in institutions, and in the monitoring of performance of staff by agents of the organisations immediately responsible for them and by officers of overseas governments. Moreover, the authority of sending societies over local managers of the institutions to which children were sent was problematic. Reports back to the UK were too often absent, intermittent or deficient – and not necessarily adequately responded to when any were received. An instinct of adults to disbelieve children and an interest of some institutions (not all) in preventing external knowledge of abuse in order to preserve reputations left children still at risk. It is a lamentable fact that we know more today than was known at the time about the experiences of child migrants and the legacy for life of what many had endured.

34.5 As a final observation, it is evident from the variable amounts of evidence deployed in this report that much of what we know about the abuse of child migrants (and child migration generally) depends a good deal on the quality and quantity of the written records kept contemporaneously, subsequently preserved, and latterly made available to public inquiries and to former child migrants or their representatives. Retrospective oral and written witness testimony by a diminishing number of former child migrants or their representatives has also been important during recent investigations. Not only has voice been given to the voiceless, and that is important, but knowledge is needed in order to learn lessons from the past.

Appendix 1: Juvenile Migration

Introduction: Rationale

1.1 While the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry is primarily concerned with the experiences of children, it is also relevant to address evidence relating to juveniles. Some migration schemes catered for both categories. Even organisations that recruited exclusively child migrants retained some aftercare responsibility for those individuals when they passed the school leaving age, sometimes until the age of 21. Other sending organisations recruited only juveniles.

1.2 As acknowledged early in our main Report, we recognise that the experiences of young adults, some barely out of childhood, others substantially older, could replicate those of their younger compatriots. Certainly many prospered, but they may still have struggled. Juveniles, like children, would be separated from the familiar, might find their identities threatened in initially alien lands, and might suffer from their isolation, usually (at least initially) as farmhands or domestic servants. They could encounter verbal and perhaps physical abuse in the competition for jobs and promotion. Some regarded their labours as slavery. An investigation revealed that in the 1920s the suicide rate among male juvenile migrants brought into Australia was more than ten times higher than in the same age group among Australian males.¹⁴⁰⁶ There are also cases of suicides among juvenile migrants in Canada, including one from Scotland.¹⁴⁰⁷ Homesickness was a regular problem and even mature adult migrants, including those with families, found it difficult to adapt. Return migration - both voluntary and enforced - was not uncommon.

1.3 The experiences of these young men and women must be remembered and considered, not least because they have not been addressed specifically in other inquiries concerning abuse. Their history reveals the widespread and long-term acceptability of the practice of juvenile migration within British society at large.

Definitions, Organisations and Numbers

¹⁴⁰⁶ Alan Gill, *Likely Lads and Lasses: Youth Migration to Australia 1911-1983* (BBM Ltd, Sydney NSW, 2005), p.85.

¹⁴⁰⁷ See reference, for instance, to Mabel Bell, Charles Bulpitt, Clarence Martin and Mary Whittaker in <https://canadianbritishhomechildren.weebly.com/our-lost-children.html>, and also John Wilson, para 8.8 below.

1.4 As with child migrants, it is difficult to identify, number and even define Scottish juvenile migrants. It is also difficult to differentiate child migration schemes from juvenile emigration programmes that catered specifically for young people over school-leaving age. Some of the schemes were administered by the same organisations that operated child migration programmes and did not categorise participants by age. Definitions are further complicated by the periodic raising of the school leaving age during the period under review: normally 13 from 1872, 14 from 1883, 15 from 1947 and 16 from 1972. For the purposes of this study, juveniles are defined as those who had attained the school-leaving age at the time of their migration.

1.5 Like many child migrants, some juvenile migrants were commonly referred to as being 'in need' or 'deprived of a normal home life'. Many had been taken into care as children because of the death, absence or apparent neglect of their parents, or the inability of parents to maintain for them an adequate home life. They may have passed from childhood to adolescence while in the care of public authority institutions or voluntary organisations in Scotland. There were also those who had become the responsibility of such public authority institutions as industrial schools, reformatories and remand homes, because of criminal convictions or because they were perceived as being at risk of becoming criminals. However, some juvenile migrants had experienced a normal home life, but chose—or were persuaded by parents, guardians, or youth organisations—to migrate in pursuit of better opportunities.

1.6 We have identified several organisations that to varying extents selected and sent Scottish juvenile migrants overseas. Some were UK-wide operations, often concerned with child as well as juvenile migrants, including those with Scottish origins. Organisations that operated (or may have operated) in Scotland that dealt only with juvenile migrants (and not with children) were the Barwell Boys' Scheme, the Big Brother Movement, the Boy Scouts, the British Immigration and Colonization Association, the Canadian Pacific Scheme, Cossar Farms, the Dreadnought Scheme, the Flock House Scheme, the Girls' Friendly Society, a number of Reformatory and Industrial Schools, the Salvation Army and the YMCA. Three in Scotland were not exclusively concerned to send Scottish juvenile (or indeed child) migrants overseas, namely the Aberlour Orphanage, Quarriers Orphan Homes of Scotland, and the Church of Scotland. Exceptionally, the Cossar farms scheme was entirely dedicated to supplying juvenile Scottish boys with farming opportunities overseas—and that dedication only to boys also made it unusual.

1.7 Local authorities in Scotland (as elsewhere in the UK) also sanctioned the overseas migration of children and juveniles in their care, although usually needing approval by the Secretary of State. Arrangements for the migration and resettlement of such individuals were effected by voluntary societies acting on behalf of the local authorities, or by the parents or guardians of the children and juveniles.

To a large extent the number of Scottish juvenile migrants in the period with which we are concerned, from 1900, is a matter of speculation, particularly when examining institutions that migrated both children and juveniles, or where juveniles were included with older adults. We also need to keep in mind those changes in the school-leaving age. In addition, when considering juvenile migration through UK wide-schemes, we should remember the modest proportion of Scots in the UK population. Low involvement of Scottish juveniles in some programmes, such as Aberlour Orphanage, the Girls Friendly Society (among Female Emigration Societies), and the Church of Scotland, is also evident. With those caveats in mind and based on such data as is available, a rough estimate of the numbers dispatched from Scotland by the several organisations might be as follows, in alphabetical order:

Table 1: Estimate number of juveniles migrated between 1900 and 1972

Organisation	Number
Aberlour Orphanage	65
Barwell Boys	155
Big Brother Movement	700
Boy Scouts	400
British Immigration and Colonization Association	550
British Women's Emigration Association	200
Children's Overseas Reception Board	1,200
Church of Scotland	10
Cossar farms	1,200
Dreadnought Scheme	280
Flock House Scheme	76
Quarriers	342
Reformatories and Industrial Schools	400
Royal Over-Seas League	80
Salvation Army	1,000
YMCA	500
Total	7,158

The total amounts to 7,158, at most 7,200.¹⁴⁰⁸ There were always more juvenile boys than juvenile girls amongst those migrated, perhaps in the ratio of 3 to 1.

Origins and Development of Juvenile Migration

3.1 The initial objective of juvenile emigration schemes in the nineteenth century was to deter and punish criminal activity by ridding Britain of 'undesirables', that is delinquents and convicts who had been committed to reformatories or prisons. The best-known venture was the Parkhurst Boys' scheme, under which 1,600 boys aged

¹⁴⁰⁸ Catholic agencies like the Sisters of Nazareth only sent children to institutions in Australia and they set an upper age limit of 12, except in the case of a few older migrants accompanying younger siblings. As recorded in the 1954 minutes of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, 'we were finding it difficult to emigrate our Catholic youth': Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, Section 21 response, BEW.001.001.0174.

12-18 were transported to Australia and New Zealand between 1842 and 1852, mainly from England, but including probably ten per cent who were sentenced in Scotland.¹⁴⁰⁹

3.2 The emphasis subsequently shifted from punishment to opportunity, when philanthropists, increasingly influenced by imperial rhetoric, argued that emigration was a physically and morally restorative remedy for poverty, unemployment and social deprivation. As stressed in our main Report, imperialism was a dominant influence over emigration policy in the decade before the First World War and again in the inter-war and post-war periods, when to promote settlement in the dominions a number of schemes were set on foot, including for juvenile migrants. These ventures were advocated and implemented against a backdrop of wider promotion of the British Empire in popular culture and in the history, geography and literature curricula in schools. Formal teaching was reinforced by educational tours of the Empire in the 1920s and 1930s, organised by the School Empire Tour Committee, the Overseas Education League, and the Society for the Overseas Settlement of British Women.¹⁴¹⁰

3.3 Until the early twentieth century, juveniles who were migrated overseas went primarily to Canada, but in the years just before the First World War they began to be sent to Australia and New Zealand. At that time and indeed subsequently, most of those sent overseas were at least initially destined to work especially in the agricultural and domestic service sectors. The cost to philanthropic organisations had been met by charitable donations. While such practice continued after 1918, the Empire Settlement Act in 1922 put in place a much more supportive legislative framework and financial support. As explained in our main Report, the immediate objective of the legislation was initially to ease a post-war unemployment problem by subsidising adult migration, and at the same time to satisfy a demand by 'white' settler societies in the overseas empire for more 'white' immigrants from the motherland. It demonstrated a new commitment by the Westminster government to

¹⁴⁰⁹ Stephen Constantine, 'In search of the English and Englishness', in Lyndon Fraser and Angela McCarthy (eds), *Far from 'Home': The English in New Zealand* (Otago University Press, Dunedin, 2012), p.21. For Parkhurst Boys see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parkhurst_apprentices; and State Library of Western Australia (2016), 'Parkhurst Boys', http://cms.slwa.wa.gov.au/dead_reckoning/private_archives/n-s/parkhurst_boys.

¹⁴¹⁰ For details see J. Sturgis and M. Bird, *Canada's Imperial Past: The Life of F.J. Ney, 1884-1973* (University of Edinburgh, Centre of Canadian Studies, Edinburgh, 2000); Marjory Harper, "'Personal contact is worth a ton of text-books": educational tours of the Empire, 1926-39', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol 32, no 3, 2004, pp.48-76.

assist overseas settlement by allocating up to £3 million a year in loans and grants to subsidise passages, land settlement projects and training courses, in partnership with dominion governments and with public and private organisations in the UK and in the dominions. For our purposes it is important to note that the Act subsidised and regulated the migration and settlement not only of families, of adults, and of child migrants, but also of juveniles over school-leaving age. Renewed in 1937 and 1952 and subsequently as the Commonwealth Settlement Act in 1957, 1962 and 1967, it finally expired in 1972. The Acts gave an unprecedented injection of state funding into the activities of existing charitable migration societies, including some that previously had been sending juveniles to empire destinations unsubsidised.

3.4 Specifically, with respect to juveniles, the Acts offset the costs of their training and travel especially to Canada, Australia and New Zealand and their establishment as juvenile employees. A contemporary account of the impact of the Empire Settlement Act on juvenile migration noted that

The effects of this change were specially marked in the migration of juveniles. The granting of free or reduced passages enabled increasing numbers to go overseas, while the greater security offered under schemes which earned the approval of Government allayed the fears of parents, and attracted a type of boy who would not ordinarily have considered seeking a career overseas.¹⁴¹¹

3.5 Legislation pertaining to juvenile migration was also passed in the dominions. For instance, an Australian statute, the Immigration Amendment Act 1913, empowered the South Australian State to introduce an apprenticeship programme.¹⁴¹² The Act did not indicate how boys were to be selected, but more information was provided by the Immigration Department in a booklet, *Opportunity for Boys to Become Farmers*, provided to prospective applicants.¹⁴¹³ This outlined the conditions which were to be met before the boys would be granted passage to Australia. It was aimed at boys over the age of 15 and not yet 19 who were physically able and willing to take up farm work, with a view to them eventually becoming farmers. Each boy needed to have the consent of his parent or guardian to migrate. The scheme was funded by the South Australian government, which would place out boys with employers and maintain supervisory duties. Under the terms of the apprenticeship,

¹⁴¹¹ A.G. Scholes, *Education for Empire Settlement: A Study of Juvenile Emigration* (Longmans, London, 1932), pp.75-76.

¹⁴¹² http://classic.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/sa/num_act/tiaaa1134o1913315.pdf

¹⁴¹³ Kibble, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0005-0024.

boys would be contracted to work for their employer for not less than one year, but not for more than three years. Revealing an awareness of the possibility of abuse, power was reserved to remove a boy from an employer who was 'guilty of such immoral or vicious conduct as to render him unsuitable to continue to be the employer of the boy'.¹⁴¹⁴

3.6 As noted in our main Report, following the recommendation of the Bondfield report in December 1924, the Canadian government ruled that state-funded child migrants under the age of 14 who were unaccompanied by parents would not normally be admitted to Canada. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as the restoration of children to parents, or at the specific request of relatives residing in Canada, was this regulation waived. Accordingly, thereafter those youngsters migrated to Canada (except into institutional care in British Columbia) were juveniles, while other juvenile sending agencies focussed on Australia and New Zealand as a destination.

3.7 What follows describes, in alphabetical order, the several organisations that, to a greater or lesser extent, sent (or probably sent) Scottish juvenile migrants overseas. Several have of course been considered in our main Report dealing with child migration. The quality and length of each presentation is unavoidably affected by the quality and quantity of available sources, including those secured following Section 21 requests made by SCAI. Whenever possible, issues addressed include the organisations' motives, financing, selection, consent and aftercare policies and practices. Attention is paid to contemporary attitudes, to evidence of good and bad practice, and to abuse or potential abuse.

Aberlour Orphanage, Strathspey

4.1 Our main Report contains much about this institution. It accommodated primarily but not exclusively Scottish youngsters. Most who were sent overseas were child migrants, but a small proportion, totalling about 65, were juveniles.¹⁴¹⁵ Approximately ten seem to have been sent to Canada before 1900, followed by 46 between 1900 and 1951, most of them in the 1920s.¹⁴¹⁶ A further nine went to other destinations in that later period. However, there are inconsistencies between figures given in the ledger books (44 between 1900 and 1930) and the list of those migrated

¹⁴¹⁴ Kibble, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0007.

¹⁴¹⁵ List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7695-4699.

¹⁴¹⁶ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.7695-7699.

(53 plus two later).¹⁴¹⁷ After 1930 Aberlour ceased to participate in the migration of boys to Canada, probably because of the economic depression. In June 1933 the *Orphanage Magazine* noted that 'the door to emigration is closed'.¹⁴¹⁸ In fact, there were a few later departures.

4.2 Most seem to have left either through colonisation schemes requiring juveniles or to join family members already resident overseas. The historic records do not contain evidence of formal policies and procedures regarding migration, but in its Section 21 response relating to the period 1900-1930 the institution stated that 'The expectation is that the organisation's policies and procedures were in accordance with good practice during this period'.¹⁴¹⁹ It is also stated that the keeping of only limited records was 'consistent with practice of the period',¹⁴²⁰ although we know that over the same period other organisations kept more detailed records.

4.3 There is little evidence in the records about funding. In the case of one 14-year-old boy sent to Canada in 1927, ██████████ the Warden paid the fare as a loan, to be repaid from a war pension.¹⁴²¹ In 1928 the *Orphanage Magazine* appealed to readers who were 'enthusiastic about the Empire and Colonisation' to send contributions for outfits or landing money for young (but not specifically juvenile) migrants.¹⁴²² 'Thus will they be taking a hand not only in helping a deserving orphan but in the building up of our great Empire land industries.'¹⁴²³ In other cases funding for juvenile migrants was supplied from their families, and in one case with assistance from a Canadian Pacific Railway reunion scheme. After 1922 funding was also available under the Empire Settlement Act, though figures have not been identified in the Aberlour records.

4.4 It is not clear from the records what criteria were used, or by whom, in the selecting of those for migration, but with respect to the years after 1924, following Canadian acceptance of the Bondfield Report's recommendations, only youngsters aged 14 or over were sent overseas, unless those younger were joining a parent or

¹⁴¹⁷ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.8061-8074.

¹⁴¹⁸ *Orphanage Magazine*, June 1933, p.57, ABE.001.008.8075.

¹⁴¹⁹ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1900-1930, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.7700.

¹⁴²⁰ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.7709.

¹⁴²¹ Aberlour Children's Files - ██████████ ABE.001.008.7838-7840.

¹⁴²² *Orphanage Magazine*, 1928, p.6, ABE.001.008.7723.

¹⁴²³ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.7723.

were part of a family group that included an older sibling, though there seem to have been exceptions to this rule.¹⁴²⁴

4.5 There is also evidence that Aberlour liaised with other organisations. In 1927 the *Orphanage Magazine* refers to a visit by a 'colonisation agent' which resulted in six boys, whose minimum age was 14, being sent under a 'Canadian Pacific Scheme' in three parties of Boy Scouts.¹⁴²⁵ In 1929 the *Orphanage Magazine* indicated that one boy went to Australia following contact with the Church of England Immigration Council, but after his discharge from the orphanage.¹⁴²⁶ In 1931 a 14-year-old boy who was resident at the Aberlour Orphanage was sent, on the application of his father, to Flock House in New Zealand.¹⁴²⁷ Sticking to a juveniles-only policy, in August 1938 the Aberlour Orphanage turned down an invitation from a Fairbridge representative to select children under 12 for migration to Australia. Its concern for the welfare of younger children in its care is reflected in a statement in the Minutes that 'under present arrangement it was not practicable to take away numbers of children under twelve, but that the scheme might be considered if Fairbridge were willing to select children at fourteen or upwards'.¹⁴²⁸ Another boy was identified, but 'after psychological examination by an expert' the Warden reported that 'this matter had disappointingly fallen through'.¹⁴²⁹ No more was heard of the proposal.

4.6 While no formal documentation exists relating to consent policies and procedures, there is evidence in the case histories of adults who gave consent to the migration of juveniles and of others who refused. For example, 14-year-old ██████ was migrated to Canada in 1927 against the wishes of a maternal aunt, who claimed she wished to take charge of him, but she had not had any prior involvement in his care. A letter from the Warden to a solicitor in Buckie stated emphatically that the boy himself did not wish to be handed over to the aunt, that the boy's mother and late father had both wished the boy to be committed to the care of Aberlour,

¹⁴²⁴ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.8064; ABE.001.008.8069.

¹⁴²⁵ *Orphanage Magazine*, p.5, ABE.001.008.7712.

¹⁴²⁶ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1900-1930, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.7710, quoting letter from David J. Garland to Canon Wolfe, 9 Feb 1929; *Orphanage Magazine*, April 1929, p.5, ABE.001.008.7733.

¹⁴²⁷ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.8073; List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7697. For Flock House see below Section 14, Flock House Scheme.

¹⁴²⁸ Aberlour Orphanage Minutes Book extract, 25 August 1938, ABE.001.008.8076.

¹⁴²⁹ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.8062; Minute Book extract 1948, ABE.001.008.8077-8080.

and that the Warden was prepared to take the issue to court.¹⁴³⁰ It also appears that the boy himself wished to migrate, and the *Orphanage Magazine* of July 1928 includes a positive letter from him following his placement in Quebec.¹⁴³¹ In 1930 the Canadian Federal Government Agent in Inverness, Anne Macdonald, wrote to the Warden regarding another 14-year-old Aberlour boy whose step-father had applied for him to enter Canada under the Canadian Pacific Railways reunion scheme. She asked for a report on the boy and confirmation of whether 'he wishes to proceed to Canada and if you are prepared to give your permission to his emigration'.¹⁴³² Refusals were generally honoured. In 1948, when the Royal Over-Seas League applied for the 'nomination of a boy to be a candidate for adoption overseas in very favourable circumstances', the Warden of Aberlour was authorised to go into the matter.¹⁴³³ A boy was identified, but his father refused consent. Later, in 1950, after the Warden had selected a boy who he thought would 'fill the bill' for an opening on an estate in Kenya, he wrote to the estate owner:

I regret to say that the boy I had in mind...after giving the proposition careful thought, has decided that he would not like to go overseas at his present age of 15. You see, all his brothers and sisters live in the North of Scotland and I think he feels the tug of family ties.¹⁴³⁴

4.7 The *Orphanage Magazine* makes occasional references to after-care, but these are sometimes very general. In July 1927 it noted that the six boys who had been sent to Canada under the Canadian Pacific Scheme 'are carefully looked after on the other side, materially and spiritually and have every chance of doing well', but neither the *Magazine*, nor any other documents, indicate the nature of that care.¹⁴³⁵ In July 1928 the *Magazine* noted that 'boy emigration was subject to a very careful supervision' and more particularly that the 'Inspector of the British Immigration and Colonialization [*sic*] Organisation', through which Aberlour sent boys, 'pays visits for inspection every two months'.¹⁴³⁶ The Warden at Aberlour was also very impressed

¹⁴³⁰ Aberlour Children's Files – [REDACTED]; Warden to James West, Solicitor, Buckie, 30 April 1927, ABE.001.008.7795.

¹⁴³¹ *Orphanage Magazine*, July 1928, quoted in ABE.001.008.7703.

¹⁴³² Aberlour Children's Files – [REDACTED] Macdonald to Wolfe, 13 Dec 1930, ABE.001.008.7762.

¹⁴³³ Aberlour, Minute book 5, 26 Feb. 1948, ABE.001.008.8077.

¹⁴³⁴ Children's Files – [REDACTED] Warden to James McKillop, Sotik Estate, Kenya Colony, 9 Aug 1950, ABE.001.008.8143.

¹⁴³⁵ *Orphanage Magazine*, July 1927, p.75, ABE.001.008.7717; 1900-1930, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.7700.

¹⁴³⁶ *Orphanage Magazine*, July 1928, pp.78-80, quoted in 1900-1930, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.7701.

by results when he met Aberlour boys during a visit to Canada in 1928.¹⁴³⁷ Contacts were also maintained with Scout groups in Canada to facilitate the settlement of migrants, and positive letters sent home were frequently published in the *Magazine*, often acknowledging receipt of letters and gifts from family and Aberlour staff.¹⁴³⁸ Yet none of the case files we have seen contains formal reports of inspections of placements, or assessments of progress.

4.8 Although the Aberlour Child Care Trust did not supply documentation for the pre-1900 period, we know that even in the nineteenth century (when attitudes to child and juvenile migration were generally favourable) the Aberlour Orphanage acknowledged that the practice could be problematic. There is no evidence, however, that it implemented any meaningful safeguards to mitigate the risks. In July 1888, shortly after three boys (ages unknown) had been sent to Canada, the *Orphanage Journal* reported that

they left us with rather heavy hearts, poor boys, and we could not part with them without feeling. Life is such a lottery so to speak, we cannot tell what is before them. Trials and difficulties they and we know nothing of may await them; may they have strength to overcome all. We feel we have done our best to train and fit them for the trials of life, and can only pray that something they have been taught may be put into practice.¹⁴³⁹

4.9 The Orphanage's concerns were borne out in the letters of two migrants, both of whom wrote of hardships, loneliness and a desire to return to Scotland. In 1888 one migrant evaluated the pros and cons of the migration experience:

America is rightly called the 'New World' - everything is new here, and one seems to be in another planet altogether. But it is not all sunshine out here, the cold in winter is terrible, and the heat in summer overpowering. And it is not all who get on here, any more than in the old country, there are many failures, only none starve here, food is plentiful. The mind, somehow, will cross the Atlantic and wander among the dear old glens of home. I often seem to hear the roar of

¹⁴³⁷ *Orphanage Magazine*, December (?) 1929, p.47, ABE.001.008.7736. The month of publication isn't clear, because the relevant page has simply been extracted and copied. As there is an acknowledgment on the adjacent page of a donation received in November, the assumption is being made here that this is the December issues of the *Magazine*.

¹⁴³⁸ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1900-1930, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.7701; *Orphanage Magazine*, 1929, ABE.001.008.7736.

¹⁴³⁹ The Orphanage and Home, Aberlour, Craigellachie, *Journal*, vol.VII, no.4, July 1888. See also Marjory Harper, 'The juvenile immigrant: halfway to heaven, or hell on earth?' in Catherine Kerrigan (ed.), *The Immigrant Experience* (University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, 1992), pp.165-183.

the Spay [*sic*], as it dances among the stones and rocks. Tell the lads if they can live at home to do so, if not, they should come here.¹⁴⁴⁰

Another letter, published in 1891, was more unequivocally negative:

If people patiently bore at home the hardships they have to bear here, and if they worked half as hard at home as they have to do now, they would be far better off than they are here. Clothing is very dear, and very poor stuff too. There is plenty of food, but it is very rough altogether. Everybody seems to be trying to save money, and they don't seem to care how they do it. However, here I am, and I mean to make the best of it. But if I ever set my foot on the soil of the old country, I shall say no more Canada for me.¹⁴⁴¹

4.10 In the twentieth century, the case file for ██████████ suggests that he may have suffered as a result of being sent, at the request of his father, from Aberlour to New Zealand.¹⁴⁴² ██████████ was one of three siblings admitted to the Aberlour Orphanage in 1925 after their mother had left her husband and children. Aged 14, he was one of a Flock House party of 28 boys who left for New Zealand in August 1931, after the initial sailing date had been postponed because of difficulty experienced by the Trustees in finding 'suitable employment' for the boys already in residence at the Flock House training hostel. Sometime later, an undated letter from ██████████ sister to the Warden of the Aberlour Orphanage asked if he had heard from ██████████ or knew his whereabouts. He had not been heard of for a year, and in his last communication (to an unnamed person - not his sister)

he said that the boys from Flock House were walking the streets, and it would be his turn next. My father does not seem to know anything about him either and he does not know what to think, but the rest of us think that he is wandering about alone. All the letters we have sent have been returned with different addresses on the envelope but no one has found him yet.¹⁴⁴³

The assumption is that ██████████ had fallen foul of the economic depression that had hit New Zealand. There is no copy of a reply to the sister in the case file, or any indication that Aberlour made inquiries about ██████████ whereabouts.

¹⁴⁴⁰ The Orphanage and Home, Aberlour, Craigellachie, *Journal*, vol.VII, no.1, April 1888.

¹⁴⁴¹ *Journal*, vol. IX, no.110, May 1891, p.24.

¹⁴⁴² Aberlour Children's Files – ██████████ – ABE.001.008.8297-8338.

¹⁴⁴³ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8305-8306.

4.11 The case file of ██████ suggests, albeit vicariously, a positive experience.¹⁴⁴⁴ He was born (illegitimate) in London in 1912, and admitted to Aberlour Orphanage two years later, following the death of his mother in Ipswich. He was migrated to Canada in 1928, at the age of 16, and remained there until his death in 1993, though he revisited the UK in his retirement. A letter sent to the Aberlour Child Care Trust in 2012 from a distant relative, ██████ stated that 'From the emails we have received from Canada I can tell you that ██████ did not regret anything that happened in his childhood & enjoyed his upbringing, which from reading some of the messages on the orphanage website, would appear to be the opinion of many'.¹⁴⁴⁵

4.12 The story of ██████ is much more problematic, as his 154-page file demonstrates.¹⁴⁴⁶ It tells us a lot about selection and consent, and a good deal about the challenges of placement and aftercare. He was born in ██████ 1935, and had become a responsibility of Lanark County Council's Public Assistance Committee (PAC). He was admitted to Aberlour in ██████ 1942, aged 6, though still remaining a PAC responsibility. Then, at the age of 15, now a juvenile, he went from the Orphanage to Kenya in 1951, to be apprenticed on the estate of a Scots-born white settler, James McKillop. Correspondence between McKillop and Aberlour indicates that he had a philanthropic agenda to invite, finance and train boys in care in Scotland to become farmers in Kenya. The first boy selected by the Orphanage declined to go, but ██████ was said to be very keen. Before any arrangements could be made, however, Aberlour had to obtain the permission of the Children's Committee of Lanark County Council, which was responsible for ██████ until he attained the age of 18, and it was also a statutory requirement to obtain the approval of the Secretary of State for Scotland. The Colonial Office also was involved, and needed information about the farm owner. They learnt that he had a good reputation. All the necessary permissions were secured, but some concerns about post-placement supervision were expressed by both the Lanarkshire Children's Department and the Scottish Home Department. The former asked Aberlour to

take suitable action to ensure that, notwithstanding the likelihood of a representative of the Labour Department at Nairobi or elsewhere taking an interest in ██████ welfare during his apprenticeship in Mr McKillop's employment, you arrange for an independent suitable person in Kenya Colony

¹⁴⁴⁴ Aberlour Children's Files – ██████ ABE.001008.8339-8364.

¹⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8364.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Aberlour Children's Files – ██████ ABE.001.008.8143-8296.

to act more or less in the capacity of welfare officer in respect of [REDACTED]
Although you and I may not think this necessary in Mr McKillop's case, I think you will agree that the proposal is a wise precaution in these days of doubt and mistrust as to the good intentions of benefactors or the like.¹⁴⁴⁷

There is no evidence in the case file that Nairobi's Labour Department took any interest in [REDACTED] progress. The Scottish Home Department was even more cautious, not simply rubber-stamping the request but making 'further enquiries' at the Colonial Office. In its letter to P. R. Brown, the Children's Officer of Lanark County Council, the Department expressed its concern 'that we know so little of the arrangements to be made for the boy's welfare in the country to which he is going'.¹⁴⁴⁸ It was pointed out that before consent could be given under Section 17 of the 1948 Children Act, the Department 'has to be satisfied on this point'.¹⁴⁴⁹ The Department was also uneasy because the Sotik Estate was reported to be 'at the back of beyond', and there was some reluctance to agree that 100 shillings per month was 'anything like a reasonable wage in Kenya for a boy of 15 years'.¹⁴⁵⁰ They also wanted to know what would happen if [REDACTED] and McKillop 'failed to hit it off - a not by any means impossible eventuality'.¹⁴⁵¹ When Brown wrote to the Warden at Aberlour to inform him of the delay, he said he had assured the Scottish Home Department 'that suitable safeguards and precautions would be taken by your Orphanage to satisfy the orphanage and my Committee that independent arrangements will be made to ensure [REDACTED] supervision and welfare while in the Colony'.¹⁴⁵² The Scottish Home Department subsequently solicited information from Aberlour about [REDACTED] progress, indicating at least a degree of after-care concern.¹⁴⁵³

4.13 The emphasis on the need for precautions notwithstanding, correspondence surrounding acceptance, travel, placement and after-care suggests that much was taken on trust, and that arrangements were brokered informally through personal networks. For instance, McKillop assured the Warden that the second-in-command at the Immigration Department was a long-standing friend, who would be 'wholly

¹⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid*, Lanark County Council Children's Department to Canon Wolfe, Aberlour, 18 Oct 1950, ABE.001.008.8265.

¹⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid*, T.M. Martin, Scottish Home Department to P.R. Brown, Children's Officer, Lanark County Council, 1 Dec 1950, ABE.001.008.8259.

¹⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8259.

¹⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8259.

¹⁴⁵¹ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8259.

¹⁴⁵² *Ibid*, Brown to Wolfe, 6 Dec 1950, ABE.001.008.8257.

¹⁴⁵³ *Ibid*, William Smith, Scottish Home Dept, to Dean Wolfe, 18 June 1951, ABE.001.008.8209.

helpful, as he was recently when I defended a man marked for deportation'.¹⁴⁵⁴ In similar vein, if the Social Welfare Committee had concerns, McKillop suggested reference should be made to his Agent, a lawyer in Edinburgh and 'a friend since my earliest days', who would make the arrangements for the payment of [REDACTED] passage.¹⁴⁵⁵ The Warden responded somewhat vaguely to the request from Lanark County Council Children's Department that an 'independent person' be asked to oversee [REDACTED] welfare in Kenya. 'I propose commending [REDACTED] to the pastoral care of the minister of St Andrew's church Nairobi, and I have other friends in the Colony who will maintain contact.'¹⁴⁵⁶ There is no evidence in the case file that the minister of St Andrew's church in Nairobi was formally appointed to mentor [REDACTED] or that he or 'other friends' were involved in the events surrounding the problematic year he spent in Kenya.

4.14 In the event, pastoral care was provided unofficially by a young missionary, Michael Lapage, whom [REDACTED] had met while travelling to Kenya, and who corresponded about him with the Warden—until [REDACTED] was sent back to the UK. Before long, things had gone badly wrong. Letters from McKillop describe [REDACTED] increasing truculence, dishonesty, laziness and insubordination, including one occasion when he 'kicked up an appalling row amongst the Africans telling them how hardly he had been treated'.¹⁴⁵⁷ As a result, by [REDACTED] 1952 McKillop felt he had no alternative 'other than to book his passage home', for which he seems to have paid himself, as he commented that it was a pity that [REDACTED] could not be made to work his passage.¹⁴⁵⁸ By [REDACTED] 1952 he was back in Scotland.

4.15 Of particular note is that both Aberlour and the Scottish Home Department seem to have withheld concerns about [REDACTED] from McKillop until he was in Kenya. In April 1951 the Warden had hinted at pre-existing issues when he commented in a letter to Lapage that 'whether or not he will go straight will to a large extent depend on his new environment and the personnel he mixes with'.¹⁴⁵⁹ Eleven months later, in response to McKillop's intimation that [REDACTED] was being sent back, the Warden wrote: 'The moment I opened your letter and read the first sentence I murmured

¹⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid*, McKillop to Wolfe, 29 August 1950, ABE.001.008.8277.

¹⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid*, McKillop to Wolfe, 29 August 1950, ABE.001.008.8277.

¹⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid*, Canon Wolfe to P.R. Brown, Children's Officer, Lanark County Council, 17 Nov 1950, ABE.001.008.8264.

¹⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid*, McKillop to Wolfe, 29 Feb 1952, ABE.001.008.8180.

¹⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8182.

¹⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid*, Wolfe to Lapage, 16 April 1951, ABE.001.008.8213.

under my breath "I am not surprised".¹⁴⁶⁰ He continued that in taking up McKillop's offer of an apprenticeship,

it was only after much pondering and heart-aching questioning that we finally decided to send [REDACTED]. At the time we imagined that he might grow out of and overcome the hereditary self-regarding and occasional dishonest streak in his nature and outlook. Even the head Home Office Inspector, after spending an hour with him in my presence, summed up the situation by saying, 'Well, it's a gamble but it's a gamble worth taking'. Now, alas, alack, your letter reveals that the gamble has not come off.¹⁴⁶¹

Later in the same letter he suggested, somewhat cryptically, that the problem had arisen partly because 'in the sort of work we are called upon to do we are very much bound and restricted by frustrating rules and regulations'.¹⁴⁶²

4.16 A letter from P. R. Brown, Lanarkshire Council's Children's Officer, to the Warden in March 1952 implies that Aberlour had also withheld relevant information from that department, and was even possibly in dereliction of duty.¹⁴⁶³ 'To say that I was surprised and disappointed at the news of [REDACTED] return...is to put it very mildly', he wrote.¹⁴⁶⁴

I had no reason to believe other than that [REDACTED] was rubbing along industriously in his work and was reasonably deferential to his master and other seniors. Nor had I any clue that he was, to your knowledge after some years' residence at the Orphanage, moody, prone to temperamental sulks, and oft-times defiant and thoughtless. These characteristics of [REDACTED] were certainly not borne out by the terms of your letter to me of 29th September, 1950, when making the choice of an Orphanage lad worthy of Mr McKillop's magnificent offer and confidence and, at the same time, willing to risk the loneliness and hard work at far off Sotik without near at hand guidance from your good self or other friends interested in his future wellbeing.¹⁴⁶⁵

Lanarkshire Council was still responsible for [REDACTED] until he was 18, and Brown was to meet him on his return to Scotland and to try and place him in suitable employment which would be 'readily accessible for those of us responsible for his

¹⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid*, Wolfe to McKillop, 8 March 1952, ABE.001.008.8188.

¹⁴⁶¹ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8188.

¹⁴⁶² *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8188.

¹⁴⁶³ *Ibid*, Brown to Wolfe, 12 March 1952, ABE.001.008.8186.

¹⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8186.

¹⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8186.

supervision and guidance'.¹⁴⁶⁶ Finally, an undated letter from Michael Lapage to the Warden of Aberlour suggests that deficiencies in after-care were particularly serious, given ████████ weaknesses, combined with the particular environment to which he had been exposed: 'I am afraid his rather sudden employment in a land that is almost flowing with anything but milk, together with the possession (very temporary in his case) of comparatively large sums of money has led to the further unseating of his powers of control'.¹⁴⁶⁷

The Barwell Boys' Scheme

5.1 Accessible information on this scheme is limited, and no primary sources have been seen, but we know that this was a government initiative, instituted in 1922 by Sir Henry Barwell, Premier of South Australia.¹⁴⁶⁸ He aimed to bring 6,000 teenagers to South Australia to fill the places of men who had been killed during the war. As such it was not targeted particularly at juveniles 'in need' or 'deprived of a normal home life'. Young men aged 15 to 18 and, despite the scheme's name, young women aged 18 to 21 were eligible. In 1923, an Immigration Act dealing with farm and domestic apprentices appointed the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Immigration as the legal guardian of each juvenile, who had to make a written declaration of their wish to come under his control. The Director of the South Australian Department of Immigration supervised the scheme, and was responsible for reception, employment and welfare. It is said that the director corresponded with the apprentices and their families. The period of government supervision was to be for three years.

5.2 Initially, after arriving at Port Adelaide, 'Barwell Boys' were accommodated in a former Destitute Asylum, which sounds like an inauspicious beginning, but generally they were assigned to farmers within 48 hours of arrival. However, there were complaints about the selection process, and the initial scheme was abandoned in 1925, and a modified and more successful programme was implemented from 1927. The number of those nominated was reduced, conditions of apprenticeships were

¹⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid*, ABE.001.008.8186. Brown did concede, however, that Wolfe had probably believed ████████ 'had the stuff in him and the determination to win through'.

¹⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid*, Lapage to Warden, ABE.001.008.8164.

¹⁴⁶⁸ State Library of South Australia (2011), 'Large Group of Barwell Boys', <http://www.samemory.sa.gov.au/site/page.cfm?c=1537> ; NAA (2019), Research Guides: Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia, <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/state-youth-migration.aspx>. For an undated picture of 'Barwell Boys' see State Library of South Australia, 'Group of "Barwell Boys" – photograph' <https://collections.slsa.sa.gov.au/resource/B+54370>

relaxed, and about half of the boys' wages was paid directly to the apprentices (the rest, one assumes, being banked). Moreover, each apprentice was allotted to a member of the Big Brother Movement, who thereafter was to provide support and counselling.

5.3 There is nothing specific we know about personal experiences, but the apprentices may have faced some prejudice. The Australian Labor Party publicly opposed the scheme, criticising it as a source for cheap labour, and declaring that Australian boys should have been preferred. But the Party also expressed concern for their welfare. Indeed, it is said that at least some boys experienced culture shock when faced by the harsh environment in rural South Australia, and the promises of the scheme were not fully realised.

5.4 Even so, by the end of 1928, 1,557 British juveniles had entered South Australia under the scheme, though considerably fewer than the total of 6,000 originally anticipated. It is not known how many of them came from Scotland, though it might be possible to determine this from the application forms held in the State Records of South Australia. We have tentatively suggested that the Scots might have numbered 155, ten per cent of the 1928 total.

The Big Brother Movement (BBM)

6.1 This scheme was founded in London in July 1925 by Melbourne businessman and politician Richard Linton, initially to recruit boys aged 15-19 for farm work in Victoria, though it subsequently sent boys to New South Wales and Western Australia. It operated, with some interruptions, from 1925 to 1983.¹⁴⁶⁹ From the beginning Linton believed that the (white) juvenile immigrant boys he hoped to attract would be more likely to come if parents, guardians or managers of institutions in the UK could feel confident that 'Big Brothers'—Australian men who shared Linton's vision of need and opportunity—would take personal responsibility for the well-being and progress of the 'Little Brothers' assigned to them. The movement was soaked in imperialist rhetoric, being described in the contemporary press as a form of 'practical patriotism' which was likely to benefit Australia and the Empire.¹⁴⁷⁰ It was

¹⁴⁶⁹ On the BBM see Alan Gill, *Likely Lads and Lasses: Youth Migration to Australia, 1911-1983*, (BBM Ltd, Sydney, 2005), pp.181-314, but esp. pp.181-205. For primary sources see, *inter alia*, The National Archives, [henceforth TNA], MH102/1885, 'Emigration of Children under the Big Brother Movement Scheme', LEG.001.004.1055-1094; and memo 'Preliminary résumé of policy' therein.

¹⁴⁷⁰ *Press and Journal* (Aberdeen), 15 April 1925.

heavily advertised, and participants were recruited from across the UK. Most 'Little Brothers' were recruited from public and secondary schools, or by organisations such as the Victoria League, the Navy League, the YMCA and various churches.

6.2 If applicants' character references and medicals were accepted by Australia House, their particulars would be passed to the Big Brother Committee of the New Settlers' League in Victoria and, later, in the other states that adopted the scheme. Each boy selected received an assisted (£5) passage, and the BBM undertook to place each recruit in selected employment and to find him a good home. All boys were required to remain under the authority of the movement until they were 21. In each participating State the BBM was the legal custodian of the boy until he came of age. Among conditions of enrolment were that 'parents must undertake that they will not follow their boys to Australia within two years and the boy must agree that he will not leave his job without written permission of the movement'.¹⁴⁷¹

6.3 The BBM claimed to offer personal attention to participants in a way that would reassure parents anxious about sending their sons so far away. It was therefore not aimed primarily at juveniles who lacked parental oversight, or were 'in need' or 'deprived of a normal home life', although there is evidence that such individuals did participate. In 1950 the practice was for Colonel Clegg, the BBM's secretary in London, to interview the applicant and one or both of his parents, taking care not to paint a 'rosy picture'. An article in *The News of the World* on 15 October 1950 quoted Clegg's warning to any interviewee that 'he's going 12,000 miles away from home; that he may get homesick and that - if he does - there is no turning back unless he himself can save up the return passage money'.¹⁴⁷²

6.4 Procedures for after-care were set in place. The Big Brother assigned to each recruit was a leading member of Australian society who might be a clergyman, a banker, a municipal dignitary or a government official—of the same nationality and religion as the 'Little Brother'. The Big Brother's initial duties were to meet the Little Brother on his arrival, arrange temporary city accommodation and, having ascertained that he was going to suitable employment, see him off on the train. His longer-term duties were to act *in loco parentis* until the Little Brother was 21, writing to him at least once a month, visiting him at intervals, and interceding with

¹⁴⁷¹ TNA, MH102/1885, 'Emigration of Children under the Big Brother Movement Scheme', LEG.001.004.1055-1094.

¹⁴⁷² *Ibid*, cutting from *The News of the World*, 15 Oct 1950.

employers on his behalf. The Little Brother, for his part, was to follow and actively seek his mentor's advice, not leave his employment without the Big Brother's permission, and maintain correspondence.

6.5 There seems to be no certain total figure for the number of Little Brothers sent to Australia from the UK. It is said that 1,515 were recruited in just four years, 1926-29, followed by far fewer due to economic depression in the 1930s, when numbers slumped to around 500, giving an inter-war total of about 2,000. The movement ceased with the outbreak of war. Post-war the organisation's records indicate that approximately 5,000 youths migrated to Australia under its auspices between 1947 and 1971, nearly all to New South Wales, with a small number, about 160, dispatched to Tasmania from 1950 to 1964. By another account, totals rose during the 1950s and 1960s to between 400 and 500 a year, and if the average was 450 a year then in those two decades alone the total would have been 9,000. Accepting 2,000 as the inter-war total and then adding 5,000 post-war we have a possibly minimum total of 7,000. But if we opt for the speculative higher averages for the 1950s and 1960s we arrive at the higher figure of 11,000. The scheme ended in 1983 following changes to immigration criteria. The Australian Senate Inquiry into child migration in 2000-2001 claimed that migration to Australia under the BBM 'represented the largest component of post-war child and youth migration, possibly accounting for as much as 50 per cent of the total intake'.¹⁴⁷³ The majority of BBM migrants were recruited in England, but there is evidence of regular Scottish participation. Erring on the side of caution, taking 7,000 as the total and that 10 per cent were from Scotland, then perhaps at least 700 Scottish boys were approved and sent as Little Brothers.

6.6 In August 1925 Richard Linton visited Aberdeen and Inverness on a promotional tour, and his recommendation of the scheme was endorsed by an editorial in the north of Scotland's main newspaper.¹⁴⁷⁴ Five months later a Hebridean newspaper, the *Stornoway Gazette*, indicated that Linton's visit had borne fruit in the Highlands, from where 250 Little Brothers had migrated the previous autumn, including boys from Dingwall and Inverness. Arrangements had been made for parties of 40 to sail in January, February and March, with—according to the newspaper—a 'fair proportion' of Scots included in the February contingent.¹⁴⁷⁵ In

¹⁴⁷³ *Australian Senate Inquiry into Child Migration*, Submission by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Dec 2000, pp.28-29, in 'Origins of the Child Migration Scheme - Parliament of Australia', https://www.apm.gov.au/senate/child_migrat/submissions/sub42.pdf

¹⁴⁷⁴ *Press and Journal*, 26 Aug 1925. See also *Highland News*, 22 Aug 1925.

¹⁴⁷⁵ *Stornoway Gazette*, 21 Jan 1926.

1928 a correspondent to the *Scottish Farmer*, writing from Gippsland, Victoria, reported an encounter with three successful Scots who had been settled on fruit farms under the Big Brother Scheme.¹⁴⁷⁶

6.7 There is further mention of Scottish participation after the war. An undated memo (probably 1950) from Australia House in the Ministry of Health files reported that the BBM

gets its recruits mostly through press publicity (including articles in various school newspapers), and by lads who have already emigrated writing home to their schools and to their friends. The Movement has had excellent publicity in Scotland with the result that 50 per cent of recent applications have come from there.¹⁴⁷⁷

The memo continued: 'No approach for recruitment is made to local authorities but occasionally there are applications from orphanages'.¹⁴⁷⁸ On 8 December 1953 *The Star*, in an article entitled 'More Boys going to Australia', reported that the most recent contingent of BBM recruits had comprised 29 from England, five from Scotland, four from Wales and two from Northern Ireland.¹⁴⁷⁹

6.8 Documents submitted to SCAI by local authorities contain occasional references to juveniles who were migrated through the BBM. On 2 November 1925 a 17-year-old boy in the care of Edinburgh City Council who 'had the chance to go to Australia under the Big Brother Scheme but could not pay cost of outfit' had his outfit and 30 shillings' expenses provided by the parish council.¹⁴⁸⁰ Other cases relate to the 1950s and 1960s. On 12 April 1950 Kirkcaldy Burgh Children's Committee agreed that a boarded-out boy, who was at that time employed as a hotel porter in Edinburgh, and who had expressed a wish to emigrate to Australia under the BBM, should be allowed to do so, subject to the consent of the Secretary of State.¹⁴⁸¹ Two months later the same committee minuted that the Secretary of State had consented to the emigration of a boarded-out boy to Australia under the auspices of the BBM,

¹⁴⁷⁶ *Scottish Farmer*, 28 Nov 1928, p.1567.

¹⁴⁷⁷ TNA, MH 102/1885, 'Emigration of Children under Big Brother Movement', undated memo from Australia House, probably 1950, LEG.001.004.1083-1087.

¹⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷⁹ *The Star*, 8 Dec 1953, cutting in MH102/1885, p.10.

¹⁴⁸⁰ Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response, Children's Separate Registers, Acc 611/5, p.1186, EDI.001.001.8150; Edinburgh Parish Council Minutes, p.17, EDI.001.001.8157. [REDACTED] had been boarding with his grandmother prior to migration.

¹⁴⁸¹ Fife Council, Section 21 response, FIC.001,001.4677; Kirkcaldy Town Council, Minutes of Children's Committee, FIC.001.001.4734.

subject to his passing a medical. It is likely that this was the same (unnamed) juvenile, who was working on a farm at Drumnadrochit at the time when consent was granted.¹⁴⁸² Also in Fife, [REDACTED], an 18-year-old from Milnathort, who had been in the care of the local authority since birth, migrated to an unknown destination in Australia under the auspices of the BBM on 5 March 1952.¹⁴⁸³ He had previously spent time in a few different children's homes before being admitted to the Working Lads' Home in Edinburgh in 1950. Some communication was maintained with him after his migration, as the Children's Committee for Cupar records the receipt of a letter from him in 1956.

6.9 In October 1955 the Secretary of State for Scotland consented to the emigration to Australia under the auspices of the BBM of a 16-year-old orphan, [REDACTED], who was in the care of Perth and Kinross Parish Council. The boy 'has for some time expressed the desire to have the opportunity of going to Australia and the Children's Officer recommended that the Committee give their consent to his emigration'.¹⁴⁸⁴ In 1960-61 the Public Assistance Committee of Aberdeenshire County Council approved the expenditure of £20 for a boy's emigration under the BBM, but no details were recorded of the boy's name or date of birth.¹⁴⁸⁵

6.10 It is not clear how well these arrangements worked, though there was evidently an awareness of problems, and an attempt to tackle them, at least in Tasmania. Between November 1949 and June 1951 forty boys were sent to that State. The minutes of the AGM of the BBM in Tasmania in 1951 commented on difficulties associated with isolation, inadequate preparation and poor supervision, and outlined strategies for resolving them. The following description of these problems indicates that there was potential for the abuse of recruits, though that possibility was not explicitly addressed.

...our work is not without many problems. We have the task of reconciling boys to a new life as well as to a new way of living, and particularly is this apparent with those lads who come from large cities in the United Kingdom to settle down in a small State such as ours. Each lad arriving in Tasmania under the

¹⁴⁸² *Ibid*, Minutes of Children's Committee FIC.001.001.4724, 14 June 1950.

¹⁴⁸³ *Ibid*, Fife Council, FIC.001.001.4671, 4679, 4689.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Perth and Kinross, Section 21 response, PKC.001.001.0665; PKC.001.001.0064-0668.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Aberdeenshire County Council, Section 21 response, Public Assistance Committee, 1960-1961, ASC.001.001.0139.

auspices of the Movement must be treated individually and with understanding. It is not just a matter of routine.

We have encountered various difficulties of our own making, brought about by our early action in spreading Little Brothers over scattered districts of the State, with, in some cases, the Big Brothers much too far removed from them. Difficulties of administration resulted from this, whilst on the lad's part we were not providing in full measure an atmosphere of companionship into which he could quickly enter. We have adopted now the policy of grouping the lads, and we will develop this policy as far as possible. By this means we hope that we can assist each new arrival to settle more quickly into his new environment. To assist us with this and with the general operation of the scheme, we propose to set up group advisory bodies to help and advise in the placing of new arrivals, the selection of Big Brothers, to watch the welfare and progress of the lads in their group, and generally to assist the activities of the Movement and its finances.

I feel I must emphasise the great responsibility we accept in bringing lads from the United Kingdom and in starting them in a new life in a new country.... I feel that the Big Brother Movement is one of the best forms of migration we can have, but we have a very grave responsibility to these lads. We ask for the fullest support from all members of the community in the work we are attempting to do.¹⁴⁸⁶

6.11 By the 1950s the age range of recruits had been raised to at least 16, it having been found that 'a lad of 15 was usually not robust enough for the heavy Australian farming'.¹⁴⁸⁷ By implication, at least some Little Brothers sent previously may have struggled.

6.12 More disturbingly, evidence laid before the House of Commons Select Committee on Health on 22 June 1998 includes a statement by a former migrant that he had been the victim of sexual abuse after migrating under the BBM. Although born in Warwickshire, ██████████ had been sent to Ferryhill Children's Home in Aberdeen 'at a young age' before being transferred to Dhurringile Presbyterian Boys' Home at Tatura in the State of Victoria, in ██████████ 1954, at the age of 12 years and 11 months. This was inconsistent with the normal practice of the BBM, which was to migrate juveniles, not children. As is noted in our main Report, Dhurringile Rural Training Farm normally received boys aged from 8 to 14. As is also noted in the main

¹⁴⁸⁶ TNA, MH102/1885, 'Emigration of Children under the Big Brother Movement Scheme', D. D. von Bibra, Chairman, Big Brother Movement of Tasmania, Minutes of the AGM, Hobart, 17 July 1951, pp.19-20.

¹⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid*, undated memo from Australia House, probably 1950, LEG.001.004.1083-1087.

Report, facilities and practices at Dhurringile were the subject of official concern in the 1950s, and subsequent public inquiries have recorded allegations of serious abuse. Such allegations have been made by, Mr ██████ in relation to AIP ██████, a superintendent who had arrived at Dhurringile in August or September 1954. Three years later, after ██████ had returned to Dhurringile from his apprenticeship placement, he decided to report AIP ██████, who left his post shortly afterwards. But his successor as superintendent, a man called AIO ██████, was also reported as a sexual abuser by a witness to this inquiry, Mr McGowan, who arrived at Dhurringile in 1961.

The Boy Scouts Association

7.1 Several juvenile migration schemes were promoted by the Boy Scouts Association in the interwar period under the auspices of the Empire Settlement Act. Boy Scout migration was not devised for juveniles 'in need' or 'deprived of a normal home life', although boys in the care of local authorities and voluntary organisations could certainly become Scouts, and would therefore be eligible to migrate, and we know that some did go overseas. A Migration Department was established at Imperial Scout Headquarters, and more than 5,000 Scouts emigrated between 1923 and 1939.¹⁴⁸⁸ Most went to Australia, with smaller numbers going to Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and Rhodesia. Over the duration of the programme, Australia received over three times the number of Scout migrants that Canada and New Zealand together received.¹⁴⁸⁹ Departures peaked in 1927, but by 1931—the year in which Australia temporarily banned the immigration of boys over school-leaving age—depression and unemployment across the dominions had brought the work of the Scout Migration Department almost to a close.¹⁴⁹⁰ However, after the war, in the 1950s, a small number of young people were sponsored by the Boy Scout Association to settle in Australia. There is no explicit reference in the secondary literature to Scottish participation in Scouts' migration schemes. However, evidence supplied to SCAI by the Aberlour Trust states that sixteen boys from Aberlour Orphanage were included in three parties of Boy Scouts sent to Canada in 1927-29 under the Canadian Pacific Scheme, and that it was standard procedure to make

¹⁴⁸⁸ Tammy M. Proctor, *On My Honour: Guides and Scouts in Interwar Britain* (American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 2002), p.137. The figures are taken from annual reports and quarterly migration statistical reports in the Scout Association Archive, TC/27, SA-London, and TC/215, SA-London.

¹⁴⁸⁹ P. Cooke to Mr Thwaite, 17 Dec 1958, TC 274, Scout Association Archive, London, quoted in Scott Johnston, 'Looking Wide? Imperialism, Internationalism, and the Boy Scout Movement, 1918-1939', unpublished MA thesis, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, 2012, p.96.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Richard A. Voeltz, 'The British Boy Scout migration plan 1922-1932', *The Social Science Journal*, vol.40, no.1, 2003, pp.143-151.

contact with local Scout Associations in the areas to which scouts were sent 'in order that a hand of fellowship can be extended to them'.¹⁴⁹¹ In these cases, some steps seem to have been taken to ensure that they were, at least, well-received. We have tentatively suggested that of the more than 5,000 Boy Scouts sent to the dominions between the wars plus some post-war, perhaps 400 departed from Scotland.

7.2 The emphasis was always on farming opportunities, and this was reinforced by the annual Whitehead Scholarship, funded by Thomas Whitehead, an aircraft factory owner, for the migration and agricultural training of Scouts and Guides (though we have encountered no evidence that Guides were migrated). It began with a grant of £5,000 in 1929, and expanded when the Scouts became residuary legatees of Whitehead's estate on his death. In Australia, boys were apprenticed to farmers, who were to train them and receive their help until their apprenticeship was completed. The farmers were expected to provide fatherly support, while the Scout Association was to implement after-care, ensuring that the boys found local Scout groups to join, and to communicate regularly by letter with boys and farmers to determine that all was well. Elsewhere, a handful of older Scouts (aged over 20) trained for the Southern Rhodesian and South African Police forces; a few received scholarships to higher education institutions in Southern Rhodesia and Australia; in Canada some who did not go on to farms were apprenticed to the Hudson's Bay Company; and in New Zealand the Te Poi project was a farm in the Waikato staffed by Scouts and their families that had 'mild success' in the 1920s.¹⁴⁹² The Scout Migration Department also participated in external migration schemes, such as the Fairbridge Farm School in British Columbia and the Big Brother movement in Victoria, Australia.

7.3 By 1932 the Boy Scout organisation was looking for a way to shed the financial responsibility of maintaining juveniles who had come to Victoria.¹⁴⁹³ One solution, arranged chiefly by Lord Somers, the Governor of Victoria, was to pass responsibility for after-care to the Big Brother Movement. It is not clear from secondary sources how much attention—if any—was paid to the actual arrangements for after-care. When the Big Brother scheme itself subsequently got into financial difficulties, its Victorian branch was dissolved in 1941 and its remaining

¹⁴⁹¹ Aberlour, *Orphanage Magazine*, 1927, p.22; ABE.001.008.7713-7714; table of migrants, ABE.001.008.7696-7697; ABE.001.008.7700 and 7702.

¹⁴⁹² Proctor, *On My Honour*, p.136.

¹⁴⁹³ Scott Johnson, 'Looking Wide? Imperialism, Internationalism, and the Boy Scout Movement, 1918-1939', unpublished MA, University of Waterloo, Ontario, 2012, p.102.

assets were handed over to the Scouts.¹⁴⁹⁴ Quite how this may have affected after-care is not indicated.

7.4 Despite heavy advertising, the Boy Scouts' migration scheme did not enjoy the success anticipated by Robert Baden-Powell and the leadership of the Scout movement. According to one scholar, 'It seemed that Scouting had not prepared the boys for the loneliness and isolation of dominion life because it was too busy training them to be empire builders'.¹⁴⁹⁵ The migration scheme was based on misplaced imperial ideologies and anachronistic assumptions about the enthusiasm of juveniles for rural life and about the demand in the dominions for farm workers. Problems were blamed on the boys rather than on the economic situation, and a report on the scheme in the State of Victoria in 1935 concluded that the screening process must be improved in order 'to only send boys of the *good type*'.¹⁴⁹⁶ The italicised word implies perhaps previously inadequate selections. That it was also controversial is evident from correspondence relating to its most ambitious migration scheme, the training of 'pit lads' aged 14-18 at Eynsham Hall, a camp near Witney in Oxfordshire. The boys were recruited from the designated 'distressed areas' of England and were given a 12-weeks training course under the superintendence of Doris Mason before being assisted to migrate to Canada and Australia. Following his visit to Eynsham Hall in April 1930, Baden-Powell reported, tellingly: 'The difficulty is to get boys to come with the intent of migrating: this is due to the objection of parents to their boys going off into the unknown, even though through general unemployment they are not wage-earners. Reassuring propaganda seems needed for distribution in centres of unemployment.'¹⁴⁹⁷

7.5 The matters raised suggested a lack of clarity about what migrated Scouts might experience. We are also left unclear about how boys were selected, screened and consents obtained. Preparatory training and practical after-care support overseas seem, from the records, to have been insufficient.

The British Immigration and Colonization Association (BICA)

¹⁴⁹⁴ NAA (2019), Research Guides: Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia, 'Boy Scout youth migration', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/boy-scout.aspx>

¹⁴⁹⁵ Proctor, *On My Honour*, p.138.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Scout Association Archive, London, TC 27, Mr Hoadley and Mr Sanders, 'Report on Migration', 1935, quoted in Johnston, 'Looking Wide?', p.104.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Eynsham Scouts Archive, 'Report of the Chief Scout to Committee of the Council for meeting of 9 May 1930', <http://www.eynshamscoutsarchive.org.uk/1930s.htm>.

8.1 The British Immigration and Colonization Association was incorporated in 1921 as the British Immigration Aid Association and changed its name in December 1923.¹⁴⁹⁸ Its aim was to encourage and sponsor the emigration to Canada of 14 to 18-year-old boys from farming families. It received funding through the Empire Settlement Act, and recruits were offered free passages, training and farm work in Canada, with the hope that they would eventually become farm owners. A condition of BICA's accreditation as a British juvenile immigration agency was that it should establish a hostel for boys to serve as a distribution home. With the aid of funds raised by the Kiwanis Club of Montreal, a hostel was opened in Montreal in 1924 (Osborne House, 87 Osborne Street, rented from the Canadian Pacific Railway), and in 1927 a training farm was established at Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue. Boys were placed on farms in various locations in Ontario and Quebec.

8.2 BICA migrated approximately 5,500 boys to Canada, most of them between 1924 and 1931. Very few were sent after 1931, but it continued operations until 1941, assisting with employment, wage remittances and medical care of the boys under its guardianship. It is not known for sure how many Scottish boys were migrated under the auspices of BICA, but evidence from the Canadian Department of Immigration and Colonization files indicates that parties of Scots were sent out under its auspices, and we have suggested 550, ten per cent of the estimated total.

8.3 Dr George Carter Cossar, on whom more later, had a clear association with BICA.¹⁴⁹⁹ From its inception he acted as its Scottish agent. This involved him arranging the migration of self-financing boys from affluent families and also extending his influence by arranging placements in Canadian provinces other than New Brunswick, the location of his farm at Lower Gagetown. In July 1924 he accompanied his first such party to BICA's new receiving hostel in Montreal, where 24 trainees from his Craigiellin training farm in Scotland were joined by twelve self-funded boys for farm placements. At the same time Cossar's farm at Lower Gagetown was being used by BICA as a reception centre.¹⁵⁰⁰ Indeed, BICA and Cossar boys continued to be lodged together in Osborne House in Montreal on arrival, and

¹⁴⁹⁸ See Library and Archives Canada (henceforth LAC) (2019), 'British Immigration and Colonization Association', <https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/immigration/immigration-records/home-children-1869-1930/home-children-guide/Pages/british-immigration-colonization-association.aspx> for an account of its operations.

¹⁴⁹⁹ NRS AF51/171 'Emigration: Agricultural Farm (for Boys) at Craigiellin, near Paisley', Dun Watson, Hon Sec, Craigiellin, to F. D. Stewart, Scottish Office, Whitehall, 16 December 1924, SGV.001.008.1983.

¹⁵⁰⁰ LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, C-10647, report by Charles Allan, Canadian government immigration agent, 14 July 1924; *Montreal Star*, 15 Aug 1924.

the Department of Immigration and Colonization grouped the two organisations together when reporting on inspections.¹⁵⁰¹

8.4 A further Scottish connection is evident in Canadian Immigration Department files which include a list of 47 boys migrated by the Aberdeen Lads' Club in 1928 and 1929 under the auspices of BICA.¹⁵⁰² The list also included five Lads' Club members who had migrated under other schemes: one with the Vimy Ridge Scheme; one with the Saskatchewan Boys' Scheme; one with the Manitoba Government Scheme; one Ministry of Labour trainee; and one with the British Settlement Society of Canada.

8.5 BICA had undertaken to give after-care to all boys for three years from the date of their arrival in Canada. However, there is evidence that the Canadian authorities had significant concerns about BICA's practices and the outcomes. A memorandum of December 1925 by George Bogue Smart, Supervisor of Juvenile Immigration, referred to correspondence he had initiated six months earlier with two BICA directors, in which he had expressed his concern that prolonged residence in the Montreal hostel was 'undesirable' both for those long-term residents and 'on account of the deteriorating influence upon new boys'.¹⁵⁰³ He also drew attention to the number of boys at the hostel, as well as the number who had disappeared, and he stressed that 'due attention should be given in the matter of selection of candidates for migration', and he referred to a number of boys who 'absolutely refused' to work on farms, and to 'a large number of chronic bedwetters'.¹⁵⁰⁴ Enuresis among juveniles is commonly a consequence of stress.

8.6 Placement arrangements were also allegedly deficient. Bogue Smart referred to 'occasional misplacements', a failure to complete boys' employment agreements within a reasonable time of their being placed, and delays in answering

¹⁵⁰¹ LAC, RG76, vol. 102, file 16120, part 1, memo to F.C. Blair, 16 Dec 1925. See also 'Immigration Program: headquarters central registry files (C-4765)'

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2266?r=0&s=5

¹⁵⁰² LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 6, Lads Club Sailings,

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1618?r=0&s=5

¹⁵⁰³ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1 (C-4765, images 2266-2268), Bogue Smart to F.C. Blair, Assistant Deputy Minister, 16 Dec 1925, p.3.

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2268?r=0&s=4

¹⁵⁰⁴ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1 (C-4765, images 2266-2268), Bogue Smart to F.C. Blair, Assistant Deputy Minister, 16 Dec 1925, p.3.

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2268?r=0&s=4

correspondence.¹⁵⁰⁵ He noted that 'disagreement within the organization has added to delay in dealing with follow up correspondence resulting from our inspectional work'.¹⁵⁰⁶ In its defence, BICA stated that the bulk of the boys with whom they had had trouble were Cossar boys.¹⁵⁰⁷ However, Bogue Smart's recommendation in December 1925 was that BICA 'should not be permitted to bring any more boys to Canada until there is evidence that the boys under their supervision at present are receiving satisfactory care'.¹⁵⁰⁸ He further recommended that the distributing hostel be moved to a rural environment. Moreover, George Cossar should take personal responsibility for the placement and supervision of any boys he had sent to Canada.

8.7 The Canadian Immigration Department had other significant concerns about BICA's selection practices and outcomes, including of juvenile migrants from Scotland. Some of the Canadian references refer specifically to Scottish recruits. As a result, Canada had received 'a good deal of undesirable publicity' through BICA's failure to properly place one of its wards.¹⁵⁰⁹ Bogue Smart laid the blame at the door of Mr. J. O'Brien, who had resigned from the Association by the date of the memo. According to Smart,

He is responsible for placing a Scottish sixteen year old lad near Kingston with a bachelor farmer whose home was kept by an aged mother, 82 years of age and almost blind. The conditions of the home were most unfavourable. While the boy was not abused he was placed amidst dilapidation and filth almost indescribable. A short time afterwards he was ill, removed to a hospital and operated on for appendicitis and died a week later. His death was not due to the filth of the home, but any respectable official of a Society that would place a

¹⁵⁰⁵ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1 (C-4765, images 2266-2268), Bogue Smart to F.C. Blair, Assistant Deputy Minister, 16 Dec 1925, p.3.

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2268?r=0&s=4

¹⁵⁰⁶ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1 (C-4765, images 2266-2268), Bogue Smart to F.C. Blair, Assistant Deputy Minister, 16 Dec 1925, p.3.

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2268?r=0&s=4

¹⁵⁰⁷ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1 (C-4765, images 2266-2268), Bogue Smart to F.C. Blair, Assistant Deputy Minister, 16 Dec 1925, p.2,

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2267?r=0&s=4.

¹⁵⁰⁸ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1 (C-4765, images 2266-2268), Bogue Smart to F.C. Blair, Assistant Deputy Minister, 16 Dec 1925, p.3.

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2268?r=0&s=4

¹⁵⁰⁹ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1 (C-4765, images 2262-2263),

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2262?r=0&s=4 Smart to 'Mr Cullen', 14 Dec 1925.

boy in the surroundings in which this Scottish boy was placed deserves to be advertised rather than advertising the Department.¹⁵¹⁰

8.8 Then in 1928 a Scottish BICA recruit committed suicide. John Wilson had arrived in Canada on 30 June 1928, aged 15.¹⁵¹¹ Just over two months later, on 3 September, ██████████ at the farm where he had been employed for the previous three weeks. BICA was represented at the inquest. According to a brief report in *The Times* 'the evidence showed that the boy had been well treated by his employer and had expressed contentment with his new surroundings'.¹⁵¹² A memorandum by George Bogue Smart in December 1925 makes reference to his death, but no explanation is recorded as to why he might have taken his own life.¹⁵¹³

8.9 In a memorandum of 18 October 1929 the Department of Immigration and Colonization further expressed concern at BICA's selection of placements. It had already used poor placements as a reason for having closed the organisation down for a time in August 1925 until its affairs could be 'put in shape'. But four years later the unidentified author of the memo wrote to BICA:

I think it is most important that you should develop every safeguard in the selection of the homes to which the boys go. The reports that are coming into the Department now indicate some weaknesses along this line. There are some homes that are totally unsuited for British boys. It is not always a question of wages, indeed there are several things more important than wages. Matters of food, cleanliness, moral character, etc are most important and I mention this so that due care may be taken to avoid placing boys in unsatisfactory homes. We must never forget that neither Government nor any Immigration Society is responsible for keeping a farmer in help, if that farmer does not offer suitable living and working conditions.¹⁵¹⁴

8.10 Following an audit in 1930, even the organisation's accounting practices were criticised in an internal memorandum to F.C. Blair, Secretary of the Department of

¹⁵¹⁰ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1 (C-4765, images 2262-2263), http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4765/2262?r=0&s=4 Smart to 'Mr Cullen', 14 Dec 1925.

¹⁵¹¹ *The Times*, 22 Sept 1928, p.9.

¹⁵¹² *The Times*, 22 Sept 1928, p.9.

¹⁵¹³ LAC, RG76, vol.102, file 16120, part 1, G. Bogue Smart to 'Mr Cullen', 14 Dec 1925. There is a reference to Wilson's death in <https://canadianbritishhomechildren.weebly.com/our-lost-children.html>, but it incorrectly states that his death registration recorded him as 'English'.

¹⁵¹⁴ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5, DIC memo, 18 Oct 1929, pp.2, 5-6. For a recent criticism of BICA by the British Immigrants in Montreal organisation see https://www.british-immigrants-in-montreal.com/BICA-s_problems.html.

Immigration and Colonization. BICA, it was claimed, had 'a peculiar system, or lack of system...for keeping their books and records'.¹⁵¹⁵ It did not keep any ledgers, and had an over-complex system for handling boys' savings accounts. It concluded that

the affairs of the B.I.C.A. are in a very unhealthy condition. The management has been inefficient and the finances have been badly handled. In the event of the Department and the railways taking over their obligations and assets I would recommend that our obligations extend only to the future care of the boys or, in other words, that we have nothing to do with the financial liabilities or assets of the Association except to receive any proceeds which may be derived from the winding up, as part payment of expenses which we will incur in caring for the boys.... I have no reason whatever to think that there has been any embezzlement of funds by any of the employees, but the office work has been so poorly managed that I would rather expect disputes over remittances which may have been lost or improperly credited and which would necessitate considerable expense to straighten out. By refusing to assume the liabilities of the Association we would also avoid creating a precedent for taking over mismanaged immigration societies and save ourselves considerable trouble and worry at some future date.¹⁵¹⁶

8.11 A passing reference to BICA in the records of Quarriers in 1932 suggests that the Superintendent of Quarriers' Fairknowe Home also had concerns about the organisation.¹⁵¹⁷ In discussing a Quarrier migrant from Scotland who had failed to settle, he cited a letter from Bishop John Farthing of Montreal which appears to have been critical of the policy of child migration. That criticism, he alleged, was based on

¹⁵¹⁵ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 6, Memo to F.C. Blair, 3 Dec 1930. By that time there were 3,500 savings accounts with total deposits of \$83,292.80. http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1806?r=0&s=5 Thanks to Deborah Waddell for supplying the references to the Department of Immigration and Colonisation's criticism of BICA's practices. See the British Immigrants in Montreal, 'Bica: The British Immigration and Colonization Association', <https://www.british-immigrants-in-montreal.com/bica.html>

¹⁵¹⁶ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 6, Memo to F.C. Blair, 3 Dec 1930. By that time there were 3,500 savings accounts with total deposits of \$83,292.80. http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1806?r=0&s=5 Thanks to Deborah Waddell for supplying the references to the Department of Immigration and Colonisation's criticism of BICA's practices. See British Immigrants in Montreal, 'Bica: The British Immigration and Colonization Association', <https://www.british-immigrants-in-montreal.com/bica.html>

¹⁵¹⁷ Quarriers, Section 21 response, Claude Winters to William Douglas, 8 March 1932, QAR.001.008.2635.

Farthing's experience of BICA, and though he felt it could be refuted in regard to Quarriers, 'it would seem unwise to agitate any further feeling'.¹⁵¹⁸

8.12 Moreover, the Aberdeen Lads' Club also had serious concerns about the practices of BICA, particularly in regard to after-care. On 8 October 1929 a meeting was held at Aberdeen between James Munro, President of the Aberdeen Lads' Club, Frank Ogden, the Club Secretary, and Anne Macdonald, the Canadian government's Inverness-based emigration agent for the north of Scotland.¹⁵¹⁹ A report of this meeting was transmitted to the Canadian Immigration Department. It had been held at Munro's request in order to discuss the procedure to be adopted for Spring 1930 in dealing with applications received from members of the Lads' Club who wished to go to Canada. It was explained that in previous years the Club had put forward the majority of their boys under the BICA scheme, but in Spring 1929 Munro and Ogden had gone to Canada with a view to investigating the conditions under which they were received, placed and followed up. 'Both men stated that they were dissatisfied with the Hostel at Montreal, and that they were more than dissatisfied with the method of placement and with the lack of Aftercare under the auspices of the BICA.'¹⁵²⁰

8.13 Attempts that Ogden had made through the authorities at Montreal to trace the location of a number of boys sent out by the Club during the past year years had, with few exceptions, elicited no information. In several instances he had been told that if a few months were allowed to elapse some information might be obtained, but in more than one instance when such time had elapsed he was given the name and address of a farmer with whom a boy was supposed to be engaged, when the boy had actually arrived back in Aberdeen several months earlier.

8.14 Previously, in 1928, in order to be in a position to meet parents' enquiries, Anne Macdonald had herself asked the London office of the Canadian Immigration Department for information as to the manner in which boys proceedings under the

¹⁵¹⁸ Quarriers, Section 21 response, Claude Winters to William Douglas, 8 March 1932, QAR.001.008.2635.

¹⁵¹⁹ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.1, Report of Interview between Mr James M. Munro, President of THE ABERDEEN LADS' CLUB, and Mr Frank Odgen, Secretary of the Club, and the CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AGENT, INVERNESS, held at ABERDEEN on 8th OCTOBER, 1929 http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1316?r=0&s=5

¹⁵²⁰ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.1, Report of Interview between Mr James M. Munro, President of THE ABERDEEN LADS' CLUB, and Mr Frank Odgen, Secretary of the Club, and the CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AGENT, INVERNESS, held at ABERDEEN on 8th OCTOBER, 1929 http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1316?r=0&s=5

BICA scheme were received and treated, and for a report on the general condition of the Receiving Hostel. The reply from the London office stated that the department was 'perfectly satisfied with the manner in which the Society in Canada deals with the boys'.¹⁵²¹ On being pressed further, a circular was received which stated that 'The Homes have previously been inspected and the boys are visited periodically not only by a Representative of the Society but by the Dominion Government Officers'.¹⁵²² However, the Lads' Club representatives claimed that this procedure was not being carried out satisfactorily. They brought up the cases of three boys whose circumstances after arrival had been the subject of an enquiry by the Department of Immigration. The boys had not proceeded to the farmers to whom they had been allocated, and all the information procured by Anne Macdonald had clearly shown 'that the placement of the boys was mishandled'.¹⁵²³ However, nothing further had been heard since July 1929, 'and the Agent had reluctantly to admit the position'.¹⁵²⁴

8.15 Anne Macdonald was then asked at the October 1929 meeting if the Department of Immigration instituted enquiries into complaints, and if so by whom the complaints were investigated in Canada. 'Again the Agent could give no information, but stated that in one case of complaint where a boy was sent out under the auspices of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the CPR representative of the BICA in Canada was apparently responsible for furnishing a report'.¹⁵²⁵ Munro also asked if the Canadian government took any responsibility for the mishandling of boys who proceeded under the BICA scheme and who were then stranded in Canada. He understood that the British and Canadian governments were responsible for the free passage scheme of juvenile applicants, that the BICA boys were proceeding under the Empire Settlement Act, and that therefore the Canadian government had some responsibility. Moreover, at Macdonald's suggestion, a number of Lads' Club

¹⁵²¹ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.1, Report of Interview between Mr James M. Munro, President of THE ABERDEEN LADS' CLUB, and Mr Frank Odgen, Secretary of the Club, and the CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AGENT, INVERNESS, held at ABERDEEN on 8th OCTOBER, 1929 http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1316?r=0&s=5

¹⁵²² LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.1, Report of Interview between Mr James M. Munro, President of THE ABERDEEN LADS' CLUB, and Mr Frank Odgen, Secretary of the Club, and the CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AGENT, INVERNESS, held at ABERDEEN on 8th OCTOBER, 1929 http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1316?r=0&s=5

¹⁵²³ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.2, memo dated 11 Oct 1929 http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1317?r=0&s=5

¹⁵²⁴ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.2, memo dated 11 Oct 1929 http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1317?r=0&s=5

¹⁵²⁵ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.2, memo dated 11 Oct 1929 http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1317?r=0&s=5

members had been put forward and accepted under a Saskatchewan Provincial Government Scheme, and she had given assurances that handling and aftercare in Canada under provincial government schemes were 'absolutely satisfactory'.¹⁵²⁶ However, Munro pointed out that, at the last minute, already accepted applicants' sailing arrangements had been transferred to the BICA with just two days' notice.

8.16 Anne Macdonald could only regret 'very much that the present position has arisen' with respect to the Lads' Club, especially because the President 'is a well-known, successful business man in Aberdeen, a prominent member of the Rotary Club, and a man whose word carried considerable weight in the City'.¹⁵²⁷ A member of the Rotary Club had that year offered to give £100 a year for seven years towards the expenses in connection with the emigration of Club members. She also noted that

the activities of the Lads' Club during the past three years in connection with emigration have received wide publicity through the public Press, and through so many prominent business men in Aberdeen being interested. The fact that the Club Committee has been forced to reconsider very carefully the advisability of recommending the Canadian Juvenile Schemes to Club Members will, undoubtedly, have an adverse effect.¹⁵²⁸

8.17 We should also note that a 1930 list of Aberdeen Lads' Club migrants held in the Canadian Immigration Department files includes the addresses of their placements in Canada.¹⁵²⁹ This list is accompanied by a memo from Anne Macdonald.¹⁵³⁰ In it she explained that she had not obtained the Canadian addresses of the boys from BICA, but from Frank Ogden, Secretary of the Aberdeen Lads' Club, who had been sent out in Canada the previous year. She commented that 'I think this is the reason why the Officials of the Lads' Club in Aberdeen complained so strongly against the lack of after-care'.¹⁵³¹ Concern was also expressed by the Canadian

¹⁵²⁶ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.2, memo dated 11 Oct 1929
http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1317?r=0&s=5

¹⁵²⁷ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.3, memo dated 11 Oct 1929,
http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1318?r=0&s=5

¹⁵²⁸ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 5 p.3, memo dated 11 Oct 1929,
http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1318?r=0&s=5

¹⁵²⁹ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 6, Lads' Club Sailings,
http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1618?r=0&s=5

¹⁵³⁰ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 6, Anne Macdonald's letter dated 26 May 1930,
http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1624?r=0&s=5

¹⁵³¹ LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 6, Anne Macdonald's letter dated 26 May 1930,
http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1624?r=0&s=5

immigration officials about the number of BICA recruits who were living in cities not on farms, and also questioned whether BICA reported boys who left their scheme. It seems that of the 47 Aberdeen Lads' Club members who had migrated to Canada in 1928-29 under the auspices of BICA, three had returned voluntarily, two had returned as stowaways, two had been deported, and one had been sent home as 'unsuitable for farm service'.¹⁵³² Evidently, the BICA scheme for juvenile migrants from Scotland (and surely from elsewhere) fell short of expectations.

The Canadian Pacific Railway Scheme (CPR)

9.1 The exact nature and the duration of this scheme are unclear, but it was probably one of the several farm training and settlement projects launched under the auspices of the Empire Settlement Act, most of which closed with the onset of the depression in 1929-30. Such schemes were generally administered by recruitment agents employed by the railway company, or, for government schemes, by the Federal Government Immigration Department. It should not be confused with the Railway Agreement of 1925 under which the Canadian government legislated to allow the CPR and the CNR (Canadian National Railway) to facilitate the settlement of continental European agriculturists from countries that had previously been designated non-preferred nations.

9.2 In 1927 six boys were migrated from the Aberlour Orphanage under the CPR scheme following a visit to the orphanage by a 'colonisation agent'.¹⁵³³ We have only scraps of evidence about selection, consent, placement, and aftercare. Recruits had to be over 5 feet tall and weigh over 100 lbs, and they were provided with an outfit and £2 'landing money'.¹⁵³⁴ Three case files include correspondence between the Orphanage and the CPR Company after the latter had requested boys' birth certificates.¹⁵³⁵ Another case file includes correspondence in 1930 concerning the transatlantic passage of a boy, ██████████, whose migration had been requested by his step-father in Toronto, and who—pending permission from the Warden of

¹⁵³² LAC, RG76, vol. 103, file 16120, part 6, Lads' Club Sailings, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c4766/1618?r=0&s=5

¹⁵³³ Aberlour, *Orphanage Magazine*, April 1927, p.5, ABE.001.008.7712.

¹⁵³⁴ Aberlour, *Orphanage Magazine*, April 1927, p.5, ABE.001.008.7712; and July 1928, p.6, ABE.001.008.7723.

¹⁵³⁵ Aberlour, List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7697-4698.

Aberlour—was being sent out under the CPR Company's 'reunion scheme'.¹⁵³⁶ Perhaps exceptionally, we learn something from fragmentary evidence about placements and after-care from Aberlour's *Orphanage Magazine*. In 1927 it was recorded that the boys 'are carefully looked after on the other side, materially and spiritually and have every chance of doing well'.¹⁵³⁷ In 1928 the Warden from Aberlour himself visited the boys working on farms. Then in 1929 he reported that within a short time of arriving the migrants who had been sent out that year were 'settled on farms all within a few miles of each other'.¹⁵³⁸ In all, 16 boys from Aberlour went out in three separate groups of Scouts under the CPR scheme,¹⁵³⁹ and they are included among the estimated total number of migrated Boy Scouts recorded earlier.

9.3 Much later, the CPR operated a scheme which led in April 1960 to Fairbridge sending two parties of teenage boys from Liverpool to Canada as young adult employees on farms, but whether they were from Scotland is not stated, and nothing further is known of this scheme.¹⁵⁴⁰

The Children's Overseas Reception Board 1940-44 (CORB)

10.1 The Children's Overseas Reception Board was an organisation created in June 1940 to evacuate British children to the dominions and the United States during the Second World War. It was born out of the fear of aerial bombardment and imminent invasion. Its terms of reference were 'To consider offers from overseas to house and care for children, whether accompanied, from the European war zone, residing in Great Britain, including children orphaned by the war and to make recommendations thereon'.¹⁵⁴¹ While those sent were generally children, most became adolescents while they were overseas. An Advisory Council drawn from representatives of various societies interested in migration and youth organisations advised the Chairman of the Board on selection, welfare and reception overseas. A special Board for Scotland with its own Advisory Council was also set up. It followed the policy laid down by the

¹⁵³⁶ Aberlour, Children's files, ██████████ CPR to Canon Wolfe, 28 Nov 1930, ABE.001.008.7761; Anne Macdonald, Canadian Government Agent, Inverness, to Canon Wolfe, 13 Dec 1930, ABE.001.008.7762.

¹⁵³⁷ *Ibid*, *Orphanage Magazine*, July 1927, p.75, ABE.001.008.7717.

¹⁵³⁸ *Ibid*, *Orphanage Magazine*, June 1929, pp.47, 64, ABE.001.008.7736-7737.

¹⁵³⁹ *Ibid*, *Orphanage Magazine*, June 1929, p.47, ABE.001.008.7736.

¹⁵⁴⁰ Prince's Trust, Section 21 response, Minutes of Fairbridge Executive Committee, 7 April 1960, PRT.001.001.3969.

¹⁵⁴¹ TNA, Records of the Children's Overseas Reception Board, <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C493>

Board in London, and a Scottish Liaison Officer was appointed to keep the Scottish Board informed of decisions and progress.¹⁵⁴²

10.2 Approximately 3,000 children were despatched by CORB over a two-month period in 19 separate parties, but only 16 parties arrived safely.¹⁵⁴³ About two-fifths came from Scotland and Wales, and four shipments comprised only Scottish children, and we have suggested a Scottish total of 1,200, but how many were juveniles as distinct from children is not clear, and how many post-war returned to Scotland is not known. Escorts overseas included Salvation Army and youth organisation leaders, as well as teachers. Nominated homes, which were usually the households of relatives or friends, accounted for 63 per cent of placements, and the demand for 'sea-evacuation' came largely from parents. New Zealand's Child Welfare Department visited the sea-evacuees at regular intervals and remained responsible for them until they reached the age of 21, a relevant point, since some stayed on in New Zealand and did not return to their parents in Britain. The Department was criticised, however, for placing children in more privileged homes than those to which most eventually returned, thus making the progress of readjustment more difficult. However, the scheme was abandoned in September 1940 after two ships carrying CORB children were torpedoed, with heavy loss of life.¹⁵⁴⁴ Most 'sea-evacuees' remained overseas until the war was over, and during that period several became juveniles, after attaining the school-leaving age.

10.3 Extensive records were kept, both in Britain and in the dominions.¹⁵⁴⁵ The documentation demonstrates that some 'sea-evacuees' on arrival were lonely, ostracised or abused, or were themselves disruptive influences.¹⁵⁴⁶ A minority was moved from placement to placement, and enuresis was a common problem. One girl

¹⁵⁴³ Michael Fethney, *The Absurd and the Brave: CORB - The True Account of the British Government's World War II Evacuation of Children Overseas* (The National Book Guild: Lewes, Sussex, 2000), Ch. 10. 'Cheerful and well behaved'.

¹⁵⁴⁴ George Cossar was escorting sea-evacuees to Canada on one of the ships which was torpedoed in 1940. He died two years later as a result of exposure and heart strain suffered during that incident. According to an article in a New Brunswick newspaper, the *Telegraph Journal*, 13 Oct 1948, Cossar was also involved, just before the outbreak of the war, in the secret rescue of more than 200 Jewish children from Nazi Germany.

¹⁵⁴⁵ UK records relating to the CORB are in the National Archives, DO131.

¹⁵⁴⁶ Marjory Harper, *Scotland No More? The Scots Who Left Scotland in the Twentieth Century* (Luath Press, Edinburgh, 2012), pp.108-115; Geoffrey Shakespeare, *Let Candles Be Brought In* (Macdonald, London, 1949); Michael Fethney, *The Absurd and the Brave: CORB - The True Account of the British Government's World War II Evacuation of Children Overseas* (The National Book Guild: Lewes, Sussex, 2000).

recalled experiencing 'no love after I said goodbye to my parents in Edinburgh';¹⁵⁴⁷ siblings were sometimes separated; homes were not always inspected; and paperwork did not reach the dominions until long after the child had arrived. Although when the scheme was launched, Geoffrey Shakespeare, Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions and Chairman of CORB, had expressed concern about the emotionally damaging consequences of overseas evacuation, it is unclear whether anything was done to mitigate that risk. Later he claimed that problems were more common in nominated homes than when children were sent to strangers.¹⁵⁴⁸

10.4 The Hocken Library in Dunedin, New Zealand, has an extensive collection relating to the CORB programme, and some of these documents indicate that there were indeed problems with the scheme. Particularly telling are the retrospective observations of Kyrsty Page.¹⁵⁴⁹ She had escorted 113 children from Britain to New Zealand in 1940 on the *SS Rangitata*, supervised some of them during their time there, and escorted them back to Britain at the end of the war. In a newspaper interview in 1993 (when she was aged 79) she claimed that the scheme had been 'dangerous and ill-considered', partly because there had been no escort for her convoy, despite the presence of U-boats.¹⁵⁵⁰ The CORB scheme, in her opinion, was misguided because it deprived children of their family and background. 'It did not take any consideration of the children as people....The whole story was quite mad from start to finish.... I have always been very against depriving children of their roots, though I can't pretend I saw the real implications of it at the time'.¹⁵⁵¹ Sometimes these sea-evacuees formed strong bonds with their foster parents, and the experience of leaving 'tore them in two'.¹⁵⁵²

10.5 Reports on individual sea-evacuees in New Zealand confirmed Krysty Page's assessment that some blossomed while others struggled. [REDACTED] and her brother were nine and seven respectively when they were evacuated from Scotland

¹⁵⁴⁷ Quoted in Fethney, *The Absurd and the Brave*, p.21.

¹⁵⁴⁸ Marjory Harper, *Scotland No More? The Scots Who Left Scotland in the Twentieth Century* (Luath Press, Edinburgh, 2012), pp.108-115; Geoffrey Shakespeare, *Let Candles Be Brought In* (Macdonald, London, 1949); Michael Fethney, *The Absurd and the Brave: CORB - The True Account of the British Government's World War II Evacuation of Children Overseas* (The National Book Guild: Lewes, Sussex, 2000).

¹⁵⁴⁹ Hocken Library, Dunedin, Sheila Monaghan Collection, MS2518/003, Papers relating to Kyrsty Page and the CORB, correspondence, reports and other papers; unnamed newspaper (probably the *Otago Daily Times*), 23 July 1993.

¹⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, *Otago Daily Times*, 11 Jan 1990.

to New Zealand.¹⁵⁵³ They were initially accommodated in a children's home in Palmerston North, and were about to be sent to different foster households when they were taken in by a couple who felt the siblings should not be separated. Both [REDACTED] and her brother subsequently returned to New Zealand as permanent settlers in early adulthood, and in 1994 [REDACTED] told *News Today* that recent reports 'about British children being ill-treated, sexually abused and used as cheap labour in this country are almost unbelievable'.¹⁵⁵⁴ Others, however, had less positive experiences than [REDACTED] and her brother, although no such Scottish examples have been found in the case records.

Church of Scotland Committee on Social Services (CSCSS)

11.1 As indicated in the main Report, the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service recruited child migrants for Australia in the 1950s, when the CSCSS was a member of the UK-wide Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration (CVOCE). It funded the migration of 83 children to Dhurringile Farm School at Tatura in Victoria. Most were below the school-leaving age. However, one of the migrants sent from Levenhall Home for Boys in Musselburgh to Dhurringile in 1952 was probably just 15 and therefore a juvenile when he arrived in Australia.¹⁵⁵⁵ We have tentatively suggested a total of 10 juveniles from Scotland, because it is possible that the Church of Scotland in the 1920s had participated in the recruitment of juvenile migrants under the auspices of Cornton Vale training farm.

11.2 If so, the records suggest that this would have been unusual. In 1907 the Church of Scotland had established a training farm at Cornton Vale, near Stirling, as a rehabilitation and training centre for destitute adult men.¹⁵⁵⁶ At the same time the Committee on Social Work became licensed as an emigration agency. Then, in 1910, assisted emigration began from Cornton Vale to Canada and later to Australia, probably accounting for 40 men between 1910 and 1914. However, in 1924, in order to take advantage of funding under the Empire Settlement Act, Cornton Vale's remit

¹⁵⁵³ Hocken Library, Dunedin, Sheila Monaghan Collection, MS2518/007, Papers relating to Kyrsty Page and the CORB, newspaper clippings, 'New life an "adventure"', [REDACTED] interviewed by Kelly Exelby in *News Today*, 18 Dec 1994.

¹⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid*, *News Today*, 18 Dec 1994, interview with [REDACTED].

¹⁵⁵⁵ Church of Scotland (CrossReach), 'Commonwealth of Australia, Dept of Immigration, Australia House, Juvenile Migration, 14-18 years', and reference to [REDACTED] COS.001.001.0859. He was born [REDACTED] 1937 and paperwork relating to his migration was signed on 19 May 1952, but he may have been 15 when he sailed or when he arrived.

¹⁵⁵⁶ Section 21 response, Church of Scotland (CrossReach), COS.001.001.0640-0643.

was expanded to include the admission of younger males aged 18-26 with a view to their emigration. According to a minute of the Acting and Finance Committee, no man under 19 years of age was to be admitted 'unless in special circumstances'.¹⁵⁵⁷ Then, in 1926, in order to qualify for government grants, Cornton Vale became primarily a training centre for would-be emigrants, and the Local Committee Minutes record that in conforming to the government scheme the age limit of 18 to 30 was to be strictly observed.¹⁵⁵⁸ Funding was initially secured from donations made to the Committee on Social Work, and later from government grants, as well as a £2,000 grant in 1926 from the Sir Robert Horne Emigration Fund.¹⁵⁵⁹

11.3 Quite who was selected, prepared and sent, and by whom, remains unclear. In 1923, 1927 and 1929 the minutes of the Cornton Vale Local Committee refer to a total of four 'boys' who were selected for emigration, but there is no evidence of their actual ages.¹⁵⁶⁰ In 1926 probably the Church of Scotland's Social Work Department reached agreements with the YMCA, Glasgow Parish Council and Govan Council to train single men and young married men who had been referred to Cornton Vale, but they sound to be older than juveniles.¹⁵⁶¹ In 1931 the minutes record the receipt of a letter from Dr George Cossar (on whom more below), a member of the Cornton Vale Local Committee, in which he suggested that some tangible link should be formed between the work for boys at his Craigiellinn farm and the general scheme of the Church's social work.¹⁵⁶² The committee agreed to consider this, and it appointed one of its members to act with the directors of the farm.¹⁵⁶³ Then in 1932 the Craigiellinn farm was gifted to the Church of Scotland, but by that time emigration had ceased.¹⁵⁶⁴ Craigiellinn was kept open as a training farm

¹⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid*, Cornton Vale, Acting and Finance Committee, 20 Oct 1924, COS.001.001.0667-0668.

¹⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid*, Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0642.

¹⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid*, Acting and Finance Sub Committee, 12 October, 1926, COS.001.001.0669. Horne was MP for Glasgow Hillhead 1918-37. In 1928, on a visit to Australia, he 'suggested that the migration of children aged from 14 to 16 years, who had not had time to form habits of life, was preferable to adult migration', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 Feb 1928, p.12.

¹⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid*, Minutes of meetings of Cornton Vale Local Committee, 12 April 1923, COS.001.001.0642; 10 March 1927, COS.001.001.0682; 13 March 1929, COS.001.001.0687; 10 April 1929, COS.001.001.0688.

¹⁵⁶¹ *Ibid*, Minutes of meetings of Cornton Vale Local Committee, 08 July 1926, COS.001.001.0681.

¹⁵⁶² *Ibid*, minutes of meeting of Cornton Vale Acting and Finance Committee, 11 March 1931, cited in Response to SCAI Section 21 request, COS.001.001.0674.

¹⁵⁶³ *Ibid*, minutes of meeting of Cornton Vale Acting and Finance Committee, 11 March 1931, cited in Response to SCAI Section 21 request, COS.001.001.0674.

¹⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid*, Church of Scotland Social Work Committee, 19 October 1932, COS.001.001.0702.

for boys, though not explicitly for their subsequent migration, until it was sold in 1939.¹⁵⁶⁵

Cossar Farms

12.1 The Cossar Farms scheme, set up by Dr George Carter Cossar (1880-1942) was a specifically Scottish migration programme for juveniles from deprived backgrounds.¹⁵⁶⁶ Altogether we reckon that Cossar was responsible for recruiting and dispatching 1,200 juvenile boys overseas from Scotland. Cossar was a wealthy philanthropist who before the First World War had opened a home for boys in Glasgow in conjunction with the Church of Scotland's Committee on Social Work. However, Cossar was particularly concerned to train up lads aged 16-19 and then to assist their migration to Australia and especially to Canada. For this purpose he purchased a training farm, Todhill, at Kilwinning in Ayrshire, to instruct and then to place boys in farm service at home or primarily abroad. Then, in 1911, when Cossar escorted his first party of boys to New Brunswick, Canada, he handed over the administration of Todhill to the Scottish Labour Colony. In 1922 its Trustees decided that Todhill farm should be devoted to training boys for farming in Scotland. Instead, in August 1922, Cossar purchased the 36-acre Craigiellinn estate at Gleniffer Braes, Paisley for £2,000. The farm was instituted 'for the purpose mainly of affording to city boys of the poorer classes some experience in farming and gardening with a view to testing their suitability for migration as farm workers to His Majesty's Oversea Dominions'.¹⁵⁶⁷ He had already in 1910 purchased a 700-acre farm at Lower Gagetown, New Brunswick, to which his recruits were sent for further training before being placed out with farmers in the province. He later increased his Canadian holding by the purchase of three adjacent farms.

12.2 The migration schemes he operated dealt only with male juveniles, primarily those from deprived backgrounds in Scotland. He was particularly interested in poor Irish Catholics in Glasgow, whose plight he felt was largely ignored, and indeed Cossar boys came primarily from Glasgow, where most of the farm's directors were also based, but the recruitment field encompassed the whole of Scotland, and

¹⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid*, minutes of meeting of Cornton Vale Acting and Finance Committee, 11 March 1931, cited in Response to SCAI Section 21 request, COS.001.001.0674.

¹⁵⁶⁶ For his biography see British Home Child Group International, 'George Carter Cossar', <http://britishhomechild.com/resources/sending-agencies-organizations/504-2/> and Geni, 'George Cossar', <https://www.geni.com/people/Dr-George-C-Cossar/6000000022618004748>

¹⁵⁶⁷ NRS, AF/51/171, 'Agricultural Training Farm, Craigiellinn', Copy of Agreement concluded with the Craigiellinn Boys' Farm under the Empire Settlement Act 1922, SGV.001.008.1977-1978.

occasionally England. As noted above, Cossar also acted as a Scottish agent for the British Immigration and Colonization Association from its inception. His objective echoed the confident imperialist agenda of other organisations that promoted child and juvenile migration. At the first annual general meeting of the Craigiellin Boys' Farm Association, Cossar stated that the Craigiellin Association aimed

to get boys at their impressionable age removed from those conditions and environments which make for moral and physical deterioration, and give them a chance of making good in the world by taking them away from their early associations and putting them to work under healthy conditions. The Association is doing a double benefit, because it is helping the individual boys, and opening up a career for them, and at the same time building up and developing those great Commonwealths on which the prosperity and indeed the existence of these Islands depends.¹⁵⁶⁸

12.3 Initially he had expected recruits sent to Gagetown to repay their fares, but that was a naïve expectation, as rightly judged by Bogue Smart, Canada's Chief Inspector of Juvenile Immigration at the Department of Immigration.¹⁵⁶⁹ However, under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act from 1922, Cossar not only obtained funding for migration and settlement overseas but an annual grant of £100 to test 100 boys per year at Craigiellin with a view to their permanent settlement as farm workers in either Canada or Australia.¹⁵⁷⁰ Recruits were to be juveniles, aged 14 to 18. He also continued to make public appeals for funds and to receive private donations, including a substantial sum in 1927 from a retired tea-planter, Sir Leybourne Davidson.¹⁵⁷¹ But he still expected recruits to contribute to their maintenance and training as much as they were able.

12.4 In due course the scheme was promoted through annual reports, which—like Quarriers' *Narrative of Facts*—always included encouraging letters from satisfied migrants and employers in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Local authorities,

¹⁵⁶⁸ NRS, AF/51/171, 'Agricultural Training Farm, Craigiellin', First Annual General Meeting of the Craigiellin Boys' Farm association, 21 Dec 1923, SGV.001.008.1952.

¹⁵⁶⁹ LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, part 1, report by G. B. Smart on Gagetown Farm, 15 Sept 1913, quoted in Marjory Harper, *Emigration from Scotland Between the Wars* (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1998), p.174.

¹⁵⁷⁰ NRS, AF43/235, Department of Agriculture for Scotland, 'Agricultural Training, Craigiellin Boys' Farm, draft Agreement between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Craigiellin Boys' Farm, SGV.001.009.7042-7048.

¹⁵⁷¹ See, *inter alia*, Cossar's appeal to the Aberdeen Rotary Club, *Press & Journal*, 1 May 1925.

labour exchanges, schools and churches as well as individuals also referred potential recruits to Cossar.

