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University of Kent

# A Socio-political History of Youth and Violence in Zambia, 1958-1991

By  
Tarryn Natasha Gourley

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‘Imiti ikula empanga’

*(The trees that grow today make tomorrow’s forest)*

**- Bemba proverb**

‘Tau, ha ica mutu yamaswe hamusaibulai,

kamuso itaca yomunde WISDOM’

*(When a lion eats a bad man and you don’t*

*kill it, it will eat a good man tomorrow)*

**- Lozi Proverb**

## Abstract

The ‘problem’ of youth has recently been high on the agenda of African governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).<sup>1</sup> This perceived threat is compounded by the increasingly youthful demographics of the continent. World Bank estimates suggest that 42.28 per cent of those living in Sub-Saharan Africa are under the age of 14 years old.<sup>2</sup> Globally, Zambia itself has the eighth lowest median age at 16.9 years.<sup>3</sup> The turn towards often nefarious activities as a means of survival among this burgeoning – and disproportionately unemployed – group, has in many countries fed into the idea of youth being synonymous with violence. Emphasising primary source material in which youths speak for themselves, this thesis explores the historical roots of this connection and elucidates the drivers of youth political violence in late colonial and postcolonial Zambia between 1958 and 1991. By focusing on the long period during which the United National Independence Party (UNIP) rose to power and then dominated the newly independent country, the approach contextualises youth violence within broader processes and explores continuities and changes in the landscape of Zambian political violence and opposition politics. Here the African National Congress (ANC)

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<sup>1</sup> Centred around the problem of youth unemployment, for example, the NGO ‘Young Africa’ works to empower youth across five different African countries: ‘Empowering Youth’, Young Africa, 2021, <<https://youngafrica.org/>> [accessed 15 May 2021]. Similarly, article 17 of the African Youth Charter, which is signed by 55 member states of the African Union, emphasises the need for ‘peace and security’ among youths. See: ‘African Youth Charter’, African Union, 2021, <<https://au.int/en/treaties/african-youth-charter>> [accessed 15 May 2021].

<sup>2</sup> Based on World Bank estimates of population ages between 0-14 years old as a percentage of the total population. See ‘Population Ages 0-14 (% of Total Population)’, World Bank, 2019 <[https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?most\\_recent\\_value\\_desc=false](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false)> [accessed 14 March 2021].

<sup>3</sup> As of March 2021: ‘Country Comparisons – Median Age’, The World Factbook, CIA, 2021 <<https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/median-age/country-comparison>> [accessed 14 March 2021].

party played a significant role. This study thus enhances understandings of the relationship between youth and violence, as well as anticolonial party politics and the workings of postcolonial African states. More specifically, and in line with recent ‘revisionist’ accounts of Zambian history, the thesis challenges two commonly held views: firstly, that negotiated independence in the country was an entirely peaceable affair; and secondly, that following independence from Britain in 1964, Zambia represented a relative ‘oasis of peace’ in an otherwise deeply troubled region. Arguing against these misconceptions, this thesis also demonstrates how youth formed a critical dimension of the workings of nationalist and postcolonial politics in the country, which has until now been overlooked or entirely neglected within Zambianist scholarship.

**Keywords:** Youth, Political Violence, Colonial Zambia, Postcolonial Zambia, Party Politics, UNIP, UNIP Youth League, ANC Youth League.


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## List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia from 1964)
IHR	Institute of Human Relations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LUTO	Let Us Try Organisation
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRANC	Northern Rhodesian African National Congress
SOPHIA	Students Open Philosophical Association
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
UAU	United Anti-UNIP Movement
UDI	Southern Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFP	United Federal Party
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNZA	University of Zambia
UNZASU	University of Zambia Student Union
UP	United Party
UPP	United Progressive Party
ZANC	Zambian African National Congress
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZCBC	Zambia Consumer and Buying Corporation
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZEMCC	Zambia Election Monitoring and Coordinating Committee

ZIMT	Zambia Independent Monitoring Team
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZIT	Zambia Institute of Technology
ZNS	Zambia National Service
ZUSO	Zambia Union of Student Organisations
ZYS	Zambia Youth Service



# **Chapter One: Introduction**

## **Introduction**

The ‘problem’ of youth has recently been high on the agenda of African governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).<sup>1</sup> This perceived threat is compounded by the increasingly youthful demographics of the continent. World Bank estimates suggest that around 40 per cent of those living in Sub-Saharan Africa are under the age of 14 years old.<sup>2</sup> Globally, Zambia itself has the eighth lowest median age at 16.9 years.<sup>3</sup> The turn towards often nefarious activities as a means of survival among this burgeoning – and disproportionately unemployed – group, has in many countries fed into the idea of youth being synonymous with violence. Emphasising primary source material in which youths speak for themselves, this thesis explores the historical roots of this connection and elucidates the drivers of youth political violence in late colonial and postcolonial Zambia between 1958 and 1991. By focusing on the long period during which the United National Independence Party (UNIP) rose to power and then

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<sup>1</sup> Centred around the problem of youth unemployment, for example, the NGO ‘Young Africa’ works to empower youth across five different African countries: ‘Empowering Youth’, Young Africa, 2021, <<https://youngafrica.org/>> [accessed 15 May 2021]. Similarly, article 17 of the African Youth Charter, which is signed by 55 member states of the African Union, emphasises the need for ‘peace and security’ among youths. See: ‘African Youth Charter’, African Union, 2021, <<https://au.int/en/treaties/african-youth-charter>> [accessed 15 May 2021].

<sup>2</sup> Based on 2019 World Bank estimates of population ages between 0-14 years old as a percentage of the total population. See ‘Population Ages 0-14 (% of Total Population)’, World Bank, 2019 <[https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?most\\_recent\\_value\\_desc=false](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false)> [accessed 14 March 2021].

<sup>3</sup> As of March 2021: ‘Country Comparisons – Median Age’, The World Factbook, CIA, 2021 <<https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/median-age/country-comparison>> [accessed 14 March 2021].

dominated the newly independent country, the approach contextualises violence within broader processes and explores continuities and changes in the landscape of Zambian politics; with special emphasis on opposition politics.<sup>4</sup> In doing so, it enhances understandings of the relationship between youth and violence, as well as anticolonial party politics and the workings of postcolonial African states. More specifically, and in line with recent ‘revisionist’ accounts of Zambian history, this thesis challenges two commonly held views: firstly, that negotiated independence in the country was an entirely peaceable affair; and secondly, that following independence from Britain in 1964, Zambia represented a relative ‘oasis of peace’ in an otherwise deeply troubled region.<sup>5</sup>

The ‘youth question’ likewise forms an important part of recent Zambian political discourse. Particular anxiety surrounds the violence allegedly perpetrated by youthful party ‘cadres’ in such socially deprived areas as Kanyama, an urban compound in Lusaka noted as a hotspot for political

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<sup>4</sup> The apparent rejuvenation of UNIP for the upcoming August 2021 general election makes this historical survey timely. Bishop Trevor Mwamba, who is contesting the UNIP presidency in time for the election, claims that there is a ‘great buzz’ about the ‘grand old parent’ party on social media, especially among the youth: ‘UNIP is Very Much Alive, Says Bishop Mwamba’, *Mast*, 12 March 2021 <<https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/12/unip-is-very-much-alive-says-bishop-mwamba/>> [accessed 14 March 2021].

<sup>5</sup> For instance, Robert Rotberg regards political violence during Zambia’s liberation struggle as merely ‘sporadic’, rather than a pervasive aspect of nationalist political culture. See, Robert Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 301. David Mulford’s account similarly understates the extent of inter and intra-African political violence embedded in the liberation struggle and supports colonial perceptions at the time that violent incidents were ‘not unusually large’: David Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 101. Zambia has been viewed internationally as an ‘oasis of peace’ in Africa, see for example: Stefan Lindemann, ‘Inclusive Elite Bargains and Civil War Avoidance: The Case of Zambia’, *Crisis States Research Centre*, 2.77 (2010), p. 2 and Silja Omarsdottir and Michael Corgan, ‘Iceland’, in *State Violence and the Right to Peace: Western Europe and North America*, ed. by Kathleen Malley-Morrison (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2009), p. 100.

violence.<sup>6</sup> General elections typically strengthen this sense of unease, as reports of violence perpetrated by youths tend to rise sharply.<sup>7</sup> Zambianists, however, have yet to catch up with these unfolding realities, and the changing role of youth in the late colonial and postcolonial life of the country has not attracted the degree of scholarly attention that it deserves. As a result, a critical dimension of the workings of nationalist and postcolonial politics at the grassroots level has been either overlooked or entirely neglected. The broader work of sociologists of youth in Africa suffers from its own limitations, not least the tendency to hone in on their role as agitators in the context of the pro-democracy movements of the late 1980s and early 1990s.<sup>8</sup> An unfortunate by-product of this emphasis is that the political work of the youth in the early post-colonial period has been largely glossed over. It is this significant gap in the literature that my project aims to rectify.

By casting the spotlight on youth disaffection and mobilization, and on their often-violent manifestations, this thesis seeks to explore the ways in which

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<sup>6</sup> For example, 'UPND Cadres Go on Rampage in Kanyama', *Zambia Daily Nation*, 10 October 2016 <<https://zambiadailynation.com/2016/10/10/upnd-cadres-go-rampage-kanyama/>> [accessed 14 March 2021]. This is true historically of Kanyama compound, which forms a key area of interest in this thesis. See especially, chapter three, p. 177. Interviewees who lived in Kanayama during the period studied in this thesis were also selected for this reason. See p. 45 of this chapter.

<sup>7</sup> Regarding the August 2021 general election see, among others: '25 Stone Throwing UPND Cadres Nabbed in Kitwe', *Zambia Reports*, 12 March 2021 <<https://zambiareports.com/2021/03/12/25-stone-throwing-upnd-cadres-nabbed-kitwe/>> [accessed 14 March 2021]; 'Police Arrest Lusaka PF Youth Chairman for Assault', *Mast*, 17 March 2020 <<https://www.themastonline.com/2020/03/17/police-arrest-lusaka-pf-youth-chairman-for-assault/>> [accessed 15 March 2021]; and 'Police Arrest 2 in Kasama Over Political Violence', *Zambia Reports*, 16 September 2020 <<https://zambiareports.com/2020/09/16/police-arrest-2-kasama-political-violence/>> [accessed 15 March 2021].

<sup>8</sup> See, for instance, Paul Richards, 'Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Crisis of Youth?', in *Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Oliver Furley (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 134-170 and Wale Adebawo, 'The Carpenter's Revolt: Youth, Violence and the Reinvention of Culture in Nigeria', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43.3 (2005), pp. 339-365.

postcolonial nationalist identities were constructed and how such ideas were contested, internalized and expressed by various Zambian youth groups. A definition of the concept of youth and the multiple meanings and identities it is associated with, naturally, plays an important part in this project. In keeping with recent insights into the study of youth in Africa<sup>9</sup>, this thesis argues that ‘youth’ is best understood in social, rather than biological, terms. That is to say that, in late colonial and early post-colonial Africa, the label designated groups of men and women, aged anywhere from fifteen to fifty years old, who were typically unemployed, unattached and held marginal status within their communities. In this context, youth were mostly excluded from both local and national power structures through a gerontocratic system that served ‘elders’ and augmented youth dependency. A sophisticated approach, however, must do more than present ‘youth’ as an undifferentiated social category. Gender, for instance, is shown to have shaped the experiences and perceptions of Zambian youth throughout the period under consideration.<sup>10</sup> Exploring the concept of youth therefore enables greater understanding of the motives behind their involvement in political violence and the ways in which they expressed dissatisfaction towards governmental and societal oppression.

The thesis focuses on the central question of youth as agents of political violence and asks why violence came to the fore at certain junctures, and not others. The study adopts an interdisciplinary approach towards violence, drawing on a variety of scholarly analyses. Thus, it builds upon, and

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<sup>9</sup> Especially, Carol Summers, ‘Youth, Elders, and Metaphors of Political Change in Late Colonial Buganda’, in *Generations Past: Youth in East African History*, ed. by Andrew Burton and Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), pp. 175-195.

<sup>10</sup> See in particular, chapter four of this thesis, pp. 203-219. Also, p. 105 and pp. 344-347.

supplements, the insights of Zambianist ‘revisionist’ histories, which have recently foregrounded the realities of political violence and authoritarianism in the country.<sup>11</sup> Of equal significance are such ‘insider’ perspectives as are provided by anthropological analyses. Several notable ethnographies offer possible entry points into the subject of youth political violence within the dynamics of a post-colonial polity. The first – exemplified by the collection edited by Broch-Due – presents collective violence as a project of identity formation.<sup>12</sup> The second, with specific reference to youth, views it as a form of labour performed by young people within globalised capitalist networks.<sup>13</sup> These approaches will help connect localised violence with wider socioeconomic and political structures, thereby avoiding what Broch-Due calls ‘the temptation to simplistically locate violence in some bounded context’.<sup>14</sup> Violence alone has been understood and applied in a multitude of ways. In this study, while being aware of the multiple meanings it can assume, political violence is defined as any ‘physical attack or threat on persons, property, institutions and symbols in order to destroy, alter and sustain systems or policies’.<sup>15</sup> Those responsible can be either outside or inside the government. David Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg also note that alleged

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<sup>11</sup> Giacomo Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> Vigdis Broch-Due, ‘Violence and Belonging: Analytical Reflection’, in *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-colonial Africa*, ed. by Vigdis Broch-Due (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 1-40.

<sup>13</sup> Danny Hoffman, *The War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

<sup>14</sup> Broch-Due, ‘Violence and Belonging’, p. 15.

<sup>15</sup> David Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg, *The Democratic Experience and Political Violence* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 5.

attacks can be considered as political violence, if they serve a political purpose.<sup>16</sup>

Before moving forward, a review of the existing literature on youth and Zambian history is necessary. This introduction will then offer a short summary of the structure of this thesis and its methodology.

### **1.1 Youth in Twentieth-Century Africa: An Overview**

Given the nature of the field, this short overview of African youth studies to date takes an interdisciplinary approach. To confine our discussion to works of history *sensu stricto* would be to ignore a significant number of other, and equally valuable, explorations of the topic. Moreover, such an attempt would run against the long tradition within Africanist history of engaging with other academic fields through debate, the borrowing of methodologies and the reliance on ethnographic material to supplement the common dearth of written sources, particularly with regards to precolonial times.<sup>17</sup> This review therefore surveys a wide array of studies from such disciplines as political science, sociology and, especially, anthropology, which now boasts an impressive collection of works pertaining to African youth. As Deborah Durham observes, anthropologists have atoned for their relative neglect of youth prior to the 1990s, and a rich, in-depth and varied body of literature on the subject has since emerged.<sup>18</sup> By addressing a broad range of investigations

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Funso Afolayan, 'African Historiography', in *Encyclopaedia of African History, Vol. 2*, ed. by Kevin Shillington (New York: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2005), pp. 626-633.

<sup>18</sup> Deborah Durham, 'Youth: Conversation with Authors and Commentary', *Cultural Anthropology*, 2012 <[https://culanth.org/curated\\_collections/7-youth/discussions/4-youth-](https://culanth.org/curated_collections/7-youth/discussions/4-youth-)

into African youth in the twentieth century, this review aims to highlight the key concerns of, and controversies between, students of the subject.

Of the most central questions to have emerged within this growing field is the issue of defining youth. Indeed, discussions surrounding who and what the category designates are to be found in almost every work involving African youth. This stems from ‘youth’ being notoriously difficult to pin down, both in analytical and in practical terms. This is especially so, since individual youths often occupy multiple social positions and identities at once. They can simultaneously be political activists, combatants, students, orphans, street children, healers, onlookers, entrepreneurs, artists and witches. Yet, up until the 1970s, youth was generally considered merely as an age-based biological measure.<sup>19</sup> As the field of youth has developed, however, so too have understandings of the concept of youth evolved and been further complicated.

Here, the most useful analyses of the concept of youth can be found in the social anthropological literature that emerged in the late 1990s. This has tended to foreground social roles, as opposed to biological age, in defining youth.<sup>20</sup> Importantly, such works recognise conceptualisations of youth emanating from within *African* society, rather than taking Western age-based notions as the gold standard. Several anthropologists have thus stressed that

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conversation-with-authors-and-commentary-by-deborah-durham> [accessed 30 March 2018].

<sup>19</sup> See, for instance, works produced in the 1970s which examine youth subcultures as sites of counter-hegemonic resistance: Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972) and Paul Corrigan and Simon Frith, ‘The Politics of Youth Culture’, *Resistance Through Rituals*, ed. by Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (London: Hutchinson, 1976), pp. 231-242.

<sup>20</sup> Clive Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi: The Youth Gangs of Soweto, 1935-1976* (London: Heinemann, 2000), p. 3.

youth should be viewed in terms of social and familial hierarchies, as well as through the lens of dependency and responsibility.<sup>21</sup> Instead of being presented as a natural chronological progression, the transition to adulthood is explained in terms of the accumulation of status, wisdom, control over resources and civic virtue.<sup>22</sup> David Turton, for example, reveals the importance of the use of age as a social distinction and power marker in African societies.<sup>23</sup> Mario Aguilar, too, in the edited collection *The Politics of Age and Gerontocracy in Africa*, highlights the centrality of age paradigms and gerontocracy in Africa, where many societies contain age-sets and other social or cultural institutions related to age.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, Aguilar links the concept of youth with the concept of elderhood and shows how the two are constantly juxtaposed against one another in society. By so doing, he reveals the role of age as a means of organising power, which implicitly places youth towards the bottom end of the social hierarchy and elders at the top.<sup>25</sup> For Aguilar, therefore ‘youth’ is less a marker of age than a marker of power.

Moving beyond localised and descriptive definitions of youth within specific ethnic groups, more recent accounts situate the category of youth within broader, globalised trajectories. By doing so it is more readily understood as a disenfranchised socioeconomic group. These studies view generation

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> David Turton, ‘History, Age and the Anthropologists’, in *After Empire: Towards an Ethnology of Europe’s New Barbarians*, ed. by Giorgio Ausenda (London: Boydell Press, 1995), p. 100.

<sup>24</sup> Mario Aguilar, ‘Reinventing Gada: Generational Knowledge in Boorana’, in *The Politics of Age and Gerontocracy in Africa: Ethnographies of the Past and Memories of the Present*, ed. by Mario Aguilar (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1998), pp. 257-280.

<sup>25</sup> For a Zambian example, see James Pritchett, *Lunda-Ndembu: Style, Change and Social Transformation in South Central Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001).



similarly to class, in that – like the latter – the former provides individuals ‘with a common location in the social and historical process’ and predisposes them to a specific range of experiences and modes of thought and action.<sup>26</sup> Defining youth in the present day, Alcinda Honwana employs the concept of ‘waithood’, first coined by Dianne Singerman.<sup>27</sup> Waithood is used to describe ‘a period of suspension between childhood and adulthood’ – a period during which young people proactively engage with society during a long process to secure financial independence and create personal identities.<sup>28</sup> This concept is particularly valuable when looking at the postcolonial and contemporary predicament of African youth, many of whose members were, and are, ‘unable to attain the social markers of adulthood’, such as employment or providing for families. When seen from this perspective, the youth represent a marginalised demographic, encompassing individuals who are deprived of the means to bring to an end a potentially endless period of dependency.

Other studies consider the symbolic meaning ascribed to youth and view the category as both historically and socially constructed. For example, in her work on shifting social perceptions of youth within African states, Edna Bay emphasises the contingent nature of the youth category.<sup>29</sup> Bay demonstrates how youth were believed to be harbingers of modernity during the

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<sup>26</sup> Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1952), p. 291.

<sup>27</sup> Singerman’s usage of ‘waithood’, however, suggests a sense of passivity: Diane Singerman, ‘The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities Among Youth in the Middle East’, *Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper*, 6 (2007), pp. 1-53.

<sup>28</sup> Alcinda Honwana, *The Time of Youth: Work, Social Change, and Politics in Africa* (Virginia: Kumarian Press, 2012).

<sup>29</sup> Edna Bay, ‘Introduction’, in *States of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contemporary Africa*, ed. by Edna Bay and Donald Donham (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), p. 10.

independence era but were later cast as dangerous threats following the 1990s pro-democracy movements. Celebrated anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff, too, have understood African youths in terms of the metaphoric importance assigned to them. Youths, according to the Comaroffs's interpretation, are more than simply a collective group of young people. They are powerful *symbols* that have come to represent 'the terrors of the present, the errors of the past, [and] the prospect of a future'.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, given the variations in the cultural meanings and social attributes ascribed to 'youth' through time and space, the Comaroffs' put forward the idea of youth as 'complex' signifiers who illuminate the social and political constitution of the societies in which they live.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, the concept of youth has been defined in multifarious ways. It is ostensibly a biological measure, a marker of power (or lack thereof), an existential subaltern category and a metaphor for historical and social change. However, in what Clive Glaser has described as the 'contested battleground of semantics' surrounding youth, there remains a common thread.<sup>32</sup> For what successive Africanist efforts to grapple with the concept of youth demonstrate is that 'youth as a category should matter to scholars because it matters to Africans'.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> For another work that considers youth as a social and political metaphor see, Summers, 'Youth, Elders, and Metaphors of Political Change in Late Colonial Buganda'. Also, Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, 'Reflections on Youth, from the Past to the Postcolony', in *Frontiers of Capital: Ethnographic Reflections on the New Economy*, ed. by Melissa Fisher and Greg Downey (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 268.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 267.

<sup>32</sup> Glaser, *Bo-tsotsi*, p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas Burgess and Andrew Burton, 'Introduction', in *Generations Past: Youth in East African History*, ed. by Andrew Burton and Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), pp. 5 and 19.

Going hand-in-hand with definitional efforts is a growing scholarly recognition of the multiplicity of sub-groups that make up the youth demographic. Indeed, youth are neither monolithic nor unidimensional. Urban youth have received particular consideration in this regard and have formed the predominant focus of many scholarly investigations.<sup>34</sup> The reason for this prevalence can be attributed to the fact that it is really only in an urban setting that the youth become a visible ‘problem’ for policy-makers. Certainly, most commentators present the urban youth as an especially volatile social group. This is the result of the interstitial space that they inhabit: socioeconomically marginalized, they are nonetheless able to partake of a globalised culture that heightens awareness of the same marginalization.<sup>35</sup> Within this urban space then, youths are forced to seek out, sometimes through illegal or violent means, alternative paths towards adulthood. Espousing these assumptions, a number of historians have looked at the problem of African youth delinquency in the colonial period. One such study is Paul Ocobock’s article on colonial anxiety about vagrancy in Kenya in the first half of the twentieth century. Ocobock looks at how wage labour and urbanization created a marginalised population, formed largely of Nairobi’s adolescents, whom the colonial government attempted to control with the use of vagrancy laws.<sup>36</sup> Andrew Burton, too, has written on the

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<sup>34</sup> See, for example, Karen Hansen, ‘Getting Stuck in the Compound: Some Odds Against Social Adulthood in Lusaka, Zambia’, *Africa Today*, 51.4 (2005), pp. 3-16 and Richard Waller, ‘Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa’, *Journal of African History*, 47.1 (2006), pp. 77-92.

<sup>35</sup> Hansen, ‘Getting Stuck in the Compound’, p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> Paul Ocobock, ‘Joy Rides for Juveniles: Vagrant Youth and Colonial Control in Nairobi, Kenya, 1901-1952’, *Social History*, 31.1 (2006), pp. 39-59.

increasing criminality of so-called ‘detrribalised’ youth in the urban areas of colonial Tanganyika.<sup>37</sup> Burton reveals that, in an attempt ‘to pick up a living as best they [could]’, African youths frequently resorted to pick-pocketing, an activity in which they were heavily implicated during the colonial era.<sup>38</sup>

A regrettable result of this focus on urban youth, however, is that far less has been written on its rural counterpart, although this is beginning to change. Ivo Mhike’s thesis, for example, provides the first comprehensive study of juvenile delinquency in colonial Zimbabwe. Mhike explores the development and enforcement of concepts of deviance and delinquency among youth in rural Southern Rhodesia and, by so doing, exposes changes in the prevailing notions of what constituted the colonial social order.<sup>39</sup> Another commendable study dealing with the rural youth element is Krijin Peters’ *War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone*, which offers a comparison between urban and rural youth gangs in Sierra Leone.<sup>40</sup> This gradual incorporation of the rural youth element within the African youth literature is a welcome development, and one that can be expected eventually to redress the imbalance of previous studies.

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<sup>37</sup> Andrew Burton, ‘Jamii ya Wahalifu. The Growth of Crime in a Colonial African Urban Centre: Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, 1919-1961’, *Crime, History & Societies*, 8.2 (2004), p. 97.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> Ivo Mhike, ‘Deviance and Colonial Power: A History of Juvenile Delinquency in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-c.1960’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of the Free State, 2016).

<sup>40</sup> Krijin Peters, *War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 230. Another work which looks at both rural and urban youth is: Danielle Resnick and James Thurlow, ‘Introduction: African Youth at a Crossroads’, in *African Youth and the Persistence of Marginalization: Employment, Politics, and Prospects for Change*, ed. by Danielle Resnick and James Thurlow (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 1-20.

Youth gangs are another sub-group that has received a significant degree of attention in the literature, especially in the context of urban-focused studies.<sup>41</sup> David Anderson's article on the Mungiki gang's violence, for instance, pays particular attention to the emergence of vigilantism, youth criminality, and extortion in Kenyan politics.<sup>42</sup> Anderson's work reflects other similar studies in which the logic of gang violence among youths is located within the broader social political canvas.<sup>43</sup> Scholars of youth gangs explain the latter's violence in a number of ways, regarding it as: an attempt to 'take back' what youths consider to be unjustly monopolised by the older generation; an opportunity to ease their sense of social marginalisation by belonging to a group; and an assertion of power in the form of hypermasculinity, even as they operate from a position of relative powerlessness. Additionally, given that gang members were – and are – often males, such studies pay particular attention to the masculine culture associated with urban youth gangs, and therefore offer a distinctly gendered perspective. Studies exploring the role of youth during South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle have led the way in this respect.<sup>44</sup> Jeremy Seekings shows how 'fighting came to be seen (by men at least) as a matter for men alone'.<sup>45</sup> Equally, Glaser, in his work on Soweto,

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<sup>41</sup> This is also true of other parts of the world see, for instance, Pilar Riano-Alcala, *Dwellers of Memory: Youth and Violence in Medellin, Colombia* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006).

<sup>42</sup> David Anderson, 'Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya', *African Affairs*, 101.405 (2002), pp. 531-555.

<sup>43</sup> See for example, Joschka Philipps, *Ambivalent Rage: Youth Gangs and Urban Protest in Conakry, Guinea* (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 2013).

<sup>44</sup> See Gary Kynoch, *We Are Fighting the World: A History of the Marashea Gangs in South Africa, 1947–1999* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005); Jeremy Seekings, *Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in the 1980s* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993); and Clive Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi*; Paul La Hausse, "'The Cows of Nongoloza': Youth, Crime and Amalaita Gangs in Durban, 1900- 1936', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 16.1 (1990), pp. 79-111.

<sup>45</sup> Seekings, *Heroes or Villains*, p. 83.

notes that the expression of youthful masculinity on the part of gang members involved young men's bodily control over young women as an extension of territory.<sup>46</sup>

Although the aforementioned studies are to be commended for exploring the gendered dimension of youth – one that, as political anthropologist Jon Abbink has noted, is ‘often relegated to second place in studies’ – the experiences and voices of female youth have remained relatively hidden. That violence is typically viewed as a male domain, and that youth as an analytical term is also highly gendered, typically referring to urban young men, has meant that analysis of the involvement of female youths in gangs has often been of only peripheral concern to Africanists. This is also true of other topics. In this respect, Rachel Johnson's PhD thesis – ‘Making History, Gendering Youth’ – is something of an exception, in that its analysis is devoted exclusively to female youth.<sup>47</sup> It foregrounds their importance to youth party politics and attempts to correct the absence of young women in histories of South Africa's liberation struggles, which earlier narratives had presented as an almost entirely masculine pursuit. Equally ground-breaking is Monique Marks' *Young Warriors*, which disproves the idea of youthful women as being invariably more peace-loving than their male counterparts. Instead, by drawing on oral testimony, Marks shows that South African female youths *did* participate in violence, usually through acts of arson, during the 1980s

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<sup>46</sup> Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi*, p. 8.

<sup>47</sup> Rachel Johnson, ‘Making History, Gendering Youth: Young Women and South Africa's Liberation Struggles after 1976’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sheffield, 2010), p. 19.

and early 1990s.<sup>48</sup> This work, too, moves away from the typical depiction of female youths as victims of violence perpetrated by young men.

Another social fault line which has attracted the attention of Africanists is that between students and so-called lumpen, or uneducated, youths. Works discussing this cleavage among youth have attempted to illuminate the reality that ‘there is no automatic solidarity among youths in any country’.<sup>49</sup> Non-elite or lumpen youths have been characterised by Ibrahim Abdullah as ‘the largely unemployed and unemployable youths, mostly male, who live by their wits and have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or underground economy’.<sup>50</sup> Abdullah further argues that their lives revolve around a counterculture which promotes criminal behaviour, petty theft, drugs, drunkenness and gross indiscipline. It is this sub-group of the youth population which is commonly linked with gang culture in Africanist discourse. Students, on the other hand, have been presented as ‘people who think; who reinvent the future nation’.<sup>51</sup> Glaser has noted that students, in contrast to street youth, were less aggressive and more respectful.<sup>52</sup> Challenging this rather facile distinction between lumpen and student youth, a number of studies have begun to consider how the activities of the two

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<sup>48</sup> Monique Marks, *Young Warriors: Youth Politics and Violence in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001), p. 104.

<sup>49</sup> Jon Abbink, ‘Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Renewal’, in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 23.

<sup>50</sup> Ibrahim Abdullah, ‘Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL)’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36.2 (1998), p. 207.

<sup>51</sup> Karel Arnaut, ‘Re-generating the Nation: Youth, Revolution and the Politics of History in Côte d’Ivoire’, in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 121.

<sup>52</sup> Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi*, p. 11.

subgroups intersected and the ways in which they interacted with one another.<sup>53</sup> Interestingly, sociological analyses are beginning to illuminate points of contact between these two apparently separate subgroups of youth. Barbara Trudell, in particular, questions the dividing line between the revolutionary activities of students and the lumpen-element of youths.<sup>54</sup> This blurring of boundaries is explained as a result of blocked mobility, whereby there is an overproduction of highly educated graduates, but a lack of suitable jobs for them to fill.<sup>55</sup> This rapidly growing problem is especially acute in Africa, given the often limited absorptive capacity of a given state's economy and the continent's 'youth bulge', which has brought into being a rising population of young people looking for jobs. Despite their educational qualifications, students face the same economic hardships as the lumpen youth. As a consequence, they are more likely to mix with, and take on the characteristics of, their uneducated counterparts. Thus, the youth demographic has typically been portrayed as uneducated urban men; yet emerging trends within African youth studies are beginning to complicate these perceptions and provide a more complete picture of the identity of youth.

Nevertheless, despite the nuances now gradually being attached to the youth demographic, that 'youth' consists of those who are generally at the peak of

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<sup>53</sup> See Barbara Trudell, 'Introduction: Vulnerability and Opportunity Among Africa's Youth', in *Africa's Young Majority*, ed. by Barbara Trudell, Kenneth King, Simon McGrath and Paul Nugent (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), pp. 1-15; Abdullah, 'Bush Path to Destruction', p. 207.

<sup>54</sup> Trudell, 'Introduction'.

<sup>55</sup> See especially: Abdullah, 'Bush Path to Destruction'; Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); and Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, 'Why We Fight': Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone', *Africa*, 68.2 (1998), pp. 183-210.



physical fitness is something accepted across the spectrum of works on African youth. Youth are understood to use their physical strength to their advantage in their actions.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, youths' physical prowess provides them with a source of power which is no longer accessible to their elders. Their youthfulness affords them the ability to apply violence as a means with which to emancipate themselves from their marginalised position in society. For this reason, anthropologist Danny Hoffman, in his article on childhood and youth in Sierra Leone, labels youth as 'both threatened and threatening, not unlike beasts in the bush'.<sup>57</sup> Explorations of this ubiquitous trait of youth, however, are starkly divided into two conflicting camps, as youth are either branded as apocalyptic brutes or revered as emancipatory agents.

Fuelled by the hotly debated issue of child soldiers, which came to the fore in the aftermath of the intra-state conflicts, or 'new wars', in West Africa during the 1990s and early 2000s,<sup>58</sup> and which was again brought to wider-world attention during the 'Kony 2012' phenomenon,<sup>59</sup> much social science analysis has rendered youth as 'apocalyptic'.<sup>60</sup> Typifying this trend are works on the

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<sup>56</sup> Thomas Burgess, 'Remembering Youth: Generation in Revolutionary Zanzibar', *Africa Today*, 46.2 (1999), pp. 29-50.

<sup>57</sup> Danny Hoffman, 'Like Beasts in the Bush: Synonyms of Childhood and Youth in Sierra Leone', *Postcolonial Studies*, 6.3 (2010), p. 306.

<sup>58</sup> Examples of conflicts in the West African region during this period include: the 'First Ivorian Civil War' 2002-2007; 'Guinea-Bissau Civil War' 1997-1999; 'Second Liberian Civil War' 1999-2003; 'Malian Civil War' 1990-1995; and 'Sierra Leone Civil War' 1991-2002.

<sup>59</sup> The Kony 2012 phenomenon was spurred by a 30-minute documentary film intended to expose the crimes of guerrilla leader Joseph Rao Kony, whose militia in Uganda readily used child soldiers. See, Carole Cadwalladr, 'Jason Russell: Kony2012 and the Fight for Truth', *Guardian*, 3 March 2013, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/03/jason-russell-kony-2012-interview>> [accessed 17 May 2021].

<sup>60</sup> Nancy Annan, 'Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects', *International Journal of Security and Development*, 3.1 (2014), pp. 1-16; and most recently, regarding the 'Kony 2012' phenomenon, see: Tim Allen, Jackline Atingo, Dorothy Atim, James Ocitti, Charlotte Brown, Costanza Torre, Cristin Fergus, and Melissa

Sierra Leone civil war, such as Krijn Peters and Paul Richards's "“Why We Fight”", and Angela McIntyre, Emmanuel Aning and Prosper Addo's 'Politics, War and Youth Culture in Sierra Leone'.<sup>61</sup> These readings foreground a so-called 'crisis of youth', who become involved, both willingly and unwillingly, in violent activities that threaten the social and political fabric of African nation states. Several crisis-related accounts also exist outside the West African region. In the South African context, for example, sociologist Ari Sitas has written on the destructiveness of the youth involved in the 1990s Comrade Movement in Natal.<sup>62</sup>

As has already been shown, there also exists a large number of studies dedicated to the violence of youth gangs and/or lumpen youth. What these latter studies have in common with many analyses of youth's involvement in warfare is that they approach youth violence as a force for destruction. The actions of youths are viewed as damaging and detrimental to social stability. In Deborah Durham's rendering, for instance, youths are the ultimate outsiders. They 'enter political space as saboteurs; their potential for sabotage comes from their incomplete subjugation to contexts and co-opters'.<sup>63</sup> From the perspective of these studies, youth can do little else but react to pressures

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Parker, 'What Happened to Children Who Returned from the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda?', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 33.4 (2020), pp. 663-683.

<sup>61</sup> Angela McIntyre, Emmanuel Aning and Prosper Addo, 'Politics, War and Youth Culture in Sierra Leone: An Alternative Interpretation', *African Security Review*, 11.3 (2002), pp. 6-15 and Peters and Richards, "“Why We Fight”". For a continent-wide analysis of child soldiers, see Rachel Stohl, 'Under the Gun: Children and Small Arms', *African Security Review*, 11.3 (2002), pp. 17-25.

<sup>62</sup> Ari Sitas, 'The Making of the Comrade Movement in Natal, 1985-1991', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18.3 (1992), pp. 629-641.

<sup>63</sup> Deborah Durham, 'Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 73.3 (2000), p. 113.

outside their control; they are, at best, cast as individual agents, versatile and resilient and taking whatever actions they can to survive.

On the other hand, youth have also been represented as promising revolutionaries. Works countering the destructive view of youth assert that their actions are politically significant, and that youth tend to act as bulwarks against authoritarianism. Emmanuel Asiedu-Acquah, for example, argues that youth-centred politics have been a positive driving force in Ghana.<sup>64</sup> Similar approaches show youth as occupying a foundational place in the construction of national socio-economic development and as important initiators of protest movements against injustices.<sup>65</sup> In looking at Madagascan youth, Lesley Sharp even notes that children and youths were willing to ‘sacrifice their lives for such causes, or enter lifelong careers as political activists’.<sup>66</sup> Works on South Africa are most emblematic of this perspective on youth. For instance, Ineke Van Kessel and Marks, in their separate studies on 1980s apartheid South Africa, both regard youth violence as being ‘liberatory’ in nature.<sup>67</sup>

The emancipatory potential of youth is also central to studies which have explored the intersections between generational conflicts and revolutionary

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<sup>64</sup> Emmanuel Asiedu-Acquah, “‘And Still the Youth Are Coming’”: Youth and Popular Politics in Ghana, c. 1900-1979’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard University, 2015).

<sup>65</sup> See Aimé Ayissi, ‘Étude Diagnostique et Cadre de Mise en Application d’un Développement Socio-économique des Jeunes du Cameroun’, *Cameroon Journal of Studies in the Commonwealth*, 3.1 (2016), pp. 232-247.

<sup>66</sup> Lesley Sharp, *The Sacrificed Generation: Youth, History, and the Colonized Mind in Madagascar* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 20.

<sup>67</sup> Ineke Van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams: The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000) and Marks, *Young Warriors*.

activities. For instance, in a sweeping analysis, Murray Last traced the cyclical pattern of youth revolutions in Northern Nigeria from 1750 to 2000. Last's study identifies a recurring pattern of revolutionary youth politics throughout the *long durée* of Northern Nigerian history and reveals that after older political systems were overthrown by the youth, these same 'new' youth leaders, once they became old, were similarly forced out by the next generation.<sup>68</sup> By doing so, Last reveals that youth actions are connected to a wider history of youth activism, in which each new generation attempts to free itself from the oppression of an older elite.<sup>69</sup> Karel Arnaut too maintains that generation and youth are powerful political forces deserving of scholarly consideration, as they ambivalently encompass continuity and rupture, inclusion and exclusion.<sup>70</sup> The potential of youth as emancipatory agents stems from 'their being young, marginal, not yet adult and established' and, therefore, able to construct a 'symbolic counter-discourse that challenges society in a moral and political sense and indicates alternatives'.<sup>71</sup> Abbink, for his part, has advocated a middle ground within this long standing debate, defending the need to view youth as both 'vanguard *and* vandals'. According to Abbink's thoughtful analysis, youth actions are dependent on the conjunctures of economic opportunity, power structures and social space, and thus cannot be easily compartmentalised as either apocalyptic or

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<sup>68</sup> Murray Last, 'Towards a Political History of Youth in Muslim Northern Nigeria, 1750-2000', in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 50.

<sup>69</sup> See also Benedict Carton, *Blood from Your Children: The Colonial Origins of Generational Conflict in South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000) and Summers, 'Youth, Elders, and Metaphors of Political Change in Late Colonial Buganda'.

<sup>70</sup> Arnaut, 'Re-generating the Nation', p. 112.

<sup>71</sup> Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa', p. 25.

emancipatory, as some studies appear to suggest.<sup>72</sup> What the above works do have in common, however, is the understanding of youth as agents of change. Whether this is regarded as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, youth are viewed as active participants in societal shifts and revolutionary activity.

Scholars who have focused on the politics of youth also disagree about the real extent of their agency. Are the youth mere pawns in the hands of political elites? Or should they rather be regarded as astute agents bent on navigating fraught political situations to their advantage? This question has especially exercised the minds of scholars of democratic participation and party politics in Africa, notably since the events of the 1990s, when pro-democracy movements, in which youth played a preeminent role, swept aside longstanding leaders of one-party states. As a result, particular interest has been paid to the dynamics of youth political participation and the minutiae of their activities within political organisations. Though the youth form a numerical majority, as Ackson Kanduza has noted with regard to Zambia and South Africa, they do not use the democratic power embedded in their numbers and remain politically side-lined.<sup>73</sup> Likewise, according to Hoffman, youth have been ‘precariously marginal to the networks of patronage and patrimonialism that characterize governance in the African postcolony’.<sup>74</sup> By viewing youth as a marginalised demographic, a number of works highlight

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>73</sup> Ackson Kanduza, ‘Steve Biko and Kenneth Kaunda: Sampling Youth in History’, *New Contree*, 62 (2011), pp. 71-90.

<sup>74</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of patron-client networks, see Jean-François Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, trans by Mary Harper, Christopher Harrison and Elizabeth Harrison (London: Longman, 1993) and Hoffman, ‘Like Beasts in the Bush’, p. 297.

the ways in which they are co-opted and exploited by parties and powerful political brokers. Indeed, Mary Maynes reminds readers that youth ‘have acted from positions of relative powerlessness, marginality, and invisibility’.<sup>75</sup> From this perspective, the youth are seen as more vulnerable to exploitation, given their weak socio-political and economic standing.<sup>76</sup> Abbink, for example, asserts that, ‘By their sheer numbers, their availability, and their eagerness to take up anything that may relieve them of conditions of poverty, idleness or ennui, youth are easily recruited by political parties’.<sup>77</sup> To describe this capturing of youth by members of the political elite, Peter Kagwanja coined the expression ‘marionette politics’.<sup>78</sup> This term, of course, is meant to demonstrate that youths are likely to become pawns in the chess game of dominant elders in his case study of Kenya during the one-party era.<sup>79</sup>

Works that emphasise the viewpoint of youth as ‘tools’ of the political elite have touched upon the role of the youth leagues and developmentalist brigades that existed during and after independence. These organisations – as argued, for instance, by Thomas Burgess and Bay – functioned to capture youth labour and loyalty.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, Richard Waller contends that they also appeared to give licence to hooliganism and rebelliousness.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, in the

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<sup>75</sup> Mary Maynes, ‘Age as a Category of Historical Analysis: History, Agency, and Narratives of Childhood’, *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, 1.1 (2008), p. 116.

<sup>76</sup> See especially, Donal O'Brien, ‘A Lost Generation?: Youth Identity and State Decay in West Africa’, in *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*, ed. by Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger (London: Zed Books, 1996), pp. 55-74.

<sup>77</sup> Abbink, ‘Being Young in Africa’, p. 3.

<sup>78</sup> Peter Kagwanja, ‘Clash of Generations? Youth Identity, Violence and the Politics of Transition in Kenya, 1997-2002’, in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 90.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>80</sup> Burgess, ‘Remembering Youth’; Bay, ‘Introduction’, p. 10.

<sup>81</sup> Waller, ‘Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa’, p. 79.

postcolonial period, elite leaders who feared losing power used youth wings to build an alternative basis of support among youngsters who were ready to use intimidation and force. Torque Mude's study in particular highlights this situation in the context of postcolonial Zimbabwe. He reveals how unemployed youths were often recruited by political parties, such as the Movement for Democratic Change or the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).<sup>82</sup> In addition, his investigation found that the youth wings of these political parties were not unwilling to intimidate opponents as a result of orders emanating from politicians in positions of power.

Conversely, other works have tended to emphasise the agency wielded by the youth involved in party politics. According to this literature, it would be a mistake to deny African youth intentionality of action and agency. Because it originates from a position of comparative weakness, youth agency is defined by Honwana as 'tactical'. In other words, it is 'a specific type of agency that is devised to cope with the concrete, immediate conditions of their lives in order to maximise the circumstances created by their... environment'.<sup>83</sup> Youths, in this perspective, are neither universally manipulated nor merely passive actors in a world designed and dominated by others; rather, they are individuals who are trying to chart their own course.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, Jok Madut

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<sup>82</sup> Torque Mude, 'Political Violence: Major Socio-Political Consequence of Urban Youth Unemployment in Zimbabwe', *Review of History and Political Science*, 2.1 (2014), pp. 107-139.

<sup>83</sup> Alcinda Honwana, 'The Pain of Agency, the Agency of Pain: Child-Soldiers as Interstitial and Tactical Agents', in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. by Alcinda Honwana and Filip De Boeck (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), pp. 31-52.

<sup>84</sup> See for instance: Sara Rich, 'Past the Kalashnikov: Youth, Politics and the State in Eritrea', in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink

Jok has noted that youths can display agency even when they are called upon by power-holders as allies or vanguard in the realization of certain political goals. The important point stressed by Jok is that the youths' involvement in party politics does not automatically prevent them from acting autonomously, at least on an individual level.<sup>85</sup> Studies which have emphasised youth agency in this context oppose the portrayal of youth as victims of elite manipulation and emphasise the need to see them as being no less shrewd than their ostensible patrons.<sup>86</sup> Insa Nolte's exploration of youth and politics in Nigeria, for instance, shows that, from 1950 to the mid-1980s, youth involvement in politics was not confined to violent action, but could also serve as an entry point for many ambitious young men to promising careers as politicians, administrators and businessmen.<sup>87</sup> The promise of self-improvement, therefore, is not necessarily less important in explaining youth political activism than the idea that youth are forced to 'work' for political parties to make ends meet. Similarly, Jeffrey Ahlman also reveals that, in Nkrumah's Ghana, the Ghana Builders Brigade served as both a locus for party intimidation and indiscipline, as well as a source of political and social opportunities for youth.<sup>88</sup> Indeed, the article argues that the Brigade provided

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and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 191-208; Thomas Burgess, 'Imagined Generations: Constructing Youth in Revolutionary Zanzibar', in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 55-82; and Sharp, *The Sacrificed Generation*.

<sup>85</sup> Jok Madut Jok, 'War, Changing Ethics and the Position of Youth in South Sudan', in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics, and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by John Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 145-162.

<sup>86</sup> McIntyre, Aning and Addo, 'Politics, War and Youth Culture in Sierra Leone'.

<sup>87</sup> Insa Nolte, 'Identity and Violence: The Politics of Youth in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42.1 (2004), p. 69.

<sup>88</sup> Jeffrey Ahlman, 'A New Type of Citizen: Youth, Gender, and Generation in the Ghanaian Builders Brigade', *Journal of African History*, 53.1 (2012), pp. 87-105.



a space for its youth members to explore a socially recognised, yet politically conceived, notion of adulthood.<sup>89</sup>

Furthermore, other analyses have argued that the youth were never completely brought under the control of elites and that it is therefore simplistic to present them as mere tools to be freely manipulated by those in positions of power. Glaser, by telling the institutional story of the youth league of the African National Congress in South Africa, shows that throughout its history, the youth league tried to ‘dynamize’ and criticize the ANC from within.<sup>90</sup> It struggled to find a balance between loyalty and rebellion to the mother body, which was led by older leaders.

Thus, the youth have been depicted as both leaders and followers.<sup>91</sup> The dividing line in the literature is predicated on whether the youths’ social position is understood to have turned them into mere pawns in the hands of politicians or, on the contrary, to have prompted them to strive to retain room for independent manoeuvre. It is perhaps possible to accommodate both views, however, by applying Durham’s notion of youth as a ‘shifter’.<sup>92</sup> Indeed, the concept neatly showcases agency, even as it captures youth precariousness. It therefore allows the exploration of how social relations are constructed, negotiated, contested, and reproduced.

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> Clive Glaser, *The ANC Youth League* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013), p. 8.

<sup>91</sup> Honwana, ‘The Pain of Agency, the Agency of Pain’.

<sup>92</sup> Deborah Durham, ‘Disappearing Youth: Youth as a Social Shifter in Botswana’, *American Ethnologist*, 31.4 (2004), p. 592.

The literature on youth in twentieth-century Africa is thus wide-ranging, manifold and continually developing. Key debates over defining youth, identities of subgroups, whether youth are apocalyptic or emancipatory during revolutionary times, and indeed whether youth are political tools or express agency in party politics, are all highly contested and polarised. Certainly, the characteristic feature of Africanist youth studies lies in its often-paradoxical discourse. This stems from the anomalous category of youth itself and is likely an issue that future scholars will continue to grapple with. The importance of acknowledging aspects of youth which are locally specific and those which are more broadly emblematic is crucial in this sense, as is the need to prioritise the voices of youth. Certainly, accounts which have drawn on the *perspectives* of youth themselves, rather than relying on *perceptions*, offer valuable insights.<sup>93</sup> In so doing, such works provide a greater opportunity to view the longstanding debates concerning African youth from new and exciting angles and vantage points. Future studies which adopt this approach will no doubt help to evolve and develop understandings of the historical, and present-day, importance of youth that is only now starting to be fully appreciated.

## **1.2 An Introduction to Youth in Zambia**

Turning now towards a survey of Zambianist literature, this section draws attention to the curious absence of youth within the recent revisionist histories of the country. This inattention becomes all the more curious given the

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<sup>93</sup> Works that use interviews to particularly good effect are Honwana, *The Time of Youth*; Kynoch, 'We Are Fighting the World'; and Mude, 'Political Violence'.

existence of earlier anthropological works, carried out by researchers at the much-lauded Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. These point to the longstanding prominence of generation and age as a social ordering principle within Zambian society. Established in 1937, in the British colony of Northern Rhodesia – as Zambia was then known –, the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute was the first local anthropological research facility to be based in Africa at the time.<sup>94</sup> The institution contributed a vast and rich body of material, which pioneered the field of urban anthropology.<sup>95</sup> Initially setup by the colonial government to tackle the challenges that emerged due to migratory labour, urbanisation and industrialisation in the territory<sup>96</sup>, the institute anthropologists began to distance themselves from their colonial associations in the early 1950s. This was largely a result of pressure from African informants and research assistants who were unhappy with the newly created

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<sup>94</sup> The British South Africa Company ruled the territory that comprised of modern-day Zambia from the 1890s until 1924, when it handed over its administrative role to the British Colonial Office. William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, 'Introduction', *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 3.

<sup>95</sup> Among the dominant figures involved in the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute were: Godfrey Wilson, Max Gluckman, Victor Turner and Elizabeth Colson. Wilson's study attempted to show the increasing stabilisation of the urban population in Broken Hill, in modern day Kabwe, thus refuting the suggestion that Africans were 'incapable' of urbanisation. See: Godfrey Wilson, *Land Rights of Individuals Among the Nyakusa* (Livingstone: Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1938). Similarly, Gluckman was concerned with breaking down anthropological opposition towards the towns, see: Max Gluckman, *Administrative Organisation of the Barotse Native Authorities* (Livingstone: Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1943). See also, Victor Turner, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1957) and Elizabeth Colson, *The Social Consequences of Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement Upon the Gwembe Tonga* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971). Those interested in a detailed history of the institute should read: Lyn Schumaker, *Africanising Anthropology: Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making of Cultural Knowledge in Central Africa* (Durham: Duke University Press 2001). Kate Crehan, *The Fractured Community: Landscapes of Power and Gender in Rural Zambia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 55.

<sup>96</sup> Especially after the 1935 bloody industrial violence, which took place on the country's Copperbelt and ended in six people being killed after police opened fire on a crowd near Roan Antelope mine in Luanshya: Alfred Tembo, 'The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and Interdisciplinary Research in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), 1937-1964', *The Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 36 (2014), p. 92.

Central African Federation, which joined Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953.<sup>97</sup>

The esteemed works of Audrey Richards are especially indicative of the importance of generation and age-based power relations within Zambia. Her study, *Bemba Marriage and Present Economic Conditions*, first published in a paper in 1940, demonstrated the unintended results of social change on the stability of marriage institutions of the Bemba people.<sup>98</sup> For instance, the introduction of wage labour in the mines shifted the balance of power towards young men and enabled them to pay for the bride price, known as lobola, which was traditionally paid for and controlled by their elder family members.<sup>99</sup> Richards' strongest work on generation, however, is her ethnography on the initiation of Bemba girls, *Chisungu: A Girl's Initiation Ceremony Among the Bemba of Zambia* (1956).<sup>100</sup> Within the work Richards' illuminates the formal rites that marked the transition from adolescents to adulthood.<sup>101</sup> This, Richards explains was done through the *chisungu*, which was danced, 'to make the girl grow (*ukumukushya*); to teach her

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<sup>97</sup> The Central African Federation was viewed with suspicion as a step towards a future settler-dominated dominion. For a reading how the rising hostility against the Central African Federation impacted the work of the Rhodes-Livingstone anthropologists see: Lyn Schumaker, 'A Tent with a View: Colonial Officers, Anthropologists, and the Making of the Field in Northern Rhodesia, 1937-1960', *Osiris*, 11 (1996), p. 240.

<sup>98</sup> Audrey Richards, *Bemba Marriage and Present Economic Conditions* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969).

<sup>99</sup> These shifting balances of power were also a concern of the colonial government, which was keen to maintain control over the population of young men working in the urban industrial areas of the Copperbelt, see: National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder' (1963).

<sup>100</sup> Audrey Richards, *Chisungu: A Girl's Initiation Ceremony Among the Bemba of Zambia* (London: Faber and Faber, 1956).

<sup>101</sup> See also Lyndon Harris's work on initiation rites of the Ngoni people in Zambia: Lyndon Harris, *The Initiation Rites of the Makonde Tribe* (Livingstone: Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1944).

(*ukumufunda*); and ‘to make her a woman’’.<sup>102</sup> This study was particularly novel at the time for its focus on female, rather than male, initiation.<sup>103</sup> Its findings remain historically relevant given that these generational ‘rites of passage’ continued well into the late colonial and postcolonial period, especially in rural settings. This is supported by research conducted for this thesis. Selina Mbozi, who grew up along the outskirts of Mazabuka, for example recalled during interview that, as a Tonga girl, she too was taken for initiation upon reaching puberty:

You would be removed from the initiation house as early as six o’clock. They would take you in the bush they would make you lie on the ground and be going round. They will kill a chicken. Then they would look for someone, a head initiator who would specifically teach you how to take care of the husband, when you marry and have kids.<sup>104</sup>

Whilst a focus on marriage and child-rearing was a key marker of the transition to adulthood for young women, for young men adulthood was achieved by attaining economic independence. Among the Tonga people, male youths around the age of fifteen were considered ready to pursue adulthood, which they did by farming separately from their families and building their own houses. This was done until they had built-up enough resources to lead their own households.<sup>105</sup> Self-sufficiency and having social dependents was thus an indicator of manhood within rural Tongan society.<sup>106</sup> Among both genders, the elders held the power to determine a youth’s progression to adulthood and supervised their activities. Arnold Epstein’s

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<sup>102</sup> Richards, *Chisungu*, p. 121.

<sup>103</sup> Jean La Fontaine, ‘Audrey Isabel Richards, 1899-1984: An Appreciation’, *Africa*, 55.2 (1985), p. 203.

<sup>104</sup> Interview with Selina Mbozi, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>105</sup> Interview with Joseph Tembo, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>106</sup> Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

1958 study of *Politics in an Urban African Community*, however, points to the breakdown of these formal generational controls in Zambia's urban areas. Focusing on the Roan Antelope copper mine, in Luanshya district, Epstein examines how the emergent community grew to become the dominion of young men.<sup>107</sup> The vast majority of the people living near the mine, according to the study, were between the ages of 20 to 40 years old and male.<sup>108</sup> Chapter three of his study, 'Conflict and Growth in the Urban Community, 1940-1950', chronicles how some of these younger and better educated men of the mines challenged the Council of Tribal Elders, who had until then dominated the 'official' African representative bodies in the towns.<sup>109</sup> Interestingly, Epstein's findings suggested that the social dichotomy between an elder and youth was not necessarily predicated on age. His respondents specified that: 'Any man... who was wise and intelligent and well known among his people might be chosen as an Elder'.<sup>110</sup>

It should be remembered that, in spite of these valuable contributions to our knowledge of generation and power in Zambia, the anthropologists of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute were also actors within the colonial system, and, thus their works can suffer from an inability to fully grasp the realities and impact of colonial rule on Zambian society.<sup>111</sup> Anthropological research

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<sup>107</sup> Arnold Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), p. 26.

<sup>108</sup> Epstein argues that the effects of overloading the urban population in the lower age categories led to the predominance of the aged in the demographic composition of the rural villages: *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>109</sup> The Council of Tribal Elders was a colonial design, intended to provide a link between compound managers and the African population: *Ibid.*, p. xvi and p. 28.

<sup>110</sup> Epstein, *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>111</sup> This limitation is also raised by James Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley: University of California

from the late 1990s onwards, has more easily unpicked these influences on the postcolonial period. Though they tend to be restricted in focus, centring largely on the third republic era that started in 1991, when the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) came to power, these works provide important insights into questions of power and identity formation.<sup>112</sup>

James Ferguson's *Expectations of Modernity* (1999), which explores the interconnections between rural and urban life on the Copperbelt, alludes to the impact of urbanisation on young men. An informant, for example, pointed to a black market seller as: 'one of those who have no respect for their elders. He insults them already with his manner... If he tries to go home [to the rural areas], he will be the first one to be bewitched'.<sup>113</sup> On the other hand, Karen Hansen's essay 'Dressing Dangerously' (2004) discerns the gender and sexuality issues at play during the anti-miniskirt debates of the late-1990s.<sup>114</sup> Hansen spotlights the often-violent hostility against the fashion, which affected young Zambian women. Chapter four of this thesis expands on Hansen's essay and traces anti-miniskirt campaigns further back to Zambia's early postcolonial period. Doing so, it exposes the equivocal violence of the 1960s and 1990s campaigns which Hansen understates.<sup>115</sup>

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Press, 1999) and, Bernard Magubane, 'A Critical Look at the Indices Used in the Study of Social Change in Colonial Africa', *Current Anthropology*, 12.4 (1971), pp. 419-445.

<sup>112</sup> See: Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity* and Karen Hansen, *Salaula: The World of Second-hand Clothing and Zambia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). See also: Kate Crehan, *The Fractured Community: Landscapes of Power and Gender in Rural Zambia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) and Ann Schlyter, *Recycled Inequalities: Youth and Gender in George Compound, Zambia* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1999).

<sup>113</sup> Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity*, p. 115.

<sup>114</sup> Karen Hansen, 'Dressing Dangerously: Miniskirts, Gender Relations, and Sexuality in Zambia', in *Fashioning Africa: Power and the Politics of Dress*, ed. by Jean Allman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 166-188.

<sup>115</sup> See chapter four, section 4.2 of this thesis, pp. 202-219.

Kate Crehan's, *The Fractured Community* (1997), is especially informative regarding the hierarchical overlap between kinship, age and gender in Zambia's third republic. In her chapter on kinship and authority, Crehan observes that the crumbling UNIP party contained three different kinds of members - men, women, and youths. Their relationship with one another was according to Crehan, 'an accurate reflection of the taken-for-granted assumption that power was the prerogative of those who were neither youngsters (*banyike*) nor female, that is, older men (male *bakulumpe*)'.<sup>116</sup> Crehan argues that the pervasiveness of the belief in a natural hierarchy that placed older and senior people in positions of authority over younger and junior people was, 'deep and unshakeable' in the minds of Zambians'.<sup>117</sup> This is supported by those interviewed for the purposes of this thesis. Joseph Tembo who as a young man lived in the rural town of Mazabuka noted: 'We just abided, that was the way... We had to respect what our elders said', whilst Christine Tembo who as a late teenager lived in Kanyama compound recalled: 'There was an emphasis to listen to elders, and respect elderly people... There was an emphasis for young people to follow all the rules and regulations they were told to follow'.<sup>118</sup> Ann Schlyter's, *Recycled Inequalities*, which focuses on late 1990s George compound in Lusaka, looks at the plight of

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<sup>116</sup> The women and youth leagues served as separate representative structures that, in theory, allowed women and youths to speak within the formal political arena of the state. Women and youth were not, therefore, excluded from the party, but their participation was carefully contained in separate organisations whose purpose was defined by the hegemonic voice of the 'elder' male. Crehan, *The Fractured Community*, pp. 137-138.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>118</sup> Interview with Joseph Tembo, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019 and Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.



disenfranchised youths from the start of MMD rule.<sup>119</sup> Schlyter's study elucidates the socio-economic fallout of the final years of UNIP's rule on Zambia's third republic. Chapter six of the ethnography, in particular, explores the lives of youths who were low-level street vendors known as 'mishanga boys'.<sup>120</sup> Though insightful regarding the socioeconomic victimhood of George compound's youth in the 1990s, the study is limited in geographical scope and the time period in question is restricted. It is these limitations which the final chapter of this thesis seeks to address, by applying a countrywide perspective to the role of youth in events towards the end of UNIP's rule, which ultimately led to the rise of the MMD.<sup>121</sup>

In addition to the wealth of anthropological literature on Zambia, a large body of historical works also exist. These, however, rarely speak directly to the subject of youth.<sup>122</sup> Instead, for the purposes of this thesis the historiography is drawn on for its insights into the workings of politics, violence, and opposition politics. Indeed, this thesis intends to build on the recent revisionist histories, which have started to uncover the violent realities of Zambia's political past. The relative dearth of research into this specific area

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<sup>119</sup> Schlyter, *Recycled Inequalities*. See also: Lawrence Malubila, *Illiteracy and Unemployment in Zambia: A Case of Kanyama Compound, Lusaka* (Saarbrücken: Lambert, 2012).

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54-56.

<sup>121</sup> See pp. 389-406 of this thesis.

<sup>122</sup> From an in-depth search of existing historical research, only two relating to Zambian youth were found. These both focused on the colonial era. One looked at girls' education between 1915-1940 in Luapula Province, whilst the other investigated the gendered routes to maturity and adulthood on the Copperbelt between 1936-1964. No existing studies thus far offer a comprehensive analysis into the relationship between youth, politics and violence within the country's recent colonial and postcolonial past. See: Sean Morrow, 'Mabel Shaw and the Education of Girls at Mbereshi, Northern Rhodesia, 1915-1940', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 19 (1986), pp. 601-635 and Jane Parpart, 'Wicked Women' and 'Respectable Ladies': Reconfiguring Gender on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1936-1964', in Hodgson and McCurdy, *'Wicked' Women and the Reconfiguration of Gender in Africa* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2001), pp. 274-292.

is perhaps a reflection of the tendency to compare Zambia's political situation with its often much more volatile neighbours.<sup>123</sup>

Earlier nationalist writings, in particular, have grossly underestimated these realities and the constancy of opposition to UNIP's rule. Works written in the 1960s and 1970s masked the inherent ambiguities and complexities of the liberation struggle in their quest to record heroic tales of anti-colonial resistance.<sup>124</sup> Political violence was seen as merely 'sporadic', rather than a pervasive aspect of nationalist political culture, as this thesis hopes to demonstrate.<sup>125</sup> Likewise, initial histories of the early postcolonial period suffered from an excessive focus on UNIP.<sup>126</sup> This led to the lack of recognition of opposition groups, and thus, the fractiousness of nation building following independence remained largely obscured.

Giacomo Macola notes that historians were only able to uncover the deep-rooted oppositional trajectories after the end of the one-party regime in Zambia.<sup>127</sup> The first revisionist work, an edited collection entitled *One Zambia, Many Histories* (2008), drew attention to the various political

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<sup>123</sup> Far less consideration has also been given to the role of political violence in Zambia's nationalist struggle, given the continued preconception of negotiated independence being a wholly peaceful affair, as compared to territories where a liberation war took place. See, for example: Timothy Scarnecchia, *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008).

<sup>124</sup> See, Mulford, *Zambia*.

<sup>125</sup> See, Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 301. See also: Andrew Roberts, *A History of Zambia* (London: Heinemann, 1976).

<sup>126</sup> See, Tordoff and Molteno, 'Introduction'.

<sup>127</sup> In large part because these new works have been able to draw upon archival sources unavailable to earlier historians, such as the archives of UNIP. The limited tolerance of dissent by the UNIP authoritarian government was also a factor. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 7 and Robert Ross, 'Preface', in *One Zambia, Many Histories*, p. ix.

projects that challenged UNIP's post-independence grip on power.<sup>128</sup> Since then, other revisionist works have made strong contributions to remedying the limitations of the initial histories of Zambian decolonisation and postcolonial politics.<sup>129</sup> Macola's *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa* was at the forefront of such scholarship. By exploring the course of the African National Congress (ANC), and the complex life of its leader Harry Nkumbula, the book challenged the dominance of UNIP-centred works, which did not paint a true picture of the complexity of Zambia's political landscape. Macola in his exploration of opposition politics also exposed the existence of inter-party violence during Zambian decolonisation and the First Republic. It is therefore a key work consulted within this thesis. Similarly, Miles Larmer's, *Rethinking African Politics*, is also readily referred to. His study unearths the intra-party conflicts that took place *within* UNIP throughout the colonial and postcolonial period.<sup>130</sup>

However, with this upsurge in new historical works, the role of youth is still yet to receive the proper attention it deserves. Youth has, for most historians of Zambia, remained a conceptual afterthought. This is in spite of the important role played by Zambian youths at the grassroots level of politics,

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<sup>128</sup> Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola, 'Introduction', in *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*, ed. by Giacomo Macola, Jan-Bart Gewald, and Marja Hinfelaar (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 1-16. A similar essay collection on the colonial period was subsequently published in 2011: Giacomo Macola, Jan Bart Gewald and Marja Hinfelaar, 'Introduction: A New Take on Late Colonial Northern Rhodesia', in *Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia*, ed. by Jan Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 3-14.

<sup>129</sup> See especially, Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa* and Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*. See also: Miles Larmer, 'A Little Bit Like a Volcano: The United Peoples Party and Resistance to One-Party State', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 39.1 (2006), pp. 49-83.

<sup>130</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*.

which, this thesis stresses, was frequently violent. Indeed, neglecting youth is also to neglect the actors who were disproportionately implicated in the political violence hitherto exposed by revisionist historians. Redressing this inattention, this thesis also exposes the endurance and equality of generation alongside other social markers, such as gender, class, and ethnicity. Critically, by recognising the importance of generation as an ordering principle within Zambian society, this thesis builds upon existing understandings of Zambian political history and demonstrates how *Zambians themselves* navigated and understood political hierarchies and power.

### **1.3 Structure of the Thesis**

With a view to better appraise the dynamics of political violence and the role of the youth in it, this thesis focuses on key political turning points between 1958 and 1991. These include: the transition between the colonial and postcolonial dispensation; the banning of multi-partyism and implementation of UNIP's so-called 'One-party Participatory Democracy' in 1972; the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s; and the rise of the MMD in the early 1990s. The start date for this investigation reflects the birth of African multiparty politics in the territory, which occurred after the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC) split, thus precipitating the creation of two separate African nationalist parties.<sup>131</sup> The year of 1991, on the other hand, marks the end of UNIP's 27 year-long rule. Analysis of this extensive time period enables a more comprehensive account to be created regarding youth violence. The thesis follows a broadly chronological

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<sup>131</sup> This is discussed in detail in chapter two of this thesis, see especially pp. 55-60.

structure. Key political moments are used as the basis of the five substantive chapters found in this study. As well as this introduction, a concluding chapter and appendix, containing brief biographical information on those who provided oral interviews, are included.<sup>132</sup>

Chapter two of this thesis considers the rise of youth politics during the Zambian independence struggle, between 1958 and 1964, when ‘youth’ as a political category took centre-stage. The analysis demonstrates that youths were an important component of the anticolonial movement - one which has yet to be fully explored in the Zambianist literature. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first examines the organisational structures of youth in the nationalist parties, within the context of the ANC split and the creation of UNIP. The involvement of youth in violent anticolonial protests also forms an important theme of the first section. With the birth of African multiparty politics in the territory, section two looks at the 1962 and 1964 electoral campaigns respectively.<sup>133</sup> The section determines the centrality of youth to the deployment of violence as a mobilisation strategy of the ANC and UNIP, to garner votes and crush the opposition. By considering how democracy, elections and violence coexisted and influenced one another within the politics of Zambian independence, the section submits that not all violence can be branded as antidemocratic – a tendency found in the political sciences. The third, and final, part of the chapter looks at the transitional

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<sup>132</sup> Full versions of certain primary sources are also included. See also section 1.4, pp. 71-75 of this chapter for further details on the oral interviews conducted.

<sup>133</sup> Of particular help has been David Mulford’s early work, *Zambia*. The book contains valuable discussion of the two cardinal elections held in Zambia during the late colonial period.

handover period, between the January 1964 general election and official independence in October 1964. Overall, the chapter seeks to understand the motivations behind the involvement in political violence, of a specific demographic in Northern Rhodesian African society, and explores how Africans themselves organised along specific social hierarchical lines during the liberation campaign.

Chapter three ‘‘Sacrificial Lambs’: Youth During Zambia’s First Republic, 1964-1972’, concentrates on the postcolonial multiparty period, when UNIP attempted to consolidate its position as the ruling party and became increasingly keen to introduce a one-party state to retain power. The chapter casts light on the subordinate position of youth within Zambian party politics, in the early independence period, and the often-violent consequences of their manipulation by political superiors. The chapter argues that while youth on all fronts became ‘sacrificial lambs’ for the sustenance of the political parties to which they belonged, they were never entirely shorn of agency or easily controlled. The ways in which violence was put to use in forging political legitimacy and authority is thus a significant component of this chapter.

Further examining the issues surrounding youth violence during Zambia’s First Republic, chapter four adds an important social dimension to historical understandings, showing that youth violence was as much a societal concern as it was a political problem. Here the chapter explores how youths dealt with their social juniors, rather than their political superiors. Adopting a thematic, rather than chronological approach, the chapter pays special attention to the

power dynamics that obtained between youths and such social inferiors as female youths, foreigners, and members of religious sects. The analysis reveals that party youths performed a type of semi-adulthood by controlling social juniors through violence. In addition, by becoming shrewd perpetrators of violence, this group attempted to consolidate their post-independence position and advance their personal interests. Violence in this context also served as an outlet for youth frustrations at their political marginalisation. Taken together then, chapters three and four show that Zambian youth were active in both the political and social spheres, thus frequently blurring the boundaries between the two fronts. This, in turn, foregrounds a central argument in this thesis, that youth, which are so often placed at the margins of the public sphere and major political processes, were in fact central to them.<sup>134</sup>

Chapter five investigates the UNIP government's attempts to co-opt problem youth from independence, up to the 1980s. The chapter exposes how the category of youth strongly shaped which projects and groups received development funding following the country's independence.<sup>135</sup> The chapter maintains that politicians were just as reliant on youths for national development, as youths were reliant on the government for socioeconomic support. Indeed, by exploring Zambia's national youth programmes of the

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<sup>134</sup> Filip De Boeck and Alcinda Honwana, 'Introduction: Children and Youth in Africa', in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. by Alcinda Honwana and Filip de Boeck (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), p. 1.

<sup>135</sup> This was different to countries like Kenya and Nigeria where ethnicity was the overriding factor in resource distribution for development. See especially: Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh and Will Kymlicka, 'Introduction: Ethnicity and the Politics of Democratic Nation-building in Africa', in *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, ed. by Bruce Berman, Will Kymlicka, and Dickson Eyoh (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), pp. 1-21.

1960s and 1970s, this chapter helps shine a light on how ‘political settlements’ were crafted between African governments and their citizens during the first few decades of independence. Of significance is the Zambia Youth Service (ZYS), created in early 1964 and the later Zambia National Service (ZNS), which replaced the ZYS in 1971. Both were government funded institutions intended to capture the labour of youth for national purposes and redirect their energies away from anti-authority activities. Importantly, analysis of political records here helps to challenge the assumptions of earlier studies which claim that an ulterior motive of the ZYS camps was to enlist youths into the UNIP youth movement. The later ZNS is shown to have been significantly influenced by the country’s security concerns, whereby the service was used in an attempt to turn the nation’s youth into a national defence force. Additionally, the chapter traces the emergence of youth animosity towards the UNIP government. The hostility of lumpen youths for example owed in part to their exclusion from the national service in the mid-1970s, as prospective university students became the prime focus of government interventions. It is likewise argued that the Government’s staunch denial of poor conditions in the ZNS served to entrench the position of University students as an ‘opposition group’.

Chapter six continues with an exploration of the role of youth in the rise of the MMD and the end of UNIP’s rule. Asking how university students, in particular, became a noticeable force in the push towards Zambian democratisation, this chapter examines the various manifestations of political activism engaged in by University of Zambia (UNZA) students between 1980



and 1991. *Inter-youth networks* are placed at the forefront of analysis – building upon the works of sociologists such as Barbara Trudell – by emphasising the fractures and alliances formed between students, lumpen youths and UNIP’s youth cadres.<sup>136</sup> This approach illustrates the importance of exploring points of contact between seemingly separate subgroups of youth, as a requisite for understanding not only student political motivations at the time, but also for understanding the grassroots mechanisms involved in the success and mass support of the MMD. Furthermore, the analysis brings to light the numerous miscalculations made by the UNIP youth league in the 1980s, which led to UNZA students and lumpen youths allying themselves with one another. This in turn allows for the argument to be made that UNIP’s loss of support among the youth helped assure its defeat in the 1991 general election.

Drawing together the main arguments of this thesis, chapter seven serves as the conclusion for this study. It discerns the broader implications of this project’s findings on debates within the field of youth and within Zambianist scholarship. Ultimately, this thesis aims to provide fresh insights into Zambia’s recent past, and, more broadly, in relation to: anticolonial party politics; the workings of postcolonial African states; and, the connection between youth and violence.

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<sup>136</sup> Trudell, ‘Introduction’.

## 1.4 Methodology

There is a wealth of primary written material relating to the history of youth in postcolonial Zambia. Central to this thesis are articles in Zambian newspapers that are used to identify important episodes of youth violence and the debates they generated. Chapter two takes advantage of the two main rival papers that existed during the late colonial era. The daily published *Northern News*, founded in 1953, catered to the 70,000 white settlers in the country. Its circulation was slightly below 14,000 by 1960.<sup>137</sup> In contrast, the weekly *Central African Mail*, founded in 1960, ostensibly served an African population of 2,500,000 and circulated 24,000 copies by 1962.<sup>138</sup> Both provided extensive coverage of events relating to anticolonial politics, though the former argued that Africans were not ready for independence and the latter sympathised with the aims of the African nationalist party UNIP.<sup>139</sup> For the postcolonial period, between 1965 and 1991, an exhaustive examination of the daily *Times of Zambia* newspaper was conducted.<sup>140</sup> Introduced as a successor to the *Northern News* in June 1965, the paper quickly appointed Richard Hall, the founder of the *Central African Mail*, as its editor-in-chief. This was done in an effort to improve its public image among an independent African readership.<sup>141</sup> Each issue was ten to sixteen pages long and reached a

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<sup>137</sup> Francis Kasoma, *The Press in Zambia: The Development, Role and Control of National Newspapers in Zambia 1906-1983* (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1986), p. 75.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.* and Irving Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia* (Washington: American University, 1969), p. 250.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250.

<sup>140</sup> Though the British Library's microfilm collection is relatively complete, any missing issues of the twenty-seven-year period were supplemented by accessing hardcopies at the National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka.

<sup>141</sup> Hall stated that: 'I generally tried to change the paper to make it a paper of Zambian readers (White and Black) and not a paper of White settlers'. Quoted in Kasoma, *The Press in Zambia*, p. 85.

circulation of about 29,000 copies nationally per day.<sup>142</sup> The *Times of Zambia* generally followed a moderate, pro-Government and pro-UNIP policy throughout the First and Second Republics.<sup>143</sup> The British and American press (especially, though not limited to *The Times* and the *Washington Post*) are also intermittently used and provide an international perspective to events discussed.<sup>144</sup> Information is also gleaned from a variety of published works, such as the memoir of Colonial District Officer, Mick Bond, *From Northern Rhodesia to Zambia: Recollections of a DO/DC, 1926-73* or the memoir of former UNZA lecturers, Michael Etherton and John Reed in, *Chikwakwa Remembered: Theatre and Politics in Zambia, 1968-1972*.

The project likewise draws on archival records. Of particular importance is material from the digitised UNIP and ANC archives, available at the British Library in London. These include party propaganda pamphlets<sup>145</sup> and the grossly underutilized records of both parties' youth wings.<sup>146</sup> The documents are used to examine the relationship between youth and the nationalist political parties, before and after independence, illuminating the divergent roles assigned to youth by each party. The National Archives at Kew also holds an assortment of relevant files from the Colonial Office of Northern Rhodesia.<sup>147</sup> Intelligence reports help complement the research on political violence during the liberation struggle, given the interest of the colonial

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<sup>142</sup> Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia*, p. 250.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247.

<sup>144</sup> International newspapers are especially useful when looking at the end of UNIP rule, when media censorship within Zambia became a prominent feature.

<sup>145</sup> Such as UNIP's newsletter: *Voice of UNIP*.

<sup>146</sup> For example, British Library, London, EAP 121/2/8/2/1, 'Youth Movement Reports' (1962).

<sup>147</sup> One example among many being: The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2527, 'Incidents of Political Intimidation in Northern Rhodesia' (1960-1962).

government in upholding law and order during that uncertain time. Likewise, government sources housed at the Zambia National Archives in Lusaka, help enhance the study's understanding of the political leadership's decision making regarding youth. These pertain to the UNIP-ANC coalition government, the handover period following the 1964 independence election, and the subsequent postcolonial UNIP government.<sup>148</sup> The abundance of material referencing youth - unemployment symposiums, annual ZYS reports and development plan statistics, among others - is suggestive of the extent of the UNIP government's regard of 'problem youth' during its rule. Special effort has been made to incorporate sources that provide a unique insight into the views of Zambian youths themselves. Written at the time of study, student and UNIP youth magazines, from the UNZA Special Collection, are made ample use of in chapters five and six. Student magazines in particular provide a rare and unexpurgated opposition perspective to events at the end of UNIP rule; a time when any dissent of public opinion was strongly censored by the government.

In keeping with this aim, to better appreciate the voice of youth, I conducted oral interviews in Zambia, with a focus on residents in Kanyama, a peri-urban compound in Lusaka, and the rural town of Mazabuka, in Southern Province. Selected for its long history of opposition politics, Kanyama (a 14 km<sup>2</sup>, 'high-density', urban area to the south-east of Lusaka's business district, with an 'official population' of 364,655) was revealingly nicknamed 'Biafra' by its

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<sup>148</sup> A range of sources were found, from reports of unrest, youth unemployment symposiums, to annual reports of the ZYS.

residents in the late 1960s.<sup>149</sup> Its sizeable Tonga demographic, sympathetic to the ANC - Zambia's main opposition party between 1964 and 1972 - generated tension and clashes with neighbouring supporters of the ruling UNIP.<sup>150</sup> Providing a rural dimension to the interviews, Mazabuka, located in Southern Province, the heartland of the ANC, was also chosen as a historic hotspot of inter-party violence. The sleepy farming town - with a population of only 4,860 in 1960 and which had grown around sugar cane plantations - often erupted into chaos as UNIP candidates attempted to make inroads during various electoral campaigns.<sup>151</sup>

Participants were selected based on their status as youths during the time under investigation. A number of leading UNIP politicians also agreed to be interviewed. A qualitative approach was used to achieve in-depth interviews and better investigate the subjective interpretations of various socio-political phenomena among interviewees. To date there has been no targeted collecting of interviews concerning the political experiences of Zambian youth during the late colonial and postcolonial period. These interviews demonstrate the potential of oral history, by uncovering hidden narratives not found in other

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<sup>149</sup> Biafra was a secessionist state that unilaterally declared its independence from Nigeria in May 1967. See also: 'Stop This Kanyama Trouble, Orders Chona', *Times of Zambia*, 15 February 1969. The population figure given is taken from: *Zambia Census of Population and Housing, Population Summary Report* (Lusaka: Republic of Zambia Central Statistics Office, 2010).

<sup>150</sup> For further information on the area see: Brenda Habasonda, 'Political Ecology of Slum Development: The Case of Kanyama, Zambia' (unpublished Master's dissertation, International Institute of Social Studies, 2012).

<sup>151</sup> By 1990 the census revealed the predominantly Tonga population of the town had grown to 32,099. For further information see: Wilma Nchito, 'Migratory Patterns in Small Towns: The Case of Mazabuka and Kalomo in Zambia', *Environment and Urbanization*, 22.1 (2010), p. 94 and Jotham Momba, 'The State, Peasant Differentiation and Rural Class Formation in Zambia: Case Study of Mazabuka and Monze Districts' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Toronto, 1982).

records. By interviewing both men *and* women, the rarely accounted for personal experiences of female youths are brought to light. Information collated from these rich discussions therefore strengthens the interpretative analysis on youth and violence for this study. Of course, a reliance on retrospective oral sources comes with its own issues, but it is hoped that this will at least begin to redress the balance, in Africanist literature, of primary material in which others so often speak *for* youths.<sup>152</sup>

By consulting this wide array of often underutilized sources, which better appreciate the impact of youth on Zambian history, this thesis is well-placed to intercede in the rich and often paradoxical discourse that has characterized African youth scholarship. This thesis is thus able to focus on the subtle shades of meaning and nuance within such debates, including: whether youths are revolutionary or apocalyptic, and indeed whether youths are political tools or express agency in party politics, as well as questions centered on how to define youth and the identities of its subgroups. Moreover, by bringing this diverse range of sources together, this thesis provides crucial new insights into the role of youth in shaping the turbulent politics of a post-colonial African state previously assumed to be an ‘oasis of peace’.

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<sup>152</sup> Though this is slowly starting to change, see for instance: Elina Oinas, Henri Onodera, and Leena Suurpää, ‘Preface’, in *What Politics? Youth and Political Engagement in Africa*, ed. by Elina Oinas, Henri Onodera, and Leena Suurpää, Vol 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), p. xi.

## **Chapter Two: The Independence Struggle and the**

### **Divergent Roles of Youth, 1958-1964**

#### **Introduction**

The years from 1958, the birth of African multiparty politics in Northern Rhodesia, through to 1964, the year of Zambian independence, were dramatic, fraught and politically tense. The period saw the British colony of Northern Rhodesia hold no less than three general elections, each under a different constitution.<sup>1</sup> In 1958 the territory was governed principally by white men.<sup>2</sup> Africans could qualify for the franchise, however, the number who met all of the conditions was statistically insignificant.<sup>3</sup> At this time, Northern Rhodesia was also part of the controversial Central African Federation, which joined Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953.<sup>4</sup> That same year saw the formation of two African nationalist parties in the colony; both campaigned against the federation and begun calling for majority rule. By 1962, African nationalist pressure had risen to such an extent that the British Government was forced to considerably open-up the franchise to include a number of Africans previously unable to vote in the colony.<sup>5</sup> As a result of this increased voter eligibility, and while

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<sup>1</sup> David Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> There were African Federal MPs, but they were very few and did not rock the boat.

<sup>3</sup> David Mulford asserts that only 11 Africans were registered as voters as late as 1958: *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Lyn Schumaker, 'A Tent with a View: Colonial Officers, Anthropologists, and the Making of the Field in Northern Rhodesia, 1937-1960', *Osiris*, 11 (1996), p. 240.

<sup>5</sup> Though it was only during the 1964 general election where universal suffrage was granted. During the 1962 election the voters roll was split between upper and lower rolls. To be eligible to vote for the upper roll an individual had to have an income of at least £720 or own at least £1,500 of immovable property. This was reduced to £480/£1,000 for those

still part of the troubled federation, Northern Rhodesia elected its first African Government in the 1962 general election. Merely two years later, and under yet another constitution, the 1964 general election ushered Zambia to independence.<sup>6</sup>

During these years the African nationalist parties in Northern Rhodesia, the African National Congress (ANC) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP), were quick to invoke generational categories and introduced the official political category of youth.<sup>7</sup> Although both parties established their own youth movements, for UNIP in particular youth were a privileged political group. During the liberation struggle youth helped to bridge the gap between high politics and grassroots politics, impacting both domains whilst acting as intermediary figures in political mobilisation.<sup>8</sup> As with other intermediary figures, as most seminal studies of mass nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa have highlighted, youths in Northern Rhodesia were an important component of the nationalist struggle; one which has yet to be fully explored in the Zambianist literature.<sup>9</sup> This chapter attempts to give youth the proper attention it deserves within this tumultuous political environment.

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who had completed primary education and £300/£1,000 for those with at least four years of secondary education. In the lower roll, voters had to have an income of at least £120 or own immovable property worth at least £250. Certain other people were automatically entitled to be a lower roll voter, such as tribal councillors or members of native authorities and courts. The wife (or senior wife) of anyone qualifying to be a lower roll voter also qualified. See, David Mulford, *The Northern Rhodesia General Election, 1962* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 50-51.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas Burgess and Andrew Burton, 'Introduction', in *Generations Past: Youth in East African History*, ed. by Andrew Burton and Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> Kate Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and Nationalism, 1914-2014* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 17.

<sup>9</sup> For example, though David Mulford notes the 'young' character of the ANC's more militant members in 1958, he fails to explore this as an essential key factor in the ANC/ZANC split: Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence*, p. 69.



Indeed, to fully grasp the Zambian liberation struggle in all its intricacies, youth as a category must be taken as seriously as it was at the time. By placing youth firmly at the centre of analysis, for instance, this chapter is able to add considerably to our understandings of the ANC/Zambian African National Congress (ZANC)-UNIP split.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first examines the organisational structures of youth in the nationalist parties, within the context of the ANC split and the creation of UNIP. The involvement of youth in violent anticolonial protests also forms an important theme of this first section. By looking at the youth leagues, and the multiple arenas of youthful protest, this chapter highlights the plurality of African youth involved in Northern Rhodesian liberation politics. Their multiple interests and experiences serve to show the level of divergence that existed even within one demographic.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, as will be argued, highly educated youths had vastly different political experiences to their less well-educated cousins, who tended to be at the forefront of party politics, rather than leading the revolution on the national stage. The picture that emerges of nationalist politics in Northern Rhodesia, when analysing the divergent roles of youth within the struggle, is most certainly one of disorder and ‘ambivalence’.<sup>11</sup> The ANC never progressed past its traditionalist view of youth as ‘protectors’, rather than revolutionaries,

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<sup>10</sup> Philippa Levine and John Marriott, ‘Forward’ in Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), p. ix.

<sup>11</sup> Supporting Macola, Gewalt and Hinfelaar’s previous findings, see: Giacomo Macola, Jan Bart Gewalt and Marja Hinfelaar, ‘Introduction: A New Take on Late Colonial Northern Rhodesia’, in *Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia*, ed. by Jan Bart Gewalt, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 4.

whilst UNIP embraced a revolutionary role for youth, often at the expense of party discipline.

The second section of this chapter deals much more exhaustively with the issue of inter-party violence. It considers the increasing hostility between UNIP and the ANC, which was partly the consequence of the shift in focus from anticolonial protest to electoral politics from 1962. Indeed, following the (re)revised constitution in 1962, the possibility to elect an African majority government became real for the first time. African votes thus became incredibly valuable to the competing parties. The section therefore looks at how youth were central to the deployment of violence as a mobilisation strategy to garner votes and crush the opposition.<sup>12</sup> Indeed as Shrikant Yelegaonkar notes, ‘Political viciousness is a roughness that all the while isolates and brings together... distinguishing foes and demonstrating honest to goodness targets’.<sup>13</sup> By examining the period prior to the two general elections, violence emerges, not as an anomaly to Zambian liberation politics, but rather as the norm.<sup>14</sup> This, in turn, enables me to make a broader argument, since the violence of youth within a framework of democratic elections refutes the social sciences theory which tends to conflate democracy and freedom with peaceful political contestation.<sup>15</sup> By considering how democracy, elections and violence coexisted and influenced one another

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<sup>12</sup> Timothy Scarnecchia, *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008), p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Yelegaonkar, Shrikant, ‘Resource Scarcity and Political Conflict’, *International Multidisciplinary Research Journal*, 4.8 (2015), pp. 2-3.

<sup>14</sup> David Anderson and Oystein Rolandsen, ‘Violence as Politics in Eastern Africa, 1940–1990: Legacy, Agency, Contingency’, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8.4 (2014), p. 545.

