DISPLACEMENT, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT

IN THE AFRICAN GREAT LAKES

~

SUDAKSHINI MARINI PERERA

Thesis submitted for the award of:

PhD IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS

School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent

SEPTEMBER 2012

ABSTRACT

This thesis offers a new approach to understanding, and dealing with, the Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups who operate in the Kivu provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Through an integrated analysis of local Kivutian and national Congolese conflict dynamics, I examine the structures of violence within which Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors operate, and demonstrate how Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Kivus are following in the footsteps of other refugee warrior groups in the region. These much-maligned and marginalized Rwanda Hutu groups have faced nearly two decades of existential threats. Yet, despite extensive operations to remove them from the Kivus, they have managed to evade capture, remain in the Congo, and pursue belligerent activities there. I argue that the failure to reduce the threat of Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups can be attributed to a dearth of understanding about their strategies and motivations.

In this thesis, I suggest a way of shedding light on significant aspects of refugee warriors' operational strategies by analyzing their refugee experience, and the subsequent impact this has on their identity and security decisions. I offer a theoretical framework for analysing refugee identity and apply it to the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors operating in the Kivus. From this analysis, I suggest the need for a new strategy when it comes to dealing with the threat that Rwandan Hutus pose to the security of both Rwanda and the Congo, and advocate an approach which is more empathetic to the security concerns of Rwandan Hutus in exile. It is hope that transforming Rwandan Hutu militants from refugee warriors into legitimate political actors in both the Congo and Rwanda will provide a durable solution to the threat that they pose, and that this will have knock-on effects which reduce the overall militarization of the eastern Congo.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This doctoral project was inspired by my time working for the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), during which I gained first-hand experience of the securitization of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors mobilized in the Kivus. In September 2009 my thesis proposal was accepted by the University of Kent, and I am extremely grateful to the University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations for providing me with a fully-funded PhD scholarship for three years, which has allowed me to undertake this research. In the last three years, my research has undergone significant transformations and I wish to thank a number of people who have assisted me in developing my ideas into the following thesis.

The School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent has been an extremely dynamic and supportive research environment within which to carry out my doctoral studies. In particular, I would like to thank my first supervisor, Dr Anne Hammerstad, for her continued support throughout my three years of study. She has provided me with both meticulous research supervision and valuable guidance on my general development as an early career researcher. I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Prof Hugh Miall, for his thorough feedback on my thesis and support throughout the process. I have also received valuable advice from Dr Ruth Blakeley, Dr Philip Cunliffe and Dr Neophytos Loizides, as well as from fellow PhD students – in particular Ingrid Boas, Govinda Clayton, David Maher, Tonson Sango and Andrew Thomson.

Several of these chapters have been presented in various forms at a number of international conferences. Chapters One, Two and Four draw upon research presented in my paper 'Chaos, Conflict and the Congo', which was awarded the Cedric Smith Prize for Peace or Conflict Research by the Conflict Research Society, and was presented at the *Conflict Research Society's Annual Conference* in September 2011. Parts of Chapter Three have been disseminated in the papers 'A Polythetic Approach to Classifying Refugees', presented at the *Kent Postgraduate Conference* in May 2010; 'Unbecoming Refugees', presented at a BISA-ESRC African Agency Seminar in June 2011; and 'Breaking Convention: The Refugee Experiences of Refugee Warriors in the Kivus', presented at the *ISA Annual Conference* in San Diego in April 2012. The ideas set out in Chapter Four and Five have been presented in the papers 'The Identity Process Framework', given at the *Identity and Otherness Conference* at Birmingham University in May 2010; 'Autochthony and (Un)certainty in the Eastern DRC', presented at the *BISA Annual Conference* in Manchester in 2011; 'Certainty and Chaos: Self-Similarity Patterning and Refugee Warriors in the Kivus', presented at the *Migration Across the Disciplines Conference* at Queen Mary University of London in June 2011; and 'Primal Security: Autochthonous Discourses in the Eastern Congo', presented at the *BISA-ISA Annual Conference* in June 2012. A rough version of Chapter Six has been presented as 'Alternative Agency: Refugee Warriors in the Eastern DRC' at the *Kent Postgraduate Conference* in May 2012. I am very grateful for all the feedback that I received from the discussants and audiences at these presentations.

I am forever indebted to my colleagues at the Rwanda Demobilization Reintegration Commission, many of whom I consider to be close personal friends, and who provided me with assistance and contacts for my fieldwork and research – in particular, Alexis Rusagara, the late Faustin Rwigema, and the dedicated staff and former child combatants at the Muhazi Rehabilitation Centre. The UN were also very helpful during my research and I am grateful to Gregory Gromo Alex from MONUSCO and Anouk Bronee from UNHCR for taking the time to assist me during my fieldwork. Although I was unable to conduct research in the Kivus, I was able to gain useful information from humanitarian personnel working there, and am grateful to Pieter Van Holden from the Life and Peace Institute in Bukavu, and Thomas Evans from the Norwegian Refugee Council in Goma for their insights. I was also able to keep up with developments in Rwanda thanks to my good friends Fiston Gakuba, Christian Kajeneri and Israel Dusabimana.

I could not have made it through this process without my friends and family. Special thanks go to my mother and sister who took the time in their busy schedules to proofread my work, and gave me moral support along the way. Finally, this thesis is dedicated to Paul Gilbert, who I cannot even begin to thank for his incredible generosity, love and support. From providing counsel on Chaos Theory when I first thought of using it, to meticulously reading and scrutinizing every word written here, he has supported me both personally and academically. This thesis could not have been written without him.

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND APPENDICES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS*

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces (Ugandan)
ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre (Zaïrean)
ADP	Democratic Alliance of the People (Zaïrean)
ALiR/PALiR	Army for the Liberation of Rwanda/Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (Rwandan Hutu)
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congolese Tutsi)
CNRD	National Council of Resistance for Democracy (Zaïrean)
DD(RR)R	Disarmament, Demobilization, (Repatriation, Rehabilitation) and Reintegration
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces (Rwandan government forces of the Second Republic)
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congolese government forces)
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Rwandan Hutu)
FLN	National Liberation Front (Burundian)
FLNK	North Kivu Liberations Front (Congolese and Rwandan)
ICG	International Crisis Group
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army (Ugandan)
M23	March 23rd Movement (Congolese, possibly Rwandan backed)
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Congolese)
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola(Angolan)
MRLZ	Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Zaïrean)
PRP	Party of the Peoples' Revolution (Zaïrean)
RCD-Goma	Congolese Rally for Democracy (Congolese)
RPA/RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Army/Rwandan Patriotic Front (Rwandan Tutsi forces during Rwandan Civil War)
RDF	Rwandan Defence Force (Current Rwandan government forces)
RUD-Urunana	United Rally for Democracy (Rwandan)
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Angolan)
WBNF	West Bank Nile Front (Ugandan)

* Brackets indicate the country of origin of the rebel group, although most of these groups have at some point had bases in the Congo/Zaïre

Introduction: Chaos, Conflict and the Congo

'Africa cannot succeed if the Congo fails'.[1]

~

Introduction: Refugees and Conflict

Gisenyi, a town on Rwanda's western border, boasts some of the most beautiful views in Africa. Looking across to the shores of Lake Kivu, mineral deposits make the sands appear silver. Across the Lake, you can make out the shores of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which rise out of the mist produced by the Lake's unique chemical composition. From this distant view, it is almost possible to be tricked into believing 'the Congo must be sweet' (see Turner, 2007, ch.3). But the beauty and serenity evoked by the view of the Congo from Gisenyi could not be further from the reality. Just across the water are the Kivu provinces of the eastern Congo – a complex, dangerous, and highly volatile environment teeming with conflict. From its inception as the colony of King Leopold in 1885 to the present day, the Congo has been characterized by plunder, pillage and violence. Although estimates of the death toll in Congo's last "official" war (1998-2003[2]) vary,[3] it is widely cited as having resulted in more deaths than any other conflict since World War Two.[4] Even though the conflict officially came to an end in 2003, pervasive

---

[1] (Dowden, 2008, p. 365)

[2] Although a number of sources describe the war ending in 2002 (e.g. International Rescue Committee, 2007), I have chosen in this thesis to refer to the post-war period as beginning in 2003, since the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement between some of the belligerent parties within the DRC only occurred in December 2002.

[3] These figures will be discussed in Chapter Four, but vary from 200,000 deaths (Lambert & Lohlé-Tart, 2008) to 5.4 million, with an estimated 2.1 million of those deaths occurring after the formal end of the war in 2002 (International Rescue Committee, 2007, p. ii). Looking only at battle deaths, PRIO (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005) estimate that 145,000 battle deaths occurred between 1998-2001 (there is no data for overall battle deaths in the years 2002-2005).

[4] Numerous authors (see Turner, 2007; Mamdani, 2007; Autesserre, 2009; Braithwaite, 2010) assert this figure, but the original data and source for this figure in not provided in their work. Because of the varying opinions on the Congo death toll, this assertion is contestable, and almost impossible to verify or calculate – largely due to a lack of unambiguous data on conflict death tolls. What can be said is that the Second Congo War has not resulted in the highest death toll of any event since World War Two. In China between 1958 and 1961, it is estimated that around 30 million people died as a result of the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward (Ashton, Hill, Piazza, & Zeitz, 1984) – a figure which is five times greater than the highest figure given for the Congo death toll. A more thorough

insecurity still plagues the Congo – especially in its troubled eastern provinces, where the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) continue to receive reports of appalling human rights atrocities being committed against civilians by belligerent factions (see Autesserre, 2006). Indeed, while the country has been declared "post-conflict" since 2003 there has been little improvement in the lives of ordinary Congolese people. In 2011 the DRC ranked the lowest of 187 countries on the Human Development Index – ranking lower than Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan (UNDP, 2011).

The view of the Congo from Rwanda's shores obscures a multitude of attrocities, but the incongruity between appearance and reality is analagous with the post-conflict label that has been applied to the Congo. The dynamics of conflict in the Congo are driven by perceptions as much are they are driven by the material reality of the situation on the ground. The role of perception is pervasive across all scales and layers of the conflict, from the drivers of local conflict generated by the 'the knowledge people use to generate and interpret social behaviour' (Turner, 2007, p. 19), to 'the dominant peacebuilding culture that shapes the interveners' views on violence' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 13). In fact, key to the current conflict in the eastern Congo are the perceptions held by many of its inhabitants about its Rwandan neighbours. Given the primacy of perceptions and ideas in shaping conflict in the Kivus, this thesis follows a constructivist approach, and focusses on the 'the intersubjectively shared ideas that shape behaviour by constituting the identities and interest of actors' (Copeland, 2006, p. 1).

This thesis examines the current conflict in the Congo's eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, arguably the most volatile area the country. In particular, I analyse the role that ideas and perceptions held about, and by, Rwandan refugees play in the conflict dynamics of the Kivus. Autesserre observes that the population of the eastern Congo, already tired from the ravages of the protracted conflict of the First and Second Congo Wars, continue to endure further abuse by citing reports that '81% had to flee their homes, more than half experienced the violent death of family members or friends, more than a third were abducted for at least a week, and 16% were subject to sexual violence, usually repeatedly'

---

discussion of the problems involved in quantifying conflict in the Congo, and the calculation of deaths, features in Chapter Four.

(Autesserre, 2010, p. 2)[5]. There are a number of reasons as to why the Kivus continue to be plagued by conflict and insecurity: they have vast and desirable resources such as coltan, gold and cassiterite; they are on the Congolese border with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi – making them vulnerable to their political instabilities as well as the Congo's own domestic difficulties; and they are home to a proliferation of militias, with dozens of armed groups known to be operating in its provinces (International Crisis Group, 2009). Linked to these factors, the Kivus are a site of mass refugee influx – especially of Rwandan refugees who have been fleeing to the Congo for decades. The presence of Rwandan refugees has added a number of complicated new layers to the dynamics of conflict in the Congo – injecting what Prunier describes as 'more septic material' into Congo's already 'festering sores' (Prunier, 2008, p. xxxi).

I begin this Introduction by situating the context of my research by outlining the impact of Rwandan refugees on conflict in the Congo and introducing the Rwandan militant Hutu groups which are the focus of this thesis. I then outline the main arguments of the thesis and briefly discuss the existing understandings and assumptions that this thesis seeks to challenge. I then explain my methodological approach, explaining in particular my decision to derive a methodology which is inspired by Chaos Theory. In addition to a brief overview of the Rwandan refugee situation in the eastern Congo, outlined below, I provide two short reviews of the literature from which I have drawn inspiration for this research: one which lays the theoretical foundations of my research by examining constructivism (and, more specifically, the securitization theory); and another which discusses the existing literature

[5] Autesserre extrapolates these statistics from the findings of a survey conducted by the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley (Vinck, Pham, Baldo, & Shigekane, 2008). 'Focusing on areas most affected by conflict in eastern DRC, surveys were conducted from September to December 2007 among a sample population of 2,620 individuals in the Ituri district in Oriental province and the provinces of North and South Kivu' (Vinck, Pham, Baldo, & Shigekane, 2008, p. 1). With regards to the displacement figure, this is not from the survey itself, but rather the authors' uncited claim that 'about 81 percent reported they have been displaced at least once since 1993' (Vinck, Pham, Baldo, & Shigekane, 2008, p. 29). Although the report may give some sense of fears and security perceptions in the eastern Congo, the authors themselves note the study's limitations. For example they acknowledge that the sensitivity of the questions, ambiguity of interpretation, and influence of local events at the time may have affected the accuracy of the answers. Furthermore there were problems of sampling as, 'A total of 649 households, or 15 percent of all the sampled households, were replaced, most frequently because no one was home (half of the cases) or because they refused (46%) and no one else could be selected. Within selected households, 412 individuals, or 10 percent of all selected individuals were replaced by another randomly selected adult of the same gender within the same household: 54 percent refused, 38 percent were not home, and 8 percent were replaced for other reasons. It is unknown whether the opinions of replaced individuals differed significantly from those of the selected respondents' (Vinck, Pham, Baldo, & Shigekane, 2008, p. 17).

on Congolese conflict, both within the academia and also with regards to policy and media reporting. Having established the basis for my research, I move to explicate the structure of my thesis. Finally, I discuss the originality and aims of this thesis.

The Rwandan refugee problem in the Congo has several different dimensions, and is in part complicated by the fact that different groups of Rwandans have been fleeing to Congo at different periods of both countries' histories, bringing with them a huge burden of social, political, demographic and economic instability. A brief precis of Rwandan refugee migration to the Congo in just the latter half of the twentieth century is perhaps enough to give a taste of the complexity of the situation: Refugees who fled in the wake of Rwandan independence (1959-62) have become embroiled in several Congolese rebellions and armed struggles since their settlement, and have often been confused with the Banyamulenge – a group of Tutsi pastoralists who are known to have settled in the Congo even before it was established as a colony in 1885. The Banyamulenge have suffered a history of persecution and exclusion in the Congo, and their struggle for recognition and acceptance has, in many ways, been severely hindered by the presence of the Rwandan Tutsi refugees who fled in the 1960s. As will be further explicated in Chapter One of this thesis, the Banyamulenge have struggled to gain recognition as citizens of the Congo because of negative perceptions of Rwanda, Rwandan refugees and, subsequently, all Banyarwanda (i.e. those groups – mainly Tutsi and Hutu – whose speak Kinyarwanda, and are believed to be of Rwandan descent). The implications of the denial of Congolese citizenship to the Banyamulenge does not concern purely abstract notions of identity. It is here that we can see the very *real* impact of perceptions; by being denied citizenship (and I subsequently refer to the Banyamulenge as being *denizens*) the Banyamulenge have struggled to stake credible claims to land and the Congo's lucrative resources. Paradoxically, some Rwandan refugees (and their descendants) have been more successful in establishing political legitimacy, and gaining citizenship rights, in the Congo where the Banyamulenge have otherwise failed.

Whilst the presence of Tutsi refugees from the 1960s has had an impact on the complex issue of the Banyarwanda in the Congo (an issue which is elucidated in Chapter Two which discusses the nature of autochthony and the assertion of primordiality in the Congo), the large influx of Hutu refugees in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide has contributed additional layers of complexity to the already intractable violence. Among this post-1994 influx were a number of Hutu *genocidaires*, who were using the eastern Congo's

refugee camps to remilitarize in an attempt to invade Rwanda and overthrow the newly established Tutsi-dominated regime. This imminent threat to Rwandan security was the pretext for the First Congo War – in which the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaïre (ADFL), a coalition led by Laurent Kabila, and backed by Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, invaded the Congo to overthrow the Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Later, in 1998, refugee presence and the security of Tutsi in the eastern Congo again provided one of the justifications (albeit one whose sincerity has been questioned) for the Second Congo War. Refugees, however, played a larger part than merely being a justification for military action in this Second War – they were actively involved as *belligerents*. Refugees and their descendants also make a significant demographic contribution to the various militias currently operating in the eastern Congo.

This thesis concerns itself with militant groups which contain Rwandan Hutu refugees who fled in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide and have remained in exile in the eastern DRC to this day. Conventional analyses (see Afoaku, 2002; International Crisis Group, 2007; 2009; 2012; Nest, 2011; Thakur, 2008, etc) do not treat Rwandan Hutus in the Congo as refugees because of their genocidal past, the widespread belief that Rwanda is a safe country for Rwandan returnees[6], and the fact that many Rwandan Hutus in the Congo are involved in armed activity and human rights abuses on both sides of the Kivu Rift Valley. As a result, Rwandan Hutu militant groups in the Congo are often thought of as "foreign armed groups" who are a threat to both Congolese and Rwandan stability. In this thesis, I examine these armed groups and attempt to demonstrate that, although they may not be refugees in a conventional sense, they have nonetheless had a refuge expereince in that they have fled their home country under duress, and they feel a return to Rwanda under the Kagame regime would only enhance the existential threats that they face.[7] I focus in my analysis primarily on the Rwandan Hutus who fight in the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – a militant group comprising mainly of Rwandan Hutus who fled to the Congo in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide. This group has been securitized as one of the most dangerous armed groups operating in the Congo, and was

[6] Indeed since June 2012, UNHCR has made several attempts to invoke the cessation clause which would deny refugee status to all Rwanda refugees on the grounds that Rwanda is a country in 'relatively stable political environment' (UNHCR, 2012)

[7] This threat is discussed in more detail in Chapters Two, Three, Five and Six, but the threats are not limited to punishment for genocidal crimes. Many Rwandan Hutus who are not guilty of genocide fear false accusations and imprisonment, and the severe punishments associated with dissent against the Kagame regime, not to mention the perceived horizontal inequalities that many Hutus in Rwanda feel that they face under Kagame.

formally funded and led by ex-*genocidaires* based in Europe[8]. Originally, the FDLR had a clear command structure and its rank and file combatants within the Congo took their orders from the European leadership, who the Congo-based commanders communicated with through internet and satellite technologies. However, since the arrest of the key leadership figures in 2009 and 2010, and the closing of the FDLR website, fldr.org, the structure and organization of the FDLR has changed considerably.

Little is known about the precise nature of this new structure, as the FDLR have retreated into the Congo's impenetrable forests to evade capture, but several trends can be observed. Firstly, and perhaps in response to spending nearly two decades in exile, the bulk of FDLR activity on the ground has been concerned with the acquisition of power and resources in the Congo, rather than with the restoration of a Hutu Power regime in Rwanda (which was the rhetoric advocated by much of the FDLR's European leadership). Furthermore, it should be noted that although the leadership of the FDLR may primarily of ex-*genocidaires*, a significant contingent of the FDLR's rank and file members are not guilty of genocidal crimes in Rwanda, but are rather Hutu refugees who fled in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and, having been labelled as *genocidaires* unworthy of humanitarian assistance by the international community during the refugee crisis which followed, became a valuable recruitment pool for those *genocidaires* who fled in their midst and wanted to remilitarize in an attempt to overthrow the newly-established Tutsi-led regime. In this thesis, I seek to show that continuing to securitize Rwandan Hutus as *genocidaires* and criminals creates a vicious cycle which marginalizes and excludes them so that they become an easy target for belligerent recruitment. Secondly, and further evidencing the above observation about their increased involvement in the Congo, the FDLR are forming numerous strategic alliances with local militias and Mai-Mai groups. While these alliances are not necessarily permanent, and do not always follow an obviously coherent pattern, they do point towards and attempt by the group to recast their nationality – moving away from their Rwandan past, towards positing themselves as "authentically Congolese", by appealing to a common Bantu heritage between the Hutu and other Congolese autochthonous groups. This is also reflected in the fact that off-shoot groups of the FDLR, which also contains Rwandan Hutu militants, have avoided references to Rwanda in their names. Indeed, groups such as the Front for the Liberation of North Kivu (FLNK) have made an explicit reference to the region in the Congo in which they are now

[8] The FDLR's former leader, Ignace Murwanashyaka was based in Germany, and their executive secretary Callixte Mbarushimana was based in France

situated. Finally it can be observed that, despite a number of tripartite attempts by the UN and the governments of Rwanda and the DRC to remove the FDLR threat (most notably Operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II, which I discuss in Chapters Five and Six), the FDLR remain as a militant group in the eastern DRC. Furthermore, the emergence of new militant groups containing Rwandan Hutus such as the FLNK and the United Rally for Democracy (RUD-Urunana), demonstrates that the threat of Rwandan Hutu militancy has not been reduced. In this thesis I argue that Rwandan Hutus are surviving (and in some instances, thriving) in the eastern Congo through the construction of a resilient and flexible identity which facilitates their survival. This identity, and its security implications, is the subject of this thesis.

Throughout this thesis, I maintain that many of the Rwandan Hutus fighting in the militias of the eastern Congo, on account of the nature of their flight under duress and their fear of the consequences of returning to Rwanda, can be considered refugees – even if they are not rights-bearing victims, as is implied in a conventional understanding of refugee groups. Consequently, I argue that Rwandan refugees are at the heart of conflict in the Congo; not just because they are actively involved in conflictual struggles in the Kivus, but because perceptions held by (and about) certain refugee groups have reignited, and added new dimensions to, the tensions which also drive much of the eastern Congo's conflicts. Rwandan refugees in the DRC have been securitized as both a threat to Rwandan security and Congolese stability. This has led to a peculiar situation whereby they are not generally regarded in terms of the same notion of victimization that is usually associated with being intrinsic to the refugee character. This thesis, therefore, attempts to provide some insight into the role that ideas, beliefs and perceptions held by and about Rwandan refugees play in the conflict dynamics of the eastern DRC, by considering the "conundrum" of identity perception (Prunier, 2008) with regard to refugees. Accordingly, two over-arching and interrelated research questions are asked: Firstly, what role do Rwandan refugees play in the conflict dynamics of the eastern DRC? And secondly, how do perceptions of these refugees, and the way in which they perceive their own place in both Rwandan and Congolese society, impact on the role that they play?

Main Arguments of the Thesis

This thesis primarily concerns itself with the intractable security predicament caused by, and facing, Rwandan Hutu militant groups in the eastern DRC, and the subsequent impact this has on regional security in the African Great Lakes more generally. The thesis seeks to answer three overarching research questions: Firstly, what are the drivers of conflict in the eastern DRC and Rwanda, and how do Rwandan Hutu militants contribute to this conflict? Secondly, what are the causes of Rwandan Hutu belligerency in the African Great Lakes? And finally, what measures can be taken to reduce this belligerency and, as a result, improve the security situation in both the eastern Congo and Rwanda? In answer to these questions the thesis sets out a detailed analysis of conflict in the Congo and situates the Rwandan Hutu militants within this analysis. The main argument of this analysis is that Rwandan Hutu militants have often been misrepresented and misunderstood in ways which lead to complex security dilemmas. In this way, the thesis tracks the securitization cycle whereby Rwandan Hutus adopt belligerent strategies to protect themselves from perceived enemies but are themselves securitized because of this belligerency. In this thesis, therefore, I test the hypothesis that Rwandan Hutus persist in adopting criminal and/or violent survival strategies in the Congo because of a marginalized and excluded position which offers them little scope of legitimate political transformation and expression. Having argued for the validity of this hypothesis, I then seek to discover a new method of analysing, and subsequently dealing with, Rwandan Hutus which begins with a new understanding that is predicated on the effect of their exile on their security decisions. In this regard I turn to the refugee studies literature, and argue that Rwandan Hutu militants are not simply warriors, but rather an armed group with a history of refuge which has shaped their identity.

The research presented in this thesis challenges a number of key assumptions held about Rwandan Hutu militant groups. Firstly, I seek to challenge the assumption that Rwandan Hutu militancy is an imported "Rwandan problem" rooted in their genocidal past. Rather, I situate Hutu militancy within the wider context of conflict in the Congo, and show how this group fit into a long-standing pattern of conflict which arises from ontological uncertainty in the Kivu Rift Valley. Secondly, I seek to show that, contrary to the rhetoric expounded by the leadership of Rwandan Hutu militant groups such as the FDLR, the rank and file Rwandan Hutu combatants operating within the Congo are less concerned with a return to Rwanda, and more interested in establishing a more permanent and secure settlement in

the Congo. As such I argue that the activities which they pursue in the Congo should not be viewed as purely criminal or exploitative, but rather a political struggle to overcome marginalization and exclusion and survive in the Congo's notoriously harsh environment. Thirdly, and drawing on the implications of the first and second assumptions that I challenge, I attempt to demonstrate that military interventions against Rwandan Hutu militants will not reduce their threat and belligerency. Rather, this thesis offers new solutions to dealing with Rwandan Hutu militancy in the Congo, which focuses less on military destruction, and more on transforming these groups into legitimate political and economic actors in both the Congo and (if they do wish to return) in Rwanda.

Method and Chaos

The perceptions held about, and by, Rwandan Hutu militants is a subject which is difficult to analyse, not just because so little is known about this notoriously elusive group, but also because subjects such as identity and perception do not lend themselves to objective analyses. The thesis aims to contribute to conflict analyses of the Congo by providing a method which may alleviate the uncertainty surrounding Rwandan Hutu militants. I aim to promote through this analysis some suggestions for improving security in the eastern DRC with regard to refugee warrior groups such as the FDLR. The analysis takes an inter-disciplinary approach which draws on literature from chaos theory, refugee studies, anthropology, social psychology and identity studies, as well as conflict analysis literature and area-specific material on the eastern Congo and Great Lakes region. The research also draws on primary fieldwork taken from two separate field-study visits to Rwanda and the town of Goma in the eastern DRC – a 2008 visit researching with ex-FDLR child soldiers who had been repatriated to Rwanda, and a 2010 visit during which interviews with elite-level personnel working with refugees were conducted. For security and accessibility reasons it was not possible to go to the forests of the Congo to research with currently mobilized FDLR soldiers – an issue which encumbers many conflict analysts working in the Kivus. Accordingly, the thesis attempts to find a method of analysing currently mobilised and belligerent Rwandan Hutu militants when directly accessing them is not possible, relying primarily on the data collected from my fieldwork and documentary analysis of various secondary sources. In lieu of clear and accessible data regarding the motivations of groups such as the FDLR, I attempt to create a framework which looks at how collective identities may be created in the context of the conflict, and the reciprocal impact they may have on

other conflict dynamics. In the thesis I attempt to examine the factors which affect perceptions and ideas about refugees, because I argue that these ideas and perceptions translate into very real consequences. Furthermore, in terms of ease of analysis, I suggest that we can never with any certainty know what the objective "reality" of the situation in the Congo is. However, we can know how certain people perceive their situation, and how they construct their reality[9]. I argue that examining perceptions, although methodologically challenging, provides more reliable analysis than objectifying selected observations.

The DRC has a number of complex and unique features and I begin in my first chapter with an examination of the specific context within which the observations I make are set. While some general lessons and trends may be observed in other conflicts, my argument is that the interaction of numerous *specific* dynamics, in particular ways, has an impact on the nature of conflict in the Congo which sets it apart from any other conflict. Accordingly, I suggest a rather complex, multi-faceted, and occasionally rather "messy", model of conflict analysis. Although the main problem with current conflict analyses of the Congo is the oversimplification of conflict, the tendency to simplify to limited variables in conflict analysis is understandable; it appears to facilitate targeted interventions, and many of the dynamics which I suggest have been ignored are ephemeral, imponderable, and in a number of cases undetectable. These three characteristics, assuming they allow analysts to produce any results at all, would lead to confusing and 'messy' results. However, as John Law observes: 'If this is an awful mess...then would something less messy make a mess of describing it?' (Law, 2004, p. 1). In order to make any useful analysis of a messy situation like the Congo, I argue that we need to use a complex and "messy" model. In this thesis, I argue that the Congo is a system in chaos – by which I do not mean a situation without order or meaning, but rather that it is chaotic in the scientific sense, in that the Congo is a complex system whose behaviour is so unpredictable as to appear random, owing to great sensitivity to small changes in conditions (OED, 2012). Like several other protracted conflicts, theorists analysing the Congo have sought to try and explain conflict in terms of perceptions. Autesserre for example has drawn upon frames analysis to discuss how the international peacebuilding community has adopted a particular view of the Congo which obscures the role of local actors and the subsequent impact that this particular frame has upon the continuation of conflict (Autesserre, 2006; 2009; 2010). Frames analysis provides a useful starting point from which to understand the perspectives of various actors, but

[9] I would like to thank Neophytos Loizides, whose comments at a research seminar on myth and reality in Turkish-Greek relations, inspired this line of reasoning.

Autesserre's analysis does not account for competing frames, and homogenises peacebuilders in a manner which overlooks the numerous NGOs, and peacebuilding organizations which do work on the local level. Furthermore, the analysis does not take into account the frames adopted by local-level actors themselves. This is not to say that such frames have not been discussed before. Indeed, it is common among academics and the media alike to explain the actions of local-level actors through, for example, perceived horizontal inequalities. However, these analyses do not take into account how these perceptions are created or why, despite a dearth of material evidence to support these perceptions, certain groups are perceived as better off than others. As such, the horizontal inequalities analysis does not account for the various alliances between rich and poor which are constantly being forged in the eastern Congo, and why in certain instances personal enrichment is seen as inhumane exploitation, while in others it is applauded as heroic survivalism.

I therefore argue that analysing the complex and mutating nature of multiple actors' perceptions requires devising a new method of analysis which can account for, and reflect, just how complicated the interaction of these various elements can be, whilst not losing the analytical value brought by analyses which examine, for example, frames or horizontal inequalities. Consequently, I aim to challenge existing conflict analysis models by drawing on elements of Chaos Theory, arguing that the Congo itself is a chaotic system which involves numerous interacting bodies and dynamics, and which has only limited possibilities for predictability. Although Chaos Theory has become increasingly popular in the social sciences, growing from its development in the natural sciences which was borne out of a need to explain increasingly complex natural phenomena, much of this work concerns itself with complexity theory and the self-organizing nature of chaotic systems.[10] However, I argue that several significant lessons for analysis can be learnt if we turn to the fundamental elements of Chaos Theory, rather than focus on complexity: 'In the unpredictable operations of complex systems lie several of the central elements of chaos theory: extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, non-linearity, and fractal geometry or self-similarity' (Mosko, 2005, p. 8). It is these three elements in particular that I utilise to develop my analytical framework, arguing that we need to take into account extreme sensitivity to initial conditions and non-linearity when we devise conflict analysis

[10] For a more thorough discussion of complexity theory in the social sciences see Mosko, 2005.

frameworks, and advocating that we utilise self-similar patterning[11] as a unit of analysis, in order to understand some of the seemingly irrational and disorderly patterns of behaviour that are evident in the Congo.

A more thorough exposition of the merits of Chaos Theory will be provided when it is utilized in Chapter Three to develop the Identity-Process Framework, but it is perhaps important at this point to establish the limits of chaos theory in the political realm. Brown observes that the complex dynamics of Chaos Theory are difficult to analyse in the social sciences and that 'the dynamics and interactions that are the source of political chaos may obscure its presence' (Brown, 1996, p. 135). What I am suggesting is not unflinching fidelity to a particular chaos model, but rather the use of what Brown has referred to as 'Chaos as Allegory' (*Ibid.*, p. 136). I therefore argue that the justification for the use of Chaos Theory – that we need non-linear models to understand complex interaction between variables – should encourage the use of complex models in conflict analysis. In the thesis, therefore, I suggest a non-linear method for understanding the various dynamics impacting on the creation and recreation of refugees' identities. This understanding is then used as an analytical tool to elucidate the evolving and uncertain nature of refugees' movements and motivations. An inability to reach currently mobilized FDLR combatants and ask them directly about their perceptions and motivations was noted earlier as a constraint on this research. However, I have suggested a method of overcoming the limitations posed by a lack of direct data from the refugees studied in this thesis, by proposing the Identity-Process Framework; a non-linear approach which looks at how collective identities may be created in the context of the conflict, and the reciprocal impact they may have on other conflict dynamics.

The Utility and Difficulty of Securitization

Because of the pre-eminence of ideas and beliefs as an explanatory factor for conflict posited in this thesis, I take a broadly constructivist approach, drawing in particular on the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School to examine how refugees, who are traditionally regarded as "victims", have come to be framed as "threats". However, the securitization approach can be somewhat problematic with respect to refugees in the Congo, and it cannot therefore be used as a framework for analysis without reservation.

[11] Self-similarity refers to the repetition of certain patterns of behaviour, sometimes on different scales within a given system.

Accordingly, the next section will critique the securitization approach and highlight both its utility and shortcomings for the purpose of my research. Since its emergence, constructivism has been challenging the dominance of realism in International Relations theory since the end of the Cold War, and its growing significance is reflected heavily in the recent International Security Studies (ISS) literature. The Copenhagen School, perhaps the most prominent school of ISS constructivism, 'has developed a substantial body of concepts to rethink security, most notably through its notions of securitization and desecuritization' (Emmers, 2007, p. 110). Securitization theory suggests that we examine security issues as existential threats to referent objects which arise, and can be examined, through the discursive practices of the "security speech-act". The speech act allows an approved "speaker" to posit certain issues as being significantly threatening to the audience, in order to gain permission from that audience to undertake extraordinary measures to deal with the perceived threat. Through the use of the security speech act, the Copenhagen School demonstrate that the meaning of a concept 'lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not in others' (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 24). By looking at how concepts are framed and used, securitization has helped us move away from traditional (politico-military) understandings of security, which now fall under the sub-discipline of Strategic Studies, and 'has developed a broad and powerful research agenda of significance across the field of security studies' (Williams, 2003, p. 511).

Indeed, one of the most salient contributions of the Copenhagen School's securitization framework is its applicability to a widening security agenda, 'given the capacity for such a conceptual framework to illuminate key elements of the ways in which security preferences and practices are constructed in international politics' (McDonald, 2008, p. 566). The area in this widening security agenda to which securitization has arguably been most widely applied is that of migration. As Dannreuther states 'international migration is probably one of the most cited, yet contested, areas of the new security agenda' (2007, p. 100). A majority of this migration security literature has focussed on the articulation of immigrants as a threat to Western liberal democracies, and the manner in which a balance can be achieved between the humanitarian concern to help refugees in need, and the political instability and economic burdens that a large influx of migrants across Western borders can bring (see Weiner, 1996; Bigo, 2002). Didier Bigo, for example, describes the securitization of migration in the West as 'a transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease, or to encourage it if it does

not yet exist, so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures' (Bigo, 2002, p. 65). This framing of migrants as threats stands in contrast to humanitarian representations of refugees, in which they are characterized as voiceless victims in need of external help. Refugees, especially conflict-induced refugees, understood in this way are seen not as the *threat* but as the referent object in need of *protection*. Nyers argues that by adding new security discourses on refugees we are uncovering their bimodal nature; on the one hand they represent a number of humanitarian concerns, and on the other they are 'othered' as a threat and cast as almost less than human.

This dichotomous framing of the refugee thus poses a number of significant challenges to security analysis – to which the securitization approach provides a useful, although not entirely adequate, starting point for analysis. Although there have been studies which have established that there are causal linkages between refugees and militarised interstate disputes (Salehyan, 2008; Lischer, 2005; Adamson, 2006), refugee flows are largely undertheorized in the literature on the causes of war, leading to what Weiner describes as an 'intellectual vacuum' (1996, p. 6) when it comes to responses to refugee crises. However, the theoretical aspect of the reciprocal causal link between migration and conflict should not be ignored. Refugees are not logically a threat, but there is something about the uncertainty that refugees present; their geographical intrusion, their ambiguous status, and their mysterious backgrounds, which cause them to be perceived as a threat. The manner in which refugees are framed in enmity provides a useful basis for evaluating the ideas and beliefs about displacement which may fuel conditions conducive to conflict. Some argue that the Copenhagen School draws its approach from a Schmittian legacy – that at the heart of securitization lies the power to judge the 'exception,' to decide what is threatening enough to warrant actions beyond the mere political (Williams, 2003). This legacy may prove particularly useful in understanding how refugees are often framed in such a way so as to require extraordinary action, and assigned a status outside of regular citizenship, in a manner that reaffirms the sovereignty of the host-state. In trying to establish a framework through which we can understand how migration – and in particular flows of refugees – come to be deemed a security issue, the Copenhagen School's securitization approach, therefore, provides a useful theoretical underpinning.

The securitization approach also has the benefit of great flexibility, for which it is perhaps not given due credit. In particular, the approach has the potential to accommodate a range

of refuge experiences. After all, displacement 'is not experienced in precisely the same way across time and space, and does not unfold in a uniform fashion' (Swedenburg & Lavie, 1996, p. 4). The charge is often levelled against the Copenhagen School that they either ignore identity, or ignore its multiple nature, and that the securitization approach 'ends up reifying and objectifying both "society" and "identity" in ways that are analytically untenable and politically dangerous' (McSweeney paraphrased in Williams, 2003, p. 519). Most notably, it is suggested that the securitization approach equates "identity" with the identity of a society and, in trying to provide a universal framework, defines any given society as having a single and unchangeable identity. Therefore, 'the fluidity and multiplicity of social identities are obscured, along with the processes of negotiation and accommodation through which they operate' (*Ibid.*). This ostensible inability to appreciate the multiplicity of identity means that some have accused the Copenhagen School of running the risk of advocating belligerent and exclusionist theories. However, I would contend that the Copenhagen School have been misunderstood in this respect – their singular framing of identity is not a reflection of what they believe identity *is*, but rather a reflection of how it gets framed *when is securitized*. Furthermore, the Copenhagen School do not exactly conflate identity with society, rather they suggest that identity is the chief security *concern* of a society, which is reiterated by Ole Wæver in his reconceptualization of identity (Wæver, Buzan, Lemaitre, & Kelstrup, 1993). Just as the chief criterion of state security is sovereignty, so the main concern of societal security is identity. In this way, both sovereignty and identity are approached in terms of survival. Roe claims that in 'Wæver's reconceptualisation, the notion of *survival* is key. Whereas state security is concerned with threats to its sovereignty; if a state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state, societal security is all about threats to identity; similarly, if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society' (Roe, 2005, p. 43).

By clarifying this distinction between state security and societal security we are also able to repudiate one of the other significant criticisms levelled against the Copenhagen School; that their approach to securitization perpetuates the state-centricism associated with more traditionalist approaches. By focussing on how the Copenhagen School handle securitization theory in the societal sector, we can move away from a preoccupation with state concerns to concerns held by communities in general, and in this way we can see how the securitization theory may be more applicable to intrastate conflict and non-state actors. Indeed, the Copenhagen School explicitly posit collective identity as a key *extra-state* security concern: In the societal sector 'the referent object is large-scale collective

identities that can function independent of the state' (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 22). However, unlike the relatively fixed premise of sovereignty, what makes collective identity both uniquely significant as a referent object and simultaneously difficult to analyse is its ephemeral nature. Collective identities will evolve in response to various developments, and much depends on whether these changes are viewed as existential threats or inevitable identity evolution. 'Thus whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends on whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained. The abilities to maintain and reproduce a language, a set of behavioural customs, or a conception of ethnic purity can all be cast in terms of survival' (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 23).

Although a focus on collective identity does indeed help vindicate the Copenhagen School from accusations of being too state-centric, it is perhaps worth considering that the charges were somewhat misplaced in the first instance. Although states are perhaps the Copenhagen School's main unit of analysis, they are not the only unit of analysis. In fact, in focussing too much on the state aspect of securitization, we are in danger of overlooking the Copenhagen School's Regional Security Compex Theory (RSCT) – key component of the Copenhagen School's approach, and one which may prove extremely useful for understanding the securitization of migration. A regional security complex is created when 'states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 43).

RSCT was first introduced by Buzan in *People, States and Fears* (1983), but taken further in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, which attempts to 'reformulate security complex theory in a post-sovereign form' (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 190). However, the theory is most fully and convincingly developed in *Regions and Powers* (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Within this thesis the African Great Lakes[12] will be considered as a regional security complex (RSC) given that, as will be demonstrated in the first chapter, the security concerns of the Congo are inextricably linked to the security concerns of its neighbouring countries. Several elements of RSCT are particularly useful in facilitating my analysis of the dynamics of conflict in the Congo. Firstly, it has utility in terms of conceptualizing what kind of state

[12] When I refer to the African Great Lakes, I will be following the UK Parliament conception of the "core" African Great Lakes, defined here as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania (Lunn, 2006) I do not include in this definition Kenya, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, although some have argued that these countries may be geographically included in the region (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).

the Congo is within an RSC. In this regard, the Congo can be categorized as a buffer state, which is 'defined by standing at the centre of a strong pattern of securitization, not at its edge' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 41). Indeed, when describing the Second Congo War, Prunier observed that 'all the peripheral conflicts in the region started to roll down into the Congo basin like so many overripe toxic fruits' (Prunier, 2008, p. xxxi). The Congo thus demonstrated itself as a buffer state by becoming the focal point of a number of other conflict in the Great Lakes' 'bad neighbourhood' (Weiner, 1996).

Secondly, within RSCT, Buzan and Wæver make allowances for sub-complexes which may emerge within the RSC and 'represent distinctive patterns of security interdependence which are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern that defines the RSC as a whole' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 51). The focus of this thesis is on the particular sub-complex of actors involved in the conflict that is primarily located in the Kivu provinces of the eastern Congo (and the Kivus can arguably be seen as a sub-buffer zone in this regard). Third, and linked to this, RSCT is useful for my analysis because it is rooted in, and emphasizes, social construction. 'RSCs are defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 45). As well as being used as an analytical and predictive framework, RSCT can be used to organize empirical study. Buzan and Wæver suggest four interrelated levels of analysis (domestic, state-to-state, region-to-region, and region-global) which need to be addressed together in order to fully understand a particular 'security constellation' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 51). While each of these levels is highly significant, and each level will be considered in this thesis, the domestic level of analysis in RSCT is particularly useful for this study because it calls for a closer analysis of the specific vulnerabilities of states, which they argue 'defines the kind of security fears it has...and sometimes makes another state or groups of states a structural threat even if it or they have no hostile intentions' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 51). Salehyan observes that within the security studies literature, 'there has been scant attention paid to how civil wars and political unrest *within* states may spark disputes *between* states' (Salehyan, 2008, p. 788). I suggest that by using RSCT to look at 'geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 45) and the perceptions which affect how relations of amity and enmity are framed, we may understand the phenomenon by which internal conflict spill over borders better.

One such manifestation of these 'spillovers' is the effect of refugees on conflict, which is the subject of this thesis. In terms of understanding refugees, we need to look beyond securitization relationships between sovereign liberal democratic states, and the refugee communities which are displaced in those states, and move to theorise about refugee flows across more proximate borders. Understanding such situations requires a framework which also allows for non-state actors, and the Copenhagen School argue that, although security complex theory was originally formulated in a states-only fashion, they wish to use it in a manner which 'attempts to broaden the concept of security to both new actors beyond the state and new sectors beyond the political and military' (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 190). Indeed, in *Regions and Powers*, Buzan and Wæver are able to develop this goal and to conceive of a framework which transcends the idea of the state as the referent object of security. Building upon the idea of the societal sector, Buzan and Wæver show how any collectivity can define its survival as threatened in terms of identity, and while such collectivities may typically be nations, by discussing collectivities rather than states, they are able to apply their theory to a much broader range of actors (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 70).

Despite its obvious utility, and its ability to overcome some of the critical charges levelled against it, the securitization framework does nonetheless have a number of weaknesses. 'In developing a relatively elegant and tight theoretical framework for security, a number of questions are left unanswered in the Copenhagen School framework' (McDonald, 2008, p. 70). One of the main problems with the practical application of the securitization theory as presented by the Copenhagen School, and the manner in which securitizations are articulated, is that 'in empirical studies one cannot always figure out clearly which audience is when and why most relevant, what implications it has if there are several audiences and when exactly an audience is persuaded' (Stritzel, 2007, p. 363). With regard to the security speech act in particular, the application of a speaker-audience relationship as set out by the Copenhagen School seems to overlook the hierarchies of power which exist, even among non-state actors. Indeed, in applying the Copenhagen School's securitization theory one is likely to find that the dichotomy between speaker and audience becomes increasingly untenable when we differentiate between the power positions of certain actors and also realise that the audience also has a say in defining what constitutes security, and who has the authority to make a successful security speech act.

My main concern with securitization theory as it stands is that, in terms of understanding how the securitization of migration is articulated, the Copenhagen School ignores power hierarchies, and this may help to reinforce dominant representations of refugees in which they are denied visibility, agency and rational speech. Nyers observes that there exists a globalised power-geometry in which refugees are 'a class of moving people who occupy the lower rungs' (Nyers, 2006, p. ix). This plays into the characterisation of refugees as passive victims which may be useful in justifying humanitarian approaches to understanding refugees, but in terms of understanding how and why refugees become a security issue, it serves little purpose. The successful securitization of refugees requires that they are not seen as passive victims in need of humanitarian action, but rather as active political agents who are, at the least a burden on resources, and at the worst capable of mobilising into 'refugee warrior communities' capable of launching existential attacks on the host community and/or sending communities.

For the purposes of my analysis, there are also some fundamental problems with the primacy of speech acts in the Copenhagen School approach. Some scholars have convincingly argued that securitization theory focuses too narrowly on the security speech-act, arguing that, in an era of increasing televisual communication, more emphasis needs to be placed on these embedded visual images (see Williams, 2003; Hansen, 2011). Indeed, as Hansen (2011) argues, the immediacy, wide circulation, and ambiguity of images equips them to 'speak security' to the masses. Thus, Hansen argues, images are just as significant and speech acts (if not more so) in the securitization process. Whilst there is certainly a need to understand the changing nature of political communication through visual imagery and new media such as the internet, this is not my main concern with regards to the speech-act. Rather, in terms of understanding how migration enters the security arena, it would appear that the security speech-act is generally inadequate on a much deeper level. Especially in protracted refugee situations in Asia and Africa, the 'relationship among chronic and recurring refugee flows, regional and intrastate conflict and economic underdevelopment' (Loescher & Milner, 2005, p. 7) suggests that refugees become a security issue over a period of time, when a number of facilitating conditions and prior perceptions (which are more significant than the single speech-act event) come into play. The speech-act is therefore predicated too much on singular acts of securitizing rather than an on-going and evolving securitization *process*, which I argue is a more accurate reflection of how refugees become securitized.

Linked to the above point, securitization theory seems to apply mainly to Western models of democratic states. Thus, most securitization theorists are concerned with how securitizations are articulated in situations where there is a *need* to persuade an audience, and in which this audience has access to tools of dissemination (be it televisual or otherwise). Speech acts in particular imply a kind of democratic consensus and access to political participation that is assumed in Western settings but may not be applicable to less democratic-based non-Western contexts. This study, however, will be looking at the securitization of migrant communities in non-Western countries, and in a highly remote context where access to typical speech-act information is significantly curtailed. By focussing on the speech act event, the Copenhagen School's securitization theory seems particularly inadequate for dealing with situations in which the speech-act does not explicitly occur. This Western-centrism is a problem with International Security Studies in general: Given that ISS is an Anglo-American tradition, most emphasis has been placed on security in relation to the West – even 'Third World' security issues are framed in relation to how they impact on Western superpowers (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 19). This study, however, examines the refugee communities in the Great Lakes as *both* the *referent objects* of security and the *source of existential security threats.* Its focus, consequently, is less about state and conventional actor-audience relationships, and more about the perceptions and identities which perpetuate regional violence in situations such as the Great Lakes. The speech-act is therefore insufficient to explain the 'collective labelling [which] has become an important cog in the mechanism that perpetuates violence in the Great Lakes' (Pottier, 2002, p. 130)

The above criticisms, however, are not necessarily problems within securitization theory that cannot be rectified. The problem is that the theory is relatively underdeveloped; 'rather than providing a consolidating position, the discourse on securitization has only just begun to transform the new idea into a more comprehensive theory' (Stritzel, 2007, p. 358). As such, a reworking of securitization theory to include factors outside of the speech act is required. One aim of this study is therefore to suggest a reworking of securitization theory which may help provide a more thorough understanding of how Rwandan refugees are securitized in the DRC, and how this has contributed to conflict dynamics in the Kivus. The securitization of identity is at the heart of this analysis and will be discussed in more detail in the theoretical framework which I expound in Chapter Three. It is hoped that through a better understanding of the perceptions which drive refugee action and refugee securitization, this thesis can shed light on some of the genuine drivers of conflict, which

are often dismissed as being too abstract or complex, but nonetheless play an important role in this seemingly intractable conflict. This research is predicated on the notion that bringing peace to the Congo has been severely hindered by a dearth of understanding regarding the nature of the conflict. I am not the first to assert this, and what follows, accordingly, is an overview of the (mis)understandings of the Congo which have plagued peacebuilding, and the scholars who have critiqued this very problem.

The Problems with the Congo

In his book, *Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles*, the journalist and Director of the Royal African Society Richard Dowden describes the DRC, as 'the vast, rich, troubled heart of the continent with all its problems and strengths as well as some special ones of its own' (Dowden, 2008, pp. 363-364). For as long as anybody can remember, the complex interaction of numerous "problems" in the Congo, has created an environment of perpetual strife, and led to the continuation of conflict which is arguably like no other conflict in the world. The distinctiveness of the Congo, however, is not universally appreciated in conflict analyses. Analyses of the Congo seem to broadly fall into two opposing camps: on the one hand, humanitarian activists and/or peacebuilding practitioners operating in the Congo and, on the other hand, academic scholars who critique their practices.



Figure 1: A word-cloud surveying 343 news items which appeared on the BBC website in 2010[13]

Despite the protracted and bloody nature of conflict in the Congo, the situation 'remains under-reported, under-researched and, when remembered, largely misunderstood' (Paddon, 2010, p. 322). Media reporting on the Congo is relatively limited, but tends to be dominated by the views of humanitarian activists campaigning on issue surrounding the Congo, many of whom are not based there. Media coverage, therefore, tends to emphasize human rights atrocities, painting pictures of cannibalism and savagery which seem to corroborate the image of the Congo as Africa's dark heart (see Figure 1). The greatest frequency of stories which hit the British press regard rape and economic exploitation.[14]

[13] Figure 1 depicts a word cloud of the text of 343 news items which featured any reference to conflict in the Congo. This word count shows the 100 most frequently appearing words in these articles. Words such as "and", "the", "report(er)s", "Mr", "Dr", and "according" have been excluded from the survey – as, although they also occurred frequently, they cannot tell us anything about the tone of any of the articles. The number of times a word appears is listed next to it in brackets. Unsurprisingly "Congo/Congolese" appears most frequently. The size of the word "democratic" is skewed by the fact it appears in the DRC's name, and "eastern" appears prominently, as that is the province where most of the recent conflict has been focussed. Although "government" and the "UN" feature heavily, they are mainly sources of information and "government" is not restricted to the Congolese government (which is usually discussed negatively). Words such as "civilians, "republic", "rights", are used in a variety of contexts and do not indicate much about the tone of the articles. Interestingly "Rwanda/Rwandan" and "Hutu" feature highly, arguably because of heavy Rwandan interference in the eastern DRC. The other heavily featured words reflect the image of the Congo as brutal: "attacks", "forces", "genocide", "killed", "rape", "rebels", "violence", "war".

[14] For example, the Observer broke a story about male rape in the Congo (Storr, 2011), and a number of examples can be found of rape-related articles on the BBC News website (e.g. Mawathe,

While these are both extremely important aspects of the conflict, they are often presented in isolation from political drivers, resulting in a rather skewed impression of the nature of conflict in the Congo. A similar, and perhaps even more embedded version of this trend can be observed in the American media. Dunn observes that the Congo is still characterized in the Western media as the 'Heart of Darkness', and that this discourse has had very real political consequences: 'While Westerners are generally uninformed about Congolese history and politics, they feel they know it well because of the powerful images encountered of it everyday [*sic*]' (Dunn, 2003, p. 4).

A video produced by the Enough Project provides an example of how atrocities in the Congo are divorced from their political and historical context. In this five minute video, it is argued that 'the purpose [of conflict in the Congo] is for a mineral' (although later the director of Enough, John Prendergast, clarifies that there are in fact three minerals – tantalum, tin and tungsten) (Prendergast & Richie, 2009). The story presented reduces the Congo to a simple conflict of pillage and rape, akin to Sierra Leone in the late 1990s. The minerals in the Congo in this narrative play a similar role to the blood diamonds in Sierra Leone's conflict. Likewise, the use of rape as a tool of war in the Congo is juxtaposed with militants' propensity to amputate civilians in the Sierra Leone. From this comparison Prendergast derives a simple argument regarding what is to be done in the Congo:

> 'Today Sierra Leone is completely at peace, it's a functioning democracy, and now the blood diamonds are clean diamonds because there was a consumer campaign. People who bought/purchased were like [*sic*] "Wait a minute! We don't want our purchases to cause this kind of thing!" So they were like [*sic*] demanding, they didn't boycott, they were just demanding that these companies that were buying the diamonds did not buy from places that actually made the situation worse. And the same for Congo today, if we start telling Hewlett Packard, and telling Apple, and these other big companies that we don't wanna [*sic*] buy products that have conflict minerals coming from the Congo in these products, they'll change their practices. But they won't do it if they don't hear from us. It's literally in our hands; it's unbelievable how much power, especially young people, in this country [the USA] have' (Prendergast & Richie, 2009).

2010; BBC, 2010). The BBC also ran a number of articles about the exploitation of resources in the Congo (e.g Fessy & Doyle, 2009).

To describe Prendergast's analysis of, and proposed solution for, conflict in the Congo as simplistic is perhaps an understatement. If we leave aside the dubious nature of his assertions about Sierra Leone and the "cleanliness" of its diamonds,[15] what we see in this analysis is a depoliticizing of the Congolese conflict, reminiscent of the depoliticizing of the Sudan/Darfur conflict by the Save Darfur Coalition (see Mamdani, 2007). Whilst the Congo is unlikely to inspire an American campaign quite as strong as Darfur, the Enough Project has framed the issues in the Congo to foster the impression that conflict in the Congo can be solved by a populist (American) consumer campaign, rather than by a radical transformation of social, political, and economic structures and behaviours in the Congo itself. But the danger posed by this (mis)understanding goes further than simply not contributing to conflict resolution in the Congo. Both boycotting campaigns and certification processes have often resulted in increased suffering and less protection for those most vulnerable. In the Congo, for example, the artisanal mining of minerals such as tin, tungsten and tantalum often provide essential livelihoods for conflict-affected populations – and are often their only source of economic stability. More is required than simply taking these minerals as causes of conflict; completely and absolutely boycotting such minerals may in fact exacerbate insecurity and instability. Much greater subtlety of approach is therefore required when addressing the role that mineral resources play in conflict dynamics.

Popular activism focussing on human rights violations thus has a tendency to consider these abuses outside of political context, leading to misguided interventions. However, it is not just campaigners in the West with limited exposure to the realities of Congo that have made mistakes when it comes to understanding Congolese conflict. Even peacebuilders actually operating in the Congo have also consistently sought to simplify and generalize the conflict – as it becomes increasingly apparent that 'fundraising and advocacy efforts succeed best when they put forward a simple narrative, and the story is most likely to resonate with its target audiences if it includes well-defined "good" and "evil" individuals, or clear-cut perpetrators and victims' (Autesserre, 2012, p. 6). Consequently, more than a decade of high-budget targeted interventions in the Congo has failed to stabilise the country. Even though the Congo was officially deemed "post-conflict" in 2003, the patterns

[15] The Kimberley Process has recently been criticised for failing to adequately address the issue of conflict diamonds, and indeed a spokesperson for the Network Movement for Justice and Development in Sierra Leone criticized the certification process's ability to protect Sierra Leoneans, stating that: 'We can no longer go back to these people, look them in the eye and tell them that the scheme is working to protect their interests, when it is not' (Global Witness, 2011a)

of violence which have marred much of the Congo's history still endure today. Indeed, Autesserre demonstrates how the continuation of conflict in the Congo has been in part facilitated by the fact that dominant narratives of the conflict posit natural resources as the primary cause of the conflict, sexual violence as the main consequence of the conflict, and extending state authority as the best solution to ending it, and that this simplistic view has hampered peacebuilders and has 'led to results that clash with their intended purposes' (Autesserre, 2012, p.1). The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was authorized to enter the Congo on 30 November 1999, and remained operating there until 30 June 2010 (on the 1 July 2010, MONUC was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUSCO]). The MONUC mission from November 1999 to June 2010 had an expenditure of US$8.73 billion, and by June 2010 it had a total of 20,586 uniformed personnel – including 18,653 troops, 704 military observers, and 1,229 police officers (MONUC, 2010). As of 30 September 2011, MONUSCO has 18,914 uniformed personnel in its mission, including 16,819 military personnel, and an approved budget for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 of more than US$1.4 billion (MONUSCO, 2011). Between MONUC and MONUSCO therefore, more than 12 years of peacebuilding, involving tens of thousands of peacekeeping[16] troops, and over US$10 billion has been spent on trying to bring peace to the Congo.

Despite concerted (and expensive) peacebuilding missions, however, deadly conflict still prevails, revealing two significant truths about conflict resolution in the Congo. Firstly, it reveals that the conflict is intractable, and that simple solutions like those advocated by numerous advocacy and fundraising groups, as well as humanitarian workers on the ground, are unlikely to work. Secondly, it reveals that despite the best efforts of the UN missions, they are not working, and there is therefore a need for them to rethink their strategies. Critiquing the shortcomings of the existing analyses of the Congo is an endeavour that has preoccupied a number of eminent analysts of the Congo. Notable among these analysts are Denis M. Tull (2007), Séverine Autesserre (2006; 2010; 2012), and Gerard Prunier (2008), who all diagnose a poor understanding of the conflict dynamics of

[16] I refer here to peacekeeping as the operation to oversee the implementation of the peace agreements, and peacebuilding as a much broader strategy, which the UN defines as involving 'activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war' (United Nations Security Council, 2000, p. 2, para. 10) peacekeeping can be seen as one of the "foundations" upon which peacebuilding can build.

the Congo as central to the failure of peacebuilding interventions, and ultimately conclude that the main hindrance to a better understanding is that interventions overlook the significance of local dynamics in driving conflict. Tull, for example has argued that unflinching fidelity by the West to the notion of statehood and state-building, coupled with a lack of political will and resources, has meant that perspectives on Congo are limited and stale. 'Failing to address the root causes of warfare, their [the peacebuilders'] apparent opting for quick-fix solutions in so-called failed states such as the DRC will at best result in a state resembling the political system that was at the core of the violent crisis since the early 1990s' (Tull, 2007, p. 129). Prunier supports this view, but does not agree with Tull that this failure has anything to do with a lack of resources or capacity to target interventions at the local level. Rather, he suggests that the failure to address local issues was because peacebuilders wanted to resolve deep-rooted conflict in the Congo quickly, due to a superficial interest in truly resolving the conflict, combined with the short attention span of the international "public". This, Prunier argues, created a situation in which 'major conflict is reduced to a comic book atmosphere in which absolute horror alternates with periods of almost complete disinterest from the nonspecialists' (Prunier, 2008, p. xxxvi). This simplistic understanding may explain why 'the complicated patchwork of local contradictions blending into the general mess is either not perceived or is ritually dismissed as "African complexities"' (Prunier, 2008, p. xxxv).

Both Prunier and Tull discuss peacebuilding failure in terms of a lack of genuine will or interest, but there are those who dispute whether this is actually the case. Autesserre, for example, argues that 'far from being uninterested in ending organized violence, most international interveners had security, economic, and diplomatic stakes in ensuring that the instability in the Congo did not spill over its borders and contaminate its neighbours' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 19). Autesserre's argument is vindicated by the length and budget of the missions in the Congo which suggest that there *was* a genuine desire to bring an end to the conflict. Furthermore, she refutes the idea that the failure to target the local level was because of an inadequacy of resources; 'no matter how inadequate, some significant financial and human resources existed, and part of these resources could have been devoted to local peacebuilding' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 18). Instead, Autesserre argues that the failure of the well-meaning and relatively well-resourced peacebuilding operations in the Congo because of a misguided peacebuilding culture which 'made it possible for foreign interveners to ignore the micro-level tensions that often jeopardize macro-level settlements' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 11). Tull, Prunier and Autesserre all agree that the

problem is that peacebuilders have tried to look at the war in state terms, and this has often led them to not fully understand the whole dynamics of conflict in the Congo. As Prunier asserts, 'It is within that gap in perception that the heart of the problem lies' (Prunier, 2008, p. xxxiv).

If what is needed to facilitate better interventions in the Congo is a better understanding of what is happening at both the local and national level, how, then, should we view the conflict in the Congo? It is perhaps tempting to characterize the Congo as a protracted social conflict (PSC) because of 'the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation' (Azar, 1991, p. 93) which certainly characterizes various stages of recent Congo wars. Indeed, the continuation of conflict in the eastern Congo does have a protracted and intractable nature, in which numerous factions vie for power. The utility of viewing conflict in the Congo as a PSC is evident (especially if we utilize Azar's four cluster variables for conflict analysis: communal content, human needs, state governance, and international linkages). However, I would argue that the PSC framework is insufficient to fully explain what is currently going on in the Congo. Azar's framework cannot facilitate a comprehensive analysis of conflict in the Congo, because it does not account for the palimpsest of unresolved dynamics and tensions from previous conflicts which bubble just below the surface of all relations in the Congo, creating a highly volatile situation which could erupt at any time once again into full-scale war. The current conflict in the eastern Congo cannot be divorced from the First and Second Congo Wars, or indeed from the history of violence which has plagued the Congo since it was established as a colony in 1885. Furthermore, there is no real consensus that this is a protracted social conflict – we can also convincingly characterize it as a resource war, given that it does 'entail a struggle between competing elites and tribes over the income derived from commodity exports' (Klare, 2001, p. 52). Given the multiple ethnic tensions in the eastern region it would also be forgivable to argue that it is an ethnic conflict. But the conflict in the Congo is more than any of these classifications – ethnic conflict, resource wars and protracted social conflicts only explain part of the problem, and it is not enough to merely characterize it as a hybrid war. What is occurring in the Congo transcends and exceeds the sum of its (manifold) parts.

Nor is it simply enough to look at local issues. Although Autesserre and Prunier convincingly argue that the disjunction between the realities on the ground and the peacebuilders'

understanding of the situation is because they overlooked local dynamics, it is not sufficient to simply look at localized violence as confined to local conflict. 'In 2007 and 2008, a conflict previously confined to a small area of North Kivu escalated into a large-scale fighting, prompting 500,000 to flee their homes' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 4). International intervention was required to contain the conflict and prevent it from spreading into a full-scale civil war, or even relapsing into regional conflict. Therefore, it is insufficient to consider local dynamics as divorced from the wider national, regional, and international implications of the various drivers of conflict. In an article for *Foreign Affairs* in 2008, Autesserre summarized the difficulties that peacebuilding efforts need to overcome: 'The international community has admittedly been facing a very complex situation: all the parties have legitimate grievances, but all are also responsible for massive human rights violations; the fighting involves many armed groups, and these often fragment and shift alliances' (Autesserre, 2008, p.95). Resolving conflict in the Congo is therefore a minefield of complexities and conundrums which peacebuilders need to carefully navigate through. Whilst this places peacebuilders in an unenviable position, it is clear that ignoring the complexities is not the solution. What is needed, therefore, is a new framework which integrates the various levels of conflict and appreciates the interaction, and interconnectedness, between local, national and regional dynamics. Whilst no framework can ever fully explain any conflict with complete accuracy, the Congo more so than any other modern conflict defies classification and breaks the mould. Following, then, from the arguments posited in Tull's, Prunier's and Autesserre's critiques, what we need is a new mould. This thesis will therefore attempt to suggest a new method for analysing conflict in the Congo, arguing that if the Congo is a conflict *sui generis*, then nothing short of a specifically tailored model of conflict analysis will be sufficient for understanding it.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis therefore aims to provide a tailored analysis of conflict in the Congo, by analysing the role that Rwandan refugees play in the Congo, and the subsequent impact of their role on the conflict dynamics of the region. While I have singled out Rwandan refugees as the primary subject of my analysis, I aim to show how they, and the ideas and beliefs held about them, play a pervasive role in innumerable aspects of Congolese conflict. In order to achieve my research aims, I have structured the thesis by dividing it into six main chapters, beginning with a history of conflict in the Congo from King Leopold to the November 2011 elections (which is the chronological boundary of my research). The 2011

elections have been chosen as an endpoint for the analysis because they serve as a symbolic example of the failure of single-focus solutions. The international community have tended to view the Congo as a victim of failed government, leading to the implementation of democratic elections in 2006. But, the 2006 elections demonstrated that straightforward solutions do not produce straightforward results. Rather than solving the crisis, the election created new dynamics which in turn produced new problems. Consequently, 'the international community's insistence on organizing elections in 2006 has ended up jeopardizing the peace' (Autesserre, 2008, p. 103). Furthermore, conflict has endured as renewed political violence broke out in Kinshasa before the 2011 elections. Facilitating elections alone is not enough; much deeper economic, social and political reform is required to bring peace to the Congo.