12.5 There is certainly evidence that publicity relating to Cossar's philanthropic work was circulated to local authorities in Scotland. Not all were persuaded. In September 1911 the Children's Committee of Edinburgh Parish Council considered a letter from one 'J.C. Cossar, Glasgow' advocating a scheme to migrate twenty young children aged 8-14 to Winnipeg.¹⁵⁷² This was an early venture. These child migrants were to be 'in perfectly good health', would be placed in foster homes in Manitoba, and would come under the guardianship of the Dominion Commissioners of Immigration, who would 'inspect periodically as to their care and protection of interests'.¹⁵⁷³ But unanimously the Committee agreed that the scheme should not be entertained, and this was subsequently ratified by the Parish Council. We are not aware of this Manitoba scheme getting off the ground.

12.6 There is much more evidence of the successful marketing of his training farm scheme. Certainly, some Scottish local authorities did send some juvenile boys in their care to Craigiellin for training, and some were subsequently migrated—at which point they came off the poor law roll. In 1928, for instance, Cossar Boys' Training Farms sent its annual report for 1926-27 to at least two local authorities, along with a covering letter pointing out its virtues. The receipt of that communication is noted in the Parish Council Minutes of Aberdeen City and of Kirriemuir.¹⁵⁷⁴ The Parish Council Minutes and Children's Separate Register of Edinburgh Parish Council record three cases of boys being subsequently trained and sent to New Brunswick.¹⁵⁷⁵ In May 1925 [REDACTED] aged 16, an apprentice gardener boarded in the Industrial Brigade Home, went to Canada under Cossar's emigration scheme and secured farm work in Toronto near to a brother who had gone out previously.¹⁵⁷⁶ In December 1927 [REDACTED] aged 15, also sailed for Canada, and in the same month [REDACTED] aged 17, was transferred

¹⁵⁷² Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response, Edinburgh Council Minutes, EDI.001.001.8154-81555. 'J.C.' Cossar, and not 'G.C.' Cossar is obviously a typographical error.

¹⁵⁷³ Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response, Edinburgh Council Minutes, EDI.001.001.8154-81555. 'J.C.' Cossar, and not 'G.C.' Cossar is obviously a typographical error.

¹⁵⁷⁴ Extracts from Aberdeen City Parish Council Minutes, 8 May 1928, ABN.001.001.1529-1530; and Kirriemuir Parish Council Minutes, ACC9/30/2/24, p.310, ANC.001.001.0014.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response, Appendix 1, Children's Separate Register, EDI.001.001.8150-8151.

¹⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*; and Pages from Children's Separate Registers for [REDACTED] EDI.001.001.8414.

to Craigiellin and subsequently sailed for Canada in March 1928.¹⁵⁷⁷ The minutes record that the decision was 'at the lad's own desire'.¹⁵⁷⁸ In June 1927, it was noted in the minutes of Careston Parish Council that [REDACTED] who had become chargeable to the parish earlier that month, was then at Craigiellin.¹⁵⁷⁹ The parish of Moulin, Pitlochry, was prepared to pay one third of the total cost of his training, including the outfit necessary 'in the event of the boy being accepted by the Canadian Government under their Emigration Scheme'.¹⁵⁸⁰ Six months later, however, it was noted in a letter from the Inspector of the Poor in Arbroath that [REDACTED] had run away from the Craigiellin Farm and that chargeability had ceased.¹⁵⁸¹

12.7 There is also evidence that publicity relating to the Cossar scheme was circulated to youth organisations, and that some of these organisations liaised with Cossar. As a result, the Cossar farms trained several juveniles who were selected for overseas settlement under the YMCA's Church Nomination Scheme.¹⁵⁸² Cossar was also involved with the Church of Scotland's training farm at Cornton Vale, Stirling, as a Director of its Local Committee, and it is likely that this assisted his recruiting.

12.8 However, the clearest evidence of Cossar's co-operation with other migration agencies is with Quarriers, which at Bridge of Weir was located only a few miles from Craigiellin. Quarriers' records indicate that some Cossar migrants were sent out in Quarriers' parties in 1927.¹⁵⁸³ However, Claude Winters, superintendent of Quarriers' Fairknowe Receiving Home in Brockville, Ontario, was keen to point out that two of the four Quarriers' boys later deported from Canada had actually been Cossar boys.¹⁵⁸⁴ In the annual report for 1929, and possibly with Cossar boys in mind, he referred to 'a measure of unrest that has not characterised the past six or seven

¹⁵⁷⁷ Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response, Appendix 1, Children's Separate Register, EDI.001.001.8150-8151; and Pages from Children's Separate Registers for [REDACTED] EDI.001.001.8448; and for [REDACTED] EDI.001.001.8406.

¹⁵⁷⁸ Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response, Appendix 1, Children's Separate Register, EDI.001.001.8150.

¹⁵⁷⁹ Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response, Appendix 2, ANC.001.001.0014; Careston Parish Council, Minutes of meeting, 20 June 1927, ANC.001.001.0019, and Minutes of Meeting, 12 Dec 1927, ANC.001.001.0020.

¹⁵⁸⁰ Careston Parish Council, Minutes of meeting, 20 June 1927, ANC.001.001.0019.

¹⁵⁸¹ Angus Council, Section 21 response, Appendix 2, ANC.001.001.0014; and Minutes of Meeting, 12 Dec 1927, ANC.001.001.0020.

¹⁵⁸² For the YMCA see Section 20, YMCA, below.

¹⁵⁸³ See, for example, Quarriers, *Canadian Children's Register*, at QAR.001.009.2133 and 2160.

¹⁵⁸⁴ Quarriers, Claude Winters to D.J. Findlay, 26 July 1933, QAR.001.009.2783.

years. We attribute it largely to the influence of boys other than our own who will not settle'.¹⁵⁸⁵

12.9 It is also possible that Cossar liaised with the Canadian Pacific Railway. In April 1925 the Dalkeith Parish Council Minute Book records the receipt of a letter from the CPR containing a reference concerning poor relief, and 'enclosing a pamphlet which deals with the work of Dr (George) Cossar and his association for boys of all classes in Canada, to be filed for future reference'.¹⁵⁸⁶ In June 1925 an advertisement appeared in a Scottish newspaper in which the CPR offered openings as farm labourers to selected Higher Grade schoolboys who would emigrate under Cossar's auspices.¹⁵⁸⁷ Also between the wars Cossar worked with the Scottish Council for Women's Trades (SCWT) on a scheme for training city girls who wished to go to Canada to take up farm or domestic work. However, the only original reference found to his involvement with the SCWT scheme is in Cossar's obituary, which stated that 'in connection with this work he made frequent visits to Canada'.¹⁵⁸⁸

12.10 It is not clear how selections were made, though of course the results of farm training would have been taken into account. Given their ages, as juveniles, the question of consent was less of an issue than in the case of child migrants, though whether realities overseas measured up to expectations is another matter.

12.11 Cossar's work was initially well received by the Canadian immigration authorities. When in 1913 Bogue Smart submitted a report on the farm at Lower Gagetown, he reported that 'Mr Cossar's plan of supplying a good class of young Scotch immigrants is not only commendable but advantageous to Canada and deserving of encouragement'.¹⁵⁸⁹ But that view was not unanimously endorsed. Indeed, Smart's 1913 report may have been triggered by a petition sent to the immigration authorities in Ottawa by sixty citizens of Gagetown, claiming that 'frequent crimes' had been committed by boys migrated by Cossar 'and others', and requesting that checks should be made to ensure no recruits had a criminal record or

¹⁵⁸⁵ Quarriers, *Narrative of Facts*, 1929, QAR.001.001.2577.

¹⁵⁸⁶ Midlothian Council, Section 21 response, MIC.001.001.2018 and 2033.

¹⁵⁸⁷ *Press and Journal*, 29 June 1925.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Cossar obituary,

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/09e0/59bfd2ae8f717a8f410cf609475d0060449d.pdf>.

¹⁵⁸⁹ LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, part 1, C-10647, report by G.B. Smart on Gagetown Farm, 15 Sept 1913.

had spent time in a reformatory.¹⁵⁹⁰ (In fact, in 1925 the British Immigration and Colonization Association decided to send all its delinquent boys to the Gagetown farm rather than returning them to Scotland.) Cossar boys were deported for a variety of reasons: vagrancy, criminal convictions, illness, and unspecified 'unsatisfactory' conduct.¹⁵⁹¹ A comment in Quarriers' records suggests that the Cossar boys who emigrated under Quarriers' auspices—and who were deported—may have been more troublesome than Quarriers' own recruits.¹⁵⁹²

12.12 There was also significant criticism of the management of the farm at Lower Gagetown in New Brunswick, as well as its facilities. In November 1924 Margaret Waugh, a former matron at the farm, wrote to G.G. Melvin, chief medical officer in Fredericton, highlighting a catalogue of problems, and questioning the suitability of the superintendents, Mr and Mrs Meiklejohn, who at that time had been in charge of the farm for 14 or 15 years.¹⁵⁹³ The house was cold. The boys rose at 5 a.m. and had no light in the morning. At night a stable lamp was placed on the table. There were no proper sanitary arrangements. There was no water closet, and the single lavatory was reserved for the exclusive use of the superintendents, 'to which they hold the key'.¹⁵⁹⁴ The only water laid on was from a tap in the kitchen. There was no bathroom, 'no means of bodily washing; no tanks, no boilers, no hot water system'.¹⁵⁹⁵ Boys were obliged to carry water from the kitchen, but 'if it does not suit Mrs Meiklejohn when they come for water or food to give it, they do not get either until she is ready to do so'.¹⁵⁹⁶ The boys were supposed to be fed and clad, but they 'are neither well-fed nor properly clad. They get neither butter nor milk and no meat except once in a long while. Meal and water and bread, stewed apple cooked without sugar, constitute their food'.¹⁵⁹⁷ There was nothing to work or cook with, and yet boys had to do their own cooking and washing. A boy aged about 16 was doing the cooking for the establishment. Waugh had witnessed a recent incident when there was no bread and the boy was ordered to make scones. Half way through the

¹⁵⁹⁰ LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, part 1, Rev. William Smith, Gagetown, to Department of the Interior, 14 Oct 1913.

¹⁵⁹¹ LAC, RG76, vol. 282, file 234636, Public Schoolboys for Placement in New Brunswick, 1926-1930. See, *inter alia*, Cossar to W. R. Little, 4 January 1929; deportation order on [REDACTED] 26 Mar 1929.

¹⁵⁹² Quarriers, Claude Winters to D.J. Findlay, 26 July 1933, QAR.001.009.2783.

¹⁵⁹³ LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, part 1 (C-10647), Waugh to Melvin, 14 Nov 1924.

¹⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

process, the superintendent, wishing to use the oven herself, had removed the half-baked scones and ordered the boys to eat them. Mrs Meiklejohn appeared to be suffering from 'asthma or consumption' and paid inadequate attention to personal hygiene. The boys were supposed to receive \$10 a month and to remain one year on the farm, at the end of which they were to be out of debt and trained for farm work. However, they never seemed to be free of debt, and 'after hiring out so many months there is always something to be paid out to the Meiklejohns'.¹⁵⁹⁸ Moreover, the boys appeared to be 'much afraid' of both Mr and Mrs Meiklejohn. Mr Meiklejohn stated to Mrs Waugh that the boys were liars and thieves and had been taken out of reformatories and gutters. George Bogue Smart, Chief Inspector of Juvenile Immigration, found some of Marion Waugh's complaints substantiated and advised Cossar to renovate the buildings and improve procedure.¹⁵⁹⁹

12.13 Then in 1927 the Meiklejohns were succeeded by John Jackson and his wife.¹⁶⁰⁰ Jackson was a noted shorthorn breeder. M.J. Scobie, manager of BICA, spoke highly of Mr Jackson, but as superintendent he was criticised by Canadian Immigration for being more concerned with farm management and agricultural experimentation than with the boys' welfare.¹⁶⁰¹ He was also criticised for lax attention to the selection of employers for the boys and poor after-care. He admitted that pressure of time sometimes prevented him from checking references; that homes were not always visited in advance, and almost never thereafter, unless trouble arose; and that there was no clear procedure regarding indenture, ensuring regular payment of wages, answering the boys' enquiries, or even keeping track of them.¹⁶⁰² Deficient inspection was then partially addressed by the appointment of one Captain Clingo in 1930, but his task was complicated by the fact that Cossar's recruits were mostly older boys who, in John Jackson's words, had 'knocked about Glasgow for two or three years after leaving school', resented regulations about compulsory waving of wages, and tended to find their own situations.¹⁶⁰³

¹⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹⁹ LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, part 1 (C-10647), memorandum by Smart, 20 Jan 1925; Cossar to W.J. Egan, 6 March 1925.

¹⁶⁰⁰ New Brunswick Museum (St John, NB), Archives and Research Library, Marianne Gray Otty Papers, F107, Cossar's Farm, p.14.

¹⁶⁰¹ LAC, RG76, vol. 567, file 811910, part 3, Scobie to F. C. Blair, 13 Jan 1932; LAC, RG76, vol. 567, file 811910, part 3, D.J. Murphy to G. B. Smart, 4 July 1930.

http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_c10647/107?r=0&s=4

¹⁶⁰² LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, part 1 (C-10647), report by Smart on Cossar farm, 21 Sept 1929.

¹⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, Jackson to Smart, 6 April 1932.

12.14 This was followed in July 1930 by a scathing report to Bogue Smart by D.J. Murphy, the Canadian Immigration Department's representative in St John, New Brunswick.¹⁶⁰⁴ He claimed his findings reflected the opinions of many who had complained. He stated that there was 'no doubt' that boys were in many cases being exploited by employers, and in other cases Cossar 'throws them in without a semblance of investigation'.¹⁶⁰⁵ 'All over the country' Murphy had found boys undertaking road work for employers 'who give the lads none of the earnings although these same boys do the chores at night and morning in addition to milking etc'¹⁶⁰⁶. Moreover, in the majority of cases Cossar boys were farmed out without agreements, and 'boys tended to move from job to job on their own account and it is all the same to Mr J. [Jackson] As long as he is not worried, all is well.'¹⁶⁰⁷ He reckoned that John Jackson lived 'in luxury' but the training farm was not well maintained, Jackson made no effort to teach the boys Canadian farming practices, and he washed his hands of them once he had secured the funding for their outfitting. No account was taken of the requirements of the farmers to whom the boys were sent. Murphy cited the unsuitability of the boys' outfit—especially the heavy hobnailed boots—as being a particular irritant to farmers' wives. 'In they bring heaps of manure stuck to the soles and the woman starts to whine, the boy starts to talk back, she calls him saucy, he asks for his pay and the man of the house comes in and throw him out. All due to Cossar's boots'.¹⁶⁰⁸

12.15 Disputes with the Canadian immigration authorities increased after 1928, largely because of new federal medical regulations. Until 1926 Cossar owned and ran the Gagetown enterprise himself. From 1926 to 1931 it was subsidised and directed by a Council of Management in Scotland, assisted by a Canadian committee, though Cossar still provided most of the funding. But in 1931, concerned that 'the responsibility is too big to be a personal one', Cossar suggested that the province of New Brunswick should make Gagetown farm responsible for processing all the province's assisted juvenile immigrants, along with unemployed boys from Canadian cities. In 1932 it became the Provincial Training Centre¹⁶⁰⁹ for the reception,

¹⁶⁰⁴ LAC, RG76, vol. 567, file 811910, part 3, Murphy to Smart, 4 July 1930.

¹⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰⁷ LAC, RG76, vol. 567, file 811910, part 3, Murphy to Smart, 4 July 1930.

¹⁶⁰⁸ LAC, RG76, vol. 567, file 811910, part 3, Murphy to Smart, 4 July 1930.

¹⁶⁰⁹ There is some uncertainty over the date at which the Cossar Boys' Training Farm became a provincial training centre. Library and Archives Canada's website states that this occurred in 1928. See LAC, 'Cossar Farm, Receiving Home and Distributing Centre for Scotch Lads', <https://www.bac->

distribution and placement in New Brunswick of all boys recruited in the UK under assisted passage agreements. Cossar was from then on required to bring out 100 boys per year, as well as receive those sent by other organisations.¹⁶¹⁰ He claimed that the new arrangements impeded his ability to secure urban recruits, or to have recruits undergo preliminary training at Craigiellin.¹⁶¹¹ Moreover, new federal medical regulations, including the enforcement of a minimum height requirement after 1928,¹⁶¹² led to a number of his trainees being rejected.¹⁶¹³ But responsibility for placement and after-care now lay with the provincial and dominion governments.

12.16 Increasing tension between Cossar and the Canadian immigration authorities was reflected in a long-running correspondence about the criteria on which boys were judged. James Malcolm, the Canadian government emigration agent in Glasgow, claimed that Cossar knowingly selected delinquents and boys who were medically unfit.¹⁶¹⁴ He cited forty 'problem cases' that had been referred to Cossar with a view to migration by the Edinburgh Juvenile Organisations Committee between 1929 and 1931. According to one boy's mother, 'he had the choice of going to Canada or going to gaol, and he chose to go to Canada under Dr Cossar's scheme'.¹⁶¹⁵ The Canadian authorities also alleged that Cossar was guilty of double standards in pressing for relaxed entry regulations while at the same time using the government-subsidised charity rate to return boys to Scotland whom he deemed unsuitable on some trifling excuse, such as a boy requiring several placements. In

lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/immigration/immigration-records/home-children-1869-1930/home-children-guide/Pages/cossar-farm-scotch-lads.aspx.

¹⁶¹⁰ See British Home Child Group International, 'George Carter Cossar', <http://britishhomechild.com/resources/sending-agencies-organizations/504-2/>. See also LAC, RG76, vol. 567, file 811910, part 2, Memo by Cossar, 7 August 1931, and F. C. Blair to Cossar, 7 Aug 1931.

¹⁶¹¹ See British Home Child Group International, 'George Carter Cossar', <http://britishhomechild.com/resources/sending-agencies-organizations/504-2/>

¹⁶¹² The medical regulations imposed by the Canadian federal government after 1928 included the enforcement of a minimum height requirement of 5 feet, which arguably disadvantaged the urban poor who were usually smaller because of poor nourishment. See British Home Child Group International, 'George Carter Cossar', <http://britishhomechild.com/resources/sending-agencies-organizations/504-2/>. See also D. Milne to G. Whiskard, 31 March 1930, SGV.001.003.7321; Whiskard to Milne, 9 April 1930, SGV.001.003.7303-7304

¹⁶¹³ See British Home Child Group International, 'George Carter Cossar', <http://britishhomechild.com/resources/sending-agencies-organizations/504-2/>

¹⁶¹⁴ LAC, RG76, vol. 282, file 234636 (C-7821). DIC memorandum, 10 April 1930; James Malcolm to W.R. Little, 21 May 1931; Cossar to Little, 30 May 1931.

¹⁶¹⁵ LAC, RG76, vol. 282, file 234636 (C-7821). DIC memorandum, 10 April 1930; James Malcolm to W.R. Little, 21 May 1931; Cossar to Little, 30 May 1931.

1931 twenty boys were sent back to Scotland. In 1933 Murphy commented that Cossar 'means well but does not know how to go about it'.¹⁶¹⁶

12.17 Complaints were also made by some Cossar boys and parents. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] aged 14 and 17, migrated from Glasgow to the Cossar farm in July 1924.¹⁶¹⁷ [REDACTED] resented being pressurised to sign a contract which would prevent the brothers moving to Toronto, where three other siblings were already settled and where his widowed mother was about to settle with two younger children.¹⁶¹⁸ He suggested that W.J. O'Brien of BICA was the real power behind the Cossar enterprise. He also wrote that

The people from some Association here are trying to get us to sign a contract for a year, or rather to consent to the farmer signing it, to keep us for 1 year, the best pay being \$10 a month with some given to us for pocket money and some put in a bank somewhere nobody around here has heard of.... it's the Orangemen here with a guy called O'Brien at the head of it, that's bringing us Protestant boys out. Cossar's only an agent.¹⁶¹⁹

Moreover, [REDACTED] claimed that the boys were threatened with deportation if they refused to sign the contract.

12.18 By 1913 the farm at Lower Gagetown had received 250 Cossar boys. By 1922 this had risen to 800. By 31 October 1928 a total of 1,076 boys had received training at Craigiellinn, of whom 734 had been sent overseas, including a number of siblings, 535 boys having been sent to Canada and 199 to Australia, while some had been migrated to New Zealand.¹⁶²⁰ However, new Canadian regulations governing minimum height requirements introduced in 1929 led to many Cossar boys being rejected, and in response Cossar brought his migration work to a close—and in December 1929 the Lower Gagetown farm was destroyed by fire. After it was rebuilt it functioned independently as a training centre for unemployed boys from eastern Canada. As a concluding note, by 1926 Cossar had fallen out with Australian agents over their reluctance to accept Craigiellinn trainees, and he never achieved his

¹⁶¹⁶ LAC, RG76, vol. 567, file 911910, part 1 (C-10647), Murphy to Blair, 14 June 1933.

¹⁶¹⁷ LAC, RG76, vol. 567, file 811910, part 1, *Letter from [REDACTED] to unnamed recipient*, 23 Sept 1924.

¹⁶¹⁸ LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, part 1 (C-10647), [REDACTED] to his mother, 6 Sept 1924.

¹⁶¹⁹ LAC, RG76, vol. 568, file 811910, part 1 (C-10647), [REDACTED] to his mother, 6 Sept 1924.

¹⁶²⁰ LAC, RG76, file 234636, *Annual report of the Cossar Boys' Training Farms Inc.*, 1927-28, by Duncan Watson.

objective of establishing a training and distribution farm in Australia.¹⁶²¹ No information has been found on Cossar's after-care arrangements in Australia.

The Dreadnought Scheme

13.1 This scheme derived from a strongly supported Australian campaign launched in 1903 in New South Wales to raise money to fund the construction of warships to protect Australian and Empire interests in the Pacific, and specifically a Dreadnought battleship for the Royal Navy.¹⁶²² In the event, the money raised was diverted to other purposes, including funding the immigration of young men from the 'mother country' to be trained as rural workers.

13.2 The scheme was not targeted at juveniles 'in need' or 'deprived of a normal home life'. It was operated by the Dreadnought Trust, which in 1910 entered into an agreement with the New South Wales Government to bring out British city boys aged 16-19 'of good character and physique' to be trained as rural workers on NSW farms.¹⁶²³ The Dreadnought Fund was to pay the NSW government £5 for each recruit sent to a training farm, Scheyville, near Pitt Town, about 20 miles from Sydney. A total of 2,557 boys had arrived by February 1915, after which the scheme was suspended until 1921. When it was then resumed, applicants were again selected by Commonwealth Immigration officers in London. They were given assisted passages and, on arrival, instruction at Scheyville along with free maintenance (but no wages) for two to three months. A few were selected to take a 12-month course at a state agricultural college. On completion of their training, the state government found them employment with approved farmers, from whom they were to receive a wage of between 15 shillings and £2 a week, along with board and lodging. Their welfare from that point was supervised by the New Settlers' League from 1921 to 1930 and after 1930 by the British Settlers' Welfare Committee. Both 'employed travelling welfare officers to visit the boys on the farms and check their progress, treatment,

¹⁶²¹ National Records of Scotland, AF51/167. *Emigration to Canada, Cossar to Sir John Gilmour*, 1 Feb 1926; *Cossar to Sir Joseph Cook, Australian High Commissioner*, 6 Feb 1926, enclosing undated letter from Cossar to the press. See also British Home Child Group International, 'George Carter Cossar', <http://britishhomechild.com/resources/sending-agencies-organizations/504-2/>

¹⁶²² Gill, *Likely Lads and Lassies*, pp.77-88; NAA, 'Research Guides, Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia, The Dreadnought Scheme', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/dreadnoughtper cent20.aspx>

¹⁶²³ NAA, Research Guides, 'Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia, The Dreadnought Scheme', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/dreadnought%20.aspx>

prospects and conduct'.¹⁶²⁴ The scheme was heavily advertised in the secular and religious press, including a YMCA pamphlet from the late 1920s, which included it in a comprehensive list of 'opportunities overseas for the youth of to-day' in the four dominions.¹⁶²⁵

13.3 Between 1911 and 1939, when the last group arrived, 5,595 young men had been assisted to migrate to Australia.¹⁶²⁶ In 1927 Edinburgh Parish Council recorded the departure for Australia under the Dreadnought Assisted Passage Scheme of a former boarded-out juvenile, 16-year-old [REDACTED].¹⁶²⁷ However, Scottish participation in the Dreadnought Scheme was modest, securing at most about 280 juvenile boys.

13.4 According to a Research Guide published by the National Archives of Australia, the majority of Dreadnought recruits encountered 'serious problems' and exploitation as a result of their urban backgrounds, isolation and immaturity.¹⁶²⁸ 'They suffered loneliness, homesickness, "Pommy bashing" and culture shock'.¹⁶²⁹ There were accidental deaths, and many returned to Britain, especially during the Depression. There were also several suicides.¹⁶³⁰ The Communist newspaper *Workers' Weekly* referred in the 1920s to suicides among Dreadnought boys, as well as to those who had resorted to running away or sleeping in public parks.¹⁶³¹ Two of the suicides—both of English boys—were reported in the New South Wales press, in 1924 and 1933 respectively. [REDACTED] aged 16, [REDACTED] on the farm of grazier Malcolm McLeod, a month after taking up employment in March 1924.¹⁶³² [REDACTED] aged 20, [REDACTED] in August 1933, three years after arriving in Australia. Following his initial training at Scheyville, he had had three work placements. Just before committing suicide he had handed to a friend the

¹⁶²⁴ *Ibid*, according to this NAA website, the British Settlers' Welfare Committee 'is considered to have been more effective' than the New Settlers League in providing aftercare.

¹⁶²⁵ NRS, AF/151/174, 'Settlement of British Boys in Australia and Other Places', *Opportunities Overseas for the Youth of To-Day*, YMCA Migration Department, London, undated, but probably c.1929, SGV.001.003.7311.

¹⁶²⁶ NAA, Research Guides, 'Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia, The Dreadnought Scheme', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/dreadnought%20.aspx>

¹⁶²⁷ Response to SCAI Section 21 request, Edinburgh Parish Council Minutes, Children's Separate Registers, EDI.001.001.8149.

¹⁶²⁸ NAA, Research Guides, 'Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia, The Dreadnought Scheme', [http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/dreadnoughtper cent20.aspx](http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/dreadnoughtper%20cent20.aspx)

¹⁶²⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁶³⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁶³¹ *Workers' Weekly*, 24 July 1925, p.3.

¹⁶³² *Albury Banner and Wodonga Express*, 25 April 1924, p.24.

sum of £7 to be paid to the Immigration Department as the last instalment of his passage money loan.¹⁶³³

Flock House Scheme

14.1 The Flock House Scheme was a shorthand title for 'The New Zealand Sheep Owners' Acknowledgement of Debt to British Seamen Fund'.¹⁶³⁴ It was an inter-war scheme, launched in 1924, to fund the emigration to New Zealand of the juvenile children of British seamen who had died or been injured in the conflict. They were to be trained in farm work with the ultimate objective of settling them on their own properties. The scheme was orchestrated by a Scottish emigrant and politician, Edward Newman, was funded from the marketing of wool, and was supported by 10 per cent of New Zealand's wool growers (over 2,600 individuals). Its patron was the Prince of Wales, and the scheme also won the approval of the Chief Scout, Lord Baden-Powell. Selection was in the hands of a London Advisory Committee, whose original remit was to identify suitable boys aged 15-17, 'of good character and health, of suitable temperament, and desirous of learning and pursuing the occupation of farming'.¹⁶³⁵

14.2 Operations began in 1924, when 54 boys were sent in two parties to the 1,000-acre Flock House farm near Bulls in the North Island, which had been purchased from a family of Scottish settlers. That was also the year in which the Salvation Army established a training farm for migrant boys on similar lines at Putarura near Rotorua.¹⁶³⁶ In 1925 assistance was extended to girls, who were sent to a 30-acre property at Awapuni, Palmerston North, where the YWCA agreed to provide a six-month training course in domestic and farm-based skills.

14.3 During the depression years, however, the scheme foundered. The girls' work scheme closed down first, because of a lack of trainees, and in 1931 the New Zealand government stopped the immigration of British boys. In 1937 the Flock House property was sold to the New Zealand government, after which it operated as a

¹⁶³³ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 Aug 1933, p.8.

¹⁶³⁴ Wikipedia, Flock House, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flock_House

¹⁶³⁵ TNA, MH102/1565, 'Emigration of Deprived Children to New Zealand, Reopening of Flock House', pp.26-29, for a description of the scheme received in the Home Office in June 1948; for the political context in New Zealand and the interests of farmers see Stephen Constantine, 'Immigration and the Making of New Zealand, 1918-1939' in his (ed.) *Emigrants and Empire* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990), esp. 132-135.

¹⁶³⁶ On the Salvation Army see Section 19, The Salvation Army, below

training farm for New Zealanders, or for self-funding immigrants, until it closed in 1988. Between 1949 and 1952, in a brief revival of the inter-war arrangements, 49 British boys were brought to Flock House—the sons of airmen as well as seamen—but the idea never got properly off the ground, perhaps because of new British expectations following the Children Act of 1948.¹⁶³⁷ Concerns were expressed in Home Office circles about selection procedures, after-care, and freedom to return to Britain. Disagreement surfaced over whether Flock House should fund the repatriation of homesick boys who could not adjust to farming in particular or to life in New Zealand in general. In all, 763 adolescents—635 boys and 128 girls—as well as a few parents had been assisted by the organisers of the Fund, who acted *in loco parentis* to the juveniles until they reached the age of 21.¹⁶³⁸ There is some evidence of networking with other organisations. One 14-year-old boy, [REDACTED] who was resident at the Aberlour Orphanage was sent to Flock House in 1931, on the application of his father.¹⁶³⁹ We have suggested that 10 per cent of those sent were from Scotland, giving a total of 76.

Girls' Friendly Society, the British Women's Emigration Association, and other Female Migration Societies

15.1 As we have seen, some agencies involved in juvenile migration assisted only boys. Others assisted only girls. The Girls' Friendly Society (GFS) was established in 1875 as an organisation to assist girls travelling to cities in Britain for employment. It soon extended its coverage to the Empire, advocating and facilitating the emigration of working-class girls. An emigration committee was formed in 1885 to arrange for the safe transit of female emigrants and to put them in touch with clergymen at ports of departure and arrival. Numbers of emigrants catered for were fairly small: 203 in 1886, 407 in 1896 and 393 in 1906.¹⁶⁴⁰ But since the GFS was an Anglican organisation which worked in close co-operation with the Mothers' Union, as well as Anglican missionary and emigration societies, its impact in Scotland was relatively minor.

¹⁶³⁷ TNA, MH102/1565, Memorandum by J.M.W. Maxwell, 23 June 1948; D.M. Rosling to M.C. Smith, 1 July 1948; C. Knowles to D.M. Rosling, 24 Aug 1948.

¹⁶³⁸ Harper, *Scotland No More?*, pp.103-108, and Flock House: A post WW1 Scheme for helping children of British Seamen who died in the conflict, <http://genebug.net/flock.html>.

¹⁶³⁹ Aberlour, Section 21 response, 1930 – 2014, Child Migration report, Aberlour, ABE.001.008.8073; List of migrated children who were resident in Aberlour Orphanage, ABE.001.008.7698.

¹⁶⁴⁰ Brian Harrison, 'For Church, Queen and Family: The Girls' Friendly Society, 1874-1920', *Past and Present*, no. 61, Nov 1973, pp.107-138. The reference to statistics is on p.126.

15.2 The British Women's Emigration Association (BWEA) was another UK-wide organisation that included the supervision of juveniles in its remit. Established in 1888, it became the major voluntary umbrella body for the recruitment, training, despatch, protection and after-care of female emigrants. About 20,000 women and girls emigrated under the auspices of the BWEA and its satellite organisations between 1884 and 1914, although that figure represented less than 10 per cent of the UK's female emigrants.¹⁶⁴¹ It is not known what percentage of BWEA migrants were Scots, but one of its member organisations, the Aberdeen Ladies' Union (ALU), migrated around 400 young women, mainly to Canada, between 1883 and 1914. Its patron was the Countess (later Marchioness) of Aberdeen who was an enthusiastic advocate of child and juvenile migration, and acquainted with William Quarrier and Thomas Barnardo. For the first seven years her recruits were migrated along with Quarriers' parties, but after 1889 she used the facilities of the BWEA to transport girls and secure repayment of their loans. She also forged contacts with the YWCA and the GFS, as well as the Women's Protective Immigration Society at Quebec and Montreal, and the Girls' Home of Welcome in Winnipeg. During a visit to Canada in 1890 she met Ellen Joyce, founder of the BWEA, and the child emigrationist Annie Macpherson, and made informal visits to a number of girls who had emigrated under the ALU's aegis. However, the Union's records do not suggest that it put in place any formal mechanisms for selection of recruits or placements, for the after-care of migrants, or for any sort of accountability.¹⁶⁴² After the First World War the BWEA was absorbed into the Society for the Overseas Settlement of British Women.

15.3 Some female emigrants to Canada, probably including juveniles, were recruited by agents of the federal government and the railway companies, but there were problems of co-ordination and management. Friction sometimes arose either when the agents of the railway company felt their decisions had been overruled or federal officials complained they had been sidelined when the transportation companies dealt directly with receiving homes or gave inadequate notice of the forthcoming arrival of migrant parties. In 1925 W.R. Little, Director of European Emigration for Canada, reminded his colleague J.B. Walker, Canada's Director of British Emigration, that it was inappropriate 'for representatives of transportation companies to be writing to hostels regarding Empire Settlement cases which should

¹⁶⁴¹ Marjory Harper and Stephen Constantine, *Migration and Empire* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), p.226.

¹⁶⁴² The Countess of Aberdeen, *Through Canada with a Kodak*, (originally published 1893, Marjory Harper (ed, with introduction, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1994).

be handled direct through your office and through the Department'. Perhaps as a consequence, in 1929, when the CPR's chief female selecting agent asked for an assurance that her decisions would be ratified by federal officials, she was turned down on the grounds that transportation officials were unaccountable.¹⁶⁴³ By 1931 the CPR had developed its own arrangements for placing domestics through a female representative in Montreal, but employment prospects were poor, and federal immigration minister W. Gordon complained to the CPR that the advice of his department's overseas agents was being undermined 'by persons apparently more interested in the selling of a steamship ticket than in the welfare of intending immigrants or Canada generally'.¹⁶⁴⁴

15.4 On these several organisations there is a lack of accessible information on such matters as selection and consent. Regulations relating to destinations, placements and after-care are also uncertain, posing a clear risk that migrants would be misled, defrauded, or even abused. In 1920 a correspondent to the *Scottish Farmer* complained about the practice of enticing inexperienced girls to New Zealand farms which were nothing more than uncomfortable wooden shacks with non-existent transportation links.¹⁶⁴⁵ Numbers too are uncertain, but assuming that other operators migrated few juvenile young women from Scotland we have suggested a total of 200, constituting 10 per cent of the probable number migrated by the largest operation, that run by the BWEA.

Quarriers Orphan Homes of Scotland

16.1 Located 17 miles south of Glasgow, Quarriers Homes, Bridge of Weir, dealt primarily with Scottish children and to a lesser extent with juveniles. It was the largest child rescue organisation in Scotland, and details of its origins, history, policies and practice are found in our main Report.¹⁶⁴⁶ Quarriers' records are voluminous, although it is only from around 1930 that it began to retain more correspondence

¹⁶⁴³ LAC, RG76, vol. 230, file 127825, part 1, C-7380, Little to Walker, 21 Nov 1925; Burnham to Little, 30 Oct 1929; Blair to Burnham, 6 Nov 1929.

¹⁶⁴⁴ LAC, RG76, vol. 230, file 127825, part 1, C-7380, Gordon to J.N.K. Macalister, 14 June 1931.

¹⁶⁴⁵ *Scottish Farmer*, 2 Oct 1920, p.1115.

¹⁶⁴⁶ On Quarriers see Anna Magnusson, *The Quarriers Story (Birlinn, Edinburgh, revised edition 2006)*; Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles*, pp.166-177; Abrams, *Orphan Country*, pp.80-84 and esp. 92-93; William MacLean Dunbar, 'Quarrier, William', *ODNB*; and Peter Higginbotham, 'Quarrier's Homes, Bridge of Weir, Renfrewshire, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/Quarriers/>.

and reports within the individual case files. The Canadian records were, unfortunately, destroyed, following the closure of Quarriers receiving home, Fairknowe, in 1934.

16.2 Although most Quarriers residents remained in Scotland, a significant proportion—approximately 35 per cent of the 20,219 residents between 1872 and 1933, over 7,000—were —were migrated to Canada. Indeed, the migration of children to Canada was an integral part of Quarriers' policy from the institution's foundation in 1872 until 1897, and again from 1904 to 1938. However, from the early 1920s virtually all migrants to Canada were juveniles, not children, following age restrictions imposed by the Adolescent School Attendance Act in Ontario in 1921 and the recommendations of the Bondfield Report in 1924 that the state-funded migration only of those over school-leaving age should be allowed. The vast majority were boys. The Canadian movement dwindled in the late 1920s and came to an end in 1938 as a consequence of economic depression. A few Quarriers residents were thereafter migrated to Australia, beginning in 1939 with a party of 13 boys and four girls (aged nine to 11) who were selected and sent to the Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Homes in New South Wales through the agency of Cyril Bavin and the YMCA. After the war, Quarriers sent a total of 21 boys to the Dhurringile Training Farm in Victoria in three parties in 1960, 1961 and 1962, but almost all the Quarriers residents sent to Australia were children, not juveniles. However, a spreadsheet of Quarriers residents submitted by Quarriers to SCAI indicates that of the 292 individuals listed who were migrated between 1900 and 1963, 163 (55.8 per cent) were aged 15 or over at the time of their migration.¹⁶⁴⁷ They included two boys, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] sent to Dhurringile Farm, Tatura, Australia in 1960 and 1963.¹⁶⁴⁸ As noted earlier, Quarriers interacted and cooperated with several other organisations, including the Aberdeen Ladies' Union, Cossar farms, the YMCA and the Church of Scotland. We have suggested that the total number of juvenile migrants sent overseas via Quarriers, a few to Australia but mainly to Canada, numbered 342.

16.3 Quarriers' initial rationale for its migration policy was to offer the opportunity for a better life for the migrants, as well as to provide an 'exit door' so that more children could be accommodated at their Scottish homes. Between the wars the rationale, particularly during the depression, was to relieve unemployment. In the

¹⁶⁴⁷ Quarriers, Migration Case Study, Spreadsheet of Children and Information, paragraph 8, QAR.001.008.0060-0075.

¹⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0075.

words of Lord Maclay, Chairman of the Council of Management, '[w]e are very loth to see so many young lads hanging about with so little to do in this Country just now'.¹⁶⁴⁹ In 1937 Maclay's successor, Dr James Kelly, further endorsed juvenile migration on the grounds that youths were adaptable, more likely to be committed to Canada, better able to face adversity, and less prone to disillusionment than older migrants.¹⁶⁵⁰ Imperialist sentiment also played a part in Kelly's rhetoric, when he commended the migrants as being 'of British stock, that which Canada requires most of all'.¹⁶⁵¹

16.4 By the inter-war period Quarriers received funding to reimburse the costs incurred in migrating those placed with Quarriers by local authorities, as well as a grant under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act.¹⁶⁵² Grants from the Canadian Government also reimbursed some of the costs. The level of funding varied, but estimated costs rose from approximately £10 per head in 1872 to £24 in 1924. In 1929-30 the total cost of passage and outfits was £960 19s 8d in respect of 37 migrants, approximately £26 per individual. In 1960 it cost approximately £62 to equip each boy who was sent to Australia.

16.5 Initially the form of admission to Quarriers required applicants to agree to the child's migration to Canada as the default option for its disposal. Prior to 1910, it is believed that there was a permission/consent form entitled 'emigration form of agreement'.¹⁶⁵³ The guardian applied to have a child admitted 'with a view to being emigrated to Canada, if thought suitable, under the care of William Quarrier or his Agent or Agents'.¹⁶⁵⁴ The form was subsequently amended to state that children were admitted into the care of Quarriers up to the age of 16, 'with the view of being maintained and educated, and thereafter kept at Home, emigrated to Canada, or otherwise discharged as the Managers of the Homes may decide'. Quarriers' Section 21 Response states that in the latter stages of 1923 the admission form was changed, and the part referring to Canada was removed, and that in 1926 the admission form was again altered to reflect that the decision to emigrate a child now lay with the Executive Council, rather than the manager of the homes.¹⁶⁵⁵ However, a scrutiny of a

¹⁶⁴⁹ Fairknowe Children, 1933, Maclay to Claude Winters, 9 March 1933, QAR.002.009.2787.

¹⁶⁵⁰ Fairknowe Children, 1938, speech by Kelly, reported in *The Brockville Recorder and Times*, 28 Dec 1937, QAR.001.009.2887,

¹⁶⁵¹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2887,

¹⁶⁵² Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0057-0058.

¹⁶⁵³ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0024.

¹⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0024.

¹⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0025.

sample of admission forms shows that in at least some cases the Canada clause was still there in 1927; by 1928 it was still on the printed form, but had been scored out from at least one form; and by 1930 it was no longer included in most printed forms.¹⁶⁵⁶ If the Canada clause was scored out or omitted, applicants were required simply to agree to leave the child 'under the care of the Homes until s/he attains the age of 16 years'.¹⁶⁵⁷ The upper age limit therefore continued to allow for juvenile migration.

16.6 In the case of migration to Canada, an initial selection of migrants, of all ages, was made by Quarriers, apparently after asking for volunteers. They were given a preliminary medical examination by Quarriers, after which those chosen had to undergo interviews and medical examinations by the Canadian Government Emigration Agent and Medical Officer respectively.¹⁶⁵⁸ It seems they were also examined by the ship's surgeon while on the transatlantic voyage, in order to ensure that none would be liable for deportation under Canada's immigration laws. Migrants were supplied with clothing, reading materials, toiletries and sundries, and were sent to Canada in conducted parties, accompanied by a member or members of Quarriers staff.

16.7 There is some ambiguity surrounding the provision of information to potential migrants and the granting of consent, particularly in the early years of migration from Quarriers to Canada.¹⁶⁵⁹ Before 1930, beyond a clause on the printed admission form and a verbal explanation at the time of admission that those placed in its care might subsequently be migrated, there is no indication as to what parents or guardians would have been told. After 1930, there is some evidence that Quarriers wrote to relatives to notify them of an upcoming migration, and to grant them permission to make a farewell visit to the child at Quarriers Home.

16.8 Children's consent to be migrated was not formally recorded, and the absence of records makes it impossible to know whether the procedure of seeking the child's consent was adhered to. However, available documentation (such as the annual *Narrative of Facts* and the individual children's 'History Books') suggests that the

¹⁶⁵⁶ [REDACTED] Admission Form, 1927, QAR.001.008.0585; [REDACTED] Admission Form, 1928, QAR.001.008.0680; [REDACTED] Admission Form 1928, QAR.001.008.0699; [REDACTED] Admission Form, 1930, QAR.001.008.0936; [REDACTED] Admission Form 1930, QAR.001.008.1555.

¹⁶⁵⁷ [REDACTED] Admission Form, 1928, QAR.001.008.0680; [REDACTED] Admission Form, 1930, QAR.001.008.0936.

¹⁶⁵⁸ Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0015.

¹⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0019.

views of would-be migrants were canvassed and they were asked if they would like to emigrate. Some asked to join siblings who had already been migrated to Canada, or the request might be made by those in Canada. A formal consent form can be found in the files of ██████████ and ██████████ in 1932. The forms state:

I hereby agree to being emigrated to Canada under the care of THE ORPHAN HOMES OF SCOTLAND to work in Fairknowe Home, Brockville, Ontario, and remain strictly under the control of the Superintendent and Matron there. I understand further that this arrangement has only been made possible by an undertaking having been given to the Canadian Department of Immigration that I shall not be placed elsewhere in Canada in less than two years and then only subject to the approval of the Department. The terms of my employment at Fairknowe are to be that my outfit which has been supplied to me by the Orphan Homes, Bridge of Weir, Scotland, will be maintained in its present condition and that I will be given a small spending allowance but no wages during the two years whilst this agreement runs.¹⁶⁶⁰

16.9 In respect of migrations in the 1930s, the procedure was that the superintendent wrote to the Canadian Government Emigration Agent providing a background to the child and the rationale for migration. The ensuing correspondence, as well as giving approval, might advise that parental consent was required, as in the case of ██████████ and ██████████ who were migrated in 1932. In respect of ██████████ William Douglas, Superintendent of Quarriers, wrote to J.D. Perdue, Canadian Government Agent in Glasgow, that he was

somewhat at a loss to know why the Oversea Settlement Department should require the father's consent' as this had not been required in the case of other candidates currently presented for migration, 'nor have we in the past been required to produce such consent.¹⁶⁶¹

Moreover, he was prepared to ignore the requirement, even if the father withheld consent. He continued:

As both your Headquarters in London and you are doubtless aware we stand in loco parentis to all the children under our care. Although it may not be known to the Overseas Settlement Department the Law in Scotland relating to consent is quite different from that in England. In this country it is sufficient that a boy over 14 years of age should express a wish to be emigrated or go where he

¹⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0023-0024.

¹⁶⁶¹ ██████████ Admission Form & Children's File, 1932, Douglas to Perdue, 15 April 1932, QAR.001.008.3412.

pleases without there being any necessity for obtaining the consent of his parents. In many cases we have found it advisable to send both boys and girls to Canada at their own request when of age to choose their domicile even in face of opposition from parents and other relatives. For this there is definite precedent by decision of the Glasgow Sheriff Court. When you pass on our observations to your Headquarters I shall be glad to know what attitude they take in this case as if necessary we would be prepared to emigrate [REDACTED] [REDACTED] entirely at our own expense in the event of his father with-holding consent as there seems some likelihood of his doing. We have sent him the usual courtesy intimation of the boy's wish to emigrate, but have had no response whatever from him.¹⁶⁶²

The Glasgow agent referred the matter to his superiors at Canada House, who consulted with the Oversea Settlement Department (OSD) at the Dominions Office. The OSD cited a regulation issued by the Department of Health for Scotland in 1929, which required that parental consent to migration should be obtained in respect of any child who was not an orphan or deserted, or, in the case of a child separated from its parents and committed to the care of a parish council, the written consent of the Secretary of State for Scotland was required. It advised that if Quarriers were to migrate the boy at their own expense, 'they cannot recognise him as coming under the Empire Settlement Act in any way, and would, therefore, be unable to pay anything for him, either for aftercare or for any other services'.¹⁶⁶³ [REDACTED] was migrated to Canada in May 1932, at the age of 16, but it is not known whether the father's consent had been obtained. Another similar case from the 1932 party was that of [REDACTED]. The Canadian Government Emigration Agent pointed out to Douglas that, since the father was still alive, 'the same requirements will be necessary in this case as in that of [REDACTED]'.¹⁶⁶⁴

16.10 If Quarriers had contact with a third party, as opposed to the parents directly, they would be notified that a child had expressed a wish to migrate. As indicated above, Quarriers generally upheld the views of the child if they were over 14 years old, even if the parent(s) lodged an objection. In reaching this decision, they sometimes took legal advice, as in the case of 15-year-old [REDACTED] from

¹⁶⁶² *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.3412.

¹⁶⁶³ *Ibid*, Andrew O'Kelly, Assistant Director, Canada House, to Perdue, 26 April 1932, QAR.001.008.3416.

¹⁶⁶⁴ [REDACTED] Admission Form & Children's File, 1932, Perdue to Douglas, 27 April 1932, QAR.001.008.3515.

Wigtownshire.¹⁶⁶⁵ The mother was dead and the father, who had been convicted of child neglect and assault, objected to the boy's migration. In a letter to the Public Assistance Officer in Stranraer (after the Officer had requested the boy's return), Quarriers wrote as follows:

With regard to the father's objections, I am afraid we cannot recognise his right to interfere in the lad's free choice to go to Canada. ██████ is over 14 years of age and has the right in law to choose his own domicile and he is exercising that right. We have taken Council's [*sic*] opinion on the whole question of a lad over 14 choosing his domicile and the law says if a male over 14 of his own free will decides to go to Canada or elsewhere, he is at perfect liberty to do so and the parent or guardian cannot interfere. ██████ has stated in writing as well as verbally without pressure of any kind being exercised, that he is desirous of going to Canada.¹⁶⁶⁶

██████ was migrated in 1938.¹⁶⁶⁷

16.11 Issues relating to consent appear in a number of other cases. When ██████ ██████ and ██████ were admitted to Quarriers in 1892, their widowed mother signed the admission form but objected to the clause authorising the children to be sent to Canada.¹⁶⁶⁸ In 1897, however, the two boys left for Canada, at the same time as the two girls were returned to their mother. A year later the boys returned to Scotland to join their mother, who had remarried. It is not clear from the records whether she had retracted her initial refusal to have them migrated.

16.12 ██████ was also sent to Canada in the 1890s, at the age of 14, a year after being admitted to Quarriers, along with two younger siblings.¹⁶⁶⁹ His father had died of tuberculosis, and his mother—who was dying of the same disease—signed the admission document with the stipulation that the children 'would not be sent to Canada without her knowledge and consent'. Two of the children were

¹⁶⁶⁵ ██████ Children's File, 1938, William Douglas, Quarriers, to Frederick Shaw, Public Assistance Office, Stranraer, 9 April 1938, QAR.001.008.4703-4705.

¹⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, QAR.001.008.4703-4705.

¹⁶⁶⁷ Correspondence in his file indicates that he and his siblings were removed from the parental home by the RSSPCC, which then liaised with the Public Assistance Department for Wigtownshire. The Public Assistance Department made a contribution towards the children's maintenance in Quarriers, but there is no indication in the correspondence that consent for ██████ subsequent migration was sought from the Secretary of State for Scotland.

¹⁶⁶⁸ Notes taken from original documents during a visit to Quarriers, History Book, vol. 13, 1891-92, p.60; hence no QAR ref. ██████ was 13 when he was migrated.

¹⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

returned to the mother in 1893, and it is not clear whether she gave her consent to [REDACTED] migration. In 1896 he returned to Scotland on the advice of his doctor, and he too died of tuberculosis in 1900.

16.13 The case file of [REDACTED] who was migrated to Canada in 1925 at the age of 18, indicates that her mother's refusal to sanction the migration was disregarded. When [REDACTED] and her siblings were admitted to Quarriers in 1912 following the death of their father, the mother had signed the standard admission form, which included a promise to leave [REDACTED] in the care of the Homes until she attained the age of 16, and to have her 'maintained and educated, and thereafter kept at home, emigrated to Canada, or otherwise discharged as the Managers of the Homes may decide'.¹⁶⁷⁰ However, the words 'emigrated to Canada' had been scored out from the admission form, which possibly indicates that the mother was opposed to migration from the outset.¹⁶⁷¹ [REDACTED] case file records that in March 1924 her mother had visited Quarriers and 'does not want her sent to Canada', but in June 1925 she was migrated.¹⁶⁷² Five years later [REDACTED] wrote to Quarriers to ask, confidentially, about her mother's circumstances, as she had recently heard from her after a silence of eight years, and she suspected that the renewed contact was because [REDACTED] and her sister were due to receive an inheritance.¹⁶⁷³ Quarriers' response included the comment that while the father's family was 'thoroughly reliable...we were quite satisfied that she [the mother] was not a proper guardian for her children'.¹⁶⁷⁴

16.14 Another case relating to consent involved [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who were migrated to Canada in 1930, aged 18 and 15, against the wishes of their mother.¹⁶⁷⁵ In this example Quarriers seems to have acquiesced—with some reservations—in a recommendation made by lawyers in Oban who had been appointed as trustees to look after the girls' welfare in 1921, following the death of their grandfather. Since the trustees regarded the mother as 'not a fit guardian', they had been sent to Quarriers in 1923. When in 1930 [REDACTED] apparently told the

¹⁶⁷⁰ [REDACTED] Admission Form and File, 1925, Form of Application, QAR.001.008.0516.

¹⁶⁷¹ *Ibid*, QAR001.008.0516. At some point in the 1930s the clause relating to emigration to Canada was removed from the admission papers, but it has not been possible to establish exactly when this occurred.

¹⁶⁷² [REDACTED] History Book, 1925, QAR.001.008.0542.

¹⁶⁷³ [REDACTED] Admission Form and File, 1925, [REDACTED] to William Douglas, 26 Jan 1931, QAR.001.008.0522-0525; and 24 July 1933, QAR.001.008.0532-0535.

¹⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid*, Quarriers to [REDACTED] 13 Feb 1931, QAR.001.008.0539.

¹⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid*, Admissions Form and Family File, 1930, C. Grant to R.A.MacVicar, 15 Dec 1931, QAR.001.008.0786-0787.

trustees that she wished to go to Canada, they felt this would be a means of removing the girls from their mother's influence.¹⁶⁷⁶ Although Quarriers agreed that 'the wisest plan would be to have them settled somewhere well beyond the reach of their mother's influence', they were hesitant to undertake the responsibility of their supervision and aftercare in Canada, on the grounds that the girls were temperamentally unsuited to migration, and ██████ might not pass a Canadian government medical.¹⁶⁷⁷ In contradiction to the statement of the trustee R.A. MacVicar on 3 February 1930 that ██████ wanted to go to Canada, William Douglas, the Superintendent of Quarriers, wrote to MacVicar on 22 February that 'the factor in the problem over which neither you and your fellow Trustees nor ourselves have much control is the wishes of the girls themselves neither of whom desires to go to Canada'.¹⁶⁷⁸ In December 1931, 17 months after the girls were migrated, their mother wrote an impassioned letter to MacVicar to request their return. She claimed that

undoubtedly the girls if not actually forced to go Abroad, were certainly strongly influenced, else, Why the Hurry? Why was the choice of Canada or New Zealand put to them? It seems a most remarkable arrangement to send a child whom you say is not in sound health to a strange country amongst strangers nobody knows anything about and who no matter how good they are cannot possibly have the same love and forbearance [*sic*] a Mother would have. You say it was their wish to go (which they deny). How could children confined as they were have any sensible and decided opinion as to what was was [*sic*] right, prejudiced too by outsiders stories [*sic*] but even if they had Well - my wishes have never had much consideration... No matter what my past failings...have been I should have been given a chance. I loved my children sincerely, and I am very unhappy and worried about ██████ I've had a most incoherent and pathetic scribble from her written evidently with a fear of being discovered writing wishing she was with me.¹⁶⁷⁹

On the basis of the younger girl's alleged unhappiness in Canada, the trustees asked Quarriers to make enquiries.¹⁶⁸⁰ The claims were refuted by Margaret Winters, wife of the Superintendent of Fairknowe Home, and apparently by ██████ herself. The

¹⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid*, MacVicar to Douglas, 3 February 1930, QAR.001.008.0857.

¹⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid*, Douglas to MacVicar, 22 February 1930, QAR.001.008.0856.

¹⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0856.

¹⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid*, C. Grant to R.A. MacVicar, 15 Dec 1931, QAR.001.008.0786-0787. The reference to New Zealand relates to a suggestion made by the trustees in March 1930 that the girls should emigrate there if suitable arrangements could be made: QAR.001.008.0867.

¹⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid*, MacVicar to Douglas, 16 December 1931, QAR.001.008.0788.

trustees believed that the mother had fabricated an argument in the hope of getting the girls returned 'so that she may filch from them their earnings'.¹⁶⁸¹ That belief was reinforced when the mother, having been asked to produce [REDACTED] letters, was unable to do so, whereupon the trustees instructed Quarriers to have their Canadian superintendent censor any letters sent to [REDACTED] by her mother, 'and report to you if she is still making an attempt to induce the girls to return to this country, so that you may pass on the information to me'.¹⁶⁸²

16.15 Another case in 1930, that of [REDACTED] also demonstrated migration taking place after parental consent had been refused.¹⁶⁸³ In a letter dated 24 March 1930, Quarriers notified the RSSPCC that [REDACTED] was going to join a migration party departing on [REDACTED]. They requested that the RSSPCC notify any relatives if they thought it wise to do so. [REDACTED] had been admitted to Quarriers at the request of the RSSPCC, he and his siblings having been neglected by their father. The Edinburgh Legal Dispensary subsequently wrote to Quarriers on 23 September 1931 advising that [REDACTED] father had voluntarily admitted his two sons to Quarriers on the understanding that they would be returned to him when they reached the age of 16. It was stated that [REDACTED] had been sent to Canada without his knowledge.

16.16 Documentation relating to [REDACTED] suggests that some pressure may have been put on him to choose the migration option. He had been admitted to Quarriers at the age of 12, at the behest of one Miss [REDACTED] and was migrated to Canada in 1931, aged 16. Shortly before he sailed for Canada, Superintendent William Douglas wrote to [REDACTED] that he was glad [REDACTED] had no intention of returning to his mother's home in Glasgow, but preferred to make his own way in the world with the help of Quarriers.¹⁶⁸⁴ He added,

I regret, however, he has not yet reached a point where he is willing to go to Canada. We shall, of course, not persuade him in any way to this but he knows our mind and I am still hopeful he may yet see the wisdom of changing his plan and seriously consider emigration.¹⁶⁸⁵

¹⁶⁸¹ *Ibid*, Douglas to MacVicar, 17 December 1931, QAR.001.008.0793.

¹⁶⁸² *Ibid*, Winters to Douglas, 31 Dec 1931, QAR.001.008.0775; MacVicar to Douglas, 29 Jan 1932, QAR.001.008.0795.

¹⁶⁸³ Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0044.

¹⁶⁸⁴ [REDACTED] Family File 1931, Douglas to [REDACTED] 24 Jan 1931, QAR.001.008.2513.

¹⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.2513.

16.17 From the outset of Quarriers' migration activity, there was recognition of the need to screen overseas placements and deliver after-care. Between 1872 and 1887 placement and after-care were the responsibility of Annie Macpherson's distribution homes at Belleville and Galt in Ontario, and Knowlton in Quebec, to which the Quarriers' parties were initially sent.¹⁶⁸⁶ After William Quarrier acquired and opened the Fairknowe Home in Brockville, Ontario, in 1888, it served as a reception and distribution centre for Quarriers' migrants until it was sold in 1934. The last Quarriers' migrants were sent to Canada in 1938.

16.18 Households which applied to the Receiving Home for a Quarriers' migrant had to be approved by Fairknowe.¹⁶⁸⁷ Initially this might involve little more than producing a reference from a minister or magistrate, and signing a few papers relating to indenture or adoption. At the Marchmont Home in Belleville, the matron, Agnes Bilbrough, kept a note of all placements and registered all children sent out.¹⁶⁸⁸ At Fairknowe, placements were checked in advance, and if a farmer was not known to the Superintendent, a reference was requested from a local minister. A list of suitable households was maintained, and the 1909 *Narrative of Facts* also referred to a 'Black list' of households where migrants should not be placed.¹⁶⁸⁹ There is also evidence that the Superintendent wrote to prospective homes with a set of conditions, asking householders to highlight, in writing, if they were unable to meet any of those conditions. This information was required in order 'to make the wisest placement, when temperamental needs as well as ability of child must be considered'.¹⁶⁹⁰

16.19 Documentation from the early years of migration suggests that Canadian households rated the migrants primarily for their employability or, sometimes, their appearance.¹⁶⁹¹ Although the treatment of child and juvenile migrants as commodities had ostensibly lessened by the 1920s, a letter to Quarriers from a potential employer in Ontario in 1928 suggests that attitudes had not changed

¹⁶⁸⁶ Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0003.

¹⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0009-0010.

¹⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0003.

¹⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0010.

¹⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.0010.

¹⁶⁹¹ See, for instance, Quarriers' *Narrative of Facts*, 1888, p.49, which included a letter from a Canadian couple who had requested a girl with 'blue eyes' and 'a good countenance': quoted in Marjory Harper, *Adventurers and Exiles: The Great Scottish Exodus* (Profile Books, London, 2003), p.185.

significantly. In requesting a 'Scotch lad, 15 or 16 years of age', who would like to come to Canada, he stipulated that he would

like to get hold of a nice clean cut lad, one that would be willing to learn and could be taught. It would make very little difference whether he had any experience on a farm or not, as the farming in this country is different, and the farm lads that do come out have to learn all over again anyway. Therefore we would be satisfied to get an inexperienced boy - one without any ties preferred.¹⁶⁹²

16.20 Employment was regulated by written agreements between the superintendent of Fairknowe Home as guardian and the employers of migrants who were sent to live with them.¹⁶⁹³ Indentures for juvenile migrants drawn up by Quarriers required that a boy was to be provided with proper board, lodging, washing and mending. According to a memorandum of conditions on which children were placed out, undated but probably 1930, a separate bed was 'essential' and a separate room 'most desirable'.¹⁶⁹⁴ Girls were not to be required to do the work of a boy or a man, and 'should not be left in any place with only men folk about'.¹⁶⁹⁵

16.21 Although the instructions to employers made stipulations about sleeping arrangements, it seems these were not always honoured. In 1926 Quarriers' management was remarkably lackadaisical in highlighting to Claude Winters a recent after-care report relating to the placement of one ██████████ in a home which, according to the Department of Immigration, 'was not a desirable one, as to accommodation'.¹⁶⁹⁶ In particular, it noted that 'the boy should have a bed to himself, and not occupy the same room as his employer. I suppose you will be attending to this matter when visiting'.¹⁶⁹⁷

16.22 An undated memorandum, but probably from 1930, pointed out to employers, to whom it was addressed, that boys were not to be sent out to other employment such as highway work; were to be given statutory holidays; were to be free to decide their church contributions voluntarily; and were not to work

¹⁶⁹² General Correspondence, 1928, J.A. Macpherson, single band and wire specialities, Iona Station, Ontario, to Quarriers Homes, 10 May 1928, QAR.001.009.3781.

¹⁶⁹³ Quarriers, Response to SCAI Section 21 request, QAR.001.008.0005.

¹⁶⁹⁴ Various letters and reports re. Fairknowe Home and children there, 'Memorandum of conditions on which children are placed out', QAR.001.009.3017.

¹⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.3017.

¹⁶⁹⁶ General correspondence, 1926, Orphan Homes of Scotland to Winters, 18 Aug 1926, QAR.001.009.3749,

¹⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.3749,

unreasonable hours.¹⁶⁹⁸ A boy's day 'is not from sunrise to sunset'.¹⁶⁹⁹ Employers were warned that boys would be removed from homes where unreasonable demands were made on their time. Quarriers was particularly concerned about restrictions on visiting rights, especially for siblings. It noted, with the final reminder in capitals for emphasis:

We have been shocked to learn that there are some who are so lacking in feeling as to prevent our boys getting together. Employers so doing are really preventing full success in dealing with their boys; though some in their foolishness profess they are being wise. Boys are social in their make-up and no boy can attain his best when this instinct is denied freedom to operate. The same may be said about other pleasures which are boys' birthright. WE CERTAINLY WILL NOT TOLERATE CONDITIONS TO CONTINUE WHEREIN A BOY IS DEPRIVED OF SUCH PLEASURES AND PRIVILEGES'.¹⁷⁰⁰

16.23 Provision was made for migrants to open savings accounts, with the money being held in trust until they came of age. Quarriers maintained a good paper trail relating to the finances of individuals who had been sent to Canada, though it could perhaps be argued that the management did not adopt best practice in retaining migrants' savings in the UK until they asked for the money. It was a practice that was questioned in 1941 by the Supervisor of Juvenile Immigration during a visit to Claude Winters in respect of the boys who had been migrated three years earlier, when he suggested that the money should be paid, as far as possible, to boys who had accounts with Fairknowe.¹⁷⁰¹

16.24 With respect to after-care following placements, annual visits were made by staff from Fairknowe, and it seems that if they heard 'on the grapevine' that something was wrong, they would send out a visitor at other times.¹⁷⁰² There is also some evidence that after-care continued, at least nominally, for a considerable time. The 1917 *Narrative of Facts* stated that Quarriers remained 'responsible to the Canadian Government for each child until he or she has attained the age of eighteen years, and we gladly continue our active interest till a much later period where we are

¹⁶⁹⁸ Various letters and reports re. Fairknowe Home and children there, undated memorandum, QAR.001.009.3018.

¹⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.3018.

¹⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.3018.

¹⁷⁰¹ Fairknowe children, 1941, Winters to unnamed individual in Quarriers' management, 3 Oct 1941, QAR.001.009.2917.

¹⁷⁰² Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0012.

permitted to do so'.¹⁷⁰³ In 1938 it was noted in a case file that Quarriers remained responsible for migrants until they were 21.¹⁷⁰⁴ On the other hand, in 1934, just before the closure of the Fairknowe Home, the Executive Council emphasised to Claude Winters that after-care should be trimmed in order to reduce expenses, and migrants should be treated in the same way as those who remained in Scotland.¹⁷⁰⁵

16.25 Quarriers' activities were frequently commended in the annual inspection reports of G. Bogue Smart, Chief Inspector of British Immigrant Children and Receiving Homes. In 1912, for instance, he wrote that the cottage homes at Bridge of Weir were 'regarded as amongst the most wonderful of their kind in the world'; Fairknowe had for years been of 'great benefit' to the farmers of eastern Ontario in supplying them with juvenile workers; and the migrants were 'systematically visited at least once each year' as well as being encouraged to maintain a regular correspondence.¹⁷⁰⁶ On the other hand, Quarriers admitted that its migration policy was not always successful, 'with some disappointments and many encouragements'.¹⁷⁰⁷ During the 1930s depression, when jobs were scarce and wages fell, youths became 'easily dissatisfied and even unduly discouraged, resulting in a larger percentage of returns to Fairknowe'.¹⁷⁰⁸ Such 'returns' needed new placements. By 1938 pre-placement and post-placement inspections were carried out by Claude Winters, the former superintendent at Fairknowe, with a representative of the Juvenile Division of the Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch. The inauguration of pre-placement visits allowed potentially unsuitable employers to be identified more easily and was quite innovative for the time. For instance, one pre-placement report in 1938 observed that the farmer's wife 'apparently has a very good opinion of herself and might be inclined to be domineering'.¹⁷⁰⁹

16.26 Despite these arrangements, it seems there were still problems. In September 1938 some criticisms of laxity in inspection and after-care emerged when the management of Quarriers interviewed Claude Winters.¹⁷¹⁰ It was reported that he had

¹⁷⁰³ *Narrative of Facts*, 1917, p.30, cited in Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0012.

¹⁷⁰⁴ ██████████ Children's files, 1938, Quarriers to Kinnoull Parish Council, 14 March 1938, QAR.001.008.4405.

¹⁷⁰⁵ Fairknowe children, 1933, Secretary, Quarriers, to Claude Winters, 19 May 1934, QAR.001.009.2815-2820.

¹⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid*, Report of G. Bogue Smart's official annual visit of inspection, 1912, QAR.001.009.3065-3066.

¹⁷⁰⁷ *Narrative of Facts*, 1931, QAR.001.001.2663.

¹⁷⁰⁸ *Narrative of Facts*, 1932, QAR.001.001.2705.

¹⁷⁰⁹ ██████████ Children's file, 1938, pre-placement visitation report by K.D. Kayler, 20 April 1938, QAR.001.008.4397.

¹⁷¹⁰ Fairknowe children, 1938, report of interview with Winters, Sept 1938, QAR.001.009.2877-2878.

a card index containing the names and addresses of 1,500 lads, and was in touch with over 70 of them annually. However, it was felt that more personal visitation was necessary regarding living and working conditions, leisure, and church connections. It further recommended that Winters should organise 'an occasional meeting with the older lads around Brockville and district, and some community centre', since all the juveniles were located within a 120-mile radius of Brockville, and many visited the town.¹⁷¹¹ More importantly, the report noted that 'homes were not visited before placement, and this ought to be done', though at the same time Winters should also be furnished with information about the backgrounds, characteristics and weaknesses of the migrants.¹⁷¹²

16.27 Not surprisingly, after-care reports reflect a mixture of positive and negative experiences. There are both explicit and veiled hints about employers who were 'rather hard to please', migrants who were 'a little difficult', drawn to bad company, or homesick. On one occasion Claude Winters pointed out to Quarriers' management that there were particular challenges in supervising juveniles. 'Large boys and girls who have been in service and away from the discipline of Bridge of Weir are quite a different problem from that of the young children in the individual Homes.'¹⁷¹³ Quarriers was also particularly aware of the vulnerability of female migrants. 'It is always about the girls we are more anxious', was one comment in a letter from the Council of Management to Winters in 1934.¹⁷¹⁴ There is also some evidence that action was taken (or at least planned) if employers were felt to be unreasonable or abusive. For instance, in 1939 the report of an after-care visit to ██████████, aged 16, who had been migrated a year earlier, noted that 'this visit was not pleasant', partly because the employer had been 'very much wrought up' over the matter of wages, had been 'most unrestrained' in his attitude to Claude Winters, and had focused on ██████████ failings.¹⁷¹⁵ Since the household had been an 'excellent home' in which boys had been placed for several years, Winters' conclusion was that the employer 'must not be well'.¹⁷¹⁶ His response was to talk to both parties before leaving them 'to think the matter over', noting that '[t]he boy seems anxious to remain but very much hurt that he is not pleasing Mr Clazie.... This is a good home...where there is every evidence of prosperity. We will make a change however

¹⁷¹¹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2877.

¹⁷¹² *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2877.

¹⁷¹³ Fairknowe children, 1932, Winters to Maclay, 2 March 1932, QAR.001.009.2776.

¹⁷¹⁴ Fairknowe children, 1933, Secretary, Quarriers, to Claude Winters, 19 May 1934, QAR.001.009.2817.

¹⁷¹⁵ Fairknowe children, 1938, Report on ██████████ 23 Sept 1939, QAR.001.009.2900.

¹⁷¹⁶ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2900.

if this spirit persists'.¹⁷¹⁷ Perhaps the spirit did not persist, for the three subsequent reports were all positive.

16.28 The problem of homesickness emerges clearly in the case of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who was migrated in 1938, aged 15. Shortly after being sent from Fairknowe to a farm near Ottawa, which had received a good pre-placement report and had previously taken in Quarrier migrants, he wrote to Claude Winters, describing homesickness and an excessive workload.

I reached Ramsayville at 12 noon feeling very lonely and homesick and have been ever since. I started work after dinner, and at night because I could not lift as much on my shovel as Mr Fee he lost his temper and swore at me and told me I was to go a little faster when I was doing my best at night after a hard day's work. I felt terrible lonely and unhappy and wish I was near some of the other boys. I know none of them will come and see me as I am so far away. Some nights I feel like running away I'm so unhappy, I want to know if would try [*sic*] and get me a farm nearer some of the other boys, but I'll stick to this one till you get one for me please...up at half past 4 retire at 9 o'clock.¹⁷¹⁸

Quarriers' response was to arrange an immediate visit and to put [REDACTED] in touch with other Quarrier boys in the area. By the time of that visit [REDACTED] was allegedly 'much better satisfied and seems quite happy', an impression which was confirmed by a subsequent after-care report in September.¹⁷¹⁹ Although 'careful questioning was made' on the latter occasion, [REDACTED] made no complaint, and was 'quite spontaneous' in voicing his satisfaction.¹⁷²⁰ He 'expressed himself as well satisfied that he had come to Canada and was ready to recommend it to other boys'.¹⁷²¹

16.29 Sometimes the language of after-care reports was ambiguous or cryptic. In September 1939 Winters' report on [REDACTED] aged 16, who had been migrated the previous year, noted that the employer's wife was 'reasonable in her attitude toward the boy'.¹⁷²² [REDACTED] was 'getting along much better than might have

¹⁷¹⁷ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2900.

¹⁷¹⁸ [REDACTED] Admission Form and Children's File, 1938, [REDACTED] to Winters, undated letter, written between 21 April and 9 May 1938, QAR.001.008.5234.

¹⁷¹⁹ *Ibid*, After-Care Report, 1 September 1938, QAR.001.008.5235.

¹⁷²⁰ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.5235.

¹⁷²¹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.5235.

¹⁷²² Fairknowe children, 1939, report on [REDACTED] 23 Sept 1939, QAR.001.009.2904.

been expected. No complaints were registered against him and I think his general behaviour is quite satisfactory'.¹⁷²³

A letter in 1932 from the Quarriers Executive Committee to the superintendent of Fairknowe implied that elsewhere assaults had taken place.¹⁷²⁴ However, their nature, and whether they were perpetrated by or against juveniles, is not clear.

There have been some cases of criminal assault and in future you will immediately send full particulars of any such to the Superintendent for consideration of the Council. Our feeling is that under almost any circumstance those cases should be prosecuted to the utmost, even at the risk of some exposure.¹⁷²⁵

It seems that sometimes information was taken on trust rather than personal observation or interview, even when a placement was known to be potentially problematic and a boy's negative reputation had gone before him. When, in September 1939, Winters attempted to visit 16-year-old ██████████ who had been migrated a year earlier, the boy and his employer were both away.¹⁷²⁶ The employer's wife reported that ██████████ was a good worker, whose only fault was a hot temper, and Winters noted that he had done 'remarkably well in view of his general reputation at the O.H.S.'¹⁷²⁷ [Orphan Homes of Scotland, that is Quarriers.] Winters had also been told by other boys that he 'seemed to be quite happy'.¹⁷²⁸

16.30 Of more concern is an after-care report on ██████████ aged 15, who was migrated in 1938 and visited in his placement the following year. Despite serious allegations about the boy's sexual conduct, nothing was done to remove him or investigate the matter further. Winters reported:

I did not find the atmosphere very pleasant. Neither the boy nor employer is satisfied with the other and there would seem to be reasons on both sides. It is a fine home and well situated but seems to be slipping in the matter of refinement and it would appear that Mr Sine is much absorbed in material things, and possibly expects too much of the boy of ██████████ age. ██████████ is conscious of this fact

¹⁷²³ Fairknowe children, 1939, report on ██████████ 23 Sept 1939, QAR.001.009.2904.

¹⁷²⁴ Letter from the Executive Committee to Canada regarding procedures, Lord Maclay to Claude Winters, 15 Feb 1932, QAR.001.009.4099-4101.

¹⁷²⁵ Letter from the Executive Committee to Canada regarding procedures, Lord Maclay to Claude Winters, 15 Feb 1932, QAR.001.009.4101.

¹⁷²⁶ Fairknowe children, 1939, report on ██████████ 2 September 1939, QAR.001.0092905.

¹⁷²⁷ *Ibid*, QAR.001.0092905.

¹⁷²⁸ *Ibid*, QAR.001.0092905.

and feels somewhat discontented. It was learned however that this boy feels that he has been unfortunate rather than careless and he feels that he might do better if he got a new start elsewhere. There have been several accidents which Mr Sine says are really carelessness and the boy's refusing to do what he is told. A disturbing factor was that [REDACTED] has misbehaved in respect to two young children. No details were given but it was manifestly in the sexual realm. I left it with the two of them to think the matter over and I have since written asking what is their decision. [REDACTED] is apparently wilfull [*sic*], self-determined in most of his attitudes and I also find that there is a possibility that others are influencing him.¹⁷²⁹

16.31 The 70-page file on [REDACTED] reflects the challenges of handling the problems arising from the migration of a boy who was sent to Canada for reasons that had not been fully thought through. [REDACTED] was the youngest of four children from Aberdeen, whose father had died and whose mother was described in the Quarriers files as an 'undesirable person'.¹⁷³⁰ He had been admitted to Quarriers in 1919, at the age of 3, and sent to Canada in 1931, three months before his 16th birthday. According to the Superintendent, William Douglas,

The deciding arguments leading to his emigration were that he was the last and youngest of his family, the others having done moderately well in Canada and that it was thoroughly undesirable that he should return to the home surroundings from which he had been taken years ago.¹⁷³¹

[REDACTED] failed to settle in Canada, had several very short and unsuccessful placements, resisted the efforts of his siblings to help him adjust, and from the outset expressed a desire to return to Scotland. An initial after-care report in November 1931 claimed that if his moodiness had been due to home-sickness, 'we could have patience, but he acts demon-like in his relationship to the people, most impudent and wilful'.¹⁷³² The allegation that the problem was 'not home-sickness...but sheer wilfulness' was repeated three months later, in a letter from the Superintendent of Fairknowe which also highlighted the financial impact of failed placements, and the bad publicity that such cases generated.¹⁷³³ During his ten months in Canada, [REDACTED] had cost Fairknowe at least \$200, and the Superintendent warned that 'the

¹⁷²⁹ *Ibid*, report on [REDACTED] 23 Sept 1939, QAR.001.009.2907.

¹⁷³⁰ [REDACTED] History Book, 1931, QAR.001.008.2690 and Admission Form and Family File, 1931, Douglas to Winter, 9 March 1932, QAR001.008.2633.

¹⁷³¹ *Ibid*, Admission Form and Family File, 1931, Douglas to Winters, 19 January 1932, QAR.001.008.2626.

¹⁷³² *Ibid*, Report on [REDACTED] 25 November 1931, QAR.001.008.2629.

¹⁷³³ *Ibid*, Winters to Douglas, 8 March 1932, QAR.001.008.2634.

cost of such cases might be well given consideration when the cost of our operations are under review'.¹⁷³⁴ He continued: 'I am convinced that it is sheer folly to try to place him again. It is neither fair to the work nor to the employers and it is inviting trouble and criticism to turn him adrift in Canada'.¹⁷³⁵ In expressing concern that ██████ might provoke wider criticism of Quarriers in Canada, he cited criticism of child migration by Bishop John Farthing of Montreal. Although Farthing's criticism seems to have been based on his experience of BICA, Winters warned that

it is a large body of opinion which he represents and though it be an uninformed body has nevertheless to be reckoned with. Although one could answer his letter fairly effectively it would seem unwise to agitate any further feeling. It seems to me better to hope that nothing more will come of the agitation.¹⁷³⁶

By late 1931 the Quarriers management was discussing the feasibility of returning ██████ to Scotland. On 23 December a memo from Douglas to Winters advised that

in view of this boy's family history and on general principles, we think the question of his return to this country should not be raised at all if avoidable but if you are driven to extremity he should earn his passage and you might refer his case to us again so that it may come up before a full meeting of our enlarged Executive Committee.¹⁷³⁷

In ██████ 1932 ██████ was returned to Aberdeen, with Quarriers covering most of the cost of his repatriation. Two months later Frank Ogden, Secretary of the Aberdeen Lads' Club, wrote to Douglas, asking for his help in returning ██████ (now aged 17) to Canada, a request which Douglas 'most emphatically' declined.¹⁷³⁸ Apparently ██████ had told Ogden that he had been sent back because he did not like farm work, and also because he wanted to visit his mother in Aberdeen. On arrival, however, having found his step-father in prison and his mother inebriated, he was 'willing and keen' to return to Canada to join his siblings.¹⁷³⁹ Frank Ogden was critical of Quarriers' refusal to countenance ██████ re-migration, which he felt was 'the only way of saving this lad from trouble with the Police', and also

¹⁷³⁴ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.2634-2635.

¹⁷³⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.2635.

¹⁷³⁶ *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.2635; see below, para 16.32

¹⁷³⁷ *Ibid*, Douglas to Winder, 23 December 1931, QAR.001.008.2628.

¹⁷³⁸ *Ibid*, Douglas to Ogden, 18 October 1932, QAR.001.008.2652.

¹⁷³⁹ *Ibid*, Ogden to Douglas, 15 October 1932, QAR.001.008.2653.

denounced the decision to send him back to Scotland on an ordinary passport.¹⁷⁴⁰ If there was anything wrong with his character, Ogden argued, he should have been deported, rather than issued with a passport that implied—erroneously—that there was no barrier against his return to Canada. Douglas defended Quarriers' action on the grounds that it was in [REDACTED] longer-term interest.¹⁷⁴¹

As you are probably aware, there is no procedure whereby a lad such as this can be sent out of the Dominion otherwise excepting on an Official Deportation Order and we leave you to judge which would be the kinder action - to return the lad as we did on an ordinary passport with no official blemish on his record or definitely to mark him as an undesirable and have him officially deported by order of the Department of Immigration. Whilst we would strongly disapprove of your encouraging this lad to return so soon to Canada, we wished to leave the matter open so that if at some considerably later time after he had learnt his lessons sufficiently, he wished independently to return to Canada at his own expense or with the help of other members of his family but not as an assisted immigrant, he might do so.¹⁷⁴²

It is difficult to assess, from the correspondence in [REDACTED] file, whether the decision not to deport him was based on the boy's interests, or a desire to avoid the negative publicity associated with deportation. The earlier reference to Bishop Farthing's criticism of child migration and Canadian public disapproval of the practice suggests that Quarriers' priority was to maintain a low profile in order to avoid attracting opprobrium. The fundamental problem, however, was probably the facile assumption that [REDACTED] should be migrated simply because his siblings had settled well in Canada.

16.32 It seems that Quarriers Council of Management was reluctant to see migrants returned to Scotland unless it was absolutely necessary. In February 1932 Lord Maclay, Chairman of the Council, wrote to Claude Winters, instructing him that

no children should be returned to Scotland without approval being received from the Superintendent at Bridge-of-Weir, acting under instructions of the Council of Management. We feel that once children are in Canada, if anything goes wrong, Canada should retain the responsibility. Of course if the return is forced by the Authority, there is no option. It is well always to keep in mind that (apart from heavy expense) one of the principal reasons when children are sent

¹⁷⁴⁰ *Ibid*, Ogden to Douglas, 20 October 1932, QAR.001.008.2654; 8 December 1932, QAR.001.008.2650.

¹⁷⁴¹ *Ibid*, Douglas to Ogden, 19 December 1932, QAR.001.008.2651.

¹⁷⁴² *Ibid*, QAR.001.008.2651

to Canada is that their friends here are undesirable and it is therefore seldom wise to send them back if it can be avoided.¹⁷⁴³

In fact, a significant number of Quarrier migrants returned—or were sent back—to Scotland, though some subsequently returned to Canada after spending time back in Scotland. Reasons for return that are documented in the case history books include sickness, injury or deformity, and at the request of relatives. One boy was returned in 1931 after his father had threatened to take legal action on the grounds that his son was 'not a poor orphan boy whom they can exploit in Canada', but had been removed across the Atlantic three years earlier without paternal consent.¹⁷⁴⁴

Sometimes the records do not give any explanation for return. However, the majority of migrants who were sent back to Scotland were those who were deemed to be problematic or to have failed, including a number of girls who had become pregnant. Some migrants were deported after committing crimes or becoming public charges. It is not always clear how return was funded, but on at least one occasion Quarriers seems to have wished to protect its reputation by partially subsidising the return of a boy who had been 'a great trouble in Canada behaving so badly the Home got a bad name on his account for miles around'.¹⁷⁴⁵ His fare was paid to Montreal, from where he was told to work his way back to Scotland.¹⁷⁴⁶ There is also evidence in a number of individual case histories that some returners continued to be given after-care, including residence in the City Home in Glasgow, placement in other institutions, or the securing of employment.¹⁷⁴⁷

16.33 On at least one occasion Quarriers seems to have intervened to pre-empt deportation, and the associated bad publicity, by funding the return of a girl who had

¹⁷⁴³ Letter from the Executive Committee to Canada regarding procedures, Maclay to Winters, 15 Feb 1932, QAR.001.009.4100.

¹⁷⁴⁴ [REDACTED] History Book, quoted in Marjory Harper, *Emigration from Scotland between the Wars* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998), p.187.

¹⁷⁴⁵ Quarriers, History Book, vol. 6, 1884-85, p.233.

¹⁷⁴⁶ Quarriers, History Book, vol. 6, 1884-85, p.233.

¹⁷⁴⁷ For examples, see Quarriers History Book, vol. 13, 1891-92, including: [REDACTED] migrated to Canada in 1888, returned to Scotland in 1893, sent initially to the City Home, and then out to service; [REDACTED] migrated 1873, returned 1877, placed in the Shelter at Maryhill; [REDACTED] migrated 1875, returned 1884, sent to the Western Infirmary and then to Govan Poorhouse; [REDACTED] migrated 1892, returned 1902, placed in service; [REDACTED] migrated 1891, returned 1903—'she called to see if she could be received to some place of service and was given a place in Glasgow'; [REDACTED] migrated 1887, sent back for fire raising in 1890, and returned to Quarriers' Homes, from where he was discharged in 1896 for 'continued misbehaviour and disobedience'; [REDACTED] migrated 1887, sent back 1891 for 'bad conduct', sent to City Home and then to service in Pollokshields; [REDACTED] migrated 1887, returned 1897 and sent to Poorhouse.

become pregnant. She had migrated in 1930, aged 19, but was returned to Scotland about 16 months later after two unsuccessful placements. Claude Winters, Superintendent of Fairknowe Home, wrote to the girl's aunt in Glasgow that if her condition had been caused by the

right sort of people we could have sought redress but she herself was so foolish in her conduct and associations, and the man to blame of such an order that we could not take action and there was nothing to do but return her to Scotland in the way we did, as otherwise she would have been deported when she became a charge upon public charity.¹⁷⁴⁸

Another Quarrier migrant who was returned to Scotland on the same vessel after only a year in Canada had aborted her illegitimate child and was suspected of following in her mother's footsteps by working as a prostitute. Her subsequent intention of returning to her Canadian employers in 1932, at Quarriers' expense, was vehemently opposed by Claude Winters, who suspected an illicit relationship between the girl and her employers and argued that she was 'decidedly undesirable from the Canadian point of view and from the point of view of the reputation of our work'.¹⁷⁴⁹ In another instance it seems that a female migrant may have been threatened with deportation if she failed to do well in a placement. In May 1926 Quarriers' management recommended that one ██████████ should be removed from the aunt with whom she had been placed, and relocated with strangers.¹⁷⁵⁰ The letter continued: 'If you can get her a situation in the country away from Brockville and tell her that if she fails to do well there it means being deported, she will surely make an effort to do what is right'.¹⁷⁵¹

16.34 Quarriers' concern to avoid negative publicity in Canada is evident from time to time in correspondence from the Fairknowe Superintendent to the Council of Management in Scotland. In 1932, for instance, Claude Winters advised the Council not to press criminal assault charges against men who had impregnated Quarrier girls since 'in many circumstances, nothing but publicity would result'.¹⁷⁵² Similar reputational concern is evident in case files. ██████████ was returned to

¹⁷⁴⁸ ██████████ Admission Form and Children's File, 1930, Claude Winters to ██████████, 3 Nov 1931, QAR.001.008.1674.

¹⁷⁴⁹ Quarriers, History Book, ██████████ quoted in Harper, *Scotland No More?*, p.98.

¹⁷⁵⁰ General correspondence, 1926, Orphan Homes of Scotland to Winters, 25 May 1926, QAR.001.009.3745.

¹⁷⁵¹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.3745.

¹⁷⁵² Fairknowe children, 1932, Winters to Maclay, 2 March 1932, QAR.001.009.2772.

Scotland in March 1931. Two years earlier he had assaulted his employer's wife, and had then been imprisoned for ten days for vandalising a railway track. When he returned to Fairknowe after failing to settle in a subsequent situation, the Home, mindful of the prevailing political and economic climate, decided to return him to Scotland, since 'for our own reputation's sake we cannot turn him adrift, in view of the unemployment and general interest of the public in feeding and caring for the unfortunate'.¹⁷⁵³

16.35 The importance of more careful selection in order to protect Quarriers' reputation and prevent the return of failed migrants to Scotland was articulated at length in 1932 in a letter from Claude Winters to Lord Maclay, Chairman of the Council of Management.¹⁷⁵⁴ Winters claimed that insufficient care had been taken to assess the temperamental suitability and character of migrants who had become 'real problems to us'.¹⁷⁵⁵ It was generally accepted that Canada should assume responsibility for migrants once they had been in the Dominion for 'a reasonable length of time', but he pointed out that the Canadian authorities had, with good reason, 'become weary of assuming responsibility for many almost immediately upon their arrival'.¹⁷⁵⁶ Although he emphasised that on the whole Quarriers had 'not been the sinners in this respect', the economic depression was creating unprecedented difficulties.¹⁷⁵⁷ He continued:

We were told quite bluntly in Ottawa by the authorities that, in the main, we were responsible for bringing to Canada misfits, because the Government Officials could not be expected to check up on anything but physical and mental capacities, and that we had a right to know the moral and temperamental character of the applicant. In normal times, even these problem cases could be easily absorbed in Canada but this is not the case today, and, purely from jealousy for the good name of the work...I would urge a most careful character analysis of each one of the children proposed as a candidate for immigration or else, in the meantime, at least, that we continue to show a willingness to assume responsibility in case of failure.¹⁷⁵⁸

¹⁷⁵³ Fairknowe Report, 9 Dec 1930, quoted in Harper, *Emigration from Scotland between the Wars*, p.187.

¹⁷⁵⁴ Fairknowe children, 1932, Winters to Maclay, 2 March 1932, QAR.001.009.2772-2777.

¹⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2772.

¹⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2772.

¹⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2772.

¹⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2772.

16.36 On the basis of the above correspondence, as well as intermittent evidence in the *Narrative of Facts* and case files, it seems that during the inter-war period Quarriers was aware of opposition to its Canadian migration policy on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, in 1932 William Douglas, Superintendent of Quarriers, seems to have cast doubt on the future of the Canadian migration work because of an unfavourable attitude towards emigration by children and their relatives in Britain.¹⁷⁵⁹ In response Claude Winters attributed this to 'exaggerated press reports' about conditions in Canada but acknowledged that the future of the work was 'at least dubious'.¹⁷⁶⁰ Quarriers sought to counteract opposition to migration in various ways, including demonstrating a willingness to liaise with Canadian social workers. An article in the *Narrative of Facts* in 1929 suggested that Quarriers and other agencies involved in youth migration were willing to learn from professionals.¹⁷⁶¹ It referred to a tendency among Canadian social workers in recent years to be critical of juvenile immigration, particularly from institutions in Great Britain, and also of agencies responsible for after-care. It attributed such criticism to lack of knowledge of the work, and commended a conference held in 1927 at the instigation of the Canadian Department of Immigration, which had brought together all child migration societies and Canadian social workers to discuss the recommendations of a child welfare investigator. As a result, the various parties had developed 'a much desired mutual understanding' and 'the suitability of the Juvenile immigrant to a large extent has been established', resulting in more juveniles being brought to Canada 'than ever before'.¹⁷⁶² Two years later, however, Canadian government financial assistance was withdrawn in response to unemployment and depression, at the same time as Quarriers' Canadian costs had increased because of the number of unemployed youths being returned to Fairknowe.¹⁷⁶³

16.37 The attitude of social workers was raised again in 1937, when Claude Winters argued for the resumption of migration activity. On 12 July he wrote to D.J. Findlay that the time was now 'more than ripe' for such a resumption, since farm labour was at a premium, and the government's attempt to induce unemployed men from the cities to work on farms had proved unsatisfactory.¹⁷⁶⁴ He acknowledged that there would be objections from labour and social welfare organisations, but felt that if

¹⁷⁵⁹ *Ibid*, Winters to Maclay, QAR.001.009.2769.

¹⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁶¹ *Ibid*, *Narrative of Facts*, 1929, QAR.001.001.2577.

¹⁷⁶² *Ibid*, QAR.001.001.2577.

¹⁷⁶³ *Narrative of Facts*, 1931, QAR.001.001.2663.

¹⁷⁶⁴ *Fairknowe children, 1937*, Winters to Findlay, 12 July 1937, QAR.001.009.2874.

immigration societies were willing to assume responsibility, these objections could be met, 'especially if a wholesale immigration is not instituted but rather a very limited experimental program', coupled with guarantees that the migrants would not become a burden on local municipalities.¹⁷⁶⁵ In a follow-up letter a day later, Winters alleged that social workers' previous criticisms of juvenile migration had been directed at 'Societies other than our own'.¹⁷⁶⁶ He noted that

modern Social Workers are strong against institutionalizing of children and therefore do not place much value upon the institution. Where free homes are not available for children, their contention is that boarding homes should be used and the Institution as little as possible.¹⁷⁶⁷

Winters' recent experience with boarding homes through the Children's Aid Society in Brockville was that they were indeed useful, although supervision was 'strenuous and insistent'.¹⁷⁶⁸ They were also less expensive and were likely to be 'an instrument to win the sympathy of the social workers', although the latter would probably require pre-visitation of the home and more frequent post-placement visits.¹⁷⁶⁹

16.38 Discussions around the possible resumption of juvenile migration in 1937 were shrouded in secrecy for reasons of political and financial sensitivity, and to avoid compromising the position of F.C. Blair, Secretary of the Department of Immigration, who favoured a resumption, but could not be seen to speak out in its favour. In November 1937 Winters explained the situation in a letter to D.J. Findlay:

My understanding is that the Department of Immigration has come to the conclusion from the experience of the last years of Juvenile immigration, that the voluntary Organizations do the most acceptable work. The reason for secrecy is very apparent; they do not want publicity and the consequent discussion and controversy. Everyone including officialdom knows that the farmers are hard pressed for labor and most people that know the farm situation agree that the only adequate source of supply is immigration. I have had representatives during the Summer from many districts covering most of our former territory and the unanimous opinion is that the farmers have found it very hard this Summer to operate. Notwithstanding this there is an element who because of prejudice, fight any suggestion of immigration. Prominent amongst these, as I have already stated, are certain factions of labor and of Social Service workers

¹⁷⁶⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2874.

¹⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid*, Winters to Findlay, 13 July 1937, QAR.001.009.2854.

¹⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2854.

¹⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2854.

¹⁷⁶⁹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2854-2855.

who have been battling the Dr Barnardo Homes. As I have already indicated, I would strongly recommend that you try to do a scientific social program and keep abreast with the ideals and standards of such work which has forged ahead at a tremendous rate in Canada during these depression periods. I am in close touch with this program and with the leaders, and by our Children's Aid program here, have attracted their attention. I regret that I have to say this myself, but I am doing it only to show what I know is needed and if you have the Social Service people with you, you have nothing to fear.¹⁷⁷⁰

By the time Winters met with F.C. Blair later in November 1937, the Department of Immigration had decided that certain organisations would be allowed to migrate male juveniles without a quota being set. Blair wanted to make the selecting organisations responsible for deciding the numbers that could be absorbed, and expected the costs of transportation, after-care and the securing of employment to be borne by those organisations.¹⁷⁷¹

16.39 Organisational distinctions were also evident in 1937 after the Department of Immigration had decided that juvenile migration should be resumed. Since Fairknowe had been closed three years earlier, it had been suggested, apparently by Quarriers' management, that the Salvation Army hostel at Woodstock should be used as a temporary reception and placement centre. While willing to accept this arrangement, the Department told Winters that they would 'much rather have an agency controlling its own work beginning with reception and placement'.¹⁷⁷² It also recommended not grouping all the distributing centres too close to Toronto 'as that does not make for either the best placement or supervision and besides it is a constant temptation to boys to leave their placement and make for the big city'.¹⁷⁷³ The Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch (successor to the Department of Immigration and Colonization) also seems to have regarded Quarriers' juvenile migration activity more highly than that of the Salvation Army. On 10 December 1937 M.J. Scobie, Supervisor in the Department, wrote confidentially to Winters to explain that when the resumption of juvenile migration had been discussed the previous year, it had been suggested, seemingly by the Canadian federal government representatives in London, that Quarrier migrants could be

¹⁷⁷⁰ Fairknowe children, 1937, Winters to Findlay, 4 Nov 1937, QAR.001.009.2857.

¹⁷⁷¹ *Ibid*, Winters to Findlay, 29 Nov 1937, QAR.001.009.2856.

¹⁷⁷² Fairknowe children, 1938, F.C. Blair to Winters, 30 November 1937, QAR.001.009.2884.

¹⁷⁷³ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2884.

distributed under the auspices of Salvation Army officers in Canada.¹⁷⁷⁴ However, 'you are well enough acquainted with the circumstances to know that any such arrangement might have been a delicate one, and would have left you out of the picture, and the boys, therefore, would not have had the benefit of your experience and wise counsel.'¹⁷⁷⁵ Nothing further had been heard, and Scobie was simply alerting Winters to his view that the Department would probably look favourably on his application, 'provided that the distribution could be made under similar circumstances to those which existed when you operated the Fairknowe Home.... I do think that you served a real need in your district and that anything that might be done should be done through you.'¹⁷⁷⁶ Winters sent Blair's communication to Quarriers' management, along with his own covering letter in which he expressed his opposition to the Salvation Army proposal. He claimed that the activities of the British Immigration and Colonization Association and, to a lesser extent, the Salvation Army were responsible for the 'general hostility to juvenile immigration'.¹⁷⁷⁷ Barnardos, too, had allegedly aggravated that hostility more by an 'intolerant attitude than by faulty after-care'.¹⁷⁷⁸ Winters wrote:

I have nothing against the Salvation Army or their good intentions but their wholesale program and their lack of studied and adequate selection and after-care was considered by Social workers and ourselves as little short of a potential scandal, in fact I am under the impression that officialdom was eager to limit them then, and even now is hoping that the lack of governmental assistance will keep them out of the program for some time. The record of the O.H.S. [i.e. Quarriers] is too good in Canada to run the chance of prejudicing the future by such an alliance.¹⁷⁷⁹

16.40 As suggested earlier, Quarriers' efforts to protect its reputation and reinstate its faltering migration programme in the 1930s also involved distancing itself from the work of other migration organisations. In a somewhat cryptic letter in March 1934 Claude Winters had observed that there was a trend towards favouring the old (presumably pre-1922) system of juvenile immigration under which the old voluntary societies were given a preference.¹⁷⁸⁰ He felt that the United Church, the British

¹⁷⁷⁴ Fairknowe children, 1937, Scobie to Winters, 10 Dec 1937, QAR.001.009.2865. See also above, para 12.13 for Scobie's involvement with the BICA.

¹⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2865.

¹⁷⁷⁶ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2865.

¹⁷⁷⁷ Fairknowe children, 1938, Winters to Findlay, 8 Dec 1937, QAR.001.009.2881.

¹⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2881.

¹⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2881.

¹⁷⁸⁰ Fairknowe children, 1933, Winters to D.J. Findlay, 29 March 1934, QAR.001.009.2798-2800.

Immigration and Colonization Association and 'such movements' were unlikely to be considered 'for some time to come', and that Barnardos would have to change both its methods and its attitude towards the Department of Immigration and Colonization.¹⁷⁸¹ He claimed that Quarriers, however, enjoyed 'great favour' with the Department, whose Assistant Deputy Minister, F.C. Blair, had recently made a confidential visit to Fairknowe to make that very point.¹⁷⁸² Winters' main complaint seemed to be that he was unable to capitalise on this attitude because of insufficient support from Quarriers' management in Scotland to organise a party of migrant boys, and he mentioned the Department of Immigration and Colonization's surprise that Quarriers was not being more pro-active. He claimed to be handicapped by having no instructions from the Executive Committee/Council of Management, which had refused to consent to his proposal for a migrant party.¹⁷⁸³

16.41 In a further attempt to defend its reputation, Quarriers shifted the blame on to Cossar migrants. In the annual report for 1929, Winters possibly had Cossar boys in mind when he referred to 'a measure of unrest that has not characterised the past six or seven years. We attribute it largely to the influence of boys other than our own who will not settle'.¹⁷⁸⁴ And in 1933 Winters further remarked that although a number of migrants sent out under Quarriers auspices had been deported, two of those migrants had been Cossar boys.¹⁷⁸⁵

16.42 Alongside inter-organisational friction there is also evidence of tensions within Quarriers between the Council of Management in Scotland and Claude Winters in Brockville. By 1932 Winters felt he had been demoted because he could no longer communicate directly with the Council of Management but only through the Superintendent of Quarriers at Bridge of Weir.¹⁷⁸⁶ In effect, decisions could no longer be made locally but had to be referred back to Scotland. In a letter of 15 February 1932, Lord Maclay, Chairman of the Quarriers Council of Management, wrote to tell Winters that 'the expenditure in connection with upkeep of Fairknowe has surprised us' and that the cost of after-care was 'excessive', considering that there were

¹⁷⁸¹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2800.

