

BRITAIN AND THE ARAB EMIRATES

1820-1956

- A DOCUMENTARY STUDY -

by

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to examine the British policy toward the United Arab Emirates from 1820 until 1956. The relationship between Britain and the Emirates began in 1820 with the signing of "a general treaty between Britain and the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf". From that time until 1900, Britain set about consolidating its position in the region with the signing of a number of other treaties with the tribes of the region.

British policy towards the Trucial States from 1820 to 1956 can be divided into two stages. The first stage lasted from 1820 to 1945. During that period Britain concentrated on maintaining her interests, and refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of the Emirates except when her interests were threatened. The second stage lasted from 1945 to 1956. That period which is the most important period in the history of the Emirates has, in my view, not been adequately studied. During that period Britain adopted a new policy aimed at developing the social, economic and political conditions in the Emirates. In 1952, Britain managed for the first time in the history of the Trucial States to unify the Sheikhs under a "Trucial States Council" to help Britain carry out its development programme. Such policy resulted in the establishment of formal education, a legal system, an

administrative system as well as new stable economic resources. In this way the Trucial Coast Sheikdoms moved from being a tribal society into a nation-state, albeit not a fully developed one. This is what this study hopes to describe on the basis of relevant documents.

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INTRODUCTION

BRITAIN AND THE GULF, 1820-1956:

A DOCUMENTARY STUDY

The European presence in the Persian Gulf dates back to the very early sixteenth century when Albuquerque conquered "Socotra" which lies between the Red Sea and the Gulf. This was an event in the then general Portuguese expansion to the East and to Africa which culminated in the occupations of Malacca (1507) and Muscat.* It was already appreciated at this time that the Gulf and, in particular, the Strait of Hormuz, were of particular strategic importance as, indeed, they remain today. The Portuguese were followed by the Dutch in the very early seventeenth century and, in 1641, the Dutch took both Mukalla (Aden) and Malacca from the Portuguese. The Dutch also managed to obtain trading agreements from Persia in the following years⁽¹⁾.

On December 31st in 1600, Queen Elizabeth the First granted the The Governer and Company of London Trading into The East Indies its Charter. The purpose of the Company was trade with "the East" by which was primarily meant India. The Charter had two important features; these were (a) the granting of a monopoly of the Eastern trade to the Company and (b) the granting of sovereign

*Date 1508

powers⁽²⁾ to the Company⁽³⁾. So far as the Company was concerned, it was not the Western Gulf statelets which were important but, rather, Persia. At this time, the mid-17th century, the Shah was still a power to be reckoned with both in terms of trade and in terms of potential military conflict. While the Gulf was geographically remote from India, its littoral and the eastern approaches were highly significant in maritime trade and, indeed, in any maritime presence in the area.

In a curious way, the interests of the Company and the seventeenth century rulers of Persia ran in parallel and complementary courses. Both were united in wishing to exclude the Portuguese, Dutch and the Ottomans from the Gulf, in particular from the Straits of Hormuz. From the Company's point of view this would both simplify navigation and decrease military expense; from the Shah's point of view it was essential that the Ottoman sphere of influence be kept to the west of the Gulf⁽⁴⁾. In short, there was a common interest between the Company and Persia - one purely economic and one political.

The interests of the Arabs to the west were quite ignored from the late sixteenth century onwards. This should cause no surprise. Provided peace and peaceful navigation were established on the seas, there was little or no reason to take account of the Arab communities. They were of no economic or political concern to the Ottomans, Persians or the British provided these

conditions obtained. British interests were with Persia⁽⁵⁾, not the Arabs.

This position, however, changed quite dramatically in the late eighteenth century. Two things happened; first, the decline of Persian power which coincided with Tsarist expansion and the continuing decline of Ottoman influence in the lands east of Egypt; second, the assumption by the East India Company of territorial government in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765 followed by yet further territories in the succeeding three decades. Britain, through the Company, had now become a sovereign power in Asia. As such the territorial powers and competence of its neighbours became of paramount interest⁽⁶⁾. The main focus of attention in Calcutta and London remained Persia but the Gulf is narrow and the control of the western side was soon seen as important. By 1820 a "General Treaty" had been concluded with the Arabs of the Gulf littoral (see below, pp.42,44ff.)

It is from this treaty that we now trace the history of British policy toward what later became the Emirates⁽⁷⁾. It should be emphasized at this point that treaties of this nature were a consistent feature of British practice in the East; we have, for example, the 9 volumes of Aitchison⁽⁸⁾ on the Indian treaties as well as the collections by Maxwell and Gibson⁽⁹⁾ and Allen, Stockwell and Wright⁽¹⁰⁾ on the Malay States and Borneo. The Arab treaties are considered in more detail below

(Chapter 1) but it is important to emphasize that they form part of a "family" of treaties establishing protectorates⁽¹¹⁾ in various parts of Asia. The essence of a protectorate in international law, both in the past and in recent history (i.e. up to the 1980s - Brunei) is that internal sovereignty is retained while control of external affairs passes to the protecting power.

It is the nature of the relation between Britain and the Gulf States which is the subject of this thesis. "Protectorate" as such, while clear in international law, does not explain adequately the history of the relationship. The reason is quite simple; the issue is not one of international law, it is rather one of imperial politics on the one hand and local responses on the other. This is true for all areas subject to the Protectorate system but it is also true at such a level of generality as to be an inadequate explanation for any one place. Typical English texts, for example, speak of imperialism as a factor in internal politics⁽¹²⁾, as an aspect of "Europe overseas"⁽¹³⁾, as an economic phenomenon⁽¹⁴⁾ and as an idea or ideology⁽¹⁵⁾.

It is our thesis that these are an inadequate explanation of the Gulf Protectorates not because these views are wrong in themselves but because the Emirates are a very local and specialized example of imperial rule. Of course economic factors were important, and just as important were the political issues of British interests in India, Persia and the Middle East. The Emirates, as

such, were not especially important, there was little to do with them and little to require of them until just after the First World War when oil and imperial communications (by air to India) became important. We have what we might call a "static imperialism", i.e. the preservation of the status quo, up to the late 1920s followed by an increasing pressure from Britain for greater control but again only in limited fields, i.e. fuel supply, aircraft and landing rights.

There are no issues of imperial policy as such here comparable to, for example, the Home Rule question in India, the Mandate in Palestine, or the Mixed Courts in Egypt, or Extraterritoriality in China, or Imperial free trade and Imperial preference. Instead, we have a society left much to its own devices from which was required only a passive acceptance of foreign rule. It is the nature of this rule which is instructive; it is, perhaps, unique in that force or the threat of force was little used, indeed the tactical advantage, according to the written records, was often on the Arab side. Stasis seemed to be the accepted position for both Britain and the respective Arab leaders from 1820 up until the post-1945 decade. The question of "modernization" or "development" is only some twenty or so years old.

The aim of this thesis is to explain how such a remarkable position was maintained so close to the 1980s.

The answer appears to lie in a mutual Arab-British acquiescence in stasis. There were obvious benefits to both sides, security and oil/navigation rights respectively. "Development" as such occurred when the dominant partner (Britain) had to withdraw (see the Postscript at pp.260) but the ways in which stasis was presumed is essential to understand recent development.

But how static was "static imperialism"? As we have said, the advantage in particular circumstances often remained with the Arab side, although this is by no means obvious or now apparent from the protectorate treaties. We do find it, however, in the records of day-to-day administration and in the negotiations between Britain and the Emirates over R.A.F. landing rights in the 1920s and 1930s. This does not, however, mean that there were no policy issues as such. There were, as we shall see; perhaps the importance of these lies not so much in the issues themselves as in the various competing positions of various parts of Imperial government in London. For example, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, the Foreign Office and the India Office all had their own respective positions in the Gulf. Not infrequently, the requirements of one were in conflict with those of the others. Not infrequently, again, the conflicts were often settled by compromise which left the status quo intact from the Arab point of view.

To deal with the mass of material available in the Public Record Office and the India Office (see below "Documents" pp10-26) this thesis is organized as follows.

Chapter 1: the subject of this chapter is the treaties of 1820, 1853 and 1892. Between them, these treaties constitute the protectorate. All are short but even so it is clear that in the seventy years between 1820 and 1892 British policy remained consistent - to leave the indigenous social, religious and political structures untouched while at the same time to obtain the sole rights of determining the form and content of Emirate external relations. There appears to have been little or no understanding by either side of the nature and impact of the treaties. This is in contrast to the situation elsewhere in Asia where the reverse was generally true⁽¹⁶⁾.

Chapter 2: this chapter is concerned with general issues of policy which we may characterize as follows. First, the implications in international relations of the British presence in the Emirates. Particularly important are the Anglo-French and Anglo-German relations and the then perceived "Russian threat", itself an aspect of Indian policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Second, there are the Indian interests. Third, at a later period, the interests of imperial defence involving particularly the Royal Air Force and the flying routes to India. Fourth and finally, the

question of the internal government of the Emirates became a matter of policy discussion in London. The Foreign Office was particularly involved in these as an aspect of Middle East policy, as also was the India Office from their own particular viewpoint.

Chapter 3: this chapter is concerned with the internal response, from within the Emirates, to increasing British pressure. The period is the 1920s to 1939 within which a consistent attempt to exercise internal control was attempted by Britain. The reaction by the late 1930s had come to be expressed in a "democratic" movement of resistance rather than in the preceding ruling-class objection. This was clearly a new phase in the development of Gulf politics (see also the Postscript at pp.260).

Chapter 4: with this chapter (and with Chapter 5) we come to the post-war period. Between 1945 and 1956 the British position in the Middle-East and in Asia generally was considerably weakened and Suez effectively marked the end of any military pretensions in the area.

Concomitant with these new developments was the appearance of nationalist movements in the mid-1950s. The documents for this period have only recently become available and many of the people involved are still in positions of power in the Emirates.

Chapter 5 is also concerned with the period which saw considerable administrative development in the

Emirates including the establishment of the Trucial States Council. In this short period, the administrative system had gone from the barest minimum to something approaching a modern bureaucracy.

Chapter 6: the conclusion attempts to summarize in short form the character of the state and the society in the Emirates. As we shall see, the post-war period constitutes a sharp break from the pre-war period. The transition from a static, self interested imperialism to preparations for a rapid withdrawal (from the British view) and to the emergence of nationalist feeling and the creation of a basic bureaucracy (from the Arab point of view) was markedly sudden. The history of the Emirates in the 1950s⁽¹⁷⁾ seems to be a history imposed from the outside, by forces external to the countries. The speed of change seems to suggest no other explanation but this is perhaps misleading. The nationalist movement of the late 1930s did seem to indicate a new factor in Emirate politics.

DOCUMENTS

The primary sources for this dissertation are the many documents held in the India Office Library and the Public Record Office at Kew. This material poses several sets of difficulties for the researcher.

First, there is the sheer range and quantity of data available. It dates from the very early nineteenth century and, by the end of our period (1956), comprises several hundreds of thousands of documents. As with all such material the problem is to choose that which is necessary but of course what is "necessary" or not depends upon the thesis of the dissertation. The material is itself crucial to both establishing and proving the thesis. In our case, it became apparent that events in the Emirates were (a) relatively minor in imperial interests and (b) determined by these same interests. This is, in effect, the thesis. It is not until after the Second World War that this position changed to any degree.

Second, several departments of state were involved with the Emirates. These were the India Office (to 1945) the Foreign Office (constantly especially with reference to Persia and Saudi Arabia), the Colonial Office (1921-26), The R.A.F. and Royal Navy also had interests but these were primarily articulated through the Foreign Office. A full description is given below (pp.12-27). The most important documents are those of the India

Office and the Foreign Office but in both cases Emirate affairs are parts only of the respective wider Indian and imperial affairs. Again, selection is the difficulty. The solution adopted here has been to rely on the Political Residency Reports (Gulf) and to cross reference to the appropriate year of the Foreign Office's series where Emirate references might be expected to occur. This solution seems to have been justified in that it produced quite often various views of the same topics.

Third, and finally, many of the documents are in Arabic (mostly with translations for London) and this has presented difficulties. These are that occasionally the translations leave something to be desired in respect of accuracy and, in addition, some of the Arabic is badly written so that it is difficult to make sense of it. In these cases, our own translation or account is preferred in the interests of accuracy. (The problem is especially acute in Chapter 4, Section (iv)).

INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCUMENTS ON THE PERSIAN GULF
(STORED IN THE BRITISH RECORD OFFICES)

The British Record Offices contain a wealth of documents relating to the Persian Gulf, in view of the strong and close relations that have existed between Britain and the area since the early years of the seventeenth century.

Many British departments were involved in the affairs of the Gulf, namely, The East Indian Company, the Government of India, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office etc. Therefore, a researcher into the affairs of the area needs to be familiar with the different venues where specific documents relating to the area are located. The following is an inventory of these sources:

(I) INDIAN OFFICE RECORDS

(A) The Records of the British East India Company
(Agencies' records)

They contain the correspondence dealing with the establishment of the company, the competition it had to face from other commercial establishments and its relations with the Persian Gulf area and other regions. In addition, they contain the reports of the English Agents from the trade centres it had established in Basra, Bander Abbas, Bushire, Jasse, among other Arab or Persian parts. Comprised in this collection are important reports on British trade with Persia and Arabia, the Wahabi activities along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and in Iraq by the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries A.D. Correspondence relevant to the British expeditions against tribes in the Gulf, especially the Qawasim from 1805 to 1820, up to the General Treaty between the British East India Company and the Sheiks of the Oman Coast can be found there.

It is noticeable that most of the documents of the East India Company are hand-written, with pages torn and are in an appalling condition, not to mention the indecipherable spelling in which these documents were written, which are quite alien to modern eyes, especially the seventeenth century documents. To this is added the lack of proper indexing, which makes the task of a

researcher quite difficult.

Of interest here is the fact that the British East India Company divided its administration in India over three major centres in Bombay, Madras and Bengal. This division was to last until the Mutiny of India took place in 1857. In view of its geographical position, the Persian Gulf fell under the supervision of the government of Bombay.

The Mutiny of India in 1858 caused the British Administration to effect a major reorganisation. A decree was therefore issued abolishing the East India Company and transferring power in the administration of India to the Indian Office. The post of Viceroy was created to run India and remained operative until the Independence of India in 1947.

(B) Political and Secret Library Records

The political and secret library of the Indian Office is full of vital sources and collections; in particular, the collections of Saldanha, Lorimer's Geographical and Historical respective guides to the Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia. In addition, there are the Official Publications of the Foreign Office and the Government of India, together with the reports of the Admiralty and the Intelligence Services on the sheikdoms of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, also, publications of the Arab Bureau in Cairo on the affairs of

the Gulf and Arabia in general which was founded during the First World War.

(C) Political or Secret Memoranda

Most of these documents originated in the Political or External Department of the Government of India. It is noticeable that some of these memoranda are collected in special volumes whilst others are loose. It is possible to trace these memoranda from 1879 to the thirties of the present century. It has been our intention herein to ascertain whatever memoranda we deemed important, noting in the meantime their reference numbers, and subject matters because of their vital importance as historical data, treating the political problems and their historical development along with the recording of the official pronouncements with respect to them.

(D) Documents of the Secret and Political Department of the Government of India

These documents could be traced from 1901 to 1948 and do constitute indispensable material for research on the region of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. They consist mainly of the consular and political reports that the English Residents, Consuls and Agents used to send to the Government of India. These reports provide detailed accounts of the events occurring at the time of writing and innumerable pieces of local information. Thus, they furnish the researcher with primary data which

may well be of vital importance for his study. In addition, these files contain a great deal of the original copies of correspondence between the Sheikhs and rulers of the Gulf Sheikdom, on the one hand, and the British Residents and agents on the other. This aspect adds to the importance of this collection.

(E) Special Correspondence and Private Reports on the Gulf

These private papers and reprints are kept in many files of various sizes. The abundance of the data has been noted, especially with respect to the internal affairs of Gulf Sheikdoms and their relations with the British Government. Most of these reports were written by the Native Agents attached to the British Residency in Bushire.

Their major headquarters was Sharja. In view of their residence in these Sheikdoms and their understanding of the situation and events locally, their reports to their higher officers, the British Residents in the Gulf, contain a wealth of detailed information. Of equal interest are the replies of the British Residents to their agents on current commercial issues according to the instructions of the Government of India or the Foreign Office. These replies are indicative of the nature of the relations between Britain and the area and the political and military options left before it.

These files cover specific periods starting from the end of the last century and (some of which) lasting up to the fifties in this century. Many collections deal with the sheikdoms along the Omani Coast; others deal specifically with Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain and their relations with neighbouring powers such as Nejd in Arabia, Persia and Iraq). In addition, whole files specialise in the political border disputes between Nejd and the Sheikdoms of the Omani Coast, and between Nejd, Kuwait and Iraq; besides the issues related to the first oil concessions and contracts in the Persian Gulf in the period between the two world wars.

(II) BRITISH PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE

The British Public Records contain huge collections of volumes related to the Persian Gulf. They can be specified as follows:

(A) Foreign Office

The British Foreign Office began assuming full control of the whole administrative apparatus governing the Gulf area as of the seventies of the last century.

This duality in administration accounts for the frequent appearance in the Foreign Office records of clear differences of opinion between the British Government in London and the Government of India, although both sides conceded at the same time the condition that these differences did not touch the essence of British interests. Such differences and controversies appeared mainly during the rule of Lord Curzon in India. Despite his celebrity as a powerful figure, Lord Curzon had no option but to concede defeat as to imperial expansion and accept the general line of British Political policy which was designed and orchestrated, at that time, by Lord Salisbury, the then British Foreign Secretary. (Later as Prime Minister.)

In fact, from the very beginning of the present century, neither Curzon nor any other Viceroy in India was able to take any decision with respect to the Gulf independently of the British Foreign Office. Notwithstanding Curzon's strong protests which he directed

at the Foreign Office in scathing criticism of its policy, the Foreign Office remained the overwhelming power in charge of decision-making, so much so, that the decisions of the Government of India came to be no longer binding and operative without the sanctioning of the Government in London when it came to matters related to the Gulf and its vicinity.

As an illustration of the above-mentioned comprehensive supervision of the British Foreign Office over the Gulf region from 1879 to 1939 (and beyond), it has been remarked that the records on the Persian Gulf from 1879 to 1906 tend to cover the general political orientation. Without going into details, at that time, the Government of India was still in high control of decision-making in the politics of the Gulf, despite the fact that this was being challenged by the Foreign Office over its political authority and its supervision of the affairs of region, at a time full of crises in international relations. As to the period from 1906 to 1939, the remarkable feature about its records is their details and precision and close following of the events, overlooking nothing in the area to an extraordinary level.

The records on the Persian Gulf from 1879 to 1906 are contained in two vital collections: the first collection

is made of the Embassy and Consular Archives. As to the second collection, it comes under General Correspondence and covers the correspondence sent by high officials in the Gulf to the Foreign Office, such as the English Residents and Consuls in some Emirates of the Gulf and in particular in the Sultanate of Muscat where they enjoyed the double status of being at one and the same time Agents for the Government of India and Consuls for the British Government. The political and consular reports they sent from 1883 to 1905 are full of vital information on the British French rivalries in the area.

As to the British Foreign Office records from 1906 to 1939, they are so bulky and complex that those records dealing with the gulf are classified under various compilations. For instance, the records of the period between 1906 and 1921 are kept partly in the volumes on Persia and mostly in the file, and volumes on the Ottoman Empire (Turkey). It goes without saying that these records do not figure independently in any single collection. As such, they cannot be said to present self-contained units but generally come under either Persia or Turkey. Similarly, there is no set rule governing their classification. A whole volume can be solely devoted to the records of the Gulf whilst other volumes can contain no more than one, two or a few records. That is why, in the bibliography at the end of this study, care is taken to note down the reference numbers of the relevant

records, not forgetting the number of the volume(s) in which they are to be found, for ease of reference.

Naturally, the collective records devoted to the Ottoman Empire come to an end by the year 1922 due to its defeat in the war and the total annihilation of both its nominal and actual sovereignty over the Gulf and Arabia. In fact, the very Ottoman Sultanate was abolished in 1922. Therefore, the documents on the Gulf come under the collections relating to Persia, Iraq, Arabia, Muscat, Nejd and Hijaz up to 1939.

To gather the records on the Gulf has necessitated drawing on these files and compilations in their entirety and following every single Emirate of the gulf on its own, in addition to falling back on the files specially indexed for oil in everyone of these Emirates starting from 1923. This year records the first concession for oil exploration to be granted in the Persian Gulf area, namely, the Hasa concession confirmed by Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on the Eastern and General Company Limited through the procurement of Frank Holmes. In this respect, the first oil concession and contracts and its allied works and related problems due to competition among the companies exploiting it, have been ascertained. These oil-related considerations were associated with the phenomenon of drawing the political boundaries between the Emirates of the Gulf and Eastern Arabia.

As the special catalogues of the Foreign Office of the period from 1906 to 1939, are collected under the Emirates, or states to which they belong, every document bears a special code.

(D) Colonial Office

The records specifically related to the Persian Gulf regions, kept at the British Colonial Office, only cover the period from 1921 to 1927. The records of this period extend over 14 large volumes comprising, each, a wealth of informative data which are indispensable for any researcher of the history of the area at that period of time. The years covered by these documents are also the years when the activities of the British Colonial Office came to the fore and became apparent as it assumed charge of supervising policy making in the region, after the implementation of the British mandate over the Arab world (Palestine, Iraq), after the First World War. The British control over some Arab countries which had come under its mandate policy led to the establishment of a new department under the name of the Eastern Department which was annexed to the Colonial Office and was assigned the

duty of supervising and implementing the British Policy in the Arab countries under British Mandate and, by extension, the Persian gulf region.

In view of the absence of catalogues describing the content of these records, it was necessary to trace them back and individually check their contents. It may be appropriate here to note that efforts have herein been deployed, as far as possible, to steer clear of repetition with regard to the records to be found in the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the India Office. However, the difficulties encountered in this task must be acknowledged seeing that each individual office had its own particular perspective or angle of vision and its own decision on policy in the face of incoming problems. These differences and variations are reflected in the nature of their records. Thus, there is no doubt that a researcher seeking to have a better insight into the subject of his studies ought to look at it from different angles and points of view.

(C) Cabinet Office Papers

After an examination of these papers centred on the period between 1921 and 1937 records that were found comprised reports and memoranda, most of which were secret, on the state of things in the Persian Gulf and Arabia put forward by the Committee of Imperial Defence or the India

Office, the Foreign Office, the Residents and official representatives of Britain in certain parts of the Gulf and Arabia . Such memoranda used to be presented before the British Cabinet to decide upon a given governmental policy. Naturally, the papers issued by the British Cabinet do not at all concern themselves with minute details. Instead, they will only set out the general views of the British Government as regards the main guidelines to be observed or the military and political means that it permits to be used to maintain and further its influence and to counteract the manoeuvres of other states aiming at destabilising the British position.

It is worth mentioning that the papers of the Cabinet Office are not classified according to their subject matter. Therefore, it was necessary to examine the whole length of every volume on the Persian Gulf and to ascertain the serial number of every relevant memorandum.

(D) Secret and Green Papers

These are the official memoranda that used to be

presented before the British Foreign Office or which formulated its policy. In their methods of treating the subjects under hand, they resemble the British Cabinet Office papers especially when it comes to deciding upon the overall policy related to vital state matters or to its recommendations for the policy line in the Persian Gulf (and Arabia) in the face of other powers, with a special emphasis on its interests therein. No files solely devoted to the secret and green papers exist on their own as such. Instead, they are to be found in the compilation dealing with Arabia and Persia.

(E) Private Papers and Special Correspondence

Our aim was limited to collecting the papers and private correspondence of some prominent figures who played an important role in the politics of the Persian Gulf. This correspondence can be found in many University libraries. However, for our present purposes, we have limited the scope of our search to some papers and correspondence that we found in the India Office Library and the Foreign Office Records. Prominent among these figures was Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary in the early years of the present century. Similarly, we made a point of referring back to the private memoirs of Lord Curzon, the Viceroy in India (1899-1904) as he was one of the most influential personalities who played a decisive role in the policy-making of the Gulf.

(III) BRITISH MUSEUM LIBRARY RECORDS

Our major interest in the British Museum Library consisted of tracing the records relevant to the Persian Gulf, especially the Aitchison collection dealing with the treaties and agreements relating to India and neighbouring countries. In compiling this collection, Aitchison was acting on orders from the Government of India. Different editions of it were published in Calcutta in the years 1876, 1892 and 1933. To every new edition were added the treaties and agreements that had not been contained in the previous one. This series was published in twelve volumes. It may be of interest to the researcher in the affairs of the Persian Gulf to know that the tenth volume contains the treaties signed between Britain and the Sheikdoms of the Gulf.

There are also some collections of records dealing with the agreements and undertakings of the Sheiks of the Persian Gulf in the period from 1820 to 1919.

The importance of these collections of the records issued by the Government of India is that the treaties, undertakings and so on embedded therein were written in Arabic, English and Persian. It is noticeable that the Arabic texts were written in an awkward style.

That is why, one very often comes across a clause in these treaties stipulating that "should there be any ambivalence in the meaning of any article in the texts of the treaties, be they written in English or in Arabic,

reference should definitely be made to the English version as a reliable source".

In addition to the collections devoted to the treaties, there are some administrative consular reports dealing solely with the Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, written by the residents, Consuls and Political Agents in Kuwait, Bahrain, Muscat and Bushire in 1920. Their importance stems from the fact that those who had written them were contemporaries of the First World War and witnessed its effects on the Sheikdoms of the Gulf.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, this is all we have been able to note down of the records kept in the British Record Offices and of selected samples of published documents and important sources in the British Museum Library. (18)

NOTES[INTRODUCTION]

- (1) See generally: A.T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, Oxford 1928. R.B. Serjeant, The Portuguese of the South Arabian Coast, Oxford, p.15; C.R. Low, History of the Indian Navy, London 1877, p.35 and Farla Sousa, The History of the Discovery of India by the Portuguese, Vol.(1), pp.126-127. Translated by J. Stevens and A.T. Wilson, op.cit., pp.114-116. Macgregor, Europe and the East (in the New Cambridge Modern History), Vol.2, p.614
- (2) That is, to raise taxes, issue coins, raise an army and establish courts of justice and make laws.
- (3) On the Company see Philips.
- (4) We should remember of course that the mid-17th century was one hundred years after the death of Sulyman and the Ottoman imperium was already in decline. This was not, however, apparent in Persia. In all fairness, however, Ottoman economic domination in Egypt and the east Arab lands was still unchallenged.
- (5) M.M. Abdullah, United Arab Emirates: A Modern History, London, Croom Helm, 1978 .

- (6) It should be remembered also that this was true for the lands further east, in particular Egypt, which in 1809, was the scene of the Battle of the Nile. The future of the Middle East was, thus, being decided in terms of European conflict.
- (7) The Arab Emirates include seven Sheikhdoms - from north to south they are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Shariqa, Ajman, Umm Al-Qwaiwan, Ras Al-Khaima and AlFujaira. These Sheikhdoms lie in the western part of the Gulf and overlook the Omani coast. (See maps)
- (8) A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sounds Relating to Indian and Neighbouring Countries. Calcutta, 1892.
- (9) Treaties and Engagements affecting the Malay States and Borneo, J. Truscott, London 1924
- (10) A Collection of Treaties and other Documents. The States of Malaysia 1781-1963, 2 vol., Oceana, London, 1981.
- (11) For definition see Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, pp.47ff, 54ff. Stevens & Sons 1966, London
- (12) See Norman Etherington, Theories of Imperialism, Barnes & Noble 1984, New Jersey
- (13) Raymond F. Betts, Europe Overseas, Basic Books, 1968, New York and London
- (14) J.A. Hobson, Imperialism, George Allen & Unwin, 1961 (6th imp.) London

- (15) Richard Koebner and H.D. Schmidt, Imperialism, Cambridge University Press, 1964
- (16) See, for example, C.H. Alexandrowicz, The History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies, 16-18c, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967, pp.83ff, 169ff
- (17) And indeed later into the 1960s and 1970s - see Postscript pp.
- (18) For more information see:
- Tuson, Penelope, The Records of the British Residency and Agencies in the Persian gulf. IOR R/15, HMSO, London, 1979
- P.R.O., F.O., Guide to the Contents of the P.R.O. (HMSO, 1963, 1968).
- P.R.O., Handbook No.13, The Records of the F.O., 1782-1979 (HMSO), 1969)
- P.R.O., Handbook No.15, The Second World War (HMSO, 1972)
- Kassem, J. Z. Selection of the Documents in British Records Office

CHAPTER 1

THE PROTECTORATE TREATIES 1820-1892:

THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LOSS OF EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY?

INTRODUCTION

The treaties to be described in this chapter date from 1820, 1853 and 1892. There are, in addition, a number of minor engagements entered into during this period. The point about the provisions in the respective treaties is that they formalise relations between the various Emirs and the British. At this time (1820) British power was in the ascendant; Napoleon had been defeated, the settlements in Canada and the Pacific were growing rapidly and, most important, the territorial control of the East India Company in India had dramatically increased. Britain had become a world power for whom the seas and the control of the sea lanes was essential.

Given its geographical location the Gulf had become of strategic importance in the early 19th century. However, given the decline of Ottoman capacity the seas in the area were less than safe - "piracy" was rife and in November 1819 the Bombay government instructed Mr.

W.J. Keir to launch a maritime attack against the Al-Qawsem, (the rulers of Ra's Al-Kheima), with the aim of destroying their forms of protection, to sink and set fire to all the ships and boats, destroy their military power, and also discipline all the tribes which obstructed navigation in the region⁽¹⁾. The attack achieved its objectives: Ra's Al-Kheima and some parts of Umm Al-Quwain, Ajman, Al-Shariga and Dubai all came under British control. Moreover, all the ships in these seaports were captured. The British forces then camped in Ra's Al-Khaima and Sheikhs from all the tribes were obliged to ask for "Protection". Every Sheikh had to sign a separate declaration with Keir⁽²⁾ before he was allowed to sign the general peace treaty which was concluded on 8 January 1820. The Sheikh of Ra's Al-Khaima was the first to sign the treaty and later the other Sheikhs signed it (see Appendix 1).

THE TREATY OF 1820

"(1) There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea on the part of the Arabs, who are parties to this contract, for ever.

(2) If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall attack any that pass by land or sea of any nation, whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind, and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods. An acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed, avowed and ordered by Government against Government; and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order of a Government is plunder and piracy.

(3) The pacificated tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other, and the flag shall be a symbol of this only, and of nothing further.

(4) The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an Envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if it chooses, shall send an Envoy also to them in like manner; and the Envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief in the paper (Register) of their vessels, which contains the length of the vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the Envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such Envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

(5) The putting of men to death after they have given up their arms is an act of piracy, and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe shall put to death any persons, either Muhammadans or others, after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall act against them in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the act and of those who ordered it.

(6) The carrying off of slaves, men, women, or children, from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting of them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

(7) These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present."

There are three important points arising from this Treaty. The first is that the Arab signatories numbered eleven (see Appendix (1) pp. 288) and included all the important power holders in the area. The main intention of the Treaty was to prevent slaving (in which it was not

successful) and to secure peaceful trade and navigation. It is the methods by which the latter was to be achieved which are important. Second, then, we have the provisions of article 5 which provides that all ships must have a "register", i.e. a paper describing its contents, crew and the arms carried, which must be produced to British vessels on demand. In effect, this was the first step in establishing British control and navigation in the Gulf.

Finally, and even more important, we have the provisions of article 6. It provides that the "British Government" (i.e. the government in India, specifically the Bombay Residency) may, if it chooses, send an "Envoy" to the "friendly Arabs". His function was to assist in the control of navigation by adding his signature on the ship register to that of the appropriate Chief (Sheikh). Before we go on to the position of Envoy (soon to be called "Native Agent" or "Residency Agent") it is necessary to outline the structure of political control exercised at this period⁽⁴⁾.

A British Residency was established at Bushire in the Persian Gulf in 1763 and from that date until 1921 exercised control under the supervision of the Indian and British governments. Up until 1873 responsibility rested with the Government of Bombay but from then it was exercised by the Government of India on behalf of H.M. Government. The Resident was an officer of the Indian

government. From 1878 he also held H.M. Commission as Consul-General for South Persia and the coasts and islands of the Gulf. As "Resident" he answered to the Government of India, and as "Consul-General" he answered to the Foreign Office. The cost of his establishment was divided between the Indian and British Exchequers. His judicial and extra-territorial jurisdictions were exercised under the Persian Islands and Coasts Council Ordinance⁽⁵⁾.

Our concern is with the Resident, i.e. the political function. To assist him he had seconded offices from the Indian Political Service stationed in Muscat, the Trucial States, Bahrain and Kuwait⁽⁶⁾. It was to these offices that the Envoy or Agent reported and it was through them that day-to-day control was exercised. From the internal British position, however, the respective distribution of political control as between H.M.G. (effectively the F.O. but later - post War I - also the R.A.F. and R.H.) and the Government of India was a constant problem. This was not resolved before 1914 because no comprehensive understanding with Turkey had then been reached. This, at least, was the reason given in 1921 when the Masterten-Smith Committee (Foreign Office) was eventually established to consider the pre-World War I position.

departments of government in the Gulf area. The Foreign Office had always had an interest, as had the India

Office. To these was now added the Colonial Office, more particularly its Eastern Department. The internal debates on the respective interests are not of direct relevance here but the eventual reorganisation is important, for internal Gulf matters, in particular the position of the Hejaz which, from the fall of the Ottomans in 1918, was now ruled by Ibn Saud. This area of control bordered the Emirates which, by a geographical proximity had become drawn into general Middle East policy.

The Committee decided that the Resident would correspond with each of the three departments of state depending upon the issue involved; the following was the scheme:

- the Colonial Office for matters affecting the Arab littoral and Ibn Saud;
- the Foreign Office in respect of Persian affairs and the jurisdiction of Consul-General;
- the Government of India in respect of internal affairs of the States of the Arab littoral, this was a recognition of Indian (political) interests in the Gulf;
- the R.A.F., the R.M. and, as an alternative, the Government of India on military matters⁽⁸⁾.

As we shall see later (Chapter 2) this division of authority had important repercussions within the Emirates

themselves but, for the present, it is enough to notice the later development.

This brings us back to the post of Agent. As we saw it was recommended in the Treaty of 1820 and the post remained in existence until the 1930s. It had a life of something like one hundred years and over that period it developed important characteristics. It must be clearly understood here that, whatever the policy shifts in India or Delhi, the Agent was a constant position from and through which political control was exercised. The first agent was in fact appointed in 1823 and at that time it was established that as a matter of principle the holder should be an Arab⁽⁹⁾. The function of the Agent was to (a) act as a channel of communication and (b) to inform the Resident of matters of local contention.

These two functions are of course closely connected and, while it would be rather pointless to try and distinguish them on a day-to-day basis, one can perhaps say that the wide function of communication itself was the decisive one. This was partly a question of language, particularly in the earlier 19th century and partly a question of "selective" reporting. The local rulers had no choice but to approach the Agent with suitable gifts. The records demonstrate the personal advantage taken of this by all Agents⁽¹⁰⁾. The Agents were also responsible for the fines imposed on the rulers for various misdemeanours and this itself was another

cause for personal advantage. The Agents also attended all the "reconciliation meetings" which were held between the rulers and Resident with the purpose of settling the minor disputes which invariably occurred.

The result was that the position of Agent became a much sought after one and, usually, became semi-hereditary in the Arab littoral. For example, the family known on the coast as the "Bayt Sarkali" held the position for three generations⁽¹¹⁾. This, however, was not yet clear in the 1820s but the 1820 agreement laid the foundation for serious future problems. While we can describe the circumstances as "indirect rule", the internal implications were as yet to be seen. As we shall demonstrate later (pp.96) the result within the coast states was a set of personal conflicts, involving the ruling families, who all came to recognise the necessity to control communications with the Resident.

From the British (i.e., in this case, the Government of India) point of view, the agreement provided a framework within which order over the coasts would be sought for and, in time, attained. The initial responsibility, however, was clearly on the Arab Agent. However, as we have said, the Agent was himself a catalyst for instability and this very quickly became apparent. The 1820 treaty, likewise, was soon seen as insufficient.

THE MARITIME TRUCE, 1835⁽¹²⁾

This is quite short but, as will be seen, it represents a considerable advance over the 1820 agreement.

1st. That from the 22nd Mohurram, A.H. 1251 (or 21st May 1835) there shall be a cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective subjects and dependents, and that from the above date until the 29th Rujub, A.H. 1251 (21st November 1835), an inviolable truce shall be established, during which period our several claims upon each other shall rest in abeyance.

2nd. That in the event of any one of our subjects or dependents committing an act of aggression by sea upon those of the parties to this engagement we will immediately afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

3rd. That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea upon any one of our subjects or dependents who are parties to the truce, we will not proceed to immediately retaliate, but will inform the Resident at Bushire, or the Commodore at Bassadore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted upon its being satisfactorily proved.

4th. That on the 30th Jumadee-al-Akhir 1251, by the blessing of Providence, we will endeavour to arrange either an extension of this truce or a firm and lasting peace, but in the event of our not being able to come to a satisfactory arrangement regarding our respective claims among ourselves, we hereby bind ourselves to give notice on or about the above date, to the Resident of Bushire of our intention to renew hostilities after the expiration of the term now fixed upon for this Truce, viz: the 29th Rujub 1251.

In form, this was an agreement between the rulers of the coast. It is not between the rulers and the Government of India as such. However, the British Resident was present at the signing and, just as important, when we read the third paragraph we find the

phrase "... we will not proceed to immediately retaliate, but will inform the Resident ... who will forthwith take the necessary steps ...". Although this provision is somewhat qualified in paragraph 4, it is a real attempt to take maritime public order into British hands. The immediate motive for the 1835 Truce was a dispute over pearl fishing rights⁽¹³⁾ and while the Truce ran only from May to November in that year it was renewed annually to 1843 when an agreement for ten years was concluded (see below, the Perpetual Treaty of 1853). This Truce obviously reinforced the 1820 agreement.

Further reinforcement was provided in the:

ANTI-SLAVERY TREATIES 1822-1838/39, 1847, 1856 AND 1873

The West Coast of the Gulf was a major consumer and trans-shipper of slaves from Africa to points further east. Some parts of the coast, e.g. Oman, were dependent on slaves for agriculture, more especially in the construction and maintenance of irrigation. The history of slaving in the area is a complex one⁽¹⁴⁾. Its relevance for our purpose is the terms of the agreements as they state or affect the discrimination of Arab sovereignty. For this purpose we take the two agreements of 1847 and 1856 on the subject. The full texts of both treaties are given in Appendix I and the relevant classes of each are as follows:

The Engagement of 1847⁽¹⁵⁾:

"And I [Sh. Sultan of Ras-ool-Kheimah and Shargah] do consent that whenever the cruisers of the British government fall in with any of my vessels ... suspected of being engaged in slave trade, they may detain and search them and [if they are guilty] may seize and detain them".

The Further Engagement of 1856⁽¹⁶⁾:

"I [rulers of the same places - see p.15] of my own free will and accord, will seize the said slaves and deliver them over to the British vessels ... I do hereby bind myself to place an embargo upon the delinquent boat and her [captain] until such time as instructions have been received from the Resident at Bushire".

The combined result of the Engagements of 1847 and 1856 was to give Britain (a) the right to search ships and (b) the right to require the respective rulers to seize and give up slaves to British control. It is conventional to regard such agreements as being motivated on the British side by a combination of guilt at European (and British) participation in the American slave trade and the increasing influence of evangelical Christianity⁽¹⁷⁾. No doubt these motives had something to do with the agreements but on the other hand it is also true that the slave trade was an important source of local revenue, control of which was an important factor in British influence. More important, perhaps, the slave trade was a constant source of friction within the coastal areas, a matter which came to a head much later.

TREATY OF PEACE IN PERPETUITY - 1853

This agreement was signed by the same signatories as for the maritime truce in May 1853⁽¹⁸⁾. The text is the same as the 1835 truce but with one significant addition at the end of Article 3. This says "... the maintenance of peace ... shall be watched over by the British government".

At this point we should pause and reflect on one very important fact. This is that the agreements from 1820 to 1853 were primarily maritime or coastal agreements. From the British point of view no other circumstance was so important as the control of the sea lanes to India. But from the internal Arab point of view the position was not so clear cut. As Dr. Zahlan says⁽¹⁹⁾:

"Thus, despite the power and prominence of the coastal area, the role played by the hinterland cannot be overlooked. The foremost measure of a coastal ruler's strength and prestige was his ability to command the tribes of the interior; his rise or decline in coastal politics could usually be measured by his ability to enforce his authority over the tribal chieftains in the area he claimed as his territory. Conversely, the extent of a ruler's territory was governed by the extent to which the tribes roaming the area would support him in time of need.

There was thus an important interaction between the coast and the interior, and this directly affected the political structure of the area. One example is the persistence in the coastal districts of the bedouin custom of exacting **diyah**, or bloodmoney, that was the accepted form of compensation for the murder of a man where the ties of blood relationship were connected with the substitute of blood revenge".

Such important questions in the modern world as the delineation of national boundaries and the economic exploitation of natural resources (in this case, oil) were of no consequence at this time. It was not until the immediate post World War I period that governments' attention was faced with these matters. However, the coastplains relationships remained a constant feature of the internal political scenario. It was a mutual dependence but rather weighted in favour of the coast because that was where the important political decisions were taken. By this we mean that the agreements concluded were done between Britain (or the Indian Government) and the coast rulers. Such, for example, were the telegraph agreements of 1853-64 and the so-called "fraud" agreement of 1879⁽²⁰⁾. The former provided for the punishment of "aggression" or "trespasses" against or on the telegraph lines and the latter for the apprehension of runaways involved in fraud. Both agreements were annexed to the 1853 treaty.

Between 1820 and 1879, then, the rulers of the Emirates had become bound in a series of agreements. These did not actually make them into "protectorates" or "protected states". Instead, they gave the Indian (and ultimately London) government a measure of internal control over the respective rulers' actions as these affected British interests, i.e. trade and navigation in the Gulf waters.

However, the Emirates were not just a separate unity - they were part of the whole Gulf and thus part also of the British Gulf-aid policy. By the end of the nineteenth century and, in particular, at the time of the unity, both the Indian and Home governments took Gulf issues as a whole both locally and insofar as they had international and European repercussions. The latter, for example, involved the Russian presence in Persia, the French presence in Oman, the German inspired Baghdad rivalry and the continuing Ottoman presence in the Arabian peninsula. These are specialised topics and outside the scope of this thesis⁽²¹⁾ but for present purposes they had one important repercussion.