The first two chapters of this thesis provide a historical overview of conflict in the Congo. In Chapter One, 'A History of Violence', I examine the dynamics of conflict in the Congo as a whole, in order to elucidate some of the structures and patterns of violence that have marred Congolese history. I highlight four particular themes: The neo-patrimonial nature of political relationships within the Congo; the dominance of an infrastructure which is conducive to economic predation and unfavourable to economic cooperation; the complex notions of citizenship and belonging in the Congo; and the attractiveness and vulnerability of the Congo to external interference. I demonstrate through a chronological account of the Congo's history from the colonial era of King Leopold to the 2011 presidential elections how these themes have endured, and why the compounding of the grievances which have arisen from these themes makes conflict in the Congo so intractable. Following scholars such as Séverine Autesserre, Morten Bøås, Denis Tull, and Stephen Jackson, I argue that it is a mistake to view the Congo as post-conflict, and that despite extensive peacebuilding attempts in the Congo, pervasive conflict endures and is likely to continuously flare-up as long as the structures of violence which I discuss in this chapter endure. My argument in this first chapter draws on the idea of fractal self-similarity, a concept taken from Chaos Theory which stipulates that in a chaotic system, there is a 'tendency of patterns or structures to recur on multiple levels or scales' (Mosko, 2005, p. 24). I argue that the Congo is indeed a chaotic system, and that we can observe that since its inception as a colony in 1885, the cycles of conflict which have emerged show remarkable similarity to one another, and thus the patterns are recurring on multiple scales.

In the second chapter, 'Borderzone and Bufferzone', I then attempt to examine the quality of fractal self-similarity (the patterns of behaviour discussed in Chapter One repeating on different levels or scales) by providing a more detailed overview of conflictual behaviour in the Kivu provinces of the eastern Congo. Again, I attempt to demonstrate how the same issues of patronage, pillage, citizenship, and external interference manifest themselves on a lower (local) level. I argue that the Kivus have become a microcosm of conflict in the Congo, and indeed of conflict in the African Great Lakes, because of its geographic position on the border between the Congo and Rwanda and Uganda. Drawing in literature from borderzone theorists (such as Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg [1996] and Martin Doevenspeck [2011]), I examine the creative ways in which Kivutian inhabitants have coped with the perpetual conflict that has played out in their territory. I also examine how and why the Kivus have been the site of both the birth of rebellion movements since the 1990s, and also the battleground of confrontations between government forces and rebel groups in the Congo since the 1990s. I therefore go on to examine a number of rebel movements, beginning with the ADFL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaïre) in the First Congo War, and the RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) in the Second Congo War. I then move to discuss the rebel groups which have proliferated in the Kivus since the official end of the Second Congo War, suggesting that conflict in the Kivus is far from over. In particular I examine the Rwandan Hutu militants who have been operating in the Kivus since the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, and who continue to engage in belligerent activities there – posing a considerable threat to Rwandan security and Congolese stability alike.

These Rwandan Hutu militants have been much securitized, and yet efforts to curb their perceived threat have largely failed. The rest of this thesis therefore examines why this is the case and how methods of dealing with this notoriously violent and elusive group of militants can be best improved. In the third chapter, 'Refugeeness and Warriorness', I argue that much of the failure to adequately deal with the Rwandan Hutu militant threat in the Congo can be attributed to the fact that their refugee experience has been overlooked, and that if we begin to understand this (and their status a stateless people) we can begin to understand more about the means and motivations which drive their actions. I therefore look at the international refugee regime and how its exclusionary classification system has led many to overlook the fact that these Rwandan Hutu militants are refugees – albeit unconventional refugees. The chapter thus critiques dominant understandings and classifications of refugees, in order to establish how and why Rwandan Hutu militants have

come to be overlooked as refugees. I argue that conventional understandings do not adequately account for certain refugee experiences, and that we need a polythetical classificatory system which makes allowances for a wide variety of refugee experiences. By asserting that there is a wide range of refugee identities and experiences, I attempt to dispel the myth that refugees are intrinsically passive, apolitical victims. I then argue that Rwandan Hutu militants are refugees who challenge this norm, and can accordingly be considered refugee warriors – a term coined by Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo in *Escape from Violence* in order to describe refugees who are 'not merely a passive group of dependent refugees but represent highly conscious refugee communities with a political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for political objective' (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 275). I argue that, although these militants do not need the rights and protections that refugee status affords them, it is important that their "refugeeness" and refuge experience is appreciated, as this can tell us a great deal about their security dilemmas, motivations, and means of survival.

Accordingly, the fourth chapter, Ordering the Chaos, offers an analytical framework for understanding refugee identity – examining the interaction of several variables and the impact that they have on refugee identity. Because of the multiple, complex and ephemeral nature of this identity (which I argue manifests collectively, but is simultaneously multi-faceted), a number of methodological issues concerning analysis arise. As such, this chapter describes in more detail the methodology that I use in my analysis which draws inspiration from Chaos Theory. In particular, I outline three significant elements of Chaos Theory which can be useful for conflict analysis. Firstly, as I have utilized it in my earlier chapters, I discuss the significance of fractal self-similarity. Secondly, I suggest that we need to be looking for non-linear relationships between variables. Finally, I suggest that there is a need for the analyst themselves to be aware of the extreme sensitivity of chaotic systems to small changes in conditions, and as such, the very real role that my own analysis of the Congo may play in shaping perceptions. Thus, I develop a framework for understanding which is inspired by Chaos Theory. The Identity-Process Framework (IPF) which I advocate facilitates the analysis of the identity of refugee warriors, whom I argue simultaneously possess multiple strands of identity. Fundamental to the framework which I develop in this chapter is the assertion that identity is an ephemeral, evolving and multi-faceted process. I therefore conceive of "identity paths" or "identity trajectories" rather than a static notion of identity. I map these trajectories by examining the relations that refugee warriors have to their sending and receiving countries; the

cultural traumas which may cause them to change the direction of their identity paths; the mechanisms through which they reconfigure and reassert their collective histories in order to create new paths; and the manner in which they navigate through (and between) different identity paths at different times in order to mobilize whichever aspect(s) of their various identity they see as strategically useful for their survival in any given situation. The aim of the framework is to allow for the interaction between a range of variables to be examines, and their impact on refugee identity explained. It also allows us to understand how the societal security of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors can be preserved through the flexible and resilient construction of identity – which (as is argued earlier in this Introduction) is the referent object of their (societal) survival.

The fifth chapter 'Identity as Tactics' goes on to apply the Identity-Process Framework to the Rwandan Hutu case by looking at how they have survived thus far in the in the eastern DRC. I argue that, despite concerted efforts to disarm, demobilise and repatriate them to Rwanda, Rwandan refugee warrior communities in the eastern DRC have disquietingly endured. I focus in this chapter on the FDLR, but also examine other Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups such as the Liberation Front of North Kivu (FLNK), the *Rasta*, and the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD-Urunana), who have all been associated with the FDLR because they contain either FDLR deserters or Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors who are perceived to harbour a Hutu Power ideology. I suggest that although military operations to remove the FDLR have boasted a reduction in FDLR numbers, the proliferation of armed groups containing Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors suggests that their threat has not been reduced, and that this group as a whole endure. I therefore examine in this chapter how the group has survived as a collectivity in the eastern DRC for nearly two decades. Using the Identity Process Framework, I suggest that they have made a transition from Oddysean refugees to quasi-Rubicon refugees who are now seeking a more permanent home in the Kivus. As such, I demonstrate how they are rewriting (or at least reinscribing) their history to assert authochthony in the Kivus, and weaving into that history a narrative which nonetheless fits in with their anti-Tutsi rhetoric. However, while they are looking for security in the Kivus, they have not forsaken their goal of return to Rwanda (or at least the overthrow of the Tutsi-led regime there). In this way, I examine how Rwandan refugee warriors creatively react to the space that they occupy and use their identity as a tactic of survival.

Finally, in the sixth chapter, 'Empathy for the Rebel?', I move to some prescriptive arguments regarding how to deal with the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors constructively, and in a manner which is conducive to long-term peace. Here, I draw on the utility of fractal patterning, which I outline in the first chapter. I suggest that we can see Rwandan Hutu behaviour as being a reminiscent (albeit on a different scale) of previous waves of Rwandan refugee activity. In this way, we can regard it as a self-similar phenomenon and use fractal patterning methods in conflict analysis. In this sense, I compare the experiences and behaviour of the FDLR with that of some Rwandan Tutsi refugee groups, looking in particular at the refugee warriors who fought in the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). Rwandan refugees in the RCD have used similar strategies to the FDLR in that they have tried to assert autochthony (by linking themselves to the Banyamulenge) and also tried to gain access to resources. Furthermore, just as we can observe a variety of off-shoot groups of the FDLR (such as the FLNK), new Tutsi militias have arisen (such as Laurent Nkunda's CNDP[17] group). I argue that, just as the RCD have transformed from a refugee warrior group to legitimate (at least tentatively) actor in the Congolese political system, so we can see the FDLR as following a similar pattern of trying to assert political influence (if not on a national scale, then at least in Kivutian politics). The thesis therefore concludes by suggesting that the FDLR should be brought in from the cold, and more attention be paid to transforming them into legitimate and credible political actors who are then accountable for their actions. The problem with analyses which only view the FDLR through the lens of criminality is that it has led to them be marginalized from formal political structures. This has then caused them to retreat from any realm in which they could be monitored, and therefore led to a dearth of understanding about them. The uncertainty which surrounds the FDLR (and which they themselves face), I argue, is at the heart of their conflictual behaviour, and alleviating this uncertainty is the key to alleviating their negative impact on conflict in the region.

By way of a conclusion, I argue that Rwandan refugee warriors in the Kivus have shown active aggression and political subjectivity, and are rarely regarded as victims. However, they are nonetheless refugees – and refugees who, although they may have done so by committing appalling human rights atrocities, have demonstrated incredible resilience and survival instinct. The case is made, therefore, for examining the driving forces behind their survival mechanisms, arguing that a better understanding of these mechanisms will lead to

[17] National Congress for the Defence of the People

a clearer understanding of their aims, and allow us to reduce their violence by offering non-violent opportunities to achieve these aims. My argument is predicated on the assertion that overlooking the nature of refugee warriors causes two separate, but interrelated, vicious cycles to emerge: Firstly, the securitization cycle; in which the securitization of the activities carried out by Rwandan refugee warriors pushes them further into para-state and illegal activity. Whilst it is obvious that these groups are engaged in numerous criminal activities, they are not the only armed belligerents operating in the Congo who engage in such deeds, and by securitizing them in the way that they have been, they are offered few alternative options but to continue engaging in these activities. Secondly, and linked to the first vicious cycle, these groups face the (in)access cycle; in which they evade capture, by withdrawing from public structures and access. I argue that if we can first overcome the problems which are caused by a lack of access, then we can also make positive moves to break the securitization cycle. The key barrier to breaking both these cycles is a deep-rooted uncertainty (borne out of a lack of understanding) about their motivations and intentions. I suggest that we can improve our understanding, thereby reducing our uncertainty, through a more sympathetic and nuanced approach to refugee warriors which takes into account their refuge experiences and the manner in which their "refugeeness" shapes their identity.

Originality and Aims of the Thesis

The primary aim of this thesis is to shed some light on the question of what is to be done about the Rwandan refugee problem in the Congo, and in particular, the Rwandan Hutu refugee crisis in the Kivus. To this end, the thesis sets out to address the following subsidiary aims: Firstly, I seek to situate the Rwandan refugee crisis within the wider context of conflict in the African Great Lakes, the Congo and the Kivus. In doing so, I attempt to demonstrate that the manner in which Rwandophone migration is securitized is replicated on a number of different scales. I also show that the structures which perpetuate violence on the local, national, and regional scales are remarkably similar. Secondly, I aim to demonstrate how we can uncover significant insights into the means and motivations of Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups via a more thorough analysis of their "refugeeness". In this regard, I hope to show that even non-conventional refugees have nonetheless experienced refuge, and this experience has had a significant impact on their identity. Thirdly, I set out to derive a sensible method for analysing this refugee identity, assessing the impact it has on refugees' security decisions, and then applying it to the Rwandan Hutu

refugee warrior case. Subsequently, I return to the original question of what is to be done about Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors in the Kivus, and offer some solutions in this regard.

I believe that the thesis makes a number of original contributions to the existing conflict analysis literature, and these fall into three main categories. Firstly, with regards to the Congo, I have provided a conflict analysis which fuses national structures of conflict with the local dynamics of the Kivus, through the identification of four recurring themes which drive conflict on both levels. I have also attempted to shed light on some of the frequently-cited, but often unverified, "facts" about the Congo. For example, I have highlighted the difficulty involved in calculating the number of conflict-related deaths that have taken place in the Congo, and also demonstrate that many of the assertions made about Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups are not supported by clear, objective evidence. Secondly, I have advocated a new approach to analysing difficult-to-measure drivers of conflict, such as identity. The Identity Process Framework that I develop synthesizes lessons from Chaos Theory with analytical tools available in migration studies, identity studies, social psychology and social anthropology, in order to provide a unique framework for analysing the effect of refuge on groups' collective identity. Finally, the thesis advocates a new approach to dealing with Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo, beginning with a greater emphasis on their refuge experiences, and moving towards a more empathetic approach to alleviating their own security concerns. In this way, the thesis aims to provide new insights, not only with regard to the specific problem of Rwandan Hutu rebels in the Congo, but also in providing new approaches to difficult-to-reach rebel groups and protracted situations beset by belligerency. In this regard, it is hoped that the thesis will form an analytical case study of a method of analysis which can then be applied to other marginalized groups-in-exile (such as, for example, the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories), as well as to other cases of protracted conflict (such as Somalia, and the Niger Delta).

Conclusion

The conflict in the eastern DRC has been chosen as the focus of this thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, In terms of suitability for the question of what role refugees play in conflict dynamics, the Congo provides an example of a protracted situation in which ideas and beliefs about displacement have had very real and tangible consequences for the subsequent dynamics of the conflict. While I emphasize the specificity of the Chaos model

which I develop – not only to the case of the Congo, but also to the issue of Rwandan refugees in the eastern Congo – it is hoped that the model can be drawn upon to encourage the analysis of other difficult-to-access groups. While of course the model would have to be tailored once again to specifically fit another purpose, there is an argument to be made that a better understanding of how ideas and beliefs about displacement manifest, and are then mobilised in FDLR case, may enhance our understanding of the effect of displacement on conflict in general. As such, there is a potential to conduct research beyond this thesis, using some of the arguments and assertions put forward here as the baseline for new analytical frameworks to examine other seemingly "imponderable" aspects of conflict.

Secondly, in addition to the academic value of improving our understanding of conflict in the eastern Congo, there is a strong humanitarian imperative to understanding the dynamics of a conflict which has caused so much human suffering. Before we can suggest interventions which may bring some long-term stability to the region, a clearer understanding of the *nature* of conflict dynamics in the region is required. My suggestions for intervention are targeted not at the national and international level (as so many intervention initiatives in the Congo are) but, in a similar vein to Autesserre (2010), at the local level – and specifically at the level of local politics in the Kivus. While this will inevitably still involve dialogue with international and national-state actors, dialogue with the FDLR (and other local militias) is at the heart of the interventions I suggest. It is local actors who are currently the main spoilers of the peacebuilding efforts, and ignoring local dynamics is therefore not conducive to a durable and sustainable peace in the Congo.

The November 2011 elections may be conceived as a second phase of the Congo's post-war "dabble with democracy". However, it is clear that in many areas of the Congo, and particularly in the Kivus, the war is far from over, and the ostensible democracy that the elections seek to provide has bought little improvement to the lives of those still living with the horrors of war. Furthermore violence in the run-up to the elections has demonstrated that the country is constantly on the verge of a full-scale civil crisis. Our aim therefore, if we cannot solve conflict in the Congo outright, should be at the very least to facilitate interventions which stabilise those regions of the Congo which are most volatile, and most likely to plunge the country back into war. We can view the Congo as being on the verge of a crisis because: 'The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear' (Gramsci,

1971, p. 276). It is our duty to try and identify these symptoms and deal with them accordingly.

Chapter One: A History of Violence

Recurring Conflict Themes in the Democratic Republic of Congo

---

'The charm of history and its enigmatic lesson consist in the fact that, from age to age, nothing changes and yet everything is completely different'.[18]

~

Introduction

Before we can look forward towards what is to be done in the Congo, it is important to first understand the historical setting which contextualizes the current struggle. Violence has characterized the entire recorded history of the Congo, but it is misleading to regard this as mindless violence that is intrinsic to Africa's 'Heart of Darkness'[19] – an image so pervasive amongst western imaginings of the country.[20] Rather, every violent struggle, every seemingly futile death, has a specific historical and political background. The Congo therefore needs to be re-imagined in a manner which re-politicizes the atrocities in order to gain an accurate picture of why it has become such a perpetually brutal environment. There is nothing innate about violence in the Congo.

However, violence is something which has become so deeply embedded in Congolese structures since the colonial period that it is often mistaken for innate. Autesserre argues that the peacebuilding frame[21] used by diplomats and UN staff members in the Congo

---

[18] (Huxley, 1952, p. 259).

[19] Although the "Heart of Darkness" is often read as referring to the Congo (as the heart of Africa) and the brutality that has endured therein, Michela Wrong has argued that this is a misreading of what Conrad meant. She argues instead that 'The "darkness of the book's title refers to the monstrous passions at the core of the human soul, lying ready to emerge when a man's better instincts are suspended, rather than a continent's supposed predisposition to violence. Conrad was more preoccupied with rotten Western values, the white man's inhumanity to the black man, than, as is almost always assumed today, black savagery' (Wrong, 2001, pp. 9-10).

[20] For more on the misleading image of the Congo as inherently violent and intrinsically brutal see see Dunn, (2003) and Autesserre (2009).

[21] Autesserre describes this frame as a dominant peacebuilding culture which 'shaped the international understanding of violence and intervention in such a way that international actors interpreted their lack of material capabilities as obstacles to grassroots peacebuilding and viewed

reemphasizes the belief that the Congo is inherently violent (Autesserre, 2009, p. 255) and has also led to a focus on national and regional, rather than local, peacebuilding attempts. Consequently, Auteserre argues peacebuilders 'never considered that micro-level conflict could cause violence or that working at the local level could be an appropriate strategy' (Autesserre, 2009, p. 256). While I agree with Autesserre's observations, I would challenge the causal direction in her argument. Clearly, the organizations such as the UN do, at least to some extent, hold the view that a certain level of violence in the Congo is acceptable, or else they would not have labelled the Congo as "post-conflict"[22] in 2002, despite clear and on-going violence. Furthermore, given the primacy of moves to facilitate elections in 2006 and 2011, Autesserre seems correct in her assessment that peacebuilding has been focussed on the Congolese state at the national level. However, I would contest her assertion that this led peacebuilders to completely overlook the local context.

My own fieldwork with UN staff members showed that they paid keen attention to local dynamics of conflict, and MONUC and MONUSCO have made numerous efforts to look at the local level, particularly in relation to militias operating in the Kivus.[23] However, their activities in these areas have had little success, and have often resulted in a worsening of the situation.[24] Therefore, it is likely that the peacebuilders *had* appreciated the importance of the local level, but realised the difficulties involved in addressing the numerous local complexities, and experienced just how badly wrong things could go when they did try to address local problems. While Autesserre's argument seems to suggest that the peacebuilding frame precluded action at the local level, I argue the reverse: That the logistical difficulties of action at the local level led to the adoption of a frame which emphasized more-easy-to-achieve national strategies. In other words, rather than the

---

their national and organizational interests as compatible with continued local conflict' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 23).

[22] Following the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN declared the Congo to be post-conflict. Autesserre observes that after this label was applied 'people affected by violence lacked the discursive space to challenge this dominant discourse. Eventually, the label became "objectified" and "widely internalized" into a shared understanding of the situation' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 67).

[23] I was able to speak to UN personnel during two separate periods of fieldwork in: 2008 (when I spoke to MONUC officers) and 2010 (when I spoke to officers in MONUSCO). Under both MONUC and MONUSCO , a number of initiatives and operations were undertaken to tackle local level actors. For example, attempts were made to integrate members from groups such as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), the Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO), and various Mai-Mai militias into the Congolese Army (FARDC).

[24] As will be analysed in Chapters Five and Six, a number of UN-led operations against militias such as the FDLR have resulted in civilian casualties, and human rights abuses, as well as a loss of support for the UN among Congolese civilians.

frame preventing the action, the unfeasibility of local action led to the adoption of a peacebuilding frame which would justify concentrating on the national and international level – where intervention was simpler, more measurable, and there was less possibility that their actions may prolong or exacerbate conflict. While it is understandable that peacebuilders may take this approach – clearly targeted and measurable interventions with high chances of success (such as the facilitating of democratic elections) are much more appealing than messy and bloody attacks which may worsen the situation – ignoring local issues is, nonetheless, a significant obstacle to lasting peace. It is obvious that whilst there is deadly violence in any part of the country, we cannot consider the Congo to be "post-conflict". We therefore do need to address the underlying causes of violence at every political level, looking at how these causes affect the current dynamics of local violence, as well as the wider implications that continuous local conflict has for the future of the Congolese state, and indeed the African Great Lakes region, as a whole.

I argue that, although the local conflicts do undoubtedly need to be addressed, this cannot reasonably be achieved unless we understand the wider patterns violence – both at the national and regional level – to which they are inextricable bound, and which feature as recurring themes throughout Congolese history. In this chapter therefore, I attempt to examine the history of conflict in the Congo, and its role within the dynamics of conflict in the African Great Lakes region. As outlined in the Introduction, I will be utilizing a method of analysis throughout this thesis which draws on a number of lessons which can be learnt from Chaos Theory. In the first two chapters, I will be referring in particular to the utility of fractal patterning, the phenomenon whereby repeating patterns of behaviour in chaotic systems emerge over time at different scales. In this chapter I will demonstrate how from its inception as the Congo Free State to the modern day, very similar violent behaviours have recurred in the Congo, and can be understood with regard to four interlinked and enduring traits of the Congolese political structure: The neo-patrimonial nature of political relationships within the Congo; the dominance of an infrastructure which is conducive to economic predation and unfavourable to economic cooperation; the complex notions of citizenship and belonging in the Congo; and the attractiveness and vulnerability of the Congo to external interference. In this chapter, I will examine how these four traits have manifested and contributed to violence within the whole of the Congo. I will then argue in the following chapter that these structures have also emerged on a local scale within the Kivus.

The neo-patrimonial nature of political rule, the predatory economic infrastructure, the ambiguous construction of Congolese citizenship, and the interference of outside forces within the Congo are linked in complex, numerous, and reciprocal ways – leading to a chicken-and-egg-style conundrum when trying to establish the nature of their individual causality in conflict. For example we could argue that it was through colonial interference that the infrastructure of economic predation was installed (suggesting outside interference causes economic predation), but we could just as easily argue that it was the easy availability of resources, and a lack of clear rules about their ownership, which made the Congo so attractive to outside actors (thus suggesting that the ease of economic predation caused the external interference). Similarly, do neo-patrimonial relationships emerge to facilitate economic extraction? Or, does the wealth generated by resource extraction merely provide the means to achieve power in a system where horizontal inequalities are rife? Because of the inseparability of these issues, this chapter will take a chronological approach which considers how these four traits have interacted over time. The first section of this chapter therefore begins by looking at the Congo's colonial experiences – demonstrating how the Congo was created as an economically lucrative venture for Belgian investors and highlighting several legacies of colonialism which would haunt the Congo post-independence. The second section then goes on to discuss the Congo's difficult independence and post-independence period from the 1960s until the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997.[25] In this section, I not only demonstrate continuity from the colonial period, but also explain how the four traits outlined above became increasingly interrelated to create myriad grievances, and methods of dealing with such grievances, which have made conflict in the Congo so intractable. In the third section I examine the two Congo Wars (1996-7 and 1998-2003) by examining the manner in which Congolese conflict transformed from a self-contained crisis of economic failure and state weakness to become a regional war that involved the security and conflict interests of at least six other African actors.[26] The final section of this chapter will look at the state of the Congo since 2003 –

[25] Thomas Turner (2007) categorizes Congo's independence period as having four distinct periods: Lumumba's struggle to consolidate power during decolonization and at independence; Belgium and the USA's attempts to assert influence in the Congo Crisis; 1965-1997 rule of Mobutu Sese Seko; and the Congo Wars which have plagued the country since the late 1990s. Dunn (2003) also "imagines" the Congo as having distinct moments in which the Congo Crisis and Mobutu's Zaïre are considered separately. I have adopted a different approach, and have chosen to analyse the period 1960-1997 in one section, because I demonstrate how Mobutu manoeuvres to gain a victory in the 1960-66 Congo Crisis, and the period which follows until 1997 can be seen as a continuation of his political manoeuvring in order to consolidate power .

[26] In this analysis, I will be discussing only Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia – but I appreciate that Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African

assessing the peacebuilding attempts, and discussing the violence which has occurred around both the 2006 and 2011 elections. The analysis of this final section will focus on country-wide violence, rather than just focussing on the Kivu regions of the eastern Congo – which will be the subject of the next chapter. Although, for ease of analysis, I have divided up this chapter into distinctive chronological periods, it is important to point out that there is a large degree of overlap and continuity between the dynamics of each phase. However, following a line of reasoning which posits the Congo as extremely sensitive to changes in conditions, this chapter also seeks to show how each phase has brought with it new challenges and changed the trajectory of conflict in the region. Therefore, I do not wish to construct "back to the future" scenarios which suggest a reversion to pre-colonial political structures (see Clapham, 1998). Rather, agreeing that the 'precolonial past is not recoverable in Africa, but its institutions and processes have not been eliminated' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 220), I attempt to build up a historical palimpsest of the Congo which points to the numerous challenges it has to overcome, but also tries to highlight features in which opportunities may lie.

The Spectres of Colonialism

The idea that violence is somehow inherent in the Congo might seem forgivable if we examine Congolese history from 1885, when the Congo became the property of King Leopold II of Belgium. However, if we look at the Congolese territory prior to 1885, we do not necessarily see an underlying trend towards violence featuring so strongly in early Congolese history. Although it is inaccurate to suggest that colonialism introduced violence *per se*, it can be argued that the colonial experience introduced into the Congo the structures which entrenched violence as a dominant form of political exchange. Muiu and Martin (2009) examine several of the ancient kingdoms[27] in the territory we know today as the DRC, and paint a picture of sophisticated political structures based on popular participation and (relatively) democratic institutions. In particular, they highlight the ancient kingdom of Kuba as being 'an extremely complex culture and society that managed to maintain its integrity against all odds in the Congo's heartland' (Muiu & Martin, 2009, p.

Republic and South Africa have also had both direct and indirect involvement in the Congolese conflicts.

[27] The territory we now refer to as the Democratic Republic of the Congo covers land that was previously under the rule of several different ancient kingdoms, including Kongo, Luba, Lunda, Yeke, and Kuba. It is for this reason that we see an extremely heterogeneous mix of people all claiming Congolese indigeneity.

116). The "odds" which Muiu and Martin write about regard the Atlantic slave trade, which caused a trend towards violence in the various kingdoms of the Congo (see Vasina, 2004; Muiu & Martin, 2009). Not only did the slave trade affect democratic structures, it 'subverted the other institutions of governance as well. Offerings became a tribute in significant goods, rendering justice became a means to extort fines and to acquire pawns or slaves, wars were fought to capture slaves, and in internal affairs powerful chiefs centralized governance in their own hands and turned into despots who displayed skulls on their fences as a means of cowing their subjects' (Vasina, 2004, p. 252). The trend of pillage and exploitation which characterized the slave trade therefore *endured* in the colonial period, rather than *began* in the colonial period, but it is nonetheless posited as a trend which was introduced by external influence on the African continent in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

However, it is important to emphasize that the relative peace and cooperation in the Congo territories prior to the Atlantic slave trade does not necessarily justify an assertion that there was no conflict in the Congo prior to Western conquest. It is an often made mistake to imagine Africa before Western explorers discovered it as being a utopia of peace and equality. Certainly, external influences did alter the Congo's political structures such that violence as a continuation of politics became enabled as a norm in the Congo. However, this is not to say that without external influence there would have never been war. There were numerous pre-slave trade conditions in the Congo which were likely to surface as political tensions at some point of its history. Perhaps most prominent among these issues was the complex ethnic make-up of the Congo's indigenous demography (indigenous here as meaning pre-colonial). 'Starting around 1000 BCE and lasting well into the first millennium AD, Congo's ancient history was marked by several migratory waves' (Muiu & Martin, 2009, p. 103). It is the competing claims of these migratory waves which mean that the current concerns over ethnic rights in the Congo are not about who is indigenous to the Congo, but who is *autochthonous*. Those claiming autochthony argue that they were there first, that they are "Sons of the Soil" who literally sprang up from the Congolese terrain. Groups such as the Batwa, for example, were pushed into the Congolese rainforests by waves of Bantu-speaking migrants, and Sudanic people coming from Darfur and Kordofan (see Muiu & Martin, 2009). The intricate ethnic make up of pre-colonial Congo was only to be complicated further by its colonial expereince. At the same time, under colonialism, the brutal structures of patronage and pillage intensified.

Unlike most of the other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Congo did not begin its colonial life as a conventional colony, but rather the personal property of the Belgian king, Leopold II, who with the assistance of British explorer Henry Morten Stanley carved out a territory by the Congo Basin which would become the Congo Free State. Leopold presented to the European Powers a colonial vision which would bring civilization to the territory. Indeed, when the Congo Free State was first established, Leopold was praised for his philanthropy,[28] 'and for more than a decade European newspapers have praised him for investing his personal fortune in public works to benefit the Africans' (Hochschild, 1998, p. 1). At this time, nobody suspected that the International African Association, the organization through which Leopold purported to carry out his humanitarian work, was all but a front for a scheme to facilitate the personal enrichment of Leopold and his various backers who had invested in the Congo Free State. Thus, from its inception in 1885, emphasis was placed on making the colony self-funding on the one hand, and generating short-term profit for shareholders on the other.

There were a few immediately available resources, such as ivory and rubber, over which the Free State gained monopoly. Locals were taxed through these products, having to fill a quota or face punishment. As ivory and rubber sources began to deplete, villagers from several settlements had to compete for whatever remaining sources were available. Failing to meet their quotas resulted in severe punishments for the villagers, and many Congolese died in competition for the resources – whilst fighting among themselves, and also at the hands of their Belgian oppressors. In order to ensure that the Congolese obeyed Leopold's laws, the *Force Publique* – an army of Congolese and West African mercenaries – was established. These mercenaries were not paid directly by Leopold. Rather, 'Leopold expected the *Force Publique* to provide for itself [with aid of the weapons he had provided for them], pillaging surrounding villages in search of food' (Wrong, 2001, p. 43). The fraudulent nature of this exploitative regime was discovered in the late 1890s by Edmund Dene Morel, a clerk for the Liverpool-based shipping line Elder Dempster, which had been contracted by King Leopold to carry all cargo to and from the Congo. Morel noticed three discrepancies in the company's dealings: that there were ship-loads of arms being transported to the Congo to be used by Belgian trading companies; that the amount of

[28] In particular, Leopold had the backing of the Catholic Church who sent a number of missionaries to the Congo Free State. Even as allegations of atrocities were being made against Leopold, Weisbord argues that 'Pius X endorsed King Leopold and ignored the unspeakable crimes committed against black Congolese of which the Belgian monarch was the author' (Weisbord, 2003, p. 45).

rubber and ivory being brought from the Congo vastly exceeded the amount that was declared (and therefore taxed); and that the Congolese natives were not being paid for the rubber and ivory that was extracted. In realising that these discrepancies amounted not to humanitarian assistance, but rather corruption and exploitation, Morel 'began to uncover an elaborate skein of fraud' (Hochschild, 1998, p. 179) which Leopold had perpetrated. We can view the brutality of the Congo Free State as combining the traits of economic predation with external interference. Indeed, Hochschild observes that Morel 'saw brutality in the Congo not as a specific imperfection to be wiped out in the way one could wipe out child labour or capital punishment, by passing a law against it, but as part of a complex, deeply embedded "System" as he called it – forced labour plus the massive European takeover of African land' (Hochschild, 1998, p. 213).

Morel began lobbying tirelessly for an investigation into the Congo, and in 1904 Roger Casement, the British Consul at Boma,[29] published the *Casement Report* which detailed the abuses taking place in the Congo. The nefarious activities of Leopold's Congo Free State were also publicised by a number of famous writers of the time. In 1902, Joseph Conrad described the Congo Free State as 'the vilest scramble for loot that ever disfigured the history of human conscience' (Conrad cited in Meredith, 2005, p. 96). Other famous writers of the period, such as Mark Twain and Arthur Conan Doyle,[30] published works which contained pictures of the rubber attrocities, depicting Congolese indigenous rubber gatherers who had been horrifically mutilated and slaughtered as a result of failures to meet the rubber quotas imposed as taxation by King Leopold. The rubber attrocities were so shocking that they sparked moral outrage from a strong Western humanitarian lobby. Most of the members of the lobby were not against colonialism *per se*, and it comprised mostly of nationals of countries that had also seized African territory in the 1885 "Scramble for Africa". However, the Congo Free State brought the whole moral justification for the colonial project into question. Arthur Conan Doyle wrote of the Congo Free State: 'Had the nations gathered round been able to perceive its future, the betrayal of religion and civilization of which it would be guilty, the immense series of crimes which it would perpetrate throughout Central Africa, the lowering of the prestige of all the white races, they would surely have strangled the monster in its cradle' (Doyle, 1909, p. 7). It was this kind of disgust at the barbarity of King Leopold's regime which inspired the Congo Reform

[29] A port-town on the Congo River, in the modern day Bas Congo Province of the DRC.
[30] See Conan Doyle's *The Crime of the Congo* (1909), and Mark Twain's *King Leopold's Soliloquy* (1905).

Movement[31] to lobby for the Congo Free State to be removed as the property of King Leopold. In 1908, therefore, the Congo Free State was handed over to the Belgian government for administration and renamed the Belgian Congo.

Given that the wider barbarity of the entire colonial project was not something which the other European powers were ready to confront, removing the Congo Free State from Leopold's direct control appealed as a simple solution to ending the atrocities in the Congo. However, Hochschild observes that 'Leopold's rape of the Congo was in part a logical consequence of the very idea of colonialism, of that belief that there was nothing wrong with a country being ruled other than by its own inhabitants' (1998, p. 212). Thus, when Leopold's colony was handed over to the Belgian government to administer, the rubber atrocities did subside, but it did not mark an end to the burdens inflicted upon the Congolese people by colonial rule. If the Belgians were to take on the considerable encumbrance of managing the vast colony of the Congo, then they too wanted to make sure that the Colony was both self-sustaining and capable of generating some revenue for the Belgian state. By 1908, rubber was no longer as profitable as it had once been, and Congolese rubber faced stiff competition on the world market from South East Asian and Latin American producers. However, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Congo was abundant in a plethora of other natural resources. Certain regions of the Congo were known for containing a profusion of particular minerals (such as Katanga which was abundant in copper, Kasai which contained diamonds, and Orientale where gold could be found). Accordingly, a similar type of pillage to that which had taken place in the Congo Free State ensued, although with two significant differences. Firstly, the physical punishments for not meeting resource quotas were no longer a feature of Belgian revenue collection, making the pillage of the Congo much more palatable as an enterprise to the international humanitarian lobby. Secondly, whereas pillage in the Congo Free State was purely about generating immediate profit for Leopold and his financial backers, profit in the Belgian Congo was importantly ploughed back into enterprise and developing the means by which pillage of the Congo could be more effective (see Turner, 2007, ch.2).

Accordingly, efforts were made to develop the capacity to mine Congo's rich mineral resources which, in addition to developing mining infrastructure, also involved forging an effective administrative structure for the Congo. Following a similar model of rule to the

[31] Founded in 1904 by Morel and Casement after the publication of the *Casement Report* in 1904.

British in West and Southern Africa, and the French in North and West Africa, the Belgians tried to put in place a system of administration which would allow them to impose strong rule on, and generate revenue from, the colony on the one hand, and yet still be seen as a respectable "civilizing" mission on the other hand. Three elements of this administrative structure were particularly of note in this respect. Firstly, in order to effectively administer the region, the Belgian Congo still relied heavily upon the "colonial trinity" of the Church, the state and the companies, upon which the Congo Free State based its rule. Under the Belgian Congo, however, there was considerable overlap between the different sectors of the trinity. 'The company sector of Belgian Congo was deeply complex, and allowed Belgian private interests to control the companies despite substantial state and foreign holdings in those companies. In Katanga and in Kivu, state and private interests were fused in the form of the *Comité Spécial du Katanga* and the *Comité du Kivu*, respectively' (Turner, 2007, p. 28). The imperialist bourgeoisie of the Belgian Congo relied heavily on African white-collar workers, traders and artisans, as well as the traditional Congolese ruling class to exploit the resources of the colony, and here we can see emerging the structures of patronage which were to plague the Congo's post-colonial life. Secondly, the Belgians wanted a more uniform administration of the state which sub-divided the country into province, district, territory and native circumscription. This created a strange fusion between cultural and political space and the artificial creation of a nation state, in which disparate ethnic groups, clans, and tribes – of different lifestyle,[32] language, culture and religion – were expected to be ruled as Congolese. Yet no attempt was made to foster a sense of Congolese nationhood. While creating a united sense of nationhood is a difficult task, which took many European nations centuries to achieve,[33] post-independence Congo saw an exacerbation of ethnic and regional difference as various groups competed to gain power, influence, and resources – and thus a trajectory *away* from unification. The failure to create a Congolese nation resulted in the same kind of factionalism which would plague post-independence Nigeria, as the Congo also became a "mere geographical expression."[34]

---

[32] I refer to the fact that some groups had nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestlyes, whilst others were more sedentary.

[33] See, for example, Paul Connerton's work on the creation of the French nation after the French Revolution (Connerton, 1989)

[34] This term is taken from Obafemi Awolowo, who wrote in that "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographic expression. There are not 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English,' 'Welsh,' or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not." (Awolowo, 1947, pp. 47-48). Awolowo here is arguing, that Nigerians feel solidarity to their region, or ethnicity, or clan, but not to the Nigerian

In part, the creation of a sense of Congolese nationhood was hampered by the fact that, despite imposing uniformity of administration, the Belgians reinforced (and arguably exacerbated) difference among various groups by classifying the Congolese inhabitants into categories of "usefulness". In their attempt to enforce indirect rule[35] in the Congo, Belgian administrators began assigning character traits to certain groups, thus establishing a hierarchy of privilege. For example, 'early state officials included the "Bangala" of the middle section of the Congo river and the "Batetela", both peoples considered to be fierce and courageous' (Turner, 2007, p. 56). As well as looking at character traits, the Belgians often assigned power according to groups' 'openness to European ideas' (*Ibid.*). This practice often created tensions between groups. For example, in the modern day provinces of Kasai, tensions arose between the Lulua people and the Luba-Kasai. Originally, it was felt that the Lulua were the most intelligent and open people to European ideas; because of this, the Germans built the town of Luluaberg (now called Kananga, the capital of Kasai-Occidentale) and placed the Lulua in administrative control of it. However, as the Belgians realized that the Lulua were not as pliable as they had originally believed, they transferred power to a rival group, the Luba-Kasai. Having been removed from power, the Lulua claimed that the Luba-Kasai were in fact "black Europeans" rather than Africans.[36] In 1945, the Luba-Kasai attempted a failed revolt against the Belgians, which then resulted in their own fall from colonial grace. Accordingly, when the Lulua inflicted violence against the Luba-Kasai during the decolonization period, the Belgians did not interfere, and may have been involved in facilitating the violence (see Turner, 2007). In the wake of these massacres, thousands of Luba-Kasai fled south-east, where they established the city of Mbuji-Mayi (now the capital of Kasai-Orientale). As Turner notes, and as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, 'the parallel to administrative encouragement of Hutu violence towards Tutsi is evident' (Turner, 2007, p. 57). The processes of economic exploitation and plunder combined with the administrative practices of patronage and

---

nation unlike, he believes, the French who have a sense of national belonging. While this may be true, Awolowo is overlooking the fact that after the French revolution, a large project was launched to foster a sense of national consciousness (see Connerton, 1989; 2008). It is this project which was lacking after the creation of the Nigerian and Congolese states. This project of creating nationality, also calls into mind the quote often attributed to Massimo d'Azeglio's *'L'Italia è fatta. Restano da fare gli italiani'* ('Italy has been made, now let's make Italians') (see d'Azeglio, 1891)

[35] A form of rule whereby the indigenous people were subject to colonial rule through subordination through colonially-appointed 'local authorities' (see Mamdani, 1996)

[36] The Luba-Kasai were persecuted as the 'black Europeans' or 'Jews of Africa' – a label which was also applied to the Tutsi in Rwanda. This type of persecution attempted to racialize both Tutsi and Luba-Kasai as non-African (see Turner, 2007; Mamdani, 2011) in order to deny their rights and claims to land.

ethnic classification thus created in the Congo a legacy of tension and violence which would provide many challenges for the post-colonial era.

The Kurtz-like Trajectory: Post-colonial Plus ça Change

Mamdani has noted that: 'The violence in the Congo may seem unintelligible but its roots lie in institutional practices introduced under colonialism, which 50 years of independence have only exacerbated' (2011, p. 31). Crawford Young argues that throughout the colonial period resistance to colonialism manifested itself through a number of movements. Young classifies these movements as belonging to five phases: primary resistance movements mainly led by traditional leaders opposed to colonial occupation; messianic movements; urban riots; pre-modern political associations; and political parties seeking to gain power in post-independence elections (Young, 1965). The winds of change swept through Africa in the late 1950s, and it was only a matter of time before the Congo would get caught up in the quest for African independence. It is in the context of opposition to colonial occupation and political parties seeking post-independence power that key independence figures such as Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu came to prominence in Congolese politics. However, almost immediately after independence, the legacy of colonialism, and the inadequacy of the decolonization process, became apparent and plunged the country into further conflict. In January 1959, pro-independence rioting in Leopoldville (modern-day Kinshasa) shocked the Belgians into realising that their colony, which they had previously believed would not get drawn into the anti-colonial struggle, needed the '"gift" of independence with "undue haste"' (Dunn, 2003, p. 62). In June 1960 the Belgian Congo became the Republic of Congo. The first elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, took control of the new Congolese government, and appointed Joseph Kasavubu, whom he had defeated in the elections, as president in a gesture of goodwill. But, Lumumba's regime was an 'unwieldy coalition of contradictory political forces' (Turner, 2007, p. 33), and almost immediately pandemonium broke out.[37] What emerged was a culmination of the effects of the patronage, ethnic tensions, and external interference of the colonial era; conflicts, insurgencies and secessionist movements erupted around the country in what became known as the Congo Crisis.

[37] Dunn (2003) describes the situation in the Congo post-independence as 'Chaos'. I have taken care to avoid this term, as I use a very different sense of the term when I expound my theoretical framework based on Chaos theory – which proposes a emergent order within the disorder.

I have chosen in this section to cover the Congo Crisis and Mobutist Zaïre in one section of this chapter in order to demonstrate the continuity which characterizes this era, and highlight Mobutu's wily political manoeuvring. A key driver of the Crisis was the mutiny of black soldiers in the *Force Publique*, who were frustrated that they were still under the control of white officers. The mutineers began to terrorize the white Belgian expatriate community in the Congo, who they felt had oppressed them for more than half a decade. In order to rescue their compatriots, the Belgian Army entered the Congo, a move which highlighted to the world Lumumba's weakness and inability to control his armed forces. However, Lumumba was in a Catch-22 situation. In order to appease black soldiers, Lumumba dismissed a number of white officers (including the commander of the *Force Publique*, Emile Janssens). However, this made him increasingly unpopular among the Belgians, who retaliated with increased interference in the affairs of the county. It is during this period that Mobutu Sese Seko (then called Joseph Desire Mobutu) began to slowly gain access to power. Once a *Force Publique* soldier himself, Mobutu was serving as Lumumba's personal aide when he was promoted to Chief of Staff of the *Armée Nationale Congolaise* (ANC), which replaced the *Force Publique*. Mobutu's appointment was meant as a manoeuvre from Lumumba to appease the armed forces, but was soon to be Lumumba's downfall.

Throughout 1960, Lumumba battled with both domestic and international opposition to his rule. On the eve of independence, South Kasai attempted to declare itself independent as a separate nation to the Congo. However, the most worrying secessionist attempt came in July 1960, when the Katangan provincial leader Moïse Tshombe, supported by Belgium, declared Katanga independent. Realising that Lumumba would not be a Belgian puppet, the Belgians believed that an independent Katanga would at least safeguard the considerable mining interests that they held there (see Turner, 2007). Given the level of violence and political breakdown in the Congo, Lumumba and Kasavubu appealed to the UN to intervene. The UN dispatched a force to the Congo, but did not remove the Belgian forces. Lumumba's Africanist anti-colonial rhetoric, and unwillingness to acquiesce to Belgian demands, meant he was increasingly maligned by Western powers – a factor that was exacerbated when he began seeking assistance from the Soviet Union. This reinforced American Cold War fears that, under Lumumba, the Congo might fall to the Communists. On 5 September 1960 a political confrontation between Lumumba and Kasavubu, where both denied the legitimacy of the other, further exacerbated the tensions. 'During all this time Mobutu, as head of the armed forces was watching and waiting, a quiet presence

behind a succession of weak and divided civilian governments' (Wrong, 2001, p. 80). And in that time, Mobutu was able present himself to the Americans as a credible ally, and gather support for his overthrow of Lumumba.

On 14 September 1960 Lumumba was overthrown in a coup, and Mobutu (with US support) took control of Kinshasa. In 1961, Lumumba was assassinated,[38] although his popularity and (association with his legacy) has been evoked by numerous Congolese politicians since then – including Laurent Kabila. Mobutu cunningly out-manoeuvred Lumumba in order to gain power. Observing the relationship between the two men, Wrong argues 'Lumumba certainly started off being the dominant member of the partnership, more famous, more charismatic, more politically sophisticated and far more idealistic. But he had lacked pragmatism, and that was Mobutu's forte' (Wrong, 2001, p. 79). Despite Lumumba's assassination, however, it would be four more years before Mobutu had control of the whole country, as the Congo became a site of a Cold War proxy war. In the early 1960s, the Congo was divided into four spheres of control: Mobutu, backed by Western powers, controlled Leopoldville and the majority of West Congo; Antoine Gizenga – a follower of the late Patrice Lumumba, supported by the Soviet Bloc and Nasser in Egypt, controlled most of the East of Congo from Stanleyville (modern-day Kisangani); Moise Tshombe led a secessionist attempt, supported by Belgian mining interests, in Katanga; and Albert Kalonji declared himself president of an independent Kasai, which also launched a secessionist attempt. Finally in 1965, after Gizenga was exiled and the secessionist attempts in Katanga and Kasai failed, Mobutu gained control of the country (although there were still numerous insurgency attempts, such as those in Stanleyville). Having finally consolidated his power, Mobutu renamed the country Zaïre in 1971.

I have taken the phrase 'Kurtz-like Trajectory', which forms the title of this section, from Michela Wrong's book *In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz*. In this book, Wrong conjures up an image of President Mobutu Sese Seko which is akin to the character of the villain Mr Kurtz in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. Just as Kurtz is originally regarded and admired as a colonial visionary, only to be revealed as a corrupt and brutal murderer, so Mobutu, originally viewed as a friend of the West, is revealed to be the same. However, Wrong argues 'if Mobutu traced a Kurtz-like trajectory from high ideals to febrile corruption, he did not

[38] While Lumumba died at the hands of a firing squad of Katangan secessionists, numerous commentators have indicated evidence of both CIA and Belgian compliance in the assassination, as well as Mobutu's own hand in Lumumba's death (see, for example, Kalb, 1982; Hochschild, 1998; Wrong, 2001).

pursue that itinerary alone, or unaided' (Wrong, 2001, p. 306). Thus, in this section I attempt not to posit the post-independence period as being driven by the brute causes of bad men who do bad things (for a discusssion of brute causes see de Waal, 2007) but rather examine the system in which such men thrive, and which is accordingly perpetuated by "bad" men.

After years of conflict and crisis, Mobutu's victory, coupled with favourable economic conditions in the early 1970s, was initially welcomed in the Congo. Indeed, Mobutu was able to launch a number of initiatives which were originally well received by the Congolese people – such as the nationalization of Congolese universities, and the creation of a Zaïrean capitalist class. Mobutu took a seemingly paradoxical approach to regime consolidation; seeking to superficially unite all Congolese citizens under one Zaïrean nationality, whilst simultaneously exploiting and exacerbating existing social divides. The careful interplay between these approaches is best illustrated if we analyse the divide and rule strategies which ran alongside Mobutu's careful attempts to create 'an imagined Zaïrean political community' (Dunn, 2003, p. 113). In a departure from the divisive policies of the colonial era, and the fragmentation which manifested itself so violently during the Congo Crisis, Mobutu attempted to create a sense of Zaïrean nationhood by 'synthesizing different cultural traditions and beliefs into a single "Zaïrean" discourse' (*Ibid.*). Much of this discourse relied on conjuring up shared memories of Belgian oppression to justify a return to what Mobutu posited as "pre-colonial" rule. Dunn (2003) argues that, by evoking images of a precolonial chieftancy, Mobutu was able to justify his autocratic style of rule; his shunning of what he saw as the "Western-rule" of democracy, and the creation of a single-party state. Old remnants of the Western colonial past were erased as Leopoldville, Stanleyville and Elizabethville became Kinshasa, Kisangani and Lubumbashi respectively. Even Mobutu himself changes his name from Joseph Desire Mobutu to Mobutu Seso Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Zu Banga (which aptly translates from the Lingala as 'the all-powerful warrior who goes from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake'). But, the creation of this identity was as much about performance as narration. Traditional dances known as *animation* were frequently performed to promote Zaïrean nationhood. Again, at the heart of these performances was a reaffirmation of the power of Mobutu; the aim of *animation* was to designate certain cultural practices as being of "Congolese heritage" in an attempt to consolidate 'national unity under the President' (Adelman, 1975, p. 135).

However, Mobutu also realized the dangers of creating a completely unified Congolese populace, and, while he may have symbolically created a Zaïrean sense of nationhood, its significance was purely a symbolic justification of his over-arching authority. Thus, it was not long before the neopatrimonial system of rule could once again be observed. In the practical running of the country, Mobutu maintained control through divide and rule. Clearly, in a country with more than 200 tribes that identify as ethnically distinct,[39] the creation of a Zaïrean identity is insufficient to overcome the ethnic differences which existed precolonially, and which colonialism sought to exacerbate. Mobutu's actions also sought to compund these differences. For example, he exacerbated tensions in Kasai by deporting members of the Luba from Shaba (see McCalpin, 2002, p. 45) there, as well as giving tacit support for the persecution of the (primarily Tutsi) Banyarwanda in the Kivus. Mobutu himself idetified as belonging to the Ngbandi, a small ethnic minority of the Équateur province. While Mobutu did put Équateurians in positions of power,[40] limiting his power base to Équateurians alone would be a risky strategy. Acemoglu, Robinson, & Verdier argue that the 'Mobutu regime is a classic example of how divide-and-rule can be used to sustain a regime with little, if any, popular support' (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Verdier, 2003, p. 12). In his autobiographical work, *Mobutu, ou, L'incarnation du Mal Zairois* (Karl i Bond, 1982), Nguz Karl i Bond recounts how in the 1960s he had opposed Mobutu and supported Moise Tshombe, but was recruited by Mobutu in the 1970s to serve as foreign minister. However, in 1977 he was accused of treason and sentenced to death, only to be forgiven in 1979 and made prime minister.[41] In the 1980s, having written his book on Mobutu, Karl i Bond was once again exiled, but returned in 1985 when he became Ambassador to the United States of America. As Turner and Young observe, elevating and then punishing dissenters in this way served as a pragmatic defence against the long-term build-up of dissent movements. 'Repentance and renewed cultivation of the favour of the sovereign could make possible a return to full grace' (Turner & Young, 1985, p. 166). Although this may be taken as a sign of Mobutu's weakness or indecisiveness, there is also compelling force behind the argument that it was 'a deliberate attempt to muddy the waters, undermine consensus and thereby prevent the formation of any coherent political movement that might eventually focus on his removal' (Wrong, 2001, pp. 100-101). Of

[39] I have taken this number from the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). However, I use "identify" here to temper this claim, as I will discuss later in the thesis the contestable nature of ethnicity and the "distinctiveness" of these identities.

[40] In '1990 46 per cent of officer corps, 34% of diplomats and 19% of the MPR Central Committee were from Équateur' (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Verdier, 2003, p. 9)

[41] Given that this book was published in French, I have drawn on syntheses of Karl i Bond's book from Schatzberg (1983) and Acemoglu, Robinson, & Verdier (2003)

course, this strategy was not completely successful, and the next chapter will cover how long-term dissenters in eastern Congo transformed themselves into a coalition which would signal Mobutu's downfall. Nonetheless, it may explain why, for more than thirty years, Mobutu was able to keep hold of power, through a complex system of patronage and patrimonialism. As I will now move to discuss, Mobutu was extremely adept in building for himself a network of internal and external support. Thus, although it is tempting to assign the responsibility of the decline of Zaïre in the 1980s and 1990s to Mobutu alone (as the "incarnation of Zaïre's evil"[42] who generated much of the Congo's current troubles) in reality, the 'momentum of Zaïre's free-fall was generated not by one man but by thousands of compliant collaborators, at home and abroad' (Wrong, 2001, p. 11).

Not least among such collaborators were the Western governments and Bretton Woods institutions. Leaving aside the possible complicity of the USA in Mobutu's overthrow of Lumumba, and his subsequent assassination, the USA became staunch supporters of Mobutu as a key African Cold War ally. Over a billion dollars in US aid was dispatched to the Mobutu regime during his reign, and greater sums where donated by France.[43] 'For its heavy investment, the United States and its allies got a regime that was reliably anti-Communist and a secure staging area for CIA and French military operations' (Hochschild, 1998, p. 303). Of course, almost none of this aid went to the Zaïrean people. Rather, this foreign aid, along with the wealth generated by nationalizing the mining companies that had previously been owned by the Belgians (see Turner, 2007), went directly to Mobutu. Most of this wealth went to sustain his patronage networks; to pay off Mobutu's overseas backers, and the *mouvanciers*[44] of the Mobutu regime. However, Mobutu also amassed for himself enormous personal wealth,[45] estimated at its peak to be around 4 billion US dollars (Hochschild, 1998, p. 303). Much of this wealth went into lavish mansions and government buildings around the country, as well as 'palatial homes in France, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and elsewhere' (Hochschild, 1998, p. 304). Thus, in the same way that Leopold had begun the Congo Free State colony to accrue for himself and his backers a personal

[42] (Karl i Bond, 1982)

[43] These figures are taken from *King Leopold's Ghost* (Hochschild, 1998).

[44] A term used in *In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz* (Wrong, 2001) to describe the Mobutu's Congolese cronies who also prospered from the plunder and pillage of the era.

[45] Hochschild estimated at its peak, that Mobutu's personal wealth was around US$ 4 billion (Hochschild, 1998, p. 303). Kevin Dunn suggests more than this, arguing that 'Mobutu and his close friends pillaged between US$4 billion and US$10 billion of the country's wealth, siphoning off up to 20 percent of the government's operating budget, 30 percent of its mineral export revenues, and 50 percent of its capital budget' (Dunn, 2002, p. 53).

fortune, so too had Zaïre become for Mobutu and his cronies a cash cow to be flogged. Consequently, little money went into developing modern infrastructure or public services in the country – the corollary being that, despite being rich in resources, the Congolese people have rarely reaped the benefits. The long-term effects of this underdevelopment are being felt today, such that Wrong observes: 'Whatever bloody deeds were carried out on his orders, this will always constitute his worst human rights violation: the destruction of an economy that quashed a generation's aspirations' (Wrong, 2001, p. 305).

Two key trends emerged from Mobutu's mode of self-interested income generation which were to prove to be his downfall. First, in investing almost nothing in developing state infrastructure, it became clear to the Congolese people that the Zaïrean state was both unwilling and unable to provide for them. What emerged therefore was a system of survival known as *System D* – the "D" standing for *Debrouillez Vous* ("fend for yourself"). Indeed, echoing the manner in which Leopold has asked the mercenaries of the *Force Publique* to provide their own source of livelihood, so too Mobutu maintained his army by giving 'the nod to a system of organized looting by instructing his soldiers to "live off the land"' (Wrong, 2001, p. 43). Jackson argues that Mobutu also advocated *System D* to the wider population[46] because it served as 'a safety valve for discontent' (Jackson, 2002, p. 521), keeping the population too focussed on survival to concern themselves with a coup against him. Jackson observes that the 'highly ambiguous and complex relationship between *Systeme D* and the Zaïrean state' (*Ibid.*) only serves to underline the fact that resistance to, and collusion with, the Mobutist regime where bound together in such a way that they became almost indistinguishable. However, just as the dissenters finally did collaborate against him, so *System D* also became incapable of saving him; the resilience and survival instincts which his opponents had spent decades developing were to be instrumental in prove his downfall. This downfall was inextricably linked to the second trend in his income generation strategy – his reliance on Western funding. However, towards the end of the Cold War, when Mobutu's position as an anti-communist ally in Africa waned in politico-economic importance,[47] and his resistance to democratization made him an embarrassment as a Western ally, aid towards his regime began to dry up.

[46] In addition to commanding the army to provide for themselves, it would appear Mobutu recommended *System D* to the Congolese people. Jackson alludes to this in his article in recounting a case in which Mobutu was 'winkingly baptising *"debrouillardise"* himself, [and] urging the population to "fend for yourselves!" in a 1970s political speech' (Jackson, 2002, p. 521).

[47] For more on this see (Clark, 2002).

Thus, in the post-Cold War era, when other countries were being increasingly drawn into the forces of globalization, Clark observes in Zaïre an opposite trajectory:

> 'While "globalization" generally implies an increasing dependence on foreign private capital for developing states, the opposite was the case in Zaïre: The few remaining foreign capital investments in Zaïre were being withdrawn in the early 1990s. Only a very few "buccaneer" capitalists, mostly mining interests, were still engaged in some investment in Zaïre by this time. Less adventurous investors, meanwhile, were sensibly awaiting the restoration of a functioning state in Zaïre before risking investment' (Clark, 2002, p. 3).

The lack of Zaïrean state function may explain why Mobutu was able to hold onto power until 1997 (rather than losing power in the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War), and may vindicate those who argue that *System D* prevented the rise of a credible opposition movement (see MacGaffey, 1991; Jackson, 2002) in the wake of the US's withdrawal of support to Mobutu. However, this argument only has credibility if we concern ourselves with rebel movements that were contained within the Congo. In order to fully understand the factors that brought an end to the Mobutu regime, we have to also look outside of the country to the changing external influences upon the country. As the next chapter will examine in more detail the internal dynamics within the eastern Congo which lead to the rebellion against Mobutu, the following section will attempt to set a contextual background to this rebellion (and the rebellions which followed) by looking at the regional dynamics which facilitated them.

Same Taxi, Different Drivers in the Congo Wars[48]

McCalpin characterizes the period 1990-96 as the unravelling of the Zaïrean state, arguing that although Mobutu was holding onto power by a thread, 'in the absence of a formidable alternative to the Mobutu regime, the Zaïrean state reached very near to the point of collapse' (McCalpin, 2002, p. 46). Two significant regional factors contributed to his final downfall and the creation of a viable alternative to Mobutu. Firstly, Young observes how, beginning with the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979, the nature of overthrow in the region resulted in 'a dissolution of the existing army, whose personnel flee to the neighbouring states or their home communities, with their arms entering hidden caches or informal

[48] The title of this section refers to the phrase "same taxi, different driver" – which was popularly referred to by Liberians to characterize the overthrow of William Tolbert by Samuel Doe in 1980.

markets' (Young, 2002, p. 25). The flow of both arms and military personnel across proximate borders strengthened movements to overthrow existing regimes. For example, the same Rwandan Tutsi exiles who helped Museveni's National Resistance Army/Movement defeat Milton Obote in Uganda then used their military knowledge and expertise to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which invaded Rwanda in 1990 and, after a bloody civil war which culminated in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, established a Tutsi-led regime there in 1994. Among the members of such groups were officers who had also benefitted from military training in the USA, and brought sophisticated military knowledge to the insurgent movements (such as the current Rwandan President, Paul Kagame). The forces which combined to form the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaïre (ADFL)[49] benefitted from similar training as they were all 'led by individuals who had been out of the country for many years, while the internal opposition to the Mobutu regime remained marginalized, voiceless, and paralyzed' (Young, 2002, p. 26). In addition to gaining military experience from their time abroad, the leaders of this rebellion were able to garner significant support from Zaïre's neighbours, who had significant grievances with the Mobutu regime. The MPLA[50] government in Angola were keen to remove the Zaïrean dictator who had been fuelling the Angolan civil war by supporting UNITA[51] rebels. However, the biggest move to oust him came from the eastern border.

Mobutu's weak state had meant that rebel groups from Uganda and Rwanda had been using eastern Zaïre as a base from which to operate. Museveni's support for the ADFL was 'in large part to deny the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and the West Bank Nile Front (WBNF) the use of Zaïrean territory as rear bases for the destabilization of Uganda' (Dunn, 2002, p. 57). However, the driving force behind the operation to remove Mobutu came from Rwanda. In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, members of the ousted genocidal government, the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the *Interahamwe,*[52] fled (along with ordinary Hutu and Tutsi refugees) to the Kivu

[49] The ADFL, who will be discussed more extensively in the following chapter, was an alliance of anti-Mobutist forces. The four main parties which united to form the ADFL coalition were: The Party of the Peoples' Revolution (PRP) led by Laurent Kabila, National Council of Resistance for Democracy (CNRD) led by André Kisase Ngandu, the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MRLZ) led by Anselme Masusu Nindaga, and the Democratic Alliance of the People (ADP), led by Déogratias Bugera.

[50] People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

[51] National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

[52] A youth militia which was largely responsible for the perpetration of genocidal killings.

provinces of eastern Congo. It was because of Mobutu's inaction in preventing these camps from being used as a base for remilitarization by the ousted genocidal forces, and his tacit support for the continued persecution of both Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis in the eastern Congo, that Rwanda not only supported, but actively 'planned and directed the rebellion' (Dunn, 2002, p. 56).[53] Thus in 1996, the ADFL, supported by their foreign backers, launched an attack on Zaïre. By May 1997 Mobutu was finally ousted. Zaïre had fallen, and when Laurent Kabila seized power in Kinshasa, he renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The regional dimension of the First Congo War was initially looked upon in a positive light. 'For the first time in history, a group of African nations had banded together to rid the region of a despot. The event was hailed as the start of an African Renaissance, spearheaded by a "new breed" of African leader' (Wrong, 2001, pp. 30-31). However, in reality very little changed and repeating patterns of patrimonialism, pillage, ethnic manipulation and external interference re-emerged. 'Kabila was more interested in building a network of key supporters through the time-tested Mobutist methods than he was in assuring the genuine economic development of the country' (McCalpin, 2002, p. 47). It is in this context that the Second Congo War began, as dissidents collaborated with external forces to remove Kabila from power. However, I have purposely misquoted the Liberian phrase used in the title of this section to read as "same taxi, different drivers" rather than "driver" because Kabila was not the only actor to follow in the footsteps of Mobutu. Certainly, even though Kabila had originally sought support from socialist forces during the Cold War,[54] he became increasingly adept at garnering support from the USA, who even defended him against UN allegations of human rights violations (Dunn, 2002, pp. 58-9). He also ensured that he could generate wealth to protect his own interests by exploiting the Congo's natural resources, and the ADFL were reportedly receiving millions of dollars and troop support from American and Canadian mining interests.[55]

---

[53] In Dunn's chapter he argues: 'In a surprisingly frank interview with the *Washington Post*, Kagame stated that the Rwandan government had decided in 1996 that the threat from the refugee camps in Zaïre had to be eliminated. The Rwandan government sought out Zaïrean opposition groups such as the PRP to help fight against Mobutu and provide a Zaïrean cover to the operations. Kagame even confirmed that Rwandan troops and officers were at the forefront of the rebellion' (Dunn, 2002, p. 56).

[54] Kabila and his men were famously trained by Ché Guevara in the 1960s (see Guevara, 1999).

[55] For more about Western and mining company support for Kabila see Dunn (2002).