¹⁷⁸² *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2798.

¹⁷⁸³ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2798 and 2804.

¹⁷⁸⁴ *Narrative of Facts*, 1929, QAR.001.001.2577.

¹⁷⁸⁵ Fairknowe children, 1933; Winters to William Findlay, Secretary, Orphan Homes of Scotland, 26 July 1933, QAR.001.009.2783-2785.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Fairknowe children, 1932, Winters to Lord Maclay, 2 March 1932, QAR.001.009.2771.

currently only 175 juveniles on the supervision list.¹⁷⁸⁷ He also instructed Winters that 'no children should be returned to Scotland without approval being received from the Superintendent at Bridge-of-Weir, acting under instructions of the Council of Management'.¹⁷⁸⁸

16.43 Winters then argued unsuccessfully against the closure of Fairknowe and the virtual abandonment of migration and after-care. In May 1934 the Executive told him that there was no justification for continuing the expense of the Canadian work in view of the small number of migrants for whom Quarriers was responsible.¹⁷⁸⁹ He was instructed to limit the work in Canada to his 'own personal efforts' in looking after those migrants who needed guidance and assistance. The Council of Management letter continued:

Boys and girls who have gone to Canada must realise - and no doubt most of them do - that they have been given their chance to make good, and that they are now on their own resources - however glad The Orphan Homes are at any time to be helpful to them - just like children who leave The Orphan Homes here and do not go abroad...It is also probable that boys and girls would not so quickly give up their jobs if they had not an open door to take them in at Fairknowe, but in any case they have practically all reached such an age that they should be able to care for themselves.¹⁷⁹⁰

But Winters rejected the Council of Management's claim about Fairknowe's redundancy. He claimed that failures were due not to the Home's open door policy, but to poor selection in Scotland.¹⁷⁹¹ As a result 'certain boys were sent who could not be expected to make good'.¹⁷⁹² Fairknowe, however, had made a 'considerable contribution' to the success of the work and it would be a 'calamity' to give it up.¹⁷⁹³ Nevertheless, Fairknowe was sold to the local Children's Aid Society in 1934. Winters received a salary of £400 for the next year, and after-care work was to continue out

¹⁷⁸⁷ Letter from the Executive Committee to Canada regarding procedures, Maclay to Winters, 15 Feb 1932, QAR.001.009.4099-4100.

¹⁷⁸⁸ Letter from the Executive Committee to Canada regarding procedures, Maclay to Winters, 15 Feb 1932, QAR.001.009.4100.

¹⁷⁸⁹ Fairknowe children, 1933, Secretary of Executive Committee to Winters, 19 May 1934, QAR.001.009.2815-2817.

¹⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2817-2819.

¹⁷⁹¹ Fairknowe children, 1934, Winters to Findlay, 7 June 1934, QAR.001.009.2821-2822.

¹⁷⁹² *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2821.

¹⁷⁹³ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2821.

of a house which he himself would provide.¹⁷⁹⁴ He was instructed to reserve a room, if possible, for 'special cases', but otherwise he had discretion 'to send any such to suitable boarding house'.¹⁷⁹⁵

16.44 Later, a report in 1938 noted that Winters needed office accommodation, since the arrangement in his home was 'very inconvenient'.¹⁷⁹⁶ It is unclear, but unlikely, that these administrative changes affected the few juveniles in their care. But the new arrangements appear to have been unsatisfactory, at least from Winters' perspective. Further exasperation emerged in a letter from Winters to R.D. Findlay in February 1938.¹⁷⁹⁷ He complained about being kept 'in complete darkness' about Quarriers immigration policy, other than being aware there was no intention to open a receiving home if migration were resumed.¹⁷⁹⁸ However, he pointed out that placement and after-care, 'according to present-day standards', now required more rigorous planning and provision.¹⁷⁹⁹ In particular, one of the Immigration Department's 'primary requirements' was the provision of a receiving Home, but as Quarriers had not submitted an accepted alternative, Winters was at a loss about how to proceed with facilitating the proposed immigration of about 30 or 40 boys. Just over a month later Winters reported that he had fixed up temporary accommodation for the impending party in two tourist camps near Fairknowe, but that it would be impossible to place boys within 24 hours of their arrival.¹⁸⁰⁰ Such undue haste would make the necessary pre-placement inspections impossible, and also prevent the Canadian staff getting to know the boys, which was imperative since they were about to be located at some distance. He wrote:

I have always made something of the selecting of a home for each individual boy. Otherwise it would be little better than drawing lots.... The matter of getting acquainted with the boys is a consideration and contributes very materially to one's influence with them which at best is usually at long range.¹⁸⁰¹

¹⁷⁹⁴ Fairknowe children, 1933, Secretary, Council of Management, to Winters, 21 May 1934, QAR.001.009.2811.

¹⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2811.

¹⁷⁹⁶ Fairknowe children, 1937, report of interview with Winters, September 1938, QAR.001.009.2877

¹⁷⁹⁷ *Ibid*, Winters to Findlay, 14 Feb 1938, QAR.001.009.2891.

¹⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2891.

¹⁷⁹⁹ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2891.

¹⁸⁰⁰ *Ibid*, Winters to Findlay, 22 March 1938, QAR.001.009.2894-2895.

¹⁸⁰¹ *Ibid*, Winters to Findlay, 22 March 1938, QAR.001.009.2894.

A slightly ambiguous comment also hinted at problems with supervision while the migrants were in transit. Winters added:

I am hoping that you will be sending a conductor. Boys simply run wild on the boat and are spoiled by the passengers otherwise. The degree of supervision on board ship has been most noticeable throughout the years not only on arrival but, in many instances, in the behaviour in the foster homes.¹⁸⁰²

By early May the boys had arrived and had been located in homes that had undergone 'careful' pre-placement visitation.¹⁸⁰³

16.45 However, relations between Winters and the Scottish management of Quarriers were evidently still strained in February 1940, when Winters wrote to James Kelly, implying that his decision to suspend Canadian migration was an abdication of responsibility; comparing their actions unfavourably with the approach of Barnardos, Gibbs' Anglican Home and the Fegan Homes; and implying that Quarriers was motivated by cost-saving. He wrote in fairly blunt terms:

Frankly, your suggestion to close out the work entirely was a surprise to me in view of the responsibility of the O.H.S. to the recent party and also to the older members of the family who are so dependent on records here. Only the Roman Catholics have made a move like this and they have been severely criticised by social agencies and the Government.... I cannot see how you can fairly liquidate your responsibility which has always been recognized as continuing long after the legal requirements have been met. The cost is not undue, when taken into consideration as a part of the whole programme. I know that our large family expect such service and are helpless in certain emergencies without it.¹⁸⁰⁴

With regard to the 1938 party of boys, he added that he was sure the government would object to 'setting them adrift'.¹⁸⁰⁵

16.46 Finally, as well as highlighting deficiencies, it is also important to note contemporary and subsequent endorsement of Quarriers' practices. While the annual reports, not surprisingly, always present migration in a positive light, circumstantial evidence, including correspondence from former migrants in later life, also suggests that a number of individuals had good memories of the Orphan Homes and/or the migration experience. Construction of the archway at the entrance to Quarriers was

¹⁸⁰² *Ibid*, Winters to Findlay, 22 March 1938, QAR.001.009.2894.

¹⁸⁰³ *Ibid*, Winters to Findlay, 4 May 1938, QAR.001.009.2897.

¹⁸⁰⁴ Fairknowe children, 1940, Winters to Kelly, 4 February 1940, QAR.001.009.2912.

¹⁸⁰⁵ *Ibid*, QAR.001.009.2912.

funded by donations from migrants in Canada; on several occasions former residents of Quarriers who wished to migrate to Canada elected to do so in Quarriers' parties, rather than independently; and case history books record the visits of former migrants to Quarriers, often accompanied by their children. Even in the 1990s and 2000s, by which time issues of historic abuse among former child migrants were being reported and investigated, former Quarriers' children were still keen to hold reunions and remember their origins. Two radio programmes in 1994, in Canada and Scotland respectively, reported on these reunions, with reference to both the positive and negative legacies of being a Quarriers' migrant.¹⁸⁰⁶ In 2001 a newspaper in Kingston, Ontario, reported a similar reunion of 'Quarriers Canadian family' in equally balanced terms under the headline 'Quarrier reunion a huge success'.¹⁸⁰⁷ Quarriers has a well-established practice of responding fully to requests for information from former migrants.

Reformatories and Industrial Schools

17.1 Reformatories and industrial schools were concerned with the institutional reform and training of young offenders, or potential young offenders. They migrated children and juveniles from different parts of Scotland in the 19th and 20th centuries, but migration seems to have been only an occasional resort, and not an integral part of either policy or practice. Even so, our suggestion is that perhaps as many as 400 juveniles were sent overseas from reformatories and industrial schools in Scotland, though that may exaggerate the total. Unfortunately, with the exception of the Kibble Reformatory, records are sparse and incomplete.

17.2 The first industrial school in Britain was opened in Aberdeen in 1841, largely in response to public concern about extensive vagrancy in the city. By 1851 there were four such schools in Aberdeen, separately for girls as well as boys, with an aggregate attendance of about 300. The experiment was allegedly so successful that it provided a model for similar institutions elsewhere in Scotland, and in England.¹⁸⁰⁸ Certainly, the movement began to proliferate in the 1850s, following the 1854 Reformatory Schools Act and the 1857 Industrial Schools Act, the two statutes being consolidated

¹⁸⁰⁶ Broadcast on BBC Radio Scotland, 1 Jan 1994; and on CBC News, 1994, report by Pamela Power.

¹⁸⁰⁷ Documents re. staff in Canada, various years 1877 onward, unnamed newspaper, quoted in email from Melanie King to Gillian Thomson, 1 May 2001, QAR.001.009.3119.

¹⁸⁰⁸ Aberdeen University Library, Special Libraries and Archives, Thomson, King and Herald Pamphlet Collection, T210/11, Alexander Thomson of Banchory, 'Report on the Aberdeen Industrial Feeding Schools', in *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1859* (London, 1860), p.5.

into a single enactment in 1866. The legislation (which was extended from its initial English and Welsh coverage to include Scotland and Ireland) enabled the courts to send any convicted child under 16 to a Reformatory School after the expiry of a prison sentence. They could then be retained until they were 18, detention being for a period of not less than two years and not more than five years. The courts were also given authority to order that a child up to the age of 14 be sent to an industrial school until they were 15 (later 16).¹⁸⁰⁹ By the end of 1883 there were 61 reformatory schools and 139 industrial schools in Great Britain, including 12 reformatories and 34 industrial schools in Scotland.¹⁸¹⁰ Referrals to an industrial school could be made on numerous grounds, including delinquency, vagrancy, begging, being beyond control, being in the company of thieves, and moral danger. Reformatory school orders, on the other hand, could only be made on narrowly prescribed grounds.¹⁸¹¹ In 1890 government approved a set of model regulations for the management of Reformatory Schools certified in terms of the Reformatory Schools Act 1866. These included regulations on lodging, clothing, diet, secular instruction, religion, discipline, recreation, visits and medical requirements.

17.3 The Report of the Inspector of Reformatory and Industrial Schools of Great Britain in 1884 indicates that a small percentage of children and juveniles were migrated, but primarily from English institutions.¹⁸¹² A Royal Commission in the same year expressed the view that emigration 'might be advantageously used to a much greater extent than at present', provided there was careful selection, preparatory training, and 'very careful arrangements for their inspection and supervision in their new country'.¹⁸¹³ This recommendation eventually led to a clause in the 1908 Children Act. This consolidated the law for the protection of children including in Scotland and marked a more interventionist approach by the state to child protection. Part IV dealt with Reformatory Schools and provided, *inter alia*, for the inspection of every Reformatory School at least once a year by the Chief Inspector for

¹⁸⁰⁹ Roy Parker, 'Some early economic threads in the history of Children's Homes', *Scottish Journal of Residential Child Care*, vol.16, no.3, 2017.

https://www.celcis.org/files/4015/1265/4672/2017_Vol_16_3_Parker_R_Some_early_economic_threads.pdf

¹⁸¹⁰ HCPP, *Twenty-Seventh Report of the Inspector of Reformatory and Industrial Schools of Great Britain*, C.4147, 1884, appendices 1(A) and 1(B).

¹⁸¹¹ Parker, 'Some early economic threads', p.2.

¹⁸¹² HCPP, *Twenty-Seventh Report of the Inspector of Reformatory and Industrial Schools of Great Britain*, C.4147, 1884.

¹⁸¹³ HCPP, *Reformatories and Industrial Schools Commission, Report of the Commissioners together with Minutes of evidence, Appendices, and Index*, C.3876, 1884.

Reformatory Schools. More particularly, Section 70 of the Act empowered managers of reformatory schools to migrate children without parental consent, provided they had obtained the Secretary of State's permission.

If any youthful offender or child detained in or placed out on licence from a certified school, or a person when under the supervision of the managers of such a school, conducts himself well, the managers of the school may, with his own consent, ...dispose of him in any trade...or by emigration, notwithstanding that his period of detention or supervision has not expired; and such apprenticing or disposition shall be as valid as if the manager were his parents. Provided that where he is to be disposed of by emigration...the consent of the Secretary of State shall also be required for exercise of any power under this Section.¹⁸¹⁴

This was followed by the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1932 which re-designated Reformatory Schools as Approved Schools, and a further Act in 1937 dealt with the regulation of Approved Schools. The 1932 Act empowered managers of an Approved School, with the written consent of a person in care and the written consent of the Scottish Education Department, to arrange his emigration, consulting parents where practicable. Section 88(5) of the 1937 Act then confirmed that only the Secretary of State could empower any 'fit person' who cared for a child or young person to arrange for their migration, with the proviso that the child/young person consented to migration and that their parents had been consulted where practicable.¹⁸¹⁵ The application of the 1937 Act can be traced in the subsequent practice of child and juvenile migration.

17.4 The Oldmill Reformatory for Boys in Aberdeen opened in 1857, to accommodate up to 150 boys, aged 10-16, who had been sentenced by the courts to detention for between two and five years.¹⁸¹⁶ In 1862 an inmate accompanied the Governor's two sons to South Africa when his time expired, an event which,

¹⁸¹⁴ Children Act, 1908, Section 70,

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1908/67/pdfs/ukpga_19080067_en.pdf

¹⁸¹⁵ Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act, 1937, Section 88(5)

<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Edw8and1Geo6/1/37/enacted/data.pdf> On legislative changes relating to the emigration of children and young people see report to SCAI by Professor Kenneth McKenzie Norrie, 'Legislative Background to the Treatment of Children and Young People living apart from their Parents', Appendix One, Emigration of Children, pp.336-345, https://www.childabuseinquiry.scot/media/1892/norrie_legislative-background-to-the-treatment-of-childrenyoungpeople-bmd-181017.pdf

¹⁸¹⁶ Peter Higginbotham, 'Old Mill Reformatory for Boys, Aberdeen, Aberdeenshire, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/AberdeenBoysRfy/>

according to the Reformatory's directors, 'excited interest among the other boys, and it is hoped it may yet lead to a spirit of emigration among them, which the Directors think it proper to encourage'.¹⁸¹⁷ The migrant's age is not known.

17.5 By the 1860s migration from Aberdeen's industrial schools was being advocated by Robert Farquhar Spottiswoode, Secretary and Treasurer of the Aberdeen Female School of Industry, and his wife Georgiana. Their speeches and publications always highlighted the need for funding as well as the philosophical and practical arguments for migration. Addressing the local Social Science Association in 1863, Mr Spottiswoode highlighted the cases of ten girls from the industrial school who had been sent to Australia and to Otago in New Zealand, all of whom were allegedly doing well.¹⁸¹⁸ A month later a pamphlet written by Mrs Spottiswoode reinforced the argument, claiming that migration was a particularly viable recourse for industrial school girls in a time of recession; and that concerns about the risk of removing young girls from supervision were unfounded, since most of them had been forced to make their own way in life from an early age, and unemployment was likely to have more deleterious (and more costly) consequences than migration.¹⁸¹⁹ She also reiterated the common justification that migration removed participants from the evil influence of relatives in Scotland. She was confident that supervision and after-care facilities were adequate, though she did not elaborate, simply noting that no-one had been allowed to hire the girls from the Otago disembarkation depots without being of 'known good character'.¹⁸²⁰

17.6 It seems that the Spottiswoodes may have been involved in the migration of girls under the auspices of Maria Rye. In 1868 four of the female paupers who accompanied Maria Rye from Liverpool to Canada were migrated from institutions in Aberdeen: three from the Female School of Industry and one from the Girls' Hospital.¹⁸²¹ Their ages are unknown, but in 1864 Georgiana Spottiswoode had appealed for funds to finance the annual migration of young single women over the age of 16, and in an article in an Aberdeen newspaper in 1872 they mentioned the

¹⁸¹⁷ Aberdeen University Library, Special Libraries and Archives, Thomson, King and Herald Pamphlet Collection, K380/5, Fifth Annual Report of the Oldmill Reformatory School, 1862.

¹⁸¹⁸ *Aberdeen Journal*, 9 December 1863.

¹⁸¹⁹ Mrs Farquhar Spottiswoode, *A Plea for Emigration, in Connection with our Female Industrial Schools* (Aberdeen, n.p, n.d.)

¹⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸²¹ *Aberdeen Journal*, 3 June 1868.

possibility of sending a few orphan children to Rye's recently-established Home at Niagara.¹⁸²²

17.7 Oakbank Industrial School for Boys was opened in 1882 when the original industrial school for boys moved to new premises. It became an Approved School in 1933 and a List D School in 1968.¹⁸²³ It accommodated both children and juveniles. Its records (Admission Books and Minutes, Discharge Book, and Visiting Directors' Report Book) were still in existence in the 1980s, but have since been lost, probably when the school closed in 2008. Patchy notes taken during the 1980s from some of these records indicate a modicum of migration.¹⁸²⁴ The 800-entry Discharge Book notes the migration of nine former pupils between 1885 and 1901, five of them up to three years after they had left Oakbank. At least four went to join relatives; one boy subsequently returned to Aberdeen; and one 15-year-old was sent to Winnipeg in 1899 under the auspices of the Children's Aid Society. The ages of three of the other migrants have been checked against the 1881 census, and they were aged between 15 and 19 when they went overseas.

17.8 Two brief entries in the Visiting Directors' Report Book also mention migration. In April 1906 director J. Fleming took the opportunity during an inspection visit 'to assemble the boys and address a few words to the scholars upon the occasion of a boy, [REDACTED] leaving for Canada'.¹⁸²⁵ A report in 20 June 1929 noted that 'one boy was preparing to set out for Canada tomorrow, and at this stage, life for him is a great adventure. We hope he will be a credit to Oakbank'.¹⁸²⁶ None of the records indicates that the school acknowledged or followed any policy relating to migration, although the director's comments imply approval. Official inspection reports on Oakbank for 1902 and 1903 are available. In both years there were 154 inmates, but neither report mentions migration.¹⁸²⁷ Much later—in 1933—an inquiry found that 'not a penny' had been spent for several years from two substantial funds

¹⁸²² *Aberdeen Journal*, 24 Jan 1872.

¹⁸²³ Peter Higginbotham, '1881 Census: Boys' Industrial School, Oak Bank, Mid Stocket Road, Aberdeen Old Marchar, Aberdeenshire, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/AberdeenBoysIS/AberdeenBoysIS1881.shtml>

¹⁸²⁴ Professor Marjory Harper's notes on records relating to historic child migration in Aberdeen.

¹⁸²⁵ Aberdeenshire Archives, DD2819, Professor Marjory Harper's notes on records relating to historic child migration in Aberdeen.

¹⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸²⁷ NRS, ED15/56 and ED15/57, Oakbank Industrial School, Aberdeen, Reformatory Inspector's Reports for 1902 and 1903, SGV.001.009.7085-7087 and SGV.001.009.7088-7090.

earmarked for the after-care of boys leaving the school, including their 'outfit or advancement in life at home or abroad'.¹⁸²⁸

17.9 Wellington Farm School for boys, Penicuik, Midlothian, opened in 1860 and by 1869 had an average of over 100 inmates. It became an Approved School in 1933 and a List D School in 1968. It closed in 2014. The 1881 census indicates that the residents were all juveniles. The inspector's report for 1896 notes that 'three or four boys were emigrated every year from the school with successful results'.¹⁸²⁹

17.10 A particular study has been made of the Kibble Reformatory, which appears both to have migrated more children (possibly up to 148) and to have kept better records than other such institutions. Kibble Education and Care Centre has also been particularly assiduous in reviewing and supplying documentation from its archive, including 74 hard copy record books or ledgers. These were examined and cross referenced in order to identify instances of migration. Material relating to each individual so identified was extracted and collated in a specific folder which was designated as a 'migration record'.

17.11 Kibble originated in 1841 through the bequest of Miss Elizabeth Kibble to establish an institution 'for the purpose of reclaiming youthful offenders against the laws'.¹⁸³⁰ Land was purchased in Paisley in 1845 and the Reformatory opened in 1859 with accommodation for 60 boys aged from 11 to 14 at time of admission. All pupils had been sent to Kibble because of a sentence imposed by a criminal court. Its first residents came from the Paisley Ragged and Industrial School. In the 1920s it became known as Kibble Farm School, and in 1933 it became an Approved School. The school roll was on average 130 boys prior to 1950. They were provided with education and vocational training in a variety of trades. The acquisition of farming skills was also emphasised. Income was obtained by way of fees charged to Scottish burghs for the housing and training of offenders. The employment of pupils while resident provided additional revenue, as employers would pay a fee to Kibble alongside paying the boys' wages. Sales from the produce of the boys' work

¹⁸²⁸ NRS, ED65/59/1, Review of Educational Endowments, Minutes of Proceedings at Inquiries, 1928-1936 Commissioners, 1932-33, Minutes of Evidence, 8 Feb 1933, Oakbank School for Boys, Aberdeen, SGV.001.009.7247.

¹⁸²⁹ Peter Higginbotham, 'Wellington Farm School for Boys, Penicuik, Midlothian, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/PenicuikRfy/>

¹⁸³⁰ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0004.

provided further income.¹⁸³¹ Later, in 1968, Kibble also became a List D School and in 1996 the Kibble Education and Care Centre, with several sites across Scotland.

17.12 Records indicate that 120 pupils were definitely migrated from Kibble between 1899 and 1959.¹⁸³² Of that number, 81 went to Canada, 38 to Australia and 1 to New York. Their ages ranged from 13 to 21, the majority being 17 or 18. Departures were evenly spread over the years up to 1930, the largest number, eleven, being sent abroad in 1914. Only six migrations were recorded after 1930.¹⁸³³ However, a further 28 boys may have been migrated, though evidence from the records is insufficient for that conclusion to be firmly drawn. In a further 13 cases references are made to pupils and migration, but the 13 pupils concerned did not ultimately migrate from Kibble.¹⁸³⁴

17.13 Kibble records do not include any statement on policy or procedure relative to the operation of migration from the institution.¹⁸³⁵ However, references to the legislative and regulatory framework that governed the operation of Kibble, the legislative provisions relating to child migration, and legislation in the then dominions, allow us to make inferences about the school's approach to migration. Indeed, it is evident from the reformatory's administrative records that migration was a recognised practice, the principal aim of which was to find employment overseas for those placed in Kibble's custody. This seemed to be the case in July 1910 when the Trustees agreed to send two inmates and an old boy to British Columbia 'as it is believed they would have a better chance of success there'.¹⁸³⁶ That is also the implication when it was agreed that ██████████ should be migrated because '[t]his would be the wisest course to follow as the crowded home in the city is no place for the boy to go to'.¹⁸³⁷ Another objective was to remove boys from an environment where they might be disadvantaged because it was known they had been pupils at Kibble and to relocate them where it was felt success was more attainable. In 1914 it was noted of ██████████ that '[t]he lad has no desire to return home as he is still pointed out as having been a Reformatory boy. He wishes to emigrate. His

¹⁸³¹ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0004.

¹⁸³² *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0003.

¹⁸³³ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0027-0028.

¹⁸³⁴ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0003.

¹⁸³⁵ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0004.

¹⁸³⁶ Kibble's Reformatory Institution, Trustees' Meeting, 13 July 1910, KIB.001.001.0673-0674.

¹⁸³⁷ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0017.

mother is thinking of doing the same'.¹⁸³⁸ Some were discharged on licence to join family members who had already migrated.¹⁸³⁹

17.14 Most pupils were migrated for work on farms and railways in Australia and Canada. This was in response to recruitment drives by those two dominions, on occasions with the additional incentive of subsidised travel costs or allowances. So, for example, eleven juvenile boys appear to have been migrated as part of the *Opportunity for Boys to Become Farmers* scheme in South Australia. The scheme offered apprenticeship contracts and subsidised passages for £10. The farm training offered at Kibble may have been of benefit to pupils in securing placements on that scheme.¹⁸⁴⁰ In 1929 and 1930 four boys, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were migrated to Canada to work on the Canadian National Railways scheme.¹⁸⁴¹

17.15 The institution's records contain no direct evidence of selection criteria.¹⁸⁴² It can be inferred, however, that selection was based on factors such as aptitude in farm work, good behaviour, and the attitude of host countries towards former Reformatory boys. The records often refer to migrants as 'suitable', 'fine, strapping fellows'; or boys with an 'excellent record of...conduct in school and their appearance'.¹⁸⁴³

17.16 The records also contain no direct evidence of procedure for securing the consent of pupils, parents or guardians.¹⁸⁴⁴ However, pupils' consent can be inferred from comments in 17 migration records that the boys were willing or eager to migrate.¹⁸⁴⁵ Occasionally, however, attitudes were more equivocal. One entry reads: 'Married sister does not want him to go, father is too selfish to mind, [REDACTED] has no decided opinion'.¹⁸⁴⁶ Parental consent can also be inferred from comments in a

¹⁸³⁸ Appendix 2: [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0468.

¹⁸³⁹ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0012-0013.

¹⁸⁴⁰ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0007. See also Family Tree Oz, 'South Australia British Farm Apprentices 1913-1914', <http://www.familytreeoz.com/sa-farm-apprentices-1913-14.html>

¹⁸⁴¹ Appendix 2: [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0109; [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0092; [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0056; [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0066.

¹⁸⁴² Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0012.

¹⁸⁴³ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0014.

¹⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0015

¹⁸⁴⁵ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0016-0017.

¹⁸⁴⁶ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0016; Appendix 2: [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0169; photograph of original record, KIB.001.001.0170.

further 22 migration records. Some parents were described as being 'only too willing' to allow their sons to emigrate,¹⁸⁴⁷ and one spoke of it as 'a rare opportunity'.¹⁸⁴⁸ In the case of [REDACTED] '[a]fter long and careful consideration the father thinks the best plan will be for the boy to emigrate to Australia where the prospects are much brighter'.¹⁸⁴⁹ One mother was 'quite willing' that her son should emigrate since he was easily led and she did not want him to return to Glasgow.¹⁸⁵⁰ Some parents were equivocal or uninterested. In the case of [REDACTED] '[t]he father does not take enough interest in the boy either to approve or object to this plan'.¹⁸⁵¹ Some parents expressed doubts about migration. In two cases there is an implication that pressure was applied by the Reformatory to obtain consent. In the case of [REDACTED] '[t]he mother is not quite resigned to his emigration but will likely agree'; and in the case of [REDACTED] '[t]he mother is anxious to get [REDACTED] home and promises to get him work with his father immediately. It was better he should emigrate'.¹⁸⁵²

17.17 With respect to consent by government officials, in 1899, the year in which migration from Kibble began with the sending of three boys to New Brunswick, a minute of the trustees meeting on 13 September notes that James Love, the Superintendent, 'was instructed to take the necessary measures for obtaining the sanction of the Home Office for the despatch of the boys and this has been done, and it is expected the sanction will be obtained immediately'.¹⁸⁵³ It is presumed that, following the Children Act of 1908, Kibble adhered to the statutory requirement to obtain the Secretary of State's permission to migrate children in the absence of parental consent. There are references to the Secretary for Scotland's certification having been obtained in some cases. However, there are also instances where the obtaining of consent has not been recorded, though this may reflect deficiencies in recording rather than failure to obtain the statutory consent.

17.18 On 3 July 1929 a minute of the trustees' meeting noted that the number of emigrants to Canada was to be reported to the Scottish Education Department, along with the result of letters to local authorities for contributions. It was to be suggested to the SED that these sums should be placed to the credit of an

¹⁸⁴⁷ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0018.

¹⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0018; Appendix 2: [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0259.

¹⁸⁴⁹ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0019.

¹⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0018; Appendix 2: [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0187.

¹⁸⁵¹ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0019.

¹⁸⁵² *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0019; Appendix 2: [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0304; [REDACTED] – Migration Record, KIB.001.001.0230; photograph of original record, KIB.001.001.0322.

¹⁸⁵³ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0011.

Emigration Fund 'to meet any contingency in case of default to complete contract by boy'.¹⁸⁵⁴ The result was to be reported to the next meeting, but no further reference to an emigration fund has been found in the records.¹⁸⁵⁵ This entry suggests that Kibble recognised a degree of accountability to the Scottish Education Department and also engaged in dialogue with it on the subject of migration. Also on 3 July 1929 Kibble's Education Committee noted that letters had been received from J.T. Barnes, Director of Migration, Australia House, apparently in relation to an appointment to interview boys, which suggests that Australia House was involved in selection and approvals.¹⁸⁵⁶

17.19 There is some evidence that Kibble boys were not always welcome in the dominions. A minute of the trustees' meeting of 14 July 1926 notes that 'Col. Craig reported that the Canadian and Australian authorities were adverse [*sic*] to taking Kibble boys and with regards to New Zealand the question was being referred to the New Zealand Government'.¹⁸⁵⁷ No Kibble boys were sent to New Zealand. On 23 January 1928 the Education Committee, in discussing the 'Emigration question', appears to have resolved to press for migration despite difficulties. It was minuted that the committee

regret the attitude which the Colonial Authorities had taken to Reformatory boys with regard to Emigration. The Committee was grateful to Col. Craig Barr for the work he has done with a view to securing better conditions, and they express the hope that some good result may yet be obtained. Meanwhile the Committee recommend that Governor to continue his endeavour to get suitable boys emigrated on the lines that are legitimately open.¹⁸⁵⁸

17.20 There is no evidence of systematic identification and scrutiny of overseas placements to which boys were sent.¹⁸⁵⁹ Placements took a variety of forms and seem to have been arranged on an *ad hoc* basis. For instance, in 1899 the Secretary and Chairman of Kibble liaised with the Clerk of the Juvenile Delinquency Board and the Canadian government emigration agent in Glasgow to arrange the migration of three boys to St John's, New Brunswick, and to obtain the necessary sanction of the Home Office for the despatch of the boys. If they were successful the Canadian agent

¹⁸⁵⁴ Appendix 6 – Minutes – Education Committee 3 July 1929, KIB.001.001.0694.

¹⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0694.

¹⁸⁵⁶ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0694.

¹⁸⁵⁷ *Ibid*, Minutes – Trustees 14 July 1926, KIB.001.001.0684.

¹⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid*, Minutes of Education Committee, 23 Jan 1928, KIB.001.001.0692.

¹⁸⁵⁹ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0011.

was willing to arrange for situations for three or four boys annually.¹⁸⁶⁰ These three boys—[REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]—were the first boys to be migrated from Kibble.¹⁸⁶¹ There was occasional *ad hoc* inspection of boys after migration. A minute of the trustees' meeting of 14 April 1909 noted that, on a forthcoming visit to Canada and the United States, the Governor intended to visit 'as many as possible of the boys who have emigrated to Canada from the Institution'.¹⁸⁶² Post-migration records also exist for 100 of the 120 pupils who definitely migrated from Kibble. The records may have been compiled because pupils were often discharged while still subject to a licence period for the sentence originally imposed. In some cases, however, the recording appears to go beyond that requirement and is indicative of an ongoing interest in the progress of former pupils.

17.21 The records of Kibble do not include any dedicated records relating to financing of migration, information being spread across a number of record sources. It seems clear there was no single method of funding. There is reference to migration expenses incurred by Kibble itself; to sums being reclaimed from the Scottish Education Department; to funds received from family members; and to expenditure being repaid in the future from the wages of former pupils once they were in employment. It also appears that on occasion government or other bodies may have provided grants or allowances to subsidise the migration of pupils. Indicative of financial practice are the following examples.

17.22 In 1899, the first year in which there is a record of pupils being migrated, a minute of the trustees' meeting on 13 September notes that the full passage money of the three boys concerned (£6 each) was to be paid by Kibble.¹⁸⁶³ However, following discussions with the Juvenile Delinquency Board, the latter had agreed to give a grant of £10 to assist with the cost of passage and outfit for every Glasgow boy, up to a maximum of five, who was being migrated to New Brunswick that year.¹⁸⁶⁴ There is no further reference in the records to the Juvenile Delinquency Board covering any costs. On 26 December 1906, Superintendent James Love reported to a meeting of trustees that an application had been made to the authorities of Paisley for a grant to pay a boy's expense to Canada.¹⁸⁶⁵ On 13 July

¹⁸⁶⁰ Appendix 6, Minutes of Trustees, 13 Sept 1899, KIB.001.001.0646.

¹⁸⁶¹ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, Minutes of Trustees, KIB.001.001.0011.

¹⁸⁶² Appendix 6, Minutes of Trustees 4 April 1909, KIB.001.001.0671.

¹⁸⁶³ *Ibid*, Minutes of Trustees, 13 Sept 1899, KIB.001.001.0648.

¹⁸⁶⁴ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0646.

¹⁸⁶⁵ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0029.

1910 it was reported to a meeting of the trustees that it had been arranged to send two inmates and one old boy to Canada. Kibble had agreed to 'incur the extra expense of sending these boys to British Columbia as it is believed they would have a better chance of success there'.¹⁸⁶⁶ Superintendent James Love 'was instructed to endeavour to arrange that the boys' employers should retain a certain amount out of the boys' wages to recoup the Institution for the extra expense'.¹⁸⁶⁷ A minute of the finance committee meeting on 25 February 1914 includes a statement from Superintendent James Love that he expected, for the current year, an additional allowance of about £400 from the government for 'both maintenance and emigration'.¹⁸⁶⁸ Also in 1914 eleven boys appear to have been migrated to South Australia under the apprenticeship scheme, *Opportunity for Boys to Become Farmers*. They were offered a subsidised passage of £10 rather than an allowance.¹⁸⁶⁹ In 1922 the terms of the Empire Settlement Act introduced the prospect of government funding for apprenticeship schemes for boys, but there are no records of such payments being received by Kibble. On 23 January 1928 the Education Committee considered the 'Emigration question'.¹⁸⁷⁰ It was noted that the Governor had been authorised 'to retain the Savings Bank Balance (with consent of the boy) and the usual Cash Allowance, in the case of boys going to Farm Work, for a period not exceeding 2 years after the date of completion of commitment'.¹⁸⁷¹ On 21 December 1928 a meeting of trustees noted that Superintendent Love had paid £30 'as suggested in last minute' (though it is not clear whether this sum was for migration) 'and had in addition sent £10 to assist in paying emigration expenses of ex Kibble boys'.¹⁸⁷² On 3 July 1929 a minute of the Education Committee noted that the number of emigrants to Canada was to be reported to the committee along with the result of letters to local authorities for contributions.¹⁸⁷³ It was to be suggested to the Scottish Education Department that these sums should be placed to the credit of an Emigration Fund 'to meet any contingency in case of default to complete contract by boy'.¹⁸⁷⁴ The result was to be reported to the next meeting, but no further reference to an emigration fund has been found in the records. Instead on 15 April 1930 it was

¹⁸⁶⁶ Appendix 6, Minutes of Trustees, 13 July 1910, KIB.001.001.0673-0674.

¹⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0673-0674.

¹⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid*, Minutes, Finance Committee, 25 Feb 1914, KIB.001.001.0665.

¹⁸⁶⁹ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0013.

¹⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid*, Minutes, Education Committee 23 Jan 1928, KIB.001.001.0692.

¹⁸⁷¹ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0692.

¹⁸⁷² *Ibid*, Minutes of Trustees 21 Dec 1928, KIB.001.001.0687.

¹⁸⁷³ *Ibid*, Minutes, Education Committee 3 July 1929, KIB.001.001.0694

¹⁸⁷⁴ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0694

recorded in a minute of the Education Committee that as two boys who were being migrated 'cannot be emigrated under the Free Scheme', authority was given to book their passages under the ordinary £10 scheme.¹⁸⁷⁵ This presumably indicates that the passage money of Kimble migrants could not be provided under the Empire Settlement Act. Instead, money was to be advanced temporarily from the Leaving Fund Account, and an endeavour was to be made to reclaim it from the Scottish Education Department. Individual migration records indicate that the school, former pupils, family members, or unnamed donors sometimes provided migration expenses. Such financial provision can be inferred from eight migration records.¹⁸⁷⁶ The Kibble records also contain balance sheet entries for five years in the 1920s which include references to approximate amounts spent on migration: £97 in 1921; £119 in 1923; £115 in 1924; £89 in 1925; and £208 in 1927.¹⁸⁷⁷

17.23 Because of limited archival resources, very little can be reported about other reformatories. The House of Refuge for Boys in Glasgow opened in 1838, with accommodation for up to 300. In 1854 it was certified to operate as a reformatory, with accommodation for up to 440 boys, aged from 10 to 15 at time of admission. It was then the largest reformatory in Britain. It closed down in 1886, by which time 'a certain number' of boys had emigrated to Canada.¹⁸⁷⁸ The House of Refuge for Girls in Glasgow opened in 1840, and was certified to operate as a reformatory in 1854, with accommodation for up to 180 girls. It relocated from Parliamentary Road to Maryhill in 1865, and to East Chapelton, Bearsden in 1882. It closed in 1926. An inspection in 1887 noted that three girls had been sent to Canada the previous year in the charge of Mrs Cameron, superintendent of the Maryhill Industrial School. The Glasgow Industrial School for Girls, Maryhill, opened in 1881, having been relocated from its previous premises at Rottenrow, Glasgow. It provided accommodation for 200 girls aged 9 to 14 at date of admission. An inspection in 1896 reported that 'in the previous few years, an average of twelve girls had been emigrated to Canada annually'.¹⁸⁷⁹ The Girls' School of Industry, Perth, opened in 1843, was certified as a reformatory in 1854, but re-designated as an industrial school around 1862. In 1870

¹⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid*, Minutes, Education Committee, 15 April 1930, KIB.001.001.0698

¹⁸⁷⁶ Kibble Education and Care Centre, Section 21 response, KIB.001.001.0030-0031.

¹⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid*, KIB.001.001.0030 and at Appendix 6, Minutes of Trustees 31 March 1922, KIB.001.001.0680-0683.

¹⁸⁷⁸ Peter Higginbotham, 'House of Refuge for Boys, Glasgow, Lanarkshire, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/GlasgowBoysRefuge/>

¹⁸⁷⁹ Peter Higginbotham, 'Glasgow Industrial Schools for Girls, Maryhill, Lanarkshire, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/GlasgowGirlsIS/>

it moved to new premises at Wellshill, with accommodation for up to 60 girls, aged from 7 to 10 at date of admission. From there in 1887 two girls emigrated to Manitoba, and one to New Brunswick.¹⁸⁸⁰ The website www.childrenshome.org.uk has entries on a further 32 reformatories and industrial schools in Scotland, but there is no indication that any of these engaged in the overseas migration of juveniles (or children) placed in their care. As will be appreciated from this section of our report, calculating from extant records the precise total of juveniles, especially distinguishing between boys and girls and by destination, is not possible, and the number we have suggested, a maximum of 400, may be an over-estimate.

Royal Over-Seas League (ROSL)

18.1 The Over-Seas Club was founded in London in 1910 by Sir Evelyn Wrench with the objective of promoting international friendship and understanding throughout the empire (later Commonwealth) and beyond.¹⁸⁸¹ In 1918 it amalgamated with the Patriotic League of Britons Overseas to become the Over-Seas League. Then in 1927 it opened premises in Edinburgh, and in 1960 it became the Royal Over-Seas League. (To simplify, though anachronistically, throughout this account we will henceforth refer to it as ROSL.) The Edinburgh clubhouse closed in 2018. The main sources of information about the activities of ROSL, including its Scottish activities, are its Annual Reports, Central Council Minutes, and back numbers of the *Overseas* magazine, all of which are held in the British Library. These have been supplemented by the recent discovery in the Scottish clubhouse of photograph albums with over 90 press photographs of named young migrants sent to New Zealand between 1949 and 1953 and to Australia in 1954.¹⁸⁸² Migration under the auspices of the ROSL was also mentioned in documents presented to the House of Commons Health Committee Inquiry into the Welfare of Former British Child Migrants in 1998 and in evidence to IICSA.¹⁸⁸³ Of those who were sent overseas, we reckon that probably 80 were juveniles over the school-leaving age.

¹⁸⁸⁰ Peter Higginbotham, 'Girls' School of Industry/Wellshill School/Balnacraig School Perth, Perthshire, Scotland', <http://www.childrenshomes.org.uk/PerthGirlsIS/>

¹⁸⁸¹ Royal Over-Seas League (ROSL), 'About ROSL', <https://www.rosl.org.uk/about-ros/>

¹⁸⁸² Photographs of Children Migrating to New Zealand, ROL.001.001.0019-0089.

¹⁸⁸³ House of Commons, Health Committee, Third Report, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, HC755-1, 1998, paras 27-38; Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes, Investigation Report*, March 2018, pp.109-112.

18.2 ROSL had branches across the UK and overseas, including, in 1934, 35 active branches and 4,540 members in Scotland.¹⁸⁸⁴ ROSL did not have any institutions for the care of children, but in 1926 it established a Migration Bureau, initially to support adult migration, but subsequently to organise the migration of children and juveniles. The League and its Central Council delegated the practicalities of support for child and juvenile migration after 1928 to this Bureau. Unfortunately, no minutes of ROSL Migration Bureau meetings have been located. Its Honorary Secretary was Cyril Bavin, who was also a member of its Central Council between 1920 and 1940. He was a New Zealand-born Australian who, as noted in Section 20 below, was also General Secretary of the YMCA Migration Department. In 1940 the British government appointed Bavin as Liaison Officer between the home government and the governments of Australia and New Zealand to safeguard the welfare of evacuee children sent there under the Children's Overseas Reception Board (CORB), upon which see Section 10 above. After the war Bavin resumed his role as ROSL Migration Secretary, continuing in post until his death in 1955. Although there are no minutes of the Migration Bureau, it contributed brief updates to ROSL's Annual Reports, to Central Council meetings, and to ROSL's *Overseas* magazine. ROSL branch and group reports contained within the Annual Reports also refer to support for migration activities in general.

18.3 There are no comprehensive or specific records relating to selection, the consent of parents, guardians or the migrants, or of choice of destination, or monitoring, or other aspects of care for children and juveniles migrated under the auspices of ROSL.¹⁸⁸⁵ It may have been that potential migrants were initially put forward by institutions or individuals in their home areas, and that applications were then sent to ROSL's Migration Bureau. It appears that applications were then passed on to New Zealand House for consideration, with final selection being made by a committee which included representatives of the British and New Zealand governments and ROSL. We assume something similar with respect to those sent to Australia.

18.4 The annual report for 1938 stated that prior to 1932 ROSL had placed 336 boys on farms overseas through its Migration Bureau.¹⁸⁸⁶ Their ages were not stated. Then, from 1932 to 1938, and in conjunction with the YMCA, it inaugurated the

¹⁸⁸⁴ Annual Report 1934, ROL.001.001.0101.

¹⁸⁸⁵ Royal Overseas League, Section 21 response, ROL..001.001.0102-0103.

¹⁸⁸⁶ Annual Report, 1938, ROL.001.001.0091.

'British Boys for British Farms' scheme, resulting in a further 200 lads being sent overseas, though again their ages were not stated.¹⁸⁸⁷ Subsequently, in the autumn of 1938, it was decided to restart ROSL's migration work under the direction of Cyril Bavin and to appeal for 'godfathers' for 100 boys, age again unspecified, to be sent overseas in 1939.¹⁸⁸⁸ It is not clear whether this objective was fulfilled.

18.5 What we do know from annual reports is that during the 1930s some of the League's Scottish branches instead supported the migration work of the Fairbridge Farm School in sending children to Pinjarra in Australia.¹⁸⁸⁹ We also know that support for Fairbridge continued after the war, indeed until the 1970s.¹⁸⁹⁰ Moreover, in 1954, two parties of children were sent to Dhurringile Rural Training Farm in Australia under the auspices of ROSL.¹⁸⁹¹

18.6 In 1949 ROSL inaugurated a scheme to send child migrants to New Zealand, which also encompassed juveniles. The New Zealand government's Child Welfare Department was to appeal for foster homes in New Zealand in which they 'would be regarded as members of the family'.¹⁸⁹² Under this scheme ROSL was to be the sole recruiting agency in the UK for children and juveniles aged between 5 and 17 whose parents were willing to allow them to emigrate to New Zealand to 'a better chance of a fuller, happier and healthier life'.¹⁸⁹³ As recorded in our main Report, the consent of parents was to be given in a sworn declaration before a magistrate. On arrival in New Zealand the children became wards of the Superintendent of Child Welfare, whose officers were meant to monitor placements. After a trial period of six months, if the arrangement proved satisfactory on both sides, the people who took charge of the children would be given legal guardianship of the migrant until he or she attained the age of 21.

18.7 The first party of 18 sailed in April 1949, and by the end of the year a total of 165 migrants had been sent to New Zealand in eight parties.¹⁸⁹⁴ A further 64 children were sent to Australia in three parties.¹⁸⁹⁵ It is not known how many children and

¹⁸⁸⁷ *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0091.

¹⁸⁸⁸ *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0091.

¹⁸⁸⁹ Royal Overseas League, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.0005-0006.

¹⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid*, at ROL.001.001.0009.

¹⁸⁹¹ *Ibid*, at ROL.001.001.0008; Photograph of first and second party of boys for Dhurringile, April and June 1954, ROL.001.001.0086.

¹⁸⁹² *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0007.

¹⁸⁹³ *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0007.

¹⁸⁹⁴ *4th Annual Report* at ROL.001.001.009.

¹⁸⁹⁵ Calculated from Photographs of children migrating to New Zealand, see ROL.001.001.0019-0089.

juveniles were migrated in aggregate, but the ROSL annual report for 1949 states that already a grand total of 389 had been sent out since the Migration Department began its operations.¹⁸⁹⁶ Evidence presented to IICSA states that in the post-war period ROSL acknowledged responsibility for sending 804 young migrants overseas, including at least 194 to Australia and 530 to New Zealand.¹⁸⁹⁷

18.8 A photograph album entitled 'Photographs of Children Migrating to New Zealand' contains photographs of young migrants sent out in the 1st, 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 20th, 21st and 25th parties, as well as the two parties of boys that went to Dhurringile in 1954¹⁸⁹⁸. In a number of cases the places of origin and the ages of the children are stated. They include recruits from various parts of Scotland, some of whom, like those from other parts of the UK, were over school-leaving age. They include [REDACTED] age 16, and [REDACTED] age 17.¹⁸⁹⁹ In other photographs the ages are not stated, but some recruits appear to be juveniles rather than children, including one boy from the Orkney Isles in the 17th party in 1951.¹⁹⁰⁰ The 15th party included 15 boys sent out to New Zealand under the Flock House Scheme, and they would also be juveniles, though their place of origin is not stated.¹⁹⁰¹

18.9 Assessment of ROSL's migration practices is hampered by the lack of records. We lack adequate information about selection of children or placements, or monitoring. Evidence presented to IICSA states that Cyril Bavin initially indicated that ROSL's resumption of child migration work in 1947 only involved former CORB recruits who wished to return to Australia.¹⁹⁰² In fact, as detailed in our main Report, very few came into that category, and ROSL was told by Australian officials to stop using the CORB designation for non-CORB children. Evidence presented to IICSA also indicates that the British government had reservations about ROSL being approved as a sending organisation for child migration, because of its lack of expertise in

¹⁸⁹⁶ Overseas League, 40th Annual Report, 1949, p.11 column 1, ROL.001.001.0094.

¹⁸⁹⁷ Independent Inquiry Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes – Investigation Report – March 2018*.

¹⁸⁹⁸ Photographs of Children Migrating to New Zealand, ROLL.001.001.0019-0089.

¹⁸⁹⁹ Photographs of Children Migrating to New Zealand, ROL.001.001.0028 and 0033.

¹⁹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0062-0063.

¹⁹⁰¹ *Ibid*, ROL.001.001.0051-0052.

¹⁹⁰² Independent Inquiry Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes – Investigation Report – March 2018*.

selection and the absence of structures to provide reports on welfare after migration.¹⁹⁰³

The Salvation Army

19.1 By our estimate, over the long term and to all destinations, perhaps as many as 1,000 juveniles, Scottish boys and girls, were sent overseas by the Salvation Army. The Salvation Army was founded in 1878 by William Booth, who regarded selective migration as integral to his scheme to relieve destitution and save souls. Although his initial vision for transplanting the 'submerged tenth' from 'Darkest England' to specially-prepared colonies fell victim to financial problems, British apathy and overseas opposition, he successfully launched an information service that offered advice on destinations, travelling arrangements and employment to working-class emigrants. In 1903 these *ad hoc* arrangements were formalised through the creation of a Migration and Settlement Department, which for the next three decades hosted lecture programmes, screened applicants, assisted selected migrants through a special loan fund, supervised passages, opened reception hostels overseas, and supplied letters of introduction to employers. At the end of the nineteenth century the Salvation Army claimed to be the world's largest emigration and employment agency, and from 1905 it chartered its own ships.¹⁹⁰⁴

19.2 Those assisted were poor families, single men and women, and, by the early 1900s, children under 14, many of whom came from workhouses and poor law unions in England.¹⁹⁰⁵ Groups were met at the port of arrival, escorted by train to a Salvation Army hostel, and placed out in households, which were subsequently inspected 'regularly'.¹⁹⁰⁶ A report from 1907 indicates that children were placed in various locations in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia.¹⁹⁰⁷ Migration ceased during the First World War, and when it was resumed, the focus was on war widows and their children, and, noticeably, on juveniles.¹⁹⁰⁸

19.3 Funding came primarily from public donations and subscriptions, supplemented from 1922 by grants made available under the Empire Settlement Act.

¹⁹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰⁴ The Salvation Army Year Book, 1907, p.46, SAL.001.002.0004.

¹⁹⁰⁵ LAC, 'Salvation Army', <https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/immigration/immigration-records/home-children-1869-1930/home-children-guide/Pages/salvation-army.aspx>

¹⁹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Report 1: The Salvation Army's Child Emigration Policy, 1900-2014, SAL.001.001.0007.

That allowed the Salvation Army to expand its migration programme, and its migration activity peaked during the 1920s.¹⁹⁰⁹ In 1923 it had launched a boys' scheme, whereby school-leavers and youths who were unemployed or in blind alley jobs could apply for assisted migration as farm labourers, often at the behest of parents.¹⁹¹⁰ Individuals under 18 could also emigrate under the Salvation Army's Scheme for Women, inaugurated in 1916, which was not exclusively for juveniles, but did include 16 to 18-year-olds; and a scheme for orphans and unwanted children.¹⁹¹¹ By the 1930s it had sent out over 200,000 migrants, most to Canada and Australia.¹⁹¹² Young men and families were the main beneficiaries, along with war widows and their children.

After the Second World War the Salvation Army's migration work never reached the scale of the 1920s.¹⁹¹³ It continued to provide a small number of assisted passages to adults and families; co-operated with Commonwealth governments in their assisted passage schemes; and operated Boys' Schemes to Eastern Australia and Canada in the 1950s. Both those schemes had ceased by the early 1960s, and in 1981 the Migration and Travel Service was incorporated as an independent company.¹⁹¹⁴

19.4 The Salvation Army's rationale for developing a juvenile migration scheme in the 1920s was explained partly in terms of its long experience and extensive global influence and networks. It was, according to one pamphlet, 'in a unique position to help and care for boys and young men who are thinking of migrating'.¹⁹¹⁵ With officers stationed across the world, it was able and willing to act as 'guardian and adviser' to juvenile migrants, and had promised the British government it would maintain oversight of all those for whom it assumed responsibility until they were 'satisfactorily settled'.¹⁹¹⁶ The Salvation Army was also motivated by the desire to deal with the particular 'boy problem' that consigned juveniles to blind alley occupations, not least the 'demoralising' dole.¹⁹¹⁷ It cited as further endorsement a statement in the report of the Oversea Settlement Committee in 1923, that '[j]uvenile

¹⁹⁰⁹ Report 1: The Salvation Army's Child Emigration Policy, 1900-2014, SAL.001.001.0007

¹⁹¹⁰ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0009.

¹⁹¹¹ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0007. For reference to a 16-year-old young woman from Glasgow who emigrated to Canada via the Salvation Army see para 19.27 below.

¹⁹¹² SAL.001.002.0178, *Organized Empire Migration and Settlement* (Migration House, London, 1930), p 8ff.

¹⁹¹³ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0007.

¹⁹¹⁴ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0007.

¹⁹¹⁵ *Boys of Britain*, 1924, SAL.001.001.0063.

¹⁹¹⁶ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0063.

¹⁹¹⁷ David Lamb, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, 1924, SAL.001.002.0264.

migrants readily adapt themselves to their new environments and for this reason are regarded by Overseas Authorities as among the most desirable settlers'.¹⁹¹⁸

19.5 In a pamphlet focused specifically on the 1923 initiative, David Lamb, the Scottish-born head of the Salvation Army's Migration and Settlement Department, marshalled a range of philosophical and practical justifications for juvenile migration.

Boy migration is desirable not only because it is the easiest, and offers at present the line of least resistance, but also because of its moral effect upon the youth of the nation. It is easy because the boys are here, of the right age; they want to go; they are wanted overseas where work and homes are waiting for them. No additional houses are necessary overseas, and their transfer relieves the housing pressure at home. Their immediate employment calls for no additional capital outlay. It is, moreover, a particularly sound proposition since they will be at once engaged in productive work. The boys will do boys' work on a farm and thus free the men to do men's work....Boyhood is the right age for transplantation, and the migration of boys will go a little way towards checking the general town drift of the world's population.¹⁹¹⁹

19.6 The Salvation Army's policies and advertising in the 1920s also continued to be suffused with an ardent imperialist rhetoric that was reminiscent of Victorian ambitions to populate the empire. The migrants were 'sent out to help slake the Dominions' perpetual thirst for British workers'.¹⁹²⁰ Furthermore, William Bramwell Booth, who had succeeded William Booth as head of the Salvation Army was, according to a 1920s pamphlet, 'as ardent an imperialist as his father'.¹⁹²¹

19.7 The Salvation Army's migration policy and procedures were well documented from an early date and seem to have been clearly thought out. The organisation's handbook, *Orders and Regulations for the Social Officers of the Salvation Army*, published initially in 1898, included two fairly lengthy chapters that covered migration, one of which dealt specifically with the migration of young people.¹⁹²² In terms of selection, the Salvation Army began with the basic premise that juveniles had a natural adaptability, to a greater extent than adults. In making a selection,

¹⁹¹⁸ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0265.

¹⁹¹⁹ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0265.

¹⁹²⁰ *Emigration Still Holds the Field*, n.d., SAL.001.002.0299.

¹⁹²¹ *Empire Reconstruction: The Work of the Salvation Army Colonization Department, 1903-1921 and After*, n.d., SAL.001.002.0091.

¹⁹²² The General, *Orders and Regulations for the Social Officers of the Salvation Army*, 1898, SAL.001.001.0028-0034.

therefore, general suitability became 'the all-important question'.¹⁹²³ Boys were drawn from all parts of the country and from all backgrounds. During the first year of the scheme, 1,000 boys were 'transplanted', their average age being 16 years and 2 months.¹⁹²⁴ Fifty per cent had come from large cities, and the other half had come from smaller towns and villages, and several had not been in any employment since leaving school.¹⁹²⁵

19.8 Under the 1923 boys' scheme, successful applicants, aged 14-19, were either sent to the Salvation Army's training centre at Hadleigh in Essex for three months' basic instruction before being sent to pre-arranged positions on overseas farms, or, in the case of Australia and New Zealand, trained on arrival at Salvation Army farms at Riverview (Queensland) and Putaruru (Auckland) respectively. The records involved in the application process included a statement of consent from parents, a medical certificate, and two character references.¹⁹²⁶ However, the different dominions imposed their own criteria over and above the general guidelines. In 1925 the *Salvation Army Year Book* stated that Australia required boys to be 16 years old, 5ft 4in in height and between 8 and 9 stones in weight.¹⁹²⁷ Those who wore glasses would not be considered. Canada, while being equally careful in its selection, had, 'more wisely', imposed no stipulations about height and weight'.¹⁹²⁸ After completion of training at Hadleigh, an additional reference was required from the officer in charge, and there would also have been a financial statement detailing how the costs were shared between the migrant, the Salvation Army and other sources such as government subsidies.¹⁹²⁹

19.9 Careful thought seems to have been given to the financial dimension and meticulous accounts were kept. In 1925 the Salvation Army estimated that it cost £48 to migrate a 'child' (presumably a juvenile under the Boys' Scheme).¹⁹³⁰ By 1928 the estimated cost was £60.¹⁹³¹ This covered selection, outfit, training, transportation and after-care. Families that were able to fund the cost of their child's migration were asked to do so, but many migrants continued to be funded through public

¹⁹²³ David Lamb, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, 1924, SAL.001.002.0266.

¹⁹²⁴ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0266.

¹⁹²⁵ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0266.

¹⁹²⁶ Salvation Army, statement on availability of historic records, SAL.001.001.0106.

¹⁹²⁷ *Salvation Army Year Book*, 1925, p.36, SAL.001.002.0898-0899.

¹⁹²⁸ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0899.

¹⁹²⁹ Salvation Army, statement on availability of historic records, SAL.001.001.0106.

¹⁹³⁰ *Salvation Army Year Book*, 1925, p.36, SAL.001.002.0898-0899.

¹⁹³¹ *Salvation Army Year Book*, 1929, p.36, SAL.001.002.0041.

donations. Each applicant's fee was paid into a central fund which was then divided to pay the expenses of those who could not fund the migration fee themselves. The Salvation Army acted as bankers for those who could not afford the fee upfront, but migrants were expected to repay any loan within two years. After deducting contributions from participants and payments made by the government the Salvation Army had to find an average of £10 per boy.¹⁹³² While the Empire Settlement Act empowered the government to contribute up to half the expense of any agreed scheme, this sum was calculated after the deduction of contributions from the boys themselves and their friends.¹⁹³³ The government's training contribution was limited to 11 shillings a week, and its outfit grant to £3 per boy. No overseas dominion contributed anything to training.

19.10 In order to foster a spirit of self-help and self-respect, the Salvation Army required each migrant, according to his ability, to contribute to the cost of relocation before he sailed and to repay a further amount after he had settled.¹⁹³⁴ While it was possible to impose a flat rate in Australia, Canada—with significant inland travelling distances and variable wage rates—was divided into four zones, with differing repayment requirements. Two years were allowed to complete repayments, with monthly deductions being made from the migrants' wages. The Salvation Army recognised the importance of avoiding 'burdensome' repayments, and took account of migrants' different circumstances, but it is unclear what happened if boys defaulted.¹⁹³⁵

19.11 After-care and supervision were described in a number of pamphlets, and discussed in correspondence. The most detailed description was provided in David Lamb's 1924 pamphlet, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*.¹⁹³⁶ It was, wrote Lamb, 'a practical, common sense method of dealing with any contingency which may arise', a strategy which included the selection and preparation of suitable placements and the provision of clothing and footwear as and when required.¹⁹³⁷ The supervision provided by the Salvation Army was compared favourably with the experience of many migrants, who on arrival were 'left to paddle their own canoe or find their way

¹⁹³² *Salvation Army Year Book*, 1924, p.36, SAL.001.002.0899; and 1929, p.36, SAL.001.002.0041.

¹⁹³³ David Lamb, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, 1924, SAL.001.002.0267.

¹⁹³⁴ *Salvation Army Year Book*, 1929, p.36, SAL.001.002.0041.

¹⁹³⁵ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0267; David Lamb, *General Booth's Scheme for Boys*, n.d., SAL.001.001.0103.

¹⁹³⁶ David Lamb, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, 1924, SAL.001.002.0262-0269.

¹⁹³⁷ David Lamb, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, 1924, SAL.001.002.0268.

as best they can'. It believed that the outstanding feature of its after-care arrangements was unity of control. As Lamb explained,

The selecting organization is also the receiving, placing, replacing, supervising, and if needs be, the repatriating authority... [and] there is a constant interchanging of officers going on so that the selecting officers know the actual conditions of settlement and the receiving officers know something of the material available.¹⁹³⁸

The *Salvation Army Year Book* for 1925 reported that officers visited sites to which migrants would be sent both before and during the migration process, and in 1937 the *Year Book* stated that the Salvation Army collected reports from government officials and from samples of migrants to assess the suitability of destinations.¹⁹³⁹

19.12 Specifically, officers in the host country, having been apprised in advance of the arrival of a party, had already set in place reception and placement arrangements. David Lamb was aware of the potential for abuse if after-care arrangements were inadequate. 'Efficient oversight will prevent abuses', he wrote in 1924, in the context of discussing placement arrangements.¹⁹⁴⁰ Boys were placed in a small selection of households in relatively close proximity in order to facilitate supervision and after-care. The migrants were subsequently visited and encouraged to keep in touch; in case of accident or serious illness, a Salvation Army officer would negotiate with local hospital authorities about admission and payment; and the Salvation Army paid the cost of repatriation. Under such circumstances, 'much the same attention is given to a boy as would be given to a Salvation Army officer on foreign service'.¹⁹⁴¹ To ensure proper oversight of the increasing number of juveniles that the Salvation Army planned to migrate, in 1924 it opened four new centres in Canada, at each of which it appointed married officers, whose time was devoted 'exclusively to the work of after-care'.¹⁹⁴² On four separate occasions it also chartered the *SS Vedic* to transport migrants from Britain to Australia. The migrants remained under the Salvation Army's guardianship until they were 18, and in some cases until they were 21. While they did not require 'coddling', it was recognised, wrote Lamb, that they required guidance, and not least 'the helping hand of a friend when they are in difficulties or suffering from home sickness', the latter being recognised by the

¹⁹³⁸ David Lamb, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, 1924, SAL.001.002.0267.

¹⁹³⁹ Report on Practice, SAL.001.001.0017.

¹⁹⁴⁰ David Lamb, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, 1924, SAL.001.002.0266.

¹⁹⁴¹ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0268.

¹⁹⁴² *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0268.

Salvation Army as a recurring problem that could rear its head 'at various points along life's road'.¹⁹⁴³

19.13 In demonstrating success, the Salvation Army cited the enthusiasm of participants and their parents, as well as the host dominions. In 1924, Lamb claimed that the only limitation on the work was a financial one.¹⁹⁴⁴ According to Lamb, 'the results of a recent inquiry made by one of the Canadian provincial governments'; noted that one province had made 1,000 applications for 75 boys.¹⁹⁴⁵ He further claimed that in the UK applications were being received at the rate of 500 per month. Two years later another pamphlet claimed that the 924 boys migrated in 1926 had been selected from 20,624 applicants.¹⁹⁴⁶

19.14 The Salvation Army also cited a low rate of return as proof of the scheme's success, claiming that of 3,000 boys who had been migrated between 1923 and 1926, only 26 (less than 1 per cent) had been returned to Britain, with 85 per cent still employed on the land.¹⁹⁴⁷ David Lamb, in *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, referred to five who had been brought back from Canada. One had 'proved to be quite a failure'; two had been returned for health reasons; and the other two had been 'desperately homesick and just made themselves a nuisance'.¹⁹⁴⁸ All had been returned to the districts from which they had been taken.

19.15 At the same time, the Salvation Army was aware of contemporary criticism. In 1930, for instance, it countered the accusation that it was 'exploiting children' by pointing out that the objective of the scheme was 'simply to provide a bridge for young fellows who have finished their schooling and are more or less at a loose end, and very often dissatisfied with the casual work that has fallen to their lot since leaving school'.¹⁹⁴⁹

19.16 It is difficult to identify precise numbers of migrants in these interwar years, and their locations. *The Salvation Army Year Book* reported that 'well nigh 600 boys' from the UK had been settled overseas in 1925.¹⁹⁵⁰ According to Library and Archives

¹⁹⁴³ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0266.

¹⁹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0268.

¹⁹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0268.

¹⁹⁴⁶ *Emigration Still Holds the Field*, n.d., SAL.001.002.0299.

¹⁹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0299.

¹⁹⁴⁸ David Lamb, *Juvenile Migration and Settlement*, 1924, SAL.001.002.0268.

¹⁹⁴⁹ *Organised Migration and Settlement*, 1930, SAL.001.002.0193.

¹⁹⁵⁰ *Salvation Army Year Book*, date unclear, probably 1926, p.36. SAL.001.002.0041.

Canada, approximately 4,000 'children' were brought to Canada under the juvenile migration programme, which ended 'around 1932'.¹⁹⁵¹ Girls stayed at the Clinton Lodge Hostel in Toronto and were trained for work in a Salvation Army hospital. Most of the boys were placed on farms in western Ontario, but others were sent to Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. By 1930 the Salvation Army had overseen the migration of over 5,000 juveniles from the UK since the boys' scheme had been launched in 1923.¹⁹⁵² By 1937, 6,000 boys had been sent to pre-arranged positions on farms in New Zealand, Canada, and particularly Australia under the boys' scheme.¹⁹⁵³

19.17 After the Second World War efforts were made to revive the Salvation Army's schemes to assist the migration of juveniles to these destinations, but with mixed results. In 1945 a letter from Colonel Owen Culshaw, Director of the Salvation Army's Migration Department, to civil servant Sir Eric Machtig, stated that the New Zealand High Commissioner had received his government's permission for the Salvation Army to migrate 50 boys aged 10-17.¹⁹⁵⁴ There is no evidence that this initiative was actually implemented.

19.18 With respect to Canada, there were several failures, in spite of much preparatory work. In 1958 Ewen Macdonald, European Colonization Manager for the Canadian Pacific Railway, wrote to Colonel T. E. Dennis, Director of the Migration Department, stating that the Salvation Army's Juvenile Migration Scheme had been approved by the authorities in Ottawa.¹⁹⁵⁵ This was a loan scheme, under which the Immigration and Travel Department of the Salvation Army in Canada would give \$200 loans towards the fare of boys who migrated under the auspices of the organisation. They would be required to repay the loan in Canadian currency in monthly instalments within 24 months of arrival, and Canadian employers were to be authorised to deduct these instalments from their wages.¹⁹⁵⁶ Selection of recruits was

¹⁹⁵¹ LAC, 'Salvation Army', <https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/immigration/immigration-records/home-children-1869-1930/home-children-guide/Pages/salvation-army.aspx>

¹⁹⁵² *Organised Migration and Settlement*, 1930, SAL.001.002.0193.

¹⁹⁵³ Harper and Constantine, *Migration and Empire* (Oxford, 2010), 283-284. See also The Salvation Army (2015) 'International Heritage Centre Blog: The New Exodus: The Salvation Army and Emigration' <https://www.salvationarmy.org.uk/history/blog12> and NAA, Research Guides – Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – The Salvation Army', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx>.

¹⁹⁵⁴ Report on Practice, Culshaw to Machtig, 6 Feb 1945 (COS/1/2/11a), SAL.001.001.0018.

¹⁹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, Macdonald to Dennis, 20 May 1958 (EM/2/2/3)/ SAL.001.001.0018 and 0023.

¹⁹⁵⁶ Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM_2_2_3 Migration to Canada, 'Boys for farming in Canada', 1953-1959, SAL.001.002.0711.

to be made by officers from the Immigration and Travel Department of the Salvation Army in Britain, which would also arrange medicals and provide background information on the boys. There is some ambiguity in the records about the age qualification, but it seems the scheme was to be applicable to boys between 16 and 18. It was advertised in the *War Cry*, and was limited to boys, who were expected to take up farm employment. They were also expected to remain on the farm until they had attained the age of 18, since they were legal wards of the Salvation Army until that time.¹⁹⁵⁷ Placements in Canada were to be secured by the Salvation Army's Toronto office, and correspondence indicates that considerable emphasis was given to the importance of making 'reliable arrangements' for placement well in advance of the boys' arrival.¹⁹⁵⁸ Recruits to the scheme were to be lightly supervised. The Salvation Army headquarters was to advise the Canadian Pacific Railway when recruits were about to sail. The CPR's port representative at Montreal would meet them off the boat and ensure they made the right connection to Toronto. On arrival at Toronto, they would be met by representatives of the CPR and the Salvation Army.¹⁹⁵⁹ In 1958 the Toronto Salvation Army intimated its intention to inaugurate a boys' residence near Toronto, on similar lines to the Riverview institution in Queensland, but there is no evidence that this was implemented.¹⁹⁶⁰

19.19 The Canadian boys' scheme demonstrates the ongoing significance of multi-agency migration of juveniles after the war. The original agreement, in 1954, had been between the United Church of Canada and the National Council of the YMCA in Britain, to place boys aged between 16 and 18 in farm employment in Canada.¹⁹⁶¹ The CPR was to grant assisted passage loans to cover ocean and rail travel and meal tickets to the recruits' destinations, and repayments were to be collected by the United Church within two years of arrival. It seems the scheme was extended to the Salvation Army in 1955. In the event, this Salvation Army Canadian scheme never got off the ground. By March 1956 only one direct enquiry had been received, from a boy who was under age, and other enquiries had been from boys who did not intend to pursue a farming career. Interest remained low in 1957, and by January 1958 the Salvation Army admitted that its 'high hopes' of placing 50 boys a year had been

¹⁹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, R.J. Warden, General Agent, CPR, to CP agents, 20 July 1954, SAL.001.002.0725. Clarence Wiseman, Chief Secretary, Toronto Salvation Army, to T.E Dennis, 10 May 1957, SAL.001.001.0788.

¹⁹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, anon to W.W. Booth, 20 May 1955, SAL.001.002.0740; Memorandum by L. C. Cumming, Canadian Government Immigration Service, April 25 1958, SAL.001.002.0853-0854.

¹⁹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, European Colonization Manager, CPR, to T.E. Dennis, 20 May 1958, SAL.001.002.0713.

¹⁹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, Memorandum by T.E. Dennis, 19 June 1958, SAL.001.002.0845.

¹⁹⁶¹ *Ibid*, R.J. Warden, General Agent, CPR, to CP agents, 20 July 1954, SAL.001.002.0725.

dashed when rising unemployment in Canada brought about the indefinite postponement of the venture.¹⁹⁶² It was revived on paper in 1959 but seems not to have been implemented.

19.20 It was only in Australia that the Salvation Army participated in post-war juvenile migration to any extent. In 1951 a warning was sent to London by the Chief Secretary's Office in Melbourne that each individual sent out should be 'thoroughly investigated' as to their suitability, including the applicants' motives and the attitude of their parents.¹⁹⁶³ Since the Salvation Army in Australia, as nominator, would be responsible for policing the settlement, supervision and conduct of nominees under 18, it was pointed out that they could not afford to receive any 'problem youths'. Although the letter went on to say that the few cases sent to date had been 'quite satisfactory', the reminder about the need for vigilance perhaps suggests otherwise.¹⁹⁶⁴

19.21 Most of the post-war Australian documentation relates to Queensland. A training hostel, Riverview, near Brisbane, had been opened in 1926, but closed with the onset of economic depression in the 1930s. In 1948 Brigadier Winton, of the Salvation Army's Sydney office, took the Minister for Immigration, Arthur Calwell, on a tour of the property, which had become run-down.¹⁹⁶⁵ Calwell's response was to emphasise that any scheme of child migration by voluntary organisations 'must be controlled closely because of the possibility of the exploitation of the children'.¹⁹⁶⁶ Riverview was reopened as a centre for training juvenile migrants in farming. Boys were to receive training for up to six months before being placed with a 'suitable farmer'.¹⁹⁶⁷ Applicants had to be under 16 years of age at the time of their selection, though some were 16 by the time they arrived. By then the school-leaving age had been raised to 15, so some intended recruits would qualify as child migrants, rather

¹⁹⁶² *Ibid*, Clarence Wiseman, Chief Secretary, Toronto Salvation Army, to T.E. Dennis, 17 Jan 1958, SAL.001.002.0833-0834.

¹⁹⁶³ Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM_2_2_2_1, assorted correspondence re child migration to Australia, 1941-47, Chief Secretary's Office, Melbourne, to Lt. Commissioner M. Owen Culshaw, London, 21 June 1951, SAL.001.002.0457.

¹⁹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0457.

¹⁹⁶⁵ NAA, Research Guides – Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – The Salvation Army', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx>

¹⁹⁶⁶ NAA, Research Guides – Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – The Salvation Army', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx>, see *Correspondence Files*, Multiple Numbers Series, 1922-68, Canberra, from Series A445.133/2/49, *Calwell to Winton*, 9 Sept 1948,

¹⁹⁶⁷ SAL.001.002.0492, Salvation Army to Hubert Lee, 12 Feb 1953.

than juveniles. They were interviewed by Australia House as well as by a Salvation Army officer, were medically examined, and reports were obtained from their headmasters as to their academic status.¹⁹⁶⁸ The Salvation Army warned would-be applicants to think carefully, however, both because of likely homesickness and because farming was hard work.¹⁹⁶⁹ But there seems to have been some pressure from the Salvation Army in Sydney to secure recruits. A memorandum in January 1953 made veiled reference to problems surrounding the establishment when it declared that 'it would be a tragedy if the difficulties experienced in getting Riverview on its feet, as well as the expense involved' were to lead to 'a breakdown in the supply of boys at this stage'.¹⁹⁷⁰

19.22 The Salvation Army in Britain seems to have been reactive, rather than proactive, in migrating youths to Riverview. One boy who went out in 1954 had been put on probation after a conviction for theft, and was sent to Riverview when the Salvation Army responded to a request from the probation officer to send him to a suitable scheme in Australia.¹⁹⁷¹ Another case in which the Salvation Army's actions were reactive involved a school-leaving orphan in the care of Lancashire County Council.¹⁹⁷² The boy had expressed a wish to go sheep farming in Australia, and was migrated to Riverview after it had been suggested to the Council Children's Officer that he should get in touch with the Salvation Army.

Between 1947 and 1967 the Salvation Army sent about 3,200 boys and girls to approximately 40 officially-approved childcare institutions in Australia to which they were linked, and 91 UK 'child migrants' were subsidised to go to Australia between 1950 and 1960.¹⁹⁷³ However, and probably fortunately, it seems that fewer than 100 migrants passed through Riverview, of whom only a small number would have been juveniles, and by the 1960s the Salvation Army was using the place for other purposes.¹⁹⁷⁴

¹⁹⁶⁸ Records of the International Headquarters, A8, T.E. Dennis to H.G. Wallace, 28 Dec 1956, SAL.001.002.0521.

¹⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0521; letter from unknown officer to Hubert Lee, 12 Feb 1953, SAL.001.002.0492.

¹⁹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, memorandum from Salvation Army, Sydney, 24 Jan 1953, SAL.001.002.0480.

¹⁹⁷¹ Records of the International Headquarters Chief of the Staffs Office COS1211c Migrant case histories 1955 reports of emigrants including b-V1, SAL.001.002.0412-0413.

¹⁹⁷² *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0414-0415.

¹⁹⁷³ Stephen Constantine, 'The British government, child welfare and child migration to Australia after 1945', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 30: 1 (2002), p.126.

¹⁹⁷⁴ NAA, Research Guides – Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – The Salvation Army', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/salvation-army.aspx>

19.23 The maintenance agreements for Riverview had recommended, rather than required, that the staff should be sufficient in number, should include women, and should be 'as far as possible persons with knowledge and experience of child care methods'.¹⁹⁷⁵ The Salvation Army was to use its 'best endeavours' to find suitable occupations for migrants at the end of their training and was to keep in touch and 'render them every possible assistance' thereafter.¹⁹⁷⁶ During the 1950s there were, according to the Salvation Army's Section 21 submission, 'practical checks' of Riverview, as well as reports on migrant boys who had been settled there, with reference to maintenance costs, arrival, progress, health and behaviour.¹⁹⁷⁷

19.24 However, as noted in our main Report, Riverview was associated with dilapidated, inadequate facilities and with physical, emotional and sexual abuse. 'Home truths' about Riverview were described unfavourably in an undated 1953 letter from seven (probably English) boys to Major Leng of the Salvation Army.¹⁹⁷⁸ The letter claimed that it was not, as claimed in the promotional literature, a training farm, but 'merely a money-making concern designed to provide the people running it with a fat and easy living'.¹⁹⁷⁹ The food was 'fit only for pigs', the working hours excessive, and the pay paltry.¹⁹⁸⁰ Hygiene was neglected and 'rust lies thick on all our eating utensils'.¹⁹⁸¹ The letter went on to threaten that if action was not taken quickly, the boys' parents would ensure that 'every leading paper in the country (England) will give a front page account of the way in which we were deluded about the conditions out here'.¹⁹⁸² The Salvation Army's response was to dismiss the complaint as the spurious allegations of an agitator, and to defend the reputation of Riverview.¹⁹⁸³ William Cooper, Chief Secretary of the Salvation Army in Eastern Australia, visited the institution on 13 October 1953, after being alerted by the State

¹⁹⁷⁵ Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service EM_2_2_2_4, Agreement with the Commonwealth Relations Office, 1960-62, Riverview Training Farm: Maintenance agreement, 16 Aug 1957, SAL.001.002.0664.

¹⁹⁷⁶ Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service EM_2_2_2_4, Agreement with the Commonwealth Relations Office, 1960-62, Riverview Training Farm: Maintenance agreement, 16 Aug 1957, SAL.001.002.0664.

¹⁹⁷⁷ Report – Practice, SAL.001.001.0107.

¹⁹⁷⁸ Records of the International Headquarters, undated letter, 1953, SAL.01.002.0491.

¹⁹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, SAL.01.002.0491.

¹⁹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, SAL.01.002.0491.

¹⁹⁸¹ *Ibid*, SAL.01.002.0491.

¹⁹⁸² *Ibid*, SAL.01.002.0491.

¹⁹⁸³ *Ibid*, W.A. Ebbs to Col. Cooper, Sydney, 28 Sept 1953. SAL.001.002.0490; Cooper to Ebbs, 13 Oct 1953, SAL.001.002.0493-0494.

Migration Officer to 'hidden discontent' among the boys.¹⁹⁸⁴ He blamed disgruntlement on the boys having been spoilt during the six-week voyage from the UK, hearing 'false stories' of easy conditions in Australia, and then being reluctant to face up to reality when placed on the farm. He reiterated the warning of the unnamed Salvation Army officer earlier in the year that applicants 'need to be fully aware of the position before they set out on their journey'.¹⁹⁸⁵ Eighteen months later Commissioner W.A. Ebbs was advised by a fellow Salvation Army officer in London that it was 'not wise or workable' to send boys over 16 to Riverview, since it was very difficult to get farmers to take on these older boys because 'the wage gets beyond most of them'.¹⁹⁸⁶

19.25 Then, in November 1956, there was an incident surrounding two boys who had just turned 16 when they arrived at Riverview.¹⁹⁸⁷ They had remained there only two days before 'absconding' to Brisbane, where they complained to Mr Longland, the State Migration Officer, that they had been misinformed about conditions. The Salvation Army's Social Secretary in Queensland blamed their disgruntlement not on lack of information but on the boys' 'inability to understand or appreciate the atmosphere of Australian farming conditions as against those which prevailed in the Old Country'.¹⁹⁸⁸ He had visited them at the Yungaba Immigration Hostel and believed they would 'make good' if they were placed straight on farms as they had requested. He felt no good purpose would be served by returning them to Riverview. That opinion was contested by the farm's manager, Major A.J. Smith, who argued that to place the boys out directly without training at Riverview would constitute a breach of the migration agreement between the Salvation Army and the Australian government. He claimed that the migration scheme as currently set up was 'very unsatisfactory' and should be disbanded.¹⁹⁸⁹ Part of the problem seems to have been that 'ordinary' migrants were mixed with Australian juvenile delinquents. In December 1956 Thomas Dennis wrote from London to Colonel H.G.Wallace in Sydney, reporting the despatch of six boys.¹⁹⁹⁰ All had come from good homes, and their parents would be 'horrified' if they thought their sons had to mix with

¹⁹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0493-0494.

¹⁹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0494.

¹⁹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, John Dent, Chief Secretary, London, to Ebbs, quoting a letter from Major A. Chambers, 2 May 1955, SAL.001.002.0507.

¹⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, A8, Herbert Wallace, Chief Secretary, London HQ, to Col. T.E. Dennis, 39 Nov 1956, SAL.001.002.0518-0519.

¹⁹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0518.

¹⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, SAL.001.002.0519.

¹⁹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, Dennis to Wallace, 28 Dec 1956, SAL.001.002.0520-0521.

delinquents at Riverview. Concern about the incompatibility of British migrants and State-committed Australian boys contributed to the closure of the migration work at Riverview in 1960, by which time it had dwindled to almost nothing.¹⁹⁹¹ The four boys then remaining at Riverview were passed over to the care of the Big Brother Movement.

19.26 The extent to which the problems at Riverview were known to the authorities, or when, is unclear. J. Armstrong, the new Chief Migration Officer at Australia House in 1955, seems to have been unaware of any issues when he asked the Salvation Army to send him 'any outstanding or interesting success stories' of residents for use in recruitment propaganda.¹⁹⁹² The Salvation Army's response was that it would be 'very happy' to oblige.¹⁹⁹³ Unfortunately we have not traced the reply so cannot comment on its contents.

19.27 Evidence of specific Scottish involvement in the Salvation Army's juvenile migration scheme is minimal and largely anecdotal. The Salvation Army does not think it ever had establishments in Scotland that had either as their primary or routine function the migration of children or juveniles overseas.¹⁹⁹⁴ It is assumed that any who went were migrated through the Salvation Army's UK-wide schemes, since the Migration and Settlement Department had a branch office in Glasgow. Similarly, while juveniles from across the UK were accepted into the Salvation Army Boys' Scheme and trained at Hadleigh farm, there is no surviving record of how many of these trainees were from Scotland. However, other sources provide us with some evidence of the involvement of Scots. Records from the Women's Social Work Headquarters of the Salvation Army show that very occasionally people would emigrate directly after a period of residence in a Salvation Army establishment.¹⁹⁹⁵ Even so, an inspection of records between 1900 and 1932 has shown only one girl under 18 doing so from a Salvation Army establishment in Scotland. This was ██████████ ██████████ who emigrated to Canada in 1923 at the age of 16, 'in charge of the S.A.', after application had been made by Glasgow Parish Council.¹⁹⁹⁶ In addition, contemporary press reports in the 1920s provide some evidence of Scottish

¹⁹⁹¹ Records of the International Headquarters, Migration and Travel Service, A10, Lieut-Colonel Ernest E. Rance to Commissioner F. Coutts, Territorial Commander, Sydney, 8 March 1960, SAL.001.002.0689.

¹⁹⁹² Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM_2_2_2_2 Boys for Riverview, W.A. Ebbs to J. Dent, 12 April 1955, SAL.001.002.0505.

¹⁹⁹³ *Ibid*, Dent to Ebbs, 27 April 1955, SAL.001.002.0506.

¹⁹⁹⁴ Report-Practice, SAL. 001.001.0015.

¹⁹⁹⁵ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0020.

¹⁹⁹⁶ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0020; Girls' Statement Book, 1923, SAL.001.001.0045.

participation in the Salvation Army's juvenile migration scheme, particularly through the recruitment visits of Salvation Army officers to regional citadels. For instance, in January 1924 H.G. Miller selected at least 24 boys in Aberdeen, and in September 1927 David Lamb visited Inverness.¹⁹⁹⁷ The only other reference that has been found to a Scottish juvenile migrant in relation to the Salvation Army is a press reference to one [REDACTED] from Glasgow. In 1925 his former employer in Canada wrote to *Workers' Weekly*, criticising the alleged treatment of migrants by the Salvation Army.

I have worked with a boy who came out under their care from Scotland about a year ago, and who now is cast aside by them. The excuse made by their Captain at Brandon, Manitoba, where the boy is supposed to be looked after, is that it is too costly to keep track of them. And as far as they are concerned he (at the age of 15) must dig out for himself. This boy, [REDACTED] of Glasgow, worked with me for two months. He gave me to understand that the Salvation Army had turned him out of his bed to get his grip at 10.30 p. m. one night. He was then told he had three miles to walk on the prairie. The boy refused to go that night, and it finally ended up with a phone message from the Captain's wife to the effect that 'he had better not hang around there, but get right out'.¹⁹⁹⁸

The Salvation Army's records otherwise include a letter in 1949 from an unknown officer to Colonel J.P. Dean stating that he had met with the Scottish Home Secretary (presumably the Secretary of State for Scotland) regarding child migrant proposals for Australia, but there is no indication if anything of consequence followed.¹⁹⁹⁹ We also know that neither of the Salvation Army's Scottish Homes which were run for children and adolescents, Redheugh in Kilbirnie and Mount Bruce in Pollokshields and later in Barrhead, seems to have been involved in the migration of those in their care.²⁰⁰⁰

19.28 From the outset, the Salvation Army generated voluminous documentation to promote and record its activities, and the observations above have been taken from a selection of these papers. It is unfortunate that many Salvation Army records were lost when the International Headquarters was destroyed during the London Blitz, although we still have the annual year books, which contain information relating to migration policy, as well as some correspondence and reports. Many pamphlets

¹⁹⁹⁷ *Press and Journal*, 30 Jan 1924; *Stornoway Gazette*, 23 Sept 1927.

¹⁹⁹⁸ Letter from H.F. Mather, Winnipeg, quoted in *Workers' Weekly*, 31 July 1925, p.6.

¹⁹⁹⁹ Report - Practice, letter from unknown officer to Lieut-Col J.P. Dean, 9 Sept 1949 (EM/2/2/2/1), SAL.001.001.0018 and 0023.

²⁰⁰⁰ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0015 and 0020.

promoting migration also survive. Papers lost in the Blitz include some of the personal papers of David Lamb, Scottish-born head of the Migration and Settlement Department, and publications by Lamb make reference to a number of migration-related documents which cannot now be traced.²⁰⁰¹ It is not known, however, whether the records of inter-war migrants were lost in the bombing or had been disposed of earlier, either as part of a planned disposal policy, as a reactive measure when the Migration Department's Head Office closed; or when records were transferred to the host country. Duties of after-care fell to the Salvation Army's immigration departments in the host countries once the migrants had arrived at their destination, and there is some evidence that the Army took responsibility for sending or taking the necessary paperwork to receiving countries on behalf of the migrants as part of their conducted passage service. Some records relating to inter-war migration are still held by the Salvation Army in Canada and New Zealand, but it is not known how complete these records are, nor how many relate to children and specifically to juveniles. Moreover, it has not been possible to obtain any primary material from the Salvation Army in the host countries to which migrants were sent. After-care records have not survived in the Salvation Army's Australian Territorial Archives.²⁰⁰²

YMCA

20.1 The YMCA was founded in London in 1844, to provide young men working in cities with opportunities for Christian fellowship, recreation and ultimately accommodation. It soon developed a sophisticated international network, which included a heavy involvement with the reception and welfare of newly-arrived migrants through its network of hostels, and the establishment of an Emigration Department within the YMCA World's Committee in 1909. After the First World War YMCA workers were placed in ports of embarkation and debarkation, and the Emigration Department liaised with the International Labour Bureaux to create better transport facilities and employment opportunities for emigrants. YMCA welfare officers who sailed with the migrants, organised shipboard activities, and at the end of the voyage ensured that new settlers were put in touch with local YMCA officials

²⁰⁰¹ *Ibid*, SAL.001.001.0019. See also Statement on Availability of Historic Records - VI, Parts 3, 4, and 6 to 8, SAL.001.001.0026.

²⁰⁰² Statement on Availability of Historic Records - VI, Parts 3, 4, and 6 to 8, SAL.001.001.0027.

or churches at their destinations.²⁰⁰³ Like the Salvation Army, the YMCA had its own separate migration department from the early 20th century.

20.2 Its objective was to assist migration in order to mitigate the threat or reality of juvenile unemployment. In 1922 Cyril Bavin, General Secretary of the YMCA Migration Department, visited Canada, Australia and New Zealand at the invitation of churches in those dominions.²⁰⁰⁴ This resulted in a co-operative nomination scheme. Churches and charities in the dominions were encouraged to appoint local committees which, after liaising with employers and residents and obtaining guarantees of employment and accommodation, nominated eligible categories of settlers to their government's immigration departments. The initial recruitment of individuals was then undertaken by the counterparts or agents of those organisations in the UK, although final selection was subject to the approval of the dominions' authorities. Local committees in the dominions assumed responsibility for the reception and after-care of recruits and also undertook to find fresh openings for anyone who had been unsatisfactorily placed in the first instance.²⁰⁰⁵ These activities laid the foundation for more active participation in assisted migration in the 1920s, when the YMCA could draw on funds made available through the Empire Settlement Act. It attracted a significant number of Scottish juveniles, perhaps overall as many as 500.

20.3 Initially, the YMCA migration programme was directed primarily at Australia, and it was in the 1920s that its recruitment of juveniles peaked, attracting a significant number of Scots.²⁰⁰⁶ In October 1924 the YMCA's migration representative, along with an Australian delegate, visited Aberdeen to select 20 applicants for farm trainee positions in the Colac district of Victoria, as well as some employees for the Camperdown, Gippsland and Hamilton districts.²⁰⁰⁷ The Caledonian Society of Colac forged links with the Scottish YMCA, which was happy to send boys to Presbyterian farmers in a largely Scottish area. In June 1925 the

²⁰⁰³ See, for instance, 'A Glimpse of Australia', *The Scottish Red Triangle News*, Sept 1927, p.20.

²⁰⁰⁴ The Scottish Red Triangle News, 1 Nov 1923, p.10. See also YMCA_J59.pdf, document supplied by Cadbury Research Library, Birmingham University, Minutes of Interim Executive Committee Meeting, 13 Russell Square, London, 5 Sept 1922.

²⁰⁰⁵ *Scottish Manhood*, February 1930, part 1, p.10. See also Marjory Harper, *Emigration from Scotland between the Wars* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998), p.165.

²⁰⁰⁶ Based on a number of articles in *The Red Triangle News* (renamed *Scottish Manhood* in Oct 1926) that indicate the number of Scottish (and other) YMCA members emigrating to Australia. See, for instance, June 1926, p.21; June 1927, p.21; July 1927, p.19; Sept 1927, p.21.

²⁰⁰⁷ *Press and Journal*, 23 Oct 1924.

Presbyterian Church in Australia asked the YMCA and the Scottish churches to secure 46 domestics and 36 boys for Victoria²⁰⁰⁸. There is also a suggestion of networking with the Boy Scouts, as Dr Cecil McAdam, who worked with the Scout movement in Victoria from 1926 to 1928, was also active in the YMCA.²⁰⁰⁹ YMCA welfare officers accompanied the migrant parties, and their recommendations, reports of the voyage, and descriptions of opportunities in Australia appeared regularly in the YMCA's monthly journal, *Scottish Manhood*. Like Quarriers *Narrative of Facts*, the journal was a mouthpiece for emphasising the scheme's credibility. The YMCA placed representatives in three States—Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia—to facilitate the assimilation of settlers.²⁰¹⁰

20.4 By its own account the YMCA by 1930 had organised the settlement of 1,500 migrants in Australia, mainly in farm work and domestic service, probably including some juveniles.²⁰¹¹ It seems that the scheme may then have fallen into abeyance with the depression. But various articles in the Australian press at the end of 1937 reported that the YMCA in the UK was planning to 'resume' emigration, and that Major Bavin, the YMCA's Community Services Officer, was coming to Australia to investigate possibilities for the migration of both boys and girls.²⁰¹² Apparently he found a ready response to his plans in New South Wales, where the Scheyville Farm was to provide training for migrants. Bavin's proposal to use the services of the British Settlers' Welfare Committee to provide after-care met with the approval of the Immigration Department, which also noted that 'the after-care of girls will require special consideration; they present more problems than boys'.²⁰¹³ A report by Bavin, dated 22 June 1938, noted that he had concluded an agreement with the Department of Labour and Industry in Sydney regarding the placement of 200 boys who, after eight weeks' training at Scheyville, would be placed in farm work by the

²⁰⁰⁸ *The Scottish Red Triangle News*, June 1925, p.22.

²⁰⁰⁹ See *Dr Cecil Gordon McAdam*, at <https://mgs.vic.edu.au/about/our-people/meet-our-alumni/dr-cecil-gordon-mcadam>; see also Scott Johnston, *'Looking Wide? Imperialism, Internationalism, and the Boy Scout Movement, 1918-1939'*, unpublished MA thesis, University of Waterloo, Ontario, 2012, p.100.

²⁰¹⁰ NAA, 'Research Guides – Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – YMCA youth migration', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/ymca.aspx>

²⁰¹¹ *Scottish Manhood*, Feb 1930, p.17, and NAA, 'Research Guides, YMCA youth migration' <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/ymca.aspx>

²⁰¹² See *Correspondence Files, class 5* (British migrants) 1945-50, A436.1945/5/395 part 1, including cutting from the *Herald* (Melbourne), 20 Dec 1937, at <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/ymca.aspx>.

²⁰¹³ H.A. Garrett, Immigration Department to Secretary, Department of the Interior, 10 Feb 1938. <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/ymca.aspx>

Department.²⁰¹⁴ There were also links between the YMCA and Quarriers, and in 1939 the YMCA in London became the sending agency for 17 children (not juveniles) sent by Quarriers to Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Home at Parramatta in New South Wales.²⁰¹⁵

20.5 The YMCA also sent juveniles to Canada. In 1926 and 1927 the Migration Department liaised with the Canadian National Council of YMCAs in the recruitment of single young men for farm service.²⁰¹⁶ From January 1928 activity increased when the United Church of Canada took over sole responsibility for nominations. In 1928 and 1929 a particular effort was made to encourage the migration of youths from the depressed mining communities of central Scotland, beginning with two parties, mainly from Cowdenbeath, that were sent out in summer 1928.²⁰¹⁷ From the United Church's receiving hostel at Norval, Ontario, 132 boys were distributed to farms in the locality in 1928. In 1929 the United Church indicated its willingness to absorb a further 600 'suitable' Protestant youths, and further contingent were recruited from Cowdenbeath, as well as Lanarkshire, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee, Orkney and Lewis.²⁰¹⁸

20.6 During 1928 and 1929, a total of 637 British juveniles were placed in Canada under the Church Nomination Scheme.²⁰¹⁹ According to *Scottish Manhood*, while six had been deported, including two for medical reasons, almost 60 per cent were still with their original employer.²⁰²⁰ In view of its self-perceived success, the Scottish branch of the YMCA Migration Department made a public appeal for £5,000 to send 400 boys and 100 families to Canada during 1930.²⁰²¹ By that time it had developed sophisticated networks with other organisations, and was administering the Church Nomination Scheme not only on behalf of itself and its colonial contacts, but as the

²⁰¹⁴ NAA, 'Research Guides – Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – YMCA youth migration', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/ymca.aspx> NAA, A436, Major C. Bavin – YMCA Migration Representative, Report on Tour of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, November 20th 1937 to June 4th 1938, by Cyril Bavin, p. 4

²⁰¹⁵ NAA, Cyril Bavin to Superintendent, Burnside Homes, 24 Feb 1938, NAA.001.001.0552; Quarriers, *Narrative of Facts*, 1939, QAR.001.001.3030-3031.

²⁰¹⁶ 'Our Boys in Canada: how the United Church looked after them', in *Scottish Manhood*, Oct 1929, p.16.

²⁰¹⁷ *Scottish Manhood*, Sept 1928, p.116.

²⁰¹⁸ *Scottish Manhood*, March 1929, p.17.

²⁰¹⁹ *Scottish Manhood*, Oct 1929, p.16. The YMCA also operated a parallel scheme for single men, 715 of whom went to Canada under its auspices between April 1926 and Oct 1929.

²⁰²⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰²¹ *Scottish Manhood*, Feb 1930, special migration number, part 1, pp.4-13.

agent and clearing house for a number of home churches that had been persuaded to participate.²⁰²² Some of the Scottish Presbyterian churches—the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church—promoted collective nomination through a joint committee, which liaised with the YMCA and organised preliminary training for recruits.²⁰²³ An initial selection was made by the YMCA Migration Department, and the selection was then submitted to the appropriate dominion government office for approval.

20.7 After the war there was an attempt to resume YMCA-sponsored migration to Australia.²⁰²⁴ In 1947 correspondence between YMCA National Secretary J.T. Massey and Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell indicates that the YMCA proposed to migrate 100 boys aged 14-18 from the UK. It seems that they may have been brought to South Australia, but little is known about the scheme, including whether juveniles from Scotland were among the parties. In May 1960 K.J. Smith, Acting Chief Migration Officer at Australia House, suggested that an 'apparent lack of cooperation between the organisation in Australia and the UK' had led to only 50 youths having been migrated to Australia under the YMCA's auspices in the previous decade. The Immigration Department's response was that youth migration had been 'particularly successful' overall, and, unlike the migration of children, there had been few recruitment difficulties.

20.8 The YMCA also renewed its co-operation with the United Church of Canada in operating a juvenile migration scheme in the 1950s. In 1954 the Canadian federal government approved an arrangement whereby the United Church of Canada, in co-operation with the National Council of the YMCA in Britain, could receive and place 50 boys a year as farm workers in Canada. The boys were to be aged between 16 and 18 and would be selected by the YMCA in Britain on behalf of the United Church of Canada. Written permission had to be secured from a parent or guardian, and the Canadian immigration authorities would oversee medicals and issue final approval. Since the boys would be classified as minors the Canadian immigration authorities stipulated that the United Church of Canada had to secure clearance and approval from provincial welfare departments. Recruits were expected to pay £10 towards their expenses, but were given loans by the Canadian Pacific Railway to subsidise

²⁰²² *Reports on the Schemes of the Church of Scotland - Committee on the Church Overseas*, 1925.

²⁰²³ The Free Church did not participate in the scheme until 1927.