This was the idea of protected status - the precedent being established earlier in the area with Kuwait. In international law, the status confers on the protecting power the sole jurisdiction over the defence and external affairs of the protectorate⁽²²⁾.

The Protectorate Treaty of 1892

The treaty signed in March 1892 is short, consisting of three provisions (see Appendix I):

1st - That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British government.

2nd - That without the assent of the British government I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the Agent of any other government.

3rd - That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British government".

Quite clearly, this resulted in a loss of external sovereignty. We are now in a position to question whether the retention of an internal sovereignty can be sustained. To answer the issue we have to consider the following:

(i) "Protectorate"; what does this term imply in law at the time, the very end of the nineteenth century? The answer lies not in international law so much, the position there being clear (i.e., that foreign state intervention is prohibited since the status is established) but in English law. This, of course, is the internal British position but it was consistent and as pervasive as the Roman position two thousand years ago. Imperial laws are the laws of Empires and the subjects must perforce accept them. For the East, Aitchison's Collection ...Sanads illustrates this very well containing as it does over a thousand such agreements.

A protected state is one "... under H.M. protection which has its own Ruler, together with regularly constituted executive government, legislature and courts, and in which H.M. has either no jurisdiction or jurisdiction within expressly defined limits"⁽²³⁾. This definition is rather difficult to apply to the Emirates although they are consistently referred to as

protectorates. They were in an "exceptional position"⁽²⁴⁾ in that the U.K. government departments concerned with these were the Foreign Office, India Office and, much later, the Colonial Office. H.M. government had in fact no internal jurisdiction or authority and the Rulers were under no obligation to accept or even ask for British advice except in certain special matters defined in the agreements. The Emirates then, were protectorates and the inhabitants were British Protected Persons⁽²⁵⁾. Apart from the individual status of the inhabitants, the position of the Emirates, the authority of Britain resembles that formerly exercised in the Ottoman Empire, China and Siam under the various capitulation treaties. Quite clearly then, an internal sovereignty was retained by the rulers of the Emirates in terms of nineteenth century and twentieth century international laws⁽²⁶⁾.

It is advisable here to look a little more closely at these general comments with special reference to nineteenth century practice. The point was "spheres of influence"⁽²⁷⁾. With respect to protectorates it was felt by 1900 in the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office that one should distinguish between "two types" of protectorate, a distinction not found in law but in the facts of the then contemporary politics. The first type is the "best organised protectorate"⁽²⁸⁾, i.e. a place in which there is in existence an organised native government under the control of a British Resident whose

advice and consent must be taken. The local law and local forms of administration continue in force.

The second type is where there is no such government so that the general maintenance of peace, order and administration is the responsibility of a British officer. There is no general treaty as in the first case, although local "agreements" or "conventions" are made.

The distinction between these two sorts of protectorate is in the "amount" of internal regulation assumed or exercised. In the first case extensive powers remain but in the second only very little. The distinction, in short, is the practical one which takes the power to regulate as opposed to the lack of such power. This is what "sovereignty" meant in the nineteenth century and it had two implications.

First, that sovereignty is not necessarily territorial - "it is not always associated with a definite portion of the earth's surface"⁽²⁹⁾. It is divisible so that the sovereign who exercises rule need not be the same as an "internal" sovereign. In effect, the distinction meant jurisdiction over either or both of an area or people. The function of the idea of jurisdiction is to exclude any foreign power but the particular status ("civilized") of the recipients of that jurisdiction was now particularly important. The Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843 and the Orders in Council made

under it⁽³⁰⁾ illustrate this clearly. The Orders for example, provided for legislative, police, public order and judicial powers. "Protectorate" in fact shades over into "dominion"⁽³¹⁾.

Second, does "sovereignty" arise from the treaties concluded with native rulers? If it does, and this is so in terms of the international recognition of treaties, then on what grounds in municipal law can jurisdiction rest? It cannot be the Foreign Jurisdiction Act itself because this act only enables the exercise of a jurisdiction already obtained ab extra. In any case, the application of the act, in particular the issue of Orders in Council (ss. 1-2) limits competence to "British subjects". We are, therefore, turned back to the common law power of the Crown by Order or Charter to legislate for any territory in which some sovereignty has been got. The question then becomes the validity of treaties and agreements. Here it is the practice developed during the nineteenth century which is important rather than the more abstract question of sovereignty. Moreover, if we look back with the benefit of a century and a half of hindsight we can see that the issue is not really susceptible of any general conclusion. It is local practice which matters with each instance providing its own special answer. Consular jurisdiction can be defined as the sovereign power to apply and administer (English) municipal law in the absence of territorial dominion.

The essence is legal omnipotence within a limited sphere in a foreign state but without a concomitant political power.

The key to this jurisdiction is that, within the limits confined by H.M. Orders in Council, the jurisdiction is to be exercised, so far as circumstances allow, on the principles of and in conformity with the common law, rules of equity and statute, and other laws for the time being in force in England⁽³²⁾. The source of these principles is in the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843 amended and consolidated in 1890 and later in 1913⁽³³⁾. The reader will of course look at these acts for himself depending on the period in which he is interested but, for purposes of illustration, we may take the 1890 version as an exemplar. The preamble recites that H.M. has jurisdiction "by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance ..." and section 1 then equated the jurisdiction under the act with that acquired "by cession on conquests" of territory. Section 2 deals with the exercise of this jurisdiction over British subjects without regular governments, i.e. in the words of the act "... a foreign country ... not subject to any government from whom H.M. ... might obtain jurisdiction ...". The purpose of this provision is to place the jurisdiction on exactly the same footing as that obtained from an organised government. For practical purposes, the extent of jurisdiction to be exercised by any court is to be determined by the Secretary of State (s.4). Various

English enactments were extended to the foreign countries (s.5 and Schd.1) and provision was also made to send persons charged with offences for trial to the courts of a British possession (s.6). Jurisdiction might also be assigned (s.9) and persons acting and exercising jurisdiction were protected from such an action (s.13). The provisions of section 16 (definitions) are as follows:

"In this Act, -

The expression "foreign country" means any country or place out of Her Majesty's dominions:

The expression "British court in a foreign country" means any British court having jurisdiction out of Her Majesty's dominions in pursuance of an Order in Council whether made under any Act or otherwise:

The expression "jurisdiction" includes power."

As we shall see, the act had some effect in the Emirates with reference to British Indian subjects, but this was much later (in the 1930s) and of limited effect in practice.

Enough has now been said to indicate some of the difficulties of definitions. Our position is that, as said a little earlier, it is the practice of day-to-day control rather than theories as to sovereignty which is decisive for an understanding of the period.

(ii) The treaties and agreements, 1820-1892: We may deal with the effects of these rather briefly. As we have seen the following appears to be the position.

(a) There was never any transfer of territorial sovereignty from the Emirates to Britain or British India.

(b) There was one attempt to establish an executive form of government.

(c) Political presence was exercised by British agents (i.e. Residents through the Agent) only in limited circumstances.

(d) Municipal English law was not applicable.

We have then, Sir Hugh Jermyns' "unorganized protectorate".

(iii) British practice in the protectorates: The point to be demonstrated here is the way in which day-to-day affairs were conducted. This, as suggested above, is really the only way to assess the true nature of the policy exercised by Britain towards the Emirates. From the multitude of documents in the India Office Library we have chosen a selection⁽³⁴⁾ to indicate the sort of issues which arose.

We take first the question of "presents", i.e. gifts from the British authorities to the rulers who were

obliged, as an act of loyalty, to accept them. Offer and acceptance demonstrated the continuance of a bond and was a public, and hence, political acknowledgement of British control. It was a sensitive area in the Arab-British relationship and one, very often, fraught with difficulty on both sides:

To (35)

The Residency Agent

Shargah

A.C.

With reference to your letter No. 256 of 23rd Octr 1911, regarding the behaviour of the Sheikh of Ajman in connection with the presents forwarded to him. Please remind the Resident about this when he next comes to the Coast. Meanwhile the Sheikh will not be considered for any future presents until he writes in a written apology asking that his discourtesy may be overlooked and that it will not occur again.

First Assist. Resdt.

A second area of difficulty and, the major one was the position of the Residency Agent, i.e. the local Arab who was the link between the (British) Political Resident and the local rulers. As we have indicated (above p.34) his position was a powerful one but it was also one of great difficulty. The issue was his authority in day-to-day matters and the individual Agent was constantly in conflict with the rulers. We can illustrate this by citing two letters both from 1912.

No.13 dated the 6th January 1912

From The Residency Agent, Shargah⁽³⁶⁾
To The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

A.C.

I have the honour to state that three Ranas complained to me in connection with claims against the people of Ajman. Firstly, a Rania named Lab Aradingat Um el Kowein, has a claim amounting to Rs 250 against one named Koori, who had absconded from Um el Kowein to Ajman and who is a Nakhoda of Ahmed bin Lota. I sent the Rania with a letter to the Sheikh of Ajman, so that he may recover the claim from Koori. The Sheikh did not accept my letter from the Rania, nor did he recover the claim. He sent the Rania back to me and I beg to forward herewith his statement regarding the Sheikh's proceedings when the letter was presented to him. [not cited, it is a recital of the lack of his claim]

Secondly, Ranas Daman and Gandanch, traders of Shargah, complained to me in connection with their claim for Rs 380 against Hammood bin Mohammad, a resident of Ajman, who is the Nakhoda of Ahmen bin Lota. I sent the Ranas with a letter from me to the Chief of Ajman. The latter acted as in the first instance; and herewith you will find the Rania's statement regarding the Sheikh's proceedings when the letter was handed to him.

Thirdly, Rania Garooreb, a trader of Um el Kowein complained to me in regard to his claim amounting to Rs 383 against Koori who had absconded from Um el Kowein to Ajman and whose Nakhoda is Ahmed bin Lota. I sent the Rania with my letter to the Chief of Ajman; and the Chief behaved as in the above two instances. I beg to submit the Rania's statement describing the action of the Chief when the letter was delivered to him.

I beg most respectfully to state that he (Chief's) insulting proceedings towards my letters took place before an assembly of his subjects and that they have been reported in the towns and the people have been astonished at this attitude which none of the Sheikhs dared to adopt. I believe that this (his action) is a reproof to me in return for the claims of the Debai people which were recovered by Your Honour from the Al Bin Lota during your last tour, because the Sheikh of Ajman considers that action as an insult from Your Honour towards them;

otherwise I do not think that anything objectionable has been done to him by me. The Sheikh of Ajman has violated the honour of the Agency by his misconduct towards me and there is no doubt that these annoying proceedings are due to the teachings of Ahmed and Naser, who are always using endeavours in arranging and strengthening the affairs of the aforesaid Sheikh, showing him that they are thus doing him good. If the Sheikh of Ajman is not corrected for his insulting proceedings towards the Agency, troubles will arise for me and botheration will be occasioned for Your Honour in future by all the Sheikhs if they do not obtain what they themselves desire. The decision, however, rests with Your Honour.

This is clearly an appeal for support (which was eventually forthcoming) and it illustrates both the problems of the Agent and a typical piece of conduct by one of the most difficult rulers of the area⁽³⁷⁾. This document is interesting, first because it is some of the earliest evidence for the scope of Indian commercial activity on the coast for the modern period. Second, it is important negative evidence that no judicial procedures were available for the recovery of debts, suggesting again the "disorganized" protectorate. This is borne out by other sources, particularly those cited by Dr. Heard Bey⁽³⁸⁾ who demonstrates that the formal legal system is post-1945. Previously culture ruled and essentially the proceedings were in the nature of arbitration rather than adjudication. Blood money and compensation (always negotiable) were the currency of legal dispute and the power to order or impose such penalties was a measure of the ruler's own authority.

The law, in other words, was political and the Agent's position in the letter just cited is almost the perfect example. It was not a question of just "insulting proceedings" but of a denial of authority, moreover a public denial ("before an assembly of his subjects").

Our final example is somewhat similar in that it also deals with the position of the Agent but it involves also the wider issue of direct British interference.

British Residency & Consulate-General,
Bushire, 26th July 1920

To (39)

Shaikh Khaled ben Ahmad,
Chief of Shargah

A.C.

I have received your letter of 7th Shawwal regarding the affair of the taking of the fort at Ajman by Abdur Rahman ben Muhammad. I have also received reports on the subject from the Agent of the High Government and a letter from the Shaikh of Ajman.

As you are aware the High Government does not interfere in internal affairs in your states unless the lives or property of British or subjects of foreign friendly powers are endangered. For this reason, until thus should happen the fighting at Ajman was no affair of the British Agent. But you and the Shaikh of Ajman finding that Abdur Rahman could not be dislodged both asked for the good offices of the British Agent and he went to Ajman at your request. Abdur Rahman having (naturally enough in the circumstances) refused to evacuate the fort until he received assurances from you and the Shaikh of Ajman backed by the assurance of the British Agent that he would be given a safe conduct and not be molested, both you Shaikhs gave the Agent the requisite assurances, and he give an assurance in the strength of this to Abdur Rahman who evacuated the fort which was handed back to the Shaikh of Ajman.

Your assurances for the protection of the lives and property of Abdur Rahman were backed by the British Agent, and this being so, my friend, I expect you to fulfill them and not to violate your pledges by trying to molest Abdur Rahman and Co. The British Government always fulfils assurances of this kind and I do not agree to your going back on your word. I am astonished to hear that you tried to molest these men when staying at the Agency. Had you succeeded in doing so I can tell you you would have incurred the grave displeasure of the High Government and I should have been compelled to send a ship of war to your port to demand an indemnity. So please be warned and remember this in future.

In view of the chance of disturbances and reprisals etc. I think it is not an infringement of your guarantee to prohibit their residing in your territory for a time, so I agree to this.

Captain,
for Deputy Political Resident,
Persian Gulf

There are two points of interest here. First, the policy that internal affairs are not something with which the British are concerned. This is rather ideal and not really a reflection of the facts. Interference was inevitable given the office of Agent over the coast and the fact that he was inevitably interested in local politics. Second, the fact that an Agent had the communication and, in large measure, the function of determining the shape of local politics meant that interference was inevitable.

However, "interference" like "protectorate" is one of these vague terms for which it is difficult to specify precise meanings. Insofar as it has meanings these are always (a) relative to circumstance and (b) to place. If

we take interference with external sovereignty we see that, by the treaties, British control was absolute after 1892. If, on the other hand, we take internal sovereignty by which we mean that the local rulers exercise power, we see that such an exercise was undisturbed provided that public order was maintained to an acceptable degree.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

All the agreements described in this chapter are directed to the end of maintaining public order. The threat of the gunboat and the indemnity was the mechanism for maintaining order on the coast. Internal sovereignty, loosely referred to as the "tribal" system was thus preserved well into the twentieth century.

Perhaps the most important result of this was the reinforcement of the position of the various rulers and the separate identity of the various "States" of the Trucial Coast. The practice of signing the treaties with each separately, the appointment of an Agent for each, all contributed to a certain view of areas and peoples. While boundaries were never clear the idea of a boundary became important (see below, p.242) and identification of oneself as belonging under the jurisdiction of a specified ruler took on an importance it had never had before.

NOTES[CHAPTER 1]

- (1) (I.O.) Hennell, Historical Sketch of the Benyas Tribe of Arabs from Year 1761 to 1831, p.403
- (2) (I.O.) L/P 85/7/195
- (3) Howley, D., The Trucial States, London, 1970, p.132
- (4) Taken from (I.O.) B.393, p.4194/28
- (5) H.M. Order in Council, 1889, later amended
- (6) These offices also had consular functions under the respective Orders in Council for Bahrain, Kuwait and Muscat
- (7) See the following. C.O. despatch 13 of 15 April 1924, p.1836,24 at paras. 3, 4, 5; I.O. to C.O. of 29 May 1923, p.1760, 7 June 1923, p.2171 and C.O. to I.O. 24 March 1924, p.1441
- (8) (I.O.) B.393, p.4194/28 at pp.2-3, (1918)
- (9) It was not until the 1930s that British Officers began to be appointed. See P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-18723
- (10) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-13723. See also R.S. Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, 1978, London, Macmillan, pp.167 ff on the career of K.B. Isa Abd al-Latif, agent from 1919-1935 whose peculations were obvious and, at the same time accepted by succeeding Residents
- (11) Zahlan, op.cit., 167 and 230, nos. 9 and 10 for references
- (12) (I.O.) Beard Coll. Val. 1596, No. 64625

- (13) See F. Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to Arab Emirates 1982 New York, Longmans pp.182 ff on the economic importance of pearling
- (14) See A.T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf ... 1928 London, Allen & Unwin pp. 213 ff. E. Rutter, "Slavery in Arabia", J. Royal Central Asian Society XX, pp.315-332 (1933)
- (15) (I.O.) L/P and S/B.159. Exactly the same agreement was concluded in 1847 with the rulers of Dubai, Ajman, Um al-Kumain and Abu Dhabi
- (16) (I.O.) L/P and S/B.159
- (17) See Heard-Bey, op.cit., p.459, no.35 and also
- (18) See Appendix I for the text
- (19) Zahlan, op.cit., p.6
- (20) See Appendix I, pp.288
- (21) See B.C. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914, University of California Press, 1967
- (22) See Roberts-Wray, op.cit., p.47 ff
- (23) Roberts-Wray, op.cit., p.48
- (24) Ibid: 89
- (25) See the list in Schd. II, British Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons Order in Council, 1949 (No. 140)
- (26) For a full discussion see M.B. Hooker (ed) Laws of South-East Asia, Vol.II, pp. on British rule and jurisdiction overseas including references to protectorate treaties and practice

- (27) This term has no legal meaning but certainly has in international relations. See, for example, Busch op.cit., pp.18-31 on the concept in the later 19th century Gulf, particularly with reference to Russia and Britian in Persia
- (28) Sir Hugh Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Overseas. The Clarendon Press (1902), pp.173 ff
- (29) Maine, Int. Law, 56, Hall Int. Law, 257
- (30) See Jenkyns, op.cit., pp.180-190 for examples
- (31) Ibid: pp.192-193 citing African Orders of the 1880s and 1890s
- (32) For an early discussion of the practical difficulties see Hope-Scott, 1843
- (33) See Tarring 1887: 13-37 for 19th century detail
- (34) Dating from 1910-1920, a period of considerable change and one in which British policy was rapidly changing - see below Ch. 2 on policy
- (35) (I.O.) R/15/1/267, p.12
- (36) (I.O.) r/15/1/267, p.17
- (37) See Said Zahlan, op.cit., pp.63-64 on Sh. Khaled bin Ahmad
- (38) Heard-Bey, op.cit., pp. 157 ff and references cited
- (39) (I.O.) R/15/1/267, p.190

CHAPTER 2BRITISH GULF POLICY AS IT AFFECTEDTHE EMIRATES C.1900-1935

As we saw in the last chapter, British policy was not at all concerned with the internal affairs of the coast states except to the extent that they impinged on British control of the littoral.

The implication of the evidence is inescapable; that policy on the internal side was a consequence of the wider imperial and great power policy of the nineteenth century. So far as the Gulf was concerned, the other powers were Russia, Germany and France. In addition, and of course closely linked were the imperial (Indian) interests. Finally, and very much last were the interests of the Emirates themselves. We take each of these in turn - (i) the external interests affecting the Emirates, (ii) imperial interests and (iii) the internal interests.

(I) British Great Power Interests

These have been the subject of extensive discussion in a number of ways in the Gulf. An excellent summary is in Dr. Dusch's Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914⁽¹⁾ to which the reader is referred. As he explains, there was the "Russian danger" (i.e. Persia), an attempted French presence in Oman, Germany and the Baghdad railway and Anglo-Turkish relations. The period of the most intense discussions on all these questions was, generally, from c.1890 to 1918. By this last date, the German and Turkish threats had been removed by the result of the First World War. The French threat had receded earlier, with the signing of the Entente Cordiale in 1904. The Russian danger, the most important from the imperial point of view (i.e. India) was in abeyance both as a result of the War and subsequent Revolution from 1917 onwards⁽²⁾ and did not reappear until very recently by which time the British role had passed to the United States. This is outside the scope of this discussion.

Having said this, it is clear from our time that, though the perceived threats had vanished by 1920 (at the latest), the policy designed to deal with them in 1900 continued to affect Britain's relations with the Emirates from then up until the mid-1930s. On the other hand, by the mid-1930s, when imperial defence came to the

front of London's collective mind⁽³⁾, consequent on contemporary European developments, the policy of the early 1900s certainly took on a new lease of life. It was, so to speak, resurrected and, even after almost four decades came to form an integral part of the imperial debate.

We refer, of course, to the policy statements of Lords Lansdowne⁽⁴⁾ and Curzon⁽⁵⁾, both of 1903 and both of which were primarily concerned with wider British interests. However, both had different audiences that is, they were addressed to different persons and this, as we shall see now, is significant.

(a) The Lansdowne Declaration

In the House of Lords, on Tuesday 5 May 1903, Lord Lamington asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for information, first, as to the negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Promoters of the Baghdad Railway Company; second, as to the Policy of His Majesty's Government in respect of the interests of this country in the Persian Gulf.

With regard to the second question, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said⁽⁶⁾:

"For a hundred years Great Britain was **supreme** in the Persian Gulf, and we and our British Indian subjects were alone the real traders there. Our position in the Persian Gulf had been maintained by

the expenditure of large sums of money, stated to be millions, and also at great cost of life. The contention was that the Administration of India had held that the security of the Persian Gulf was necessary for the proper defence of the Indian Empire ... only a year ago the under Secretary for Foreign Affairs declared that it would be impossible for us to abandon what we looked upon as our rights and position, not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in those provinces of Persia which bordered on the Indian Empire.⁽⁷⁾

Russia must have an outlet in the Southern Sea, but Russia had no trade whatever in Southern Persia. The only object which she could have would be for a naval base, and the only object of a naval base would be to threaten British trade with India. I believe that if allowed any power to come down into the Persian Gulf they would inflict a great injury on India and enable that Power to strike them in the flank ..."

Lord Ellenborough then said⁽⁸⁾:

"The strength of our position in the Persian Gulf and our influence there had sensibly lessened in the last 15 months, and from the fact it might be argued that further changes were contemplated. Anyone who reads Lord Curzon's book⁽⁹⁾ on Persia and among other publications, the series of articles in "The Times", must see how seriously at stake were our interests. There was danger that from drifting and neglect to face our responsibilities, we might get into a position from which war alone could extricate us; and to avoid this he counselled a firm declaration of a well-considered policy".

Lord Ellenborough said that

"the establishment of a Naval arsenal on the Persian Gulf would be a menace to our trade not only with India and China but with Australia and New Zealand. He would sooner see Russia at Constantinople than a great power occupying a good harbour in the Persian Gulf.

Lord Lansdowne replied⁽¹⁰⁾:

"I now pass to the closely connected subject of the Persian Gulf ... The Noble Lord told your Lordships with absolute truth that it was owing to British enterprise and to the expenditure of British lives and money, that the Persian Gulf is at this moment open to the navigation of the world. It was our ships that cleared those waters of pirates; it was we who put down the slave trade, it was we who buoyed and beaconsed those intricate waters.

There is no doubt that in the Gulf, as in other parts of Persia, we are feeling very keenly the competition of other Powers. That, I am afraid, is our fate not only in Persian waters; nor can we expect, because we have been in the development of commerce throughout the world the pioneers of that form of civilisation, that we shall always be able to maintain the position of superiority which we at first enjoyed. The Noble Lord asked me for a statement of our Policy with regard to the Persian Gulf. I think I can give him one in a few simple words.

- It seems to me that our Policy should be directed in the first place to protect and promote British trade in those waters.

- In the next place I do not think that he suggests, or that we should suggest, that those efforts should be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other powers.

- In the third place - I say it without hesitation - we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all means at our disposal.

I say that in no minatory spirit, because so far as I am aware, no proposals are on foot for the establishment of a foreign naval base. I at least have heard of none and I cannot help thinking that the Noble Lord waxed almost unnecessarily warmth at the idea of such a foreign intrusion with which, so far as I am aware, we are not at present threatened".

The day after the Declaration, the Russian ambassador met Lansdowne and told him that his declaration was not that important and although Russia was not mentioned by name, he believed that Lansdowne had meant it. If this hypothesis was correct, the Ambassador wanted the Minister to know that Russia did not intend to establish 'fleet' base in the Gulf. The Minister replied he knew he did not say anything new, but what he did was to confirm the British government's policy, which was very well known. To this the Russian ambassador agreed and even went further proposing that the time for discussion on spheres of influence had not yet come. Lansdowne agreed but added that certainly some settlement of individual problems would be reached⁽¹¹⁾. The Russian reaction, therefore, was generally favourable⁽¹²⁾ and the German government actually went so far as to deny that they had any special interests in possessions (a port) in the Gulf⁽¹³⁾.

The statements from Lords Lansdowne and Ellenborough represented the Foreign Office view and were directed towards Russia and Germany. They had considerable supports in Britain⁽¹⁴⁾ including, now, the Cabinet. This brings us to Lord Curzon's celebrated visit to the Gulf in November 1903, a visit which he had raised in 1901 but which had then been vetoed. His view had always been that Russia would not be allowed to continually flank Britain the Gulf and, in his famous Persia and the Persian Question he had earlier made his

position clear⁽¹⁵⁾, that Russia was a constant threat. While this view did not go entirely unchallenged⁽¹⁶⁾, it had become accepted in London by 1903.

The Cabinet gave Curzon the necessary permission to visit the Gulf but subject to two prohibitions; that he did not impinge on the Foreign Office's treaty making prerogatives nor upon the Persian responsibilities, also a Foreign Office preserve. These issues are outside the provision of this study⁽¹⁷⁾; the point of interest here is the speech delivered by Curzon to the assembled Chiefs of the coast on the 21st of November, a speech he described as "an epitome of the British historical presence in the Gulf during the past century"⁽¹⁸⁾.

(b) Curzon's Speech^{(19)*}

He began by addressing the Chiefs of the Arab Coast who were in treaty relations with the British government. He told them he had come there as the representative of the great Empire of India, of the British authority which they and their fathers and forefathers had known and dealt with for more than a hundred years. He stressed that his object was to show them that, though they lived at some distance from the shores of India, they were not forgotten by the government, but that they should adhere to the policy of guardianship and protection which had given them peace and guaranteed their rights for the best

*The original report was 6 pages long - I have extracted the information I require - thereby reducing it in my text to 4 pages

part of a century; and that the first Viceroy of India who had ever visited those waters did not quit them without seeking the opportunity of meeting them in person, and of renewing the assurances and engagements by which they had been so long united.

He went on to say that their fathers and grandfathers before them had doubtless told them of the history of the past. He reminded them that a hundred years ago there had been constant trouble and fighting in the Gulf. He continued that when the British government intervened, in the interests of its own subjects and traders, and of its legitimate influence in the seas that wash the Indian coasts, this state of affairs must not continue. British flotillas appeared in these waters. He emphasized that British forces occupied the ports and towns on the coast which could be seen from the deck of a ship.

He told them that out of the relations that were created, and which by their own consent constituted the British government the guardian of inter-tribal peace, there had grown up political ties between the Government of India and themselves, whereby the British government became their overlord and protector, but required that they had relations with no other Power. Every one of the States, known as the Trucial States, had bound itself, as they knew not to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any other Power, not to admit the

agent of any other government, and not part with any portion of its territories. He warned that these engagements were binding on every one of them, and they had faithfully adhered to them. They were also binding in their reciprocal effect upon the British government, and as long as they were faithfully observed by the Chiefs, there was no fear that any one else would be allowed to tamper with their rights or liberties.

He worried that sometimes the record of the past was in danger of being forgotten, and there were persons who asked why should Great Britain continue to exercise those powers? The history of the states and families and the present condition of the Gulf were the answer. They were there, he reminded them, before any other Power, in modern times, had shown its face in those waters. He again reminded them that the British had found strife and had created order. It was their commerce as well as their security that was threatened and called for protection. At every port along those coasts the subjects of the King of England still resided and traded. The great Empire of India, which it was their duty to defend, lay almost at their gates. The British had saved them from extinction at the hands of their neighbours. They had also opened those seas to the ships of all nations, and enabled their flags to fly in peace. They had not seized or held their territory or destroyed their independence, but had preserved it. They were not now

going to throw away that century of costly and triumphant enterprise; he assured them they should not wipe out the most unselfish page in history and the peace of these waters had still to be maintained; their independence would continue to be upheld; and the influence of the **British government** must remain **supreme**.

But, he added, there was one aspect in which the Chiefs themselves could avert any renewal of trouble in the future. The British government had no desire to **interfere** and had never interfered, in their **internal affairs**, provided that the Chiefs governed their territories with justice, and respected the rights of the foreign traders residing therein. He reassured them that if any internal disputes occurred, they would always find a friend in the **British Resident**, who would use his influence as he had frequently done in the past, to prevent these dissensions from coming to a head, and to maintain the status quo; for they could not approve of one independent Chief attacking another Chief by land, simply because he was not permitted to do it by sea, and thus evading the spirit of his Treaty obligations.

He concluded his speech by saying that those were the relations that subsisted between the British government and themselves and the **Sovereign** of the **British Empire** lived so far away that none of them had ever seen or would ever see His face, but his orders were carried out everywhere throughout his vast dominions by

the officers of his government, and it was as his representative in India, who was responsible to him for their welfare, that he was there to exchange greetings with them and to renew old assurances, and wish them prosperity in the future.

So far as affairs on the coast itself were concerned, this speech was held to be a great success⁽²⁰⁾. From the point of view of his audience at the Durbar, Curzon stressed the benefits of peace, in particular the economic benefits, and the position of Britain in not wishing to interfere in internal affairs⁽²¹⁾. But, from the external point of view, when taken with the Lansdowne/Ellenborough statements it reinforces the view that internal arrangements on the coast were subordinate to the wider British interests.

(II) British Imperial Interests

The opinion just expressed at the end of the preceding paragraph appears also to be valid in relation to British imperial interests in the post-War period. The Turkish, German and Russian threats had ceased and attention now focussed on internal imperial matters as such. There were two - aviation and imperial defence.

(a) Aviation and Oil

After World War I, new changes or developments appeared, which were not on the scene before, i.e. air flights. This was a fact which made the Gulf very important. Britain saw the Gulf link (military and civil air flights) as essential to connect Britain, Egypt and Iraq, with India and the Far East.

The first air journey between Iraq and India was in December 1918, made by an RAF plane and in 1919 long distance air journeys began, though in a discontinuous way. The issue of an air link between India and the external world was raised in July 1919 when the British airlines proposed a project to connect Cairo with Karachi. The British refrained from using the Eastern coast of the Gulf because Persia was a member of the Aviation Association. It allowed foreign planes to fly over its territories on certain routes and land in specified places on the coast, and that was precisely what happened with the British planes⁽²²⁾. At that time

the planes required that airports should be as near to each other as possible (about 200 miles, not more), and 'stations' where emergency landing would be possible should be established every thirty miles. For that reason the British went to the Western part of the Gulf in 1920.

The Prince of Kuwait welcomed the idea of the construction of an airport in Kuwait and so did the Sheikh of Bahrain. But the Sheikh of Qatar and Burami opposed the idea. The British authorities' view was that opposition would end when they gave money to the people concerned⁽²³⁾. In the Trucial Coast on the other hand, the British authorities wished to build two airports, one in Ra's Al-Khaima, the other in Al-Shariqa and two stations for emergency landing. At the beginning they faced fierce opposition from the Sheikhs and tribes. The British experts, as documents mention, believed that the opposition was of two kinds - "internal" and "coastal". They believed the "coastal" opposition was easy to contain; they should not listen to the Sheikhs and would go on building the airports they wanted, because "the people in the Gulf would soon realise that the air link would not be disastrous for them. We know that their opposition is aimed at making us give up the whole idea, but when they realised that we were determined to go ahead, they agreed wholeheartedly". The internal opposition, on the other hand, was a "bit difficult" to

contain because it affected the influence of the Sheikh on the tribes that were loyal to him. For that reason the Resident pressed Britain to offer money to the Chiefs or Sheikhs and he estimated that Britain should pay no more than £3,000 a year, and recommended protection of the chiefs of tribes who were willing to cooperate with the British authorities in this regard, and to protect them from any danger which they might face as a result of their cooperation⁽²⁴⁾.

The Sheikh of Ra's Al-Khaima refused to give the British a piece of land on which they could build or construct an airport and did not allow the Survey team to survey any part of Ra's Al-Khaima. The deputy Air Marshall was not happy with that. He told the Indian government that it should do its best to prepare for the construction of airports. He also added that the Air Board attached great importance to this air link which required airports and places for landing on the Omani coast and that this line or link would be important in supporting India, Singapore and the Far East in military terms, if the situation demanded it. It would also facilitate cooperation between the Fleet and flying boats.

He concluded his report⁽²⁵⁾ by asking the Indian government to remind the Sheikh in question of Britain's unwillingness to tolerate his opposition and of the severe punishment that Britain had inflicted on him when

he refused to permit a barge to stay at the entrance of the city. But the Sheikh of Ra's Al-Khaima did not give in to the pressure, which made the British seek the Sheikh of Al-Shariqa's cooperation⁽²⁶⁾. An agreement was not signed until July 1932, in which he agreed to give Britain a piece of land so that Britain could build an airport. The Agreement also specified things like security, responsibility and expenses, which the two parties agreed upon. The Agreement reads⁽²⁷⁾:

"It having been intimated to me, Sultan bin Saqar, Sheikh of Sharjah and its villages, by Lieutenant Colonel Sir Hugh Biscoe, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, that the High British Government's desire to establish an air route along the Arab Coast for the aeroplanes of the Imperial Airways Company (herein after referred to as the Company), and that they wish to have an air station at Sharjah at which British aeroplanes can land. I hereby agree to grant to the said Company the following facilities:-

(1) The Company may select a landing ground at Sharjah, and may put on it such marks as are necessary, and their aeroplanes may land on that ground.

(2) I will construct a rest house for the passengers and staff of the Company on a site to be selected by the Company and in accordance with plans drawn up by them, and under the supervision of an engineer of the British government. The house and fixed fittings to be considered as my property.

(3) The Company shall have the right to import, free of duty, petrol and spare parts for aircraft, provisions for the passengers and staff, and whatever may be required for their service.

(4) The Company may send their employees to reside in the rest house but neither they nor the passengers shall enter the town of Sharjah without my permission.

I further accept full responsibility for the protection of the staff and passengers of the Company and their aircraft, so far as my dependents, relatives and subjects are concerned, and further to their protection as far as possible against marauders from outside my jurisdiction.

I will supply 35 guards and 2 head guards.

In return for the above, it is agreed that the British government shall make me the following payments:

(1) Pay for 35 guards and two chiefs at the rate of RS.20 p.m for each guard and RS.40 p.m for each of the two head guards, payment to commence from the date the guards are appointed.

(2) Rent for the Air Station is RS.800 p.m payment to commence from the date the first commercial aeroplane lands.

(3) Rent for the Rest House RS.300 p.m.

The government shall advance me by instalments such sums as may be considered reasonable by the engineer supervising the work for the construction of the building, and no rent shall be payable to me until all sums advanced have been repaid. The government shall supply gratis doors, windows and steel joints and corrugated iron.

(4) For the responsibility that I have accepted, a personal subsidy of RS.500 p.m to commence from 1 July 1932.

(5) A landing fee of RS.5, for every commercial aeroplane that lands on the aerodrome. No charge shall be made for aeroplanes belonging to the Royal Air Force.

The Company and their employees shall not deal directly with the Sheikh but through the Residency Agent or Political Resident.

This Agreement shall be for eleven years but payments will only be made for so long as the facilities are utilised.

Should the British government require to renew this agreement at the end of the above period they may do so provided three months' notice is given me".

Therefore, with the emergence of aviation, the sea was no longer of such strategic importance as before. It was no longer the only way to reach India and the other British colonies.

Air flights enabled the British to control, to some extent, the inner parts of the Gulf. Oil, on the other hand, emphasised the need for Britain to interfere in order to get concessions concerning drilling for oil, and to maintain these concessions and keep away from the Gulf the new powers which began to appear on the coast under the cover name 'oil companies'. The most important power appearing after the First World War was the United States. The emergence of such powers worried Britain. In September 1918 the Political Resident discussed the dangers facing British Policy at that time. He said⁽²⁸⁾:

"Behind us all, but growing with each day of the War into a nearer reality, looms the colossal figure of the United States, who partly through historical accident, have so far an uncommonly clean record as a great power in the eyes of the Near East. Whether we wish it or not, if we the allies in Europe do not agree, they are bound to act as the final arbitrators. Should they see an impatient scramble for the spoils they may be apt to take an idealistic view of the problem and try to shield the more backward races by eliminating outside control to below the necessary minimum".

His speech was a true prediction fully confirmed after the Second World War.

Oil Concessions along the Omani Coast

The importance of oil came to the fore after the First World War on the international scene. Companies started competing for concessions for oil extraction in the Gulf.

Britain realised the full impact of oil on the political future of the region. The Foreign Office declared on 14th March 1918 that oil was one of the issues that could not merely be dealt with as no more than a purely economic investment. On the contrary it should be construed as a demanding responsibility leaving no room for half-solutions and must be tackled with foresight⁽²⁹⁾. Britain's policy consisted in deprecating hastiness in concluding contracts before making sure of their chances of success. However, the entry of other foreign companies (mainly American) took Britain by surprise. Besides, people like Holmes who was a British citizen and gained many concessions in Bahrain and Kuwait for the Eastern & General Syndicate Company at the expense of its rival, the Anglo-Persian Company (A.P.C.) in which the British government had a share of 51%, irritated the British government. Therefore, it saw it necessary to bar the way before these rival companies, by ordering the authorities representing the Indian

Government in the Gulf in 1922 following direct instructions from the Foreign Office which regulated the political decision-making in the Gulf to force undertakings on the respective Sheikhs in Qatar and the Omani Coast. Among other things, these undertakings contained: "I write this letter with my own initiative, in which I undertake before your Lordship that, should there be any hope of finding oil in any of the lands under my dominion, I shall refrain from granting its concession to any foreigners, except those appointed by (or enjoying the approval of) His Majesty's Government ... I take this to be binding"⁽³⁰⁾. These undertakings did not prevent the rival companies, however, from looking forward to signing contracts with these Sheikhs, which led to open talks between the Standard Oil Company and these Sheikhs with respect to oil. This spurred the British government to act promptly through the Petroleum Consortium Ltd. Company which was an affiliation of the (I.P.C.)^{*} with a view to contracting oil concessions from the said Sheikhs. In the course of the negotiations between the Sheikhs and the P.C.L. whose name changed, to become afterwards, P.D.T.C., (Petroleum Development Trucial Coast) the British government issued strict orders banning the Government of India from making public their intention not to accept the Standard Oil Company on the grounds of its being non-British, which would have drawn the intervention of the American government in guarding the interests of this company, as

*Iraq Petroleum Co.

was the case in Kuwait in 1921 when the British were told bluntly that, in the event of this company being denied access to open competition for oil concessions in the region, the British interests in areas under American influence would suffer in consequence.

As for the Sheikhs, themselves, British Government confirmed that "it was a must to confront them with the truth since we cannot tell them that the Standard Oil Company had completely withdrawn";⁽³¹⁾ for if they did, their deceit would be exposed before the Sheikhs, some of whom had links with some Arab officials employed by the American company. The final decision was taken to the effect that the Sheikhs were to be told that when the British government realised the intention of Standard Oil to procure concessions, it informed that company that the P.C.L. had rights of precedence in the area⁽³²⁾. Once again, the British government informed the Sheikhs that they were not to accept any American company.

Accordingly, the negotiations between the British company and the Sheikhs started and led to the signatures of the Sheikhs of Sharja and Ras Al Khaima in 1938 granting this company oil concessions and an annual lease⁽³³⁾. Then, on 11th January 1939, the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi signed the concessions, followed by the Sheikh of Dubai in May 1939.

The text of the contract reads as follows: (34)

AGREEMENT made on Jer. 10 of May 1939 between the ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CCMPANY LIMITED hereinafter referred to as the COMPANY and His Excellency Shaikh Sa'id bin Maktum, Ruler of DUBAI, referred to hereinafter as the LESSOR.

The LESSOR agrees to lease to the CCMPANY a plot of land situated on the shore of the Lagoon and forming part of a property known as HAMRIYAH measuring 340 Feet by 140 feet, the frontage being the ridge which marks high tide.

The LESSOR agrees to allow the COMPANY to erect on the aforesaid plot such buildings as they require, to perform their services as suppliers of Oil Products in Dubai and for delivery to aircraft; the LESSOR agrees also to allow the CCMPANY to erect a Jetty extending from the entrance to the Store into the Lagoon a distance sufficient to give six feet of water at the Jetty head at a low tide and to fix a bucy in the Lagoon for the purpose of mooring a launch used for refuelling Flyingboats.

The LESSOR agrees to supply FREE all local Stones and Gatch required in the construction of the Depot Buildings.

In consideration of the above the COMPANY agrees to pay the LESSOR for the land monthly rental of Rs. 200/(Rupees Two Hundred Only). The CCMPANY agrees also to hand over to the LESSOR ten years from the date of occupation, all the buildings erected on the LESSOR'S PROPERTY: this doernot include the Buoy and the Jetty.

This AGREEMENT is renewable for another period to be agreed upon by both the contracting parties and the Clauses being adhered to and unchanged.

RULER OF DUBAI

Inspector, Gulf Ports Agencies
ANGLO IRANIAN OIL CCMPANY LTD.

British interests along the Omani Coast developed, as we have suggested, in parallel with the advent of the air route and oil. Therefore, it became

incumbent upon them to develop and adapt their own governing methods so as to preserve those growing interests.

Thus, the development of aviation and exploitation of oil, coupled later with the positive results of the First World War forced Britain to reformulate its old policy in an attempt to create a policy which could cope with the new developments and enable Britain to remain the only power dominating the Sheikdoms on the Omani coast.

(b) Imperial Defence, 1935*

On Tuesday, 24 September 1935, a meeting was held in London by the Standing Official Sub-Committee concerning Trucial Coast Policy⁽³⁵⁾.