<sup>15</sup> Anderson and Rolandsen, ‘Violence as Politics in Eastern Africa, 1940–1990’, p. 544.

within the politics of Zambian independence, the section posits that not all violence can be tarred with an antidemocratic brush – something which political scientists have often been too quick to do.<sup>16</sup>

The third, and final part, of this chapter looks at the transitional handover period, between the January 1964 general election and official independence in October 1964. An exploration of youth politics at this time reveals continued inter-party hostility vis-à-vis the national role of youth in an independent Zambia. UNIP's attempt to exclude the opposition from plans to establish a national youth service, and the party's 'internal' recruitment of UNIP youths to camps, were condemned harshly by the ANC. The ANC feared that these outward actions by UNIP were the first signal of the incumbent government's move towards a one-party system in an independent Zambia. This section shows that even before independence, UNIP considered moving towards a one-party system. It will be shown that the fear of this possibility, and of the future demise of the ANC, drove an eventual power struggle within the ANC youth league, some of whose members defended the adoption of a more militant, and indeed militaristic, approach to deal with UNIP's autocratic tendencies.

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<sup>16</sup> For example, Birch, Daxecker and Høglund's work claims that violence, even at levels 'undermines the democratic character of elections' by substituting free choice with coercion and by deterring participation, see: Sarah Birch, Ursula Daxecker and Kristine Høglund, 'Electoral Violence: An Introduction', *Journal of Peace Research*, 57.1 (2020), p. 4. Jamar deems elections with violent streaks as 'token democratic practices'. See: Astrid Jamar, 'The Crusade of Transitional Justice: Tracing the Journeys of Hegemonic Claims', in *Violence and Democracy* (London: The British Academy, 2019), p. 59.

## 2.1 The Rise of Youth Politics in Late Colonial Zambia

### 2.1.1 *The ANC and Its Youth League*

The emergence of a more racialized form of colonial rule, through the proposed Central African Federation, marked the dawn of African nationalist party politics in colonial Zambia. Indeed, the central imperative in the establishment, in 1948, of the ANC, known as Northern Rhodesia African Congress until 1953, was to frustrate attempts to incorporate Northern Rhodesia into the federation, alongside Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.<sup>17</sup> The ANC, unconvinced by the colonial vision of federation as an experiment in multi-racial political cooperation, regarded it with suspicion. ANC members considered it a mechanism to further entrench white settler power in the territory. The party therefore worked, unsurprisingly, to actively undermine its realisation through mobilisation campaigns and by pushing for greater African representation in the colonial legislature.<sup>18</sup> Although ultimately unsuccessful in this pursuit – the Federation was established in 1953 – the early activities of the ANC laid the foundational groundwork that placed Zambia on the path towards independence.<sup>19</sup> Despite the failure of the ANC to prevent federation, the party continued to be a hotbed of anticolonial activity, leading a series of boycotts of butchers' shops in the 1950s and also using the lack of safeguards for African interests in the 1957 Constitutional Amendment Bill as a rallying point for anti-federal protests.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Larmer, Miles, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 26.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> See especially the most recent book-length study of the Central African Federation: Andrew Cohen, *The Politics and Economics of Decolonization in Africa: The Failed Experiment of the Central African Federation* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017). Also Tordoff, William and Robert Molteno, 'Introduction', *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff

An critical feature of the ANC during these early years was its youth league. Established in 1952, just four years after the initial launch of the party, the ANC youth league was an important body in the party.<sup>21</sup> This was not only because of the immediate responsibilities of the wing, but also because of its heavy involvement in the turbulent breakup of the party in the late 1950s. Although operating as a discrete section of the main body, the league was looked upon as being ‘part and parcel’ of the ANC itself, much like the ANC women’s league.<sup>22</sup> It was accordingly represented by a youth league director at the party’s National Executive. This was the highest office of the youths, which organised from the branch to the director’s level.<sup>23</sup>

Those who joined the ANC youth league were typically male and not yet old enough to join the main body of the party, where entry was generally only open to those aged 40 and above. A job application for a leadership position in the youth league, later on in the independence struggle, casts light on the range of people joining the youth league. The applicant, from Isokasaka village in the Mwinilunga District, was a married, 34 years old male, who had previously resigned from his position in a mining company ‘to work for the freedom of my country’.<sup>24</sup> Female youths also joined as members of the youth

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(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 7; and Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 28.

<sup>21</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired by Walter Harragin’ (1960).

<sup>22</sup> The main ANC body consisted mainly of elder men, the women’s league of elder women, and the youth league comprised both male and female youths: British Library, London, EAP121/1/2/10, ‘ANC Mukuba Youth Movement Directive Notes’, n.d.

<sup>23</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/2/10, ‘ANC Mukuba Youth Movement Directive Notes’, n.d.

<sup>24</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/2/10, ‘Letter to the ANC National Secretary, Job Michello, From ANC Nchanga Branch Secretary, S. Judeer Kapelembe’, 21 June 1963.

league, but were fewer in number than their male counterparts. This likely stemmed from the younger age they were able to progress to the women's league, which was predicated more strongly on marital status and having children than on age alone.<sup>25</sup> Of course, in practice, these requirements were often interpreted freely and were much more dependent on how local branches organised and operated than on any central directive.<sup>26</sup>

Necessarily, youths in leadership positions were kept busy with the day-to-day bureaucracy needed to run such an organisation. Eighteen-year-old Christine Tembo, after relocating to Kanyama, Lusaka, in 1956, was tasked as an ANC youth secretary with writing membership cards and approving transfer forms within the urban compound.<sup>27</sup> However, much of the political work attributed to ordinary youth members, especially males, stemmed from the idea of youth as 'protectors'. A letter sent out to all youth branches in Lusaka emphasised that 'This [youth league] is the only political spear which will help our Senior Officials in this country of ours'.<sup>28</sup> Supporting this, youth movement directive notes from Mukuba, Kitwe, stated that 'This section is the most active in the party with duties of organising defence of the party's property, buildings and its members in time of intimidation, provocation and

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<sup>25</sup> Another possible reason could also have been marital commitments, given that it was not uncommon for African girls to marry at thirteen or fourteen years of age. See for example, Dorman, T., *African Experience: An Education Officer in Northern Rhodesia* (Oxford: Radcliffe Press, 1993), p. 37 and Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>26</sup> For instance, George Muyuni revealed that, in 1960s Mazabuka, to join the youth league a person had to be at least 25 years old, whilst in 1956 Christine Tembo was only 18 years old when she became a secretary in the ANC youth league in Kanyama. *Ibid.* and Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/2/10, 'Letter to the ANC Freedom Fighters, From ANC Youth Secretary, B. N. Chikonda', n.d.

threats directed against the party members.’<sup>29</sup> This emphasis on youth as protectors for the main party was to prove a divisive issue.

### 2.1.2 *A Youthful Split?: The Birth of ZANC/UNIP*

The typecasting of youth as mere ‘bodyguards’ was seen as particularly problematic by the younger, more militant, and usually highly educated male members of the main body of the party. The debate, indeed, was triggered by younger ANC members who, in the late 1950s, had begun to return in greater numbers to Northern Rhodesia after having attended universities abroad. They brought with them not only degrees, but revolutionary commitments as well.<sup>30</sup> Highly educated and politicised, many were able to quickly insert themselves into the party’s ranks and to begin pushing for a more ‘radical’ youth league.<sup>31</sup> For example, having been actively involved in the Students Representative Council at Fort Hare University in South Africa, Sikota Wina returned to his birth place and became an especially vocal critic of the role ‘youth’ was assigned within the party.<sup>32</sup>

Of course, not all of those who objected to the party’s vision of the youth league had been able to attend university. Higher education opportunities

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<sup>29</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/2/10, ‘ANC Mukuba Youth Movement Directive Notes’, n.d.

<sup>30</sup> Most of those who formed the later UNIP independence government in 1964 attended universities abroad at this time, including Mainza Chona, Arthur Wina, Simon Kapwepwe, Nalumino Mundia and Munukayumbwa Sipalo. All except Kapwepwe were under 40 years old. Robert Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy: The Tribulation of Southern Africa, 1960-2000* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 37.

<sup>31</sup> These young men included Sikota Wina, a son of a former chief minister of the Lozi paramount, and Simon Kapwepwe, a friend of Kaunda’s from Lubwa. Both were committed to the idea of creating an independent African state. Roberts, Andrew, *A History of Zambia* (London: Heinemann, 1976), p. 219.

<sup>32</sup> Donovan Williams, *A History of the University College of Fort Hare, South Africa, the 1950s: The Waiting Years* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), p. 52.

open to black Northern Rhodesians in the 1950s were still extremely rare. Not only was there no university in the colony itself, but the number of scholarships and sponsorships obtained by young Africans at the time was woefully small.<sup>33</sup> Even at independence in 1964, there were just over 100 black university graduates within the country's 3.5 million strong population.<sup>34</sup> Kaunda himself, eight years younger than Nkumbula, had only completed his secondary education. At the time this was still a notable achievement. Despite university graduates making up a privileged few, they managed to garner a disproportionate amount of influence within the party over other young and zealous members, who had not had the opportunity to attend university. Their influence likely centred on their more radical political views and approach.

Of course, some members of the old guard too had attended universities abroad. Leader of the ANC, Harry Nkumbula, for instance, had studied at the University of London's Institute of Education and then the London School of Economics in the late 1940s.<sup>35</sup> However, what made these new graduates much more radical were the countries they now tended to complete their degrees in. These were either states that had successfully achieved independence, such as India, or, conversely, colonies dominated by highly racialized settler regimes, such as South Africa. India in particular became an

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<sup>33</sup> It was only in 1957 that the Federal government opened a multi-racial University College at Salisbury, in Southern Rhodesia. Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, p. 218.

<sup>34</sup> John Stabler, 'The University of Zambia: Its Origin and First Year', *The Journal of Higher Education*, 39.1 (1968), p. 32.

<sup>35</sup> Nkumbula failed his university examinations and was forced to return to Northern Rhodesia without a degree early in 1950. Giacomo Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 30.



inspirational hub for aspiring nationalists, who came from areas still under the thumb of colonial rule. Simon Kapwepwe, for instance, managed to win a scholarship to study at the University of Bombay, and, upon his return in January 1955, stepped in as acting president of the ANC when only 33 years old, following the arrest of both Nkumbula and Kaunda by the colonial government on charges of possessing prohibited literature.<sup>36</sup> In South Africa, on the other hand, black Northern Rhodesians came into contact with youth groups who were moving towards more aggressive forms of protest in the late 1950s, following the failure of the passive resistance campaigns.<sup>37</sup> For black Zambians studying in South Africa, the situation made clear the urgent need to breakup federal ties with Southern Rhodesia, which was also a white settler regime.<sup>38</sup> Having attended universities other than those in Britain, the black university graduates who returned to Northern Rhodesia during this period were usually more radical and opinionated than their predecessors.<sup>39</sup> They favoured direct action and immediate results. This approach often clashed with the beliefs of older ANC members, but appealed to the impatience of youth and won them favour among younger non-graduates in the party. This enabled them to form a significant pressure group which called for a more revolutionary role for the youth league.

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<sup>36</sup> Leader of the NRANC, Harry Nkumbula was six years his senior. Kenneth Kaunda was the youngest of the three politicians being 31 years old in 1955. Interview with Sikota Wina, Lilayi, Lusaka, 20 August 2019.

<sup>37</sup> *Sub-Saharan Africa Report: Issues 2847-2853* (Rosslyn: Foreign Broadcast Information, 1983), p. 32.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with Sikota Wina, Lilayi, Lusaka, 20 August 2019.

<sup>39</sup> Makerere University in Uganda was the only other university in Africa then providing scholarships to young Africans in Northern Rhodesian. *Ibid.*

This young, politically zealous group, which included secondary school leavers, showed themselves to have conflicting ideas with the leaders of the organization they joined.<sup>40</sup> In 1955 Sikota Wina, having seen the vibrancy of the nationalist youth movements in South Africa, and having been expelled from Fort Hare for politics, made a somewhat impertinent visit to Nkumbula to discuss changing the ANC's approach to the youth league. Wina reportedly told him, 'Sir I feel there is need to establish a much more vibrant youth league than just in name... I am prepared to set up a youth league that will not just be physical bodyguards...not just for rousing crowds and so forth, but, also policies and directions. Where is the revolution going?'.<sup>41</sup> Wina found his offer frustratingly rejected, with Nkumbula replying that he did not want Wina to get involved in politics until after he had finished his degree. Wina found it 'disturbing' that the leader of the ANC was seemingly content for the youth league to continue to be a body for 'just guarding leaders, cheerleading', but not for the production of ideas.<sup>42</sup> The ANC approach to its youth league was perhaps unsurprising, given that most of the ordinary members had had very limited education. However, Wina, along with others of his peers, believed it to be a shameful waste of youthful potential.<sup>43</sup> They viewed youths as valuable pools of creativity who could help accelerate the country's march towards independence.

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<sup>40</sup> Fiona Klouwenberg and Inge Butter, 'African 'Youth' Since Independence: Notes on a Bibliographic Overview, 1990-2005', *African Development*, XXXVI.3 (2011), p. 58.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Sikota Wina, Lilayi, Lusaka, 20 August 2019.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

This perceived inactivity in harnessing the revolutionary potential of youth contributed to the break-up of the ANC in October 1958, when a splinter group formed their own party: the ZANC, which was later renamed UNIP in 1959 after ZANC was banned.<sup>44</sup> It was the younger and more militant ranks of the leadership who, unhappy with the seemingly slow progress of Nkumbula's party in achieving independence, formed the bulk of the new party's leadership. The creation of UNIP coincided with the start of African multiparty politics in the territory, establishing two main, African-led, nationalist parties during the late colonial period.

Unlike Nkumbula's Congress, which viewed political decision making as the sole responsibility of adults, UNIP entrusted power in the hands of a younger generation of leaders and appeared to take seriously the asset of 'youthful ingenuity' to the independence struggle. Kaunda was only 35 years old when he became the president of ZANC. In 1959, after Kaunda was imprisoned for nine months, an even younger Mainza Chona, having broken away from the ANC, led the renamed UNIP party at 29 years old.<sup>45</sup> He came with others such as Titus Mukupo who had failed to oust Nkumbula from the Congress presidency.<sup>46</sup> Indeed, rather than attempting to win back younger supporters by bringing itself more in line with UNIP, the ANC leadership further entrenched its gerontocratic style of leadership. Job Michello, Nkumbula's

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<sup>44</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 74.

<sup>45</sup> Chona served as UNIP's interim national president until 1960 when Kaunda was released. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 74.

<sup>46</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 74.

new national secretary, for one, referred expressly to ‘old hands of Congress [being] back at the helm’.<sup>47</sup>

Kaunda maintained his previous attitude that young people should be included in the ranks of the new party, to train them as the future leaders of an independent Zambia, and to provide them with a constructive role aimed at absorbing their potentially subversive energies and exploiting their willingness to serve.<sup>48</sup> UNIP firmly envisioned youth, both educated and uneducated, as the decisive constituency in sustaining revolutionary momentum.<sup>49</sup> The party’s hierarchy, having done away with the ANC generational model, instead deployed one based upon meritocratic credentials. This typically meant that more highly educated individuals took up more senior party positions, as ‘senior youths’, whilst less well-educated individuals were involved in the nitty-gritty of grassroots party politics as ‘junior youths’. It was this group who comprised the majority of what the colonial government referred to as lumpen youth.<sup>50</sup>

### 2.1.3 *Lumpens and Educated Delinquents*

Lumpen youth were a group that engendered intense anxiety for the United Federal Party (UFP) colonial government, the white settler party which had won the November 1958 general election. Juveniles, able-bodied but idle,

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 238.

<sup>49</sup> Burgess, Thomas, ‘Remembering Youth: Generation in Revolutionary Zanzibar’, *Africa Today*, 46.2 (1999), p. 45.

<sup>50</sup> Lumpen was used in a derogatory sense to describe uneducated, unemployed often black male youths.

were especially suspect in the eyes of colonial governments at this time.<sup>51</sup> It was presumed that it was these youths who, unable to find employment, posed a threat to the colonial social order by involving themselves in delinquent behaviour.<sup>52</sup> This was an issue which so alarmed colonialists in Northern Rhodesia that a number of programmes were set up purporting to solve the issue of ‘problem’ youth. These included the Roan Antelope Farm School programme, established in 1958 to fill the gap between African youths leaving school and their being able to find underground employment in the Luanshya mines.<sup>53</sup> As the anxiety over youthful delinquency peaked, a Youth Development Council was even set up in June 1962 under the aegis of the Northern Rhodesia Council of Social Services. The final report, overseen by its chairman, Rev. E A H Fielder, warned:

The problems of [African] youth in Northern Rhodesia have given sufficient cause for concern for the matter to have been debated in the Legislative Council during 1961, and for the Government to decide to set up a Youth Development Council whose function it would be to look at the problems of youth in this country, at what was being done about these problems by various agencies, and to advise how efforts should be directed to the best effect.<sup>54</sup>

From about the 1950s, the colonial government gradually increased investment in African further education, in an attempt to ease the issue of

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<sup>51</sup> Studies span from colonial Zimbabwe through to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; see especially: Ivo Mhike, ‘Deviance and Colonial Power: A History of Juvenile Delinquency in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-c.1960’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of the Free State, 2016); Gondola, Didier, *Tropical Cowboys: Westerns, Violence, and Masculinity in Kinshasa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 2016); and Richard Waller, ‘Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa’, *Journal of African History*, 47.1 (2006), pp. 77-92.

<sup>52</sup> Marks, *Young Warriors: Youth Politics, Identity and Violence in South Africa*.

<sup>53</sup> ‘Roan Antelope Farm School Almost Ends Juvenile Crime’, *Northern News*, 9 October 1958, p. 7.

<sup>54</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder’ (1963).

youth delinquency. Ironically this very investment helped to produce a group of youths even more problematic than their lumpen cousins. Fully or partly secondary-educated youth became the first section of youths to mobilise under the UNIP banner and involved themselves in anti-colonial protests from 1959-1960. It is important to keep in mind that, as with the group of youthful university graduates, this was a similarly educated minority in the African youth demographic. Despite African further education moving higher up on the colonial agenda, only a fraction of Northern Rhodesia's youthful black population was able to enrol. Brown Moses Mazumba recalled that, 'Back before independence, we didn't even have primary schools in place'.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, government investment in African education, although growing, was still woefully inferior to what was spent on white children. In 1950, it was 30 times less; and as late as 1956 there were still just six secondary schools and twenty training colleges in the entire colony which Africans could attend.<sup>56</sup> Those who were able to enrol in secondary schools and colleges were also typically male. This stemmed from the perception at the time that the education of girls was unnecessary, a view shared by the girls' families and the colonial government.<sup>57</sup> The former prioritised marriage and generally believed a formal education would hamper a girl's prospects, whilst, for the latter, the reality that most women married young meant they

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<sup>55</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 24 September 2018.

<sup>56</sup> Expenditure on African education did increase from £245,538 in 1947 to £458,162 in 1951, see: *Northern Rhodesia Handbook* (Lusaka: The Northern Rhodesia Information Department, 1953), p. 110 and Gatian Lungu, 'Educational Policy-Making in Colonial Zambia: The Case of Higher Education for Africans from 1924 to 1964', *The Journal of Negro History*, 78.4 (1993), p. 229 and House of Commons Debate, Vol 553, 1 June 1956, col. 661. See also, Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, p. 194.

<sup>57</sup> Dorman, *African Experience*, p. 36.

were rarely involved in youth delinquency.<sup>58</sup> This meant that, in 1956, there was not a single secondary school in the colony for girls.

As with the monetary investment in these institutions, the type of education they provided was also highly racialized. According to a government handbook produced for prospective European settlers, the training colleges taught Africans surveying, medicine, veterinary surgery, agriculture, carpentry, bricklaying and other professions and trades ‘in which they can be of most use to their own people and also indirectly benefit the European’.<sup>59</sup> For this reason, the colleges were a place where youth had to continuously fight against an educational system which actively inhibited their intellectual, social, and political ambitions.<sup>60</sup> The UFP ensured this by using some education officers to spy on students. Students were also encouraged to write essays praising the Federation, and promotions were given to students who supported the UFP.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, although further education could offer prospects to enhance the socioeconomic status of individual students, these opportunities were incredibly scarce.<sup>62</sup> The lack of opportunities after schooling compounded the steady radicalisation of students against the colonial system. Their education, infused with modern Western values,

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<sup>58</sup> It was only in 1963 that a typing school pilot scheme in Kitwe was started to give ‘dignity’ to young women: National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder’ (1963) and Interview with Phiri Mbao, Chilenje, Lusaka, 16 August 2019.

<sup>59</sup> *Northern Rhodesia Handbook*, p. 89.

<sup>60</sup> Helene Charton-Bigot, ‘Colonial Youth at the Crossroads: Fifteen Alliance ‘Boys’’, in *Generations Past: Youth in East African History*, ed. by Andrew Burton and Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), p. 86.

<sup>61</sup> ‘Provincial News in Western Province’, *Voice of UNIP*, p. 14.

<sup>62</sup> Charton-Bigot, ‘Colonial Youth at the Crossroads’, p. 86.

highlighted the hypocrisy of a paternalistic and racist colonial system that impeded their access to full socio-political adulthood.<sup>63</sup>

It therefore took very little effort on the part of UNIP to rally this group to the anti-colonial cause. Indeed, in many respects the subsequent – violent – actions of the students in 1959 and 1960 were self-organised, and, perhaps, went *beyond* what UNIP even anticipated when it had encouraged disobedience to authority during political meetings attended by some college students.<sup>64</sup> The string of protests and strikes which erupted at Northern Rhodesian colleges were so unexpected and extensive that a full-blown government inquiry was commissioned, and a report later published, to ascertain their cause.<sup>65</sup>

The use of arson and intimidation was a recurrent feature of college protests. Fire was used by students as a platform to redirect power and make visible their transformation from governed to ungovernable colonial subjects.<sup>66</sup> It was an accessible tool of protest within the grasp of ordinary students, with matches as the primary instrument of ignition being both affordable and concealable.<sup>67</sup> Kerry Chance rightly points out that arson is therefore ‘highly democratized’.<sup>68</sup> During 1959 a total of fourteen schools were burnt down,

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<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired by Walter Harragin’ (1960).

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Kerry Chance, ‘Where There Is Fire, There Is Politics’: Ungovernability and Material Life in Urban South Africa’, *Cultural Anthropology*, 30.3 (2015), p. 399.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 402.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*



including four buildings at the Hodgson Technical College.<sup>69</sup> A further nine schools were wholly burned from January to June 1960.<sup>70</sup> Although these numbers did include some primary schools, at the time, these incidents affected mainly the 26 secondary and college education institutions that existed in the colony. With these actions, the youth signalled not only their own, but also their nation's, metaphorical transition from 'youthful dependency' to 'independent adulthood', as self-rule became a more tangible possibility.

The disturbances were much more politically oriented than Thomas Rasmussen suggests in his study.<sup>71</sup> Rasmussen's undue emphasis on 'purely local' grievances relies too heavily on the general conclusions of the government report.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, a more critical approach is necessary when dealing with government-led inquiries, which are not necessarily the objective, unbiased bodies they are sometimes taken to have been. The report concluded that there was no evidence of any party official at any school before or during the strikes; that no political meetings had advocated the strikes; and that the students involved had not rallied themselves under political parties.<sup>73</sup> However, much of the original evidence included in the report's appendices would seem to run against the same report's general conclusions and to

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<sup>69</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired by Walter Harragin' (1960).

<sup>70</sup> This number also included primary schools: National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired by Walter Harragin' (1960).

<sup>71</sup> Thomas Rasmussen, 'The Popular Basis of Anti-Colonial Protest', in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 42.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired by Walter Harragin' (1960).

describe a series of politically inspired protests and, importantly, a loss of respect for colonial authority. This was only hinted at in the main body of the report, which noted, ‘the school authorities represented the Government in the eyes of students, and thus the students were opposed to the school authorities’.<sup>74</sup>

The closest the report came to affirming the underlying political motivations for the protests, was in mentioning that the appointment of a black UFP Minister, Gabriel Musumbulwa, as Minister of African Education after the legislative elections of March 1959, had caused some enmity among students, who alleged that the new Minister was a European ‘stooge’.<sup>75</sup> Again, the appendices speak much louder than the report: student hostility to Musumbulwa ran very deep. A student from Hodgson Technical Training College, for instance, accused Musumbulwa of being ‘an anti-African Minister... we are utterly opposed to yr [sic] Ministry because you are a UFP buttered man. Anything Federal here is stinky... we condemn your shallow, irresponsible, satanic and unsympathetic decision towards the uprising future generation’.<sup>76</sup> The letter was also written as an act of inter-school cooperation with the students of Munali Secondary School, which had been closed after protests. The student signalled solidarity, writing that Hodgson students would ‘fight relentlessly until our brothers are brought back’.<sup>77</sup> The report

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<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> John Mwanakatwe, *John M. Mwanakatwe: Teacher, Politician, Lawyer: My Autobiography* (Lusaka: Bookworld Publishers, 2003), p. 70 and National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired by Walter Harragin’ (1960).

<sup>76</sup> See appendix 7: *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Munali was later re-opened. See appendix 7: *Ibid.*

seemed to avoid as much as possible the idea that the students involved in the protests were in fact politically astute and were wilfully involving themselves in unified anti-colonial activity.

No longer willing to put up with racial discrimination and insults (in another school, the students had been called 'wild pigs'), the students of Hodgson Technical Training College in Lusaka, whose governor was Evelyn Hone, the last governor of Northern Rhodesia, became the prime example of UNIP inspired anti-colonial activity.<sup>78</sup> At an average age nearer to twenty than eighteen years old, the students were able to easily attend political meetings in the holidays, and become galvanized by the general feeling of unrest in the country, as the Monckton Commission – an advisory commission set up by the British Government in 1960 to investigate and make proposals for the future of the Central African Federation - commenced its deliberations.<sup>79</sup> The first serious outbreak of indiscipline at the College occurred in March, 1959, at the time of the Territorial Elections, when political interest amongst students reached fever pitch. It is also perhaps not coincidental that the protest occurred in the immediate aftermath of the outlawing of ZANC.<sup>80</sup> On a number of occasions, students chanted 'Za Za', the cry favoured by the ZANC.<sup>81</sup> A ZANC political publication was later found in the possession of a student, which was a parody of the Lord's Prayer with the word 'Zambia'

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<sup>78</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 38.

<sup>79</sup> The Commission eventually concluded that the Central African Federation could not be maintained except by force or huge changes in the racial legislation. It advocated a majority of black African members in the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian legislatures and argued that these territories should be given the option to leave the Federation after five years. National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired by Walter Harragin' (1960).

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

substituted wherever possible.<sup>82</sup> Two fires occurred at this time which were suspected to have been started by students, and sixty concrete posts of a new perimeter fence were destroyed at night.<sup>83</sup>

Yet the hostility of the students was not purely directed at school property. The penmanship skills taught to students by their colonial masters were put to good use. Several virulent letters were sent to superiors from students, whose angry words did not shy away from making extreme threats of physical violence if their voices went unheard. On 21 March 1960, the temporary principal of Hodgson College received a letter signed by multiple students enrolled at the college, the contents of which revealed that the students unequivocally flew the UNIP flag when protesting at the closure of the college. The students artfully turned the college motto into an ominous threat. The seriousness of its content speaks for itself:

The Temporary Principal [Mr Ray Smith],  
Hodgson.  
Sir,

We your faithful students are now your enemy because for 12 months you have proved yourself an enemy of UNIP and of all true African people.

On Thursday you brought the police into the College with guns to kill us you must now die. Hodgson must always be UNIP and any principal must allow us FREEDOM. No gaiting no stupid rules no punishments these are the terms upon which we return, you are our enemy and never again will you be our principal. In a short time your head will not be on your body, and no one will ever find it. We burn down buildings 4 at Hodgson we will kill people and remember our Motto Deeds nor [sic] Words.

From your true and loyal  
UNIP students<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

It would appear that some students at least were prepared to see through this death threat. On 21 March 1960, after the letter had been received, the school was closed down, and a search of the dormitory lockers disclosed a ‘considerable quantity of home-made weapons including knuckle-dusters (made of chain and solder bars), a piece of bicycle chain on a metal handle, hacksaw blades sharpened and fitted with handles, home-made spears, pieces of pipe, and a chain with a lead ball attached’.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, nine days prior to the school’s closure, the principal had had a stone thrown at him in the dormitories.<sup>86</sup> The menace of arson was once again applied, with the knowledge that the colonial authorities were powerless to prevent, and catch, its perpetrators.



**Figure 1: Makeshift weapons found in dormitories of Hodgson Technical Training College, following the departure of students**

*Source:* ‘Photograph of Weapons Found in Northern Rhodesia School’, Lusaka, 1960, National Archives, Kew, CO 1069/125/2.

The case of Hodgson Technical Training College shows quite clearly that these protests centred on the desire for, in the students’ own words,

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<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> The stone throwing incident occurred on the evening of 12 March 1960: *Ibid.*

‘FREEDOM, FREEDOM. FREEDOM.’<sup>87</sup> Their agenda was to ‘PARALISE THE GOVT’ [sic] and to ‘step on [the] white man’s head’.<sup>88</sup> On 16 March 1960, another letter written to the principal on behalf of all students proclaimed emphatically: ‘We are sons of this country, and are ready to die for our country. These days, you must be very careful or else you will find your house on fire some day.... We all belong to ‘UNIP’ Now !!!!!?’.<sup>89</sup> Such unmistakably political declarations reveal, at the *very least*, that the students had mobilised themselves after being inspired by the formation of a youthful ZANC/UNIP. For UNIP, the students who wanted an active role in the liberation struggle were a captive audience. None of the student letters ever mentioned the ANC, who – as we know – took a more conservative approach to youth political participation. These students would continue to contribute to the liberation struggle, embroiling themselves in anti-colonial groups such as the National Union of Northern Rhodesia Students, formed in 1963, or directly filling leadership positions in UNIP, as educated ‘senior’ youths.<sup>90</sup>

#### 2.1.4 *UNIP and Its Youth League*

With the loyalty of highly educated youths secured, UNIP was keen to focus on recruiting less educated youths to its ranks. They were a group who were to play an important role in the grassroots mobilisation of ordinary people and would eventually make up the bulk of its youth league membership. The aims and objectives of the UNIP youth league were similar in some respects to

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<sup>87</sup> See appendix 8 and 9: *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> See appendix 8 and 9: *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> Angel, William, *Youth Movements of the World* (Essex: Longman Current Affairs, 1990), p. 639.

those of the ANC youth league. Youth league members were ‘To support at all times and to carry out the aims and objects, rules, principals [sic], programmes and policy of the Party’.<sup>91</sup> In contrast to the ANC, however, an emphasis was placed on the preparation of boys and girls ‘for leadership’ roles, as well as their contribution ‘To assist the Party in the promotion of African Self-Government’.<sup>92</sup>

During the initial years of the liberation struggle, UNIP were particularly astute in the organisation of their youth league and appeared to be a lot more flexible than their ANC antagonists. There was ‘no age limit to admission for membership in the Brigade’, and new branches were usually not registered, meaning they were hardly amenable to government control.<sup>93</sup> The UNIP youth wing, although still technically a wing of the main party, was much more organisationally independent from the parent body than the ANC’s youth league. This provided UNIP with a refuge from colonial surveillance and better safeguarded the party from accusations of thuggery and violence, in which the more militant youth wing was frequently involved. Nevertheless, this loose organisation made it more difficult for the main party to enforce control over the youth league’s lower leadership. As will be discussed later in this chapter, it would become apparent during the 1961 Cha Cha Cha uprising that this system was not always beneficial. The lack of any age constraints, on the other hand, meant an even greater pool of youths could be

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<sup>91</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder’ (1963).

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> This changed after independence, with an entry limit tending to be placed at 35 years old, see: Crehan, *The Fractured Community*, p. 137 and Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 340.

recruited to the UNIP cause. This was especially true of younger children. William Banda, for example, as a standard 6 pupil, ran away from school in 1960 and joined UNIP; he was just 15 years old.<sup>94</sup> It was at school that Banda was recruited by UNIP.<sup>95</sup> This suggests that UNIP, keen to emulate its success at mobilising secondary level students, set its sights on another similarly ready-made cohort of youths in primary schools.<sup>96</sup> That the youths were already brought together in large groups for the purposes of education meant that half the work was already done for UNIP. Indeed, rather than having to canvas multiple residences for young recruits, UNIP officials were able to make a single trip to the local school and contact just as many youths. This strategy saved them an exorbitant amount of time and resources. The belief that youths should be in education rather than getting involved in politics meant that this mobilisation tactic was used only sparingly by the ANC youth league.

UNIP, additionally, invested time in producing propaganda material to recruit for its youth league. During the later 1950s and early 1960s, there was a special focus on affirming the important place of youth in the liberation struggle. The *Zambia Pilot* professed the importance of youthful militancy as a pressure group on the imperial regime: ‘As is well known all the world over the Youth are not blessed with the gentle mind of tolerance and

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<sup>94</sup> Interview with William Banda, Bauleni, Lusaka, 15 August 2019.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> In 1956 there were about 175,000 African boys and girls, mainly boys, in the junior or elementary schools, whereas there were a total of 750 secondary schools places in 1956, rising to 2,480 in 1958: HC Deb, 1 June 1956, Vol 553, col. 661 and *Ibid.*, col. 676. Also: Interview with William Banda, Bauleni, Lusaka, 15 August 2019.



acquiescence'.<sup>97</sup> A telegram sent on 7 December 1961 by the director of the UNIP youth movement, Dingiswayo Banda, to all UNIP youth league divisional secretaries in Northern Rhodesia, declared that: 'my office will start sending to all branches some magazines, periodicals and other reading materials on the role the Youths play in the political struggle'.<sup>98</sup> The valorisation of youth in their campaign efforts was at the very least successful in persuading Mazabuka youth, Joseph Tembo, to join the party: 'they paid attention to the youths and they looked to them as the ones who were campaigning for the party's popularity'.<sup>99</sup> The UNIP newsletter was thus not entirely pretentious when it boasted: 'the great United National Independence Party, the most progressive Party towards Africans liberation is the most powerful party in N. Rhodesia today. Yes, powerful because it has the gracing of the young and well-schooled, militant and dedicated nationalists.'<sup>100</sup>

On the other hand, the ANC took a rather different line in its approach to propaganda, one which did little to entice potential or former ANC youth members back to the party. The ANC continued to prioritise the authority of elders. ANC national secretary, Job Michello, in September 1959 stressed Nkumbula's 'world of experience' and the need to be guided by 'one who has been on the battlefield long enough'.<sup>101</sup> This focus on elder experience sought to reaffirm the control of adults within the political sphere. Given that a

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<sup>97</sup> 'The Youth World – Over', *Zambia Pilot*, 16 January 1962, p. 13.

<sup>98</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/1, 'Telegram to All UNIP Divisional Secretaries, From Dingiswayo Banda, Director of UNIP Youth Movement', 7 December 1961.

<sup>99</sup> Interview with Joseph Tembo, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>100</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/5/15, 'UNIP Newsletter', March 1961.

<sup>101</sup> Extracts from a letter addressed to 'All Chiefs and People of Northern Rhodesia', it was reprinted in *Freedom Magazine* in May 1960. Quoted from: Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 79.

youthful faction had split the party apart, the ANC leadership, unsurprisingly, focused on curtailing the power of the youth that remained. Intriguingly, the ANC attempted this by borrowing colonial discourse on the ‘problem’ of youth delinquency. In a later press statement, in April 1962, Michello once again stressed the superiority of Congress, as a party of ‘adults’, in contrast to UNIP who consisted of ‘teenagers and loafers’.<sup>102</sup> The ANC would be there to welcome back these juvenile delinquents, but only if they submitted to Nkumbula as ‘their father’.<sup>103</sup> The ANC’s propaganda thus attempted to attract youth by promising them access to valuable adult guidance, which was to be given on the implicit understanding that they would be totally subservient to the party.

#### *2.1.5 Youthful Motivations for Joining Politics*

Separate from UNIP and the ANC’s own strategies to entice youth to their parties, it is important to acknowledge the agency and political awareness of these youthful individuals in their decision to join politics, however limited that may have been. Certainly, the direct personal experience of colonial repression was a common reason for becoming involved in politics, whether that was as part of UNIP or the ANC. The desire to have racial parity and unity - in essence, to be able to live life without discrimination - was an overwhelming pull towards politics. As a youth in Mansa District, Laiza Choongo, reported, ‘The whites used to see blacks as baboons’.<sup>104</sup> The fight to be seen, acknowledged, and accepted, ‘from the point of view as humans,

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<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/5/15, ‘Letter to the Senior Chief, Mburuma, From African National Congress National Secretary, J. E. M. Michello’, 4 September 1961.

<sup>104</sup> Interview with Laiza Choongo, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

not animals’, was thus a driving motivation in her support of UNIP.<sup>105</sup> Ordinary youths were also keen to change the material discrimination they faced everyday as Africans. William Banda, for example, was incensed that blacks were banned from entering butcheries and were forced to buy what they needed through a small hatch. Even this was racially determined. Banda recalled, ‘You could only buy ‘boys meat’, which was mainly bones. That is what whites called it, you were not allowed steak. The youths, me and the boys, wanted to change this. As we saw this we thought the elders were right, we were engaged in a real fight’.<sup>106</sup> Of course the experience of colonial discrimination did also assist the ANC in recruiting youths to its party. Reiterating William Banda’s experiences, Christine Tembo, an ANC youth, became drawn to anti-colonial politics having witnessed on a consistent basis racial inequality when trying to do something as basic as buying food. Tembo notes that, ‘before independence, when we were buying food we were having to buy it through a window. We couldn’t enter, we had to go to the window and ask for such things and they would bring it through the window. They said we weren’t allowed [to go in] as Africans had a bad smell. Yes so we weren’t allowed in’.<sup>107</sup> The commonplace realities of living under a racialized system therefore helped to cement the desire for self-rule among Northern Rhodesia’s black youth.

The reasons youths joined specific nationalist parties seems to diverge, depending on whether an individual joined the ANC or UNIP youth league.

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> Interview with William Banda, Bauleni, Lusaka, 15 August 2019.

<sup>107</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 24 September 2018.

Those who joined the UNIP youth league tended to join out of negative or positive social pressures, and because of UNIP's perceived militancy, whilst those who joined the ANC youth league did so out of regional loyalty. It is important to remind the reader here that both the ANC and UNIP youth leagues were organisations based on *voluntary* membership. This fact does not of course exclude the possibility that a number of youths were pressured into joining specific parties during the liberation struggle. Indeed, as political scientist Betsy Sinclair has shown, there is a connection between peer networks and political behaviour.<sup>108</sup> The idea of peer pressure as a form of political coercion is certainly an interesting one, especially given that the youth demographic is more susceptible to this form of 'social politics'.<sup>109</sup>

Recruitment for the UNIP youth league, in particular, seems to have relied upon the use of peer network groups rather than material incentives, which others had accused UNIP of doing. The allegation that two UNIP youths in Mikomfwa, Luanshya were being paid '2.10s a week by the organisation' was strongly refuted by the two youths.<sup>110</sup> They stated it was 'completely untrue'.<sup>111</sup> UNIP, instead, seems to have ridden an exponential wave of popularity, which increased the likelihood of younger individuals joining the newly established party and others feeling pressure to do so. For example,

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<sup>108</sup> Betsy Sinclair, *The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 15.

<sup>109</sup> Psychological and educational studies have found that youth, who tend to crave social acceptance more than adults do, are less resistant to peer influence. See for example: Laurence Steinberg and Kathryn Monahan, 'Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence', *Developmental Psychology*, 43.6 (2007), pp. 1531–1543 and Adesoji Oni, 'Peer Group Pressure as a Determinant of Adolescent Social Adjustment in Nigerian Schools', *Asian Pacific Journal of Educators and Education*, 25 (2010), pp. 189-202.

<sup>110</sup> 'Frightened to Sleep at Home at Night', *Central African Mail*, 23 October 1962, p. 32.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

despite the ANC being led by someone from her ‘tribal line’, Laiza Choongo decided to support UNIP because: ‘UNIP had people with greater influence than ANC... UNIP had greater influence because it had greater followers’.<sup>112</sup> This instance reveals that individual youths did ‘not make their political decisions in isolation’.<sup>113</sup> For some at least, their wider social network, knowing who within their community and further afield supported which party, significantly determined their own political behaviour.<sup>114</sup>

The rising social pressure also generated more overt acts of intimidation to ‘encourage’ participation in UNIP political activities, especially among individuals who would otherwise not have involved themselves.<sup>115</sup> Intimidation was a common experience for female youths residing in rural areas. A possible reason for this gendering may have been the lack of socio-educational opportunities for girls. This made them unlikely to have much knowledge of politics and thus were vulnerable to manipulation. In 1963 the UNIP youth league membership in Mazabuka only had 64 female youth members, compared to 106 male youth members.<sup>116</sup> As a teenage girl in 1960s Mazabuka, Emily Kachabe, joined the UNIP youth league after being forced and threatened with beatings. She seemed to experience a lack of choice in joining UNIP activities, and a lack of understanding as to what these activities were meant to achieve. Kachebe recalled how, without explanation, she was frequently made to get into trucks and start singing. In interview, Kachebe

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<sup>112</sup> Interview with Laiza Choongo, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>113</sup> Sinclair, *The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior*, p. 15.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.

<sup>116</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/1, ‘Letter to the Director of Youths, From Isaac Chona, UNIP Youth Regional Secretary’, 8 March 1963.

stressed that, if given the choice, ‘I would have stopped because I never liked it’.<sup>117</sup> Indeed, when attempting to understand youths’ own reasons for becoming involved in the political parties, it is important to acknowledge that their motivations were manifold.

Beyond the realm of negative social pressures, youths also joined the UNIP youth league on more positive grounds. Some youths, for instance, were motivated by the level of responsibilities entrusted to them by UNIP as a party. This was especially true for male youths who were very active in the role of political mobilisation of grassroots members.<sup>118</sup> Local UNIP leaders, in the wards and constituencies, would direct youths to perform a range of activities during party meetings.<sup>119</sup> There was little resentment towards this however, as the ‘big ones’ who told the youths what to do, would listen to any suggestions the youths had.<sup>120</sup> This was a stark change from the ANC, who followed a much stricter hierarchy, whereby instructions had to be followed unquestioningly. The perceived tangible impact of their actions on the liberation struggle helped to cement youthful loyalty to UNIP as a party. William Banda for instance was able to join a youth ‘action group’, which was a team of self-help youths who used to harass whites.<sup>121</sup> These youths used to attack the police and chase people from white farms.<sup>122</sup> They also played an important role as messengers, ensuring that a steady flow of information flowed between branches. By foot they could travel 260km in

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<sup>117</sup> Interview with Emily Kachabe, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>118</sup> Interview with Phiri Mbao, Chilenje, Lusaka, 16 August 2019.

<sup>119</sup> Interview with Phiri Mbao, Chilenje, Lusaka, 16 August 2019.

<sup>120</sup> Interview with Joseph Tembo, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>121</sup> Interview with William Banda, Bauleni, Lusaka, 15 August 2019.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

only a few days, as Banda had done going from Chiwangu to South Luangwa.<sup>123</sup> Care had to be taken to avoid both police and wild animals such as lions on these journeys. Although fewer in number, female youths too were able to play a part. They contributed vital money to party funds, which helped to mobilise huge swathes of UNIP youths.<sup>124</sup> The way they dressed their bodies was also used as a form of anti-colonial protest. ‘Traditional’ chitenge wraps (printed cloth) were often worn around the waist, and adorned with political party slogans and images.<sup>125</sup> The slogans and images signalled their political allegiance to others.<sup>126</sup> Phiri Mbao, a female UNIP youth in Chibolya compound, Lusaka, recalled how during the liberation struggle: ‘everyone would wear the chitenge material as a sense of belonging’.<sup>127</sup> Dressing in these political chitenges by female youths was supported by their party men, a stark contrast to what was to come after independence with the infamous anti-miniskirt campaigns.

The ANC youth league carried on in much the same spirit and organisation as before the party split. Youths who joined the ANC youth league, or chose to stay, in contrast to the reasons given by UNIP youths, were much more motivated by regional loyalties than by the organisation and functioning of their party’s youth league. The identity of ANC supporting youths, as Tonga, Ila and Lenje, thus seems to have surpassed the importance of their other

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<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> Interview with Phiri Mbao, Chilenje, Lusaka, 16 August 2019.

<sup>125</sup> The use of chitenges in this way was probably not unique to UNIP. Future research into this area could prove fruitful in connecting the politics of colonial and postcolonial dress. A respectable start has been made by Hansen, see: Karen Hansen, *Salaula: The World of Second-hand Clothing and Zambia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 82.

<sup>126</sup> Wearable political slogans and announcements continued to be part of civic political culture throughout UNIP’s rule after independence. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>127</sup> Interview with Phiri Mbao, Chilenje, Lusaka, 16 August 2019.

identity as youths.<sup>128</sup> Their motivations seemed to follow the broader regional party divisions, whereby the ANC drew its support principally from Southern and Central Provinces and from the ‘Bantu Botatwe’ ethnic groups.<sup>129</sup> As Larmer points out: ‘This was not a ‘tribal’ base of party political support, but rather stemmed from the particular history of the uneven integration of different parts of Northern Rhodesia into the territory’s political economy and the interaction between this and developing identities of the territory’s diverse peoples’.<sup>130</sup> Liston Lweendo, who joined the ANC youth league in the Monze area at 18, joined Congress rather than UNIP, ‘partly out of tribalism, or ethnicity, where people simply said this one belongs to us so we had to support him. That is, Harry Nkumbula needed to be supported, so any other youth league that was to come out was to be destabilised or neutralised by frustrating them. That was maintained amongst us, we Southerners wanted to support our own man’.<sup>131</sup> Selina Mbozi put her reasons to continue to support ANC after the split more bluntly: ‘I wanted tribesmen to rule the country.’<sup>132</sup>

In addition, some youths also joined the ANC youth league out of a sense of familial loyalty because their family members were already Congress supporters. Agness Lweendo was only 10 years old when her father brought her a card. She did not know what the card was, but, as she was very young, she found herself unable to disobey: ‘I was just following parents’.<sup>133</sup> She

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<sup>128</sup> Youths who shared this identity but placed more emphasis on their youthfulness seemed to have been more likely to join UNIP.

<sup>129</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 29.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

<sup>132</sup> Interview with Selina Mbozi, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>133</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.



continued to support Congress up until it was banned in 1972 with the introduction of the one-party state. This example, among the many others given in this section, helps to foreground the variety of youthful motivations for joining politics *and* supporting specific parties during the anti-colonial struggle. By taking seriously the voices of youths, such as Agness Lweendo, the heterogeneity of African youth in Northern Rhodesia, their agency, and the dynamics at play in their political decisions can be more readily understood.<sup>134</sup>

However, limited their agency and political knowledge, African youths in Northern Rhodesia considered carefully which party best served their interests. Both ANC and UNIP youths rested significant weight on ‘freedom’ holding the key to their future success and the ability of their respective parties to rapidly achieve this. This idea helps explain why youths were often so resolute in supporting *their* party, and thus their willingness to engage in inter-party violence (to be examined in the second part of this chapter), as well as anticolonial violence, as the following section on the Cha Cha Cha explores.

#### 2.1.6 *The Cha Cha Cha Protest*

The two nationalist parties were increasingly involved in anti-colonial protests in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During January-February 1960, for example, the two parties participated in a joint boycott of a store in Livingstone, in which Africans were warned at public meetings that defiance

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<sup>134</sup> Waller, “Rebellious Youth in Africa”, p. 92.

of the boycott would result in heavy punishment and that they would have “kunu” applied to them (i.e., they would disappear without a trace).<sup>135</sup> In March 1960 another boycott of beerhalls was arranged in Ndola. The boycott was publicised by the UNIP youth league, who shouted warnings in the compounds by night that ‘anyone who ignored it should be beaten and that their persons and houses should be attacked with petrol bombs’.<sup>136</sup> At a secret youth league meeting 15 bottles of petrol were distributed to deal with any non-compliance.<sup>137</sup> Nevertheless, the Cha Cha Cha, in which the ANC had little involvement, cemented the perception of UNIP as the party of action. UNIP youths, enthralled by their ability to take ‘direct’ action against the colonial regime, formed a significant proportion of those involved in the Cha Cha Cha protests. The protests would last from 1 July to 31 October 1961.

The initial causes of the protest stemmed from the 1961 proposed constitution for Northern Rhodesia.<sup>138</sup> The Colonial Office version would have made an African majority in the legislature possible, but under pressure from the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, the plan was revised in favour of Europeans.<sup>139</sup> The concession elicited a swift response by UNIP.<sup>140</sup> Kaunda outlined a ‘Master Plan’ at the beginning of July 1961 to block the constitution. He declared: ‘If the British government goes ahead and forces this constitution through, UNIP and all its supporters will boycott the

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<sup>135</sup> The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2527, ‘Paper on Intimidation of Individuals and Authorities in Northern Rhodesia’, 17 August 1960.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup> Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, p. 220.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*

elections. But we shall not let the constitution survive.’<sup>141</sup> A programme of non-violent campaigns, inclusive of boycotts, strikes and refusal to pay taxes, was intended to render the colony ungovernable, but was not to be launched at that point.<sup>142</sup> Unhappy with the lack of action by Kaunda, a wave of unofficial protest action was launched by local UNIP officials from late July onwards.<sup>143</sup> A chaotic campaign of civil disobedience subsequently took place.

The Cha Cha Cha, as it came to be known, took place almost entirely in UNIP’s main area of strength, the Northern and Luapula Provinces. The Luapula Province, by way of example, had an astounding 345 UNIP branches registered by the middle of 1960.<sup>144</sup> These were directed by about 2,000 minor officials, supported by both the women’s and youth leagues, most of whom had ‘learned the art of agitation’.<sup>145</sup> Protest also erupted on the Copperbelt. There, the UNIP youth league was very much at the forefront of activity.<sup>146</sup> It was only in the southern portion of the Luapula district, which contained some Congress members and many followers of the Watch Tower church, that no disorder took place.<sup>147</sup> In Southern province, the Congress stronghold, no disturbances were recorded in the government report that documented the

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<sup>141</sup> Hall, Richard, *Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period* (Hong Kong: Sheck Wah Tong Printing Press, 1976), p. 155.

<sup>142</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 39.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>144</sup> *An Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia: July to October, 1961* (Lusaka: Northern Rhodesia Government Printer, 1961), p. 14.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>146</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 40.

<sup>147</sup> The Watchtower followers would become a source of frustration for the incumbent UNIP government, following independence. This is discussed in chapter four of this thesis, pp. 241-250. *An Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia*, p. 17.

protests.<sup>148</sup> Eastern province, another area where Congress held more sway, was likewise not seriously affected by the disorders.<sup>149</sup>

As already noted, the Cha Cha Cha signalled a loss of control over the party's lower echelons, where local UNIP militants wilfully acted against the instructions of the national leadership.<sup>150</sup> Ian Macleod, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, belatedly warned the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir E Hone, that: 'the lower echelons of a "Nationalist" party in Africa today are likely to press for and take to violent courses in advance of their party's central leadership... the leaders find it difficult or inexpedient to take positive action to suppress violence if they are to maintain their leadership'.<sup>151</sup> UNIP was not the unified nationalist party it purported to be. Kaunda retrospectively attempted to downplay the extent of this indiscipline in his 1980 book, *Kaunda on Violence*: 'The doctrine [of non-violence] became the official policy of the United National Independence Party and apart from a few regrettable lapses, it was honoured by the masses, whose discipline in the face of grave provocation was remarkable'.<sup>152</sup> Contrary to the image painted here by Kaunda, violence pervaded the lower levels of the party, during the liberation struggle, and beyond. The resort to violence was in direct antithesis to previous calls for peacefulness by the upper party leadership. In May 1960, UNIP distributed six thousand copies of a strongly worded statement. It read:

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<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.


<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>150</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 43.

<sup>151</sup> The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2245, 'Letter to the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir E. Hone, From the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Ian Macleod', 13 October 1961.

<sup>152</sup> Kenneth Kaunda, *Kaunda on Violence* (London: Sphere Books, 1980), pp. 18-19.

“There are those in our ranks who will be speaking irresponsibly of bloodshed and violence... There are those in our ranks who feel that by throwing a stone at a passing car or by burning a particular building they are revolutionaries engaged in revolutionary warfare. They must be told that they are working contrary to the deep interest of three million people.”<sup>153</sup> Such efforts by the upper leadership fell on deaf ears as public meetings in September 1961 frequently announced that ‘the policy of the United National Independence party was now one of violence for the overthrow of the Government’.<sup>154</sup>



**Figure 2: Destroyed school building, burnt during the Cha Cha Cha**  
Source: ‘History of Pictures: Cha Cha Cha’, *Vanguard*, October 1969, p. 4.

From late July and August 1961, hundreds of sabotage attacks occurred, with youth often at their centre. Much of this activity involved the destruction of property. Sabotage was intended to inflict ‘monetary hurt’ on the colonial government and thus force the government’s hand over the constitution. Cattle were killed, schools and government buildings burned down in an orgy of violence. The physically straining work was most often done by youths, who were involved in blocking roads, destroying bridges in Luapula province

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<sup>153</sup> ‘UNIP Lashes Violence’, *Central African Mail*, 24 May 1960, p. 2.

<sup>154</sup> The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2245, ‘Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, From the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir E. Hone’, 6 September 1961.

and, on the Copperbelt, crude attempts at sabotage by the UNIP youth league.<sup>155</sup> At all main Copperbelt centres, UNIP youth league formations held a series of meetings to plan sabotage operations and where teams of saboteurs were selected. Following these meetings, nine explosions occurred from 4 to 6 August 1961.<sup>156</sup> The Universal Store at Bancroft was completely gutted, causing a loss of approximately £25,000, whilst a public service bus was burnt out at Konkola, near Chingola.<sup>157</sup> UNIP youths were also involved in the burning down of schools. Arson was especially used if the people found out that the Principal, the Missionaries, or the teachers at those schools were working as “informers” for the government officials.<sup>158</sup> Unlike the 1959/1960 school protests, these incidents of arson were usually enacted by youths who did *not* attend the institutions. The burning down of a girls’ dormitory at the Santa Maria Mission on Chilubi Island, Northern Province in August 1961 was the work of a non-student male culprit.<sup>159</sup>

The extent of youth involvement in the violent disturbances and the anxiety it caused the colonial government was apparent. On 6 September 1961, a telegram sent by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir E Hone, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, expressed this unease: ‘The United National Independence Party Youth Brigade has played an increasingly important role in this and may now be regarded as the spearhead

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<sup>155</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>156</sup> *An Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia*, p. 21.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>158</sup> ‘Missionary Joins Police Reserve’, *Voice of UNIP: A Grim Peep into the North*, October 1961, p. 7.

<sup>159</sup> ‘Thirteen Jailed in North’, *Central African Mail*, 28 November 1961, p. 6.

of violent thinking and action'.<sup>160</sup> As the Cha Cha Cha protests went on, people started to become targets of violence. Police officers and other colonial figureheads were increasingly likely to become victims of youthful attacks. On the evening of 22 July 1961, in the Chimanimine township at Broken Hill (present-day Kabwe), a police sergeant and a constable who were accompanying a woman back to her house, after she had complained of having been threatened, were set upon. A crowd of more than fifty men and youths armed with sticks and clubs struck the sergeant several times and beat the constable until he lost consciousness. The woman managed to run away without injury.<sup>161</sup> One of the mob was shouting "Cha Cha Cha let us beat them".<sup>162</sup> Police, as strong arms of colonial rule, thus became legitimate targets of youthful anticolonial protest during the Cha Cha Cha.

Violence was not confined to the police; Europeans were also victimised. On 8 August 1961 Joseph Cumins Foust, an American medical doctor who was driving with his young family north from Mpika, along the Great North Road, was met by a crowd of 20 to 30 young men. They had blocked the road by destroying the culvert. The men were all armed with spears and axes, including several who had guns. The crowd shouted the UNIP adages 'Kwacha' and 'Freedom'. One person threw a spear at the Land Rover Foust and his family were travelling in.<sup>163</sup> A 20-year-old African man told Foust

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<sup>160</sup> The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2245, 'Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, From the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir E. Hone', 6 September 1961.

<sup>161</sup> *An Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia*, p. 24.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>163</sup> The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2247, 'Statement of Joseph Cumins Foust to Police', 13 August 1961.

that he was going to get his friends from the village to come to kill him. The man left and came back with his friends; this time, he carried a spear. The crowd shouted: ‘Do you surrender’, ‘Hands up’... ‘We are going to kill you all, but first we are going to beat you, beat you, beat you’.<sup>164</sup> Foust and his family managed to get away without injury. In the subsequent police report of the incident, he recalled that, ‘The younger members of the crowd were very threatening, but they appeared to be being kept in check by the same grey sports jacketed man’.<sup>165</sup> Indeed, the threat of violence was a key strategy adopted by the lower party leadership, but as this incident shows, it was not commonly followed through with if the proposed victim was European. The infamous murder of Lilian Burton, killed in 1962 by a young man who had just attended a UNIP meeting in Ndola, was a very notable exception, however.<sup>166</sup>

The reaction of the colonial state to the sabotage, general disorder and increased violence towards *European* people was swift. The army was hastily sent into the north to restore order. It was a decision that would lead to an estimated 50 deaths and many villages being punitively burnt to ash by the government troops. This tactic of violent repression was especially wrought on the inhabitants of Chinsali and Mporokoso, in what was then the Northern Province.<sup>167</sup> The police too, were able to exact revenge by burning down the

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<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>166</sup> As a result of this incident the colonial authorities banned UNIP meetings on the Copperbelt in 1962. For a more detailed analysis of this politically motivated act of violence against a European see: Walima Kalusa, ‘The Killing of Lilian Margaret Burton and Black and White Nationalisms in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in the 1960s’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37.1 (2011), pp. 63-77 and Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 34.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.



huts of UNIP supporters. In Matumba village, in Chinsali district, for example, the Police Mobile Unit cordoned off the village and 44 out of its 64 huts, which were identified as belonging to UNIP members were set alight.<sup>168</sup>

UNIP was quick to publish and expand on allegations of these and other violent actions by the security forces in its pamphlet, *A Grim Peep into the North*.<sup>169</sup> Distributed in October 1961, the pamphlet became a perfect propaganda tool for UNIP, showcasing to the African populations the atrocities the colonial government was willing to engage in. One of the articles included in the pamphlet highlighted the questionable accounts given by the police and soldiers about the death of a youth in Kasama, in the Northern Province, on 17 July 1961.<sup>170</sup> Entitled the ‘Mysterious Death of Martin Mwamba’, it described how police and soldiers had tried to blame Mwambwa’s death on him falling off his bicycle after having run away. The article, however, pointed out that he had died from blood loss and that villagers had overheard the police tell him that if he did not reveal the whereabouts of another UNIP supporter, he would be beaten to death.<sup>171</sup> Such an incident reveals that youth, as well as involving themselves in violence during the Cha Cha Cha protests, were also commonly victims of such brutality.

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<sup>168</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 204.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>170</sup> ‘Mysterious Death of Martin Mwamba’, *Voice of UNIP: A Grim Peep into the North*, October 1961, p. 2.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*

The *Central African Mail*, a newspaper sympathetic to the UNIP nationalist cause also published accounts of abuses by security forces. In late August 1961, for instance, a *Central African Mail* article reported a clash between security forces and local UNIP supporters just east of Lake Kampolombo, where the local UNIP chairman, Dixon Kaminda had been killed, along with three others.<sup>172</sup> When the police arrived at the second village 20 people were rounded up and each person was asked whether they had their situpa, the required registration certificate for Africans at the time.<sup>173</sup> Many within this group, however, had likely burnt theirs as a form of protest; burning situpa's and other official documents, which were viewed as symbolic of the colonial order, was a common form of anticolonial protest during the Cha Cha Cha. Indeed, it was a means of protest easily accessible to the everyday person. Two weeks prior to this police raid, for example, on 14 August 1961, in Samfya District, about 36km north of the village, UNIP officials had deposited a burnt sack of identity and marriage certificates at the boma.<sup>174</sup> Angered by these widespread acts of defiance, the security forces clamped down on those who had burnt them in the village. Anyone without their situpa was severely beaten. Mr Sanger, a young man and a UNIP youth league official at the village, was repeatedly struck by police with batons.<sup>175</sup> The account reveals that leaders of the UNIP youth league often became victims of violence due to their involvement in the protests.

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<sup>172</sup> 'A Plane Circles, So They Buried Him Hurriedly', *Central African Mail*, 29 August 1961, p. 3.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>174</sup> *An Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia*, p. 17.

<sup>175</sup> 'A Plane Circles, So They Buried Him Hurriedly', *Central African Mail*, 29 August 1961, p. 3.



**Figure 3: Samfya District: Police officer emptying bag of partially destroyed identity certificates**

Source: Screenshot of *Northern Rhodesia: Military Patrols Swoop on Villages*, Video Recording, British Pathe, 27 August 1961, <<https://www.britishpathe.com/video/v1va4eedcn9qh985fkpp31fl6oqo5-zambia-nr-elections/query/northern+Rhodesia>> [accessed 11 February 2020].

Asides from physical violence, huge numbers of UNIP youths and UNIP members faced imprisonment. The ‘Summary of Offences’ reported in connection with the disorders from 13 July-31 October 1961 indicates that the overwhelming numbers of those arrested belonged to UNIP. Out of 183 arrested and/or convicted for arson, attempted arson, or burning of motor vehicles, 123 were UNIP members.<sup>176</sup> The report does not specify age, but interviews reveal that youths were included in these numbers. For instance, Agness Lweendo recalled how her elder brother, then a youth in his twenties, was jailed ‘for politics’ and sentenced to 6 months for burning down a school.<sup>177</sup> There were more than 3,000 arrests, and 2,600 men and women were jailed, some being sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.<sup>178</sup> That many UNIP youths witnessed these arrests, along with the atrocities committed by the security forces against people in their own communities,

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<sup>176</sup> *An Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia*, p. 78.

<sup>177</sup> Agness Lweendo could not recall where the exact location of the school was. Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 24 September 2018.

<sup>178</sup> Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 156.

and that many themselves were victimized, helped to further radicalise the younger generations against the colonial order. The following year, in January 1962, a UNIP youth article was published in the political magazine *Zambia Pilot*. The author angrily declared: ‘Hundreds and hundreds here have been victimised in one way or another... we have come to be familiar with teargas, and we have suffered several times at the hands of security gangsters and police chaps’.<sup>179</sup> The young author continued: ‘All these humiliations and tortures serve not only to create a great determination but also to plant seeds of hatred between Blacks and Whites. A youth knows that a term in prison for political conviction is a college training for bitter days of the struggle ahead’.<sup>180</sup> The reaction of the security forces played perfectly into the hands of UNIP, which consolidated its standing among the local population. Support for UNIP grew, not just among educated youths, but also ordinary youths because of the Cha Cha Cha; this was true at least in its areas of strength. In contrast to the ANC, which had remained, for the most part, out of the protests, UNIP gained a reputation as the party of direct anticolonial action, which valued the contribution of youths to the struggle. Indeed, despite the dangers, youths willingly put themselves on the line during the Cha Cha Cha.

At the beginning of November 1961, the chaos that the Cha Cha Cha had brought upon Northern Rhodesia dissipated. A political solution was reached, and the British government agreed to re-revise the proposed constitution to improve the African nationalist position. The scope of African participation

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<sup>179</sup> ‘The Youth World – Over’, *Zambia Pilot*, 16 January 1962, p. 13.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

in the disturbances demonstrated the need to change direction before anti-colonial sentiment in Northern Rhodesia reached unmanageable levels.<sup>181</sup> In March 1962, UNIP's National Council accepted the revised constitution proposed by the British government and, as a result, UNIP agreed to participate in elections held in 1962.<sup>182</sup> The settlement shifted the focus to electoral politics and the need to win independence and power from votes, rather than protesting against the colonial government.

The shift to electoral politics meant that the competition between UNIP and the ANC accelerated, especially during the run up to key elections, such as the general election in October 1962 and the final January 1964 election, which decided the party that would lead an independent Zambia. This was exacerbated by the annoying persistence of Congress, whom UNIP had hoped would disappear into irrelevance. Clashes thus became the mainstay of African nationalist politics from 1962 onwards. Moreover, UNIP's approach to its rank-and-file activists radically altered after the Cha Cha Cha protests.<sup>183</sup> The Cha Cha Cha had not only paved the way for majority rule, but, worryingly for UNIP, had also revealed the dominance and independence of the party's lower echelons, particularly the youth league.<sup>184</sup> Given the prior history of unruly youth leagues in nationalist politics, the UNIP leadership was keen to regain absolute control over its youth league members, an aim that was strongly pursued from November 1961 onwards.

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<sup>181</sup> Rasmussen, 'The Popular Basis of Anti-Colonial Protest', p. 43.

<sup>182</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 48.

<sup>183</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 48.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43 and Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 233.

The shift in anticolonial politics, from protest to electioneering, also encouraged the ANC to implement changes within its own party. This included a heightened emphasis on the role of ANC youths as ‘bodyguards’. Indeed, during the disturbances themselves, tension between the two parties had slowly intensified. For example, on 1 August 1961, in Kasama, a Congress member who was driving a party Land-Rover, was stopped by fifteen UNIP youths wearing sashes and was told in no uncertain terms to keep away from the area.<sup>185</sup> UNIP supporters committed 70 per cent of assaults on civilians and their victims included ANC supporters during the Cha Cha Cha.<sup>186</sup> Even prior to the 1961 disturbances, ANC members were victimised by UNIP youths. In May 1961 in Chibolya, a stronghold of the ANC, ‘young UNIP thugs’ harassed people to such an extent that residents formed small groups to protect themselves.<sup>187</sup> The ANC thus changed its course. An ANC youth donation form asserted, ‘we could ensure your complete protection from thugs – Remember that by supporting the youth movement you will be protecting your properties, wives, children, houses and your freedom generally.’<sup>188</sup> The stage was thus set for significant inter-party fighting between the two African parties. This centred over which party would be the first to form an all-African majority government in Northern Rhodesia. The fierce defence of ANC youths and the zealous militancy of

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<sup>185</sup> The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2245, ‘Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, From the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir E. Hone’, 6 September 1961.

<sup>186</sup> Of the 39 convicted for assault on civilians, 27 were UNIP members: *An Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia*, p. 78.

<sup>187</sup> The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2527, ‘Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, From the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir E. Hone’, 27 May 1961.

<sup>188</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/2/10, ‘ANC Youth Donation Form’ (1962).

UNIP youths were significantly entangled in this subsequent violence, as will be explored in part two of this chapter.

## **2.2 The General Election Campaign of 1962**

The general election of 1962 took place over two stages, in October and December 1962. It had three rolls: upper, lower, and national.<sup>189</sup> These were all campaigned for concurrently over a year, from 1 November 1961 to 30 October 1962.<sup>190</sup> By-elections for several seats then took place in December 1962. During the campaign period electioneering took on an increasingly violent flare. The following section explores how the stiff competition for votes led to a rising number of violent incidents on the ground. An exploration of the dynamics of violence again shows youth to have been at the forefront during the struggle for independence. By investigating how the role of youth shifted within UNIP and the ANC, by highlighting the various forms youthful violence took and, finally, by disaggregating violence on a regional basis, the grim reality of the territory's electoral politics during the late colonial period are exposed.<sup>191</sup>

More broadly, this section hopes to contribute to an emerging literature that takes seriously the relationship between democratic elections and violence. Indeed, prior to the last decade or so, political scientists largely accepted the

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<sup>189</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 261.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>191</sup> Recent revisionist histories have of course already made much headway in exposing the reality of pervasive political violence during Zambia's late colonial era. They have thus corrected earlier nationalist works which referred to it as merely 'sporadic': See, Robert Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 301.

general consensus which held democracy as the epitome and driver of political peace.<sup>192</sup> This reasoning continues to influence international peace-keeping, which advocates democratic development and elections as catch-all strategies for conflict management.<sup>193</sup> Until relatively recently only a handful of scholars, such as John Keane and Michael Mann,<sup>194</sup> have challenged this orthodoxy by pointing to the relationship between violence and democratic governance in their works. Scholars of electoral politics, unable to ignore the bloodshed of some contemporary election campaigns, have been quicker to acknowledge the centrality of violence within their field.<sup>195</sup> Yet, a tendency exists in the literature to regard violence and democracy as fundamentally antithetic.<sup>196</sup> This propensity has done little to enhance understandings of the

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<sup>192</sup> Rummel for instance views elections as a democratic guarantor of social peace: Rudolph Rummel, *Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence* (New York: Routledge, 1997). See also: Denis Merklen, 'Political Violence in Democracy', *Cités*, 50 (2012), pp. 57-73. For works that suggest democracy has a positive impact on conflict see: Philip Keefer, 'Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies', *World Bank Economic Review*, 22.1 (2008), pp. 33-61; John Schwarzmantel, 'Democracy and Violence: A Theoretical Overview', *Democratization*, 17.2 (2010), pp. 217-234; and Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, 'Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa?: Understanding and Preventing Conflict', *Journal of African Economies*, 9.3 (2000), pp. 244-269.

<sup>193</sup> For example: 'Guinea-Bissau: Upcoming Elections Vital to Prevent 'Relapse' into Instability, Says UN Envoy', 30 August 2018, *UN News*, <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/08/1018072>> [accessed 20 October 2018]. Also see the background study for the United Nations and World Bank flagship study: Charlotte Fiedler, *The Effects of Specific Elements of Democracy on Peace* (Bonn: German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2017) and Julia Leininger, 'Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping – Conflict Resolution Through State-Building and Democracy Promotion in Haiti', in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, ed. by Armin von Bogdandy and Rudiger Wolfrum and Christiane Philipp, Vol 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 465-530. Also, Kristine Høglund, 'Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21.3 (2009), p. 414.

<sup>194</sup> See, Michael Mann's landmark study which surveys 'genocidal democracies' in the modern world: Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). John Keane on the other hand focuses on the use of force by governing democracies, see: John Keane, *Violence and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>195</sup> See, Nic Cheeseman, 'The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2.2 (2008), pp. 166-184.

<sup>196</sup> For example, Birch, Daxecker and Høglund's work claims that violence, even at levels 'undermines the democratic character of elections' by substituting free choice with coercion and by deterring participation, see: Birch, Daxecker and Høglund, 'Electoral Violence', p.



extent to which democracy, elections and violence coexist and influence one another. By exploring the violence of Zambian youth during the democratic elections that would ultimately move Zambia towards independence, this section hopes to contribute towards the few studies which *have* attempted to explore the junctures of these three aspects, particularly within the African context.<sup>197</sup>

### 2.2.1 *Shift in the Role of Youth*

Before moving on to the 1962 electoral campaign itself, and the often-violent part played by Zambian youths, it is important to discuss in greater detail how their role shifted within their respective parties during the transition to electoral politics. The biggest change was in UNIP. As previously mentioned, the Cha Cha Cha had been a relative success for the Zambian nationalist cause, helping to force the colonial hand concerning constitutional amendments. The actions of UNIP youths were crucial in this regard; however, as the Luapula District Commissioner observed, ‘youth leaders ignored advice and guidance of their own political leaders, who had advocated non-violence and restraint’.<sup>198</sup> The brazen disregard of the orders issued by the upper UNIP leadership resulted in Kaunda reorganising the party in early 1962.<sup>199</sup> Though hidden behind the explanation that the reform would help boost the party’s contact with the ‘common man’ and reduce the

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4. Jamar deems elections with violent streaks as ‘token democratic practices’. See: Jamar, ‘The Crusade of Transitional Justice: p. 59.

<sup>197</sup> The key work in the African context remains: Mimmi Kovacs, ‘Introduction: The Everyday Politics of Electoral Violence in Africa’, *Violence in African Elections: Between Democracy and Big Man Politics*, ed. by Mimmi Kovacs and Jesper Bjarnesen (London: Zed Books, 2018), pp. 1-26. See more generally: Paul Staniland, ‘Review Article: Violence and Democracy’, *Comparative Politics*, 47.1 (2014), p. 99.

<sup>198</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 234.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 233.

burden of work on headquarters officials, establishing a more effective control over the youth league was the principal driver for such changes. Indeed, UNIP's new constitution specifically stressed that 'the [youth] brigades shall not take any separate action on political matters'.<sup>200</sup> At the party's Annual Conference in 1962, the director of the youth movement praised his youths for having 'shaken the White Settler Government in this country'; at the same time, he also emphasized the need for youths to perform their duties in the 'best interests of the Nation and country.'<sup>201</sup>

As a consequence of the party's reorganisation, the UNIP youth league was restructured and given a stronger vertical command chain.<sup>202</sup> This was meant to ensure orders filtered down to the lower levels through disciplined youth leaders. Trusted youths were given the opportunity to complete leadership courses abroad, in Ghana and East Africa, to ensure more 'dependable' leadership in the league's ranks.<sup>203</sup> Leadership positions were tightly controlled in the upper levels of the league, and it was not uncommon for the holders of certain posts to be directly appointed by officials in the main body of the party.<sup>204</sup> The new structure of the UNIP youth league was not without its problems. The issue of appointing – as opposed to electing – youth leaders proved a particularly sensitive matter in 1962. Pandemonium ensued when the youths themselves called out UNIP's duplicity, for while the party

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<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>201</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/2/8/2/1, 'Report Submitted to Annual Conference by UNIP Director of Youth Movement, Dingiswayo Banda' (1962).

<sup>202</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 234.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>204</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, 'Letter to Director of Youth Movement, From D M Simutenda, Regional Youth Organiser', 29 April 1962.

demanded national democratic elections, it refused to implement the same principle when it came to filling the high ranks of the youth league. One particularly bitter and lengthy quarrel in the Lusaka constituency revealed how some UNIP youths pushed back against ‘reorganisation’, which they correctly perceived to be a check on their *individual* political powers. The newly introduced post of ‘youth regional organiser’, for example, was intended to strengthen the link between the youth league and the Central Committee, by providing a matrix for the main party to oversee youth activities beyond the UNIP youth director.<sup>205</sup> Their actions at the time reveal that it was not just the party leaders who attempted to refashion the role of youth within the party.

The system of appointing nominees to the newly instituted position of youth regional official caused mass uproar amongst youths of Lusaka Constituency. Numerous angry letters were sent in protest. Previously, UNIP youths had been able to nominate and elect local candidates for the positions of chairman, vice chairman, secretary, vice secretary, treasurer, or vice treasurer, with limited interference from party elders. The new practice of appointing external candidates by the UNIP leadership, therefore, did not go down well.<sup>206</sup> As the youths put it: ‘We shall never accept any form of nomination

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<sup>205</sup> The UNIP youth league was originally kept organisationally separate from the main party. This was done to limit the ease at which the colonial government could shut down the party’s political activity and ensured that the UNIP youth league could continue to operate independently should there be a clampdown on the main party: British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, ‘Letter to Youth Constituency Secretary, From UNIP National Secretary’, 3 May 1962.

<sup>206</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, ‘Letter to the Director of Youth Movement, Dingiswayo Banda, From W B Sauti, Constituency Secretary’, 26 February 1962.

as we believe in the principle of 'ONE MAN ONE VOTE VALUE'.<sup>207</sup> One youth in particular, Edward Simeo Mulenga, the youth secretary of the Lusaka Constituency, was a thorn in the side of the UNIP leadership. He rallied his youthful comrades to pressure UNIP into giving them an electoral voice within the party, just as the colonial state had bowed to pressure after the disturbances of 1961. Following the appointment of David Simutenda as youth regional organiser, lower-ranked youths officials made his job extremely difficult until he agreed to take their concerns to the UNIP youth director. Their dislike of Simutenda stemmed from the fact that he had been *nominated* by the UNIP leadership to take up the position, rather than selected by the youths themselves.<sup>208</sup> Bringing the issue to the attention of the UNIP youth director, Simutenda pointed out that what youth members wanted was 'democracy so as to exercise their rights as members of the Party and for them to be more respected... what they say they even say for those in other areas'.<sup>209</sup> His letter reveals that the issue was not confined to Lusaka, but was also felt by youths outside of the capital.

The turmoil contributed to a violent local power struggle within the Lusaka youth constituency in July 1962. It involved those who supported Mulenga's crusade against UNIP's system of nominations, and those who did not. A vicious confrontation occurred when Mulenga, together with youth chairman

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<sup>207</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, 'Letter to the National Secretary, From Edward Simeo Mulenga, Youth Constituency Secretary', 29 May 1962.

<sup>208</sup> This animosity was to continue, with letters being continually sent calling for his resignation: British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, 'Letter to Director of Youth Movement, From B Mbuye, UNIP Youth Vice Constituency Chairman and W B Sauti, UNIP Youth Constituency Secretary', 18 June 1962.

<sup>209</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, 'Letter to Director of Youth Movement, From D M Simutenda, Regional Youth Organiser', 29 April 1962.

Elias Chanda, went to a youth cabinet meeting and shot at UNIP youth vice chairman, Lazarous Mutua. Two blasts were fired from a pistol but missed, fortunately for Mutua. David Simutenda, in a telegram sent to the UNIP national secretary recalled: 'After Mulenga has shot two shots he ran away... one shell of the shots has been found and a mark of a hole were [sic] one bullet has entered is seen'.<sup>210</sup> As a result of the 'struggle for power, personal prestige and recognition', Dingiswayo Banda, director of the UNIP youth movement, removed Mulenga from his position as youth secretary in Lusaka Constituency.<sup>211</sup> Chinyanta, a youth appointed by Banda, replaced Chanda, who was also stripped of his position. Banda sent a telegram in which he appointed a new cabinet, without instituting an electoral vote, and directed Simutenda, still the youth regional organiser, to implement the changes. This was to cause greater uproar than the nomination of the regional youth official himself.<sup>212</sup>

Banda had kicked a hornet's nest. Already antagonised by the nomination system in place, youths who supported Mulenga were swift in their vitriol, and viciously sincere in their threats; they had continued to support their ringleader notwithstanding the allegations of attempted murder. A slew of shocking and threatening letters, all signed in the name of the 'Lusaka Youth Movement', was sent to the Director of the UNIP youth movement.<sup>213</sup> The opposite of esoteric, the written threats referenced arson and other direct

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<sup>210</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, 'Telegram to the National Secretary, From David Most Simutenda, Regional Youth Organiser', 11 July 1962.

<sup>211</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, 'Telegram to Regional Secretary, From Dingiswayo Banda, Director of Youth Movement', 23 July 1962.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>213</sup> Of course, it is likely not all the members of the UNIP youth league backed these letters.

physical assaults: ‘These days you have to be very careful or else you will find your house on fire, if Mulenga will not be back in few days time. If we shall not see Mulenga back, we shall make you vomit and swallow’.<sup>214</sup> The tone was highly impudent and intended to signal to the *very* top of the UNIP hierarchy that respect could easily be lost if the youths were disrespected and excluded from decision making. In case the threat to Banda’s person had not been made clear enough in the prior warning, it was followed by an even eerier caveat: ‘We require Mulenga now! Now! If failed to that, you will be badly burnt at any time from now... we have written to our friends in the Copperbelt you have to explain when you go to the Copperbelt or else you will find yourself in the river Jo[r]dan which takes water into a dead sea’.<sup>215</sup> The wording of the letter suggested that the question was morphing from a local to a national one, so much so that the Lusaka youths’ ‘friends’ on the Copperbelt now threatened to get involved as well.

The youths defended their aggressive reaction by skilfully using the shifting national context of democratic elections. They cited that Mulenga had the support of the people on the ground, thereby suggesting that his removal had been undemocratic and, by implication, not dissimilar from the very colonial practices that UNIP itself was trying to bring to an end. The youth declared: ‘Banda that is why we don’t want nominations, you had plotted against Mulenga who is a great organisation [sic] he had organised Lusaka Youths. You have no right to remove Mulenga he is an elected by the people not you

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<sup>214</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, ‘Letter to Dingiswayo Banda, UNIP Director of Youth Movement, From Lusaka Youth League’, 26 July 1962.

<sup>215</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, ‘Letter to Dingiswayo Banda, UNIP Director of Youth Movement, From UNIP Lusaka Youth Brigade’, 26 July 1962.

Banda. We have to see to it that Banda you quit from Lusaka stupid bullsheet [sic].<sup>216</sup> It was a delicate issue for UNIP to confront, and it would only be truly resolved in early 1963, when fresh elections for the youth cabinet in Lusaka were called.<sup>217</sup> The lengthy incident reveals that even at the beginnings of electoral democracy in the territory, some groups of youths were not afraid to use violence, or threats of violence, to enforce greater democratic representation for themselves within the party. There was no questioning of whether democratic ideals and violence were antithetical to one another by the youths themselves; rather violence was viewed as instrumental in enforcing their democratic rights and forcing the hand of those with greater power in the party.

The ANC, meanwhile, continued to delegate its youth members the role of ‘protectors’ in preparation for the 1962 election campaign. In Mukuba, Kitwe, directive notes from the ANC youth league instructed that:

Youths should be very active so as to try and suppress the other political parties existing in the country today. The Youth movement in every District should use some effective force to keep the party active and should do everything possible to keep members of the party protected from unnecessary provocation and intimidation from other parties. At any time and where members of the public or other political parties try to make it impossible for the Youths to carry out their work then reasonable force must be used to achieve the desired objective.<sup>218</sup>

Instead of turning a blind eye to violence, the notes reveal that, at least in some circles of the ANC youth movement, ‘reasonable force’ was openly encouraged, not only to protect members of the public, but also – and

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<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>217</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, ‘Letter to Dingiswayo Banda, UNIP Director of Youth Movement, From D M Simutenda, Regional youth Secretary’, 29 January 1963.

<sup>218</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/2/10, ‘ANC Mukuba Youth Movement Directive Notes’, n.d.

importantly – to ‘suppress’ other political parties. As will be seen below, there was a fine line between protector and attacker, avenger and aggressor. It was a line that ANC youths would frequently cross.

### *2.2.2 Youthful Inter-party Violence: Some Introductory Observations*

With the role of youth within the parties re-adjusted, from mid-1962, electioneering went into full swing. Inter-party violence involving youth increased in direct proportion. Such violence exposed how coercion and elections could be ‘enduringly compatible’.<sup>219</sup> Youths deployed a number of different ‘types’ of violence and tactics to capture votes. The work of youth included demanding political documents, threatening violence, stoning houses, riots, and assaults on individuals.<sup>220</sup> Given the comparatively limited size of their membership, youth were disproportionately involved in violence, as a later government inquiry testified.<sup>221</sup>

In addition, the experience of political violence was markedly gendered in both the ANC and the UNIP youth leagues. As Liston Lweendo, a male ANC youth in 1960s Monze, recalled, ‘it was youths’ who were largely involved in violence; ‘mostly it was men but it was mixed. The violent ones were the

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<sup>219</sup> Staniland, ‘Review Article’, p. 99.

<sup>220</sup> *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt: July-August 1963* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1963), p. 7.

<sup>221</sup> Membership figures show youth membership significantly and consistently below the men and women’s leagues. A UNIP membership report for the Choma-Namwala area, dated June 1963, stated that in Choma West youth members numbered only 1024, compared to the men’s league, 1791, and the women’s league, 1520. This pattern was repeated in other parts of the district: Choma East: Men 606, Women 309, Youth 374; Macha: Men 30, Women 18, Youth 10; Mapanza: Men 183, Women 61, Youth 23; Namwala East: Men 361, Women 91, Youth 82; Namwala West: Men 902, Women 303, Youth 132. Data taken from: ‘Membership Reports’, *UNIP Regional Gazette: Choma-Namwala*, 17 June 1963, p. 3 and *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*, p. 7.



guys'.<sup>222</sup> In contrast, he emphasised that the young 'Ladies were naturally peacemakers, so it was the men who used to fight in any given situation'.<sup>223</sup> Female youths from both parties were more likely to be the victims, rather than the perpetrators, of political violence. Agness Lweendo, an ANC youth member in Kalomo at the time, and Emily Kachabe, a UNIP youth member in Mazabuka at the time, both remembered being intimidated out of active politics during the 1962 general election campaign. Agness Lweendo was harassed on her way home by a gang of male UNIP youths, who continued to hound her at night by banging on the door of her house. She noted: 'Since that point I didn't like politics, as politics meant violence, so I had no mind to want to be in politics, that's why I didn't continue'.<sup>224</sup> Emily Kachabe's experience as a female youth in UNIP was no better. She experienced violence from both parties recalling that: 'I joined because they used to beat us and use force on us... This was older people, older men'.<sup>225</sup> On one campaign trip, in which young females were told to dance on trucks, Kachabe was almost stabbed with a knife by the ANC opposition. She recalled how she left the UNIP youth league after that: 'I came home, then I told my father that I was almost stabbed and that is when he said just stop what you're doing'.<sup>226</sup>

The party allegiance of 'youthful perpetrators' of violence likewise tended to vary, depending on whether they operated in an urban or rural setting. This

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<sup>222</sup> Interview with Margaret Kasoka, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>223</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup> Interview with Emily Kachabe, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*

was largely a consequence of the specific regional bases of each party. UNIP's strength rested on the Copperbelt mining towns and other Bemba-speaking areas, whilst the ANC's stronghold was in the agricultural Southern Province, as well as parts of Central Province.<sup>227</sup> Accordingly, UNIP youths were the main perpetrators in urban areas, particularly on the Copperbelt. The violence there involved spontaneous gang-like clashes over territory in the townships. In the more rural southern regions of Zambia, ANC youths were the chief aggressors. They used 'preventive' violence to combat UNIP rivals who attempted to make inroads into the ANC's home turf. Rural violence centred on daily intimidation and property destruction, which had the potential to jeopardise an individual's entire livelihood.

Before exploring patterns of urban and rural violence prior to the 1962 election, it is important to mention one type of youthful violence that transcended different geographical settings: the violence resulting from party card-checking. Countless incidents erupted from such campaigns. Indeed, no type of violence better showed 'the grim intersection of violence and voting' during Zambia's struggle for independence.<sup>228</sup> Although the practice of card-checking was officially banned in 1962, it continued in public places as a mechanism for enforcing party membership and intimidating opposition supporters.<sup>229</sup> A party card signalled a person's political allegiance *and* their allegiance to the independence cause. As Macola points out, 'To be found without a card meant nothing less than rejecting national affiliation and its

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<sup>227</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 91.

<sup>228</sup> Staniland, 'Review Article', p. 99.

<sup>229</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 78.

necessary attributes: freedom and independence'.<sup>230</sup> UNIP staged a significant drive to register voters and gain members. There was a membership fee for the privilege of joining both parties. This meant that gaining members also crucially helped add to party funds.<sup>231</sup> The extent of the intimidation was such that even Kaunda lamented the widespread inclination to view those with different party cards as an 'enemy who should be hit at any time'.<sup>232</sup> In a similar vein an earlier press release by a UFP supporting group called 'Federal Fighting Force' had noted: 'One weapon of intimidation is the 'Party Card'. The after-dark proposition made by small parties of thugs is always the same: 'Buy a card which, when Freedom comes, will enable you to run your own business and have a nice, big house or take a beating'. Often one member of the threatened family is beaten up as demonstration'.<sup>233</sup> The party card was thus a potent symbol of belonging to the national identity espoused by each party and was thus a central feature during many incidents of political violence from 1962 to 1964.

### *2.2.3 Urban Perpetrators: UNIP Youth Violence*

Within urban areas UNIP youths played a prominent role in campaigning. They harassed ANC organisers in the townships and pulled down the campaign posters of the opposition. UNIP youths were responsible for the bulk of canvassing, and painted road signs, houses and schools with party

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<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 250.

<sup>232</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 78.