²⁰²⁴ NAA, 'Research Guides – Good British Stock: Child and Youth Migration to Australia – YMCA youth migration', <http://guides.naa.gov.au/good-british-stock/chapter3/ymca.aspx>

their ocean and rail fares and meal tickets to their destinations. Repayments were to be made in monthly instalments over a two-year period, and were to be collected by the United Church of Canada. The United Church was also to undertake preliminary vetting of farms as well as six-monthly after-care visits, and care and maintenance in times of need until the recruits had attained the age of 19.²⁰²⁵

20.9 In 1954 the General Agent of the Canadian Pacific Railway anticipated that the scheme should be 'of considerable help in stimulating the movement of juveniles to Canada', and encouraged his sub-agents to bring it to the notice of 'all organisations and societies concerned with youth welfare in your district', such as boys' homes and orphanages, as well as the local YMCA secretaries.²⁰²⁶ He added that it was possible a similar scheme might shortly be instigated between the Over-Sea League and the United Church of Canada. While the Royal Over-Seas League was certainly involved in juvenile migration to the antipodes after the war, there is no evidence that it participated in any Canadian scheme. However, as we have seen, the Salvation Army did attempt (albeit abortively) to utilise these arrangements to reactivate juvenile migration to Canada in the 1950s.²⁰²⁷

Numbers and Destinations

21.1 In this and in the following concluding sections we summarise our findings. We begin with an acknowledgement that the above survey of organisations involved in juvenile migration from Scotland is not comprehensive. Coverage has been limited by a number of factors. Not every institution that migrated or may have migrated juveniles kept detailed records. In some cases, particularly for very small institutions, no records at all seem to have been kept. In other cases, records may not have survived, either wholly or partially. A few institutions have not responded to requests to supply records. Occasionally, the research process has identified small institutions that may have migrated juveniles and children, perhaps under the umbrella of bigger organisations, but we became aware of the existence of these institutions too late to

²⁰²⁵ Salvation Army, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM_2_2_3 Migration to Canada, 'Boys for farming in Canada', R.J. Warden, General Agent, CPR Company, London, to CP agents, 20 July 1954, SAL.001.002.0725; William Davidson, Chief Secretary, Salvation Army, Toronto, to Commissioner W. Ebbs, London, 30 Nov 1954, SAL.001.002.0728; Cunard Line circular to agents, 23 Sept 1955, SAL.001.002.0742.

²⁰²⁶ *Ibid*, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM_2_2_3 Migration to Canada, 'Boys for farming in Canada', R.J. Warden, General Agent, CPR Company, London, to Canadian Pacific agents, 20 July 1954.

²⁰²⁷ See above, para 19.19.

request records. On the other hand, the major and best-known institutions, notably Quarriers, generated, retained and supplied voluminous records. However, time constraints have made it impossible to scrutinise this documentation fully, and the above survey relies on sampling the original records, aided in most cases by the organisations' responses to Section 21 requests.

21.2 We know the destinations to which Scottish juveniles were sent. There are occasional references to Kenya, South Africa and Rhodesia, but most were sent to New Zealand, Australia and Canada. Because of accessed records, most of the cases we have examined relate to Canada. As noted earlier (para.2.4), it is however impossible to calculate or even to estimate with any confidence the number of Scottish juvenile migrants sent from Scottish or other UK institutions. Some organisations did not keep detailed statistical records. Quantification is also hampered by the changing definition of juveniles—as the school-leaving age was raised three times during the period under review. Calculations are also made more problematic by the need to keep in mind those who were migrated as children but who, as juveniles, remained the responsibility of the institutions that had sent them, and of their overseas counterparts, in some cases up to the age of 21. The latter are mentioned on the basis that their vulnerability to abuse continued—and indeed, may have increased—following their migration, and not least following their placement for employment. Any attempt at enumeration is therefore speculative.

21.3 Assigning numbers sent by particular organisations is further complicated because there was considerable networking and collaboration among the institutions that migrated juveniles. For instance, the Cossar farms trained juveniles who were subsequently migrated under the interdenominational Church Nomination Scheme, which was administered by the YMCA as a scheme to recruit juvenile boys for farm work in Australia and Canada.²⁰²⁸ Cossar boys were also migrated under the umbrella of Quarriers. The Royal Over-Seas League was involved with the migration of juveniles under the Flock House Scheme, and by the YMCA. Cyril Bavin was General Secretary of the YMCA Migration Department, a member of ROSL's Central Council between 1920 and 1940 and subsequently its Migration Secretary until his death in 1955. He had also been a Liaison Officer between the British and Dominion

²⁰²⁸ See Marjory Harper, 'Making Christian colonists: an evaluation of the emigration policies and practices of the Scottish Presbyterian churches and Christian organisations between the wars', *Records of the Scottish Church History Society*, vol. 28 (1998), pp.173-215.

²⁰²⁹ Prince's Trust, minutes of Fairbridge Executive Committee, 7 April 1960.

Governments under the CORB sea-evacuation scheme during the Second World War. In 1954 two parties of children were sent by ROSL to the Church of Scotland's Dhurringile Rural Training Farm in Australia. The Aberlour Trust sent juveniles overseas under the auspices of the Boy Scout Movement. When the Salvation Army closed its institution at Riverview, Queensland, in 1960, the remaining four boys living there were handed over to the Big Brother Movement. In 1960 the Chair of the Fairbridge Society suggested that they should co-operate with the Big Brother Movement, and the director followed this by referring to recent efforts in Edinburgh and Glasgow to 'step up' the number of teenage migrants, though the outcome of that venture is not known.²⁰²⁹

Changes in Contemporary Attitudes

22.1 Organisations that migrated juveniles were convinced that it was a proper and practical way to solve a perceived imbalance between 'supply and demand'. It was felt that juveniles who were unemployed or in 'blind alley' occupations in Britain and not least in Scotland would benefit by being relocated to the dominions. There was very little discussion in the institutions' own publications, minutes or correspondence of the ethics of the practice. Not surprisingly, migrants' correspondence that was selected for publication in their magazines or annual reports was overwhelmingly positive, albeit with occasional hints of problems such as homesickness and uncongenial placements.

22.2 Assisting the migration overseas of juveniles who were 'in need' or 'deprived of a normal home life' also took place within a wider context shaped by imperial agendas and rhetoric. This endorsed the view that to migrate juveniles as well as children was to provide the Commonwealth with 'good British stock'. It was not uncommon for parents to send their adolescent children abroad unaccompanied in the belief that migration would offer them a better life in another 'British' territory. In doing so, they might have recourse to the supervisory services of organisations like the Big Brother Movement, the Dreadnought Scheme or the Salvation Army.

22.3 However, the ethics of migrating juveniles (as well as children) came under increasing scrutiny during the twentieth century. After the First World War new philosophies of child care began to stress the importance of maintaining the family unit. Concerns were raised about the damaging psychological effects of separating

²⁰²⁹ Prince's Trust, minutes of Fairbridge Executive Committee, 7 April 1960.

families, including siblings. Politically, migration also came under attack from the British labour movement, which claimed it was a device designed to preserve the existing social structure and to divert attention from the need to introduce welfare provision in the UK. As noted in our main Report, at the invitation of the Canadian Department of Immigration, a three-strong investigative delegation was appointed by the Oversea Settlement Committee to visit Canada. The subsequent Bondfield Report in December 1924 generally endorsed child and juvenile migration, and made no reference to abuse. However, it recommended that state-funded migration only of those over school-leaving age should be allowed, a recommendation that was accepted by the UK and Canadian governments. As also indicated in our main Report, professional opinion during and after the Second World War, even among organisations that had been involved in juvenile as well as child migration, began to shift, as epitomised especially in the Curtis report in 1946, which led to the Children Act in 1948.

22.4 Canadian attitudes towards juvenile migrants seem to have been ambivalent at least from the 1920s. In an address to the Kiwanis Club of Montreal in February 1924, George Bogue Smart, Supervisor of Juvenile Immigration to Canada, argued strongly in support of the practice. His speech was reported in detail in the *Montreal Gazette*.

Juvenile immigration transcends in importance any other form of immigration at this juncture. The opportune time has now arrived for the immigration of young men and women on a large scale. Action taken now will bring immense returns within a few years and perhaps a few months after this new organized effort has been brought into effect. These young settlers are selected with due regard to their health, physical and mental equipment, previous record and their adaptability for life and work in Canada. No child is permitted to leave the mother country without the consent of its parent, guardian, or the department of government concerned in the training and education of the child. Almost unnoticed, Canada has gained through this branch of emigration a juvenile population of practically 80,000, fully 75 per cent of whom are engaged in agricultural pursuits. As farm apprentices they have long since proved desirable. It may be confidently asserted that among the great army who have reached Canada in the past the percentage of failures has been infinitesimal. Despite an occasional expression of an unfriendly attitude toward the movement, the farmers and others, who have formed their opinion of this class of settler from their own personal experience of them as employers, keep up a constant demand for the emigration of larger numbers of boys and girls of 'teen ages, as farm and domestic apprentices and workers. This branch of immigration, therefore, goes on from year to year, widening its scope and its success has fully

answered any criticism that is levelled against it. The demand for British boys and girls in Canada has grown out of all proportion to the supply. During the past 22 years, the total migration reached 35,580 boys and girls, consisting of 75 per cent boys and 25 per cent girls...The future of these children must be looked after. The Government of Canada considers them in the light of a sacred trust. For several years after their arrival, our inspectors, both men and women, thoroughly inspect their conditions, and if it is found that anything needs rectification the Department promptly attends to it and sees that it is done. These young people have their interests safeguarded as effectively as possible. It is due to the extent to which the obligation to care for and protect to the fullest these young settlers that the movement has achieved its great success. It cannot be too clearly recognized or too strongly urged that its success is conditional upon the maintenance of close, constant and vigilant supervision over the children until they have shown themselves capable of taking into the own hands the management of their affairs. The responsibility for this supervision and watching over the individual interests and welfare of the children must not only be accepted by the organization bringing them to Canada, with the co-operation of the Dominion Government, but also by residents of the communities in which the children are placed. Everything is being done by the Government to protect these children.²⁰³⁰

22.5 However, Smart's endorsement differed markedly from the critical judgements of Canadian trade unionists and eugenicists. Juvenile (and child) immigration was criticised by the former on the grounds that cheap labour was being imported, and by the latter who wished to exclude 'degenerate' migrants. Professional child care specialists in government posts, tuned in to new thinking, were also increasingly critical of the practice, for example in British Columbia with respect to Fairbridge's Prince of Wales farm school (on which see our main Report). Disquiet intensified on both sides of the Atlantic after reports of the suicide of juvenile migrants in Canada. By December 1924 Smart himself expressed concern about George Cossar's operations at Gagetown Farm, New Brunswick (see above 12.12, 12.14). Indeed, in 1925 he was highly critical of the operations of the British Immigration and Colonization Association (see above 8.5, 8.6, 8.7). Then, by the late 1920s, Canadian hostility increased in the face of economic depression. In 1929 William Douglas, Superintendent of Quarriers, referred to an unfavourable attitude towards emigration by potential young migrants and their relatives in the UK, an attitude which Claude Winters, Superintendent of Quarriers' Fairknowe Home, attributed to exaggerated

²⁰³⁰ *Montreal Gazette*, 15 Feb 1924, p.4, c.4.

press reports about Canadian conditions. Winters attempted to liaise with Canadian social workers in order to strengthen Quarriers' reputation. It is also notable that in 1937 Winters referred to discussions around the possible resumption of juvenile migration being shrouded in secrecy for reasons of political and financial sensitivity (see above, 16.38). What occurred, partly as a result, is that organisations in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK shifted their attention especially to Australia as a destination, where there seemed to be still attractive opportunities for fresh starts and employment. But better education and employment opportunities and Welfare State provision post-war reduced the attraction to juveniles of once-and-for-all emigration from Scotland.

Quality of Care, Evidence of Abuse, Deportations

23.1 The records of the large institutions, such as Quarriers and the Salvation Army, indicate that they generally had clear policies regarding the selection, consent, placement and after-care of juveniles, as well as appropriate financial accounting systems, and that there was a genuine attempt to implement those policies. They were generally aware of, and sought to implement, legislation relating to juvenile migrants. Large organisations were also probably subject to greater contemporary scrutiny than small institutions. They were accountable to councils of management or trustees and, as already noted, maintained relatively good paper trails in terms of documenting policy and practice. It could be argued, however, that attitudes were still too casual; that too much was taken on trust; that managements and staff were naïve; and that the effective implementation of policies was often impeded by inadequate resources.

23.2 We cannot evaluate the activities of smaller institutions that did not keep records, or whose records no longer exist, and we should therefore also be concerned about their practices. Indeed, perhaps the very absence of such records might indicate a less professional and perhaps more personal and even autocratic approach. For example, we have seen, in relation to child migration, the impact of despotic control exercised by individuals such as Emma Stirling (see our main Report), and it is possible that some institutions that migrated juveniles were equally cavalier in their approach. Alternatively, they too may simply have taken too much on trust, by handing over juveniles to be migrated by other institutions without first investigating or vetting their policies and practices. Material published by institutions that migrated juveniles was sometimes disingenuous, or at best, highly selective. In particular, we cannot take at face value the glowing (and often formulaic)

endorsements in migrants' correspondence, which was frequently published in the promotional pamphlets and reports of the sending organisations.

23.3 Records from sending agencies in Scotland to which we have had access have enabled us to report in some cases on the variable selection procedures of those agencies which marketed only juvenile migration or included it as part of wider programmes. Similarly we have described the practices of some agencies in securing the—ideally informed—consent of teenage juvenile migrants. We also know something, sometimes a lot, about the institutions in which they had been initially placed in Scotland, and/or of the sending agencies to which they had applied, or of the parents or other persons who had applied on their behalf. But in some cases we have not learnt much specifically about selection procedures, including medical inspections and educational assessments, and we have had to assume that they followed practice for child migrants. We are also quite well informed about approvals for admission granted by officials representing governments overseas. But there is of course no guaranteed correlation between adequate procedures for the selecting and sending of juveniles overseas prior to them entering the world of work and the quality of their subsequent experiences as young employees.

23.4 As for monitoring the well-being of juvenile migrants once overseas, we have noted good practice by some organisations, and less good practice by others. There is evidence that some sending institutions were aware that problems could (and did) arise. Indeed, Claude Winters, Superintendent of Quarriers' Fairknowe Home, suggested that juvenile migration posed particular challenges (see above, 16.27). Sometimes the institutions took pre-emptive action to reduce risk, notably through proper pre-placement visits to the farms and homes to which juvenile migrants were to be sent and subsequent inspections. At other times responses were reactive, for instance in moving juveniles from what turned out to be unsuitable placements. Arguably, the moving of juveniles from one employer to another, especially if it happened repeatedly, could be defined as abuse, since it often involved humiliation and an undermining of self-respect. Lack of comparable evidence, and the passage of time, make it impossible to determine whether abuse was worse in some destinations than others. Anecdotally, it seems that juveniles who went to Australia may have been subject to more abuse, but this could be a reflection of the more recent history of juvenile migration to that location, and the availability of first-hand witness evidence.

23.5 We need here to remember that SCAI's definition of abuse ranges from physical and sexual abuse to emotional and psychological abuse, and includes such

practices as the separation of siblings, whether by age or gender. So defined, evidence of the abuse of child migrants is presented in detail in our main Report. This was made possible by written and oral testimony presented by former child migrants to SCAI and to other previous inquiries, often supported by the Child Migrants Trust and other agencies. The evidence so provided unavoidably results in an emphasis on the abuse of children under the school-leaving age who were migrated to institutions, farms and homes in Australia, Canada and Southern Rhodesia. Institutional and government records, married to later retrospective testimony, have therefore been informative about the nature and to some extent the scale of abuse in those places. Testimony by former child migrants of their abuse after they left those institutions as juveniles and young adults is also, though to a less extent, available.

23.6 However, we also have some knowledge of the abuse of those who migrated as juveniles and who were launched, sometimes after some preliminary training, into the world of work. As recorded in this Appendix, direct or indirect evidence of actual or potential abuse has been identified in respect of a number of institutions that sent and received Scottish juvenile migrants. Some reports indicate or imply deficient selection, placement and after-care; delays in answering correspondence; poor accounting practices; and a general lack of safeguards for recruits. Perhaps because of retained and accessible records we have had disturbing matters to report about the experiences of juveniles sent overseas by even some of the best, like Quarriers, as well as by some of the worst, like BICA.

23.7 As a reminder of just some examples, while the Aberlour Child Care Trust has not supplied documentation relating to the pre-1900 period, migrants' correspondence in the published *Journal* of the Aberlour Orphanage before 1900 makes reference to loneliness and unhappiness, that might be interpreted as reflecting abuse caused by unsuitable placements or poor after-care. In the same period there is also evidence in the *Journal* that the Aberlour management had reservations about the validity of its migration policy, but adopted a rather passive approach to potential problems. BICA's neglect is evident from the account of a juvenile left in deplorable conditions. There is a reference in the records of the Big Brother Movement indicating that a child with a Scottish background [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was sent to an overseas institution where he was sexually abused. George Cossar's migration activities generated a significant amount of criticism and hints of abuse from a numbers of quarters: the citizens of Lower Gagetown, former matron Margaret Waugh, D.J. Murphy of the Canadian Immigration Department, and a

number of boys and their parents. Some of his young charges were subsequently deported for misbehaviour, but poor management at Lower Gagetown farm needs to be remembered. The recollections of Kyrsty Page in respect of the CORB scheme suggest that some evacuees may have been abused, insofar as they were deprived of their family and background. Some material in Quarriers' records also suggests actual or potential abuse, including pressure put on a recruit to choose the migration option; non-observance of placement agreements about sleeping arrangements; excessive workloads; lax inspection and after-care; boys being refused permission by employers to meet with other migrants; an implication of assault; and the failure to act decisively following allegations of sexual misconduct by a migrant. The circumstances are not spelt out, but we learn of girls in Quarriers' care overseas getting pregnant and being sent back to Scotland. Action was also taken—or at least planned—if employers were unreasonable or abusive, which suggests knowledge of abuse. It may not have been, however, necessarily the welfare of migrants that was Quarriers' priority in urging more rigorous selection and placement but a desire to protect the institution's reputation and prevent the return to Scotland of migrants who had failed. We also know that the Salvation Army sent boys to Dhurringile in the 1920s where some were sexually abused.

23.8 Return migration might sometimes be an indicator of abuse. Of course, return migration was a long-standing and significant part of the story of British—including Scottish—emigration. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, about a third of overseas migrants from Scotland ultimately returned to their homeland.²⁰³¹ As well as the broad categories of voluntary and forced repatriation, there were various overlapping typologies of return migration: occasional, seasonal, serial, boomerang, temporary and permanent. These in turn were affected by factors such as success or failure; conservatism or innovation; career development or retirement.²⁰³² In one sense, therefore, juvenile migrants who returned may just have been conforming to wider patterns of mobility. Some returned of their own volition, temporarily, to visit family or the institutions from which they had been sent overseas. Quarrier's records

²⁰³¹ M. Anderson and D.J. Morse, 'The People', in W.H. Fraser and R.J. Morris (eds), *People and Society in Scotland*, vol. 2, 1830-1914 (John Donald, Edinburgh, 1990), p.16; Marjory Harper, *Testimonies of Transition: Voices from the Scottish Diaspora* (Luath, Edinburgh, 2018), p.191.

²⁰³² Mario Varricchio (ed.), *Back to Caledonia: Scottish Homecomings from the Seventeenth Century to the Present* (John Donald, Edinburgh, 2012); Marjory Harper (ed.), *Emigrant Homecomings: The Return Movement of Emigrants 1600-2000* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005).

in particular make several references to migrants visiting the Homes at Bridge of Weir, often bringing their own families with them.

23.9 However, a number of juveniles who had been migrated to Canada were later returned to their homeland as deportees. A legal deportation order might follow because of illness, insanity, a criminal conviction, vagrancy or in some other manner becoming a 'public charge', the last being the most common reason for the deportation of juveniles. That such action was taken against young immigrants might suggest in some instances (not all) a failure by agencies involved in selecting, transporting and receiving juveniles overseas—and then in the after-care of those youngsters once abroad.

23.10 A snapshot of deportations in the fiscal year 1933-34 reveals that 149 juveniles had been deported back to Britain from Canada, all but three of them male. Almost all had arrived within the previous five years. The society with the greatest number of deportations was the British Immigration and Colonisation Association, with 40, followed by the Salvation Army, with 25, and the United Church of Canada, with 21. Twenty-five of the 149 deportees had come from Scotland: six had been migrated by the United Church of Canada (presumably under its arrangement with the YMCA), five by BICA, five by the Salvation Army, four by Cossar, two by Quarriers, two by a Manitoba government scheme, and one by the Catholic Emigration Association. In 18 cases the deportees had become public charges; a further two were deported for medical reasons; two more for criminal convictions; and another individual for vagrancy. In one of these cases the deportee was said to have caused a 'great disturbance'; and in another the cause was 'resisting police officer'.²⁰³³ As a particular and pertinent example, a report in 1933 by Claude Winters, Superintendent of Quarriers' Fairknowe Home, itemised the deportation of four Quarrier boys in the previous four years for theft, vagrancy and attempting to stowaway on a ship. But Winters seemed only concerned that such cases would influence the Canadian Immigration Department's attitude to 'the worth or unworth of our activity in the field of juvenile immigration'.²⁰³⁴

23.11 We need to consider whether at least some of those falling sick, thieving, becoming vagrants or seeking to get back to Scotland by illicit means might have

²⁰³³ LAC, RG 76, vol. 69, file 3115, part 20.

²⁰³⁴ Response to SCAI Section 21 request, Quarriers, Winters to F.C. Blair, Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Immigration and Colonization, undated, QAR.001.009.2785; Winters to William Findlay, Secretary, Orphan Homes of Scotland, 26 July 1933, QAR.001.009.2783-2784.

been damaged by the conditions in which they found themselves living and driven to desperate measures by abuse they had suffered—in all its forms: emotional, psychological, physical, sexual. Such testimony as we have seen, some by juvenile migrants, rather more, as recorded in our main Report, by former child migrants reflecting on their later lives as teenagers and young adults, is littered with references to verbal abuse (lousy worker, pommie bastard, slum kid), educational deprivation (not given the skills for better outcomes), low standard of living (poor pay, long hours, grim accommodation), physical violence (beatings, getting into fights), sexual attacks (especially by predatory males of all ages). All forms of abuse have the potential to damage self-respect, and cause alienation. ██████████ who had been migrated by Quarriers in 1930, at the age of 17, was deported just under five years later, after initially becoming a public charge and subsequently receiving a prison sentence for carrying a gun. His case file indicates a history of unsuccessful placements and he is blamed for his failure to adapt.²⁰³⁵ It is also very probable that deportation carried a stigma likely to affect juveniles into their adulthood, and failure to prevent such extreme action by better forms of care and protection was itself tantamount to neglect and an abuse. We have encountered only one case of suicide by a Scottish juvenile migrant (para 8.8 above), but we should remember John Wilson, aged 15, who killed himself after barely two months in Canada.

²⁰³⁵ Quarriers, ██████████ - Admission Form and Children's File 1930, Assistant Director, Department of Immigration and Colonization, Canada House, London to Secretary, Orphan Homes of Scotland, 29 Jan 1925, QAR.001.008.1558.

Appendix 2: Government Approval and Inspection Systems for Residential Institutions in Australia Receiving Child Migrants from Scotland after 1945

Introduction

1.1 This Appendix provides an account of the approval and inspection systems that were in place within the United Kingdom Government and Scottish Office to monitor standards of residential care being provided for Scottish children sent to Australia after 1945. After an initial discussion of contemporaneous expectations around the nature and role of inspections of children's out-of-home care, as reflected in the Monckton, Clyde and Curtis reports, and the complex system of approval and inspections of residential institutions accommodating post-war UK child migrants in Australia, the main body of this appendix will go on to review evidence of specific failings in those systems.

1.2 The importance of regular inspections of residential institutions for children was clearly recognised by both the Curtis and Clyde reports, both in terms of ensuring that appropriate standards were being maintained in the physical and emotional care of children, as well as potentially identifying specific cases of abuse.²⁰³⁶ The need for clear communication between administrators and effective systems and methods of inspection were also demonstrated by the Monckton report, commissioned in the wake of the widely-publicised case of the death of Dennis O'Neill.²⁰³⁷ The report noted both how poor communication around the inspection of O'Neill's foster home and the failure of one of the inspectors to have a private conversation with him, despite having grounds for concern, represented significant failings in his protection. Drawing on its substantial experience of institutional visits

²⁰³⁶ See *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, cmd. 6922, London: HMSO, 1946, referred to in main text as the 'Curtis report', paras. 98-99, 106-120, 123, 129-135, 349, 355, 371-372, 376, 394, 345, 398-403, 407, 412-414, 436-437. The Committee's methodology for its inquiry was precisely intended to include an assessment of the effectiveness of existing standards and systems of inspections, with the Committee comparing inspection reports held by relevant public bodies and comparing these with its own inspections made by sub-groups of the Committee to 451 residential institutions. See also *Report of the Committee on Homeless Children*, cmd. 6911, London: HMSO, 1946, referred to in the main text as the 'Clyde report', paras. 40-41, 67-69, 74, 80, 85.

²⁰³⁷ *Report by Sir Walter Monckton on the Circumstances Which Led to the Boarding Out of Dennis and Terence O'Neill at Bank Farm, Minsterley and the Steps Taken to Supervise Their Welfare*, cmd.6636 (London: HMSO, 1945), See for example, p.14.

undertaken by sub-groups of its Committee, the Curtis report criticised inspection systems which were fragmented in coverage. Inspections were too infrequent, paid insufficient attention to conditions adversely affecting children's healthy psychological development (including over-crowding, limited access to play space and materials, or the sparseness of their material environment), and failed to produce required remedial action by residential institutions. The fragmented systems of inspection for children's out-of-home care in Scotland as well as in England and Wales were, both Clyde and Curtis noted, a consequence of the regulatory framework of the day in which the government departments responsible for inspections varied according to the legal provisions through which children had come into care.

1.3 There was already a recognition, within some UK Government departments, of the need to develop a more coherent and unified system of administration and oversight for children's out-of-home care before the Curtis and Clyde reports were published. Most of the recommendations within the Curtis and Clyde reports with regard to the administrative re-structuring of children's out-of-home care had previously been proposed in an internal Government report produced in 1944 by the Ministry of Health and discussed with both the Home Office and later the Board of Education.²⁰³⁸ The Dominions Office were not, however, directly involved in these discussions as, aside from their administration of child and youth emigration under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act, they had no other responsibilities for children's out-of-home care.

1.4 The Curtis Committee recommended that responsibility for inspections be situated in a single central government department that would work in conjunction with inspections undertaken by local authorities.²⁰³⁹ This was implemented, for England and Wales, by the Transfer of Functions (Relief of Children) Order, 1947. This Order made the Home Office Children's Department the lead central body for the inspection of children's out-of-home care, a role which its Inspectorate took up from early 1948. The report also recommended that new specialist training be developed for those inspecting boarded out children and a baseline of training should be completed for inspectors working for the central Government department.²⁰⁴⁰ These recommendations reflected the underpinning argument within the Curtis Report that children's safety could be compromised through complex administrative systems

²⁰³⁸ The Break Up of the Poor Law and the Care of Children and Old People', TNA: MH102/1378.

²⁰³⁹ *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, recommendations 5-16, especially 10 and 12.

²⁰⁴⁰ *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, Appendix 1.

split between different central and local government departments, as well as the need for a more general improvement in standards of training for child-care workers.²⁰⁴¹

1.5 The Clyde report also recognised that different legal responsibilities and systems for the over-sight of children's out-of-home care existed for the Scottish Home Department, the Departments of Education and Health, and the Ministry of Pensions, largely reflecting comparable divisions of responsibility in England and Wales.²⁰⁴² It concluded that there was no justification for the continuation of such a fragmented system of regulation and over-sight of children's out-of-home care, and, like Curtis, recommended that in future this should be over-seen by a single, lead department.²⁰⁴³ The Clyde report differed from the Curtis report, however, in seeing a valuable on-going role for the over-sight of boarded out children by community-based professionals such as doctors, teachers, clergy or district nurses, rather than simply by official inspectors from the relevant local authority.²⁰⁴⁴ After Clyde, the decision was taken by the Cabinet that administrative arrangements for the out-of-home care of children in Scotland should mirror those in England and Wales, with the Scottish Home Department thus becoming the central lead department as the Home Office had for England and Wales.²⁰⁴⁵

1.6 Given the Monckton, Curtis and Clyde reports, and the subsequent consolidation of central and local government administration of children's out-of-home care (reinforced in the 1948 Children Act), it is reasonable to suggest that the importance of co-ordinated administration and effective systems of regular inspection should have been understood by those with responsibility for the over-sight of children's out-of-home care in local and central Government. An awareness of these issues might also reasonably have been expected of voluntary societies and religious organisations involved in children's out-of-home care at the time, many of whom had submitted evidence to the Curtis and/or the Clyde committees. These

²⁰⁴¹ See also *Training in Child Care: Interim Report of the Care of Children Committee*, cmd. 6760, London: HMSO, 1945.

²⁰⁴² *Report of the Committee on Homeless Children*, paras. 19-27, 34-35.

²⁰⁴³ *Report of the Committee on Homeless Children*, paras. 41-42. Its recommendation that the Ministry of Pensions be allowed to maintain special over-sight of children who had lost at least one parent as a result of the war also mirrored the recommendation on this issue by the Curtis report.

²⁰⁴⁴ *Report of the Committee on Homeless Children*, paras. 68-69.

²⁰⁴⁵ 'Cabinet, Responsibility for the Care of Deprived Children', Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal, 12th March 1947, TNA: MH102/1393, pp.9-13 on available copy (and see also Cabinet approval of this on same file at pp.2-4)

organisations included most of those involved in the post-war migration of children from Scotland to Australia: Dr Barnardo's Homes, the Fairbridge Society, the Sisters of Nazareth, the Catholic Child Welfare Council, the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service, Aberlour Orphanage and Quarriers Orphan Homes of Scotland.

1.7 Despite this, the system of approval and over-sight of residential institutions for child migrants accommodated in Australia was complex and spread across many different organisational bodies (see Figure 1 below). In terms of government agencies, inspections of residential institutions were undertaken with varying degrees of collaboration by State Child Welfare Departments, Departments of Immigration, and State Migration Officers, whose reports were then passed on to the Australian Commonwealth Government Department of Immigration. In principle, these would be sent regularly by the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration via the UK High Commission in Canberra to the Commonwealth Relations Office in London, and also shared with the Home Office and on occasion the Scottish Home Department.

1.8 Reports were also provided by State officials to support the initial approval of residential institutions in Australia to receive child migrants from the United Kingdom, which usually provided basic details about the physical facilities, and sometimes about staffing and management, at the receiving institution. Decisions about the approval of institutions by the UK Government were taken by the Commonwealth Relations Office,²⁰⁴⁶ usually (though not always) in consultation with the Home Office²⁰⁴⁷ and occasionally the Scottish Home Department. Recommendations made by staff at the UK High Commission in Canberra were also often taken account of in this process, which were usually based primarily on the reports provided by State officials and only very occasionally by direct experience of those institutions by High Commission staff. It was rare for a member of staff from

²⁰⁴⁶ See for example, 'British Emigration Policy', Report by Interdepartmental Committee of Officials, para 52, NRS: ED11/384, p.263 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7833-7834.

²⁰⁴⁷ For examples of institutions being approved by the Commonwealth Relations Office without the approval of the Home Office see the case of Nazareth House, Geraldton (3.14 below), also the note about Burnbrae being 'one of several institutions' approved by the Commonwealth Relations Office without reference to the Home Office in Minute by Northover, 27th March 1951, TNA: MH102/1889, p.3 on available copy, LEG.001.003.0601. Home Office staff do not always appear to have been clear about the Home Office's role in the approval of residential institutions in Australia, see MacGregor to Dixon, 4th August 1950, NRS: ED11/386, p.78-80 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7938-7940, in which it is suggested that the Home Office only indicates 'approval' in relation to the work of sending organisations in the United Kingdom and not overseas organisations.

the UK High Commission to make a physical site visit to a residential institution in Australia before it was approved for receiving child migrants.




Figure 1: Usual administrative lines of communication between government bodies in Australia and the United Kingdom for child migration after 1945

1.9 It is worth noting that neither the Curtis, nor Clyde Committees appear to have been aware of the administrative structures by which child migration to Australia had operated before 1945, nor the proposed scale or administrative systems for the post-war resumption of child migration to Australia.²⁰⁴⁸ The Dominions Office did not present evidence relating to either Committee. As a result neither Curtis nor Clyde appear to have been aware of existing systems of administration for child migration or of failings of institutions and inspection systems in Australia known at that time by the Dominions Office (see 2.1-2.16 below). The fact that the Curtis report only provided one paragraph and one recommendation in relation the post-war resumption of child migration, and Clyde none at all, is possibly a reflection of the relatively small number of children at the time involved in child migration programmes compared to the numbers in other forms of out-of-home care in the United Kingdom. The impression of the Curtis Committee that post-war child migration was likely to be on a small scale would probably have been strengthened by written evidence submitted to it by Dr Barnardo's Homes which stated that they only expected their future child migration work to consist of sending parties of around 30 children and juveniles per annum to Canada.²⁰⁴⁹ It is not entirely clear why Dr Barnardo's Homes did not inform the Curtis Committee that they were also thinking of sending more children to residential homes in New South Wales, including its farm school at Mowbray Park, Picton, given that they had been in discussion with the Dominions Office about plans for this in 1944 and 1945.²⁰⁵⁰ The

²⁰⁴⁸ The lack of any reference to child migration in the Clyde report, and of the involvement of the Dominions Office in providing evidence, suggests that this was an issue on which the Committee had not focused on in any detail. The Curtis Committee received evidence from Dr Barnardo's Homes and the Fairbridge Society about the proposed resumption of their child migration work, as well as a memorandum from Fairbridge arguing that there was a need for British child migrants to receive the same treatment overseas as would be expected if they remained in the United Kingdom (see Memorandum, ULSCA(F): H6/2/14, pp.29-35 on available copy), on which the Committee made its recommendation about the standards expected for child migrants, see *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, para. 515., However, the Curtis Committee did not receive evidence from the Dominions Office about the administrative systems through which child migration operated.

²⁰⁴⁹ Memorandum on the Migration Work and Policy of Dr Barnardo's Homes, TNA: MH102/1451B/123.

²⁰⁵⁰ See Memo re Kirkpatrick, 26th May, 1944, and Kirkpatrick to Wiseman, 17th December 1945, TNA: DO35/1138/M996/1, pp.2-3,59-60 on provided copy, LEG.001.002.0827-0828 and 0884-0885. See also confirmation of these arrangements by the Dominions Office, Wiseman to Kirkpatrick, 22nd January 1946, TNA: DO35/1138/M996/1, p.54 on provided copy, LEG.001.002.0879. It is hard to get a clear view on the chronology of this because of the lack of a date on the memorandum of evidence submitted to Dr Barnardo's Homes to the Curtis Committee, but one possibility is that Dr Barnardo's Homes had become clearer about its plans for sending children to Australia by the end of 1945 after it had submitted this evidence to Curtis. This would not, however, take account of the fact that Dr Barnardo's Homes were aware that the Dominions Office had made a loan towards the capital

lack of reference in Dr Barnardo's Homes' evidence to the Curtis Committee about the provision of a substantial loan towards the capital costs of the construction of the Picton farm school by the Dominions Office also meant that the Curtis Committee were not aware that the UK Government department had invested financially in the development of some residential institutions in Australia on the basis of their continued reception of child migrants from the UK.²⁰⁵¹

1.10 Residential institutions in Australia that had received child migrants before 1945 were considered exempt from the process of institutional approval applied to institutions receiving child migrants for the first time after 1945. However, individual requests for groups of children to be sent to these established institutions could still lead to inspections by State officials to check that they were in a fit state to receive new children (see, e.g., 3.2-3.4 below). Australian and UK officials undertaking inspections of residential institutions were not always qualified in child-care, and in many cases did this work on the basis of their administrative responsibility for matters relating to immigration, or as more general administrative representatives of the UK Government.

1.11 As will be discussed in more detail in this Appendix, the complex organisational processes through which approval and inspection reports were generated and shared led, at times, to delays in information being shared. On occasion, it also allowed for the possibility for critical information to be withheld by the Australian authorities from the UK Government. Inspection reports from Australian State officials were not always passed on quickly and systematically to the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration, further contributing to gaps and delays in the UK Government's knowledge of institutional conditions. The substantial geographical distance between residential institutions accommodating child migrants, and pressures on staff resources, also made it difficult for staff at the UK High Commission to undertake much direct observation of their work.

The geographical isolation of many residential institutions to which child migrants from Scotland were sent, of itself, appeared to run contrary to the recommendation of the Clyde Committee. The Committee recommended that any new institutions in which children would be placed should be close to local communities in which they would be able to participate in appropriate social and recreational activities.²⁰⁵² The

expenditure on the construction of the farm school and that this meant that there was a presumption that the farm school would begin to receive child migrants again after the war.

²⁰⁵¹ For files relating to this, see also, e.g., DO35/1138/M1020/2 and DO35/10262.

²⁰⁵² *Report of the Committee on Homeless Children*, para 97.

Clyde Committee was also aware of the risks of isolated placements for children that were difficult to monitor, as evident in its critical comments about conditions in which some children had been boarded out on crofts in remote rural parts of Scotland.²⁰⁵³ As will be noted below, despite knowledge within the UK Government of problems with residential institutions accommodating child migrants, and a specific recommendation for it to undertake an annual inspection of all of these, there were often long gaps between visits from UK officials to these institutions, with some apparently receiving no visits at all.²⁰⁵⁴

1.12 The migration of children from Scotland to Australia operated within this complex and fragmented administrative structure. The Dominions Office/Commonwealth Relations Office would communicate directly to voluntary societies about the funding of their work through the Empire/Commonwealth Settlement Acts. Indeed, from 1930 until 1947, when the Home Office and Scottish Home Department became the lead central Government departments for children's out-of-home care, the Dominions Office was the only UK-based Government department involved in the administration of child migration. In Scotland this meant, for example, that the Commonwealth Relations Office was in direct contact with the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service, given its status as a UK Government-recognised sending organisation.²⁰⁵⁵ After the Ross Fact-Finding Mission in 1956, this communication between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service also involved a discussion, in very general terms, of the need for improved institutional standards in relation to further child migrants being sent to the Dhurringile Rural Training Farm (see 4.13 below).²⁰⁵⁶

1.13 The Scottish Home Department appears to have had the same role in this administrative system for Scotland as the Home Office did for England and Wales. More generally, the Scottish Home Department shared the same interests with the

²⁰⁵³ *Report of the Committee on Homeless Children*, paras 73-74.

²⁰⁵⁴ Communication between the Scottish Home Department and the Home Office in early spring 1960 appears to suggest, for example, that the Home Office had not received any institutional inspection reports from Australia since reports were forwarded on from the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration for the renewal of approval of residential institutions in 1957, see NRS: ED11/386, pp.11, 14 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7871 and 7874.

²⁰⁵⁵ See also correspondence between the Dominions Office and the Church of Scotland Overseas Department in 1937 about difficulties experienced by the latter in recruiting children for migration to the Burnside Homes in North Parramatta, Sydney, New South Wales, in TNA: DO35/686/7, on available copy LEG.001.002.6232-6233.

²⁰⁵⁶ See correspondence in TNA: DO35/10275, pp.23-26, on available copy, LEG.001.003.2463-2466.

Home Office in policy issues concerning child migration arising from the 1948 Children Act, given that the duties and powers of the Secretary of State in sections 17 and 33 of the Act related both to the Home Secretary (for children migrated from England and Wales) and to the Secretary of State for Scotland (for children migrated from Scotland).²⁰⁵⁷

In relation to issues of approval and inspections of institutions, the Scottish Home Department seems only to have received communication and reports from the Home Office in relation to residential institutions for which the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service was to be the primary recruiting body.²⁰⁵⁸ This appears to have been the case because it was assumed that the other sending organisations with whom the UK Government had maintenance and outfitting agreements for their child migration work were primarily based in England and so fell within the scope of the Home Office rather than the Scottish Home Department. As a consequence, it appears that the Scottish Home Department did not, as a matter of course, receive approval or inspection reports concerning residential institutions in Australia to which children from Scotland were sent if the headquarters of the sending organisation were based in England.²⁰⁵⁹ This would include, for example, all receiving institutions in Australia associated with Roman Catholic religious orders, Dr Barnardo's Homes and the Fairbridge Society. Communication on these issues normally took place between the Home Office and Scottish Home Department. The only example so far found of direct communication between the Commonwealth

²⁰⁵⁷ See for example, the substantial correspondence between the Home Office and the Scottish Home Department on the drafting of regulations for the child migration work of voluntary societies permitted under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act, NRS: ED11/306, on provided copy). See also NRS: ED11/395, on provided copy.

²⁰⁵⁸ The specific institutions about which the Scottish Home Department were consulted were therefore Dhurringile and the Kildonian training farm (see correspondence in NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy), and Benmore and Burnbrae (see correspondence in TNA: MH102/1889, pp.56-69, on available copy) until it became clear that recruitment for the latter two homes would be undertaken by the Church of England Advisory Council on Empire Settlement rather than the Church of Scotland.

²⁰⁵⁹ See for example, the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1956, para 85, NRS: ED39/131, p.46, on provided copy, in which it is suggested that the Scottish Home Department would be brought into discussions of the renewal of approval of individual residential institutions in Australia 'as necessary', rather than assuming that the Scottish Home Department would automatically be involved in all such discussions. There is a suggestion in one letter from the Home Office Children's Department to the Commonwealth Relations Office that the Scottish Home Department would be consulted about any institutions to which children from Scotland might potentially be sent (see Savidge to Palmer, 3rd April 1951, TNA: MH102/1889, pp.81-82, on available copy), but no archival evidence has yet been found that the Scottish Home Department were consulted about any institutions other than those for which the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service might have acted as the lead recruiting organisation.

Relations Office and the Scottish Home Department on issues of standards in residential institutions in Australia concerned the question of how to respond to strong criticisms about the Dhurringile Rural Training Farm made in the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission to Australia's confidential addenda, given that the Commonwealth Relations Office currently had a pending application for a boy to be migrated to Dhurringile by the Church of Scotland.²⁰⁶⁰ The Scottish Home Department was also consulted (through the Home Office) about proposals for the future management of child migration programmes developed for the 1956 Confidential Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, given that this included discussion of whether or not to introduce regulations for voluntary organisations under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act.²⁰⁶¹

1.14 In 1950, an inspector employed by the Scottish Home Department, Miss Harrison, undertook an unpaid tour of residential institutions in Australia, including 18 institutions accommodating child migrants (see 4.4-4.13 below). Aside from this, however, there is no evidence at this stage of any other member of staff of the Scottish Home Department making any other direct visits to residential institutions in Australia that received children from Scotland. Furthermore, there is currently no other evidence of the Scottish Office or Scottish Home Department having any form of direct or independent monitoring of institutions accommodating child migrants sent from Scotland to Australia. The Scottish Office and Scottish Home Department would therefore have been primarily reliant on information from inspection reports, normally written by Australian State officials, and passed on to them via the UK High Commission and Commonwealth Relations Office. This would be consistent with the position of the Home Office which was similarly reliant on receiving such approval inspection reports from the UK High Commission and Commonwealth Relations Office, and was only involved in direct inspections of Australian institutions through its support of John Moss' unofficial visit in 1951/52 and the involvement of John Ross in leading the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission.

1.15 As a consequence, the approach taken in this Appendix is that an evaluation of the government system for approving and monitoring residential institutions in Australia to which child migrants from Scotland were sent should focus not simply on the work of the Scottish Office or Home Department, but on the wider administrative

²⁰⁶⁰ See Costley-White to Munro, 16th June 1956, NRS: ED11/386, pp.32-33 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7892-7893.

²⁰⁶¹ See NRS: ED39/131, on provided copy SGV.001.004.5058-5064.

system operated by the UK Government in which the migration of children from Scotland was embedded.²⁰⁶²

1.16 In addition to inspections under-taken by Australian and UK officials, some (though not all) voluntary societies sending children to Australia had their own complementary systems for monitoring the welfare of these children. The nature and extent of these systems, as well as their relationship to suggested standards of monitoring, will be discussed further in Appendix 3.

1.17 Having given these introductory comments, this Appendix will now:

Section 2) consider specific knowledge that the UK Government had of problems with residential institutions accommodating child migrants in Australia during the Second World War

Section 3) note specific failures in the system of approval of receiving institutions and sending organisations by the UK Government,

Section 4) review the extent of direct inspections of receiving institutions in Australia by representatives of the UK Government and Scottish Home Department, and examine grounds on which representatives of the UK Government would have had reasonable cause for being cautious about relying primarily on reports provided by Australian officials

Knowledge within the UK Government of problems within residential institutions accommodating child migrants in Australia, 1942-1945

2.1 In December 1942, Sir Ronald Cross, the UK High Commissioner to Australia, submitted a four-page report to the Dominions Office setting out a series of concerns he had about conditions at the St Mary's Agricultural College run by the Christian Brothers at Tardun, Western Australia.²⁰⁶³ Cross' comments were made on

²⁰⁶² This Appendix will therefore consider some examples of residential institutions and organisations that may not have received child migrants from Scotland to illustrate patterns of what might be considered to be systemic problems within the wider administration of child migration to Australia by the UK Government and which might be considered to have a bearing on the ability of the Scottish Office and Scottish Home Department to safeguard child migrants from Scotland.

²⁰⁶³ The report by Cross and initial responses by staff within the Dominions Office are held in TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/1, on available copy, LEG.001.002.0674-0692.

the basis of observations he made during a visit to Tardun in October, 1942. Tardun was situated in a remote rural area, over three hundred miles away from Perth.

2.2 Cross' criticisms focused on the evident over-crowding at Tardun (including the effects of this on the potential for effective educational work), its institutionalised character, the rudimentary nature of the accommodation, the lack of separate facilities for any residents who were ill, the very poor standard of clothing of child migrants, the inadequacy of planning for children's after-care after leaving the institution (including the Principal's assumption that many of the boys would probably simply want to remain within the religious order), and the poor standard of leadership provided by the Principal and his predecessor. Although Cross noted that, from his superficial contact with them, the boys at Tardun appeared healthy and not unhappy, he questioned how the poor physical environment of the institution could be reconciled with the regular maintenance funding provided to Tardun by the UK Government.

2.3 Cross concluded that whilst it would be desirable for a follow-up inspection of Tardun to be undertaken by a UK official, this was unlikely to be a practical option for the time being given Tardun's isolated location. He recommended, instead, that the Australian Commonwealth Government be approached to request an inspection to be made by a representative of the State Government of Western Australia. The Dominions Office agreed to this suggestion, noting that such an inspection could reasonably be expected given that a number of Australian-born boys were also resident at Tardun and that this State inspection could be expected to provide an informed view on whether Tardun was successfully achieving the educational aims that were the basis on which the UK Government had agreed to fund child migrants to be sent there.²⁰⁶⁴

2.4 At the request of the Australian Commonwealth Government, the State Government of Western Australia sent an official, Mr McAdam, from its Department of Lands and Immigration to undertake inspections of the Christian Brothers' institutions at Tardun, Bindoon and Castledare in April, 1943.²⁰⁶⁵ McAdam's reports focused largely on surveying their physical amenities, and concluded that each institution was successfully fulfilling their work with UK child migrants. Information was also attached to these reports about the 'chosen occupation' of each UK child

²⁰⁶⁴ See minute by R. Wiseman, 5th February 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/1, pp.1-3 on available copy.

²⁰⁶⁵ Reports on Castledare, Bindoon and Tardun, April 1943, TNA, DO35/1138/M1020/4, on available copy pp.19-31, LEG.001.002.0813-0825.

migrant sent to these institutions but little detailed information about the nature and extent of their training for these. The almost exclusive focus of the reports on physical resources (including buildings, land and livestock) appears indicative of the fact that McAdam, a senior State immigration official, lacked any specialist knowledge in assessing either educational provision or child welfare. On the basis of these reports, the then Secretary of State for the Dominions Office, Clement Attlee, declared himself reassured about standards of care at these institutions though noted that the effectiveness of Tardun's training work 'is a matter which will require watching'.²⁰⁶⁶ Sir Ronald Cross noted that McAdam's report did not address a number of the specific concerns he had initially raised (whilst recognising that these had not been communicated in detail to the Australian authorities), but agreed that there was also some evidence of progress, with a new Principal apparently having been appointed.²⁰⁶⁷ Cross recommended that whilst no further immediate action seemed appropriate, a representative of the UK Government should make a return visit to Tardun as soon as possible. A private minute in the Dominions Office by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, Paul Emrys-Evans, noted that whilst Cross took the view that there had been some improvement, he still did not regard the situation as satisfactory.²⁰⁶⁸

2.5 In June 1943, William Garnett, then Official Secretary to the UK High Commissioner in Canberra, wrote to Mr Wiseman, a civil servant at the Dominions Office providing an account of a visit he had made to the Northcote Farm School, in Bacchus Marsh, Victoria, after receiving a letter from one of the cottage mothers making serious allegations about the conduct of the institution.²⁰⁶⁹ Garnett's report noted a range of criticisms about the Farm School's work, both in terms of the unsuitability of vocational training focused on agricultural work, when future work prospects in this area were limited, and on repeated concerns about health risks to children related to poor standards of management of the farm. He also noted that the State Child Welfare Department had made no inspections of the Farm School because they had no legal powers over the child migrants placed there (these events taking place prior to the passing of the 1946 Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act through which guardianship of child migrants was assumed by the

²⁰⁶⁶ Attlee to Cross, 30th July 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/4, pp.11-12 on available copy.

²⁰⁶⁷ Correspondence between Cross and Attlee, and private note, June-July 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/4, pp.1-2, 15-16 on available copy.

²⁰⁶⁸ Note by Emrys-Evans, 26th July 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/4, p.2 on available copy.

²⁰⁶⁹ Garnett to Wiseman, 4th June 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1, pp.132-138 on available copy, LEG.001.002.0666-0672.

Commonwealth Minister of Immigration and usually devolved to the relevant State Child Welfare Department). Garnett was particularly critical of the Farm School's management, noting the failings both of the Principal, Colonel Heath, who had recently resigned and the inexperience of the Farm School's local Trustees. Recognising that Heath had been appointed to the Northcote Farm School having previously been the Principal at the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra, Western Australia, Garnett also questioned whether similar failings might also have occurred during his leadership there. In addition to these wider organisational failures, Garnett reported that police investigations had been undertaken into sexual acts performed by teachers at a local state school with girls resident at the Farm School, and that criminal prosecutions of the teachers (who had been immediately dismissed from their posts following the police investigation) were now pending. Under the 1928 Crimes Act in Victoria, operating at that time, it was a serious criminal offence for a man to engage in sexual conduct with a girl under the age of consent (16), with offences committed by a girl's teacher regarded as an aggravated case potentially leading to 15 years imprisonment.²⁰⁷⁰

2.6 A subsequent inspection report on the Northcote Farm School was produced for the Commonwealth Government Department of Immigration by R.H. Wheeler in May 1944, who was accompanied by Garnett on this visit.²⁰⁷¹ A copy of this report was also passed directly to officials in the Dominions Office by Wheeler at a meeting in London.²⁰⁷² In this Wheeler notes that whilst undertaking this visit, he learned from Garnett for the first time about the cases of sexual abuse at the Farm School which he describes as having involved four girls aged at the time 13 and 14, and the prosecution of a single teacher on four counts of having carnal knowledge of them (although Garnett mentions *schoolmasters* in the plural in his original 1943 report). The teacher was subsequently acquitted, and immediately moved to another school. The court proceedings are reported to have led to Colonel Heath's resignation. Girls involved in the court cases were also reported subsequently to have been found in

²⁰⁷⁰ See Hayley Boxall et al, *Historical Review of Sexual Offence and Child Sexual Abuse Legislation In Australia: 1788-2013*, special report for the Australian Royal Commission prepared by the Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 2014, <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/230ca156-daa5-4877-83cb-c2e92670ba89/Historical-review-of-sexual-offence-and-child-sexu> p.73.

²⁰⁷¹ Confidential report on visit to Northcote Children's Farm School, 8/9th May, 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, pp.174-179 on available copy LEG.001.002.0174-0179.

²⁰⁷² Note of discussion with Wheeler, 6th July 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, pp.171-173 on available copy.

bed with old boys returning to the Farm School in cottage homes in which the cottage mother was present. Wheeler notes that one of the girls was reported to have said that a man living next door to her in England had sexual intercourse with her before she came to Australia at the age of 8. Whilst not sharing the view of local school staff that this implies that the girl concerned was 'inherently bad', Wheeler nevertheless dismissed her story as a fabrication intended to impress her friends.

2.7 In May 1944, the Dominions Office forwarded a dossier of complaints to the UK High Commission compiled by the London office of the Fairbridge Society which primarily concerned issues around the poor standards of education, training and after-care of children at the Fairbridge Farm School, at Pinjarra, Western Australia, and suggested significant problems with the Farm School's management.²⁰⁷³ In response to this, the UK High Commissioner responded to the Dominions Office with impressions gained from a recent inspection visit to Pinjarra undertaken by Garnett in addition to other recent information it had received about the Farm School there.²⁰⁷⁴ He noted that he had received reports that 'Pinjarra has concealed adverse facts, that many boys are in reformatories, and that every possible difficulty has been encountered there'.²⁰⁷⁵ Furthermore, he had received extracts from a confidential report (undertaken by Caroline Kelly for the Australian Commonwealth Government) which, he stated:

...shows that all charges referred to in the dossier are within knowledge of Commonwealth Government. Report advises that no further children be admitted to Pinjarra until an overhaul of present administration has been made, and states that 'responsible Government officers, members of churches and persons previously on staff' all concurred that grave state of affairs existed, but that knowledge had been concealed for fear that the scheme might be damaged and financial backing suffer; that Secretary and Committee were evasive, and latter 'positively ignorant of its responsibilities'; that the acting principal (formerly Gardener)²⁰⁷⁶ has not the necessary qualifications; that

²⁰⁷³ See Green to Wiseman, with enclosure, 21st April 1944, TNA: DO35/1330, pp.47-104, on available copy, LEG.001.003.4907-4964.

²⁰⁷⁴ See Telegram UK High Commission to Dominions Office, 28th June 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, pp.190-192 on available copy. The dossier, sent by Wiseman to the UK High Commission, is mentioned in this telegram and elsewhere in this file, but we have not yet been able to trace the original letter or dossier in the National Archives and will continue to search for this.

²⁰⁷⁵ Telegram UK High Commission to Dominions Office, 28th June 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, p.191 on available copy.

²⁰⁷⁶ The Acting Principal was not called Gardener, but was, Kelly had noted, previously been the Farm School's gardener.

disturbing stories should be investigated by 'some directly representing Governments who contribute'; that needful changes could quite easily be effected with a minimum of publicity, working on theory that what is past is gone; that a separate investigation should be made of management of such funds as Old Fairbridgean Benevolent Fund and the Principal's Fund.²⁰⁷⁷

2.8 The Kelly Report would have made the UK High Commissioner aware of allegations of sexual activity involving children resident at Pinjarra. Kelly commented on what she saw as the lax oversight of a hostel for old boys and girls at Pinjarra (presumably aged 16 and over) which 'stamps the Committee as positively ignorant of its responsibilities'. Kelly continued, saying that:

Delinquency [i.e. sexual activity] is naturally not unknown and there have been many cases of girls becoming unmarried mothers. Of these, Mrs Joyner [the wife of the Chairman of the local Fairbridge committee] explained, "If a girl disgraces Fairbridge she is expelled." An easy way, no doubt, of shelving the responsibility. Reliable authority stated that such girls were taken by the Salvation Army or Roman Catholic Foundling Home.²⁰⁷⁸

Given that girls usually left Fairbridge at the age of 16 to be placed out with employers as domestic workers, the reference to expulsion here implies a reference to girls still resident at the Pinjarra Farm School under the age of 16. Under the 1913 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act, operative at that time in Western Australia, defilement of girls under 16, and indecent dealing with girls under 16, by men was a criminal offence subject to two years' imprisonment if the offender was aged under 21 and up to five years' imprisonment if the offender was older.²⁰⁷⁹

2.9 In July 1944, R. H. Wheeler subsequently met with officials from the Dominions Office to discuss inspections that he had undertaken of Northcote, the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong and Dr Barnardo's Farm School at Picton. At this meeting, Wheeler indicated that he felt that

both the Commonwealth and the U.K. Governments must be held to be in some way responsible for not realising how things had been going wrong at Northcote and he thought also at Pinjarra and he felt that it was their duty to be

²⁰⁷⁷ Telegram UK High Commission to Dominions Office, 28th June 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, p.192 on available copy, LEG.001.002.0190-0193.

²⁰⁷⁸ Kelly, *Child Migration*, NAA: A436, 1945/5/54, p.50.

²⁰⁷⁹ See Boxall et al, *Historical Review*,

<https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/230ca156-daa5-4877-83cb-c2e92670ba89/Historical-review-of-sexual-offence-and-child-sexu> , p.85.

kept informed on the subject. He thought, therefore, that each school ought to be inspected at least once a year on behalf of each Government.²⁰⁸⁰

This was not the first occasion in which concerns about the need for more regular visits to institutions accommodating child migrants had been expressed. In his 1942 report to the Dominions Office about his visit to Tardun, Sir Ronald Cross noted that he was the first representative of the UK Government to have visited the institution since child migrants were first sent there in 1938, and he advised that in future 'occasional visits by UK representatives would be in every way desirable'.²⁰⁸¹

2.10 There is some indication that the Dominions Office provisionally accepted Wheeler's suggestion.²⁰⁸² Sir Ronald Cross also endorsed Wheeler's proposal of annual inspections by UK officials, though he suggested that these be conducted in the spirit of informal visits rather than more formalised inspections.²⁰⁸³

2.11 In October 1944, in the light of these accumulated criticisms of residential institutions accommodating child migrants, William Garnett produced an extensive report for the Dominions Office evaluating the work of Farm Schools for child migrants in Australia, including an Appendix reporting on conditions at Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia.²⁰⁸⁴ Garnett made a range of criticisms of institutions associated with Fairbridge (including the Northcote Farm School), regarding their restrictive focus on agricultural and domestic work, dysfunctional relationships between the London Society and local committees in Australia, the limited experience of members of local committees in Australia in child-care matters, the difficulties in finding staff with the appropriate training and personal qualities for these institutions (particularly in the role of cottage mothers) and the social isolation of children at Fairbridge institutions. The report also describes the resignation of Colonel Heath in general terms as 'owing to differences with the Northcote

²⁰⁸⁰ Minute of meeting with R.H. Wheeler, 6th July 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, pp.171-173 on available copy, LEG.001.002.0171-0173.

²⁰⁸¹ Notes on visit to Tardun, 15th December 1942, TNA: DO35/1138/M1120/1, pp.15-19 on available copy.

²⁰⁸² Minute, 12th July 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, p.30 on available copy.

²⁰⁸³ Minute, 5th September 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, p.35 on available copy.

²⁰⁸⁴ Report on Farm Schools in Australia, 6th October 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, pp.219-246 on available copy, LEG.001.002.0219-0246. It should be noted that Garnett was largely dismissive of a number of claims in the dossier critical of Pinjarra, and was in general sceptical about the appropriateness of the Fairbridge Society in the United Kingdom seeking to control operations in Australia (see Garnett to Wiseman, with enclosures, 23rd August 1944, TNA: DO35/1330; also telegram from High Commission to Dominions Office, 15th August 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2).

Committee²⁰⁸⁵ rather than related directly to the prosecution of sexual offences against children under his care. It also noted the need for the accommodation of returning old boys to Farm Schools to ensure that the 'undesirable incidents such as have occurred at Northcote are to be avoided'.²⁰⁸⁶

2.12 In his Appendix on Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, Garnett also made a series of critical comments. St Vincent's Orphanage at Castledare, which housed a small number of UK child migrants under the age of 10, provided a very poor standard of accommodation and equipment. Garnett took the view that these conditions, and the lack of any female members of staff, meant that Castledare was not a suitable institution to receive any further young UK child migrants without significant improvements being made.²⁰⁸⁷ St Joseph's Farm School at Bindoon was seen more positively as providing vocational training to boys of school leaving age, and whilst boys were involved in the construction of the Farm School's buildings, Garnett saw this as an appropriate element of their training in various trades. Tardun remained over-crowded, due to boys having been transferred there from Clontarf during the war, and had no training facilities for manual trades. Like Bindoon, Tardun's buildings were still in the process of construction by the boys under supervision from the Brothers. Although well-fed, the accommodation at Tardun lacked any comfort with limited bathing and laundry facilities. Boys at Tardun were reported by Garnett to be happy and healthy, with progress in their school work at a standard that might be expected of children who had always lived in institutions. Unlike Bindoon, where boys over school-leaving age were reported to be receiving a wage, the seven boys remaining at Tardun up to the age of 18 were receiving no wages for their work.

2.13 In summary, Garnett saw certain advantages to the Christian Brothers' work in terms of the range of vocational training that was offered across their institutions, the long-standing association of their order with educational work and the possibility for some boys to take advantage of opportunities in higher education in the future at Christian Brothers' residential colleges. However, Garnett noted the standard of

²⁰⁸⁵ Report on Farm Schools in Australia, 6th October 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, p.229 and p.232 on available copy.

²⁰⁸⁶ Report on Farm Schools in Australia, 6th October 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, p.237 on available copy.

²⁰⁸⁷ Note that the recurrent references in reports and correspondence to the presence or absence of female staff in institutions reflected a broader assumption about the practical and emotional care of children being a role for which women were better suited than men.

comfort provided at these institutions was generally low and that the practice of training boys at institutions that were still being built meant they were deprived of opportunities provided by places that were more fully established. Tardun's isolation meant that the boys placed there were 'strikingly ignorant of the outside world', and there was no educational justification for keeping boys there up to the age of 18 without pay. Aftercare did not appear to be provided in any systematic way, and very few records of boys appeared to be kept. Garnett concluded that each of these shortcomings should, in future, be addressed. It is worth noting that Garnett's assessment of Tardun was far less positive than McAdam's report in 1943.

2.14 With regard to the Fairbridge Farm Schools, Garnett recommended that educational opportunities at them should be broadened, that the London Society should be able to be assured of standards of care at the Farm Schools whilst appropriate autonomy was maintained by local committees in Australia, that senior staff and trustees should be appointed with appropriate training and experience, that the quality and supervision of cottage mothers should be improved, that proper records of children should be maintained and that greater contact between child migrants and local Australian communities should be encouraged. When John Moss visited the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra in December 1951 he found that some of these problems, particularly in relation to staffing, supervision and contacts with the local community remained seriously unresolved.²⁰⁸⁸ As noted below (see 3.12-3.13), Garnett's recommendation that no further child migrants be sent to Castledare without a significant improvement in staffing and conditions there was also not met.

2.15 By late 1945, senior figures in the Dominions Office were beginning to argue that stronger over-sight and control of child migration by the UK Government was necessary. Sir John Stephenson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Dominions Office, wrote a memo questioning whether it was acceptable to send British children into the care of private organisations overseas without any 'complete power of control by the Government beyond their power to make occasional investigations and call for reports from the Society'.²⁰⁸⁹ Without such control, Stephenson argued, the risk would

²⁰⁸⁸ See Fairbridge Farm School, Pinjarra, Report by John Moss, 14th December 1951, TNA: MH102/2041, pp.8-13.

²⁰⁸⁹ Memorandum, 29th November 1945, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, pp.55-56 on available copy, LEG.001.002.0055-0056.

be that the role of the UK Government would be 'limited to certain financial contributions and a general but not very effective power of supervision'.²⁰⁹⁰

2.16 By 1945, then, the UK Government, through its UK High Commission in Canberra and Dominions Office in London, had knowledge of a wide range of failings across a number of residential institutions accommodating child migrants in Australia. These variously included problems with institutional management, standards of accommodation, the suitability of staffing, the quality and appropriateness of vocational training, and concerns about sexual activities between former and current residents at child migrant institutions and by adults with access to child migrants. Whilst child migration was still seen as potentially valuable in providing children with opportunities for education, training and employment, these other concerns were taken by staff at the Dominions Office and the UK High Commission to show the risks of child migration work continuing without effective over-sight. A specific recommendation was made to the Dominions Office by R. H. Wheeler that representatives of the UK Government should undertake direct annual inspections of residential institutions accommodating child migrants, and the Kelly report also made reference to the need for representatives of the UK Government to directly investigate reported problems at the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra. By 1945, questions were being raised about the need for more active over-sight and control of child migration work at a senior level within the civil service at the Dominions Office.

Failures in the UK Government system for the approval of sending organisations and receiving institutions for child migrants

3.1 From 1947 the intended system for the approval of receiving institutions for child migrants in Australia was that decisions be made by staff at the Dominions Office, informed by recommendations from the UK High Commission in Canberra and in consultation with the Children's Department within the Home Office and, it appears, on occasion, the Scottish Home Department (see also 1.10 above). In principle, the Home Office and (presumably) the Scottish Home Department would have had the power to veto approval of residential institutions in Australia, but in practice never ultimately withheld approval if approval was supported by the

²⁰⁹⁰ Memorandum, 29th November 1945, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, pp.55-56 on available copy.

Commonwealth Relations Office.²⁰⁹¹ Such approval decisions were meant to be informed by reports provided by relevant officials representing the Government of the State in which the residential institution was based.

3.2 This system began to be formalised from spring 1947 through the UK Government's response to a request for 340 child migrants to be sent to Catholic residential institutions in Australia, submitted to the State of Western Australia by the Catholic Episcopal Migration and Welfare Association (CEMWA) in Perth.²⁰⁹² CEMWA was the agency established under the aegis of the Archbishop of Perth to deal with matters relating to Catholic immigration to Western Australia, and became part of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee (FCIC), a national body co-ordinating Catholic immigration across the whole of Australia under the authority of the Episcopal Conference of Australian Catholic bishops.²⁰⁹³ As the organisation making applications for quotas of child migrants to be sent to Catholic institutions in Australia, it also had the formal role of serving as the custodian organisation for child migrants at Catholic institutions in Western Australia, responsible for seeing that appropriate care was being provided to them.²⁰⁹⁴

3.3 On discovering about CEMWA's group nomination, the Secretary of the Australian Commonwealth Government Department of Immigration, Tasman Heyes, contacted the State Migration Officer for Western Australia reminding him that any such group nominations needed to be approved via his department before being sent to Australia House. Heyes requested that formal inspections be urgently made of the institutions to which CEMWA proposed these child migrants should be sent—namely the Christian Brothers' institutions at Castledare, Clontarf, Bindoon and

²⁰⁹¹ In the case of Benmore (See for example, 4.11), the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration had already been notified of John Moss' recommendation that it not be approved for receiving child migrants and indicated their assent to this, before the Commonwealth Relations Office forwarded his report on to the Home Office, see Dixon to Savidge, 9th March 1952, TNA: MH102/1889, pp.41-42 on available copy. Benmore is the only residential institution yet found to have had UK Government approval refused.

²⁰⁹² Stinson to CMO, 24th February 1947, National Archives of Australia, K403, W59/63, p.13.

²⁰⁹³ See Frank Meacham, *The Church and Migrants, 1946-87*, Haberfield, St Joan of Arc Press, 1991, p.18, 32-33; also Flint to Under-Secretary of State, 6th July 1948, TNA: DO35/3386, pp.79-80 on available copy; also Nicol to Heyes, 14th August 1948, National Archives of Australia, A436, 1950/5/5597, p.8.

²⁰⁹⁴ On the link between the submission of a group nomination for children and the assumption of custodianship on their arrival, see Arthur Calwell, *Immigration: Policy and Progress*, Canberra: Commonwealth Government of Australia, 1949, p.33.

Tardun, the orphanage at Subiaco run by the Sisters of Mercy and Nazareth House at Geraldton—and reports from these shared with the UK High Commission.²⁰⁹⁵

3.4 The reports submitted by State officials in Western Australia in May 1947 revealed that the accommodation at Clontarf was in such a poor state that it was currently unfit to receive any child migrants, that dormitory accommodation intended for child migrants at Nazareth House, Geraldton, was now occupied by elderly residents admitted to the institution during the war, and that Bindoon did not at that point have the staff or equipment to undertake primary education for children, despite CEMWA's original group nomination asking for 50 children under the age of 14 to be sent there.²⁰⁹⁶ State officials therefore proposed that no children be sent to Clontarf or Nazareth House, Geraldton, and that this group nomination should therefore be reduced in total from 340 to 175 children. Both William Garnett at the UK High Commission and civil servants at the Dominions Office were aware of these reports and approved the reduced numbers of child migrants to be sent that had been proposed by State officials (including the requirement that no child migrants be sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton, whilst elderly patients were still resident there).²⁰⁹⁷ Given his knowledge of Castledare from his 1944 report, Garnett added that the quota of 30 child migrants requested for Castledare should only be approved subject to a further report being provided in a few months' time demonstrating further improvements in conditions there. It is worth noting that the Sisters of Nazareth were evidently aware that children could not be accommodated at Nazareth House, Geraldton, whilst elderly residents were occupying the dormitories but had originally planned to move those elderly residents out of the institution to make it possible to receive those children.²⁰⁹⁸ It is not clear where the order planned to move these elderly residents to, and in the event, they never were moved.

²⁰⁹⁵ See Heyes to Gratwick, 23rd and 30th April, 1947, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, pp.135-137, 139.

²⁰⁹⁶ The reports were forwarded to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration in two batches, see Gratwick to Heyes, 20th May 1947, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, pp.121-125; Gratwick to Heyes, 26th May 1947, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, pp.126-131, NAA-000000004.

²⁰⁹⁷ Garnett to Dixon, 12th June 1947, TNA: DO35/3386, pp.152-154 in available copy, LEG.001.004.5584-5586.

²⁰⁹⁸ General Council Minutes, 31st March 1946, NAZ.001.006.2919-2920.

3.5 Although CEMWA's original group nomination clearly involved requesting children be sent into institutional conditions that were not fit, in various ways, to receive them, there is no evidence that this led the UK Government or Catholic authorities in the UK to question CEMWA's suitability as a custodian organisation for child migrants. CEMWA remained the custodian organisation for all post-war Catholic child migrants sent to Western Australia.

3.6 In June 1947, Tasman Heyes wrote to the Chief Migration Officer at Australia House stating that only 45 children should be sent to Western Australia under this nomination for Catholic child migrants in the next few months.²⁰⁹⁹ This request was made on the basis that only limited numbers of children could be expected to be integrated successfully into receiving institutions in any one migration party.

3.7 In July 1947, the original quota of 340 child migrants was re-instated following new institutional reports documenting additional pre-fabricated accommodation being acquired by Nazareth House, Geraldton and assurances by the Christian Brothers and Archbishop of Perth that necessary action would be taken to address concerns raised in the reports made in May.²¹⁰⁰ Garnett received a telephone call from an official at the Commonwealth Department of Immigration assuring him of improvements at Castledare, and promising that a copy of a written report on this would be sent to him imminently.²¹⁰¹ There is no archival evidence of this written report subsequently being received by Garnett or by staff at the Commonwealth Relations Office, despite the latter chasing Garnett for this.²¹⁰² This decision to re-instate the full quota of 340 child migrants was taken whilst Arthur Calwell, the Australian Commonwealth Minister for Immigration, was in London holding meetings with Clement Attlee and other Cabinet ministers about encouraging post-war migration to Australia, as well as making administrative arrangements for ships to be made available to carry migrants to Australia (including the *SS Asturia* and *SS Ormonde* which subsequently carried child migrants to Australia through the autumn of 1947).²¹⁰³ Calwell had particularly close links with the Christian Brothers, having been educated as a child at a Christian

²⁰⁹⁹ Heyes to Chief Migration Officer, 5th June 1947, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, pp.118-119, NAA-000000004.

²¹⁰⁰ Gratwick to Secretary, Department of Immigration, undated, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, pp.88-89; Smith to Heyes, 11th June 1947, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, p.100.

²¹⁰¹ Garnett to Dixon, 21st July 1947, TNA: DO35/3386, p.141 on available copy.

²¹⁰² Dixon to Garnett, 7th August 1947, TNA: DO35/3386, p.138 on available copy.

²¹⁰³ Mary Elizabeth Calwell, *I am Bound to Be True: The Life and Legacy of Arthur A. Calwell*, Preston, Vic.: Mosaic Press, 2012, pp.64-65.

Brothers' school. Calwell is reported to have had a meeting with Br Conlon (the lead Australian recruiter for this party of child migrants) during his visit to London in June/July 1947 in which Conlon requested Calwell's support for the 340 children to be sent to Australia.²¹⁰⁴

3.8 Less than three months after Australia House was advised of Tasman Heyes' suggested limit of 45 children being sent, 146 child migrants sailed on the *SS Asturias* from Southampton on 22nd August with a further 188 children arriving on two other crossings by 10th December 1947.²¹⁰⁵ Heyes' recommendation appears to have been based on the principle that residential institutions were more likely to manage successfully the assimilation of child migrants if they were sent in smaller groups. The decision to send almost the entire CEMWA group nomination in the autumn and winter of 1947 appears instead to have prioritised the removal of children from the UK as quickly as practically possible—something which may have served both the interests of Conlon and Calwell.²¹⁰⁶ Shipping records compiled by CEMWA show that the following numbers of child migrants were sent from Scotland to these institutions in Western Australia in the autumn of 1947, all arriving on a single shipment on the *SS Ormonde* in November of that year:

²¹⁰⁴ Colm Kiernan, *Calwell: A Personal and Political Biography*, Melbourne: Nelson, 1978, p.17; Commonwealth Department of Immigration to Garnett, 18th July 1947, National Archives of Australia, 133/2/8, p.86; Garnett to Dixon, 21st July 1947, TNA: DO35/3386, p.141 on available copy. Note that Calwell was aware of the previous recommendation for only 45 children to be sent at first, and had written to Conlon about this, Calwell to Conlon, 10th June 1947, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, p.104.

²¹⁰⁵ Lists of child migrants sent under this Catholic group nomination, collated by sending and receiving institution, are recorded for three sailings that arrived in Western Australia in the latter part of 1947 (the *SS Asturias*, arrived 22nd September 1947, the *SS Ormonde*, arrived 7th November 1947, and a second sailing of the *SS Asturias*, arrived 10th December, 1947), in National Archives of Australia, A436, 1950/5/5597, pp.46-63.

²¹⁰⁶ Having launched his role as the first Commonwealth Minister of Immigration with the policy of attracting 50,000 war orphans to Australia over three years, Calwell had been forced to abandon this policy and the arrival of large parties of child migrants in the autumn of 1947 (sometimes misleadingly referred to in the press as 'war orphans') was a means by which the impression could be given that the Commonwealth Government was undertaking energetic action to achieve its goals of large-scale child migration.

Institution	Number of children	Age range	Sent from
Castledare	1 boy ²¹⁰⁷	6	Nazareth House, Aberdeen
Clontarf	17 boys	7-10	Nazareth House, Aberdeen; Nazareth House, Lasswade.
Bindoon	10 boys	10-13	Nazareth House, Aberdeen; Nazareth House, Lasswade.
Geraldton	2 girls	7-8	Nazareth House, Aberdeen
Subiaco	8 girls, 4 boys	4-14	Convent of the Good Shepherd, Colinton; Nazareth House, Aberdeen; Nazareth House, Lasswade.

3.9 The speed, scale and apparent lack of effective administration of arrangements for these migration parties in autumn 1947 gave rise to a number of serious shortcomings in standards of care for those child migrants, in part related to the fact that they were sent to institutions that were over-crowded and/or not adequately equipped to receive them. A number of these short-comings persisted despite repeatedly being raised as matters of concern by some inspectors (see also 4.8, 4.28 below).

3.10 In January 1948, State inspectors visited Bindoon and found that desks for the classrooms had still not arrived and that younger boys were involved in arduous construction work.²¹⁰⁸ An inspection report of Bindoon in August 1948 noted the urgent need for renovation work to be undertaken in dormitories and bathrooms,²¹⁰⁹ but this work had still not been completed by July 1950.²¹¹⁰

²¹⁰⁷ Reference is subsequently made of four Scottish boys being transferred from Subiaco to Castledare in 1949 in TNA: DO35/3386 p.63, on available copy.

²¹⁰⁸ Report on Bindoon, 22nd January 1948, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, pp.74-75, NAA-000000004.

²¹⁰⁹ Report on Bindoon, 3rd August 1948, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/33, p.160, NAA-000000003.

²¹¹⁰ See Report on Bindoon by Denney and Bartley, 6th July 1950, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/88, NAA-000000009.

3.11 State inspectors visiting Clontarf in May 1947 had described the bathrooms as being in a deplorable state,²¹¹¹ but construction and renovation work on these was not confirmed as having been completed until August 1951.²¹¹²

3.12 A State inspection of Castledare took place in July 1948, and appears to have been the first such inspection since the young child migrants sent in 1947, many aged six or seven, had arrived.²¹¹³ This made a series of highly critical comments about the state of dormitories (with dirty, urine-soaked bedding and urine-stained floors), overcrowding (to the point of constituting a possible health-risk in relation to the spread of infectious disease) and the insufficient number of staff for the number of children being accommodated. Although improvements were gradually made to the dormitories, the issue of overcrowded teaching space was apparently not rectified until construction work on new classrooms was completed in December 1953.²¹¹⁴ Whilst staffing levels at Castledare fluctuated to a certain extent in subsequent years,²¹¹⁵ when the Ross Fact-Finding Mission visited Castledare in March 1956 four Christian Brothers were found to be in charge of 117 children, the worst staffing ratio of any institution inspected during their tour.²¹¹⁶

3.13 The lack of any direct monitoring of children sent to Castledare in the autumn of 1947 by the UK Government contributed to further failings. Although Garnett had agreed that up to 30 child migrants could be sent to Castledare, in reality 52 boys were sent there from the parties of child migrants shipped to Western Australia in the autumn and winter of 1947.²¹¹⁷ The report provided by Western Australian State inspectors in May 1947 had also indicated that the recommended number of 30 boys should not be sent in one ship but could only be properly assimilated into the

²¹¹¹ Report on Clontarf, 14th May 1947, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/96, pp.65-66, NAA-000000022.

²¹¹² Report on Clontarf, 2nd August 1951, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/96, pp.50-51, NAA-000000018.

²¹¹³ Report on Castledare, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/47, pp.177-179, NAA-000000002.

²¹¹⁴ Report on Castledare, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/89, pp.27, 30, 35-36, NAA-000000021.

²¹¹⁵ Four nuns were appointed to the staff of Castledare in 1949 to undertake domestic and nursing work, but the number of teaching Brothers on staff with day-to-day contact with the young children accommodated there appears to have fallen from six in 1947 and 1948, to five in 1949, to just four in 1950 and 1951, and they did not increase, and then only to five, until 1954 (see Barry Coldrey, *The Scheme*, Argyle-Pacific Publishing, O'Connor, WA, 1993, p 463).

²¹¹⁶ See Confidential Report on Castledare, TNA: BN29/1325, p.138 on available copy, LEG.001.004.3244.

²¹¹⁷ See National Archives of Australia, A436, 1950/5/5597, pp.46-63.

institution in groups of no more than six to ten.²¹¹⁸ The size of the three groups arriving at Castledare in the autumn 1947 were in fact 28, 12 and 12. This over-recruitment about the agreed quotas was apparently because that was the number of boys aged under 9 that had been recruited during Br Conlon's recruiting visit to the UK (including Scotland) in 1946/47 and Castledare was the main approved receiving institution able to accommodate boys under that age.²¹¹⁹ Garnett had also recommended to the Dominions Office that children sent to Castledare should be limited to those aged 7 or 8, but in the event 32 of the children sent there were aged 6 and under.²¹²⁰ The under-staffing and over-crowding of Castledare would have made more difficult the close monitoring and supervision of staff, and for close attention to children's welfare to be paid, and again suggested a context in which organisational interests were prioritised over children's welfare. Br MDF who has been identified as one of the most prolific sexual offenders against children in Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia²¹²¹, was on the staff at Castledare between 1944 and 1954. Similar issues appear to have arisen in relation to Bindoon, where the reinstatement of the quota of 100 boys was premised on the fact that Conlon was said to have recruited boys for Bindoon aged 12 to 14 who would complete their primary education before moving into vocational training.²¹²² In reality, of the 84 boys migrated to Bindoon in the autumn of 1947, only 46 were aged 12 or over; 19 were aged 11; 14 were aged 10; 4 were aged 9 and 1 was aged 8. The youngest of these boys (the 8 and 9 year olds) were sent to Bindoon from the final shipping of that autumn, on the *SS Asturias*, which arrived at Fremantle on 10th December 1947. These younger boys (including Frederick Smith who has submitted evidence to this Inquiry) may have been sent to Bindoon because the Brothers' institutions which would normally accommodate younger children, Castledare and Clontarf, had no space available. One of these 9 year-old boys is a witness who has reported extensive experiences of sexual and physical abuse from

²¹¹⁸ Report on Castledare, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, p.124.

²¹¹⁹ Assistant Under-Secretary for Lands and Immigration to Heyes, 12th November 1947, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, p.82.

²¹²⁰ See lists of child migrants arriving in Western Australia, Sept-Dec 1947, produced by CEMWA in National Archives of Australia, A436, 1950/5/5597, pp.48-63.

²¹²¹ See Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Report of Case Study 11, <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/file-list/Case%20Study%2011%20-%20Findings%20Report%20-%20Christian%20Brothers.pdf>, pp.20, 21, 23, 26, 31.

²¹²² See Garnett to Dixon, 21st July 1947, TNA: DO35/3386, pp.141-42 on available copy.

his arrival at Bindoon and at all other Brothers' institutions to which he was transferred from there.²¹²³

3.14 Further failures occurred in UK Government over-sight at Castledare. In 1950, the UK Government was apparently unaware that a further 15 children had been sent to Castledare despite a State inspection report in March of that year indicating that accommodation there was already 'totally inadequate' for the existing numbers.²¹²⁴ The following year, in his report on Castledare, John Moss had indicated that more child migrants should only be sent there subject to a written assurance being given from the Christian Brothers that new classroom accommodation would be built as quickly as possible.²¹²⁵ Fr Stinson, on behalf of CEMWA, subsequently confirmed to State and Commonwealth authorities in February 1952 that building permits required for the new classrooms had been granted and that work would begin imminently.²¹²⁶ On the basis of Fr Stinson's information, the Commonwealth Department of Immigration in April 1952 allowed 20 more child migrants from the UK to be sent to Castledare, with the agreement of the UK Government.²¹²⁷ However, in September 1952 the Commonwealth Department of Immigration wrote to the State Child Welfare Department in Western Australia to express concern that a report it had received over the summer indicated that promised work on bathrooms and the new classrooms at Castledare had in fact not yet begun. Particular concern was noted because the decision to send more child migrants to Castledare had been made on the basis of assurances about this work being undertaken, and it appeared that child migrants were about to arrive from the UK without any progress having been made.²¹²⁸ The State Child Welfare Department replied the following month, after these child migrants had arrived, confirming that work had not begun as promised because it had transpired that Castledare did not have sufficient funds to undertake it.²¹²⁹ No explanation was provided as to why the Christian Brothers or CEMWA had assured State and

²¹²³ See 'Nine Years Under the Christian Brothers – the Fifteen Evil Ones', WIT.003.001.8683-8701.

²¹²⁴ See Report on Castledare, 12th September 1950, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/47, pp.62-63, NAA-000000002.

²¹²⁵ See Report on Castledare, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/89, pp.50-52; Moss to Cook, 10th December 1951, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/89, pp.47-48.

²¹²⁶ See Membery to Wheeler, 11th February 1952, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/89, p.45.

²¹²⁷ Heyes to Under-Secretary, Lands and Immigration, 21st April 1952, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/89, p.39.

²¹²⁸ Nutt to Secretary, Child Welfare Department, 15th September 1952, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/89, p.37, NAA-000000025.

²¹²⁹ Young to Secretary, Commonwealth Department of Immigration, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/89, p.36, NAA-000000025.

Commonwealth authorities in the spring of that year that this work was about to be undertaken, despite them apparently knowing at that stage that they did not have the financial resources to fulfil this commitment. The eventual completion of this work, much later, in December 1953, appears to have happened at around the same time that the Christian Brothers were seeking approval of Castledare as a residential institution to receive child migrants from Malta.²¹³⁰

3.15 As noted above (3.4), the UK High Commission had requested that no child migrants should be sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton whilst elderly residents were still being housed on the same site.²¹³¹ This recommendation was never adhered to. Fifty-two girls who were sent to Australia in the autumn and winter of 1947 were placed at Nazareth House, Geraldton,²¹³² and children and elderly residents were accommodated within that institution for a number of years. It was not until early 1949 that the UK High Commission asked the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration why child migrants had been sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton, when it could find no trace of any correspondence in which it had reversed its earlier view.²¹³³ This query did not lead to the relocation of elderly residents from that institution, and an inspection report of this institution by State officials in November 1949 noted that more elderly residents were still being admitted and no apparent effort had been made to re-house them.²¹³⁴ Nazareth House, Geraldton, was formally approved to receive child migrants by the Commonwealth Relations Office at some point in 1949, probably at least eighteen months after child migrants from England and Wales had arrived.²¹³⁵ This approval was made without consultation with the Home Office: an internal Home Office minute questioning why that might have been the case.²¹³⁶ One former child migrant who gave evidence to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry recalled being taken out of school at the age of 13 whilst at Nazareth House, Geraldton, to work in the elderly wards there, a report confirmed by other child migrants.²¹³⁷ The use of child migrants' labour to support the running of the elderly wing at Nazareth House, East

²¹³⁰ Heyes to Commissioner for Malta, 19th January 1954, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/89, p.27.

²¹³¹ Garnett to Dixon, 12th June 1947, TNA: DO35/3386, pp.152-54 in available copy.

²¹³² See National Archives of Australia, A436, 1950/5/5597, pp.46-63, NAA-000000006.

²¹³³ For details of this query by the UK High Commission see Nutt to State Immigration, 25th February, 1949, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/47, p.144.

²¹³⁴ Report of inspection of Nazareth House, Geraldton, National Archives of Australia, PP6/1, 1949/H/1165, p.28, NAA-000000024.

²¹³⁵ Internal minute, 24th October 1953, TNA: MH102/1882, p.9 on available copy, LEG.001.003.0314.

²¹³⁶ Internal minute, 23rd November 1950, TNA: MH102/1882, p.3 on available copy, LEG.001.003.0308.

²¹³⁷ See Witness statement HIA331:22, https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/hia_331_evidence_redacted_opt.pdf

Camberwell has also been reported by a former child migrant who has provided a witness statement to this Inquiry.²¹³⁸ Removing a child migrant from school education or vocational training before the age of 16 clearly contravened the maintenance agreement made for their on-going financial support with the UK Government.²¹³⁹ Most girls sent to Australia from Scotland by the Sisters of Nazareth up to 1953 were likely to be sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton.²¹⁴⁰

3.16 In May 1947, St Joseph's Girls Orphanage at Subiaco was described in a half page report by Western Australian State inspectors as being 'well conducted and spotlessly clean'.²¹⁴¹ However, apart from a single sentence stating that 'The children appear well dressed and healthy', the rest of the report focused on the size, material condition and cleanliness of the rooms and gave no indication about levels of training or quality of staffing, play facilities or the educational provision available for children. The Curtis report had specifically referred to 'a fetish of tidiness and high polish' in children's residential homes as a possible indication both of an overly-institutionalised environment and over-reliance on children's labour to achieve this.²¹⁴² The comment about the cleanliness of Subiaco and lack of information about staffing levels or children's institutional work did not, however, lead the UK Government officials reviewing this report to ask any further questions about standards of care at Subiaco. The sleeping accommodation was described as consisting of three rooms, one accommodating 64 children and the other two, 20 each.²¹⁴³ The size and impersonality of these institutional arrangements directly contradicted the recommendation of the Clyde report that:

the number of children housed in any one building should be drastically reduced, and the maximum number should, as soon as feasible, not exceed 30. Immediate steps, too, should be taken to reduce the size of the sleeping

²¹³⁸ Witness statement by [LSU] p.4, para. 14, WIT.001.002.4772.

²¹³⁹ See Roman Catholic Institutions – Australia Outfits and Maintenance Agreement, 7th March 1949, TNA: DO35/3387, pp.138-154 on available copy, especially sections 2, 3 and 9, LEG.001.004.5759-5775.

²¹⁴⁰ I am aware, for example, of one case of a child migrant, Y.R., who was sent from Scotland by the Sisters of Nazareth to Nazareth House, Geraldton, who gave material for inclusion in the exhibition, *On Their Own: Britain's Child Migrants*, which Prof. Lynch co-curated at the V&A Museum of Childhood in 2015/16.

²¹⁴¹ Report on St Joseph's Orphanage, Subiaco, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, p.122, NAA-000000004.

²¹⁴² See *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, paras. 186,188,190-191,194, 238, 240, 247, 250.

²¹⁴³ The report on Subiaco provided by Western Australia State inspectors was the only one of those produced by them in May 1947 which referred to the number of beds in dormitories. There is no indication that the UK High Commission or Commonwealth Relations Office asked for any further information in relation to this.

dormitories. This could be done quite readily by some structural adaptations. In certain instances as many as 40, 50 or even 60 children all sleep in the same dormitory. This arrangement is highly undesirable and detrimental to the development of the child's individuality. Therefore in any Institution the dormitories should accommodate not more than 12 to 15 children...²¹⁴⁴

3.17 Whilst it is arguably understandable that there might have been some delay in the implementation of these recommendations for institutions in Scotland in which children were already living, it is less clear why the process of giving new approvals for institutions to receive child migrants implemented by the UK High Commission and Dominions Office in the summer of 1947 did not follow standards recommended in the Curtis and Clyde reports.

3.18 As noted above, the approval of institutions and quotas of children by the UK Government for child migrants sent to Western Australia in 1947 was undertaken in a period between May to July 1947, with the first party of children leaving the UK at the end of August. This was a period in which the Home Office and Scottish Home Department had been identified as the lead government departments for children's out-of-home care for England and Wales, and for Scotland, respectively following the Cabinet decision on this in April 1947, but had not yet fully assumed these responsibilities (with notification of the Transfer of Functions (Relief of Children) Order, 1947, only being circulated by early August 1947).²¹⁴⁵ Initial discussions took place between staff in the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Children's Department of the Home Office in August 1947 about appropriate standards for the care and oversight of child migrants overseas,²¹⁴⁶ but these occurred after the UK High Commission and Commonwealth Relations Office had agreed the migration of children sent to Australia in autumn 1947.²¹⁴⁷ Immediately after this the Commonwealth Relations Office did pass on copies of the inspection reports produced on the institutions in Western Australia by Australian officials earlier that summer.²¹⁴⁸ The Home Office, at that point, did not feel they needed to raise any objections, in part because they

²¹⁴⁴ *Report of the Committee on Homeless Children*, para. 87.

²¹⁴⁵ See correspondence in TNA: MH102:1397 on available copy.

²¹⁴⁶ See minute of meeting at Commonwealth Relations Office, 20th August, 1947, TNA: MH102/1553, pp.4-5 on available copy.

²¹⁴⁷ See also internal note by Miss Maxwell, Home Office Children's Department, 24th July 1947, TNA: MH102/1553, p.2, noting that whilst the Home Office understands that inspections are made prior to the approval of institutions receiving child migrants, it had no knowledge of the basis or standards on which these inspections operated.

²¹⁴⁸ For comments on these by staff in the Home Office Children's Department see notes in TNA: MH102/1879, pp.1-2, on available copy.

mistakenly believed that no children would be sent to Castledare. Responding to these reports, one Home Office official commented on 5th September, 1947, that 'I do not feel entirely reassured about these places.'²¹⁴⁹ By that point, however, the first large party of child migrants for Western Australia had already set sail on the *SS Asturias*.²¹⁵⁰

3.19 Problems persisted with the approval process of residential institutions who wished to receive child migrants. In a number of cases, approval was given to residential institutions by the UK Government on the basis of limited information about the quality of care to be provided for children there. For example, the St Vincent de Paul Orphanage at Goodwood, Adelaide, was approved to receive child migrants by William Garnett on behalf of the UK Government in 1948 on the basis of a report sent by State immigration and child welfare officials.²¹⁵¹ This report focuses primarily on material conditions at the institution. It offers general praise for the Mother Superior and her immediate junior who are described as having 'abundant character, charm and personality', but says nothing about staffing levels or training. Children currently resident at the orphanage were described as appearing contented, neat and tidy, but no account is provided of any direct interviews with children at the institution. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse received testimony from one witness about physical and sexual abuse at this institution.²¹⁵²

3.20 In the case of Dhurringile Training Farm, to which a number of child migrants from Scotland were sent, the UK Government gave approval for it to receive child migrants without any representative of the UK Government having undertaken a direct inspection of it. The UK Government's approval of Dhurringile was based on a report produced by State immigration and child welfare officials in Victoria in May 1950 that was written whilst construction work on the site was still underway and before any staff had been appointed.²¹⁵³ The report focused primarily on the physical accommodation

²¹⁴⁹ See note in TNA: MH102/1879, p.2, on available copy, LEG.001.006.1266.

²¹⁵⁰ The Home Office had also given permission for the migration of two children to Western Australia who were under 'fit person' orders through the terms of the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act, See for example internal note by Miss Maxwell, Home Office Children's Department, 24th July 1947, TNA: MH102/1553, p.2 in available copy.

²¹⁵¹ Commonwealth Department of Immigration to Garnett, 24th March 1948, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1956/67269, pp.199-201; Garnett to Ordish, 6th April 1948, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1956/67269, p.198.

²¹⁵² See witness A5, Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Investigation into Child Migration Programmes, Day 5, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1109/view/public-hearing-transcript-3rd-march-2017.pdf>

²¹⁵³ Both the report by State officials and a supplementary letter from the Presbyterian Church confirming plans for Dhurringile as a receiving institutions for child migrants are on file at National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/25, pp.75-77, NAA.001.001.0695-0697.

and nature of training to be provided by the training farm. As the UK Government gave approval to this institution before any staff appointments had been made, it was not possible for it to have any view of the suitability of staff working at the training farm, of staffing ratios, or of the supervision and management of staff at the point at which it agreed that child migrants could be sent there. The State officials' report indicated that a 'strong local committee' would be appointed to support the institution and assist with children's after-care, but the calibre of this committee and its lack of interest in child-care was later strongly censured in the confidential appendix on Dhurringile by the 1956 Ross Fact-Finding Mission (see 4.13 below). This decision by the UK Government was made whilst it was being chased for a response from the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration, with the Commonwealth Minister for Immigration himself experiencing pressure from the Presbyterian Church in Victoria about the need to migrate the first party of children within a fixed period of time.²¹⁵⁴ The Scottish Home Department was consulted about its views on whether Dhurringile should be approved, via the Home Office, and agreed that approval should be granted based both on the reports received from Australian government and church officials and an interview its staff had with Andrew Boag, a Presbyterian minister from Australia who was visiting Scotland to recruit child migrants.²¹⁵⁵ The Scottish Home Department appeared content to accept assurances from Boag that staffing levels would be closely monitored as more children were admitted to Dhurringile, although no record is made of any specific reassurances from Boag about the appointment of house-mothers which the Scottish Home Department appear to have seen as a necessary measure.²¹⁵⁶ Staff at the Scottish Home Department assisted Boag's recruitment efforts for Dhurringile by providing him with a list of contacts for voluntary homes and local authorities in Scotland, some four months before actually taking the decision to approve Dhurringile as a receiving institution.²¹⁵⁷ Boag also received help from the Scottish Home Department's Chief Inspector, Hewitson Brown, in accessing a contact list of approved schools from which he might be able to recruit children, two months before the Department made the formal decision to give its approval to Dhurringile.²¹⁵⁸

²¹⁵⁴ See Harrison to Holt, 18th May, 1950; Harrison to Holt, 25th August, 1950; Challinor to Holt, 10th September, 1950, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/25, p.36, 44, 59.

²¹⁵⁵ See Martin to MacGregor, 11th September 1950, NRS: ED11/386, pp.107-108 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7967-7968 (see also copies of the Australian reports on pp.66-71 on same file).

²¹⁵⁶ See notes on meeting with Boag, 8th September 1950, NRS: ED11/386, p.111 on provided copy, and undated notes, NRS: ED11/386, p.52 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7971 and 7912.

²¹⁵⁷ See Martin to Boag, 28th April 1950, NRS: ED11/386, p.92 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7952.

²¹⁵⁸ See correspondence in NRS: ED11/386, pp.85-88 on provided copy, which includes a letter suggesting that Boag and Brown had a mutual acquaintance (see p.88), SGV.001.003.7945-7648.

This assistance from the Scottish Home Department also preceded its receipt from the Home Office of the Australian reports about conditions at Dhurringile.²¹⁵⁹

3.21 In the case of the Riverview Training Farm, run by the Salvation Army in Queensland, approval was again given for it to receive child migrants on the basis of inspection reports by State officials and with no direct inspection of the institution having been undertaken by a representative of the UK Government. Approval of Riverview was delayed subject to renovation work being completed, and once granted was conditional upon a satisfactory report being received on the first party of child migrants to be sent there.²¹⁶⁰ In response to a request for this report, State officials initially submitted a very short report in 1951 that said nothing about conditions or standards of care at Riverview.²¹⁶¹ In response to a request from the Home Office for a more detailed report, State immigration officials provided somewhat more information about the boys' work placements but still only a short paragraph containing a brief description of the facilities at Riverview.²¹⁶² On the basis of this report, the UK Government confirmed in 1952 that they required no further information and agreed that further parties of child and youth migrants could be sent to Riverview.²¹⁶³

3.22 Both Dhurringile and the Riverview were identified as offering particularly poor standards of care during inspection visits by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission in 1956, and were privately recommended by Ross for placing on a 'black-list' of institutions to which no further child migrants should be sent.²¹⁶⁴

3.23 As with Nazareth House, Geraldton, failures in the approval system extended to child migrants being sent to residential institutions which had not been directly approved by the UK Government. This reflected the difficulty of the UK High Commission in managing effective over-sight of child migrants across the substantial

²¹⁵⁹ These reports were only received by the Scottish Home Department in early September, shortly before it made its decision to approve Dhurringile (see MacGregor to Martin, 2nd September 1950, NRS: ED11/386, p.60 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7920.

²¹⁶⁰ Bass to Wheeler, 27th March 1950, National Archives of Australia, J25, 1958/3052, p.179, NAA-000000014; Majoribanks to Secretary, Commonwealth Department of Immigration, National Archives of Australia, J25, 1958/3052, p.145, NAA-000000013.

²¹⁶¹ State Migration Officer to Heyes, 10th July 1951, National Archives of Australia, J25, C, p.141.

²¹⁶² Heyes to Longland, 15th October 1951, National Archives of Australia, J25, 1958/3052, p.136; Smith to Heyes, 7th November 1951, National Archives of Australia, J25, 1958/3052, p.133, NAA-000000017.

²¹⁶³ Davey to Secretary, Department of Immigration, 5th February 1952, National Archives of Australia, J25, 1958/3052, p.130, NAA-000000019.

²¹⁶⁴ See, e.g. Ross to Secretary of State, 28th March 1956, and Whittick to Shannon, 22nd June 1956, TNA: BN29/1325, pp.99-102, 104-105 on provided copy.

size of Australia. On at least three other occasions, child migrants were sent to residential institutions not approved by the UK Government because it appeared that the receiving organisation in Australia assumed that approval of one of its residential homes meant that children could be sent to another home run by the same organisation (3.24-26).

3.24 During his informal inspection tour of residential institutions accommodating child migrants in 1951, the Curtis Committee member John Moss visited the Padbury Farm School, Stoneville, associated with the Church of England Swan Homes in Western Australia.²¹⁶⁵ Although it had not been specifically approved by the UK Government to receive child migrants, Moss discovered that child migrants had been sent to Padbury when it was found that there was insufficient accommodation for them at Swan Homes on their arrival. He was critical of this as Padbury operated as a training farm, and the child migrants being sent there from Swan were too young, in his view, to have a proper opinion of whether or not they wished to pursue farming as a career. Padbury was, he noted, also isolated and a site in development, with the boys having done the majority of the work in constructing the buildings and cultivating the land. Whilst Padbury appeared to have received child migrants under the broader approval of Swan Homes, Moss commented that it would have been unlikely to have been approved as an institution in its own right for children under school leaving age.