The following were present at the meeting:

1. Sir John E. Shuckburgh, K.C.M.G., C.E., Deputy Permanent Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office. (In the Chair).
2. Mr. G.W. Pendel, C.M.G, Counsellor, Foreign Office.
3. Captain T.S.V. Phillips, R.N., Director of Plans, Admiralty.
4. Sir Andrew Ryan, K.B.E., C.M.G., His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.
5. Air Vice-Marshal C.L. Courtney, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.
6. Air Vice-Marshal C.S. Burnett, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.
7. Lt.-Col. T.C.W. Fowle, C.B.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

*The original report was 24 pages long - I have extracted the information I require - thereby reducing it in my text to 12 pages

8. Captain R.K. Arbuthnott, M.C., General Staff, War Office.
9. Wing Commander G.C. Pirie, M.C., D.F.C., Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, Air Ministry.
10. Mr. E. Hale, Principal, Treasury.
11. Mr. K.W. Blaxter, Principal, Colonial Office.
12. Mr. M.J. Clauson, Principal, India Office.
13. Mr. E.A. Seal, Principal, Admiralty.
14. Mr. A.C.E. Malcolm, Third Secretary, Foreign Office.
15. Mr. G.E. Crombie, Assistant Principal, India Office.
16. Major F.B. Webb, Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

THE CHAIRMAN of the Sub-Committee started the meeting by referring to the despatch from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. C/306, of the 16th November, 1934, to the Government of India, in which Colonel Fowle had outlined for approval, the policy which he recommended to be pursued in future by His Majesty's Government in their relations with the Trucial Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. This recommendation was, very briefly, that "no change need be introduced into the policy or methods which had been maintained with success for a long time". The Air Ministry had, however, raised in this connection the question whether His Majesty's Government should not, in future, take a more active interest in the internal affairs of the Trucial coast than hitherto. The Chairman invited the Air Ministry representatives to develop their arguments before the Committee.

AIR VICE-MARSHALL COURTNEY invited the Sub-Committee to consider in particular two of the recommendations contained in Colonel Fowle's despatch; their gist was:-

- (1) that His Majesty's Government should avoid active interference in the internal affairs of the Trucial Sheikhdoms;
- (2) that His Majesty's Government should refrain from preventing hostilities on land between Trucial Sheikhdoms. (He assumed that under this latter head there should also be included the prevention of internal disturbances in any one Sheikhdom).

The Air Ministry, he said, were, to their regret, unable to agree that either recommendation was consistent with Lord Curzon's address of 1903 to the Trucial Sheikhs.* That speech had hitherto been accepted as the ruling authority in matters affecting the policy of His Majesty's Government on the Trucial coast, and as a basis the Air Ministry fully accepted it still. There were, however, inconsistencies between the policy contained in that speech and the policy now recommended by Colonel Fowle, and these inconsistencies must, in the Air Ministry's view, be resolved.

*See p.67.

Air Vice-Marshal Courtney pointed out that conditions had changed since Lord Curzon had made his speech, and said that as regards the first point, which he had quoted from Colonel Fowle's despatch, it was the view of the Air Ministry that, if British interests were threatened owing to any developments in the internal affairs of a Trucial Sheikdom, His Majesty's Government should intervene. Air power now permitted His Majesty's Government to intervene, or prevent hostilities on land, if they wished to do so, and he suggested that His Majesty's Government should make it clear to the Trucial Sheikhs that they could and would intervene by sea, air or even land, if necessary. As the safety of the air route to the Far East was now the principal British interest on the Trucial coast, the Air Ministry had taken the initiative in asking that the matter should be considered by the Sub-Committee.

Turning to the second point raised in Colonel Fowle's despatch, Air Vice-Marshal Courtney remarked that Curzon's speech was dictated by the fact that in Lord Curzon's day the only action only to His Majesty's Government was action by sea. The advent of air power had abolished this limitation, and it was not perfectly possible for His Majesty's Government to prevent hostilities between Trucial Sheikhs on land as well as on the sea.

COLONEL FOWLE observed that, if the safety of the air route could be assured with the present commitments of His Majesty's Government, he saw no need to extend them. He quoted in support of his view the recent quarrel between His Majesty's Government and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi over the R.A.F. petrol store. In that case, measures had successfully been taken (viz., a threat to immobilise the Abu Dhabi pearling fleet) which were designed to affect the people of Abu Dhabi, as well as their Sheikh. **No internal interference had been necessary**, and the Sheikh, having given his signature to the agreement by which he had allowed the petrol store, had simply been told that he must give effect to it.

MR. RENDEL suggested that it might be convenient if he spoke before the discussion progressed any further since from the Foreign Office point of view there would be advantages in framing the question raised by the Air Ministry in even wider terms than the Air Ministry had employed. While many of the principles enunciated in Lord Curzon's speech of 1903 might still be applicable, it seemed essential to recognise that the general situation in the Gulf, particularly from the international point of view, had been completely and fundamentally revolutionised by post-war developments. Lord Curzon's speech had been made at a time when the Persian Gulf had been virtually a

British lake, under unchallenged British control and cut off by almost impassable deserts from the North and West. The Ottoman Empire had proved no serious menace to this position. There was no aviation, there was no oil, and there was little foreign trade. As a result, the limits of His Majesty's Government's action had been set solely by themselves. Today, the Persian Gulf was one of the world's highways, bordered by strongly nationalist States, whose interest in the Gulf was real and active, and the discovery of oil had led other foreign Powers to take an increasing interest in Gulf affairs. In his view, the time had come, or was at least rapidly approaching, when His Majesty's Government would no longer be able to maintain their previous policy of merely keeping others out, and living, as it were, from hand to mouth, but would be faced with the necessity of going either forwards or backwards.

He feared that, if His Majesty's Government tried to maintain a negative policy of non-intervention and minimum control, they might find themselves subjected to very strong pressure from foreign powers whose nationals wished to be allowed to enter the Persian Gulf for commercial exploitation, aviation, etc. He mentioned in this connection the American Government's interest in oil, the Italian interest in shipping, the Japanese interest in trade, and the Dutch interest in flying as factors which

had already made their appearance; and with regard to the first, he reminded the meeting that, when the Kuwait Oil concession was first proposed the American Government had threatened to penalise British oil interests in territories under American influence if American interests were not allowed to compete at Kuwait. This was a threat which almost any Government was in a position to make with regard to British trade and industry, civil aviation, shipping, etc. In these circumstances a negative attitude would be increasingly difficult to maintain, and if the British were not to find foreign Governments intervening in the Gulf on behalf of their nationals, they should certainly have to assume a greater measure of definite responsibility themselves, as they had been obliged to do in Qatar. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that the French and the Dutch might at any moment want to remove their air route to the Far East from the Persian to the Arab coast. With regard to oil, His Majesty's Government must face the possibility that it would be found in commercial quantities. In that event, questions of jurisdiction and of protection would arise and must be faced, as at Qatar. Another consequence of the grant of oil concessions on the Trucial Coast would be the necessity of according protection to the companies and their workings and employees. But the grant of such protection in its

turn made it necessary to fix boundaries. For all these reasons the Foreign Office view was that, if foreign political influence was not to be allowed to penetrate into the Gulf area, it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to assume an increasing degree of better defined control, and generally speaking, therefore, he wished to support the Air Ministry's views.

COLONEL FOWLE agreed that the discovery of oil on the Trucial Coast meant that His Majesty's Government must offer their protection, making it, of course, conditional on the actual grant of a concession. If oil were not found, it was clear that no guarantee was necessary.

MR. RENDEL pointed out, however, that a British company was not always available to compete particularly in view of the Oil Agreement of 1928 between the various groups of the Iraq Petroleum Company - and that in such circumstances it might be impossible, even if it were desirable, to keep foreign enterprise out. Foreign Governments wished to deal with a responsible authority. Who was at present that authority on the Trucial Coast? Unless His Majesty's Government were in a position to say that they were ultimately responsible in all respects, some foreign Power or other might take matters into its

own hands. It was important that these admittedly hypothetical questions - which might, however, at any moment become acute - should be faced before the pressure of foreign enterprise became too great.

COLONEL FOWLE said that, as regards aviation, there was already machinery for controlling the Dutch and the French air lines should they decide to use the Arab coast. As regards foreign air lines, he doubted whether His Majesty's Government had the means to exclude them.

This drew from AIR VICE-MARSHAL COURTNEY the remark that His Majesty's Government did not wish to exclude them, but to control the conditions on which they should enter.

CAPTAIN PHILLIPS said that the Admiralty were in general agreement with the views of Colonel Fowle. They would prefer to see His Majesty's Government keep a free hand by avoiding any unnecessary new commitments. As he understood the history of this question, the reason for confining guarantees to the sea in the past was that the physical arguments against any guarantee covering land operations had been very strong, whereas protection from the sea was an easy matter. The advent of aeroplanes had undoubtedly made possible many operations which previously

could not be undertaken, but he was not convinced that it could be said today that they alone could uphold a guarantee by land, and that if we gave such a guarantee there was no chance of our being involved in military operations.

He would, however, on the general question, like to make a purely personal suggestion which was, that His Majesty's Government should again consider **whether there would not be considerable advantage in replacing the native agent at Sharjah who, he understood, had recently died, by an Englishman.** He thought it could no longer be maintained that Sharjah was too dangerous for this purpose, and he hoped that this idea might be examined.

THE AIR MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVES intimated that, if the proposal were put forward officially, they would strongly support it.

MR. CLAUSON said that the India Office were in general agreement with the views of the Government of India and of Colonel Fowle. Referring to Mr. Rendel's suggestion that, in their relations with the Trucial Coast, His Majesty's Government must now either go **backwards or forwards**, he indicated that the India Office were ready to advance when and as necessary, but that they saw no adequate reason why His Majesty's Government should not continue to pursue their present policy. If an oil

concession were granted on the Trucial Coast, for example, at Ras-al-Kheima, the India Office would not oppose the necessary guarantees of protection being given.

As regards foreign penetration of the Trucial Coast in general, Mr. Clauson observed that while the political control which His Majesty's Government at present exercised was still undisputed, it had often been convenient for them to be able to describe the Trucial rulers as being "independent Arab Sheikhs in special relations with His Majesty's Government". None the less, the India Office would not wish to exclude the eventual possibility that control on the Trucial Coast might be tightened up by some such measure as the placing of a British political agent in one of the Sheikhdoms, but their general policy was one of evolution.

Reverting to the conflict at Dubai in October 1934,

Air Vice-Marshal Courtney repeated that the Air Ministry were unable to find that the pronouncements of the Government of India covered the support which the Royal Air Force had afforded. The Air Ministry, he said, were of course at all times ready to give this support, but he must point out that they had not formally assumed any obligation to do so. The second proclamation issued by Colonel Fowle on the 24 of October had warned the inhabitants that "... those responsible ... will be held to account". This was in the last resort a threat of force and it implied that His Majesty's Government were

prepared to take action beyond any that was now formally provided for. If, therefore, the policy recommended by Colonel Fowle was to be approved, the Air Ministry must press, if only out of consideration for the **Air Officer Commanding in Iraq**, that the Committee should make a recommendation to clarify the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to such action.

AIR VICE-MARSHAL COURTNEY and AIR VICE-MARSHAL BURNETT referring to the fact that in certain possibilities the Air Office Commanding in Iraq might be called upon for assistance, both insisted strongly that these possibilities were not by any means remote. They were, in fact, daily becoming more urgent and when there were oil concessions to be protected the Royal Air Force would need more facilities, such as landing grounds, than were at present available. They could not, therefore, agree to leave the matter in an uncertain state.

THE CHAIRMAN then proposed, and the Sub-Committee after some further discussion agreed, to recommend as follows:

- (1) that His Majesty's Government must admit ultimate international responsibility for the affairs of the Trucial Coast, including Qatar;
- (2) that the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq might be **informed that intervention on land in the Trucial Sheikhdoms** was an additional commitment which he might in certain circumstances be called upon to meet;

- (3) that the interested Departments should examine the personal suggestion put forward by Captain Phillips, for the appointment of an **Englishman as agent** on the Trucial Coast in place of the present native Residency agent at Sharjah;
- (4) that as the departments represented on the Sub-Committee were unable to reach agreement as to the necessity or otherwise for a new pronouncement or the adoption of a new policy in the Persian Gulf, this matter should therefore be reserved for further consideration".

From that meeting we can conclude the following:

- (1) The Gulf in the 1930s became "a world highway" and was no longer an exclusively British lake as it had been in 1903 at the time of Curzon.
- (2) The most important developments that took place in the Gulf during the 1930s centred on two areas: aviation and oil.
- (3) Britain was competing against the United States, Japan, Italy and France for influence in the region. The developments in the 1930s led to a change in British policy towards the Gulf in terms of a new British readiness to intervene militarily on land as well as at sea in the area when British interests were threatened. To carry out that new policy, Britain saw it necessary to appoint a British Agent instead of the native agent she used to employ.

Therefore, Britain after having radically changed its old policy, firmly controlled the situation in the Sheikhdoms on the Omani coast. As the Second World War started, Britain had already secured its interests in these Sheikhdoms by means of Agreements which prevented the Sheikhs from getting in touch with the other European powers, who were competing with Britain. By doing so, Britain was able to break the resistance of the Sheikhs of the Trucial coast and overcome their fears concerning the results of air flights on the independence of the region. Imperial Airlines had several installations in Al-Shariqa and had a 'station' for emergency landing in Ben Al-Yais and an RAF base in Abu Dhabi.

When the Second World War began, Britain's task was to protect these areas from any external or internal danger they might face. Moreover, it refused to allow a non-British plane to fly over the region. The Indian government sent a letter to the British Foreign Office on 12 September 1938,⁽³⁶⁾ in which it mentioned the fact that their policy was not to encourage civil flights over the Arab coast on the Gulf. It finalised its success in the region with obtainment in 1939 of concessions concerning drilling for oil in the Sheikhdoms⁽³⁷⁾.

(III) Emirate Internal Affairs

We now come to the internal affairs of the Emirates. As we shall see, they take their content and characteristics from British policy, both great power and imperial. There are two documents of great importance which sum up the position by the early 1930s.

(a) The Political Resident's Reports, 1929⁽³⁸⁾ *

The Political Resident in the Gulf, Colonel Barrett, sent a seminal report to the British Foreign Office on 5 September 1929. The report included some suggestions concerning British Policy towards the internal situation in the Sheikhdoms on the Omani coast, the objectives of which were to maintain control of the coast and change the situation in a way that suited Britain's interests in the Sheikhdoms. He started his report by talking about the killings and murders which were a common and familiar means used by Sheikhs to reach power.

He explained that the root of most of the fratricidal trouble was that although - thanks to the pearl trade - the rulers were not paupers, they were poor, and the poverty of the State rendered it almost impossible for the ruler to satisfy the demands of his numerous relations. The anxiety of Sheikh Hamad (ruler of the rich State of Bahrain) to satisfy all his Al Khalifa relatives - even those with whom he was not personally on good terms - was a manifestation of the Arab rulers' inherent dread of his

*The original report was 22 pages long - I have extracted the information I require - thereby reducing it in my text to 9 pages.

relatives and anxiety to conciliate them

He was in absolute agreement with the views laid down by Sir Frederick Johnston in paragraph 3 of his letter No. 133S of the 23 April 1929 that **unless and until the Government of India were prepared to interfere much more than they had done in the past, and were prepared, if necessary, to bolster up a weak Sheikh, however much they might regret it, the only course was to continue to shake hands with successful murder..**

He added that the result of the policy of bolstering up weak Sheikhs was to be seen in Bahrain and Muscat, and if government decided to adopt it they must do so with their eyes open to the consequences.

It was also quite within the bounds of probability that the bigoted prejudice of the Trucial Chiefs may have forced them to a policy of active interference in Trucial Oman, if they wished to establish their air service along the coast; but the time had not yet arrived when he could recommend forcing themselves on the Sheikhs regardless of consequences.

He mentioned also that Sir Frederick Johnston (the Resident) was of the view that in his dealings with these Chiefs both interference and non-interference was carried in some matters to a greater degree than was consistent with their interests.

He explained that one of the reasons for which they maintained an agent on the coast was the protection of the interests of their British subjects, who were mainly Sindi Bunniahs and Khojas. The presence of these British Indians gave them certain responsibilities, but it also gave them corresponding advantages, and he did not think it would be to their benefit that they should pack up and leave. Long experience had taught the Residency Agent that the mere threat to summon a sloop was the best method of dealing with continued recalcitrance. It was a gesture and nothing more. The fact that the Agent was himself an Arab made him a much better judge than any European of the course of the secret intrigues that were always flowing on the coast. His nationality had also the disadvantage that the Agent could not always keep himself free from undue interference in these intrigues. Khan Bahadur Isa Abdul Latif, O.B.E., was the third generation of his family to hold the post of Residency Agent, and the connection had continued for over 65 years. In this long period certain hereditary friendships and enmities had certainly been formed. The "Bait Sarkali", as the family were called, had attempted to take wives from the ruling Sheikhs, sometimes with unfortunate results; they had built up for themselves a position of power and influence which aroused jealousy, but on the whole they had done excellent work for His Majesty's Government, which none other than they could have performed. He recommended that

they should continue to use the great influence of the family, but should attempt to supervise their work.

He went on to say that at present the Residency Agent worked directly under the Resident of Bushire, who visited the coast once or, if means of transport allowed, twice a year. In addition, the coast was visited at frequent intervals by His Majesty's ships, whose presence had a most beneficial and tranquillising effect on the more unruly elements on land. The commanders of these ships were practically the supervising Political Agents of the coast, but their sphere extended from Ras al Had to Basrah and their term of service was confined to two years. In this short period, he stressed, it was impossible to learn the language and the customs or the local politics. The commanders must, in the nature of things, be largely in the hands of their interpreters. Many of these men had done some excellent work, but the fact remained that the Resident's appreciation of the Residency Agent's work depended largely on the reports of Baluchi interpreters.

He emphasized that the Residency Agent was a very astute man, and his relations with the naval interpreters were excellent.

He explained that with regard to the question of the appointment of a **British Political Agent** on the Trucial Coast, the position had not materially altered since Sir Percy Cox (a former and highly regarded President) discussed the question 1913. Except in the improved relations between the Navy and the Arab Sheikhs,

there had been no material alteration in the past 16 years. "Europeans" were still vigorously excluded from the coast. The prohibition had very occasionally been modified to admit of short professional visits by American missionary doctors, but applied even to the European pearl merchant, M. Rosenthal, whose presence, the previous year, as a competitor to Mohamed Ali Zainal had been of the greatest benefit to the pearl traders of Dubai.

It was pointed out that one of the reasons for the revolution in Dubai, which was attempted by the Sheikh's family in April, was the circulation of a story that the ruling Sheikh had given permission to a Mr. Straw (representative of the Standard Oil Company) to stay ashore for a night in Dubai while the mail ship was anchored off the coast.

It was thought that that a British Political Agent, although their treaties of 1820 gave them the right to appoint him, would have to be forced on the Sheikhs, and the Political Agent would have to be protected by an armed guard. The Arab Agents already maintained an armed guard at their own expense.

It was probable that a British Political Agent would increase British influence on the coast, and smooth all difficulties in the way of the air service. Those

difficulties, owing to the settled Arab policy of exclusion, were considerable. If the Arabs continued their obstruction - and the air route was of vital importance and must be established quickly he recommended that they force them to grant the necessary facilities, and at the same time force them to accept a British Political Agent to ensure that there would be no backsliding.

He continued that the amount of pressure required should not be excessive. Owing to the maritime position of the town, the Navy could soon force any policy desired. The Arabs might threaten to emigrate as they did after the Hyacinth incident⁽³⁹⁾; but if a trading centre such as Dubai were selected as the site for the new agency, the Arab move should not be more than a trifling annoyance. Delmuk, leader of one opposition tribe in Dubai, and his followers would go, but the Indian, Persian, and Baluch trading community, after a protest that they had been ruined, would remain and prosper. If time pressed, a policy of pressure must be adopted; but he preferred that a slower and more gradual method should be tried.

He pointed out that the coast and its Sheikhs were apparently content to live in the seventh century; but owing to the example of Bahrain there were faint signs of a stirring in the dry bones. Two years ago the entry of any modern invention was prohibited, but now the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah was inquiring about a Ford car, and had



been for a flight in a flying boat; the Sheikh of Dubai had purchased a motor launch for himself; the richest and most influential merchant of Abu Dhabi had also purchased a launch; and inquiries were being made whether Khalil Kanoo, of Bahrain, could bring his water-boring apparatus to the coast.

He insisted that the Government of India did not desire increased commitments, but they were bound to come. His Majesty's Government must be prepared, in course of time, to protect their friendly Sheikhs by armed force against attack by land or sea. The position of the Trucial principalities, which had a hinterland of desert, should make it a comparatively easy task, but it was an unfortunate fact that the closer the contact with the British power the more defenceless did the rulers become and, consequently, the more dependent on British support.

This, however, he continued was for the future. For the present, in connection with the air route, he anticipated no great trouble in obtaining store-houses for petrol, but difficulties would increase when they demanded wireless stations manned by a permanent staff. The Residency Agent was sufficient to meet the initial demands of the Royal Air Force, but as these increased the need for a resident Political Agent would increase. He will have to be appointed eventually, but he recommended that an attempt be made to prepare the way for the appointment.

Summing up, he said that the system of succession by

murder, however inhuman, did not of itself necessarily lend to induce insecurity, as it was purely a family concern. They may deprecate it, but except at the cost of interference in internal affairs, the final result of which could not be forecast, they could not prevent it. He himself made a slight move during his last visit to the coast by addressing a letter to each Sheikh, in which he stated that **"fratricide" was abhorrent to God and man**, and asked their assistance in suppressing it by themselves refusing to acknowledge the succession of a fratricide. The Sheikhs one and all agreed with him in the polite Arab fashion, but he did not anticipate any great result from this pronouncement.

Continuing, he said that at present there was not undue interference on the coast. They had certain duties to perform in connection with the slave trade and the protection of British subjects, and it was only in connection with the performance of these duties that they interfered.

Also, the **projected air service** down the coast had brought the time for the establishment of a Political Agent at Dubai considerably nearer; but as the first step the people should be familiarised with the prospect by frequent visits of a British officer in the despatch boat which were absolutely necessary to carry out this scheme.

He added that the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast were well disposed, provided they confine themselves to the

sea, but were extremely jealous of European penetration, which they saw must ultimately lead to the extinction of their independence. Every Sheikh, however well disposed he may have been personally, must consider the junta and must walk warily. He warned that the coastal Sheikhs were by no means devoid of the avarice of the Semites, but thanks to the pearl trade they were not in the same state of poverty as the Sheikhs of the Aden Residency area, and consequently their price was much higher.

He did not recommend the immediate appointment of a Political Agent to reside on the coast unless His Majesty's Government was forced to adopt this course by the urgent demands of the Arab air route.

Finally, he concluded that "we can , if we wish, make ourselves extremely unpleasant to the Trucial Sheikhs and their subjects; indeed, by cutting off supplies and the seizure of pearling dhows we can kill all these small principalities, but by proceeding to extremes we certainly ran a risk of antagonising world opinion, which appears to be on the look-out for any stick which offers for beating the British Empire".

Thus, this report, which included 17 paragraphs, discussed in detail the internal situation in the Sheikhdoms. It truthfully described the difficult

situation in the Sheikhdoms and the policy which Britain must carry out.

In earlier years Britain had not paid attention to such issues on the grounds that these were internal matters, but when its interests (on land) were about to be put at risk, the British authorities in the Gulf tried to examine all the factors which would undermine or maintain the security inside the Sheikhdoms. This we shall explain in detail by taking the proceedings of the 1933 Durbar.

(b) The Second Durbar of the Trucial Chiefs, 1933

The officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf began his address to the Trucial Chiefs, at Dubai on the 23rd September 1933⁽⁴⁰⁾, by welcoming the Chiefs of the Arab Coast, who were in Treaty relations with the British government.

He pointed out to the Chiefs that just thirty years ago his Excellency, the Viceroy of India, Curzon, had visited them and addressed them in a Durbar.

He continued that His Excellency, the Viceroy, had reminded them of the state of these seas in the olden times, when there was constant trouble and disturbances in the Persian Gulf.

He explained that the British government had then intervened, and British Warships and British Forces compelled peace and created order on the seas. He

elaborated by explaining that the British had saved them from extinction at the hands of their enemies, and had opened the seas to all and placed lights and buoys for the shipping, they had also brought steamers to supply them, and with the benefit of an air service for their merchants' letters and pearls. From time to time fresh treaties had been made between the Chiefs and the British government, and always had friendship been carefully preserved and increased between them, and they should not allow these things to pass.

He finished his address by pointing to the relations that were thus created, and which, by their own consent, constituted the British government the guardian of inter-tribal peace. Political ties between the British government and themselves had grown up and the British government had become their overlords and protectors, they had relations with no other Power. He reminded them that every one of the States, known as the Trucial States, had bound itself not to enter into agreement or correspondence with any other Power, not to admit the Agent of any other government, and not to part with any portion of its territories. Those engagements were binding on every one of them, and they had faithfully adhered to them; and His Majesty's government had authorised him to inform the Chiefs, there that day, that they were mindful of their treaties with them, which had given them peace and protected their coasts for over a century. He emphasized that they were fully determined

to discharge the obligations imposed on them by those treaties; to uphold their independence and to maintain their own Treaty rights and position.

Colonel G. Loch, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, suggested that the Address might be communicated to the Press, as it clearly stated our special position in connection with the Trucial Chiefs. He concluded that it might have proved of value to the British in the future, in the event of difficulties with other Powers or the great oil companies, to be able to point to the fact that British special relations with the Trucial Chiefs had not been concealed, and had indeed been published in the Press, so that they were a matter of common knowledge.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As we have seen, the combination of great power and imperial interests continued to dominate the internal affairs of the Emirates well into the 1930s. It is only at about the end of that decade that some effort was made to explore the possibilities of change on the coast. But even then, the internal change was seen either as a consequence of external affairs or as a necessary condition for the furtherance of British interests. The consistency of this position is remarkable. For example, the Curzon position remained a key element in 1935 though formulated before 1900.

All was not stasis, however. We have already seen the persistence of the Curzon position but in respect of imperial defence, for example, the original propositions now take on a new aspect. Non-interference in internal affairs was originally designed to limit British involvement to the main aim of Britain's presence - the security of the sea lanes - and where interference did occur it was limited to keeping a public order. Internal affairs, including succession to office by murder were left alone provided they caused no harm to the main purpose. But by 1935 the Air Ministry is calling for some interference to force the Emirate rulers to agree to the establishment of air stations. This is "positive interference" in the general imperial interest. It is this, rather than the great power interests which is dominant at this time.

This shows us an interesting shift in perception from 1900 to 1935. The original policy of Lansdowne and Curzon was formulated in Foreign Office terms. But by 1935 that same policy had come to be turned to imperial interests. Partly this was because of the hiatus in international relations in the Gulf, a position which ended in 1945, but partly also because of imperial necessity in the new world of civil and military aviation. India, and its protection was the main force of this effort. At the same time, British interests further West in Palestine and Iraq were also important and even up until 1950 the British government (especially Ernest Bevin)⁽⁴¹⁾ hoped to retain a general position of power in the Middle East. This was finally disposed of by Suez but it was not even practical in 1945.

Returning to "positive intervention"; the idea that such could or should be employed necessarily focussed attention on the characteristics of the Emirate social and political structures. But at the time most observers were content to lament the backward state of the region or the immense problems involved in changing anything. Change, however, was on the way and it began to come about from internal pressures rather than, as one might expect, as a reaction to external forces. This is the subject of the next two chapters.

NOTES[CHAPTER 2]

- (1) University of California Press, 1967
- (2) See C.H. Ellis, The British "Intervention" in Transcaspia 1918-1919, University of California Press, 1964
- (3) Primarily the Foreign Office, but also the Colonial Office in the later 1930s. See below
- (4) Below
- (5) Below
- (6) Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series (1903), 121
- (7) Ibid.
- (8) Ibid:
- (9) See below No.15
- (10) Reference: Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series (1903), 122 f
- (11) Lansdowne to Scott, May 6th 1903, Home 2497/03
- (12) Scott to Lansdowne, May 8th 1903
- (13) Lansdowne, May 8th 1903, Home 2530/03
- (14) See, for example, J.O. Ross, Russia, India and the Persian Gulf, London, 1903, pp 2-7
- (15) London, Longmans (1892), 2 volumes, where he said
- Vol. II, p.465

[Britain] must and does claim, in return for the sacrifices to which she has submitted, and the capital which she has sunk, and for the sake of the peace which she is here to guard, that no hostile political influence shall introduce its discordant features upon the scene. A Russian port in the Persian Gulf,

that dear dream of so many a patriot from the Neva or the Volga, would, even in times of peace, import an element of unrest into the life of the Gulf that would shake the delicate equilibrium so laboriously established, would wreck a commerce that is valued at many millions sterling, and would let loose again the passions of jarring nationalities only too ready to fly at each other's throats. Let Great Britain and Russia fight their battles or compose their differences elsewhere, but let them not turn into a scene of sanguinary conflict the peaceful field of hard-won trade. I should regard the concession of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia by any Power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the *status quo*, and as an intentional provocation to war.

- (16) See, for example, Sir Thomas Holdich, The Indian Borderland 1880-1900, London, 1901, pp.223-224

The mere possession of a trade port at Bundar Abbas could hardly be considered as a menace to England in itself; for so long as England holds command of the sea, such a port would be more of an objective to her superior naval power than a menace; and if England ceases to command the sea the want of such a port to Russia would hardly affect the question of the vulnerability of India. The political danger no doubt arises from the prospect of a trade port developing into a naval station. But it would take not merely the occupation of Bundar Abbas, but the further occupation of the Islands of Kishm, Hormuz, and Larak to the south of it, and the construction of costly permanent fortifications on these most undesirable islands, to render the position strong enough to constitute a distinct menace to British interests, either in the Persian Gulf or Indiawards. Such developments as these may safely be considered as beyond the reach of Russian political enterprise at present.

- (17) See Busch, op.cit., pp.261 ff on the Persian responsibilities and Curzon's position
- (18) (I.O.) L/P&S/20.C/248D
- (19) (I.O.) L/P&S/7/195
- (20) See, for example, J.G. Lorimer, Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Calcutta (1908-1915), p.2662, as follows:

"The tour was an effectual demonstration of British power and influence, and it was carried out at an opportune moment, shortly after the stress of foreign rivalry in the Gulf had been overcome by other and more substantial means; it was without precedent in the history of the Gulf; and it is likely to remain for long an event without parallel in local annals. Perhaps the most solid results of the cruise were the joint observations made in connection with questions of naval strategy by the Viceroy and the Naval Commander-in-Chief; but the political results, also, must have been great, and on the whole they were auspicious. On the Arabian coast of the Gulf, however, the visits to Masqat, Trucial Oman and Kuwait were entirely successful, and appreciably strengthened the political bonds which connected those principalities with the British power; of the visit to Bahrain it can only be said that, if it was not followed by an visible improvement in the behaviour of the recalcitrant and wrong-headed Shaikh of the islands, it marked at least, in an unmistakable manner, the intention of Great Britain to exclude all foreign influence from that important centre".

- (21) See below, pp. ~~86-87~~, on the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1935
- (22) (I.O.) L/P and S/18/210, 15th June 1915
- (23) (I.O.) L/P and S/18/B.414, Air Communications in the Persian Gulf, 25th August 1928
- (24) Ibid:
- (25) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371-17815, Tribal Considerations of the Air Route, July 1929
- (26) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371-15278, Air Activities in the Persian Gulf, 18th November 1930
- (27) (I.O.) R/515/4, copies of Agreement Concessions
- (28) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371-3481
- (29) (I.O.) L/P 8S/10-22-195, Foreign Office memo, 14th March 1918

- (30) (P.R.O.) CO727,4 from Under Secretary I.O. to Vic,
7th February 1922
- (31) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371-19975, Activities of Standard Oil
Co. of California in the Persian Gulf, 17th November
1936
- (32) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371-19975, Clouson to Ballantyne, 16th
December 1936
- (33) (I.O) L/P&S/18/B469 Abu Dhabi Oil Concessions, and
(I.O) L/P&S/18/B.457 Sharjah Oil Concessions.
- (34) (I.O) L/P&S/18/B.458 Dubai Oil Concessions and
Connected Documents. Concluded with Said bin Maktom,
22nd May 1937 and
(I.O) R/15/4 Copies of Agreement Concessions.
- (35) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371-18912, Committee of Imperial
Defence, London, the meeting of the Sub-
Committee, 24th September 1935
- (36) Ibid. :
- (37) (I.O) R.16-6/177-6135, I.O. to F.O. 12th September
1938
- (38) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371-13712, 1929
- (39)"On 27th December 1910, H.M.S. Hyacinth, patrolling
the Trucial Coast, received reports of an arms cache
at Dubai, and proceeded to the spot. While its men
were searching the town for arms, the local Arabs
decided to resist, and before the affair was
concluded, four sailors were dead and ten wounded or
missing; thirty-seven Arabs had been killed. The
Resident and the Commander in Chief, Admiral Slade,
arrived quickly and gave to the Sheikh, an ultimatum
demanding compensation of RS 50,000, 400 rifles and
approval of the establishment of a British Agent.
The Sheikh was willing to pay, but not to accept an
Agent.

To the India Office staff, the affair was unfortunate as the cost of the blockage operations. Slade, too, felt that the action taken by the Hyacinth's Commander, Captain J.D. Dick, was somewhat hastily undertaken without paying sufficient consideration to the prejudices and ideas of an oriental people. Cox was quickly informed that such forceful action must receive prior approval and, in addition, the demands regarding the posting of an Agent were not to be enforced."

See, The Times, 30th December 1910 and B.C. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, London, 1967, p.284

- (40) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371-16957, Report from Lt.Col. G. Loch, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 1933
- (41) See Lewis, W.R., The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951.pp.12-16, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.

CHAPTER 3INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN THE EMIRATES:
THE FIRST STIRRINGS OF POLITICAL CHANGE, 1939

In the latter part of the last chapter we described briefly the Political Resident's Report of 1929 and the proceedings of the 1933 Durbar. On the face of these two documents it appears that little had changed on the internal affairs side from c1900. This is true, but only up to a point. By 1939, ten years after the political report, the first intimations of fundamental change were beginning to appear. This is not at all surprising; the impact of imperial defence requirements and the issue of oil had, for the first time, put the rulers of the Emirates into something like an equal bargaining position with Britain. The more prescient of the Political Residents realised this, but what they did not foresee was the emergence of a local "reform" movement in the coast states.

In this chapter, we take the Resident's Report of 1939 which presages change from the British point of view and, second, we give an account of the development of the "reform" movement in the same period. When taken together, we see that internal affairs were now not solely dictated by great power or imperial interests but were beginning to take on a life of their own. Although this was short lived, it was both prepolitic and of long term significance.

(I) The Political Resident's Report on the Gulf in 1939 *

The end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s witnessed the growth and strength of the British influence in the Arab coast of the Gulf. Britain had followed a single method (Agreements) which enabled it to dictate its will on the Sheikhs. The Political Resident in the Gulf explained in his long report on 17th March 1939⁽¹⁾ how Britain was able to reach that strong position in the Gulf Sheikhdoms and how it was able to maintain it.

T.C. Fowle, the Political Resident in the Gulf, began his report of 1939 by saying that as he should shortly be retiring from his present post he thought it would be useful if he put on record his views on some of the wider aspects of their policy on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf.

He went on to say that in a recent letter he had expressed some doubt as to whether it was generally realised how economical their administration on the Arab side was in comparison with the important interests involved, and as that statement led naturally to a consideration as to how they would implement their responsibilities at such little cost. He thought that the main factor on the whole was that they possessed the goodwill of the Arab Rulers and their people. One reason for this, he continued, was that as far as possible Britain let them alone to manage their own affairs in

*The original report was 16 pages long - I have extracted the information I require - thereby reducing it in my text to 8 pages

their own way and, being human, he felt they much preferred to mismanage these themselves rather than have them efficiently managed by others. He explained when by the discovery of oil in one of the States, e.g. Bahrain, there were sufficient funds for progress, he did not proceed to hurry and hustle the Ruler and his people towards "efficiency", but had been content with providing them with experts to draw up simple plans, which the local government could put into force themselves, with advice, and generally speaking with friendly guidance. He elaborated that even when they did not follow this advice, provided it was not on a major issue, he would make no attempt to force it down their throats, but to try to carry out a policy based on the methods of "indirect" rather than the ones of "direct" rule.

The second reason for the goodwill, he pointed out, was that in their negotiations with the Rulers, over oil, and air facilities, Britain gave them "a square deal". We carried a money bag, he stated, instead of a thick stick and were prepared to talk instead of to threaten. This method cost money, and took time, but in the end Britain would get what it wanted and with no bad feeling. He emphasized that this did not imply that British policy was a weak one, and in any really serious differences of opinion between the States and Britain (for example with regard to breaches of their Treaties) Britain was of course prepared to take a firm line and as the government

was aware, on various occasions he had suggested taking drastic action. The threat alone of drastic action, he stressed, had hitherto been sufficient to achieve the purpose, and for the last ten years or so Britain had been able to obtain its objectives on the Arab side, and to enforce the implementing of Treaties, without firing a gun or dropping a bomb.

The third and most important reason for the goodwill of the Arab States, he explained, was that they regarded His Majesty's Government as their **natural protector** both within the four corners of their Treaty obligations, and outside them. It was his opinion that this was the outstanding and permanent factor which, in all important issues, was at the back of the minds of the Rulers and their people. Its local importance could not be over-estimated. Also, the Arab States had their differences with His Majesty's Government, and on occasions he had found them rather a nuisance, in connection with slavery for example. While at the same time they knew perfectly well that it was only His Majesty's Government which stood between them and absorption by Ibn Saud, Iraq or Persia. They naturally much preferred to remain as they were, free and independent under their own Shaikhs, and under British protection than for their States to become mere districts of Saudi Arabia, or Iraq or Iran, with their present Rulers replaced by oppressive Saudi, Iraqi or Iranian

officials. It was this consideration, more than any other single factor he argued, which enabled them to run the day-to-day administration of the Arab side with a handful of officials (one Resident, and three Political Agents), without the payment of a single rupee of subsidy, or the upkeep (on their part) of a single soldier, policeman, or levy. This had had a distinct and salutary effect on the minds of the Sheikhs and their people when on any particular occasion their interests temporarily clashed, and which in any serious emergency, such as a major war which had so nearly come upon them last September (1939), would be of incalculable value.

He went on to say that there was in fact no doubt as to the existence of the goodwill of the Arab States, but they must not fall into the bad habit - if he might put it that way - of taking this feeling for granted, or of assuming that it would always continue irrespective of what they did or did not do, particularly in regard to the matter of protection by His Majesty's Government. If a feeling were ever to grow up in the Arab States that His Majesty's Government were inclined to take their responsibilities too lightly the effect would be most unfortunate, and speaking frankly he continued that there had been occasions of late years when it had seemed to him that a line of policy suggested by His Majesty's Government could - if carried out - have given that impression to the local Rulers and their people.

He argued that valuable as had been the goodwill of the Arab States in the past it would, in his opinion, be still more valuable in the future. He suggested the whole of the Arab side was changing, and with extraordinary rapidity. In the last ten years from a *cul de sac* it has become an international highway of the first importance. Oil fields were springing up. In certain of the Arab States money was pouring in, and in all of them new ideas were fermenting. He quoted two recent movements at Kuwait and Dubai as significant cases in point. He explained that a few years ago those movements would have taken the form of an attempt, whether successful or not, of a rival to put himself in the position of the Sheikh. Now, however, those movements took a "democratic" form, of the people in general trying to get more power into their own hands. There was much, in his personal opinion, that was healthy in those movements, and in any case whether they liked them or not they must make the best of them since under modern conditions they were inevitable.

He went on to say that the old patriarchal conditions of life in the Arab States, whether for good or ill, were being broken up, as they had been in so many other Asiatic countries, but even more rapidly, and with that break would come the inevitable consequences already indicated. He warned that some of the local agitations and movements would be directed against the local Rulers, but some would certainly be directed against Britain, in fact that was already happening. Hardly a fortnight

passed he said without an attack being made in the Arab Press of Iraq, Palestine, Syria, or Egypt, against His Majesty's Government and its policy towards the Arab States of the Gulf. Under the convenient term of "colonisation" accusations were sometimes brought that it was their policy to disunite the Arab States, and on other occasions to unite them: in each case for Britain's own nefarious ends; and that Britain undermines the independence of the States, and uses its influence to favour British subjects and foreigners generally to the detriment of the local Arab. It was all vague and unsubstantial, and at present did not perhaps cut much ice, but then a large proportion of antiBritish propaganda all over the world was of the same formless character, but that did not prevent it from having considerable effect.

He stressed that he foresaw difficult years ahead of Britain in the Arab States, its policy towards which would have to be most carefully conducted, and the first step towards this object was a realisation by all the authorities concerned in the Gulf of the change that had taken place in those States. It was no longer a case of more or less compliant Sheikhs ruling over more or less submissive peoples, tucked away in an obscure corner of the world. He warned again that the complacency of the Sheikhs could no longer be taken for granted on all occasions;

Even supposing the Sheikhs were prepared to yield to His Majesty's Government there were now people in all of the States who were acquiring more power through the force of public opinion, who in some of the States had already acquired regularly constituted Councils, and who in the majority of the States (in his opinion) would in the course of the next few years obtain similar institutions. He added that much the same movement was going on today in the Indian states and was, therefore, no longer merely a question of wringing a reluctant consent from a Ruler to their proposals, but of careful consideration of what the effect of their proposals might be on his people.

In view of all those considerations "pressure-policy" was in his opinion a two edged weapon, and before using it in any particular case His Majesty's Government should reflect most carefully as to whether they were prepared to face a show-down with the Rulers and their people, with the attendant repercussions in the Gulf and outside it. There was the further important consideration that in the difficult times ahead Britain's chief mainstay would be the feeling in the Arab States that His Majesty's Government stood between them and absorption by their neighbours, and anything which weakened that feeling would add considerably to their difficulties.

He summed up by saying Britain's 'rule' over the Arab States of the Gulf rested on the goodwill of the

Rulers and their peoples, partly self-interested goodwill no doubt, but none the less firm for that reason: the best basis for goodwill was not sentiment but self-interest.

He elaborated that this goodwill depended on three main factors. **First** - the fact that as far as possible they let the Rulers and their people, under their guidance and advice, manage their own affairs in their own way. **Second** - the fact that in their various negotiations with the Rulers, in which of course their people were interested, on the subject of oil, air facilities and so forth, they gave them a patient hearing and a square deal. **Third** - and most importantly the Rulers and their people realised that it was only His Majesty's government who protected them from absorption by their stronger neighbours.