<sup>233</sup> The statement was intended for release after 5 February 1961 to all Northern and Southern Rhodesian newspapers, the UK Colonial Secretary, and UK based newspapers: The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2527, 'Press Release Regarding Operation "Soothe"', 2 February 1961.

slogans. The main roads of the Copperbelt were painted at one-mile intervals by UNIP youths to assist with the party's campaign.<sup>234</sup> The UNIP youth league also successfully lobbied other youth groups into supporting their party. This effectively provided UNIP youths access to existing networks and helped to rapidly expand their urban influence. For instance, UNIP youths hit the jackpot in Kitwe after securing the support of the mine youth labour movement.<sup>235</sup> Rodger Mwanza, from the mine youth movement, wrote to UNIP's youth director: 'We have strong instructions to the members of the mine youth labour movement to work in close corroboration[sic] with the youth brigade and vote UNIP. The need for qualified young men in this country, the technician administrative officers etc... is treated with urgency in my movement'.<sup>236</sup> For their part, the mine youth labour movement viewed UNIP as the party who would embrace all youth movements and assist the 'frustrated and desperate young men' in the townships with gaining better access to training after independence.<sup>237</sup> The lack of relevant evidence in the party records suggests that incorporating existing, but unconnected, youth movements remained an untapped strategy within the ANC. This was to its detriment in the urban campaigns for the 1962 general election.

Despite its aptitude at networking, UNIP's eventual electoral success in the 1962 election also rested upon the considerable use of violence against ANC

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<sup>234</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 277.

<sup>235</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/1, 'Letter to D. Banda, Director of UNIP Youth Brigade, From Rodger Mwanza of the Mine Youth Movement in Klusakili Township', 8 September 1962.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*

supporters.<sup>238</sup> The sizeable pocket of ANC supporters in Mufulira, for example, experienced significant violence. The fear of UNIP violence and intimidation was such that attendance at ANC meetings in the town declined markedly towards the end of October.<sup>239</sup> Voting results unequivocally demonstrated the success of UNIP violence on the Copperbelt.<sup>240</sup> As a countermeasure, ANC members on the Copperbelt entered into an ‘unholy’ alliance with the UFP, the white settler party. Indeed, the formation of the Copperbelt-based United Anti-UNIP Movement (UAU), between the ANC and the UFP, provided a bulwark against UNIP youth intimidation in the urban political sphere.<sup>241</sup> ANC youths were recruited as UAU bodyguards and received £2 a week out of UFP funds for their efforts.<sup>242</sup> The UAU enabled the ANC to bolster the defensive role of youth within its party, despite its limited resources. This was particularly necessary given that victims could easily be singled out and identified in urban areas due to the language they spoke. In interviews, ANC supporters drew particular emphasis to this aspect, because it was that which ‘would give them away’.<sup>243</sup> Those who attempted to switch languages, shifting to Bemba or Nyanja, the languages commonly spoken by UNIP supporters, were usually found out because of their accents.<sup>244</sup> Indeed, this was a significant method used to identify opposition victims during the electoral campaigns. It is an important reminder that there

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<sup>238</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 50.

<sup>239</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 277.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>241</sup> Congress was promoted as a ‘moderate’ organisation and non-violent ally to UFP.

Nkumbula, who had resumed the ANC presidency after ending his prison sentence in early 1962, was given every kind of help including a white ‘election advisor’ named Roy Horrell. For further detail see: Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 166.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>243</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*

can exist political ‘borders from language itself’.<sup>245</sup> Moreover, it reveals how ethnic identities continued to play an importance to ANC youth, and how they demarcated themselves against UNIP: ‘It was an aspect of tribalism and ethnicity. Language defined everything... Once you speak a particular language you were identified as belonging to a particular group and you would be beaten as such’.<sup>246</sup>

Competition was especially fierce as each party attempted to consolidate control over high density urban areas, which contained high numbers of potential voters.<sup>247</sup> Gang style street battles between UNIP and ANC youth erupted in townships, as each vied for control over select voters, usually those who had not yet been ‘captured’ by either party. In January 1962, at Kabwe, known then as Broken Hill, a particularly vicious ‘lightening battle’ between ANC and UNIP supporters raged.<sup>248</sup> The fight took place following an ANC meeting at Bwacha Township, where Harry Nkumbula had spoken to nearly 400 supporters and condemned UNIP as a party of ‘thugs’.<sup>249</sup> When an open lorry full of ANC supporters went past UNIP supporters, chanting slogans at UNIP members on the street, chaos ensued. A *Central African Mail* reporter recalled how ‘a bitter fight followed... One police officer asked me if I could let a man who had been wounded in the head and had shock rest in my car’.<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> An observation made by the interviewees themselves: *Ibid.*

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>247</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 50.

<sup>248</sup> ‘Fighting Follows ANC Meeting’, *Central African Mail*, 20 January 1962, p. 2.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*

The violence of UNIP youth gangs in the urban sphere appeared to conflict with pronouncements from the upper leadership. Kaunda, in an attempt to stay the violence, announced in the Chingola publication *Our Future*: ‘apart from the fact that it does not pay, we have only our people to get killed’.<sup>251</sup> Yet the uncomfortable truth, regardless of the ‘official’ UNIP view, was that violence assisted the party in its 1962 election victories on the Copperbelt and other urban centres. The ANC director of youth himself warned in June 1962 that: ‘The brutal attacks on us could do a great damage to our party as a whole, for all our members would be fearing to hold an African National Congress membership card in fear of UNIP intimidation, which has been going on for long’.<sup>252</sup> The sustained attacks not only suppressed ANC campaigning efforts, but helped to cow the township populations into submission due to the fear generated by party youth ‘thugs’. Furthermore, the gang-like style of political violence in the urban areas allowed inter-party warfare to blend in with existing lawlessness. In Ndola, district officer Edward Cyril Greenall observed: ‘it was a decidedly unnerving experience for residents of the urban districts to wake up each morning to find the dead bodies of Africans in the townships of the mineworkers... no one knew whether the disturbances were entirely over politics or... a case of old grudges being repaid’.<sup>253</sup> The line between crime and politics was thin indeed.

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<sup>251</sup> ‘No Violence’, *Our Future*, p. 1.

<sup>252</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/2/10, ‘Letter to All ANC Provincial Secretaries, From ANC Director of Youth, Phillip Singoy’, 13 June 1962.

<sup>253</sup> David Coe and E. Cyril Greenall, *Kaunda’s Gaoler: Memoirs of a District Officer in Northern Rhodesia and Zambia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 173.

#### 2.2.4 Rural Aggressors: ANC Youths in Southern and Central Province

In the rural southern areas fewer followers meant that UNIP had to expend greater resources to gain any ground in ANC strongholds.<sup>254</sup> Consequently the tables were turned. Even in Kafue, the gateway town to Southern Province, a UNIP secondary school student wrote to the party's youth league to complain that they had no 'pamphlets of UNIP and others like 'Voice of UNIP', where we can get our information about our party'.<sup>255</sup> Aside from supply chain problems, the most pressing issue for UNIP was the scale of violence their supporters suffered at the hands of ANC youths. Certainly, UNIP youths were much less likely to be the victims, rather than the aggressors, in the southern portion of the country. Their low numbers in these regions left them vulnerable to attack. Reaffirming Macola's perceptive analysis of the ANC's turn to preventive, over retaliatory, violence, this section demonstrates how ANC youth adopted this pre-emptive method in dealing with their UNIP counterparts.

Although Nkumbula criticised UNIP for tormenting ANC supporters outside of Southern and Central provinces ('Their whole history is marred by intimidation and violence on a massive scale'), he did not shy away from occasionally condoning the use of 'retaliatory' violence by ANC followers.<sup>256</sup> His reluctance to condemn all forms of political violence incentivised some

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<sup>254</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 91.

<sup>255</sup> In the secondary school the student claimed that 2/3 were UNIP boys and 1/3 ANC boys: British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/4, 'Letter to UNIP Youth Movement, From Anonymous Student at Kafue Secondary School', 27 October 1962.

<sup>256</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 293.



youths to deploy ‘preventative’ violence to safeguard Congress as a party.<sup>257</sup>

Oral interview material best testifies to this practice. Liston Lweendo, for instance, recalled how ANC youths focused on property destruction in Masaka, Central Province. He starkly noted the destructive force of ANC youth at the microeconomic level:

The way we used to frustrate them, the upcoming party, if one who belongs to the opposition comes up with cattle or animals we would inject those animals with poisonous stuff so the animals could die. If one was a farmer that comes up with a big hectarage[sic] of maize, then the following day you would find all of the maize was slashed down because we wanted only those that belonged to our own party to progress, not the opposition.<sup>258</sup>

In a rural setting, with subsistence farming common place, this technique was just as devastating as physical violence against political victims. An entire family’s livelihood could be wiped out in a single act.<sup>259</sup> During the 1962 election campaign, the use of micro-economic violence was favoured by some youths, including Liston Lweendo, who feared the consequences of physical confrontation: ‘We focused on their property fearing that once you fight you go to jail and you would be arrested’.<sup>260</sup> Getting arrested in smaller towns for political violence was more likely, compared to isolated rural villages, where

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<sup>257</sup> A comprehensive reading of retaliatory and preventative violence can be found here: Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 91.

<sup>258</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

<sup>259</sup> William Barndt’s study on Bolivia, from the 2000s, shows how the intentional destruction of opposition livelihoods can be used to bolster political power. See, William Barndt, ‘Destroying the Opposition’s Livelihood: Pathways to Violence in Bolivia since 2000’, *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 4.3 (2012), pp. 3-37. See also a study on Kenyan ethnic-based politics and pastoral raids: Janpeter Schilling, Francis Opiyo, and Jurgen Scheffran, ‘Raiding Pastoral Livelihoods: Motives and Effects of Violent Conflict in North-western Kenya’, *Pastoralism*, 2.25 (2012), pp. 1-16 and Stephen Jackson, ‘Fortunes of War: The Coltan Trade in the Kivus’, in *Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action*, ed. by Sarah Collinson (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2003), pp. 21-36.

<sup>260</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

police presence was thin on the ground.<sup>261</sup> David Kasoka, whose family were UNIP supporters, recalled that in Mazabuka police resources typically only stretched enough to deal with the more serious incidences of violence, such as murder and riots.<sup>262</sup>

Nevertheless, despite the risk of arrest, daily intimidation and physical fights were the most common form of violence employed by ANC youths within their rural strongholds. Common were scenes such as those witnessed on 1 April 1962, when Congress ‘thugs’ ambushed and stoned UNIP members travelling home on a lorry, after having attended a public meeting addressed by Kaunda.<sup>263</sup> The motivations of ANC youths indicates that they consistently employed ‘preventative’ violence as a strategy to *defend* their party’s local and national interests. George Muyuni, then an 18-year-old ANC youth in Monze, put it frankly: ‘We were increasing the number of this party... when your friends come you would defeat them... with stones, with axes, with spears, you would fight to kill. You would fight to kill so they won’t come back again’.<sup>264</sup> Muyuni demonstrates how an individual ANC youth could have multiple, overlapping motivations to engage in violence. He added that he and his young ANC comrades fought because ‘it was just belonging to different parties. It was just the feeling of belonging’.<sup>265</sup> Muyuni’s motivations ranged from increasing membership numbers and driving out opposition to a feeling of comradeship and party loyalty.<sup>266</sup> Margaret Kasoka’s own

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<sup>261</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 91.

<sup>262</sup> Interview with David Kasoka, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>263</sup> ‘Congress Guards Disband, Two Jailed for Rioting’, *Voice of UNIP*, April 1962, p. 7.

<sup>264</sup> Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*

recollections of incidents in 1962, as a 14-year-old ANC youth living on the outskirts of Mazabuka, likewise show that a tendency existed amongst ANC youths to view violence as a legitimate strategy to prevent UNIP inroads: ‘If you beat them, then they would be scared to campaign and then the [UNIP] population of the country would go down’.<sup>267</sup>

The role of ANC youths, as violent defenders of the party, ensured UNIP made little progress in the Central Province and, especially, the Southern Province of the colony.<sup>268</sup> Their aggressive and pre-emptive use of violence against political opponents enjoyed popular support, as a result of the similar treatment that ANC supporters were receiving in the Copperbelt townships.<sup>269</sup> The scale of harassment of UNIP supporters forced some people out of their homes, as they feared that their homes would be stoned or set alight. David Kasoka, who was then a 10-year-old child and whose family supported UNIP, recalled how: ‘During the campaign, UNIP supporters and Congress supporters would fight, resulting in people sleeping outside of homes. We used to sleep in the bush because we were scared of being beaten’.<sup>270</sup> He added: ‘At night sometimes they could come throwing stones, especially if they hear this place they belong to a different political party. So they follow you throwing stones at you and so forth’.<sup>271</sup> UNIP frustration with the ANC’s continued strength in the Southern and Central provinces was substantial. Its regional party publication, *People’s Voice*, complained: ‘We have frequently

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<sup>267</sup> Interview with Margaret Kasoka, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>268</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 93.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>270</sup> Interview with Margaret Kasoka, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>271</sup> Interview with David Kasoka, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

made appeals to some of our countrymen, who still back the wrong horse even when the race had been won, the ANC is nothing but a decaying cesspool of incorrigible Quislings'.<sup>272</sup>

### 2.2.5 *The Results of the 1962 General Election*

Overall nationalist parties used youths as a political weapon with considerable success during the 1962 election campaign.<sup>273</sup> Inter-party warfare and intimidation led by youths in the run-up to the election reflected the regionalisation of nationalist party politics in Northern Rhodesia. In contrast to the campaign period, voting on the day of the election passed peacefully. The results of the 1962 general election saw UNIP and the ANC between them take over 80,000 votes in the upper roll.<sup>274</sup> UNIP was unsurprisingly dominant in Northern and Luapula Provinces, which it won easily in any areas where ANC candidates stood.<sup>275</sup> Richard Hall points out that assuming that UNIP would have won easily in the 25 uncontested main roll seats, the ANC still had the following of about a fifth of the electorate.<sup>276</sup> In the lower roll the ANC took slightly less than a third of the 826,237 total votes cast.<sup>277</sup> Yet, despite this, the ANC was able to pull off a relative coup, by playing UFP and UNIP off against one another, as neither the UFP nor UNIP had enough numbers to form a government individually. As Macola notes, the ANC 'held

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<sup>272</sup> 'Congress is Resorting to Bribery', *People's Voice*, 16 October 1962, p. 5.

<sup>273</sup> The National Archives, Kew, CO 1015/2527, 'Paper on Intimidation of Individuals and Authorities in Northern Rhodesia', 17 August 1960.

<sup>274</sup> Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, p. 221.

<sup>275</sup> Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 174.

<sup>276</sup> Mulford, *The Politics of Independence*, p. 322. Hall's work states that the UNIP candidates left unopposed were 24: Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 174.

<sup>277</sup> For a more detailed analysis of the election results of 1962 see: Mulford, *The Northern Rhodesia General Election* and Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 86.

the balance of power'.<sup>278</sup> Eventually, after many private talks between the two sides, a young Sikota Wina, who was acting as the UNIP intermediary in these talks was told by the ANC leader himself to: 'Just go tell him [Kaunda] that Harry Nkumbula would be satisfied with Minister of Education'.<sup>279</sup> It was a position that Nkumbula intended to use to help establish Zambia's first university.<sup>280</sup> An uneasy coalition deal was thus struck between the two African nationalist parties, leaving the settler dominated United Federal Party in opposition.<sup>281</sup>

UNIP and the ANC formed Zambia's first all-African cabinet placing the colony decisively on the road to independence.<sup>282</sup> The Central African Federation was all but defunct and was dissolved at the end of 1963.<sup>283</sup> The final independence election was set for 20-21 January 1964 and was the first to be held under universal franchise. In preparation for the election, the territory was divided into 65 main roll and ten reserved roll constituencies.<sup>284</sup> The election campaign for this general election was to be just as tumultuous as the last. Given that UNIP candidates were left unopposed in 25 of the 65 main roll seats, there was greater concentration on campaigning in contested constituencies and especially places where the ANC had been dominant in the 1962 election.<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>279</sup> Interview with Sikota Wina, Lilayi, Lusaka, 20 August 2019.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>281</sup> Tordoff and Molteno, 'Introduction', p. 9.

<sup>282</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 48 and Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 174.

<sup>283</sup> General elections were held in Nyasaland for the Legislative Council in Nyasaland in August 1961. The aftermath of the election left all five elected Executive Council seats available for the Malawi Congress Party, the African led nationalist party in the colony. Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, p. 221.

<sup>284</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 318.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 322.

## 2.3 The General Election Campaign of 1964

### 2.3.1 *A Divided Coalition*

The UNIP-ANC coalition government formed at the end of 1962 resulted in a short-lived truce between the two parties. However, the various tensions wrought by the coalition meant that, by May 1963, the truce had for all practical purposes ceased to be effective.<sup>286</sup> UNIP, whilst grappling with the serious challenges of maintaining the coalition, was distracted by the emergence of problematic factions from within its own party. Concern centred around the Barotse secessionist movement in particular. In October 1962, this was intensified when UNIP Secretary General Munukayumbwa Sipalo, a Lozi, was attacked with a petrol bomb. Although his attackers were never caught, Bemba youth league members were blamed for the incident.<sup>287</sup> The event challenged UNIP's assertion to be a national party – a claim which its apparent electoral breakthrough in Barotseland in 1962 had supported.<sup>288</sup> The internal problems faced by UNIP intensified the party's animosity towards the ANC, whose continuing existence likewise countered UNIP's hegemonic claim to be the party of the nation. Such frustrations were released upon ANC supporters at the grassroots level.

This UNIP-driven violence, unsurprisingly, helped to erode the trust of ANC leaders in the coalition. In April 1963, ANC reports pertaining to the situation in schools were regularly fed back to the party's 'high-command'. These

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<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 338.

<sup>287</sup> Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 169.

<sup>288</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 49.

revealed that even the youngest members of the ‘opposition’ had seemingly become legitimate targets in the eyes of UNIP. In Mufulira, ANC children were harassed for their Congress affiliation. At Kansuswa African Township, the children of ANC members were reportedly ‘lined up and whipped [like] slaves’, while the other children shouted UNIP slogans.<sup>289</sup> At Kamuchanga School, UNIP youths attacked the son of the ex-District treasurer in the presence of the teachers and the Headmaster’.<sup>290</sup> As Minister of Education, and as leader of the ANC, Nkumbula himself was incensed by the situation, which contributed to his repeated threats of resignation from the coalition. The situation showed that power sharing had done little to diminish hostilities between the two parties.<sup>291</sup>

Palpable disappointment at the lack of positive change brought about by an African-led government, ironically, also seemed to fan the flames of frustration. Violent confrontations between UNIP and ANC supporters, prior to the 1964 general election, were found to be connected to general feelings of ‘disappointment that the coming to power of a Nationalist Government had not resulted in immediate and widespread benefits to the mass of the people’.<sup>292</sup> UNIP officials, such as Sikota Wina, seemed to suggest that the friction between the two parties on the ground was ‘mostly based on who was the leader’.<sup>293</sup> Pining the blame on personality politics, an article in the

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<sup>289</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/2/10, ‘Letter to the ANC Administrative Secretary, P. Z. Chanda, From ANC Mufulira District Cabinet, Chairman J. M. Sikazwe, Secretary N. J. Masunga, Treasurer J. D. Kopollo’, 6 April 1963.

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>291</sup> Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 169.

<sup>292</sup> *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*, p. 6.

<sup>293</sup> Interview with Sikota Wina, Lilayi, Lusaka, 20 August 2019.

*Zambia Pilot*, a monthly UNIP publication in the areas of Kitwe, Kalulushi and Mufulira, wrote that Congress followers had been ‘mised’ by Nkumbula into developing ‘Strong anti ANC-UNIP coalition feeling’.<sup>294</sup>

However, telegrams sent to the ANC district chairman in Ndola suggest that, at least from the perspective of ANC supporters, the history of inter-party violence was a stronger reason for the continuing hostilities. ANC supporters in Chingola district resented the alliance of ANC and UNIP because, ‘We have been molested, provoked, abused and butchered and houses have been burnt etc. So we are not prepared to combine with UNIP’.<sup>295</sup> Personal grudges held strong amongst ANC supporters and helped to perpetuate the cycle of violence that had begun during the campaign for the 1962 general election. George Muyuni, for one, recalled that violence persisted into the 1964 campaign for the independence election: ‘if you were UNIP and you see someone from ANC you want to beat him. And vice versa, others would do the same.’<sup>296</sup> The continuation of political violence was an embarrassment to Kaunda’s coalition government and considerable efforts were made to keep the full extent of the violence secret. This was successful in the respect that nobody was able to put a verifiable figure on the number of politically motivated fatalities at this time.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> ‘Stubbs and Congress’, *Zambia Pilot*, 16 January 1962, p. 4. *Zambia Pilot* was a monthly publication of the Kitwe, Kalulushi, Mufulira for the United National Independence Party.

<sup>295</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/5/15, ‘Telegrams Received in Favour and Against Coalition Government with UNIP, From ANC District Chairman in Ndola, Daniel Simoloka’, n.d.

<sup>296</sup> Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>297</sup> Attempting to ascertain a figure would certainly be an arduous, but rewarding, task for a future scholar to embark upon. Coe and Greenall, *Kaunda’s Gaoler*, p. 173.



### 2.3.2 UNIP's Migrant Youth and ANC Anti-foreigner Sentiment

The youth leagues of both parties changed relatively little between the two general election campaigns, with one notable exception. This exception was linked to how each party viewed foreigners. For UNIP, any African was viewed as having a duty to involve themselves in the party and drive the territory towards independence. This starkly contrasted the ANC, who monopolized xenophobic and 'nativist' propaganda against anyone perceived to be foreign. Differences in ethnicity and country origins were thus added to the catalogue of justifications for violence within the Congress youth league. As will be discussed in a later chapter<sup>298</sup>, this monopoly on xenophobic violence was to change hands in the immediate independence era, when it would be UNIP youths instead who spearheaded violent campaigns against foreigners.

In an attempt to portray itself as the 'embodiment' of an embryonic Zambian nation, UNIP was keen to bring any voting age individuals into its party. This focus deviated minimally from its position prior to the 1962 election. Indeed, in 1959, the UNIP regional president in Lusaka had written to ANC headquarters and declared: 'A citizen is a person whose origin and destiny cannot be placed in any other country other than that which is domiciled... On this basis therefore, all Africans are not deviates [sic]: all Africans are citizens by birth'.<sup>299</sup> Following a statement released by Nkumbula that Malawians should not meddle in Northern Rhodesian politics, a 1962 UNIP

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<sup>298</sup> See chapter four of this thesis, pp. 219-241.

<sup>299</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/5/15, 'Letter to ANC Headquarters, From UNIP Regional President, J. H. Chimba', 23 February 1959.

press statement insisted that: ‘the worst blunder we could make as African Nationalists is to give imperialists and their agents the impression that we (the Africans) are bickering and sniping at each other’.<sup>300</sup> UNIP youths echoed this ‘internationalism’. Margaret Kasoka recalled that she viewed any African migrants ‘as Zambian... as long as they were blacks it was okay’.<sup>301</sup> Likewise, Joseph Tembo, another UNIP youth, stressed that, ‘There was no “we are from Malawi”’. No. We were united blacks. As long as you were black you belonged’.<sup>302</sup> The *Zambia Pilot* argued that: ‘N Rhodesia people in Nyasaland had to fight with their Malawi mates there, and the Malawians in Zambia will do exactly the same... It is not only the struggle for people in N.R.’<sup>303</sup>

Yet, this approach did not necessarily translate into UNIP youths protecting foreigners from violence. Indeed, the experiences of Tanganikan couples living in Northern Rhodesia at the time reveal how the idea of African inclusivity did not extend to foreigners who did not take part in UNIP activities. In April 1963, frequent complaints were lodged by married Tanganikans in Kitwe who were subjected to nightly visits by UNIP youth leaguers who pressured the couples to burn their marriage and identity certificates.<sup>304</sup> Those who joined nationalist parties from their country of origin became key targets of UNIP youths, who viewed any alternative party allegiance as an affront to their power, and to Zambia’s independence cause.

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<sup>300</sup> ‘Press Statement: Nkumbula’, *Zambia Pilot*, 16 January 1962, p. 24 and ‘Welensky’s Stooze Receives Answer. Malawi Out Says Nkumbula Is Just a Tshombe’, *Voice of UNIP*, April 1962, p. 6.

<sup>301</sup> Interview with Margaret Kasoka, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>302</sup> Interview with Joseph Tembo, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>303</sup> ‘Press Statement: Nkumbula’, *Zambia Pilot*, 16 January 1962, p. 24.

<sup>304</sup> ‘TANU Plea to UNIP on Marriage Papers’, *Central African Mail*, 11 April 1963, p. 1.

Heavily targeted were members of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which was the principal political party in the struggle for sovereignty in the East African state of Tanganyika. In June 1963, for instance, a TANU member was viciously attacked and had his marriage and identification certificates destroyed by UNIP youths.<sup>305</sup>

In contrast, the ANC moved to defend its members rights as the ‘indigenous’ people of Northern Rhodesia, a territory whose borders had been markedly porous during colonisation because of the reliance on labour migrants for the copper mines.<sup>306</sup> This aspect of ANC propaganda has already been studied by Macola, whose work illuminates how anti-foreigner sentiment within the ANC stemmed from the widely held perception that the Bantu Botatwe were ‘the first occupants of Northern Rhodesian soil and the ultimate “indigenous”’.<sup>307</sup> Anti-foreigner rhetoric by the ANC was intimately linked with Kaunda’s personal background, as he himself had Malawian parents.<sup>308</sup> Perhaps because of this, and the privileged political and economic position they had occupied in the colony, Malawians or “Nyasas” became favoured targets of the ANC vitriol.<sup>309</sup>

UNIP’s strategy of inclusion, as a means of winning votes, was reflected in its youth league, which welcomed youths who hailed from outside the colony.

As a result of UNIP drawing upon the large pool of young male migrants who

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<sup>305</sup> ‘UNIP Youths Beat Me – Tanu’, *Central African Mail*, 1 June 1963, p. 8.

<sup>306</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 88.

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*

had travelled to Northern Rhodesia from neighbouring Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia, the ANC began an infuriated campaign against UNIP youths. There were sustained verbal attacks against the UNIP youth league by the ANC Director of Youth, Philip Singoyi. In July 1963, for instance, he accused UNIP's urbanised boys of being foreigners and 'Black Emperiliaists [sic] who are now busy working to make Nyasas Gods and Godesses in your own motherland. Go out in this country and organize, organise so that the future election puts in an Indigenous Government of your own'.<sup>310</sup> Singoyi's statement clearly shows how the ANC youth league mandate grew to encompass the perceived threat of foreigners to the ANC party. Singoyi continued: 'Mr D Banda, UNIP, has instructed further his youths to supress the African National Congress by force and for that he is using youths from Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland being that he has failed to organise the real Northern Rhodesian Youths'.<sup>311</sup>

The argument that UNIP youths were not true Zambians was routinely voiced as the reason why Congress failed to attract similar numbers of youths to its cause and, importantly, was used as a justification for the aggressive tactics employed by Congress's own youths. In April 1960, for instance, a man passing through Lusaka's Mapoloto township, at night, was asked by three ANC 'thugs' if he had a membership card. When the victim said he had none, the youths asked what tribe he was. As soon as he revealed he was a Nyasalander they beat him up with sticks.<sup>312</sup> Although this specific incident

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<sup>310</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/2/10, 'ANC Press Statement to Northern Star by Philip Singoyi, ANC Director of youth', 2 July 1963.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>312</sup> 'Thugs Busy Over Easter in Lusaka', *Central African Mail*, 19 April 1960, p. 16.

took place in April 1960, it is safe to assume from Singoyi's 1963 remarks that similar low-level attacks must have continued to occur in the run-up to the 1964 general election. The undercurrent of tension and violence related to the theme of belonging, and the debates over Zambian citizenship and political patriotism, were to continue throughout the period.

### 2.3.3 *Criminals or Politicians?: Youthful Unrest on the Copperbelt, 1963*

As with the 1962 electoral campaign, violence during the 1964 campaign period varied according to the environment it occurred in. In the rural southern areas of Northern Rhodesia, the sparse records pertaining to youthful activities suggest that retaliatory violence against UNIP supporters continued to be perpetrated by ANC youths, whose activities were justified in 'defensive' terms.<sup>313</sup> As already discussed, the necessity for 'defence' was often imbricated with the politics of xenophobia. But the ANC director of youth continued to emphasise the protective role played by its youth league. He remarked that he had 'instructed my youths... to protect the peace-loving citizens'.<sup>314</sup> The director was perfectly ambiguous in his apologetic statement regarding the political violence: 'The present wave of violence in the country is very regrettable by the African National Congress Youth Movement.'<sup>315</sup> He neither condemned nor condoned the suspected perpetrators, seemingly exculpating the ANC for the part it played.

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<sup>313</sup> This in stark contrast to records pertaining to the Copperbelt in which a dedicated report on political violence at the time exists, see: *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*.

<sup>314</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/2/10, 'ANC Press Statement for Northern Star Newspaper', 2 July 1963.

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*

Urban areas continued to be a major setting for inter-party violence during the election campaign; this was more often than not spearheaded by UNIP youths. The undeniable link between youth and conflict on the Copperbelt was highlighted in the *Report of Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*. The report was ordered when violence erupted on the Copperbelt from July to August 1963.<sup>316</sup> Concern was raised about the high unemployment rate in the townships and the ‘lawlessness’ of school leavers. It was estimated that ‘75 per cent of children leaving primary schools could not obtain employment’.<sup>317</sup> The report calculated that vis-à-vis the 91,000 people employed in the area, there were between 30,000 and 50,000 unemployed people spread throughout the townships.<sup>318</sup> It was these unemployed, mainly young individuals, who were noted to be ‘easy prey to political agitation’.<sup>319</sup> Hall makes a similar claim in his work, suggesting that unemployed youths ‘acted brutally in the name of UNIP to slake their boredom’.<sup>320</sup> The beginning of this chapter has of course demonstrated that youthful motivations for joining politics were far more complicated than Hall surmised; but that they acted brutally in the name of the party is not under question.

Despite the association between youth violence and the youth leagues being fully recognised at the time, the report on the 1963 Copperbelt disturbances recommended that the youth leagues not be disbanded: ‘it is preferable for

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<sup>316</sup> *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*, p. 5.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>320</sup> Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 170.

those militant youths to be subjected to such limited control by their parties as exists, than that they should roam the townships free of all restraint'.<sup>321</sup> The message from the retreating imperial power was clear: so long as African youths were kept reasonably in check – and, presumably, prevented from harassing white settlers – they would face little interference from the Colonial Office. This benefitted UNIP, which – as we know – had put significant effort into recruiting and deploying youths in its youth league. The blind eye turned to the violence performed by the youth leagues increased their aggression against opposition supporters during the 1964 election campaign and set a violent precedent which would remain a feature of politics in an independent Zambia.<sup>322</sup>

Witnesses interviewed for the 1963 inquiry considered the youth organisations of the political parties to be 'attracting the most extreme elements in the community' and expressed disquiet about the inadequacy of control exercised by the nationalist parties over their youth, who 'appeared to have little or no control of their activities'.<sup>323</sup> Adding to this concern, the 'strong-arm' youth groups ostensibly blurred the boundaries between criminal and political activities as they involved themselves in political intimidation during the 1964 election campaign. It became ever more difficult to distinguish between 'roving gangs of youths', who would otherwise be involved in criminal activities, and members of the nationalist youth

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<sup>321</sup> *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*, p. 9.

<sup>322</sup> This is explored in chapter three and four of this thesis, which focus on the connection between violence and the youth leagues during the immediate independence period.

<sup>323</sup> *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*, p. 7.

leagues.<sup>324</sup> Some local residents viewed those in the youth leagues as ‘delinquents who would in any event be engaged in acts of lawlessness whether under the guise of politics’ or not.<sup>325</sup> The nexus between political and criminal violence meant that, in the shadows of the Copperbelt townships, it was easy for petty criminals to ‘reinvent’ themselves as party cadres, with little change in their everyday activities.<sup>326</sup> Indeed, as David Carey and Gema Santamaría note in their work on violence and crime in Latin America, ‘Political and criminal violence have frequently operated, if not in tandem, then on a continuum or in what has been described as a ‘grey zone’’.<sup>327</sup> Youthful intimidation, which ranged from demanding political documents or threatening violence to stoning houses or direct assaults on individuals, could simultaneously help to strengthen a political party and bolster a youth gang’s hold over a specific urban area.

This may partly explain the exponential rise in violence on the Copperbelt in 1963. In Chingola, during the first six months of 1963, there were nearly eight times as many politically motivated incidents as there had been in the corresponding period in 1962.<sup>328</sup> The incidents in Chingola included thirteen cases of homicide and resulted in over 500 people receiving hospital treatment for various injuries. Arson and cases of stoning of houses were regular incidents. Assaults on individuals by ‘roving gangs of youths’ reached

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<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>326</sup> Jeffrey Ross, *The Dynamics of Political Crime* (London: SAGE, 2003), p. x.

<sup>327</sup> David Carey and Gema Santamaría, ‘Introduction: The Politics and Publics of Violence and Crime in Latin America’, in *Violence and Crime in Latin America: Representations and Politics*, ed. by Gema Santamaría and David Carey (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017), p. 5.

<sup>328</sup> *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*, p. 3.



a total of thirty-eight cases alone during the Easter week-end of 13-14 April 1963.<sup>329</sup> Most of these incidents were tied to groups of UNIP youths demanding party cards.<sup>330</sup> In Mufulira, the deterioration of public order was experienced earlier, in February 1963. This took the form of lawlessness by ‘gangs of youths after some political meetings’.<sup>331</sup> The worst incident occurred on 19 May, when a large meeting was followed by no less than three separate riots.<sup>332</sup> UNIP youth violence on the Copperbelt effectively intimidated residents into submission, not only towards the party, but also the youths themselves, as many people feared to be out after dark.<sup>333</sup> Such intimidation doubtlessly helped to secure UNIP’s eventual electoral victory in January 1964.

Indeed, in both the 1962 and 1964 elections, youthful violence was central in mobilising communities, garnering votes and crushing the opposition. This was despite the key differences between the youth leagues of each party. The ANC, for instance, maintained a more conservative role for its youth, who were framed as ‘protectors’ rather than revolutionaries. UNIP, in contrast, embraced a revolutionary role for its youth, which was often at the expense of party discipline. Nevertheless, youths from both these parties formed a crucial component of the independence struggle, directly frustrating the colonial state (as had happened during the Cha Cha Cha with UNIP youths)

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<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>330</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/2/10, ‘Letter to the ANC National Secretary, Job Michello, From ANC Nchanga Branch Secretary, S. Judeer Kapelembe’, 21 June 1963.

<sup>331</sup> *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*, p. 5.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*

and indirectly mobilising the population to vote for African nationalist parties, either through persuasion or coercion.

#### 2.3.4 *The Results of the 1964 General Election*

The results of the 20-21 January 1964 general election meant there was to be no repeat of Nkumbula's erstwhile coup of 1962.<sup>334</sup> The cash-strapped ANC was ruthlessly cut down to size and a victorious UNIP freed from the prospect of having to form another coalition with its rival. UNIP won 69.1 per cent of main roll seats, with 570,612 votes, whilst Congress won 30.5 per cent of main roll seats, with 251,963 votes.<sup>335</sup> The reserved roll seats also revealed a stark difference between the number of votes each party received. UNIP won 6177 votes, whilst the ANC only received 165 votes.<sup>336</sup> This translated into UNIP winning 51 out of 65 seats available, with the ANC winning just nine.<sup>337</sup> Kaunda became Prime Minister of an all-UNIP government with full control of internal affairs, except for defence.<sup>338</sup> The success of UNIP in the election ensured that it was to be the party to take the territory to formal independence in October 1964.<sup>339</sup> It is to this interim period, between the 1964 general election results and official independence, that the next section turns to.

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<sup>334</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 87.

<sup>335</sup> Michael Krennerich, 'Zambia', in *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*, ed. by Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich and Bernard Thibaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 949.

<sup>336</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>337</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 49.

<sup>338</sup> Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, p. 221.

<sup>339</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 87.

## 2.4 Preparing for the Handover of Power: January-October 1964

The election of January 1964 ushered in a dominant, and certainly youthful, UNIP cabinet whose average age was just 36-years-old.<sup>340</sup> At 39 years of age, the UNIP leader was also the youngest Premier in the Commonwealth at the time.<sup>341</sup> The ostensive youthfulness of the anti-colonial revolution was remarked upon by Kaunda himself who emphasised: ‘The pent-up emotions of seventy years of colonialism have to be worked off... we are young and invigorated by our sense of purpose’.<sup>342</sup> He spoke not only of the youngness of the government, but also of the emergent Zambian nation, whose existence was to be formalised on 24 October 1964. Before the legal handover of power there was nine months for UNIP, *and* the ANC, to prepare for independence. Indeed, the efforts of both parties to reorganise their youth to fit into an independent Zambia, and the problems that came with this, form the focus of this section.

UNIP’s key priority between 22 January 1964 and 24 October was to socialise its youth members, transforming them from political agitators into valuable nation-builders. This was to be achieved primarily through the establishment of the Zambia Youth Service (ZYS), a national youth service, which was intended to discipline and reward loyal UNIP youths.<sup>343</sup> Change within the ANC youth league was less drastic, as its young members simply exchanged one fight for another, adapting themselves from anticolonial freedom fighters

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<sup>340</sup> Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, p. 175.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>343</sup> ‘National Youth Service’ and the ‘Zambian Youth Service’ were used interchangeably during this interim period. The institution would be officially known as the Zambian Youth Service from independence.

to bastions of multipartyism. Indeed, Congress feared, correctly, that the UNIP government would usher in a one-party system after independence, effectively threatening the ANC's very existence. As will be explored, this opened the way for more extreme voices within the ANC youth league, who called for a more militaristic approach to the problem and for the league itself to have a much more central position within the party.

#### 2.4.1 UNIP's Problem of Youth

As mentioned above, during the handover period, one serious issue with which UNIP had to grapple was the need to re-socialise Zambian youths, turning them into *builders*, rather than *breakers*, of society.<sup>344</sup> As a 1963 government report frankly warned:

It does not seem to us that the political parties have used the opportunity presented to them by their enthusiastic following of young people to train and educate them in the social skills desirable for nation-building. These citizens of tomorrow need to learn more than the arts of political agitation if they are not to become a threat to all the African leaders themselves hope to achieve.<sup>345</sup>

The UNIP cadres' relationship with the police highlighted this issue most clearly. Indeed, it was not surprising that relations between youth and police were tense, given that most of their interactions had involved youths being arrested for illicit party activities: 'The issue of arresting was very common, pushing us into jail was very common'.<sup>346</sup> Police heavy-handedness during the Cha Cha Cha had also intensified the suspicion and disdain of youths

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<sup>344</sup> The reference here is to Alcinda Honwana, 'Innocent and Guilty: Child-Soldiers as Interstitial and Tactical Agents', in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. by Alcinda Honwana and Filip De Boeck (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), pp. 31-52.

<sup>345</sup> *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unrest on the Copperbelt*, p. 9.

<sup>346</sup> Interview with Phiri Mbao, Chilenje, Lusaka, 16 August 2019.

towards African officers. Indeed, the colonial police force was composed of large numbers of Africans, members of the colonized indigenous majority, who were, for this reason, often accused of being ‘sell-outs’.<sup>347</sup> During the colonial period, as Muschalek’s study notes, police ‘were not a symbol of security but of the various insecurities that dictated the lives of Africans’.<sup>348</sup> These African police forces provided the colonial state with its ‘coercive power and enforced discriminatory laws’.<sup>349</sup> Police, as the embodiment of colonial repression, were thus subject to threats and attacks by UNIP youths during the fight for independence. In Kitwe, UNIP regional youth organiser, Mr Chikwanda, menacingly cautioned in April 1963 that: ‘The police are misbehaving quite a lot. We would like them to be impartial. If they continue their partiality, I and my 20,000 youths in the region will behave likewise, and will defeat the police at the first minute of clash’.<sup>350</sup> This youthful hostility towards the police, and by extension state authority, had served UNIP well during the anticolonial struggle. But, with UNIP now in full control of the government, defiance against state authority was no longer a welcome trait amongst its youth. The establishment of a national youth service was intended to redirect these threatening energies of youth into something more productive for the emergent country.

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<sup>347</sup> Timothy Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011), p. 1.

<sup>348</sup> Marie Muschalek, *Violence as Usual Policing and the Colonial State in German Southwest Africa* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2019), p. 4.

<sup>349</sup> Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe*, p. 1.

<sup>350</sup> ‘To Party Political Leaders Beware of Idle Youths’, *Central African Mail*, 6 April 1963, p. 21.

Through the formation of a national youth service, UNIP was also keen to reward young people, many of whom had made huge personal sacrifices to help secure Zambian independence. These included the forfeiting of educational opportunities. Even the relatively privileged Sikota Wina highlighted the personal sacrifices made by himself and his brother for UNIP and the liberation cause. Wina recalled that in 1962, whilst he was in detention, he was visited by a Harvard University representative who offered him a scholarship and produced two plane tickets to America. Upon listening to the offer, Wina had declined. The man said ‘What! Mr Wina do you know Harvard University?... do you know how many years Nelson Mandela has been in prison and you’re choosing not to go to Harvard University’.<sup>351</sup> Wina had replied, ‘I have heard a lot about your university... it is one of the best universities, but I am not leaving... as we haven’t yet finished the task we started here and I cannot just abandon it half way through’.<sup>352</sup> Wina reflected that although he sometimes regretted his decision, the liberation struggle was much more important to him than going to Harvard University.<sup>353</sup> Sikota Wina’s brother, Arthur Wina, had also relinquished his education for the party. As a young man, Arthur Wina had successfully secured a scholarship in the United States. He was just three months away from finishing his PhD when he abandoned his studies after being asked to stand in the elections in ‘one of the difficult areas’.<sup>354</sup> The examples of Sikota and Arthur Wina show the extent of commitment and sacrifice youths gave to the Zambian liberation cause. Likewise, ordinary youth league members showed a willingness to

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<sup>351</sup> Interview with Sikota Wina, Lilayi, Lusaka, 20 August 2019.

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid.*

forego self-interest to achieve the shared goal of independence. There existed a common collective mentality amongst youths that ‘Once the country calls, you obey’, signalling an already incipient loyalty to a Zambian nation.<sup>355</sup>

As early as 1962, UNIP had recognised the importance of supporting its youth and not abandoning them to their fate, as many had been expelled from school as a ‘result of their active participation in the Youth Brigade work’.<sup>356</sup> On 23 February 1962, Dingiswayo Banda, Director of the UNIP youth movement, asked all UNIP divisional secretaries to provide the names of the pupils who had been excluded. He wrote that he intended to ‘find some places for some of these youths’ abroad and was attempting to ‘put across my case to some interested bodies’.<sup>357</sup> Banda’s telegram of course reveals that only a limited number of places abroad would be found, leaving many other youths without an education and future opportunities for work.

Many youths wrote to UNIP after the January 1964 general election asking for payment in kind for the loyalty they had shown to the party. Lusaka student Rex Mukena Samwinga wrote urgently to the UNIP national secretary:

What I did is join UNIP at once, in the youth movement, elected a youth Const [sic] Treasurer, through my hard working and experience in the work of organisation... My parents are old and poor, they are struggling to pay my school fee.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>356</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/1, ‘Telegram to All UNIP Divisional Secretaries, From Dingiswayo Banda, Director of UNIP Youth Movement’, 23 February 1962.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>358</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/17, ‘Letter to the UNIP National Secretary, From Student Rex Mukena Samwinga in Lusaka’, 28 October 1964.

Another UNIP youth member, A Chomba, sent a desperate letter to the Chingola UNIP regional secretary:

Since I came to this place I am being worried with hunger. You should think even by yourself that I have been to this constituency for one and a quarter year (1 ¼ yr)... Through this condition which I am facing, being a prisoner is better, and all my clothes a tone [sic] that I cannot try to visit in town... Then kindly sir if possible you could send me money to buy some clothes.<sup>359</sup>

It was people like Samwinga and Chomba that Berrings Lombe, the new

National Secretary of the ANC after the exit of Michello, must have had in mind when he told the first ANC Youth Assembly in April 1964 that:

Towns and villages are flooded with those who are wandering from place to place hoping to find a promised job by political parties now controlling the Government or something to eat. Very soon... more so-called freedom fighters who were imported by other political parties to rally behind them will perish from starvation or commit suicide because of massive unemployment.<sup>360</sup>

To be sure, Lombe did not miss the opportunity to highlight the alleged foreignness of the ‘starving’ youths; yet he had certainly hit upon an uncomfortable truth about the coming of independence and the inheritance of power from the colonial government. Indeed, UNIP, as the party in power, faced a particularly momentous burden in dealing with the challenging social problem of youth – a task formerly the responsibility of the colonial government – and one in which little headway had been made.

Although youth unemployment had been used to the advantage of the nationalist parties in recruiting young people to the nationalist cause, this matter now had the potential to threaten the independence government if it

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<sup>359</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/11, ‘Letter to Chingola UNIP Regional Secretary, From A. Chomba, UNIP Youth Member’, 25 April 1964.

<sup>360</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/1, ‘Speech Delivered by the National Secretary to the First Youth Assembly Held in the National Assembly Chamber at Chilenje Headquarters’, 18 April 1964.



was not promptly addressed. It was, after all, an issue that extended beyond party politics. An article in the *Central African Mail* implored that, ‘an all-out effort must be made to employ these youths in some way. Otherwise, they will become a menace to the country. They will become gangsters and tsotsis, preying on useful citizens. This will not have been their fault’.<sup>361</sup> The expectations of youth, that they would be able to improve their lot in life following independence, added to the pressure to come up with a workable national solution.

The UNIP Director of Youth had recommended a solution to this issue back in 1962. Dingiswayo Banda detailed his vision at the 1962 annual conference: ‘It is my desire that sooner or later there must be established here one youth movement to which the youths of both sexes must belong and that there will be no exception whether such youths are in school or not. From the age of 5 to 30 years we shall work hard to put all in the Youth Movement’.<sup>362</sup> This was not an entirely novel idea: other newly independent nations on the continent had already begun establishing their own national youth services at this time, such as Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika.<sup>363</sup> Most of these had had Israeli backing, as Israel had hoped to use the youth training programs as an entry point to Africa.<sup>364</sup> By May 1963, UNIP youths were already helping communities with building projects similar to those that the future ZYS would

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<sup>361</sup> ‘To Party Political Leaders Beware of Idle Youths’, *Central African Mail*, 6 April 1963, p. 21.

<sup>362</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/2/8/2/1, ‘Report Submitted to Annual Conference by UNIP Director of Youth Movement, Dingiswayo Banda’ (1962).

<sup>363</sup> Uganda had achieved independence in 1962, Kenya in 1963 and Tanganyika in 1961.

<sup>364</sup> Uganda for instance asked for Israeli assistance in setting up a national youth service in 1963. See, Steven Carol, *From Jerusalem to the Lion of Judah and Beyond: Israel's Foreign Policy in East Africa* (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2012), p. 74.

embark upon. According to a report by the Youth Development Council, in rural areas, youths had made roads to connect villages together, constructed bridges and helped to dig wells.<sup>365</sup> The UNIP proposal for the establishment of a national youth service was thus not entirely fortuitous, given the triple need to socialise, reward and employ UNIP and non-UNIP youths alike, and that there had already been existing blueprints for national youth services elsewhere on the continent.

#### *2.4.2 Impartial or Partisan?: UNIP's Vision for the National Youth Service*

Although the national youth service was premised on the laudable task of youth empowerment, the policies and structures proposed by the UNIP government created significant inter-party tension. In the aforementioned report, Dingiswayo Banda declared: 'these are the fathers, mothers and tomorrow's custodian of Zambia, the way the Youths of this country are brought up must be our main task now.'<sup>366</sup> He continued: 'the African mentality in colonies is almost beyond redemption... we have to go back to our old days when the African of this country was proud of his drums and dances, his traditions, customs, culture... To bring these things to life again the youths of Zambia must first of all be decolonised in their mental and physical outlook.'<sup>367</sup> However, the ANC did not trust that this process of 'mental decolonisation', led by a UNIP government, would remain free from party interests.

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<sup>365</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder' (1963).

<sup>366</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/2/8/2/1, 'Report Submitted to Annual Conference by UNIP Director of Youth Movement, Dingiswayo Banda' (1962).

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*

The initial system to recruit youths to the national youth service via UNIP regional secretaries was particularly partisan and appeared to confirm the ANC's fears. Indeed, the UNIP youth league freely admitted it intended to act: 'as liaison between the Government and the Party development schemes of state'.<sup>368</sup> This early blurring of boundaries between party and state hinted at UNIP's later inclinations to use state resources in an effort to erode the multiparty system. Numerous application letters for the ZYS camps were sent by UNIP youths to UNIP officials. Webster Hamoonga, for instance, was a member of the UNIP youth league. In his application, he wrote: 'I beg to be registered in a list of the youths going into the Zambia Youth Service Camps. I am a youth of 18 years old. I passed my std VI (6) in 1962 and am unemployed'.<sup>369</sup> The following correspondence between UNIP youth, Johnston M Musukwa, and M S Bwebya, UNIP Youth Regional Secretary for Kitwe, reveals that the UNIP youth regional secretaries were also in charge of distributing the transfer forms for the youth service camps. Musukwa wrote: 'The help is this I want you to send me a transfer form for youth camps... please help me for this matter... They said you are a loafer so go everywhere you want that is why'.<sup>370</sup> Subsequent letters revealed that Musukwa was selected for the Kitwe camp.<sup>371</sup> Such examples illuminate the beginnings of the blurring of boundaries between party and government, in

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<sup>368</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder' (1963).

<sup>369</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/17, 'Letter to the UNIP National Youth Secretary, From Mazabuka Youth, Webster Hamoonga', 26 May 1964.

<sup>370</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/11, 'Letter to a UNIP Secretary, From Johnston M Musukwa, UNIP Youth Member', 20 July 1964.

<sup>371</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/11, 'Telegram to Kitwe Camp Director, From M S Bwebya, UNIP Youth Regional Secretary', Kitwe, 21 July 1964.

which UNIP used government resources to the advantage of its own party youths.

The ANC was extraordinarily disturbed by the shape the Zambian national youth service was taking. This was made clear in the minutes of the ANC youth movement territorial working committee held in April 1964. ‘The National Youth Service’, participants stated, ‘should not be biased and it must be known that such extravagance shall never be tolerated in this Country’.<sup>372</sup> An ANC member for Central Province called the planned national youth service a ‘useless institute bound to collapse’.<sup>373</sup> He said that it was an excellent idea but that it had ‘been constituted on the wrong basis’.<sup>374</sup> He explained that, ‘If the Minister concerned had thought of all sections of the people, I am telling you, it would help this country to lessen unemployment and crime among the Youth. But how can it succeed when other people are treated as sub-human beings. We must take serious steps against this, and work for a better representative board of Directors’.<sup>375</sup> Certainly, the ANC youth league, like the UNIP youth league, had a long-term commitment to unemployed young people. Its policy circa 1963 was to encourage them to ‘be ready to take any jobs in agriculture or manual work’.<sup>376</sup> The main issue with the proposed ZYS was its apparent political biases. On the contrary, at least in theory, the ANC aimed to ‘encourage the coming together of youths

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<sup>372</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/2/10, ‘Minutes of the First Session of the ANC Youth Movement Territorial Working Committee’, 18 April 1964.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>376</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder’ (1963).

of different political parties, of churches, and of other voluntary societies, whatever their race or creed'.<sup>377</sup> This helps to explain the anger at the composition of the ZYS' eventual Board of Directors, whose members were drawn from 'one political party'.<sup>378</sup> This was unanimously condemned by the assembly.<sup>379</sup> Indeed, the UNIP government had opened itself up to severe criticism from the ANC, as the national youth services' board of directors had entirely excluded *anyone* belonging to the opposition.<sup>380</sup> This again signalled UNIP's early autocratic tendencies; thus, the ANC's critique of the structure and operation of the ZYS cut much deeper, to a fear that UNIP was creeping towards a one-party system. The ANC's protests were effectively protests against its own demise as a party. This explains the serious threat issued to the UNIP government if it did not reform the nascent national youth service into a politically impartial movement, with a multiparty board of directors.

Section B of the resolutions read as follows:

if our demands are not considered as they stand, the Assembly may be forced to call the [ANC] Youth Movement in Northern Rhodesia to resort to civil disobedience at mass organised rallies on a large scale. The youths in Northern Rhodesia are much more concerned to the future lives of the people and cannot be determined by one political party UNIP for the benefit of White and Black imperialisms, which UNIP as a party has committed itself to.<sup>381</sup>

The ANC's own preparation for the handover of power, as the above-mentioned resolutions suggest, rested largely on Congress's pre-emptive fight to maintain a two-party system after independence.

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<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>378</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/2/10, 'Minutes of the First Session of the ANC Youth Movement Territorial Working Committee', 18 April 1964.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*

### 2.4.3 ANC Preparation for the Handover of Power

During the interim period the ANC's key aim was to secure its future. This meant fighting UNIP's autocratic tendencies, evidently by any means necessary. As early as December 1963, this was a concern of W. B. Sauti, the ANC Director of Youth Movement and Director of Elections at the time. Addressing all provincial, district and branch ANC youth secretaries, he wrote: 'Youth of Northern Rhodesia, take note that you are the builders of a progressive democratic assistant order of your mother Northern Rhodesia'.<sup>382</sup> The role of the ANC youth league shifted from being an organisation entrusted with the protection of the party to one that, additionally, also served to protect multiparty politics in a nearly independent Zambia. Just a month prior to the 1964 general election, Sauti was resolute in his call for total discipline from ANC youths: 'All must endeavour to receive independence on the right lines... In any political struggle for national freedom undisciplined youth cannot be useful unless they maintain a certain standard of Party discipline and become loyal to the Party engaged in the task'.<sup>383</sup> However, besides from calling for extreme discipline, he gave little detail as to how ANC youths were also to protect multipartyism. Indeed, practically, the ANC youth league was in a sorry state following the January 1964 general election.

The ANC's youth league struggled with obtaining sufficient resources to support its youths, as the party as a whole struggled with limited finances.

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<sup>382</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/20, 'Letter to ANC Youth Provincial Secretaries, District Secretaries and Branch Secretaries, From W. B. Sauti, ANC Director of Youth Movement and Director of Elections', December 1963.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*

Unlike UNIP, the ANC could not fallback upon government means. In March 1964, in a reply to an ANC youth who was asking for basic supplies, the new ANC Director of Youth, B Kalota, admitted:

I would be failing in my duty if I did hide the fact that I am unable to provide you with all these necessary things which you so much require. The only supplies that I would perhaps be able to give you are cards and files. I am sure you shall not doubt my willingness to see you financed, but we are really in financial embarassment [sic] here in the H/Q. We have neither transport nor Office equipment here, but we may soon recover from this financial shock.<sup>384</sup>

B D Kalota had replaced W B Sauti as the ANC Director of Youth after the 1964 general election, and, as his comment shows, was a lot more forthright than his predecessor. He was also certainly more militant in his thinking. In a statement of the aims of the youth movement, the same Kalota and the ANC youth secretary, R M Inambao, stated that: ‘The Youth Movement of African National Congress would not allow its members to leave the Party, without bearing the consequences, of such cowardly and malicious acts’.<sup>385</sup> Kalota also aimed to secure greater recognition and authority of the youth league within the main party. This is why he called for less interference from the party elders – ‘The Youth Movement requests the Party as a whole to let the Youths organise (fairly) freely without obstruction from any one’ – even as he declared that the ANC youth league would involve itself in affairs within the main body.<sup>386</sup> Aim number nine, for example, stated that: ‘The Youth Movement would not allow the Leaders of the Party, to behave like Lords’.<sup>387</sup>

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<sup>384</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/17, ‘Letter to ANC District Youth League Secretary of Mankoya, From B. D. Kalota, ANC Director of Youth League’, 31 March 1964.

<sup>385</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/20, ‘Statement of Aims of the Youth Movement Written by B D Kalota, Director of ANC Youth and R M Inambao, Secretary of ANC Youth’, 20 February 1964.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*

This was clearly a stark difference to the ANC youth league in previous years, which had been quite content to follow the orders of the upper-leadership of the ANC. Kalota's intentions likely stemmed from a desire for the ANC youth league to 'catch-up' with its UNIP rivals. The UNIP youth league had unequivocally surpassed the ANC's organisation in terms of effectiveness in its daily running and recruitment.

From March-April 1964, Kalota expanded the pre-existing militarism of the ANC youth league, with a focus on protecting multiparty democracy. The gravity of this task was likened to that of the liberation struggle itself. It was emphasised to youths that the: 'time has come for you and we to toil for the true Freedom of our Mother country. We must be prepared to go to jail, be hanged or killed... while fighting for freedom. We must form a united front and oppose UNIP in and out'.<sup>388</sup> Indeed, ANC youths were bluntly and repeatedly told that they must expect to go to jail for the cause. Kalota cautioned: 'I as your Director shall never accept any loafers who are not prepared to go to jail in the rank and file of this Youth Movement'.<sup>389</sup> The first session of the ANC youth movement territorial working committee in April 1962, expressed: 'Remember we are the backbone of this Mother Organisation, hence we must toil and be imprisoned if that is the only way which can bring us a democratic Sovereign Rule'.<sup>390</sup> The youths were encouraged to secure the future of Zambia once again, ensuring that the 'Govt must be of the Nation and not for the Party' - an obvious reference to UNIP's

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<sup>388</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/2/10, 'Minutes of the First Session of the ANC Youth Movement Territorial Working Committee', 18 April 1964.

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*



creeping abuse of government power.<sup>391</sup> Thus, rather than the ANC's electoral failure leading to political capitulation, the ANC youth league proposed to renew the 'fight' for freedom. Congress youths led this radicalisation, as the ANC youth territorial working committee announced: 'Remember you are the eyes and protectors of the party. We need in Northern Rhodesia young people with sound knowledge to help achieve a good Government which will not deprive the people of their Freedom'.<sup>392</sup> Protecting the future of multipartyism, and by extension the ANC's very existence, was thus at the heart of this rhetorical escalation. However, it was only very occasionally that this rhetoric resulted in any kind of physical altercation between ANC supporters and their political opponents.<sup>393</sup>

Nonetheless, these efforts at reinvigorating the ANC youth seem to have wavered as 1964 ebbed ever closer to the date of official Zambian independence. The 'fight' to maintain a multiparty system in an independent Zambia seemed to increasingly fall on the youth alone. Towards the end of the year, Kalota became an ever more vocal critic of his own party's leadership, who he viewed as dragging their feet and not fully utilising the youth league, who were in Kalota's eyes more than up to the task at hand. Initially, Kalota had drawn upon the 'cult of personality' that had grown up around the image of the ANC's leader. This was in an attempt to manoeuvre the youth league into a more favourable position within the wider party.

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<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>393</sup> An example of one of these rare incidents occurred on 10 February 1964, when a man in Chibolya township in Lusaka was set upon by a group of ANC supporters who struck him on the face and beat him up for failing to declare his political allegiance. 'Caught for Vengeance', *Voice of UNIP*, March 1964, p. 19.

Nkumbula was frequently referred to as ‘our Messiah’ by youth leaders in an attempt to emphasise their unswerving loyalty to the party.<sup>394</sup> Binding together the image of the youth league and Nkumbula was intended to make it harder for others in the party leadership to disagree with what was said, as criticism against the youth party risked also being viewed as criticism against Nkumbula himself. As Frank Dikötter points out in his work exploring cults of personality, a cult could be used to debase ‘allies and rivals alike, forcing them to collaborate through subordination’.<sup>395</sup> Kalota used this reality to considerable effect. In an earlier speech, he had declared: ‘I must warn you strongly that my Youth Wing is not going to tolerate any divisions... We must all make a united front to deal with anyone who tries to mislead the people. If you hear anyone criticising Nkumbula that person must bear the consequences of such malice. In fact, he will have done enough to provoke you. Nkumbula is our Messiah.’<sup>396</sup>

By August 1964, however, Kalota seemed to have all but given up on the ANC’s ‘Messiah’. His efforts to obtain greater influence for the youth league in the wider party had seemingly failed. This was also a time of particular political tension, as disturbances between the religious Lumpa movement and the government erupted in July-August 1964.<sup>397</sup> The military response by the

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<sup>394</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/4/1, ‘Speech by B D Kalota, ANC Director of Youth to the Youth Territorial Working Committee’, 18 April 1964.

<sup>395</sup> Frank Dikötter, *Dictators: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing 2019), p. iv.

<sup>396</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/4/1, ‘Speech by B D Kalota, ANC Director of Youth to the Youth Territorial Working Committee’, 18 April 1964.

<sup>397</sup> The Lumpa massacre falls outside the purview of this chapter. For a detailed analysis, see David Gordon, ‘Rebellion or Massacre?: The UNIP-Lumpa Conflict’, in *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*, ed. by Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 45–76. Mick Bond, *From*

UNIP government against the Lumpa church followers, who were viewed as a non-party opposition, indicated once again UNIP's autocratic tendencies.<sup>398</sup> Accordingly, Kalota was significantly disillusioned with ANC progress in safeguarding opposition politics and multiparty democracy. In a joint letter to the ANC national secretary, he and Inambao wrote: 'We have defended the National President on political platform and in Public, painting a good picture as our Messiah, but then he disappoints the people at the last hour. We must make it abundantly clear, that if maintaining two Party System in Northern Rhodesia means imprisonment, deportation and rustication, then we will face it, our stand in Congress is un-shakeable.'<sup>399</sup> The ANC leadership's apparent lack of fervour in adopting a more aggressive approach to combating the UNIP government's anti-opposition stance was denounced by the ANC youth director. His desolate conclusion was: 'We have wasted our time in Congress and therefore we must know the future of the Party'.<sup>400</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The ANC youth league thus still seemed to be stuck fighting for a greater role in the party, as had been the case prior to the initial ANC/ZANC-UNIP split. Perhaps because more conservative youths had stayed in Congress, for all the fiery speeches given by Kalota, the failure of the 1964 struggle to obtain greater party authority for the youth league was met with comparatively quiet

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*Northern Rhodesia to Zambia: Recollections of a DO/DC, 1926-73* (Lusaka: Gadsden Publishers, 2014), p. 71.

<sup>398</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 105.

<sup>399</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/24, 'Letter to ANC National Secretary, From B D Kalota, ANC Director of Youth, and R M Inambao, ANC Secretary of Youth', 22 August 1964.

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*

acceptance. The ANC never progressed past its traditionalist view of youth as ‘protectors’ by the time independence was formalised and, UNIP continued to embrace a revolutionary role for its youth, at the expense of party discipline. Additionally, the political divergence of highly educated youths and their lumpen cousins continued into the postcolonial period, though their experiences would gradually converge towards the end of UNIP’s rule.<sup>401</sup> This chapter’s exposure of the ubiquity of political violence, and the role of Zambian youth within this, also continued into independence. Indeed, despite the frustrations of not being able to respond to the interim political situation in a more assertive fashion, ANC youths certainly got the opportunity to do so during the immediate independence period, as UNIP and the ANC found themselves once more locked in electoral conflict.

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<sup>401</sup> See especially, chapter six of this thesis, pp. 355-406.

## **Chapter Three: ‘Sacrificial Lambs’: Youth During Zambia’s First Republic, 1964-1972**

### **Introduction**

In the immediate post-independence period, Zambia’s ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), faced considerable challenges, both from outside and from within the party.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, far from bringing an end to political strife, independence exposed and laid bare the existence and multiplicity of competing visions for the nation’s future.<sup>2</sup> The fragile alliances forged during the anti-colonial struggle were rendered obsolete in the absence of a ‘common enemy’ to fight against.<sup>3</sup> During Zambia’s First Republic, the country remained a multiparty democracy from 1964 up until a one-party system was introduced in 1972.<sup>4</sup> The longstanding African National Congress (ANC) remained in existence throughout the period, and was also joined by other opposition parties which emerged from splits within UNIP itself.<sup>5</sup> The most important of these were the United Party (UP), led by Mundia and the United Progressive Party (UPP), led by notable Bemba and originally UNIP politician Simon Kapwepwe.<sup>6</sup> The existence – and, from the late 1960s,

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<sup>1</sup> Jan Pettman, ‘Zambia’s Second Republic —the Establishment of a One-Party State’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 12.2 (1974), p. 231.

<sup>2</sup> Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), p. 53.

<sup>3</sup> Pettman, ‘Zambia’s Second Republic’, p. 231.

<sup>4</sup> Macola, Giacomo, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 95.

<sup>5</sup> Pettman, ‘Zambia’s Second Republic’, p. 233.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

growing strength – of these opposition forces meant that UNIP became increasingly keen to introduce a *de jure* one-party dispensation to keep power.

As a number of revisionist works have argued, UNIP endeavoured to deal with such ‘subversive’ elements by fashioning itself as the only legitimate authority and embodiment of the nation, thereby increasingly weaving together the identities of nation, party, state and government.<sup>7</sup> This political philosophy, of course, ‘allowed little room for “loyal opposition”’.<sup>8</sup> Political contestation within this context led to violent forms of exclusion against those deemed a threat to the ruling UNIP government.<sup>9</sup> Violence was frequently deployed as a means of consolidating political power and weakening the opposition, especially at the grassroots level of party competition. Given that youth generally occupied these lower echelons, they were often at the forefront of political violence, a reality usually glossed over in existing Zambianist literature. Zambian youths, as will be shown throughout this chapter, were intimately involved in political violence, often simultaneously as both its perpetrators and victims.

Youth on all fronts became ‘sacrificial lambs’ for the sustenance of the political parties to which they belonged.<sup>10</sup> Certainly, it was the youth who faced the direct consequences of political violence, whilst their leaders reaped

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<sup>7</sup> See especially: Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa* and Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*.

<sup>8</sup> Pettman, ‘Zambia's Second Republic’, p. 231.

<sup>9</sup> Preben Kaarsholm, ‘State of Failure Societies in Collapse? Understandings of Violent Conflict in Africa’, in *Violence, Political Culture and Development in Africa*, ed. by Preben Kaarsholm (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Samuel Okafor, ‘Youth Involvement in Political Violence/Thuggery: A Counter Weight to Democratic Development in Africa’, *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 5.3 (2017), p. 1.

its benefits. The ability and willingness of youths to put their bodies and lives on the line to serve party interests meant that they became a highly sought-after resource in the eyes of the political elites. Yet the youths were not easily controlled or shorn of agency. And so, as will be revealed, at various moments, they were also regarded as posing a threat to those persons or organisations that attempted to direct their energies for political gain. In this sense, especially regarding UNIP youth, there existed a constant tension between employing youthful militancy and suppressing it. Zambian youths were much more unpredictable and combustive than Samuel Okafor's zoological metaphor appears to imply.

### **3.1 Shaping an Independent UNIP Youth**

During the early part of the First Republic, the youth held an especially important place within UNIP and its government. This is perhaps not surprising, given that UNIP itself was a relatively 'youthful' party, whose very inception in 1958 had been the result of a rupture between the moderate elder leaders in the ANC and a number of its more militant younger members.<sup>11</sup> More significant, however, was the critical role the youth wings of UNIP and the ANC had played in mobilising the population during the anti-colonial struggle. At least according to the Committee of the National Convention on Zambia's Development, which in 1967 published a report on the role of youth in the nation, it was then that 'the strength of youth was first

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<sup>11</sup> Thomas Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', *The Journal Modern African Studies*, 7.3 (1969), p. 408.

and fully recognised'.<sup>12</sup> Youth's enthusiasm had been successfully pitted against the colonial order. The creation of the Zambia Youth Service (ZYS) in 1964 was partly underpinned by this feeling; that the party and the youth were indebted to each other and that their relationship should be one of reciprocity.<sup>13</sup> Here the UNIP government employed what Jean-Francois Bayart has dubbed the 'politics of the belly', in which patron-client networks between youths and the government were established in order for the UNIP leadership to maintain support.<sup>14</sup> For example, the ZYS provided vocational training on the understanding that this would improve a youth's future job prospects, and, also lured youths with the promise of potential jobs within the ZYS itself. These functioned as strong incentives for members of UNIP's own youth wing to continue to support a nationalist vision from which the youths stood to benefit materially. The promise of potential future benefits, and UNIP's provisions for youth, offset the often-high personal risks entailed by exposure to political violence in the ruling party's youth wing.

Additionally, the service was established to essentially reorient youthful activities to work *with* state authority, rather than against it, as the strictly confrontational posture of the independence struggle had become untenable in the new dispensation. The eagerness to create a national youth service was thus predictably reinforced by UNIP's new position as head of the

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<sup>12</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report by Committee of the National Convention on Zambia's Development on the Role of the Youth in the Nation, Chaired by the Hon D H Banda' (1967).

<sup>13</sup> Jon Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Renewal', in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. By J. Abbink and W. M. J. van Kessel, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, trans by Mary Harper, Christopher Harrison and Elizabeth Harrison (London: Longman, 1993).



government, and a concern to channel the revolutionary energies of its youth away from anti-authority activities. Indeed, many of Zambia's youth had shown themselves to be an active force in airing their grievances and were substantial stakeholders in the future of the newly independent nation. The Government was therefore acutely aware of the potential threat that the 'frustrated hopes and energies' of youth could pose. The purpose of the ZYS was thus to both reward UNIP youth for their contribution in the liberation struggle and intended to socialise youths from political agitators into valuable nation-builders. As stated in the 1967 annual report of the ZYS, its goals were to: 'provide training in skills or trades with a view to producing semi-skilled artisans', *and* to 'provide training in patriotism, leadership, national consciousness, and the importance of discipline'.<sup>15</sup> Minister of Education, Mr Wesley Nyirenda, warned Zambia's youths that, 'You are the leaders of tomorrow. You must prepare now to discipline yourselves because you cannot expect to discipline others unless you are disciplined'.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, President Kenneth Kaunda noted that the youth should be 'carriers of the national ideals such as discipline and national cleanliness of both mind and body'.<sup>17</sup> These ideals of youth were nearly indistinguishable from UNIP's own youth wing, which has been discussed at length in chapter two. UNIP regional secretary for Kitwe, Mr John Mutunda, for example declared that the youth brigade was 'to help build and discipline the nation, to help and rescue

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<sup>15</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Zambia Youth Service Synopsis of Annual Report', January-December 1967.

<sup>16</sup> 'Advice – and a Warning for UNIP's 'New Leaders', *Times of Zambia*, 29 September 1969, p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report by Committee of the National Convention on Zambia's Development on the Role of the Youth in the Nation, Chaired by the Hon D H Banda' (1967).

those in trouble.’<sup>18</sup> This contiguity between the UNIP youth league and ZYS aims is unsurprising given the close connection between the two organisations. Indeed, as has already been explored in chapter two, the majority of youths who obtained places in the ZYS were already UNIP youth league members, a result of partiality in the recruitment process.<sup>19</sup>

Overall, then, a focus on the need for discipline prevailed within the newly established ZYS and continued to be an important part of political rhetoric which concerned youths. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter five, part of the ZYS training involved military discipline and drills, which was introduced from 1966. For example, one camp manager asserted that drills taught youths to ‘obey every order without question... should an officer give a youth a wrong order the youth leader must carry out the order first and complain about it later’.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, in practice, it was not always easy to achieve these desired effects. In 1968, for instance, a camp in Kafue, near Lusaka, was reportedly plagued by desertions. An exasperated telegram to the National Secretary revealed the difficulties that often arose: ‘Some of the boys run away when they come to Kafue Induction Centre for physical exercises and para-military discipline. They are not used to wake up early in the morning and working hard’.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> ‘Youths to Combat Hooligans’, *Times of Zambia*, 11 March 1969, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Though a national organisation, as chapter two briefly explored – and which chapter five explores in further detail – the realities of the ZYS recruitment process meant that it was predominantly UNIP youths who obtained places. See chapter two, pp. 138-141 and chapter five, pp. 258-289 of this thesis.

<sup>20</sup> See, especially chapter five, pp. 280-283 of this thesis. Also, ‘The Golden Rule Is Discipline’ for Youths’, *Times of Zambia*, 1 May 1967, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, ‘Telegram to National Secretary, M Chona, From the Director of the National Youth Service, A C Chalikulima’, 20 January 1968.

Yet not all ZYS indiscipline, nor violence, was condemned by the UNIP government, so long as it worked towards building the nation envisioned by UNIP. This was most clearly demonstrated in August 1969, when 500 members of the ZYS stormed the Lusaka High Court, in protest at Judge Ifor Evans's decision to quash the sentences imposed on two Portuguese soldiers who had illegally entered Zambia from Angola.<sup>22</sup> The youths dressed in the service's distinctive khaki drill and green berets stormed through the corridors, breaking up everything in sight and pelting the walls with rotten vegetables. A Czechoslovakian diplomat was also beaten-up by the youths outside the court. Many of the youths waved banners in support of President Kaunda with slogans such as 'Revoke [Minister of Justice] Skinner's Appointment Today', 'Away with Imperialistic Judgements', 'Zambia Faces Judicial Assassination', 'An Eye For An Eye'.<sup>23</sup> Presented as a defence of the nation against a perceived foreign threat, these actions attested to the ability of the service to uphold patriotic fervour and allegiance to President Kaunda among ZYS youths. In a stunning move of open encouragement of the youths' violent actions, President Kaunda thanked them for their support and promised to arm the youngsters 'with sophisticated weapons' so that they could be ready to defend the nation against similar forces.<sup>24</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the constitution of the ZYS did not sit well with the ANC, which felt threatened by UNIP's ability to rely on state resources to co-opt the nation's youth. Indeed, due to their limited resources, opposition parties

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<sup>22</sup> 'We Didn't Beat-up Diplomat – ZYS', *Times of Zambia*, 15 August 1969, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> 'Thugs Storm High Court: Judges Hold Out Against Onslaught', *Times of Zambia*, 17 July 1969, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

were not in a position to establish organisations similar in scope and influence to the ZYS. As such, the ruling party was at a distinct advantage in its ability to entice and co-opt youth for political purposes. ANC leader, Harry Nkumbula, argued that the idea of involving the state in the formation of the national youth service was ‘based on Hitlerism, in the same way as Hitler started all those sort of things when he was preparing for damage of the world’.<sup>25</sup> There is, of course, little doubt that the ZYS functioned as a system of patronage for loyal members of UNIP’s own youth wing, many of whom were fast-tracked through the recruitment process upon providing their party membership card number.<sup>26</sup> With this in mind, Nkumbula’s rebuke that ‘Hitler’s Gestapos and the ZYS, established to perpetually maintain UNIP superiority, differ only in names’, was an exaggeration, but one which captured an important dimension of UNIP’s *modus operandi*.<sup>27</sup>

### **3.2 UNIP, Youth, and Violence Against the Opposition**

With the weight of national resources indirectly bolstering the UNIP youth wing, the organisation became an ever more potent source of intimidation and political violence against opposition supporters, as youths readily fought to consolidate a political dispensation in which they felt they had a material stake. As will be shown, UNIP youths were employed to silence divergent

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<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, pp. 106-107.

<sup>26</sup> A case in point, already provided in chapter two of this thesis, was Mazabuka youth, Webster Hamoonga, who wrote to the UNIP National Youth Secretary to ask to be registered in a list of youths going to the Youth Service Camps. Hamoonga even thought it pertinent to include his UNIP membership card number and independence membership card number, as important information when applying for the ZYS. British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/17, ‘Letter to the UNIP National Youth Secretary, From Mazabuka Youth, Webster Hamoonga’, 26 May 1964.

<sup>27</sup> ‘Gestapo, Youths All the Same – Harry’, *Times of Zambia*, 19 July 1969, p. 1.

views and manipulate electoral outcomes, whilst the youth of opposition parties were increasingly cornered in a predominantly defensive position.

During periods of enhanced political tension, the Zambian ruling party (like ruling parties elsewhere on the continent) was not loathed to unleash the violent capacity of its youth wing on opponents.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, given the increasingly tense relations with its Rhodesian and Angolan neighbours, in 1966 the Director of UNIP's youth movement, Dingiswayo Banda, overtly called for the UNIP youth brigade to 'deal with anyone anti-UNIP and Government ruthlessly. The Youth Brigade is now called to action'.<sup>29</sup> Mr Banda was the youth wing's most vehement champion. Thus, a mere one year later, he declared that the 'youth brigade shall, and must fight untiringly to curb any Satanic moves or efforts that could bring mighty UNIP into disrepute', and that the youths must deal with rival parties 'severely'.<sup>30</sup> Many UNIP youths bought into this perceived need. In 1969 Livingstone, where political hooliganism had raged since the hotly contested December 1968 general elections, a *Times of Zambia* reporter asked youths about why they involved themselves in political violence and rioting. A common reply, he wrote, was 'We want to finish them'.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa', p. 15 and Chrispine Owino, 'Socio-economic Status of Youth in Kenya: Implications for Peaceful Elections', in *Youth and Peaceful Elections in Kenya*, ed. by Kimani Njogu (Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 2013), p. 64.

<sup>29</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/26, 'Telegram to All UNIP Youth Constituency Secretaries for Broken Hill Region, From UNIP Regional Youth Publicity Secretary, Dominic B Moomba', 27 May 1966.

<sup>30</sup> 'Banda Appeals to UNIP Youth', *Times of Zambia*, 19 May 1967, p. 9 and 'Tougher UNIP Card Checks to Come: Banda', *Times of Zambia*, 18 June 1968, p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> 'Battle of Livingstone...', *Times of Zambia*, 28 April 1969, p. 6.

A key activity in which the party's youths were regularly engaged following independence was card-checking. As Macola explains, '[h]aving been legalized in the summer of 1965, systematic card-checking in public places became one of UNIP's favourite methods to police the political field and enforce obedience to the party'.<sup>32</sup> Card-checking campaigns routinely took place across the country, such as the one that occurred at a bus terminal in Mumbwa, an ANC stronghold in the Central Province, on 15 December 1969. During the operation, UNIP youths held up a Mongu-Lusaka bus for nearly two hours and threatened to beat-up passengers who did not have a UNIP card. According to one of the passengers, a Mr Susiku Namakando, the youths checking for UNIP cards were menacingly armed with clubs. The same youths had also beaten-up several passengers in a bus from Lusaka the previous day.<sup>33</sup> In another incident in Mufulira, one of the few Copperbelt towns in which UNIP's supremacy could not be taken for granted, a civil servant in the department of Veterinary Services complained he had been dragged from his car by a youth, who was apparently the leader of a group that had enjoined the man to produce his UNIP card. The assault took place when the civil servant told the youths he did not have one and then refused to buy one.<sup>34</sup> The message 'sent' through these often-violent campaigns was manifest: there was a price to be paid for opposing the ruling party.<sup>35</sup> The message was readily absorbed. In Kanyama compound a shop owner who was threatened by youths admitted that he had 'no intention of being beaten-up if

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<sup>32</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 112.

<sup>33</sup> 'UNIP Youths Hold up Bus', *Times of Zambia*, 16 December 1969, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> 'Riot Police Swoop After Muf. Card Check Trouble', *Times of Zambia*, 23 August 1969, p. 1.

<sup>35</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 408.

I can avoid it'.<sup>36</sup> The simplest way to do this, of course, was to disengage from opposition politics and bow to the demands of UNIP.

UNIP youths were also put to good effect in frustrating the organisation of opposition rallies. For example, on 21 February 1965, a total of 50 UNIP youth set upon the chairman of the ANC's Broken Hill branch, who was packing-up chairs and tables shortly after a rally had taken place in Lusaka. The ANC official, Mr Francis Ambote was attacked and assaulted, an act which served to impress upon those who had attended the rally the cost of opposition to the ruling party.<sup>37</sup> In more extreme cases, the price could be life itself. A famous political assassination was that of ANC's Eastern Province president MacDonald Lushinga, murdered by UNIP youths in Fort Jameson (Chipata) in March 1964. As reported by Mr Tembo, he, Lushinga and others were attempting to travel to an ANC meeting when they were stalked by UNIP youths, who eventually attacked them behind an Indian shop where the group had stopped. According to Tembo, this was:

the place where the most cases of violence, UNIP youths have been attacking people, the Indian [shop] owner knew all about this and other past acts but did not inform the police. There were four groups of these youths waiting for Mr Lushinga and it took Mr Lushinga's group two miles of running and fighting. Mr Lushinga died of spear and axes wounds which were severe and Mr Justin Phiri who helped him till at the end received panga cuts and stone bruises when he was protecting Lushinga's body... things are bad and hard work shall be needed to recapture our people back. We have lost many members through intimidation and fear.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> 'Pay up – or Lose Your House, Say 'UNIP Youths'', *Times of Zambia*, 3 November 1970, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> 'Police Did Not Guard Us - ANC', *Times of Zambia*, 27 February 1965, p. 3.

<sup>38</sup> This attack may have been in retaliation for earlier indiscretions of Lushinga, who himself may have been responsible for the death of UNIP official Omelo Mumba in 1962. British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/90, 'Letter to the ANC National Secretary, From Fort Jameson Resident, S M G Tembo', 30 March 1964.

Events such as these were damaging, not only to individual victims, but also to the wider party to which they belonged. Widespread intimidation in select areas meant the ANC often found itself short of candidates during election races. For instance, a candidate for the Chifubu ward (Ndola) was beaten by UNIP activists prior to the 1966 local government elections and concerned about his personal safety, withdrew from the electoral race one week after the attack.<sup>39</sup> Youthful violence thus proved an invaluable means to undermine political opposition to UNIP.

All the same, the increasing powerfulness of the youth movement meant that party discourse placed a greater emphasis on the values of discipline and loyalty than had previously been the case during the anti-colonial struggle.<sup>40</sup> This stemmed from UNIP concerns that its hitherto unbridled youth wing could become autophagic and threaten to usurp the mother party, if not kept under the strict control of party 'elders'. Speeches delivered by UNIP political leaders in the early part of the First Republic were replete with references to the need for a disciplined youth brigade. The aforementioned Nyirenda, for instance, warned youths of the need for discipline when he addressed UNIP youths at a one-day seminar in Lusaka's Hindu Hall.<sup>41</sup> Kaunda, too, stressed that: 'No one can fight for his country if he is not disciplined. I want all youths to take seriously what I say.'<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 112.

<sup>40</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 407.

<sup>41</sup> 'Advice – and a Warning for UNIP's 'New Leaders', *Times of Zambia*, 29 September 1969, p. 7.

<sup>42</sup> 'Kaunda: I Must Have Discipline: You Aren't Policemen, Youths Are Told', *Times of Zambia*, 12 August 1969, p. 7.



In the same 1969 speech, Kaunda berated the fact that UNIP youths had occasionally been involved in ‘scenes’ and had taken it upon themselves to play the role of policemen. This ‘indiscipline’, he urged, ‘must stop [...]’. If you come across a criminal or a thief, or if someone abuses you, do not take the law into your own hands, but report him to the appropriate authorities’.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, the actions of youths ‘playing policemen’ unnerved the upper echelons of the ruling party in several important ways. Firstly, the youths concerned undermined a key apparatus of state control by creating a potential rival to police authority and, by extension, the incumbent government, regardless of the fact that they too were part of UNIP. Secondly, allowing youths law enforcement capabilities would make it more difficult for UNIP to use the police as a vital ‘back-up’ mechanism to restrain youth violence if it became too unwieldy, a method UNIP periodically resorted to. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, it revealed the strength of the UNIP youth brigade in its own right and the potential for maverick regional officials to exploit this powerfulness against official instructions. In Kitwe, for example, the UNIP regional secretary, John Mutunda, advocated that youths be given the power to make arrests to stamp out crime.<sup>44</sup> Kitwe’s Youth Regional Secretary, Evaristo Mutale, also asserted that the youths would be on the look-out for ‘suspicious characters’ 24 hours a day.<sup>45</sup> These practices openly flouted the orders, repeatedly given by Kaunda and others, not to permit youths to control

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<sup>43</sup> ‘Kaunda: I Must Have Discipline: You Aren’t Policemen, Youths Are Told’, *Times of Zambia*, 12 August 1969, p. 7.

<sup>44</sup> ‘Youths Seek Powers of Arrest: Move to Combat Crime Wave’, *Times of Zambia*, 23 April 1969, p. 2.

<sup>45</sup> ‘Youths to Patrol Kitwe: DG Calls for Watch on Rival Parties’, *Times of Zambia*, 14 May 1969, p. 1.

the townships in place of police under any circumstances.<sup>46</sup> Certainly the use of youth in defiance of official party orders was an acute cause for concern, especially given the internal tensions by which UNIP was plagued after independence.<sup>47</sup> We will return to the subject later.

As suggested by the example of Kitwe, ambitious UNIP officials were probably frequently tempted to draw on the youth to foster their own careers within the ruling party. As Obeng notes with reference to the Ghanaian context, that young men needed to form coalitions in order to obtain their personal goals; as such, they often provide willing to do the bidding of 'big men'.<sup>48</sup> In the Zambian context, UNIP 'big men' competed for party posts by using their influence over party youths to their advantage.<sup>49</sup> For example, in February 1971, at Buchi Community Hall in Kitwe, youths staged a walk-out against the appointment of youth regional secretary Mr Davidson. They later admitted that they had been convinced to stage the walk-out as part of an ongoing leadership struggle.<sup>50</sup> In Chimwemwe, a UNIP section leader, Harrison Chimpampa, sent youths to break the windows of a rival's family home and threatened: "If you want to live you must have your last meal here

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<sup>46</sup> This order was again emphasised by Mr Boniface Zulu, Lusaka Urban District Governor, see, 'Zulu Refuses Demand for Youth Squads', *Times of Zambia*, 17 February 1970, p. 2. The eventual acceptance of UNIP youths as vigilantes is explored in chapter six. See, pp. 379-383 of this thesis.

<sup>47</sup> Pettman, 'Zambia's Second Republic', p. 233.

<sup>48</sup> Pashington Obeng, 'Gendered Nationalism: Forms of Masculinity in Modern Asante of Ghana', in *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa*, ed. by Lisa Lindsay and Stephan Miescher (London: Heinemann, 2003), p. 201.

<sup>49</sup> Interestingly, Thomas Rasmussen found that in the Northern and Luapula Provinces, where UNIP was unchallenged by any rival party, competition for important party posts was actually keener than elsewhere. Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 416.

<sup>50</sup> 'Protest Youths Are for It!: After That UNIP Walkout...', *Times of Zambia*, 12 February 1971, p. 7.

today and go”<sup>51</sup> The incident exposed the tendency on the part of some lower-level politicians to mobilize party youths with a view to intimidating personal rivals, thereby defending or promoting positions of personal power. The increase in such incidents was yet another reason why UNIP top leaders felt impelled to lay growing emphasis on the need for discipline in the UNIP youth wing. This stress on discipline – itself a result of the growing assertiveness of the party’s youth organization – marked a palpable shift in the way UNIP leadership tried to manage its youth wing.

### **3.3 The Role of Youth in the ANC**

In the immediate post-independence period, in contrast to UNIP, the ANC, led by the ‘old man’ of Zambian nationalism, Harry Nkumbula, was both less able and inclined to use its relatively weak youth wing to the same violent effect.<sup>52</sup> As with many post-colonial African opposition parties, the ANC had very limited funds with which to cultivate its youth wing and win support. In this regard, it could hardly compete with UNIP, which acted as a *de facto* distributor of state resources.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, the ANC was also a victim of its own organisational, financial and leadership weaknesses, and could thus not support its youth wing to the same extent as the ruling party.<sup>54</sup> ANC youths even wrote exasperated letters complaining that they ‘suffer from hunger’,

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<sup>51</sup> ‘Violence Threats: UNIP Man Gets Suspended Sentence’, *Times of Zambia*, 5 February 1969, p. 7.