3.25 An inspection report was then produced by State officials in February 1952 commending Padbury as suitable for approval for the reception of child migrants by the UK Government.²¹⁶⁶ This offered a more positive account of the accommodation at Padbury compared to private notes provided for the UK Government by John Moss.²¹⁶⁷ A discussion then ensued between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Home Office about this approval, in which the Home Office indicated that, on the basis of Moss's report, a minimum age should be set under which child migrants should not be sent to Padbury.²¹⁶⁸ The Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration forwarded a response to this proposal from the manager of the Swan Homes, Mr Peterkin, which indicated that children were not normally sent there under the age of 11, unless older siblings had expressed an interest in farm work and younger siblings were sent with them to keep the family together. Peterkin commented that 'a

²¹⁶⁵ Report on Padbury's Boys' Farm School, 4th December 1951, National Archives of Australia, PP6/1, 1949/H/1145, pp.44-46.

²¹⁶⁶ Child Migration, Anglican Homes, Stoneville, 24th February 1952, National Archives of Australia, PP6/1, 1949/H/1165, pp.41-42.

²¹⁶⁷ Extract from notes of Mr Moss, undated, TNA: MH102/1890, p.19 on available copy.

²¹⁶⁸ Taylor to Dixon, 23rd June 1952, TNA: MH102/1890, p.11 on available copy.

boy's welfare, both educational, social and vocational, as well as his living conditions are all thoroughly safeguarded at Padbury. I have never seen an unhappy boy there'.²¹⁶⁹ On the basis of these comments, the Commonwealth Relations Office asked the Home Office to remove the requirement of a minimum age for children to be sent to Padbury in order to allow the Swan Homes the flexibility it wished to transfer children between these institutions.²¹⁷⁰ The Home Office agreed to this, and the UK Government approved Padbury without any minimum age limit.²¹⁷¹ In an oral history interview for the National Library of Australia, a former child migrant who had been resident at Padbury during that period reported physical abuse by the home's manager who had been commended by Moss in his 1951 report. During the period in 1952 in which the UK Government was deciding whether or not to approve Padbury as a residential institution to receive child migrants, another interim manager was in charge at Padbury whom this former resident has alleged sexually abused him.²¹⁷² It therefore appears that this child migrant may have been sexually abused whilst placed at a residential institution that had not, at that point, been approved by the UK Government. The response of the UK Government to the comments of the Swan Homes management also reflects a process that can be observed in other instances (such as the Ross Fact-Finding Mission) in which the UK Government chose not to enforce its own standards of good child-care practice in preference to engaging in more sustained confrontation with government agencies and voluntary organisations in Australia.²¹⁷³

3.26 In a letter from the Commonwealth Relations Office to Dr Barnardo's Homes, dated 3 March 1960, it is noted that child migrants had been placed at a new home,

²¹⁶⁹ Nutt to UK High Commission, 5th September 1952, TNA: MH102/1890, pp.6-7 on available copy.

²¹⁷⁰ Taylor to Dixon, 22nd September 1952, TNA: MH102/1890, p.5 on available copy.

²¹⁷¹ Taylor to Dixon, 1st October 1952, TNA: MH102/1890, p.4 on available copy, LEG.001.003.0689.

²¹⁷² See interview with ██████████ Forgiven Australians and Former Child Migrants Oral History Project, National Library of Australia, <http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-219399697/listen> 00:43:00-01:04:00.

²¹⁷³ For example, the Benmore Presbyterian Home had been approved by the UK High Commission in 1947 without reference to the Home Office. The Commonwealth Relations Office wrote to the Home Office about Benmore in 1951, as a small party of child migrants was being put together by the Presbyterian Church to be sent there. The Commonwealth Relations Office expressed concern that, whilst it was quite reasonable for the Home Office to expect to see a report on Benmore before making a decision about its approval, the Australian authorities would be 'considerably embarrassed' if a home which they thought had been approved turned out not to be. The Home Office replied that it could see that it would be 'undesirable' to withdraw approval 'unless some very strong grounds appear to make it necessary', and that although it would be preferable to delay any sailing of boys until a full report on the home had been received, the boys should not be prevented from sailing if any delay would cause them to lose the opportunity to go to the home (Palmer to Savidge, 21st May 1951, and Savidge to Palmer, 24th May 1951, TNA: MH102/1889, pp.78-80 on available copy.

Belmont, in New South Wales, which had not yet been formally inspected by Australian authorities for approval by the UK Government.²¹⁷⁴ This was not the first time that this situation had arisen in relation to Dr Barnardo's Homes. Correspondence in a Home Office file dating to November 1952 indicates that child migrants had been placed at Normanhurst by Dr Barnardo's Homes without that residential institution having been approved by the UK Government either. In letters between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Home Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office notes that child migrants appear to have been placed at Normanhurst towards the end of 1951 and that, although the Australian authorities were apparently happy with standards, the UK High Commission had not been notified about this, nor had the usual approval from the UK Government been sought.²¹⁷⁵ The Home Office replied that this situation might possibly have arisen because Dr Barnardo's Homes assumed that the approval of their child migration work by the UK Government could be automatically extended to any new institution in which they placed child migrants in Australia.²¹⁷⁶ It is not clear, given that this situation had previously arisen in relation to Normanhurst, why Dr Barnardo's Homes would not have understood the proper approval process for residential institutions before placing child migrants at Belmont.

3.27 Alongside short-comings in the system for the approval of individual residential institutions, there was also a lack of rigour in at least one instance of the UK Government's approval of a British sending organisation, namely the Royal Overseas League. Following a substantial capital investment in construction and renovation work at Dhurringile, the Australian Commonwealth Government were dissatisfied with the number of children subsequently sent there under the auspices of the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service. By March 1952, only 31 children had been sent to Dhurringile from an original group nomination of 100.²¹⁷⁷ Recognising that the refusal of guardians to allow children to be sent to Australia had significantly limited the numbers that the Church of Scotland had been able to recruit, Presbyterian authorities in Australia proposed that the Royal Overseas League undertake recruitment of children for Dhurringile in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This would operate under the terms of the financial agreement made between the UK

²¹⁷⁴ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes, Investigation Report*, Section 2:1 Barnardos, para. 35.

²¹⁷⁵ Dixon, CRO, to Oates, HO, 3rd November 1952, TNA: MH102/1895, pp.19-20 on available copy, LEG.001.006.1933-1934.

²¹⁷⁶ Oates, HO, to Dixon CRO, 14th November 1952, TNA: MH102/1895, p.18 on available copy, LEG.001.006.1932.

²¹⁷⁷ Heyes to Nelson, 12th March 1952, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/106, p.126, NAA.001.001.0882.

Government and the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service.²¹⁷⁸ The Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration initially made it clear to the Presbyterian Church that they thought that the UK Government were unlikely to accept this proposal because they were aware that the UK Government was not willing to recognise the Royal Overseas League as a sending organisation. An internal memo within the Commonwealth Department of Immigration notes three separate letters from the UK High Commission (dated 9th August 1949, 27th September 1950 and 12th April 1951) in which it had previously been indicated that the UK Government, in particular the Home Office, would be unwilling to extend such approval to the Royal Overseas League.²¹⁷⁹ Two reasons for this were given by the UK High Commission in the most recent of these letters, which still anticipated regulations being established for the child migration work of voluntary societies under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act. First, the Royal Overseas League lacked the appropriate child welfare expertise to undertake the selection of children. Second, the Royal Overseas League did not have structures in place to provide reports on the welfare of the children they had sent overseas. It is worth noting that these concerns about the absence of structures within a voluntary society for monitoring child migrants they had sent overseas were not applied by the UK Government to other organisations that lacked any significant monitoring systems, such as the Sisters of Nazareth and the Catholic Child Welfare Council (see Appendix 3), most probably because neither the Commonwealth Relations Office nor the Home Office had any detailed knowledge of what monitoring systems these voluntary societies operated.

3.28 Following internal discussion within the Commonwealth Department of Immigration, it was decided that although the UK Government clearly had reservations about the child migration work of the Royal Overseas League, it would be worth establishing whether the UK Government's position had changed. On 22nd July 1953, Tasman Heyes sent a long letter to the UK High Commission requesting that the League now be considered for approval as a sending organisation. Heyes noted that the UK Government had allowed the League to arrange the recruitment of child migrants to New Zealand (although, in reality, the UK Government did not fund this scheme, nor did it appear to have any legal powers at that time to prevent the migration of children from family homes where their parent or guardian had given consent other than through the requirements of the 1939 Adoption of Children Act). In contrast to the high risks of sending child migrants to private homes in New Zealand,

²¹⁷⁸ Challinor to Heyes, 8th July 1953, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/106, pp.33-34.

²¹⁷⁹ Castle to Assistant Secretary, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/106, pp.33-35.

Heyes argued that the Australian system of sending child migrants to institutions that were 'very thoroughly investigated and subject to the approval of the Home Office' posed far less of a risk to the children concerned. Heyes further pointed out that objections to the League's selection of children to be sent to New Zealand had not been raised by the UK Government (although, unknown to Heyes, concerns had previously been expressed in 1948 within the Home Office about the League's methods of selection of children and preparation of foster families overseas).²¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, Heyes argued, the lack of child welfare expertise within the League put it in no worse a position as a recruitment organisation than the Church of England Advisory Council for Empire Settlement, which had been recognised as a sending organisation by the UK Government.²¹⁸¹ Any concerns about standards of selection should also bear in mind, Heyes continued, that Australia House would also act as a safeguard to ensure that expected selection standards were met. Heyes concluded by commending Dhurringile as a 'fine' scheme and reminding the UK High Commission of the substantial capital investment that the Australian Commonwealth Government had made in making it ready to receive child migrants. He did not offer any explanation of how the League would be able to undertake appropriate post-migration monitoring of the welfare of the children it had sent overseas.

3.29 On 19th October 1953, the UK High Commission in Canberra replied to Heyes that, in response to his letter, approval had now been given to the Royal Overseas League by the Home Office for the purposes of selecting and sending children for Dhurringile. No details were given of the reasons for the reversal of the UK Government's position on this issue, or of any special measures to be put in place regarding the monitoring of children at Dhurringile despite reservations previously expressed about the League's lack of structures for this. A witness to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, ██████████ was subsequently put forward by the Royal Overseas League for migration to Dhurringile in July 1954, apparently without the necessary legal consent in his case from the Home Secretary.²¹⁸² Mr ██████████

²¹⁸⁰ See correspondence in TNA: MH102/1560 on available copy, LEG.001.006.0959-0968.

²¹⁸¹ Heyes' comparison appears to be borne out by the fact that an inspection of the Church of England Advisory Council for Empire Settlement's child migration work in 1957 criticised the effects of the Council's very limited administrative resources for its ability to undertake and record the selection and monitoring of child migrants appropriately (see correspondence in TNA: DO35/10268 on available copy).

²¹⁸² ██████████ was under the care of Middlesex County Council and, as such, required the consent of the Home Secretary for his migration under s.17 (1-3) of the 1948 Children Act; see copy of ██████████ LEM3 form at National Archives of Australia, PP93/10, 450, especially p.2.

reported to the Independent Inquiry that he was subsequently subjected to serious and sustained physical and sexual abuse whilst resident at Dhurringile.²¹⁸³

The UK Government's decision to approve an institution like Padbury, or a sending organisation like the Royal Overseas League, despite known concerns within the UK Government arguably reflected a broader dynamic in post-war child migration to Australia in which UK Government officials were unwilling to press their understanding of appropriate childcare standards too strongly in opposition to the Australian Commonwealth Government's sustained interest in recruiting child migrants.

The extent of inspections undertaken by the UK Government and Scottish Home Departments

4.1 Despite the recommendation being discussed between the UK High Commission and Dominions Office about the need for annual direct inspections of residential institutions accommodating child migrants in Australia by representatives of the UK Government (2.9-2.10 above), this recommendation was never implemented. Instead, aside from occasional, ad hoc, visits to single institutions, inspections of significant numbers of institutions accommodating child migrants were only undertaken in 1944 (by William Garnett), 1950/51 (by John Moss), 1951/52 (by Mr Crook, of the UK High Commission, who visited 13 institutions in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland) and 1956 by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission. Indeed, periods of several years often elapsed between inspection visits of individual institutions by representatives of the UK Government. For example, in the case of residential institutions run by the Christian Brothers in Western Australia, inspections undertaken by representatives of the UK Government only appear to have taken place in 1942 (only of Tardun, by Sir Ronald Cross), 1944 (by William Garnett), 1951 (by John Moss) and 1956 (by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission, and subsequently in 1956 during Anthony Rouse's observation of the Australian Commonwealth Government's inspections, post-Ross). Some residential institutions only appear to have been visited by John Moss and the Ross Fact-Finding Mission, and not all were visited by Ross.²¹⁸⁴

²¹⁸³ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, transcript of Day 4, pp.90-117, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1095/view/public-hearing-transcript-2nd-march-2017.pdf>

²¹⁸⁴ Mr Crook, from the UK High Commission, also undertook some informal visits to residential institutions accommodating child migrants in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria in 1952 (with notes on these visits recorded in TNA: MH102/2044 on available copy, LEG.001.006.2443-2458). Comments on each institution are brief and do not provide any evidence of direct, private conversations with child migrants. In terms of the institutions that have received particular attention in

4.2 A significant factor behind the failure to institute such annual inspections appears to have been the difficulty of resourcing this in terms of staff time and expense, given also the logistical challenges of visiting residential institutions across a wide geographical area (with the distance between Canberra and Perth, for example, being greater than that between London and Moscow). In the immediate discussion of proposed annual inspections of residential institutions accommodating child migrants, in August 1944, one civil servant in the Dominions Office commented that 'six inspections in the course of a year is going to take a pretty good part of any officer's time' if made a responsibility of the UK High Commission in Canberra.²¹⁸⁵ This comment was made before the substantial expansion of the number of residential institutions in Australia receiving UK child migrants in the post-war period (with 39 institutions listed as having been approved for receiving child migrants in the Appendix to the report of the 1956 Ross Fact-Finding Mission). These pressures on the UK High Commission are also indicated in an internal memo within the Dominions Office, dated 29th November 1943. This noted that William Garnett had still not made a follow-up visit to the farm schools at Pinjarra and Tardun following Cross's critical report on Tardun from the previous December, and commented that 'I imagine that any difficulty which has so far been felt in sending him to Western Australia has been the difficulty of sparing staff from the High Commissioner's Office at Canberra'.²¹⁸⁶

4.3 Pressure on resources at the UK High Commission in Canberra appear still to have been an issue in the mid-1950s. Following the involvement of Anthony Rouse, a UK High Commission official, as an observer to the Australian Commonwealth Government's limited review of residential institutions in the summer of 1956, the High Commission subsequently advised the Commonwealth Relations Office that:

we shall probably not be able to make Rouse or indeed anybody else available for further inspections – not only because we cannot afford prolonged absence

our main report and addenda, Crook did visit the Riverview Training Farm and St Joseph's, Neerkol, but not the Northcote Training Farm or the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong.

²¹⁸⁵ Note by Wiseman, 18th August, 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, p.33 on available copy.

²¹⁸⁶ Dominions Office memorandum, 29th November 1943, DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, p.3, on available copy.

from the Office by any member of the staff in present conditions, but also because of the cut we have been told to make in our touring expenditure.²¹⁸⁷

4.4 The only evidence of a direct inspection of residential institutions accommodating child migrants from Scotland by a member of staff associated with the Scottish Office and Scottish Home Department was undertaken between early April and late June, 1950, by Miss Harrison, a Scottish Home Department inspector.²¹⁸⁸ Harrison's visits to residential institutions in Australia took place on a similar basis to those conducted by the Curtis Committee member, John Moss, in 1950/51, with both Harrison and Moss undertaking these in the context of personal trips to Australia. Both Moss and Harrison were paid expenses by the UK Government and Scottish Office, respectively, to meet the local travel costs of visiting these institutions. In September 1950, a civil servant in the Home Office Children's Department wrote to the Scottish Home Department saying that they would be very grateful to see her report when available as they were 'very short of first hand information about the arrangements for the reception and welfare of children who emigrate'.²¹⁸⁹ This appears to be confirmed by a handwritten note by a Home Office civil servant commenting that the Commonwealth Relations Office would be the better point of contact for Miss Harrison in making arrangements for her visit as 'they have a complete and up-to-date list of institutions in Australia and we haven't'.²¹⁹⁰ One implication of this is that the Scottish Home Department at that point similarly lacked a comprehensive list of approved institutions in Australia. The Home Office was optimistic that findings from her report would help them in drafting regulations for the child emigration work of voluntary societies, under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act, which had still not been introduced.

4.5 Miss Harrison's report was circulated amongst senior officers of the Scottish Home Department and copies were also sent to the Home Office Children's

²¹⁸⁷ Fraser to Johnson, 20th September 1956, TNA: BN29/1325, p.25 on available copy. It is not made explicit what 'in present conditions' refers to here, although the Commonwealth Relations Office staff were involved in liaison with the Australian Commonwealth Government on a wide range of policy issues. This letter was written at the point at which British nuclear testing at the Maralinga site was about to commence (with the first test explosion taking place a week after the writing of this letter). The Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, was also playing an important role in an attempted negotiation with the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, during September 1956, over a possible resolution to the crisis over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.

²¹⁸⁸ Harrison's report and correspondence relating to this trip are held in TNA: MH102/2335 on available copy, LEG.001.006.2971-2985.

²¹⁸⁹ Prestige to Rowe, 20th September 1950, TNA: MH102/2335, p.19 on available copy, LEG.001.006.2981.

²¹⁹⁰ Handwritten memo, TNA: MH102/2335, p.2, on available copy.

Department and civil servants dealing with issues of child migration in the Commonwealth Relations Office.²¹⁹¹ Her report itself was based on visits to 18 residential institutions accommodating child migrants, as follows:

1.	Fairbridge, Pinjarra (Western Australia)
2.	Methodist Homes, Perth (Western Australia)
3.	Church of England Homes, Perth (Western Australia)
4.	Clontarf, Christian Brothers (Western Australia)
5.	Castledare, Christian Brothers (Western Australia)
6.	Tardun, Christian Brothers (Western Australia)
7.	Bindoon, Christian Brothers (Western Australia)
8.	Nazareth House, Geraldton (Western Australia)
9.	St Joseph's, Subiaco, Perth (Western Australia)
10.	Methodist Homes (Adelaide)
11.	Church of England Girls' Home (Adelaide)
12.	St Vincent's Roman Catholic Home (Adelaide)
13.	Methodist Home, Melbourne (Victoria)
14.	Methodist Hostel, Melbourne (Victoria)
15.	Church of England Boys' Home, Melbourne (Victoria)
16.	Dr Barnardo's Girls' Home, Sydney (New South Wales)
17.	Dr Barnardo's Boys' Home, Picton (New South Wales)
18.	Fairbridge, Molong (New South Wales)

²¹⁹¹ A copy of this report is available in TNA: MH102/2335, pp.10-12 on available copy, LEG.001.006.2972-2974.

4.6 Aside from appendices listing institutions visited, and those already approved for receiving child migrants, Harrison's main report was only three pages long.²¹⁹² Most of the report consisted of a broad overview of the policy and systems in operation for children's reception on arrival in Australia, the grouping and allocation of children to particular institutions, the standard and type of institution, the range of education and training available, systems for after-care, the provision of hostels for those leaving residential institutions, arrangements for the legal guardianship of children, and final general comments. Harrison's report struck a largely positive tone, describing Australia as

very pleasant for the young. For the greater part of the year the sun shines, there are masses of flowers and fruit and plenty of good food...There are opportunities for cheap sport...Social distinctions are not rigid and at present authorities are desperately keen to make immigration a success and every possible help is given.²¹⁹³

Although physical conditions in receiving institutions varied, the Roman Catholic girls' homes were described as being of 'a very high standard as far as equipment and salubrious surroundings go'.²¹⁹⁴ Immigration societies in Australia were said to be 'very keen for larger numbers of children and the Presbyterian Homes throughout Australia are specially keen to get immigrants – Scottish children if possible.'²¹⁹⁵ The concerns raised by Harrison were also raised subsequently by Moss and Ross, notably the lack of family histories sent with child migrants and dissatisfaction with the educational standard of children being sent particularly to Catholic institutions. With regard to the latter, Harrison said that 'care should be taken to see that no really defective child is sent out, for the sake of the child and the honour of Britain.'²¹⁹⁶

4.7 Unlike the Moss and Ross reports, Harrison's report made no comments about individual institutions. There was no indication in her report whether she had spoken directly to any child migrants, and for the most part the content seemed to be based on information she had been given by either government immigration or child

²¹⁹² Harrison's response when asked to give further details about her impressions of Burnbrae and Benmore suggests that she did have more detailed notes available on individual institutions (see NRS: ED11/306, pp.14-15 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7376-7377), but this level of detail was not reflected in her circulated report.

²¹⁹³ See TNA: MH102/2335, p.12 on available copy.

²¹⁹⁴ See TNA: MH102/2335, p.10 on available copy.

²¹⁹⁵ See TNA: MH102/2335, p.12 on available copy.

²¹⁹⁶ See TNA: MH102/2335, p.12 on available copy.

welfare officers, from staff in voluntary societies receiving child migrants or from her own observations of the location and facilities of residential homes.

4.8 With regard to systems of inspection for residential institutions, Harrison simply noted that 'Inspection is carried out regularly—in Western Australia quarterly and energetically'.²¹⁹⁷ There is no indication that Harrison reviewed any inspection reports produced by Australian State officials, including in Western Australia. If she had done so, she would have been aware that repeated concerns about overcrowded teaching space and inadequate protection from flies in the kitchen and dining areas at Castledare had not been addressed,²¹⁹⁸ nor had required changes been made to poor conditions in the bathrooms and 'bed-wetters' dormitory' at Clontarf.²¹⁹⁹ Less than six months before Harrison had begun her tour of Australia a conference of State officials in Western Australia noted their concerns about the amount of work, and insufficient education, being provided to boys at Bindoon and Tardun, as well as the lack of control of the boys' behaviour. They reportedly took the view that 'if British authorities were aware of conditions [this] may create uneasiness and probably cessation of selection of children under the scheme.'²²⁰⁰ Officials in the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration, including R. H. Wheeler, were also aware that State officials in Western Australia were 'gravely concerned' with conditions at Nazareth House, Geraldton, as well as Tardun and Bindoon.²²⁰¹ Harrison was also presumably unaware that Sir Tasman Heyes, the Secretary of the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration, had written to State immigration officials in Western Australia in both September 1949 and May 1950 about inspection reports on institutions accommodating child migrants not being sent on to him.²²⁰²

4.9 Harrison noted that

practically all Roman Catholic Homes are Institutions but in Western Australia particularly (where most of our children are) the child welfare inspectors are bringing in modern methods quite quickly and the Roman Catholic Immigration

²¹⁹⁷ See TNA: MH102/2335, p.10 on available copy.

²¹⁹⁸ See for example, reports on Castledare, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/47, pp.81-82, 85, 89-90, NAA-000000002.

²¹⁹⁹ See for example, report on Clontarf, National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/96, pp.63-64, NAA-000000022.

²²⁰⁰ See memo in National Archives of Australia, K403, W1959/88, p.56.

²²⁰¹ Memo in National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/8, p.20, NAA-000000004.

²²⁰² See letters from Heyes to State Department of Lands and Immigration, National Archives of Australia, A445 133/2/47, p.91 and 103, NAA-000000002.

Officer, Fr Stenson [sic], is fully alive to the necessity of bringing their Homes up to modern standards if they wish more children and the state grants.²²⁰³

The modern methods attributed to child welfare officials are not described in any further detail, nor is evidence of their impact easily identifiable in State inspection reports of that period. As noted in the Investigation Report into Child Migration Programmes of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Fr Stinson was subsequently involved in the direct recruitment of children from Catholic residential institutions in the United Kingdom, against the wishes of the Catholic Child Welfare Council (discussed further in Appendix 4).²²⁰⁴ Despite his responsibilities as their formal custodian, Fr Stinson also subsequently failed to provide regular or comprehensive reports on children sent to Catholic institutions in Western Australia to Catholic sending organisations in the United Kingdom.²²⁰⁵

4.10 Whilst Harrison's report provided a broad overview of policies relating to child migration it failed to identify problems known to Australian State inspectors. It appeared to repeat assurances given about the effectiveness of systems of monitoring and care rather than reviewing evidence (such as inspection reports) that would have provided a stronger basis for evaluating these. Officials in the Home Office Children's Department had mixed views of it.²²⁰⁶ Whilst giving some useful information at a general level, it was noted that it lacked much detail. One official commented that they were reassured to hear that State Child Welfare officials were carrying out regular inspections and trying to ensure modern methods. Another, however, wrote that 'my own impression of the "energetic" inspection of W Australia, as revealed by their reports, is that it is still in the tap-turning [?] stage and says little about the emotional needs and growth of the children'.²²⁰⁷ This official also noted some scepticism was also expressed about how helpful Miss Harrison was as an inspector—'My feeling is that Miss Harrison's outlook may be much the same as Mr Moss's – not wholly a recommendation. Has she kept up with the rapid advances of the past six years?'²²⁰⁸ Such scepticism was later demonstrated in the Home Office's decision not to support the Scottish Home Department's suggestion that Miss

²²⁰³ 'Report of visit to Australia', 15th July 1950, TNA: MH102/2335, p.10 on available copy.

²²⁰⁴ IICSA Investigation Report into Child Migration Programmes, March 2018, p.133

²²⁰⁵ IICSA Investigation Report into Child Migration Programmes, March 2018, p.141.

²²⁰⁶ See notes made by Home Office staff on TNA: MH102/2335, pp.4-6 on available copy, LEG.001.006.2966-2968.

²²⁰⁷ See note, TNA: MH102/2335, p.6 on available copy.

²²⁰⁸ See note, TNA: MH102/2335, p.6 on available copy.

Harrison might serve as a member of the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission to Australia on the basis that 'someone better could be got'.²²⁰⁹

4.11 A short Home Office memo also noted similarities between Harrison's and Moss's findings (and there is some indication that Harrison had given Moss her diary of more detailed notes about her institutional visits before he submitted his own reports).²²¹⁰ Although, both Moss and Harrison indicated that regular inspections of residential homes took place, Moss' report showed that copies of these inspection reports were not always sent 'as a rule' to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canberra, and so were not passed on to the UK Government officials in London.²²¹¹ Staff in the Home Office Children's Department were also aware that Miss Harrison had taken a positive view of standards of care at the Benmore and Burnbrae children's homes in Western Australia from her 1950 visit, but that John Moss had considered Benmore not to be a suitable receiving institution when he visited it little more than eighteen months later on the grounds that it was poorly equipped and under-staffed.²²¹²

4.12 There is no indication that the Home Office Children's Department passed on any reservations about Miss Harrison's report on to staff in the Scottish Home Department. It is not clear that Miss Harrison's views on child migration were necessarily shared in all respects by other members of staff in the Scottish Home Department. For example, she saw a minimum age of three or four as quite reasonable for a child's migration, whereas other officials in the Scottish Home

²²⁰⁹ See Ross to Morley, 19th November 1955, TNA: DO35/6380, pp.139-140 on available copy.

²²¹⁰ See Martin to MacGregor, 18th December 1950, TNA: MH102/1882, pp.75-76 on provided copy.

²²¹¹ Memo, TNA: MH102/2335, p.8 on available copy.

²²¹² See Martin to Dixon, 19th September 1951, and Moss reports on Benmore and Burnbrae, 8th February 1952, TNA: MH102/1889, pp.44-47, 58-59 on available copy. Although the couple managing Benmore who gave Moss particular concern (because of their lack of previous training and experience of child-care and the husband's questionable approach to disciplining children) had arrived after Harrison's visit, Moss's report indicated that staffing at Benmore had not been satisfactory prior to this and that the local superintendent, Dr Pearson, did not think that Benmore or Burnbrae were particularly suitable for child migrants and had only offered them because he understood that there was a large volume of unaccompanied children seeking migration from the UK, and he wanted the Presbyterian Church to play their part in supporting this. It may be that Harrison took a more optimistic view of Benmore when she visited it partly on the basis of what she was told about the Presbyterian Church's future plans for it (see Note by Miss Harrison, 17th September 1951, NRS: ED11/306, pp.14-15 on provided copy).

Department appear to have been far more cautious about agreeing to the migration of younger children.²²¹³

4.13 Weaknesses in the system of over-sight of residential institutions in Australia within which the Scottish Home Department worked are evident with regard to the case of children sent from Scotland to the Dhurringile Rural Training Farm in Victoria. As noted above (see 3.20 above), Dhurringile had been approved as a receiving institution by the Scottish Home Department on the basis of reports and assurances about conditions there which had been made before refurbishment of the institution had been completed and staff appointed. Staff at the Scottish Home Department had assisted the recruitment of boys for Dhurringile by providing Revd Andrew Boag with lists of local authorities, voluntary homes and approved schools, months before receiving these reports and giving Dhurringile its formal approval.

4.14 On 2nd July 1952, the Home Office sent the Scottish Home Department a copy of rough notes made by John Moss about Dhurringile during his visits to residential institutions in Australia in 1951/52.²²¹⁴ This appears to have been the first information about conditions at Dhurringile received by the Scottish Home Department since boys from Scotland began to be sent there from the autumn of 1950. The brief notes included confirmation of educational arrangements for boys at the Farm and the provision of placements with local families during holidays. The report commented that the 'kitchen, sanitary arrangements, bathing arrangements, etc, will be very good',²²¹⁵ suggesting that work on these had not been completed. Moss also noted the on-going difficulties in recruiting children from Scotland for Dhurringile, and commented that even when work on the Home had been completed 'it will be difficult to prevent [Dhurringile] becoming rather institutional'.²²¹⁶ In acknowledging receipt of this report, the Scottish Home Department commented to the Home Office that there was little it could do about the small numbers of children being sent from Scotland and that Miss Harrison had warned the Presbyterian Church in Victoria against being too optimistic in terms of the numbers of boys they imagined would come from Scotland in the future. It was unfortunate, it noted, that the Presbyterian

²²¹³ Compare 'Points made by Miss Harrison', Para 1c, NRS: ED11/306, p.55 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7417, with content in NRS: ED11/410 on general principles applied by staff in the Scottish Home Department to the approval of a child's migration under s.17 of the 1948 Children Act, SGV.001.003.8000-8008.

²²¹⁴ Northover to Martin, 2nd July 1952, NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7901-7903.

²²¹⁵ 'Copy of rough note prepared by Mr John Moss during his visit to Australia in 1951/52', NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7902-7903.

²²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

authorities in Victoria were still continuing to develop Dhurringile on a scale that was unrealistic given likely levels of recruitment.²²¹⁷

4.15 It appears that the Scottish Home Department did not receive any further inspection reports about Dhurringile until it was sent a copy of the confidential appendix on Dhurringile produced by the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission on 16th June 1956.²²¹⁸ In response to a query from a Scottish local authority about child emigration in January 1953, the Scottish Home Department earlier stated that it had received 'no bad reports' concerning children migrated in the previous year but this might imply an assumption on their part that they would have been notified if problems had occurred and that an absence of information indicated that there were no serious grounds for concern.²²¹⁹ The Fact-Finding Mission's confidential appendix on Dhurringile described as 'deplorable' both material conditions at the home as well as the attitudes of its committee members. Showers and lavatories for the boys, which Moss had indicated would be very good, were found to be 'inadequate in number and in poor condition'. The overall impression of the accommodation was that it was largely, isolated, bare and 'cheerless'. The five staff contained no house-mothers (see 3.20 above), and were judged to be 'inadequate in number' by the Fact-Finding Mission. The number of staff employed was also fewer than had been promised by the Presbyterian Church to the State Immigration Department in Victoria in its application for approval of Dhurringile as a receiving institution.²²²⁰ The Fact-Finding Mission's confidential appendix also noted critically the way in which the Church of Scotland advertised Dhurringile as providing boys with a 'splendid opportunity...under ideal conditions under trained experts in social work',²²²¹ a phrase apparently originally taken from a circular letter publicising the scheme that was sent out by Andrew Boag.²²²²

²²¹⁷ See Martin to Northover, 8th July 1952, NRS: ED11/386, p.40 on provided copy.

²²¹⁸ See Costley-White to Munro, 16th June 1956, ED11/386, pp.32-35 on provided copy.

²²¹⁹ See Scottish Home Department to Auld, 17th January 1953, NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7896-7897. See Auld to Scottish Home Department, 6th January 1953 to which the letter from the Scottish Home Department to Auld is a reply, NRS: ED11/386, SGV.001.003.7898.

²²²⁰ See Harrison to Nelson, 20th April 1950, NRS: ED11/386, p.70 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7930-7931.

²²²¹ Child Migration Fact-Finding Mission, Note on Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, TNA: BN29/1325, p.142 on available copy.

²²²² A copy of Andrew Boag's letter originally making this claim is on NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7949. The Royal Overseas League had similarly over-stated the quality of provision at Dhurringile in its own recruitment work (see TNA: DO35/10276, LEG.001.002.5959).

4.16 Different views were taken within the Scottish Home Department about the Fact-Finding Mission's views. In one Minute, an official noted that the Fact-Finding Mission had criticised Dhurringile 'in no uncertain terms' and regretted that the Commonwealth Relations Office had not forwarded on the other confidential appendices produced by the Mission 'so that we could look at Dhurringile within the framework of the whole set-up'.²²²³ This point is significant given that the Fact-Finding Mission had produced highly critical confidential appendices on other residential institutions to which children from Scotland had been sent (such as Bindoon, Castledare, St John Bosco's Boys Town, St Joseph's, Neerkol and the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra). Noting that the Commonwealth Relations Office had passed this confidential appendix on Dhurringile on to the Scottish Home Department primarily because it wanted its view on whether a pending application for a child's migration to Dhurringile should be approved, the Minute noted that the more pressing concern should be for the 31 boys already resident at Dhurringile. This emphasis on the need to attend to the welfare of child migrants already sent overseas, rather than focusing primarily on future policy decisions about the continuation of child migration, is rare in the archived UK Government correspondence on how the results of the Fact-Finding Mission should be addressed. With this concern in mind, the Minute suggested that it was likely that prompt action would be taken to improve conditions at Dhurringile if the Church authorities were notified of the contents of the confidential appendix. The Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office subsequently decided not to share the detailed content of the Mission's confidential appendices with voluntary organisations in the United Kingdom or Australia for a variety of reasons, including John Ross's own objection that these documents had been produced confidentially only for use within the UK Government and not for sharing with voluntary organisations.²²²⁴

4.17 An alternative view of the confidential appendix on Dhurringile within the Scottish Home Department was given in another memorandum by J. S. Munro, dated 2nd July 1956. By this point, Munro appears to have received further information about the results of the Fact-Finding Mission than were provided in the original letter from the Commonwealth Relations Office on 16th June.²²²⁵ Munro's comments are worth quoting in some detail:

²²²³ See Minute on NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7866.

²²²⁴ See Ross to Shannon, 28th June 1956, TNA: BN29/1325, LEG.001.004.3180-3182.

²²²⁵ By the time of writing this memorandum, Munro now understood that the Fact-Finding Mission's views had created considerable controversy, and that the Home Office were also unclear why Ross had

For our part we cannot see why Dhurringile should be so lowly placed. If it is a bad home news would have leaked out long ago and the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service would not be a party knowingly to sending children to Australia under bad conditions. The Home is favourably commented on in the annual reports of the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service, as for example in that dated 1955, where it is claimed that "This School which is operated by the Presbyterian Church at Victoria, provides excellent opportunities for boys who by reason of adverse home circumstances would seem likely to profit most by the chance of a completely new life amidst totally different surroundings".²²²⁶

Munro went on to note that the Scottish Home Department could not reasonably disagree with the view that children could still be sent to institutions criticised by the Fact-Finding Mission pending a review of residential institutions shortly to be undertaken by the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration. Munro's comments suggest that the Scottish Home Department's knowledge of conditions at Dhurringile in the period since 1950 had depended primarily on the principle that information about poor standards there would inevitably 'leak out' and on information from published annual reports of the Church of Scotland. This does not appear to accord with the emphasis on the importance of direct, rigorous inspection of children's out-of-home care by government officials in both the Clyde and Curtis reports.

4.18 On 20th September 1956, the Commonwealth Relations Office received the reports from the Australian Government's review of residential institutions for child migrants. This was accompanied by private notes on these institutions made by Anthony Rouse, the UK High Commission official who had accompanied the Australian review team as an observer.²²²⁷ Rouse generally confirmed the Fact-Finding Mission's view of the 'bare and cheerless' accommodation at Dhurringile, in which the general appearance of the bathroom facilities for the children was that they were 'dirty and poor'. Although Rouse was unsure what would constitute an adequate number of staff, he noted that the provision of more staff would make it

only recommended five institutions for black-listing given that the information provided in the confidential appendices indicated that at least ten receiving institutions were 'bad'.

²²²⁶ Munro to Walker, 2nd July 1956, NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7891. It is worth noting that the Church of Scotland's annual reports may have been seen as giving grounds for confidence about conditions at Dhurringile through their references to positive reports having been received about boys sent there (see Appendix 3, 7.2).

²²²⁷ See Fraser to Johnson, 20th September 1956, TNA: BN29/1325, LEG.001.004.3133-3162 (for Rouse's notes on Dhurringile, see pp.43-45).

possible for less to be expected of the boys in terms of work to maintain the running of the institution. Rouse's impression, from meeting the chair of the management committee of Dhurringile, was that he was far more interested in the farm than the residential home itself, and Rouse noted that the dairy was far cleaner than the boys' bathrooms probably because they were inspected more regularly. Rouse's impression more generally was that the management committee had 'old-fashioned' views and were not conversant with current thinking about good standards of child-care. The Home's superintendent also commented that he had raised concerns about poor conditions at Dhurringile with the management committee but had received little support from them. Rouse also visited the local school attended by boys at Dhurringile and commented that their poor performance in their academic work might reflect the demoralising effects of the environment in which they were living. The Australian review team had spoken with boys at Dhurringile, without the superintendent present, and they had complained about lack of care on some issues. When criticisms of Dhurringile were reported back to the Secretary of the Social Services Department for the Presbyterian Church in Victoria, Revd Harrison, Rouse found Harrison's assurances about future improvements 'too glib'. It appears that Rouse's private notes were forwarded on by the Commonwealth Relations Office to the Scottish Home Department.²²²⁸ The Scottish Home Department also received a copy of a letter from Rouse dated 4th December enclosing a follow-up report on Dhurringile from the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration, stating that changes to the staffing and accommodation required by the Australian Commonwealth Government review had now been made and that Dhurringile was well-placed to continue to receive more child migrants.²²²⁹ Rouse's accompanying letter stated that from this report 'it appears that certain short-comings have now been rectified'. A note by Munro commented that communication from the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration around that time appeared 'rather retaliatory in tone', and that whilst some defensiveness might be expected on its part following the Fact-Finding Mission, there was nevertheless 'room for

²²²⁸ In Gibson to Munro, 23rd November 1956, TNA: DO35/6382, on available copy, LEG.001.004.7338, there is a reference to a previous letter from the UK High Commission (Fraser to Johnson, 20th September 1956, pp.148-150 on same file) which commented on the disparity between Rouse's comments and those provided by the official Australian Government review. It appears that a copy of this letter from the UK High Commission, with its original enclosures of Rouse's private notes, had been passed on to the Scottish Home Department via its office in London.

²²²⁹ Rouse to Johnson, 4th December 1956, NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7888-7890.

improvement in Australia and we should concentrate on that aspect'.²²³⁰ 'When the dust settles', Munro also noted, 'we may see more clearly whether the improvements at Dhurringile are sufficient. If not, the Church of Scotland may have to think again before continuing to use the home.' It appears that the Commonwealth Relations Office took the view that the Scottish Home Department did not have any strong objections to the boy, whose migration to Dhurringile had been pending during the summer of 1956, now being sent there.²²³¹

4.19 Although included in the 'black-list' of institutions proposed by John Ross, discussions between the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office did not lead to the cessation of child migration to Dhurringile or other institutions about which the Fact-Finding Mission had raised concerns. Instead, during the autumn of 1956, a new policy was developed in the wake of the Mission's report to ask UK-based voluntary societies undertaking child migration to agree to informal inspections of their UK-based work. Residential organisations overseas were also to be asked to provide particular information about their work in the hope that the type of information requested would nudge these institutions towards more progressive practice.²²³² This arrangement was written into the terms of the renewal of funding for child migration through the Commonwealth Settlement Act in 1957.²²³³ Whilst the Home Office was to review the work of most voluntary organisations sending child migrants overseas, this role was to be taken by the Scottish Home Department for sending organisations based in Scotland.²²³⁴

4.20 In preparation for the renewal of funding for child migration under the terms of Commonwealth Settlement Act in 1957, the Scottish Home Department was also specifically consulted about whether it was willing for funding for the migration of children to Dhurringile by the Church of Scotland to be renewed given the strong

²²³⁰ Notes by Munro re letters dated 17th January 1957, NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7887.

²²³¹ See Johnson to Sudbury and Gibson, 8th November 1956, TNA: DO35/6382, on available copy, LEG.001.004.7252-7253.

²²³² See cover letter from Sudbury, 27th December 1956, TNA: DO35/10275, on available copy, LEG.001.004.9748-9750.

²²³³ See Annex A, TNA: DO35/10275, pp.69-71, on available copy.

²²³⁴ This appears to have meant that the Scottish Home Department would review the work of sending organisations primarily based in Scotland (such as the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service) but not necessarily all cases of individual child migrants from Scotland, and seems consistent with an already established view that the Scottish Home Department would be concerned only with sending organisations whose headquarters were based in Scotland or on wider matters of policy relating to the regulation of child migration under the terms of the 1948 Children Act (see 1.12 above).

criticisms made in the Fact-Finding Mission's confidential appendix.²²³⁵ The Commonwealth Relations Office suggested that this renewal was to be made on the understanding that the Church of Scotland could not be held directly responsible for any failings on the part of the Presbyterian Church in Victoria, but that at the same time the Church of Scotland would be expected to make its 'best endeavours' in encouraging its Presbyterian colleagues in Australia to ensure that appropriate standards were reached at Dhurringile. The Scottish Home Department wrote back to confirm that both it, and the Church of Scotland, were happy to proceed with the renewal of funding of child migration to Dhurringile on that basis,²²³⁶ having previously received the required report on Dhurringile from the Presbyterian Church in Victoria.²²³⁷ Miss Harrison, no longer employed by the Scottish Home Department, also subsequently provided a short report of impressions from an informal visit to Dhurringile in September 1958, which suggested that although the home was physically somewhat run down, the former residents that she visited with the home's Superintendent were all 'happily settled' and that any problems with their placements should be easily rectifiable if the Superintendent visits each boy 'regularly and often'.²²³⁸ No further reports on Dhurringile appear to have been received by the Scottish Home Department, certainly prior to January 1960 when the Scottish Home Department contacted the Home Office about the lack of further reports from Australia.²²³⁹ [REDACTED] a witness to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, reported persistent physical and sexual abuse at Dhurringile during the period 1956-1958.²²⁴⁰ In addition to this, a witness to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry reported having been sexually assaulted by the superintendent of the home in that period.²²⁴¹

4.21 Subsequent events concerning Dhurringile demonstrated short-comings with the voluntary agreement that the UK Government made with sending organisations

²²³⁵ Gibson to Hutchinson, 29th May 1957, TNA: DO35/10275, on available copy, LEG.001.004.9722-9724.

²²³⁶ Munro to Gibson, 6th June 1957, TNA: DO35/10275, on available copy, LEG.001.004.9718.

²²³⁷ See Cumming to Commonwealth Relations Office, 11th February 1957, NRS: ED11/386, pp.23-25, on provided copy.

²²³⁸ Impressions of Miss Harrison on Dhurringile, September 1958, TNA: DO35/10276, on available copy, LEG.001.004.9788.

²²³⁹ See NRS: ED11/386, on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7871 and 7874.

²²⁴⁰ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Investigation into Child Migration Programmes, Day 4, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1095/view/public-hearing-transcript-2nd-march-2017.pdf>, pp.90-117.

²²⁴¹ Witness statement HIA354:22, https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/hia_354_redacted_opt_0.pdf

in 1957 about informal inspections of their UK-based work. The Scottish Home Department had itself sought a stronger system of over-sight than this voluntary agreement in the wake of the report of the Fact-Finding Mission, supporting in particular the recommendation that the requirement of Secretary of State consent for a child's emigration be extended to children emigrated by voluntary societies and not just local authorities. As one internal Scottish Home Department minute noted:

The question whether consent should be required to an emigration proposed to be arranged by a voluntary society as well as to one proposed to be arranged by a local authority must, I think, be answered by reference to the welfare of the children concerned. If there is evidence, as the Fact-Finding Mission apparently thought there was, that the voluntary societies, without supervision, are not sufficiently safeguarding the welfare of the emigrant children then supervision must be introduced. Public opinion would not accept, as a reason for not introducing it, the fact that it would be administratively difficult...The obvious way of providing [this supervision] would be by extending to voluntary bodies the existing requirement, in the case of local authorities, of the Secretary of State's consent.²²⁴²

This view was communicated in correspondence with the Home Office in which the Scottish Home Department provided its views on a confidential inter-departmental report on future emigration policy being drafted in August 1956.²²⁴³ In this, the Scottish Home Department commented that it was hard to justify the continued failure to have an equivalent system of regulation for the emigration of children by voluntary societies compared to that already in place for local authorities given that staff working for voluntary societies were often less highly trained and experienced than those working for local authorities.²²⁴⁴ The Scottish Home Department also expressed scepticism at the Home Office's objection that it would find it hard to manage the extension of Secretary of State consent to the emigration of children from the care of voluntary societies given the additional caseload this would create for its Children's Department. Whilst the Scottish Home Department's position was explicitly endorsed by Sir Charles Cunningham, the most senior civil servant in the Department at the time, Cunningham also took the view that this was 'a very small problem' and that it was not necessary for the Scottish Home Department to 'die in

²²⁴² See Minute on NRS: ED11/391, pp.4-5 on provided copy.

²²⁴³ Correspondence relating to this, including drafts of the report, are held on NRS: ED11/391, on provided copy.

²²⁴⁴ See Telegram from Munro to Hutchison, 17th August 1956, NRS: ED39/131, pp.293-295 on provided copy.

any ditches' on this issue 'so long as we are not associated with the report in question. I gather that we are not.'²²⁴⁵ The text of the inter-departmental report eventually agreed between the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office proposed the introduction of an informal system of inspection of the child migration work of voluntary societies in preference to extending the requirement for Secretary of State consent to them or the wider introduction of regulations under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act. The grounds given for this decision in this report were that voluntary societies would resent this degree of intrusion into their work, extending Government supervision of voluntary societies' emigration work would cause significant additional workload pressures (in part because the quality of case files provided by voluntary societies could not be assumed to be adequate), concern had been expressed by the Oversea Migration Board that greater regulation would stifle the already limited child migration work done by voluntary societies, and that any such system of supervision might not detect mistakes made by voluntary societies anyway.²²⁴⁶ The Scottish Home Department continued to note its disagreement with this view in a memorandum to the Cabinet on 22nd October, noting that 'we doubt whether the Government would be on strong grounds in securing, by means of a condition attached to a grant, a measure of control over the voluntary bodies for which they are not prepared to seek Parliamentary authority.'²²⁴⁷ The view of the Home Office and Commonwealth Relations Office prevailed, however, and the expectation of voluntary societies' support for informal government inspection of their UK-based work was introduced with the renewal of funding agreements of their work in 1957.²²⁴⁸

4.22 The Scottish Home Department's concern about the robustness of a voluntary agreement about inspections with sending organisations proved prescient in the light of subsequent events concerning Dhurringile (on the following cases, see also Appendix 3, 7.10-7.16). In January 1960, a party of 11 boys was sent to Dhurringile from Quarrier's Homes under the auspices of the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service with their emigration only being discovered by the Scottish Office

²²⁴⁵ Cunningham to Hutchison, 21st August 1956, NRS: ED39/131, SGV.001.003.8300.

²²⁴⁶ See Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1956, paras. 71-82, NRS: ED39/131, SGV.001.003.8155-8160.

²²⁴⁷ See Memorandum on Migration Policy, Empire Settlement Acts 1922-1952, NRS: ED39/131, SGV.001.003.8350-8352.

²²⁴⁸ A summary of this policy is also provided in the Minute, 24th October 1961, on NRS: ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8011-8013.

because of its coverage in the press.²²⁴⁹ The sudden development of plans by Quarriers to migrate children in 1959 after a twenty year period in which they had not been involved in any child migration work to Australia suggests that it was likely the result of some specific approach or contact between Quarriers and Dhurringile or the Presbyterian Church in Victoria. However, no evidence of correspondence relating to this has been identified. It appears that the Scottish Home Department and the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service had not been in contact with each other about informal inspection of its child migration work since 1957 because the Home Department had assumed that the latter's child migration work had become inactive.²²⁵⁰ After being contacted by the Scottish Education Department, the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service appears to have apologised for their failure to make the Home Department aware of the migration of the 11 boys and noted that this oversight had happened because they had been involved in 'practically no action' with regard to child migration since the renewal of its funding agreement in 1957. In 1961, however, the Scottish Education Department became aware of a further party of five boys having been sent to Dhurringile from Quarriers and initially expressed uncertainty as to whether or not they had been sent under the auspices of the Church of Scotland or whether indeed any of the children might have been under the care of a local authority or subject to 'fit person' orders (in which case their migration would have required the consent of the Secretary of State for Scotland). In response to questions from the Scottish Home Department about the arrangements for these boys' migration, Quarriers confirmed that they had been sent under the terms of the UK Government agreement with the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service and that none of the boys required Secretary of State consent for their emigration.²²⁵¹ The Director of the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service also confirmed that this second party of boys had been sent whilst he had been on sick leave and that the arrangements had been made primarily by Quarriers in consultation with a less experienced administrator at the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service who was covering for the Director's absence.²²⁵² Whilst there was internal discussion within the Scottish Office as to whether the 1957 agreement really did require sending organisations to notify the Home Office or Scottish Office about all individual children being migrated, the view

²²⁴⁹ The events described in this paragraph are summarised in the Minute, 24th October 1961, and Kerr to Cameron, 17th November 1961, on NRS: ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8011-8013 and 8031-8032.

²²⁵⁰ See Minute, 21st November 1961, NRS: ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8027.

²²⁵¹ See Davidson to Kerr, 7th November 1961, NRS: ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8025-8026.

²²⁵² See Cameron to Kerr, 30th November 1961, and Minute, 5th January 1962, on NRS: ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8028-8029 and 8033.

was taken that the failure on two occasions by the Church of Scotland to notify the Scottish Office of parties of child migrants being sent overseas was not in the spirit of allowing their work to be observed by Home Department inspectors.²²⁵³

4.23 After this, the Scottish Office was more actively involved in discussions about the possible migration from Quarriers to Dhurringile of a further 11 children. A report of a meeting of two Scottish Office officials with Quarriers about the children's migration was submitted to the Home Department's Chief Inspector on 12th October 1962.²²⁵⁴ The report mis-spelt Dhurringile (as 'Donngahile') and stated that 'Donngahile is not a farm!', raising questions about the extent of these officials' knowledge of Dhurringile as a receiving institution. In this meeting, the officials queried the appropriateness of sending children under the age of 12-13 years, given problems in the ability of younger children to give meaningful consent to their migration. The Superintendent of Quarriers stated that they had already decided to withdraw the proposed emigration of a seven and a half year old boy from this party. The officials also questioned why older children being put forward for migration, with or without parental consent, on the basis of having had little or no parental contact for many years had not been considered for boarding out or adoption. Quarriers' response to this was that it was often difficult to find appropriate foster-care and adoption placements for such older children. The officials also questioned the migration of a particular boy who was thought to be an 'awkward character' by Quarriers but for whom Quarriers believed that emigration could be 'the making of him'. It was suggested to Quarriers that his emigration should also be re-considered given that he had other siblings remaining in Scotland.²²⁵⁵ In the following March, Quarriers notified the Scottish Office that this proposed emigration party had now been reduced to six boys, one of whom was ten years of age, another eleven, one thirteen and the three others over fourteen.²²⁵⁶ The boy previously described as 'awkward' was still to be included in this party as Quarriers believed that, whilst he still had siblings remaining in this country, on-going contact with his family would not be beneficial for him. Given that both his older sister and an aunt had tried to

²²⁵³ See Minutes, 9th November 1961 and 14th December 1961, NRS: ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8027-8028.

²²⁵⁴ See Quarrier's Homes, Bridge of Weir, Proposed Emigration to Australia, NRS: ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8102-8103. One of these officials appears to have been based in the Scottish Education Department, and the other possibly in the Scottish Home Department.

²²⁵⁵ The importance of keeping siblings together was one of the underlying principles that appears to have underpinned the Department's decisions on applications for a child's migration made under s.17 of the 1948 Children Act (see NRS: ED11/410, SGV.001.003.8002).

²²⁵⁶ See Munro to Hassan, 1st March 1963, NRS: ED11/509, SGV.001.003.8105-8107.

provide care for members of the family,²²⁵⁷ it was not clear that this was necessarily the case, and this instance appears to reflect a wider approach within Quarriers in which emigration was prioritised over maintaining bonds with family members (on this, see also Appendix 3, 7.9-7.15). No further comments to Quarriers from the Scottish Home or Education Departments about this party are on file and in May 1963, five of them left Scotland for Dhurringile, the sixth having been withdrawn for medical reasons.²²⁵⁸

4.24 The fact that Quarriers and the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service were able to make preparations to send two parties of child migrants to Dhurringile in 1960 and 1961 without the knowledge of the Scottish Home Department could be seen as indicative of the weakness in a system of over-sight based on voluntary co-operation rather than stricter regulation. However, even when the Scottish Home and Education Departments became more involved in discussions with Quarriers about the migration of boys in 1962 weaknesses in the effectiveness of Government oversight continued. The fact that two boys migrated were under the age of 12 and the boy considered 'awkward' was still migrated, despite reservations expressed by Scottish Office officials, further indicates the limits of the Government's influence. There is no evidence that the Scottish Home Department had received any updated reports about conditions about Dhurringile since 1957 which would have given them a basis for understanding the conditions to which these children were being sent.

4.25 As a consequence of the highly infrequent nature of visits by representatives of the UK Government or Scottish Home Department to residential institutions accommodating child migrants, the UK Government and Scottish Home Department effectively devolved responsibility for regular inspections on to State child welfare and immigration officials, with reports and information from these being passed to the UK High Commission via the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration. This system was not an inherently efficient one as State officials did not always pass these reports on to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration (see 4.8). It also created the possibility for information that might reflect badly on child migration programmes not being passed to the UK High Commission by Australian officials. In some cases, for example, whilst copies of the highly critical child welfare inspection report of Castledare in July 1948 (see 3.12 above) and a report about

²²⁵⁷ QAR.001.008.6487, 6733-6734, 6737, 6739, 6745, 6779, 6802, 6811.

²²⁵⁸ See Munro to Scottish Education Department, 21st May 1963, NRS: ED11/509, p.103 on provided copy.

sexual activity between boys at Tardun in 1949²²⁵⁹ can be found in the Australian National Archives, these reports do not appear amongst those received by the UK High Commission in the UK National Archives.²²⁶⁰ Similarly, as noted above, in 1949 concern was expressed between the State officials in Western Australia and the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration about the extent to which boys at Bindoon were being used as manual labourers in construction work on the institution's buildings (see 4.8 above), with State officials explicitly expressing concern about consequences if the UK Government became aware of this.

4.26 Although officials in the UK Government and Scottish Home Department would not have been aware of such information being withheld, there would have been reasonable grounds, however, for doubt about whether inspections provided by Australian officials would have been a wholly reliable source.

4.27 In a letter to the Dominions Office, dated 13th December 1946, William Garnett continued an on-going discussion with officials in London about the proposed resumption of child migration to Catholic residential institutions in Western Australia. In this letter, Garnett commented that 'I can only speak from first-hand experience of Catholic institutions in Western Australia, and there is at least one of these which was used in the past to receive migrant children which should not be approved for use in the future unless it has been entirely re-organised: and one rather alarming fact was that the State Officer concerned with this particular work was a Catholic and could see nothing wrong in the institution'.²²⁶¹ Although not specifically named here, it seems reasonably likely that Garnett is referring to Castledare as this was the Christian Brothers' institution that he had singled out for the strongest criticism in his 1944 report and to which he indicated no further child migrants should be sent without substantial work having been undertaken to improve it.²²⁶² The State officer (from the State Lands Department) who accompanied Garnett on his 1944 inspection visits in Western Australia was Mr McAdam, who had previously produced positive reports of Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia in the wake of concerns raised by

²²⁵⁹ See Memo on inspection: St Mary's Agricultural School, Tardun, 2nd December 1949, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/41, pp.70-76, NAA-000000005.

²²⁶⁰ In the case of sexual activity at Tardun there is no evidence of the report cited in footnote 143 being passed on to the UK High Commission, but another report, written six months after this, was passed on to the UK High Commission (see Department of Immigration to Bass, 22nd June 1950, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/41, pp.53-56).

²²⁶¹ Garnett to Head, 13th December, 1946, TNA, DO35/1140/M1131/1, LEG.001.002.1360-1361.

²²⁶² Report on Farm Schools, 6th October 1944, TNA, DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, pp.242-244 on available copy.

Sir Ronald Cross (see 2.4 above).²²⁶³ Although Garnett was aware that McAdam was Catholic, he may not have been aware that McAdam had very active links with the Christian Brothers College in Perth.²²⁶⁴ Whether knowing of McAdam support of the Christian Brothers or not, Garnett was clearly doubtful about his impartiality, and aware of the risks of insufficiently rigorous reporting on institutions such as Castledare.

4.28 Garnett also had grounds for questioning whether inspections by Australian officials necessarily generated effective change. On 12th January 1951, he wrote to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration in response to a series of inspection reports on residential institutions in Western Australia which they had forwarded to him covering the period 1948-1950.²²⁶⁵ Garnett commented particularly on reports relating to Castledare in which he noted that critical comments made about staffing, dormitories and bathrooms at the institution had been followed by a positive report by a State officer in February 1949, 'by which time there could hardly have been any material changes'. He also noted that the issue of inadequate classroom accommodation, which had been first raised by reports in 1948, was again raised by a State report in March 1950, indicating that although the Commonwealth Government had been aware of this problem, no action had apparently been taken to address it. Noting the failure of staff at Castledare to address alterations to the accommodation that had been required of them, Garnett went on to comment that

My own impression after reading through these reports and with vivid recollection of what the place looked like when I last saw it is that the authorities responsible for Castledare have been very dilatory in effecting essential improvements, even assuming that the institution is capable of being adapted to meet modern requirements.²²⁶⁶

Garnett's criticisms made in this letter implied, a) that he was not convinced of the reliability of State inspection reports given that one report had made positive comments on conditions that a later report described as unsatisfactory, b) that there was insufficient evidence that action required in these reports had been enforced by Commonwealth or State officers, and c) that the general attitude of those with managerial responsibility for Castledare implied in these reports did not indicate that

²²⁶³ See Secretary, Prime Minister's Department to Department of Interior, 18th August 1944, National Archives of Australia, A461, M349/1/7, p.10.

²²⁶⁴ Obituary of McAdam, Annual of Christian Brothers College, Perth, 1946.

²²⁶⁵ Garnett to Nutt, 12th January 1951, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/47, pp.39-41, NAA-000000002.

²²⁶⁶ Garnett to Nutt, 12th January 1951, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/47, p.41, NAA-000000002.

they had undertaken prompt and effective action with regard to the welfare of the children in their care. Whilst commenting in this letter particularly in relation to the situation at Castledare, Garnett's criticisms of the consistency and effectiveness of the inspection regime at Castledare might have reasonably raised questions as to whether these shortcomings were limited only to inspections of that institution or reflected wider issues with the monitoring of residential institutions by Australian authorities more generally.²²⁶⁷

4.29 Further doubts about the reliability of inspection reports provided by Australian authorities were also raised by the private notes made by Anthony Rouse, when he accompanied R. H. Wheeler's inspection of residential institutions undertaken in the summer of 1956 (see 4.18). Rouse's notes confirmed strong criticisms that had been made by the Ross Fact-Finding Mission in the confidential appendices to their report, contradicted the more positive assessment of these institutions given in the report produced by the Australian Commonwealth Government and indicated aspects of the Australian inspections that had been glossed over in the Commonwealth Government's report on these.²²⁶⁸ In relation to St Joseph's Farm School at Bindoon, for example, Rouse supported the Mission's view of the unacceptable physical condition of the home, its isolation and the poor attitude of its management. By contrast, the Australian review required only minor physical changes to be made to the institution, focusing particularly on the need for a new wooden rack for boys to hang their towels on.²²⁶⁹ The UK High Commission, Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office were aware of these discrepancies, as well as the fact that the Australian Commonwealth Government had incorrectly claimed that Rouse had agreed the contents of their report.²²⁷⁰ Reflecting on the Australian Commonwealth Government's report, a Commonwealth Relations Office official commented in an internal memorandum that 'as we feared, the Australian authorities focus only on material things like bathrooms and carpets, and ignore what has been said about

²²⁶⁷ On this see also 'Memorandum submitted by Mr Dallas Paterson on emigration of children overseas and relating to his own experience as Principal of Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra', TNA: MH102/2251, LEG.001.006.2793, where Paterson notes that the small population and huge geographical expanse of Western Australia made it difficult for social services to be provided with the same level of training as existed in more densely populated areas.

²²⁶⁸ Mr Rouse's reports, TNA: BN29/1325, pp.43-57.

²²⁶⁹ Report on Bindoon by R.H. Wheeler, TNA: BN29/1325, LEG.001.004.3144-3146.

²²⁷⁰ Fraser to Johnson, 20th September 1956, TNA: BN29/1325, p.25 (Gordon Lynch, *Remembering Child Migration*, London: Bloomsbury, pp.74-75).

atmosphere and management'.²²⁷¹ This comment suggests that the Commonwealth Relations Office was well aware that the approach to inspections and reporting undertaken by Australian authorities was unlikely to provide information about the adequacy of selection, training, supervision and monitoring of staff or attention to the welfare of individual children.

4.30 Each of the examples given here in 4.27-4.29 could have raised reasonable doubts about the reliability, rigour and effectiveness of inspections of residential institutions accommodating child migrants by Australian State officials. We have seen, however, no evidence in any archival materials that we have reviewed that UK Government officials questioned whether they should implement their own regular inspections for residential institutions accommodating child migrants. Indeed, even after receiving the confidential appendices to the Ross report with its strong criticisms of the standards of care in a number of residential institutions, a Home Office official wrote to the Commonwealth Relations Office saying that

On the long view, we are convinced that for cogent practical as well as political reasons it is not possible for us to take any effective responsibility for judging the merits of individual institutions in Australia. This responsibility must rest with the Australian authorities, and the sooner they accept it the better.²²⁷²

The Home Office view was that the preferable course was to reach a general agreement with the Australian authorities about appropriate standards of care, and for the Australian authorities then to ensure that these standards were upheld. These comments about the need to establish agreed standards for inspections by Australian authorities were made nine years after the resumption of post-war child migration to Australia.

4.31 The example of the discrepancy between reports provided by Rouse and by the Australian Commonwealth Government could have raised questions at the time about whether the Australian authorities might report conditions in these residential institutions in a way that might be considered unrealistically positive by the standards of UK officials in order to ensure that the migration of unaccompanied children to Australia was not disrupted. Again, this does not seem to have changed the UK Government's reliance on reports provided by the Australian Commonwealth and State Governments. Indeed, in responding to incidents of sexual abuse (and

²²⁷¹ Stephen Constantine, 'The British Government, child welfare and child migration to Australia after 1945', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 30 (1), p.117.

²²⁷² Gwynn to Shannon, 12th July 1956, TNA: BN29/1325, LEG.001.004.3166-3167.

subsequent criminal convictions) involving boys from Dr Barnardo's Homes' Farm School at Mowbray Park, Picton, the Commonwealth Relations Office asked the UK High Commission to see if the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration could undertake checks to see that similar incidents had not occurred at other institutions accommodating child migrants.²²⁷³ The UK High Commission subsequently replied that Commonwealth Department of Immigration had declined to do this on the grounds that there was no obvious need to conduct investigations that would 'raise a lot of dust' with receiving institutions, that no sexual assaults had taken place at Picton itself (which appears not to have been the case)²²⁷⁴ and that it was possible to move on from the Picton case because it had not attracted much adverse publicity in the press.²²⁷⁵ Despite this, the UK High Commission expressed the hope that 'it may be...that the Australians have taken more notice of our reference to this matter than we have been allowed to know and intend by discreet means to emphasise the need for those in charge of children's institutions to be more than usually on guard'.²²⁷⁶ The Australian Commonwealth Government did not subsequently initiate any investigations of other institutions accommodating child migrants, and no independent review was initiated either by the UK Government.

²²⁷³ See Commonwealth Relations Office to Acting High Commissioner, 25th July 1958, DO35/10260, LEG.001.002.8082.

²²⁷⁴ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, Section 2.1 Barnardo's, paras. 21-22.

²²⁷⁵ UK High Commission to Johnson, 8th August 1958, TNA: DO35/10260, LEG.001.002.8078-8081.

²²⁷⁶ UK High Commission to Johnson, 8th August 1958, TNA: DO35/10260, p.68 on available copy.

Appendix 3: Monitoring practices and other related standards of voluntary organisations and local authorities sending post-war Scottish child migrants

Introduction

1.1 This Appendix summarises current knowledge about systems for monitoring the welfare of child migrants sent from Scotland by UK-based voluntary organisations and local authorities. There was never a legal requirement for sending organisations in the UK to maintain any checks on the well-being of children they had sent overseas, in part because regulations for the child migration work of voluntary societies allowed under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act were never introduced during the period in which child migration programmes were in operation (see 2.40 below). However, as this Appendix will go on to discuss, wider policy discussions of child migration involving the UK Government and some other professional and voluntary organisations recognised that some form of post-migration monitoring would be good practice. Despite this, monitoring practices varied considerably between different sending organisations and, in some cases, these fell below recommended standards.

1.2 Such monitoring systems could be expected to consist both of periodic checks of general conditions in overseas receiving institutions for child migrants as well as ways of checking the welfare and progress of individual child migrants. At the level of the UK Government (including the Scottish Home Department), monitoring consisted of periodic checks of conditions in receiving institutions. As Appendix 2 has indicated, these checks were rarely undertaken directly by representatives of the UK Government, or Scottish Home Department. In the case of children sent to Australia, reliance was placed on reports provided by Australian State and Commonwealth Government officials despite gaps or delays in the provision of this information and known short-comings in some of these reports. In the case of post-war child migrants sent to the Fairbridge Prince of Wales Farm School in Canada, no direct inspection was made by representatives of the UK Government before the decision was taken to send no more children there in 1948, and in the case of the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College, the only form of direct inspection for which archival

records have been found was an informal visit undertaken by John Moss in 1954.²²⁷⁷ As noted in Appendix 2, the Scottish Home Department only appears to have received reports about institutional conditions at Dhurringile and not at any of the other residential institutions in Australia to which child migrants from Scotland were sent. No evidence has been found of the Scottish Home Department having received any reports of institutional conditions at the Prince of Wales Farm School in Canada nor at the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College.

1.3 The UK Government, including the Scottish Home Department, undertook no individual monitoring of the welfare of children after their migration. Although, as discussed in Appendix 2, they received information about general conditions in receiving institutions to varying degrees, there is no evidence that these national government departments received any information about the progress or welfare of individual children either from inspection visits to residential institutions or from after-care reports. From 1957, the United Kingdom Government made access to such monitoring reports as sending organisations had for children they had migrated overseas part of the terms for the renewal of their funding under the Commonwealth Settlement Acts.

1.4 Child migrants sent from Scotland to New Zealand by the Royal Overseas League, in conjunction with the New Zealand Government, were therefore not subject to any form of on-going monitoring at all by the UK Government or Scottish Home Department because the New Zealand scheme did not operate on the basis of funding provided under the terms of the 1922 Empire Settlement Act. The Home Office and Commonwealth Relations Office also accepted the New Zealand Government's argument that s.33 regulations could not be applied to this scheme as it was one primarily run by the New Zealand Government itself (even though the Home Office were aware that the Royal Overseas League played an active role in the recruitment and selection of British children for this scheme and had previously had concerns about the League's standards).²²⁷⁸

²²⁷⁷ See 'Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College, Report by John Moss', 18th June 1954, TNA: MH102/1898, pp.20-23 on submitted file.

²²⁷⁸ The New Zealand Government set out this argument very briefly in a telegram to the Commonwealth Relations Office dated 11th June 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, p.35 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1675. The Home Office were aware of the role of the Royal Overseas League in relation to the New Zealand scheme and (reflecting concerns about the League's child migration work to Australia, see TNA: MH102/1560), a Home Office note observed that 'we are not altogether sure that in all cases they [the Royal Overseas League] fully realise the need of the children or the standards of

1.5 Given these limitations in the monitoring systems operated by the UK Government and Scottish Home Department, any monitoring undertaken by sending organisations would have potentially constituted an important additional safeguard for child migrants' welfare. As well as providing important information about conditions in receiving institutions, and the progress of individual children, which could have informed sending organisations' future policy decisions about their child migration work.

1.6 This Appendix will, first of all, provide a chronology of proposals for standards for monitoring child migrants' welfare by sending organisations that were put forward by Government, professional and voluntary bodies in the post-war period (section 2). The principle that continued monitoring of child migrants' welfare overseas was well-established by then,²²⁷⁹ but in reviewing the post-war context, it is possible to clarify the more immediate debates about policy and standards within which voluntary organisations were operating in that period. These proposals were developed by organisations based in England, but they are relevant for the work of the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry both because, in several instances, they were widely publicised and because in some cases they were certainly known to organisations whose headquarters were in England but whose migration work included children sent from Scotland. Sections 3-9 will then consider what is known about the nature and extent of such monitoring undertaken by Dr Barnardo's Homes; the Fairbridge Society; the Catholic Child Welfare Council, the Sisters of Nazareth, the Catholic Church in Scotland and the Good Shepherd Sisters; the Royal Overseas League; the

care they should be given' (Note, 1st June 1948, TNA: MH102/1564, p.1 on submitted copy, LEG.001.002.9765).

²²⁷⁹ For example, when considering initial proposals from the Child Emigration Society for the setting up of child migration to Western Australia, a civil servant at the Local Government Board commented, that if this was to be supported 'it would be necessary to consider whether any, and if so, what action must be taken for assuring ourselves and the Guardians [i.e. local Boards of Guardians] from time to time that the Society was fulfilling satisfactorily the obligations undertaken by them. It would probably be a comparatively easy matter to arrange for the receipt of reports by Western Australian Government inspectors as to the children who may be retained in the Farm School but reports on older children placed out with settlers might involve the making of special arrangements with the Western Australian Government or with other Commonwealth authorities on lines similar to those made with the Government of the Dominion of Canada.' It was later suggested by the Local Government Board that an arrangement in which annual reports on each child up to the age of 16 would be sufficient. (Notes, 17th August 1911, TNA: MH102/1400, part one, p.63, 69 on submitted copy). The Child Emigration Society duly noted that it was willing to provide any required on-going reports on child migrants' welfare for any Boards of Guardians who had put children in their care forward for migration (Whalley to Burns, 29th August 1911, TNA: MH102/1400, part one, p.68), and there are examples of these reports produced by the Pinjarra school at TNA: MH102/1400, part two, pp.9-19.

Church of Scotland and Quarriers; local authorities in Scotland; and the Salvation Army. These sections will indicate considerable variation in organisational practices.

1.7 Despite varying practices with regard to the individual monitoring of children that had been migrated overseas, it is not clear that the majority of sending organisations necessarily had a rigorous mechanism for producing effective reports on more general institutional conditions to which child migrants were being sent to. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration²²⁸⁰ in May 1951 recorded the following:

Miss Coleman [the representative for the National Children's Home] said it was very difficult to get information and facts – apart from propaganda material – regarding exact conditions in the receiving country, the kinds of lives children will live, etc. The Organisations concerned might have some idea of the conditions, but it was very difficult to persuade other people of the advantages of emigration. It was agreed that personal contact with those who knew the conditions overseas was the best approach in convincing others of the benefits overseas.²²⁸¹

This suggests that, for a number of sending organisations, an understanding of institutional conditions overseas may have been based on inter-personal contacts with representatives of receiving organisations in the context of a wider organisational affiliation and collaboration rather than more formalised inspections and reports.

1.8 On the basis of what is currently known about organisational knowledge and standards in relation to post-war child migration, it is important to recognise that sending organisations' monitoring of the welfare of children they had migrated was not a sufficient condition to safeguard those children from abuse. As will be noted below (4.1-4.8), the Fairbridge Society implemented a system of individual monitoring of its child migrants and, in the case of its farm schools in Australia, sought to intervene on issues of organisational standards in ways that sometimes brought the London society into conflict with the local organising committees in Australia. However, knowledge of abuse or poor standards and outcomes for children it had sent overseas, did not lead the Fairbridge Society always to take effective action. Knowledge of failings in the overseas care of child migrants gained

²²⁸⁰ See 2.29 below on the membership and formation of this Council.

²²⁸¹ Minutes of meeting of CVOCE, 1st May 1951, University of Liverpool Special Collections and Archives, Fairbridge Collection (henceforth ULSCA.F): H6/1/2/1, pt. I p.13 on provided copy, PRT.001.001.8146.

through formal and informal monitoring systems was only valuable when gathered in an organisational context in which there was a sustained willingness to take necessary and prompt action to address these. Given what is known about the concealed nature of many cases of sexual abuse, and the length of time that may pass before disclosures about such abuse are made, it is also clear that monitoring systems would not necessarily identify all forms of abuse to which child migrants were exposed overseas. However, given the number of contemporaneous disclosures about sexual abuse reportedly made in relation to Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, it cannot be assumed that such monitoring systems would have failed to detect any cases of abuse or lack of appropriate care experienced by child migrants.²²⁸²

1.9 At the same time, it is reasonable to suggest (in accordance with standards of the day) that maintaining an understanding of the welfare and progress of individual child migrants was a necessary element of sending organisations' ability to satisfy themselves about the conditions to which they were sending children as well as the effects of migration on those children's lives.

Proposed standards by Government, professional and voluntary organisations for on-going contact between sending organisations and children migrated under their auspices

Memorandum by the Provisional National Council for Mental Health (1945)

2.1 On 12th June, 1945, the Provisional National Council for Mental Health submitted a memorandum to the UK Government's Dominions Office, setting out a series of recommendations for appropriate standards for any resumption of child migration programmes.²²⁸³ The Provisional National Council was an umbrella organisation, incorporating the Central Association for Mental Welfare, the Child Guidance Council, and the National Council for Mental Hygiene and the Mental Health Emergency Committee, which provided a range of mental health services for children and adults.

²²⁸² See Gordon Lynch, *Possible collusion between individuals alleged to have sexually abused boys at four Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, 1947-1965: a secondary analysis of material collated by historical abuse inquiries*, (2019), <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

²²⁸³ See Niemeyer to Dixon, 12th June 1945, TNA: DO35/1133/M803/41, pp.10-21 on submitted copy, LEG.001.003.4298-4309.

2.2 Apparently aware of press reports of the possible resumption of child migration after the War, the Provisional National Committee drew on their experience of the effects of war-time evacuation schemes on children's mental health to set out recommended standards for the overseas placement and supervision of children (which they expected to take place mainly through foster care rather than residential institutions), on-going contact with children by sending organisations, approaches to the selection of children, and arrangements for their transportation overseas. The memorandum has particular significance as it drew current thinking about child-care standards to the attention of civil servants in the Dominions Office who were directly involved in subsequent discussions about the post-war resumption of child migration. It also demonstrates that officials in the Dominions Office might have been expected to have had some awareness of the need to bear in mind good practice in child welfare through their administration of child migration schemes, prior to when this became the focus of more extended discussion between these officials and the Home Office's Children's Department from August 1947 onwards.

2.2 The Provisional National Council's recommendations about on-going contact between sending organisations and children they had sent overseas were premised on the assumption that local child welfare departments in receiving countries would undertake regular supervision visits to monitor these children. As it was assumed that children would normally be placed in foster care, given that this was seen as a preferential form of care to that provided by residential institutions (unless an older child migrant specifically requested an institutional placement), the Provisional National Council expected such supervision contacts to be attentive to the welfare of the individual child and the suitability of a particular foster home for them.

2.3 In addition to such individual supervision, the Provisional National Council also recommended that on-going contact between the UK office of the sending organisation and its overseas child migrants was necessary:

The maintaining of a central office in this country [i.e. the United Kingdom] (at least for some time), with suitable personnel is also important. Experience has shown that the staff need not be a large one. (Probably one trained and experienced social worker to several hundreds of children). Copies of the records of the children would be kept at this office and the staff would act as a link between the parents and relatives of the home country and the children and foster parents and social workers in the country to which they have gone. Experience has shown the value of such an arrangement in existing evacuation schemes. Anxious or puzzled parents and friends are glad to avail themselves of expert help in times of need and appreciate the tangible proof this office

represents that their children's interests are watched by those responsible for sending them abroad. The supervisors can refer matters of difficulty to this office and the children themselves find it reassuring to have this link with the home country, particularly if parents or relatives fail them for any reason or during the inevitable period of unsettlement and homesickness after the initial period of excitement of arrival and settling in is over.²²⁸⁴

2.4 Although the model envisaged by the Provisional Council of child migrants being placed with foster parents overseas and receiving regular, individual monitoring from overseas social workers, did not fit the pattern experienced by most post-war UK child migrants, some wider underpinning principles can be identified. The sending organisation, even if not undertaking its own independent overseas monitoring of children, was seen as having an on-going responsibility to both child migrants and their relatives remaining in the United Kingdom. Receiving regular information about individual child migrants' welfare was seen as an integral part of discharging this responsibility.

Memorandum by the Home Office Children's Department (September 1947)

2.5 During the summer of 1947, staff in the Home Office Children's Department became aware of specific proposals to resume child migration to Australia through contact with both the Commonwealth Relations Office and Australia House, as well as through discussions with the Fairbridge Society about appropriate standards for this work. An internal memorandum circulated within the Children's Department in June 1947 set out some initial thoughts about the Department's position with regard to child migration work. Whilst noting strategic reasons for and against the policy of child migration, the memorandum went on to advocate an approach that was sensitive to the individual needs of the child and to the significant effects that migration could have on a child's life:

I feel the only practical solution on emigration is to consider each child's particular position without undue regard for national and wider considerations, on the lines that where a child has absolutely no relations in this country and no prospect of being adopted or boarded out, that is, he is likely to remain an institution child all his life and have only himself to rely on and work for when he is grown up, we should not prevent emigration, even where it means simply transfer to an institution in another country [to which a senior colleague, Mary Rosling, added a note in the margins, 'but this would seem to be a hypothetical

²²⁸⁴ See Niemeyer to Dixon, 12th June 1945, TNA: DO35/1133/M803/41, pp.17-18 on submitted copy, LEG.001.003.4305-4306.

case, for if an "institution" is fit for migration he should be fit for boarding out in this country']. In such a case there would not seem to be any harm in his emigrating, but, even so, we should be satisfied that he will be properly looked after and have an opportunity of learning a trade which will support him when he leaves the Home. The child, of course, must himself be willing to emigrate, but it is very doubtful what importance can be attached to a child's statement of his willingness to emigrate. He can hardly have sufficient knowledge or judgment to take a reasoned decision on his own future, and is, in all probability, influenced by pictures and stories of life in, say, Australia, which may be heavily glamourized. But where a child in an Institution has a family or relatives to whom he might be able to return, or a chance of being adopted or boarded out in this country, we should discourage emigration, particularly if it would be simply emigration to a Home or Institution. It might, in fact, be a question of trying to balance possible material and physical benefits to be obtained from life in Australia while remaining an Institution child, against the possibility of finding a home of his own in the perhaps narrower physical limits of this country. I think it would be wrong to agree to the emigration of a child for whom there were prospects of a home life of his own in Britain, even if the prospects are remote at the time of the application for his emigration, and even if that home life could never be as high materially as possible institutional care in Australia. Again, I think it is not right to approve of the emigration of children whose parents do not want them to go. Admittedly the homes from which the children have come may be bad, and the prospects of improvement remote, but to remove the children abroad may well remove also the only encouragement to the parents to make efforts to better themselves and their home conditions. Especial care must be taken where the child is very young and has been away from his own home for only a short period. In such a case a decision should be postponed for some years...Again, we should surely not break up brothers and sisters by emigrating some and not others. On the whole, I think we should tend to be anti-emigration except where we can be fully satisfied that the child can only gain by it.²²⁸⁵

2.6 Discussions took place between the Children's Department and Fairbridge Society later that summer about the latter's concerns about standards of management at its farm school at Pinjarra. During these discussions, it was suggested that the Children's Department prepare a memorandum setting out what standards might be expected of child migration programmes in the light of good standards of child-care in the United Kingdom. The final version of this document was agreed in September 1947. Although initially prepared with the use of the

²²⁸⁵ Memorandum by Miss Maxwell, 26th June, 1947, TNA: MH102/1553, pp.13-14 on submitted copy, LEG.001.002.9666-9667.

Fairbridge Society in mind, it was suggested that this would be circulated more generally to other interested organisations in Australia.

2.7 Reflecting the Children's Department's sense of caution about the value of child migration, expressed in the internal memorandum discussed above, the September memorandum began by directly quoting key principles of children's out-of-home care identified within the Curtis report²²⁸⁶:

- (i) Affection and personal interest; understanding of his [the child's] defects; care for his future; respect for his personality and regard for his self esteem.
- (ii) Stability; the feeling that he can expect to remain with those who will continue to care for him till he goes out into the world on his own feet.
- (iii) Opportunity of making the best of his ability and aptitudes, whatever they may be, as such opportunity is made available to the child in the normal home.
- (iv) A share of the common life of a small group of people in a homely environment....

The memorandum continued:

It follows from this conception of the kind of care which should be given to a deprived child and the prospect of its realisation in this country that it would be difficult to justify proposals to emigrate deprived children unless the Societies or Homes to which they go are willing and able to provide care and opportunity on the same level.²²⁸⁷

2.8 With these standards of care in mind, the memorandum was clear that UK sending organisations had an on-going responsibility for monitoring and safeguarding the welfare and progress of children they had sent overseas:

Home Office responsibility towards deprived children in this country would not allow the Department to regard with equanimity any scheme of emigration in which the care of the child passed entirely out of the hands of the parent organisation in this country, which had had the responsibility of selecting the child and arranging his emigration, and in whose care he had previously been. The Organisation arranging emigration must retain a continuing responsibility for children whom it has sent overseas, as the responsible agent, and the children's link with this country until they are independent. The parent

²²⁸⁶ See *Care of Children Committee Report*, para. 427.

²²⁸⁷ 'Emigration of children who have been deprived of a normal home life', NAA: K403, W59/63, p.17, NAA-000000027.

Organisation must be able to ensure that the children continue to be cared for in the country of emigration in a way of which they can approve and that the standards of care are not lower than would be accepted by them for children still in their care in this country. Continuing responsibility is also necessary to ensure that the care given is suitable to the children whom they are selecting and sending overseas and that their emigration is likely to be successful. It is of first importance that the Organisation arranging emigration should be responsible for general policy in regard to the training and care of children at the Homes which they administer but within this framework the Homes should be free to develop according to the conditions of the area in which they are placed...

In order to ensure that the parent Organisation can in fact carry out its continuing responsibility and ascertain that its aims and policy are being carried out overseas some organised contact between the headquarters and the Homes overseas is necessary. A liaison officer with a thorough knowledge and understanding of the needs of deprived children should be appointed by the headquarters Organisation to pay regular visits to the Homes overseas while remaining in touch with the Society in this country...

High standards of care can be achieved and maintained only by the employment at the Homes or farm Schools of staff of good calibre. All persons concerned in the running of the Homes, particularly those in immediate charge of the children should be most carefully selected...The Principal of the Home or Farm School is, of course, the most important appointment. The attitude of the other staff and the whole tone of the Home or School is likely to be influenced by the attitude and character of the Principal. Because of the importance of this appointment it is very desirable that the headquarters Organisation should have final responsibility for the appointment but selection should be close consultation with the Local Committee or Board of Governors.²²⁸⁸

2.9 Having seen a copy of this memorandum, the Commonwealth Relations Office advised Walter Garnett, at the UK High Commission in Canberra, to circulate it to interested parties in Australia as a 'departmental, not a government, statement of views'.²²⁸⁹ In doing so, the Commonwealth Relations Office hoped to avoid the memorandum being presented to the London office of the Fairbridge Society as constituting "'instructions" from the U.K. Government', given its doubts about attempts by the Fairbridge Society in London to exert more control over institutions

²²⁸⁸ 'Emigration Of children who have been deprived of a normal home life', NAA: K403, W59/63, pp.17-18. NAA-000000027.

²²⁸⁹ Costley-White to Garnett, 2nd October 1947, TNA: MH102/1403, pp.14-15 on submitted copy, LEG.001.002.9422-9423.

in Australia.²²⁹⁰ Garnett duly forwarded the memorandum on to the Secretary of the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration, Tasman Heyes, commenting that it set out the views of the Home Office on the issue of child migration but was 'a departmental expression of views and is not to be taken as a statement of the views of the United Kingdom Government'.²²⁹¹ The approach taken by the Commonwealth Relations Office and Garnett can be seen in the wider context of the political and legal autonomy for British overseas Dominions established through the 1931 Statute of Westminster, and the sensitivity that some policy-makers felt in the wake of this about giving the impression of still seeking to control the work of governments or other organisations in the Dominions. Heyes then forwarded multiple copies of this memorandum to Commonwealth and State Immigration officials in Western Australia for circulation to all organisations in that State interested in child migration.²²⁹² Given that Fairbridge were already aware of this memorandum, the other organisations to which this circular was likely to have been sent would have included the Catholic Episcopal Migration and Welfare Association (which organised Catholic child migration for Western Australia and was to become a constituent member of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee) and possibly also the Sisters of Nazareth and the Sisters of Mercy. It is not clear, at this point, if the Home Office Children's Department circulated this memorandum to other UK-based sending organisations.

2.10 In a subsequent letter to the Commonwealth Relations Office, Walter Garnett expressed some criticisms about this Children's Department memorandum.²²⁹³ According to Garnett the memorandum demonstrated a limited understanding of the different kinds of relationship that sending organisations had with children prior to their migration, as well as what he considered to be an unwarranted assumption that standards of child-care in Australia were not already at the level recommended by the Curtis Committee. In this respect, Garnett felt that if it were presented without sufficient sensitivity to those receiving child migrants in Australia, 'those who have devoted many years to this problem on the spot might not take it very kindly'.²²⁹⁴ Whilst expressing reservations about the degree of control that the memorandum proposed sending organisations should have over operational matters in Australian

²²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

²²⁹¹ Garnett to Heyes, 18th October, 1947, NAA: K403, W59/63, p.16, NAA-000000059.

²²⁹² See Heyes to Commonwealth Migration Officer, 3rd December 1947, NAA: K403, W59/63, p.15.

²²⁹³ Garnett to Costley-White, 17th November 1947, TNA: MH102/1403, pp.8-9 on submitted copy, LEG.001.002.9416-9417.

²²⁹⁴ Garnett to Costley-White, 17th November 1947, TNA: MH102/1403, pp.8-9 on submitted copy,

institutions, Garnett nevertheless accepted the principle that 'the selecting authority is entitled to be satisfied that the children are properly cared for'.²²⁹⁵

2.11 Given evidence presented in Appendix 2 about the Home Office's subsequent approval of receiving institutions on the basis of limited information in reports from Australian officials, it is reasonable to suggest that the Home Office went on to approve institutions in Australia for receiving child migrants without having sufficiently detailed information to know whether standards advocated in its September 1947 memorandum were being upheld.

Discussion of draft regulations under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act in the Home Office's Advisory Council on Child-Care (1949-1954)

2.12 One of the recommendations made by the Curtis Report was that an Advisory Council on Child Care be established for the Home Office to ensure that its staff were both able to receive advice on current policy issues and be made aware of current developments in thinking about child-care.²²⁹⁶ A similar Advisory Council was also established to advise the Scottish Home Department. The Home Office Advisory Council was intended to include individuals with a range of experience and knowledge of contemporary child-care issues and standards. Its initial membership included specialists in child health, psychiatry, and education, representatives of local authority children's committees and others with established interests in child welfare (including Lady Allen of Hurtwood whose campaigning work had led to the establishment of the Curtis Committee and Leila Rendel, founder of the Caldecott Community).

2.13 One of the first policy issues on which the Advisory Council on Child Care was consulted was the draft regulations for the child migration work of voluntary organisations under s.33 of the Children Act.²²⁹⁷ The Council's discussion of these issues took place in a context in which public concerns had already been raised about the post-war resumption of child migration. The Liberal Party Organisation Committee on the Curtis Report published *Nobody's Children: A Report on the Care of Children Deprived of Normal Home-Lives* in May, 1947.²²⁹⁸ Part summary and part commentary of the Curtis report, *Nobody's Children* accepted the view of the Curtis

²²⁹⁵ Garnett to Costley-White, 17th November 1947, TNA: MH102/1403, pp.8-9 on submitted copy.

²²⁹⁶ *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, para. 434.

²²⁹⁷ See outline agenda for the first meeting of the Advisory Council, drafted December 1948, TNA: MH102/1503, pp.17-18 on submitted copy.

²²⁹⁸ A copy of this report is submitted in TNA: MH102/1562, pp.11-45, LEG.001.002.9730-9764.

Committee that migration might be appropriate for some children under particular circumstances. However, it claimed that 'deplorable notions of child care'²²⁹⁹ still persisted in some organisations involved in sending and receiving child migrants, and argued that no child should be emigrated if they had parents able to make reasonable provision for them in this country. It condemned attempts to tempt parents into giving their child over to migration on the basis of unrealistically optimistic pictures of the life that might be possible for them overseas. It also argued that no child should be allowed to be emigrated unless it was in the clear interests of that particular child and that good standards of care, staffing and training would be provided.²³⁰⁰ Children sent overseas should have contact with someone equivalent to a Children's Officer and contact with family remaining in the United Kingdom should be supported. On the basis of concerns that old attitudes might still prevail in child migration work, *Nobody's Children* recommended that an inter-governmental inquiry be set up specifically to consider the placement of child migrants in work, the after-care provided to them and the management of compulsory savings schemes for child migrants by receiving organisations.²³⁰¹ On the basis of the report, the Women's Liberal Federation wrote to the Home Secretary to inform him that it had passed a motion calling for an inter-Governmental Commission of Enquiry to 'examine the whole system of the emigration of deprived children to British Dominions and overseas.'²³⁰² This call was also endorsed by the Young Women's Christian Association of Great Britain,²³⁰³ and perhaps particularly significantly for child-care professionals, by the British Federation of Social Workers, whose President, Chair and Secretary wrote to the letters-page of *The Times* commenting that they had

reason to think that the practices of the various agencies for the migration of children overseas vary and that their methods of selection of children, their

²²⁹⁹ *Nobody's Children*, TNA: MH102/1562, p.39, LEG.001.002.9758.

²³⁰⁰ Critical reference is made to the opening up of a new recruitment office by one child migration organisation in the North-East of England apparently anticipating an economic down-turn in the region. This probably refers to the expansion of the Fairbridge Society's work in Newcastle.

²³⁰¹ The fact that the report identified these as specific concerns suggests that it may have been aware of criticisms of Fairbridge's Pinjarra Farm School made by Miss Tempe Woods, of which Fairbridge and the Dominions Office were also aware (see Green to Wiseman with enclosures, 21st April 1944, and Tempe Woods to Wiseman with enclosures, 5th April 1945, TNA: DO35/1330).

²³⁰² Women's Liberal Federation to Chuter Ede, 27th April 1948, TNA: MH102/1562, pp.9-10 on submitted copy, LEG.001.002.9728-9729.

²³⁰³ Curwen to Chuter Ede, 11th May 1948, TNA: MH102/1562, p.8 on submitted copy, LEG001.002.9727.

welfare, education, training and after care in the receiving countries are not always of a sufficiently high standard.²³⁰⁴

2.14 The proposed inter-governmental commission was not, however, established. John Ross (the director of the Home Office Children's Department) and Mary Rosling took the view that such a commission would not serve a productive purpose as it would merely rehearse instances of bad practice in child migration work that anyone familiar with the field would already be aware of. Negative publicity arising from such a commission, it was suggested, might have the effect of discouraging the migration of children who might genuinely benefit from it. Most pertinently, though, the Children's Department took the view that future child migration work would fall under the powers of the Secretary of State to be developed under the recently passed Children Act and that these would ensure good standards of care for child migrants. As Rosling put it in a letter to the Commonwealth Relations Office:

All emigration societies must now be aware that whatever has happened in the past there must be proper supervision and provision now and in the future for the children's welfare and that regulations will be found to secure this under the Children's Act. In the meantime every possible step is being taken by the Home Office, in conjunction with the Commonwealth Relationship Office, to investigate the arrangements at present being made and to ensure that the Society concerned has the right aims and the staff and funds to carry them out before any consent is given to the emigration of children for whom the Secretary of State is responsible. Discussions have been held with a number of emigration societies and their future plans have been discussed with them.²³⁰⁵

2.15 The subject of the drafting of regulations for the migration of children by voluntary societies under s.33 of the Children Act was treated as a matter of priority by the Advisory Council at its first meeting on 19th January 1949.²³⁰⁶ Mr Kirkpatrick, a Council member who was also a member of the senior management of Dr Barnardo's Homes, gave a short overview of lessons from Barnardo's long involvement in child migration work. These included both the importance of measures to bring back children who did not settle overseas and of regarding the work of overseas organisations as an extension of the work of those organisations in the United Kingdom, both of which suggested the need for close on-going contact between

²³⁰⁴ *The Times*, 24th March 1948, p.5, CMT.001.001.0442.

²³⁰⁵ Rosling to Cox, 28th September 1948, TNA: MH102/1562, p.5 on submitted copy, LEG.001.002.9724.

²³⁰⁶ See minutes of first meeting of Advisory Council, 19th January 1949, TNA: MH102/1761, pp.15-20 on submitted copy, INQ-000000001.

sending organisations and receiving institutions overseas. The Council decided, on the basis of this initial discussion, that it required more information about the current practice and experience of sending organisations in order to be able to have a more informed view on the content of future regulations. One issue on which the Council sought specific information was on the arrangements for continued care for child migrants overseas: 'Does the emigration organisation in England retain responsibility for care? If not, what arrangements are made?'²³⁰⁷

2.16 The Home Office Children's Department provided a six-page document on 'Questions for consideration in connection with the emigration of children' for discussion at the Advisory Council's third meeting on 23rd March 1949.²³⁰⁸ Whilst building on a number of principles previously set out in the Department's September 1947 memorandum, this document demonstrated a far more detailed understanding of variations and standards in practices of sending and receiving organisations than that earlier document. Whilst setting out a range of issues on which good standards should be sought (including the selection, preparation, accommodation, training and after-care of child migrants), the document set out a number of areas in which close and on-going communication between the sending organisations and receiving institutions or agencies overseas would be necessary:

(i) Emigration of children should be undertaken only by organisations which are financially sound, adequately staffed, and able to supervise the progress of the children overseas and their aftercare to independent life. (para. 1(a))

(ii) It is suggested that increasing use should be made as escorts of the staff with whom the children will live while overseas, either newly trained and appointed staff acting as housemothers and fathers in the pre-emigration home and continuing in the same capacity overseas, or established staff who have returned to this country for refresher courses and would be able to maintain contact with the children overseas. The value of the latter in the pre-emigration home is obvious. (para. 16)²³⁰⁹

²³⁰⁷ See note to Mr Prestige, 25th January 1949, TNA: MH102/1762, p.7 on submitted copy, INQ-000000004. Further notes and correspondence on the Children's Department's collation of this information from sending organisations in February 1949 is held on TNA: MH102/2328.

²³⁰⁸ Note by the Home Office on questions for consideration in connection with the emigration of children, TNA: MH102/1763, pp.10-15 on submitted copy, INQ-000000002.

²³⁰⁹ The only sending organisations known to have adopted this approach as a matter of policy appears to have been the National Children's Home and Dr Barnardo's Homes. In the case of the National Children's Home, critical reports of receiving institutions by staff who had accompanied child migrants to Australia and then remained attached to those institutions played an important role in the charity's decision to move away from child migration work. Mr Kirkpatrick reported to a later meeting

(iii) Emigration organisations should be required to review their accommodation and to consider what action should be taken to bring it up to the standards not generally accepted in this country. It will probably be found that, generally, the Homes which are built on the cottage home principle will need a considerable reduction of the number of children and some additional facilities within the cottages if they are to house children of mixed sexes. Where, as in some cases, the Homes are of an institutional type, arrangements should be made for dividing the children into small groups within their premises. Much better accommodation for the housemother staff will usually be required in addition. In countries where the mixing of sexes is impracticable at the present time owing to housing difficulties, the arrangements within the home should permit of the fullest possible mixing of children for hobbies and recreation. (para. 18)

(iv) Although most organisations claim that every opportunity is given to children to develop special aptitudes and interests, it is clear that it is by no means certain that the aptitudes will be discovered: in fact the number of children going on to higher education or special training is in some cases disturbingly small. Judging from reports from people outside the Homes, there is unhappily some reasons to think that emigration has not yet outgrown its original purpose in the supply of needed labour...This danger is all the greater in the case of those organisations which leave the work of employment finding to the head of the school or to the local committee of managers, as there may be a tendency to satisfy local needs...There are difficulties in providing university and other special training since this will usually entail residence a long way from the school. While no doubt use will be made of hostels run by such bodies as the W.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., G.F.S., etc., where they exist, these are not numerous. It appears that little can be done unless emigration organisations themselves meet the need. This might best be done by the provision of hostels in University and other towns by the larger organisations which would cater for any emigrant children requiring such help...The whole question of the facilities for training and employment requires re-examination by the organisations, and much more joint effort if the right provision is to be made. (paras 20-23)

(v) Where children go directly to foster-homes, it is understood that, once the Australian authorities have approved the foster-home, they would not normally visit the home further, unless there were special reason for doing so. It seems clear, therefore, that if children are to be properly supervised and helped,

of the Advisory Council that it was Dr Barnardo's Homes' policy that children selected for migration would spend a year being assessed and prepared in pre-emigration homes in the UK and to form relationships with staff who would then escort them on their trip overseas and remain with them for three months after their arrival (see TNA: MH102/1765, pp.16-17 on submitted copy, INQ-000000005). It is not clear how this policy would have operated as Dr Barnardo's Homes opened up more residential homes for children in New South Wales.

adequate provision must be made by the organisation responsible for them.
(para. 27)

(vi) Most organisations accept the principle that responsibility for their children should continue until they are 21, and some organisations would undoubtedly assist an old girl or boy even longer if he needed help. But the application of the principle depends largely on the adequacy of aftercare and until this is better organised, it is possible that the need of children for help will never be known.
(para. 28)

(vii) Similarly those who were not proving a success as emigrants might not be brought to light. Where these are known the larger organisations would certainly return them to this country, but some of the smaller organisations are reluctant to incur the expense and are inclined to take the line that having been taken overseas the child must remain there however unsuitable and unhappy. Judging by the number of adults who are recorded in the press as returning from emigration, there is opportunity for disappointment and it is suggested that some machinery should be devised to ensure that in a reasonable case the parent organisation should assume responsibility for the child's return. (para. 29)

(viii) It is usual for the larger organisations to send regular reports on children in their homes to local authorities, voluntary society or parents – whoever was responsible for sponsoring the child's emigration. Such reports as have been seen show that there is room for great improvement in the whole matter of record keeping during the period of the child's supervision overseas. (para. 34)

(ix) In order to ensure that the parent organisation can in fact carry out its continuing responsibility and ascertain that its aims and policy are being applied overseas, some organised contact between the headquarters and the Homes overseas is necessary. A liaison officer with a thorough knowledge and understanding of the needs of deprived children should be appointed by the headquarters organisation to pay regular visits to the Homes overseas while remaining in close touch with the Society in this country. (para. 35)

(x) Heads of Homes are often sent out from this country, whilst it is more usual to select subordinate staff overseas...The head of the Home is, of course, a most important appointment. The attitude of the other staff and the whole tone of the Home or School is likely to be influenced by the character and attitude of the Head. Because of the importance of this appointment, it is very desirable that the headquarters organisation should have full responsibility for the appointment in corporation with the local committee or board of governors.
(para. 37)

(xi) It is suggested that use might be made of emigration organisations (as voluntary organisations) of the facilities provided by the Central Training Council

in Child Care, both in the employment for work overseas of trained housemothers and fathers to whom the prospect of emigration appeals and in the return to this country (possibly in connection with a period of furlough) of established staff for full courses or refresher courses. (para. 38)

Whilst emphasising several ways in which child migration work needed to be improved, the document therefore identified a number of reasons why sending organisations needed to maintain active and close communication with receiving institutions/agencies overseas. Such contact was seen as necessary in order to ensure that appropriate individual monitoring and support for child migrants took place (i, v, vi, vii, viii), and that appropriate standards and provisions were being developed and maintained more generally for children they had migrated (ii, iv, vi, ix, x). Specific mechanisms were also suggested to encourage this, including the movement of staff between the UK and Australia, the appointment of liaison officers and the structural oversight of policy and senior appointments in receiving institutions (ii, ix, x, xi).