Michela Wrong observes that Kabila's repetition of Mobutist governance had an 'ironic inevitability' (Wrong, 2001, p. 31). Indeed, Kabila's intention was to seize power for himself, but it was not necessarily to replace the system which had previously sustained Mobutu. Indeed, over the course of the First Congo War, a number of developments made Mobutu's pragmatic style of politics both likely and lucrative for whoever would come next. Firstly, the ADFL, much like Lumumba's "unwieldy coalition" of post-independence government, lost all internal coherence once its unifying goal of toppling Mobutu had been achieved. When Kabila came to power there was no incentive to appease the various factions within the coalition. Given the backlash Kabila faced from Congolese citizens who regarded him as little more than a "puppet" of Rwanda and Uganda, breaking his affiliation with them (and also distancing himself from Congolese Tutsi groups) was the best way for him to consolidate domestic support. Kabila's predicament – caught between gaining external support and gaining internal legitimacy – is just one example of the competing security choices facing actors in the Congo, and accounts for the constantly mutating and complex web of alliances that have characterized the Congo since the late 1990s. Kabila chose to distance himself from Rwanda and Uganda, and by extension he encouraged increased persecution of the Tutsi, who were also viewed as Rwandan "foreign invaders". He did so by removing Tutsi ministers from the government, ousting Rwandan troops from the country, and encouraging a massacre of Banyamulenge in Kinshasa (Vlassenroot, 2002). While the breaking of this coalition was largely the source of Rwandan and Ugandan moves against him, much like Mobutu, his flexibility in forging and breaking alliances was also key to his resilience. Although he had lost the support of Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila avoided Mobutu's fatal error of surrounding himself with hostile governments. Kabila ensured that he had the support of the governments of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia by giving them shares in Congolese diamonds, petroleum and mining industries. Kabila exploited the fact that, like him, many of the actors in the Congo after the overthrow of Mobutu had no strong desire to overthrow the kleptocratic system, but rather wanted to become the benefactors of this kleptocracy. Thus, as Turner observes 'Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola defended Kabila, Congolese sovereignty, *and* their own material interests' (Turner, 2007, p. 10).

But Kabila and his backers were not the only actors keen to take advantage of the kleptocratic opportunities that control of Congolese power offered. Although both the governments of Rwanda and Uganda argued that their moves to overthrow Kabila were motivated by securing threats to their own borders, there is evidence to suggest that

Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in this second war was also most likely to have been (at least partly) motivated by economic interests. Rwandan and Ugandan officers soon saw the financial opportunities that a continued presence in the Congo could bring. 'A 2001 UN report documents the great extent to which Rwandan and Ugandan military forces and private companies exploited the territory under their occupation' (Atzili, 2007, p. 170). For Rwanda in particular, the presence of Rwandan refugees in the Congo, and their ostensibly imminent threat to Rwandan security, became a convenient reason for Rwanda to maintain a military presence in the eastern DRC, thus allowing them to reap the spoils of war. Also like Kabila, both Rwanda and Uganda were able to quickly forge a new alliance to fulfil their goals. Originally, both Rwanda and Uganda put their backing behind the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) – a political wing of a disparate coalition of Congolese politicians, coming from a variety of political backgrounds, who united in Goma in August 1998 after Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers dispatched troops to overthrow Kabila in Kinshasa. However, much like the ADFL, the 'anti-Kabila alliance was plagued from its inception by divisions and infighting' (Afoaku, 2002, p. 118). After falling out over tactics and strategy, the alliance between Rwanda and Uganda also broke. In the Second Congo War, Rwanda and Uganda therefore supported different rebel groups. Rwanda gave significant support to the RCD-Goma (Congolese Rally for Democracy) led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, while Uganda supported the MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) led by Jean Pierre Bemba.

As the quest for power, influence and resources in the Congo continued, the Second Congo War broke out in August 1998. The Second War is often referred to as the deadliest war since World War Two.[56] Although there were certainly civil dimensions to this war – and the belligerent internal factions fighting both for and against Kabila will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter – this conflict has come to be known as Africa's World War (see e.g. Prunier, 2008) because of the sheer number of international actors actively involved in the conflict. Only two years after Congo's neighbours had "banded together" to overthrow Mobutu, the Congo became the site of a bitter struggle between these same neighbours. In his introduction to *the African Stakes of the Congo War,* Clark (2002) poses a significant question: 'If we look outside the Congo itself for the sources of the war and into

[56] For example, Time Magazine called the Congo conflict 'the world's most lethal conflict since World War II' (Robinson, 2006). Indeed, the frequently cited survey by the International Rescue Committee on excess mortality in the Congo (International Rescue Committee, 2007) led to a widespread belief that the 'the four and a half year war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has taken more lives than any other since World War II and is the deadliest documented conflict in African history' (International Rescue Committee, 2012).

the politics of the neighbouring states, what is it about their political development, we might ask, that makes them interventionist?' (Clark, 2002, p. 4). In response to this question, Clark outlines a number of factors which may have encouraged the involvement of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in this conflict, linked to what Ayoob termed 'Subaltern Realism' (Ayoob, 1998).[57] Using Ayoob's argument, Clark suggests that much like the classical realism of European leaders of the early modern period, the leaders of the Congo's neighbouring countries linked their foreign policy to their domestic policy. For example, 'given the vast amount of natural resources and wealth that have flowed from Congo into Uganda since 1998, one might perceive the invasion and occupation to be part of a rational plan to build the Ugandan economy at Congo's expense' (Clark, 2002, p. 5). This wealth could then be used to fortify leaders' own personal rule in their respective countries, and eradicate rebel movements based in neighbouring countries. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, this subaltern realism can also be applied to the aims and motivations of both the Congolese and foreign armed groups that participated in the Second Congo War.

The complex mix of transient alliances – involving both internal and external actors – may explain why the conflict dragged on for four years. The conflict took a great toll on the civilian population – with starvation in Kinshasa (see Afoaku, 2002, p. 115), widespread internal displacement, and an extraordinarily high excess death toll[58] due to infrastructural collapse (although there is great contention regarding exactly how many people died during the conflict). In addition to this, the conflict compounded the widespread insecurity felt by many Congolese people, intensified ethnic tensions, and ensured that illicit and predatory war economies endured. Given the widespread and deep-rooted nature of the conflict, it is unsurprising that initial attempts to bring an end to it (such as the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreement) failed – although Lusaka did establish the mandate for the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The biggest opportunity for peace came after the assassination of Laurent Kabila in 2001. He was replaced by his son Joseph

[57] Ayoob coined the term in an attempt to describe the behaviour of Third World states in the international system. Although Ayoob qualifies that the theory 'does not necessarily aspire to supersede or supplant neorealism and neoliberalism as *the* "theory" that fully can explain how the international system operates, it does go a long way toward filling important gaps in the theoretical literature and correcting the acute state of inequity that pervades International Relations theorizing' (Ayoob, 1998, p. 48) by giving a more central focus to "subaltern" states who operate outside of hegemonic power blocs.

[58] As highlighted in the introduction, estimates of the excess death toll in this period vary from 200,000-5.4 million. A more comprehensive discussion of the problems of calculating excess deaths in conflict will feature in Chapter Four.

Kabila, who was much more willing to negotiate with the rebel forces to broker a peaceful solution. Throughout 2002, four key peace agreements were signed: the Sun City Agreement in April 2002 established a framework for democracy in the Congo; July 2002 saw the signing of the Pretoria Accord between Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame, ending the Rwandan invasion of the Congo; Ugandan forces agreed to withdraw in September 2002 under the Luanda Agreement; and in December 2002 the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was signed in Pretoria between the parties of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). Those involved in the ICD included the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (led by Joseph Kabila), the RCD, the MLC, the political opposition, civil society representatives, the Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement (RDC/ML), the Congolese Rally for Democracy/National (RCD/N),[59] and the Maï-Maï.[60] The signing of this agreement supposedly brought all the belligerent parties to the bargaining table (although, as I shall demonstrate in the following chapter, many belligerent groups were left out). Consequently, the Congo was declared "post-conflict" in 2003.

The Persistence of "Post-Conflict" Conflict

Although, activists calling for wider international attention on the Congo, believe it to be a forgotten war,[61] the Congo has received a large amount of international assistance after the ostensible end of the war. Autesserre argues that 'International involvement grew uncommonly robust during the three and a half years demarcated as the transitional period from war to peace and democracy, from June 2003 to December 2006...The UN mission in the Congo became the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operation in the world. The European Union (EU) sent the first ever European-led peacekeeping force. The International Criminal Court chose the Congo as its historic first case' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 3). Despite these concerted efforts, however, pervasive insecurity and conflict in the Congo

[59] These two groups had split from the original RCD (sometimes known as RCD-Goma) over the course of the conflict.

[60] The Maï-Maï refers to a disparate group of local defence militias which formed in the Congo. Some, but by no means all, Maï-Maï factions were represented at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

[61] For example, writing on the Congo War in the *New York Times,* Nicholas Kristoff wrote 'no humanitarian crisis generates so little attention per million corpses, or such a pathetic international response' (Kristof, 2010). In a report for Channel 4, Jonathan Miller argued that 'the brutal reality is that because no one outside of eastern Congo feels threatened by the conflict in this corner of hell, no one much cares what goes on here' (Miller, 2008). Agreeing with Autesserre, I also believe these charges are somewhat unfair and that an extensive and expensive peacebuilding mission in the Congo has been embarked upon, even if the mission has been misguided in its approach.

still persist. In the next chapter I will discuss the continuation of conflict in the Kivu regions, where conflict is most prevalent, but conflict has not been confined to this region. Indeed, the label of "post-conflict" is highly misleading, and even in areas where the violence has been reduced since 2003, the so-called peace is extremely fragile. Violence has flared up throughout the country around both the 2006 and 2011 elections, and despite an insistence by the international community that elections are a necessary step towards strengthening the state, several commentators have observed that the elections 'cemented several of the cleavages that led to violence in the first place' (Bøås, 2008, p. 53), and note that in the Congo, 'people often experience the state as an oppressive, exploitative, and threatening machine' (Autesserre, 2012, p. 18). As new coalitions form, and rebel movements emerge, it is evident that the patterns of state corruption, pillage, patronage, and complex migration that have plagued the Congo since its inception as a colony in 1885 continue to hamper security and stability in the country.

There is a relative degree of academic consensus regarding why conflict has continued in the Congo. Several commentators, for example, point to the unresolved issue of land rights contributing to insecurity at the local level (see, for example, Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004; Bøås, 2008; Autesserre, 2010). Access to land rights, they argue, are why various actors continue to engage in belligerent actions: 'Today, these actors use war as a means to reorganize the local economic space and control the mobility within and between spaces. The result is a struggle between informal networks that link local warlords and rebel leaders with their external sponsors, and have given rise to the development of new strategies for economic, political and social control. In turn, this renegotiation of the local political and economic fabric has led to a redefinition of local power structures' (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004, p. 387). While I would not necessarily disagree with such analyses, or the findings of theorists who posit control of resources as the primary motivation for belligerency, the concern of this section is not so much uncovering what the "real" motivations of these actors are, but rather what they posit as their grievances.

In her introduction to the *Trouble With the Congo,* Autesserre argues that in her fieldwork interviews 'two themes constantly recurred: the primacy of land and other micro-level issues in causing violence and producing anguish, and the unspeakable horrors perpetrated on the Congolese population' (Autesserre, 2010, p. 2). While the "primacy of land" has been widely discussed, this section will turn its attention to the "other micro-level issues", and the legacies of the "unspeakable horrors" that Congolese people have endured. My

analysis focusses on the fact that, in addition (and linked) to unresolved land issues, three other key issues need to be addressed: Firstly, land rights cannot be legitimized unless issues pertaining to citizenship, autochthony and authenticity are also addressed. Secondly, access to land is only significant because almost all economic opportunities are tied to the land (either by way of subsistence agriculture or resource extraction) and these opportunities are so important because the culture of *System D* still prevails. Finally, while the state needs to be capable of defending land rights and mediating between rights-based disputes, measures to strengthen it need to be coupled with a project to also improve trust in a state system. Although these issues are themselves highly complex, and will not be easy to address, this analysis argues that quick-fix and easy-to-achieve actions will not be the answer to bringing peace to the Congo. Rather, much like Obi and Rustad's work on persistent conflict in the Niger Delta, this thesis calls 'for radical reforms that can address the root causes of the conflict and brighten prospects for sustainable peace' (Obi & Rustad, 2011, p. 14).

The difficulty of assigning land rights in diverse regions can be illustrated with the case of the Ituri District, where there is conflict between the pastoralist Hema and agriculturalist Lendu. Both communities are competing for land in Ituri, but 'since neither of these communities comes originally from the region, different interpretations have arisen about the local history of migration and, more importantly, about land ownership' (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004, p. 388). In such a context it is not necessarily important to discuss indigeneity, but rather autochthony. Autochthony is the quality of being primordial to a particular geographic territory (often autochthons refer to themselves as 'sons of the soil' – the implication being that they literally sprang up from the terrain). It has been used extremely effectively in Ituri district, and other areas, to demarcate self/other categories and justify conflict and violence. As several commentators have observed (see Dunn, 2009; Jackson, 2006), autochthony provides a useful discourse that is simultaneously simple and complex: Unlike terms like ethnicity or race, which are contingent on a number of (ill-defined) factors, autochthony only has the stipulation of original inhabitation. However, this simplicity is deceptive as varying scales of indigenousness and territory, questions of descent, and conflicting histories and mythologies all contribute to an autochthony concept which is uncertain, malleable and easily manipulated. As Grant, Mitchell and Nayame observe in West Africa, autochthony serves as a 'powerful discourse for asserting a primordial form of belonging to the land, threatening the rights of migrants, and contributing to outbreaks of violent conflicts' (Grant, Mitchell, & Nayame, 2011, p. 385).

Therefore, while autochthony quickly establish superficial in/out distinctions, and fulfils primal desires for security and certainty, it is transient and evolving in nature. Thus, it exists in a highly volatile realm, shrouded in uncertainty, which often leads to the creation of more insecurity.

The Ituri region provides and interesting example of how autochthony may not necessarily solve problems. While there is some consensus that the Lendu arrived in Ituri before the Hema,[62] autochthony's flexibility means that simply establishing this is insufficient to claim land ownership. The idea of springing from the terrain can be interpreted in a number of ways. While the Lendu may seek to posit their earlier migration as a legitimate claim to autochthony, the Hema can retaliate with a counter-claim; that their presence made the land valuable. 'Concretely, it is shown how the widespread notion of a superior Hema and a yet-to-be-civilized Lendu population springs from the way early colonial administrators perceived Ituri's natural and social environments' (Pottier, 2009, p. 24). This belief has endured amongst the Hema, who claim that before them, Ituri was uncivilized jungle, and it is their presence which – in a remarkable echo of the White Man's Burden that justified colonialism – made the land what it is today.[63] The Hema thus claim that they too are 'sons of the soil' and that the Lendu claims to land are borne out of ignorance of land laws rather than any genuine claims of autochthony.[64]

Autochthony is linked to a complex notion of citizenship in the Congo. Jackson observes three significant levels of citizenship which would suggest that building state authority and simply assigning all those resident[65] in the Congo citizenship is unlikely to be of much consequence to their claims to land rights. Several Congolese groups may have obtained

---

[62] For more on this see Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers (2004).

[63] I would like to thank Kevin C. Dunn whose remarks at a roundtable panel on autochthony at the ISA Annual Convention in San Diego, April 2012, inspired this line of reasoning in my analysis of the Hema and Lendu.

[64] In his discussion of the Ituri conflict, Pottier (2009) cites an article by Djugudjugu (2002). In this article, one of Djugudjugu's Hema interviewees claims that Lendu grievances which resort to autochthony are not supported by law, and are thus baseless. 'The majority of land conflicts stems from ignorance regarding the procedure for land acquisition. Often, the [majority Lendu] population is not informed about the law. People still believe that they can inherit ancestral land. Hence, no sooner has the occupier left or died than people think they can recuperate the land for settlement without any formality whatsoever. When the state decides otherwise and allocates the concessions to new owners, the people rise up in surprise' (Djugudjugu, 2002, p. 68)

[65] Jackson points out that a distinction is often drawn between two types of citizenship: 'the first supposedly founded in "traditional" kinship-based forms of identity and in *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by inheritance), the second through more "modern" *jus soli* norms (citizenship by place of birth) concerning territory and residency' (Jackson, 2007, p. 482).

'civic' citizenship (meaning that they have a relationship with the state). However, given that the state is fairly ill-equipped to provide them with protection and public goods, this citizenship is meaningless if it is not accompanied by what Jackson terms the 'ethnic/local' dimension of citizenship (i.e. a relationship between the individual and customary authority – which is significant for land allocation), and the 'empirical/lived' dimension of citizenship (pertaining to 'the ethically vital, lived sense of belonging and existential security for the individual within society as a whole') (see Jackson, 2007, p. 483). It is in the competition for ethnic/local citizenship that ethnic tensions and autochthonous discourses arise, and it is in the quest for empirical/lived citizenship that groups feel the need to arm and form rebel coalitions, in order to protect themselves against their perceived oppressors. Therefore, in order to prevent the proliferation of armed groups, all three aspects of citizenship need to be addressed. The Sun City Agreement and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue gave the Congolese inhabitants, who were lacking the benefits of any of the levels of citizenship, the impression that belligerency is the only path to gaining access to power and resources in the Congo. If this feeling is to be overcome, then the insecurity which they face, because they have neither access to power nor resources, needs to also be addressed.

Many of the authors who discuss the primacy of land rights do so because they argue that many other issues (such as migration and citizenship) become a means to achieve the ends of securing access to land (see, for example, Autesserre, 2010; Jackson, 2007; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004). I would argue however, that access to land is itself a means to the end of survival – a survival which many understand as being primarily facilitated through land access because of the economic system that has arisen under *System D*, and which still endures in the Congo today. Earlier I discussed how Mobutu used the idea of *System D* as a method of ensuring that the Congolese people were too busy surviving to mount a rebellion. However, he also used the *System* to attract supporters arguing that 'everything is for sale, everything is bought in our country. In this traffic, any slice of public power is a veritable exchange instrument, convertible into illicit acquisition of money or other goods' (Mobutu cited in Reno, 2000, p. 445). For those who cannot get direct access to public power, therefore, access to land provides a "veritable exchange instrument" in that it provides one of the few ways in which income can be generated. Mobutu's advice to "live off the land" is literally seen as the only way to live.[66] Given that many public services do

[66] In the next chapter I discuss the creative ways in which the inhabitants of Western Rwanda and the Eastern Congo use the Kivus for income generating activities.

not exist in the Congo, many civilians outside of urban hubs such as Kinshasa[67] survive through subsistence agriculture or artisanal mining – both of which require access to land. If other meaningful paths to economic survival (and potential betterment) were available that weren't either directly or indirectly linked to access to land, it is likely that the issue of access to land would be of lesser significance in driving conflict.

Finally, outside of the Kivus, the eruption of concentrated incidents of violence in the Congo since 2003 has been mainly concentrated around the elections. Morten Bøås observed that the 2006 election, the first election since the official end of the conflict, 'did not bring the many fragmented pieces of Congolese society together' (Bøås, 2008, p. 54). When Laurent Kabila's main rival in the elections, Jean Pierre Bemba, 'made it clear that he would not accept his defeat, the capital changed into an urban frontline, with presidential troops attacking his [Bemba's] home in plain daylight' (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2009, p. 476). Similarly, violence broke out in 2011 after Kabila was again declared president in Kinshasa. This time Etienne Tshisekedi disputed the result and 'there were reports of unrest and gunfire soon after the results were announced' (Smith, 2011). Autesserre has argued that the focus on state building and extending state authority has increased insecurity because 'overall, large parts of the population survive in spite of the state rather than with its help' (Autesserre, 2012, p. 18). While Autesserre has highlighted a significant and important aspect of the nature of insecurity in the Congo (especially in the East),[68] she arguably underplays the significance of statebuilding. Despite its current predatory nature, the state does nonetheless need strengthening in order to both guarantee the security of those who successfully demonstrate that they have certain land rights, and to provide alternative forms of social empowerment and economic productivity for those who do not gain land rights. However, a strong state that is not trusted by Congolese society, as Autesserre points out, is likely to compound insecurity, and statebuilding measures in this respect have therefore been fairly unsuccessful in reducing instability in the Congo.

[67] In Chapter Six, I suggest that a move away from an emphasis on agricultural and mining subsistence/trade is required in order to tackle the intractable and rising competition for land. However, I warn of the dangers of creating services industries and labour markets that are confined to urban hubs and therefore exclude the rural population who feel even more insecure as a result. I offer Rwanda as an example where urban-rural horizontal inequalities have been compounded by labour market transformation.

[68] The quote from Autesserre refers specifically to the distrust felt people of the eastern Congo, but I suggest this distrust exists in other parts of the Congo as well.

Conclusion

As the examples in this chapter from Kinshasa, Kasai, Katanga and Ituri show, no part of the Congo has been completely without its own troubles, and all the Congolese provinces have had to deal with the harsh legacies of colonialism and overcome difficult postcolonial obstacles. However, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, it is in the Kivus that these difficulties have manifested themselves most violently and intractably. Given that these other regions had a similar colonial experience, are not especially richer, and also contain a mix of groups which identify as being of different ethnicities, what is it that has made conflict in the Kivus so deadly and protracted? I argue in the next chapter that conflict in the Kivus has been especially difficult because of its unique geographical position on the eastern border of the Congo. As such, the Kivus represent a microcosm of conflict in the African Great Lakes; where the neo-patrimonial nature of political relationships, the dominance of a predatory economic system, the complex notions of citizenship and belonging, and external interference continue to contribute to violent conflict. In the Kivus, autochthonous tropes may serve as an attractive tool to claim power and resources, but the assertion of such tropes has also led to a complex web of alliances and an unstable notion of belonging. It is in this complexity and uncertainty that we can locate the core causes of conflict in the Kivus. The next chapter therefore seeks to elucidate and simplify the 'complicated patchwork of local contradictions' (Prunier, 2008, p. xxxv) which contribute to the protracted, intractable, and violence conflict that continues to haunt the Kivus today.

Chapter Two: Borderzone and Bufferzone

Local Complexities and the Rwandan Question in the Kivus

'To make sense of the current conflict in Kivu one has to integrate a snapshot into a longer historical perspective, by deciphering the continuities and discontinuities of political order in a region notoriously difficult to govern'.[69]

~

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the problems which accrued during the Congo's volatile and violent history snowballed to create the highly complex and intractable situation which exists today. While I demonstrated in the previous chapter that events such as elections, which place a strain on the delicate balance of power, can trigger violence in almost all parts of the Congo, most areas of the country are in constant *fear* of instability and insecurity rather than *actual* armed violence. However, in the Kivu regions, armed violence is a much more palpable and tangible problem. Fighting has continued past 2003 in the Kivu regions of the Congo, where a number of foreign armed groups, local militias, Congolese army brigades, and Rwandan army factions still battle for control of power and resources. In addition to the small-scale violence that has broken-out among the various militias and foreign armed groups,[70] violence in the Kivus has spilled over to other parts of the country on a number of occasions. For example, 'it was mainly in North Kivu that security conditions eventually turned into large-scale violence after the presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections of 2006' (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2009, p. 478); between August 2008 and January 2009 the Kivus were in a state of "Crisis" during Laurent Nkunda's CNDP offensive (see Oldenburg, 2010); and the launch of Operation *Umoja Wetu* in 2009 involved the government forces of Rwanda, the DRC and the military wing of MONUSCO (see International Crisis Group, 2009). During the 2011 presidential race, the Kivus was 'considered one of the hotspots during these elections as

---

[69] (Tull, 2003, p. 431)

[70] A more detailed and comprehensive discussion of these attacks will be presented in Chapter Four.

government forces and armed groups continue to battle it out in the forests' (Essa, 2011). It is because of this continued and contagious volatility that I have chosen to focus this thesis on the dynamics of conflict in the Kivus. In the previous chapter I analysed persistent conflict in the Congo at the national and regional levels – highlighting repeating patterns of conflictual behaviour and conflict dynamics. In this chapter, based on the argument that these patterns of behaviour repeat themselves on multiple (fractal) scales, I turn my attention to the local dynamics of the Kivus – arguing that the same four issues of patronage, pillage, citizenship, and external interference manifest themselves here at the provincial level.

As in other parts of the country, history is of utmost significance to an analysis of the Kivus: We cannot understand the current Kivutian conflicts without first shedding light on circumstances there during the Congo Wars; which in turn cannot be understood unless we examine the turmoil the Kivus expereinced during the independence crises; and we cannot analyse its experiences during independence unless we understand the colonial legacies in this troubled region. From the point of view of understanding current conflict dynamics, an appreciation of the way in which history is imagined by the actors in the Congo is just as important (if not more so) than trying to uncover what "really" happened in the region's past. These narratives of Congolese history also have a notable impact on the way that issues such as migration, patronage and pillage are understood, and these perceptions of history often drive the dynamics of conflict as much as the realities. Encompassing the historical understandings of neo-patrimonial relationships, economic exploitation, and external interference, is the more specific question of the DRC's relationship with its Rwandan neighbours – the complex history of which can be seen to underlie many of the ethnic, land-based, and political tensions in the Kivus.

Accordingly, I move to consider in tandem the development of conflictual tensions in both the Congo and Rwanda, in order to assess their impact on the Kivus. The historical narratives of both countries will be woven together to set the background to the analysis of the current conflict in the Kivus. The chapter will follow a similar chronological structure to the previous chapter, and again I will seek to highlight repeating patterns of behaviour. However, although I will discuss their external backers, I will mainly focus on local-level

actors in this analysis, which I will categorize as Kivutian non-Banyarwanda[71] Congolese, Congolese Tutsi (such as the Banyamulenge), Banyarwanda Hutu migrants, and Banyarwanda Tutsi migrants. There is strong overlap between these categories, and the armed groups and alliances which I examine are constantly changing their allegiances. These mutating alliances mean that the demographic composition of seemingly ethnically-aligned militias is frequently changing,[72] making their true nature (insofar as we may consider they have a "true nature") difficult to fully comprehend. What I will be examining, however, is the myths and perceptions which they posit as being "real" – the articulations of "autochthonous authenticity", the divisions between "Rwandophones" and "Congophones",[73] tensions between Hutu and Tutsi (and Nilotic and Bantu myths) – are all used to articulate competing securitizations. I argue that it is these competing articulations (and the uncertainty of their potential success) that much of the local-level violence in the Kivus.

This chapter will examine the local dynamics of conflict in the Kivus in order to explain why these provinces, more so than any other in the Congo, continue to face such violent and intractable conflict. I take as my starting point an analysis of the Kivus' geographical position, by combining analytical tools from border studies and regional security complex theory. I do this in order to elucidate some of the features of Kivutian geography which allow conflict to thrive there. However, although conflict in the Kivus is more intense than it is in the rest of the Congo, the nationwide tensions which have plagued the country are, in essence, the same as the drivers of conflict in the Kivus. The second part of this chapter will therefore follow the previous chapter in tracing the neo-patrimonial nature of political relationships, structures of economic predation, complex notions of citizenship and belonging, and vulnerability to external interference, which have driven conflict in the Kivus throughout its history. Overall, this chapter aims to show that the conflict in the Kivus can be seen as a microcosm of wider tensions in the African Great Lakes. By comparing the

[71] Those who speak Kinyarwanda and are therefore widely thought of as Rwandan (although groups such as the Banyamulenge, who do speak Kinyarwanda would strongly assert that they are Congolese and not Rwandan).

[72] For example, the North Kivu Liberations Front (FLNK) contains both deserters from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and former members of various Maï-Maï miltia.

[73] Turner (2007) observes that the term "Congophone" emerged to reduce and simplify the dichotomy between Rwandophones and supposedly "authentic" Congolese. However, Turner also observes that Congophone 'literally makes no sense, since Congo as opposed to Kongo is not a language' (Turner, 2007, p. 106)

patterns of violence set out in the previous chapter with those which occur in the Kivus in this chapter, we can observe repeating patterns of behaviour recurring on differing scales.



Figure 2: Map of Goma and Gisenyi

Picture courtesy of Google Maps, available at http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?um=1&hl=en&q=goma-gisenyi&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&biw=1280&bih=843&wrapid=tlif133691248148211&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=il. (Date accessed 13/05/2012)

Analysing the Border

Much of the scholarly literature on the Kivu regions tends to focus on *either* North *or* South Kivu, or when they do focus on both, examine the two provinces consecutively.[74] In this analysis, however, I will be looking at North and South Kivu together as the collective entity of "the Kivus". The rationale for this integrative analysis arises from my argument that the primary reason for the prevalence of conflict (and in particular the continuation of violence) in the Kivus, more so than in the rest of the country, is due to its geographical characteristics. These characteristics are shared by North and South Kivu alike. The Kivus,

[74] For example, Tull (2003), Bøås (2008) and Doevenspeck (2011) focus primarily on North Kivu, and Vlassenroot (2002) concentrates on South Kivu. In his 2007 book, *The Congo Wars*, Thomas Turner does analysis both North and South Kivu, but treats them separately in two dedicated chapters. However, some scholarly work has attempted to deal with the two regions together. For example, in their article on 'Eastern Congo's Intractable Security Conundrum', Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers (2009) do deal with both North and South Kivu.

located as they are in the far eastern border of the Congo, are the most geographically remote from state power in Kinshasa. Several quantitative studies have attempted to draw a correlation between the length and likelihood of civil wars and their geographical location. Studies carried out at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), for example, have claimed that civil wars are more likely to last longer if they are located near an international border and away from the state capital (Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, 2009). Although there are several cases which do not necessarily support the thesis that there is a positive correlation between location and civil war, conflict in the Kivus certainly seems to fit this hypothesis, located as it is over 1000 miles from Kinshasa,[75] and on the international border between the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. Three significant over-arching geographical characteristics, I argue, determine the intractable nature of conflict in this area. Firstly, the relationship between the state and the individual in the Kivus is extremely weak, and many easterners, as Autesserre observes, are largely distrustful of the state (Autesserre, 2012). Part of the reason for the failure of attempts to substantially reduce violence in the Kivus can be attributed to the fact that the (relatively) successful state-building measures that have been implemented in Kinshasa (and at least superficially brought stability to western Congo) have not translated or trickled down into stability in the Kivus. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the Kivus have been the main site of post-colonial rebellion against the Mobutu and (both) Kabila regimes in Kinshasa. Obviously, the Kivus' geographical location is something which cannot be changed.[76] However, the infrastructural inadequacies of the Congo have given the inhabitants of the Kivus a sense of remoteness and political marginalization from power. This perception of predation by Kinshasa, and exclusion of Kivutians from state politics, may explain why rebellions tend to break out in the Kivus so frequently.

Secondly, the Kivus faces additional security pressures not suffered by the rest of the country because they form the "borderzone" between Rwanda and the DRC. Arguably, the Congo's historical relations with Rwanda have been more fraught than its relations with

[75] As the crow flies, the distance from the centre of Kinshasa to the centre of Goma is 978 miles. However, given the poor transport infrastructure in the Congo, the practically navigable distance between Kinshasa and Goma is considerably more than that.

[76] Although the physical location of the Kivus cannot be changed, its isolation from state power could be changed by altering the location of the state through establishing a new, regionally neutral, central capital. Precedents for doing so have already been set by moving the Brazilian capital to Brasilia in 1960 and the Nigerian capital to Abuja in 1991.

any other of its neighbours.[77] According to Lavie and Swedenburg, 'Borderzones are sites of creative cultural creolization, places where criss-crossed identities are forged out of the debris of corroded, formerly (would-be) homogenous identities, zones where the residents often refuse the geopolitical univocality of the lines' (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1999, p. 15). This forming of criss-cross identities in the Kivus, however, has a corollary whereby "creative cultural creolization" has also caused mass confusion and uncertainty. Throughout this chapter, I will highlight several key waves of Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi migration to the Kivus, but the timing and implications of who migrated, and when they migrated, have been largely misunderstood and misrepresented by numerous actors, thus creating a complex, unstable, and ephemeral network of enmity and amity relations. It is in this borderzone that we see myths and tropes about peoples' heritage and identities becoming matters of life and death,[78] as local actors strive to assert a sense of ontological certainty in the face of deep-seated *un*certainty. We can attribute the strength of this uncertainty to the fact that creolization in the Kivus is broken and fragmented. Creolization implies a seamless integration of cultures form a new culture which, although it is informed by its component cultures, has a distinct character of its own. In the Kivus this is not the case. There is no distinct or single 'Kivutian' culture .

Thirdly, and linked to the above point, the Kivus can be seen as the site at which the power relations between Congo and Rwanda manifest on a micro-level. An example of this manifestation is given by Doevenspeck in his observations of the border crossing between Rwanda and the Congo on the Northern shores of Lake Kivu (See Figure Two) – between the towns of Gisenyi (in Rwanda) and Goma (in North Kivu). Expressing sentiments which echo my own impressions formed during fieldwork, Doevenspeck notes the distinct contrast between the two towns in spite of their geographical proximity:

> 'The initial perception of the border as a distinct cut-off point... certainly reflects real asymmetries and inequalities; economic opportunities and insecurity in Goma contrast with visible urban governance and security in Gisenyi, where local markets are much smaller. This contrast mirrors the distinct paths of development the two states have

[77] Throughout this chapter, I demonstrate how the Kivus have been a site of Rwandan migration, and discuss the impact of this on Congolese politics, but my argument regarding the fraught nature of the Congo-Rwandan relationship is also bound to the discussion of Rwandan state interference in the Congo and its leading role in the Congo Wars which featured in the previous chapter.

[78] I will discuss in Chapters Five and Six how discourses of citizenship, belonging, and autochthony have contributed to the perpetuation and nature of violence in the Kivus. However, as a relevant comparative example, the articulation and assingnation of Tutsi or "Tutsi collaborator" identity in the Rwandan Genocide demonstrates how dangerous narratives of identity can be.

> followed since the mid-1990s, with the result that this border is not only one between former warring parties but also between two very diverse political orders and societal projects. On the one side is Rwanda, ostensibly the "strongest" state in Africa with its obsession for security control and impressive development in terms of macro-economic indicators (Ansoms, 2009; Goloobo-Mutebi, 2008). On the other side is the DRC with weak and dysfunctional, if not completely absent, state institutions, partly under the custody of the UN and the international humanitarian industry, and partly at the mercy of politico-economic adventurers (Kodi, 2008; Prunier, 2009).' (Doevenspeck, 2011, p. 133)

This marked contrast between political systems in Rwanda and the Congo, echoes the security concerns of actors operating on numerous scales in both countries. While Doevenspeck's work examines what 'people make of their border-related social world' (Doevenspeck, 2011, p. 129) by looking at the micro-level interactions of ordinary people in everyday life, the Kivutian territory can also be seen as the arena where more large-scale international and regional security concerns play out.

In the previous chapter, I discussed Ayoob's theory of Subaltern Realism. Ayoob argues that 'Third World states, rather than subaltern classes, form the quintessential subaltern element within the society of states, given their relative powerlessness and their position as a large majority in the international system' (Ayoob, 2004, p. 41). In this chapter, I suggest that the security dilemmas which drive state-to-state interaction in the African Great Lakes are not dissimilar to the everyday interactions between individual actors operating in the Kivus. Ayoob calls his theory Subaltern *Realism* because he sees it as being driven by three elements of "essential realism" – 'statism, survival and self-help' (Ayoob, 2004, p. 37). This behaviour, however, is not purely restricted to state actors. Certainly, in the Kivus, we can see that many of the actions of local actors are equally driven by survival and self-help. Furthermore, given that many local discourses operate along a Rwandan/Congolese and autochthon/allochthon dichotomy, there is also an element of statism in their actions. As the intersection of the boundaries between Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, the Kivus are marked by both internal and cross-border ethnic tensions, and actors operating in the Kivus 'harbour ethnic and regional fissures that can easily turn into internal and interstate conflict' (Cicek, 2004, p. 496). At the regional-level, the Kivus can be understood using Buzan and Wæver's regional security complex theory (RSCT) on a sub-complex level, and here a fractal pattern (repeating patterns of behaviour/interaction on differing scales) can be observed. Buzan and Wæver argue that

the DRC is an insulator state between the East-Central Africa security complex, and the Southern Africa security complex – 'bearing the burden of this difficult position, but not strong enough to unify its two worlds into one' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 41). Similarly, the Kivus are pulled in opposing directions by the competing security concerns of the various networks of actors which interact there. An inability to unify or mediate between these competing concerns has contributed to persistent insecurity in the provinces. Furthermore, just as the DRC has served as a regional buffer state (as the battleground of inter-state conflict in the region is situated within this bufferzone), the Kivus can be seen as the sub-buffer and the main site of violence within the DRC. The manner in which the Kivus' geography has exacerbated conflictual tensions throughout history will now be explored in more detail.

The Shifting Boundary of the Border: Narratives of History in the Kivus

I now move to outline the sources of conflict and historical struggles for power which have taken place in the Kivus, although I would add the caveat that the historical narratives presented here are widely contested. While I will primarily be using historical scholarly analysis to give a background to the complex issues of migration, ethnic identification, and land-ownership in the Kivus, and have – where possible – attempted to verify certain narratives with two or more sources, a significant methodological obstacle when analysing the Congo is that claims often get repeated without verification, and thus come to be treated as "fact" by many analysts,[79] leading to what Sigwalt describes as the 'rationalization of a myth' (Sigwalt, 1975, p. 137). This problem with the veracity of "factual" claims is magnified in the Kivus – where a significant element of the conflict is played out in rhetoric. In other words, gaining credence for your own conception of history and claims of belonging in the Kivus is as much a tactic of warfare as military strategy or resource control. As such, I am acutely aware in this chapter of the fact that the narrative presented by the scholars I cite (and, indeed, my own synthesis of their claims) inevitably contributes to this war of words – championing one narrative of history over another. In

[79] In an analysis of early historical work on populations in the Kivus, Newbury notes a number of historians, such as Moeller (1936) and Cuypers (1966), who use faulty methodology in identifying ethnic groups in the eastern Kivus – and in doing so reify cultural differences and socio-economic stratification as racial difference. However, the problems which arise from uncritical methodology are not limited to early historians of Congolese society. For example, the Congolese death toll of 5.4 million between 1998-2004 has been cited unproblematically on multiple occasions by scholars, journalists, and humanitarian agencies (see Introduction and Chapter Four for a more thorough discussion of this).

order to overcome this problem, I seek in this chapter not to present historical narratives as "fact", or even make a judgement about which narratives are more "credible" than others. Rather, following Doevenspeck, this chapter 'highlights certain border-related practices and conceptualizations of the border as expressed in the narratives of the borderlanders' (Doevenspeck, 2011, p. 130). Accordingly I discuss a range of historical events and analyse their significance for the manner in which various competing historical narratives are constructed and presented.

Several scholars who examine the legacy of colonialism often allude to the artifical and arbitrary nature of conlonial borders, and identify this as a significant driver of post-colonial conflict (see Mamdani, 1996; Nugent, 2004; Iliffe, 2007; Young, 2009). However, the border between Rwanda and the Congo is not necessarily as arbitrary as some other borders in Africa, as both countries are separated by Lake Kivu, which serves as a natural boundry marker. At the time of the creation of the Congo Free State in 1885, Lake Kivu already represented the border between the various states of the Kivus[80] and the ancient Kingdom of Rwanda. Despite this division, however, 'early [Western historical] writings on Kivu[81] focused on the similarities of the Kivu states with Rwanda rather than on differences, the Rwandan political and social system as described in these early sources [thus] became the model for later studies in Kivu' (Newbury, 1978, p. 131). Accordingly, there has historically been a sense of Rwandan-Kivutian affinity, especially among Rwandans who see the Kivus as a rightful extension of the Rwandan Kingdom. Indeed, the waxing and waning of the Kingdom of Rwanda makes it difficult to say with any certainty whether the modern-day region of the Kivus ever was part of the Rwandan Kingdom. Furthermore, the nature of the manner in which land was conquered by Rwanda's precolonial kingdom – i.e. through migration – may also explain why the Congolese have historically been so suspicious of Rwandan migration to the region. Indeed, in a later work on the history of the Kivu Rift

[80] It is difficult to talk of ancient kingdoms or independent precolonial "states" in the Kivús. Sigwalt argues that: 'The normal pattern [in eastern Zaïre] was for ritual authority to extend only as far as the effective control of one, or sometimes two, levels of delegated political authority. As the need arose because of expansion or schism, royal rites were duplicated to serve newly independent states. Hence "independence" was a fluid concept, as well as an ambiguous one, and consequently no definite figure can be established for the actual number of "independent" states the area encompassed. Fifty would probably be a conservative estimate' (Sigwalt, 1975, p. 139). Newbury notes that early works written on the Kivus 'focussed on discrete ethnic groups, each apparently geographically discrete ethnic groups' (Newbury, 1978, p. 132). Newbury argues that Bushi state which covers territory in modern-day South Kivu including the capital, Bukavu, was 'the most centralized of the Kivu states at the time of European arrival' (Newbury, 1978, p. 131).

[81] At the time of Newbury writing, the North Kivu and South Kivu were administered together as Kivu.

Valley, Newbury (1986) explains how in the eighteenth century, a war in the Rwandan Kingdom's eastern frontier led to a mass exodus of refugees to the eastern shores of the Kivu Rift Valley (in what is modern-day Rwanda's Western Province).

Although the refugees who fled westwards into Rwanda would not have categorized themselves as Rwandan (indeed, they had been displaced from their homeland by the Rwandan kingdom's eastern expansion), for those already living in the Kivu Rift, these refugees were identified as Rwandan, or at least as sharing Rwandan culture (Newbury, 1986). Over time, the identification of these refugees as Rwandan led to the justification for the Rwanda Kingdom's expansion westward to the eastern shores of Lake Kivu. Fear that the presence of Rwandan refugees on the western shores of Lake Kivu (in the eastern Congo) could prompt a similar expansion into the Congo may go some way to explaining the anti-Rwandophone sentiments which have been prevalent in the Kivus throughout most of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Indeed, Tull observes how much of the anti-Rwandophone sentiment in the Kivus evokes the narratives of history in which Rwanda has used migration to acquire territory. 'In line with the revisiting of narratives rooted in the experience of past violent conflicts, fears about the creation of a Hutuland or the ever-present worry about a Rwandophone-led secession of the Kivus and/or its integration into the Rwandan state resonated widely' (Tull, 2005, p. 186). However, it is misleading to deduce from this narrative that "local"[82] or "authentic" Kivutian sentiment is intrinsically anti-Rwandophone and loyal to the Congo. Many so-called "local" Maï-Maï groups have at various stages allied with Rwandophone groups, and several militias exist which comprise of both Banyarwanda and "local" actors. Furthermore, the incorporation of the Kivus into the Congo is hotly contested. Movements for the separation of the Kivus from the Congo which justify themselves through narratives of history in which the Kivus have been exploited by Rwanda and the Congo alike, have also arisen throughout history.[83]

Historically, the Kivus have been a site of transit. For example, for Tutsi pastoralists who lived a largely nomadic life, the boundary between modern Congo and modern Rwanda

[82] I refer to "local" here as members of ethnic groups such as the Wanande, Bambuba, Balese, Watalinga, Batwa, Bapere, Bahunde, Batembo, Nande, Nyanga, Bakano, Bakusu, and the Bakumu Batembo - the non-Kinyarwanda speaking ethnic groups listed by the North Kivu authorities as residing in North Kivu (see http://www.provincenordkivu.org/presentation.html (Date accessed 14/05/2012). No similar data is available for South Kivu.

[83] See http://www.africafederation.net/Kivu_Political.htm (Date accessed, 13/05/2012)

was much more fluid, with various groups of similar ancestry[84] now resident on either side of the border. The question arises, however, as to how this fluid border, which was able to accommodate both constant territorial movement and rapid demographic change (through migrant and pastoralist movements), became a site in which autochthonous discourses are asserted with such ferocity and certainty. Interestingly, Appadurai's work on uncertainty may explain how this trend came about: 'Uncertainty about identification and violence can lead to actions, reactions, complicities, and anticipations that multiply the pre-existing uncertainty about labels. Together, these forms of uncertainty call for the worst kind of certainty: dead certainty' (Appadurai, 1999, p. 322). Indeed, I argue that this desire for dead certainty came about when the Kivu Rift Valley border ceased to be fluid, and was established by colonial powers as a clear boundary between the Congo Free State and the Kingdom of Ruanda in German East Africa.[85] Although the colonial project did not *construct* an artificial border between Rwanda and the Congo, it did impose a rigidity to the border which had previously been both changeable and contestable. Turner argues that by administering the border in this way, 'The Europeans exported a new concept of the state, with clear boundaries and equal subdivisions, and a particularly lethal subtype, the "nation state" where nation (cultural community) and state (political structure) coincide or should coincide' (Turner, 2007, p. 52).

Despite a clearly demarcated state boundary between Rwanda and the Congo being established under colonial rule, little was done to establish as sense of Congolese belonging in the Kivus. The ultimate emergence of a sense of Congolese consciousness among Kivutians may be rooted in the fact that the Belgian administration of the Congo imported to the region an obsession with racial hierarchy, while simultaneously altering the demographic makeup of the Kivus by importing Hutus and Tutsis from Rwanda into eastern Congo. It is in these actions that the most nefarious roots of conflict in both Rwanda and the Congo can be found. When Germany lost its colonies after its defeat in World War One, Ruanda-Urundi,[86] two kingdoms of German East Africa, were given to the Belgians. In order to most efficiently administer and benefit from all of their colonies, the Belgians attempted to "understand" the people that they were administering by classifying them and

[84] I purposefully refrain from using the word 'ethnicity' here, as it is one which I move to demonstrate is highly contestable in this case.
[85] The modern-day states of Rwanda and Burundi, along with Tanganyika (which was the name given to the mainland area of modern-day Tanzania) formed German East Africa.
[86] This became the colony of Ruanda-Urundi when it was administered by the Belgians, but was then divided into the two modern-day states of Rwanda and Burundi after independence in 1962.

describing them according to their physical characteristics and perceived usefulness. The Belgian science of classifying the "usefulness" of Africans is one which is now wrought with controversy as it attributed racial superiority to one group over another. Although this polemic of physical racial difference and hierarchy between ethnic groups[87] has featured more prominently in the history of Rwanda, it also had a significant impact on the Congo. Given that the consequences of both cases are inextricably linked, I shall consider the history of racial classification in the two countries together.

The general perception held by the Belgians was that the Congo was resource-rich but people-poor (the Belgians not only perceived a population dearth in terms of quantity, but they also thought there was lack of "useful" Africans in the Congo). In contrast, Rwanda had almost no valuable resources, but was highly populated, and contained a number of "useful" Africans. Rwandan Hutus were viewed as sturdy, hard workers and therefore recruited to work in the Congo's extractive mining industries. 'This led to programmes to transfer families from Rwanda to eastern Congo, with consequences that are still being felt' (Turner, 2007, p. 29). Rwandan Tutsi, on the other hand, were considered more open to European ideas and skilled jobs, and the Belgians perpetuated in Rwanda the German method of ruling the colony through the Tutsi monarchy. In the mid-1920s and 1930s the Belgians carried out administrative reform such that most of the Hutu chiefdom (and sub-chiefdoms) in Rwanda were ruled by the Rwandan Tutsi *mwami*. This had the doubly dangerous consequence of simultaneously breeding resentment and anti-Tutsi sentiment among the Hutu, and a feeling of natural superiority amongst the Tutsi. A more concrete outcome of this classification in Rwanda was the ascription of physical characteristics to the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi tribal divisions. These designations were then marked upon the Rwandan psyche with the colonial introduction of identity cards, stating a person's ethnicity according to the Belgian classification. These identity cards would later resurface as particularly important in facilitating the identification of Tutsis for extermination during the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.

In the Kivus, many of the ethnic tensions which are present today are also based on Belgian classifications of autochthony and migration. Certainly, the Kivus have been a historic site of migration for many lacustrine populations. The nature of this migration has been widely

[87] I make the distinction that race implies innate physical differences in characteristics, whereas ethnicity is linked to cultural and social differences but does not necessarily require physical difference.

contested, with various groups claiming that they were the first to arrive. However, as Sigwalt has noted 'The most important development in African historiography since 1970 is almost surely the growing awareness that oral tradition alone is insufficient as a source for reconstructing the past beyond about 1750' (Sigwalt, 1975, p. 137). Newbury, in analysing the historical accounts of the Kivus given by Moeller (1936) and Cuypers (1966), points to the continued reproduction of inaccuracies in historical analyses which attempt to suggest the autochthony of a particular group:

> 'Based primarily on Moeller, Cuypers' historical reconstruction postulates an autochthonous Twa (pygmy) group and subsequent "waves" of immigrants forming "layers" of stratified social "classes" which seem to apply to the region as a whole. The first two migrations are dated (without sources) to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This dating problem derives from Moeller, although Cuypers offers no explanation as to how such dates were in fact arrived at' (Newbury, 1978, p. 135)

As is demonstrated in the quotation above, historical analyses of the region upon which these classifications were based are highly problematic. Unfortunately, the consequences of unverified historical narratives are not limited to poor academic practice: These misrepresentations of ethnic identity in the Kivus lend themselves to 'the persistent emotive power of racist discourses' (Pottier, 2009, p. 24) and champion the narratives of certain groups over the other, even though there is no real evidence for the credibility of any one *claim* over the other. Thus, despite a profound lack of understanding about precolonial systems of rule, the colonial administration in both Rwanda and the Congo imported into the Great Lakes region the "fevers of race",[88] which the Rwandan and Congolese people incorporated into their own constructions of their history. In the Congo, the Hutu-Tutsi division was written over an already confused ethnic composition. In particular, the colonial period also saw in the Congo the evolution of the term Bantu (which originally referred to a family of languages) into the designation of an ethnic grouping. Like the Hutu and Tutsi classification in Rwanda, the Bantu designation began to refer to physical characteristics, and was therefore thought of as a "natural" rather than "constructed" grouping. Processes of economic exploitation and plunder combined with the administrative practices of patronage and ethnic classification have had a lasting legacy

[88] The term was coined in French by the journalist Collette Breackman as *'les fievres ethniques'* and is translated and used by Thomas Turner in *The Congo Wars* (2007) as the 'fevers of race'. Because of the complex and contestable nature of ethnicity (which I discuss later) and the 'Us'/'Them' and in/out dichotomies which are associated with race, I have chosen to keep to Turner's translation.

in both Rwanda and the Congo. Whilst I would argue that the fevers of race were perhaps the most significant legacy of the colonial period, it is worth noting that we should not consider colonialism's legacies separately, but in tandem, in order to understand the extent of their impact on the current dynamics of conflict in the Congo. Indeed, even if racial tensions were not present in the Kivus, the weakness of the state, external interference in the Kivus, and economic predation by various actors in the provinces would still be present and would still drive conflict there. 'The extremely violent politics of recent years is best regarded as a consequence of all of these...rather than the direct result of one idea, even one as "infectious" as race' (Turner, 2007, p. 52). Furthermore, while groups competing for power and security may see it as useful to talk of autochthony or earlier migration to access land rights, a narrative of autochthony is based on an assumption of multiple and distinct migrations by separate groups,[89] rather than a process of gradual and continuous migration by all groups involved.

The Kivus as a Site of Postcolonial Rebellion

Despite post-independence criticism of the colonially constructed (or at least, misrepresented) notions of ethnicity, race and social order (see Sigwalt, 1975; Newbury, 1978; Turner, 2007), these mythic notions persisted and mutated among the post-independence Congolese population. During this time, new waves of migration from the Congo's troubled neighbours further confused the already-complex demographic makeup of the Kivu provinces. It is tempting to view the Kivus as relatively removed from the crisis over post-independence state control in Kinshasa in the early 1960s. However, the position of the Kivus as a sub-insulator[90] between Rwanda and the DRC, in addition to the problems it faced as a result of weak governance and poor provision of public goods from Kinshasa, meant that the Kivus were also a site of crisis during decolonization and independence. The example of the Banyamulenge in South Kivu and their involvement in the 1964 Simba rebellion may best serve as an illustration of how domestic strife in both the Congo and Rwanda combined to create a new dynamic of conflict in the Kivus.

---

[89] Indeed, Newbury has suggested that the representation of distinct blocks of migration by separate groups (which form an underlying assumption of autochthonous claims) are of 'questionable validity' (Newbury, 1978, p. 136).

[90] Again, I refer back to Buzan & Wæver's (2003) discussion of insulator states who, geographically positioned between two security complexes, have to bear the burden of both complexes' security concerns. I argue that the Kivus have to bear the burden of both Congolese domestic strife and the domestic troubles of its neighbours – particularly Rwanda, but also Burundi and Uganda.

The term Banyamulenge refers to a community of Tutsi pastoralists who had been given some access to the grazing lands in modern-day South Kivu. Although members of the Banyamulenge claim that they were present in the current territory of the Congo long before its establishment as a Belgian colony, there is much disagreement over their history. 'Two issues dominate this debate: the moment of arrival of these Banyamulenge settlers, and their exact numbers' (Vlassenroot, 2002, p. 502). A number of issues have made this contestation particularly difficult to resolve including a scarcity of written records, their pastoralist and nomadic nature, their reputation among colonial powers as being 'uncooperative',[91] and their confusion with later (and contemporary but different) waves of Tutsi settlement in the Kivus. Prior to Congolese independence, the Banyamulenge were referred to as "Banyarwanda" – a blanket term for people who spoke Kinyarwanda and were thought of as being of Rwandan origin. However, events unfolding in the Rwandan decolonization process led to large-scale Rwandan Tutsi migration to the Kivus in the 1950s and 1960s.[92] In order to claim Congolese citizenship and distance themselves from Rwandan refugees who settled in the mid-1960s, most of the South Kivu Tutsi pastoralists who claimed to have been present in the Congo since before 1885 changed their name to "Banyamulenge" (meaning people of Mulenge).[93] The Banyamulenge, however, still experienced a turbulent history of persecution and exclusion in their struggle for citizenship, and have been involved in several post-colonial rebellions in the Congo.

Vlassenroot argues that the roots of the Banyamulenge's rebellious activities can be traced back to a 'political awakening' during the 1964 Simba (or Mulele) rebellion. The Simba rebellion, led by former supporters of Antoine Gizenga (who presented themselves as Lumumbist leftists), began in western Congo but spread to the east. Although the rebellion had appealed to newly arrived Rwandan Tutsi refugees (many of whom joined the *Armee Populaire de Liberation* (APL) rebel forces), the Banyamulenge did not feel any particular political affinity to the Simba cause. 'Rather, those who eventually joined the rebellion did

[91] See the reports by the geographer Weis *in le pays d'Uvira*, which are discussed in *The Congo Wars* (Turner, 2007). Turner suggests in a footnote, that 'Weis seems to imply that the Banyamulenge were not Congolese but Rwandan, and threatened to establish authority over neighbouring peoples that *were* Congolese' (Turner, 2007, p. 221).

[92] Despite favouring and ruling through Tutsi chiefs during their colonial administration of the Congo, the Belgians – in line with the logic of decolonization which advocated transferring power to a ruling majority – handed control of Rwanda to the Hutu-led majority party, the PARMEHUTU. Hutu resentment over decades of subjugation under the Tutsi led to widespread persecution of Rwandan Tutsi. Massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda took place in 1959, 1963, and 1967, leading to a mass exodus of the Tutsi population from Rwanda. Pottier observes 'forced migration of some 150,000 Rwandan Tutsi who fled their country as independence approached (1959-61)' (Pottier, 2002, p. 11).

[93] A township in the South Kivu Haut Plateau overlooking the South Kivutian capital, Uvira.

so mainly because they hoped this would safeguard their families' (Vlassenroot, 2002, p. 503) who were constantly under threat.[94] However, as the events of the Simba rebellion demonstrate, groups such as the Banyamulenge, who have historically struggled to foster acceptance and belonging in the Congo, also struggled to establish long-term security. Although they were able to gain some primal security through joining the Simba rebellion, this quickly proved to be both superficial and tenuous. In 1966, after their defeat, a number of Simba rebels (including those who were of Babembe ethnic origin) sought sanctuary in South Kivu's Haut Plateau – a territory that has traditionally been occupied by the Banyamulenge. Seeing lucrative economic opportunities in raiding Banyamulenge cattle herds, and imposing taxation on the Banyamulenge inhabitant population, the Simba turned against their former allies 'which turned the rebellion into an ethno-military campaign against the Banyamulenge' (Vlassenroot, 2002, p. 503). Thus, having begun the rebellion on the side of the Simba, the Banyamulenge switched allegiance to join the Congolese government forces, the Congolese National Army (ANC).

The behaviour of the Banyamulenge in the early 1960s – in changing their name and joining, then leaving, the Simba rebellion – illustrates a security paradox that has faced several Rwandophone settler groups in the Congo (although this is not necessarily a paradox that is limited to Rwandophones). On the one hand, it appears that groups such as the Banyamulenge can adapt to the system of survival in *System D*. However, while these survivalist strategies may provide them with some immediate and basic security, it simultaneously undermines their long-term security prospects. The Banyamulenge support of the Simba rebellion evolved into a new confrontation between Babembe and Banyamulenge. Similarly, the act of changing their name to Banyamulenge (to establish Congolese indigeneity) would later backfire to become the very aspect of their identity which would exclude them from Congolese citizenship. In this sense, it is tempting to view the Banyamulenge in the Kivus as victims of citizenship manipulation – and indeed a number of commentators do discuss how the Banyamulenge have been cynically manipulated throughout their history (see, for example, Vlassenroot, 2002; Jackson, 2007 and Turner, 2007). Certainly, the Banyamulenge have been subject to much exploitation under the rule of Mobutu, and 'Rwandophone nationality has been literally switched on

[94] Under colonial rule, the Banyamulenge had been able to gain control of several *petit chefferies* (see Vlassenroot, 2002; Turner, 2007) and used the land for their cattle. Contestation of their right to this land post-independence meant that they were the target of persecution from competing land claims. Linked to this, the Banyamulenge were persecuted for being Tutsi foreign invaders in the Congo.

and off as expediency dictated, a key element in the divide-and-rule strategies pursued by President Mobutu Sese Seko' (Jackson, 2007, p. 482).

However, it is also important to note that the Banyamulenge have not always been marginalized and excluded from Congolese political power. For example, in 1969, Mobutu chose the Banyamulenge member, Barthélemy Bisengimana, as his Director of the *Bureau de la Présidence*. Bisengimana immediately went about promoting Banyamulenge members to positions of power, and set in motion the promulgation of a 1971 nationality law which gave citizenship status to the Banyamulenge as Congolese nationals. However, Bisengimana soon fell from grace, and the Banyamulenge community fell with him. In 1981 a new nationality law revoked Banyamulenge citizenship. It is here that the previous strategy of adopting the name "Banyamulenge" came to be used by their political opponents to marginalize and exclude them: 'Banyamulenge could not claim any citizenship rights because in 1885 there was no ethnic community called "Banyamulenge" living in Zaïre' (Vlassenroot, 2002, p. 507). Mamdani also observes a similar feeling among non-Tutsi Congolese about the settler nature of the Banyamulenge, noting how many Congolese people feel that 'the Tutsi have developed a disturbing tendency to call themselves by the name of the place where they have settled' (Mamdani, 2001, p. 250). However, as I will later demonstrate with regard to the Hutu refugees who migrated from Rwanda in the 1990s, the line between "victim" and "combatant" in the Kivus is not clear. Because of their marginalization by their former ally Mobutu, the Banyamulenge soon proved to be a valuable recruitment pool for the rebellion *against* Mobutu, which was brewing in the eastern Congo. Thus when Mobutu's strategies of rule were in their favour, they were happy to support him, and only turned against Mobutu when he was no longer favouring them. This is not a criticism of Banyamulenge action, but rather an observation that the actions of so-called "victims" and "perpetrators" in the Kivus are not so easy to prise apart; expediency of allegiance (rather than ideological affinity) is what drives the formation of alliances on both sides.

Thus, although the Banyamulenge were certainly victimized, they have not always been completely helpless in the Kivus. Indeed, it was in part the Banyamulenge's quest for achieving long-term security through citizenship rights, and the fact that the Mobutu regime was no longer able to provide them with neither security nor national recognition, which contributed to Mobutu's downfall in 1997. This being said, it is clear that attributing Mobutu's downfall to the Banyamulenge alone would be to downplay the other

considerable forces that were playing out in the Congo at the time. In the previous chapter, I discussed the slow death of Zaïre and Mobutu's regional alienation from neighbouring regimes. However, significant internal dynamics also contributed to Mobutu's downfall. When mixed with regional events, they finally sealed his fate. It was in the Kivus that the regional and internal dissent towards Mobutu collided and collaborated to overthrow him.

Arguably the key actor (if not the mastermind, then at least the most prominent) in the overthrow of Mobutu was Laurent Kabila, a former supporter of the late Lumumba and also a member of the Simba rebellion. In the 1960s, Kabila's association with Lumumba's socialist leanings had attracted the attention of Ché Guevara, who deployed to the Congo in order to assist Kabila. However, Guevara soon became disillusioned with Kabila, writing in his diary: 'So far, nothing makes me think he is the man for the situation' (Guevara, 1999, p. 69). However, in the mid-1990s a drastic turn of events led to Kabila finally becoming the "man for the situation". In the previous chapter, I discussed the impact that the end of the Cold War and the creation of enemies in Central Africa had on Mobutu's decline. But the trigger which precipitated Mobutu's demise lay in the events which took place in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide, and the subsequent rebellion which grew in the Kivus. This rebellion gave renewed strength to the stagnant and ineffective opposition movements that had failed to oust Mobutu for decades (see Young, 2002). The volatility of the Kivu region in the 1990s, a site of rebellion against Mobutu, can be attributed to the fact that, as well as having a number of home-grown Congolese demographic complexities, and a high population density, the Kivus continued to be the destination of migratory movements from conflict zones in its neighbouring countries. The fallout of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide acted as the trigger event to propel Kabila to power, but the Kivus were also the site of Burundian Hutu migration from the aftermath of the 1993 Burundian Genocide against the Hutu – which would also have significant implications for the dynamics of conflict in the region.

Following the end of the Rwandan Genocide, nearly a million Rwandan refugees (most of them Hutu) fled Rwanda and poured across the Congolese border into camps in the Kivu regions. The effect of the refugee crisis which ensued had three significant effects on the Kivus which are important for understanding the nature of the conflict that followed, and helped transform a disparate and lethargic internal opposition into a rebellion that was capable of ousting Mobutu in the space of a few months. Firstly, the influx of so many refugees in such a short space of time brought with it significant economic and

environmental burdens which exacerbated the visibility of state weakness in the Kivus. Towns such as Goma effectively became giant refugee camps, and the delicate balance of *debrouillez vous* survival economics was shaken. By allowing the camps to remain, Mobutu presented himself as weak: His inability to deal with the influx of Rwandan migrants revealed to the opposition groups that, behind all the riches and images of a strong "Zaïrean leopard", there was actually a very weak system that could be toppled. The "burden" of Rwandan inhabitation of the Kivus continues to be a source of conflictual tension.

Secondly, as *genocidaires* fled with, and were present amongst, the refugees, the refugee camps became highly militarized (see Pottier, 2002; Braithwaite, 2010, etc.). This resulted in one of the most highly criticised humanitarian operations in recent history. Several reports at the time suggested that the refugee camps, especially the camps in North Kivu's capital Goma, were being run by Rwandan *genocidaires* – who were using humanitarian assistance to reassemble and rearm their militias.[95] Guilt about not intervening during the Rwandan Genocide, and the perception that aid agencies were facilitating the militarization of the refugee camps, meant that many high-profile humanitarian agencies, such as the International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, Save the Children, and certain chapters of *Medicins Sans Frontier* (MSF) withdrew from the camps – leaving the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) abandoned by many of its partners in the region. The withdrawal of humanitarian support made the international community's control of the camps increasingly difficult to maintain, and many refugees in the camps were left vulnerable to recruitment by the *genocidaire* forces as they remilitarized. Consequently, some Rwandan Hutus refugees who had not taken part in the Rwandan Genocide, became part of a Hutu Power project in exile.[96] Another aspect of this militarization relates to the spread of Hutu Power consciousness throughout the Kivus. Renewed anti-Tutsi rhetoric threatened the existential security of Congolese Tutsi, which again re-mobilized Congolese Tutsi groups such as the Banyamulenge.

---

[95] In a report in Le Soir, *Medicins San Frontier* claimed that 'The instigators of the genocide are taking control of the camps in an increasingly systematic way' (cited in Pottier, 2002).

[96] It is important to qualify that Rwandan Hutu foreign armed groups in the Congo are not made up exclusively of ex-*genocidaire* of *Interahamwe*, as is often reported by organizations such as the UN , who state that 'The term ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* used in this text shall be understood as referring to all Rwandan armed groups on Congolese soil, irrespective of their denomination (ex-FAR, *Interahamwe*, ALIR, FDLR, RUD-Unana [*sic*], Rasta etc' (United Nations Security Council, 2007, p. 2). However, this is a misleading label as not all members of these groups are ex-FAR or *Interahamwe*. For example, the first military commander of the FDLR, Paul Rwarakabije was not himself known to have played any part in the Rwandan Genocide (Global Security, 2011).

