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**U.S. Power and Post-conflict Reconstruction : The Cases of
Japan and Iraq**

**A thesis submitted by J.F. Bridoux
PhD in International Relations**

**University of Kent
September 2008**

Abstract

Shortly before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, American officials made references to the reconstruction of Japan and Germany after World War II as constituting examples of successful democratisation, replicable once Saddam Hussein would be toppled. Such a statement generates questions regarding the relevancy and intelligence of planning the reconstruction of Iraq on the basis of what was done in Japan and Germany given the obvious differences of context and conditions pertaining to these reconstruction projects.

Our purpose consists in operating a comprehensive analysis of past reconstruction cases and of the current reconstruction project in Iraq in order to understand why American officials believed that extensive social reengineering aiming at seeding democracy and economic development is replicable. In other words, the research question animating our work aims at identifying factors explaining the outcome of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects.

Hence, this study compares the reconstruction of Japan from 1945 until 1952 with the current reconstruction of Iraq, aiming to develop a comprehensive analytical framework relying on power differentiating between coercion and consent. The analysis reveals that additionally to the effective use of material resources of power, the outcome of reconstruction projects depends on a specific comprehension of what power does on behalf of American foreign policy-makers; an understanding of pre-reconstruction conditions, consistency in the formulation and implementation of policies across reconstruction fields identified as the state, the security dimension, the economy and the civil society; and finally, consistency between reconstruction policies and U.S. regional and global foreign policies.

As an outcome of an analytical approach relying on the concept of power, our findings regarding the outcome of the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq provide us with an opportunity to appraise the effectiveness of American power in the contemporary international structure, put at risk in its coercive and consensual expressions.

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This book is dedicated to my wife, Ena, and our daughter, Saya. I will forever be indebted to Ena, who kindly agreed to put the bread on the table for the four years it took me to complete this work. Her support was obviously not only material. She turned out to be as harsh as a U.S. Marine Corps drill sergeant in her motivational speeches to help me finish this study. As for Saya, she was the best cure to take my mind away from the PhD and constantly reminded me that life is not only about books and American power.

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1. Introduction

Background and Rationale

“There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken. The nation of Iraq — with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people — is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom”. President George W. Bush, Hilton Hotel, Washington D.C., 26 February 2003.

This statement made at the eve of the invasion of Iraq emphasises a key-component of Bush’s foreign policy: democracy promotion and the assumption that any nation is able to acquire and develop democratic ideals. Starting from the postulate that the United States is in an unprecedented position of power in the contemporary world and that, as the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. have demonstrated, the main threat to U.S. security originates in the conjuncture between weak states and catastrophic technologies, the American national security strategy lauds a distinct American internationalism reflecting the union of American values and national interest. The ultimate aim of this strategy is to make the world safer and better by promoting political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.¹

The second title of NSS 2002, “Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity”, makes an explicit link between freedom and justice, and their universality: “the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere”.² These principles are then defined as “the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property”.³

NSS 2002 then identifies international institutions, development aid, and bilateral relations as the main instruments in order to propagate these fundamental values, and reasserts that America “will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it”.⁴ Those who resist it are then identified as rogue states, defined as dictatorial, seeking weapons of mass destruction, disregarding international law, aggressive, sponsoring terrorism, rejecting basic human values and all the United States stands for.⁵ Rogue states constitute a threat in regard to the potential alliance they could constitute with terrorist groups, which could lead to their arming with WMD, that could be used against the U.S. and

¹ *The National Security Strategy of the United State 2002*, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴ *National Security Strategy 2002*, p. 4.

⁵ *National Security Strategy 2002*, p. 14.

its allies. The remedy to deal with such threats is pre-emption, justified on the basis that the U.S. cannot remain idle when “enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies”.⁶

By identifying pre-emption as a potential foreign policy instrument, the Bush administration presupposes that the United States is in a position of power to do so, that is that it could act unimpeded and has the necessary resources to achieve the removal of those constituting a threat to the American national security. We saw that there was no doubt in American foreign policy-makers’ minds about the status of power enjoyed by the United States: “Today the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence”.⁷ However, while the U.S. may have the necessary power instruments in order to wage war and win it, does it have what it takes to rebuild what it would destroy?

The question is worth asking as the line of thought of the Bush administration regarding the national security strategy stops at the use of force to dispose of threats. Nothing is said about what could follow a pre-emptive strike motivated by the eradication of an imminent threat from a rogue state, eradication that would in all likelihood cause regime change. In that way, the active promotion of democracy as strategy instrument falls short of encompassing the reconstruction phase that would follow U.S. intervention.

That makes Bush remarks about the ability of Iraq to develop democratic institutions because it has been done before in post-WW II Japan and Germany the more interesting. Indeed, shortly before the invasion, when the planning for post-war reconstruction was being formulated, and in the early stages of the occupation of Iraq, U.S. officials referred to both Japan and Germany as successful examples of post-conflict reconstruction cases, that could serve as insights for what was to happen in Iraq once Saddam Hussein was gone.⁸

In turn, such references to past successes prompted reactions questioning the relevancy and intelligence of building the reconstruction of Iraq on a model of policies implemented in Japan and Germany after WW II. Dower as early as 2002 warned that “lessons we can draw from the occupation of Japan all become warnings where Iraq is concerned”.⁹ This pessimism about the probability of seeing democracy take roots in Iraq as

⁶ *National Security Strategy 2002*, p. 15.

⁷ *National Security Strategy 2002*, p. 1.

⁸ Fallows, J., ‘Blind into Baghdad’, *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004); Dower, J. W., ‘Occupation: A Warning from History’, in Gardner, L. C. and Young, M. B., eds., *The New American Empire* (New York, London: The New Press, 2005), p. 182; Feldman, N., *What We Owe Iraq. War and the Ethics of Nation-Building* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 2006), see the introduction.; Synnott, H., ‘State-building in Southern Iraq’, *Survival*, 47:2 (Summer 2005), p. 54.

⁹ Dower, J. W., ‘Occupation: A Warning from History’, p. 182.

it did in Japan and Germany is shared by the few authors who have ventured in comparative analyses of the U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction of Japan, Germany and Iraq.

Flockhart applies a social constructivist approach to the democratisation of Germany and Iraq, by conceptualising both democratisation processes as identity constructions, she looks at how democratic norm sets are transferred through state socialisation and points out differences that impede on the successful implantation of democratic norms in Iraq.¹⁰

Stradiotto identifies U.S. military intervention with the objective of operating regime change as an important causal variable to democratisation. Comparing the reconstruction of Iraq with past reconstruction cases following U.S. military intervention, he concludes that “democratization is strongly influenced by the success of US military intervention and assistance during the transitional phase and positive socioeconomic conditions within the host country during the rebuilding stage”.¹¹

In 2003, Dobbins produced an extensive study analyzing the United States’ role in nation-building since the end of WW II. His objective consisted in extracting best practices of the reviewed cases by identifying key-factors explaining the success of democratization and the creation of vibrant economies in these countries. Dobbins then builds on the lessons learned from the seven cases under scrutiny and applies his findings to elaborate best practices in order to reach similar results in Iraq.¹²

However, a comprehensive study questioning the Bush administration assertion that if democracy instauration in Japan and Germany after WW II was successful, then it should also be in Iraq, and hence that the success met by the U.S.-led reconstruction of Japan and Germany is replicable, is still to be done. Indeed, so far, references to the reconstruction of Japan and Germany in relation to the reconstruction of Iraq have focused on elements of differentiation -be it regarding pre-conditions, economic indicators, the status of the state apparatus post-invasion, levels of economic and social development, etc- or on one aspect of the reconstruction explaining success or failure, as explanatory of the different outcomes characterising reconstruction projects.

While useful, those analyses do not account for all the factors explaining a specific outcome of U.S.-led reconstruction. Hence, we argue that it is necessary to implement a comprehensive analysis of past reconstruction cases and of the current reconstruction project in Iraq in order to understand why American officials believed that extensive social

¹⁰ Flockhart, T., ‘Similar and Yet So Different: The Socialization of Democratic Norms in Post-War Germany and Present Day Iraq’, *International Politics*, 43:5 (November, 2006).

¹¹ Stardiutto, G. A., ‘Democratic Prospects in Iraq: A Comparative Approach’, *International Politics*, 43:5 (November, 2006), p. 574.

¹² Dobbins, J. et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003).

reengineering aiming at seeding democracy and economic development is replicable. In other words, the research question animating our work aims at identifying factors explaining the outcome of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects. More accurately, we want to compare the reconstruction of Japan from 1945 until 1952 with the current reconstruction of Iraq in order to develop a comprehensive analysis that will show that in addition to material resources and their effective use by the U.S., the outcome of reconstruction projects is dependent on a specific comprehension of what power does on behalf of American foreign policy-makers, an understanding of pre-reconstruction conditions, consistency in the formulation and implementation of policies across reconstruction fields, and consistency of the policies implemented with U.S. regional and global foreign policies.

Does it mean that we attempt to supply a walk-through guide to successful reconstruction projects? No. Instead, we contend that a conceptual framework relying on a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent should help us to understand the outcome of U.S.-led nation-building in Japan in the early Cold War context and in Iraq in the Post-Cold War world. Can that framework be applied to other instances? Yes, but subject to a review of basic analytical parameters and key elements pertaining to that specific reconstruction effort. It means to operate a review of the occupier and occupied status (limitations in space), a reassessment of the period's international realities (limitation in time), and finally, a reconsideration of power and its nuances in the period of analysis (what was true after WWII and now may not be during the Cold War for example). So, we contend that for the analysis to be valid, it must be located in time and space and hence conclusions will depend on the specificities of the period and area under scrutiny.

The chosen approach to assess the outcome of post-conflict U.S.-led reconstruction cases is based on postulates and analytical building blocks that provide us with the conceptual structure with which we will look at both case-studies:

Postulates

1. The idea that power is coercion and consent, active in several fields and interacting permanently;
2. Choosing a specific mode of power exertion relies on one's perception of what power does;
3. Such perception is the fruit of historical experiences that led to the development and acquisition of a specific conception about one's nation status and role in the world;
4. In turn such a conception shapes foreign policy decisions and modes of action that rely on specific mechanisms of power exertion.

5. Power is exerted at the local, regional and global levels and consistency of power exercise at these three levels is essential for the effectiveness of foreign policies and hence of post-conflict reconstruction.

Analytical building blocks

1. A concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent. The identification of ideas that have historically animated U.S. foreign policy. Linking these ideas stemming from the American historical experiences to the current U.S. administration's understanding of the status, position and role of the U.S. in the world; hence conditioning a specific understanding of power; in turn conditioning specific foreign policy actions characterised by a specific use of power instruments;

2. Applying these findings to two reconstruction cases, Japan and Iraq, looking at the influence of preconditions on the reconstruction; insisting on which nuances of power are at work in four interconnected fields of reconstruction projects (security, economy, the state and civil society); pointing out sources of congruence and opposition between mechanisms of power at work in the framework of reconstruction and stemming from the regional and global realities (influence of regional and global factors on reconstruction);

3. Assessing the degree of consistency achieved by the U.S. in integrating the influence of regional and global factors in defining foreign policy responses and hence influencing the reconstruction processes.

So, we contend that by relying on a concept of power in international relations that differentiates between coercion and consent, we will be able to give more explanatory salience regarding the outcome of U.S.-led reconstruction projects. We are not so much interested in what power is but in what power does. Indeed, a post-conflict reconstruction project aiming at democratising and economically rebuilding a country shattered by war requires the mobilisation of tangible and intangible assets brought into action by an exertion of power on behalf, in our case, of the United States. A conception of power relying exclusively on coercion and the use of material capabilities in the exercise of power can account for dimensions of the reconstruction like stabilising the country, building state infrastructure and reviving the economy, both the seat of an investment in material resources. However, it would not be able to account for the socialisation process happening in the reconstructed country as such a process, aiming at sharing ideas and values embodying democracy, relies essentially on the ability to generate consent amongst the political and civil societies of the occupied country. Consequently, it is necessary to look at both

expressions of power, coercion and consent, in order to provide a comprehensive account of what power resources were used to which ends.

In addition, we contend that it is necessary to give historical depth to the American use of power in order to understand its contemporary exercise. In other words, we argue that actors of power have a specific understanding of what power can do and how it should be used that is grounded in historical experiences and the values that developed from these experiences. American leaders have a specific understanding of power and its use that derives from their personal take on the issue, itself a product of their perception of American past experiences as a nation.

Moreover, we assert that in order to understand what power does, it is necessary to observe its exertion in a limited whole in time and space. Hence, as post-conflict reconstruction cases often constitute a period in which the concentration of power exertion is high and varies, we think that such a setting constitutes a useful framework of observation as it should allow us to really understand power in its actual context, through how it works.

We also contend that in order to be comprehensive, the analysis ought to look at power exertion in reconstruction processes across four inter-connected fields (security and stability, political society, economy, civil society). In addition to an analysis of results obtained in each of the fields through power exercise, one should also look at connections between these fields and assess how they complete or impede on each other. In other words, power exertion in a specific field will generate specific outcomes that in turn will influence conditions and outcomes in the three other fields of observation. Hence, the power in charge of reconstruction should aim at consistency of action between the four fields, in order to avoid pitfalls and paradoxes, for the reconstruction project to achieve effectiveness. The analysis of both cases in this study is structured around these four fields in which reconstruction takes place and around what expression of power, coercion or consent, dominates the reconstruction in each of these fields.

Finally, we argue that in order to be complete, the analysis ought to deploy over three interconnected levels of analysis: local, regional and global. Foreign policy coherence of objectives and actions across the three levels on behalf of the power user in its reconstruction project ought to be optimal if it is to be efficient. Hence, in addition to the four fields across which reconstruction is assessed, we also look at how power exerted by the United States regionally and globally through specific foreign policy decisions has an influence on the outcome of the reconstruction. We argue that consistency between regional, global foreign policies and reconstruction policies is essential to the outcome of the reconstruction. Hence,

while the four fields we identified structure the analysis of the case-studies, they are permanently permeated by accounts of regional and global foreign policy decisions that impact the evolution of the reconstruction process.

Defining the Field

What will constitute our field of observation? As we stated, the post-WW II reconstruction of Germany and Japan is considered by many, especially contemporary American officials, as the perfect example of how reconstruction should be led. Later cases tend to be benchmarked against these two seminal experiences. But as mentioned here above, subsequent accounts of American-led reconstruction experiences are limited to the identification of challenges, a definition of the U.S. role and potential international contributions, a narrative of the reconstruction, and finally a summary of lessons learned. Existing accounts are thus based on the occupation's pre-conditions, fact-finding, rendition of these facts and best practices. We argue that such an approach, while useful, is not sufficiently comprehensive.

We attempt to palliate this shortcoming by implementing a comprehensive analytical approach that differentiates between two case-studies, the reconstruction of Japan from 1945 until 1952 and the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq.

A first question to be asked concerns the definition of post-conflict reconstruction. Relating more to post-conflict reconstruction following civil wars, Darby and Mac Ginty locate post-war reconstruction in the field of Peace Studies, as the last stage of the implementation of peace processes. They define the reconstruction phase as “the reconstruction of fractured relationships (political, social, cultural, and economic), [and], reconstruction of infrastructure, housing, and industry”.¹³

Fukuyama locates post-conflict reconstruction as part of nation-building¹⁴, as the phase aiming at the reconstruction and development of political, economic and social institutions of a failed state in a post-conflict situation. In this case, reconstruction and

¹³ Darby, J. and Mac Ginty, R., ‘Peace Accord Implementation and Post-war Reconstruction: An Introduction’, in Darby, J. and Mac Ginty, R. (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking. Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 256.

¹⁴ The term nation-building is rather used by Americans, reflecting the American experience of building a new political order out of various communities that did not share a common historical experience in terms of values and traditions. State-building, favoured by Europeans, emphasises the construction of political institutions. Fukuyama argues that what Americans mean by nation building is actually state building coupled with economic development. Fukuyama, F., ‘Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory’, in Fukuyama, F. (ed.), *Nation-Building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 3

development thus constitute two sets of activities at play in a nation-building process. Reconstruction refers to the immediate post-conflict phase that sees the implementation of actions aiming at restoring damaged societies to their pre-conflict conditions. Development unfolds on the longer-run and involves “the creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth”.¹⁵

In addition, Hippler defines nation-building as “as a preventive political option to avoid the breakup of the state and social fragmentation, as an alternative to military conflict management, as part of military interventions or as an element of post-conflict policies”.¹⁶ He then differentiates between the use of the term nation-building as descriptive or analytical versus normative strategic. The descriptive use refers to the analysis of a process of socio-political development “that allows loosely linked communities to become a common society with a nation-state corresponding to it”.¹⁷ Descriptive in essence, analyses belonging to this category tends to produce narratives and corollary best practices in nation-building and reflect a strategy of development.¹⁸ On the other hand, nation-building can be analysed as a “political objective as well as a strategy for reaching specific political objectives”.¹⁹ Programmatic or conceptual in character, nation-building aims then at the creation of a political and social system in the reconstructed country conducive to the internal or external intervening power’s interests; nation-building is thus aimed at gaining dominance on the reconstructed society and hence constitutes an imperial strategy. Such an approach drags in its wake ethical considerations regarding intervention and nation-building.²⁰

¹⁵ Hippler, J., ‘Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building – Terminology and Political Concepts’, in Hippler, J. (ed.), *Nation-building. A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 5.

¹⁶ Hippler, J., *Op. cit* p. 4.

¹⁷ Hippler, J., *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁸ Dobbins, J. et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building. From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005); Przeworski, A., *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Sisk, T. D., *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington D.C.: United State Institute for Peace/Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1996); Kumar, K. (ed.), *Postconflict, Elections, Democratization and International Assistance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), Reilly, B., *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Jenkins, K. and Plowden, W., *Governance and Nation-building. The Failure of International Intervention* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006); Pouligny, B., Chesterman, S. and Schabel, A. (eds.), *After Mass Crime; Rebuilding States and Communities* (New York, Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007); Rotberg, R. I., *Rebuilding a New Afghanistan* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Short, N., *The International Politics of Post-conflict Reconstruction in Guatemala* (London: Routledge, 2008).

¹⁹ Hippler, J., *Op. Cit*, p. 6.

²⁰ Walzer, M., *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Holzgrefe, J. L. and Keohane, R. (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Chatterjee, D. K. and Scheid, D. E., *Ethics and Foreign Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Hoffman, S., Johansen, R. C., Sterba, J. P. and

Finally, studies on transitional justice and war-crime tribunals,²¹ and an attempt at considering international trusteeship for failed states²² complete the contemporary intellectual production on nation-building.

However, the existing literature on nation-building is rather focused on failed states in the wake of civil wars and subsequent peace-building and reconstruction led by international organisations and less as the result of a military intervention or conflict ending up with an occupation and reconstruction emphasising democratisation and economic recovery implemented by an occupier. Hence, which term shall we use? Nation-building, state-building, reconstruction?

Our focus is on U.S.-led projects of political, social and economic reengineering of countries following a war with the U.S. that ended up with the American occupation and exclusive management of post-war policies in these countries having for objective the establishment of a sustainable democratic regime and some form of assurance that the economy would be revived enough to sustain the state and its population.²³ Furthermore, we focus more on the period of the occupation of the country and the U.S.-led formulation and implementation of policies than on the long-term partnerships developed between the U.S. and the reconstructed countries.

In addition, the status of both countries constituting the case-studies at the time of the occupation also plays a role in the choice of term. Indeed, neither Japan or Iraq can be considered as failed states, main focus of the literature on nation-building. Moreover, while

Väyrynen, R., *The Ethics of Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1996); Ignatieff, M., *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (London: Vintage, 2003); Dobbins, J. et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003); Chesterman, S., *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Walzer, M., *Arguing about War* (New Haven: Yale University, 2004); Feldman, N., *What We Owe Iraq. War and the Ethics of Nation-Building* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 2006); Chandler, D., *Empire in Denial: the Politics of State-building* (London: Pluto Press, 2006).

²¹ Teitel, R., *Transitional Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Bass, G. J., *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crime Tribunals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

²² Lyon, P., 'The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 31:1 (1993), pp. 96-110; Caplan, R., *A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-Torn Territories*, Adelphi Paper, 341 (New York: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2002); Parker, T., *The Ultimate Intervention: Revitalising the UN Trusteeship Council for the Twenty-first Century* (Sandvika: Norwegian School of Management, 2003).

²³ The literature on U.S. nation-building is extensive and has essentially produced post-reconstruction analyses aiming at explaining success and failure and at providing recipes for a positive outcome of U.S.-led nation-building operations. See Dobbins, J. et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003); Fukuyama, F. (ed.), *Nation-Building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), especially chapters 1, 3 and 4; Pei, M. and Kasper, S., 'Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation-Building', Carnegie Policy Brief n° 24, 2003.; Pei, M., Amin, S., and Garz, S., 'Building Nations. The American Experience', in Fukuyama, F. (ed.), *Nation-Building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 64-85.

not victim of a civil war, Iraq nevertheless needed a redefinition of the contours of her nation. Without the iron grip of Saddam Hussein on the state and nation, fault lines animating the Iraqi society were unleashed and became sources of conflict between the ethnic and religious components of the Iraqi society. Hence, while not building an idea of an Iraqi nation from scratch, the occupation had to salvage and build on whatever was left to generate a feeling of appurtenance to an Iraqi nation. In Japan, no nation-building was needed, however, reforming the state constituted the main tasks of the occupier. Consequently, we will use the term post-conflict reconstruction to define the field of our analysis, as encompassing the processes of democratisation and economic development taking place during a period of formal occupation by the U.S.

So, our research question aims at identifying factors explaining the outcome of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects. More accurately, we compare the reconstruction of Japan from 1945 until 1952 with the current reconstruction of Iraq in order to develop a comprehensive analysis that will show that in addition to the use of material resources by the U.S., the outcome of reconstruction projects is dependent on a specific understanding on behalf of American foreign policy-makers of what power does, an understanding of pre-reconstruction conditions, consistency in the formulation and implementation of policies across reconstruction fields, and consistency of the policies implemented with U.S. regional and global foreign policies.

Indirectly, as an outcome of the chosen analytical approach, we also intend to qualify the effectiveness of the current American use of power. Indeed, the integration of the purpose, use and finality of American power in the analysis of the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq leads us, in complement to providing a descriptive analysis, to include regime change, democratisation and economic recovery of occupied countries as part of a deliberate foreign policy choice taking into account the national interest of the United States. In turn, our findings regarding the outcome of the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq should provide us with an opportunity to appraise the effectiveness of American power today.

Choosing Case-studies

The choice of a focus on post-WW II Japan and contemporary Iraq has a justification based on the rationale of the study and on the chosen analytical approach.

First of all, as we aim to understand whether the Bush administration's assumption that because democracy and liberal capitalism were successfully inserted in Japan and Germany after the Second World War, such reconstruction projects are replicable in the contemporary era, we do not have a vast choice of cases to investigate.

Since 1900, the U.S. intervened militarily more than two hundred times, out of which seventeen cases may be considered as nation-building exercises, that were characterised by a deliberate intention to operate a regime change or preserve the existing regime, a post-conflict deployment of a large number of U.S. troops on the ground, and a use of American military and civilian personnel in the political administration of the occupied country.²⁴

However, we need to observe cases following a U.S. military intervention followed by an occupation, which implemented a comprehensive scheme of remoulding all aspects of the political and economic systems of the occupied country, what we can term 'total reconstruction'. It involves not only the reconstruction of physical but also of ideological and psychological elements. On top of the obvious material damages, the people need reconstruction. Their systems of values are shattered and the solidifying element constituted by the nation all but disappeared. The American occupational authorities face people who are on their knees, lost, in need of direction. It leaves us with post-WW II Japan, Germany, and Austria, and to a certain extent, the two contemporary reconstructions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, in the case of Iraq, with the destruction of the Ba'ath regime depriving Iraqis of their system of reference regarding the definition of an Iraqi identity, Iraqis fell back on religion and ethnicity as defining elements of their identity. Thus, while the physical reconstruction was needed, a redefinition of identity by the occupier as it happened in Germany and Japan after World War II was less obvious.

In the choice of case-studies, we dismiss Austria and Germany on the ground that being divided in four occupation zones, reconstruction policies varied - even though we can argue that policies implemented in the U.S., British and French areas were consistent with each other- and the Soviet-led reconstruction evolved differently leading to the partition of the country for half a century. It seems to us that the purpose of assessing whether U.S. reconstruction policies post-WW II can be replicated in the contemporary era requires choosing a reconstruction case characterised by a unilateral formulation and implementation of policies by the U.S. Hence, we chose Japan, where the U.S. was solely in charge.

Regarding the contemporary era, Afghanistan, with the involvement of the UN and NATO, is more a case of multilateral reconstruction and it can be argued that the U.S. investment in the reconstruction of the country is somewhat lighter than in Iraq. Thus, that leaves us with Iraq, where the U.S., similarly to post-WW II Japan, has massively invested in the reconstruction of the country.

²⁴ Pei, M., Amin, S., and Garz, S., 'Building Nations. The American Experience', p. 64.

Another line of justification is located in the evolution of both reconstruction processes in Japan and Iraq. Unsurprisingly, as U.S. officials believe that what happened in Japan can be replicated in Iraq, both reconstructions followed similar developments, even though conditions were different. Hence, if similar policies were implemented, conditions become one of the main sources of explanation of reconstruction outcomes. Consequently, we need a sufficient degree of differentiation of the periods under scrutiny to bring to the fore explanatory factors of the outcome of the reconstruction.

In summary, we need to compare what is comparable: reconstruction processes following a military conflict won by the U.S., followed by an occupation on the long run unilaterally led by the U.S.

But why choose to rely on a historical mode of analysis and on two case-studies that are so different? Another option would have been to analyse two reconstruction cases separately through an application of theory, for example a social constructivist analysis of the effectiveness of socialisation processes of democratic norms in U.S. occupied countries, rather than operating an historical comparison.

Here, our choice is explained by the chosen mode of analysis: built on a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent, and being multidimensional; a social constructivist influenced understanding of effects of power by U.S. foreign policy-makers that is grounded in historical experiences of the U.S. as a nation and specific to the period under scrutiny; an analysis of power exertion in four fields constituting the reconstruction; and the integration of the influence of U.S. regional and global exercise of power on the analysed reconstruction processes.

Hence, we need case-studies providing us with limited wholes in which interactions animating the exercise of U.S. power and historical factors influencing reconstruction can be identified. We believe that post-conflict contexts constitute a relevant field in which to observe relations of power as it is in such periods that major reconfiguration of power take place²⁵, and hence have to be integrated in the definition of foreign policy. Coupled with a focus on reconstruction cases, it should allow for the identification of interactions animating power exertion in the country being reconstructed, while accounting for the influence of a regional and global exercise of power on the reconstruction. Hence, to choose two case-studies located in different historical settings, in our case the post-WW II/Cold War world and the post-Cold War environment, is essential, as we argue that the specific configuration of the international system, the U.S. perception of its position and of its role in the

²⁵ As argued by G.J. Ikenberry in his *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

international system contribute to a specific foreign policy formulation, and hence contributes to a comprehensive understanding of reconstruction outcomes.

In addition , explanatory factors regarding the reconstruction outcomes are also located in the period preceding the American intervention and subsequent reconstruction effort. Here, both Japan and Iraq share similarities. Both nations experienced authoritarian and militaristic regimes. Their experience of democracy was close to inexistent. The occupier faced regimented people and strong conservative elites. In both cases, Japanese and Iraqis were more accustomed to be told what to do than to take initiatives. Japan and Iraq were both drained by costly wars that left the populations in a state of despair and a wish for change. The United States offered Japan and Iraq an opportunity by putting them at the centre of a project aiming at the making of a new regional and new world order. By reinventing Japan and Iraq, the United States aimed at the reconstruction not only of two shattered nations but of a regional and global order congenial to its interests. In both cases, the reconstruction effort unfolded in all spheres of the nation's life: the United States attempted to remould the state, the economy and civil society at the image of the American system. These similarities also constitute a source of explanation of the outcome of both reconstruction projects.

Finally, while sharing similarities, Japan and Iraq have differences that constitute explanatory factors regarding the outcome of the American occupation and wider project of supremacy perpetuation. Regarding the reconstruction's pre-conditions, while Japan was a homogeneous nation in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture; Iraq constitutes a melting pot of groups that define their identities less in regard to an Iraqi nation than to various ethnic groups, faiths and cultural backgrounds. In addition , the Japanese institutions were relatively preserved and the U.S., instead of rebuilding them from scratch, reformed them from the inside. On the contrary, in Iraq, the U.S. had to rebuild the state completely.

Geographically, Japan and Iraq are also different. When the United States attacked and occupied Japan, it took on a limited whole. Japan is isolated geographically, religiously and culturally. It is an island inhabited by people practising a state religion, Shinto, that is peculiar to Japan, and whose feeling of racial superiority casts them aside of other Asian nations. On the contrary, by attacking Iraq, the United States attacked the whole Arab and Muslim world. Iraq is surrounded by countries sharing the same religion and ethnicity. While most of these countries are supposedly allies of the U.S., those influencing most the reconstruction process, Iran and Syria, are enemies. The isolation of Japan provided the United States with a free-hand in its reconstruction effort while the situation of Iraq was

bound to end up in the involvement of neighbouring countries, not always sympathetic to American objectives. These differences constitute another source of explanatory factors of the outcome of the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq.

Conceptual Approach and Organisation of the Analysis

We contend that a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent applied to post-conflict reconstruction cases can contribute to an understanding of the outcome of those reconstruction cases under scrutiny. Indeed, while a conflict sees the use of power in its primal most simplistic expression, a post-conflict situation requires a recalibrating of power use. It is an exercise of power that is far more sophisticated as various nuances of power co-exist depending on the fields in which they are at work. Thus, to the sound of guns, a far more complex understanding of power use is required as power will move from the use of force to its application in the various fields in which reconstruction takes place (the state, the economy, the civil society, the security sphere). Thus, depending on the fields in which power is then exercised as an occupier, the power in charge needs to balance coercion and consent generation in order to reach objectives that are usually part of a more general foreign policy project, whose ultimate goal consists in promoting a specific national interest.

Consequently, the post-conflict reconstruction project undertaken by the occupier also has to be cleverly cast in a broader set of foreign policies to ensure consistency in between objectives and achievements. In summary, it is paramount to our purpose to comprehend how these various nuances of power co-exist (complete or impede on each other), how the fields witnessing an exercise of power react to it and how this exercise of power in various fields impede or complete each other, and finally, how the national (that is where the reconstruction effort happens – at home and in the invaded country), the regional and global aspects of the occupier's foreign policy interact.

How are we going to reach that objective?

Using Power

The analysis relies on a concept of power characterised by a differentiation between power exerted as coercion and power as based on consent generation. Such a differentiation is in itself not original. It relies on a concept defined by Antonio Gramsci and later transferred to international relations by various authors. It is indeed commonly accepted that a concept of power relying exclusively on coercion falls short of providing for the various faces that power can take. Consequently, a first claim is that power is both coercion and

consent. Both expressions are permanently at work when power is exerted, and moreover, permanently interact and influence each other. However, we wish to make clear that we do not operate a Gramscian analysis of post-conflict reconstruction cases. We limit our call to Gramsci to borrowing his concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent, and to two other of his concepts, political society and civil society.

A second claim asserts that power is at work in several dimensions at the same time. As much as coercion and consent must be looked at as a unit, that is as two parts of a whole that complete or impede on each other, the fields in which the analysis takes place are numerous and interrelated. In the case of post-conflict reconstruction, there are several of these fields to be considered: security and stability, the dynamics of politics, the economy and the role of the civil society are taken into account and provide the framework in which nuances of power are expressed.

Indeed, we argued earlier on that power in international relations is multidimensional in character. In order to achieve an efficient exertion of power, defined as the attainment of specific objectives through the use of specific resources, one needs to identify key-factors across a variety of issues and fields that need to be mastered in order to be successful in power projection. It is important to understand that these fields in which power is exerted impact on each other. Across both case-studies, in chapter 5 and 6, we will build our analysis around these four dimensions in which power is exerted in the framework of reconstruction: the security, the economy and the political and civil societies.

A third claim is that one's approach to power is conditioned by previous experiences. Foreign policy-makers' conceptions of power are essentially based on their own perceptions and beliefs about what power can do and ought to do. Such understanding is grounded in personal experiences but also in collective historical experiences that characterise a nation. Hence, it is necessary, in order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the outcome of a reconstruction project, to look at defining elements of the power-wielders' conception of power from a historical perspective, as their foreign policy decisions and actions are partly conditioned by such historically constructed beliefs about what power does and how it does it. This is dealt with by chapter 3 and 4, focusing on our power-wielder of choice, the U.S., holder of an understanding of power that is grounded in seminal experiences that affected the American Republic from its inception. Specific historical occurrences contributed to the development of specific ideas and values that have shaped the current U.S. foreign policy and take on power.

In summary, a comprehensive understanding of outcomes of post-conflict reconstruction cases should be achieved by looking at nuances of power and the relationship between coercion and consent in power exertion, and at the various fields in which power unfolds, all from a historical perspective.

Let us be clear here regarding the use of the concept of power. We do not intend to conceptualise a new approach to what power is and does in international relations but, however, we contend that some of the originality of our work lies in the application of the concept of power as it will bring to the fore the observation of mechanisms of power and their contribution to an understanding of the outcome of reconstruction projects. Indeed, International Relations Theory offers numerous analyses of power at work at the global level, that is by putting states, transnational actors and the structures of the international system as foundations of the analysis, the objective being to qualify the global status of power-holders.²⁶ In contrast, we aim at looking at power at work in a time and space located whole in order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the outcome of an occupation and reconstruction process. Power only constitutes the lenses through which we will look at the reconstruction cases. Ultimately, our aim is to understand why some U.S.-led reconstruction projects were efficient while others failed.

Actors

In addition to the definition of our use of the concept of power, we need to identify actors of power involved in the reconstruction cases as well as the way they interact. There are three sets of actors to be considered when observing a U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction project.

First, we consider the role of the occupational power. In the U.S., we need to integrate the role of the foreign policy-making community, the occupational authorities, and the U.S. public opinion. All three contribute to a specific understanding and exertion of power. The foreign policy-making community includes the Presidency and all agencies participating to the definition and implementation of foreign policies aiming at the preservation and advancement of the American national interest, itself a sum of various influences, including positions defended by those who financed the presidential campaigns, various interest groups and lobbies. This is dealt with by chapter 4, where we look at U.S. foreign policy-making and the specific understanding of what power is and does by the current administration. Obviously, the occupational authorities, that is the structure put at work in an occupied

²⁶ This point will be developed in chapter 1.

country in order to manage the post-conflict reconstruction, is at the frontline of the occupier's exertion of power. Interestingly, the man in charge, for example Paul Bremer in Iraq, may have a different conception of how power works compared to his 'bosses' back in Washington, and hence, there may be frictions between both actors of power when power is actually exercised on the ground. Indeed, some decisions or processes through which decisions are implemented can become a battleground of opposing conception of power exercise, essentially due to different ideas regarding outcomes. Finally, the U.S. public opinion does play a role, albeit more sporadic, as we can argue that through pressures on their representatives, American citizens can influence the course of action of a reconstruction project, especially during electoral periods.

The occupied country constitutes a second set of actors to be considered. Both the occupied political elite and civil society play a major role in the reconstruction effort. The local political society exerts power in two directions. Firstly, towards the occupational authorities, the local elite will attempt to influence the outcome of the reconstruction of their nation by pushing forward special interests and values; while the occupation will try to make use of the local elite to gain legitimacy by acquiring the civil society's consent. Secondly, the local political society faces its civil society. The interaction between both these actors in the context of a post-conflict reconstruction is complex and subject to frictions. Indeed, the local political society acts as a filter between occupational authorities and the population it tries to get consent from. However, consent generation to occupational policies is further complicated by the fact that the coercive aspect of power exertion that sometimes is needed to ensure compliance, either through the active or passive use of force, is missing. More often than not, the seat of coercive power is located with the occupational authorities and any use of force by the local political society can be seen by the population as illegitimate.

Finally, a third set of actors is at work: the international community. It is constituted by international organisations and states that, voluntarily or not, do influence a reconstruction project. Close neighbours of the reconstructed country obviously play a major role as the outcome of the reconstruction will affect them directly. Consequently, they might engage actively in trying to influence the reconstruction by interacting with the local political and civil society as well as with the power in charge of reconstruction.

Geopolitical Coherence

Finally, we need to integrate three levels of study and a key-concept at its core: consistency. Indeed, we contend that the analysis must unfold at the local level, that is where

the reconstruction takes place as well as at home (that is the domestic sources of power of the power-holder); at the regional level and at the global level. The main challenge facing the power wielder consists in having power at work at these three levels in a coherent fashion. Decisions taken in whatever level can have a direct impact on outputs at other levels. The efficiency of a reconstruction process is thus also directly dependent on the level of coherence achieved in exercising power globally, regionally and locally. Again, across our two case-studies, we will integrate the influence of local, regional and global factors in order to complete our attempt at providing a comprehensive explanation of how U.S.-led reconstruction projects achieve effectiveness.

Structure and Methodology

This study unfolds in three steps.

The first step consists in an attempt at conceptualising an approach to power that can subsequently be applied to post-conflict reconstruction cases. Chapter 2, through a review of the existing literature on power in international relations, throws the foundations of our analytical framework by relying on a concept of power that differentiates between coercion and consent generation as modes of action. We will provide a survey of what has been said so far about power in international relations by looking at how existing theories account for the effects of power. Starting from power seen as a sum of material capabilities and as based on coercion, we will gradually incorporate concepts of power emphasising power as consent generation, power as multidimensional and finally as specifically historical, into our analysis. The end-result will be a conceptualisation of power incorporating the balance between coercion and consent in the use of power and the understanding that power is at work in various dimensions of the political life of the international system that will constitute the conceptual prism through which we look at both reconstruction processes in order to assess the outcome of the reconstruction and by extension, the effectiveness of the U.S. use of power.

The second step of the analysis consists in looking at what power means to American foreign policy-makers. Essentially based on second-hand material but also on archives, Chapter 3 investigates American history and points out specific factors that had and still have an influence on how the American policy-makers and their citizens see themselves, their position and role in the world, and, ultimately, how these elements influenced their conception of power, and hence their approach to foreign relations. Based on these findings, we then proceed with assessing contemporary U.S. understanding of power and its effects by looking at the way the current administration assesses America's status and role in the world.

Hence, chapter 4 focuses on the Bush administration foreign policy and its approach to power. Relying on second-hand material and on policy papers produced by the White House, the State and Defense Departments, and by the National Security Council (NSC), we attempt to link the American historical experience of power with the current foreign policy and corresponding understanding of power. Indeed, based on its understanding of the current international system and its dynamics, as well as America's status and role in it, the current U.S. administration developed a foreign policy emphasising unilateralism, democracy promotion, regime change, right of pre-emption and the use of force. We then ground each of these foreign policy themes in the American past, by looking at the historical elements outlined in chapter 3. In turn, it should allow us to qualify the contemporary American use of power and assess which faces of power are at work in the U.S. foreign policy, contributing then to a specific understanding of what power is and does.

The third step of the analysis relies on two case-studies, the post-WWII reconstruction of Japan from 1945 until 1952, and the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq since 2003. We base our analysis to a lesser extent on second-hand sources essentially provided by American, Japanese and Iraqi officials that contributed to the reconstruction efforts, and to a greater extent on archives provided by occupation authorities and American agencies. Regarding Japan, the bulk of the material we use was produced by GHQ/SCAP, in charge of the occupation and accessed during a three month period of research at the National Diet Library. We also rely on archives of the Departments of State, Navy, and War, of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), of the OSS and CIA, of the U.S. Congress, as well as on papers of various individuals who worked for GHQ/SCAP.

The material used for the reconstruction of Iraq case-study is partially constituted by second-hand sources, memoirs of Iraqi and U.S. officials and studies provided by various think tanks; but we relied essentially on documents provided by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the White House, the State and Defense Departments, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the CIA, the U.S. Army, the various committees and sub-committees of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. General Accountability Office, the JCS, the NSC, and the United Nations and its agencies. We also made use of items provided by news agencies as *The Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *USA Today*, *The Economist*, *The Time*, *The Guardian*, *ABC News*, *BBC* and polls provided by Gallup and Zogby. We did not conduct interviews with U.S. officials mainly because our work is not a narrative of reconstruction projects but a critical analysis of events and facts that led to specific outcome.

I actually contacted U.S. officials at NATO, people I personally know, but who, nevertheless made clear that they would not deliver any sensational information and would limit their contribution to a reciting of the official line.

Findings

This study originates in a critical appraisal of the Bush administration statement that post-conflict reconstruction projects that took place in post-WW II Japan and Germany can be replicated successfully in the contemporary era, and especially in Iraq. In turn, it led us to ask three questions about U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction: What analytical framework can help us to bring to the fore factors explaining a specific outcome of reconstruction projects? What explains the outcome of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects? What does such an outcome tell us about the state of contemporary U.S. power?

Chapter 2 to 4 define the main components of our analytical framework. We outline a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent. We argue that in reconstruction cases, power is at work simultaneously across several dimensions. We contend that perceptions of power and its use by U.S. foreign policy-makers are grounded in history, as historically constructed ideas dominating foreign policy contribute to an understanding of the status and role of the U.S. in the world, and hence, condition the choice of specific forms of power in order to achieve foreign policy objectives. Finally, we argue that foreign policies unfolding at the regional and global levels of analysis should also be considered as explanatory factors as they can have an influence on the reconstruction process.

Chapter 5 and 6 give an answer to the second question. By analysing the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq by considering the influence that pre-conditions to the occupation have on the reconstruction, by implementing a concept of power incorporating coercion and consent allowing for the identification of power mechanisms at work in the four fields in which reconstruction unfolds (the political society, the economy, the security, and the civil society), by pointing out sources of congruence and opposition between policies unfolding in these four fields as well as stemming from the regional and global realities (influence of regional and global factors on reconstruction), we aim at qualifying the outcome of both reconstruction projects in Japan and Iraq. We find out that the reconstruction of Japan was permanently animated by consistency of action between expressions of power across the four fields of the reconstruction effort, in between these four fields and in between reconstruction policies and regional and global U.S. foreign policies. In parallel with a permanent adaptation of reconstruction policies to local, regional and

international realities, it led to the achievement of the objectives the U.S. set out for at the beginning of the reconstruction. In the case of Iraq, a lack of realism and knowledge about pre-conditions and realities animating the Iraqi society; conflicting reconstruction policies; regional and global foreign policies that cut out international support to the reconstruction of Iraq and alienated neighbouring countries, led to the questioning of the effectiveness of American policies.

The final chapter of this study will operate a comparative analysis of the two case-studies and risk a qualification of the effectiveness of reconstruction policies and of the outcome of both reconstruction projects as well as an assessment of American power at work. Our final conclusions argue that the reconstruction of Japan was a success essentially due to a coherent use of power by the occupier in all dimensions of the reconstruction effort while the overall objective of turning Japan into a state allied and aligned with the U.S. resulted from a more general effort at the regional and global levels to reinforce American power in the face of the rise of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the reconstruction of Iraq did not benefit from the same degree of coherence regarding policies implemented and integration into a regional and global American foreign policy project, which in turn led to a squandering of American power resources, in turn leading to inefficiency and contradictions in the implementation of reconstruction policies.

We contend that the first case illustrates a successful exertion of power the effects of which last until today in favour of the United States. It is a case of exercise of power based on an effective use of coercion and consent generation sealed in a comprehensive policy that aimed at preserving the regional and global status of the United States as superpower. The reconstruction of Japan was part of a wider project that was successful because national, regional and global dimensions of policy implementation were interwoven in a consistent project. By dispensing power wisely in various dimensions and mainly through consent generation, the United States strengthened its base of power for decades. Through a permanent interaction between the two faces of power, coercion and consent, the United States built a solid presence in the region and achieved the objectives it set for when reconstructing Japan: to repel Communism and contain the USSR. It is still the indispensable power in Asia-Pacific, the cornerstone of stability in an otherwise volatile region.

The Iraq case constitutes a failure of power exertion that is caused by a short-term vision, a lack of planning and purpose and a focus on coercion in the implementation of policies. Moreover, the Bush administration, blinded by a perception of unchallenged American power, lost focus and embarked on a ideological quest of democracy promotion

that set aside the national interest embodied by the maintenance of American supremacy. Instead, by dismembering national, regional and global policies from one another, the United States now faces a multitude of challenges to its position as global superpower. It illustrates a failed attempt of power exercise that translated in a focus on coercion use. Such a focus erodes the U.S. power foundations causing the American house in the Middle East, and to a certain extent globally, to crumble. Through the unwise use of power and a lack of imagination regarding the power dimensions to be involved in the reconstruction process, the Bush administration failed to achieve its objective of creating a democratic Iraq that would serve as an example for the Middle Eastern civil and political societies. The democratic revolution in the region is not happening and the credibility and legitimacy of the United States as a regional and global power playing the role of stabiliser is now in doubt.

The final chapter thus brings together our findings and assesses the usefulness of the proposed analytical framework of reconstruction projects, the outcome of U.S.-led reconstruction in the light of the effectiveness of U.S. mechanisms of power, in turn ultimately assessing the effectiveness of contemporary American power.

2. American Power: The Tale of Force and Consent

Since the end of the Cold War, the question of the United States' power is arguably one of the most popular themes in international relations literature. One can argue, as Henry Luce, that the 20th century was an American century²⁷, dramatically ending with the victory of a U.S. sponsored capitalist 'free' world over communism. To American foreign policy-makers, the sky seemed to be the limit then. George Bush Senior proclaimed the dawn of a New World Order under American auspices and not many observers were ready to question the reality of the American status as the only superpower. But will the 21st century be American too?

Twenty years after Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, which foresaw the end of American supremacy, the declinist school still has aficionados questioning the sustainability of an American led international system, let alone empire. Echoing Kennedy, authors like Wallenstein, Todd and Mann, looking at the demographic, cultural, industrial, financial, ideological and military forces at play in today's world, conclude that the United States is in decline, unable to control international fluxes and the growing four superpowers (Russia, EU, China, Japan), and conclude that the U.S. is on its way to be a great power amongst others.²⁸ Declinist theorists perceive the current emphasis of the U.S. administration on the coercive aspects of power, imperialistic in design, as the sign of a hegemonic decline similar to the fate of Chinese, Roman, British and Dutch empires.

To others, the status of the United States as sole superpower is not in question.²⁹ The key-issue lies in what is America to do with such massive power at her disposal. Hence, the focus is not on the reasons for an American power decline but on the nature, expressions and forms of such power. Opposing the declinist argument, Buzan argues that we now live in an era of 1 + 4: the United States is the only superpower alongside four great powers (the EU, Japan, Russia and China)³⁰, defined as being in a position to potentially access superpower status and taken into account by the superpower's calculations when policies are defined. The United States leads the race thanks to its massive politico-military superiority and

²⁷ Luce, H., 'The American Century', *Life Magazine* (February, 1941).

²⁸ Todd, E., *Après l'Empire* (Paris: Gallimard, 2004); Mann, M., 'The First Failed Empire of the 21st Century', *Review of International Studies*, 30:4 (October, 2004), pp. 631-653; Wallerstein, I., 'The Eagle Has Crash-Landed', *Foreign Policy*, 131 (July/August, 2002), pp. 60-65.

²⁹ See Kennedy, P., 'The Greatest Superpower Ever', *New Perspectives Quarterly* (Winter, 2002).

³⁰ Buzan, B., *The United States and the Great Powers. World Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 86-88.

ideologically thanks to its leading position amongst capitalist democracies, without rival ideologies regarding the future of the post-industrial society.³¹ Such a dominant position triggered talks about resurgence of the concept of empire to illustrate the seemingly limitless American power.

But what kind of superpower is the United States? Ikenberry argues that “The United States is not just a superpower pursuing its interests; it is a producer of world order”.³² The critical question regards the type of unipolar order the United States is willing to build. Either the U.S. bets on the furtherance of the post-1945 hegemonic liberal order that animates the Western system, an order based on multilateralism, strategic restraint, and rule-based relationships, as developed by Regime theorists³³; or, an international order organised along the lines of ‘empire’ defined by Ikenberry as an “order built around American unilateralism, coercive domination, divide and rule strategies, and reduced commitment to shared rules of the game. In this imperial vision of order, U.S. power is the provider, protector, arbiter, and final word in international order.”³⁴ For Ikenberry, both options are at work in the current system. America favours the rule-based order in its relations with the capitalist democratic world, the core; but, dominates the periphery and seeks through coercion to tame resistance to the American hegemonic project.

For some, the American imperialism has two objectives. First, it seeks, by combining democracy, free-market promotion and corporate privatisation of whole economies at gunpoint, to spread market capitalism worldwide. It is bad medicine that far from being benevolent actually aggravates the living conditions of the masses while benefiting a small number of global elites. Second, it seeks the territorial control of raw materials and energy resources in order to tame its politico-economic rivals (the four superpowers).³⁵ As Juhasz

³¹ Buzan, B., *The United States and the Great Power.*, p. 166.

³² Ikenberry, G. J., ‘Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age’, *Review of International Studies*, 30:4 (October, 2004), p. 609.

³³ Krasner, S., ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, *International Organisation*, 36:2 (Spring, 1982) pp. 185-205; Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Ruggie, J. G., ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order’, *International Organisation*, 36:2 (Spring, 1982), pp. 379-415; Keohane, R. O., ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, *International Organization*, 36:2 (Spring, 1982), pp. 325-356; Keohane, R. O., *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Gilpin, R., *Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Young, Oran, “Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International Regimes”, *International Organization*, 36:2 (Spring, 1982), pp. 277-297.

³⁴ Ikenberry, G. J., *Op. cit.*, p. 610.

³⁵ Harvey, D., *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 25, 184-185, 198-199; Juhasz, A., *The Bush Agenda* (London: Duckworth, 2006), Chapter 2 and 3; see also Robinson, W., *Promoting Polyarchy*; Gilpin, Robert, *U.S. Power and Multinational Corporations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

argues when referring to *Pax Romana*, “the belief that the Roman Empire brought peace to the world by establishing such a militarily and economically dominant Empire that no nation in the world sought to challenge its hegemony. Sadly for both the United States and the world, a *Pax Americana* is exactly what the Bush administration is after. Bush is pursuing ‘an Empire of oppression’ – one economy at a time”.³⁶

Others do not normatively qualify the notion of American empire but deem it useful in International Relations theory to conceptualise the current configuration of power in the world. Cox argues that the debate about American empire reflects a perennial concern of U.S. policy-makers, which is how to maintain U.S. supremacy.³⁷ Hence, a broader definition of empire, going over the narrow sense of a territorial control and direct administration of entities attached to an imperial centre, is needed. Empire refers instead to “relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies”³⁸ stressing the acceptances of the dominated elites of the values of the imperial centre.³⁹ Such a definition of empire sounds like Gramscian hegemony as an expression of power based on consent generation. New apostles of the concept of empire actually mix both terms. It is an empire that generates ‘benevolent hegemony’, a form of power seeking acceptance and promising to deliver stability and peace in the international order, making it congenial to the maintenance of the U.S. hegemonic position.⁴⁰

Not every observer agrees with the benevolent hegemonic shape taken by the U.S. empire. For Johnson and Newhouse, the focus on hard power since 9/11 leads the United States on an imperial path similar to Rome, and hence, by rejecting soft power in favour of the use of force, jeopardises its position as world leader. Domination and not hegemony is the characteristic mode of functioning of such an empire: “the United States was something else than it professed to be [a benevolent hegemon], that it was, in fact, a military juggernaut

³⁶ Juhasz, A., *The Bush Agenda*, pp. 22-23.

³⁷ Cox, M., ‘Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine’, *Review of International Studies*, 30:4 (October, 2004), p. 591; Cox, M., ‘The Bush Doctrine and the Lessons of History’, in Held, D. and Koenig-Archibugi, M., *American Power in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 22-23.

³⁸ Doyle, M. W., *Empires* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 19.

³⁹ Maier, C. S., ‘An American Empire ? : The Problems of Frontiers and Peace in Twenty-First Century Politics’, in Gardner, L. C. and Young, M. B., *The New American Empire* (New York: The New Press, 2005), pp. xii-xiii; see also Gill, Stephen, ‘Neo-Liberalism and the Shift Towards a U.S. Centred Transnational Hegemony’ in Overbeek, H. (ed) *Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: the Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s* (London: Routledge, 1993) pp.246-81.

⁴⁰ Cox, M., ‘September 11th and US Hegemony – Or Will the 21st Century Be American Too?’, *International Studies Perspectives*, 3:1 (February, 2002), pp. 53-70; Cox, M., ‘American Power Before and After. Dizzy with Success?’, *International Affairs*, 78:3 (July, 2002), pp. 261-76.;

intent on world domination.”⁴¹ Brzezinski and Maynes insist on the costs generated by such a project aiming at American world domination and point out the domestic costs linked to an ever expanding military; the growing divide between those who serve, coming mainly from the less wealthy strata of the American society, and those who they fight for and who benefit from the American policy of expansion, the economic elite; the international backlash one should expect from American arrogance expressed through unilateralism; and, the lost opportunity to actually build a genuine stable and peaceful world order by co-opting rather than coercing.⁴²

Notwithstanding their differences about the qualification of American power, most observers agree that we live in a unipolar era, that the United States enjoys an unparalleled position of power and that such a situation is here to last, even if the world is full of dangers for the superpower.

In their analysis of contemporary American power, most observers rely on a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent. Coercion is the path chosen to achieve domination and is usually negative regarding its outcome in terms of global stability and preservation of American superpower status, while consent is in the same family as multilateralism and cooptation and seen as the most desirable strategy to further American global hegemony as well as the correct moral choice.

As our purpose consists in qualifying U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects by relying on the concept of power as analytical instrument, the first step of our analysis consists in defining our approach to power in international relations and the use we will make of the concept.

Consequently, this first chapter sets out to define and sets limits to the use that we will make of the concept of power. The chapter is built on four sections and goes crescendo from the most basic assumptions about what power does, when essentially based on coercion, to a more elaborated concept integrating coercion, consent, multidimensionality and historicity. Thus, circumventing our concept of power constitutes the first step of our analysis.

In a nutshell, as this will be developed later on in detail, we start from a series of postulates.

⁴¹ Johnson, C., *The Sorrows of Empire. Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), p. 4, Newhouse, J., *Imperial America. The Bush Assault on World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

⁴² Brzezinski, Z., *The Choice. Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), pp. 213-215; Brzezinski, Z., *Second Chance. Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower* (New York: Basic Books, 2007); Maynes, C. W., ‘The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America’, *Foreign Policy*, 111 (Summer, 1998), p. 39-47.

First, we contend that world politics is inhabited by various actors, not only state-actors but also social agents and structural pressures that have an influence on international relations. Hence, our ontology is constituted by state-actors, non-state-actors (international institutions, non-governmental organisations, etc) and the structure of the international system.

Second, we argue that power is a relationship that is causal in nature. The ultimate purpose of using power is to get another to behave or perform in a fashion that is congruent with one's expectations and interests, even if he does not wish to do so. It is possible to reach such an objective by forcing one to comply or by persuading one that he has a shared interest to do so. Hence, similarly to a Gramscian understanding of power, we contend that power is expressed through coercion⁴³ and consent. Both expressions of power are not mutually exclusive but interact in permanence depending on the conditions in which power is exercised and for what purpose.⁴⁴

Third, the analysis also makes use of power as being segmented in several dimensions (political, military, cultural-ideological, economic, and institutional). Section 3 looks at how these dimensions of power are in permanent interaction and either complete each other, or oppose each other, depending on the context.

Fourth, in order to acquire an understanding of power, one should limit the object of analysis in time and space. While global and regional levels of analysis are considered, we argue that power can only be understood in a limited whole, in which relations of power can be easily identified and assessed.

Fifth, section 4 asserts that understanding power requires studying the meaning of power for those who exert it. Hence, it is relevant to address historical occurrences that have shaped a specific understanding of power, which in turn should help us to appreciate why and how some expressions of power have been favoured above others. It translates into a journey through the history of the recipient of power and the observation on the long-term, in a Braudelian fashion, of critical elements that underpin his conception of power. But to apply a Braudelian methodological approach⁴⁵ to the study of American foreign relations would constitute a task well beyond the purpose of this thesis. Our purpose is rather to go back five hundred years in American history, and to put to the fore specific key-factors that had and

⁴³ Section 1 looks at theories of power emphasising coercion and material capabilities.

⁴⁴ To an expression of power based on coercion, section 2 adds an understanding of power and its effects stemming from consent generation policies and looks at how coercion and consent interact.

⁴⁵ For Braudel's differentiation between time and space, and the application of his approach, see Braudel, Fernand., *Le Temps du monde* (Paris : Armand Colin, 1979); Braudel, Fernand, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II. Vol 1. La part du milieu*, 9th edition, (Paris : Armand Colin, 1990).

still have an influence on how the American policy-makers and their citizens see themselves, their position and role in the world, and, ultimately, how these elements influenced their conception of power, and hence their approach to foreign relations. Consequently, we will be rather selective as it is not our objective to provide a comprehensive cross-borders and cross-disciplines analysis of American foreign relations history.⁴⁶ Instead, we contend that the contemporary understanding of international relations and the corollary views on American power are rooted in the pre-colonial period, and through the evolution of the Republic matured into the understanding of power and foreign relations that we witness today. In turn, such a specific understanding of power and its effects influence directly the substance of our empirical work, that is the reconstruction processes of Japan and Iraq.

Thus, the balance between coercion and consent in the use of power and the understanding that power is at work in various dimensions of the political life of the international system constitute the conceptual prism through which we look at both reconstruction processes in order to assess the outcome of U.S.-led reconstruction and by extension, the effectiveness of the U.S. use of power.

Consequently, it is necessary to address what has been said so far in IR theory about power. The purpose of this exercise is not to provide a summary of the numerous debates about power but to incorporate in our reflection those theories that have something to say about power, coercion, consent, the multidimensional nature of power and the role of historical experiences as defining a specific understanding of power. In so doing, we will link these theories of power with theories of U.S. foreign policy in order to set the scene for chapter 2 and 3, which will investigate how power is perceived by the United States, and hence, in what way it affects the formulation of its foreign policy.

Power and Coercion

Power in political science in general, and IR theory in particular, has generated a wealth of literature. So far, no agreement has been reached as to a definition of power that

⁴⁶ For attempts at a Braudelian reading of American history, see Tyrell, I., 'American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History', *The American Historical Review*, 96:4 (October, 1991), 1031-1055; Nugent, W., *Structures of American Social History* (Bloomington, 1981); Henretta, J., 'Families and Farms: *Mentalités* in Pre-Industrial America', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 35 (January 1978), pp. 3-32; Andrews, R., 'Some Implications of the *Annales* School and Its Methods for a Revision of Historical Writing About the United States', *Review*, 1:3/4 (Winter/Spring, 1978), pp. 165-180; Bailyn, B., 'Braudel's Geohistory – A Reconsideration', *Journal of Economic History*, 11 (Summer, 1951), pp. 277-282; Beard, C. A. and Beard, M. R., *The Rise of American Civilization*, re-print, (London: MacMillan, 1954); Lockridge, K., 'Social Change and the Meaning of the American Revolution', *Journal of Social History*, 6 (Summer, 1973), pp. 403-439; Meinig, D. W., *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, Vol. 1, *Atlantic America, 1492-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

would satisfy all. On a personal level, we all experience forms of power. If every time I am supposed to comply with expectations from others I am forced to do so by being constantly hit on the head with a cricket bat, it is very likely that my understanding of power will equate to the use of force. If, on the contrary, it is explained to me why I should comply, that it would actually be in my interest to do so, I would probably understand power as an effort to generate consent. But would that consent be generated because I am scared of the cricket bat or because I genuinely identify a common interest in complying? Such questions have been asked since the dawn of social and political studies. At a personal level, they are already complex to solve. When one observes the international political society, it becomes a puzzle.

Indeed, if we consider consent as being a crucial component of power, one set of theories understanding power as a sum of capabilities can already be discarded. These theories' ontology is essentially composed of state-actors and their relations. The level of analysis is typically located at the global scale and attempt at explaining why some states are more powerful than others. They rely heavily on objective data, quantitative in nature, and put these data against each other in an attempt to compare and then qualify one's power as greater than another's. Such analyses do not consider power mechanisms in their dynamic interactions and fail to acknowledge the importance of consent generation in the exertion of power. The focus on a global level of analysis leaves also too much room for abstractions and does not allow for an understanding of how power is actually implemented and received, and hence, falls short of explaining outcomes of power relationships between actors of the international system. On the contrary, we argue that a clear definition of the object of study in time and space should allow us to observe power at work and draw conclusions regarding its effectiveness. This is why we focus on two case-studies clearly limited in time and space and aim at integrating softer aspects of power in the analysis.

In IR Theory, such a focus on coercion, conflicts and power as a sum of material capabilities are at the core of a Realist theory of power. Realism finds its roots in classical texts as Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*⁴⁷, Machiavelli's *Prince*⁴⁸, Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*⁴⁹ and Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*.⁵⁰ All variations of Realism subscribe to the following basic assumptions : states are the main actors of an international system characterised by an anarchical condition, their behaviours can be explained rationally, they seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power as an

⁴⁷ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner, (London: Penguin Classics, 1970).

⁴⁸ Machiavelli, N., *The Prince*, translated by George Bull (London: Penguin Books, 2004).

⁴⁹ Carr, E. H., *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

⁵⁰ Morgenthau, H. J., *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1966).

end or as necessary means to reach other ends, the ultimate end being the survival of the state.⁵¹

In its classical form, Realism leaves the definition of power open but argues that the quest for power is innate to the human nature and universal in time and space. Power enters the realm of politics when it is directed towards other human beings. Hence, it is a social fact defined by the ability to influence others and the resources used to exercise this influence.⁵² The dominant state is the state that is the most powerful and which uses its power to reinforce its security and dominant role in the system.

Realists are sons of political theorists of the first face of power: Lukes' focus on prevailing in conflicts where actors and their capabilities in terms of power are the objects of study.⁵³ It is, amongst others, expressed by Machiavelli's concept of power defined as "simply the effectiveness of strategies for achieving for oneself a greater scope for action than for others implicated by one's strategies"⁵⁴, Hobbes' "the government is the sovereign and the activity of the government is the exercise of sovereign power"⁵⁵ for the sake of peace and stability, and Dahl's "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do".⁵⁶ All share a focus on power as a simple causal relationship summarised as A acts with resources at his disposal to obtain something from B in order to prevail.

Morality, legitimacy and consent are not part of the equation. Power is essentially seen as exercise of raw force. While acknowledging the existence of a smooth way to exercise power through influence in order to generate consent, the most efficient way to exercise power relies on the ability of one to subjugate another. Power is nothing else but a brutal causal relationship with the objective of prevailing in conflicts.

In IR theory, Structural Realism attempts to complete this understanding of power by emphasising the structure of the international system as anarchic, characterised by interactions among units (nation-states) with similar functions and a distribution of capabilities across the system that varies over time, from system to system.⁵⁷ These capabilities are above all material. Waltz focuses on population and size of territory, natural

⁵¹ Keohane, R., 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond' in Keohane, R. O. (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 163.

⁵² Morgenthau, H. J., *Science: Servant or Master?* (New York: New American Library, 1972), p. 31; Morgenthau, H. J., *Politics Among Nations*, p. 25.

⁵³ Lukes, Steven, *Power. A Radical View* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1974), pp. 11-15.

⁵⁴ Clegg, S. R., *Frameworks of Power* (London: Sage, 1989), p. 32.

⁵⁵ Hindess, B., *Discourses of Power. From Hobbes to Foucault* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 39.

⁵⁶ Dahl, R. A., 'The Concept of Power' in Bell, M., Edwards, D.V., and Wagner, R.H., *Political Power: a Reader in IR Theory and Research* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 80.

⁵⁷ Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 93.

resources, economic strength, military capability, political stability and competence⁵⁸ and Kennedy argues that economic resources and military capabilities explain the prevalence in conflicts and subsequent rise of a particular power in the international system.⁵⁹

Realism and Structural Realism are the targets of numerous critiques that insist on its lack of historical depth in the analysis, which leads to a difficulty in accounting for change⁶⁰; and, regarding the concept of power, as lacking the necessary sophistication allowing for a wider understanding of power as control over outcomes in opposition to power as a sum of material resources. Both theories adopt a fixed a-historical view of the framework for action, which, not accidentally, corresponds with the then imposed bipolarity on the study of international relations and the concern of the sustenance of U.S. power as guarantee of the maintenance of the existing order.⁶¹

Regarding Theories of American foreign policy, Realism and Structural Realism are both systemic theories with two variants: Defensive Realism and Offensive Realism. Both posit that the amount of power accumulated by the U.S. explains foreign policy decisions. However, where Defensive Realists laud a moderate U.S. foreign policy because expansionist policies can trigger counter-balancing efforts on behalf of other powers and hence challenge American power and security⁶², Offensive Realists argue that the U.S. should permanently seek to maximise its power resources to remain unchallenged and secure.⁶³

Realism and Structural Realism equate power with domination by the use of coercive power. It fails to distinguish between power as a base of action and power as control over outcomes.⁶⁴ In an international system characterised by anarchy and self-help as principle for action, power takes exclusively the face of force, leaving aside 'softer' aspects of power and logically, the notion of power by consent.

⁵⁸ Waltz, K., *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁵⁹ Kennedy, P., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (Londres: Fontana, 1988), p. 439.

⁶⁰ Ashley, R. K., 'The Poverty of Neorealism', in Keohane, R. O. (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 280; Cox, R. W., *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 88.

⁶¹ Cox, R. W., *Approaches to World Order*, p. 91.

⁶² Grieco, J., 'Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics', in Doyle, Michael and G.J. Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 163-201.

⁶³ Mearsheimer, J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

⁶⁴ Russett, B., "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain really dead?", *International Organization*, 39:2 (Spring, 1985), pp. 213.

Power, Coercion and Consent

In the previous section, we focused on an approach of power insisting on causality, conflicts and their resolution by those winning conflicts of preferences. In IR theory, to the emphasis on material capabilities in the exercise of power and the role of structural factors in the distribution of these capabilities in between state-actors, Liberal-Institutionalism through the Theory of Hegemonic Stability and the Theory of Regimes; and Long-Cycle Theory and World Systems Theory address the issue of the role of the position of powers in international structure and of consent and legitimacy in the exercise of power.

We are now in presence of Lukes' second and third faces of power, tackling the role of the structure on power and the ability to generate consent on behalf of the power wielder, which constitutes the second component of our understanding of power.

The role of the structure on the exertion of power is enounced by Bachrach and Baratz who argue that the study of power ought to include the potential limits set by actors to decision-making by leaving aside of the debate non-controversial matters, "by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals not withstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power conflicts".⁶⁵

As Bachrach and Baratz contend, "to measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation".⁶⁶ This approach focuses on the role of the structure in a power relationship. It looks at the environment in which the relationship takes place and, to the analysis of power as a relationship between two subjects harbouring power resources pitched against each other, it includes structural factors that influence power capabilities. It will be important for our future purpose of looking at the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq as structural pressures issued from the international system played a role in limiting alternatives for the U.S. in its choices during the reconstruction processes, as will be developed further on when we will analyse both case-studies.

In IR theory, both Kindleberger's Theory of Hegemonic Stability⁶⁷, and its improved version, Keohane's functional Theory of Regimes⁶⁸ focus on the structural compatibility

⁶⁵ Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S., 'Two Faces of Power', in Bell, R., Edwards, D.V., and Wagner, R.H., *Political Power: a Reader in IR Theory and Research* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 96. See also Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S., 'Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework', in Bell, M., Edwards, D.V., and Wagner, R.H., *Political Power: a Reader in IR Theory and Research* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 100-109.

⁶⁶ Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M., 'Decisions and Non-decisions, pp. 100-109.

⁶⁷ Kindleberger, C., *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

⁶⁸ Keohane, R. O., *After Hegemony*.

between the interstate system and the world capitalist economy, the aim being global stability achieved thanks to the presence of a hegemonic power⁶⁹ and the creation of international regimes.⁷⁰ As Keohane underlines, regimes are designed to reduce uncertainty and to encourage co-operation, which is a combination of hegemonic power and international regimes established under conditions of hegemony.⁷¹ The bedrock of this hegemonic stability lies in preponderance in material resources by a dominating economic centre.⁷² Keohane contends that access to raw materials and military superiority are essential for the hegemon-to-be: the former, to provide transformable resources to industries; and the latter, to protect areas essential to its economy.⁷³

Such dominance is used by the hegemon to influence foreign societal actors, who in turn, exert pressure on their governments for policy changes, which would be consistent with the interests of the hegemonic power. As James and Lake contend, it is “a Trojan horse strategy in which the hegemon changes the constellation of interests and political power within other countries in ways more favourable to its own interests”.⁷⁴ As Ruggie points out, its social project and its power distribution in domestic politics must be in favour of a liberal international order.⁷⁵ Moreover, other economic powers must also have an interest in the development of a liberal international economy. In turn, this unveils the question of deference and community of aims with the hegemonic power, and hence the question of power exerted through consent. The acceptance of values and the recognition of common interests underpin the presence of consent in power relations. The question of legitimacy of the power wielder and of the relevancy to agree to his project expressed in terms of values and interests enter the picture.

In social and political theory, this focus on consent and legitimacy is found in Lukes’ third dimension of power. He complements Bachrach and Baratz’s study of structural influence by arguing that we are in presence of power when “A exercises power over B

⁶⁹ Kindleberger, C., *The World in Depression*; Kindleberger, C., ‘Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods and Free Rides’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 25:2 (June, 1981), pp. 242-254.

⁷⁰ Krasner, S., ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, pp. 185-205; Ruggie, J. G., ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order’, pp. 379-415; Keohane, R. O., ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, pp. 325-356; Keohane, R. O., *After Hegemony*; Gilpin, R., *Political Economy of International Relations*.

⁷¹ Keohane, R. O., *After Hegemony*, p. 138.

⁷² Kindleberger, C., *World Economic Primacy 1500-1900* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 45.

⁷³ Keohane, R. O., *After Hegemony*, pp. 32-33, 39-40; Gilpin, R., *Political Economy of International Relations*, pp. 76-78.

⁷⁴ James, S. C. and Lake, D. A., ‘The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain’s Repeal of the Corn laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846’, *International Organization*, 43:1 (Winter, 1989), p. 4.

⁷⁵ Ruggie, J. G., ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change’, p. 382.

when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests".⁷⁶ His definition of power rests on two related elements: the control of the political agenda and the notion of real interests. The exercise of power is here characterised by the integration or exclusion of specific issues from the political agenda through "the operations of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions"⁷⁷, and, by the existence of latent conflicts that illustrate the contradiction between the interests of those who are powerful and the real interests of those who are excluded.⁷⁸ The process through which the victims of the exercise of power are unaware of the exclusion of their real interests lies in the ability of the powerful to generate consent among the powerless. As Lukes puts it: "Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?"⁷⁹, which in turn, allows for the taming of potential conflicts and acquire legitimacy as power-wielder.

Such a Lockean conception emphasising consent and legitimacy is also found in the work of Parsons and Arendt. Here, power is rooted in a legitimate capacity to act by means presuming consent of the agents at the receiving end in order to achieve defined collective goals. Power is here grounded in specific social conditions. It is still seen as a capacity but a capacity that is expressed under specific conditions defined by the attribution of the consent of those who are ruled. Hence, power can be but should not be force, persuasion, threats, etc...various means of action used to get others to conform to a specific course of action. Instead, power should be based on consent.⁸⁰

Arendt also insists on the notion of legitimate consent in her definition of power corresponding to:

[...] the human ability not just to act but to act in concert[...]. When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.⁸¹

Power is again seen as a capacity and it finds its origin in the collective action of getting together in order to attribute power to a specific agent. This collective action also provides the necessary legitimacy to the ruler, which leads Arendt to argue that "power is

⁷⁶ Lukes, S., *Power. A Radical View*, p. 34.

⁷⁷ Lukes, S., *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁷⁸ Lukes, S., *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

⁷⁹ Lukes, S., *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁸⁰ Parsons, T., 'On the Concept of Political Power', in Parsons, T., *Politics and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 361.

⁸¹ Arendt, H., *On Violence*, (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970), p.44.

consensual [...]. Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow”.⁸²

This focus on legitimacy is relevant to our purpose as one of the key-factors in a successful reconstruction project is the acquisition of a legitimate status as occupying power. As we will see later on, the United States were perceived by the Japanese as having the right to occupy and administer their country, while the occupation authorities made sure to keep intact the institution of the emperor in order to dress their actions in the clothes of legitimacy. Regarding Iraq, the difficulties faced by the United States are partially due to the total denying by the Iraqi population of any form of legitimacy to the U.S. as occupying power and ruler of Iraq, which played a major role in the difficulties faced by the occupation authorities in their reconstruction effort.

Going back to IR theory and Liberal Institutionalism, this emphasis on legitimacy permeates Ruggie’s work. He sees a two-way relationship between hegemonic power and liberal economy. On the one hand, the hegemon gets economic benefits from its dominant position in the system, and on the other hand, the global economy expands through an impressive development of the international co-operation, cemented by the existence of the hegemonic power, what Ruggie terms ‘embedded liberalism’, the particular hegemonic system that developed after WWII and particularly relevant to our first case-study on Japan, as the main American objective in reconstructing Japan consisted in integrating Japan in a new liberal capitalist world order led by the U.S.⁸³

Addressing in detail the question of the deference of actors of the international system to a liberal world order, Keohane refines this version of hegemonic stability by proposing a functional theory of regimes in which the concept of hegemony is defined in terms of willingness as well as ability to lead and focuses on the incentives facing the hegemon⁸⁴ and the incentives facing other countries, raising the question of deference which accounts for the legitimacy of hegemonic regimes and the coexistence of co-operation with hegemony.⁸⁵

Hence, Keohane argues that a theory of hegemony should “analyse dominant power’s decisions to engage in rule-making and rule enforcement, [...], explore why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemon”.⁸⁶ To this end, Keohane and Gilpin refer to the

⁸² Arendt, H., *On Violence*, p. 52.

⁸³ Ruggie, J. G., ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change’, pp. 381, 385, 393.

⁸⁴ Asking under what domestic and international conditions will such a country decide to invest in the construction of rules and institutions.

⁸⁵ Keohane, R. O., *After Hegemony*, p. 39.

⁸⁶ Keohane, R. O., *Ibid.*, p. 39.

Gramscian notion of ideological consensus, needed for the hegemon in order to be backed by other powers.⁸⁷

During its development, Liberal Institutionalism has thus integrated intangible factors in its appraisal of the concept of power. In complement to a focus on state-actors, material capabilities and the influence of structural factors on the exercise of power, other power resources and mechanisms focusing on consent are integrated in the analysis. Nevertheless, while explaining how specific interests are excluded from the debate and how international structures constrain actors of the international system, Liberal Institutionalism fails to explain how these interests are shaped, and hence, how to account for the power to influence and to generate consent. Moreover, these theories do not provide a satisfactory account of the complexities of power in international relations. They still focus on material capabilities as the key-element needed to acquire and exercise power and states as main recipients of power. In addition, by establishing the global world order as the framework of analysis and its stability as finality of the exercise of power, relationships of power are not dissected in detail, and hence they fail to address expressions of power and cases of resistance to these expressions by non-state actors. Finally, these theories do not account for historical factors that have forged a specific understanding of power and the corollary use of some instruments of power instead of others. To the credit of Liberal Institutionalism, consent is now part of the equation of power. While dwarfed by the role of the structure in the exercise of power, consent is nevertheless taken into consideration and at the core of an attempt at explaining why states defer to the establishment of a specific international regime harbouring ideas and interests defined by the hegemonic power. Unfortunately, the interaction between power expressed as coercion and as consent is not integrated in the analysis. Power is either seen as expressed through one or the other but not both.

Another set of theories suffer from the same biases. Modelski's Long-cycle Theory and Wallerstein's World-system Theory, emphasising the positive valuation of the influence of the world leader who provides order and stability to the system⁸⁸, similarly to the previous theories, place the states and their respective material capabilities at the centre of the analysis.