He concluded that owing to modern democratic developments in the States, there were difficult times ahead of Britain, and Britain must be careful, all the more so because of the much increased strategical and political importance of the Arab side in recent years, to continue in the future the main lines of their policy which had served them well in the past. Above all, Britain must avoid taking any step which would lessen the confidence, which at that time the States had in His Majesty's government as their natural protector.

The Political Resident predicted that Britain's policy would pass through a difficult stage of the democratic development which arose after the 'discovery' of oil. In this of course he was right, as we now go on to describe. At the same time, however, it is also true that oil gave rise to international complications for Britain particularly with the United States of America in the post-War world.

(II) The "Reform" Movement (Dubai) 1939

We use the term "Reform" here in a very loose sense - it does not mean the introduction of a Western system of government or anything like it. Consider, for example, the ever present internal conflicts characteristic of the coast states. We read that in 1915 there was conflict between Abu Dhabi and Umm Al-Qaiwain about who should dominate the tribes in the region. The result of this conflict was the assassination of the ruler of Umm Al-Qaiwain, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Rashed in 1923. The political agent in Al-Shariqa sent a letter to the British Resident in the Gulf on 27th October 1923, saying that Sheikh Hamad Bin Ibrahim, who had come to power after the assassination of Sheikh Abdullah, had a hand in the assassination⁽²⁾. The new ruler was himself assassinated in February 1929. Again the Political Agent in Al-Shariqa said in his letter to the British Resident

on 20th October 1929, that the Ruler of Al-Shariqa played a significant role in the assassination of Sheikh Rashed. The Ruler of Al-Shariqa had the ambition of "dominating" the Sheikhdom of Umm Al-Qaiwain⁽³⁾. The Sheikhdoms were in constant conflict.

There was, for instance, a political and military conflict between Ras Al-Kaima and Al-Fujaira, Ajman and Al-Shariqa. Britain did not interfere in these conflicts. But the Political Agent in the Gulf sometimes did something to ease the tension between these Sheikhdoms, especially when British interests were in danger⁽⁴⁾. One of the most illustrative examples is the political conflict in Dubai in 1934, when security in this Sheikhdom was threatened. Britain issued two statements in November 1934. The first statement addressed the Ruler of the Sheikhdom of Dubai, Sheikh Sa'id Bin Maktoum. It advised him to protect himself from his enemies and to secure the safety of the British people living there and their belongings. The second statement said that the Political Agent, having heard of some unrest in Dubai, said that if the British people or their belongings were put at risk, the people responsible for that would be punished severely⁽⁵⁾.

Britain did, in fact, carry out her threats; she imposed large fines on the Sheikhs as a form of punishment⁽⁶⁾.

The conflicts and civil wars were, however, not restricted to the Sheikhdoms themselves. They sometimes occurred within the same Sheikhdom. The Sheikh (Ruler) was often assassinated by his son, brother or one of his relatives. Sheikh Sultan Bin Zaed, who was the Ruler of the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi, is a case in point. He was assassinated in 1926. The report which was sent on 12th August 1926 from the national representative in Al-Shariq to the Political Agent in the Gulf said that Sheikh Sultan Bin Zaed, from the time he came to power, did not pay his family the sums of money they normally received. He invited his brother Saqr to a dinner party but when Saqr arrived, he shot Sheikh Sultan. The Sultan's sons ran away; some of them went for protection to Abdullah Bin Hallous, the Ruler of Al-Ihas' in Saudi Arabia⁽⁷⁾. Saqr did not rule the Sheikhdom for long. There was disagreement between him and the tribe of Al-Manasir, which led Saqr to kill his son Mohammad and then his elder brother, simply on the grounds that these two people might have some connections with the tribe of Al-Manasir, who were unfriendly to him. The killing of the son and the brother made one of the servants at the palace attempt to shoot Sheikh Saqr, but the servant did not hit his target; Sheikh Saqr was able to escape. But a man from the tribe of Al-Manasir followed him and was able to kill him in 1927⁽⁸⁾. Thus, assassinations and killings were common to these tribes and Sheikhdoms at

that time. They were sometimes regarded as heroic deeds, stories of which were circulated among individuals and tribes.

The policy of assassination sometimes had an effect on British interests, because the killer had to contact the British Resident, and show his approval of the agreements and treaties made with the consultation of his predecessors⁽⁹⁾. By so doing, the British kept reminding the Rulers of the agreements⁽¹⁰⁾. But when the British wanted stability in the region (in the hope of drilling for oil) they reminded the Sheikhs of the fact that killing relatives was against their religion and "good manners". It is something that God and His Messenger do not approve of and it is, above all, against man's nature⁽¹¹⁾.

Such an unstable political situation was not uncommon in Bedouin and tribal societies, where illiteracy prevailed. On this latter point Britain did nothing, the then given reason being that the introduction of any form of "westernization" would undermine the inherited Arab tradition⁽¹²⁾. A similar sensitivity was shown on the issue of radio broadcasts, the Foreign Office idea being that such were probably subversive or certainly capable of being made so especially the broadcasts in Arabic from Cairo and Baghdad⁽¹³⁾. As we shall see, these fears were unfounded for the time, pan-Arabism was not yet the force in the

Gulf that it was later to become. At the same time it is clear from the documents that British officers expected some sort of reform movement to arise. They were right, but wrong as to its source and form. It came in fact from inter-familial disputes within the Sheikhdome of Dubai. These were not, as just described, in the form of murder and assassination but in the form of distribution of income and, hence, of actual responsibility.

We take the report of the Political Agent in Bahrain of June 1938⁽¹⁴⁾. The Sheikh of Dubai had promised his notables, of the tribe Abu Falasah, to fix allowances in cash for them but in this he was opposed by his wife (Hissha) and son (Rashid). The Political Agent noted that the delay had caused "general grumbling" among the Abu Falasah, and the majority of them had united against Sheikh Sa'id for being under the influence of his wife and son without caring for the "bad consequences". He pointed out that they had been holding private meetings at Dairah quarters, where the majority of the Abu Falasah notables lived, and had been discussing the whole situation and the affairs of Dubai. They asked the Sheikh to fix allowances for them and he gave them no reply. This caused a sensation among them and they decided to make further demands for reforms on the following basis:-

"Budget and Civil List; Education, Health and Sanitation; Peace and Order; Removal of all sorts of corruption in the various departments; Grant of justice and freedom to the inhabitants in trade and other crafts".

He continued that should the Sheikh fail to comply with their request for the above, they were determined to enforce them.

A few days later on the 22nd June the Residency Agent in Sharjah sent a letter⁽¹⁵⁾ to the Political Agent in Bahrain stating that the Sheikh of Dubai had accepted the reforms. On 20th June, the conciliation committee sat in Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Dalmuk's house. It was attended by Sheikh Jum'ah on behalf of the Sheikh of Dubai and Muhammad bin Thani on behalf of the Shaikh's relatives and notables. All the Abu Falasah notables including Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Dalmuk and also the local people and the merchants were in favour of the reforms.

The Residency Agent went on to say that Sheikh Jum'ah agreed on behalf of the Sheikh of Dubai to abolish restrictions and to let the people have freedom in working ferries, lighters, motor car service and other crafts which were monopolised by his wife and the sons of the Sheikh. Sheikh Jum'ah also promised that he would look into the question of employing local people in the Customs and other services in the course of a month or two, and that he would also consider the question of allowances when his relatives proved sincere to him, but that he was not prepared to commit himself at the moment.

He pointed out that his relatives, who enjoyed special privileges and received certain shares from the

diving tax, would not agree unless the Sheikh fixed their allowances then. He explained that Sheikh Jum'ah and the conciliation committee had sent for him to help them against both parties and during the evening on 20th June he saw the Sheikh with the conciliation committee and he confirmed the suggestion made by the Sheikh's brother, Jum'ah, and said he was ready to share with his relatives, and those who served him, the "loaf" which he received from his country provided they proved sincere to him. After a long talk with the Sheikh the Agent went with the conciliation committee to Dairah and had a long talk with Awlad Rashid Awlad Bati bin Suhail and Al Huraizat and persuaded them to accept the suggestion made by Sheikh Jum'ah on behalf of the Sheikh of Dubai and leave the question of local service and allowances to be discussed later after peace had been restored. They agreed and gave 'Ahad' (oath and solemn affirmation) that they would abide by their promise not to act in any way against the Sheikh if he fulfilled his promise and to withdraw their forces from the towers and other pickets. He then went to the Sheikh and the committee asked him to take similar 'Ahad' from the Sheikh which he did. The Sheikh promised to demobilize his forces and disarm all new recruits as soon as his relatives vacated the towns. Having got the undertaking from the Sheikh he went to Dairah with the conciliation committee and conveyed the 'Ahad' to the Sheikh's relatives. They ordered their men

to vacate the towers and the next day all their men were disarmed by them. The Sheikh then sent Jum'ah bin 'Abdullah to see if his cousins and relatives had carried out their obligations in order that he might do his part. Jum'ah bin 'Abdullah reported to him and the Sheikh disarmed his men and sent away most of the bedouins, except those who were waiting for their wages and presents, and by noon everything was over and only a small number of the bedouins remained. He concluded that the only thing remaining was to fix a time for the Sheikh and his relatives to meet each other. The Committee had sent word to him that he should go to Dubai and arrange with them the time.

All the local people and merchants expressed their gratitude to the Agent for the prompt action taken in preventing trouble. Local people and merchants were in favour of the reforms and were against the Sheikh's wife and son, Rashid. The Agent added that he had received private information that Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah were trying their best to agitate the Sheikh against his relatives and promised to help him in the matter if he needed support.

However, the following day the Residency Agent in Sharjah sent another letter⁽¹⁶⁾ to the Political Agent in Bahrain saying that the Sheikh of Dubai had changed his mind after a long talk with Sheikh Sultan bin Salim of Ras al Khaimah, who had also gone to Sheikh Mani'. He

blamed them for having allowed an outsider to act jointly with them in arranging peace, a fact which was detrimental to the interests of their state and which would automatically lead to interference by the British government in their affairs, and that of the rest of the Trucial Coast. Therefore, he suggested, they should cancel the arrangements and try to settle the dispute later. Should they fail to arrange matters themselves, he was prepared to settle it for them. He said that Sheikh Sa'id could take any action against them and that the British government would help him against them. Sheikh Mani' and his party said that everything was settled between them and Sheikh Sa'id and they were not prepared to re-open the subject.

The Residency Agent went on to say that on the arrival of the Political Agent on 22nd June, he had informed him about Ras al Khaimah and had ordered him to send word to Sheikh Sultan to go back to Ras al Khaimah and mind his own business without interfering in the affairs of another state; and he had, accordingly, sent word to him when he went to Dubai in the afternoon. Sheikh Sultan left for Ras al Khaimah on 23rd June.

The Residency Agent then went on to say that on the evening of 22nd June he had gone to the Sheikh of Dubai with the conciliation committee and the Sheikh had asked for time until the morning to reconsider his decision about the employees and the allowances. On the 23rd he

had again gone with the conciliation committee and declared in the presence of his brothers, sons and many others of the notables of the Abu Falasah that he was prepared to abide by the undertakings which he had given before. He went on to say that he went with the conciliation committee back to Daira and took Sheikh Mani', who was accompanied by his brother Sheikh Hashar, Sheikh Muhammad bin Huraiz, Sheikh Rashid bin Huraiz and Muhammad bin Thani, to Sheikh Sa'id in order to give to and take from him 'Ahad' (pledge). The 'Ahad' was conducted by Sheikh Jum'ah bin 'Abdullah in the presence of the Sheikh's brothers, the conciliation committee and about 20 persons from the notables of the Abu Falasah.

He concluded that it ended the whole trouble and the town enjoyed perfect peace and order.

Later, however, on the 1st October, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf sent a letter⁽¹⁷⁾ to the Sheikh, Said Bin Maktum, Ruler of Dubai, saying that on his arrival in Bahrain from leave in England the Sheikh's brother, Shaikh Juma, had come to see Mr. Weightman, the Political Agent, Bahrain, and himself on his behalf on the subject of the difficulties which he was having with the Abu Falasa. He went on to say that he was glad of the opportunity of meeting again his friend Sheikh Juma.

He continued that Shaikh Juma's general request on his behalf was for his own support against the Abu Falasa and he was aware, in the month of June when there was

likelihood of trouble between himself and the Abu Falasa, with the help of Mr. Weightman and Khan Sahib Abdur Razzaq, their Agent on the Trucial Coast, that an arrangement had been made too between him and the Abu Falasa by which certain requests which they had made (improvement of the Customs, the formation of a Baladiyah, the cessation of monopolies and some other matters) should be granted by him.

He pointed out that as he understood it, these arrangements had not yet been put into force, except the cessation of monopolies, and there was still trouble between the Sheikh and the Abu Falasa, and the Sheikh now wanted his support against them. He went on to say that both he and the Political Officers under him were always ready to give their good offices in making peace, but it was not the policy of His Majesty's Government to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab States on the Persian Gulf, and those affairs the Sheikhs had to settle themselves. He stressed in the present instance that the disagreement between the Sheikh and the Abu Falasa was obviously an internal matter, for the settling of which the Sheikh must be responsible.

He emphasized that the Sheikh was a wise man and must be aware that all over the world cases had occurred of demands which had been made on their rulers by their people for reforms, demands which had often been refused. The result had often been that in the end the Ruler had

had to give much more than if they had given a little in the beginning, and in some cases the Rulers had even lost their thrones. He stressed that if the Abu Falasa had a strong party behind them, of which of course he was the best judge, then this showed that the demands which they had made had popular support in his State; but if on the other hand, the Abu Falasa had not a strong party behind them, then he did not understand why the Sheikh had a fear of them or why he had applied to him for support.

He pointed out that the Sheikh's disagreement with the Abu Falasa was an internal matter and he was not able, therefore, to give the Sheikh the support for which he asked, and advised him to look carefully to the future, and to profit by the experience of other countries where early and generous reforms had deprived those who wished to oppose the Rulers of the popular support on which they relied.

He warned that should there be an outbreak in Dubai, the Sheikh would be responsible to His Majesty's Government should any harm come to their subjects or their property.

He concluded that he hoped to hear from the Sheikh shortly and that all was well in his State.

The Sheikh of Dubai made an agreement on 19th October 1938 with the notables of the Abu Falasa. This agreement had nine articles⁽¹⁸⁾.

The first article stated that a Majlis (Council) be founded at once in the State of Dubai to be formed of members of the Abu Falasa and other tribes, subjects of Dubai, and the Majlis should consist of 15 members who should and in the future would be selected by the notables of Dubai.

The second, the Majlis should hold its meetings from time to time to deal with all matters concerning the affairs of the State under the Presidentship of the Ruler of Dubai; and should he be, for any accidental reason, unable to attend, one of the members of the Majlis should preside.

Thirdly, the Ruler of Dubai should enforce all the decisions arrived at by the majority of the Majlis.

The fourth, the Ruler of Dubai should refer to the Majlis all matters concerning the State of Dubai and take no action in any matter without the previous approval of the majority of the Majlis.

The fifth, no decision whatsoever should be considered operative unless it had been approved by the majority of the Majlis.

The sixth, all the income and expenditure (of the State) should be paid in the name of the State of Dubai. No expenditure should be incurred without the previous approval of the majority of the Majlis.

The seventh, the Majlis should not interfere in the private affairs and personal property of the Ruler of Dubai.

The eighth, should the Ruler, as President of the Majlis, refrain from attending any of its meetings without a reasonable cause, the Majlis should hold its meeting and in his (Ruler's) absence pass such decisions as may be considered suitable. Such decisions should be operative. But matters connected with His Majesty's Government should not be discussed in the absence of the Sheikh.

Finally, the ninth stated that the Ruler should receive an allowance of one eighth of the total income of the State and that allowance was to be paid for his household expenditure and that of his sons. He should not receive any other allowance.

These articles indicate an attempt at political reform in the Trucial States at that time but, unfortunately, a few months later at the end of March 1939, the Council broke up and the situation remained as it was until the 1950s.

The dissolution of the Council had much publicity in the press and on the wireless. The telegram from the Secretary of State to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on 27th April 1939⁽¹⁹⁾, stated that much was being made in the press here, and there was broadcast that Sheikh Dubai recently murdered the whole of his Council at a feast. The news was being given a tendentious turn which implied that the Sheikh was encouraged by Britain in this way to suppress a liberal

modernist movement. The Secretary of State suggested that the full facts should be broadcast on the BBC Arabic news.

The amended extract from a telegram from the Resident in the Persian Gulf to Secretary of State for India, on 28th April 1939, is as follows⁽²⁸⁾:

"Recently there has been a democratic movement in the State of Dubai which is in special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government. This was an internal matter and His Majesty's Government do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. The Sheikh declined to act on advice to associate his people with himself in his government according to immemorial Arab custom by the formation of a Council. A Council was thereupon forced on him by the people which owing to maladministration later grew unpopular. At the end of March the Sheikh with his sympathisers dissolved the Council. In the course of disturbances two of the Sheikh's principal opponents, Sheikh Hashar Bin Rashid and his son, were killed. There were about ten other casualties, including wounded. Of the Council, half of the members remained at Dubai and the other half went to the neighbouring State of Shargah. The Sheikh was again advised to rule with the aid of a Council and to establish also a Mejliss at Tujjara (Council of Merchants) which he has done. Five members of the old Council are on the new one."

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is quite obvious from this account why parentheses have been put around the word "reform". The form it took was in fact wholly traditional and in keeping with the traditions of the coast. The demand was for money and the method was threat, counter-threat and eventually killing. However, the aim was now to redistribute power on a wider scale and away from the royal family. The motives, of course, are almost entirely self-interested but at the same time there is a break with the post "tribal" method of doing things. By this we mean that allegiance is to a place, rather than to a putative blood relationship so far as the allocation of resources is concerned. It failed "naturally" because the place was not a state but the idea of the latter rapidly gained ground in the years after 1945, when British policy itself had to change to take account of this fact as well as of wider political change.

It is also worth pointing out some of the inconsistencies between the official British version (the telegram just cited) and the 1938 agreement which precedes it. In the telegram we have a reference to "immemorial Arab culture ... the formation of a Council". This is true so far as it goes. But the constitution and function of the Majlis has little "immemorial" about it. To take the articles of the agreement; the first talks of the selection of fifteen members by "the notables of

Dubai". This is a concession to the then current political realities and whether this has anything to do with "Arab culture" except in a very vague sense is debateable.

Turning now to the second article; we have "presidentship", "accidental reason, unable to attend", "one of the members of the Majlis should reside". It is difficult to suppose that in the Dubai of 1939 such phrases could or would be taken seriously. And as for the Ruler of Dubai enforcing the decisions arrived at by a majority, it is just not believable in the circumstances of the time. The account given earlier (pp.124f. the "Reform" movement) of the personal nature and the aggression involved in disagreements is sufficient evidence for this.

Again, the Ruler should not take any action without the "previous approval" of a "majority". This is not within any conception of reality. The same is true for the provisions on income and expenditure.

Having made these comments, it is also true that internal affairs were now taking on an independent existence to some degree. The extent of that degree is the subject of the next chapter.

NOTES[CHAPTER 3]

- (1) (I.O.) L/P and S/18-B.469, Abu Dhabi Oil Concessions
(I.O.) L/P and S/18-B.457, Sharjah Oil Concessions
(I.O.) L/P and S/18-B.458, Dubai Oil Concessions
- (2) (I.O.) R/15/1/14/27, Succession to the Sheikhdome of Abu Dhabi, 1909-1921
- (3) (I.O.) R/15/1/14/27, Succession to the Sheikhdome of Abu Dhabi, from Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Foreign Secretary of State of India, 17th March 1929
- (4) Kasem, J.Z., p.286
- (5) (I.O.) R/15/1/14/43, Unrest in Dubai: Trucial Coast Policy, 34/36 British Residency to Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, 9th February 1936
- (6) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371/13009, Political Resident to Foreign Secretary, Simla, 13th December 1927
- (7) (I.O.) R/15/1/14/27, Succession to the Sheikhdome of Abu Dhabi, 1909-1921
- (8) Mann (Major Clarence), Abu Dhabi, pp.87-88
- (9) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371/8952, Political Resident Persian Gulf to Foreign Secretary, Government of India
- (10) Abdalazzez, A.A., op.cit., p.353
- (11) (I.O.) R/15/1/14/27, Succession to the Sheikhdome of Abu Dhabi, Political Resident to Sheikh of Ajman, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras Al-Khaima

- (12) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371, Future Policy in the Trucial Coast. Recommendation of Col. Peryet, Pol. P.G. to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 5th September 1929
- (13) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371/18919 from Political Agent, Bahrain, to Political Resident, Bashire, 17th February 1935
- (14) (I.O.) IOR.R/15/4/11, Dubai Local Affairs, British Agency, Sharjah, 18th June 1938
- (15) (I.O.) IOR.R/15/4/11, from Residency Agent, Sharjah, to Political Agent, Bahrain, Dubai Local Affairs, 23rd June 1938
- (16) Ibid:
- (17) (I.O.) R/15/4/11, Letter from Mr. T.C. Fowle, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Sheikh Said bin Maktum, Ruler of Dubai, 1st October 1938
- (18) (I.O.) R/15/4/11, Translation of Agreement between Ruler of Dubai and the Abu Falasah, dated 19th October 1938
- (19)-(26) ???
- (27) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371/23186, Legislation Council in Dubai, Persian Gulf Intelligence Report, Trucial Coast (Secret), 27th April 1938
- (28) (P.R.O.)(F.O.) 371, Telegram from Resident in the Persian Gulf to Secretary of State for India, 28th April 1938

CHAPTER 4

THE WINDS OF CHANGE 1950-1956 (I): "NATIONALISM"

INTRODUCTION

As we saw in the latter part of Chapter 3, the so-called "reform" movement of 1938-39 in Dubai came to nothing and this was followed by the hiatus of 1939-45. However, in the latter year reform reappeared but this time in the form of proposals for some sort of federation for the coastal states. From the documentary evidence, it appears that these proposals came not from within the Emirates themselves but from outside, in particular from two Lebanese newspapers, Al-Shara and Al-Nahar, which proposed:

First, the establishment of a federation of the Emirates with Bahrain as its centre.

Second, the adoption of a foreign policy of these Emirates.

Third, to guarantee the internal autonomy of the Emirates.

Fourth, abolishing passport restrictions between these Emirates.

Fifth, the formation of a High Council in Bahrain of the Chiefs and Sheikhs of the Emirates to supervise the organisation of the area.

Sixth, the High Council to be represented by a member at the Arab League.

The political Resident found that these reports were without foundation as he stated in his letter of 3rd September 1945⁽¹⁾ that "from local enquiries it would appear that there is no foundation for press articles".

They were presumably "inspired", and he thought that if this had come from anywhere in the Gulf he would have heard of it.

The initiative toward federation was not lost, however, and it came not from internal pressure but from Britain. Mr. R. Hay, the Political Resident in Bahrain, in his letter of 29th January 1951⁽²⁾ wrote that although it might have been possible to bring about some kind of union of the Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms, he was doubtful whether it would be possible to achieve a real Federation of all the Gulf Sheikhdoms owing to local jealousies and geographical factors. He pointed out that as the Sheikhdoms developed Britain might, in due course, persuade their governments to send representatives to some kind of council which would endeavour to achieve coordination in such matters as education, health, postal services, etc., but he doubted if Britain would be able to achieve any kind of political union under a central authority.

He continued that it had been suggested to him that Britain ought to decide whether it should be policy to develop relations with the Sheikhdoms on colonial or diplomatic lines, i.e. whether Britain was to endeavour to bring them more closely under their control or to aim at their eventual complete independence. His opinion was that government should continue present policy for as long as it had the power to do so and not to change it

substantially in either direction. He stressed Britain should preserve the internal independence of the Sheikdoms and indeed increase it whenever possible while maintaining control of foreign relations and the right to interfere to prevent gross maladministration or preserve law and order in a serious emergency. The present situation, he added, was beneficial to all concerned. The Sheikdoms enjoyed good government as they deserved, they none of them wished to be absorbed by any of their more powerful neighbours and, thanks to their protection, they had come through two World Wars unscathed and trade flourished with a minimum of restrictions. On the other hand, Britain was able to ensure that the British and American oil companies in the area carried out their operations in safety and without undue interference by the local authorities, to develop valuable air communication centres and to promote British trade interests. He did not pretend that the Rulers and their peoples really loved them but they respected them and realised that they could not do without them and, therefore, were unlikely to agitate for any drastic change.

He emphasized that when the time came, they would have to do their best to encourage reforms and ensure that they were carried out on the right lines. He warned there might even be some anti-British agitation, but he was doubtful if there would be any real popular demand

for complete independence in the Sheikhdoms so long as Britain was able to guarantee protection. He went on, that should, however, any demand for union with a neighbouring state arise, e.g. Kuwait demanding union with Iraq or Saudi Arabia, which he considered most unlikely, Britain might find it politically graceful to withdraw.

He did consider that they would be wise to foster the internal independence of the States to the greatest extent possible and that as their internal administrations improved, Britain should gradually relinquish anything which detracted from that independence. Britain had already handed over the quarantine administration at Bahrain to the local government and hoped shortly to do the same at Kuwait. He added that in due course Britain should allow the Sheikhdoms to run their own postal and telegraphic services, possibly in coordination with some kind of council as suggested earlier in his despatch, and they should aim at ultimately handing over all jurisdiction to them. He said this, however, was a long term policy and, for the present, Britain must concentrate on persuading the Rulers to improve the administration of the Sheikhdoms.

He concluded that what he had said also applied in full force to Bahrain and Kuwait. Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhdoms were so "primitive" that Britain was compelled

to keep them under close tutelage of a more or less "colonial" character for many years to come; and amongst other things governments should, in his opinion, be willing to spend money on the development of those Trucial Sheikhdoms in which there was little prospect of oil being found.

He requested that he be informed to what extent government concurred in these views for the guidance of himself and officers serving under his Residency.

In reply to Hay's letter (of 29 January) the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that⁽³⁾ he concurred generally in the views given in His Excellency's Despatch No.13 of 29 January on the development of further relations between His Majesty's Government and the British Protected States in the Persian Gulf. This Despatch proposed to set down his comments on the details of their recommendations.

He agreed that the practical possibility of achieving any form of political federation of these States was remote. He doubted whether, for the reasons given in paragraph 2 of His Excellency's Despatch and because of the differing stages of development at which the States had arrived, such a project should even be adopted as an objective of policy unless there were a spontaneous desire for federation among the Rulers themselves. In the backward Sheikhdoms of Trucial Oman

the position was different, and there it might be that a form of federation, promoted with the assistance of His Majesty's Government, would ultimately provide the best hope of political and economic viability. He saw considerable advantage for the Persian Gulf States as a whole, however, in His Excellency's suggestion of encouraging the Rulers to consult together on matters which were of regional concern. He noted for example, from the Bahrain Government's Report for the year 1948, that a congress of doctors from the Persian Gulf area was held in Bahrain in November 1948. He welcomed that example of consultation and hoped that it might be continued and possibly extended to other spheres such as education and in due course when the States took over the administration of their own postal services, some coordination would be desirable, still more in the possible event of the introduction of a new currency for the Persian Gulf.

He went on to say that he agreed that it was undesirable to attempt to bring the States more closely under the control of His Majesty's Government in the sense of imposing upon them the more dependent status of a Protectorate. He considered that His Majesty's Government, being responsible for the foreign relations of these States, had both the right to intervene so far as was necessary to prevent serious maladministration and to ensure that their international commitments were

carried out, and the obligation to assist generally in the development of the administrative systems of the States. He was in agreement with His Excellency's views on the present policy given in paragraph 3 of his Despatch.

He explained that although the goal of independence may not be attainable in the near future, he did not wish to lose sight of it as the ultimate purpose. He emphasized that he readily appreciated that, from the point of view of the States themselves, many years of development and education may be necessary before they reached a stage of sufficient strength and maturity for this purpose to be fulfilled.

He also agreed with His Excellency's recommendation that the internal independence of the States should be fostered to the greatest possible extent. He hoped that, with a view to the improvement of their administrations in other spheres, the Rulers would be ready to make the best use of the young men who returned to the States after training and education abroad. He agreed that it was the function of His Majesty's Government to encourage the reforms for which a demand was likely to arise, and ensure that they developed on sound lines. He pointed out that it seemed to him that only by assisting reasonable progress, even in the face of opposition from those in authority, could His Majesty's Government hope to maintain their special position in these states.

He concluded by writing that the remarks in the preceding paragraphs applied chiefly to Bahrain and Kuwait and, in some respects, to Qatar. He added that in the present circumstances he could hold out no certainty that funds could be provided for **expenditure on the general development** of these States over and above those already provided for the Trucial Oman levies; but this did not preclude consideration of any recommendations for specific projects.

Thus, Britain embarked on a two-tier policy to change the situation: first to review its policy towards the Trucial States, and secondly to improve the internal political and social situation. Governments agreed to **these proposals** especially those having to do with the establishment of a **Federation of the Trucial States** and **the allocation of funds** for the development. In 1952 a "Council" of Sheikhs was created under the chairmanship of the Political Resident⁽⁵⁾. Thus, the "Trucial States Council" met annually or, occasionally, more often. It was a discussion group rather than a legislative or policy making body. For example, in his annual report for 1955 the Political Resident said⁽⁶⁾ that it discussed **internal reforms and improvements within the States, and development projects** financed by Her Majesty's Government. **Education, Traffic Regulations, Nationality Laws, Jurisdiction, Control of Arms, Suppression of Narcotics** and other related subjects were discussed "with varying degrees of interest".

Although the establishment of that Council was a major development in the Emirates in the 1950s, it had some negative results, which can be summarised as follows:-

1. The Council, in as much as it created some kind of unity between the Sheikhdoms, was an important factor in consolidating the independence of each Sheikhdom and its own system. The Council continues until this day yet it has not, so far, discussed the question of merging the Sheikhdoms. However, the Sheikhdoms were already in existence when the Council was established.

2. The main concern of the Council was the development of economic and social conditions such as education, the judiciary and the civil service, which Trucial society needed during that period. In spite of the Council's concern with those important matters it had not paid attention to the development of the political situation. The Emirates did not yet have a constitution to regulate the political process, the method of coming to power, political participation and the spreading of political awareness among the people. On the contrary, the Council managed to prevent the emergence of opposition political parties. Very often the Sheikhs asked the Political Resident through the Council for British intervention by means of the Oman Coast Scouts to

stop unrest and demonstrations by popular political movements. The Council had thus helped to consolidate the authority and influence of the Sheikhs and to keep them in power.

In spite of these shortcomings, the creation of the Trucial States Council did lead to some **political stability**. The Rulers had been able to travel abroad to places in Europe and the Arab World. Among the most important manifestations of internal stability was that there was no civil war or struggle for power between the members of the ruling families during the period 1950-1955. This was an important new situation which had never existed in the Sheikhdoms before and had helped to maintain continuity in the implementation of development programs in the social, judicial, economic and administrative fields (see below, Chapter 5). However, in 1956 there emerged on the Arab scene some political issues which have had great impact on the society of the Trucial States.

Among the most important of those issues had been the Suez crisis in Egypt which gave rise to feelings of Arab nationalism. Enthusiastic feeling began to spread among young people in schools and in clubs through their Egyptian teachers in support of Egypt against the attackers. Anti-imperialist political slogans began to appear for the first time in the Gulf region. Demonstrations and riots occurred throughout the

Sheikhdoms. The Rulers sought the help of the Political Resident in confronting the demonstrations and riots. Therefore, the year of 1956 was a politically "hot year" in which the nationalist opposition movement almost succeeded in bringing about a political change in the Sheikhdoms. The Rulers as well as Britain managed to control the situation by using the Oman Coast scouts who were given the task of protecting military and civilian installations and of dispersing the demonstrations and protecting British interests in the region (see below, pp.185).

The fifties were, for the Trucial States, an important period politically both for the Rulers and for Britain. The best picture of the period is contained in a secret report prepared by the Political Resident dated June 1956. In view of the important of this report we give it in detail.

(I) THE SECRET POLITICAL REPORT OF 1956

This report was prepared in June 1956⁽⁷⁾ by the Political Resident as "an analysis of the position and problems of the U.K. government in the States of the Persian Gulf". The report explained "the nature of the United Kingdom's position" when it stated that the seven Trucial Shaikhdoms (of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Quawain, Ras Al-Khaimah and Fujairah) were "independent Arab Sheikhdoms under U.K. protection and linked to the U.K. Government by a number of treaties and undertakings given at various times since 1820 by Britain to the Rulers". It went on to say "The principal rights and responsibilities which made up the U.K.'s special position were:

(1)

(i) Defence

Assurances had been given to the Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar that the United Kingdom would protect them against external aggression. There was no specific obligation towards Kuwait or the Trucial States though this obligation could be said to be implicit in the fact that those States were recognised to be under United Kingdom protection.

(ii) The exclusive agreements with the Rulers whereby they had undertaken not to communicate with foreign governments except through the U.K. government. On the basis of this agreement, the U.K. conducted their foreign relations for them.

(iii) Extra-territorial jurisdiction, which was exercised by agreement with the Rulers. This varied from State to State, but in general it covered British subjects and all foreign nationals except Arabs.

(iv) The report referred to the oil agreements by saying the Rulers had undertaken not to grant oil concessions without U.K. government approval. Furthermore, the United Kingdom also concluded Political Agreements with the oil companies concerned, which provided, inter alia that the companies conducted their relations with the Rulers on policy matters through the U.K. Political Agent.

(v) Aviation

By special Air Navigation Agreements with each State having an airfield the U.K. government had (a) control over traffic rights; (b) facilities for the R.A.F.; and (c) in Bahrain and Sharjah only, responsibility for the operation of the airfield.

(vi) As for the arms and slave trade, the report referred to agreements which prohibited them.

(2) The report went on to state that except in one or two specific matters, such as arms and slavery, Britain had no right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Sheikhdoms and could influence them only:-

- (a) by proffering advice. The Political Agent in each territory saw the Ruler frequently and this access was an important part of the U.K.'s position; and
- (b) through the British Advisers and employees of the Rulers. (In Bahrain and Qatar but not in Kuwait the Administrations were headed by Advisers from the United Kingdom). In all three States numbers of officials and experts from the United Kingdom were employed.

The report then went into detail about the United Kingdom's limited capacity to direct the internal governments of the Trucial States. The United Kingdom could impose its wishes in internal matters only if it was prepared to resort to force. But it had an ultimate responsibility to restore law and order if a security situation beyond the control of the local police arose. This was recognised by the people. In that the

territories were British Protected States (they are so designated by Order in Council) (1954)) the United Kingdom was also liable to be held generally responsible before world opinion for all that went on in them. In a sense, the United Kingdom's position was thus one of "responsibility without authority".

With regard to British military intervention in the internal affairs of the Sheikhdoms, the report recommended against it even if it were asked for by the rulers because this would have created very great difficulties for the U.K. throughout the Arab World, and it would give a propaganda handle to hostile outside influences.

(3) Regarding the U.K. government's main purpose in the Gulf, the report stated that it was to ensure fair access to the oil and stable conditions for its production.

(4) However, the report warned of dangers from which the United Kingdom's oil interests had to be protected, such as:

- (i) political disturbances or a breakdown in security which would impede oil operations;
- (ii) the emergence of hostile regimes which sought either to impose difficult conditions on the oil companies or to nationalise them.

(5) To achieve this goal, Britain had to:

- (i) preserve internal security and to promote good government, social progress and economic development in the territories;
- (ii) retain the goodwill of the governments and peoples of the States.

(6) The report then predicted that Britain's efforts to achieve that goal were likely to be impaired in a number of ways:

- (a) by the Rulers and their governments succumbing to the xenophobic influences of Arab nationalism, particularly from Egypt, and turning against their connection with the West;
- (b) by the degeneration of administration in the hands of an irresponsible ruling family into mis-government of the kind "prevailing" in Saudi Arabia;
- (c) by the Rulers (upon its individual relation with whom the U.K. position depends) losing their authority to reformist or revolutionary movements which might, on gaining power, reject the connection with the United Kingdom;

- (d) by the encroachment upon, or absorption of, the territories by their neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia.

These dangers were, however, not as great as was sometimes thought in view of the contemporary situation which was described as follows:

- (a) The Rulers of all the States and the majority of their subjects did not oppose the British connection as long as it did not infringe too obtrusively upon their independence, their convenience and their conception of themselves as good Arabs. Moreover, the Rulers, if not the more volatile of their subjects, were conscious that they owed the independent existence of their States to United Kingdom protection. This was the vital factor which differentiated the Gulf from the normal pattern of political development in other dependent territories.
- (b) The oil companies were able to operate satisfactorily and their relations with the governments were generally good.

(c) The States were undoubtedly and inevitably subject to the influence of Arab nationalism of the particularly virulent kind emanating from Egypt. They could not be insulated against it. The main threat was not so much from the Egyptian teachers and experts employed by the governments (there were numbers of these, mostly in Kuwait, but they were not in a position to influence policy) as from the general psychological impact of Egyptian propaganda and prestige.

The report concludes by stating that the Trucial States were far behind Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, both politically and economically. Outside influences were far less felt. The role of the "dowlah" or State, as the U.K. government was called there, was unquestioned. The only present problems were those caused by Saudi expansionism - that was attempting to show the population that the present Emirate "dowlah" (State) was not worth their allegiance.

(II) THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, 1953-1956

Earlier in this chapter we referred briefly to the emergence of the nationalist movement in the Trucial States and how it was helped to grow as a result of the Suez crisis. In view of the importance of this question and its close relationship to our study of the Emirates political developments, we now move to study it in more detail.

The best documentary study of the nationalist movement during the 50's as embodied in what was called the 'National Front', centred in Dubai is contained in the British Resident's report of 9th October 1956⁽⁸⁾.

On 9th October 1956, Mr. B.A.B. Burrow of the British Residency in Bahrain, transmitted to The Right Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, a copy of a report by Mr. J.M. Edes, Assistant Political Agent in the Trucial States, on the political situation in Dubai.

He considered it commendable of Edes for having produced, for the first time, a comprehensive account of the involved political development in Dubai in recent years, and of the chief personalities concerned in them. He went on to say that valuable assistance in the task was provided by the Agency Arab assistant, Mr. Ali Bustani.

The report consisted of several sections. Section 1 is described as a general estimate of the political forces in Dubai, whilst Section 2 is described as an

historical review of the National Front from the time of its foundation in 1953 to 1956. The National Front was a loose association of individuals nominally in opposition to the Regent Sheikh Rashid, his father the titular Ruler, Sheikh Said, and to the Political Agency. Section 3 contains a list of a number of local personalities who had been, or were, connected with the Front in some way or other. Section 4 is a collection of the various propaganda pamphlets which had been discovered in Dubai during the previous years.

The National Front was only formed in Dubai in 1953, and it was then that hostility towards the autocratic rule of the Al Maktum family started; hostility existed in 1928 and 1938 as we have seen in Chapter 3. The motives for this were seen in two parts. The first part was the alleged partiality of the Ruler and Sheikh Rashid to the Persian inhabitants of Dubai. The second was the desire of other members of the ruling family and their supporters to obtain a share of government power. Between the years 1929 and 1939 Dubai's peace was continuously disturbed by the rivalry of two factions of the ruling family. The Ruler himself, Sheikh Said, and his son Sheikh Rashid, who had a reputation of being violent and quick tempered, were supported by a few of the old Beni Yas families, the foreign communities, especially those which originated in

Persia, and the Bedouin of the hinterland. This support made up the first faction. The two quarters of the town, Dubai and Shandagha, which lay to the South East of the Creek which in turn ran through its centre, were the base of this faction.

The other faction, which called itself the reforming party, consisted of the cousins of the Ruler. It was led by Sheikh Menna'bin Rashid, and was supported by the majority of the old settled Beni Yas families of Dubai. These families mainly lived in the section of the town, Dairah, which lay to the North East of the Creek. Although this faction was known as the Reforming Party, it was not especially progressive in the reforms which it advocated. Instead it was designed to divest the Ruler of some of the wealth and power that accrued to him for their own benefit and enjoyment.

Menna's faction was successful in 1938 in forcing Sheikh Said to rule through a council and to give them a share in the customs administration. After a year, however, the Ruler gained the upper hand, and decided to rid himself of Menna's party. The operations were carried out by Sheikh Rashid. He cruelly and violently recovered control over Dairah and dissolved the Council. Members of Menna's party were either killed or ejected and some were tortured or had their eyes burnt out. This sequence of events was curiously similar to that which occurred at about the same time in Kuwait. The difference being only that there was greater violence shown in Dubai.

Through their action, Sheikh Rashid and his father earned the lasting hatred of many of the old settled Beni Yas families. They had supported the other faction but despite the trouble did not leave the town. The Residency Agent, Said Abdurrezeg of the Agency, was accused of having done nothing to oppose the dissolution of the Council, although he had witnessed and had guaranteed the act that established it. Consequently, he also incurred the hostility of the old Beni Yas families.

The National Front was created by the years of continual hostilities, and interestingly enough, many of its old original founders were involved in Shaikh Memma's movement. Dubai is still geographically and politically divided into the section on the North of the Creek, the home of the settled Beni Yas, and the southern section where the ruling family lives and communities of foreign origin also predominate.

(i) An Estimate of the Political Situation in the Town of Dubai 1956⁽⁹⁾

The position of the Regent, Sheikh Rashid had remained reasonably secure since the exile (in May 1955) of Sheikh Juma bin Maktum, brother of the nominal Ruler Sheikh Said. However, a number of attempts had been made to weaken Rashid's position by certain self-interested persons, most of whom belonged to the so-called National Front. In particular, this group of

people had tried to undermine his supposedly existing reforms in local administration. These attempts had so far been frustrated and Rashid's reforms in the customs and law court and his establishment of a small police force had progressed steadily, if not quickly.

Rashid had been able to retain the support of part of the settled Arab community in Dubai⁽¹⁰⁾. These included the more recent immigrants who left Hira, Sharjah and settled in Dubai in 1935-1940. They numbered around 300-400 and were led by two men Ali bin Abdulla al Awais and Rahaman bin Abdulla. Most of them were wealthy merchants and were more interested in increasing their trade than indulging in political activity. They seldom called on Rashid, but when they did, it was in connection with their commercial interests.

Similar to these immigrants were the immigrants from Ajman, Umm al Quwain and Ras al Khaimah. They were also traders who were on friendly terms with Rashid. The Muscatis from Batinah, described as "petty traders", also supported Rashid but they had no leaders and were not interested in political affairs. From the neighbouring states, such as Dubai, Kuwait, Saudi, Iraq, Bahrain and Quatar, came merchants who either settled or travelled regularly to Dubai. Most of them supported Rashid, although they did not venture into politics. Most of the Iraqis came from Zubair and tended to regard Saleh al Usaimi as their leader. Amongst the Bahrainis there were

a small number of resident Shia'Bahrainis who had lived on the Trucial Coast for a very long time. Their leader was Mirza al Rahma.