Thirdly, the militarization of the camps and presence of *genocidaires* forces in the Kivus significantly threatened the newly established, Tutsi-led regime in Rwanda. Mobutu's inability (or unwillingness) to deal with the camps revealed to the new Rwandan regime the need to have a more cooperative and capable regime in the Congo. The rebellious tendencies that had been stirring in the Kivus thus became the vehicle through which Rwanda believed it could drive this change. In the previous chapter I discussed how Rwanda allied with some of the Congo's other neighbouring governments who shared a desire to oust Mobutu. However, a foreign invasion of the Congo would have contravened international law. These foreign governments therefore sought to intervene indirectly, by giving their support to a coalition of rebel parties. The Banyamulenge provided the most obvious recruitment pool for the ousting of Mobutu – especially after Mobutu failed to protect them from the Governor of South Kivu's announcement that the Tutsi had to leave South Kivu.[97] However, the full force of the rebellion that broke out in the Kivus in the last few months of 1996 involved a coalition of groups which came together in Goma to form the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre (AFDL).

Turner observes that of the four main parties which came together to form the AFDL, only two groups included the Banyamulenge: the Democratic Alliance of the People (ADP), led by the Congolese Tutsi Déogratias Bugera, who became the first general secretary of the AFDL; and the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MRLZ), a south Kivutian group led by Anselme Masusu Nindaga (Turner, 2007, p. 4). However, two other groups were arguably more prominent in the rebellion: Namely, the Party of the Peoples' Revolution (PRP) led by Laurent Kabila, and the National Council of Resistance for Democracy (CNRD) led by André Kisase Ngandu. Both Kabila and Ngandu were vying for overall leadership of the group, and Kabila was made spokesperson, while Ngandu was made military commander. Although McCalpin argues that 'it is unclear as to how he [Kabila] emerged as its leader' (McCalpin, 2002, p. 46), Kabila's rise to power is most likely because of Ngandu's untimely death. Nzongola-Ntalaja offers one possible explanation for Kabila's emergence as leader:

> 'Commander Kisase Ngandu did not live to see the AFDL victory. He died in mysterious circumstances in January 1997, apparently assassinated by those who did not feel comfortable with his Lumumbist sense of nationalism and patriotic duty. After his death, the remaining leaders decided to fuse their groups into one, with Kabila as

[97] See Thomas Turner (2007, p. 4 and Chapter 4).

AFDL president, Bugera as secretary general, and Masusu as military commander' (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 226).

Nzongola-Ntalaja's account reveals a number of significant insights into Kabila's strategy of rule, which may explain why the Kivus once again became the birthplace of the movement to oust him in 1998. Firstly, if Ngandu's assassination was because he was seen as too Lumumbist, the fact Kabila wasn't also targeted may suggest that he was not as Lumumbist as he originally posited himself to be. Indeed, Ché Guevara had previously noted misgivings about Kabila's ideological commitment to socialist principles (Guevara, 1999). The triumph of Kabila over Ngandu therefore eerily echoes the triumph of Mobutu over Lumumba – and not only because one was assassinated to make way for the other. Ngandu's and Lumumba's downfall was rooted in their emphasis on ideology, while Kabila and Mobutu demonstrate the importance of pragmatism when vying for power in the Congo. It is no surprise then that when Kabila came to power, the same system of rule that had encouraged dissent in the Kivus under Mobutu endured, and that Kivutian rebel movements emerged once again in response. Secondly, the other faction leaders – who represented the Kivutian elements of the coalition – were very soon removed from power under the new Kabila regime. In November 1997, Masusu Nindaga was arrested for "indiscipline" and disparaged by Kabila as a "Rwandan puppet". This was the same term that many Congolese people were using for Kabila himself, and which Nzongola-Ntalaja argues proved that Rwanda, and not the AFDL, orchestrated the rebellion (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 226). Bugera was also sidelined from power and removed from the government in July 1998 – removing the last hold on representation that the Congolese Tutsi had. The Banyamulenge's role in the First Congo War therefore placed them in an even weaker position than they had been before the rebellion. Not only had they gone unrewarded by the new Kabila government, but the belief that the Congolese Tutsi were really Rwandan collaborators was further compounded. This belief was exploited by Kabila, who used them as a scapegoat to posit himself as "authentically Congolese" rather than the Rwandan/Ugandan puppet that some Congolese groups believed him to be.

Although the First Congo War did successfully overthrow Mobutu, it did not achieve the goal that had initially justified Rwandan involvement in this overthrow – namely the removal of Rwandan Hutu *genocidaires* from the Kivus. Indeed, Mobutu used them to fight the AFDL coalition forces. During the First Congo War, both *genocidaire* and non-*genocidaire* Rwandan Hutu refugees were militarized to assist Mobutu, as Castles and

Miller observe: 'In 1997, the Zaïrean government began to arm Rwandan Hutu refugees as part of a broader effort to quell the anti-government insurgency in the eastern part of the country' (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 11). Although many of the refugee camps shut down in 1996, and a large proportion of Rwandan refugees returned home, those that remained were dominated by the Hutu hardliners – who were the source of the Rwandan regime's security threat, and the same militants that had assisted Mobutu switched their allegiance to Kabila. 'By November 1997, allegations had started to emerge that Kabila has begun to negotiate with and help the Hutu' (Kasaija, 2010, p. 199). Just as the Banyamulenge switched sides in the Simba rebellion in order to safeguard the security of their families, we can see that Rwandan Hutus in the Kivus adopted a similar style of temporal association in Kivus during the Congo Wars.

Throughout, this thesis argues that transient and tenuous alliances are a key feature of group dynamics in the eastern Congo. The uncertainty and instability that this type of alliance-formation creates has served as a key barrier to understanding the motivations of actors. As I will argue later in this thesis, Rwandan Hutu groups' tendency to switch affiliations in the Kivus has led to a widespread perception that they are criminals motivated by greed, rather than grievance. However, if we compare the actions of these group with those of the Banyamulenge in the 1960s, we can see that establishing security and ontological certainty[98] is as important for Rwandan Hutu groups as it was for the Banyamulenge.

This is not to say that conflict in the Kivus does not have at least some economic dimension to it. Certainly, all actors involved have sought to benefit from the provinces' lucrative resources. Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi militia alike have been accused of looting and raping in the eastern Congo's mines (United Nations Security Council, 2001; Thakur, 2008; Nest, 2011; Eichstaedt, 2011). Rwandan and Ugandan army officers also saw the financial opportunities that a continued presence in the Congo could bring: A 2001 UN report revealed mass-scale looting in the DRC in which 'stockpiles of minerals, coffee, wood, livestock and money from territories conquered by the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were taken and transferred to those countries or exported to international markets' (United Nations Security Council, 2001, p. 3). Filip Reyntjens also observes: 'For the Rwandan elite, who live well above the means their country can afford, the wealth

[98] This will be discussed in Chapter Five, but for more on ontological (un)certainty see Dunn (2009).

generated in the DRC has become essential' (Reyntjens, 2001, p. 312). It was therefore necessary for both Rwanda and Uganda to forge new alliances with rebel movements which could serve as a proxy through which to continue interfering in the country. Once again, a suitable proxy could be found in the Kivus in the form of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). Much like the AFDL, the RCD consisted of a coalition of opposition groups to Kabila – from those whom Kabila has sidelined, such as the Banyamulenge, to ousted Mobutists. Haskin argues that the 'RCD was created by Uganda and Rwanda to both legitimize their invasion and to embrace the Congolese insurgents' (Haskin, 2005, p. 90). The fragility of the RCD coalition meant that it fell apart even before it had a chance to get off its feet. In the Second Congo War, Rwanda therefore gave significant support to the RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. Uganda, after falling out with Rwanda over tactics and strategy, supported the MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) led by Jean Pierre Bemba. 'In mid-1999, the RCD disintegrated into factions and the war was stalemated' (Kasaija, 2010, p. 188).

The RCD were not the only group whose factions proliferated. The focus of this thesis is on the Hutu armed groups who are fighting in the Kivus. It may seem counter-intuitive, given the strong anti-Tutsi rhetoric many Hutu armed groups advocate, to draw parallels between the actions of these groups and those of Tutsi-dominated groups such as the Banyamulenge and RCD. However, their patterns of behaviour can be seen to echo each other. Just as the RCD split into factions, so too have the Hutu groups. For example, both the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and the Burundian Hutu group the National Liberation Front (FLN), emerged during this time in the Kivus to counter-act the perceived Tutsi threat with a Hutu Power movement, but various off-shoots of these groups have since emerged. Furthermore, a number of local defence militias – known collectively as the Maï-Maï, but representing disparate groups and interests – also arose to ensure that local Congolese interests were not subsumed under the interests of these foreign armed groups. We can conclude, therefore, that widening the base of a group's interests (by splitting into factions) is a common mechanism of group survival in the Kivus. The proliferation of armed groups which emerged in the Kivus during this Second Congo War may explain why, despite the official end of the conflict in 2003, conflict in the Kivus has endured. The next section will now move to focus on these armed groups.

An opportunity to overcome the stalemate of the Second Congo War emerged in 2001 with the assassination of Laurent Kabila, and the accession to power of his son Joseph Kabila. Joseph Kabila seemed much keener to negotiate an end to the hostilities, and spoke of his desire to 'restore peace and consolidate national communion' (Reyntjens, 2001, p. 315) in the Congo. Thus, by the end of 2002, peace accords had been signed which guaranteed the withdrawal of both Ugandan and Rwandan occupation of the Congo, and the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement signed in December 2002 brought a number of belligerent parties together to form the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) transitional government. Two factions of the splintered RCD movement were represented in the ICD (RCD-Goma and the RCD Liberation Movement known as RCD-ML), as well as the Ugandan-backed MLC and a few Maï-Maï groups – heralding a new age of cooperation between the belligerent parties. Despite this initial optimism, deadly violence endured in the Kivu regions. A number of combined factors can account for this continuation of violence. Even in the early days of the new Joseph Kabila regime, academics such as Filip Reyntjens seemed pessimistic about the prospects for the future, arguing that 'some of the domestic forces that made him president are the same as those which supported his father in his intransigent policies' (Reyntjens, 2001, p. 315). Even then, there was concern about the new regime's human rights abuses in its dealings in the Kivus (*Ibid.*), particularly with regard to so-called "Rwandan collaborators" who were scapegoated as responsible for Laurent Kabila's death.

Among academic theorists writing after the "end" of the conflict, the most commonly cited (and widely accepted) reason for the continuation of violence has been the fact that local land rights issues in the Kivus have not been adequately addressed (see, for example, works by Tull, 2003; Autesserre, 2012; and Bøås, 2008). According to a series of baseline surveys carried out by Global Witness: 'In communities surveyed in North Kivu, the studies found that reduced access to fields combined with an increased demand for available agricultural produce reduces the purchasing power of local residents and pushes food prices up on local markets' (Global Witness, 2011b, p. 1), thereby increasing poverty in the province. Slightly less discussed (although it has been noted by certain theorists), and linked to land rights (see for example, Jackson, 2007, Bøås, 2008 and Dunn and Bøås, forthcoming), is the fact that the complex relationship between citizenship and migration has not been addressed. Building on this, I add a third factor which, when combined with the ambiguity surrounding citizenship and land rights, makes conflict in the Kivus intractable. Namely, the

exclusion of a number of significant belligerents from the bargaining table, and in particular the exclusion of Rwandan Hutu militants.

As has been demonstrated in both this and the previous chapter, the Rwandophone position in the Congo has been precarious throughout the country's history. Certainly, Congolese Tutsi have been cynically manipulated and persecuted by sucessive Congolese governments since Mobutu, and used as a means to justify Rwandan interference in the Congo. However, these groups have also had some opportunity to engage in Congolese politics – for a decade in the 1970s under Mobutu, and later in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Equally manipulated and used by both Congolese regimes (to fight rebel movements) and the Tutsi-led Rwandan regime (as a justification for interfering in the Congo) are the Rwandan Hutus who have been exiled in the Congo since 1994. I argue that excluding this group from peace negotiations in 2002 meant that the peace of 2003 was always incomplete. Since 2003, the subsequent mishandling of this highly belligerent, evasive, and resourceful group has meant that they continue to contribute to conflict in the Congo. Unless this group are therefore better understood and dealt with, conflict in the Kivus is likely to endure. The rest of this thesis will therefore analyse the specific problem of Rwanda Hutu militias in the Kivus, and attempt to find durable solutions to dealing with their threat to regional security. One of the main obstacles with dealing with this group is that there is a dearth of accurate and clear knowledge about them. While I will discuss some creative ways to overcome the barriers to analysis that this access impasse presents, I will first outline what is known about this group, and the specific threats to security that they present.

The multifacted nature of the threat that Rwandan Hutus present may explain why they are widely misunderstood, and also accounts for the manifold nature of the attacks which have been launched against them. For the Rwandan government in Kigali, the Rwandan Hutu militants may provide a convenient excuse for continued Rwandan interference in the Congo, but they also represent a real threat to Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis, with many fearing that they may attempt to "finish off" the Genocide of 1994. However, while there is evidence of persecution of Congolese Tutsi by Rwandan Hutu, several commentators have argued that the actual strength of this threat against Rwanda has grown weaker, as the Kagame regime has grown stronger. Rafti describes Rwandan Hutu opposition to the Kagame regime as 'crumbling in exile' (Rafti, 2004-5). Indeed, Buzan and Wæver also note the strengthing of Tutsi Power in the region, arguing that since the end of the First Congo

War it has become 'common to refer to the "Tutsification" of Central Africa' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 245). The presence of Rwandan Hutus in the Congo can nonetheless be seen as a continuing threat to regional stability, and, although two large-scale wars have been launched by Rwanda to remove Rwandan Hutus from the Congo, the hardliners have remained. This thesis examines those hardliners – their aims and motivations, and what can be done to curb the threat that they pose. I will demonstrate in later chapters that although several reports suggest a decline in Rwandan Hutu militia figures, these reports obscure the true strength of the Rwandan Hutu Power movement.

The presence of Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo has been securitized as a key threat to the stability of both Rwanda and the Kivus. For the Rwandan regime in Kigali, led by President Paul Kagame, the Hutu armed groups in the Congo present a challenge to their political power, and the threat of a return to genocidal ideology in Rwanda. Kagame has in fact aimed to posit these Rwandan Hutu groups as being un-Rwandan, because they do not fit with his vision of Rwandan unity. In an interview with the BBC in July 2012, Kagame alluded to the Hutu armed groups in the Congo as being outsiders, describing them as people who 'have been connected with Rwanda's problems right from the beginning, even in history for many years. They have created these problems. These problems you saw relating to Genocide and many others are not inherently Rwandan, they come from outside' (Kagame, 2012). Kagame's claims that those Hutu groups in the Kivus have a connection to the genocide are not unfounded – certainly, there are *genocidaires* operating among Hutu groups in the Congo. Furthermore, groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) do advocate a strong anti-Tutsi, Hutu Power rhetoric. However, some other groups such as the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD-Urunana), simply call for an Inter-Rwandan dialogue, allowing Hutu groups more access to political power in Rwanda.

Despite some Hutu groups calling for peaceful negotiation, the Kagame regime has been extremely adept in using the threat of return to genocide as a justification for preventing this Inter-Rwandan Dialogue, and maintaining a monopoly over power in Rwanda. Indeed, Kagame has faced criticism from Rwandan opposition parties and the international community alike for his repression of political expression. In August 2010, the *Rwanda*

Briefing was published by several of Kagame's former allies[99] who had become disillusioned with the increasingly authoritarian character of the Rwandan government. The briefing acknowledges that 'All Rwandans, regardless of ethnicity, are victims of the authoritarian character of the government that rules Rwanda' (Nyamwasa, Karegeya, Rudsingwa, & Gahima, 2010). General Nyamwasa, for example, was shot in South Africa in June 2010, and claims that the attempt on his life was ordered by Kagame because he is a dissenter. However, the Briefing observes that the Hutu population is particularly discriminated against in Rwanda: 'The Tutsi are disproportionately represented in institutions of the state responsible for the coercive use of power. ... The perception of majority [*sic*] of the Hutu population is that the government is dominated by the Tutsi and that the government discriminates against them...Lack of space for political participation has disenfranchised the Hutu majority' (Nyamwasa, Karegeya, Rudsingwa, & Gahima, 2010, pp. 15-16). As I discuss later in the thesis, the marginalization of Hutu groups from the Rwandan political arena can explain a great deal about the nature of Rwanda Hutus' activities in the Kivus and why, despite many Rwandan Hutu groups harbouring a project of collective return to Rwanda, most Hutu hardliners have remained in exile in the Kivus for nearly two decades.

Indeed, the Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Kivus have, since their arrival *en masse* in 1994, largely confined their activities to the eastern Congo. Inhabiting the refugee camps of the eastern Congo, the first armed groups consisted primarily of ex-*genocidaires* seeking to regroups, remilitarize, and invade Rwanda in order to re-establish a Hutu Power regime there. Perhaps most prominent among them was the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) and its political wing, Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALiR). Although the leadership of ALiR was dominated by ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* members, it is nonetheless acknowledged that the group also contained members who had played no part in the genocide and were recruited from the eastern Congo refugee camps. For example, a report by the Rwandan Government notes: 'Most of the combatants were ex-FAR, reinforced by militiamen and refugees they had recruited in the camps' (Omaar, 2008, p. 40). In 1998 several skirmishes took place between the forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)[100] and ALiR in the Eastern Congo. Although there was a clear Hutu Power

[99] The *Rwanda Briefing* was written by four former members of the Kagame regime: General Kayumba Nyamwasa, former army chief of staff; Colonel Patrick Karegeya, former head of external security; Gerald Gahima, former prosecutor general; and Theodore Rudasingwa, former Rwandan ambassador to Washington

[100] The army of the Rwandan Patriotic Front who after the 1994 Genocide became the Tutsi-dominated regime in Rwanda.

dimension to ALiR, the RPA were also carrying out reprisal killings against Hutu civilians at this time. Furthermore, although ALiR sought publicity for itself through the kidnapping of foreigners, those who had been kidnapped were released, and appeared sympathetic to the ALiR cause. According to Filip Reyntjens in 1998: 'a Canadian nun recalled her "positive experience" at the hands of the group she described as "multi-ethnic", [and] desirous of obtaining "an equal place in society free from ethnic issues". Two weeks later, two Belgian missionaries were abducted and freed safe and sound on July 21' (Reyntjens, 1999, p. 10). Nonetheless, in addition to kidnapping, the group did carry out several other human rights atrocities, and in 1999 were placed on the US terror watchlist. Another group, the Republican Rally for Democracy in Rwanda (RDR), who are often conflated with ALiR as an ex-*genocidaire* group, were also added to the watchlist.

It is from the remnants of ALiR and the RDR that the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), who are the main focus of this thesis, formed in 1999. The activities of this group, and other Rwandan Hutu armed groups will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. However, it is useful to give a brief overview of some of the recent activities of these Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the in the Kivus, and the impact that this has had on Congolese conflict. In the First Congo War, Rwandan Hutus were used by President Mobutu to help combat the threat of Laurent Kabila's AFDL forces in eastern Congo. In the Second Congo War these groups (initially, ALiR, RDR and, when they disbanded, the FDLR) were then used by Kabila to combat the RCD rebellion, which was being supported by the Rwandan government, in the Kivus. When the Second Congo War ended, increased cooperation between the governments in Kigali and Kinshasa led to the Rwandan Hutu groups losing influence. Nonetheless, groups such as the FDLR remained armed and in need of security. Consequently, the Rwandan Hutu armed groups continue to fight against both Rwandan and Congolese government forces, as well as foreign and local armed militias, in the Kivus today. As the rest of this thesis will seek to demonstrate, Rwandan Hutu armed groups are an integral part of the Kivutian security predicament. Finding an equitable and sustainable solution to curbing their belligerency is therefore an essential element of any strategy of bringing peace to both Rwanda and the Congo.

For the Congolese, the threat posed by the Rwandan Hutus has several dimensions, which I will class as irredentist, exploitative, and intrusive. In terms of irredentism, I have already discussed the Congolese concern that the presence of Rwandan Hutus has been manipulated by the Rwandan government to justify interference in the country. But, there

is an equal concern that these Rwandan Hutus are themselves exploiting the country, reflecting a wider fear among the Congolese that 'Rwanda considers the Congolese Kivu region as a "natural" zone of expansion' (Reyntjens, 2001, p. 312). The exploitative threat that the Rwandan Hutus present can be linked to their belligerent and/or criminal actions in terms of their human rights abuses against Congolese civilians, exploitation of Congolese resource wealth, and continued militarization of the Kivus.[101] Although the data is incomplete, in 2009, 'the best available estimates were that the FDLR fully controlled up to six coltan mines (all in South Kivu) [and] one coltan mine was jointly controlled by FDLR and Maï-Maï forces (Ibanga mine, North Kivu)' (Nest, 2011, p. 93).

However, the Rwandan Hutu groups are not the only groups in the Kivus to engage in such exploitative activities which are very much a part of everyday survival in this area. As such, the final dimension of the Rwandan Hutu threat can be classed as intrusion upon the existing mechanisms that many local Congolese groups use to survive. In other words, by exploiting resources, the Rwandan Hutus are taking away from the pool of resources that are then available for Congolese groups to exploit. Eichstaedt suggests that some Congolese feel that the Rwandans are further exploiting the country by taking their minerals and exporting them as Rwandan "conflict-free" minerals. As one of Eichstaedt's informants notes: 'They say it is blood coltan [when it is in the Congo], but when it is in Rwanda, it is white' (Eichstaedt, 2011, p. 125). Even though equally exploitative forces have facilitated its extraction and trade, so-called "Rwandan" coltan – which often orginates from the Congo – has been marketed as "stigma-free" coltan and taken away from local Congolese miners' trade. Although it is not Rwandan Hutus who are primarily involved in this "stigma-cleansing process" they are contributing to Congolese coltan being branded as a conflict mineral in the first place, and are nonetheless Rwandan "invaders".

Similarly, in conditions where land rights are already highly contested, yet another settler group claiming that it deserves "a piece of the pie" makes the pie even more difficult to divide. It is because of the above mentioned threats that the Congolese government, Rwandan government and UN peacebuilding forces in the Congo (first under MONUC, and now under MONUSCO) have united since the end of the Second Congo War to try and remove the Rwandan Hutu groups from the Kivus. However, despite nearly a decade of

[101] These exploitative activities will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five when I analyse in more detail the specific activities of three particular militias containing Rwandan Hutus: the FDLR, RUD-Urunana, and the FLNK.

attempts to achieve this goal, Rwandan Hutu groups remain in the Congo, and continue to pose a significant obstacle to a sustainable peace. In the following chapters, I will move to demonstrate that much of this failure can be attributed to a lack of understanding about the nature of these groups, and the fact that the effectiveness of their methods of operating, and mechanisms for dealing with existential threats, have been underestimated.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that the wider patterns of patronage, pillage, external interference, and citizenship manipulation that have plagued the Congo as a whole are repeating themselves on the local scale in the Kivus. Not only do the Kivus represent a microcosm of the Congo's national and regional dynamics, but they can also be seen as the epicentre of these dynamics – the battlefield of national and regional (as well as local) tensions. I argue that the Kivus have become this epicentre of violence because of its borderzone location – agreeing with Lavie and Swedenburg that 'Borders are zones of loss, alienation, pain, death-spaces where formations of violence are continuously in the making' (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996, p. 15). In particular, the problems associated with migration, autochthony and citizenship in the African Great Lakes can be seen to play out most strongly in the Kivus, and this chapter has attempted to reflect that by examining how these issues have led to conflict in the Kivus. The uncertainty about citizenship and belonging in these provinces has manifested through a divide between perceived Rwandophone "settlers" and the seemingly "authentic Congophone locals". In this chapter, I have outlined the experience of both Tutsi and Hutu Rwandaphone groups in an attempt to demonstrate how, despite having almost diametrically oppposed ideological motivations, they have remarkably similar security concerns, and have followed comparable patterns of behaviour (a summary of Hutu and Tutsi mobilization in the Congo is provided Appendix A). In later chapters, I will return to this comparison in order to demonstrate how fractal self-similarity can be used as an analytical tool in this case.

It is clear that Tutsi armed groups in the Congo continue to be a source of threat to Congolese stability. However, given that several of these groups[102] have been involved in

[102] For example, the Tutsi armed group the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), led by Laurent Nkunda, was disbanded in 2009 and its soldiers integrated into the Congolese government forces. The success of this integration has been limited, and its former leader Bosco Ntaganda now leads a new rebel group – the March 23 Movement (M23). In 2012, the UN published a report accusing the Rwandan government of assisting the M23 and breaking military sanctions in

peace negotiations and been incorporated into the Congolese army, of arguably greater concern to the stability of the African Great Lakes is the question of what is to be done about the Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the region. Much of the current conflict in the Kivus is driven by the uncertainty surrounding Rwandan Hutu militants – who have been securitized as a threat to both Rwanda and the Congo, and who, in response to this securitization, have adopted increasingly belligerent survival mechanisms. Despite concerted attempts to remove the Rwandan Hutu threat in the Kivus, however, the hardliner Hutus (who are the main source of this threat) remain – and have demonstrated a resilience that has outlived both Mobutu and Laurent Kabila. I argue that the failure of moves to reduce the threat that Rwandan Hutus pose to regional stability can be attributed to a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of their motivations and means. This group have often been regarded as simply *genocidaires*, with criminal intentions and who advocate a genocidal ideology. However, I argue that this informs an extremely blinkered view of the security predicament facing many Rwandan Hutu militants operating in the Kivus, and obscures a multitude of beliefs, motivations, and survival mechanisms. I argue that a better understanding of this widely misunderstood, and notoriously elusive, group is the first step towards improving the thus-far unsuccessful methods used to curb their violent activities. The rest of this thesis, therefore, moves to better understand the Rwandan Hutu groups and, from this understanding, attempts to find some more effective and creative solutions for dealing with their threat. Accordingly, the next chapter begins by looking at the refuge experience of Rwandan Hutus in the DRC, and the impact that this may have to their security choices and subsequent decisions.

---

this respect (United Nations Security Council, 2012). Thus, although the integration of this Tutsi armed group into the Congolese army was not wholly successful, they continue to receive at least some support from the Rwandan government – whereas the Rwandan Hutu groups have been isolated from any government support in the African Great Lakes.

Chapter Three: Refugeeness and Warriorness

Refugee Warriors and their Challenge to Refugee Norms

'In law, a person may either be a refugee or a warrior, but he or she cannot be both. But law is one thing and practice is another'.[103]

Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, Rwandaphone migration to, and interference in, the Kivus stands out as particularly salient in contributing to the provinces' persistent and intractable conflicts. Indeed, much of the fighting in the Kivus in recent years has been focussed around Rwandaphone militant groups; from the "renegade" Tutsi officers of the CNDP, to the FDLR and their Hutu Power militancy. Although both Tutsi and Hutu armed groups in the Congo are largely disliked by the local Kivutian population (Thakur, 2008; Fessy & Doyle, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2009; BBC, 2010b), there is evidence that the Tutsi groups are receiving at least some support from the Rwandan government. For example, in 2012, the UN published a report which indicated that the Kigali government had been providing men and arms to the M23 rebel group led by Tutsi General Bosco Ntaganda. Although Rwandan assistance to this group has soured relations between Kinshasa and Kigali, the Rwandan and Congolese government had previously been working together to reduce violence in the Kivus. In this regard, many former Tutsi militants fighting in the Kivus were either repatriated to Rwanda or incorporated into the Congolese army. Although this did not completely solve the Tutsi security predicament (indeed, there is still much anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Congo), and several Tutsi-led militias remain active in the Kivus, it is arguably the Rwandan Hutu groups who pose the biggest obstacle to peace in the eastern Congo.

This sentiment is echoed in many policy reports on conflict in the Congo, with Rwandan Hutu groups often posited as the main cause of violence in the Kivus. In 2009, the

---

[103] (Adelman, 1998, p. 2)

International Crisis Group issued a report claiming that: 'The FDLR are the most powerful and harmful political-military rebel organisation in [the] Congo' (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 1). This assessment of their strength is not solely based on their genocidal ideology and belligerent activities in the Congo, but also takes into account the security threat they pose to Tutsi groups. Indeed, the belligerency of Tutsi groups is often seen as a response to Rwandan Hutu militancy. For example, Thakur argues that 'a number of Kinyarwandan Tutsi armed collectives have sprung up in the Kivus *in reaction* to the rise of the FDLR and anti-Tutsi sentiment' (Thakur, 2008, p. 59, emphasis added). Whether Tutsi militants have armed in response to Hutu militants, or *vice versa* – or even if these groups have taken up arms in order to protect themselves from the local Congolese population – remains to be determined. However, it is clear that the Tutsi armed groups are at the very least attempting to *justify* their belligerency in relation to Hutu violence. Furthermore, given that Hutu armed groups continue to play a key role in the perpetuation of violent conflict in the Kivus, it is clear that these groups need to be addressed, and their violent actions reduced. As I will detail and analyse in later chapters, attempts to reduce Rwandan Hutu groups' belligerency has largely failed. In this chapter, I argue that the failure of these measures can be attributed to a fundamental misunderstanding about their nature, and it is this nature which I will attempt to explore further.

Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the marginalization, exclusion and fear that the Rwandan Hutu groups in the Congo have experienced since 1994, and argues that the refugee nature of Rwandan Hutu militants has been largely overlooked. I suggest that, by overlooking the refugee nature of these groups, we risk ignoring a significant aspect of their identity which may determine their belligerency. Subsequently, I demonstrate why the attempts to reduce their threat, which have thus far been primarily about disarmament, may have failed. In the second section, I examine why the refugee nature of Rwandan Hutu groups has been largely overlooked, and attribute this to the fact that Rwandan Hutus in the Congo are not typical refugees. Although Rwandan Hutus are not 'conventional' refugees in need of humanitarian assistance, by denying them the refugee label we run the risk of forgetting their refugee experience, when devising methods of resolving conflict. As such, I put forward a polythetic approach to classifying refugees, which allows for a much wider range of people to be included under the label of "refugeeness", whilst still maintaining the humanitarian prerogative to only assist those refugees in need. In the third section, I argue that Rwandan Hutu militants in the Kivus may be considered refugee warriors – an approach I justify

through Kunz's push-pull paradigm. I conclude this chapter by arguing that much about the means and motivations of refugee warriors can be uncovered if we examine in more detail their experience of refuge, and the impact that this has on their identity. We therefore need to consider the nature of their "refugeeness" as playing a key role in their security decisions. Arguing that uncertainty about, and uncertainty facing, refugee warriors is at the heart of their warrior-like activities, this chapter sets the context for the following chapter in which I suggest a new method of dealing with the Rwanda Hutu refugee warriors[104] through an appreciation of their identity and, in turn, an understanding of the processes of their exile. Through this understanding, it is hoped that some of the uncertainty about them, which I argue has exacerbated their securitization, may be alleviated.

Refugees, Conventions and Securitizations

It is often expedient to strengthen one's arguments with observations from fieldwork, and perhaps with insights uncovered during interviews, but I would like to begin with the circumstances of an interview that did not take place. I scheduled an informal discussion with some UN workers[105] on the problem of the refugees fighting in the FLDR – which my research and fieldwork led me to believe was a Rwandan Hutu militia which consists of ex-*genocidaire* forces *and* Rwandan Hutu refugees who have been recruited into the force during their protracted stay in exile. However, at the beginning of this discussion I was told by a member of the group that the premise of my research was ultimately flawed, because there were no refugees in the FDLR. When I questioned whether or not members of the FDLR had fled from Rwanda to the Congo after the 1994 Genocide, I was told that they had, but that did not make them refugees, since they were wanted criminals, and that this – under the exclusion clause[106] of the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* – meant that they were categorically not refugees. Furthermore, he informed me, there was

[104] Having established that they are refugee warriors in this chapter, the rest of the thesis will refer to this group as "Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors" or "Hutu refugee warriors".

[105] I had arranged to informally meet a number of humanitarian personnel working in the Congo, in the hope that this would then lead to securing more official interviews. In this case, an interview was not secured with the member in question, in part because he did not regard any FDLR members as refugees. For this reason, I have kept the identity of the member private as he did not give consent for a formal interview. However, it is worth pointing out that the member I have referred to here did *not* work for UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).

[106] 'The *exclusion* clause ensures that serious criminals and persons whose actions have exhibited disregard for basic norms of human dignity cannot invoke international protection' (Hathaway, 1991: vii).

no conflict in Rwanda, so under the cessation clause[107] of the same *Convention*, they were also unable to claim that they were refugees. When I asked what they were, I was told that I could call them what I liked (he suggested criminal migrants), but I could not classify them as refugees. The refusal to accept the refugee nature of the FDLR, and the lack of clarity regarding an alternative term for them, is, therefore, the premise of this chapter.

I found three aspects of the characterization of this group as non-refugee problematic. Firstly, not all of the Rwandan Hutus in the FDLR are *genocidaires*, and not all of them are wanted for crimes in either the Congo or Rwanda. In 2008, for example, I carried out fieldwork in the Muhazi Child Rehabilitation Centre in Rwanda, where I met a number of Rwandan Hutu child soldiers who claimed to have been involved with the FDLR. The Rwandan government's willingness to rehabilitate and reintegrate these child soldiers was based on an acknowledgement that they were not responsible for genocidal crimes (even the oldest among them were only toddlers at the time of the 1994 Genocide). Furthermore, my own questioning of their activities whilst in the FDLR revealed overwhelmingly that these children were used as look-outs, and domestic servants (cooks, water-carriers, etc) for the actively engaged combatants – activities which can hardly be considered "crimes" in the Congo. However, even though these children had fled as refugees, and had not committed a crime, by association with the FDLR (which admittedly does contain wanted criminals) they lost their refugee status. It seems highly problematic that, although not all FDLR members should face exclusion, the presence of some who should be excluded in their ranks, disqualifies the entire group from being considered as refugees.

Some may argue that this discussion is academic, since although these child soldiers may not deserve exclusion, the fact that Rwanda is no longer in conflict means that under the cessation clause they still cannot be called refugees. However, my second problem with the denial of the refugee status for FDLR members is rooted in the nature of the cessation clause, and the designation of Rwanda as 'safe' (thus warranting the application of cessation). Since 2010, the Kagame government has requested that all Rwandan refugees exiled outside of Rwanda be denied refugee status under the cessation clause because 'of a

[107] The *cessation* clause of the Convention provides that refugee status is not warranted if the refugee can either reclaim the protection of her own state, or has secured an alternative form of enduring protection' (Hathaway, 1991, p. vii)

relatively stable political environment' (UNHCR, 2012) in Rwanda. 'UNHCR[108] is therefore working with all concerned parties with a view to the application of the cessation clauses by the end of June 2012' (*Ibid.*). Human rights groups, however, have argued that the blanket application of the cessation clause to Rwandan refugees is a mistake. Although Rwanda is not officially in conflict, dissent towards the Kagame regime is suppressed ruthlessly, with opposition leaders being imprisoned, and reports of dissidents activists and journalists being murdered in exile. The organization Reporters Without Borders has documented a number of restrictions on freedom of speech and civil liberties. Reporters Without Borders claim that: 'Even in exile, some refugees are in danger. Three Rwandan refugee journalists were the victims of a mysterious attack in the Ugandan capital of Kampala at the end of August. Another Rwandan journalist had a similar experience in Kampala a year ago. The assailants in both cases spoke Kinyarwanda. Dozens of people, including many journalists, will be endangered if governments and UNHCR withdraw the refugee status of Rwandan refugees and make them go back to Rwanda' (Reporters Without Borders, 2011). Indeed, many of the child soldiers I interviewed said that they had not returned to Rwanda earlier because they were led to believe that if they returned to Rwanda they would be jailed or killed for being Hutu.

While this fear is arguably more of a myth created by FDLR hardliners to keep their more moderate base in the Congo, it is nonetheless experienced as a "genuine risk" by many Rwandan Hutus exiled in the Congo. Indeed, while the fears of the child soldiers I interviewed turned out to be unfounded, this is not the case for many other Rwandan exiles, who face imprisonment if they return to Rwanda. In particular, many Hutus feel that the Kagame regime is dominated by Tutsis and that this reflects a very real horizontal inequality within the country. However, because Kagame's regime has outlawed the articulation of a Hutu/Tutsi division, publicly airing grievances over these inequalities is extremely risky. As Reporters Without Borders observe, 'you just have to be unfairly accused of "genocide denial" or "revisionism" and you go to jail' (Reporters Without Borders, 2011). Indeed, although retaliation for genocide against ordinary Hutus has not occurred, the fact that leaders of the opposition such as Victoire Ingabire have been jailed for highlighting Hutu grievances certainly gives those Hutus in exile the perception that a return to Rwanda would result in persecution.

[108] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Finally, given that they were originally given refugee status, it is difficult to track at exactly which point Rwandan Hutus lost their refugee status. If we track their refuge experience, then we can see a number of key events stand out. In the immediate aftermath of the Rwanda Genocide, the Rwandan Hutus who fled into Zaïre were regarded as refugees. However, two things happened which led to a loss of their refugee status. Firstly, *genocidaire* forces within the camps began to militarize the camps – resulting in one of the most highly-criticised humanitarian operations in recent history. Several reports at the time suggested that the refugee camps, especially the camps in North Kivu's capital Goma, were being run by Rwandan *genocidaires* – who were using humanitarian assistance to reassemble and rearm their militias. The second factor therefore is linked to the first, as the international community 'came to see eastern Zaïre through the deceptive lens of moral sympathy with the RPF-led regime in Kigali' (Gowing, 1998, p. 41). The corollary of this was the assignation of collective guilt to those in the refugee camps. Consequently, the perception that refugees who remained in the camps were collectively guilty was made palpable to them. Pottier describes the provision of inappropriate and inferior food by the World Food Programme (WFP) in the Goma refugee camps as 'the clearest sign that they [the Rwandan refugees] were treated as a mass of undifferentiated, unworthy people.' (Pottier, 2002, p. 143).

In 1996, the WFP reported that the markets in four eastern Zaïrean refugee camps had been closed, after bans were placed on refugees' economic activity. It was observed that 'the continued restriction on economic activities in conjunction with anecdotal reports of malnutrition related mortality in Mugunga camp indicate that the nutritional situation of this refugee population may be deteriorating and needs to be closely monitored.' (Refugee Nutrition Information System, 1996, p. 10). A similar assessment was made of Rwandan Hutu refugees in Tanzania, while the nutritional needs of Rwandan (Tutsi) refugees in Uganda were being adequately met (Refugee Nutrition Information System, 1996, p. 11). Indeed, the Rwandan politician Seth Kamanzi hailed the Rwandan refugee crisis in the Congo as being over in November 1996 – describing it as 'a magnificent Christmas gift' (Pottier, 1998, p. 151). As such, it appears that the petering out of political will to assist the Rwandan Hutus, coupled with the assertion by the new regime in Kigali that the refugee crisis was over, led to the revocation of their refugee status, even though many of the Rwandans who were left in the Congo may have themselves remained fearful of return to Rwanda and not felt any real change in their situation.

It was noteworthy that the UN member I spoke to invoked the exclusion and cessation clause of the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,* as this provides an extremely narrow definition of who can and cannot be considered a refugee, and is not usually the basis of mandates for refugee protection in Africa.[109] However, applying such a narrow definition justified, to the UN worker I interviewed at least, the belief that Rwandan Hutu groups such as the FDLR should under no circumstance be considered refugees. Although this justification does not necessarily reflect the wider views of the UN in the Congo, it may explain why, up until the point of writing, moves to reduce the threat of Rwandan Hutu militants have been dominated by military attempts to disarm them. In Chapter Five, I will discuss the most prominent of these military operations, *Kimia II* and Operation *Umoja Wetu*. Suffice it to say that both operations involved forces consisting of UN, Congolese and Rwandan military personnel working in tandem to disarm FDLR forces who, on paper at least, had inferior military capability and numbers. Despite this, both operations have proved fairly unsuccessful as the FDLR threat remains. *Umoja Wetu* and *Kimia II* call into question the suggestion that local complexities in the eastern Congo have been ignored (Autesserre, 2006; 2010; 2012). Rather, I would suggest that peacebuilders in the Congo have attempted to engage with local-level actors, but simply misunderstood the nature of actors such as the FDLR. This misunderstanding has led to a primarily military, rather than political, approach to dealing with these groups. Arguing that militancy breed militancy, I suggest that the continued belligerency of Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo can be attributed to the fact that military operations against them challenge their existential security. These Rwandan Hutu groups have had a harrowing refuge experience in which they fear return to Rwanda, and have no formal rights in the Congo. Occupying an uncertain and contested space in the Kivu provinces, these Rwandan Hutu groups are literally on the periphery of Rwandan and Congolese political life, and see belligerency as a key to their survival. Understanding the threats to their survival is therefore an essential element of understanding the nature of their belligerency.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the extent to which we need to appreciate the impact of these armed groups' refugee identity on the security choices that they face everyday. However, it is necessary to clarify that my aim in this chapter is *not* to assert that Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo should be awarded official refugee status.

---

[109] Indeed, *The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa* (1969) is widely regarded as a more appropriate guideline for refugee protection in Africa.

Indeed, the award of *UN Convention* refugee status would afford rights and protections to groups like the FDLR that they do not necessarily deserve. Indeed, the exact criteria for who can and cannot be given refugee status under the *UN Convention* has been very carefully determined, and several problems would arise if the Convention status was granted to groups like the FDLR. The Convention posits refugees as essentially apolitical and vicitimized subjects, which serves a number of significant purposes. Firstly, the humanitarian imperative to provide assistance to refugees is predicated on the assumption that they are people *in need*. The suggestions that certain refugees can, and indeed may want to, act for themselves would reduce the political will to provide assistance, which in turn would compromise UNHCR's mandate. Secondly, UNHCR's operations rely on the cooperation of host countries to accept refugee populations within their borders. As it stands, refugee flows often bring with them a number of risk factors – such as disease and environmental degradation – of which host countries generally bear the brunt. The suggestion that the refugee populations they are being burdened with are anything other than helpless victims of circumstance would certainly reduce host countries' willingness to take on refugees (and the considerable risks that they bring). Furthermore, by taking on apolitical refugees, host countries are only fulfilling a humanitarian imperative to help people in need. If hosts were seen to be willingly providing refuge to refugee populations which displayed political agency – some of whom may be terrorists, members of rebel militias, or wanted criminals in their sending countries – their hospitality may be construed as an act of aggression against the government of the sending country. This would have considerable international relations repercussions which the host country is unlikely to want to risk. The practical running of many UNHCR operations – which often rely on the help of host countries who face a number of political and developmental issues themselves – requires that, even if there is an acknowledgement that these refugees may have had a political past, their political activities must be restricted whilst they are in exile.

Of course, the framing of refugees in terms of victimhood can be seen to justify the humanitarian approach. Indeed, as Zetter observes: 'Within the repertoire of humanitarian concern, refugees now constitute one of the most powerful labels' (Zetter, 1991, p. 39). It has been argued by several theorists that the external imposition of a refugee label on a certain group of people can be used to reinforce certain institutional values and policy programmes (see Wood, 1985; Zetter, 1991; Haddad, 2008). A wealth of international and national institutions, NGOs and charities have developed around a convenient label of "refugee" and a 'stereotyped identity with a categorical prescription of assumed needs'

(Zetter, 1991, p. 44). As Haddad has suggested, labelling refugees in this way has been used as a tool for both attracting aid to refugees and granting legitimacy to the bureaucratic practices and organizations which deal with them. 'Hence the victim-like definition is necessary for the survival of the concept in theory and the survival of the individual in practice' (Haddad, 2008, p. 35). Indeed, in recent years, we have seen a movement away from the image of the heroic male dissident refugee (which dominated much of the Cold War framing of the refugee) to a move towards the use of the female pronoun when discussing refugees. While some may posit the logic behind framing the refugee as female as located in the fact that 'refugee women and girls constitutes the majority of the world refugee populations, and that many of them are exposed to special problems in the international protection field' (Executive Committee of the UNHCR, 1985: Conclusion No. 39), others may take a more cynical approach in arguing that 'the main purpose of any definition or description of the class of refugees is to facilitate, and to justify, aid and protection' (Goodwin-Gill, 2007, p. 2). Certainly, by rendering the refugee in the female voice, images of victimhood and entitlement to protection and aid are reinforced.

However, as the "heroic dissidents" of the Cold War, Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, Rwandan refugees in the Kivus, and many other groups who are active in exile demonstrate, the *Convention* understanding of refugees only represents a very narrow range of refugee experience. While this understanding was used to dismiss the basis of my research during interviews, I believe that ignoring these non-conventional types of refugees and their experiences is detrimental to conflict analysis. Indeed, I argue that if Rwandan Hutus in the Congo believe themselves to be refugees, we should accept that those who perceive themselves to be refugees are as they say they are. From their own self-identification, we should move to discern which criteria leads them to believe themselves thus. Indeed, during my interviews with former members of the FDLR, some described themselves as former 'refugees in the Congo', and groups such as RUD-Urunana describe the existence of a Rwandan refugee problem in the eastern DRC. In this regard, they argue that 'the most urgent action [for peace in the African Great Lakes] is for the UN Secretary General to appoint without delay a Special Representative for Rwandan refugees in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, as this constitutes the best way towards a timely and durable resolution of the impasse' (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 3). Given that these groups see themselves as refugees, I suggest that from a conflict analysis point of view at least, their refugee nature needs to be taken into account.

"Refugeeness" and Conflict Analysis: The Polythetic Classification

As demonstrated above, there are salient reasons as to why refugee protection agencies adopt a narrow approach to refugee classification. Indeed, the humanitarian imperative that such an approach maintains is essential to the survival of the international refugee regime. However, from a conflict analysis point of view, to consider only those who conform to standard notions of victimization and passivity as refugees would be to overlook the very real, and often extremely significant, impact that refugee populations have on conflict. As such, it is necessary to take a broader approach to understanding refugees in conflict – beginning firstly with a classification system which allows a wider range of refugee experience to be considered. In this regard, I suggest taking a polythetic approach to understanding refugees in conflict analysis. The polythetic approach to classification posits a number of characteristics as constituting a category or genre, in which members of that category may possess several of those characteristics, but not all of the characteristics, and do not necessarily have to have the same characteristics in common. Whereas monothetic classifications provide a single set of criteria which all members of a category must possess in order to be included, a polythetic classification uses several possible criteria; 'single features being neither essential to group membership nor sufficient to allocate an item to a group' (Ellen, 2006, p. 33). Some characteristics might render a member of a category more typical than others (Ellen uses the example of "bird" in which, due to its possession of a number of features, such as its ability to fly for instance, a wren may be considered a more 'typical' bird than an ostrich). In each class there might therefore be an archetypal core who possess several of the features commonly associated with the class, and also peripheral members who may possess fewer of the features, or only some of the less salient features, yet can nonetheless be incorporated into that category by virtue of this possession. In this way, we can begin to build up a category of '"refugeeness" [which] touches on all the various "ensembles" of human life' (Nyers, 2006, p. xv). By choosing to classify in this way we can build up a Venn diagram of sets and sub-sets in which, as well as appreciating differences between categories we can see differences between core and periphery, and similarities between [usually peripheral] actors of different sets.

Often refugee status is regarded in relation to citizen status creating an 'Us/Them' dichotomy between refugee and citizen. Nyers go as far as to argue that 'Refugee identity is a limit-concept of modern accounts of the political and is constituted through an

exceptional logic: whatever qualities are present for the citizen are notably absent for the refugee' (Nyers, 2006, pp. xiv-xv). Although this is perhaps presenting the distinction too starkly, refugees are by definition people without citizenship. However, as I will demonstrate in Chapters Five and Six, although denied access to formal citizenship in the Congo, the Rwandan Hutu groups are engaging with informal types of citizenship in circumstances in which the state is notably absent. This presents an analytical problem: how do we deal with actors who, although not formal citizens, display qualities of citizenship? Ellen (2006) argues that rather than viewing something as either *x* or *y* (in this case, as either refugee or citizen) a polythetic approach encourages us to see a more gradual distinction; *more x* than *y* (or *vice versa*). We therefore, do not limit ourselves by providing only mutually exclusive categorisations. 'The idea of gradation eliminates distinct boundaries and has been suitably termed "fuzziness"' (Ellen, 2006, p. 49). This classification allows us to account for the variation *within* a category, without necessarily having to render categories too narrow. This may allow us to overcome some of the methodological difficulties that the ambiguous role of refugees present. For example, Malkki (1995) notes in her ethnography of Hutu refugees in Tanzania two sub-sets of refugees, in township and camp settings. While monothetic classifications (e.g. the criteria that they were of Hutu origin and had settled in Tanzania) would homogenise this group, Malkki's study 'revealed radical differences in the meanings that people ascribed to national identity and history, to notions of home and homeland, and to exile as a collectively experienced condition' (Malkki, 1995, p. 2) between the two sub-sets. By applying a polythetic classification, we may encircle both sub-sets within the overriding category of Hutu refugee in Tanzania, but appreciate (and represent) that they also have differing contextual characteristics. By representing this as a Venn diagram, we can also show the possible similarities certain sub-sets share with other over-arching categories (for example, town refugees had assimilated identities which were influenced by the host townships).

We build up, therefore, a category not of refugee, but of "refugeeness" in which a variety of actors may coexist, and their multiplicity still be acknowledged. To elucidate this conception further, I suggest a scenario in which there are three actors who all may be considered refugees (because they possess one or more of the criteria that Hathaway posits as constituting the refugee character, which I will discuss later). As illustrated in Figure 3 below, we may suppose a scenario involving three different types of Rwandan refugee – all of whom have been present in the Congo at some period in history. Actor A in this scenario is a Rwandan ex-*genocidaire* who fled to the DRC in the aftermath of the

Rwandan genocide. Actor A fled across the borders, has a well-founded fear of returning to Rwanda as he will face retribution for his crimes. He fears extreme persecution as he is critical of the Kagame regime, does not believe that return to Rwanda whilst a Tutsi regime is in place is a safe option, and knows that dissenters towards the Kagame regime within Rwanda are often jailed. Actor A possesses all the traits required for being a refugee, except that as a *genocidaire*, he has committed a crime (and therefore exclusion applies). By contrast, Actor B possesses all the traits Hathaway associates with being a refugee, except that the cessation of a genocidal regime in Rwanda means that he can safely return. Actor B is represented here by a Rwandan Tutsi who fled to the DRC to avoid persecution in the 1960s, after the post-independence Hutu regime began persecuting Tutsi, and remained a refugee in Zaïre until 1994. Actor B had the status of a "conventional" refugee until 1994, when he possessed all of the traits Hathaway identifies. After 1994, however, when the genocidal regime is overthrown and the Tutsi-led regime is installed, Actor B loses all the qualities of "refugeeness" – demonstrating the ephemerality of the category. The temporary nature of "refugeeness" is significant, as changes in both external and personal circumstances can lead to the loss of refugee characteristics. Even so, the memory of refuge (which I term the "once-exiled consciousness") can play a significant role in a group's security decisions. For example, the strength of the Tutsi regime in Kigali no doubt reflects the fear those in power have of a return to Tutsi persecution. This fear is connected to the very real memory of being forced to flee Rwanda between the 1960s and 1990s. Consequently, Actor B may no longer be a refugee, but their refuge experience is nonetheless significant. Finally, Actor C reflects the protracted nature of Rwandan refuge in the Congo, as demonstrated by a second generation Rwandan Hutu refugee born in the Congo, who fears persecution if they return to Rwanda. Actor C represents a refugee such as the FDLR child soldiers who act as domestic servants and look-outs, who do not qualify for exclusion because they have not engaged in serious crimes in the Congo.

	Fled across international borders	Has well-founded fear in sending country	Face(d) persecution in sending country	Persecution is/was linked to social or political status	Conditions in sending country does not allow safe return (no cessation)	Has not committed crime or human rights abuses (no exclusion)
Genocidaire who fled to DRC post-1994 (Actor A)	*	*	*	*	*	–
Tutsi refugee who fled to DRC in 1960s and remained until 1994 (Actor B)	Before 1994 * After 1994 –	Before 1994 * After 1994 –	Before 1994 * After 1994 –	Before 1994 * After 1994 –	Before 1994 * After 1994 –	Before 1994 * After 1994 –
2nd generation Rwandan Hutu refugee in DRC (Actor C)	–	* (although this fear may be based on scare-propaganda more than hard evidence of persecution)[110]	*[111]	*	–	*

Figure 3: Three Refugee Actors in the Polythetic Classification

[110] I have chosen to categorise this as a well-founded fear given the reports which indicate that those who oppose the Kagame regime have faced imprisonment, exile and repression (Reporters Without Borders, 2011).

[111] *The Rwanda Briefing*, written by Kagame's former allies, claims that 'the majority Hutu population inside Rwanda feel marginalised and excluded by the government, and they question the legitimacy of the government' (Nyamwasa, Karegeya, Rudsingwa, & Gahima, 2010, p. 16). They also claim a high level of state repression, suggesting that 'Some in the [Rwandan] security services have a licence to kill and maim innocent citizens or to make them disappear without a trace' (Nyamwasa, Karegeya, Rudsingwa, & Gahima, 2010, p. 18). Regardless of whether these claims are true, they are certainly believed by many Rwandan Hutus who chose to remain in the Congo. As such, I have chosen to mark both boxes, 'well-founded fear in sending country' and 'face(d) persecution in sending country', as present criteria in the case of Actor C.

All three actors are considered to possess significant aspects of "refugeeness". *Not* possessing one of Hathaway's criteria is insufficient to exclude them. Interestingly, Actors A and C do not share all traits in common, and share more traits in common with Actor B before 1994 than with each other, yet they are often seen as falling within the same category of Rwandan Hutu refugee (and are often perceived as collectively guilty of war crimes), whilst the Tutsi refugees of the 1960s (Actor B) are generally seen as being of a different refugee-type. What the table above demonstrates is that all three actors possess characteristics which are deemed to be attributed to a sense of "refugeeness". We can therefore simultaneously see, in this classification, how Actors A, B and C may come to occupy the same category. Unlike monothetic classification, the polythetic approach does not posit a classification as being somehow composed of its constituent parts; possession of the criterion of flight across borders is insufficient to make one a refugee (for example, a criminal – whose crimes have no social or political dimension and who has fled across a border from the police – may not be considered a refugee). Similarly just because a refugee has not made the journey across international borders him/herself, also means that they cannot be excluded as a refugee actor. Because of this, we can regard the descendants of both Rwandan Tutsi and Hutu refugees who are still present in the Congo as being stateless refugees – as they do not possess citizenship rights in either Rwanda or the Congo, and fear persecution in their sending country.[112]

While no criterion can necessarily exclude an actor from entering a category, the relationship between criteria is necessarily hierarchical. Before 1994, Actor B possessed all of the criteria most associated with the archetypal conception of the refugee, Actor B may therefore be seen as representative of a core category of refugee (a "typical" refugee), whereas Actors A and C may be seen to occupy the periphery of the category, because they do not possess every characteristic. In Figure 4, below, I have represented a small sample of actors in the Kivus who have had some refuge experience. However, the UNHCR only recognize the Sudanese refugees in the Kivus and the Kivutian refugees in camps in Rwanda and Uganda as refugees – typical refugees who occupy the core of the category. Quite close to the core are Rwandan and Burundian asylum seekers, who believe themselves to have the qualities of a typical refugee, but who are yet to be granted this status. Of course the Kivutian internally displaced persons (IDP) are not classed as refugees because they are

[112] This idea is perhaps best represented by drawing parallels with Palestinian refugees, and their descendants, in protracted refugee situations (such as Palestinian refugees in Jordanian refugee camps who have been present since 1948).

encompassed by a separate category of IDP for operationalization reasons. However, for analytical reasons it may be helpful to consider the nature of their refuge experience; thus I have included them within this wider classification of "refugeeness" on the periphery. Also on the periphery are Rwandans who have been displaced into the Congo (and who under the cessation clause will not qualify for refugee status). While Rwandan dissidents and non-combatants may be closer to the core of the category, as the exclusion clause does not apply to them, Hutu militants who are excluded can also be included in the category, albeit further out on the periphery.



Figure 4: Core-Periphery representation of groups with refuge experience relating to the Kivus[113]

Core-periphery relations are also useful if we are trying to demonstrate similarities, as well as differences, between categories. In Figure 5, the two categories represented – "refugee" and "host" – overlap. Building on Malkki's (1995) earlier distinction between camp and town refugees, camp refugees may be classified as occupying the core of the refugee category, and the town refugees as occupying the periphery of both the refugee and host category. This representation helps us understand Malkki's observations that 'the camp refugees perpetuated and reified the very categorical order in terms of which they were displaced, while the town refugees' lives seemed to have the effect of challenging and

[113] The sub-categories which I have shaded in grey I categorize as "Refugee Warriors" and will discuss this in more detail in the next section.

dissolving totalizing, essentializing categories' (Malkki, 1995, p. 4). In this sense the camp refugees perpetuated the notion of a "typical" refugee community by remaining in camps insulated from the outside world, whilst the town refugees, by virtue of assimilating with their hosts took on a new identity which incorporated elements of both "refugeeness" and "hostness".



Figure 5: Venn Diagram illustrating the overlap between refugee and host communities

Given that the polythetic classification allows us to account for the plethora of refugee experiences, I now wish to suggest some of the general criteria that those wishing to posit themselves as refugees may possess. Some effort will be made to examine the variation within these criteria which lead to the generation of the sub-sets, by looking more closely at some of the criteria associated with "refugeeness". It should be reiterated, once again, that possession of any single criteria does not automatically include an actor into the refugee categorisation and similarly the absence of any particular criteria is not sufficient to deny any actor entry into "refugeeness" – in other words I argue that there is no element which is *sine qua non* to the category of "refugeeness". Ultimately, the decision as to who does or does not belong within the "refugeeness" category rests with the researcher, but it should certainly take into account the views of the actors the research is focussed on. Furthermore, the onus is on the researcher to justify *why* he or she has chosen to classify his/her subjects as belonging within the "refugeeness" category. In this regard, I have outlined below a sample of criteria which may assist the researcher in deciding whether or not they may want to consider their subjects as belonging to the "refugeeness" grouping. I would, nonetheless, qualify that the criteria suggested below are what I deem to be some of the most prominent characteristics of "refugeeness", and characteristics which I would

argue occupy the upper echelons of the criteria hierarchy. It is not, however, an exhaustive list. As new refugee situations emerge and the international system within which refugees operate evolves, it is subject to change.

I take as the departure point for the establishment of a set of criteria Kuhlman's sociological label of refugees as 'involuntary international migrants' (Kuhlman, 1991). This establishes the first criteria that may be incorporated into a classification of "refugeeness": *flight across international borders.* The cross-border element of the classification may help to distinguish refugees from internally displaced persons [IDPs] – although we can argue that IDPs are simply refugees for whom this particular criterion is absent. Kuhlman's definition emphasizes the *forced nature of refugee migration*, and it is here that we can draw upon Kunz's push/pull paradigm – the motivating factors for refugee migration are not the pull factors which draw refugees to their host countries but the push factors which force them from their country of origin. As Kuhlman puts it, for refugees 'it is not some paradise at the other end which they seek, but merely an escape from the hell in which they live' (Kuhlman, 1991, p. 8). These push factors can also be examined in the case of refugees who did not flee across borders themselves. This is perhaps best demonstrated in the case of second and third generation Palestinian refugees who cannot return to Palestine (see Rabinowitz, 2010). There are, as argued earlier, degrees of push factors which need to be represented in the classification; I suggest that we cannot establish an objective standard by which to assess "genuine" risk (or attempt to scientifically measure the extent of that risk). As Haddad observes 'push and pull factors cannot be observed in isolation; rather it is the perceived difference between the place of origin and the place of destination that counts' (Haddad, 2008, p. 29). Here we can observe the utility of the sliding scale in the polythetical classification: If we posit another criteria of the classification as being *fear of being harmed if remaining in their sending country*, we can utilise the sliding scale by asking refugee actors to rate their fear (with the maximum score being awarded to anyone who feared certain and imminent death). The point here is not to assess whether or not harm is actually likely, but rather the degree to which the fear and perception of such harm is present, and what perceived justifications there are for this fear.[114]

[114] Justifications can range from having been personally threatened with harm or attacked, to having family/friends who have been attacked, to as little as anecdotes about people who were attacked – provided that these anecdotes are genuinely believed by those who claim they are in danger.

Sub-sets could then be established if we include in the classification criteria relating to the nature of the fear. Shacknove suggests that there are three broad categories under which fear may induce refugee flight – *persecution in the sending country; inability of the sending country to provide vital (economic) subsistence;* and *natural calamities in the sending country* (Shacknove, 1985, p. 278). As the OAU definition highlights, those facing *conflict in the sending country* should also qualify as a factor generating sufficient fear to cause refugee flight. The criteria outlined above may help us to establish some sub-sets of refugees. These sub-sets are themselves not distinct categorisations and it is possible that a single refugee could simultaneously belong to more than one sub-set. Kunz suggests that refugees should also be defined by 'the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere' (Kunz, 1973, p. 130). Kunz argues that this reluctance to uproot 'characterises all refugee decisions' (Kunz, 1973, p. 130). However, I would refute the accuracy of this observation. Certainly, a *degree of reluctance to uproot* and leave the sending country is a likely criterion, but all refugees ulitmately accept the (often painful) necessity of uprooting, or else the flight would not take place – and some refugees may potentially class themselves as *willing* to leave. This is why the criterion has been posited as a *degree of reluctance to uproot* in my classification.

More recent sociological definitions of the refugee seem to emphasize their *"outsider" status* (see Nyer, 2006; Haddad, 2008). 'As an object of classification, the refugee is trapped within the relation of the exception' (Nyers, 2006, p. xiii). Here, Nyers is drawing from Agamben's logic to argue that the refugee is 'included solely through its exclusion' (see Agamben discussed in Nyers, 2006, p. xiii). Again, there will be actors who do not possess these qualities and, as I will discuss in the following section, there are sub-sets of refugees who do in fact seek to challenge and avoid these criteria by finding alternative mechanisms to exercise political agency. Even refugees who may be considered speechless, invisible and/or passive cannot be said to wholly or absolutely possess such qualities: 'After all, the dynamics of presence-absence, inside-outside, included-excluded are never perfectly asymmetrical or consistent. The contingencies of political life are far too messy and uncertain to allow for such an eventuality' (Nyers, 2006, p. xiii).

Outsider status may be reinforced through the existence of other criteria – for example habitation in a refugee camp. This criterion is not essential to being a refugee but it can be argued that the "typical" image of the refugee conjures up notions of refugee camps set up along borders. This image of the refugee as occupying peripheral space – quite literally –

reinforces the image of the refugee as an outsider. This brings with it, as corollaries, a number of other qualities which we might consider to be tangential- or sub-qualities of "refugeeness". Although I have not included violence as a defining characteristic of refugees *per se,* the potential for violence, or the occupation of a site of potential violence, which both refugee camps and border-zones present may help explain why certain refugee groups become securitized. Refugees who are threatened in this way may view their refugee status as being only temporary in nature, and, like many other refugee groups, may express a desire to eventually return home. Of course refugee-camp refugees are only one sub-set of refugees and may be compared to "town refugees" who may seek to challenge their outsider status by, for example, assimilation into their host community. If these town refugees come to view their habitation in the host community as something more permanent, they may become a refugee diaspora – which can arguably be defined by a dual loyalty to both sending and receiving countries (see Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996).

The final set of criteria, which I seek to elucidate in the classification system, pertains to legal protection. Although I have earlier sought to repudiate claims that protection should be the sole (or at least ultimate) purpose of the refugee label, legal entitlement and protection is nonetheless an important part of both the identity of the refugee and external perceptions of the refugee. Following Hathaway (1991), refugees can be legally categorised according to their possession of certain legal entitlements, of which they may be protected under one, several or none of the following: *UNHCR support under the 1957 Convention and Protocol; protection by some other regional arrangement* (e.g. 1969 OAU Convention, 1985 Cartagena Declaration); or *protection 'as stipulated in the national legislation of the asylum state'* (Hathaway, 1991, p. 27 *italics added*). If they are insufficiently protected by the former conventions, they can turn to international human rights law. Here the importance of the non-exclusive nature of the polythetic classification is particularly pertinent; there are, of course, a large class of refugees who are not formally legally acknowledged, and consequently have no legal entitlement to protection. This, however, is insufficient to negate their refugee status. If they possess a suitable number[115] of the other criteria in the classification system they can nonetheless be deemed refugees. As the FDLR demonstrate not all refugees are victims (or only victims). The polythetic classification system therefore seeks to avoid the practice of denying certain groups refugee status so as to evade the responsibility to protect them. My argument is not one which calls for the

[115] Again what constitutes a 'suitable number' is left largely to the researcher to determine.

granting of *UN Convention* Refugee Status to belligerent refugees like the Rwandan militants in the FDLR (which would entitle them to rights that they arguably do not deserve). Rather, it is one which calls for us to understand that these militants are still refugees, and that we need to understand the impact of their refugee identity on the security choices that they face. Nyers argues that 'The prevailing attitude in conventional analyses of refugee movements is one that provides no place for refugees to articulate their experiences and struggles or to assert their (often collectively conceived) political agency' (Nyers, 2006, p. xiv). In the final section of this chapter, therefore, I move to discuss a particular category of refugees – refugee warriors; those refugee communities who assert political agency through belligerent action.