⁸⁷ Keohane, R. O., *After Hegemony*, pp. 44-45; Gilpin, R., *Political Economy of International Relations*, p. 73.

⁸⁸ Modelski, G., 'The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, (20(2), 1978), pp. 214-235; Modelski, G., *Long Cycles in World Politics* (London: MacMillan, 1987); Modelski, G., 'The Evolution of Global Politics', *Journal of World-Systems Research* (1(7), 1995), pp. 1-98.

Modelski emphasises the positive impact of 'world leadership', the reciprocity of gains between leaders and followers, the diffusion of economic and political innovations, the minimal use of coercive force, and the realisation of systemic interests in order and stability. While insisting on material capabilities, Modelski integrates ideology and culture in his account and argues that four conditions are essential for the production of global leadership: politico-strategic organisation for global reach, lead economy, open society, and responsiveness to global problems.⁸⁹ The two first conditions rely on material factors for their realisation while the latter relies essentially on cultural and ideological factors. Long-cycle theory points out the availability of globally mobile forces (sea-air power coupled with space-information power) combined with good intelligence, efficient leadership, and finally insularity as involuntary provider of surplus security.⁹⁰ It also emphasises the role of globally significant sectors of the economy, the lead industries that radiate innovative impact travelling through international trade upon the world economy and hence giving new shape and meaning to global transactions.⁹¹ Finally, an efficient network of communication improves the global leader's awareness and responsiveness to global problems. Thus, even though it pertains to the building of the leader's legitimacy, responsiveness relies on a material basis without which it would be impossible to answer global problems.⁹²

For each condition, Modelski contends that it is possible to rely on quantitative indicators in order to locate actual global leader and potential challengers. Accordingly, even though Modelski displays good intentions through the use of concepts such as legitimacy, open-society and responsiveness, he does not exploit their explanatory potential and relies essentially on material factors.

The same conclusions are drawn regarding Wallerstein's World-system theory. He defines a hegemonic power as typically a core-state, which enjoys a position of economic and military superiority due to its productive efficiency. The hegemon plays a dominating role within the world-system and builds on an institutional framework of practices and

⁸⁹ Modelski, G., 'The Evolution of Global Politics', *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 1:7 (1995), p. 27.

⁹⁰ Modelski, G., *Long Cycles in World Politics* (London: MacMillan, 1987), p. 220; Modelski, G., 'The Evolution of Global Politics', pp. 30-31; Modelski, G. and Thompson, W.R., *Seapower in Global Politics 1494-1993* (London: MacMillan, 1988); Chase-Dunn, C., 'The Limits of Hegemony: Capitalism and Global State Formation' in Rapkin, David P. (ed.), *World Leadership and Hegemony* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 224.

⁹¹ Modelski, G., 'The Evolution of Global Politics', p. 33.

⁹² Modelski, G., *Ibid.*, p. 37.

organisations that regulate all international transactions aiming at maintaining imbalance between core-countries and states in the periphery.⁹³

Wallerstein is subject to critiques because his theory is better at accounting for the existing stability and order than for potential change as it reduces politics to economic conditions and to the expression of the will of nationally dominant groups.⁹⁴ Consequently, even though Wallerstein keenly emphasises the dynamism of the system, he does not satisfactorily explain developmental breakthroughs. As Skocpol underlines, “Wallerstein is very forceful on the subject of the stability of the world capitalist system”.⁹⁵

Regarding his concept of power, Wallerstein privileges material capabilities translated into economic and military power as base for hegemony. The primacy in productive efficiency within the world-economy is the essential condition to attain the status of hegemon. This productive efficiency⁹⁶ leads to commercial efficiency⁹⁷ that in turn supports the achievement of financial efficiency.⁹⁸ Military strength is a crucial achievement in the process of hegemony acquisition as core states have to use military force in order to uphold their dominant position within the world-economy. They have to intervene in order to retain access to raw materials and markets, and to challenge any threat emerging from the periphery or semi-periphery that might put at risk the stability of the capitalist world order.⁹⁹

Once hegemony is achieved, ideology turns out to be the key-factor to maintain stability, which is “the degree to which the elite of the system feel that their own well-being

⁹³ Wallerstein, I., *The Modern World-System, i, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (San Diego : Academic Press, 1974); Wallerstein, I., *The Capitalist World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Wallerstein, I., *The Modern World-System, ii, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750* (San Diego : Academic Press, 1980); Wallerstein, I., ‘The Three Instances of Hegemony’, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 24:1-2 (1983), pp. 100-107; Wallerstein, I., *The Politics of the World Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilisations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Wallerstein, I., *The Modern World-System, iii, The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy* (San Diego : Academic Press, 1989); Chase-Dunn, Christopher, ‘Interstate System and Capitalist World-Economy: One Logic or Two?’ in Ladd Hollist, W. and Rosenau, J. (ed.) *World-System Structure. Continuity and Change* (Beverly Hills, London: Sage, 1981) pp. 30-53; Chase-Dunn, Christopher, *Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

⁹⁴ Cox, R. W., *Approaches to World Order*, p. 513.

⁹⁵ Skocpol, Theda, ‘Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: a Theoretical and Historical Critique’, *American Journal of Sociology* 82:5 (1977), p. 1077.

⁹⁶ Productive primacy in the agro-industrial sector.

⁹⁷ Commercial primacy by being the entrepot of much of the world trade and by controlling the transport, insurance sector, and communication.

⁹⁸ Financial primacy by controlling the banking sector (exchange, deposit, and credit), and the investment (direct and portfolio).

⁹⁹ Hobden, S. and Wyn Jones, R., ‘World-System Theory’ in Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 137.

is wrapped up in the survival of the system as such as the competence of its leaders”.¹⁰⁰ Dominant economic forces encourage certain intellectual and cultural thrusts, movements and ideologies, to persuade the elite and populations of the hegemonic power to pay the price of military supremacy; to persuade the elite and populations of the allied countries to focus on the positive rather than the negative inputs of an alliance; and, to create doubts among the victims of the system as the acceptability of their complaints.¹⁰¹ Consequently, when persuasion becomes difficult, and most important, when the hegemon can no longer demonstrate greater productive efficiency, a particular hegemonic cycle ends and another begins.

In summary, World-system Theory integrates material capabilities and ideological factors in its approach. Being functionalist, it emphasises the systemic distribution of resources and the material conditions as explanatory factors of the acquisition of power. Ideological aspects are considered in their explanatory force to maintain the system, not as criteria at the core of the definition of hegemony, and needing material capabilities to deploy and play their stabilising role. Similarly to the previous surveyed theories, power is not addressed in its complexity. World System Theory suffers from economic determinism, which seems to control all other expressions of power. Again, the generation of consent is barely explained, the interplay between coercion and consent not accounted for and the multidimensional nature of power ignored.

The theories summarised here above match theories of American foreign policy emphasising domestic factors in the formulation of foreign policy: Liberalism and Marxism.

Liberalism argues that “American foreign Policy should be a reflection of its domestic political values”,¹⁰² as the promotion of such American values and ideals as individual liberties, democracy, and freedom is both beneficial to U.S. security and global stability as like-minded liberal states are less likely to conflict. One way of reaching such an objective is the Wilsonian objective of attributing to the U.S. the role of developing an international institutional framework based on multilateralism in order to build a peaceful and liberal world order. Another option consists for the U.S. in actively promoting democracy not only through international institutions but directly through foreign aid, bilateral pressures, economic incentives, and support to local democratic movement, which was characteristic of

¹⁰⁰ Wallerstein, I., *The Capitalist World-Economy*, p. 22.

¹⁰¹ Wallerstein, I., ‘The Interstate Structure of the Modern World-System’, in Smith, S., Booth, Ken and Zalewski, M. (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 100-101.

¹⁰² Schmidt, B., ‘Theories of US Foreign Policy’ in Cox, M. and Stokes, D., *US Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 14.

the Clinton administration; or, as exemplified by the G.W. Bush administration, through the use of force aiming at regime change.¹⁰³

Marxism theories focus on the economy as determining U.S. foreign policy choices. One current sees the U.S. foreign policy as an extension of the U.S. capitalist economic interests. In this case, American interventionism is essentially motivated by the need for the American economy to acquire cheap raw materials and open markets to deal with economic crises, as well as the necessity to maintain global stability, required by capitalists to invest and develop profits. The ultimate objective is to expand an open free trade economic system to the whole world to ensure continuous American prosperity, actually resulting in all but name, in an American empire.¹⁰⁴

Power, Coercion, Consent and Multidimensionality

While the above theories do not provide us with the required conceptual framework to develop our understanding of power, several authors aiming at explaining the New World Order following the fall of USSR, produce approaches that steer away from the emphasis on material capabilities and prove more useful to our purpose. They underline the importance of “soft power” in opposition to coercion in the exertion of power and develop further the complexity and interplay between these two expressions of power as well as the multidimensional character of power, that is power is exercised in various dimensions and in order to be powerful, one needs to be efficient in the majority of these dimensions.

When coining the term ‘soft power’ in 1990 in reaction to Paul Kennedy’s argument about the decline of American power, Joseph Nye refers to one of three possible expressions of power: coercion, inducement and attraction. He defines power as “the ability to effect the outcome you want, and if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this happen”.¹⁰⁵ In order to reach such an objective, one can make use of hard power, which rests on the use of force or on threats and inducements. But there is another expression of power

¹⁰³ See Smith, T., *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Cox, M., Ikenberry, G. J. and Inoguchi, T. (eds.), *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Halper, S. and Clarke, J., *America Alone. The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹⁰⁴ See Kolko, G., *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); Williams, W. A., *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (London: W.W. Norton, 1972); Williams, W. A., *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York: IG Publishing, 2007 [1980]); Chomsky, N., *Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance* (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 2004).

¹⁰⁵ Nye, J.S., *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 4.

and it is based on attraction. Soft power is the ability “to get others to want what you want, [...], it co-opts people rather than coerces them”.¹⁰⁶

This emphasis on ideological factors is developed further by Nye who differentiates between ‘hard’ and ‘soft power’¹⁰⁷. He criticises an approach exclusively based on resources comparison and power taken as control over countries. Nye emphasises the need for a behavioural approach to power and defines hegemony as “control of diffusion of power through trans-national interdependence”.¹⁰⁸ Nye identifies soft power instruments such as the capacity for effective communication and the capacity for developing and using multilateral institutions. Accordingly, intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions tend to come to the forefront of the quest for power.¹⁰⁹

Similarly, Susan Strange develops a concept of structural power made of four interrelated structures, four faces of a pyramid supporting each other: the security structure, which confers the ability to offer, withhold or threaten security; the financial structure through which credit is offered, withheld or demanded; the production structure, which provides the ability to determine the locus, mode and context of wealth creating activity; and, the knowledge structure, which gives the capacity to influence ideas and beliefs and to control the access to and the communication of that knowledge.¹¹⁰ Strange maintains the material capabilities at the core of her definition to achieve hegemony but nevertheless puts the emphasis on the knowledge structure through control (material and non-material) of communication instruments aiming at the cultural and ideological control.¹¹¹

Ikenberry, and Ikenberry and Kupchan¹¹², in addition to more traditional forms of power relying on material assets¹¹³, understand the concept of power as socialisation. They present two ways in which a state can exercise power and secure the acquiescence of other nations. The first is through the manipulation of material incentives, either by the use of

¹⁰⁶ Nye, J.S., *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁷ Nye, J.S., ‘Soft Power’, *Foreign Policy*, 80 (Fall, 1990), pp. 53-171; Nye, J.S., ‘What New World Order?’, *Foreign Affairs*, 71:2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 83-96; Nye, J.S., *The Paradox of American Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹⁰⁸ Nye, J.S., ‘What New World Order?’, p. 88.

¹⁰⁹ Nye, J.S., ‘Soft Power’, pp. 166-167.

¹¹⁰ Strange, S., ‘The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony’, *International Organization*, 41:4 (Fall, 1987), p. 565; Strange, S., ‘The Future of the American Empire’, *Journal of International Affairs*, 42:1 (Winter, 1988); pp. 13-14; Strange, S., *States and Markets* (London: Pinter, 1988).

¹¹¹ Strange, S., *States and Markets*, p. 13.

¹¹² Ikenberry, G. J., ‘Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony’, *Political Science Quarterly*, 104:3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 375-400; Ikenberry, G. J. and Kupchan, C. A., ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’ *International Organization*, 44:3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 283-315.

¹¹³ Ikenberry, G. J., ‘Liberal Hegemony or Empire? American Power in the Age of Unipolarity’ in Held, D. and Koenig-Archibugi, M., *American Power in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 93-95.

sanctions or inducements. The second is by altering the substantive beliefs of leaders in other nations.¹¹⁴

Ikenberry thus dismisses the emphasis on material capabilities in the quest for acquiescence to a hegemonic project. Nevertheless, when he displays the three mechanisms of socialisation, Ikenberry refers to material capabilities in two of them. He contends that socialisation can occur through normative persuasion, external inducement or internal reconstruction.

Normative persuasion refers to ideological persuasion and transnational learning through contacts with subordinated countries' elites, leading to the internalisation of the hegemon's norms and hence to the adoption of co-operative state policies compatible with the hegemon's interests.

External inducement is the initial use of economic and military incentives followed by the injection of normative principles underlying the hegemon's policies in order to push the elites of dominated countries to embrace them as rightful.

Finally, *internal reconstruction* pertains to a direct intervention of the hegemon in secondary state in order to transform its political institutions. It can only occur when the hegemon defeats and occupies the subordinated state.

This analysis echoes the hegemonic war approach of Gilpin in which a new hierarchy of prestige is established after a war, determining which state(s) will govern the international system.¹¹⁵ Ikenberry adds to this that the victorious state has to assure the reconstruction of the vanquished, which results in the import of the hegemon's normative principles about domestic and international political order. The process of socialisation occurs when the elites of the secondary state come to accept them gradually as their own and socialisation comes "primarily in the wake of the coercive exercise of power".¹¹⁶

Nye, Strange and Ikenberry prove particularly useful to our purpose but by keeping the focus on the global order and the actions of the superpower in this order, all three still do not manage to offer an explanation of how power actually works. To their credit, as we put the concepts of coercion and consent at the core of our approach, we integrate both material and intangible elements of power, as they do. We contend that both expressions of power are at play and combine in order for an agent to achieve a specific set of objectives through the use of power over a subject. While the use of coercive power is pretty straightforward to analyse, the actions of an agent aiming at shaping subjects' values and interests in order to

¹¹⁴ Ikenberry, G. J. and Kupchan, C. A., 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', p. 285.

¹¹⁵ Gilpin, R., *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 33.

¹¹⁶ Ikenberry, G. J. and Kupchan, C. A., 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', pp. 290-292.

get them to consent to a set of policies is less evident to observe. As Lukes pleads, it is essential to bridge agents and subjects of power and we should aim at explaining how power wielders shape the preferences of those subject to their power? How can we identify ways and mechanisms through which powerful agents influence others' conceptions of their own interests?¹¹⁷

Our objective is an attempt at understanding power for what it does. We believe that in order to acquire such knowledge, it is essential to steer away from explanatory models that focus exclusively on world order and power relations between state-actors. We bring the level of analysis down to the observation of power exchanges between agents and subjects in a specific time and space defined framework. It does not mean that the influence of the international structure is not taken into consideration in the analysis. It means that the object of our enquiry is agents wielding power over subjects through various means, including coercive and consensual means of power. We look at how coercion and consent interact in power relations that is how they complete or impede on each other. We look at dimensions of power at work and attempt to qualify the power relationship that animates each of them as based on coercion and/or consent. Ultimately, we want to be able to explain how an agent wielding power manages to reach its objectives or on the contrary, why failure is the outcome.

It is here that we turn our attention to Antonio Gramsci's concept of power. It is now obvious that Machiavelli's subtle distinction between the use of force and the generation of consent in his analysis of strategies of power, later inspiring Gramsci's differentiation between power based on coercion and power based on consent, is at the core of our understanding of power. In addition, Gramsci provides us with other conceptual tools that prove useful for our purpose.

Firstly, Gramsci adds a critical dimension by identifying the potential for change by looking at the origins of contradictions and conflicts. These changes are not merely originated systematically by states or by systemic configurations of power. Critical theories look at a structure in its temporal definition. This historical structure constitutes the framework for action of material capabilities, ideas and institutions located in time and space, which is the approach we choose through case-studies. Moreover, to coercion and consent as key-factors of our analysis, we argue that it is also necessary to integrate historical depth to the analysis. In our case, American power has to be understood in the light

¹¹⁷ Lukes, S., 'Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds', in Berenskoetter, F. and Williams M.J., *Power in World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 97.

of specific historical experiences that have shaped an American understanding of power and of its use as the next chapter will demonstrate. Finally, we contend that to grasp the complexity of power in its entirety, it is necessary to see it as a multidimensional concept, at work in the various facets of the international political and civil societies.

Power, Coercion, Consent, Multidimensionality and Historicity

Gramsci bases his definition of power on the concept of 'dual perspective' defined as "the dialectical unity of the moments of force and consent in political action".¹¹⁸ The dual perspective can be reduced to two fundamental levels that represent the dual nature of power as expressed by Machiavelli's Centaur, half-animal and half-human: "The first way is natural to men, and the second to beasts. But as the first way often proves inadequate one needs have recourse to the second. So, a prince must understand how to make a nice use of the beast and the man".¹¹⁹ It is what Gramsci defines as "the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation".¹²⁰ This concept avows that as long as the consensual aspect of power is at the forefront, hegemony prevails. Force should only be used in rare deviant cases as most of the time the conformity of behaviour is ensured by the prevalent hegemony.

Thus such a concept of power differentiates between consent and its corollary hegemony, and, force and its translation into domination. Hegemony does not mean the eradication of coercion, as it is always latent but undesirable to use.

Nevertheless, in extreme cases, one should use force if consent does not bring antagonistic groups in line with the dominant class' position:

The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as "domination" and as "intellectual and moral leadership". A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate" or subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups.¹²¹

When related to the definition of power outlined by Gramsci, coercion can take a different meaning in function of the objective and the consent of subordinate actors. It is possible to differentiate between two forms of coercion: the active use of force and the threat of the use of force. Active coercion is to be used as a last resort. It obviously relies on

¹¹⁸ Gramsci, A., *Selections from the Prison's Notebooks*, edited and translated by Hoare, Q. and Novell Smith, G., (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971 [1929-1935]), p. 169.

¹¹⁹ Machiavelli, N., *The Prince*, p. 74.

¹²⁰ Gramsci, A., *op. cit.*, p. 169.

¹²¹ Gramsci, A., *Selections...*, p. 57.

material capabilities and the capacity to project these capabilities on actors resisting hegemonic policies, in opposition to hegemony, relying heavily if not exclusively on ideology. It is the less desirable option as it undermines the hegemon's legitimacy and credibility and marks the beginning of the end for the hegemonic power. Indeed, if one avows universalism of ideas and values,¹²² one should not make use of what one condemns¹²³ as it would directly question one's legitimacy as the helmsman of a hegemonic policy based on consent. At this stage, one does not speak of hegemony anymore but of domination, easily equated with concepts of colonialism and imperialism.

The threat of the use of force, still undesirable, constitutes another degree of domination in so far as two outcomes are possible. Either the targeted actors fall in line with the hegemon's position or they drift towards confrontation provoking active coercion. The first option can either be long-lived (genuine acceptance) or short-lived as the most radical elements of the targeted actors would never accept to consent¹²⁴ and would engage on a road leading to the gathering of the necessary conditions to resist the hegemon, which ultimately could lead to the latter's use of force. In both cases the legitimacy and credibility of the hegemonic power is at stake and it would be in its interests to favour the first outcome (subordinate's consent) as the other options could create a dangerous precedent susceptible of undermining the power's position in other instances of hegemony.

Gramsci's approach to power with a focus on coercion and consent has been at the source of many reflexions on the nature of power, as the surveyed theories incorporating both aspects have shown. However, where these theories tend to use the world order as their framework of analysis and fail to investigate the connection between coercion and consent in the exertion of power, we intend to look at unfolding relations of power in a limited whole constituted by the reconstruction processes of occupied countries. In the process, we attempt to put to the fore the connection between coercion and consent in relations of power. It is here that Gramsci's insights are particularly relevant to our purpose. First of all, as our field of investigation is primarily constituted by the actions of the United States in the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq, that is a case of local level of analysis in opposition to global, Gramsci's definitions of the state as field of expressions of power will be investigated.

Moreover, as we focus on reconstruction processes, there is one more variable to be considered, that is the role of the occupation authorities with the political and the civil

¹²² Most of the time including democracy, equality, peace and understanding as the most attractive notions.

¹²³ Totalitarianism, war, use of force, intimidation.

¹²⁴ For various reasons as national pride, own interests, hegemonic project of their own.

societies of the occupied countries. As mentioned before, we will also look at the effects that the international structure has on such deployments of power. Hence, on top of the dual perspective, it is necessary to look at other concepts at the core of a Gramscian approach to power that prove useful to our purpose: state, historical bloc, and organic intellectuals as well as how these concepts relate to power and how they can prove useful in analysing reconstruction projects.

The state in its broad Gramscian definition consists in the civil society (sphere of private interests) and the political society (state apparatus), hence, “not merely the governmental apparatus, but also the ‘private’ apparatus of hegemony or civil society”.¹²⁵ It includes the traditional view of the administrative, executive, and coercive apparatus of government coupled with the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society, elements such as the church, the educational system, the press, briefly “all the institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order”¹²⁶. To be successful, policies of power, expressed through coercion and consent, must be deployed in the civil and political society.

Anderson pinpoints a asymmetry in power expressions between civil and political society. While the former is the seat of consent, the latter harbours both consent and an exclusive rightful right to use force.¹²⁷ Out of this distribution of power, Anderson signals the emergence of a critical question, central to our study: what is the connection between coercion and consent in the exertion of power by the bourgeois class in capitalist countries? As he argues, only a historical enquiry of power relations in a specific framework of analysis can provide an answer that still would essentially be valid for that very particular object of study. We contend that by looking at both case-studies of reconstruction of Japan and Iraq, we can shed light on the relationship between coercion and consent. Indeed, both projects share in common the instillation of liberal capitalism as a new mode of functioning destined to replace the authoritarianism of the toppled regimes. In so doing, the United States tried to empower a capitalist elite in tune with Washington’s objectives of recasting both Japan and Iraq in the liberal capitalist democratic world while preserving the newborn democratic institutions, themselves protecting the rule of the capitalist bourgeoisie over the masses in these two reborn countries. Consequently, both case-studies provide fertile ground on which

¹²⁵ Gramsci, A., *Selections...*, p. 261.

¹²⁶ Cox, R. W., *Approaches to World Order*, p. 126.

¹²⁷ Anderson, P., ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, *New Left Review*, 1/100 (November/December, 1976), p. 41.

to investigate the connection between coercion and consent in the exercise of power. As Anderson contends,

we can substitute ‘coercion’ or ‘repression’ for Gramsci’s ‘military struggle’-----as the mode of class rule enforced by violence; ‘culture’ or ‘ideology’ for his ‘political struggle’-----as the mode of class rule secured by consent. It is then possible to capture something like the real nature of the relationship between the two variables by which Gramsci was haunted. If we revert to Gramsci’s original problematic, the normal structure of capitalist political power in bourgeois-democratic states is in effect simultaneously and indivisibly dominated by culture and determined by coercion. To deny the ‘preponderant’ or dominant role of culture in the contemporary bourgeois power system is to liquidate the most salient immediate difference between Western parliamentarism and Russian absolutism, and to reduce the former to a myth. The fact is that this cultural domination is embodied in certain irrefutably concrete institutions: regular elections, civic freedoms, rights of assembly-----all of which exist in the West and none of which directly threaten the class power of capital. The day-to-day system of bourgeois rule is thus based on the consent of the masses, in the form of the ideological belief that they exercise self-government in the representative State.¹²⁸

Consequently, a hegemonic relationship is an interactive process as the potential hegemon has to present its policies as being in the interests of the targeted subordinate actor(s). It has to incorporate the subordinate’s interests and accordingly make the necessary concessions in its program for hegemony in order to obtain the consent of the less-powerful¹²⁹

Accordingly, there is a continuous interplay between hegemon and targeted subordinate actor(s) aiming at the identification, aggregation and incorporation of subordinates’ vital interests into the hegemon’s policies, the whole procedure being wrapped in institutions and processes constituting a canvas preserving the stability and cohesion of the system. This is what Gramsci calls a historical bloc, at the core of his notion of hegemony and defined as:

Structures¹³⁰ and superstructures¹³¹ form an “historical bloc”. That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production.¹³²

¹²⁸ Anderson, P., ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, p. 42.

¹²⁹ Showstack Sassoon, A. (ed.), *Approaches to Gramsci* (London: Writers and Readers, 1982), p. 111.

¹³⁰ The ensemble of economic relations.

¹³¹ The ethical political sphere.

¹³² Gramsci, A., *Selections...*, p. 366.

The historical bloc is brought into existence by the presence of a hegemonic social class. Its main function is to maintain cohesion and identity within the bloc through the propagation of a common culture. A social class is hegemonic if it manages to bring the subordinated masses to agree to its own ideas, values and interests, and more important, if it manages to present them as universal, meaning in the general interests of the diverse social formations on which hegemony is implemented. This implementation takes place by giving some satisfaction to the subordinate groups while not jeopardising the interests of the ruling class.¹³³ But coercion is a key ingredient of a successful policy of consent generation as “normal conditions of ideological subordination of the masses-----the day-to-day routines of a parliamentary democracy-----are themselves constituted by a silent, absent force which gives them their currency: the monopoly of legitimate violence by the State”.¹³⁴

In addition to this looming coercion, a historical bloc requires what Gramsci terms ‘organic intellectuals’ whose role is to cement the links between structures and superstructures by producing and organising ideology, “they theorise the ways in which the hegemony can be developed or maintained”.¹³⁵

Intellectuals are in charge of the formulation of a message susceptible to gain the consent to the ruling class’ ideology and of the organisation and running of the governmental apparatus. These two functions correspond to the dual composition of the superstructure: civil society (private sphere) and political society (the state), corresponding to the two functions of hegemony exercised throughout society and direct domination through the governmental apparatus.¹³⁶

These intellectuals are described as ‘organic’ by Gramsci. They do not constitute a social class on their own but are the ‘organically’ linked thinking and organising elements of a fundamental social class. In addition to the two previous functions, their main function is to direct the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they ‘organically’ belong by forging, as they do for the whole society, a common identity. In the case of the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq, we can identify two sets of ‘organic intellectuals’: the personnel of the occupation authorities that formulated the policies that structured the new state apparatus and the local elite (politicians, civil servants, businessmen...) across the political and civil societies,

¹³³ Cox, R., *Approaches to World Order*, p. 132.

¹³⁴ Anderson, P., ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, p. 43.

¹³⁵ Gramsci, A., *Selections...*, p. 5; Gill, S., ‘Hegemony, Consensus and Trilateralism’, *Review of International Studies*, 12 (1986), p. 210.

¹³⁶ Gramsci, A., *Selections...*, p. 12.

trained and politically indoctrinated to perpetuate and secure democracy, capitalism and free-markets.

As we intend to integrate the role of the international structural pressures on the deployment of power in both reconstruction processes under scrutiny, it is essential to assess how Gramsci has inspired international relations theorists.

Gramscian concepts have been transferred and applied to international theory by various scholars regrouped under the label of Italian school, which elaborates a definition of hegemony rooted in the ideological dominance of leading social classes of the hegemonic state, and, with dominance of a specific mode of production at its core. In order to become hegemonic, a state has to found and protect a world order universal in conception, meaning an order that other states could find compatible with their interests. Such a universal order is based on the concept of global civil society, in other words, a global mode of production linking social classes of the countries it encompasses. It has been designated by neo-Gramscians as a 'transnational historical bloc', a form of organic alliance of classes involving elites of core and peripheral countries. Elites share the same material interests, norms, values and ideas about the social world. Accordingly, the hegemonic order is seen as legitimate and hence, stable as unquestioned values and understandings about order are shared by the whole system of states and non-states entities, appearing to most actors as the natural order.¹³⁷ The ideological cement of this order is issued from organic intellectuals, directly related to the existing elites. They are to be found in national bureaucratic apparatus and intergovernmental agencies¹³⁸.

International institutions are at the centre of the global hegemonic project. They are products of the hegemonic order and express and legitimise rules that facilitate its expansion. They have three main functions: ideological legitimisation of the norms of the existing order, absorption of counter-hegemonic ideas, and co-optation of peripheral elites.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Cox, R., *Production, Power and World Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 7; Gill, S. (ed), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 42; Rupert, M., 'Power, Productivity, and the State: The Social Relations of U.S. Hegemony' in Rapkin, D. P. (ed.) *World Leadership and Hegemony* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 71, 74-75.

¹³⁸ On the role of organic intellectuals attached to social forces challenging the existing order. see Cox, R., 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order', *Review of International Studies*, 25:1 (1999), pp. 3-28.

¹³⁹ Cox, R., *Approaches to World Order*, pp. 137-138; Murphy, G.N., *International Organisation and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 25; Cox, Robert, 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 12:2 (Summer, 1983), pp. 162-175.

The internationalisation of the state is another means of systemic stability. It is translated into relative freedom of movement for goods, capital and technologies. States create official agencies orientated towards the global economy and working at the adjustment of national political economies to the hegemonic mode of production. It is also translated by the creation of official and not-so-official meetings between the economic and financial elites of countries part of the hegemonic order, resulting in the creation of a transnational managerial class.¹⁴⁰ As we will see later on, all these elements critical to the reinforcement of the power of a global hegemon have been present in the reconstruction policies implemented by the United States in Japan and Iraq.

While a global hegemonic order is based on consent, coercion is not absent of the picture as Augelli and Murphy argue in their study on the relationship between the U.S. and the Third World.¹⁴¹ Force, if not essential to the building of a hegemonic order, remains crucial to the containment and punishment of hostile elements to the existing order. Cox locates the likeliness of such a counter-hegemonic uprising in the periphery, where hegemony tends to wear thin, in opposition to the well-stabilised hegemony in the core.¹⁴² Nevertheless, the use of force should be as remote as possible as it undermines the legitimacy of the hegemonic order. Accordingly, ideology should remain at the core of the instruments used for the maintenance of hegemony.

The Italian School is not free of critics. Indeed, the conceptual appropriation of Gramsci's work by the Italian School generated objections in terms of the viability of the interpretation of Gramsci's work, the applicability of his key-concepts to the international relations study (especially the concepts of global civil society), the relevancy of Gramsci's concepts to understanding the contemporary social order¹⁴³, a weakness in the applicability of Gramscian ideas to concrete situations, and a reduction of the role of structures in the making of hegemony through an over-emphasis on agential interaction.¹⁴⁴

Interpreting Gramsci is a difficult enterprise given the conflicting influences that characterised his life and his work, and the particularly appalling conditions in which he wrote his key texts, *The Prison Notebooks*. As Germain and Kenny point out:

¹⁴⁰ Cox, R., *Production, Power and World Order*, pp. 254-255, 359; Cox, R., *Approaches to World Order*, pp. 107-109; Gill, S., 'Hegemony, Consensus and Trilateralism', p. 211-218; Robinson, W. I., *Promoting Polyarchy. Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, especially chapter 1.

¹⁴¹ Augelli, E., Murphy C. N., *America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis*, especially chapters 7, 8 and 9.

¹⁴² Cox, R., *Production, Power and World Order*, p. 266.

¹⁴³ Germain, R. D. and Kenny, M., 'Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians', *Review of International Studies*, 24:1 (January, 1998), pp. 3-21.

¹⁴⁴ Joseph, J., *Hegemony: A Realist Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2002), p.1.; Bhaskar, R., *Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 165, 172-174.

Anyone wishing to negotiate Gramsci's work,[...], cannot ignore the many different Gramscis on offer.[...] perhaps the biggest problem arising from the Italian School's appropriation of Gramsci stems from the way in which the significance of some of his ideas and the debates into which he entered have been lost or misunderstood through the decontextualization of his thought.¹⁴⁵

To resolve the issue of the application of Gramscian ideas to the study of international relations, Germain and Kenny embark in an hermeneutical quest by revisiting two key-concepts used by the Italian School in its understanding of how the world works: civil society and hegemony.

Germain and Kenny argue that the concept of civil society as read by neo-Gramscians disrupts the original meaning of Gramsci by artificially divorcing the concept of civil society from the concept of state. While neo-Gramscians elaborate on a global civil society that is at the core of the exertion of hegemony, Germain and Kenny insist on the organic relationship linking civil society and the state if one wishes to retain Gramsci's historically specific meaning. In other words, there is no civil society without its counterpart, the state. Hence, to speak of a global civil society in a Gramscian sense seems futile as it would require the existence of its necessary counterpart, "some kind of concrete transnational structure of authority" in order to be able to echo Gramsci's famous equation to read "international state = global political society + global civil society".¹⁴⁶

Such a reading of Gramsci is deemed narrow by Rupert, who argues that the project of applying Gramsci to international relations studies implies a transcendence of historically specific political forms such as the concept of the state. Indeed, the project of historical materialism necessarily calls for "a transnational political horizon because capitalism is not coextensive with the political state, but, [...] is an emerging transnational structure of class dominance",¹⁴⁷ which generates transnational political movements of transformation or resistance in the civil society. Rupert points out that Gramsci himself insisted on the need to integrate the international dimension in the analysis of the struggle for hegemony as it is necessary "to take into account that international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique, and historically concrete combinations".¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Germain, R. D. and Kenny, M., *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁴⁶ Germain, R. D. and Kenny, M., 'Engaging Gramsci...', p. 15, 16.

¹⁴⁷ Rupert, M., '(Re-)Engaging Gramsci : a Response to Germain and Kenny', *Review of International Studies*, 24:3 (July, 1998), p. 432.

¹⁴⁸ Gramsci, A., *Selections...*, p. 285.

Regarding the concept of hegemony, two related shortcomings are identified: the issue of measuring hegemony and the issue of working with Gramscian ideas in the realm of international relations. If hegemony is characterised by the acquisition of the consent of the subordinate groups by the dominant group across civil society, the actual efficiency of hegemony can be measured by the absence of social strife and the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the existing social order.¹⁴⁹ While feasible in the national context, such an operation seems rather more difficult to achieve in an international context. The attempts made at illustrating this hegemonic relationship at the international level focus essentially on the existence of a transnational managerial class that forces its own neo-liberal agenda on subaltern classes in a growingly globalised world market¹⁵⁰ but ironically fails to account for a two-way ideological exchange that characterises a hegemonic relationship as explained by Gramsci.

The emphasis put by the neo-Gramscians on actors struggling for hegemony generates another critique involving the account for the influence of the structure in the analysis of hegemony. Joseph rejects a Gramscian vision of hegemony that defines hegemony “as a purely agential process,[...], concerned with the plans and actions of social agents, groups and individuals. [...] The construction of hegemony becomes an inter-subjective affair to be worked out by or between different sets of people.”¹⁵¹ Attempting to move away from such an agential account for hegemonic processes, Joseph, inspired by a critical realist approach, offers to re-read Gramsci by focusing on mechanisms generative of change, which implies a focus of the object of a theory of hegemony on social structures. Reminding us of Gramsci’s statement on the interconnectivity between structure and superstructures, Joseph argues that social structures make human activity and social practices possible and hence that a study of hegemony needs to be located in such a structural context: “a hegemonic struggle is more than just a clash of world-views or group consciousnesses, it must challenge not just the dominant ideas within society, but the very social structures that produce them”.¹⁵² In order to reach this objective, Joseph differentiates between structural hegemony and surface hegemony. “Structural hegemony and surface hegemony are two aspects of a continual process. Structural hegemony concerns the deep, underlying conditions within society and the unity of the social formation. Surface hegemony concerns the actual hegemonic projects

¹⁴⁹ Germain, R. D. and Kenny, M., ‘Engaging Gramsci...’, p. 17.

¹⁵⁰ See Robinson, William. I., *Promoting Polyarchy*.

¹⁵¹ Joseph, J., *Hegemony. A Realist Analysis*, p. 1.

¹⁵² Joseph, J., *Op. cit.*, p. 4, 11.

that arise out of this situation [...]”.¹⁵³ Where structural hegemony performs the functional role of securing the reproduction of social formation, surface hegemony consists in specific actual hegemonic projects by one group over others, it is hegemony in its agential sense.

Jessop, while acknowledging the contribution of Joseph in pointing at the critical realist re-reading of Gramsci and a corollary effective theorisation of hegemony, criticises Joseph’s analysis as lacking “the mediations or intermediate concepts that would enable a movement from rational abstraction to concrete-complex analysis”.¹⁵⁴ These critiques insist on the lack of operationalisation of Gramscian ideas in the study of international relations or to be more accurate, in the difficulty of ‘globalising’ Gramsci’s ideas. Indeed, operationally speaking, the process of their application has sometimes been described as “amorphous”¹⁵⁵ and the neo-Gramscian transformative and ethical objective of analysing the global civil society counter-hegemonic movements resisting and attempting to transform a global neo-liberal capitalist order falls short of uncovering global mechanisms of ideological dissemination, which in turn “calls the whole idea of global hegemony into question”.¹⁵⁶

Indeed, the most frequent critiques aim at the neo-Gramscian account for hegemon effectiveness in controlling the political agenda and in structuring policy preferences at the global level. Moreover, these, when specified, are accounted for by non-falsifiable arguments. It is true that for anyone who adopts a critical approach to the concept of hegemony, the major obstacle is, first, to demonstrate that the hegemon controls the instruments of ideological domination; and second, to establish the relevant facts, or terms of policy discourse and policy preferences that would exist in the absence of hegemony. It is fair to say that until now, studies focusing on the ideological side of hegemony, have faced, without solving it, this problem of empirical verification.

The objective of this study does not consist in an attempt to read and apply Gramsci’s concepts to the global political order but rather aims at looking at how a concept of power influenced by Gramsci’s understanding that power is coercion and consent can help us to understand the international dynamics at play in the cases of the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq. We separate the realms of the global from the international in purpose. Indeed, Gramsci himself points out that hegemony does extend beyond the national borders and “occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the

¹⁵³ Joseph, J., *Hegemony. A Realist Analysis*, p. 131.

¹⁵⁴ Jessop, B., ‘Critical Realism and Hegemony. Hic Rhodus, Hic Saltus’, *Journal of Critical Realism*, 1:2 (May, 2003), p. 189.

¹⁵⁵ James, S.C. and Lake, D.A., ‘The Second Face of Hegemony...’ pp. 1-29.

¹⁵⁶ Femia, J., ‘Gramsci, Machiavelli and International Relations’, *Political Quarterly*, 77:3 (July, 2005), p. 343.

international and world-wide field”.¹⁵⁷ For Gramsci, the origin of a transformative (revolutionary) action is national, “[...], the international situation should be considered in its national aspect,[...], the line of development is towards internationalism, but the point of development is “national””.¹⁵⁸ He continues his argument by insisting that socialism should be given a realistic content in order to avoid disillusion by falling into the trap of an inactivity generated by abstractions: “[...], non-national concepts (i.e. ones that cannot be referred to each individual country) are erroneous [...]: they have led to passivity and inertia [...]”.¹⁵⁹

Reminding us of the struggle of the Bolsheviks, Gramsci argues that its originality consisted in the purge of what he terms ‘pejorative ideological element’ and the integration of a realistic political content: “It is in the concept of hegemony that those exigencies which are national in character are knotted together [...]”.¹⁶⁰ As Femia contends, hegemony is national in character because it relies on perceptions, values, ideas and interests that are unified, a ‘common sense’ that is hard to imagine at the global level.¹⁶¹

Based on these conclusions, our purpose consists in looking at the unfolding of a power relationship between two nation-states. It does not imply that we adopt a realist approach to the study of international relations by positing the nation-states as main objects of analysis, but inspired by Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, we aim at an analysis that is restricted in scope and certainly not explaining power and hegemony on a global scale.

Accordingly, we aim to study a specific relationship between two nation-states in a particular historical structure, temporally and geographically defined. Realist in outlook because it focuses on a relationship between nation-states, our approach is nevertheless critical and transformative as we focus not only on relations between states but also on practices of power exerted by non-state agents that either concur with or question the developing relations of power. In addition, we integrate the regional and global levels of analysis. We look at how power exertion by the U.S. influenced the outcome of its relations with the reconstructed country and at how the evolution of foreign policies of regional actors and decisions made by international actors influenced the U.S. foreign policy and reconstruction projects.

Indeed, by reviewing the relationship between coercion and consent as discussed by Gramsci, by locating the object of analysis in time and space, and finally by applying a

¹⁵⁷ Gramsci, A., *Selections...*, p. 350.

¹⁵⁸ Gramsci, A., *ibid.*, p. 240.

¹⁵⁹ Gramsci, A., *ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁶⁰ Gramsci, A., *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁶¹ Femia, J., ‘Gramsci, Machiavelli...’, p. 344.

model of power sensitive to a number of dimensions, we hope to assess the outcome of U.S.-led reconstruction projects in the wake of conflicts. It is this idea that the concept of power should unfold in various constitutive dimensions that animates the final section of this chapter. We thus focus on the various expressions that power can take, depending on the desired outcome: the exertion of various faces of power, in turn translating into the aptitude to coerce or to generate consent through sharing ideas and values.

As the literature review illustrates, power is a concept over which a wealth of ideas and thoughts have matured. Inspired by Social Constructivism, we argue that a conception of power finds its roots above all in the way one views the world and one's position in it, and hence conditions relations between states.¹⁶² One's view of the world is a personal and collective construct that is permeable to many influences: personal beliefs, education, cultural factors, values, ideas, identity (individual and collective) and the result of one's interactions with others all contribute in the definition of one's understanding of how the world works. These factors leave some autonomy to agents and are to a certain extent under control or chosen by individuals. Another set of factors that contribute to the making of one's view of the world is less easy to assess. The influence of structural factors, that is factors that contribute to the definition of the material conditions under which agents define themselves and their beliefs, are rather autonomous in the way they influence agents.

Hence, the starting point of an analysis of power should be the definition of the historical structure in which the analysis takes place. Once a historical structure is defined, it is possible to focus on the inter-subjective interactions animating agents as the material conditions that define these social interactions can be understood. In summary, when studying the concept of power, one should start by locating in time and space the framework of analysis. Then, the analysis should spread over three levels: structures, interactions between agents and structures, and interactions between agents. This ontological choice is supplemented by a time differentiation that hopefully will not only allow us to shed light on the obvious short-term exchanges characterising interactions between agents, but that will incorporate longer trends and structural movements that contribute to the conditioning of agential interactions and structural influences, and hence to the definition of power. Such an

¹⁶² See Wendt, A., 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46:2 (1992), pp. 391-425; Katzenstein, P. J., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Wendt, A., *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Finnemore, M., *National Interest in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Nau, H., *At Home and Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

approach requests a rather holistic understanding of power that goes beyond traditional understandings of power as an outcome of capacities.

Consequently, our tentative definition of power could be summarised as follows: Power is a historically located multidimensional concept whose exertion is subject to structural and agential conditions. It presupposes the existence of a definition of interests and of a will on behalf of an agent to make use of a set of power capabilities under his control as well as an ability to do so under conditions not always of his own choosing, that is an ability to master or at least to be able to deal with the consequences of structural activities. Power has two faces, it is coercion and consent. Consent refers to a specific form of power exertion, also called hegemony, that results in the aggregation of interests between the powerful and its targets. It carries at its core the notion of consent generation, freedom of choice, and a permanent agential and structural interaction that contribute to the maintenance of hegemony on the long term, i.e. hegemony is more than just conjectural.

The two expressions of power, coercion and consent interact permanently. They shape each other and while coercion is often required to create conditions congenial to consent generation, consent can change the conditions under which power is exerted through its influence on the structures. Indeed, a hegemonic structure imposes a change of conditions for power exertion as the power factors needed to implement hegemony differ from the situation in which there was an absence of hegemony. For example, the power means needed to generate consent to a specific hegemonic project are different from the means needed to maintain hegemony alive.

Consequently, we consider that the concept of power is sensitive to a certain number of constitutive dimensions. Some of them favour coercion in their expression while others focus on consent in their implementation. The predominance of a set of dimensions characterise the exertion of power as hegemonic or on the contrary as dominating, depending on the relative importance of consent and coercion in the exertion of power in a specific dimension.

Accordingly, in an attempt to provide for a comprehensive analysis of our reconstruction cases, we define four fields across which power is exerted by the U.S. in Japan and Iraq. The state is the seat of an exertion of political power. It is defined as the will of the ruling elite (own will or under public pressure) to exert this power and to act as the organising and aggregating force of the elements which eventually will lead to the realisation of consent generation. One could find the integration of such a definition of political power in the model as tautological as if there was no political will to start a hegemonic project, then

where is the need to build on further?; but, political will is at the root of any hegemonic project and more important, at the core of the implementation process of hegemony, as the driving force behind the organisation and aggregation of the forces implementing hegemony. One has to look at the elite's perception or perceptions in case of the presence of rival factions, of the global and regional orders and the hegemon's position in them; and, to the elite's perception of the actor at which hegemony is aimed. We also should consider the ensemble of forces, in the hegemonic power and in the targeted actor, which are susceptible to influence this perception, because these forces are potentially interested in the development of a hegemonic relationship. Hence, groups active in civil society and political society should also be considered (i.e. pressure groups, opinion leaders).

The security field is home to the use of force expressed by military power. It pertains essentially to the world of material capabilities, even though ideas and institutions also play a role. It translates into a superiority of military means or the possibility to coerce (hence generating the fear of coercion); the capacity to project these means, which also relies on the power's geographical position and the capacity to control geo-strategic zones; the capacity to turn the economic structure of production into an economy of war, which relies on an easy access to natural resources; a military-industrial complex characterised by a lead and control of high-technological flux; the control of proliferation of arms; a position of strength in eventual regional military alliance or in bilateral military agreements; up to date military doctrines taking full advantage of the technological evolution of warfare; a perception on behalf of other actors of the system of the military prowess; and most important, the capacity to generate an understanding among other powers that conflict should be avoided as it would be pointless.

The economy is another critical dimension of a reconstruction project that needs analysis. Economic power moves across material capabilities, ideas and institutions. It can be defined as natural, industrial, commercial and financial outstanding human and material resources; technological lead in invention, innovation and implementation of new technologies to the production activities; control of transnational flux or trade¹⁶³; position of strength in regional and global economic institutions (if any), or position of force in economic and trade treaties; the political will and the capacity to implement economic sanctions; the dominance of a model for the development of a mode of production¹⁶⁴ relying essentially on political and social benefits issued by that model, resulting in the insertion of such a mode of production in foreign countries, and hence the unity of mode of production.

¹⁶³ Especially regarding the transfer of new technologies.

¹⁶⁴ As accepted domestically and by most nations.

including the ideological factors that it carries, as models of capitalist development like neo-liberalism. In the economic dimension, the trade patterns, industrial investments and aid programs are the translation of hegemonic projects as the threat of their suppression can be a very efficient tool to trigger consent. They fill the role of spreading a unique mode of production (the hegemon's) in the targeted country and also aim at the adoption of free trade at all levels but especially by the targeted country as it would result in the maximisation of the hegemon's economic power as hegemonic instrument. Hence, the role of national agencies in charge of economic aid and the design of economic and trade policies are to be considered. The operations of multinational corporations are also important. Even though they act as autonomous actors seeking profit, their operations strengthen the hegemon's economy and tend to help the spread of the hegemon's norms and values. Regional and multilateral economic organisations partly play the role of regulators of economic relations and their actions should be analysed especially as far as the role of the hegemon in their activities is concerned. Finally, one should also look at the role of economic-corporate interests groups and at their influence in the hegemonic country and in the targeted country. Financial power derives from a strong and healthy domestic capital accumulation capacity; the control of credit instruments, including the ability to cut down or eventually suppress capital transfer to other countries; the possibility to play the role of lender of last resort when needed; and, a position of force among multilateral financial institutions with the aim of managing the international monetary system. Banking consortia, investment banks, international financial organisations and forums, national finance agencies, multinational corporations and pressure groups involved in the hegemonic power and the targeted country are to be investigated as instruments of implementation of hegemony.

The civil society witnesses exertion of ideological and cultural power. Ideological power is the capacity to produce and spread norms, values and interests perceived as universal and in favour of each actor of the system. It relies on the necessary domestic consensus on these norms, values and interests and the material capacity to produce and project them. Psychological warfare and propaganda also belong to the world of ideological power and can be identified as coercive means to generate consent amongst targeted actors. The cultural dimension of power is closely associated with ideology and relates to the ability to generate a strong domestic hegemony susceptible to be universal enough to be expanded across the borders. Hence, it concerns first the capacity to aggregate and impose a common cultural identity domestically by the production of a culture sustaining the reigning ideology (i.e. liberal capitalism and mass-consumerism); and second, the means to expand this culture

across borders towards hegemony-targeted countries. The control of the means of communication and information is essential to the achievement of this objective. The ideological-cultural sphere of action is at the core of policies aiming at the acquisition of consent from the subordinate country. The means to spread the hegemon's norms, values and interests encompass cultural production and broadcasting capabilities. Organic intellectuals, and especially the interaction between the hegemon's and subordinate's ideas makers; all forms of media (oral, written and visual); cultural multilateral organisations; civil society opinion leaders in both countries and interaction; national agencies with cultural purposes; cultural associations of both countries and interaction; cultural operations or consequences of multinational corporations' activities; and, the cultural influence of off-shore nationals (troops, investors, missionaries...) are all to be considered.

It is hoped that such a multidimensional concept of power applied to the reconstruction of Japan after WWII and Iraq since 2003 will help us to qualify the outcome of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction cases and shed light on how power actually works.

However, we need first to take our second analytical step. Indeed, after having looked at what has been said so far about power in international relations theory and define the use we will make of the concept in our analysis, our second analytical step consists in assessing what power means to American policy-makers. As mentioned previously, we contend that one element allowing for a comprehensive take on power in international relations resides in acquiring an understanding of what we call 'a collective memory of power', that is the ensemble of shared historical experiences that contribute to a widely accepted definition of power and of its use by the population and the political elite of a given state. In our case, chapter 3 takes us through American history in order to achieve this objective, while chapter 4 will apply our findings to the Bush administration's foreign policy in order to define power as understood by policy-makers of the current U.S. administration.

3. Power and the American Experience

Second analytical step of this study of American power and post-conflict reconstruction projects, the purpose of this chapter consists in going back five hundred years in American history, to bring to the fore specific factors that had and still have an influence on how the American policy-makers and their citizens see themselves, their position and role in the world, and, ultimately, how these elements influenced their conception of power, and hence their approach to foreign relations. Consequently, we will be rather selective and it is not our objective to provide a comprehensive cross-border and cross-disciplinary analysis of American foreign relations history. Instead, we contend that the contemporary understanding of international relations and the corollary views on power are rooted in the pre-colonial period, and through the evolution of the Republic matured into the understanding of power and foreign relations that we witness today.

Our starting point consists in looking at two sets of elements: material factors and ideas that animated the American Revolution and the formative years of the Republic.

As Perkins contends “the revolution is an act of isolation from a society that saw itself very different than societies on the other side of the ocean”.¹⁶⁵ This act of isolation formed the starting point of a specific ideology, Americanism: “As a new nation legitimated by an ideology, it differs from other countries, which take their identity from a common history, not a political doctrine, a national creed”.¹⁶⁶

Reinforcing this new ideology, the geography, demography and economics of the American continent also contribute to the making of an American understanding of foreign relations. A geographical location that provided for protection by oceans, vast spaces rich in resources, agricultural choices, and technological progress are all factors that contributed in the rise of specific ideological and political choices that in turn defined an American conception of power and of its role in world affairs.

These choices, which were sometimes made, sometimes imposed on the United States, can be summarised as: an unconditional love for freedom and the corollary weariness of power, a commitment to Republicanism, a staunch defence of free-enterprise with

¹⁶⁵ Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume I. The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1777-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 22.

¹⁶⁶ Lipset, S.M., ‘A Unique People in an Exceptional Country’, *Society*, 28:1 (November/December, 1990), p. 5.

individualism as its cornerstone, an understanding of power and liberty as characterised by a dialectical relationship, a belief in being a chosen people, and the certitude that a bright future lay ahead, which in turn expressed itself in an exceptionalism tainted by racial and moral superiority expressed in the manifest destiny and a tendency to favour aloofness from international power politics. In turn, these ideological choices led to the adoption of a foreign policy encompassing two sets of specific policies that can be summarised by an alternation of isolationism and expansionism.

Considering objective immutable elements such as the geography and physical characteristics of the North American continent coupled with an analysis of early Americans relations to effects of power, we argue that power expressed through coercion characterises the days of America as a colony and the early days of the U.S. Republic. Later on, when the United States developed its power further, softer expressions of power based on ideology were preferred to or acted in combination with the use of force. In turn, this understanding of power mixing coercion and consent constitutes the bedrock of a contemporary American conception of power. It evolved over the course of two centuries but this first encounter with the effects of power left a mark on the American collective perception of power, and while more sophisticated and integrating other expressions of power, this focus on coercion and the ability to prevail remains at the core of what it means to be powerful for Americans.

In turn, such a specifically embedded conception of power had a direct influence on how reconstruction processes in Japan and Iraq were led. Both cases are reconstruction efforts in the wake of conflicts. The use of force in its primal expression, war, conditioned the realities faced by Americans when they initiated the reconstruction of these occupied countries. But where in Japan Americans turned to softer expressions of power aimed at gaining consent to their policies, in Iraq, coercion was at the forefront of the occupation, essentially because of a dramatic security situation but also because consent did not seem like the option that would achieve results, as we will see in chapter 4 and 5. These references to power expressed as coercion or consent find their roots in the American experience with power. Hence, we consider essential for our purpose to locate the roots of an American perception of power in order to grasp choices that were made during both occupations.

Isolationism and the Fear of Coercion

The young American Republic's understanding of power stemmed from her position in the international system at the time. Surrounded by hostile monarchies, American leaders and population feared the effects of power, understood then as essentially based on the use of

force to resolve issues between states. Hence, early American leaders and their citizens often privileged a form of aloofness from the politics of European nations.

Nevertheless, the United States was never in a position to be completely detached from the outside world for two reasons: firstly, America lies west of Europe. Secondly, even if in a rather isolated position, the United States' success and prosperity, and sometimes its existence, have always been deeply connected to events out of its control. As Lafeber explains, America was born out of 14th and 15th century events as religious crusades, scientific discoveries, and attempts to find new routes to Asia.¹⁶⁷ Hence, the geographical location of the American continent to the west of Europe placed the yet to be born United States on the path chosen by European explorers. Indeed, defining elements of the U.S. approach to power are found as far as the entrepreneurial venture of Columbus and his followers. Their quest for personal wealth and Christian civilising mission echo two recurring themes in U.S. foreign policy: self-interest and idealism.

This move to the west did not stop on the eastern shores of the United States but became a central defining element of the U.S. foreign policy: expansion would follow the sun. Crossing a continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the United States throughout the 19th and 20th centuries expanded its commerce, civilisation and interests across the Pacific, culminating in three wars fought in Asia in less than fifty years during the 20th century. As Vevier argues, the ideology of American continentalism was closely related to earlier European expansionism to the West as it represented a continuation of the drive to spread civilisation and commerce to Asia.¹⁶⁸

But the focus on spreading civilisation consisted in a myth for the masses. Self-interest and the maximisation of power were the real purposes of the American expansion and the move westwards relied heavily on the use of force in its unfolding. As we will see later on when looking at both case-studies, as much as democracy promotion justifies regime change nowadays, expanding civilisation was a cover for pure simple good old optimisation of power resources aimed at maximising the United States position in the international system.

Other factors explain the much needed westwards expansion and corollary justification through civilisation of unknown lands. Indeed, west was actually the only

¹⁶⁷ Lafeber, W., *The American Age. U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Present*, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), p. 8.

¹⁶⁸ Vevier, C., 'American Continentalism: An Idea of Expansion, 1845-1910', *The American Historical Review*, 65:2 (January, 1960), pp. 323-325, 333.

possible route of expansion for the early American colonies were blocked to the north by Canada and Quebec, and to the south by Spanish possessions.¹⁶⁹

Colonists did not wait until gaining their independence to expand. The high birth rate in the colonies and the necessity to acquire more land to replace the soil worn out by intensive agriculture¹⁷⁰ pushed them to the west. Later on, with a buoyant developing economy, sugar, tobacco and fish from North America became valuable products in Europe. These trade relations tied Americans to the economic world-system as their labour helped Spain, England and Holland to replace the Italian and German cities at the centres of world trade.¹⁷¹ It is through trade relations that America started to make its weight felt on the international scene. Of course, it is not comparable to what the U.S. economy represents today but as early as the pre-revolutionary period, American settlers and businessmen, not to mention European powers, understood that it was a land full of promise. We witness here the birth of American foreign relations as these developments led to contact with Indian tribes and French settlers to the west and to the birth of slavery in the Southern States, and consequently, to the opening of a new trade route to West Africa.

These early foreign relations changed American society. Where the original settlers came to a New World full of spiritual hope of confessional freedom and with the mission to spread their faith to the native savages, the organisation and development of the North American economy led to drastic changes in the American collective psyche. Self-interest was taking precedence on idealism as making money became the main priority over building the perfect society envisioned by the first settlers.¹⁷² If there was something America was not short of, it was land, whose acquisition and development helped to maintain a high rate of economic growth, which in turn facilitated national stability and devotion to individualism.¹⁷³

After its independence, the United States maintained the same course towards fast economic development and correlated expansion. George Washington insisted on the necessity for the next generations to consolidate control of the North American continent. He defined America's national interest as going west to exploit the vast resources at the disposal of Americans and to develop a continental empire built by free men.¹⁷⁴ Protected by vast oceans, self-sufficient in raw material, the young Republic witnessed dramatic developments

¹⁶⁹ Fensterwald, B., 'The Anatomy of American 'Isolationism' and Expansionism. Part I', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2:2 (June, 1958), p. 112.

¹⁷⁰ Especially tobacco and cotton.

¹⁷¹ LaFeber, W., *The American Age*, p. 8, 71.

¹⁷² LaFeber, W., *The American Age*, p. 10.

¹⁷³ Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume* , p. 15.

¹⁷⁴ Ellis, J., *Founding Brothers. The Revolutionary Generation* (London: Faber and Faber, 2002), p. 134.

in the next century. Indeed, the urgent need to expand was also justified by the dramatic increase in American population, with a doubling of the population every generation and the massive arrival of newcomers eager to make a fresh start, the need to acquire new territories to accommodate the growing population triggered a revolution in communication and transportation that was at the inception of the development of the American industrial economy.

The use of force to acquire more land was seemed as normal and the most efficient expedient to achieve the objective of expansion. Americans, relative to natives, were powerful and there was no harness to their power, barring a feeble sense of guilt linked to Christian morality, nevertheless rapidly forgotten as early expansionists were also convinced that they were spreading civilisation. We find a similar justification in the post-WW II and post-Cold War world: America is unchallenged and decided to make use of its status and power to impose reconstruction projects, dressed in the clothes of progress and modernity on war-torn Japan and Iraq.

Complementarily to this civilising mission as the idea at the centre of American justification for expansion through the use of force, one needs to assess the ideas that shaped the early American mind in its relation to power. Republicanism, free-enterprise and liberty come to the fore when one thinks of the making of the Republic. But in a world of power politics, exemplified by the revolutionary bloodbath against Great Britain, young America was on a collision course with the greedy European powers surrounding the Republic. Steering warily in stormy times, the Founding Fathers built on these constitutive ideas to reach the conclusion that isolation from Europe and continental expansion were the key to the United States' survival. Later on, the move to the west would give birth to another ideology, which alongside isolationism and expansionism, would prove resilient in the United States foreign policy, the idea that America was divinely chosen, morally exceptional and destined to lead the world. Such an idea is still at the core of contemporary American foreign policy and conception of power as we will see later on.

But first, let us focus on the emerging ideology of the colonial and early national periods. It encompassed a commitment to republicanism as the form of regime offering hope for the future in opposition to monarchy, and individual free enterprise as a model. It translated into foreign affairs by the embracing of revolutionary ideas and of an open doors commercial policy as against a closed system controlled by the state.¹⁷⁵ Republicanism and

¹⁷⁵ Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, pp. 10-13.

free-enterprise matched the mentalities of American colonists who saw themselves as different from the mother-country.

The choice of republicanism as a political regime implied a dilemma for the founding fathers. To survive politically, the young Republic had to remain aloof from the intrigues and power politics plaguing the old world as entanglement in alliances with European powers was seen “as a descent to the level of court intrigues and a moral national selfishness contrary to the principles of republicanism”.¹⁷⁶

Isolationism had to be the path to survival. Such an option was helped by the geographical status of the United States as Ruggie argues, America’s wish to remain aloof from political alliances “flowed naturally from its geopolitical constitution”.¹⁷⁷ At the same time, to survive economically, the United States had to practice free-trade to maintain a flow of hard currency and pursue its development. Hence, republicanism led to political isolationism and economic openness: to trade worldwide was fine but there was no question of involvement in the politics of other continents and of entanglement in alliances.

A specific understanding of the concepts of power and liberty was at the roots of the Republican choice. Not only the architects of this new nation, but also the common people, through past experiences as outcasts from Europe and through their daily lives as inhabitants of colonies, understood the dialectical relationship animating power and liberty. The effects of power were feared while liberty was cherished, as Madison expressed, defining the Constitution as a field on which a debate about the balance between power and liberty can blossom, as he hoped that Americans would be “anxious to establish the efficiency of popular charters, in defending liberty against power and power against licentiousness”¹⁷⁸

To early colonists, power, in the words of John Adams, meant “the dominion of some men over others, the human control of human life: ultimately force, compulsion”.¹⁷⁹ The concept of power is here above all directly in correlation with the concept of liberty. There is a moralistic imperative residing in preserving the liberty of the individual in the face of the growing power of the government. Power is a concept that is highly morally laden at the beginning of the Republic. It is a conception of power that is defined in a negative way: the power of not doing is more important than the power to achieve. The effects of power are feared, as Madison underlines, “the means of power against foreign dangers at home have

¹⁷⁶ Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, pp. 16, 22.

¹⁷⁷ Ruggie, J. G., “The Past as Prologue?: Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy”, *International Security*, 21:4 (Spring, 1997), p. 89.

¹⁷⁸ Quoted in LaFeber, Walter, ‘The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation’, *The Journal of American History*, 74:3 (December 1987), 695.

¹⁷⁹ Baylin, B., *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1992), p. 56.

always been the means of tyranny at home”¹⁸⁰, while Hamilton argues that “Safety from external dangers is the most powerful director of national conduct...to be more safe, [citizens] at length become willing to run the risk to be less free”.¹⁸¹

This debate on the effect of power on liberty characterised the first twenty-five years of U.S. foreign policy, epitomised by the incessant exchanges between Federalists and Republicans. For the latter, represented by the prolific Thomas Jefferson, the revolution is seen as a liberation movement from England but also from the corruption of European aristocracy and monarchy. Individual liberty is at the core of such an interpretation and considers any accommodation of personal freedom to governmental discipline as dangerous.¹⁸² For the former, the Federalists as Alexander Hamilton and George Washington, the Revolution is seen as “an incipient national movement with deep, if latent, origins in the colonial era”.¹⁸³ Hence, the core principle of this approach is collectivistic rather than individualistic, it lauds the surrender of personal, state, and sectional interests to the larger purpose of nationhood, first embodied in the Continental Army and later in the newly established federal government.

Logically, we find in this early schism between Republicans and Federalists the roots of two American foreign policy traditions: realism and idealism. The anti-English Republicans were ready to take the risk to confront Great Britain and favoured an alliance with France, at the risk of going to war, potentially losing it and the revolutionary acquisitions in the process. Here, we face a very ideological view; policies are subjugated to passion as what matters is the total impossibility to deal with those who personify corruption and tyranny. Such a position can lead to interventionism. It echoes the current American administration’s approach to dealing with “rogue” states, totalitarian regimes whose values are in such total opposition with the American ideal of a free world that regime change became the mantra of the G.W. Bush administration.

The Federalists, placing national integrity and unity - survival of the young Republic - above all else, warned against foreign political ties and privileged political isolation. Their objective was to buy time in order to strengthen the young Republic. Here, we look at a rather realistic position regarding politics, where what matters is not the ideological betrayal

¹⁸⁰ James Madison quoted in LaFeber, W., ‘The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy’, p. 697.

¹⁸¹ Alexander Hamilton quoted in LaFeber, W., *Ibid.*, p. 697.

¹⁸² Merriam, C. E. Jr, ‘The Political Theory of Jefferson’, *Political Science Quarterly*, 17:1 (March, 1902), pp. 26-27; see also Cooke, J. W., ‘Jefferson on Liberty’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 34:4 (October/December, 1973), pp. 563-576.

¹⁸³ Ellis, J., *Founding Brothers*, p. 14.

of the concept of personal freedom by negotiating with the tyrant but the interest of the state through its preservation. Such a position favours isolationism.¹⁸⁴

The revolutionary process exposed American leaders to European politics, where they sought help, especially in France. This exposure strengthened their desire for isolation as decisions turned into policies exemplify: Madison's Resolution to the Congress in June 1783 called for avoiding entanglement in European politics, Washington's Farewell Address in 1796 warned against permanent alliances while allowing for careful ad hoc temporary alliances in case of emergencies¹⁸⁵, Jefferson's Inaugural Address in 1801 repeats Washington's warning while contemplating the possibility of an alliance with England if France refuses to settle the Louisiana purchase; and James Monroe's Doctrine in 1823 states the non-colonisation principle, isolationism from European affairs, and the rejection of further European expansionism in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁸⁶

There were two sets of factors constituting the case for isolationism.

On the one hand, morality called for aloofness. As Thomas Paine enounced in *Common Sense*, "The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind, [...]"¹⁸⁷, what was good for America was good for the world. Americans should maintain maximum freedom of action to protect their interests, which were distinct from, and purer than Europe's. As Perkins underlines, if America remained isolated and hence morally superior, more nations will turn to the beacon of freedom.¹⁸⁸ Here, isolationism crosses the path of American exceptionalism, later at the roots of America's justifications to export her political institutions and reform occupied countries at her image. It constitutes the cradle of subsequent policies of consent generation to American values and interests as our two case-studies will illustrate.

On the other hand, a set of far more pragmatic reasons emerged: To survive and to expand, the young Republic had to avoid war, hence, Washington's Declaration of Neutrality in 1793 from the wars in Europe in order to buy time to strengthen the young nation with the objective of being able to face a potential conflict with a European power. Such a position was reinforced by the principles enounced in the Monroe Doctrine, which is non-colonisation, isolation from European affairs, and non-expansion of European powers in the

¹⁸⁴ Bowman, A. H., 'Jefferson, Hamilton and American Foreign Policy', *Political Science Quarterly*, 71:1 (March, 1956), pp. 18-19.

¹⁸⁵ Washington, George, 'Farewell Address', September 17, 1796, partially reprinted in Jentleson, B. W., *American Foreign Policy. The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*, 2nd edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), p.76.

¹⁸⁶ LaFeber, W., *The American Age*, p. 86.

¹⁸⁷ Paine, Thomas, *Common Sense* (New York, 1942), pp. 23, 26-27, 31-32.

¹⁸⁸ Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, p. 51.

Western Hemisphere. It became the standard practice of U.S. foreign policy. While warning European powers to respect these principles, the U.S. was ready to apply them as well. In other words, what Europeans could not do, the U.S. would not either. But these same principles would later become weapons of expansion on top of hemispheric defence, as Dangerfield argues, “the principles as stated in 1823 laid out a system of foreign policy remarkably congenial to the national temper... [and] was never...to lose its original and valiant quality of committing the United States...to leadership in world politics”.¹⁸⁹

But the United States was then not in a position to experience expansion across its natural boundaries. Isolationism and continental expansion (the realist approach) remained the norm as against interventionism and expansion of American values (the moralist approach) until the United States accumulated sufficient power resources to launch itself on an expansionist path that would meet no end.

Riding the Bull: America the Expansionist

This expansionist ideology had at its core a discourse centred on American exceptionalism, itself based on ideas like the American society uniqueness and the mission to spread its political institutions, founded on democracy and freedom. America initiated a policy that still constitutes the official foreign policy line today: a permanent democratic revolution aiming at transforming the world to its own image. Consent generation to these ideas was a key-component of this expansionist process. Given its ongoing rise to power in the international system, the United States found itself in a position to deliver a message encouraging other nations to adopt democracy and American ideals instead of forcing these nations to do so. The ultimate aim of such a policy remained the maximisation of American power but also included an attempt at shaping the international system in order to make it more congruent to American interests, of which security and stability were the most important.

Indeed, having reached its natural borders to the west, the United States aimed at pushing further across the Pacific. A doctrine of ‘Manifest destiny’ was the central element to a discourse aiming at selling American expansion as natural and benefiting targets of expansion as well as the world. What was good for America was good for the world.¹⁹⁰ The

¹⁸⁹ Dangerfield, G., *The Era of Good Feelings* (New York: Easton Press, 1952), p. 308.

¹⁹⁰ The sense of mission belonging to Manifest Destiny was first expressed by Ralph Waldo Emerson, philosopher of the 1840s, who emphasised that “...in every age of the world, there has been a leading nation, one of a more generous sentiment, whose eminent citizens were willing to stand for the interests of general justice and humanity...which should be that nation but these States?” Quoted in Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume. I.*, p. 176

United States sought to reformulate existing structures of the international system to match its interests while insisting on discursive elements of power that put to the fore a common interest for other states in supporting such an international system having U.S. values and interests at its core.

Hence, when approaching the question of American expansionism, it is possible to identify two points of view: a utilitarian justification and an idealist approach to the question. The former refers to the isolationist course chosen by the young American Republic as a necessity to expand to the west across the North American Republic. As Fensterwald underlines, “this brand of isolationism was the handmaiden of expansionism, supplying it with the freedom and energy essential to its success.”¹⁹¹

But expansionism carried the seeds of destruction of isolationism. While seen as the corollary to expansionism, isolationism would become harder to implement as the more the United States expanded, the more often it came into contact with the vital interests of other powers. Moreover, the more it expanded, the more powerful the United States became and a policy of aloofness was simply not applicable anymore.

But the relationship between isolationism and expansionism was a two-way street. While isolationism contributed to American expansionism, the latter fostered two beliefs that contributed to the development of isolationism: a feeling of superiority illustrated by the fact that Americans started to see themselves as the chosen people on an unbroken path to success; and, the formation of the concept of Manifest Destiny that gave Americans a sense of moral and political superiority *vis-à-vis* imperialist countries of Europe.

This idealistic characterisation of expansionism insists on its uniqueness. In opposition to European imperialism that not only sought the physical control of territories but the subjugation of the local populations, American expansion “sought land and its resources, not a subordinate population, [...], Americans see themselves as constituting a model society, [...], one destined to transform the world”¹⁹², the Republican ideals rising above the tyranny personified by the European empires. The same rhetoric applied to the Pacific War with Japan and the 2003 war with Iraq. Both these nations did not match American expectations and conceptions of what political institutions ought to be. As we will see later, one of the official justifications given for American-led reconstruction projects was the remoulding of political and civil society institutions in order to meet American standards of democracy, freedom and free-markets. American exceptionalism was shared through temporary physical expansionism having for objective permanent ideological brainwashing.

¹⁹¹ Fensterwald, B., ‘The Anatomy of...’, p. 116.

¹⁹² Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume 1*, p. 8.

Thus, American expansionism was dressed in the attractive clothes of exceptionalism, encompassing the American endorsement of natural rights, drive for personal independence, and celebration of democracy¹⁹³, in order to better sell the idea at home and abroad.

In fact, the early expansion was mainly realised through the threat or the actual use of force as the acquisition of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Oregon, California and the Southwest illustrated.¹⁹⁴ These acquisitions by force or the threat to use force exemplify the primal need for the Republic to consolidate its borders but give also a hint as to the nature of the American Republic. It is a Republic in permanent revolution, in permanent progression, as Adas contends,

American exceptionalists tend to see the rise of the United States to global power as part of a larger teleological progression toward,..., human virtue, utopian sublimity, civilization, development, or modernity....and,..., they have premised their prescriptions for interaction with foreign peoples and cultures on assimilationist imperatives that exceed those of even their most expansive and chauvinistic rivals, past or present.¹⁹⁵

Moreover, this belief that what is good for America is good for the world also has in its womb a denigration of the worth and viability of first, non-American, and later, non-Western cultures.¹⁹⁶ It exemplifies the racist nature of American expansionism, finding its roots in the moral and intellectual qualities required to form and manage liberal political institutions. Jefferson, referring to Europe and Spanish possessions, argues that “ignorance, poverty and vice” plaguing European cities and Spanish-American possessions do not constitute a fertile ground on which to seed the rationality necessary for the exercise of liberal politics, while Americans are ripe to receive and exercise the principles of freedom.¹⁹⁷

This racial superiority of the Anglo-Saxons finds its roots in the early colonisation of the American Atlantic shores. The first English pioneers brought as part of their heritage the religious myth of a pure Anglo-Saxon church and the secular myth of the free nature of Anglo-Saxon political institutions.¹⁹⁸ This emphasis on freedom loving Anglo-Saxons, organised in a “democratic country of united local communities, meeting in an annual

¹⁹³ Appleby, J., ‘Recovering America’s Historic Diversity: Beyond Exceptionalism’, *Journal of American History*, 79:2 (September, 1992), p. 424.

¹⁹⁴ Perkins, B. *op. cit.*, p. 170.

¹⁹⁵ Adas, M., ‘From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon’, *American Historical Review*, 106:5 (December, 2001), p. 1702.

¹⁹⁶ Adas, M., ‘From Settler Colony...’, p. 1696.

¹⁹⁷ Merriam, C. E., ‘The Political Theory of Jefferson’, pp. 40-41.

¹⁹⁸ Horsman, R., *Race and Manifest Destiny. The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 9.

parliament and enjoying trial by jury”¹⁹⁹, is important for our purpose as it constitutes the origin of the link between race and liberty, and subsequently, superior political institutions. To the early pioneers and their revolutionary descendants, they were the sons and daughters of those German tribesmen who carried liberty from the woods of Germany to England and finally to the New World.

The Romantic movement of the late 18th and early 19th centuries would translate these institutional achievements into an ideology that had at its core, not the continuity of institutions, but the continuity of innate racial strengths. As Horsman argues, “the emphasis on superior racial characteristics as a reason for strong institutions led to an emphasis on inferior racial characteristics as a reason for weak institutions.”²⁰⁰ In turn, it led to a racial characterisation of American expansionism. The Manifest Destiny of America was not the Manifest Destiny of all but was restricted to the white race. Indeed, the early American expansionism is not colonial in nature as the acquired territories receive statehood status, but there is no will to integrate the native populations and these are eradicated or displaced as Perkins underlines, “the US government is the government of the white race.”²⁰¹ It is confirmed by the early encounters with natives that led settlers to develop a racism providing an excuse to remove Indians who blocked land expansion.²⁰² There were not to be any obstacles to the realisation of the American Manifest Destiny.

Again, this feeling of American superiority permeates both reconstruction projects in Japan and Iraq. As will be developed later, there is a contradiction in the American projects of transforming the world to her image. Clearly, at the onset of the reconstruction processes in Japan, there were doubts regarding the ability of the Japanese to adopt and live by the tenets of democracy. It is also the case in Iraq today. Nevertheless, American officials do not see democracy as a construct but as an experience, something to be lived on a daily basis in order to be assimilated and respected. Hence, even if Americans emitted doubts about the ability of non-Western cultures to acquire democracy, by the 20th century, it was clear to Americans that it would be through experiencing democracy with long-term support of the United States that new democracies would flourish and enjoy the goodness of American values and political regime. Such was the American mission.

Indeed, Manifest Destiny is deeply grounded in another key-concept pertaining to American history: the idea of mission. The first pioneers reaching the shores of America

¹⁹⁹ Horsman, R., *Race and Manifest Destiny*, p. 17.

²⁰⁰ Horsman, R., *ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁰¹ Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume I.*, p. 174.