<sup>52</sup> Pettman, ‘Zambia’s Second Republic’, p. 232.

<sup>53</sup> Rasmussen, ‘Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia’, p. 409.

<sup>54</sup> Robert Molteno and Ian Scott, ‘The 1968 General Election and the Political System’, in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 156.

and that ANC leaders in their areas ‘don’t look [after] us well... they are not interested in what we are doing, they just waste the money for beer’.<sup>55</sup>

The ANC was not even able to properly fund card-selling campaigns of the kind which, as we have seen, were frequently organised and carried out by UNIP youth. One example, from many, is provided by the Barotseland Province, where a pleading letter was sent by the District Chairman of the ANC Youth Brigade of Mankoya, who wrote: ‘As ANC here in Mankoya district will be damaged because of having no youth at our District office, as I cannot keep them without food to feed them. Therefore, this is up to you that you don’t wish to listen to our complaints. Because of your negligence you have pushed ANC in a pit here in Mankoya’.<sup>56</sup> The subsequent reply received from the leadership of the ANC youth league admitted that the party was unable to offer any material assistance.<sup>57</sup> The frustrations of ANC youth leaders were palpable. Certainly, the lack of assistance from the wider ANC body meant its youth members were working to rally support with the equivalent of both hands tied behind their backs. A natural outcome of these financial stringencies was the increasing loss of public members. As W. Donovan, the ANC Youth Chairman in Chipapa ward, Mambwe district, wrote despairingly in the summer of 1965 ‘we have no power at all’.<sup>58</sup> The weakness of the ANC youth brigade in his area, he argued, had enabled UNIP

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<sup>55</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/100, ‘Letter to African National Congress, From ANC Youth for Livingstone’, 23 July 1965.

<sup>56</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/36, ‘Letter to the ANC Youth Director, From District Chairman of the ANC Youth Brigade Mankoya District’, 6 March 1964.

<sup>57</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/17, ‘Letter to ANC District Youth League Secretary of Mankoya, From B. D. Kalota, ANC Director of Youth League’, 31 March 1964.

<sup>58</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/100, ‘Letter to Chipapa ANC Youth League, From ANC Youth Chairman W Donovan’, 9 August 1965.

youths to gain a foothold: 'UNIP is working very hard in this area and I am quite sure that it will have ½ of the supporters, they are quite sure of this. I was told by one of these fellows that whether we like it or not they are already having some members in this area that bought cards already'.<sup>59</sup>

Many ANC youth also felt disillusioned with the seeming lack of interest in youth work on the part of both local and national officials. An ANC youth in Livingstone, for instance, complained in 1965 that 'we youth of National African Congress we do suffer a lot... from hunger... we want you to send us money... Here the leaders they are not interested in what we are doing, they just waste the money for beer... Here they do like National African Congress but the leaders they don't work together'.<sup>60</sup> The very limited resources the ANC could draw upon to fund its youth wing thus allowed UNIP youths to more easily assume control over certain areas, despite the obvious willingness of ANC youths to continue in their political activities.

Given the overall weakness of the ANC youth brigade after 1964, ANC leaders were much more inclined to attempt to use political debate to expose occurrences of UNIP aggression on the ground, rather than taking the path of physical confrontation.<sup>61</sup> At least in the mid-1960s, ANC officials pursued a politics of 'anti-violence' and 'anti-youth'. For instance, to *avoid* 'inter-party' clashes during vigorous card campaigns conducted by UNIP youths, official instructions issued from the ANC's head office apparently advised its

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/100, 'Letter to African National Congress, From ANC Youth for Livingstone', 23 July 1965.

<sup>61</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 411.

supporters to 'buy UNIP cards'.<sup>62</sup> ANC leaders also attempted to air their grievances and garner sympathy through parliamentary debate. As Macola notes, by early 1968, the inspection of political cards had 'become so significant a feature of urban social life in Zambia as to lead Nkumbula to advocate the dissolution of the UNIP youth wing'.<sup>63</sup> Speaking in the National Assembly on 20 August 1968, Nkumbula put it thus:

The youth organisation has been used to terrorise women and children in their own houses. The youth organisations have been interfering with the private lives of many people in this country. They have gone to the bus stops, to the railway stations stopping people intending to go to certain places from catching the bus or the train. They have gone to the same places forcing people to buy this wonderful UNIP card. And if one refuses to buy this UNIP card, he is beaten-up by the youths... Why is the ruling Party... using these innocent little children, poison their minds against other people, teach them to hate, teach them to kill, teach them to steal? Can this actually be condoned by any decent and reasonable persons?<sup>64</sup>

This rhetoric against the existence of youth parties after independence was unsurprising given the scale and intensity of UNIP youth assaults. One such incident, dating to 1969, occurred in Livingstone during a UNIP youth membership drive and involved ANC MP for Choma, Peter Muunga. Mr Muunga claimed a gang of UNIP youths manhandled and heckled him as he was driving along with his wife on UNIP anniversary day. He said the youths, dressed in UNIP uniforms, set on him at Livingstone Post Office. One of them grabbed him by the arm and hit him with a fist. He recalled: '[m]y wife wept as I defended myself from the gang. I failed to find enough time to call the

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<sup>62</sup> 'UNIP Youths Stoned in Card Clash: ANC Men in Mufulira Market Melee', *Times of Zambia*, 26 June 1968, p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 113.

<sup>64</sup> 'National Assembly Debates', 20 August 1968, in Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 113 and William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, 'Parliament', in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 232.

police until I reached home'.<sup>65</sup> In consequence, Muunga called on UNIP leaders to 'regulate' the activities of UNIP youths during membership drives, stressing that '[p]eople must canvas for membership in a peaceful and friendly manner'.<sup>66</sup> Even Nkumbula himself, as the opposition leader, was not exempt from victimisation and intimidation by youths loyal to UNIP. On 16 January 1969, Nkumbula had driven into Mufulira for a party meeting accompanied by some of his aides. They had stopped at a garage in the heart of town to have an exhaust pipe welded. It was then, according to Nkumbula, that 'the youths came'. He claimed that there 'must have been 1,000 of them. Police came to my protection and... I asked to be taken to the police station'.<sup>67</sup> Referring to this and other attacks by UNIP youths against ANC members, Nkumbula warned: 'I'm capable of organising the same sort of thing. I'm trying to avoid it, but provocations unchecked must lead somewhere'.<sup>68</sup>

Indeed, partly because of its organisation weakness and partly because of its liberal leanings, the ANC showed a clear reluctance to condone political violence. However, as had been the case during the liberation struggle, Nkumbula's party was not *entirely* opposed to relying on its own youth wing to defend and protect 'peace loving citizens', if necessary.<sup>69</sup> Naturally, these militant inclinations applied with special force to the Southern Province, where the ANC retained much of its original strength. A key turning point in

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<sup>65</sup> 'Police Crush New Party Violence', *Times of Zambia*, 31 October 1969, p. 1.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> 'Protection for ANC Leader After Muf. Incident', *Times of Zambia*, 17 January 1969, p. 1.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> British Library, London, EAP 121/1/2/10, 'Letter to the ANC National Secretary, Job Michello, From ANC Nchanga Branch Secretary, S. Judeer Kapelembe', 21 June 1963.

this respect came in 1967, when a by-election took place in the Southern Province town of Mazabuka.<sup>70</sup> The decision to 'heat the urban areas' in the Southern Province had been agreed upon at a conference of regional UNIP officials in September 1966, and by the end of the month, Mazabuka was said to be 'torn by party fights'.<sup>71</sup> There were countless reports of intimidation and eruptions of fighting in the area. UNIP youths demanded party cards from people across the town. The fear of being beaten by youths during these card-drives ensured that many people tried to remain in their homes.<sup>72</sup> The extent of intimidation engineered by the UNIP regional secretary Joseph Hamatwi was unequivocally demonstrated when the bulk of the UNIP youth wing in Mazabuka had to be dismantled for fear that it had gone out of control.<sup>73</sup> The Resident Minister of Southern Province, Maimbolwa Sakubita, was especially jarred that the group of youth implicated in the violence had decided to call itself the 'Sakubita squad'.<sup>74</sup>

Following the ferocity of UNIP's election campaign, only one-third of the previously ANC leaning electorate felt safe enough to cast their ballots in February 1967 and UNIP won the constituency.<sup>75</sup> The by-election, characterized as 'a clear distortion of the democratic process' due to the sheer level of coercive tactics employed by UNIP youths, highlighted UNIP's ruthless determination to cower the opposition into surrendering.<sup>76</sup> The

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<sup>70</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 410.

<sup>71</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 122.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*



expression ‘Mazabuka tactics’, used to describe intense anti-opposition violence, even became part of the political dictionary of both parties.<sup>77</sup> The frequent insinuations made by party officials that the ANC had no right to exist were not empty words, but rather posed a direct and real threat to the continuing existence of the ANC as a party. Speaking of UNIP militants, the party’s director of elections openly stated that their work ‘will be aimed at wiping out the ANC’; another UNIP politician from Southern Province, Daniel Munkombwe, added that the opposition would be ‘bulldozed and crushed’.<sup>78</sup> Violence and harassment had effectively won UNIP a key ANC stronghold, and there seemed to be little indication that it would end with Mazabuka.<sup>79</sup>

It was at this point that the ANC realised that UNIP was willing to ruthlessly ‘fight its way into enemy’s territory’, and that it would literally have to fight for its survival.<sup>80</sup> The ANC’s political position on violence and youth therefore experienced a discernible shift, in which erstwhile threats were put into practice. As had occurred during the independence movement, ANC youth were recast as guardians, entrusted with the task of easing the physical dangers experienced by members and sympathizers of the party.<sup>81</sup> By early 1969, the ANC’s national secretary, Edward Mungoni Liso, was advising members of his party who were ‘being threatened by members of the ruling

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<sup>77</sup> William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, ‘Introduction’, in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 23.

<sup>78</sup> Molteno and Scott, ‘The 1968 General Election and the Political System’, p. 165.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>80</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 122.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

party' to give UNIP a dose of its own medicine.<sup>82</sup> In general, in the aftermath of Mazabuka, the regional youth wings of the ANC became a lot more proactive in countering their UNIP adversaries. An example is provided by another Southern Province town, Kalomo. Here, an ANC youth, Charles Munolende, declared that, due to an imminent visit by 'UNIP chaps... planning to bring youths from all over the Copperbelt to come and fight here', he was actively gathering as many ANC youths as possible to 'bring them here' for a counteroffensive and thus defend ANC interests.<sup>83</sup> Likewise, the 'no-card – no facilities' campaign by UNIP held in Mufulira on 23 June 1968 ensued in a vigorous response by militant ANC supporters, who clashed with the UNIP youths conducting the campaign.<sup>84</sup> Occasions such as these revealed that, ironically, the activities of UNIP youths, meant to intimidate ANC supporters and demoralise its activists, actually entrenched their loyalty towards the party. With each respective attack on ANC sympathizers, UNIP pushed them yet closer to the opposition. The ANC became increasingly looked to as a shield, which, at least partially, protected Tonga-speaking people from the worst aggressions committed by UNIP youths.<sup>85</sup>

### **3.4 A More Militant Opposition?: The Formation of the UP**

The renewed vigour of the ANC and its youth organisation may also have owed something to the creation, and subsequent banning, of a new opposition party, the UP. The UP was created in mid-1966, but did not become an

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<sup>82</sup> 'Give UNIP a Dose of Its Own Medicine', *Times of Zambia*, 10 January 1969, p. 7.

<sup>83</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/100, 'Letter to the Youth Secretary of ANC for Kalomo, From Charles Munolende', 2 March 1968.

<sup>84</sup> 'UNIP Youths Stoned in Card Clash: ANC Men in Mufulira Market Melee', *Times of Zambia*, 26 June 1968, p. 1.

<sup>85</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 122.

important feature in Zambian politics until after the UNIP central committee elections held at Mulungushi in August 1967.<sup>86</sup> The results saw Lozi candidates defeated, and thus served to reinforce criticisms that UNIP had neglected the Barotseland Province.<sup>87</sup> UP strength grew especially in the Barotse Province, and it acquired several prestigious adherents, most notably Nalumino Mundia, a 'hero of UNIP's independence struggle'.<sup>88</sup> Mundia had been expelled from the party due to internal clashes.<sup>89</sup> Indeed, the new formation's members were largely drawn from a faction of dissatisfied ex-UNIP politicians, who drew support from grievances over Barotse Province's share in development and lack of Lozi influence within UNIP.<sup>90</sup> The creation of the UP exposed the awkward reality that the ruling party was not as internally united as it proclaimed.<sup>91</sup> With the creation of the UP, the underlying factionalism within the ruling party was made starkly visible.

The creation of the UP accentuated inter-party conflict. With respect to the UP, UNIP relied heavily upon tactics of coercion, harassment and intimidation by its youth wing in an attempt to beat down the newly established opposition party.<sup>92</sup> However, as had been the case with the ANC, UNIP's strong-arm approach was not altogether successful, given the UP did not shy away from employing militant tactics comparable to UNIP's. Having

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<sup>86</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 413.

<sup>87</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 56.

<sup>88</sup> Moltano and Scott, 'The 1968 General Election and the Political System', p. 156 and Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 126.

<sup>89</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 126.

<sup>90</sup> Pettman, 'Zambia's Second Republic', p. 233.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 407-408 and p. 233.

patterned its youth wing on the ruling party's own organisation, the UP was able to build a substantial grass-roots organisation.<sup>93</sup>

In early 1968, the UP's attempt to gain a following in the Copperbelt turned the industrial heartland of Zambia into a hotspot of inter-party violence.<sup>94</sup> UP members took part in rioting and were, overall, less timid than their ANC equivalents, both in standing their ground and fighting their way into 'enemy' territory. In Kitwe's Chimwemwe Township, for example, UP militants went on a 'rampage and threw stones at every house' in May 1968. More than 20 houses of UNIP members, including that of youth regional secretary, Evaristo Mutale, were stoned.<sup>95</sup> Indeed, UNIP youths were frequently victims of UP activism, given they were the 'strong arm' of the ruling party and thus most likely to directly confront the opposition. UNIP youths in Mikomfwa in Luanshya, on the Copperbelt, consequently demanded a one-party state be enacted: we are facing more problems here Zambia, we should immediately declare one party state to be granted so that everyone in Zambia will be solidly behind the Governing party.<sup>96</sup> Another riot involving UP and UNIP youths occurred in July 1968 in Chiwempala township. It ended with UNIP youths in 'full control'.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 413.

<sup>94</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 56.

<sup>95</sup> 'Police Out on 24-hour Patrols in Riot-torn Township', *Times of Zambia*, 28 May 1968, p. 1.

<sup>96</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/27, 'Agendas for Conference on 27 November 1968, From Mikomfwa Youth Branch', 27 November 1968.

<sup>97</sup> 'Mother, Baby, Feared Dead, Many Hurt in Party Riot', *Times of Zambia*, 22 July 1968, p. 1.

Another flashpoint of political violence involving the UP and UNIP youths was Kanyama Compound, in Lusaka. Here, however, UNIP seemed to be the dominant instigator of clashes between the two parties, its youths leading a campaign of terror aimed directly at UP officials. On the night of 28 January 1968, UNIP youths in the compound woke two UP officials from their beds, threatened to beat them and seized party cards and money. An exasperated Dickson Chikulo, the UP treasurer, openly accused UNIP of robbery and charged that to ‘attack a person while asleep is the same as attacking a corpse in a mortuary’.<sup>98</sup> He threatened that unless UNIP stopped attacking UP members while asleep, there would be a lot of trouble in the country. Similarly, at a meeting held in Lusaka on 31 March 1968, several people were injured and three vehicles badly damaged when violence broke out at a UP meeting that was to be addressed by national party president Mundia. When UP members stood their ground and refused to be intimidated into abandoning the gathering, UNIP youths threw stones at them and violent clashes between members of the two parties ensued.<sup>99</sup> During another incident, a group of young men ‘who looked like UNIP youths’ threw stones at about 100 supporters of the UP at a meeting in Matero, another compound in Lusaka.<sup>100</sup> Like the ANC, then, the UP also faced relentless victimisation at the hands of the UNIP youth wing, which helped to frustrate the activities of the new opposition party.

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<sup>98</sup> ‘Four Arrested After Clashes at New Kanyama’, *Times of Zambia*, 29 January 1968, p.7.

<sup>99</sup> ‘Mob Halts U.P Meeting – Several Hurt: Mundia Accuses Police’, *Times of Zambia*, 1 April 1968, p. 1.

<sup>100</sup> ‘Ex-Minister Back in Lusaka Court’, *Times of Zambia*, 24 July 1968, p. 1.

UNIP's attack on the UP eventually culminated in the banning of the party on 14 August 1968<sup>101</sup> – an event which offered the ANC an unexpected opportunity to strengthen its position. The official reason given for the party being outlawed was the murders of UNIP officials, killed by ‘panga-wielding men’, who were later identified as UP members. The first victim had been killed in Chililabombwe, in the Copperbelt, during a political clash, and the other when a group of regional and local UNIP leaders later visited the site.<sup>102</sup> The UP’s activities were thus branded by President Kaunda as ‘a danger to national security, peace and order’. Using his emergency powers, Kaunda proceeded to ban the party.<sup>103</sup> Most members of UP’s executive, including Mundia, were then confined to remote rural areas.<sup>104</sup> But in spite of it being banned, as Rasmussen notes, the ‘political impact of UP did not die with the party’.<sup>105</sup> After an altogether fruitful round of discussions with Mundia and other UP detainees, most members of the banned party were persuaded to join the ANC in 1967.<sup>106</sup> This quickly paid off. In August 1968, a 29-year-old ex-UP youth from Chipata, for example, showed his intention to stand in upcoming elections on behalf of the ANC. He emphasised his prior experience in ‘quickly’ dealing with ‘the activities of those of UNIP’ in a

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<sup>101</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', pp. 407-408 and Pettman, 'Zambia's Second Republic', p. 233.

<sup>102</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 414.

<sup>103</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 56.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', p. 414.

<sup>106</sup> There were other parties that vied for the attentions of ex-UP members. For example, an offshoot of the UP, ZANDU (Zambia African National Democratic Union), was formed in May 1969. The party ‘proposed to lead this country in a vigilant democracy where everyone in the country is happy to see it’. British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/15, ‘Circular Written by J B Banda, ZANDU National Organising Secretary’, 19 October 1969. Also, Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 127.

letter to the ANC Director of Elections.<sup>107</sup> Outside of the UP, a number of other youths at this time, also moved to support the ANC - attracted to the party as an unfaltering beacon of democratic government. A youth Medson Mwale, professed the: 'ANC as the only party for a real Democratic Government', whilst another youth, Chinda HamuSaukwa declared: 'I want to fight against the emergence of a one-party state in Zambia'.<sup>108</sup>

As mentioned by both Macola and Larmer, this union proved profitable and accounted for the comparative success of the ANC in the general elections of December 1968, despite Nkumbula's party being made the target of systematic intimidation and official harassment.<sup>109</sup> The merger between the two parties expanded ANC influence from its traditionally safe constituencies in Southern and Central provinces, to include eight of the 11 Barotseland parliamentary seats.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, the UP and ANC alliance helped improve the ANC's ability to confront the violence of the UNIP youth wing, by enabling it to pursue a more militant course of action with the revitalising force of ex-UP members now behind the party. As Macola writes, the ANC became 'infused with some of the assertive militancy that had characterized the former party'.<sup>111</sup> ANC youths openly avowed to 'die in the name of African National Congress'.<sup>112</sup> For instance Moses Sikanyiti, an ANC youth,

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<sup>107</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/4, 'Letter to the ANC Director of Elections, From Medson F. Mwale', 23 August 1968.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.* and British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/4, 'Letter to the ANC Director of Elections, From Chinda Zachariah HamuSaukwa', 27 June 1968.

<sup>109</sup> See, Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 127 and Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 56.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 135.

<sup>112</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/4, 'Letter to the ANC Director of Elections, From Vincent N. Kanunka', 15 April 1968.

passionately wrote: 'I must point it out that my everlasting enemy in the world is UNIP. Anything said about UNIP I vomit. I will fight UNIP in general election on all angles. If it means death, I must fall it and my bloody will pave the nation which is now being ill-treated'.<sup>113</sup> In 1970, whilst continuing to condemn card-checking by UNIP youths, Nkumbula instructed his followers to retaliate when attacked by UNIP supporters. 'I have told my supporters that if you are attacked don't come to me, attack back'.<sup>114</sup> At one point he even forewarned that if a UNIP member asked him for a UNIP card, 'he would leave here in an ambulance.'<sup>115</sup>

In Kanyama compound, the hotbed of opposition in the Zambian capital, ANC youths were particularly active from 1968 onwards.<sup>116</sup> The deprived peri-urban area had long been 'plagued by incessant episodes' of inter-party violence and in 1969 was nicknamed 'Biafra' by its embittered residents.<sup>117</sup> Given the level of inter-party violence, residents of the township had separated themselves into UNIP and ANC sections. Indeed, there actually existed a dividing line, which ran through the heart of the township, in the form of a road, aptly nicknamed the 'Berlin Wall'.<sup>118</sup> On 11 November 1968, ANC youths added to this virulent political atmosphere when they attacked a thirty-eight-year-old painter, Wilson Kawiwa. The attack left the man in

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<sup>113</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/4, 'Letter to ANC Director of Elections, From Moses Mwiimbi Sikanyiti', 5 May 1968.

<sup>114</sup> 'Nkumbula: ANC Will Win Election Seats If 'There Are No Threats'', *Times of Zambia*, 17 October 1970, p. 7.

<sup>115</sup> 'Harry Blames UNIP for L'stone Trouble', *Times of Zambia*, 7 April 1970, p. 1.

<sup>116</sup> An explanation for this may lie in the failed attempt by Nkumbula to ban all political youth movements in the country in August 1968. The motion was defeated by 31 votes to 7 in Parliament. 'Ban Youth' Move Beaten', *Times of Zambia*, 31 August 1968, p. 7.

<sup>117</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 135.

<sup>118</sup> 'Curfew Plea as L'stone Home is Bombed', *Times of Zambia*, 26 May 1969, p. 1.



hospital needing treatment for five axe-wounds to his head. He recalled how a group of slogan-chanting youths, coming from the direction of the ANC offices, some armed with stick and chains, attacked him as he stepped out of a lavatory hut.<sup>119</sup> In 1969, UNIP announced plans for the mobilization of more than 3,000 youths for a massive card-checking campaign in Lusaka's low density areas. ANC district secretary, Sitwale Welima, quickly reacted by organising a door-to-door campaign for cards in Old Kanyama. His argument was that if 'it is legal for UNIP to check for party cards I see no reason why ANC can't check for its members'.<sup>120</sup> Later on, the ANC apparently even sent 86 youths from Mazabuka in order to fight for control over Kanyama and the wider Lusaka area.<sup>121</sup>

In Mazabuka itself, violence was rained down upon UNIP members by the ANC youth league. Agness Lweendo, for example, recalled how in the mid-1960s her uncle (who was 47-years-old at the time and had travelled from Livingstone to Mazabuka) was badly beaten by ANC youth leaguers because he belonged to UNIP. The only way he managed to escape with his life was because the perpetrators of the attack mistakenly thought he had died, when in fact he had fainted from the pain of the injuries he sustained. The attackers dumped him on the roadside, and a passer-by had taken him back home to Livingstone. Lweendo commented: 'It was from that moment onward that he never did UNIP activities again.'<sup>122</sup> This renewed militancy represented an

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<sup>119</sup> 'Victim of Kanyama Violence Was Beaten with Axe', *Times of Zambia*, 12 November 1968, p. 7.

<sup>120</sup> 'Parties to Launch Big Card Check-ups', *Times of Zambia*, 15 July 1969, p. 7.

<sup>121</sup> 'Kanyama's Thieves Warned: 'You're Out'', *Times of Zambia*, 23 March 1970, p. 7.

<sup>122</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

obvious change from the immediate post-independence period, when the ANC had been both reluctant *and* unable to organise its youth.

The Southern Province's capital, Livingstone, also witnessed significant inter-party fighting in the aftermath of the ANC-UP merger. Party battles between UNIP and ANC youths raged in the town after the general elections of December 1968, when Livingstone was the only parliamentary constituency won by UNIP in the entire Southern Province.<sup>123</sup> The 'political hooliganism' between the two opposing youth wings frequently made headlines in *Zambian newspapers*.<sup>124</sup> An example of one of these incidents occurred on 20 September 1969, when youths in the Linda township of Livingstone clashed with one another following card-checking by UNIP youths. The ANC organised a counter card-checking campaign, which resulted in further 'vicious' skirmishes.<sup>125</sup>

Nevertheless, the violent activism of the ANC's youth wing after 1968 proved problematic for the party in the medium term. Indeed, as had been the case with the UP, it provided the ruling party with an excuse to ban the ANC in several areas, not least in Livingstone itself. Here what UNIP branded a 'terrorist campaign unleashed by the ANC and ex-UP members' led to the imposition of a total ban on the party in the district and the detention of a number of its officials in February 1970.<sup>126</sup> As a result of these developments, the role of ANC youth was scaled back so as to protect the future existence

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<sup>123</sup> 'Police Warn 'Violent' Party Youths', *Times of Zambia*, 23 May 1969, p. 9.

<sup>124</sup> See for example: 'Battle of Livingstone...', *Times of Zambia*, 28 April 1969, p. 6.

<sup>125</sup> 'Card Check Sparks New Violence', *Times of Zambia*, 22 September 1969, p. 1.

<sup>126</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 135.

of the party. Thereafter, the ANC leader resorted back to calling on the government to outlaw political youth wings in the country, as a solution to curb intimidation and violence directed at its supporters.<sup>127</sup>

### **3.5 The UPP and the Threat From Students**

In August 1971, another opposition party was formed by Simon Kapwepwe, called the UPP.<sup>128</sup> The party, under Kapwepwe, was perceived as anti-western and pro-Chinese, though it rested on a political ambiguity that enabled widespread support from across a broad political spectrum.<sup>129</sup> The UPP's strong Bemba ties also won it support among the Bemba peasantry in Northern Province.<sup>130</sup> Its launch began a wave of public demonstrations by UNIP members to show their loyalty to the ruling party, and also provoked a flurry of denunciations of the UPP.<sup>131</sup> The new party raised the spectre of the ruling party's defeat in the next general election, scheduled for 1973, and, therefore, was immediately targeted with fierce repression.<sup>132</sup> UNIP Regional secretary for Kitwe, Raphael Mwale, proclaimed UPP members as enemies of the country and that they should not be accepted back even if they confessed.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> See for instance, 'KK Condemns Brutal Acts', *Times of Zambia*, 14 January 1972, p. 1.

<sup>128</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 137.

<sup>129</sup> Miles Larmer, 'Enemies Within?: Opposition to the Zambian One-party State, 1972-1980', in *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*, ed. by Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, Giacomo Macola (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 99.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 70.

<sup>132</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 138.

<sup>133</sup> 'Police Attacked For 'Failing to Arrest Terror Gang'', *Times of Zambia*, 24 January 1972, p. 1.

UNIP was quick to employ loyal party youth to crush the party. In September 1971, a campaign to evict UPP supporters from houses and businesses was launched in Chingola. Youth regional secretary Bonaventure Lubilo instructed a newly-formed 'youth eviction squad' to draw up a list of business premises and houses belonging to UPP supporters for the next council meeting.<sup>134</sup> In the neighbouring Copperbelt town of Kitwe, UNIP youths put these plans into action when they descended on two homes in Wusakile township and ordered the occupants out, smashing their property and accusing them of belonging to the UPP. Patrick Chalwe and his wife were forced out of their property and told the latter 'belong[ed] to Kaunda'.<sup>135</sup>

Despite the continuing persecution of its members and supporters, however, the UPP was still able to compete in a number of parliamentary by-elections in December 1971.<sup>136</sup> Kapwepwe won the Mufulira West seat despite being prevented from touring the mining town, and despite UNIP youths brazenly turning away voters who did not have UNIP party cards in Mufulira's Lwansato and Kwacha townships.<sup>137</sup> The actions of UNIP youths were not without consequences. In the Southern Province, in Chief Ufwenuka's area, a UNIP youth was severely beaten by UPP supporters and had to be rushed to Monze Mission Hospital after the attack.<sup>138</sup> Elsewhere, UNIP won comfortably; however, as Larmer argues, given the sheer level of coercion employed by UNIP and that the UPP was prevented from openly

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<sup>134</sup> 'Squad Gets Ready to Oust UPP Men', *Times of Zambia*, 7 September 1971, p. 1.

<sup>135</sup> 'UNIP Youths Wrecked Homes - Witness', *Times of Zambia*, 22 September 1971, p. 7.

<sup>136</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 138.

<sup>137</sup> 'Angry Clashes at Polling Stations', *Times of Zambia*, 21 December 1971, p. 1.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*

campaigning, the ‘elections should not be treated as an accurate gauge of either party’s underlying support’.<sup>139</sup> Indeed, what is remarkable is that the UPP did win one constituency at all in this context. By so doing, it had showed itself to be a credible threat to UNIP power.

Not the least remarkable feature of the UPP was its success in capturing the support of students at the University of Zambia (UNZA), built after independence to train the country’s future intelligentsia. This was a cause of real concern to UNIP, as the university had already emerged as a separate centre of active opposition to the UNIP leadership.<sup>140</sup> The university was thus a rich recruiting ground for the new party, and students strengthened the UPP ranks considerably; for its part, the UPP provided students with a political platform through which their grievances had the potential to become politically potent. The ideological ambiguity of Kapwepwe’s UPP, and his attractive ‘showman’ qualities, in this respect, enabled the party to appeal to both conservative business figures in Zambia’s urban areas and radical leftist students at UNZA.<sup>141</sup> As is explored in further detail in the final chapter of this thesis, students were staunch anti-imperialists, and there was widespread support of radical Marxist theory on campus.<sup>142</sup> During interview Kennedy Shepande, who was then a student himself at the university, suggested that student inclinations towards the UPP were simply a matter of extremes: ‘They

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<sup>139</sup> In Namwala constituency for example, a UPP organiser was beaten when he attempted to rally support for UPP at a bar, see, 'UNIP Unleash Big Drive to Get Votes', *Times of Zambia*, 4 December 1971, p. 7 and Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 79.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>141</sup> As Kapwepwe was described by Sikota Wina: Interview with Sikota Wina, Lilayi, Lusaka, 20 August 2019.

Larmer, ‘Enemies Within?’, p. 105.

<sup>142</sup> See chapter six of this thesis, pp. 348-355. ‘Which Way Campus Politics?’, *Bridge*, 3 January 1991, p. 5.

saw Kapwepwe as a more revolutionary individual, than the moderate Kenneth Kaunda'.<sup>143</sup> A survey conducted in September 1971, of student opinion on the formation of the UPP, found that most students were sympathetic to the plight of the UPP and critical of UNIP's inconsistency with its actions in, what was then, a democratic country.<sup>144</sup> A shocked fourth year student attacked the behaviour of ruling members and condemned the eviction from houses and expulsion from jobs of people said to belong to the UPP. He called these 'unlawful and unconstitutional'. Another fourth year student interviewed for the survey quipped: 'I cannot say anything lest I find myself at Chilubi Island studying the breeding of mosquitoes'.<sup>145</sup>



**Figure 4: Armed police and students outside British High Commission**

Source: 'Demonstration in Pictures (British High Commission)', *Spark*, 5 August 1970, p. 4.



**Figure 5: UNZA student being arrested, 1970**

Source: 'Demonstration in Pictures (British High Commission)', *Spark*, 5 August 1970, p. 4.

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<sup>143</sup> Interview with Kennedy Shepande, Lusaka, 19 August 2019.

<sup>144</sup> 'Kapwepwe...: What the Campus Thinks About That Resignation – and the New Party', *University Observer*, 14 September 1971, p. 5.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

In August 1971, when the UPP burst through to the surface of Zambian politics, relations between UNZA students and the UNIP government were particularly raw. Indeed, there had been several clashes on international policies. In 1970, a British High Commission demonstration, for instance, led to police clashes with students who were trying to present a petition in protest at the British handling of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).<sup>146</sup> Kennedy Shepande explained: 'In South Africa, although sanctions had been imposed our government continued to trade with South Africa and this put us on loggerheads with each other'.<sup>147</sup> In July of that same year, the university's Students' Union had protested against France's sale of Mirage jets to Apartheid South Africa.<sup>148</sup> Although the protest was ostensibly in support of the policy of the Zambian government policy, when 1,500 students stormed the French embassy, police opened fire, wounding one student, and used tear gas against the crowd.<sup>149</sup> As a result, 54 students in total were arrested. In the aftermath of the 'Battle of Lusaka', as well as attacking police brutality, student leaders publicly condemned Kaunda for his inconsistent approach to South Africa, an accusation grounded in the revelation that the president had secretly been in contact with South African Prime Minister John Vorster.<sup>150</sup> Following further disturbances, Kaunda banned all 'unlawful'

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<sup>146</sup> This pertained to the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front government in 1965, when the white settler minority of Southern Rhodesia – in a bid to maintain power - broke away from British control. The new state became commonly known as Rhodesia, however the British government continued to refer to the country as Southern Rhodesia and maintained it was an illegal, rather than unilateral, declaration of independence. 'Demonstration in Pictures (British High Commission)', *Spark*, 5 August 1970, p. 4.

<sup>147</sup> Interview with Kennedy Shepande, Lusaka, 19 August 2019.

<sup>148</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 68.

<sup>149</sup> 'The Battle of Lusaka: Students Storm Embassy', *Times of Zambia*, 8 July 1971, p. 1.

<sup>150</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 68.

demonstrations by students and threatened expulsions.<sup>151</sup> Some students were also accused of being agents of Zambia's regional enemies, a claim which the government had already advanced in as early as 1967, when a government report on the role of the youth in the nation had charged that the Zambia Student's Union had 'become a vehicle for undesirable influences and activities and, in some cases, foreign influences'.<sup>152</sup>



**Figure 6: A banner of protest raised by students during the 'Battle of Lusaka'**

Source: 'Student Power and Pan-African Politics', *The University Observer*, 14 September 1971, p. 6.

Students were additionally antagonised when loyalist UNIP youths – who had been encouraged by Mr Bulawayo, Secretary for Publicity at Freedom House to make the students 'feel the full weight of the party'<sup>153</sup> – threatened to march on the university. They were only deterred by the preparation of petrol bombs and other home-made weapons by the students.<sup>154</sup> The event served to highlight the historical belligerency of UNIP youths towards students, since the inception of the university. Indeed, four years prior, even without the level of hostilities of 1971, Mr Leo Katakwe, UNIP youth regional secretary for Kitwe, angrily declared at a youth party assembly: 'We killed people and

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<sup>151</sup> Pettman, 'Zambia's Second Republic', p. 238.

<sup>152</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report by Committee of the National Convention on Zambia's Development on the Role of the Youth in the Nation, Chaired by the Hon D H Banda' (1967).

<sup>153</sup> 'Massive Protest Called Against Students', *Times of Zambia*, 14 July 1971, p. 1.

<sup>154</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 69.



burned shops during the struggle and we shall continue to do this if necessary to defend this freedom... We died for this freedom and we are not going to let small stupid students spoil it' he said.<sup>155</sup> UNIP youths and university students were thus pitted against one another, revealing the gulf that separated these two youth groupings on the Zambian political scene. This tension between Zambia's educated and lumpen youth is a powerful reminder that youth did not necessarily act as bulwarks against authoritarianism, but could also be its most ardent supporters.<sup>156</sup> Moreover, it highlighted that there existed no automatic solidarity between subgroups of youth in Zambian society.<sup>157</sup>



Figure 7: Nine of the university students who quit with Kapwepwe (centre), circa 1971

Source: 'Nine of the Students Who Quit', *Spark*, 2 June 1981, p. 1.

Other student protests were effectively thwarted, as the organisers admitted they were frightened of being molested by UNIP's Youth Brigade.<sup>158</sup> However, the government's heavy handedness and the ruling party's readiness to use its youth against the students pushed many of the latter

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<sup>155</sup> 'UNIP Demonstrations on Copperbelt', *Times of Zambia*, 6 October 1967, p. 1.

<sup>156</sup> Emmanuel Asiedu-Acquah, "'And Still the Youth Are Coming": Youth and Popular Politics in Ghana, c. 1900-1979' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard University, 2015).

<sup>157</sup> Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa', p. 23.

<sup>158</sup> 'Massive Protest Called Against Students', *Times of Zambia*, 14 July 1971, p. 1.

towards the newly formed UPP. Immediately after the university was closed in July ten of the student leaders who had been expelled started to work full-time for the UPP.<sup>159</sup> This included Cosmos Chola, who was then President of the University of Zambia Student Union (UNZASU), and Geoffrey Hammaundu who was also part of the UNZASU leadership, as the publicity chief. This group of students – and the ‘Battle of Lusaka’ would be memorialised by subsequent cohorts of students, as symbolic of student opposition.<sup>160</sup> The tactic of using youthful intimidation to enforce obedience among recalcitrant students thus backfired spectacularly, as it solidified student opposition to the government and turned UNZA students into one of the cornerstones of the UPP’s strength.

The events also served to entrench student hostility against the UNIP government more generally. By the end of October 1971 student discontent with the UNIP government was high. A poll conducted by university students themselves found that 67 per cent of students thought that ‘the government does not represent the will of the people’, with only 15 per cent feeling it did.<sup>161</sup> Student published magazines were abound with criticism of UNIP. In December 1971, an opinion piece in the *University Observer* wrote:

I register my disgust at the current UNIP public robbery and filthy political organization. I must say we are tired with UNIP’s hypocrisy. UNIP advocates peace, prosperity and stability... It is this same organization that initiated the innocent people of this

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
<sup>159</sup> The names of nine of the ten students were: Vincent Chisunka, John Muluwila, Jonas Mukumbi, Geoffrey Hammaundu, Cosmos Chola (UNZAS President at the time), Lewis Kangwa, Dennis Sikazwe, Boniface Kawimbe and Augustine Katotombwe. Records examined did not reveal the tenth. Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 69.

<sup>160</sup> This is evidenced in student magazines. One article described future students looking upon the infamous ten with ‘awe and admiration’, see: ‘Flashback – 1971 at UNZA: Year of Dedication’, *UZ*, December 1971, p. 3.

<sup>161</sup> ‘This is What Poll Revealed’, *University Observer*, 29 October 1971, p. 3.

country to learn that aiming a stone at another human being is a gallant hobby... Many people like Mr Mulenga of Kitwe have been axed and crippled in various ways by UNIP thugs for alleged UPP affiliation, others have been left shelterless and jobless.<sup>162</sup>

Cartoons, such as the one below, also highlighted the suffering caused by the use of extortion by UNIP youths in card selling campaigns.<sup>163</sup> This extortion was likewise frequently complained about by ANC youths, who claimed that some people were being forced into buying UNIP cards for as much as £15 in Kitwe.<sup>164</sup>



**Figure 8: Cartoon in the student *University Observer* magazine, criticising UNIP card campaigns**

Source: 'Those Card Checks Are Just 'Robbery'', *University Observer*, December 1971, p. 6.

In Lusaka, the UPP also attracted significant numbers of younger party intellectuals, who were unhappy with the growth of corruption and who felt excluded from the upper-levels of the UNIP hierarchy.<sup>165</sup> The UPP was perceived by UNIP leaders to be slowly eroding the ruling party's monopoly over Zambia's youth, on which it so heavily relied to bolster its authority, sparking even more intense political viciousness.

The hostility of UNIP towards students was unrelenting. It continued during the parliamentary by-election in December 1971, when former university

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<sup>162</sup> 'Those Card Checks Are Just 'Robbery'', *University Observer*, December 1971, p. 6.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>164</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/24, 'ANC Youth Report From Kitwe' (1969).

<sup>165</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 54.

student union leader was hounded by thousands of angry UNIP supporters as he drove up with UPP leader Kapwepwe and stones were furiously hurled at their cars.<sup>166</sup> Wider UPP members were also heavily victimised and the violence of UNIP youths became an ever more permanent stratagem used by the ruling party. One UPP man had both his eyes gouged out during the December's by-election in Mporokoso, in the Northern Province.<sup>167</sup> Again, however, UNIP underestimated the youthful militancy of the opposition party, which stubbornly refused to cede the political ground it had made. The UPP Copperbelt youth secretary, Andrew Mwansa, commented that his party would 'meet force by force. It was time UNIP, which was causing all the trouble, realised that UPP had more supporters than them'.<sup>168</sup>

The incessant inter-party violence reached a climax in January 1972, when Kapwepwe was violently attacked by a 100-strong mob, which included UNIP youths, at a Lusaka market as he tried to buy vegetables. An eyewitness to the incident recalled: 'I saw about 100 people, elderly and young men, punching and kicking him. He was bleeding from cuts over his left eye, his nose and his head. His glasses had been smashed. A Land-Rover full of paramilitary police just laughed at him as he walked away. He looked a terrible mess.'<sup>169</sup> The attack took place only days after Kapwepwe had taken his seat at the National Assembly as the sole UPP representative.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> 'The Battle at the Boma: First Blood to UNIP as Their Man 'Takes' a Seat', *Times of Zambia*, 3 December 1971, p. 1.

<sup>167</sup> 'Stop the Violence: Now UNIP Hands Out Two-week Ultimatum', *Times of Zambia*, 25 January 1972, p. 1.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>169</sup> 'Kapwepwe Beaten up in Market', *Times of Zambia*, 13 January 1972, p. 1.

<sup>170</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 80.

Kapwepwe spoke of his ordeal as he was being treated in hospital. 'I don't know why it happened... I just went shopping to buy vegetables and other groceries'. Then wincing with pain, he repeated: 'My body... my head, my body... my head'.<sup>171</sup> Later a 25-year-old man, Jaston Mpande of Chawama compound, appeared in Lusaka magistrate's court charged with assaulting the UPP leader.

The incident enraged younger UPP supporters, who resorted to more extreme methods to avenge the beating of their leader.<sup>172</sup> Dennis Sikazwe, for example, was involved in the bombing of UNIP local offices in Lusaka, for which he was subsequently arrested.<sup>173</sup> He was only saved from a long jail sentence because his confession was extracted by means of torture.<sup>174</sup> The spiralling violence, provoked by the hostility of UNIP youths towards UPP supporters, culminated in the banning of the UPP by Kaunda on 4 February 1972. Kaunda claimed that the party was 'bent on violence and destruction'.<sup>175</sup> 123 UPP leaders including Kapwepwe were later detained.<sup>176</sup> The police swoop on the UPP signalled the end to multi-partyism in Zambia, and a one-party system was ushered in that same year. The banning of the UPP was symbolic of UNIP's failure to contain 'youthful' opposition in the form of the UPP, despite the considerable attempts the government had made to try and monopolise Zambian youth for its own political ends.

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<sup>171</sup> 'Kapwepwe Beaten up in Market', *Times of Zambia*, 13 January 1972, p. 1.

<sup>172</sup> 'No Place for Troublemakers in UNIP' – Kabwe', *Times of Zambia*, 17 January 1972, p. 5.

<sup>173</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 84.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>175</sup> 'Dawn Swoop Delivers Death Blow to UPP: We Had to Do It, Says Kaunda', *Times of Zambia*, 5 February 1972, p. 1.

<sup>176</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 138.

### 3.6 Sacrificial Lambs?

Between 1964 and 1972, Zambian youths were heavily involved as perpetrators of political violence. However, these same youths were likewise frequently victims. Indeed, countless youths lost their lives or were severely injured from inter-party violence before the one-party system was declared. Not unlike in contemporary Zimbabwe, the Zambian situation highlighted the ‘permeability of notions of victim and perpetrator in youths’ lived experiences’.<sup>177</sup> Laiza Choongo, who lived in Mazabuka during the time in question, even alleged that youth’s relationship with their superiors was founded on fear and punishment: ‘They were being forced or commanded by the ones on top. They [the youths] were also scared that if they failed to organise people they might be punished by those who were on top of them. They would have been beaten and chased from the party’.<sup>178</sup> To this extent, the youths *were* the ‘sacrificial lambs’ who suffered most from the consequences of political violence.

This was grimly illustrated on 9 February 1969, when the body of 24-year-old UNIP youth, Martin Mayaba, who had been hacked to death with a panga, was found with his neck almost completely severed.<sup>179</sup> The attack was politically motivated. The youth was attacked because he worked as UNIP’s Dambwa branch youth secretary.<sup>180</sup> In another incident, a youth was hacked

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<sup>177</sup> Ivo Mhike, ‘Political Violence in Zimbabwe’s National Youth Service, 2001–2007’, in *What Politics?: Youth and Political Engagement in Africa*, ed. by Elina Oinas, Henri Onodera and Leena Suurpää (Leiden: Brill, 2017), p. 249.

<sup>178</sup> Interview with Laiza Choongo, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>179</sup> ‘Panga Killing Political, Police Believe’, *Times of Zambia*, 10 February 1969, p. 1.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*

to death on a footbridge between the Livingstone townships of Maramba and Libuyu. The youth had switched allegiance from the ANC to UNIP two weeks prior to his murder. The youth suffered deep cuts on the left arm and a deep wound on the left side of the neck, which was believed to have caused his death. These killings were the worst instances of the political violence that swept both Livingstone and Lusaka in May 1969.<sup>181</sup>

Party youths also frequently found themselves imprisoned. In involving themselves in violent political campaigning they risked their own freedom. Getting arrested and facing imprisonment was a significant worry among party youths, as openly admitted by an executive meeting of UNIP youth held in Luanshya in 1967.<sup>182</sup> Being arrested could have serious consequences on the future employment prospects of the individuals involved, and thus could have a lasting impact on those who were fighting to secure their future. One example of this, out of many, involved the arrest of two UNIP youths who were charged with rioting in Livingstone. The youths were 21-year-old Charles Sililo and Crispin Masake, 20, both from Maramba township. They were accused of having led an attack against two men outside a primary school. The men had been assaulted with stones, iron bars and sticks. Both youths received a weighty sentence of nine months imprisonment with hard labour.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> 'Schoolboy Hacked to Death After Party Switch: and Flare-up in Lusaka', *Times of Zambia*, 24 May 1969, p. 1.

<sup>182</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/29, 'UNIP Youth Joint Executive Meeting', 10 October 1967.

<sup>183</sup> 'UNIP Rioters Are Jailed', *Times of Zambia*, 14 May 1970, p. 1.

Yet, given the importance of youth to UNIP, and the fact that, as the ruling party, it had significant influence over government structures, the plight of these youth was not ignored. The likelihood that the individuals arrested were some of the party's most loyal 'soldiers' made it inconceivable to simply leave them to rot in prison. Thus, on numerous occasions youths were given a free pass. In 1969, President Kaunda – in his capacity as secretary general of UNIP – announced a general amnesty for all past offenders in UNIP.<sup>184</sup> Office holders in 1971 too advocated that the youths be granted immunity from arrest should they decide to temporarily take the law into their hands by doing away with UPP and its leaders.<sup>185</sup>

The police also regularly turned a blind eye to incidents.<sup>186</sup> At least according to Nkumbula, when UNIP youths beat-up members of the public during card-checking campaigns 'you find that the police are looking on when this kind of thing is happening'.<sup>187</sup> ANC Luanshya provincial chairman Edward Wakunguma complained bitterly that '[t]his is all we can expect from the Government – turning its youths loose on people then pretending to arrest them'.<sup>188</sup> In May 1970, an ANC supporter, Mr Nyoka, who lived in Lufu, near Chipata, filed a complaint with the police after police failed to bring UNIP offenders to justice after they violently disrupted an ANC meeting.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> 'Amnesty Declared for UNIP: 'Let Us Bury Past Offences'', *Times of Zambia*, 19 September 1969, p. 1.

<sup>185</sup> 'Tour Reports Will Size up UPP, Says Chona: UNIP Youth Want 'to Finish' New Party', *Times of Zambia*, 6 September 1971, p. 7.

<sup>186</sup> Police apparently did not arrest youths who misbehaved for fear of falling victim to political interests, see 'Youth Wings: 'Too Much Drinking, Smoking Freedom'', *Times of Zambia*, 2 October 1969, p. 7.

<sup>187</sup> Tordoff and Molteno, 'Parliament', p. 232.

<sup>188</sup> 'Card Check Youths Freed', *Times of Zambia*, 29 June 1970, p. 1.

<sup>189</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/1/7/13, 'Telegram to Zambia Police Headquarters, From Commissioner of Police for Lusaka, R J Kambela', 24 June 1970.



Even when arrests did happen, party leaders supported youths as best they could. For instance, UNIP regional secretary Goodson Bwalya paid the fees for five accused members of Luanshya's UNIP youth brigade, who were ordered to pay K3 to the man they beat-up.<sup>190</sup> Similarly, when Haven Kunda, the Roan vice chairman of the UNIP youth league, together with his organising secretary Obet Chipupu, were arrested by Zambia Police on 16 March 1968, a letter was swiftly sent to the UNIP Luanshya constituency secretary for assistance – monetary and otherwise.<sup>191</sup> In another matter, four UNIP youths were charged for rioting at Mazabuka Railway Station on 12 October 1966. All four were found guilty. Smart Chisala was sentenced to six months prisons with hard labour, Wilson Katemutemu to three months in prison, David Mulendema to 6 strokes of the cane and Charles Sibalwa was fined £4.<sup>192</sup> Though this looked severe, the sentences were in reality remarkably lenient considering the maximum sentence for rioting carried seven years imprisonment and all of the accused youths – with the exception of Charles Sibalwa – had previous convictions. This outcome was no doubt achieved thanks to UNIP having hired one of Zambia's leading legal firms, Ellis & Co., to represent the four in court.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> 'UNIP Pays for Luanshya Beating', *Times of Zambia*, 30 October 1971, p. 7.

<sup>191</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/27, 'Letter to the Luanshya Constituency Secretary, From Roan UNIP Youth Branch', 18 March 1968.

<sup>192</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/35, 'Telegram to Mr Chapoloko, MP and the Administrative Secretary for UNIP, Lusaka, From Ellis & Co., Farmers' House, Lusaka', 5 January 1967.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

Opposition youths were afforded no such protection. Indeed, ANC youths were frequently arrested and convicted for their political crimes. This was the case in June 1970, when two young ANC officials stood trial for possession of offensive weapons during a political riot in Wusakile township, Kitwe.<sup>194</sup> This was despite the fact that UNIP youths had provoked them during a card-checking campaign. UNIP also reserved the prerogative to withdraw protection from its own youths if they became too unruly. This appears to have been the case with the UNIP youth secretary of Matero. After a riot, in which youths had destroyed a shop by smashing windows with bottles and stones on the secretary's command, the latter was swiftly arrested and made to pay over K250 in fines.<sup>195</sup> Here, it is probably safe to assume that the Matero leader in question was regarded as commanding *too* much influence over his youthful comrades for the liking of higher ranking UNIP leaders. Once more, incidents such as these illuminate the underlying tension within UNIP between exploiting youthful violence for political means and suppressing it before it became a threat to the party itself.

## **Conclusion**

Youth were a crucial component of the inter-party political violence that plagued the First Republic. The role of youth in each party and its activities varied widely. UNIP, as the ruling party, attempted to control the political energies of its youth by using national resources to consolidate its youth wing and the members' trust in its youth wing. Insofar as this goal is concerned,

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<sup>194</sup> 'Two Deny Wusakile Card Riot Charge', *Times of Zambia*, 30 June 1970, p. 7.

<sup>195</sup> 'Use Words Not Fists, Youth Leader Told', *Times of Zambia*, 15 February 1972, p. 2.

UNIP was largely successful. Throughout the multi-party era, UNIP youths demonstrated their loyalty to the party and their readiness to defend it against opposition threats. Their violent propensities, however, did at times provoke and entrench opposition support, as attested by the example of the ANC after the 1967 by-election in Mazabuka. Additionally, this period uncovered a fraught relationship between UNIP and university students, which highlighted a need for the UNIP government to build and consolidate a youthful support base among *all* the country's youths.<sup>196</sup> Nevertheless, UNIP youths were vital in the maintenance of UNIP hegemony, ensuring that, for the most part, Zambian people feared to openly support opposition parties or challenge the government's authority.

The ANC, in contrast, was decidedly more reluctant to use youth as violent political tools. Instead of taking to the streets, the cash-strapped Nkumbula opted for the rhetorical condemnation of the violent activities of UNIP youth organisation and only deviated from this position when the spread of political intimidation left him with little alternative options. To a considerable extent, this development was made possible by the merger between the ANC and the banned UP, which injected a renewed militancy into the ANC's otherwise impotent youth wing. The UP was the first Zambian opposition party openly committed to resisting the intimidation and terror tactics of UNIP youth. The persistent assaults did eventually take their toll on the party, however, and the threat from the opposition was mostly neutralised. The UPP posed an even bigger threat to UNIP power, given that it undermined the ruling party's

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<sup>196</sup> This is a later topic of concern in this thesis. See chapter five of this thesis, pp. 337-406.

hegemony over youthful violence thanks to its robust support base among university students. Their penchant for spirited protest, epitomised by the anti-apartheid demonstration of July 1971 and their violent aftermath, made this threat all the more alarming. It was only by banning the party that UNIP was able to restore a semblance of control.

Not unlike elsewhere in independent Africa, then, youth were a driving force in the politics of postcolonial Zambia.<sup>197</sup> As spearheads of political violence, both as cadres of the ruling party and in the opposition, the bodies of youths were repeatedly put ‘on the line’ in the name of political gains. Indeed, their entanglement in militant party politics meant they were as much victims as they were perpetrators of political violence – or, as articulated by Honwana and De Boeck, that they occupied an ‘interstitial position between victim and perpetrator’.<sup>198</sup> It was a lamentable irony that Zambian youths had the most incentive to invest in the future, but were in fact the most likely to sacrifice their own long-term interests and even their lives for the sake of the older generation in power.<sup>199</sup> From the perspective of youth, their contribution to the overall dominance of UNIP was something of a Cadmean victory. For while they contributed to uphold the new postcolonial polity, they also paid a heavy price for their actions (though, of course, the price of political engagement was even higher for opposition youths).

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<sup>197</sup> Especially in Ghana, see Emmanuel, “‘And Still the Youth Are Coming’”.

<sup>198</sup> Alcinda Honwana and Filip De Boeck, ‘Introduction’, in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. by Alcinda Honwana and Filip De Boeck (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), p. 12.

<sup>199</sup> ‘The Sad Irony of Youth Participation in Election Violence’, Young African Leaders Initiative, 2015, <<https://yali.state.gov/the-sad-irony-of-youth-participation-in-election-violence/>> [accessed 8 June 2018].

Zambian youths could thus be Okafor's 'sacrificial lambs'. They were certainly highly prized by Zambian political parties by virtue of their perceived militancy and 'willingness' to put themselves in the sometimes-literal line of fire, as university students had done. Okafor's metaphor, however, only captures one aspect of historical reality. Indeed, although the youth's actions did usually serve to bolster and protect the political parties they supported, their violent militancy could, and did at times, hinder the objectives, and even threaten the very parties they were fighting for. There thus existed a constant unease, especially within UNIP, as to whether youth militancy would turn out to be a poisoned chalice.

## **Chapter Four: Shrewd Perpetrators: Youth Violence**

### **Against Marginal Social Groups, 1964-1972**

#### **Introduction**

Having in the preceding chapter cast light on the subordinate position of youth within Zambian party politics, and the often-violent consequences of their manipulation by political superiors, the focus now shifts to examine how youth dealt with their social juniors. The activities of youth in the *social* realm during Zambia's First Republic forms the crux of this chapter, which seeks to answer Abbink's call to integrate the youth factor in analyses of African societies, thereby 'testing the relative autonomy of youths as actors (re)shaping social relations and power formations'.<sup>1</sup> Put differently, it will go beyond static explorations of youth agency, which are often confined to *either* the political *or* the social realm, despite the two being closely entwined.<sup>2</sup> By analysing both domains, it is hoped that a more holistic understanding of Zambian youth in the immediate post-independence period can be achieved. Taken together, chapters three and four show that Zambian youth were active on *both* of these fronts and frequently blurred the boundaries between the political and social.<sup>3</sup> And this, in turn, foregrounds the argument that youth,

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<sup>1</sup> Jon Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Renewal', in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> For studies that typically take into consideration only the political agency of youth, see Emmanuel Asiedu-Acquah, "'And Still the Youth Are Coming": Youth and Popular Politics in Ghana, c. 1900-1979' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard University, 2015) and David Anderson and Oystein Rolandsen, 'Violence as Politics in Eastern Africa, 1940-1990: Legacy, Agency, Contingency', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8.4 (2014), pp. 539-557. For an exclusive focus on social agency, see Deborah Durham, 'Disappearing Youth: Youth as a Social Shifter in Botswana' *American Ethnologist*, 31.4 (2004), pp. 589-605.

<sup>3</sup> Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa', p. 3.

which are so often placed at the margins of the public sphere and major political processes, were in fact central to them.<sup>4</sup>

Adopting a thematic, rather than chronological approach, this chapter pays special attention to the power dynamics that obtained between youth and such social inferiors as female youth, foreigners and members of religious sects. As will be shown, youth violence against these marginal social groups served as an outlet for frustrations at their political marginalization, as well as a means to consolidate their post-independence position and advance personal interests. Many Zambian youths in this context became shrewd perpetrators of violence, resorting to force as active agents. This was especially true for UNIP youths, who committed the majority of these violent acts. Their social autonomy was left relatively unrestrained and unchecked by the upper echelons of the party hierarchy or by the government, for the most part.<sup>5</sup>

According to Gramsci, ‘civil society’ – as opposed to ‘political society’ – is ruled through consent rather than force.<sup>6</sup> By focusing on the social violence of Zambian youth, this chapter complicates Gramsci’s binary distinction. Although they did not hold power within the domain of party politics, youth exerted considerably more influence on the ground, not least because they were able to use their physical strength to their advantage in their interactions

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<sup>4</sup> Filip De Boeck and Alcinda Honwana, ‘Introduction: Children and Youth in Africa’, in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. by Alcinda Honwana and Filip de Boeck (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> ‘Minister Defends Role of Party Youths’, *Times of Zambia*, 8 June 1967, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Peter Kagwanja, ‘Clash of Generations? Youth Identity, Violence and the Politics of Transition in Kenya, 1997-2002’, in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 88.

with social juniors.<sup>7</sup> As will be shown throughout this chapter, their youthfulness afforded them the ability to apply violence as a social tool to promote their own individual interests. Mirroring the behaviour of party elders on the national stage, youth controlled, or at least attempted to control, the lower echelons of Zambian society, inhabited by marginal social groups, who, like the youth themselves, occupied a liminal position in the newly independent nation. The dealings of youth with these groups attest to their intention to forcefully ‘contain’ potential rivals and, moreover, indicates how these same groups provided youth with a means of performing a type of semi-adulthood in which they too could control social juniors.

#### **4.1 Capitalizing on UNIP Power**

A strategy to which UNIP youth commonly resorted was to appropriate the status of their party in order to wield adult authority, which otherwise remained painfully out of reach.<sup>8</sup> By so doing, youths, especially in urban areas, were able to present themselves, under the threat of intimidating violence, as the custodians of public order. Coercion and intimidation under the flag of UNIP were instrumental in this social construction of power relations between youth and other actors in their communities at large.<sup>9</sup>

A parental committee, established in late 1960s Lusaka to deal with the problem of juvenile delinquency, noted that, ‘Our children have been given

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<sup>7</sup> Thomas Burgess, ‘Remembering Youth: Generation in Revolutionary Zanzibar’, *Africa Today*, 46.2 (1999), pp. 29-50.

<sup>8</sup> Alex Perullo, ‘Politics and Popular Song: Youth, Authority, and Popular Music in East Africa’, *African Music*, 9.1 (2011), p. 89.

<sup>9</sup> Jean Cohen, ‘Strategy or Identity: Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements’, *Social Research*, 52.4 (1985), p. 694.



so much power [by the party leaders] that they control and guide us. They no longer listen to instructions.’<sup>10</sup> This statement clearly betrayed exasperation at the reversal of existing social hierarchies. Powers which had previously been the preserve of social elders were now being challenged and taken over through violence and intimidation by Zambian youths, not only to consolidate the position of the party in whose name they spoke, but also their own. A telling incident took place in New Kanyama, a suburb of Lusaka, in December 1967, when a gang of youths, who had otherwise been enforcing attendance of UNIP meetings, also insisted on protection fees from shebeen queens.<sup>11</sup> It was not made clear to such residents who these fees eventually went to, nor whether they were intended for the party or remained in the pockets of the youth who had extorted them. On a later occasion, in the very same township, a ‘mystery’ collection by youths wearing yellow UNIP shirts on 2 November 1970 resulted in angry protests from residents.<sup>12</sup> According to the newspaper report published the following day, ‘The youths had forced the people to “donate” money and threatened to demolish their houses – or shops – if they did not pay up’.<sup>13</sup> Owners of property were told to pay 50n each, tenants 30n and taxi drivers as much as K2.<sup>14</sup> ‘No explanation was given for the collection’, according to one anonymous victim.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> ‘Youth Wings: ‘Too Much Drinking, Smoking Freedom’, *Times of Zambia*, 2 October 1969, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> ‘Young Thugs Spread Terror in Suburb’, *Times of Zambia*, 7 December 1967, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> ‘Pay up – or Lose Your House, Say ‘UNIP Youths’’, *Times of Zambia*, 3 November 1970, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

What these youths were doing was taking advantage of their newly established associations with political parties, often obfuscating, through the cloak of party business, activities driven by the desire for personal gain and material rewards. Monique Marks has argued with reference to South Africa that youth always had clear justifications for their actions, which were about the country's future, rather than about their own personal agendas.<sup>16</sup> Mark's contention neglects the fact that these two drivers of youth behaviour were not necessarily mutually exclusive. The actions of Zambian youth during the First Republic bear this out. Zambian youth were indeed 'social shifter[s]', but 'shifters' whose actions were not necessarily as progressive as Deborah Durham's Botswanan youth protesters of 1995.<sup>17</sup> Instead, by regarding Zambian youth as 'stakeholders' in the new nation, as Aning and McIntyre's study of young combatants in Sierra Leone posits, the motivations for their sometimes reactionary positioning can be better understood.<sup>18</sup> Nowhere is this better highlighted than in the case of the anti-miniskirt campaigns of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

#### **4.2 Anti-Miniskirt Campaigns and Male Youth's 'Precarious Masculinity'**

Numerous localized anti-miniskirt campaigns took place throughout the First Republic. Nonetheless, these campaigns peaked during a handful of years –

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<sup>16</sup> Monique Marks, *Young Warriors: Youth Politics, Identity and Violence in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001).

<sup>17</sup> Durham, 'Disappearing Youth'.

<sup>18</sup> Kwesi Aning and Angela McIntyre, 'From Youth Rebellion to Child Abduction: The Anatomy of Recruitment in Sierra Leone', in *Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa*, ed. by Angela McIntyre (Cape Town: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), pp. 67-86.

notably, 1966 to 1967, and, thereafter, in 1969 and 1971. Africanists, of course, know that such campaigns were not unique to Zambia and also occurred in a number of other independent African countries at the time, not least in Tanzania, Uganda and Zanzibar, which have all been the focus of exemplary studies dedicated to the topic.<sup>19</sup> The contentious history of the miniskirt in Zambia, however, remains woefully under-analysed.<sup>20</sup> A notable exception is Karen Hansen's essay, 'Dressing Dangerously', which shows that fierce support for the miniskirt's proscription continues to haunt the present day.<sup>21</sup> In 2002, twenty members of Zambia's then ruling party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), were arrested after hundreds of youths had stripped women naked in public for wearing mini-skirts or trousers.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, despite its commendable engagement with the topic, the essay's main focus is the late-1990s miniskirt debates, which – Hansen suggests – 'had a sharper and violent edge' in comparison to those that had taken place in earlier periods.<sup>23</sup> By making this claim, Hansen's work downplays the brutality of the late 1960s and early 1970s campaigns, which

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<sup>19</sup> See for instance: Andrew Ivaska, 'Anti-Mini Militants Meet Modern Misses': Urban Style, Gender, and the Politics of 'National Culture' in 1960s Dar es Salaam, Tanzania', in *Fashioning Africa: Power and the Politics of Dress*, ed. by Jean Allman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 104-124; Joseph Kasule, 'Miniskirts Missing in the Act: The Politics of Cultural Transformation in Uganda, 1972 and 2014', *Ahfad Journal*, 36.1 (2019), pp. 15-32; Thomas Burgess, 'Cinema, Bell Bottoms, and Miniskirts: Struggles Over Youth and Citizenship in Revolutionary Zanzibar', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 3.5 (2002), pp. 287-313.

<sup>20</sup> Larmer's *Rethinking African Politics*, by way of illustration, only devotes one paragraph to the matter. See, Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 166.

<sup>21</sup> Karen Hansen, 'Dressing Dangerously: Miniskirts, Gender Relations, and Sexuality in Zambia', in *Fashioning Africa: Power and the Politics of Dress*, ed. by Jean Allman (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 166-188.

<sup>22</sup> 'Zambian Women Stripped for Wearing Mini-skirts', *Telegraph*, 15 January 2002, <<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1381558/Zambian-women-stripped-for-wearing-mini-skirts.html>> [accessed 19 September 2019].

<sup>23</sup> Hansen, 'Dressing Dangerously', p. 166.

were, as this section will demonstrate, likewise violent and hyper masculinized.

Moreover, it is argued that male members of the UNIP youth league, anxious about the increasing autonomy of young women and its effects on their own precarious masculinity, used the anti-miniskirt campaigns as a means to (re)assert control and demonstrate their manhood. These motives can be traced to the idea that manhood, in contrast to womanhood, is a 'precarious state' requiring 'continual social proof and validation'.<sup>24</sup> As mentioned in the introduction, a key underpinning of adulthood for otherwise marginalized male youths was the existence of a gendered hierarchy predicated on the control, dependency and subordination of women to men.<sup>25</sup> The violence of anti-miniskirt campaigns then did not occur in a social vacuum. At interview, Agness Lweendo, indicated that there existed a hidden culture of patriarchal control in Zambia, which was often violently demonstrated through wife beating: 'If a man beat you it means you are so much loved. The results were mostly bad, some would have wife beating, some would face death, but that would be hidden to avoid embarrassing situations. Wife beating was rampant. Children were equally being beaten depending on how they were following instructions'.<sup>26</sup> As beneficiaries of this gendered hierarchy, male party youths

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<sup>24</sup> For more detailed explanation, see Joseph Vandello, Jennifer Bosson, Dov Cohen, Rochelle Burnaford, and Jonathan Weaver, 'Precarious Manhood', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95.6 (2008), pp. 1325-1339.

<sup>25</sup> Burgess, Thomas and Andrew Burton, 'Introduction', in *Generations Past: Youth in East African History*, ed. by Andrew Burton and Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), p. 8.

<sup>26</sup> The use of the third person, by Agness Lweendo, to describe this common occurrence likely helped assuage the 'embarrassing' topic within the group dynamics of the interview, especially given her husband, Liston Lweendo, was present. In contrast, during individual interviews female participants tended to speak about similar occurrences using more personal examples. Nevertheless, Agness Lweendo's candidness on the topic of paternal

thus fought fiercely to maintain the gendered status quo and, by so doing, protect their path to recognized adulthood. This contrasted with political party leaders, who, having already attained adulthood, did not view the miniskirt as a threat at all, or, when they did, conceived of the threat mainly in terms of Westernization and cultural imperialism.

It is important to note, before moving forward with the analysis, that youth is a highly gendered term, infused with masculine connotations. The category of youth is routinely used in studies to refer to urban young men. More specifically, non-elite or lumpen youths have been characterized by Ibrahim Abdullah as unmarried males who are ‘largely unemployed and unemployable’.<sup>27</sup> Importantly, it was this sub-group who made up the core membership of the Zambian party youth leagues.<sup>28</sup> Although ‘they were there’ – that is, in the youth leagues – young women were rarely involved in any physically demanding or dangerous activities.<sup>29</sup> Recalling his experiences as an African National Congress (ANC) youth in the Southern Province town of Mazabuka, Mr George Muyni stated: ‘when... the opposing team would come... the ladies would hide themselves to show they belonged to this party, because they were scared of being beaten’.<sup>30</sup> Supporting this, Selina Mbozi, whose youth was also spent in Mazabuka, recollected that, ‘They were mixed,

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misogyny, within a group setting, speaks volumes regarding its normalisation. Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

<sup>27</sup> Ibrahim Abdullah, ‘Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL)’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36.2 (1998), p. 207. Also see, Obeng, ‘Gendered Nationalism’, p. 201.

<sup>28</sup> Abdullah, ‘Bush Path to Destruction’, p. 207.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with George Muyni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

although I have no record of women killing, but men'.<sup>31</sup> These two interviews indicate a critical difference between the two genders and their relationship with violence. Chiefly it was male youths who perpetrated violence and female youths who were its victims. Early anti-miniskirt episodes highlight this difference and help to complicate understandings of Zambian youth as perpetrators of violence, as well as revealing youth to be an internally differentiated category.<sup>32</sup>

Due in part to the rapid migration that followed the end of colonial restrictions on Africans, especially women, living in towns and cities, a greater number of professional and social opportunities became more widely available to young women after independence. Once limited to teaching and nursing services, women found themselves able to become air hostesses and stenographers, along with other professions.<sup>33</sup> These new opportunities were also a direct consequence of the implementation of universal basic education by the Government. Obtaining an education meant that girls could enter the public world of knowledge and, in the words of Patricia McFadden, 'begin to imagine themselves beyond the narrow patriarchal identities of motherhood and wifehood'.<sup>34</sup> Even those unable to break into the formal job market found other means of earning an independent living, such as opening unlicensed bars (aka 'shebeens'), marketeering and also prostitution.<sup>35</sup> Kafue UNIP

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<sup>31</sup> Interview with Selina Mbozi, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>32</sup> Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa', p. 23 and Kagwanja, 'Clash of Generations?', p. 88.

<sup>33</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/18/33, 'Second Symposium on Unemployed Youth in Zambia', (1965).

<sup>34</sup> Patricia McFadden, 'African Women Changing the Meaning of Citizenship', *Meridians*, 6.1 (2005), p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> 'Hell for Squatters', *Times of Zambia*, 18 April 1969, p. 6.

youth publicity secretary, Mr Geoffrey Lialabi, gave voice to widespread unease with younger women's ability to more readily sever their dependency on men, accusing them of taking 'advantage of their husbands' awkward working hours and indulg[ing] in prostitution'.<sup>36</sup> Prostitution itself of course could offer economic autonomy to women. Thus, as McFadden again notes, 'this entry of black women into the modern public spaces of neocolonial society marked a dramatic turning point in their unstoppable sojourn toward the status of citizenship and entitled individuality'.<sup>37</sup> The mobility of young women in public urban spaces – from hotels and bars to buses and bus stations, downtown streets and offices – was indicative of their changing social position as economic contributors to the development of the Zambian nation.<sup>38</sup> This shift helps to explain why so many of the anti-miniskirt campaigns took place in urban rather than rural areas. It also explains why the spectacle of a young woman wearing the then fashionable miniskirt was received with intense hostility by young urban Zambian men: the miniskirt was a visible symbol of rising female accumulation, consumption, mobility and autonomy.<sup>39</sup> This pattern of diminishing contrasts and rising conflict between female and male youths can be understood through a mechanism Sigmund Freud called the 'narcissism of differences'. This notion describes the tendency for related groups to engage in feuds to emphasise the declining differences between one another, as a means to assert power.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> A study of early postcolonial campaigns against prostitution could also prove a fruitful exercise in furthering understandings of the gendered aspect of youth. Due to space limitations, it remains outside the scope of this chapter.

<sup>37</sup> McFadden, 'African Women Changing the Meaning of Citizenship', p. 5.

<sup>38</sup> Ivaska, 'Anti-Mini Militants Meet Modern Misses', p. 599.

<sup>39</sup> Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 101.

<sup>40</sup> David Matsinhe, 'Africa's Fear of Itself: The Ideology of "Makwerekwere" in South Africa', *Third World Quarterly*, 32.2 (2011), p. 309.

The miniskirt became a cardinal issue as clothes are one of the ‘strongest bearers of cultural meaning’, this is as true for the people who wear them and the people who observe the wearer’s dressed body.<sup>41</sup> The miniskirt displayed a young woman’s cultural and gendered sensibilities. It conveyed to onlookers a wearer’s self-conceptions of their own sexuality, age and status within their communities.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, throughout the colonial era, dress had been a prime site of contestation and struggle. Clothing was used to construct Africa’s ‘backwardness’ and related need for foreign guidance and leadership.<sup>43</sup> The female body was at the heart of this, with Western constructions of dress and nakedness marking an individual’s level of modernity and a people’s readiness to self-rule.<sup>44</sup> In 1969 Valentine Musakanya, Minister of State for Technical and Vocational Education, wrote in a letter to President Kenneth Kaunda that ‘the colonizers and missionaries found... nudity incompatible with their trade and contrary to religious doctrines... As time went on... we copied and accepted the “Bwana’s dress”’.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, nationalist struggles saw both the appropriation of western dress, such as suits, as a mechanism through which Africans asserted their equality with their colonial masters, and, conversely, the ostensible return to

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<sup>41</sup> Hansen, ‘Dressing Dangerously’, p. 166.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> Ayo Coly, *Postcolonial Hauntologia: African Women’s Discourses of the Female Body* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2019), p. 32.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>45</sup> Letter to Kenneth Kaunda, His Excellency the President, From Valentine Musakanya, Minister of State for Technical and Vocational Education entitled, ‘Memorandum on the Dangers of Cultural Conservatives’, 2 April 1969. Quoted in Valentine Musakanya, *The Musakanya Papers: The Autobiographical Writings of Valentine Musakanya*, ed. by Miles Larmer (Lusaka: Lembani Trust, 2010), p. 45.



‘traditional’ African clothing, sported as an assertion of national pride.<sup>46</sup> The body thus acted as a site of cultural and social control and rebellion prior to independence. It was a preoccupation that bled into the Zambian postcolonial era.<sup>47</sup> Ayo Coly put it as follows: ‘The colonial rhetorical deployment of the African female body to signify Africa lead[sic] to a postcolonial African angst over the female body and subsequently sealed the fate of the African female body as a rhetorical element of African postcolonial discourses’.<sup>48</sup> Indeed, the First Republic’s anti-miniskirt campaigns reveal how battles over clothing were unevenly gendered towards the regulation of what women chose to wear. Laiza Choongo, who lived as a youth in Mazabuka during these campaigns, stressed that, ‘Amongst the gents there was no problem’ with what they wore, even if they were articles of western clothing like jeans.<sup>49</sup>

Anti-miniskirt campaigns were almost invariably driven by young men. Recollecting his time as a youth in Mazabuka, for example, George Muyuni commented that there were ‘No complaints from the women’ about miniskirts.<sup>50</sup> In Lusaka, an 18-year-old girl, interviewed by the *Times of Zambia* in September 1966, asserted that the girls felt differently towards mini-dresses, slacks and coloured stockings. ‘As far as I am concerned’, she said, ‘I don’t see anything bad in short skirts. It’s a lot of nonsense people trying to get them banned’.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, although anti-miniskirt rhetoric was

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<sup>46</sup> Ronald Aminzade, *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 189.

<sup>47</sup> Coly, *Postcolonial Hauntologies*, p. 32.

<sup>48</sup> Ayo Coly, ‘Un/clothing African Womanhood: Colonial Statements and Postcolonial Discourses of the African Female Body’, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 33 (2015), p. 13.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Laiza Choongo, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>50</sup> Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>51</sup> ‘Mini-storm Blows up Over Mini-skirts’, *Times of Zambia*, 24 September 1966, p. 7.

in part supported by the government, with President Kenneth Kaunda's ruling that all skirts must be at least three inches below the knee, no clear Government actions were taken to officially ban miniskirts.<sup>52</sup> It was instead male members of the youth leagues who took upon themselves the physical enforcement of its interdiction among young women.<sup>53</sup> It was an all-male affair directed primarily against female 'offenders'.<sup>54</sup> Youth therefore were both the targets *and* the enforcers of the campaign.<sup>55</sup> As a youth-instigated and led campaign, exercised through intimidation, humiliation and beatings, youth showed themselves able to independently assert social power. It was significant that, during the campaigns, male youth were prepared to move outside the law to achieve their aim of banning the miniskirt.<sup>56</sup> Their violent vigilantism involved physical force and intimidation at levels not normally used by the state.<sup>57</sup>

As already mentioned, government and UNIP support for anti-miniskirt campaigns was sparse and disjointed. No unified consensus emerged from parliamentary debates. Nonetheless, senior critics and supporters alike concentrated on the cultural appropriateness and the modern and western symbolism of the miniskirt, rather than its threat to patriarchal dominance as male youth leaguers did. One of the most vocal politicians who railed against the miniskirt was Vice President Simon Kapwepwe, who argued that cultural

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<sup>52</sup> Audrey Wipper, 'African Women, Fashion, and Scapegoating', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 6.2 (1972), p. 335.

<sup>53</sup> Wipper, 'African Women, Fashion, and Scapegoating', p. 335.

<sup>54</sup> Ivaska, 'Anti-Mini Militants Meet Modern Misses', p. 584.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> David Anderson, 'Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya', *African Affairs*, 101.405 (2002), p. 546.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

nationalism should be established in dress.<sup>58</sup> Writing to the Minister of Education on 15 January 1969, Kapwepwe revealed his staunch cultural nationalist agenda: ‘We all know that any country without cultural background is a Nation without backbone and without backbone, one is paralyzed to defend a culture which is not their own’.<sup>59</sup> For Kapwepwe, it was the miniskirt’s Western associations which made it an offensive item of dress, especially because its popularity had soared at a time when Zambia was meant to have broken free from colonial shackles.<sup>60</sup>

Those political leaders who defended the miniskirt, likewise, still continued to centre discussions around its cultural appropriateness. Indeed, the aforementioned Musakanya championed miniskirt wearers by proclaiming in 1969 that, ‘What these girls are showing is their awareness of their independence and a pride in their freedom. They are proud of their blackness’.<sup>61</sup> Musakanya went further, stating that, ‘Our mini-girls are lovely to look at. When I see them on the street, so smart, so independent and so much a part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, they make me feel proud of them’.<sup>62</sup> For Musakanya, young women wearing the miniskirt positively symbolized Zambia’s cultural modernity and development as an independent nation. In a letter to Kaunda, Musakanya argued that the ‘reaction exhibited against the

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<sup>58</sup> Hansen, ‘Dressing Dangerously’, p. 169.

<sup>59</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/13/95, ‘Letter to Minister of Education, Hon W Nyirenda, From the Vice President’, 15 January 1969.

<sup>60</sup> Wipper, ‘African Women, Fashion, and Scapegoating’, p. 330.

<sup>61</sup> ‘Mini-girls Find a Friend: I’m Proud of Them – Minister’, *Times of Zambia*, 21 February 1969, p. 1. Mr Kalulu was a second Government Minister to support the miniskirt dress. See, ‘Witnesses Are Just Foreign Agents’: Kalulu on the Attack’, *Times of Zambia*, 14 March 1969, p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> ‘Mini-girls Find a Friend: I’m Proud of Them – Minister’, *Times of Zambia*, 21 February 1969, p. 1.

“Mini-Skirt”... is a compound of [the] inferiority complex we ex-colonial people continue to live up against... cultural conservation is in inverse proportion to economic and technological development; the more culturally intolerant a nation is the less capable it is to advance’.<sup>63</sup> Musakanya believed that postcolonial Zambia could draw usefully on elements of Western culture, and praised the urbanised and diverse Copperbelt as being the most advanced province in this respect.<sup>64</sup> A champion of cosmopolitanism, Musakanya firmly placed the miniskirt within the cultural ‘melting pot’ of postcolonial Zambian society.<sup>65</sup>

Views of the miniskirt in broader Zambian society, of course, varied more widely. In 1971, for instance, the House of Chiefs passed a motion stating that ‘Women’s dress above the knee should be condemned’.<sup>66</sup> Others were more accepting, like one Lusaka businessman who said, ‘I believe in freedom of speech, of the Press, of movement – and of fashion, as long as all are decent. I’ve lived through many fashions and this [the miniskirt] is far from the worst’.<sup>67</sup> A Kitwe hotelier echoed this sentiment, commenting that as long as the women who came into the hotel were ‘decently dressed, we have no objections to the length of their skirts’.<sup>68</sup> As with the political leaders, there was limited recourse to forceful action, unlike what was promoted and pursued by male members of the UNIP youth league. Indeed, it is here that

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<sup>63</sup> Musakanya, *The Musakanya Papers*, p. 45.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Hansen, ‘Dressing Dangerously’, p. 169.

<sup>67</sup> ‘Mini-storm Blows up Over Mini-skirts’, *Times of Zambia*, 24 September 1966, p. 7.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

the actions of young males diverged considerably from those of other members of Zambian society, with violent results.

The steadfast commitment to anti-miniskirt campaigns by UNIP youth league members was in essence reactionary, an attempt to retain a traditional patriarchal system in which they were set to inherit power through dominance over women. This was inconsistent with the government's more progressive developmentalism, which – at least in theory – aimed at slowly granting women economic and social freedoms. Male youths, as politically and economically marginalized individuals, perceived the sight of mini-clad women as foreshadowing the erosion of patriarchal power, the one social power that was clearly within their grasp and which would allow them (eventually) to attain rudimentary adulthood.<sup>69</sup> Intriguingly, this situation, in which youth actions went against the general progressive government trajectory, stood in stark contrast to other youth actions on the continent. Up to the 1980s, for instance, in Remo, Nigeria, it was youths who were challenging traditional systems, not fighting to uphold them as Zambia's early postcolonial [male] youths were attempting to do with gender.<sup>70</sup>

Male youth's support of 'traditional' gender roles was violently defended. They resolutely referred to the anti-miniskirt campaigns as 'wars'.<sup>71</sup> Humiliation of women was a key strategy, as an interview with Laiza Choongo attests. Living as a young woman in Mazabuka during the late

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<sup>69</sup> Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, p. 101.

<sup>70</sup> Nolte, 'Identity and Violence', p. 69.

<sup>71</sup> 'Leave the Mini-girls Alone, Chimba Warns UNIP Youth', *Times of Zambia*, 23 April 1969, p. 7.

1960s, and in spite of supporting UNIP, she experienced first-hand and indirectly through friends the brutality of the anti-miniskirt campaign in the area. Choongo revealed that youths ‘would even tear the skirt apart so you would be completely naked since that’s what you want’.<sup>72</sup> She went on to confirm the success these public strippings had in stopping young women from wearing miniskirts, and thus also their submission to their male counterparts: ‘When someone that you know experiences that, it came as a warning to you... When you know someone who experiences that, it was just a no go zone as well to avoid the embarrassment. So it would act as a deterrent’.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, many times the male youths also carried with them blades to help tear off miniskirts. The use of blades served a dual-purpose. They made it easier to destroy the miniskirts being worn by young women and acted as a weapon of intimidation. This, coupled with the size of the gangs of UNIP youths that armed themselves with razor blades (as many as forty in one Livingstone campaign in April 1969), meant that young women were left powerless to resist.<sup>74</sup> By moving in groups, male youths amplified the level of intimidation they wielded.

Moving in groups also provided an opportunity for individual male youths to demonstrate their masculine virility in the presence of other young men, who were both their comrades and their sexual rivals. In the township of Chifubu, Ndola, for example, on the evening of 7 June 1967, three young girls were attacked by a 30-year-old male UNIP youth, Zebron Tembo, in the presence

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<sup>72</sup> Interview with Laiza Choongo, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> ‘Leave the Mini-girls Alone, Chimba Warns UNIP Youth’, *Times of Zambia*, 23 April 1969, p. 7.

of two of his male associates. The girls had been on their way to night school when Tembo stopped them and told them: ‘Don’t you know you are forbidden to wear short clothes.’<sup>75</sup> He then went on to kneel on the ground, caught hold of one of the girl’s dresses and ripped it from the hem to the waist.<sup>76</sup> It was an act intended to demonstrate his authority over the female youth as his social junior. That Tembo then went on to pull down her half petticoat to her knees and touch the inside of her thigh, not only emphasized where social control of the girl’s body lay, but also signalled to Tembo’s male associates his potent masculinity, given the sexual connotations of such an action.<sup>77</sup> It insinuated that he could access women if he so desired, whenever he wished. The anti-miniskirt campaigns of the First Republic therefore enabled the direct expression of an individual’s masculine virility to other men, as well as being a method to intimidate women into submission.<sup>78</sup> Masculinity is, after all, ‘intimately bound up with the subordination of women’.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, as Marc Epprecht points out, these young men ‘are rarely self-assured patriarchs. On the contrary, they are commonly affected by debilitating sexual insecurity arising from economic or structural marginality’.<sup>80</sup> The subordination of young women, and their bodies, through these acts thus reassured and confirmed to young men, and those around them, their masculine credentials.

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<sup>75</sup> ‘Magistrate Stresses Danger of Those Illegal Campaigns’, *Times of Zambia*, 5 August 1967, p. 7.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> Wipper, ‘African Women, Fashion, and Scapegoating’, p. 349.

<sup>79</sup> Andrea Cornwall, ‘To Be a Man Is More Than a Day’s Work: Shifting Ideals of Manliness in Ado-Odo, S W Nigeria’, in *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa*, ed. by Lisa Lindsay and Stephan Miescher (London: Heinemann, 2003), p. 233.

<sup>80</sup> Marc Epprecht, ‘Sexuality, Africa, History’, *American Historical Review*, 114.5 (2009), p. 1268.

The physical beating of female youths was also a common occurrence during the campaigns. Frequent threats were also made in this regard. This is evidenced in the minutes of one UNIP Youth Joint Meeting held in the Copperbelt town of Luanshya on 17 July 1964. One male youth declared that: ‘We stopped women from wearing trousers, but we have failed. I now command you to beat any one you see in that way’.<sup>81</sup> Certainly, male youths were not known to dish out empty threats. In September 1966, around the town of Kabwe, then still known as Broken Hill, a Miss Sifuniso and her sister were severely beaten by a gang led by UNIP youth constituency secretary, Mr Boniface Zulu.<sup>82</sup> In February 1969, 23-year-old Patrick Mwanza seriously assaulted a girl wearing a miniskirt in Lusaka.<sup>83</sup> The application of such a high degree of violence against people posing no physical threat to the campaign’s enforcers is indicative of the concerns of these male youths over their precarious masculinity *and* of the gendered entitlement they felt they deserved over women. Indeed, if new patterns of interaction were to emerge, the changes in the position of young women required complementary changes to the male position; yet these changes would have necessitated men giving up certain rights and privileges and also acquiring a different view of themselves.<sup>84</sup> And these were ‘sacrifices’ that most male youth were not prepared to make. Succinctly put, male *Zambian* youth, in using violence,

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<sup>81</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/29, ‘Minutes of UNIP Youth Joint Meeting’, 17 July 1964.

<sup>82</sup> ‘UNIP Youth Leader Cleared’, *Times of Zambia*, 21 September 1966, p. 1.

<sup>83</sup> ‘Mini Case’, *Times of Zambia*, 26 February 1969, p. 7.

<sup>84</sup> Wipper, ‘African Women, Fashion, and Scapegoating’, p. 345.



were actively attempting to safeguard their future access to a dominant social identity.

The violence of the anti-miniskirt campaigns also triggered the start of a growing concern among the members of the Zambian political elite about their ability to control young Zambian men. It was a worry that would become more apparent in the 1970s and will be focused on in more detail in the next chapter.<sup>85</sup> Convictions for violence perpetrated against miniskirt wearers remained consistently low. However, efforts to regain control over youthful violence became increasingly frequent from 1969. In April, for instance, the Minister for National Guidance, Mr Justin Chimba, ordered UNIP youths to 'leave mini-girls alone'.<sup>86</sup> He declared that 'No UNIP member must take the law into his own hands. He must wait until the party has formulated an official policy on the mini skirt'.<sup>87</sup> Ironically, given that youth's recourse to violence was often justified under the pretext that they had received orders from UNIP government officials, that UNIP youths ignored such requests also exposed the relative weaknesses of state and party authority within the lower rungs of Zambian society.