The total number of support from the settled Arab community in Dubai, including the pro-Rashid settled Beni Yas under Ali bin Sulten bin Fahat and Sheikh Mijrin, (whose numbers were approximately 1,000) was estimated at 3,000-4,000 including families. This estimation did not include the nomadic Beni Yas, who were loyal to Rashid and among whom he was popular and to whom he was generous. The loyalty of the Beni Yas was an important factor in Dubai politics as a whole, as Rashid could always "bring in the Bedu".

The Persian community consisted of Persians and those of predominantly Persian origin. It was the largest, wealthiest and most influential group in Dubai, where it had been long resident. Primarily merchants, they made their money out of the export trade, building and real estate speculation. Their leaders were Muhammed Hajji Badri, Abdul Wahid Fikree, Sheikh Mustafa Abdullatif, and Sheikh Ghulam Abbas Ansari. They studiously avoided political involvement, gossip and intrigue and quietly strengthened their control over local trade. They always paid great respect to the Agency and its staff and though they tended to visit Rashid only for business reasons, they were on very good terms with him and the Al Makkum ruling family. They

welcomed general improvements to Dubai and were heartily disliked by most of the Beni Yas. Their numbers were around 20,000 including their families.

There were three more groups who were pro-Rashid. These were the Hyderabadis, the Indians, and the Pakistanis. The 150 or so from Hyderabad, who were led by Haji Jaffer Ali, were mainly business men. Although they got on well with Rashid they were of little political consequence. The Indians were permanently resident in Dubai and were, like the Hyderabadis, business men and petty traders. The Indians were political but only amongst themselves. Their community was split into two competing factions, the Indian Association, and the Indian Welfare Association. After reconciliation with the help of Mr. Pur, the Indian Consul at Muscat, the two associations were abolished and a new all-embracing Indian National Association was formed. The permanency of this reconciliation was viewed with scepticism by some. Dhamanmal Issardas was chosen as their leader by the 750 strong.

The Pakistanis who numbered approximately 100 were petty traders, tailors, and barbers. They were entirely absorbed by commercial activities so hence they did not feature on the political scene.

Rashid had 4,000-5,000 unaccounted supporters as well as those mentioned above.

The main opposition to Rashid in 1956⁽¹¹⁾ was made up of the disaffected leaders of the settled Beni

Yas and their families as well as various friends under their influence, the original National Front in fact. It would have been unwise to have thought of the National Front as a party as at this time it did not possess unity. However, it was the term originally used by its members (National Front) for their club and was a convenient way of describing and referring to those people who came together from time to time and for a variety of motives, but usually to oppose Shaikh Rashid and to criticise His Majesty's Government. As politics were still very much a question of personalities, the National Front is best regarded as a loose association of individuals lacking an organisation, a secretary and a common fund. The only way they were held together was when one of their members displayed above average qualities of leadership. Only two individuals at that time showed these qualities, Juma and Bin Fateim but both were exiled as a result. The Bin Fateim and the Bin Ghurair families were associated with the National Front since the early days; hence, they provided some sort of permanent backbone. There was no political philosophy stated by the members of the National Front despite their nationalistic postures; they were more concerned with the spread of their own influence and the increase of their wealth. Due to the support Rashid gave to the Persians, with whom the National Front were involved in commercial rivalry, they opposed Rashid, and after Juma's exile,

they tried to upset Rashid's tentative reforms. These reforms were disliked as they encroached upon their vested interests and upon a number of traditional and corrupt practices which had provided them with a source of profit and political power. It was, therefore, true to say that the National Front's members were essentially reactionary, and its 500 members subscribed to some or all of the Front's objectives with varying degrees of loyalty.

To conclude, therefore, it is fair to say that the National Front at that time did not prove to be a dangerous threat to Sheikh Rashid nor to Her Majesty's Government's position in the Trucial States. It had failed to upset the recent reforms and had made little impression on the other communities in Dubai. To strengthen Rashid's position, the knowledge that the Trucial Oman Scouts as well as the new Police Force could both, in an emergency, be used against it tended to inhibit its activities.

Having said this, it would have been unwise to assume that the local political situation in Dubai was inherently healthy. A number of factors were present which could have, in time, made the Front's opposition to Rashid and its anti-British activities a serious menace. These were the Front's nationalism, the growth of education and the character of Rashid himself.

The fear of the Front's nationalism arose from the fact that the Front was composed almost entirely of Sunni Arab merchants who could well have become hypnotised by their own slogans. As it offered excellent contacts for Egyptian and Saudi infiltration, the fear was that propaganda and money could have been introduced on a large scale, thus feeding the Front. With this assistance the members could have organised themselves and their influence could easily have spread into nationalism on a large scale.

The growth of education was also feared, as it would produce young men more critically minded than their fathers. It was thought at the time, that if there was a lack of jobs, these young men would be tempted to follow the usual Middle Eastern pattern, by participating in political activity. This would almost certainly have been devoted to attacking the British and the existing system of sheikh rule.

Sheikh Rashid's character did not inspire a great deal of confidence. He had increasingly shown signs of weakness and irresponsibility and was easily fooled by the intrigues of self-interested persons. His chief interest was to increase his revenues and in some ways he was too uncertain a person to handle factions opposed to him in a firm and uncertain manner. He tried to please everyone and tended to turn a blind eye to the disloyal activities of some of his followers. Unable to say 'no'

loudly and clearly, he was very much under the influence of his wife, Latifah. There was little doubt that, without discreet backing from the Agency, Rashid would have capitulated over the customs strike and the question of Bedu for the new Police Force. As Thani bin Abdulla had defected, Rashid lacked a powerful, disinterested adviser. It was a fact that many of the people who were close to him and talked the loudest in his "Majlis" were connected with the National Front.

(ii) The Activities of the National Front (12)

The Front originally started in 1953 as an Arab club in Dubai under the leadership of Ahmed bin Sulten bin Sulaim, the president, and Hamed bin Majed bin Ghurair. It comprised some 35 people including local merchants, customs officials and employees of the British Bank of the Middle East.

With its birth it brought (for the first time to the Trucial States), nationalism. In 1955 it was described by the Agency as "yet another party demanding 'Arabia for the Arabs'". The nationalistic overtones of the Front were revealed in its declared objects namely to oppose the power of local and influential Persian merchants, to stop further immigration into Dubai from Persia, India and Pakistan, to institute "reforms" in such government departments as then existed, and to oppose the autocratic

and traditional system of rule by the pro-Persian Al Makkum family.

From 1953 to May 1955, the Front, particularly some of its younger members whose average age was about 22, tried in every way to reduce the mercantile influence of the local Persians and Indians. Increasingly virulent verbal attacks were made on the two communities and propaganda was spread in order to stir up trouble between the Persian and Arab communities. It was suspected at the time that some members received communist newspapers and were in touch with the Lebanese Communist Party.

In 1954-1955, the discussions in connection with the Greshen Linley electricity scheme, provided a focal point for the Front's activities. It was reported that Arab merchants were doing their best to sabotage the proposals because of Persian participation. The Al Maktum ruling family had clung to the traditional principle of toleration for all nationalities in Dubai on the grounds that intolerance and economic discrimination had an adverse effect on local trade and prosperity. They were thus violently criticised also by members of the Front, which inevitably aligned itself with the Juma faction against Sheikh Rashid in the struggle for power at the time when the ruler, Sheikh Said, had revealed his incapacity for continued rule as a result of senility. In this struggle, the Front was thought to have succeeded in sowing the seeds of suspicion and antagonism between

Rashid and his brother Khalifah, and Rashid, whom Juma and the Front had openly criticised, was forced to close their club in February 1955. The more effective blow to the Front's influence was made, however, when Rashid finally triumphed over Juma the following May. When Juma with four of his sons were expelled immediately afterwards, the Front virtually dissolved with its prestige lowered, its leadership dispersed or cowed and its morale shattered.

From May 1955 to March 1956 Sheikh Rashid, firmly established as effective Ruler although nominally Regent, began to set in motion a number of minor reforms. The various personalities connected with the Front began once again to come together as the bitterness engendered during the Juma episode still remained; they began to attack Rashid's reforms.

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1955, certain members of the Front were known to be in touch with the Saudis. Two in particular, bin Fateim and bin Ghurair acted as agents for the Saudis and distributed arms and money among the Bedu. Bin Fateim passed on information to the Saudis about the movements of the Trucial Oman Levies and had close contacts with Dhahran. He made a considerable fortune during this period. The Front increased its members, spread anti-British propaganda and definitely supported the Saudi case over Buraimi⁽¹³⁾, reaching the height of its

influence in Dubai just before the re-occupation of Buraimi in October 1955. The re-occupation, however, gave a blow to its prestige and when certain papers seized during the operation provided incontrovertible evidence of bin Fateim's complicity, leading to his exile in March 1956, the Front once again found itself leaderless. Fateim's exile however was used by the Front as an occasion for the distribution of pamphlets and scurrilous slogans appeared on some walls in Deira. Nevertheless bin Ghurair and his family lay low and for some months afterwards the activities of the Front were not much in evidence.

The middle and end of this period, from March 1956 to September 1956, witnessed a revival of the Front's activities. Majid bin Muhammed bin Fateim, the young nephew of the exiled bin Fateim, was ostentatiously active and it was a well known secret that he had remained in contact with his uncle in Saudi Arabia. The improvements in local administration had begun to bear fruit⁽¹⁵⁾; the revenue from the renovated customs had increased; the customs director's appointment was renewed until November 1957; the two visits of Mr. Muhammed Abdul Khaliq, clerk for H.B.M. Court in Bahrain, had led to improvements in the local Court's procedures and a new Qadhi from Syria was appointed and took up his appointment in early September; a new local police force was established in June under Sheikh Muhammed bin Hasher

and an officer from the T.O. Scouts helped to form and train it. All these events provided an opportunity for a renewal of intrigue and written as well as verbal criticism by members of the Front. Finally the Suez Canal crisis⁽¹⁶⁾ afforded a further chance for the Front to step up its activities; generally speaking, these included criticism of H.M.G.'s position in the Trucial States, attempts to boycott persons supporting Rashid, proclamation of the Egyptian line over the Suez Canal and interference with recent reforms in Dubai. The following incidents give some idea of the pattern of this activity:

(a) The Customs Strike, June 1956

The customs strike in June 1956 occurred when the employees refused to obey the orders of Mehdi Tajir, the director, in connexion with some seized hashish; they tried to persuade Rashid to remove him but were themselves dismissed. The chief ringleader was Muhammed al Musa and was supported by bin Fateim, Murshid al Usaimi, Thani bin Abdulla and Isa Gurg, Chief Arab Assistant to the local branch of the British Bank. Murshid al Usaimi immediately employed two of the dismissed officials at higher rates than Rashid had paid them and Thani bin Abdulla persuaded Sheikh Shakhbut to employ two others as customs officials on Das Island and in Abu Dhabi.

(b) Interference in Dubai Court, June-July

Members of the Front tried to persuade Sheikh Muhammed bin Hasher to resign from the post at the time when Abdul Khaliq made his second visit to Dubai. Both Murshid al Usaimi and Thani bin Abdulla declared to Hasher that he (Hasher) was virtually a "coolie" under Khaliq's direction.

(c) Criticism of the Police Force

The creation of the police force had been unpopular with members of the Front because they had urged that if there had to be a police force, then it should have been recruited entirely from the Bedu. Rashid eventually refused their demands, when it was pointed out to him that this was an attempt by the Front to win over the nomadic Beni Yas. The Front's only success in that year was the defection of Thani bin Abdulla, Rashid's powerful advisor.

The spreading of propaganda was accomplished in two main forms. The first was by pamphlets. These accused the Agency, the British Bank and Gray, Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. of interference in town affairs. Although semiliterate and usually written in Arabic, they were clearly nationalistic in content; for example, the call for Omani unity. Some had been printed and imported from Pakistan, others from Saudi Arabia and their distribution locally was done by members of the Front.

The second form taken was by dissemination of rumours. Although not only confined to the Front, members of the Front were very active in gossiping especially during the Suez crisis. One example traced to the door of the Front, was the rumour that "7,000 men" had disembarked at Dubai on 29th August in order to combat the growing influence of the National Front.

The Front changed its tactics and, instead of attacking the Persians, they played down its former antagonism and tried to bring them into an alliance. This was not at that time successful even though they made overtures to merchant Abdulla Badri, son of Hajji Muhammed Badri. Their attempts to have Juma brought back from exile also were unsuccessful despite putting strong pressure on Rashid and his old father. Rashid at that point refused.

The Front was suspected of being active outside Dubai but not noticeably. It was thought that it had obtained influence over the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, as a result of a monopoly agreement concluded the previous year between him and the bin Ghurair family over the export of fish. The Ghurair were strong enough to persuade Saqr to jail or fine those fishermen under his jurisdiction who refused to sell to the monopoly.

(iii) Persons Connected with the National Front (See Appendix)(16)

Ahmed Bin Sultan Bin Sulaim

Sunni Muslim of the Beni Yas of "somewhat gloomy disposition, aged about 45". One of the two original founders and first president of the National Front, he participated in demonstrations against Sheikh Rashid in 1939 and was exiled to India where he acted as a broadcaster on All India Radio programmes during the war. Dismissed from this work at the end of 1950, he was allowed to return to Dubai through the mediation of local merchants. Comparatively well educated, he interested himself in matters of world politics. He tried to get posts in the Court and Customs but his application was not entertained. His views underwent a traumatic change and he began to support the British and Sheikh Rashid. This, together with his record of failure in the early days of the Front, earned him the hatred of its members.

Murshid Al Usaimi

A Kuwaiti subject who lived in Dubai for about 30 years, a Sunni Muslim, aged about 56, who originally came to Dubai as a servant of a Kuwaiti merchant, and during the Second World War made a good deal of money out of the food shortage with the help of Sayid Abdul Razzaq, the former Residency Agent. As a result of his assistance to the ruling family of Dubai during the Dubai troubles of 1940 and the Dubai - Abu Dhabi war in 1945, Murshid was

exempt from custom duties. The creation of a new Customs system , whereby he was obliged to pay dues like other merchants and lost his former franchise, affected him deeply. He had, therefore, come to hate the present customs director, Mr. Mahdi Tajir, and tried to interfere in the customs. He also disliked Sheikh Rashid, who not only was the originator (with Agency help) of the new customs system but also refused to take his advice to dismiss Mehdi Tajir. Murshid had lost his former influence in a number of other ways:- (1) In the past Sheikh Rashid used to purchase all building materials through him, paying him a large commission which amounted to RS 3, for example, on every bag of cement valued in the market at RS 8. Rashid had endeavoured to buy his requirements from elsewhere. (2) The improvements in the Dubai Court⁽¹⁷⁾ had tended to put an end to Murshid's old practice (also the practice of Hamed bin Majid bin Fateim and Hamed bin Majid bin Ghurair) of holding a private court in his own house, settling disputes and dispensing his own justice. (3) Murshid used to be Rashid's political adviser but his advice was no longer so eagerly sought.

One of the wealthiest men in Dubai (he was granted in the past, several pieces of land by the Ruler and made a fortune in real estate speculation), was reported to have obtained monopoly concessions for a public electricity project with the backing of the Kuwaiti capital.

Although outwardly very correct in his attitude towards the Agency, there was no doubt that he disliked the Agency's support of the Ruling family and that he was definitely "agin" Sheikh Rashid. Too subtle to associate himself unequivocally with the National Front, he was influential with a number of their members. His politics were strictly determined by his economics.

Details of other notable persons are in the Appendix (pp. 315).

(iv) Propaganda Pamphlets in Dubai, 1956⁽¹⁸⁾

(a)

"Dear Dubai Nation

To all citizens of Dubai and dear nation. I am calling you all the Arabs, Persians and other Muslims to come together as one hand. Do not make any difference between an Arab and non-Arab. We all have one religion and one home. Look to Bahrain. We should follow as our brothers followed the path of unity. Unity is the basis of success and power on the earth. You cannot do anything against a nation unless you are united. Unity is the remedy for aggrieved nations. Brothers, do publish the voice of unity among your brothers and other citizens. Clear the road in order to reach to your noble objects. We are attacked by three enemies; poverty, sickness and ignorance. How long should we endure such disunity among ourselves. Is not sufficient for you to suffer from imperialism, their tails (supporters) and the GALAVYEEN traitors.

Towards unity - my brothers

Signed jealous youth

"

(b) A call to every brother citizen of Oman

Do not expect anything new when you begin to read this. We and you share one object; we all feel and suffer from Imperialism which is driving us under not only every day but every second.

Start your movements for freedom from now on! In due course you will be able to achieve freedom not only for yourself but also for your country. Do not think that imperialism cannot be resisted in your country in these days and do not listen to anyone who tells you to think first before resisting imperialism. Your country is a part of the Arab world.

Get up from your sleep and contact all your relatives from Dhafar to Qatar. Your country needs your help. Do not listen to those who tell you to wait. This is a precious opportunity. Rest assured that you are not an ignorant country and that you belong to the progressive Arab world. Join hands and listen to President Gamal Abdul Nasser who has said in the Egyptian constitution that "Egypt is a part of the Arab world and a progressive country".

(c) "Let us share in our leap

Oh' free Arabs. Your feeling towards your Arab nation must force you to go on a general strike on the opening of London conference on the 16th August inst, to show to the world that all Arabs are one nation and one people. That they are one heart. They will be happy when they are all happy and will be sad when they are all sad, from Atlantic to our Arab Gulf.

We request from all our free workers brothers to be ready to accept this invitation and to go on strike against the cruel colonialist. On the opening of the London conference all Arab countries will go on general strike. Let it be known to the West that today's Arab nation is not the same as it was in the past.

Kindly keep this paper safe. Let others to read it."

(d) "The Free Nation of Dubai

All the Arab governments have begun to struggle beside their great sister (Egypt). All the Arab nations have contributed in the struggle and in the fight for turning out the colonial (power) and the cleanliness of the motherland from colonialism's foulness.

The Agency and the Bank both have started printing leaflets against Egypt and her brave leader (Gamal Abdul Nasser) not only that, but also they have attacked all the Arab Governments. For what? because they have

supported Egypt in her nationalising the Suez canal.

O! free nation, be cautious of these leaflets and the British false colonialism. Wake up, you free nation and get back your rights, respect, and your freedom and be as a nation.

God is great and success to the Arabs."

The Political propaganda as the documents indicated showed the situation in the Trucial States after the Suez crisis. It is possible these political leaflets had been written by Egyptian teachers who were working in the Trucial States at that time. The evidence for this is based on the fact that the political leaflets were concerned with fighting against Britain and not the improvement of the internal situation. In addition, they asked for freedom and unity which were common demands in the Arab world.

The leaflets especially asked the people to support Egypt against Britain and no mention of political reform inside the Trucial States was made.

(v) Repercussions of the Suez Crisis - 1956

On the 13th August 1956 a secret report⁽¹⁹⁾ on the repercussions of the Suez Canal dispute, was sent to the Foreign Office from Bahrain. In the report it was thought amongst British officials and others with experience of local reaction, that even the successful forcible action by Britain against Egypt would not have the effect of making it easier to maintain Britain's positions in Bahrain but rather the reverse.

It was argued in this report that Nasser was still a hero to almost all Arabs, and if Britain defeated him it would be regarded as a humiliation to the Arabs generally, thus causing resentment rather than respect. Many thought that given a year or two many Arabs would have seen through Nasser, and would have come to understand the threat that he posed to the rest of the Arab world.

The report explained that Britain's position in the Persian Gulf states rested partly on the knowledge that it could intervene with force if necessary, but also on the fact that it was generally acceptable to the local inhabitants. Many of them realised that they could not stand alone, and they would rather have Britain than anyone else. They would not have been able to go on

feeling this if Britain had attacked Egypt. Even those who were most conscious of the benefit of Britain's presence, mainly the Rulers and senior members of their families and senior merchants, would have an intolerable strain put on their feelings, since it would have been impossible for them to feel as Arabs, and at the same time remain in friendly relations with Britain. At the time of the report it seemed quite likely that the hostilities would last longer than a few days. Due to this, Britain had to consider the possibilities of evacuating part or all of the British subjects living in the area. It was feared that if it did, this would have given, on one hand, rise to lasting mutual suspicion, and on the other hand, would have lost Britain its position in local governments and in commerce, which would have been difficult to regain.

Another problem, as the report stated, was Israel. If Britain successfully took action against Egyptian armed forces, then the rest of the Arab world would think that Britain supported Israel. The question of Palestine was already at this time,⁽²⁰⁾ universally difficult and it was feared that if Britain wiped out the Egyptian army, which, however unjustly, was regarded as a vital factor in containing further Israel advances, the previous suspicions of its policy being influenced by Zionism would have been revived.

The report went on to say that with all these probable reactions, it might be thought that all Persian Gulf Arabs would, after an attack by Britain on Egypt, have done everything they could to bring to an end their special relationship with Britain, including attempts to the make oil concessions unworkable. Britain, therefore, had to maintain themselves in the Gulf, by force, and in the face of at least partially hostile local populations, for an indefinite time.

The report emphasised that an acceptance by Britain of a peaceful solution, even though not really meeting its requirements, would have been regarded temporarily as a loss of prestige. However, there was a very high respect for Britain's patience and diplomatic ability which Britain might use to outweigh the loss of prestige. Relations with local authorities and populations might continue comparatively friendly and, for reasons of ordinary self interest, there would not have been any serious attempt to diminish Britain's participation in local oil resources. This was especially true of Kuwait which was closer to the rest of the Arab world, but it also would have had overriding influence on many other factors at play in Bahrain.

The report concluded that Britain, then, was faced with two options. It either had to act forcibly against Egypt or it had to accept a very unsatisfactory compromise. The officials in Bahrain felt very strongly

that forcible action against Egypt would automatically destroy Britain's command and respect with the Gulf Arabs. It was quite clear, however, that prolonged hostilities that is for more than a few days, would have the worst possible effect on its position in the Gulf. With this tense situation the question of sending British Forces to the Gulf to maintain Britain's position, was discussed.

The situation was generally tense in the towns of Dubai and Sharjah and reaction⁽²¹⁾ (in November 1956) when it came some days after was strikes and demonstrations in which Bahrain and Qatar had given a lead. Both Sheikhs Rashid of Dubai and Saqr of Sharjah cooperated with the Agency to ensure that public security was maintained; the former, in particular, summoned leading Dubai notables on November 3rd and reiterated his intention not to tolerate any anti-British talk or demonstrations; the latter promised to restrain his Egyptian and Jordanian schoolmasters.

During the night of November 5th, the Agency received two reports of a proposed strike and demonstration in Dubai for the following day, and immediate steps were taken to strengthen public security; a troop of Scouts moved into position in the Agency compound in the early hours of November 6th, and Dubai police mobile patrols began to tour the town for likely malcontents and places of trouble. No strike or

demonstration in fact occurred, although an attempt was made late in the night of November 5th to set fire to the roof of the garage in the compound of the house of the Assistant Political Agent. Guards and a helpful crowd quickly extinguished it and very little damage occurred. Extra guards were at once placed at the house. The situation became progressively more calm and there were no further incidents. On the night of November 7th, an unsuccessful attempt was made to burn down the W/T transmitters near Sharjah airfield and anti British slogans were openly and increasingly shouted by the boys of Sharjah school, who were not restrained until the Political Agent warned the headmaster that he would be held responsible for the conduct of his boys. There was no doubt that some of the schoolmasters vented their antiBritish feelings and were able to instigate their boys in shouting abuse at the British Officers of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The atmosphere in Sharjah quietened thereafter, but an unsuccessful attempt by an unknown man to burn the car in the compound of the house of the Officer Commanding Trucial Oman Scouts, was made on the night of November 26th. At that time, the instigators of the three attempts at arson had not been discovered.

The Ruler of Sharjah had been using a well known tracker to trace the culprits - with no success - and offered a reward of RS 500 to any person who could give information about or names of persons involved in the Sharjah incidents.

In Abu Dhabi, the al bu Falashah Sheikhs and townspeople were so preoccupied with the activities of the British Agent (Colonel Hennessey), the dowser, and the Indian doctors, that they gave scant attention to international affairs. The Sheikhs **"welcomed"** the **intervention** in Egypt, since they were only too conscious of the close ties between Cairo and Riyadh, and told the Political Officer that they **hoped Nasser would be taught a lesson by the Israelis**. They all, however, **wished Britain had continued** the operation to its logical conclusion i.e. the **removal** of the Nasser government. **"Zaid"** remarked to the Political Officer that **Britain should have done to Cairo what the Russians did to Budapest**. The townspeople and Beduin, though somewhat less enthusiastic than the Sheikhs, seem to have been impressed by Britain's prompt action and were relieved to see an end to the fighting. There were no hostile reactions whatever⁽²²⁾.

Although there were no untoward incidents in Ras al Khaimah, some of the local students expressed their anti British feelings by writing **"down with the colonisers, up with Gamal Abdul Nasser"** on walls and on the Ruler's landrover. On one occasion, some students followed the then Agent shouting slogans, but he ignored them. It seems highly probable that they were instigated by the teachers in Ras al Khaimah school⁽²³⁾.

(III) CONCLUDING REMARKS

The material put forward in this chapter is, in its own way remarkably consistent with earlier history, only the players had changed in the drama. As we saw in Chapter 2 the great power and imperial interests of Britain were decisive in determining the internal affairs of the Emirates. In 1956 the great power (though no longer the imperial) interests were vital. But, the vitality was rather negative, Britain was clearly demonstrated to be a great power no longer. Instead, it was Arab nationalism (emanating from Cairo) and the United States which were decisive and, so far as the internal affairs of the Emirates were concerned, the former was the most important.

Par-Arabism was of course nothing new, its history goes back to the late nineteenth century and to the reform movements in Cairo and, even earlier in Islam to the Wahabis of Saudi. For own purposes, however, it is the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948 and the Suez affair of 1956 which spurred on both Par-Arabism and the ejection or withdrawal⁽²⁴⁾ of Britain from the area.

The propaganda pamphlets (above, p.181) are quite a new phenomenon in the Emirates. They speak of the "Arab nation", of "national interests" and of ejecting "colonialists". This is a quite new form of language in the Emirates. It supposes an Arab "interest" hitherto quite obviously lacking in the internal affairs of the

Emirates. Of course, we must not give too much weight to such a small sample, though at the same time many other examples are known and available⁽²⁵⁾. The new power is not a military one or a colonial one, instead it is the presence of common identity, exemplified here in pan-Arabism for which Nasser's Cairo was the inspiration and centre. As we have seen, the rulers in the Emirates were by no means entranced by this and they hoped, in fact, for his defeat and his removal from Middle-East politics. From their own internal position they took steps to minimize this dangerous influence. We are a long way from the Russian formed movement in the Gulf and from the German-backed Baghdad railway.

At the same time, the internal interest was now much more an internal as opposed to a British matter. No longer could the Agent control events. Instead, the rulers themselves had to show some wider initiative in a general way. The Trucial States Council was a first step towards this. More important, the rulers themselves could no longer treat their states as personal possessions.

However, we must not rush ahead of history here; the "National Movement", so-called, was still, in its form, very personal and familial in its nature. In contrast to the propaganda pamphlets, it was not anti-colonial as such. Indeed, this was far from its motives. Instead, we have a movement whose purpose was to widen the pool of those to whom various payments and

responsibilities should be distributed. In other words, to increase the number of those entitled to power and prestige. This again is perfectly consistent with the earlier internal history of the Emirates (see above, Chapter 3).

Finally, taking Britain's interests as a great power, by 1956, Britain was no longer such; Indeed as Professor Louis has demonstrated⁽²⁶⁾ in detail, this was no longer true even in 1945. But this fact took some to be realised in the Emirates themselves. The British position remained that of the protecting state and from the internal point of view the Political Resident still exercised considerable power. At the same time, as the documents show, British officers on the spot and the Foreign Office in London were fully aware that the necessary great power strength (especially military) was now lacking.

NOTES**[CHAPTER 4]**

- (1) August 1945, P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-145177, Persian Gulf Residency, Bashire, about the Federation of the Arab Emirates in the Gulf, 5th November 1945
- (2) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-91326, British Resident, Bahrain, 29th January 1951
- (3) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-91326, 2nd April 1951
- (4) (I.O.) R/15/4/11, British Agency, Sharjah, 18th June 1938
- (5) "... something should be done in a positive way to show the advantages of the special relationship between the Sheikhdoms and the British government. P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109805, British Residency, Bahrain, 12th March
- (6) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120540, British Residency, Bahrain, May 1956
- (7) See below, Chapter 5
- (8) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120571, An analysis of the position and problems of the U.K. Government in the States of the Persian Gulf, June 1956
- (9) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120552, British Residency, Bahrain. The political situation in Dubai and the National Front, 9th October 1956
- (10) Ibid:

- (11) Ibid:
- (12) Ibid:
- (13) Ibid:
- (14) For details, see Zahlan, op.cit., 130 ff, 192 ff
- (15) See below, Chapter 5
- (16) See below, pp.315
- (17) For an amazing account of court procedure, see Mr. R. Knox-Mawer, Palm Tree Court, Penguin Books, 1987. The first chapter deals with the Emirates where, amongst other questions, that of whetherwhirling dervishes would benefit from probation was important. In the event, the answer was a resounding NO when they served up the judge's own camel to him for dinner!
- (18) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120552. British Residency, Bahrain,
The Political Situation in Dubai and the National Front, 9th October 1956
- (19) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 13th August 1956
- (20) See W.R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East - 1945-1951, pp. 381 ff. Clarendon Press, 1984, for a similar view of the Palestine problem pre-dating Suez
- (21) Reported in P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120557, from Bahrain to Foreign Office, November 1956
- (22) Ibid:
- (23) Ibid:
- (24) One can choose one's own noun here, depending upon one's point of view.
- (25) In the reference cited in no. (21) above
- (26) Op.cit., no. (20)

CHAPTER 5

WINDS OF CHANGE 1950-56 (II): THE BEGINNINGS OF A MODERN STATE INFRASTRUCTURE

In this chapter we shift focus from the "political" to the "administrative" and "social". Of course no one supposes that these classes are or can ever be so clearly separated. Neither do we, but we use these terms to point toward equally important changes in the Emirates in these few crucial years.

In the last chapter we saw the first manifestations of pan-Arab nationalism on the coast and the gradual emergence of local political feeling, as yet fairly underdeveloped, indeed very familial and "bedouin" in its forms.

In this chapter we take the beginnings of change in the areas of law, education, administration and economics. The data put forward will no doubt seem meagre but that is just a reflection of the limited progress. Having said this, any progress, especially from the internal Emirates' position, is really a considerable change from the pre-war period. The actual pace of change should not be over-estimated; after all, Curzon's propositions of 1903 were still directly

relevant in the mid-1930s and, barely twenty years later we actually have the introduction of modern legal and administrative systems. They did not then have the sophistication to which we are accustomed today but, nevertheless, they represent a really qualitative advance. No doubt both Curzon and the later Resident of the 1930s would be equally surprised!

(I) THE LEGAL SYSTEM

The traditional legal system of the coast can be described as "customary" in the sense that tradition was rather more important than Islam (the Sharia). It is important to realise this fact. One does not look for the classical laws but, instead both the local rulers and the British were faced with "bedouin" practice.

For example, on 28th February 1935⁽¹⁾, the Political Agent in Sharjah reported that two raiders of the Awamir tribe had gone off with some booty from the territory of the Sheikh of Hamriyah, who pursued and caught them up. One of the raiders agreed to give up his share of the booty. The other, stouter-hearted, made the sporting suggestion that the Sheikh should let him away on his camel as far as he, the Sheikh, could see, and then pursue him. If the Sheikh was successful in overtaking him, then his share of the booty would be returned, otherwise he would keep it. The Sheikh agreed,

gave the raider the start agreed upon, rode after him, overtook, fired on, and wounded him so severely that the latest news was that he was on the point of death.

The Agent said that the whole affair reminded him "of one of the old Scotch, or North Country ballads, and probably formed a Trucial Coast ballad: the Arabs were very good at that sort of thing". He went on to say that it showed that in spite of an air route, air facilities, and the general opening up of the Trucial Coast, the folk there were quite 'primitive', and had their own ways, peculiar perhaps in our eyes but quite satisfactory in theirs, of settling their affairs.

This report gives us a picture of the legal situation at that time. However, "most disputes between members of the tribal society never actually reached the Ruler, nor the qadi; they were dealt with on the family or tribal levels. But cases with domestic or external political relevance were tried by the Ruler: his very title in Arabic, hakim, was derived from the same root as the word for judge. Matters concerning the pearling community were tried by an independent diving court, salifah al ghaus, manned by respectable members of that community, merchants, captains, and divers alike"⁽²⁾.

Although most qudah in the main population centres of the Trucial States during this century were born outside the area "they also took into consideration the traditional concepts of the local population concerning

right and wrong, fairness and justice in punishment. In some cases the "opinion of the Ruler" was of considerable weight and could even be the decisive factor in reaching a verdict"⁽³⁾.

The judicial situation in the Trucial Sheikhdoms continued as described above until important developments took place in the mid-1940s, such as the arrival there in 1945 of geological expeditions (from various countries) which included some dozen or so American experts, for purposes of oil exploration⁽⁴⁾. The Political Resident proposed that⁽⁵⁾ he should be authorised to arrange for the rulers of the various Trucial Sheikhdoms to be approached with a view to securing a formal cession of jurisdiction over British subjects, British protected persons and non-Moslem foreigners. He advised that the present was a good opportunity to approach the Sheikhs. The plan of approaching, first, the Sheikhs from whom no difficulty was anticipated seemed a good one. It would then be easier to bring Abu Dhabi and Ras al Khaimah into line if they were difficult. With regard to possible adverse reactions from the Americans, he expected that they would in any case prefer their citizens to be subjected to British jurisdiction rather than to that of the local chiefs. In any event, there would seem no reason why they needed to hear of any negotiations at the present stage.

In a letter dated 26th February 1945⁽⁶⁾ the External Department in London supported the Political Resident's proposal and the Foreign Office agreed to his proceeding as he proposed.

In July 1945 the Political Resident obtained from all the Trucial Sheikhs their formal agreement to the cession to the British government of jurisdiction over British subjects and all foreigners in their territories. (See Appendix 2).

On 24th November 1945 the India Office sent a letter to the Foreign Office saying that⁽⁷⁾ in their view, it was desirable to proceed with the preparation of an Order in Council covering the Trucial Sheikhdoms. They stated that "the draft could appropriately follow the terms of the Quatar Order in Council, 1939, with consequential amendments (which could follow the terms of the Bahrain Order in Council, 1913) necessitated by the cession of jurisdiction over all foreigners as in Bahrain instead of over non-Moslem foreigners only, as at Quatar". It was felt this course of action was preferable to meet all future requirements. The proposal was discussed between the Political Residency in the Gulf and the Foreign Office in London, and was adopted in 1949, and was later redrafted as the Trucial States Order in Council, 1950 which was the first revised Order since 1949 and was issued quickly so as to enable the Trucial Oman Levies (Queen's) Regulation and Rules to be

applicable⁽⁸⁾. The general revision of these Orders was not complete and it was not until 1952 that Britain could issue the Bahrain Order.

The Political Agent referred⁽⁹⁾ (May 1955) to the great difficulty in arranging to send persons out of the jurisdiction under Article 28 by ship. He asked whether aircraft could also be used. He had not amended Article 28 to provide for that as he imagined that the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Civil Aviation should first be consulted and that the Trucial States aircraft of the R.A.F. might not be available. He had set out on the attached list a note of the principal amendments and alterations with, where necessary, a brief note of the reasons for the change. He had included the amendments made by the Trucial States (Fujairah and Kalba) Order, 1952⁽¹⁰⁾.

He added that if this was agreed they should have all four Orders very much alike. Abu Dhabi was likely to develop very quickly if oil was found in any quantity and he suggested that it would be wise to put the Orders right before that development began.

Shortly afterwards it was reported that there was an increase in proceedings taken and general activities performed under the Order. Her Britannic Majesty's Court for the Trucial States took seven criminal cases and one civil suit while several settlements were made out of Court, the most notable being that arising out of the

financial difficulties of an Indian firm in Dubai. The creditors eventually transferred their claims to the firm's headquarters in Bombay. Details of the mixed cases heard are given in Appendix (3A)) to that Report, with a schedule of fees collected in Appendix (3C).

The Report went on to say that in what might have been, and may yet be, a further criminal case, a Saudi subject Abdullah bin Ghurab against whom a complaint of slaving had been laid, left the limits of the jurisdiction and had therefore not been apprehended. It was for consideration whether some legal or treaty arrangements should not be made, at least with the other Persian Gulf States, to enable them to extradite suspected criminals who had left the jurisdiction. It would, of course, have had to be borne in mind that a suspect who was under their jurisdiction in the Trucial States was not necessarily so elsewhere.

The Political Agent explained that a similar occurrence precluded the Joint Court from hearing its only case of the year and that was a suit for recovery instituted by a Jordanian against a Dubai subject who, however, had left for Pakistan before the arrangements for the Joint Court had been completed. Although a summons was issued and sent to the United Kingdom High Commission in Karachi, service could not be effected and the case never came to Court.

It was pointed out that administration of estates was undertaken by the Court for the Trucial States in two instances during 1954. Details were given in his Appendix (3B).

The Political Agent said that there was one inquest, arising out of the death on December 31st, 1953, of Mr. T.E.C. Henderson, of the Desert Locust Survey, Sharjah. The inquest began on January 5th, when it was adjourned pending the result of a post-mortem examination in Bahrain. Subsequent investigations were protracted, and the Court did not resume the inquest until June 5th, when an open verdict was recorded⁽¹¹⁾.

He also pointed out that arising out of the Report on which action was required, the first (Jurisdiction over Persons covered by Article 8(a)iii of the Order when operating outside its limits) was still under consideration by higher authority. The second, concerning attempts to commit offences under the Alcoholic Drinks Regulation, had been covered by Article 6 of the new Trucial States Alcoholic Drinks Regulation, 1954 (Queen's Regulation No.1 of 1954) which was the only legislation promulgated under the Order during the year. Progress was made, however, with several draft laws including Traffic and Arms Regulations⁽¹²⁾.

The number of persons subject to the Order who were registered during 1954 is given in the Appendix to the Report (3D). The increase of a hundred over last year's

figure represented an **improvement in the machinery of registration**. From this data, the number of people registered under that order was 540 in 1954. The majority of cases recorded that year were cases of theft or entry without a visa. The penalty for theft was 4 months jail as well as a fine of RS 200, or 6 months without a fine. Entry without a visa was punishable by RS 1, and repatriation. Thus, the Trucial States in 1954 began witnessing the emergence of the **overdue formal recording of cases**. That practice was, however, followed only in relation to foreigners, and had, therefore, a limited effect. The legal system as a whole was weak because there was no legislative or executive authorities propping it up.

This is especially true for new types of case in the 1950s, for example, compensation in accident cases and right of subjects on change of nationality. The subject of compensation was raised by the Ruler of Sharjah at the fifth meeting on 25th June 1954, who said that⁽¹³⁾ there were continual arguments and friction when there was a motor accident involving the subjects of different States. Different Qadis had different ideas of damages and he thought it was necessary to have a flat rate for damages as was done in Bahrain and Kuwait. He personally would like to bring the Kuwait rates into force. The Political Agent remarked that the rates in Kuwait were really excessive and he thought that Bahrain

would provide a more valuable parallel for the Trucial States. The Ruler of Sharjah replied that an excessive rate was what was required in order to make people drive more carefully. Moslem law gave 400 camels as the price of a man's life, and the present price of a camel was RS 400.

The Political Agent said that, as he understood the matter, there were two aspects to the problem. The first was the machinery for getting a case of the type envisaged by the Ruler of Sharjah to court and the second was the desirability of standardising the Qadis' awards. He enquired what the present machinery was. The Ruler of Umm al Quwain explained that at present the cases were referred to the Qadis of the two States concerned and should they not be able to agree, the matter was referred to the Qadi of a third State as arbitrator. On enquiry all Rulers agreed that this system worked satisfactorily and that there was no need for a change.

On the question of the standardisation of awards the Ruler of Abu Dhabi said that the proposal was unnecessary and that the old Moslem way was best. The Ruler of Sharjah asked him what the old Moslem way in this particular matter might be, and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi replied that such matters were known only to the Qadis. After further discussion it was finally agreed, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi dissenting, that the Political Agent should be asked to find out the scale of payments

provided by the Oil Company in Bahrain and approved by the Bahrain government. This scale would then form a basis for further discussion at the next meeting.

At the same meeting, the new issue of Rights of Subjects on change of nationality was raised by the Regent of Dubai who said that there was an old custom on the coast, that he considered a bad one, whereby a subject wishing to change allegiance to another State could do so only at the cost of the confiscation of his property. He had discussed the matter with the Ruler of Sharjah who agreed with him that interchange of nationality should be free of penalty. The only limitation he wished was to be at liberty to hold property where necessary for settlement of debt. All other Rulers agreed with the Ruler of Dubai's proposal except the Ruler of Abu Dhabi who said that in this case also the old Moslem custom was best and Abu Dhabi would remain faithful to the old Moslem custom.

The Ruler of Sharjah said that in this connection a point had arisen recently on which he would like the opinion of the Council. A certain man had quarrelled with him and wished to go elsewhere. To this he had no objection and thought he was well rid of a foolish fellow, but the man had two sons being educated at Sharjah school. As it seemed a pity that the boys' education should be ruined and their schooling end just because they had a silly father, he would welcome

guidance as to whether the man's rights as a father should override his own duties as a Ruler to the boys who were still his subjects. The Political Agent said that this was an interesting point on which he would hesitate to give an opinion without further consideration, but in the meantime he would very much like to hear what the other Rulers thought of the problem from the point of view of **Moslem law and custom**. In reply to a further question from the Ruler of Sharjah as to what would be done in the United Kingdom, the Political Agent stated that the problem would not arise as, wherever the father went, there would be compulsory education for the children, but he agreed that in the special circumstances of the Trucial Coast the Ruler of Sharjah's question was one of great importance.