²⁰² LaFeber, W., *The American Age*, p. 11.

brought with them “a sense of mission to redeem the Old World by high example. It was generated by the potentialities of a new earth for building a new heaven.”²⁰³

Throughout American history, the type of mission changed but this original sense of mission remained. Successively, concepts and ideas that were to be at the core of an American version of democracy were fed into such a sense of mission: religious liberty, a republican government based on the consent of the governed and free of any form of aristocracy, a federal type of government organised on a careful balance of powers and a Bill protecting individual basic rights (freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, and, equality of religion amongst others), protection of the states against federal power, freedom for the slaves and the willingness to preserve and expand democracy in the world, self-determination and Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms. As Merck underlines, “in all these enlargements of mission the Goddess of Liberty holding aloft her light to the world seemed to Americans to be, in reality, themselves.”²⁰⁴

Manifest Destiny, conceived as a mission, marks a turn in the conception of expansionism. Generally speaking it meant divine expansion over an area not clearly defined. For some, it meant the North American continent, for others, the entire Western hemisphere. But for all supporters of Manifest Destiny, it was an idealist concept, which, even though less acquisitive than the expansion project of John Q. Adams, was articulated in two ways. Firstly, in a traditional fashion, it refers to physical expansion over a given area. But to Adams’ concern with territorial extension to accommodate the ever growing American population, Manifest Destiny carried in its arms an ideological message: wild and uncivilised territories deserved to benefit from American civilisation and democratic form of government.

In addition to active physical extension, expansionism worked through attraction; that is by appealing to neighbouring nations to join the American democratic experience and enjoy the fruits of freedom, either by themselves adopting a democratic and preferably republican form of government, or by physically adhering to the United States.

Robert J. Walker, Secretary of the Treasury in 1847, emphasised the divine mission pertaining to the United States and the power of attraction of the American political model when he declared that

²⁰³ Merck, F., *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 3.

²⁰⁴ Merck, F., *Manifest Destiny...*, p. 4.

a higher than any earthly power guides American expansion and still guards and directs our destiny, impels us onward, and has selected our great and happy country as a model and ultimate centre of attraction for all the nations of the world.²⁰⁵

Such a power of attraction was reinforced by the safeguards offered to newly adherent nations to the United States in the Constitution and in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 stressing that “the several states composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government,..., the government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers.”²⁰⁶

In opposition to J.Q. Adams’ warning of external involvement in domestic affairs of foreign countries, we witness here the birth of active expansionism with the purpose of promoting American ideals and form of government. Such a promotion takes two forms: a non-interventionist type based on the power of example and hence on consent generation and a more assertive type encouraging the U.S. to move from influencing her neighbours to actually physically spread into them, by force if needed.

Hence, American expansionism has three roots: the ideals of promoting liberty, peace, and a federal republican form of government; the economic interests in acquiring more land, resources and commerce routes; and, the willingness to ensure the nation’s future by having more nations sharing the same love for democracy and freedom.²⁰⁷ One can conclude that the formulation of the Manifest Destiny ideology, at least in its political constituent, prefigure the contemporary promotion of democracy currently at the core of the current American foreign policy.

Indeed, one can argue that democracy promotion constitutes one of the elements in the genesis of American foreign policy as Americans supported regime change as early as the 18th century and the French Revolution. Subsequently, they sided with revolutionary forces that swept Europe and Latin America in the 19th century in their opposition to monarchy, seen as a dictatorial system, and to colonial power.

Jefferson was amongst the first to formulate this highly ideologically laden position. To him, the American Revolution is the opening act of a global struggle against tyranny

²⁰⁵ Quoted in LaFeber, W., *The American Age*, p. 95.

²⁰⁶ Commager, H. S., *Documents of American History*, 6th edition, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958), p. 178.

²⁰⁷ Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume I.*, p. 178.

destined to spread worldwide. “This ball of liberty,..., is now so well in motion that it will roll around the globe”.²⁰⁸

However, Americans would rather see themselves as the guardians of liberty, not crusaders in arms²⁰⁹ as J.Q. Adams warned, America should not go “abroad in search of monsters to destroy”, otherwise “she would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit”.²¹⁰

The last sentence of Adams’ words illustrates the dilemma facing the United States in its rise to global power: a choice to be made between empire or hegemony, between global domination or global leadership. During the 20th century, the United States oscillated between these two extremes. At times, it behaved like an imperial power, seeking territorial expansion through the use of force, as the annexation of Cuba, the Philippines and Hawaii illustrates. At times, it found itself in a position to lead the world to stability and chose to put its ideological mantra insisting on freedom, democracy and free markets at the fore of its foreign policy.

Taming the Bull: America the Imperial

At the end of the 19th century, after having reached the natural borders of the North American continental mass, and after having solved through a brotherly bloodbath of four years the ever dividing question of slavery, and as a consequence experimenting her first post-conflict reconstruction project, America found itself at the dawn of new age.

American foreign policy became global rather than continental, driven by corporate rather than by agrarian interests. The first consequence of expansion concerned domestic politics. The necessity to achieve new foreign policy goals required a questioning of the checks-and-balances constitutional system preserving the delicate balance between liberty and power. “As American military and economic power moved outward, political power consolidated at home”.²¹¹

President McKinley was the first of the ‘imperial’ presidents. He formulated a policy aiming at the economic security of the U.S. dressed in the clothes of a civilising mission towards ‘lesser breeds’. This unrelenting American expansion to the West took the name of ‘New Manifest Destiny’.

Economic expansionism was at the core of his approach as the economy was to be the engine of American expansionism, which would be peaceful, as the U.S. would expand not

²⁰⁸ Quoted in Ellis, J., *Founding Brothers*, p. 142.

²⁰⁹ Perkins, B., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume I.*, p. 50.

²¹⁰ Quoted in LaFeber, W., *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire* (Chicago, 1965), pp. 42-46

²¹¹ LaFeber, W., “The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy”, pp. 696, 708.

by force of arms but by attraction. Secretary of State Seward's Law of Imperial Gravity served as a framework for the U.S. foreign policy until the Second World War: commercial expansion was to be obtained by the domination of adjacent states' markets, especially in Asia as there were few opportunities in the European sphere of influence. And finally, political supremacy would follow commercial ascendancy.²¹² In this case, the economic and financial dimensions of power were at the centre of Seward's approach aiming at a peaceful acquisition of consent to American policies from targeted countries.

To this, American policy-makers added a cultural-ideological message justifying the policies. The New Manifest Destiny gathered the domestic consensus necessary for the rise of a strong foreign policy. It also made clear to Asians that America had ambitions in the Pacific. American leaders always saw Asia as part of a larger opportunity. The central pillar of the U.S. foreign policy was the maintenance of an open global system that could be undermined unless East Asia was integrated into it.²¹³ Having reached the West Coast, Americans were looking for new opportunities, being always on the move, the Pacific Ocean seemed like the natural space for further expansion. The New Manifest destiny was at the core of this approach to East Asia and defined America's mission in expansionist terms, the greatest of the great nations being blessed with God-given rights to spread both its new political institutions and commerce across the American continent and then into other continents to uplift other people to the American enlightened standards.²¹⁴ The New Manifest Destiny describes a revival of that spirit of American expansionism of the 1840s, "bolstered by a belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and an obligation to civilize and christianize 'lesser people' of the world...expansion was no longer continental but transoceanic, with expansionist efforts directed primarily at Latin America and the Far East".²¹⁵

Between 1865 and the 1890s, the U.S. expanded peacefully in the Pacific. The increase of foreign trade, and the outpouring of American citizens as travellers, missionaries, advisers and founders of educational institutions, helped to develop an empire of influence in

²¹² Iriye, A, *Pacific Estrangement. Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 6.; Paolino, E.N., *The Foundations of the American Empire. William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 27; LaFeber, W., *The Clash. U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History* (New York, London: WW. Norton, 1997), p. 27; Bartlett, R. J., *The Record of American Diplomacy* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1964), p. 275.

²¹³ LaFeber, W., *The Clash*, p. xix.

²¹⁴ Paterson, T. G. (ed.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy. Vol I. To 1914*. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), p. 256.

²¹⁵ Findling, J. E., *Dictionary of American Diplomatic History* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 381.

East Asia.²¹⁶ These individuals were the first conveyors of an American idea of universalism. They seeded consent to American accomplishments in indigenous population. In addition to commercial supremacy, the U.S. developed an ideology of its superiority, ideologically embodied by all ‘things American’, by cultural factors in which racism was strongly present. That racism tainted all early American enterprises abroad, through old-fashion colonialism and through economic assertiveness.

But the first powerful moves outside the United States were also imperialistic and colonialist in nature. American leaders made great use of the consensus present in the majority of the American society about the need for expansion. The War with Spain brought Cuba and the Philippines into the American Empire. Conquest was justified in the name of civilisation and enlightenment to the profit of lesser breeds²¹⁷. In order to expand American trade peacefully in the Pacific, it was necessary to acquire stepping-stones in the region. Moreover, it would be necessary, in the future, to protect this economic expansion, which would inevitably bring new interests to defend. Hawaii and the Philippines were these stepping-stones.

McKinley annexed Hawaii to the United States in 1897. Three months later, the Philippines were also part of the American Empire after a successful war against Spain. McKinley did not hesitate to go to war as the American policies in East Asia, and particularly in China were checked by the European powers’ colonialism. The territorial partition of China into closed spheres of influence, especially by France, Russia and Germany but also by Great Britain and Japan in order to counter them, put at risk the American economy in need of open markets to deal with its overproduction resulting from the second industrial revolution.

These economic demands were also seconded by missionary interests claiming that the moral awakening of Asia would “combine with America to make the Pacific Ocean the chief highway of the world’s commerce”.²¹⁸ It was thus essential to keep the trade routes open, and more important, to become more assertive in developing new markets for American products, especially in the promising China.

²¹⁶ Iriye, A, *Pacific Estrangement*, p. 10.

²¹⁷ As McKinley talks about the Philippines: I walked the floor of the White House night after night...and prayed the Almighty God for light and guidance...and one night late it came to me this way...: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain - that would be cowardly and dishonourable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France and Germany – our commercial rivals in the Orient – that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves – they were unfit for self-government - ...: (4) that there was nothing left to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianise them, and by God’s grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. Quoted in Robinson, W., *Promoting Polyarchy*, p. 117.

²¹⁸ LaFeber, W., *The Clash*, pp. 58-59.

The acquisition of the Philippines and Hawaii was the indispensable strategic move in order to re-open the door of trade in East Asia. Having realised these imperialistic but necessary objectives, America was ready to codify and implement the second component of its expansionism in the Pacific. It would be peaceful and the sound of guns would be replaced by the sound of money. The use of force or the threat of the use of force made room for an approach, essentially economic, based on the acquisition of consent through mutual benefits resulting from the American economic expansion in the Pacific.

The Open door policy formulated by Secretary of State Hay in 1899-1900 characterised the American involvement in Pacific affairs, not through the stationing of troops, but by the expansion of commercial activities, codifying the peaceful, liberal expansionist strain in American foreign affairs.²¹⁹ So, alongside imperialist expansion, as in Hawaii and the Philippines, the U.S. asserted itself through a peaceful economic policy not devoid of an ideological message as the United States would not demand territory or use force to back up its policy in China but would present itself as the only one standing for the Chinese integrity, under threat from colonialist policies of European powers and later of Japan.

The assassination of McKinley in 1901 marked the end of the first American expansionist moves outside of the North American continent. Theodore Roosevelt, his successor, held conceptions of foreign policy that would change the American approach to international affairs and bring the U.S. closer to the status of true global power.

Roosevelt shared the view of his predecessors that America was the best hope for the world and perceived the world as being regulated by power. Ideologically, America was to serve as a beacon for the rest of mankind but he was the first President who insisted that it was the United States' duty to make its influence felt globally, and so in terms of national interest. For him, it was time to disentangle America and to use its power to prevail.²²⁰ Ideologically, like McKinley, he justified this by the need to advance civilisation, peace and stability in the world, but nevertheless, Roosevelt was more a realist than an idealist: national self-interest governed what happened in international affairs, and world peace did not come from human goodwill or moral restraint but from balanced power restraining the selfish aims of nation-states.²²¹

²¹⁹ Iriye, A, *Pacific Estrangement*, p. 66.

²²⁰ Marks III, F. W., 'A Cautious and Sensitive Diplomat' in Paterson, T. G. (ed.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy. Vol I. To 1914*. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), pp. 463.

²²¹ Dallek, R., 'A Crusading Progressive' in Paterson, T. G. (ed.) *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy. Vol I. To 1914*. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), pp. 496-497.

The United States was now a great power and although still in the shadow of the hegemon of the time, Great Britain, America was conscious that her potential power expressed in terms of material and ideological resources would force her to be more active on the world scene. It took two world wars for the United States to achieve superpower status. And although between the two world wars the U.S. resumed an isolationist policy, what Fensterwald calls a return to 'normalcy'²²², the European group suicide through the two world wars left America as *primus inter pares*.

After the idealist surge of Wilson, Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover adopted an isolationist stance in foreign affairs and decided to stay aloof from international issues. The non-commitment of the U.S. to the League of Nations, the lack of enforcement provisions in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the rejection of the Four Power Pact destined to maintain the status quo in the Pacific by the Congress exemplify the course chosen by these three Republican administrations. The support of the American public for these policies reflected the indifference of the common American regarding foreign policy. This new wave of isolationism did not drag in its wake its usual companion, territorial expansion, as it was the case in the 19th century, even though U.S. policies in the Pacific and in Latin America remained imperialist in design if short of the actual use of force.

Rejection of multilateralism and indifference of the American public to world affairs still plague the U.S. foreign policy today. But the policies of the G.W. Bush administration are far more interventionist and seek to extend American interests defined in moralistic and material terms throughout the world. Wilsonian in their justification, these policies, through the stubborn rejection of multilateralism are old-fashion isolationism in their willingness to expand American ideals and interests geographically.

However more than to Wilson, Bush's policies can be traced back to McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. Those policies constitute a legacy of an American experience of power. A closer look at tenets of the contemporary U.S. foreign policy shows a striking resemblance to the themes discussed in this chapter. As we will now see in chapter 4, U.S. foreign policy today constitutes a sum of ideas and values that have been present in American history since the inception of the Republic: republicanism as the ideal political regime, free-enterprise, freedom, Americans as the chosen people, and hence exceptionalism leading to expansionism are all constitutive of a contemporary perception of the status, role and mission of the United States in the world.

²²² Fensterwald, B. Jr., 'The Anatomy of ...', p. 124.

These ideas and values, either as justification or as inherently part of the processes, have also been present in both reconstruction projects in Japan and Iraq. America still distils her ideology and vision of the world through an alembic labelled with democracy, free-markets and acceptance of American power as the best instrument for global stability, while actually, the U.S. ultimate purpose consists in the maintenance and reinforcement of its global supremacy.

4. The Delicate Mix of Coercion and Consent: The Failures of the Bush Administration

So far, we have argued that power is expressed through coercion and consent, and that a comprehensive understanding of power requires an analysis of the interactions between instruments of hard and soft power; that is how they complete each other or impede each other in the exercise of power. We also contend that power is multidimensional in character and hence an analysis of power exertion should spread through the whole spectrum of relations between actors, that is the various fields in which power is expressed, and also integrate the effects of the international structure on such exertion of power. That was our first analytical step described in chapter 2.

In addition, we assert that in order to understand the nature of power exertion by a specific actor of the international system, it is useful to give an account of the experiences faced by that actor, the sum of which influences how power is perceived and hence exerted. That was our second analytical step dealt with in chapter 3.

Our third analytical step consists in implementing our findings. We argue that the scope of an analysis of power should be limited in time and space in order to be able to pinpoint mechanisms of power, that is how power actually works. Ultimately, our objective consists in qualifying how the use of American power in post-conflict reconstruction cases contributes to an understanding of the outcome of reconstruction policies. Consequently, it is necessary to locate our framework for action in time and space; that is defining a historical moment that will constitute the limits of our analysis.

In order to do so, we agree with Ikenberry, who argues that exertions of power are arguably better concentrated in the wake of conflicts, “major postwar junctures are rare strategic moments when leading or hegemonic states face choices about how to use their newly acquired power – choices that ultimately shape the character of postwar international order”.²²³ With this newly acquired power, the victorious state has several options: dominate the international system thanks to its preponderance in material capabilities allowing for prevailing in conflicts over resources; decline a hegemonic role and return home; or, transform the international system in order to reinforce its newly acquired status of global power by gaining the allegiance of the other states through international institutions building.

²²³ Ikenberry, G. J., *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 4.

aiming at showing other states that the leading state agrees to restrain the use of its newly acquired power.²²⁴

The post-WWII and post-Cold War world constitute two of these major junctures when the United States found itself in a position to exert power so to speak unimpeded. While in 1945, the United States chose the third way by engaging in extensive international institutional making, the post-Cold War witnessed two phases. The nineties were characterised by an engagement of the United States with the world through multilateralism and outside moves were mainly justified by humanitarian motives or by the impotence of other powers as in Somalia in 1993 and Kosovo in 1999, and in the case of the Middle East, by a policy of containment of Iraq aiming at preserving U.S. interests in the region. The accession of G.W. Bush to the White House and especially the attacks of 9/11 triggered a repositioning of the United States foreign policy along assertive lines of action that discarded existing international agreements and unleashed American power in a more punitive fashion.

Consequently, it seems to this author that a focus on major post-conflict junctures provides the necessary analytical framework to investigate power reconfiguration and its actual influence on American power exertion. Indeed, the particular dynamics animating power at the global level at these key-moments in history allow for the integration of structural effects on power exertion, while the focus on the two post-conflict reconstruction projects should feed us with the needed observable interactions essential to qualify American power and the outcome of its exertion.

But before engaging with the case-studies, it is necessary to address the question of contemporary American power and specifically, the foreign policy repositioning and the corollary change in power exertion that characterised the G.W. Bush administration. Such changes originate in a specific understanding on behalf of American officials of the status and role of the United States in today's world that translates into specific choices regarding the form of power to be used.

Consequently, after an attempt at conceptualising the use we will make of the concept of power in the first part of the study, it is now time to look at a way to implement our findings and illustrate our case.

We start our project of understanding the U.S. effectiveness at reconstructing countries in the wake of conflicts and the corollary assessment of American power effectiveness with a survey of the current American foreign policy.

²²⁴ Ikenberry, G. J., *After Victory*, p. 4.

Chapter 4 investigates the tenets of Bush's foreign policy and attempts to link these key elements to the concept of power defined in chapter 2 as well as to the sum of ideas and values born out from American history as described in chapter 3.

Chapter 5 analyses the reconstruction of Iraq. It illustrates a failed attempt of power exercise that translated in a focus on coercion use. Such a focus eroded the U.S. power foundations. The American house in the Middle East, and to a certain extent globally, started to crumble. Through the unwise use of power, a lack of imagination regarding the power dimensions to be involved in the reconstruction process, and because of a discrepancy between actions taken during the reconstruction process and the political realities animating the region and the international system, the Bush administration faced an unexpected outcome of its reconstruction policies. The democratic revolution in the region, one of the official lines for intervention, is not happening and the credibility and legitimacy of the United States as a regional and global power playing the role of stabiliser is now in doubt.

Chapter 6 focuses on the reconstruction of Japan and is considered as an example of effective exertion of power that lasts in time. By dispensing power wisely in various dimensions and mainly, though not exclusively, through consent generation, the United States strengthened its base of power for decades. Through a permanent interaction between the two faces of power, coercion and consent, and an awareness of the consistency needed between the reconstruction policies and regional and global realities of the time, the United States built a solid presence in the region and achieved the objectives it set for when reconstructing Japan: to repel Communism and contain the USSR. It is still the indispensable power in Asia-Pacific, the cornerstone of stability in an otherwise volatile region.

Before engaging with the two reconstruction processes supplying us with the necessary framework of analysis in our attempt to qualify the outcome of reconstruction policies and to a certain extent, the effectiveness of contemporary American power, it is first necessary to engage with what the G.W. Bush administration has to say about power. This is the objective of this chapter.

The current American foreign policy is under permanent scrutiny and observers try to make sense of how the most powerful state redefines its relations with the world. Some authors labelled the Bush foreign policy as revolutionary²²⁵ as it radically breaks free from previous administrations. "To a new world, a new foreign policy" seems to be the motto of the U.S. decision-makers, as Bush argued: "The Twenty-First Century opens with unique

²²⁵ Daalder, I. H. and Lindsay, J. M., *America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

promise for the United States, [...]. Few nations in history have been granted such a singular opportunity to shape the future”.²²⁶

Hence, our first objective consists in labelling the Bush foreign policy. The debate opens on the administration’s view of the world and the role of the United States (section 1). The existing literature provides two sets of arguments. On the one hand, neocons argue that Bush turned to neoconservatism²²⁷, which benefited from the opportunity offered by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to push forward its agenda. This line of thought argues that neocons were ready with a plan and 9/11 provided them with the perfect occasion to implement their ideas.

On the other hand, the influence of neocons is downplayed as other key-decision-makers, like Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, and Powell (during the first administration), are not neoconservative. Bush is seen as at the helm of the foreign policy, the only decision-maker who paved the way to a new foreign policy, revolutionary in character.

To the two options outlined here above, we argue that there is a third possibility. The current American foreign policy is remarkably consistent with past foreign policies and many of its themes are congenial to past doctrines.²²⁸ While we agree that the influence of an expression of neoconservatism, called conservatism nationalism, is present in Bush’s decisions, we avow that Bush’s foreign policy is rather traditional regarding its main purpose and components. Indeed, since the United States started its rise to power, the furtherance of American global supremacy seen as the best option for international peace and order, and the main tool of such a policy, the promotion of political and economic freedom, were always present. But contrary to past experiences, this same traditional objective is now harmed by the combination of means of action chosen by the Bush administration. Indeed,

²²⁶ Bush, G. W., ‘Party Platform: Foreign Policy – U.S. World Leadership’, Republican National Convention 2000, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania”, *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), p. 29.

²²⁷ For a definition of and a description of the main tenets of neoconservatism including alleged influence on U.S. foreign policy, see Kristol, I., ‘The Neo-conservative Persuasion’, *On the Issues*, (September, 2003); Kristol, I., *Neoconservatism. The Autobiography of an Idea* (Chicago: Elephant Paperback, 1995); Kristol, I., ‘My Cold War’, *The National Interest* (1993); Kristol, I., ‘Defining Our National Interest’ in Harries, O. (ed.), *America’s Purpose: New Visions of US Foreign Policy* (San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1991), pp. 53-69; Podhoretz, Norman, ‘Neoconservatism: A Eulogy’, *Commentary*, (March, 1996), pp. 19-27; Stelzer, I. (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004); Lomasky, L.E., ‘Straussed Out – Philosopher, Intellectual and Political Scientist Leo Strauss’, *Reason*, (November 1998); Hurst, S., ‘Myths of Neoconservatism: George W. Bush’s ‘Neo-conservative’ Foreign Policy Revisited’, *International Politics*, 42:1 (March, 2005), pp. 75-96; Micklethwait, J. & Wooldridge, A., *The Right Nation. Why America is Different?* (London: Allen Lane, 2004).

²²⁸ An argument partially made by Nugent in his analysis of the contradiction in the American assertion of Republican virtue while using imperial force. Nugent, W., *Habits of Empire. A History of American Expansion* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008).

unilateralism, regime change, right of pre-emption and actual use of force damage the legitimacy of the U.S. as a force for international order and jeopardise the American capital in soft power patiently accumulated over decades of multilateral engagement and restraint. Thus, we deem necessary to ground each of the debated foreign policy themes in the American past, by looking at the historical elements outlined in chapter 3. We contend that it is not so much the American foreign policy that changed but the world in which it evolves, which in turn, allowed U.S. decision-makers to maximise the power at their disposal.

Section 2 attempts to look at the current American foreign policy from the perspective of a multidimensional concept of power in order to assess the nature of a specific exertion of power, that is whether we refer to power as exercise of coercion or generation of consent. We contend that the emphasis on raw power, or use of force, hides other instruments of power that the Bush administration deploys. While obviously relying on military power, the current U.S. administration calls upon other faces of power to implement its foreign policy, but it is the mix between coercion and consent in the exercise of foreign policy that the Bush administration got wrong. Consequently, it leaves the United States in a delicate position in the international system, having moved from the status of leader of the free world, winner of the Cold War, to the status of potentially the greatest force for instability in the international system, as section 3 illustrates.

The United States and the 21st Century World **G.W Bush's Views of the World**

Arguably, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the United States represent a turning point in American history. For some, it marks the beginning of a new era in international politics and a corollary new American way to deal with the world, a breaking point with past practices that leads America on the path to empire. For others, 9/11 is not so much at the source of a new doctrine but constitutes an opportunity that generated specific reactions that magnified traditional U.S. foreign policy behaviour. We argue that the choices made by the Bush administration are not exceptional and are actually deeply rooted in American historical values and ideals.

After a rather messy electoral process, G. W. Bush entered the White House and found himself at the head of the most powerful state in the world. Like his predecessor, Bush had to provide an answer to a recurring question since the fall of Soviet Union: In an unprecedented position of power, without real challenger, how should the United States engage the world?

Clinton chose to rely on Wilsonian internationalism aiming at building a world order based on the rule of law. Globalisation was then perceived as the driving factor of relations

between states, international institutions and non-state actors. As Daalder and Lindsay argue, “globalization was increasing economic, political, and social ties among nations and, [...]. this growing interconnectedness made fulfilment of Wilson’s vision all the more important”.²²⁹ Consequently, Clinton’s foreign policy aimed at reinforcing existing multilateral arms control instruments and sought to create new ones in various fields as the environment and international justice.

Contrary to the liberal humanitarian Clinton, the foreign policy of the Bush administration ended up based on a foundational statement that provides a new vision of America’s position and role in the world: the world is a dangerous place in which rogue states and terrorist organisation potentially equipped with WMD represent asymmetric threats difficult to identify and counter. In this world, there are no other challengers to the American position of power in the global order but dangers gather, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones, [...], by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few”.²³⁰

Influenced by neoconservatism, based on the Machiavellian doubts on the nature of the human being and human society, and on the Hobbesian conception of a world inhabited by nation-states in permanent armed struggle for supremacy, Bush insists on an anarchical world, “where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might”.²³¹

Such a view of the world can be traced back to the weak position in which the early Republic found itself at its inception, instrumental to an understanding of the world as a dangerous place in the collective psyche of Americans. Later on, through its rise to power, the United States learnt to deal with its fears and engaged with the world through first continental expansion, followed by international expansion fuelled by raw and soft power instruments at the disposal of American leaders, leading the U.S. on the path to consider itself as exceptional.

²²⁹ Daalder, I. H. and Lindsay, J. M., *America Unbound*, p. 12.

²³⁰ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, p. 1.

²³¹ Kagan, R., *Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), p. 3. On a neoconservative pessimistic view of the world, see also Kristol, W. and Kagan, R., ‘National Interest and Global Responsibility’ in Stelzer, I., *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), pp. 55-74.; Kristol, W. and Kagan, R. (eds.), *Present Danger. Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); Krauthammer, C., ‘In Defense of Democratic Realism’, *The National Interest*, (Fall, 2004), p. 1; Kagan, R., ‘The Benevolent Empire’, *Foreign Policy*, 111 (Summer, 1998), pp. 24-35.

This consciousness of the exceptional status of the U.S. in the world is shared by G.W. Bush as the NSS 2002 underlines the United States position of “unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence”.²³²

Nevertheless, even though blessed with incomparable strength, Bush on the campaign trail advocates American humility in the relations with other nations:

The duties of our day are different. But the values of our nation do not change. Let us reject the blinders of isolationism, just as we refuse the crown of empire. Let us not dominate others with our power — or betray them with our indifference. And let us have an American foreign policy that reflects American character. The modesty of true strength. The humility of real greatness. This is the strong heart of America. And this will be the spirit of my administration.²³³

9/11 changed Bush’s view and opened the eyes of his administration to the dangers of our contemporary world.

Interestingly, this view of a threatening world is not exclusive to the Bush administration. As we saw in chapter 3, throughout its history, America perceived the world as a rather inhospitable place, plagued by competition and wars between states. The very birth of the Republic amongst hostile monarchies was painful, full of dangers, and on the brink of collapse several times. But America was not the giant it is today, and it could not afford to pursue ‘imperial’ policies to deal with the threats it was then facing. Today, the United States can, and decided to, face the threats and dangers that question its very existence, and according to Bush, the existence of freedom and democracy worldwide. The struggle is Manichean, it is above all an ideological struggle between the forces of freedom and justice, and totalitarian powers. In a way, the Cold War is not over, liberalism is still under assault and the Bush administration poses as the only champion of freedom and democracy.

It is on the rubble of the WTC that G.W. Bush pledged to find those responsible for the first attacks on the United States since Pearl Harbor. Like in 1941, the giant was awakened and responded by carrying the war abroad. Like in 1941, the United States makes massive use of force to beat its enemy but the outcome proves different and, while in 1945, the U.S. found itself in an unprecedented position of power, in 2003, after defeating Afghanistan and Iraq, America misunderstood the purpose of her actions. The tale of force

²³² *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, Introduction.

²³³ Bush, G. W., ‘Party Platform: America’s Role, Republican National Convention 2000, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’, *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), p. 38.

and consent is in the writing and so far, coercion is in the lead, menacing the United States' position as benevolent global hegemon, and hence, the stability of the international system.

Following the 9/11 attacks²³⁴, the initial reactions of the Bush administration allow to point out elements that became central to the U.S. foreign policy and corollary understanding of power in international relations.

In his address to the nation on the evening of the attacks, President Bush identifies the rationale for these terrorist acts. America is under attack because it represents “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world”²³⁵

Logically, the United States being a force for good, he then casts the attacks in a Manichean framework of a struggle between good and evil. Evil is identified with those who reject freedom and justice, while the United States strives “to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world”.²³⁶ God is manifestly on the side of America. To make sure that everyone knows it, Bush then quotes the Bible and literally acquires God: “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me”.²³⁷ Bush views the struggle to come as an ideological struggle reminiscent of the Cold War fight against the evil Soviet empire, as defined then by President Reagan.

Retribution for these evil acts is next. Bush calls for the law enforcement and intelligence agencies to track down those responsible for the attacks and enlarges the target of revenge to those who harbour the culprits who committed the attacks. Instead of limiting the scope of U.S. actions to civil justice, Bush actually declares that America is *at war* against terrorism: “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.”²³⁸ Consequently, on September 18, Bush signs an authorisation for use of military force bill.

In the accompanying statement, he defines threats to the national security of the United States and the scope of military action:

Those who plan, authorize, commit, or aid terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests -- including those who harbor terrorists -- threaten the national security of the United States. It is, therefore, necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to defend

²³⁴ For a detailed narrative of the events on 9/11, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 1-14.

²³⁵ Bush, G. W., *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, 11th September 2001, Washington DC.

²³⁶ Bush, G. W., *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, 11th September 2001.

²³⁷ Bush, G. W., *Ibid.*

²³⁸ Bush, G. W., *Remarks by The President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team*, 12th September 2001, Washington DC.

itself and protect United States citizens both at home and abroad. [...], Senate Joint Resolution 23 recognizes the seriousness of the terrorist threat to our Nation and the authority of the President under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States.²³⁹

Terrorists and those protecting them constitute the targets and are deemed the major threat to the national security. The use of force is justified by the right of the U.S. to self-defence and to protect its citizens but is not limited to the act of punishing those responsible for the attacks. It is also used in order to *prevent* any further attacks on the U.S.

Finally, Bush attempts to universalise the conflict by asserting that the attacks on America were attacks on all freedom-loving people in the world. He then affirms that “the freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail”.²⁴⁰ Bush aims at rallying as many countries as possible to protect the banner of freedom in the world.

The analysis of the Bush administration approach to foreign policy should allow for a better understanding of his views on power. The previous section has shown a conception of foreign policy that is highly ideologically laden through the emphasis on the promotion of American ideals and principles, and rather simplistic in its analysis of the international system and of the interactions that characterise it. The current administration, at first glance, focuses on the use of force and unilateralism to meet the threats to U.S. and global security. A further investigation of the Bush discourse on power reveals a more sophisticated understanding of the concept.

Based on the postulate that the purpose of the U.S. foreign policy consists in preserving and extending the current American global supremacy by shaping the international system in order to lead it to congruence with U.S. interests, a whole range of power options to reach that objective are identified.

To understand the current American administration’s approach to power requires a conceptual differentiation between power as it is defined and power as it is actually implemented. Bush’s appraisal of power is by no means monolithic. It differentiates between hard and soft power or coercion and consent, one or the other being privileged considering the position of a given state in the international system. Hence, the international behaviour of states is in correlation with their power status because they perform different strategic judgements, threats assessments and the means to address them, as well as different interests’ calculations. If in a position of power, a strong state will favour the use of force, while a

²³⁹ Bush, G. W., *President Signs Authorization for Use of Military Force Bill*, 18th September 2001.

²⁴⁰ Bush, G. W., *Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity*.

weak state would privilege softer means of power.²⁴¹ Nevertheless, even though one tends to equate Bush's conception of power with the use of force, it is possible to find references to other expressions of power essentially originating in the role defined by the administration for the United States in the contemporary world.

The United States' Role in the World

From Bush's statements here above flows a new set of roles for the U.S.

Firstly, the U.S. is to be a force for peace and order because it is paramount to America's national interest. Bush, who defines himself as a realist²⁴², nevertheless marries traditional realism, that is a policy defined by U.S. national interest, with deep American values to generate a new realism, branded a distinctly American internationalism, inspired by what Americans stand for as a nation: commitment to freedom.

Secondly, peace and order are to be achieved and maintained by promotion of political and economic freedom, and more importantly, by American strength flowing from its alliances based on common values and its unmatched military.²⁴³ As Bush said: "The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms".²⁴⁴ As Moens argues, "Bush sees the world from the vantage point of a type of conservative internationalism where cooperation is the logical result of the pursuit of common national interests and where national interests derive from deeper values".²⁴⁵

Thirdly, the United States, if necessary, will take a unilateralist turn. Formal arrangements could impede on American supremacy, hence, the U.S. should look for partners to constitute ad hoc coalitions of the willing and avoid to being entangled in alliances that could impede its freedom of action.

Fourthly, pre-emption is the recommended course of action as America cannot afford to wait to be struck.

Fifthly, regime change, even in absence of an attack on the U.S., should be used to topple tyrannical regimes and to replace them with democratic institutions, guaranteeing peace and stability among nations.

²⁴¹ Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., 'National Interest and Global Responsibility', p. 58.

²⁴² "I'm a realist when it comes to the world. I see the world the way it is, not the way we hope it is". Bush, G. W., 'Building a Strong Military', 31st July 2000, Ohio, *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), p. 55.

²⁴³ Moens, A., *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush. Values, Strategy, and Loyalty* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), pp. 87-88.

²⁴⁴ Bush, G. W., *A Period of Consequences*, 23rd September 1999, The Citadel, South Carolina, p.4.

²⁴⁵ Moens, A., *op. cit.*, p. 87.; see also Bush, G.W., 'A Distinctly American Internationalism', speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (Simi Valley, California: 19th November 1999).

Universal Peace and Order

Bush identifies peace and order as the main interest of the United States. Peace promotion is at the start of literally all his speeches on foreign policy and relies on close partnership with existing allies to defend and further democracy promotion, security through a control of WMD proliferation, and prosperity through open-markets in all regions of the world.

A quote from an early speech on foreign policy given at the Citadel in September 1999 embodies Bush's vision:

Our world, shaped by American courage, power and wisdom, now echoes with American ideals. We won a victory, not just for a nation, but for a vision. A vision of freedom and individual dignity – defended by democracy, nurtured by free markets, spread by information technology, carried to the world by free trade. The advance of freedom – from Asia to Latin America to East and Central Europe – is creating the conditions for peace.²⁴⁶

Relying on the theory of democratic peace, American interests are identified with the promotion of international peace. Political and economic liberty provide for peace amongst nations, which in turn delivers security and order. Bush identifies the twelve years of Republican administration between 1980 and 1992 as the perfect example of what needs to be achieved, these were years when “around the globe, the word, the ideals and the power of the United States commanded respect. The American presidency showed bright and purposeful”.²⁴⁷

By so doing, the Bush administration is in tune with neoconservatives and some of the most traditional themes in U.S. foreign policy.

Indeed, based on the omnipresent moralism that characterises his ideology, Bush is convinced that the American form of democracy and way of life represent the ultimate regime, the best option to offer happiness to the people. Hence, these ideals and values such as freedom, democracy, morality, justice, and free-markets must be protected and serve as a universal example of a successful regime that contributes to international peace and order.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ Bush, G. W., *A Period of Consequences*, p.1.

²⁴⁷ Bush, G. W., ‘Party Platform: Foreign Policy – U.S. World Leadership’, Republican National Convention 2000, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’, *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), p. 30.

²⁴⁸ Kristol, W. and Kagan, R., ‘National Interest and Global Responsibility’ in Stelzer, Erwin, *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), p. 64; Kagan, R., *Paradise and Power*, p. 87.

In addition, Bush's administration sees the United States as the most powerful nation in the world. Such a status implies the obligation to assume responsibilities regarding the stability of the world order, echoing neoconservatives like Kagan and Kristol: "Now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do".²⁴⁹

Based on these postulates, the Bush administration advocates a very active role for the U.S. in today's world as inaction would cause the world to be a dangerous place, a danger that could eventually threaten the United States directly.²⁵⁰ In other words, a world in the image of the U.S., its values and interests is a world congenial to democracy and individual liberties, a safer world.

Such an activist foreign policy promoting American ideals and interests as the best way to achieve peace has deep roots in American history. Hamilton, John Quincy Adams, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and of course Reagan all shared the vision of an America involved in world affairs in order to make the world a better place.

Bush and neoconservatives refer to Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson as their key-thinkers, but Wilsonian regarding its objective, such a policy rather echoes Theodore Roosevelt regarding the means to be deployed. Roosevelt shared the view of his predecessors that America was the best hope for the world and perceived the world as being regulated by power. America was to serve as a beacon for the rest of mankind but he was the first President who insisted that it was the United States' duty to make its influence felt globally, and so in terms of national interest. For him, it was time to disentangle America and to use its power to prevail.²⁵¹ Ideologically, it was justified by the need to advance civilisation, peace and stability in the world, but nevertheless, Roosevelt was more a realist than an idealist: national self-interest governed what happened in international affairs, and world peace did not come from human goodwill or moral restraint but from balanced power restraining the selfish aims of nation-states.²⁵²

Similarly, Wilson's view of America was that of "the city on a hill, an oasis of liberty and civility and model for a corrupt, violent world".²⁵³ But where Roosevelt lauded the exertion of American raw power, Wilson saw America as the driving force in the making of

²⁴⁹ Kagan, R., *Paradise and Power*, pp.10-11.

²⁵⁰ Muravchik, J., 'The Neoconservative Cabal'. in Stelzer, Irving. (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), p.255; Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, 75:4 (July/August, 1996), p. 19.

²⁵¹ Marks III, F. W., 'A Cautious and Sensitive Diplomat', p. 463.

²⁵² Dallek, R., 'A Crusading Progressive', pp.496-497.

²⁵³ Nester, W. R., *Power across the Pacific* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996), p. 86.

a better world by peaceful means. Military power and expansionism were to be replaced by a rule of law in which a world public opinion rather than alliances and armaments would be the key to international order. It would be America's international order, based on its principles and meeting its interests. Consent was to be the key-element in the U.S. foreign policy, the world had seen enough wars, and force was to be banned forever; replaced by peace, ensured by economic well-being, political stability and social cohesiveness.²⁵⁴

When related to the concept of power, Wilson's and G.W. Bush's discourses are appealing and ideologically attractive. The idea of universal peace and order works in the areas of ideological and political power both domestically and internationally. At home, the discourse on international peace and order promotion generates support and enthusiasm across the political landscape and hence facilitates bi-partisan support to the government. Abroad, peace calls to every single human being on earth. Those without power would embrace it as a mean of bringing social, national, and international order. It would unite the big brotherhood of men, banning war and lead mankind as a whole on the path to progress and modernisation. The peace ideology aims to be a hegemonic ideology based on global consent. To reach that objective, interdependence and transnational contacts were to be developed. Logically, the advancement of democracy and free-markets constitute the weapon of choice to achieve this objective, as President Taft initiated through the dollar diplomacy, as Wilson implemented, and as G.W. Bush advocates a century later.

Consequently, in terms of power exertion, consent is preferred to coercion in the realisation of these objectives. For the Bush administration, it translated into the promotion of democracy and free-markets as the ideal means to spread American values and preserve American interests in the world. In addition, as chapter 4 and 5 will show, part of the rationale to embark on the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq was to install a democratic regime and an open economy in both countries, inserting them in the American-led global capitalist economy. In both cases, early policies of reconstruction included political democratisation and economic liberalisation.

Promotion of Political and Economic Freedom

In order to reach the objective of international peace, Bush identifies the promotion of political and economic freedom as central to success. Both concepts rest on the statement

²⁵⁴ Iriye, A., *The Cambridge History of American Foreign relations. Volume III. The Globalizing America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 104.

that the basic values of human freedom and dignity are universal.²⁵⁵ They echo traditional American values present in the definition of foreign policy since the Republic's inception.

Indeed, economic well-being has always been at the centre of the American foreign policy. At home, America has to be prosperous in order to drag the other world's economies to higher level of prosperity. Domestic prosperity means a society in peace. American leaders reckon that one of the fundamental conditions of world peace is the access of all nations to the trade and raw materials of the world; and that the U.S., given its commanding economic strength and its position as creditor nation, is especially responsible for the leadership in the reduction of trade barriers.²⁵⁶ Before Wilson's administration, the dollar-diplomacy initiated by President Taft reflected this approach. America had to exercise its influence to maintain stability and bring about prosperity throughout the world.²⁵⁷ Americans, champions of liberal expansionism, backed by peace ideology, did not see any contradiction between America's commercial and ideological expansion and the interests of mankind as a whole.²⁵⁸

Similarly, the opening statement of NSS 2002 leaves little doubt regarding the purpose of the American national security strategy. Based on an unprecedented strength and a faith in liberty and the values of a free society, a distinctly American internationalism reflecting a union of American values and national interests constitutes the cornerstone of the U.S. foreign policy. Political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity constitute the path to progress and the goals to be achieved.²⁵⁹ Here, religious, political and economic freedom are interwoven and should constitute universal objectives to be achieved by all the people of the world, who in any case, do aspire to reach them but are not always living in conditions favourable to achieving these aspirations: "In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere".²⁶⁰

In opposition, those hampering the march towards freedom and justice are considered as evil. As Daalder and Lindsay argue, "the mission that Bush envisioned went well beyond defending America's national interests. It was more fundamentally a struggle between good

²⁵⁵ Bush, G. W., 'Party Platform: Foreign Policy – U.S. World Leadership', p. 32.

²⁵⁶ Bartlett, R. J., *The Record of American Diplomacy*, p. 500.

²⁵⁷ Ninkovich, F., *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900* (Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1999), pp. 27-28, 34.

²⁵⁸ Munro, D., *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 235.

²⁵⁹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, p. 1.

²⁶⁰ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, p. 3.

and evil that touched all the world's peoples".²⁶¹ Mission, good, and evil are themes echoing Bush's profound religiosity. However, Daalder and Lindsay argue that it is hard to assess the influence of Bush's faith on the direction of the foreign policy except regarding his dislike for ambiguity and lack of self-doubt, personality characteristics attributed to his faith.²⁶²

The concept of freedom and its expression as a fight between the forces of good and evil is a powerful ideological concept. Bush and the neoconservatives are here on the same wavelength in their belief that on top of the obvious material dominance, this call to a superior American morality with God on its side, places the United States in a legitimate position to lead the world towards freedom and justice.

We evolve here in the dimension of ideological and political power. Ideology is at the core of the Bush foreign policy. Rejecting the realist emphasis on national interest and the idealist humanitarian interventions as guiding principles in foreign policy, Bush shifts the attention of the political institutions and of the American public opinion to ideas putting to the fore the exceptional morality of the United States, the nation chosen by God to fly high the banner of freedom throughout the world, reminiscent of the Manifest Destiny and New Manifest Destiny ideologies that animated American foreign policy in the 19th century. However, this ideology is superficial and merely a smoke screen hiding the genuine American foreign policy objective: the perennial furtherance of global American supremacy.

In addition, this ambition to play an active role in promoting freedom finds its roots in the American character, in a belief in the nation's great destiny. Underlined by the founding fathers who envisioned a great role for the U.S., the legitimacy of its actions abroad finds its justification in the Constitution and there is no need to look for legitimacy anywhere else. Hence, this breed of American internationalism finds its origins in the American nationalism. What is good for the U.S. is good for the world. As Halper and Clarke contend, such a statement implies that the United States' moral purposes and national interests are the same'.²⁶³

While laudable when not constituting a façade hiding other goals, the objective of promoting freedom and democracy becomes threatening when the means of such propagation are under scrutiny. Indeed, today, the Bush administration dismisses the

²⁶¹ Daalder, I. H. and Lindsay, J. M., *America Unbound*, p. 87.

²⁶² Daalder, I. H. and Lindsay, J. M., *ibid.*, p. 89. On the issue of the influence of Bush's faith on his policies, see Wallis, J., 'Dangerous Religion. George W. Bush's Theology of Empire', *Sojourners*, 32:5 (September/October, 2003); Judis, J. B., 'The Chosen Nation: The Influence of Religion on U.S. Foreign Policy', *Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief*, 37 (March, 2005), p. 7; Kline, S., 'The Culture War Gone Global: 'Family values' and the Shape of US Foreign Policy', *International Relations*, 18:4 (March, 2004).

²⁶³ Halper and Clarke. *America Alone. The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 5.

instruments of collective bargaining established in the post-WWII world in favour of a unilateral behaviour. Going alone or alongside those who care to commit resources to support American foreign policy ventures is now the norm.

The so-perceived American position of unmatched power in the international system leads the most influential fringe of the U.S. administration to make use of that power without discernment. When faced with the choice to rely on coercion or to attempt consent generation, the American leadership, naively blinded by the sum of power at its disposal and unaware of the potential of softer aspects of power, stubbornly relied on coercion and its logical corollary, unilateralism. When faced with the disbelief of her friends, who mostly, still play by the rules of the Cold War multilateralism between allies, America, in one stroke of a pen, discarded reservations voiced at the UN by her long-lasting supporters and decided to walk the walk on her own, or more precisely, among a coalition of the willing, implementing what could be termed 'selective multilateralism'.

Unilateralism and Ad-Hoc Alliances

Indeed, contrary to the previous administration, G.W. Bush practises 'selective multilateralism'. It is justified by the willingness to avoid situations *à la* Bosnia and Kosovo in which American freedom of action was impeded upon by European allies. Hence, instead of relying on existing international institutions and alliances to build partnerships, Bush advocates the selection of specific allies, agreeing with American policies, to constitute ad hoc coalitions of the willing:

International organizations can serve the cause of peace, but they can never serve as a substitute for, or exercise a veto over, principled American leadership. The United Nations was not designed to summon or lead armies in the field and, as a matter of U.S. sovereignty, American troops must never serve under United Nations command.²⁶⁴

Instead of all-out multilateralism, Bush advocates alliances and coalitions of the willing, meaning those willing to stand by the U.S. and its foreign policy objectives. Hence, alliances are not an end in themselves but a means to achieve larger strategic objectives, in this case, the preservation of international stability through the protection of a liberal democratic order congruent with U.S. interests and principles. Bush and neoconservatives contend that such an American involvement, or benevolent hegemony, is not a daunting

²⁶⁴ Bush, G. W., 'Party Platform: Foreign Policy – The United Nations', Republican National Convention 2000, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania', *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), p. 34.

prospect to her allies as a foreign policy characterised by a high degree of morality comforts other nations and tempers their fears of the American military might.²⁶⁵

On the contrary, nations that challenge the American led order are exposing themselves to the wrath of the U.S. power. The retribution for such behaviour is characterised by unilateralism and pre-emption.

Unilateralism is clearly the favoured mode of action by the Bush administration. The basic foreign policy objective of preserving international order through the maintenance of the American hegemony, itself supported by the promotion of American ideals and principles, echoes Wilson's project after the First World War. But where Wilson privileged the creation of multilateral organisation through which collective security was supposed to be enforced, Bush would rather rely on American power to promote U.S. principles simply because the U.S. has the power capabilities to act alone and does not want to be prevented from doing so.²⁶⁶ Hence, it is the power status of the United States that explains U.S. unilateralism. The U.S. acts unilaterally because there are fewer constraints on its behaviour.

The question of legitimacy underlies this statement. Where Europeans see multilateralism as a mean to gain legitimate sanction from the international bodies before taking actions, the United States is not ready to sacrifice its vital interests to the ruling of international organisations. And where does Bush look for legitimacy? In the American Constitution. The Constitution embodies principles that are deemed universal and self-evident truths, and in a brand of internationalism promoted by Presidents T. Roosevelt, Truman and Reagan and not the internationalism *à la* Wilson and Carter. It is an internationalism that does not rely on international conventions but on the development of American power and the U.S. ability to lead with the objective of preserving international stability under American hegemony.

As the two case-studies will demonstrate, the ability to generate international support to a reconstruction project proves critical to its outcome. In the case of Japan, benefiting from the legitimacy brought in the wake of its victory in WWII, and thanks to the inclusion, even though rather superficial, of its allies in the reconstruction plans and implementation,

²⁶⁵ Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., 'National Interest and Global Responsibility', p. 73.

²⁶⁶ Krauthammer, C., 'Democratic Realism. An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World', Speech given at the 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture, AEI Annual Dinner, Feb. 10th 2004, p. 3. On the neoconservative opinions about multilateralism, see Boot, M., 'Myths About Neoconservatism', in Stelzer, I. (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), p. 50; Perle, R., 'Thanks God for the Death of the UN', *The Guardian* (21st March 2003); Kagan, *Paradise and Power*, p. 144; Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', p. 8; Kagan, R., 'Rejecting the Global Buddy System', *New York Times* (25th October 1999); Kagan, R., 'A Distinctly American Internationalism', *The Weekly Standard* (29th November 1999).



the U.S. gained international consent to its policies in Japan, helping the effectiveness of the outcome. However, the decision to confront Iraq in 2003 unilaterally, without the backing of the UN, would constitute one of the reasons of the future U.S. failure to gain extended international support to the reconstruction of Iraq, and hence contributed to the mitigated outcome characterising the whole enterprise.

If multilateralism is not part of the picture of the G.W. Bush foreign policy, it is not surprising to observe that, on the basis of the same justification, the use of force including the right of pre-emption are the favoured modes of operation.

Use of Force and Pre-emption

The might of the American military constitutes the cornerstone of a new foreign policy and the primary tool to achieve the purpose of global peace: “I’m ready to lead the country. I’m ready to lead with a noble goal of keeping the peace. And the cornerstone of that goal will be a proud and strong and ready United States military”.²⁶⁷

Bush defines the main mission of American military as to make the world more peaceful.²⁶⁸ To achieve this objective, he identifies the rebuilding of the American military power as the essential step to be taken, along with the review of overseas deployments and interventions to avoid overstressing military resources.²⁶⁹

To reach this objective, Bush outlines a range of measures including a review of spending policies with emphasis on better treatment for the armed forces with promises for better pay, benefits, housing and schools in order to raise the morale of the military personnel²⁷⁰; and on research and development, committing to invest \$20 billion over six years²⁷¹ with the objective of implementing an anti-ballistic missile system and the

²⁶⁷ Bush, G. W., ‘A Strategic Plan to Strengthen the US Military, 7th September 2000, Westland, Michigan’, *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), p. 69. See also Bush, G. W., *A Period of Consequences*, pp. 2-3; Bush, G. W., ‘Increased Investments in National Security and Improved Benefits for Military Personnel, 21st August 2000’, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), pp. 58-60; Bush, G.W., ‘Building a Strong Military and Better Treatment of the Armed Forces, 6th September 2000, Milwaukee, Wisconsin’, *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), pp. 64-65.

²⁶⁸ Bush, G. W., *A Period of Consequences*, p. 2; Bush, G. W., ‘Building a Strong Military’, p. 55; Bush, G. W., ‘Rebuilding the military power of the US, 18th August 2000, Bartlett, Tennessee’, *In their Own Words. Sourcebook for the 2000 Presidential Election* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), p. 56.

²⁶⁹ Bush, G. W., *A Period of Consequences*, p. 2.

²⁷⁰ Bush, G. W., *Remarks by the President to the Troops of Fort Stewart*, 12th February 2001, Cottrell Field, Fort Stewart, Georgia.

²⁷¹ Bush, G.W., *A Period of Consequences*, pp. 5-6

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), aiming at modernising the armed force alongside new technologies.²⁷²

The defence of America includes the recourse to pre-emptive action if necessary. When direct threats are discovered, Bush advocates a “strong and swift offence – including the use of Special Operations Forces and long-range strike capabilities”.²⁷³ Paul Wolfowitz, during his testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee preceding his nomination as Deputy Defense Secretary, mentioned the existence of asymmetrical threats and the need to “do everything in our power to stop them”.²⁷⁴ The scope of pre-emption is clearly defined in NSS 2002. The primary targets are terrorist networks and rogue states that harbour them and could potentially arm terrorists with WMD.²⁷⁵

Obviously, such an approach to security implies again the question of legitimacy of the use of pre-emption. As Gaddis argues, “pre-emption defined as prevention, however, runs the risk, [...], that the United States itself will appear to much of the world as a clear and present danger”.²⁷⁶ Moreover, by adopting such a preventive action stance as legitimate in foreign policy, the United States paves the way for similar behaviour. Other states will find it normal to act as the strongest does, hence potentially undermining international stability.²⁷⁷ Hence, the task of justifying military intervention becomes more complex and indispensable.

Consequently, Bush turns to the right of American self-defence in order to protect “the U.S., the American people, and our interests at home and abroad” as well as the protection of allies and friends.²⁷⁸ Actually, it is not a development in the U.S. foreign policy that is new, pre-emption and corollary justifications are also rooted in American history. President John Quincy Adams, after the burning of the White House by the British in 1814, advocated a policy of unilateralism and prevention to protect the United States.²⁷⁹ Jefferson, when assessing the right of Americans to buy or seize Indian lands, can be considered at the origin of the doctrine of pre-emption when he stated that he: “recognized the legal right of Indian

²⁷² Bush, G.W., *ibid.*, p. 5; see also Rumsfeld, D., ‘Transforming the Military’, *Foreign Affairs*, 81:3 (May/June, 2002), p. 27; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004. A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow* (Washington DC: 2004).

²⁷³ Bush, G.W., *ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁷⁴ Garamone, J., ‘Wolfowitz Discusses DoD Goals During Testimony’, *American Forces Information Service*, 7th March, 2001.

²⁷⁵ *The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002*, pp. 6, 13; see also Gaddis, J. L., ‘Grand Strategy in the Second Term’, *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2005) and Kagley, C. W. and Raymond, G. A., ‘Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order’, *International Studies Perspectives*, 4:4 (November, 2003), p. 389.

²⁷⁶ Gaddis, J. L., ‘Grand Strategy in the Second Term’, p. 5.

²⁷⁷ Kagley, C. W. and Raymond, G. A., ‘Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order’, p. 391.

²⁷⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002*, pp. 6, 16.

²⁷⁹ Wolfson, A., ‘Conservatives and Neoconservatives’, in Stelzer, I. (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), p.229.

nations to the land they possessed and at the same time the legal right of the...intruder to purchase the land, free from the fear that the land might be sold to a rival...power”.²⁸⁰ Hence, in order to prevent the rise in influence of a neighbouring rival power, America had the duty to make sure that she would strike first by occupying the land first.

Unilateralism and prevention are thus the favoured means to enhance America’s security and have characterised the Bush administration response to the 9/11 attacks in particular and the war on terror in general. Ultimately, unilateralism and preventive wars are means, not ends in themselves. To ensure American security and the maintenance of an unchallenged U.S. global position of power and global stability, regime change constitutes the ultimate objective.

Ironically, pre-emption, one of the current tenets of U.S. foreign policy, was used by the Japanese in December 1941. Pearl Harbor was a pre-emptive strike as Japanese leaders had concluded that war with the U.S. was inevitable and that it would be better to strike first. Sixty years later, the American administration would use the same line of reasoning when striking Saddam Hussein first before he could arm terrorists with WMD.

Regime Change

Even though democracy promotion does not mean regime change to the early Bush, a more assertive stance regarding specific regions of the world is adopted. One can detect here the thoughts of Paul Wolfowitz on democracy promotion and regime change. It translated into a rather different discourse.

Indeed, regarding the Middle East, Bush gives a hint on what was to come. On top of the usual rhetoric on peace endorsement, support to Israel as the only true democracy in the region, access to oil for industrialised countries, and control of WMD proliferation, Bush identifies Saddam Hussein as a target for removal from office:

We support the full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act, which should be regarded as a starting point in a comprehensive plan for the removal of Saddam Hussein and the restoration of international inspections in collaboration with his successor. Republicans recognize that peace and stability in the Persian Gulf is impossible as long as Saddam Hussein rules Iraq.²⁸¹

Logically, based on the U.S. official postulate that American ideals and interests are congruent with international peace and stability, and that the United States must accept the

²⁸⁰ Washburn, W. E., *Red Man’s Land/White Man’s Law* (New York, 1971), p. 56.

²⁸¹ Bush, G. W., ‘Party Platform: Foreign Policy – The Middle East and Persian Gulf, p. 27.

responsibilities of its status as sole superpower; which means the maintenance of a global benevolent hegemony, the promotion of political and economic freedom abroad is deemed essential. And there is no better means to perform regime changes than with the huge U.S. military superiority that allows for unilateral and pre-emptive actions. So, not satisfied with the mere global promotion of American ideals and principles through influence. Bush and the neoconservatives laud the eradication of hostile regimes, through means ranging from economic and diplomatic sanctions to military intervention, and their replacement with regimes more in line with U.S. interests and less threatening for America and world security.²⁸²

The existence of threats to international and American security embodied in the proliferation of WMD and the potential transfer of these weapons to terrorist groups constitutes a first justification for regime change.²⁸³

But there is another justification that is far more complex in its construction. Kagan and Kristol contend that the rationale sustaining regime change is based on the moral considerations that the U.S. should not have normal relations with regimes opposed to American principles. They argue that regime change is the only option as relationships with tyrannical regimes are difficult to sustain because “American interests and those of tyrannical regimes inevitably clash”.²⁸⁴ The clash finds its roots in the antinomy between the functioning mode of an international order based on political and economic freedom sustained by U.S. power, and the foundations on which tyrannical regimes rest. However, while defining an axis of evil encompassing North Korea, Syria, Iran and Iraq, the Bush administration conveniently left aside friendly regimes that are anything but democratic. The Administration operates a form of ‘selective’ democracy promotion, leading to the generation of a lot of irony regarding the genuine objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

Again, democracy promotion is no novelty. As we saw in chapter 3, democracy promotion constitutes one of the elements in the genesis of American foreign policy as Americans supported regime change as early as the 18th century and the French Revolution. The U.S. official line presents regime change as the only option to counter regimes hostile to American ideals of freedom and liberty. It is the logical outcome of a foreign policy choice founded on the will to use American power unilaterally and with the objective of maintaining U.S. supremacy in the international system. It is not an objective that originates on 9/11. It has always been present since the inception of the American Republic. The

²⁸² Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., ‘Toward a neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, p. 7.

²⁸³ Boot, M., ‘Myths about Neoconservatism’, p. 49.

²⁸⁴ Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., ‘National Interest and Global Responsibility’, p. 68.

United States is a country carrying a permanent democratic revolution across its borders for the furtherance of another goal, the maintenance of its unchallenged global position of power.

In summary, Bush's main objective is to maintain the United States in an un-rivalled position of power in order to preserve the U.S. capital of power and indirectly international stability through multilateral means as alliances and international organisations, but if the national interest of the United States requires it, through the use of its military might. The early Bush's conceptions of power are not exceptional. One can detect the hands of his foreign policy advisors, the so-called Vulcans²⁸⁵, all sons and daughters of the Cold War, mainly realists favouring status quo, balance of power and deterrence²⁸⁶.

Nevertheless, the influence of idealists amongst his advisors is perceptible. American interests are expressed through ideas and the means to achieve these interests potentially depart from the Cold War period. The use of force in the name of the defence of freedom is not a last stand option anymore but the American military is put at the core of the instruments of the U.S. foreign policy. The Bush administration lauds that because of its overwhelming position of power in the international system, the United States should not be shy regarding the blunt use of force, especially since it would be in the name of universal values present at the core of the U.S. foreign policy since time immemorial: freedom and liberty, even if the ultimate aim remains consolidating American power.

9/11 confirmed the Bush administration's view of the world as a dangerous place. After the initial shock they caused, the terrorist attacks on American soil triggered a chain reaction of foreign policy decisions that eventually led to a far more assertive policy. The U.S. flexed its muscles and left behind the legacy of fifty years of Cold War policies. Realism was on its death bed, national interest replaced by ideology, deterrence by pre-emption, negotiation by use of force, and humility by arrogance.

While rejecting the excesses of democratic globalism, Bush embarked on a policy of conservative nationalism that found its roots in the American historical experience. The major themes presented by the Bush administration all refer to the expansionist policies of the 19th and early 20th century. American exceptionalism embodied by superior morality making America the chosen nation to lead the world, in turn justifying a permanent democratic revolution global in scale aiming at sharing superior American values with the world; the right to use force for higher purposes; and the conception of America as the sole

²⁸⁵ Mann, J., *Rise of the Vulcans. The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), especially chapter 16.

²⁸⁶ Rice, C., 'Promoting the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, 79:1 (January/February 2000), p.61.

power able to ensure global stability constitute the bedrock of the contemporary American foreign policy. It is but a continuity of previous beliefs and policies but the means used to implement such policies have changed. The supposed unmatched American power status in the world has blinded American leaders and led to an imbalance in the American exertion of power. Constraint and collaboration expressed through the use of instruments of power favouring consent left the picture and were replaced by foreign policy instruments insisting on the actual use of American power through coercion if necessary.

Power and American Foreign Policy: Multidimensional and Corrupted by Coercion

Based on the postulate that the purpose of U.S. foreign policy consists in preserving and extending current American global supremacy by shaping the international system in order to lead it to congruence with U.S. interests, a whole range of power options to reach that objective can be identified.

As mentioned earlier on, Bush's appraisal of power is by no means monolithic. It differentiates between hard and soft power, one or the other being privileged considering the position of a given state in the international system. However, the reference to military means of action is at the core of Bush's approach to power. Logically, with preventive wars as a doctrine, the development and the maintenance of a military able to meet political objectives is indispensable. Hence, the following policies have been implemented:

- The permanent development of military capabilities, starting with the reinforcement of military personnel;
- The creation of a Homeland Defence Department;
- The ability to win simultaneous major wars;
- The performance of constabulary missions in critical regions;
- The maintenance of U.S. leadership in the Revolution in Military Affairs;
- The preservation of U.S. nuclear strategic superiority;
- The safeguarding of U.S. leadership in the application of high technologies to military affairs;
- The development of a global missile defence system;
- The reinforcement of power projection capabilities.

There is a passive and an active way to use of military power. Firstly, military might acts as a deterrent towards potential challengers and as a mean to generate a specific

behaviour. The simple existence of a military able to intervene anywhere, at any time, and with overwhelming superiority acts as a threat towards states that could constitute a challenge to U.S. interests. Secondly, if dissuasion is unsuccessful, the active use of military force in defence of American interests or in order to restrain rogue behaviour on behalf of the challenging state is recommended.

Yet, military power is a dangerous option as it demands sacrifices in blood and treasure that are not always sustainable on the long-run as the U.S. is now learning. Even though the Bush administration opted for a conservative nationalist approach and dismissed the neoconservative fringe calling for democratic globalism, the acquisition of political power at home and if possible abroad is paramount to any militaristic ventures abroad, as the roads to the Iraq War have demonstrated.

Consequently, for Bush, the acquisition of political power starts at home. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Bush adopted the hard-line approach provided for by neoconservatives. As we all witnessed, neoconservatives structured their current of thought into an ideology sustained by a network of think tanks and various forms of media that carry their message over and contribute to the shaping of political decision-makers' and public opinions. In addition, Bush proved successful in striking a mighty chord with the American public. Without the unification of the country behind his goals and methods of action, Bush would not have been able to implement his expansionist project. This public support encompasses the much needed domestic stability, which finds its roots in an indisputable patriotism founded on the belief by the American public that all things American are superior through their exceptionality. This sense of superiority is not only identified with political motives but also with economic prowess. Liberal capitalism is the only viable system and should be spread worldwide. The demise of socialism as an economic system reinforced the faith of America in its mode of production. Economic power matters as it gives the necessary resources to implement political power.

Indeed, for Bush, the U.S. share of the global economy remains the sole instrument of measurement of U.S. economic power. In turn, it explains his views on economic power as praising the maintenance of the global capitalist system with the U.S. at its centre. At home, Bush promotes a Reaganite economic policy focusing on the supply-side by implementing tax reduction, support to entrepreneurs, and accepting budget deficits, considering that over time, economic growth created by tax cuts will compensate for them.²⁸⁷ Logically, in order to absorb the production surplus generated by the American economy, Bush, alongside

²⁸⁷ Stelzer, I., 'Neoconservative Economic Policy. Virtues and Vices', in Stelzer, Irving. (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), pp. 195-198.

democracy promotion, supports international free-market promotion aimed at the opening of new markets for U.S. goods. Alongside the promotion of economic freedom, the spread of American values is paramount to the maintenance of U.S. supremacy in the world, hence, the importance given to ideology in the Bush's approach to power.

Generally, ideological power can be defined as the generation of a domestic consensus on the foreign policy agenda and to the spread and the embracement of the powerful state's political values, norms and principles through power of influence, that is the acceptance of its political regime as the best on offer by the other units of the international system. Ideology is at the core of the G.W. Bush project. After winning the battle of ideas against other trends of American conservatism and against the liberal project of humanitarian intervention, Bush, developed an array of measures aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the American public and political decision-makers. Rejecting the realist emphasis on national interest and the idealist humanitarian interventions as guiding principles in foreign policy, he shifted the attention of the political institutions and of the American public opinion to ideas putting to the fore American exceptionalism, democracy and free-market promotion, the importance of moralism in international affairs, regime change, unilateralism, and the right of pre-emption. The combination of these ideas and their implementation should provide a unipolar stable global world order ensuring security to the United States and the prolongation of its global supremacy.

Complementing ideological power, cultural power is seen as the ability to present and to generate the global acceptance of the superpower's culture embodying specific values and ideals. Corollary to the ideological power, Bush understood that cultural factors play a key-role in the acquisition of ideological power. Again, the Bush administration was supported by an array of think-tanks, mainly neoconservative, open to the public and their ideas carried over by a network of dedicated media (press, radio, television). These media constitute the heralds of the new administration's message in the United States and contributed to the strengthening of this message in the American public opinion, but also globally.

The limits of G.W Bush's Foreign Policy

The current U.S. administration's approach to power is flawed as it suffers from basic assumptions that pollutes its vision by closing conceptual doors that need to be open to understand today's world.

State-centrism is one of these assumptions. What Bush fails to comprehend is that the contemporary world is not inhabited only by nation-states and that other non-state actors have their word to say. As Halper and Clarke contend, the belief that democracy and free-

market are one is antinomic with the functioning mode of the global economy which “functions alongside lines (open, multilateral and interdependent, cooperative structures) opposed to the neo-conservative approach defined by unipolarity, unilateralism, the use of force and government-domination, with a minor role for the non-state actors and international organisations”.²⁸⁸

Moreover, if the use of force is the favoured mode of action aiming at planting democracy and free-market principles, nation-building should follow, which means switching the focus from destruction of the hostile regime to its reconstruction by developing, before military actions, long-term policies dealing with political and cultural issues.²⁸⁹

In the same order of idea, state-centrism and the use of military power are inefficient when the threats are “unconventional, transnational, and non-state specific”²⁹⁰, as the military response to terrorist threats has confirmed. Kaldor argues that the failure of the American administration to adjust to new realities resides in its tendency to see current conflicts in ‘Old Wars’ terms, that is as World War II and the Cold War, wars “between states fought by armed forces in uniform, where the decisive encounter was battle”²⁹¹; while ‘New Wars’ “take place in the context of the disintegration of states,[...], wars that are fought by networks of states and non-states actors, often without uniforms”.²⁹² This discrepancy causes a misperception of contemporary security threats and hence, the wrong choice of the means to counter them. New Wars are not fought as Old Wars.

Consequently, the discharge of other means of power actually hurts the U.S. power as it mobilises huge resources for little gain, while an approach that would consider historical and cultural specificities and a corresponding socio-cultural response would actually translate into the gain of the consent to American objectives. The focus on the eradication of terrorist nodes instead of working on the suppression of the popular support for terrorism is an example. Yet, the dismissal of soft means of power is hardly surprising and a reference to Nye’s concept of power distribution can help us to understand this vision.

Nye refers to a three-dimensional chess game, or a layer cake: the top chessboard of military power is largely unipolar, the middle chess board of economic power is multipolar, and the bottom chess board is constituted by transnational relations out of government

²⁸⁸ Halper, S. and Clarke, J., *America Alone*, p. 314.

²⁸⁹ Halper., S. and Clarke, J., *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 310; Fukuyama, F., ‘The Neoconservative Moment’, *The National Interest* (Summer, 2004), pp. 3-4.

²⁹⁰ Halper, S. and Clarke, J., *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁹¹ Kaldor, M. ‘Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror’, *International Politics*, 42:1 (March, 2005), p. 492.

²⁹² Kaldor, M., *ibid.*, p. 492.

control. Nye argues that in such a complex game of power, “you will lose if you focus only on the interstate military board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections among them”.²⁹³ Ultimately, a policy with the use of force to enable promotion of democracy and free-market, and unilateralism at its core, leads to wasting the benefits of half a century of diplomatic partnership and collaboration between the U.S. and its allies. Lacking of historical truth, Bush’s conception of power is anachronistic and questions the political society crafted by the successive American administrations, jeopardising the gains accumulated by the U.S.

The glorification of democracy and free-market is another assumption that does not stand trial. Bush and neoconservatives believe that liberal democracy and free-market are universal principles widely accepted and desired by those who do not benefit from them. They ground their argument in the past successes of U.S. foreign policy that translated in the implantation of democracy and free-market in countries as The Philippines, Indonesia, Chile, Nicaragua, Taiwan, and South Korea. Such a statement raises two observations: Is democracy the best of regimes for everyone? If so, is the American version of democracy the most appropriate?

Smith questions the references to past successes of democracy promotion and reminds us that U.S. administrations and the subsequent Bush and Clinton administrations, incorporated democracy promotion in their foreign policies but always in relation with the furtherance of American interests. Ideas never took precedence on national interests.²⁹⁴ On the contrary, Bush claims that democracy is the best of systems whatever the environment in which it is supposed to be implanted, and that it is the sole option to further American interests. Smith clearly disagrees and points out that democracy is successful depending on the specificities of a given environment: “Democracy has to be firmly rooted in the local and very particular conditions of specific states, [...], the success of fledgling democracies depends far more on local factors than on anything that the U.S. can or cannot do”.²⁹⁵ Moreover, Bush’s emphasis on the American version of democracy as the best available is questionable and one should consider to basing an understanding of democracy in culture and history before engaging in its promotion. One version of democracy does not fit all.²⁹⁶

²⁹³ Nye, J. S., *The Paradox of American Power*, p. 39; see also Nye, J.S., ‘What New World Order?’, pp. 83-96.

²⁹⁴ Smith, S., ‘US Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions’ in Cox, M., Ikenberry, G. J. and Inogushi, T., *American Democracy Promotion. Impulses, Strategies and Impacts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 65-66.

²⁹⁵ Smith, S., ‘US Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions’, p. 65.

²⁹⁶ Smith, S., *ibid.*, p. 68-71.

Its overall promotion carries the risk of triggering upsurges of nationalism as it assaults local cultures and institutions.²⁹⁷

Consequently to the promotion of democracy comes regime change. The eradication of tyrannical regimes that threaten global stability is at the top of the Bush agenda. But the United States has not always questioned the nature of certain regimes and actually collaborated with very suspicious leaders, not exactly models of democratic statesmen. When questioned about past collaborations between the United States and tyrannical regimes against Communism and Muslim fundamentalism, neoconservatives brush aside these remarks by qualifying these collaborations as “tactical deviations from a broad strategy of promoting liberal democratic governance throughout the world”, resulting from direct threats to U.S. security or from the absence of a viable democratic alternative.²⁹⁸ So, are neoconservatives ready to sacrifice the defence of democratic ideals on the altar of national interests? It sounds very much like the Realism they so much criticise. But yet, to neoconservative ears, it does not, which led Charles Krauthammer to differentiate between Democratic Globalism and a Democratic Realism that lauds the suppression of the most threatening regimes first while other dictatorships should be left alone and spared for the time being, which explains perfectly that the U.S. can dispose of a Saddam while supporting Musharraf’s Pakistan, frown at Syria and Iran and leave Communist China and North Korea literally unharmed. Hence, it confirms that it is not the promotion of political and economic freedom that conducts the U.S. foreign policy but the preservation of American interests. Democracy and free-market promotion is not an end, but a means to implement another foreign policy means, the perpetuation of a stable international order, which in turn allows for the deployment and the preservation of American global supremacy.

The crisis in legitimacy is another weakness of the focus on the use of force. Bush is conscious of the necessity to gain international support for American actions by seeking moral support and approval. International legitimacy does not mean multilateralism through cooperation with, and approval by, international organisations, but rather the acquisition of the support of sufficient other nation-states. In order to generate this support, Bush contends that the United States should put its power at the service of its principles and those who share them and not only as a means to achieve greater security but as an end in itself.²⁹⁹ The trouble is that he also bluntly affirms that the ultimate end lies in the maintenance of U.S. hegemony and that the use of force should be forgiven through the honourable objective of

²⁹⁷ Halper, S. and Clarke, J., *America Alone*, p. 262.

²⁹⁸ Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., ‘National Interest and Global Responsibility’, p. 68.

²⁹⁹ Kagan, R., *Paradise and Power*, pp. 154-155.

democracy and freedom promotion. But the international community does not share this thinking and worries about the lack of restraint on American military power. By the use of pre-emption in a unilateralist fashion, the United States undermines two essential sources of legitimacy: the sustaining of the international peace and order and the consultation of allies before actions.³⁰⁰ Fukuyama summarises nicely the issue of legitimacy deficit by arguing that “America’s own current legitimacy deficit hurts both the realist part of our agenda, by diminishing our actual power, and the idealist portion of it, by undercutting our appeal as the embodiment of certain ideas and values”.³⁰¹

As we tried to demonstrate, the Bush administration’s approach to power acknowledges the differentiation between power as coercion and consent based. It is also grounded in several dimensions: the political, military, economic, ideological and cultural faces of power. Finally, foreign policy instruments like unilateralism, regime change, pre-emption, democracy promotion and the will to use force all find their roots in ideas that developed over the course of American history: republicanism, free-enterprise, freedom, Americans as the chosen people and exceptionalism. However, notwithstanding the Bush administration’s rather comprehensive understanding of power, a specific perception of the world and of America’s status and role in this world have caused U.S. officials to favour a specific use of power above others.

Indeed, the overwhelming reliance on coercion casts a shadow on the other instruments of power at America’s disposal. Instead of taking advantage of its superpower status to extend the long lasting peace characterising the relations between the great power and the liberal democratic world, the United States succumbed to its perennial demon: fear. For American foreign policy-makers, we now live in an age of perpetual wars. U.S. leaders did not learn from their mistakes, force as a policy is not an option, as Kolko argues, “all states that have gone to war over the past centuries have not achieved the objectives for which they sacrificed so much blood, passion, and resources. They have only produced endless misery and upheavals of every kind”.³⁰²

In the face of so much destruction, so few gains and a world that is far more dangerous now than ever, observers call for a review of policy in favour of a return to a hegemonic behaviour. The world does not need a Leviathan but could do with a leader. A return to

³⁰⁰ Cooper, R., ‘Goals of Diplomacy, Hard Power, Soft Power’, in Held, D. and Koenig-Archibugi, M. (eds.), *American Power in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 176-177.