Thus, the anti-miniskirt campaigns show the deliberate violence enacted by male youth in an attempt to maintain their gendered advantage over a group of their social juniors. The young women who were beginning to occupy more favourable social positions with the onset of national development, were

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<sup>85</sup> See pp. 253-336 of this thesis.

<sup>86</sup> 'Leave the Mini-girls Alone, Chimba Warns UNIP Youth', *Times of Zambia*, 23 April 1969, p. 7.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

violently chastised for daring to move against a traditional patriarchal privilege that was set to benefit young men. Male party youths fiercely fought to maintain the gendered status quo to protect their path to recognized adulthood. When their actions are assessed in the context of the anti-miniskirt campaigns, male party youths can most certainly be viewed as shrewd perpetrators who consciously used violence to their own advantage. This, of course, is a major difference from the directly political violence they were involved in. There, as has been seen in the previous chapter, their agency was greatly restricted, and their violence deployed primarily for the benefit of political parties and their leaders.

The UNIP government and male UNIP youth leaguers differed in opinion concerning the type and level of threat posed by the miniskirt. That youth reacted much more extremely than the UNIP government, whose upper levels did not envisage the resort to violent campaigns, underlines the agency and autonomy of male youths in their use of violence within the lower hierarchies of Zambian society. They deliberately sought to uphold a ‘traditional’ gender hierarchy and prevent female youths from reaching socioeconomic parity with themselves, in contrast to the stated goals of national development. The anti-miniskirt campaigns revealed that male youths were capable of acting independently and that their own agenda was not always in keeping with that of the leaders of the political organizations they joined.<sup>88</sup> This situation – as will be seen in a later chapter – precipitated a growing government awareness

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<sup>88</sup> Fiona Klouwenberg and Inge Butter, ‘African ‘Youth’ Since Independence: Notes on a Bibliographic Overview, 1990-2005’, *African Development*, XXXVI.3 (2011), p. 58.

of the havoc an unchecked youth league could cause within Zambian society. The government's preoccupation with controlling 'problem' youth in the 1970s can be roughly traced to this starting point.

### **4.3 Xenophobia or Socioeconomic Struggle?: Youth Violence against Foreigners**

Violent outbursts against the African 'other' have become a topical issue on the continent, not least because of the continued, and often deadly, xenophobic attacks in South Africa against Nigerian and other migrants.<sup>89</sup> The resultant crisis caused a serious diplomatic rift between the two countries. The severity of these waves of antforeigner violence has heightened academic interest, and publications on this worrying phenomenon have mushroomed.<sup>90</sup> Commendable as such studies are, it is puzzling that very few interrogate why those perpetrating such violence against foreigners are

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<sup>89</sup> Polona Zajec, 'Understanding South African Xenophobia: Through the Prism of J. M. Coetzee's Summertime 'Scenes from a Provincial Life'', *Acta Neophilologica*, 50.1 (2017), p. 77. On the most recent incidents, see 'South Africa Targets Foreign Truck Drivers as Xenophobic Tensions Rise', *Report Focus News*, 17 May 2021 <<https://www.reportfocusnews.com/2021/05/17/south-africa-targets-foreign-truck-drivers-as-xenophobic-tensions-rise/>> [accessed 19 May 2021]; 'South Africa's President Ramaphosa Condemns 'Anti-foreigner Violence'', *BBC News*, 4 September 2019 <<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49566458>> [accessed 19 September 2019]; and 'South Africa Apologises to Nigeria Over Xenophobic Attacks', *BBC News*, 17 September 2019, <<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49726041>> [accessed 19 September 2019]. For further details about the violent eruptions of 2008, see Barry Bearak and Celia Dugger, 'South Africans Take Out Rage on Immigrants' *New York Times*, 20 May 2008, <<https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/world/africa/20safrica.html>> [accessed 19 September 2019].

<sup>90</sup> For instance: Ebenezer Oni and Samuel Okunade, 'The Context of Xenophobia in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa in Comparison', in *The Political Economy of Xenophobia in Africa*, ed. by Adeoye Akinola (New York: Springer, 2018), pp. 37-51; Julius Gathogo and Isabel Phiri, 'Xenophobia/Afrophobia in the Post-Colonial Africa: Strategies for Combat', *Theologia Viatorum*, 33.2 (2009), pp. 216-241; Morgan Ndlovu, 'Manufacturing Black-on-Black Violence in Africa: A Decolonial Perspective on *Mfecane* and Afrophobia/Xenophobia in South Africa', *Journal of African Renaissance Studies*, 12.2 (2017), 97-109; and Nanette De Jong, 'Displays of Masculinity and Rituals of Display: Congolese Immigration and Xenophobia in Johannesburg', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 31 (2018), pp. 106-118.

‘youthful’. This section, using the lens of Zambia’s First Republic, foregrounds the centrality of youth involvement in antforeigner violence perpetrated against European, Congolese and Tanzanian victims. Contrary to the late colonial period, when xenophobic, ‘nativist’ propaganda had been by and large monopolized by the ANC, in the immediate post-independence era, it was UNIP youths who spearheaded the violent campaigns against foreigners. The targeting of some foreign nationals and not others likewise reveals that ‘belonging to the nation’ was selective and exclusionary. Attacks against Malawians, for instance, are very rarely, if at all, mentioned in coeval newspaper reports. Zambia’s other neighbours, on the other hand, did not get off so lightly.

The anti-foreigner violence of Zambian youth can be attributed to three discrete drivers, all rooted in the specific ‘threats’ which foreign nationals were seen as posing. Campaigners justified their actions by pointing to the needs to defend Zambia’s non-racialist society, uphold public security and protect scarce economic resources. The first of these factors, exemplified by anti-European campaigns, was predicated on the ‘danger’ the group posed to UNIP and its policies which had strengthened the social position of black youths. The second driver of violence, most visible during the anti-Congolese campaigns, was male youth attempts to gain social respectability by remoulding their notorious image as political thugs into one of custodians of public order. The third factor, concerning resource competition, involved mainly Tanzanian victims, deemed to be poaching scarce jobs, affordable housing, educational opportunities, and access to women.

The level of violence wielded by youths was often extreme. Indirect violence in the form of lootings, forced evictions and demolition of migrant property was a regular occurrence. Just as frequent was the direct physical abuse of migrants through beatings, stoning and stabbings. A point of difference with contemporary South Africa, where black male migrants formed the majority of victims of xenophobic attacks, was that in early postcolonial Zambia, neither women nor children were spared.<sup>91</sup> This gendered distinction suggests that part at least of this violence involved the assertion of masculine dominance over vulnerable groups of women, as had occurred during the anti-miniskirt campaigns. The identity of Congolese victims most clearly illuminates Zambian youths' divergence from the commonly accepted pattern of males being the chief victims of xenophobic violence. Most youths involved in anti-foreigner violence were members of either the UNIP youth league or, in the case of anti-European violence, the Zambia Youth Service (ZYS). The UNIP leadership and government did not openly support the violent campaigns against foreigners; however, where Zambia's relations with the victims' countries of origin were less than cordial, next to no politicians came to the defence of the persecuted nationals. Condemnation was openly forthcoming only when Europeans were attacked, due to the risk the violent campaign posed to harmonious relations with the West. The international visibility of this turmoil risked the pulling of Western investment. Indeed, such attacks involved big demonstrations by youths, rather than consisting of smaller, but more violent, instances of vigilantism.

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<sup>91</sup> De Jong, 'Displays of Masculinity and Rituals of Display', p. 110.

Before moving further, it is important to explore the meaning of xenophobia and how it connects to the early postcolonial era in Zambia. Xenophobia has over the years gained the status of a global phenomenon. It is not at all an African affair, having been experienced in one form or the other across most continents of the world.<sup>92</sup> At its most basic, xenophobia can be understood as ‘a fear or dislike of things foreign or strange’.<sup>93</sup> Reynolds and Vine maintain that xenophobia is a psychological state of hostility or fear towards outsiders.<sup>94</sup> Xenophobia itself is a word with multiple and complex meanings, each bounded by the context to which it is applied. In South Africa, for instance, much emphasis has been placed on anti-foreigner sentiment being a result of isolation from outsiders during apartheid.<sup>95</sup> Plainly, the history of Zambian xenophobia is difficult to reconcile with this particular explanatory strand. The country’s long history of cosmopolitanism – itself a consequence of the labour demands of the copper mines – did not prevent the rise of youth-driven campaigns against ‘new’ immigrants in the early independence period. Regardless of xenophobia’s ultimate causes, common to all xenophobic contexts are deliberate acts of marginalisation. This involves longer-term residents in the host nation intentionally seeking to demote and belittle the social standing of migrants in relation to their own.<sup>96</sup> As will be illustrated,

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<sup>92</sup> Oni and Okunade, ‘The Context of Xenophobia in Africa’, p. 39.

<sup>93</sup> Keith Snell, ‘The Culture of Local Xenophobia’, *Social History*, 28.2 (2003), p. 4.

<sup>94</sup> Vernon Reynolds, Ian Vine, *The Socio-Biology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism, and Nationalism* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), quoted in Oni and Okunade, ‘The Context of Xenophobia in Africa’, p. 39.

<sup>95</sup> Matsinhe, ‘Africa’s Fear of Itself’, p. 302.

<sup>96</sup> De Jong, ‘Displays of Masculinity and Rituals of Display’, p. 106.

the anti-foreigner actions of Zambian youths tend to fit into this latter conceptual framework.

Xenophobia, however, might not be the only, or even the best, term to describe instances of violence directed against the numerically marginal Europeans residing in postcolonial Zambia, given they were white and usually Zambian citizens. Certainly, at the time of independence in 1964, a policy was endorsed whereby anyone who had been a formal resident of Northern Rhodesia automatically became a Zambian citizen.<sup>97</sup> A concept more befitting in this case is that of ‘strangerhood’, which is used to refer to instances when the members of specific groups *within* a nation’s borders are conceived of as ‘strangers’ on account of perceived racial and cultural differences. This identity is commonly assigned by those who regard themselves as ‘sons of the soil’ and is deployed to emphasize the ‘strangers’ second-class status. In return for being tolerated, the latter are forced to surrender many of their rights.<sup>98</sup> By treating Europeans as strangers, Zambian youths attempted to redraw lines of power and place themselves firmly at the top of the social hierarchy vis-à-vis the newly disempowered white settlers. In this reading, acts of violence served to symbolize and enforce this stripping of power from European hands following independence. Ironically, youths justified their actions against European Zambians by stressing that the latter did not subscribe to the non-racialist ideals of UNIP and the government.

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<sup>97</sup> This contrasts with the later citizenship debates that would occur during the MMD era, especially regarding the ‘true’ national identity of presidential candidates. See, Beth Whitaker, ‘Citizens and Foreigners’, *African Studies Review*, 48.1 (2005), pp. 114-115.

<sup>98</sup> Bruce Whitehouse, *Migrants and Strangers in an African City: Exile, Dignity, Belonging* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), p. 13.

The perceived threat posed by racist European residents was intimately connected with the self-interest of UNIP youths in preserving the racial inclusivity of the new nation, one from which, as black youths, they could expect to benefit. For instance, during a Luanshya UNIP Youth Branch meeting held on 16 May 1966, one Bwana S. Mkakutu declared: ‘The only privilege we have got is our leadership because even the goel [*sic*, but ‘goal’] your blood transmission of trust is registered. Let us all recall our past unity and fight the common enemy. The westerners are here to destroy us with their dollars’.<sup>99</sup> Independence and the anti-colonial struggle meant that youths were more conscious of their newly acquired social privileges and the need to ensure that the power they aspired to would not remain in same ‘western’ hands as before independence.<sup>100</sup> Differently put, this was a struggle intended both to define who belonged to the nation and who had the right, as a Zambian national, to hold power, including in the social realm.<sup>101</sup>

On the whole, anti-European actions were less violent than those targeting other foreign groups and commonly took the form of organised protests through which youths asserted their authority. A case in point was the demonstration staged in Broken Hill on 17 February 1967 by youths and women.<sup>102</sup> The march took place in order to denounce the beating of an expatriate railwayman by a group of Europeans, at Broken Hill Railwaymen’s

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<sup>99</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/27, ‘Minutes of Meeting of UNIP Youth Branch Cabinet Held on 16 May 1966’, 16 May 1966.

<sup>100</sup> Zajec, ‘Understanding South African Xenophobia’, p. 73.

<sup>101</sup> Abbink, ‘Being Young in Africa’, p. 27.

<sup>102</sup> ‘200 Protest at Beating: Women and Youths Denounce Thugs Who Attacked Railwayman’, *Times of Zambia*, 17 February 1967, p. 1.



Club, after he danced with the wife of a Zambian railwayman. A white South African had been subsequently arrested.<sup>103</sup>



**Figure 9: Placard carrying youths and women protesting at the attack**

*Source: '200 Protest at Beating: Women and Youths Denounce Thugs Who Attacked Railwayman', Times of Zambia, 17 February 1967, p. 1.*

More than 200 women and youths protested in Broken Hill against this incident. That they were expressing their solidarity with another European foreigner reveals, importantly, that it was a specific group of 'Europeans' that was targeted by the youths – those racist whites who did not conform to the new social values of the Zambian nation, which youths were set on protecting and (eventually) inheriting from their seniors. The protest was used as a show of youthful power against this group of Europeans; here exclusionary language took the place of direct violence. Yells of 'Racialists go back to Smith', 'We sympathize with Allison', 'Supporters of Smith go to Rhodesia' and 'UNIP will protect the recruits' were heard throughout the march.<sup>104</sup> Such phrases served to distance the Europeans involved in the case from the nation, and effectively demarcated them as strangers. Later in the same afternoon, green uniformed youths from the ZYS camp, near Broken Hill, also

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<sup>103</sup> 'Arrest: S. African to Appear in Court Following Attack on Railway Recruit', *Times of Zambia*, 18 February 1967, p. 1.

<sup>104</sup> '200 Protest at Beating: Women and Youths Denounce Thugs Who Attacked Railwayman', *Times of Zambia*, 17 February 1967, p. 1.

menacingly confronted whites who had watched the demonstration.<sup>105</sup> In this case, youths used intimidation to ensure that political change was also followed by social change, in which black Zambians would be free to mix with whomever they wanted.

Another confrontation between Zambian youths and European foreigners was decidedly more combative. On 16 July 1969, ZYS members stormed the High Court, in opposition to the decision by High Court Judges, Mr Ivor Evans and Irish-born Zambian Chief Justice, Mr James Skinner to quash sentences on two Portuguese soldiers who had entered Zambia from Angola in uniform.<sup>106</sup> The two soldiers had originally been fined K2,000 each by a Lusaka magistrate and handed a prison term of two years.<sup>107</sup> Like in the case of the aforementioned 1967 protest, Zambian youths carried a number of banners broadcasting exclusionary messages. These read: 'Revoke Skinner's Appointment Today', 'Away with Imperialistic Judgements', 'Zambia Faces Judicial Assassination', 'An Eye for an Eye'.<sup>108</sup> Once more, Zambian youths were attempting to cast European foreigners as 'strangers' who threatened Zambia's borders through the dangerous decisions they took and who had outstayed their welcome in positions of influence. Both Ivor Evans and James Skinner, as Europeans working in Zambia's High Court, fitted these profiles and suffered the brunt of youthful hostility. Indeed, after youths had breached the Lusaka High Court, they had immediately sought to break down the

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> 'Thugs Storm High Court: Judges Hold Out Against Onslaught', *Times of Zambia*, 17 July 1969, p. 1.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

locked door of Skinner's office, where the two had sought shelter.<sup>109</sup> Youths – in khaki drill and green berets – had hammered on the door and took running kicks at it. But the door had held.<sup>110</sup> They had then turned their fury towards the furniture and smashed everything in sight and pelted the walls with rotten vegetables. Moving outside, they had directed their attention at a Czechoslovakian diplomat, severely beating him up.<sup>111</sup> Czechoslovakian Press attaché Bohuslav Hynek was likewise set-upon by about 40 youths who surrounded him, beat him up, and tore his clothing.<sup>112</sup>

Youth violence in this case can be viewed as a kind of continuation of the anti-colonial struggle, in which youths attempted to do away with such lingering colonial influences as might have blocked the promised handover of power to the upcoming *African* generation. Although, admittedly, this last example spills into the political realm, it crucially suggests that on a deeper social level Zambian youths viewed themselves unequivocally as powerful enough to enact change. Indeed, the collective power of youths demonstrated in these protests served as a warning to the Government of the possible chaos and disruption an untamed youth population could cause. Moreover, anti-European demonstrations and protests were very visible, both nationally and internationally. This might go some way to explaining why politicians, in an effort to protect the country's image as a stable investment destination, quickly condemned the use of violence in these and similar instances. For instance, in 1965, after youths from the ZYS had gone 'on the rampage' in

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<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

Livingstone and harassed Europeans in the main street, President Kenneth Kaunda was quick to state that he ‘deplored and condemned’ their actions.<sup>113</sup> Kaunda declared he was ‘disappointed that some ZYS chaps have gone beating up innocent men, women and children. This is not the right way to behave; to try and take the law on ourselves will lead to chaos and disorder’.<sup>114</sup> Minister for Local Government, Mr Sikota Wina, also voiced his disapproval and warned that ‘The Youth Service is not a gestapo wing of the Government... The Government will be ruthless in taking action against those who take the law into their own hands’.<sup>115</sup>

Like with Europeans, youth anti-foreigner violence against Congolese people living in Zambia was prompted by the threat they were perceived as posing to Zambian society. Anti-Congolese sentiment was based on the idea that they presented a risk to social security by increasing crime levels in the areas where they lived, particularly on the Copperbelt. Violence against the Congolese was thus based on the notion of ‘cleansing’ society of its social ills, with all its dehumanizing connotations of dirt and purification.<sup>116</sup> The crimes the Congolese were accused of being involved in included robberies, riots and kidnappings. As the *Times of Zambia* reported on 1 October 1968, ‘Hundreds of peaceful law-abiding Congolese living in Zambia are subjected to “constant harassment and friction” from local people because of gangster

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<sup>113</sup> ‘Youth Service Not a Gestapo’, *Times of Zambia*, 26 November 1965, p. 1.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> Michael Neocosmos, ‘The Politics of Fear and the Fear of Politics: Reflections on Xenophobic Violence in South Africa’, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 43.6 (2008), p. 587.

raids which have been attributed to Congolese nationals'.<sup>117</sup> Incidents such as the Buchi Hall riot, which led to eight Congolese people being charged in Kitwe in December 1968, added to these perceptions. The riot, which took place after a beer party to mark the coming to power of President Joseph Mobutu, started when a police officer who tried to separate quarrelling attendees, was set upon by the eight Congolese men.<sup>118</sup> On 7 December 1970, Congolese nationals were beaten, stoned and subjected to 'savage acts' during a riot in Bulangililo township, Kitwe. Singing a UNIP song, 'Tiyende pamodzi ndi mutima umo', meaning 'Let us march in unity', the group of UNIP-supporting youths suspected the Congolese to be child kidnappers.<sup>119</sup> Congolese, therefore, became obvious scapegoats for the criminality that remained a societal problem after Zambian independence, and even overtook colonial levels.<sup>120</sup> Indeed, a newspaper article in 1969 warned that in the Copperbelt townships, 'To walk... at night is inviting trouble – men are beaten and robbed and women robbed and raped... only the foolhardy step out of doors unless they are in groups'.<sup>121</sup> The paradox here, of course, was that the youths employed much of the same violent methods that they were allegedly fighting to stop amongst the Congolese living in Zambia.

Zambian youths put existing hostility towards Congolese foreigners to their advantage, by skilfully using violence against the minority group to carve out

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<sup>117</sup> 'Innocent Congolese Beaten Because of Gunmen', *Times of Zambia*, 1 October 1968, p. 7.

<sup>118</sup> '8 Congolese in Court on Kitwe Riot Charge', *Times of Zambia*, 4 December 1968, p. 1.

<sup>119</sup> 'Congo Nationals Beaten, Stoned in Riot – Court', *Times of Zambia*, 13 March 1970, p. 9.

<sup>120</sup> Gathogo and Isabel Phiri, 'Xenophobia/Afrophia in the Post Colonial Africa', p. 217.

<sup>121</sup> 'Hell for Squatters', *Times of Zambia*, 18 April 1969, p. 6.

for themselves the role of custodians of public order and guardians of the 'native' population. In other words, youth anti-Congolese violence formed part of an attempt by youths to gain social respectability by presenting themselves as vigilantes. The forms of violence exerted by youths reveal a 'cleansing' drive, to rid the areas where they lived of criminal activity. Forced evictions from homes or the total destruction of dwellings signified the intention of wiping out social problems with the expulsion of Congolese nationals from local areas. By way of illustration, in December 1969, in Kitwe's Bulangililo site and service township, an incident during which a man was stabbed (and another struck by a bottle), saw a wide number of properties smashed-up by gangs who chanted 'Tiyende pamodzi ndi mutima umo'.<sup>122</sup> All the victims were Congolese nationals, who reported that the gang had hurled stones at the windows, doors, walls and roofs of their houses. A car owned by a Congolese man was also stoned by the youths.<sup>123</sup> Mrs Estehr Kazhinga, of Plot 298, recalled: 'It was about 8pm when I heard a gang chanting. Within seconds stones and bricks were thrown at the house, shattering some windows. The next-door house of Mr Albert Madyamba had the door and window ripped open by heavy stones and was looted'.<sup>124</sup> The attackers had told their victims that the violence would continue until the Congolese quit the township.<sup>125</sup>

The violence, although not explicitly gendered, took on these undertones, as Congolese women and children formed a large share of its victims. Targeting

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<sup>122</sup> 'Terror Gang Hunts Out Congolese in Kitwe', *Times of Zambia*, 9 December 1969, p. 1.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

women afforded male youths an opportunity to assert their masculine dominance. The experiences of these women and children with the xenophobia of Zambian youths contradicts Timothy Gibbs' claim that young men tended to be the main victims of social violence.<sup>126</sup> The violent targeting of women and children illuminates another specific mechanism aimed at cleansing areas of Congolese. Indeed, by violently targeting, not only men, but women and children as well, youths put pressure on the more vulnerable members of the foreign group, making it more likely they would leave out of fear. An incident in Lusaka's Chawama compound in February 1971 casts light on these dynamics. The gang involved used large sticks and iron bars to break down doors and demolish houses.<sup>127</sup> However, the focus of violence was also redirected onto women and children, resulting in horrific physical injuries among this specific group, who was more vulnerable to violence. One of the victims, Mrs Elena Mputu, said she was sitting at home when the mob had suddenly burst through the door. Mputu had then been stoned on the head as she tried to protect her children. One of the children, pictured on the next page, was also hurt.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Timothy Gibbs, 'Inkatha's Young Militants: Reconsidering Political Violence in South Africa', *The International Africa Institute*, 87.2 (2017), p. 391.

<sup>127</sup> 'Avengers Wreck Township: 48 Homes Smashed', *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1971, p. 1.

<sup>128</sup> 'Avengers Wreck Township: 48 Homes Smashed', *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1971, p. 1.



**Figure 10: An injured Mrs Mputu with her injured child**

Source: 'Avengers Wreck Township: 48 Homes Smashed', *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1971, p. 1.



**Figure 11: Wrecked homes of Congolese nationals in Lusaka's Chawama compound**

Source: 'Avengers Wreck Township: 48 Homes Smashed', *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1971, p. 1.

In the same incident, another Congolese woman, Mrs N'tuma Albert, stated that men had attacked her with sticks and stones while she tried to escape from her home with her children. She was subsequently forced to seek refuge in a nearby lavatory, where she had to spend the night with her children.<sup>129</sup> A further victim reported how the youthful perpetrators had sung 'Tiyende Pamodzi', ostensibly insinuating that the destruction and violence enacted against the women was party business.<sup>130</sup> In the most violent of these acts, whilst a Congolese man was attacked and almost buried under his collapsing

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<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*



home, his young wife was brutally kicked in the stomach causing her to drop their four-month-old baby.<sup>131</sup> A vice-chairman of the Congolese Association admitted that ‘My family is now living in fear’, a comment that seemed to confirm the success of the violence in creating an intolerable situation for Congolese nationals residing in areas controlled by youth vigilantes.<sup>132</sup> Many others were left with no choice but to move, as their houses had been totally destroyed by youths. Those left homeless in this single incident numbered more than one hundred.<sup>133</sup> Such violence enabled youths to demonstrate their social power as vigilante figures and, therefore, their authority to determine who belonged, and who did not, in the lower levels of independent Zambian society.

Unlike in the case of anti-European violence, the Government reaction to these attacks was decidedly muted. In Kitwe’s Bulangililo township, for example, many Congolese were ‘flocking out’ of Zambia because they felt the police were not affording them enough protection.<sup>134</sup> Indicative of the authorities’ response was the reply to a letter originally sent by the provincial general secretary of the Congolese Association, Mr Charles Kazadi, to complain about the plight of the people he represented in December 1969. In his response to Kazadi, the Kitwe’s youth regional secretary merely promised to ‘look into the matter’.<sup>135</sup> The government’s apathetic response in this case had probably something to do with the hostile diplomatic relations between

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<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> ‘Terror Gang Hunts Out Congolese in Kitwe’, *Times of Zambia*, 9 December 1969, p. 1.

<sup>133</sup> ‘Avengers Wreck Township: 48 Homes Smashed’, *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1971, p. 1.

<sup>134</sup> ‘Congolese ‘Tortured’ by Terror Groups’, *Times of Zambia*, 20 December 1969, p. 1.

<sup>135</sup> ‘Terror Gang Hunts Out Congolese in Kitwe’, *Times of Zambia*, 9 December 1969, p. 1.

Zambia and the Republic of Congo at the time, a hangover from the earlier Katanga crisis from 1960 to 1963. Indeed, the secession of Katanga had posed a significant threat to the unity of Zambia itself, given the historically strong ties between the two ‘Copperbelts’ and that the Katanga secession had been supported by the white Southern Rhodesian regime and the Belgians. The distrust of the Congolese by the Zambian government, and its apathetic response to their victimization by youths, likely stemmed from the fact that most of the Congolese victims of youth violence were supporters of the Katangan secession who had fled to the Copperbelt after its ending.<sup>136</sup> Youths were thus left free to violently enforce their authority over this marginal group, and, in the name of crime prevention, buttress those vigilante credentials that would win them social respect within the lower levels of Zambian society.

Youths were also motivated by socioeconomic competition with foreign groups deemed to be posing a threat to scarce resources. This was notably true of relations between Zambian youths and Tanzanian foreigners residing in the urban centres of the country. Violence against this group was especially intense since the two groups shared many commonalities, with both typically being migrants to Zambia’s urban towns and cities, where they normally occupied the same economically insecure positions. Although it is true that in 1963 about 60 per cent of African immigrants settled in the rural areas of Zambia, making a living from peasant farming, 32.3 per cent lived in the

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<sup>136</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 37.

urban areas.<sup>137</sup> Those who chose to settle in the urban areas tended to be better skilled, meaning that they competed for jobs with the large number of unemployed Zambian school leavers that universal primary education and limited employment opportunities were generating. Worryingly, in 1964, the figure for *urban* youth unemployment given by the second symposium on unemployed youth in Zambia stood at 5,000 males seeking work and a further 15,000 who were not employed.<sup>138</sup> The figure would rise steadily upwards in subsequent years, as the youths themselves migrated from rural to urban areas in search of employment opportunities. Given this context, it is not surprising that youth attention turned towards Tanzanian foreigners, who – their relatively low number notwithstanding – were singled out as rivals for meaningful employment and affordable housing.<sup>139</sup> This was compounded by the fact that migrating foreigners, in search of greener pastures, were willing to accept lower remuneration than local people for their labour and services.<sup>140</sup>

The resulting frustration of youths with their own marginal socioeconomic position saw gangs of jobless youths going round businesses and calling for all foreign workers to be dismissed. On 23 February 1965, for example, Ndola youths toured factories and offices demanding that employers kick out foreign

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<sup>137</sup> The remaining 7.7 per cent were in European farm areas. Patrick Ohadike, 'Immigrants and Development in Zambia', *The International Migration Review*, 8.3 (1974), p. 402.

<sup>138</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/18/33, 'Draft of Second Symposium on Unemployed Youth in Zambia', November 1964.

<sup>139</sup> De Jong, 'Displays of Masculinity and Rituals of Display', p. 109. According to the 1963 census, Tanzanians only made up 5.4 per cent of African immigrants living in Zambia, whilst a newspaper report in 1972 guessed they numbered 10,000 in total.

<sup>140</sup> Oni and Okunade, 'The Context of Xenophobia in Africa', p. 38.

workers.’<sup>141</sup> At Monterey Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd., about 70 youths stood outside the manager’s office, where the manager, Mr. G. E. Canning, told the youths: ‘If the Government wanted to check my employees list I could allow it, but I can’t give it to you unauthorized persons’.<sup>142</sup> These violent actions stemmed from a desperate attempt on the part of young men to escape poverty and insecurity. Moreover, that life in the urban areas, especially on the Copperbelt, was very hard for those youths and Tanzanian migrants living in the townships exacerbated these tensions further. A 1969 newspaper article reported for instance that, ‘There is no piped water or gravel roads... When it rains the townships are awash with mud. Water seeps through the inadequate roofs of hovels, drenching clothes and food as well as the miserable inhabitants’.<sup>143</sup> Such squalid conditions increased the urgency with which individuals sought to better themselves. The fact that endemic problems of housing, jobs and transport already existed in these urban areas compounded the sense that migrants were putting pressure on limited resources that belonged to longer term residents.<sup>144</sup>

Conflict between the two groups was thus the result of limited differences and can be understood through what Freud calls the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ between groups.<sup>145</sup> The narcissism of small differences is the idea that communities with close similarities are especially likely to engage

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<sup>141</sup> ‘Kick Out Aliens, Workless Africans Tell Employers: Then UNIP Calls Off ‘Sack Foreigners’ Drive’, *Times of Zambia*, 23 February 1965, p. 1.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> ‘Hell for Squatters’, *Times of Zambia*, 18 April 1969, p. 6.

<sup>144</sup> Aderanti Adjepoju, ‘The Politics of International Migration in Post-Colonial Africa’, in *The Cambridge Survey of World Migration*, ed. by Robin Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 168.

<sup>145</sup> Matsinhe, ‘Africa’s Fear of Itself’, p. 309.

in conflicts because of a hypersensitivity to details of differentiation.<sup>146</sup> As David Matsinhe notes, ‘Historically competition for power, prestige and survival intensifies as differentials between the competing groups wane... as groups tend towards diminishing contrasts, especially when the means of survival are scarce, they exert on each other greater competitive pressure tending towards ruthlessness’.<sup>147</sup> That Tanzanian migrants and youths were both attempting to establish themselves within the socioeconomic sphere, therefore, fuelled aggression by youths towards this similarly marginal group. As Polona Zajec wrote with reference to South African xenophobia, because the victims of socio-economic poverty ‘cannot reach the richest that hold power, they react to the ones closest to them using high unemployment, competition for jobs, for education, even for women, as excuses to justify their attacks’.<sup>148</sup> Zambian youths applied the identity of foreigner on Tanzanians as a means to differentiate themselves and justify attacks against the group.<sup>149</sup> Their youthful physique, energy and unity gave them a violent edge over their Tanzanian competitors.

The type of violence employed by Zambian youths frequently involved the harassment of Tanzanian business people through looting, stealing, beatings and intimidation. Indeed, as a youth leader from Ndola observed, ‘Of late I have noted that a number of Organizers and youths are getting into a very bad habit of attacking business premises belonging to different racial groups.

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<sup>146</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Civilization, Society and Religion* (London: Penguin Freud Library, 1991) p. 131 and p. 305.

<sup>147</sup> Matsinhe, ‘Africa’s Fear of Itself’, p. 309.

<sup>148</sup> Zajec, ‘Understanding South African Xenophobia’, p. 74.

<sup>149</sup> Abbink, ‘Being Young in Africa’, p. 25.

They not only take the law into their own hands but also take over responsibilities which are for Trade Unionists'.<sup>150</sup> The most notable incident of anti-Tanzanian violence during the First Republic occurred in Lusaka's Mandevu shanty township.<sup>151</sup> In January 1972, fierce fighting was reported to have taken place between UNIP youths and Tanzanian nationals. Highlighting their economic motives, youths looted Tanzanian houses and beat-up their occupants as a show of domination.<sup>152</sup> A Tanzanian charcoal burner, Mr Anyimbe Mundeleke, complained that he had been beaten-up by a group of UNIP youths and had his house looted. He said that 20 bags of charcoal had gone missing.<sup>153</sup> Indeed, the ransacking of houses often entailed the physical abuse of their tenants. Another Tanzanian, Miss Jack Masembe, was found later that day lying in a pool of her own blood after youths ransacked her home.<sup>154</sup> Individuals were also robbed away from their homes. For instance, a Tanzanian who worked as a driver with the state-run United Bus Company of Zambia was also beaten-up by the youths, who searched his pockets and got away with K9. The man was forced to sell his 'radio the next day to refund the money to the company'.<sup>155</sup>

As with the attacks against Congolese foreigners, this violence also had a vigilante undercurrent, as many youths claimed to be simply enforcing the Government drive to expel migrants with no work visas. This helps to explain

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<sup>150</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/27, 'Letter to Office of the President, From Justin P C Kabwe, Ndola Regional Youth Secretary', 24 December 1964.

<sup>151</sup> 'Violence Flares as Youths Run Riot: Tanzanians Beaten and Robbed in Lusaka', *Times of Zambia*, 4 January 1972, p. 1.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

why Tanzanian migrants were also forced out of their homes and told to leave Zambia. Indeed, those ‘aliens’ who refused to leave the township were forced to sit outside in pouring rain, while others were made to lie in streams of pouring water.<sup>156</sup> Mr Mwasoni Kanjola had his jaw fractured when the youths hit him with knobkerries to force him out of his house.<sup>157</sup> Action by the youths did follow a Government order that all non-Zambians without valid work permits must leave the country immediately. However, reactions by politicians against the violent actions of United National Independence Party (UNIP) youths reveals that they were not entirely in line with Government thinking on the matter.<sup>158</sup> Although the Government did order the expulsion of 150,000 African nationals from Zambia who were without work permits, including nationals from Tanzania, there was no government campaign to violently remove these ‘aliens’. Indeed, at the time of the attacks, the Tazara railway was being constructed. It was a project intended to build an intercountry railway line to link the port of Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania, with the town of Kapiri Mposhi, in Zambia’s Central Province. Such a project was strongly desired by the UNIP government, as it would provide Zambia with an accessible seaport that was not ruled by white minority governments.<sup>159</sup> Politicians and government ministers were thus quick to condemn the youth’s actions. Home Affairs Minister, Mr Lewis Changufu, described the incident as ‘unfortunate and regrettable’. Admitting surprise at the fights between Tanzanians and Zambians, whose ‘traditional bonds were cordial’, he

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<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>159</sup> Philip Snow, ‘China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage’, in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. by Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 287.

cautioned that police would act against the troublemakers.<sup>160</sup> By violently targeting Tanzanian nationals, therefore, UNIP youths went against UNIP and the Government. The actions of youth here, reveal that they were motivated by self-interested socioeconomic concerns about resource scarcity, and acted with violence to assert themselves against a potential rival group in underprivileged urban areas. That these actions stemmed from socioeconomic problems foreshadowed the huge issues that were to arise in the mid-1970s from mass youth unemployment, when the copper price crashed.<sup>161</sup>

Overall, this section on violence against marginal foreign groups has served to highlight the youthful character of its perpetrators and their active role as perpetrators. During Zambia's First Republic, youth violence against Europeans 'strangers', Congolese foreigners and Tanzanian competitors was mostly predicated on the distinct social threats each group appeared to pose. Europeans, a numerical minority, were targeted because they seemingly threatened to sabotage the anti-racialist discourse that was introduced by the UNIP government. Youths reacted violently as a means to defend Zambia's racial inclusiveness, but also as a means to affirm their newly won position as independent citizens vis-à-vis those who had formerly held power. Youth violence against Congolese people, on the other hand, was based on the perceived criminal threat they posed to the security of ordinary Zambians, whilst concurrently helping to bolster the youths' image as guardians of Zambian society. Youths were likewise motivated by the socioeconomic

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<sup>160</sup> 'Violence Flares as Youths Run Riot: Tanzanians Beaten and Robbed in Lusaka', *Times of Zambia*, 4 January 1972, p. 1.

<sup>161</sup> Whitaker, 'Citizens and Foreigners', p. 120.



threat Tanzanian foreigners appeared to embody. Violence here was used in an attempt to dislodge the group's socioeconomic standing through lootings, robberies, and intimidation of business owners. The government's policy to remove foreigners without valid work permits provided a blanket justification for attacks on Tanzanians who were legally allowed to live in Zambia.

#### **4.4 Protectionist Pressures: Youth Persecution of Watchtower Members**

Another minority group targeted by Zambian youths were members of the religious sect called the Watchtower, part of the Jehovah's Witnesses Christian denomination.<sup>162</sup> Whilst in the late colonial era it had been the apolitical stance of the Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina which had proved a source of great concern to UNIP, leading to a tragic confrontation in 1964, in the early independence period, this anxiety was transferred to the Jehovah's Witnesses.<sup>163</sup> Comparisons between the two religious groups were frequently made during the First Republic, in part to rationalise the stringent measures taken against Watchtower members.<sup>164</sup> Youth violence against Watchtower followers, like that directed at female youths and foreigners, emanated from the perceived threat they posed to the power of UNIP youths. Youths reacted violently to a group that they considered had opted out of the nation and hence

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<sup>162</sup> The African Watchtower movement itself was derived directly from the North American Jehovah's Witnesses. See, Wim van Binsbergen, *Religious Change in Zambia: Exploratory Studies* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1981), p. 278.

<sup>163</sup> Key studies of the Lumpa phenomenon include: Andrew Roberts, *The Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina* (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1972); David Gordon, 'Rebellion or Massacre?: The UNIP-Lumpa Conflict Revisited', in *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Postcolonial Zambia*, ed. by Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 45-76; and Binsbergen, *Religious Change in Zambia*.

<sup>164</sup> Hooker J., 'Witnesses and Watchtower in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland', *The Journal of African History*, 6.1 (1965), p. 105 and Van Binsbergen, *Religious Change in Zambia*, p. 267.

undermined the ascendancy of the UNIP government.<sup>165</sup> Their use of violence was essentially protectionist, aimed at containing a potentially subversive social group which was viewed as a kind of unofficial ‘opposition’ party.

Jehovah’s Witnesses teachings stipulate that nothing should be placed higher than God, including the nation-state. It is God’s theocratic state, according to a 1941 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society publication, which ‘is of paramount importance in God’s purpose and arrangement... everything else is of secondary importance to the great Theocracy’.<sup>166</sup> This idea, coupled with the belief that all governments and organised religions are under Satan’s dominion, meant that Watchtower adherents in postcolonial Zambia followed the path of non-cooperation with secular authorities and refused to participate in nation-building initiatives.<sup>167</sup> This included abstaining from voting, singing the national anthem, joining political parties and attending public meetings.<sup>168</sup> Given that the UNIP Government emphasised total loyalty to the new state, Jehovah’s Witnesses were viewed as a considerable ‘internal threat’ to the new political order, as voiced by Vice President Simon Kapwepwe.<sup>169</sup> Indeed, on the Copperbelt, District Governor for Chililabombwe, Mr Bwanga Wisamba, urged all residents to register as voters – ‘otherwise you will be

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<sup>165</sup> Pettman, ‘Zambia's Second Republic’, p. 231.

<sup>166</sup> Although this specific publication where the quote was taken from was published in Brooklyn, America, the African Watchtower movement was itself an offshoot of the North American Jehovah’s Witnesses. During a violent incident in 1969 a chief spokesman of the Watchtower movement, Mr Smart Phiri, was reported to have flown to New York to consult those at the world headquarters. See: ‘Witness Homes Burned in New Luapula Violence’, *Times of Zambia*, 25 June 1969, p. 1. For further detail also see: Van Binsbergen, *Religious Change in Zambia*, p. 278 and Joseph Rutherford, *Children* (Brooklyn: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 1941), p. 99.

<sup>167</sup> Rutherford, *Children*, p. 242 and Hooker, ‘Witnesses and Watchtower in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland’, p. 91.

<sup>168</sup> Van Binsbergen, *Religious Change in Zambia*, p. 267.

<sup>169</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 231.

regarded as enemies of Zambia'.<sup>170</sup> More pointedly, in 1969, the UNIP national secretary himself likened the Watchtower to a 'political party' and suggested that independent associational activity was akin to opposition.<sup>171</sup> The scene was thus set for a clash between members of the Watchtower and UNIP.

The children of Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to sing the national anthem were suspended from school, Watchtower meetings were broken up, and senior UNIP officials called for the church to be banned.<sup>172</sup> In August 1967, at Mongu's Katimamulilo Government School in Western Province, 14 pupils belonging to the Watchtower sect were suspended because they would not sing the National Anthem or salute the flag at school.<sup>173</sup> Church supporters were threatened with the removal of their citizenship, while others were treated like opposition party members and were sacked from their jobs or banned from marketplaces.<sup>174</sup> Foreign Watchtower leaders were not spared either and were sometimes deported.<sup>175</sup> The anti-Watchtower atmosphere meant that youths were given a virtual blank cheque and were able to violently assert themselves against the group, whose members they equally perceived to be a threat to their self-interests as stakeholders in the UNIP-dominated polity.

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<sup>170</sup> 'Non-voters Branded 'Enemies'', *Times of Zambia*, 2 December 1969, p. 7.

<sup>171</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 231.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>173</sup> '14 Watchtower Pupils Suspended', *Times of Zambia*, 24 August 1967, p. 7.

<sup>174</sup> Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p. 231.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*

Unlike the other minority groups who incurred the wrath of UNIP youths, the mainly rural composition of the Jehovah's Witnesses membership meant that it was rural youths who deployed violence against the sect members. Watchtower members concentrated in exclusive villages, intentionally positioning themselves as social outsiders. At the village level, a permanent transformation of community was often achieved.<sup>176</sup> Their insistence on a strictly local rural society left no room of any kind for structures of control beyond the local level.<sup>177</sup> The Watchtower micro-society was highly conservative and the religious lifestyle called for in these self-contained communities left little room for self-improvement in the form of material gain and improving one's social position. It was preached that 'A college education does not make a man 'wise''.<sup>178</sup> This view was predicated on the belief that 'Good that is enduring does not result from such worldly teaching' as 'college education... commerce, and politics, with the ability to make money'.<sup>179</sup> This belief ran counter to the ambition of the average UNIP youth, who was attempting to better himself in the material world, both economically and educationally. Thus, the violence of UNIP youths against Jehovah's Witnesses was not only intended to protect the party's hegemony in general but was also aimed at the suppression of a social group whose teaching limited opportunities for economic adulthood.

Besides the limitations which Jehovah's Witnesses placed on individual economic advancement, another source of concern for UNIP youths was the

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<sup>176</sup> Van Binsbergen, *Religious Change in Zambia*, pp. 161-162.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 287.

<sup>178</sup> Rutherford, *Children*, p. 87.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 266.

Watchtower emphasis on complete discipline from children and youths. As has been discussed in chapter one, rural youths, in contrast to their urban counterparts, were much less free from elder control.<sup>180</sup> The stronger gerontocratic grip of elders in the rural setting meant that their actions in the social realm were more strongly controlled by the main body of UNIP. However, the extreme discipline required of youths by Watchtower surpassed the levels called for by UNIP. A 1941 Watchtower publication declared: 'From the time the child is born it should be taught obedience, because to obey that which is right is essential to life. Obedience in small things, as well as in the weightier matters, should be required of the child'.<sup>181</sup> Discipline was all encompassing to Watchtower life, in contrast to the relative social freedoms afforded by UNIP membership. Thus, the struggle against gerontocracy was part and parcel of the violence against Watchtower members, with UNIP youths protecting their comparatively improved social standing from the spread of the proselytizing Jehovah's Witnesses.

The UNIP government did little to stem youth violence against Watchtower members. The main UNIP party even encouraged a 'get tough' policy against Jehovah's Witnesses, which operated concurrently with the violent political campaigns against ANC supporters in the late 1960s.<sup>182</sup> The first victims of this policy were 30 families belonging to Watchtower, who were forced to spend the night out in the cold and rain after junior UNIP officials locked them out of their houses in Chifubu, Ndola.<sup>183</sup> Minutes of a UNIP Youth

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<sup>180</sup> See, pp. 28-30 of this thesis.

<sup>181</sup> Rutherford, *Children*, p. 265.

<sup>182</sup> 'Witnesses Complain of 'Terror Tactics'', *Times of Zambia*, 15 January 1969, p. 1.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

League meeting held in Mikomfwa, Luanshya, on 25 July 1968 reveal the youth resolve to crush Watchtower. Comments by the Regional Youth Secretary for the area, referred to as 'Comrade Bright Kaleya', illustrate the hostility towards the religious group: 'he assured the people that in future they [sic, but 'there'] will be law whereby the Watchtower Sect will be abandoned to have... licences.'<sup>184</sup> The pronouncement was a portent of what was to come. The following year in Luanshya a vicious confrontation occurred involving UNIP youths and Watchtower members. On 16 June 1969, at Chimbe Ferry, a Watchtower meeting addressed by Mr Lazarus Kalube was disrupted by youths armed with sticks and axes. Sect members were ruthlessly set upon. One Mrs Mary Kashiba was so severely beaten she was still in Chembe clinic nine days after the assault. The violence also spread to the areas of Chiefs Kalasa, in Mansa district, and Kasoma, in Samfya district.<sup>185</sup> Twelve Witnesses had already been killed in these areas the previous year by UNIP followers.<sup>186</sup> The renewed attacks of June 1969 resulted in Zambian Watchtower adherents fleeing to the Congo, in an effort to escape persecution.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/27, 'Minutes of UNIP Youth League Meeting Held in Mikomfwa on 25 July 1968', 25 March 1968.

<sup>185</sup> 'Witness Homes Burned in New Luapula Violence', *Times of Zambia*, 25 June 1969, p.

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<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*




Figure 12: A member of the Watchtower sect stands in front of the remains of a church hut gutted by attackers at Chief Kunda along the Chembe-Mansa road

Source: 'Witness Homes Burned in New Luapula Violence', *Times of Zambia*, 25 June 1969, p. 1.

As revealed in the above photograph of the burnt down Watchtower church between Chembe and Mansa, in Luapula, a tactic frequently used by youths was arson. Indeed, it is a tool of intimidation that persists in present-day Zambia.<sup>188</sup> As an instrument able to destroy or disfigure, arson is used, as Matt Hinds-Aldrich states, to prove 'the resolve of the respective actors and the gravity of their claims'.<sup>189</sup> The use of arson by youths during the First Republic was deeply rooted in attempts at social control.<sup>190</sup> Arson as an act of 'performative violence' was used to visually display youth antipathy towards the religious group, as well as illuminate the groups' powerlessness vis-à-vis the youths. Fire in this sense was used to regulate the social hierarchy, visibly positioning Watchtower members *firmly* beneath UNIP youths.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> See for instance: Chris Phiri, 'Veep Directs Police to Ensure Arrest of Shibuyunji Arsonist', *Zambia Reports*, 9 July 2019, <<https://zambiareports.com/2019/07/09/veep-directs-police-ensure-arrest-shibuyunji-arsonist/>> [accessed 10 October 2019]. Also, Matt Hinds-Aldrich, 'The Seductions of Arson: Ritualized Political Violence and the Revelry of Arson', *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture*, 16.1 (2009), p. 107.

<sup>189</sup> Hinds-Aldrich, 'The Seductions of Arson', p. 104.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 118.

<sup>191</sup> Chance, 'Where There Is Fire, There Is Politics', p. 400.

UNIP youths were involved in a spree of arson attacks from early January through to March 1969. During this period, 45 Kingdom Halls were burnt and 469 houses belonging to Jehovah's Witnesses destroyed or taken throughout Zambia.<sup>192</sup> In Mansa at this time almost 200 youths attacked 20 Jehovah's Witnesses returning from their burned-out Kingdom Hall.<sup>193</sup> On 19 February, a Watchtower church in Chundeponde village, Mpika district, in the then Northern Province, was turned to ash when UNIP youth secretary Robbie Kaluba, 24, and Mwewa Yotamu, 24, set it alight.<sup>194</sup> Along with others, the youths had gone to the village to look for Watchtower minister, Mr Malapande. They asked him to pack up and leave. They said he was not wanted in the area and they threatened to burn down his house. They then destroyed the church by setting it on fire.<sup>195</sup> The two men told police they had burnt the church down because members of the Watchtower Sect did not follow the laws of Zambia, they did not vote and they did not buy UNIP cards.<sup>196</sup> In other words, by being non-political Watchtower members were perceived to undermine the strength of the governing party and thus the body from which the youths themselves derived their social clout. Fire was used to reassert and victimise the accused group. The total destruction of the segregated villages also served to reclaim territorial control from Watchtower. A myriad of similar incidents occurred throughout the year, with the planned 17 June constitutional referendum compounding the violent

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<sup>192</sup> 'Sect Appeals to KK: Stop Violence', *Times of Zambia*, 4 March 1969, p. 1.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>194</sup> 'UNIP Youth Secretary Jailed for Arson', *Times of Zambia*, 22 April 1969, p. 1.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*



enmity directed at the religious group. Two other men, Goodson Musonda, 25, and Jackson Moses, 35, along with seven others, burnt churches and crops belonging to the Watchtower sect, along with numerous houses at a village near Kasama, Northern Province.<sup>197</sup> On a separate occasion near another village around Kasama, two UNIP branch chairmen, Wilson Tapa, 25, and Thomson Kabela, 25, were involved in inciting a crowd of 100 to burn two houses belonging to Watchtower women.<sup>198</sup>

That such episodes of violence were clustered broadly around the referendum date lends weight to the idea that Watchtower was viewed as an ‘opposition’ group by UNIP youths. The latter’s violent actions were driven by a protectionist agenda aimed at containing a social group that was deemed disloyal to the political dispensation, a dispensation that youths profited from through improved social standing - within the much more conservative rural areas. As has been shown, fire became a recurrent, and efficacious, mechanism exerted by youths to protect their social position. As with female youths and foreigners, violence against this minority religious group was essentially born out of fear concerning their ability to safeguard access to a socially dominant identity, UNIP. An additional driver of the violence was the gerontocratic tensions that resulted from the extreme conservatism of the Watchtower sect, which strictly enforced youth subservience. Anxiety over the sect’s seeming popularity thus sparked violent reactions from UNIP youths. Although there were a handful of court cases dealing with those

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<sup>197</sup> ‘Arsonists Lose Appeals: Watchtower Burnings Sequel’, *Times of Zambia*, 4 October 1969, p. 7.

<sup>198</sup> ‘UNIP Youth Secretary Jailed for Arson’, *Times of Zambia*, 22 April 1969, p. 1.

accused of such crimes, their actions received little in the way of open condemnation from the UNIP government.

### **Conclusion**

UNIP youths were thus able to act with relative autonomy in the social sphere. In their dealings with female youths, foreigners or religious sect members, the youths' actions attempted to mould power relations in their favour. Violence was a fundamental tool in this endeavour. It was shrewdly applied against these marginal social groups to control Zambia's 'civil society'. Youth violence during the First Republic reveals that, as with Zambia's political society, the marginal social sphere was likewise ruled through youthful force.

An analysis of the anti-miniskirt campaigns has served to complicate understandings of the category of youth in the Zambian context. By incorporating a gendered perspective, the experience of young men is shown to be vastly different from that of young women, with the former being perpetrators of violence and the latter solely victims. Zambian youth must therefore be understood as a composite social entity, where no automatic solidarity existed between members of its subgroups. It also shows that it was male youths who held power when interacting with those socially junior to themselves. Such interactions were predicated on violence and driven by the fear of losing this influence.

By examining youth interactions with marginal foreign groups who lived in the newly independent nation, youth violence has also been shown to be a reaction elicited from the threats they ostensibly posed to youth power. Tanzanians became the victims of choice in attacks generated by anxiety around youths' own socioeconomic standing. Deemed to be competitors in this respect Tanzanians faced intimidation, lootings, and robberies, especially if they were business owners. Moreover, the governments' policy to remove foreigners without valid work permits provided a justification for such attacks on those legally allowed to live in Zambia. Youth violence against foreign nationals also stemmed from their attempt to carve out a more socially respectable identity as vigilantes and protectors of the new social order. Groups of Europeans deemed to be subverting the anti-racialist discourse introduced by the UNIP government therefore faced the violent wrath of youths, who acted to affirm their newly won position as racial equals with those who had formerly held power. Similarly, violence against Congolese people was based on the perceived criminal threat they posed to the security of ordinary Zambians given the low-level criminal activities the members of this group were often accused of being involved in.

Likewise, a focus on the victimisation of Jehovah's Witnesses has highlighted the connection between the social and political. Youth's violent actions were driven by the ostensible objective of containing a minority social group deemed to be disloyal to the political dispensation, a dispensation rural youths prized for its promise of greater freedoms from gerontocratic control. The Watchtower sect, as a group that enforced strict youth subservience, was

singled out for this reason, with arson being the tool of choice for its suppression.

Altogether, this chapter demonstrates that violence was essentially born out of fear concerning youths' ability to safeguard access to the socially dominant identity of UNIP. The use of violence by youths allowed them to exert considerable influence on the ground and carve out a space in which they wielded power. Furthermore, by looking at youth violence in the social realm, the chapter has helped to disassemble the binaries of victim and perpetrator. Using a bottom-up, rather than top-down, approach, this chapter has shown that youth could more freely exert power in the sphere of the social. In the political sphere, Zambian youths in the political sphere were very much victims, in the sense that they were manipulated by their political seniors to serve as 'fodder' during interparty political conflict. An examination of the social sphere, however, reveals them to be active perpetrators of violence when interacting with their social juniors. This reflects the different degrees of agency UNIP youths were able to exercise within the two domains. Analysing youth actions in the social realm shows that they were never completely subservient to the First Republic's elites. Unlike in the arena of party politics, within the lower social rungs of Zambian society, youth were a dominant force. Their actions went relatively unchecked in this context by the UNIP government, except when they jeopardized wider matters. This youthful autonomy, nonetheless, generated an increasing concern about the future manageability of Zambian youths, a problem that would come to the fore in the 1970s.

## **Chapter Five: Disciplining the Delinquent: UNIP**

### **Government Attempts to Co-opt Problem Youth,**

#### **1964-1980s**

##### **Introduction**

The creation of the Zambia Youth Service (ZYS), in early 1964, saw the country join a select group of newly independent African states that were the first to establish national youth programmes on the continent.<sup>1</sup> Significant work was needed to rectify the inequalities produced by colonialism, thus these initial programmes of the 1960s prioritised training young people to develop their respective nations, with an emphasis placed on increasing agricultural production. Zambia was no different. Certainly, 1964 was a pertinent transitional year for the country, which transformed from a colonial territory into a fully-fledged sovereign state. With this momentous change, the new United National Independence Party (UNIP) Government faced a 'crisis of expectation' as ordinary people, many of whom were youths, looked to the government to reward their past efforts in the liberation struggle.<sup>2</sup> President Kaunda was also mindful of the need to redirect the agitational energies of UNIP youths away from anti-authority activities, lest their energies be turned upon UNIP's own government during moments of

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<sup>1</sup> Other members of this group were Tanzania, whose own national youth service was created in 1963 and Kenya which formed its national youth service the same year as Zambia, in 1964. National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/18/33, 'Second Symposium on Unemployed Youth in Zambia' (1965).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

grievance.<sup>3</sup> The first half of this chronologically structured chapter thus looks at how these concerns encouraged the formation of the ZYS as a ‘social buffer’, intended to compliment UNIP’s political youth wing already in existence.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, although painted by the UNIP government as a national institution, in which large numbers of Zambia’s unemployed youths were set to benefit, the reality was that the ZYS functioned as a dispensary of UNIP party patronage. In demonstrating this, the first half of this chapter challenges the assumptions of previous studies which claim that an ulterior motive of the ZYS camps was to enlist youths into the UNIP youth movement.<sup>5</sup> Contrary to this viewpoint the archival evidence reveals instead that UNIP youths were almost exclusively recruited to the ZYS, therefore nullifying the need for any policy of political indoctrination.

In contrast, as the second half of this chapter explores, the later Zambia National Service (ZNS), which replaced the ZYS in 1971, did attempt to convert its youthful recruits into UNIP supporters. This was likely because a much broader body of youths were encouraged to participate in ZNS camps compared to those of its predecessor. The context of early 1970s Zambia helps explain why this shift in recruitment policy occurred. The inception of

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<sup>3</sup> Indeed, Kaunda admitted that his party was mainly designed for agitational purposes. Colonialism was seen as the ‘Common Enemy in opposition to which a people, traditionally divided along tribal, linguistic and regional lines’, formed a fragile alliance during the struggle for independence. With the advent of independence, this ‘common enemy’, and the glue that held these alliances in place, vanished. See especially: William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, ‘Introduction’, in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Chapter three of course discussed in detail how political youth wings operated after independence. See also, National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Report by Committee of the National Convention on Zambia’s Development on the Role of the Youth in the Nation, Chaired by the Hon D H Banda’ (1967).

<sup>5</sup> See by way of example: Marja Hinfelaar, ‘A History of SNV from a Zambian Perspective, 1965-2005’, *African Studies Centre*, 95 (2011), p. 7.

the one-party state in 1972, economic pressures driven by demographic changes, and the increasing hostilities Zambia faced from its white settler neighbours all played a role in making non-partisan enlistment a necessary characteristic of the ZNS. Indeed, security fears significantly influenced government motivations to use the ZNS as a tool to militarise large sections of the nation's youths into a combative national defence force. Throughout the operating life of the ZNS the core defence objective of the programme remained paramount and ran contrary to the general continental trend of the 1970s, which saw many African countries establish national youth programmes for the purpose of demilitarising and pacifying belligerent youths in the aftermath of conflict and internal strife.<sup>6</sup> Zambia's neighbour Malawi, along with Kenya, were some of the other few countries at the time to buck this general tendency towards youth pacification. However, unlike these two states, Zambia intended, and used, paramilitary training of its youths for pressing national defence purposes.<sup>7</sup> After years of voluntary recruitment, the ZNS was made mandatory for all school leavers in 1976, not only to expand numbers within the ZNS 'Home Guard', which remained low, but also in an attempt to quash mounting student opposition towards the government.<sup>8</sup> This decision, however, served to exclude youths who were unable to finish school, and thus did little to alleviate the youth

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<sup>6</sup> Examples of nations which followed this trend included: Nigeria, whose National Youth Service Corps was established only 3 years after the Nigerian-Biafran War in 1973. Ghana similarly launched its own National Service Scheme in 1973 following a military coup in 1972. For further examples see: Kazeem Lamidi, 'Origin and Trajectory of National Youth Service Programme in Africa: An Exploratory Review', *Africa: History and Culture*, 4.1 (2016), pp. 12-22.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Banda, *The State, Counterinsurgency, and Political Policing in Colonial and Postcolonial Malawi, 1891-1994* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), p. 203.

<sup>8</sup> This mounting student opposition had been simmering since the late 1960s and early 1970s, as touched-upon in chapter three of this thesis. See pp. 179-189.

unemployment problem in the second half of the 1970s. As will be seen, educated youths within the camps themselves fared no better during this time, as state resources dwindled and camp living conditions declined. This, along with state resources for youths being diverted to support freedom fighters of neighbouring countries, pushed the ZNS to an unceremonious demise in the early 1980s. Indeed, it is argued that the Government's staunch denial of poor conditions in the ZNS served to further consolidate the position of University students as an 'opposition group'. The evidence shows that rather than easing relations between the two sides, compulsory ZNS attendance fanned the flames of student hostility.

By analysing both the ZYS and ZNS in tandem this chapter aims, not only to enhance understandings of a shamefully neglected topic within histories of independent Zambia, but, moreover, intends to move beyond the typical and restrictive 'developmental' lens which studies of national youth programmes often employ. This growing field of research has been preoccupied with measuring the relative successes - or failures - of programmes in promoting youth employment.<sup>9</sup> Whilst an important undertaking, this chapter intends to demonstrate that studies of national youth services which move *beyond* the confines of solely assessing 'employability success' are equally valuable ventures.<sup>10</sup> For instance, by exploring Zambia's national youth programmes

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<sup>9</sup> See for instance, Ransford Gyampo, 'Youth Participation in Youth Programmes: The Case of Ghana's National Youth Employment Programme', *Journal of Pan African Studies*, 5.5 (2012), pp. 13-28 and Aislinn Delany and Helene Perold, 'National Youth Service, Employability, Entrepreneurship and Sustainable Livelihoods', in *Perspectives on Volunteering: Voices From South Africa*, ed. by Jacqueline Butcher and Christopher Einolf (New York: Springer, 2016), pp. 75-98.

<sup>10</sup> See also: Luke Melchiorre, 'Creating a 'Monster': The National Youth Service Pre-university Training Programme, Student Activism and the Kenyan State, 1978-90', *Africa*, 89 (2019), pp. 65-89.



of the 1960s and 1970s, this chapter helps shine a light on how ‘political settlements’ were crafted between African governments and their citizens during the first few decades of independence. Here, the recently coined term ‘political settlement’ describes the ways in which societies and their governing elites create, or fail to create, understandings between one another in order that non-violent methods of governance are reached.<sup>11</sup> In particular, this chapter highlights how pathways of power and dependency were negotiated and contested by politicians and youths, as a specific demographic of Zambia’s populace.<sup>12</sup> In this respect it is argued that politicians were just as reliant on youths for national development, as youths were reliant on the government for socioeconomic support. Indeed, youths were powerful in numbers, whilst the government was powerful in resources; assets each side needed from the other. This resulted in a constant exchange and shift in the balance of power.<sup>13</sup>

An institutional and historical analysis of Zambia’s past national youth programmes is also appropriate given the recent re-emergence and re-envisioning of national youth services in modern day Africa, including in Zambia itself.<sup>14</sup> This trajectory is unsurprising given that the African

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<sup>11</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the term political settlement see: Tim Kelsall, ‘Thinking and Working with Political Settlements’, *Overseas Development Institute* (2016), p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Richard Emerson identifies dependency as the very basis of power. When one person is dependent on another for something, then that second person has power over the dependent person. See, Richard Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence Relations’, *American Sociological Review*, 27.1 (1962), pp. 31-4. Also, Kelsall, ‘Thinking and Working with Political Settlements’, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> The large population of youths made them powerful as a labour force and a potentially destabilising social force due to their youthful energy and precarious socio-economic position.

<sup>14</sup> For instance: in 2013 the Malawian president announced the re-launching of the country’s youth programme which was closed in 1993 due to its politicisation; a new

continent is currently home to the youngest population in the world, a population that is expected to now double by 2045.<sup>15</sup> Zambia's re-established National Youth Service was launched in 2005.<sup>16</sup> Initially intended to respond to the increasing numbers of unemployed street youths, from 2012 its recruitment focus changed to only accommodate the secondary school graduates who were yet to gain admission places in universities.<sup>17</sup> As will be seen, there are striking parallels between Zambia's contemporary and historical national youth programmes, especially concerning the changing patterns of recruitment.<sup>18</sup> The '*longue durée*' approach taken in this chapter, which looks at a 16-year long period of Zambian history, may therefore provide potential insights into this persistent issue among national youth programmes.<sup>19</sup>

## **5.1 The Creation and Running of the ZYS: 1965-1970**

### *5.1.1 Establishing the ZYS: The Focus on Youth Development*

As already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the ZYS largely functioned as a social buffer to UNIP's own political youth wing. However,

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iteration of the Tanzanian youth programme was launched in 2012; the same year Cape Verde launched their own National Programme of Volunteering (PNV); whilst Rwanda's Urugerero was introduced in 2013. For further examples see: Lamidi, 'Origin and Trajectory of National Youth Service Programme in Africa', p. 15.

<sup>15</sup> Delany and Perold, 'National Youth Service, Employability, Entrepreneurship and Sustainable Livelihoods', p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> Lamidi, 'Origin and Trajectory of National Youth Service Programme in Africa', p. 16.

<sup>18</sup> 'Government to Re-Introduce Compulsory National Youth Service for School-Leavers Countrywide', *Lusaka Times*, 14 July 2012, <<https://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/07/14/government-reintroduce-compulsory-national-youth-service-schoolleavers-countrywide/>> [accessed 3 April 2018].

<sup>19</sup> Such bodies largely rely on short-term perspectives generated in annual review reports. For example: *State of the Youth in Zambia, Policy Brief: Education, Unemployment, and Poverty Reduction* (Lusaka: Population Council and UNFPA 2018) and Kulijekusuzhyika Nyimbili, *State of the Nation Report on Young People in Zambia* (Lusaka: Restless Development, 2012).

broader issues pertaining to youths and development provided an equally strong incentive for bringing a national youth service into being. Such issues explain the services' intense focus on training youths in agricultural skills. Indeed, the government's ZYS scheme was intended to solve the issue of reliance on white settler countries for food by putting to work idle, but able, young people who might otherwise threaten the nation's stability.<sup>20</sup> Not only was Zambia losing £2,000,000 each year importing vegetables from South Africa, but the country was also facing a daunting unemployment crisis.<sup>21</sup> This crisis largely affected youths who constituted 50 per cent of the 3,409,000 strong population in 1965.<sup>22</sup> A 1963 survey of African Standard 6 school-leavers found that 30.3 per cent were known to be unemployed, a figure which increased to 38.7 per cent in 1965.<sup>23</sup> As already mentioned in chapter two, the unemployment issue had been compounded by the liberation struggle.<sup>24</sup> One Lusaka youth noted that his job had 'suffered during the struggle' following his arrest in Chadiza Eastern Province for politics.<sup>25</sup> It was feared that without government intervention into this mushrooming problem youths would rapidly become a 'destructive element in society'.<sup>26</sup> In January 1964, during the interim handover period before Zambian independence, a report commissioned to look into the possibility of establishing a national youth service, warned: 'Because of the large numbers

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<sup>20</sup> Hinfelaar, 'A History of SNV From a Zambian Perspective', p. 6.

<sup>21</sup> 'Minister Warns ZYS Youths to Behave', *Times of Zambia*, 22 February 1965, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Out of 265,966 youths surveyed, 103,050 were either seeking paid work or not employed: National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder' (1963).

<sup>24</sup> See pp. 132-138.

<sup>25</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, 'Letter to the Chairman of the Zambia Youth Service Board, From Lusaka Youth, N H Kabondo', 4 January 1968.

<sup>26</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Information Pamphlet of the National Youth Service' (1964).

of unemployed and untrained youth in the country the Government faces an emergency situation'.<sup>27</sup>

From 1964, an emergency situation was indeed seemingly unfolding before the UNIP government's eyes, particularly in the country's urban centres. Many unemployed youths were travelling to towns in search of jobs that did not exist. In 1963 a survey had found that 73 per cent of youths with a Standard 4 or 6 certificate arrived in Lusaka from the rural areas that year.<sup>28</sup> After independence the trend showed no signs of abating. This in turn evoked fear about youthful delinquency and urban overpopulation. These, often youthful, rural-urban migrants were derogatorily called squatters. It was a term previously used by colonialists to describe so-called 'unlawful occupants' of land reserved for whites.<sup>29</sup> It was estimated, using the rate of urban growth in 1970, that by 1980 the urban population in Zambia would double to 2 million.<sup>30</sup> Newspaper reports at the time agonised over the changing cityscape of Lusaka, as hundreds of people poured into slums on the outskirts of the city.<sup>31</sup> In interview Agness Lweendo explained that the prospect of having electricity and fridges in the urban areas was a significant draw for the younger generation.<sup>32</sup> However, in rapidly constructed peri-urban areas conditions of underdevelopment were acute. Brown Moses

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<sup>27</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Working Party on the Establishment of a National Youth Service' (1964).

<sup>28</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder' (1963).

<sup>29</sup> Hinfelaar, 'A History of SNV From a Zambian Perspective', p. 6.

<sup>30</sup> 'Drift to Towns 'a Threat to Nation': Minister Warns of Hunger and Chaos as Thousands Join Trek From Villages', *Times of Zambia*, 21 January 1970, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> 'Squalid Slums Behind Lusaka Skyline', *Times of Zambia*, 6 September 1965, p. 7.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 24 September 2018.

Mazumba who lived in Kanyama, a peri-urban area of Lusaka, explained that following independence:

In Kanyama there was only one small clinic, there were many health hazards, the roads were pathetic. To give an example to bury a person we lacked transport, we would have to carry the body because it was peri-urban not urban, and there was poor communication, it took time. By the time a truck would come the body would be rotten.<sup>33</sup>

As a consequence of this dramatic rate of population movement, alongside worsening unemployment and urban living conditions, crime became a focal point of concern amongst the Zambian public and politicians alike. Indeed, the UNIP government found itself sharing the same anxieties as late colonial officials over youths.<sup>34</sup> According to annual police crime statistics, the year 1965 saw a rise in the number of young people found guilty of storebreaking, theft by servant, robbery, malicious damage and assault, when compared to statistics from 1964.<sup>35</sup> The printed news media was saturated with stories of ‘the youthful delinquent’, ensuring that this inherited colonial concept remained firmly entrenched in the country’s psyche following independence. Stories covered included: the sentencing of a youth to eight years hard labour for breaking into 135 offices and homes during a period of 12 months, through to the theft of £20 worth of telephone lines by a gang of three youths, aged between 19-21 years old, from Wusakile Mine Township in Kitwe.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Paul Ococock, *An Uncertain Age: The Politics of Manhood in Kenya* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017), p. 228.

<sup>35</sup> 'Crime up and Fewer Caught in 1965, Police Report', *Times of Zambia*, 14 March 1966, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup> 'Year of Crime Ends in Jail Sentence', *Times of Zambia*, 29 January 1965, p. 1 and 'Three Remanded', *Times of Zambia*, 5 February 1965, p. 1.

These broader issues thus fed into the reasoning behind UNIP's determination to send youths 'back to the land' and explains the huge amount of money subsequently invested into the ZYS and rural areas.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, the UNIP government allocated £170 million exclusively for rural capital between 1966 and 1970. This compared with the £103 million funding set aside for urban areas.<sup>38</sup> Mr Arthur Wina, then Minister of Finance, announced that this rural fund would 'be the foundation stone for our development plans which will take us up to 1970... and the intention is to transform the rural areas into really prosperous areas'.<sup>39</sup> This surge in rural development required a large workforce. Keen not to 'waste its manpower by allowing thousands of people to be unemployed' politicians attempted to mobilise the nation's youths.<sup>40</sup> Their numbers, availability to work and youthful energy, made them the ideal candidates to work on development projects. The *Area Handbook for Zambia* explained that 'The ZYS camps are designed to provide training related to the country's needs and plans for development'.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, a not insignificant amount of the £170 million was reserved for the ZYS. In 1966 for instance, £900,000 was set aside to build an additional 10 ZYS boys' camps and eight ZYS girls' camps.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Richard Waller, 'Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa', *Journal of African History*, 47.1 (2006), p. 89.

<sup>38</sup> Carol Angi and Trevor Coombe, 'Training Programmes and Employment Opportunities for Primary School Leavers in Zambia', *Manpower and Unemployment Research in Africa*, 2.2 (1969), p. 7.

<sup>39</sup> '£35-m. Will Help Rural Areas - Wina: Minister Reviews Past and Future', *Times of Zambia*, 4 January 1965, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Information Pamphlet of the National Youth Service' (1964).

<sup>41</sup> Irving Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia* (Washington: American University, 1969), p. 171.

<sup>42</sup> 'Youth's Role in Zambia's Future', *Times of Zambia*, 23 May 1966, p. 7.

The belief in youth's potential to rejuvenate the rural areas was likely influenced by the personal experiences of politicians with colonial development ideology and practices prior to the country's independence.<sup>43</sup> Kenneth Kaunda himself was a chairperson of Chinsali Young Men's Farming Association in the 1950s, a group that engaged in and contributed to an emerging discourse of farming and development.<sup>44</sup> As Marja Hinfelaar notes, 'For these young, relatively well-educated men, development projects opened up new avenues for social mobility that were independent of the traditional authorities'.<sup>45</sup> Now in government, these same men were keen to replicate their experiences through the ZYS. This was despite the failures, and eventual abandonment, of the colonial schemes they had been part of.

#### 5.1.2 *Exclusive to UNIP: ZYS Recruitment and the Competition for Places*

These broader issues and motivations to create the ZYS, however, fail to explain its politicisation.<sup>46</sup> Answers to this are better found through an examination of the recruitment process. It is argued within this chapter that due to the limited places available within initial ZYS camps, prioritisation was given to UNIP youths who were strategically valuable to the UNIP government. Their value, as has been explored in chapter three, was the 'work' they performed for UNIP in violently quashing opposition parties during the time of multiparty politics that followed independence. Even with the use of a partisan system of recruitment, many UNIP youths had to be

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<sup>43</sup> Paul Ocobock, 'Joy Rides for Juveniles': Vagrant Youth and Colonial Control in Nairobi, Kenya, 1901-5', *Social History*, 31.1 (2006), p. 58.

<sup>44</sup> Hinfelaar, 'A History of SNV From a Zambian Perspective', p. 5.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> As was already alluded to in chapter two and three. See pp. 138-141 and pp. 151-156 respectively.

turned away and placed on a waiting list for the ZYS. Indeed, it is important to note here that the ZYS was a wholly voluntary organisation and that the competition for places was fierce. By 1965 there were only 2,000 youths in camps and 29,000 youths on the waiting list.<sup>47</sup> This was in comparison to the figure proposed in 1964 of 50,000 youths to be enrolled by July 1966.<sup>48</sup> The figure of 50,000 youths was calculated from the percentage of school leavers who failed to find employment.<sup>49</sup> Thereafter, it was hoped that approximately 25,000 youths would be enrolled annually to replace an equal number who would finish their service each year.<sup>50</sup> As will be seen later in this chapter, the attempt to rapidly expand the number of ZYS camps produced issues in their quality and led to problems with discipline.

The constant pressure to increase the capacity of the ZYS also led to the requirements for entry being narrowed inordinately. Admission to the ZYS was based upon whether a potential recruit fitted the ZYS definition of a youth. Analysis shows that as the demand for places outstripped capacity, the parameters of who was considered a 'youth' was rapidly tightened. Originally the definition of 'youth' within the national youth organisations in the territory had centred around educational achievements and fitness for work, rather than defining youth by age.<sup>51</sup> For example in 1963 the Youth Development Council decided 'not to attempt any exact definition', but to

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<sup>47</sup> 'Govt. Studies ZYS Report', *Times of Zambia*, 1 May 1965, p. 1 and National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report Synopsis on the Committee of Inquiry Appointed to Inquire into Matters Concerned with the Operation of the Zambia Youth Service' (1965).

<sup>48</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Working Party on the Establishment of a National Youth Service' (1964).

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder' (1963).



‘leave the term ‘youth’ to be capable of a fairly wide interpretation’.<sup>52</sup> This changed with the ZYS. In 1964 the information pamphlet given to youths wishing to join the camps explained that ‘any person between the ages of 16 and 25 who is unemployed and has no prospect of reasonable employment’ could sign-up.<sup>53</sup> By 1968, this age bracket had been reduced a whole five years to exclude anyone over the age of 20 years old. Further restrictions had also been added to the recruitment process, which stipulated that those eligible for enrolment into the ZYS should also be unmarried, with no children.<sup>54</sup>

The stipulation to be unmarried and childless principally served to exclude female youths from joining the ZYS.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, it was common for young girls to be married and with children at the specified age range. For example, in Chipata, a town in Eastern Province, 5 out of 13 girls interviewed were disqualified from joining because they were either over the required age or were mothers.<sup>56</sup> A ZYS recruitment officer, J C Mulanbaka, wrote exasperatedly on 12 January 1968 that: ‘I recently revisited Mumbwa where there was no recruitment, I was told by Mama Regional Secretary there that all girls here are either mothers or are in a state of - pregnancy! What can I do? I left, moved on to Makoya, Answer? As above.’<sup>57</sup> This led to a situation

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Information Pamphlet of the National Youth Service’ (1964).

<sup>54</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, ‘Letter to All Ministers of State, for the Provinces, From Director of the Zambia Youth Service, J C Mulabaka’, July 1968.

<sup>55</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Establishment of a National Youth Service’ (1964).

<sup>56</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, ‘Report on Youth Recruitment for the Director of the Zambia Youth Service, by Zambia Youth Service Recruitment Officer, J C Mulanbaka’, 12 January 1968.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

where only about 14 to 20 per cent of recruits were female.<sup>58</sup> This percentage is unsurprising given that in the late 1960s there was still only one camp in the entire country which admitted women and girls.<sup>59</sup> This camp, located in Northern Province at Lunzuwa, near Abercorn, at the time had a maximum capacity for only 120 girls.<sup>60</sup> There also seemed to be a lack of awareness among female youths as to the requirements for joining. Emile Kachabe, who lived in Mazabuka as a young woman, explained that her reason for not trying to sign-up to the ZYS was that ‘I thought you had to do a course to qualify, I didn’t realise it was open... I just saw the camp open and the people already being members. I didn’t know how to join’.<sup>61</sup> That female youths did not pose a significant existential threat to the state, or need rewarding for involvement in political violence, could suggest why there was an apparently less vocal recruitment campaign to encourage female youths to join the ZYS, along with fewer resources dedicated to ‘girls’ camps, and a lack of gender inclusive recruitment requirements. It can be surmised therefore, that the overall ‘definitional adjustments’ were used as a strategy to artificially limit the number of youths the government service was obliged to help. It was above all a face-saving strategy, ensuring the government could claim it was supporting youths in need, by systematically disavowing others within the

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<sup>58</sup> This figure is calculated from a report on the recruitment of youth in various areas and newspaper reports in the late 1960s. For instance, on 10 December 1967 only one girl and 7 boys were recruited at Kasempa, whilst 15 girls were recruited compared to 60 boys from the districts of Solwezi, Mwinilunga, Balovale, Kapombo and Kasempa. ‘ZYS Gets 75 More’, *Times of Zambia*, 4 January 1967, p. 7 and British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, ‘Report on Youth Recruitment for the Director of the Zambia Youth Service, by Zambia Youth Service Recruitment Officer, J C Mulanbaka’, 12 January 1968.

<sup>59</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Establishment of a National Youth Service’ (1964).

<sup>60</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Zambia Youth Service Synopsis of Annual Report’, January-December 1967.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with Emile Kachabe, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

same demographic. The limited capacity and resources available to the ZYS in the 1960s therefore produced a situation whereby places were reserved for UNIP supporting, unattached *male* youths. These were the same group of UNIP youths typically involved in anti-opposition violence.

On top of these prerequisites for entry, the politicised recruitment process ensured this group was favoured during enlistment campaigns. Unlike in other African youth services, where attempts were made to recruit and indoctrinate opposition youths into supporting the government party, the ZYS in 1960s Zambia actively excluded opposition members and acted instead as a reward centre for its young UNIP party cadres; those who toed the party line.<sup>62</sup> Tanzania's equivalent of the ZYS, the Tanzanian Patriotic Defence Force, was only similarly comparable, drawing on the TANU youth wing of the ruling government party. Importantly, this was in 1965, after the introduction of the one-party state in Tanzania. At the time of the ZYS multiparty politics still existed in Zambia.<sup>63</sup> The recruitment process for the ZYS was explicitly politicised through the recruitment staff and the organisational system, which meant that all applicants had to go through UNIP youth branches where their applications would be inspected and interviews held. Indeed, applicants who circumvented this partisan system and sent their forms straight to the director of the ZYS were told to reapply

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<sup>62</sup> For instance, Ivo Mhike argues that the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government in Zimbabwe attempted to stem the swelling opposition by using the national youth service to enlist youths to the party and to carry out political 'work'. See: Ivo Mhike, 'Political Violence in the Zimbabwe National Youth Service, 2001 -2007' in *What Politics?: Youth and Political Engagement in Africa*, ed. by Elina Oinas, Henri Onodera and Leena Suurpää (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p. 252.

<sup>63</sup> Stefan Lindemann, 'Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia: Explaining Persistent Exceptionalism', *Crisis States Research Centre*, 2.80 (2010), p. 5.

via their local UNIP office. This happened to Evans Sikazwe, a youth from Lusaka in 1969 who was told in a reply letter from J C Mulambaka, the then ZYS director, that: 'Your application dates 27 January 1969, addressed to the Deputy Director of this organisation has been passed to me for immediate action... I would like you to contact the Local UNIP Office so that you can... be put on the list by them since we interview all trainees through them'.<sup>64</sup> In addition, Youth Branch secretaries of the UNIP party were instructed by their respective Youth Constituency secretaries to pick two comrades each from their branches to send to the ZYS.<sup>65</sup> In July 1968, the UNIP Youth Constituency Secretary for Luanshya wrote: 'I am here-by informing you that you are asked very sincerely to pick two comrades from your branch so that they can go to the Zambia Youth Service who are of 16 years to 20 years of age'.<sup>66</sup> UNIP youths themselves were also involved in 'mobilisation campaigns' and instructed by their Youth Regional Secretaries to ascertain the suitability of candidates, check youths' occupations and count numbers within the area they were assigned to survey.<sup>67</sup>

The primary evidence thus reaffirms Tordoff and Scott's assertion that recruitment to the ZYS 'was primarily in the hands of UNIP regional secretaries'.<sup>68</sup> It comes as no great surprise therefore that African National Congress (ANC) politicians continued to complain about the politicised

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<sup>64</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, 'Letter to Lusaka Youth, Mr Evans Sikazwe, From Zambia Youth Service Director, J C Mulambaka', 6 February 1969.

<sup>65</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/27, 'Telegram to Luanshya Youth Branch Secretaries, From J Mwenda, Youth Constituency Secretary', 12 July 1968.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> 'UNIP Campaigns to Get Unemployed into Camps – or the Zambian Army', *Times of Zambia*, 4 November 1967, p. 7.

<sup>68</sup> William Tordoff and Ian Scott, 'Political Parties: Structures and Policies', in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 116.

recruitment process of the service, as had occurred during the 1964 interim period.<sup>69</sup> Nkumbula himself called for the break-up of the ZYS in March 1968. In this same parliamentary sitting, ANC MP Mr Edward Nyanga, alleged that youths were only accepted in camps if they held UNIP cards.<sup>70</sup> The director of the ZYS, Mr Dingiswayo Banda, at the time refuted this claim by replying that if UNIP cards were demanded during recruitment he was not aware of the fact.<sup>71</sup> However, the evidence of the party's heavy influence over the ZYS selection process - exposed in the previous paragraph - alongside Banda's ambiguous retort, speak volumes as to the reality behind the allegation.<sup>72</sup> Certainly, archival records show a remarkable absence of ANC youth sending in ZYS application forms.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, this available evidence confutes Marja Hinfelaar's suggestion that the ZYS was a tool of political indoctrination; that there was an 'ulterior motive' to enlist youths into the UNIP youth wing.<sup>74</sup> In an interview with Fred Kafumbe, used by Hinfelaar, Kafumbe recalls that 'youth of the Zambia Youth Service were actually campaign leaders, who would enter villages to force people to vote for Kaunda's UNIP party'.<sup>75</sup> Whilst correctly identifying that acts of ZYS members were connected with UNIP, Hinfelaar incorrectly interprets this as evidence that youths within the camps must have been 'converted' into

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<sup>69</sup> See pp. 140-141 of this thesis.

<sup>70</sup> 'Nkumbula Calls for Break-up of Zambia Youth Service', *Times of Zambia*, 28 March 1968, p. 9.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> A lack of ANC youth in the ZYS could also be partly explained by the regional basis of the ANC being in rural Southern Province where most youths moved into the farming industry and, therefore, already had agricultural training and/or were already employed.

<sup>74</sup> Hinfelaar, 'A History of SNV From a Zambian Perspective', p. 7.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

supporting UNIP.<sup>76</sup> As the membership debacle shows, recruits were nearly always already UNIP youth members, so one-sided political propaganda would have been redundant and these youths would likely have involved themselves in party campaigns regardless of their enrolment in the ZYS.

Instead, the primary evidence points to the ZYS as an instrument of reward - rather than political conversion - for those youths who were able to obtain a place.<sup>77</sup> Numerous letters, for instance, were sent by UNIP youths with an expectation that their party loyalty would be rewarded with a place in the ZYS. For example, the UNIP youth branch secretary of Luanshya sent a letter to the UNIP constituency youth secretary on 19 October 1966 with a list of six youths he wished to put forward to join the ZYS. The branch secretary wrote: 'These are my fellow youths who I have proved them for long stay with me as youths of my branch. Hoping for them a good lovely for their camp destine[sic]'.<sup>78</sup> At a UNIP youth seminar, it was even boasted that UNIP's close contact with the camps would make it easy to find places for those UNIP youths who needed them.<sup>79</sup> The ZYS thus functioned as a system of patronage for UNIP to reward its members at the very lowest level of the party hierarchy. Indeed, UNIP youths were vital for mobilising supporters and intimidating the opposition. The UNIP leadership accordingly

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<sup>76</sup> Chapter three explores this politicisation in more detail ie. how the political actions of ZYS members can be viewed as an extension of UNIP politics. See pp. 151-163 of this thesis.

<sup>77</sup> This of course was to change with the onset of the one-party system when a need arose to 're-educate' the youthful opposition.

<sup>78</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/27, 'Letter to the UNIP Constituency Youth Secretary of Luanshya, From Mwelwa S, Youth Branch Secretary of Mpatamatu', 19 October 1966.

<sup>79</sup> 'UNIP Campaigns to Get Unemployed into Camps - or the Zambian Army', *Times of Zambia*, 4 November 1967, p. 7.

complimented the youths' sacrifices with employment opportunities in the ZYS, either through the occupational training received by recruits, or, by directly offering party youths jobs within the camps. For instance, UNIP National Secretary, Mainza Chona, wrote to the ZYS director to ask about a youth he referred for a job in a camp: 'I shall be glad if you will investigate whether the above named has applied for a job with you as he tells me that he has done so... He is a veteran Freedom Fighter and I referred to him in my conversation with you at the Airport yesterday. Please do everything you can to offer him a job'.<sup>80</sup> Molteno and Tordoff conclude, 'It is perhaps this factor of reward which accounts for the readiness of so many people to continue working for the party'.<sup>81</sup>

Similarly, the running of the ZYS to support the UNIP party matches Kaunda's own view of the ideal relationship between the party and government: 'Government is a mere instrument of the Party. Government is a mere servant of the Party. Government must do what the Party wants'.<sup>82</sup> An early corruption scandal, uncovered by an auditor's report of the ZYS in 1966, perfectly illustrates how this viewpoint, regarding party and state, influenced the running of the ZYS. The report findings disclosed that £184,877 was spent by the ZYS from the 28 August 1965 to the 31 December 1965. However, the auditors could not trace vehicles, heavy equipment and furniture on which

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<sup>80</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, 'Letter to Director of Zambia Youth Service, Mr Chalikulima, From National Secretary Mainza Chona', 23 July 1968.

<sup>81</sup> Robert Molteno and William Tordoff, 'Conclusion: Independent Zambia: Achievements and Prospects', in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 374.