The Ruler of Abu Dhabi said that the Ruler of Sharjah's question was an astonishing one. Such circumstances could not conceivably arise in Abu Dhabi. Abu Dhabi did not have such things as **schools**. The **Political Agent** remarked that he thought that was a **pity** and that Abu Dhabi ought to have at **least one school**. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi replied that a school would be a good idea but declined further comment on the problem. The other Rulers agreed that the point raised by the Ruler of Sharjah was one of importance, and that it might usefully be considered at the next meeting when they had time to think over the implications. The Rulers further

agreed that the practice of confiscating the property of a man wishing to change nationality should be abolished in every State except Abu Dhabi, whose Ruler dissented from the resolution. At this point, "the meeting adjourned for midday prayers and reassembled after forty five minutes".

This account abstracted from the document provides the background to the creation of a formal legal system. The formal system was as follows. The first instance in all cases was the Court for the Trucial States, under the Political Agent as judge. The Assistant Political Agent, the Political Officer in Abu Dhabi or persons appointed by the Secretary of State in London acted as assistant judges. A Chief Court for the Persian Gulf, under the Political Resident as judge, served as an appeal court in civil and criminal matters, as well as the court of the first instance in certain criminal cases which were assigned to it by the Order in Council. The Full Court of the Persian Gulf was the higher appeal court, composed of "not more than three and not less than two members nominated by the Political Resident from among the following: the Political Resident, the Assistant Judges of the Chief Court, the Judges of the High Court of Kenya, the Judges of the High Court of Cyprus or members of the Bar ... of not less than 9 years' standing"⁽¹⁴⁾. Both the latter courts could sit either in the Trucial States or within the limits of the Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar

and Muscat Orders in Council. The nomination of registrars, court procedures and conditions for appeals were all regulated in detail in the Orders in Council on the model of British Courts abroad elsewhere. Little was changed throughout the period of the courts' functioning.

Very considerable changes were, however, made over the years with regard to the persons to whom this jurisdiction applied. In the 1950 Order in Council it was envisaged that it should apply to all persons (as well as corporations and matters) within the limits of the Order, except for subjects of any of the Trucial States Rulers other than those who joined the TOL or were employed by a person or company which was itself subject to this order⁽¹⁵⁾. In the 1956 Order in Council a clause was introduced which provided for the transfer to the sheikhs of jurisdiction over certain non-native groups of people. In 1960 the first such transfer was agreed between the Rulers and the British Government regarding the nationals of most Muslim states (except Muslim Commonwealth Countries). This agreement specifically mentioned the "stateless persons of Palestinian origin", the first such reference in the Gulf area.

It might be useful at this point to summarize the effects of the 1956 Trucial States Order.

- (1) The Political Agent shall be the Judge of the Court for the Trucial States.
- (2) The Judge of the Chief Court be the Political Resident.
- (3) The Chief Court shall have jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal.
- (4) The Chief Court shall forthwith report to the Secretary of State every order made under this Article and the grounds thereof.
- (5) The Court for the Trucial States may refer any matter (civil) in the progress of a suit:
 - (a) between parties belonging to the same community to a punch or jamaah of the local leader of that community for consideration and report;
 - (b) in commercial cases to a Majlis (Council) or jamaah (group of people) of the principal local merchants for consideration and report.
- (6) The Court for the Trucial States may refer any matter (civil) in the progress of a suit which involves a point of Muhammadah law to a Qadhi for consideration and report.

This is a scheme which is very familiar to any student of colonial law, it is comprehensive and highly structured. Similar schemes worked perfectly well in East and West Africa and, in earlier days, in South-East Asia. However, the scheme is administrative in nature,

rather than purely judicial. It depends for its success on a strong executive power. This, as we shall see, tended to be rather lacking in the Emirates at this time. The rulers, for example, could dismiss or appoint judges, not quite at will, - there was a requirement to consult the Political Resident - but sufficiently to inhibit the full working of the formal system⁽¹⁶⁾. The account of the proceedings at pp. 202 above indicates the reality of the circumstances in the 1950s.

In spite of these shortcomings in the system, it must be stressed that the mere existence of written standardized "laws" regulating the life of individuals and the society of the Shaikhdoms was an essential factor in the process of nation building in the Trucial States.

(II) THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

Demands for the creation of a Civil Service began in 1938, when individuals in Dubai called for an improvement in the internal situation there, which included the Civil Service⁽¹⁷⁾. Nothing positive was done until the mid-1950s when the Sheikh of Dubai, Rashid Bin Said, visited the Agent twice in October 1956 to discuss the question of local government. The Sheikh agreed to have an expert, by the name of Abd Es-Salam Abd Er-Raouf from Iraq for three months to study the possibility of setting up public facilities in the town.

It was hoped that he would be able to "recommend a number of proposals for setting up a Municipal administration, including a sanitary service"⁽¹⁸⁾. This expert arrived in Dubai on 24th November 1956. The Sheikh of Dubai organised an open 'majlis' (meeting) with the merchants to explain the purpose of the presence of that expert, and to enlist their help. The Iraqi expert was "agreeably surprised by Dubai, though he feels that one of the first tasks for the 'baladiya' (City Council) here should be to clear the streets and the creek of filth and rubbish"⁽¹⁹⁾. In the same year research also began for the purpose of providing other essential services such as electricity⁽²⁰⁾.

Among the most important developments of that year was that work started on laying down traffic regulations, laws on residence, travel and immigration controls and border demarcation, all of which were first discussed on 25th June 1954 during the fifth meeting of the Council of Trucial States⁽²¹⁾.

During that meeting, ways of developing the health service were also considered. The Political Agent announced that Britain would be contributing £2,000 towards equipment for the Dubai hospital, including an X-ray machine⁽²²⁾. The Sheikh of Dubai agreed to transfer to the Hospital Committee all his rights in the long lease of the Doctor's residence which amounted to £250 for 15 years and, the possession of the house which had

cost £8,000 to build. The Political Agent referred to the fact that the Rulers had previously agreed to make an annual contribution to the hospital. The Council voted to thank the Sheikh of Dubai and the British government for their generosity⁽²³⁾.

Later, more hospitals were built. A doctor, J.R. Mandody, a surgeon with the American Presbyterian Mission in India, arrived on 24th October 1956 to examine the possibilities of establishing a hospital in Abu Dhabi⁽²⁴⁾.

The establishment of two hospitals in 1956 created a need for drug dispensaries. Britain offered to contribute £1440 (RS 19000) for the training of eight dispensers. However, in 1956 there were still only three trainees who were boys⁽²⁵⁾. In the light of this shortage, the Political Officer urged the Sheikhs to make use of the grant. On the 1st November 1956 one dispensary was opened at Ras El-Khaima. The Ruler provided two rooms for that purpose. Afterwards two dispensaries were opened in the other Sheikhdoms. Naturally these dispensaries needed drugs which could only be imported. This created a need for laws to regulate the use of drugs and to prevent their abuse. These laws which were known as "The Trucial States Dangerous Drugs Regulations 1955"⁽²⁶⁾ are as follows:

1. No person subject to the Trucial States Orders, 1950 and 1952, shall procure, be in possession of, sell or otherwise supply any dangerous drugs within the limits of the Order except under licence from the Political Agent.

2. Nothing in Article 1 of this Regulation shall prohibit individuals from having in their possession such quantities of drugs as may be prescribed in good faith for their personal use by a medical practitioner who has been approved by the Political Agent for the purpose.

3. No medical practitioner subject to the Order shall issue a prescription for dangerous drugs to any person for any purpose other than **bona fide** medical treatment.

4. No person subject to the Order shall import into, or export from, the Trucial States any dangerous drugs without the written authority of the Political Agent which will be given only on the production to him of a declaration by the importer setting out in detail the descriptions and quantities of the dangerous drugs to be imported.

5. (a) Any person subject to the Order who, within the Trucial States, aids, counsels, or procures the commission in any place outside the Trucial States of any offence punishable under the provisions of any law in force in such places and providing for the control or regulation of the manufacture, sale, possession, use,

export or import of dangerous drugs shall be guilty of an offence against this Regulation.

(b) For the purpose of prosecution under the preceding paragraph the Court may receive in evidence a certificate purporting to be issued by or on behalf of the Government of any place outside the Trucial States and stating that any law mentioned in the said certificate is a law providing for the control or regulation in such place of the manufacture, sale, possession, use, export or import of dangerous drugs: and any statement in any such certificate as to the effect of the law mentioned in the certificate, or any statement in any such certificate that any facts constitute an offence against the law, shall be conclusive.

6. No person subject to the Order shall attempt to do or aid any other person in doing anything which is an offence against this Regulation.

7. Any person subject to the Order found guilty of an offence against this Regulation shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding 5,000 rupees, or both, and any dangerous drugs and receptacles and things in relation to which, or to the contents of which, any offence against the Regulation has been committed shall be liable to forfeiture.

8. The expression "dangerous drugs" used in this Regulation means the drugs listed in Schedule A hereto.

9. (1) This Regulation shall not apply to -
(a) the preparations listed in Schedule B hereto, or
(b) dangerous drugs imported or exported for the use of Her Majesty's Government.

(2) Article 1 of this Regulation shall not apply in the case of dangerous drugs procured, sold, supplied or held by or on behalf of the Al Maktum Hospital, Dubai, and the American Mission Hospital, Sharjah.

10. This Regulation may be cited as "The Trucial States Dangerous Drugs Regulation, 1955".

In spite of these laws some people began to abuse drugs. The problem was discussed at the ninth meeting of the Trucial Council held on 25th June 1956. The Chairman of the Committee (the Political Agent) stated that two foreigners had that year been captured and imprisoned by the Agency for importing hashish. The Ruler of Sharja said that he had jailed two persons for smuggling opium into his territory, and he asked if there was any known treatment to cure the addicts. The Assistant Political Agent stressed the need to stamp out trafficking in drugs. The Political Agent asked the Sheikhs "to let him have copies of any A'lan they might have issued forbidding such traffic"⁽²⁷⁾.

The Political Agency played an important role in the making and execution of those policies because of "the Rulers' lack of administrative experience and the absence of reliable educated men in the Trucial States"⁽²⁸⁾. Furthermore, a Political Officer, Mr. M.S.

Buckmaster was appointed in Abu Dhabi in September 1955 to encourage the Ruler "to turn his thoughts to setting up an elementary administration".

Administration was, rightly, seen as both necessary to and part of economic development. The two were inseparable although it was not until the 1950s that this became accepted within the Emirates by the respective rulers.

The economy of the Trucial States before the 1950s was quite primitive and unstable. It depended on pearling⁽²⁹⁾, fishing, customs duties and gifts and grants from Britain. The majority of the people were nomads, who lived by herding sheep and camels. An improvement in the economic situation required the creation of stable economic sources. The first step in that direction was the arrival in 1945 of the first geological expedition to explore for oil. For a long time no economically viable oil fields could be found. Britain felt it had to do something to improve the economic situation if it were to maintain its position in the region.

In a report to the British government in 1952 the Political Agent warned that "we cannot run the Gulf on the cheap and the maintenance of our position here will require expenditure of money"⁽³⁰⁾. Britain's position became more difficult when the Trucial States began to receive offers of help in their development projects from

other countries. The Trucial States exploited those offers by putting pressure on Britain to increase her help for them. The Rulers of Ajman and Ras El Kheima, for example, "considered approaching Egypt for financial help if her Majesty's Government cannot meet what they consider to be their minimum requirements"⁽³¹⁾.

Britain, therefore, had to reconsider her policy towards the Trucial States, and started a programme of development there. The year 1954 witnessed "the first beginnings of economic development sponsored by Her Majesty's Government in the Trucial States"⁽³²⁾ in the form of allocations for education, health and agriculture. In 1956 the British government agreed to spend £31,000 (RS.411,680) on development in the Trucial States. The Political Agent also announced that Britain would allocate more funds the following year for water exploration and drilling. That project was naturally welcomed by the Sheikhdoms as they lacked stable water supplies which were indispensable for their development programmes. The cost of hiring and transporting equipment for that purpose and bringing engineers out from England was estimated to be about £1000 to be borne by Britain. Drilling was estimated to cost RS 8000 (£10,000) to be borne by the Sheikhs. The Sheikh of Sharja said that "that was a lot of money". He wanted several wells dug, and expressed his worry that after drilling there might not be water after all.

The ruler of Umm Al-Quwain expressed his confidence in the supervisor of the project by saying that "it was well known that the Political Agent had special gifts from God and that he was always right". The Rulers of Sharjah and Dubai expressed on behalf of themselves and the other Rulers "their genuine appreciation of the efforts being made by Her Majesty's Government to assist them in various fields particularly in the matter of development and said that at no time in the history of Trucial Oman had relations between themselves and Her Majesty's Government been happier than at present"⁽³³⁾.

The water drilling project began at the end of 1954. In two years several wells were dug where water was found. Work began on the establishment of agricultural trial stations for which an adviser, Mr. L.W. Huntington was appointed. He urged the Sheikdoms to grow vegetables and fruit as he expected there would be a big market for vegetables in Dubai.

Huntington reported that⁽³⁴⁾ a small beginning had been made to improve agriculture in the Trucial States. He had made short visits to many villages, although he still had many to see. He had taken water tests from many wells and had seen most of the sort of crops grown in the area and the methods of local farmers; and he felt he was beginning to have a better idea of what was required.

In Kharran, he continued, near Ras al Khaimah, a Trials Station had been established. Although the first seeds were sown only eight months before, they now had a good idea of what could grow and what could not. The oil companies, he stressed, the Royal Air Force and the foreign communities throughout the Gulf, had all expressed some interest, and if they could grow enough, a good market was assured. They were expanding the Trials Station to four times its present size and would shortly be importing foreign cattle and poultry.

He went on to say that the two new gardens were designed especially as family holdings; for example, each garden could be worked by a man, his wife and one child. If laid out correctly, each garden would keep the family supplied with vegetables, fruit, milk and meat, and still leave plenty for sale. He emphasized it could be a pattern for future development.

He hoped to get out in the near future an expert who would advise them on the drainage of the Kharran plain. Until he had made an examination, he had advised Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammed not to allow any new large gardens to be started. He pointed out that in the coming year, he would like help from them all. He wanted to start small trial gardens in Sha'am, Shemal, Dhaid, Manama, Falaj al Aly, Sharjah, Dubai, Buraimi, Fujairah or Ghurfa, Kalba or Khor Fakhani. Those, he emphasized, would be very small, perhaps only twice the size of a

room. He would supply seeds and artificial manure and lay out the gardens. They should provide one good gardener, one good coolie for each garden and ordinary manure. He warned he could not be everywhere at once, but he or his assistant would visit each place about once a month or every six weeks. Thus, the local farmers would be able to learn how to lay out a garden and how to grow new types of seed.

He concluded by asking the Sheikhs to help him to grow vegetables and fruit for sale. He explained he would once again provide seed and manure, and they the labour. They would then agree to sell him as much as he wanted of the produce at a fixed price per pound. He would then sell the goods in bulk to the oil companies, etc and any profit would be ploughed back into the improvement of agriculture in the Trucial States.

The Political Agent advised⁽³⁵⁾ the Rulers "to seek Huntington's advice over proper farming techniques and with such cooperation they might well be able to increase revenue in their States". He also endorsed the plan of the agricultural adviser for a central marketing system since this would reduce overheads and would ensure that the quality of the products was up to a required standard.

Thus, the Trucial States began to use planning and modern methods of economy. This created new stable sources of revenue which reduced dependence on other

illegal sources of income such as trade in slaves and in arms.

In 1954, the Rulers issued an A'lan (declaration) prohibiting trade in slaves. This reduced the scale of the problem but did not stamp it out as records show that that year there were 59 incidents of trade in slaves in Sharjah alone. As for the trade in arms, the problem was more serious. Between 1950 and 1956, arms imports on "No Objection certificates" amounted to 822 rifles and 312,000 rounds of ammunition⁽³⁶⁾. This was due in part to disagreement between the Rulers about ways of controlling the trade.

The Ruler of Dubai alone, in 1956, issued an A'lan, prohibiting dealings in arms without a permit from the Ruler. The Political Agent stated that there was no need for arms since security was to be undertaken by Trucial Oman Scouts. But the Ruler of Sharjah said that the people would always prefer to carry rifles for personal protection. There was no need for registration since every Ruler knew his subjects! The Ruler of Abu Dhabi was not in favour of any change in the prevailing practice. He said that it was a traditional custom among Persians and the Arabs to carry arms and he, himself, preferred to "remain as my father and grandfather" in this matter. However, it would be "difficult to control imports, since arms could be landed anywhere on the coast at night". Moreover, it was generally believed that "it

would merely create ill-feeling to try and control arms imports, and that (despite the presence of the Trucial Oman Scouts) it would be some time before the Bedouin would travel unarmed.

In spite of the difficulties in the way of controlling trade in arms and in slaves, the problem in 1956 had diminished due to the improvement of the economic situation through increased agricultural production and higher revenue from customs duties. The improved economic conditions affected the labour situation: many Bedouins or tribesmen began to move to the cities in search of employment with companies, especially those working in the field of oil. Statistical surveys published in 1956⁽³⁷⁾ showed that the number of workers increased. For example, in the city of Das alone there were 500 workers, 60 of them Europeans, 150 Pakistanis and Indians and the rest were nationals of Abu Dhabi, most of whom were tribesmen. This new phenomenon of increased settled labour is a significant social and economic development. New political awareness began to spread among the labour force which took the form of strikes and demonstrations for better conditions. There also began to emerge the problem of illegal immigrants which greatly exacerbated the unemployment problem among the local people.

(III) EDUCATION

The society of the Trucial States was, until the fifties, a predominantly "backward and primitive"⁽³⁸⁾ one as there was no regular formal education as existed, for example, in the neighbouring Shaikhdoms of Kuwait and Bahrain. There was a special Department of Education in Kuwait, and there were fifty Kuwait students studying abroad in 1945⁽³⁹⁾. In Bahrain, education was not restricted to males, women also received education. In 1945, Mrs. Belgrave, the Political Advisor's wife, received a silver medal for her efforts in the field of women's education and services for women in Bahrain over the twenty years she had spent in that country⁽⁴⁰⁾. Thus Kuwait and Bahrain were totally different from the Sheikdoms of Trucial States with regard to the spread of education in so far as they managed to organise themselves administratively and to provide for their citizens most of the essential public services. The Trucial States, on the other hand, were totally deprived of all essential public services such as schools, courts, hospitals, roads, postal services, electricity, etc., because there were no "educated people to run such services"⁽⁴¹⁾.

When the Trucial States began to have contacts with neighbouring countries, Britain began to fear, lest they should fall under foreign influence such as from Saudi Arabia or Egypt⁽⁴²⁾. Britain had to do something about

the situation there before it reached a stage when her presence in the Sheikhdoms and her relations with them would be jeopardized. All the reports of the Political Residents clearly demonstrate that transforming the society of the Trucial States from a "primitive" to a "civilized" society could not take place without the spread of "education". However, it was feared that the spread of education might create a political awareness that would demand political changes in the region or develop into political opposition to the rule of the Sheikhs and their relationship with Britain, as had happened in Bahrain and Kuwait. In a letter dated 29th January 1951, the Resident Political Resident commented on the potential risks that might result from the spread of education by saying

"some concern has been expressed regarding the results which education may have on the situation in the Gulf. At present, there is no 'effendi' class in the Sheikhdoms, there are no local doctors or lawyers and no intellegentsia outside the Ruling family and merchants. It is inevitable that with the spread of education there will be in due course demands for modifications in the existing patriarchal forms of the government. There may even be some anti-British agitation, but I am doubtful if there will be any really popular demand for complete independence in the Sheikhdoms for so long as we are able to give them our protection"⁽⁴³⁾.

He added that it was not Britain alone that feared the results of the spread of education; the Sheikhs themselves were afraid that education might lead to demands for a change in the traditional system⁽⁴⁴⁾.

Despite these risks Britain, in order to protect her reputation regionally and internationally, had no alternative but to agree to contribute towards the establishment of regular formal education. The Sheikhs were to bear part of the cost. Kuwait also undertook to pay the salaries of the teachers who came from abroad to teach in the state schools which were to be established in the Trucial States. Talks on the need to establish state education started in 1945 when Sheikh Abdulla Al-Jabir Al-Sabah, in his capacity as the director of education in Kuwait, visited the Sheikhdome of Al-Sharja and had dinner with its ruler⁽⁴⁵⁾. Demands by the Political Agent for education were again made in 1950. However, implementation did not begin to take place until 1954 when Britain allocated £5,000 for the establishment of a school in Al-Sharja.⁽⁴⁶⁾ That school was opened on 14 January 1955. It was mainly staffed by teachers supplied by Kuwait and these were augmented in November by two teachers provided by Egypt. The Egyptian government also promised to provide doctors and technical experts⁽⁴⁷⁾.

The number of students registered at school in 1956 was 450 and there were 7 teachers who were paid by the Government of Kuwait⁽⁴⁸⁾. The educational situation continued to improve considerably in Al-Sharja. Sheikh Sakr of Al-Sharja supported the spread of education. He reserved some places in Al-Azhar University at Cairo and

in the Syrian University⁽⁴⁹⁾. He used, from time to time, to discuss with the British Political Agent the difficulties and obstacles that stood in the way of setting up that school. That was the reason why educational missions were sent abroad. Sheikh Salem, stepbrother of the ruler of Al-Sharja, was reported to have gone to the United States for study. He studied at the University of Indiana, where he took a two year course in Railway Engineering. The costs of that were to be borne by the Arab American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and the Saudi government. He was accompanied by his brother Mohammed. Sheikh Salem announced that he would not return to Al-Sharja until the economic situation improved with the production of oil. He also said that he was receiving a substantial monthly salary from Saudi Arabia⁽⁵⁰⁾. In the other Emirates too, education began to spread. In October 1956 Sheikh Shakhtaboot set up a new school. That action by the Sheikh was "a development as welcome as it was unexpected"⁽⁵¹⁾. He wanted the school to be concerned with the affairs of Abu Dhabi alone, and did not want to have any foreign teachers in it.

Some specialised schools were also established. The Sheikdom of Ras Al-Khaima asked Britain to help it to set up a school of agriculture⁽⁵²⁾. Foreign teachers began to come from various countries to the Emirates. Teachers from Jordan and one Palestinian teacher from Jaffa came to teach in the schools of Dubai, which had a

new Director by the name of Hashim Abu Omer in November 1956. The appointment of this Director lead to an improvement in the educational system in Dubai. The Political Agent in the Gulf admired him because

"for the first time in the history of the Trucial States students have begun to wear Western style school dress. There were certain objections from some of the parents, but the headmasters said that the new dress was not contrary to religion or the local customs. The parents seemed to have been mollified. Sheikh Rashed himself has been agreeably surprised to see his own sons wash their faces regularly in the morning and cut and clean their nails"⁽⁵³⁾.

Education did not affect the family alone, it also affected the social as well as political life. With regard to social life, education led to the setting up by some Persian youths of social clubs and a sports club. The activities of that club included activities such as cards. What mattered to the political resident was that the club did not contain books or magazines and therefore it "appeared to have no political significance"⁽⁵⁴⁾. In September 1956 the first cultural club was opened in Dubai. The founders of the club were a group of young men who were working in the Customs, the Bank and the Court of Dubai together with a small group of traders. The first meeting was held on 21st October 1956. The opening address was made by Sheikh Shankidi, a judge at the Court of Dubai, in which he said "the time has come for the people of Dubai to improve their life, especially

in respect of education. They should work together to solve their social problems"⁽⁵⁵⁾. The next speaker was someone by the name of Majid Bin Hamad Bin Aziz, who asked the traders to make donations to the club. He is reported to have said "the Arabs should unite and think of the welfare of their country"⁽⁵⁶⁾. A place was rented in which from ten to fifteen members used to meet every night to read books or magazines.

Britain feared lest this should have political implications such as the organisation of demonstrations, or that it might lead to the establishment of opposing political parties. Neither Britain nor the rulers were particularly happy about these clubs. The Political Resident Representative said "the club's functions are being carefully watched, since there was a strong suspicion that it is politically inclined"⁽⁵⁷⁾. This is why Judge Shangadi was dismissed shortly afterwards. After some negotiation between the Political Resident and the Sheikh of Dubai, a new judge by the name of Abd Al-Rahman Al-Dajjany was appointed. In October 1956 he delivered a Friday Prayer sermon on the occasion of the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, in which he said "all peoples, regardless of their religions, must learn to cooperate with one another for their mutual benefit"⁽⁵⁸⁾. The Political Agent commented on that sermon by saying "these wise words were, however, lost on most of his hearers since few of them understood his high, Classical Arabic"⁽⁵⁹⁾.

While it was unlikely that much progress in the field of education had been achieved over a period of two years, it was not an insignificant achievement that the foundation was laid for formal education, though it took place later than it did in many other countries in the region.

The spread of education in the Trucial States, limited though it was, resulted in what Britain and the Sheikdoms' rulers had feared, namely that local students and teachers got involved in political activities such as demonstrations and strikes (above pp.175-188).

(IV) CONCLUDING REMARKS

As we have seen in this chapter the winds of change were rather a gentle breeze. This is particularly striking if we compare the very modest advances in institutions of state with the rather more extensive political activity of the time (above, Chapter 4, especially I(ii)). In the case of the latter there is a development in terms of pan-Arab feelings and interests. The stage is the whole of the Middle East and the Emirates are a part with its own particular and special role. But in terms of the development of institutions within the Emirates there is a vast difference. Even states, such as Kuwait, are far in advance of the very primitive Emirates. From the documents cited, it is

clear that the respective Emirate rulers had little grasp of the idea of a state in other than familial terms.

British policy in the 1950-56 period was not particularly helpful in redressing this situation. London was thinking in rather small terms (£2000 for education, £1000 for sanitation!). This may and probably almost certainly was a consequence of post-World War II British poverty. At the same time it seems also to be true that there was a lack of will on the part of the British to institute any far reaching or fundamental change. We have constant references (a) to the backward or "primitive" state of the Emirates and (b) a fear (well founded) of the consequences of introducing change in any of the various aspects of Emirate society. As we have seen, the political side needed very little encouragement, or alteration in the status quo, to take undesirable forms.

The view of the rulers in the Emirates is particularly interesting in this respect. There is a constant reference to the "cultures of fathers and grandfathers" and a consistent unwillingness to change or alter social and economic practice, at least until an absolutely certain return can be guaranteed. The issue of licensing fire arms for the bedouin is a good example of this. It was said to be against tradition but the real reason was clearly the old one, that the bedouin were the counter-balance in the rulers' favour against

the power and money of the coasting trading merchant groups.

Given these political considerations and the wider pan-Arab issue, especially after Suez, we should not be surprised at the minimal progress of state institutions in this period. On the contrary, perhaps the most surprising thing is the progress made from these basic institutions in the twenty years following the 1950s (see postscript below, pp.260).

NOTES[CHAPTER 5]

- (1) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-18919, 28th February 1935
- (2) Heard-Bar, Frauke, from Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, England, 1982, p.158
- (3) Ibid:
- (4) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-45192, External Department, London, 1945
- (5) Ibid:
- (6) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-45192, 1945
- (7) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-45192 (Jurisdiction in Trucial Court Sheikhdoms), Political Resident, Persian Gulf, 1945
- (8) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-114741, 1955
- (9) Ibid:
- (10) See Roberts-Wray, op.cit., p.90 for details
- (11) P.R.O. (F.O.) 370-114741, 1955
- (12) Ibid:
- (13) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109814, 25th June 1954
- (14) Part III, Article 13 of the Orders in Council; in the 1959 version the Judges of the High Courts of Kenya and Cyprus were replaced by "Persons who hold or have held judicial office under the Crown".
- (15) The matter of jurisdiction is further elaborated on in Article 8, b) to e), regarding British property, ships, aircraft, and certain persons who were physically outside the limits of this order.
- (16) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956

- (17) I.O. R/15-4-11, Dubai Local Affairs, Residency Agent,
Sharjah, 18th June 1938
- (18) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (19) Ibid:
- (20) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120557, 1956
- (21) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109814, 1954
- (22) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109805, 1954
- (23) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109814, 1954
- (24) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (25) Ibid:
- (26) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-114755, Queen's Regulation made under
Article 82 of the Trucial States Order in Council,
1950, No.4, 1955
- (27) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (28) Ibid:
- (29) Fenelon, The United Arab Emirates, London, 1973, p.16
- (30) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109805, British Residency, Bahrain,
12th March 1954
- (31) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120540, 7th May 1956
- (32) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109805, 1954
- (33) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109814, Minutes of the Fifth Meeting
of the Trucial Council held in the Political Agency
Residency on 25th June 1954
- (34) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (35) Ibid:

- (36) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, Minutes of the Nineth Meeting of the Trucial Council on 25th June 1956
- (37) Ibid.
- (38) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-91326, Report from Sir R. Hay, British Residency, Bahrain, 29th January 1951
- (39) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-45177, Report from Political Resident, 1945
- (40) Ibid:
- (41) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120540, 7th May 1956
- (42) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109805, 12th March 1954
- (43) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-91326, 1951
- (44) Ibid:
- (45) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-45177, 1945
- (46) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109805, March 1954
- (47) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-126540, 7th May 1956
- (48) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (49) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120540, 7th May 1956
- (50) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (51) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (52) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (53) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (54) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (55) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956
- (56) Ibid:
- (57) Ibid:
- (58) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553
- (59) Ibid:

CHAPTER 6CONCLUSION: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PAST

In his The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, Professor William Louis said:⁽¹⁾

"The history of [1945-1951] may be interpreted as an unsuccessful attempt to transform the system of domination, ... into a relationship of equal partners. ... The aim was to sustain British influence ... in order to maintain Britain's position as a world power".

How accurate is this in respect of the Emirates? The answer is that it is not, but for a variety of reasons. In the first place Louis is concerned with a very short period and the emphasis is on the Labour Government's policies in the immediate post-war era. Second, his comment really applies only to the major issues of Palestine and the Persian Oil crisis of 1951. The Emirates are not just peripheral to these major issues but, internally, had nothing like the resistance to British domination which was present in the rest of the Middle East. Despite the Nationalist Movement and some institutional development in the 1950s, they remained isolated.

In the Introduction we talked about the idea of "static" imperialism and we are now in a position to

explain this idea a little further. Given that imperial and great power interests were paramount until 1956 it should come as no surprise to learn that the structure of the so called "tribal" societies of the Gulf has remained in existence. "Tribal" here refers to an endogamous unit of which there are a number in the Emirates. (See Table No. 1-2 P.238-241) According to Arab genealogists the classification of tribes is

'very elaborate and extends to twelve or more grades and ramifications, for which there are no corresponding names in English language. The relative order and value, however, of these divisions are very uncertain as the authorities differ on the subject.

In Oman the system adopted is more than ordinarily simple and the divisions are very few. The genealogist appear to make a distinction, but no real difference, between the various sorts of tribes which are differentiated by names. The system seems to be merely a numerical scale in which the trunks or stocks come first and then the smaller branches, but there is a wide divergence as to the order in which these names should come.

The following is a list of some of the more important grades:- Jadtham, Jamhoor, Shaab, Kabeela, Amara, Batn, Asheera, Faseela, Rahat, Fakhth, etc.'(2)

The shaikh is regarded as the father of his tribe and the system of government is simply patriarchal. Generally each fakhth, or subdivision, has its own shaikh, who considers himself independent of the others, but in almost every case one of these subdivisional shaikhs takes rank above, and has superior power to, the others, especially in time of war.

TABLE 6-I

Country	U.A.E.						
	Abu Dhabi	Dubai	Al Shargah	Ras Al Khimh	Uml Qwin	Al Fjarah	Ajman
Name of Ruler	Al Nhayan	Al Maktom	Al Qawsem	Al Qawsem	Al Mully	Al Sharqi	Al Qasam
Name of Tribe	Bany Yas	Beny Yas	Al Qawsem	Al Qawsem	Al Mully	Al Sharqi	Al Nami
Date	1855	1894	1790	1790	1820	1892	1820

The sheikhship is usually hereditary and is assumed by the eldest son, unless he be incapable, on the death of the father; the son succeeds even if he be a mere youth.⁽³⁾ The treaties described in Chapter 1 were made with tribal chiefs. The tribes which ruled the region at that time continue to be crucial, even after independence and the formation of a state. That state continues to be greatly influenced politically and otherwise by the tribal make-up of the society.

The current ruling tribes in the seven Emirates date back to 1749. Two of the largest tribes to migrate at that time were Al Qawasim and Bani Yas. The former settled at what is now called Ras Al Kheima "the head of the tent". This tribe has continued to rule there since then. The latter tribe, Bani Yas, settled in the interior at what is now called Abu Dhabi "the place of the deer". (See Table No.(1)) p.238

The most important branch of the Al Qawasim tribe is Bani Qatab who lived at Al Sharja and have continued to rule there since 1920. Aal Ze'ab and Abu Ali live at Omm al Quwain. Abu Khruban live at Ajman. Bani Yas is made of about 20 sub-tribes.⁽⁴⁾ The most important of which, Al Qawasim and Bani Yas, continue to be the two largest tribes in the Emirates and constitute two major competing political entities of great influence on the political situation in the Emirates. Abu Dhabi has more tribes

dispersed throughout its territory than any other sheikhdom in the UAA. The tribes have traditionally constituted the most important source of local political support for the ruling family. The most recent manifestation of the importance of these tribes in local affairs was Sheikh Zayd's appointment of tribal leaders to fill most of the 50 seats in the short-lived Consultative Assembly established in January 1972.* The Bani Yas, which includes the Al Nuhayyan family, are the most important tribe. See Appendix 7, p.326.

The Al Nuhayyan belong to one of the smaller sub-tribes of the Bani Yas, the Al Bu falah. In terms of UAE politics it is significant that,

'members of the Al Bu Falah and other branches of the Bani Yas are also found in Dubai and Sharjah - a factor that sometimes contributes to friction between Abu Dhabi and these two states'.(5)

In fact, the ruling family of Dubai is a member of the Al Bu Falasah, one of the largest sub-tribes of the Bani Yas, which clashed with the Al Bu Falah in the 1830's and left Abu Dhabi to settle in Dubai. For further details on the number and geographical distribution of the tribes, see the Table No. 2 at pp:240

A study of this table shows the following:

1. Tribes vary in number. This affects the political

*See Table (3) p:248.

TABLE 6-2								
TRIBAL POPULATION IN TRUCIAL OMAN 1968								
Emirates	Abu	Dubai	Sharigah	Ajman	Umm Al	Ras El	Fujaira	Total
TRIBE	Dhabi				Guiwain	Khaimah		
Bani Yas	4,597*	3,913*	1,424	213	1	290	27	10,465
Al Shrgguiyyin	80	65	116	69	25	82	8,372*	8,809
Shihuh Habus	147	74	74	13	-	5,845	244	6,397
Al Ali	60	155	505	85	2,862*	1,445	3	5,118
Al Gawsim	101	108	3,592*	8	3	1,055*	14	4,881
Al Manasir	3,224	275	49	21	-	38	-	3,607
Zaab	22	27	710	7	4	2,455	-	3,225
Al Dhawahir	2,844	42	109	41	-	9	57	3,102
Mazari	1,287	271	293	17	38	1,062	76	3,044
Al Bu Shamis	370	769	689	190	12	408	-	2,438
Bani Kitab	617	156	1,458	21	6	112	-	2,370
Al Nuaym	325	171	219	616*	25	968	10	2,334
Al Nagbiyyin	16	-	1,345	-	-	541	3	1,905
Al Awamir	1,721	69	37	7	19	34	5	1,892
Other(1000)	2,339	1,769	2,146	303	214	3,597	327	10,695
Totals	17,750	7,864	12,769	1,611	3,209	17,941	9,138	70,282

Source: 1968 Trucial States Census (unpublished). No census after this.

(*) The tribe or tribal confederation to which the ruling family in the Emirate belongs.

situation in the Emirate. The bigger the number of tribe members, the more influential it is in relation to the ruling tribe. The tribe in power allies itself with the larger tribes to the detriment of the smaller ones which, in turn, make alliance among themselves and may seek the help of tribes from outside the Sheikdom. This leads to political instability and the continuation of tribal wars.

2. Each tribe is spread over a number of locations. Up to the 1950s, members of a tribe would be loyal to the chief of that tribe regardless of the geographical distance between them. Colonel T.C. Fowle said, on 21st September 1934, that,⁽⁶⁾

'he had come to the conclusion that though these frontier lines will look very nice and neat on the map, off the map and in actual working practice they may be a considerable nuisance, if not a danger. Frontiers, while necessary elsewhere, in Arabia are merely necessary evils only to be drawn when unavoidable. The population of the country is nomadic - the tribes wandering considerable distances according to the season in search of water and pasture - the average Arab Sheikh has a very vague idea as to where his territory begins and ends, and often there are no well-defined physical features along which a boundary could conveniently be placed. In the eyes of the average Arab - and when one is considering the creation of frontiers one must consider local public opinion however unorthodox this may appear - a frontier is not so much geographical as tribal and political. A Sheikh in answer to a question as to how far his authority extends will rarely answer "from A to B"; he will say "over such and such a tribe".'

However, border disputes continue today both within the Emirates and between them and their neighbours.


The map of the Emirates (p . 244 .) shows the geographical distribution and illustrates the main problems which can be summarized as follows:

1. As a result of tribal distribution, the territories of Dubai and Ras al Khaima is each made up of two parts, Ajman four parts, Fujaira 6 parts, and Sharja 7 disparate parts. The division of the territories of the Emirates into various geographically separate parts made them difficult to run.

2. Some small territories belong to more than one Emirate. For example, the village of Duba on the coast of Oman with no more than 2,500 people is divided among Oman, Sharjah and Al Fujaira. This division certainly causes friction among the Emirates concerned.

3. Perhaps the most curious fact about the geographical distribution of the Emirates is that some of them have within their own borders an area of land belonging to another Emirate. For example, Al-Fujaira has within it a piece of land that belongs to Ajman. This curious situation of one-part-of-a-territory-within-another-

Internal Frontiers of the United Arab Emirates



territory came about when some Sheikh bought land within the territory of another Sheikh.(7)

The division of the border of the Emirates on a tribal basis caused many political and military clashes among the Emirates.

In 1972 there was an armed clash between Sharja and Fujaira over disputed territory. The dispute was settled only after the intervention of the federal government which bought the disputed piece of land.(8) Also in 1976 there was a dispute between Sharja and Dubai over a desert area of 150,000 square metres. This time the federal government's intervention failed to solve the dispute. When the head of the federation, Sheikh Zaid, threatened to resign in protest, the two disputing Emirates agreed to refer the matter to a British-French committee to arbitrate and suggest a solution.(9) But the dispute has not yet been settled.

The ruler of the Emirates, Sheikh Zaid, was indignant at the border disputes within his country. He complained in August 1976 that he failed to solve tribal disputes over a few hundred metres of land despite a week long shuffle between the disputing Emirates. Failure to solve that particular dispute prevented the establishment of a hospital that was supposed to be built on that piece of land.(10)

Among the most important reasons for the failure of the federal government to solve the border disputes among its Emirates were the weakness of the federal authorities and the excessive autonomy of each Emirate which is a result of the tribal influence on the ruling authorities.

The tribal influence on the political system in the Emirates hampered the political authority of the federal government. It is remarkable in the Gulf states that there is a wide gap between rapid social change and that conservative nature of the government system especially in respect of the decision-making machinery. The rulers easily accept social modernisation such as in the sectors of education, health, housing, etc., but were reluctant, indeed opposed, to any change in the political situation such as in respect to the electoral constituencies and constitutional institutions. Therefore the Gulf society lives in a state of division and instability. The middle class which emerged as a result of education and contacts with foreign culture and countries gradually changed allegiance from the tribe to the state but continued to live under the old tribal political structure.⁽¹¹⁾ This is soon very likely to lead to conflict between the middle class and the authorities.

In the UAE, however, there are already signs of discontent among the educated younger members of the

ruling dynasties who openly call for free democratic elections to the Federal National Council (FNC) rather than,

'the present custom of nominating its members according to tribal and family ties. Failing to get their way, a few young and talented ministers have already resigned senior posts in protest against the centralized manner with which the old leaders run the UAE's affairs and they have supporters among the influential Bani Khalifa branch of Abu Dhabi's Royal Family as well as among other young members of Royal Families throughout the UAE (especially in Sharjah)'. (12)

At Al Ain University there have been debates on the nature of the federal system as well as on the way its representatives are selected. Demonstrations occurred in Abu Dhabi in March 1979.

To guard against such a possibility, the ruling families did their best to strengthen their family and tribal influence by keeping to themselves and to their most loyal tribal chiefs the most sensitive posts in the state. (See Appendix 7)

Furthermore, they have established nominal parliamentary structures with no powers of legislation or control over the government. The Sheikh has the power to dissolve or suspend the Parliament.

In 1971 a federal national council (FNC) was established in the United Arab Emirates made up of 40 members drawn from the various Emirates as follows: 8

TABLE 6-3

**ABU DHABIANS IN THE 28-MEMBER UAE CABINET OF
DECEMBER 1973 IN ORDER OF RANK**

<i>Rank</i>		
2	Deputy Prime Minister	Khalifah bin Zayd bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan = *
4	Public Works	Hamdan bin Muhammad bin Khalifah Al Nuhayyan + * %
5	Interior	Mubarak bin Muhammad Al Nuhayyan + *
7	Foreign Affairs	Ahmad bin Khalifah al-Suwaydi * #
9	Health	Sayf bin Muhammad bin Khalifah Al Nuhayyan + *
12	Oil and Mineral Wealth	Mana' bin Sa'id al-'Utaybah * #
17	Information	Ahmad bin Hamid * #
22	Planning	Muhammad bin Khalifah al-Kindi * #
24	Minister of State for Financial and Industrial Affairs	Muhammad al-Habrush * #
25	Minister of State for Internal Affairs	Hamudah bin 'Ali * #
27	Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs	'Utaybah bin 'Abdallah al-'Utaybah * #

Notes:

= Heir Apparent and Deputy Ruler


* Members of the Abu Dhabi Council of Ministers 1971-73

+ Members of the Bani Khalifah branch of the ruling Al Nuhayyan family

% Head of the Bani Khalifah

Member of a family aligned to the Al Nuhayyan

6-24: UAE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, 1974



SOURCE: Based on a schema provided by John Duke Anthony in his *Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*, Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute

members from Abu Dhabi, 8 from Dubai, 6 from Sharjah, 6 from Ras El Kheima, 4 from each of Ajman, Umm El Quwaim and Al Fujaira ^{see Table (4)}. All are appointed by the Sheikhs of their Emirates. The appointees are often either relatives of the Sheikhs or Chiefs of allied tribes. The only qualifications needed are that the appointee should be literate and over 25 years old. The responsibility of the national council is to examine matters referred to it by the cabinet and to issue relevant decisions and laws that can be effective only after the approval of the High Federal Council which is made up of the ruling Sheikhs. (13)

Thus the task of the national council is but advisory. This situation came about on the basis of the 1971 temporary constitution which was supposed to be replaced by a permanent one in 5 years time. However, as a result of tribal disputes among the ruling Sheikhs the old constitution has not so far been replaced. The federal ruler Sheikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi has similarly not been replaced since the establishment of the federation. The situation is very likely to continue as it is since every Sheikh would be reluctant to give up any of his powers. The ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zaid, would be the most reluctant of the Sheikhs to allow any change since he would be the biggest loser because he is currently the

President of the federation and because Abu Dhabi, under the current temporary constitution, has a power of veto which no other Emirate has. Thus the ultimate power is virtually in the hands of Sheikh Zaid alone. This situation is detested by the rulers of Sharja and Ras El Kheima who might well do something to change it. The tribal influence is thus shown to be a major factor of potential political instability in the United Arab Emirates.