³⁰¹ Fukuyama, F., ‘The Neoconservative Moment’, p. 5.

³⁰² Kolko, G., *The Age of War. The United States Confronts the World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), p. 178.

liberal hegemonic policies favouring multilateralism, negotiations, restraint, and the use of soft power tools is seen as the way to salvage what can be salvaged by the United States.³⁰³

By choosing the path to domination, the Bush administration discarded other expressions of power that were often used with success by previous administrations. Even if in a formidable position of power, the United States should keep in mind that power has many faces and that coercion rarely offers dividends. Instead, deploying an array of power measures that generate the consent of others proves more fruitful and far less costly. In times of critical choices, one should look back at history and learn lessons. This administration, blinded by the overwhelming stock of raw power at its disposal and by a seemingly unchallenged position in the world, forgot a basic rule of international relations that also applies to human relations: to speak softly, to argue and convince will always deliver better results on the long-run than using a big stick. This is what the two case-studies about the reconstruction of Japan after the Second World War and the current American efforts in Iraq will attempt to illustrate.

³⁰³ Fukuyama, F., *After the Neocons. America at the Crossroads* (London: Profile Books, 2006), pp. 184-185; Kaldor, M., 'American Power: From 'Compellence' to Cosmopolitanism', *International Affairs*, 79:1 (January, 2003), p. 21; Nye, J. S., *The Paradox of American Power*; Gaddis, J. L., 'Grand Strategy in the Second Term', p. 15; Lebow, R. N. and Kelly, R., 'Thucydides and Hegemony: Athens and the United States', *Review of International Studies*, 27:4 (October, 2001), p. 609; Bedford, David and Workman, Thom. 'The Tragic Reading of the Thucydidean Tragedy', *Review of International Studies*, 27:1 (January, 2001), pp. 51-67; Welch, David. A., 'Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides', *Review of International Studies*, 29 (2003), pp. 301-319.

5. American Power at Risk ? Re-constructing Iraq

The three previous chapters have set the scene for the implementation of the research question animating this study. Chapter 2 defined the boundaries of our use of a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent as well as identifying several dimensions where power can be exerted. Chapter 3 looked at ideas and values that developed over the course of American history and at their influence on how American decision-makers see the world and America's status and corresponding role in it. Chapter 4 assessed the influence that factors identified in chapter 3 have on the contemporary perception of power by American decision-makers, and hence resulting in their choice of a specific set of foreign policies expressing their understanding of what power does.

Our concern is thus what power does and how this concept can help us to understand the outcome of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction. Hence, we limit our intervention in looking at what form of power exerted in a specific field of a reconstruction process produced what results, and how these results matched the overall rationale of the reconstruction project, which in turn, explains partially the outcome of reconstruction.

To the concept of power outlined here above, we add another key-concept which we deem essential to assess the outcome of a reconstruction project: consistency. Indeed, we argue that while looking at mechanisms of power at work during the reconstruction, it is necessary to assess the level of consistency achieved by the power wielder between objectives and means of power. We contend that consistency ought to be achieved in:

- The exertion of power in the four fields across which the analysis unfolds: the security sphere, the state, the economy, and the civil society. Consistency of policies in these four fields is crucial to understand the outcome of post-conflict reconstruction;
- The exercise of power through foreign policies at the regional and global levels of analysis and their influence on the local level (reconstruction process). Coherence of objectives and power exertion at these three levels is another key explanatory factors of the outcome of reconstruction projects.

Consequently, our methodology consists in approaching the reconstruction of Iraq from three angles.

Firstly, we examine the pre-conditions to the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. The Bush administration reliance on power exertion through the use of force as a means to resolve disputes between states jeopardised from the beginning the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq. By starting a war of aggression, not of self-defence, the U.S. generated a lack of legitimacy for the whole enterprise. From the onset, the reconstruction of Iraq was penalised by the absence of broad material and moral international support. Moreover, a specific understanding of Iraq's realities by American officials conditioned the planning of the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. It is also necessary to consider the impact that these realities had on early policies of reconstruction in order to assess whether discrepancies between planning and post-war realities played a role in the outcome of the reconstruction.

Secondly, we look at the various fields in which reconstruction efforts unfold: the security and stability dimension, the political institutionalisation, the economic recovery and finally the strengthening of the civil society. In the case of Iraq, they match the CPA's focus on the four foundational pillars of Iraqi sovereignty: security, essential services, economy and governance.³⁰⁴ We assess the various instruments, policies, actions and institutions that were used and created in these four dimensions by the occupation authorities and qualify the nature of power exertion used to reach the occupier's pre-defined objectives, that is an answer to the question: what was the mix of power instruments used, based on coercion or consent, or a mix of both? We also assess the extent to which some of these policies conflict with each other, keeping in mind the distinction between coercion and consent in the process. Hence, that should allow us to observe instances of opposition or mutual reinforcement between coercive and consent-based actions, answering the question of consistency of policies implemented in the four fields of reconstruction.

Thirdly, we cast the reconstruction project in the wider regional and international context by looking at the influence U.S. regional and global foreign policies had on the reconstruction. The objective here consists in pinpointing U.S. actions at the international and regional levels, as well as domestically, and assess whether these actions contribute to or impede power exertion in the reconstruction efforts. We perform this task while looking at the four fields in which power is exerted in occupied Iraq. Again, consistency of action between these three levels of policy implementation will be assessed.

We hope that such an approach will provide a comprehensive understanding of the reconstruction project in Iraq and help us to qualify its outcome. In turn it should contribute

³⁰⁴ CPA, *An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments* (Baghdad: undated), p. 1.

to an understanding of the effectiveness of American power in the contemporary international structure, compared with the effectiveness of American power exertion at the onset of the Cold War, as the analysis of the reconstruction of Japan will demonstrate.

This chapter is thus organised as follows.

The first section looks at the pre-conditions to the invasion and reconstruction project. We basically look at three sets of variables: Firstly, we try to shed light on factors that conditioned a specific understanding of the realities of pre-war Iraq, which led to the adoption by the invader of particular plans for the post-war reconstruction. In turn, such an understanding conditioned the use of specific instruments of power, based either on coercion or consent, or both. We then attempt to assess the impact that these pre-conditions have on the reconstruction project. Secondly, we look at the specificities of Iraq, and their impact on the reconstruction. Both actions should provide us with an assessment of how close to the mark the occupier was to the realities that emerged after the end of the conflict. Thirdly, we assess the organisation of the occupation. After the cessation of conventional hostilities, the United States installed a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in charge of implementing reconstruction policies. A year later, a formal transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government occurred and the CPA was replaced by the American Embassy in Iraq with extraordinary advisory status. Declaring a formal occupation, and hence stripping Iraq of sovereignty, was seen by many Iraqis as a mistake that fuelled the insurgency and general discontentment. This decision worsened the security situation. Overnight, from a status of liberators, Americans became occupiers, in turn causing them to move from a position of being able to generate consent to a position of coercion wielders.

The second section looks at the exertion of American power across the four fields of the reconstruction, the security, the state, the economy and finally the civil society. We assess consistency of power exertion and of reconstruction policies across these four fields as well as interactions between them that contribute to an understanding to the outcome of the reconstruction as a whole. Hence we start by looking at what is considered as paramount to successful reconstruction, the existence of security and stability in the conquered country in order to implement reconstruction projects. In the case of Iraq, security would prove critical to any advances in the three other reconstruction fields. Faced with a full-scale insurgency, the initial American response was the overwhelming use of force and a fast build-up of Iraqi capacities in the field of security. Such a strategy quickly showed its limitations and gradually, the U.S. developed an approach that would be more comprehensive, trying to link the various components of reconstruction instead of focusing exclusively on coercion.

Then we address the question of the political institutionalisation of the occupied country. Given the fault lines animating the Iraqi society, building a new Iraqi state was always going to be difficult. From a policy of a quick transfer of power to an Iraqi Interim Authority, distrusting Iraqi abilities, the U.S. moved towards formal occupation in order to deal with the insurgency and initiate reconstruction projects. After a bit more than a year, the Occupation formally ended and the U.S. supported the nascent Iraqi state by lending its coercive capability to Iraq, while monitoring and advising the new Iraqi political society on how to create a democratic state.

We also look at the economic aspects of the reconstruction. Paramount to the reconstruction effort, re-launching an Iraqi economy crippled by years of mismanagement and sanctions was critical to the outcome of reconstruction. Restoring essential services, providing jobs to the population, creating the basis for a competitive market-based economy gradually integrating Iraq in the global economy were the components of the U.S. strategy. It was hoped that better economic conditions and living standards would turn Iraqis away from the insurgency and contribute to the stabilisation of the country as well as generating consent to U.S. policies.

We then proceed with the emancipation of the Iraqi civil society. Debilitated by decades of oppression and violence, the Iraqi civil society was given a unique opportunity to make its voice heard for the first time in its history. Seat of consent generation *par excellence*, the civil society was subjected to a barrage of democracy promotion, rule of law and human rights. Numerous organisations were created and sponsored by the occupiers to promote values and interests congenial to those of the U.S. The lack of security, feeble advances in the economic field and the poor display of unity showed by the nascent Iraqi political society were all elements impeding the development of the Iraqi civil society. However, the Occupation progressed in most of its projects and despite poor conditions, the Iraqi civil society is continuously reinforcing itself, slowly constituting a counter-power to the state, while advancing the state's interests in seeing democracy taking roots in Iraq. The civil society arguably constitutes Iraq's chance to gradually climb out of the quagmire caused by the violent expressions of diverging interest between Iraqi ethnic and religious groups.

The final section looks at the change of policy engineered by the U.S. administration, the so-called *New Way Forward*, their best attempt at understanding all dimensions of what post-conflict reconstruction entails. Policies and actions in the four fields of the reconstruction started to move in parallel and consistency of action became a key-parameter

for U.S. officials in order to measure progress. However, overall five years into the reconstruction of Iraq, while the general situation is better, much remains to be done and the current period of relative stability enjoyed by Iraq is fragile.

Pre-conditions to the Occupation and their impact on Reconstruction

Our first task consists in observing the pre-conditions to the occupation of Iraq and assessing their impact on policies of reconstruction in order to identify factors that influence the outcome of the overall project.

A first set of variables to be considered is defined by the objectives of the war against Saddam Hussein and of the occupation of Iraq, as well as the process chosen by the U.S. to achieve these objectives. Firstly, we argue that the decision to go to war with Iraq had two consequences in terms of power resources. Domestically, that is in the U.S., the support of the population for the war and hence, for its stated objectives, was solid. Internationally, such support was not as present, impeding the American legitimacy to act, and hence, later on, partly depriving the U.S. occupation of wide international participation in its reconstruction effort in Iraq. Not only the stated rationale for toppling Saddam Hussein but also the means to do so and perhaps more importantly, the discrepancy between these means and the expectations of the international community, played a major role in making the U.S.-led reconstruction of Iraq more difficult. The gap between the Bush administration's reading of international reactions to the Iraqi venture and the actual realities animating the international system echo a vision of foreign policy at odds with the world in which it evolved.

Moreover, the U.S. foreign policy, in its design and definition of national interest, would prove inconsistent. The invasion and occupation of Iraq did not match the regional American foreign policy objective aiming at stabilising the region. Instead, the invasion and occupation of Iraq generated instability as Arab populations perceived such massive U.S. presence and use of force as the premises for a new crusade, while regional powers like Syria and Iran positioned themselves according to the disappearance of Saddam Hussein and its army. The fall of Saddam's Iraq saw the rise of new power contenders in the region, constituting a frontal assault on the U.S. goal of being the power broker in the Middle East.

In addition, the invasion of Iraq put at risk the American foreign policy aiming at displaying power in order to avoid challenges to its global superpower status. Indeed, the possibility of getting bogged down in the country, unable to finish off the enemy, instead of

reinforcing the perception of America the powerful, contributed to the realisation that the U.S. was not so untouchable.

Domestic and International Support

After having dealt with the Taliban in Afghanistan, guilty of harbouring the terrorist network that organised and implemented the attacks of 9/11 on the United States, the Bush administration turned its attention to its next target: Iraq, a dictatorial regime, potentially armed with WMD, a threat to stability in the Middle East, and having defied the international community for ten years by refusing to cooperate on weapon inspection.

The process through which Iraq was dealt with included all the U.S. foreign policy tenets described in chapter 4: unilateralism, pre-emption, coercion, and regime change. These choices of action are the natural offspring of American policy-makers' perception of their country's exclusive superpower status as well as of previous American experiences as we saw in chapter 3.

While the American population was generally supportive of a strong and dominating United States, the international community was far less receptive to what quickly became identified as arrogance and irresponsible behaviour. Constant calls to obtain the UN seal of approval for the U.S. plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein would be cast aside by the Bush Administration, which would adopt a go-it-alone policy, in spite of the existing UN involvement in containing Ba'athist Iraq through the implementation of sanctions since 1991³⁰⁵ and no-fly zones operated by the U.S. and Britain, causing sporadic confrontations with Iraqi forces over the years.³⁰⁶

Based on intelligence gathered by the United States on Iraqi attempts to deceive UN inspections³⁰⁷, the United States concluded that Iraq had hidden chemical and biological weapons and could be in a position to acquire nuclear weapons within a decade.³⁰⁸ Dismissing international objections to a war with Iraq, the United States, backed by a

³⁰⁵ See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 687 (3rd April 1991); United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1284 (17th December 1999); and United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441 (8th November 2002).

³⁰⁶ See Tariq, A., 'Throttling Iraq', *New Left Review* (September/October 2000), pp. 5-6; BBC News, *No-fly Zones: The Legal Position* (19th February 2001); and BBC News, *Containment: The Iraqi No-fly Zones* (29th December 1998).

³⁰⁷ The summary of these findings were presented by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN Security Council on 5th February 2003 in a last American effort to obtain international support for action against Iraq. See Powell, C., *Remarks to the United Nations Security Council*, New York, 5th February 2003.

³⁰⁸ CIA, *National Intelligence Estimate. Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs* (Washington DC, October 2002), p. 1.

coalition of the willing', started military operations against Iraq on 9th April 2003. After three weeks of combat, Baghdad fell.

The American recourse to force should not come as a surprise. As we saw in chapter 3, violence has regularly been the chosen mode of action by the U.S. to reach its foreign policy objectives. Moreover, again echoing previous experiences, the use of force as mode of action disguised as a justification to promote a more noble goal, in our case advancing democracy in an authoritarian country, reminds us of the *mission civilisatrice* undertaken by the U.S. when implementing its Manifest Destiny, expanding West for the sake of sharing American exceptionalism and enlightenment with lesser breeds. However, while coercion was seen for centuries as a common mode of conflict resolution between states, whatever the stated obvious or hidden objectives, today's world is far less receptive to such use of power, as Dominique de Villepin's speech at the UN Security Council illustrated.³⁰⁹

In terms of power, the Bush administration, by declaring war on Iraq unilaterally, entered a paradox. On the one hand, Bush's domestic political power capital reached its peak. The Congress overwhelmingly voted in favour of the war while a huge majority of the American public opinion supported the Administration's policy. The memory of 9/11 and the ensuing continuous discourse on the threats of terrorist groups armed with WMD by rogue states like Iraq constituted the two main factors that led the support for the invasion of Iraq.³¹⁰ It is paramount to victory in a conflict to benefit from domestic support. War needs to be, if not popular, at least supported by the population of powers at war in order to achieve success, otherwise, as the Vietnam War illustrates, failure becomes a possibility. In addition, it is reasonable to expect that the population of the victorious power will also shoulder the burden of reconstruction in the wake of victory. Consequently, once hostilities are over, it is vital to ensure security and stability in the occupied country in order to limit further damages to human and material resources of the occupying power. American domestic support to the war was then acquired and indispensable to the future reconstruction of Iraq.

³⁰⁹ "To those who choose to use force and think they can resolve the world's complexity through swift and preventive action, we offer in contrast determined action over time. For today, to ensure our security, all the dimensions of the problem must be taken into account: both the manifold crises and their many facets, including cultural and religious. Nothing lasting in international relations can be built therefore without dialogue and respect for the other, without exigency and abiding by principles, especially for the democracies that must set the example. To ignore this is to run the risk of misunderstanding, radicalization and spiralling violence. This is even more true in the Middle East, an area of fractures and ancient conflicts where stability must be a major objective for us". de Villepin, D., *Address by His Excellency Dominique de Villepin, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Before the United Nations Security Council*, New York, 19th March 2003.

³¹⁰ A poll taken on March 20, 2003, the day after the invasion. 72% supported the invasion, 78% of those supporting the invasion also supported the Administration's policy on Iraq, and 67% considered that the U.S. had done enough to solve the crisis with Iraq through diplomatic means. ABC News/*Washington Post* Poll. 20th March 2003. N=506 adults nationwide. MoE ± 4.5.

In contrast to the level of support enjoyed domestically, the U.S. administration lost a sizeable part of its international political power as the legitimacy of its actions in Iraq was questioned worldwide. The United States, far from being seen as a liberator, was deemed a menace to international stability. The U.S. approach to dispose of perceived threats, by putting at its core a dangerous mix of coercion, unilateralism and preventive war, undermined international support for the Iraqi venture, and hence diminished American power. By favouring coercion over consent generation, the U.S. jeopardised both its official project of changing the Middle East from the start and its international status, until then considered to be that of a benevolent hegemon.³¹¹

Indeed, as we saw in chapter 4, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002* acknowledges the superpower status of the U.S. in the contemporary international system and argues that such supremacy should not be challenged. The United States should take any necessary measures, not only to ensure its security, but also to maintain its current position of power. Such statements propelled reactions from the international community and key-U.S. allies and slowly, international public opinion started to shift from a traditional position of support of U.S. power to a position of questioning the legitimacy, not only of the American actions but also of its position as only superpower and hence international source of stability. Such doubts did not go unnoticed by political elites across the globe, which became astutely aware that big parts of their political constituencies would not support American aggression. Consequently, even before the first shot was fired in Iraq, international support to the post-war reconstruction of the country was in doubt as U.S. actions' legitimacy was under fire, which in turn put at risk the shift from coercion to consent generation, necessary to the occupation's purpose.

Another issue that shaped the international community's perceptions was the justification offered by the U.S. to go to war. The American insistence on using force was conditioned by the official line regarding the objectives of the war: to operate a regime change in Baghdad to eliminate Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, to reduce the threat of international terrorism, and to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East

³¹¹ A February 2003 Gallup poll reveals that only 36% of Canadian and 38% of British people support a potential confrontation with Iraq, while 57% of Americans consider that the world has a favourable image in the eyes of the world (compared to 79% a year before the poll). See Newport, F., 'Editor's in Chief Pulse of the Nation', *Gallup* (18th February 2003). Following another poll taken in July 2004, 50% of Europeans think that the US plays a negative role to preserve peace in the world against 28% for a positive role, while 74% of Europeans think that the EU foreign policy should be independent from that of the United States. See Manchin, R. and Hideg, G., 'EU Survey: Are Transatlantic Ties Loosening?', *Gallup* (6th July 2004)

generally³¹², as the existing status quo was deemed obsolete and not conducive to global stability. Moreover, the Pentagon had already decided that such a regime change would have to occur by force. A pre-emptive strike was deemed necessary as the two previous methods to deal with Saddam Hussein, containment, deterrence and international control failed to deliver.³¹³

Indeed, pre-emption was on the agenda as the attacks of 9/11 constituted a wake-up call. American officials and public opinion were quick to note that the terrorists were coming from supposedly American allies, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The deal cut with repressive regimes in the region was under fire, as Gordon explains: “For decades prior to 11 September 2001, the United States basically had a deal with repressive governments throughout the Arab world: they could run their countries more or less however they wanted, as long as they were willing to sell oil at reasonable prices to the West, act as strategic allies of the United States and not threaten the Middle East regional order”.³¹⁴ But these regimes, “where the combination of repressive regimes and American support for them (and for Israel) led to alienation, resentment and hatred for the West”³¹⁵, produced a layer of very active discontented anti-Western individuals that fed various Islamic terrorist groups. Consequently, a review of the Cold War policy in the region was necessary.

Hence, the Bush administration designed a new regional policy presented to the American public and the international community as promoting democracy in the name of global stability at the core of the U.S. national interests. References to sustained military presence in one of the most volatile and energy strategic regions in the world were carefully left aside.³¹⁶

Thus, the American strategy envisioned a grand-scale democratic wave in the Middle East, starting with Iraq. On top of reducing anti-Western activities and potential WMD development, it would allow the region to benefit from greater stability as the U.S. foresaw

³¹² See Bush, G. W, *State of the Union Address*, Washington D.C. (29th January 2002); Bush, G. W, *President Bush Pleased with House Vote on Iraq Resolution*, Washington D.C. (10th October 2002); Bush, G. W, *President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat*, Speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center, Cincinnati Union Terminal (7th October 2002); Bush, G. W, *State of the Union Address*, Washington D.C. (28th January 2003); Gordon, P. H., ‘Bush’s Middle East Vision’, *Survival*, 45:1 (Spring, 2003), p. 155-164.

³¹³ Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Presentation – The Case for Action* (12th September 2002), pp. 6 – 7.

³¹⁴ Gordon, P. H, ‘Bush’s Middle East Vision’, p. 156.

³¹⁵ Gordon, P.H., *Ibid.*, p. 156; on Arab resentment against the U.S., see also Lefebvre, J. A., ‘U.S. Military Hegemony in the Arabian/Persian Gulf: How Long Can It Last?’, *International Studies Perspectives*, 4:2 (May, 2003), p. 190.

³¹⁶ Except in classified document as a working paper from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to Vice-President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell and Head of NSC Rice illustrates, mentioning that with Saddam Hussein gone, the position of the United States in the region would be much-improved. Rumsfeld, D., *Working Paper on Iraq*, 27th July 2001.

that with Saddam's support to Palestinian extremist groups gone, Palestine would become a democratic state and not a threat to Israel. Democracy could then expand gradually in the region³¹⁷, which in turn, would bring peace. Last but not least, it would secure the American, in particular, and the capitalist West's generally, access to the much needed oil in a period of unprecedented global growth³¹⁸, even though Bush administration officials vehemently denied allegations that the U.S. aimed at controlling Iraqi oil as Douglas Feith argued: "If U.S. motives were in essence financial or commercial, we would not be confronting Saddam Hussein over his weapons of mass destruction. If our motive were cold cash, we would instead downplay the Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruction and pander to Saddam in hopes of winning contracts for U.S. companies".³¹⁹

As in the past, as American exceptionalism and the Manifest Destiny illustrated, behind the idealistic democracy promotion and threats to global stability rhetoric, a far more realistic discourse was at work. The Bush administration dressed its military strategic objectives in the Middle East, namely to acquire a solid anchorage at the heart of the region for U.S. forces³²⁰ in order to secure oil resources and potentially bring more stability to the

³¹⁷ Lefebvre questions G.W Bush's administration willingness to actually see democracy replace the current autocratic regimes allied to the U.S. in the Middle East. See Lefebvre, J. A. 'U.S. Military Hegemony in the Arabian/Persian Gulf: How Long Can It Last?', pp. 186-190. In addition, Douglas Feith argues that the Pentagon continuously tamed the Department of State desire to put more emphasis on democracy promotion in Iraq as an objective of the war. See Feith, D. J., *War and Decision. Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), pp. 286-287. Rumsfeld was more in favour of creating conditions for democracy to flourish instead of creating democracy in Iraq, as he was aware that democracy-building would commit the U.S. on the long-term, and that too much democracy too fast, including early elections may lead anti-democratic element to power (the 'one man, one vote, once' phenomenon).

³¹⁸ Anderson, P., 'Force and Consent', *New Left Review*, 17 (September/October 2002), p. 17.

³¹⁹ Feith, D. J., Prepared Statement, in Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *The Future of Iraq*, 108th Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11th February 2003), p. 23. Access to Iraqi oil as a reason to go to war with Saddam Hussein is vehemently denied by the Bush administration. See Fleischer, A., *Press Briefing*, 6th February 2003; Rumsfeld, D., 'It Would Be a Short War', CBS News, 15th November 2002; Halper, S. and Clarke, J., *America Alone*, pp. 155-156. On the 'blood for oil' thesis that emphasizes American interventionism in southern oil rich countries in order to secure market dominance for US multinationals and a stable flow of oil to the US economy, see Klare, M., *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependence on Imported Petroleum* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); Juhasz, A., *The Bush Agenda*, especially chapter 4; Juhasz, A., 'It's Still About Oil in Iraq', *Los Angeles Time* (6th December 2006). On U.S. oil control operations as a foreign policy objective aiming at securing oil supply to global capitalism and as a means to maintain U.S. supremacy over other industrial capitalist countries, see Stokes, D., 'Blood for Oil? Global Capital, Counter-Insurgency and the Dual Logic of American Energy Security', *Review of International Studies*, 33:2 (April, 2007), pp. 245-264.

³²⁰ But at long last, the Bush administration came out in the open about this issue, as the negotiations with the Iraqi government about the right to maintain 60 U.S. bases in Iraq for an undefined period of time have shown. As of 13th June 2008, these negotiations were at a dead end as Maliki confirmed. See Paley, A. R. and DeYoung, K., 'Iraqis Condemn American Demands', *The Washington Post* (11th June 2008), p. A01; Paley, A. R. and DeYoung, K., 'Key Iraqi Leaders Deliver Setback to U.S.', *The Washington Post* (14th June 2008), p. A01. On the call for U.S. military presence globally but more specifically in the Middle East, see PNAC.

region, in the clothes of democracy and freedom. If democracy promotion in the Middle East was indeed the real objective of the Bush administration, why leave the autocratic regimes of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States live? As Fallows argues, America cannot be taken seriously about democracy promotion because of “its need for foreign oil, which forces it to coddle regimes it would otherwise blast as anti-democratic. [...] The need for oil drenches America in hypocrisy.”³²¹ If in any doubt, in a presentation about contingency plans in the case of an occupation of Iraq, Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, underlines the importance of seizing Iraqi oil fields and energy infrastructure.³²² Even more cynical, in the same document, is a comment regarding regional stability. Planners foresaw that an American invasion and occupation of Iraq would provoke “some turmoil” in the region, but that should not be an issue because “Arab regimes tend to be good at ‘handling’ the street”.³²³ Let us remember that a key-justification presented to the public by the U.S. administration in going to war with Iraq was the establishment of a democratic and free Iraq that would become the cornerstone of stability in the region, and hence would enhance the security of the United States. Ironically, neighbouring autocratic regimes were relied on to put down any protest their population might voice in reaction to the invasion. So much for the progress of democracy and freedom rights in the Middle East.

In the light of what precedes, pre-conditions animating the American project regarding Iraq and the Middle East were not congenial to the development of a foreign policy based on consent generation. Not for the first time in its history, the U.S. foreign policy was bordering the revolutionary, potentially causing more instability than constancy. In other words, as in many other reconstruction cases, coercion was at the core of the initial American actions and motivations to invade Iraq. While presenting a justification for the war that was supposed to generate consent at home and abroad, the Bush administration’s focus on the use of force as a mean to resolve disputes between states would cast a shadow on the whole American project jeopardising from the beginning the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq. Indeed, whatever the motivations and justification in terms of future risks posed by Saddam’s regime, the U.S. started a war of aggression, not of self-defence as it was the case regarding the invasion of Afghanistan. Hence, one key elements was missing: legitimacy. Such lack of

Rebuilding America’s Defenses. Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century (September, 2000), especially pp. 14, 15, 17.

³²¹ Fallows, J., ‘Success without Victory’, *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February, 2005), p. 86; see also Tariq, Ali, ‘Recolonizing Iraq’, *New Left Review* (May/June 2003), p 7.

³²² Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Discussion – Possible Contingencies* (9th December 2002), p. 7.

³²³ Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Presentation – The Case for Action*, p. 8. The emphasis on ‘handling’ is in the original.

legitimacy conditioned partly the progress made during the reconstruction of Iraq. Not only did it alienate the majority of the international community but when things started to turn sour in Iraq, it constituted the bedrock of the American public's rejection of the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq. From this, we can conclude that legitimate support to the reconstruction project at home and abroad is a key-element defining the outcome of the reconstruction project. This support buttresses the use of power through consent generation to the project and in a way conditions the minds of the various actors involved in the process. Consent ought to take over from coercion very quickly in the wake of military victory. Indeed, as we will see later on, another key-element pertaining to potential success in post-conflict reconstruction consists in being able to switch rapidly from coercion to consent generation mode. Such switch is highly dependent on the level of preparedness that the future occupier has developed, namely planning for contingencies.

Planning for Contingencies

Amongst pre-conditions for a successful occupation and reconstruction project, planning holds a critical place. Regarding the case of Iraq, the main efforts focused on the invasion plan, the coercive act of the play; while the post-war Iraq planning, the supposedly consent-based operations, was characterised by an internal power-struggle between the Pentagon and the State Department regarding the leadership over the reconstruction effort. Under G.W. Bush, the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA, without coordination and without consulting previous efforts, produced various plans for reconstruction projects should the U.S. topple Saddam, even though early considerations about what an occupied Iraq would look like and require in terms of actions existed under the presidency of Bill Clinton.³²⁴

The various agencies required to provide plans for a post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq acted without much coordination and based on postulates and opinions about how a

³²⁴ On motives to engage with Iraq as well as critiques of inaction, and planning work for a post-invasion Iraq designed under Clinton, see: Congress of the United States of America, *Iraqi Liberation Act* (31st October 1998), p. 3.; PNAC, *Letter to President Clinton on Iraq* (26th January 1998). See also Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., 'Bombing Iraq Isn't Enough', *New York Times* (30th January 1998); Kagan, R., 'Saddam Wins Again', *The Weekly Standard* (4th January 1999); Kagan, R., 'A Way To Oust Saddam', *Weekly Standard* (28th September 1998); Department of State, *Saddam Hussein's Iraq* (Washington DC, September 1999); Centcom, *Desert Crossing. Pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference* (29th-30th April 1999).

reconstruction should unfold that were sometimes in opposition.³²⁵ Eventually, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld prevailed and the Pentagon took the lead regarding post-war planning as late as December 2002.³²⁶

Less than three months before the war, the Pentagon still did not have a comprehensive plan to deal with post-conflict Iraq. The late start of the post-war planning and the consequent obvious shortcomings that resulted constitute an indictment of those policy-makers whose optimism proved lethal to U.S. reconstruction efforts.³²⁷ What can be considered as planning mistakes made by OSP and how did these shortcomings influence U.S. power in the aftermath of the war?

Firstly, planners at the Pentagon's OSP relied heavily on intelligence and advice provided by Iraqi exiles³²⁸ who promised that Americans would be welcomed by the Iraqi population, stability and security maintained, and the infrastructure of the country in place.³²⁹ Consequently, the planning did not focus on potential turmoil following the fall of the Ba'athist regime. No tactics were designed to deal with the control of key-structures such as ministries and essential services facilities, with the notable exception of the Ministry of Oil. American exertion of power would be handicapped from the start as it was lacking of the essential structures needed to reach its objectives to maintain stability, and of course, did not

³²⁵ On disagreements between U.S. agencies regarding the shape and outcome of Iraq's post-conflict settings, see Feith, Douglas J., *War and Decision*, chapters 8 and 9.

³²⁶ With the set up of the set up of the Office of Special Plans (OSP), , formerly Northern Gulf Affairs Office, part of the Pentagon's Near East and South Asia Affairs Section. OSP was headed by Under-Secretary Douglas Feith. In a December 2002 presentation prepared by OSP, one of the scenarios foreseen consisted in imagining that Saddam loses power prematurely, that anarchy erupts with Kurds moving towards Mosul and Kirkuk, and sectarian violence exploding. The key principles enounced to deal with such a situation emphasised the importance for the U.S. "to influence events in Iraq and the formation of a new government", to make sure that oil revenues would remained controlled by the central government in order to ensure territorial integrity, to organise a conference with all Iraqi interested parties (except Ba'athists) under UN auspices, to seize main oil fields and energy infrastructure, to provide security to UN/NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid. See Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Discussion – Possible Contingencies*, pp. 6-7.

³²⁷ On the issue of a lack of planning for post-conflict operations, see Diamond, L., *Squandered Victory* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), p. 284; Packer, G., *The Assassin's Gate. America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), especially chapter 4; Galbraith, P., *The End of Iraq* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 88-90; Phillips, D. L., *Losing Iraq. Inside the Post-war Reconstruction Fiasco* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2005), especially chapter 12.

³²⁸ Especially by Amhad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), posing as the post-Saddam leader of Iraq.

³²⁹ Dreyfuss, R., 'More Missing Intelligence', *The Nation* (19th June 2003). On the quality of intelligence provided by the INC to U.S. intelligence services and malfunctioning of the U.S. intelligence community prior to the 2003 war, see United States Senate – Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress* (Washington DC, 8th September 2006). On the production of intelligence by the OSP, including alleged links between Al-Qaeda and Iraq, in order to push the case for war, see Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Report N° 07-INTEL-04, *Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*, 9 February 2007.

have sufficient troops on the grounds to control the country anyway, as stability and security were not supposed to be issues.

Secondly, as planners deemed that the country would be stable, and the essential infrastructure of Iraq and the state structure would be safe and running, the involvement of the U.S. in Iraq was thought to be short, with a swift hand-over to Iraqis.³³⁰ Hence, while efforts were made in identifying Iraq's inside-actors that could play a role in the post-invasion period³³¹, there was a form of over-reliance on opposition groups in exile, groups who would quickly realise the gap between those who stayed and those who left. Indeed, no efforts were made to understand what the political realities in Iraq could be, without the iron grip that Saddam had on the various ethnic and religious groups in the country. At OSP, in contrast to analyses from the CIA, State Department and from the War College³³², no serious thoughts were given to the possibility that ousted Sunnis might revolt against the new order or that disenfranchised Shi'as might swiftly drive for power, opposing the American picture perfect of setting up an American-style democracy in Iraq.

Consequently, and thirdly, the Pentagon set up the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), headed by the retired General Jay Garner, with a mandate to prepare for potential humanitarian crisis in the direct aftermath of the invasion. It was never the task of ORHA to deal with major reconstruction projects and to set up a new political order as it was foreseen by the OSP that the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA), essentially made of Iraqi exiles, and the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) would take over rapidly each in their field of expertise, respectively the political and the economic aspects of reconstruction.³³³ Illustrative of the lack of urgency and forecast,

³³⁰ Hence, reconstruction would not be U.S. sponsored nation-building as in Kosovo but a short-termed venture in which the U.S. would show the way to the Iraqis who would use their own resources, essentially from oil revenues, to rebuild their country. The U.S. presence would be limited in terms of troops and in time to a few months. As Rumsfeld put it, if the United States were to lead an international coalition in Iraq, we would be guided by two commitments: to stay as long as necessary; and to leave as soon as possible" in order to avoid a culture of dependency and help the Iraqis to help themselves. Rumsfeld, D. H., 'Beyond Nation-Building', 14th February 2003, Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum, New York City.

³³¹ On the OSP's approach to select members of the IIA and the overall purpose of the IIA, see Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Discussion – Iraqi Interim Authority Action Plan* (3rd April 2003); Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Discussion – Iraqi Interim Authority Structure and Implementation* (28th March 2003); Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *Discussion – Iraqi Interim Authority Implementation Plan* (29th April 2003).

³³² See U.S. Department of State, *Memo from Lorne W. Craner, Arthur E. Dewey and Paul E. Simons to Under-Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobrianski : Iraq Contingency Planning* (7th February 2003); Crane, C. C. and Terrill, A. W., *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2003), p.1.

³³³ Herring, E. and Rangwala, G., *Iraq in Fragments*, p. 13; Gordon, M. and Trainor, B., *Cobra II. The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), p. 183.

those discussions on the transfer of power did not happen before April 2003, that is after Saddam had been toppled. In the absence of a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction of the Iraqi state and the inclusion of efficient Iraqi insiders, the U.S. created a legitimacy gap as Iraqi externals would be seen with distrust by the Iraqi population, considering them as walking in the trail of the invading forces, and hence at the service of the U.S. Such early lack of legitimacy would plague the occupation from the start and make the generation of Iraqi consent to American decisions falter.

Moreover, if the purpose of having an IIA quickly installed in a position of power in order to put Iraqis quickly in charge, why such plans were not designed well ahead? Instead, the time lapse between the invasion and the potential reliance on an Iraqi body shouldering the political bulk of the nascent reconstruction gave an opportunity to anti-occupation force to coalesce and start their activities. By the time an Iraqi Interim Authority could have acted, CPA judged that the conditions on the ground were not conducive to a transfer of any parcel of power to Iraqis, and that the U.S. had to be in charge, reinforcing further the perception of the Iraqi population that they were now an occupied people, and hence burying further the possibility to rally the population to the making of new Iraq.

Fourthly, the Pentagon was moving away from previous U.S.-led nation-building experiences by vetoing any help offered by the State Department to plan post-war Iraqi reconstruction³³⁴ and by refusing to include the UN in the projected occupation and reconstruction of the country; The role of the UN, while considered in early drafts, was later on looked upon with condescendence, as the Bush administration considered earlier UN-led nation-building as failures and the Security Council's letdown regarding retaliation against Saddam's Iraq as the proof of its inefficiency. To some, the rejection of UN was a mistake as the international body would bring legitimacy to the operation. As General Abizaid³³⁵ put it: "We are an antibody in their society. [...] The key thing is to internationalise the problem. We really need the UN stamp of approval. It would be crazy to keep the US government in charge for too long".³³⁶

³³⁴ Even though the State Department had led 'The Future of Iraq Project', a series of studies issued from 17 seminars dealing with every aspect of reconstruction in Iraq and whose participants were U.S. experts and Iraqi exiles. While not constituting a post-war plan *per se*, 'The Future of Iraq Project' had the merit of bringing together Iraqis from various religious and ethnic backgrounds and delivered interesting if not definite proposals for post-war reconstruction, especially regarding the instauration of democracy in Iraq.

³³⁵ General John P. Abizaid succeeded General Tommy Franks at the head of Centcom in July 2003. Born to a Christian Lebanese-American father, he is fluent in Arabic and was acutely aware of how the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. would be perceived in the Arab world.

³³⁶ Quoted in Gordon, M. and Trainor, B., *Cobra II*, p. 187.

By developing its own dogmatic conception of what the reconstruction of Iraq ought to be, the Pentagon did not capitalise on past experiences in U.S.-led nation-building through the inclusion of agencies heavily involved in other reconstruction cases, not to mention the wealth of experience of UN staff. Consequently, the occupation and reconstruction were not led on the premises of lessons-learned but driven by specific interests and objectives, while realities were twisted or simply ignored. Instead of capitalising on problems and solutions met in other reconstruction cases, the occupation forced through policies of reconstruction at odd with the realities on the ground, jeopardising future efficient use of power as the discrepancy between wishes and realities grew.

The three stages of the reconstruction of Iraq illustrate the lack of planning contingencies by OSP: a) stabilisation phase where an interim coalition military administration focuses on security, stability and order³³⁷; b) a transition phase with a gradual transfer of responsibilities to Iraqi institutions; and c) a transformation phase after a new democratic constitution is drafted and elections held.³³⁸

The Pentagon thus foresaw a quick victory and expected to be welcomed as liberators by the Iraqi population. The reconstruction would be a short-term affair, financed by Iraqi oil and international help. Politically, the new state would be taken over rapidly by the new Iraqi leadership embracing democracy and eager to remain a friend of America.³³⁹

The outcome of the Baath regime's fall would be slightly different. Based on false assumptions, the post-war planning quickly showed its limitations. The discrepancy between pre-war assumptions and post-war realities were such that the occupation, after recovering from the initial shock, had to adjust permanently to new developments, impeding on an efficient use of power. Somehow, events in post-war Iraq did not follow what was written in the pre-war plans and Americans moved from a position of perceived power in remoulding Iraq and later the Middle East to a position of reactivity to events spinning out of control on the ground. The post-war realities would constitute a major test of the U.S. ability to exert power and implement a successful reconstruction of Iraq.

³³⁷ The stabilisation phase included a purge of Ba'ath party members, a reliance on Iraqi police and army to enforce security, the set up of a war crime tribunal, and the dismembering of the Republican Guard and pro-Saddam paramilitary units.

³³⁸ Grossman, M. I., Prepared Statement, in Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *The Future of Iraq*, 108th Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11th February 2003), p. 15; see also Feith, D. J., Prepared Statement, in Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *The Future of Iraq*, pp. 20-24.

³³⁹ The statement of an USAID official about the post-war effort summarises the line of thought that inhabited the Bush Administration: "It's going to be very quick. We're going to meet their immediate needs. We're going to turn it over to the Iraqis. And we're going to be out within the year". USAID official Wendy Chamberlin quoted by Fallow, J., 'Blind into Baghdad', *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004).

Indeed, the initial conditions following the demise of the Ba'ath regime would prove radically different than what was foreseen by the pre-war planning. The collapse of governmental structure leading to widespread looting, the reorganisation of loyalists to the Ba'ath regime, the sorry state of the infrastructure, and the beginning of a sectarian realignment constituted the realities faced by the victors. From the start of the occupation, these developments impeded an efficient use of power instruments by the victors. Where plans relied essentially on an exertion of soft power, conditions would prompt the occupiers to react to violence with violence, jeopardising from the start their status as liberators. In a matter of weeks, liberation turned into occupation, cancelling the U.S. opportunity to build on the legitimacy that sprang from toppling the Ba'ath regime, and hence, putting at risk the success of the post-conflict cooperation.

Indeed, American planners did not foresee that once the head of the regime was chopped off, the body would disintegrate. They intended to rely on Iraqi police and military forces to ensure a certain level of security in the immediate aftermath of the war but these hopes did not materialise as the Iraqi army faded away, soldiers simply going home, and police officers not turning up at their stations. Instead, widespread looting and organised crime emerged. American planners did not understand that because of the nature of Saddam's regime, competent subordinate had no opportunities to emerge and carry on business as usual³⁴⁰, and did not foresee the scope of the collapse of the Iraqi state, which lost all its administrative capacity, and most importantly, its ability to coerce and hence ensure security and stability.³⁴¹

On top of the Iraqi governmental failure, the security situation worsened due to the rise of former regime loyalists and various militias opposed to the American occupation. Here, speed of action, the key-element in the American military campaign proved one of the factors causing the nemesis of the stability in Iraq. Far from being destroyed, paramilitary units faithful to Saddam had been dispersed instead of eliminated. They quickly reorganised and joined with anti-occupation forces to start a guerrilla war. American planners did not foresee this development either.³⁴²

³⁴⁰ Rathmell, 'Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq. What Can We learn?', *International Affairs*, 85:5 (October, 2005), p. 1024.

³⁴¹ Dodge, T., 'The Causes of US Failure in Iraq', *Survival*, 49:1 (Spring, 2007), pp. 87-89; Hendrickson, D.C. and Tucker, R.W., 'Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War?', *Survival*, 47:2 (Summer, 2005), pp. 10-12, 22.

³⁴² Rathmell, 'Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq, p. 1024; Hendrickson, D.C. and Tucker, R.W., 'Revisions in Need of Revising', pp.18-21.

Finally, the coalition was to face its worse surprise. Iraq's administrative, social and physical infrastructure was in a sorry state. The dream to use Iraq's supposed developed infrastructure, especially in the oil sector, to help the reconstruction effort vanished.³⁴³

The same conclusions were drawn regarding the political conditions conducive to the rise of a democratic state in Iraq as Rathmell argues: "Iraq was not a promising environment for achieving the goal of building a peaceful, democratic, free-market nation. Iraq had failed to develop into a cohesive nation-state; its state structures had the form but not the substance of a modern state, its economy was in poor shape and its society had endured almost half a century of debilitating violence."³⁴⁴

With the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the Coalition, an opportunity presented itself to salvage the idea of an Iraqi nation-state. The critical question was whether the various communities composing Iraq would come to terms with the possibility to build a common future. Given the number and depth of divides plaguing the Iraqi society, the chances were slim.³⁴⁵

Also belonging to the pre-conditions to the reconstruction and playing a critical role in the outcome of the U.S. project in Iraq, the fault lines that animate the Iraqi society constitute a set of objective factors that would impede on the reconstruction of Iraq from the start. Ignorant and blinded by the chimeras that characterised the pre-war planning, U.S. officials were caught off guard and, when faced with the unleashing of centuries of resentment between Iraqi communities fell short of providing a decisive answer. In the days and weeks that followed the toppling of the regime, American decision-makers simply did not know how to react to the reality they faced in Iraq. Moreover, these fault lines were also

³⁴³ Rathmell, A., *op. cit.*, p. 1024.

³⁴⁴ Indeed, the history of Iraq gave birth to an Iraqi nation-state that is all but artificial. Iraq became a state in the wake of the First World War after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire when the British government formed Iraq out of three Ottoman provinces. Three groups of population inhabited these provinces: Kurdish-speaking Sunni and Shia Muslim Kurds in the north, Sunni Muslim Arabs in the centre, and a combination of Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslim Arabs and Arabic speaking Shia Muslim Arabs in the south. They lived together as a nation-state since 1921, not always in harmony but managed to accommodate themselves with their differences. Later on, the Iraqi state under Sunni control gradually destroyed the non-Sunni political, religious, economic and cultural base. The exclusion of the Shi'a and Kurdish communities from the nexus of power as well as the permanent suppression of their cultural and religious expressions, compromised the idea of a unified Iraq in most Shi'a and Kurdish minds.; Rathmell, A., 'Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq', p. 1018; Allawi, A., *The Occupation of Iraq. Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 145-146.

³⁴⁵ Today, there are 27.5 million Iraqis. 75 to 80 percent are Arabic, 15 to 20 percent are Kurdish and 5 percent Assyrian, Turkoman, and other ethnic groups. The population is 97 percent Muslim, 60 to 65 percent being Shia and 32 to 37 percent Sunni. Christian and other confessions represent about three percent. Estimates 2007. CIA, *World Factbook* (2007). See also CIA, *Political and Personality Handbook of Iraq* (Washington: January 1991, declassified 26 March 2003), p. 3; on the struggle between Sunnis and Shi'as see also Gosh, B., 'Why they Hate Each Other', *Time* (12th March 2007), pp. 14-22; and, Polk, W. R., *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

accentuated by the fact that by attacking Iraq, the United States attacked the whole Arab and Muslim world, which perceived the presence of non-Muslim soldiers at the heart of the Middle East as the beginning of a new crusade. Hence, Iraq's neighbours, most of them U.S. allies, experienced widespread contestation of the American presence in Iraq. Ironically, by invading Iraq, the U.S. put at risk the stability of friendly regimes in the region, in direct opposition to one of U.S. foreign policy tenets: regional stability. Finally, while most of these countries are supposedly allies of the U.S., those most influencing the reconstruction process, Iran and Syria, are enemies and of opposite confessions, leading both countries to support their factions in Iraq, fuelling further instability. Hence, the geographical situation of Iraq was bound to end up in the involvement of neighbouring countries, not always sympathetic to American objectives

In fact, immediately after the regime's fall, the U.S. occupiers quickly understood that the pre-war planning was nowhere near the mark compared to the realities Americans were facing daily on the ground. None of the predicaments of the OSP occurred. Iraqis did not welcome U.S. troops, insurgents were already active and looting occurred on a grand scale, Iraqi infrastructure was gutted, sectarian differences were emerging.³⁴⁶ In short, Iraq was a country in need of long-term support, not a country able to reconstruct itself, materially, politically and socially.

In terms of power, the U.S. squandered its resources essentially because of a misreading of the realities affecting Iraq and a wishful thinking attitude regarding the reconstruction to follow the war. Such a lack of realism paved the way for a succession of mistakes by the Coalition Provisional Authority, in charge to implement a reconstruction programme based on a top-down approach, an approach that left little room for consent generation amongst Iraqis but favoured coercion-based policy instruments. The coercion-based approach to deal with the challenges in post-war Iraq was not only imposed by the realities faced on the ground but also a logical continuation of policies of coercion that had led to the war. The failure of the U.S. to generate consent to its regional leadership in the Middle East led the Bush administration to review its foreign policy options. Indeed, as Dodge argues, the shift of American foreign policy in the Middle East from consent generation to a focus on coercion aimed at bringing Iraq, and potentially other reluctant

³⁴⁶ As the Department of State's Future of Iraq Project foresaw. See U.S. Department of State, *The Future of Iraq Project. Transitional Justice. Working Group* (Washington DC: March 2003), pp. 28-29.

states in the region, to consent to American hegemony in the Middle East essentially because previous policies focusing on consent generation to American interests had failed.³⁴⁷

Due to pre-conditions poorly conducive to effective and consistent use of power in the implementation of reconstruction policies, the hope to move back to policies of consent generation to the American project in Iraq after the invasion were soon shattered and the beginning of the occupation turned into the continuation of the war.

Thus, at the onset of the occupation, pre-conditions did not prove congenial to a favourable outcome of reconstruction policies that would follow. While enjoying high levels of domestic approval in the U.S., the weak international support for the war in Iraq, the regional opposition of Arab populations to the invasion, the perception of the U.S. as a destabilising force, and the gap between planning and Iraqi reality all threatened the consistency of American actions and effective use of power exertion.

Across the four identified fields of reconstruction, the security, the state, the economy and the civil society, American actions would indeed more often than not be characterised by the use of force to push through resistance to the implementation of the reconstruction policies. The field of security, and the lack of it, would prove to be the driving factor that would condition potential progress in all three other areas. Deeply interconnected, those four fields harboured actors of power entangled in a struggle for survival, in the case of the Iraqi population; acquisition of power, in the case of the Iraqi political society; and imposition of a specific project of what Iraq should become, in the case of occupation authorities.

As mentioned earlier on, we contend that the outcome of post-conflict reconstruction is in correlation with the understanding that coercion and consent are at work across the four aspects of reconstruction and that all actors resort to both expressions of power in their actions. The main challenge for the U.S. occupation consists in getting the mix of coercion and consent right, ensuring that coercion and consent complete each other and do not impede each other, as well as making sure that its policies are consistent across reconstruction fields. This is what we are now going to investigate by looking at the actions of the occupational authorities in charge of reconstructing Iraq.

³⁴⁷ Dodge, T., 'The Sardinian, the Texan and the Tikriti: Gramsci, the Comparative Autonomy of the Middle Eastern States and Regime Change in Iraq', *International Politics*, 43:4 (September, 2006), p. 457.

Reconstructing Iraq: Power exertion and Consistency of Action across the Four Fields.

In the wake of the defeat of Saddam, the United States inherited a bankrupt Iraqi state. Years of economic sanctions and the fantasist policies of Saddam Hussein bled Iraqi population, resources and infrastructure to death. When the Ba'ath state disintegrated, power reconfiguration took place along sectarian fault lines that would prove difficult to erase as competing groups engaged in a contest for power resources in the context of a vacuum of power. The failure of the United States to comprehend the complexities of Iraqi history, and of Iraqi political and civil societies, led to the adoption of a coercion-based approach, declaring an official occupation to deal with the multitude of challenges to the U.S. presence in Iraq.³⁴⁸

From liberators, the U.S. turned into an occupier whose first responsibility was to create conditions conducive to the transfer of power to Iraqis and to the revival of the Iraqi economy. From a policy of coercion (the invasion) with the aim of toppling a dictatorship and generating Iraqi consent to an American designed project of democracy and free-market building, Americans faced a rise of violence that led to strong coercive measures to eradicate the opposition. In turn, such use of force led to a decline in American legitimacy in Iraq as U.S. soldiers started to behave more like occupiers (embodied by the searches of Iraqi houses for insurgents, detention of civilians, etc...) and less like liberators, which led to further loss of legitimacy and further need to use force. The Coalition forces were at the centre of a vicious circle of increasing coercion and diminishing consent-production: the need to use force to deal with rising violence undercut the legitimacy of the Coalition, which in turn weakened potential consent-generation amongst the Iraqi population, which further fuelled resistance, which led to more use of force.

Unable to deal with the situation, ORHA was dissolved and replaced by CPA, in charge of the complete reconstruction of Iraq.³⁴⁹ Arguably, the CPA constituted the major power broker in post-Saddam Iraq but was by no means the only recipient of power in the country. The CPA, temporarily vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority in Iraq³⁵⁰, was organised by departments run by senior advisers shadowing Iraqi ministries and

³⁴⁸ As a U.S. senior official said: "No one in Washington anticipated the degree to which the chaos would undermine that central goal of presenting the United States as a liberator", quoted in Schmitt, E. and Sanger, D. E., 'After Effects: Reconstruction Policy; Looting Disrupts detailed US Plans to Restore Iraq', *New York Time* (19th May 2003).

³⁴⁹ CPA was created on 11 May 2003 and endorsed by UNSCR 1483.

³⁵⁰ CPA's objectives were "to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people

in charge of reorganising them completely.³⁵¹ The CPA coordinated with the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)³⁵², made of 25 members representing the various political trends of the country³⁵³, and with the Coalition Coordinating Council (CCC) including other international partners to the reconstruction process in Iraq, but without any decision-making power. In addition to the political arm of the occupation, the Development Fund for Iraq was created to manage the funds destined to run the administration of the country and to rebuild the economy and Iraq's infrastructure. Paul Bremer, the head of CPA, was solely in charge of allowing disbursements for purposes he deemed to be to the benefit of the Iraqi people.³⁵⁴

The CPA reported directly to the President through the Pentagon, in an attempt to limit dispersion of decision-making centres. But by putting the Department of Defence in charge of the occupation in order to ensure unity of command, the Bush administration did not consider the lack of human resources at the Pentagon to manage post-conflict civilian aspects of reconstruction.³⁵⁵

To deal with the security situation, US military command structure was reorganised: Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) reporting to US Central Command (CENTCOM). CJTF-7 had operational control of all coalition armed forces in Iraq, including the future Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

The organisation of the occupation authorities put the U.S. solely in command in Iraq. Backed by its military arm and counting on an ailing legitimacy provided by the IGC, the

can freely determine their own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development" CPA, Regulation N° 1, *The Coalition Provisional Authority*, 16th May 2003. See also See Bremer, L. P. III, *My Year in Iraq* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006).

³⁵¹ Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act* (2nd June 2003), p. 11.

³⁵² The IGC is described by Feldman, a former CPA official, as "the Americans' best effort at a demographically representative, unelected Iraqi body that might nonetheless have a chance of enjoying political legitimacy in Iraq". Feldman, N., *What We Owe Iraq*, pp. 115-116.

³⁵³ The main political factions were the al-Da'wa party, spearheading the Shia fight against secularism in Iraq; the Shia SCIRI, Iranian backed and at the head of a sizeable militia, the Badr Brigades; the exiled Iraqi National Congress (INC), headed by Ahmad Chalabi and backed by the Pentagon but dismissed by the State Department and the CIA; Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National Accord (INA), composed mainly of former Ba'athists and military officers and created by the CIA in 1992; the two Kurdish parties, Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), both Sunni seculars, benefiting from stable regional institutions in the north of the country and supported by a large Peshmerga militia force. See CPA, Regulation N°6, *Governing Council of Iraq*, 13th July 2003.

³⁵⁴ CPA, Regulation N°2, *Development Fund for Iraq*, 10th June 2003.

³⁵⁵ Consequently, the CPA had to appeal to the State and the Treasury Departments to provide for civilian experts. Hence, the CPA was always a work in progress, staffing itself while designing its mission. Rathmell, A. 'Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq', p. 1026. A June 2004 GAO report states that the CPA throughout its existence worked with about a third of its positions vacant, essentially due to the lack of stability in the country and the hardship of the posting. GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq. Resources. Security. Governance. Essential Services and Oversight Issues* (Washington DC: United States General Accountability Office, June 2004), p. 40.

CPA engaged with the huge task of turning Iraq into a democratic, stable and peaceful state aligned with U.S. regional interests. However, the huge concentration of power in the hands of CPA, justified by the need for action and in the hope to be the only generator of success, also made it easier for other power players to locate the seat of failures. A diffusion of power exercise, for example endowing Iraqis with decision-making power, on top of potential consent-generation to policies, would also have limited the perception that failures in Iraq were entirely due to the U.S. occupation. By deciding to address directly the Iraqi population instead of trying to make use of a buffer by empowering the future Iraqi political elite, CPA posed as a colonial administration that worsened the Iraqi perception that the U.S. did not wage war only against Saddam but had other designs, namely the subjugation of Iraq and its people to push forward its interests in the region. Indeed, the role given to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) would not allow any power-sharing.

The analysis of U.S. policies across the security, the political, the economy and the civil society dimensions of the reconstruction of Iraq will now shed light on the way power was exercised and on how it influenced outcomes.

The Security Dimension: Conditioning Progress in the Three Other Spheres of Reconstruction

We now turn to the analysis of U.S. policies in the first field of reconstruction, the security sphere. By looking at how power was exerted by considering interactions between coercion and consent-based mechanisms of power, we intend to shed light on factors that reinforced or impeded the consistency of American actions. In addition, we also look at how U.S. regional and global foreign policies played a role in enhancing or impeding consistency of action in the security area. Finally, we also assess the influence that policies implemented in the security field had on the three other reconstruction dimensions under scrutiny: the state, the economy and the civil society.

In a post-conflict situation, the establishment of a secure environment is generally considered as paramount to the successful reconstruction of a country.³⁵⁶ In occupied Iraq, security is the key to progress in other dimensions of the reconstruction. Consequently, consistency of action in the security field is essential.

³⁵⁶ Jones, S. G., Wilson, J. M., Rathmell, A., Riley, K. J., *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005), p. xi; Dobbins, J. et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building*, p. xxv.

Security is the realm of power expressed through coercion. Nevertheless, we will see that coercion and consent walked hand-in-hand as the security issues faced by the Occupation were inseparable from progress made in the political, economic and civil society spheres, while progress in the non-security dimensions of the reconstruction was always dependent on the level of coercion applied in order to improve security and stability.

The early Coalition's inefficient response to armed challenges to the Occupation reflects a lack of understanding of the complexities animating Iraq. There are multiple sources of violence in Iraq: a largely Sunni insurgency, terrorist activities by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, militia warfare, and anarchy and criminality. When combined, these sources prove lethal and very difficult to deal with as violence runs across sectarian divides and involves other regional actors:

1/ With the collapse of Saddam's security forces, anarchy and criminal lawlessness got a free-hand. Iraq was engulfed in a wave of criminal activities including carjacking, kidnappings and murders. The Iraqi civil society found itself under siege and living in permanent fear.³⁵⁷ The absence of Iraqi police on the streets in the aftermath of the Ba'ath regime's collapse was essentially due to several factors: most pre-war senior officers had been removed; policemen simply did not turn up at work, when they did, they were not trained to patrol the streets but to stay in their stations; they did not have the required equipment to deal with heavily armed insurgents, a problem accentuated by the fact that most of their equipment had been stolen in the chaos following the regime's dismissal.³⁵⁸ In May 2004, CPA deemed the Iraqi police unfit to provide security and order in Iraq. The Coalition had to start rebuilding the police force from scratch.³⁵⁹ This inability to restore order would later on condition progress made in the other fields of reconstruction as it had a direct impact on the Iraqi infrastructure, essential for re-starting the economy and hence meet essential demands of the Iraqi population, in turn leading to consent generation to American policies.

2/ As we will see later on, CPA orders N°1 and 2 exacerbated the first and main source of violence in Iraq, the Sunni Arab insurgency. Lacking a central command structure being a network of networks having different objectives, the Sunni Arab insurgency aims mainly at restoring Sunni Arab rule in the country and for its other components at gaining

³⁵⁷ Hendrickson, D. C. and Tucker, R. W., 'Revisions in Need of Revising', p. 10.

³⁵⁸ Jones, S.G., Wilson, J.M., Rathmell, A. and Riley, K.J., *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, p. 118.

³⁵⁹ CPA, *Iraqi Police: An Assessment of the Present and Recommendations for the Future* (Baghdad: 30th May 2003).

local power and control. Its infrastructure, arms and support originate essentially in Iraq.³⁶⁰ The exclusion of Sunnis by the CPA from the political reconstruction of the Iraqi state led to the alienation of close to 30% of the Iraqi population. It fuelled further instability and hence took a toll on progress made in the economic sphere, and in the political and civil society as national reconciliation became elusive.

3/ A third source of violence, albeit more limited, is constituted by Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Sunni Arab, Iraqi-run, supported by foreign jihadists numbering 1300, the main objective of Al-Qaeda in Iraq consists in pushing the U.S. out of Iraq by bringing the sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias to unbearable levels. The lack of U.S. engagement with Iraq's neighbours, especially Syria in this case, led to the transformation of Iraq into the frontline of the war on terror. Non-Iraqi jihadists flocked to Iraq and caused further instability, once again threatening progress in other reconstruction fields. The lack of consistency between what was needed in Iraq, that is reducing the flow of foreign fighters, and a confrontational policy *vis-à-vis* Syria exemplifies the need to achieve coherence of foreign policy actions regionally if the reconstruction is to progress.

4/ Sectarian conflicts, fought by various militias, between Sunni and Shia communities constitute an important fourth source of violence that caused 1.6 million Iraqis to be displaced and 1.8 million to have fled the country. The rise of Shia militias, affiliated with political parties or localised, exacerbated sectarian violence against Sunnis. Militias also fight each other for local power control. In addition to undermining the authority of the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as the ability to Sunnis to join a peaceful political process, they put violence at the core of any attempts by political leaders to expand their power.³⁶¹ Here, the failure of the Bush administration to engage Iran regarding her support to Shi'a militias illustrates the lack of consistency between regional foreign policy and reconstruction imperatives in Iraq. To block the flow of Iranian arms to Shi'a militias was paramount to stability in Iraq and the future progress of reconstruction policies in all fields. However, the unwillingness of the Bush administration to constructively engage with Iran proved fatal to the control of Shi'a militias by the Occupation.

At first sight, the use of force seemed the only method available to Coalition forces to tame the burgeoning insurgency. Hence, while the end of major combat operations was

³⁶⁰ United States Institute for Peace, The Iraq Study Group Report, Chapter 1.

³⁶¹ The Mahdi Army led by Moqtada-al-Sadr is estimated at 60 000 fighters. It dominates an area of Baghdad counting 2.5 million people and targets Sunni civilians, coalition forces and Iraqi security forces. The Badr Brigade, affiliated with SCIRI, is backed by Iran and clashes regularly with the Madhi Army in the south of Iraq. Many of its members are part of the Iraqi police and target Sunni civilians while on duty. United States Institute for Peace, The Iraq Study Group Report, Chapter 1.

announced by G.W. Bush on May 1, 2003, Coalition forces remained entangled in deadly encounters with those who did not see them as liberators but as occupiers and oppressors. As we will try to demonstrate, while some sources of violence in Iraq can only be dealt with through the use of force, some decisions and actions taken by the Coalition forces and CPA in the security field contributed to a worsening of the situation and hence sent the reconstruction of the country on a path to failure.

Indeed, CPA Order 1 contributed to a worsening of the insurgency, as *de facto*, through the de-Ba'athification, Sunnis, until then constituting the ruling class in Iraq for centuries, were left out of the Iraqi political power landscape and ostracised. CPA Order 2, dissolving the security apparatus³⁶², fuelled further Sunni discontentment as Sunni officers and cadres were left without a job and deprived of termination payments. They would turn their skills and knowledge of terrain to the service of an insurgency aiming at ousting the U.S. out of Iraq and re-establishing the Sunnis in power. Both orders caused a worsening of the security situation, in turn leading to complications regarding the implementation of reconstruction projects in all other dimensions, such as the infrastructure, the economy and the civil society.³⁶³

The lack of contingencies to deal with consequences of the de-Ba'athification and demobilisation orders led to a situation in which the CPA lost the initiative and became reactive instead of proactive. It slowed down drastically the reconstruction process, especially the economic side of it, as resources were concentrated on the improvement of the security situation. Indeed, the insurgency intensified from September 2003, with attacks on international governmental and non-governmental organisations, contractors and Iraqis working with them or the Coalition. The CPA's response focused on a massive use of force.³⁶⁴ Consequently, the public sentiment about the occupation in central and southern Iraq worsened which played in favour of insurgents and contributed to further degradation of the security situation. It then seemed unlikely that consent generation would be back on the agenda for a while as CPA was then identified as at the source of all evils plaguing 'liberated' Iraq. To discontented Iraqis, responding to the use of force with violence seemed

³⁶² CPA, Order N°2, *Dissolution of Entities*, 23rd May 2003, dissolved the Ministry of Information, the security and intelligence services, the Ministry of Defence, the Republican Guard, and the armed forces.

³⁶³ 400,000 individuals across sectarian divides were left unemployed by this measure, unable to provide for their families. By dismissing senior ranks of the army, the CPA deprived itself from professionals who could have constituted the backbone of the new Iraqi army. Instead, these dismissed officers often joined the insurgents and brought with them a military knowledge that would reinforce the fighting capacity of the insurgency. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and various Shi'a militias saw their ranks swollen by the rank and file of Saddam's army. Hundreds of thousands of young men were left idle and bitter.

³⁶⁴ Major combat operations in Baghdad, Tikrit, Ba'qubah, Kirkuk and Balad were undertaken

the only option, hoping that permanent insecurity and growing Coalition casualties would lead to the departure of foreign troops.

In addition, when faced with the rising levels of violence it greatly contributed to generating, the Bush administration made two errors of judgement: the conflation of various groups resisting the occupation and the corollary exclusive resort to violence, where consent generation might have been a constructive approach to deal with some of these insurgency groups; and, the lack of resources in terms of number and quality of troops to face the rise of violence in the country.³⁶⁵

Indeed, the Bush administration made the fatal mistake of conflating both Sunni insurgents and Al-Qaeda terrorists into one source of violence to be dealt with in the same fashion. Until late 2005, the U.S. administration chose to apply coercion to those rejecting the new Iraq. In its *National Strategy for Iraq* paper, the NSC's first core assumption regarding security issues presents "terrorists, Saddamists and rejectionists"³⁶⁶ as one entity to be dealt with and the only way to dispose of these threats is for Coalition and Iraqi security forces to be on the offensive militarily and possibly politically.

Applying coercion to these three sources of violence until then constituted a political mistake on behalf of the Occupation. Indeed, while these groups have in common the objective of ousting the U.S. from Iraq, they have a different purpose for doing so. Al-Qaeda terrorists see Iraq as the frontline in their holy war against the West. Expelling Americans and turning Iraq into an Islamic state is the first step towards the propagation of the Jihad into neighbouring countries and then westwards.³⁶⁷ While Al Qaeda terrorists are not open to negotiating, and as it is U.S. policy not to negotiate with terrorists, the use of coercion to dispose of Al Qaeda in Iraq is the only outcome possible.³⁶⁸ For the U.S. administration, it is an existentialist war pitching freedom and democracy against tyranny and obscurantism. But by identifying Iraq as the main battlefield in the war on terror, the U.S. administration has in a way legitimised Al Qaeda's fight and pinpointed geographically a location to which

³⁶⁵ The U.S. military was not ready to deal with a guerrilla-type war. Blinded by the success of military operations in March 2003 against Saddam's army, U.S. army leaders and Pentagon officials overestimated the capacity of American forces to deal with a full-scale insurgency and terrorist operations in Iraq. The so called Revolution in Military Affairs would soon display its limits.

³⁶⁶ NSC, *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (Washington DC: November 2005), p. 18.

³⁶⁷ NSC, *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁶⁸ As the NSC and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued: "the terrorists regard Iraq as their central front of their war against humanity. And we must recognize Iraq as the central front in our war against terror". NSC, *Ibid.*, p. 4; Wolfowitz, P., Prepared Statement, in Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Iraq: Status and Prospects for Reconstruction – Resources*, 108th Congress, First Session (29th July 2003), p. 25.

foreign jihadists can converge.³⁶⁹ In turn, such an outcome opposed the global U.S. foreign policy objective aiming at defeating terrorism and hence weakened the United States in its fight against global terrorism. In addition, the U.S. foreign policy objective of promoting democracy closed the door to involving non-democratic regimes as Syria and Iran in the reconstruction process of Iraq. In turn, this reinforced the forces opposed to the U.S. occupation as Jihadists trickled into Iraq. In this case, decisions made in Iraq were thus inconsistent with global foreign policies while global foreign policies also impeded on progress in Iraq.

To deal with these threats, a rapid reconstruction of Iraqi security forces could have alleviated the security burden for Coalition forces and generated a dose of consent amongst the Iraqi population as the occupation would have been more discrete. Instead, the reformation of Iraqi security forces lingered for objective reasons (essentially due to the worsening of the security situation) and subjective reasons (the dissolution of the former Iraqi army, the lack of diligence on behalf of the Occupation in re-training and re-equipping Iraqis and the mistrust of Coalition officials regarding the fighting efficiency of Iraqi troops). Consequently, Coalition forces shouldered the bulk of the fight against the insurgency and against terrorists, and lost the opportunity to empower and legitimise Iraqi forces and *in fine*, the Iraqi government.

Finally, the issue of militias in Iraq exemplifies the inefficiency of politics of coercion. Any Iraqi actor aspiring to some share of power understood early on that he had to be backed by an armed organisation. The failures of the Coalition to provide for security and stability in the country led Iraqi political parties, religious and ethnic groups to organise their own militias to back their claim to political power. Consequently, the security situation worsened, and coercion and violence as political expedients gained further ground on consent and negotiated solutions among Iraqi power brokers.

The sphere of security is here directly linked to progress made on the political front. National reconciliation is indeed the ultimate objective in order to secure Sunnis a genuine and honest political role in the construction of a new Iraq. However, such a deal is only reachable and acceptable by Sunnis if there is grass-roots work done in civil society in order to build bridges between communities and silence the voices of sectarianism. Hence, it is

³⁶⁹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate. Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*, (Washington DC: April 2006); Mazzetti, M., 'Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat', *The Washington Post* (24th September 2006).

essential to underpin advances in the construction of the new Iraqi political society with progress in the direction of unity in the civil society.

Another mistake made by the Coalition consisted in under-estimating the human and material resources needed to secure stability in Iraq. In order to face increasing levels of violence and form the basis for an improvement of the security situation and establishment of law and order after a conflict, it is possible to turn to previous reconstruction cases as a benchmark. Indeed, compared to other reconstruction cases,³⁷⁰ international troops levels and financial assistance in Iraq were insufficient.

Looking at the resources available to the CPA in June 2003, when the security situation considerably worsened, it is clear that troop levels were too low for the mission of stabilising the country.³⁷¹ At the time, attacks on Coalition personnel averaged 12 per day.³⁷² A year later, in June 2004, with similar troop levels, attacks averaged 50 per day with a peak to 80 in April 2004. It is only in 2007, with the beginning of 'The Surge' that attacks drastically diminished, as the two tables here below illustrates.³⁷³

³⁷⁰ Based on Kosovo and Afghanistan, four conclusions can be reached: firstly, international troop levels should be 1,000 soldiers per 100,000 inhabitants and international police level at 150 officers for 100,000 inhabitants; secondly, after five years, the level of trained domestic police should be 200 officers for 100,000 inhabitants; thirdly, total financial assistance should be at least \$250 per capita for the first two years of reconstruction; and finally, security assistance should last at least five years. Jones, S. G., Wilson, J. M., Rathmell, A., Riley, K. J., *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, p. xiii. Diamond estimates that 300,000 troops were necessary to maintain stability, see Diamond, L., *Squandered Victory*. See also Edelstein, D. M., 'Occupation Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail', *International Security*, 29:1 (Summer, 2004), pp. 49-91.

³⁷¹ About 160,000 Coalition soldiers were on the ground then, including 13,000 non-US troops. At 571 soldiers per 100,000 inhabitants, the American occupation was 50 percent short of troops levels in previous reconstruction cases. Jones, S. G. et al, *op. cit.*, p. 133 ; Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act* (2nd June 2003), p. 2.

³⁷² Jones, S. G. et al, *Op. cit.*, p. 159.

³⁷³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (7th March 2008), p. 18.





Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Month, May 2003 to May 2008



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In light of what precedes, the Pentagon’s option to launch the war with smaller agile forces does not seem astute.³⁷⁵ Americans were thus victims of their success. This line of

³⁷⁴ GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. Progress Report: Some Gains made, Updated Strategy Needed* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accountability Office, 13th June 2008), p. 12.

³⁷⁵ Douglas Feith justified this choice by contending that it was because the U.S. fielded a small invasion force that the Iraqi regime collapsed rapidly: “What surprised the regime was the initiation of the war before we had larger forces in place. Had we decided that large numbers of forces - large enough to police the cities

justification would stand if U.S. officials had nevertheless thought of contingencies in case of uprising and insurgency. But, as his testimony in front of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations proves, Feith and OSP did not plan for such a possibility as they had envisioned that the Iraqi police and armed force would ensure security, that existing Iraqi ministries would continue to work, after vetting top personnel, and nowhere is there a mention of potential sudden collapse of law and order.³⁷⁶

Moreover, there is also an issue of troop quality to be considered: while American forces, as combat troops, were well equipped to win a war, they were not trained for peace-keeping duties following the military defeat of the Iraqi army.³⁷⁷ The Bush administration's contempt for the UN as exemplified in the weeks before the war jeopardized the presence of an international police force, trained and experienced in peace-keeping duties as well as police instructors to train the new Iraqi Police.³⁷⁸ Here, the U.S. foreign policy tenet lauding unilateralism instead of multilateralism backfired and was in direct opposition to progress of the reconstruction in the security sphere in Iraq. There was a clear lack of consistency between global foreign policies and what was required locally in Iraq.³⁷⁹

The U.S. go-alone pre-war policy backfired as the bulk of troops in Iraq remained American, fuelling further anti-Americanism and the sentiment of being occupied. However, the presence of a more diverse occupation force might not have made a big difference as it would have remained as *occupying* forces, which seems to be the key behind resistance.

Indeed, in light of the differentiation between power expressed as coercion or consent, the occupying forces' interactions with the Iraqi population would condition the outcome of the reconstruction, as it deepened further the resentment created by the presence of foreign

to prevent the immediate post-regime-collapse looting – were the top priority, we could have delayed the start of the military action and lost tactical surprise, but then we might have had the other terrible problems that we anticipated". Feith, D. J., *Remarks on Iraq Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 8th July 2003, Washington DC, p. 6.

³⁷⁶ Feith, D. J., Prepared Statement, in Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *The Future of Iraq*, p. 24.

³⁷⁷ Tripp, C., 'The United States and State-Building in Iraq', *Review of International Studies*, 30 (October, 2004), p. 551.

³⁷⁸ On the debate regarding the need to get more international police instructors to train Iraqi Police. see Biden, J. R. Jr, Opening Statement, in Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Iraq: Status and Prospects for Reconstruction – Resources*, 108th Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 29th July, 2003), pp. 5-10.

³⁷⁹ As Senator Feingold underlined: "I did not think that the go-it-alone mentality served this country well in the lead-up to conflict in Iraq, and I do not think that it serves us well now as we confront these enormous costs. The rest of the world has an interest in Iraq's stability. But they will not come forward without some sense that they are participating in an effort that is multilateral in its decision-making, not just its billing practices". Feingold, R. F., Prepared Statement, in Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Iraq: Status and Prospects for Reconstruction – Resources*, 108th Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 29th July, 2003), p. 54.

troops. In charge of performing a vast array of security tasks, ranging from counter-terrorist actions to dealing with petty criminals, as well as searching for insurgents, U.S. troops were constantly confronted with the Iraqi population. U.S. soldiers are trained to fight other soldiers and not so much to deal with civilians. The permanent insecurity surrounding U.S. anti-terrorist and anti-insurgency operations put a lot of pressure on the U.S. rank and file soldiers in their interactions with Iraqis. Inevitably, collateral damages occurred³⁸⁰ and cultural clashes happened.³⁸¹

Not only are Iraqis faced with the occupier's use of force on a daily base but, if we may say so, the 'quality' of such use of force certainly did not help consent generation. In other words, the lack of cultural sensitivity on behalf of U.S. troops contributed to a worsening of a negative image of an occupation that is seen as ignorant and careless. Thousands of daily encounters between Iraqis and the invaders constitute as many cultural clashes that rarely progress in the right direction. The cultural divide between Iraqis and occupation force has proven fatal to the generation of such conditions buttressing consent production, despite efforts made by the Occupation in educating their soldiers.³⁸² Instead, coercion stayed at the foreground, participating to further insecurity while further damaging Iraqi consent to the presence of U.S. forces. Consequently, due to the omnipresence of cultural clashes, it would prove more difficult for Americans to spread their values and ideas across the Iraqi civil society.