Refugee Warriors: Escaping the State of Exception

The term "refugee warriors" was coined by Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo in *Escape from Violence* in order to describe refugees who are 'not merely a passive group of dependent refugees but represent highly conscious refugee communities with a political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for political objective' (Zolberg, Surhke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 175). Some scholars may dismiss the notion of refugee warriors as outdated, and there are concerns with this label which we need to be aware of. Indeed, labeling this group as both refugee (which suggests victimization and the need for assistance) and warrior (which suggests belligerency and may conjure up notions of primitiveness), does run the risk of alienating both those who feel that this group are undeserving of assistance *and* those who feel that they are unfairly maligned. However, if we argue that the term refugee warrior is more than just the sum of its parts, then we can see why it can be an appropriate term to apply to the Rwandan Hutu militant groups that I examine. My argument is predicated on the assertion that, in order to understand this group adequately, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on their refuge situation, and therefore the label given to them needs to acknowledge their "refugeeness" *in addition* to their belligerent character, and understand the reciprocal relationship between these two. I suggest that the term refugee warrior reflects both of these aspects of their nature, and allows us to analyze these two elements in tandem in order to better understand their security dilemmas, motivations and choices. Understanding this, I argue, will provide us with the important first step towards improving measures to deal with this group and

reduce their violence. In his much-cited article 'Why Refugee Warriors are Threats,' Howard Adelman outlines four preconditions determining whether or not a person may be considered as belonging to a refugee warrior community:

> 'The preconditions for being a member of a refugee warrior community are: first, the person is a refugee in the sense that the person, or that person's parents or even grandparents (the person who is a refugee warrior need not have been a citizen in the country against whose regime the war is waged), fled the geographical territory of a home land; second, that person uses violent means aimed at overthrowing the regime in power; third, the base for waging the violent conflict is normally located in refugee communities in a neighbouring state; and, fourth, the refugees are not fighting on behalf of their host state as surrogates of that state' (Adelman, 1998, p. 50)

Adelman's classification has been widely accepted and, given its compatibility with Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo's definition of refugee warriors, the two works 'have become widely cited reference points in academic discussions about the refugee warrior phenomenon'. (Nyers, 2006, p. 103) However, I would suggest this categorization is slightly too narrow, in that it takes a "typical" community of refugees and militarizes them in relation to their sending state. Refugee warriors may represent a broader category of refugees, and their militant actions do not have to be confined to "overthrowing the regime in power". Furthermore refugee communities who have been used for "fighting on behalf of their host state" may also be considered refugee warrior communities, as this may be part of their wider quest 'to secure a "human security" that does not trap them within the false options of "victim" or "criminal"' (Nyers, 2006, p. 101).

The case of Rwandan refugee warrior communities displaced in the African Great Lakes may better illustrate my point. When Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo introduced the concept of the refugee warrior, they took as their archetype the Rwandan Tutsi refugees who had been displaced in Uganda since the 1960s and were recruited in the 1980s to Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/NRA) in order to overthrow Milton Obote. According to Adelman's classification, these Rwandan Tutsi would not qualify as refugee warriors because they were technically fighting on behalf of the host state – admittedly initially to overthrow the Obote regime, although once it was overthrown they were fighting on behalf of the Museveni regime. But to classify the Rwandan Tutsis in the NRA as "fighting on behalf of the host" overlooks the role that their involvement in the NRA played in helping them achieve their own political objectives. After all, members of this

community, such as Fred Rwigema and Paul Kagame, used the military experience they gained in Uganda to form the Rwandan Patriotic Army/Front (RPA/RPF) and invade Rwanda in 1990. In doing so, this group of Rwandan Tutsi refugees transformed from a refugee group exiled in Uganda, to a refugee warrior community used to bring about regime change in Uganda, to an invading force in Rwanda, to finally constitute a regime in Rwanda that has lasted for nearly two decades. Similarly, we can argue that Rwandan Hutu militants in the Congo are operating in a manner which is conducive to both their short-term survival, and their long-term goals of accessing power and resources. Between 1994 and 1996, these Hutu militants can be seen as 'typical' refugee warriors – who operated inside the eastern Zaïrean refugee camps, and through violent means attempted to overthrow the new RPF-led regime in Rwanda. However, when the refugee camps closed in 1996, and the First Congo War began, these militants remained refugee warriors, but became a refugee warrior community of a slightly different character. Used by Mobutu to defend the eastern Congo from the ADFL rebellion, and again by Kabila against the RCD in the Second Congo War, it is tempting to view these Rwandan Hutus as "proxy forces for their host state" rather than refugee warriors. However, I argue that this understanding obscures the fact that refugee warriors can be *both* proxy forces and in pursuit of their own objectives. Certainly in both instances of their mobilization by Zaïrean/Congolese government forces in the First and Second Congo War, Rwandan Hutu militants were not operating unselfishly. Rather, they were using the support of the Zaïrean/Congolese regime to pursue their own agenda of reducing the Rwandan regime's influence and interference in the Kivus, as well as furthering their anti-Tutsi campaign against Congolese Tutsi groups.

Thus, I suggest that the militant Rwandan Hutu groups within the Kivus may be considered as refugee warriors who engage in political violence for their own objectives, even though the methods through which they achieve these objectives may have evolved over time. Further compounding the argument for their refugee status is the manner in which several of these refugee warrior groups are organized. In particular, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) stand out as having a clear 'political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for political objective' (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 275). The FDLR refugee warrior group was formed in 1999 out of the remnants of two other refugee warriors groups: the Rwandan Democratic Rally (RDR) and the Army/Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR/PALiR). Formed by ex-*genocidaires*, both groups used the eastern Zaïrean refugee camps to recruit more members to their cause. After ALiR appeared on a US terror watchlist in 1999, a new group taking the official title of

the FDLR was created in 1999, and they continue to operate in the Congo under this name to date. Like its forerunners, the group advocate a strongly anti-Tutsi rhetoric, and in addition to their desire to destroy Rwanda's Tutsi-led regime, are known for persecuting Rwandan, Burundian, and Congolese Tutsi in the eastern Congo. The FDLR have a strong political leadership and sophisticated command structures within the group's base in the Congo, and have also received support and funding from key leadership figures in Europe. Notable figures include the FDLR's leader Ignace Murwanashyaka, who until his arrest in 2009 was based in Germany, and the executive secretary, Callixte Mbarushimana, who was based in France. Until 2009,[116] the European leadership's main method of communication with its Congolese commanders was through fdlr.org – a website used to communicate FDLR strategy between Europe and the Congo, and publicise the FDLR's aims. The FDLR also have an explicitly military wing, the Abacunguzi Fighting Forces (FOCA), who are actively involved in the group's decision-making process (see Thakur, 2008). Despite Murwanashyaka announcing in 2005 that the FDLR were ready to 'lay down its arms to transform its fight into a political struggle and...to cooperate with international justice' (Smith, 2005), the heavy influence of FOCA may explain why the FDLR have nonetheless continued to engage in violent activity.

While the criminal and violent aspect of the FDLR is undeniable, there is certainly an argument that their refugee experience, and the political agency that their "refugeeness" denies them, may provide them with little choice but to engage in violent activity. Firstly, by virtue of being stateless, refugees do not have access to a political arena through which to air legitimate grievances. Furthermore, international refugee conventions tend to prohibit the political activity in which refugees can engage. Article III of the *OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa* (1969), for example is dedicated to the "Prohibition of Subversive Activities" – which includes a ban on refugees attacking citizens in host countries 'by use of arms, through the press, or by radio' (Article III, paragraph 2). This prohibition thus treats the exercising of both political violence and the articulation of political opinion (which is usually protected as freedom of expression) as unacceptable subversive activities that refugees cannot engage in. As such, when refugees do engage in either of these activities, they are treated not as refugees (or

[116] In September 2009, after an investigation by the German newspaper *Die Tageszeitung*, the website's German hosts terminated their contract to host the domain. The FDLR attempted to then resurrect the site using first British, then Italian, hosting firms, but eventually these contracts were also terminated.

as refugee warriors) but rather as generic non-state actors. It is only in this way, as "non-state actors" or "foreign armed groups"[117] that refugee warriors are able to gain any form of political recognition. In other words, 'through political recognition, refugee warriors are asked to reject their refugee status: they can be warriors, they can be political actors, but they cannot be refugees' (Nyers, 2006, p. 105). Although refugee warriors may not operate through a state, simply regarding them as "non-state actors" ignores the significance of their experience on their mobilization. It is here that I return to my own field experiences, and it is now possible to contextualize the comments that I referred to at the beginning of this chapter as conforming to the international power regime. Nyers' analysis of UNHCR's approach to dealing with refugee warriors highlights this conformity with an interesting paradox: He argues that by appreciating that refugee camps and refugee populations may be the location of threats and insecurities, UNHCR recognises 'refugee warrior groups as nonstate political actors in their own right. At the same time, however, the UNHCR refuses to name these "nonstate actors" as refugee warriors. These people, they say, are not *bona fide* refugees; their "refugeeness" is inauthentic' (Nyers, 2006, p. 109). In this legal understanding, the 'common consensus on the refugee warrior is that this classification of refugee constitutes a misnomer, a category mistake' (Nyers, 2006, p. 99). However, the existence of non-state actors within refugee populated areas (which is how refugee warriors are often classified) is a real threat, and a phenomenon which refugee-support agencies have been increasingly forced to confront.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the restrictive nature of current methods of classifying refugees for conflict analysis, and the problems that this presents when we try to understand groups which do not conform to the "conventional" understanding of refugees. I argue that although refugees represent a broad range of backgrounds and experiences, the international refugee regime (albeit for good reason) tends to homogenize these experiences into an increasingly narrow group. I have therefore sought to present a new method of classification, through a polythetic approach, which allows for a wider range of refugee experiences to be represented within a broader category of "refugeeness" which may assist conflict analysts in understanding how and why refugees may contribute to conflict. Within this category, however, I argue that a hierarchy of "refugeeness"

[117] A term used, for example, by Global Security in their analysis (Global Security, 2005).

remains – whereby some refugees can be seen as "more refugee-like" than others. I have therefore attempted to represent this hierarchy by replacing the discrete refugee/not refugee distinction with a continuous core/periphery distinction according to levels of "refugeeness". At the periphery of this distinction I have situated the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors who are fighting in the Kivu provinces of the Congo. I argue that this group may be termed refugee warriors because they have undeniably had a refugee experience (and are, in many cases, still refugees), but they also challenge standard notions of victimization and passivity – engaging as they do in violent political struggles and warfare. The belligerent activities of this group means that their warriorness is often emphasized over their "refugeeness", and indeed the international community tends to view them as "non-state actors" rather than refugee warriors. Furthermore, even within Conflict and Peace Studies, there is a tendency to code these groups as "non-state actors". Indeed, both Uppsala and PRIO datasets code conflict between groups such as the FDLR as "nonstate wars". This is problematic for a number of reasons, and the misleading impact this has on the nature of how conflict in the Congo is understood will be discussed in the next chapter. However, it also mischaracterizes these groups, whose refugee experiences play a significant role in informing their political activism and violence. I therefore argue that ignoring the refugee nature of such groups is presenting a significant barrier to arriving at sustainable methods of reducing belligerency. However, this "refugeeness" is not an easy or static concept to analyse, and requires that we take a new approach to understanding refugee identity and its impact on refugee warriors' security choices. The next chapter, therefore, moves to examine the methodological difficulties in examining "refugeeness", and suggests a new theoretical framework for overcoming some of these difficulties.

Chapter Four: Ordering the Chaos

The Identity Process Framework

'Our real discoveries come from chaos'.[118]

~

Introduction

Chapter One of this thesis showed that the Congo is a conflict *sui generis*. If we add to this unique situation the confusing and confused narratives of refugee migration to the Kivus, as outlined in Chapter Two, it is understandable that conflict analysts have thus far struggled to devise an appropriate model for the Congo. Although I have demonstrated that the structures of violence in the Congo have remained remarkably similar throughout its history, the various groups of actors in the Congo may be characterized by a complexity and ephemerality of association. Numerous actors are interacting and forming alliance at various levels for numerous strategic gains (be they political, social or economic), and these alliances are constantly changing in response to a fast-evolving situation.

The plethora of dynamics comprising the conflict, and its constant mutability, have resulted in narratives of conflict in the Congo falling into two, fairly broad, camps. In the first camp, traditional analyses have sought to isolate certain aspects of the conflict and construct a narrative through a singularizing lens. Arguably, the most dominant of these single-lens narratives, especially with regards to the resource-rich Eastern region, is the reduction of the conflict to a resource war. Accounts such as those provided by Jackson (2002), Eichstaedt (2011) and Sherman (2000) portray the conflict as a struggle over natural resources in a Hobbesian environment where life is both short and cheap. In this account, greedy governments and rebel groups perpetuate conflict in order to line their own pockets, whilst desperate and impoverished civilians abandon their hopes of sustainable development and educating their children for a better future, and opt instead for "quick-buck" activities, such as artisanal mining. Non-resource based features of the conflict –

[118] (Palahniuk, 2000, p. 258).

such as environmental degradation, ethnic conflict, and mass killings – are explained away as corrollaries of income-generating activities undertaken by the perpetrators (see for example, Eichstaedt, 2011). Similarly, scholars such as Sherman have used the convenient resource lens to explain the Congo's rebel movements, arguing that 'economic interests not only shape the conflict, but, if the economic advantage of fighting outweighs that of peace, perpetuate it as well' (Sherman, 2000, p. 699). Jackson has argued that 'profits increasingly motivate the violence, and violence increasingly makes profits possible for all belligerents' (Jackson, 2002, p. 517).

Framing Congolese conflict as essentially driven by economic motives provides a neat narrative, but it is also too reductionist. This understanding, for example, does not account for the variation in attitude towards different actors engaging in the same activities: Why is artisanal mining when undertaken by certain actors considered to be survivalist heroism, whereas in other cases it is viewed as criminal exploitation? Some have sought to answer this question by arguing that resource wars provide the wrong lens through which to view conflict in the Congo, which can be better explained in ethnic or nationalistic terms. In short, they suggest that violence in the Congo is essentially about Hutus fighting Tutsis or Rwandans fighting Congolese. In this narrative, indigenous Congolese are seen as heroes, Rwandan forces are seen as criminal, and Hutus are both criminal and exploitative of the general feeling that the Tutsi are alien invaders in the Congo. Whilst this may point towards another interesting aspect of the conflict, it again offers a fairly blunt view of its dynamics. As Autesserre asks, then 'why did indigenous Congolese ally with Rwandan Hutu armed groups? Why did some ethnic Tutsis ally with Kabila, the indigenous Congolese's patron, to fight other ethnic Tutsis?'[119] (Autesserre, 2010, p. xvii). By viewing conflict through any singular lens, be it ethnic, economic, or otherwise, we obfuscate the strong interplay between these overarching dynamics, and ignore the changing agency of, and security dilemmas facing, those involved in conflict in the Congo. Through a singular framework,

[119] Over the course of eastern Congo's turbulent history, so-called "indigenous" Congolese groups have allied with groups such as the FDLR in order to defend themselves against domination from Tutsi groups whom they perceive to be Rwandan "invaders". Similarly, Tutsi groups such as the Banyamulenge have tried to distance themselves from Rwandan Tutsi groups. The constantly changing alliances between different groups in the Eastern Congo suggests that simply framing the conflict in terms of Rwandan vs. Congolese or Hutu vs. Tutsi is inaccurate and misleading.

actors are expected to follow a predetermined trajectory, and outliers can be explained away by modifying models in hindsight.[120]

Such models are appealing because they offer the possibility of a solution to the current conflict, and the prevention of the breakout of future conflicts, through the simple modification of certain detectable and measurable variables, whilst holding all other variables "constant". Simplifying variables leads to clean analyses and targeted interventions. However, analyses such as those described above, by focussing on singular aspects, run the risk of ignoring the impact of several important dynamics which, although they may be in some cases ephemeral or difficult to identify, nonetheless have a significant impact on conflict dynamics. If we take the example of the FDLR, we can track how it has evolved over time: It was at one time allied with Mobutu's forces against Kabila, then switched after Mobutu's overthrow to support Laurent Kabila against Rwanda and RCD rebels. Now that Joseph Kabila has agreed to cooperate with Rwandan forces to remove the FDLR threat, the FDLR continue to forge new alliances with local actors. These include Maï-Maï militias, other foreign armed groups, and even some Congolese Tutsi groups. The range of groups that the FDLR have allied with demonstrates that we cannot view their actions as purely economically motivated, or purely ethnically motivated, or even simply survival motivated. Rather, in order to understand why the FDLR, and other Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo, behave in the way they do, we need to look at a *range* of interacting dynamics.

The second camp, which include scholars such as Dunn (2003). Turner (2007), Prunier (2008), and Autesserre (2010), takes an almost opposite approach which involves viewing the Congolese conflict as a whole. Acknowledging the complexity and fleeting nature of the various conflict dynamics, they tend to characterize the Congo as chaos – painting a picture of disorder and confusion. For example, Dunn argues that a series of ABC news reports on Congolese conflict gave the impression 'that this central African country was a land of violence, chaos, and avarice, perhaps beyond the comprehension of Western audiences' (Dunn, 2003, p. 4). Dunn goes on to explain how the constant deployment of the image of

[120] For example, Olsson and Fors' model for analysing the two Congo Wars shows 'that once a war has commenced, the abundance of natural resources and the ruler's kleptocratic tendencies determine conflict intensity' (Olsson & Fors, 2004, p. 321), and Wood's analytical model on rebel capability develops a 'statistical analysis [which] supports the hypothesis that comparatively capable insurgents kill fewer civilians than their weaker counterparts' (Wood, 2010, p. 601). Both models provide a general rule from which a prediction about the path of conflict can be made.

the Congo as chaotic has served as a useful justification for external interference in the county, a pattern that dates back to the original justification for King Leopold to colonize the region in 1885. Indeed, this image of chaos in the Congo has been widely adopted and has proved to be remarkably enduring. Thomas Turner characterizes the country as moving away from its previous 'total chaos' (Turner, 2007, p. 45), again painting a picture of a situation whose default setting is disarray. Turner's and Dunn's image of a chaotic Congo has led them to construct historical narratives which – although they offer a comprehensive account of the history of conflict in the Congo, tend towards the descriptive. In addition to Dunn's and Turner's macro-narratives of a chaotic Congo, the image of chaos has been applied to analyses of specific aspects of the conflict. Michael Nest, for example, argues with regard to Congo's tantalum production – which has often been posited (and exaggerated) as a key driver of conflict – that the 'popular image of tantalum is that it is hacked from the ground in chaotic mines lorded over by a thug with a gun' (Nest, 2011, p. 31).

Thus far, I have been careful not to characterise the Congo as chaotic, not because I do not believe it to be so, but because I conceive of Chaos in the Congo in the scientific sense of the word; arguing that the Congo is 'a complex system whose behaviour is so unpredictable as to appear random, owing to great sensitivity to small changes in conditions' (OED, 2011) – and thereby a chaotic system. Nest has argued that in terms of tantalum production, 'the physicality of mining – mud, water, dirt, dust – should not be confused with an absence of order' (Nest, 2011, p. 31). The use of the term chaos in the sense of disorder and confusion is deceptive, because there an identifiable sense of order in the Congo, and it is for this reason that I argue that we should refer to the Congo as Chaotic in the scientific sense. I argue that the apparent confusion alluded to by some scholars should be regarded as a product of uncertainty rather than disorder. The presence of uncertainty, in the Knightian sense that is not susceptible to measure (see Knight, 1921), and the unpredictability that results, is key to understanding why even the most sophisticated models of analysis have struggled to fully encompass the dynamics of conflict the Congo. However, immeasurability does not mean that the Congo lacks order, and the inadequacy of current conflict models should be regarded as an indicator that we need to change them. It is here that I suggest the utility of understanding the Congo as scientifically Chaotic, for it allows us to draw inspiration from Chaos Theory for the basis of a new conflict analysis model.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I examine the concept of identity. I suggest that considering identity is essential when attempting to understand the perceptions which drive conflict dynamics, but I also acknowledge that a number of methodological problems arise when trying to analyse the role that identity plays in these dynamics. The second section examines the utility of Chaos Theory for trying to mitigate the analytical obstacles presented when focussing on identity. I argue that a number of methodological insights may be drawn from Chaos Theory. Furthermore, given that natural scientists have largely moved away from using linear Newtonian equations to understand complex *natural* phenomena, a similar commitment to non-linearity should be exercised when examining complex *social* phenomena. My overall argument is that there are three broad lessons that conflict analysis can draw from Chaos Theory: That complex non-linear models are required to understand protracted conflicts such as the conflict in the Congo; that we need to pay attention to the significant impact that small changes in conditions may have on a conflict's trajectory; and that by drawing on the concept of fractal patterning (the idea that self-similar patterns of behaviour repeat themselves on varying scales at different times) we can not only better understand why certain actors act in the way they do, but possibly even uncover some significant insights into what their future behaviourmay entail. Fractal self-similarity will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, but the need for non-linear models and attention to extreme sensitivity will be expanded upon in this second section.

In his analysis of the Congo Wars, Thomas Turner asserts that the actors who drive the conflict pursue actions which they perceive to be in their own interests. In order to properly understand the conflict, therefore, Turner argues that the 'cultural and ideological biases, shortages of information and other factors shaping their perceptions must be analysed in detail' (Turner, 2007, p. 15). I propose that these factors may be analysed by looking more closely at the manner in which conflict actors in the Congo construct their identities. In the third and final section of this chapter, I set out my own conflict analysis framework which I have called the Identity-Process Framework (IPF). The IPF is a non-linear approach to understanding how collective identities may be created in the context of the conflict, and the reciprocal impact they may have on other conflict dynamics. The framework takes a broadly hermeneutical approach, by rejecting the pursuit of objectivity and examining intersubjectively held beliefs (see Gadamer, 1975). In particular, the framework adheres to two key principles of Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy: Firstly, the framework follows the assertions that 'the whole should be understood from the part, and

the part should be understood out of the whole' (Dobrosavljev, 2002, p. 607). That is to say, there is a reciprocal feedback mechanism within the framework whereby the overall structure of the identities constructed are affected by small changes within their constituent parts and *vice versa*. Secondly, the understanding of identity used here is one based on practical (as opposed to theoretical) philosophy and 'practical knowledge does not consist of rigid principles, but of moveable outlines' (Dobrosavljev, 2002, p. 610). The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to elucidate a general framework for understanding the factors shaping the creation of what I describe as 'identity paths' (and the possible trajectory of these paths), rather than setting out a fixed notion of identity. I argue that the factors affecting identity are based on understandings which are temporary, and thus the form of identity is one which is itself an evolving process rather than a static given.

In order to demonstrate the utility of the Identity Process Framework in conflict analysis, I will apply it in Chapter Five to the Rwandan Hutu refugees who fight in the armed groups of the eastern Congo. I suggest that the IPF may help uncover some valuable insights into this widely misunderstood group, and allow us to analyse them through a framework which reconciles their warrior nature with their refugee experiences. As such, in this chapter, I establish how the framework can be applied to an understanding of refugee warrior identity. I ground my framework for understanding the refugee identity of refugee warriors by examining four particular shaping aspects of their identity. In the first place, I look at how refugees establish the basis of their identity in relation to the space they occupy – discussing how the nature of their relationship with both sending and receiving countries may affect how they conceive of their position in society and the manner in which they perceive themselves accordingly. Secondly, I account for changes in their identity paths (for example, accounting for how refugees move from framing themselves as a refugee or diaspora group to asserting that they are "local" to their host area or region) by examining the cultural traumas which cause them to adjust the manner in which they frame themselves. Thirdly, and again linked to cultural trauma, I argue that, while refugees may try to assimilate into host communities by asserting indigenous belonging, they do not fully erase their relationship with their country of origin. I attempt to explain how a dual identity as members of both sending and receiving communities may be created by reconfiguring history to fit a secure and resilient narrative through processes of collective memory and forgetting. Finally, I argue that the main safeguard of refugees' identity is the ability to switch between different identity paths by constituting themselves as resistant and oppositional subjects against the threat which they perceive to be oppressing them. In this

sense I draw on the idea of the differential consciousness, which can be described as 'a key strategy used by dominated peoples to survive demeaning and disempowering structures and ideologies. It is the ability to acknowledge and operate within these structures and ideologies but at the same time to generate alternative beliefs and tactics that resist domination' (Counihan, 2008, p. 356). I argue that refugees can utilise their differential consciousness in order to position themselves on an identity path which they perceive as being most strategically safe and/or powerful. The differential consciousness aspect of the framework allows refugee actors agency over the construction of their own identity – thereby attempting to overcome the tendency, that I discussed in the previous chapter, to frame refugee identity as inherently passive. Having set up the theoretical basis of my framework in this chapter, I then move in the next chapter to demonstrate the applicability of the framework with regards to the FDLR.

Identity: The Appeal of a Human Face and the Difficulties of an Ephemeral Character

As the earlier conflict analysis of the Congo demonstrates, states are not necessarily the only key actors in a conflict. It is inappropriate to use the state as the main *unit* of analysis when studying the eastern Congo, where the forces of Kinshasa are relatively weak, and the conflict is dominated by various militias (albeit militias who in some instances have a degree of state backing from Kinshasa, Kigali or Kampala). The Congolese state does, however, remain a useful *tool* of analysis, as it is a source of the structures which facilitate the perpetuation of violence. Although it is useful as a unit of analysis in structural examinations of the Congo, given the relative weakness of the Congolese state as a unified actor, it contributes only partially analyses of agency. This chapter attempts to analyse the agency of refugee groups acting in the Congolese conflicts, and follows Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo who argue that refugee warrior groups constitute 'highly conscious refugee communities' (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 275). The units of analysis in my framework are therefore communities, which following theorists such as Wæver (1993) and McSweeney (1999), I argue consist of individuals who identify themselves as belonging to such communities.

The significance of this definition of refugee warriors as communities is that existential threats do not necessarily mean physical extermination, but also include affronts to a community's collective identity. Following the securitization approach, which I have set out in earlier chapters, the security speech act that applies to communities has been described

by McSweeney as 'if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as "us"' (McSweeney, 1999, p. 72). For theorists such as Wæver and McSweeney who utilize the securitization approach, 'the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community' (Wæver, 1993, p. 25) warrants further consideration. Identity is the referent object of the societal security of a community, and I argue that what is at stake for refugee warriors in the Congo is not just the physical survival of individual members, but also their collective survival as a community. In this regard, the refuge experience of these groups become keys to how they perceive themselves, and how they are perceived by others, as 'it is the issues of identity and migration that drive the underlying perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities' (Wæver, 1993, p. 6).

By focussing on communities, I am not suggesting that any analysis based on examination of the state as an actor is not useful. Rather, I am emphasizing that the state is not the *only* actor that needs to be considered in a regional analysis (something which Buzan and Wæver highlight in *Region and Powers* [2003] when they talk of *units* in Regional Security Complex Theory rather than states). As Christopher Clapham demonstrates in his analysis of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, 'entities that are not accorded the status of states, such as guerrilla insurgencies or even voluntary organisations, may take on attributes that have customarily been associated with sovereign statehood' (Clapham, 2000, p. 31). Therefore, when examining identity in this chapter, I draw on some of the literature on state identity – taking as my starting point the work (and critiques) of Alexander Wendt. Although I am not using the state as the main unit of my conflict analysis, even the non-state communities that I analyse have some state-like qualities. For example, refugee warrior communities, like a state, have 'political leadership structure[s] and armed sections engaged in warfare for political objective' (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989, p. 275). As such, it would seem expedient to consider that some of the determining factors in the construction of state identity may also feature in the construction of the collective identity of the refugee warrior community. In the first place, I argue that the four national interests which Wendt argues that states seek to preserve – physical security, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem (see Wendt, 1999, pp. 235-7) – are also the interests which refugee warrior communities seek to gain and safeguard. Wendt illustrates a number of interactions and interpretations between two states and argues that 'Identities and interests are not only created in such interactions, but they are also sustained that way' (Wendt, 1999, p. 331). Similarly, the creation of a refugee warrior identity is shaped by interactions with host communities and *vice versa*. McSweeney has argued that the

'analysis of collective identity can be approached from the sociological angle of social constructionism, which focuses on the processes and practices by which people and groups construct their self-image' (McSweeney, 1999, p. 69). In this regard, I use a social constructivist approach to examine belligerent refugee groups and "local" militias in the Congo.

The title of this sub-section refers to Bill McSweeney's assertion that 'identity is a good thing with a human face and ephemeral character which makes it at once appealing and difficult to grasp' (McSweeney, 1999, p. 69). Although the salience of identity in societal security is evident, as McSweeney himself noted, identity is problematic as a unit of analysis, not least because of its 'ephemeral and empirically contentious' character (McSweeney, 1999, p. 72). For McSweeney, 'Identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups' (McSweeney, 1999, p. 73). This characteristic of identity means that we cannot conceive of a static notion of identity, but rather of identity as a process (which I emphasis by labelling my framework the Identity *Process* Framework). The telos of the process is for communities to create a resilient, yet flexible, identity which is capable of competing with other identity claims in order to ensure the survival of a community. Flexibility and resilience are particularly important for minority and marginal communities, who are constantly struggling for survival. Thus, flexibility and resilience are key features of the identity of refugee warrior communities. However, the actual process of constructing such an identity may also bring with it security threats based on other groups' perceptions of refugee warrior identity. In this sense, the identity has to constantly evolve to accommodate and respond to new threats, and such changes in identity may lead some members of the group to disassociate themselves from the community and cause other individuals, previously outside the group, to identify with the new collective identity. Given the impermanent nature of a group's collective identity, and indeed the evolving nature of the group's demographic, identity becomes a difficult to grasp topic of interpretation. As such, any framework in which identity plays such a pivotal role will be beset with methodological difficulties. However, the problematic nature of an analysis of identity does not mean that it should necessarily be overlooked or dismissed as 'impossible' (see St Louis, 2009). The question is not *whether* we need to incorporate identity into a theoretical security framework, but rather *how* we should go about achieving this in a manner that makes allowances for the multiple facets and complexities of various identities. It is here that I suggest we can draw on the analytical tools available to us in Chaos Theory for inspiration.

Chaos and Uncertainty: Overcoming the Methodological Problems of Analysing Identity

I have attempted to establish uncertainty as a key feature of conflict in the Congo: The only thing that actors in the Congo can be certain of is that nothing is certain. Because uncertainty is immeasurable in stark numerical terms, conflict analysts often shy away from trying to factor it into their analyses. However, I argue that it is imperative to understand what drives this uncertainty and how this then impacts on security choices. Like identity, uncertainty presents a number of methodological problems and calls for difficult value-judgements, in part created by the fact that both concepts are definitionally vague. The complex nature of both identity, and the uncertainty that is generated as a result, tends to compound insecurity. Actors suffer an ontological crisis of certainty as the world in which they locate their identity rapidly changes. Similarly, analysts struggle to find a static or concrete root in which to anchor their understandings of the ever-changing identities of these insecure actors. Despite the difficulty of analysis, given the causal links between identity, uncertainty and insecurity, understanding how uncertainty and identity drive conflict should be foremost in our consideration. An understanding of uncertainty and identity, however, cannot be achieved using a simple linear model, and again we can learn a number of valuable lessons from Chaos Theory.

Chaos Theory was developed in the natural sciences in response to a desire to explain complex phenomena such as weather patterns and the behaviour of stars. One basic tenet underlying Chaos Theory is that the behaviour of a number of natural phenomena cannot be accurately predicted or explained through simple equations because 'the cherished measure of scientific validity, [and] predictability can only hold true for a radically narrow range of phenomena' (Mosko, 2005, p. 7). Newtonian, linear equations (which use constant variables) may explain what happens when a known force is applied to an object whose mass is known, and where the coefficient of friction between the object and the surface it is travelling on is also known. However, it cannot account for the movement of stars in the galaxy, or explain why moth populations rise and fall. It is in response to these latter questions that scientists turned to Chaos Theory; 'a science of process rather than state, of becoming rather than being' (Gleick, 1987, p. 5). Given that there are numerous natural phenomena which cannot be explained using linear models, because they contain elements whose properties cannot be known or held constant, it seems almost impossible that any social phenomenon could be explained using a linear model. Explaining a phenomenon as complicated as conflict through a purely linear quantitative model, which uses constant

proxy variables, therefore poses difficulties, as we cannot measure (or in some cases even detect) many of the plethora of factors which drive individual and group decisions, and their subsequent impact on conflict.

Nonetheless, quantitative models,[121] which follow Newtonian assumptions about the constancy of "known" variables, are often favoured over qualitative models of conflict by policy-makers and academicians alike. Such models claim to offer clear and logically-arrived-at explanations and solutions, and can often be seen to "tidy-up" the messy and confusing surfeit of information that accompanies studies of conflict. Generalizable conflict models[122] are often posited as being able to identify areas which are susceptible to conflict (based on the variables which they identify as causing conflict), and some even stretch to making broader claims about "trends" and the trajectories of conflict over time.[123] In reality, the extent of disagreement among these quantitative studies about what the data means, and the many real-life exceptions which seem to buck the trends that they predict, suggests that their accuracy is over-estimated. Indeed, the claims of most quantitative models of conflict are derived from *post-hoc* analysis, using what Taleb describes as the hindsight bias (Taleb, 2004). Furthermore, whilst such models may appear well-ordered, this ostensible neatness can be misleading. I refer back to the John Law quotation I cited in the Introduction to this thesis: If something is actually messy (and we may believe that conflict is often extremely messy) then would a neater, more deterministic analysis not make a 'mess of describing it?' (Law, 2004, p. 1). I argue that quantitative models do make a mess of explaining conflict, not least because they ignore the variable and difficult-to-measure elements which contribute so heavily to conflict dynamics. 'Pains and pleasures, hopes and horrors, intuitions and apprehensions, losses and redemptions, mundanities and visions, angels and demons, things that slip and slide, or appear and disappear, change shape or don't have much form at all, unpredictabilities, these are just a few of the phenomena that are hardly caught by social science methods' (Law, 2004, p. 2). But it is in

[121] Although sophisticated and multi-level quantitative conflict analysis models have been developed, because they use proxy and dummy variables with set values, they still conform to the assumptions of constancy and knowability that underlies linear Newtonian modelling. Therefore, although these models may be complex in the sense that they are complicated, they are *not* complex in the non-linear, Chaos Theory sense.

[122] See, for example, Buhaug's (2010) article which posits a relationship between the likelihood of civil wars occuring and their distance from the capital, and Braithwaite, who argues that 'contagion from neighbouring conflicts becomes a risk of diminishing value for increasingly capable states' (2010, p. 311).

[123] For example, the PRIO datasets which I will discuss later in this chapter are used by Steven Pinker to demonstrate how violence has declined over time (Pinker, 2011).

the rich dynamics of these phenomena that many of the most illuminating drivers of conflict lie. While the significance of understanding the ethereal and ephemeral may suggest that a more qualitative understanding of conflict is necessary, qualitative approaches also need to ensure that they are not too linear or simplistic in their handling of conflict. Chaos Theory, I suggest, can provide a safeguard against the pitfalls of over-simplification.

Mosko (2005) argues that three distinct features of Chaos Theory – non-linearity, extreme sensitivity to conditions, and fractal self-similarity – can be considered as bridging the space between qualitative and quantitative approaches. In classical linear models we can make assertions that posit clear causal links between, for example battle deaths and levels of conflict (the problems of which I will discuss in more detail below). However, in complex systems the relationship between variables is unpredictable, and may defy the trajectory determined by a linear model and display a wide range of complex behaviours. Furthermore, in a non-linear framework, it is possible to account for how changing one input may not only alter its relationship with another variable, but may also alter the relationship between other dynamics which may not seem obviously related to the variables being examined. Gleick summarises this characteristic of complex systems by arguing that 'the act of playing the game has a way of changing the rules' (Gleick, 1987, p. 24). An awareness of this phenomenon is particularly useful for the analysis of identity and uncertainty. Later in this thesis, I attempt to demonstrate the way in which a shift in the identity of the FDLR, and the subsequent actions they embark upon, may affect the relationship between Tutsi militias such as the CNDP and local Congolese civilians. Of course a non-linear model does not make for ease of predictability, but I argue that it is expedient to be weary of "predictive models". Recent developments in academic quantitative modelling has admittedly led to more elaborate conflict analyses – using numerous variables and being cautious about their predictive claims. However, international policy towards resolving conflict has tended to follow more primitive and simplistic models.[124] The international community has tended to view the Congo as a victim

[124] For example Collier's work on greed and grievance has been widely criticized by numerous academics (most notably Ballentine & Sherman [2003] and Fearon & Laitin [2003]). Not only are there several examples which disprove Collier's assertions, critiques such as that by Surhke, Villanger and Woodward have also criticised the methodology used – arguing that 'if the magnitude of the coefficient does not correspond to economically meaningful measures, then a significant relationship may have little relevance for policy' (Suhrke, Villanger, & Woodward, 2005, p. 15). Nonetheless, the models that Collier uses have has enduring significance for policy makers. The World Bank published his research report, *Breaking the Conflict Trap* (Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler,

of failed government, and predicted that steps towards democracy would stabilize the country, leading to the implementation of democratic elections. However, as Autesserre observes, 'the international community's insistence on organizing elections in 2006 has ended up jeopardizing the peace' (Autesserre, 2008, p. 103). Five years on, the organizers of the second elections in 2011 had not learnt from the lessons of 2006, and again election-based violence broke out. This is not to say that the failure to avoid violence around the 2011 elections could necessarily have been predicted (my argument is that predictability is often weak); but the short-sighted obsession with elections on the part of policy-makers working on peacebuilding has hindered the development of a less linear, and more nuanced, understanding of the relationship between democracy and peace. In this sense a non-linear framework allows for the analysts to be self-reflexive; realising that the variables they choose also play a key role in the narrative that they construct, and that the impact of the interventions which they suggest may have a number of significant effects (both positive and negative) on the future development of the conflict which they will not necessarily foresee.

The unpredictability associated with non-linearity arises from Chaotic systems' extreme sensitivity to initial conditions – although, given that we cannot properly establish "initial conditions" in an analysis of the Congo, it is more appropriate to describe it as "extreme sensitivity under *changing* conditions". Large-N studies and predictive models which purport to make general claims, rely on a proportional relationship between variables. However, if subject to extreme sensitivity, this proportionality is lost and the predictive ability of such models is undermined. To illustrate this point, I refer to an ongoing debate exists between proponents of conflict data sets compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute (UCDP/PRIO) (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005) and those who advocate the datasets compiled by the Correlates of War (COW) Project (Sarkees, Wayman, & Singer, 2003). At the heart of this debate is a question over whether or not violence has declined over time. Using data from their own 'estimate of the trends in global and regional battle deaths 1946-2002' (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005, p. 146), Gleditsch and Lacina argues that 'battle violence has declined over the past 50 years due to a decline in major interstate conflict and large internationalised civil conflicts' (*Ibid.*) On the other hand proponents of the Correlates of War dataset observe 'a disquieting constancy in

---

Reynal-Querol, & Sambanis, 2003). His latest book, *The Plundered Planet* continues to put forward simplistic models: The formula governing this research is 'nature + technology + regulation = prosperity' (Collier, 2010, p. 2).

warfare and hint at patterns of interchangeability or substitutability among the types of war' (Sarkees, Wayman, & Singer, 2003, p. 49). I would agree with Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer's observations of the interchangeability among types of war, globally. However, if we look in more detail at the specific data used by both sides of the debate in order to present their characterizations of conflict, we can see a number of problems with the numbers – especially if we look at the raw data for the Congo.

To begin with, both datasets reveal a number of methodological problems with calculating battle deaths in the Congo, which reflect a wider inaccuracy in the manner in which battle deaths are calculated. For example, in the UCDP/PRIO data set the battle death best estimate in the DRC for the period 1998-2001 is 36,250/year, and no data is available for 2002-2004. The data that is available however, may be considered dubious, as it was coded as 'based on battle-deaths data that was not specific to the conflict year', and also 'based on UCDP/PRIO coding rules because no other information was available' (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005, codebook p. 5).[125] In their coding decisions, only four sources are cited for the period 1998-2001 (see Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005, coding decisions p.169). Two of these sources are by the International Rescue Committee: One which estimates 1.7 million 'excessive deaths' and 200,000 'violent deaths' from 3 household surveys conducted over 22 months (Roberts, 2000), and a second household survey conducted over 32 months between August 1998 and March 2001 which provides provides an estimate of 2.5 million excess deaths and 350,000 violent deaths (Roberts, Hale, Belyakdoumi, Cobey, Ondeko, & Despines, 2003). They also use estimates from a closed data set (International Institute for Strategic Studies, date unavailable) which estimates 145,000 total combat deaths, and a dataset provided by Michael Clodfelter, who estimates that 'by June 2000 about 200,000 people had been killed in battle or massacre, with as many as 1.5 million dying from disease and malnutrition' (Clodfelter, 2002, p. 630). From these figures, it would seem that the battle death figure of 36,250 that UCDP/PRIO record was arrived at was taken by simply dividing the International Institute for Strategic Studies 145,000 figure by four (for the years between 1998-2001). However, there is no indication as to why this figure is to be believed. Furthermore although the "excessive deaths" and "violent deaths" estimated by the

[125] Under the UCDP/PRIO coding rules 'The data coders have made a decision whether there was an active conflict according to the definition for all countries for all years [that] they are independent after 1945. This does not mean there are no uncertainties regarding the coding' (Kreutz, 2010, p. 8). This rule however, does not reveal how the data coders have come about making this decision.

International Rescue Committee are presented as significant in the coding decisions, they are ignored in the final figure, although no reason is given as to why this is the case.

The Correlates of War try to disaggregate battle deaths into non-state war, inter-state war, intra-state war and extra-state wars. But this disaggregation is also problematic and not very helpful in the case of the Congo. Only one conflict (the Hema-Lendu conflict of 1999-2005) is acknowledged as a non-state war in the COW dataset. Even in this case a code of "–9" (meaning that no data is available) is given for the number of battle deaths which occurred during this period. However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the FDLR and other foreign armed groups in the Congo are also considered non-state actors. Why, then, is no data about these actors included? Why also, do neither COW or UCDP/PRIO utilise the data available in the detailed reports that the UN Panel of Experts in the DRC regularly file? The Congo is only coded in the COW data as an inter-state war (which I believe completely obscures its internal dimensions) and again in both these cases a code of "–9" (data unavailable) or "–8" (data inapplicable) is given (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Thus, the inadequacy of both the UCDP/PRIO dataset and the COW dataset in providing accurate information on battle deaths is evident.

Another problem with large-N studies, such as those conducted by COW and UCDP/PRIO is that, in looking at battle deaths, defined 'as deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during *contested combat*' (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005, codebook pg. 3, *emphasis added*), they limit themselves to only looking at a very narrow aspect of the overall conflict experience. I would refute, therefore, the extent to which these studies can tell us about the wider dynamics of conflict. Certainly, this is something of which the authors of these quantitative studies are already aware. Lacina and Gleditsch observe that 'there are compelling reasons to believe that there is a need for increased attention to non-battle causes of mortality, especially displacement and disease in conflict studies. Therefore, it is demographers, public health specialists, and epidemiologists who can best describe the true human cost of many recent armed conflicts and assess the actions necessary to reduce their toll' (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005, p. 145). However, I would argue that this does not necessarily reduce the problem of inconsistent or inaccurate data. This can be illustrated by the variation among reports written on "excessive death toll" (rather than battle death toll) by the demographers, public health specialists, and epidemiologists that Lacina and Gleditsch call upon. The most

widely cited death figures come from a report by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which claimed that between 1998 and 2007 the excess death toll in the Congo was 5.4 million, with an estimated 2.1 million of those deaths occurring after the formal end of the war in 2002 (International Rescue Committee, 2007, p. ii). In an earlier report for the *Lancet*, involving some of the same researchers who wrote the IRC report, it is claimed that conflict period 1998-2004 saw an excess death toll of 3.9 million in the Congo (Coghlan, et al., 2006). However, both the IRC and *Lancet* report findings have been criticised for being 'too excessive' (Human Security Report Project, 2009-2010) and some estimate the excess death toll for the period 1998-2004 as low as 200,000 deaths (Lambert & Lohlé-Tart, 2008). Thus calculating non-battle deaths proves even more problematic than calculating battle deaths, and with a variation of 200,000-5.4 million, it is doubtful that these figures can tell us anything meaningful about how many people have died in the Congo, let alone about larger trends in global levels and causes of violence.

However, the real question relates to what battle deaths can even tell us about the true dynamics of conflict in the Congo. The problem with these studies is that they put a great deal of emphasis on the quantities of deaths *globally*, which has often come at the expense of the qualities of violence in individual case studies. I argue that understanding the dynamics of conflict in the Congo will not result from calculating how many people have died. Rather, I argue that the dynamics of conflict in the Congo are driven by the insecurities and uncertainties that its inhabitants face. While conflict-death figures may help us build a wider picture of this, alone they can tell us very little. Hence, I argue for an approach derived from Chaos Theory, which appreciates the extreme sensitivity that actors' security decisions have to their conditions. In other words, small changes in conditions (which cannot be coded or controlled for in large-N studies) lead to large differences in actors' perceptions and actions. This means that in a setting such as the current conflict in the Kivus, the dynamics and boundaries of conflict are always changing; it is a war of words as much as it is a war of weapons, and perceptions are as important as realities.

In the social sciences the extreme sensitivity of a chaotic system can be demonstrated through Lévi-Strauss's formula for the structure of myth. Lévi-Strauss's allows for relations between elements which are not proportional to be modelled, and also allows for the "spiralling possibilities" which myth is vulnerable to, as a result of extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. By appreciating these features of the "mythical" when it undergoes

transformation, and making allowances for them in his framework, Lévi-Strauss is able to demonstrate how 'two communities which may have begun with only the slightest of differences in their cosmologies might well diverge as their respective histories unfold, a result as much of chaotic processes inherent in complex systems as of diffusion or differential experiences of external influence' (Mosko, 2005, p. 22). Indeed, this can be seen if we compare the dominant histories of Rwanda and Burundi – two countries with remarkably similar demographics and with similar tensions between Hutu and Tutsi groups. The dominant view of the history of Rwanda is one of continual persecution of the Tutsi (marked by the 1994 Genocide in which nearly a million Tutsi were killed), whereas in Burundi the 1972 massacre of Hutus by Tutsis has resulted in a narrative which is dominated by the view that it is the Hutu who are persecuted by the Tutsi. In realist terms this phenomenon may be explained through simple causality; the Tutsi managed to hold on to power in Burundi, whilst in Rwanda they did not. But it does not account for the factors which meant that this was the case in the first place, and nor does this explanation account for why, in 1993, Burundi also saw the massacre of 25,000 Tutsis by Hutus. Simple solutions may explain the onset of this violence, but a much more nuanced understanding is needed to explain their underlying causes and nature (for example, why did the Burundian genocide of the Tutsi in 1993 result in 25,000 deaths, whilst the 1994 Rwandan genocide result in 1,000,000?). Chaos Theory can allow us to concentrate on those seemingly small differences in the course of history which make for massive changes in the eventual outcome of a conflict.

Whilst attention to non-linearity and extreme sensitivity may make analysis seem an extremely daunting task, 'like walking through a maze whose walls rearrange themselves with every step' (Gleick, 1987, p. 24), one of the other key lessons we can draw from Chaos Theory is that of fractal self-similarity, which suggests that just because a system is complex, it is not disordered. We may characterize a chaotic system as resembling a fractal: 'a mathematically conceived curve such that any small part of it, enlarged, has the same statistical character as the original' (OED, 2011). This characteristic of a fractal is referred to as '"self-similarity" or the tendency of patterns or structures to recur on multiple levels or scales' (Mosko, 2005, p. 24). In Chapters One and Two, I argued that we can observe in the Congo repeating patterns of behaviour on different political scales. I will look at fractal self-similarity in more detail in Chapter Six, when I argue that we cannot necessarily predict FDLR behaviour, but we can certainly understand it as following a pattern similar to earlier waves of Rwandan refugee warrior groups in the Congo. In this way we can move away

from the unhelpful labels of "senseless" or "criminal"[126] which often accompany descriptions of Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior violence, and uncover some of the more political motivations behind their actions, in order to more constructively tackle some of the most persistent causes of violence in the eastern Congo.

It is important at this point to establish the limits of Chaos Theory in the political realm. Brown observes that the complex dynamics of Chaos Theory are difficult to analyse in the social sciences and 'the dynamics and interactions that are the source of political chaos may obscure its presence' (Brown, 1996, p. 135). The models which I suggest are therefore not designed to be generalizable, but rather, are designed to examine a particular dynamic of conflict in the Congo: Refugees, the ideas and beliefs that they hold, and the ideas and beliefs held about them. What I am suggesting is not unflinching fidelity to a particular chaos model, but rather the use of what Brown has referred to as 'Chaos as Allegory' (Brown, 1996, p. 136). In other words, I am using the same guiding principles that the Chaos theorists who devised complex non-linear formulations for weather patterns or stock market flows used, in order to devise a framework which appreciates the complexity, non-predictability and sensitivity of identity and its impact on conflict. In the next section I set out the theoretical basis of my Chaos-inspired model for understanding refugee identity. Earlier in this chapter, I posited a notion of identity as a process, rather than as a static given. The framework, therefore, attempts to create a non-linear understanding of the identity process by establishing a notion of "identity paths." Identity paths are how I refer to the trajectories which the collective identities of a group follow. Multiple identity paths can be (both sequentially and simultaneously) created and held, and I try to account for the conditions which may lead to a change in identity.

The Identity Process Framework

In this final section, I develop the identity process framework, which I propose as a method for better understanding and analysing the multiple and ephemeral nature of refugee identity. I argue that the identity paths which I have described above are constructed and shaped by a number of factors. Rather than trying to observe each and every one of these

[126] My aim here is not to dispute that there is a criminal aspect of FDLR activity, but rather to point out that in addition to being criminal, some of these activities may *also* have a political dimension which the emphasis on the criminal dimension often obscures. By viewing their activities solely through a lens of criminality, we run the risk of depoliticizing all of their actions and misdiagnosing solutions to conflict in the Kivus.

factors (which I suggest are too many to identify, let alone examine), I have chosen four overarching dynamics which shape identity paths, in order to account for the often confusing and ever-changing nature of refugee identity. I begin my analysis by rooting the framework in the relationship between refugees and territory – arguing that uncertainty that surrounds refugee identity may be in part due to the precarious relationship between refugees and their host and sending countries. In particular, this analysis looks at how refugees' identities and sense of belonging may alter as their refugee situation becomes more protracted. Following Shapiro (1997, 2007), I suggest that an understanding of violent cartographies may enrich an understanding of how group identity in relation to territory is formed. For Shapiro, violent cartographies are 'inter-articulations of geographic imaginaries and antagonisms based on models of identity-difference' (Shapiro, 2007, pp. 293-4). Following my discussion of the Kivus as a borderzone site of refugee influx in Chapter Two, I look at the pressures placed on both refugees and host communities at sites of refugee influx, and examine how collectivities locate themselves in this site through an architecture of enmity and violence. Although there are of course instances in which refugees have been able to live peacefully with their host communities, I focus primarily on how refugees locate themselves in more hostile situations, in order to understand how a refugee identity may become militarized. In the first section I therefore look at how the violence of borderzones impact on refugee identity, and examine how a protracted period of time spent as a refugee may alter refugees' perceptions of their sending country as well as their relationship with their host country.

The second component draws on the violent imaginary of refugee communities, and focuses on the possibility that, both as a collectivity and in individual cases, refugees have to some degree suffered cultural trauma. 'Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways' (Alexander, 2004, p. 1). Of course the case for the Rwandan Genocide having constituted a cultural trauma for the Rwandan Tutsi population is one that hardly needs making, but the Genocide has clearly also been a source of trauma for Rwandan Hutus – especially those Hutus who were forced to flee in its aftermath. While the level of trauma obviously varies from case to case, the geographical, social and cultural upheaval suffered in the process of seeking refuge is likely to have significant implications. For host communities, perceptions of settling refugee communities will be strongly influenced by the circumstances that resulted in their migration, and

whether these stories are framed in terms of enmity or amity will undoubtedly affect their reception. For the refugee communities, the cultural trauma suffered must be dealt with through new beginnings, although they may not get a say in how they are identified, and may find themselves inextricably linked to "collectively guilty" or "collectively feared" groups. In response to this securitization, the group may have to recast a new identity for themselves. Building on Alexander, we can see how 'the trauma process can be likened, in this sense, to a [security] speech act' (Alexander, 2004, p. 11). Just as the security speech act requires the speaker to persuade the audience that an issue warrants extraordinary measures because they constitute a threat, 'the goal of the speaker is to persuasively project the trauma claim to the audience-public' (Alexander, 2004, p. 12), and again extraordinary actions are necessary to overcome this trauma. As with securitization, however, mapping the extent and the nature of the response to cultural trauma is necessary in order to understand why some refugee communities embrace, and are embraced by, their host communities, whereas others become the source of tension.

If identity is the referent object of societal security, and there is a strong case for suggesting that it is, we need to examine how collective self-images come into being, and how they might change. I suggest that this could be achieved through analysing collective memory and collective forgetting. Here I draw on anthropological traditions; focussing on the work of Halbwachs (1941), Connerton (1989; 2008) and Heisler (2008) to derive a method for examining how histories are continually formed and reformed, and identities reconfigured, in order to aid the survival of a community. By utilising the literature on how communities remember (see Connerton, 1989) we can begin to consider how certain norms and cultural values become entrenched in a group's collective psyche. However, if we are to look at how these norms change over time, it is not simply enough to look at collective remembering; we also need to look at how these memories are written over the memories which were there before. As such, I suggest we need to combine an examination of collective memory with an examination of its corollary – collective forgetting. By examining both collective remembering and collective forgetting we can see identity as a process rather than a fixed phenomenon – a question of continual strategic positioning in accordance with whatever is most efficacious in order to ensure survival as a collectivity.

The final element of identity incorporated into the framework is intended to account for the motivations behind this strategic positioning of identity. I refer here to differential consciousness – the idea that collectivities may simultaneously possess a number of

oppositional consciousnesses which create a 'new kind of rationality' (Sandoval, 2000, p. 30) which we need to acknowledge when dealing with refugees. I agree with Sandoval that we need to engage in a cognitive mapping of these consciousnesses in order to understand the motivational forces which lead to transient and multiple identities. The aim here is not to make normative or prescriptive judgements about what types of identity are desirable or undesirable. Rather the assertion is that the fluidity and multiplicity of identities, particularly refugee identities which are not grounded in fixed territorial space, means that they can be easily rendered as threatening.

The framework is inspired by Foucault's work on the spatialization of disease, in which he argues that disease is played out on three levels; in classification, on the body/assemblages of bodies, and in administrative structures (Foucault, 1993, p. 15). In the identity process framework, a similar logic can be applied to refugees. On the one level, they exist in classification where they are ascribed a certain territorial origin and settlement. The effects of this can be seen in security discourse, as certain territories may be recognized as the site of certain refugee activity. For example, the First Intifada in 1987 has been depicted as beginning in the Jabalia refugee camp, and this site is often associated with refugee violence. On another level, "refugeeness" is focussed on certain bodies, or assemblages, who have been designated "refugee" and are (at least temporarily) concentrated in a certain locus. Finally, the location of refugees plays out in the administrative practices of the host, as they must devise certain methods of "dealing" with the refugee situation. Having already established (and critiqued) in earlier chapters how refugees are conventionally classified, this framework seeks to examine how refugee identity is then ascribed and played out on certain "bodies" in certain sites.

Borderzones: Refugees and Territory

Lavie and Swedenburg discuss sites of refugee influx as "borderzones" – both in the literal geographical sense (refugee camps are usually set up at or near the borders of receiving countries) and in a metaphorical sense (I refer back to Lavie and Swedenburg's assertion that they are 'sites of creative creolization...zones where the residents often refuse the geopolitical univocality of the lines' [1999, p. 15]). Lavie and Swedenburg do not argue that if refugees were not present at these sites then the identity of the remaining "local" community would be completely homogenous. Nonetheless, it is clear that the presence of refugees brings with it a number of demographic and cultural differences, which are likely

to be experienced as a burden to the host community. At the very least, the protracted presence of refugees among host populations challenges the 'notion that there is an immutable link between cultures, people, or identities and specific places' (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1999, p. 1), which is a foundational assumption of the idea of the modern nation state. 'Similarly, one is led to question the notion of identity as a historical essence rooted in particular places, or as a fixed and identifiable position in a universalizing taxanomic order' (Malkki, 1995, p. 2).

Lavie and Swedenburg consider the possibility that migrants may be perceived as threats to the ostensible cultural homogeneity of the host country, by referring to the example of the somewhat hysterical attitude held in some Western societies towards 'massive migrations by radicalized non-white subjects into the heart of the Eurocenter [*sic*]' (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1999, p. 2). They draw on the differences created between Western conceptions of "self" and "other", in which the "self" occupies the Eurocentre, and the "other" (which the "self" regard as "savage" or uncivilized) occupies the Third World. The hysterical attitude towards migrants was therefore born out of a securitization process whereby the "other" became threatening because they refused to stay in their "place", or become sufficiently "white" when they entered the Eurocentre. 'The Savage is no longer "out there" but has invaded the "home here" and has fissured it in the process' (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1999, p. 12). Lavie and Swedenburg's work constitutes part of a larger canon of literature which examines the perception that Third World immigration to the West may constitute a threat (see for example, Bigo [2002] who examines the "threat" of Muslim immigration to the West). While this kind of securitization is not experienced by all refugee groups, the sense of threat that can be felt by host communities when refugee communities "invade" their space is equally applicable to migration across more proximate borders in Africa, Asia, and South America.

While host communities may feel threatened by the insecurity a mass influx of refugees may create when they enter their territory, the relationship between the refugees' collective identity and the space which they occupy is also a source of insecurity for the refugees themselves. Refugees are, to use Haddad's term, "between two sovereigns" (Haddad, 2008), and are likely to not being fully accepted by the host nation, while also being unable to rejoin their sending nation, a difficult and alienating process. I suggest that this liminal position leads to the constantly evolving nature of refugee identities, as they attempt to negotiate an identity which is not necessarily anchored to a specific territory.

The uncertainty which accompanies a lack of linkage to a singular space is not specific to refugees, but any members of a diaspora: '"Diaspora" refers to the double relationship or dual loyalty that migrants, exiles and refugees have to places – their connections to the space they currently occupy and their continuing involvement with "back home"' (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1999, p. 14). However, I would argue that the forced nature of their flight (which is a condition not present in many other types of migrants), and the lack of means to choose the site of their resettlement (which is particularly acute for refugees compared to other migrants) means that this uncertainty for refugees is greater, as they have been unable to prepare or consider exactly what their relationship with host and sending country might be prior to their flight. Furthermore, unlike migrants, for refugees there is no option of immediate return to their home country if things do not go to plan in their host country. The fact that refugees do not have citizenship status in their host states, and have fled from hostile states whose citizenship has offered them little protection, makes uncertainty for the refugee even greater.

The creation of an identity in relation to host and sending country among refugee communities is a rather *ad hoc* process; a response to developments in both sites in order to ensure survival. Given the transitory state of refugee identity, it may seem counter-intuitive to suggest that relationship to territory should be the basis of an analysis of refugee identity. However, I argue that we can begin to understand this relationship if we try to identify whether the refugee community in question is an Odyssean community or a Rubicon community. 'Odyssean refugees perceive themselves as temporarily in their reception society; they are oriented toward the past and the homeland' (Joly, 2002, p. 9). For these refugees, they are still very much members of their sending community but have been temporarily forced to flee because this community has come under attack by an oppressive regime. Joly gives as an example of such Odyssean refugees the Mapuche refugees who fled Chile. For these refugees the geographical territory which constitutes Chile (which they identify as their "homeland") is extremely significant to their identity. As a result, the Mapuches may cooperate while in exile with various other Chilean diaspora organizations. However, the racism and prejudice that the Mapuches have experienced, not just during the Pinochet regime from which they fled, but throughout Chile's colonial and postcolonial history, has meant that their interaction with Chilean organizations has been extremely cautious and distrustful (Joly, 2002, pp. 11-12). Thus, although the end of Pinochet's military dictatorship in Chile meant that some Mapuches could (and several did) return home, for many even the current regime in Chile is not one which they believe to be

"truly Chilean" – it does not defend their beliefs and values, which they believe constitute the true Chilean identity. The identity of the Mapuche, much like that of the Kurds, is at once anchored within the territory of their sending country, but also premised on a rejection of the national regime which currently dominates that territory. As long as such a regime exists they see themselves as unable to return to their sending country, but they hold true that they can and will eventually return to their country of origin. Consequently, they 'determine themselves and their group identification within the structure of conflict of homeland society and its cleavages' (Joly, 2002, p. 12).

By contrast, for Rubicon refugees 'return for the purpose of settling back home is not envisaged within the framework of options for the future and exile is perceived as definitive' (Joly, 2002, p. 16). Vietnamese refugees to the West, for example, can be seen as representing a Rubicon refugee community as they directed their collective identity project towards creating associations which would facilitate faster integration into their receiving communities (see Joly, 2002). While it is tempting to see Rubicon refugees as less threatening to host societies than Odyssean refugees (given their seeming willingness to assimilate into the host's culture), we must be careful not to conclude that Rubicon refugees are somehow a more "desirable" type of refugee: 'This may mean a greater propensity to have a positive attitude toward the society of reception and perhaps a greater availability to make a fresh start and to innovate. On the other hand, the involuntary character of the migration invested the move with a negative character which may have adverse effects on settlement' (Joly, 2002, p. 16). While these refugees may have rejected the culture of their homeland, it does not necessarily follow that they will accept the culture of their host, and indeed may have their own identity which they seek to assert within the host community. Rubicon refugees tend to be a more heterogeneous group than Odyssean refugees as they do not share the common goal of return to the homeland. Consequently, there is greater uncertainty surrounding the aims and motivations of Rubicon refugees. Furthermore, whilst the receiving community might regard Odyssean refugees as a temporary nuisance, Rubicon refugees place upon their hosts a more permanent strain.

In her discussion of Odyssean and Rubicon refugees, Joly argues that the refugee's 'relationship to the country of origin and its structure of conflict has a determining impact on the process of settlement' (Joly, 2002, p. 4). In addition, we also need to understand how certain refugee communities may shift from being an Odyssean group to a Rubicon

community. Joly alludes to this phenomenon, but does not fully explain why this may happen. I suggest that an answer can be found if we invert the direction of the relationship between sending country and the process of settlement that Joly puts forward, and appreciate that the process of settlement may have a determining impact on the relationship to the country of origin. I argue that a key factor contributing to the transition from Odyssean to Rubicon status is the protracted nature of exile. As the length of their exile increases, Odyssean refugees may develop an increasingly distant relationship with their sending country. Accordingly, their motivations may turn away from a collective return project, and move towards establishing a more enduring sense of security in their host country, which many may see as a new place of permanent settlement. As a result, these refugees will concern themselves with the power-play of their host country (and gaining political and civil status therein). I argue that as refugee situations become more protracted, they become easier to analyse because it is possible to discern from the focus of the refugee community's activities whether they consider themselves to be Odyssean or Rubicon refugees.

It is important to emphasize that not all prolonged refugee situations lead to the creation of Rubicon refugee communities. Indeed, many refugee groups, despite being caught in protracted refuge situations, never fully make the transition from Odyssean to Rubicon. The most notable example of such a group are the Palestinian refugees who see themselves very much as a nation in exile and hold on to the Odyssean dream of return to their homeland – even though their 'homes' have long-since been destroyed, and most members of this group were actually born outside of the territory to which they dream of returning. Indeed, it is likely that most refugee groups, even if they have decided to focus on assimilating into their host countries, will still have some relationship, however small, to their sending country. Nonetheless, I argue that understanding whether a refugee group is *primarily* motivated by an Odyssean project of return or a Rubicon project of resettlement is significant, as, once this has been established, we have a territorial basis upon which to understand their actions. The uncertainty which has been brought about by their liminal position between two sovereigns is partly alleviated because we can know (at least for a fixed period of time) towards which sovereign the brunt of their activities are oriented.