This brief description of the state and the society in the UAE as it exists now, has shown no major changes since the 1950s. For evidence of this we return to the 1950s and to the relatively new policy of social and economic development (Chapters 4 and 5). As we saw, there was the establishment in the 1950s of the first school, the first hospital, the first written laws, the emergence of a civil service and public services as well as the improvement of methods of agriculture and water drilling. Britain contributed some material and financial assistance as well as advisors and experts.

This development programme was enhanced by the establishment in 1952 of the first Federation of the Emirates chaired by the British Agent in the Gulf, the so called "Trucial States Council". For the first time in the history of the Emirates, Britain managed through that Council to bring together the Sheikhs to discuss the conditions in their Sheikhdoms and ways of their development. This was shown in the report of the

Political Agent dated 5th July 1954 in which there is reference to the fifth meeting on 25th June 1954⁽¹⁶⁾. It appeared to him from the start that, whether from the congenial surroundings and setting or from some other cause, many of the Rulers had lost much of the shyness which had characterised their behaviour at earlier sessions. Sheikh Rashid of Dubai, released from the inhibiting presence of his father, was able to play a full and valuable role in the proceedings. Even the Ruler of Abu Dhabi whose bearing at the only previous meeting he had attended had been sphinx-like made several interventions in the debate. Admittedly these were almost without exception to express opposition and dissent from the opinions of his colleagues, but his brother Sheikh Zaid subsequently explained that the Ruler had quarrelled with him on the journey to Dubai and that the opinions expressed except in one instance were indicative more of general ill humour than the Ruler's real views which were known to vary from day to day. Sheikh Zaid took the opportunity privately to identify the State of Abu Dhabi wholeheartedly with the proceedings and decisions of the Council whatever its Ruler might have said to the contrary. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi also tended to appreciate individual attention and did not entirely approve of the position of finding himself only one among six others of equal rank. He was, moreover, by no means devoid of histrionic sense and

liked to play the different roles suitable for various occasions.

With the exception of Sheikh Shakhbut, whose attitude caused genuine amusement to his fellows and quite possibly to himself, all who attended appeared to be in cheerful and affable spirits. Permission to smoke was requested by the Regent of Dubai, frequent pleasantries were exchanged, and an informal atmosphere achieved which led to a wholly desirable urge for conversation. While the number of remarks addressed specifically to the Chair was far larger than at any previous meeting it still left much to be desired by the strict canons of procedure for Committees. At the same time the audience appeared genuinely interested in the items of the Agenda which were eagerly discussed by the Rulers in a series of impromptu sub-committees round the table. The meeting was otherwise remarkable when compared to its predecessors in two respects. Firstly, the usual attempt to spin out discussion to the maximum was not needed since it proved in fact impossible to get through the agenda and, secondly, for the first time there were items for discussion put forward and initiated by individual Rulers themselves.

A further point of note was that for the first time the Rulers seem to have been sufficiently interested to talk about the discussions of the meeting to the outside world. Dubai "suq" (market) was fully informed of the

proceedings by the next day and in the matter of travel documents and change of nationality, as well as water drilling expressed high approval. On the latter issue, H.M.G. was awarded considerable credit which more properly belonged to the Rulers of Dubai and Sharjah. In spite of the informality of the procedure the minutes showed achievement not only in prospect but also in retrospect as a result of the previous session of last November. Four items required further action by the Rulers after the November meeting of Council, and in each case progress can be regarded as satisfactory. Each one of the Trucial States had published the 'Alan' (decree) against the sale of slaves and in some instances, notably Ajman, the ordinance has been enforced with salutary results. The new arrangements for Travel Documents have been introduced and a stop appears to have been put to their illegal sale. With one exception (Fujairah) all Rulers have carried out the resolution that they should give a fixed sum of money annually to the Dubai hospital payable by Banker's order or its equivalent. Finally, although the Foreign Office draft for Traffic Regulations was not accepted, the cause was not apathy but excessive and possibly misguided enthusiasm on the part of the two Rulers most concerned, both of whom took independent action in accordance at least with the spirit of the Council's decision.

In spite of this, the Council sometimes experienced difficulties from the Sheikhs, as pointed out in a report prepared by the Political Agent in 1956⁽¹⁷⁾. These problems were firstly, the lack of friendship between certain of the Rulers. This was covered up by Arab formality and politeness during such an event as the Trucial Council. Sharjah and Dubai were having a trade war, trouble over passports, and trouble over frontiers and their relations could not therefore be called good. He went on that the only sign of this in the Council was that they sat on opposite sides of the room. The Ruler of Ras al Khaimah wanted to settle his problems with Fujariah by going to war. He warned him off this and there was distinct awkwardness when the two had to sit next to each other in the Council, only relieved when Ali of Ajman diplomatically sat between them.

Second, there was the lack of common problems of interest to them such as agriculture, but as a whole it could be best dealt with between the Political Agent and individual Sheikhs, who were very localist, i.e. the Sheikh of Ajman cared only for Manama, Sharjah for Dhaid, and Umm al Qawain for Falaj al Ali. He added there were other problems which affected all the Rulers but which were far too controversial to be dealt with by the Trucial Council i.e. frontiers and passports were regulated by the Agency, and while a Ruler may have had individual opinions on it (and an individual policy) he

would not necessarily have wished to let the Agency (or the other Rulers) know of it.

Thirdly, there were problems of genuine concern for the Trucial Council, and the comparative liveliness of the Rulers during their discussion made it obvious as to which these were. In the last meeting of 1956, he stressed that the subjects which evoked interest were the abolition of arms carrying, the registration of arms which the Rulers were, as a whole, against, and the question of the repair of the road at Qallah Mahafidh. He added that roads, over which all the Rulers and their followers travelled, evoked general concern in the Trucial States and the Rulers had started to do something about them on their own accord.

As a whole, he concluded it was correct to say that the Council would remain a "hot house plant" until the possession of funds gave it the opportunity of making effective, non-controversial decisions affecting all the states, and that while it was useful as a symbolic gathering showing the unity of the States, its main attraction to the Rulers would be in the feast that it gave them.

However, in spite of these shortcomings, the establishment of the Trucial States Council in 1952 was a very important development in the history of the region.

The new Council began to establish constitutional organs and legal and executive organizations. This marked the beginning of the formation of the State. Individuals began to be liberated from the restrictions of tribal customs and traditions and to move towards allegiance to the State rather than to the tribe.

The process has continued with the formation of the Emirates in 1971. But they remain control^{led} by the same families as before independence and attempted coups (the last in June 1987 in Sharjah) still occur within the ruling families. (18)

NOTES[CHAPTER 6]

- (1) The Clarendon Press at p.i
- (2) S. B. Miles, op. cit., p.420
- (3) Ibid., p.421
- (4) Al-Tabtbai, A., op. cit., p.362
- (5) J. Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, pp.131-132
- (6) F.O.371/17815
- (7) Al-Tabtbai, A., op. cit., pp.422-423
- (8) J. D. Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, pp.214-215
- (9) John Townsend, United Arab Emirates, Political Developments, pp.6-7, Arab Report and Memo, Vol.I, No.11, July 4 1977
- (10) Ali, Khalifa, The U.A.E.; Unity in Fragmention, p.103, Crom.Helm, London, 1979
- (11) Al-Nafisy, A., Gulf Co-operation Council, Taha Publishers, Ltd., London, 1982, p.64
- (12) Plascov, A., op. cit., p.149. See also Ann Fyfe, Democracy in the Gulf, the Middle East, June 1980, p.33
- (13) A. Khalifa, op. cit., pp.45-46
- (14) U.A.E., Provisional Constitution of U.A.E., Middle East Journal 26, No.3, 1972, pp.307-25
- (15) Plascov, A., op. cit., p.149; also Middle East Economic Digest, 9 January 1981

(16) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-109814, 1954

(17) P.R.O. (F.O.) 371-120553, 1956

(18) Al Majalla, The International News Magazine, London,
No.386, July 1-7, 1987

**POSTSCRIPT: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TRUCIAL STATES
AFTER 1956**

I. British Policy Towards the Arab Emirates 1956-1970

The period following the 1950s witnessed sweeping changes on an international level, particularly in the Gulf area where the United States emerged as a powerful country threatening British interests in the region.

There was no doubt that the competition between Britain and the United States in the Gulf area over oil concessions threatened the relations between the two countries. However, the United States tried to maintain the good relations between the two countries. This was evident from a statement made in 1957 by the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in which he emphasised the point that it was necessary to stop these 'differences' for the sake of resisting the common enemy, i.e. the Soviet Union, also taking the view that what happened or what may happen should be regarded as minor matters which should not affect the interests between Britain and the United States⁽¹⁾. Once again the United States admitted the political and military superiority of Britain in the region, despite Britain's weaker military position in the Middle East after its withdrawal from Egypt in 1954.

The United States committed itself to help Britain in covering the defence costs of what is called the 'Eastof-Suez' strategy. This state of affairs made Britain more dependent on the United States which then

had golden opportunities to extend its influence to the Gulf in a way that was not previously known⁽²⁾.

British defence policy paid much attention to the military bases in the 'East-of-Suez' area. The White Paper issued by the British Defence Ministry in 1957⁽³⁾ outlined this policy which stressed the important role of some of the bases in which Britain enjoyed political and military superiority, particularly in the Gulf area, Aden and the Emirates on the Omani coast. In this new policy, oil was regarded as very important, so Britain took the responsibility of defending the area and giving it military support. In order to implement its new policy, Britain decided in 1966 to move its military base from Aden to the Gulf area, to Bahrain, Muscat and Al-Sharifa which became British military bases⁽⁴⁾. Moreover, the British Labour Government issued a number of statements which indicated its intention of a final withdrawal from Aden and the Protectorates in a time not later than 1967⁽⁵⁾. Later, the British Defence Secretary announced that his country would concentrate its forces in the Gulf area in order to protect those oil-producing Emirates. Britain, then, justified its policy, saying that if it withdrew from the Gulf, there would be serious danger as a result of a conflict between the Gulf Emirates and the bigger neighbouring countries, a matter which would create a chaotic situation in the area and would give rise to an increasing number of internal problems⁽⁶⁾.

This situation did not last long because of the political "awareness" which began to spread among people and because of the emergence of national movements in many parts of the world among which was the Gulf area. The British government was convinced that its traditional military presence was unsustainable any longer and it would be better to look after her interests mainly on the basis of mutual understanding between Britain and the rulers of the region. This understanding should be based on friendship treaties instead of direct military domination. Consequently, the British Defence Ministry declared in 1967 a new policy, which called for the reduction in Britain's military forces in the 'East-of-Suez' area. Afterwards, the policy of withdrawal appeared officially in the statement which was made on 16th January 1968 by the British Labour government under the leadership of Harold Wilson. The statement spoke of the British government's intention of withdrawing its forces from the 'East-of-Suez' area in a period not later than the end of 1971 and practically this meant its withdrawal from the Gulf. In fact, Britain's military presence remained until that time, in addition to some treaties with the Arab Emirates, most of which dated back to the nineteenth century. Those treaties gave the British government the responsibility of protecting the Emirates and caring for their foreign affairs⁽⁷⁾.

The Labour government justified its statement on the grounds that it firstly faced many economic difficulties and secondly because of its adherence to the austerity policy it was following. There was no possibility of continuing to bear the burdens and responsibilities of keeping its military presence in some territories which were thousands of miles away. In addition to this, the British forces in the Gulf were no longer regarded as protecting British interests so much as a kind of provocation to the people's feelings. Moreover, the withdrawal of British forces might support Britain's position in the eyes of the people of the Gulf in that it would appear to have abandoned its old imperial policy⁽⁸⁾. The last and most important reason was that it was useless for Britain to keep acting the role of the 'guard' or in other words the protector of interests which concerned other countries as well, since oil and its protection were a matter of concern not only to Britain but to other countries in Europe, the United States and Japan, though these countries had no military forces in the region to protect their interests⁽⁹⁾.

However, during the three years which followed the announcement of the policy of withdrawal in January 1968 and its implementation in 1971, the British government took steps to secure stability in the region, and consequently kept the situation and regimes at that time under control, so that it might not face the same results

which followed its withdrawal from South Yemen, where the rulers were discharged, and a New Left government was to lead the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen⁽¹⁰⁾. The most important results which the British and American authorities expected from the policy of withdrawal were:

- (1) Riots, which may be caused inside the Gulf Emirates themselves, and which could be the result of the people's political "awareness" after their contact with the rest of the world, and which had some bearing on the previous political situations⁽⁹⁾.
- (2) The withdrawal would lead to a situation of instability because the British military absence might have given rise to the rebirth of tribal conflicts and traditional emulation among the ruling families⁽¹¹⁾.
- (3) The British military absence would perhaps help, as it were, the growth of a new military power i.e. the Soviet Union, especially at a time when left movements in the area were on the scene⁽¹²⁾.

What was anticipated by the British and American authorities indeed happened. As soon as the withdrawal was announced, Iran claimed sovereignty over Bahrain and

over the islands which were near the Hormuz Strait. The justification that the Iranian Government gave was that it feared some Left unfriendly powers might put the Hormuz Strait under its control and by so doing prevent Iranian navigation⁽¹⁴⁾.

There were also some movements which emerged at that time. One such movement was the Zufar Liberation Front, with the aim of dethroning the 'traditional rulers'. The front declared that its activities would extend from Oman to the rest of the Gulf Emirates and that its members would destroy the Gulf Emirate's Union because, in their view, it was founded on principles which served British interests as well as Western 'oil' interests in the region⁽¹⁵⁾. Another front was founded in 1970 - it was called "The National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf"⁽¹⁶⁾.

The "Left movements" did not achieve any progress because of several difficulties that faced them: the Gulf States were on their way to independence and were under British protection. There was also the people's loyalty to the tribe which made it difficult to accept foreign ideas. Despite this, the Iranian claims and the left 'movements' had much influence on the rulers in the region who offered, for fear of dethronement, sums of money to Britain in return for its presence in the Gulf⁽¹⁷⁾.

This state of political instability which predicted a change in the political scene, particularly with regard

to the rulers, together with the above mentioned factors, contributed towards the emergence of the idea of federating the Arab Emirates in order to fill the "gap" which the British departure from the Gulf had left.

II. The Announcement of the Independence of the Arab Emirates

There was no doubt that all the external and internal circumstances in the Gulf area not only helped but necessitated a kind of federation among the Arab Emirates. This was the only appropriate solution to what the United States had called "the gap" which the Soviet Union might exploit⁽¹⁸⁾ and through which it could enter the area and consequently threaten Western oil interests. For this reason all the reports from Britain and the United States emphasised the necessity to have some form of union between the Gulf Emirates. One of the examples in this regard was the attitude taken by the British Conservative government who took over from the Labour government in 1970, shortly before the implementation of the policy of withdrawal. The Conservative government, unlike the Labour government who favoured the policy of withdrawal, regarded withdrawal as a threat to British interests. But that did not last long. The Conservative government changed its attitude after Douglas Home, the Foreign Secretary, had sent William Louise, who was formerly a British Resident in the Gulf, on an

exploratory mission to the Gulf in August 1970. He wrote a report⁽¹⁹⁾ referring to the necessity of implementing the policy of withdrawal which had become demanded by the people in the region. He thought there would be no justification for keeping a permanent military presence after the withdrawal. He stressed the point that any British military presence would lead to strong opposition by the people in the region and above all would have undesirable consequences on British interests. He concluded that the solution was the unification of the Gulf Emirates as being the best way to face any situation that may follow the withdrawal. Britain should encourage "understanding" between the Gulf Emirates because it would help in the stability in the region and be of benefit to Western interests.

In May 1971, Home announced in Parliament his government's intention to adhere to the Labour government's decision and withdraw the British Forces in the time already specified. Home also expanded on British relations within the area. The most important point was the nullification of all the treaties which Britain had previously had with the Emirates. The alternative was to have friendship treaties, including military support and training, and to back a union among the Arab Emirates and support its military by giving to the Emirates the Scouts of the Omani coast⁽²⁰⁾.

It is appropriate to mention here that Britain tried and brought together all the Princes of the Omani coast in a federal council under its supervision in 1952⁽²¹⁾ (see above p.150).

The United States, after having failed to convince Britain to keep its military presence in the Gulf, saw that the ideal solution to keep the area out of the influence of the Soviet Union was firstly to encourage the Gulf Emirates to forget their differences and come to a kind of union, and secondly to ask Saudi Arabia and Iran to play the role of the 'guard' or the 'policeman' in the Gulf. The last point was strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia and Iran because the two countries could not join a military alliance, such was opposed by the people in the region and threatened the stability of the region. The Soviet Union emphasised in an official statement made in March 1968 that a 'regional defence alliance' that followed Britain's withdrawal would be in the first place directed against the security of its Southern boundaries. That was the first time that the Soviet Union talked about the Gulf area as its Southern boundaries⁽²²⁾. The Soviet Union also opposed the idea of unifying the Gulf Emirates which was regarded as an imperial plan⁽²³⁾. That did not, however, prevent the announcement of the birth of the Arab Emirates' Federation in 1971.

III. Announcement of the Federation of the Arab Emirates

Though the idea of founding a kind of Federation among the Emirates was not something new as we have already seen, the announcement of the British withdrawal was a suitable occasion to introduce the idea of a union once again. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan, Emir of Abu Dhabi, was the first to introduce the idea to Sheikh Rashed Bin Maktoum, Emir of Dubai, during a meeting between the two Emirs in Sumaih, Dubai on the 18 February 1968. During this meeting the two Sheikhs signed a bilateral agreement known as "Dubai Bilateral Agreement", which was regarded as the "core" of the Union.

The Agreement specified that⁽²⁴⁾:

- "(1) The foundation of a Union between the two countries to supervise foreign and defence affairs and coordinate health and education services and the like.
- (2) The Union is the legislative power in the affairs assigned to it besides any other matter agreed upon.
- (3) The affairs which the Union had not been authorised to look after remained the responsibility of the governments of the two countries.

(4) The last and the most important article was concerned with the invitation of the rulers of the other Emirates to discuss this agreement in the hope of joining the Union and afterwards to invite the rulers of Qatar and Bahrain to consider the future of the region and agree with them to secure this objective through a joint strategy."

The Emirs of Al-Shariqa, Umm Al-Quwain, Ra'su Al-Khaima, Al-Fujaira and Ajman together with the Emirs of Qatar and Bahrain responded to the invitation of Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashed. A meeting between the nine Emirs was convened in Dubai between 25th-27th February 1968. In this meeting Qatar was prominent in the sense that it put forward several 'suggestions' whose aim was unity. One of the proposals was to bring together the five small Emirates (Al-Shariqa, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, Al-Fujaira and Ra'su Al-Khaima) in a kind of one united Emirate of considerable importance, which might join the other Emirates in a bigger union. Qatar called this 'The United Emirate of the Arab Coast'⁽²⁵⁾. This proposal was opposed by the Emirs of the five smaller Emirates whose pride and insistence on the fulfilment of the concept of equality between the Emirates (regardless of the size of the Emirate or its population) drove them to adopt this attitude.

The failure of the Qatari proposal did not prevent Qatar from putting forward another plan which aimed at the foundation of a Union among the nine Emirates in all fields. The aim was to maintain the protection, security and independence of the Emirates, to unify the foreign policy and coordinate matters that were related to defence⁽²⁶⁾. The Qatari suggestion was the basis for the Arab Emirates Union agreement which the nine Emirs signed on 27th February 1968. The result of the conference held in Dubai was the announcement of the birth of 'The Arab Emirates' Federation', made through the joint statement. The 'Federation Agreement' was appended to the statement⁽²⁷⁾. Here we give an outline of what the Agreement included⁽²⁸⁾:

- "(1) Foundation of a Federation whose members are the Emirates in the Arab Gulf. This will be called "The Arab Emirates' Federation".
- (2) The aim of this Federation is to strengthen the ties between the member Emirates, to coordinate their progress and prosperity plans, to respect every Emirate's independence and sovereignty, to unify foreign policy and to put in order all matters concerning defence.
- (3) The 'Supreme Council' whose members are the rulers of the Emirates will supervise the Federation's affairs.

- (4) The Supreme Council is the authority which sets a perfect and permanent charter for the Federation and who directs its policy. The Council also issues the regulations necessary for that. It is the authority in defining specialisations. Moreover, its decisions should be unanimously made.
- (5) Each year there will be a new "Chairman" of the Supreme Council from among the rulers of the member Emirates. The Chairman is the Federation's representative at home and abroad. (This last point was not carried out as we shall see later).
- (6) Formation of a Council which works as an executive body to the Union provided that its decisions are not final unless they are approved of by the Supreme Council.
- (7) The member Emirates will cooperate to strengthen their military resources and to exercise their legitimate right in defending any or all the Emirates from any military attack.

- (8) The Union has a Supreme Court which is called "The Federal Court".
- (9) Each local government will deal with its internal affairs which are not the Union's responsibility.
- (10) The Agreement will come into force on 20th March 1968 in accordance with the approved regulations in each member Emirate until a permanent charter for the Federation is set up."

Many criticisms were levelled against the Agreement of 'The Arab Emirates' Federation. The most important criticisms were: first, that the basis at which the Agreement aimed was to establish a kind of union which was associated with the rulers' personalities, in the hope of coordinating the foreign and defence policies and that the Agreement did not affect the 'internal authority' which every ruler had in his Emirate. On the contrary, the Agreement emphasised the independence and sovereignty of every Emirate something which allowed the continuation of local 'trends' and moreover contradicted the concept of union.

Second, was that since the Supreme Council's decisions should be unanimously made, any opposition from any Emir would nullify what others agreed upon, and since

the Agreement did not recommend the formation of a parliamentary democratic system or any national representative institution inside the union, the union would not be different from the kind of rule which the Sheikhs had already through the Supreme Council of the Emirates which Britain had created⁽²⁹⁾.

However, as soon as the Agreement was announced, the British authorities were quick to emphasise that they accepted with pleasure the formation of that union and welcomed it as a step towards maintaining the region's stability, but denied that Britain had stimulated the union and emphasised that it had no connection with it⁽³⁰⁾.

With the exception of Britain's supportive attitude, the union faced strong opposition from the Iranian government which claimed that Bahrain was part of its territories⁽³¹⁾. In general all the Arab countries welcomed and supported the union⁽³²⁾. At the same time some Left parties attacked the union. They held the view that the union consolidated imperial interests⁽³³⁾.

The nine Arab Emirates began their successive meetings to formulate a constitution for the States. Because of the political differences and the tribal conflicts among these Emirates, the meetings did not give any positive result, thanks to disagreement on points such as representation in the 'Ministerial Council', location of the capital, different flags of the Emirates compared with just one flag and the 'location' of authority and the like.

It is appropriate here to mention that the most important meeting was the fourth session held in Abu Dhabi in October 1969 which made considerable progress in the sense that Sheikh Zayed was appointed as President of the Union for two years and it was agreed that Abu Dhabi would be the temporary capital until the union's new capital was built.

The representation in the National Council was to be equal among the Emirates. They also agreed to appoint a committee to discuss the temporary and final constitutional draft for the union. The situation became critical after the British Agent in Abu Dhabi, James Trodel, interrupted the meeting of the Supreme Council in October 1969 by reading a letter from Sir Stewart Mills the British Political Resident in the Gulf - in which Sir Stewart encouraged the rulers to speed up the foundation of the union and sent them his government's best wishes. The Emirs of Qatar and Ra'su Al-Khaima were among other Emirs who regarded that incident as British interference in the Gulf Affairs.

Sheikh Zayed regarded this attitude with much flexibility on the grounds that Britain was still in charge of the Emirates⁽³⁴⁾. Because of the letter, some Emirs refused to sign the joint statement, saying that their signature would give a wrong impression to the general public, i.e. that the rulers of the Emirates were led by the instructions of the British government and its

'agents'. The ruler of Ra'su Al-Khaima found it an opportunity to leave the meeting hall and so did the ruler of Dubai. The ruler of Ra'su Al-Khaima then made a statement in which he attacked the British attitude and accused the British Agent of interference for the purpose of imposing the union on the Emirates. He also believed that the failure of the fourth session was primarily due to this interference. Sheikh-Zayed - being the Chairman of the Session - made a brief statement in which he decided to put off the meeting until later so that there would be ample time to complete the study of the agenda⁽³⁵⁾.

Sheikh Zayed suggested a new session but he received approval from only six Emirates. Therefore the Supreme Council (of the nine Emirs) did not convene after the postponement of its previous meeting. Soon after that there appeared new events; Bahrain announced its independence on 14th August 1971. The statement made by Bahrain explained the reasons which made it leave the Union. Qatar, too, announced its independence on the 1st September 1971. Bahrain and Qatar justified their withdrawal from the Union on the grounds that there were differences between the Emirates. For example, they wanted more representation in the Council of the Federation because they felt their States were more populated⁽³⁶⁾.

The independence of Bahrain and Qatar opened the way for the rulers of the other Emirates to announce the

Union. The Emir of Ra'su Al-Khaima was the only Emir not to join the Union. He did not approve of the articles in the Union's constitution which gave Abu Dhabi and Dubai special privileges. That was, that two Emirates' approval of any decision which the Supreme Council took should be final and vital, and that each Emirate (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) had eight seats in the Consultative National Council while Al-Shariqa and Ra'su Al-Khaima each had six seats and each of the other Emirates four seats only.

Tribal and family differences had a crucial role in this kind of disagreement. There were severe conflicts between the ruler of Ra'su Al-Khaima and the ruler of Al-Shariqa. One incident was when the former, on 14th January 1972, supported one of the opponents of the ruler of Shariqa in an attempt to dethrone him.

The ruler of Ra'su Al-Khaima's refusal to sign the Union's Constitution, did not prevent the announcement of the foundation of the United Arab Emirates whose members were the other six Emirates. That happened on 2nd December 1971. The Supreme Council issued a statement in which the Council elected Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan, ruler of Abu Dhabi, as the first President of the United Arab Emirates for a period of five years. Sheikh Rashed Bin Sa'id AlMaktoum, ruler of Dubai, was elected as the Vice-President for the same period⁽³⁷⁾. The Constitution specified that both Sheikhs have the right to renew their

'posts' after the end of the period specified, provided that the Supreme Council - being the authority in the country agrees⁽³⁸⁾. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan is still the President of the United Arab Emirates.

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: AN OVERVIEW

The United Arab Emirates consists of the following Emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Ras Al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm Ul-Qaiwain and Al-Fujairah, bordering the southern shore of the Gulf extending over a strip of land 650 km long, 77,700 km in circumference. See the following table⁽³⁹⁾;

The Emirates	Km ²	%
Abu Dhabi	67340	86.67
Dubi	3885	5.0
Sharijah	2590	3.33
Ras Al Khaimah	1683.5	2.17
Al Fujairah	1165.5	1.5
Umm Al Qaiwain	777	1.0
Ajman	259	0.33
TOTAL	77,700	100.0

Every Emirate is autonomous, with its own government within the general framework of the union of all Emirates, with Abu Dhabi as its capital, the venue for the central government and the headquarters for the Supreme Council of the union made of all the rulers of individual Emirates.

The population of the Emirates counted 179,100 people approximately, according to the census of 1968 : whereas it was 557,887 in 1975. As to the relatively recent census of 1985 it was approximately 1,622,464⁽⁴⁰⁾.³

More than two thirds of the population of the United

Arab Emirates live in the two Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the rest being divided over the five remaining Emirates, as shown in the following table, (41).

Emirates	1968	1975	1980	1985
Abu Dhabi	46,5000	211,812	451,848	670,125
Duabi	59,000	183,187	276,301	419,103
Sharjah	31,500	78,790	159,317	268,723
Ras Alkhaima	24,500	43,845	73,918	116,470
Ajman	4,200	16,690	36,100	64,318
Alfujarah	9,700	16,655	32,189	54,465
Um-Alajwain	3,700	6,908	12,426	29,299
TOTAL	179,100	557,887	1,042,099	1,622,464

This rapid growth in population is due to the huge influx of immigrants during the 1970s seeking work in the country as a whole and especially in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The Indians and Pakistanies constituted the biggest group in U.A.E. See Table No. 5, ⁽⁴²⁾ p. 282.

The number of incoming labour force has been on the increase as to reach 78% of the native population in 1979⁽⁴³⁾. See the table following,

Year	Population Figures	Nationals		Alien	
		Number	%	Number	%
1968	180,000	114,000	63	66,000	37
1975	557,000	201,000	36	356,000	64
1977	862,000	215,000	25	647,000	75
1978	950,000	222,000	23	728,000	77
1979	1,015,000	228,000	22	787,000	78

Michael Watkins wrote in The Times, after his visit to the United Arab Emirates in April 1988⁽⁴⁴⁾:

"A Sudanese receptionist checked me into the hotel, while a Filipino carried by suit-case. In the bar I drank Dutch beer while a German **maitre d'hotel** took my order for dinner served by an Indian. Enjoying the wine of Bordeaux, I was subjected to Simon and Garfunkel numbers sung by Mike and Julie from Sheffield. My wake-up call came from a Chinese telephonist and I drove into the city in a Japanese taxi with a Pakistani at the wheel. The riddle is: where was I?

No, not Hammersmith. Dubai - one of the seven desert sheikhdoms covering an area two-and-a-half times the size of Holland, once the backward Trucial States, now in their 16th year as a federation. Where else is the indigenous local inhabitant outnumbered six to one by expatriates?"

Naturally, this increase affected the balance of the social fabric of the population of the Emirates. Consequently, the political situation has become potentially explosive should any friction occur between the natives and the immigrants⁽⁴⁵⁾. This situation also

TABLE 6-5:

WORK PERMITS ISSUED BY UAE MEMBER EMIRATES
TO EXPATRIATES BY COUNTRY, REGION OR CONTINENT, 1976

COUNTRY EMIRATE	ARAB COUNTRIES	INDIA	PAKISTAN	Iran and REST OF ASIA	EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	NORTH & SOUTH AMERICA	AFRICAN COUNTRIES	AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND	TOTAL	%
Dubai	13,296	55,338	30,898	6,362	7,160	1,593	399	133	115,179	48.0
Sharigah	9,516	24,669	11,512	1,831	5,969	635	42	170	54,344	22.7
Abu Dhabi	21,519	10,205	11,106	3,737	2,320	396	48	51	49,381	20.6
Ras al-Khaimah	2,200	6,051	2,717	428	862	313	12	9	12,592	5.3
'Ajman	1,189	2,248	1,181	540	220	39	6	5	5,428	2.3
Umm al-Guiwain	606	521	213	32	68	9	2	1	1,452	0.6
Fujairah	182	610	253	59	61	11	2	1	1,179	0.5
TOTAL	48,508	99,642	57,880	12,988	16,660	2,996	511	370	239,555	100.0
%	20.2	41.6	24.2	5.4	7.0	1.3	0.2	0.1	100.0	

Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, UAE, Annual Statistical Report, 1976, (in Arabic), p. 16.

constitutes a constant threat to the political future of the state in the long run, especially in view of the discrimination rampant in the treatment of people according to their nationalities, or occupations and because of the absence of effective legislation which would guarantee for the labour force their full rights.

The imbalance in the number of immigrant labourers over and above the native people in the United Arab Emirates is due to the natural increase in the production of oil which was 619 M.b approximately in 1975 and rose to 709 M.b in 1977. Then, gradually, the production started decreasing following the fall in oil prices, until it came down to 380.6 M.b in 1985⁽⁴⁶⁾. (For more information see Appendix 8). pp.335-339.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As we have seen, we can now conclude that tribalism, frontier disputes, paternalism, and immigration have all been approached here from the perspective of their negative impact upon the integration of member emirates in the UAE insofar as they impede the emergence and realization of a solidly founded federal political culture and a sense of political community. The negative impact of such variables varies. Tribalism's most salient unfavorable aspect is its parochial and factionalistic orientation; frontier disputes, their magnitude and conflictual linkage to personal and dynastic rivalries;

paternalism's, its precarious nature and effect on the scope of political power; and immigration's, its seemingly uncontrollable size and potentially unfavorable linkage with the external environment.⁽⁴⁷⁾ As time elapses, some of these factors may get weaker, and others may gain intensity or remain stable.

NOTES

[POSTSCRIPT: CHAPTER 6]

- (1) Kassem, J.Z., Arabian Gulf, Cairo, 1974, p.319-320
- (2) Ibid: p.320
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- (4) The Middle East and North Africa 1968-1969. The Persian States, Bahrain; Outer & Trucial States, p.556 and Hawley, D., The Trucial States, p.556
- (5) Wahed, R., The Study about Union of Arabian Emirates in the Gulf, p.1
- (6) Laqueur, W., The Struggle for the Middle East, The Soviet Union and Middle East 1958-1968, p.113
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- (10) Rustow, D., Middle East Political Systems, p.64
- (11) Kassem, J.Z., op.cit., pp.328-329
- (12) The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal, pp. 7-8
- (13) Ibid: pp.8-9
- (14) Laqueur, W., op.cit., pp.114-115
- (15) Al-Jazerah, Newspaper Saudi Arabia, 12/5/1970

- (16) Al Hayah, Lebanon, 29/6/1970
- (17) Al-Anowar, Lebanon, 24/1/1968
- (18) Fairhall, D., Russia Looks to the Sea. East of Suez, pp.234-235 (see Jamel, Z.K., op.cit., p.347)
- (19) The Gulf, Implications of British Withdrawal. Comments by Ian Michie, pp.20-21
- (20) Ibid: p.17
- (21) Al-Baharna, H., The Legal States of the Arabian Gulf States, p.7
- (22) Laqueur, op.cit., p.346
- (23) Europe Publications, Middle East and North Africa 1968-1969. Development in the Gulf, p.26
- (24) Waheed, R., op.cit., p.161
- (25) Ibid: pp.165-166
- (26) Ibid: pp.167-170
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- (28) Sayed, N., Political Situations of Arabian Gulf Emirates, pp.269-273 and Information and Research Section, Abu Dhabi, Federation of Arab Emirates Report, p.1
- (29) Al-Bahrna, H., op.cit., p.7
- (30) Al-Rais, N., Oasis Conflict and Oil, Lebanon, 1973, p.55
- (31) Jamal, Z.K., op.cit., p.369
- (32) Hawley, D., The Trucial States, p.264

- (33) Al-Hayah Newspaper, Lebanon, 18/3/1968, Statement of the Arab Nationalist Movement in the Gulf
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- (37) The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates, Middle East Journal, Summer 1972, p.7
- (38) Anthony, J.D., op.cit., p.271
- (39) Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, U.A.E. Annual Statistical Report, 1976 (in Arabic), p.35
- (40)&(41) U.A.E. Government, Information and Culture Ministry p.32, U.A.E., 1986 and U.A.E. Government, Ministry of Planning, National Accounts for U.A.E., 1975-1984, p.47, U.A.E., 1984
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- (44) The Times, 9th April, 1988
- (45) Alnafisi, A., op.cit., p.80
- (46) U.A.E. Government, Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Development in U.A.E., 1980-1982, U.A.E., p.57, 1983. See also U.A.E. Government Ministry of Information, pp. 106-107, U.A.E., 1986
- (47) Khalifa, A., op.cit., p.113

APPENDIX (1)

TREATIES AND ENGAGEMENTS IN FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1906,
BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE TRUCIAL CHIEFS OF
THE ARAB COAST.

ARTICLE 5.

The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a paper (Register) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many Karabs it holds. And they shall also have in their possession another writing (Port Clearance) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the Nacodah, the number of men, the number of arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound. And if a British or other vessel meet them, they shall produce the Register and the Clearance.

ARTICLE 6.

The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an Envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if it chooses, shall send an Envoy also to them in like manner; and the Envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief in the paper (Register) of their vessels, which contains the length of the vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the Envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such Envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

ARTICLE 7.

If any tribe, or others, shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances, and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the British at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.

ARTICLE 8. —

The putting men to death after they have given up their arms is an act of piracy, and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe shall put to death any persons, either Muhammadans or others, after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall act against them in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the act and of those who ordered it.

ARTICLE 9.

The carrying off of slaves, men, women, or children, from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

ARTICLE 10.

The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports and into the ports of the allies of the British so far as they shall be able to effect it; and they shall buy and sell therein, and if any shall attack them, the British Government shall take notice of it.

ARTICLE 11.

These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present. End of the Articles.

Issued at Ras-ool-Kheimah, in triplicate, at midday, on Saturday, the twenty-second of the month of Rabe-ul-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the eighth of January one thousand eight hundred and twenty, and signed by the contracting parties at the places and times under written.

Signed at Ras-ool-Kheimah at the time of issue by

L. S.

(Sd.) W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.

L. S.

(Sd.) HASSUN BIN RAHMAH,
Sheikh of Hatt and Fahleia, formerly of Ras-ool-Kheimah.

L. S.

(Sd.) KAZIB BIN AHMED,
Sheikh of Jourat al Kamra.

Signed at Ras-ool-Kheimah on Tuesday, the twenty-fifth of the month of Rabe-ul-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the eleventh of January 1820.

L. S.

(Sd.) SHAKBOUT,
Sheikh of Aboo Dhebbec.

Signed at Ras-ool-Kheimah at midday, on Saturday, the twenty-ninth of the month of Rabe-ul-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the fifteenth of January 1820.

L. S.

(Sd.) HASSUN BIN ALI,
Sheikh of Zyah.

The seal is Captain Thompson's, as Sheikh Hassun bin Ali had not a seal at the time of signature.

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Signed for Mubammad bin Haza bin Zaal, Sheikh of Debay, a minor, at Shargah, on Friday, the twelfth of the month of Rube-oo-Sanee, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the twenty-eighth of January 1820.

L. S.

(Sd.) ZAID BIN SYF,
Uncle of Sheikh Muhammad.

Signed at Shargah at midday, on Friday, the nineteenth of the month of Rube-oo-Sanee, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the fourth of February 1820.

L. S.

(Sd.) SULTAN BIN SUGGUR,
Chief of Shargah.

Signed at Shargah by the Vakeel on the part of the Sheikhs Suleman bin Ahmed and Abdoolla bin Ahmed, in his quality of Vakeel to the Sheikhs aforesaid, on Saturday, the twentieth of the month of Rube-oo-Sanee, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the 5th of February 1820.

L. S.

(Sd.) SYUD ABDOOL JALIL BIN SYUD YAS,
*Vakeel of Sheikh Suleman bin Ahmed
and Sheikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of the
family of Khalifa, Sheikhs of Bahrein.*

Signed and accepted by Suleman bin Ahmed, of the house of Khalifa, at Bahrein, on the ninth of Jemade-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the twenty-third of February 1820.

L. S.

Signed and accepted by Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of the house of Khalifa, at Bahrein, on the ninth of Jemade-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the twenty-third of February 1820.

L. S.

Signed at Fahleia at noon, on Wednesday, the twenty-ninth of the month of Jemade-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the fifteenth of March 1820.

L. S.

(Sd.) RASHED BIN HAMID,
Chief of Ejman.

Signed of Fahleia at noon, on Wednesday, the twenty-ninth of the month of Jemade-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hejira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the fifteenth of March 1820.

L. S.

(Sd.) ABDOOLLA BIN RASHID,
Chief of Umm-ool-Keiweyn.

Engagement entered into by Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Bas-ool-Kheimah and Shargah, for the abolition of the African slave trade in his ports, 1847.

It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, that certain conventions have lately been entered into by His Highness the Imam of Maskat and other powers with the British Government for the purpose of preventing the exportation of slaves from the African coast and elsewhere, and it having, moreover, been explained to me that, in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid conventions, the concurrence and co-operation of the Chiefs of the several ports situated on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf are required, accordingly I, Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee tribe, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurrum A.H. 1264 (or 10th December A.D. 1847).

And I do further consent that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in slave trade, they may detain and search them, and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this engagement,

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by the exportation of slaves from the coasts of Africa, or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

*Dated this 14th day of Jemade-ool-Awul A.H. 1263, or
30th day of April A.D. 1847.*

—
L. S.
—

(Sd.) SHEIKH SULTAN BIN SUGGUR.

Debay.—Sheikh Muktoom's Engagement is dated 14th Jemade-ool-Awul 1263, or 30th April 1847.

Ejman.—Sheikh Abdool Azeez's Engagement is dated 15th Jemade-ool-Awul 1263, or 1st May 1847.

Umm-ool-Keiweyn.—Sheikh Abdoolla bin Rashed's Engagement is dated 15th Jemade-ool-Awul 1263, or 1st May 1847.

Aboo Dhebbec.—Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon's Engagement is dated 17th Jemade-ool-Awul 1263, or 3rd May 1847.

The First Maritime Truce, 21 May 1835

TRANSLATION of the terms of a truce for six months agreed upon by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast in the presence of Captain Hennell, the Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated Bassadore, the 21st May, 1835.

We whose seals are here unto attached. Vizt. Sultan bin Suggur, Shaik of the Joasmee Tribe, Shackboot, the father and plenipotentiary of Shaik Khuleefa, Chief of the Beniyas, Obed ben Saeed, the Chief of the Boo Felasa tribe and Debaye, and Rashid ben Humed, the Shaik of Eyman, being fully impressed with a sense of the evils suffered by our subjects and dependents in consequence of their being debarred from carrying on the Pearl Fishery on the Banks during the present state of Hostilities among ourselves, and duly appreciating the gneral advantages that would be derived from the establishment of a Truce during the Fishing Season, do hereby agree to bind ourselves down to observe the following conditions:

1st. That from the 22nd Mohurrum, A. H. 1251 (or 21st May 1835), there shall be a cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective subjects and dependents, and that from the above date until the 29th Rujub, A. H. 1251 (21st November 1835), an inviolable truce shall be established, during which period our several claims upon each other shall rest in abeyance.