Hence, Pentagon officials, aware that more U.S. troops on the ground could do more harm than good, called for a speed up of Iraqi security forces training, who would be in charge of patrolling the streets and enforcing law and order, while U.S. troops would perform combat operations against insurgents.³⁸³ Aiming at buttressing its coercive

³⁸⁰ Kucinich, D. J., Prepared Statement in Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, *Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds*, 108th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 15th June, 2004), p. 9.

³⁸¹ As Crocker underlines, "raids against mosques, the use of police dogs, searches of homes and women have greatly angered Iraqis, who see these activities as transgressions of local or religious laws". Crocker, B, 'Checking the Rising Tide: Anti-Americanism in Iraq and the Future of the US-Iraq Relationship', in The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, *Iraq. Reconstruction and Future Role* (Abu Dhabi, UAE: ECSSR, 2004), p. 51; see also Langewiesche, W. 'Letter from Baghdad', *Atlantic Monthly* (January/February, 2005), pp. 93-98.

³⁸² U.S. Army, *FM3-07. Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington D.C.: February 2003), p. I-5; U.S. Marine Corps Institute, *Iraq: An Introduction to the Country and People* (Washington D.C., Undated), especially pp. 1-23; 1st Infantry Division, *Soldier's Handbook to Iraq* (Undated), especially pp. 3-1 – 3-10.

³⁸³ As Wolfowitz argued: "the function of American troops is to go after enemy that have been identified through actionable intelligence. When it comes to patrolling the streets of Iraqi cities, it is a disadvantage to have American troops. It means that our people are colliding with ordinary Iraqis trying to go about their

capabilities, but above all in an attempt to put back consent at the centre of the picture, occupation authorities decided to rely on local security forces to eventually take over. It was hoped that Iraqi insurgents would be less likely to attack their fellow countrymen, and that the street would welcome a change of personnel, as with more Iraqi security forces, more legitimacy generation was expected. Consequently, CPA produced a series of orders reorganising the Iraqi Security Forces and a performing judicial system.³⁸⁴

The recruiting and training process of the various components of Iraqi security forces was painstakingly slow.³⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the need to develop Iraqi forces was clear for two reasons. Firstly, the number of attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces was on the rise as well as becoming more sophisticated.³⁸⁶ Secondly, a State Department poll of January 2004, confirmed by another poll in June 2004 stated that the Iraqi population was confident that Iraqi security forces would do a better job than the Coalition forces in maintaining security.³⁸⁷ It was hoped that by transferring more security responsibilities to Iraqis, at least some of the insurgents would lay down arms and that the population would somehow grant more legitimacy to the occupation. Close to the end of CPA's tenure, the prospects of Iraqis

day-to-day business". Wolfowitz, P., Prepared Statement, in Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Iraq: Status and Prospects for Reconstruction – Resources*, p. 35.

³⁸⁴ CPA, Order N°22, *Creation of a New Iraqi Army*, 7th August 2003; CPA, Order N°28, *Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps*, 3rd September, 2003; CPA, Order N°26, *Creation of the Department of Border Enforcement*, 24th August, 2003; CPA, Order N°15, *Establishment of the Judicial Review Committee*, 23rd June 2003. Out of 860 reviewed judges and prosecutors, 176 were removed on corruption charges or human rights violations; CPA, Order N°7, *Penal Code*, 9th June 2003; CPA, Order N°35, *Re-establishment of the Council of Judges*, 13th September 2003; for the necessity to develop Iraqi security forces, see also Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, 14 July, 2003, p. 10.

³⁸⁵ The evolution of security forces recruitment can be found in various reports: CPA, *Weekly Report. Iraq Fact Sheet*, 28th October, 2003; Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, 14 October 2003, p. 4; CPA, *Weekly Report. Iraq Fact Sheet*, 25th December, 2003. As Kerik, in charge of rebuilding Iraq's security apparatus explained before the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representative: "The Iraqi Police, as they stand today, are unable to independently maintain law and order and need the assistance and guidance of Coalition Force to accomplish this task". Kerik, B., Prepared Statement in Hearing Before the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, *Winning the Peace: Coalition Efforts to Restore Iraq*, 108th Congress, First Session, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 8th October, 2003), p. 39. A June 2003 CPA internal report on the state of the Iraqi Police shed light on the massive task of rebuilding the Iraqi police, described as lacking of professional standards, as suffering from absence of training, ignorant of human rights, and depleted of initiative, as well as under-equipped. CPA, *Iraqi Police: An Assessment of the Present and Recommendations for the Future*, p. 4.

³⁸⁶ GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq. Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services and Oversight Issues* (June 2004), p. 43.

³⁸⁷ Only 20% of the Iraqis interviewed said that the Coalition forces were very effective in keeping law and order and about a third of interviewees said that Coalition forces were effective at protecting Iraqis from civil war and major threats. U.S. Department of State, Opinions Analysis, Office of Research, M-03-04, (Washington DC: 6th January, 2004).

shouldering the security burden looked rather bleak. Not only were the numbers low³⁸⁸ but the quality of these Iraqi forces was questionable, as during the rise of violence in April 2004, these security forces collapsed in several locations.³⁸⁹ Due to lack of training³⁹⁰, delays in delivery of equipment³⁹¹ and poor leadership, Iraqi security forces were never a match for heavily armed insurgents. After the end of CPA's presence, Iraqi security forces were still unable to shoulder a bigger part of security tasks. The lack of reliable data about Iraqi units efficiency and the absence of a system to measure Iraqi readiness to face with success insurgents postponed the transfer of more security responsibilities from the Coalition to its Iraqi counterparts.³⁹²

Adding to the already critical situation, with the dramatic events of Fallujah and the general rise of violence in the Sunni Triangle in April 2004, some Coalition partners, such as Spain, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, decided to withdraw their troops, stretching further the U.S. forces that had to replace them. International civilian contractors, also primary targets of insurgent activities, started to leave the country, hampering further the reconstruction effort. Travelling around the country became increasingly difficult, and the CPA and its supporting U.S. agencies had to reduce their presence in the field. In addition, Iraqis working for the CPA, mainly translators, became targets, considered by insurgents as collaborators of the occupiers. Hence, communication problems between CPA staff and locals worsened, which had a direct impact on reconstruction projects across the three other fields under scrutiny: the state, the economy and the civil society. Reconstruction projects

³⁸⁸ Even though 18,000 Border Police and Enforcement officers were on duty, none was fully trained. Out of the 14,600 police officers on duty, only 2,324 completed training. The 32,000 strong Civil Defence Corps on duty received a on-the-job training. Out of the foreseen 40,000 strong Iraqi Army, 3,000 Iraqi soldiers completed training and were available while another 1,700 were being trained. Finally, the 70,000 strong Facilities Protection Servicemen were on duty but essentially composed of militiamen. U.S. Department of Defense, *Draft Working Papers. Iraq Status* (Washington DC: 15th March 2004), p. 21.

³⁸⁹ GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq. Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services and Oversight Issues* (Washington DC: United States General Accountability Office, June 2004), pp. 5, 58-59. For example, staffing of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps decreased from 30 to 82% depending on the region in the first two weeks of April 2004.

³⁹⁰ The Iraqi Police recruits could not benefit from the training scheme designed by the CPA as instructors could not travel freely in the country. Hence, police training was delegated to local Coalition units, which did not follow the scheduled 108 hours training course of the Transition Integration Programme but delivered training with whatever resources they had. Consequently, training varied from three days to three weeks, at the discretion of the local Coalition commanders. GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq* (June 2004), pp. 57-58.

³⁹¹ As of August 2004, the Iraqi security forces depending of the Ministry of the Interior (Iraqi Police and Border Enforcement) were at 55% of their requirements in terms of weapons, 35% in vehicles, 24% in communication equipment, and 41% in body armour. U.S. Department of State, *Iraq Status Report*, 8th September 2004.

³⁹² GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq. Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accountability Office, 14th March 2005), pp. 9, 13-14.

thus became harder to achieve and suffered delays but also saw their costs rising due to the worsening of the security situation. Finally, numerous contractors and NGOs simply pulled out of the country for security reasons.³⁹³

The failure of the CPA and the Coalition forces to quickly train and equip Iraqi security forces would prove lethal to many reconstruction projects. Without the capacity to drastically improve the security situation, the Coalition found itself stretched thin and incapable of facing the multiple challenges that made the security situation worse. Major projects were called off, others delayed, and hence the hope to rely on some form of improvements in the daily life of Iraqis in order to manufacture consent to the occupation remained elusive. The contest for the state was permanently at the forefront and the Iraqi civil society could not benefit from the economic resources necessary to its development and reinforcement, which were essential for the acquisition of stability. Clearly, the lack of consistency in power exertion in the security sphere influenced directly the three other fields of the reconstruction effort.

The CPA then realised that a key-factor in re-attributing the monopoly of coercion to an Iraqi state would require the elimination of internal forces contesting such monopoly. Indeed, dealing with the rise of armed militias, essentially attached to political parties or ethnic and religious groups, was paramount to the attainment of such an objective. As much as it was necessary to develop indigenous security forces, it became even more critical to disarm and incorporate militiamen in the political and civil society in order to create conditions conducive to a successful reconstruction.

Iraqi militias were identified by the UN fact-finding mission of February 2004 as potentially a “source of coercion and intimidation” and hence jeopardising the electoral process, especially if directly linked to political parties.³⁹⁴ Consequently, with the transition process of handing power to an Iraqi temporary government and the perspective of elections in late 2004 or early 2005, it became necessary for the CPA to take the necessary measures to deal with yet another potential source of instability by forbidding militias and designing a Transition and Reintegration Plan (TRP) aiming at disbanding and reintegrating members of militias into the Iraqi society.³⁹⁵

³⁹³ A GAO report estimates that a rise of 10 to 15 percent in projects’ costs due to security imperatives. GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq* (June 2004), p. 52.

³⁹⁴ United Nations Security Council, *The Political Transition in Iraq: Report of the Fact-finding Mission*, doc. N° S/2004/140 (23rd February 2004), p. 10.

³⁹⁵ Through 1/Entry into the Iraqi Armed Forces or other security forces; 2/ Retirement with veterans’ benefits; 3/reintegration into civil society and economy through education, training and job placement. CPA, Order N°91, *Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias in Within Iraq*, 2nd June 2004.

On paper, the plan looked good. But while the main militias agreed to the CPA plan³⁹⁶, smaller militias did not, or simply were not contacted by CPA due to a lack of resources, because they were deemed of less political importance, or because of the security situation. Those militias kept fighting Coalition forces. Moreover, the infrastructure needed to perform the TRP was not fully functional.³⁹⁷

But following the withdrawal of the CPA in June 2004 and the official transfer of power to the IIG, the TRP was shoved aside and so to speak defunct as the security situation had not improved. The militia problem would keep haunting the Iraqi newly formed government for years to come.³⁹⁸

Again, the militia issue illustrates the influence of the sphere of security on the reconstruction of the Iraqi state. The overall security situation is closely connected to the progress made in the political sphere and especially regarding a potential national reconciliation. However, in a situation of volatile security and political instability due to a permanent contest for the control of a nascent state, Iraqi power brokers were not ready to dispossess themselves of the protection and tool for action provided by their armed gangs. Not only did the use of force permanently shadow consent generation in the relations between occupiers and occupied, but coercion was also the privileged mode of action of those supposed to rebuild the Iraqi state from the inside.

The security dimension of the reconstruction project proved to be central to any progress in other fields. Permanently, the Occupation responded by coercion to challenges to its authority and specific project in Iraq. Indeed, while attempts to rely on softer aspects of power were used, they rapidly reached their limits because they were either not consistent with Iraqi expectations or simply unable to cope with the levels of violence they faced. Any attempts at generating consent were thwarted by one simple fact: Iraqis do not want to be occupied. Anything the Occupation threw at them in terms of definition of a common interest and reconstruction project would have been welcome but from the outside under the form of support, not imposition. Attempts at generating consent by legitimising the reconstruction by putting an Iraqi face on the occupation were also discarded as demagogic and fake. The IGC did not perform its role of buffer between CPA and the Iraqi population, failing to generate consent in the name of the Occupation; hence, without actors of power

³⁹⁶ The bulk of militiamen was concentrated in the KDP, PUK and the SCIRI's Badr Brigades. KDP: 41,000, PUK: 31,000, and Badr: 16,500. GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq* (June 2004), p. 66.

³⁹⁷ As the GAO report of June 2004 underlines, some sites for the job-training of ex-militiamen were closed in April and May 2004 due to the worsening of the security situation. GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq* (June 2004), p. 63.

³⁹⁸ Jones, S. et al., *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, p. 117.

able to manufacture consent, the Occupation relied on coercion to enforce its policies, fuelling resentment and further disabling consent generation.

Decisions made in the security sphere had a direct impact on progress of the reconstruction in the three other fields of reconstruction, the state, the economy and civil society. The Sunni purge, the dismantling of the Iraqi army, the conflation between terrorists and insurgents, the inability to control militias, the lack of U.S. human and material resources, the excesses of the U.S. forces and the overall inability to curb the level of violence caused the Iraqi state to remain a battlefield for contending factions and barred Sunni from a potential process of national reconciliation. This impeded the reconstruction of the state institutions, deprived the economic reconstruction of essential resources that were used to deal with security issues while looting worsened the already sorry state of infrastructure, essential for the economy to be revived. It also impacted on reconstruction progress of the Iraqi civil society as sectarianism thrived impeding national reconciliation at the grass-roots level, and as the growing negative image of U.S. troops and efficiency in Iraqi minds impeded genuine consent generation to American values and ideas to be spread across the Iraqi civil society.

Moreover, the lack of consistency between U.S. local reconstruction, regional and global policies also impacted on the effectiveness of security reconstruction policies. Indeed, the decision to-go-it alone and hence to make use of essentially U.S. troops deprived the U.S. of the experience of international organisations and other nations in peace-making, as well as of their material resources. Declaring Iraq as the frontline of the fight on global terrorism, hurt the U.S. global foreign policy objective aiming at winning the war on terror, as Jihadists found in Iraq not only a battlefield but also exposure to promote their cause. The promotion of democracy as foreign policy objective closed the door to including Syria and Iran in the reconstruction process, hence causing both countries to become defensive, thinking they might be next on the U.S. invasion list. Consequently, Syria and Iran offered support to those in Iraq who rejected the American presence and project to reconstruct the country.

Consequently, faced with failure, the American administration organised the transfer of power from CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government at the end of June 2004. It constituted a new form of collaboration between the U.S. and Iraq. From a MacArthurian mode of functioning, the American presence in Iraq moved from formal occupation to indispensable presence, essentially because the Coalition under U.S. leadership was considered by the Iraqi political class as the only entity able to provide the needed level of security and stability in order to pursue the reconstruction of the state.

The Political Society Dimension of Reconstruction: Betting on the Iraqi State to Achieve Success.

We look now at the second field of reconstruction: the re-creation of an Iraqi state. In the wake of the Ba'ath regime fall, the Iraqi institutional structure collapsed entirely. Under Saddam, as in previous Iraqi regimes³⁹⁹, patronage and client-based relations were the norm. Those wanting to progress had to be connected to the Ba'ath party and the whole system functioned as a 'shadow state' on the basis of rewards and bribes at all levels of power.⁴⁰⁰ The 2003 invasion hit that system at its heart by removing the top layer of the regime and finalised the total collapse of whatever public institutional structure was left in Iraq.⁴⁰¹ While the official state all but disappeared, the 'shadow state' survived and as Tripp argues, "the 'shadow state' itself disintegrated into its myriad components,[...], these, far from evaporating, fell back on their local ties and communities, positioning themselves to re-form according to the new dispensations of power".⁴⁰²

Consequently, from the onset of the occupation, the Iraqi political society found itself in a process of re-adjustment to new political realities. Those with physical power at their disposal would be instrumental in the political reconfiguration of Iraq triggered by the Coalition. Far from managing to control these centrifugal fluxes, the occupation authorities contributed to their development and as the results of the 2005 elections would confirm later on, powerful factions at the head of armed militias, gathering support from their ethnic and sectarian communities or from the Occupation fought over ministries, turned them into fiefdoms and posited themselves as the new Iraqi oligarchy.

The fragmentation of the Iraqi political society remains an enduring legacy of the CPA's actions and logically had a direct influence on the reconstitution of the civil society as we will see later on. That process of fragmentation sprang from the inexistence of security and stability in the country, while in turn deepening further the rifts between Iraq's communities, and hence worsening the security situation. As long as Iraqi political society failed to find a way out from spiralling violence, no national reconciliation and hence no

³⁹⁹ See Rayburn, J., 'How the British Quit Mesopotamia', *Foreign Affairs*, 85:2 (March/April 2006), pp. 29-40; Tripp, C., *A History of Iraq*, ch. 3 to 5.

⁴⁰⁰ CIA, *Political and Personality Handbook of Iraq*, pp. 3-10; on the intelligence apparatus of Saddam Hussein, see CIA, *Iraq. Foreign Intelligence and Security Services* (August 1985, declassified August 2004); Tripp, C., *A History of Iraq*, especially pp. 259-267.

⁴⁰¹ Tripp, C., *A History of Iraq*, Third Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 275-277.

⁴⁰² Tripp, C. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

gains in stability could be made, which in turn jeopardised the overall reconstruction project. As we will see later on, the situation improved when the U.S. finally invested heavily in improving the security in the country through the Surge, as some stability was brought and warring parties forced to sit down and talk to each other. While conducive to progress in the reconstruction process, the reinforcement of the Iraqi state actually did not play in favour of the original U.S. idea of what the Iraqi state should look like and how it should behave.

From the onset of the CPA's tenure, it was clear that the U.S. had a very specific idea of what the Iraqi state ought to look like. The bottom-line for the U.S. administration was to make sure that the new Iraqi state would be friendly to the United States and responsive to the defence of American interests in the region. Behind the smoke screen that bringing democracy, stability and order in the region is, those interests consist mainly in allowing the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, at the heart of the Middle East, in order to complete the encirclement of Iran, considered as a potential challenger to U.S. regional interests; and, of course, to be in a position to secure access to oil resources. Indeed, with so many U.S. troops on their doorsteps, oil-producing countries might think twice before using oil a weapon against the U.S. or the industrialised world in general, which would endanger global economic growth on which U.S. wealth and global status rely. If anyone doubts that the permanent presence of U.S. troops in Iraq constituted one of the main objectives of the Bush administration in going to war with Saddam Hussein, one just needs to look at the recent negotiations between PM Maliki and the U.S. administration regarding the presence of 60 U.S. bases in Iraq for an undefined period of time.⁴⁰³

The contest for the Iraqi state caused CPA decisions to collide with Iraqi realities and expectations of Iraq's power players. On one side, the CPA took the necessary steps to make sure that Iraq would be a centralised democratic pro-Western country, mainly backed up by Iraqi seculars and former exiles. Such a vision matched the American project of anchoring democracy in the region and securing a U.S. military presence at the heart of the Middle East, as well as making sure that the Iraqi oil would be in the hand of a strong central government, easier to deal with than if oil resources were divided amongst regions. On the other side, we find a myriad of actors who had a specific agenda regarding the form and content of the future Iraqi state: The Kurds favoured de-centralisation to maintain their autonomy; Sunnis were *de facto* disenfranchised from the political sphere through the de-

⁴⁰³ Paley, A.R. and DeYoung, K., 'Iraqis Condemn American Demands', p. A01; Paley, A.R. and DeYoung, K., 'Key Iraqi Leaders Deliver Setback to U.S.', p. A01.

Ba'athification order and the effects of the insurgency; and Sistani and Shi'as leaned towards a form of Islamic Republic, potentially close to Iran.

Illustrative of the contest for the state, the American designed Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)⁴⁰⁴ became the subject of a struggle between the CPA and the various Iraqi parties as several provisions were contentious and laid the foundations for further discussions that would plague relations between communities in Iraq.⁴⁰⁵ American attempt at providing Iraq with a model for her permanent constitution, the TAL also includes a Bill of Rights ensuring that all Iraqis are equal before the law and equal in their rights whatever their ethnic, religious or racial background.⁴⁰⁶

Many of the TAL's contentious provisions were adopted in the Iraqi constitution and later on constituted blockage points, on which the Iraqi government is still working. In other words, the American insistence on seeing specific ideas embodied in the Iraqi fundamental law contributed to a slow-down of the political development and the strengthening of the Iraqi state. These contentious provisions were the issue of centralisation versus de-centralisation, to accommodate Kurdish fears of a strong central government but limiting the power of the Shi'a majority⁴⁰⁷; the inclusion of de-Ba'athification⁴⁰⁸, aggravating the political rejection of the Sunni community and hence threatening national reconciliation; the possibility to veto based on alliances of regions, and hence to block all institutional progress including the adoption of a permanent constitution; and, the lack of clear provisions regarding the sharing of natural resources amongst regions.

⁴⁰⁴ The TAL stipulates that "the system of government in Iraq will be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic. Federalism will be based on geography, history and separation of powers, and not on ethnicity or sect". Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8th March 2004, printed in U.S. Senate, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 22nd April 2004* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 85; Iraqi Constitution (October 2005).

⁴⁰⁵ The TAL was the supreme law of Iraq during the transitional period, referring to the period starting with the transfer of sovereignty from CPA to the IIG on June 30, 2004 until the formation of an Iraqi transitional elected government, in any case not later than December 31, 2005. A National Assembly will be constituted after elections are held, no later than December 31, 2004. The National Assembly will have the responsibility to write the permanent constitution of Iraq.

⁴⁰⁶ CPA, *An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments* (Baghdad: undated), p. 44.

⁴⁰⁷ Eventually, on 12th April 2008, the Regions Law became effective. It allows for one or more provinces to form a region, which would be governed by a legislative council possessing significant authority to pass laws that could supersede national legislation. SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th April 2008), p. 9.

⁴⁰⁸ No former Ba'ath party member with the rank of Division Member or higher is allowed to run as representative to the National Assembly and Governorate Councils. Lower ranks as Full Member have to sign a discharge confirming their renouncement to Ba'athism. Article 35 and 38 specify that, on top of the conditions enumerated in article 31, members of the Presidency Council or candidates to the position of Prime Minister, if ever members of the Ba'ath Party, would have had to leave the party at least ten years before its fall.

The CPA-led institutional remoulding of the Iraqi political society, while forming the basis of democracy and human rights in Iraq, contributed to the future deepening of the country's fragmentation. In the year that followed the June 2004 transfer of power, Iraqi political parties would entrench themselves in their positions and prove unable to reach agreements conducive to greater political stability.⁴⁰⁹ Key-issues such as de-Ba'athification, national reconciliation and natural resources sharing would plague any meaningful advances towards national unity.

Indeed, the first decision made by CPA, the purge of the Ba'ath party, would prove fatal to security (as we saw above) and to any prospect of a fast national reconciliation between Iraqi factions, by literally stripping what was left of Iraqi institutions of those with some expertise.⁴¹⁰

Politically, the scope of the purge constituted a mistake as it contributed to the collapse of the state, and hence caused a vacuum of power that became a battleground for the various Iraqi factions struggling for power resources. Without any regulatory framework, the only outcome of such a struggle was the use of force, which led to further loss of security and the rise of insurgents and militias as we saw here above. Moreover, it also prompted an exodus of Sunni experts to Syria and other neighbouring countries, depriving the Iraqi state of those with experience to run it. In turn, it impacted the economic recovery of the country as those with expertise fled. Here, decisions made in the political sphere directly influenced the economic dimension of reconstruction. The purge signalled the CPA commitment to bring democracy to the Iraqi society and to build accountable governmental institutions. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the purge in the TAL and later in the constitution was not the most politically astute decision as Sunnis remained wary of their future as a minority.

Consequently, the punitive aspect of the purge, aiming at showing the Iraqi population that Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party were gone for good, and hence, bringing some legitimacy to the occupation, had two direct consequences.

First, Sunnis, as constituting the bulk of the Ba'ath Party, felt even more ostracised and fell back on their common identity as a form of protection. It translated into a

⁴⁰⁹ The debate between communities about the future constitution is comprehensively explained in Al-Marashi, I., 'Iraq's Constitutional Debate', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 9:3 (September, 2005), pp. 143-144.

⁴¹⁰ Ten thousand individuals were removed from government positions and forbidden to be employed in the public sector on the basis that they were members of the four highest ranks of the party. In addition, individuals having positions in the top three layers of management in national government ministries, affiliated corporations and other government institutions as universities and hospitals were subjected to interviews aiming at determining their affiliation with the Ba'ath party and the potential risk they posed to security. CPA, Order N° 1, *De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society*, 16th May 2003.

reinforcement of the insurgency, which produced the exact opposite of what the purge intended. Indeed, far from repenting, those punished for being Ba'athists expressed their anger by rejecting the occupation and fighting coalition forces and their supporters. What measure of consent the CPA gained amongst the former victims of Ba'athism (essentially non-Sunni), it lost by fuelling violence, to which coercion could be the only answer. The security dimension of the reconstruction was victim of the reconstruction of the state designed by American officials. Both the political and security fields of the reconstruction were here in complete opposition, and policies were inconsistent with each other. Worse, the purge, as a source of violence, was now enshrined in the document serving as the basis for a future constitution.

Second, by dissolving government institutions created by Saddam, the CPA actually dismantled organisations that were amongst the biggest employers in the country. From one day to the next, the CPA denied Iraqis their source of revenues. Resentment grew stronger especially since in some rare cases, former Ba'athists were kept in their position on the ground of their indispensable expertise. Such exceptions seen as unfair triggered a process of denunciation, complaints, and violent expressions of discontentment that contributed to the worsening of the violence.

The rise of a new Iraqi state was obviously plagued by many problems. Without the exclusive coercive control exercised by Saddam Hussein on political and civil society, the state became a battleground of opposing factions, all preoccupied by the power they could accumulate during the reconstruction process and the redefinition of the state's boundaries. As the CPA's main objective consisted in keeping Iraq united, the Occupation implemented a top-down approach, a Japan-like model with centralisation of authority in the hand of the occupation authorities, later on assisted by the IGC. The main objective consisted in keeping the country together by bridging differences between Iraqis and in avoiding the emergence of one of the factions fighting each others for power in Iraq. In order to achieve this objective in an already volatile political environment, coercion became the main power instrument used by the occupation authorities. The permanent need for the Occupation to impose decisions, in opposition to constructively share, aggravated the fault lines plaguing the Iraqi political and civil society. The use of force to deal with challenges to the state widened the gap between state and civil society as a sizeable part of the Iraqi society, essentially Sunnis and some Shi'as, were alienated and the use of coercion to contain such alienation was seen as necessary to avoid state collapse.

Consequently, it became obvious to the occupation that progress made in the economy and the development of the civil society were paramount to a potential progress in the reconstruction of the security and political spheres. By putting the economy back on its feet, CPA hoped for the strengthening of an Iraqi middle class, that would embody democratic and secular ideals and hence give more weight to moderate political parties. It was hoped that a decisive revival of the economy would generate some level of support from the Iraqi population to the Occupation and lead to potential stabilisation of Iraq. Finally, economic revival would go hand-in-hand with the development of a strong democratic civil society built on the rule of law, a free press and local elected authorities, as an opportunity to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis.

It was hoped that the lack of progress in the security and political areas, both closely linked, could be compensated for by targeting the support of the various Iraqi political factions, that is the Iraqi people. The failure of coercive power in the security and political fields triggered an accentuation of policies of consent generation by addressing basic needs and political aspirations of the population. In turn, it was hoped that such support gained through consent would probably expand and somehow influence the political formation of the country and hence, improve the security situation. To the Romans' 'bread and circuses' as an instrument of political control over the population would follow the American 'jobs and electricity' for all policy.

Reconstructing the Economy: Attempts at Generating Consent and at Integrating Iraq in the Global Economy

Our third field of observation of the reconstruction of Iraq is constituted by policies implemented in the economic sphere. In parallel to the democratisation of Iraq, and according to the official line, the U.S. sought to build a free-market economy buttressed by a vigorous private sector which would lead to prosperity for Iraqis, and in turn would contribute to reinforcing democracy. While CPA policies in the security and political arenas were harmed by the inevitable coercion that accompanied most of American actions, the economy was identified as the ground in which to seed consent through prosperity for the Iraqi people. Witness to permanent interactions existing between the fields of reconstruction, progress in the economic area would be hampered by the lack of progress in the security and political fields. Indeed, on top of dire initial conditions, the rampaging insurgency and the translation of potential economic benefits into political objectives by the various Iraqi

political factions would contribute to the failure of the Iraqi economic revival and hence jeopardise the reconstruction project as a whole.

Lucid at the onset of CPA's tenure, Bremer agreed that to reach a fully functioning market economy in Iraq was beyond the scope of its mission. Certain that the occupation would be short, Bremer fixed four sets of objectives essential to sustainable growth and market economy: to get the oil production back to pre-war levels; to issue a new currency; to establish an independent central bank; and, to liberalise commercial and investment laws.⁴¹¹

Creating a market-based economy in Iraq, or even creating conditions to reach such status, was an ambitious project regarding the pre-conditions. Indeed, the sorry state of the infrastructure, decades of a centralised and corrupt economy⁴¹², the impact of the UN oil-for-food programme⁴¹³, and the issue of Iraq's external debt and 1990 war-reparations⁴¹⁴ all contributed to the disintegration of the Iraqi economic infrastructure.⁴¹⁵

At the beginning of its tenure, the CPA thus had to deal with two major repercussions of the collapse of the Iraqi economy: the crumbling of the infrastructure and the disintegration of the middle class. Both would play an important role in the CPA's attempt at reconstructing the economy to provide wealth to the Iraqi people, which in turn, it was hoped, would generate consent to the whole U.S. project in Iraq.

CPA concluded rightly that in order to manage economic transition, it would be vital to restore essential services to the Iraqi population. The reparation of the dilapidated power and water infrastructure was put on top of the CPA's economic recovery agenda. Indeed, the economic strategy of the CPA consisted in relying on the oil sector to foster long-term growth, while gradually diversifying economic activity, but these objectives would be impossible to achieve without power and water. Moreover, essential needs had to be

⁴¹¹ Bremer, L. P., *My Year in Iraq*, p. 116; CPA, *An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments*, p. 3.

⁴¹² United States Institute for Peace, *The Iraq Study Group Report*.

⁴¹³ For an indictment of the Ba'athist regime's corrupted practices and distortion of the oil-for-food program, see U.S. Department of State, *Saddam Hussein's Iraq*; Allawi, A., *The Occupation of Iraq*, pp. 122-123; United States Agency for International Development, *A Year in Iraq* (Washington D.C.: USAID, May 2004), p. 18. GDP per capita evolved as follows: 1980 - \$4200, 1990 - \$750, 1996 - \$500, 2000 - \$1400, 2003 - \$750; GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accountability Office, May 2003), p. 20; CPA, *Administrator's Economic Report*, 25th November 2003.

⁴¹⁴ GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq* (May 2003), p. 23. Based on data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, OCDE, UN Compensation Commission and GAP analysis; Debt amounts written off: \$42 billion by the Paris Club (80% of total debt), \$4.5 billion by US (100%), \$9 billion by Russia (75%), Kuwait (\$15 billion) and Saudi Arabia (\$9 billion) refused to commit until a free-elected government was in place. Other nations took a similar position. MNF-I, *Iraq Year in Review. 2004 Fact Sheet* (Baghdad: 2005).

⁴¹⁵ As the top economic advisor to CPA summarised: "The electricity system is substandard, marginal and erratic; the supply of water [...] is unreliable; the health system is a disgrace; and the communications and transportation system is of fourth-world quality. Overall the quality of the infrastructure of Iraq is much worse than that in the other countries that have successfully managed transition". Peter McPherson quoted in Bremer, L. P., *My Year in Iraq*, p. 63.

addressed in order to assuage the population. In other words, providing essential services was identified as a key-political instrument that, if not able to generate consent to the occupation, could at least contain discontentment and potentially gain the support of ‘fence sitters’, Iraqis neither supporting the Coalition or the insurgency but waiting to see who would prevail.⁴¹⁶ Consequently, in parallel to the long-term reforms through orders aiming at liberalising the economy, CPA focused on essentials and on the future main revenue generator, the oil sector, while incomprehensibly neglecting the near-term unemployment problem, likely to ameliorate the living conditions of the population. When one realises that in 2003, 50% of the Iraqi population lived under the poverty line and that 60% were food insecure, one understands quickly that generating jobs should have been a priority.

The economic reforms initiated by CPA consisted in the overhaul of the institutional framework, macroeconomic and financial measures to bring transparency and efficiency to the system, the introduction of market reforms and liberalisation aimed at reviving the economy by betting on the private sector and by attracting foreign investors.⁴¹⁷ However, few investors answered the call as security conditions were not conducive to material and human investments in the country, while the very same Ba’ath regime-backed commercial gangs that flourished under the UN sanction-led period reconverted into the new commercial elite of the new Iraq.⁴¹⁸ In addition to structural measures, another effort to develop the private sector consisted in launching a small-to-medium business loan programme to boost Iraq’s private sector.⁴¹⁹

However, those reforms did not address immediate needs: a restoration of essential services and rampant unemployment. Reforms aiming at the creation of a market-based economy seemed off the mark for the population and largely a theoretical exercise. Most of the Iraqis did not see how these reforms would influence their daily lives but instead identified foreign contractors as the main benefactors of the economic program. While an achievement in itself as the CPA-led economic reforms did create the institutional and legal framework necessary to turning Iraq into an open economy, they failed to deliver the level of consent hoped as no benefits were delivered on the short-term. Instead, the security issues

⁴¹⁶ Wright, D. P. and Reese, T. R., *The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005: On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p. 369.

⁴¹⁷ See CPA, Order N°12, *Trade Liberalization Policy*, 7th June 2003 which suppress tariffs and custom duties; CPA, Order N° 20, *Trade Bank of Iraq*, 14th July 2003; CPA, Order N°40, *Bank Law*, 19th September 2003; CPA, Order N°39, *Foreign Investment*, 19th September 2003; CPA, Order N°38, *Reconstruction Levy*, 9th September 2003; CPA, Order N°76, *Consolidations of State-Owned Enterprises*, 20th May 2004.

⁴¹⁸ Allawi, A., *The Occupation of Iraq*, p. 125.

⁴¹⁹ CPA, *Administrator’s Economic Report*, 25th November 2003

and the political struggle between communities in Iraq were at the forefront of the news. Many Iraqis saw the opening of their country to foreign interests, moreover essentially American, as a new form of coercion, an organised looting of the country's resources while their basic needs were not met. It became clear to CPA that restoring essential services to the population had to be a priority worked on in parallel to the overall project of creating a free-market Iraqi economy.

While the issue of restoring essential services to the Iraqi population was identified as the cornerstone of reconstruction programs, it would prove a challenge beyond the CPA's capacities. Oil, electricity and water production were intimately linked as oil was needed to produce electricity, itself needed to deliver water to households. While Iraqis were expecting marvels from the most powerful and technology advanced country in the world, especially compared to Saddam Hussein's regime, occupation authorities committed the sin of announcing unrealistic targets regarding the providing of these three essential services, and ultimately failed to deliver.⁴²⁰

The power of the imaginary polluted the minds of both Iraqis and U.S. officials as to what was achievable. This was essentially due to ignorance on behalf of the occupation of the sorry state of Iraqi infrastructure, the rise in import of electrical appliances due to the lifting of sanctions, and the slow but nevertheless present rise of economic activity. Consequently, unable to see an improvement in their daily lives, and actually facing a worsening of the situation compared to the pre-invasion situation, Iraqis became very ironic regarding the capacity of the U.S. to actually help them out and regarding the success of Iraq's reconstruction.

The looting and criminality that engulfed Iraq in the wake of the regime's fall delivered a fatal blow to the country's infrastructure, already close to collapsing due to the policies of coercion enforcement implemented since the Gulf War. CPA's investment in essential services covered transport and telecommunications but focused heavily on

⁴²⁰ The CPA reports on the progress made on providing essential services used the pre-war situation as a benchmark, which itself was far from meeting the needs of the Iraqi population: 40% of Iraqis did not have a reliable access to a source of drinking water, 70% of sewage treatment units were in need of repair, and the country's electrical power system was running at 50% of its capacity. Feith, Douglas J., Prepared Statement, in Hearings Before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, *Postwar Reconstruction*, 108th Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15th May 2003); Jones, S. et al., *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, p. 112. Moreover, accurate measures of pre-war levels were difficult as Saddam Hussein favoured some regions over others with the supply of power. More and more constant electricity was provided to Baghdad, Tikrit, Fallujah and tribes supporting the regime while the Kurdish north and Shi'a south received little. Barton, F. and Crocker, B., *Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction* (Washington D.C.: CSIS, September 2004), p. 59; CPA, *An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments*, p. 32.

electricity, water and oil. Running and reliable electricity and water networks were essential to the oil industry, itself the engine of the Iraqi economic recovery as well as necessary to run power plants, themselves providing for water treatment units. In addition to damages caused by looters to power plants, water treatment units and oil production and refining facilities, insurgents quickly understood that in order to be successful, the U.S.-led reconstruction would need to deliver essential services to the population and to economic actors. Consequently, sabotage and attacks on essential services facilities became a pillar of the insurgents' strategy, proving fatal to the CPA's objectives.⁴²¹

Such a strategy proved lethal to the restoration of essential services, which deprivation led to further discontentment and Iraqi suspicion regarding the efficiency of the reconstruction as whole. After thirteen months of activity, the Iraqi power system was still being reconstructed. The frustration of Iraqis was understandable and as Bremer pointed out, their expectations, given the shocking state of the infrastructure and the dire security conditions, were unrealistic.⁴²² Recurrent attacks on power plants and supply routes dramatically slowed down reconstruction work, which was further jeopardized by attacks on foreign contractors. As a CSIS report underlines, "In fact, by late June 2004, all power programs operated by non-Iraqis had actually been halted".⁴²³


⁴²¹ While stating an objective of generating 6,000 MW by June 2004, CPA would not even managed to reach pre-war generation levels. The pre-war electrical power production was 3,300 MW. In May 2003, it collapsed to 200 MW. By October 2003, power generation reached 4,417 MW, meeting the goal of 4,400MW CPA, *Weekly Report. Iraq Fact Sheet*, 28th October, 2003. By the end of CPA's tenure, power generation was floating between 4,500 and 4,900 MW, higher than under Saddam but still short of the promises made by CPA, and hence short of providing the whole country with enough electricity. Calculated on a seven day-period, only one governorate in the Kurdish region enjoyed 22 hours of power daily. The southern Shi'a governorates received between nine and twelve hours daily. The essentially Sunni governorates seven to eight hours with the exception of Karbala, which got ten hours daily. Finally Baghdad had eleven hours, far from the 20 hours plus enjoyed before the war. CPA, *Administrator's Weekly Report. Essential Services*, 28th June 2004.

⁴²² "The attitude was, you guys put a man on the moon, and threw out a regime that we couldn't touch for 35 years in three weeks, so why was the electricity not fixed in three weeks?". Paul Bremer quoted by Burns, J. F., 'Transition in Iraq: The Departing Administrator', *New York Times* (29th June 2004).

⁴²³ Barton, F. and Crocker, B., *Progress or Peril?*, p. 60. As a EIA report underlines. "Power transmission and distribution infrastructure is frequently targeted, amounting to approximately 1000 MW lost per day. As of January 2007, some 80 transmission towers between Baiji and Baghdad alone were reported destroyed by sabotage, preventing power imports from the north. It is estimated that another 1500 MW is lost per day due to shortages of fuel and water supply for hydropower". See Energy Information Administration, *Country Analysis Briefs. Iraq*. (August, 2007), p. 11 and SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th April 2008), p. 123.

Since 2004, the situation did not dramatically improve as the table here below illustrates.⁴²⁴ As of today, there is still a fairly sizeable gap between demand and supply.⁴²⁵

Figure 13: Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq, January 2004 through May 2008



The failure of the occupation to provide sufficient levels of power to the Iraqi population had two intertwined consequences across the security and economic fields of reconstruction. Firstly, Iraqis, being worse off than before the invasion, started to question the actual capacities of the occupation to provide them with a better life. In turn, it contributed to discontent that sometimes translated into utter rejection of the occupation’s policies as a whole, and hence, jeopardised consent generation to the overall reconstruction project. Indeed, the restoration and development of power generation capacity is crucial to the provision of other essential services like water, oil and healthcare; indicators that if in the black would have surely contributed to higher levels of satisfaction and hence consent to the occupation. In turn, it would have helped to set the reconstruction effort on the path to success. Security was paramount to the reconstruction works necessary to provide electricity. It constitutes an example of how coercion, through the eradication of violence, could

⁴²⁴ GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. Progress Report: Some Gains made, Updated Strategy Needed*, p. 53.

⁴²⁵ Consequently, a 2007 survey shows that discontentment about electricity furniture has risen. Indeed, 88% of Iraqis rate the availability of power negatively compared to 54% in 2005. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll, *Iraq. Where Things Stand* (19th March 2007), p. 13.

represent an instrument of consent generation by creating conditions conducive to the restoration of essential services to the population.

However and secondly, the lack of power generation caused a slow-down of reconstruction policies, as the Iraqi economy is highly dependent on electricity for the agricultural sector⁴²⁶ and the oil sector.⁴²⁷ Scepticism coupled with a stagnant economy fuelled further rejection of whatever decisions were made by the occupation and later the Iraqi government in the other fields of reconstruction, and more than often translated into expressions of such anger by violence, worsening the security situation, in turn putting at risk the whole reconstruction of Iraq.

The state of the water systems under Saddam Hussein was similar to the power system, neglected and obsolete. Untreated wastewater flowed directly into the Tigris and Euphrates, the main sources of water of the country.⁴²⁸ As in the case of the electricity sector, the sorry state of the water infrastructure due to years of negligence, lack of maintenance and qualified personnel, as well as looting on a grand-scale and some damages caused by the air bombing campaign preceding the invasion, caused major delay in reconstruction. In addition, the continuous lack of security saw projects delayed, their costs rising, and in some cases foreign contractors pulling out.⁴²⁹ Five years into the reconstruction effort, the water infrastructure remains in poor conditions with access to drinking water varying across provinces.⁴³⁰

As in the case of electricity generation, promises made by CPA did not rely on realistic accounts of pre-conditions and contributed further to disbelief and discontentment among the Iraqi population. While demand and expectations rose, the occupation was again victim of the lack of security and of its own fantasies about its ability to restore essential

⁴²⁶ Irrigation systems relying on pumps powered by electricity.

⁴²⁷ Supposed to be the main income source for the Iraqi government and the financing of the reconstruction.

⁴²⁸ Causing various gastrointestinal diseases, especially among children. The 140 water and 13 major wastewater treatment facilities were working at 35% and 25%, respectively, of their capacity. United States Agency for International Development, *Our Commitment to Iraq* (Washington D.C.: November 2005), p. 30; United Nations Development Group and World Bank Group, *United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment* (October 2003), p. 21.

⁴²⁹ GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq. U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accountability Office, September 2005), pp. 20-22. See also GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq. Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting, Security, and Capacity Challenges* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 15th February 2007).


⁴³⁰ Even though U.S.-led projects have progressed rather well in the sector, 70% of Iraqis gave a negative rating to clean water supply in March 2007, compared to 42% in 2005. United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Iraq: Water and Sanitation Sector – Feb 2008* (4th March 2008); SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th April 2008), p. 127; ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll, *Iraq. Where Things Stand*, p. 13.

services. Similarly, but with even more dire consequences, reconstruction progress in the oil production sector would prove insufficient.

Indeed, the story of oil production arguably embodies the drama faced by Iraqis regarding the provision of essential services. In a country with the fourth largest proven oil reserves⁴³¹, people faced shortages and 70 minutes waiting lines at petrol stations⁴³², until 2004 when finally, Iraqi refining capacities briefly met demand.⁴³³

A look at the evolution of crude oil production and refining capacity since 2004 leads to the conclusion that the Occupation did not manage to improve what was supposed to constitute the main Iraqi source of revenue to finance reconstruction as the table here below shows⁴³⁴:

Figure 12: Iraq's Reported Crude Oil Production, Exports, and U.S. Goals, June 2003 through May 2008



Source: GAO analysis of Iraq Ministry of Oil data collected by State Department.

⁴³¹ 115 billion barrels (2007 estimate) and a probable 50 to 100 billion of recoverable oil in unexplored territories, essential in the southern and western deserts. See Energy Information Administration, *Iraq Energy Profile*.

⁴³² Wong, E. and Fisher, I., 'Transition in Iraq: The Mood', *The New York Times* (29th June 2004)

⁴³³ Energy Information Administration, *Iraq Energy Profile*.

⁴³⁴ GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. Progress Report: Some Gains made, Updated Strategy Needed*, p. 51. See also CPA, *Weekly Report. Iraq Fact Sheet*, 28th October, 2003; Energy Information Administration, *Country Analysis Briefs. Iraq*. (August, 2007), p. 2; CPA, *Weekly Report. Iraq Fact Sheet*, 31st April, 2004; For comprehensive data on Iraqi oil production, see Energy Information Administration, *Iraq Country Profile. Energy Data Series*. For a detailed evolution of petroleum products production, see also SIGIR, *15th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th October 2007), p. 122.

The causes of such a lack of progress are numerous. Of course, the eternal lack of security plagued efforts at reconstructing the oil infrastructure. Insurgents targeted pipe-lines and other facilities regularly, threatened workers and contractors, shut off access to oil production sites, all contributing to a dramatic slow-down of repairing and modernisation of key-oil infrastructures.⁴³⁵ A January 2007 SIGIR report highlighted that Iraq's petroleum sector faces technical challenges in procuring, transporting and storing crude and refined products, managing pricing controls and imports, fighting smuggling and corruption⁴³⁶, improving budget execution, and managing sustainability of operations.⁴³⁷

Another issue faced by the government lies in the lack of a method of oil revenue sharing between central and regional governments. With most oil resources concentrated in the Shi'a and Kurdish regions, and very little left for the Sunnis, a legal framework to deal with future investments and production revenues is essential. It is especially true since as of today, Iraqi oil resources are largely untapped⁴³⁸ and with costs of production amongst the lowest in the world⁴³⁹, it constitutes an interesting opportunity for foreign investors. As of April 2008, the Iraqi Government made progress on two of the four pieces of legislation constituting the Hydrocarbon Law, the Framework Law providing a new national structure to manage the sector and now before a Council of Representative Committee, and the Revenue Distribution Law, destined to organise the distribution of oil revenues in between the various Iraqi regions, presently with the Council of Ministers.⁴⁴⁰ These developments illustrate the links between the progress made in the political field and the economic fields of reconstruction. Further modernisation of the oil sector is highly dependent on political advances between Iraqi factions on future oil revenues.

Indeed, currently, Iraq's central government has the monopoly of exploration and production in the whole country except for the Kurdish Regional Authority⁴⁴¹, which has already signed small exploration and production deals with smaller foreign companies.⁴⁴² Such moves went against the official line of the U.S. administration that deems such deals dangerous to the acceptance of a national oil revenues sharing law destined to more tightly

⁴³⁵ GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq. Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 18th July 2007), pp. 12-13.

⁴³⁶ GAO reports that 10 to 30% of refined fuels are diverted to the black market or smuggled out of Iraq. See *Rebuilding Iraq. Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's Oil Sector*, p. 14.

⁴³⁷ SIGIR, *12th Quarterly Report to Congress* (31st January 2007), p. 48-49.

⁴³⁸ Only 2,000 wells drilled compared to two million in Texas alone.

⁴³⁹ Energy Information Administration, *Iraq: Oil and Economy*.

⁴⁴⁰ SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th April 2008), p. 9.

⁴⁴¹ The Iraqi oil sector is divided between two companies, the North and South Oil Companies.

⁴⁴² Mufson, S., 'Bush Officials Condoned Regional Iraqi Oil Deal', *Washington Post* (3rd July 2008), p. A01.

bind the country together. Lately the Iraqi government has opened the door to foreign firms, hoping to increase the production output by 60%.⁴⁴³ But the lack of agreement between political parties about the future hydrocarbon law impeded on any significant progress on the short-run. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Government has signed five non-bid service contracts with major U.S. and European oil firms to help them to map out their investment needs, which was criticized as a form of bypassing the Iraqi parliament, opposed to any deals with foreign companies until the signature of an Iraqi National Petroleum Law.⁴⁴⁴

What is valid for the electricity and water sectors is also true for the oil sector. The same conditions pertaining to security, causing delays in reconstruction of infrastructures, the lack of sufficient power generation and rising demand all contribute to the slow progression in oil production. However, on top of the impact the lack of petroleum products has on the daily life of Iraqis, similarly to the limited access to electricity and water, oil production actually has a critical impact on the overall reconstruction effort as it constitutes the main source of revenues for the Iraqi government. However, thanks to the soaring oil prices and ironically to the lack of expertise allowing the Iraqi government to spend its revenues, Iraq produces and sells sufficient oil at the moment. It actually earns more money than it can spend. Of course, as we will see later on, the lack of Iraqi capacity to deliver proper procurement methods for reconstruction contracts impedes the reconstruction as a whole, including in another critical sector, healthcare.

Providing the Iraqi population with healthcare was quickly identified by CPA as central and essential. If there was an area in which consent to the occupation could be generated, it was healthcare as it directly affected the population, and given the security situation, it was often a case of life or death. Consequently, CPA freed the financial resources needed for a quick improvement of the healthcare system in Iraq. An audit of existing facilities was implemented by CPA and necessary modernisation work undertaken.⁴⁴⁵

However, the lack of security also hit reconstruction of healthcare infrastructure and projects were slowed down, leaving Iraqis in some regions without decent access to medical

⁴⁴³ Raghavan, S. and Mufson, S., 'Iraq Opens Oil Fields to Global Bidding', *The Washington Post* (1st July 2008), p. A01.

⁴⁴⁴ Raghavan, S. and Mufson, S., *ibid.*; Mufson, S., 'Bush Officials Condoned Regional Iraqi Oil Deal', *Washington Post* (3rd July 2008), p. A01.

⁴⁴⁵ In addition, a policy of preventive healthcare focusing on proximity clinics replaced the existing hospital-based curative model, in order to ease access to health services and immunization, especially with the aim of reducing the high infant and maternal mortality rates suffered under the previous regime. CPA, *An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments.*; United States Agency for International Development, *A Year in Iraq*, pp. 14-15. See also SIGIR, *3rd Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th October 2004), p. 52, for the re-habilitating of clinics and vaccination campaigns.

services.⁴⁴⁶ In addition, the medical supply distribution system is plagued by corruption and inefficiencies, leading to shortages of medications.⁴⁴⁷

The restoration of essential services constituted a critical facet of the reconstruction effort. Indeed, to Iraqis, it would constitute the benchmark of the occupation's capacity and ability to reconstruct their country. Should the occupation authorities succeed in their project to get Iraqis to be better off than they were under Saddam Hussein, one can expect that the population would be supportive of the whole enterprise as there would be something positive in stock at the end of the day.

To CPA, given the poor security conditions and a strengthening of the insurgency, it was paramount to provide the population with basic needs to demonstrate its efficiency and attempt to steer away Iraqis from joining insurgents, with the ultimate objective of creating conditions favourable to gaining their consent to the presence of occupation forces in the country. But the work undertaken in restoring essential services was intimately linked to progress made in the security field, prompting CPA to allocate funds destined to essential services to the security dimension of the reconstruction.⁴⁴⁸

It did not stop insurgents. Indeed, recurrent attacks on infrastructure kept hampering reconstruction projects and while some progress was made, coercive actions never managed to provide for the necessary conditions for the efficient reconstruction of essential services infrastructure, and hence, to allow for consent generation based on the provision of these services, which in turn threatened the success of the whole reconstruction project. The security dimension of the reconstruction kept hampering the economic dimension and the resulting potential improvement of the condition of Iraqis, in turn allowing for stronger support to policies of reconstruction.

⁴⁴⁶ By October 2007, out of 142 U.S.-funded additional Primary Healthcare Centres, 80 were completed, 56 in construction and 6 deprogrammed because they were targeted and bombed by insurgents. Openings of completed centres was hampered by the lack of qualified personnel as since 2003, the number of doctors in Iraq dropped from 24,000 to 14,000. SIGIR, *15th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th October 2007), p. 127. In April 2008, a total of 60 Primary Healthcare Centres were open to the public. SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress. Section 2* (30th April 2008), p. 138. Healthcare coverage in Iraq is far from complete, prompting 69% of Iraqis to rate access to medical services negatively. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll, *Iraq. Where Things Stand* (19th March 2007), p. 14.

⁴⁴⁷ As a DoD recent report underlines: "The unpredictable security situation, a large population of IDPs and refugees, failing building integrity, sporadic availability of water and electricity and shortages of physicians continue to plague the quality, capacity and progression of the country's healthcare system". U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (7th March 2008), p. 15.

⁴⁴⁸ As a SIGIR report underlines: "In July 2004, DoS reallocated \$1.8 billion to training and equipping Iraqi security forces and associated expenditures. Security costs for contractors have risen on average from an initial 10-12% to more than 25%, adding greatly to the costs of major construction projects". SIGIR, *8th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (31st January 2006), p. 5.

In parallel to the restoration of essential services, unemployment, made worse by the de-Ba'athification and security forces dislocation orders, was eventually identified by CPA as another dimension of the reconstruction that could play a role in enhancing the security situation.

As we mentioned, CPA focused on reforms destined to turn Iraq into an open economy in the long term with a string of actions aiming at transforming the finance and banking sector while paying less attention to immediate issues facing the Iraqi population, like unemployment and the lack of economic opportunity. It is somehow surprising as Paul Bremer, as early as June 2003, in a talk with President G.W. Bush pointed out that "our most urgent problem is unemployment. We think it's about 50 percent but who really knows? Also, Iraq's got a young population, with about half of them under the age of nineteen. That's an explosive combination".⁴⁴⁹

Nevertheless, CPA waited until February 2004 to design first measures to fight unemployment through a micro-lending programme.⁴⁵⁰ The lack of security would prove again critical as in some regions, like Al-Anbar, the micro-lending project suffered from a lack of participation due to threats to local bankers.⁴⁵¹

In addition, a National Employment Programme, aiming at creating 100,000 jobs in the public sector was launched. However, a lack of investments and the ongoing insecurity slowed down the programme.⁴⁵²

In June 2004, at the end of the CPA's mandate, economic reforms aiming at creating conditions for a market economy had not delivered short-term improvements on Iraqis' lives. A May 2004 poll reveals that unemployment levels were still high, 35,9% of Iraqis declaring themselves employed.⁴⁵³ Another poll taken in February 2004 showed that 72,8% of Iraqis

⁴⁴⁹ Bremer, L. P., *My Year in Iraq*, p. 71.

⁴⁵⁰ In order to encourage private business initiatives to stimulate employment by offering credits to viable micro and small businesses. DFI provided \$2.25 million micro-lending program for the governorates of Al-Anbar, Salah Ad Din, and Diyala. Two partner-NGOs implemented programs for total of \$14.5 million in other regions. CPA, *Administrator's Economic Report*, 17th January 2004.

⁴⁵¹ CPA, *Administrator's Economic Report*, 14th March 2004.

⁴⁵² By mid-January 2004, 76,000 jobs were created. In addition, eleven Employment Centres and three Technical and Vocational Training Centres opened throughout the country but none was fully operational due to a lack of equipment and trained staff. Seventeen more centres were due to open later on in 2004. CPA, *Administrator's Economic Report*, 17th January 2004. By March 2004, the Civil Affairs of CJTF-7 estimated that CPA had created 379,721 jobs, representing 45% of the target of 850,000. The breakdown of jobs created was as follows: Security/national defence, 220,923; regional jobs programs, 37,421; CJTF-7, 51,673; civilian contractors working under CPA contracts, 68,154; governorate teams, 1,550. CPA, *Administrator's Economic Report*, 14th March 2004. The last comprehensive data were provided on 21st May 2004 and showed a total number of jobs created reaching 435,809, 51% of the 850,000 target. CPA, *Administrator's Economic Report*, 21st May 2004.

⁴⁵³ In both the public and private sector. Barton, F. and Crocker, B., *Progress or Peril*, p. 51.

considered job availability as very bad or quite bad.⁴⁵⁴ More of concern, 60% of interviewed people declared being very concerned or somewhat concerned by the possibility of losing their jobs. So, not only was the unemployment situation dramatic, but the future did not look especially bright to Iraqis.

As a CSIS report argues, while the pay rise in the public sector was positive, for other Iraqis, the situation was more difficult. They had the choice between working for a foreign contractor or for the U.S. and risking to become a target of insurgents, or they could work for an Iraqi company or a state-owned enterprise, which might not allow for a wage able to support a family.⁴⁵⁵ In addition, the report points out that “the continuing lack of economic opportunity and high levels of unemployment impact reconstruction in other sectors, fuelling security problems and leading to entrenched frustration and anger at the occupying forces. [...] Unemployment continues to overshadow the U.S.-driven macroeconomic efforts and salary increases for civil servants”.⁴⁵⁶ Again, progress in the economic sphere of the reconstruction project was intimately linked to progress made in the security sphere, while progress in the security field also depended on shutting down the source of insurgency fighters by giving them economic opportunities.

In parallel to these measures destined to boost employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sectors, the Occupation realised that agriculture was a key-sector on which to work. Second largest contributor to Iraq’s GDP, accounting for 25% of Iraq’s workforce, and helping to feed 18 million urban dwellers, the agricultural sector is essential to a successful development of the Iraqi economy. Hence, CPA and USAID launched a modernisation program aiming at transforming the Iraqi agriculture into a competitive market-based sector.⁴⁵⁷

However, heavily dependent on electricity and water, Iraqi agriculture did not develop according to plans. The lack of a sustainable source of power caused shortages of water, shortening the production season, impeding the sector’s expansion and hence limiting job creation.⁴⁵⁸

Since March 2006, in an attempt to provide more jobs to Iraqis, the U.S. Government implemented the Iraqi First Program destined to bring down barriers preventing Iraqi

⁴⁵⁴ Oxford Research International, *National Survey of Iraq*.

⁴⁵⁵ Barton, F. and Crocker, B., *Progress or Peril*, pp. 45-46.

⁴⁵⁶ Barton, F. and Crocker, B., *Progress or Peril?*, pp. vii-viii.

⁴⁵⁷ Livestock production, crops and dates production, irrigation systems all benefited from extensive aid and partnerships with U.S. universities to enhance Iraqi knowledge of the latest technological advances in the agriculture. CPA, *An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments*, p. 66.

⁴⁵⁸ SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th April 2008), pp. 130-132.

businesses from competing against international companies for U.S. government contracts.⁴⁵⁹ Despite all these efforts, in June 2008, the DoD reported that unemployment figures were at 17.6%⁴⁶⁰ and 38.8% for underemployment, with peaks between 30% and 50% in some provinces, underlining the lack of job opportunities across Iraq.⁴⁶¹

CPA faced a Gordian knot regarding unemployment and economic opportunity. Hostage of the security situation, the economy moved slowly and hence job creation remained elusive. In turn, the lack of employment fuelled discontentment and populated the insurgency, which in turn raised insecurity levels, itself hampering reconstruction projects and private investments and thus potential job creation.

On top of obstacles due to the security situation, the reconstruction of Iraq was plagued by several structural problems. An April 2008 SIGIR report identifies five key elements explaining the lack of efficiency of reconstruction contracts implementation: numerous cases of fraud, waste and abuse characterised U.S.-led reconstruction contracts in Iraq⁴⁶²; the lack of human resources endemic at CPA and DoD, as well as the high turnover, responsible for ineffective administration and implementation of reconstruction contracts⁴⁶³; the transfer of completed projects to the Iraqi government is fragmented⁴⁶⁴; a lack of Iraqi resources in terms of qualified personnel to follow up projects and maintain infrastructure⁴⁶⁵;

⁴⁵⁹ So far a total of \$8 billion in contract business has been awarded to Iraqi businesses, creating 69,000 jobs. In addition, the DoD set up a task force aiming at supporting local businesses by developing skills and business practices to enhance Iraqi competitiveness, leading fifty-three state-owned factories to restart their activities and an additional 3,900 Iraqi companies to be granted DoD contracts worth \$1 billion. U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (16th June 2008), p. 12.

⁴⁶⁰ *The Economist* cites unemployment rate between 25 and 40%. 'The Change in Iraq. Is it Turning the Corner?', *The Economist* (14th – 20th June 2008), p. 31. So does the Iraq Index provided by The Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index. Tracking Variables of Security and Reconstruction in Post-Saddam Iraq* (29th May 2008), p. 42.

⁴⁶¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (16th June 2008), p. 12.

⁴⁶² Several cases of corruption have led to the indictment and prison sentences of American officials and contractors. SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th April 2008), pp. 27-28, 31; GAO, *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq. Conditions in Iraq Are Conducive to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accountability Office: 23rd April 2007); GAO, *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq. Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accountability Office: 11th March 2008), pp. 6-7; Claude, P., 'Fraudes en Irak: 23 milliards de dollars ont disparu', *Le Monde*, 17th June 2008 cites the sum of \$23 billion stolen, vanished or at least non-justified since 2003 from the U.S. Treasury.

⁴⁶³ SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th April 2008), p. 31; GAO, *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq. Conditions in Iraq Are Conducive to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accountability Office: 23rd April 2007), pp. 16-17.

⁴⁶⁴ SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th April 2008), p. 31.

⁴⁶⁵ For example, as of August 2006, the Ministry of Oil had only spent 1% of budgeted funds to improve the oil sector infrastructure. For a detailed table of the 2006 national budget and actual expenditures per ministries, see GAO, *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq. Conditions in Iraq Are Conducive to Fraud, Waste,*

and, the Iraqi government institutions are plagued by endemic corruption, and current U.S. efforts to fight corruption do not deal efficiently with this issue.⁴⁶⁶

All these items taken together have hampered the fast implementation of the reconstruction effort and hence written off the opportunity of delivering quick, clear and visible results to the Iraqi people. The results of a March 2007 poll are indicative of the damages caused by the lack of security in the long run. Compared to November 2005, when 71% of Iraqis declared that their life was going well, in March 2007, only 39% made the same statement. If in any doubt that security and stability was the main concern of Iraqis, 74% declared their neighbourhood not safe.⁴⁶⁷ More alarming to the U.S., the number of Iraqis rejecting the U.S. presence grew considerably since the beginning of the occupation, Iraqis tending to blame the U.S. for all their problems. Indeed, in March 2007, 51% of Iraqis deemed attacks on the U.S. or Coalition forces acceptable⁴⁶⁸ and 78% rejected the U.S. presence in the country.⁴⁶⁹ Regarding the effectiveness of the reconstruction, 67% of Iraqis qualify it as ineffective in their area, with the worst ratings coming from areas experiencing high levels of violence.⁴⁷⁰

However, even if there is nationwide rejection of the U.S. presence and questioning of its actions' effectiveness, only 35% of Iraqis wish for an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops, while the majority estimate that the Coalition should stay until stability is achieved. Consequently, the U.S. has an opportunity to redeem itself and deliver in all fields, especially in the critical area of security and stability. However important, efforts in the coercion-driven security field cannot be sustained on the long-run without winning hearts and minds. This was identified by the Occupation and its successor as an essential component of the reconstruction efforts. By engaging with the Iraqi civil society, the U.S.

and Abuse, p. 26. See also GAO, *Iraq Reconstruction. Better Data Needed Iraq's Budget Execution* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accountability Office, January 2008).

⁴⁶⁶ GAO, *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq. Conditions in Iraq Are Conducive to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse*, pp. 20-22; SIGIR, *7th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th October 2005), p. 8. Notably, Prime Minister Al-Maliki forbade any investigations of himself, of any government members, or senior officials without his green light, leading to the suspension of 48 investigations for corruption. SIGIR, *15th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th October 2007), p. 7; United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, *The State Department and the Iraq War. Hearing of C. Rice, Department of State Secretary* (Washington D.C.: 25th October 2007), pp. 13-17.

⁴⁶⁷ ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll, *Iraq. Where Things Stand* (19th March 2007), p. 1.

⁴⁶⁸ Compared to 17% in February 2004. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll, *Iraq. Where Things Stand*, p. 6.

⁴⁶⁹ Compared to 51% in February 2004 and 65% in November 2005 who rejected the U.S. presence. The sectarian divide is sharp in this case, with 80% of Shi'ites and 97% of Sunnis rejecting U.S. presence while 75% of Kurds support it. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll, *Iraq. Where Things Stand*, p. 6.

⁴⁷⁰ Construction ineffective or inexistent in their area: 60% of Shi'ites, 94% of Sunnis, while 73% of Kurds are positive about it. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll, *Iraq. Where Things Stand*, p. 7.

hoped to share values and define a common set of interests that would ease the consent of occupied to the occupiers' policies and intents, and hence help to turn the reconstruction of Iraq into a success story.

Forging Consent: Rebuilding the Civil Society

As we developed earlier on⁴⁷¹, the exertion of power based on consent finds a propitious field in the civil society. Gramsci locates the seat of consent generation in the civil society, where institutions like the church, the educational system and the press amongst others, contribute to the dissemination of dominant values, interests and ideas consistent with the hegemonic social order.⁴⁷² Ultimately, the objective of such dissemination consists in gaining the consent of the masses to the social order defined by the dominant classes in the society. Hence, engaging the Iraqi civil society is an essential component of the success of the reconstruction effort. It embodies perfectly the framework for a shift from coercion-based instruments of power to softer expressions of power. It is here that success is built and most importantly, sustained. Alongside the political democratisation of Iraqi institutions, the distillation of democratic values including human rights and the rule of law were at the centre of the remoulding of the Iraqi society into a democracy. Starting from the postulate that democracy is not exclusive to Western countries and that all people are able to learn democracy practices, the Occupation embarked on a programme of civil society re-engineering having at its core the sharing of values and the generation of a common interest (between Iraqi parties and between Iraqis and the U.S.) aiming at manufacturing consent for the whole American project, with at its core the acceptance by the Iraqi population of the new American-sponsored leaders.

Policies of consent generation by the Occupation operated in several fields: the media, education, civil society organisations, and local governance. After a period of rather theoretical exercise by the CPA, the launch of the PRTs⁴⁷³ marked an improvement in consent generation amongst Iraqis. Indeed, the U.S. started to make a difference by getting up close and personal with its occupied population by de-centralising teams made of military and civilian officers in provinces and localities across Iraq. After a period characterised by a complete lack of legitimacy and local consent to the American project of reconstructing Iraq,

⁴⁷¹ See chapter 2 American Power : The Tale of Force and Consent.

⁴⁷² Gramsci, A., *Selections...*, p. 261.

⁴⁷³ Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

the presence of PRTs allowed for a more effective identification of local needs and a faster response to these needs across the whole country, in turn participating in the stabilisation of Iraq.

However, the American strategy in the battle for hearts and minds suffered from an early blow from which it would never recover. As we saw earlier on, a March 2007 poll revealed that 78% of Iraqis oppose the presence of U.S. forces. Much of this opposition was born in the very first moments following the invasion. The shift in Iraqi minds from jubilation at the fall of Saddam Hussein to rejection of occupation is due to inter-related policy and operational miscalculations by CPA.

As Rend Al-Rahim, the Iraqi Representative to the United States, argued in June 2004, at the end of CPA's tenure, "The 'Mother' of all policy errors is the declared policy of occupation".⁴⁷⁴ The occupation of Iraq entailed the humiliating loss of sovereignty; the takeover of the Iraqi state by incompetent foreigners who proved that they did not have the skills to run it, rendering the occupation unworkable; the inability of foreign military forces to perform security duties due to the lack of personnel, language skills, intelligence capacities, or social understanding; the failure to deliver basic services; the disenfranchisement of some sectors of the Iraqi society through the purge; and the non-existence of an efficient communication between the Coalition and the people to explain reasons for hardship and failures. As a result, "Iraqis did not have the opportunity to be an active part of their own liberation, to be part of liberation and part of the transition process. A feeling of alienation has set in because of a feeling of a disempowerment and disenfranchisement."⁴⁷⁵

Indeed, as in other reconstruction fields, the re-moulding of the Iraqi civil society as a centre of gravity for democracy and human rights, as well as the main source of support and defence of a new democratic Iraqi state, was essentially American-led. Building on previous reconstruction cases, the U.S. focused on the development of a free press, an education system sensitive to democratic values and grass-root organisations across the Iraqi civil society.

In Iraq, CPA identified the establishment of a free press as essential to building a democratic society as it would spread ideas and values congenial to the whole American project of re-formatting the Iraqi society along democratic lines. Indeed, the establishment of a free press was an essential element of the CPA's attempt at manufacturing consent

⁴⁷⁴ Al-Rahim, R., Prepared Statement, in Hearing Before the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, *Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds*, 108th Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14th June 2004), p. 18.

⁴⁷⁵ Al-Rahim, R., Prepared Statement, p. 20.

amongst the Iraqi population. However, CPA consistently failed to objectively inform the Iraqi population about reconstruction progress. An official black-out was practiced on insurgents' activities and whatever bad news could impede the reconstruction.

Nonetheless, Iraqis were not blind and when faced with essential services shortages and witnessing the lack of progress in their daily life, they could not turn to the CPA as a source of information, which essentially focused on providing information on progress made, but without balanced perspective. In the weeks that followed the fall of the Ba'athist regime, dozens of newspapers were started. Most of these new ventures were launched by various political parties and their production and reporting of news were often distorted as they reflected specific political interests and objectives.

The opening of the news world translated also into a boom of satellite broadcasts, essentially from abroad, with the two pan-Arab channels as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya amongst the favourites. Anti-war in orientation, both channels insisted on the rise of anti-occupation incidents and on the insecurity in Iraq. The CPA would later condemn such reporting as inflammatory and inciting to violence, and close down both channels' station in Iraq. Iran also opened an Arabic-language station targeting the Shi'a audience. All the main international news agencies were also present in Iraq and provided a news feed closer to the mark.

Such developments in the media world contributed to a questioning of the American, and generally speaking of a Western, version of news reporting. Indeed, as Emad El-Din Aysha argues, "From the early days of satellite television to the CNN age, what really existed was a 'US village' of global *reach*. In contrast, regional informational umbrellas can now collect and disseminate information quite independently on a local basis, while increasingly being able to broadcast their version of events globally".⁴⁷⁶ This diversification of information sources available to Iraqis impedes one of American consent generation's main instruments: propaganda. As Richard Bulliet put it, "Prior to Sept. 11, we did not realize that we were in a propaganda war, but we were", and the U.S. in the Middle East "is at best playing catch-up, at worst losing".⁴⁷⁷

In an effort to make use of this new freedom of expression and to fight Arabic speaking channels influence in Iraq, CPA created a broadcasting station (comprising a newspaper, a radio and TV station), the Iraq Media Network (IMN) to inform the population about the Coalition's intents and operations. However, the IMN would always face a

⁴⁷⁶ Emad El-Din A., 'September 11 and the Middle East Failure of US Soft Power: Globalisation Contra Americanisation in the New American Century', *International Relations*, 19:2 (June, 2005), p. 193-210.

⁴⁷⁷ Poniewozik, James, 'The Battle for Hearts and Minds', *Time Magazine*, 158 (22nd October 2001).

reputation of being a mouthpiece for the CPA.⁴⁷⁸ Indeed, the majority of Iraqis preferred watching the pan-Arab satellite channels and the IMN never managed to get its message through. Moreover, in its order n°14, the CPA listed a series of prohibited media activities including reporting on events that could conflict with the CPA's policies, incite violence against CPA and coalition personnel, and endanger public order.⁴⁷⁹ Such a statement did not play in favour of the occupation and was perceived by the Iraqi public as a confirmation that the IMN was not independent from the CPA and hence could not be trusted. Instead, Iraqis tapped pan-Arabic news channels for information about what was happening in their country. Through its inability to provide objective and accurate information, CPA gave ground to rival perspectives, not always objective either, about the evolution of the situation in Iraq. Consequently, CPA lost one of its essential instruments of communication and consent generation to its overall project of remoulding the Iraqi civil society.

In its battle to win Iraqi minds, the United States could also rely on the political forging of Iraq's future generations. Education constituted another field in which U.S. efforts to address Iraqis' concerns about their children's future could make a difference. From education used as a regime's tool to control the society, the education reforms implemented by the Occupation would put democracy promotion teachings at the centre of practices. However, with the handover to the Iraqi government, some mishaps in the curriculum happened.

The education sector also constitutes a cornerstone of consent generation to the installation of a new social order across civil society. Hence, CPA focused on getting Iraqi children back to school as quickly as possible while rebuilding facilities and reviewing curriculum with the aim of spreading democratic values and ideas, until then alien to Iraqis. Indeed, until the fall of Saddam Hussein, education was used by the Ba'ath regime as an instrument to maintain an iron grip on the Iraqi society, schoolbooks being littered with references to Saddam Hussein and teachers used as propaganda heralds.⁴⁸⁰

The pre-war situation was indeed dire, with very low attendance levels⁴⁸¹ and poor facilities.⁴⁸² The March 2003 conflict and extensive looting that followed made the situation worse and before reviewing the education system in depth, the rehabilitation of infrastructure

⁴⁷⁸ CPA, Order N°66.

⁴⁷⁹ CPA, Order N°14, *Prohibited Media Activity*, 10th June 2003.

⁴⁸⁰ Wang, T., 'Rewriting the Textbooks. Education Policy in post-Hussein Iraq', *Energy*, 26:4 (Winter, 2005).

⁴⁸¹ 25% of school-aged children did not attend school in 2002-2003.

⁴⁸² UNICEF estimated that 5,000 should be built.

was central to the Occupation's policies.⁴⁸³ In parallel, CPA aimed at getting children back to school quickly to complete their interrupted academic year.⁴⁸⁴

Security and stability were again paramount to the Occupation's successes in education in order to get Iraqis in charge of designing the education system they wanted. While the U.S. brought in education experts to serve as advisers to the Education Ministry in order to make sure that the programmes would have democratic values at their core, some argued that while democratisation is laudable, the reform of the education system should above all constitute a means to empower Iraqis with the ability to recreate their own society and promote creative and critical thinking.⁴⁸⁵ However, creative and critical thinking would get a serious blow and books were not free of biases.

Keeping in mind the potential influence of religion, references to Islam were scrapped by U.S. advisers from schoolbooks, and limited to reflect the influence of religion in Iraqi society.⁴⁸⁶ In addition, anything anti-American in schoolbooks was considered as propaganda and erased: "Pressured for time, and hoping to avoid political controversy, the Ministry of Education under the US-led coalition government removed any content considered 'controversial', including the 1991 Gulf War; the Iran-Iraq war; and all references to Israelis, Americans, or Kurds".⁴⁸⁷ Saddam's treatment of Kurds was also erased as well as the ecological destruction of marshlands. Thus, the role of U.S. advisers in revising the curriculum was rather intrusive and they did not intend to give a free-hand to Iraqis on the topic.⁴⁸⁸

Overall, five years into the reconstruction, the U.S. reorganisation of the educational sector in Iraq, aiming at liberalising and modernising the Iraqi education in order to prepare the next generation to practise democracy, has made incremental progress. Compared to the

⁴⁸³ By March 2004, 32,000 teachers were trained, 2,700 parent teacher associations created, and 2,500 schools repaired. By the end of 2006, USAID had rehabilitated nearly 3,000 schools, while at the same time USAID and UNESCO provided 8.6 million and 12 million new textbooks respectively. Over 90,000 teachers and administrators were trained. UNESCO, *Report of the Director-General on the Cultural and Educational Institutions in Iraq* (Paris: 14th August 2003), p. 3; United States Agency for International Development, *A Year in Iraq*, p. 16; United States Agency for International Development, *Top Strategic Accomplishments in Iraq* (Washington D.C.: USAID, December 2006), p. 1.

⁴⁸⁴ CPA, USAID and UNESCO financed the acquisition and distribution of 8.7 million mathematics and sciences textbooks for academic year 2003-2004 for primary and secondary education.