Cultural Trauma: Remembering and Forgetting the Past

Regardless of whether refugee groups are Rubicon or Odyssean in motivation, their transition from citizens (or, if they were not afforded rights as citizens in their sending countries, and were fleeing prolonged persecution and oppression, denizens) in one country to refugees in another is likely to force them to undergo a change in the manner in which they collectively conceive themselves. St Louis argues that 'when the world appears to be in flux to perplexing existential effect, identities can provide a comforting resource to (re)stabilize individual and collective subjectivities' (St Louis, 2009, p. 565). The threats faced by refugee groups whilst in exile means that they may have to forge for themselves new collective identities. The second aspect of my framework, therefore, focuses on the twofold manner in which new identities are created. In the first place, I examine the cultural traumas which may account for the context in which the need to forge a new identity arises. The nature of such traumas may range from the actual act of exile – which brings with it a sense of dislocation and uncertainty which the group may find traumatic, to a complete sense of anomie – caused, for example, by experience of a genocide, or other crimes against humanity. Secondly I move to identify *how*, in light of these traumas, new identities are constructed. Drawing inspiration from St Louis's assertion that the creation of a present identity is arrived at 'through a past that is imaginatively reconstructed and dramatized' (St Louis, 2009, p. 565), I move to look at the processes of collective memory and forgetting which allow refugee groups to reconfigure their pasts in a way that allows them to survive as a collectivity in exile. I have used the plural 'identities', rather than spoken of a singular collective identity here because, while it is possible that a refugee group may create a unified collective identity, upon which they all agree, and which endures for the entire period of their exile, more likely than not there will be disagreement between members. Consequently, it is more likely that a refugee group will create multiple identities whilst in exile, and as the situations in both host and sending countries change, these identities are likely to evolve.

Suarez-Orozco asserts that immigrants are likely to undergo a number of stresses, ranging from an overall sense of alienation from 'many of their [previous] sustaining social relationships' (Suarez-Orozco, 2000, p. 195) to 'stresses that result in post-traumatic symptomology' (Suarez-Orozco, 2000, p. 196) such as the experience or witnessing of torture, rape or killing. Such experiences are likely to create 'traumatic memories [which] are the unassimilated scraps of overwhelming experiences, [and] which need to be

integrated with existing mental schemes, and be transformed into narrative language' (van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1995, p. 176). Van der Kolk and van der Hart are here talking about individual traumatic experiences, but as Hutchinson and Bleiker observe, 'individual experiences of trauma can translate into collective experiences, and thus into political formations' (Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2008, p. 390). However, this relationship between individual and collective experience is not a one way street. Rather, there is a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the collective where individual traumas can translate into collective experience, and collective traumas can shape the identity of the individual (and I refer to cultural trauma as constituting the sum of this relationship).

In the Identity Process Framework, this reciprocal relationship accounts for the fact that members of the same refugee group may diverge to form different sub-groups with quite different identities. It can, for example, explain why among the Hutu refugees who fled Rwanda in 1994, some (most notably those who had committed atrocities during the Genocide) tried to remilitarize in the camps, whilst others resisted such militarization. This example illustrates that the experience of cultural trauma is not necessarily one which implies that those who experience it are themselves victims. The shame or guilt of past actions could be considered a "trauma" in the sense that it is being used here, as much as the suffering of persecution or victimization, as it also leaves an indellible mark on the consciousness of this sufferers.[127] By examining these cultural traumas we can try to better understand the strategies and motivations of certain refugee groups, whose actions may otherwise seem to defy "rational" comprehension. In this sense, cultural trauma provides what Blumer calls a 'sensitizing concept' – which, although it cannot necessarily directly tell us what we are looking for, may highlight areas in which to search for it (Blumer, 1954). Cultural trauma, within my framework, allows us to account for the non-linearity which Chaos Theory suggests is present in complex systems, as it 'alerts us to a new empirical phenomenon and suggests a new relationship between previously unrelated events, structures, perceptions and actions' (Alexander, 2004, p. 4).

The reciprocal relationship between the forging of collective and individual identity is further evidenced if we look beyond the cultural traumas, which may explain *why* identities change, to look at the processes of remembering and forgetting which facilitate *how* identities change. Halbwachs argues that it is possible an individual possesses two

[127] I refer here to the earlier quotation from Alexander (2004, p. 1), which I cited on page 138.

simultaneous types of memory; his/her *individual* memory taken from his/her own personal experience and point of view, and a *collective* memory which is disseminated by a group. 'These two memories are often intermingled. In particular, the individual memory, in order to corroborate and make precise and even to cover the gaps in its remembrances, relies upon, relocates itself within, momentarily merges with, the collective memory' (Halbwachs, 1941, pp. 50-1). In this understanding, collective memory is defined as 'the combined discourses of self: Sexual, racial, historical, regional, ethnic, cultural, national, familial, which intersect with an individual' (see Eyerman, 2004, p. 66). Through this conception of memory, we may better understand how the historical narratives which inform group identities are shaped.

This conception of collective memory may be illustrated through Rabinowitz's discussion of Palestinian refugees who are united by the collective project of all Palestinians being allowed to return to Palestine, imagined in the collective Palestinian memory as a harmonious and peaceful place, based on a rose-tinted view of conditions before 1948. 'This nostalgic effigy of a distant golden age catapults the past into the present, engendering a morally prescribed vision for the future' (Rabinowitz, 2010, p. 500). This memory of the old country, which preceded the birth of many Palestinian refugees, and which many have not therefore experienced first-hand, drives the project of collective return, and allows Palestinians to frame themselves as a suffering nation in exile. This collective memory is significant in uniting Palestinian refugees, who may otherwise share very different identities if they were to be constructed based on categories such as religion, wealth, status, or dwellings (urban/rural). For some Palestinian refugees displaced in protracted situations, even the option of citizenship in their host country is rejected, as this, they believe, would entail crossing the Rubicon and abandoning their Odyssean dream. Palestinian refugees have therefore constructed a utopian homeland which is far removed from the realities of modern-day Israel (where many Palestinians are treated as second-class citizens), but one which provides a moral justification for the return project. However, the Palestinians are not the only group who have constructed a collective memory for moral effect: Rabinowitz observes that '[t]he idealized misrecognition on the part of Palestinians of this demographic transformation [of Israel] and its capacity to rule out massive return is mirrored in the way most Israelis overlook the suffering of Palestinian refugees' (Rabinowitz, 2010, p. 505). Conflict therefore occurs when groups construct identities based on memories which are irreconcilable but held by each party to be sacred.

Collective memory has a corollary which may explain how identities change; namely, collective forgetting. There is a tendency to view forgetting negatively, as a failure of collective memory, but in reality collective forgetting can be utilised by communities in order to facilitate political transition. For refugee communities and host communities, dealing with the political upheaval that migration brings creates such a plethora of information that some degree of forgetting is required in order to create at least a partially coherent collective identity. Paul Connerton (2008) identifies seven types of forgetting, which he argues an individual or collectivity may adopt in order to survive and develop: Repressive erasure, prescriptive forgetting, forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity, structural amnesia, forgetting as annulment, forgetting as planned obsolescence, and forgetting as humiliated silence.[128] Not all of the classifications of forgetting are of immediate utility for understanding all groups; different actors may employ a number of different forgetting techniques in varying situations. For example, for host communities there may be a sheer surfeit of information about the arriving refugee communities, which consequently need to be pared down in order to form a single collective narrative. 'The old narratives and the old core stories slowly become effaced. There may be a number of reasons for this, but one at least is a wish to circumvent the problems of overflow that flow from the sheer excess of information' (Connerton, 2008, p. 66).

The political upheaval that migration brings for refugees communities also suggests that a degree of collective forgetting may be required. The most likely form of forgetting which may be deployed by refugee communities in these circumstances is "forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity". This type of forgetting focuses on 'the gain that accrues to those who know how to discard memories that serve no practicable purpose in the management of one's current identity and ongoing purposes' (Connerton, 2008, p. 63). For example, it is not expedient for Rwandan refugees who wish to settle in the Congo to highlight their Rwandan origins (as people of Rwandan origin are treated with suspicion by many "indigenous" Congolese groups). However, in the case of those Rwandan refugees in the Congo who may be associated with genocidal crimes in Rwanda, the most salient type of forgetting that the group may engage in is a type of forgetting whose 'most

[128] Connerton argues that these seven types can be distinguished by the fact that they 'have different agents, as well different functions and values' (Connerton, 2008, p. 69). He is also careful to add that, although he has identified seven different forms of forgetting to 'disentangle the different types of acts that cluster together under the single term "to forget"' (Connerton, 2008, p. 59), this is not an exhaustive list.

salient feature is a *humiliated silence*' (Connerton, 2008, p. 67). It is possible that some of those who feel this humiliated silence had no direct part in the Rwandan Genocide, but they may still feel a sense of collective shame at this association; there may be a concerted effort to silence their past and induce a collective forgetting. While we should be careful not to equate silencing with forgetting, 'some acts of silence may be an attempt to bury things beyond expression and the reach of memory; yet such silencing, while they are a type of repression, can at the same time be a form of survival, and the desire to forget may be an essential ingredient in the process of survival' (Connerton, 2008, p. 68).

By incorporating the notions of collective memory and collective forgetting, and thus the manner in which historical narratives aid the designation of threat, into the securitization approach that I critiqued in earlier chapters, we can better understand how the attitudes of, and towards, refugee groups may change over time, and also how refugee groups may simultaneously hold multiple identities. Collective memory and forgetting accounts for the manifold nature of collective identity; the process involves constantly forgetting and re-remembering or re-casting history, redefining identity by building new (or reintegrating past) narratives. So far, however, the explanatory variables expounded in the identity-process framework only explain the forward motion of the identity trajectory – looking at how identities are created and evolve. However, the significance of the creation of multiple identities is that no previous identity needs to be completely destroyed. Rather, previous identities can be revisited if the situation requires them to be mobilized. The framework therefore now moves to examine how different identities can be utilised for strategic effect, and how actors may move in any direction along the identity paths which they have constructed.

Reconfiguring, Re-inscribing and Resisting: The Differential Consciousness.

'Collective memory is conceived as the outcome of interaction, a conversational process within which individuals locate themselves, where identities are described as the different ways individuals and collectivities are positioned by, and position themselves, within narratives' (Eyerman, 2004, p. 67). Earlier, I highlighted Rabinowitz's example of Palestinian refugees as a collective 'whose very identity hinges on return' (Rabinowitz, 2010, p. 499). Certainly, return continues to be a significant element of Palestinian refugee identity, but given that many members of this group are now second- third- (or even fourth-) generation refugees, return may not be the only identity which they have constructed. Some groups of

Palestinian refugees in Jordan, for example, have moved towards gaining Jordanian citizenship, and many Palestinians who fled to America became naturalized Americans. Despite this, it is perhaps incorrect to describe them as full-blown Rubicon refugees. They may not physically return to Palestine, but they still long for the option of being able to do so. The fact that some Palestinians have assimilated into their host countries, whilst still nurturing a project of return (even if this only manifests itself as the *option* to return) to Palestine, may be an example of what Sandoval has termed the "differential consciousness" (Sandoval, 2000).

Sandoval highlights four types of "oppositional consciousness", within which she argues marginal groups constitute themselves, in order to resist subordination by the dominant social order (Sandoval, 2000). These four types are the *equal rights consciousness* – which, based on a notion of common humanity, seeks the group's assimilation into the current social order, in order to gain equal rights (such as the earlier example of Vietnamese refugees in America); the *revolutionary consciousness* – which emphasises the group's difference and calls for a radical restructuring of society for these differences to be accepted, accommodated, and appreciated, and so that the group are no longer subordinated (such as the Chilean Mapuches refugees); the *supremacist consciousness* – which also emphasises difference, but argues that their difference gives them a "higher evolutionary level", and they should therefore be given leading positions of power (this could have partially motivated the demands of the RPF in Rwanda[129]); and the *separatist consciousness* – which reinforces difference by calling for complete autonomy from the dominant social order (for example, Kurdish separatists). While, examples can be given of refugee groups who have exhibited signs of identities constituted within each of these consciousnesses, they are often thought of as distinct consciousnesses such that one group cannot hold more than one consciousness. However, we could argue that a group such as the RPF may have begun with an equal rights consciousness which then evolved into supremacist consciousness as their military victories gave them the confidence to pursue such aims. What the RPF might therefore exercise is a *differential consciousness* – which

[129] The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Paul Kagame, was comprised of Rwandan Tutsi refugees exiled in Uganda who invaded Rwanda in 1990 to overthrow the Hutu government. Timothy Longman (Longman, 2002) argues that the RPF's military victories gave them a sense of entitlement which led them to make military and political demands which would give disproportionate power to the Tutsi-led group despite the fact the Tutsi only constituted 15% of the Rwandan population. While there may be some truth to Longman's assertion, RPF demands were also motivated by fear of extermination by Hutu extremists, and a counter-claim to these extremists' assertions that the Tutsi were "cockroaches".

'involves switching among the other four sites [of oppositional consciousness] as the conditions of oppression or the shape of power changes' (Moya, 2002, p. 79). The utility of differential consciousness, is that it allows oppressed groups to respond to changing situations by developing a subjectivity which is 'kinetic and self-consciously mobile' (Moya, 2002, p. 79). The differential consciousness serves as a tool to strengthen groups' resilience, but it also requires that groups who mobilize it already possess a number of survival skills:

> 'Differential consciousness requires grace, flexibility, and strength: enough strength to confidently commit to a well-defined structure of identity for one hour, day, week, month, year; enough flexibility to self-consciously transform that identity according to the requisites of another oppositional ideological tactic if readings of power's formation require it; enough grace to recognize alliance with others....As the clutch of a car provides the driver the ability to shift gears, differential consciousness permits the practitioner to choose tactical positions, that is, to self-consciously break and reform ties to ideology, activities which are imperative for the psychological and political practices that permit the achievement of coalition across differences' (Sandoval, 2008, p. 348).[130]

The differential consciousness therefore allows for groups to navigate between these various oppositional consciousnesses, arguing that none are mutually exclusive, but just mobilized at different times. Differential consciousness provides a fifth way, which weaves between the four oppositional consciousnesses. In other words, differential consciousness is 'a state of "nomadic" being that invests in identities as tactics' (Tapia, 2001, p. 735). Differential consciousness is therefore a strategic choice; groups mobilise different identities in varying situations depending on which is strategically most effective in the given circumstances. The differential consciousness element of the identity process framework gives refugees the agency required to analyse them as actors in conflict. Sandoval applied differential consciousness to what she called Third World women in the United States – that is, women whose ancestral origin could be traced to the Third World, and who had settled in the United States of America. Lavie and Swedenburg noted that the differential consciousness which Sandoval observed among these women produced strategies for coping with their experience which fractured the binary distinctions which the West had held up between the First and Third Worlds (see Lavie & Swedenburg, 1999,

[130] This quotation is taken from a book chapter which heavily reproduces material that Sandoval published in *Genders* (1991, pp. 1-25)

p. 5). I argue that when refugees utilize their differential consciousness they challenge the binary distinction between refugee and citizen and defy their traditional role as passive actors.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to highlight the utility of a more comprehensive analysis of identity in conflict analysis. It has observed that current models of conflict analysis do not necessarily have a wide range of tools through which to adequately analyse identity, and has therefore sought to provide a new framework for analysis in this respect. The framework drew inspiration from the lessons of Chaos Theory in calling for a non-linear model which took into account the extreme sensitivity to small events to which complex conflict systems are susceptible. In doing so, I argued that two conflicts which begin in remarkably similar ways may result in drastically different outcomes, because of small differences in the unfolding of events. Consequently, I argue that models which predict risk factors to conflict are often inaccurate, as the number of variables affecting the outcome are multitudinous and cannot all be numerically coded. Furthermore, in cases where a numerical value can be assigned (such as number of battle deaths), I argue that the data upon which this value is decided is oftentimes unreliable. In response to this criticism, I offer my own non-linear framework in the form of the Identity Process Framework. I begin the framework, which attempts to explain the sensitizing concepts shaping refugee identity, by examining refugees' relationship with the territories they occupy, explaining the varying directions of their identity paths through cultural traumas, and then using collective memory and forgetting to elucidate the development of multiple identity paths. I then account for refugees' agency through the mobilization of differential consciousness. This chapter has outlined the theoretical underpinnings of my framework. In the next chapter I move to apply the framework to Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors – arguing that analysing them in this way will reveal a number of insights regarding this elusive group's security choices and motivations.

Chapter Five: Identity as Tactics

The Disquieting Endurance of Rwandan Hutu Refugee Warriors in the Congo

---

'The FDLR is no longer just an external invading insurgency group that can easily be thrown out of the country but is an integral part of the North Kivu security predicament'.[131]

~

Introduction

The Identity Process Framework set out in the previous chapter sought to elucidate some of the aspects of uncertainty and insecurity which compound refugees' need to construct flexible and resilient identities. In this chapter, I move to apply this framework to the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors operating in the Kivus. I argue that if we seek to understand their actions in light of these uncertainties, we may not only begin to understand why they act in the way that they do, but we may also uncover ways of addressing their insecurity and providing non-violent alternative options for them. The focus of this chapter will be the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), who have been described by the International Crisis Group as 'the most powerful and harmful political military rebel organisation in [the] Congo' (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 1), and have been responsible for a number of human rights violations in the eastern DRC including murder, rape, forced recruitments, recruiting child soldiers and illegally exploiting minerals through slave labour (see Feeley & Thomas-Jensen, 2008; International Crisis Group, 2009; Greste, 2009). The group consists mainly of Rwandan Hutu refugees who fled to the Congo in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, and several members are wanted for genocidal war crimes in Rwanda (although it is important to stress that not all of them are in this position).[132] In addition, I will also examine a number of other militias who have been affiliated with the FDLR, but who have contested this connection (and the FDLR often reciprocally deny their association with these groups).

---

[131] (Bøås, 2008, p. 60).

[132] For example, the first military commander of the FDLR, Paul Rwarakabije did not take part in the Genocide.

These groups include the Liberation Front of North Kivu (FLNK), the *Rasta*, and the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD-Urunana), all of whom have been associated with the FDLR, because they contain either FDLR deserters or Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors who are perceived to harbour a Hutu Power ideology. I do not believe that there is sufficient reliable evidence to make a judgement as to whether or not these groups are affiliated with the FDLR. However, what the existence of these groups does prove is that even if measures against the FDLR are succeeding in reducing their numbers (and I would contest the extent to which even this is the case), the proliferation of militias containing Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors indicates that the militancy of this group as a whole has not been reduced.

Despite more than a decade of existential attacks against them by rival rebel militias, including a recent concerted offensive by the combined forces of the Rwandan army, Congolese army and MONUSCO, the FDLR have nonetheless endured and demonstrated great resilience and survival instinct. Indeed, several reports regarding their resource extraction activities (see Eichstaedt, 2011; Nest, 2011) indicate that their resourcefulness stretches beyond merely ensuring their survival to actually *improving* their position in the Kivus (although this improvement is primarily understood in economic terms). The FDLR are not alone in exploiting the eastern Congo's lucrative resource base (certainly other local militias, as well as the Congolese Army and RDF, are known to also exploit natural resources for personal gain) (see, for example, Atzili, 2007; Eichstaedt, 2011; Nest, 2011). However, it is clear that the FDLR have been exploiting the Congo's mineral wealth. One MONUSCO officer noted that some FDLR soldiers, when captured or demobilized could have up to US$900 worth of gold on their person (MONUSCO Officer, 2010). However, the FDLR's resourcefulness in out-manouevering the military operations against them, as well as their income-generating activities, have come at an appalling human cost – a cost which has been borne by the most vulnerable inhabitants of the eastern Congo, many of them, themselves having been displaced by war. While the military attacks against the FDLR are proving inadequate, it is clear that the Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior threat needs to be reduced. As such, this chapter argues, contrary to Rafti, that Rwandan opposition is not 'crumbling in exile' (Rafti, 2004-5), but has rather turned its attention towards more practical means of survival in the eastern Congo.

In Chapter Six, I will analyse what can be done about Rwandan Hutu belligerency and argue that the failure of military interventions demonstrates that a new approach to reducing the

FDLR's violence, combined with a more integrative approach towards Rwandan Hutus in general, is necessary. At the heart of my argument is the assertion that we need to offer groups such as the FDLR non-violent alternatives to overcoming the constant security dilemmas which they face. Before viable alternatives can be offered, however, a deeper analysis of the manner in which these groups perceive their security situation, and the way they construct their collective identity according to this perception, is necessary. I propose that, through the application of the Identity Process Framework, we can uncover some significant insights into the collective identity of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors in order to understand better their motivations and strategies for overcoming their security situation. Given how remarkably resilient the group has been in surviving in eastern Congo's Hobbesian environment, if we can learn more about how they survive – not just in a physical/military sense, but also as a collective "self" with a group identity, we may be able to move towards offering them more peaceful opportunities to ensure their survival and pursue their goals.

This chapter begins by first giving an overview of what is known about the FDLR in terms of its structure, activities and governance. I also examine some of the interventions deployed to tackle the FDLR threat, focussing in particular on the joint operation *Umoja Wetu* – one of the most comprehensive military offensives aimed at the FDLR. I look at how, although the operation may have temporarily reduced FDLR numbers, the threat of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors nonetheless endures. In fact, I argue that they may have fortified their position by adopting a number of strategies. Such strategies include using the impenetrability of the Congolese forests to evade capture, allying with Maï-Maï groups, and diversifying their base through off-shoot groups such as the FLNK and *Rasta.* Accordingly, I examine how Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors have responded to the existential threats to their position, and argue that current attempts to destroy groups which contain them (such as the FDLR) are inadequate. At the heart of these refugee warriors' success in surviving is a resilient and flexible collective identity which facilitates the groups' endurance. I therefore move to examine how their identity defence system works by applying the Identity Process Framework to the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors operating in the Kivus. Accordingly, the second, third, and fourth sections of this chapter echo the framework set out in the previous chapter. As such, it focuses on spatialization, cultural trauma and collective memory and differential consciousness, respectively.

Thus, in the second section I examine the FDLR's relationship with the space that it occupies – demonstrating that the FDLR have made the transition from being a group of Odyssean refugee warriors to becoming a quasi-Rubicon community. I analyse the implications that this has for both Rwandan and Congolese security. Despite advocating strong anti-Kagame rhetoric, in practice most of the FDLR's activities have been situated in and directed towards the Congo, indicating that they see themselves less as Rwandan refugees, and more as Congolese denizens. It is therefore possible that they are not primarily motivated by a possibility of to return to Rwanda, but rather by a desire to convert their Congolese denizen-ship into citizenship. However, achieving this is likely to be impeded by a number of serious obstructions, not least because of the highly contested question of Rwandophone[133] nationality in the Congo. I have argued that one of the potential tools offered by Chaos Theory to conflict analysis involves the idea of fractal patterning (the observation that repeating patterns of behaviour may manifest at different scales over time). Therefore, I observe the FDLR's transition from Rwandan refugee to Congolese denizen, and identify the FDLR's behaviour as a repeated pattern in a long history of Rwandophone migration in the Great Lakes. I argue that the FDLR follow in the footsteps of many other Rwandophone groups who see the boundary between Rwanda and the Congo as one which is both fluid and contestable. FDLR attempts to integrate into a highly divided, and historically anti-Rwandophone, society like the eastern Congo run up against a minefield of difficulties: On the one hand, in order to ensure immediate security in the Congo they will have to distance themselves from their Rwandan roots, yet on the other hand, the Hutu-Power rhetoric which is so central to their collective identity is likely to make their Rwandophone association difficult to break.

In the third section of this chapter, I move to look at the way in which the FDLR have thus far attempted to navigate this minefield by analysing the multi-faceted nature of their identity. I demonstrate the ways in which they have integrated into the eastern Congo, whilst still remaining true to their Rwandan origins. During the FDLR's exile in the Congo they have faced a number of cultural traumas – from their post-1994 exodus from Rwanda, through the events which led the group to form in 1999, to the various targeted operations designed to wipe them out since that formation. In overcoming each one of these traumas, the FDLR added new strands to their identity. Just as the twisting together of fibres gives a rope extra strength and flexibility, the process of interweaving various strands of identity

[133] Referring to those who speak Kinyarwanda – that is to say Hutus and Tutsis who inhabit the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.

created by the traumas that they have endured has given the collective identity of the FDLR extra strength and flexibility. Of course multiple strands of simultaneously-held identity are likely to result in some inherent contradictions, and I also look at how, through the processes of collective memory and collective forgetting, the FDLR configure their past in order to incorporate the various strands of their identity into one collective identity. In particular, I examine how the assertion of autochthonous discourses have been utilized to recast the FDLR's history.

Finally in the fourth section, I look at how the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors have coped with existential threats to their survival by utilizing their differential consciousness, or deployed their 'identity as tactics' (Tapia, 2001, p. 735). In this section I look at two particular elements of activity that demonstrate skillful use of their differential consciousness. Firstly, I examine the speed and expediency with which groups such as the FDLR have managed to respond to changes on the ground in the Kivus by forging (and if necessary breaking) alliances. In doing so, I demonstrate how the FDLR have at different times in their histories been able to present themselves as members of a number of rights-deserving groups including refugees, autochthons and "locals". Secondly, I examine the various FDLR-affiliated and FDLR-offshoot groups which have proliferated in the Kivus. I examine how the activities of groups like the *Rasta* (a criminal gang who are often cited as providing funds for the FDLR) give the FDLR a sense of plausible deniability for the war crimes they are so often accused off, and also provide the economic means by which the FDLR can endure in the Congo. I also suggest that the existence of groups such as the Front for the Liberation of North Kivu (FLNK), which purportedly consists of FDLR dissenters, demonstrate the continuation of Hutu Power ideology by a name other than that of the FDLR. Returning to the utility of fractal self-similarity as a method of analysis, I argue that just as the FDLR may be regarded as a reincarnation of ALiR, so groups like the FLNK may be regarded as the next generation of the FDLR. Having looked in this chapter at how Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors construct their identity, and the strategies and motivations driving them, I move in the next chapter to look at the various incentives these groups have to remain violent, and the different strategies we can employ to encourage them to disarm and reduce their violence.

Whilst researching Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups for this thesis, I encountered a large problem of inaccessibility. On the one hand, during fieldwork, I discovered that relatively few organizations (with the notable exception of MONUSCO) actively engage with

groups such as the FDLR. Furthermore, as this group is often securitized – or rather criminalized – they tend to retreat from accessible spaces. The Chaos Theory model which I set out in the previous chapter is therefore designed to analyse a group in a context where a dearth of information exists. Much of my analysis has been based on reports about the FDLR, and other Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups, that have been compiled by humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations, International Crisis Group, and the Pole Institute.[134] Where possible, I have also used information disseminated by these groups themselves, as well as various media reports about the groups. However, this collection of resources represent a relatively inconsistent, and unsupported cannon of literature. For example, in the 2007 Nairobi Communiqué[135] which was praised by the UN Security Council as 'an important milestone towards the definitive settlement of the problem of illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo' (United Nations Security Council, 2007), all Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups in the eastern Congo are conflated under one term which associates them all with genocidal activity: 'The term ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* used in this text shall be understood as referring to all Rwandan armed groups in Congolese soil, irrespective of their denomination (ex-FAR, *Interahamwe*, ALIR, FDLR, RUD-Unana [*sic*], Rasta, etc' (United Nations Security Council, 2007b, p. 2). Such a conflation is common in reports, as is the assertion that these groups are subsidiaries of one another. Again, this allegation has been contested by certain groups. For example, in a 2009 press release, the group RUD-Urunana challenged a 2009 report by the International Crisis Group (International Crisis Group, 2009), arguing that: 'While reading the ICG report, one may come up with an impression that the RUD-Urunana is a subsidiary of the FDLR. We would like to recall the International Community that, due to profound divergences, certain members departed officially and publicly with the FDLR in September 2004' (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 1). It is not my intention in this chapter to either prove or disprove these allegations, but rather to highlight the disjuncture between how these groups see themselves and how the international community views them. In doing so, I seek to reveal why efforts to reduce their threat have not been more successful.

---

[134] The Pole Institute describes itself as an 'Intercultural Institute for Peace in the Great Lakes Region' (Pole Institute, 2011) and was set up in 1997 by 22 local Kivutians in the wake of the First Congo War. It has been working in the Kivus since, and attempts to foster inter-communal dialogue and provide 'a meeting ground for reflection and discussion' among the Kivutian people, who it believes many other NGOS by-pass in their peacebuilding operations (translated and paraphrased from the Pole Institute website – see Pole Institute, 2011)

[135] Officially called *The Joint Communiqué of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on a Common Approach to Ending the Threat Posed to Peace and Stability in Both Countries and the Great Lakes Region*.

Rafti claims that 'The Rwandan opposition is disintegrating as a consequence of its prolonged existence in exile' (Rafti, 2004-5, p. 95). Rafti bases her argument on a characterization of the Kagame regime in Kigali as extremely strong, and a notion of Hutu power groups (such as the FDLR) and Tutsi opposition groups as weak and fragmented, arguing that 'the Rwandan external opposition's effectiveness has been marred by prolonged leadership antagonisms. There have been constant regroupings and realignments' (Rafti, 2004-5, p. 116). Rafti concludes by arguing that groups such as the FDLR need to return to Rwanda if they want to be taken seriously as an opposition group, and challenge the Kagame regime from within, arguing that 'exile politics have proved futile' (Rafti, 2004-5, p. 117). Rafti's research makes some compelling arguments for the merit of FDLR repatriation. However, I argue that Rafti overlooks a number of power dynamics in the Congo and Rwanda, which may explain why it is not necessarily expedient for these groups to repatriate. Firstly, she underplays the implications of the strength of the Kagame regime. Although Rafti acknowledges that dissidence is heavily policed in Rwanda, she sees this as only a minor obstacle: 'In spite of the dangers posed – through the omnipresence of the security forces – and the difficulties in setting up a political party that will be accredited, a multi-ethnic opposition party active in Rwanda would likely enjoy popular support' (Rafti, 2004-5, p. 115). Echoing many human rights organizations, I would instead suggest that these dangers are not so easy to overcome. Indeed, they have been a matter of life and death for many critics of the Kagame regime. Setting up a party in opposition to Kagame would encounter more than just a few "difficulties" – especially if this party were to be a Hutu Power party (which I argue, given the FDLR's rhetoric, is more likely than the multi-ethnic party that Rafti believes the opposition would form).

Secondly, Rafti's characterization of Hutu Power movements as "crumbling in exile" assumes that these movements still retain return to Rwanda as their primary motivation. In fact, as many of their actions have demonstrated, several of the movements (most likely because they realise that the overthrow of the Kagame regime is becoming increasingly difficult) have turned their attention towards a more permanent settlement solution in the Congo. If we then examine these groups' activities within the Congo, we can see that they are far from crumbling. Rather, they are creating in the Kivus a support base for their Hutu Power rhetoric and anti-Tutsi sentiments. By shifting the focus from Rwanda to the Congo, we can view Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors not as a weary and failed opposition

movement, but as a group that has survived in hostile conditions for nearly two decades, and has adapted to its environment in creative ways.

Although the FDLR are currently seen as a rebel group that threatens the peace and stability of the Congo and Rwanda alike, they were not always treated as enemies of the state by the Congolese government. Indeed, in the Second Congo War, the FDLR and its forerunner groups (such as RDR and ALiR) were utilized and given tacit support by Laurent Kabila's government as a source of military power to assist in the defense against Kabila's main opposition; the Rwandan-backed rebel group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). Since the offical end of the war in 2002, however, there has been increased cooperation between the government of Rwanda and the government of Congo under Joseph Kabila. As a result, FDLR members have become *personae non grata* on both sides of the Kivu Rift Valley.[136] Consequently, in 2008, the Rwandan and Congolese governments agreed to launch a joint military offensive against the two main Rwandan rebels groups which were contributing to conflict in the eastern Congo: The FDLR, and the Tutsi-Power rebel group, the National Congress for the Defense of the Congolese People (CNDP).[137] Consequently, Rwandan and Congolese forces were assisted by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in an operation designed to dismantle the FDLR.

Broadly speaking, efforts to destroy the threat of the FDLR have followed three main approaches. When combined, these approaches represent an all-encompassing strategy targetting all levels of the FDLR's organization. Firstly, efforts have been made to cut off the FDLR's European leadership network. In November 2009, the FDLR's leader, Ignace Murwanashyaka, was arrested, along with his deputy Straton Musoni in Germany. In October 2010 executive secretary Callixte Mbarushimana was arrested in France. These arrests not only froze the assets of these leaders, preventing them from transferring funds from the FDLR's Western-based diaspora to the FDLR fighters in the Congo, it also blocked communications between the European and Congolese command. Furthermore, by being indicted for crimes against humanity, (Mbarushimana was indicted by the International

[136] The valley of Lake Kivu which demarcates the border between Rwanda and the Congo

[137] The CNDP was led by former RPA soldier Laurent Nkunda, who was arrested in 2009 in Rwanda after an agreement between the Congolese and Rwandan governments to cooperate over harbouring rebel leaders in their respective countries. Nkunda's arrest coincided with the launch of Operation *Umoja Wetu* against the FDLR, and demonstrates the strength and power of the Rwandan regime to arrest dissenters, even if they were at one time (like Nkunda) valuable allies.

Criminal Court, and Murwanashyaka and Musoni were tried in Stuttgart) international attention was brought to bear upon the nefarious activities of the FLDR.

Secondly, in order to reduce the base of non-combatant Rwandan refugees that the FDLR were holding in the Congo, to act as human shields and as a recruitment pool, a repatriation operation was undertaken – again with the support of both the Congolese and Rwandan governments, although it was MONUSCO that bore the logistical brunt of this operation. The opportunity of repatriation to Rwanda was also extended to FDLR combatants, a chance, I was informed during interviews, that was particularly utilized by FDLR child soldiers and FDLR fighters who played no part in the Rwandan Genocide (and thus were not likely to face imprisonment if they returned to Rwanda) (Interview with MONUSCO Officer, 2010). In some cases, where repatriation is not seen as a desirable option, MONUSCO was also able to disarm and demobilize some FDLR moderates and reintegrate them into eastern Congolese society. I was informed that several former FDLR combatants chose to remain in the Congo as they had married local Congolese women and settled there (Interview with MONUSCO Officer, 2010). Thirdly, and finally, a number of concerted military operations to wipe out the remaining FDLR hardliners were undertaken. Arguably the most prominent among these was Operation *Umoja Wetu* (meaning "Our Unity") which was launched on 20 January 2009 – combining the military power of the Rwandan army, (RDF),[138] Congolese Army (FARDC),[139] and MONUSCO. *Umoja Wetu* was launched after a deal was made between Kagame and Kabila. Under the terms of this agreement, Kagame agreed to remove the renegade Tutsi leader Laurent Nkunda from the eastern Congo, in exchange for Kabila allowing Rwandan Forces into the region to wipe out the remaining FDLR combatant (whose anti-Tutsi activities, Kagame claimed, justified the belligerent actions of Nkunda's CNDP militia). Consequently, two days after *Umoja Wetu*'s launch, on 22 January 2009, Nkunda was arrested as he crossed the border into Rwanda.

This multi-pronged and comprehensive attack on the various elements of the FDLR's organization can boast some successes: While the Europe-based leaders like Murwanashyaka and Mbarushimana were under arrest, they were unable to communicate with their Congo-based military commanders, and the website fdlr.org continues to be suspended. Between 2001 and 2010 more than 100,000 Rwandan refugees were repatriated from the DRC (UNHCR, 2010), and MONUSCO estimates that the FDLR's

[138] Rwandan Defence Forces
[139] Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo

numbers in 2011 were somewhere in the region of 3,000[140] combatants (a considerable reduction from its 2008 estimate of 8,000 combatants [Thakur, 2008]). However, despite nearly a decade of concerted efforts to wipe out the FDLR, the group remains. Furthermore, the successes outlined above are somewhat superficial and a more detailed analysis of their full implications reveals that, in reality, this success is somewhat limited.

Although the FDLR leaders in Europe were successfully arrested, they are yet to face punishment – in December 2011 a lack of sufficient evidence saw Callixte Mbarushimana dismissed of charges of war crimes by the ICC. Mbarushimana was released, and may now resume his role in the FDLR. The cases of Murwanashyaka and Musoni in Stuttgart are ongoing, but 'it is not yet clear if the German prosecution will be able to prove that orders leading to the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity came from Murwanashyaka himself' (Wegner, 2011). MONUSCO's reported success in repatriating Rwandan refugee warriors from the Kivus has been complemented by similar claims from UNHCR who boast that a "significant reduction" of Rwandan refugees has taken place in the eastern Congo (who constitute a significant recruitment pool for groups such as the FDLR). However, UNHCR also estimates that around 59,000 Rwandan refugees in the Kivus remain inaccessible to them (UNHCR, 2012a) and are therefore unregistered, undocumented and unlikely to be able to easily return to Rwanda (if that is even a desirable option for them). This group of "inaccessibles" is likely to replace those non-combatant and moderate fighters who were repatriated to Rwanda. Indeed, a 2009 report revealed that 'during the last few years the group has recruited a growing number of young Hutus from among the Rwandan refugee population in the DRC' (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 1). Furthermore, we have to ask when we judge the success of these operations, "success for whom"? While a significant number of Rwandan refugees may have been repatriated to Rwanda – 10,908 by January 2011 according to UNHCR statistics (UNHCR, 2012b) – this has not necessarily led to an improvement in the lives of those who have been repatriated. As UNHCR itself reports: 'The returnees face extreme poverty, as well as land and shelter issues, lack of medical coverage, a dearth of job opportunities and the need to walk long distances in search of water' (UNHCR, 2012b). This undermines Rafti's claim that the Rwandan opposition would be in the best position to challenge the Kagame

[140] Some reports state the current figure is closer to 2,500 (MONUSCO, 2011), although the same report estimated that between 2009 and 2011 the 6,000 strong FDLR were reduced by 3878 combatants – which would indicate that 2122 FDLR fighters remain. While there are no major discrepancies between the figures given in reports – the vagueness of the figures suggests that they should be very much regarded as best estimates with a +/-1000 level of accuracy.

regime from within Rwanda. Aside from the tight security control within Rwanda, those Hutu refugees who repatriate are likely to encounter basic survival issues, in a country with few income-generating opportunities, of much greater day-to-day concern than oppositional politics.

While groups such as the FDLR do face existential threats in the Congo, I argue that the military attacks launched to wipe out the FDLR hardliners still present in the eastern Congo have had limited success. The ineffectiveness of the military operation manifests itself in four overarching ways. Firstly, poor communication between MONUC/MONUSCO's civilian and military wings has meant that certain military actions have undermined political attempts to reduce the FDLR's violence. For example, in 2005, a number of military offensives against the FDLR, which were supported by MONUC's military leg without first notifying its civilian staff, were launched. The UN reported these attacks as having moderate success.

> 'Some 1,000 troops, comprising two FARDC battalions, took part in one such operation from 6 to 9 September in the Kahuzi Beiga Park area, which is an area of FDLR concentration. There are reports that FDLR elements have dispersed in South Kivu and that their ability to move freely in population centres and to attack civilians has [consequently] been restricted' (UN Secretary General, 2005).

However, this report does not reveal that some of the good will between FDLR members and local Congolese citizens broke down as a result of this operation. For example, some FDLR Hutus were skilled farmers who sold their surplus at markets and were beginning to foster economic links with the local community. After the attacks, the potential for this economic relationship to evolve into a longer-term peaceful coexistence broke down. The Pole Institute, for example, reported on several areas in which the FDLR are economically integrated with local populations (including mining and farming) which make the FDLR 'a major economic force in both Kivu provinces' (Pole Institute, 2010, p. 28). It is possible that interventions could have been focussed, not on destroying the FDLR, but on demilitarizing them by offering power through trade as an alternative solution to militarism. The Pole Institute suggests opening legitimate trade routes may give the FDLR financial incentives to reduce their violence. This opinion is echoed by Dijkzeul, who argues that that the failure of *Umoja Wetu* may lie in the fact that, while military attempts to disarm the FDLR were being posited as the main course of action to reduce their violence, such military attacks

overlooked the fact that 'new alternatives to either local integration or peaceful return were opening up' (Dijkzeul, 2010, p. 327). The military operation may, however, have provided a strong existential threat to the FDLR, and been represented as a significant enough cultural trauma for them to see the need to remain armed. Alexander describes cultural trauma as resulting from 'acute discomfort entering in the core of the collectivity's sense of their own identity' (Alexander, 2004, p. 10). Certainly, the military attacks against them would have caused the FDLR acute discomfort. This, in turn, may have damaged the chances of the group being willing to engage in violent alternatives which could also provide them with security.

Secondly, the attacks drove the remaining FDLR contigent further into the Congo's impenetrable forests – making them harder to capture, and placing the vulnerable Congolese inhabitants, who had previously fled to the forests for protection from armed militias, in greater danger of attack or exploitation from the FDLR. There is reason to believe that the impassability of Congo's dense forests and national parks has been used to strategic advantage by the FDLR. Indeed, during operation *Umoja Wetu*, the International Crisis Group reported that 'Rwandan Hutu rebel fighters were carrying out reconnaissance in Kivu's forests to prepare for a retreat into areas that would be difficult to penetrate, as the coalition forces approached' (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 5). Furthermore, this retreat from easy access – and therefore accurate monitoring – allows the group to plan its strategy and replenish its resources (in both human and material terms) away from obstruction by its enemies.

Thirdly, and linked to the fact that retreat into the Kivu forests makes the FDLR almost impossible to monitor, it is likely that reports of the FDLR's numbers having been reduced are over-optimistic. The Rwandan government may have boasted a steady reduction in the numbers of FDLR combatants between 2003-2006, but there was a rise in FDLR mobilization in 2007 and 2008.[141] As highlighted in an earlier footnote, MONUSCO estimated that in 2009 the FDLR were a 6000-strong force, and that between January 2009 and February 2011, it 'demobilised a total of 3878 FDLR combatants which is over half the FDLR fighting force' (MONUSCO, 2011). MONUSCO's 2011 figures place the FDLR membership at 2500 – but these are largely the FDLR hardliners, described by one

[141] The Rwandan government estimated the number of FDLR fighters at 12,500 in 2003, 10,700 in 2004, 8,500 in 2005, 6,300 in 2006, and 7,000 in 2007 (see International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 5) It was estimated that the FDLR had around 8,000 combatants – around 5,000 in North Kivu and 3,000 in South Kivu (Thakur, 2008)

MONUSCO official as the '1% criminals' (Interview with MONUSCO Officer, 2010) that will prove most difficult to combat. While there are no major disagreements between reports on the number of active FDLR combatants, the untrackable nature of the FDLR means the figures are at best an estimate – not necessarily accurate even to the nearest 1000. The figures given should very much be regarded as the *low* estimates for FDLR numbers, as they take into account only the FDLR members who are accessible and recordable. They do not take into account the "inaccessibles" which UNHCR report of (UNHCR, 2010), and those amongst these "inaccessibles" who may have been recruited to groups such as the FDLR. Furthermore, there is reason to question the methods MONUSCO uses to calculate its figures. On its website MONUSCO made the following assertion:

> 'In 2010 the FDLR leadership attempted to boost recruitment by enlisting Congolese combatants and child soldiers. This is evidenced by a two-fold increase in the number of child soldiers extracted by DDR/RR [Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement]. *Six hundred and forty five child soldiers were extracted by DDR/RR last year compared to 233 child soldiers in 2009'* (MONUSCO, 2011, *emphasis added*).

However, the rise in the DDR/RR of child combatants is not necessarily evidence that the FDLR are *recruiting* more children, other arguments are equally plausible: The FDLR may be *allowing more children to leave* the group; news that minors will not face imprisonment if they return to Rwanda may have reached more child soldiers and encouraged them to leave the FDLR; and/or the higher demobilization figures may be due to an improvement in the efficiency of the DDR/RR process. Although there is no evidence to necessarily back-up these alternative explanations, there is equally no evidence to justify MONUSCO's reasoning. It is therefore expedient to question the methods by which MONUSCO has arrived at this estimate and, accordingly, the figures should be received cautiously. The flaw in MONUSCO's reasoning also highlights the dangers of linear reasoning in conflict analysis: MONUSCO has equated an increase in one side of the equation (i.e. number of children extracted by DDR/RR) with a proportional increase in the other side of the equation (i.e. the number of children recruited as soldiers in the first place). Of course, in reality, this linear relationship does not necessarily hold true, and a number of other (non-linear) variables need to be taken into account.

Fourth, although there is discrepancy over the number of combatants currently recruited within the FDLR, it is not the only reason that the success of a joint operation in disarming them has been over-stated. 'General John Numbi, commander of the joint operation, declared that *Umoja Wetu* had met 85 per cent of its objectives. He said that the coalition's mission had not been the destruction of the FDLR, but a reduction in its operational capacity in order to secure its surrender and the repatriation of its fighters to Rwanda' (cited in International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 9). However, as the International Crisis Group argues, it is worth questioning the extent to which the FDLR's operational capacity had been reduced. 'In surviving the joint offensive, the movement's political and military leaders once again demonstrated their capacity for resistance and strength of their opposition to the demobilisation of combatants' (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 11). Furthermore, while there may have been a reduction in the number of combatants fighting in the FDLR *proper*, I argue that the increase In FDLR-aligned and splinter-groups formed by FDLR dissenters since 2004 demonstrates an increase in the number of members of militias who share the FDLR's broad objectives and interests. In this way, I argue that even if the FDLR's operational capacity and numbers have been reduced, its principle threats – of belligerent activity, anti-Tutsi rhetoric, and dissent towards the Kagame regime – have not been significantly reduced. Rather, the group's core membership has diversified to form a number of factions which constitute the same threat that the FDLR pose. I will go on to discuss these groups in more detail later in the chapter but, for now, wish to simply put forward the hypothesis that this apparent "base diversification" may be evidence that the threat of Hutu Power groups in the Congo is as strong as ever.

Floating Across the Rubicon

The FDLR are framed as a threat to both the security of Rwanda and the stability of the Congo. Indeed, the attempts to disarm and disassemble the FDLR are tied to a much larger stabilization project of demilitarizing the Kivus – beginning first with the Rwandophone militias, who many Congolese militias posit as the key grievance driving their own militarization. Local Congolese sentiment is particularly against the Rwandan-backed Tutsi-led militias – whom they claim terrorize their people and exploit their resources. These militias (and the Rwandan forces backing them), however, argue that their actions are necessary in order to protect the Kivus' Tutsi population from the constant threat of persecution by Hutu militias such as the FDLR. Therefore, in order to address the cycle of militarization in the eastern Congo, a simple line of action can been formulated, which may

have been the reasoning behind operations such as *Umoja Wetu and Kimia II*: Eliminating the Hutu militia threat by disarming, demobilizing and repatriating Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors means that the Tutsi militias should disarm. This would send Rwandan Tutsi back home and stop Rwanda from interfering in the country. In turn, it is hoped, that this would remove the Congolese militias' grievance over Rwandophone military presence. This formula for disarmament in the Congo seems sensible and simple enough, in theory, but in practice has proved difficult. Some (see for example, Eichstaedt, 2011; Nest, 2011) provide a greed-based explanation for this difficulty – arguing that grievances against persecution or invading foreigners are not the true source of conflict in the Kivus. Rather, they suggest that all belligerent parties involved in the Kivus have economic motivations for remaining armed in order to control the provinces' valuable natural resources. However, I suggest that another reason lies in the fact that many of the members of the Hutu militias such as the FDLR have little desire to return to Rwanda. Those not wishing to return are not solely limited to the *genocidaires* who fear reprisal for their genocidal crimes. FDLR members who are not implicated in the Genocide may also believe that it is in their interest to remain in the eastern Congo.

The FDLR presents a peculiar paradox. The group's name, and the name of its precursor ALiR, would seem to indicate a primary objective of the liberation of Rwanda (by taking control of political power there). Indeed, this goal features heavily in its rhetoric. However, empirical data on the FDLR indicates that almost all of its activities are concentrated within the eastern Congo. The question that follows, therefore, is: Why do the FDLR, who claim that they want to liberate Rwanda, their "homeland", conduct the majority of their activities within their Congolese host site, even when opportunities to return to Rwanda arise? There are, no doubt, myriad factors contributing to this peculiarity, but those that pertain to the evolving relationship between the FDLR members and the space that they occupy may be particularly worthy of further consideration in explaining this phenomenon. I argue that we can understand this relationship by looking at the different dynamics that drive the FDLR's relationship with their sending country and their site of settlement.

Firstly, social, political and economic developments both in Rwanda and the Congo may explain why FDLR members no longer perceive a return to Rwanda as a viable future option. I argue, therefore, that the current contingents of Hutu refugees, who comprise the FDLR and FDLR-affiliated/derivative groups, have made the transition from being an Odyssean refugee group to a quasi-Rubicon group. I have been careful here to add the

"quasi-" caveat, as it would be an over-statement to suggest that all FDLR members have irrevocably abandoned hope of a return to Rwanda. As the repatriation of some FDLR members by MONUSCO demonstrates, some do indeed wish to return to Rwanda. However, it is clear that for FDLR hardliners return to Rwanda is not just of low-priority – it is something which they are actively trying to avoid. The most obvious explanation for this is the current strength of Paul Kagame's Tutsi-led regime in Rwanda. Not only is this regime currently politically and militarily stronger than it ever has been, Kagame's own success in the August 2010 presidential elections (where he gained 93% of the vote) has been cited by some as a reflection of his ruthlessness in quashing dissent, more so than his resounding popularity. In an article for *The World Today*, Mark Naftalin paints a picture of concern about Rwanda's freedom of expression: 'Human Rights Watch was not alone in describing the 2010 election as marred by "intimidation, exclusion of the opposition and critical voices, and a climate of fear". State-centred control and careful strategic positioning have also resulted in the ascendency of Kagame's party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) throughout state institutions and the country' (Naftalin, 2011, p. 23). A report in *The Economist* just prior to the 2010 elections noted that 'in the past few months a string of attacks on Rwandans with whom he [Kagame] has fallen out, or who publicly oppose him, has further besmirched his reputation, though he strenuously denies any involvement in them and solid evidence implicating him has not been produced' (The Economist, 2010a). Nonetheless, Kagame is still very much regarded as 'a darling of the aid-giving world' (The Economist, 2010b), who has shown that he can be trusted to use foreign aid to good effect. Accordingly, in the Western debate over whether to support efficiency at the expense of freedom – Kagame may be seen as evidence that efficiency has won out.

For members of the FDLR, the strength of the Kagame regime is a key deterrent to returning to Rwanda, for both psychological and pragmatic reasons, and is likely to 'reinforce, rather than eliminate, the notion of Tutsi and Hutu being mutually exclusive groups who are engaged in a struggle for political hegemony' (Naftalin, 2011, p. 24). Psychologically, within the FDLR there are those who fear that they will be charged with genocidal crimes, (some because they were actually involved in the genocide and some who fear false accusation). For this group, return is certainly not an option, and indeed some former *genocidaires* within the FDLR have been using scaremongering techniques to prevent even those who are not guilty of genocide from returning. During my fieldwork, I interviewed child soldiers who were fighting in the FDLR – all of whom were less than four at the time of the genocide, and therefore could not possibly be regarded as guilty.

However, a number told me that before the Red Cross informed them that they would be welcomed back to Rwanda, they were led to believe that the Rwandan government would kill them if they returned because they were Hutu. While there is no evidence of reprisal killings of Hutus currently taking place in Rwanda, fear of reprisal killings is nonetheless sufficient to prevent some Hutu refugees from returning.

Pragmatically, return to Rwanda may also not be an attractive option, and the push factors driving them away from Rwanda are complemented by the fact that remaining in the Congo may provide them with some lucrative economic and political opportunities. With a population of around 10 million people, Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa – a problem compounded by the fact its economy is based primarily on subsistence agriculture. Following the return of both Hutu and Tutsi migrants back to Rwanda since 1994, competition for land has been fierce. Bruce argues that 'land access for returnees has been a problematic and potentially explosive issue' (Bruce, 2007, p.1). Hutu refugees who have been exiled in the Congo for nearly two decades are likely to find acquiring new land, or even reclaiming the land they abandoned, almost impossible. Given the competition for land, Rwanda is attempting to diversify its economy, concentrating on growing tourist, information services and construction industries. However, employment in these industries requires education and specialist training, which those who have been exiled in the eastern Congo seldom have. Potentially, returnees to Rwanda may be able to find employment in Rwanda's mining industry, but in a country where unemployment is high,[142] competition for these jobs is also high. Many more agricultural and mining opportunities are available, however, in the eastern Congo – making remaining in the Congo an attractive option. Indeed, these economic incentives to remain in the Congo may explain why some Rwandan Tutsi migrant communities (who fled to the Congo to escape persecution in Rwanda prior to 1994) remain there, even though conditions in Rwanda are much safer for them now.

Thus far, I have discussed the relationship between the Rwandan refugee warriors and their host and sending communities in state terms – assuming a clear geographical divide between Rwanda and the Congo. However, several commentators note that, both as a concept and an entity, the state is Africa should not be considered to rigidly (see Tull, 2003; Clapham, 1996). As I discussed in Chapter Two, the Congolese-Rwandan border had pre-colonial roots.

[142] There is no concrete data for current employment figures in Rwanda, but according to the 2002 census, 30% of Rwandans were unemployed (International Labour Organization, 2010)

> 'The border that demarcates Rwanda and Burundi from the DRC is not, in fact, quite as capricious as some colonial artefacts. It roughly follows what was once one amongst several "African frontiers" along which a number of centralized but expanding pre-colonial Central African kingdoms contended with other less structured "forest" societies, the edge of "civilization" sometimes advancing, sometimes retreating across the centuries' (Jackson, 2007, p. 483).

The waxing and waning of these pre-colonial kingdoms may account for the multifarious ethnic make-up of the Kivus. It may also explain why the contested question of who is primordial in the Kivus is almost impossible to resolve. This contested history is what fuels many Rwandophone claims to rights in the Congo (and Congolese concern that Rwanda has an irredentist agenda in the Kivus [see Englebert, 2003]). Although Rwandan Hutu refugees may not be directly pursuing an irredentist agenda, they have served as a convenient justification for Rwandan interference in the Kivus.

A closer look at Rwanda and the Congo's precolonial history may reveal that Rwandophone migration to the Kivu provinces follows a repeating pattern of behaviour. If we begin to understand Rwandophone migration as a form of territorial expansion, then a move by Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors to claim a new "homeland" in the Kivus is not a new phenomenon, but rather one that echoes the creation of the Rwandan state. Indeed, Newbury (1986) explains how in the eighteenth century, a war on the Rwandan kingdom's eastern frontier led to a mass exodus of refugees westward to the eastern shores of the Kivu Rift Valley (in what is modern-day Rwanda's Western Province). Although these refugees would not have categorized themselves as Rwandan (indeed, they had been displaced from their homeland by the Rwandan Kingdom's eastward expansion), for those already living in the Kivu Rift Valley, these refugees were identified as Rwandan – or at least as sharing Rwandan culture. Over time, however, the identification of these refugees as being Rwandan led to the justification for the Rwanda Kingdom's expansion westward to the eastern shores of Lake Kivu. We could therefore argue that both the Rwandan state, and Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups, are using the presence of those identified as being Rwandan in the Congo as reason to interfere in the country. In this process, Rwandan Hutu refugees in the DRC are also trying to make claims over rights to natural resources, and access to political power (either in Rwanda or, more recently in the local politics of the Kivus).

This move to assert more ownership of the Kivus may be reflected in the fact that the breakaway factions of FDLR soliders – such as the RUD-Urunana and FLNK – have expunged the focus on Rwanda from their names. The FLNK, in particular, has not only clearly indicated its intention to "liberate" North Kivu from the interference of Rwanda and power-grabbing nature of Congolese Tutsi, it has allied with a number of Congolese Maï-Maï militias – capitalizing on the fact that the Nande and the Hutu make up the largest ethnic groups in the Kivus.[143] The Nande and the Hutu both belong to the Bantu ethno-linguistic family, so the FLNK can be seen to be asserting a sort of "mega-ethnic" kinship claim in this alliance. It is worth noting that the FLNK's interest is not in the whole of the Congo, but rather is limited to the Kivus (and more specifically North Kivu). Many humanitarian organizations such as the International Crisis Group and the United Nations tend to conflate the FDLR and FLNK as being affiliated, although the accuracy of doing so can be contested. Nonetheless the FDLR does seem to advocate similar goal to the FLNK. Recent FDLR and FLNK activity in appropriating Kivutian mines (see Eichstaedt, 2011; Nest, 2011) also appears to support a project of Kivutian separatism. In this regard, the Kivus can be seen as a resource-rich safe-haven for Rwandan and Congolese Hutus, protecting them from persecution from both the Rwandan and Congolese states.

Re-inscribing Histories: Rwandan Hutus and Kivutian Autochthony

If Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors do seek to establish the Kivus as a new site of their "homeland", a number of obstacles need to be overcome. Firstly, the Kivus are not a land without people for Rwandan people without land to settle on. In this regard, there is a general suspicion among non-Rwandophone Congolese groups, such as the Hunde, Nande and Nyanga of North Kivu and the Bembe and Lega of South Kivu,[144] towards Banyarwandan people in general. This suspicion is reflected in the fact that the longstanding question of Rwandophone nationality and citizenship in the Congo has still not been adequately addressed. The complex history of Rwandan migration may in part account for this reluctance to give even the Rwandophone groups who lay claims to having been present in the Congo since the mid nineteenth century access to clear citizenship

[143] In 2007 the Nande and Hutu managed to foster a power-sharing agreement in Kivu's provincial politics – In January 2007 the Nande Mayor of Beni, Julien Paluku was elected governor of North Kivu, and Léon Bariyanga Rutuye, a Hutu from Rutshuru was elected president of the provincial assembly (International Crisis Group, 2007).

[144] These are broadly ethno-linguistic groups and the Hunde and Nande in fact speak languages which share a number of similarities to Kinyarwandan – although there is little evidence of ethno-solidarity between the groups.

rights: Questions concerning how you can distinguish between, for example, a Banyamulenge member whose ancestors arrived in the Congo prior to 1885, and one whose links to the country are much more recent, as well as more general ambiguity over the cut-off date to distinguish between indigene and migrant, are just two of the perplexing issues that challenge the granting of citizenship to Rwandophones. Furthermore, the ethical quandary of assigning indigenous rights in the Congo is not simply limited to an abstract discussion. As Jackson observes, the ambiguous nature of Rwandophone citizenship has been manipulated by political elites in the Congo as a strategy of rule and control throughout Congolese history (Jackson, 2007, p. 482).

When the colonial boundaries between Congo and Rwanda were drawn, parts of the former Rwandan kingdom were incorporated into North Kivu, which also brought into Congolese territory a large Hutu population – which became known as the "Banyabwisha" or "Banyarutshuru". Rwandophone Tutsi were also known to inhabit the area; pastoralists known as the Banyajomba settled in Masisi (a town in North Kivu), and there was a large contingent of Tutsi pastoralists in South Kivu. Between 1937 and 1955 an estimated 85,000 Rwandophones were moved from Rwanda to Masisi by the Belgians, who had two aims: Alleviating famine in densely populated Rwanda, and providing a source of labour for Congo's plantations and mines (Turner, 2007, p. 113). These extra waves of Rwandan migration to the Kivus further confused who was "indigenous" (defined here as pre-colonial) Rwandophone in the Congo, and who was a later migrant – an issue of increasing saliency in the post-colonial allocation of land and resources. In the 1960s, South Kivu's Tutsi pastoralists changed their name to the Banyamulenge –not only to demarcate themselves as different to recent Tutsi settlers, but also to assert indigeneity to Mulenge (a township on the South Kivu plateau). The Banyamulenge's nomadic lifestyle had meant that their settlement history and origin was difficult to trace, and it was hoped that adopting the "-mulenge" suffix would provide them with a veneer of territorial rootedness in the Kivus, and thus a legitimate claim to the land and citizenship rights that accompany pre-colonial inhabitancy. The strategy backfired. The fact that no group called the Banyamulenge existed in pre-colonial Congo meant that the Congolese state was able to deny the Banyamulenge's indigeneity claims (Vlassenroot, 2002). In 1969, President Mobutu sought to consolidate his power by seeking support from the Congolese Tutsi and appointed a member of the Banyamulenge, Barthelemy Bisengimana, as the Director of the *Bureau de la Présidence*. Bisengimana used his position to promote the Banyamulenge citizenship status, and in 1971, a new law was passed giving members of the Banyamulenge

citizenship rights, which they used to claim access to land. However, when Bisengimana fell from grace in 1977 the law was revoked and the law which replaced it in 1982 was more exclusive than even the previous laws had been. Thus from the 1980s, the Banyamulenge and several other Banyarwanda groups have been denied citizenship in the Congo, and marginalized and excluded from political life. This situation only began to change in 2004, when a new citizenship law was promulgated to foster post-conflict unity (Jackson, 2007).

The law has not resolved the Banyamulenge issue. 'The issue of statelessness of the Banyamulenge might appear to have been solved by the 2004 nationality law.[145] However, this has not yet produced tangible results. In practice, [by 2008] there are no examples of cases of Banyamulenge who have successfully obtained Congolese nationality' (UK Border Agency, 2008, p. 13). Furthermore, Jackson criticizes the 2004 law for still not fully clarifying the Rwandophone nationality question, and argues that, even if some Rwandophone groups such as the Banyamulenge gain the "civic" dimensions of citizenship (i.e. individuals in this group are entitled to a relationship with the state), this citizenship is meaningless if it is not accompanied by the "ethnic/local" dimension of citizenship (i.e a relationship between the individual and customary authority – which is significant for land allocation), and the "empirical/lived" dimension of citizenship (pertaining to 'the ethically vital, lived sense of belonging and existential security for the individual within society as a whole' [Jackson, 2007, p. 483]). The latter two dimensions of citizenship – the local and the lived – are notably missing for Congolese Tutsis, who are widely regarded as "Rwandan puppets" and still persecuted accordingly, even if the 2004 citizenship law guarantees them civic citizenship rights. Conversely, we could argue that, although members of the FDLR have not been given civic citizenship rights in the Congo, they are pushing for local and lived citizenship rights in the Kivus. In other words, although the state may not recognize them as citizens, they have managed to gain some degree of access to land and resources in the Kivus and, through economic integration and inter-marriage, have managed to foster a sense of belonging with the local community.

It is worth examining how groups containing Rwandan Hutus who arrived in the Congo after 1994 have had some moderate success in asserting belonging in the Kivus, while the Banyamulenge have struggled to legitimize their claims to belonging, even though they

[145] Law No. 04/024 on Congolese Nationality, 12 November 2004. The law stated that Congolese Nationality could only be established by origin or by acquisition. Acquisition could occur in five ways: naturalization, option, adoption, marriage, or birth and residency in the DRC.

have been present in the Kivus since at least 1885. I argue that Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors are asserting two different types of solidarity with local Congolese "indigenes" which give their claims to belonging more weight. Firstly, and quite simply, the major concern of local Congolese people is Rwandan interference in local politics and pillage of their resources. The Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors are clearly opposed to the Rwandan Kagame-led regime, and can therefore claim solidarity with groups such as the Mai-Mai through the logic "my enemy's enemy is my friend" (see Bøås, 2008 where a similar argument is made). While these groups remained maligned by the Rwandan government, they can posit themselves as being as anti-Rwandan as the Maï-Maï, and this may explain why the FLNK, as well as containing Rwandan refugee warrior deserters from the FDLR, also comprises of Congolese Maï-Maï deserters. Secondly, these groups have been able to assert a sense of belonging in the Kivus by claiming autochthony (or primordiality) to the region. This has mainly been achieved by reifying the mythic distinction between the mega-ethnicities of "Bantu" (to which the Hutu, and a number of other indigenous Congolese groups belong) and "Nilotic" (the mega-ethnicity to which the Tutsi are said to belong, and who are thought of as having Sudanic/Ethiopian roots). 'The Bantu/Nilotic mythology provides a poisonous basis on which conflicts over autochthony at lower scales can be inscribed upward into a pan-regional metanarrative' (Jackson, 2006, p. 107). Thus Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors are able to claim that, as Bantu people, they are autochthonous to Central Africa, and therefore, although it is tempting to categorise them as Rwandan, this is simply adhering to the artificial boundaries imposed by the oppressive colonial regime. Given that the Kivus were once a part of the ancient Kingdom of Rwanda, the Hutu as autochthons of that Kingdom are necessarily autochthons of the Kivus. In contrast, they argue that the Tutsi who allegedly travelled down from the Horn of Africa are foreign invaders to both Rwanda and the Congo and cannot claim to be autochthons anywhere in Central Africa. Thus, in a tract which has been circulated by Maï-Maï groups, the sentiment is specifically anti-Tutsi, and does not refer to the threat of Hutu Rwandans in the Congo: A tract circulated in 2000 commanded '*Mututsi Aende Inje* [Tutsi Get Out!] – *Mkongomani Aongoze Inchi* [Congolese Guard Your Country!] – or MAI-MAI for short' (cited in Jackson, 2006, p. 106). The claim to autochthony therefore attempts to resolve the ambiguity surrounding citizenship in the Congo in such a way that denies Tutsi any claims by moving the qualification required for citizenship rights from beyond mere indigeneity (meaning pre-colonial settlement) to one of autochthony (or "son of the soil" – a literal claim to having sprung up from the Kivutian soil). In this way, Rwandan Hutu refugees, despite only

physically arriving in the Kivus in the 1990s can trace a Bantu ancestry which positions them as Kivutian autochthons, whilst the Tutsi, because of the Bantu/Nilotic myth, regardless of whether they settled before 1885 or not, will always be allochthonous strangers.