2d. That in the event of any one of our subjects or dependents committing an act of aggression by sea upon those of the parties to this engagement we will immediately afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

3d. That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea upon any one of our subjects or dependents who are parties to the truce, we will not proceed to immediately retaliate, but will inform the Rest. at Bushire or the Commodore at Bassadore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflisted upon its being satisfactorily proved.

4. That on the 30th Jumadee-al-Akhir 1251, by the blessing of Providence, we will endeavour to arrange either an extension of this truce or a firm and lasting peace, but in the event of our not being able to come to a satisfactory arrangement regarding our respective claims amon ourselves, we hereby bind ourselves to give notice on or about the abov date, to the Resident of Bushire of our intention to renew hostilities aft the expiration of the term now fixed upon for this Truce, Vizt. the 29th Rujub 1251.

**Treaty of Peace in perpetuity agreed upon by the
Chiefs of the Arabian Coast in behalf of
themselves, their heirs and successors,
under the mediation of the Resident
in the Persian Gulf, 1853.**

We, whose seals are hereunto affixed, Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Ras-ool-Kheimah Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon, Chief of Aboo Dhebee, Sheikh Saeed bin Butye, Chief of Debay, Sheikh Hamid bin Rashed, Chief of Ejman, Sheikh Abdoolla bin Rashed, Chief of Umm-ool-Keiweyn, having experienced for series of years the benefits and advantages resulting from a maritime truce contracted amongst ourselves under the mediation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf and renewed from time to time up to the present period, and being fully impressed therefore, with a sense of the evil consequence formerly arising, from the prosecution of our feuds at sea, whereby our subjects and dependents were prevented from carrying on the pearl-fishery in security, and were exposed to interruption and molestation when passing on their lawful occasions, accordingly, we, as aforesaid, have determined for ourselves, our heirs and successors, to conclude together a lasting and inviolable peace from this time forth in perpetuity, and do hereby agree to bind ourselves down to observe the following conditions:—

ARTICLE 1.

That from this date, *viz.*, 25th Rujjub 1269, 4th May 1853, and hereafter, there shall be a complete cessation of hostilities

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at sea between our respective subjects and dependents, and a perfect maritime truce shall endure between ourselves and between our successors, respectively, for evermore.

ARTICLE 2.

That in the event (which God forbid) of any of our subjects or dependents committing an act of aggression at sea upon the lives or property of those of any of the parties to this agreement, we will immediately punish the assailants and proceed to afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

ARTICLE 3.

That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea by any of those who are subscribers with us to this engagement upon any of our subjects or dependents, we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident or the Commodore at Bassidore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, provided that its occurrence can be satisfactorily proved.

We further agree that the maintenance of the peace now concluded amongst us shall be watched over by the British Government, who will take steps to ensure at all times the due observance of the above Articles, and God of this is the best witness and guarantee.

L. s.

(Sd.) ABDOOLLA BIN RASHED,
Chief of Umm-ool-Keiweyn.

L. s.

(Sd.) HAMID BIN RASHED,
Chief of Ejaman.

L. s.

(Sd.) SAEED BIN BUTYE,
Chief of Debay

L. s.

(Sd.) SAEED BIN TARNOON,
Chief of Beniyas.

L. s.

(Sd.) SULTAN BIN SUGGUR,
Chief of the Joasmee

that the Government cruisers did not fall in with the said vessels, then, no matter where the slaves have been landed, do I hereby bind myself to place an embargo upon the delinquent boat and her Nakhoda until such time as instructions have been received from the Resident at Bushire regarding them.

Dated this 17th day of Ramzan, A. H. 1272 (or 22nd day of May 1856 A.D.)

L. S.

SHEIKH SULTAN BIN SUGGUR,

of Ras-ool-Kheimah and Shargah.

A similar engagement was entered into by the Maritime Chiefs—

Sheikh Abdoolla bin Rashed, of Umm-ool-Keiweyn, on the 22nd May 1856.

Sheikh Saeed bin Butye, of Debay, on 24th May 1856.

Sheikh Humaid bin Rashed, of Ejman, on the 24th May 1856.

Sheikh Zaid-bin-Khalifa of Aboothabi, on the 25th May 1856.

and of the general peace, are preparing telegraphic lines and stations at various points in or near the Persian Gulf, we do hereby engage for ourselves, our heirs and successors, to respect and abstain from all and every interference with the said telegraphic operations that may be carried on by the said British Government in or near our territory.

And in the event (which God forbid) of any of our subjects or dependents committing an act of aggression or trespass on the said telegraphic lines and stations or other telegraphic material, we will immediately punish the offender and proceed to afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

The telegraphic line being intended for the common good, our subjects and dependents shall be permitted to send messages by the telegraph at such rates of payment as may be paid by British subjects.

such Chief shall be liable to a fine of 50 dollars in addition to all just claims proven against such runaway.

3rd.—Further, if the Chief harbouring such runaway refuse to deliver him up, or accept his liability when demanded by the Government Agent, and permit him to proceed to the pearl banks in pursuance of his vocation, such Chief shall be liable to a fine of 100 dollars in addition to all just proven claims against the runaway.

4th.—When facts are disputed, a council of arbitration (mejlis) will be convened, at which the Government Agent will preside, the disputing parties and all the Trucial Chiefs sending delegates, or if they wish, attending themselves. The decision of the council to be binding only when confirmed by Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

5th.—These fines are only to be enforced when Her Britannic Majesty's Resident in the Persian Gulf has satisfied himself that the Chief complained against is really in fault and fairly liable.

We therefore have written and put our signatures and seals to this document, consenting and binding ourselves to carry out this agreement without opposition.

(Sd.) SALIM BEN SULTAN BEN SUGGUR AL JOASMI
with his own hand, Shargah.
[Seal.]

(Sd.) RASHID BEN HOMEYD BEN RASHID AL
NAEEAMEE, Ajman.
[Seal.]

(Sd.) HUSHUR BEN MUKTOOM, Debai.
[Seal.]

(Sd.) AHMED BEN ABDULLAH BEN RASHID, Um-
el-Kowein.
[Seal.]

(Sd.) The mendicant of God, ZAYED BEN KHULIFA,
Abu Dhabi.
[Seal.]

(Sd.) HOMEYD BEN ABDULLAH BEN SULTAN AL
JOASMI with his own hand, Ras-el-Kheima.
[Seal.]

[20]

**Agreement for the prohibition of the Arms
Traffic, 1902.**

We, the undersigned, agree to absolutely prohibit the importation of arms for sale into our territories, or the exportation therefrom, and to enforce this we have issued a notification to all concerned.

(Sd.) **MAKTOOM-BIN-HASHAB**
(Chief of Debai).

(Sd.) **SAGAR-BIN-KHALED**
(Chief of Shargah).

(Sd.) **RASHID-BIN-AHMAD**
(Chief of Um-el-Kowain).

(Sd.) **ABDUL AZIZ-BIN-HOMAI**
(Chief of Ajman).

(Sd.) **ZAEED-BIN-KHALIFAH**
(Chief of Abu Dhabi).

Signed and sealed in my presence by the above-mentioned Trucial Chiefs on board the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" on the 24th, 25th, and 26th November 1902.

C. A. KEMBALL, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Offg. Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

APPENDIX (2)

THE TRUCIAL SHEIKHS FORMAL AGREEMENT TO THE CESSION TO
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF JURISDICTION OVER BRITISH
SUBJECTS AND ALL FOREIGNERS IN THEIR TERRITORIES.

(Received under Bahrain Printed Letter NoC/782 dated 6th August 1945

 Translation of letter dated 9th Shaban 1364 (18th July 1945) from Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed, Regent of Kalba to the Political Agent, Bahrain.

A.C.

I have received your letter No. C/703, dated 10th July 1945 (1st Shaban 1364) and read it regarding what you have referred to that the British Government exercise the jurisdiction on the British subjects and all foreigners in our territory, and this custom has been since old times and that the British Government now finds it necessary to regularise this custom for which you have asked our agreement. We formally agree to your request about this custom, and have the honour for all you require from our end.

U.E.

Translation of letter dated 10th Shaban 1364 (19th July 1945) from Shaikh Ahmad bin Rashid, Ruler of Umm al Qawain to the Political Agent, Bahrain.

A.C.

Your honourable letter of 10th July 1945 (1st Shaban 1364) has been received to the effect that the British Government exercises the jurisdiction on the British subjects and all foreigners and now they want to regularise this custom by publishing a notification proclaiming in it, and you want our agreement to that. All right, I express my desire to what the British Government find beneficial and good for the people and the country. I wish you success for everything beneficial.

U.E.

Translation of letter dated 11th Shaban 1364 (20-7-45) from Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid, Ruler of Ajman to the Political Agent, Bahrain.

A.C.

Your esteemed letter to us has been received and your friend has noted what you say especially about the British subjects and foreigners who are in our territory. Please note that we, about this matter, are as we were with the Great British Government in the past. I agree to what you have mentioned so that you may know.

U.E.

Translation of letter dated 14th Shaban 1364 (24th July 1945) from Shaikh Said bin Maktoom, O.B.E., Ruler of Dubai to the Political Agent, Bahrain.

A.C.

With reference to your kind letter No. C/703, dated 10th July 1945 regarding the exercise of jurisdiction by the Great British Government on her subjects and foreign subjects in our territory. In view of the strong relations and old alliance between us and the Great Allied Government, we agree to it and support it. In the end we renew the ties of friendship and sincerity.

U.E.

APPENDIX (3)

THE OPERATION OF THE TRUCIAL STATES ORDER IN COUNCIL
1950, DURING 1954.

APPENDIX A.

Proceedings taken in Her Britannic Majesty's Court for the Trucial States during 1954.

<u>A. Criminal</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>Prose- cutor</u>	<u>Accused</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Regula tion or section</u>	<u>Findings.</u>	<u>Sentence</u>
<i>Sessoid</i>								
<u>(i) Summons cases</u>								
No.5 of 1954	Dec.28	Mr.W.P.R. Mawdsley <i>+ panel of amenors</i>	Regina (Mohd.Ahmed, Trucial Oman Levies,Public Prosecutor)	Saud al Magharabi (Saudi)	5 charges concerning slavery.	Section 370, Indian Penal Code.	Plea of guilty on 4 charges, the fifth withdrawn.	4 years R.I. on each charge to run concur- rently.
<u>(ii) Warrant Cases</u>								
No.1 of 1954	Jan.6	Mr.W.P.R. Mawdsley	Regina	Bashir Ahmed (Pakistani)	Theft	Section 379, Indian Penal Code.	Guilty	4 months' rigorous im- prisonment plus fine of Rs.200 or further 2 months R.I.
No.3 of 1954	Oct.27	Mr.W.P.R. Mawdsley.	Regina	Darling Samael Da Silva (Portuguese)	Theft	Section 379 Indian Penal Code	Guilty	6 months rigorous im- prisonment.

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>Prose- cutor</u>	<u>Accused</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Regula tion or section</u>	<u>Findings</u>	<u>Sentence.</u>
(iii) <u>Summons Cases.</u>								
No.2 of 1954.	June 2	Mr.W.P.R. Mawdsley	Regina	Abdul Razak Abdul Rahman (Pakistani)	entering Trucial States without valid visa	Article 1 of Trucial States Pass- port Regula- tion 1952.	Plea of guilty	Fine of Rs.1/- and order to leave.
*No.4 of 1954	Oct.27	Mr.W.P.R. Mawdsley.	Regina	Mohammed Akram (Pakistani)	Acting negligently as to be likely to cause danger or or death.	Section 336 Indian Penal Code.	Guilty	2 months rigorous imprison- ment.
No.6 of 1954	Dec.27	Mr.W.P.R. Mawdsley	Regina	Mohammed Akram (Pakistani)	Entering Trucial States without valid visa	Article 1 of Trucial States Pass- port Regu- lation 1952.	Plea of guilty.	Fine of Rs.1 and order to leave.

* This case in which the offence related to subjects of the Ruler of Sharjah was heard by the Court for the Trucial States the consent of the Ruler and the Political Agent having been given under Article 68 of the Trucial States Order-in-Council.

APPENDIX A (continued)

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>Prosecutor</u>	<u>Accused</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Regulation or section</u>	<u>Findings</u>	<u>Sentence.</u>
No.7 of 1954.	Dec.28	Mr.W.P.R. Mawdsley	Regina	Saud al Magharabi	Voluntarily causing hurt.	Section 323 Indian Penal Code.	Guilty	6 months rigorous imprisonment.

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3. CIVIL

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>Plaintiff</u>	<u>Defendant</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Decree.</u>
No.1 of 1954.	Feb.20	Mr.W.P.R. Mawdsley	Jaafar Haji Bhaker Abdul Latif and Muhsin Haji Bhaker (Muscatis)	Govindram s/o Gangaram. (Indian)	Recovery	Case compounded.

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APPENDIX B.

Estate cases handled by Her Britannic Majesty's Court for the Trucial States during 1954.

Serial No.	Name of deceased & date of death.	Nationality of deceased	Whether probate or Letters of Administration granted, or whether dealt with under Article 50	Person to whom grant made or property delivered under Article 50.	Date of grant	Value of Estate	Court fees Court fee
1.	Thomas Evans Carlisle Henderson December 31, 1953.	British	Dealt with under Article 50	Mr. A. Drummond, Desert Locust Survey, Sharjah.	April 20, 1954.	Rs. 1405-12	Pending.
2.	Abdul Latif al Othman al Bassam al Zubairi. <i>Tamaya, 1954</i>	Iraqi	Letters of Administration	1. Mr. Ali Bustani Arab Assistant at Political Agency, Dubai. 2. Mr. Saleh Usaimi, Merchant, Dubai.	November 4, 1954.	Rs. 43,000	None yet.

N.B. Arrangements were still in hand at the end of the year to appoint Salih Usaimi as trustee of the property. Court fees have not yet been levied as the nett value of the estate remains to be finally determined.

APPENDIX C.Schedule of Court Fees and fines collected.Fees.

Civil case No.1 of 1953(fees for copying various documents in the case) Rs.	43- 0
Civil Case No.1 of 1954 Court fee Rs.	400- 0
Copy of Coroner's verdict on Mr.T.E.C. Henderson Rs.	3- 8

Total Courte fees Rs. 446-8

Fines

Criminal Case No.2 of 1954 Rs.	1
Criminal Case No.6 of 1954 Rs.	1
Total fines	<i>Rs.</i> 2-0 Rs. 2
Grand total	Rs.	448- 8

Registration Fees

Persons	Rs 483/-
Companies	Rs 60/-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

reference:-

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APPENDIX D.Persons subject to the Order-in-Council registered during 1954.

Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies	..	76
Citizens of Commonwealth Countries	..	364
British Protected Persons	..	3
British subjects without citizenship	..	2
Portuguese Indians	..	53
Middle Easterners(various)	..	31
Americans	..	9
Others	..	2

		540

APPENDIX (4)

PERSONS CONNECTED WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT IN 1956

2. HAMED BIN MAJID BIN GHURAIR.

Sunni Muslim and leader of the Beni Yas section. Aged about 55, he is the father of Nos. 3, 4 and 5. Was one of the founders of the National Front. Also a pro-Saudi sympathiser and agent. At one time violently critical of Dubai ruling family and of the Persian Community. Together with No. 1 and some less prominent Arabs, formed the group which wanted the electricity scheme to be a purely Arab concern. Since bin Fateim's departure (No. 7) he has been less conspicuously active and avoids talking politics in the suq or his majlis. Dislikes H.M.G., Abu Dhabi and Muscat.

3. SAIF BIN HAMED BIN MAJID BIN GHURAIR.

Sunni Muslim of Beni Yas and eldest son of No. 2. One of the founders and now self-styled leader of the Front, is aged about 35 and is an undoubtedly clever and able young man. Has spent some ten years in Bombay, where he was an agent for Kuwaitis involved in gold smuggling. He made a large fortune there which enabled him to enter a circle of some prominent Arab personalities in Bombay, among them the then Saudi Ambassador to India. In 1954 the Indian authorities ordered him to leave and he returned to Dubai. Subsequently he visited Cairo, once in 1954 and again in 1955 when he took with him Rs. 40,000/- which he had collected in Dubai for the Egyptian Arms Fund. He tried unsuccessfully to see Colonel Nasser and had to make do with a letter of thanks. Well educated, Saif speaks good English and Arabic and is generally knowledgeable about world affairs by following the newspapers, and radio. Influential and persuasive, he is active in the Front, spending most of his time outside of Dubai. Considered discreet and cunning, he helped to resurrect the Front after Juma's exile. Is decidedly anti-British and opposes H.M.G.'s influence in the Middle East.

4. ABDULLA BIN MAJID BIN GHURAIR.

Second son of No. 2. Sunni Muslim, Beni Yas, age about 30. An unpleasant young man who confines himself to his business activities, which at best are dubious and at worst downright crooked. Was involved in a case in which he was fined Rs. 500/- for interfering with Dubai post office. Currently involved in a case in a Rotterdam court, where an injunction was issued against him for delivery of fish without proper calorific content. Not important politically.

5. MAJID BIN GHURAIR.

Youngest son of No. 2. Sunni Muslim, Beni Yas, age about 26. Educated in Pakistan, visited the United Kingdom, Europe and Egypt in 1954. An active member of the Front, he has a penchant for secret intrigue. As anti-British as his father and brother Saif.

6. SHAIKH JUMA BIN MAKTUM.

He and his six sons were enemies of Shaikh Rashid, opposed H.M.G. and always supported Saudi Arabia. They used to act as Saudi agents for spreading pro-Saudi propaganda. In 1955 he and four sons were deported by Rashid and settled in Dammam. They are believed to be in contact with the National Front and have been passing on information to the Saudis from Dubai. Is in touch with his brother the Ruler, Shaikh Said and has been trying to return to Dubai.

11. AHMED AL MUSA.

317

Sunni Muslim aged 35. Najdi by origin. Rashid's purchasing agent and rent collector, and does various work for Rashid's wife. Spends most of his time in the house of No. 9. Has interfered in Customs.

12. MUHAMMAD BIN RAFIDH.

Sunni Muslim of mixed Persian and Arab origin. Aged 38. Rashid's former passport clerk who until recently used to issue (and make a good thing out of) the Ruler's travel documents. Now Rashid's private secretary; thus has opportunity to see all letters, including many of the Agency's. Writes all Rashid's replies. Spends a good deal of time with Nos. 9 and 10, dining and picnicing. Is anti-British and attempted to disrupt the Customs.

13. YOUSIF AL DAWIS.

Beni Yas, Sunni Muslim, aged 28. Rashid's headguard for passengers on and off B.I. ships. To be seen most evenings in No. 9's house.

14. ISMAIL.

Sunni Muslim, Beni Yas, aged 35. Rashid's second driver, who drives No. 9 as well as doing repairs on latter's car.

15. JUMA' BIN KHALEFAH.

Sunni Muslim, Beni Yas, aged 38. Rashid's "distributor of rations." Frequently visits No. 9.

16. MUHAMMAD AL MUSA.

Sunni Muslim, aged 28. Najidi by origin. Former customs official mixed up in hashish smuggling with Pakistanis, from whom he is rumoured to have received a lac of rupees. Ring leader in customs strike and now spends much time in the house of No. 9 for whom he is working. One of the Front's original members.

17. ISA GIBRG.

Persian by origin from Lingah. Young sunni Muslim. Is senior Arab Assistant to the British Bank of the Middle East's Branch in Dubai, where he is highly thought of. Before the arrival of Mohdi Tahjir, used to help in the Customs and often translated letters in English to Shaikh Rashid. At one time enjoyed considerable political influence with the Regent but has been annoyed by his subsequent loss of power. It is now almost certain that he organised

/the

the strike in the Dubai customs at meetings in his house. Bitterly dislikes Mehdi Tajir who has ousted him from the customs and Shaikh Mohammed bin Hasher, the latter because Gurg used to mediate in cases to his own personal benefit. He is in close contact with members of the National Front, especially Nos. 11, 16, 18, and 19. 318

18. ATIQ AL MURR.

Sunni Muslim of Beni Yas, aged 30 years. Former Customs employee now working for No. 9. Original member of National Front.

19. SAIB AL DA'AR.

Former cashier in the Customs.

20. ABDULLA BIN JUMAN.

Sunni Muslim of Beni Yas, aged 45 years. Is regarded as the President of the Dubai municipality. Receives a salary of Rs. 600 a month from Shaikh Rashid and does no work. A member of the National Front and close friends with the Fateim and Ghurair families. He is regarded as the latter's right hand man and is on good relations with No. 9.

21. SAIF BIN FALBAN.

Sunni Muslim of Beni Yas, aged 40 years. One of the original members of the National Front and pro-Saudi. Now supports Shaikh Rashid and the British attitude towards Egypt. He dislikes Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 20.

22. SALIM BIN MUSSABEH.

Sunni Muslim of Beni Yas, aged 60 years. In the past a pro-Saudi but dislikes Egypt and has changed his attitude. Interfered on political matters and visited Turki bin Ataishan on two occasions. He is not liked by National Front but is on friendly terms with Nos. 2, 9, 10 and 20.

23. ABDULLA BIN MOHAMMED BIN MANIA'.

Sunni Muslim of Beni Yas, aged 40 years, an original National Front member but like No. 21 has been changing his attitude. Formerly employed by and clerk to 21.

24. AHMED BIN HASSAN.

Sunni Muslim, aged 58 years, in the National front from the beginning. Is Qadhi of Dubai court, old, corrupt and licentious. under the influence of No. 2.

25. AHMED BIN MOHAMMED.

A Dubai schoolmaster. Influenced by No. 2 and an uneducated man. An original member of the Front.

26. ISA BIN ABDULLA HAMED.

Sunne Muslim of Beni Yas, aged 28 years. Former junior clerk in Dubai customs, who after his dismissal was appointed by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi as Customs officer for Das Island.

27. KHALAF BIN GHAIT.

Sunni Muslim of Beni Yas, aged 42 years. Dismissed from the Dubai customs, where he had reputedly embezzled Rs. 47,000. with the help of former customs director in Dubai, Rashid bin Hamed, and is likely to be Customs director in Abu Dhabi.

APPENDIX (5)

LETTERS ABOUT THE GIFTS FROM BRITAIN TO THE SHEIKHS

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مطابق مع رمضان ١٣٢٨

نزيبي

١٩١٠



509 ✓
20-9-10

لجاء فإذ كانتم قد حضرتم في قريتنا المأهولة بالعلماء والفقهاء
والأئمة والعلما والوجهاء الكرام والبررة والعباد الصالحين

المستشف الى وفاة العلامة بعد ذلك وحيي وبعثت
عليه

المرفوض شيخ عثمان ارجع علينا انعام الذي حضرنا هديته اليه

ويبد فوق ذلك تنفق من انما اعطيتكم لانها كجاء في النظر

كيف تامرهن هذا انتم
وكانوا يذوقوا العذاب

10000 dated 14th September 1910

To, The Presidency Agent, Shargah.
To, The Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

A.C. I have the honor to state that the Sheikh of
Aqnam has returned to me the present which you have
given him and stated that in addition that he
requests to be given a rifle like the rest of the Sheikhs.
I shall act upon your instructions.

J.F.
Arnold
807

P.F.

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1	2	3	4	5	6
		1		2	

Reference
IOR R/15/1/267

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APPENDIX (6)

EXAMPLES OF HANDWRITTEN DOCUMENTS

OFFICE NOTE.

No. 13 dated the 6th January 1912.

From,

The Residency Agent, Sharjah.

To,

The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

A.C.

I have the honour to state that three Banias complained to me in connection with claims against the people of Ajman. Firstly, a Bania named Lal, trading at Mun. et. Kowin, has a claim amounting to Rs 250 against one named Koori, who had absconded from Mun. et. Kowin to Ajman and who is a Nakhoda of Ahmed bin Lota. I sent the Bania with a letter to the Sheikh of Ajman, so that he may recover the claim from Koori. The Sheikh did not accept my letter from the Bania, nor did he recover the claim. He sent the Bania back to me, and I beg to forward herewith his statement regarding the Sheikh's proceedings when the letter was presented to him.

Secondly, Banias Damam and Gandaruch, traders of Sharjah, complained to me in connection with their claim for Rs 300 against Hammood bin

1	2	3	4	5	6
1					
2					

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Reference
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No such cause exists in the present instance if you look at the list herewith of the presents joined.

12) Aken Athaki was to have been a better kind of present in view of the error at step B. but inadvertently the clock which was intended for him was not given him & he has said nothing.

3. Do not think P.R. has time to remonstrate with this Chief. We may ignore his action & need not give him any more presents until he has expressed his opinion as to what he has seen done.

P. R.

This strikes me as rather serious impertinence. But is the kind of thing that better dealt with personally.

Would it be filed till your next visit to the Trucial Coast? Abdul Zafiq might be told that you will deal with it on your next visit?

Please direct Agent to

remind me about Dr. when I next come to the Coast - say that meanwhile see Shankh will not be considered for my future presents until he writes in a written apology that we had his accounts be correct. I shall not be able to do this. I shall not be able to do this. I shall not be able to do this.

APPENDIX 7


GENEALOGY OF THE RULING FAMILIES
OF THE U.A.E

Source: Abdullah, M. M., The U.A.E.,
Croom Helm, London, 1978


Anechon, V. D. P., Arab States of the
Lower Gulf, Washington D.C., 1975

Appendix 1: Genealogy of the Ruling Families

Āl-bū-Falaḥ (Banī Yās): Ruling Family of Abu Dhabi



The Qawāsim Family



Klabā branch

Mājid b. Sulţān
1871-1900
Ḥamad b. Mājid
1900-03
Sā'id b. Ḥamad
1903-37
Ḥamad b. Sā'id
1937-51

Shārjah branch

Khālīd b. Sulţān
1866-68
Sālīm b. Sulţān
1868-83
Şaqr b. Khālīd
1883-1913
Khālīd b. 'Aḥmad
1913-24
Sulţān b. Şaqr
1924-51
Muḥammad b. Saqr
1951-51
Şaqr b. Sulţān
1951-65
Khālīd b. Muḥammad
1965-72
Sulţān b. Muḥammad
1972-

Rās al-Khaimah branch

Ḥumaid b. 'Abdullah
1869-1900
Khālīd b. Şaqr
1900-09
Sālīm b. Sulţān
1909-17
Muḥammad b. Sulţān
1917-19
Sulţān b. Sālīm
1919-48
Şaqr b. Muḥammad
1948-


Dabā branch

'Aḥmad b. Sulţān
1871-83
Rāshīd b. 'Aḥmad
1883-1907 / 1924-37
Khālīd b. 'Aḥmad
1907-24
'Aḥmad b. Rāshīd
1937-51

Lingah branch

Qaḍīb b. Rāshīd
1805-29
Muḥammad b. Qaḍīb
1829-29
Sā'id b. Qaḍīb
1829-54
Khalīfah b. Sā'id
1854-74
'Alī b. Khalīfah
1874-78
Yūsuf b. Muḥammad
1878-85
Qaḍīb b. Rāshīd
1885-87
Muḥammad b. Khalīfah
1898-99

ABRIDGED GENEALOGICAL CHART OF THE AL NUHAYYAN FAMILY




- A: Ruler since August 1966; overthrew B with British consent; (b. 1908)
 B: ex-Ruler and brother of A; living "in exile" in al-'Ayn; (b. 1903)
 C: deceased (1958) brother of the Ruler
 D: deceased (1958) brother of the Ruler
 E: eldest son of A; Heir Apparent, Deputy Ruler; Abu Dhabi Prime Minister; Minister of Finance and Defense (1971-73); UAA Deputy Prime Minister (1971-)
 F: Minister of Communications (1971-73) and nephew of the Ruler
 G: Minister of Education, Public Health, Water Resources, Development and Public Works as well as Vice-Premier (1971-73); UAA Minister of Public Works (1973-)
 H: Minister of Police, Public Security, Citizenship, Passports and Residential Affairs (1971-73); UAA Minister of Interior (1973-)
 I: Mayor of al-'Ayn and Minister of Agriculture (1971-73); Head, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (1973-)
 J: Mayor of Abu Dhabi Town; Minister of Electricity (1971-73); UAA Minister of Health (1973-)
 K: Minister of Hydraulic and Electric Power (1971-73)
 L: Minister of Justice (1971-73)

Note: Ministerial posts cited are in the administration of Abu Dhabi unless stated to be UAA.

Source of names, birth dates and dates of rule: Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States*. London: 1970, p.

329
**ABRIDGED GENEALOGICAL CHART OF
 THE AL MAKTUM RULING FAMILY OF DUBAY**




Notes:

- = Ruler of Dubai with dates of reign in parentheses.
- A = Head of the Bani Rashid branch of the Al Maktum; "elected" Ruler of Dubai by notables of the ruling family in opposition to I, but went unrecognized by the British; later elected leader of reform group of 1938 formed in opposition to I; expelled from Dubai at time of present Ruler's wedding
- B = Second most influential member of the Bani Rashid; killed at time of present Ruler's wedding, along with his son, Buti
- C = Operated a rival taxi service to that of the present Ruler during the 1930s; attacked by supporters of present Ruler, thereby alienating the Bani Rashid further from the Bani Hashar, the incumbent branch
- D = Son of former Ruler of Dubai and leader of Bani Suhayl branch during reign of Shaykh Sa'id (1912-1958); onetime powerful Wali of Dayrah; often in opposition to Bani Hashar
- E = Present Ruler of Dubai (1958-) and Vice-President, United Arab Emirates (UAA), (1971-)
- F = Deputy Ruler and Heir Apparent; Prime Minister, UAA (1971-)
- G = Head of Dubai Municipality; Deputy Prime Minister, UAA (1971-)
- H = Minister of Defense, UAA (1971-)

Source of names, birthdates and dates of reigns: Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States* (London: 1970), p. 355.

ABRIDGED GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE AL QASIMI
RULING FAMILY OF SHARJAH




Notes:

- [] = Indicates Ruler of Sharjah
 A = Incumbent Ruler (r. 1972-); former Minister for Education and Training, first UAA Council of Ministers
 B = Slain during an unsuccessful *coup* attempt in January 1972
 C = Failed in bid to regain rulership in January 1972 in which B was killed
 D = Former Ruler (1924-1951) and progenitor of the Bani Sultan line of the family
 E = Claimed the rulership and held power briefly in 1951; progenitor of the Bani Muhammad line of the family
 F = Deputy Ruler (1965-1972) and Commander of the Sharjah Defense Force
 G = Commander of the Sharjah Security Force; allegedly a candidate for the rulership in January 1972
 H = Head of the Shari'ah Court System
 I = Head of the Port Department
 J = Head of the Petroleum and Mining Department
 K = Head of Sharjah Municipality

Source of names and birthdates: Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States* (London: 1970), pp. 356-57.


**AN ABBREVIATED CHART OF THE AL QASIMI RULING
FAMILY OF RA'S AL-KHAYMAH**




- A = Ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah since 1948 and member of the Supreme Council of UAA Rulers; head of the Bani Muhammad branch of the ruling Qasimi family
- B = Ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah from 1921-1948; deposed by A, his nephew, and exiled by the British
- C = Eldest son of B and a leading claimant to the rulership
- D = Deputy Ruler and Heir Apparent; Deputy Chairman, UAA Commission for Government Reorganization (1973)
- E = Deputy Commander, Abu Dhabi Defense Force

Source of names and dates of birth: Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States* (London: 1970), p. 358.

Āl-bū-Khuraybān (Na'im): Ruling Family of Ajman




Āl-'Alī: Ruling Family of Umm al-Qaiwain



Genealogy of the Ruling Families

Sharqiyyin: Ruling Family of Fujairah



APPENDIX 8

TABLES NO. -1-2-3-4

TABLE (-1)
Economic Indicators in U.A.E.
(1975-1980)

(Value in Million Dh. And at Current Prices)

Economic Indicators	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Annual growth rate %
Population (persons)	557887	680000	862000	930000	975000	1043000	13.3
Labour Force (labour)	288414	384182	477811	494923	523638	541033	13.4
Gross Domestic Product	39460	51033	63419	60669	79972	109833	22.7
National Income	33924	43527	53660	50740	68722	98746	23.8
Disposal Income	31503	40143	50146	47492	63948	91989	32.9
National Saving	22027	27800	31176	26828	39103	61029	22.6
Final Consumption	9476	12343	18970	20664	24845	30960	26.7
Government Final Consumption	3261	4648	7413	8163	9600	11992	29.8
Private Final Consumption	6215	7695	11557	12501	15245	18968	25.0
Gross Fixed Capital Formation	12059	16585	22686	25779	28442	30155	
G.F.C.F. Government Sector	3848	7085	10593	11629	15075	12454	
G.F.C.F. Business Sector	8211	9500	12093	14150	13367	17701	
Total Imports	10912	13601	20218	21473	26642	34116	25.6
Total Exports	29112	36012	41049	39444	56251	84512	23.8
Surplus of the Merchandise Trade	18200	22411	20831	17971	29608	50396	22.6
Current Surplus of the Balance of Payments	12697	14863	11095	8989	18590	38909	25.1
Wages and Salaries	5633	8138	11443	12617	14166	16011	23.2

Source: Ministry of Planning, U.A.E., Economic & Social Development in U.A.E., 1975-1986, p.73

Table (2)

WORKERS BY EMIRATES

EMIRATES	1984	1983	1982	1981	1980	1979	1978	1977	1976	1975
ABU DHABI	249610	256588	265413	263400	266710	253653	218327	204395	170251	131046
DUBAI	159694	162575	167278	160851	155121	154787	159133	150906	120631	87486
SHARJAH	81643	82083	82420	75326	56209	57031	59391	61947	44835	34223
AJMAN	13523	13516	14154	14621	11780	10811	11001	11255	10178	5432
UMM AL-QIWAIN	7158	7213	7463	7644	5092	5056	4790	5792	3948	3152
RAS AL-KHAIMA	38974	40475	41965	41440	34560	31766	31504	31339	25671	20386
FUJEIRA	16115	15403	15837	15528	11561	10136	10339	11667	8469	6689
TOTAL	566717	577853	594530	578810	541033	523240	494485	477301	383983	288414

Source: Ministry of Planning, U.A.E., National Accounts for U.A.E., 1975-1984, p.92

ECONOMIC VARIABLES IN U. A. E.

(Value in Million Dirhams / At Current Prices)

Economic Variables	1984	1983	1982	1981	1980
Population (Persons)	1230900	1194500	1186000	1122000	1042100
Labour Force (Labour)	566717	577853	594530	578810	541033
Crude Oil Production (ooo Barrels)	468780	451579	460788	548104	626387
Gross Domestic Product At Purchaser's Value	100710	102553	112433	121100	109833
National Income	79077	81369	93885	106696	98746
Disposal Income	78217	80569	91375	102680	91989
National Saving	36810	34428	42529	56259	61029
Final Consumption	41407	46141	48846	46421	30960
Private Final Consumption	24687	26183	26846	24946	18968
Government Final Consumption	16720	19958	22000	21475	11992
Gross Fixed Capital Formation	29823	31668	31683	30643	30155
G. F. C. F. Government Sector	9842	10459	9754	9315	12454
G. F. C. F. Business Sector	19981	21209	21929	21328	17701
Total Commodity Imports	25530	30970	34795	35594	34116
Total Commodity Exports	58440	59254	69980	82142	84512
Surplus of The Merchandise Trade	32910	28284	35185	46548	50396
Current Surplus of The Balance of Payments	23470	18909	23988	34842	38909
Wages and Salaries	23586	24077	23300	21123	16011

Source: Ministry of Planning, U.A.E., National Accounts for U.A.E., 1975-1984, p.43

TABLE 4
TOTAL ANNUAL EXPORT OF CRUDE OIL IN THE UAE
(barrels)

Emirate Year	ABU DHABI	DUBAI	SHĀRIGAH	TOTAL
1962	5,412,256			5,412,256
1963	18,060,696			18,060,696
1964	67,803,766			67,803,766
1965	102,096,258			102,096,258
1966	132,494,374			132,494,374
1967	137,559,949			137,559,949
1968	181,446,190			181,446,190
1969	218,823,922	3,651,094		222,385,016
1970	253,533,581	30,949,134		284,482,715
1971	339,061,675	45,323,357		384,385,032
1972	384,212,140	55,595,650		439,807,790
1973	472,112,631	81,151,245		553,263,876
1974	511,702,061	88,317,655	8,259,080	608,278,796
1975	514,070,340	91,635,272	13,954,750	619,660,362
1976	580,827,473	115,828,116	13,395,182	710,050,771

Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, UAE, Oil Statistical Review (1977), pp. 42, 47, 57. Figures for the year 1962 were taken from the 1976 issue of ibid., p. 49.

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(ii) India Office, political and secret, the series L/P&S/18.

(iii) Colonial Office, Series 727.

(iv) The Foreign Office files, Series 371 (the Persian Gulf) Public Record Office.

(i) The Series R/15/1 ff (I.O.L.)

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| R/15/1/4/27 | <u>Succession to Shaikhdom of Abu-Dhabi,</u>
26/5/1909-28/7/1929 |
| R/15/1/4/29 | <u>Aiman Affairs,</u> 26/10/1910-27/8/1921 |
| R/15/1/4/30 | <u>Aiman-Shariah Affairs,</u> 1922-1929 |
| R/15/1/4/37 | <u>Deposition of Sheikh Saqar Bin Khalid &</u>
<u>Succession of Sheikh Sultan Bin Saqr as</u>
<u>Sheikh of Shariah,</u> 1924-1932 |
| R/15/1/4/43 | <u>Unrest at Dibai & Trucial Coast Policy,</u>
1934-1936 |
| R/15/1/14/38 | |
| R/15/1/14/36 | <u>General situation on Trucial Coast,</u> 1934-
1936 |

R/15/1/19/20

R/15/1/19/20/20 Nejd-Bahrein Relations, 1932-1939

R/15/2/8/41 Annual Report, Trucial Coast, 1934

R/15/2/20/1-4 Slave Trade, 1931-44

R/15/2/22/14 Recognition of Fujuirah as independent state

R/15/2/35/31 Disturbance on Trucial Coast, 1936-39

R/15/3/1/5-6 Formal calls between H.M. Ships & Sheikhs of the Trucial Coasts, 1931-48

R/15/4/20/3 The Ajman, 1908

R/15/4/22/5 Baghdad Railway, 1910-1918

R/15/4/11 Dubai Local Affairs, British Agency, Sharjah, 18 June 1938

R/15/4/11 from Residency Agent, Sharjah to the Political Agent, Bahrain, Dubai Local Affairs, 23 June 1938

R/15/4/11 Letter from Mr. T.C. Fowle, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Sheikh Said bin Maktum, Ruler of Dubai, 1 October 1938

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- R/15/4/3 Agreement between the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company Ltd. and Sheikh of Dubai,
1939
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about the relation with Britain, 1940
- R/15/4/2 E.No.0210 Political Agent Bahrain to
Resident Agent Sharigah, 14 June 1941
- R/15/4 Copies of Agreement Concessions.
- R/15/4/2 British Policy, Oil and New Mashikh in
Fajarah, 10 August 1942.

(ii) The Series L/P&S/18 ff (I.O.L.)

L/P&S/18

- B19 Turkish jurisdiction on the Arabian Coast (in 4 parts, 1879-84)
- B47 British protectorate over the Arabian Coast (by E. Neel)
- B50 Limits of Turkish jurisdiction (by E. Neel)
- B151 British interests on the coast of Arabia (1905)
- B159 Existing treatest ... Trucial States, (1906)
- B259 Arabia: Anglo-French Russian agreement, Sykes-Picot agreement.
- B387 Memo by Political Department (I.O.) on treaties between H.M.G. & Chiefs of Arabia.
- B392 Wireless Telegraph situations in the Gulf, (1928)
- B393 Political control in the Gulf (1928)
- B403 The Trucial Chiefs (1908-1928)
- B409 Precis of Treaties between H.M.G. and the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast.
- B414 Air communications in the Gulf, Air Ministry (1928)
- B419 Future Policy of the Trucial Coast (1929)

- B159 Treaties and Engagements in force on 1 January 1906 between the British Government and the Trucial Chiefs of the Arab Coast
- B210 External situation of Indian Conquest, 1915
- B469 Abu Dhabi Oil Concessions
- B457 Sharjah Oil Concessions
- B458 Dubai Oil Concession
- B3956 Foreign Office to Indian Office, 24 November 1947

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- C248D Precise of correspondence regarding the Trucial Chiefs
- C248B Precise on Naval Arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1882-1905
- C247 Russian activities in the Persian Gulf
- C297 Lord Curzon despatch. Russian ambition to construct a railway line through Persia and acquire a port in the Persian Gulf, 1901
- C248D Visit of Lord Curzon to the Pirate Coast and Durbur of the Trucial Chief of Sharjah, November 1903

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- C.O.727, Vol.4, Arabia, 1922
- C.O.727, Vol.10, Arabia, 1925
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Smith, Near East Peace Problems and a Possible
Solution, 24 September, 1918

F.O.371/5270, Control of Arabian littoral (E8447/
8447/44)

F.O.371/6343, Control by Colonial Office (E9744/533/65)

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Colonial Office and Govt. of India (E11047/11047/91)

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attitude of his succession.

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Report of 1925 and history of British interests, case
of Persian claims to Bahrain.

F.O.371/12009, Situation in the Trucial Coast
(E421/91). Treaty obligations of Trucial Chiefs
regarding relations with foreign powers (in this case,
Persia) (E4135/421/91)

(P.R.O.)(F.O) 371/13009. Political Resident to Foreign
Secretary, 13 December, 1927, about Britain burning the
ship.

F.O.371.13402, British Position and Policy-Persian Gulf
(W12204/12204/98)

F.O.371/13070, Historical summary, British position
1907-1928 for the Committee of Imperial Defence (E5300/
3164/34)

F.O.371/13723, Trucial Chiefs (E2746/56/91)

(P.R.O.)(F.O) 371/13723, Letter from Political Resident
to Political Agent about the British Policy in
establishing the Majilis (Council) in Dubai, April 1929

(P.R.O.)(F.O) 371/13723, from F.W. Johnston, Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Foreign Secretary
to the Government of India about succession to the
chiefship of Abu Dhabi. Bushire, 23 April, 1929

(P.R.O.)(F.O) 371/13723, attempt to dispose of Sheikh Said of Dubai, 5 September, 1929

F.O.371/14458, Trucial Coast and Govt. of India (1929-32). The position of the political agent (E76/76/91)

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F.O.371/15347, Air base at Abu Musa (E5019/439/34)

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(P.R.O.)(F.O) 371/16957, Report from Lt.Col. G. Loch, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 1933

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