⁴⁸⁵ Wang, T., 'Rewriting the Textbooks. Education Policy in post-Hussein Iraq'

⁴⁸⁶ Wang, T., 'Rewriting the Textbooks. Education Policy in post-Hussein Iraq'

⁴⁸⁷ Asquith, C., 'Turning the Page on Iraq's History', *Christian Science Monitor*, (4th November 2003).

⁴⁸⁸ As Gregg Sullivan, spokesman for the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau of the State Department, contended: "We will strongly recommend concepts of tolerance, and be against anything that is anti-Semitic or anti-West - content that would only sow the seeds for future intolerance. We'd hope it's only an advisory role, but if something develops that's disadvantageous to the Iraqi people, we'd weigh in on a stronger level." Quoted by Asquith, C., 'Turning the Page on Iraq's History'.

2003 situation, the physical infrastructure and human resources slowly reconstituting Iraqi's access to education have been reinforced and developed further. Little by little, ties are created and reinforced between Iraq and the U.S. in the education sector.⁴⁸⁹ Over time, it should contribute to the anchorage of democratic ideals and values in the young Iraqi generations, building up strong foundations of democracy in the future Iraqi civil society.

While the education reforms will prepare future Iraqi generations to practice democracy, the existing adult population, after years of debilitating oppression need to be made familiar with the concept of democracy. In addition to the CPA focus on building democratic and accountable Iraqi institutions, re-creating the state, a whole programme of democracy promotion was implemented in the Iraqi civil society.

While efforts by the CPA focused on the superstructure of the state, top-down democracy is not enough. Indeed, Americans understood that democracy had to take root in Iraqi civil society in order to create a culture of democracy amongst Iraqi people, who had to buy in and protect democracy. On top of formal education in schools and universities, informal public education, the strengthening of civil society organisations, the promotion of public debate and conflict resolution were all on the agenda.⁴⁹⁰

After the departure of CPA, USAID implemented programmes developing local civil society organisations, teaching them to advocate for their communities and hold local government accountable. Needless to say, with the Abu Graib detainees' scandal still in mind, Americans had rather a long way to cover to convince Iraqis about the virtues of the rule of law. Working close to the population, USAID Local Governance Program encompassed resident teams in 17 of the 18 provinces, organising sessions with youth, journalists, local officials and educators to discuss democratic principles, stimulate civic participation, increase understanding, support and participation in the political process. In parallel, the Community Action Programme (CAP) was launched, creating 600 community action groups across Iraq. They aimed at identifying local needs, participating in social and economic development, generating employment and income, teaching about environmental protection and management.⁴⁹¹ USAID also launched a Civic Education Campaign, teaching Iraqis about democracy through posters and leaflets promoting democratic principles, rights of citizens, and federalism.⁴⁹² The role of women in Iraqi society was central to CPA's and

⁴⁸⁹ SIGIR, *17th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress. Section 2* (30th April 2008), p. 140.

⁴⁹⁰ Witness to the dynamism animating the Iraqi civil society, by June 2004, 2,000 civil society organisations had applied for NGO status. CPA, Order N°45, *Non-Governmental Organizations*, 25th November 2003.

⁴⁹¹ United States Agency for International Development, *Iraq PRTs*, p. 10.

⁴⁹² United States Agency for International Development, *Democracy in Iraq* (Washington D.C., USAID, May 2004).

USAID policies. In order to enhance women's participation, CPA launched the Women's Program, creating Women's Centres across Iraq offering vocational trainings and educational opportunities.⁴⁹³

As a USAID report argues, the role of the Iraqi civil society in the development and preservation of the nascent Iraqi democratic experience is critical: "A vibrant and politically-active civil society is crucial to the future of a democratic and pluralistic Iraq. As Iraq transitions to a fully representative democracy, its citizens must be able to exercise their freedom to associate, express their views publicly, openly debate public policy, and petition their government. Civil Society Organizations must be willing and able to take on potentially divisive issues such as civic education, women's rights, government corruption and impunity, and a free, independent, and professional media".⁴⁹⁴

Finally, the late successes in the security field allowed for the implementation of projects developing the Iraqi civil society, slowly seeding democratic values across the country. Even hardliners suspected of taking part in Al Qaeda terrorist activities, the insurgency or sectarian violence go through a re-education programme providing religious discussions about the Koran, English and Arabic literacy classes and lessons on principles and values of a democratic society.⁴⁹⁵

Given the difficult conditions faced by the Iraqi population, to generate interest for the creation of a strong civil society in Iraq was always going to be a challenge. The common Iraqi was more interested in knowing whether his family would be safe and fed than being taught about the virtues of democracy and the rule of law. However, in the face of a continuous lack of stability, the Occupation did manage to implement programmes that developed and strengthened the Iraqi civil society, constituting a solid, if nascent, counterpart to the power of the state but most importantly, participating to the defence of the rise of the new democratic state in Iraq. This is a critical achievement for the long-term success of democracy in Iraq and hence of the reconstruction project as a whole. However, as we will see in the conclusion of this chapter, such a claim actually depends on how and by whom success is defined.

Four years after the invasion of Iraq, progress was excruciatingly slow. In all four fields of the reconstruction under scrutiny, with the notable exception of civil society, few objectives set by the Occupation authorities were actually reached. The U.S. administration

⁴⁹³ CPA, *An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments* (Baghdad: undated).

⁴⁹⁴ United States Agency for International Development, *Democracy in Iraq*.

⁴⁹⁵ On the correctional policy of the U.S., still in charge until the end of 2008, see the excellent article by Woods, A. K., 'Hard Man, Soft Sell', *Financial Time Week-end* (28th-29th June 2008), pp. 44-53.

displayed a lack of imagination and consistency in the design and implementation of its policies. The four dimensions of reconstruction that constitute our framework of analysis to assess the outcome of the Iraqi reconstruction project were dealt with by the U.S. separately, without consistency.

Indeed, security was first identified as paramount to success but the constant and indiscriminate use of force generated resentment and rejection of the Occupation, and so more and more even by moderate sections of the Iraqi society. A second attempt consisted in turning multinational by presenting the reconstruction of Iraq as regional and international issue and by seeking to reintegrate the more moderate elements of the insurgency in the political negotiations also failed. The collapse of these two strategies led to a decisive review of the American approach. All four dimensions of the reconstruction effort were dealt with consistently and in parallel, finally bringing some measure of success to the reconstruction, as the next and final section of this chapter will now investigate.

Getting Personal: flexibility and adaptability, the *New Way Forward*

By the end of 2006, sectarian deaths were soaring and little was done by the Coalition and the Iraqi government to stop the haemorrhage.

Consequently, the U.S. administration presented the *New Way Forward* in January 2007, constituting a response to failures resulting of an early transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or by a belatedly response to growing sectarian violence. It designed a new campaign plan stretching until July 2008. A fundamental change in the Bush administration's thinking pattern occurred: national reconciliation would not be the product of a nationwide agreement of what Iraq should look like but would come from a long and piecemeal process involving all actors; while Iraqi forces have developed their capacities, they are not ready to act independently; Iran and Syria are pointed out as troublemakers in Iraq and should be confronted by the U.S; and the stability of Iraq is an international and regional issue which calls for further diplomatic efforts to involve key-international and regional actors.⁴⁹⁶

The *New Way Forward* acknowledges the multidimensional character of the challenges facing the reconstruction of Iraq and consequently produces a strategy whose four components are inter-related and mutually reinforcing as well as being aware of the need to

⁴⁹⁶ NSC, *Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review* (Washington D.C.: January 2007), pp. 7-9.

review the regional U.S. posture in the Middle East in order to address the Iranian and Syrian threats to Iraqi stability.⁴⁹⁷

In July 2008, the U.S. administration operated a change of policy regarding Iran, announcing that an American senior envoy would join in the Geneva international discussions about a possible freeze and suspension of Iran's enrichment of uranium.⁴⁹⁸ On top of more multilateralism and more engagement with Iraq's neighbours, *The New Way Forward* develops around four axes.

Firstly, the security dimension is deemed essential for progress to be made in other fields. Consequently, the Bush administration operated the so-called *Surge*, sending an additional 37,000 American troops to Iraq. GAO and DoD reports from June 2008 show that the violence sharply decreased since the Surge started from 180 recorded attacks per day in June 2007 to 45 attacks in May 2008, even though Baghdad remains highly volatile and recurrent sectarian and militia-led violence plagued Basra during Spring 2008.⁴⁹⁹ *The Surge* mainly aimed at wresting sanctuaries out of Al-Qaeda control and facing Iranian-supported militia extremists. Tactically, it put the emphasis on counterinsurgency practices underscoring the importance of units living among the people they are securing through joint security stations and patrols with ISF. The overall goal of the operation being "to pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress".⁵⁰⁰ *The Surge* aims at creating conditions conducive to successful reconstruction projects having a quick and direct impact on Iraqis. Indeed, CPA launched large reconstruction projects aiming at restoring and developing Iraqi infrastructure, especially regarding essential services. *The New Way Forward*, through the PRTs (see below), argues that smaller reconstruction projects showing fast benefits to the population were essential to succeed.

Aiming at delivering quicker results in order to show Iraqis that reconstruction was progressing, the Department of State launched the PRTs in November 2005, "to lead the

⁴⁹⁷ As General Petraeus argued, "Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports AQI. And Iran has fuelled the violence in a particularly damaging way, through its lethal support to the Special Groups, those Special Groups being a Hezbollah-like organisation to serve Iranian interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq". Petraeus, General D. H., *Report to the Congress on the Situation in Iraq* (Washington D.C.: 9th April 2008), p. 2 and Petraeus, General D. H., *Report to the Congress on the Situation in Iraq* (Washington D.C.: 10-11th September 2007).

⁴⁹⁸ *The Economist*, 'The World this Week' (19th July 2008), p. 8.

⁴⁹⁹ GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. Progress Report: Some Gains made, Updated Strategy Needed*, pp. 11-13.

⁵⁰⁰ Petraeus, General D. H., *Report to the Congress on the Situation in Iraq* (Washington D.C.: 9th April 2008), p. 1.

decentralizing of U.S. reconstruction and capacity-building efforts”.⁵⁰¹ The idea was to develop local actions aiming at capacity-building of local governments, through inter-agency teams working on building provincial, municipal and local capacity in dealing with central government and citizens. In addition, micro-loans to locally develop the economy were delivered, programs aiming at strengthening the rule of law implemented and steps taken to promote national reconciliation by building bridges between communities.⁵⁰²

In addition, with the January 2007 *Surge*, complementing the ten existing PRTs, fifteen ePRTs⁵⁰³ were created and active mainly in programs aiming at gaining loyalties of the local population. The objective was to facilitate the support to moderate elements seeking peaceful ways of resolving political differences.⁵⁰⁴ They implement local governance programs aiming at training new locally elected individuals on issues like governance, public finance, city planning and reconstruction projects management.

In October 2007, SIGIR released an audit on PRTs’ results and concluded that they were making incremental progress. On governance, progress is being made but there is the need to see the enactment of the Provincial Powers Law to define the rights and responsibilities of government offices and to hold provincial officials accountable for their actions. The rule of law proves more difficult to work on as there is a lack of coordination between police and the judiciary on top of permanent security issues involving threats made to judges. Reconstruction projects are usually efficiently dealt with by Iraqi provincial officials including budget execution, but there is a lack of human and material resources for maintaining infrastructures. The national reconciliation showed little progress, except in Anbar where local tribes rallied to face al-Qaeda and support the national government. As SIGIR explains, “efforts toward reconciliation have been undermined by tension between rival Shia groups, a sense of alienation among Sunnis, and growing public frustration over the inability to obtain government services”.⁵⁰⁵

In addition to fostering good governance with local officials, the PRTs work with Iraqi civil society organisations in a similar fashion. The focus is on “empowering women, youth issues, business development, agriculture and agribusiness and advocacy work for a democratic and tolerant Iraq”.⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰¹ SIGIR, *16th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (31st January 2008), p. 81.

⁵⁰² United States Agency for International Development, *Iraq PRTs*, p. 5.

⁵⁰³ Embedded with military brigade combat teams

⁵⁰⁴ SIGIR, *16th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress*, p. 81.; SIGIR, *15th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th October 2007), p. 75.

⁵⁰⁵ SIGIR, *15th Quarterly Report to The United States Congress* (30th October 2007), p. 160.

⁵⁰⁶ United States Agency for International Development, *Iraq PRTs*, p. 7. Sere also activities by the National Democratic Institute, teaching Iraqis about democracy, governance, elections and civil society, and trains

PRTs also buttressed and organised the Sunni ‘Awakening Movement’⁵⁰⁷ in Anbar and the Concerned Local Citizens across Iraq, leading to further security gains.

Finally, to help areas in which insurgents are particularly active, and hence which are finding it harder to benefit from the reconstruction projects, the U.S. government developed the Community Stabilization Program (CSP), with the objective of restoring economic and social stability in communities impacted by insurgent activity, while concurrently building the foundation for long-term development. Its main mode of action consists in addressing the youth through the creation of employment and skills development programs. CSP uses public works activities to integrate ethnically and religiously diverse youth, while fostering tolerance and managing conflict, which in turn limits the risk of seeing idle youth accepting money from terrorists or insurgents to attack Coalition and ISF troops.⁵⁰⁸

In parallel to the Surge and its civilian component aiming at better performances for reconstruction projects, the *New Way Forward* insists on developing further Iraqi capacity in the field of security. A June 2008 DoD report cites that 478,000 Iraqi security personnel had been trained since late 2003 and that Iraqi forces have performed well in numerous operations.⁵⁰⁹ However, a GAO report tempers the DoD’s optimism by shedding light on the actual level of readiness of the ISF to perform security tasks on their own, qualifying it as showing “limited improvement”.⁵¹⁰ The report highlights the low autonomy regarding logistical capabilities and combat support, the lack of a single unified force, the sectarian and militia influence impeding some operations, and training and leadership shortages.⁵¹¹

However, as mentioned here above, some Sunnis turned away from the insurgency and the support for Al-Qaeda in Iraq to form the Sons of Iraq.⁵¹² The movement started with Sunni awakening, rejecting indiscriminate violence of Al Qaeda in Iraq and aware that it will be difficult to share in Iraq’s wealth if they do not contribute in the political arena. However, question marks remain regarding the increased risk of insurgent infiltration in their ranks,

Iraqis on how to debate issues and reach agreement peacefully. United States Agency for International Development, *Iraq PRTs*, p. 12.

⁵⁰⁷ Later renamed Sons of Iraq.

⁵⁰⁸ United States Agency for International Development, *ibid.*, p. 16.

⁵⁰⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (16th June 2008), p. 35.

⁵¹⁰ It is estimated that 10% of ISF are able to conduct operations independently of Coalition forces. GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. Progress Report: Some Gains made, Updated Strategy Needed*, p. 27.

⁵¹¹ GAO, *ibid.*, pp. 29-31.

⁵¹² In April 2008, 91,000 Sons of Iraq were under monthly contract to support Coalition and Iraqi forces to improve security. So far, 21,000 Sons of Iraq have been transferred to Iraqi security forces.

and the need to have a coherent transfer mechanism of those former insurgents into Iraqi institutions or civilian life.

A second key-component of *The Way Forward* is constituted by national reconciliation efforts through the enactment of key-legislation. So far three laws addressing Sunni concerns have been enacted: the de-Ba'athification reform allowing lower-ranking members of the party to return to government jobs, but its implementation stalled; the amnesty of certain detainees, especially Sunnis and Sadrists detained without trial (but the law does not cover all detainees); and, provincial powers law formalising the sharing of power between national, provincial and local governments. All three laws seek to open avenues in Sunni participation to Iraqi political life and hence are critical to national reconciliation. However, three other essential pieces of legislation have not progressed. The Provincial Elections law will provide electoral rules in order to organise new elections aiming at granting provincial councils more representative of the population they serve. The Hydrocarbon law is in the process of being drafted and three of its four provisions are still pending. Finally, no progress was made on the disarmament and demobilisation of militia, essentially due the lack of a secure environment, the inclusion of all parties in negotiations, and appropriate reintegration opportunities. So far, none of these conditions are met.⁵¹³

In addition to these critical laws, the review of the October 2005 Constitution has not progressed. Three contentious issues are still being debated: the power of the presidency; the status of disputed areas, especially Kirkuk; and, the relative power among federal, regional and provincial governments.⁵¹⁴

The third pillar of *The New Way Forward* is to make sure that the Iraqi government execute its capital investment budgets, essential as most U.S. reconstruction projects are nearing completion. The inability of the Iraqi government to use its considerable resources is essentially due to the lack of security, a shortage of trained staff; and weak procurement and budgeting systems. Consequently, the U.S. has provided the Iraqi ministries with training programmes and embedded advisors to help them spend their resources. However, these efforts are not integrated as various U.S. agencies lead their own programmes.⁵¹⁵

Finally, the fourth component of the new U.S. strategy consists in improving the delivery of essential services to the Iraqi population. However, low spending rates in the sectors of oil production, electricity generation and water, the lack of an integrated energy

⁵¹³ GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. Progress Report: Some Gains made, Updated Strategy Needed*, pp. 34-40.

⁵¹⁴ GAO, *ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

⁵¹⁵ GAO, *ibid.*, pp. 43-49.

strategy, endemic corruption, continuous security issues, and lack of Iraqi expertise in maintenance did not allow for substantial progress to be made.⁵¹⁶

Since the implementation of *The New Way Forward*, some progress was made in all areas of reconstruction. Gradually, the Iraqi state is getting stronger; the civil society is developing and learning how to contribute constructively in the country's development, while also learning how to voice its concerns regarding the state. In the most important field of security, Iraqis have made incremental progress and so far the Coalition has transferred security duties to ISF in nine out of the eighteen provinces. When needed, the Coalition remains ready to support ISF operations. The economy is progressing steadily, driven by high oil prices and thanks to better security conditions, reconstruction projects are moving on faster, creating more jobs and wealth. On the political front, while much still needs to be done, critical legislation has been enacted, gradually clearing the path to national reconciliation.

However, much remains to be done to be able to qualify the U.S. project of reconstructing Iraq as successful. Indeed, while all indicators regarding violence levels regressed, it is still endemic in Iraq. Al Qaeda, while diminished, is not vanquished, and Sunni die-hard insurgents are still active. The Sunni and Shi'a militias remain an issue and a potentially very serious source of violence, especially towards Iraqi civilians. Security conditions thus remain volatile and dangerous across Iraq, with continuous religious and ethnic violence leading to further displacement of population in and out of Iraq,⁵¹⁷ hence depriving the country of a whole layer of technocrats and professionals (as doctors, nurses, teachers,...), who, because they belonged to the 'right' religious group, had the chance to develop skills under the previous regime.⁵¹⁸

We saw that the lack of expertise is one of the main reasons for the slow pace of reconstruction projects; those who fled Iraq are needed, and national reconciliation is the key to getting them to come back. They constitute an essential element for the future development and survival of the Iraqi state and civil society.

While it is too early to predict the final outcome of *The New Way Forward*, the U.S. government seems to have finally managed to develop a reconstruction strategy that takes into account all dimensions of what post-conflict reconstruction entails. Policies and actions in the four fields of the reconstruction move in parallel and consistency of action is a key-

⁵¹⁶ GAO, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq. Progress Report: Some Gains made. Updated Strategy Needed*, p. 53.

⁵¹⁷ It is estimated that about 2.77 million of persons are displaced in Iraq and 2 million Iraqis fled Iraq, essentially to Syria and Jordan, essentially Sunnis.

⁵¹⁸ GAO, *Ibid.*, p. 16.

parameter for U.S. officials in order to measure progress. In the next and final section of this chapter, we summarise our findings and risk a judgement on the outcome of the U.S. policies in Iraq. To do so, we put our three key-analytical tools at the centre of our appraisal: power as coercion and consent, consistency of action across the four fields of reconstruction, and consistency of action between policies of reconstruction and regional and global U.S. foreign policies.

Conclusions

The question at the core of this study regards the conditions pertaining to success or failure in the case of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects. Indeed, based on the postulate of the G.W. Bush administration that successful reconstruction in Japan after World War II can be replicated in Iraq today, we aim to explain why the reconstruction of Japan is considered a success while the ongoing exercise in Iraq is considered already doomed by many observers.

To assess the outcome of U.S.-led reconstruction, we look at:

- The influence of pre-conditions to the occupation and reconstruction;
- How power differentiating between coercion and consent was exerted in the four fields of observation of reconstruction projects, security, the state, economy and the civil society, and was consistency of action achieved in between these dimensions of the reconstruction. We actually try to explain specific outcomes in the reconstruction project under scrutiny by looking at what form of power exerted in a specific field of a reconstruction process produced what results, and how these results matched the overall rationale of the reconstruction project;
- To what extent reconstruction policies benefited of consistency when put against regional and global foreign policies.

However, before taking the steps above, we need to define what, in this specific case, defines success or failure. From the perspective of Iraqis, we can argue that the success of the reconstruction of their country is defined by a functioning state that provides its population with basic needs and a regulatory framework in which interactions take place; in other words, the possibility to live a normal life in a stable environment conducive to progress and wealth.

In addition, assessing the outcome of the reconstruction of Iraq requires putting achievements against the original rationale and goals of the whole U.S. project in Iraq. We can identify two sets of reasons, one concerns the U.S. foreign policy objectives and the other the objectives of the reconstruction as such.

First, regarding the U.S. foreign policy, five objectives can be identified: deprive Saddam of weapons of mass destruction; cut the support Saddam Hussein allegedly offered to terrorist groups, turn Iraq into a democratic state friendly to U.S. interests serving as an example to other states in the region, secure access to oil resources in order to keep the tap open at decent prices for the sake of the global capitalist economy, and build up long-term U.S. military presence at the heart of the Middle East in order to control the most volatile region in the world, which in turn would enhance global stability. These two sets of objectives, if attained, would contribute to the reinforcement of the U.S. position in its global war on terrorism and its status as unchallenged global superpower.

The second sets of reasons focuses on the reconstruction's objectives as defined by the Bush administration: stabilising the country in the wake of the invasion and ensuring security; restoring essential services quickly; turning Iraq into a democracy with a strong political society respecting the rule of law and a vibrant civil society embracing and defending human rights and democratic values; making Iraq economically stable and thriving, serving as an example to other countries in the region who could embrace the same path and hence contribute to a weakening of global terrorism, as democracies tend to reject extremism.

In the light of our findings, how can we qualify the U.S.-led reconstruction of Iraq?

Pre-conditions and Their Influence on Reconstruction

Let us start by assessing the influence that pre-conditions to the occupation had on reconstruction policies in Iraq.

Firstly, the defining elements of the U.S. foreign policy on the eve of the invasion of Iraq were not congenial to the use of instruments of power based on consent generation. While presenting a justification for the war that was supposed to generate consent at home and abroad, by putting the eradication of a dangerous regime and the corollary democracy promotion at the core of the justification for intervention in Iraq, the Bush administration focus on the use of force as a means to resolve disputes between states and to preserve the uncontested U.S. global power status, jeopardised from the beginning the post-conflict

reconstruction of Iraq. Indeed, whatever the motivations and justification in terms of future risks posed by Saddam's regime, the U.S. started a war of aggression, not of self-defence causing a lack of legitimacy for the whole enterprise.

In addition, the international community and public opinion, facing un-restrained U.S. power exertion questioned the legitimacy, not only of the American actions but also of its position as only superpower and hence international source of stability. Coupled with shaky American justifications to go to war with Iraq, essentially based on the presumption that Saddam Hussein still possessed WMD and supported international terrorism, this lack of international legitimacy of U.S. actions and status penalised the reconstruction of Iraq as it translated into the absence of broad material and moral international support.

Such lack of legitimacy thus partly conditioned the progress made during the reconstruction of Iraq. Not only did it alienate the majority of the international community but when things started to turn sour in Iraq, it constituted the basis of the American public's rejection of the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq. From this, we can conclude that legitimate support to the reconstruction project at home and abroad is a key-element defining the outcome of the reconstruction project.

Another key-element pertaining to potential success in post-conflict reconstruction consists in being able to switch rapidly from coercion to consent generation mode. Such a switch is highly dependent on the level of preparedness that the future occupier developed, that is planning for contingencies.

Secondly, caused by faulty intelligence and fantasies about the realities of pre-war Iraq and by an inter-agency struggle for control over reconstruction, American officials did not plan for all possibilities after Saddam Hussein's fall. Based on exiled Iraqis' assumptions that American forces would be welcomed and that the structures of the state would keep running, U.S. plans did not consider a potential eruption of anarchy after the regime's fall and designed the occupation of Iraq as a short venture requiring few U.S. troops on the ground. A quick handover to a new Iraqi government was thus foreseen. However, through over-reliance on Iraqi exiles, the absence of a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction of the Iraqi state and the inclusion of efficient Iraqi insiders, as the limited mandate of the ORHA illustrated, the U.S. created a legitimacy gap as Iraqi externals would be seen with distrust by the Iraqi population, considering them as at the service of the occupiers. Such early lack of legitimacy would plague the occupation from the start and make the generation of Iraqi consent to American decisions falter.

Moreover, the Pentagon's own dogmatic conception of what reconstruction should be translated into the rejection of any help offered by the State Department and its refusal to rely on UN previous post-conflict experiences. Consequently, the reconstruction was not led on the premises of lessons-learned but driven by specific interests and objectives, while realities were twisted or simply ignored. Instead of capitalising on problems and solutions from other reconstruction cases, the occupation forced through policies of reconstruction at odd with the realities on the ground, jeopardising future efficient use of power as the discrepancy between wishes and realities grew.

Indeed, and thirdly, after the regime's fall, it became clear to Americans that postulates made in the planning were way off the mark. The collapse of governmental structure leading to widespread looting, the reorganisation of loyalists to the Ba'ath regime, the sorry state of the infrastructure, and the beginning of a sectarian re-alignment constituted the realities faced by the victors. With the fall of the regime, Iraqi security forces faded away, resulting in looting on a grand scale, leading to further damage to state structures and economic infrastructure, essential to quickly launching reconstruction projects. Lacking sufficient forces to enforce security, and actually not being briefed to do so, American forces did not react to the destruction following the fall of Saddam Hussein. Victim of its own military success due to small agile forces focusing on speed of action and overwhelming fire power, the U.S. army dispersed instead of destroyed Iraqi forces, who thus rallied and quickly turned against the occupying forces.

Finally, and fourthly, by attacking Iraq, the United States attacked the whole Arab and Muslim world. While most of these countries are supposedly allies of the U.S., those most influencing the reconstruction process, Iran and Syria, are enemies. Hence, the geographical situation of Iraq was bound to end up in the involvement of neighbouring countries, not always sympathetic to American objectives. The initial failure of the U.S. to include the regional powers surrounding Iraq in the reconstruction of the country and the failure to integrate its Iraqi policy into the larger regional political framework by omitting to address other issues directly linked to the Iraqi question, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the issue of a nuclear Iran and the influence of Syria in Lebanon, and of course both Iranian and Syrian support to Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a military groups, played a critical role in the outcome of the reconstruction of Iraq. As the *Iraq Study Group Report* pointed out: "Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interests in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively. [...] The United States cannot

achieve its goal in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and instability”.⁵¹⁹

The official rationale of the intervention in Iraq, toppling a dictatorial regime in order to generate democracy, and hence a regime potentially friendly to the U.S. and supportive in its global struggle against terrorism, which in turn would enhance American control in a strategic region due to the energy resources it harbours, led to the adoption of a coercion-based policy marred by fantasist conclusions regarding the conditions under which such policy would operate. The lack of time dedicated to planning, its ‘unknowns’ and misperceptions, the wishful thinking inhabiting the administration, and the resulting lack of resources dedicated to face the post-invasion/pre-reconstruction realities all contributed to the maiming of U.S power, which, in the absence of sufficient space and time to generate consent, became reactive and had to turn to raw expressions of power based on coercion in order to keep a foothold in Iraq. In short, Iraq was a country in need of support in the long-run, not a country able to reconstruct itself, materially, politically and socially.


In terms of power, the U.S. squandered its resources essentially because of a misreading of the realities affecting Iraq and a wishful thinking attitude regarding the reconstruction to follow the war. Such a lack of realism paved the way for a succession of mistakes by the Coalition Provisional Authority, in charge to implement a reconstruction programme based on a top-down approach, an approach that left little room for consent generation amongst Iraqis but favoured coercion-based policy instruments. The coercion-based approach to deal with the challenges in post-war Iraq was not only imposed by the realities faced on the ground but also a logical continuation of policies of coercion that had led to the war.

Assessing Consistency of U.S. Actions across the Four Fields

These post-invasion realities impacted directly on the degree of consistency achieved by U.S. policies across the four fields of the reconstruction in Iraq. The table below summarises the policies and actions (in blue) undertaken by the U.S. in the security, political society, economic and civil society dimensions of the reconstruction and qualifies them as based on coercion or consent. Those policies generated outcomes either positive (in green) or negative (in red). To differentiate between early policies and later policies, we have put the policies of the *New Way Forward* and their outcomes in bold.

⁵¹⁹ United States Institute for Peace, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 6th December 2006. p. 2.

Power, Consistency and the Four Fields



We saw that pre-conditions to the invasion and the early post-war realities characterised by the fragmentation of the Iraqi state and civil society put security and stability at the forefront of issues faced by the U.S. in Iraq. To deal with the various Iraqi groups engaged in a struggle to secure power in the post-Saddam era, the American occupation responded by the use of force in order to restore order and retain control over events and outcomes. Indeed, in the realm of security, the decision to have a relatively small U.S. force in Iraq led to the loss of control of the security and stability situation and allowed for the rise of a Sunni insurgency, widespread looting and the inability to control Shi'a militias. It led to further need to apply policies of coercion and caused massive collateral damages on the Iraqi population, in turn jeopardising consent generation to the occupation. Similarly, the decision to disband Iraqi security forces and the conflation of Al Qaeda sponsored terrorists with Sunni insurgents further fuelled the insurgency and the loss of consent generation ability on behalf of the U.S., as the more the security situation worsened, the more the Iraqi population withdrew its support for the Occupation, perceived as inadequate and useless.

The failure of the Occupation to rebuild Iraqi security forces rapidly also contributed to the lack of consent attribution to CPA's policies. Indeed, a rapid reconstruction of Iraqi security forces could have alleviated the security burden for Coalition forces and generated a dose of consent amongst the Iraqi population as the occupation would have been more discrete. Instead, the reformation of Iraqi security forces lingered. Coalition forces thus provided the bulk of the fighting against insurgents and terrorists, and lost the opportunity to empower and legitimise Iraqi forces and hence the Iraqi government. Instead, U.S. forces were in charge of doing the fighting, leading to countless daily encounters with Iraqis, constituting as many cultural clashes, emphasising the cultural divide between the American soldiers and Iraqis, and thus making more difficult the spread of American values across the Iraqi civil society.

However, while CPA decided to embark on building new Iraqi security forces to gradually take over security duties and hence reduce interactions between U.S. troops and Iraqi population, CPA did not manage to quantitatively and qualitatively develop Iraqi forces in order to implement such a transition of responsibilities in the security sphere of the reconstruction. In turn, overstretched on the ground, Coalition troops simply did not have the resources and the training to perform security missions. Hence, the security situation deteriorated, which led to further use of coercion to contain challenges to the Occupation and

the new Iraqi state, in turn draining resources from the three other fields of the reconstruction, and hence putting at risk the whole project of rebuilding Iraq.

The security situation grew worse with decisions made in the political sphere of the reconstruction. Coercive in nature, the declaration of a formal occupation, the de-Ba'athification order and an attempt at imposing a U.S. version of the state on Iraqis led to further discontentment and further fuelled the insurgency among Sunnis, convinced that their voice would not be heard in the new Iraq. In addition, a process of decentralisation of state power towards regions and provinces based on the U.S. model of federalism, and the willingness to balance Iraqi factions against each other, led to further weakening of the Iraqi state capacity, in turn leading to questioning by the Iraqi population of the capabilities of the new Iraqi state. This process of fragmentation of state power coupled with the ongoing challenges to its existence led to the failure of CPA to develop new Iraqi security forces. In turn, it accentuated the security burden on U.S. forces while jeopardising consent generation of the Iraqi population as clashes with non-Iraqi forces continued.

Moreover, CPA's inability to ensure the demobilisation of militias fuelled further instability. Of course, the poor initial security conditions led Iraqi political parties to keep an armed service as in occupied Iraq, violence was the norm. In order to preserve their share of power in the nascent Iraqi state, political parties used militias as protection and as tools of intimidation towards political rivals, and in the case of Shi'a, to fight Sunni insurgents. The militia issue is an example of the influence of the sphere of security on the reconstruction of the Iraqi state. The overall security situation is closely connected to the progress made in the political sphere and especially regarding a potential national reconciliation. However, in a situation of volatile security and political instability due to a permanent contest for the control of a nascent state, Iraqi power brokers were not ready to dispossess themselves of the protection and tools for action provided by their armed gangs. Not only did the use of force permanently shadow consent generation in the relations between occupiers and occupied, but coercion was also the privileged mode of action of those supposed to rebuild the Iraqi state from the inside. Indeed, the fragmentation of the Iraqi political society due to the inexistence of security and stability not only impeded the strengthening of the Iraqi state but had a direct influence on the reconstitution of the civil society by deepening further the rifts between Iraq's communities and hence worsening the security situation. As long as the Iraqi political society failed to find a way out from spiralling violence, no national reconciliation and hence no gains in stability could be made, which in turn jeopardised the overall reconstruction project.

The security dimension of the reconstruction project proved to be central to any progress in other fields. Indeed, the Occupation responded with coercion to challenges to its authority and specific project in Iraq. While attempts at generating consent to U.S. policies were made, they rapidly reached their limit because they were not consistent with Iraqi expectations or were simply unable to cope with the levels of violence they faced. Consent generation suffered from the permanent Iraqi rejection of their status as defeated and occupied nation. Hence, the Occupation's definition of a common interest and reconstruction project would have been welcome, but from the outside as the form of support, not imposition. Similarly, generating consent through putting an Iraqi face on the occupation failed. The role of buffer between the CPA and the population that was envisaged for the IGC did not work efficiently and, lacking of power-brokers able to focus on consent, the Occupation relied on forcing its decisions, fuelling resentment and chasing away consent and legitimacy.

The reconstruction of the Iraqi state was further complicated by the fault lines animating the Iraqi society. The CPA-created TAL, serving as a basis for the Iraqi Constitution. However far from generating national reconciliation, it further reinforced the differences animating Iraq. Indeed, the will to de-centralise power versus the creation of a strong centralised state actually caused entrenched cultural and political differences to be identified with specific provinces and regions. In addition, the inclusion of de-Ba'athification in the TAL and the Constitution would further alienate Sunnis from participating in the reconstruction of Iraq and reinforce Sunnis' tendency to fall back on their identity and constitutive of political power. National reconciliation, at the end of CPA's tenure was far from being reality. It would take another four years to see Iraqi factions agree on legislation destined to solve these issues, as negotiations on an Amnesty Law and Hydrocarbon Law illustrated.

Moreover, the scope of the purge initiated by CPA and later on implemented by the new Iraqi government further weakened the Iraqi state, as Sunnis, constituting the bulk of those with expertise, fled, depriving the state of skills needed for its recovery. In turn, this impacted the economic recovery of the country. Here, decisions made in the political sphere influenced directly the economic dimension of reconstruction.

In addition, the purge provoked Sunnis to fall back on their common identity as a form of protection. It translated into a reinforcement of the insurgency, which produced the exact opposite of what the purge intended. Indeed, far from repenting, those punished for being Ba'athists expressed their anger by rejecting the Occupation. The consent the CPA gained

amongst the former victims of Ba'athism was quickly overshadowed by the rise in violence, to which coercion could be the only answer. The security dimension of the reconstruction is here victim of the reconstruction of the state. The political and security fields of the reconstruction are in opposition, and their policies inconsistent with each other. Worse, the purge, as a source of violence, was now enshrined in the document serving as the basis for a future constitution. The failure of coercive power in the security and political fields triggered an accentuation of policies of consent generation by addressing basic needs and political aspirations of the population. In turn, it was hoped that such support gained through consent would probably expand and somehow influence the political formation of the country and hence improve the security situation.

While CPA policies in the security and political arenas were harmed by the inevitable coercion that accompanied most of American actions, the economy was identified as the ground in which to seed consent through development. Witness to permanent interactions existing between the fields of reconstruction, progress in the economic area would be hampered by the lack of progress in the security and political fields. Indeed, the permanent lack of security took a toll on the economic development of the country too. Facing continuous attacks on essential services facilities by terrorists and insurgents, the Occupation failed to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi population and to re-launch the Iraqi economy. CPA understood that managing economic transition meant restoring essential services to the Iraqi population. The reparation of the power and water infrastructure was thus a priority and would further contribute to economic recovery as the economic strategy of the CPA consisted in relying on the oil sector to foster long-term growth, while gradually diversifying economic activity, but these objectives would be impossible to achieve without power and water. Moreover, providing essential services was identified as a key-political instrument that, if not able to generate consent to the occupation, might at least contain discontentment.

The macro-economic reforms did little to improve living conditions in Iraq and instead of generating hope and consent to reconstruction policies, they contributed to the identification of foreign contractors as the main benefactors of the economic program. Indeed, Iraqis considered the opening of their country to foreign interests as a form of coercion, an organised looting of the country's resources while their basic needs were not met.

Hence, CPA focused on restoring essential services by undertaking large scale reconstruction projects of water, power and oil facilities. However, insurgents and terrorists quickly understood that impeding the provision of essential services by CPA to Iraqis was a

very efficient strategy to seed rejection of the Occupation and reconstruction in the Iraqi society. The inability of the Occupation to challenge attacks on essential services facilities would prove fatal to the outcome of the reconstruction project in Iraq and illustrates the direct correlation between the security and economy dimension of the reconstruction. The security dimension of the reconstruction kept hampering the economic dimension and the resulting potential improvement of the condition of Iraqis, in turn allowing for stronger support for policies of reconstruction.

The failure to deliver essential services was aggravated by an inability to fight unemployment. Indeed, hostage of the security situation, the economy moved slowly and hence job creation remained elusive. In turn, the lack of employment fuelled discontent and populated the insurgency, which in turn raised insecurity levels, itself hampering reconstruction projects and private investments and thus potential job creation. Overall, the inability to restore essential services due to dire security conditions is at the source of the failure of CPA's economic policy, leading to a slow-down of the economic recovery. In turn, this led to further discontentment and general questioning of the effectiveness of an American-led reconstruction.

In the field of civil society, the lack of progress in the security dimension of the reconstruction also impeded the implementation of programmes aiming at spreading democratic ideals and values, promoting non-violent means to solve conflicts and address inequalities inherited from the Ba'ath regime. The attempt at liberating the press ended up with the need to censor local newspapers when they became too critical of the Occupation. This led Iraqis to turn to pan-Arabic channels to obtain information about what was happening in their country. By so doing, Iraqis accessed information that was essentially highly critical and anti-American. By failing to communicate with its occupied population, CPA failed to prevail in the propaganda war and hence, failed to win the war of ideas. The reform of education constituted another means for CPA to seed consent for American policies across Iraqi civil society. The review of the curriculum emphasised democratic values and human rights, contributing to the reinforcement of an Iraqi democratic political society thanks to the integration of democratic practices by young generations. However, due to security circumstances, the reforms of the education sector progressed slowly, especially regarding the reconstruction of infrastructures. Nevertheless, it is one of the fields in which incremental progress was achieved, helping to generate consent to American policies in Iraq.

In addition to the CPA focus on building democratic and accountable Iraqi institutions, a whole programme of democracy promotion was implemented in Iraqi civil

society through informal public education, the strengthening of civil society organisations, the promotion of public debate and peaceful conflict resolution programmes. The implementation of these programmes is relatively recent as previous security conditions did not allow for their progress. Until *The Surge*, not much was achieved regarding the promotion and practice of democracy, illustrating the direct link between the security sphere and the need to coerce in order to create conditions congenial to seeding democracy.

Four years into the Occupation of Iraq, reconstruction progress was slow. In all four fields of the reconstruction, with the notable exception of civil society, few objectives set by the Occupation authorities were actually reached. The U.S. administration displayed a lack of imagination and consistency in the design and implementation of its policies. The four dimensions of reconstruction that constitute our framework of analysis to assess the outcome of the Iraqi reconstruction project were dealt with by the U.S. separately, without consistency.

Indeed, security was first identified as paramount to success but the constant and indiscriminate use of force generated resentment and rejection of the Occupation. Secondly, the attempt at presenting the reconstruction of Iraq as regional and international issue and seeking to reintegrate the more moderate elements of the insurgency in the political negotiations also faltered.

In all four dimensions of the reconstruction, the U.S. failed to achieve consistency between policies, actions and outcomes. Influenced by pre-conditions far from congenial to what the American planners had in mind for the reconstruction of Iraq, the inability of the Occupation authorities to balance expressions of power based on coercion and on consent led to a rapid drifting to the adoption of policies and actions based on the use of force to tame those opposed to the American re-moulding of the Iraqi state, security environment, economy and civil society.

The first phase of the occupation was thus characterised by inconsistency and dispersed efforts in all four fields of the reconstruction. However, displaying strong capabilities to adapt, the American administration reviewed its policies, embodied in *The New Way Forward*. Reconstruction policies became more complementary, exemplified by the way to deal with security issues, illustrating the mix of coercion and consent generation in the exertion of power: following the control over an area as an outcome of the use of force, local expert teams move in quickly, protect the population, identify critical needs, start up reconstruction projects, and improve governance, in order to isolate insurgents. Coercion and consent walk hand-in-hand and following coercion, political and economic development

occurred, providing conditions conducive to consent generation, which in turn leads to the stabilisation of the area. Gradually, bringing a sense of normality to the population allows for the reconstruction of the country to move ahead. As of today, compared to two years ago, critical advances have been made in the security, political, economic and civil society fields. While fragile, these advances are permanently reinforced and Iraq is now moving forward.

Indeed, in the security field, the Surge coupled with the work of PRTs in the economic and civil society dimensions of the reconstruction, led to a reduction of Al Qaeda's activities in Iraq and a loss of intensity of the Sunni insurgency, leading to progress in stabilising the country, in turn allowing for economic recovery to proceed while strengthening civil society through the implementation of good governance and democracy promotion programmes. Consent to reconstruction policies across Iraq is gradually being achieved as Iraqis start to witness an improvement in their living conditions, a slow rise in job openings and overall better security conditions. In turn, this leads to a reduction of those willing to contest the U.S. and the new Iraqi government as moderates drift away from turning into insurgents as an option.

The progress made in the security field also allowed for further development of the Iraqi state coercive capacity. Gradually, Iraqi forces are taking over security duties from U.S. troops, and the corollary diminution of contacts between U.S. forces and the Iraqi population as well as the identification by the Iraqi population of a renewed coercive capacity of the central government contribute to further attribution by the Iraqi population of legitimacy to their new government. This reinforcement of the Iraqi state coupled with the development of the economy and a stronger civil society allow the country to slowly move towards the elusive goal of national reconciliation, eventually bringing normality back to Iraqi lives.

Consistency of action between the dimensions of the reconstruction and a review on behalf of the U.S. of what power can achieve now contribute to the adoption of a more positive look at the outcome of the reconstruction of Iraq. While far from being a success, either for Iraqis or when considering U.S. regional and global interests, the prospect of witnessing a strong, democratic and peaceful Iraq is gradually appearing.

Assessing Consistency of Reconstruction policies with Regional and Global U.S. Foreign Policies

We argued that, in addition to consistency of reconstruction policies with each other, another key-analytical factor explaining the outcome of a post-conflict reconstruction project resides in an assessment of the degree of consistency achieved by the power in charge of the reconstruction in the definition and implementation of its regional and global foreign policies compared with implemented reconstruction policies.

We saw in chapter 4 that the Bush administration defined the U.S. national interest as the enhancement of America's security through the maintenance of the U.S. unchallenged global position of power and the spread of American values and ideals in order to further develop the presence of democratic regimes in the world. In turn, that would contribute to the reinforcement of global stability and hence be conducive to the safeguarding of the United States' security. However, the terrorist attacks on American territory challenged the American decision-makers' perception of the U.S. as being safe and unchallenged. Relying on their perception of the U.S. global status as characterised by an unprecedented position of power, U.S. foreign policy-makers answered the terrorist challenge by declaring a war on international terror through a set of foreign policy instruments such as unilateralism, democracy promotion, regime change, right of pre-emption and the use of force when necessary.

These tenets defining modes of action of U.S. foreign policies regionally and globally had a direct impact on the policies in the four fields of reconstruction described in Iraq as the following table summarises:

U.S. Foreign Policies and Their Impact on Reconstruction

U.S. Foreign Policies	Four Fields of Reconstruction			
	<i>Security</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Economy</i>	<i>Civil Society</i>
<i>War on Terror</i>	Iraq as battlefield. Point of convergence for Jihadists. Security deteriorates. Regional instability grows.	Iraqi state has to fight Sunni Jihadists. Impedes on national reconciliation and constructive relations with neighbours.	Iraqi state has to dedicate resources to fight terror. Impedes on economic recovery.	Under siege as civilians also victims of terrorists. Sectarianism grows.
<i>Unilateralism</i>	Few non U.S. troops. Issue of legitimacy as U.S. seen as occupier. Security deteriorates.	Limited UN and international involvement. Loss of expertise in re-building Iraqi state. U.S. as colonial power.	Bulk of financing reconstruction on U.S. U.S. and U.K. corporations only policy leads to inefficiency and corruption. Slows down economic reconstruction.	Limited UN and international involvement. Loss of UN and international expertise in nation-building.
<i>Democracy promotion and regime change through pre-emptive use of force</i>	"Who is next?" reaction in Middle East. Instability grows. Syria and Iran under threat, want to see U.S. fail in Iraq. Support insurgents and militias.	What kind of regime after Saddam? State is battleground of diverse conceptions. Impedes on strengthening Iraqi state.	Democracy hand-in-hand with macro-economic measures to insert Iraq in global economy. Fails to address basic needs of population. Slows down economic recovery.	Learning democracy is long process. Imposition of democracy from outside not always accepted.
<i>Non-engagement with Syria</i>	Jihadists flow into Iraq through Syria.	Syria undermines Iraqi state potentially dominated by Shi'a.	Smuggling of fuel to Syria. Black market. Parallel economy weakens Iraq.	Fuels sectarianism.
<i>Non-engagement with Iran</i>	Iran supports Shi'a militias.	Iran not in favour of strong Iraqi state.	Smuggling to Iran. Parallel economy weakens Iraq.	Fuels sectarianism.
<i>U.S. permanent military presence in Iraq</i>	Create instability regionally. Iraqis and U.S. in Iraq still target of Jihadists. Syria and Iran arm build-up.	Iraqi state as U.S. puppet in Middle East.	Depending on security treaty, could be a drain on Iraqi resources.	Still feeling of being occupied. Not conducive to acceptance of U.S. ideals and interests. Democracy could recede.

While U.S. foreign policy decisions directly impacted the evolution of the reconstruction of Iraq, developments they caused in Iraq in turn impacted U.S. foreign policy globally and regionally. Indeed, inconsistencies they contributed to generating in the reconstruction process backfired and put at risk global and American regional foreign policy objectives.

The announcement of a global war on terror by the Bush administration, in addition to legitimising terrorist networks through their assimilation to a state at war with America, coupled with the invasion and occupation of Iraq, provided international terrorists with a battlefield where they could contest American power. The inflow of Jihadists into Iraq played a part in the destabilisation of the Middle East as a whole and put under siege Arab regimes allied with the U.S. as their populations questioned the intervention of the U.S. and the massive presence of American troops in an Arab nation. Jihadists are seen by many Arabs as defending Islam, once again victim of Western imperialism, against a new crusade. In turn, such an outcome undermined the global U.S. foreign policy objective aiming at defeating terrorism and hence weakened the United States in its fight against global terrorism.

In addition, democracy promotion and regime change implemented by the unilateral use of force contributed to further regional destabilisation as Iran and Syria, aware of being potential U.S. targets and witnessing the inability of the international community to stop U.S. designs, also identified Iraq as a ground on which to defeat U.S. power. It translated into support to Iraqi factions fighting U.S. presence in Iraq, which in turn further fuelled regional instability.

The initial refusal of the U.S. administration to engage with Syria and Iran regarding the future of Iraq further impeded the reconstruction of Iraq. Coupled with the long-term presence of U.S. troops on their doorstep, such non-engagement pushed Syria and Iran to buttress their security by arming, and in the case of Iran, by seeking to develop nuclear weapons. In addition, the U.S. refusal to reach out to both countries impeded the progress of two other causes of regional instability, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the potential drift of Lebanon into another civil war. Both Syria and Iran indeed support factions that oppose the peaceful resolution of both conflicts.

These developments not only impede the reconstruction of Iraq but are inconsistent with global U.S. foreign policy objectives: regional stability across the world, control of the conventional arms race and especially of the spread of WMD, and winning the war on terror through cutting support to international terrorism.

Not only were policies of reconstruction inconsistent with each other across the four fields under scrutiny (security, state, economy and civil society), but U.S. Middle East foreign policies have proven inconsistent with global U.S. foreign policy objectives through the regional instability they generated.

However, with the implementation of *The New Way Forward* in Iraq, creating incremental progress across the four fields of reconstruction, the U.S. administration adopted a foreign policy stance that moved away from a unilateralist position regarding the management of the Iraqi reconstruction to take into account opinions and concerns of the regional actors and the international community.

Indeed, the U.S. reached out both to Iran, by sending a special envoy to the European negotiations about the future of nuclear development of Iran, and to Syria. New levels of consistency are being achieved regionally as the U.S. gets more engaged with Iran and Syria, both responsible for the flow of fighters and material support to terrorists and insurgents. By recently opening the door to negotiations with Iran and Syria, the U.S. gives itself another chance to stabilise Iraq.

Moreover, the U.S. recently adopted a lower profile regarding its status as global superpower. Of course, one can argue that the U.S. military capabilities are over-stretched. However, it seems that the Bush administration understood that the Iraq reconstruction would be better off if treated multilaterally, as the International Compact on Iraq illustrates, by structuring international aid under the IMF and UN umbrella, in order to lead Iraq's integration into the global economy and international community. Gradually, the U.S. has moved away from its perceived status as global bully to a more discreet position of power congenial to multilateralism and peaceful engagement with friends and rivals. Ultimately, even though it is too early to say, such a move from a position of aggressive projection of power to a review of what power can do through the use of consent generation foreign policy instruments, might save the United States the embarrassment of seeing its power at risk.

Indeed, the American reconstruction project in Iraq has not failed yet. Despite its shortcomings, the Iraqi state is developing, whilst under American tutelage, to perform its duties towards the Iraqi population. However, the question of the allegiance of the new Iraq to the U.S. and its interests in the region remains open. Recent signs seem to show that Iraq will not turn into a docile state aligned with the U.S. The fault lines that animate Iraqi society as well as the volatility that characterises the Middle East cast doubts on the achievement of the original aim of the U.S. foreign policy of enhancing its control over the region. In that sense, the reconstruction of Iraq, as of today, can be characterised as ineffective, even though

the change of policy initiated by the Bush administration in 2006 starts to bear fruit. The Iraqi adventure was close to turning into the nemesis of American power but while proving to be the strongest test of what American power can do, it actually provided the U.S. with the opportunity to question itself and its understanding of what its power can do in the contemporary world.

In contrast to the reconstruction of Iraq, the reconstruction of Japan between 1945 and 1952 was a very different story. Of course, the times were different and the starting conditions of the reconstruction project were also radically different. However, the purpose was the same, reinforcing and furthering U.S. supremacy; and, the American understanding of power was also similar to what it is today, essentially springing from past historical experiences, as chapter 3 illustrated. However, in Japan, American power exertion was never taken hostage by U.S. foreign policy objectives. Where inconsistency of power use, reconstruction policies and of U.S. foreign policies characterised the Iraqi experience, consistency of action was the norm in Japan.

This is what the next chapter will investigate.

6. Reconstructing Japan: Coercion, Consent and Consistency.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the analysis of the American-led reconstruction of Iraq draws permanent criticism regarding its methods, goals, and overall management, feeding an ongoing debate regarding its effectiveness. This is especially true when put against U.S.-led reconstruction cases as in Germany and Japan.

Indeed, the reconstruction of Japan and Germany after WW II is usually considered by American policy-makers as a case of effective post-conflict reconstruction. More recent experiences have proven less successful, as in Somalia and Kosovo, and prompted the U.S. to shy away from reconstruction of devastated nations as a foreign policy objective at the beginning of the G.W. Bush administration as Bush stated in 2000: "I would be guarded in my approach. I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we commit our troops".⁵²⁰

Nevertheless, following the attacks of 9/11 and the review of the U.S. national security emphasising the repulsion of any challenges to the global American supremacy, including from international terrorism, the Bush administration embarked on a project to remould the Middle East in order to make it more congenial to U.S. interests, past consent generation policies having failed. Coercion spearheaded this evolution of U.S. foreign policy in the region through the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The U.S. ended up then with reconstruction projects in both countries whose size and scope had not been equalled since the end of WW II.

However, the post-WW II world was very different from the contemporary international system. Instead of a rising communist threat, the U.S. is now facing a far more diffuse and yet far more difficult threat to assess and deal with: failed states and the consequent lack of stability and extremisms, embodied by various terrorist movements.

Hence, logically, on his trip to Baghdad, Noah Feldman, Professor of Law at New York University and Senior Constitutional Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (CPA), was surprised to see that most of his fellow travellers were reading books on the reconstruction of Germany and Japan in the wake of World War II instead of literature on modern Iraq.⁵²¹ Indeed, in its reconstruction project in Iraq, the U.S. encounters economic, political, cultural and social conditions that have very little in common with post-World War II reconstruction efforts and the exercise of learning about the country one is about to occupy seemed obvious to Feldman.

⁵²⁰ Bush, G.W., Presidential debate, 3rd October 2000, Boston, MA.

⁵²¹ Feldman, Noah, *What We Owe Iraq*, p. 1.

However, besides the very different reasons to go to war with Germany and Japan (essentially repelling an aggression versus pre-emptively striking Iraq), the contexts and purpose of both reconstruction projects were not very different in essence. At the strategic level, where the main U.S. objective in rebuilding Japan and Germany was to turn these two countries into rich and capitalist economies to constitute a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, the reconstruction of Iraq is an example of regime change to establish a capitalist liberal system run by a government friendly to the U.S. and ready to support American policy in the region, and in corollary, enhance the security of U.S. interests globally.

Paul Bremer, at the head of the CPA in Iraq, was aware of the differences between the post-World War II and contemporary occupation projects. Due to the length of the WWII, American planners had the time to work on occupation policies for two to three years before the end of the war and consider all possible contingencies. In Iraq, the U.S. planners had a few months but yet managed to produce a rather comprehensive plan with clear objectives, while failing to assess accurately the extent of the Iraqi state collapse and subsequent rise of violence.

While there was a sound knowledge of German and Japanese political economic and cultural aspects amongst occupation authorities' staff, those data were lacking to U.S. occupiers of Iraq, as it was shut down to U.S. interests for most of Saddam's rule.

Finally, Japan and Germany fought total wars, with their populations entirely mobilised behind the war effort. After the defeat, Germany and Japan had little choice left but to accept the occupation and the reconstruction project defined by their victors. In Iraq, the U.S. toppled a regime but did not defeat a country. As Bremer underlines: "The vast majority of Iraqis were delighted to have Saddam and his henchmen thrown out, but few were happy to find a foreign, non-Muslim army occupying their country".⁵²²

In the light of these considerations, it is understandable that Feldman was puzzled by his colleagues' choice of reading material. However, it is also understandable that one might want to get informed about successful reconstruction ventures as Germany and Japan turned out to be for the United States. The underlying question in the mind of these CPA officials was why was the reconstruction of Japan and Germany successful?

Chapter 2 defined the boundaries of our use of a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent and identified several dimensions in which power can be exerted. Chapter 3 looked at ideas and values that developed over the course of American

⁵²² Bremer, L. Paul III, *My Year in Iraq*, p. 37.

history and at their influence on how Americans see the world and their status and corollary role in it. Chapter 4 assessed the influence that factors identified in chapter 3 have on the contemporary perception of power by American decision-makers and corollary effect on American perception of the status and role of the U.S. in the world, and hence on the definition of American foreign policies.

Based on these first three chapters, we argued that looking at reconstruction processes by using a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent, by integrating outcomes of such exertion of power at the local, regional and global levels of analysis, and finally by looking at how fields in which a reconstruction project unfolds interact, as well as by assessing the degree of consistency of policies unfolding in these four fields, can help us to appraise the outcome of a reconstruction project. In addition, we also contend that the outcome of a reconstruction project is influenced by the pre-conditions to this project.

Chapter 5 applied our findings to the reconstruction of Iraq and now the present chapter reveals that, while still questionable in Iraq, the favourable outcome of the reconstruction of Japan is more obvious. We argue that the rebuilding of Japan resulted in a favourable outcome for the U.S. because pre-conditions were favourable, and because on top of consistent regional and global foreign policies, the American occupation authorities maximised its use of power by integrating coercion-based and consent-generation-based mechanisms of power across all fields of the reconstruction project, achieving a high level of coherence between policies unfolding in the political society, the economy, the civil society and the security dimensions of reconstruction. The end of the process fulfilled the original objectives of the occupation and reconstruction: Japan was, and still is, a faithful and unconditional ally of the United States. The efficient use of power coupled with a high level of reconstruction and foreign policies consistency allowed the U.S. to reach its strategic objectives in the struggle against the rising power of global communism.

Indeed, the shaping of post-war Japan involved every dimension of the country's life and occurred at all levels of the Japanese society. The occupation revised entirely the whole economic, financial and trade structures, aiming at greater liberalisation; the political institutions and the bureaucracy were reformed along democratic lines; the Japanese civil society was turned upside down with the reform of its trade unions, education system, religious activities and youth organisations among others, and by the injection of Western and especially American popular culture. The victors set to work in all the dimensions of power available in their new relationship with the vanquished.

This chapter is organised differently than the previous chapter on the reconstruction of Iraq. Indeed, where security and stability are at the forefront of the Iraqi experience, it was not in Japan. Thoroughly beaten, the Japanese army and more importantly, the Japanese population, simply did not have the resources to physically contest the American occupation. Hence, we decided to organise the chapter in a more linear fashion, with *The Reverse Course* as the key-turning point, and a focus on the remoulding of the state, the economy, and civil society both before and after that turning point. The security dimension of the reconstruction is not overlooked but pertains more to the regional and global level of analysis and the U.S. military anchorage in Japan.

The first section looks at what the world looked like at the end of the Second World War. Having suffered less than its allies, the U.S. entered the post-WWII world in a very strong position. Surpassing by far economically and militarily the other powers, the U.S. also enjoyed high levels of legitimacy and soft power. At the source of the making of the liberal institutionalisation of the new world order, America listened to its allies but also to its former enemies. In the immediate aftermath of the war, U.S. policies aimed at reinforcing America's global status in a new world order whose boundaries and working mechanisms were defined in Washington. In Asia, the Pacific War⁵²³ had lasted four years and constituted the outcome of a failure to get Japanese consent to the U.S. project for Asia-Pacific. It was essentially due to inconsistencies and a lack of coordination in the diverse spheres of American interventionism. Indeed, U.S. officials did not make use of power in a coherent way but instead tended to disperse their efforts and, faced with the staunch refusal of Japan to abide, chose to coerce, which led Japan to strike the U.S. in 1941. In 1945, The United States, which provided the greatest war effort against Japan, entered the vanquished country and set on a comprehensive reformist course in order first to avoid the resurgence of militarism, and later on, to ensure that Japan would side with the U.S. against the USSR in the new historical structure provided by the Cold War.

The second section looks at the pre-conditions to the occupation: the issue of legitimacy enjoyed by the U.S. as occupying power, the influence of extensive destruction sustained by Japan before the reconstruction started, the homogeneity of Japanese society, the isolation of Japan, the quality of the reconstruction planning instruments, and finally the organisation and the rationale behind the reconstruction project in Japan. In addition to the four first pre-conditions, which can be considered as objective, the U.S. invested heavily in

⁵²³ American denomination of the war against Japan. The Japanese called the war in Asia, which started in 1931 against China, the Great Asian War.

the pre-war planning of the reconstruction of Japan while displaying flexibility and adaptability of reconstruction policies to evolving international realities.

Indeed, the Occupation moved from a focus on genuine democracy promotion and development of a liberal capitalist economy to a focus on repelling Communism, implying a partial retreat from the most liberal reforms then undertaken to favour political stability and an at all costs economic recovery as well as unconditional alignment with the United States. While punitive under certain aspects like the dismantling of war-making industrial capacities, the purge of ultra-militaristic elements and the trial of those considered as war criminals, the planning of the occupation is striking for its emphasis on giving a chance to Japan to gain a seat alongside 'civilised' nations. Far from throwing back the country to the stone age, Japan was given a chance to be born-again, if only as a little American brother.

The third section gives an account of the early policies of the Occupation across the four dimensions of the reconstruction; the state, the economy and civil society. The security sphere will be dealt with later on as stability was acquired by the time the American forces walked into Japan. We thus focus first on the wave of democratic principles that were fed to the Japanese political and civil societies by looking at the purge that took place in the political, economic and education fields, by reviewing the political reforms centred on a new constitution and role for the emperor, by assessing the economic reforms aiming to develop of liberal capitalism in Japan, and, by analysing the policies seeking to distil democratic principles and individual liberties in Japanese society. Throughout this first phase, the Occupation favoured consent generation among the Japanese. The re-invention of Japan into a democratic and peaceful country struck a mighty chord with the majority of the public opinion and a good part of the political elite. Nevertheless, when needed, the threat of coercion was never far away. While benevolent, the Occupation did not tolerate questioning of its aims and method, as the process of the birth of a new Japanese constitution illustrates. However, consistency of action in the re-moulding of the state, economy and civil society characterised the American policies of reconstruction and contributed to its favourable outcome.

The fourth section deals with the so-called *Reverse Course* and the influence of regional and global American foreign policies on the reconstruction of Japan. Due to the rise of a global communist threat, the U.S. decided to review its ultra-liberal political and economic projects in Japan. Japan was to become the democratic and capitalist bulwark of the struggle against the USSR in the region. It implied a move from genuine democratisation in all spheres of the Japanese society to controlled democratisation (with a red purge being

implemented) and a focus on economic recovery as well as partial remilitarisation. At the end of the process, Japan was aligned with the U.S., helping to maintain U.S. supremacy in the region and to consolidate America as the leader of the free world. Notwithstanding this u-turn, the U.S. managed to maintain coherence between the various fields of the reconstruction as well as with regional and global foreign policy objectives. At the end of the occupation of Japan, the reconstruction of the country had achieved its objectives of developing a Japanese democratic state structure, whose elite was aligned with the U.S.; a Japanese economy, while not strong yet showing signs that it would eventually perform with continuous American support; a civil society permeated by democratic values, rejecting excesses of the past, and receptive to American ideals and values; and a Security Treaty organising American long-term presence in the region as well as defining Japan as a key-ally to the U.S. in its fight against the rise of Soviet influence in East Asia.

By any measure, the reconstruction of Japan was indeed a success for American foreign policy-makers.

The United and States in the Post-WWII World

On August 15, the Emperor Hirohito announced to his bewildered subjects that the war was over⁵²⁴. As we saw, major wars often transfer the helm of leadership from one country to another, transforming the existing international system⁵²⁵. The Second World War certainly brought in its wake a dramatic remoulding of the international scene. The unconditional German and Japanese surrenders caused a political and economic collapse creating giant vacuums of power in Central Europe and in Asia-Pacific, vacuums that had to be filled. European colonial powers, economically shattered by the war, were not in a position to meet the power requirements of the new international settings. Moreover, early Japanese victories against these colonial powers downplayed the image of the white man's superiority, stimulating independence movements in Asia-Pacific, which success would

⁵²⁴ The complete text read: 'To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security of and well-being of Our Subjects...We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandisement...We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable...' 14th day of the 8th month of the 20th year of Showa (August 14th, 1945, broadcasted on August 15th, 1945) (Hirohito's Surrender Broadcast 15th August 1945) .

⁵²⁵ On the cycle of hegemonic wars, see Gilpin, R., *War and Change in World Politics*. See also Ikenberry, G. John, *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*.

later lead to the same pattern of struggles for independence in Africa. The end of colonialism added power dislocations to the ones issued from the end of the war.⁵²⁶

Even though it is not possible to reduce the origin of these vacuums of power to a single explanatory factor or a single power, one can avow that the United States played a major role in their creation. America assumed an important share of the war in Europe and most of it in Asia. Roosevelt was inflexible regarding the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the American attitude to colonialism contributed to its downfall. However, even though the U.S. played a major role in the dislocation of the pre-war order, it also was in a position to fill these empty spaces vacated by the weakened old powers.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the initial views of the United States of the post-war world aimed at the creation of a better world by the emergence of free democratic processes (self-determination), the growth of free economic exchanges and trade, a United Nations dominated by the great powers in fairness and impartiality, and good relations with Great Britain and the USSR.⁵²⁷ The Yalta and Potsdam conferences resulted in the creation of the United Nations and of the liberal, international, economic and financial system of Bretton Woods, designed to oppose all forms (left or right) of economic nationalism and autarky, and to integrate the world economy under American leadership providing the U.S. with economic security.⁵²⁸ Regionally, this idealistic vision resulted in territorial deals cut between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta conference in February 1945.⁵²⁹

However, soon after Truman's ascent to the Presidency, his mistrust of Soviet Union and the successful Soviet tests of the A-bomb, led him to destroy the Yalta order. At the Potsdam conference in July 1945, Truman pledged the respect of the open-door principle in Chinese areas supposed to pass under Soviet control, and opposed the Russian entry into the Asian conflict.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁶ Lundestad, G., *The American Empire* (Oslo : Norwegian University Press, 1990), pp. 35-36; MacKerras, C., 'From Imperialism to the End of the Cold War' in McGrew, A. and Brook, C. (eds.) *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order* (London : Routledge, 1998), p. 40; LaFeber, W., *The Clash*, p. 256.

⁵²⁷ Schnabel, J. F., *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945-1947* (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1979), p. 13.

⁵²⁸ Pollard, R. A., *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War 1945-1950* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 4; Williams, A., *Failed Imagination? New World Orders of the Twentieth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), see chapter 3.

⁵²⁹ Concerning East Asia, the Soviets received the Southern half of Sakhalin, the Kuriles off the Siberian coast, the Chinese ports of Dairen and Port-Arthur, recognition of their dominance in Outer Mongolia, and de facto power over the Chinese Eastern Railway. In return, Stalin promised to enter the war against Japan as soon as the conflict in Europe was over.

⁵³⁰ LaFeber, W., *The Clash*, p. 246.

Moreover, the resurgence of considerations of power, embodied in George Kennan's long telegram commenting on Stalin's recent election speech⁵³¹ and the U.S. perception of a Communist economic encirclement⁵³² menacing American prosperity and hence international peace and prosperity, brushed aside idealism.⁵³³ There was no question of a peaceful world based on co-operation between great powers with the resuming of the Chinese civil war and the growing crises in Greece and Turkey, first acts of a play which would last for more than forty years, the Cold War. America was indeed to contain Communism.

Similarly to the post-Cold War world, the United States moved from a hot war to a cold one in an uncontested position of force. To the traditional factors influencing the formulation of the American foreign policy and the determination of global and regional objectives, were added factors issued from the new historical structure taking place.

It is possible to identify four pillars supporting American power at the end of WWII: its economic superiority, a substantial military lead, a domestic consensus on the policy pursued, and a ideology able to drain strong domestic and international support.

The economic base of the American power is the most impressive. The American gross national product (GNP) passed from \$209.4 billion in 1939 to \$355.2 billion in 1945. The work force was slightly depleted by the war as 'only' 400,000 Americans lost their lives⁵³⁴. America was producing almost as much as the rest of the world together⁵³⁵ and was enjoying a clear lead in technological developments and energy production.⁵³⁶ Finally, in 1950, the U.S. held 49.8 percent of the world's monetary gold, reserve currencies, and IMF reserves.⁵³⁷ This economic lead was bound to diminish with the rapid reconstruction and the increase of production in most of the world⁵³⁸ but until then, America was providing over

⁵³¹ The telegram, written by Kennan from the American embassy in Moscow, is considered as the harbinger of the containment doctrine.

⁵³² By cutting off supplies of raw materials, curtail trade and suppressing markets for investments and surpluses.

⁵³³ Bernstein, B. J., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago : Quadrangle Books, 1972), pp. 57-58; for a Marxist account of the U.S. policy aiming at creating a specific world order congenial to its interests, and the actual impossibility to do so leading to further confrontations with those challenging the American project, see Kolko, G., *The Politics of War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). For the influence of interests groups on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy post-WWII, see Shoup, L. H. and Minter, W., *Imperial Brain Trust. The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Authors Choice Press, 2004 [1977]), especially chapter 4.

⁵³⁴ In comparison to 20 million Soviets.

⁵³⁵ In Soviet Union, steel and agricultural production had been cut in half during the war.

⁵³⁶ Between 1940 and 1950, the U.S. was behind 82 percent of major discoveries, inventions and innovations.

America was producing 46 percent of the world's electric power and its businesses were controlling 59 percent of the world's oil reserves.

⁵³⁷ Lundestad, G., *The American Empire*, pp. 39-59; LaFeber, W., *The Clash*, p. 257.

⁵³⁸ In 1950, the US produced about 40 percent of the world's GNP, in 1960 around 30 percent.

half of global development assistance providing additional leverage for the American foreign policy.

Such a strong economy provided the necessary basis for military strength. Until 1949, the U.S. enjoyed a monopoly on the atomic bomb, and for the years to come, it remained the main deterrent to Soviet aggression. The American Air Force and the U.S. Navy were by far the strongest in the world at the end of the war⁵³⁹, while the Army personnel was the weakness of America's military capabilities.⁵⁴⁰ Yet, the Second World War had proven how fast America was able to shift from a civilian to a military economy.

The domestic political support for an involvement in international politics was the third pillar of America's strength and assertiveness in the post-war years. Indeed, the traditional isolationism, resting on the belief that the U.S. could not be attacked and more importantly on the ideological position underlining American moral exceptionalism in comparison with the other powers, was discredited. Pearl Harbor and the fascist ideology demonstrated that first, America was vulnerable, and second, that the U.S. was definitely closer ideologically to some states than others. The U.S. joined the United Nations and was involved in the occupation of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Austria. It maintained its defence spending higher than before the war and gave itself the means to support its foreign policy. For instance, in 1946-1947, a consensus developed particularly regarding the necessity of containing the Soviet Union, and to promote America's values in the rest of the world.

To promote these values, American leaders could rest on ideological factors that would draw international support for American foreign policy. Hunt argues that the ideology that shapes American foreign policy is historically based on three elements: a sense of national mission, hostility toward social revolutions, and the racial classification of peoples. As developed in chapter 3, a sense of national mission has always been strongly present in the formulation of the U.S. foreign policy. Hunt's second point is also relevant to the post-war years as the opposition to the Soviet Union and the defence and promotion of democracy worldwide would oppose the spread of revolutionary Communism. Finally, the third point is also to be taken into account, not only in the foreign policy but also in the domestic political context. Indeed, American politicians, especially Southerners had to support the racism of

⁵³⁹ In 1944, 95 000 aircrafts were produced, surpassing Germany and Japan combined. The U.S. Navy was larger and as efficient as the Royal Navy, which until 1940 was still the most important by size and quality.

⁵⁴⁰ During the war, the United States and USSR both had about 12 million men under arms. After the demobilisation, the Soviets came down at 2.8 million in 1948 for only about half of that figure for the U.S. Lundestad, G., *The American Empire*, pp. 41-42.

their region to maintain their political base. American foreign policy-makers were often openly racist as the analysis of the occupation of Japan will illustrate.⁵⁴¹

But the identification of America with democracy and the mission to spread democracy as the universal political regime, and hence the perception of Soviet totalitarianism as the unique threat, remains the crucial point explaining the mobilisation of the American public behind the anti-communist ideology and the identification of America as the only power able to save the world from totalitarianism.⁵⁴² America was unique and held universal values to be shared by everyone. Support for American ideas was strong in democratic countries and the tension between uniqueness and universalism was seldom put forward. The United States thus entered the post-war period as the most powerful country in the world, a statement especially accurate for the Asia-Pacific region where America was to face another power contender and main challenger for the next fifty years: the Soviet Union

Hence, the free world (not occupied by the USSR) was reorganised on American principles by linking the attribution of aid for reconstruction to the acceptance of the Bretton Woods system. The American allies and former foes accepted, Stalin did not. In Asia, it translated into keeping the Soviet power under control and by creating a functioning system before a sharp turn to the left on behalf of the new nationalist forces at work in the region. For American officials, the key to Asia was Japan. Japan and the U.S. had a common interest: Japan needed America to survive and the United States needed Japan, the new factory of Asia, to organise the Asian world and to become the bastion of U.S. power and influence in the Far East.

So, the emerging confrontation between the two superpowers, the growing global economic crisis and Washington's fear of an Asian revolution led America to provide its former foe with a vibrant economy, tied to Southeast Asia, in fact, a new co-prosperity sphere.⁵⁴³

The occupation of Japan started in August 1945 and ended in April 1952. In those years, Japan lost all sovereignty, no decision being possible without the approval of the American administration led by General Douglas MacArthur. Two distinctive periods of the occupation can be identified.

First, the Americans launched an agenda of demilitarisation and democratisation resulting from the purest tradition of American idealism and strongly influenced by the 'New

⁵⁴¹ Hunt, M., *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1987).

⁵⁴² Yahuda, M., *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 110.

⁵⁴³ Schaller, M., *The American Occupation of Japan. The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 298.

Dealers' present in SCAP/GHQ.⁵⁴⁴ The rise of Communism in Asia and aggressive soviet policies in Eastern Europe, and hence the resurgence of power considerations caused what has been termed *The Reverse Course*: the rearmament and development of the Japanese economy in co-operation with the less liberal elements of the society, placing Japan in a position of subordinate Cold War partner of the United States.

We argue that the case of Japan's occupation illustrates a successful exertion of power on behalf of the United States, while achieving consistency regarding foreign policy objectives. The American administration and the occupation authorities embarked on a policy that aimed at securing the consent of the Japanese political and civil societies to the American project of democratisation and aligning Japan with the U.S. policy of repelling Communism in Asia. The occupation authorities constantly played both faces of power in a consistent way, manufacturing consent in the Japanese political and civil societies to the wider American project of acquiring supremacy in Asia and reinforcing its global power status.

While the outcome of the occupation policies translated into consent to broader American objectives of perpetuation of supremacy, coercion was always looming in the background. Indeed, when consent was not genuine or spontaneous, the United States never relinquish the right to threaten to use force to reach its objectives.

The same process of interaction took place in the various dimensions of the reconstruction process. What made the outcome of the occupation of Japan congenial to U.S. interests were the favourable pre-conditions to the occupation; the ability of the American administration to cast the reconstruction project in a wider scheme aiming at the development and maintenance of the American regional and global supremacy; and the aptitude of the United States to avoid collisions between policies implemented in the reconstruction fields (the security, the re-definition of the state, the development of a buoyant capitalist economy, and the creation of a strong civil society). All elements coalesced and generated a favourable outcome of the reconstruction of Japan.

Pre-conditions to the Reconstruction

The first key-element leading to efficient use of power and hence to reconstruction effectiveness lies in the pre-conditions to the occupation. Notwithstanding the fact, as described here above, that the United States enjoyed an uncontested material and moral position of power in the international structure at the end of World War II, and that such a

⁵⁴⁴ Acronym for Supreme Commander of Allied Powers -MacArthur- and General Headquarters, in charge of the occupation of Japan.

status reinforced its legitimacy as builder of world order, a set of pre-conditions directly influencing the reconstruction favoured effectiveness of American reconstruction policies in Japan: the total war fought between Japan and the U.S. leading to the unconditional surrender of Japan and extraordinary levels of material and psychological destruction, the geographical isolation of Japan, the homogeneity of the Japanese society, the stability of the country embodied in the absence of civil strife and the maintenance of working Japanese governmental structures, and the extensive pre-reconstruction planning and organisation of the occupation, all contributed to a reconstruction outcome favourable to the U.S.