The autochthony trope appears simple; it posits a certain group as aboriginal, "sons of the soil" and accords to them a privileged position in an otherwise confusing and threatening society. These autochthony discourses are very much rooted in the classificatory efforts of Belgian administrators during the colonial era, and can be seen as the final and most deadly symptom of 'race fever [which] passes from the Belgians, to whom it was serious but not fatal, to the Africans, who are victims of this imported pestilence' (Turner, 2007, p. 51), and for whom the consequences are very grave indeed. Autochthony is intrinsically complex and slippery, given that primordial existence in a certain territory is difficult (if not impossible) to establish. Even if the Rwandan Hutus are able to claim that they have more of a right to be in the Kivus than the Tutsi, the primal security that this claim may afford can only ever be temporary. Autochthony claims, in going beyond merely claiming ancient settlement to claiming that one's ancestors sprang up from the soil, puts forward a claim to primordiality which cannot be shared with other groups. In this regard, the Hutu will have to contend with the numerous other Congolese Bantu groups who believe that they are the true autochthons of the Kivus. Disputes over who was "there first" soon arise, and often result in an aggressive spreading of myths and tracts, through which interpretations of history can literally determine life or death. Thus, the initial security that autochthony purports to provide fades quickly and becomes highly volatile; the desire for certainty and the concomitant attempts made to establish security can indeed have the opposite effect, polarising groups and leading to violent conflict. As Appadurai notes: 'Uncertainty about identification and violence can lead to actions, reactions, complicities, and anticipations that multiply the pre-existing uncertainty about labels. Together, these forms of uncertainty call for the worst kind of certainty: dead certainty' (Appadurai, 1999, p. 322).

Identity as Tactics: The Differential Consciousness

Given the slippery nature of autochthony, the FDLR cannot rely on the assertion of autochthony alone in order to ensure their security. Indeed, while autochthonous assertions may provide a sense of primal security, more is needed to consolidate the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors' long-term security. However, given the ever-changing

security situation – not just within the Kivus, but also in relation to the threat that refugee warriors pose to (and, consequently, face from) the governments of the Congo and Rwanda, making long-term security plans is not always possible. Furthermore adopting a long-term survival strategy may in fact reduce the overall effectiveness of their efforts to survive, as much of their endurance can be seen to be rooted in their flexibility, and the capacity to adapt to changing situations. Adopting rigid strategies may bring more danger than security. While this adaptability itself could be seen as the cornerstone of the Rwandan refugee warriors' long-term security over the past decade or so, in recent years some of their activities have indicated a desire to integrate more into Congolese life. Two particular elements of their activity point toward this; an increased focus on trade, and intermixing with the local Congolese population.

For example, FLDR members have been able to gain control over a number of coltan, gold, tin and tungsten mines in the eastern Congo (Nest, 2011, p. 80). Rodriguez argues that 'mineral exploitation and trade are the highest remunerative economic activities in which the FDLR is currently engaged. Both have enabled its hierarchy to sink deep roots in the eastern DRC' (Rodriguez, 2011, p. 180). She also argues that the FDLR control more than 50% of local mineral trade in the Kivus, but there do not appear to be any solid figures that back up her claim. Furthermore, there are reports which indicate that the FDLR's influence over mining resources is waning. Indeed, in a 2011 report, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC submitted a report indicating that 'while in the past, FDLR derived much of its funding from mining, its direct access to and control over certain natural resources have been reduced. Instead, the main sources of financing for FDLR are trade in commercial products in mining areas under its control, and taxation and agricultural sales of products such as palm oil and cannabis' (UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2011, p. 3). Regardless of the accuracy of the figures Rodriguez gives for the portion of Kivutian mines controlled by the FDLR, however, the FDLR can be seen to control significant resources within eastern Congo. A report by the International Crisis Group published in 2010, revealed that the FDLR controlled the trading road between Hombo and Bunyakiri in South Kivu, and that they also controlled the Walikale mines in North Kivu (and had collaborated with officers of the FARDC 1st Brigade, many of whom were ex-CNDP soldiers sharing the wealth from those mines). As noted earlier, during an interview with a MONUSCO officer, I was told that some demobilized FDLR soldiers often had as much as US$900 in gold on their person – which further corroborates the view that FDLR members have access to considerable resources in the Kivus. While the control of resources and

collaboration with ex-CNDP members (who it is often claimed are their sworn enemies) may initially vindicate those who argue that the FDLR's actions go beyond pure survival to criminal acts of greed. It is possible to view this wealth accumulation as providing the FDLR with the resources upon which to achieve long-term stability. If understood in this way, some have argued that opening up economic links with the FDLR may encourage them to disarm, as trade relations may provide the security they crave. Indeed, the Pole Institute make the argument that 'a more sensible way than seeking solutions by military means that lead to a dead end would be to end the isolation of internal markets under the economic control of the FDLR and open them to the general Congolese trade...The incentive for trade could perhaps replace dependence on the AK 47' (Pole Institute, 2010, p. 14).

But trade alone, especially trade which has been generated through looting and the illegal exploitation of extractive industries, in the way that much of the FDLR has gained their wealth, cannot on its own provide long-term security. In many cases, the FDLR's income generating activities have been a source of great resentment among the eastern Congolese populace who see the FDLR again as illegal foreign pillagers of Congolese wealth. In his work on mining and conflict, *Consuming the Congo*, Peter Eichstaedt observes that the control of mines is a precarious position, and reports several instances in which the FDLR has been pushed out of the mines by certain army brigades (Eichstaedt, 2011) – a trend which is corroborated in Michael Nest's account of mine control in the Congo in *Coltan* (Nest, 2011). As a result of this loss of revenue, some believe that the FDLR have resorted to kidnap and ransom as techniques of income generation. Indeed, one local NGO reported that 'having lost control of some resource-rich areas, they [the FDLR] have now gone into the kidnapping business' (Pole Institute, 2010, p. 7), demanding hundreds of dollars for the return of Congolese civilians kidnapped from villages. Naturally these activities have not endeared the FDLR to the local Congolese population (although it should be noted that human rights violations such as this have been inflicted upon the Kivutian locals by militias opposed to the FDLR and the FARDC as well). Therefore, coupled with the potential to use their economic dominance to foster trade links in the Kivus, if the FDLR are to gain any level of acceptance in the Congo, they need to distance themselves from kidnapping and do more to assert their "Congoleseness". In terms of distancing themselves from activities such as kidnapping and looting the Congolese people, we can argue that they have done this by claiming to have no connection to the *Rasta* (the criminal gang who conduct most of the kidnappings and who, according to some sources [Thakur, 2008; International Crisis

Group, 2009] are widely believed to operate on behalf of the FDLR).[146] Instead, the FDLR are making moves to assert a sense of "Congoleseness" by increasingly allying and integrating with Congolese groups.

In her analysis of Burundian Hutu refugees displaced in western Tanzania, Malkki makes a significant distinction between the refugees who remained interned in camps (whom she described as constructing an identity based on a nation in exile) and the town refugees who 'tended to seek ways of assimilating and of inhabiting multiple, shifting identities – identities derived or "borrowed" from the social context of the township' (Malkki, 1995, p. 3). Like the Burundian town refugees in Tanzania, the Rwandan Hutu refugees in the Congo have incorporated into their own identities elements of the identities and practices that prevail in the Congo. On the most general level, we can argue that by surviving in the Congo for so long, despite facing constant adversity and existential threats, the FDLR have fully embraced the principle of *Debrouillez Vous* (fend for yourself) which drives so much of eastern Congolese life. We can also see more concrete attempts to integrate into Congolese life through family associations. 'Intermarriage between members of the FDLR and Congolese women has made their integration into local society possible' (Pole Institute, 2010, p. 15). Indeed, while I have discussed the evasion of punishment for their genocidal crimes and human rights violations (or, in the case members of the FDLR who are not guilty of such crimes, the fear that they may be falsely accused of such crimes and punished for them) as the key factor preventing FDLR demobilization and repatriation to Rwanda, intermarriage and rooted settlement in the Congo is also a prevalent factor preventing return to Rwanda. During an interview, a MONUSCO officer noted that even if some FDLR soldiers are willing to demobilize, they have families in the Congo and therefore do not want to be separated from them and return to Rwanda.

In strategic terms, the FDLR has also attempted to embrace and engage in the "militarized politics" arising from the failure of state control in the Eastern Congo (see Tull, 2007) through the forging of alliances. Indeed, following the trajectory of its own creation out of what remained of the ALiR and RDR at the end of the twentieth century, the FDLR has also formed alliances to strengthen its position. Indeed, de Veenhoop observes that after the 2006 Congolese elections, the FDLR began to take the strategy of alliance forming more seriously: 'The FDLR leadership anticipated the emergence of political problems after the

[146] Although Thakur, and the International Crisis Group both state that there is an FDLR-Rasta affiliation, they give no evidence to support this assertion.

elections, and considered this an opportunity to renew relations with some of its former partners or to develop new alliances and receive military and political aid in exchange for military support against the political adversaries of their Congolese allies' (de Veenhoop, 2007, p. 27). Since then, the alliances have been mainly centred around common Bantuness – as can be seen in the alliance between the FDLR and the Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC, also known as the Maï-Maï *Sheka*), a Congolese armed group consisting mainly of ethnic Nyanga founded in 2009 (UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2011, p. 59), but they have not been solely with Congolese groups. In 2009, the UN Group of experts observed that 'FDLR- Maï-Maï -FNL[147] networks have formed an alliance in the face of *Kimia II*[148] operations and collaborate tightly with each other' (UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2009, p. 7), and MONUSCO observes that 'the FNL currently appears to be in an alliance with Maï-Maï Yakutumba[149] and FDLR in South Kivu' (MONUSCO, 2011). Given that the FNL is a Burundian Hutu refugee warrior group in the Congo, we may also see the FDLR as strengthening their anti-Tutsi stance by appealing to alliances based on common "Hutuness" and "Bantuness". In addition to strengthening their position within the Congo, forming these alliances also provides a platform along which the FDLR can spread their anti-Tutsi rhetoric.

Forming both political and military alliances in the Kivus, however, requires the FDLR to tread a very careful line. On the one hand, the alliances need to be strong and solid enough to provide the FDLR with the security and reinforcement that they seek. Yet, on the other hand, the alliances need to be loose enough that the FDLR still maintain their own distinct identity (and therefore don't lose their *raison d'être*). Also, if it proves more politically expedient to do so, these alliances can be quickly broken. Perhaps the most effective way in which the FDLR have done this can be seen through the apparent alliance that UN agencies and the International Crisis Group claim the FDLR have been working with the *Rasta* and the FLNK. Although no concrete evidence is given for this association, the UN Group of Experts on the Congo does note anecdotal evidence of discussions between the leadership of the FDLR and the FLNK. The Front for the Liberation of North Kivu (FLNK) was formed in mid-2007 out of FDLR and Maï-Maï deserters, and allegedly has strong links to

[147] A Burundian Hutu refugee warrior group operating in the Kivus.

[148] A 2009 Military Operation jointly launched by the Congolese Armed Forces and Rwandan Army against the FDLR in South Kivu.

[149] A Maï-Maï group based in Fizi territory and led by William Amuri Yakutumba. While this group had agreed to integrate into the FARDC after signing the Goma Agreement, a number of members including Yakutumba himself, later withdrew from the process and resumed fighting in opposition to the FARDC (see Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2011, p. 17).

both the FDLR and the FARDC operating in the Kivus (International Crisis Group, 2009). Furthermore, there have been allegations that the criminal armed gang, the *Rasta*, formed by former FDLR deserter Commander Koffi, is a 'special branch of the FDLR, which loots and kidnaps as a means to raise funds for the FDLR, but the FDLR has systematically denied these allegations' (Thakur, 2008, pp. 58-9). By publicly denying association with the FLNK and Rasta, the FDLR are able to distance themselves from the human rights violations committed by these groups, whilst still being able to (allegedly) benefit from the revenue and military advances these groups make. Furthermore, the existence of several FDLR deserters in these groups indicate that, while the FDLR's numbers may have been reduced, the military threat of its members (or rather former members) has not. By moving to other groups, some of the criminal members of the FDLR may have once again evaded capture and traceability.

Also associated with the FDLR is the splinter group RUD-Urunana. There is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding this group, whose leadership consists entirely of FDLR deserters, but who strongly deny any affiliation with the FDLR. Indeed, in a press release categorically denying any association with the FDLR, RUD-Urunana spokesperson Dr Augustin Dukuze explained how the RUD leadership had previously been formally expelled from the FDLR. He argued: 'One cannot thus be expelled from an organization while remaining its member. RUD-Urunana is an independent organization with its own leadership and independent political vision' (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 1). However, in a report by the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO), RUD-Urunana are described as a 'faction' of the FDLR (United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, 2011, p. 12). Although UNJHRO do not provide any evidence or justification for labeling RUD-Urunana an FDLR faction, a 2009 report by the UN Security Council alleged that during Operation *Umoja Wetu*, the FDLR military leadership received support from the RUD as 'Jean-Marie Higiro, the United States-based president of RUD, was also reportedly in regular telephone contact with General Mudacumura [of the FDLR] from January 2009 onwards' (United Nations Security Council, 2009, p. 13) – although, once again, evidence of this contact was not provided. However, the RUD deny these allegations, arguing that they are 'unfounded since Dr J M Vianney Higiro has never been and is not in contact with any member of the leadership of the FDLR/FOCA[150] neither in the field nor elsewhere' (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 1). Regardless of whether or not we are to believe that there is a connection between the FDLR and RUD-

[150] The explicitly military wing of the FDLR.

Urunana, it is clear that dialogue with this splinter group is a viable option for finding a more peaceable solution to the Rwandan Hutu refugee problem in the Congo. Indeed, in May 2008, a Conference at Kisangani 'secured agreement on a road map in which the FDLR-RUD[151]...confirmed their commitment to voluntary disarmament, repatriation or relocation under security guarantees from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the international community' (United Nations Security Council, 2008, p. 4). Although the FDLR proper did not agree to either the conference or the road map, if RUD are affiliated with the FDLR, this can be seen as a positive step to negotiating with the group. If they are affiliated with the FDLR, the RUD-Urunana may be regarded as the more palatable face of the FDLR in their quest to foster dialogue with the leadership in Rwanda, rather than simply overthrow the leadership, as the FDLR originally wanted to (Global Security, 2005). If there is no affiliation between the two, comfort can be found in the fact that the FDLR have mellowed somewhat. In 2005, Ignace Murwanashyaka announced that the FDLR was ready to 'lay down its arms to transform its fight into a political struggle and was ready to cooperate with international justice' (Smith, 2005). Offering opportunities to the RUD may encourage other groups such as the FDLR to come out of hiding and also engage in negotiations.

Both the splinter groups RUD-Urunana and the FLNK have sought to distance themselves from the FDLR by avoiding an invocation of the "liberation of Rwanda" in their names. The name of the FLNK (The Liberation Front of *North Kivu*) may indicate a desire among certain former FDLR members to establish a more permanent sense of belonging within the Kivus, but it is important to emphasize that their connection to Rwanda has not been completely lost, and it is for this reason that the FDLR will continue to endure as a group. While the security situation in the Kivus is ever changing, and therefore the FDLR are constantly forging and breaking alliances, they remain attached to the desire for an ultimate return to Rwanda (as they have never foresaken the belief that the Hutu comprise the Rwandan Nation), and have called for an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue (although this has not yet been achieved) (see Smith, 2005; RUD-Urunana, 2009). Indeed, an Inter-Rwandan dialogue remains the chief concern of the splinter group RUD-Urunana. They argue that 'only this Dialogue would lead to lasting peace, stability, and the establishment of new political, judiciary, and security institutions that would be the reflection of the legitimate aspirations

[151] The UN refer to the RUD-Urunana as the FDLR-RUD. In order to maintain impartiality regarding their affiliation with the FDLR, I have elected to refer to them by the title they prefer to go by on their website: RUD-Urunana.org

of all the constitutive groups of the Rwandan society' (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 4). We can view the ability to at once assert themselves as Congolese autochthons, and the rightful people of the Rwandan Nation, as an example of their mobilization of differential consciousness. In *Methodology of the Oppressed* Sandoval undertakes 'a mapping of consciousness organized in opposition to the dominant social order' (Sandoval, 2000, p. 54) in the case of US Third World Women. She argues that in some situations, this group mobilise as a women's group (allying with other women's groups in America), and in other situations they mobilise as a third world group (forming a coalition of groups which represent Third World immigrant interests). She argues that by utilising their differential consciousness, US Third World women are able to respond to various situations by mobilizing an appropriate element of their identity – using "identity as tactics" (see Tapia, 2001).

The FDLR, in response to the ever-changing security situation in the Kivus (as well as the changing relationship they have to Rwanda and the Congo), can also be seen to exercise a differential consciousness – and the agility of their identity mobilization in this respect may be one factor explaining their survival in the Kivus thus far. Indeed, we can see how through the forging of various alliances the FDLR is at once able to posit itself as part of an alliance of Congolese autochthones, whilst maintaining its commitment to Hutu Power and the "Hutu Nation of Rwanda". Similarly, the proliferation of FDLR-splinter groups (meaning groups formed by FDLR deserters) such as RUD-Urunana and the FLNK (both of whom have distanced themselves from the FDLR and *vice versa*) may demonstrate a strengthening of the Rwandan Hutu position, even if the overall strength of the FDLR proper is deteriorating. Certainly the RUD-Urunana have shown themselves to be willing to engage in a non-violent solution to their predicament, and a willingness to return to Rwanda, as long as doing so will allow them access to the Rwandan political arena. In a press release sent out in July 2009, RUD-Urunana put forward a number of solutions to a lasting peace in the region, arguing that their organization 'has the firm commitment to constructively and actively contribute to the finding [of] lasting and peaceful solutions to the problems that have plagued our homeland and the African Great Lakes Region' (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 4). We can see, therefore, that members of certain Rwandan refugee warrior groups feel comfortable making the transition from their armed militant past to positing themselves as willing political negotiators. The ability of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors to posit themselves at different times as Rwandan, Congolese, Kivutian, Hutu, Bantu, refugee, militant, and dissident may make analysing them confusing, but their ability to navigate

between these labels and assert different elements of their identities at different times, gives them a great flexibility and resilience – which may explain why they have survived as a collectivity for so long.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to analyse the FDLR, using the few facts known about them to account for their surprising durability in the face of more than a decade of existential attacks and a hostile reception in both the Congo and Rwanda. In the first section I sought to explain how, despite a number of well-intentioned, and fairly well-resourced attacks against the FDLR by the tripartite coalition of the Government of Rwanda, the Government of the DRC, and MONUSCO, the group have managed to endure by adopting a number of strategies that the tripartite forces had either not prepared for or anticipated. I argued that much of the failure to adequately address the FDLR problem is rooted in a poor understanding of their motivations, goals, and the strategies they use to achieve these goals. In the second section of the chapter I then argued that we can uncover more about these motivations and strategies if we try and understand how the FDLR use their "identity as tactics". I gave examples of the mobilization of identity as tactics by explaining the transition that the FDLR made from being Odyssean to becoming quasi-Rubicon refugee; the manner in which they established belonging in the Kivus through the assertion of autochthonous discourses; the establishment of security through trade; and the diversification of the base of Rwandan Hutu refugee interests through the forging of alliances and the proliferation of FDLR-splinter groups. Each of these actions in turn creates a multi-faceted and broad identity – the different strands of which can be mobilized against existential threats as the situation demands.

The multiple and ephemeral nature of the FDLR's collective identity makes analyses of the group quite difficult. Indeed, while it is hoped that this chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of what is known (and what can perhaps be deduced) about the FDLR, it is merely an analysis based on the little (and sometimes unreliable) information that can be gleaned from reports and limited existing analyses of the FDLR. It is likely that my analysis therefore has only scratched the surface of the concerns and aspirations of FDLR and FDLR-affiliated members. However, through using what is known, a number of possible avenues for further exploration with regard to finding a solution for FDLR belligerency have been uncovered. These include integration in the eastern Congo through

trade, the possibility of an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue, and access to lived and local citizenship rights in the Kivus. The potential for success of each of these possibilities will be examined in the next chapter.

Chapter Six: Empathy for the Rebel?

Towards a More Understanding Approach to Rwandan Hutu Refugee Warriors in the Kivus

---

'Political dialogue is the only viable option'.[152]

~

Introduction

Having set out in the previous chapter how Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors have used their identity as a survival mechanism in the eastern Congo, I move in this chapter to discuss what can be done to reduce their threat in a sustainable way. This requires taking an approach with which Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors are themselves willing to cooperate, rather than attempting to impose policies to remove them that by-pass dialogue with the group (a strategy which has thus far failed). Using fractal patterning as a heuristic device, I will examine how historical attempts to reduce the militancy of Tutsi refugee warriors may provide us with some solutions to dealing with Hutu refugee warriors in similar situations. I argue that, just as some Tutsi groups have transformed themselves from refugee warriors into "legitimate"[153] parties of power, similar opportunities should be offered to Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups, such as RUD-Urunana, who claim that they want to enter in negotiations with the Rwandan government, in order to become political actors in Rwanda.

---

[152] (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 1).

[153] Although this legitimacy is questioned by Hutu power groups, Rwandan opposition groups, and local Congolese groups, in the eyes of the international community at least, the Tutsi former refugee warriors of the RPF constitute the legitimate political party in power in Rwanda. Furthermore, whilst there is some concern about the tenability of their new-found political position, at least for the meantime, groups such as the Banyamulenge and RCD are seen as legitimate. For example, Rwandan Tutsi refugees in the RCD have managed to transforms themselves into political agents, who have, at least officially, the protection of the Congolese government (see UK Border Agency, 2008, p. 10).

Although not entirely comparable, groups such as the RCD, and the CNDP do face similar security concerns to Rwandan Hutu militant groups in that they face constant existential threats, and feel a need to arm themselves accordingly. I set the cut-off date for this thesis as the Congolese national elections of November 2011. Up until this period, there were some Tutsi militias operating in the Kivus, but they were largely considered to be "renegade groups". The majority of Tutsi who had fought in the RCD and CNDP had been incorporated into the Congolese army. However, since then, Tutsi armed groups in the Kivus appear to have proliferated, as several Tutsi soldiers mutinied and deserted the army. Of note is, the March 23 Movement (or M23) rebel group formed in April 2012, led by Bosco Ntaganda. Since its formation. The UN have reported that the M23 have been receiving support from the Rwandan government. The activities of the M23 suggest that the Tutsi are once again emerging as a security problem in the Kivus. However, these Tutsi groups are justifying their belligerency by arguing that as long as the Rwandan Hutu problem remains, their essential security needs are not being met. But Hutu groups will not reduce their belligerency if they feel similarly threatened by Tutsi groups who ostensibly have Rwandan government backing.

The FDLR hardliners may need to be incorporated into the power structures of the Kivus because their Hutu Power (and, in some cases, genocidal) ideology is not going to be accepted by the Kagame regime in Rwanda. I argue that this ideology provides sufficient grounds for the Kagame regime to refuse to share power with this particular group, but it does not justify its refusal to negotiate with any (more moderate) Hutu opposition groups in exile. For these hardliners, and for the more moderate refugee warriors who have settled in the Kivus and do not wish to return to Rwanda, a more permanent form of settlement needs to be negotiated. Built into these negotiations, there needs to be a clarification of their status in the Congo. I will, therefore, also examine some strategies for facilitating greater integration of these groups into the dynamics of power in the Kivus, including the opening of markets to allow economic integration, an inter-Kivutian dialogue, and the opportunity to participate in local-level politics. At the heart of this chapter is the argument that reconciliation, rather than retribution, is needed.[154] I argue that the framing of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors as purely criminal, in an environment where human

[154] In this sense, I follow Mamdani's work on the negative effects of criminalization in peace processes and the positive effects of reconciliation in his comparison of South Africa and Rwanda (Mamdani, 2002).

rights atrocities have been committed by almost all parties involved in the Congo, will only serve to increase their belligerency and compound conflict in the Kivus.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section compares the behaviour of Tutsi refugee warriors in the Kivus with that of the Hutu refugee warrior groups I examined in the previous chapter, and argues that Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior behaviour can be seen to follow an established pattern of refugee warrior activity in the Kivus. In particular, I argue that the activities of the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors, which are often framed as "war crimes" are actions that have been carried out by numerous actors in the Congo – including Tutsi refugee warriors – and should be understood as strategies of survival rather than purely criminal activities. As such I suggest that we need to move away from efforts which solely focus on dismantling these groups, and capturing and arresting leaders. Instead, Rather than trying to dismantle these groups (who have fostered a sense of collective identity and belonging in the Kivus) outright, we should look at more creative and constructive approaches to *transforming* these groups into legitimate political actors.

In the second section, therefore, I move to discuss how alternative strategies of survival may be offered to the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors by looking at a more viable option for repatriation to Rwanda. I argue that before repatriation can become an attractive possibility for refugee warrior groups who have an Odyssean desire to eventually return to Rwanda, the possibility of an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue needs to be opened up. Here, I draw on the arguments put forward by RUD-Urunana, and human rights organizations such as Reporters Without Borders, who believe that as long as there is no space for Dialogue in Rwanda, and as long as the Kagame regime continues to clamp down on dissenting voices, return for many groups in Rwanda is not a safe option.

Of course, some groups adhere to an ideology so strongly anti-Tutsi that it is unlikely that the Kagame regime will ever accept a power-sharing agreement with them (and, indeed, these groups are themselves unlikely to want to share power with a Tutsi-led group such as the RPF). For these groups, return to Rwanda is not likely to be a viable option. Thus, in the third section, I move to examine how these groups can be better integrated into the Kivus so as to reduce their belligerent activities. My argument in this section is predicated on the notion that viable alternatives to violence should be provided for Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors. In other words, I argue that the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors who currently operate in the Kivus have little choice but to engage in violence in order to facilitate their

survival. If they remain in the Kivus with their situation unchanged, therefore, this violence will continue. However, if non-violent options are opened up to them, then their belligerency may be reduced. At the very least, offering alternative options for the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors will provide a moral upper-hand: If measures have been taken to provide security options for them, it will reduce the credibility of their claims about the necessity of survival-through-violence (Bøås, 2008) if they continue to engage in violent activities. The aim of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive strategy for reducing the threat of refugee warriors, but rather to suggest new approaches to designing how we deal with these threats. Most significantly, I argue that Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors are not a homogenous group, and that various members will have different needs. This chapter therefore examines a range of options for preventing the belligerency of this group and reducing their threat to both Congolese and Rwandan stability.

He Who is Without Sin

Gerrie Swart has described the eastern Congo as a 'no war, no peace'[155] society, and argues that 'the result of the failure to devise a sustainable peace strategy in the eastern DRC has ultimately led to a plethora of painstakingly negotiated peace agreements and intensive mediation, each violated with an almost immediate return to the battlefield' (Swart, 2011, p. 148). Within the eastern Congo, peace processes, however, are not the only agreements being violated. Human rights violations are rife, and even in 2012 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that the Kivu regions' human rights conditions were of particular concern:

> 'The High Commissioner is particularly concerned by the situation in the east of the country, especially in Orientale and Kivu provinces, where soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) continued to subject the local population to arbitrary executions, sexual violence, arbitrary and illegal arrests and detentions, torture and ill-treatment, extortion, looting and forced labour. Combatants of various armed groups also continued to commit serious human rights abuses against civilians, including murders, rapes and abductions. Sexual violence continued to be a major source of concern throughout the reporting period' (United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, 2012, pp. 5-6).

[155] Swart takes his argument from Roger MacGinty's framework set, out in his book *No War, No Peace* (MacGinty, 2008)

The observations of the High Commissioner demonstrate that these human rights violations are being committed by government forces, local militias and foreign armed groups alike. Indeed, Morten Bøås argued that in 2008 the FARDC was 'identified by MONUC as the largest systematic human rights abuser in the country' (Bøås, 2008, p. 63). However, it appears to be non-governmental leaders that are being singled out and punished for these crimes. For example, when the former vice-president of the Congo (and Kabila's chief opponent in the 2006 elections), Jean Pierre Bemba was arrested by the International Criminal Court in 2008, Bemba's lawyers claimed that the allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Central African Republic with which he was charged, his subsequent trial as a result of these allegations, was 'intended to remove him from the Congolese political scene' (BBC, 2010). The case is still ongoing – but there is a clear inconsistency, given the ICC belief that Bemba is responsible for war crimes (because he is the leader of an armed group who commit atrocities), while Kabila (who has not been indicted) is not held similarly responsible for the actions of the FARDC. Although there is a question as to why the ICC sees fit to arrest the leaders of some groups, but not of others who are committing similar atrocities, the range of leaders that the ICC has issued arrest warrants does nonetheless confirm that it is not just the Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups that are committing atrocities in the Congo. For example, the only Rwandan Hutu to be arrested by the ICC is Callixte Mbarushimana, executive secretary of the FDLR. Mbarushimana, who was based in Paris, was arrested by the French authorities in October 2010, after the ICC issued a warrant for his arrest for 'Five counts of crimes against humanity: murder, torture, rape, inhumane acts and persecution; [and] Eight counts of war crimes: attacks against the civilian population, murder, mutilation, torture, rape, inhuman treatment, destruction of property and pillaging' (International Criminal Court, 2012). However, the Pre-trial Chamber of the Court voted to drop the charges and, in December 2011, Mbarushimana was released by the ICC.

In comparison, the Hema leader, Thomas Lubanga, was found guilty by the court in March 2012, and the Tutsi former chief-of-staff of the CNDP Bosco Ntaganda has had a warrant issued for his arrest. Furthermore, there have been allegations that 'Rwandan military officials have allowed Ntaganda to enter Rwanda and supplied him with new recruits, weapons, and ammunition' (Reuters, 2012). The Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) has also been more directly involved in criminal activity in the Kivus, and during operation *Umoja Wetu*, the UN observed that top officers in the RDF and FARDC embezzled 'several million US dollars in operational funds' and 'also received consistent reports that RDF and newly

integrated CNDP elements working in tandem also cleared several areas of civilian populations' (UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2009).

The arrests and allegations mentioned above highlight a number of interrelated and problematic elements of the international judicial system with regard to the eastern Congo, and indeed the African Great Lakes in general. Firstly, although reports from human rights organizations show that abuses in the eastern DRC are widespread (UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2009; Amnesty International, 2012, pp. 126-129; United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, 2012), the indictments of the ICC demonstrate that they are only selectively punished. Secondly, and linked to this fact, the ICC seems to only indict rebel leaders in the DRC – demonstrating that the actions of governments (both Congolese and the Rwandan) seem to be held to less account than those of rebel groups. As a corollary of this observation a third element emerges: There is a lack of clarity regarding with whom the buck stops. For example, Jean Pierre Bemba's defense lawyer, Aime Kilolo, told the BBC that Bemba could prove his innocence because 'He will show that at no time could he be associated with allowing rapes or murders... nor did he have effective control of troops, nor was he responsible for discipline' (BBC, 2010). However, Bemba was still indicted by the ICC for this apparent lack of control, but the judge asked the prosecution to amend the charges against him from 'criminal responsibility' to 'command responsibility' (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2012). On the other hand, the Rwandan government was reported to be actively arming and aiding Ntaganda during his reign of terror in the Kivus. Is it therefore a war crime to lead a rebel movement that commits atrocities, but not a war crime to aid a rebel leader in conducting these atrocities? Finally, many of these trials have taken over two years, resulting in the acquittal of human rights abusers such as Callixte Mbarushimana, and have been stalled by insufficient evidence and poor prosecutorial conduct. This indicates that, even if the ICC are justified in their indictment of these "war criminals", they are not particularly effective at punishing those that they judge as needing to face international justice.

Connerton argues that 'the existence of past injustice, and the continued memory of that injustice, raises the question of the rectification of injustices' (Connerton, 1989, p. 9). However, the plethora of culprits guilty of human rights abuses in the eastern Congo suggests that retributive justice is difficult to implement in a consistent and impartial manner. Indeed, there is a tendency for the ICC to concentrate on arresting those war criminals who do not appear to be backed by rich or powerful states. This may be because

the ICC feels that those who are weak and isolated are easy to prosecute, in reality however, even these attempts fail and often end up doing more harm than good. For example, now that Mbarushimana has been acquitted of war crimes, he can boast his innocence, even though the failure to find him guilty of such crimes was not because he did not commit them, but because the prosecution were inadequately prepared at the time of his trial (International Criminal Court, 2012). Similarly, it was observed that the ICC arrest did not deter Jean Pierre Bemba from participating in the Congolese political arena. In a report for the International Refugee Rights Initiative, in conjunction with members of Congolese civil society, it was argued that 'Bemba has not, however, taken his incarceration to mean that he should be sidelined and has pushed his own candidacy' (Bueno, 2011). According to his defense lawyer, Nick Kaufmann, 'there is nothing in the Rome Statute which prevents Mr. Bemba from being the flag bearer for his party in the November 2011 presidential elections. This is even more so the case since – until determined otherwise – Mr. Bemba is an innocent man' (Wairagala, 2011). However, Bemba's incarceration meant that he was incapable of launching a viable presidential bid, even though he was Kabila's strongest opponent in 2006. Thus, the ICC can be seen to be interfering with the democratic processes of the DRC. Given that the identity of "the perpetrator" in the Congo is not clear-cut (see, for example, Mamdani's [2002] work on perptrators and justice) it seems problematic to only punish some perpetrators and not others. I argue that it would be better, as happened in South Africa (Mamdani, 2002), to draw a line under past crimes and move instead to look for reconciliation.

The fact that human rights violations have been committed by numerous actors in the eastern Congo demonstrates that the actions of the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors are not unique, but rather fall into a standard pattern of behaviour in the quest for power, control, and resources in the region. Therefore, while the inconsistent nature of their punishment may reveal a problem with the international justice system, much can be learnt from the actions of both those groups who are punished and those who proceed with relative impunity. In this regard, I argue that if we compare the actions of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors operating in the Kivus today with the actions of Rwandan Tutsi refugee warriors who have been belligerent in the Kivus (both in the past and in contemporary settings), we may be able to uncover something about the security dilemmas and incentives that Rwandan Hutus in the Kivus face. We can consider the Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors as a community in transition from refugee to citizen, given that they are attempting to engage in the political dynamics (albeit in a belligerent manner)

of the DRC. They are not the first refugee warrior group to attempt to make this transition; the Tutsi refugee warriors[156] who fought in the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma) have metamorphosized from refugee warriors to legitimate political stakeholders in Congolese democracy.

Rwandan Tutsi refugee warriors have been present in South Kivu since Rwanda's independence period, when Hutu-dominated nationalist forces began persecuting the Tutsi who had dominated them during the colonial period. Political turmoil in Rwanda meant that by the mid 1960s more than half of the Rwandan Tutsi population lived outside of Rwanda (Turner, 2007). These refugees (and their descendants) have now been resident in the DRC for half a century, and been the target of much persecution in the Kivus. Constantly seen as an alien "other", it was the insecurity conferred upon them by their uncertain citizenship status, combined with Mobutu's tacit support for their persistent persecution, which motivated the Tutsi refugee warriors to join Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) in the First Congo War. Their renewed persecution under Kabila, however, led to their involvement in the RCD during the Second Congo War. What is interesting is that, despite regime change in Rwanda facilitating a safe potential return to the homeland for the Tutsi refugee warriors, several decades in exile meant that many had formed roots in the DRC, and return was no longer the most desired option. Rather, benefitting from fortification in the form of Rwandan backing, the Rwandan Tutsi refugee warriors sought to assert their own political agency in the DRC – to shift from being refugee warriors, to taking up the role of legitimate political agents.

We can see that this objective has, to some extent at least, been achieved; the RCD had come to be regarded as a legitimate Congolese stakeholder. In the 2002 Inter Congolese Dialogue to establish a transitional post-conflict government in the DRC, the RCD were given 7 Ministerial positions and 4 Deputy Ministerial positions – the same allocation afforded to the Joseph Kabila government, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the official political opposition groups. The RCD refugee warriors have not only started to leave their refugee status behind (which had previously denied them access to

[156] I have refrained from calling this group Rwandan Tutsi refugee warriors, because they also contain Banyamulenge members who would regard themselves as Congolese, rather than Rwandan. However, I have still referred to them as a refugee warrior group because the Banyamulenge did not have official Congolese citizenship throughout much of Congolese history, and were therefore also a stateless people.

the Congolese political system), but have also managed to bring into being a political subjectivity that was not linked to armed danger or threat. Whilst there is some concern about tenability of their newfound political position, at least for the meantime, the RCD have managed to transform themselves from refugee warriors to political agents – with the RCD being represented in the provincial assembly of North Kivu.[157] Furthermore, those Tutsi refugee warriors who fought in Laurent Nkunda's CNDP militia have been integrated into the FARDC.

This transition is far from perfect or stable; the RCD lost power in the 2006 Congolese elections, as their Banyamulenge leader, Azarias Rubwera, only gained 1.69% of the vote for president (African Elections Database, 2012), and only 15/500 seats in the national assembly (*Ibid.*). In the 2011 elections they did not have a presidential candidate. However, the fact that they had been given an opportunity to participate in elections, and a political arena within which to operate is significant. Of course, the actions of the 'renegade Tutsi leader' Laurent Nkunda (Al Jazeera, 2008), and his successor Bosco Ntaganda, suggest that Tutsi violence in the Congo has not been completely reduced. However, this violence is often justified as a response to continued FDLR violence against Tutsis in the region. 'Nkunda, in particular, reinforced the perception of the imminence of genocide, fuelling paranoia among the Tutsi' (Swart, 2011, p. 147), but Swart also observes that this 'led to an upsurge in anti-Tutsi sentiment' (*Ibid.*). It is possible, therefore, that offering groups like the FDLR the option to participate in the political arena (in the same way that opportunities to partake in both local and national politics have been offered to Tutsi refugee warriors) may have a dual impact, of both reducing their own violence, and reducing the need of Tutsi militias to resort to violent methods to protect themselves. In doing so, it may be possible to break the vicious cycle of violence that the two intertwined security dilemmas produce.

We might question at this point why the former Rwandan refugees of the RCD chose to remain in the DRC, rather than return to Rwanda – where their presence would arguably be received with more hospitality, and would certainly provide an environment in which they would be less prone to persecution. In response to this question, I suggest two significant factors – one psychological, and the other pragmatic. To begin with the psychological reasons, we can argue that the Tutsi warriors stopped seeing themselves as refugees once

[157] See the website of North Kivu's provincial government: http:www.provincenordkivu.org/gvnment_provincial.html&usg=ALkJrhiibiSN2cmGFQT3CpHqFTOgac-rQ. Date accessed: 05/06/2012

regime change in Rwanda meant that they would be welcomed back. In his work on Palestinian refugees, Rabinowitz argues that the right to return has the potential to 'redefine people's sense of historic justice, individual and collective choice, identity, morality and destiny' (Rabinowitz, 2010, p. 494). The well-founded fear of being persecuted, which formerly defined the Tutsi as refugees, had been alleviated, and what the Tutsi now faced is a choice. No longer being passive (refugee) victims is likely to have had an esteem-boosting effect on the Tutsi, which may have translated into the confidence to exercise political agency in the eastern DRC – knowing that they had the support of the new Rwandan regime (who, it is alleged, have supplied several Tutsi groups with military training, strategic support, armed personnel, and financial assistance). However, these psychological effects are difficult to assess, and such an approach is overly-reliant on speculative deduction; inferring anything about the Tutsi's decision to remain in the DRC based on psychological speculation alone would provide little insight into the manner in which the nature of their refuge affects their actions.

More concrete assertions, can however, be made if we consider the practicalities of return. Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa, with a heavily agriculture-dependent economy, and little by way of mineral wealth. Returnees to Rwanda face stiff competition for land and, especially for those who have been exiled for over half a century, asserting successful claims to land are extremely difficult. UNHCR has observed that limited land is a significant obstacle to their operations to return refugees to Rwanda, and has sought to mitigate this through "reintegration projects" which they regard as 'important to ensure the sustainability of returns to Rwanda, where scarcity of land makes self-sufficiency difficult' (UNCHR, 2011). By contrast, land is more readily available in the DRC and, perhaps more importantly, lucrative economic opportunities are offered by the Congo's mineral wealth. In Mobutu's Zaïre, 'describing everyday survival strategies, Congolese will often say *"nous vivons mysterieusement"* ("we live mysteriously"), *"nous vivons dans l'air"* ("we live in the air")' (Jackson, 2002, p. 521). This mysterious style of living is also characteristic of the Tutsi – in fact, given the precarious position they have occupied for so many decades, and which has not presented their survival, we may assume that the Tutsi, perhaps as part of their refugee warrior activities, or perhaps in some separate capacity, have mastered the system of survival in the Congo. Even if the Tutsi are often posited as marginalized and persecuted in the Congo, by virtue of the fact that they have managed to survive for this protracted period, the Tutsi have demonstrated a degree

of assimilation into Congolese culture by following the guiding principle of Zairois life *"Debrouillez Vous!"* ("fend for yourselves!").

The "fend for yourself" environment of "System D" remained long after the overthrow of Mobutu,[158] but for the Tutsi of the RCD there have been significant changes in the Congo since 1997, which actually place them in a better position than one of merely eking out survival. The remarkable metamorphosis of the Tutsi from Rwandan refugees (or Congolese denizens), to refugee warrior community, to credible Congolese political actor is not necessarily a transition to which all refugee warrior communities aspire, and indeed even some Tutsi groups have returned to violent struggle. However, those Tutsi refugee warriors who have assimilated into the Congolese political system as legitimate political actors demonstrate that a political presence to refugee subjectivity need not always be one of armed danger. This being said, it would be naïve to claim that the Tutsi could have reached this point without violence – certainly their success as refugee warriors in the ADFL and the RCD aided their access to power in the Inter Congolese Dialogue. We might even go as far as to say that had they not been violent, they would not have gained a position at the bargaining table in the first place. This is reflected in the fact that the other belligerent group of the Second Congo War, the MLC, the RCD-ML, the RCD-N[159] and the Maï-Maï, also gained ministerial representation in the Inter Congolese Dialogue, and we could in this sense view the actions of the FDLR as a bid to gain political recognition in the DRC.

Political recognition for the FDLR may be a positive step towards their own transition from violent group to legitimate actor, and this may be what they are aiming for, but it appears that the UN intervention in the Congo is currently presenting a clear barrier to this approach. In an interview in 2010, Gregory Alex, Director of Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRRR) at MONUSCO informed me that there 'may be 30,000 [Rwandan refugees] remaining in the DRC, but that's the one per cent who tend to be criminals or are held by them' (Interview with Gregory Alex, 2010). These refugees do not appear to display a strong desire to return to Rwanda, yet the emphasis of the MONUSCO operation is placed on repatriation – allowing Rwanda to then deal with the returnees as they see fit (which, for those judged responsible for Genocide, means being

[158] Jackson has argued that "Economic activity outside the formal, legal sphere was already significant at independence, particularly in the Kivus" (Jackson, 2002: 520)

[159] Splinter factions of the RCD: the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) is led by Mbusa Nyamwisi and RCD-National (RCD-N) is a Ugandan-backed rebel group led by Roger Lumbala that is now allied with the MLC.

brought to justice). But it is this fear of reprisal which is preventing repatriation, and the Congolese government's new spirit of cooperation with the Government of Rwanda and assistance with the capture of FDLR members, that is causing the FDLR to remain hidden and continue their violence. Whilst the arrest of key FDLR figures such as Callixte Mbarushimana and Ignace Murwanashyaka was hailed as a significant blow to the strength of the FDLR, it only serves to compound the lower-level FDLR warriors' fear of capture. As long as fighters in the FDLR feel existentially threatened by Rwanda and the international community, they will continue to defend themselves aggressively, thus perpetuating the security dilemma-like cycle of violence. As Mamdani observes; 'Every round of perpetrators has justified the use of violence as the only effective guarantee against being victimized yet again' (Mamdani, 2002, pp. 267-8).

The Social Crisis of Post-Genocide Rwanda[160]

Although they have been studied here as a collectivity, Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors represent a highly heterogeneous category. Thus, within this category, a distinction should be made between those who have an Odyssean desire to return to Rwanda, and those who have crossed the Rubicon and aim for more permanent settlement in the eastern DRC. In this section I will examine those Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors who harbour a project of return to Rwanda, and discuss what needs to change in order to for this to be facilitated. UNHCR have said that they planned to apply the cessation clause to all Rwandan refugees by the end of June 2012 (although this date has now been extended), because of the "relatively stable" environment in Rwanda (UNHCR, 2012). However, as Reporters Without Borders have observed: 'Lots of Rwandan refugees live in appalling conditions outside of Rwanda, above all in nearby African countries. If they don't go back, they must have a reason' (Reporters Without Borders, 2011). In particular, they highlight the constraints on opposition to the Kagame regime, which is often facilitated through a manipulation of laws pertaining to genocide: 'You just have to be unfairly accused of "genocide denial" or "revisionism" and you go to jail...[they] cannot return to a country where arbitrary justice reigns' (Reporters Without Borders, 2011).

---

[160] In *When Victims Become Killers*, Mamdani argues that 'The depth of the crisis in the eastern Congo cannot be understood unless we see it as the result of a confluence of two distinct processes: the social crisis of postgenocide Rwanda and the citizenship crisis in the entire region' (Mamdani, 2002, p. 261). Following from this, in this section I will examine what needs to be transformed in Rwanda to deal with this crisis, and then I will move in the next section to examine what needs to be done about citizenship in the DRC.

Mamdani corroborates the view that the Rwandan regime use the genocidal label to prevent a rise in opposition, but adds that this has the nefarious consequence of also justifying the opposition's militarization: 'In postgenocide Rwanda, those in power tend to demonize all oppositional politics – regardless of political character – as *genocidaires*, and, as if on cue, opposition takes on an armed character' (Mamdani, 2002, p. 261). The nature of political power in Rwanda, therefore, needs to change before those Hutu refugee warriors who wish to eventually return to Rwanda feel that it is safe to do so. In the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide, the newly installed RPF regime banned a number of political parties which it viewed as having a genocidal ideology, or the propensity to intensify ethnic cleavages. However, the widespread reach of this ban was seen as representative of the 'increasingly authoritarian character of the regime and the growing exclusion of Hutus from political life' (Basedau & Moroff, 2011, p. 216). Indeed, as discussed in earlier chapters, the Kagame regime in Rwanda has clamped down heavily on opposition, and has become 'for all intents and purposes a single party state' (Lermarchand, 2006, p. 7). In particular, by removing the labels of Hutu and Tutsi from political discussion in Rwanda (and replacing it with a supposedly unifying assertion that everyone in Rwanda is Banyarwanda), it has become very difficult for Hutu opposition groups to voice their grievances about horizontal inequalities in Rwanda without being accused of divisionism.[161]

It is clear, therefore, that Rwanda needs to change, as the 'growing restrictions on political space have promoted views among some Hutu, including those in the FDLR, that they have little or no say in Rwandan political life, and that the Hutu population are being collectively punished for the genocide' (Swart, 2011, p. 147). This sentiment is certainly corroborated in the arguments put forward by RUD-Urunana who suggest that, although there is a tendency to view the Kagame regime as stable and promoting economic progress, 'when one scratched slightly under the surface, one uncovers a society ridden with rampant structural inequalities, injustice, nepotism, corruption, and flagrant abuse of human rights' (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 1). At the same time, however, there is a clear sense of fear among

[161] Indeed, this was confirmed in my own fieldwork in 2008, when I observed that Tutsi child soldiers who had fought in the RPF were given the opportunity to catch-up their education in a specially-designed *Kadogo* School. As a result many of them entered into well-paid jobs, and some even served as civil servants and government ministers. In contrast, the Hutu child soldiers who were sent to the Muhazi Child Rehabilitation centre were given relatively little access to education, and most engaged in subsistence farming or small-scale income-generating activities such as selling phone cards. When I asked if this was not likely to be seen as preferential treatment for Tutsis, I was informed that there is no preferential treatment because "everyone is Rwandan".

Tutsis in Rwanda of a more democratic form of rule. Given that they are a minority in Rwanda, more openness in the Rwandan political system would mean allowing for the very real possibility that a Hutu-led regime would gain power. Taking into account the horrors that they have suffered in Rwanda – not just in 1994, but also in massacres in 1959 and 1973 – and the persecution they have faced in the Great Lakes Region throughout their history, it is understandable that the Tutsi see absolute power as the only guarantee of their existential survival. However, as Mamdani observes, 'victor's justice – the Tutsification of state institutions – cannot be an effective guarantee against a repeat of genocidal violence in Rwandan society. If anything, it will keep alive the spectre of yet another round of genocidal violence' (Mamdani, 2002, p. 272). It is clear, therefore, that some sort of compromise needs to be reached which can simultaneously satisfy the Kagame regime that relinquishing some power will not result in the extermination of the Tutsi, and at the same time, allow those Hutus who feel marginalized and excluded to participate in the political arena. In a press release issued in July 2009, the Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior group RUD-Urunana stated that 'the Rwandan problem is political in nature and requires political solutions. It is our firm conviction that as long as the Rwandan problem is not resolved the African Great Lakes region will remain unstable' (RUD-Urunana, 2009, p. 4). In this regard, RUD-Urunana call for an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue and the organization of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission.

In addition to a more reconciliatory approach to justice, however, RUD-Urunana call for an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue with a view to leading to a power-sharing agreement (RUD-Urunana, 2009).[162] Of course, power-sharing is likely to be seen as a risky concession from the Kagame regime. However, I suggest that a consociational power-sharing agreement may prove fruitful. The idea of consociationalism was set out by Arendt Lijphart in the 1970s (although I draw upon his revised work, Lijphart, 1990) as a framework for facilitating powersharing. Rene Lermarchand has recently attempted to apply Lijphart's framework to Africa – arguing that even if 'power-sharing experiences in Africa have generally failed, this does not necessarily invalidate the case for consociationalism' (Lermarchand, 2006, p. 2). Lermarchand outlines three particular aspects of Lijphart's theory which may facilitate effective power-sharing in Rwanda: *group autonomy* such that, although common decisions are made as a collective, affairs that are only of concern to one

[162] Presumably, RUD-Urunana would present themselves as a political party who wish to take up some of the available political posts – although the degree of legitimacy which they would achieve among the Rwandan populations still remains to be seen.

group can be decided by them alone; *proportionality* of representation for each group; and the *minority veto* (Lermarchand, 2006). I argue that the minority veto is of particular significance in the Rwandan case, as the use of it would allow the Tutsi to safeguard themselves against any existential threats. Indeed, Lijphart himself described the minority veto as 'the ultimate weapon that minorities need to protect their vital interests' (Lijphart, 1990, p. 495). Lemarchand gives the example of Burundi [which he notes was once described as Rwanda's 'false twin']) as 'a faithful image of the ideal consociational polity' (*Ibid.*, p. 3). He highlights the use of this model by arguing that despite havig similar backgrounds with regards to a history of Hutu-Tutsi tensions, Rwanda 'is a full-fledged Tutsi-dominated dictatorship which denies altogether the existence of ethnic identities' (*Ibid.*, p. 4), whilst Burundi 'is a multiparty democracy based on the explicit recognition of ethnic differences' (Lermarchand, 2006, p. 4). Vandeginste argues that, although the Burundian system evolved out of many trial and error attempts, its most recent incarnation involves a dual system which appreciates the plurality of Burundian society, and has also transformed former rebel groups into political parties (Vandeginste, 2009, pp. 71-2). Although the system is still far from perfect, the case of Burundi demonstrates that a consociational approach can help resolve Hutu-Tutsi tensions, and that taking such an approach in Rwanda may simultaneously allay Hutu grievances about exclusion and Tutsi concerns that a loss of power will lead to extermination. In doing so, it is possible that the 'spectres of yet another round of genocidal violence' (Mamdani, 2002, p. 272) may finally be laid to rest.

Citizenship and Statelessness in the Eastern DRC

Of course consociationalism has its limits. Even though in theory, consociationalism allows for automaticity of inclusion (see Lijphart, 1990), so that even hardliners can be included in negotiations, it is unlikely that Hutu Power hardliners will want to return to Rwanda and share any form of power with Tutsi-led parties such as the RPF. In this regard, it would appear that the best course of action when dealing with this group is to integrate them into a more permanent form of settlement in the eastern DRC. However, Hutu Power hardliners are not the only group of refugee warriors who may have crossed the Rubicon with regards to Rwanda. During my fieldwork, for example, I was informed that several FDLR members had married local Congolese women and settled in the Kivus. As such, they had no strong desire to return to Rwanda. While settlement in the Kivus may, therefore, be the most desirable option for both of these groups of Rubicon refugee warriors, the political

situation in the Kivus needs to be addressed if this settlement is going to be a peaceful one. In particular, the uncertain status of Rwandan refugee warriors as denizens of the Congo needs to be addressed, in order to ensure that the question of Rwandophone nationality does not become a target of cynical manipulation by Congolese elites (Vlassenroot, 2002), or a source of pervasive insecurity among Rwandophone militants (Bøås, 2008). However, citizenship is about more than simply gaining recognition from the Congolese state. In this section, therefore, I use Jackson's (2007) three conceptions of citizenship to suggest a more comprehensive approach to addressing the uncertainties of rights and belonging that drive much of the conflict in the eastern Congo.

In his analysis of North Kivu, Morten Bøås argues that the province needs 'a new approach [to peacebuilding] that combines political, military, and developmental measures' (Bøås, 2008, p. 64). Indeed, political measures are useless unless the military practices that compound much of the conflict, and the developmental dearth that has resulted from over a century of conflict and exploitation in the Congo, are first addressed. As the previous chapter has shown, military moves to remove Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups such as the FDLR have proved largely ineffective. In fact, Bøås argues that they have compounded insecurity in the Kivus, and suggests that military measures to remove Tutsi and Hutu armed groups in the Congo demonstrates that 'the more pressure put on them, the more they feel cornered, fighting with their backs against the wall for the survival of their community' (Bøås, 2008, p. 63). I would echo this observation: Military efforts have been key to both MONUC's and MONUSCO's attempts to handle the FDLR. The primary objective of both missions with regard to the FDLR has been Disarmament, Demobilization and (in most cases) Repatriation (DDR) to Rwanda – processes which ultimately equate to the destruction of the group. I suggest, however, that this existential threat to the FDLR's survival may in part explain why they continue to resort to such extreme and aggressive measures to protect themselves. This argument is evidenced by the events of 2005, which saw peaceful negotiations between MONUC's civilian leg and the FDLR jeopardized by MONUC's military operations. 'At the time, the FDLR negotiated with the civilian leg of MONUC about its voluntary repatriation, and then without any advance notification to its civilian staff, the military leg of MONUC attacked the FDLR positions' (Dijkzeul, 2010, p. 326).

Although the UN Report of the then Secretary General (UN Secretary General, 2005) stated that this attack was largely a success, given that the numbers of FDLR combatants had been

reduced, it overlooked several key corollaries of the attack which greatly undermined long-term peacebuilding efforts. In particular, Dijkzeul points to the fact that peaceful economic coexistence was being fostered between the FDLR and local Congolese civilians through the trade of FDLR agricultural surplus (as it was observed that several FDLR members were skilled farmers). These relations were severely damaged after the attack, and the will of FDLR soldiers to seek non-violent means of coexistence in the Congo was reduced as a result of this imminent threat to their group survival. Whilst MONUC were trying to militarily dismantle a group that they saw as intrinsically violent and criminal, 'the irony was that, unbeknown to most international observers, new alternatives to either local integration of peaceful return were opening up. Unfortunately, these alternative courses of action became more difficult to accomplish' (Dijkzeul, 2010). Furthermore, the attack pushed the remaining FDLR members further into the Congolese jungles – making their capture much harder to achieve – and gave rise to the activities of new "criminal" groups in FDLR-held territory, such as the *Rasta*.[163] Despite the failures of MONUC in this respect, MONUSCO continue to pursue a strong DDR[164] programme through its military wing, and the policy of militarily dismantling the FDLR is one which is advocated by other international peacebuilders, such as the International Crisis Group (2009).

Dijkzeul's observations, however, point to a different form of reintegration which could reduce FDLR militancy, namely, economic reintegration. I was informed by Pieter Vanholder of the Life and Peace Institute[165] that some FDLR members 'are fine as long as they can make money'[166] – a sentiment which is echoed by the Kivutian civil society group, the Pole Institute:

> 'The economic integration of the FDLR in various areas is an accepted fact. They are involved in artisanal gold mining in South Kivu; cassiterite mining in Walikale in North

[163] The *Rasta* are viewed as a criminal militia who loot, kidnap, attack and terrorize civilians in the FDLR-held areas of the Kivus. They are known to contain FDLR renegades, so there is a general perception that their activities are undertaken to fund the FDLR, but these are allegations that the FDLR have denied (see Thakur, 2008; Dijkzeul, 2010) .

[164] In the case of the FDLR, reintegration usually first involves repatriation to Rwanda

[165] The Life and Peace Institute are a Swedish-run organization who describe themselves as an 'international and ecumenical centre that supports and promotes nonviolent approaches to conflict transformation through a combination of research and action that entails the strengthening of existing local capacities and enhancing the preconditions for building peace' (Life and Peace Institute, 2012). They have field offices in a number of African countries, including in the eastern DRC.

[166] I am extremely grateful to Pieter Vanholder who took the time to discuss his experiences of the FDLR in Bukavu with me at the 2012 ISA Annual Convention, San Diego.

> Kivu; in the marketing of these minerals; in transportation of persons and goods; in the slaughtering of animals stolen in Masisi, selling them in different markets in Walikale and elsewhere; and in the sale of consumer goods, especially beer, and their transport between Hombo and Walikale. All of these activities make the FDLR a major economic force in both Kivu provinces' (Pole Institute, 2010, p. 28)

While many of these activities are arguably illegal, they fit part of a larger culture of surviving in *System D*, given the palpable absence of the state in the eastern Congo. As such, the Pole Institute has suggested, if the FDLR are to be better integrated into the Kivus, then the economic isolation of the FDLR, and FDLR-controlled markets, needs to end (Pole Institute, 2010, p. 14). Of course, the FDLR right to control of these markets is highly contested, and a source of pervasive tension.

Eminent scholars on the Congo, such as Séverine Autesserre and Morten Bøås, have suggested that land rights need to be resolved before peace in the Congo can be found. Bøås argues that 'any lasting solution to the North Kivu problem will have to include an agreement on Banyarwanda citizenship and on concomitant land rights issues' (Bøås, 2008, p. 54). Autesserre also argues for the primacy of land rights as key to resolving conflict in the area (Autesserre, 2008; 2010; 2012). I do not dispute this argument, but given the difficulty involved in assigning land rights when competition for both space and ownership is heated and complex, we need to reduce the importance of land as a means of survival in the eastern DRC. Autesserre herself argues that 'land matters because for many people it is the key to survival and feeding one's family' (Autesserre, 2008, p. 95). But the question that we need to be asking, then, is not "how can we then distribute land more fairly?", but rather "how can we offer people other ways of surviving which are not reliant on land ownership?" This would require a transformation of the labour market in the Kivus, away from a reliance on farming and mining (the two main sources of income in the Kivus, and yet two activities which are extremely land-intensive) towards other income-generating activities, such as production or service industries, which do not require so much land. This transformation would not be easy, but it would be one which may aid the development of the country as a whole.

Of course the transformation of labour markets may mean that land becomes less of an issue in the Kivus, but it will not solve the difficult issue of Banyarwanda citizenship. Various citizenship laws throughout Congolese history have attempted to deal with this issue – the

most recent of which is *Loi No. 04/024 Relative a `la Nationalite' Congolaise* which was promulgated by the Transitional Government in 2004 (see Jackson, 2007). However, this law has not clarified the situation particularly well, and the status of Rwandophone migrants to the Congo remains uncertain. The law now gives nationality to 'all persons belonging to ethnic groups or nationalities whose people and territory constituted that which became the Congo (presently the Democratic Republic of the Congo) at independence, are Congolese by origin' (Article 6 of the law cited in Jackson, 2007, p. 489). As Jackson points out, however, this law still leaves open the possibility of legal exclusion (particularly as those deemed to have dual nationality can lose their Congolese nationality), and also ambiguity of interpretation. Jackson argues that 'the position of Congolese Hutu...has remained more ambiguous, sometimes hailed as "brothers" of the other Congolese because of common affinity within a larger population bloc known as "Bantu", sometimes lumped with the Tutsi as the common "Rwandan enemy"' (Jackson, 2007, p. 488). Furthermore, Jackson argues that even if both Hutus and Tutsis in the Congo are given citizenship status, this citizenship status is only *civic* in nature. Even if they are given inclusion under the 2004 law (which currently does not provide citizenship rights for those who arrived in the Congo after independence), the law only guarantees that the state will recognize the individual as having Congolese nationality. However, in the Kivus, where the provisions of the state to those who have national status are limited, the assignation of Congolese nationality to groups such as the Hutu and the Banyamulenge are only of limited value in reducing their security predicament. Therefore, I argue that we need to go beyond merely giving those refugee warriors who wish to remain in the Kivus civic citizenship status.

In this sense, two other levels of citizenship (i.e. local citizenship and lived citizenship) need to be addressed if a more permanent sense of settlement in the Kivus is going to allay Rwandan refugee warriors' security concerns. I argue that the economic integration which I discussed above may help to open up the ability of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors to gain access to lived citizenship – which Jackson describes as the 'the ethically vital, lived sense of belonging and existential security for the individual within society as a whole') (see Jackson, 2007, p. 483). I suggest that economic integration will reduce their reliance on belligerency, and that as they become less belligerent, hostility towards them by local Congolese populations will also reduce. However, this on its own is insufficent, as it still leaves open the possibility that Rwandophone citizenship can be manipulated by what Dunn and Bøås

terms "regional bigmen" (Dunn & Bøås, forthcoming).[167] Through case studies of the DRC, Côte D'Ivoire, Kenya and Liberia, Dunn and Bøås argue that "regional bigmen" use ethnic manipulation and autochthonous discourses to gain traction among local populations in order to cement their power. In the DRC, Mobutu, both Kabilas, and numerous local leaders (as well as big men outside of the Congo, like Kagame) have manipulated the uncertainty surrounding Rwandophones for political and strategic gain. I argue, therefore that the political space in the Kivus, much like the political space in Rwanda, needs to be opened up, so that Rwandophones have the opportunity to participate in politics at the local level.

Earlier I discussed Rene Lermarchand's work on consociationalism in Africa. In the case of the Congo, Lemarchand argues that the failure of the peace process can be attributed to 'the failure of power-sharing strategies to include potential spoilers' (Lermarchand, 2006, p. 13) – following from Grignon's argument that 'all non-participants to the ICD are potential spoilers of both the transition and its peace-building initiatives on account of both economic and security interests' (Grignon, 2006, p. 92). Certainly we can see the belligerent activities of all Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups as reflecting the fact that there was no incentive to act in accordance with a peace process in which they had no say. It is, therefore, worth exploring the possibility of bringing these groups to the bargaining table. This needs to go beyond including them in small ad-hoc agreements, to incorporating them into the institutional design of long-term peacebuilding strategies in the Congo – if not at the national level, then at least at the local level. This, in itself, would require a reformulation of local level politics to allow Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors to gain access to the "ethnic/local" dimension of citizenship (i.e. a relationship between the individual and customary authority). In this regard, interesting possibilities may open up for consociationalism at the local level. Even if the DRC represents a 'less than successful experiment' (Lermarchand, 2006, p. 1) with consociationalism, more luck may be had if we consider it as an option for local level institutional design.

This strategy would not be a far cry from already existing institutional structures. North Kivu's provincial agreement already operates along a power-sharing system.[168] It would not

[167] I am grateful to Kevin C. Dunn who discussed his forthcoming book which he is co-writing with Morten Bøås, in a roundtable on autochthony at the 2012 ISA Annual Convention, San Diego.(Dunn & Bøås, forthcoming)

[168] Details of this power sharing can be found on the website of the North Kivu provincial assembly

be a radical transformation to allow the FDLR (or for that matter FLNK, or RUD-Urunana) the opportunity to transform into a political party and contest local politics in the Kivus. In this regard, I follow Morten Bøås's work on the Niger Delta in which he argues that marginalized young men in the Niger Delta join groups such as MEND because they see violence as a form of empowerment (Bøås, 2011). As Bøås argues:

> '...external stakeholders should place more emphasis on dialogue and the establishment of a "respectable" face for MEND than on offering military support to the government, as facilitating the transformation of an insurgency such as MEND into a more genuine and legitimate political force and less a vehicle for violent patrimonialism is in the interests of both the population of the Delta and those of stakeholders seeking to secure the long-term sustainability of the area's oil production' (Bøås, 2011, p. 124).

In the same way, I argue that transforming groups such as the FDLR into legitimate political actors may serve as a more sustainable mechanism for peace than trying to militarily disarm them through military operations. Indeed, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter, a successful precedent for doing so can be seen in the case of the RCD and their inclusion into the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (see also Lermarchand, 2006).