<sup>82</sup> Tordoff and Ian Scott, 'Political Parties', p. 146.

money had been spent.<sup>83</sup> A land purchase deal with UNIP was especially scrutinised. This included a part payment of £5,200 for two properties near Broken Hill bought from UNIP, despite an initial valuation for both properties of £4,000 being accepted by the ZYS Board. This decision was later ignored by the Board's administration who made a payment of £5,200 to UNIP, therefore bestowing an extra £1,200 to the party from public funds of the ZYS.<sup>84</sup>

### 5.1.3 *The Institutional Framework of the ZYS*

Despite its politically parochial style of recruitment the ZYS was run as a national government institution, financed using public funds from a national budgetary partition. It also received technical assistance from foreign countries, as well as aid from the World Food Programme in the form of vegetable oil, powdered milk, canned dried fish and other basic food staples.<sup>85</sup> This accounted for less than 10 per cent of the total budget.<sup>86</sup> The ZYS programme was managed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Development until 1968, when the responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Cooperatives, Youth, and Social Development.<sup>87</sup> These ministries were also involved in other social welfare provisions for youth, including the overseeing of a probation service, two schools for male juvenile offenders,

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<sup>83</sup> 'Shocks From ZYS Audit', *Times of Zambia*, 8 April 1966, p. 1.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Zambia Youth Service Synopsis of Annual Report', January-December 1967.

<sup>86</sup> 'National Youth Service Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa', p. 4 and Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia*, p. 172.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157 and Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 230.



and numerous temporary havens or youth shelters in the main urban centres.<sup>88</sup> The leadership structure of the ZYS service was controlled through an executive board composed of the ZYS director-general who answered to six other members who were appointed by the Minister in charge.<sup>89</sup> This was similar to the organisation of Kenya's youth service which also had a director-general who was in charge of the overall running of the camps.<sup>90</sup> Within the camps themselves the positions of authority, listed in order from the most senior to the most junior staff were: the Camp Director, Assistant Directors, teachers and training instructors, and recreation officers, along with the quartermaster accountant, the medical dresser and clerk, storemen, cooks and drivers.<sup>91</sup> Interestingly, the majority of instructors who taught youths practical skills were retirees who had left their job to 'dispense wisdom' to the younger generation. Brown Moses Mazumba remembered that: 'Most of them they were aged people... It was serving the nation... The elderly people who were experienced with these skills would help teach poultry, farming, so eventually the young people would become independent'.<sup>92</sup> Within the camps then, there was an accord between the generations, with the more experienced group passing on knowledge to those whose able bodies enabled them to act upon this training. Before the opening of the camps, these instructors were given a 1-week course to bring them up to date on new methods and world events.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Although these services fall outside the remit of this chapter, a future exploration could further expand understandings of the relationship between youth and government in postcolonial Zambia: Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia*, p. 158.

<sup>89</sup> *The Zambia Youth Service Act: Chapter 143*, Vol 10 (Lusaka: Ministry of Legal Affairs, Government of the Republic of Zambia, n.d), p. 2.

<sup>90</sup> 'National Youth Service Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa', p. 3.

<sup>91</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Information Pamphlet of the National Youth Service' (1964).

<sup>92</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

<sup>93</sup> Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia*, p. 172.

There was also a heavy international presence within the ZYS sites themselves. Although the camps were directed and run by Zambians, it was common for personnel from overseas to come into the camps to help with skills training.<sup>94</sup> Foreign technical advisors were predominantly from Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands and Israel. European support in particular stemmed from continued concern about unemployed youths in non-aligned countries being a potential 'breeding ground for Communist activities'.<sup>95</sup> Development aid also provided foreign countries with 'soft power' influence within an independent Zambia.<sup>96</sup> Soft power was achieved both through official government agencies or via charities.<sup>97</sup> For instance, a British student was able to work as a Youth Extension officer, in charge of the running of Young Farmers' Clubs in the Western Province, by joining the Voluntary Service Overseas Scheme.<sup>98</sup> In 1966, nine Dutch agricultural advisors arrived to assist the Zambian government with ZYS camps in Katete, Solwezi, Kabwe and Kitwe, and in 1967 another 18 Dutch volunteers were seconded to the ZYS for two years to provide specialist training in building and poultry rearing.<sup>99</sup> Similarly in 1965 Sweden sent eight volunteers to ZYS camps, and another

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<sup>94</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/18/33, 'Second Symposium on Unemployed Youth in Zambia' (1965).

<sup>95</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Youth Development Council Overseen by Chairman Rev. E A H Fielder' (1963).

<sup>96</sup> The term 'Soft Power' refers to a state's ability to shape the preferences of other states via non-coercive means. Soft Power is an indirect form of exerting power. Definition taken from: 'Soft Power', Reut Institute, 2007 <<http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=1752>> [accessed 17 October 2019]. The concept was coined by Joseph Nye, see: Joseph Nye, 'Soft Power', *Foreign Policy*, 80 (1990), pp. 153-171.

<sup>97</sup> Hinfelaar, 'A History of SNV From a Zambian Perspective', p. 5.

<sup>98</sup> 'Young Briton Helps Our Young Farmers', *Times of Zambia*, 7 February 1967, p. 7.

<sup>99</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Zambia Youth Service Synopsis of Annual Report', January-December 1967 and Hinfelaar, 'A History of SNV From a Zambian Perspective', p. 7.

13 in 1967, to teach tractor driving and mechanics.<sup>100</sup> Israel provided training for agricultural techniques based on the Kibbutz community system of farming and also provided Israeli army officers to instil discipline in ZYS youths.<sup>101</sup>

#### 5.1.4 *Life in the Camps: A Fixation with Agriculture?*

Day-to-day life within the camps revolved around education, skills training and agricultural labour. The length of service for each youth who joined the ZYS was two years.<sup>102</sup> Living arrangements were largely taken care of for those youths who joined the ZYS. Food, clothes and housing were provided for all recruits, in return for their labour which normally occupied about half their time in camp.<sup>103</sup> In addition each youth received pocket money in the sum of £1 per month, of which 10s was banked'.<sup>104</sup> Whilst in the camps youths received two hours of lessons a day. These ranged from learning to read and write, to classes in arithmetic, English, Geography, Zambian and African History, as well as learning about the government and current affairs.<sup>105</sup> The formal education taught at the camps was intended to help youths who had had their education interrupted during the liberation struggle, and those who had never been able to access education due to colonial inequalities.<sup>106</sup> The youths were also taught about Humanism. Zambian

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<sup>100</sup> 'Swedes Will Instruct at ZYS Camps', *Times of Zambia*, 27 September 1965, p. 7.

<sup>101</sup> 'We'll Train Zambian Youths, Says Israeli', *Times of Zambia*, 20 July 1971, p. 2.

<sup>102</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Working Party on the Establishment of a National Youth Service' (1964).

<sup>103</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Information Pamphlet of the National Youth Service' (1964).

<sup>104</sup> 'Their Aim Is Our Future', *Times of Zambia*, 12 February 1967, p. 2.

<sup>105</sup> David Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 230.

<sup>106</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Information Pamphlet of the National Youth Service' (1964) and National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Zambia Youth Service Synopsis of Annual Report', January-December 1967.

Humanism, as explained by Kaunda himself was ‘neither antireligious nor some super-religion’ and made ‘the welfare of Man the central aim of national policy... for socially desirable ends’.<sup>107</sup> Above all it was a religious and philosophical idea created to be a unifying civic culture for Zambians to follow.<sup>108</sup> The meaning of Humanism was taught to youths by members of staff, with the intention that after youths left the camps they could practice and teach it in the places they eventually settled.<sup>109</sup>

Vocational skills were also taught for two hours per day. These were intended to teach youths the ‘dignity of manual work’.<sup>110</sup> Unlike with other tasks there was a clear gender divide between what tradecrafts female and male youths were taught. Male youths recruited to the ZYS learnt skills in brickwork, carpentry, leather work, plumbing, tailoring, metal work and mechanics.<sup>111</sup> These skills were intended to benefit the country, as well as the individuals learning them, as there existed shortages in these types of skilled labour within the economy.<sup>112</sup> Female youths on the other hand were taught skills in nutrition, home-building, mother-craft, poultry raising and vegetable gardening.<sup>113</sup> In short, they were trained in the domestic economy.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> ‘Letter to My Children: Exclusive Dr Kaunda’s New Book in Excerpt Form for Our Readers’, *Times of Zambia*, 15 July 1973, p. 5.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Zambia Youth Service Synopsis of Annual Report’, January-December 1967.

<sup>110</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/18/33, ‘Second Symposium on Unemployed Youth in Zambia’ (1965).

<sup>111</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, ‘Letter to All Ministers of State, for the Provinces, From Director of the Zambia Youth Service, J C Mulabaka’, July 1968 and National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/18/33, ‘Second Symposium on Unemployed Youth in Zambia’ (1965). Also, Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 230.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia*, p. 172 and Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 230.

<sup>114</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/18/33, ‘Second Symposium on Unemployed Youth in Zambia’ (1965).



**Figure 13: Bricklaying being undertaken by male youths**

*Source: 'Zambia Youth Service Activities in Pictures', Times of Zambia, 24 October 1970, p. 31.*



**Figure 14: Knitting being practised by female youths**

*Source: 'Zambia Youth Service Activities in Pictures', Times of Zambia, 24 October 1970, p. 31.*

Youths of both genders were also involved in a substantial amount of community work in the areas surrounding the camps they lived in. Tasks ranged from bush clearing, to building roads and dams. Bush clearing opened up new land for local farmers to settle, whilst the dams and roads built were intended to advance local development, improve the local economy and relieve pressure from central government.<sup>115</sup>

However, the aspect of training most concentrated upon within the camps was agriculture. This remained a major element of the later ZNS training scheme as well. Basic agricultural skills were taught to both genders of youths and included: animal husbandry, farm mechanics, crop growing, livelihood and

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<sup>115</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Working Party on the Establishment of a National Youth Service' (1964).

co-operative farming. Youths in the ZYS were so involved in agricultural work that they were often called the 'land army'.<sup>116</sup> In Ndola, acting town clerk Mr Julius Sakala christened youths sent to the rural areas, 'soldiers of the soil'.<sup>117</sup> The use of militarised language within the agricultural sphere was intended to enhance the respectability of going into farming, which at the time of independence was often shunned as a profession by youths in urban and rural areas alike. Emphasis was placed on modern techniques and commercial farming as a viable alternative to blue collar work in the cities. Prioritisation was given to training youths to grow maize, vegetables, citrus fruits, peanuts, coffee, cotton, and cattle raising.<sup>118</sup> This was to help Zambia achieve self-sufficiency in food production and cut down on expensive imports and reliance on white settler states such as South Africa.<sup>119</sup> Youths were told that vegetable growing played an important role in the feeding of the nation.<sup>120</sup> After leaving the ZYS camps youths were expected to form co-operative farms in order to help Zambia become self-reliant in food production. Significantly funding for these co-operatives, as with the ZYS recruitment process, was politicised. In 1965 it was declared by Mr Justin Kabwe, the Western Province Political Assistant, that under the Government's 18-month development plan ANC supporters would not be allowed to form co-operatives.<sup>121</sup> This sentiment was affirmed by the Minister for Labour and

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<sup>116</sup> 'Loafers a Government Problem, Says Ndola', *Times of Zambia*, 11 February 1969, p. 7.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia*, p. 172.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> 'Zambia Youth Service Activities in Pictures', *Times of Zambia*, 24 October 1970, p. 31.

<sup>121</sup> 'Co-ops for UNIP Members Only' - Kabwe: 'Members Do Get Best Treatment', *Times of Zambia*, 19 July 1965, p. 1.

Social Development, Mr Mundia, and the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Chona who instituted the policy 'It pays to belong to UNIP'.<sup>122</sup>

One example of a co-operative established by ZYS youths was LUTO – Let Us Try Organisation. The co-operative was formed in 1965 by ten young men with an average age of 21, who had received training at the ZYS camp in Kitwe.<sup>123</sup> During the same year of its creation, LUTO had already started to grow vegetables to supply the Copperbelt market.<sup>124</sup> The farm's chairman, Augustin Kayula, admitted at the start of the project: 'We do not know how much money we will make out of the scheme. We will have to wait until the first crop is ready for sale. We will pay the Zambia Youth Service back the money we have borrowed'.<sup>125</sup> The loans made available for this kind of venture were vital to get co-operatives off the ground, especially as the youths themselves had little to no capital for initial investment.<sup>126</sup> Major Peter Moxon, a former Malawian farmer and politician who provided support to the youths involved, stated in a newspaper interview that he hoped LUTO would demonstrate to Zambian youths 'that there is a good rewarding living to be made off the land... of course, they can only be successful if they are enthusiastic and prepared to work hard'.<sup>127</sup> Indeed, the Major observed that 'Among urban youngsters there has been, in the past, little ambition to go into farming. They [youths] tend to look towards the towns for work.'<sup>128</sup> The

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<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> 'Kaunda's Call Reaches Youth Camp: Farm Trainees Strike Out on Their Own Win Contract', *Times of Zambia*, 8 July 1965, p. 7.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

Zambian President himself congratulated the co-operative in a telegram which read: 'I send my hearty congratulations to you on the activities at your camp... Please extend this to LUTO chairman Major Moxon and other LUTO members. This is what Zambia needs: young patriots and land-lovers. Will visit your camp at some later date to see for myself'.<sup>129</sup> Subsequently, in 1967, following an increased membership of 36 youths, the co-operative received a Government loan of £14,556 that allowed the purchase of 300 chickens and a 2 ½ ton truck for the transportation of produce to market.<sup>130</sup> Despite being one of the most successful youth co-operatives, just five years after its inception, the farm was abandoned in 1970.

In 1966, a form of military training was introduced into the ZYS camp curriculum under the belief that such discipline would enhance land cultivation among the youths. Col. Nyirenda explained, 'We have got what you might call the outward trapping of army discipline... But our discipline is much more relaxed'.<sup>131</sup> Both genders were involved in this type of training. One camp commander, Captain Joseph Gal claimed that 'on exercise the weaker sex was not only as good as the husky males but often better. The two crack shots in the brown beret brigade are women'.<sup>132</sup> The programme was heavily assisted by an Israeli mission which sent specialist instructors to ZYS camps to teach weapons training to recruits.<sup>133</sup> The incorporation of weapons

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<sup>129</sup> Kaunda Says 'Well Done', *Times of Zambia*, 10 July 1965, p. 1.

<sup>130</sup> 'Youths Make Success of Co-operatives Near Kitwe', *Times of Zambia*, 12 January 1967, p. 7.

<sup>131</sup> 'Their Aim Is Our Future', *Times of Zambia*, 12 February 1967, p. 2.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> Richard Sklar, 'Zambia's Response to the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence', in *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 361.



training into the ZYS scheme came shortly after the Southern Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965, by Ian Smith's white settler government. The prospect of conflict was brought into focus. The UNIP government, had only inherited an army of 2,900 soldiers at independence.<sup>134</sup> Although in 1968 this was rapidly expanded to 4,400, the reluctance of Britain to move in with force to stop the rebellion meant Zambia had insufficient numbers to ensure its own security, should events take a negative turn.<sup>135</sup> The coincidence of UDI and the inclusion of military discipline within the ZYS can therefore be partly explained by an increased anxiety over Zambia's neighbour, Rhodesia.

Military training of ZYS recruits, nonetheless, did not become a key focus of the ZYS. Military exercises were used more as an initial instrument to instil discipline and socialising them to support [government] authority.<sup>136</sup> One camp manager asserted that drills taught youths to 'obey every order without question... should an officer give a youth a wrong order the youth leader must carry out the order first and complain about it later'.<sup>137</sup> Military exercises in this sense were less about creating a fighting force to assist in Zambia's worsening security situation, and much more about adults reinforcing control over youths by moulding a future generation into compliant citizens. Indeed,

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<sup>134</sup> By comparison, Rhodesia had an army thought to comprise of some 4,000-5,000 regular troops.

Sklar, 'Zambia's Response to the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence', p. 361 and Lindemann, 'Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia', p. 11.

<sup>135</sup> Andrew DeRoche, 'You Can't Fight Guns with Knives': National Security and Zambians Responses to UDI, 1965-1973', in *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*, ed. by Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 79.

<sup>136</sup> This was contrary to the anti-government activities which had been encouraged in UNIP youths during the liberation struggle.

<sup>137</sup> 'The Golden Rule Is Discipline' for Youths', *Times of Zambia*, 1 May 1967, p. 7.

youths were only taught military discipline for three months at the ZYS Kafue induction camp, at which point they were moved onto different training farms and camps.<sup>138</sup> At Kafue induction camp, youths would wake up at 5.30 am every day for physical training, followed by breakfast at 8 am and another hour of drills.<sup>139</sup> On route marches, which were either 12 or 24 miles long, recruits sang traditional Zambian songs as they trekked through the bush.<sup>140</sup> These marches were intended to shape the youths' character, as Col. Nyirenda explained, 'We want discipline and order. We are getting this now.'<sup>141</sup>



**Figure 15: Para-military training being carried out at the Kafue Camp**

Source: 'Zambia Youth Service Activities in Pictures', *Times of Zambia*, 24 October 1970, p. 31.

Furthermore, due to administrative issues on the side of the Israelis, and their subsequent withdrawal, the paramilitary training was stopped in 1967.<sup>142</sup> The programme was then amended to provide training in fire prevention.<sup>143</sup> It was only in October 1970 that President Kaunda promised that all youths in camps would be taught how to handle firearms, so they could defend Zambia if the

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<sup>138</sup> '300 Youths Go to Camp: Discipline Before Trade Training', *Times of Zambia*, 22 June 1967, p. 7.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> 'Their Aim Is Our Future', *Times of Zambia*, 12 February 1967, p. 2.

<sup>141</sup> '300 Youths Go to Camp: Discipline Before Trade Training', *Times of Zambia*, 22 June 1967, p. 7.

<sup>142</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Zambia Youth Service Synopsis of Annual Report', January-December 1967.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

need arose.<sup>144</sup> Kaunda said that the youth of Zambia would till the land in times of peace – and defend the land in times of war, thus paving the way for a militarised national service to come into being just one year after this declaration.<sup>145</sup>

#### 5.1.5 ZYS Results: Discipline, Employment and Agriculture

It is necessary to now turn to the outcomes of the ZYS national project. Particular attention is paid to the impact of the ZYS on youth discipline, employment prospects, and on the country's agricultural output, given these formed key objectives of service training. Disciplinary training was relatively successful in regard to controlling the energies of individual youths. In the case of minor breaches of camp rules, individuals were judged not by camp commanders but by a committee of his or her fellow youths.<sup>146</sup> Using peer judgment for these occasions helped to avoid the perception of unfair punishments being handed out, and importantly avoided ZYS recruits from conspiring with one another against camp authorities. Punishments decided by these peer committees were usually based on the removal of privileges or the assignment of extra work duties.<sup>147</sup> Occasionally those who had fallen foul of the ZYS system were supported by UNIP youth wing leaders. On 5 May 1967, for example, UNIP youth secretary, H B Kalanga, wrote to the director of the ZYS, pleading, 'On behalf of the above mentioned youth, I would like to address you and mention that Bwana Mayumbelo who was

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<sup>144</sup> 'ZYS Makes Way for a National Service', *Times of Zambia*, 19 October 1970, p. 1.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Report of the Working Party on the Establishment of a National Youth Service' (1964).

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

expelled from Broken Hill has regreted[sic] the way he behaved while at the camp and wishes to apologize very sincerely to you and assure you of his good behaviour. Should you be kind enough to accept him at any of your camps'.<sup>148</sup> This exchange reveals how youths attempted to levy their established political networks to aid one another.

These instances of comradeship highlight the potential difficulty faced at the time by camp leaders and government authorities when navigating outbreaks of indiscipline. As later cases demonstrate comradeship could easily snowball into acts of mass rioting and protests by ZYS youths.<sup>149</sup> In February 1965, for example, 150 youths at the Broken Hill ZYS camp threatened to go on strike over day to day issues in the camp's living conditions.<sup>150</sup> Much later, in December 1969, 30 Kafue camp members marched to the UNIP regional office to protest against alleged insults and accusations of theft made by their camp commissioner, who they demanded be dismissed.<sup>151</sup> Despite their disciplined training in the ZYS these instances reveal that youthful recruits retained their reactivity and ability to form rebellious coalitions with one another to confront those in positions of power. In August 1965 outbreaks of unrest even forced the UNIP Government to launch an official inquiry into the operation of the ZYS. A report was eventually published in August 1965,

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<sup>148</sup> British Library, London, EAP121/2/8/1/37, 'Telegram to the Director of the Zambia Youth Service, From Under Secretary of the Youth Movement, H B Kalanga', 5 May 1967.

<sup>149</sup> This theme will be further explored in chapter six, when looking at student unrest at the University of Zambia.

<sup>150</sup> 'Minister Warns ZYS Youths to Behave', *Times of Zambia*, 22 February 1965, p. 2.

<sup>151</sup> 'Youths Quizzed After Rumpus: 'Officials Insulted Us'', *Times of Zambia*, 23 December 1969, p. 9.

but its findings were not made public.<sup>152</sup> The report found that due to ZYS camps having been inaugurated in far too big of a hurry, there had been a lack of quality control and proper enforcement of discipline.<sup>153</sup> It was recommended therefore that commissioners ‘concentrate on consolidating the position of the 2,000 youths presently in the camps’.<sup>154</sup> This was largely kept to, given only an additional 1,771 youths entered the camps by 1970.<sup>155</sup>

Nevertheless, given that the ZYS recruits were made up of UNIP youth league members, ‘indiscipline’ directed against the opposition by ZYS members was, by and large, tolerated by camp leaders and the UNIP Government alike. In July 1969, for instance, ZYS recruits were implicated in the infamous violent ransacking of the High Court after Mr Justice Evans released two Portuguese soldiers who had been arrested by Zambian immigration officials for illegal entry into the country.<sup>156</sup> The actions of the youths in this case were not condemned by the President, who had also spoken on the aggression from Portuguese forces at the time. Instead, Kaunda praised the youths, saying he was happy to hear that they were ready to pick up arms at a moment’s notice to defend Zambia.<sup>157</sup> Clearly not all ZYS ‘indiscretions’ were the wrong kind in the eyes of the UNIP government, even after the government inquiry.

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<sup>152</sup> Refusal to make public the inquiry’s finding likely stemmed from the attempt to avoid acknowledgement of awkward political links between ZYS violence and party violence: ‘Probe of ZYS Is Called’, *Times of Zambia*, 10 March 1965, p. 3.

<sup>153</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, ‘Report Synopsis on the Committee of Inquiry Appointed to Inquire into Matters Concerned with the Operation of the Zambia Youth Service’ (1965).

<sup>154</sup> ‘Govt. Studies ZYS Report’, *Times of Zambia*, 1 May 1965, p. 1.

<sup>155</sup> ‘‘Wasted Young Lives’ Our Public Enemy No. 1’, *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1970, p. 7.

<sup>156</sup> Molteno and Tordoff, ‘Conclusion’, p. 368.

<sup>157</sup> ‘Kaunda: I Must Have Discipline: You Aren’t Policemen, Youths Are Told’, *Times of Zambia*, 12 August 1969, p. 7.

Given the UNIP credentials of many of the recruits, it is perhaps unsurprising they were able to act aggressively in ways not wholly condemned by the UNIP government.<sup>158</sup> Alternatively of course the UNIP government could well have been trying to 'save face' by giving tacit approval to ZYS actions in an attempt to create the appearance of a controlled ZYS, that was in reality uncontrollable. The UNIP-recruited ZYS thus seemed to be subject to an inconsistent policy on discipline.<sup>159</sup> Individuals were reprimanded for breaking camp rules, but in the case of riots, ZYS recruits were rarely punished, so long as their actions aimed to benefit the party.

As well as an - apparent - focus on discipline, the ZYS as an institution aimed to increase the employment prospects of its recruits. By 1970, 3,771 recruits had passed through ZYS vocational and agricultural training.<sup>160</sup> Rather than the ZYS being a programme which directly secured jobs for the youth, the training youths received whilst in the camps was intended to provide them with enough of an edge to gain employment. A 1964 information pamphlet on the ZYS clearly stated that 'The National Youth Service cannot be committed to finding employment for all the young people after service. The emphasis is placed upon teaching the youths self-reliance and preparing them to fend for themselves'.<sup>161</sup> This was contradicted in a later statement by the Minister for Labour and Social Development, Mr Nalumino Mundia, who announced: 'Concentrate on your training for this will determine your

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<sup>158</sup> For further details on the High Court case refer back to chapter three, p. 155.

<sup>159</sup> Tordoff and Scott, 'Political Parties', pp. 115-116.

<sup>160</sup> 'Wasted Young Lives' Our Public Enemy No. 1', *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1970, p. 7.

<sup>161</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 183, 'Information Pamphlet of the National Youth Service' (1964).

future... After you have completed your course the Government will give you employment'.<sup>162</sup> Despite this confusion over responsibility for the youths who finished their two years of service, a number of male youths were directly absorbed by industry, commerce, the police force and the army.<sup>163</sup> Of 157 agricultural trainees leaving the service in December 1968, 136 were inducted into the police.<sup>164</sup>

Yet, skills training did not necessarily ensure youths' greater employment opportunities after graduating.<sup>165</sup> Some youths encountered difficulties in obtaining jobs as the ZYS certificate was not recognised by prospective employers.<sup>166</sup> Ex-ZYS recruit, Kenneth Mushingi, said that continued unemployment had been his own experience and had also been the unhappy tale of many of his friends. Mushingi slammed the programme: 'We have come to the conclusion that our response to the Government's call to go into the service camps and learn some useful trades was after all fruitless. We can only conclude that the training offered at youth camps are in no way beneficial.'<sup>167</sup> It is difficult to ascertain from records whether Mushingi was in a minority-group of unemployed ZYS graduates, or whether these issues were more widespread. A growth in unemployment figures in the later years of the 1960s may provide a clue. In the first seven months of 1969, for instance, an average of 19,128 men were registered as unemployed. This

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<sup>162</sup> 'Minister Warns ZYS Youths to Behave', *Times of Zambia*, 22 February 1965, p. 2.

<sup>163</sup> Kaplan, *Area Handbook for Zambia*, p. 172.

<sup>164</sup> Angi and Coombe, 'Training Programmes and Employment Opportunities for Primary School Leavers in Zambia', p. 8.

<sup>165</sup> 'Wasted Young Lives' Our Public Enemy No. 1', *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1970, p. 7.

<sup>166</sup> 'ZYS Youths 'Can't Find Employment'', *Times of Zambia*, 29 January 1970, p. 2.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*

compared with an average of 12,372 for the same period in 1968, the previous year.<sup>168</sup>

The fixation on agricultural growth within the ZYS seemed to fair little better in terms of the impact made by the programme on the wider economy and the nation's food security. The production of food generated in ZYS farms does appear to have been plenteous, but supply chain issues hampered effective distribution. In 1969, the Ministry of Rural Development, for instance was desperately looking for markets for milk produced by youths at Solwezi camp in North-Western Province, as the milk production there had risen to 45 gallons a day.<sup>169</sup> Moreover, though youths were encouraged to join the co-operative programme once they left the ZYS, and though the programme received substantial financial support, from 1964 to 1969 only approximately eight, rather insecure, co-operatives comprising of ten to twenty youths were established.<sup>170</sup>

The main national successes in agriculture during this period were seen in Southern Province, which was a prosperous farming region well before the ZYS came into being. This helps to explain why 60 per cent of Young Farmers' Clubs were located in the province, whilst a national survey of all youths enrolled in the ZYS found only 20 per cent were willing to be trained

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<sup>168</sup> Angi and Coombe, 'Training Programmes and Employment Opportunities for Primary School Leavers in Zambia', p. 6.

<sup>169</sup> 'Youth, You Are the Key: Kamanga Boosts Farmers', *Times of Zambia*, 26 April 1969, p. 2.

<sup>170</sup> £142,000 was spent from 1966-1967 on the ZYS. Angi and Coombe, 'Training Programmes and Employment Opportunities for Primary School Leavers in Zambia', p. 8.



as farmers.<sup>171</sup> Indeed, in many other areas of Zambia, agriculture continued to carry a stigma in the eyes of youths. In 1970 Ellison Banda, a youth looking for blue collar work on the Copperbelt testified to the difficulty the government faced in persuading youths 'back to the land'. He stated: 'I left the rural area, where my parents are, to look for employment on the Copperbelt. How does Government expect me to find employment at home now if I did not find it three years ago'.<sup>172</sup> Banda did not even entertain a career on the land as a possible option for himself. In this sense he lacked trust in the ability of rural farming to offer him suitable prospects for his future. This lack of confidence in the agricultural sector was likewise reflected in the struggle the Zambia College of Agriculture faced when trying to fill 100 vacancies for a new two-year agricultural training course, which the college launched in 1967.<sup>173</sup> The somewhat fragmentary successes of the ZYS then in achieving its goals, and the limited section of youths who actually benefited from training, meant that by the beginning of the 1970s the ZYS was no longer fit for purpose and was dissolved. The ZNS supplanted the ZYS in 1971, just one year before the one-party system was also introduced in the country.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4 and 'ZYS a 'Notable Advance'', *Times of Zambia*, 14 April 1965, p. 3.

<sup>172</sup> 'Loafers Put Their Case: There's No Work in Rural Areas', *Times of Zambia*, 13 March 1970, p. 2.

<sup>173</sup> 'Young Men Unwilling to Make Careers on the Land', *Times of Zambia*, 3 February 1967, p. 9.

<sup>174</sup> Giacomo Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 95.

## 5.2 Establishing the ZNS: Shifting to a Militarised Youth Programme

### 5.2.1 *A New Decade and a New Context*

The introduction of the one-party system in 1972 ushered in Zambia's Second Republic.<sup>175</sup> All political parties thereafter were rendered illegal, except for UNIP, forcing well-entrenched opposition parties underground and out of public view.<sup>176</sup> With relative ease UNIP subsequently 'won' the 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988 general elections that were held.<sup>177</sup> These were nothing like their tempestuous predecessors. Yet, as the years progressed under one-party rule, the government was no longer able to blame opposition forces for the continued problems regarding Zambia's youth. By officially erasing party divisions, the social tensions underlying generalised youth problems therefore became harder to ignore. Additionally, by banning opposition parties, inter-party warfare became a less admissible tactic which the UNIP Government could use to subdue opposition youths or youths problematic to the government. The context of the 1970s, moreover, had significantly shifted within Zambia. This added to youth becoming a critical issue the government needed to attend to. Indeed, as well as the problems created with the introduction of the one-party system, there was also mounting unemployment and escalating boarder security issues, as will be discussed in more detail below. Such problems were far more severe than they had been in the previous decade. Resources were subsequently diverted into a nonpartisan

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<sup>175</sup> The Second Republic remained up until 1991 when the UNIP government was replaced by an MMD government. The end of the Second Republic will be discussed in further detail in chapter six. Also, Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*, p. 95.

<sup>176</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 24 September 2018.

<sup>177</sup> Stefan Lindemann, *Elite Bargains and the Politics of War and Peace in Uganda and Zambia* (unpublished doctoral thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010), p. 179.

national service scheme in an urgent attempt to manage the potential threat youths could pose under these more trying conditions, as well as to alleviate some of the security fears triggered by neighbouring white settler states. In preparation for these compounding issues, the ZNS was thus born in 1971.<sup>178</sup>

The Zambian border in the 1970s faced increasing incursions and hostilities from its white settler neighbours, particularly Rhodesia and Mozambique. These territories continued to be under white settler control until 1980 and 1975 respectively. As a landlocked country, Zambia had common borders with eight other countries, and in the 1970s felt the strains of having ‘four fronts’ of intense liberation wars along its borders in Mozambique, Rhodesia, Angola and Namibia.<sup>179</sup> Kaunda himself often attempted to intercede in these conflicts, providing logistical support to African liberation movements.<sup>180</sup> This was similar to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere’s commitment to make his own nation a key ‘frontline state’ in the push against white settler regimes to the south.<sup>181</sup> As also occurred in Tanzania, refugees from Mozambique flowed into Zambia between the late 1960s and early 1970s.<sup>182</sup> In addition, pressure was placed on the country by constant land and air incursions, as retribution for Zambia’s support of various African liberation

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<sup>178</sup> Lindemann, ‘Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia’, p. 13 and ‘ZYS Makes Way for a National Service’, *Times of Zambia*, 19 October 1970, p. 1.

<sup>179</sup> ‘Kaunda of Zambia is Respected as Peacemaker in Southern Africa: Philosophy of ‘Humanism’ Guides His Conciliatory Approach’ *Washington Post*, 25 May 1984, p. 15 and Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>180</sup> ‘Kaunda of Zambia is Respected as Peacemaker in Southern Africa: Philosophy of ‘Humanism’ Guides His Conciliatory Approach’ *Washington Post*, 25 May 1984, p. 15.

<sup>181</sup> Andrew Ivaska, ‘Movement Youth in a Global, Sixties Hub: The Everyday Lives of Transnational Activists in Postcolonial Dar es Salaam’, in *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Richard Jobs and David Pomfret (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series, 2015), p. 189.

<sup>182</sup> Tordoff and Molteno, ‘Introduction’, p. 30 and Ivaska, ‘Movement Youth in a Global, Sixties Hub’, p. 188.

efforts. Between June 1969 and March 1971, for example, Portuguese forces committed forty acts of aggression on Zambia, killing fifty Zambians.<sup>183</sup> A partial blockade was also imposed on all Zambian-bound cargo at the Beira and Lobito Bay ports by the Portuguese.<sup>184</sup> Attacks by Rhodesian forces on guerrilla camps within Zambian territory added to tensions in the early 1970s.<sup>185</sup> Kaunda lambasted the British as ‘clearly not serious’ in helping to defend Zambia, after Britain sent only a squadron of ten Javelin jets to protect Zambian airspace, despite escalating numbers of Rhodesian attacks.<sup>186</sup>

Zambia’s geopolitical position within southern Africa at the time thus enhanced its interaction and exposure to the activities of its warring neighbours.<sup>187</sup> Indeed, conflicts have been understood to spill-over the borders within which they are fought.<sup>188</sup> This acknowledgement within the literature, however, has largely been limited to the positive effects of conflict on GDP per capita growth on neighbouring countries.<sup>189</sup> Yet, as Fatmata Sesay points out, being contiguous to a country in conflict equally requires the taking up of military measures to ensure sufficient levels of border protection. Sesay notes: ‘This action, because of its high expense, in most cases constitutes a diversion of resources away from possibly development-oriented initiatives, and therefore leads to loss’.<sup>190</sup> For Zambia, the need for

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<sup>183</sup> Tordoff and Molteno, ‘Introduction’, p. 34.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 232.

<sup>186</sup> DeRoche, ‘You Can’t Fight Guns with Knives’, p. 81.

<sup>187</sup> Kristian Gleditsch, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 44.3 (2007), pp. 293-309.

<sup>188</sup> Fatmata Sesay, ‘Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries: Direct and Indirect Effects on Economic Growth’, *TIGER Working Paper Series*, 68, (2004), p. 1.

<sup>189</sup> Sesay, ‘Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries’, p. 2.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

increased measures to protect its borders was unavoidable in the 1970s. Kaunda and his colleagues' decision to establish a national service can therefore be readily understood by viewing their decisions through a national security lens, alongside the pressing need to implement a youth development programme.

Although Zambian officials already pursued a wide range of projects to improve the nation's security prior to the 1970s - including the introduction of military-style training in the former ZYS - the increasing severity of attacks meant a much more steadfast solution was needed.<sup>191</sup> Token gestures were no longer enough of a reassurance to the public or deterrent to the belligerent forces. It was thus decided that the ZNS would have an upgraded and widened scope of military training than had been implemented in the ZYS, all the while retaining a developmental focus.<sup>192</sup> By introducing the ZNS it was hoped graduates of the programme would directly bolster the nation's overstretched army and air force, by creating a large reserve of trained and able bodied citizens who would be available for military service if needed.<sup>193</sup> This 'Home Guard' was attractive given the lower costs involved in its upkeep compared to recruiting full-time soldiers that would drain the treasury.<sup>194</sup> What enabled the UNIP government to ask that ZNS graduates automatically join a reserve army was the civic idea that it was a duty of citizens to support their

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<sup>191</sup> DeRoche, 'You Can't Fight Guns with Knives', p. 88.

<sup>192</sup> The amount of money needed for military and police forces was a drain on the Zambian treasury, which desperately needed developmental rather than defence spending: Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 232.

<sup>193</sup> Wisdom Lopa, 'An Assessment of Civil-Military Relations in Zambia' (unpublished Master's dissertation, Copperbelt University, 2014) and Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 230.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 232.

government in times of war, an idea which extended to this moment of ‘no-war no-peace’ within the country.<sup>195</sup> Indeed, these border hostilities, which occurred without an official declaration of war, help to highlight the often slippery distinctions between the conditions of war and peace. Rosa Brooks questions ‘whether war and peace have ever been as distinct as we like to imagine’.<sup>196</sup> In exploring the ZNS, during this turbulent time between Zambia and its neighbours, it seems difficult to refute Brooks’ position.

This national security reasoning behind the creation of the ZNS was also bolstered by the need to check the ever snowballing unemployment issue among youth in the 1970s. Explosive population growth, coupled with a higher turn-out of school educated young people, created a boiling point situation whereby jobseekers outstripped economic growth.<sup>197</sup> The 1969 census established that 70 per cent of the population was below 30 years of age, making this predicament particularly critical.<sup>198</sup> As happened in the previous decade, youths participated heavily in the pattern of rural-urban migration.<sup>199</sup> Urban centres thus faced double jeopardy during this population boom, as cities and towns struggled to keep up with their own natural

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<sup>195</sup> The Eritrean Minister of Defence, Sebat Ephrem coined the phrase ‘no-war no-peace’ to describe Eritrea’s predicament after the Eritrean–Ethiopian War ended in 2000: Gaim Kibreab, *The Eritrean National Service: Servitude for ‘The Common Good’ and the Youth Exodus* (Oxford: James Currey, 2017), p. 64. Also, Lindemann, ‘Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia’, p. 13 and Cecil Burns, ‘War and Citizenship’, *International Journal of Ethics*, 46.4 (1936), p. 411.

<sup>196</sup> Rosa Brooks, ‘There’s No Such Thing as Peacetime’, *Foreign Policy*, 13 March 2015, <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/theres-no-such-thing-as-peacetime-forever-war-terror-civil-liberties/>> [accessed 18 May 2019].

<sup>197</sup> ‘Zambia Faces a Population Explosion – Prof’, *Times of Zambia*, 17 August 1972, p. 1.

<sup>198</sup> ‘Job Crisis: Our Plans Have Been Defeated, Says Chikwanda’, *Times of Zambia*, 21 October 1974, p. 1.

<sup>199</sup> Angi and Coombe, ‘Training Programmes and Employment Opportunities for Primary School Leavers in Zambia’, p. 2.

population increases, as well as growth from internal-migration.<sup>200</sup> For instance, between 1963 and 1974, the Copperbelt population almost doubled from 543,465 to 1,046,000.<sup>201</sup> By way of comparison the population of the more rural Southern Province grew from 466,327 to 496,041 within the same period.<sup>202</sup> The share of the urban population ultimately rose from 20 per cent in the mid-1960s to roughly 40 per cent in the late 1970s, making Zambia the second most urbanised African country at the time.<sup>203</sup> Such large population changes meant that many youths competed for a relatively small number of jobs, creating poverty and disillusionment. In 1974 Lusaka, an anonymous youth complained he had ‘only one pair of shoes, one trouser[sic] which is getting torn and only two shirts. What a life!’.<sup>204</sup> He emphasised that he could not go back to the land ‘since the towns are the only places where one can exploit his talents and pursue his areas of endeavour and improve his lot materially.’<sup>205</sup> A 25-year-old youth from the same area, who had completed form five in 1968, was thoroughly discouraged by his employment prospects. He claimed that ‘Despite my education I cannot get employment... each time I go to look for employment all that I am told by the bosses is that I must put it in writing. And when I do they never reply. I have been looking for

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<sup>200</sup> 70 to 78 per cent population increase in major urban centres between 1963 and 1969, compared with an average national population growth rate of 2.5 per cent per year over that period. See: *Ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 250.

<sup>202</sup> The population of certain ‘rural’ provinces (Northern and Luapula) actually decreased: Angi and Coombe, ‘Training Programmes and Employment Opportunities for Primary School Leavers in Zambia’, p. 2 and Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 250.

<sup>203</sup> Lindemann, ‘Elite Bargains and the Politics of War and Peace in Uganda and Zambia’, p. 212.

<sup>204</sup> ‘Plight of a Young Man Who Can’t Find Work’, *Times of Zambia*, 2 January 1974, p. 4.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*

employment for the past ten months and problems of life are getting worse'.<sup>206</sup>

Despite improved access to primary education following independence, the school system was unable to retain many young people as places became more limited through the grade years.<sup>207</sup> In 1968, out of 41,000 pupils who passed Grade 7, only 14,000 found places in Form 1, according to figures released by the Minister of Education, Mr Arthur Wina.<sup>208</sup> This meant that many young people were forced to leave school without the necessary qualifications needed to obtain jobs.<sup>209</sup> Indeed, gone were the days of early independence, when there was a pressure to fill a large number of skilled jobs with a limited number of school leavers. By the 1970s the situation had firmly flipped on its head. A senior official in the Department of Labour succinctly explained the problem at the time. He commented that: 'previously, a person with grade 7 education could usually get a clerical job, and we find that many people with grade 7 still feel that way. They insist, against our advice, that they must have an office or clerical position, even when we explain that there are no jobs available in that area for people with their educational background'.<sup>210</sup> The lack of school places for youths to progress in education, and the lack thereafter of jobs, created an atmosphere of frustration among youths. In 1968 a youthful protest erupted, due to dissatisfaction over the

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<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>207</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 24 September 2018 and 'Zambia Too Young to End Drop-out Problem', *Times of Zambia*, 12 March 1979, p. 5.

<sup>208</sup> 'Teacher's Union May Inspect Youth Camps', *Times of Zambia*, 27 January 1968, p. 7.

<sup>209</sup> Nyimbili, 'State of the Nation Report on Young People in Zambia', p. 12.

<sup>210</sup> Angi and Coombe, 'Training Programmes and Employment Opportunities for Primary School Leavers in Zambia', p. 2.



shortage of Form 1 places.<sup>211</sup> This tense situation contributed to the urgent need of the UNIP government to come up with a solution; the ZNS it was hoped would be an analgesic.

### 5.2.2 Organisation of the ZNS: 1971-1975

With the establishment of the ZNS as a truly national organisation for all youths, the government's budget for technical assistance grew to 5.3 per cent in 1975 to reflect this change, and to 8.5 per cent in 1979.<sup>212</sup> This coincided with Zambia's international efforts in youth development. In 1973 President Kaunda pledged K30,000 annually, over the course of three years, to help set up the proposed Commonwealth Youth Programme.<sup>213</sup> Indeed, Kaunda personally supported many youth development projects, including the ZNS. In 1971 he described youths as guards of Zambia's sovereignty in wartime and developers of the country in peacetime.<sup>214</sup> MP for Chingola East, Mr Fines Bulawayo, echoed the sentiment that youths, as the vanguard of the nation, must stand up in time of war and defend their country. Bulawayo stated that, 'the enemy had spread his wings in various fields' and as a result it was important that 'security committees were formed in various organisations to counter these activities'.<sup>215</sup> The organisation of the ZNS thus reflected these changes towards a militarised national youth programme and the vision of youth as defenders of the nation. In January 1971, the ZYS became a branch of the Ministry of Defence, in order to pave the way for the

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<sup>211</sup> 'Youths Quit 'Low' Jobs', *Times of Zambia*, 25 November 1972, p. 5.

<sup>212</sup> Hinfelaar, 'A History of SNV From a Zambian Perspective', p. 10.

<sup>213</sup> 'Aid Pledge for Youth Schemes', *Times of Zambia*, 31 January 1973, p. 1.

<sup>214</sup> 'Defence Chiefs Take ZYS in Hand', *Times of Zambia*, 15 January 1971, p. 1.

<sup>215</sup> 'Youths Urged to Spot Enemy', *Times of Zambia*, 18 July 1976, p. 3.

establishment of the ZNS.<sup>216</sup> As a wing of the defence force, the primary duty of the ZNS was defence and the production of agriculture.<sup>217</sup> This was not too dissimilar to the former ZYS. However, in interview, Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika noted that militarism was consistently retained in the ZNS given ‘the commanders of national service always came from the army... seconded to national service’.<sup>218</sup> This ensured that as a ‘third force of the defence force’ the ZNS was always run as a military wing.<sup>219</sup>

The militarisation of the ZNS coincided with the process of Zambianisation within the military, which saw many youths gain high ranking leadership positions.<sup>220</sup> Kaunda’s leadership in the early 1970s, therefore showed a continued commitment to promoting youths to positions of power.<sup>221</sup> This seemingly benevolent strategy helped to further engender the loyalty of youths towards the President and the UNIP government, thus working to safeguard UNIP’s political power. Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika recalled that, ‘In the Air Force we had very young pilots, guys like Christopher Singogo, General [Peter] Zuze, who was first commander of the Air Force’.<sup>222</sup> They were young people, Singogo was in his early twenties, and Zuze was about 30 years old when he was promoted to commander of the Air Force.<sup>223</sup> In 1976 General Kingsley Chinkuli took over as the first black Commander of

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<sup>216</sup> ‘Defence Chiefs Take ZYS in Hand’, *Times of Zambia*, 15 January 1971, p. 1.

<sup>217</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>220</sup> Sklar, ‘Zambia’s Response to the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence’, p. 361.

<sup>221</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>222</sup> General Zuze was eventually replaced as commander of the ZNDF at the beginning of 1979, rumoured to be a reaction to his alleged discontent with the policy of non-retaliation against the Rhodesians. See: Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 248.

<sup>223</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

the Zambia National Defence Force, having first been appointed a Commander in 1970 at the age of 31 years old.<sup>224</sup>



**Figure 16: General Kingsley Chinkuli circa 1970s**

*Source:* ‘Snapshot in History – General Kingsley Chinkuli’, *Zambian Observer*, 11 July 2019, <<https://www.zambianobserver.com/snapshot-in-history-general-kingsley-chinkuli/>> [accessed 18 July 2019]. This change in military leadership meant that ZNS recruits were more likely to be instructed by young military personnel seconded to the service. In other words, successful youths in this instance instructed and guided fellow youths who remained in positions of dependency. Certainly, by 1975 a total of 106 ZNS instructors, drawn from the military, had been trained.<sup>225</sup> The leadership structure of the military and its responsibility for the ZNS thus helps further complicate traditional understandings of youth within hierarchies acting solely as powerless dependents.

Moreover, these young ZNS instructors were more likely to hold strong views on the liberation wars taking place along Zambia’s borders. Indeed, young Zambian officers were much more likely to have had interactions with freedom fighters before joining the army and were therefore more gung-ho about assisting their neighbours than the British officers they replaced. This

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<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup> ‘Huge Rural Plan Gets Off Ground: Jobless Will Be Sent ‘Home’’, *Times of Zambia*, 5 February 1975, p. 1.

in turn likely influenced and inspired ZNS recruits into holding similar views. For example, Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika had first-hand experiences with Namibian freedom fighters before joining the army to work in the education department, as a political commissar.<sup>226</sup> In Western Province, as a 20-year-old, Lt Nkanika taught at Sesheke secondary school, in a town which bordered Namibia. Lt Nkanika recalled that, ‘there were a lot of freedom fighters there. So that kind of excited me and once or twice I entertained soldiers in my house... and my headmaster did not like it, because Namibia was still attacking Zambia and he thought what if Namibian intelligence know they are here and then they target your house’.<sup>227</sup> The headmaster eventually forced Lt Nkanika to transfer to Kalabo secondary school across the Zambezi. Ironically in Kalabo, Lt Nkanika became further involved in liberation struggles by using his house as a resting and storage place for guerrilla troops.<sup>228</sup> Such an experience inspired Lt Nkanika to join the army in 1972.

In terms of the recruitment policies implemented by the new ZNS programme, these were expanded to allow almost any youth to join the programme. George Muyuni, from Mazabuka, explained that because he was unable to finish form 3 for financial reasons he joined the ZNS: ‘Entry into national service had no qualifications, as long as you were a youth. That’s why I stopped school and opted to join, because there was no restriction on who could join’.<sup>229</sup> Joining the ZNS remained voluntary up until 1976.<sup>230</sup> The

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<sup>226</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>229</sup> Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

much broader basis of ZNS recruits, youths who were not necessarily staunch UNIP supporters, meant that a policy of political party indoctrination was introduced. ZNS youths were to be turned into youths loyal to the President, the party and the government. This use of a youth movement, of course, has been well documented by other scholars, not least sociologist Ebenezer Obadare. He argues that youth movements are a vehicle used by governments to cultivate ‘good’ citizens and are thus open to political party indoctrination with regards to national loyalty.<sup>231</sup> In interview, a former ANC supporter, George Muvuni, who joined the ZNS in 1975, recalled that: ‘In National Service there was a command which you would be under so you would support the party in power... I changed the party I supported in 1975 when I joined Zambia National Service. So I had no other choice but to start supporting UNIP’.<sup>232</sup> Mr Muvuni explained that camp leaders told him the reason he had to support UNIP was because the ZNS was under the government, and if you came ‘together with other people who were ZNS, who supported ANC... then you would try to overthrow the government. As long as you were under Zambia National Service you should support the party’.<sup>233</sup> Muvuni’s recollections expose the continued anxiety over an opposition resurgence, despite the one-party state having been introduced. His experience, nonetheless, speaks to the success of the programme in quashing opposition support as he never switched back to supporting the ANC after his time in the service.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> Ebenezer Obadare, *Statism, Youth and Civic Imagination: A Critical Study of the National Youth Service Corps Programme in Nigeria* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2010), p. 27.

<sup>232</sup> Interview with George Muvuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

In day-to-day life at the ZNS camps, youths were not given any pocket money, as had occurred in ZYS facilities. Instead recruits would receive essential items such as blankets, food, protective clothing and transport.<sup>235</sup> Recruits were provided with a uniform to wear, which by 1978 was barely distinguishable from the field uniform of the Zambian Army.<sup>236</sup> It was identical in terms of the type of camouflage, fatigues, combat boots, web belts, and berets used.<sup>237</sup> The youths received basic skills training and received a certificate for completing courses in, for example, agriculture, carpentry, driving and electrics.<sup>238</sup> Former ZNS youth, George Muyuni, notes that this ‘was what persuaded you to support UNIP’.<sup>239</sup>



**Figure 17: Youths examining a good tomato crop at a ZNS Camp in Kitwe**

Source: ‘How to Solve Unemployment: Give Youths Some Land to Till’, *Times of Zambia*, 4 September 1975, p. 7.

Agricultural training formed a key focus of the early ZNS, whose youthful recruits were used to form the backbone of a renewed farming effort to

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<sup>235</sup> ‘Huge Rural Plan Gets Off Ground: Jobless Will Be Sent ‘Home’’, *Times of Zambia*, 5 February 1975, p. 1.

<sup>236</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 231.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>238</sup> Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*

achieve self-sufficiency in food production.<sup>240</sup> The combination of military methods with agricultural production ensured that a more orderly implementation was attained.<sup>241</sup> For example, after three years of service, recruits were resettled in co-operatives and remained under the supervision of the ZNS until the farms proved viable. The trainees were expected to build their own houses, while the Government provided essentials such as seed, fertilisers and implements.<sup>242</sup> The marketing of crops took on military efficiency, in stark contrast to the shambolic logistical system set up under the ZYS. During the 1970s a system was established that meant young farmers immediately received money for crops sold.<sup>243</sup> Lt Nkanika emphasises that ‘it was a very successful strategy of employing youth - of empowering them’.<sup>244</sup> The infusion of K6,703,000 into the cooperative movement during the early 1970s helped maintain this success.<sup>245</sup> The loans linked to this money had no strict collateral and youths were given money based on what their individual needs were to allow them to start farming.<sup>246</sup> For example: two oxen, a plough and a bag of fertiliser. Several youths spoke to the success of the early ZNS programme. 12-year-old Laban Kawamba had failed to secure a place in Grade Three and applied for enlistment in the National Service to undergo training in farming. Kawamba stated that, ‘Instead of sitting idle at home I felt I should contribute to the nation by taking

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<sup>240</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>242</sup> ‘Huge Rural Plan Gets Off Ground: Jobless Will Be Sent ‘Home’’, *Times of Zambia*, 5 February 1975, p. 1.

<sup>243</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>245</sup> 60 per cent of the amount would be loaned to Zambia by the Swedish government, while the rest would be provided by the Government: ‘Ailing Co-ops Get K6.7m Boost’, *Times of Zambia*, 3 February 1975, p. 1.

<sup>246</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

up farming. My family is poor and there is no one supporting them at the moment. The money I will earn after completing my training will help them'.<sup>247</sup> 15-year-old Joyce Kayo also spoke highly of ZNS training and was confident that at the end of three years life would 'certainly be happier... because we'll be able to earn money from the land'.<sup>248</sup> Like Kawamba, Kayo had failed to secure a place at school, unable to raise funds for entering grade seven.

ZNS recruits equally participated in military patrols and training which took on a greater importance as the crises between Zambia and its neighbours intensified.<sup>249</sup> Every morning recruits would partake in drill exercises, eat breakfast at 7am, and disappear in the fields to complete manual work.<sup>250</sup> Both male and female youths were subject to this routine within the camps.<sup>251</sup> ZNS members were trained in small arms in light crew-served weapons.<sup>252</sup> In August 1971, President Kaunda spoke to 600 ZNS officer cadets in Kapiri Mposhi. He stressed that 'You are not too young to defend Zambia. You have to defend this country with your heads, hands and hearts'.<sup>253</sup> In 1975 Kaunda repeated this sentiment by stating that ZNS servicemen were part of the country's defence and must be ready at any time to defend the nation.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> 'Rural Reconstruction', *Times of Zambia*, 16 February 1976, p. 6.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>249</sup> This was especially the case in the later compulsory years of the ZNS after 1976: Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 230.

<sup>250</sup> 'Rural Reconstruction', *Times of Zambia*, 16 February 1976, p. 6.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>252</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 231.

<sup>253</sup> 'KK Stresses Cadets' Role in Defence of the Nation', *Times of Zambia*, 23 August 1971, p. 7.

<sup>254</sup> 'Learn to Tackle Your Own Problems – KK', *Times of Zambia*, 1 March 1975, p. 1.



Indeed, youths would realise this defensive role principally towards the end of the 1970s.



**Figure 18: Dr Kaunda gets a tip on reloading a rifle after a ZNS pass-out parade**

Source: 'Learn to Tackle Your Own Problems – KK', *Times of Zambia*, 1 March 1975, p. 1.

Kaunda's focus on youth continued well into the mid-1970s, shown by his frequent visits to ZNS camps and his attendance of passing-out ceremonies for youths.<sup>255</sup> Kaunda's enthusiasm and focus on youth was backed by other ministers. For instance, Minister of State for Defence and Zambia Airforce Commander, Mr Peter Zuze, attended ZNS passing-out parades as well. Zuze told attending youths at Katete camp in February 1974 that pass-out parades were a symbol of not only the fruit of hard work, but also of the fact that the Government policy was being implemented with a critical sense of urgency.<sup>256</sup> Youths were told by these various politicians and leaders that their military training was for the primary role of defending the country against 'fascist and racist enemies whose preoccupation was conduct of unprovoked aggression against Zambia'.<sup>257</sup> Such remarks by politicians were not over exaggerations. During this time Zambia faced direct fire from Rhodesian

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<sup>255</sup> For example: *Ibid.*

<sup>256</sup> 'Keep Fascists at Bay, Zuze Tells Youths', *Times of Zambia*, 11 February 1974, p. 2.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*

troops on a recurrent basis. This was beginning to frustrate Zambia's own professional soldiers, with one platoon captain of an artillery unit in the Chiawa area taking matters into his own hands and shelling a Rhodesian forces camp in retaliation for Rhodesian troops firing upon his camp the previous day.<sup>258</sup> Such incidences served to intensify conflict between the two sides. This particular incident was followed by mobilisation on the Rhodesian side until the 'feral' captain was withdrawn.<sup>259</sup> Publicly the troops involved were reprimanded, but in private they were applauded for their actions by the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>260</sup> ZNS recruits also found themselves in the line of fire, due to such skirmishes. George Muyuni, for example, recalled the time when he was shot in the thigh, by a Rhodesian bullet, whilst serving in the ZNS in the border town of Chirundu, in the lower Zambezi.<sup>261</sup> The injury left a permanent scar and forced Muyuni to leave the ZNS after four years.<sup>262</sup> The incident occurred whilst the ZNS was providing supplies to support Zimbabwean guerrillas. Muyuni recollected: 'I was shot intentionally. We were supporting a rebel group which was fighting to overthrow white rule in Zimbabwe... so Kaunda sent us to supply the guerrillas with food. Us we were supporting the guerrillas of Nkomo'.<sup>263</sup> Unlike the ZYS then, ZNS recruits were directly involved in covertly supporting various neighbouring guerrilla factions which were sheltering inside Zambia's own borders. This put them in danger of attack from white settler forces.

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<sup>258</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>259</sup> This event was recounted in interview and may have missing details. The exact date of the incident is unknown. See: Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>260</sup> Zambia officially had a policy of non-retaliation at this point in time: *Ibid.*

<sup>261</sup> Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*

Despite the incorporation of strict military training, in 1975 disciplinary problems nonetheless cropped up in ZNS camps. The most notable problem was desertion. Many of those who decamped themselves subsequently demanded that ZNS recruits be paid allowances and be provided with better diets which included meat and chicken.<sup>264</sup> These requests were of a similar nature to previous ZYS protests for better resources and were mostly acquiesced by the authorities. Regardless, as part of the military, desertion from ZNS camps were taken extremely seriously. In the legal parlance the ZNS Act stated:

Any service member who deserts shall be guilty of an offence and be liable on conviction to a fine of up to K50 or six months in prison... Any person who induces or attempts to induce, or does any act calculated to induce any member of the service to desert or to commit any breach of discipline shall be guilty of an offence and shall be fined K500 or two years in prison or both.<sup>265</sup>

In Mwinilunga, in Western Province, 64 youths were arrested by police following their desertion from a camp. They allegedly stole blankets, cups and other items when they fled the camp at night. Even those who had run away without stealing anything were condemned by Kaunda for committing an offence for having tried to escape their duty to the nation.<sup>266</sup> This problem was not limited to just one camp. In Kasempa 80 youths absconded and another 108 youths fled from a camp in Kabompo in August 1975.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> '40 Run-away Mbala Youths Back in Camp', *Times of Zambia*, 23 August 1975, p. 5.

<sup>265</sup> 'Something Has Gone Amiss in ZNS Camps', *Times of Zambia*, 2 November 1980, p. 5.

<sup>266</sup> 'KK Orders Camps Deserters' Arrest', *Times of Zambia*, 1 August 1975, p.1.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*

Intriguingly all camps were located in Western Province.<sup>268</sup> Given that these youths had seemingly broken the tacit political settlement agreed between themselves and the UNIP government, a number of severe threats were issued by Kaunda's government. Indeed, the youths had snubbed the dedicated youth programme established to provide this demographic with resources to achieve adulthood. Those that deserted were thus viewed as ungrateful troublemakers. Kaunda publicly announced that, 'The Party will be ruthless against those who have absconded and I appeal to them to come back'.<sup>269</sup> Those who refused to return were threatened with being blacklisted by the Party and were told they would find it difficult to get any employment in the country.<sup>270</sup>

With such large-scale changes between the ZYS and ZNS, by the mid-1970s there were strong opinions from both the public and politicians on the success of the ZNS. Farmers were up in arms about the apparently exclusive focus on youths in agricultural development. Mr Landson Haantuba, a former member of parliament, decried that young people were being given priority and the Government was reaching too deep into the pockets of the taxpayer. He pointed out that 'old people have nothing of the kind'.<sup>271</sup> It was a concern that continued through to the late 1970s, with farmers becoming increasingly worried that they might end up roaming the streets like youths due to a lack of funds to support their own farms.<sup>272</sup> According to these Zambians, the

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<sup>268</sup> Perhaps one explanation - though more research is needed - could be the 'spill over' effect of the Angolan liberation war, whereby the dangerous realities faced by ZNS recruits in turn led to a lower tolerance of poor camp conditions.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>271</sup> 'Don't Let Youths Drain Us - Ex-MP', *Times of Zambia*, 5 June 1976, p. 5.

<sup>272</sup> 'Trained Farmers Roaming Streets: New Plan to Aid College Graduates', *Times of Zambia*, 1 June 1978, p. 5.

UNIP Government had swung too far in favour of youths. There were also rumblings by politicians complaining about the lack of uptake in the service, compared to the number of unemployed youths still in the urban areas in the early 1970s. In Parliament Mr Willa Mung'omba, UNIP MP for Mporokoso South, declared, 'We now need to introduce an element of compulsion through the National Service corps'.<sup>273</sup>

As well as the above concerns, there was also a gradual move towards questioning the political positions of people representing youths in the mid-1970s, who were long past that stage in their own lives. On 24 August 1975, the *Times of Zambia* published an article which raised the issue that, 'some of the people referred to as youth in the Party hierarchy, are in fact persons who are in the afternoons of their lives – grandparents some of them'.<sup>274</sup> The monthly ZNS magazine *Youth* likewise mocked the fact that some of the youths in the party were not really youths and concluded that 'We need real youths to settle in these places'.<sup>275</sup> The questioning of the definition of youth seemed to coincide with the next younger generation pushing for greater self-representation in youth institutions in the country. On 5 February 1975 Nchanga MP, Mr Cosmas Masongo, declared that the political old-guards who had outlived their purpose should be retired from political and Government service. He maintained that Zambia required a dynamic and revolutionary young leadership which would steer the nation through victories to eradicate poverty, hunger, and disease. But as long as top

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<sup>273</sup> 'Why Youth Has Failed Us', *Times of Zambia*, 26 January 1972, p. 1.

<sup>274</sup> 'Just Who Is the Animal Youth?', *Times of Zambia*, 24 August 1975, p. 7.

<sup>275</sup> 'Kaunda Forecasts Big Strides in Youth Movement', *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, p. 6.

positions were regarded as compensation for roles played during the freedom struggle, leadership would continue to be ineffective and unpractical.<sup>276</sup> The call for younger youths to take over leadership positions was based on the assumption that younger youths would have a better understanding of the problems facing youths in the 1970s, compared to so-called ‘grey-haired youths’.<sup>277</sup> In March 1975, in an open letter to the Secretary for Youth Affairs at Freedom House, Central Committee member, Mr Jethro Mutti wrote that it was wrong for adults to dictate on youth matters.<sup>278</sup>

### *5.2.3 Re-envisioning the ZNS and the Introduction of Compulsory Service From 1976*

In response to this issue of ‘grey-haired youths’ a new leadership of the UNIP youth league was appointed in 1975. The new league was planned as an ‘umbrella organisation’ in which all other youth organisations would fall under.<sup>279</sup> This was seemingly done to try and bring youths under greater party control. The strengthening of the UNIP youth league’s influence brought it into closer alliance with the ZNS. President Kaunda announced that: ‘The executive members have almost cleared the dust which had started to gather and are now ready to take up the challenge of mobilising the youth of this country into a ‘dynamic and creative force’.<sup>280</sup> The new UNIP youth league leadership were personally vetted by Kaunda himself, and were highly

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<sup>276</sup> ‘Let’s Kick Out the Old Stagers’, *Times of Zambia*, 5 February 1975, p. 1.

<sup>277</sup> ‘Adults Shouldn’t Meddle in Youth Affairs, Acknowledges Mutti’, *Times of Zambia*, 11 March 1975, p. 1.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>279</sup> ‘Now Zambia’s Youthquake Will Erupt From There: The Legendary Old Freedom House’, *Times of Zambia*, 30 August 1975, p. 7.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*

educated university graduates, who were less in touch with the plight of their lumpen cousins.<sup>281</sup> The change in leadership thus made little progress in routing out the problem of elitist leadership. Nevertheless, the university educated executive served to dampen the public's association of the youth brigade with political violence, as it had historically been linked.<sup>282</sup>



**Figure 19: Kennedy Shepande after being appointed UNIP Youth League Publicity Secretary**  
Source: 'Now Zambia's Youthquake Will Erupt From There: The Legendary Old Freedom House', *Times of Zambia*, 30 August 1975, p. 7.

The new leadership held strong ideological views linked to Marxism, which in turn influenced their views on the ensuing liberation struggles across Africa during the mid-1970s. As will be discussed in chapter six, the University of Zambia (UNZA) had a strong Marxist tradition, and thus the handful of graduates who now composed the UNIP youth league leadership approached their new duties with the same ideological outlook. The dedicated ZNS magazine *Youth*, of which many of the new UNIP leadership were editors, was rife with references to Marxism and Marxist understandings of

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<sup>281</sup> According to Kennedy Shepande, Kaunda appointed 'troublemakers' at the University as a way of ingratiating them with the UNIP leadership. Interview with Kennedy Shepande, Lusaka, 19 August 2019.

<sup>282</sup> 'Now Zambia's Youthquake Will Erupt From There: The Legendary Old Freedom House', *Times of Zambia*, 30 August 1975, p. 7.

colonialism and liberation struggles.<sup>283</sup> Indeed, in the January 1979 publication of *Youth*, an article confidently declared: ‘We know that science is able to enable MAN to finally conquer nature and to attain the true and practical humanism of communist society. The obstacle to this is the imperialist bourgeoisie that prefers to use science for making profits instead of benefitting the human race as a whole’.<sup>284</sup> The article finished by stating that ‘Selfishness will end in the humanism of communist society. Here in lies our optimism’.<sup>285</sup> Another *Youth* article revealed that the UNIP youth league was in fact working alongside the Komosol, an All-Union Leninist Young Communist League organisation based in the Soviet Union.<sup>286</sup> Both organisations had pledged, ‘to work ‘unswervingly’ for complete and final eradication of colonialism, neo-colonialism’ for all nations fighting for freedom.<sup>287</sup>

The ideological beliefs held by the leadership of the UNIP youth league meant the ZNS trainees were educated to become more proactive in involving themselves in supporting African liberation struggles. UNIP youth league Executive Publicity Secretary, Kennedy Shepande, in July 1975 stated that Zambia’s youth had a duty to fight counter-revolutionaries who were enemies

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<sup>283</sup> Unfortunately, only the 1979 publications of *Youth* were available at the National Archives of Zambia. Other publication years may not have been previously saved for future use. For further information on Marxism in an African context see: Jean Copans, ‘The Marxist Conception of Class: Political and Theoretical Elaboration in the African and Africanist Context’, *Review of African Political Economy*, 32 (1985), pp. 25-38.

<sup>284</sup> ‘Petty Bourgeois Pessimism: A Critique of Mr Robert Makola’s Absolute Endism’, *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, p. 5.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>286</sup> ‘Komsomol and Youth League Sign ‘Death Sentence’ for Colonialists’, *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, p. 3.

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*



of the nation.<sup>288</sup> This contradicted the teaching of early 1970s recruits who were taught not to exchange fire with settler state soldiers.<sup>289</sup> In November 1979 the gung-ho viewpoint seemed to feed through to ZNS youths, who demanded that President Kaunda issue university students, college students and school pupils arms to fight against rebel forces.<sup>290</sup> During the incident a total of 50,000 youths had marched from the High Court to State House chanting: ‘Give us guns. We want war. One man one gun, we want war’.<sup>291</sup>

The change of leadership in the UNIP youth league in 1975 was also followed with the changing of the ZNS from voluntary to compulsory service in January 1976.<sup>292</sup> Instead of targeting all unemployed youths with compulsory service, however, it was form five school leavers – those who would most likely continue with higher education and onto university - who were subject to mandatory service.<sup>293</sup> It was announced that all form five school leavers would have to go for ZNS training for 20 months.<sup>294</sup> The U-turn in recruitment, from all youths on a voluntary basis, to only form five school leavers, likely stemmed from the troublesome relationship college and university institutions had had with UNIP. For instance, since its inception the UNZA student body had resisted any attempts by Freedom House to have students join the Party hierarchy.<sup>295</sup> There also existed a somewhat tense

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<sup>288</sup> ‘Youth Must Fight Foes’, *Times of Zambia*, 25 July 1975, p. 7.

<sup>289</sup> Interview with George Muyuni, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>290</sup> Of course, this call to arms by ZNS recruits could have been part of a generalised trend amongst all youths. ‘50,000 March for KK: ‘Zambia to Make Arms’’, *Times of Zambia*, 23 November 1979, p. 1.

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>292</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 230.

<sup>293</sup> ‘Varsity Entry to Rely on National Service’, *Times of Zambia*, 11 August 1975, p. 1.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>295</sup> ‘Now Zambia’s Youthquake Will Erupt From There: The Legendary Old Freedom House’, *Times of Zambia*, 30 August 1975, p. 7.

relationship between President Kaunda himself and students, following student leaders' criticism of the President's conduct with South Africa. This incident resulted in the closure of the University for many weeks.<sup>296</sup> Replacing the UNIP youth league leadership with UNZA graduates, and the introduction of compulsory service for those likely going onto take college and university courses, therefore appears to have been a deliberate strategy used by Kaunda in order to bring 'highbrow youths' under the control of the party. By targeting students before they set foot on University campus it was assumed issues of political defiance would be curtailed. The state used the ZNS programme as a de facto 'rite of passage' for Zambian youths to access tertiary education, jobs in the civil service and state funded youth empowerment programmes.<sup>297</sup> Any employer who offered a job to students eligible for compulsory service was threatened with prosecution, whilst university admissions only accepted those who had completed their 20-months of national service.<sup>298</sup> These laws attempted to ensure that educated youths were provided with the 'correct' political training in the ZNS, in the hope that they would not become an unyielding opposition force in the future.<sup>299</sup>

The hope that the ZNS would tame students into submission, was coupled with the idea that the compulsory ZNS would foster feelings of national unity

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<sup>296</sup> Tordoff and Molteno, 'Introduction', p. 34.

<sup>297</sup> Mhike, 'Political Violence in Zimbabwe's National Youth Service', p. 246 and 'Draft Dodgers Warned: You Won't Get Jobs', *Times of Zambia*, 29 July 1977, p. 1.

<sup>298</sup> 'Skipping Students Report to ZNS', *Times of Zambia*, 22 May 1976, p. 2 and 'Draft Dodgers Warned: You Won't Get Jobs', *Times of Zambia*, 29 July 1977, p. 1.

<sup>299</sup> Chapter six will discuss the idea of UNZA students as an opposition group and the fallout from the ZNS compulsory service for prospective university students: Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 230.

among Zambians from all over the country, which became more essential as external threats grew.<sup>300</sup> The Government ensured that ZNS camps were dispersed throughout the territory in an effort to bring those from different regions together and contribute to the emergence of a shared sense of national belonging.<sup>301</sup> As Gaim Kibreab explains in the context of the national service in Eritrea: ‘national service provided those from both urban and rural areas with an exceptional opportunity to know, mix and bond with tens of thousands... hailing from diverse geographical areas and backgrounds’.<sup>302</sup> This was also the case in the ZNS, as one recruit commented, the ZNS provided them with: ‘The chance to sleep, to drink and smoke with so many guys from different quarters of Zambia... I have never had so many friends! An assortment of characters yet united by one common objective – to conquer the rugged path of trial’.<sup>303</sup> A female school leaver said she liked the national service because she made friends with so many people from different parts of the country.<sup>304</sup> The disciplinary nature of training in ZNS camps was also expected to mould recruits into non-questioning and compliant citizens committed to the ‘national project’.<sup>305</sup> The Minister of Defence at the time, Mr Grey Zulu stressed that youths who underwent ZNS training would be taught to obey the orders given to them, and complain later if they thought the orders were unjustified.<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>300</sup> This was also in keeping with the aim of the ZYS.

<sup>301</sup> Lindemann, ‘Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia’, p. 13.

<sup>302</sup> Kibreab, *The Eritrean National Service*, p. 105.

<sup>303</sup> ‘National Service Shamed Critics’, *Times of Zambia*, 28 August 1977, p. 4.

<sup>304</sup> ‘Students Off for ZNS’, *Times of Zambia*, 4 December 1977, p. 3.

<sup>305</sup> Kibreab, *The Eritrean National Service*, p. 85.

<sup>306</sup> ‘Youth Camps Will Be ‘Mixed’’, *Times of Zambia*, 10 June 1971, p. 2.



Figure 20: School leavers from Ndola's Kansenshi and Convent secondary schools boarding a ZNS truck  
Source: 'Students Off for ZNS', *Times of Zambia*, 4 December 1977, p. 3.

Moreover, the ZNS seemingly functioned as a means for groups of young, educated men to express nationalistic masculinity. One school leaver eagerly told a *Times of Zambia* reporter in December 1977: 'We are going for the training that will turn us into real men'.<sup>307</sup> Yet, the ZNS was also able to recruit a much larger proportion of female youths compared to the ZYS, which served to muddy these gendered stereotypes in the camps. One female youth from Kansenshi Secondary School described how she was easily able to keep up with the tough physical and mental demands of ZNS training: 'Those who went there have told us that training becomes very difficult in the first few months. But when one gets used it is nothing'.<sup>308</sup>

The ability for all youthful recruits to keep up with the stringent training was especially important in the second half of the 1970s, given the increased dangers faced by ZNS recruits at this time. Indeed, on 28 January 1976 President Kaunda declared a state of emergency in response to the grave

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<sup>307</sup> 'Students Off for ZNS', *Times of Zambia*, 4 December 1977, p. 3.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*

security situation which had developed within Zambia's borders.<sup>309</sup> Armed gangs were terrorising travellers and villagers in Western Province, due to continued civil strife in Angola that followed its independence in November 1975.<sup>310</sup> In a speech Kaunda warned that: 'Africa has fought and driven out the ravenous wolves of colonialism, racism and fascism from Angola through the front door. But a plundering tiger with its deadly cubs is now coming in through the backdoor. The effects of foreign intervention are now being felt in Zambia'.<sup>311</sup> He further declared that. 'We are at war, so I call upon Zambians to be vigilant'.<sup>312</sup> Because of these various security dangers present from the mid-1970s, military training was given primary importance in the ZNS.<sup>313</sup>

The increased level of military training was certainly needed at the height of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle in the 1970s, given ZNS recruits were directly involved in defending their country from Rhodesian incursions, and attacks on guerrilla camps within Zambian territory. ZNS chief of staff, Brigadier-General Stanley Mulenga succinctly reported: 'For this, ZNS played its role of supporting the regular army in time of crisis'.<sup>314</sup> The sheer numbers of trained personnel the programme added to Zambia's army was intended to 'rattle the white rebels' of Rhodesia.<sup>315</sup> Indeed, Zambian reservists added an additional 15,000-20,000 people to the 12,000 strong

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<sup>309</sup> 'State of Emergency: We're at War, Warns KK', *Times of Zambia*, 29 January 1976, p. 1.

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>313</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 230.

<sup>314</sup> 'Something Has Gone Amiss in ZNS Camps', *Times of Zambia*, 2 November 1980, p. 5.

<sup>315</sup> 'Zambia Puts Army on Full Alert After Rhodesia Raids', *New York Times*, 21 November 1979, p. 3.

professional force already in the military.<sup>316</sup> This ensured that the government was able to call upon a large number of trained military personnel in times of crisis. Such a crisis revealed itself after Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces shot down the civilian Viscount *Hunyani* plane, resulting in Rhodesia retaliation with Operation Gatling on 19 October 1978.<sup>317</sup> The operation was essentially a revenge attack on Nkomo's guerrilla bases within Zambia and on Zambian infrastructure. ZIPRA guerrillas were estimated to number 12,000 in Zambia and about 3,000 inside Zimbabwe itself at this time.<sup>318</sup>

Operation Gatling resulted in heavy casualties at Freedom Camp, near Chikumbi village, which housed Nkomo's military high command. The official death toll at the camp numbered 623 people: 565 ZIPRA, 12 South African ANC, 38 Zambian police and army personnel and 8 support staff.<sup>319</sup> Following these events the UNIP government called to arms ZNS graduates and trainees. On 20 November 1979 President Kaunda recalled all male ZNS reservists for active duty and cancelled all military leave as attacks on Zambia intensified.<sup>320</sup> The 'Green Army' of ZNS recruits who heard the President's call helped guard key strategic points, which in turn helped release

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<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>317</sup> Ian Pringle, *Green Leader: Operation Gatling, the Rhodesian Military's Response to the Viscount Tragedy* (Warwick: Helion, 2016), p. 74.

<sup>318</sup> 'Zambia Puts Army on Full Alert After Rhodesia Raids', *New York Times*, 21 November 1979, p. 3.

<sup>319</sup> Pringle, *Green Leader*, p. 156.

<sup>320</sup> 'Zambia: President Kaunda Puts Army on War Alert 1979', British Pathe, 2020, [video] Available at: <<https://www.britishpathe.com/video/VLVA6H3N488XKEOIEEVNRG7FJN96B-ZAMBIA-PRESIDENT-KAUNDA-PUTS-ARMY-ON-WAR-ALERT/query/PUT>> [accessed 30 November 2020].

professional soldiers for active combat.<sup>321</sup> ZNS recruits manned roadblocks and guarded bridges which were sometimes blown-up, whilst others died in the fighting.<sup>322</sup> Reservists found themselves in active firefights with the enemy, and fought alongside Zambian National Defence force regulars in a number of battles, including at Chongwe Bridge, Kavalamanja village and the Mbororo ambush.<sup>323</sup> At Chongwe Bridge, 25 miles from Lusaka, on 20 November 1979, five school leavers were involved in the defence of the bridge, which was eventually blown up by a Rhodesian helicopter. The bridge was of strategic importance as it connected the main eastbound highway of Zambia to Malawi. In the ensuing exchange of fire three ZNS reservists and one of the raiders was killed.<sup>324</sup>

The mass recall of ZNS graduates, however, seemed to have little impact on deterring Rhodesian forces from committing further attacks on the country. During Interview David Kasoka, for example, recalled that in the 1980s he was travelling in a bus which only just managed to cross the Magoye bridge, without a driver – who had abandoned his passengers – before the bridge was blown up by Rhodesian forces.<sup>325</sup> Indeed, rather than being militarily key in this instance - despite their very real sacrifices - the mobilisation of ZNS

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<sup>321</sup> For further detail see: Pringle, *Green Leader*.

<sup>322</sup> ‘Something Has Gone Amiss in ZNS Camps’, *Times of Zambia*, 2 November 1980, p. 5.

<sup>323</sup> Freedom camp, Mboroma camp and the CGT complexes were the main camps of ZIPRA inside Zambia. Kavalamanja was also the site of a ZIPRA camp. See, Pringle, *Green Leader*, p. 75 and ‘Zambia Puts Army on Full Alert After Rhodesia Raids’, *New York Times*, 21 November 1979, p. 3.

<sup>324</sup> Alick Musonda, *Maliongo’s Adventures: The Stolen Diary of a ZNS Recruit* (Lusaka: Grand Designs, 1995), p. 63 and ‘Zambia Puts Army on Full Alert After Rhodesia Raids’, *New York Times*, 21 November 1979, p. 3.

<sup>325</sup> Interview with David Kasoka, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

graduates likely functioned more as a reassurance to a shaken Zambian population.<sup>326</sup>

#### *5.2.4 A Problematic Revision: Problems in ZNS Camps and the Exclusion of Lumpen Youth*

The somewhat partial military impact of the ZNS was likely influenced, in part, by the endemic problems within ZNS training camps by the late 1970s. Indeed, the camps became breeding grounds of discontent because of waning resources and neglected facilities. This situation of dereliction largely stemmed from the severe economic difficulties Zambia experienced as a result of an international recession in the mid-1970s.<sup>327</sup> Mineral producers consequently faced a slump in commodity prices and, as a result, copper was produced in Zambia at a loss. Annual revenue dropped drastically from K191.1 million in 1973, to a mere K56 million in 1974.<sup>328</sup> This was disastrous given that the mining industry ordinarily employed 16 per cent of the total labour force in Zambia.<sup>329</sup> Copper also constituted 90 per cent of Zambia's foreign exchange earnings.<sup>330</sup> The copper slump was even more calamitous for Zambia due to the series of oil shocks which hit the world in the 1970s. The first oil shock came in 1973 with the Arab-Israeli war and events in Iran and Iraq resulted in a second shock in 1979.<sup>331</sup> All oil importing states,

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<sup>326</sup> Further research is needed in this specific area.

<sup>327</sup> Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Free Press, 2006), p. 277.

<sup>328</sup> 'Zambians Warned of Tougher Austerity Measures', *Times of Zambia*, 3 January 1976, p. 1.

<sup>329</sup> Angi and Coombe, 'Training Programmes and Employment Opportunities for Primary School Leavers in Zambia', p. 5.

<sup>330</sup> 'Zambians Warned of Tougher Austerity Measures', *Times of Zambia*, 3 January 1976, p. 1.

<sup>331</sup> Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p. 276.



including Zambia, were adversely affected. World Bank estimates in a 1981 study showed that as an oil importing African state, Zambia's oil imports, as a percentage of export earnings, rose from 4.4 per cent in 1970 to 23.2 per cent in 1980.<sup>332</sup>

The effect was to put severe strain on the balance of payments, forcing the UNIP government to reduce imports on many essential goods, to raise domestic costs and prices, as well as find savings in national development projects.<sup>333</sup> For instance, government support for agriculture faced large cuts, as happened with the five-year rural reconstruction programme which had its funding slashed by K17.5 million per year.<sup>334</sup> This, combined with low producer prices, meant that farming became an increasingly unattractive occupation. By 1979 over 100 co-operatives had gone into liquidation in Luapula Province alone.<sup>335</sup> The desertion of farms and the failure of co-operatives meant the country increasingly relied on expensive food imports.<sup>336</sup> In December 1974 the economic situation had caused Zambia's external and internal public debt to soar to K636.4 million.<sup>337</sup> By 1976 the nation was warned to brace for severe austerity measures as the full brunt of the world-wide economic recession took its toll.<sup>338</sup>

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<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 277.

<sup>334</sup> 'Jobless Round-up Won't Be Easy', *Times of Zambia*, 6 February 1975, p. 1.

<sup>335</sup> '106 Co-ops Go into Liquidation', *Times of Zambia*, 4 June 1979, p. 7.

<sup>336</sup> Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p. 281.

<sup>337</sup> 'Zambia's Debt Soars to K636m', *Times of Zambia*, 10 January 1976, p. 1.

<sup>338</sup> 'Zambians Warned of Tougher Austerity Measures', *Times of Zambia*, 3 January 1976, p. 1.

The severe economic recession experienced by Zambia had a knock-on effect in the running and affordability of ZNS camps, especially given the ZNS was government funded. Living conditions in ZNS camps across the country began to fall below par from lack of investment. In 1977 one anonymous recruit at Katete ZNS camp, reputed for its well-disciplined and well-trained servicemen, complained that a stagnant pool of dam water was being used for bathing, washing and drinking: 'It's pumped into pipes to the camp – we drink!... Just imagine, a young revolutionary, pillar of Zambia's future is made to drink stagnant, germ-infested water.'<sup>339</sup> Due to the lack of funds the health hazard was not resolved. Neither was this instance an isolated event. In Gwembe camp, 70 youths deserted in 1976 because of an unresolved water problem.<sup>340</sup> Unsuitable food was also common within the camps. One furious letter, sent anonymously by a ZNS recruit to the *Times of Zambia* in November 1980, read:

The food we eat, especially fish is not fit for human consumption. The fish was soaked by rain some time back, resulting in the growth of fungus, a sign that the fish was rotten... Even pigs which are not normally choosy, refuse to eat the leftovers when there is fish on the menu.<sup>341</sup>

Such occurrences led to a serious public image problem for ZNS camps. Debates over whether these issues were exaggerations of pampered youths or actual issues took up the energy of politicians, youths and their parents alike. Authoritarianism was certainly at play on the side of UNIP politicians, who attempted to silence those who expressed any criticisms about the ZNS camps. Indeed, questioning the official discourse and conventional wisdom of those

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<sup>339</sup> 'Students Have Reason to Desert ZNS Centres', *Times of Zambia*, 14 August 1977, p. 4.

<sup>340</sup> '70 Youth Desert Rural Centre', *Times of Zambia*, 4 June 1976, p. 7.

<sup>341</sup> 'Something Has Gone Amiss in ZNS Camps', *Times of Zambia*, 2 November 1980, p. 5.

involved in running the camps became tantamount to treachery during the late 1970s.<sup>342</sup> Stories that five per cent of recruits died during training were considered ‘enemy propaganda’, and camp commanders stringently rebuffed accusations about their camp’s conditions.<sup>343</sup> Ndola ZNS camp commander, Noah Mwashu, claimed that ‘It is not true that the camps’ conditions are comparable to concentration camps’.<sup>344</sup> Party Secretary-General, Grey Zulu, also attempted to quash rumours of ill-treatment at the camps, emphasising instead that national service training was an asset to the government and the nation.<sup>345</sup> Even in Irving Kaplan’s country study of Zambia, such complaints were quickly dismissed. Kaplan wrote: ‘Many of the 20,000 youths who had served in the ZNS complained about poor food, poor living conditions, and time wasted on useless training, but none corroborated the exaggerated rumours that had been circulated’.<sup>346</sup>

That these grievances were uncorroborated and simply rumours according to Kaplan, was a wild bending of the truth on his part. Indeed, repetitive complaints are easily found within the archival newspaper record of the *Times of Zambia*, a place where freedom of speech was still somewhat tolerated at this time by the UNIP government. Vyalema Morris Lungu, a ZNS recruit at Mtetezi Production Camp, wrote exasperatedly in August 1977, to the *Times of Zambia*, about the dysfunctional complaints procedures at the camps. Lungu stated, ‘I am sorry I am disclosing these problems through the Press.

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<sup>342</sup> Kibreab, *The Eritrean National Service*, p. 16.

<sup>343</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>344</sup> ‘National Service Boss Hails Rural Centres’, *Times of Zambia*, 4 April 1976, p. 3.

<sup>345</sup> ‘Rural Centres Not Torture Camps – Zulu’, *Times of Zambia*, 16 March 1976, p. 1.

<sup>346</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 231.

There is no other way. We are forbidden to write to our head office... when we present problems they don't even go to the people who are in a position to solve them'.<sup>347</sup> ZNS youths in the early 1980s protested the unfairness that former ZNS youths, prior to 1975, were provided with basic facilities such as plates, mattresses and tinned beef, whilst they had to buy sundries like soap, razor blades and face towels from the meagre K6 allowance they were awarded.<sup>348</sup> One respondent in a newspaper article wrote that, 'Conditions have deteriorated so much that those who were at camp five years ago may have cause to believe that their successors have highly exaggerated things'.<sup>349</sup> Indeed, this may also have contributed to the reason why politicians felt such criticisms to be wildly over-exaggerated if they had not visited camps after 1975. This situation encouraged comparisons of life in ZNS camps with George Orwell's *Animal Farm* and convinced parents to send their children abroad for education in order that they could avoid compulsory service.<sup>350</sup>

The refusal to acknowledge or investigate problems, meant that issues in camps continued to spiral out of control. The lack of investigation also created a lack of accountability of camp leaders, whose actions remained unchecked by senior politicians. Simon Mwake, a parent of boys who were undergoing ZNS training in 1980 recounted how, 'when they write back to us, my wife cries... because of the bad treatment they receive from camp officials'.<sup>351</sup> Certainly, accusations abounded about ex-grade 7 instructors bullying form

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<sup>347</sup> 'Students Have Reason to Desert ZNS Centres', *Times of Zambia*, 14 August 1977, p. 4.

<sup>348</sup> 'Something Has Gone Amiss in ZNS Camps', *Times of Zambia*, 2 November 1980, p. 5.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>350</sup> 'National Service Shamed Critics', *Times of Zambia*, 28 August 1977, p. 4.