By attacking the United States in 1941, Japan embarked on four years of war against the greatest economic power of the time. Rapidly, the American economy was turned into an instrument of war with only one aim: the destruction of Japan, who had attacked the United States without warning. Four years and two atomic bombs later, Japan was all but beaten, accepting unconditional surrender. As mentioned in chapter 5, it leads us back to the question of the intensity of a conflict as explanatory factor of the stability situation in the post-conflict reconstruction phase and to the subsequent efficiency of reconstruction policies as related to pre-conditions to the occupation. We saw that in Iraq, the actual conflict was short and relative to World War II, human and material damages relatively light. On the contrary, Japan had embarked in a total war, exhausting herself in the process to such an extent that material and mental resistance to the new order was impossible.⁵⁴⁵ On top of the obvious material damages, the Japanese people needed reconstruction. Their systems of values were shattered and the solidifying element constituted by the nation as defined by the previous regime all but disappeared. The Japanese state and people needed to be re-invented and the American occupational authorities had a free-hand to do so.

This was especially true since the destruction sustained by Japan cut short any willingness to physically contest the presence of the American occupation. The Japanese were beaten and they knew it, an essential condition to their acceptance of foreign rule, as former Ambassador Grew underlined:

⁵⁴⁵ The generally accepted estimates calculated by the Japanese government after the surrender evaluate the lost of servicemen and civilians to 2.7 million, roughly 3 to 4 percent of the 1941 population of around 74 million. Millions more were injured, ill or malnourished. Materially, it was estimated that the effects of allied blockade and bombing campaigns destroyed one-quarter of the country's wealth, including four-fifths of all ships, one-third of all industrial machine tools, and almost a quarter of the motor vehicles. Sixty-six major cities had been bombed, destroying forty percent of these urban areas overall rendering thirty percent of their populations homeless. The living standards fell to sixty-five percent of their pre-war levels in rural areas and to thirty-five percent in urban areas. By the time of the surrender, nine million Japanese were homeless. Dower, J. W. *Embracing Defeat.*, pp. 45-48.

...closely disciplined and conformist people – a veritable human bee-hive or ant – hill and culturally totalitarian...the Japanese will not crack. Only by utter physical destruction or utter exhaustion can they be defeated.⁵⁴⁶

Moreover, the Japanese state structures were preserved, the nation ethnically homogeneous and politically stable since the centralisation of the Meiji Constitution.⁵⁴⁷ External support to a potential rejection of the American occupation was also out of question. Indeed, Japan's isolation was not only geographical, hence making material support from abroad difficult, but also moral and racial. No neighbouring countries were supporting Japan, whose wartime atrocities and declared racial superiority were still a vivid memory. In turn, the factors mentioned here above led to the absence of civil strife and armed insurrection, further reinforced by a massive occupation force, which facilitated the installation of the Occupation's structures and hence the beginning of reconstruction projects.

The extensive pre-reconstruction planning constitutes another factor that played a role in determining the outcome of the reconstruction of Japan. The underlying objective of the occupation of Japan consisting in developing and reinforcing American supremacy was indeed embodied in the occupation planning documents. In addition to coercive measures destined to deprive Japan of her ability to wage war⁵⁴⁸, a fundamental reorganisation of the Japanese state, economy, and civil society institutions took place in order to align Japan with U.S. regional and global interests. All dimensions of the reconstruction project, the political, the economy, the civil society, and later on the security dimension through the 1952 Security Treaty, were carefully provided for in the pre-reconstruction planning phase.⁵⁴⁹ Nothing was left to chance and all contingencies were thought of. Finally, the nomination of General

⁵⁴⁶ Grew, J., *Report from Tokyo* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), p. viii.

⁵⁴⁷ The Meiji Constitution of 1889 placed the reign of a line of Emperors “unbroken for ages eternal” (Article I) at the centre of the political spectrum. The Emperor held supreme command over the military; and in the domestic arena, he could make the ultimate decisions, whatever the Diet's conclusions. Junichiro, K., ‘The 1930s: a Logical Outcome of Meiji Policy’ in Wray, H. and Conroy, H., eds., *Japan Examined. Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 241-251; Beasley, W.G., *The Rise of Modern Japan. Political, Economic and Social Change since 1850* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), p. 76.

⁵⁴⁸ As stated in the Potsdam Declaration, the objectives of the occupation were: to make sure that Japan would not become a menace to peace and security of the world by dismantling its war-making capacities and by the “establishment of a democratic and peaceful government...with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people”. *The Potsdam Declaration*, 26th July 1945.

⁵⁴⁹ The initial post-surrender policy regarding Japan lies in three basic documents: the Potsdam Declaration (07/1945) incorporating the terms of the Japanese surrender; the U.S. initial post-surrender policy relating to Japan; and, the secret Joint Chiefs of Staff document 1380/15, a comprehensive military directive elaborating the post-surrender policy.

Douglas MacArthur at the head of the occupation constituted a decisive final touch to the preparation of the reconstruction. Strong-minded and imposing, MacArthur embodied the U.S. power at work in Japan and turned almost into a father-figure to the eyes of the Japanese elite and population.

Consequently, the basic occupation policies formulated in the ‘United States initial post-surrender policy relating to Japan’ and in JCS 1380/15⁵⁵⁰ were three-folded and as Cohen argues “in spirit and essence, a product of FRD’s New Deal era”.⁵⁵¹

The security aspect aimed at total permanent demilitarisation and disarmament of Japan, materially but also ideologically by the suppression of all institutions expressive of militarism and aggression to make sure that Japan would not again become a menace to the U.S. or the peace and security of the world.⁵⁵² The ideological aspect was concerned with the development among Japanese people of a desire to renounce to war, a form of ‘spiritual demilitarisation’ and to cultivate individual liberties and a respect for fundamental human rights, ultimately resulting in the formation of democratic and representative organisations, not imposed but “supported by the freely expressed will of the people”. This freely expressed will of the Japanese people was the key legitimising the radical top-down reforms undertaken by Americans.

Regarding the economy, the dismantlement of war-making industries was a top-priority, even though the securing of the economy for a self-sustaining peaceful Japan was essential to the realisation of domestic stability and other objectives of the occupation. Access to but not control of raw materials was permitted.⁵⁵³ The dislocation of the massive combines (*zaibatsu*) was on top of the agenda as they were seen in collusion and having been the first benefactors of the war economy and a ‘Japanese New Deal’ took shape, with the purpose to distribute “the wealth more widely, break up the financial combines, purge big business, encourage labor unions, ban trade cartels”.⁵⁵⁴

To accomplish this mission, Truman named General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (SCAP) and solely in charge of Japan’s occupation, his

⁵⁵⁰ FEC, *Report by the Secretary-General – 26/02/1946 – 10/07/1947* – (Washington DC : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 50-58, Annex 5.

⁵⁵¹ Cohen, W., ‘American Leaders and East Asia. 1931-1938’ in Iriye, A. and Cohen, W. (eds.) *American, Chinese and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia 1931-1949* (Wilmington: SR Books, 1990), p. 4.

⁵⁵² GHQ/SCAP/Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, Volume 2 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 423-429; FEC, *Report by the Secretary-General*, Appendix 5, p. 51.

⁵⁵³ GHQ/SCAP/Far East Command, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan* (Tokyo : GHQ/SCAP, 1950), p. 3.

⁵⁵⁴ Cohen, W., ‘American Leaders and East Asia’, p. 14.

powers often equal to those of a Roman Consul.⁵⁵⁵ Such a strong character helped the American project as the Japanese people historically always looked for a leader. Since the unification of the country by Tokugawa in 1603⁵⁵⁶, the Japanese people grew accustomed to stability, unity and obedience, the cardinal principles of Japan's national polity were to purge Japan of Western influence; to live austere; to devote their lives to fighting for the emperor; and to respect the following values, loyalty, hierarchy, collectivism, filial piety, and emperor worship.⁵⁵⁷ In addition, the willingness to adapt in order to develop was deeply engrained in the Japanese mentality, the aim being to show that the Japanese could be responsible and as organised and modern as the Westerners themselves.⁵⁵⁸ Such a capacity to adapt and willingness to progress by assimilation helped the American reconstruction of Japan. Moreover, MacArthur embodied the same strength of character and charisma as the powerful shogun who had kept Japan safe for centuries. He was perceived as the leader needed on the path to recovery.

Even though MacArthur was in theory supposed to share power with representatives of the other nations having fought Japan (the policy-making Far Eastern Commission based in Washington⁵⁵⁹ and the advisory Allied Council based in Tokyo), he quickly became the helmsman of the Japanese cruise to recovery. Indeed, the influence of U.S. allies in the war against Japan was limited. The U.S. organised the occupation of Japan and the definition of reconstruction policies by putting SCAP/GHQ at the centre of decision-making with the Japanese government implementing policies and SCAP/GHQ in charge of their

⁵⁵⁵ Schonberger, H. B., *Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1989), pp. 45-50; Wolfe, R. (ed.), *Americans as Proconsuls. United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952* (Carbondale : Southern Illinois University Press, 1984).

⁵⁵⁶ The country was centralised around the Shogun, a military ruler, supported by a military class, the *samurai*, and presided over 260 *daimyo*, rulers of provincial centres where Japanese daily life was both focused and governed. All swore allegiance to the divine Emperor whose actual power was mostly ceremonial. Emmerson, J. K. and Holland, H. M., *Eagle and the Sun. America and Japan in the 20th Century* (Reading, Ma: Da Capo Press, 1988), p. 33; Reischauer, E. O. and Craig, A. M., *Japan. Tradition and Transformation* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1989), pp. 39-72.

⁵⁵⁷ See Grew, J., *Report from Tokyo*, pp. 17, 29-30.

⁵⁵⁸ Hirakawa, S., 'Japan's Turn to the West' translated from Japanese by Bob Tadashi in Jansen, Marius. B. (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol V. The Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 435; Beasley, William G., *The Rise of Modern Japan*, p. 69; Westney, E., *Imitation and Innovation. The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 10-18.

⁵⁵⁹ With representatives of the US, China, USSR, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and Brazil. GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 2. Administration of the Occupation*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), Appendix 2, p. 2-4.

enforcement.⁵⁶⁰ Such a framework put the U.S. solely in charge⁵⁶¹, which contributed to high degree of coherence in policy formulation and implementation, thus helping the favourable outcome of the reconstruction.

Maintaining a Japanese government that implemented policies and decisions of the occupier facilitated consent to U.S. policies. The public trauma due to the overwhelming defeat of Japan was thus partly compensated for by the pride of still having a Japanese government, and not only an occupation authority that would have been considered as colonial in nature by the population. Regarding the dimensions of the reconstruction, the presence of a Japanese government helped to maintain a sense of national pride, an element essential to motivate the people to embrace the huge task ahead, while the population was still in a position to locate power in a familiar setting, a government made of Japanese politicians. However, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state was subordinated to the Supreme Commander, and if the use of the Japanese government proved unsatisfactory, SCAP was entitled to act directly, and ensure the implementation of the policies by all measures, including the use of force⁵⁶². It was thus consent generation evolving in the shadow of coercion. Here, both the ideological and coercion-based dimensions of power intersect in the remoulding of the Japanese state.

In theory, the definition of the reconstruction policies was a collegiate exercise. In practice, the United States was solely in charge of the reconstruction programme and made it clear to its allies from the onset of the occupation. The U.S. maximised its power exertion in Japan by producing an institutional framework that put the U.S. at the centre of the reconstruction design, enhancing policy coherence, facilitating power location and exertion, and overall control on reconstruction policies and processes.

The pre-conditions here above all contributed to providing the U.S. with freedom of action to implement its reconstruction policies that eventually helped the favourable general

⁵⁶⁰ The organisation of the occupation and reconstruction effort was based on the maintenance of a Japanese government in power, a body of ad hoc international committees voicing the opinions of U.S. allies, and finally SCAP/GHQ itself in charge of policy implementation. The decision-making was centralised in American hands with the State Department outlining policies and the War Department implementing them.

⁵⁶¹ GHQ/SCAP, *Op. cit.*, Appendix 2, p. 4 ; Schaller, M., *The American Occupation of Japan*, pp. 63-64. Policy were originally formulated by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) but in April 1946, SWNCC 29 (29/04/1946) organised the policy-making process as follows: the State Department formulated policies, the War Department was in charge of its execution and administration, and the SWNCC of its coordination. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was consulted when military questions were involved, and constituted the official channel for communication with SCAP. GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 2*, p. 11; JCF-I, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Reel 6.

⁵⁶² FEC Advisory Committee FEAC 5 – Authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 24/10/45 in JCF-I, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2 : 1946-1953. The Far East*, edited by Paul Kesaris and Randolph Boehm (Frederick : University Publications of America, 1980), Reel 6: FEC. *Report by the Secretary-General*, Appendix 5, p. 52.

outcome of the occupation. Indeed, the U.S. was in a position to rely on power expressions that were characterised by a consistent use of coercion and consent when implemented across the four fields structuring the reconstruction effort: the security, the state, the economy and the civil society, as the next section will now illustrate.

American Power Exertion and Consistency of Action across the Four Fields: Policies of Reconstruction of the State, Economy, Civil Society and Security

Faithful to the reconstruction objectives outlined in the Potsdam Declaration, the first step of the re-invention of Japan into a democratic country consisted in the purge of ultra nationalistic and militaristic elements through all spheres of the Japanese society.⁵⁶³

The purge started with a screening of political leaders and officials, and national agencies associated with the militaristic Japanese State. The rationale behind the purge program was to wipe out the existing leadership and replace it with a new one, in order to avoid the resurgence of forces favourable to militarist rule and aggression. Hence, the purge was preventive in nature, not only punitive.⁵⁶⁴ Japanese officials, especially the conservative Yoshida Shigeru, new Prime Minister, despised the purge, and warned MacArthur of risks of anarchy, chaos and corollary communist threat when he extended the program to regional and local levels.⁵⁶⁵

After a first political purge, SCAP launched the economic purge because of the close association between the *zaibatsu* and the war wagers. It started with the elimination of business leaders⁵⁶⁶, and later on, the purge was extended to relatives of the third degree, aiming at eliminating *zaibatsu* family members as dominant share holders and officeholders, consistent with the objective of breaking the traditional family system – the centuries old

⁵⁶³ The purge aimed at “the exclusion from public office and from positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture of active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression”. U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1948. Volume VI. The Far East and Australasia* (Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 649. See also SCAPIN 550, 04/01/1946 and SCAPIN 548, 04/01/1946. GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 6. The Purge*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), Appendix 2. By the end of July 1946, 1 067 individuals had been purged out of 8 920 screened, and SCAP decided to extend the purge to the regional and local levels. By the end of August 1948, 203 865 people had been purged, out of 1 098 464 screened. GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 6. The Purge*, pp. 15-35.

⁵⁶⁴ SCAP and Far East Command, *August 1947, Two Years of Occupation* in Eichelberger, R. L. *The Papers of General Robert L. Eichelberger. Japan and America, c. 1930-1955 : Serie 1, The Pacific War and the Occupation of Japan* from the William. R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Reel 33, box 64, p. 20.

⁵⁶⁵ Dower, John W., *Empire and Aftermath. Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience 1878-1954* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 332.

⁵⁶⁶ Out of 3 200 screened individuals, 292 were removed by mid-July 1947, adding to the 450 early resignations.

‘house system’ – and its transformation into the natural family group known to Western countries.⁵⁶⁷

Finally, the purge extended to education and public information media.⁵⁶⁸

The purge program raised protestations from Japanese officials, and by early 1948, these were echoed in Washington in the press and in the government, fearing that the zeal deployed by SCAP in his witch-hunting would cripple the already meagre human resources needed for the re-building of Japan’s political system, bureaucracy and economy. Purging was needed for the rise of a democratic Japan, but the replacement of old leaders in all fields seemed impossible on the short-term.

In the case of the purge policy, while psychologically critical to the acceptance by the Japanese population that the political changes engulfing the country were genuine and that the old crowd was gone for good, dimensions of the reconstruction effort conflate. The wish to see democracy taking roots by removing the former elite was in conflict with the reconstruction of the Japanese state and economy. Indeed, on the one hand promoting democracy requires, as a fundamental step, to exclude those who were in collusion with the authoritarian regime. On the other hand, the economic and political spheres do need structure in order to run and to sustain the nation. The American occupation authorities understood that dilemma but nevertheless favoured their ideological project to economic and political stability of the country. As we will see later on, after *The Reverse Course*, the purge lost its impetuosity and to the moral imperative of eradicating the former regime’s elite from position of power, the U.S. substituted a pragmatic downsizing of the purge’ scope in order to maintain the institutional structure and competencies needed for the reconstruction to progress.

Following the pre-*Reverse Course* reasoning, one can ask why the Emperor was not considered as a war criminal, bearing the responsibility of starting the war. Some American officials considered it, and until today the question remains at the centre of the scholarly literature on wartime Japan.⁵⁶⁹ The case of the treatment of Hirohito by SCAP/GHQ

⁵⁶⁷ By October 1947, 3488 persons had been screened, and 350 of them barred from their positions, see SCAP and Far East Command, *August 1947, Two Years of Occupation* in Eichelberger, R. L., Reel 33, box 64 : 83. After the extension of the economic purge, 1 555 business people were eventually affected, either through voluntary retirement or removal from their positions, see Cohen, W., *Empire without Tears: America’s Foreign Relations, 1921 – 1933* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), p. 169. Officially, out of 171 971 screenings in the economic field, 662 persons remained purged in August 1947, see GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 6*, p. 84.

⁵⁶⁸ 5,000 teachers being barred from the profession and in the media the screening ended up with 210 persons purged out of 1,709 screened. SCAP and Far East Command, *August 1947. Two years of occupation*, Reel 33, box 64: 23, 87.

⁵⁶⁹ See Bix, H., *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001).

constitutes the perfect example of the dilemma faced by the occupation and later rationale for *The Reverse Course*: to democratise but not if it endangered stability.

While some American officials and legislators were in favour of considering the emperor as war criminal and hence demote him⁵⁷⁰, they were also aware that disposing of Hirohito was to risk civil unrest, and an eventual Communist led revolution. The point was that no one else was available to replace the institution of the Emperor, considered by the Japanese as a father figure, but also the father of the Japanese race, the very much needed leader in these troubled times.⁵⁷¹

MacArthur shared the conviction that the Emperor should be kept as an instrument of democratisation of the Japanese society and of political stabilisation. SCAP/GHQ thus explained to the Japanese people that they were duped, more importantly that the Emperor was duped by the militarist clique, hence the moderate conservative elements would resurge and take the lead to force peace on the name of the Emperor.⁵⁷² Hence, the Emperor was presented as the saviour of the nation from utter destruction, the re-born leader, free from his militaristic watchdogs; ready to lead the country towards enlightenment under MacArthur as the torchbearer.⁵⁷³ The last act in the re-invention of Hirohito was played on New Year's Day 1946, with the publication of the Emperor's renunciation to divinity, preceded by the five-article Charter Oath proclaimed by the Meiji Emperor at the beginning of his reign in 1868.⁵⁷⁴ The new Japan was thus going back to its own history, to the first manifestation of

⁵⁷⁰ See a diplomatic note to be sent to the Emperor of Japan, written by one of Truman's aides in May 1945, asking Hirohito to comply with American demands to stop the war or he would take full responsibility for continuing the war and be classed as an international war criminal. Draft of diplomatic note to the Emperor of Japan proposed by Lt. General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., US Army 16/05/1945 in Truman, H., *Papers of Harry. S. Truman, White House. Central Files* (Independence: H. S. Truman Library Documents), box 197-1, Microfiche 5410. See also Acheson's opinion lauding the suppression of the imperial institution in U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946. Volume VI. The Far East and Australasia* (Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 90.

⁵⁷¹ United States Strategic Bombing Survey/Morale Division, Volume 7, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale* (1947), pp. 153-154.

⁵⁷² Nevertheless, the SWNCC 55/6 (26/10/1945) still considered Hirohito as not immune from arrest, trial and punishment as a war criminal. It was eventually dropped in June 1946. SWNCC and SANACC, *Case Files 1944-1949* selected and edited by M. P. Claussen (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1977), Reel 7. See also Situation Report – Japan – 09/01/1946 in O.S.S./State Department, *Intelligence and Research Reports. Part II. Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia* (Washington: University Publications of America, undated), Reel 2, number 18.

⁵⁷³ This policy was formulated by MacArthur's military secretary and chief of psychological -warfare operations, Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, in a memorandum called 'Answer to Japan'. Partially reproduced in Dower, J., *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 282-283.

⁵⁷⁴ The Meiji Oath reads: 'Deliberative assemblies on a wide scope shall be convened, and all matters of government decided by public opinion ; both the high and the low shall with a unity of purpose vigorously engage in the conduct of public affairs : all the common people, no less than the servants of state, civil and military shall be enable to fulfill each his just aspirations, lest discontent should affect their minds ; all the evil practices of the past shall be eliminated, and the nation shall abide by the

‘democracy’ it ever witnessed. As former Ambassador Grew noted, the monarchy was used to unify liberal elements in Japan willing to cooperate with the global post-war objectives of the United States.⁵⁷⁵ The process of values and interests sharing between the American and the new Japanese elite was on its way, seeding consent in the Japanese state and elite to U.S. objectives.

Moreover, thanks to keeping Hirohito in place and avoiding a too drastic reshuffle of Japanese political institutions, Americans had realised an essential objective, the stability of the Japanese society and consent to the American reconstruction of Japan.⁵⁷⁶

Considerations of stability and the need to ensure Japanese co-operation with the American programme of reforms, and later on, the need for a fast rebuilding of Japan as a constitutional monarchy providing the U.S. with an anti-communist bulwark in Asia in the deepening Cold War context, led to the re-creation of Hirohito. The Emperor was wearing new clothes, those of a “‘human’ ‘democratic’ emperor who had suffered together with his people”.⁵⁷⁷

Americans and the new Japanese leadership had what they wanted. The Emperor was still in place and contributed to the stability of the country, hence buttressing the reconstruction policies. From SCAP’s point of view, the program for the democratisation of Japan had more chances to be successful, placing the Emperor at its centre and formulating his new political role in a new Constitution, the core of SCAP’s political reforms.

In its exertion of power, the American administration married the promotion of democracy in Japan with the broader objective of containing rising communist forces in Asia. As Bix suggests Hirohito was responsible for Japan’s aggressive wars in the region, and morally should have been held responsible, along the militarists that were judged and found guilty. Here, the American occupation authorities favoured political stability based on consent of the people by parting from their original project of punishing all those responsible

universal rules of justice and equity ; wisdom and knowledge shall be sought throughout the world to promote the prosperity of the Empire’ in U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1946, p. 134.

⁵⁷⁵ Schonberger, H. B., *Aftermath of War*, p. 12.

⁵⁷⁶ A survey conducted in December 1945 about the Emperor showed that 62 % of the people interviewed were in favour of his retention and 7 % felt sorry for him. Only 4 % did not care and another 3 % wanted him dropped. The same survey showed that so far 70 % of the Japanese were satisfied with the occupation policies. Max W. Bishop, of the office of the political adviser in Japan to the Secretary of State (Byrnes), 04/02/1946 in U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1946, p. 135. See also United States Strategic Bombing Survey/Morale Division, Volume 7, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale* (1947), p. 153.

⁵⁷⁷ Bix, H. P., *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, p. 624.

for the war. Moralism was overseen in favour of realism for the sake of the efficiency of reconstruction policies.

In terms of nuances of power, by placing the emperor, even though in a symbolic role, as an actor of the Japanese political landscape, the Americans exercised ideological and political power through consent generation. Through the re-invention of a new emperor, a new Japan was born. A new national ideology embodied by the rejection of war as an instrument of policy and peace as a national way of life was to be the bedrock of the Japanese elite's and population's consent to the American project of Japan as a model of peaceful democratic country. It contributed to the broader American project of maintaining the United States' supremacy regionally and globally, and constituted the cornerstone of the future achievements of the reconstruction of Japan. Such a vision was then implemented through the political reforms that reshuffled the country from top to bottom in order to create a Japanese political landscape moulded on the American model.

Re-formatting the State

The re-creation of the Japanese state was at the core of SCAP/GHQ's approach to democratisation.⁵⁷⁸ Indeed, all the policies implemented in the sphere of the political society were simultaneously applied in the other dimensions of the reconstruction, ensuring consistency of action. In the realm of the state, while the institutions expressive of totalitarianism were eliminated, a selective purge of the most nationalistic and militaristic elements of the Japanese political elite led to the rise of moderately conservative Japanese officials and bureaucrats. Coupled with the decision to maintain the imperial institution and to work through the Japanese government to implement reconstruction policies, it led to the maintenance of essential state structures that were needed to keep the country running and stable.

The reform of the Japanese state started with removing oppressive laws and agencies that held the minds of the Japanese people in subjection and the liberation of those jailed for the violation of such laws.⁵⁷⁹ Logically, the Secret and Special Higher Police, and the

⁵⁷⁸ The pre-reconstruction American vision of the Japanese government was summarised as a government of men and not a government of law. The Japanese were seen as an extremely regimented people governed by an oligarchic dictatorship. GHQ/SCAP/Government Section, *A Brief Report on the Political Reorientation of Japan* (Tokyo, 1949), p. 6. See also U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, p. 87 and JCF-I, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2 : 1946-1953.*, Reel 3; FEC, *Report by the Secretary-General – 26/02/1946 – 10/07/1947*, Appendix 5, pp. 50-58.

⁵⁷⁹ Civil Liberties SCAPIN 93 in GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation, Volume 14. Legal and Judicial Reforms*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), p. 6.

Thought Bureau of the Ministry of Justice were dissolved, and the police remodelled into a democratically controlled organisation whose functions were limited to the maintenance of law and order.⁵⁸⁰

Afterwards, the criminal code was modernised and democratised along Anglo-Saxon law.⁵⁸¹ The crime of lese-majesty was abolished, as the Emperor was now equal to the other Japanese citizens by his renunciation to divinity and his new role as symbol of the State, as defined in Article I of the Constitution.⁵⁸² The Civil Code was also revised and emphasised individual dignity and the essential equality of sexes. A Domestic Relations Court was established having jurisdiction over family matters.⁵⁸³

In October 1946, the National Public Service Law aimed at the creation of “a technically sound, modern and progressive civil service system”.⁵⁸⁴ Promotion was based on merit and access on open competitive examinations. Nevertheless, the decision to govern the country through existing organs of government, because of the lack of linguistic and technocratic capacity to govern directly,⁵⁸⁵ left the civilian bureaucracy practically untouched, which in turn actually contributed to the stability of the country and subsequent successful implementation of reconstruction policies.

The promulgation of the new Japanese Constitution⁵⁸⁶ constituted the peak of this reform program and was at the centre of the remoulding of the political landscape in Japan. Early in 1946, SCAP initiated the replacing of the Meiji Constitution of 1889 with a new National Charter, rooted in basic ideals from the Anglo-American legal tradition.

Diverse Japanese sources⁵⁸⁷ provided SCAP with their own drafts of the future constitution. SCAP rejected them and forced the acceptance by the Japanese government of its own version.⁵⁸⁸ Menacing the Japanese officials in charge of discussing the constitution

⁵⁸⁰ GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 15. Police and Public Safety*, p. 3; GHQ/SCAP/Far East Command, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan* (Tokyo: GHQ/SCAP, 1950) p. 20.

⁵⁸¹ GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 14. Legal and Judicial Reforms*, pp. 37-54.

⁵⁸² GHQ/SCAP/Government Section, *A Brief Report on the Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 13.

⁵⁸³ GHQ/SCAP/Far East Command, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan*, p. 21.

⁵⁸⁴ GHQ/SCAP/Government Section, *A Brief Report on the Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 19.

⁵⁸⁵ As opposed to Germany where the occupation took the form of a direct military government.

⁵⁸⁶ 03/11/1946, into effect 03/05/1947.

⁵⁸⁷ Political parties, private study groups and individuals – for an American comparative analysis of these drafts, see U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946*, pp. 170-172.

⁵⁸⁸ Hussey (aide to Whitney, chief of Government Section of SCAP) reports the following incident illustrating the victor-vanquished relationship maintained by American officials: “At 10: 10 o’ clock, General Whitney and the undersigned left the porch and went out into the sunshine of the garden as an American plane passed over the house. After about fifteen minutes, Mr. Shirasu (Associate to the Foreign Minister) joined us, whereupon General Whitney quietly observed to him: ‘We are out here enjoying the warmth of atomic energy’” Dower narrates the incident but uses ‘We have been enjoying your atomic sunshine’. His

that SCAP would not hesitate to make public their reticence to adopt the U.S. version allowing for more rights and freedoms, American negotiators actually forced the consent of the Japanese conservative elite to the shape of the new Japanese state.⁵⁸⁹

In fact, SCAP was not threatening the imperial institution. SCAP agreed to its perpetuation but only in the context of a more liberal national charter, removing political prerogatives from Hirohito. At the same time, MacArthur made clear that if the SCAP draft was rejected, the conservatives would jeopardise the throne and their own fragile political position.⁵⁹⁰ Without major changes, the charter was accepted by the Emperor and presented as being a Japanese creation.

The dramatic drafting process and later imposition on Japanese officials showed the American willingness to provide Japan with a liveable democracy, and more strikingly, proved that they had the means to get the Japanese to accept it. The Japanese elite's consent to the new constitution, although forced in outlook, relied on a common interest between occupied and occupants. Indeed, in order to keep its dominant position in the society, the Japanese elite had to accept fundamental changes to the political landscape of the country, while the American occupation needed these same men to remain in a position of power in order to provide the needed structure to implement reconstruction policies. Such exchange of consent, the Japanese elite's acceptance of the constitution and the American approval of it staying in power, constituted the bedrock of further progress in the political society dimension of the reconstruction, and eventually success of the reconstruction project, as well as the overall achievement of the American regional and global foreign policy goal to counter the rise of Communism and strengthen her global power status. Even with the maintenance of the less radical Japanese strong men in power, the new constitution was nevertheless throwing the foundations of a new democratic state in Japan, separating the executive, legislative and judicial powers⁵⁹¹; enshrining sovereignty in the Japanese people⁵⁹²; and renouncing to war.⁵⁹³

source is Whitney's biography of MacArthur, *MacArthur : His Rendezvous (sic) with History* (New York : Knopf, 1959), I guess that Whitney rephrased his original utterances in a more shocking and 'aesthetic' way during the writing of the biography. The quote that I have used comes from the report written by Commander Alfred R. Hussey after the meeting, and countersigned by the two other members present at the conference, Charles L. Kades and Milo E. Rowell.

⁵⁸⁹ See Whitney's statement to the Japanese delegation about the lack of any other option but to adopt the U.S. version of the constitution, in Hussey Papers (Asia Library, University of Michigan, 1977), Constitution file 1, item 14.

⁵⁹⁰ Dower, J.W., *Empire and Aftermath*, p. 320.

⁵⁹¹ GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 14. Legal and Judicial Reforms*, Appendix 5, Constitution of Japan.

⁵⁹² GHQ/SCAP/Government Section, *A brief Report on the Political Reorientation of Japan*, pp. 6-10.

The drafting of the Japanese Constitution embodies the supreme power enjoyed by the United States as occupier. Here, both coercion and consent mingled in order to get the conservative political elite to comply to the birth of a new democratic Japan. It is a form of forced consent that illustrates the awkward reality of a Japanese government that existed only by name. In the realm of the state, the American occupation remoulded Japan on the American model. It did so by consistently playing on both the coercive and consensual aspects of power. The conservative elite knew that the people would choose the charter that would give them most liberties. It was in their interest to appear as at the source of the democratisation of the country and they did so under the threat of the occupation authorities. It was forced consent but nevertheless consent.

In turn it buttressed the reconstruction policies as the American administration obtained double dividends. At home, American public opinion was pleased to witness the re-birth of Japan as a democracy built in the image of America. It filled Americans with pride of being American and its perennial self-perception as an exceptional people destined to enlighten backwards cultures by bringing them the hope of a perfect political regime, reinforcing their support for the reconstruction of Japan. In Japan and regarding the U.S. foreign policy, the democratisation of the Japanese state and the political empowering of its people also contributed to the efficiency of the reconstruction policies and the general U.S. foreign policy goal of turning Japan into an ally facing the rise of Communism in East Asia. Democratising Japan sowed the seeds of a political system congenial to U.S. values and interests, in turn throwing the foundations for a long-term convergence of interests between both nations.

The same scheme happened in the economic sphere where liberal capitalism walked hand in hand with democracy promotion.

Opening the Economy

Indeed, the same mix of coercion towards the former regime's elite and consent generation in the Japanese population characterised the economic policies of the reconstruction. Consistently with the reforms implemented in the remoulding of the State, Americans considered the rooting of democracy in the economic sphere as essential to the success of the reconstruction. Along with the political agenda of democratisation, the

⁵⁹³ GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 14. Legal and Judicial Reforms*, Appendix 5, Constitution of Japan.

Economic and Science Section (E.S.S.)⁵⁹⁴ of SCAP triggered reforms aiming at physical and spiritual demilitarisation and democratisation of the economy in order to deprive Japan of the power to make war. The programme embodied the de-concentration of economic power; the suppression of massive combines (*zaibatsu*); the identification and purge of top business managers; the modification of the agrarian regime; the designation of factories for potential reparations; the demilitarisation of the economy; and, the principle of equal opportunity for foreign enterprises within Japan. At the end of the process, Japan was an open economy, based on free-markets and integrated in the capitalist global economy. The level of coherence achieved in the economic reconstruction, and between political and economic reconstruction, contributed to the overall success of the American project of reinventing Japan.

Until 1946, the initial approach to the reform of the Japanese economy was mainly punitive and aimed at the maintenance of a minimal level of economic activity as to sustain the basic needs of the Japanese people and the reduction of the Japanese industrial war potential. Hence, SCAP aimed at fulfilling its responsibilities for the prevention of disease and unrest as an occupying power under the Geneva Convention and not much more.⁵⁹⁵ It authorised Japan to maintain its industries but just to sustain its economy and allowed for exaction of reparations in kind⁵⁹⁶, but started the destruction of all existing combat equipments and of primary war industries.⁵⁹⁷

In January 1946, the Edwards⁵⁹⁸ Mission on Japanese Combines started its three months analysis of the question of de-concentration of economic power. It concluded that the lack of an independent middle-class and a strong labour movement carrying democratic, humanitarian, and cosmopolitan sentiments following the industrial revolution in Japan was partly due to the concentration of economic power in great combines. Moreover, low wages and concentrated profits translated into the shrinking of the domestic market, which in addition to the rise of Japanese productivity, led to the need to export to pay for necessary

⁵⁹⁴ The personnel of the E.S.S. was made of some five hundred American economists, engineers, and former businessmen supervising the ministries of Finance, Labour, and Commerce and Industry.

⁵⁹⁵ Dower, J. W., *Embracing Defeat*, p. 529.

⁵⁹⁶ 1100 large enterprises were designated for possible reparations. They were allowed to produce for civilian needs but had to be ready for removal, some just remained idle.

⁵⁹⁷ SWNCC 302, Reduction and Control of Japanese War Potential, 25/05/1946 in SWNCC and SANACC, *Case Files 1944-1949*, Reel 26.

⁵⁹⁸ Corwin D. Edwards, consultant on cartels, Department of State, and Professor of Economics at the North Western University.

food and raw materials, and to make up for the deficit in domestic consumption.⁵⁹⁹ In addition, the long mobilisation of Japan for war led to a rise of concentration of economic power in a few *zaibatsu*⁶⁰⁰ and collusion between business and the military clique. This concentration of political and economic power closed the door to democratic progress in the Japanese society and instead led to escalation of conflicts and war of expansion.

Consequently, SCAP started a programme aiming at the establishment of "a system of competitive enterprise with substantial diffusion of ownership and control"⁶⁰¹ of the means of production and trade in order to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people and preclude the resurgence of economic activity that could be employed to support military ends.⁶⁰² SCAP identified *zaibatsu* for dissolution. It also identified members of *zaibatsu* families in order to dispossess and to bar them from position of business for ten years, alongside a purge of leaders in the industry, finance, commerce and agriculture, who had been active exponents of militarist nationalism and aggression. SCAP provided the Japanese government with a directive to establish a permanent legislation that would assure continued democratic practices of business enterprise by preventing the possibility of future concentration.⁶⁰³

Finally, hand in hand with the programme of economic de-concentration, SCAP enforced fair trade practices by the creation of a Fair Trade Commission, the promulgation of antitrust laws and fair trade practices.⁶⁰⁴

The consent of the Japanese population to this programme was not hard to gain. The dissolution of the combines would give more business opportunities to more people and if

⁵⁹⁹ Sumner, J.D., Report of the Mission of the Japanese Combines. A Report to the Department of State and the War Department, March 1946 in Truman, H., *Papers of Harry S. Truman, White House. Central Files*, Box 197-1, Sheet 4283.

⁶⁰⁰ *Zaibatsu* means 'financial clique' and originally referred to four families and their interests: the four traditional or old combines present since the beginning of Japan's industrialisation were Mitsui, Sumimoto, Mitsubishi, and Yasuda. They were joined later by six holding companies having benefited from a close cooperation with the military, called *shin-zaibatsu*, or 'new financial clique': Asano, Furukawa, Nissan, Okura, Nomura, and Nakajima. GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 28. Elimination of Zaibatsu Control*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), p. 3.

⁶⁰¹ Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, 25/11/1947 in U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1947. Volume VI. The Far East*. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 320.

⁶⁰² GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 29. Deconcentration of Economic Power*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), pp. 55-56.

⁶⁰³ Law concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade, law 54, 12/04/1947; and, Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Power, law 207, 19/12/1947 in GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 28. Elimination of Zaibatsu Control*, p. 33.

⁶⁰⁴ GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 30. Promotion of Fair Trade Practices*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), pp. 17. 68-88.

democracy was to be successful in Japan, old discredited political and economic leaders had to go, as their collusion and their responsibility in the military adventure was too obvious. Von Hippel also plays up the economic conditions in the early occupation. Hunger forced the Japanese people to accept whatever the occupiers offered, an empty stomach does not favour political resistance. In the case of Japan, she adds that high respect for education, high literacy rates and high levels of industrialisation also eased the acceptance of the U.S. economic programme.⁶⁰⁵

The reforms attempted to bring economic freedom to Japan and as in the case of the political reforms, embodied the spirit of free capitalism and free trade. Democracy promotion and economic freedom walked hand in hand in the re-invention of Japan, illustrating the consistency of policies between the political and economic reconstruction of Japan. The consent of the economic elite was not hard to obtain. They simply had little choice. Again, forced consent was gained but the Japanese would soon discover the advantages of the new system through the integration of Japan in the American economic sphere.

In addition to macroeconomic reforms, SCAP /GHQ also designed a land reform following the same reasoning. It was necessary as the food shortage of 1945 caused limited social unrest and a prolific ground for Communist propaganda. The American sponsored reform aimed at rooting democracy in rural areas by eliminating exploitative landlordism and rural tenancy, eradicating the existing social order by emancipating millions from a form of semi-serfdom.⁶⁰⁶ It was also the best way to block Communist influence as the JCP could not make use of one of its traditional discourse, the emancipation of peasantry.⁶⁰⁷ Local land commissions were in charge of the implementation of the programme and served as a first experience of democracy for Japanese farmers as each community was in charge of managing land.⁶⁰⁸

Through all programmes of economic reform, SCAP emphasised the promotion of democracy and capitalist economy on the American model. This programme of ideological re-education was inserting itself in all spheres of the Japanese life and became the spinal

⁶⁰⁵ Von Hippel, K., *Democracy by Force. U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 13-18.

⁶⁰⁶ Before the land reform, 54% of farm land was owner operated and 46% tenant operated.

⁶⁰⁷ The land reform programme ended up with 89% of owner operated farm land and only 11% of tenant operated farm land.

⁶⁰⁸ GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 33. The Rural Land Reform*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), pp. 125-127. See also Hewes, L., *The Japanese Land Reform Program. Its significance to Rural Asia*. Presented at the 13th Annual National Farm Institute, Des Moines, Iowa, February 16-17, 1950, in Hewes, L., *Japanese Land Reform Program* (Tokyo : GHQ/SCAP/Natural Resources Section, 1950), p. 93.

cord of later American containment of Communist ideas in Japan. The reconstruction of the Japanese economy was based on the implementation of a liberal economic programme emphasising free-market and competition. The dissolution of *Zaibatsu* paved the way for economic opportunities for Japanese entrepreneurs and the opening of the country to American business interests.

Alongside political reforms, the economic reforms slowly transformed the Japanese economy into a vibrant and competitive actor, gradually taking its place amongst industrialised nations, and later on serving as the engine of capitalist development in East Asia. It also allowed for the continuous, if strenuous, enrichment of the Japanese economic elite, more than often also constituting the political elite, and population, which eased their consent to the overall American-led transformation of the country. Economic success fed stability and political consent, helping the overall favourable outcome of the reconstruction as policies were consistent with each other across all dimensions of the reconstruction of Japan. In turn, this contributed to the reinforcement of the regional and global U.S. position of power as the leader of the capitalist free world.

Alongside a political and economic reconstruction resting on democratic values, providing stability and to a certain extent wealth, the reconstruction of the civil society constituted the ground on which to win the hearts and minds of Japanese. In parallel to filling their stomachs and providing them with a vision for the future, the occupation developed comprehensive and coherent civil society re-education programmes aiming at generating consent to the re-invention of Japan. The education of future generations of Japanese was deemed essential by SCAP/GHQ and a wave of democratisation and liberalisation swept across civil society. Policies that remoulded civil society were also consistent with democratisation policies that were implemented in political society and economic spheres of the reconstruction.

Re-forging the Civil Society: Re-education Made in America

In civil society, the two first years of the occupation witnessed the implementation of democratisation programmes mirroring the coercive measures aiming at eradicating nationalism and militarism in political society. The coercion displayed in political society walked hand-in-hand with consent generation policies in civil society. Here, the Occupation aimed at seeding consent to American policies on the long run, eventually facilitating the integration of American values and ideals by the Japanese civil society, the ultimate seat of consent generation to the American project of re-inventing Japan. Such a policy was

consistent with the more punitive policies implemented in political society and the economy, SCAP/GHQ playing the Japanese population against their elite. Indeed, similarly to the threats made by U.S. officials to disclose to the Japanese public the political elite's recalcitrance regarding the most democratic aspect of the new fundamental law, SCAP/GHQ aimed at consistency of action and effectiveness of policies by cultivating consent at the grass-roots level to play it against potential resistance by the Japanese elite to reconstruction policies.

Reconstruction planning documents insisted on the revival and reinforcement of “democratic tendencies among the Japanese people” and asked for the establishment of the freedom of speech, of religion, of thought and the respect for fundamental human rights. To do so, Japanese people were encouraged to form democratic and representative organisations.⁶⁰⁹ The reorientation swept through the whole of Japanese society, as SWNCC 162/2 described re-education not only of “the youth but of the population as a whole, and must be developed in such manner as to reach into the minds of the Japanese through every available channels”.⁶¹⁰

The educational system was reformed; the media were subject to strict control and redesigned to help to spread democratic ideas by a constant flow of cultural materials from the West; religious groups and activities were liberalised; and labour and cultural organisations were revived or cleaned from nationalistic and militaristic elements. The Americans were again on a mission of salvation and civilisation. The enlightenment of the West, and particularly of the United States, was to free the Japanese from the murky waters of totalitarianism and secure the consent of the Japanese people to democratic ideals presented as embodying American interests.

Keeping in mind that it was necessary to erase negative perceptions of the Japanese produced by the wartime propaganda⁶¹¹, the Civil Information and Education Section (C.I.E.S.)⁶¹² of SCAP/GHQ set out to reorient the Japanese civil society. Once again, American policy-makers professed an approach to the Japanese through their own leaders in order to obtain more confidence to the proposed policies. The proposed approach and the

⁶⁰⁹ *The Potsdam Declaration*, 26th July 1945; JCF-1, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2 : 1946-1953*. Appendix 5.

⁶¹⁰ Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946*, p. 107.

⁶¹¹ Described as “children, savages, sadists, madmen, or robots”. Dower, J., *Embracing Defeat*, p. 213. See also Koshiro, Y., *Trans-Pacific Racism and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 1; O.S.S./Research and Analysis Branch, *Civil Affairs Handbook – Japan - Section I – Geographical and Social Background* (Washington: HQ, Army Service Forces, 1944), pp. 75-79.

⁶¹² Activated on September 22, 1945. GHQ/SCAP/Civil information and Education Section, *Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields* (Tokyo, 1950).

material used reflected also the concern to obtain consent from the Japanese people to the reform. It had to be “persuasive rather than didactic, and [...] designed to ensure the maximum response and acceptance by the Japanese [...] of the aims and ideals of the United States”.⁶¹³

The C.I.E.S. maintained close relations with the Japanese professionals of information and culture and imbued them with their role and responsibilities in a democratic society. The cultural material consisted of documentary films⁶¹⁴, press and magazines articles⁶¹⁵, photographs⁶¹⁶, books⁶¹⁷, periodicals, motion pictures⁶¹⁸, radio broadcasts⁶¹⁹, and plays and music from the United States and other countries, all highlighting the concepts, institutions and accomplishments of democracies. In addition, seventeen C.I.E. information centres with libraries (and U.S. librarians) opened in major cities organising children’s story hours, English language classes, lectures, and American music concerts.⁶²⁰

In addition to the material provided by the occupation, the newly discovered freedom of speech⁶²¹ in the Japanese society allowed a very dynamic cultural and information industry to blossom. It was nevertheless under American control. Not everything could be heard; hence, not everything could be said.⁶²²

⁶¹³ U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946.*, pp. 107-108.

⁶¹⁴ Essentially showing cities, towns of the United States and other Western countries. U.S. projectors were lent to schools, citizen’s public halls, parent-teacher associations, youth groups, labour unions, farm cooperatives and other for showing of documentary or educational films. GHQ/SCAP/C.I.E.S, *Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields*, p. 9.

⁶¹⁵ The three major American news agencies provided 90% of all news of foreign origin in Japanese newspapers. GHQ/SCAP/Far East Command, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan*, p. 28.

⁶¹⁶ Essentially exhibits about the objectives of the reorientation programme of Japan. GHQ/SCAP/C.I.E.S, *Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields*, p. 10.

⁶¹⁷ By the end of 1949, out of the 374 translated books in circulation in Japan, 324 were Americans. One could find the following : *Abe Lincoln Grows Up* by Carl Sandburg, *The Miracle of America* by André Maurois, Florence Peterson’s *American Labor Union*, Charles A. Berad’s *The Republic, Freedom and culture* by John Dewey, *Peace of Mind* by Joshua Liebman and Orwell’s *Animal Farm*.

⁶¹⁸ 2217 features films were in operation at the end of 1949, roughly one-third were non-Japanese and mainly American. GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 18. Theater and Motion Pictures*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), p. 10.

⁶¹⁹ SCAP broadcasted complete information on the occupation objectives and directives, news, and cultural entertainment and educational matters. The first year of the occupation, programmes on war guilt and crimes like *Now it can be told* or *The Truth Box* were broadcasted. Later on, it shifted to more positive aspects of democratisation focusing on basic democratic values in programmes as *Liberal Thinkers. The Question Box*, or *The New Road*. GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 19. Radiobroadcasting*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), pp. 10-12.

⁶²⁰ GHQ/SCAP/C.I.E.S, *Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields*, pp. 5-6.

⁶²¹ SCAPIN 16, 10/09/1945 and SCAPIN 52, 24/09/1945 ensuring the minimum control upon freedom of speech.

⁶²² News had to adhere strictly to the truth; nothing should be printed which might disturb the public tranquillity; no false or destructive criticism of the Allied powers and Allied forces of occupation was allowed; no mention of Allied troops movements could be made: news stories had to be factually written

The education system was another sensitive domain in which SCAP had to root democratic ideals. The objective was “the elimination of ultra nationalism and militarism and the introduction of new educational practices aimed at developing an educated; peaceful and responsible citizenry”⁶²³, essential to live in a democratic society. The reform of the education provided for a decentralised system through the removal of strict control by the central government, only responsible for the legislation of minimum standards of education. Finally, SCAP created the Institute for Educational Leadership, staffed with American education specialists, in charge of the training of Japanese administrative personnel and supervisors, educational associations, parent-teacher associations and generally the population, to make the Japanese people aware of the significant changes in the direction of education in a democratic Japan.⁶²⁴

Regarding the content of the school programmes, SWNCC 108/1 organised the revision of textbooks, especially in morale, history and geography⁶²⁵, emphasising the teaching in morale and ethics based upon universal moral and religious teachings, not upon imperial rescripts, the interdependent character of international life, the respect for minorities and the “necessity of friendship based upon mutual respect for people of all races and religions”.⁶²⁶ The textbook writing and production was removed from the Ministry of Education and opened to the free competitive market on the basis of national standards, the occupation underlining that “surveillance by SCAP will be necessary to prevent a resurgence of former ultra nationalism⁶²⁷ or an intrusion of communistic doctrine into textbooks”.⁶²⁸

without editorialising; news should not be reflecting propaganda lines; no news story should be distorted by the omission of pertinent facts or details. Moreover, the Japanese government was kept out of direct or indirect control of newspapers and news agencies. GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 17. Freedom of the Press*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), pp. 12-13; U.S. Army and Far East Command, *Operations of the Military Intelligence Section. Volume VIII. Intelligence Services, Documentary Appendices* (Tokyo: 1951), pp. 131-132.

⁶²³ SWNCC 108/1, Policy for the Revision of the Japanese Education System. Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for the Far East, 05/10/1946. JCF-I, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2 : 1946-1953. The Far East*, Reel 4. See also GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 20. Education*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), p. 47; SWNCC and SANACC, *Case Files 1944-1949*, p. 11.

⁶²⁴ GHQ/SCAP/Civil information and Education Section, *Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields*, p. 12.

⁶²⁵ SCAP suspended Japanese history, geography and moral courses until the publication of textbooks cleared of military and ultra nationalistic ideologies. The Acting Political Adviser (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 05/01/1946 in GHQ/SCAP/Far East Command, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan*, pp. 93-94.

⁶²⁶ JCF-I, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2 : 1946-1953. The Far East*, Reel 4.

⁶²⁷ Periodically, a public debate starts in Japan when one of the publishers goes soft of Japan's wartime misdeeds in the draft of high school history text books. In one case, the draft barely mentions the colonisation of Korea and instances of slave labour and war crime; refers to WW II as the Great East Asia War, term used by wartime Japan to describe the war in the Pacific; insists on the role of Japan's advance in South Pacific as motivating independence movements after the war ; includes the full text of the Imperial Rescript on

Again, SCAP dwelled on the need to incorporate in the curricula, matters that would contribute to the understanding and support of true democratic principles and practices.

The revision of the Japanese education system embodies the American limitless power in its remoulding, not only of present, but also of future Japanese generations. This cultural imposition of American values through the re-writing of textbooks reached its peak with an attempt at replacing the Japanese writing system, deemed an obstacle to learning, by a phonetic system and use of Roman characters.⁶²⁹ It constituted a display of arrogance, egocentricity, and racism, inviting “the Japanese people to commit cultural suicide”.⁶³⁰ This incident illustrates the delicate racial relationship between Japan and the USA. Since early encounters, Americans pointed out the obedience to the ruler and the ‘need’ of leadership as intrinsic Japanese characteristics. During the occupation, U.S. officials quickly linked these features to the sense of American racial superiority:

Japan is a nation that definitely wants to be led in world affairs. She needs the association of an honest mind and teacher...every act of Japan since the arrival of Admiral Perry and the decision of the Japanese leaders to take upon themselves Western ways has been an act of following and not of leadershipOur whole success depends upon our being able to keep the thought of the leadership in Japan in harmony with what we said in our psychological warfare and to build the future Japan upon what we told the Japanese was their own ideals.⁶³¹

The teacher-pupil relationship also fitted into the racial hierarchy defined by the Americans. The racial dual-identity of Japan had brought the two nations to war. As long as Japan accepted its status of honorary white nation in international affairs, a national identity equivalent to a cultural construct accountable for a level of civilisation; but, did not pretend to the same consideration on an individual basis, the two countries avoided clashes.⁶³² The occupation and the seemingly racial harmony did not erase the problem. Indeed, the U.S. maintained the anti-Oriental immigration and naturalisation policy until 1953, and maintained the immigration quota system unfavourable to Asians until 1965. In Japan, the

Education and an analysis of Japanese mythology based on Shinto religion ; emphasises the bravery of the young *Kamikaze* ; and says that war cannot be judged right or wrong. Japan Times, 15/08/2000 , p. 2.

⁶²⁸ GHQ/SCAP/Far East Command, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan*, p. 24.

⁶²⁹ SWNCC 298 Reform of the Japanese Writing System and Language Problem, 19 02/1947. See SWNCC and SANACC, *Case Files 1944-1949*, Reel 26.

⁶³⁰ Toshio, N., *Unconditional Democracy. Education and Politics in Occupied Japan 1945-1952* (Chiba-Ken: Hiroike Institute of Education, 1982), p. 206.

⁶³¹ Address delivered by Senator Elbert D. Thomas at the University of Michigan. The United States in World Affairs, 05/08/1947 in Truman, Harry. *Papers of Harry. S. Truman*, Box 197-3, Microfiche 5434.

⁶³² Koshiro, Y., *Trans-Pacific Racism*, p. 50.

anti-fraternisation order between American troops and Japanese nationals reinforced the already obvious American superiority and inculcated to the Japanese people a proper sense of relations between the 'white' victors and the coloured vanquished.

With *The Reverse Course* policy and the worsening of the international situation, the Occupation changed its physical concept of race for culture. The message lauded the embracing of Western values, of which every single American soldier of the occupation force was a representative, a "salesman of democracy".⁶³³ By so doing, Japanese would improve their racial quality close to that of civilised Westerners. SCAP downgraded the importance of race, as it was aware of its negative force. Japanese accepted to play the game as it was so embarrassing to be subjected to 'white' rule and accepted the U.S. proposal to become a white honorary nation, an ally of strategic importance. Japan, in search of a new role in the world, accepted without expecting the same privileges in America. In contrast with the pre-war years, Japan and the U.S. attained a racial accommodation that seemed stable for the years to come.⁶³⁴

Such a conception favoured the American anchorage in Japan. The relationship pupil-teacher, which characterised American perception of Japan since the 19th century, certainly constituted a major element favouring the consent of the Japanese leadership, but also of individuals who were still eager to separate themselves from their Asian neighbours to enter the West. In turn, this facilitated the implementation of reconstruction policies and their efficiency, eventually leading to the success of the overall project of turning Japan into a nation congenial to American regional and global interests.

Similarly to education, religion was turned into a tool facilitating the implementation of the reconstruction project and consent to American policies. All legal restrictions on freedom of thought, religion, assembly or speech, and all thought control laws were abolished and prisoners having violated these laws released.⁶³⁵ Separation of the state and religion was enforced.⁶³⁶ The 'State Shinto'⁶³⁷ doctrine was eliminated from school

⁶³³ Armed Forces Information and Education Division. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *A Pocket Guide to Japan* (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). As General Ridgway, the successor to General MacArthur, expressed : "Our alliance with Japan is a tribute to the individual Americans who have contributed in the events from which it has developed. They have carried to the Japanese people an appreciation of our deep feeling for the democratic principles upon which our country is founded. I am confident that every American in Japan will seize upon every opportunity to further the feeling of mutual respect and friendship which now exists between our people and the Japanese". Quoted in Troop Information and Education Section, GHQ/Far Eastern Command, *Japan – Friend and Ally* (1952), pp. 1-2.

⁶³⁴ Koshiro, Y., *Trans-Pacific Racism*, p. 12.

⁶³⁵ 04/10/1945.

⁶³⁶ 15/12/1945.

textbooks, its symbols removed from public buildings and school-conducted bowing towards the imperial palace abolished. The government was forbidden to control religious activities or to support one of them in particular. It was incorporated later on in articles 20 and 89 of the new constitution.⁶³⁸ Finally, SCAP facilitated the activities of Christian missions as the Americans, and especially MacArthur, considered that “Christianity with its emphasis on the dignity of the individual and the brotherhood of man can make an important contribution to the democratization of Japan”.⁶³⁹

The reorganisation of labour and the assimilation of democratic principles by employers, workers and their unions was another target of SCAP for the democratisation of the civil society. Policies included the abrogation of existing regulations preventing organised labour and control by police of labour activities, and the liberation of trade unionists who had opposed the government, including Communist leaders imprisoned since the 1930s, and the promulgation of new liberal labour laws.⁶⁴⁰

However, SCAP could not allow for the growth in power of a labour movement, especially dominated by Communists, given the catastrophic economic conditions and hunger spreading in Japan. The JCP and Communist actions in trade unions were under surveillance by the O.S.S.⁶⁴¹ and the Civil Intelligence Section of SCAP⁶⁴² but no punitive actions were taken. Indeed, the early Occupation had a liberal approach to unionism and encouraged its activities to integrate workers in the democratisation process of Japan.⁶⁴³

Nevertheless, when first clashes occurred between labour and government in February 1947, MacArthur forbade strikes on the grounds that it would create a dangerous precedent and hence endanger the Japanese economy. Indeed, the occupation was facing a dilemma as the workers’ demands for better wages were justified but at the same time, given the state of

⁶³⁷ ‘State Shinto’ was a national cult centred in the concept of a divine Emperor. Its acceptance became a test of loyalty to the state, and to express disbelief was to invite inevitable persecution for dangerous thoughts (like Buddhism and Christianity).

⁶³⁸ GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 21. Religion*, collated and published in 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo National Diet Library, 1990), pp. 3-6.

⁶³⁹ GHQ/SCAP/Far East Command, *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan*, p. 26. By April 1950, 2248 missionaries were at work in Japan. They would be more than 4000 after the outbreak of the Korean War, missionaries working in Korea having been sent to Japan.

⁶⁴⁰ Through the Trade Union Law (12/1945), Labour Relations Adjustment Law (09/1946) and Labour Standards Law (04/1947).

⁶⁴¹ O.S.S., ‘Left Wing Groups in Japanese Politics 1918-1946’, 01/01/1947 in O.S.S./State Department, *Intelligence and Research Reports. Part II. Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia.*: Reel 3, n° 31.

⁶⁴² Mr Max. W. Bishop of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan to the Secretary of State. Interrogation of Nosaka Sanzo, Communist leader, on the Strategy of the JCP, 31/01/1946 in U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946*, p. 136.

⁶⁴³ SWNCC 92 Directive regarding Principles for Japanese Trade Unions, 13/12 1946 in SWNCC and SANACC, *Case Files 1944-1949*, Reel 10.

the economy, the Japanese government was not in a position to fulfil these demands.⁶⁴⁴ One year later, SCAP would exclude public employees from the full protection of the Trade Union Laws and Labour Relations Adjustment Law. Later on, all public servants were denied the right to bargain collectively and to strike. The recovery of the Japanese economy and the eradication of the Communist threat in Japan had become the new priority.

Very quickly, the occupation moved from demilitarisation and democratisation to economic revival and strengthening of anti-Communist elements in the Japanese society, *The Reverse Course* had started. From a policy of genuine democratisation in all spheres of the Japanese society, the Occupation moved towards making Japan all but a satellite of the United States.

Until then, the consent of the Japanese people and elite had been rather easy to gain. Either the proposed reforms had a strong appeal and were embraced with enthusiasm, or when they were more difficult to implement, the Occupation resorted to the threat of coercion to get them through. Hence, the Occupation, so far, was a mix of benign coercion and strong consent generation that spread through all dimensions of reconstruction in order to align Japan with American interests.

With *The Reverse Course*, the motivations changed but the means remained the same. Those to be convinced also were less the conservative elite than the common people, who traumatised by the destruction that hit Japan, were not always keen on contemplating a Japan siding with the U.S. in the new struggle against Communism and hence participating to a potential conflagration.

However, such a policy shift was necessary if the reconstruction of Japan was to be successful and meet the U.S. foreign policy objectives of repelling Soviet influence in East Asia. This consistency between regional and global U.S. foreign policy objectives and the re-direction of reconstruction policies to meet these objectives contributed to the overall favourable outcome of the reconstruction of Japan, for the Japanese and for the United States.

The Reverse Course 1947-1952: Consistency of Reconstruction Policies with U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

By mid-1947, the occupation and reconstruction of Japan did an about-face. The punitive and liberal reformist programme based on demilitarisation and democratisation in all spheres of activities in Japan made room for a programme of economic recovery aiming

⁶⁴⁴ Situation Report – Japan – 28/02/1947, in O.S.S./State Department, *Intelligence and Research Reports. Part II.*, Reel 4, n°11.

at self-sustenance, strengthening of the state apparatus, policing of the civil society and further alignment with the United States aiming at the strengthening of the U.S. position of power regionally and globally in the face of the rise of a Communist threat. This change of policy was characterised by a high degree of consistency in between policies implemented in the reconstruction of the Japanese political society, economy, civil society and security, as well as in between these policies and U.S. foreign policy aims.

Global and regional factors played a role in that u-turn of American policy regarding Japan. At the global level, Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and assertiveness in other parts of the world, especially in the Middle East and the Mediterranean; the economic crisis shaking Western Europe and the need for extended American involvement in that region⁶⁴⁵; and, the U.S. policy of operating in an open, global, capitalist framework, all concurred to the definition of a new role for Japan. Regionally, the looming collapse of China into Communist hands; the sorry state of the economy in the Far East; and, the everlasting desperate economic conditions in Japan, were perfect conditions for a swing of the whole region towards Moscow. Washington reacted by offering to Japan what it had gone to war for: economic interdependence with Asians.

For the nations shattered by the war, economic recovery was hampered by the need to reconstruct. And to reconstruct, they were going bankrupt buying from the U.S. (exporting four times more than before the war). For the U.S., even though Communism was a threat, the economic catastrophe that would certainly occur if no help was provided to redress the global economy was a clear and present danger. Hence, the former enemies, Germany and Japan, on who the ultimate recovery of Europe and Asia depended, had to be quickly rebuilt.

Regarding Japan, a number of U.S. top-officials got organised to secure East Asia to American interests by making Japan the bulwark of the fight against Communism in the region. Illustrating the weight interest groups can have in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, these officials were also reinforced by the American Council on Japan (ACJ), initiated in August 1948 by Howard Kern, the virulent anti-Communist editor of *Newsweek*. He made use of his numerous contacts inside the occupation and with Japanese officials “to inform the American public and to assist the Truman Administration in solving those problems that must be solved if victory in Japan is to be assured”.⁶⁴⁶

Although the ACJ was a small and loosely structured pressure group, its members were among the most strenuous participants in the debate over Japanese policy, providing

⁶⁴⁵ Exemplified by the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, 12/03/1947.

⁶⁴⁶ Schonberger, H. B., *Aftermath of War*, pp. 144-145.

ideological, strategic, and economic rationales for the creation of a new capitalistic structure in Japan. The peace and security treaties marked the culmination of efforts by the Japan lobby to reverse the reformist orientation of the early occupation, to make Japan a bulwark against Communism in Asia, and to rivet Japan into an American dominated world capitalist system.⁶⁴⁷

Schonberger summarises the characteristics and objectives of the ACJ: a loose group of individuals with the right contacts in Washington; a comprehensive programme of action; anti-Communism; a capitalist Japan at the centre of Asian recovery; and, America as the leader of a global capitalist system.

Howard F. Kern^{648 649} became very active against SCAP as early as 1947. Since the beginning of the occupation, Kern was opposed to the socialistic ideals of the economic doctrine applied in Japan. He used his position as foreign affairs editor of *Newsweek* to attack the policies of de-concentration of economic power, and particularly the purge programme, applied by MacArthur, on the ground that the removal of leading figures in industry, commerce, and finance would disrupt the economic recovery:

The economic application of the purge cuts off the most active and efficient, cultured, and cosmopolitan section of the nation – the very section that has always been the best disposed toward cooperation with the United States. These classes consider that they have helped make the occupation one in which the US has been able to reduce its occupying forces to a minimum because resistance has been practically nil...many occupation officers in all levels shared the bewilderment of the Japanese. Some felt that instead of pressing for an investigation in Germany, Congress should send a commission to Japan to discover why American capitalistic principles are being undermined by American occupation authorities.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁷ Schonberger, H. B., *Op. cit.*, pp. 159-160, see also Schonberger, H. B., 'The Japan Lobby in the American Diplomacy, 1947-52', *Pacific Historical Review*, 46:3 (August, 1977), pp. 327-359.

⁶⁴⁸ In his diaries, in the first entry regarding *Newsweek*, General Robert L. Eichelberger (8th US Army, HQ in Yokohama) mentions 'Mr Hearn and Pakenham from *Newsweek*'. I checked the *Newsweek* magazines published around that time and I could not find an article or anyone bearing the name of 'Hearn' in *Newsweek*'s staff. I presume that Eichelberger misunderstood and misspell the name 'Kern' when they met for the first time. After having started to correspond with Kern (after his return to America in October 1948), Eichelberger mentions 'Kern' and 'Hearn' does not appear anymore in his diaries.

⁶⁴⁹ Seconded by Compton Pakenham, British citizen. He was *Newsweek*'s Tokyo Bureau Chief. Born in Kobe, he had many conservative friends in pre-war Japan. He was despised by MacArthur who called him a 'British fascist' in Eichelberger, R. L., *The Papers of General Robert L. Eichelberger*, Reel 36. Diaries 1947, 29/06/1947.

⁶⁵⁰ Extract of an article written by Howard F. Kern in *Newsweek*, 27/01/1947 in GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 6. The Purge*, p.77.

MacArthur and the 'New Dealers' of SCAP/GHQ were opposed to these conclusions and proved that the critiques were not borne out by facts, as levels of production remained the same. However, they failed to grasp the mood of the time regarding the future of Japan. On the one hand, the majority of the Japanese population genuinely favoured the strengthening of democracy, politically and economically⁶⁵¹. On the other hand, the political and economic elite, scared by the rise of the JCP and the influence of Communist trade unions, was open to the alternative defended by influent American officials and by American businessmen to whom Japanese economic recovery meant good profits.⁶⁵²

The ACJ was the federator of these opinions and organised their dissemination in Japan and the United States by creating networks of communication between Japanese and U.S. officials⁶⁵³, and by arranging conferences with media professionals, academics, business leaders, and public opinions leaders for the spreading and acceptance of its objective in the United States and in Japan, especially through the influence of General Robert L. Eichelberger who was sympathetic to the ACJ's thesis, considering that nothing in Japan had been done to counter the interests of the Russians.⁶⁵⁴ Eichelberger would soon become the main point of entry for ACJ's members' and American officials' contacts with Japanese policy-makers, bankers and industrialists favourable to their views⁶⁵⁵. Annex 1 holds a table giving an overview of the links of the ACJ in the U.S. and in Japan.⁶⁵⁶

Japanese and American officials, influenced or reinforced in their opinions by the activities of the ACJ, set off to change the design of the occupation. Their objectives were to

⁶⁵¹ As the threat of MacArthur to make public the debate on the adoption of a new constitution, when Japanese officials hesitated to accept the very liberal American draft, demonstrated.

⁶⁵² Many ACJ members were top American businessmen looking for profits in Japan and all over Asia, when Japan would act as the locomotive of Asian economy.

⁶⁵³ Notably, in late 1948 the ACJ invited twelve high-ranked State and Army officials concerned with Japan for a dinner followed by a conference. Unfortunately, I could not find the report of the conference. Nevertheless, I managed to find out in the Papers of General Robert L. Eichelberger a summary of a later report on Japanese policy by the ACJ dated of 12/04/1949, which gives a comprehensive analysis of the ACJ's positions on Japan.

⁶⁵⁴ Eichelberger was strongly anti-Communist. On top of the ACJ, he was member of the board of directors of 'Common Cause', an anti-Communist lobby. Eichelberger, R. L., *The Papers of General Robert L. Eichelberger*, Reel 36, 1947 Diaries, 10/03/1948.

⁶⁵⁵ After the war, Eichelberger became very active with the ACJ and gave numerous conferences on Japan in America. He also joined the Army Department as an expert on Japan, nominated by the Under-Secretary of the Army Draper, another advocate of the ACJ's views.

⁶⁵⁶ This table is based on Schonberger, H. B. (1977 and 1989), on the Papers of General Robert L. Eichelberger (especially the diaries and correspondence), and on Schaller, M. (1985).

strengthen the Japanese economy and the overall role of Japan in the region through remilitarisation and an early Peace Treaty with the U.S.⁶⁵⁷

Consequently, the policy on excessive concentration of economic power in Japan became the first target of the tenants of *The Reverse Course*.⁶⁵⁸ Later on, the reformists obtained a Peace Treaty and security agreements that would anchor the U.S. in Japan and configure the East Asian security landscape, with Japan as a junior partner in the defence of American interests in the region.

Economic recovery

In late 1947, the first attacks on the economic programme of the occupation took place. A memorandum prepared in the Department of State in November feared that the de-concentration programme “has been or may be carried too far” and might interfere with economic recovery.⁶⁵⁹ In December 1947, Kern hit again in *Newsweek* and criticised the “economic experimentation” driven in Japan by SCAP, “aimed at applying New Deal social levelling theories in Japan...[which] would gravely endanger the existence of the Japanese economic system and make Japan a permanent economic ward of the United States”.⁶⁶⁰ In the Congress, Senator William F. Knowland criticised the de-concentration measures as “socialistic and contrary to Anglo-Saxon philosophy”⁶⁶¹ and for going far beyond the necessary objective of eliminating trusts and cartels in Japan.⁶⁶² Finally, Secretary of the Army Royall justified the critics by the costs to the U.S. of supporting Japan: “the United States can’t provide relief for occupied areas indefinitely” and stressed the importance of making Japan “self-supporting as quickly as possible”.⁶⁶³

The justification of the burden on the American taxpayers for an indefinite U.S. role in Japanese reconstruction became very popular in America⁶⁶⁴. The partisans of *The Reverse Course* exploited it to gain the consent of the American public to their programme of action. Soon, planning documents started to change the orientation of the occupation objectives.

⁶⁵⁷ Resume of Recommendations of the Report on Japanese Policy by the American Council on Japan, 12/04/1949, by Howard Kern in Eichelberger, R. L. *The Papers of General Robert L. Eichelberger*, Reel 33, n°31.

⁶⁵⁸ This policy was enounced in FEC 230.

⁶⁵⁹ Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1947*, pp. 320-323.

⁶⁶⁰ Extract from an article written by Howard Kern, *Newsweek*, 01/12/1947 in GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 29. Deconcentration of Economic Power*, p. 21.

⁶⁶¹ Congressional Record, Senate, 19/12/1947, vol. 93, n°168, 11809-11.

⁶⁶² GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 29. Deconcentration of Economic Power*, p. 22; Schaller, M., *The American Occupation of Japan*, pp. 117-118, 197-200, 207;

⁶⁶³ Address by the Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall in San Francisco, 06/01/1948 in GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 29. Deconcentration of Economic Power*, p. 22.

⁶⁶⁴ 65 percent of Americans were in favour of the rebuilding of Japan economically.

These documents insisted on the self-sustenance of the Japanese economy to alleviate the burden of the U.S. taxpayer, its fast integration in the global economy, greater economic control for Japanese, and the cessation of reparation payments by Japan.⁶⁶⁵

Eventually, in March 1948, the U.S. Government withdrew its support from FEC 230, without retiring it physically from FEC, to avoid condemnation from the allied powers.⁶⁶⁶

Having changed the course of the economic reorientation in Washington, the partisans of a stronger Japan had to design and implement a new policy, with or without the help of SCAP. Hence, Draper set on an economic mission in Japan⁶⁶⁷, notably accompanied by many sympathizers or members of the future ACJ. Draper concluded that it was necessary to eliminate extreme forms of economic concentrations in Japan without hindering production, which meant restoring the Japanese capitalistic class and securing a conservative government, while containing the left.⁶⁶⁸

Consequently, the official turn of the American reconstruction policy in Japan⁶⁶⁹ encompassed: no further extension of the purge; further planned reduction of the costs of the occupation borne by the Japanese Government; economic recovery of Japan as primary objective of the U.S. policy⁶⁷⁰; no pre-censorship of the Japanese press; the development of medium and long wave radio broadcast from Okinawa to enhance the appreciation of American ideas by the Japanese; the rapid conclusion of wartime trials; and finally, the availability of Northeast Asia, which if it was lost to Communist victory in China, then Southeast Asia, to Japan's needs and trade, as Japan's recovery badly needed trade opportunities.⁶⁷¹

Yoshida and the Japanese conservatives welcomed the activation of the Kennan-Draper economic plan but MacArthur opposed it as a creation in the exclusive interests of

⁶⁶⁵ JCF-I, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2 : 1946-1953. The Far East*, Reel 6; SWNCC and SANACC, *Case Files 1944-1949*, Reel 31.

⁶⁶⁶ Memorandum from the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, Mr. Frank G. Wisner to General MacCoy (FEC), 02/03/1948 in SWNCC and SANACC, *Case Files 1944-1949*, Reel 26.

⁶⁶⁷ From 20/03/1948 to 26/04/1948, date of the statement on the mission.

⁶⁶⁸ Schonberger, H. B., *Aftermath of War*, p. 197.

⁶⁶⁹ Embodied in PPS 28, serving as a basis for NSC 13/2, 07/10/1948.

⁶⁷⁰ Through long-term United States aid programme, revival of Japan's foreign trade, promotion of private enterprise, attacking inflation through balanced budget, and maintenance of high export levels through hard work (no strikes).

⁶⁷¹ Report by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), 25/03/1948 in Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1948*, pp. 691-696; PPS 28/2 – Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy toward Japan (A Revision of PPS 28 and PPS 28/1, 26/05/1948) in U.S. Department of State/Policy Planning Staff, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers 1947-1949. Volume II – 1948* (New York : Garland Publishing, 1981), pp. 180-182; The Strategic Importance of Japan, 24/05/1948 in CIA – I –, *Research Reports: Japan and the Security of Asia 1946-1976* (Frederick: Microfilm Project of University Publications of America, 1982), Reel 2; SWNCC 373/1 Restoration of Private Trade with Japan, 29/07/1947 and to SCAP on 02/12/1948 in SWNCC and SANACC, *Case Files 1944-1949*, Reel 31.

the big business in America and Japan. Figures proved him right. Regarding the economic de-concentration, the De-concentration Law and the Anti-Monopoly Law were amended or simply ignored.⁶⁷² The economic purge was stopped and in some instances, people already condemned as war criminals were released from jail by the Japanese authorities. Joseph M. Dodge, Washington's envoy to advise SCAP on economic matters, started his programme of opening Japan to market forces, which ultimately would lead to economic recovery.

Yoshida put in place a highly trained bureaucracy to implement the American directives of reconstruction. The economy remained strictly controlled from above and the bureaucracy ensured that it would remain protected from foreign encroachments in these years of reconstruction.⁶⁷³ Under MacArthur, economic control and the bureaucracy attained levels of power never reached before, even during the great mobilisation for war.⁶⁷⁴

With the Soviet control on atomic weapons assured in September, the Communist victory in China in October 1949 and with the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950, MacArthur's opposition to the new policy lost ground and *The Reverse Course* unfolded without much resistance. The time was ripe for the launching of a red purge and generally a tougher stance against the left in Japan that would assure the alignment of the Japanese society on the American project by eradicating alternatives, and secure the economic recovery. Again, political, economic and civil society re-engineering were led in a consistent fashion, further participating to the attainment of the American final reconstruction's objective: making Japan a capitalist economy, led by an elite supporting American regional and global interests. The freedom of movement granted to the Japanese political and economic elite would thus be matched by the reduction of liberties and political expression in the civil society.

Controlling Civil Society

Indeed, as early as July 1948, SCAP had already suppressed the right to strike and to bargain collectively in the Japanese public service.⁶⁷⁵ The growing influence of the JCP⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷² Out of the 325 companies originally designed for screening in early 1948, only nineteen were ordered to reorganise. Dower, J. W., *Empire and Aftermath*, p. 344; LaFeber, W., *The Clash*, p. 274; GHQ/SCAP, *History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation. Volume 29. Deconcentration of Economic Power*, pp. 28-29.