2.17 The document was the subject of some discussion at the Advisory Council's third meeting, but as it appeared as a later item on the agenda, the Council appear to have agreed views only on the first two paragraphs of the document by the conclusion of that meeting.²³¹⁰

2.18 As the Council continued to focus primarily on the issue of reception centres for children in need of out-of-home care, the document on questions concerning the emigration of children was not discussed at the Council's fourth meeting on 11th May, 1949.²³¹¹

2.19 By the time of the Council's fifth meeting on 15th June 1949, Philip Dingle, appointed to the Council on the basis of his role as Town Clerk of Manchester, presented his own paper on child emigration for discussion by the Council. As he put it in the meeting, this was partly in an attempt to demonstrate the difficulty in the Council forming a view on these issues without further information.²³¹² The paper itself proposed a series of measures that could potentially be introduced under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act, which presumed a high degree of regulation of the child migration work of voluntary societies. These included the compulsory registration of

²³¹⁰ Minutes of third meeting of Advisory Council, 23rd March 1949, TNA: MH102/1763, pp.18-20 on submitted copy, INQ-000000002.

²³¹¹ Minutes of fourth meeting of Advisory Council, 11th May 1949, TNA: MH102/1764, pp.21-23 on submitted copy.

²³¹² Paper by Mr Dingle on regulations controlling emigration by voluntary organisations, TNA: MH102/1765, pp.3-4 on submitted copy, INQ-000000005.

voluntary societies with the Secretary of State for the purposes of child migration work (with only well-managed organisations with suitably trained staff approved), the prohibition of advertising to raise funds for child migration, the prohibition of the migration of children to any country not approved by the Secretary of State, the requirement for voluntary societies only to migrate a child in their care with the approval of the relevant local authority, the development of a national register to record details of all children migrated overseas, ensuring that suitable arrangements were made by the sending organisations with overseas governments so that standards of care recommended by the Curtis report were upheld, and that periodic reports on conditions in receiving institutions should be made available to the Secretary of State. Although not addressing the specific responsibilities of sending organisations to maintain on-going oversight of individual children and receiving institutions, Dingle's emphasis on high standards of regulation for child migration work (including his proposal that 'even more drastic regulations' might be needed temporarily to protect children until more detailed measures could be set in place) suggested that he did not contest the broad emphasis on sending organisations' on-going responsibilities set out in the Home Office's paper previously submitted to the Council in March.

2.20 A number of proposals made in Dingle's paper were discussed by the Council.²³¹³ The emerging view, supported by John Ross, was that whilst it would not be possible for s.33 regulations to prohibit all child migration, they could prevent child migration work by a particular organisation or under particular circumstances. As such it would be possible for the general policies and procedures of individual voluntary organisations to be subject to approval by the Secretary of State, which would then make the consent of the Secretary of State for individual cases of child migration by that organisation unnecessary.²³¹⁴ Migration of a child by a voluntary organisation through arrangements not approved by the Secretary of State would therefore be prohibited. The Council also took the view that high standards should be maintained in obtaining parental consent for the migration of a child by a

²³¹³ Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Advisory Council, 15th June 1949, TNA: MH102/1765, pp.6-10 on submitted copy, INQ-000000005.

²³¹⁴ It may be worth noting that Mr Kirkpatrick, representing Dr Barnardo's Homes, indicated that he would be willing to work within a system in which individual consent from the Secretary of State to the migration of children by voluntary societies would be required. Whilst Lady Allen protested that the Home Secretary had assured comparable controls would be in place for the emigration of children by local authorities and voluntary societies, John Ross argued that this need not necessarily mean that individual consent would be required across all these cases and general controls over arrangements made by voluntary societies would be sufficient.

voluntary society and that these should be comparable to those expected for the Secretary of State consent to the migration of a child by a local authority. High standards of selection processes for child migrants, to be carried out by trained staff, were also agreed to be a necessary element of standards that should be expected under s.33 regulations. The responsibility of sending organisations to keep initial sponsors of a child's migration (including local authorities) briefed on the child's progress overseas was also accepted.

2.21 The Council's sixth meeting on 6th July, 1949, returned more substantially to issues relating to a sending organisation's on-going responsibilities to children it had emigrated.²³¹⁵ Concerns with standards of care overseas were noted, with risks being seen as associated both with the placement of children with foster-carers in remote areas where on-going supervision was difficult and in isolated residential institutions offering a limited range of training opportunities. Voluntary organisations were to be encouraged to develop the model of scattered homes in urban areas in preference to isolated 'group communities' in rural areas. Effective after-care was again seen as difficult across large geographical areas, and should be undertaken either by the sending organisation or by a relevant State authority. Some involvement in the sending organisation for the after-care of the child was seen as desirable given that 'the emigrating society...was ultimately responsible for the welfare of the child'.²³¹⁶ The expectations on sending organisations might also depend on the degree of supervisory oversight offered by State authorities in the country receiving the child migrant, which it was felt 'varied at present in extent and in quality',²³¹⁷ although such State supervision appears to have been seen as much as an additional check on voluntary organisations' work overseas than divesting sending organisations of any on-going responsibility for children they had migrated. The lack of trained workers in receiving countries was a source of concern to the Council, particularly with regard to the quality of after-care for child migrants, and the Council felt that sending organisations should be encouraged 'to send their overseas staff'²³¹⁸ to the UK to be trained. Although it was not realistic to expect voluntary organisations only to employ trained staff overseas at present, they should be made aware that this would

²³¹⁵ Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Advisory Council, 6th July 1949, TNA: MH102/1765, pp.15-18 on submitted copy, INQ-000000005. Although the minutes of this meeting indicate some clear indications of views from the Council, John Ross later described the Council's discussion of principles for draft s.33 regulations in the spring and summer of 1949 as having been 'somewhat inconclusively' conducted (TNA: MH102/2038, p.9).

²³¹⁶ Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Advisory Council, 6th July 1949, TNA: MH102/1765, p.16.

²³¹⁷ Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Advisory Council, 6th July 1949, TNA: MH102/1765, p.16.

²³¹⁸ Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Advisory Council, 6th July 1949, TNA: MH102/1765, p.17.

be expected of them in the future and that they should be recommended to make use of courses provided through the Central Training Council in Child Care for house-parents and after-care workers. Whilst the Council took the view that the appointment of liaison officers to maintain contact between the sending organisation in this country and 'its representatives overseas', and to inspect and report on the work being done overseas, could not be a formal requirement within s.33 regulations, such appointments would nevertheless be recommended to sending organisations. The Council's discussion of these issues again appears to assume a close working relationship and on-going communication between sending and receiving organisations, with the minutes of this meeting more than once referring to the staff of receiving organisations as the 'overseas representatives' of sending organisations. As noted in relation to the Home Office's March paper to the Council (2.16), the fact that conditions for the care and supervision of child migrants overseas were seen as being in need of improvement in various regards indicated that sending organisations needed to play an active role in monitoring the welfare of child migrants and to ensure that standards were being appropriately raised.

2.22 Whilst John Ross had indicated that a memorandum setting out draft s.33 regulations would be brought back for further discussion by the Council, this did not take place until the Advisory Council's twenty-third meeting on 24th January 1952.²³¹⁹ In the intervening period, the Women's Group on Public Welfare had published its own report on *Child Emigration* in the spring of 1951 which addressed the same areas of concern as had been already raised in the Home Office note of March 1949, namely the selection and preparation of child migrants, transfer for records, escorts and the journey overseas, standards of care in overseas institutions, training and after-care. *Child Emigration* endorsed the underpinning principle that 'no matter what the formal arrangements may be, these British committees who make the promises to the child emigrant and its parents cannot divest themselves of

²³¹⁹ Minutes of the twenty-third meeting of the Advisory Council, 24th January 1952, TNA: MH102/1784, pp.25-26 on submitted copy, INQ-000000003. The delay in the implementation of the s.33 regulations was also the subject of a Parliamentary question to which the Home Secretary replied, on 26th April 1951, that they were still in the process of being produced (TNA: MH102/2045, on submitted copy). It appears that the drafting of the regulations were, in part, delayed by staff shortages and illness (See for example, NRS: ED11/306, pp.132-143,196 on provided copy, also TNA: MH102/2038, p.4 on submitted copy), and when an initial draft was produced by the autumn of 1950, it took a further 10 months to receive comments from the Commonwealth Relations Office (who had circulated them to the Australian Commonwealth Government and UK High Commission), see TNA: MH102/2038, pp.3 and 5-6. It was then decided to seek the views of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration before putting any revised draft to a meeting of the Advisory Council.

responsibility for that child's subsequent welfare'.²³²⁰ Whilst its wider recommendations implied the need for sending organisations to remain satisfied that appropriate standards were being maintained by those receiving child migrants overseas, the Women's Group on Public Welfare report also suggested specific ways in which sending organisations' continued responsibility for child migrants should be fulfilled once they had left the UK. For children being migrated to foster-homes, it was stated that sending organisations should retain ultimate responsibility for the child and that, in the case of the New Zealand scheme for which children were recruited through the Royal Overseas League, the League should set up a reception centre in New Zealand both to enable initial observation of children before placement and as a place to which children could return if their placement broke down or they felt the need to abscond from it.²³²¹ The need for such a centre was also acknowledged by John Moss in his main 1953 report²³²² but the League did not implement this recommendation. The Women's Group on Public Welfare report also recommended that Principals of overseas receiving institutions should be interviewed by at least some members of the UK sending organisations before their appointments were confirmed.²³²³ A clear recommendation was also made on the need for sending organisations to receive substantial reports on children's welfare and progress after migration:

Full periodic reports on the child's progress should be kept in the Dominions and also sent back to the emigrating body. Not only can the child's welfare thus be kept under continual review, but his history may serve as a guide for selecting, handling and training other child emigrants.²³²⁴

The Women's Group on Public Welfare report was published with the clear intention of informing the on-going process of drafting s.33 regulations, with the recommendations in the final text of the report being clearly asterisked where the authors felt that they could be addressed specifically by these draft regulations.

2.23 At least some of the voluntary organisations involved in child migration work were aware of the Women's Group on Public Welfare report. A Home Office letter to the Commonwealth Relations Office, dated 17th May 1951, notes that 'the voluntary

²³²⁰ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.20, LIT-000000002.

²³²¹ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, pp.49, 60.

²³²² John Moss, *Child Migration to Australia*, London: HMSO, 1953, p.29.

²³²³ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.61.

²³²⁴ WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.61.

organisations have been getting restive and are very anxious to know what we propose to do about some of the recommendations made in the report'.²³²⁵

2.24 In August 1951 the Home Office also received the views on its draft s.33 regulations both from Walter Garnett, of the UK High Commission in Canberra, and Tasman Heyes, the Secretary of the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration.²³²⁶ The tone of both sets of comments was somewhat defensive, with the draft regulations regarded as a potentially unnecessary layer of administration for a system that both Heyes and Garnett regarded as 'highly organised'. With regard to the proposed requirement for the sending organisations to provide the Secretary of State with details about standards of care overseas, both Heyes and Garnett commented that such information was already provided to the Home Office through the initial reports produced for the purposes of approving a residential institution in Australia by State Child Welfare and Immigration, as well as Commonwealth Immigration, officials. Furthermore, Garnett pointed out, such information was now provided according to a pro-forma recently developed by the Home Office itself. Such information, provided by Australian government officials would, Garnett argued, be more substantial than that produced by voluntary organisations which—in the case of many UK-based sending organisations who acted primarily as recruiting organisations—did not necessarily have detailed first-hand knowledge of conditions in receiving institutions in Australia anyway. Comments from Heyes and Garnett also suggested a concern that in addition to producing unnecessary administrative and organisational requirements, the draft regulations also had the potential to disrupt the existing system. Heyes expressed unhappiness with what he thought was a Home Office suggestion to appoint external members to voluntary organisations' UK selection committees on the grounds that this might lead to external members being appointed who were 'opposed in principle to child migration' and who could have a 'crippling' effect on the selection committees' work.²³²⁷ Garnett similarly expressed concern that any changes to the existing system might disrupt current working relationships that the UK High Commission had with other organisations involved in child migration work:

²³²⁵ Prestige to Gibson, 17th July 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, p.38, on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1678.

²³²⁶ Gibson to Prestige, 7th August 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, pp.23-36 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1663-1676 (on specific points in this correspondence noted in this paragraph, see particularly pp.26-27, 31-32, 34).

²³²⁷ Heyes to Garnett, 29th June 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, p.39 on available copy, LEG.001.004.1679.

Further, it is desirable that the contact which this office has always maintained with migration societies and child welfare departments in these matters should be preserved. There should be no lessening of the very close and friendly contact between this office and the Department of Immigration on migration matters generally and on these children's cases in particular.²³²⁸

2.25 Whilst accepting some of the proposed Home Office regulations, and rejecting or modifying others, Heyes and Garnett indicated that they had no opposition to the principle that annual reports on individual child migrants should be provided to sending organisations, and where necessary, to the Home Office.²³²⁹

2.26 On 2nd November, 1951, the Home Office sent a memorandum which provided an initial draft of s.33 regulations for comment from the Scottish Home Department. In its response, the Scottish Home Department raised various queries.²³³⁰ It observed, for example, that the requirement on voluntary organisations to provide information about conditions overseas for child migrants would be 'almost worthless' unless subject to corroboration by relevant government officials overseas. On the specific issue of post-migration reports, the Scottish Home Department was unconvinced:

Would it not be sufficient if the report [on an individual migrant now overseas] were required only where the child was not making satisfactory progress? In any case, an annual report to the organisation in this country rather seems to imply that the organisation is continuing in some way to be responsible for the child. Such a continuing responsibility on the part of the British organisation is not, I think, specifically laid down.²³³¹

2.27 The Scottish Home Department's intervention on this issue is significant as it appears to have been the strongest challenge made by any organisation to the principle of the sending body retaining some responsibility for the child migrant once they were placed overseas. From subsequent documents produced by the Home Office that were also seen and accepted by the Home Office Advisory Council

²³²⁸ Garnett to Sedgwick, 16th July 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, p.27 on available copy, LEG.001.004.1667.

²³²⁹ Heyes to Garnett, 29th June 1951, and Garnett to Sedgwick, 16th July 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, pp.29 and 33 on submitted copy.

²³³⁰ Martin to Savidge, 29th November 1951, NRS: ED11/306, pp.202-204 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7569-7571. The original memorandum sent by the Home Office on which the Scottish Home Department commented does not appear to be in this NRS file, however the Scottish Home Department comments relate exactly to the paragraph numbers of the memorandum on TNA: MH102/1784, pp.19-22 on submitted copy, INQ-000000003.

²³³¹ Martin to Savidge, 29th November 1951, NRS: ED11/306, pp.203-204 on provided copy, SGV.001.003.7570-7571.

and representatives of sending organisations, it is clear that the Scottish Home Department's challenge to this underlying principle was not accepted and the requirement of post-migration reports on individual children remained part of the draft regulations.²³³² Given that the Scottish Home Department saw, and did not challenge, a later revision of these draft regulations which included, and indeed, extended requirements about post-migration reporting (see 2.32 below) it is clear that they did not pursue their objection any further either. A note by one Home Office official around this time also expressed some reservation about the value of such reports in terms of being able to intervene in the case of a child now in the care of an organisation overseas: 'one has an uneasy feeling that the reports would be of little value and anyhow what could be done on receipt of them except hesitate to send any more children out either to that place or with such a background'.²³³³ Again, the fact that this requirement for annual reporting was retained in the draft regulations despite such constraints in terms of intervening in the care of children now overseas, indicates that some value was still seen in them. As noted below (2.29), there appears to have been a recognition in the Home Office that such annual reports might be the only way in which the Home Office could maintain an understanding of the on-going conditions in which child migrants were growing up.²³³⁴

2.28 During 1951, the Home Office also continued to receive legal advice on what measures could, and could not, be introduced under the legal powers given to the Secretary of State by the 1948 Children Act. One view noted that the very language used in s.33 of the Act itself showed the 'characteristic woolliness of compromises'²³³⁵ over the kind of powers allowed to the Secretary of State in regulating the child migration work of voluntary organisations. Whilst the Secretary of State's powers were inevitably limited to those which could be enforced through British courts—which constrained the degree of control that could be exercised over

²³³² It may be worth noting that senior staff in the Home Office children's inspectorate were also consulted about their views on these draft regulations during November, 1951, and no objections were raised by them to the principle of requiring annual reports on individual child migrants post-migration (see correspondence and notes in TNA: MH102/2043, part two pp.14-27 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1849-1862).

²³³³ See Note, 29th December 1951, TNA: MH102/2043, part one, p.7 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1744.

²³³⁴ This view appears to reflect the lack of institutional reports being sent from the Commonwealth Department of Immigration to the UK High Commission, something which John Moss noted could be improved (see Note, 12th May 1952, TNA: MH102/2043, part one, p.8 on submitted copy).

²³³⁵ Note by Shelley, 13th February 1951, TNA: MH102/2040, p.5 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1703.

organisations based overseas—the specific language used in s.33 of the Act also added further constraints. By empowering the Secretary of State to control only the ‘arrangements’ of voluntary societies, this meant that regulations could only control the stated policies and working practices of voluntary organisations, but not have any powers over failure to adhere to those standards once a child was no longer in the care of that sending organisation.²³³⁶ As a result the legal drafting of the regulations continued to pose considerable difficulties in terms of what could, and could not, be introduced through the s.33 regulations in terms of the on-going care of a child after leaving the care of the sending organisation. Even those sending organisations who ran institutions overseas to which they sent children might not be considered to be responsible by a British court if requirements in the s.33 regulations were not kept in instances where the carrying out of these regulations would be subject to the laws of another country.²³³⁷ Another set of advice indicated that whilst it would be *intra vires* for the Secretary of State to introduce regulations relating to ensuring that suitable arrangements were made for the care of a child overseas, it would be *ultra vires* to require that a voluntary organisation based overseas produce regular reports on that child’s progress.²³³⁸ The fact that this requirement for annual reporting on individual children remained in the draft s.33 regulations after this advice was received suggests an on-going uncertainty about the precise legal limits of powers that this section of the 1948 Children Act allowed to the Secretary of State. Even in the context of continued discussion about what could, and could not, be introduced under these regulations, there was a view in the Home Office that voluntary organisations still had the capacity to recognise and carry out good standards of practice, even if they could not be compelled to do so in every instance under s.33 regulations. Thus, for example, legal views were expressed that it would be difficult to require sending organisations to repatriate children they had sent

²³³⁶ Note by Shelley, 13th February 1951, TNA: MH102/2040, pp.4-5 on submitted copy LEG.001.004.1702-1703.

²³³⁷ See note 26th February 1951, TNA: MH102/2040, p.6 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1704, which also recognises the difficulty in establishing what could, and could not, be regulated in terms of work by voluntary organisations relating to the care of children overseas. This view appears to have been expressed particularly in relation to requirements of sending organisations to repatriate children who did not settle overseas, where the ability of voluntary organisations to do this would necessarily be constrained by the laws of the country to which the child had been sent.

²³³⁸ Note by Harvey, 18th January 1951, TNA: MH102/2040, p.4 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1702. Earlier advice had also suggested that the wording of s.33(2) of the 1948 Act, was ‘inept for ensuring continued supervision by the exporter, where – as I understand is normally the case – the importing country has “suitably arrangements” with which the S. of S. is “able” to be “satisfied”’, note by Shelley, 7th January 1950, TNA: MH102/2040, pp.10-11 on submitted copy.

overseas but who had not settled, it was nevertheless recognised that 'some of the larger Voluntary Organisations which have been sending children to the Dominions recognise that they have some form of continuing liability for the children have on occasion repatriated an unhappy child'.²³³⁹ This suggested that reasonable standards of good practice could not be associated simply with requirements which could be legally introduced under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act, and that sending organisations had a responsibility to reflect on their own standards of practice.

2.29 At the Advisory Council's twenty-third meeting, in January 1952, the Council considered both the memorandum which had already been seen by the Scottish Home Department and accompanying note from the Home Office setting out proposed regulations under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act²³⁴⁰ as well as a letter from the recently-formed Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration (CVOCE).²³⁴¹ Constituent members of the CVOCE included organisations involved in the migration of children from Scotland, namely the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, Dr Barnardo's Homes, the Catholic Child Welfare Council, the Church of Scotland Committee of Social Service, the Fairbridge Society and the Royal Overseas League. The Council had been formed specifically to encourage co-operation between these voluntary organisations in response to the Home Office's attempts to formulate s.33 regulations, in particular (as Cyril Bavin put it at its inaugural meeting) so that 'with one voice – a reply might be made to those who would seek to obstruct child emigration'.²³⁴² The constituent members of the CVOCE had been sent copies of the draft s.33 regulations from the Home Office before writing this letter.²³⁴³ The

²³³⁹ See Memorandum, 11th January 1951, TNA: MH102/2040, p.12 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1710.

²³⁴⁰ See note and memorandum by Home Office, TNA: MH102/1784, pp.16-22 on submitted copy, INQ-000000003.

²³⁴¹ Hall to Under-Secretary of State, 9th November 1951, TNA: MH102/1784, pp.13-15 on submitted copy, INQ-000000003.

²³⁴² See note of meeting on 30th January 1951, and minutes of meeting of CVOCE, 6th March 1951, ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1, pt. I p.3-4 on provided copy, PRT.001.001.8136-8137. It is evident that the Women's Group on Public Welfare report was a significant concern for members of the Council in terms of its possible effects on their work (See for example, minutes of meeting of 3rd April 1951, minutes of meeting of 1st May 1951, 6th June 1951, pp.8, 11 and 15-20 on provided copy). See also minutes of meeting of the CVOCE, 14th February 1952, pt II p.18 on provided copy, in which it is recorded that the Council would respond to a query from the Women's Group on Public Welfare about its work by stating a general leaflet on the Council would be sent to them in due course, and that the Council did not otherwise 'desire to enter into much correspondence with the Women's Group on Public Welfare'.

²³⁴³ See note by Savidge, 27th August 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, p.6 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1646.

Home Office note commented that the draft regulations had been produced taking into consideration the *Child Emigration* report by the Women's Group on Public Welfare.²³⁴⁴

2.30 The Home Office note stated that legal advice received on the drafting of s.33 regulations had indicated that whilst the regulations allowed the Secretary of State to control voluntary organisations' arrangements for the emigration of children, these could not be extended to requiring voluntary organisations to be registered with the Secretary of State for the purposes of this work. Nor did this require voluntary organisations to review the cases of children who had emigrated with a view to repatriating those who had not settled down, nor to seek the approval of the Secretary of State for the approval of the emigration of individual children.²³⁴⁵ The note also indicated that children could only be emigrated to Australia with the support of funding under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act if they were to be sent to residential institutions that had been approved by State and Commonwealth Government officials, as well as the Commonwealth Relations Office. The Home Office also noted that, 'over the past two or three years', the Commonwealth Relations Office had made a practice of consulting the Home Office about such institutional approvals (implying that this had not been the case during the period 1947-1949). The note also recognised different models of relationships between

²³⁴⁴ See Memorandum on Child Emigration, Report of a Committee of the Women's Group on Public Welfare, 12th April 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, pp.46-49 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1686-1689, in which Mr Savidge, a Children's Department official, provides a detailed summary of the extent to which each asterisked recommendation in the report is already included in the current draft of the s.33 regulations. A Home Office note, dated 2nd February 1952, later observed that 'Several of the recommendations [of the Women's Group on Public Welfare report] have been covered, or partially covered, in our draft proposals. Others have been rejected as impractical or ultra vires.' The Home Secretary rejected a request for a delegation from the Women's Group on Public Welfare to discuss the draft regulations with him in February 1952 on the grounds that their report had already informed the drafting of the regulations and as they were now under discussion by the Advisory Council, further discussion at that point would not be appropriate (see correspondence in TNA: MH102/2045).

²³⁴⁵ This point about the legal constraints for these draft regulations was queried by Philip Dingle in the Council meeting. It is difficult to reconcile the reported legal advice that the Secretary of State could not take decisions with regard to the migration of individual children by voluntary societies with the fact that the draft regulations presented to this meeting by the Home Office contained a number of special circumstances in which sending organisations were required to give the Secretary of State a month's notice. These included cases of the emigration of the child under five years of age, the emigration of a child whose parents had refused to consent to their emigration, the emigration of a child by a voluntary society against the wishes of its selection committee and the emigration of a child who had withdrawn their consent to their emigration but whom the voluntary society still wished to emigrate. The implication of the notice period required by the Secretary of State appears to have been that the Secretary of State could then decide to prohibit the child's emigration having reviewed their case.

sending and receiving organisations, in which in some cases the sending organisation might be able to exert some influence but had no absolute means of control.

2.31 Within these constraints, the draft regulations still contained a number of detailed requirements that voluntary organisations were expected to observe in relation to providing the Secretary of State with details about their working methods, satisfying the Secretary of State that standards of selection, preparation, travel and overseas care would promote children's welfare, and recording details of those they had, or were planning to, emigrate. Selection was to be made through suitably convened case committees including at least one person with experience in social work and one person with direct knowledge of the place to which children would be sent. In addition to seeking consent from parents and guardians, as well as from the child themselves, the case committee was also expected to ensure that emigration was in the best interests of the individual child (rather than the child being suited to emigration) and that a check had been made as to whether any other relatives in the UK might be prepared to provide the child a suitable home.²³⁴⁶ Some of the forms of on-going relationship between the sending and receiving organisations advocated in the Home Office's document of March 1949 (see 2.16 above) were not included in the draft regulations. This was not, in itself, surprising given that ideas such as the appointment of liaison officers and the role of sending organisations in encouraging suitable training of overseas staff had been accepted as good standards of practice by the Council which should be recommended rather than could be required through regulation (see 2.20 above). However, the draft regulations made an explicit requirement for post-migration reporting to be undertaken on individual child migrants:

13. A voluntary organisation which arranges for the emigration of a child should arrange for an annual report on the welfare of the child to be sent to it by the organisation, children's home, or other establishment or person responsible for the child's care in the country to which he emigrates. Such arrangement should provide for reports being furnished for at least three consecutive years or until the child attains the age of eighteen, whichever is the later.²³⁴⁷

²³⁴⁶ Principles for selection committees' working methods set out in these draft regulations were very similar to those also recommended in the Women's Group on Public Welfare Report, p.59.

²³⁴⁷ Memorandum by the Home Office on Regulations to be made under section 33 of the Children Act, 1948, TNA: MH102/1784, p.22 on available copy, INQ-000000003.

An earlier Home Office memorandum on these regulations had noted that this requirement for the annual reporting on individual child migrants was 'as far as we could go' in terms of monitoring conditions in overseas institutions 'since the Regulations will not bite on Homes, Institutions or individuals in the receiving country'.²³⁴⁸

2.32 In its letter, the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration (CVOCE) stated its position on a number of issues relevant to the draft regulations. The CVOCE accepted the principle of having a selection committee convened by the sending organisation, informed by relevant personal and family case histories provided by an experienced worker based on interviews with both the child and parent or guardian (and where necessary a special psychological report). The need to ensure the effects of emigration were understood both by the child and their family members was accepted as was the need to avoid breaking any significant emotional connection that the child still had with relatives in the UK. Whilst noting the range of overseas residential institutions that were used, the CVOCE commented that these were approved by overseas authorities and that the CVOCE recognised the need to use suitable staff (whilst making no statement about appropriate training). Whilst not commenting on standards of training, the CVOCE expressed the view that 'religion should play a vital part in the child's life, with every facility being given to the child to be brought up in its own faith, and members of staff should, by example, as well as precept, be fitted to undertake this obligation'.²³⁴⁹ The CVOCE concurred with the principle that sending organisations should remain well-informed about children they had sent overseas, noting that it felt that 'regular and comprehensive reports on the progress of each child should be sent to the Emigration Society concerned'.²³⁵⁰ The letter reflected views that members of the CVOCE had already previously agreed when the Council met to consider the recommendations made by the Women's Group on Public Welfare.²³⁵¹ In some cases, however, there appears to have been discrepancies between some of the recommendations supported by organisational

²³⁴⁸ See Memorandum on Child Emigration, Report of a Committee of the Women's Group on Public Welfare, 12th April 1951, TNA: MH102/2038, LEG.001.004.1688.

²³⁴⁹ Hall to Under-Secretary of State, 9th November 1951, TNA: MH102/1784, p.14 on available copy, INQ-000000003.

²³⁵⁰ Hall to Under-Secretary of State, 9th November 1951, TNA: MH102/1784, p.15 on available copy, INQ-000000003.

²³⁵¹ See minutes of meeting of CVOCE, 6th June 1951, ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1, pt I pp.15-20 on provided copy, PRT.001.001.8148-8153.

representatives in the Council's meetings and their actual organisational practice.²³⁵² It is also worth noting that a sub-committee of the CVOCE, convened to offer proposals to the Home Office in relation to the drafting of s.33 regulations, had interpreted the idea of regular reporting on children sent overseas slightly differently to this letter. Minutes of this sub-committee stated that 'the Council considers that it would be helpful for those interested in each child to receive six-monthly progress reports, and see no reason why this could not be arranged'.²³⁵³ This wording suggested a system in which regular reports would be provided in those cases where parents or guardians in the UK requested them, rather than a presumption that sending organisations would request these as a matter of course. Although the CVOCE's formal letter to the Home Office appeared to accept that sending organisations had a responsibility to ensure that regular reports were received about children they had sent overseas, the sub-committee minutes raises the question as to whether some of the Council's members may not have felt this to be an organisational obligation in all cases.

2.33 In the discussion of these documents at the Advisory Council's twenty-third meeting, Mr Lucette, General Superintendent of Dr Barnardo's Homes, stated that the views expressed by CVOCE did not constitute a policy that was shared in practice by all its members, in part because of their different aims and organisational structures. As will be demonstrated later in this Appendix, it does appear to be the case that voluntary organisations who were constituent members of this Council were engaged in a range of different practices with regard to child migration and did not all uphold standards of good practice that the Council's letter had advocated. For example, it appears that none of the Catholic organisations sending child migrants

²³⁵² For example, the Council minutes for the 6th June meeting record that representatives supported the principle of children's migration being approved by selection committees using specially collated case histories of the child, the transfer of children's records overseas, the provision of regular post-migration reporting, the importance of individual staff attention for the care of child migrants, and the appointment of suitable Principals for receiving institutions, yet these principles do not appear to have been adhered to consistently by the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee nor the Church of England Advisory Council on Empire Settlement. As noted above, the principle of providing overseas reception centres for children sent overseas into foster-care was also accepted by the Council, but not implemented by the Royal Overseas League. At the same meeting, which had endorsed the principle of smaller cottage style homes for child migrants, Fr Nicol had commented 'on the condemnation of institutional life by the Home Office and said that where there were large institutions, such as those of his own Organisation, it was impossible to take action to bring them into line with modern opinion regarding the value of small units in homes, although Canon Flint, at Coleshill, was endeavouring to do so'. ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1, pt I, PRT.001.001.8148-8154.

²³⁵³ Minutes of meeting of the sub-committee of the CVOCE, 27th September 1951, ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1, pt II, PRT.001.001.8167-8168.

from the United Kingdom, nor the Royal Overseas League adhered to these standards with regard to post-migration reports.²³⁵⁴ The Advisory Council discussed, and largely approved the first two thirds of the Home Office's draft regulations, subject to them making stronger references to the need for trained workers with experience of social work with children and removing the contingency to allow a voluntary organisation the potential to emigrate a child against the advice of its selection committee.

2.34 Agreement of the remainder of the Home Office's draft s.33 regulations were held over until the Council's twenty-fourth meeting in February 1952.²³⁵⁵ The Home Office's draft was approved by the Council subject to some minor amendments. One amendment, proposed by Philip Dingle, and accepted by the meeting, was that the first post-migration report on a child should be sent to the sending organisation six months after their arrival with annual reports following thereafter. A Scottish Home Department note records that a member of the Scottish Home Department attended this February meeting of the Advisory Council and that

while no drastic changes were suggested [at this meeting], the Home Office were asked to consider some amendments which might be made. Home Office will prepare a revised draft in the light of the Council's suggestions, consult with their legal advisors on certain points, and submit it again to the Council. The Voluntary Organisations will then be consulted (although there might be informal consultation with them in the preparation of the revised draft).²³⁵⁶

2.35 By the time of the Council's twenty-fourth meeting, both the Home Office and Scottish Home Department had received copies of an interim report from John Moss based on his discussions with Commonwealth and State authorities, as well as visits to a number of residential institutions for child migrants, during his trip to Australia which had begun the previous year (on this, see main report 7.21-7.25). This included a discussion he had held with an officer in the Commonwealth Department of Immigration specifically about the content of the draft s.33 regulations from the

²³⁵⁴ It also appears that these standards of reporting may not have been adhered to either by the Church of England Advisory Council on Empire Settlement, but that organisation does not appear to have been involved in the migration of any Scottish children.

²³⁵⁵ Minutes of twenty-fourth meeting of Advisory Council, 21st February, 1952, NRS: ED11/306, pp.53-54 on provided copy. Note the Home Office's main copy of these minutes in the series of files for Advisory Council meeting minutes appears to have been lost in transfer to the National Archives at Kew, but a copy is submitted at TNA: MH102/2047, pp.48-49 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1933-1934.

²³⁵⁶ Note, 22nd February 1952, NRS: ED11/306, p.19 on provided copy, SGV.001.004.4324.

Home Office.²³⁵⁷ Moss's interim report was generally positive about his observations, stating that 'generally speaking I believe the Homes in Australia are of good standard and that many British children deprived of a normal home life in the United Kingdom would ultimately have a better chance in this country'.²³⁵⁸ With regard to the supervision of voluntary organisations by State Child Welfare Departments, Moss went on to comment:

I have been very much impressed by the thoroughness in which the interests of migrants are safeguarded under existing procedure. In so far as the State standards are concerned there appears to be some variation in connection with migrant children. In most of the States the State Child Welfare Department is excellently organised and it is clear that the standard of care exercised over State wards is carried over to the supervision of migrant children. On the contrary, in one State the local Child Welfare arrangements do not seem to be so good and therefore it might follow that the nature of care required for migrants might be on a somewhat lower basis.²³⁵⁹

2.36 Although the tone of Moss's report was generally reassuring about conditions in Australia, there were elements that might have given rise to concern to readers. It was indeed the case, Moss commented, that child migrants were required to do more domestic work to support the running of Australian institutions than they would in England, in part because of staffing costs, but he regarded this as a matter of prevailing local conditions in Australia rather than a matter of substantive concern.²³⁶⁰ Whilst generally positive about systems of inspection by local Child Welfare Departments, Moss noted that inspection reports were sent 'from time to time', rather than in a regular and systematic way to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration, and that these reports did not appear to be sent as a matter of course to the UK High Commission.²³⁶¹ His positive views of conditions in Australia led him to take the view that Australian organisations should be allowed to appoint

²³⁵⁷ See Northover to Martin, and accompanying interim report by John Moss, 16th February 1952, NRS: ED11/306, pp.58-78 on provided copy.

²³⁵⁸ John Moss interim report, NRS: ED11/306, p.59 (and see also p.64) on provided copy, SGV.001.004.4364 and 4369.

²³⁵⁹ John Moss interim report, NRS: ED11/306, p.62 on provided copy.

²³⁶⁰ John Moss interim report, NRS: ED11/306, pp.65-66 on provided copy.

²³⁶¹ John Moss interim report, NRS: ED11/306, pp.63-64 on provided copy. See also Observations of Mr John Moss on Home Office Memorandum dated March 1952, 8th April 1952, TNA: MH102/2043, part one p.52 on submitted copy, where Moss says that an arrangement could be made for information in periodic State reports to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration on receiving institutions *could* be made submitted to the UK High Commission if there was any variation in reported conditions in these compared to the reports on which those homes were initially approved.

their own senior staff and make their own decisions about operational policies without close monitoring by sending organisations in the UK. He agreed, however, that it would be helpful for UK-based organisations to encourage members of staff who had completed the Central Training Council's approved child-care training to consider moving to Australia to work in residential institutions there.²³⁶² In his interim report, Moss did not express any views on the proposal that sending organisations should receive regular, comprehensive post-migration reports on children they had sent to Australia. Moss also took no view on the issue of post-migration reporting to sending organisations in the UK in his main report that was eventually published in 1953.

2.37 On 2nd August, 1952, the Home Office Children's Department wrote to the Scottish Home Department to inform them on progress with the development of the draft regulations.²³⁶³ A version, revised in the light of the Advisory Council's comments, had been circulated to members of the CVOCE, including the Church of Scotland Committee of Social Service.²³⁶⁴ The Children's Department expressed surprised that the CVOCE had only raised one criticism, 'perhaps because they had expected more drastic proposals', in which they argued that prospective child migrants should not be required to be interviewed by a whole case committee but simply by one member of that committee.²³⁶⁵ The Children's Department indicated that they were not likely to give way to that suggestion,²³⁶⁶ although they duly did later that autumn after further representations from the CVOCE.²³⁶⁷ A copy of these revised draft regulations was attached to this letter. The wording about post-migration reporting, about which the CVOCE had raised no objections, was as follows:

²³⁶² John Moss interim report, NRS: ED11/306, pp.66 and 70 on provided copy.

²³⁶³ Prestige to Rowe, 2nd August 1952, ED11/306, pp.39-45 on provided copy, SGV.001.004.4344-4350.

²³⁶⁴ A copy of the June 1952 draft sent to the Council is at TNA: MH102/2043, part one, pp.39-43 on submitted copy.

²³⁶⁵ See Hall to Boys-Smith, 11th July 1952, TNA: MH102/2043, part one, p.34 on submitted copy.

²³⁶⁶ On the Council's comments and Home Office response, see also Note, 18th July 1952, TNA: MH102/2043, part one, pp.11-12 on submitted copy.

²³⁶⁷ See Notes dated 27th October 1952, also notes of meeting with Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, 23rd October 1952, TNA: MH102/2043, part one, pp.16-17 and 18-19 on submitted copy. A central argument made by Council members for arranging children's migration through central, national committees rather than local case committees was that the level of expertise relevant to child migration work was much greater with these national committees than would be the case with local committees probably constituted on an ad hoc basis.

11. A voluntary organisation which arranges for the emigration of a child should arrange for a report on the welfare of the child to be sent to it by the organisation, children's home, or other establishment or person responsible for the child's care in the country to which he emigrates not later than six months after the child arrives in that country and thereafter annually for at least two years or until the child attains the age of eighteen, whichever is the later.

12. Reports received in accordance with paragraph 11, and all records relating to the performance by a voluntary organisation after [date to be agreed] of the function of making arrangements for the emigration of children, should be available to inspectors appointed by the Secretary of State.²³⁶⁸

Although it had largely concurred with the proposed regulations in its response to the Children's Department, minutes of the CVOCE's meeting the previous month showed that its members did not have a uniformly positive view of these regulations.²³⁶⁹ Fr Nicol, representing the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, criticised the draft regulations saying that they would 'limit the activities of the Voluntary organisations and the Authorities concerned failed to appreciate that the organisations were only interested in emigration with a view to giving children a chance in life which would not otherwise be available to them'.²³⁷⁰ Nicol is also reported to have said that 'his Committee would be reluctant to carry on with their child emigration activities if they were bound by such regulations'.²³⁷¹ Cyril Bavin, representing the Royal Overseas League, similarly complained that 'the introduction of further regulations might cause the New Zealand Government to abandon child emigration altogether'.²³⁷² Canon Flint, representing the Catholic Child Welfare Council, commented that 'the regulations merely followed on from the Curtis Committee's report and there was general feeling against child emigration by the "powers that be"'.²³⁷³ These objections to the draft regulations by representatives of these particular organisations are worth noting given apparent failures by these

²³⁶⁸ Memorandum by the Home Office on Regulations to be made under section 33 of the Children Act 1948, June 1952, NRS: ED11/306, p.44 on provided copy, SGV.001.004.4349.

²³⁶⁹ See minutes of the meeting of the CVOCE, 8th July 1952, ULSCA.F:H6/1/2/1, pt II, p.26 on available copy, PRT.001.001.8185.

²³⁷⁰ See minutes of the meeting of the CVOCE, 8th July 1952, ULSCA.F:H6/1/2/1, pt II p.26 on available copy.

²³⁷¹ See minutes of the meeting of the CVOCE, 8th July 1952, ULSCA.F:H6/1/2/1, pt II p.26 on available copy.

²³⁷² See minutes of the meeting of the CVOCE, 8th July 1952, ULSCA.F:H6/1/2/1, pt II p.26 on available copy.

²³⁷³ See minutes of the meeting of the CVOCE, 8th July 1952, ULSCA.F:H6/1/2/1, pt II p.26 on available copy.

organisations to safeguard children's welfare according to standards of the day that will be discussed in sections 5 and 6 of this Appendix.

2.38 In the event, however, these draft regulations were not enacted. In response to an enquiry about progress from the Scottish Home Department, the Home Office responded in a letter dated 16th January 1953 to say that it had just received 'a tentative first draft from our Legal Adviser which it is clear will need a good deal of tinkering' and that 'it may therefore be some little time before we can let you have a copy which will represent anything approaching final form'.²³⁷⁴ Further drafting of the regulations took place during 1953.²³⁷⁵ However, in a letter dated 4th November 1953, replying to a query from the Commonwealth Relations Office about when these regulations would next be placed before the Home Office Advisory Council, John Ross commented that:

I explained that it would not be possible, because of other claims on the time of the Council, for the draft to be put to the Advisory Council on Child Care for some months; and that we intended to consider before then whether it was necessary to make the regulations in present circumstances. We are getting drafts of the regulations, and of an accompanying memorandum, into final shape, but we think that we ought to consider before going back to the Advisory Council whether there was justification for making the regulations in the near future. Our view about this is influenced by the absence of any recent evidence pointing to the need for regulations at present, and by the reassuring nature of Moss's report on what he saw in Australia.²³⁷⁶

Commenting on the finalised regulations, a Government legal advisor wrote, on 17th March 1954, that the

main result of the Regulations would be merely to increase the paperwork of the voluntary organisations and the Home Office. In view of the letter of Mr Ross of the 4th November, 1953, suggesting that there is no need for the Regulations to be made, it seems unnecessary at this stage to consider these points further.²³⁷⁷

²³⁷⁴ Oates to Martin, 16th January 1953, ED11/306, p.37 on provided copy, SGV.001.004.4342

²³⁷⁵ Correspondence and notes relating to revised drafting of the regulations during 1953 is held on TNA: MH102/2047, in which there continues to be no further objection to the inclusion of the requirement for annual reporting on individual child migrants.

²³⁷⁶ Ross to Dixon, 4th November 1953, TNA: MH102/2047, p.30 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1915.

²³⁷⁷ Note by Wollaston, 17th March 1954, TNA: MH102/2047, pp.7-8 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1892-1893.

After some further discussion of the draft regulations, Mr Prestige, the Secretary of the Home Office Children's Department division dealing with the work of voluntary societies noted that

the draft now seems to satisfy the policy of the moment and to be ready to be laid by until it is decided to make Regs at all...If the draft is put before the Advisory Council, some members will no doubt press for the Regs to be made. Accordingly (?) lay by until pressed.²³⁷⁸

John Ross confirmed this decision to lay the regulations by on 30th June 1954.²³⁷⁹

2.39 Whilst the Home Office appears to have settled on this position as a result of the relatively positive accounts of conditions in residential institutions overseas provided by John Moss' confidential and published reports, it may be worth noting that there is no indication that Moss himself felt that the introduction of regulations was unnecessary.²³⁸⁰ It appears that Home Office staff were not necessarily convinced that all of the sending organisations' working practices were of a satisfactory standard. As Prestige commented, in his note dated 29th June 1954,

my experience of emigration societies was that the case committee tended to be small and in fact often committees of one – a social worker; and the objects of wishing a requirement of a committee were, so far as I was concerned, to ensure that there was a balance between "professional" and "amateur" points of view, and to avoid leaving a decision of much moment in relation to a child's whole future in the hands of a single person.²³⁸¹

Reluctance to introduce these regulations within the Home Office might also reflect uncertainty about what such regulations could, in practice, achieve. In a letter to the Scottish Home Department on 15th October 1955, a Home Office official commented that

²³⁷⁸ Note by Prestige, 29th June 1954, TNA: MH102/2047, pp.8-9 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1893-1894.

²³⁷⁹ Note by John Ross, 30th June 1954, TNA: MH102/2047, p.9 on submitted copy. This decision appears to have been made informally a little earlier than this as the Home Office responded to a chasing letter about progress on the regulations from the Scottish Home Department earlier that month stating that it was not pursuing the introduction of these as it was felt that existing arrangements by the voluntary societies were 'reasonably satisfactory' (see note 10th June, 1954, NRS: ED11/306, p.24, on provided copy).

²³⁸⁰ John Moss himself, however, does not appear to have expressed the view that s.33 regulations were wholly unnecessary (see Note, 12th May 1952, TNA: MH102/2043, part one, p.8, in which Moss suggests modifications to the regulations but not their abandonment).

²³⁸¹ Note by Prestige, 29th June 1954, TNA: MH102/2047 pp.8-9 on submitted copy.

Our interest is ultimately in the making of emigration regulations under the Children Act: and it is clearly impracticable to lay down requirements by regulation about what is to happen in Australia unless the Australian Authorities are prepared to co-operate.²³⁸²

2.40 It is worth noting that whilst John Ross took the view that there was no pressing need to introduce s.33 regulations in the summer of 1954, he reversed his position on the need for statutory control of child migration work by voluntary organisations after directly observing conditions at residential institutions accommodating child migrants in Australia during the Fact-Finding Mission of spring 1956. Whilst having been sceptical in the past about the extent to which the Secretary of State could intervene in the cases of the migration of individual children by voluntary organisations (see 2.20 above), John Ross recommended in the Fact-Finding Mission's report that in future the migration of all children by voluntary organisations should be subject to the individual consent of the Secretary of State in order to prevent the migration of children to institutions whose standards would not be considered acceptable to UK authorities.²³⁸³ The fact that the controls advocated by Ross at that point did not include reviving more detailed s.33 regulations is perhaps an indication that he remained sceptical of the value of these as the best mechanism for managing voluntary organisations' child migration work. Ross's recommendation that children should, in future, only be emigrated by voluntary organisations with the consent of the Secretary of State would have required further legislation. In the event, it was not introduced having been opposed by all of the members of CVOCE (apart from the Church of Scotland) and the Oversea Migration Board.²³⁸⁴ The view of the majority of the members of CVOCE was that this additional

²³⁸² Note on letter from C. P.Hill, NRS: ED11/306, p.25 on provided copy, SGV.001.004.4330.

²³⁸³ See *Child Migration to Australia: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission*, cmd.9832, London: HMSO, 1956, paras 22 and 36-39. It may be worth noting in relation to this that the Minister of Pensions had previously indicated that it would not be acceptable for children under the care of the Ministry of Pensions (i.e. those receiving public support having lost one or both parents through the war) to be migrated as 'their emigration would place them beyond his effective control' (see minutes of meeting of CVOCE, 1st May 1951, ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1, pt I p.13 on provided copy).

²³⁸⁴ See TNA: DO35/6383, pp.22, 27, 111, and 219 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.7611, 7616, 7700 and 7808; and see especially Cumming to Under-Secretary of State, 16th October 1956, in this file, pp.228-229, in which the Church of Scotland Committee of Social Service commented that 'we are inclined to the view that it would be a good thing if the consent of the Secretary of State for Scotland were obtained relative to the migration of each child. As an Organisation, we have always had a very excellent relationship with the Scottish Home Department with regard to points relating to emigration arrangements for individual children. We cannot feel that it would in any sense restrict or make difficult our work if in every case it were obligatory upon us to obtain the formal consent of the Secretary of State for Scotland.'

form of independent scrutiny of their work would 'impose such a restriction on the activity of the Organisations as to make it almost impossible to operate their Child Migration Schemes'.²³⁸⁵ The Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office instead established a system of informal supervision and reporting on general policies for the care of children in Australia (rather than requirements for providing direct reports on institutions or individual children), linked to the renewal of Commonwealth Settlement Act funding for child migration programmes in 1957.²³⁸⁶ In proposing this measure to members of CVOCE, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Lord John Hope, sought to persuade them that they might find such an informal system of supervision preferable to a system of statutory regulation that Parliament might press to introduce if their co-operation with this informal system was not forthcoming.²³⁸⁷

Summary

2.41 The material presented in this section has considered the role of the notion that sending organisations had some form of on-going responsibility to children they had migrated overseas in discussions about standards of good practice involving UK and Australian Government departments, voluntary organisations involved in child migration work and other voluntary and professional organisations in the period 1945-54.

2.42 It appears reasonable to claim that the broad principle that sending organisations retained some form of responsibility for children they had migrated overseas was generally accepted. This acceptance extended to sending organisations themselves, given their agreement to the proposed draft s.33 regulation that annual reports on the progress of individual child migrants should be sent to sending organisations by receiving institutions or organisations. It is worth noting that the idea that annual reports should be provided on the welfare of individual children after migration was accepted not only by sending organisations but by the Home Office (including its Children's Inspectorate), the Commonwealth Relations Office, the UK High Commission in Canberra, the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration, the Home Office's Advisory Council on Child Care, the Women's Group

²³⁸⁵ TNA: DO35/6383, p.111.

²³⁸⁶ Notes, correspondence and memoranda relating to the negotiation of these voluntary supervision measures between the Commonwealth Relations Office, Home Office and voluntary organisations can be found in TNA: DO35/6383.

²³⁸⁷ See verbatim report of meeting with representatives of voluntary organisations held in CRO (?) on 14th December 1956, TNA: DO35/6383, p.113-114.

on Public Welfare and (after some initial reservations) the Scottish Home Department.

2.43 The Home Office initially took the view (in memoranda produced in 1947 and 1949) that sending organisations' on-going responsibility for child migrants' welfare should be discharged through their involvement in the appointment of senior overseas staff, the training of staff working overseas, the management of the child's transition from the UK to an overseas country, the monitoring of child migrants' welfare whilst in residential care, the repatriation of children who had not settled and the child's after-care after leaving a residential institution. The Home Office also supported the idea that liaison officers should be appointed to facilitate communication between sending and receiving bodies, and to ensure that sending organisations were satisfied that good standards were being maintained in children's care overseas.

2.44 As discussion of these on-going responsibilities developed in relation to the development of s.33 regulations, it became clear to staff in the Home Office that there were significant constraints on what these regulations could require in terms of sending organisations' on-going responsibilities once a child had migrated to another country. As a consequence, as these regulations were subjected to consultation and re-drafting, the principle of the sending organisations' on-going responsibility to children they had migrated overseas took the narrower focus of requiring annual reports on individual children post-migration.

2.45 Although the focus on sending organisations' on-going responsibilities found a narrower expression as the draft s.33 regulations were developed, sending organisations were exposed to the broader argument (for example made in the Women's Group on Public Welfare report) that they were not free of all responsibility to children they had migrated once they were settled in another country. Sending organisations had the capacity to reflect on their standards of practice in relation to such on-going responsibility and were not constrained to discharge this responsibility only in ways that might be required from the anticipated draft s.33 regulations. For example, some sending organisations—such as Dr Barnardo's Homes—arranged for the repatriation of children who had not settled overseas at their own expense, without having been required to do so by any government regulation.²³⁸⁸ It was also possible for sending organisations to recognise standards

²³⁸⁸ On this see 'Migration of Children of Dr Barnardo's Homes', 8th February 1949, TNA: MH102/2328, pp.29-38 on available copy, LEG.001.004.2798-2807, which was a paper submitted to the Home Office

of good practice being advocated through the Home Office's draft s.33 regulations and to implement these, irrespective of the Home Office's eventual decision not to introduce such regulations (see 3.1 below).

Monitoring systems implemented by Dr Barnardos Homes

3.1 From 1945, it appears that Dr Barnardo's Homes operated a system of individual reporting on all child migrants sent to Australia (details of this system are also discussed, with reference to individual cases, in the main report, 17.19-17.29). An analysis of case files undertaken for the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse indicated that the frequency of these individual reports—both on children in residential institutions run by Dr Barnardo's Homes and on those children under 21 who had left residential institutions—varied from every six, nine and twelve months.²³⁸⁹ It is clear that there were also cases in which aftercare reports were produced on a more frequent basis.²³⁹⁰ From 1952, Dr Barnardo's Homes implemented the policy that the first of these reports should be sent within six months of the child's arrival in Australia, and at least on an annual basis thereafter. It appears to have done this anticipating the introduction of this specific requirement in the draft s.33 regulations discussed by the Home Office Advisory Council on Child Care (on which Dr Barnardo's Homes had a representative).²³⁹¹ Dr Barnardo's Homes appear to have continued to implement this standard for individual reporting despite the fact that these s.33 regulations were not introduced. This indicates that voluntary organisations had the capacity to introduce standards of practice encouraged through the draft s.33 regulations without having to wait for these regulations formally to be brought into effect. The provision of regular progress reports on

Advisory Council on Child Care in the context of the Council gathering information about child migration practices to inform their discussions of the content of s.33 regulations to be drawn up under the 1948 Children Act. The Barnardo's paper (p.36 on available copy) noted that children were monitored overseas and those who were not settling for reasons of 'ill health or mentality' were returned to the UK were necessary. A paper from the Home Office submitted to the same Advisory Council meeting ('Note by the Home Office on Questions for consideration in connection with the Emigration of Children', same file, pp.23-28 on available copy) observed that some of the larger voluntary organisations had proactively adopted such repatriation policies whilst some of the smaller organisations had been reluctant to do so because of the potential financial liability in paying for child migrants' return fares, 'however unsuitable or unhappy' a child might be (see p.27).

²³⁸⁹ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, March 2018, pp.71-72; see also Boys' Aftercare Records (1957-1960), BAR.001.006.0397-0423.

²³⁹⁰ See Girls Aftercare Reports (Jan 1957-Jan 1962), BAR.001.006.0362-0392.

²³⁹¹ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 11 hearing, p.55, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1619/view/public-hearing-transcript-11th-july-2017.pdf>

children sent overseas was also offered to parents who might be considering the possibility of consenting to their child's migration.²³⁹² In addition to these individual reports, managers in charge of individual residential institutions run by Dr Barnardo's Homes were also required to submit monthly institutional reports to Barnardo's general manager in New South Wales. It does not appear, however, that these regular monthly reports were passed back as a matter of course to Dr Barnardo's Homes in the UK.

3.2 The level of detail in reports on individual children varied.²³⁹³ The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse noted some instances of after-care reports on individual children by Barnardo's officers in Australia which clearly suggested an understanding of the individual needs and interests of the child.

3.3 Although this standard of reporting broadly met that encouraged by the Home Office and its Advisory Council on Child Care, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse also noted evidence that the volume of these reports meant that they were not closely read as a matter of course by staff working on child emigration in Dr Barnardo's Homes in the UK.²³⁹⁴ Although they seem likely to have been read more closely by staff in Australia, and cases of serious problems with individual children identified, Dr Barnardo's Homes staff in the UK appear to have recognised at the time that their knowledge of an individual child's progress was less detailed than it would have been had that child remained in the UK.²³⁹⁵ Evidence received by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse also suggested that concern had been expressed by the chair of the UK management committee for Dr Barnardo's Homes in 1958 that there was some resistance in the New South Wales body of Dr Barnardo's Homes to giving Barnardo's staff in the UK the right to inspect their work and that the UK organisation had no power to compel them to do so.²³⁹⁶ This reflected problems in governance arrangements between a UK 'parent' organisation

²³⁹² See form letter to parents of prospective child migrants, 21st August 1952, BAR.001.006.0071.

²³⁹³ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 11 hearing, pp.46-50, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1619/view/public-hearing-transcript-11th-july-2017.pdf>

²³⁹⁴ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.71-72.

²³⁹⁵ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 11 hearing, pp.35, 52-54, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1619/view/public-hearing-transcript-11th-july-2017.pdf>

²³⁹⁶ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 11 hearing, pp.56-57, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1619/view/public-hearing-transcript-11th-july-2017.pdf>

and their overseas affiliates which were also experienced by the Fairbridge Society (see 4.6 below).

3.4 Whilst the level of individual monitoring of children operated by Dr Barnardo's Homes, and regular contact with its General Manager in New South Wales, potentially provided important safeguarding measures for supervising child migrants' welfare, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse also found that these systems did not always ensure effective transfer of knowledge, specifically in cases of sexual abuse. In 1955, for example, it is not clear that Dr Barnardo's Homes in the UK were aware that a staff member had been dismissed from the farm school at Mowbray Park, Picton, New South Wales, following allegations of 'indiscreet fondling' of children.²³⁹⁷ In May 1958, Dr Barnardo's Homes became aware of a number of cases of sexual abuse against children in its care through a third party rather than through its own internal monitoring processes.²³⁹⁸ When prosecutions were pursued against the perpetrators of this abuse through the summer and autumn of 1958, there is also no apparent record of these prosecutions in the minutes of Dr Barnardo's Homes UK Management Committee despite members of the UK management committee having visited New South Wales that summer to undertake their own investigation (see also 3.6 below).²³⁹⁹

3.5 In addition to reports on individual child migrants and receiving institutions, UK staff from Dr Barnardo's Homes also visited New South Wales either as part of general reviews of its receiving institutions for child migrants and policies on child migration, or in response to more urgent problems. For example, in 1948, Mr Kirkpatrick, the charity's UK General Superintendent, visited New South Wales to review its child migration work and subsequently produced a short report on this for the chairman of Barnardo's migration sub-committee.²⁴⁰⁰ Kirkpatrick noted cases in which child migrants placed with foster carers in New South Wales in the inter-war period did not always feel that they had been well-treated or given enough support in developing their lives in Australia, despite a system of them receiving visits from people associated with the charity. He also recognised that the original policy aim of child migration to add to the agricultural work-force (or domestic work, for girls) had meant that there had been too little flexibility in the kinds of work and levels of

²³⁹⁷ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.65-66.

²³⁹⁸ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.68.

²³⁹⁹ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 11 hearing, pp.7-30, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1619/view/public-hearing-transcript-11th-july-2017.pdf>

²⁴⁰⁰ See Kirkpatrick to MacAndrew, 26th May 1948, BAR.001.006.0046-0051.

education that child migrants had been able to pursue. Thought was also given as to how child migrants' loneliness might be addressed and they be given more support in being able to integrate into local communities.²⁴⁰¹

3.6 When senior management of Dr Barnardo's Homes in the United Kingdom became aware of investigations of sexual offences against boys who had been migrated to the charity's farm school at Picton in New South Wales in 1958, the charity sent a delegation to New South Wales. This was led by its General Superintendent, Mr Lucette, to support the investigation and liaise with Australian and UK government officials. Working with the charity's New South Wales General Manager, the Commonwealth Department of Immigration and local police and child welfare officials, this delegation established that there was no further risk of sexual assault from staff remaining at Picton. On this basis, Dr Barnardo's Homes were able successfully to ask the Commonwealth Minister for Immigration (and later the United Kingdom Commonwealth Relations Office) to lift temporary bans that had been placed on their child migration work when they had become aware of these cases of sexual abuse. Whilst there are questions as to whether Dr Barnardo's Homes gave a fully accurate understanding of past offences that had taken place at the Picton farm school to the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse nevertheless described the visit of UK staff to support the investigation as 'an appropriate procedural response [which indicated that] Barnardo's appreciated the seriousness of the matter'.²⁴⁰²

3.7 In 1967, a report was produced by a Barnardo's officer, Miss Dyson, based on a three-week review of the charity's work in New South Wales on how receiving institutions were managing problems that they faced, how individual child migrants had progressed and what improvements might be made to the charity's migration work.²⁴⁰³ Whilst supporting the charity's continuation of its child migration programme, Dyson's report showed a willingness both to record views and experiences of child migrants that were critical of the organisations' work, for example, in relation to the effectiveness of their preparation for migration,²⁴⁰⁴ and to

²⁴⁰¹ See also the report on structures and conditions for Barnardo's work with child migrants in New South Wales, in Notes on Migration to New South Wales for the Committee of Management, April 1953, BAR.001.006.0074-0080.

²⁴⁰² See IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.68-69.

²⁴⁰³ *Three Weeks with Barnardo's in Australia*, September 1967, BAR.001.006.0028-0045.

²⁴⁰⁴ *Three Weeks with Barnardo's in Australia*, p.25 (MIII.157-158).

identify past failures from which future practice should be improved.²⁴⁰⁵ Dyson's report also identified ways in which existing communication between the charity's staff in New South Wales and parents of child migrants in the United Kingdom could be further improved.²⁴⁰⁶ Whilst the report's endorsement of child migration work several years after most other sending organisations in the United Kingdom had ended this work might be criticised, Dyson's report nevertheless reflected a clear attempt to provide evidence about child migrants' experiences in Australia that could inform future organisational practice.

3.8 Whilst there were evidently some weaknesses in its systems (for example in terms of the extent to which reports on individual child migrants were read by staff back in the UK), Dr Barnardo's Homes had means both of monitoring the welfare of individual child migrants and wider conditions in its institutions.

Monitoring Systems Implemented by the Fairbridge Society

4.1 By 1945, the Fairbridge Society was aware of the need for effective monitoring of the welfare of children in its farm schools overseas as a result of a number of incidents and issues that had occurred immediately before and during the war years.²⁴⁰⁷ These included the dismissal of two members of staff who had sexually abused child migrants at the Prince of Wales Farm School in British Columbia, one of whom was convicted, and the production in 1944 of a critical report on standards at the farm school by Isobel Harvey, the Superintendent of Child Welfare for British Columbia. In 1940, Mr Beauchamp, the Principal of the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong, New South Wales, was forced to resign by the Fairbridge New South Wales Committee following allegations of a number of incidents of sexual behaviour both between children at the farm school and between a number of boys and a member

²⁴⁰⁵ See for example, cases in which it was noted that some poor selection choices were made in situations where children were added too quickly to pre-arranged migration parties or there were unhelpful delays in the sending of records from the United Kingdom to the General Manager in New South Wales, *Three Weeks with Barnardo's in Australia*, p.26 (MIV.165), p.28 (MIV.172).

²⁴⁰⁶ *Three Weeks with Barnardo's in Australia*, p.28 (MIV.173). See also her suggestions about how child migrants in Australia might be supported to make one-off visits back to England to be able to see family, in cases where they were anxious about them, *Three Weeks with Barnardo's in Australia*, p.29 (MIV.178).

²⁴⁰⁷ These are discussed in summary form in IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.79-85, and in more detail in Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 12 hearing, pp.47-179, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1619/view/public-hearing-transcript-11th-july-2017.pdf>

of staff in the Principal's own house.²⁴⁰⁸ In 1943, following the case of the sexual abuse of girls at the Northcote Farm School in Victoria (for which Fairbridge acted as the recruiting body) by two teachers at their local school, the Principal resigned amidst wider concerns about risks to children posed by poor standards of management at the farm school.²⁴⁰⁹ In response to this case, the London office of the Fairbridge Society wrote to Lord Grey, the chair of the trustees of the Lady Northcote Trust, to indicate that before sending any more children they would need better communication from its Principal about children's welfare and progress there. In particular, the London office commented to Lord Grey that the Northcote trustees should 'realise that schools of this kind cannot be left to run themselves but require constant supervision by all parties responsible for their welfare'.²⁴¹⁰ The Fairbridge Society in the UK also had significant concerns about standards and management at the Pinjarra Farm School in Western Australia to the extent of compiling its own dossier of concerns about the institution.²⁴¹¹ In 1944, the farm school at Pinjarra was also the subject of critical reports produced separately both by an independent visitor for the Australian Commonwealth Government²⁴¹² and Walter Garnett of the UK High Commission which made criticisms about the standards of management, staffing and training at farm schools associated with Fairbridge.

4.2 This awareness of the need to check on the progress and welfare of children they had sent overseas was also linked to growing concern in the London headquarters of the Fairbridge Society about its governance relations with its two main farm schools in Australia, at Pinjarra and Molong. In both cases, the farm schools had been established with a significant degree of autonomy from the UK Fairbridge Society. The Pinjarra farm school had been established, with its own local committee, by Kingsley Fairbridge, before the London headquarters of what was then the Child Emigration Society was formally constituted. Similarly, the farm school at Molong was developed primarily by a group in New South Wales whose local fund-raising activities, and incorporation of Fairbridge New South Wales for tax purposes, limited the extent to which the London office of Fairbridge could direct their

²⁴⁰⁸ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation*, Day 12 transcript, 12th July 2017, pp.94-99.

²⁴⁰⁹ Garnett to Wiseman, 4th June 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1, LEG.001.004.4466.

²⁴¹⁰ See Green to Wiseman with enclosures, 15th October 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1.

²⁴¹¹ Extract from letter from Garnett, 9th March 1944, LEG.001.004.4008, and Green to Wiseman with enclosures, 21st April 1944, TNA: DO35/1330, pp.47-104, LEG.001.003.4907-4964.

²⁴¹² See note by Peters with enclosures, 26th June 1944, NAA: A436, 1945/5/54. NAA-000000052.

work.²⁴¹³ From 1937 onwards, senior figures in the Fairbridge Society's London office raised on-going concerns with ministers and civil servants in the Dominions Office about the limited control they could exert over the management and conditions at these Australian farm schools.²⁴¹⁴ Concern about standards of training and after-care at Pinjarra also reportedly led to Fairbridge's London office threatening to withhold funding or further child migrants for the work in Western Australia. The response of the Dominions Office was to try to seek informal resolutions between Fairbridge's UK and Australian operations and to avoid being caught in the role of a mediator in this conflict.²⁴¹⁵ Some officials and ministers, including Walter Garnett at the UK High Commission in Canberra, also interpreted the attempts by Fairbridge's London office to control matters in Australia as an expression of older colonialist attitudes of imposing British control over its Dominions that was not in keeping with the wider political trend of the inter-war period towards much greater recognition of the autonomy of Britain's Dominions.²⁴¹⁶ Despite this limited support from the UK Government, the General Secretary of Fairbridge's UK society continued to press for it to be able to have greater influence over operations in Australia, and by 1945 had seriously raised the possibility with the Dominions Office that no further children might be sent to Pinjarra or Molong if standards of training and after-care were not improved.²⁴¹⁷

4.3 Concern amongst Fairbridge's London officers about problems of ensuring effective standards of training and after-care were being provided at its overseas farm schools was such that the Society submitted a memorandum to the Curtis Committee arguing that child migration should only operate on the basis that children should not receive lower standards of care overseas than would be the case if they remained in the UK post-Curtis.²⁴¹⁸ This memorandum, along with some

²⁴¹³ On this organisational history, see Memorandum by Green, 26th June 1937, and note of meeting on 28th June, 1937, TNA: DO35/691/5 on submitted copy, LEG.001.003.3383-3388.

²⁴¹⁴ See for example, note of meeting on 28th June, 1937, TNA: DO35/691/5, on submitted copy and note 26th November 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, LEG.001.004.3801-3802.

²⁴¹⁵ See for example, note by Plant, 8th July 1937, TNA: DO35/691/5, on submitted copy.

²⁴¹⁶ See for example, note by Parker, 18th December, 1945, DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.

²⁴¹⁷ See for example, Green to Wiseman, 31st August, 1945, and Report on Farm Schools in Australia by Mr W. Garnett and Comments of the General Secretary of the Fairbridge Farm Schools, Inc., TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, LEG.001.004.4047-4087.

²⁴¹⁸ Memorandum, 25th January 1946, ULSCA.F: H6/2/14. Fairbridge also provided the Committee with a copy of a memorandum originally submitted by them to the Dominions Office on 25th January 1945 which described both the rationale and working methods of the organisations, and re-iterated its view of the need to ensure appropriate protections for child migrants in Australia (see copies in both ULSCA.F: H6/2/14 and TNA: DO35/1139/M1118/1).

limited evidence that the Curtis Committee appear to have received about concerns about standards at overseas receiving institutions,²⁴¹⁹ seems to have played a significant role in shaping the Curtis Report's recommendation that children should only be migrated overseas, in limited circumstances, if their standards of future care were comparable to those recommended elsewhere in the report.

4.4 The Fairbridge Society's concern, particularly about issues of standards and governance at Pinjarra, led it to liaise closely with the Home Office Children's Department on these issues during the summer of 1947, leading to the Children's Department producing the memorandum discussed in paragraphs 2.7-2.10 above. Whilst being aware of recommended standards of care, the UK Fairbridge Society was not always successful in ensuring that these were appropriately implemented in its overseas farm schools, for example, on issues including the calibre of staff appointments or the numbers of children to be accommodated in its cottage homes. Concerns about standards at both the Molong and Pinjarra farm schools continued to be raised repeatedly in the post-war period.²⁴²⁰ There were also a number of indications, from both Pinjarra and Molong, that forms of corporal punishment being used with children exceeded those recommended in the Home Office's 1951 Memorandum on the Conduct of Children's Homes which identified standards of care expected in children's residential homes run by local authorities and voluntary organisations in the UK.²⁴²¹

4.5 In 1948, the Fairbridge Society implemented a policy for Principals at its overseas farm schools in which they were expected to produce reports on individual children both for the period in which they were living at the farm schools as well as after-care reports, up to the age of 21, after they had left them.²⁴²² Whilst examples of reports submitted to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse and this Inquiry indicated some understanding of individual children, there were also

²⁴¹⁹ See Note for Mr Green, 5th October 1945, ULSCA.F: H6/2/14.

²⁴²⁰ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.91-94.

²⁴²¹ See for example, IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.93; also Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 2, pp.6-11, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1046/view/public-hearing-transcript-28th-february-2017.pdf> Compare with Memorandum by the Home Office on the Conduct of Children's Homes, 1951, especially Appendix III, copy on TNA: DO35/6383, pp.195-214 on submitted copy.

²⁴²² The principle of the requirement for regular reporting had also been understood soon after Kingsley Fairbridge established his farm school at Pinjarra, with his London executive committee requesting quarterly reports on each boy in order to be able to provide annual reports that were required by agreements made with Boards of Guardians from whom those children had been recruited (see Sherington & Jeffrey, *Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration*, pp.50-51).

indications that these reports were not consistently provided at the frequency expected. One Fairbridge document in 1958 indicated that 'great difficulty' was being experienced in obtaining these reports from the then Principal at Molong.²⁴²³ The Independent Inquiry also took the view, on the basis of evidence received, that more general inspection visits of the farm schools, particularly by members of the local overseas committees, were not sufficiently effective in identifying difficulties within these institutions.²⁴²⁴

4.6 Whilst there was, therefore, an attempt by Fairbridge to implement a system of monitoring of child migrants it had sent overseas in the context of a wider organisational appreciation of the need to monitor institutions receiving them overseas, this did not operate in ways that provided significant safeguards from the physical and sexual abuse, and poor emotional and educational support, that many former Fairbridge residents have described. The discrepancy between the Society's awareness of the need for monitoring the overseas farm schools to which it sent children and systems for doing this, and such failures in safeguarding, suggests that whilst such awareness and systems might have been a necessary safeguard for child migrants, they were not in themselves sufficient to protect them.

4.7 There are a number of possible factors that may explain this discrepancy. Unlike some other voluntary organisations involved in this work, the Fairbridge Society had been created specifically to undertake child migration. From its inception whilst Kingsley Fairbridge was a Rhodes scholar at the University of Oxford, the Society had a philanthropic ethos that found support from a network of establishment figures, including senior colonial administrators, senior army officers, peers and members of the Royal Family. The early death of Kingsley Fairbridge supported an organisational narrative of a founder who had heroically given his life in pursuit of a vision to benefit both poor children and the British Empire.²⁴²⁵ Repeated praise for the Society's work further consolidated a sense of public value in it, even if Fairbridge's London staff understood that there were significant problems in the governance and standards of farm schools that it was sending children to.²⁴²⁶

²⁴²³ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.90.

²⁴²⁴ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.90.

²⁴²⁵ See for example, the preface and epilogue written by Leo Amery and Sir Arthur Lawley, respectively, to Kingsley Fairbridge, *The Autobiography of Kingsley Fairbridge*, London: Oxford University Press, 1927.

²⁴²⁶ See for example, *Report to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy*, cmd. 4689, London: HMSO, 1934, pp.45-49; also commendation of

The Society's fusion of class-based philanthropy and enthusiasm for building up the British Empire led to staff being appointed to senior roles in its farm schools who shared this ethos but who had little or no previous training or experience in residential child-care.²⁴²⁷ Whilst senior figures in the Fairbridge Society in the UK had proactively sought to encourage the Curtis Committee to recommend good standards be maintained at overseas institutions receiving child migrants and were well aware of the wider standards recommended by Curtis, a belief in the value of its work amongst its staff and supporters led it to continue its child migration work despite evident failures to maintain those standards. The belief that the Fairbridge Society was transforming children's lives by removing them from slums and enabling them to find new opportunities for their lives in the open lands of the Dominions, meant that when its London officers became aware of problems they tended to focus more on failures in training rather than the emotional effects of placing children in cottage homes with unsuitable cottage mothers.²⁴²⁸ The Fairbridge Society might therefore be seen as exemplifying how any benefits from organisational attempts to monitor the welfare of child migrants overseas could be compromised by factors including the fragmented governance structures of an organisation, the failure in an organisational culture to pay adequate effect to children's emotional lives and the ways in which a belief in the inherent value of an organisation's work could lead to insufficient recognition being given to sustained evidence of its harmfulness.

4.8 There are certain similarities between the post-war child migration work of Dr Barnardo's Homes and the Fairbridge Society in that there are indications that both organisations sought to implement standards in keeping with those recommended by the Home Office Children's Department and the Home Office Advisory Council on Child Care. In addition to the reporting systems on individual children noted above, both organisations also appear to have sought to adopt recommended standards of selection involving case committees.²⁴²⁹ However, evidence provided to the

Pinjarra by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Malcom MacDonald in *Fairbridge Farm Schools: Child Emigration Society, Annual Report, 1934*, pp.30-31, Batty Library: 362.732 FAI.

²⁴²⁷ See for example, the criticisms of the lack of relevant childcare experience of Principals of Fairbridge farm schools in William Garnett, 'Report on Farm Schools in Australia', TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, LEG.001.004.4047-4087.

²⁴²⁸ See for example, Fairbridge's focus on problems in training and preparation for work in note 26th November 1943, LEG.001.004.3801-3802, and Green to Wiseman with enclosures, 21st April 1944, TNA: DO35/1330, pp.47-104, LEG.001.003.4907-4964, despite Fairbridge's dossier of complaints about Pinjarra also including allegations of bad treatment of child migrants by cottage mothers.

²⁴²⁹ See for example, paragraph 6 of the draft s.33 regulations being considered by the Home Office Advisory Council in January 1952, TNA: MH102/1784, pp.20-21 on submitted copy. A description of the systems used by Dr Barnardo's Homes for the selection of child migrants is described in a

Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse indicated that Dr Barnardo's Homes had implemented this policy earlier than Fairbridge,²⁴³⁰ and that it was not clear that parental consent had been appropriately obtained in all cases of children sent by Fairbridge.²⁴³¹ The Independent Inquiry also noted other evidence which suggested that standards of governance and care were perceived at the time as having been better for Dr Barnardo's Homes' child migration work than for the Fairbridge Society.²⁴³²

Monitoring Systems Implemented by Catholic Organisations

The Catholic Church

5.1 As will be discussed further in this section, the involvement of the Catholic Church in the migration of Scottish children took administratively complex forms involving organisational relationships that extended across the United Kingdom. To set the work of Scottish Catholic organisations in context, this section will begin, first, by noting the role of the Catholic Child Welfare Council (CCWC), a consultative body of diocesan child welfare representatives for England and Wales, including knowledge of criticisms of standards in Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia before the resumption of post-war child migration in 1947. It will then consider the involvement of different bodies within the Catholic Church in Scotland. The nature and extent of monitoring of child migrants by these various organisations will then be considered.

5.2 As noted elsewhere in this report (App. 1, 2.1-2.3), the UK High Commissioner to Australia, Sir Ronald Cross, submitted a critical report to the Dominions Office on conditions at the Christian Brothers' farm school at Tardun following a visit he had

memorandum by Barnardo's to the Home Office dated 8th February 1949, TNA: MH102/2328, pp.29-38 on submitted copy.

²⁴³⁰ See IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.70 and 89; [REDACTED]

²⁴³¹ See, for example, Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 2, pp.32-50, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1046/view/public-hearing-transcript-28th-february-2017.pdf> which documents a complex case in which Fairbridge appears, inaccurately, to have had parental consent for the emigration of Marcelle O'Brien, with their local representative having previously argued that consent should not be sought from the mother on the grounds that this might lead the mother to seek to regain custody of her daughter. The migration of Marcelle O'Brien at the age of 4, in 1949, was also at a much younger age than had been thought acceptable by staff in the Home Office Children's Department (see 2.5 above), given that she was not being migrated with an older sibling.

²⁴³² IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.72.

made there in October 1942. The Dominions Office drew this report to the attention of Bernard Griffin, then an auxiliary bishop in Birmingham (and who became Archbishop of Westminster in 1943) and Canon Craven of the Crusade of Rescue (the child rescue society for the Archdiocese of Westminster).²⁴³³ Both men had active roles in the arrangement that had been made for the migration of children to Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia in 1938 and 1939, with Griffin serving as the administrative liaison for financial claims for these children under the terms of the Dominions Office's maintenance agreement with the Christian Brothers, and Craven serving as Secretary for the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement which had been the sending organisation recognised by the UK Government for the 1938/1939 migration parties. Griffin reportedly responded to Cross's report with considerable concern and promised to raise the issues highlighted directly with the Christian Brothers.²⁴³⁴ Dominions Office officials discouraged him from doing this, however, until further reports on Tardun were received. After receiving a report from Australian officials (see Appendix 2, 2.4), there is no evidence that the Dominions Office made any subsequent contact with Griffin to ask him to take any further action.

5.3 The Dominions Office also made Canon Craven aware of criticisms made of Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, particularly Castledare, in the report produced by Walter Garnett in 1944 (see Appendix 2, 2.11-2.13). Craven is recorded as having given the following response to this report at a meeting with officials in the Dominions Office on 13th February 1945:

He [Craven] told me that it had always been intended that representatives of the Catholic Council should go out to Western Australia to inspect the Christian Brothers Institutions but that this intention had been stopped by the war. They were not satisfied with conditions of those institutions and before they would allow any other children to go out to Australia a visit would have to be paid to examine the conditions on the spot and ascertain that the deficiencies were remedied. This represented their general attitude to Mr Garnett's report and they were very grateful for having been supplied with it. Canon Craven told me that he had ceased to be the Secretary of the Council and that the man now in charge was the Reverend W. Flint, Fr Hudson's Homes... Canon Craven was still a member of Council and likely to succeed Archbishop of Westminster as

²⁴³³ See note of contact from Sir Ronald Cross, note of minute of meeting with Craven and Griffin and report by Sir Ronald Cross on Tardun, TNA, DO35/1138/M1020/1, pp.1-3, 4, and 15-19 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.4473-4476 and 4487-4491.

²⁴³⁴ Minute of meeting with Archbishop Griffin and Canon Craven, 23rd March 1943, TNA, DO35/1138/M1120/1, p.4 on submitted copy.

Chairman. In particular they were not satisfied with the conditions at Castledare or at Tardun, although it was noted that the Archbishop of Perth had arranged for the Sisters of Nazareth to assume responsibility for the domestic arrangements at Castledare after the war. In referring to paragraph 7(c) of the report he also said that he was quite aware that Brother Conlon required watching and that it was necessary to see that the Christian Brothers did not try to absorb the children into their own Institutions, rather than allow them freely to choose their own vocation.²⁴³⁵

5.4 In May 1946, Griffin (now Archbishop of Westminster) and Craven met with Archbishop Simonds (the Archbishop of Melbourne) and Brother Conlon who had come to the UK on behalf of the Catholic Church in Australia to make arrangements for the resumption of child migration to Catholic institutions in Western Australia. On the basis of this discussion, Griffin agreed to convene an urgent meeting of the CCWC—the collective body for all administrative officers of diocesan child rescue societies in England and Wales—to discuss their proposal. Griffin and Craven did not raise criticisms made by Cross and Garnett in this conversation with Simonds and Conlon. Moreover, despite later indicating to the CCWC that they intended to raise these concerns with Conlon before he finished his recruitment trip, there is no indication that this was ever done.²⁴³⁶ It has been claimed that Br Conlon was also aware of cases of sexual abuse of boys at institutions run by the Christian Brothers before he made this recruitment trip, and that he had also previously expressed concerns to the Christian Brothers' General Council at the slowness with which the Brothers' Provincial Council in Australia had dealt with such cases.²⁴³⁷

5.5 The CCWC normally met in full only on an annual basis, but the extraordinary meeting specifically to discuss the possible resumption of child migration to Australia was quickly organised and was held on 13th June 1946.²⁴³⁸ Unlike other examples of minutes for annual meetings of the CCWC, the minutes for this meeting about the resumption of child migration were written up as being 'strictly confidential'. It is unclear why these notes were marked as being strictly confidential. One possibility is

²⁴³⁵ Minute of meeting with Canon Craven, 13th February 1945, TNA, DO35/1139/M1126/1, p.2 on submitted copy, LEG.001.002.1281.

²⁴³⁶ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 15, pp.152-155, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/2047/view/public-hearing-transcript-17th-july-2017.pdf>

²⁴³⁷ See Barry Coldrey, "*Reaping the Whirlwind*": *the Christian Brothers and Sexual Abuse of Boys 1920 to 1994*, private report submitted to the General Council of the Christian Brothers (no date), pp.58-62. See also Lynch, *Possible collusion*, <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

²⁴³⁸ Minutes of extraordinary meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, June 1946, BEW.001.001.0015-0018.

that this reflected a desire to avoid drawing attention to this scheme to other non-Catholic migration organisations so that as many Catholic child migrants as possible could be sent under the auspices of Catholic organisations who would protect those children's Catholic faith (see also 5.12 below). Despite being broadly aware of Conlon's recruitment initiative that year and having sought to discourage it, staff in the Dominions Office and UK High Commission in Canberra only seem to have become aware of the detail of plans for child migration by Catholic organisations in the spring of 1947. As with discussions with Scottish Catholic representatives around the same time, however, the concern for confidentiality may have reflected more the desire to avoid non-Catholic voluntary organisations becoming aware of this initiative (see 5.12 below).

5.6 Prior to this meeting, members of the CCWC had already received a version of Garnett's comments on the Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, but with the identities of the institutions anonymised.²⁴³⁹ At the CCWC meeting in June 1946, Craven argued that Garnett's criticisms related to conditions that were the result of war-time pressures, and that these should not discourage the resumption of children's migration to these institutions. Whilst some of Garnett's criticisms did indeed relate to war-time issues (such as the requisitioning of the Christian Brothers' institution at Clontarf by the Royal Australian Air Force, which led to over-crowding at Tardun after boys were transferred there from Clontarf), not all did (such as Garnett's concerns about staffing and accommodation at Castledare).²⁴⁴⁰ Craven's intervention appears to have given sufficient reassurance to other members of the CCWC, as they decided at that meeting to support the resumption of Catholic child migration to Australia on the basis that Br Conlon's recruitment work would be undertaken through collaboration with the relevant child rescue administrators for each diocese.

5.7 Craven did not mention his view about the need for the CCWC to do an independent inspection of Christian Brothers' institutions before any further child migrants should be sent there at the June meeting of the CCWC. He did, however, mention this at the CCWC annual meeting in November 1946.²⁴⁴¹ He also re-iterated

²⁴³⁹ Wiseman to Murphy, 10th November 1945, TNA, DO35/1139/M1126-2, p.20 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.5053.

²⁴⁴⁰ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 15, pp.152-153, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/2047/view/public-hearing-transcript-17th-july-2017.pdf>

²⁴⁴¹ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.140; minutes of the meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, November 1947, BEW.001.001.0112-0118.

the need for such an inspection in a meeting with officials at the Dominions Office in January 1947 at which he commented that:

there could be no actual movement of children for some considerable time and certainly not until the Catholic Council were completely satisfied as the settlement arrangements in Australia. The main concern of the Council was to safeguard the welfare of the children, and he had in mind the somewhat critical reports on the living conditions for children in the Christian Brothers' Institutions in Western Australia. Consequently, he had tried to persuade Brother Conlon that the Council could not be advised to take energetic action at this stage, and that they might find it necessary for a representative (presumably Canon Craven) to go out on a tour of inspection before agreeing to the departure of any parties of children.²⁴⁴²

Evidence provided to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, however, indicated that active efforts had already been made by Br Conlon during the late summer and autumn of 1946 to identify suitable children for migration apparently with the support of diocesan child rescue officers, with 260 children already approved for migration by Conlon by early October 1946 (on this, see also Appendix 4, 2.3).²⁴⁴³

5.8 On 29 July 1947, after receiving updated reports from Australian State officials supporting the migration of 340 children to Catholic institutions in Western Australia (see Appendix 2, 3.7), Commonwealth Relations Office officials noted that they should contact Canon Craven to indicate that, on the basis of these reports, all of the proposed receiving institutions (with the possible exception of Castledare) should be regarded as now approved for receiving child migrants by the UK Government.²⁴⁴⁴ It is not clear whether this contact with Craven was made. It is clear, however, that firm arrangements had already been made prior to this by Br Conlon, the Sisters of Nazareth and Canon Flint (on behalf of the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement) for the migration of children to these institutions.²⁴⁴⁵ At least some

²⁴⁴² Minute of meeting with Craven, 3rd January 1947, TNA, DO35/1139/M1126/2, p.9 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.5042.

²⁴⁴³ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 15, pp.46-47, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/2047/view/public-hearing-transcript-17th-july-2017.pdf>

²⁴⁴⁴ See minute at TNA: DO35/3386, pp.8-9 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.5440-5441.

²⁴⁴⁵ An analysis undertaken by Prof Lynch of a sample of LEM3 forms for 110 children sent to Catholic institutions in Western Australia in the autumn of 1947, submitted in digitised form through the National Archives of Australia (series PP93/10) indicates that 61 of these children had already received pre-migration medical checks earlier in July before the suggestion had been made in the Dominions

members of the CCWC were actively involved in this process as well (including Fr Leahy, the child rescue administrator for the Diocese of Clifton).²⁴⁴⁶ The advanced nature of arrangements for children's migration by mid-July 1947, with the first party of children sent to Catholic institutions in Western Australia departing on the SS Asturias on 29th August, 1947, suggests that the commitment not to send children to these institutions before an independent inspection of them was made by Catholic representatives from the UK was not being adhered to.

5.9 Although there are indications that the lack of direct inspection of Catholic receiving institutions in Australia continued to be raised by members of the Catholic Child Welfare Council²⁴⁴⁷, the witness on behalf of the Catholic Church for England and Wales for the child migration programmes investigation by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse accepted that no such inspections ever took place.²⁴⁴⁸

5.10 The administrative processes through which Catholic child migration from England and Wales occurred from autumn 1947 onwards are, at times, difficult to discern because of the different organisations involved and the complex arrangements between them. Officials in the Dominions Office appear to have believed that they were liaising with Canon Craven in his capacity as a member of the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement (CCBOS)—the body involved in negotiating the 1938/1939 parties of Catholic child migrants—and appeared unaware that the Catholic Child Welfare Council (CCWC) was the primary body with whom Br Conlon was working with in 1946/1947.²⁴⁴⁹ Despite the CCWC's important

Office of contacting Craven to notify him of the approval of these institutions. An Excel spreadsheet of this analysis has been submitted to the Inquiry. Canon Flint, on behalf of the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement, had also written to the Dominions Office on 24th April and 15th July 1947 to request clarification about the UK Government's financial contribution towards these child migrants, noting in the later letter that this was now becoming an urgent issue as the first group of children had already been selected for migration and were ready to sail at the end of August (see TNA: DO35/3386, p.147).

²⁴⁴⁶ This is indicated both by Conlon signing as the representative of the CCWC, as well as Fr Leahy's signature both on behalf of the CCWC and as the person giving consent, on LEM3 forms for children who had pre-migration medical checks prior to the end of July 1947 (see analysis referred to in note 109).

²⁴⁴⁷ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.140.

²⁴⁴⁸ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 16, pp.44-45, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/2170/view/public-hearing-transcript-18th-july-2017.pdf>

²⁴⁴⁹ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 15, pp.137-139, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/2047/view/public-hearing-transcript-17th-july-2017.pdf>

role at this time, it appears that there was an agreement endorsed by Archbishop Griffin that whilst members of the CCWC would support Conlon's recruitment work, the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement would be the body that liaised administratively with the UK Government.²⁴⁵⁰ In practice, this may well have made little difference as the constitution of the CCBOS indicated that its child emigration sub-committee should be made up of the same diocesan child-care representatives who made up the membership of the CCWC.²⁴⁵¹ Lack of clarity about these organisational relationships was not limited to the UK Government. When it published its report on *Child Emigration* in the spring of 1951, the Women's Group on Public Welfare also believed that the CCBOS was the lead body arranging Catholic child migration from the UK, as did John Moss when writing his 1953 report.²⁴⁵²

5.11 Whilst the CCWC was clearly a central administrative point of contact for representatives of the Catholic Church in Australia who were seeking to recruit child migrants, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was not able to establish the CCWC's precise role in the selection of children.²⁴⁵³ Australian Catholic officials had been told since the Catholic Child Welfare Council meeting in June 1946 to undertake their recruitment work in conjunction with the diocesan child rescue administrators who formed the constituent members of the CCWC, and the CCWC held details of child migrants sent overseas. However it is not clear whether the CCWC actively made selection decisions about which children should be migrated or merely served as a holding point for details of children that diocesan administrators selected for migration. It is also unclear at this point whether the CCWC held details of children migrated from institutions in Scotland and, if so, what that may have implied for the Council's understanding of their responsibility for the post-migration monitoring of children or whether that responsibility possibly remained with a Catholic organisation in Scotland.

²⁴⁵⁰ On this arrangement see minutes of meeting of Catholic Child Welfare Council, November 1947, BEW.001.001.0116.

²⁴⁵¹ See Griffin to Wiseman, 3rd July 1939, enclosing the new constitution of the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement, TNA: DO35/691/1. This helps to explain how Canon Flint was undertaking child migration work as an administrator for both organisations. See IICSA addendum on Catholic Church, 1.11. See also Flint to Under Secretary of State, 6th July 1948, TNA: DO35/3386, pp.79-80.

²⁴⁵² See for example, WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.19; John Moss, *Child Migration to Australia*, London: Home Office, p.iii.

²⁴⁵³ The letter from Flint to Mother General, 8th February 1954, NAZ.001.006.2539, suggests that at least in the case of the children referred to here, the CCWC was acting as an administrative hub through which applications were being sent to Australia House, but that its central Emigration Committee had not made any active selection decisions in relation to these children.

5.12 A parallel administrative structure appears to have operated for the migration of children from Catholic institutions in Scotland during Conlon's recruitment trip in 1946/1947. In July 1946, Br Conlon met with Lady Margaret Kerr (who was involved in a review of Catholic juvenile migration to Canada in the 1930s)²⁴⁵⁴ and Fr Patrick Quille, a member of the Social Services Committee for the Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh, to discuss his child migration plans. By this stage, it is reported that Donald Campbell, Archbishop of Glasgow, had already given Br Conlon permission from the Scottish Catholic Hierarchy to visit residential homes in their dioceses to select children for migration.²⁴⁵⁵ Minutes from this meeting were written up as confidential, possibly because the plans for Catholic migration were still at an early stage and there was concern that if knowledge of them spread, there might be sectarian attempts to migrate Catholic children through non-Catholic emigration schemes. As the minutes of the Scottish meeting note, 'Some Anglican and other Committees are also parties to the [new assisted migration] scheme. It is, therefore, more urgent than ever to reclaim our children now from non-Catholic voluntary homes.'²⁴⁵⁶ Unlike the CCWC's agreement with Conlon, however, there is no indication that the Scottish Hierarchy required Conlon to liaise with diocesan representatives responsible for Catholic child welfare in their diocese.²⁴⁵⁷

5.13 Br Conlon appears to have initially focused his recruitment work in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and by October 1946, is not recorded as having recruited any children from Scotland.²⁴⁵⁸ By April 1947, Fr Quille was beginning preparations for contacting local authorities in Scotland about the possible recruitment of Catholic children under the care of those authorities.²⁴⁵⁹ In May 1947, a formal agreement was signed between the Australian Catholic Hierarchy and Fr Quille, as Secretary to the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement for Scotland and Northern Ireland (CCBOS S&NI) for an annual payment of A£500 to be made towards administrative costs of arranging the migration of Catholics to

²⁴⁵⁴ See Catalogue entries on emigration since 1926, BSC.001.001.0829.

²⁴⁵⁵ See Minutes of Confidential Meeting in the Catholic Enquiry Office on 19th July 1946, BSC.001.001.0220-0221.

²⁴⁵⁶ Minutes of Confidential Meeting in the Catholic Enquiry Office on 19th July 1946, BSC.001.001.0221.

²⁴⁵⁷ On this requirement from the CCWC, see Murphy to Conlon, 11th July 1946, SCA: DE132/8/4, BSC.001.001.0852.

²⁴⁵⁸ See Simonds to Murphy, 2nd October 1946, BSC.001.001.0210.

²⁴⁵⁹ See Quille to Conlon, 23rd April 1947, SCA: DE132/9/3, BSC.001.001.0199, and Conlon to Quille, 25th April 1947, SCA: DE132/9/3, BSC.001.001.0194-0195.

Australia (including Catholic child migrants).²⁴⁶⁰ The CCBOS (for England and Wales) had been in existence since 1938, formed from a merger of the Catholic Emigration Association and the Catholic Emigration Society.²⁴⁶¹ We do not, at this stage, know whether the CCBOS S&NI was created at the same time as this parallel organisation for England and Wales, or at some later point (including the finalising of this agreement with the Australian Catholic Hierarchy). We do know that Quille's responsibility for the emigration of children from Scotland and Northern Ireland was understood and recognised by the CCWC.²⁴⁶²

5.14 Alongside this involvement of the CCBOS S&NI, there are also regular references to the administration of this child migration work in the minutes of the Archdiocesan Social Services Committee for St Andrews and Edinburgh for the period between September 1946 and November 1948.²⁴⁶³ This raises the possibility that there was a similar overlap in administration between the CCBOS S&NI and the Archdiocesan Social Services Committee, as existed between the CCBOS and the CCWC in England and Wales. It also raises the question as to what form of responsibility the Archdiocesan Social Services Committee had for children being migrated under these arrangements. Given that 58 children were migrated from institutions associated with the Sisters of Nazareth in Northern Ireland through the work of these organisations in 1947²⁴⁶⁴, including a number of who subsequently gave accounts of serious physical and sexual abuse at receiving institutions in Australia to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, questions also arise about the nature of the responsibility of these Scottish organisations for the safeguarding of these children. It is worth noting that members of this Archdiocesan committee were clearly aware of both the Curtis and Clyde reports, and that Fr Quille had attended meetings in both England and Scotland to discuss their implications for Catholic child-care provision.²⁴⁶⁵

5.15 There is considerable inconsistency in the name of the sponsoring organisation used on the LEM3 forms for the 110 children migrated from Scotland

²⁴⁶⁰ See Agreement between the Australian Catholic Hierarchy and the Rev P.F. Quille, SCA: DE132/9/11, BSC.001.001.0865-0866.

²⁴⁶¹ See circular letter from Griffin to bishops, 6th January 1939, Archives of the Archdiocese of Birmingham; also Griffin to Wiseman, 3rd July 1939, TNA: DO35/691/1.

²⁴⁶² Minutes of meeting of Catholic Child Welfare Council, November 1947, BEW.001.001.0116.

²⁴⁶³ Copies of these minutes are accessible at BSC.001.001.0201-0207, 0322-0326.

²⁴⁶⁴ See Table at AUS-5924 at <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D42-Senior-Counsel-Opening-Docs-Rev-RO.pdf>

²⁴⁶⁵ See Minutes of Archdiocesan Social Services Committee, 19th December 1946, BSC.001.001.4087, and 4th February 1947, BSC.001.001.4097.

and Northern Ireland in 1947. On a sample of forms reviewed for this Inquiry that were signed by Conlon, the sponsoring organisation is identified as either the Catholic Child Welfare Council²⁴⁶⁶, the Catholic Child Welfare Council for Scotland,²⁴⁶⁷ the Scottish Catholic Council for Child Welfare,²⁴⁶⁸ or the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement.²⁴⁶⁹ Forms signed by Fr Quille identify the sponsoring organisation as the Catholic Child Welfare Council,²⁴⁷⁰ in one case the Catholic Child Welfare Committee and in some other cases the Scottish Catholic Migration Society for Australia.²⁴⁷¹ For some children migrated from Nazareth House, Lasswade, the person signing on behalf of the sponsoring body is Sr Ann (or Agnes ?), and the sponsoring organisation is identified as the Catholic Child Welfare Council Birmingham.²⁴⁷² It is not always clear who has filled in the names of the sponsoring organisation on forms signed by Conlon and Sr Ann, although forms using the 'Catholic Child Welfare Council for Scotland' seem more clearly to be in Conlon's hand-writing.²⁴⁷³ In the case of the forms signed by Quille, however, the organisational names are clearly also written in Quille's handwriting.