<sup>351</sup> 'Something Has Gone Amiss in ZNS Camps', *Times of Zambia*, 2 November 1980, p. 5.

fives by locking them in the guardrooms or beating recruits with little cause.<sup>352</sup>

In January 1977, one youth, Chikwanda Mulenga, in Kasama, likened the treatment recruits received to 'slavery'. Mulenga damningly wrote:

Someone sentenced to prison is better treated than a person serving the nation... It is also believed that the beating up of recruits has stopped, which is a lie. The beating is still going on. If a recruit is sick they say 'you are a malingerer' and without the assistance of your fellow recruits you can lie in pain... These people are forcing us to be called deserters (as they prefer to refer to us when we run away).<sup>353</sup>

That youths' complaints were not taken seriously left recruits with limited options to protest conditions. Absconding and rioting therefore became an increasingly common occurrence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The most prominent demonstration to occur involved from five school leavers from Kafue National Service camp.<sup>354</sup> 1,580 youths marched 50km in heavy rain to Freedom House to protest against the ill-treatment and poor living conditions at the camp in December 1980.<sup>355</sup> Students at Kafue ZNS camp claimed they were given a diet of maggot-ridden *nshima* and unwashed saltless and snail-infested kapenta (tiny dried fish) whilst in the camps. Two youths from the camp, Alfred Kabwe and Fred Lukonde, were both admitted to the University Teaching Hospital for treatment because of illness contracted as a result of poor food. Eight others were also taken ill.<sup>356</sup> The students at the ZNS camp further complained that on top of being called

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<sup>352</sup> 'Students Have Reason to Desert ZNS Centres', *Times of Zambia*, 14 August 1977, p. 4.

<sup>353</sup> 'Truth About National Service?: Punish Culprits', *Times of Zambia*, 23 January 1977, p. 4.

<sup>354</sup> See also the later Mkushi ZNS camp riot in April 1981: 'ZNS Men Run Riot?', *Times of Zambia*, 1 April 1981, p. 1.

<sup>355</sup> '1,580 Protest: Kafue ZNS Recruits Walk 50km to Meet Chona', *Times of Zambia*, 28 December 1980, p. 1.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*

‘animals’ by ZNS officers, they had no access to water to clean themselves or wash their clothes. One of the youths who was protesting claimed: ‘Most of us have not had a bath for as long as we have been at the camp. We have been wearing the same clothes since we left our homes’.<sup>357</sup> Other students commented: ‘We cannot continue to live under such conditions’.<sup>358</sup>



**Figure 21: Demonstrators from Kafue ZNS camp, pictured outside Freedom House in Lusaka**

Source: ‘1,580 Protest: Kafue ZNS Recruits Walk 50km to Meet Chona’, *Times of Zambia*, 28 December 1980, p. 1.

Following the December protest at Freedom House more than 300 of those involved absconded from the ZNS, citing ill-treatment and poor living conditions.<sup>359</sup> By January few had returned to the Kafue ZNS camp. It was only after this mass protest that ZNS Commander, Brigadier-General Tom Fara, admitted there was a problem in the water supply because of low pressure. Yet this admission was swiftly followed with an assertion that ‘comfort is the last thing we think about here at the camp. What worries us most in the amount of exaggeration involved in the allegations’.<sup>360</sup> By

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<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>358</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>359</sup> ‘300 Desert ZNS Camp After Demo’, *Times of Zambia*, 30 December 1980, p. 1.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*

repeatedly refusing to listen to the youths' concerns, and make adjustments for their needs, the ZNS leaders and UNIP officials played a dangerous game with the ZNS cohort of prospective college and university students.

The final nail in the coffin for the revised ZNS was the outbreak of a deadly disease in Lwamfumu National Service camp in Mansa.<sup>361</sup> The outbreak occurred in February 1981 and left 145 female youths bedridden and another 15 in a critical condition at the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka.<sup>362</sup> On 12 February the Minister of State for Education himself admitted that about 40 per cent of beans fed to recruits were pest-infested and badly damaged by insects or rats.<sup>363</sup> By 14 February, only four days after the initial outbreak of disease, 48 recruits had been hospitalised in Lusaka.<sup>364</sup> This was out of 2000 recruits which were resident at the camp. By 18 February, the disease causing the illness had been identified as typhoid. Altogether four recruits died during the initial outbreak. Further outbreaks occurred in other areas of the country as 400 recruits escaped themselves from the camp and took the disease with them.<sup>365</sup> The outbreak resulted in a huge public outcry and fatally damaged the reputation of the ZNS camps. Having dismissed, ignored and downplayed issues in the conditions of the camps previously, the UNIP government was forced to close all ZNS camps for girls by 25 March 1981. MPs also began pressing the government for the abolition of the 20-month compulsory

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<sup>361</sup> 'Three ZNS Girls Die: Disease Hits Mansa Camp', *Times of Zambia*, 12 February 1981, p. 1.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>364</sup> '48 ZNS Girls Hospitalised', *Times of Zambia*, 14 February 1981, p. 5.

<sup>365</sup> 'Killer Typhoid Spreads', *Times of Zambia*, 18 February 1981, p. 1.

service as a result of the incident and argued that it was no longer beneficial to the nation.<sup>366</sup>

Although the boys' camps in the ZNS continued, by 2 November 1981 there was only a total of 3000 recruit in ZNS camps throughout the country as most had been deserted.<sup>367</sup> The typhoid outbreak at Lwamfumu had sounded the death knell of the final national youth development programme instituted by the UNIP government. By 28 November 1981 the *Times of Zambia* ran an article explaining that ZNS training had been 'postponed indefinitely', with no reasons given by the government as to why.<sup>368</sup> Although camps were eventually re-opened under a voluntary basis, they were 'riddled with financial mismanagement', according to Minister of State for Youth and Sport, Mr Joseph Kasongo.<sup>369</sup> In 1986 the remnants of the ZNS were reorganised to incorporate a limited number of UNIP youth league members who were trained in warfare.<sup>370</sup> It was a move that went full circle, echoing the initial ambitions of the ZYS of the 1960s, but in a much more diminished form.<sup>371</sup>

As well as the fallout from the economic recession causing problems in the ZNS, ironically, Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika explained that the struggle against apartheid and the Smith regime in Rhodesia may have contributed to

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<sup>366</sup> 'Girls' Camps Closed', *Times of Zambia*, 25 March 1981, p. 1.

<sup>367</sup> 'ZNS Camps Deserted', *Times of Zambia*, 2 November 1981, p. 1.

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>369</sup> 'ZNS Shames Minister: Cash Abuse of Farm Produce Rampant', *Times of Zambia*, 8 June 1985, p. 2.

<sup>370</sup> 'ZNS Will Be Reorganised', *Times of Zambia*, 21 May 1986, p. 1.

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*



the neglect of conditions in the ZNS camps, as Zambian leaders diverted their ‘attention from internal developments to solving outside problems’.<sup>372</sup> Lt Nkanika recalled that ‘as a result we forgot the youths’.<sup>373</sup> In this sense the UNIP government was a victim of its own success in supporting regional liberation struggles. This aligns with what Fatmata Sesay terms ‘negative spill over’, when neighbouring nations to conflict zones are more likely to become adversely impacted, through disruptions in trade, collateral damage from nearby battles, and resources spent to assist refugees or factions of fighters.<sup>374</sup> This combined with the economic issues experienced by the country, meant that fewer resources were available to placate and engage Zambian youth. Indeed, there were times when shoes, for example at Bata Shoes Company, were only manufactured for freedom fighters. Zambian school children had to do without because all the shoes had been sold or were given to Zimbabwean or South African freedom fighters.<sup>375</sup> This sequence of events was also repeated in the distribution of maize, cooking oil and sugar, thus causing internal shortages in Zambia itself.<sup>376</sup> The large degree of attention paid, and resources given, to external struggles meant that the needs of Zambians themselves, including youths, were overlooked in the early 1980s. Stable patronage from the UNIP government for youths could no longer be

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<sup>372</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>374</sup> Indeed, Zambia had devoted a huge number of resources to building the Tazara railway because of consistent transport setbacks that resulted from hostile neighbours and the ensuing liberation wars. Despite the completion of Tazara only 21,000 tonnes of goods could be carried a month. This came at a huge cost of \$406 million, funded by an interest free Chinese loan which was to be paid by Zambia and Tanzania. See also: ‘Zambians Warned of Tougher Austerity Measures’, *Times of Zambia*, 3 January 1976, p. 1 and ‘Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Bridge to China?’, *New York Times*, 29 January 1971. Also, Sesay, ‘Conflict in Neighbouring (Developing) Countries’, p. 3.

<sup>375</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*

relied upon, at a time when youths were becoming increasingly deprived economically. This resulted in many youths, in turn, refusing to answer the government's 'back to the land call' and call to defend Zambia in the 1980s, because there was no longer reciprocation for their efforts. In particular, the deaths that resulted directly from government negligence in the running of the ZNS camps, severed the trust of educated youths, and further entrenched UNZA as a site of opposition politics.<sup>377</sup> Far from moulding future university students into compliant citizens loyal towards the UNIP government, the punitive experiences and poor quality camp conditions fostered antagonism towards the state in this group of youths.<sup>378</sup> Indeed, the government remained frustrated that its efforts to bring students into the UNIP fold, using the ZNS, were a total failure.<sup>379</sup> The President himself admitted that there was a complete breakdown of communication between the Party and students in 1979.<sup>380</sup>

On top of the impact of the ZNS on deteriorating student and government relations, the decision to only recruit from five leavers after 1976 also started to make itself felt with the worsening plight of unemployed youths. Indeed, youths who were unable to complete their education up to form five were excluded from participating in the ZNS after 1976. In interview, David Kasoka recalled that 'in fact Zambia National Service you used to go after

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<sup>377</sup> As will be explored in the following chapter of this thesis: 'Students as an Opposition Force and the Contribution of Youth to the Fall of UNIP, 1980-1991.'

<sup>378</sup> See also Luke *Melchiorre's case study on the Kenyan National Service*: Melchiorre, 'Creating a 'Monster'', p. 85.

<sup>379</sup> 'Kaunda Forecasts Big Strides in Youth Movement', *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, p. 6.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*

you complete school. Then since I didn't complete my grade 12 that's why I couldn't go'.<sup>381</sup> This meant that youths unable to attain a secondary education were left without access to government resources to support their progression into the workforce. The lack of government provision was compounded by a worsening and cut-throat job market, in which the growing numbers of university qualified youths held the upper hand.<sup>382</sup>

The exclusion of lumpen youths was justified through the 'revived' UNIP youth league, which was intended to cater for all Zambian youths, including those unable to find places in higher education institutions. However, at least in terms of numbers, recruitment in the later years of the 1970s proved the league to be extremely unsuccessful in attracting any youths to join as members. In October 1979, in a UNIP National Council annual report for 1978-1979, it was revealed that the party youth league 'no longer existed' in Lusaka Province.<sup>383</sup> In January 1980, the UNIP youth league in Kabwe reported that not a single membership card had been sold in the area since separate party cards for youths were introduced the year before.<sup>384</sup> Within the entirety of Central Province, only 526 youth league cards were sold out of the 10,000 sent out to the province in March 1980.<sup>385</sup> Given the UNIP youth league was so unsuccessful in attracting members, the league failed to provide an alternative safety net for youths who failed to qualify for the ZNS. This

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<sup>381</sup> Grade 12 is the current day equivalent of form five in Zambia. Kasoka was fortunately able to find a job without attending the ZNS. Interview with David Kasoka, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>382</sup> 'Aid Pledge for Youth Schemes', *Times of Zambia*, 31 January 1973, p. 1.

<sup>383</sup> 'Lusaka Youth League Is Dead', *Times of Zambia*, 14 October 1979, p. 1.

<sup>384</sup> 'Youth Cards: Kabwe Sells Zero in 12 Months', *Times of Zambia*, 14 January 1980, p. 1.

<sup>385</sup> 'Youth Cards Record Low Sales', *Times of Zambia*, 5 March 1980, p. 5.

meant that this group of youths received little to no patronage from the UNIP government and had little pragmatic reasons to remain loyal to the regime.

Significantly, rather than attempting to create a renewed network of government support for these unemployed youths - likely because of economic pressures - unemployed youths were instead blamed by the government for loafing in urban areas. Assistant director in the Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Mr Bishop Sinyangwe likened the government response to 'children who see a wild forest fire approaching our settlement but do nothing to make the fire break and avert the disaster'.<sup>386</sup> The mentality of victim blaming also ignored the reality that direct government decisions, concerning ZNS recruitment, had aggravated the youth unemployment situation in the second half of the 1970s. In February 1979, the government decided that the problem would be resolved by rounding up 'loafers' and sending them 'back' to the rural areas. It was rumoured that the constitution would even be amended to empower the government to do so.<sup>387</sup> A man from Lusaka, L K Daka, wrote into the *Times of Zambia*, and pointed out the substantial flaw in such a plan and questioned: 'How do you expect a man who has no money (since he is a loafer) to be dumped somewhere in the bush and leave him to cultivate the land when he has no means to build a shelter, no money to hire a tractor or oxen and no money to buy food in the meantime?'.<sup>388</sup> The plan to 'send back' poor urban youths to the countryside

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<sup>386</sup> 'School Leaver Time-bomb: We're Creating Two Nations in One', *Times of Zambia*, 3 April 1978, p. 5.

<sup>387</sup> 'Forcing Loafers Back to the Land Won't Solve Our Problems', *Times of Zambia*, 11 February 1979, p. 4.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*

thus eerily mirrored the actions of Zambia's past colonial rulers, and highlighted the government's general failure to uphold its end of the political settlement concerning lumpen and unemployed youths. This failure would come back to haunt UNIP in the final decade of its rule.<sup>389</sup> Indeed, neglecting this section of youths in Zambian society created a gradual time-bomb which exploded in the early 1990s.<sup>390</sup>

## Conclusion

By surveying Zambia's national youth programmes between 1964 and the early 1980s it is possible to reach a better understanding of the country's development policies. Indeed, this chapter has shown that the category of youth strongly shaped which projects and groups received development funding following the country's independence.<sup>391</sup> The favouring of youths by the government likely stemmed from UNIP's historical roots as a party of youths. President Kaunda himself of course was enthusiastic about raising the next generation of youths into loyal UNIP supporters.<sup>392</sup> Additionally, during this tumultuous era, when Zambia faced hostility from its neighbours, youths were viewed as able defenders of the nation. As such state patronage was readily dispensed on Zambia's national youth programmes, so long as the government was able to afford it. The liberation struggles that surrounded

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<sup>389</sup> 'Our Drop-outs', *Times of Zambia*, 5 March 1974, p. 4.

<sup>390</sup> This is discussed in further detail in chapter six of this thesis.

<sup>391</sup> This was different to countries like Kenya and Nigeria where ethnicity was the overriding factor in resource distribution for development. See especially: Githu Muigai, 'Jomo Kenyatta & the Rise of the Ethno-Nationalist State in Kenya', in *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, ed. by Bruce Berman, Will Kymlicka, and Dickson Eyoh (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), pp. 200-217 and Toyin Falola, 'Ethnicity & Nigerian Politics: The Past in the Yoruba Present', in *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, ed. by Bruce Berman, Will Kymlicka, and Dickson Eyoh (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), pp. 148-166.

<sup>392</sup> Mulford, *Zambia*, p. 238.

Zambia at this time thus had a profound impact on the character of Zambia's national youth programmes. Training camps were used to mould recruits into a reputable Home Guard, which was later officially called to arms by President Kaunda, following Rhodesia's bombing campaign 'Operation Gatling'.

Furthermore, the analysis of Zambia's national youth programmes sheds important light on the constantly evolving power dynamics between Zambian youths and the UNIP government during the time in question. This chapter reveals how particular sub-sections of youth became a focus of each incarnation of Zambia's national youth programmes in this era. Following independence, it was loyal, male, party youths from UNIP who gleaned the limelight, due to their value in containing opposition supporters. As has been shown in this chapter, the ZYS was relatively effective in producing a stable political settlement between this narrow band of recipients, and the UNIP government. Indeed, the creation of the ZYS rewarded UNIP party youths with better job prospects, whilst the UNIP government was able to ensure its party youths remained an active force against the opposition. When ZYS youths did cause trouble, in the form of protests and riots, their actions largely benefitted the UNIP government and paradoxically served to strengthen the accord between each group.

In the early 1970s, following the creation of the one-party state, attention was turned towards so-called lumpen youths. Without opposition politics to blame for social issues among youths, the government hastily created the ZNS. The

programme was intended to alleviate the growing unemployment problem among Zambian youths. In return for the vocational training they received at the camps, youths were expected to develop the country's agriculture and defend the nation in times of crisis. Indeed, the government was reliant on the labour of youths to achieve its national development goals, whilst lumpen youths relied on the ZNS to help them carve a path to economically independent adulthood. When youths felt the political settlement became unbalanced, and that government patronage fell below par for their efforts, youths were quick to organise strikes and protests to ensure their voices were impossible to ignore. Here youths used the very thing which made them valuable to the UNIP government – their numbers – against those in power, to secure greater resources. Indeed, regardless of the particular group or subsection of youth, their interactions with the government constantly revolved around the attempt to gain further patronage from the government. The government, on the other hand, mindful of the need to quell potential future revolts, also used these exchanges to secure further labour from youths.

In the second half of the 1970s the government made the ZNS compulsory for all form five school leavers, in an effort to deal with rising student opposition at UNZA and other tertiary education institutions. This reactive decision, however, disastrously excluded youths who were unable to progress in their education and exacerbated the plight of lumpen youths within the country, as will be shown in chapter six of this thesis. Moreover, at a time of severe economic recession, the government was no longer able to afford camp maintenance costs, and thus deteriorating conditions in the ZNS aggravated

relations between prospective students and the government. This was made worse by the government's refusal to establish a dialogue with school leavers or even acknowledge camp problems. Unable, and unwilling, to keep to its side of the bargain and appropriately fund the ZNS, the government sealed the fate of the originally unstable political settlement between itself and prospective students. By the early 1980s the various political settlements between youths and the government were in flux, no longer slowly evolving over time, but making erratic jumps from crisis to crisis. The continuation of the tense relationship between students and the government is explored in the next chapter.



## **Chapter Six: Students as an Opposition Force and the Contribution of Youth to the Fall of UNIP, 1980-1991**

### **Introduction**

On 26 June 1990 thousands of University of Zambia students flooded into the streets of Lusaka chanting ‘Kaunda must go’ and ‘Castrate Kaunda’, as they burnt the red, green and black national flag to protest rising food costs. Soon joined by school children, and those living in nearby slum compounds, the protest triggered widespread looting and rioting, signalling the beginning of the end of United National Independence Party (UNIP)’s 26-year rule.<sup>1</sup> Shortly afterwards, and assisted by students who helped compose its manifesto, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) was founded; a party destined to oust UNIP from power in the 31 October 1991 general election.<sup>2</sup> Asking how students became such a noticeable force in the push towards Zambian democratisation, this chapter explores the various manifestations of political activism employed by University of Zambia (UNZA) students between 1980 and 1991.<sup>3</sup> Certainly, students offer a unique spotlight for the investigation of societal change. Their identity as revolutionaries has of course been well-trodden within the existing Africanist

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<sup>1</sup> ‘Lusaka Curfew to Quell Riots Over Price Rises’, *The Times*, 27 June 1990, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Jotham Momba and Clever Madimutsa, ‘The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia’, *The South African Institute of International Affairs*, 17 (2009), p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> This period follows on from the first significant analysis of student politics in postcolonial Zambia by Michael Burawoy’s, see: ‘Consciousness and Contradiction: A Study of Student Protest in Zambia’, *British Journal of Sociology*, 27.1 (1976), pp. 78-98.

literature on student politics.<sup>4</sup> Just as the work of John Nkinyangi identifies this youth group as distinctly mobile and politically articulate, Leo Zeilig recognises their ability to animate and ‘converge’ their own struggles with broader popular forces.<sup>5</sup> In the Zambian context these characteristics united to make students an enduring, and consistent, opposition base during the 1980s – with the traumas of compulsory service in the Zambia National Service (ZNS) still fresh in the mind of undergraduates. That the university was directly financed by the government, and that Kaunda himself occupied the position of Chancellor of UNZA, meant that student frustrations with the university administration had a proclivity to turn into frustrations against the ruling party.<sup>6</sup> The university campus in particular remained one of the last bastions of political dissent against the authoritarian UNIP government and its policies.<sup>7</sup> Of importance to note is that between 1979 and 1987 UNZA was

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<sup>4</sup> For example: Clive Glaser, *The ANC Youth League* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); Dan Hodgkinson and Luke Melchiorre, ‘Introduction: Student Activism in an Era of Decolonization’, *Africa*, 89.1 (2019), p. 1; Dan Hodgkinson, ‘The ‘Hardcore’ Student Activist: The Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), State Violence, and Frustrated Masculinity, 2000–2008’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39.4 (2013), pp. 863-883; Maurice Amutabi, ‘Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining the Role of Students in National Leadership and the Democratization Process’, *African Studies Review*, 45.2 (2002), pp. 157-177; and Piet Konings, ‘University Students’ Revolt, Ethnic Militia, and Violence During Political Liberalisation in Cameroon’, *African Studies Review*, 45.2 (2002), pp. 179-204. This perspective continues to be applied to contemporary student politics including work on the Rhodes Must Fall Movement, see: Leigh-Ann Naidoo, ‘Contemporary Student Politics in South Africa: The Rise of the Black-led Student Movements of #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall in 2015’, in *Students Must Rise: Youth struggle in South Africa before and beyond Soweto '76*, ed. by Anne Heffernan and Noor Nieftagodien (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2016), pp. 180-190.

<sup>5</sup> Zeilig, Isaac, ‘Students and the Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 1995-2005’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Brunel University, 2005), p. 114 and Nkinyangi, ‘Student Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa’, p. 169.

<sup>6</sup> This was done to reflect the understanding that UNZA was a ‘public good’ and that direct government control over public expenditure on the university was a necessity. Hodgkinson and Melchiorre, ‘Introduction’, p. 6;

Lyson Tembo, *The University of Zambia: An Analysis of Some Issues* (Accra: Association of African Universities Conference, 1972), p. 40; and Bizeck Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia, 1966-2016* (Lusaka: UNZA Press, 2016), p. xii.

<sup>7</sup> Issa Omari and Paschal Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities* (Nairobi: Man Graphics, 1991), p. 30.

run under a federal system, meaning two campuses existed, one based at the Great East Road Campus in Lusaka and the other, the Ndola campus, based in Kitwe.<sup>8</sup> This meant student protests frequently spread and were directed from two-fronts across the country, which were organised through a single unified University of Zambia Student Union (UNZASU).<sup>9</sup> As is evidenced throughout this chapter, especially within student publications, this sub-group of youths were exceptional in their vocal criticism of the government - and the President - within the public space of the university campus. In doing so many students sacrificed their own futures, given the regularity with which individuals were expelled, or indeed the entire university closed down, in reaction to their 'misdemeanours'. Between 1976 and 1986, for example, closure time amounted to a total of 400 days of lost learning.<sup>10</sup> By engaging in fierce remonstrations, students also risked becoming victims of violence at the hands of disgruntled security forces tasked with preventing their public protests and arresting troublemakers.

Yet scholars have also begun to understand that student 'revolutionaries' are not isolated political actors.<sup>11</sup> Expanding upon these insights this chapter places *inter-youth networks* at the forefront of its analysis. This approach, building upon the work of sociologists such as Barbara Trudell, emphasises

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<sup>8</sup> The Ndola Campus was temporarily based at the Zambia Institute of Technology in Kitwe. In December 1987 the Ndola campus became the Copperbelt University (CBU) and became permanently positioned at the former ZIT campus in Kitwe. Bizeck Phiri's study is particularly valuable in illuminating the complex internal bureaucracy of the university system of UNZA at the time. See, Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 45.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>10</sup> Randi Balsvik, 'Student Protest: University and State in Africa, 1960-1995', *Forum for Development Studies*, 25.2 (1998), p. 305.

<sup>11</sup> See for instance: Bahru Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement 1960-1974* (Oxford: James Currey, 2014).

the fractures and alliances formed between students, lumpen youths and UNIP's youth cadres.<sup>12</sup> Exploring these critical points of contact between seemingly separate subgroups of youth is not only requisite for understanding the political motivations and actions of Zambian students at the time, but sheds further light on the grassroots mechanisms involved in the success and mass support of the MMD, which has typically been viewed through the prism of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) organisation.<sup>13</sup> This chapter, by focusing on another stakeholder group – youth, including students and their youthful compatriots – adds another dimension to our understanding of the pro-democracy movement. It reveals the importance of bilateral networks of influence and exchanges between specific social groups in understanding how a patchwork of alliances came together to produce a successful mass movement. Indeed, this chapter argues that students and lumpen youths became allied through the numerous miscalculations and actions of the UNIP youth league between 1980 and 1991. Vigilantism in particular served as a rallying point against the youth league and UNIP government. Through these various exchanges, the UNIP youth league unwittingly strengthened opposition amongst already hostile students and alienated much of its core support base of lumpen youths. Thus, the haemorrhaging of support for UNIP among Zambian youths and their turn

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<sup>12</sup> Barbara Trudell, 'Introduction: Vulnerability and Opportunity Among Africa's Youth', in *Africa's Young Majority*, ed. by Barbara Trudell, Kenneth King, Simon McGrath and Paul Nugent (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), pp. 1-15.

<sup>13</sup> See especially, Miles Larmer, *Mineworkers in Zambia: Labour and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa, 1964–1991* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Momba and Madimutsa, 'The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia'; Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, 'The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia', *Review of African Political Economy*, 54 (1992), pp. 75-91; and Emmanuel Akwetey and Jon Kraus, 'Trade Unions, Development, and Democratization in Zambia: The Continuing Struggle', in *Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa*, ed. by Jon Kraus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 123-156.

towards the MMD, meant the new party controlled a key group of political mobilisers. As demonstrated in previous chapters of this thesis, youthful foot soldiers were crucial to the success of a party's grassroots campaign in the lead up to elections. UNIP's loss of youth therefore assured its loss in the 1991 general election.

In order to explore the multiple issues raised in the above paragraphs, this chapter is divided into three key sections. The first section explores thematically the identity of students as a discrete youth group in Zambian society. This is not only important in understanding the dynamics of their interactions with other youth groups, but also highlights that UNZA students were themselves a heterogeneous group. This is especially critical to explaining the often fluid and varied responses to crises by the elected student union during the 1980s, who had to be responsive to campus culture. The following sections both provide a chronological analysis of events, in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Section two explores several significant crises involving UNZA students in the 1980s. By considering these events, along with events discussed in previous chapters, a long-standing history of Zambian student opposition is construed.<sup>14</sup> Section two also analyses the existence of inter-youth networks between students and other youth groups, which were made particularly visible and changeable during moments of crisis in the 1980s. It is argued that such networks ultimately served to erode valuable support for UNIP among its youthful constituency. The third and final section of this chapter explores how all these elements came together –

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<sup>14</sup> Especially chapter two, pp. 60-70 and chapter three, pp. 179-189 of this thesis.

from the entrenchment of students as an opposition base, to the waning of support for UNIP among lumpen youth - to aid the MMD in the early 1990s and ultimately drive UNIP out of power.

### **6.1 Student Culture: The UNZA Campus**

Before examining the timeline of key events involving Zambian university students, it is important to first survey who exactly constituted this identity. Class and gender dynamics, along with ideological viewpoints, membership of student-led organisations, and student public engagement all need to be considered in order to better understand the UNZA student body as heterogenous and diverse. UNIP's own youth magazine the *Vanguard* noted that university students 'originate from varied backgrounds and their difference in background to a large extent reflects itself in the way they respond to the call of revolution'.<sup>15</sup> The varied background of university students at this time can initially be explained by the exponential growth in enrolment numbers, as more youths were able to access tertiary education for the first time. Indeed, by the early 1980s the number of university graduates in the country had grown exponentially, from just over 300 in 1966, to 6,000 in 1982.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, and, despite their penchant to cause trouble for the UNIP government, students continued to represent only a small percentage of the country's entire population. Out of a national population of 7,800,000 by 1991, only a total of 5,000 students were enrolled at UNZA campuses.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> 'Can Students Lead a Revolution?', *Vanguard*, January 1986, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> 'UNZA Has Vital Role – Kaunda', *Times of Zambia*, 19 December 1982, p. 1 and Tembo, *The University of Zambia*, p. 1 and Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 77.

<sup>17</sup> For comparison, in the year 1990 the UK awarded 77,163 degrees to students, out of a population of 57,237,500. Students in the UK thus made up 0.13 per cent of the population



viewed as.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, in much the same way as UNIP youths had patrolled the appearance of young women on the streets during the infamous mini-skirt campaigns, male students at the university criticised what female students wore and wrote numerous student published articles on the topic well into the 1980s.<sup>23</sup>



**Figure 22: Fashion on Campus**

Source: 'Fashion on Campus', *Scribe*, 10 December 1980, p. 10.

In the *Dialect* magazine, an explicit drawing of the nefariousness of female fashion was laid bare. A caption instructed 'please ladies don't cut them too high'.<sup>24</sup> In another student magazine *Sophia*, a male editor writing about campus life declared that:

Killer skirts and miniskirts are an old fashion colonial gear relegated to the mid and late sixties and early seventies. Both hot pants and miniskirts are inferior and outright indecent dressing that 'puts the things where everybody can see it' and if you can do this without fear shyness or shame then you are as good as any other animal that carries its barefaced thing in public without shame'... if you are found you will be 'chased' and exposed.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> 'Chongololos Have Decency', *Dialectic*, 14 March 1989, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> See chapter four of this thesis, pp. 202-219.

<sup>24</sup> 'Fashion on Campus', *Scribe*, 10 December 1980, p. 10.

<sup>25</sup> Albert Hadunka, 'Life Around US: A Campus Survey', *Sophia: The Love of Wisdom*, August-September 1990, p. 2.



The aversion to the miniskirt did not then stop at the walls of the university campus. Instead, the strong anti-imperialist rhetoric embedded in the student body was used to attack the miniskirt's indecent foreign heritage, shaming those who embraced non-traditional fashion. These 'imitators' were unaffectionately called 'brain-washed chongololo girls' by their male counterparts.<sup>26</sup> Out of the few female students who involved themselves in student publishing, however, it is clear that these assaults on what women were wearing – including the apparent concern of 'imported panties' being on display in the library and lecture theatres – did not go unchallenged. Pointing out the hypocrisy one female student deftly asked: 'Who says girls are not disgusted with the knowledge of the whole geography... [of] boys who wear shorts leaving one's curiosity completely satisfied?'<sup>27</sup> In another article the author questioned whether the gendered terms of Mojos, Mamas, Monks and Nuns, embedded in student vocabulary were detrimental to student cohesion: 'For those labelled MONK, they become 'allergic to girls' and some even stop caring about the impression people have of them... Don't you think campus life would be better without the word MONK?''<sup>28</sup> A conservatism towards female sexuality, similar to that of wider Zambian society, thus existed within campus culture, revealing gendered, as well as class based, dividing lines between the students themselves. One student, Melvin Simuchimba asserted that 'God intended that women should not only

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<sup>26</sup> Chongololos are a common and docile black millipede found in southern Africa. In Zambia 'Chongololo' or 'Chong' came to refer to people who were enamoured with Western culture and typically spoke in an accent that pronounced the word in a distinctive manner, synonymous with those from more privileged backgrounds: 'Chongololos Have Decency', *Dialectic*, 14 March 1989, p. 5.

<sup>27</sup> 'Yet Here Is Another Reply From a Glamorous Lady', *Confrontation*, 17 August 1983, p. 9.

<sup>28</sup> 'Monkism Lambasted', *Engine: The Voice*, 12 June 1985, p. 7.

be submissive but also accept men's leadership... although the women's struggle has led to virtually all fields or opportunities being open to them in many societies, very few women have been able to perform as competently as their male counterparts'.<sup>29</sup> This masculinised student culture, wherein the female gender was looked down-upon and shown outright contempt helps explain some of the gendered insults used by students against the government and university authorities, as well as the macho bravado of student political organisations.

As this analysis of gender has touched upon, there were also important class dynamics at play within the student body. One survey conducted in the latter half of the 1970s indicates the family backgrounds of students attending UNZA. Parental occupations of the students were: 33 per cent 'professional' (primary teachers or equivalent), 26 per cent 'clerical', 5 per cent 'commercial', 15 per cent 'artisans and other manual work', and 6 per cent unspecified.<sup>30</sup> Children of parents working as professionals and clerical roles - jobs which required proficiency in English - were given an educational advantage over others. This helps to explain why a larger number of university students came from these better educated sections of the Zambian population.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, the figures show that students came from a fairly broad range of socioeconomic backgrounds, including the working class. Irrespective of their family circumstances all students stood out nationally as a privileged class, when compared to the ordinary Zambian man or woman.

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<sup>29</sup> Melvin Simuchimba, 'Women's Liberation with Reference to Zambia: A Critique', *Sophia: The Love of Wisdom*, 5 September 1991, p. 18.

<sup>30</sup> Burawoy, 'Consciousness and Contradiction', p. 91.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

As shown at the start of this section, university education was only available to a small minority of the population and provided graduates with an advantage in the job market upon leaving the university.<sup>32</sup> Importantly UNZA was publicly funded and free to attend for all students from its inception. Additionally, tuition bursaries of K81 per term were paid to every student, and an additional K20 for transport costs.<sup>33</sup> These advantages, however, were gradually eroded as the economic situation in the country worsened. As will be explored in the second section of this chapter, university bursaries were vulnerable to government budgetary constraints. Michael Burawoy points out, in his 1976 article on student protest in Zambia, that in this respect, UNZA students saw themselves as a ‘deprived incipient elite’.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, as an elite group, students were concentrated within a dedicated campus space, which gave them a special ability to organise within the autocratic one-party regime.

Although a privileged stratum of Zambian society, students did not confine themselves to their ivory towers. As well as having attended ZNS training, this youth group mixed with the rest of the population in various voluntary endeavours linked to national development and public service work.<sup>35</sup> On a

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<sup>32</sup> This advantage did gradually decrease, as Zambia sunk deeper into economic crisis.

<sup>33</sup> By comparison about 42 per cent of the total labour force in Lusaka was involved in petty commodity activities ranging from trading mealie meal to selling cigarettes singly and vegetable hawking: ‘Student Perks Stopped: State Move Sparks Protest’, *Times of Zambia*, 11 December 1983, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> Burawoy, ‘Consciousness and Contradiction’, p. 94.

<sup>35</sup> This ‘mixing’ had occurred throughout the institution’s existence. The Chikwakwa student theatre group for instance in the 1960s and 1970s performed numerous plays for the public at the university campus and beyond. On 19 September 1970, President Kaunda attended a performance of *Che!*. The memoir of Michael Etherton and John Reed, former lecturers involved in Chikwakwa, brilliantly details the impact of student public engagement activities and the political repercussions of such during the multiparty era. See:

community level some students belonged to the Childcare and Adoptive Society of Zambia, while others worked to construct clinics in deprived areas and teach rural people the importance of preventative medicine.<sup>36</sup> Students in the Department of Social Work were also involved in supporting village productive committees as part of their degree, whilst other students were involved in conducting surveys on problems in 'slum' compounds as far afield as Livingstone.<sup>37</sup> The connections students made with ordinary people, including those from rural areas, helped to fashion a student political consciousness around the deprivation of the working class. Given the anticipated elite status of UNZA students, this consciousness was centred on a moral paternalism, in which students saw themselves as political advocates of the impoverished.<sup>38</sup> This sheds light on the later involvement of UNZA students in wider socioeconomic issues which did not directly impact them *and* provides context for their strong ideological beliefs centred on Marxism.

Student ideology heavily leaned towards the left of the political spectrum and permeated campus culture to a considerable degree. Zambia's officially proclaimed ideology 'Humanism' followed its own distinct type of socialism - which stressed Christian virtues and appealed to romantic conceptions of the 'common man' – but it was rejected by students as utopic and petty-bourgeois.<sup>39</sup> Students regarded humanism as a 'one-man ideology created

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Michael Etherton and John Reed, *Chikwaka Remembered: Theatre and Politics in Zambia, 1968-1972* (Belfast: Original Writing Ltd, 2011), p. 144.

<sup>36</sup> Tembo, *The University of Zambia*, p. 32.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>38</sup> Burawoy, 'Consciousness and Contradiction', p. 93.

<sup>39</sup> Chiponde Mushingeh, 'Unrepresentative 'Democracy': One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1973-1990', *Transafrican Journal of History*, 23 (1994), p. 137 and Burawoy, 'Consciousness and Contradiction', p. 89.

from above' and not born out of public discussions about what would be best for the country.<sup>40</sup> Students also felt that the official ideology of Humanism was untested, unscientific and used by politicians to hide behind 'a façade of capitalistic motives and activities'.<sup>41</sup> This stemmed from the perceived hypocrisy of politicians who were meant to be serving ordinary people, spending large sums of taxpayer money on white Mercedes-Benzes and Range Rovers. A student publication jibed: 'If the misguided party militant lumpen elements want to honor their captain – they should call him Range Rover – because that is a true reflection of his life style[sic]'.<sup>42</sup> With these perceived failures of Humanism, students instead viewed Marxist-Leninism as a more robust and suitable ideology to guide national politics in Zambia. Most issues were filtered by students through the lens of Marxist-Leninism, which resulted in the university administration commonly being referred to as 'capitalist', 'imperialist' and 'counter-revolutionary' by the UNZASU leadership.<sup>43</sup> Particularly alluring to students was the ideology's anti-capitalist principals, which were viewed as a key component in fighting the inequalities left by colonialism.<sup>44</sup> The Marxist emphasis on the importance of a highly committed intellectual elite in promoting revolution to free the working classes, reinforced UNZA students' own understanding of *themselves* as an educated elite who were the 'voice of the voiceless'.<sup>45</sup> Being

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<sup>40</sup> Balsvik, 'Student Protest', p. 315.

<sup>41</sup> Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 41.

<sup>42</sup> 'How Party Militants Insult the AK-47', *Dialectic*, 5 February 1981, p. 3.

<sup>43</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 68.

<sup>44</sup> Of course, revolutionary nationalist movements were strongly influenced by Marxist-Leninism, such as in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. See: Vishwas Satgar, 'The Anti-racism of Marxism: Past and Present', in *Challenges for Marxism and Anti-racism*, ed. by Vishwas Satgar (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2019), pp. 1-28.

<sup>45</sup> The work of Russian theorists Mikhail and Pyotr Lavrov inspired this idea. For further information see: *Victor Terras, Handbook of Russian Literature (New Haven: Yale*

a privileged group, who benefited from tax-payer money, also bolstered the idea among students that they were indebted to help the ‘masses’.<sup>46</sup> This feeling of obligation ran to such an extent that UNZA students considered themselves as ‘civil servants under training’.<sup>47</sup>

The ideological beliefs in Marxist-Leninism stemmed from the exposure of UNZA students to socialist and communist theories in their university studies. This encouraged students to embrace the idea of transformational revolutionary politics.<sup>48</sup> For example, Jonam Mwansa, a former accountancy student who graduated from UNZA in 1975, recalled that at the university: ‘you are exposed to studies in socialism which is a very exciting, radical philosophy... you are young and vibrant on entering UNZA and you want to see some change in society. For a young man radicalism is the best thing’.<sup>49</sup> Student exposure to Marxist-Leninism and other political ideologies varied by the individual. Mwamba Kangwa, a student who graduated UNZA in 1975 and studied a degree in Education, noted that he was not a politically-active student: ‘I was neutral. I was not really very involved in student politics.

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*University Press, 1985), p. 351 and Zeilig, ‘Students and the Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 1995-2005’, p. 278.*

<sup>46</sup> This idea parallels the ‘Going to the People’ student movement of the Narodniks in Russia. In 1874, approximately 2,000 to 4,000 students travelled to rural areas in the Russian Empire, in an attempt to prepare serfs for their future political role. Unlike in the Zambian case, Russian labourers proved unreceptive to students’ revolutionary message and often turned students over to government authorities. See especially: *Leonard Schapiro, Turgenev, His Life and Times (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 259 and Zeilig, ‘Students and the Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 1995-2005’, p. 12.*

<sup>47</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/11/50, ‘Letter to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education, the Secretary of the Bursary Committee of the Ministry of Education, the Director of the Manpower Committee, and the Vice-chancellor of UNZA, From Second Year University Students at the University of Zambia’, 16 April 1966.

<sup>48</sup> Hodgkinson and Melchiorre, ‘Introduction’, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup> ‘Ex-UNZA Militants Disown Socialist Ideals’, *Times of Zambia*, 28 September 1985, p. 4.

Maybe it was because of my course, languages'.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, the majority of students in leadership positions were strongly Marxist in their political stance. Indeed, the ideological viewpoint of Marxism influenced broader student actions, as even apathetic students supported UNZASU directives. Education graduate, Peter Kamuvanga for instance, reminisced that on the campus, 'students act with one voice and support each other. You find that even a student who did not want to participate in any activities is influenced by the others and he eventually gathers courage. I experienced this in the 1973-74 academic year, such that I ended up being elected sports secretary' in the UNZASU executive'.<sup>51</sup>

As Kamuvanga notes, UNZASU was a forceful presence on campus in encouraging student political engagement and activism. UNZASU was popularly elected each year and although turnout for UNZASU elections was generally low, this did not reflect the authority of the union.<sup>52</sup> UNZASU exercised full control over all non-academic student affairs and could declare a full student boycott, in which all students were expected to comply.<sup>53</sup> In these boycotts students adopted Marxist discourse, shouting piercing chants such as 'Viva Marxism-Leninism', 'Abased imperialism', 'international proletarianism'.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, although unregistered since the university's inception in 1966, UNZASU functioned as a crucial and democratically elected representative body for students within the university administration

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Burawoy, 'Consciousness and Contradiction', p. 86.

<sup>53</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 71.

<sup>54</sup> 'Ex-UNZA Militants Disown Socialist Ideals', *Times of Zambia*, 28 September 1985, p. 4.

and at a national level.<sup>55</sup> As Michael Buraway noted, ‘The upward flow of influence within the university’ stood in ‘marked opposition to the downward flow of influence in the wider authoritarian political structure of Zambia’.<sup>56</sup> In May 1979 the UNZASU Constitution, on which all UNZASU affairs were conducted, was revised.<sup>57</sup> Its aims were to promote, protect and defend student interests, both inside and outside of the university sphere. It was explicit in the need to support and promote anti-imperialist struggles in alliance with ‘progressive forces’.<sup>58</sup> The 1979 constitutional revision reveals that the student union extended its sphere of influence and concern beyond the campus to wider society. This dual focus is made readily apparent in the second section of this chapter and made the student body a particularly politicised and unified force in the one-party era.

The Marxist zeal of UNZA students was likewise expressed and refined through the unofficial student publications produced by students themselves. Student magazines were an important medium of dissent. They served to embolden students, whilst being particularly difficult for the authorities to control. As soon as one magazine was banned or subject to censorship, another would take its place.<sup>59</sup> The magazines were created using a mixture of typed and handwritten pages stapled together, and the only access students needed to publish their magazines was a photocopier for wider circulation. This meant even into the 1990s, the university authorities and government

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<sup>55</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, pp. 66-67.

<sup>56</sup> Buraway, ‘Consciousness and Contradiction’, p. 86.

<sup>57</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 66.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>59</sup> Julius Ihonvbere, *Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: The Case of Zambia* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1996), p. 68.



achieved only limited success in repressing the student voice. The great number and diversity of student magazines published between 1980 and 1991 is a testament to this. These publications were run by various student groups. Each had their own aims and fell onto various ends of the leftist spectrum. The magazine run by the Students Open Philosophical Association (*SOPHIA*), for example, proclaimed its aim was simply to ‘promote communication of ideas across the campus populace’ and for ‘readership to increase academic and social awareness in the University’.<sup>60</sup> The magazine itself accepted articles from a range of students including: ‘the Born Again Community, the Marxists, the Rastafarians, the Nuns, Vet, Med, and Agriculture students, Lumpens, Momas, Unipists, Ladies and Gentlemen’.<sup>61</sup>

These publications are invaluable in revealing what students themselves felt and thought about issues of their time. The contemptuous language they used to describe the UNIP government is particularly revealing. However, these publications did not go unnoticed by the UNIP leadership. In an interview in the UNIP youth league’s own magazine, President Kaunda noted his ‘disappointment’ that some publications from UNZA were insulting, ‘bring the students back into the fold... I want the Youth League to be a revolutionary movement but that does not mean insulting other people’.<sup>62</sup> The UNIP *Youth* magazine attracted especial vitriol among students, which stemmed from the magazine’s attempt to bring students back under the UNIP

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<sup>60</sup> ‘Editorial Comment’, *Sophia: The Love of Wisdom*, March 1990, p. 1.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> ‘Kaunda Forecasts Big Strides in Youth Movement’, *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, p. 6.

fold.<sup>63</sup> Interestingly the *Youth* magazine was initiated and run by ex-UNZA students, including UNIP youth league Executive Publicity Secretary Kennedy Shepande.<sup>64</sup> Their original name for the magazine *Youthquake*, and the use of red-communist styled writing on the cover, was swiftly rejected by the senior UNIP leadership.<sup>65</sup> The intolerance of the UNIP leadership towards a strongly left UNIP youth magazine did nothing to ingratiate other UNZA students into supporting UNIP. The *Dialect* student magazine for example declared: ‘We totally abhor UNIP Youth League’s ‘Youth’ Magazine which produces very cheap attacks by Charlatans who are in an ideological quagmire’.<sup>66</sup> In an attempt to win over students an effort was made to conflate Humanism and Communism. One *Youth* article declared for example that, ‘Selfishness will end in the humanism of communist society’.<sup>67</sup>

The *Dialect* was a staunchly Marxist leaning student magazine and did not shy away from colourfully insulting UNIP politicians as ‘fat gluttons with cheeks like babies’ buttocks’, *or*, more moderate students it identified as ‘markshits of the insipid under-baked type’.<sup>68</sup> The insult of markshit was intended by the editors of the *Dialect* as a label for those deemed to lack true Marxist beliefs. In a similar vein the *Dialect* warned students that prolonged exposure to a student magazine, the *Vanguard*, which took a more centrist

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<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Shepande used to contribute articles to the student magazine *UZ* during his time at UNZA: Interview with Kennedy Shepande, Lusaka, 19 August 2019.

<sup>65</sup> The term youthquake was coined in the 1960s and described significant cultural, political, or social change arising from the actions or influence of young people: Interview with Kennedy Shepande, Lusaka, 19 August 2019.

<sup>66</sup> ‘UNIP’s Youth’, *Dialectic*, 31 October 1980, p. 4.

<sup>67</sup> ‘Petty Bourgeois Pessimism: A Critique of Mr Robert Makola’s Absolute Endism’, *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, p. 5.

<sup>68</sup> ‘What Supporting UNIP Means’, *Dialectic*, December 1980, p. 6.

viewpoint, would, ‘give you ulcers’.<sup>69</sup> Describing the UNIP party in a December 1980 article, a *Dialectic* author wrote: ‘You fool no one but yourselves you fat – bugs and lice. We are anti-parasite, whether the blood sucker is a Christian or humanist or a democrat – we shall hammer and expose’.<sup>70</sup> The anti-religious bent of *Dialectic* editors, typical to Marxist-Leninism, created discord between these student views and Zambian Humanism, which had a religious element. Another article in the *Dialectic* confidently asserted that, ‘Students have always been in opposition to UNIP because of their total rejection of humanism, which they have correctly identified as a deceptive, sweet-sounding capitalist ideology’.<sup>71</sup> The Humanist Socialism followed by the UNIP government was described as no different from the ‘Rightists’, it was ‘like the difference between a kind capitalist and a cruel one – both are exploiters despite their different attitudes to their workers.’<sup>72</sup> The *Dialectic* positioned itself in antithesis to the UNIP government for this reason. Another student magazine, the *Scribe*, objected, ‘We don’t want to be associated with any of your kind... we are watching’.<sup>73</sup>

## 6.2 The Tumultuous 1980s: Student Crises and Rebellion

Having examined the dynamics of the student body at UNZA, this section now explores the hallmarks of various student protests, riots and challenges which UNZA students involved themselves in during the 1980s. These actions followed on from those of the 1970s, which were expansive in their

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> ‘What Supporting UNIP Means’, *Dialectic*, December 1980, p. 2.

<sup>71</sup> ‘Students Conflict with UNIP’, *Dialectic*, 10 May 1981, p. 3.

<sup>72</sup> ‘What Supporting UNIP Means’, *Dialectic*, December 1980, p. 6.

<sup>73</sup> ‘The Reactionary Nature of the ‘Vanguard’’, *Scribe*, 10 December 1980, p. 2.

outlook and chiefly concerned with the liberation struggles that occurred in territories which bordered Zambia.<sup>74</sup> Some scholars have argued that the 1980s and 1990s saw African students become inward-looking, turning their attention towards campus-based ‘bread and butter’ issues which stemmed from inadequate government funding.<sup>75</sup> This section reveals instead, however, that UNZA students continued to involve themselves in outward-looking issues, the main difference between the 1970s and 1980s being that these issues were nationally, rather than internationally, focused. It is argued that rather than making students self-absorbed, campus struggles over simpler matters, such as meal allowances or fees, increased student sympathy with the working-classes and lumpen youths, who received even less support from the government during the worsening economic situation.<sup>76</sup> Rather than concentrating analysis exclusively on the four main closure events that occurred at UNZA in 1982, 1984, 1986 and 1989, this section also considers lesser-known events or protests.<sup>77</sup> It is maintained that these were just as important in establishing inter-youth alliances between students and other youths, as well as further entrenching student opposition to UNIP. This section follows a chronological structure to clarify the influence events had on one another.

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<sup>74</sup> As already discussed in chapter two and three of this thesis. See, pp. 60-70 and pp. 179-189, respectively.

<sup>75</sup> See: Balsvik, ‘Student Protest’, p. 307 and Nkinyangi, ‘Student Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa’, p. 158.

<sup>76</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 68.

<sup>77</sup> The work of Issa Omari and Paschal Mibyo focus exclusively on closure events at UNZA, whilst Phiri’s study only minimally connects events into the broader national political picture, see: Omari and Mibyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities* and Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*.

This section begins where the previous chapter left off, by examining the fallout from the disastrous mandatory ZNS training of prospective university students. Indeed, anti-UNIP sentiment was high amongst students who had gone through ZNS training and been involved in active fighting against white settler forces. An article published by the student *Spark* magazine in the early 1980s announced: ‘Most of us have gone through the same misery of National Service. A punishment for completing Form 5 and beating ignorance... It is time Shemunaists realised that their days are numbered’.<sup>78</sup> Given the prevalence of male chauvinism within campus culture, the substitution of Humanist for Shemunaist here was likely intended to signal the effeminate and hence inferior nature of the Humanist ideology and its architects. Kaunda himself also admitted that there had been a breakdown of communication between the Party and students: ‘I have always made it clear... that students are our own children, but as a Party I don’t think we are forthcoming. We are not in touch with them. There is a breakdown in communication.’<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, this admission was accompanied by other statements from Kaunda aimed at reasserting UNIP’s authority over students who: ‘the Party and its Government would continue to regard... as children in their tender age who needed protection and guidance’.<sup>80</sup> Similarly, Kaunda made clear that revolutionary action of youths was only acceptable ‘under Zambian manners’.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> ‘Opinion’, *Spark*, 6 March 1981, p. 1.

<sup>79</sup> ‘Kaunda Forecasts Big Strides in Youth Movement’, *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, p. 6.

<sup>80</sup> ‘UNZA a Victim of Foreign Ideologies’, *Times of Zambia*, 17 March 1984, p. 1.

<sup>81</sup> ‘Kaunda Forecasts Big Strides in Youth Movement’, *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, p. 6.

Tensions were not, however, confined solely to students and the government at the start of the 1980s. As already discussed, from 1979 UNZA operated under a federalised system.<sup>82</sup> This change was intended to help expand the university, by establishing multiple campuses around the country. An attempt by the government to accommodate ‘campusless’ UNZA students enrolled at the new, but unbuilt, Ndola campus inadvertently fuelled hostility between UNZA and Zambia Institute of Technology (ZIT) students in Kitwe, where UNZA students were temporarily housed.<sup>83</sup> The hostility, which reached its peak in 1980, underlines the need to not take intra-student alliances for granted; they were just as changeable and susceptible to fractures as other youthful coalitions. In 1980, the additional intake of 300 UNZA students at the Ndola campus tipped the scales in their favour at the shared ZIT campus. This was to such a degree that people often referred to the ZIT campus as the ‘University of Zambia Ndola Campus’, much to the frustration of ZIT students.<sup>84</sup> ZIT students and UNZA students were also subject to different rules and regulations while they cohabited, which produced envy amongst ZIT students who did not enjoy the same degree of freedom afforded to UNZA students.<sup>85</sup> One former UNZA student recognised that: ‘One of the major problems on this campus is that two different rules and regulations apply to two institutions, ZIT students are envious of the greater freedom we enjoy’.<sup>86</sup> In May 1980, trouble broke out between the two student bodies after an UNZA publication allegedly boasted that UNZA graduates would become

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<sup>82</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 51.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> ‘The Two Just Cannot Mix!: ZIT-UNZA Kitwe Riots’, *Times of Zambia*, 15 June 1980, p. 4.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

managers, whilst ZIT students would become general workers.<sup>87</sup> The publication also protested against UNZA students who had not answered the 1979 call-to-arms being treated as deserters from the National Defence Force.<sup>88</sup> A sentence in the publication provocatively read: 'UNIP and Kaunda must be stripped of all political and economic powers'.<sup>89</sup> In retaliation ZIT students in one of their own circulars appealed to authorities to take UNZA students to army barracks, to be court-martialled as deserters.<sup>90</sup> The fiery situation enraged both sides and exploded into a battle which raged for two days in mid-June 1980. It was only when police in full riot gear stormed the campus that the fighting ceased.<sup>91</sup> The clash resulted in 14 injuries among students and left a multitude of smashed windows.<sup>92</sup> On 26 June 1980 soldiers stormed the shared campus in Kitwe once more and removed male students to answer charges of desertion.<sup>93</sup> This move set the tone of government 'intervention' for the rest of the 1980s.

As the 1980s progressed, the art of negotiation and dialogue was increasingly discarded by the autocratic UNIP government in favour of reactive repression.<sup>94</sup> Capitulation was never totally abandoned, however, as a strategy when dealing with the stubbornness of UNZA students. This was likely because the university remained a 'vital instrument of nation building', on which the UNIP government and the Zambian people relied for national

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<sup>87</sup> 'Students in Kitwe Campus Running Battle', *Times of Zambia*, 24 May 1980, p. 1.

<sup>88</sup> 'Students Face Army Action', *Times of Zambia*, 13 June 1980, p. 1.

<sup>89</sup> 'Students in Kitwe Campus Running Battle', *Times of Zambia*, 24 May 1980, p. 1.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> 'The Two Just Cannot Mix!: ZIT-UNZA Kitwe Riots', *Times of Zambia*, 15 June 1980, p. 4.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> 'Soldiers Round up Students', *Times of Zambia*, 27 June 1980, p. 5.

<sup>94</sup> Balsvik, 'Student Protest', p. 319.

development.<sup>95</sup> In a speech given by Kaunda, he implored the university to continue to use its research programmes to find solutions to the country's development problems: 'the biggest shareholder in this enterprise is the public. The biggest shareholder therefore has the right to demand his due dividend in the form of the university's contribution to social progress'.<sup>96</sup> A later example of the important contribution made by the university to national development was the agricultural department's reformulation of stock feed in 1984. The new formula required only K10 of foreign exchange per tonne to import vitamin trace minerals, compared to the stock feed used by the National Milling Company, which required K240 of foreign exchange per tonne to produce.<sup>97</sup> Projects such as these were important for lowering the cost of food and raising nutrition standards among ordinary people.<sup>98</sup> The indispensability of students thus provided them with somewhat of a cushion against the worst violence of the state, though the UNIP government was not below using more esoteric means to control students.<sup>99</sup>

In 1981, just a year after the UNZA/ZIT riot, further disquiet befell UNZA as students staged a boycott over the declining food quality in the cafeteria. From its inception, all students admitted to UNZA were provided a meal allowance which was paid directly to the university. Consequently, all students were expected to source their meals from the dining halls.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, ED1/11/50, 'Toast to the Guests Representing Sister Universities, His Excellency Dr Kenneth Kaunda, Chancellor of the University of Zambia at a Banquet at the Ridgeway Hotel', 12 July 1966.

<sup>96</sup> 'UNZA Tasks Listed: University Gets KK Challenge', *Times of Zambia*, 18 October 1981, p. 1.

<sup>97</sup> 'UNZA Finds Cheap Formula', *Times of Zambia*, 28 February 1984, p. 1.

<sup>98</sup> 'KK Salutes UNZA', *Times of Zambia*, 14 September 1984, p. 1.

<sup>99</sup> Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 16.

<sup>100</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 55.



However, as the economic crisis in Zambia worsened problems arose in the ability of the cafeteria staff to prepare appetising and nutritious meals for students within the allotted meal allowance.<sup>101</sup> This resulted in UNZA students organising a boycott on 17 February 1981.<sup>102</sup> Class boycotts were the student ‘weapon of choice’ across Africa at this time. The boycott involved a refusal to attend all lectures until the ‘shoddy catering services’ were improved.<sup>103</sup> The issue of food was a particularly sensitive one, given that campus catering failures awkwardly exemplified the wider economic failings of the UNIP government through its inability to properly feed even an elite group in society.<sup>104</sup> The *Dialectic* magazine also linked student actions to the wider context of government failure to provide for the basic needs of its citizens: ‘No foreign exchange means no cooking oil... in true UNIP fashion whereby you import cars and increase your petrol bill, the little that remains will not be able to meet all the needs of the people. So in January you import soap, February, cooking oil, not once can you have both soap and cooking oil’.<sup>105</sup>

Across Africa at the time, as Randi Balsvik rightly observes, it was not necessarily the boycotts themselves but rather the *response* of university administrations and governments, that was vital in uniting a country’s

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<sup>101</sup> Boycotts were not exclusive to UNZA students during this period. Many colleges also organised boycotts because of worsening material conditions, such as students at Luanshya’s Technical Vocational Teachers’ College and Trades Training Institute who boycotted meals in protest against alleged poor diet in June 1983: ‘Students Boycott ‘Poor Food’, *Times of Zambia*, 4 June 1983, p. 5. For further studies on campus food politics, see especially: Todd Smith, ‘Food Price Spikes and Social Unrest in Africa’, *Climate Change and African Political Stability*, 11 (2013), pp. 1-12.

<sup>102</sup> ‘UNZA Students Protest’, *Times of Zambia*, 18 February 1981, p. 1.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> Nkinyangi, ‘Student Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa’, p. 165.

<sup>105</sup> ‘The UNIP Way of Solving the Shortages Problem’, *Dialectic*, 13 March 1981, p. 3.

students under a sense of ‘collective victimhood’.<sup>106</sup> Ironically, the more reactive and repressive the response of authorities was, the more solidarity students expressed for one another. The reaction of the UNIP government to the boycott organised by UNZA students in February 1981 perfectly demonstrated this effect. Following the boycott UNIP not only renewed attempts to form a party youth branch on campus, which it had unsuccessfully tried to do in previous years, but the government also installed a greater number of Special Branch agents on campus. These reactions, which attempted to push students into joining UNIP and covertly monitored their activities, spectacularly backfired. The presence of the Special Branch on campus was designed to deter indiscipline and intimidate students. The Secretary of State for Defence and Security, Alexander Grey Zulu, admitted that Special Branch picked-up UNZA students for questioning, under the pretence of protecting the lives of citizens.<sup>107</sup> Former UNZA student and UNIP youth league politician, Kennedy Shepande recalled that: ‘There was recruitment as informers... those after graduation were given jobs, some jobs, as a way of thanking them’.<sup>108</sup> UNZA students union president in Kitwe, Mr Henry Kabinga, reported a lot of intimidation from the ‘dogs’ on the campus. The term ‘dogs’ was used to describe the Special Branch agents at the campus. Most of the suspected agents did not mix freely with other students in discussions. Kabinga pointed out that, ‘If they did they often did not contribute anything but listened to what other students said’.<sup>109</sup> That Kabinga spoke of this at a public UNZA commission of inquiry into the running of the

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<sup>106</sup> Balsvik, ‘Student Protest’, p. 320.

<sup>107</sup> ‘Allowances: No Change’, *Times of Zambia*, 4 March 1981, p. 1.

<sup>108</sup> Interview with Kennedy Shepande, Lusaka, 19 August 2019.

<sup>109</sup> ‘UNZA Has ‘Dogs’ Probe Team Told’, *Times of Zambia*, 26 November 1981, p. 5.

university, reveals that such actions by the government served to embolden students, rather than silence them. Neither did condemnation of the UNIP government disappear due to the increased presence of Special Branch. The *Vasso* student magazine defiantly wrote that the UNIP government, ‘instructed its underground torturing machinery, the Special Branch, to come and intimidate students on this campus... UNIP must understand that the strength of the will of the people is becoming enormous and is not something which the most sophisticated intelligence network can ever crush’.<sup>110</sup> The *Dialect* mocked the renewed attempt to create a UNIP youth league on campus as ridiculous because it was ‘well known’ that, ‘only 5% of the population are members’.<sup>111</sup> This was a dig at the extremely low membership uptake for the UNIP youth league at the time, with only 526 cards out of 10,000 being sold in Central Province in 1980.<sup>112</sup>

In 1982, having failed to establish a UNIP youth league at UNZA, a renewed attempt was made to influence students by establishing an Institute of Human Relations (IHR). The IHR was explicitly created to promote Zambian Humanism.<sup>113</sup> The IHR was a government driven project which bypassed university channels for its creation. Moreover, Kaunda’s decision to make his friend, British-born Lord John Hatch, the head of the new IHR - an institute meant to guard and develop Zambian Humanism - was a significant error in judgement.<sup>114</sup> The institute was officially opened by President Kaunda. At the

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<sup>110</sup> ‘Essence’, *Vasso*, 17 February 1981, p. 1.

<sup>111</sup> ‘UNIP is for Old People?’, *Dialectic*, 13 March 1981, p. 4.

<sup>112</sup> ‘Youth Cards Record Low Sales’, *Times of Zambia*, 5 March 1980, p. 5.

<sup>113</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 83.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

opening ceremony the inaugural lecture was given by Lord Hatch to an empty audience, as students snubbed the event.<sup>115</sup> The uneasy situation intensified in March 1982, when students issued an audacious circular which likened Lord Hatch to Cecil Rhodes and in which students asked if it was ‘really necessary’ to form such an institute which was aimed at putting the, ‘workers and peasants to sleep... Is it not downright disgraceful to use funds generated by the people’s toil on such abhorrent ventures? Is it now edifying enough that UNIP is flogging a dead horse by trying to revitalise decayed ‘Humanism’ which continues to exist but in inertia.’<sup>116</sup>

The situation was extremely embarrassing for Kaunda, and given his personal involvement in the IHR, eroded his authority.<sup>117</sup> An ultimatum to withdraw the remarks was issued, but ignored by UNZASU leaders, who instead organised a crisis management committee. The committee decided to call for a boycott of all classes on 4 March 1982.<sup>118</sup> By the 19 March 1982, the impasse was broken when 59 students, which included the entire UNZASU executive, were expelled from the university.<sup>119</sup> UNZA was then closed ‘for a short holiday’. This, however, did nothing to calm the situation. Student publications continued to berate Humanist politicians for their selfish consumption and abuse of public money, ‘We have repeatedly pointed out that UNIP and its Government has outlived its usefulness... We would like

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> ‘59 Students Fired: UNZA Acts Over ‘Insulting’ Circular’, *Times of Zambia*, 20 March 1982, p. 1.

<sup>117</sup> Balsvik, ‘Student Protest’, p. 315.

<sup>118</sup> ‘UNZA Student Unrest Looms’, *Times of Zambia*, 5 March 1982, p. 1.

<sup>119</sup> The expelled UNZASU leadership were: Norbert Mumba, Chibambe Nkole, Newton Ng’uni, Bruce Mukanda, Darlington Banda, J M Wakumelo, D Mwansa, Mutambo Chaati, Ben Chilufya, G Mwape, Evans Hapompowe D Kamayoyo and J T Phiri: ‘59 Students Fired: UNZA Acts Over ‘Insulting’ Circular’, *Times of Zambia*, 20 March 1982, p. 1.

to warn the Mercedes Benz clan that workers and peasants are disgusted'.<sup>120</sup> As occurred in other African universities in the 1980s, UNZA students threatened further disruption in order to pressure the government to readmit those who had been expelled in March 1982.<sup>121</sup> In a move of solidarity with their expelled peers, students organised an eight-day class boycott on 13 April 1982 and collectively raised the funds needed to challenge the expulsions and suspensions in the court of law.<sup>122</sup> This act of camaraderie was comparable to the later Nigerian situation in February 1988, when the National Association of Nigerian Students threatened a nationwide student strike which forced the Babangida regime to rescind its decision to try nine students for arson and property damage. These charges related to earlier incidents at the University of Nigeria campus at Nsukka.<sup>123</sup> Unlike in the Nigerian case, UNZA students were ultimately unsuccessful in forcing the government's hand.<sup>124</sup> In light of the escalating UNZA boycotts, the university was closed in anger for an entire term on 21 April 1982.<sup>125</sup> Students were ordered to leave at gun-point in a

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<sup>120</sup> The Nyirenda, 'University of Zambia Commission of Inquiry Report', published on 17<sup>th</sup> March 1983 pointed to the problematic issue of student publications which were used to abuse the party and government without recompense. 'UNZA Needs Dialogue', *Times of Zambia*, 4 April 1982, p. 1 and Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 33.

<sup>121</sup> Balsvik, 'Student Protest', p. 317.

<sup>122</sup> 'Students Boycott Classes', *Times of Zambia*, 13 April 1982, p. 1 and Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 41.

<sup>123</sup> The incidents stemmed from student protests against the immensely unpopular Structural Adjustment Program instituted by Nigeria's head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida in the 1980s: Olu Akaraogun, 'The Quest for Learning', *West Africa*, 2 October 1988, pp. 1781-1782.

<sup>124</sup> Though unsuccessful in their efforts, the readiness of UNZA students to action stood in marked contrast to the muffled protests of university students in neighbouring Malawi. These students faced a much more ruthless and efficient autocratic regime under Hastings Banda's Malawi Congress Party government. Any and all dissident from students or academics swiftly led to their detention in camps as political prisoners. See, Innocent Gondwe, 'Youth and Politics in Malawi: The Case of University Students Since 1965', *SSRN Electronic Journal* (2010), p. 10 <<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2626625>> [accessed 5 April 2020] and Anthony Nazombe, 'Poetry for Our Times: Jack Mapanje's the Chattering Wagtails of Mikuyu Prison', *Journal of Humanities*, 8.9 (1994), pp. 87-113.

<sup>125</sup> Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 41.

predawn operation, which saw police and senior army officers ‘slinging AK-47 rifles’ pick up several students for their alleged involvement as ringleaders of the boycott.<sup>126</sup> The police once more solidified their image as the oppressive arm of the government. In June 1982, at least five expatriate members of staff had their contracts permanently terminated or reduced by the university authorities. Some of the lecturers were among those who had signed an internal memorandum opposing the presence of armed police on campus in April, demonstrating where their sympathies lay.<sup>127</sup>

The fallout of the first closure of the university in the 1980s widened the gulf between the student population and the government. The evidence showed, even in the early 1980s, that castigating the students at the university did nothing but aggravate the situation and unify students against the government.<sup>128</sup> In the summer of 1982, the UNIP youth league leadership, many of whom were UNZA graduates themselves, attempted to heal the widening rift. Kennedy Shepande called for dialogue between the UNIP youth league and the student movement in an effort to remove the suspicion and mistrust that had built-up.<sup>129</sup> He expressed sadness that students were ‘disunited’, ‘unconcerned’ about their future, and engaged in ‘too much theoretical criticism’ of the Party.<sup>130</sup> He remarked: ‘Students are today seeing themselves more as critics of society than champions of finding solutions to

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<sup>126</sup> ‘UNZA Closed Down: Ridgeway, Ndola Campuses Not Affected’, *Times of Zambia*, 22 April 1982, p. 1.

<sup>127</sup> They included two Danish lecturers, Dr Sven Borgen and Dr Leif Mortensen and Mr Sean Morrow, Dr Edward Steinhart and his wife Suzane, a librarian, both Americans: ‘UNZA Reopens Doors Today’, *Times of Zambia*, 21 June 1982, p. 1 and Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 6.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>129</sup> ‘Lets Talk Youths Tell Students’, *Times of Zambia*, 11 July 1982, p. 7.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

the political, economic and social problems of our country... I would, therefore, like today to call for greater dialogue between students and the UNIP Youth League, so that we can work together for the achievement of political unity, economic prosperity and social justice based on the philosophy of Humanism.<sup>131</sup> Such appeals fell on deaf ears, particularly as the debt-ridden government began to follow the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in an effort to rescue the economy.<sup>132</sup> Both financial institutions were headquartered in Washington DC, and as such were regarded by students as neo-colonial instruments.

In 1983 the World Bank deemed that African countries receiving loans needed to reorganise educational funding because, according to the wisdom of the intuition, governments had long regarded universities as ‘sacred cows’ which were in reality ‘bloated, overfunded and inefficient’.<sup>133</sup> This was a spectacularly unfair analysis of the situation by the World Bank, as postcolonial states were still attempting to ‘catch-up’ on skilled labour and national development, of which universities were key remedies. Moreover, far from being ‘bloated’, the university enrolment rate of Zambia was far lower than in other areas of the world, and bounced around the zero per cent mark five years after independence.<sup>134</sup> By comparison, the figure in Latin American countries at the time was about 4 per cent.<sup>135</sup> Nevertheless, with this dogmatic view the World Bank insisted that resources should be spent on

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<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> Balsvik, ‘Student Protest’, p. 309.

<sup>133</sup> Zeilig, ‘Students and the Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 1995-2005’, p. 89.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

primary education, rather than the higher education sector.<sup>136</sup> As Randi Balsvik notes, ‘These developments combined to undermine not only the economy, but the morale, the dignity and the sense of mission within the universities’.<sup>137</sup>

In the same vein as other African universities, UNZA students mobilised themselves in December 1983 to protest against the government’s decision to abolish student allowances as part of a wider structural adjustment programme.<sup>138</sup> The action was taken at a time when the purchasing power of students had markedly declined. Students in fact had actually expected a rise in allowances when the government made its announcement.<sup>139</sup> They were therefore particularly upset by the decision, but were told unsympathetically by the UNIP National Youth Council that they should ‘appreciate the severe economic situation in the country which had led to such measures’.<sup>140</sup> Yet, students mobilised not only for themselves, but out of concern for youths who, without allowances, would not be able to attend UNZA in the future and fulfil their potential. UNZA students contended to reporters of the *Times of Zambia* that ‘the abolition of allowances would, among other things, block the poor from progressing to the university’.<sup>141</sup> The incident produced a key moment of solidarity between university students and youths still in primary

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<sup>136</sup> Balsvik, ‘Student Protest’, p. 309.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup> In Nigeria, between 1986 and 1990, a number of the country’s 21 universities were closed after repeated demonstrations against structural adjustment programmes. See, Kole Shettima, ‘Structural Adjustment and the Student Movement in Nigeria’, *Review of African Political Economy*, 56 (1993), pp. 83-91.

<sup>139</sup> ‘Allowances Rejected: Pocket Money Is Inadequate – Students’, *Times of Zambia*, 3 March 1981, p. 1.

<sup>140</sup> ‘Retain Student Perks – Youths’, *Times of Zambia*, 24 December 1983, p. 1.

<sup>141</sup> ‘Students’ Perks Averted Crisis’, *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1984, p. 4.



and secondary education, which demonstrated the fortitude of inter-youth alliances. On 11 December UNZA students held a 'war council' to map out a strategy to fight the government's decision to abolish student allowances in all tertiary education institutions from January 1984.<sup>142</sup> The meeting was held at the Great East Road Campus in Lusaka, in a charged atmosphere with students alleging, correctly, that the Government's decision had been taken on the instructions of the IMF which had called for cuts in public expenditure.<sup>143</sup> The national Zambia Union of Student Organisations (ZUSO) declared their intention to join the protest, charging that the decision to abolish allowances was shamefully taken unilaterally, without any consultation of student representatives.<sup>144</sup> This sudden expansion and organisation of students nationally, from UNZA and other educational institutes, became a daunting issue for the government. A taster of student solidarity was demonstrated when over 500 institutionally mixed students gathered on the streets at Kaunda Square, in Kitwe.<sup>145</sup> In February 1984, the government rescinded its decision to abolish student allowances. This was carefully framed as an action made in 'the spirit of fatherhood to achieve rapprochement'.<sup>146</sup> In actuality the government had little choice, especially given UNIP's own youth league came out in support of the student position. UNIP youth league Secretary for Publicity, Mr Njekwa Anamela, said the move would bring untold misery to the poorer families and was against the

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<sup>142</sup> 'Students See Red Over Perks Move', *Times of Zambia*, 12 December 1983, p. 1.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> 'Student Perks Stopped: State Move Sparks Protest', *Times of Zambia*, 11 December 1983, p. 1.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> 'Students' Perks Averted Crisis', *Times of Zambia*, 2 February 1984, p. 4.

UNIP constitution which stipulated that the party was obliged to provide full education to the citizens of Zambia.<sup>147</sup>

However, the government in another fatefully unconsidered move, approved the arrest of the last remaining UNZASU leader, Azwell Banda, that same month. This was due to another simmering issue over meal cards. Banda's compatriots had all resigned the previous week over the implementation of meal cards in the dining halls, which were seen as restrictive.<sup>148</sup> A dawn swoop by armed police, to pick up Banda, occurred on 15 February 1984.<sup>149</sup> The student reaction was swift. A fourth-year humanities and social sciences student told the *Times of Zambia* his colleagues were angered by the 'detention' of their leader.<sup>150</sup> Reminiscent of the notorious 1971 'Battle of Lusaka', subsequent rioting resulted in three students being admitted to the University Teaching Hospital with injuries.<sup>151</sup> Reports stated that at least 30 students were arrested in the ensuing fracas.<sup>152</sup>



**Figure 23: Demonstrating UNZA students in full force**

Source: 'UNZA Fiasco Keeps Occurring', *Times of Zambia*, 27 January 1985, p. 3.

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<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*


<sup>148</sup> 'UNZA Students Riot', *Times of Zambia*, 15 February 1984, p. 1.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*



**Figure 24: Bus burnt out by UNZA students**

Source: 'UNZA Fiasco Keeps Occurring', *Times of Zambia*, 27 January 1985, p. 3.

During the riot, a Mass Media Complex staff bus had its windows smashed and was set on fire by students, who then fled from paramilitary police.<sup>153</sup> A passing motorcyclist was also stoned as students targeted any 'strangers' entering the campus. Michael Mubanga, a Lusaka resident who lived near the university, recalled: 'It was terrible. Stone-carrying students punched on[sic] anybody they did not know'.<sup>154</sup> The violence directed at vehicles in particular, points to student frustrations with the introduction of meal cards being liminal to broader issues. A lecturer at UNZA who was interviewed by a *Times of Zambia* reporter suggested that the destruction of vehicles by students stemmed from their awareness of the austere economic conditions, which seemed at odds with the many new government-owned cars on the road.<sup>155</sup> As Randi Balsvik notes African students, 'had no intentions of letting the political elite eat public money in peace'.<sup>156</sup> The UNZASU general meetings

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<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> 'Problems Behind Student Unrest...', *Times of Zambia*, 21 February 1984, p. 4.

<sup>156</sup> Balsvik, 'Student Protest', p. 316.

between 3 and 13 February also exposed these deeper criticisms of UNIP and its government. The UNIP leadership was accused of being extravagant with the peasants and workers' money by buying 71 Mercedes-Benz cars and importing civil engineers to design the UNIP Party headquarters to be built in Lusaka.<sup>157</sup> These criticisms spilled over into the riot as students were heard shouting 'our motive is to fight UNIP'.<sup>158</sup> The shouts reveal how easily campus based problems could morph into criticisms of the government. The university was closed on 17 February following the riot. Seven students were expelled, eighteen others were suspended, including UNZASU leader Azwell Banda.<sup>159</sup> Solidarity, however, between UNZA students continued to flourish regarding other issues. In January 1985, for example, 530 students from all departments boycotted class in sympathy with their colleagues in the School of Business and Industrial Studies, who were subjected to 'mediocre' lecturing.<sup>160</sup>

By mid-1980s the Zambian economic situation had continued to worsen. The country's foreign debts exceeded \$4 billion.<sup>161</sup> The cost of servicing the debts accounted for roughly 50 per cent of the Zambia's foreign exchange earnings.<sup>162</sup> This dramatically impacted people's standard of living, as the Zambian Kwacha was devalued by 58 per cent against the dollar between

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<sup>157</sup> 'UNZA Fiasco Keeps Occurring', *Times of Zambia*, 27 January 1985, p. 3.

<sup>158</sup> 'UNZA Shut – for 5<sup>th</sup> Time', *Times of Zambia*, 17 February 1984, p. 1.

<sup>159</sup> 'UNZA Shut – for 5<sup>th</sup> Time', *Times of Zambia*, 17 February 1984, p. 1.

<sup>160</sup> '500 UNZA Students Join Boycott', *Times of Zambia*, 22 January 1985, p. 1.

<sup>161</sup> 'Six Dead, 1,000 Arrested, in Zambian Food Riots', *Associated Press*, 10 December 1986 <<https://apnews.com/article/e165610b1aa7e554b5ffed4d1ff551df>> [accessed 10 January 2021].

<sup>162</sup> Balsvik, 'Student Protest', p. 310.

1982 and 1984, and again by another 64 per cent between 1984 and 1985.<sup>163</sup> In 1984 the Southern Province of Zambia also experienced famine, which affected at least 16,000 families.<sup>164</sup> By March 1985 168,000 school leavers had joined the existing one million jobless youths that roamed the streets looking for work.<sup>165</sup> The *Times of Zambia* was littered with articles anxious about this pressing issue: ‘Much would have to be done to effectively tackle the youth unemployment problem’.<sup>166</sup> On the other hand, the UNIP youth league itself suffered from chronic underfunding. Addressing a conference, Kennedy Shepande, the youth league Secretary for Administration warned: ‘The league is beset by too many problems and needs revamping: projects worked out by the league have gone unsupported’. He stated that the funds allocated to both the youth league and the Ministry of Youth and Sport were too meagre and did not ‘reflect the gravity of the youth problem in our country’.<sup>167</sup> Within the wider educational system, some politicians began to complain of conditions in state boarding schools for secondary students. In Western Province, MP of Liuwa, Mr Namushi Namuchana, grumbled that the idea of free education in Zambia was a mockery as pupils had to bring their own blankets and bed sheets, and pay out of pocket for books which cost more than K40 each.<sup>168</sup> In December 1985, within this troubled context, the news that boarding fees were to be introduced in schools led to significant backlash.

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<sup>163</sup> Hans-Otto Sano, ‘The IMF and Zambia: The Contradictions of Exchange Rate Auctioning and De-Subsidization of Agriculture’, *African Affairs*, 87.349 (1988), p. 564.

<sup>164</sup> ‘Starvation Hits 16,000 Mazabka Families’, *Times of Zambia*, 7 May 1984, p. 1.

<sup>165</sup> ‘One Million Youths Jobless’, *Times of Zambia*, 13 December 1981, p. 1 and ‘168,000 Jobless Youths on Streets’, *Times of Zambia*, 23 March 1985, p. 1.

<sup>166</sup> ‘Unemployment a Headache’, *Times of Zambia*, 31 December 1985, p. 3.

<sup>167</sup> ‘Solve Youth Jobs Crisis – Shepande’, *Times of Zambia*, 13 August 1984, p. 1.

<sup>168</sup> ‘UNZA a Victim of Foreign Ideologies’, *Times of Zambia*, 17 March 1984, p. 1.

The fees proposed were K85 per term for primary and secondary school pupils.<sup>169</sup>



**Figure 25: Paramilitary police drive off protesting UNZA students on the Great East Road**  
Source: 'Students Protest', *Times of Zambia*, 3 December 1985, p. 1.

The move was quickly articulated by UNZA students as UNIP leaving Zambia and Zambians to the 'mercy of IMF'.<sup>170</sup> Student publications wryly labelled the institution the 'International Misery Fund' and the 'Imperialist Monetary Fund'. They accused the government of having let itself be sequestered by the foreign institution.<sup>171</sup> In keeping with the previous meal card riots, student opposition for the proposed boarding fees escalated to more widely question the competency and compassion of the political regime.<sup>172</sup> In an expression of solidarity with those outside of UNZA, university students staged a mass demonstration in support of school aged youths and, more broadly, in defence of ordinary Zambians who were seemingly defenceless against the government's continued IMF cuts.<sup>173</sup> Students declared their

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<sup>169</sup> 'Chainama Students Protest', *Times of Zambia*, 5 December 1985, p. 1.

<sup>170</sup> 'Events We Shall Never Forget (Of 1985)', *Target*, 28 March 1986, p. 3.

<sup>171</sup> Balsvik, 'Student Protest', p. 310.

<sup>172</sup> Nkinyangi, 'Student Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa', p. 158.

<sup>173</sup> 'Students Protest', *Times of Zambia*, 3 December 1985, p. 1.

position: 'We strongly and rightly feel that the majority of the people in this country cannot afford to pay the fees, taking into account the fact people have been badly hit by the current machinations of the IMF'.<sup>174</sup>

On 2 December 1985 over 2,000 UNZA students staged a demonstration in Lusaka.<sup>175</sup> Placards carried by the students read: 'Education is a right, not a privilege for the rich', 'Free education a must. We say no to boarding fees', and 'No to mass illiteracy'.<sup>176</sup> Rather than revealing themselves as an elite - isolated within their ivory towers and indifferent to the general interest - Zambian university students proved to be zealous advocates of the poorest in their society.<sup>177</sup> UNZA students demonstrated an intention to open up dialogue between themselves and ordinary Zambians by distributing copies of a circular to passers-by, which attempted to persuade and explain to the wider population the students' political position. The circular argued that the re-introduction of the fees was a 'colonial policy' which would defeat the literacy campaign, because the majority of Zambians were poor.<sup>178</sup> It read: 'We are convinced that this is a deliberate act engineered by the International Monetary Fund... which has since taken over the running of Government affairs in this country. The people of this country are disgusted with the IMF brutes... enough is enough. No one is going to reduce the future generations of this country to perpetual illiteracy and ignorance'.<sup>179</sup> As had occurred in

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<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>177</sup> Silvia Federici and George Caffentzis, 'Chronology of African University Students' Struggles: 1985-1998', in *A Thousand Flowers: Social Struggles Against Structural Adjustment in African Universities*, ed. by Silvia Federici, George Caffentzis and Ousseina Alidou (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000), p. 116.

<sup>178</sup> 'Students Protest', *Times of Zambia*, 3 December 1985, p. 1.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*

previous student protests, armed paramilitary police were called in to quash the demonstration, despite its peaceful nature. Police fired teargas canisters and used batons to disperse students. Many students fell down in the stampede that followed, losing watches and shoes in the chaos. Though many sustained bruises there were no serious injuries, and police sealed students back into the UNZA campus.<sup>180</sup>

Spurred by the bravery of UNZA students school pupils began to stage their own protests at the introduction of boarding fees in primary and secondary schools. On 4 December 1985, for instance, about 300 students from Chainama Hills College of Health Sciences staged a protest outside Freedom House in Lusaka. Some of their placards displayed comradery with UNZA students and expressed exasperation at their treatment at the hands of Zambian security forces. They read: 'No guns, no tear gas and no canisters, this is not South Africa' 'We are armed with sense and not guns'.<sup>181</sup> On dispersing from Freedom House, pupils defiantly sang songs while they were escorted by police back to their college.<sup>182</sup> On 5 December 1985 pupils at Lusaka's Natural Resources Development College and Chainama Hills College continued to boycott class in protest. Backbenchers in the government also voiced their opposition to the boarding fees decision on 5<sup>th</sup> December and were supported by the Zambia National Union of Teachers, alongside the ZCTU.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>181</sup> 'Chainama Students Protest', *Times of Zambia*, 5 December 1985, p. 1.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>183</sup> 'Students Stay Put', *Times of Zambia*, 6 December 1985, p. 1.



Throughout 1986, as the UNIP government maintained its negotiations for the release of a second tranche of an IMF Special Drawing Right, opposition against the cuts continued.<sup>184</sup> Of key importance were the protracted protests by UNZA students, and their alliances with other educated youths. This ensured sustained opposition against the bitter remedy prescribed to salvage the economy.<sup>185</sup> Indeed, student publications persisted in their criticism of the decision to introduce boarding fees into 1986. The magazine *Chita – Banging* asserted in February 1986 that: ‘The introduction of boarding fees has led to a lot of conflict and is likely to lead to more added trouble and controversy... UNIP must stop the ROT! The conscious and vigilant students of UNZASU will not idly watch their brains be tramped upon without reacting’.<sup>186</sup> The outspokenness of students was not ignored by the UNIP government which placed approximately 300 special branch members at UNZA from the Office of the President to monitor student activities.<sup>187</sup> The editors of the student run *Echoes* magazine complained that: ‘we are operating under the eyes of the GESTAPO, but we should learn to ignore them and continue with our just struggle... We owe the working people our loyalty’.<sup>188</sup> Another article reaffirmed the students’ continued opposition to the UNIP government if it kept ‘indulging in political and economical prostitution with the World Bank and the IMF... not meant to solve the problems of the common man on the street’.<sup>189</sup> By May 1987 President Kaunda decided to break with the ZUSO,

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<sup>184</sup> The IMF Special Drawing Right was created as a supplementary international reserve asset. Allocations played a role in providing liquidity and supplementing member countries’ official reserves amid the global financial crisis.

<sup>185</sup> Balsvik, ‘Student Protest’, p. 310.

<sup>186</sup> ‘Editorial Comment’, *Chita – Banging*, 27 February 1986, p. 1.

<sup>187</sup> ‘Comment on Political Repression’, *Spark*, 7 April 1986, p. 1.

<sup>188</sup> ‘Comment’, *Echoes*, 22 May 1985, p. 2.

<sup>189</sup> ‘Comment’, *Echoes*, 2 March 1987, p. 2.

having faced continued pressure from student protests, and having witnessed major food riots take place in December 1986, after corn meal prices were increased.<sup>190</sup> The student magazine *Echoes* wrote that: ‘The December food riots on the Copperbelt wouldn’t have occurred had the PIG listened and not given us some good spanking by the showgrounds that fateful day. Our criticism is merely a reflection of the face of the PIG in the mirror’.<sup>191</sup> Here, the acronym for Party in Government (PIG) was mischievously used by students to insult the government. As the comment reveals, students were increasingly involving themselves in issues not directly linked to UNZA campuses.

Whilst 1985 had seen alliances between UNZA students and other educated youths solidify, 1986 saw hostilities between UNZA students and the UNIP youth league become entrenched. In January 1986 over a three-week vacation about 2,000 UNIP youth league delegates had been accommodated in UNZA, and the state they left the university housing blocks infuriated students. According to the *Vanguard* the UNIP youths, ‘stole anything they could lay their hands on’.<sup>192</sup> In the dining halls, forks, knives, plates and sugar were stolen. This led to the common sight of students eating rice with bare hands.<sup>193</sup> The *Vanguard* demanded that ‘UNIP must be made to pay because it is to blame for the suffering of our people’. This set the tone for future conflicts that were to arise between the two groups that same year.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Balsvik, ‘Student Protest’, p. 310.

<sup>191</sup> ‘Comment’, *Echoes*, 2 March 1987, p. 2.