There is a reciprocal link between the transformation of local politics in the Kivus (and national politics in Rwanda), and the reduction of the Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior threat. I have demonstrated above how power-sharing politics in the Kivus and Rwanda could open up the political space needed to transform Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors from rebel militants into legitimate political actors. This in turn will strengthen the stability and security of both Rwanda and the Kivus, as the rebel groups will have an outlet for their political grievances other than recourse to belligerency. Furthermore, Tutsi rebel groups and Congolese local militias which have formed to defend themselves from Hutu belligerency (and who should also be given a similar opportunity to transform themselves) will no longer have a justifiable reason to do so. The focus of this thesis has been on the specific problem of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors in the Kivus, and as such the suggestions have been primarily aimed at alleviating the immediate tensions in the Kivus and their impact on Rwandan insecurity. However, there is a wider regional dimension to this conflict and again there is a reciprocal link between addressing the Rwandan Hutu

---

www.provincenordkivu.org/gvnment_provincial.html&usg=ALkJrhiibiSN2cmGFQT3CpHqFTOga_c-rQ
Date accessed: 05/06/2012

problem and regional stability: If local interventions are to succeed, then they need to be complemented with at least some degree of regional transformation. Similarly, local- and national-level transformations may make regional dynamics of conflict easier to resolve.

In Chapter Two, I used Regional Security Complex Theory to demonstrate how the Congo can be regarded as a buffer state for Central and East African regional insecurity, and argued that the Kivus serve as a sub-buffer-within-the-buffer. If tensions within the Kivus are eased, then the epicentre of the Congo-focussed regional security complex will have been targeted, and this will produce knock on effects for the rest of the region. Furthermore, both the Rwandan and Ugandan governments would be denied the convenient framing of "security" as a justification for continued interference in (and pillage of) Eastern Congo. Reducing insecurity in the Kivus would also allow transformation of the Congo as a whole. In the first place, it would lessen the Congo's reliance on the UN in the east of the country, and allow for greater Kivutian participation in Congolese national politics. If moves to transform labour markets in the Kivus prove sucessful, it could also serve as a useful model for improving the economic infrastructure in the rest of the Congo, and facilitate a move away from income-generating activities which are overly-reliant on access to land and resources in other parts of the country. Strengthening the whole country in this way, through improvements to its political and economic infrastructure, will make the Congo less vulnerable to external interference. Although the primary focus of this thesis has been on the local complexities of identity and belonging which drive conflict on either side of Lake Kivu, it is clear that successfully addressing these tensions will have futher implications for both national and regional security.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to provide some solutions for dealing with the threat that Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors present to both Rwanda and the Congo. I argue that if the reduction of this threat is to be at all meaningful, then measures need to be taken on both sides of Lake Kivu to reduce the existential insecurity and uncertainty the drives much of Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior violence. Mamdani argues that 'postgenocide power is defined by a diasporic, rather than a territorial, notion of political obligation and political community' (Mamdani, 2002, p. 261), and as such I argue that the Hutu refugee warrior connundrum cannot be solely solved by measures in Rwanda, or the DRC alone, but rather a holistic combination of a range of measures in *both* countries. Furthermore, I argue that Rwandan

Hutu refugee warriors do not represent a homogenous category of actors. Among the many variations within the group, it is important to appreciate that there are both Rubicon and Odyssean (as well as moderate and hardliner) elements. The strategy for dealing with them needs to address these competing needs and desires, and provide non-violent solutions to ensure that the security needs of all within the group are being met. Regarding those members of the group who desire a return to Rwanda (or can justifiably be incorporated into the Rwandan political system), an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue needs to be made available so that legitimate political grievances can safely be aired. For those groups who seek a more permanent settlement in the Kivus, both insitutional and market reform is necessary in order to stabilise the Kivus (so that violence is not the most viable option of surival), and facilitate the incorporation of these groups into Kivutian life. This chapter is predicated on the argument that refugee warrior groups need to be brought in from the cold, and more attention must be paid to transforming them into legitimate and credible political actors – who are then accountable for their actions. The problem with the current analyses, which tends to criminalize and securitize Rwanda Hutu groups, is that it has led them to be marginalized from formal political structures, caused them to retreat from any realm in which they could be monitored, and therefore led to dearth of understanding about them. I argue that the uncertainty which surrounds (and which they themselves face) them is at the heart of their conflictual behaviour, and that alleviating this uncertainty is the key to alleviating their negative impact on security and stability in the region.

Conclusion

Displacement, Identity and Conflict in the African Great Lakes

---

'In the end, it may be of only limited value to analyze insurgency-ruled eastern DRC by resorting to often misleading binaries such as "political versus economic" and "greed versus grievance". These may provide seemingly comforting certainties but are inadequate to capture the complexities and ambiguities that characterize the political situation in eastern DRC and other war-torn zones'.[169]

~

Introduction

I began this thesis by considering Richard Dowden's claim that 'Africa cannot succeed if the Congo fails' (Dowden, 2008, p. 365). As long as deadly conflict endures in the Congo, the rest of Africa (or, at the very least, the African Great Lakes) will be plagued by instability and uncertainty. Not only do Congo-based rebel groups threaten the stability of regimes in Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, nearly half a million Congolese refugees have been displaced in Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.[170] Certainly, the regional implications of conflict in Africa's "troubled heart" emphasize the imperative to find a sustainable solution for peace in the Congo. However, it is important that these regional dynamics do not become conflated with a narrow focus on national/state actors. Although other scholars have called for national peacebuilding measures to be combined with local measures (see, for example, Autesserre, 2010), before these approaches can be integrated it is necessary to understand how regional, national and local politics interact to create the particularly intractable conflict that is experienced in the Congo. I have therefore taken as the geographical focus point of my thesis the conflict dynamics in the Kivus – the Congo's most volatile provinces which, in addition to having their own local complexities, serve as a microcosm of national

---

[169] (Tull, 2007, pp. 127-128)

[170] According to UNHCR A total of 426,809 Congolese refugees were displaced in Africa in March 2012. Of this figure 25860, were described as displaced in an African country other than those which I have listed above, but their countries of residence have not been specified.

and regional tensions. I argue that the continuing presence of foreign armed groups operating within the Kivus constitutes one of the greatest sources of local and regional tensions. Yet, they have thus far not been adequately addressed. In particular, the Rwandan Hutu armed groups, while widely acknowledged as key drivers of conflict, have been largely overlooked by peacebuilders, and have been offered little or no incentives to cease and desist their belligerency. This thesis thus provides a detailed examination of the forces and perceptions which drive Rwandan Hutu armed groups to militancy, and from this analysis, draws some insight into measures which can be taken to reduce their violence.

The thesis has taken a broadly constructivist approach, and is predicated on the idea that Rwandan Hutu armed groups have been securitized as a threat to both Congolese stability and Rwandan security. While the violent and exploitative behaviour of these armed groups is of course real, the negative perceptions held by many about these groups has been exploited by the Rwandan and Congolese governments alike. For example, even though Joseph Kabila's government has (at least implicitly) supported groups like the FDLR when they served as a useful counter-force to Rwandan-backed rebel movements such as the RCD-Goma, they have now turned against the Rwandan Hutu groups, and have cooperated with the Rwandan government in operations against Rwandan Hutu rebels. Although Kabila was primarily motivated by moves to improve relations between Kigali and Kinshasa, and also to reduce the violence in the Kivus, one cannot help but think that the Kabila government is scapegoating the Rwandan Hutu groups (and, for that matter, Rwandan armed groups in general) in order to detract from the government's own inadequacy in providing public services and security in the provinces. Similarly, the presence of Rwandan Hutus in the Kivus has provided the Kagame regime in Rwanda with a convenient justification for continued interference in the Congo, both in terms of supporting Tutsi-led armed movements, and in pillaging the provinces' resources. The nature of the Rwandan Hutu groups' securitization, and the convenience offered to both Kinshasa and Kigali by continuing to securitize them in this way, has led to a dearth of understanding about these groups. This lack of understanding has created two vicious cycles which may explain why efforts to curb their threat have thus far been unsuccessful.

The first cycle pertains to the problem of representation: It is convenient for both the Kinshasa and Kigali governments to present the activities of these Rwandan Hutu groups as little more than criminal violence and atrocious human rights abuse (especially for the

Rwandan government, who find invocation of a return to genocide a particularly useful rhetorical device). This framing has undermined any political response to these groups' endeavours, resulting in primarily military operations against them; these are designed to disarm a group in its entirety without taking into account the factors which caused them to arm in the first place. As a result, I argue that efforts to curb the activities of these groups have failed because the wrong kind of operations against them have been undertaken. Groups tend to take up arms in order to defend themselves against existential threats and safeguard their rights and freedoms. Operations to disarm a group without any mechanisms to address their grievances are likely to cause them to defend themselves *more* aggressively. It is clear, therefore, that a new strategy – which incorporates a clearer understanding of the motivations and security concerns of these groups – is needed. Unfortunately, this strategy is hindered by a second cycle which arises from the first. Namely, that the aggressive strategies which have been adopted against groups such as the FDLR have forced them to retreat away from access in the Kivus, into the Congo's impenetrable forests. They have also splintered into various new groups, off-shoots, and allied with local Congolese defense forces. As such, the Rwandan Hutu groups have become extremely elusive and difficult to track. This has compounded the dearth of understanding about these groups and the uncertainty surrounding them has intensified their securitization. This thesis has therefore sought to break this cycle by providing some analytical insight into the means and motivations of these Rwandan Hutu groups, and from this analysis, drawn some conclusions as to how we can reduce their threat to the Kivus, and thereby bring more peace and stability to the African Great Lakes region.

Overview of the Argument of the Thesis

In order to provide as comprehensive an understanding of Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior groups as possible, I have sought in this thesis to connect their agency with the structures within which they operate. As such, I began by contextualizing this thesis in my first chapter, 'A History of Violence', with a historical account of conflict in the Congo. One could be forgiven for thinking, given the continuing and horrific nature of the atrocities that have plagued it since its inception as a Belgian colony in 1885, that violence is somehow intrinsic to the Congo. However, I show in this chapter that violence is not intrinsic to the Congo, and only appears to be so because certain structures which are conducive to violence have endured throughout Congolese history and remain today. I highlight in particular four interrelated themes, which emerge as prominent contributors to the

numerous crises that the country has faced: Firstly, I show how ascent to power in the Congo has been predicated on neo-patrimonial, rather than meritocratic, *relationships.* This resulted in successive waves of governance for the self interest of those in power, rather than the public good. This protracted crisis of government has created numerous social, political and economic grievances amongst the Congolese people, and given rise to several rebel movements opposed to power-holders in Kinshasa. Secondly, the kleptocratic nature of the Congolese state, combined with the survivalist activities of ordinary Congolese citizens who receive neither security nor services from their government, has led to the creation of a predatory economic infrastructure in the Congo. As such, the Congo has been plundered for its natural resources in an environment where wealth creates power and power creates wealth. Fierce competition for these resources, and a lack of clarity regarding who owns and controls them, has led to a proliferation of militant groups around mines and resource-rich areas. Throughout Congolese history, violence and exploitation have accompanied resource extraction. Thirdly, it is not just Congolese people who see the lucrative opportunities that the Congo's vast mineral wealth has to offer. Indeed, the resource wealth of the Congo, coupled with the weak control of Kinshasa over the rest of the country has made it both attractive and vulnerable to external interference and exploitation. Throughout its history, the Congo has been plundered pillaged, and exploited by European colonial powers, Cold War superpowers, and African "subaltern realists" alike. Finally, resentment at this history of exploitation, and competition for resources and power, when combined with the confusing history of settlement in the Congo, has resulted in complex notions of citizenship and belonging in the country. Ideas about "authentic Congoleseness" become a matter of life and death, as political leaders scapegoat those with uncertain citizenship status as the source of the country's ills. It is within this historical context, therefore, that I attempt to situate the current conflicts in the Congo. In doing so, I demonstrate that this most recent phase of conflict is not new, but rather follows repeating patterns of conflict which have plagued the country throughout its history.

In Chapter One, I focus on the large-scale patterns of violence which have plagued the whole of the Congo. However, in recent years, much of this violence has been confined to the Congo's volatile eastern provinces, the Kivus. The second chapter, 'Borderzone and Bufferzone', then moves to look at this localized violence to explain why, given that there is relative stability in the rest of the country, there is still such intractable and deadly conflict in the Kivus. The chapter looks firstly at what sets the Kivus apart from the rest of the

Congo, and concentrates in this regard on its geographical location, situated as it is on the border between the Congo and Rwanda. In the Kivus, Rwandan and Congolese identities meet, collide and combine to create a confusing narrative of migration and belonging in the area. If the Congo can be considered an African buffer state, in that it stands 'at the centre of a strong pattern of securitization' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 41), then the Kivus are the buffer-within-the-buffer, in that they stand at the centre of Congolese (and Rwandan) securitization. Because of their physical location, the Kivus not only serve as a microcosm of the wider tensions in the African Great Lakes, but also as the battleground on which these tensions play out. Foreign rebel groups and government forces from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda battle with and against local Congolese militias and army factions. Although the Kivus have certain geographical traits which make violence more intractable and enduring, I argue that it is the same underlying issues which drive conflict in the whole of the Congo that also drive the conflicts in the Kivus. Therefore, I demonstrate how the repeating structures of violence discussed in Chapter One are replicated on the provincial scale in the Kivus. I outline the history of patrimonialism, economic exploitation, external interference and confused belonging in the Kivus, in order to explain the enduring conflict there. I also highlight the significant role played by Rwandaphone groups in the various anti-government rebellions that have had their origins in the eastern Congo. As such I compare and contrast various Tutsi groups (including the Banyamulenge, who have been present in the Congo since at least 1885, and those Rwandan Tutsi who have been fleeing to the Congo since the 1960s) with the Rwandan Hutu armed groups that have been present in the Congo since 1994. I attempt to show that, although these two groups are often seen as natural enemies, their histories show that they are following remarkably similar behavioural trajectories. Therefore, I suggest that we can learn something about the behaviour of current Rwandan Hutu groups in the Kivus by analysing the past behaviour of the Tutsi groups in the Congo, about whom more is known. In this analysis, I stress the importance of fear and uncertainty in driving Tutsi militancy in the Kivus and explicitly link this to the ambiguity surrounding Tutsi citizenship in the Congo. I argue that the Rwandan Hutus also face a crisis of certainty regarding their citizenship, which is inextricably bound to the protracted period that they have spent in exile. I then move to examine in more detail the impact of the Rwandan Hutu's migration experience on their identity and subsequent security decisions.

I began my examination of Rwandan Hutu identity in Chapter Three, 'Refugeeness and Warriorness', with a conundrum which initially hindered my research into the refuge

experience of the Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo. Namely, the refusal by a certain member of UN personnel to accept that the Rwandan militants in groups such as the FDLR were in any way refugees, despite the fact that many had fled as refugees to the Congo in 1994. While acknowledging the difficulties for the international refugee regime that awarding refugee status to members of a politically conscious, militant group (who have in their midst wanted *genocidaires*) would entail, the chapter seeks to highlight the analytical dangers of ignoring the refugee experience of Rwandan Hutu armed groups. In particular, I argue that ignoring the refugee aspect of the Rwandan Hutu experience in the Congo tends to produce analyses which over-emphasise their criminality and belligerency without acknowledging the uncertainty and insecurity which drives these actions. Accordingly, I argue that a new approach to understanding refugees is needed for conflict analysis purposes; one which allows for the refuge experience of Rwandan Hutu armed groups to be considered without evoking any obligation to provide them with assistance – which they may neither need nor deserve. In response to this, I present a polythetic approach to classifying refugees according to the degree of "refugeeness" that characterizes them. In this nomenclature, I present the idea of a range of criteria which constitute the refugee experience. Possession of any single criteria does not automatically include an actor into the "refugeeness" categorisation, and similarly, the absence of any particular criteria is not sufficient to deny any actor "refugeeness". Within this classification, it is possible to include a wide range of people, from a large variety of backgrounds and experiences, but who nonetheless consider themselves to be refugees within the "refugeeness" categorization. I suggest that this category would have a core and a periphery, in which those refugees who for UN refugee status may constitute the core. At the periphery, I situate the Rwandan Hutu refugees who fight in armed groups in the Kivus, and who are best described as the sub-type of "refugee warriors". By considering Rwandan Hutus as refugee warriors we can analyse their "refugeeness" and warriorness in tandem. This allows us to understand the impact that this groups' period in exile has had on their identity and militancy.

In Chapter Four, 'Ordering the Chaos', I move to examine the linkages between refuge, identity and insecurity by setting out my own analytical framework which I synthesize from tools that are available in identity studies, social psychology, refugee studies and anthropology. I argue that the identity of threatened and marginalized groups such as Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors is one of the most significant tools that they have at their disposal in order to ensure their group survival. In this chapter I analyse in more detail how

identity can be utilized effectively as a survival mechanism – arguing that the creation of a flexible and resilient collective identity is the key to doing so. My analysis throughout this thesis draws on a number of lessons from Chaos Theory. In Chapters One and Two, I show how patterns of behaviour repeat themselves over time, and on differing scales, to demonstrate the Chaotic phenomenon of fractal self-similarity. In Chapter Four, I introduce two other lessons which are valuable for conflict analysis: Firstly, I argue that models of conflict analysis need to allow for non-linear causality and complex linkages between variables which are constantly changing; and secondly, that small differences in conditions may result in drastically different outcomes. I critique large-N studies of conflict, and argue that – at least for the purposes of this research – nothing short of a specifically tailored model, which must then be applied to the specific context of the Congo will suffice. I draw inspiration from Chaos Theory for this model because it was developed as a "science of process" – of systems that are constantly in flux and cannot be held constant. It is from this that I develop the Identity Process Framework (IPF) for examining refugee identity, which I label thus because I argue that the collective identity of refugee warrior groups is constantly evolving in response to their changing situations in order to ensure survival. Within the IPF I identify four key features of refugee identity which may assist our understanding: Refugees' relationship with their host and sending countries; the cultural traumas they may encounter and their responses to these traumas; the processes of collective remembering and forgetting which allows them to shape and recast their identity; and the differential consciousness which allows them to strategically position their identity according to whichever aspect it is most expedient to mobilize in any given situation.

Having set out the IPF in Chapter Four, I move in Chapter Five, 'Identity and Tactics', to apply the Framework to the Rwandan Hutu armed groups operating in the Kivus, focussing in particular on the FDLR, but also examining groups such as the FLNK and RUD-Urunana, who are often associated with the FDLR. I detail in this section the attempts which have been made to remove the threat of Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Kivus and demonstrate how these attempts have been largely unsuccessful, despite being well-resourced. I argue that much of the failure to adequately address the Rwandan Hutu armed group problem is rooted in a poor understanding of their motivations, their goals, and the methods by which they achieve their aims. I examine how Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors' means and motivations have adapted to their surrounding environment, proliferated in the form of FDLR off-shoot groups (such as the FLNK, *Rasta* and RUD-Urunana), and managed

to stand firm in the Kivus despite nearly two decades of existential attacks against them. In particular, I discuss the creative ways in which Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors are asserting a sense of belonging in the Kivus, and forging and breaking alliances in a manner which is expedient to their survival. Although concerted military efforts have been made to disarm groups such as the FDLR and reduce their belligerency, operations such as *Umoja Wetu* have sought to compound insecurity. The failure of these operations therefore vindicates those, such as Michael Sibilondire,[171] who argue that 'it is impossible to get the FDLR out of the DR Congo by force' (Kavanagh, 2008).

In Chapter Six, 'Empathy for the Rebel?' I synthesize my account of the structures of violence in the Congo (and more specifically the Kivus), and my analysis of the means and motivations of Rwandan refugee warriors through the Identity-Process Framework, in order to come up with some prescriptive approaches to dealing with the Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior threat in the African Great Lakes. The argument put forward in this chapter echoes those put forward by scholars working on the Niger Delta, such as Augustine Ikelegbe (2011) and Morten Bøås (2011), who argue that marginalization and exclusion drive much of the violence there. Similarly, I argue that as long as Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors are excluded from the political arena and marginalized as criminals and human rights abusers, they have little incentive to reduce their militancy, and can use their marginalization to justify their belligerency.[172] Following Mamdani's arguments that the crisis in eastern Congo represents the convergence of the problems associated with the diasporic nature of post-genocide power in Rwanda, with the citizenship crisis of the entire African Great Lakes region (Mamdani, 2002), I call for a holistic approach which offers possibilities of inclusion for Rwandan refugee warriors on both sides of Lake Kivu. From the Rwandan perspective, I argue that an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue needs to be organized first and foremost, so that there is a safer political environment in which Hutu (and, for that matter, Tutsi) opposition groups can air legitimate grievances against the Kagame regime. From this, it is hoped that moves towards consociational forms of power-sharing can be achieved. However, I also acknowledge that there may be actors within the Rwandan Hutu refugee warrior community for whom return to Rwanda is either unfeasible or undesirable.

---

[171] Michael Sibilodire, also known as Mike India, has been attempting to encourage the FDLR to leave the Congo through radio communication and SMS messages from his mountain shack in North Kivu. The BBC report that 'The programme has been running for four years now and has met with some success as more than 5,000 of the FDLR have returned to Rwanda' (Kavanagh, 2008).

[172] For example, in an interview with the BBC, an FDLR spokesperson claimed that they do not want war, but they will not disarm because their weapons provide them with an 'insurance policy' (Fessy & Doyle, 2009).

In this case, more needs to be done to address the uncertain status of denizenship that these groups experience in the Congo. Transforming these groups from refugee warriors into citizens requires more than simply endowing civic citizenship upon them. Indeed, efforts need to be made to incorporate them more fully into the economic and political structures of the Kivus, and to give them the option to safeguard their existential security in manners other than through belligerency. In this chapter I call for a move away from retributive justice (which entails championing certain narratives of conflict over others and, in doing so creates more dynamics of violence) towards reconciliatory justice. At the heart of this chapter, and indeed the whole thesis, is the insistence that *alternatives* need to be provided for Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors, so that they can ensure their long-term security, without recourse to violence.

Contribution to Understanding Conflict in the Congo and Beyond

The primary aim of this thesis has been to suggest a new approach to conflict analysis of the Congo. While academics such as Auteserre have already made the case for integrating a top-down and bottom-up approach to peacebuilding in the Congo (Autesserre, 2010), there appears to be a lack of clarity regarding the relationship between local, national and regional dynamics in the Congo. Without first elucidating this relationship, even the best-intentioned attempts at integrated peacebuilding are likely to fail. As such, the thesis has sought to demonstrate how repeating patterns of conflictual behaviour occur at different scales, by highlighting the structures that have endured in the Congo to facilitate (and indeed necessitate) such violence. Therefore I have integrated national and regional dynamics with local dynamics to give a detailed account of both the general issues driving conflict in the Congo, and the specificities of conflict in the Kivus. It is hoped that an integrated approach to peacebuilding may then be built upon this integrated approach to conflict analysis. I have contextualized the current conflict in the Kivus within the wider history of the African Great Lakes, and have attempted to demonstrate how we can make better sense of the current violence if we view it as a fractal of previous (and larger-scale) patterns of violence.

The Rwandan Hutu armed groups that I have examined in this thesis are a notoriously elusive collectivity, about whom little is actually known (although a considerable amount of conjecture regarding their motivations and affiliations has been disseminated). In recent years they have come to be regarded as key sources of instability in the African Great

Lakes, and as such, expensive and extensive military operations have been launched against them. Despite superiority in resources and numbers, however, these operations have been largely unsuccessful, and the threat of Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo remains. This thesis has sought to demonstrate why this has been the case, and shown how these groups have been both *misunderstood and underestimated:* Misunderstood, because strategies to deal with them have overwhelmingly focussed on disarmament and repatriation, even though repatriation to Rwanda is not a desired option for many, and their militarization is in many cases born out of a fear, which the operations against them only compound. Underestimated, because despite more than a decade of concerted attempts by the Rwandan government, MONUC/MONUSCO, and the Congolese government to remove these groups, they have managed to endure in the Congo. The thesis has tried to advocate a new approach to understanding the Rwandan armed groups in the Congo, and from this new understanding has suggested different solutions to alleviating the threat that they pose.

I have sought to stress both the specificity and complexity of the Congolese security predicament, and argue that actors' perceptions, even more so than the reality of what is actually happening in the Congo, drive much of the conflict. As such, I suggest that examining how actors perceive their position in the Congo, and the subsequent impact that this may have on their identity, motivations, and actions, is of utmost significance to our understanding. Although I acknowledge that the examination of ethereal dynamics such as identity and perceptions is not an easy one – and, indeed, is often beset with methodological complications – I also argue that unless we account for the significance of both identity and perception, any conflict analysis of the Congo would be lacking. This thesis has therefore sought to provide a systematic framework for analysing identity. This framework is applied to a case study of Rwandan Hutu refugee warriors in the Kivus, in order to demonstrate its practical application. The Identity Process Framework, however, is one which can be applied to other groups in order to help analyse their identity, and the impact that this may have on their actions. By integrating an analysis of groups' geographical location, histories, narratives, and strategies, the IPF can be used to help understand why certain groups advocate a rhetoric which may not necessarily be congruent with their actions, change the way in which they portray themselves to the outside world, contest or recast history, and make strategic alliances with other groups.

In terms of the general academic contribution of this thesis, a number of lessons and conclusions can be applied to other cases. In particular, I make a strong case for the utility of Chaos Theory inspired conflict analysis. While quantitative studies of conflict may provide a sense of clarity and predictability, which are useful in a number of contexts, for the purposes of my research they have limited utility. In the case of the Congo, the information provided in large-N datasets is inaccurate and conflict variables, even if they have been assigned a numerical value, can rarely be held constant. The science of Chaos takes into account the fluctuating nature of these variables, and offers a different approach to analysis which can embrace, rather than erase, this transience. I highlight three key aspects of Chaos Theory which can be used as guiding principles for the design of conflict analysis models. Firstly, I suggest that we need to look for non-linear relationships between variables (which, as I have already said, are not constant), which place them within a wider geographical, socio-political, and historical context. Secondly, small changes in the conditions and variables that we are looking at may lead to drastically different event outcomes. This means that not only is predictability near impossible, but there is a need as an analyst to be aware of the role that one's own analysis plays in perpetuating a certain narrative of conflict, and the effect that this may have on the conflict's subsequent trajectory. Finally, in terms of analysis, I argue that in a protracted conflict situation, such as that experienced in the Congo, similar patterns of behaviour emerge and repeat themselves over time, and across different scales. Identifying and analysing these patterns, or "fractals", of conflict may uncover some interesting characteristics of a conflict and allow us to foresee *how* conflict may peak and trough (even if we cannot predict when and where is may do so).

The significance of uncertainty and identity as drivers of conflict has featured as a dominant theme in this thesis. In particular, I examine the uncertainty and insecurity faced by marginalized and excluded groups that have spent long periods in exile. There are two elements of this examination which may have wider academic significance. Firstly, as outlined in Chapter Three, I argue for a new approach to classifying refugees which accounts for a wider range of refuge experiences. In this respect, I believe that the "refuge*ness*" category may be of analytical value to scholars studying other socially excluded and/or belligerent groups who have had some degree of refuge experience: From the militancy of Palestinian refugees in Gaza, to the Chadian rebels fighting in Darfur, and the role played by diaspora organizations in the Sri Lankan civil war. The notion of "refugeeness" allows us to think beyond the humanitarian understanding of the refugee, to

examine how groups' refuge *experiences* may affect and shape the nature of their actions. Secondly, I show how uncertainty about the identity of refugee groups renders them simultaneously threatened and threatening. In this regard, I suggest that while host communities may securitize refugee communities, these refugee communities securitize back. The defensive-aggressive to-and-fro which occurs between hosts and refugees therefore gives rise to security dilemma-like situations, which in turn compound conflict. Understanding the security concerns of the perceived aggressor in any conflict is therefore essential to breaking this vicious cycle of securitization. It is for this reason, that I allude in the last chapter of this thesis to the utility of adopting a more empathetic approach to rebel groups, even if they do have *genocidaires* and human rights abusers in their midst. In order to understand *why* these groups do what they do, it is often necessary to see the world from their point of view, even if what they stand for goes against our own deeply-held convictions.

In this thesis I have sought to challenge a number of widely-held assumptions about refugees in conflict more generally, and also about the specific problem of Rwandan Hutu refugees. In terms of the general assumptions, I have attempted to show that refugees can be both victims and perpetrators and that, even if certain groups in exile demonstrate gross human rights violations in both their sending and receiving communities (and therefore do not necessarily deserve humanitarian assistance) their refuge experience should not be overlooked as a motivating factor for their actions. As such I attempt to reframe the refugee label not as one of rights and protection, but as one which can account for motivation and means. This reframing can contribute to understanding militant exile groups around the world. Relating to the specific case of Rwandan Hutus in exile in the eastern Congo, this thesis has demonstrated that, in light of their uncertain citizenship status, and the constant military attacks against them, very little non-violent alternatives to survival have been offered to them. Nonetheless, when not engaged in military activities, groups such as the FDLR have shown remarkable resourcefulness and a willingness to assimilate into the local host population, this thesis therefore calls for more credit to be given to this resilience and survival instinct and for alternative methods of reducing their belligerency to be pursued with requires both the creating of political space within which to air their grievances, and opportunities to transform themselves into legitimate political and economic actors on both sides of the Kivu Rift Valley.

Areas for Future Research

Although this thesis has sought to provide a detailed account of the Kivus' current security predicament, and has suggested a new approach to dealing with the security threat that Rwandan Hutu armed groups operating within the Kivus present to both the Congo and Rwanda, it has merely scratched the surface of the process required to bring about deep-rooted and sustainable peace in the African Great Lakes. As such, this thesis provides the basis for a larger body of research which I intend to conduct in the future. I have outlined above the general academic contributions that the thesis has made to scholars wishing to study the Congo, and those seeking to devise new conflict analysis models inspired by Chaos Theory. However, there are a number of directions in which I would like to take this research myself.

Firstly, the approach taken in this thesis was developed because direct contact with currently mobilized combatants fighting in the Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo was not possible. These groups operate deep within the impenetrable forests of the Kivus, and I was unable to gain security clearance to seek them out. Even if I had been able to gain clearance to visit the forests, fear that they will be captured and tried for past and present crimes suggests that it is unlikely members of these groups would have been willing to speak to me. The criminal activities in which some of these members are involved would have also put me in a difficult ethical and moral position as a researcher. The research which is already available on Rwandan Hutu groups faces a similar problem – often it is based on anecdotal evidence from local Congolese residents and NGOs, who are themselves inconsistent in their account about who these groups are and what they want. It is out of this lack of accessibility that the IPF was developed – in order to draw some analysis even where reliable information and access is lacking. However, a new methodological innovation in crowdsourcing may be able to complement my research by facilitating access to these Rwandan armed groups. Crowdsourcing harnesses the power of mobile and internet communication to collect information, and may serve as a sensible solution to overcoming the inaccessibility impasse which prevents direct research with Rwandan Hutu armed groups in the Congo. It is estimated that by 2012 most villages in Africa would be covered by mobile networks (Aker & Mbiti, 2010) (and indeed, towns like Goma, Bukavu and Uvira in the Kivus do have network coverage). In an article on using crowdsourcing to improve food security in sub-Saharan Africa, van Etten argues that 'this radically changes the way in which information can be collected' (van Etten, 2011, pp. 103-

104). Van Etten then discusses a number of ways in which automated voice or SMS-based questionnaires can be used to glean information regarding crop growth from farmers in remote villages in Africa. I suggest that it may be possible to similarly gain information from militants fighting in armed groups in the Kivus. Indeed, as I described in a footnote (168) earlier in this conclusion, communication with FDLR members through SMS messages has already led to some moderate successes.

Secondly, the final chapter of this thesis outlines a number of issues which need to be resolved before any lasting solution to peace in the African Great Lakes can be successful. It argues that transformation on both sides of Lake Kivu is necessary before the Rwandan Hutu militant problem can be adequately addressed. As such I call for consociational politics in Rwanda, to allow for wider representation. The exact workings of this new governmental arrangement, however, have not been detailed in this thesis, and this provides an area for subsequent exploration. In particular, I would like to conduct a detailed and comparative analysis of consociational politics in Burundi in order to understand the benefits of a consociational system and the various pitfalls that it is necessary to be mindful of when devising such a system. Similarly, my proposition of ensuring better representation in both national and local-level politics for groups who have been resident in the Congo for a long period of time, but who are lacking formal citizenship rights, needs further examination. Again, more research needs to be carried out into power-sharing arrangements. As such, I intend to conduct further research into innovations in institutional design. The Congo already has a complex multi-party system of government. Research into how this system can be expanded to incorporate representation for groups with ambiguous citizenship therefore needs to take into account the complex system of representation that already exists, in order to come up with a solution which gives those who are marginalized and excluded access to the political system, without exacerbating existing (or creating new) tensions.

Finally, this thesis has sought to lay the groundwork for transforming Rwandan Hutu militant groups from 'criminal gangs' into legitimate political actors. The empathetic approach to understanding the legitimate political grievances which underlie and drive many of the illegitimate belligerent activities carried out by groups, like the FDLR and RUD-Urunana, can be applied to a number of other African contexts. Work on transforming an insurgency into a 'more genuine and legitimate political force and less a vehicle for violent patrimonialism' (Bøås, 2011, p. 124) has already been carried out on insurgency groups in

the Niger Delta. Similar work could be carried out with the Tutsi rebel groups operating within and outside the Congo, Ugandan insurgents, and numerous other actors in Africa. Following the work of Bøås, I would like to conduct cross-continental research into marginalized groups who use 'violence as empowerment' (*Ibid.*), examine what drives their militancy, and come up with sustainable alternatives through which they might air their political grievances.

Conclusion

The view of the Kivus from the shores of Gisenyi does indeed provide a deceptive sense of serenity which obscures the violence and volatility of the eastern Congo. However, the luxury and calmness of the Gisenyi beaches and hotels also provides an inaccurate representation of the true nature of Rwandan affluence. Indeed, on both sides of Lake Kivu Rwandan Hutus are marginalized, excluded, and in some cases criminalized. While tight state control arguably prevents those who live on the Rwandan side of the border from rebelling against their situation, constraints on those who reside in the Congo are less stringent. Indeed, for the Rwandan armed groups who operate in the Kivus, violence has become a mechanism of survival, and political and economic empowerment. This violence has had significant detrimental effects on the local Congolese population who, unprotected by the weak Congolese state, find themselves prey to these groups, Tutsi militia who justify their belligerency through the presence of Hutu groups, and continued Rwandan government interference in (and exploitation of) the provinces. Rwandan Hutu armed groups are therefore a key driving force in the current security predicament in the Congo, and a central justification for the repressive behaviour of the Rwandan government. As such, the need to reduce these armed groups' violence has significant and far-reaching implications for the future peace and stability of the African Great Lakes. This thesis has sought to provide solutions to reducing the threat of Rwandan Hutu violence in the Kivus. At the heart of these solutions is the need for a better understanding of both the dynamics of survival and conflict in the Kivus and the security concerns and motivations which drive actors' violence.



Appendix A: A Timeline of Rwandophone Mobilization in the Congo

Bibliography

~

- Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2003). *Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule.* London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Adamson, F. (2006). Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security. *International Security, 31* (1), 165-199.
- Adelman, H. (1998). Why Refugee Warriors are Threats. *The Journal of Conflict Studies, (Spring)*, 49-69.
- Adelman, K. L. (1975). The Recourse to Authenticity and Negritude in Zaire. *Journal of Modern African Studies, 13* (1), 134-139.
- Afoaku, O. (2002). Congo's Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations, and Strategies. In J. F. Clark, *the African Stakes of the Congo War* (pp. 109-129). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- African Elections Database. (2012). *Elections in Congo-Kinshasa*. Retrieved May 28, 2012, from African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/cd.html#2006_Presidential_Election
- Aker, J., & Mbiti, I. (2010). Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa. *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24* (3), 207-232.
- Al Jazeera. (2008, April 26). *Arrest Warrant for DRC Commander*. Retrieved May 25, 2012, from Al Jazeera: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2008/04/200861502143390962.html
- Alexander, J. (2004). *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Alexander, J. (2004). Towards a Theory of Cultural Trauma. In J. Alexander, R. Eyerman, B. Giesen, N. Smelser, & P. Sztompka, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* (pp. 1-31). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Amnesty International. (2012). *Annual Report 2012: The Democratic Republic of the Congo.* London: Amnesty International.
- Appadurai, A. (1999). Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalization. In B. Meye, & P. Geschiere, *Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of Flow and Closure* (pp. 305-325). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Ashton, B., Hill, K., Piazza, A., & Zeitz, R. (1984). Famine in China, 1958--61. *Population and Development Review, 10* (4), 613-645.

- Atzili, B. (2007). When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict. *International Security, 31* (3), 139-173.
- Autesserre, S. (2006). Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar 'Settlement' in the Eastern D. R. Congo (2003-2006). *African Studies Review, 49* (3), 1-29.
- Autesserre, S. (2008). The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict. *Foreign Affairs, (May-June)*, 94-110.
- Autesserre, S. (2009). Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Icdntervention. *International Organization, 63* (1), 249-80.
- Autesserre, S. (2010). *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Autesserre, S. (2012). Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences. *African Affairs, 111* (443), 1-21.
- Awolowo, O. (1947). *Path to Nigerian Freedom.* London: Faber and Faber.
- Ayoob, M. (2004). Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: the Case for Subaltern Realism. *International Studies Review, 4* (3), 27-48.
- Ayoob, M. (1998). Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World. In S. G. [ed.], *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (pp. 31-54). New York: St Martin's Press.
- Azar, E. (1991). The Analysis and Management of Protracted Social Conflict. In V. Volkan, J. Montville, & D. Julius, *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships* (pp. 93-120). Lexington: D.C. Heath.
- Basedau, M., & Moroff, A. (2011). Parties in chains: Do ethnic party bans in Africa promote peace?. *Party Politics, (March)*, 205-222.
- BBC. (2010). *Jean-Pierre Bemba denies ICC war crimes charges*. Published November 22 2010. Retrieved May 2012, 31, from BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11808293
- Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives, 27*, 63-93.
- Blumer, H. (1954). What is wrong with social theory? *American Sociological Review, 19* (1), 3-10.
- Bøås, M. (2008). "Just Another Day" - The North Kivu Security Predicament After the 2006 Congolese Elections. *African Security, 1* (1), 53-68.
- Bøås, M. (2011). 'Mend Me': The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the empowerment of violence. In C. Obi, & S. A. Rustad, *Oil and*

Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence (pp. 115-124). New York: Zed Books.

- Braithwaite, A. (2010). Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion. *Journal of Peace Research, 47* (3), 311-319.
- Brown, T. (1996). Non-Linear Politics. In D. Kiel, & E. Elliot, *Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and Applications* (pp. 119-139). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Bruce, J. W. (2007). *Returnee Land Access: Lessons From Rwanda.* London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Bueno, O. (2011, August 29). *Gone But Not Forgotten: Bemba and Congo's 2011 Presidential Elections*. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from The Trial of Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo: http://www.bembatrial.org/2011/08/gone-but-not-forgotten-bemba-and-congo%e2%80%99s-2011-presidential-elections/
- Buhaug, H. (2010). Dude, Where's My Conflict? LSG, Relative Strength, and the Location of Civil War. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 27* (2), 107-128.
- Buhaug, H., Gates, S., & Lujala, P. (2009). Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53* (4), 544-569.
- Buzan, B. (1983). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009). *The Evolution of International Security Studies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (2009). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cicek, O. (2004). Review of a Pespective: Subaltern Realism. *Review of International Affairs, 3* (3), 495-501.
- Clapham, C. (1996). *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival.* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Clapham, C. (1998). *African Guerrillas.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Clapham, C. (2000). Degrees of Statehood. In S. O. Vandersluis, *The State and Identity Construction in International Relations* (pp. 31-48). London: Millennium.

- Clark, J. F. (2002). Introduction. In J. F. [ed], *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (pp. 1-12). New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
- Clodfelter, M. (2002). *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000.* Jefferson: MacFarlane.
- Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. (2011). *Democratic Republic of Congo: OPAC Shadow Report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child.* London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers.
- Coghlan, B., Brennan, R. J., Ngoy, P., Dofara, D., Otto, B., Clements, M., et al. (2006). Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey. *The Lancet, 361* (9504), 44-51.
- Collier, P. (2010). *The Plundered Planet: Why We Must, and How We Can, Manage Nature for Global Prosperity* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Collier, P., Elliot, V., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., & Sambanis, N. (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.* Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
- Connerton, P. (1989). *How Societies Remember.* Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Connerton, P. (2008). Seven Types of Forgetting. *Memory Studies, 1* (1), 59-71.
- Copeland, D. C. (2006). The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism. In S. Guzzini, & A. Leander, *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics* (pp. 1-20). London: Routledge.
- Counihan, C. (2008). Mexicanas' Food Voice and Differential Consciousness in the San Luis Valley of Colorado. In C. Counihan, & P. V. Esterik, *Food and Culture: A Reader* (pp. 354-368). New York: Routledge.
- Cuypers, J. (1966). Les Bantous interlacustres du Kivu. In J. Vasina, *Introduction a l'ethnographie du Congo* (pp. 201-11). Kinshasa: Editions Universitaires du Congo.
- Dannreuther, R. (2007). *International Security: The Contemporary Agenda.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- d'Azeglio, M. (1891). *I Miei Ricordi.* Firenze: Babera.
- de Waal, A. (2007). *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dijkzeul, D. (2010). Developing secuirty in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUC as a practical example of (failing) collective security. In P. G. Danchin, & H. Fischer, *United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security* (pp. 313-343). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Djugudjugu, J.P.L. (2002). La problématique du conflit ethnique Hema-Lendu en Ituri. *Mouvements et Enjeux Sociaux*.
- Dobrosavljev, D. (2002). Gadamer's Hermeneutics as Pratical Philosophy. *Philosophy, Sociology and Psychology, 2* (9), 605-618.
- Doevenspeck, M. (2011). Contructing the Border from Below: Narratives from the Congolese-Rwandan State Boundary. *Political Geography*, 129-142.
- Dowden, R. (2008). *Africa: Altered States Ordinary Miracles.* London: Portabello Books.
- Doyle, A. C. (1909). *The Crime of the Congo.* London: Hutchinson and Co.
- Dunn, K. C. (2002). A Survival Guide to Kishasa: Lesson of the Father Passed Down to the Son. In J. F. Clark, *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (pp. 53-74). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Dunn, K. C. (2003). *Imagining the Congo.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dunn, K. C., & Bøås, M. (forthcoming). *Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and Conflict.* Zed Books.
- Eichstaedt, P. (2011). *Consuming the Congo: War and Conflict Minerals in the World's Deadliest Place.* Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books.
- Ellen, R. (2006). *The Categorical Impulse: Essays in the Anthropology of Classifying Behaviour.* New York: Berghahn Books.
- Emmers, R. (2007). Securitization. In A. C. [ed], *Contemporary Security Studies* (pp. 109-126). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Englebert, P. (2003). *Why Congo Persists: Sovereignty, Globalization and the Violent Reproduction of a Weak State.* Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper Nr. 95.
- Essa, A. (2011, November 26). *Wanted Congo rebel holds campaign rally.* Retrieved from Al Jazeera: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/2011112535125538487.html
- Eyerman, R. (2004). Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity. In J. Alexander, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* (pp. 60-112). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review, 97* (1), 75-90.
- Feeley, R., & Thomas-Jensen, C. (2008). *Past Due: Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo.* Washington DC: Enough Project.

- Fessy, T., & Doyle, M. (2009, April 9). *From rebel-held Congo to beer can*. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7991479.stm

- Foucault, M. (1993). *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception.* (A. S. Smith, Trans.) New York: Pantheon.

- Gadamer, H.G. (1975). Hermeneutics and Social Science. *Philosophy Social Criticism, 2* (4), 307–316.

- Gleick, J. (1987). *Chaos: Making a New Science.* London: Abacus.

- Global Security. (2011). *Profile of the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda*. Retrieved May 9, 2011, from Global Security : http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/fdlr.htm

- Global Witness. (2011b). *Artisanal mining communities in eastern DRC: seven baseline studies in the Kivus.* London: Global Witness.

- Global Witness. (2011a). *Civil society expresses vote of no confidence in conflict diamond scheme*. Retrieved October 14, 2011, from Global Witness: http://www.globalwitness.org/library/civil-society-expresses-vote-no-confidence-conflict-diamond-scheme

- Goodwin-Gill, G. (2007). *The Refugee in International Law.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Gowing, N. (1998). *New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies: Ominous lessons learnt from the Great Lakes and eastern Zaire.* Oxford: Background paper to the Dispatches from Disaster Zones Conference.

- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selection from the Prison Notebooks.* (Q. Hoare, G. Nowell-Smith, Eds., Q. Hoare, & G. Nowell-Smith, Trans.) Lawrence and Wishart.

- Grant, J. A., Mitchell, M. I., & Nayame, F. K. (2011). New Regionalisms, Micro-Regionalisms and the the Migration-Conflict Nexus: Evidence from Natural Resource Sectors in West Africa. In T. M. Shaw, J. A. Grant, & S. Cornelissen, *The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms* (pp. 375-397). Burlington: Ashgate.

- Greste, P. (2009). *FDLR Inc: Congo's Multinational Rebels*. Published November 18 2009. Retrieved January 7, 2011, from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8364327.stm

- Grignon, F. (2006). 'Economic agendas in the Congolese peace process'. In M. Nest, *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Economic dimensions of War and Peace.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

- Guevara, E. (1999). *The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo.* (P. Camiller, Trans.) London: Harvill Press.
- Haddad, E. (2008). *The Refugee in International Society: Between Two Sovereigns.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Halbwachs, M. (1941). *On Collective Memory.* (L. Coser, Ed., & L. Coser, Trans.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hansen, L. (2011). Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis. *European Journal of International Relations, 17* (1) 51-74.
- Haskin, J. M. (2005). *The Tragic State of The Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship.* USA: Algora Publishing.
- Heisler, M. O. (2008). Challenged Histories and Collective Self-Concepts: Politics in History, Memory, and Time. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 617* (1), 199-211.
- Hochschild, A. (1998). *King Leopold's Ghost: The Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa.* Oxford: Pan Books.
- Human Security Report Project. (2009-2010). *The Shrinking Cost of War.* Vancouver: Human Security Report Project.
- Hutchinson, E., & Bleiker, R. (2008). Emotional Reconciliation: Reconstructing Identity and Community after Trauma. *European Journal of Social Theory, 11* (3), 385-403.
- Huxley, A. (1952). *The Devils of Loudun: A Study in the Psychology of Power, Politics, and Mystical Religion in the France of Cardinal Richelieu.* New York: Harper.
- Huysmans, J. (1998). Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier. *European Journal of International Relations, 4* (1), 226-255.
- Iliffe, J. (2007). *Africans: The History of a Continent.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- International Criminal Court. (2012). *Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo* . Retrieved May 2012, 31, from International Criminal Court: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/
- International Crisis Group. (2009). *Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR.* Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2007). *Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report N°133.* Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

- International Labour Organization. (2010). *LABOURSTA Internet: Rwanda.* Retrieved May 30, 2012, from International Labour Organization: http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest

- International Rescue Committee. (2012). *Conflict in Congo Deadliest Since World War II, Says The IRC.* Retrieved July 18, 2012, from International Rescue Committee. : http://www.rescue.org/news/conflict-congo-deadliest-world-war-ii-says-irc-3730

- International Rescue Committee. (2007). *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: And Ongoing Crisis.* International Rescue Committee.

- Jackson, S. (2002). Making a Killing: Criminality & Coping in the Kivu War. *Review of African Political Economy, 29* (93/94), 516-536.

- Jackson, S. (2007). Of 'Doubtful Nationality': Political Manipulation of Citizenship in the D. R. Congo. *Citizenship Studies, 11* (5), 481-500.

- Joly, D. (2002). Odyssean and Rubicon Refugees: Towards a Typology of Refugees in the Land of Exile. *International Migration, 40* (6), 3-23.

- Kagame, P. (2012, July 13). BBC Hardtalk Interview with Paul Kagame. (Z. Bedawi, Interviewer)

- Kalb, M. G. (1982). *the Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa - From Eisenhower to Kennedy.* New York: Macmillan.

- Karl i Bond, N. (1982). *Mobutu, Ou, L'incarnation du Mal Zairois.* London: Rex Collins.

- Kasaija, P. (2010). Rebels and Militias in Resource Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. In W. Okumu, & A. Ikelegbe, *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa* (pp. 183-217). Tshwane (Pretoria): Institute for Security Studies.

- Kavanagh, M. J. (2008, June 13). *Radio reaches out to DR Congo rebels.* Retrieved June 2, 2012, from BBC News (BBC Focus On Africa magazine): http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7432186.stm

- Klare, M. T. (2001). The New Geography of Conflict. *Foreign Affairs, 80* (3), 49-61.

- Kristof, N. D. (2010). Orphaned, Raped and Ignored. Published 30 January 2010 in *New York Times.*

- Kuhlman, T. (1991). The Economic Integration of Refugees in Developing Countries: A Research Model. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 4* (1), 1-2.

- Kunz, E. F. (1973). The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement. *International Migration Review, 7* (2), 125-146.

- Lacina, B., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2005). Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths. *European Journal of Population, 21,* 145-166.
- Lambert, A., & Lohlé-Tart, L. (2008). *La Surmortalité au Congo (RDC) Durant les Troubles de 1998–2004: Une Estimation des Décès en Surnombre, Scientifiquement Fondée à Partir des Méthodes de la Démographie.* ADRASS.
- Lavie, S., & Swedenburg, T. (1999). *Displacement, Diaspora and the Geographies of Identity.* Durham: Duke University Press.
- Law, J. (2004). *After Method: Mess in Social Science Research.* London: Routledge.
- Lermarchand, R. (2006). Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. *African Affairs, 106* (422), 1-20.
- Lijphart, A. (1990). The Power-Sharing Approach. In J. V. Montville, *Conflict and Peace-Making in Multi-Ethnic Societies* (pp. 491-509). Lexington: D.C.Heath.
- Lischer, S. K. (2005). *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, And The Dilemmas Of Humanitarian Aid.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Loescher, G., & Milner, J. (2005). *Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implication.* Oxford: Routledge.
- Longman, T. (2002). The complex reasons for Rwanda's engagement in Congo. In J. Clarke, *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (pp. 129-145). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lunn, J. (2006). *The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?* London: House of Commons Library: International Affairs and Defence Section.
- MacGaffey, J. (1991). Historical, Cultural and Structural Dimensions of Zaire's Unrecorded Trade. In J. M. [ed.], *The Real Economy of Zaire: The Contribution of Smuggling & Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth* (pp. 26-36). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Malkki, L. H. (1995). *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mamdani, M. (2011). The Invention of the Indigene. *London Review of Books, 33* (22), 31-33.
- Mamdani, M. (2007). The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency. *London Review of Books, 29* (5) 5-8.
- Mamdani, M. (2001). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda.* Oxford: James Currey.

- Mawathe, A. (2010). *Haunted by Congo rape dilemma*. Published May 15 2010. Retrieved October 19, 2011, from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8677637.stm

- McCalpin, J. O. (2002). Historicity of a Crisis: The Origins of the Congo War. In J. F. Clark, *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (pp. 33-52). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

- McDonald, M. (2008). Constructivism. In P. D. Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction* (pp. 59-72). London: Routledge.

- McSweeney, B. (1999). *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Meredith, M. (2006). *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

- Miller, J. (2008, March 27). *Horror of Congo's Forgotten War.* Channel 4 News Report. Broadcast on March 27 2008.

- Moeller, A. (1936). *Les grandes lignes des migrations de Bantous de la province Orientale du Congo Belge.* Brussels.

- MONUC. (2010) *MONUC Facts and Figures*. Published 30 June 2010. Retrieved August 16, 2011, from United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml

- MONUSCO. (2011). *MONUSCO Facts and Figures*. Published 30 September 2011. Retrieved October 21, 2011, from MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml

- Moya, P. (2002). *Learning from Experience: Minority Identities, Multicultural Struggles.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Muiu, M. w., & Martin, G. (2009). *A New Paradigm of the African State.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Naftalin, M. (2011). Rwanda: A New Rwanda. *The World Today, 67* (6) 22-24.

- Nest, M. (2011). *Coltan.* Cambridge: Polity.

- Newbury, D. (1986). 'From "Frontier" to "Boundary": Come Historical Roots of Peasant Strategies of Survival in Zaire'. In G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities* (pp. 87-112). Trenton: Africa World Press.

- Newbury, D. (1978). Bushi and the Historians: Historical Themes in Eastern Kivu. *History in Africa, 5,* 131-151.

- Nugent, P. (2004). *Africa Since Independence: a Comparative History* . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nyamwasa, K., Karegeya, P., Rudsingwa, T., & Gahima, G. (2010). *Rwanda Briefing.*
- Nyers, P. (2006). *Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency.* London: Routledge.
- Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2002). *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History.* New York: Zed Books.
- Obi, C., & Rustad, S. A. (2011). *Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence.* London: Zed Books.
- OED. (2011). *Oxford English Dictionary.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oldenburg, S. (2010). Under Familiar Fire: Making Decisions During the "Kivu Crisis" 2008 in Goma. *Africa Spectrum, 45* (2), 61-80.
- Olsson, O., & Fors, H. C. (2004). Congo: The Prize of Predation. *Journal of Peace Research, 41* (3), 321-336.
- Omaar, R. (2008). *The Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Abroad with a Focus on the FDLR and RUD/URUNANA.* Kigali: Rwanda Demobilization and Reintergration Commission.
- Open Society Justice Initiative. (2012). *Trial Background.* Retrieved June 4, 2012, from The Trial of Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo: http://www.bembatrial.org/trial-background/
- Paddon, E. (2010). Beyond Creed, Greed and Booty: Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Africa, 80* (2), pp. 323-331.
- Palahniuk, C. (2000). *Invisible Monsters.* New York: Vintage.
- Pole Institute. (2010). *Guerillas in the Mist: The Congolese Experience of the FDLR War in Eastern Congo and the Role of the International Community.* Pole Institute: Institut Interculturel dans la Région des Grands Lacs.
- Pottier, J. (2002). *Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pottier, J. (2009). Representations of Ethnicity in the Search for Peace: Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo. *African Affairs, 109* (434), 23-50.
- Pottier, J. (1998). The 'Self' in Self-Repatriation: Closing Down Mugunga Camp, Eastern Zaire. In R. Black, & K. Koser, *The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction* (pp. 142-170). New York: Berghahn Books.

- Prendergast, J., & Richie, N. (2009, May 20). *Congo's Conflict Minerals*. Retrieved August 26, 2011, from Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: http://www.enoughproject.org/videos/nicole-richie-and-john-prendergast-congos-conflict-minerals

- Prunier, G. (2008). *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Castrophe.* USA: Oxford University Press.

- Prunier, G. (2008). *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe .* USA: Oxford University Press.

- Rabinowitz, D. (2010). The Right to Refuse: Abject Theory and the Return of Palestinian Refugees. *Critical Inquiry, 36* (3), 494-516.

- Rafti, M. (2004 - 2005). Crumbling in Exile: The Changing Nature of the Rwandan Opposition. *Annuaire L'afrique de Grands Lacs*, 95-117.

- Refugee Nutrition Information System. (1996). *Report on the Nutrition Situation of Refugee and Displaced Populations - Report to the United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination.* Geneva: RNIS.

- Reno, W. (2000). Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa. *Journal of International Affairs, 53* (2), 433-459.

- Reporters Without Borders. (2011). *UNHCR Urged to Review Decision to Withdraw Refugee Status From Rwandan Refugees.* Published Ocotber 11 2011. Retrieved May 24, 2011, from Reporters Without Borders: http://en.rsf.org/rwanda-unhcr-urged-to-review-decision-to-11-10-2011,41158.html

- Reuters. (2012, June 4). *AlertNet: The World's Humanitarian New Site*. Retrieved June 5, 2012, from DR Congo: Rwanda Should Stop Aiding War Crimes Suspect: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/dr-congo-rwanda-should-stop-aiding-war-crimes-suspect

- Reyntjens, F. (1999). *Talking or Fighting? Political Evolution in Rwanda and Burundi,1998-1999.* Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (Current African Issues).

- Reyntjens, F. (2001). The Democratic Republic of Congo, from Kabila to Kabila. *African Affairs, 100* (399), 311-317.

- Roberts et al, L. (2003). *Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from Eleven Mortality Surveys.* Bukavu/New York: International Rescue Committee.

- Roberts, L. (2000). *Mortality in Eastern DRC: Results from Five Mortality Surveys.* Bukavu/New York: International Rescue Committee.

- Robinson, S. (2006, May 28). The Deadliest War in the World. *Time Magazine .*

- Rodriguez, M. P. (2011). The FDLR as an Obstacle to Peace in the DRC. *Peace Review, 23* (2), 176-182.
- Roe, P. (2005). *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma.* London: Routledge.
- RUD-Urunana. (2009). *Rwandan Refugees in Eastern DRC: Political Dialogue is the Only Viable Option.* RUD-Urunana.
- Salehyan, I. (2008). The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science, 52* (4), 787-801.
- Sandoval, C. (2000). *Methodology of the Oppressed.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sandoval, C. (2008). US Third World Feminism: The Theory and Methof of Oppositional Consciousness in the Postmodern World. In G. Henderson, *Geographic Thought: A Praxis Perspective* (pp. 338-354). London: Routledge.
- Sarkees, M. R., & Wayman, F. (2010). *Resort to War: 1816 - 2007.* CQ Press.
- Sarkees, M. R., Wayman, F. W., & Singer, J. D. (2003). Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at their Distribution over Time 1816-1997. *International Studies Quarterly, 47* (1), 49-70.
- Shacknove, A. (1985). Who is a Refugee? *Ethics, 95* (2), 274-284.
- Shapiro, M. (2007). The NEw Violent Cartography. *Security Dialogue, 38* (3), 291-313 .
- Sherman, J. (2000). Profit vs. Peace: The Clandestine Diamond Economy of Angola. *Journal of International Affairs, 53* (2), 699-719.
- Sigwalt, R. (1975). Early Rwanda History: The Contribution of Comparative Ethnography. *History in Africa, 2,* 137-146.
- Smith, B. (2005, March 21). *Rwandan Hutu rebels denounce genocide, end war* . Retrieved January 16, 2012, from The Jurist: Legal News and Research: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/03/rwandan-hutu-rebels-denounce-genocide.php
- Smith, D. (2011). Congo Election Sparks Violent Protests. Published December 10 2011 in *The Guardian*.
- St Louis, B. (2009). On the Necessity and 'Impossibility' of Identities. *Cultural Studies, 23* (4), 559-582.
- Storr, W. (2011). The Rape of Men. Published July 17 2011 in *The Observer*, p. 36.

- Stritzel, H. (2007). Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond. *European Journal of International Relations, 13* (3), 357-383.
- Suarez-Orozco, C. (2000). Identities under siege: Immigration stress and social mirroring among the children of immigrants. In A. Robben, & M. Suarez-Orozco, *Cultures under siege: Collective violence and trauma* (pp. 194-227). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Suhrke, A., Villanger, E., & Woodward, S. (2005). *Economic Aid to Post-Conflict Countries: A Methodological Critique of Collier and Hoeffler.* Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights.
- Swart, G. (2011). No War No Peace in the Volatile East. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 144-153.
- Swedenburg, S., & Lavie, T. (1996). *Displacement Diaspora and Geographies of Identity.* Durham: Duke University Press.
- Taleb, N. (2004). The Roots of Unfairness: The Black Swan in Arts and Literature. *Comparative Literature, 21* (41-2), 241-254
- Tapia, R. (2001). What's Love Got to Do With It?: Consciousness, Politics and Knowledge Production in Chela Sandoval's Methodology of the Oppressed. *American Quarterly, 53* (4), 733-743.
- Thakur, M. (2008). Demilitarising militias in the Kivus (eastern Democratic Republic of Congo). *African Security Review, 17* (1), 52-67.
- The Economist. (2010a). Rwanda's Election: President Paul Kagame Under Scrutiny. Published August 5 2010 in *The Economist* .
- The Economist. (2010b). Efficiency versus Freedom. Published August 5 2010 in *The Economist* .
- Tull, D. M. (2007). The Democratic Republic of Congo: Militarized Politics in a 'Failed State'. In M. Bøås, & K. C. Dunn, *African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine* (pp. 113 – 130). London: Lynne Rienner.
- Tull, D. M. (2005). *The reconfiguration of political order in Africa: a case study of North Kivu (DR Congo).* Hamburg: Institut fur Afrika-Kunde.
- Turner, T. (2007). *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality.* New York: Zed Books.
- Turner, T., & Young, C. (1985). *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- UK Border Agency. (2008, December 23). Operational Guidance Note: The Democratic Republic of Congo.

- UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo. (2011). *Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo.* New York: United National Security Council.
- UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo. (2009). *Letter dated 9 November 2009 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: United Nations Security Council.
- UN Secretary General. (2005). *Nineteenth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.*
- UNDP. (2011). *International Human Development Indicators.* United Nations.
- UNHCR. (2011). *Regional Operations Profile – Africa.* Retrieved May 12, 2011, from UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02d7fd6.htm
- UNHCR. (2010). *Repatriation Fact Sheet for the Democratic Republic of Congo.* Geneva: UNHCR.
- UNHCR. (2012a). *2012 UNHCR country operations profile - Democratic Republic of the Congo.* Retrieved May 25, 2012, from http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c366.html
- UNHCR. (2012b). *2012 UNHCR country operations profile - Rwanda.* Retrieved May 2012, 24, from UNHCR - The UN Refugee Agency: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c576.html
- United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council. (2012). *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation and the activities of her Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: United Nations.
- United Nations Joint Human Rights Office. (2011). - *Final Report of the Fact-Finding Missions of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office into the Mass Rapes and Other Human Rights Violations Committed by a Coalition of Armed Groups Along The Kibua-Mpofi Axis In Walikale Territory, North Kivu, From 3.* United Nations Joint Human Rights Office.
- United Nations Security Council. (2000). *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.* New York: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. (2001). *Letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council.* New York: UN.
- United Nations Security Council. (2007). *Joint communiqué of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on a common approach to ending the threat posed to peace and stability in both countries and the Great Lakes region.* Nairobi: United Nations.

- United Nations Security Council. (2008). *Twenty-sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: United Nations Security Council.

- van der Kolk, B., & van der Hart, O. (1995). The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of Memory and the Engraving of Trauma. In C. Caruth, *Trauma: Explorations in Memory* (pp. 158-82). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

- van Etten, J. (2011). Crowdsourcing Crop Improvement in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Proposal for a Scalable and Inclusive Approach to Food Security. *IDS Bulletin, 42* (4), 102-110.

- Vandeginste, S. (2009). Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error. *Africa Spectrum, 44* (3), 63-86.

- Vasina, J. (2004). *How Socities Are Born: Governance in West Central Africa Before 1600.* Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

- Vinck, P., Pham, P., Baldo, S., & Shigekane, R. (2008). *Living With Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.* Berkeley: Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley.

- Vlassenroot, K. (2002). Citizenship, Identity Formation and Conflict in South Kivu: The case of the Banyamulenge. *Review of African Political Economy, 26* (93-4), 499-515.

- Vlassenroot, K., & Raeymaekers, T. (2004). The Politics of Rebellion and Intervention in Ituri: The Emergence of a New Political Complex? *African Affairs, 103* (412), 385–412.

- Vlassenroot, K., & Raeymaekers, T. (2009). Kivu's Intractable Security Conundrum. *African Affairs, 108* (432), 475-484.

- Wæver, O. (1993) Societal Security. In Wæver, O., Buzan, B., Lemaitre, P., & Kelstrup, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe.* (pp. 17-58). London: Pinter.

- Wæver, O., Buzan, B., Lemaitre, P., & Kelstrup, M. (1993). *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe.* London: Pinter.

- Wairagala, W. (2011, July 27). *Can Bemba Run for Congolese President from his ICC Jail?* Retrieved May 31, 2012, from The Trial of Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo: http://www.bembatrial.org/2011/07/can-bemba-run-for-congolese-president-from-his-icc-jail/

- Wegner, P. (2011, December 27). *Universal Jurisdiction in Germany: The FDLR Trial in Stuttgart*. Retrieved January 16, 2012, from Justice in Conflict: http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/12/27/universal-jurisdiction-in-germany-the-fdlr-trial-in-stuttgart/

- Weiner, M. (1996). Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows. *International Security, 21* (1), 5-42.

- Weisbord, R. (2003). The King, the Cardinal and the Pope: Leopold II's genocide in the Congo and the Vatican. *Journal of Genocide Research, 5*, 35–45.

- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics* . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Williams, M. C. (2003). Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly, 47*, 511-531.

- Wood, G. (1985). The Politics of Development Policy Labelling. In G. Wood, *Labelling in Development Policy. Essays in Honour of Bernard SchafferLabelling in Development Policy. Essays in Honour of Bernard Schaffer* (pp. 5-31). London: Sage Publications.

- Wood, R. M. (2010). Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians. *Journal of Peace Research, 47* (5), 601-614.

- Wrong, M. (2001). *In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz.* London: Fourth Estate.

- Young, C. (2002). Contextualizing Congo Conflicts: Order and Disorder in Postcolonial Africa. In J. F. Clark, *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (pp. 13-32). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

- Young, C. (1965). *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence.* Princetown: Princetown University Press.

- Young, C. (2009). The Heritage of Colonialism. In J. W. Harbeson, & D. R. [eds], *Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order* (pp. 19-39). Boulder: Westview Press.

- Zetter, R. (1991). Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 4* (1), 39-59.

- Zolberg, A., Suhrke, A., & Aguayo, S. (1989). *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.