5.16 It is our understanding that no evidence has been found of the existence of organisations called the Catholic Child Welfare Council for Scotland or the Scottish Catholic Migration Society for Australia.²⁴⁷⁴ A National Committee for Catholic Child Care was established by the Scottish Hierarchy along similar lines to the Catholic Child Welfare Council in England and Wales, but this Scottish body was not created until 1962.²⁴⁷⁵ There is a reference in a document publicising the Catholic child migration scheme which appears (from the reference to Br Conlon's schedule) to date from sometime in the period from late 1946 until the early summer of 1947 and

²⁴⁶⁶ See for example, NAA: PP93/10, files 148, 149, 684, 685. For fuller list see Excel spreadsheet provided to SCAL.

²⁴⁶⁷ See for example, NAA: PP93/10, files 147, 150, NAA-000000046; NAA-000000038. Note the name 'Catholic Child Welfare Council for Scotland' only seems to be used by Conlon in relation to children being sent from residential institutions in Northern Ireland.

²⁴⁶⁸ See for example, NAA: PP93/10, files 702,715, NAA-000000063; NAA-000000040. Again Conlon only uses this organisational name for some children being sent from institutions in Northern Ireland.

²⁴⁶⁹ See for example, NAA: PP93/10, file 445, NAA-000000062.

²⁴⁷⁰ See for example, NAA: PP93/10, files 682, 726, NAA.001.001.1490-1493 and 1514-1517.

²⁴⁷¹ See for example, NAA: PP93/10, file 882, NAA.001.001.1528-1530.

²⁴⁷² See for example, NAA: PP93/10, file 612, NAA-000000039.

²⁴⁷³ For a longer sample of Conlon's hand-writing, see for example, Conlon to Lyons, 3rd May 1938, NAA: A461, M349/1/7, p.164.

²⁴⁷⁴ See also Johnson to Small, 3rd November 1997, BSC.001.001.0827-0828.

²⁴⁷⁵ Constitution of the Scottish National Committee for Catholic Child Care, BSC.001.001.4769-4770; National Committee for Catholic Child Care, Report on Catholic Child Care in Scotland – December 1963, BSC.001.001.4642-4647.

which refers to Catholic Migration Secretaries for Australia who are based in London and Edinburgh.²⁴⁷⁶ This title simply appears to be a way of referring to this work to external bodies and the Scottish Catholic Migration Society for Australia does not appear to have been a formally constituted organisation at any point. It is also unclear why Fr Quille used this organisational name after the agreement signed with the Australian Catholic Hierarchy which identified the CCBOS S&NI as the relevant administrative organisation in Scotland for this work.

5.17 References to the Catholic Child Welfare Council in these three forms would appear to refer to the CCWC whose involvement in child migration work in 1946/1947 has been described above. Although the CCWC had some administrative role in arranging the Catholic child migration parties that sailed in the autumn of 1947, its remit only covered England and Wales and so it is not entirely clear how it could operate as a sponsoring organisation for the migration of children from Scotland and Northern Ireland. If, as seems to have been the case, children from Scotland were migrated under the auspices of the CCWC,²⁴⁷⁷ this would raise questions as to what responsibility the CCWC had for monitoring their welfare after their migration in addition to any responsibility that might have attached to Catholic sending organisations in Scotland.

5.18 This use of names of organisations which did not exist on the LEM3 forms of these children migrated from Scotland and Northern Ireland is a phenomenon that the expert witnesses have not seen in any other LEM3 forms for children migrated in the United Kingdom either by Catholic or other sending organisations. Given that Quille and Conlon, and the names of the institutions from which child migrants had been taken, were clearly identifiable on these LEM3 forms, it is not clear that the use of the names of non-existent organisations necessarily represented a deliberate attempt at deception. At the very least, though, it suggested an institutional culture in which there was a relatively weak emphasis on maintaining clear lines of administrative responsibility that would support effective accountability for that work. Given the confusion in these LEM3 forms, it was not clear which organisation in Scotland was taking primary responsibility for these children's migration and, as such,

²⁴⁷⁶ See Document outlining the Catholic churches emigration proposals, SCA: DE132/11/5, BSC.001.001.0844.

²⁴⁷⁷ See for example, the reference to a party of Scottish child migrants being sent under the auspices of English Catholic migration authorities in 1948 in Statement on Progress of Catholic Scheme of Migration to Australia, Scotland and Northern Ireland, June 1947 to April 1948, BSC.001.001.0288.

might be understood as the 'parent organisation' that might subsequently be expected to monitor their welfare.

5.19 In 1947 and 1948, administrative work for Catholic child migration work continued to be based at the Catholic Enquiry Office, in Edinburgh, supported by an administrator, Norah Menaldo, who was appointed to this work following the financial agreement with the Australian Catholic Hierarchy. Menaldo appears to have taken the lead in writing reports on progress with Catholic emigration to Australia. As noted above, the Social Services Committee for the Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh continued to note and discuss this work in its meetings.²⁴⁷⁸ The Scottish Catholic Hierarchy also received reports on emigration to Australia in general and expressed a strong desire for the arrangement with the Australian Catholic Hierarchy to continue when it appeared that it might lapse in 1948.²⁴⁷⁹

5.20 The Australian Catholic Immigration Committee (ACIC) became the recognised Catholic organisation by the United Kingdom Government for sending child migrants with funding provided under the Empire Settlement Act in 1948.²⁴⁸⁰ Both the CCBOS S&NI administrative address (in the Catholic Enquiry Office, on Victoria Street, Edinburgh) and its administrator who had dealt with child migration work, Norah Menaldo, appear to have transferred over to the ACIC under the direction of the first ACIC administrator, Fr Nicol.²⁴⁸¹ The Edinburgh office for ACIC appears to have closed in 1950, with the administration of Catholic child migration then transferred to ACIC's office in London.²⁴⁸² From this point, no archival records relating to child migration appear to be held by the Catholic Church in Scotland. A complicating factor for understanding this history is that ACIC does not seem to appear as the listed sponsoring organisation on child migrants' LEM3 forms until 1951, after its Edinburgh office had closed.²⁴⁸³ Between 1948 and 1951, children migrated from Scotland by Catholic organisations mainly had the Catholic Child Welfare Council

²⁴⁷⁸ See copies of minutes held at BSC.001.001.4094-4162.

²⁴⁷⁹ See Mellon to Quille, 24th May 1948, BSC.001.001.0295.

²⁴⁸⁰ See Catholic Child Migration to Australia from Scotland and Northern Ireland, 1946-1950, Scottish Catholic Archives, April 2010, BSC.001.001.0163, archival entry for 2nd November 1948; on the United Kingdom Government recognition of ACIC see TNA: DO35/3386.

²⁴⁸¹ See Catholic Child Migration to Australia from Scotland and Northern Ireland, 1946-1950, Scottish Catholic Archives, April 2010, BSC.001.001.0163-0191, paras 1.2, 6.3, 7.2. See also Margaret (surname unknown) to Menaldo, 26th September 1949, BSC.001.001.0219, by which time Menaldo is clearly working as an administrator under ACIC's London office.

²⁴⁸² See Catholic Child Migration to Australia from Scotland and Northern Ireland, 1946-1950, Scottish Catholic Archives, April 2010, BSC.001.001.0163-0191, para 7.6.

²⁴⁸³ See provided Excel spreadsheet, 'SCAI (analysis of LEM3 forms for Catholic child migrants sorted by date).

identified as their sponsoring organisation, with Quille or Menaldo signing those forms on that organisation's behalf (with the exception of three forms signed in the spring of 1949 by Quille and Menaldo on behalf of the Catholic Child Welfare and Migration Committee). Given that, as noted above, the Catholic Child Welfare Council's remit only extended to England and Wales, and Quille and Menaldo were not formal officers or representatives of that Council, the administrative lines of responsibility and accountability are not entirely clear in this instance. This suggests that all subsequent administrative work was undertaken through ACIC's London office and then through ACIC's representatives in the United Kingdom after the closure of the London office by Fr Stinson (Nicol's successor) in the autumn of 1953. These representatives were Canon Flint (in the Archdiocese of Birmingham), for 1954-1956, and Canon Flood (in the Archdiocese of Westminster) from 1956 onwards. During these years, Flint and Flood simultaneously served as both the ACIC representative in the United Kingdom and as the child emigration administrator for the CCWC. Nicol and Stinson could be understood as liaison officers between Catholic organisations in the United Kingdom and Australia, in that they had some contact with both sending organisations in the UK and receiving institutions in Australia. Whilst that might appear to have met the standard of liaison encouraged by the Home Office, in practice the primary focus of Nicol's and Stinson's work was on the recruitment of children from the United Kingdom and they never enabled any detailed monitoring of those children after their migration.

5.21 No systematic monitoring of child migrants' welfare appears to have been undertaken by anybody of the Catholic Church in England and Wales or in Scotland. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse established that the CCWC did not establish any regular or comprehensive system of monitoring child migrants whose details it held, nor was this provided by Australian administrators such as Fr Nicol or Fr Stinson.²⁴⁸⁴ In 1952, most probably in response to the draft s.33 regulations circulated to members of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, on which the CCWC was represented (see 2.29, 2.32 above), the CCWC devised a standard report form to be used by Catholic institutions in Australia to provide information on the welfare of individual children migrated to them. Fr Stinson agreed to the content of this form and was also aware of the need for regular monitoring in relation to the anticipated introduction of s.33 regulations.²⁴⁸⁵

²⁴⁸⁴ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.141.

²⁴⁸⁵ See the discussion of the draft s.33 and development of this monitoring form at the annual meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council attended by Fr Stinson in October 1952, BEW.001.001.0160.

Until that point no attempt had apparently been made within the CCWC to establish a regular system of monitoring for post-war child migrants who had begun to be placed in Catholic institutions in Australia from the autumn of 1947. The CCWC also noted without any apparent concern a report from Fr Stinson to its annual meeting in 1952 in which Stinson indicated that State officials in Western Australia had initially undertaken unannounced inspections of residential institutions (which had generated critical reports on Bindoon and Castledare in 1948, noted in Appendix 2), but that as a result of the Moss visit, these unannounced visits had been stopped and State officials began to convene regular meetings for all organisations involved in child migration in that State (presumably with the intention of providing a positive image of child migration).²⁴⁸⁶ As a result of this process, Stinson commented that ‘a great understanding’ had been developed between the religious orders and Child Welfare officers, and only two pre-announced inspections now took place each year. The fact that such an inspection regime was evidently less rigorous than unannounced inspections should have been evident to members of the CCWC, and it appears that collaboration with State Child Welfare officers which enabled Catholic receiving institutions to continue their work without significant external intervention was regarded as a preferable state of affairs. At its annual meeting in 1953, the CCWC noted that no reports had yet been provided from Australia on the form agreed with Fr Stinson—and at the same meeting noted that 184 Catholic children had migrated within the past year ‘under the signature of Fr Stinson himself’ and that ‘diocesan Secretaries had frequently not been contacted’.²⁴⁸⁷ By 1955, the CCWC’s annual meeting noted that these reports had still not been provided by receiving institutions in Australia, and the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse received no evidence of such reports being received in a comprehensive or regular way after then. A four-page broad evaluation of child migration since 1947 (containing a statistical overview of the scheme but little detailed information about individuals) does appear to have been sent from CEMWA to the CCWC sometime that year.²⁴⁸⁸ A spreadsheet summarising records relating to Scottish child migrants sent under the auspices of Catholic organisations, submitted as an exhibit attached to Dr Keenan’s witness statement, indicates that for the 59 child migrants included on this list, post-migration monitoring reports of any kind were received in relation to only 14 of them, and in nine of these cases consisted only of a single document for the entire

²⁴⁸⁶ See meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, October 1952, BEW.001.001.0158.

²⁴⁸⁷ Minutes of the meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, October 1953, BEW.001.001.0168.

²⁴⁸⁸ CEMWA, ‘British Migrant Children who have come to Western Australia, since World War II’, BEW.001.001.0042-0045.

period of their time in residential care in Australia.²⁴⁸⁹ The five other Scottish child migrants for whom more regular post-migration monitoring reports were all received, from 1956 onwards, were sent to Nazareth House, East Camberwell, an institution discussed in more detail both in this Appendix (see 5.36-5.40 below) and Appendix 4.²⁴⁹⁰ In the absence of a comprehensive monitoring system, information about the welfare of children sent overseas appears to have been provided on an intermittent basis for only some children and by some receiving institutions, with information provided often being very minimal.²⁴⁹¹ In 1956, the Catholic Rescue Society for the Archdiocese of Southwark indicated to the CCWC that it was no longer prepared to consider sending any further child migrants to Australia until it received adequate reports on children already sent from its care.²⁴⁹²

5.22 Members of the CCWC were aware, before 1952, of the Home Office interest in sending organisations' standards of monitoring for children it had sent overseas. In February 1949, an official at the Home Office collated information about sending organisations' policies and working methods to inform the Home Office Advisory Council's initial discussion about the possible content of s.33 regulations (see 2.15 above).²⁴⁹³ This included information about sending organisations' 'arrangements for continued care in the country of emigration', including arrangements made where children were placed into the care of another organisation overseas.²⁴⁹⁴ Canon Flint was contacted by the Home Office for this information in relation to arrangements for Catholic child migrants and appears to have provided information to this request by post.²⁴⁹⁵ In the memorandum summarising information received from sending organisations, the Home Office noted a range of approaches that these organisations reported to monitoring child migrants' welfare overseas. These included receiving three or six monthly reports from receiving institutions, undertaking regular after-care inspection visits with records of these held in the headquarters of organisations in Australia and then returned to head offices in the UK, the UK headquarters

²⁴⁸⁹ See Exhibit RK/8, BEW.001.001.0535-0538.

²⁴⁹⁰ See BEW.001.001.0536.

²⁴⁹¹ See IICSA addendum on Fr Hudson's Care, para 8.1 not currently submitted to SCAI.

²⁴⁹² IICSA Nineteenth Addendum, para 1.15 not currently submitted to SCAI.

²⁴⁹³ See note and memorandum, TNA: MH102/2328, pp.3 and 39-43 on submitted copy, LEG.001.006.2869 and 2904-2909.

²⁴⁹⁴ See MacGregor to Prestige, 25th January 1949, TNA: MH102/2328, p.50 on submitted copy.

²⁴⁹⁵ See TNA: MH102/2328, pp.3 and 48 on submitted copy. A copy of this document, presumably sent by Flint, has not yet been traced in the National Archives.

receiving reports from State Committees²⁴⁹⁶ and supporting continued parental contact with children. Although this memorandum noted variations in practices between organisations, there is no indication in this Home Office memorandum that any sending organisation did not utilise any of the monitoring practices that it described. Given that the Catholic Child Welfare Council did not in fact appear to be utilising any of these monitoring practices, this raises the question as to whether there may have been some misrepresentation of the post-migration monitoring policy of the CCWC in information provided to the Home Office at that point. This is not the only occasion on which information provided to the Home Office appears not to reflect accurately the working practices of Catholic organisations, with a Home Office representative seeming to gain only a partial understanding of the recruitment and selection process for Catholic child migrants from a meeting of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration attended by both Canon Flint and Fr Stinson.²⁴⁹⁷ Home Office Children's Department officials also seemed to have been sceptical about Canon Flint's support for the kind of standards of child-care their Department was seeking to uphold. On seeing that Flint had given evidence to the Oversea Migration Board about child migration in 1955, the Assistant Secretary in the Children's Department with responsibility for child migration work, Mr C.P. Hill, commented that Flint's contributions were 'not likely to be helpful so far as child care is concerned'.²⁴⁹⁸ In the minutes of Flint's meeting with the Board received by the Children's Department, one of the Department's officials underlined Flint's erroneous

²⁴⁹⁶ Presumably this meant reports from State child welfare and immigration inspectors. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse did not find any evidence of UK sending organisations receiving information through direct contact from Australian State officials in this way.

²⁴⁹⁷ At a special meeting of the Council for Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration convened with a representative from the Home Office to discuss revised drafts of the s.33 regulations, the central issue under discussion was sending organisations' practices with regard to the recruitment and selection of children. The Home Office representative appears to have left the meeting understanding that Catholic child migration operated through the Catholic Child Welfare Council as a form of selection committee rather than knowing about the direct recruitment of children from residential homes by Australian administrators (see notes dated 27th October 1952, also notes of meeting with Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, 23rd October 1952, TNA: MH102/2043, part one, pp.16-19 on submitted copy, LEG.001.004.1753-1756. There does seem to have been some awareness of the role of Australian administrators in the recruitment of Catholic child migrants in the report produced by the Women's Group on Public Welfare (WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.19) although the report stated that its understanding of Catholic recruitment and selection processes were far from clear. The fragmented nature of the selection processes – some apparently through members of the CCWC and some through direct recruitment by Australian Catholic representatives – did not easily accord with the standard of organisational selection processes expected in the draft s.33 regulations.

²⁴⁹⁸ See note by Hill, 19th February 1955, TNA: MH102/2053, pp.4-5 on available copy, LEG.001.004.2258-2259.

claim to the Board that Catholic child migrants were settled as soon as possible into Australian families with an accompanying exclamation mark in the margin.²⁴⁹⁹

5.23 In March 1949, the Home Office made a follow-up request specifically to identify any monitoring forms that sending organisations either currently used or had used in the past to check on the welfare of child migrants overseas.²⁵⁰⁰ In this instance, the Home Office contacted Canon Bennett, the diocesan child rescue administrator for the Archdiocese of Liverpool, possibly because of his earlier involvement in pre-war Catholic child migration to Canada. Bennett responded, providing an example of an individual monitoring form used for a child sent to Canada in 1924, and commenting that children now sent to Western Australia became the responsibility of Australian State Governments and no regular reports were received about them.²⁵⁰¹ It is worth noting that, by 1952, Canon Bennett appears to have become unhappy with child migration to Australia and was reported, by Fr Stinson, to be no longer willing to allow Stinson access to recruit children from any residential homes in his Archdiocese.²⁵⁰²

5.24 Therefore, whilst there is evidence to suggest that Canon Flint and the CCWC recognised that some form of post-migration monitoring was being encouraged through contact with the Home Office as early as February 1949, no such system was ever effectively implemented. It is not clear, at this stage, whether it was envisaged that children migrated from Scotland would have been included in the request for annual reports that the CCWC made to residential institutions in Australia or not.

5.25 There is also no evidence of any form of monitoring of child migrants' welfare by bodies associated with the Catholic Church in Scotland. Although the Social Services Committee of the Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh briefly discussed child migration at some of its meetings, available minutes indicate that these discussions concerned basic operational issues. At no point is there any indication that this Social Services Committee either asked for, or received, a report about the welfare of children who had been recruited from Scotland. The only information that the Social Services Committee appear to have received about the

²⁴⁹⁹ See minutes of meeting of Oversea Migration Board, 21st March 1955, copy held on TNA: MH102/2053, pt.2 p.30 on available copy, LEG.001.004.2384.

²⁵⁰⁰ See Davey to Pelly, 24th March 1949, TNA: MH102/1592, p.45 on submitted copy, LEG.001.006.1124.

²⁵⁰¹ Bennett to Davey, 5th April 1949, TNA: MH102/1592, pp.50-51 on submitted copy.

²⁵⁰² See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 19, pp.147-149, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/2460/view/public-hearing-transcript-21st-july-2017.pdf>

welfare of child migrants was a note of a letter received from Redmond Prendiville, Archbishop of Perth, thanking Fr Quille and saying that the children had arrived safely in Western Australia.²⁵⁰³ This absence of monitoring may have been indicative of wider systemic failings in Catholic residential child care in Scotland in the early post-war period, with reports to the Scottish Hierarchy in 1960 and 1961 observing a general lack of individual case-work by Catholic organisations for children in Catholic residential homes, inadequate planning for children's discharge from residential institutions and an absence of after-care.²⁵⁰⁴

5.26 Archival material provided to the Inquiry contains a number of examples of progress reports either relating specifically to Catholic child migration from Scotland or Catholic migration from Scotland to Australia more generally for the period 1947-1949. These reports either discuss issues associated with the administration of child migration (such as reasons for the difficulty in recruiting child migrants after 1947)²⁵⁰⁵ or provide only statistical data relating to this work.²⁵⁰⁶ There is no discussion in any of these reports of the institutional conditions to which the child migrants are being sent or their welfare since arrival in Australia. It is not entirely clear for which body these reports were being prepared, although it seems likely that they would have been sent to the Scottish Hierarchy. A report by the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee indicates that the Scottish Hierarchy were receiving reports about Catholic emigration to Australia for each of their quarterly meetings. There are no indications of such reports being discussed on a quarterly basis for minutes of the meetings of the Scottish Hierarchy provided for 1948, however,²⁵⁰⁷ which might suggest that quarterly reporting was only established once the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee had formally taken over this work in late 1948. There is no indication in any of the minutes of meetings of the Scottish Hierarchy provided to

²⁵⁰³ See Minutes of Archdiocesan Social Services Committee, 2nd December 1947, BSC.001.001.0201.

²⁵⁰⁴ National Committee for Catholic Child Care, Report on Catholic Child Care in Scotland – December 1963, BSC.001.001.4642.

²⁵⁰⁵ See Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, Scotland and Northern Ireland, (no date but likely to be for the first half of 1949), AUS-4078; see also Report on Progress Australian Catholic Migration Scheme (no date but probably late 1948 or 1949), BSC.001.001.0292; Report on Australian Immigration, October 1949, BSC.001.001.0233-0239; Australian Catholic Migration Scheme, Scotland and Northern Ireland, Quarterly Progress Report, 1st February 1949, BSC.001.001.0290-0291; Statement on Progress of Catholic Scheme of Migration to Australia, Scotland and Northern Ireland, June 1947 to April 1948, BSC.001.001.0288.

²⁵⁰⁶ See for example, Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, Scotland and Northern Ireland, SCA: DE132/11/1, BSC.001.001.0871; Scottish Catholic Migration Scheme to Australia, BSC.001.001.0294.

²⁵⁰⁷ See Extracts from Minutes of Meetings of Scottish Hierarchy 1948 containing references to child migration, BSC.001.001.0157-0160.

this Inquiry that members of the Scottish Hierarchy either asked for or received information about the standards of care, accommodation or training at the residential institutions to which child migrants were being sent in Australia. As noted above, the Scottish Hierarchy were keen to have the funding agreement with the Australian Hierarchy to support the administration of Catholic emigration to Australia renewed in 1948, including the administration of child migration.²⁵⁰⁸ The Scottish Hierarchy wanted to continue these arrangements for child migration despite not having received any information about the welfare of Catholic children migrated from Scotland and Northern Ireland under this arrangement the previous year. As noted in Appendix 2 (3.10-3.12), however, inspection visits undertaken by State officials in 1948 identified significant problems at Castledare and Bindoon, suggesting that the Scottish Catholic Hierarchy's decision to support this migration work without adequate information about conditions in Australia placed child migrants at significant risk. It is also not clear whether any organisation or representative within the Catholic Church in Scotland understood that girls had been sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton, despite it not having been approved as a receiving institution by the United Kingdom Government (Appendix 2, 3.15).

5.27 We have received no evidence that the Scottish Catholic Hierarchy or the Social Services Committee for the Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh continued to plan for, or discuss, any issues relating to Scottish child migrants from 1950 onwards when ACIC's office in Edinburgh appears to have been closed. Although Scottish children continued to be migrated to Australia from 1950, it appears that the primary organisational responsibility for this would have resided with ACIC (as the recognised sending organisation by the United Kingdom Government), the residential homes providing children for migration (for the most part associated with the Sisters of Nazareth) and possibly the CCWC (given it was still trying to act as an administrative hub for child migration applications). It is not clear, however, what form of responsibility the Scottish Archdiocesan Social Services Committees might have had for children recruited from Catholic residential homes in Scotland and this is an issue that will be discussed further in relation to the direct recruitment of child migrants from Catholic residential institutions in Appendix 4.

5.28 As has been noted above, the CCWC had knowledge of concerns raised about Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia during the war which had led to the proposal that a direct inspection be undertaken of those residential homes by

²⁵⁰⁸ See for example, Quille to Toohey, 31st May 1948, SCA: DE132/9/15, BSC.001.001.0214.

Catholic authorities in the United Kingdom. The CCWC and ACIC were also aware, through their involvement in the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, of Home Office proposals about regulations for continued monitoring of children after migration in the context of regulations being drafted under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act. Claims have also been noted about Br Conlon's knowledge of the sexual abuse of children at Christian Brothers' institutions and his dis-satisfaction with the order's response to this. There is no available evidence which indicates that any of this knowledge was conveyed to the Scottish Catholic Hierarchy or any individual representative of the Catholic Church in Scotland. In the case of the s.33 regulations being drafted in 1951/1952, it may have been the case that the Catholic Church in Scotland had no direct organisational involvement in the administration of child migration work by then. However, given that these proposed regulations indicated standards of good practice, the principle of annual reporting could reasonably have been extended to child migrants sent to Australia through arrangements with the Catholic Church in Scotland from 1947 to 1949, most of whom would still have been living in residential institutions in Australia. The failure to share this knowledge, or more generally to establish any effective system for monitoring the welfare of Scottish Catholic child migrants overseas, appears indicative of a wider institutional culture that prioritised the movement of children to 'rescue' them from family environments considered to be unsuitable and in which there was little curiosity about the conditions to which they were being sent other than the belief that it would be a 'completely Catholic atmosphere' in which all threats to their faith would be removed.²⁵⁰⁹

The Sisters of Nazareth

5.29 The Sisters of Nazareth played a substantial role in providing children for migration to Catholic institutions, with an analysis undertaken for the 1997/1998 Health Committee report indicating that the order had sent a total of 755 children to Australia in the period between 1938-1963 (65.5% of all children sent by Catholic organisations in that period).²⁵¹⁰ The fact that a proportion of these children appear

²⁵⁰⁹ See Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, Scotland and Northern Ireland, Quarterly Progress Report – Child Emigration, AUS-4078, section 4.

²⁵¹⁰ For this data see 'The welfare of former British child migrants', vol.II, Health Select Committee, Third Report, 1997/98, pp.160-161. Although this survey was for the period 1938-1963, the Sisters of Nazareth have indicated to this Inquiry that their last party of migrants sailed on 22nd December 1956 (see NAZ.001.006.2554, p.2). It is difficult to reconcile the figure established for the Health Select Committee with the data provided by the Sisters of Nazareth to this Inquiry, which indicates that only 632 children were sent from their institutions in this period (see NAZ.001.006.2453). The discrepancy

to have been recruited directly by ACIC's administrators, and not through the CCWC, makes it less clear whether the CCWC would in principle have monitored the welfare of children recruited in this way. However, the fact that the CCWC did not establish a comprehensive or regular reporting system even on those children who were recruited with its knowledge means that this distinction may have had less significance in practice.

5.30 There is no indication that the Sisters of Nazareth adopted different policies or approaches to child migration in England and Wales, compared with Scotland or with Northern Ireland, and Nazareth Houses across all of the UK would have been under the authority of the Order's head house at Hammersmith. There is, therefore, no reason to believe at this stage that the approach to monitoring child migrants nor other organisational practices used by the Sisters of Nazareth that has been disclosed through the work of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse would be any different to that used for children sent from Nazareth Houses in Scotland (or for Scottish children sent from Nazareth House, Carlisle).

5.31 The Sisters of Nazareth indicated to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry in Northern Ireland that they did have a monitoring system in place but had not been able to identify specific archival evidence of any documents generated by this.²⁵¹¹ It was said that once the child migrants were in Australian institutions, the Sisters 'would have heard' from those running them as to how the children were progressing and that such reports 'would likely be sent' to the head of the order and not to individual houses and that the head of the local order or her council would have visited and would have seen first-hand how the children were faring.²⁵¹²

5.32 At the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, the Sisters of Nazareth clarified this evidence to indicate that it believed it did operate a system of receiving individual reports for children sent to Nazareth Houses at Geraldton and East

may partly be explained by the fact that the data in NAZ.001.006.2453 appears to exclude children sent from Nazareth House, Sligo, or the Bishop Street and Termonbacca homes run by the Sisters of Nazareth (data on children sent from these can be found at Witness Statement of Sr Brenda McCall, Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, <https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M2-D49-SrBrendaDocs-Red-OPT.pdf> pp.15-17). Evidence provided by the order to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse indicated that 63.1% of post-war Catholic child migrants had previously been 'nominally in the care of the Sisters of Nazareth organisation' (IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.122).

²⁵¹¹ Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Day 49, Evidence, Sr Brenda McCall, paras 24, 26, p.11: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>.

²⁵¹² Northern Ireland Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Day 49, Evidence, Sr Brenda McCall, paras 24, 26, p.11: <https://www.hiainquiry.org/module-2-child-migrant-programme>.

Camberwell in Australia.²⁵¹³ In addition to this, visitations made to these Australian institutions by the Order's Superior-General would also have provided indications of the welfare of child migrants that had been sent to them. However, the Order was unable to provide the Independent Inquiry with any documentary evidence of having received an individual report on one of the children it had migrated other than a document which it appeared to have received from the CCWC. No examples were provided either of extracts from visitation reports to Nazareth Houses in Australia which directly addressed the issue of child migrants' welfare. Whilst the Sisters of Nazareth were obviously aware that girls had been sent from their institutions in the United Kingdom to Nazareth House, Geraldton, it is not clear that the order understood that this had happened despite Geraldton not having been approved as a receiving institution by the United Kingdom Government (Appendix 2, 3.15). Additional information has been provided to this Inquiry which suggests that the Sisters of Nazareth, possibly via the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, did submit more regular half-yearly reports from December 1956 onwards for five Scottish child migrants sent to Nazareth House, East Camberwell.²⁵¹⁴ Similar reports do not appear to have been sent for Scottish child migrants sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton, however,²⁵¹⁵ which suggests that more regular reports from East Camberwell for that specific period may have been linked to particular efforts to provide that information in relation to children sent to Nazareth House, East Camberwell, rather than a more consistent policy enacted for both institutions by the order.²⁵¹⁶ At the time of writing this Appendix, copies of these reports on individual children has not been available and so it is not possible to comment on their content.

5.33 The Sisters of Nazareth acknowledged at the Independent Inquiry that it appears to have undertaken no follow-up monitoring with regard to children sent to institutions run by other religious orders. Given that around 80% of children sent by the Sisters of Nazareth were sent to institutions run by the Christian Brothers, the Sisters of Mercy, the Salesians and the Sacred Heart Sisters, this would have meant that even if the order had operated some form of monitoring for children sent to Nazareth Houses in Australia, no check would have been undertaken on the

²⁵¹³ See Stephen Constantine and Gordon Lynch, 'An Analysis of Documentary Material relating to the Sisters of Nazareth, Submitted at the Request of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse', June 2017, para. 8.2, ICA.001.001.0133.

²⁵¹⁴ See Exhibit RK/8, BEW.001.001.0536.

²⁵¹⁵ See BEW.001.001.0535 and 0537.

²⁵¹⁶ Note, for example, that on BEW.001.001.0535, child migrants 513 and 515 would both have been eleven years old in December 1956, and therefore of an age in which regular residential reports would have been expected.

substantial majority of those children it sent overseas.²⁵¹⁷ The failure to undertake any comprehensive monitoring of these children appears to be further confirmed by the exhibit appended to Dr Keenan's witness statement, where only single reports seem to have been received by the Catholic Child Welfare Council for seven of the thirty-two Scottish children sent from Nazareth Houses to the care of other religious orders in Australia.²⁵¹⁸ The order also provided the Independent Inquiry with copies of positive inspection reports on the Nazareth Houses in Australia from State inspectors, but these had previously been obtained from the UK Public Records Office and there was no evidence that the Sisters of Nazareth had any contemporaneous knowledge of these reports.²⁵¹⁹ Evidence presented to the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry from the order from one child's case records makes reference to some regular correspondence between child migrants and sisters at Nazareth House, Aberdeen and also, on one occasion, a positive report from Fr Nicol about the progress of children sent to Australia.²⁵²⁰ References to this correspondence and Fr Nicol's assurance are brief, however, and contain very little information. This is, however, the only reference we have found of correspondence from child migrants in Australia to sending houses in Scotland, suggesting that such correspondence may have been ad hoc and not universally undertaken by all children sent overseas. Although sisters at Nazareth House, Aberdeen, may have felt reassured by this correspondence, such reliance on children's letters would not have been considered a rigorous system of monitoring children's welfare in the standards of the day (exemplified, for example, in the Curtis report and the draft s.33 regulations).²⁵²¹ The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse also received evidence based on archival material from the National Archives of Australia which suggested that the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee in Australia saw the encouragement of

²⁵¹⁷ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.124-125.

²⁵¹⁸ BEW.001.001.0535-0538. Note seem likely to have been sent to the Catholic Child Welfare Council possibly via the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee or Catholic Episcopal Migration and Welfare Association in Western Australia, but without any direct involvement by the Sisters of Nazareth.

²⁵¹⁹ The inspection reports provided to IICSA by the Sisters of Nazareth were those archived in TNA: MH102/1882 and which have been provided to the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry as NAZ.001.006.2466.

²⁵²⁰ LZK [REDACTED] file, NAZ.001.006.3118.

²⁵²¹ There is an indication that, in 1953, the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee sought to encourage letter writing from child migrants in Australia as a means of trying to encourage sending organisations to send more children (see Minute of meeting with Fr Stinson and Mgr Crennan, 5th October 1953, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/124, p.116). Whilst this might raise some questions about organisational motivations for encouraging children to write positive letters about experiences in Australia, it should be noted that the letters referred to in the LZK [REDACTED] file precede the 'campaign', that the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee reportedly intended to begin after the autumn of 1953.

letter-writing by child migrants as a means of providing assurances to sending institutions in order to ensure a continued supply of children.²⁵²²

5.34 Further evidence concerning the culture and systems of monitoring operated by the Sisters of Nazareth is provided in a series of documents provided by the order to this Inquiry, including extracts from History of the Foundation documents for the Nazareth Houses at Geraldton and East Camberwell. The History of the Foundation document for Nazareth House, East Camberwell, contains a number of references to inspections or informal visits from which positive impressions of external visitors are recorded. These include visits by Australian Catholic education inspectors (in Sept 1953 and May 1956), representatives of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee (Sept 1953 and Nov 1953), informal and formal visits by representatives of the UK Government with State Child Welfare and Immigration Departments (March 1955, Feb 1956, Sept 1958) as well as by State Child Welfare officers (Dec 1961).²⁵²³ Positive comments are recorded with reference to the standards of teaching, the quality and design of the building work, the good physical appearance of the children and the arrangements for girls to be placed with families during holidays. Although a few references are made to visits to Nazareth House, East Camberwell, by the Mother-General, including formal visitations, only one reference can be identified to a visitation in which specific reference is made to child migrants accommodated there. This concerns a visitation held in April 1955, in which it is recorded that:

The house throughout is in good order and on the whole well kept. The children's wing is nicely arranged and well equipped. At present there are fifty migrant children from the British Isles here looking well and happy. The classrooms are up to date and the children have every educational opportunity. The auditorium is one of the best of its kind and will be a great asset in the future.²⁵²⁴

No reference is made with regard to visitations about the well-being of individual children and there are no indications in the History of Foundation document of any reports on individual children being sent back to the Order in the UK.

5.35 Extracts have been provided from the History of the Foundation document for Nazareth House, Geraldton for the period 1945-1948. After the arrival of child

²⁵²² See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes Investigation, Public Hearing Day 15, pp.9-10.

²⁵²³ See Camberwell Nazareth House extract from History of the Foundation, NAZ.001.006.2397-2399, 2404-2405, 2411 and 2414.

²⁵²⁴ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.006.2403.

migrants at Geraldton from September 1947, positive inspection visits are reported from State Child Welfare officers in October and December 1947, as well as from Fr Stinson (on behalf of CEMWA) in March 1948 and the Western Australia Lotteries Commission (which provided funding to charitable organisations including residential institutions in Western Australia receiving child migrants) in April 1948.²⁵²⁵ It is also recorded that the Australian High Commissioner to London visited Nazareth House, Geraldton, twice in six weeks with his Secretary and local MPs to see the child migrants.²⁵²⁶ The recorded visits of the Australian High Commissioner are unusual in that, at this stage, we have seen no references to him making visits to any other receiving institutions for child migrants in that period and it is unusual for officials of that seniority to visit institutions twice in a relatively short space of time. The accuracy of this claim is also called into question by newspaper articles which suggest that the Australian High Commissioner, Jack Beasley, was in London around this time. The History of Foundation extracts for Geraldton contain no indication of any regular reporting on individual child migrants to the order in the UK, although the extracts end relatively soon after the post-war child migrants arrived at Geraldton.

5.36 These documents provided by the order also provide valuable additional insights into the context and culture of the monitoring of child migrants' welfare both by the Sisters of Nazareth and other external agencies. Extracts provided from the History of the Foundation document for Nazareth House, East Camberwell, provide suggestions that the relationship between State Child Welfare officers and the institution was one of the officers seeking to facilitate the order's work rather than necessarily provide a rigorous, independent scrutiny. One State Child Welfare officer involved in regular visits to Nazareth House, East Camberwell, is described as 'a friend of long-standing'.²⁵²⁷ As noted below (3.36), it appears that the State Child Welfare Department gave advanced briefing to the Sisters of Nazareth about the inspection to be undertaken by the UK Fact-Finding Mission, led by John Ross, in spring 1956, from which the order understood that it needed to prepare for the Mission as a body that was hostile to the continuation of child migration. The

²⁵²⁵ Geraldton Nazareth House extract from History of the Foundation, NAZ.001.006.2426 and 2428.

²⁵²⁶ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.006.2428 and 2430. The dates of the reported visits are 1st December 1947 and 14th January 1948. The reference to the December visit conflicts with clear evidence that the London High Commissioner, Mr Beasley, was still in London in late November/early December -

<https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/43745539?searchTerm=Beasley%20AND%20commissioner%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20&searchLimits=notWords||requestHandler||anyWords||exactPhrase||dateTo=1948-03-31||dateFrom=1947-11-01||sortBy=dateAsc||-category=Article>

²⁵²⁷ Camberwell Nazareth House extract from History of the Foundation, NAZ.001.006.2418.

Director of the State Child Welfare Department, Mr Nelson, is also reported to have visited the Sisters of Nazareth at East Camberwell with a representative of the State Immigration Department to discuss how the Order could be best protected against having to repay a substantial capital building grant to the Federal Government if no further child migrants were received (on this, see also Appendix 4, Section 3, The recruitment of girls for Nazareth House, East Camberwell, in 1953).²⁵²⁸

5.37 The description of the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission's visit to Nazareth House, East Camberwell could possibly be seen as illustrating differences between the order's priorities in childcare and those of the Ross Committee, whose members John Ross and Pauline-Wansborough Jones were more sympathetic to the childcare principles advocated by the Curtis Committee. The full extract about this visit is as follows:

From the things of the Spirit we turn inevitably to mundane matters. The Children's Welfare Department, Melbourne, sent us notice of the coming of a "Fact-Finding Mission" from Home Office, London. Every effort was made to the House in good order as the principal object of the Mission was to show justification for the withdrawal of the Imperial subsidy (12/6 per capita weekly) made in respect of migrant U.K. children, and secondly to stem the flow of migrants to large institutions like ours.

Permission was granted by Rev. Mother General for a complete reconditioning of the kitchen and was begun on Feb 1st. On Feb 27th, Mr John Ross, Under Secretary of State, Whitehall, Miss Wansborough-Jones, Senior Officer Child Welfare, Essex County Council, Mr Walter Garnett, ex-Deputy U.K. High Commissioner Canberra and Mr Johnston, Secretary to the Mission, accompanied by Mr Nelson, Director of Children's Welfare Dept., Melbourne, Miss E. Phillips, Mr Cummane, Immigration Dept., Rev. E. Perkins, Catholic Social

²⁵²⁸ *Ibid*, NAZ.001.006.2412-2413. It appears that the Order may have reached an arrangement with the Commonwealth Department of Immigration in 1962 where it was allowed to open Nazareth House, East Camberwell to other Australia-born children without apparently having to re-pay any of its capital grant on the basis that places at the institution could be made submitted to the Department of Immigration in the future if needed (see NAZ.001.006.2538). On the issue of the threatened repayment of a capital grant for the extension of Nazareth House, East Camberwell, see also Appendix 2, 4.9; also minutes of meeting of the CVOICE, 30th April 1952, ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1, pt II p.20 on provided copy, in which Fr Nicol states that the Australian Commonwealth Government was seeking assurances about the on-going supply of child migrants from voluntary organisations prior to making capital grant payments. Nicol himself recognised that it would be difficult to give such assurances given that 'there could be no guarantee that child emigrants in any great and continuous numbers would be forthcoming'.

Services and Rev. D. Leahy O.P. were present at the discussion on child migration.

Matters discussed included selection of the right type of migrant from the U.K. in which Mr Garnett sought to blame the Sisters in the Home Houses. Fortunately, the Camberwell Superior was in a position to speak of her experience and pointed out the unwillingness of parents to part with their children, and also to give an account of the success of many boys who migrated to Australia in 1938 and 1939, one attained to captaincy in the regular army before his 25th birthday. Other subjects were facilities for mixing with Australian families during holidays and weekends; allowing children to go to the city unaccompanied; pocket money allowance; higher education where girls were susceptible of it. In general, Mr John Ross, member of the Mission was satisfied with the Sisters' work while deploring the existence of this large building. A report of the visit was to be made later on.²⁵²⁹

5.38 The comments made by the Fact-Finding Mission's confidential appendix on Nazareth House, East Camberwell, included the following:

Premises: A very large institution, containing one wing for old people, and second opened in 1952, built for migrant girls. All rooms are large and lofty, and there are spacious corridors. Small dormitories each containing about 8 beds, though there is room for more, and there are playrooms and sitting rooms for different age groups. There are elaborate modern ablution rooms, good school classrooms and outdoor playing space...

Furnishing and equipment: Bedding is good, and there are bedside lockers. Sitting rooms are well furnished but so tidy and polished that they look unused and the youngest children's playroom has a number of large toys, symmetrically arranged...

Recruitment and selection: All the girls have come from Roman Catholic Children's Homes in the United Kingdom and a number are said to be backward and of poor intelligence. Most of the children had been in children's homes since infancy. Both the Mother Superior and the State Child Welfare Department commented on the apparent unsuitability, through low intelligence or emotional disturbance, of some of the girls sent, three or four of whom would probably never be self-supporting, and also on the very inadequate records which accompanied them...

General Comments: The accommodation is lavishly planned and furnished, but on a scale which makes anything approaching a home atmosphere impossible.

²⁵²⁹ Camberwell Nazareth House extract from History of the Foundation, NAZ.001.006.2407-2409.

The general impression is of a place more like a hospital than a home. The Mother Superior said that a number of the older girls were presenting “sexual difficulties” with which she felt unable to deal. The girls themselves were friendly and animated, and ready to talk, but they are clearly not receiving appropriate preparation for life outside the shelter of an institution.²⁵³⁰

5.39 From the Fact-Finding Mission’s confidential appendix, it is clear that whilst Nazareth House, East Camberwell was perceived to be offering a high standard of building and furnishing, it reflected the type of large, impersonal and ‘unhomely’ residential institution that the Curtis Report had criticised as being unlikely to provide an appropriate emotional environment for the care of the individual child. Indeed the Home Office had, when first approached by the Commonwealth Relations Office about its approval as a receiving institution, expressed reservations along the same lines (see also Appendix 4, 3.3).²⁵³¹ The fact that the Sisters of Nazareth, forewarned about the visit, had apparently focused their efforts on the renovation of the kitchen and the tidying of sitting rooms and play equipment suggested that the order’s focus was on creating a positive impression about the quality of the material environment of the institution. This organisational investment—and pride—in the physical fabric of the building is reflected in the kind of positive comments from external visitors that are recorded in the History of the Foundation document as well as the description of the construction of a new chapel as

a very fine structure...[T]he altars, sanctuary and altar rails are of Portuguese marble and the Stations of the Cross are of carved lime wood, these should complete the perfection of the chapel and make it a worthy dwelling place for Our Blessed Lord and will with God’s help be the means of bringing many souls back to the Fold.²⁵³²

In a similar vein, Monsignor Crennan, of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, is reported as saying that he hoped that more children from the UK could ‘be induced to take advantage of the facilities and amenities’ at Nazareth House, East Camberwell.²⁵³³ The History of the Foundation document for Nazareth House, East

²⁵³⁰ Confidential appendix on Nazareth House, East Camberwell, TNA: BN29/1325, pp.143-144 on submitted copy.

²⁵³¹ See McGregor to Palmer, 25th November 1950, TNA: MH102/1882, p.89 on submitted copy.

²⁵³² Camberwell Nazareth House extract from History of the Foundation, NAZ.001.006.2403-2404.

²⁵³³ Camberwell Nazareth House extract from History of the Foundation, NAZ.001.006.2398. The extensive publicity brochure produced for the recruitment of boys to Christian Brothers’ institutions in Western Australia, possibly for the initial parties recruited in 1938/1939 similarly includes a large number of photographs demonstrating the physical amenities of the sites (see NRS: ED11/384, SGV.001.004.4652-4704). This contrasts with literature produced by other sending organisations which

Camberwell, also records that an advantage of the legal incorporation of all the Order's houses in Australia would be 'the safeguarding of the property of the Congregations from resumption by the State or Government (Federal)'.²⁵³⁴

5.40 This emphasis on the material fabric of the institution clearly contrasted with the ethos of the Curtis Report which regarded with suspicion children's homes which demonstrated 'unnatural cleanliness and polish'. That was both because of the likely use of children's time to maintain unrealistically high standards of cleanliness and because of the Report's emphasis on physical environments for children that were homely, comforting, stimulating and colourful which enabled them to engage in free and creative play.²⁵³⁵ Whilst the positive comments recorded in the History of the Foundation document for East Camberwell noted that children appeared well-cared for, the Curtis Report had noted that the short-comings of large residential institutions were not that they provided inadequate physical care for children but insufficient attention to their individual emotional needs.²⁵³⁶ The Curtis ethos is reflected in the Fact-Finding Mission's comments about both the impersonal nature of the buildings at Nazareth House, East Camberwell, and the signs of institutionalisation evident there both in children's limited opportunities to engage with activities in the wider community and their lack of emotional preparation for adult life. Whilst the order may have regarded the physical structures of Nazareth House, East Camberwell. With a sense of pride, from the perspective of the Fact-Finding Mission, it would have been remarkable that such a large institution for children should have been recently built whilst the policy trend after Curtis was clearly towards trying to move children away from this kind of out-of-home care.²⁵³⁷ It is worth noting that the reported frequent references to the Curtis report in Sisters of Nazareth archives in the United Kingdom in this period suggest that the order was well aware of the type and standards of care encouraged in this report.²⁵³⁸

gives greater emphasis to the emotional environment of the institution or children's play and development (See for example, 73rd Annual Report of Dr Barnardo's Homes, for the Year 1938, submitted from Barnardo's Archives, Plaistow).

²⁵³⁴ Camberwell Nazareth House extract from History of the Foundation. NAZ.001.006.2412.

²⁵³⁵ See for example, *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, paras 190,207,208,209,211,234,235,247,427.

²⁵³⁶ See, e.g., *Report of the Care of Children Committee*, para 418.

²⁵³⁷ See also footnote 946 above on Fr Nicol's and Canon Flint's understanding of the Home Office's strong opposition to large residential institutions for children in 1951. See also notes on Nazareth House, Camberwell, 20th September 1951 and 10th September 1954, TNA: MH102/1882, pp.10 and 50 on submitted copy.

²⁵³⁸ See Confidential Briefing Paper: Sisters of Nazareth and Emigration by Dr Peter Hughes, NAZ.001.006.2912.

5.41 The fact that so little individual reporting on the welfare of child migrants in Australia was undertaken by the Sisters of Nazareth might be understood as an expression of a wider organisational culture in which children were perceived to be part of the corporate body of the order rather than as individuals in need of particular kinds of social and emotional nurture. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse commented on the March 1952 circular letter sent by the order's Superior General to Mother Superiors supporting the recruitment of more child migrants to Australia,²⁵³⁹ saying that the letter reflected 'the frequently impersonal tone of the selection process, in which the organisation's interests appeared to take precedence over those of the children'.²⁵⁴⁰ It is notable in this letter that complaints made in Australia about the 'quality' of children sent by the order before 1952 was reported to be a matter of concern in terms of the order's reputation (and the future of Catholic residential institutions in Australia) rather than one of concern for the welfare of the individual children.²⁵⁴¹ The fact that the Mother Superior of Nazareth House, East Camberwell, reportedly told the Fact-Finding Mission that unsuitable children might have been selected for emigration because they could only choose from those children whose departure would not be objected to by parents (see 3.36 above), further suggests that the organisational desire to identify suitable numbers of children for migration may have weighed more than the individual interests of the child. The level of record-keeping by the Order, more generally, appears to have been fairly minimal in relation to its child migration work. For example, only short descriptions of the numbers, sending houses and receiving institutions are given in relation to the extensive recruitment work that Br Conlon undertook in conjunction with the Sisters of Nazareth from the summer of 1946—a period in which Br Conlon was resident at the order's head house at Hammersmith.²⁵⁴² The case records of children migrated from Nazareth Houses in Scotland do not include any records of the information which informed selection decisions about individual children nor of the setting up of the kinds of case committees recommended in the draft regulations. This is in sharp contrast to the case history reports and selection review

²⁵³⁹ This letter has been provided to the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry as [REDACTED]

²⁵⁴⁰ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.124.

²⁵⁴¹ This letter has also been submitted in evidence to this Inquiry (see Superior General circular letter, 21st March 1952, NAZ.001.006.2916).

²⁵⁴² Records of the order's child migration work, which began with children being provisionally selected for emigration and having LEM3 forms completed for them from August 1946, are given in NAZ.001.006.2520 and NAZ001.006.2449. Fr Nicol also appears to have been initially based at the order's Head House in Hammersmith when arriving in London to set up ACIC's work there (see headed notepaper for Margaret (surname unknown) to Menaldo, 26th September 1949, BSC.001.001.0219).

processes encouraged by the Home Office's draft s.33 regulations which were intended to ensure that migration would be in the individual interests of the child (see 2.31-2.32 above).

5.42 The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse took the view that the Sisters of Nazareth did not have rigorous selection process for child migrants that it sent overseas and appears to have operated more in terms of identifying children to meet quotas raised by residential institutions overseas.²⁵⁴³ This would run against the recommended standard of the day that children should only be selected for emigration if they were suited to it, and emigration was in their best interests.²⁵⁴⁴ The confidential appendices to the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission also noted that no personal histories had been sent with children placed at Nazareth House, East Camberwell, at St Joseph's, Neerkol, or at Christian Brothers' institutions at Castledare and Clontarf, to which the Sisters of Nazareth had all sent significant numbers of children.²⁵⁴⁵ The provision of such case histories to senior staff at receiving institutions overseas had been both a recommendation of the Moss report and the Women's Group on Public Welfare²⁵⁴⁶, and included as a clause in the Home Office's draft s.33 regulations (something endorsed by Moss in his report).²⁵⁴⁷ The description of child migrants sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton, as war orphans in a brief history of that institution, apparently produced within the order, further suggests that receiving institutions may have had little understanding of the actual family backgrounds of children being sent to them.²⁵⁴⁸ Taken in conjunction with The

²⁵⁴³ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.135; see also Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration investigation, transcript of Day 13, pp.128-131, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1696/view/public-hearing-transcript-13th-july-2017.pdf>

²⁵⁴⁴ See for example, WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.59.

²⁵⁴⁵ See confidential appendices for these institutions at TNA: BN29/1325, pp.139, 144, 146-147 and 157, LEG.001.003.1948, 1953, 1955-1956, 1966.

²⁵⁴⁶ Moss, *Child Emigration to Australia*, p.4; WGPW, *Child Emigration*, p.61.

²⁵⁴⁷ See Memorandum by the Home Office on Regulations to be made under section 33 of the 1948 Children Act, TNA: MH102/1784, clause 12, p.22 on submitted copy.

²⁵⁴⁸ See Typescript regarding Sisters of Nazareth arriving in Western Australia, NAZ.001.006.2906. The mistaken impression that child migrants were 'war orphans' appears to have been one that was replicated in media reports of parties of child migrants sent to Western Australia in 1947 – see 'Warm Welcome for War Orphans – Big Contingent Arrives Tomorrow', *Sunday Times*, 21st September 1947, p.6; 'War Orphans in Geraldton', *The Daily News*, 24th September 1947, p.5; 'New Little Australians – Arrival of Orphan Children', *Geraldton Guardian and Express*, 25th September 1947, p.2. This mistake appears to have arisen because post-war child migrants were, at least initially, associated with the Australian Commonwealth Government's plan to bring 50,000 war orphans to Australia. The fact that this mistake was replicated in the Sisters of Nazareth's own understanding of the history of Nazareth House, Geraldton, suggests that information about children's background that might have corrected this mistake was not provided.

Sisters of Nazareth's relatively minimal approach to monitoring the welfare of children it had migrated overseas, the order's apparent failure to undertake appropriate selection processes and transfer of records, raises wider questions about its adherence to standards of the day. This seems to be in keeping with other evidence which suggests that religious orders running residential children's homes in Scotland in the early post-war period, including the Sisters of Nazareth, do not appear to have adhered to the ethos of care for the individual child that had been encouraged by both the Curtis and Clyde reports or to have engaged significantly with understandings of good practice in child-care of that period.²⁵⁴⁹

The Good Shepherd Sisters

5.43 The Good Shepherd Sisters have been unable to provide this Inquiry with any material relating to their policies and systems with regard to the migration of children from their institutions, including those for obtaining information about children after their migration.²⁵⁵⁰ Given that individual records appear to have been kept for girls who remained at the order's institutions in Scotland, the lack of information about children after their migration to Australia suggests that the order did not maintain records for them or collate reports on their welfare and progress from this point. This would be consistent with the lack of systematic post-migration monitoring evident with other Catholic sending organisations in the United Kingdom. The lack of any apparent records of policy decisions by the order to send girls for migration also means that it is not clear on what basis they decided that the institutions to which these girls would be sent to in Australia would provide appropriate care and training.

Note on monitoring systems and allegations of systemic abuse at Christian Brothers' institutions

5.44 The failure of Catholic sending organisations in Britain to establish effective monitoring systems for Scottish child migrants could be seen, as the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse concluded, as a systemic safeguarding failure for all children sent under their auspices.²⁵⁵¹ This failure may also be understood as having particular significance for Scottish boys sent to Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia. As noted in the main report (8:28), the Australian Senate

²⁵⁴⁹ National Committee for Catholic Child Care, Report on Catholic Child Care in Scotland – December 1963, BSC.001.001.4642-4648.

²⁵⁵⁰ See Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, Section 21 response, GSH.001.001.0101-0417.

²⁵⁵¹ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation*, pp.125, 142.

Community Affairs Committee described the evidence it received about sexual abuse at these institutions as indicating 'systemic criminal sexual assault and predatory behaviour by a large number of the Brothers over a considerable period of time'.²⁵⁵² A secondary analysis of thirty-five witness statements received by three previous Inquiries has indicated that within this source material, accounts are given of nineteen different attempts by victims of sexual abuse at these institutions to disclose their abuse to other staff at these institutions or other people in the local community, eleven of which are alleged to have happened whilst boys were resident at Bindoon.²⁵⁵³ Written reports produced by staff at these institutions were unlikely to pass any knowledge of cases of sexual abuse to other organisations, possibly even other organisations within the wider Catholic Church. However, the fact that so many contemporaneous disclosures of abuse are reported to have been made at these institutions suggests that if Catholic sending organisations had adopted a more proactive approach to monitoring the welfare of boys sent to them—including the kind of direct visit by representatives of the Catholic Child Welfare Council that Canon Craven had described as necessary to civil servants—then cases of sexual abuse at these institutions may well have become known.

Monitoring Systems Implemented by the Royal Overseas League

6.1 The role of the Royal Overseas League in post-war child migration from the UK is complex and, in some respects, still not fully understood. Historical understanding of its work has been hampered by the League's apparent decision at some point after the mid-1950s to dispose of archival records both of case files of children whose emigration it was involved in arranging, as well as any organisational correspondence or minutes about its child migration work. The League's child migration work was conducted through its Migration Committee and primarily delivered through its Honorary Secretary, Cyril Bavin, who in the post-war period appears to have undertaken this work as an activity during his retirement. The absence of any surviving documentation of this Migration Committee makes it difficult to establish whether, in practice, a Committee was constituted that undertook any effective scrutiny of Bavin's work (a situation analogous to the work of

²⁵⁵² Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee, *Lost Innocents*, 4.20.

²⁵⁵³ Gordon Lynch, *Possible collusion between individuals alleged to have sexually abused boys at four Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, 1947-1965: a secondary analysis of material collated by historical abuse inquiries*, <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

the Church of England Advisory Council on Empire Settlement whose child migration work was undertaken largely by a single officer with minimal supervision). The apparent absence of any detailed discussion of the Migration Committee's work in minutes of the League's Central Council suggests that the League may not have exercised any detailed oversight of Bavin's work.²⁵⁵⁴

6.2 The League's involvement in child migration to Australia is particularly opaque, and has only recently become somewhat better understood as a result of research undertaken to support the work of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. In 1955, the League's Secretary of its child migration work, Cyril Bavin, reported to the Overseas Migration Board that the League had sent 194 children to Australia between 1945 to 1955, not including 18 boys whom it had sent to Dhurringile from 1953.²⁵⁵⁵ In a conversation with a London County Council official in February 1948, Bavin reported that 130 children had already been sent to Australia by the League by then after the War.²⁵⁵⁶

6.3 The policy framework through which the League migrated these children to Australia remains somewhat unclear. In August 1948, a conference of Commonwealth and State Immigration officials included a discussion of proposals submitted by the League in July 1948 for the approval of a scheme by which it would emigrate children for adoption by Australian families.²⁵⁵⁷ The conference decided to reject this proposal on the grounds that

- i) there should be personal contact between the proposed adopter and child before the custody of the child was transferred,
- ii) State authorities should have full knowledge of a child's family and medical history to minimise the risk of unsuitable placements,

²⁵⁵⁴ See Royal Overseas League, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.002.

²⁵⁵⁵ See Royal Overseas League, 'Statement of Our Migration Activities', TNA: DO35/6377, pp.88-89 on provided copy. The Royal Overseas League operated as the recruiting agency for Dhurringile for boys sent from England, Wales and Northern Ireland, after the Presbyterian Church in Victoria expressed disappointment at the limited numbers of children being provided from Scotland by the Church of Scotland. Formally, children recruited by the League for Dhurringile were migrated under the auspices of the UK Government's funding agreement with the Church of Scotland Committee of Social Service. Correspondence relating to the League's involvement in this capacity can be found in National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/106, see also Appendix 2, 3.27.

²⁵⁵⁶ See 'Interview with Mr Bavin', 5th February 1948, TNA, MH102/1560, p.28 on submitted copy.

²⁵⁵⁷ Proceedings of conference of Commonwealth and State Immigration Officials, 26/27th August 1948, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1960/66717, pp.333-335. Whilst the ROSL's scheme to New Zealand involved the placement of children in foster-homes, and only rarely full adoption, the proposed scheme to Australia appears to have involved full adoption immediately on the child's arrival in Australia.

- iii) adoption agreements should not be finalised before a probationary period of placement had been conducted and
- iv) the League had no structure in Australia for managing any breakdown of adoption placements and that children in these circumstances would then become the responsibility of the Child Welfare Department in the State in which they had been placed.

Instead of the widespread migration of children directly for adoption by Australian families, the conference recommended that encouragement be given to 'aunts and uncles' schemes in Australia through which child migrants placed in residential institutions would be placed out with families during vacations, with these placements naturally leading to adoptions where this suited particular cases. Where breakdowns occurred in such placements, the child would revert to being the responsibility of the approved receiving organisation. The conference took the view that it did not wish to discourage organisations not currently approved for child migration work, such as the Royal Overseas League, from putting forward children for migration but that in these cases the selection and distribution of children should be undertaken in conjunction with approved sending and receiving organisations. A letter from the Chief Migration Officer at Australia House to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration at the end of December that year refers to the League being aware of the non-approval of their scheme by the Australian Commonwealth Government.²⁵⁵⁸

6.4 In November 1949, the Australian Commonwealth Government clarified its view that it was prepared to accept some individual cases of the migration of children to Australia for adoption by the League, but not to accept this approach as a more general, nation-wide programme.²⁵⁵⁹ As noted in Appendix 2 (3.27-3.29), both the Australian Commonwealth Government and the UK Government also understood that, until 1953, the UK Government was unwilling to recognise the League as a sending organisation to Australia because it lacked appropriate child-care expertise in making selection decisions about children and did not have any mechanism by which it could monitor the welfare of children it had placed overseas. There is no indication, therefore, that the League had any formal recognition for its child migration work to Australia until 1953 from either the Australian Commonwealth or

²⁵⁵⁸ Lamidey to Secretary, Department of Immigration, 31st December 1948, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1960/66717, p.297.

²⁵⁵⁹ See Submission by Metcalfe, 28th November 1949, and Memorandum by Nutt, 30th November 1949, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1960/66717, pp.132-34.

UK Governments, either in terms of formal government approval for this work or receipt of government funding.

6.5 Given that the League only appears to have brought its proposed migration work to the attention of the Australian Commonwealth Government in the summer of 1948, the basis on which it had apparently migrated at least 130 children to Australia by then is unclear.²⁵⁶⁰ It is also not entirely clear on what basis the League appears to have continued to send children to Australia after its proposed scheme was rejected by Immigration officials in Australia in the summer of 1948, particularly as this would have required the co-operation of immigration officials at Australia House in London.

6.6 A partial answer may lie in the fact that the League appear to have been involved in the migration of children who were claimed to be returning to Australia having previously been sent there through the temporary Children's Overseas Reception Board (CORB) migration scheme which had operated as an extension of child evacuation policies during the Second World War. Bavin had previously been involved with the management of the CORB scheme during the War through his role, at that time, in supporting youth migration on behalf of the YMCA.²⁵⁶¹ Certainly, in 1955, Bavin told the Overseas Migration Board that the 194 children that he had listed as being sent to Australia were in fact children who were originally sent to Australia through the CORB scheme and who now wished to return to Australia to settle there permanently.²⁵⁶² These 'CORB returnees', Bavin claimed, had been sent in eight parties between August 1947 and July 1949. Whilst it is possible that some of these children were former CORB evacuees now emigrating permanently to Australia, there is also evidence to suggest that not all were. In the spring of 1948, there was correspondence between the Home Office's Children's Department and an officer at London County Council, expressing concern about a migration scheme to Australia operated by the League which had received some publicity.²⁵⁶³ The official at London County Council, Mr Lowndes, had decided to contact the Home Office after learning about the League's attempt to send two children to Australia whose problems were

²⁵⁶⁰ Further evidence of the migration of children to Australia by the League around this period was provided by a periodical publication by the League, in November 1948, displaying a photograph of a party of children it had sent to Australia (see IICSA, ROL000005, p.6.)

²⁵⁶¹ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, transcript of Day 13, p.97, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1696/view/public-hearing-transcript-13th-july-2017.pdf>

²⁵⁶² See Royal Overseas League, 'Statement of Our Migration Activities', TNA: DO35/6377, p.88 on provided copy, LEG.001.004.6613.

²⁵⁶³ See correspondence at TNA: MH102/1560, pp.24-30.

such that it was likely that an adoption placement might breakdown without adequate support. Within this correspondence from London County Council, a copy of a record of an interview with Cyril Bavin was enclosed in which the Council had sought more information from him about the League's emigration scheme. In this note, Bavin is recorded as saying that they were looking for children who would be adopted by families in Australia, and that children put forward for this scheme by parents in the UK would be subject to a preliminary vetting by the League before undergoing a final interview and medical check with immigration officers at Australia House. Bavin is reported to have said in this interview that prospective adoptive families in Australia were vetted by the Australian Government, and that Australia House paid for half of the fares for children's migration with adoptive families paying the other half. Children emigrated for adoption in this way, Bavin stated, had to obtain the necessary licence for overseas adoption from the Bow Street magistrates court required under s.11 of the 1939 Adoption of Children (Regulation) Act. It was on the basis of these arrangements that Bavin claimed that 130 children had already been migrated to Australia. There is no reference to CORB evacuees in Bavin's description of this scheme to London County Council, nor did the two children that the Council were concerned about as prospective child migrants had any previous connection with the CORB scheme. Given that London County Council staff had proactively sought an interview with Bavin to clarify how the League's migration scheme to Australia worked, and there appear to have been no prior knowledge of this within the Home Office, the League's suggestion in its Section 21 response that it probably sought advice from relevant government departments before undertaking this work does not seem, in this instance, to be correct.²⁵⁶⁴

6.7 There are further suggestions that some children emigrated through the League's work may have been inaccurately identified as former CORB evacuees by immigration officials at Australia House in order to facilitate the administrative arrangements for their emigration. In a letter dated 2nd June 1949, a State immigration official wrote to Noel Lamidey, the Chief Migration Officer at Australia House, to ask about a group of seven children about to arrive on the *SS Mooltan* who were marked on the shipping list as a CORB children's party despite the fact that 'very few of these children, if any, were originally members of the CORB party evacuated to Australia'.²⁵⁶⁵ In a letter dated 5th July, Mr Lamidey replied that:

²⁵⁶⁴ See Royal Overseas League, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.011.

²⁵⁶⁵ Best to Chief Migration Officer, 2nd June 1949, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1960/66717, p.230.

The Overseas League in London has taken an interest in CORB children who wish to return to Australia and this arrangement has worked satisfactorily particularly as the League is in a position to provide the children with entertainment at the various ports of call. Usually however, there are insufficient children to make the formation of a separate party and the appointment of escorts worth-while. For this reason, therefore, approved children who require the services of an escort have been included in the party.²⁵⁶⁶

Noting that some nominators in Australia (presumably individuals rather than organisations) would find the process of making shipping arrangements for children they were due to receive difficult, Lamidey comments that 'various voluntary bodies have proved most helpful in this connection' and states that 'the Overseas League, whilst not an approved organisation for the reception of children in Australia, is nevertheless active in the migration field and it would perhaps be unwise to discourage their efforts.'²⁵⁶⁷

6.8 The implications of Lamidey's letter of 5th July appears to be that the League may have sent children to Australia that it had recruited alongside children who had previously gone to Australia under the CORB scheme, that these children were designated as being associated with the CORB scheme on their shipping documentation even if they had no previous contact with that scheme, and that immigration staff at Australia House found this a convenient arrangement that they were happy to support and were willing to approve these children for migration. We note that this arrangement between the League and Australia House appears to have continued after both were aware that the League's proposed scheme had not been approved by the Australian Government.²⁵⁶⁸ Further evidence of such inaccurate use of the CORB designation on migration documentation by immigration officials at Australia House is further provided by a letter from Tasman Heyes to Noel Lamidey in February 1949 suggesting that staff at Australia House should not continue to use

²⁵⁶⁶ Lamidey to Wall, 5th July 1949, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1960/66717, p.229.

²⁵⁶⁷ Lamidey to Wall, 5th July 1949, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1960/66717, p.229.

²⁵⁶⁸ At an informal meeting with members of the CVOCE in December 1951, Lamidey stated that although the migration of children to foster-carers in Australia was not acceptable to State Governments in Australia if their Child Welfare Departments became responsible for any breakdowns in foster placements, 'it would be a different matter if the foster placement could be carried out through recognised Emigration organisations who would be responsible for the arrangements and supervision' (see Brief notes of informal discussion at Australia House on 12th December 1951, ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1, pt II p.14 on provided copy). This raises the question as to whether Australia House staff had informally considered the League to be a 'recognised' organisation for the migration of some children although it did not formally have this recognition from the UK or Australian Commonwealth Governments.

the CORB designation for children who had no previous contact with that scheme and should always identify the approved organisation under whose auspices children or youths were being migrated.²⁵⁶⁹

6.9 One possible interpretation of this evidence is that the League had arrangements in place with Australia House and prospective adoptive families in Australia for the migration of children between 1945 and February 1948. Such adoptions would have legally required a licence from the Bow Street Magistrates' Court before such children could leave the UK. During this period, the League may also have arranged for the return to Australia of former CORB evacuees. Their scheme for the migration of children not previously associated with the CORB scheme, which seems to have been well established by February 1948, appears only to have formally been brought to the notice of Australian Commonwealth and State immigration officials in the summer of 1948. After the League's proposed scheme was officially refused by these authorities in Australia, the League appear to have continued to send both children who were and who were not former CORB evacuees to Australia. This appears to have been made possible by immigration officials at Australia House registering all of these children as returning CORB evacuees, as they could not be identified as having been sponsored for migration by the League given that the League was not an approved organisation for child migration. If correct, this would raise questions as to whether all of the 194 'CORB' children that Bavin claimed to the Oversea Migration Board to have been migrated to Australia by the League were genuinely returning CORB evacuees or whether this figure also included children who had been emigrated inaccurately under a CORB designation to circumvent the League's non-approval as a child migration organisation. As the League has apparently disposed of its administrative records relating to its child migration work, it is difficult to establish what proportion of post-war child migrants sent to Australia by the League were genuine former CORB evacuees or not. It is likely that further clarity on this might only be achieved with further analysis of surviving records of court proceedings relating to children's migration for adoption from the Bow Street Magistrates Court, and no such analysis has previously been undertaken by any Inquiry.

6.10 Although the League was given information about the existence of archival material relating to the League's migration of children to Australia before 1954 in the

²⁵⁶⁹ See Heyes to Chief Migration Officer, 1st November 1949, National Archives of Australia, A446, 1960/66717, p.183.

UK and Australian National Archives, and the content in paragraphs 6.3-6.9 above was also presented to them, during the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse's Child Migration Programmes investigation, the League make no reference to this in their Section 21 response to this Inquiry.

6.11 Our understanding of the administrative process for the League's involvement in child migration to New Zealand is clearer at this point than it is for the League's child migration work to Australia (see main report 5.6, 10.14, 13.74-13.75). The League appears initially to have proposed a similar scheme to the New Zealand Government to that which it proposed to Australian authorities in the summer of 1948, although in the case of migration to New Zealand, children were to be sent to foster homes without the presumption that this would automatically lead to full adoption. The League advertised the scheme in the UK, and undertook initial recruitment, with final selection decisions being made by New Zealand immigration officials in discussion with the League. We have not identified any archival evidence which would support the League's claim (apparently originating from the New Zealand Government) that any UK Government officials were members of this final selection committee,²⁵⁷⁰ and are not aware of any other instance in which UK Government officials sat on selection committees for child migrants.

6.12 In evidence to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, a witness on behalf of the Royal Overseas League stated the League sought to encourage an on-going relationship between children it had helped to migrate and local overseas branches of the League.²⁵⁷¹ This included giving child migrants junior membership of the League which appears to have been converted into life membership, for at least some, in adulthood. The witness also accepted that this on-going relationship between child migrants and local overseas branches of the League were not necessarily clearly defined and did not necessarily involve members of overseas branches of the League visiting individual child migrants.²⁵⁷²

²⁵⁷⁰ No references have been found to any such arrangement on the limited files in the UK National Archives that have so far been located relating to this scheme. On the claim about the involvement of the UK Government, see Royal Overseas League, Section 21 response, ROL.001.001.002/009.

²⁵⁷¹ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, transcript of Day 13, pp.105-107, <https://www.iicsa.org.uk/key-documents/1696/view/public-hearing-transcript-13th-july-2017.pdf>

²⁵⁷² The suggestion made by this witness that child migrants may have been placed out with members of the League during holidays would not seem to be relevant to the majority of children migrated by the League who were already placed with families overseas and we have, at this point, seen no evidence of boys placed at Dhurringile by the League going to stay with members of the League during their vacations.

6.13 The lack of any clear structure within the League for monitoring children's welfare after their migration appears to be confirmed by evidence noted in Appendix 2 (3.27), that the lack of any such monitoring system within the League was known to the UK and Australian Commonwealth Governments at the time. As a member of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, the League, and Bavin as its representative, would have been aware of the proposal about regular reporting on child migrants placed overseas being included in the draft s.33 regulations and did not raise any objections to that requirement (see 2.29, 2.32, 2.37 above). There is, however, no evidence that the League at any point had a system in place to be able to comply with that requirement. Indeed, Home Office staff appear to have agreed that the Royal Overseas League could be approved as a sending organisation in 1953 precisely because they knew that the League did not have the structures in place to comply with the requirement for regular post-migration monitoring, and without addressing this, would be unable to continue to be involved in child migration once s.33 regulations had been introduced.²⁵⁷³ The League may have taken the view, in relation to its child migration work to New Zealand, that such a requirement was not relevant to its work as the New Zealand Government had argued that this scheme should be exempt from s.33 regulations (see 1.3 above). It could be argued, however, that even if such a formal exemption were appropriate in this case, the principle that sending organisations should have an adequate reporting system was still a form of good practice to which sending organisations should reasonably have adhered to.

6.14 Despite the League apparently lacking any systematic mechanism for monitoring the welfare of children it had migrated, Cyril Bavin claimed in a League publication that reports from New Zealand indicated the 'happy settlement of children in their homes' and demonstrated that the League's was 'one of the most, if not the most, satisfactory child emigration schemes in existence'.²⁵⁷⁴ Any such reports from New Zealand would, it might be assumed, have consisted of some ad hoc letters from families or child migrants in New Zealand. As the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse noted, however, there is evidence to suggest that visits by child welfare officials to child migrants in New Zealand were infrequent and sometimes ineffective in identifying problems with placements.²⁵⁷⁵ It is not clear,

²⁵⁷³ See both Minute, 9th September 1953, and Prestige to Bavin, 13th October 1953, TNA, MH102/2049, pp.4-5 and 7 on submitted copy.

²⁵⁷⁴ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.111-112.

²⁵⁷⁵ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, p.111. As the Women's Group on Public Welfare's *Child Emigration* report (pp.49-50) had noted, comparable standards for monitoring foster placements in the United Kingdom, as set out in the Home Office's Boarding Out regulations of 1946,

either, that information from New Zealand child welfare officials informed the League's understanding of the welfare of child migrants overseas in any effective way. The New Zealand Government decided to end this scheme in 1953, shortly after its Superintendent of Child Welfare had produced a report detailing a series of shortcomings in the scheme, including problems with the quality of foster placements (in which just over a third of the 530 children sent by the League had already had more than once foster placement).²⁵⁷⁶ The effect of the limited funding provided for foster carers appears to have been one factor in causing a turnover of foster placement for individual children, and it might have been expected that the League should have been aware of this. Despite the clear record of failings in the scheme in the Superintendent's report, Bavin is reported to have declared to have been both surprised and disappointed at the New Zealand Government's decision not to continue it.²⁵⁷⁷

6.15 There is no evidence that the League undertook any monitoring of children it had placed with families in Australia or New Zealand. There is also no indication that the League had any monitoring system in place for children whose migration it had arranged to Dhurringile.

6.16 The League's apparent failure to implement a system of post-migration monitoring for children whose migration it had helped to arrange could be interpreted in terms of a wider range of evidence that raises questions about its adherence to reasonable standards of the day. As noted above, there were concerns within the Home Office Children's Department in the spring of 1948 about the League's standards in selecting children for migration. These concerns saw the Home Office liaising with Australia House to try to ensure that in future, any children being put forward for migration by the League through Australia House would have reports on their suitability for migration provided through local authority Children's Officers.²⁵⁷⁸ As also discussed earlier, the League appears to have migrated children to private families in Australia before seeking formal approval for this work from the Australian Commonwealth and State Governments, and after this approval was

were that an inspection should take place within a month of initial placement and no less often than every six weeks after this.

²⁵⁷⁶ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.112.

²⁵⁷⁷ IICSA, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.112

²⁵⁷⁸ For correspondence on this, see TNA: MH102/1560. Note that the Home Office were aware that, until s.33 regulations were in place, the UK Government had no power to prevent the emigration of children by a voluntary organisation if that organisation did not require funding under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act for this work.

refused in the summer of 1948, appear to have continued this work. On the basis of this evidence it appears that the League found ways of collaborating with immigration officials at Australia House to migrate children, despite not being an approved child migration organisation, through the inaccurate designation of some children being sent by the League as former CORB evacuees. In addition to its failure to establish a system for monitoring the welfare of children whose migration it had helped to arrange, the League also failed to take up the recommendation of the Women's Group on Public Welfare that it set up a reception home in New Zealand for children being migrated there, and to which children could go if their placement broke down or they ran away (see 2.22 above). In this context, it may also be relevant to note that the League's apparent decision at some point to dispose of archival materials relating to its child migration work contrasts with other organisations, such as Barnardo's and the Fairbridge Society, for which fuller archives are available.

6.17 In its report on 'The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants', the Health Select Committee took the view that the Royal Overseas League had played a more active role in the migration of children to New Zealand than the League had initially acknowledged to their inquiry. On that basis, the Committee recommended 'that the League reconsider its disavowal of responsibility for child migration to that country. It should join with other voluntary agencies in making a contribution towards improving the welfare of former child migrants'.²⁵⁷⁹ Given evidence presented by the League to IICSA, it is not clear what proactive steps were taken by the League to meet this recommendation in the nearly twenty years since the Health Committee made that recommendation. After the publication of the IICSA report on child migration in March 2018, the League issued a brief apology in the news section of its website stating that 'The Royal Over-Seas League (ROSL) deeply regrets and apologises for its support of government initiatives from the 1920's onwards relating to child migration and condemns unreservedly the abuse and ill treatment of children.'²⁵⁸⁰

It is not clear what further action, if any, the League has undertaken since the publication of the IICSA report or whether, given the evidence described above, its apology for 'support of government initiatives' constitutes an accurate representation of its historical involvement in child migration.

²⁵⁷⁹ House of Commons Health Committee, *The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants*, 1997-98, HC755, para. 31.

²⁵⁸⁰ Royal Over-Seas League, 'Report on Child Migration from IICSA', https://www.rosl.org.uk/rosl_news/527-report-on-child-migration-from-iicsa

Monitoring Systems and wider organisational practices of the Church of Scotland and Quarriers

7.1 Although apparently approached in the post-war period by a number of institutions in Australia interested in receiving child migrants, as well as the UK committee of the Fairbridge Rhodesia Memorial College,²⁵⁸¹ the Church of Scotland only appears to have been involved in the migration of children to the Dhurringile Rural Training Farm. From material provided to us by the Inquiry, it appears that surviving records from this work are limited. For example, it seems that the Church of Scotland have only been able to identify the names of boys migrated to Dhurringile under its auspices from Quarriers in the early 1960s through lists of names on government files in the National Records of Scotland.²⁵⁸²

7.2 There are indications within this material about the basis on which the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service considered Dhurringile to be a suitable receiving institution for child migrants. The Rev. W. White Anderson, Moderator of the Church's General Assembly, is reported to have visited Dhurringile during a tour of Australia in 1951, and to have formed a positive view of its work.²⁵⁸³ In addition to this, the annual reports of the Committee on Social Service to the Church's Assembly in 1952, 1954, 1955 and 1957 made reference to positive reports received of children migrated—both from letters sent from the boys themselves and letters from the staff at Dhurringile itself.²⁵⁸⁴ From the way in which these reports are described, it appears that recurrent reports were received on the progress of individual boys over a period of years, although it is not possible on the basis of this information to know the frequency or comprehensiveness of these reports. The contrast between these positive reports provided by staff at Dhurringile and the far more critical observations of Dhurringile by the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission further re-iterates that whilst such self-reporting by receiving institutions could, in principle, have provided a valuable safeguard for child migrants (and the absence of such reporting might be seen as indicative of wider failures in organisational systems and culture), it was insufficient to protect children's interests without additional, effective independent scrutiny.

²⁵⁸¹ See CrossReach, COS.001.001.0914.

²⁵⁸² See Cross Reach, Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0653/54.

²⁵⁸³ See CrossReach, Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0661; *The Challenge of Need*, COS.001.001.0443.

²⁵⁸⁴ See CrossReach, Section 21 response, COS.001.001.0660-0662.

7.3 More detailed records have been provided in relation to children migrated from the care of Quarriers and the following analysis is based both on case files that have been reviewed for 39 children sent from Quarriers to the Burnside Homes in 1939 and to Dhurringile between 1960-1963 and on other organisational documents. The following analysis considers how organisational practices, including monitoring systems, might be assessed according to standards of the day.

7.4 In December 1938 and January 1939, the Superintendent of Quarriers wrote to parents and to the Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children to seek their agreement to the emigration of specific children following a request for children from the Fairbridge Society. The letters emphasised the good standing of the Fairbridge Society, noting that it worked 'under Royal Patronage, and other well known ladies and gentlemen' and that the Society was keen to include Scottish boys for a party to be sent to New South Wales in February.²⁵⁸⁵

7.5 On the basis of these letters, consent was given for the emigration of a number of children. In some cases, those giving consent or supporting this proposal did so explicitly on the basis that the children were being sent to a Fairbridge Farm School:

- 'I hereby agree that my grandchild [name given] should join the party going to the Fairbridge Farm School.'²⁵⁸⁶
- 'I am deeply interested in the particulars of the Emigration Scheme to New South Wales which you furnished me with and I am even more stronger in the opinion that the suggested inclusion of the boy [name given] in the scheme would be a glorious opportunity for him'.²⁵⁸⁷
- 'I...heartily agree that the best thing for this boy would be for him to be emigrated to New South Wales under the auspices of the Child Emigration Society Incorporated [i.e. Fairbridge]'.²⁵⁸⁸
- 'I was much interested to hear the suggestion that [name given] might be sent to one of the Fairbridge Schools in New South Wales. I have heard much of the work in the Fairbridge Schools, and I feel personally that this might be a most excellent chance for him.'²⁵⁸⁹

²⁵⁸⁵ Examples of these letters are at QAR.001.008.5633, 5653, 5689 and 5823.

²⁵⁸⁶ QAR.001.008.5599.

²⁵⁸⁷ QAR.001.008.5631.

²⁵⁸⁸ QAR.001.008.5652.

²⁵⁸⁹ QAR.001.008.5692-5693.

- 'I am very pleased that [boy's father] has agreed to [name given] going to Fairbridge. I happened to have some application forms and got him to sign one which I enclose herewith.'²⁵⁹⁰ [letter contains enclosed Fairbridge consent form signed by father]²⁵⁹¹

7.6 In reality, however, none of the children emigrated by Quarriers in 1939 were sent to a Fairbridge Farm School in Australia, but to the Burnside Homes, Parramatta, which were operated by the Presbyterian Church. To date there is no evidence of any organisational link between the Burnside Homes and Fairbridge. Fairbridge's annual reports for 1938, 1939 and 1940, for example, contain no references to Burnside as an institution, nor to any specific plans to send children to Burnside under Fairbridge's auspices.²⁵⁹² There is also no reference to any organisational links between the Burnside Homes and Fairbridge which has yet been found in the UK National Archives or National Archives of Australia, or the Fairbridge archives at the University of Liverpool. Furthermore, the Burnside Homes were not an institution for which the UK Government had agreed to pay outfitting and maintenance costs for child migrants with their financial agreements with Fairbridge under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act.²⁵⁹³ It appears that the Quarriers children who went to the Burnside Homes sailed in April 1939,²⁵⁹⁴ and although the Fairbridge Society reportedly sent children on a number of sailings that year, none of these sailings fell in that month.²⁵⁹⁵ Correspondence from the New South Wales State Government to the Superintendent of the Burnside Homes also confirmed that it would offer financial contributions towards child migrants' maintenance 'on the same basis as has been approved for the Fairbridge, Barnardo and Salvation Army schemes', implying that the Burnside scheme was separate to these.²⁵⁹⁶ One connection between Burnside and Fairbridge was Andrew Reid, a New South Wales businessman and director of the Burnside Homes. Reid had a long-standing interest in child migration, having donated money to Burnside to enable them to build new

²⁵⁹⁰ QAR.001.008.5821.

²⁵⁹¹ QAR.001.008.5822.

²⁵⁹² Copies of these annual reports submitted on request.

²⁵⁹³ Copies of these financial agreements are held on NAA: A461.B349.1.3 (copy submitted on request).

²⁵⁹⁴ See for example, QAR.001.008.5820.

²⁵⁹⁵ The 1939 annual report for the Fairbridge Society notes that children sailed to the Molong and Northcote farm schools in Eastern Australia under its auspices in February, May, June and July that year. Note Bavin to Macintyre, 12th April 1939, NAA.001.001.0560 contains details about the preparation and departure of these children from Quarriers to Burnside and contains no reference to Fairbridge.

²⁵⁹⁶ Under-Secretary to Milliken, 9th May 1938.

accommodation for child migrants and later played a leading role in establishing the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong.²⁵⁹⁷ This connection was, however, a personal one, and did not entail any formal organisational link between Fairbridge and Burnside, or grounds for claiming that children being sent to Burnside were being sent to a Fairbridge institution.

7.7 As noted in the main report (13.31-13.32), the proposal to send children to the Burnside Homes, Parramatta, in New South Wales, had quite separate origins to the development of the Fairbridge Farm School at Molong. Initially there had been an attempt to recruit children for Burnside through the Church of Scotland. In correspondence from the Superintendent at Burnside to the Church of Scotland it is argued that Burnside would be a preferable destination for children migrated by the Church of Scotland compared to a Fairbridge farm school because children at Burnside would remain 'directly under the care of the Church.'²⁵⁹⁸ By 1937, however, this proposal had proven unsuccessful not least because many guardians or single parents were reluctant to consent to their children travelling so far away.²⁵⁹⁹ Both an official in the Dominions Office and Walter Garnett, in the UK High Commission in Canberra, noted that the prospective of sending children to the Burnside 'Home' (i.e. a children's residential institution) was probably much less attractive to parents and guardians than the prospect of their children going overseas to a Fairbridge farm school.²⁶⁰⁰

Eventually arrangements for the recruitment of children were taken on by Cyril Bavin on behalf of the YMCA,²⁶⁰¹ although as the Dominions Office noted at the time, the YMCA had no previous experience with child migration.²⁶⁰² It appears that Quarriers

²⁵⁹⁷ See Geoffrey Sherrington and Chris Jeffrey, *Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration*, London: Woburn, 1998, pp.167-171; also Bavin to Ross, 14th March 1939, NAA.001.001.0557.

²⁵⁹⁸ Superintendent to MacDonald Webster, 9th May 1936, NAA.001.001.0544.

²⁵⁹⁹ See Superintendent to White, 8th May 1936, NAA.001.001.0543; Webster to Crutchley, 22nd January 1937, TNA: DO35/686/7.

²⁶⁰⁰ See note 26th January, and letter to Garnett, 3rd February 1937, TNA: DO35/686/7, pp.2, 6 on submitted copy.

²⁶⁰¹ Bavin evidently made contact with Burnside after hearing about the Church of Scotland's difficulty in recruiting children and offered to take this recruitment work on through the YMCA (Bavin to Milliken, 24th February 1938, NAA.001.001.0552). This appears to reflect a wider pattern of Bavin actively involving himself in promoting opportunities for child migration, repeated in the post-war period with his work on the scheme to New Zealand and recruitment for Dhurringile through the Royal Overseas League.

²⁶⁰² Garnett to Costar, 8th June 1938, TNA: DO35/686/7, pp.43-44 on submitted copy. Although no date is given there appears to have also been prior contact between the YMCA and the Church of Scotland in the 1920s regarding child or juvenile migration work, see COS.001.001.0669.

decided to send children to Burnside because of personal contacts between one of Quarriers' Executive Committee members, Lord Maclay, and Andrew Reid.²⁶⁰³

As the Australian Commonwealth Government and State Government for New South Wales were willing to contribute towards the maintenance costs of children at Burnside, and the Presbyterian Church's success in fund-raising had meant that they had not approached the Dominions Office for a similar contribution, the Dominions Office and UK High Commission did not feel any need to proactively offer such UK Government funding.²⁶⁰⁴ Because no UK Government funding was offered for child migration to Burnside, no formal approval of Burnside as a receiving institution was ever made by the UK Government, although a Dominions Office note based on a brochure about Burnside took a positive view of it.²⁶⁰⁵ The 1939 migration party from Quarriers to the Burnside Homes therefore appears to be the only case from the 1930s onwards in which British child migrants were sent to a specific receiving institution in Australia without this being supported by Empire Settlement Act funding.

7.8 On the documentary evidence currently available, it is difficult to be certain how arrangements for the migration of children from Quarriers, which was initially stated to be under the auspices of Fairbridge, led to children being sent to a residential institution with no clear connections to the Fairbridge Society. If Quarriers had presented the potential migration of children to parents, guardians and other relevant bodies as a collaboration with Fairbridge in good faith, it may have been that after receiving consents in the spring of 1939, a decision was made by Quarriers to send their migration party to Burnside instead, possibly as a result of contacts either with Bavin or the Church of Scotland. There is no indication, however, on any of the case files that any of the parents, guardians or relevant bodies (such as the RSSPCC) who had agreed to these children's migration on the basis that this would be through the Fairbridge Society were notified of this change. Given that some consents appear to have been given specifically on the basis of Fairbridge's public reputation (7.4 above) and the suggestion that migration to a residential home might be seen as less beneficial to children than migration to a Fairbridge Farm School, this omission could be seen as undermining the potential for informed consent. There is also no indication of what knowledge Quarriers had about Burnside before agreeing

²⁶⁰³ Kelly to Ross, 12th June 1939, NAA.001.001.0567.

²⁶⁰⁴ Costar to Garnett, 13th May 1938, Garnett to Costar, 8th June 1938, TNA: DO35/686/7, pp.43-44 and 49-50 on submitted copy.

²⁶⁰⁵ See note 19th February 1936, TNA: DO35/686/7, p.16 on submitted copy.

to send children there, something which again might be seen as entailing some risk to children given that it had not undergone any formal approval by the UK Government as a receiving institution.

7.9 As noted previously, the Curtis report and Home Office had emphasised the importance of maintaining family bonds when considering children's selection for emigration.²⁶⁰⁶ Likewise, the Scottish Home and Education Departments also appear to have emphasised the importance of maintaining bonds between siblings (see Appendix 2, 4.23).²⁶⁰⁷ Despite this, Quarriers appear to have placed more weight on the perceived benefits of emigration to the individual child rather than maintaining family contacts. In the case of one family, in the late 1930s, one brother was emigrated to Canada by Quarriers, one brother remained in Scotland with Quarriers, another brother and sister were migrated to Burnside and a fifth was not admitted to Quarriers. The case files for those emigrated suggest a strong wish amongst some of them to try to maintain contact despite the substantial distances separating them.²⁶⁰⁸

7.10 Jeanette Maxwell's Home Office memorandum in 1947 had advocated not migrating children for whom there was any chance they might be able to leave a residential institution to live with a parent or other family member (2.5 above). Although Quarriers, like other sending organisations, migrated children for whom there seemed little prospect of them returning to the care of a parent or other family member, the case files reviewed also include instances where the break between a child and other members of their family was less clear. In one case, a mother requested custody of two of her children from Quarriers in 1960 after two of her sons had been sent to Dhurringile.²⁶⁰⁹ Quarriers subsequently wrote to her to ask if she would consider sending the other two children now in her care to Australia so that all the siblings could be together.²⁶¹⁰ In another case of two boys whose mother had died and who were sent to Dhurringile in 1963, their father had been trying to

²⁶⁰⁶ On the importance of avoiding separation between the parent and child see Women's Group on Public Welfare, *Child Emigration*, p.29.

²⁶⁰⁷ On the importance of maintaining sibling bonds see also Women's Group on Public Welfare, *Child Emigration*, p.59; this also appears to have been a principle informing views within the Home Office on whether Secretary of State consent should be given in specific cases of children to be migrated from the care of local authorities (see notes by Ratcliffe, no date and 2nd September 1950, TNA: MH102/1954, pp.5-6 on submitted copy).

²⁶⁰⁸ Relevant documents for this family's case are QAR.001.008.5383/5424/5431/5435/5439/5462/5469. For another case of sibling separation with the 1939 migration party see also QAR.001.008.5576.

²⁶⁰⁹ See QAR.001.008.5854/5868/6109/6123.

²⁶¹⁰ QAR.001.008.6115.

maintain contact with them and an aunt had expressed interest in having them come and live with her the previous year (but was struggling to do so because of other family commitments).²⁶¹¹ In another case, a boy sent to Dhurringile in 1960 had family members who had provided care for his siblings or expressed an interest in this and there had also been interest in his being boarded out with his sister the previous year, although nothing had developed with this.²⁶¹² Another case had involved a grandmother who had been willing to receive the boy back into her care from Quarriers—and had previously received his brother—but where this was opposed by the RSSPCC on grounds, not of cruelty, but the difficulty in her providing suitable care whilst working and having health problems.²⁶¹³ Whilst, in each of these cases, there may not have been immediate prospects of them being boarded out or returning to family members at the point at which their migration was being considered by Quarriers, the presumption of Quarriers' management appears to have been towards encouraging the child's migration rather than maintaining them in Scotland in order to preserve these family links.

7.11 An organisational presumption towards the perceived benefits of a child's emigration over maintaining family contact in the United Kingdom can also potentially be seen in the way in which Quarriers sought parental consent for a child's migration for the parties sent to Dhurringile. When contacting parents to seek their consent for their child's migration, Quarriers appear to have used a standard letter. The wording of this was:

'Dear []

We have been invited to send a small party of boys to a Home not unlike our own in Australia...After a time there the boys would be placed in suitable employment and altogether we feel it would be a very good chance for the boys selected, especially when their outside contacts in this country are not so strong.

Having regard to these circumstances would you be willing to allow [name of child] to be submitted to go to Australia? I should, of course, like to make it clear that investigations are, at present, only in the preliminary stages. I would, too, like you to know that [] is very keen to go.

I should be glad to hear from you as soon as possible.

²⁶¹¹ QAR.001.008.6602-6603, 6629, 6632 and 6642.

²⁶¹² QAR.001.008.6756 and 6779.

²⁶¹³ See QAR.001.008.6497, 6510, 6512-6513, 6525 and 6532.

Yours faithfully

Superintendent'

7.12 The phrasing of this letter could be read as placing a degree of emotional pressure on the parent by emphasising that the child's 'outside contacts' (i.e. their family relationships) in this country were not strong and that the child themselves was 'very keen' to be migrated (and so any attempt by the parent to block this would be a source of considerable disappointment to them. The fact that the child had been consulted about this opportunity before the parent also placed greater pressure on the parent to comply with the child's wishes. This is exemplified in one case of a mother who had kept up regular maintenance payments for her son whilst he was in Quarriers and appears to have kept regular contact with him. She felt unable to refuse consent to his emigration because he was so enthusiastic about it, even though she would greatly miss him.²⁶¹⁴

7.13 Similar emotional pressures can be seen in some cases of parental consents given to children migrated in the 1939 party to Burnside. In one case, a mother was evidently very reluctant to allow her son to be migrated but as she had not had much involvement in his life did not feel entitled to deny him that opportunity despite wanting to remain in contact with him.²⁶¹⁵ In another, a mother was very distressed when her son wrote to her from Quarriers in January 1939 informing her that he was about to go to Australia and solicitors made contact with Quarriers on her behalf to establish if they had sought the necessary consent from her.²⁶¹⁶ Her initial refusal to give this consent drew a strong response from Quarriers' superintendent who wrote back to her stating that her unsigned letter on this matter was not valid and continuing:

On the assumption that this letter was dictated by you, I regret very much that you do not see your way to give your consent to the emigration of [REDACTED]. You certainly have no prospects for him, and why stand in his way?... I trust you will re-consider your decision and write me accordingly.²⁶¹⁷

The mother subsequently gave her consent, subject to receiving written confirmation from her son that he definitely wanted to emigrate to Australia.²⁶¹⁸

²⁶¹⁴ See QAR.001.008.6460 and 6462-6463.

²⁶¹⁵ See QAR.001.008.5687-5688 and 5699-5700.

²⁶¹⁶ See QAR.001.008.5300 and 5301.

²⁶¹⁷ QAR.001.008.5297-5298.

²⁶¹⁸ See QAR.001.008.5306 and 5308.

7.14 Further evidence of an organisational presumption towards children's emigration in the Dhurringile parties relates to psychological reports which indicated that five of the sixteen children migrated by Quarriers in 1960 and 1961 would not be suited to this on educational or emotional grounds (note Quarriers Section 21 response only appears to indicate three such cases).²⁶¹⁹ In one of these cases, the person migrated later wrote as an adult to Quarriers stating she got 'very depressed' at times.²⁶²⁰ Despite these reports constituting an important counter-indication against the approval of these children's migration, there is no indication of why their recommendations were not followed in these children's case files and the summary statements by the Superintendent in support of their emigration makes no reference to them. There is no indication that any such psychological assessments were subsequently made on the boys who were migrated to Dhurringile in 1963.

7.15 The overall impression, taking into account Quarriers' migration of children disregarded continued family bonds in Scotland or psychological assessments suggesting their unsuitability for migration, is that there was an organisational presumption towards the migration of these children which was not in accordance with how the best interests of the child would be understood at that time.

7.16 Given requests for personal details and family contacts that people migrated by Quarriers later made to them, it seems that in a number of cases, children were migrated to Australia with little information about their family backgrounds.²⁶²¹ There is, however, an indication that case histories were sent over with the party of children migrated to Burnside in 1939.²⁶²²

7.17 From the information available, it is not clear what Quarriers knew about conditions at the Burnside Homes before sending children there in 1939. With regard to post-war migration to Dhurringile, Quarriers have indicated that its Council of Management approved the migration of boys under the scheme offered by the Presbyterian Church of Australia and left it to Quarriers' General Director to obtain further details of this scheme from the Church of Scotland.²⁶²³ We do not have any indication of what information was provided to Quarriers by the Church of Scotland.

²⁶¹⁹ See Quarriers, Section 21 response, QAR.001.008.0043. The five cases in which psychological reports express the view in which a child's emigration would not be suitable are the three noted by Quarriers – DB (QAR.001.008.5941); EJ (QAR.001.008.6003) and RM (QAR.001.008.6431) – plus EC (QAR.001.008.6268) and MR (QAR.001.008.6065).

²⁶²⁰ QAR.001.008.6030.

²⁶²¹ See for example, QAR.001.008.5424/5431/5462/5750-5751/6030/6715-6716.

²⁶²² Acting Superintendent to Bavin, 24th May 1939, NAA.001.001.0565.

²⁶²³ Quarriers Response in Respect of Section 21 Notice, 31st January 2019, p.7.

As noted in Appendix 2 (4.15-4.20), the Church of Scotland Committee of Social Service was aware that concerns had been raised about Dhurringile as a result of the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission, but we do not know from current material whether it made Quarriers aware of these previous concerns or provided any other subsequent information about standards there. Although Quarriers note that their view of Dhurringile may have been shaped by the positive impression of it given in the letter to Scottish residential institutions circulated by Andrew Boag, this letter was written in 1950 and it may have been reasonable for Quarriers to have obtained more recent knowledge about conditions at Dhurringile before children were sent there.

7.18 Quarriers note that there is no evidence of any monitoring or inspections of the children that it sent to the Burnside Presbyterian Orphan Homes in 1939. This accords with the case files that have been reviewed in which no such reports appear and in which the main means of receiving information about children migrated by Quarriers appears to have been through occasional letters sent by the children themselves.²⁶²⁴

7.19 For the children sent to Dhurringile from 1960 to 1963, Quarriers have stated that two sets of reports were sent back to them by Dhurringile's Principal, in June 1962 and January 1964.²⁶²⁵ There is no indication that any further reports were sent back about these child migrants after the closure of Dhurringile in 1964. This implies that Quarriers did not receive copies of any aftercare reports produced about boys who had left residential institutions in Australia, nor did they receive any further reports about boys under school leaving age after the closure of Dhurringile.²⁶²⁶ No reports appear to have been received, either, from State Child Welfare officers who might have been expected to undertake regular visits in the case of children who were adopted or boarded out with local families soon after arrival at Dhurringile, with the only information made about these placements coming in reports received from the Principal of Dhurringile.²⁶²⁷ The potential weakness of a monitoring system reliant on reports from managers of receiving institutions is arguably reflected in the fact that those reports that Quarriers did receive on children sent to Dhurringile in the early 1960s were produced by **AIQ** who has been identified as physically

²⁶²⁴ See for example, QAR.001.008.5275/5278/5281.