<sup>192</sup> ‘UNIP Youth League Delegates Run Away with UNZA Property’, *Vanguard*, January 1986, p. 2.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

A significant topic which further antagonised relations between UNZA students and UNIP youths was the introduction of the infamous vigilantes, also known as anti-crime squads. In January 1986, the Government Gazette announced that the Zambia Police Act had been amended to allow vigilantes to arrest people without a warrant. Suspected criminals would then be taken to the nearest police officer or station.<sup>195</sup> The recruitment of vigilantes was highly politicised as one ex-vigilante, Charles Chisala, detailed in a 2016 article he wrote for the *Zambia Daily Mail*. Chisala explained that the vigilantes were members of the UNIP youth wing.<sup>196</sup> Chisala was a school leaver who had successfully passed his final examinations in secondary school. Yet, he struggled to find a place in a tertiary learning institution to study for a career in journalism and had turned into a ‘dangerously frustrated youth’, who was recruited as a vigilante.<sup>197</sup> Just as with ordinary youth members, vigilantes helped with party mobilisation and the dissemination of ideology, as well as in ‘anti-crime’ operations.<sup>198</sup> Chisala describes training for covert operations under the command of the Office of the President Special Branch: ‘We used to attend serious political and security lessons in the lecture room at a police station every week under the supervision of a station inspector’.<sup>199</sup> The vigilantes, he stated, ‘were a real militia’.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> ‘Vigilantes Legal’, *Times of Zambia*, 4 January 1986, p. 1 and ‘Vigilantes to Get Guidelines’, *Times of Zambia*, 6 January 1986, p. 5.

<sup>196</sup> Charles Chisala, ‘Recalling My UNIP Vigilante Days’, *Zambia Daily Mail*, 24 July 2016, <<http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/recalling-my-unip-vigilante-days/>> [accessed 8 December 2019].

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

One of the key justifications for providing legal powers of arrest to vigilantes was to control a section of young low-level street vendors, known as 'Mishanga' boys.<sup>201</sup> This group was seized upon by the government as a scapegoat for the commodity shortages affecting the country, who blamed them for black-market selling. Problematically they made up part of the lumpen youth group which was a core UNIP constituent base. Vigilante attacks on this group thus served to alienate lumpen youths from the UNIP party. The government relocation of unemployed urban youths to the rural areas also strained the loyalty of lumpen youths to UNIP.<sup>202</sup> The UNIP youth league's magazine was strongly scathing of 'Mishanga' boys. Despite street vending having been outlawed in the capital due to the lack of enforcement, a 1979 article in *Youth* complained that: 'The 'Mishanga' boys took advantage of this weakness and were back on the streets flourishing with more impunity to the dismay of all law abiding citizens, who are the victims of this other group of exploiters who sell a stick of cigarettes at five ngwee each'.<sup>203</sup> The high mobility of 'Mishanga' boys, who rarely operated from an established base of operations, meant that ordinary law enforcers struggled to stop their activities.<sup>204</sup> Vigilantes were thus introduced in an effort to combat this group of youths. This was done to show the government was doing something about the commodity shortages, rather than dealing with the real root cause of the issue – which lay squarely with the disastrous economy. Ex-

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<sup>201</sup> 'Exploitation Must Go', *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, pp. 15-16.

<sup>202</sup> This move was also criticised in student publications. The *Dialectic* wrote, 'The government solution has been to go back to the land in callous disregard of the type of education they have imparted in the youth': 'Opinion', *Dialectic*, 4 April 1985, p. 2.

<sup>203</sup> 'Exploitation Must Go', *Youth: Your Monthly Authentic Magazine on Youth*, January 1979, pp. 15-16.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*

vigilante, Charles Chisala, points to a more sinister reason for bringing the vigilantes into operation in 1986. He explains that vigilantes arose because of the need for UNIP to retain its grip on power, so the UNIP government: ‘resorted to repressive means of extending its stay in office, and extensively used its youths... In the 80s the [vigilante] movement morphed into a fearsome militia, terrorising citizens with impunity’.<sup>205</sup> Rather than protecting the public from ‘Mishanga’ boys, Chisala’s recollections point to the use of vigilantes as a defensive tool. They were used by the ruling party in an effort to shield itself from the widespread resentment which had grown with the chronic shortages of basic commodities such as food, detergents, bath soap and salt.<sup>206</sup>

Ironically, it was frequently the vigilantes themselves that were the ones extorting ordinary people. Charging retail store owners a fee for controlling lines by making sure nobody cut the queues, and, also charging those waiting in line a fee was common practice. This practice would later backfire. In 1988, for example, 200 people stormed Kitwe Zambia Consumer and Buying Corporation (ZCBC) store, to protest against youths demanding that people paid K10 *before* being allowed to buy cooking oil.<sup>207</sup> Vigilantes were effectively a law unto themselves.<sup>208</sup> Charles Chisala recalls his role in controlling lines at State owned National Import and Export Corporation

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<sup>205</sup> Charles Chisala, ‘Recalling My UNIP Vigilante Days’, *Zambia Daily Mail*, 24 July 2016, <<http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/recalling-my-unip-vigilante-days/>> [accessed 8 December 2019].

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>207</sup> *Times of Zambia*, 13 May 1988.

<sup>208</sup> Charles Chisala, ‘Recalling My UNIP Vigilante Days’, *Zambia Daily Mail*, 24 July 2016, <<http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/recalling-my-unip-vigilante-days/>> [accessed 8 December 2019].

stores and ZCBC stores.<sup>209</sup> As a deputy commander in the vigilantes he was responsible for deploying small bands of vigilantes at different stores with, 'pieces of hose pipe to whip those who would not obey their instructions'.<sup>210</sup> He then was paid in kind by the managers of the retail stores in essential commodities, such as mealie meal, sugar and cooking oil.<sup>211</sup>

The vigilantes were attacked by UNZA students as being both a ruse, intended to cover-up the government's own mishandling of the economy, *and* being a tool of repression. Though students did not physically protest against the vigilantes, their criticism nonetheless indicates the concern UNZA students felt towards ordinary people being harassed by the UNIP vigilantes. The *Vanguard* was biting its criticism of UNIP. An article published in its January 1986 issue responded:

In a bid to supplement police brutality in such a hopeless situation UNIP has come up with yet another suicidal, myopic and diabolic measure. This is the legalization of the already existing UNIP vigilantes. It is a well-known fact that some of these vigilantes, if not all of them engage in anti-people activities... such as criminal acts... misusing their UNIP given powers in order to survive the economic hardships which are affecting everyone small or big. This is so because of the composition of the vigilantes themselves.<sup>212</sup>

The same article described vigilantes as 'mustard fed puppies' and paramilitaries on rampage in towns on the pretext of trying to wipe out 'Mishanga' sellers.<sup>213</sup> The *Vanguard* questioned why the 'Mishanga' sellers

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<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> 'UNIP 'Redcaps' for Oppression', *Vanguard*, January 1986, p. 4.

<sup>213</sup> 'The Essence of the Continued Presence of the Paramilitary Recruits in the City Center', *Dialectic*, 5 February 1981, p. 4.

were gone, but the queues for commodities were longer.<sup>214</sup> In February 1986, UNZA publications once again criticised ‘UNIPist militants’ in their party membership campaign that took place in Chipata and the Copperbelt. The student publication *Echoes* alleged that there were many unconstitutional acts committed by the vigilantes:

To these 10<sup>th</sup> rate ‘Nazi degenerates that there is a provision in the Constitution which reads: ‘Membership to the Party shall be Voluntary’. Therefore these coercive actions prove to us that they do not know their country’s constitution, lack political consciousness and are only the ‘running dogs’ to ensure the maintenance and perpetuation of the bourgeois ruling class... to us the revolutionary students we find this move to be disgusting and unrully[sic].<sup>215</sup>

Unsurprisingly severe remarks such as these attracted the attention of the government which attempted to stifle their publication. In February 1986, the government proposed a committee to oversee and limit student publications. This was under the pretext that a reduced number of publications would ‘improve their quality’ and filter out content possibly infiltrated by outside bodies’.<sup>216</sup>

The attempt to control student publications was also controversially followed by another attempt to establish a UNIP youth league on campus in March 1986.<sup>217</sup> In April 1986 UNZASU invited executive secretary of the UNIP youth league, Alexander Kamalondo, to put forward the case for a UNIP youth branch on campus.<sup>218</sup> Previously students had refused to have a UNIP

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<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup> ‘Vigilantes Violate Citizens Constitutional Rights’, *Echoes*, 27 February 1986, p. 4.

<sup>216</sup> ‘UNZA Code Urged’, *Times of Zambia*, 7 February 1986, p. 1.

<sup>217</sup> The UNIP youth league was not the only organisation blocked by UNZASU. The Catholic Church Conscientization Committee was also resisted by students in October 1982, due to its perceived connection with the CIA. See: ‘CIA Sows Seeds: Ex-UNZA Man Exposes Clandestine Activities’, *Times of Zambia*, 10 October 1982, p. 1.

<sup>218</sup> ‘UNZA Showdown: Kamalondo Challenges Students to Join Party’, *Times of Zambia*, 8 March 1986, p. 1.

branch at the Lusaka main campus because they did not believe party policies were serving the interests of the masses.<sup>219</sup> The meeting with Kamalondo failed to start on time because students refused to sing the National Anthem.<sup>220</sup> This was in retaliation for earlier remarks made by Kamalondo that he would deal with agitators who were hindering the establishment of a UNIP branch at UNZA.<sup>221</sup> During the meeting itself Kamalondo argued that allowing a youth branch on campus would allow the ‘leaders of tomorrow’ to better understand the party policies and Zambian ideology.<sup>222</sup> Unsurprisingly students raised concerns. This centred on the lack of an ‘ideological basis for such an alliance’.<sup>223</sup> UNZASU president-general Ben Chilufya affirmed that the barrier standing between UNIP and the students’ union was one of fundamental ideological difference. Humanism and Marxism-Leninism could not be easily reconciled.<sup>224</sup> UNZASU social and cultural secretary, Bernard Mutale, resolutely told Kamalondo that he should accept defeat.<sup>225</sup> The failure of the two sides to resolve their differences led to Kamalondo making underhand threats to students. During the fifth Copperbelt provincial youth league conference he warned students that those that think they are: ‘superior to the Party would not be appointed to responsible positions, but will die with their university degrees... If you continue to shun the Party just because you think you’re educated, UNIP will not only ignore you but we shall also condemn you’.<sup>226</sup> In Mufulira, 600 UNIP youths demonstrated against UNZA

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<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>223</sup> ‘Comment’, *Echoes*, 29 January 1986, p. 2.

<sup>224</sup> ‘UNZA Showdown: Kamalondo Challenges Students to Join Party’, *Times of Zambia*, 8 March 1986, p. 1.

<sup>225</sup> ‘Students Undaunted?’, *Times of Zambia*, 14 April 1986, p. 1.

<sup>226</sup> ‘You’ll Die with Your Degrees’, *Times of Zambia*, 13 April 1986, p. 1.



students for rejecting the UNIP youth league. Placards read, 'UNZA – should not kill the cow that feeds it with milk for growth'.<sup>227</sup> The reactions of UNIP youths created an intractable hatred between these two youth groups, whilst the actions of vigilantes antagonised lumpen youths who, ordinarily, supported UNIP.

By May 1986 tensions were high on campus. Economic pressures and suppression of student activities led to an eruption of fury among students. The agitation had mounted to such a degree over the course of the 1980s, that only the slightest spark was needed to light the fuse of student discontent. On 2 May 1986 UNZASU leaders issued an open ultimatum to UNZA authorities to buy an ambulance for the university clinic.<sup>228</sup> The organisation on 13 May 1986 of an UNZASU conference between secondary school students and other higher learning institutes was also banned by UNZA authorities. UNZASU ignored the ban on the student meeting that had been organised. This led to the UNZA Principal resolving to expel UNZASU President-general, Ben Chilufya.<sup>229</sup> The lack of an ambulance for the university clinic and the banning of a student conference combined to create immense anger among the student body. On 16 May, students went on an orgy of destruction when they learnt that UNZASU President-general Ben Chilufya had been arrested. UNZA students smashed the principal's official car, a Peugeot 504, and set it alight.<sup>230</sup> This popular make of car in the 1980s and early 1990s was

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<sup>227</sup> 'Muf Youths in Anti-UNZA Protest', *Times of Zambia*, 14 March 1986, p. 1.

<sup>228</sup> 'Students Undaunted?', *Times of Zambia*, 14 April 1986, p. 1.

<sup>229</sup> Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 114.

<sup>230</sup> 'Students Run Riot: UNZA Principal Beaten in Rumpus', *Times of Zambia*, 17 May 1986, p. 1.

the official government and parastatal companies' vehicle in Zambia. It was an act of inter-student solidarity, which had become so common at UNZA during the 1980s. The principal of the university himself was violently assaulted by students in retribution for his decision to expel their leader.<sup>231</sup> Buildings, property and other cars were not spared from the students' wrath.



Figure 26: Smoke billowed from UNZA principal's car, set ablaze by angry UNZA students  
Source: 'Campus Tense', *Times of Zambia*, 18 May 1986, p. 1.

Students used the violence to pressure the university administration and government into releasing their arrested leader, Chilufya. A day after the violent scenes, on 17 May 1986, UNZASU Treasurer-General Anthony Kapenda said that the students would continue boycotting classes until Mr Chilufya was released. He alleged that the student leader had been beaten-up by policemen before he was whisked away to an unknown place.<sup>232</sup> Inter-campus unity prevailed as the Kitwe based UNZASU Deputy Secretary-General Mr Clement Ngalati issued a statement of support for his Lusaka based comrade. He publicly declared:

In view of the escalating oppression of students rights at the main campus and the subsequent uncalled for arrest of the student vanguard president-general Ben Chilufya, we as a representative

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<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> 'Campus Tense', *Times of Zambia*, 18 May 1986, p. 1.

body of the Ndola campus populace wish to notify the university administration that we are watching the events at the Lusaka campus very closely and we have decided to go on standby.<sup>233</sup>

Ngalati's warning that the entire Ndola campus was on standby was ominously followed with the candid remark that students were 'prepared to die' to secure his release. He warned of drastic action if the students' conditions were not met.<sup>234</sup> Rather than heed to the demands of students, the government swiftly closed UNZA for three months on 18 May 1986. Students were woken up at 4.30am by security forces and were all ordered to leave the premises with immediate effect.<sup>235</sup> UNZASU was banned indefinitely.<sup>236</sup> The government of UNIP hoped that by banning the student union it was eliminating the militancy and ideas that it stood for. Later events would disprove this notion.<sup>237</sup>

During the late 1980s discontent and grievances with conditions in UNZA continued. The *UZ* complained that the 'UNITED NATIONAL INTENSIVE PROFITEERS' had withdrawn blankets and linen from UNZA students and expelled 200 UNZA employees, whilst they had raised their own government salaries.<sup>238</sup> Following the 1986 UNZA closure students also found their freedom restricted. The student magazine *Echoes* lamented that, 'In our pursuit for a free academic atmosphere we continue to meet with strong

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<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>235</sup> 'UNZA Campus Shut: Student Unrest Forces Closure', *Times of Zambia*, 19 May 1986, p. 1.

<sup>236</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 85.

<sup>237</sup> 'UNZASU Rises from Oblivion', *Sophia: The Love of Wisdom*, 5 September 1991, p. 21.

<sup>238</sup> 'Profiteers', *UZ*, 3 September 1987, p. 2.

opposition from the PIG'.<sup>239</sup> Any criticisms, 'from this ivory tower are rebuffed by the PIG in his Copper plated soundproof enclosure up that small mountain/hill'.<sup>240</sup> In April 1989, and in spite of student protests, fees were finally introduced permanently at UNZA. The *Pasha* magazine noted correctly that the fees would 'see the mass exodus of students who cannot pay'.<sup>241</sup> The registration date for UNZA in fact had to be postponed to lower the fees because 2,000 out of the 3,000 students at the Lusaka campus could not afford to pay.<sup>242</sup> Malcontent at the 'cost-sharing' introduced by the government, along with poor conditions within UNZA facilities, led to disturbances in November 1989 and the closure of the university for one month.<sup>243</sup> Following the closure a UNIP youth league was finally formed at UNZA, and occupied the offices of the banned UNZASU.<sup>244</sup> However, it was received with suspicion by students who viewed it as another Special Branch 'mob' in disguise.<sup>245</sup> Yet, even after introduction of fees, some students did enrol as members of the campus youth league under the belief that they would be able to obtain UNIP scholarships to cover their educational costs.<sup>246</sup> Student freedom of speech was also clamped down on, as several student publications were banned for expressing views contrary to UNIP.<sup>247</sup> By the end of 1989 organised student opposition was effectively crushed – though not for long.

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<sup>239</sup> 'Comment', *Echoes*, 2 March 1987, p. 2.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>241</sup> 'The Fees Fizz', *Pasha*, 2 August 1989, p. 5.

<sup>242</sup> Balsvik, 'Student Protest', p. 310.

<sup>243</sup> Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 26.

<sup>244</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 84.

<sup>245</sup> 'League Here to Stay', *Watchdog*, 9 May 1990, p. 14.

<sup>246</sup> UNIP on Campus???, *Sophia: The Love of Wisdom*, March 1990, p. 7.

<sup>247</sup> Ihonvbere, *Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization*, p. 68.

Over the course of the 1980s, the various conflicts between students and the UNIP government and its respective youth league, helped set the stage for the spectacular role students were to play in the early 1990s pro-democracy movement. During this crucial period, students honed their ability to politically organise themselves and others. The alliances students forged with other youth groups over shared problems, such as the IMF cuts, were particularly important in this respect. As shown throughout this second section of this chapter, students were able to articulate their grievances in opposition to the state because of their strong ideological beliefs in Marxist-Leninism. The emphasis placed in Marxist-Leninist theory on the importance of workers and the masses, was similarly important in directing student focus towards concerns which impacted the wider population. This interest in the plight of ordinary Zambians, at a time when the UNIP government's support was lacking, endeared them to the public. This was crucial in the events of the early 1990s, in both rallying people to the MMD cause and spurring widespread protests.

### **6.3 The Rise of the MMD and the Fall of UNIP**

The third and final section of this chapter, will now examine the dramatic rise of the MMD and the fall of the UNIP government. This occurred over a short period of just two years. Zambia was not alone of course in experiencing momentous political change. Democratisation seemed to sweep sub-Saharan Africa during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Leo Zeilig's study on 'Students and the Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa' records that in 1991

alone 86 major protest movements occurred across 30 countries.<sup>248</sup> This was in comparison to the 20 recorded incidents of major political unrest annually in the 1980s. By 1992 many African governments had been forced to implement democratic changes to dictatorial political systems.<sup>249</sup> Issa Omari and Paschal Mihyo's 1991 study indicates that Zambians, in private, considered students to have 'saved the situation by demonstrating to draw the attention of the polity to the plight of the society under siege'.<sup>250</sup> An inauspicious reversal of fortunes saw the regime that had been helped to power through the exuberance of youth subsequently doomed by this same, diverse, group.

By the 1990s the economic situation in Zambia had deteriorated to catastrophic levels and public discontent was high. Agness Lweendo recalled this gloomy period of the country's history: 'things got worse with essential commodities. One week there would be no *nshima*, which never happened before during colonialism. Another time you couldn't get soap or sugar.'<sup>251</sup> She remembered feeling perplexed that, 'Zambia produced sugar, but sugar was nowhere to be seen. Zambia produced maize, but maize was nowhere to be seen'.<sup>252</sup> Agness Lweendo stated that because of the shortages in essential commodities people started calling for multipartyism. Brown Moses Mazumba also recalled that in Kanyama compound only community led

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<sup>248</sup> Zeilig, 'Students and the Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 1995-2005', p. 75.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>250</sup> Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 59.

<sup>251</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 24 September 2018.

<sup>252</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

projects existed, as the Lusaka city council did not operate in the settlement.<sup>253</sup> The lack of material support in compounds like Kanayama, meant that those living in these areas felt wholly abandoned by the UNIP government during the economic crisis. The constant price increases of staple foods similarly led to unease among much of Zambia's citizenry. Kennedy Shepande described the economic situation in the early 1990s as 'bad'. He remembered that even as a UNIP youth official, the shortages in sugar and other essential commodities were such that, 'you couldn't get [anything] unless you knew somebody at some retail shop... there was food rationing, it was a bad situation.'<sup>254</sup> As mentioned in section two of this chapter, in December 1986, the country experienced massive food riots because of the volatile price of basic food and products. Over 1,000 people were arrested for looting on the Copperbelt, as subsidies on *nshima* were lifted, causing a 110-pound bag of maize to rise to \$8.20. The average wage at the time was \$7 a month.<sup>255</sup> Although the violence of multipartyism had largely ended with the one-party state, Agness Lweendo remembered that the violence of hunger existed instead. This was a key motivator in the push towards multipartyism. Lweendo recalled: 'My husband was dealing with mealie meal for his job, and yet mealie meal for this country was still not available. So this was the violence in a way. Other people were producing sugar but sugar was still not available. So she thought there was not much benefit of one-party state if

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<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>254</sup> Interview with Kennedy Shepande, Lusaka, 19 August 2019.

<sup>255</sup> 'Six Dead, 1,000 Arrested, in Zambian Food Riots', *Associated Press*, 10 December 1986 <<https://apnews.com/article/e165610b1aa7e554b5ffed4d1ff551df>> [accessed 10 January 2021].

basic goods were not available'.<sup>256</sup> People were sleeping hungry with nothing to eat and she saw multipartyism as something that would be the solution to this. Similarly, Joseph Tembo remembered that in Mazabuka, shortages in shops 'was why people stopped supporting one party state'.<sup>257</sup>

Lumpen youths were especially impacted by the disastrous economy. In 1991, 65 per cent of those unemployed were youths.<sup>258</sup> Urban youths also faced forced relocation to rural areas. In April 1988, a further 10,000 unemployed youths were moved by the government. The resettlement schemes added to the estrangement felt by lumpen youths, who had already been widely scapegoated as the cause of commodity shortages. Though stalwarts of UNIP youth league remained, the majority of lumpen youths in Zambia no longer felt served by the government and deserted the party in droves. Kennedy Shepande, who was the UNIP youth league secretary, recollected the sorry state of the youth league during this time, 'It was still there, but the youths they had moved away in terms of policy to multiparty'.<sup>259</sup> Indeed, the key constituency of lumpen youth was lost by the various actions of the UNIP government and its youth league. As such, Phiri Mbao who lived in Chilenje, Lusaka, observed during the 1991 election campaign that, 'The UNIP youths didn't help out... it is one reason why UNIP lost the elections'.<sup>260</sup> As will be seen, with the majority of lumpen youths having shunned the party by the

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<sup>256</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 13 August 2019.

<sup>257</sup> Interview with Joseph Tembo, Mazabuka, 10 July 2019.

<sup>258</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>259</sup> Interview with Kennedy Shepande, Lusaka, 19 August 2019.

<sup>260</sup> Interview with Phiri Mbao, Chilenje, Lusaka, 16 August 2019.



early 1990s, their large numbers were able to bolster student protests and enable them to snowball into mass demonstrations.<sup>261</sup>

In 1990, UNZA students kept busy by maintaining a clandestine UNZASU, which remained an officially banned organisation. One student magazine defiantly declared that, 'The murder of UNZASU should never imply the death of consciousness... We should expose and hammer at the slightest opportunity we find'.<sup>262</sup> Because of this, the UNIP youth branch which had been established on the Lusaka campus was not left in peace for long. Chairman of the campus UNIP youth league, Lackson Simukonde, a second-year humanities student, apparently received a number of threatening letters from anonymous students. He complained that 'it was mob psychology'.<sup>263</sup> Unlike before UNZASU operated in the shadows of the university in the 1990s. Instead, loosely organised male students were the ones calling for class boycotts whenever there was a problem. To the untrained eye these individuals, who were based in the old residences of the university, were acting spontaneously and independently. This appearance was likely intended to cover the involvement of UNZASU, ensuring that the main body of UNZASU was protected should the university authorities decide to expel troublemakers. As Bizek Phiri explains, 'Because the lumpens portrayed themselves as an unorganised group without identifiable leadership, the University Administration could not easily deal with them'.<sup>264</sup> Intimidation was also used by UNZASU members. For example, anonymous circulars

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<sup>261</sup> Interview with Lt Colonel Bizwayo Nkanika, Chamba Valley, Lusaka, 18 August 2019.

<sup>262</sup> 'Editorial Comment', *VOP: Voice of the People*, May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>263</sup> 'League Here to Stay', *Watchdog*, 9 May 1990, p. 14.

<sup>264</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 71.

were pushed under the doors of students suspected to be UNIP supporters. These circulars threatened the targeted students with violence if they continued supporting the party.<sup>265</sup> Additionally, UNZA students started to meet regularly with members of the public to discuss politics.<sup>266</sup> Nevertheless, UNZA students did not grandiosely believe they would be the ones to overthrow the UNIP political system, not least because they lacked the weapons and power to do so. Instead, students at the *Spark* magazine reasoned that, ‘it is the oppressed and exploited workers and peasants who will overthrow it. We are only their allies, their supporters and sympathizers... Even though we demonstrate, student pressure cannot constitute a big threat to the entire state machinery’.<sup>267</sup> What the student authors of this article failed to acknowledge, however, was their importance as an organising force during a time when opposition parties were banned. As will be explored below, students were important facilitators of public protests, maintaining momentum in spite of the risk to themselves.

On 26 June 1990, with the country in \$7.2 billion worth of foreign debt and after yet another announcement by Kaunda that cornmeal prices were to be raised twofold, students organised a march in protest.<sup>268</sup> What began as a peaceful demonstration against the new maize price, turned into a three-day riot, as residents in the overcrowded compounds joined students to air their

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<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>266</sup> Tembo, *The University of Zambia*, p. 72.

<sup>267</sup> ‘Comment on Political Repression’, *Spark*, 7 April 1986, p. 1.

<sup>268</sup> ‘Calm Returns to Zambia After 3 Days of Riots’, *Washington Post*, 28 June 1990 <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/06/29/calm-returns-to-zambia-after-3-days-of-riots/a5ba094d-f118-4bdf-a140-5838d35d841f/>> [accessed 1 January 2021].

own displeasure.<sup>269</sup> The student demonstration was rapidly swollen by unemployed lumpen youths and the underprivileged in Lusaka city.<sup>270</sup> Looting occurred across Lusaka, from Longacres, Munali, Avondale, Northmead, Thornpark, Chilenje, Woodlands, Libala to Matero. The protests and riots also spread to the Copperbelt, where enraged mobs of unemployed youths stoned vehicles and shouted insults at security forces on the Ndola-Kitwe-Chingola road. Tear gas canisters were fired in a futile attempt to regain control. Youths in Chingola also burnt vehicles, which to them symbolised societal inequality and their inability to escape poverty.

By the end of the day, a two-day curfew was imposed throughout Lusaka, between 18.00-06.00.<sup>271</sup> UNZA students were critical in sustaining the momentum of the protests during this time. In contrast with the quiet of central Lusaka, at the UNZA campus noisy anti-government demonstrations continued to take place. Over 1,000 students shouted threats directed at the president himself. The highly masculinised campus culture at UNZA, already explored within this chapter, in turn influenced the type of threats expressed by students at this time. The call to ‘Castrate Kaunda’, for example, was used to emasculate the president and reflected the gendered understanding of power among UNZA students.<sup>272</sup> Importantly, banners were also hung on the perimeter fence of UNZA, which signalled the ongoing nature of the protest to the wider public, and to the president himself as he toured the destruction

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<sup>269</sup> ‘Lusaka Curfew to Quell Riots Over Price Rises’, *The Times*, 27 June 1990, p. 9.

<sup>270</sup> Balsvik, ‘Student Protest’, p. 307.

<sup>271</sup> *Times of Zambia*, 27 June 1990.

<sup>272</sup> ‘Lusaka Curfew to Quell Riots Over Price Rises’, *The Times*, 27 June 1990, p. 9.

left by the 26 June demonstration.<sup>273</sup> The messages on the banners called for the president's resignation or death: 'Kaunda don't shoot, resign' and 'Hang Kaunda'. Here the students added a political dimension to the public's economic distress.<sup>274</sup> Alongside this, students accelerated their efforts to 'educate' people living in neighbouring shanty compounds to UNZA.<sup>275</sup> By doing so students raised awareness of the deficient policies and lack of government direction among a population who otherwise lacked access to uncensored political information. As a result of this the unrest quickly morphed into a wider anger with the one-party system. The masses blamed the UNIP government for their woes.<sup>276</sup> The rioting and looting thus continued for a second day.<sup>277</sup> This time more political targets were chosen by the eclectic mix of protestors were much more politicised. In their anger a national monument, commemorating Kaunda's role in the nationalist struggle, was set alight. State-owned stores too were singled out by the protestors to be ransacked.<sup>278</sup>

Over the course of the three-day long uprising, 24 people were killed and 5 UNZA students were shot by security forces.<sup>279</sup> A three-year-old girl was also

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<sup>273</sup> 'Riots Force Kaunda to Fix Date for Referendum', *The Times*, 29 June 1990, p. 9.

<sup>274</sup> 'Calm Returns to Zambia After 3 Days of Riots', *Washington Post*, 28 June 1990 <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/06/29/calm-returns-to-zambia-after-3-days-of-riots/a5ba094d-f118-4bdf-a140-5838d35d841f/>> [accessed 1 January 2021] and 'Riots Force Kaunda to Fix Date for Referendum', *The Times*, 29 June 1990, p. 9.

<sup>275</sup> Mushingeh, 'Unrepresentative Democracy', p. 137.

<sup>276</sup> 'Lusaka Curfew to Quell Riots Over Price Rises', *The Times*, 27 June 1990, p. 9.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>278</sup> Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Free Press, 2006), p. 406.

<sup>279</sup> 'Calm Returns to Zambia After 3 Days of Riots', *Washington Post*, 28 June 1990 <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/06/29/calm-returns-to-zambia-after-3-days-of-riots/a5ba094d-f118-4bdf-a140-5838d35d841f/>> [accessed 1 January 2021].

tragically caught in the crossfire and died of gunshot wounds sustained from police fire.<sup>280</sup> Another 41 people were treated for gunshot wounds, cuts from flying glass, and fractures inflicted by police batons or rifle butts.<sup>281</sup> The national crisis was reported internationally by renowned newspapers, such as the American-based *Washington Post* and *The Times* in Britain. Kaunda faced mounting pressure to relinquish his 26-year grip on power.<sup>282</sup> The President ultimately agreed to set a date for a referendum on party pluralism, which he had previously promised in May 1990, but had never followed through on.<sup>283</sup> Such a referendum had previously been called for by the trade union leader Frederick Chiluba in December 1989, after learning of events in Eastern Europe: 'If the owners of socialism have withdrawn from the one-party system, who are Africans to continue with it?'<sup>284</sup> Article 4 of the Republic Constitution was thereafter repealed to allow for the formation of parties other than UNIP.<sup>285</sup> This paved the way for the creation of the MMD in July 1990.

UNZA students, on the other hand, paid for their role in the unrest. At 3am, on the morning of 29 June 1990, the university was stormed by security forces who fired live rounds at panicked students.<sup>286</sup> According to student reports at the time, police kicked in doors and windows and fired ammunition before

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<sup>280</sup> 'Lusaka Curfew to Quell Riots Over Price Rises', *The Times*, 27 June 1990, p. 9.

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>282</sup> 'Calm Returns to Zambia After 3 Days of Riots', *Washington Post*, 28 June 1990 <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/06/29/calm-returns-to-zambia-after-3-days-of-riots/a5ba094d-f118-4bdf-a140-5838d35d841f/>> [accessed 1 January 2021].

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>284</sup> Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p. 406.

<sup>285</sup> Momba and Madimutsa, 'The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia', p. 1.

<sup>286</sup> 'Kaunda's Forces Round up Students', *The Times*, 30 June 1990, p. 9.

herding students onto the lawns.<sup>287</sup> During the ensuing ruckus one student was shot in the arm and twenty-eight student leaders were beaten and detained.<sup>288</sup> Many more others, however, were able to evade capture by disappearing into nearby compounds like Kalingalinga.<sup>289</sup> UNZA was closed for an entire month.<sup>290</sup> By the time it reopened in August 1990, all students who had been arrested had been released.<sup>291</sup> But, during the months of closure UNZASU was not idle; it was in fact crucial in helping to organise the formation of the MMD.



**Figure 27: Membership card of Selina Mbozi for the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy**

*Source:* Shown during interview with Selina Mbozi, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

With political parties other than UNIP legalised, the MMD was quickly bought into existence on 20 July 1990 and officially registered as a political party on 4 January 1991 - ready for the 31 October 1991 general election.<sup>292</sup>

Various groups attended the meeting where the new party was conceived.

They included representatives of academia, the Law Association of Zambia,

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<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>289</sup> Omari and Mihyo, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 12.

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>291</sup> Phiri, *The History of the University of Zambia*, p. 84.

<sup>292</sup> Momba and Madimutsa, 'The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia', p. 2.

the Press Association of Zambia, the Economic Association of Zambia, ZCTU, and UNZA students' very own UNZASU. Each played an important role in supporting the fledgling party. The Economic Association of Zambia, for example, provided the secretariat, whilst UNZASU and academics were the intellectual driving force behind the MMD manifesto.<sup>293</sup> Past UNZA graduates also helped bolster the political ranks of the MMD. Boniface Kawimbe and Jonas Mukumbi are particularly noteworthy electoral candidates who stood for the new party. Both had previously joined the UPP in the 1970s, after the infamous 'Battle of Lusaka' incident, thus highlighting the equivalent importance of UNZA alumni in shaping the political trajectory of 1990s Zambia. Boniface Kawimbe was one of the few UPP members to reach senior office under the MMD, serving as Minister of Health from 1991-2001.<sup>294</sup> Following the inaugural meeting, the MMD paid for an advertisement in the national newspapers entitled 'National Interim Committee for Movement for Multiparty Democracy – Resolutions and Framework of Action'. This public invitation saw hundreds of people flock to the MMD secretariat to purchase membership cards, like the ones pictured above, to express their solidarity.<sup>295</sup>

Like their colleagues, who had been directly involved in founding the new party, the main student body at UNZA was overwhelmingly in favour of the MMD. This was shown following the university's reopening in August 1990,

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<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>294</sup> Miles Larmer, 'Enemies Within?: Opposition to the Zambian One-party State, 1972-1980', in *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-colonial Zambia*, ed. by Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, Giacomo Macola (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 123.

<sup>295</sup> Ihonvbere, *Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization*, p. 68.

when UNZASU elections were held. The majority of successful candidates were those who expressed support for the MMD.<sup>296</sup> The presidential post went to Misheck Mazyopa, who although a staunch Marxist-Leninist, was a paid-up member of the MMD.<sup>297</sup> Like other students, Mazyopa set aside ideological politics in favour of pragmatism, on the understanding that the MMD was ‘the only political party that can remove the UNIP government from power’.<sup>298</sup> These ideological differences, however, were remembered nearer the time of the general election, when students attempted to distance themselves from the party that was soon to take power. Interestingly, a number of successful UNZASU candidates were former members of UNIP. Vice-President, Fabian Mumba, for example, though a founding member of the MMD, had been a former UNIP campaigner in the 1988 Zambian elections.<sup>299</sup> An elected UNZASU committee member, Eric Mungaila, also had ties with UNIP as a youth league chairman in Chingola, but by 1991 had declared his support for the new party.<sup>300</sup> The closure of the university, moreover, had the unintended consequence of providing the MMD with 4,000 campaign workers, as students had been bussed back to their home villages.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> For instance, Vice-secretary Martin Kalungu supported the MMD, as well as the new treasurer, Famous Kabwe, who believed that students and the MMD had common interests.

<sup>297</sup> ‘Who is Who in UNZASU’, *Sophia: The Love of Wisdom*, 5 September 1991, p. 14.


<sup>298</sup> The UNZASU secretary, Gilbert Bvumburai, similarly stated he supported the MMD despite disagreeing with most of its ideas because he felt that the MMD was the only party that could dislodge UNIP from power. Ideologically he viewed Marxism as the most suitable ideology for third world countries. UNZASU Sports Secretary, Nicolas Banda, was also a supporter of MMD because he saw it as the party promising to remove the UNIP government from power. However, he was open about his intention to join the pro-Marxist social Democratic Party (SDP) in future: ‘Who Is Who in UNZASU’, *Sophia: The Love of Wisdom*, 5 September 1991, p. 14.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>301</sup> Ann Schlyter, *Recycled Inequalities: Youth and Gender in George Compound, Zambia* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1999), p. 49.





**Figure 28: A student cartoon depicts the MMD cutting down the one-party tree where Kaunda is hiding. The MMD is supported by the Law Association of Zambia, ZCTU and UNZA**  
 Source: 'Cartoon', Watchdog, 3 January 1991, p. 16.

In an attempt to quell the rising support of the MMD, the Kaunda government sought to intimidate those who joined the party. On 10 February 1991, remaining UNIP youths stoned MMD members in Luburma in Lusaka, injuring five MMD supporters.<sup>302</sup> On 26 June 1991, a near riot also occurred between UNIP and MMD youths in Livingstone's Maramba township.<sup>303</sup> Charles Chisala who had been a UNIP vigilante during the 1991 general election campaign recalled: 'Our mandate later included identifying members and sympathisers of the MMD, which was then fighting to remove UNIP from power... We reported them to the bosses who then unleashed us on the

<sup>302</sup> *Times of Zambia*, 10 February 1991.

<sup>303</sup> *Times of Zambia*, 26 June 1991.

hapless mortals to discourage them'.<sup>304</sup> However, without the backing of large numbers of lumpen youths, who were key to the party's previous political successes, this strategy was largely ineffective and party officials were forced to agree 'to share ground' with the MMD. Kaunda switched tactics thereafter. He refused to update voter registration lists, which effectively disenfranchised thousands of potential voters who were suspected opposition supporters.<sup>305</sup> Government resources and the state media were also co-opted for UNIP's campaign. It was only later, when the MMD won a ruling in the courts, that the opposition was given access to the state media.<sup>306</sup> Despite these attempts by UNIP to frustrate the MMD electoral campaign, the new party amassed significant national support. Phiri Mbaio described why she switched political allegiance to the MMD, having been a staunch UNIP member before the early 1990s. She explained:

We were all forced together... to change to MMD, we moved from UNIP and went to MMD. We even bought cards and joined as full members. I joined because I was just being motivated by the situation, now that nearly everyone had joined MMD. Even if I didn't have a role to play in the MMD, the fact that the community, the society had dictated the direction, the way to go - like a wind of change I was forced to go.<sup>307</sup>

This was similar to Laiza Choongo, who had also been a UNIP supporter but joined the MMD because of its potential to produce positive societal change.<sup>308</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> Charles Chisala, 'Recalling My UNIP Vigilante Days', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 24 July 2016, <<http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/recalling-my-unip-vigilante-days/>> [accessed 1 January 2021].

<sup>305</sup> Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p. 406.

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>307</sup> Interview with Phiri Mbaio, Chilenje, Lusaka, 16 August 2019.

<sup>308</sup> Interview with Laiza Choongo, Mazabuka, 11 July 2019.

It was at this point, when the MMD looked certain to secure victory that UNZA students began to distance themselves from the party. In keeping with UNZASU's previous refusal to entertain UNIP in its midst, the student union was similarly keen to ensure that the University would not be used as a future platform for the new political party.<sup>309</sup> Though UNZA students were *for* multipartyism, they were wary of becoming too closely affiliated with the MMD party. Closer political entanglement was thus avoided, out of fear that it would deny students their autonomy and freedom to criticize a future MMD government for any shortcomings and misdeeds.<sup>310</sup> This core concern of UNZASU is highlighted clearly in their involvement as independent monitors overseeing the democratic process. Initially the students' union supported the *Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT)* which had been established to ensure free and fair elections took place on 31 October 1991. Nearly 1,500 students had volunteered to oversee voting in this organisation. ZIMT, however, was accused of being influenced unfairly by both UNIP and the MMD. Its founder decided to run for a parliamentary seat for the MMD, whilst the press charged that ZIMT had been infiltrated by members of UNIP's Special Branch.<sup>311</sup> UNZASU also accused the ZIMT of co-opting some students without clearance or consultation with the union. These students were disowned

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<sup>309</sup> 'UNZASU Declares State of Emergency', *Sophia: The Love of Wisdom*, 5 September 1991, p. 5.

<sup>310</sup> Omari and Miho, *The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities*, p. 91.

<sup>311</sup> Eric Bjornlund, Michael Bratton and Clark Gibson, 'Observing Multiparty Elections in Africa: Lessons from Zambia', *African Affairs*, 91.364 (1992), p. 425 and David Bartlett, 'Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26.3 (2000), p. 441.

by UNZASU as representing themselves and not UNZA students.<sup>312</sup> Owing to this and the allegations of the organisation's partiality, the students' union swiftly joined a breakaway organisation, Zambia Election Monitoring and Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC). 700 UNZA students subsequently also joined the ZEMCC to monitor ballot boxes.<sup>313</sup> Thus although UNZA students played an important role in officially observing the elections, they were careful to distance themselves from any political party during the election campaign. Indeed, UNZASU recognised that although it had a mutual aim with the MMD in ousting the UNIP government, there was no ideological basis for future alliances.

On 31 October 1991, the vast majority of Zambians cast their ballots in favour of the MMD. Frederick Chiluba became President, receiving 76 per cent of the presidential vote. The MMD attained more than 84 per cent of the total votes and won in all of the 19 constituencies of the southern province.<sup>314</sup> Overall the MMD won 125 out of 150 available parliamentary seats.<sup>315</sup> The vice-national secretary of the MMD suggested that his party secured victory so easily because 'people were fed up with one-party dictatorship' and public opinion had shifted against UNIP.<sup>316</sup> Agness Lweendo supported this idea in interview, remembering that, 'MMD came out as victorious. I waited and cast

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<sup>312</sup> Ihonvbere, *Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization*, p. 133.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>314</sup> Julius Ihonvbere, 'From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia', *Journal of African Studies*, 29.1 (1995), p. 10.

<sup>315</sup> Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p. 406.

<sup>316</sup> Momba and Madimutsa, 'The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia', p. 4.

my vote because I was sick and tired [of the regime]. That was why I went to vote'.<sup>317</sup> On 1 November 1991, youths in Lusaka celebrated the MMD victory by tearing up UNIP cards.<sup>318</sup> Despite earlier resistance, a despondent Kaunda quietly accepted UNIP's defeat and personally escorted Chiluba on a tour around State House. After giving a farewell speech on television he tearfully detached the presidential pennant from his limousine and was driven away.<sup>319</sup>

## **Conclusion**

In the midst of economic decline, Kaunda's defeat had thus been cemented by the loss of support amongst Zambia's youth, the same demographic which UNIP revered and had risen from during the colonial period. During the 1980s and early 1990s, this chapter has traced the cardinal role played by UNZA students in rallying and supporting various other youth groups – and ordinary Zambians - against the UNIP government.<sup>320</sup> UNZA functioned as a sustained base of opposition during these defining years of Zambian history, and not only provided a political articulation of grassroots issues, but also demonstrated the successes of taking action. This chapter has also shown that the UNIP government's inability to cater to the needs of lumpen youths during the economic turmoil, and its scapegoating of 'Mishanga' boys as a cause of commodity shortages, alienated a key support base which it had historically relied on to win elections. The failure of the UNIP youth league to bridge the momentous gap between itself and UNZA students, coupled

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<sup>317</sup> Interview with Christine Tembo, Brown Moses Mazumba, Agness Lweendo and Liston Lweendo, Kanyama, Lusaka, 24 September 2018.

<sup>318</sup> *Times of Zambia*, 1 November 1991.

<sup>319</sup> Meredith, *The State of Africa*, p. 407.

<sup>320</sup> Mushingeh, 'Unrepresentative 'Democracy'', p. 137.

with the role played by vigilantes in targeting fellow lumpen youths, meant that by 1991 the party had lost the youth. UNZA students' skill in building inter-youth networks, on the other hand, made all the difference in the push to remove UNIP from power.

## Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This study has exposed the interfusion of youth, politics, and violence throughout Zambia's late colonial and early postcolonial period. By taking seriously an often neglected demographic and analytical category in Zambian history, this thesis has shed light on the multiple ways in which Zambians *themselves* organised and understood hierarchies of power and politics. Revealing that it was youths who were at the heart of political violence, both as its perpetrators and victims, this investigation has provided a crucial *in-depth* explanation of the often-violent undercurrents operating within Zambian politics between 1958-1991. This analysis thus builds on current revisionist works, which have begun to uncover the real extent of political opposition to United National Independence Party (UNIP) hegemony, as well as the reasons for the party's longevity.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, in looking at youth, who occupied the lower rungs of the socio-political ladder, this examination has offered substantial insights into the lived experience of politics at the grassroots level of Zambian society.<sup>2</sup> Transcending conventional methodologies, the analysis has carefully stitched together top-down elite *perceptions* of youth with bottom-up *perspectives* from the youth themselves.<sup>3</sup> This approach, used throughout the chapters of

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<sup>1</sup> The latter has especially been taken for granted within the older nationalist literature pertaining to Zambia.

<sup>2</sup> Which revisionist historians have discerned a need for in Zambianist literature. See: Miles Larmer, "'If We Are Still Here Next Year': Zambian Historical Research in the Context of Decline, 2002-2003', *History in Africa*, 31 (2004), p. 216.

<sup>3</sup> Here interviews conducted for the purpose of this thesis have been invaluable in revealing the perspective and experiences of youth themselves, who are so often silent in the written

this thesis, has proved that no easy black and white distinctions can be made regarding Zambia's youth, whose lived realities always existed in shades of grey. Rather than fitting comfortably into the binary descriptors used so often in youth studies, this thesis argues that it is youth's *potential to become* something that tends to be the overarching motivator in both their actions and the actions of the political parties wishing to control them.<sup>4</sup> In other words, they are neither 'makers' nor 'breakers', but it was their *potential* for both in Zambian society that constituted their categorisation.<sup>5</sup>

Whilst chapter one explored the central issue of defining youth within African youth scholarship<sup>6</sup> and surveyed how youth has been discussed – or neglected – within Zambianist literature<sup>7</sup>, chapter two has illuminated the ways in which youth became embedded in African nationalist politics during the late colonial era. Indeed, in recognising the ways in which the energies of youth

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record with others speaking for them. This approach, moreover, has helped avoid what Broch-Due calls 'the temptation to simplistically locate violence in some bounded context', by connecting localised youth violence and actions with wider socioeconomic and political structures. See, Broch-Due, Vigdis, 'Violence and Belonging: Analytical Reflection', in *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-colonial Africa*, ed. by Vigdis Broch-Due (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Deborah Durham's study renders youth as political saboteurs, whilst Asiedu-Acquah, for example, counters this destructive view of youth by asserting their tendency to act as bulwarks against authoritarianism: Deborah Durham, 'Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 73.3 (2000), p. 113. Also see, Emmanuel Asiedu-Acquah, "'And Still the Youth Are Coming": Youth and Popular Politics in Ghana, c. 1900-1979' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard University, 2015).

<sup>5</sup> The edited collection *Makers and Breakers* has likewise attempted to navigate through the binary stereotypes of African youth, in an attempt to uncover the lived realities of youth behind these preconceptions. Filip De Boeck and Alcinda Honwana, 'Introduction: Children and Youth in Africa', in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. by Alcinda Honwana and Filip de Boeck (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), pp. 1-18.

<sup>6</sup> Discussions surrounding who and what the category designates permeate almost every work involving African youth.

<sup>7</sup> The anthropological works of the Rhodes-Livingstone institute in particular denote the important role of gerontocracy as a means of organising power within precolonial and colonial Zambian society. This hierarchy placed elders at the top and youths at the bottom rungs of socio-political power.



were mobilised to the nationalist cause, the chapter has contributed towards a better understanding of the tumultuous inter-party and intra-party struggles that took place during the twilight years of colonial rule in the territory.<sup>8</sup> Significant is the finding that disagreements over the role of youth played a cardinal part in the African National Congress (ANC)/Zambian African National Congress (ZANC)-UNIP split; a role hitherto unacknowledged in Zambianist discourse. Having failed to secure a greater role in the ANC party, a number of leading youths created UNIP, which contrary to the ANC's traditionalist view of youth as simply 'protectors', embraced a revolutionary role for its youth. This had dramatic ramifications on the character of both parties' nationalist movements, particularly on the realities of political violence; the consequences of which continued well into the First Republic. Harnessing their vitality, the UNIP party benefited from UNIP youth league members who aggressively campaigned for their party at the grassroots level. Indeed, an indispensable part of electioneering, and thus achieving negotiated independence democratically, was winning votes at the grassroots level. Those in the ANC youth league, on the other hand, acted as violent defenders of the party, particularly as UNIP attempted to make inroads into Southern Province.

Accounting for both the role of UNIP and ANC youths in political violence, the analysis found that the majority of urban perpetrators were from the UNIP youth league, whilst the majority of rural aggressors in Southern and Central

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<sup>8</sup> Which Macola and Larmer have already diligently worked to uncover. See, Giacomo Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).

Province were ANC youths.<sup>9</sup> As well as considering rural youth, which has so often been side-lined in favour of investigating urban youth, the chapter discussed the political divergence of highly educated youths and their lumpen cousins.<sup>10</sup> The theme of divergence and convergence between these two sub-groups of youth is of course continually referenced throughout this thesis.<sup>11</sup> As well as unveiling that political violence was not anomalous within Zambian African nationalist politics<sup>12</sup>, the chapter more broadly contributed to the literature on negotiated independence. A proclivity to juxtapose the violence of liberation wars with territories that experienced negotiated independence settlements, has unfortunately overshadowed the realities of everyday violence in the latter.<sup>13</sup> With this modest case study on Zambia, it is hoped other scholars will conduct similar inquiries, by examining violence in areas which experienced negotiated independence in its own right.

Tracing matters of party politics into the early postcolonial period, chapter three explored the link between political competition and political violence. The chapter established that youth were a crucial component of the inter-party political violence that plagued the First Republic. The majority of this was

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<sup>9</sup> See sections: 2.2.3 'Urban Perpetrators: UNIP Youth Violence', pp. 107-111 and 2.2.4 'Rural Aggressors: ANC Youths in Southern and Central Province', pp. 112-116 of chapter two of this thesis.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Karen Hansen, 'Getting Stuck in the Compound: Some Odds Against Social Adulthood in Lusaka, Zambia', *Africa Today*, 51.4 (2005), pp. 3-16 and Richard Waller, 'Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa', *Journal of African History*, 47.1 (2006), pp. 77-92.

<sup>11</sup> Particularly chapter three, chapter five and chapter six of this thesis.

<sup>12</sup> Earlier nationalist studies emphasised that any violence was the exception to the norm. See: Tordoff, William, 'Introduction', *Politics in Zambia*, ed. by William Tordoff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), pp. 1-39 and David Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).

<sup>13</sup> Far more scholarly focus on political violence has been afforded to countries which experienced liberation wars: Timothy Scarnecchia, *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008).

carried out by UNIP youths, who were vital elements in maintaining UNIP hegemony. The chapter showed that in the face of other competing political visions for the country, the violence wielded by UNIP youths ensured that, for the most part, Zambian people feared to openly support opposition parties or challenge the UNIP government. In short, their violence was revealed to be the ‘natural offshoot’ of UNIP’s exclusionary political philosophies, an argument first put forward by Macola.<sup>14</sup> Throughout the multi-party era their violent propensities, however, did at times provoke and entrench opposition support, as attested by the example of the ANC after the 1967 by-election in Mazabuka. The cash-strapped ANC opted for the rhetorical condemnation of the violent activities of the UNIP youth organisation and only deviated from this position when the spread of political intimidation left little alternative options for survival – indicating that the ANC never progressed past its traditionalist view of youth as ‘protectors’.

The chapter also noted that UNIP’s aim of building a larger youthful support base in the country was only partially achieved, as shown by UNIP’s fraught relationship with University students. The chapter submitted that the existence and growing strength of these opposition forces – especially from the late 1960s – meant that UNIP became increasingly keen to introduce a *de jure* one-party dispensation to keep power.<sup>15</sup> The eventual adoption of the

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<sup>14</sup> Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa*.

<sup>15</sup> Examples of this growing opposition, given in chapter three, included the merger between the ANC and the banned UP, which injected a renewed militancy into the ANC’s otherwise impotent youth wing. The UP was the first Zambian opposition party openly committed to resisting the intimidation and terror tactics of UNIP youth. Another example included the creation of the UPP party which posed an even bigger threat to UNIP power, given that it undermined the ruling party’s hegemony over youthful violence thanks to its robust support base among university students.

one-party system thus symbolised the inability of the UNIP government to manage competing political interests in the newly independent nation. This reality stood in stark contrast to how one-partyism was presented to the public as a ‘natural progression’, given UNIP’s professed supremacy.

Additionally, chapter three questioned the real extent of youth agency within the dynamics of their political participation and the minutiae of their activities within political organisations. This line of inquiry has especially exercised the minds of scholars of democratic participation and party politics in Africa and produced considerable disagreement.<sup>16</sup> Asking whether party youths were mere pawns in the hands of political elites, or, whether they should rather be regarded as astute agents bent on navigating fraught political situations to their advantage, the chapter interrogated the utility of Samuel Okafor’s designation of youth as ‘sacrificial lambs’.<sup>17</sup> The archival evidence examined confirmed that the bodies of Zambian youths were repeatedly put ‘on the line’ in the name of political gains. The chapter illustrated that in as much as their entanglement in militant party politics made them perpetrators of political violence, they must also be considered victims. This of course echoes Honwana and De Boeck’s assertion that youths occupy an ‘interstitial

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<sup>16</sup> See: Mary Maynes, ‘Age as a Category of Historical Analysis: History, Agency, and Narratives of Childhood’, *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, 1.1 (2008), p. 116; Peter Kagwanja, ‘Clash of Generations? Youth Identity, Violence and the Politics of Transition in Kenya, 1997-2002’, in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 90; and Alcinda Honwana, ‘The Pain of Agency, the Agency of Pain: Child-Soldiers as Interstitial and Tactical Agents’, in *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. by Alcinda Honwana and Filip De Boeck (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), pp. 31-52.

<sup>17</sup> Samuel Okafor, ‘Youth Involvement in Political Violence/Thuggery: A Counter Weight to Democratic Development in Africa’, *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 5.3 (2017), p. 1.

position between victim and perpetrator'.<sup>18</sup> However, Okafor's metaphor only captured one aspect of the lived political experiences of Zambian youth at this time. Indeed, although the youth's actions did usually serve to bolster and protect the political parties they supported, the chapter found that their violent militancy could, and did at times, hinder the objectives and even threaten the very parties they were fighting for. There thus existed a constant unease, especially within UNIP, as to whether youth militancy would turn out to be a poisoned chalice.

With chapter three having cast light on the subordinate position of youth within Zambian party politics, and the often-violent consequences of their manipulation by political superiors, chapter four shifted the focus to how youth dealt with their social juniors. Special attention was paid to the power dynamics that obtained between youths and such social inferiors as female youths, foreigners and members of religious sects. The chapter revealed that within the social sphere youths – principally male UNIP youths - acted out a form of semi-adulthood, by wielding violent control over their social subordinates. Concerning gender, for instance, the chapter showed that hypermasculinity and control over female bodies served as one means of achieving adulthood for an otherwise marginalised youth. This was in accordance with a gendered hierarchy, predicated on the control, dependency, and subordination of women to men, which operated in much of Zambian society at the time.<sup>19</sup> The chapter identified the anti-miniskirt campaigns as

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<sup>18</sup> De Boeck and Honwana, 'Introduction', p. 12.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas Burgess and Andrew Burton, 'Introduction', in *Generations Past: Youth in East African History*, ed. by Andrew Burton and Helene Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), p. 8.

key events in this regard, as male party youths fought fiercely to maintain the gendered status quo and, by so doing, protect their path to recognized adulthood. This was comparable with Clive Glaser's findings in the context of gangs which operated in Soweto, South Africa, between 1935-1976, where youthful masculinity was tied to 'bodily control over young women'.<sup>20</sup> By incorporating a gendered perspective, the chapter similarly highlighted the vastly different experiences of young men from that of young women, with the former being perpetrators of violence and the latter solely victims. Zambian youth must therefore be understood as a composite social entity, where no automatic solidarity existed between members of its subgroups.

Chapter four likewise highlighted UNIP youth's violent outbursts against the African 'other' and Jehovah's Witnesses, a minority religious group which existed in Zambia. Concerning foreign nationals, victims of choice were found to be Tanzanians, specific groups of Europeans, and Congolese people. The chapter recognised that youth violence against foreigners stemmed from youths' attempts to quash perceived socioeconomic competitors and to carve out a more socially respectable identity as vigilantes and protectors of the new order. By highlighting the case of male UNIP youths violently victimising Congolese women and children the chapter also countered Timothy Gibbs' claim that young men tend to be the main victims of social violence.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, by violently targeting, not only men, but women and children as well, youths put pressure on the more vulnerable members of the foreign group, making it

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<sup>20</sup> Clive Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi: The Youth Gangs of Soweto, 1935-1976* (London: Heinemann, 2000), p. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Timothy Gibbs, 'Inkatha's Young Militants: Reconsidering Political Violence in South Africa', *The International Africa Institute*, 87.2 (2017), p. 391.

more likely they would leave out of fear. Regarding Watchtower members, youth's violent actions against them were found to be driven by a 'threat containment' mentality, as the religious sect was deemed disloyal to the UNIP political dispensation; a dispensation rural youths prized for its promise of greater freedoms from gerontocratic control. As with chapter two, this exploration of rural youth helped advance understandings of the adoption of violence by this specific sub-group of youth, which has remained under-researched compared to its urban counterparts.<sup>22</sup> An examination of youth violence during the First Republic thus revealed that, as with Zambia's political society, the marginal social sphere was likewise ruled through youthful force.

The analysis of this 'shrewd' violence demonstrated that it was essentially born out of fear concerning youths' ability to safeguard access to the socially dominant identity of UNIP. Taken together, therefore, chapters three and four showed that Zambian youth frequently blurred the boundaries between the political and social and were active on both fronts during Zambia's First Republic.<sup>23</sup> This allowed the argument to be made that youth, which are so often placed at the margins of the public sphere and major political processes,

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<sup>22</sup> See, chapter two of this thesis, pp. 112-116. See Krijn Peters, *War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 230. Another work which looks at both rural and urban youth is Danielle Resnick and James Thurlow, 'Introduction: African Youth at a Crossroads', in *African Youth and the Persistence of Marginalization: Employment, Politics, and Prospects for Change*, ed. by Danielle Resnick and James Thurlow (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 1-20. See also, Ivo Mhike, 'Deviance and Colonial Power: A History of Juvenile Delinquency in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-c.1960' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of the Free State, 2016).

<sup>23</sup> Jon Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Renewal', in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 3.

were in fact central to them.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, the chapters revealed that a concurrent analysis of both the political and social realms can help complicate, and escape, the rigid binary distinctions between victim and perpetrator, which are so often applied in African youth studies.<sup>25</sup> In the political sphere, Zambian youths can be understood as victims, in the sense that they were manipulated by their political seniors to serve as ‘fodder’ during interparty political conflict. Yet, an examination of the social sphere revealed them to be active perpetrators of violence when interacting with their social juniors. This finding, especially, builds on the work of Jok Madut Jok, who has already argued that party political involvement does not automatically prevent youths from acting autonomously, at least on an individual level.<sup>26</sup>

Moving towards an understanding of how public resources were used by the UNIP government to co-opt problem youth, chapter five examined two key organisations, the Zambia Youth Service (ZYS) and the Zambia National Service (ZNS). These were established in 1964 and 1971, respectively. While chapter two briefly looked at the nationalist visions of a publicly funded youth service, chapter five went into much greater detail about how these visions were realised. Moving beyond the ‘developmentalist’ framework, which

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<sup>24</sup> De Boeck and Honwana, ‘Introduction’, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> This approach consolidates the seemingly contrasting viewpoints of youth being ‘marionettes’ of the political elite, as argued by Peter Kagwanja, and youth as reactionary ‘stakeholders’ as put forward by Kwesi Aning and Angela McIntyre. See: Kwesi Aning and Angela McIntyre, ‘From Youth Rebellion to Child Abduction: The Anatomy of Recruitment in Sierra Leone’, in *Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa*, ed. by Angela McIntyre (Cape Town: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), pp. 67-86; Kagwanja, ‘Clash of Generations?’, p. 90; and Abbink, ‘Being Young in Africa’, p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> Jok Madut Jok, ‘War, Changing Ethics and the Position of Youth in South Sudan’, in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics, and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by John Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 145-162.



considers such programmes chiefly through their employability successes, the chapter took a similar approach to Ivo Mhike's work on Zimbabwe and explored the political implications of Zambia's national youth organisations.<sup>27</sup> In so doing chapter five has enhanced understandings of Zambia's development policies during the first few decades of independence – which are shown to be strongly shaped by the category of youth. This diverged from countries like Kenya and Nigeria where ethnicity was the overriding factor in resource distribution for development.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, viewed as the 'future of the nation', state patronage in Zambia was readily dispensed on youths through the form of national youth programmes, so long as the government was able to afford it. Applying a political perspective to the topic, moreover, enabled the chapter to serve as a case study into the mechanisms behind 'political settlements' that were crafted between newly independent governments and their citizens. Indeed, the chapter highlighted how pathways of power and dependency were negotiated and contested by politicians and youths. Zambian politicians were shown to be just as reliant on youths for national development, as youths were reliant on the government for socioeconomic support. This, it is argued, created a constant exchange and shift in the balance of power.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Ivo Mhike argues that, in the context of Zimbabwe, youth were coerced into the youth service and their violence used to entrench the incumbent party's political power: Ivo Mhike, 'Political Violence in the Zimbabwe National Youth Service, 2001 -2007' in *What Politics?: Youth and Political Engagement in Africa*, ed. by Elina Oinas, Henri Onodera and Leena Suurpää (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 246-264.

<sup>28</sup> See especially: Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh and Will Kymlicka, 'Introduction: Ethnicity and the Politics of Democratic Nation-building in Africa', in *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, ed. by Bruce Berman, Will Kymlicka, and Dickson Eyoh (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), pp. 1-21.

<sup>29</sup> The large population of youths made them powerful as a labour force and a potentially destabilising social force, due to their youthful energy and precarious socio-economic position.

Notable differences between the various incarnations of the ZYS and ZNS were likewise identified. These crucially highlighted how changing political perceptions of youth impacted these national organisations and the realities of their youthful members. In the immediate independence period, the UNIP government conceived of the ZYS as an exclusive reward for a sub-section of youth revered for the political benefits they brought the party: loyal (male) UNIP youth cadres. Indeed, these idealised youths, prized for their hooliganism against opposition party members, caused similar ‘trouble’ as ZYS members, and worked against opposition parties. In this way, the early character of the ZYS corresponds with Richard Waller’s assertion that such organisations ‘appeared to give licence to hooliganism and rebelliousness’.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, this author’s analysis of the ZYS, which finds that ZYS members were already staunch UNIP youths, strongly confutes Marja Hinfelaar’s suggestion that the ZYS was used a tool of political indoctrination.<sup>31</sup> In the early 1970s, the one-party state brought with it a reconceptualization of youth as ‘threatening’ because of their apparent idleness and delinquency. Analysis revealed that this was tied into the banning of multipartyism, which had previously served as a scapegoat for the existence of national issues, such as the rising unemployment and social crisis impacting Zambian youths. The ZNS, which came into being in 1971, was thus intended to alleviate this

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<sup>30</sup> Waller, ‘Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa’, p. 79.

<sup>31</sup> Hinfelaar uses an interview with Fred Kafumbe who recalled that ‘youth of the Zambia Youth Service were actually campaign leaders, who would enter villages to force people to vote for Kaunda’s UNIP party’. Yet Hinfelaar’s interpretation that these youths must have been indoctrinated within the ZYS I argue is incorrect. These youths were already campaign leaders prior to their time in the ZYS, and as such would have campaigned for UNIP regardless: Hinfelaar, ‘A History of SNV From a Zambian Perspective’, p. 7.

growing 'danger' by providing vocational training. In turn, youths were expected to develop the country's agriculture and provide the labour for other government run development projects. The chapter observed that when this political settlement became unbalanced, youth at the time were quick to respond with organised strikes and protests. Youth's potential for disruption was thus rendered visible in these moments, a finding which expands on Deborah Durham's idea of youths as 'saboteurs' - by illuminating a fragile political settlement as the motivation behind their violence.<sup>32</sup> That is to say, ZNS youths did not act automatically as saboteurs, but resorted to violence to defend their own interests. This was in spite of the ZNS actively pushing members to support and sympathise with UNIP, in contrast to the ZYS.

In the second half of the 1970s, chapter five highlighted how the government turned its focus from lumpen youths to educated youths. The ZNS was thus transformed and made compulsory for all form five school leavers, in an effort to tackle rising student opposition at the University of Zambia (UNZA) and other tertiary education institutions. Chapter five – *and chapter six* - illustrated the disastrousness of this reactive decision. It served to exclude youths who were unable to progress in their education, and exacerbated the plight of lumpen youths within the country, who could no longer rely on a government safety net. Ironically, it was similarly demonstrated that the decision ultimately aggravated the government's already strained relationship with educated youths. The deepening recession limited the availability of state resources to effectively run the ZNS camps and deteriorating conditions

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<sup>32</sup> Durham, 'Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa', p. 113.

were not ameliorated. Significantly, therefore, the chapter found that the roots of *mass* youth opposition to the government began as far back as the 1970s. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of ‘problem’ youth more widely symbolised the UNIP government’s national failures and inability to look after its citizens.<sup>33</sup> Simply put, youths were the canaries in the mine to the unravelling of UNIP authority in the face of severe economic challenges. These economic challenges were found to be exacerbated by Kaunda’s focus on supporting the various liberation struggles that surrounded Zambia at the time. This focus likewise shaped the character of Zambia’s national youth programmes, as trainees were expected to defend the nation against the very real aggressions of their white-ruled neighbours. Indeed, by analysing Zambia’s national youth services, the chapter accordingly shed light on the impact of Kaunda’s southern African foreign policy on *Zambian* people, something which few scholars have seriously explored.<sup>34</sup>

Continuing from where chapter five left off, chapter six explored the contribution of youth to the fall of UNIP between 1980 and 1991, with particular emphasis on students. A key argument made in the chapter, was that UNIP’s loss of support of Zambia’s youth played a central role in the

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<sup>33</sup> This mirrors the idea of youth as ‘complex’ signifiers, who illuminate the social and political constitution of the societies in which they live, as put forward by Jean and John Comaroff. See: Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, ‘Reflections on Youth, from the Past to the Postcolony’, in *Frontiers of Capital: Ethnographic Reflections on the New Economy*, ed. by Melissa Fisher and Greg Downey (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 267.

<sup>34</sup> Kalusa and Phiri note that in spite of President Kaunda’s admission of the devastating consequences on people of his own southern African foreign policy, few scholars have seriously emulated his efforts to analyse such impact. See, Walima Kalusa and Bizeck Phiri, ‘Introduction: Zambia’s Postcolonial Historiography’, *Zambia Social Science Journal*, 5.1 (2014), p. 4.

party's demise.<sup>35</sup> As this thesis has traced, it was, ironically, the same demographic which UNIP had revered, and risen from, just decades earlier. The chapter demonstrated that UNZA functioned as a sustained base of opposition during these defining years of Zambian history. Students showed themselves to be a guiding light, at a time when any and all criticism of the UNIP government was relentlessly repressed. Students provided a political articulation of the many rising issues affecting Zambian people during the 1980s and proved the success of direct action alongside their well-studied counterparts in the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).<sup>36</sup> As scholars such as John Nkinyangi and Leo Zeilig have already identified, chapter six's analysis showed that students were distinctly mobile within the socioeconomic strata they inhabited, politically articulate because of their education, and able to 'converge' their own struggles with broader popular forces.<sup>37</sup> Though many studies have conceived of students as staunch revolutionaries in the context of their political activities, chapter six revealed that - in spite of their actions being revolutionary - some students construed

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<sup>35</sup> This is comparable to Murray Last's findings in his sweeping analysis which traced the cyclical pattern of youth revolutions in Northern Nigeria from 1750 to 2000. Last revealed that once older political systems were overthrown by the youth, these same 'new' youth leaders, once they became old, were similarly forced out by the next generation: Murray Last, 'Towards a Political History of Youth in Muslim Northern Nigeria, 1750-2000', in *Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, ed. by Jon Abbink and Ineke Van Kessel (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 50.

<sup>36</sup> See especially, Miles Larmer, *Mineworkers in Zambia: Labour and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa, 1964-1991* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Jotham Momba and Clever Madimutsa, 'The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia', *The South African Institute of International Affairs*, 17 (2009), pp. 1-19; Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, 'The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia', *Review of African Political Economy*, 54 (1992), pp. 75-91; and Emmanuel Akwetey and Jon Kraus, 'Trade Unions, Development, and Democratization in Zambia: The Continuing Struggle', in *Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa*, ed. by Jon Kraus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 123-156.

<sup>37</sup> Isaac Zeilig, 'Students and the Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 1995-2005' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Brunel University, 2005), p. 114 and John Nkinyangi, 'Student Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Higher Education*, 22.2 (1991), p. 169.

themselves simply as a-political actors who were responsible for pushing forward new ideas and holding [any] government accountable.<sup>38</sup> In this sense the distinction made in some studies of African youth, and which has been criticised by Jon Abbink, between youth as either apocalyptic or emancipatory is further complicated by UNZA student's own position.<sup>39</sup>

By acknowledging the role played by youth, chapter six also reached an improved understanding concerning the importance of inter-group networks in building a grassroots opposition base. The analysis thus contributed to the broader literature on the African pro-democracy movements, which swept the continent in the 1990s.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, by recognising these multiple points of contact between sub-groups of youth, the chapter enhanced understandings regarding both the political motivators that drove people to opposition politics, and the mechanisms that drew their disorganised dissent into a fully-fledged opposition party. In this respect exploring the intersections of youth sub-groups and their connection with broader political forces was key. The chapter showed that students were a central organising element in the rise of opposition party politics and in creating alliances with other youth groups. On top of this, their experience in managing a union and organising mass class-boycotts gave them an edge in traversing the tough terrain of opposition

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<sup>38</sup> Zeilig, 'Students and the Struggle for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 1995-2005', p. 114 and Nkinyangi, 'Student Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa', p. 169.

<sup>39</sup> Abbink, 'Being Young in Africa', p. 23.

<sup>40</sup> Such as: Lisa Mueller, *Political Protest in Contemporary Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) and Emil Uddhammar, Elliott Green and Johanna Soderstrom, 'Political Opposition and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa', in *Political Opposition in Africa*, ed. by Elliott Green, Emil Uddhammar and Johanna Söderström (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp 1-11. For Zambia, see especially: Lise Rakner, 'Institutionalising the Pro-democracy Movements: The Case of Zambia's Movement for Multiparty Democracy', *Democratizations*, 18.5 (2011), pp. 1106-1124.

politics. This, it was argued, contrasted with UNIP's handling of its relationships with various sub-groups of youth. The chapter illuminated that by the time the 1991 election occurred, UNIP had managed to alienate all but the most loyal youths to its party. The failure of the UNIP youth league to bridge the considerable gap between itself and UNZA students, combined with the role played by vigilantes in targeting lumpen youths, meant that by 1991 the party had all but lost the youth. UNZA students' skill in forging inter-youth networks, in contrast, helped ensure the removal of UNIP from power and the success of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).

Chapter six, taken together with other analyses of educated youths within this thesis<sup>41</sup>, has also challenged the periodisation of student protests in the existing Africanist literature, which has so often been confined to the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, this thesis joins a promising handful of other studies which have begun to colour in the picture of student political involvement in Africa *before* the 1980s.<sup>42</sup> Examining the *longue durée* of student politics has allowed this thesis, for example, to not only contextualise the seemingly sudden rise of student protests in 1990s Zambia, but also to better understand student actions within the various moments they occurred. In the same way this thesis has, throughout, pointed to the undercurrent of political violence which existed in the country, from the inception of African multiparty politics

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<sup>41</sup> See especially chapter two pp. 60-70, chapter three pp. 179-189 and chapter five pp. 310-320 of this thesis.

<sup>42</sup> Spurred by the Rhodes Must Fall protests, the 2019 special issue of *Africa*, 'Student Activism in an Era of Decolonisation', has made strong inroads into acknowledging the prolonged history of student politics across a number of African countries. See for instance: Tatiana Smirnova, 'Student Activism in Niger: Subverting the 'Limited Pluralism'', 1960-83', *Africa*, 89 (2019), pp. 167-188 and Luke Melchiorre, 'Creating a 'Monster': The National Youth Service Pre-university Training Programme, Student Activism and the Kenyan State, 1978-90', *Africa*, 89 (2019), pp. 65-89.

in 1958, through to the end of UNIP's 27-years in power. By doing so this thesis has shown that political violence was not confined to a few sporadic outbreaks, but pervaded Zambian political culture in multiple and diverse ways - with youths embedded in its realities. This thesis asserts that it makes no sense to look at one, without the other. Of course, this violence was not as extreme as its regional neighbours, but that should not preclude a serious study of its existence in Zambia's past, nor disqualify the recognition of its impact on the everyday lives of Zambian people. Having explored political violence in Zambia during the late colonial and early postcolonial period, and the importance of youths in shaping its various historical trajectories, this thesis, in line with recent revisionist accounts, has also been able to shed light on the continued forms of opposition to UNIP rule that existed.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, exploring the interconnection between youth, politics and violence, has shown that dissent existed from the moment of the party's inception and endured until it was forced out of office in 1991. The often-used adage 'UNIP is power', was certainly not gospel.

The specific evidence and analysis presented by this thesis, overall has shown that youths – a complex and contested group - were a leading social identity which (violently) shaped both UNIP's and Zambia's socio-political history. The reasons for youths' significant ability to shape and mould these histories was, ultimately, because the category mattered to Zambians. It is hoped that this study will spur further explorations into the rich history of youth in

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<sup>43</sup> See in particular, Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa* and Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*.



Zambia. It is, ironic, that Kenneth Kaunda best captures and sums up the events chronicled by this thesis. He wrote in 1973, whilst still leader of UNIP and President of Zambia:

‘Whilst we still burst with youthful enthusiasm and idealism we look up on our elders with some degree of pity, swearing we will make a better job of things than they did. But almost before we know it, our arteries have begun to harden, our judgment becomes more cautious and our behaviour more measured, and behold! We find bounding up behind us another generation as impatient of our attitudes as we were of those of our elders’

- **Kenneth Kaunda**, *Letter to My Children* (London: Longman, 1973), p. 136.

## Appendices

### *Appendix One:*

‘Letter to the Minister of African Education from students of the Hodgson Technical Training College. N.D.’

The Minister, AED

Sir,

Your action towards our brothers has been a great shock and landmark in NR history which will make us fight relentlessly until our brothers are brought back.

The so formed reasons for closing Munali have been childish too illogical, unwarrantable in other words you are an anti-African Minister. We give you 48 hrs. in which to consider the case or you will find yourself debased completely.

The rumours that you shall sell Munali are so stupid that Hodg students will never tolerate remember our motto is DEEDS NOT WORDS in fact we are utterly opposed to yr Ministry because you are a UFP buttered man. Anything Federal here is stinky... we condemn your shallow, irresponsible, satanic and unsympathetic decision towards the uprising future generation.

Dont hide this letter for it is very important it has been written by the vexed students.

The reply to this letter must be an immediate reopening of Munali

Yrs uncompromisingly

HODGS.

SOURCE: Hodgson Technical Training College Evidence, Appendix 7, Paragraph 36 in National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired By Walter Harragin’ (1960).

*Appendix Two*

‘Letter to all students of the Hodgson Technical Training College from student leaders of Hodgson Technical Training College. N.D.’

My dear Comrades,

I think you are aware of what is happening here at our college, they are keeping us in such away that even a pig couldn’t tolerate it.

My dear Comrades, the Principal wants us to be used as political stooges. By calling the police to come and investigate among us those who attend political meetings. So comrade I am appealing to you that we should hang together, if one is expelled about politics, we are all expelled.

One pack up, we all pack up. FREEDOM. FREEDOM. FREEDOM.

NOW

THIS IS THE TIME TO PARALISE THE GOVT

‘No work of any kind when our friend are’ expelled, unless they come back, a failure to that, we close.

SOURCE: Hodgson Technical Training College Evidence, Appendix 8, Paragraph 38 in National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired By Walter Harragin’ (1960).

*Appendix Three*

‘Letter to all students of the Hodgson Technical Training College from anonymous student of Hodgson Technical Training College. Dated 28 April 1960.’

Comrades,

I understand that there will be a general assembly this morning. Now Comrades it is now becoming more dangerous for we all know that time has now come when we were promised.

...It is of no use talking every now and then when people to whom we talk can treat us badly. I mean we should not fight against this people, when we know that we have got no weapons. So what we are to do is to fight through talking to them actions and other things.

We must all re act in any way we think is necessary to show how for we are proud of our country we must show them now for we don't want to be under such un necessary conditions.

Munali was closed and after it was re opened there are no troubles going on at present.

Third year carpenters should not leave this college, when they cannot have a good master, if at all, they happen to go through Mr Ray Smith's policy, we are all prep. ready to go at once.

Third year carpenters are you brave! We want you to show us how for you are brave. My words may sound shallow but remember we are all Africans we must work hard so that we step on a white man's head insteady of him doing that we must do it strongy. Brothers, who think I am right, should we leave this place in a peaceful manner if at all we are to leave. May God bless us all that we step on a white man's head.

(SGD) Name withdrawn

CID 28.4.60

SOURCE: Hodgson Technical Training College Evidence, Appendix 9, Paragraph 40 in National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired By Walter Harragin’ (1960).

*Appendix Four*

‘Letter to temporary principal of Hodgson Technical Training College, Mr Ray Smith, from UNIP students of Hodgson Technical Training College. Dated 21 March 1960.’

Appendix 15 (Hodgson T T College, paragraph 49)

Mr Ray Smith

The Temporary Principal,

Hodgson.

Sir,

We your faithful students are now your enemy because for 12 months you have proved yourself an enemy of UNIP and of all true African people.

On Thursday you brought the police into the College with guns to kill us you must now die. Hodgson must always be UNIP and any principal must allow us FREEDOM. No gaiting no stupid rules no punishments these are the terms upon which we return, you are our enemy and never again will you be our principal. In a short time your head will not be on your body, and no one will ever find it. We burn down buildings 4 at Hodgson we will kill people and remember our Motto Deeds nor Words.

From your true and loyal

UNIP students

‘Received on Monday 21 March, 60’

SOURCE: Hodgson Technical Training College Evidence, Appendix 15, Paragraph 49 in National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, Box 57H, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Certain African Schools Chaired By Walter Harragin’ (1960).

## Appendix Five

Brief biographic information of interview participants, arranged alphabetically in each area:

*(Interviews conducted between September 2018-August 2019, supported with translation and fixing meetings by Victor Munthali in Mazabuka and Aaron Mwanza in Lusaka)*

### Mazabuka (July 2019)

Name	Date of Birth	Places Lived	Schooling	Family	Employment	Political Party Affiliation
Mrs Laiza Choongo	Circa 1950	Lived in Mansa district until 1996 when she moved to Mazabuka	Stopped schooling after completing primary school, as her father died and her mother couldn't afford to sponsor her.	Parents were farmers. Two brothers and one sister. First born brother was able to support himself through school to become a teacher	Aspire to become a nurse but as a housewife she never worked (married 1972)	Supported UNIP (ineligible to vote at the independence election)
Mrs Emily Kachabe	1945	Moved to Mazabuka in 1977. Was in Kafue before that	Didn't go to school	Ten siblings, four sisters and six brothers	Was married instead. Joined the Apostolic Church	Member of the UNIP youth league until her father stopped her because of the dangers
Mr David Kasoka	1 August 1954	Magoye, Southern Province when very young and then moved to Mazabuka	Used to live in Magoya, up until standard one. Went to Mazabuka primary school for standard two and went to Kaloma secondary school through to form four.	Parents were fishermen. Had seven siblings, four sisters and three brothers.	Worked for Barclays Bank in Mazabuka from 1972 onwards and retired in 1995.	Family supported UNIP
Mrs Margaret Kasoka	1948	Lived in Mazabuka since 1969, before lived near the outskirts of Mazabuka	Unknown	Father was a fisherman and her mother was a housewife	Housewife (employment history unknown)	Fluid. She supported anyone in power as long as they weren't white
Mrs Selina Mbozi	1938	Lived in Mazabuka from 1971, prior to this lived in chief Hanjalika's area.	Attended school up to standard 4	Father was a farmer and mother sold pottery. Four brothers and six sisters.	Housewife/ANC politician	ANC youth candidate and campaigner during the liberation struggle
Mrs Mary Michelo	1940	Grew up near Monze road. From 1973 lived in Mazabuka	Went to school up to standard six	Five siblings, one brother, four sisters	Wanted to be a teacher but got married instead	Husband supported UNIP (unsure whether she voted in elections)
Mrs Mtonga	1940	Moved to Mazabuka when 13	'Not even a chance'. Didn't go to	Ten siblings, five sisters and five brothers.	Worked for Zambia Sugar	Husband supported UNIP

		years-old for marriage. Before lived in Mwanza	school at all, as her father died and there was no one to sponsor her	Her family farmed to survive		(unsure whether she voted in elections)
Mr George Muyuni	1954	Lived in Mazabuka since 1966	Went to school at Chibuyu primary school and then in Monze until form three when his parents could no longer financially support him.	Six brothers and sisters. Second youngest.	Agricultural farming (aspired to be a teacher when younger)	Initially ANC youth, switched to UNIP due to joining Zambia National Service after leaving school
Mr Joseph Tembo	Circa 1940	Born in and lived in Zimbabwe before moving to Zambia in 1970 near Chirundu. Moved to Mazabuka in 1974	Schooling up to standard 3 primary school.	Four brothers and two sisters. Both parents originally from Zambia and move to Zimbabwe. Moved back to Zambia in 1970 after father retired as a mine supervisor.	Carpentry (learnt as part of a national service youth project)	UNIP youth league member, until joining the main party at 42 years-old

### Kanyama, Lusaka (August 2019)

<b>Name</b>	<b>Date of Birth</b>	<b>Places Lived</b>	<b>Schooling</b>	<b>Family</b>	<b>Employment</b>	<b>Political Party Affiliation</b>
Mr Brown Moses Mazumba	1943	Born in Zimbabwe, at Wanderer Mine. Came to Ndola, Northern Rhodesia in 1951. 1952 move Kabwe and 1954 moved to Chipata. Moved to Matero, Lusaka area. Later moved Chirundu. Moved Mazabuka 1964 and Kanyama in 1982	Went school in Matero between 1956-58, until the age of 15 years-old. Later moved to Chirundu up to form four.	Due to the British colonial system their family moved a lots looking for jobs, including in Zimbabwe. Both his parents were Zambian. Had eight siblings.	Worked for Chirundu sugar from 1964, and moved to Mazabuka to work for British Tate & Lyle Ltd. 1982 involved in community work in Kanyama	Told not to join any political parties while working for Chirundu sugar from 1964.
Mrs Agness Lweendo	29 August 1952	Born in a village near Livingstone. Schooled in Kaloma and moved to Kanyama around 1970 for marriage	Started school in 1959 up to 1962, which was called standard 2. Then in 1962 went to Namwianga Mission boarding school in Kaloma from 1963 until 1965 for standard 3 to	Mother received education up standard two (was considered learned back then). Father used to work in Zambia for a company called Rhodesia Railways, then worked	1970-1972 worked in a hotel, under the national hotels corporation. From 1972 was a junior clerical officer at the immigration headquarters. 1976 took a book keeping course but had to focus on child rearing	ANC supporter

			5 (when she was 13 years old). There were changes made in the education system, so she was one of the first people to finish grade 7. After grade 9 she was married	in the post office. Five sisters and three brothers	responsibilities. 1985 went back to hotel industry.	
Mr Liston Lweendo	2 February 1945	Born in Masaka village in Southern Province.	Started school in 1954 up to standard 2. Became ill and couldn't go to school until 1958. In 1969 father passed away and because a lack of support he relocated to Kanyama to stay with his nephew.	On his mother's side he had 10 siblings. On his father's side he had 42 siblings, because his father had eight wives in total. His father was a farmer	Worked for the national mining company as a security guard (during which he completed night school)	ANC youth league member
Mrs Christine Tembo	1938	Born in Zimbabwe. Came to live in Livingstone in 1952. 1954 moved to Chipata and then in 1956 moved to Kanyama	Started school in Livingstone in 1952. In 1954 taken to Chipata but didn't continued with school	Father works in mines in Hwange Colliery in Zimbabwe. Four sisters and one brother. Lived with older sister in Livingstone	Aspired to become a teacher but didn't fulfil requirements for school	Former ANC secretary for the youth league in Chilenje, Lusaka

### Lusaka (August 2019)

Name	Date of Birth	Places Lived	Schooling	Family	Employment	Political Party Affiliation
Mr William Banda	1945	Born in Mporokosa in Northern Province.	Completed school up to standard 6, when he left to join politics.	Father was Simon Banda born in Mwamba district. Mother Maria Churu, was daughter of the first chief Chumba, in Mporokosa. Father was a migrant worker, who had 2 daughters and 2 sons.	Staunch UNIP politician. District Governor for Lundazi province. Later also former Lusaka Province MMD Chairperson (later UPND Presidential Advisor)	ANC youth who moved with UNIP party when it was created (as part of the UNIP youth league)



Mrs Veronica Phiri Mbaio	15 November 1943	Grew up in Kapatamoyo in Chipata. Came to Lusaka in 1959 (Matero, Chibolya and finally Chilenje). Lived in Chibolya, Lusaka from 1962-1964. Moved to Matero until 1968	Went to school up to standard 3, in Kapatamoyo. 1957 stopped school to be married.	Third born of 15 siblings. Because it was economically tough, she stayed with her uncle's family.	Married and looked after children (aspired to something more but money issues meant she couldn't achieve a basic education for this)	Joined UNIP around 1964 and became a full member after marriage (as part of the women's league, had time because she only had only child)
Lt. Colonel Bizwayo Nkunika	1949	After college in Kabwe. Moved to Sesheke border town in the Western Province of Zambia as a teacher in 1970. Transferred to Kalabo	After finishing Cambridge overseas certificate exams, and after working, went to Nkrumah Teachers College in 1968 in Kabwe	Unknown	1967 started work for the Bank of Zambia. Became teacher in 1970. 1972 left teaching and joined the army for 20 years (as political commissar)	No political party activity during liberation struggle. UNIP politician
Mr Kennedy Oliver Shepande	1951	Went school in Kafue in 1965	In 1965 went to Kafue secondary school for 5 years. In 1971 he entered university at UNZA	Unknown	1972/1973 elected secretary general of UNZASU. 1975 became UNIP youth league Executive Publicity Secretary. Became a member of parliament, deputy minister for education, minister for permanent office, works and supply, later on I became a diplomat in Tokyo. Then returned to Zambia and established a law firm	UNIP politician
Mr Sikota Wina	1931	Born in Mongu, Barotse Province, son of the traditional Chief Minister to the Paramount Chief.	In 1941 didn't do well in school so his father sent him away from Mongu to Kafue training institute to begin standard one. Went to University of Fort Hare in South Africa (which later expelled due	Father was Chief Minister of the King of Barotseland when it was still a protectorate. Arthur Wina, his brother, was also a politician	After being released from detention he joined UNIP and became publicity director. In the 1964 general elections he was elected in the Luanshya-Kalulushi constituency and was appointed Minister of Health in the	UNIP politician and later MMD politician

			to his political activity)		independent UNIP government. In 1990s became a member of the MMD and was elected to the National Assembly in the Chililabombwe constituency in the 1991 election	
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