²⁶²⁵ Quarriers Response in Respect of Section 21 Notice, 31st January 2019, pp.14, 41-42.

²⁶²⁶ See for example, the dates of birth for children nominated for migration in the 1963 party, which includes children born in 1951, 1953 and 1955, Kerr to Chief Inspector, 3rd August 1962, NRS: ED11/509, pp.27-28 on provided copy.

²⁶²⁷ See for example, QAR.001.008.5972/6200/6201.

and psychologically abusive by two witnesses to this Inquiry (see, for example, main report, 31.12).

7.20 Brief positive reports about Dhurringile were also included in Quarrier's annual *Narrative of Facts* in 1960, 1961 and 1963 based on summaries of correspondence from the Principal and General Superintendent and comments from another external visitor.²⁶²⁸ As a public document intended to encourage support for the charity, however, this information would not of itself be indicative of a rigorous system for monitoring either Dhurringile as an institution or the welfare of individual children sent there (see also Appendix 2, 4.17).

Monitoring Systems Implemented by Local Authorities in Scotland

8.1 Previous inquiries have indicated that there was not a consistent approach adopted across local authorities in the United Kingdom for monitoring the welfare of children sent overseas. In the case of one child migrant sent from Northern Ireland to Dhurringile, the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry received evidence that the Children's Officer from the local authority from whose care he was sent actively sought details about his welfare and progress directly from the Child Welfare Department in Victoria, albeit six years after his arrival in Australia, and sought to continue contact after this.²⁶²⁹ The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse also heard that the Children's Officer for Cornwall County Council (who herself had previous links with Fairbridge) both visited Fairbridge farm schools to which children from the Council's care were sent and received periodic reports on them.²⁶³⁰ More generally it appears that the nature and extent of information received by local authorities across the United Kingdom was dependent on the nature of the monitoring systems of the voluntary organisations who had undertaken their migration and received those children overseas (see also 2.16 above).

8.2 The lack of any system of independent post-migration monitoring by local authorities of children sent from their care appears to be confirmed by material

²⁶²⁸ See Quarrier's Homes, *A Narrative of Facts Relative to Work Done for Christ*, for the eighty-ninth year ending 31st October 1960, for the ninetieth year ending 31st October 1961, and for the ninety-second year ending 31st October 1963.

²⁶²⁹ Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Module 2 Child Migration, witness statement for HIA354, paras. 12-25.

²⁶³⁰ Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report*, pp.113-114.

submitted by various local authorities to this Inquiry in which no evidence can be found of such a system being in place.²⁶³¹ It is not entirely clear whether this lack of evidence reflects gaps in surviving records or simply the absence of any systematic approach. Lack of evidence of such systematic monitoring might also be understood in the context in which a number of local authorities in Scotland appear to have sent very few, if any, children overseas through schemes run by recognised voluntary organisations.

8.3 If local authorities did not undertake any systematic and independent post-migration monitoring of children sent from their care, and were therefore reliant on information provided through the reporting systems of voluntary organisations, then the preceding sections of this Appendix will have made clear that there was considerable variation in practice across these voluntary organisations.

8.4 There appear to be very few examples from the post-war period of local authority records of post-migration reports provided by voluntary organisations to local authorities from whose care a child migrant had been sent. In one case, relating to the migration in 1950 of a boy over school-leaving age from the care of Kirkcaldy Town Council with the Big Brother Movement, the Council's Children's Officer appears to have made their own arrangements for keeping in touch with him. There is one record of a letter having been received from this boy a few months after his migration confirming that he was now settled happily on a farm in Australia.²⁶³² In another case of a boy migrated from the care of the Burgh of Motherwell and Wishaw in 1965, apparently through the Big Brother Movement, no such arrangement for post-migration checks are recorded.²⁶³³ Material on discussions of child migration policy provided by local authorities to this Inquiry focus primarily on the general circulation or discussion of information about child migration sent to local authorities by specific voluntary organisations involved in this work, or to the more specific discussion of children's cases prior to emigration (with particular reference to the need to obtain necessary consent from the Scottish Home Department).

²⁶³¹ See Edinburgh City Council, Section 21 response Clerwood Children's Home, p.110.

²⁶³² Fife Council, Section 21 response, FIC.001.001.4670,4679-4680, also FIC.001.001.4726/27). There seems to be a somewhat similar example of a boy migrated from the care of Inverness County to the Fairbridge Farm School at Pinjarra in 1936, where a single post-migration report on his progress is noted (Highland Council, Section 21 response, HIC.001.001.0005).

²⁶³³ North Lanarkshire Council, Section 21 response, NLC.001.001.0261.

8.5 In its Section 21 response, East Lothian Council has identified a case of one boy who emigrated to Australia through Barnardo's in 1947. The only minuted references to his case in the Council's Education Committee are those referring to his consideration for emigration and the revocation of his 'fit person' order placing him in the care of the Council following his emigration.²⁶³⁴ Similar details were recorded by the Council for the emigration of three boys from Nazareth House, Lasswade, in 1947 whose emigration had received maternal consent, and where again the revocation of their 'fit person' order under the 1937 Children and Young Persons Act (Scotland) was noted following their emigration.²⁶³⁵ In neither of these cases were any post-migration monitoring reports noted for these boys (although one pre-migration report on the boy sent with Barnardo's was recorded). This may imply that the Council took the view that once the 'fit person' order that had placed these children under their care had been revoked, they had no on-going responsibility for the care of these children. Given the wider policy discussions noted in section 2 of this Appendix about the continuing responsibilities of sending organisations towards children they had migrated, this suggests either that in these cases the Council did not take account of such continuing responsibilities or may have assumed that such continuing responsibilities resided not with them but with the voluntary organisation who had arranged for the child's migration. There is no record of any policy discussion, in these cases, between the Council and the relevant voluntary organisation about how any such continuing responsibility to child migrants was to be discharged.

8.6 Overall, in comparison to voluntary organisations who arranged for the migration of tens and, in some cases, hundreds of children per annum from across the United Kingdom, local authorities in Scotland appear to have only very rarely sent children from their care overseas in the post-war period through child migration schemes run by recognised voluntary organisations. Given the highly sporadic nature of these local authorities' involvement in child migration work, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is little evidence of systematic post-migration monitoring. Any monitoring that was set up (as in the Kirkcaldy case noted in 8.4 above) appears to have happened at the discretion of the relevant local authority's Children's Officer. From the limited records available it appears that local authorities did not typically undertake continued monitoring of children migrated from their care over extended periods of time. There may have been an assumption that a local authority's

²⁶³⁴ East Lothian Council, Child Migrants Section 21 response, ELC.001.001.0049.

²⁶³⁵ East Lothian Council, Child Migrants Section 21 response, ELC.001.001.0051.

responsibility to a child may have ended with the revocation of any court order at the point of their emigration, but there is no evidence of any explicit policy discussion in these local authority records about whether local authorities had any on-going responsibilities towards children whom they had allowed to be migrated overseas.

Monitoring Systems Operated by the Salvation Army

9.1 It appears that some boys were migrated to Australia from Scotland under the auspices of the Salvation Army to the Riverview Training Farm in Queensland.²⁶³⁶

9.2 Material submitted to this Inquiry provides indications of various information being received about boys sent to Riverview. In 1952, 1954, 1955, 1958 and 1960 short reports were received by the Salvation's Army's Migration Department in London on the progress of boys sent to Riverview.²⁶³⁷ These reports were typically fairly short (between 4-6 lines) and typically focused on the boys' standards of behaviour, their health, their adaptation to Australian conditions (including life in an institution and farm work) and their attitude to learning. Given that boys sent by the Salvation Army normally resided at Riverview for a period of months before being placed out with local farmers, it appears that only a single report was returned in relation to each boy which was usually produced after they had left Riverview. Records of reports have been held on file for no more than 42 boys, which is fewer than the total number believed to have migrated to Australia under the auspices of the Salvation Army between 1950 to 1960.²⁶³⁸ Given that these reports normally accompanied correspondence providing information required for maintenance payments to be made under the Army's funding agreement with the United Kingdom Government, it is not clear why a more comprehensive run of reports is not held in the Army's archives. No record has been found of the Army's Migration Department in London chasing any missing reports. A common point made in these reports concerns whether a boy adapted well or not to conditions at Riverview, but this was phrased in a way that suggested such adaptability was entirely a matter of the attitude and aptitude of the individual boy and no reflections were offered on whether Riverview was offering appropriate support to help boys adjust. Although, as will be discussed in following paragraphs, there appears to have been a recurrent

²⁶³⁶ See for example, Memorandum to Colonel Culshaw, 15th November 1948, SAL.001.002.0460; Boys for Riverview Farm, Queensland, SAL.001.002.0463.

²⁶³⁷ See Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/3, SAL.001.002.0552, 0571-0572, 0576, 0593, 0605-0606, 0615-0617 and 0646-0648.

²⁶³⁸ See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes Report, p.116, which notes total figures of 71 or 91 boys emigrated to Australia by the Salvation Army in that period.

issue of boys finding Riverview to be a very different kind of institution to the one they had been expecting, only two references occur to this in reports on individual boys (both written in March 1960).²⁶³⁹

9.3 In addition to these reports on individual boys, there are records of other organisational correspondence concerning conditions and practices at Riverview. On 24th August 1953, the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory wrote to the Salvation Army in London enclosing an escort's report of the voyage of a party of boys going to Riverview which notes the challenges of managing a party of boys who had become bored on the long and monotonous sea crossing.²⁶⁴⁰

9.4 By September 1953, a number of these boys had written back to the Salvation Army in London, stating:

Dear Major Leng,

Just a few lines to let you know a few home truths about this place. First of all this place is not a Training Farm, it is merely a money-making concern designed to provide the people running it with a fat and easy living. The food is fit only for pigs, they don't seem to care so long as we have something on our plates. We are worked from 4.30am to 4.30pm for the ridiculous sum of 4/-. If we are very lucky we get into town every two weeks for one and a half hours.

HYGIENE: The lavatories are in a filthy and appalling condition. Rust lies thick on all our eating utensils, and as we said before the food is abominable. If something is not done about this very quickly our parents will see that every leading paper in the country (England) will give a front page account of the way in which we were deluded about the conditions out here.²⁶⁴¹

The London office in receiving this letter contacted the Eastern Australia Territory Headquarters to inform them about this. The London office speculated that one boy, already identified as a trouble-maker, was 'at the back of this', and contrasted this letter with a letter apparently sent from one of its signatories to his mother which

²⁶³⁹ See Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/3, SAL.001.002.0552, in which one boy is said to have 'found that Riverview was altogether different to what he expected it to be' and another was reported to have 'called Riverview a "dump" and said on more than one occasion that he would run away from the place'.

²⁶⁴⁰ Cooper to Ebbs, 24th August 1953, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0487.

²⁶⁴¹ ██████████ to Leng, no date, SAL.001.002.0491, enclosed with Ebbs to Cooper, 28th September 1953, SAL.001.002.0490.

described his experiences more positively.²⁶⁴² The description of the voyage previously given by the escort might have reasonably raised doubts, though, that this boy's letter to his mother (in which he reportedly wrote that he 'thoroughly enjoyed the five weeks sea trip') may have offered a rather inaccurately positive account.

9.5 In response, the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory wrote back the following month with a rebuttal of the boys' complaints.²⁶⁴³ Although it was recognised that they did begin work from 5am until 4.00-4.30pm, this was a reflection of the working hours required on a farm and three meal breaks were taken during the day. The productivity of these boys was said to be very poor, and the Chief Secretary suggested that the experience of having been waited on on-board ship for the six weeks during their crossing may have prepared them poorly for life on arrival on a working farm. Their criticisms about food and standards of the toilets were rejected as unfounded (although they were said by the farm's manager to be wasteful with their food), and it was argued that the boys did not appreciate that if they were to have the kind of farming apprenticeship they were receiving at Riverview on a private farm, they would have to pay for this. Rather than reflecting poorly on the institution, the Chief Secretary suggested that their comments indicated that boys being sent to Riverview needed to be better prepared for the work that would await them there. An internal memorandum in the Salvation Army's Migration and Settlement and General Travel Office in London, written about receipt of this letter, noted that no independent information had been received about hours of work or conditions at Riverview since the War, other than information obtained from letters sent from boys back to their parents.²⁶⁴⁴ A letter back to the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory, sent a week after this memorandum was written, accepted the Chief Secretary's account of Riverview without raising any further questions.²⁶⁴⁵ There is no other indication of the London office taking any further action in response to the boys' complaints.

9.6 On 10th December 1954, a letter was sent from the new Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory to the Salvation Army's Migration and Settlement and

²⁶⁴² Ebbs to Cooper with enclosure, 28th September 1953, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0490.

²⁶⁴³ Cooper to Ebbs, 13th October 1953, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0493.

²⁶⁴⁴ Memorandum from Leng to Ebbs, 22nd October 1953, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0495.

²⁶⁴⁵ No name to Cooper, 29th October 1953, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0495.

General Travel Office in London confirming the safe arrival of the latest party of boys for Riverview. They were said to be in good health and to have 'earned a very good reputation for good behaviour on the boat'.²⁶⁴⁶

9.7 The following year, the Commissioner for the Salvation Army's Migration and Settlement and General Travel Office in London wrote to the Eastern Australia Territory saying that

the New Chief Migration Officer – Mr. J. Armstrong – at Australia House has expressed a desire for information of any outstanding or interesting success stories of any of our boys, and if suitable, this would be used for propaganda for recruitment by Australia House for Riverview in their literature. Would it be possible for you to let us have this?²⁶⁴⁷

Although the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory wrote back to indicate that he would be pleased to try to obtain this information,²⁶⁴⁸ no subsequent positive testimonials about boys' experiences at Riverview are recorded on the files from the Salvation Army archives that have been provided to the Inquiry. The next recorded correspondence on the Salvation Army's file on Riverview is a letter from the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory confirming the safe arrival of another party of boys for Riverview in June 1955.²⁶⁴⁹

9.8 In May 1955, a letter from the Director of the Queensland Children's Department to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration noted the case of a mother who had emigrated to Australia along with her son, who was to go to Riverview for training.²⁶⁵⁰ Ten days after her son was admitted to Riverview, the mother visited the State Children's Department to complain that the Salvation Army in the United Kingdom had described Riverview to her as an agricultural college providing technical agricultural training. Had she known what the facilities at Riverview were actually like, she would not have agreed to him being emigrated to go there. The Children's Department supported her request to take her son back

²⁶⁴⁶ Dent to Ebbs, 10th December 1954, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0503.

²⁶⁴⁷ Ebbs to no name, 15th April 1955, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0505.

²⁶⁴⁸ Dent to Ebbs, 27th April 1955, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0506.

²⁶⁴⁹ Dent to Ebbs, 21st June 1955, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0511.

²⁶⁵⁰ Harris to Secretary, Commonwealth Department of Immigration, 24th May 1955, NAA: J25/1958/3052.

under her guardianship and he subsequently enrolled at another college with a view to go on to more specialised agricultural training. The Children's Department noted that the impression that the mother appeared to have been given about Riverview was not accurate, given that Riverview had no specialist educational facilities, and recommended that the Department of Immigration take action to ensure there were no inaccurate impressions about Riverview on the part of authorities in England. It is not clear what action was taken as a result of this recommendation.

9.9 In the spring of 1956, the UK Fact-Finding Mission produced a highly critical confidential appendix to its main report on conditions at Riverview. Comments within this confidential appendix included:

The accommodation for migrant boys consists of dormitories in large wooden army type huts. The furnishings are poor, the accommodation is primitive and the ablution and sanitary arrangements most unsatisfactory...Rooms are bare and comfortless...The home is staffed by Salvation Army Officers, who appear to be rigid and narrow in outlook and to have no particular ability for work of this type...[Boys] are not allowed outside the grounds except at specified times and to certain places, and a member of staff expressed the view that if they were given more freedom they might run away. Recreation is always supervised, on the grounds that unless the boys are watched constantly there is a danger of misbehaviour which might bring discredit on the home...In view of the nature of the accommodation and of the staffing, it does not seem that this establishment has anything to offer migrant boys. The one migrant in residence, an intelligent, self-assured boy of good type, said that he disliked being there and was longing for the time when he could leave and enter employment.²⁶⁵¹

9.10 On the basis of this report, discussions took place between the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office about whether Riverview should be considered a 'black-listed' institution to which no further child migrants should be sent, although such a 'black-list' was never enforced by them. When conducting its own review of a small number of receiving institutions for child migrants in the summer of 1956, having been made aware of criticisms made by the UK Fact-Finding Mission, the Australian Commonwealth Government's Department of Immigration declined to include Riverview. That was on the basis that it only received boys aged between fifteen and a half to seventeen years of age (i.e. above school leaving age) for a period of months before they were placed in employment, and as such should

²⁶⁵¹ UK Fact-Finding Mission, confidential appendix on Riverview Training Farm, TNA: BN29/1325, pp.132-133 on submitted copy.

not reasonably be regarded as a 'children's institution'.²⁶⁵² After deciding not to introduce further regulations for the migration of children, the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office instead agreed, from 1957, to begin a system of informal inspections of sending organisations' administrative arrangements by the Home Office²⁶⁵³ and to seek up-dated information from receiving institutions about their policies and standards with regard to the care and training of child migrants.²⁶⁵⁴ Information provided by the Salvation Army in response to this request provided a brief overview of conditions.²⁶⁵⁵ It noted that boys sent there were accommodated in a large dormitory, paid a small weekly gratuity for their work, and provided three months' training prior to placement with local farmers. It further noted that these boys did not attend the annual holiday camp arranged for other children at Riverview because the farm needed to be kept working and that they received after-care from the Queensland State Child Welfare Department but not from any dedicated after-care officer from the Salvation Army as the expense and distances over which boys were sent made such an appointment impractical.²⁶⁵⁶ The Commonwealth Department of Immigration also forwarded on separate reports on receiving institutions from State authorities to the UK High Commission, with which it noted that as

the Fact Finding Mission visited most of the institutions only slightly more than twelve months ago and made detailed notes in each instance, we did not feel that a special effort was warranted to prepare the reports as comprehensively as would otherwise have been desirable.²⁶⁵⁷

The half page report prepared on Riverview by State officials summarised brief information about the nature of the institution and described its manager as 'a

²⁶⁵² Bunting to Tory, 10th September 1956, TNA: BN29/1325, pp.29-30 on submitted copy.

²⁶⁵³ Reference to such an inspection visit, in which the Home Office inspector raised questions about where the Salvation Army got its child migrants from, how they dealt with home-sick boys who did not settle overseas and whether they broke up families, is noted in memorandum by Leng, 2nd September 1958, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0527.

²⁶⁵⁴ See circular letter from Sudbury to approved sending organisations, 27th December 1956, TNA: DO35/10273, pp.99-101 on provided copy.

²⁶⁵⁵ Leng to Sudbury with enclosure, 15th February 1957, TNA: DO35/10273, pp.86-89 on submitted copy.

²⁶⁵⁶ Leng to Sudbury with enclosure, 15th February 1957, TNA: DO35/10273, pp.86-89 on submitted copy.

²⁶⁵⁷ Heyes to Official Secretary, 3rd May 1957 with enclosure, TNA: DO35/10273, pp .82-83 on submitted copy, LEG.001.002.8746-8745.

practical farmer who has wide experience in the care of boys'.²⁶⁵⁸ The State authorities noted that since the Fact Finding Mission had visited Riverview, a further twelve boys had been sent there, and concluded that 'it is considered that this Home is fulfilling satisfactorily its function of providing preliminary farm training for migrant youths desirous of entering rural occupations.'²⁶⁵⁹ On the basis of this limited information, the Commonwealth Relations Office proposed to the Home Office that the UK Government's funding agreement to support the Salvation Army's migration of boys to Riverview be renewed. This recommendation was made on the basis that the older age of boys sent there and the limited length of their stay meant that the standards they might hope would be adhered to for institutions accommodating children for longer periods of time 'need not be so strictly applied'.²⁶⁶⁰ The Commonwealth Relations Office added that whilst the funding agreement with the Salvation Army could be renewed on this basis, the Salvation Army would at the same time be encouraged to make 'every effort...to improve the conditions and amenities' at Riverview.²⁶⁶¹ The Home Office and UK High Commission in Canberra agreed to the renewal of the UK Government funding agreement with the Salvation Army on this basis and renewals of this agreement are known to have been made in both 1957 and 1960.²⁶⁶²

9.11 On 29th November 1956—eight months after the Fact-Finding Mission's visit to Riverview—the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory wrote to the manager of the Salvation Army's Migration Department in London about the case of two boys who had left Riverview to complain to an official in Brisbane about conditions they had experienced on arrival at Riverview about which they felt they had not properly been warned about before travelling to Australia.²⁶⁶³ His letter contained extracts from two other letters about the boys' complaints. One of these was from the Army's Mens' Social Secretary who noted that they both appeared likeable boys and they did not raise any complaints about Riverview as an institution

²⁶⁵⁸ Riverview Salvation Army Training Farm, Ipswich, Queensland, TNA: DO35/10273, p.84 on available copy.

²⁶⁵⁹ Riverview Salvation Army Training Farm, Ipswich, Queensland, TNA: DO35/10273, p.84 on available copy.

²⁶⁶⁰ Gibson to Whittick, 5th June 1957, TNA: DO35/10273, p.71-72 on available copy, LEG.001.002.8735-8736.

²⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁶² See Whittick to Gibson, 14th June 1957, and telegram UK High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office, 28th June 1957, TNA: DO35/10273, pp.65, 70 on submitted copy. Copies of these renewed agreements are on same file, pp.11-12, 31-36.

²⁶⁶³ Wallace to Dennis, 29th November 1956, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0518-0519.

or their treatment on arrival, but appeared to have formed the view from another 'delinquent' lad who was currently at Riverview that the institution was 'a kind of Borstal'.²⁶⁶⁴ The Social Secretary took the view that the problem was not so much with lack of information given to the boys before travelling as 'their inability to understand or appreciate the atmosphere of Australian farming conditions as against those which prevailed in the Old Country [i.e. the United Kingdom]'.²⁶⁶⁵ He felt that there was no value in forcing them to return to Riverview, though, and suggested that they be allowed to go straight to work placements with farmers instead. The manager of Riverview took a different view, initially insisting that the boys be forced to return to Riverview and then, when it became clear that this was not going to happen, stating that he was no longer prepared to receive any further child migrants at Riverview if they were to be allowed to 'walk off at their own whim and fancy'.²⁶⁶⁶ The manager also noted that these boys' complaints were the same as others that had previously been sent to Riverview, namely that they were unhappy mixing with some of the other boys resident there, the institution was not as it had been described before their migration, they did not like the food and they did not like the discipline of the institution. Given this repeated experience of boys' dis-satisfaction with Riverview on arrival, the manager proposed that the migration scheme be disbanded.

9.12 A month after receiving this letter, in December 1956, the manager of the Salvation Army's London Migration office wrote back to the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory, noting that a further six boys had sailed to Australia to go to Riverview just a few days' earlier.²⁶⁶⁷ The letter noted that reports had previously been sent from time to time from the Salvation Army in Australia to their office on boys sent to Riverview which they had then passed on to parents and guardians. The London office commented that it had previously believed that staff at Riverview appreciated that boys who—in most cases had only just left school and their family homes—would need some initial sympathy and support in adjusting to institutional life in a new country. Whilst this confidence was supported by earlier reports submitted from Australia, 'the only reports we have received latterly have been most

²⁶⁶⁴ Wallace to Dennis, 29th November 1956, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0518.

²⁶⁶⁵ Wallace to Dennis, 29th November 1956, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0518.

²⁶⁶⁶ Wallace to Dennis, 29th November 1956, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0519.

²⁶⁶⁷ Dennis to Wallace, 28th December 1956, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0520.

disturbing, with nothing good to report and we are wondering what has caused the change.²⁶⁶⁸ Particular concern was noted about the recent account of the two boys who had left Riverview after only being there for two days and who had refused to return, and the London office commented that one of the mothers of these boys had also been in touch with them directly about this, extremely upset that her son had been sent to a Borstal-like institution accommodating 'delinquent boys'. The attitude of Riverview's manager was also noted with concern in terms of his lack of sympathy for the lack of preparedness for farm work from boys who had only just left school. Given the decent background of the boys being sent, and the care that the London office felt was taken in their selection, assurances were sought that these boys were not in fact being expected to mix with delinquent boys at Riverview. It is worth noting that our review of the individual reports that had been returned on boys sent to Riverview (see 9.2 above) did not obviously demonstrate the kind of deterioration described in this letter. It is not clear whether the complaint of the two boys who had left Riverview shortly after arrival may have led the London office to read more critically comments about whether boys had successfully 'adapted' to conditions at Riverview or not.

9.13 The Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory wrote back in response to this the following month saying nothing in response to the concerns which the London office had raised about staff attitudes at Riverview and assuring the London office that he completely understood parental concerns about reports of their children being forced to mix with delinquents at Riverview, but that no such delinquent boys were accommodated there.²⁶⁶⁹ Despite the concerns raised by the London office, of which there appears to be no record of a full response from the Eastern Australia Territory, boys continued to be sent to Riverview for just over another three and a half years until the summer of 1960.²⁶⁷⁰

9.14 There is some ambiguity about whether these assurances about the absence of 'delinquent' children at Riverview would have been entirely correct. In 1941, the Salvation Army informed Australian Commonwealth officials that Riverview was

²⁶⁶⁸ Dennis to Wallace, 28th December 1956, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0520.

²⁶⁶⁹ Wallace to Dennis, 15th January 1957, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0523; this response was acknowledged by the London office in no name given to Wallace, 31st January 1957, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0524.

²⁶⁷⁰ See Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM2/2/2/3, passim but especially SAL.001.002.0533/0535-36/0542/0546/0549/0551/0560/0562/0566/0570.

intended not only to 'provide a home for orphans and other boys who are taught farming' but also received 'prisoners of a certain type who are ordered by the Court for a certain period instead of being sent to gaol'.²⁶⁷¹ Boys sent to Riverview as migrants from the United Kingdom appear to have usually made up only a small proportion of those residing there in the post-war period with a number of other Australian-born boys sent there as wards of the State (many of whom would have been taken into care on grounds of their protection or lack of family care, but in some cases because they were judged to be uncontrollable by their parents).²⁶⁷² The UK High Commission had expressed concern about the presence of both 'delinquent' and 'mentally deficient' children at Riverview in 1949 when considering the initial approval of the institution for receiving British child migrants and requested that all such children be removed before child migrants would be allowed to be sent there. An internal memorandum within the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration dated 12th January 1950 discussed this request, and the response to it from the Salvation Army and the Director of the Queensland State Child Welfare Department.²⁶⁷³ Whilst the memorandum noted that 'any sub-normal inmates' would be removed, the State Director had reportedly said that 'any who might contaminate the migrants would be transferred to the State Training Farm' which did 'not necessarily mean that all the unsuitable children would be removed'. The implication of this memorandum therefore appeared to be that whilst 'delinquents'²⁶⁷⁴ who were judged by the State Child Welfare Department to constitute a moral risk to child migrants would be removed, not all boys placed at Riverview under the care of the State on grounds of their previous behaviour necessarily would be. Although an internal recommendation was made within the Salvation Army that no further

²⁶⁷¹ No name (Eastern Australia Territorial Headquarters) to Secretary, Department of Social Services, 4th September 1941, NAA: A885/B96, pp.63-64 on submitted copy.

²⁶⁷² See for example, Institution Report, Riverview Training Farm, 23rd April 1951, NAA: A885/B96, p.4 on submitted copy, which reported that there were 54 boys resident there, by which time only eight boys had been sent to Riverview by the Salvation Army under the terms of its funding agreement with the Commonwealth Relations Office.

²⁶⁷³ Memorandum from Metcalfe, 12th January 1950, NAA: A445/133/2/49, pt. 1, p.76-77 on submitted copy.

²⁶⁷⁴ It appears from these documents that at this point, in 1949, 'delinquents' referred not to boys who had been placed at Riverview through the criminal courts, but who had been taken under the care of the State because it had been judged that they could not be controlled by their parents (see Memorandum by Wheeler, 18th November 1949, NAA: A445/133/2/49, pt. 1, p.86-87 on submitted copy). This interpretation that only those boys judged to be a risk to in-coming child migrants would be moved – and that not all the small number of 'delinquent' cases at Riverview were necessarily judged to fall into that category – appears to be confirmed by a letter from the Queensland Premier to the Commonwealth Prime Minister complaining about the slow approval of these institutions (see Hanlon to Chiffley, 16th September 1949, NAA: A445/133/2/49, pt. 2, pp.18-19 on submitted copy).

'delinquent' children be placed at Riverview alongside British child migrants, it is not clear what action was taken on this. Comments from the Eastern Australia Territory received by the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration also suggested that although Riverview had in the past 'taken occasional delinquent cases', they would 'watch against this in the implementing of our proposal to train Migrant youth'.²⁶⁷⁵ The phrase 'would watch against' appeared somewhat ambiguous, and could have implied either that no further boys of this kind would be admitted to Riverview whilst it received child migrants, or that such admissions would be monitored in order to ensure they did not put the institution's work with migrants at risk. Whilst noting this lack of clear assurance that all 'delinquent' boys would be removed from Riverview, the memorandum suggested that the Commonwealth Department of Immigration advise the UK High Commission that arrangements had been put in place at Riverview to satisfy their requests.

9.15 There are suggestions in both material about Riverview collated by the Forde Report into abuse in residential institutions in Queensland and the report on Salvation Army institutions in the Eastern Australia Territory by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, that boys were admitted to Riverview in the post-war period either through orders from criminal courts,²⁶⁷⁶ through transfer from the Queensland State reformatory at Westbrook²⁶⁷⁷ or as wards of the State. Although the admission profiles of boys may have varied in the post-war period (and the institution appears to have focused more on the admission of 'delinquent' boys after boys from the United Kingdom stopped being sent there in 1960), it therefore seems possible that some 'delinquent' boys were resident at Riverview at the same time as boys migrated from the United Kingdom by the Salvation Army. This seems to be confirmed by a letter from the Commander of the Eastern Australia Territory to the Director of the Army's Migration and Travel Department in London in October 1959 which stated that 'we already have a few such [delinquent] boys, but the rule is that migrant lads and delinquent lads cannot

²⁶⁷⁵ See Memorandum by Wheeler, 18th November 1949, NAA: A445/133/2/49, pt. 1, p.86-87 on submitted copy also Memorandum by Rignold, 23rd November 1949, same file, pt. 1, p.85 on submitted copy.

²⁶⁷⁶ Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Australian Royal Commission), Report of Case Study no.5, Response of the Salvation Army to child sexual abuse at its boys homes in New South Wales and Queensland, p.13. Note data cited here relates specifically to the period 1965 and 1977, and so it is not clear from this whether boys were also placed at Riverview through the criminal justice system in the 1950s.

²⁶⁷⁷ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions (Forde report), 1999, pp.57, 81, 131; also Australian Royal Commission, Report of Case Study no.5, p.42.

be associated together on the same farm'.²⁶⁷⁸ The implication of this appears to be that rather than adhering to the initial request from the UK High Commission that no 'delinquent' boys be sent to Riverview whilst it served as a training centre for British boys, a small number of 'delinquent' boys may have continued to be admitted to Riverview but on the informal basis that they not associate with migrants from Britain.

9.16 As noted in the main report (29.1-29.5), accounts have been provided, particularly through the Australian Royal Commission, about experiences of physical and sexual abuse at Riverview through the 1950s. The Forde report also documented accounts of long working days, very poor accommodation, harsh discipline and sexual abuse at Riverview primarily in the 1960s and early 1970s, but with some accounts also referring to the 1950s.²⁶⁷⁹

9.17 The impression of Riverview that emerges from several sources discussed above is of an institution with poor physical accommodation, limited training facilities, and an authoritarian ethos, in which instances of serious physical and sexual abuse took place. Although conditions at Riverview may have deteriorated even further in the 1960s and early 1970s (given evidence collated by the Forde report), there appears to be certain continuities throughout this post-war period in terms of poor conditions, long working hours, very limited educational provision and staff who were highly unsuited to the care of vulnerable boys. The complaint that the Salvation Army's Migration Department had received in 1953 from boys sent to Riverview about conditions there appears to have made the London office aware of the lack of independent information it had about standards at Riverview. Despite this, the London office accepted the rebuttal of these complaints from the Eastern Australia Territorial Headquarters and sought positive accounts of Riverview's work in order to support more publicity for its migration scheme for boys to be sent there. The incident of the mother removing her son from Riverview in 1955, and complaining about the false impression she had received about it as an institution before agreeing to her son's migration, further suggests that there were failures both in the degree of scrutiny the Army in the United Kingdom applied to Riverview and with the information provided to some parents/guardians and boys prior to their migration. When concerns were again raised about Riverview in 1956 by the case of two boys who had left shortly after arrival there, and the London office also raised

²⁶⁷⁸ Coutts to Meyer, 19th October 1959, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0681.

²⁶⁷⁹ Forde report, pp.65-67, 73-74, 90-91, 94,

wider question about the attitude of staff at Riverview, there is no indication that these concerns were effectively followed through with the Eastern Australia Territory and boys continued to be migrated to Riverview for a number of years afterwards.

9.18 The case of Riverview can be seen as an example of wider systemic failures in monitoring and scrutiny of receiving institutions in Australia, discussed in Appendix 2. In terms of the Salvation Army's own internal systems, the failures noted above appear to reflect an emphasis on pursuing the organisational project of this migration scheme without sufficient scrutiny being made of conditions at Riverview. It also provides another indication that whilst the absence of any internal reporting systems might be seen as raising wider questions about other sending organisations' culture and practices, the presence of internal reporting systems (such as the individual reports on boys provided by the manager at Riverview) were not in and of themselves sufficient to safeguard children. The willingness of the Salvation Army in London to believe the assurances of its Eastern Australian branch, without independent scrutiny or rigorous checking of complaints, created conditions in which assumptions about the benefits of child migration were left unchallenged.

Appendix 4: Issues concerning the selection, recruitment and approval of child migrants outstanding from previous Inquiries and Reports

Introduction

1.1 This fourth Appendix uses material obtained through this Inquiry to address two specific issues relating to post-war Catholic child migration which have been raised but not resolved through previous inquiries and investigations.

1.2 The first of these issues, addressed below in Section 2, relates to the question of organisational consent for the migration of children from Catholic residential homes. As will be discussed in this Section, Br Conlon appears to have recruited children directly from Catholic residential institutions in the United Kingdom for the migration parties of boys sent to Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia in 1938/39. These children, as was also the case with post-war Catholic child migrants, were recruited largely from residential institutions associated with the Sisters of Nazareth. When Conlon returned to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1946, the Catholic Child Welfare Council agreed to support his recruitment activities but only on the basis that he worked in conjunction with the relevant child rescue administrator for the diocese from which children were being selected. It is doubtful that Conlon consistently adhered to that request, and evident that subsequent administrators working on behalf of the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee certainly did not. The implications of this for Scottish child migrants are considered in this Section.

1.3 Section 3 focuses on issues surrounding the selection of girls by the Sisters of Nazareth for its new accommodation for child migrants at Nazareth House, East Camberwell, in 1953 and 1954. As will be discussed further in this Section, there is archival evidence claiming that the Sisters of Nazareth arranged the migration of girls to this institution in that period in response to a specific threat that they might have to repay a substantial grant to the Australian Commonwealth and Victoria State Governments which they had received towards the costs of expanding this Nazareth House to receive child migrants. Whilst noted in evidence during the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse's hearings for its Child Migration Programmes Investigation, this issue is revisited in this Appendix in the light of further evidence received by this current Inquiry relating to girls sent from Nazareth Houses in Scotland to East Camberwell in that period.

Catholic child migrants and the role of consent by diocesan administrators

2.1 When Br Conlon visited the United Kingdom in 1938 to arrange for the migration of 110 boys to Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, he recruited children largely from residential institutions run by the Sisters of Nazareth, without apparently liaising with the relevant child rescue administrators for the dioceses in which those institutions were based.

2.2 In the summer of 1946, the Catholic Child Welfare Council (CCWC) confirmed its willingness to support Conlon's recruitment of more child migrants for Western Australia, but only on the basis that he now work in conjunction with these diocesan officials. Writing to Conlon to confirm the Council's support for his child migration work, its Secretary stated that:

I think you will find this Council will be able to give you far more assistance than was possible before and will considerably lighten your work, but as they are responsible for all child welfare work in their dioceses, and acting on behalf of their bishops, we must ask you not to communicate with, or visit, any Homes etc. without reference to the representatives who, naturally, will require reasonable notice of your visits so that they may themselves be able to accompany and help you and consult their records etc. beforehand.²⁶⁸⁰

2.3 The authority of diocesan child-care administrators was reinforced by a decision of the Catholic Bishops of England and Wales following the publication of the Curtis report to exert greater control over standards of care in children's residential institutions in their dioceses run by religious orders. In a letter from Cardinal Griffin to the CCWC's annual meeting in November 1946, it was stated that 'the Hierarchy recommends: i) that all Homes having the care of children shall come under the charge of the diocesan rescue societies, especially with regard to admittance and discharge of children'.²⁶⁸¹ Other policy decisions announced in this letter included arrangements for all children in Catholic children's homes to be enabled to attend local Catholic primary and secondary schools in the community (something requested particularly in relation to the Sisters of Nazareth) and support for the establishment of training colleges for Catholic child-care workers.²⁶⁸² Minutes of the meeting recorded that members of the CCWC 'expressed their very great

²⁶⁸⁰ Murphy to Conlon, 11th July 1946, BSC.001.001.0852.

²⁶⁸¹ See minutes of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, 7th November 1946, BEW.001.001.0110.

²⁶⁸² See minutes of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, 7th November 1946, BEW.001.001.0110.

pleasure at this announcement'.²⁶⁸³ Whilst there was evidently some concern within the CCWC as to whether the further encouragement of adoption and boarding out in the Curtis report risked Catholic children being placed in non-Catholic households,²⁶⁸⁴ there appears to have been a recognition within the CCWC that the trend towards improving standards in children's out-of-home care required greater control over the fragmented system of residential institutions run by different religious orders. The fact that this letter explicitly mentions communication with the Sisters of Nazareth suggests that it is likely that the religious order was aware of this request from the Catholic Hierarchy in England and Wales. The presentation of this policy as a 'recommendation' could be understood in terms of the complex relationship between bishops and religious orders, in which bishops had no authority to instruct religious orders to act in particular ways but could choose to withdraw their consent for that religious order to operate in their diocese. In this sense the bishops' policy was not an 'order' with which religious orders such as the Sisters of Nazareth were compelled to adhere, but a statement of an expected standard with which they should comply if they were to continue to receive permission to work in their dioceses. There is no doubt, however, that the approval of an individual child's migration (as one form of discharge of a child from residential care) was understood by the Archbishop of Westminster and the Catholic Child Welfare Council as falling clearly under the authority of diocesan child rescue officials.

It appears that Conlon, at least initially, complied with the CCWC's 1946 request. On 2nd October 1946, Bishop Simonds, who had accompanied Conlon to the United Kingdom as the Australian Hierarchy's representative for post-war immigration work, wrote to the Secretary of the CCWC to update him about progress with Conlon's recruitment work.²⁶⁸⁵ In this letter, Simonds wrote that 'at the invitation of the Bishops' representatives', Conlon had visited 18 residential institutions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and had identified 260 children at these whom he considered suitable for emigration to Australia. In practice, however, these 260 children did not bear a very close relationship to those children eventually migrated to Australia during the autumn of 1947. Of the 260 children mentioned by Simonds, only 85 were from Nazareth Houses, and the remaining 175 from other Catholic residential homes. Of the 334 Catholic children who were actually migrated in the autumn 1947 parties, however, 284 came from institutions run by or associated with

²⁶⁸³ See minutes of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, 7th November 1946, BEW.001.001.0110.

²⁶⁸⁴ See minutes of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, 7th November 1946, BEW.001.001.0107-0108.

²⁶⁸⁵ Simonds to Murphy, 2nd October 1946, BSC.001.001.0210-13.

the Sisters of Nazareth.²⁶⁸⁶ Of the 175 children that Simonds had reported to the CCWC as having been approved by Conlon from residential homes other than those associated with the Sisters of Nazareth, no more than seven appear to have been sent.²⁶⁸⁷ It is clear, therefore, that there was a significant change from the children initially referred to in Simonds' letter to the CCWC in October 1946, and those actually sent in the autumn of 1947, with a much higher proportion of children sent in 1947 made up from institutions associated with the Sisters of Nazareth than Simonds had indicated. For example, whilst Simonds' letter suggested that, by October 1946, six girls had been found suitable for migration by Conlon from Nazareth House, Belfast, 21 children were sent from that institution in the autumn of 1947. Similarly, whilst Simonds' letter referred to 10 children being suitable from Nazareth House, Londonderry, in the event 40 children were sent from Londonderry by the Sisters of Nazareth in the autumn of 1947.²⁶⁸⁸ It is not immediately evident from the archival sources why substantially more children were judged suitable for migration from these two Northern Ireland institutions by Conlon after the selection work described by Simonds in his letter in October 1946. This raises questions as to whether these increased numbers may have reflected a rushing through of larger numbers of children after Conlon became aware that shipping berths might become available during the spring of 1947.²⁶⁸⁹ It may be worth noting that these children appear to have fallen under the auspices of the arrangement made between the Australian Catholic Church and the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement for Scotland and Northern Ireland (see Appendix 3, 5.13-5.14). There also does not appear to have been any notification to the CCWC sent by Conlon or Simonds about the specific institutions from which children were being recruited before those migration parties sailed in the autumn of 1947. Although some of the children sent to Australia in the autumn of 1947 did have LEM3 forms signed by the relevant diocesan administrators for Clifton, Birmingham and Northampton,²⁶⁹⁰ in many other

²⁶⁸⁶ See shipping lists at National Archives of Australia, A436, 1950/5/5597, pp.46-63.

²⁶⁸⁷ Shipping lists at National Archives of Australia, A436, 1950/5/5597, pp.46-63, indicate that in these three migration parties in the autumn of 1947 only six children came from St Edwards, Broad Green and one from St Gabriel's, Knolle Park.

²⁶⁸⁸ In the shipping lists for these 1947 migration parties, the sending institution for these boys is listed as St Joseph's, Londonderry, which we understand to have been the home run between the Sisters of Mercy and Sisters of Nazareth at which boys were accommodated.

²⁶⁸⁹ Examples of LEM3 forms signed for children at these two institutions between March and May 1947, when Conlon believed that Australia House was soon about to start allocating future berths to child migrants include NAA: PP93/10, 108, 175, 283, 287, 437, 445, 542, 696, 702, 715, 733, 748, 846, and 1005.

²⁶⁹⁰ See for example, NAA: PP93/10, 227, 460, 468, 614, 775, 1038.

cases it would seem that children were recruited by Conlon from homes run by religious orders without any archival evidence of consultation with the relevant diocesan administrator.

2.4 Fr Nicol and Fr Stinson were also both involved in the subsequent recruitment of children from Catholic residential institutions in their capacity as officers of the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee. It is clear that both understood that they should only recruit children in conjunction with diocesan child rescue administrators. When beginning his recruitment work in the United Kingdom in the autumn of 1948, Fr Nicol wrote to Canon Flint, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Catholic Child Welfare Council's child emigration sub-committee. In this letter Nicol noted that a further 100 girls had been requested for Nazareth House, Geraldton, and that he was confident that these girls could be found, particularly as the Sisters of Nazareth had agreed to help him secure children from their residential homes. In relation to this recruitment activity at these institutions, Nicol asked Flint, 'How does this fit in with the necessary permissions of the various diocesan secretaries. Can you give a general permission covering my activities in this matter or is it a local affair?'²⁶⁹¹ A reply from Flint does not appear to be available, but it is worth noting from Nicol's request that he was aware that some form of diocesan permission was required for children being selected for migration from residential institutions (including those run by the Sisters of Nazareth). Given that the CCWC functioned as a consultative body for diocesan child rescue administrators, with powers for this work residing at diocesan level, it is unlikely that Flint could have given Nicol permission to recruit children that bypassed such diocesan consent and that, just as the Council had indicated to Conlon in 1946, consent was required from the relevant administrator for each individual diocese. Fr Stinson also understood that such consent from diocesan officials was also required.²⁶⁹²

2.5 The need for such consent by diocesan officers was further re-iterated at the annual meeting of the CCWC in October 1952, attended by Fr Stinson. In response to a question about necessary consents to a child's migration, Canon Flint replied 'that the Diocesan's Secretary's signature would be accepted if the parents could not be found. The point was again stressed here that cases should be nominated by the Diocesan Secretary and by no-one else.'²⁶⁹³ This clear statement about the need for

²⁶⁹¹ Nicol to Flint, 29th October 1948, BEW.001.001.0006.

²⁶⁹² See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, *Child Migration Programmes Investigation*, Transcript of Day 15 public hearing, p.161.

²⁶⁹³ Minutes of meeting of Catholic Child Welfare Council, October 1952, BEW.001.001.0160.

the involvement of the Diocesan child rescue administrator, and for this to be recorded on a child's emigration form, raises concerns about whether LEM3 forms with no signatures from Diocesan administrators (other than possibly in cases where parents signed to give consent) had been completed in compliance with this expectation.

2.6 Despite clearly understanding this requirement, neither Nicol, nor Stinson consistently followed it.²⁶⁹⁴ In an otherwise warm and collaborative letter to Stinson in November 1953, the then Secretary of the CCWC commented:

For the past year I have obtained some figures from Australia House regarding Catholic children emigrated but these figures are probably incomplete, and details regarding some of the children we haven't got and details of others are rather sketchy. It has been a muddled year and I want to put it on record that the Catholic Child Welfare Council does not hold itself responsible for possible future enquiries concerning these children whose emigration it did not sponsor. It would appear that at least 114 children from England and Wales were dealt with directly by yourself without reference to this office. It was the Brother Conlon-Father Nicol technique all over again!²⁶⁹⁵

In its annual meeting that autumn, the Catholic Child Welfare Council also noted that many of the 184 Catholic children migrated in the previous year had been sent 'under the signature of Fr Stinson himself' and that 'diocesan Secretaries had frequently not been contacted'.²⁶⁹⁶ Despite knowing of a larger number of cases in which the requirement for consultation and consent from the diocesan administrator for a child's migration had been breached by its representatives, the CCWC continued to co-operate with the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee in this migration programme.

²⁶⁹⁴ In a private memorandum from Fr Stinson to Mgr Crennan, Director of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, written in mid-1952, Stinson noted that Nicol found the requirement to work with Diocesan officials to be 'too cumbersome' and had been dealing instead directly with Nazareth Houses, BEW.001.001.0010. In this memorandum, BEW.001.001.0011, Stinson also commented that he also intended to let the Sisters of Nazareth know that he was planning to work through the CCWC, but evidently abandoned this approach in the succeeding months. See also numerous examples of LEM3 forms for 1952/53 where Mother Superiors of Nazareth Houses signed the consent form for a child's migration, with their consent witnessed by Fr Stinson (NAA: PP93/10, 85, 107, 295, 446, 672 and 783).

²⁶⁹⁵ Secretary to Stinson, 6th November 1953, BEW.001.001.0199.

²⁶⁹⁶ Minutes of the meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, October 1953, BEW.001.001.0168 (see also Appendix 3, 5.21). In Flint to Crennan, 2nd February 1954, BEW.001.001.0040, Canon Flint comments that whilst Fr Stinson understood the requirements to work with the CCWC and its constituent Diocesan administrators, Stinson 'soon forget them in practice'.

2.7 It may be important to consider why these representatives of Australian Catholic organisations were asked to seek the permission of diocesan administrators with regard to the emigration of particular children. Given the reference in the Council's letter to Conlon in 1946 of diocesan administrators needing advance notice of Conlon's visits to residential institutions so that they could 'consult their records', it is possible that in England and Wales, diocesan child rescue administrators into whose care parents had signed their children may have been the de facto guardian of those children and been given powers by parents to decide how children might be placed. Such powers might also have been assumed to reside with Diocesan child rescue administrators in cases where children's parents could not be traced (see 2.5 above). It may also have been significant for enabling Diocesan administrators to check who the guardians were of children in residential care so that appropriate consent could be obtained from them.²⁶⁹⁷ This was the interpretation placed on this requirement by the Select Committee of the Western Australian Parliament in its interim report on child migration who referred to such by-passing of the Catholic Child Welfare Council by Australian Catholic administrators as leading to the selection of children 'under conditions which were far from satisfactory for the maintenance of proper custody and guardianship of these children in these UK institutions'.²⁶⁹⁸ It certainly seems to be the case that the Catholic Child Welfare Council saw such approval of children's discharge from residential institutions through emigration to Australia by diocesan administrators as necessary for ensuring the Church's control over standards of care provided to these children (see 2.3 above). Given the evidence that the Sisters of Nazareth had co-operated with Australian Catholic administrators in sending children in their care to Australia without the necessary consultation with or consent from diocesan administrators, this would raise potentially serious questions about the legal basis on which these children would have been emigrated.

2.8 The situation with regard to such permissions from diocesan officials for children migrated from residential institutions in Scotland is less clear. We have seen no evidence that the Social Services Committee for the Archdiocese of Edinburgh and St Andrews, nor Fr Quille as a diocesan official, made similar requests to Conlon, Nicol or Stinson about the need for diocesan permission to be provided in relation to

²⁶⁹⁷ See discussion of this issue at the extraordinary meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council in June 1946, in which one member said that Diocesan administrators should be given reasonable notice of any planned visits by Conlon to residential institutions in their Diocese so that they would have 'time to consult records, guardians, etc', BEW.001.001.0017.

²⁶⁹⁸ Select Committee into Child Migration, *Interim Report*, p.39.

children's migration from residential institutions. A similar governance structure appears to have operated between Scottish dioceses and residential institutions run within them by religious orders, as operated in England and Wales. This was that the residential institutions functioned under the authority of the religious order concerned, but that they were only able to operate in a particular diocese subject to the permission of the diocesan bishop or archbishop. Whilst day-to-day decisions about staffing would therefore have fallen under the authority of the religious order, a bishop or archbishop had the ultimate power to require an institution run by a religious order in their diocese to be shut down. However, it is not clear that the Catholic Child Welfare Council's requirement for diocesan level permissions for children's migration from England and Wales pertained in the same way to residential institutions run by religious orders in Scottish dioceses. There does not appear to have been comparable roles in Scotland to child rescue administrators for dioceses in England and Wales, nor was there (despite some Catholic children from Scotland having this named as their sponsoring organisation on their LEM3 forms, see Appendix 3, 5.15-16) a Catholic Child Welfare Council for Scotland. We understand that there was an organisation called the National Committee for Catholic Child Care, established by the Scottish Hierarchy in 1962 with one of its aims being to bring Catholic residential child-care more in line with standards recommended in the Curtis and Clyde reports, but this body was formed after Catholic child migration from the United Kingdom had largely ended.²⁶⁹⁹ On the basis of archival records available to us from the Social Services Committee of the Archdiocese of Edinburgh and St Andrews, it is not clear what role diocesan officials had either in terms of parents signing children into their care or as custodians of individual children. On this basis, it is difficult to establish whether diocesan permissions were needed or had any significance for children migrated from residential institutions run by religious orders in Scottish dioceses.

2.9 This, however, is not the case for Scottish children migrated from residential institutions in England and Wales, notably Nazareth House, Carlisle. We have access to three LEM3 forms for boys from Scotland who were sent to Western Australia from Nazareth House, Carlisle in the autumn of 1947: Frederick Smith²⁷⁰⁰, [REDACTED]

²⁶⁹⁹ See for example, National Committee for Catholic Child Care, Report on Catholic Child Care in Scotland – December 1963, BSC.001.001.4642-4648; Constitution of the Scottish National Committee for Catholic Child Care, no date, BSC.001.001.4769-4770; Report on Catholic Child Care Service in Scotland, no date, BSC.001.001.4772-4775.

²⁷⁰⁰ WIT.003.001.8672.

██████████²⁷⁰¹ and ██████████²⁷⁰². Mr Smith's account of serial sexual and physical abuse during his time at Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia has been discussed elsewhere in this report (see main report, 32.25-32.26). In all three cases, Br Conlon signed on behalf of the CCWC as the sponsoring organisation (although it is not clear whether the 'Catholic Child Welfare Council' is written in his own handwriting or by someone else). On two of these forms (Smith and ██████████), consent is signed by the Mother Superior, and witnessed by Fr Caton. On the third (██████████), consent is signed by the boy's father witnessed by a Fr Tully in Dumfries (which suggests that the form may have been sent to the father or Tully for the completion of the consent signature). In the period in which these consents were signed (between December 1946 and June 1947), the diocesan child rescue administrator for the Lancaster diocese clearly appears to have been a Fr Hannigan.²⁷⁰³ Fr Caton was a curate for the parish of St Bede's in Carlisle,²⁷⁰⁴ within which it is likely that Nazareth House, Carlisle was situated. On the basis of the archival evidence available, there is no indication that appropriate permission was sought from Fr Hannigan for the recruitment of boys for migration from Nazareth House, Carlisle. Hannigan's signature does not appear on any of these LEM3 forms, nor do we have any indication on what basis Fr Caton, as a relatively junior clergyman, would have had for witnessing the consent on an LEM3 form in Hannigan's place.²⁷⁰⁵ Nazareth House, Carlisle, is also not an institution listed in Simonds' letter to the CCWC in October 1946 as one which Conlon had accessed

²⁷⁰¹ National Archives of Australia, PP93/10, 686, NAA.001.001.1502-1505.

²⁷⁰² National Archives of Australia, PP93/10, 782, NAA.001.001.1522.

²⁷⁰³ Fr Halligan is listed as representing the Diocese of Lancaster at Catholic Child Welfare Council meeting minutes for November 1946 (BEW.001.001.0093), November 1947 (BEW.001.001.0112), November 1948 (BEW.001.001.0119, in which Canon Brimley and Fr O'Neill are also listed as representing the Diocese of Lancaster), November 1949 (BEW.001.001.0126, at which Fr McGann is also listed as representing the Diocese of Lancaster), November 1950 (BEW.001.001.0133), November 1951 (BEW.001.001.0141, at which Fr O'Neill again also listed as representing the Diocese of Lancaster), November 1952 (BEW.001.001.0150, at which Fr O'Neill is again also listed as representing the Diocese of Lancaster), and November 1953 (BEW.001.001.0162, at which Fr O'Neill is again also listed as representing the Diocese of Lancaster).

²⁷⁰⁴ <https://www.cumbrianmartyrs.org.uk/about-us/st-bede-s-priests> - also <https://www.cumbrianmartyrs.org.uk/media/attachments/2018/12/12/history-of-st-bedes.pdf>

²⁷⁰⁵ The practice in at least some other dioceses in England and Wales was for the child rescue administrator to act either as signing the consent for the child's migration or as witness for the consent signature (which would seem appropriate if that administrator had been given some custodian responsibility for the child): See for example, Fr Flint for the Archdiocese of Birmingham (NAA: PP93/10, 698, 699), Fr Leahy for the Diocese of Clifton (NAA: PP93/10, 156, 460), and Fr Hunting for the Diocese of Northampton (NAA: PP93/10, 227, 1038).

with the permission of the 'bishop's representative', nor were any of the other institutions listed by Simonds in the Diocese of Lancaster.

2.10 It could be argued that this material remains subject to interpretation. It is possible, for example, that Conlon did approach Fr Hannigan as the bishop's representative for child rescue for the Diocese of Lancaster after Simonds had written his letter of October 2nd 1946, without this being recorded in surviving records. It is also possible that Hannigan gave permission for Conlon to recruit children from Nazareth House, Carlisle, and for the migration of specific boys from there, but without this being recorded, and that Fr Caton had the appropriate authority to sign consent forms as a local priest in Carlisle (although again we have no record for this). The absence of any archival trace of such permission—and indications that Conlon (as well as later Australian Catholic administrators) did not consistently obtain such permissions—does, however, mean that it remains a source of concern that these three Scottish boys may have been migrated from Nazareth House, Carlisle, without required oversight and consent of their migration by the Diocese of Lancaster. Their cases may also reflect a larger number of cases of children recruited from Catholic residential institutions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. If the diocesan administrator for the Diocese of Lancaster did have any guardianship or custodian responsibilities for these three boys then if they were migrated without his permission this would raise questions about the legal basis on which their migration took place. If Mr Smith may have been placed in a particularly vulnerable position with regards to predatory sexual abusers at Bindoon because of the unusually young age at which he was sent there, and again if his migration took place without appropriate oversight by anyone with custodian responsibilities for him in the Diocese of Lancaster, this would be a further source of concern.

2.11 Evidence that children were sent overseas from Catholic children's homes, particularly those run by the Sisters of Nazareth—without appropriate knowledge or consent from diocesan child-administrators—appears to reflect wider tensions between these administrators and religious orders operating in their dioceses who were keen to maintain as much autonomy as possible. Such tensions appear to have run throughout the period in which twentieth-century Catholic child migration was operating in England, Wales and Scotland. In a 1956 paper to members of the CCWC and religious orders reflecting on the history of Catholic child-care over recent decades, Mgr Bennett from the Archdiocese of Liverpool noted how residential institutions run by religious orders had often run in isolation from each other and without reference to wider discussions of good practice, commenting that there would have been significant benefits to the quality of residential child-care 'if there

had been closer liaison between the Catholic Child Welfare Council and the Religious who had the care of children' and that such co-operation might have made it possible to anticipate the policies of 'the Curtis Committee and the Children Act, 1948, by an internal reform on a voluntary basis'.²⁷⁰⁶ Similar problems were noted in a report on Catholic child-care in Scotland submitted to the National Committee for Catholic Child Care in December 1963, which observed that residential institutions were still being 'run as isolated units according to the ideas of the Superior in office for the time being', that there was a lack of any individual casework in relation to nearly three hundred children who had been placed in those homes other than by local authorities, and that there was a 'disinclination on the part of the Sisters to take the Training Courses that are provided'.²⁷⁰⁷

2.12 A further note should be added about the recruitment activities of Br Conlon and Fr Stinson. A secondary analysis of material from previous Inquiries concerning allegations of systemic abuse at Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia has identified twenty-one Brothers working at these institutions against whom allegations of sexual abuse have been made in the period 1947-65.²⁷⁰⁸ Br Conlon served as the Superior in charge at Tardun from 1933 to 1938 when a number of these Brothers (and others against whom allegations of serious physical abuse have been made) were working on his staff. No allegations have been received by previous Inquiries of sexual or serious physical abuse by Conlon himself, but it appears that Conlon was aware of cases of sexual abuse of boys more generally in the Christian Brothers in Australia (including a case before the war at Clontarf)²⁷⁰⁹ and it seems unlikely that he would have been entirely unaware that some Brothers with whom he worked at Tardun would have constituted some risk to children's welfare. Despite this, Conlon played an active role in over-seeing the emigration of child migrants to Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, including Tardun, in 1938/39, and then the post-war resumption of child migration to these institutions in 1947. Conlon

²⁷⁰⁶ Paper read by Monsignor Bennett to 42 Representatives of the Religious Orders and Congregations Whose Work Includes Child Care, 23rd October 1956, BEW.001.001.0193.

²⁷⁰⁷ Report on Catholic Child Care in Scotland - December 1963, National Committee for Catholic Child Care, BSC.001.001.4776. Note take up of child-care training by religious sisters in England and Wales appears to have been significantly better than in Scotland, see Paper read by Monsignor Bennett to 42 Representatives of the Religious Orders and Congregations Whose Work Includes Child Care, 23rd October 1956, BEW.001.001.0195.

²⁷⁰⁸ Gordon Lynch, *Possible collusion between individuals alleged to have sexually abused boys at four Christian Brothers' institutions in Western Australia, 1947-1965: a secondary analysis of material collated by historical abuse inquiries*, <https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/>

²⁷⁰⁹ See Barry Coldrey, *Reaping the Whirlwind*, pp.58-62.

was also resident at Bindoon from 1951 until 1958, a period in which around half of the Brothers working at that institution each year were individuals against whom numerous allegations of sexual abuse have been made and numerous other allegations of serious physical abuse have also been recorded. Conlon, however, continued to support the child migration programme, writing to the UK Government to advocate for its continuation in 1956 whilst he was apparently visiting Britain in an attempt to recruit more children.²⁷¹⁰ Fr Stinson served as chaplain at Clontarf in 1950/51, where he would presumably have heard confessions from both staff and boys. Staff working at Clontarf at that time included the Superior, Br^{MDI} (against whom numerous allegations of serious physical abuse, and some allegations of sexual abuse, have been made), Br^{MHZ} (against whom numerous allegations of sexual abuse have been made), as well as Br^{AKP} (accused of sexual abuse) and Br^{AKN} (accused of serious physical abuse).²⁷¹¹ The annual visitation report for Clontarf by the Christian Brothers in 1951 also made reference to the particular need for Brothers to take special care with their behaviour in dormitories and in their touching of boys.²⁷¹² By the following year, Br^{MHZ} had been transferred from Clontarf to Tardun. Given his presence at Clontarf in that period, and his particular role in hearing confessions, it might be expected that he might have had some awareness of risks to children's well-being at that institution. Nevertheless, Stinson came to the United Kingdom in 1952/53 to recruit child migrants for Catholic receiving institutions in Australia, including the Brothers' institutions in Australia. Whilst the direct recruitment of children from Catholic residential institutions in the United Kingdom by these Australian officials raises issues about the implications of the by-passing of diocesan administrators, questions also arise about what knowledge Conlon and Stinson might have had about the sexual and physical abuse of boys at the Brothers' institutions in Western Australia before undertaking their recruitment trips.

The recruitment of girls for Nazareth House, East Camberwell in 1953

3.1 From 1943, the Australian Commonwealth Government was developing ambitious plans for the immigration of 50,000 war orphans over three years after the end of the war from the United Kingdom and continental Europe who would be sent

²⁷¹⁰ On this, see Lynch, *Possible collusion*, 6.5-6.6.

²⁷¹¹ See Lynch, *Possible collusion*, 6.7.

²⁷¹² *The Trustees of the Christian Brothers, Memorandum of Advice*, CTJH.056.11094.0192_R.

to 'cottage homes' in urban areas run by State authorities rather than voluntary organisations.²⁷¹³ Although there were indications from the outset that numbers of children available from the United Kingdom were likely to be limited,²⁷¹⁴ the Commonwealth Government continued to give public support to this plan until, following a critical review of its viability and estimates of the high costs of building and staffing new State-run cottage homes,²⁷¹⁵ it was suspended in August 1946.²⁷¹⁶ Instead of this programme, the Australian Commonwealth Government decided, in consultation with State Premiers, to give greater financial support to voluntary organisations undertaking child migration work, in particular providing higher levels of capital funding than before the war to enable voluntary organisations to expand accommodation to enable them to receive child migrants.

3.2 Commonwealth and State capital funding for the construction of a new wing at Nazareth House, Camberwell, to accommodate 150 female child migrants from the United Kingdom was approved in 1948. By this stage, the Commonwealth Department of Immigration were already aware that numbers of children available for migration through the work of voluntary organisations might be limited. When the United Protestant Association submitted an application for capital funding for buildings to receive British child migrants and made explicit reference to the grant

²⁷¹³ See for example, Memorandum by Peters, 29th November 1943, NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684, NAA-000000050.

²⁷¹⁴ See Notes on Meeting of Sub-Committee on Child Migration, 24th January 1944, NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684, and Report on Child Migration (British and white alien), 17th March 1944, NAA.C: A689, 1944/43/554/2/5. On similar reservations about the migration of children who had lost parents in war-time service for Britain, see the opinion piece 'Future of Britain's War Orphans', *Melbourne Herald*, 1st November 1943, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716. After the publicising of the Commonwealth Government's ambitious post-war child migration plans, the UK Minister of Pensions, Sir James Womersley, made it clear that he would not sanction the migration of any war orphans under his care until they were aged at least 15 or 16 and able to express a meaningful opinion about their migration ('Emigration to Australia – Decision Left to War Orphans', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5th February 1945, see also cablegram High Commissioner's Office to Prime Minister's Department, 3rd October 1944, and cablegram Wheeler to Peters, 23rd August 1945, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716). The likelihood that there would be few, if any, children under the care of the UK Ministry of Pensions available for migration to Australia was again emphasised by the United Kingdom Government in Hankinson to Forde, 23rd July 1945, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66717.

²⁷¹⁵ Nutt to Acting Secretary Department of the Interior with enclosures, 8th August 1945, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716; *Report of the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee*, Presented 27th February, 1946, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716, NAA-000000048.

²⁷¹⁶ See Immigration: Decision of Premiers' Conference, 20th August 1946, TNA: DO35/1134/M822/85, LEG.001.003.4321-4325.

that had just been made to the Sisters of Nazareth for Camberwell in support of this,²⁷¹⁷ Arthur Calwell, the Commonwealth Minister of Immigration replied:

[B]oth Commonwealth and State authorities would require to be satisfied that a steady flow of child migrants was available from an assured source before approving of Government expenditure for the purchase and renovation of buildings to accommodate child migrants at present, since most existing voluntary child migration organisations appear to be experiencing considerable difficulty in securing sufficient children to occupy the institutions already secured to receive their charges.²⁷¹⁸

In the context of the Commonwealth Department of Immigration's growing caution about numbers of available child migrants, the Sisters of Nazareth's application to expand Camberwell to create 150 spaces was clearly ambitious.²⁷¹⁹ Given Calwell's comments, it appears that this application would only have been approved on the basis of specific assurances by the Sisters of Nazareth that they would be able to ensure a sufficient supply of girls to fill these places.

3.3 The United Kingdom Government was only approached about the possible approval of Nazareth House, Camberwell, by the Commonwealth Department of Immigration two years after this initial funding agreement had been made and when the building work for this extension was nearly completed. The request for approval from the Department of Immigration strongly implied that they thought that such approval should be forthcoming.²⁷²⁰ The Mother-General of the Sisters of Nazareth was also actively involved in this initiative and visited Melbourne in 1950 to discuss its progress.²⁷²¹ As noted in Appendix 2 (5.37-5.40), the development of a new building project for a large residential child-care institution ran against the recommendation of the Curtis Report towards smaller residential units.²⁷²² When

²⁷¹⁷ See Agst to Calwell, 2nd June 1948, NAA: A445, 133/2/50, (pt 2 pp.78-79), NAA-000000067.

²⁷¹⁸ Calwell to Agst, 15th June 1948, NAA: A445, 133/2/50, (pt 2 pp.75-76), NAA-000000067.

²⁷¹⁹ Compare, e.g., approval given in 1950 for capital funding for the construction of a new cottage at the Church of England Clarendon Home in Tasmania to accommodate 12 child migrants at a cost to the Commonwealth and State Governments of A£10,766, correspondence on NAA: A445, 133/2/10, pt 2, pp.52-65, and pt 3, pp.8-31 on available copy.

²⁷²⁰ Heyes to Official Secretary, 12th October 1950, TNA: MH102/1882, p.92 on provided copy, LEG.001.006.1537.

²⁷²¹ See Heyes to Official Secretary, 24th April 1951, and extract from rough notes prepared by Mr John Moss, Nazareth House, Camberwell, 20th September 1951, TNA: MH102/1882, pp.50 and 66 on provided copy.

²⁷²² When originally approached about the request to approve Nazareth House, Camberwell, the Home Office Children's Department similarly took a dim view of such a large and impersonal project,

originally approached about the approval of Nazareth House, Camberwell, as a receiving institution, an internal note at the Home Office's Children's Department records that 'the building of a new wing to accommodate 150 girls cannot but be regarded as reactionary, and, though since the building is now underway, we cannot do anything about it, I think we should indicate in our letter that it is not a type of provision which now holds favour.'²⁷²³ Whilst the Sisters of Nazareth at Camberwell appear to have been proud of the quality of this new building, it was regarded as impersonal and inappropriate by John Ross when he visited it with the UK Fact-Finding Mission in 1956.²⁷²⁴

3.4 As noted in Section 2 above, the highest levels of Catholic child migration occurred from 1938 onwards when Australian representatives of Catholic organisations visited the United Kingdom to publicise their work and to select children for migration. From the autumn of 1952, Fr Cyril Stinson undertook this work in the United Kingdom as the administrator of the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee. On his return to Australia in October 1953, Fr Stinson wrote a report about his work in the United Kingdom that was passed on to Mgr Crennan, the administrator of the national Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, and also seen by officials in the Commonwealth Department of Immigration. Stinson's report, as regards his experience of the recruitment of child migrants, and particular girls, is worth quoting here at some length:

The position regarding Girls is very desperate. After seven months of really hard work from January to August of this year, concentrating on one nomination for Nazareth House, Melbourne I could only manage to submit the names of 45 girls, only 20 of whom were approved and have arrived in Melbourne. At the time of leaving England I had only two other girls' applications submitted for consideration.

I think it wise to detail the steps I took to find these girls. First of all as with the boys I attempted to work through the Crusades of Rescue and the result was practically a "NIL" return. Then I called on the Provincial Superiors of Nazareth

with an internal note recording [...] something missing here -if link to quote above or reference below –needs to be made clearer

²⁷²³ See note by Ratcliffe, 23rd November 1950 (also McGregor to Palmer, 25th November 1950), TNA: MH102/1882, pp.3 and 89-90 on provided copy, LEG.001.006.1448, 1534-1535

²⁷²⁴ See Appendix 3, 5.37-5.40. Criticism of the institutional nature of Nazareth House, Camberwell, from a Catholic welfare organisation in Melbourne was also noted by John Moss, although Moss's response was that this approach to institutional care was 'the normal practice of Catholic organisations' (see extract from rough notes prepared by Mr John Moss, Nazareth House, Camberwell, 20th September 1951, TNA: MH102/1882, p.50 on provided copy).

House, Sisters of Charity, Sisters of Mercy, Franciscan Sisters and several other Orders dealing with Girls Orphanages. I appealed to them all for help and again undertook to visit all their Homes and investigate the possibilities. They all promised to send a Circular to the Homes concerned expressing their approval and asking the Local Superiors to contact me if there were any prospects. Then I wrote to the Local Superiors personally myself. By phone I contacted every Girls Home in the Westminster, Southwark and Middlesex Dioceses. As a result of it all I got about 20 names. I then called on the Mother General of Nazareth [i.e. the Sisters of Nazareth] again pointing out to her that her Sisters in Melbourne had received £90,000 from the Australian Govt. for their Extensions, and that if the Migrant girls were not forthcoming it was quite likely they would be asked to refund the money. Once again I emphasised to her that the Mother Superior in Melbourne had assured the Govt. that she had an undertaking from the Mother General in England that their Houses in Britain would make the children available. Mother General then promised me to circularize the Houses again and promised to treat the matter as a No.1 priority in all her Visitation. I then wrote again to all the Nazareth Houses for girls appealing to them to make every effort to fill this nomination. The result of all this was a further 25 names and from the whole of the 45 names submitted 20 were approved.

I am convinced sincerely and without any attempt at self-praise that nothing further could possibly be done to find the girls we require.²⁷²⁵

Elsewhere in his report, Stinson also noted that the Sisters of Nazareth were willing to receive babies as migrants at Nazareth House, East Camberwell, which was not a common practice amongst other child migration organisations.²⁷²⁶

3.5 Although Stinson's wording is some circuitous, he appears to be claiming here that in the period January to August 1953, he undertook an intensive recruitment exercise to try to find girls to fill spaces at Nazareth House, Camberwell. During this period, he claims he reminded the Mother-General of the Sisters of Nazareth that a commitment had been made by the order that girls would be forthcoming from its houses in the United Kingdom to justify the substantial expansion work at Camberwell towards which the State and Commonwealth Governments had contributed. Her reported response to encourage more girls to be put forward from the order's houses in the United Kingdom led to the putting forward of more girls' names for approval (presumably this means by immigration officials at Australia House) with those girls who had been approved having arrived in Melbourne by the

²⁷²⁵ Report by Fr Stinson, 1st October 1953, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/124, pp.76-78, NAA-000000034.

²⁷²⁶ See National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/124, p.79, NAA-000000030.

time Stinson returned to Australia in late September 1953.²⁷²⁷ Stinson's account of 20 girls having been approved to sail to Nazareth House, East Camberwell, in 1953 accords with details provided by the Mother Superior at East Camberwell to the Victorian State Social Services Department with respect of a claim for Commonwealth Endowment payments (i.e. child allowance payments) for 20 girls who arrived at that institution from three sailings that arrived in Melbourne in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 1953.²⁷²⁸

3.6 Two of these three sailings are not recorded in the list of sailings of migrants sent by the Sisters of Nazareth which have been provided by the order to this Inquiry.²⁷²⁹ The first of these unrecorded sailings was a party of nine girls whose ship, the *New Australia*, arrived in Australia on [REDACTED] 1953.²⁷³⁰ The History of the Foundation for Nazareth House, East Camberwell, records that eight of these children were sent from the order's head house in Hammersmith and the other from the nearby Nazareth House at Isleworth.²⁷³¹ Although, of itself, this does not confirm the accuracy of Stinson's account, the sending of a party of children initially from the head house of the order would appear to be consistent with a direct communication from Stinson to the order's Superior General about the urgency of providing more girls for Nazareth House, East Camberwell. The second of these unrecorded sailings involved six girls who sailed from the United Kingdom on the *Moloja* on [REDACTED] 1953. Of these six girls, two were sent from Nazareth House, Oxford,²⁷³² and two from Nazareth House, Isleworth.²⁷³³ It has not been possible to ascertain the sending institution for the two remaining girls as their LEM3 forms have not been accessible from their files in the National Archives of Australia.²⁷³⁴ In total, then, of the 20 girls

²⁷²⁷ See Camberwell NH Extract from History of the Foundation document, NAZ.001.006.2397, in which it is noted that Stinson visited Nazareth House, Camberwell, on 29th September, soon after his arrival back in Australia, to discuss the possibility of the admission of Maltese child migrants to fill vacancies at Camberwell.

²⁷²⁸ Sister Mary to Collopy with enclosure, NAA: A885/B458, pp.15-17 on provided copy. These girls were reported to have arrived on the *Otranto* on [REDACTED] (five girls), the *New Australia* on [REDACTED] (nine girls) and the *Moloja* on [REDACTED] (six girls). As these 20 girls were the first ones that the order had sought to claim Commonwealth Endowment payments for at East Camberwell, it does not appear that any of the girls migrated to Australia by the Sisters of Nazareth in [REDACTED] 1953 were sent to Nazareth House, East Camberwell (see Child Migrants from NH 1938-1956, NAZ.001.006.2554).

²⁷²⁹ Only the sailing of the *Otranto* is recorded at NAZ.001.006.2554.

²⁷³⁰ See Reverend Mother to Collopy, 31st August 1953, NAA: A885/B458, pp.16-17 on provided copy.

²⁷³¹ History of Foundation, Camberwell Nazareth House, NAZ.001.006.2864.

²⁷³² See LEM3 form at NAA: MMP210/2, 1953/38/1000/[REDACTED] (NAA.001.001.1949); NAA: MP210/2, 1953/38/1000/[REDACTED] (NAA.001.001.1974).

²⁷³³ See LEM3 form at NAA: MP210/2, 1953/38/1000/[REDACTED] (NAA.001.001.1958); NAA: MP210/2, 1953/38/1000/[REDACTED] (NAA.001.001.1966).

²⁷³⁴ NAA: MP210/2, 1953/38/1000/[REDACTED] contains removal slips but no copies of the original LEM3 forms for these girls.

who arrived at Nazareth House, East Camberwell, at least eighteen were sent from Nazareth Houses in the United Kingdom.²⁷³⁵ The fact that girls were sent to Nazareth House, Camberwell over three sailings during the summer of 1953 also reflected a higher frequency of sailings than was usual for children sent from Nazareth Houses—comparable in frequency only to the three sailings which occurred in the autumn of 1947 when the numbers of children being sent to Catholic institutions in Western Australia were too large to be managed in a single sailing.²⁷³⁶ The staggered nature of these sailings might be consistent with Stinson’s account of an increased effort by the order to try to send more girls to East Camberwell after Stinson’s initial recruitment work in spring 1953.

3.7 Stinson’s account of having reached an impasse in the recruitment of more girls for Camberwell by August 1953 concurs with information in a letter from Mr K. R. Crook, an official at the UK High Commission in Canberra, to the Commonwealth Relations Office in early August 1953 which noted:

I need not describe this home (Nazareth House, Camberwell) again expect to say that here too the standard of accommodation and fittings is very high indeed. I gather that there is a serious difficulty about the supply of children from the United Kingdom. About a dozen have so far arrived and a few more are expected next month. But the wing was built for 150 children and so far as I can see the Roman Catholic organisation in London has indicated that there is no hope of getting these. This news has only just been received and so far neither the home authorities nor the Child Welfare Department are quite sure what the trouble is. The matter I gather is now under discussion with Monseigneur Crennan [the Secretary of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee]. It would really be a great pity if, after the money which has been spent on this home, it should not be found possible to keep it filled. It is so large and so well equipped that the children there at present are almost lost in it. When I was there the sisters in charge were most distressed at the thought that they might not get enough children.²⁷³⁷

²⁷³⁵ In addition to the nine girls from Nazareth Houses sent on the *New Australia*, and (at least) four from Nazareth Houses sent on the *Moloja*, five girls sent on the *Otranto* appear to have been from Nazareth House, Belfast (see NAZ.001.006.2554).

²⁷³⁶ On the frequency of sailings recorded in the Sisters of Nazareth’s archives, see NAA.001.006.2553-2554.

²⁷³⁷ Extract from letter of 7th August, 1953 from Crook to Dixon, TNA: MH102/1882, p.39 on provided copy, LEG.001.003.0344. Crook went on to ask if the Commonwealth Relations Office or Home Office could do anything to try to encourage more children to be sent to East Camberwell, but the Home Office declined (see Oates to Dixon, 8th September 1953, same file, p.38 on available copy).

This also appears to provide a context in which Stinson needed to explain the problems with the recruitment of girls for Camberwell in his report produced in October 1953.

3.8 It is clear that concern about recruitment for Camberwell was shared not only by the Sisters of Nazareth, but also by the Commonwealth Department of Immigration and the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee. In a letter to Monsignor Crennan, dated 22nd October 1953, Sir Tasman Heyes, the Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Immigration, notes that he has read Stinson's report with interest.²⁷³⁸ Whilst not identifying Nazareth House, Camberwell, by name, Heyes made the point that current levels of recruitment by Catholic organisations were making it possible to fill emerging vacancies within existing receiving institutions rather than making it possible to fill significant new expansions of these homes. 'This factor,' Heyes continued, 'combined with others, again emphasises the need for very close investigation of all applications for financial assistance from governmental sources towards capital expenditure on the extension of homes for migrant children'.²⁷³⁹ The clear implication of this appears to have been that the Commonwealth Department of Immigration did not regard, on current evidence, its investment in the extension of Nazareth House, Camberwell, to have been worthwhile. Despite reading Stinson's report, there is no indication that Heyes, or any other official in the Commonwealth Department of Immigration who read it, regarded Stinson's warning to the Mother-General about the possible repayment of its capital grant as inappropriate. Three weeks after Heyes sent this letter, Crennan is recorded as having paid a visit to Nazareth House, Camberwell. The Sisters of Nazareth recorded in their History of the Foundation document that he had shown a 'keen interest in provision made for migrant children' and 'expressed a wish that more children from Nazareth Houses in the Home countries and Maltese be induced to take advantage of the facilities and amenities'.²⁷⁴⁰ The evident continued concern about the limited recruitment of girls to Camberwell despite the significant Government investment in this, and its implications not only for Nazareth House, Camberwell, but for other Catholic institutions that might seek capital funding to receive child migrants in future, provided the context in which girls continued to be recruited from Nazareth Houses in the United Kingdom to Camberwell during the autumn of 1953. The 'pressing need' to fill over a hundred places for girls at Nazareth

²⁷³⁸ Heyes to Crennan, 22nd October 1953, NAA: A445, 133/2/124, pp.62-63.

²⁷³⁹ Heyes to Crennan, 22nd October 1953, NAA: A445, 133/2/124, p.63, NAA-000000047.

²⁷⁴⁰ Camberwell, NH, Extract from the History of the Foundation document, NAZ.001.006.2398.

House, East Camberwell, was also specifically noted at the annual meeting of the CCWC in 1954.²⁷⁴¹

3.9 We know that a party of 17 girls from Nazareth Houses at Aberdeen, Kilmarnock, Nottingham, Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Cardiff sailed to Australia on the Orontes on [REDACTED] 1954 to be placed at Nazareth House, Camberwell.²⁷⁴² They clearly did not include the 20 girls that Stinson had initially recruited for Nazareth House, Camberwell, earlier in 1953, whom he reported already to have arrived in Australia by the time he submitted his report in early October 1953.

3.10 If these girls were sent by the Sisters of Nazareth after Stinson's warning about the risk of having to re-pay the Commonwealth Government grant and the evident concern in Australia about the lack of recruitment for Camberwell, it might be expected that evidence of activity for their selection for migration might be found during the autumn of 1953. This is consistent with dates on LEM3 migration forms for girls sent from the Nazareth Houses at Aberdeen and Kilmarnock which show consents for their migration being signed on either the 23rd or 26th November 1953.²⁷⁴³ Although they did not sail until the following [REDACTED] these LEM3 forms indicate that discussions about their migration had begun at least six months' before their eventual departure.

3.11 Further detailed evidence of selection decisions made in that period is provided with regard to the case of [REDACTED] (who was migrated as [REDACTED] [REDACTED]). As noted in an autographical statement submitted to the Inquiry, [REDACTED] had [REDACTED] at the age of two and a half and had spent three and a half years after that in hospital. As a result of this, [REDACTED] had to wear calipers.²⁷⁴⁴ Following the death of her mother in May 1953, [REDACTED] was admitted to Nazareth House, Kilmarnock, with her calipers. She continued to wear her calipers whilst attending a local school whilst at that Nazareth House.²⁷⁴⁵ Consent for her

²⁷⁴¹ Minutes of the meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council, October 1954, BEW.001.001.0174.

²⁷⁴² Child migrants from NH 1938-1956, NAZ.001.006.2554.

²⁷⁴³ See LEM3 forms for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at National Archives of Australia: MP765/1, [REDACTED] NAA.001.001.1423-1428, and MP210/2 1954/38/717/[REDACTED] NAA.001.001.1436-1441, and, and LEM3 form for [REDACTED] WIT.003.001.8774-8775, My Story by [REDACTED] WIT.003.001.8774.

²⁷⁴⁴ My Story by [REDACTED] WIT.003.001.8760.

²⁷⁴⁵ My Story by [REDACTED] WIT.003.001.8762.

migration to Australia was signed by her father on 26th November 1953.²⁷⁴⁶ When she was sent to Australia, she was not sent with her calipers.²⁷⁴⁷

3.12 Prior to leaving for Australia, LTI received a medical examination, required as a condition of immigration by the Australian authorities, to check that she was fully healthy and would not require significant medical treatment in Australia.²⁷⁴⁸ This examination was undertaken by a Dr Barr in Kilmarnock who indicated that she had no medical problems, had a 'good' physique and was a 'healthy and lively little girl'. A declaration of her medical history, signed by the Mother Superior of Nazareth House, Kilmarnock, also stated that she had never had any serious illness. The Mother Superior's signature preceded the statement, 'I hereby certify that the information supplied by me to the Medical Examiner is correct in every particular.'²⁷⁴⁹

3.13 After LTI arrival at Nazareth House, Camberwell, in the early summer of 1954, a report of a visit by State inspectors recorded that the Mother Superior at Camberwell was concerned that of the girls who had recently arrived, two (including LTI) had serious, long-term medical conditions and two were found to be in need of special education.²⁷⁵⁰ Concern was raised about the lack of medical information sent with these girls. This matter was referred back to Sir Tasman Heyes at the Commonwealth Department of Immigration who requested that full medical or psychiatric reports be provided on these girls.²⁷⁵¹ The report on LTI indicated that she had with one leg one inch shorter than another and a built-up boot and spring heel were advised for her. The report also indicated that further information had been obtained from her father in Scotland which indicated that she had at the age of two and had spent three years in hospital, one of which was in a respirator.²⁷⁵² The Commonwealth Department of Health subsequently contacted its Chief Medical Officer at Australia House in London to inquire why such an obvious disability, which would have clearly disbarred LTI from migration, was not spotted during her medical examination.²⁷⁵³ During the autumn

²⁷⁴⁶ LEM3 form for LTI WIT.003.001.8774-8775, My Story by LTI WIT.003.001.8774

²⁷⁴⁷ My Story by LTI WIT.003.001.8763.

²⁷⁴⁸ See Medical Examination form, 16th March 1954, My Story by LTI WIT.003.001.8776.

²⁷⁴⁹ See Medical Examination form, 16th March 1954, My Story by LTI WIT.003.001.8776.

²⁷⁵⁰ Visit to Nazareth House, East Camberwell, 24th August 1954, My Story by LTI WIT.003.001.8777.

²⁷⁵¹ Heyes to Nelson, 14th September 1954, My Story by LTI WIT.003.001.8779.

²⁷⁵² Nelson to Heyes with enclosed medical report, 19th May 1955, My Story by LTI WIT.003.001.8781-8782.

²⁷⁵³ Metcalfe to Mathieson, no date, My Story by LTI WIT.003.001.8783.

of 1954, Canon Flint also tried to get more information about [LTI] medical history to pass on to Catholic authorities in Australia, suggesting that they were also aware that her case had become a concern.²⁷⁵⁴

3.14 When Australia House contacted Dr Barr to seek an explanation for the discrepancy between his medical report and [LTI] physical condition, Barr replied that 'I cannot find excuse for myself' in terms of missing her disability, though 'no doubt I have been pre-occupied with the condition of lungs, heart and so on'.²⁷⁵⁵ The limited defence of his report that he made was that Part A of the form (the declaration of the individual's medical history) would normally be completed in advance of the physical examination by the applicant and that their answers would normally be read back to them during the examination before the applicant finally signed it. This reported procedure was evidently not followed in [LTI] case, however, as Part A of the form was signed by the Mother Superior who did not attend the examination. Dr Barr recalled that [LTI] was accompanied to the medical examination by 'an older girl, evidently a member of the domestic staff of Nazareth House, who knew nothing about her'.²⁷⁵⁶ As a result, Barr commented, 'the history of [LTI] and [LTI] was not disclosed to me. I can be quite emphatic on that point and can assure you that had I learned about it at the time I doubt very much if I would have considered her application at all'.²⁷⁵⁷ In conclusion, Barr wrote 'I cannot offer you a reasonable explanation as to why this child's disabilities were missed. My sole comment is that the applicant's medical history was not properly disclosed to me. There is certainly a lesson to be learned there.'²⁷⁵⁸

3.15 Whilst Barr sought to lay part of the blame for the failure of the medical examination to make a proper record of [LTI] health on the lack of information given, it appears difficult to understand this process simply in terms of a lack of communication. Given [LTI] evident history of [LTI] and her use of calipers whilst at Nazareth House, it is hard to read the Mother Superior's signed statement that she had no previous illnesses as a statement made in good faith. The failure to provide adequate medical records of [LTI] and the other girl travelling with her who reportedly had a chronic health condition clearly contravened standards of good practice which had been set out in the Moss Report (in which Moss wrote 'I heard of

²⁷⁵⁴ Flint to Crennan, 8th November 1954, BEW.001.001.0012-0013.

²⁷⁵⁵ Barr to Mathieson, 5th September 1955, My Story by [LTI] WIT.003.001.8790.

²⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

some institutions where adequate health reports and medical histories were not sent to the organisation in Australia. These are clearly essential')²⁷⁵⁹, the Women's Group on Public Welfare Report,²⁷⁶⁰ the draft s.33 regulations,²⁷⁶¹ and the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration.²⁷⁶² The decision by the order to put forward some girls forward for migration without apparently providing information that might have led to their migration being refused by immigration officials could possibly be understood within the context in which, according to Stinson, the migration of a number of girls put forward by the order earlier in 1953 had been refused.

3.16 As noted in Appendix 2 (5.36), the order appears to have remained concerned about the risk of the repayment of its capital grant for the extension to Nazareth House, Camberwell, to the Australian Commonwealth Government. In 1955, a brief report of a visit to Nazareth House, Camberwell, by a member of staff from the UK High Commission recorded that 'the Mother-Superior is obviously worried about the inadequate supply of children from the United Kingdom especially since, under the terms of the financial agreement with the Australian authorities, the Home is restricted to taking migrant children only'.²⁷⁶³ In 1958, the History of the Foundation for Nazareth House, Camberwell, records that the order was exploring incorporation of its Houses in Australia as one of the advantages of this action would be 'the safeguarding of the property of the congregations from resumption by the State or Government (Federal)'.²⁷⁶⁴ In the same year, it was recorded that the Director of the Victorian State Child Welfare Department and an official from the State Immigration Department visited Nazareth House, Camberwell, to discuss how the problem of the decreasing numbers of child migrants received by the institution could best be

²⁷⁵⁹ *Child Migration to Australia: Report by John Moss* (London: HMSO, 1953), para. 18.

²⁷⁶⁰ *Child Emigration*, Report by the Women's Group on Public Welfare (London: National Council of Social Service, 1951), pp.31-32.

²⁷⁶¹ Memorandum by the Home Office on Regulations to be made under section 33 of the Children Act, 1948, TNA: MH102/1784, p.22 on provided copy: 'Para 12. The voluntary organisation should furnish to the person in charge of the organisation who will be responsible for the care of the child in the country to which he emigrates all the information in its possession which is material to the understanding of the child.'

²⁷⁶² See minutes of meeting of CVOCE, 6th June 1951, ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1, pt I pp.15-20, on provided copy.

²⁷⁶³ Confidential, Report of Visits to Institutions and a School in Tasmania and Victoria, April 1955, TNA: MH102/1882, p.27 on provided copy, LEG.001.006.1472.

²⁷⁶⁴ Camberwell NH, History of the Foundation, July 1958, NAZ.001.006.2412.

managed 'while safeguarding against the repayment of State and Federal building subsidies'.²⁷⁶⁵

3.17 In summary, in the context of limited numbers of children being made available for migration from the United Kingdom, the building work undertaken at Nazareth House, Camberwell, to enable it to receive 150 girls from the United Kingdom constituted both an ambitious initiative and significant investment from the Australian Commonwealth and Victorian State Governments. Fr Stinson's report claims that this expansion and investment was undertaken on the basis of assurances from the Mother General of the order to the Mother Superior that girls would be made available from Nazareth Houses in the United Kingdom. Given that this was one of the most ambitious institutional expansion to have been supported around that time (another being Dhurringile, about which problems of recruitment are discussed in Appendix 1, 3.27, 4.14), Stinson's claim that this was premised on assurances about a viable supply of child migrants appears credible. During 1953, reportedly in response to Stinson's warning and continued concern in Australia about low levels of recruitment, the Sisters of Nazareth appear to have made continued efforts to identify girls for migration to Camberwell. This accords with dates on LEM3 forms for girls from Nazareth Houses in Aberdeen and Kilmarnock who were eventually migrated in █████ 1954, but for whom preparations for their migration seem to have begun in the previous autumn. As noted above (3.12) four of the 17 girls sent to Camberwell in the █████ 1954 party were found to have physical or educational difficulties which would normally have been considered by the Commonwealth Department of Immigration to have precluded them from being accepted as child migrants. In the case of LTI █████ the Mother Superior of Nazareth House, Kilmarnock, certified that she had no prior history of significant illness and the medical assessment given of her by a doctor in Kilmarnock was seen as difficult to reconcile with her physical condition by doctors who assessed her after her arrival in Australia. In the context of an apparent attempt by the Sisters of Nazareth to recruit more girls for migration to Camberwell, the medical declaration made by the Mother Superior of Nazareth House, Kilmarnock, seems most plausibly understood as a deliberate falsification of LTI █████ medical history in an attempt to keep up the number of girls being accepted for migration. The fact that she, and other girls, were migrated without appropriate records that would have been necessary for their proper treatment or support overseas—and in the case of LTI █████

²⁷⁶⁵ Both references occur in Camberwell, NH Extract from History of the Foundation, NAZ.001.006.2412-2413.

migrated without her calipers—suggests the order prioritised its organisational needs to ensure a flow of girls to Camberwell over concern for those girls' welfare.

3.18 It was not unique to the Sisters of Nazareth for financial investment in the expansion of receiving institutions to have an apparent bearing on organisations' thinking about their child migration work. For example, on 24th January 1953, the Chief Secretary of the Eastern Australia Territory for the Salvation Army wrote to counter-parts in the United Kingdom that

We note from your letter that you are experiencing certain difficulties in securing suitable boys for Riverview and sincerely trust that your efforts will meet with success. It would be a tragedy if the difficulties experienced in getting Riverview on to its feet as well as the expense involved, if there was a breakdown in the supply of boys at this stage. We shall look forward to better news with your following letters.²⁷⁶⁶

The following month, he wrote again stating 'We are very concerned at the lack of names sent us in connection with boys for our Training Farm Scheme, at Riverview, Queensland...The complete absence of boys offering for Riverview under [group nomination] Q.G.300 is causing us a lot of worry.'²⁷⁶⁷ A Commission established by the Church of England in 1953 to review the future of the Church of England Advisory Council of Empire Settlement (a body which had undertaken migration of children to Anglican children's homes in Australia since 1947) also commented that there was in general too little appreciation in Britain of the need for maintaining a proper 'religious balance' in Commonwealth countries and, in the face of the obvious commitment of the Catholic Church to supporting emigration, there was an obvious duty for the Church of England to match this in providing migrants for Anglican churches overseas.²⁷⁶⁸ This included the need to meet the demands for British

²⁷⁶⁶ Cooper to no name given, 24th January 1953, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.002.0480.

²⁷⁶⁷ Cooper to Ebbs, 23rd February 1953, Records of the International Headquarters Migration and Travel Service, EM/2/2/2/2, SAL.001.001.0481.

²⁷⁶⁸ On Roy Peterkin's recollection of pressure from the Archbishop of Perth for the Swan Homes to compete with Catholic child migration work, see Senate Community Affairs Committee, *Lost innocents: righting the record*, Canberra 2001, para 2.39. On attempts to secure Commonwealth and State Government funding to expand the Swan Homes to find provide additional space to accommodate child migrants, see Peterkin to Calwell, 11th March 1948, Calwell to Peterkin, 1st April 1948, NAA: K403, W59/114. See also previous concerns amongst Protestant churches in the United Kingdom about more organised Catholic migration schemes, and the suspicion of Catholic organisations receiving preferential treatment from the Commonwealth Department of Immigration under Calwell (Bessborough to Fisher, 25th June 1947, and Burlingham to Eley, 3rd July 1947, Lambeth Palace Library: Fisher/27/329,333).

children from Anglican children's homes in Australia which 'the Church of England is clearly under an obligation to satisfy'—a remark apparently reflecting evidence received by the Commission that the Anglican Church in Australia had spent thousands of pounds expanding their children's homes to make space for British child migrants.²⁷⁶⁹ However, what appears distinctive in the case of Nazareth House, Camberwell, is the scale both of the expansion of the institution at a time when it was recognised that it was difficult to recruit child migrants in the United Kingdom and of the extent of the financial leverage which the order sought from the Commonwealth and State Governments to achieve this. On the basis of available evidence, this expansion would appear to have been premised on the basis that the Sisters of Nazareth would transfer girls from their institutions in the United Kingdom to fill these places and led to an approach in which consideration of whether migration was in the interests of children could have been compromised by the financial concerns of the order.

3.19 A possible comparison could be drawn between the sending of girls from Scotland to Nazareth House, Camberwell, to address concerns about low numbers of child migrants there, and the decision to send boys from Quarriers to Dhurringile in the early 1960s, despite in some cases psychological reports indicating that their migration was not appropriate (see Appendix 3, 7.14). In both cases, there are some indications that organisational priorities for the placing of children in overseas institutions may have been given greater weight than indications about individual children's welfare. It is possible that, over time, immigration officials at Australia House sought to enforce more rigorous standards over the selection of children for migration. In a letter dated 26th April 1956 from Canon Flood, in his capacity as Secretary of the Emigration Committee of the CCWC, to Mgr Crennan, Secretary of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, Flood noted that recent attempts to migrate 20 children from Nazareth House, Belfast, had stalled because officials at Australia House had taken the view that they did not meet required physical or educational standards for migration.²⁷⁷⁰

3.20 Given the apparent problems with the rigour and accuracy of LTI medical check prior to her emigration, some further analysis has been undertaken of other medical reports for children migrated from the care of the Sisters of Nazareth. LEM3 forms for children emigrated from Scotland by the Sisters of Nazareth in the autumn of 1947 appear to indicate that all of them received their pre-migration

²⁷⁶⁹ Memorandum on the present position, Lambeth Palace Library: Bell/183/19-21.

²⁷⁷⁰ Flood to Crennan, 26th April 1956, WIT.003.001.9286.

medical check at Australia House on 21st August 1947 (with a small number also taking place on 22nd and 24th August). In all of the 38 LEM3 forms reviewed for children from Scotland who received medicals at Australia House on those dates, the same phrase 'No known history of disease' is written across the first part of the form which requests the applicant's medical history and no signature is given to the medical history statement.²⁷⁷¹ This applies both to children sent from Nazareth Houses in Scotland and the Convent of the Good Shepherd in Edinburgh. The consistency of these responses suggests that it was not the case that the orders did not possess any medical information about these children given the period of their previous stay in Nazareth Houses, but that no medical histories were provided for these children at the point of their migration. In addition to being an apparent breach of the expectation (on the LEM3 form) that such histories would be taken for all children before their emigration, the failure to pass on any known information could be understood as a risk to the children's well-being. The lack of provision of such medical histories appears to have occurred with regard to children migrated from other Catholic children's homes across the United Kingdom in 1947 as well.²⁷⁷²

3.21 Analysis of medical reports of other children migrated from Nazareth Houses in Scotland around the time of [LTI] show no declarations of previous serious illness in their medical histories, with only occasional references to enuresis which is recorded as responding to treatment.²⁷⁷³ This could indicate a wider pattern of under-reporting of prior illness, but it is difficult to reach firm conclusions on this as a small sample of LEM3 forms (available in digitised form from the National Archives of Australia) for child migrants in 1953 sent by other organisations have the same pattern of 'nil' responses to questions about serious previous illness.²⁷⁷⁴

²⁷⁷¹ For the list of LEM3 forms to which this refers see [REDACTED]. One exception to this is PP93/10/1175 in which the medical history section is simply left blank rather than having this statement written across it.

²⁷⁷² See for example, NAA: PP93/10/16, 53, 540.

²⁷⁷³ See NAA: PP93/10/2, 17, 246, 292, 293, 346, 473 (although this does refer to tonsils having previously been removed), 649, 707, 709, 718, 795, 801, 814, 873, 1209.

²⁷⁷⁴ See NAA: PP93/10/639, 651, 653, 926 (although there is a reference to mumps here, but as an illness within the past 12 months rather than a serious illness), 1054, 1089.

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