⁶⁷³ LaFeber, W., *The Clash*, p. 277.

⁶⁷⁴ Dower, J., *Embracing Defeat*, p. 546; Pempel, T. J., 'The Tar Baby Target : 'Reform' of the Japanese Bureaucracy' in Ward, Robert E. and Sakamoto, Yoshikazu (eds.), *Democratizing Japan. The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 179.

⁶⁷⁵ Situation Report – Japan, The Abolition of Strikes and Collective Bargaining in the Japanese public Service, 30/07/1948 in O.S.S./State Department, *Intelligence and Research Reports. Part II. Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia*, Reel 5, n°18.

and its systematic anti-occupation approach⁶⁷⁷, and generally the success of Communism in East Asia worried American officials in Washington and in Tokyo. Reports were now talking about Communist expansion contained by “Japan, the bastion of the free world in Asia”.⁶⁷⁸ They were focusing on methods of action⁶⁷⁹ and pointing out vulnerabilities of the Communist movement⁶⁸⁰, and highlighting the strategic importance of Japan and Okinawa to repel Soviet influence in East Asia⁶⁸¹. A memorandum of Edwin O. Reischauer warned of the growing sympathy of the Communist movement in Japan caused by the fact that “any simple positive creed has special appeal for a people intellectually at sea” and by the American “mistaken information policy which has managed to preserve the forbidden fruits charm of Communism”. He concluded that the occupation programme failed to provide enough information on democracy to the Japanese people, “crying for information, but we have so reduced the flow that they have been forced to drink from the stream of Communist propaganda to attempt to quench their thirst”.⁶⁸²

Gradually, the Japanese government, under guidance of SCAP/GHQ, eradicated Communist political presence in Japan, leading to the ban of the Communist press⁶⁸³, the purge of the JCP and eventually, its suppression in September 1951, followed by the purge of Communist elements in the public and private sectors.⁶⁸⁴

Most of the genuine idealistic supporters of democracy became cynic and opted for anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, the majority of the population, still struggling in poor

⁶⁷⁶ The JCP membership passed from 5000 in 1946 to 150 000 in 1949, and had a great success at the 1949 elections (10% of the votes cast). ‘The Potential of World Communism: Far East. Part I: Japan, 01/08/1949’ in O.S.S./State Department, *Op. cit.*, Reel 5, n°35.

⁶⁷⁷ In the summer of 1949, violent incidents erupted, including the seizure of a steel plant in Hiroshima and of a police station in Fukushima.

⁶⁷⁸ ‘The Potential of World Communism: Far East. Part I: Japan, 01/08/1949’ in O.S.S./State Department, *Intelligence and Research Reports. Part II*, Reel 5, n°18.

⁶⁷⁹ CIA-I, ‘Intelligence Memorandum n° 208: Communist Methods in Asia, 26/08/1949’ in CIA – I –, *Research Reports: Japan and the Security of Asia 1946-1976*, Reel 1; ‘Communist Strength in Japan, 28/09/1948’ in CIA – I –, *Op. cit.*, Reel 3.

⁶⁸⁰ ‘Intelligence Memorandum n° 208: Vulnerabilities of Communist Movements in the Far East, 20/09/1949’ in CIA – I –, *Op. cit.*, Reel 1.

⁶⁸¹ ‘The Strategic Importance of Japan, 24/05/1948’; ‘The Ryukyu Islands and their significance’, 06/08/1948 in CIA – I –, Reel 1.

⁶⁸² Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 18/02/1949, including a memo and letter by Edwin O. Reischauer, Associate Professor of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard University. Summary of Observations as Member of the Cultural and Social Sciences Mission, 04/02/1949 in U.S. Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. The Far East and Australasia*, Vol. 2. Part 2 (Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 663.

⁶⁸³ By October 1950, 1 387 Communist and left-wing publications were shut down. Dower, J., *Embracing Defeat*, p. 437.

⁶⁸⁴ Cohen, Warren, *Empire without Tears*, pp. 449-452; See ‘The Campaign against Communist Teachers in Japan’, 14/11/1949 in O.S.S./State Department, *Intelligence and Research Reports. Part II. Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia*, Reel 5, n°40.

economic conditions realised on which side its bread was buttered and followed the Government's and SCAP/GHQ's new policies.⁶⁸⁵ *The Reverse Course* took its toll on the most liberal elements of the Japanese society. A well-orchestrated anti-Communist propaganda managed to secure the consent of the Japanese people to this sudden change of policy. From democratisation and demilitarisation to economic reconstruction and radicalisation of the struggle against Communism, the American policy realised a u-turn that would become almost insane to many Japanese as the Korean War broke out.

The war next door was a gift from the Gods for Japan, as the U.S. called on Japan to produce the needed materials to fight the Communist invasion. It would also have another controversial outcome: the remilitarisation of Japan and the conclusion of a Peace Treaty and Security Agreement placing Japan as the most Western frontier of the United States, as the bulwark of the American security in the region, the first line of defence against Communism. Japan became a huge factory to help the economic recovery of East Asia, and a massive American base destined to contain Soviet Union.

In addition to the re-creation of the Japanese political and civil society, and economy, the U.S. embarked on reviewing its position regarding the military power of Japan, aiming at buttressing its security in the region and hence its control over East Asia. By adding the security dimension to its reconstruction project of Japan, the U.S. completed its task and reached new levels of consistency in its politics of power. Indeed, with the security aspect dealt with, the U.S. actually created a new state, supportive of its regional and global interests, and hence reinforcing its global power status. Indeed, the story of the reconstruction of Japan owes its success to the fact that American officials never lost sight of the purpose and objectives of their foreign policy: to maintain and further U.S. global supremacy while adapting reconstruction policies to meet these goals.

U.S. Foreign Policy and The Security Aspect: Rearmament and Peace Treaty, and Their Influence on Reconstruction

The security aspects of the reconstruction of Japan constituted the last building block of the U.S.-led re-invention of its former enemy. So far, we investigated the reconstruction of the state, the economy and the civil society and we conclude that thanks to the consistency

⁶⁸⁵ Many Japanese organisations or individuals wrote to MacArthur and President Truman to express their hope that the US would extend the Truman doctrine to Japan. They wrote also for all sorts of reasons, generally about their actions in favour of democracy and US-Japan friendship. Some letters were naive or absolutely funny because of language misunderstanding, as a letter from a Takeshi Kanai, editor of a magazine for boys (*Shoneu*), asking Truman to write on any of a provided list of subjects, including 'The type of boy I like' (sic). Truman, H., *Papers of Harry Truman*, Box 197-1, Microfiche 5422, Letter from Takeshi Kanai 20/07/1951).

between policies implemented in these three fields, the reconstruction of Japan had been rather effective, even though Communist ideas were still propagated in Japan. By addressing the question of Japan's domestic and regional security, the U.S. would achieve new levels of consistency between policies of reconstruction and its regional and global foreign policies. This consistency of action between reconstruction policies, international and regional realities and U.S. foreign policy objectives, led the reconstruction of Japan to reach effectiveness on the long run, with the casting of Japan as unconditional American ally in the region, contributing to the achievement of the ultimate U.S. foreign policy objective: maintaining its situation of strength in East Asia, and hence contributing to global U.S. supremacy.

However, in order for the reconstruction of Japan to be qualified as fully successful, American officials, facing a redistribution of power in East Asia through the rise of Communism embodied by the rise of nationalist decolonisation movements and the victory of Mao in China, had to address the sensitive question of remilitarising Japan in order to improve the U.S. regional security status. As the Japanese constitution stipulated that Japan renounced to war, and as the Japanese population embraced this new reality, remilitarising Japan could prove tricky, and potentially, through the probable rejection of such an option, jeopardise the success met by the reconstruction policies so far.

Nevertheless, the perception by U.S. officials of the rise of a global Communist threat and the slow recovery of the global economy propelled a review of the U.S. foreign policy that would indeed impact the reconstruction of Japan. U.S. officials feared a global collapse of capitalism more than an international Communist revolution. Regarding Asia and particularly Japan, America opted for a development of global and regional economic complementarities in order to repel Communism and to trigger economic growth. NSC 48⁶⁸⁶ embodied this new approach to Asia and Japan.

The document warned that if Japan fell into the Soviet sphere of influence, it would shift the balance of world power to the disadvantage of America. To meet this menace, Washington opted for the promotion of democratic forces and economic stability through economic assistance, the development of economic relations between Japan and other free countries of the world, and the U.S. support against external aggression. In Japan itself, SCAP had to open the channels "for those elements in Japan that have gained most from the occupation to exercise their influence over government policy and economic influence in the

⁶⁸⁶ NSC 48, US Policy towards Asia, 10/06/1949 in National Security Council, *Documents of the National Security Council* (Bethesda : University Publications of America, 1987). Reel 2.

direction of ensuring Japan's friendship, its ability to withstand external and internal Communist pressure, and its further development in a democratic direction".⁶⁸⁷

NSC 48 also recommended the opening of Southeast Asia to Japan for raw materials and exports. Japan was to become the factory of Asia, the main force for the regional economic development, which would lead to strengthening social and political stability in a region open to American economic interests and contributing to U.S. security interests.⁶⁸⁸

However, before the negotiations of a Peace Treaty, the JCS wanted to make sure that Japan was politically stable and Western oriented, dotted with sufficient self-defence forces, that no time limit would be set for the departure of occupation forces, and that the U.S. would maintain bases in Okinawa and in mainland Japan.⁶⁸⁹

Self-defence meant rearmament and Peace Treaty meant to let Japan go her own way. The Japanese people were in favour of a Peace Treaty that would give them back their independence. So was Prime Minister Yoshida but he opposed any rearmament, as it would drain resources better used for the economic recovery. The Pentagon was opposed to the signature of an early Peace Treaty as it would endanger the future of American bases in Japan, deemed essential for the security of the U.S. The Communists denounced a Peace Treaty, as they knew that it would include American bases in and around Japan, and U.S. allies and Japan's neighbours feared a resurgence of militarism after independence would be granted.⁶⁹⁰ The State Department, Secretary Acheson ahead, in favour of a Peace Treaty to undercut anti-U.S. sentiments in Japan, had thus to fight its way through severe opposition.

The Korean War solved the problem. At the global level, it forced Truman to adopt NSC 68, the core text of the Cold War policy formulating the doctrine of containment of the USSR.⁶⁹¹ Regionally, Japan became the first benefactor of the war, and witnessed an economic boom stimulated by U.S. 'special procurements'. Indeed, NSC 48/5 planned "to

⁶⁸⁷ NSC 48, US Policy towards Asia, 10/06/1949 in National Security Council, *Documents of the National Security Council*, Reel 2, p. 6.

⁶⁸⁸ NSC 48, US Policy towards Asia, 10/06/1949 in National Security Council, *Documents of the National Security Council*, Reel 2, pp. 24-25.

⁶⁸⁹ JCS 1380/65, report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to JCS on Current Strategic evaluation of US Security Needs in Japan, 01/06/1949 in JCF-I, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2 : 1946-1953. The Far East*, Reel 4.

⁶⁹⁰ The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), 24/03/1950 in Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. East Asia and the Pacific*, p. 1154.

⁶⁹¹ Containment meant "to develop throughout the world positive appeals superior to those of Communism...even at grave risk of general war, to block further expansion of Soviet power [...] by all means short of general war, to induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and so as to foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behaviour to conform to generally accepted international standards". National Security Council, *Documents of the National Security Council*, Reel 2.

assist Japan to become economic self-supporting and to produce goods and services important to the US and to the economic stability of the non-Communist areas of Asia".⁶⁹² The Korean War kick-started the Japanese economy and launched it on a path to success, which in turn allowed for the overall success of the reconstruction policies thanks to the economic gains enjoyed by Japan.⁶⁹³

In addition, Japan became a leading exporter not only regionally but also globally as the productive capacity of western countries was overstretched. Japan and South East Asia were on the verge of a long lasting economic partnership in which the latter provided the raw materials and Japan the manufactured products.

Boosted economically, Japan was also attributed a key-role in the re-definition of the U.S. foreign policy through the doctrine of containment, seeking "global situations of strength". Japan was one of these and as such the reconstruction of the country became critical and hence had to be integrated with coherence in the general framework of U.S. foreign policy definition. The security and economic fields of the reconstruction effort intersected as the security gains made by the U.S. thanks to the reinforcement of Japan economically were matched by the wealth and corollary consent generated amongst the Japanese elite and population to U.S. policies.

Consequently, the next step for the U.S. consisted in remilitarising Japan and drafting a Peace Treaty.⁶⁹⁴ Japanese Communists having been purged and the relations with Moscow and Beijing being frozen, the only obstacles to a Peace Treaty and Security Agreement providing America with the needed bases in Japan and in the Pacific to contain Soviet expansion were Japan's former foes, who feared her remilitarisation. The objective was to keep Japan oriented to the West; to deny Japan to the USSR in time of peace or war; to

⁶⁹² Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS on Japan as a Source for Supply of US Military Requirements, 11/06/1951 in JCF-I, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2 : 1946-1953. The Far East*, Reel 6.

⁶⁹³ Through 'special procurements', most industrial sectors were stimulated, especially those producing armament and what U.S. soldiers needed on a daily basis. Eventually, the 'special procurements' brought an estimated \$2.3 billion in Japan between June 1950 and the end of 1953. Moreover, between 1954 and 1956, 'new special procurements' added another \$1.75 billion. It enabled Japan to increase its imports and to double its scale of production in key-industries.

⁶⁹⁴ A so-called 'National Police Reserve' counting 75,000 men was created in secrecy, constituting the core of what would become the Japanese 'Self-Defence Force' without constitutional change to the Article Nine on renunciation of war. Washington would eventually manage to equip and form a Japanese army able to ensure the security of Japan and which became a key-element of the Cold War American security system in East Asia. Dower, J., *Empire and Aftermath*, p. 378; Dower, J., *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 547-548. NSC 60/1 approved by Truman in May 1951 stated that the United States should proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty, and stipulated that Japan should "take steps to provide for its own security and defense". JCS 2180/2 Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the JCS, United States Policy towards Japan, 28/12/1950 in Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. East Asia and the Pacific*, pp. 1386-1388.

secure the availability of Japanese bases for U.S. military operations in event of war and to make Japan's war potential available to the U.S.⁶⁹⁵

The Peace Treaty and the Security Agreement signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, finally gave Japan its 'independence' after six years of occupation. It assured Japan's entry in the international community through application for membership in the U.N., the respect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the conformity in trade and commerce to internationally accepted fair practices. Japan was granted the right of self-defence and the right to enter into collective security arrangements.⁶⁹⁶

The Security Treaty stressed the temporary impossibility for Japan to exercise her right to self-defence and as such, Japan desired that the U.S. maintained armed forces in and about Japan to deter armed attacks on Japan. The U.S. accepted but insisted that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense".⁶⁹⁷ Article 1 granted the right of the U.S. to dispose troops in and about Japan, these forces contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and Japan, including in case of domestic trouble caused by instigation or intervention of an outside power. Article 2 stipulated that Japan cannot grant rights of bases, garrison, manoeuvre or transit of forces to a third power without prior consent of the U.S.⁶⁹⁸

Finally, the U.S. signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Philippines (30/08/1951) and security treaties with Australia and New Zealand (01/09/1951) to calm their fear of having to combat Japan again.

The Peace Treaty and its security complement were a high price to pay for Japanese independence and security, high but unavoidable in a dangerous world. At least, Japan was independent again, official sovereignty being restored on April 28, 1952. However, Japan was all but a satellite of the United State. Her economy was reliant on U.S. imports of Japanese goods, her security totally dependent on the presence of American forces based in

⁶⁹⁵ JCS 2180/2 Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the JCS, United States Policy towards Japan, 28/12/1950 in Department of State/FRUS, *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. East Asia and the Pacific*, p. 1389.

⁶⁹⁶ Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan in U.S. Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington DC : U.S. Government printing Office, 1955), p. 3171.

⁶⁹⁷ Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 08/09/1951 in U.S. Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, pp. 3331.

⁶⁹⁸ The administrative agreement for the implementation of the Security Treaty turned out as inequitable as the two other documents. America had exceptional extraterritorial rights; the number of military installations was far in excess of anything anticipated; and on top of providing free of charge the use of bases, Japan had to assure the financial burden of the presence of the US forces equivalent to \$155 million per year. Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, 08/09/1951 in U.S. Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, pp. 3342-3362.

the region and her army exclusively equipped, trained and at the disposal of the U.S. The democratisation that characterised the early reconstruction of Japan was put on hold and former political and economic elite back in power. In a sense, the U.S. sacrificed the genuine development of a democratic society in Japan on the altar of American regional and global security and supremacy. Ironically, it is one of the key-factors explaining the effectiveness of the reconstruction of Japan.

However, from an American point of view, such a policy was consistent with the overall objective of reinforcing U.S. supremacy in East Asia and its global status as superpower. The welfare and security of the American political and economic elites took precedence over a genuine exercise of democracy. The collusion that characterised the subsequent relations between American and Japanese capitalism and political elite is a testimony to the success of the overall American project of reconstructing Japan. This statement leads us to conclude this chapter by bringing together the explanatory factors that led to a favourable outcome of the reconstruction of Japan for the U.S.

Conclusions

As outlined previously, our research objective consists in bringing to the fore factors explaining the effectiveness of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects in order to explore the postulate made by the G.W. Bush administration that successful reconstruction in Japan after World War II can be replicated in Iraq today.

To assess the outcome of the U.S.-led reconstruction of Japan after World War II, we follow the same framework designed in the previous chapter on the reconstruction of Iraq. Hence, we look at:

- The influence of pre-conditions to the occupation and reconstruction;
- How power differentiating between coercion and consent was exerted in the four fields of observation of reconstruction projects - security, the state, the economy and the civil society - and was consistency of action achieved between these dimensions of the reconstruction? We try to explain specific outcomes in the reconstruction project under scrutiny by looking at what form of power exerted in a specific field of a reconstruction process produced what results, and how these results matched the overall rationale of the reconstruction project;
- To what extent reconstruction policies benefited of consistency when put against regional and global foreign policies.

Similar to the assessment used in chapter 5, we should consider how success was defined by the Japanese and by U.S. policy-makers.

After the unconditional surrender, the Japanese feared the complete subjection of their country to American rule and a corresponding punitive policy aiming less at reconstructing than turning Japan into an American colony. Hence, when SCAP/GHQ made clear that the American objective consisted in turning Japan into a democratic and peaceful nation, the Japanese enjoyed some degree of relief. Indeed, first victims of the militaristic and expansionist policies implemented by the previous regime, an exhausted Japanese population yearned for peace and stability, and a redefinition of the state. Hence, we can argue that a successful reconstruction for the Japanese meant the instauration of a democratic regime centred on a strong state and civil society backed up by a dynamic economy, providing the population with basic needs and offering new perspectives for the future.

The U.S. objectives for the reconstruction of Japan matched those aspirations as the United States embarked on a reconstruction course aiming at turning Japan into a democratic and demilitarised country at peace with its neighbours and not a threat to international peace anymore. However, after 1947 and the rise of a Communist threat to U.S. interests, reconstruction objectives consisted in making Japan a capitalist and democratic country, friendly to and aligned with the U.S. interests in repelling Communism, in brief an anchor of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region. In order to reach these goals, the U.S. reviewed some of the most extreme democratisation policies implemented until then. Instead, it focused on reinforcing stability and economic well-being by developing the Japanese state capacities, strengthening its economic basis, fortifying democracy and anti-Communism in the civil society, and developing an embryo of security apparatus. The overall objective was to keep the reconstruction of Japan in line with American expectations of the future role Japan had to play in order to buttress the U.S. policy regionally and hence contribute to the reinforcement of the U.S. global status as superpower. Over five years, America reinvented Japan twice, first as a democratic and demilitarised peace-loving country; and second, as its closest ally in the region, anti-Communist, economically and militarily revived to face the Communist threat.

Thus, what is there to say about the effectiveness of the U.S.-led reconstruction of Japan?

The pre-conditions to the occupation constitute a first set of factors that play a role in the outcome of the reconstruction.

Pre-conditions and Their Influence on Reconstruction

Firstly, the defining elements of U.S. foreign policy at the onset of the occupation of Japan were congenial to the use of power instruments favouring consent generation. Exiting the Second World War as a legitimate victor, the United States enjoyed an uncontested material and moral position of power in the international structure. Buttressed by strong economic and military resources of power, the ideological face of American power led to its positioning as at the source of the liberal institutionalisation of the new world order. To discredited totalitarian ideologies, the U.S. presented the world with a democratic liberal capitalist vision of a new world order resting on peaceful relations between states through multilateralism embodied by international institutions, and global economic wealth through the creation of international institutions promoting free trade and openness.

Secondly, the nature of the conflict between the U.S. and Japan played a role regarding the status of the United States as occupying power. Indeed, the unconditional surrender of Japan put an end to a war of aggression Japan had started against the U.S., hence the United States walked in defeated Japan with the international legitimacy of a victorious power that had been attacked. This legitimacy was also granted by the population and the more liberal elements of the political establishment of Japan as they accepted their status as vanquished nation, and as they did not have any other option but to accept a U.S. occupation, as stated in the surrender documents.

Thirdly, the level of material and psychological destruction sustained by Japan did not allow for any form of resistance to the occupation and the reconstruction policies to come. On top of the obvious material damages, the Japanese people needed reconstruction. Their systems of values were shattered and the solidifying element constituted by the nation as defined by the previous regime all but disappeared. The Japanese state and people needed to be re-invented and the American occupational authorities had a free-hand to do so.

Fourthly, such re-invention was facilitated by the fact that Japan was an homogeneous nation in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture and that Japanese institutions were relatively preserved. Consequently, there was no sources of potential internal strife as the coercive structures of the state were still in place and running.

Fifthly, When the United States attacked and occupied Japan, it took on a limited whole. Japan is isolated geographically, religiously and culturally. It is an island inhabited by people practising a state religion, Shinto, that is peculiar to Japan, and whose feeling of racial superiority casts them aside of other Asian nations. In addition, the atrocities committed by

Japanese troops since the beginning of Japan's expansion in Asia further alienated support from Japan's neighbours, giving a free-hand to the U.S. in its reconstruction project.

Finally, thanks to the duration of the war, American policy-makers, from the moment the defeat of Japan became obvious, had the time to plan for the occupation and reconstruction of Japan. Moreover, the U.S. administration mobilised those with expertise about Japan in order to plan for all possible contingencies. At the onset of the occupation, Americans were ready with a comprehensive and coherent plan that did not leave room to chance.


The six sets of pre-conditions here above all contributed to providing the U.S. with a freedom of action to implement its reconstruction policies that eventually helped the favourable general outcome of the occupation. Indeed, the U.S. was in a position to rely on power expressions that were characterised by a consistent use of coercion and consent when implemented across the four fields structuring the reconstruction effort: the security, the state, the economy and the civil society, as the next section will now illustrate.

Assessing Consistency of U.S. Actions across the Four Fields

Regarding the reconstruction of Japan, American power was thus exerted consistently in all dimensions of the reconstruction. Policies did not conflict with each other, or when they did, it was not to such an extent that it would jeopardise the reconstruction project as whole.

The table here below summarises the policies and actions (in blue) undertaken by the U.S. in the security, political society, economic and civil society dimensions of the reconstruction and qualifies them as based on coercion or consent. Those policies generated outcomes either positive (in green) or negative (in red). To differentiate between early policies and later policies, we have put the policies of *The Reverse Course* and their outcomes in bold.

Power, Consistency and the Four Fields



Thanks to favourable pre-conditions to the occupation that secured stability in Japan, SCAP/GHQ had a free-hand to implement its reconstruction policies. Indeed, the strong U.S. military presence and the complete demobilisation of the Japanese army provided the

Occupation with the necessary conditions to implement its programme of democratisation of the Japanese state, economy and civil society.

The re-creation of the Japanese state was at the core of SCAP/GHQ's approach to democratisation. Indeed, all the policies implemented in the sphere of political society were simultaneously applied in the other dimensions of the reconstruction, ensuring consistency of action. In the realm of the state, while the institutions expressive of totalitarianism were eliminated, a selective purge of the most nationalistic and militaristic elements of the Japanese political elite led to the rise of moderately conservative Japanese officials and bureaucrats. Coupled with the decision to maintain the imperial institution and to work through the Japanese government to implement reconstruction policies, it led to the maintenance of essential state structures that were needed to keep the country running and stable. Here, while the purge was an expression of coercive power by SCAP/GHQ, the preservation of the imperial institution and the decision to work through the Japanese government to implement policies contributed to the consent of the new Japanese political elite and population to the reformatting of the political society and its institutions. However, the scope of the first political purge did put at risk the operational efficiency of the Japanese state, prompting the Occupation to review its purge policy after *The Reverse Course* of 1947.

The will to democratise through punishing those officials and bureaucrats that contributed to the functioning of the previous authoritarian regime was tempered by the need to build a strong Japanese political society able to resist internal and external challenges to its authority, challenges embodied by the Japanese Communist Party and the rise of Communism in the region. Notwithstanding the review of the scope of the purge, the democratisation of the Japanese state structure, embodied by the new constitution enshrining the separation of powers and the re-casting of the imperial institution in a symbolic role, did turn Japan into a democratic political system, one of the main objectives of the Occupation. The same pattern of action, purge alongside development of the most liberal elements of the political society, was applied to the other spheres of the reconstruction.

Indeed, the same mix of coercion towards the former regime's elite and consent generation in the Japanese population characterise the economic policies of the reconstruction. The expression of U.S. power through coercion by the purge of Japanese economic leaders, the policy of de-concentration of economic power in Japan, and the opening of the economy engendered consent in the Japanese population as the opening of the mode of production gave more economic opportunities to smaller Japanese entrepreneurs. Further consent was sowed thanks to the promotion of trade unions and the promulgation of

laws protecting workers' rights. Hence, the democratisation of the Japanese economy led to support of reconstruction policies by the population, while the Japanese economic elite was compelled to adapt to the new realities.

However, in the two first years of the Occupation, such a change of mode of production did hamper the economic recovery of the country, which led to hunger and thanks to the rise of organised labour, to strikes, endangering stability, and hence the reconstruction. Hence, SCAP/GHQ had to display more coercive power by forbidding strikes and later on the right to collectively bargain for public sector employees as it would further endanger the economic recovery of the country, much needed to maintain stability.

The Reverse Course policies then partially compensated for economic slow-down by the integration of Japan in the American economic sphere and by putting Japan at the centre of capitalist development in Asia-Pacific. Such repositioning of Japan's regional economic role was completed by a focus on Japanese economic revival through the review of the economic purge and de-concentration policy, and by enhanced control on labour movements, eventually leading to economic recovery, and hence to further consent to the Occupation's reconstruction policies.

In the civil society, the two first years of the occupation witnessed the implementation of democratisation programmes mirroring the coercive measures aiming at eradicating nationalism and militarism in the political society. The coercion displayed in the political society walked hand-in-hand with consent generation policies in the civil society. Indeed, placing Japanese sovereignty in the hands of its people rather than with the emperor, creating a free press even if censored, the democratisation of the education, and programmes seeding democracy across all strata of the civil society led to the gradual acceptance by the Japanese people of democratic ideas and American values.

Moreover, such acceptance was also generated by the maintenance of a racial hierarchy between white and yellow races. Indeed, the emphasis on racial differences that typified the two first years of the reconstruction had several consequences. Firstly, it led by some Japanese to the questioning of the rationale to adopt Western values if racial equality was not to be achieved. Secondly, the perennial claim to racial equality that typified the development of Japan towards modernity also meant acceptance of American superiority, not only material but also ideological. If the democratic United States beat Japan, then democracy is a political regime superior to the Japanese regime, and hence should be embraced. Thirdly, Japanese always considered themselves superior to other Asians. The Japanese political and economic development since the opening of the country by

Commodore Perry in 1856 was indeed un-replicated in other parts of Asia. The Japanese willingness to modernise was also driven by the imperative of achieving racial equality with the West and by their differentiation with other Asian nations.

However, the racial differentiation enforced by the occupation had a negative impact on the acceptance by the Japanese of the American project to turn Japan into a democratic country, as the emphasis remained on an asymmetric relationship between white victors forcing down their vision of the future of Japan on the defeated yellow race, which was shameful and hence unacceptable to the Japanese political and civil society.

With *The Reverse Course* in 1947, references to racial differences were replaced by an emphasis of cultural similarity between the U.S. and Japan. Indeed, the Occupation insisted that if the Japanese were to embrace democratic American values, Japanese would enter the Western family of democracies and hence benefit from a status of white honorary nation. Japan and the U.S. so achieved racial accommodation, which in turn contributed to the acceptance of the American reconstruction project.

From racial domination, the relationship between the U.S. and Japan turned thus into a pupil-teacher relationship, accentuated by the dominating personality of MacArthur at the head of the reconstruction policies. Such a relationship, characterising the American perception of Japan since the 19th century and matching the Japanese ability to absorb and adapt to all things foreign, facilitated the acceptance by Japan of her new role, that of a regional strategic ally, contributing to the reinforcement of the U.S. regional position of power in Asia.

Finally, the security dimension of the reconstruction of Japan went through the same process as the three other dimensions, *The Reverse Course* of 1947 constituting a turning point. The two first year of the occupation focused on demilitarisation of the Japanese state, economy and civil society. Logically, the Japanese army and security services were disbanded. The police remained and was in charge of maintaining security across the country. The acceptance by the Japanese government of the defeat and the fact that the state kept performing its functions ensured stability in the critical transitional period between the cessation of hostilities and the arrival of American forces. The size of the U.S. occupation force finally contributed to further maintenance of security and stability, essential conditions for the reconstruction policies to be implemented.

The early occupation's radical democratic policies offered the opportunity to those opposed to the U.S. presence to voice their rejection of the American project for Japan. Indeed, the Japanese Communist Party and some ultra-nationalistic groups did question the

democratisation of Japan as the best option for the country's future. SCAP/GHQ, through censorship of the press, managed to limit the damages that opponents to U.S. presence could do. However SCAP/GHQ realised that the gradual structuring of the Japanese Communist Party into an efficient propaganda machine active in the political and civil society through the press, trade unions and other collective organisations, put at risk the reconstruction project. This was especially true in the economic sphere where strikes were feared for their consequences on the fragile Japanese economy, which if threatened could have led to general instability.

Finally, the signature of a Peace Treaty and Security Treaty with Japan constituted the ultimate action taken in the security dimension of the reconstruction. Both treaties casted Japan as the cornerstone of U.S. regional security strategy, turning Japan into an American military base. The outbreak of the Korean War further reinforced this new role for Japan as a supply base for U.S. projection of force in the region, in turn impacting on the political, economic and civil society dimensions of the reconstruction. Indeed, the conservative Japanese political elite was comforted in its position of power as the U.S. needed to rely on political allies sharing the same commitment to repel Communism. The Japanese economy was the first benefactor of the U.S. military presence and regional conflicts involving the United States as the needs in supply and military equipment were met by Japanese manufactures. Finally, the Japanese civil society benefited from the consequences of security policies and their economic consequences as the people, thanks to the economic recovery, reached better living standards thanks to the wealth generated. In addition, these developments led to a general consensus across the civil society of the new role of Japan as junior partner of the U.S., fulfilling the American foreign policy objective of building a strong presence in East Asia, further contributing to American global supremacy.

Assessing Consistency of Reconstruction policies with Regional and Global U.S. Foreign Policies

We argued that in addition to consistency of reconstruction policies with each other, consistency of regional and global foreign policies with reconstruction policies constitutes another key-analytical factor to explain the outcome of a post-conflict reconstruction project.

We saw that in 1945, the U.S. benefited from a strong global position of power, comparable to its position of power at the end of the Cold War. In addition to predominance in material resources, the United States also enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy and soft power due to its victory against aggressive ultra-nationalist ideologies. The victory was the

victory of a political ideology, liberalism, and of a mode of production, capitalism, that both proved their resilience and viability in the face of the most dangerous challenges they had met until then. Early post-World War Two American foreign policies thus rested on the global spread of liberal capitalism and democracy, both seen by American decision-makers as the best options for international stability. Global promotion of free markets and democracy through international institutionalisation constituted then the cornerstones of American foreign policy.

However, with the rise of a Communist threat, championing independence from colonial powers and rejecting capitalism as global mode of production, regional challenges to the American vision of world order blossomed. Consequently, the United States foreign policy, while maintaining the spread of liberal capitalism and multilateralism at its core, reviewed its promotion of democracy in the light of a new imperative: containing the USSR. Hence, while democracy was still encouraged, political conservative elite and economic recovery were privileged in order to limit the risk of seeing local Communist parties reaching power through the ballot box. In countries where Communist parties were too active and hence constituting a risk to American foreign policies, they were simply suppressed, the result of a convergence of interests between U.S. foreign policies and local conservative elites.

Moreover, regionally, the U.S. sought to create situations of strength, of which Japan was one. Hence, the United States defined Japan as at the centre of U.S. regional interests, which led to identifying Japan as the leader of Asia's economic development, to define Japan as at the heart of U.S. regional security policies leading to a permanent presence of American military forces in the country, and to a U.S. engagement with Japan's neighbours to make them accept Japan's new regional role.

The table here below summarises the U.S. foreign policies that impacted on the four dimensions of the reconstruction of Japan:

U.S. Foreign Policies and Their Impact on Reconstruction

U.S. Foreign Policies	Four Fields of Reconstruction			
	<i>Security</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Economy</i>	<i>Civil Society</i>
<i>Containment of USSR and anti-Communism</i>	Remilitarisation of Japan. Security Treaty (U.S. bases). Common enemy.	Maintenance of conservative elite. Privilege stability to full scale democratisation. Democratic institutions as only alternative to Communist regime.	Strong economy needed to contain rise of Communist ideas. Liberal capitalism as only alternative to Communist mode of production.	Purge of Communists and liberal democracy programmes accentuated. Democratic values as only alternatives to Communist totalitarianism.
<i>Multilateralism and engaging Japan's neighbours</i>	Calm regional fears of resurgence of Japanese militarism.	Gives space to Japanese state to reorganise and solidify. U.S. creates protective ring to deal with external challenges to re-making of the state.	Opens markets to Japan and access to raw materials.	Favours ideological and cultural exchanges, reinforces democratic values across society.
<i>Global democracy promotion</i>	Re-invention of Japan as peaceful nation.	Japan integrated in the family of democratic nations. Opens new channels to other democracies.	Democracy hand-in-hand with macro-economic measures to insert Japan in global economy.	Facilitates democracy embracement by population. Japan part of free world.
<i>Global promotion of liberal capitalism</i>	Focus on economic revival instead of military. Japan's security in U.S. hands.	Economic progress leads to stabilisation and reinforcement of state structures.	Economic recovery is the priority.	Gradual improvement of living conditions and economic opportunities generate consent to reconstruction.
<i>Japan at centre of U.S. interests in Asia. Japan as leading regional development</i>	Japan's security paramount to U.S. regional interests. U.S. chips in.	Normalisation of Japan's relations with neighbours. Japanese state consolidated.	Contributes to economic recovery and development. Basis of Japanese economic miracle.	Japan as model of democratic development for other nations.
<i>U.S. permanent military presence in Japan. Japan at heart of U.S. regional security</i>	Japan is safe and stable.	Acquisition of status of ally of U.S. Strengthens Japanese state.	Drain on economic recovery. Further economic progress in secured environment.	Facilitates assimilation of U.S. values and ideals through permanent interactions with Americans. Also creates frictions.

The U.S. foreign policy of promoting democracy and liberal capitalism were intimately intertwined as to their effects. Indeed, it translated in the security and political dimension of the reconstruction of Japan into her re-invention as an economic successful and peaceful nation joining the family of liberal democratic countries, embodying to others the possibility of moving away from authoritarianism and its failures. Hence, the early reconstruction policies enforced extreme democratisation and economic de-concentration measures echoing these two tenets of U.S. foreign policy. They resulted into a focus on economic recovery and genuine democratisation of the Japanese state and civil society. While the scope of democratisation was questioned by the more conservative elements of the Japanese political society, the civil society slowly integrated democratic ideas and the perspectives they offered. Fearing a return to aggressive policies embodied by the previous ultra-nationalistic regime, the Japanese people, exhausted by a decade of war, contemplated the possibility to voice their opinions and to reap the fruits of a more competitive liberal capitalist economy; in turn it facilitated consent generation to American reconstruction policies. However, with the rise of a global Communist threat, expressed regionally with the victory of the Communists in China and the Soviet-supported anti-colonial guerrillas spreading across Asia, the U.S. reviewed the scope of democracy promotion and instead focused on stability through economic recovery. Coupled with the policy of containment of Communist ideas, it translated in a review of reconstruction policies across the four fields.

Indeed, anti-Communism spread through all the dimensions of the reconstruction of Japan. The security sphere witnessed Japan's remilitarisation and the acquisition of a Peace and Security Treaty casting the country as a critical ally of the U.S. in the region. The remoulding of the Japanese state saw a move from extreme democratisation, embodied by the Occupation's rejection of the old conservative elite, to privileging stability by relying on these old elite to suppress Communist influence in the Japanese society. The Japanese economy was developed further, notably through a review of the scope of the purge and of de-concentration policies, in order to produce more wealth faster to check the spread of Communist ideas through the spread of economic wealth. Finally, the Japanese civil society witnessed the enforcement of anti-Communist measures through the suppression of any organisation promoting Communist ideas. Instead, there was a renewed focus on programmes promoting the American version of democracy.

The containment of Communism was then complemented by specific foreign policies aiming at the designation of Japan as leader of Asian economic development and as the cornerstone of American security interests in the region. Both policies were intimately linked as the economic recovery of Japan, that would further promote capitalism in East Asia, was only possible if Japan's reconstruction was secure from internal and external threats.

Hence, the American investment in Japan as future regional economic engine and as a key to U.S. regional security translated in the security area by making sure that Japan would be stable and safe by developing a network of U.S. military bases, still active today; and an embryo of a new Japanese army, the so-called Self-Defence Force as Article Nine of the Japanese constitution forbade a standing army. In parallel, the Japanese state and its conservative elite were strengthened through the normalisation of Japan's relations with her former foes, integrated in a collective regional security organisation aiming at calming their fears about a re-armed and potentially aggressive Japan, and by the acquisition of the status of American ally. Such policies translated in the acquisition of stability and security for Japan, now sure that any nations initiating war with her would face the U.S., which in turn contributed to generating the required stability for reconstruction policies to progress.

The consequences of these foreign policies on the economic dimension of the reconstruction was two-sided: on the one hand, the American military presence constituted a financial burden on the Japanese economy, slowing down its recovery. On the other hand, such inconvenience was compensated for by the integration of Japan in the American economic sphere and by the security and stability that the economy needed to progress; so contributing to the Japanese economic miracle that followed.

Finally, the newly acquired status of Japan as regional economic power and key-ally of the United States played a role on the reconstruction of Japanese civil society. Indeed, the mutually reinforcing economic recovery and democratisation of Japan embedded further the progress of American defined democratic and capitalist ideas and values in the country, and served as an example of successful modernisation to other nations. The massive U.S. military presence in order to defend Japan also played a role in conveying American values to America's new ally through permanent interactions between the Japanese population and American personnel. However, as we are reminded regularly by the media, the co-habitation between Japanese and American soldiers also created, and still creates, frictions.

In summary, the American exertion of power during the reconstruction of Japan was thus characterised by a consistent use of coercion and consent across all fields of the reconstruction effort, especially from 1947 and *The Reverse Course*.

Benefiting from a secure and stable environment, early policies aiming at punishing those responsible for the war, while alienating the Japanese political and economic conservative elite, were welcome by the population, suspicious of those who led Japan to the abyss. Rallying the Japanese population around a re-invention of the emperor as leader of a new democratic and peaceful Japan, the U.S. occupation, while risking to deprive the country of the technical skills required for economic reconstruction and state building, seeded consent to the U.S. reconstruction project across all strata of the Japanese society.

In the U.S., the support of the U.S. public opinion was acquired through an ideological discourse emphasising democracy-building on the model of American institutions and ideals. Historical themes as the exceptionalism of American political institutions and the mission to share them hit home regularly and coupled, after 1947, with a rhetoric emphasising the Communist threat, contributed to the U.S. domestic support to the reconstruction project. In this case, the fact that Communism was easily identified with the USSR played in favour of the straightforward detection of where the threat was, which in turn, facilitated the support of the U.S. population, and later on of the Japanese elite and population, around the foreign policy theme consisting in containing the Soviet threat, including through building a strong Japan reflecting American values and standing for American interests.

After 1947, the democratisation of Japan moved from a punitive content with a purge programme aimed at the elites responsible for the war to a policy of elite cooption and strengthening of the state and the economy, which in turn benefited to the Japanese population and hence eased its consent to the reinvention of the country. Sharing a similar objective of repelling progressive political forces, the U.S. and Japanese conservative elites agreed to turn Japan into an East Asian bulwark of liberalism and capitalism. The forces constituting the new Japanese state were thus co-opted in the project of the creation of a new Japan, and to early coercion policies embodied by the purge, succeeded consent generation strategies motivated by repelling Communism. In parallel, the occupation did manage to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people and American values were embraced without much resistance. Political and economic liberalism became the norm, a statement to be nuanced by the eradication of all alternatives in Japan, essentially embodied by the Communist influence. A limitation of the democratisation of Japan was the price to pay for political stability and economic development, in turn easing the integration of the liberal capitalist regime by the population, and leading Japanese away from the temptation of experimenting an alternative to the American project.

At the end of the occupation, the democratisation of the country was a success. Of course, the realities that sprang from the Cold War tempered these achievements as *The Reverse Course* illustrated but the authoritarianism and militarist ideology that plagued Japan were all but eradicated.

However, while consent generation to American policies and objectives was efficient, coercion was still looming in the background in order to convince the Japanese that there was no other option, as turning towards the USSR. The realm of security and the unmatched position of military strength enjoyed by the United States contributed further to generating consent to the American objective of turning Japan into a state aligned with U.S. interests. The massive presence of U.S. military personnel and material in Japan reminded everyday to the Japanese that resistance was futile. Moreover, the beginning of the Cold War enhanced such a perception as the Japanese witnessed the military build-up that turned their country in an American fortress. In the years that followed, the United States, thanks to its military presence in Japan and a series of military agreements with Asian nations, became a major power in East Asia, which in turn contributed to the maintenance of its status as global superpower.

The consistency of U.S. policies across the four fields in which reconstruction took place as well as the integration of these policies in a wider foreign policy scheme that posited the U.S. as benevolent leader of the free world, ready to support friends and allies, gave Japan a new regional and global role supporting American foreign policy objectives regionally and globally, namely prevailing over the USSR on the long-term. Ultimately, these achievements constitute the reasons why the American-led nation-building project in Japan can be characterized as effective.

7. Post-conflict Reconstruction and the American Experience

“We really don’t need the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten”, Condoleezza Rice, 2000.⁶⁹⁹

“The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society”, Condoleezza Rice, 2000.⁷⁰⁰

“Democratic state-building is now an urgent component of our national interest”, Condoleezza Rice, 2008.⁷⁰¹

The change of mind experienced by the G.W. Bush administration regarding the relevance of nation-building embodies the evolution of its perception of the contemporary world and of what power can achieve in such a world.

With the identification of failed and weak states as potential sources of disturbance for the American –led world order, the Bush administration decided to reform these states to turn them into capitalist democracies. The objective is to include those states in the American-defined society of civilized nations and in the global capitalist economy. Such inclusion has only one purpose: the maintenance and reinforcement of the status of the United States as uncontested rule-maker and leader of the contemporary world order.

This renewed interest in nation-building as a key-foreign policy instrument and major component of a definition of the American national interest logically prompts questions about what defines effective post-conflict reconstruction in the minds of U.S. decision-makers. Our starting point relies on the Bush administration’s postulate that as the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II succeeded, turning both countries into capitalist democracies successfully integrated in the American-led free world, then it should also be the case in the contemporary world as any culture can sustain the viability of implanting democratic ideals and values and develop free-market economies in societies that so far did not experience them.

⁶⁹⁹ Quoted in Gordon, M., ‘Bush Would Stop US Peacekeeping in Balkan Fights’, *New York Times*, 21st October 2000.

⁷⁰⁰ Rice, C., ‘Rice, Condoleezza, ‘Promoting the National Interest’, p. 53.

⁷⁰¹ Rice, C., ‘Rethinking the National Interest’, *Foreign Affairs*, 87:4 (July/August, 2008), p. 3.

Consequently, the research question at the core of this study regards the conditions and factors pertaining to success or failure in the case of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects. We aim at providing an analytical framework build on nuances of power allowing us to understand why some U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction experiences, following an American armed intervention, were successful, while others failed. More precisely, we want to understand why the reconstruction of Japan is considered a success by American officials, and hence served as a benchmark for subsequent U.S.-led reconstruction ventures, while the ongoing exercise in Iraq is already doomed by many observers. Finally, we look at what the result of these two nation-building projects tell us about the status of contemporary American power.

This study has thus posed three questions about U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction: What analytical framework can help us to bring to the fore factors explaining a specific outcome of reconstruction projects? What explains the outcome of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects in Japan and Iraq? Based on these results, what criteria seem essential for post-conflict reconstruction to succeed, and what does it tell us about the ability of the United States to mobilise power resources conducive to achieve success in reconstruction projects?

Elaborating the Framework of Analysis

The analytical approach we developed to assess the outcome of post-conflict U.S.-led reconstruction projects in Japan and Iraq is founded on several postulates and building blocks.

To start with, while not attempting a comprehensive Gramscian analysis of post-conflict reconstruction⁷⁰², we make use of Gramsci's differentiation between power expressed as coercion and consent, and on his concepts of political and civil society as constituting the state. We postulate that power is coercion and consent, active in several fields and interacting permanently. Choosing a specific mode of power exertion relies on one's perception of what power does and such perception is the fruit of historical experiences that led to the development and acquisition of a specific conception about one's nation's status and role in the world; in turn such a conception shapes foreign policy decisions and modes of action that rely on specific mechanisms of power exertion. Finally,

⁷⁰² For a recent Gramscian analysis of post-conflict reconstruction, see Short, N., *The International Politics of Post-conflict Reconstruction in Guatemala* (London: Routledge, 2008). Short applies fundamental Gramscian concepts as hegemony, historic bloc, political and civil society, and organic intellectuals to the reconstruction of Guatemala after the civil war.

power is exercised at the local, regional and global levels, through foreign policies, and consistency of power exercise at these three levels is essential for efficiency.

We then identified a suite of analytical blocks that constitutes the framework through which both case-studies are analysed. A first block is constituted by our understanding of power, ending up with a concept of power differentiating between coercion and consent, multidimensional in character and grounded in the historical experiences of the power-wielder. Hence, it was necessary to feed a specific American understanding of the concept of power with the identification of ideas that have historically animated U.S. foreign policy. In turn, we linked these ideas stemming from the American historical experiences to the current U.S. administration's understanding of the status, position and role of the U.S. in the world; hence conditioning a specific understanding of power; in turn conditioning specific foreign policy actions characterised by a specific use of power instruments.

The second analytical block consisted in identifying four interconnected fields of reconstruction projects, the security dimension, the political society, the economy and the civil society. We looked at how pre-conditions influenced reconstruction policy, pointed out sources of congruence and opposition between mechanisms of power at work in the framework of reconstruction, and assessed the degree of consistency achieved between these four fields, thus contributing to a specific outcome of a post-conflict reconstruction project.

The third analytical block looked at the degree of consistency achieved by the U.S. in integrating regional and global realities (influence of regional and global factors on reconstruction) defining foreign policy responses and influencing the reconstruction processes.

Finally, the ultimate stage of our analysis aims at assessing the outcome of U.S.-led reconstruction projects, explaining failure or success depending on the efficiency of power mechanisms at work.

Specific conceptions of what U.S. power can do on behalf of American decision-makers led to the adoption of specific policies of reconstruction in Japan after WW II and now in Iraq. Both cases harboured policies that mixed the coercion and consent faces of power across all the fields of the reconstruction process (security, economy, political and civil society) while making use of an array of power expressions (military, economic, ideological, cultural, political). However, the outcome of the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq is rather different. In order to test whether our analytical framework achieved its objective to assess and explain the outcome of the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq, it is now

time to turn to the two reconstruction cases under scrutiny and operate a comparative analysis of their outcome.

Reconstructing Iraq: Inconsistency, Coercion and Disconnected Foreign Policies

The rationale for operating regime change in Iraq originates in the U.S. administration's perception that the world is full of dangers. Hence, the official line insisted on the threats constituted by Iraq, and presented the overall objective of enacting regime change so as to deprive Saddam of weapons of mass destruction; cut the support Iraq allegedly offered to terrorist groups, including potentially arming them with WMD, especially Al Qaeda; and finally turning Iraq into a democratic state friendly to U.S. interests. Iraq was to serve as an example of democratisation to other states in the region who could embrace the same path and hence contribute to weaken global terrorism as democracies tend to reject extremisms, in turn consolidating American security and position of global power. To these three objectives, we add two unofficial U.S. goals: securing access to oil resources in order to keep the tap open at decent prices for the sake of the global capitalist economy, and building up long-term U.S. military presence at the heart of the Middle East in order to control the most volatile region in the world, which in turn would enhance global stability. These two sets of objectives, if attained, would contribute to the reinforcement of the U.S. position in its global war on terrorism and its status as unchallenged global superpower. So, a first set of objectives is directly linked to one of America's primordial national interest: international security and stability leading to American security, in turn participating to the furtherance of the U.S. status as uncontested superpower.

We identified pre-conditions to the reconstruction as one of the key elements participating to an understanding of the outcome of a reconstruction project. In Iraq, preconditions did not facilitate the implementation of U.S. reconstruction policies.

Due to the Bush administration's foreign policy tenets linking U.S. security, pre-emption and use of force as legitimate means of action, un-restrained U.S. power exertion prompted the international community to question the legitimacy, not only of the American actions but also of its position as only superpower and hence international source of stability. In conjunction with the fact that the two main justifications to invade Iraq proved unfounded, no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq and no substantial connections between the Ba'ath regime and Al Qaeda were ever proved. It caused a fall in the international

legitimacy of U.S. actions and status, which in turn penalised the reconstruction of Iraq as it translated into the absence of broad material and moral international support.

Moreover, the infrastructure in Iraq was in a dramatic state. Even though the March 2003 war damages to the infrastructure were limited, years of negligence aggravated by international sanctions left the country with an infrastructure close to collapsing. When the occupation walked in, not only were essential services not provided but the majority of Iraqi bureaucrats and specialists in charge of those services all but vanished.

To the material aspects, we can add that Iraq is a mixture of groups that define their identities, less in regard to an Iraqi nation, but to various ethnic groups, faiths and cultural backgrounds. With the fall of the Ba'ath regime, which had until then enforced a concept of Iraqi nation identified with the Ba'athist state, Iraqis fell back on ethnicity and religion as defining elements of their identity. Such causes for fragmentation were aggravated by the geographical location of Iraq. At the heart of the Muslim world, Iraq is indeed surrounded by countries relatively friendly, essentially because allied with the U.S., but also has two turbulent neighbours. Indeed, those influencing most the reconstruction process, Iran and Syria, are hostile to the U.S. and potentially constitute another source of identity definition, in opposition to what America has on offer. Consequently, instead of unity and stability, the fault lines animating the Iraqi society came to the fore following the liquefaction of the Ba'athist state and caused the fragmentation of political and civil society, constituting a major impediment on the efficiency of U.S. reconstruction policies.

The lack of knowledge about these realities and the limited resources dedicated to the planning of the reconstruction of Iraq caused the American occupation to quickly depart from what was planned to a position of reacting to events on the ground. In turn, it affected the efficiency of the reconstruction process.

Thus, the pre-conditions to the occupation of Iraq jeopardised from the start the whole reconstruction project. Because of a lack of international support, an infrastructure close to inexistent, the implosion of the Iraqi state and civil society, the lack of contingencies to deal with the corresponding lack of stability and security, and a general ignorance of the realities characterising the Iraqi society, the CPA and the Pentagon, in charge of the occupation and the definition of reconstruction policies, lost the initiative and became reactive. losing the strategic vision needed for the reconstruction to progress.

In addition to the influence of pre-conditions as an explanatory factor for the outcome of a reconstruction project, we identified four fields of observation of reconstruction policies (political society, economy, security, and civil society). We argued that exertion of power in

these fields had to be consistent in order for policies to succeed. In Iraq, there was a clear lack of consistency regarding the exertion of power while implementing reconstruction policies. The first phase of the occupation was indeed characterised by inconsistency and dispersed efforts in all four fields of the reconstruction. However, with *The New Way Forward*, the U.S. reconstruction moved from an over-reliance on coercion to instruments of power based on consent-generation, while reconstruction policies became more complementary.

Following the outburst of violence in the wake of the regime's fall, U.S. officials identified the security dimension of the reconstruction project as critical to any advances in the other fields. However, such a focus on security issues implied the exclusive use of coercive expressions of power as main policy instruments, eventually leading to the general failure of reconstruction policies. Indeed, in addition to the pre-conditions outlined above, that is the general U.S. foreign policy statement that put the use of force as the main instrument of power and the lack of contingencies to deal with potential uprising and collapse of the rule of law, other factors led to a continuous lack of stability in Iraq.

The declaration of a formal occupation in the face of increasing violence; the implementation of a purge process too wide in scope; the low number of Coalition troops on the ground; the slow pace in rebuilding Iraqi security forces as well as their fast deployment; and, the failure to engage with Iraq's neighbours, especially Syria and Iran, both supporting anti-U.S. forces in Iraq, all contributed to the failure of the U.S. authorities to achieve security and stability. The U.S. response to challenges to the occupation of Iraq relied essentially on massive use of force, with little attempts at tackling the roots of violence, which would have involved exertion of power based on consent generation in the three other fields under scrutiny.

Indeed, when considering progress made in the reconstruction of the Iraqi political society, we conclude that the initial violence and the U.S. choice to rely on coercion impeded on any success in providing Iraq with a solid state structure. The core objective of the Iraqi state reconstruction by the U.S. was to empower a new political elite that would be congenial to U.S. interests and objectives in the Middle East, while in the process repel challenges to the new Iraqi state. The inability of the Occupation to tame sources of violence and play a stabilising role by controlling opposing factions that had turned the state into a battleground; its decision to adopt a top-down approach to the re-making of the state instead of allowing more freedom of action to Iraqi parties and hence the risk of seeing a future Iraqi political society questioning the American vision; the disenfranchisement of Sunnis from the political

process through the purge; the failure to provide for a fundamental law taking into account specific Iraqi interests; the exodus of the former Sunni bureaucratic corps; and, the constant use of coercion to push forward an American version of what the new Iraqi state should be all contributed to a process of fragmentation of state power and the inability of Iraqis to reach national reconciliation. So far, the American attempt at creating an Iraqi state congenial to U.S. interests and objectives in the region have failed.

In the field of economy, the U.S. bet on prosperity for Iraqis as a means to enhance stability. However dire security conditions kept hampering economic reconstruction, which in turn fuelled resentment. In addition, fraud and abuses in the attribution of contracts by U.S. agencies, endemic corruption in Iraqi ministries and the lack of Iraqi expertise in budget planning and implementation also contributed to the feeble progress of the Iraqi economic reconstruction. Progress in the economic reconstruction of Iraq is intimately linked to progress in the security area, but should not be processed separately, as the lack of economic opportunity fuelled resentment and caused some Iraqis to join the insurgency, worsening the security situation, in turn impeding on economic progress.

Critical to the generation of consent to the U.S. project in Iraq, the development and strengthening of the Iraqi civil society was highly dependent on progress made in the three other fields of the reconstruction. Indeed, poor security conditions, the open struggle for the control of the state by political factions, and the lack of progress in the economy, especially regarding the restoration of basic services, conditioned the implementation of the U.S. civil society building programmes. Indeed, in order to be viable, a new democratic Iraqi state had to be buttressed by a strong and dynamic civil society, ready to defend democracy and the rule of law that slowly took root in Iraq. However, before engaging with these new concepts, Iraqis needed the vital space to do so. Without a safe environment, economic opportunities and the stability brought by the strengthening of the state, Iraqis simply did not benefit from the conditions conducive to a reflection on their involvement in the rebuilding of their country.

Thus, the first phase of the occupation was characterised by inconsistency and dispersed efforts in all four fields of the reconstruction. Ironically, it is that same American inability to curb violence, be it terrorist-caused or due to sectarian conflicts, that explain partly later successes. In fact, incremental progress was made once U.S. officials adopted a comprehensive and global perspective on the issues they faced, and once they became more sensitive to what power can do. Practically, it meant a critical review of power instruments at work as well as a realisation of the impact that these power instruments have on each other.

However, it is also because after the 2006 and 2007 ethnic cleansing that took place, few neighbourhoods are still mixed, hence Sunnis and Shi'as tend to kill each other less. In addition, the indiscriminate killings performed by Al Qaeda led a sizeable contingent of the Sunni insurgents to side with the U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces in chasing down insurgents and terrorists.

The U.S. and Iraqi government built on these developments and abandoned their reliance on coercion to advance reconstruction. Indeed, since January 2007, marking the beginning of *The New Way Forward*, reconstruction policies were altered and became more complementary. While *The Surge* brought more boots on the ground, counter-insurgency tactics changed from 'find, fix, finish' to 'clear, hold, build'. Indeed, in the wake of the securitisation of a neighbourhood, local expert teams made of American advisers and Iraqis move in quickly, protect the population, identify critical needs, start up reconstruction projects, and improve governance, in order to isolate insurgents. Coercion and consent walk hand-in-hand. Coercion establishes the conditions conducive to consent generation, which in turn leads to the stabilisation of the area. Gradually, bringing a sense of normality to the population allows for the reconstruction of the country to move on. As of today, compared to two years ago, critical advances have been made in the security, political, economic and civil society fields. While fragile, these advances are permanently reinforced and Iraq is now moving on.

Finally, we argued that consistency of regional and global foreign policies with reconstruction policies deployed in the four dimensions of the reconstruction constitute another explanatory factor of the outcome of a post-conflict reconstruction project.

In Iraq, we saw that early U.S. foreign policies failed to address the regional issues caused by the invasion of Iraq. Iran and Syria, both key-regional actors, were not engaged with by the U.S. administration, causing both countries to support Iraqi factions in their opposition to American presence. However, following the *New Way Forward*, tactical progress made in Iraq was reinforced by a review of the U.S. foreign policy posture regarding the reconstruction.

New levels of consistency are now achieved regionally as the U.S. gets more engaged with Iran and Syria, both responsible for the flow of fighters and material support to terrorists and insurgents. By recently opening the door to negotiations with Iran on the status of its nuclear programme, the U.S. gives itself a narrow space for linking both issues. If Iran is more amenable, it will benefit Iraq, and the U.S. project as a whole.

Globally, the U.S. recently adopted a lower profile regarding its status as global superpower. Of course, one can argue that the U.S. military capabilities are over-stretched and hence Washington better not flexes its muscles again. However, it seems that the Bush administration understood that the Iraq reconstruction would be better off if treated multilaterally. The International Compact on Iraq brought together the international community under the IMF and UN umbrella, and structures the international support to Iraq, gradually leading the country's integration in the global economy and international community.

The new Iraqi state has not failed yet. Despite its shortcomings, the permanent struggle between parties to control ministries including through the use of their militias, the endemic corruption, and the lack of skills and experience of bureaucrats, the Iraqi state is reinforcing itself and started, whilst under American tutelage, to perform its duties towards the Iraqi population. As Toby Dodge argues, the Iraqi 'state is beginning to re-cohere'.⁷⁰³

So, if we put the American objectives of the regime change in Iraq against gains made since the reconstruction began, did the U.S. reach its goals?

Regarding WMD, it did, not because invading U.S. forces found and dismantled them but because they simply were not there. Without weapons of mass destruction available, the second U.S. goal consisting in cutting Ba'athist support to terrorist groups was also reached, the worst case scenario seemingly disappearing. Again, as of today nothing proves that Saddam was actively supporting terrorist groups to start with.

Toppling Saddam Hussein and replacing him with a democratic regime friendly to the U.S. and its regional interests was the last official objective of the invasion. Is Iraq a democracy today? More importantly, is it supporting the U.S. in the Middle East? The first question would require a whole book dedicated to the question. However, elections did take place, were deemed fair and Iraq has now an institutional structure contributing to democracy anchorage in the country. Moreover, it seems that the U.S. managed to avoid the exclusive dominance of an Islamic party in Iraq, a concern that agitated CPA and American officials from the beginning of the reconstruction project. In addition, democracy is further reinforced by the Iraqi civil society, rather actively developing, and starting to play its role as guardian of democratic gains made.

Five years into the reconstruction, Iraq is not supporting U.S. regional interests. By the look of it, access to oil will be heavily controlled by the regions, and less by the central government, and U.S. oil firms will not be alone in winning contracts. The Iraqi government

⁷⁰³ Quoted in The Economist, 'The Change in Iraq. Is it Turning the Corner?', *The Economist* (14th - 20th June 2008), p. 30.

is gaining in capacity and resources and is now more daring. The other 'unofficial' objective consisting in enhancing U.S. physical control in the Middle East is being thwarted by the refusal of the Iraqi government to sign a security agreement with the U.S., agreement that includes permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq.

Overall, the U.S.-led reconstruction project of Iraq is a failure regarding the defence of U.S. interests. On top of the astronomical amount of money spent by Washington on the war on terror and especially on reconstructing and controlling Iraq, America lost more than it gained in the venture. Indeed, with more than 4,000 killed and more than 30,000 wounded, the U.S. is paying a heavy price in Iraq. Moreover, to the loss in material resources, we can add the loss of international sympathy that so far benefited the U.S. and that contributed to a questioning of U.S. legitimacy as a force for stability in the international system. Overall, the lack of consistency of U.S. policies in Iraq, in the Middle East and globally, essentially due to a misunderstanding of the limits of power in the contemporary world, contributes to a strategic weakening of the U.S. global stance, and questions the status and future use of American power. The analysis of the reconstruction of Iraq, viewed through the lenses of the concept of power, consistency of action of policies of reconstruction in the security, political society, economy and civil society; and through integrating inter-related influences of the local, regional and global levels of power exertion, embodies the limits of the U.S. conceptualisation of power and hence questions the status and effectiveness of contemporary American power exertion.

Reconstructing Japan: Consistency, Consent and Coherent Foreign Policies

The objective of the reconstruction of Japan was to turn Japan into a democratic and demilitarised country at peace with its neighbours and not a threat to international peace anymore. However, deciding to define the contours of a world emerging from five years of war in Europe and more than ten in Asia, Washington soon integrated the future of Japan into a set of regional and global foreign policies that would be far more realistic than the idealistic democratisation of Japan. Indeed, after 1947 and the rise of a Communist threat to U.S. interests, the objectives of the reconstruction of Japan consisted in making Japan a capitalist and democratic country, friendly to and aligned with the U.S. interests in repelling Communism, in brief an anchor of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region. In order to reach these goals, the U.S. reconstructed the Japanese state, economy, civil society and security apparatus along lines congenial to American expectations of the future role Japan had to play in order to buttress the U.S. policy regionally and hence contribute to the reinforcement of the U.S. global status as superpower.

Again looking at preconditions as contributing to an understanding of the outcome of a reconstruction project, we conclude that the preconditions to the Occupation of Japan would prove conducive to a favourable outcome for the objectives of U.S. reconstruction policies.

After ten years of war⁷⁰⁴, Japan was materially and psychologically exhausted. The infrastructure of Japan was severely damaged but at least SCAP/GHQ walked into a country that still benefited from a well organised and working state apparatus. While technocrats and bureaucrats kept their positions and operated the machinery of the state, maintaining stability and order in the country, the ruling political class was discredited and there was no one to turn to in search of purpose and direction except towards the occupier. Hence, the process of re-socialisation and re-definition of identity that occurred during the reconstruction was greatly helped by the absence of resistance and no serious alternatives. A homogeneous nation in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture, Japan harboured a strong sense of nation and unity, which in turn contributed to the maintenance of stability across the country. The absence of fault lines running across Japanese society played in favour of the occupation as security and stability were secured.

In addition, isolated geographically and alienated from her neighbours because of her policy of racial superiority, Japan did not benefit from external support that could have constituted a challenge to the U.S. occupation. Overall, these preconditions played in favour of the U.S. reconstruction project. At the onset of the occupation, Japan was ripe, ready to be picked. The occupation and reconstruction of the country were considered by Japanese as an opportunity, a second chance to be grasped.

Finally, thanks to the duration of the Pacific War, American officials benefited from an extensive period of planning for the post-conflict occupation and reconstruction of Japan. The knowledge about the political and economic conditions animating Japan also constituted a factor that contributed to the efficient design of post-war policies, and hence to the later effectiveness of the reconstruction.

So, in summary, preconditions to the occupation in Japan played in favour of the occupation and the start of reconstruction programmes thanks to careful planning, security and stability, the knowledge of Japan and the Japanese culture by the U.S. occupation officials and policy-makers, the preservation of the Japanese state structure to the extent that it was still able to run the country, and the absence of an alternative to the U.S. project due to Japan's isolation.

⁷⁰⁴ Since 1937 with China and since 1941 with the U.S., the U.K. and Commonwealth countries.

To these favourable preconditions, we saw that the U.S. achieved consistency of power exertion and of policy implementation across the four fields of the reconstruction. Indeed, in each dimension of the reconstruction, the United States maximised its use of power instruments, mixing coercion and consent and avoiding both expressions of power to impede on each other, as well as ensured that reconstruction policies implemented in the four fields were complementary. Moreover, reconstruction policies were congruent with regional and global American foreign policies, as the reverse course of 1947 illustrated.

Regarding the reconstruction of the Japanese state, the democratisation took first a punitive shape with a purge programme aimed at the elites responsible for the war. The purge was generally welcome by the Japanese public, especially since it did not concern the Emperor. The forces constituting the political and civil societies were then co-opted in the project of the creation of a new Japan. Here, the Japanese national trait consisting in looking for strong leadership played a role in the successful outcome of the political reforms. The leadership provided by SCAP/GHQ proved instrumental in the dissemination and incorporation of democratic modes of action at all levels of the Japanese society.

Regarding the economy, we saw that the United States in 1945 was the uncontested leader globally and regionally. The economic reconstruction of Japan was designed to complement the political re-invention of the country. Economic freedom and free-trade went alongside political democratisation. Both were in permanent interaction and reinforced each other's achievements. At the end of the process, Japan was a liberal capitalist country backed by American economic power. The United States managed to lead Japan and its people on a path of economic development that would exclude any chance of unrest due to poor economic conditions. The overwhelming American economic power allowed for the U.S. to support the Japanese recovery and integrate Japan in its economic sphere, contributing to her rise to the status of second biggest economy in the world.

On the subject of the re-moulding of Japanese civil society, the occupation did manage to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese people and American values were embraced without much resistance. While tradition remained central in the life of the Japanese, the path to progress that opened after the end of the war was without doubt made in America. Political and economic liberalism became the norm for Japanese, who, without renouncing to their sense of belonging to a group, learned individualism through the integration of individual liberties in their daily life. At the end of the occupation, the democratisation of the country was a success. Of course, the realities that sprang from the Cold War tempered these achievements as the reverse course illustrated but the authoritarianism and militarist ideology

that plagued Japan were all but eradicated. The ideological power displayed by the United States was without doubt strongly seconded by the cultural dimension of American power. Japan embraced American culture, however without ever disposing of her strong heritage. Throughout the occupation, the American administration literally assailed the Japanese with programmes transmitting the American culture. It helped to root democracy in the daily life of the Japanese and facilitated the reconstruction of the country as Japanese learnt to know the values of their occupiers and their designs.

In the realm of security, the position of the United States in 1945 was un-matched. During the democratisation process in Japan, it always loomed in the background. The massive presence of U.S. military personnel and material in Japan reminded everyday to the Japanese that resistance was futile. Moreover, it is security considerations and the beginning of the Cold War that enhanced such a perception as the Japanese witnessed the military build-up that turned their country in an American fortress.

At the end of the reconstruction process, the Japanese political, educational, cultural and economic institutions were re-moulded on American model. In all fields the Occupation authorities oriented Japan towards American values and interests. By the end of the occupation, Japan's institutional landscape was democratic and liberal. Moreover, Japan was integrated in the regional and global institutional frameworks initiated by the United States and became the cornerstone of American regional policy in East Asia.

Indeed, the effectiveness of reconstruction in the four fields was also matched by consistency of U.S. foreign policies with reconstruction policies. Due to the need to contain the rise of Communism, Japan was eventually invited by the United States to join the military effort in the struggle against Soviet Union. Even though the military was discredited, the fact that Japan was allowed to develop a self-defence force contributed to the renaissance of Japanese national pride as sovereignty was gained back. The remilitarisation of Japan was then sold to her neighbours through a series of military agreements with Asian nations aiming at calming their fears of a potential resurgence of Japan as military power. In the years that followed, the United States, thanks to its military presence in Japan became a major power in East Asia, which in turn contributed to the maintenance of its status as global superpower. Moreover, the U.S. designated Japan as at the heart of U.S. security interests in the region, turning Japan into a key-ally. Such a redefinition of Japan's role led to the implementation of an anti-Communist programme across all the spheres of the reconstruction effort, turning Japan into a conservative democratic and capitalist country, whose elite would consistently align themselves on U.S. interests. hence contributing to the

reinforcement of the U.S. strategic position in East Asia, and hence buttressing the U.S. global position of power.

Put against the definition of success by the American administration, it seems to this author that the reconstruction of Japan was a rather efficient venture. All the objectives set by the administration were achieved and Japan became and still is a faithful ally of the United States. Essentially, it was successful because pre-conditions were conducive to the implementation of a reconstruction project. Indeed, due to the level of destruction sustained by Japan, she had little choice but to agree to an occupation and transformation of her political and civil societies, economy and security. However, in addition to these favourable pre-conditions, the United States carefully planned and staffed the reconstruction process, cared for contingencies, and precisely defined the role of Japan in the American sphere of influence. It was successful because the U.S. made efficient use of nuances of power, avoiding contradictions in its use across the fields of reconstruction. It was successful because every single realisation of the reconstruction process aimed at one objective: the maintenance and reinforcement of American supremacy in East Asia and globally in the face of the rise of its challenger and rival ideology, Communist USSR. The reconstruction of Japan was integrated fully in the definition of American foreign policy objectives and as such benefited from high levels of coherence in its implementation.

Contrasting the Reconstruction of Japan and Iraq.

In the light of the conclusions regarding the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq, we contend that the following factors condition the outcome of a post-conflict reconstruction project and hence need to be mastered by the power in charge of the reconstruction.

First, a specific understanding of what power does conditions the choice of power instruments and hence foreign policies that both impact on reconstruction outcome. Such an understanding is grounded in ideas that have historically animated U.S. foreign policy and in the realities animating the historical structure in which reconstruction projects develop. In both the cases of Iraq and Japan, the understanding of effects of power was grounded in historical concepts as republicanism as the ideal political regime, free-enterprise, freedom, Americans as the chosen people, and hence exceptionalism leading to expansionism. All constitutive of a specific perception of the status, role and mission of the United States in the world on behalf of U.S. decision-makers. Consequently, U.S. decision-makers consistently perceived America as the best hope for the world and sought to achieved global supremacy in order to be in a position to spread its political institutions and economic mode of production, preferably through consent generation. It translated into the adoption of foreign

policies emphasising promotion of democracy and free markets, as well as the corollary maintenance of U.S. global supremacy, through the use of force to repel challenges if necessary, in order to preserve global stability.

Moreover, to the influence of historical experiences on conceptions of power, we contend that the historical structure in which the reconstruction takes place also conditions the perception of such a status of power and role. Indeed, at the end of World War II and at the beginning of the 21st century, American decision-makers perceived the status of American power as favourable, constituted by a mix of impressive material resources buttressing potential use of coercion and a sum of soft power instruments based on the legitimacy provided by the acceptance of the United States as a global benevolent hegemon. In turn, it led to a specific understanding of the role that the U.S. should play in the world and to the adoption of foreign policies aiming at the maintenance and further development of the unchallenged American global position of power. In turn, it translated in the adoption of foreign policy tenets as promotion of democracy and free-markets, both at the core of the U.S. rationale in reconstructing Japan and Iraq.

However, during both reconstruction projects, the American global position of power was challenged, leading to different reactions based on a specific understanding of what power does, in turn leading to the adoption of different foreign policies relying on a different use of power. Indeed, when clearly threatened by the rise of Communism in 1947, the United States understood that even if its coercive capabilities were unmatched, it was essential to counter the Soviet threat to rally as many nations around the idea of a free economically viable world centred on the United States. Hence, the U.S. presented itself as the benevolent leader of an open world, taking into considerations the interests of its allies, versus an authoritarian Communist alternative offering a Moscow-dominated world that did not allow for power sharing and contestation. Hence, the United States made use of both expression of power: building its capacity to coerce by building a network of global military alliances to answer the Communist threat while basing its relations with allies on consent generation by supporting them economically, militarily and ideologically through the diffusion of values and interests defined in common with the elites of those allied countries, whether democratic or not.

In contrast, in answer to international terrorism and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the global spread of the Western political and economic system led by the United States, the Bush administration decided to coerce. Convinced that it was morally right to answer to the 9/11 attacks with a unilateral pre-emptive use of force, the Bush

administration nevertheless misunderstood the mood of the international community. It then led to the rejection by the majority of U.S. traditional allies of such modes of power exertion putting at risk global stability, in turn depriving the United States of legitimacy in its actions. Consequently, the reconstruction of Iraq was also deprived of legitimacy and broad international support, leading to its mitigated results. Consequently, U.S. coercive power found itself overstretched, unable to cope with challenges to the U.S. project in Iraq, and hence questioned worldwide. Similarly, U.S. soft power, patiently accumulated during the Cold War, and having benefited from the victory over the USSR, was also questioned as the United States was less seen as a global benevolent hegemon than as a threat to global stability.

A second factor conditioning the outcome of post-conflict reconstruction projects lies in the preconditions to the reconstruction and if these preconditions are negative, the ability to adapt and provide solutions to elements threatening the project. In the case of Japan, preconditions to the occupation generally played in favour of the U.S. reconstruction: the issue of legitimacy enjoyed by the U.S. as occupying power, the influence of extensive destruction sustained by Japan before the reconstruction started, the homogeneity of the Japanese society, the isolation of Japan, the quality of the reconstruction planning instruments, and finally the organisation and the rationale behind the reconstruction project in Japan. In addition to the four first pre-conditions, that can be considered as objective, the U.S. invested heavily in the pre-war planning of the reconstruction of Japan. All contributed to a reconstruction outcome favourable to the U.S.

In contrast, preconditions to the Occupation of Iraq, and the inability of the U.S. to deal with the issues they caused, constituted a severe blow to the effective implementation of reconstruction policies. Indeed, while enjoying high levels of domestic approval at home, foreign policy tenets and the process that led to the 2003 War with Iraq caused a fall in U.S. international legitimacy resulting in a lack of international support for the reconstruction. Moreover, the regional opposition of Arab populations to the invasion, the perception of the U.S. as a destabilising force, and the gap between planning and reality all threatened the consistency of American actions and effective exercise of power. Because of its inability to deal with the negative effects of preconditions, the Bush administration jeopardised from the start the outcome of the reconstruction of Iraq.

A third factor explaining the outcome of reconstruction projects lies in the degree of consistency achieved in the exertion of power and of policies across the four dimensions at play in post-conflict reconstructions.

Indeed, the reconstruction of Japan enjoyed high degree of consistency in the exertion of coercive and consensual power as well as between policies unfolding in the security, state, economy and civil society dimensions of the reconstruction. A first phase saw reconstruction policies emphasise the coherent implantation of democratic and capitalist principles in the Japanese state, economy and civil society through a purge of militaristic and ultra-nationalist elements in the political, economic and education fields, political reforms centred on a new constitution and role for the emperor, economic reforms aiming at the development of liberal capitalism in Japan, and policies seeking to distil democratic principles and individual liberties in the Japanese society. Throughout this first phase, the Occupation favoured consent generation among the Japanese to its programmes. The re-invention of Japan into a democratic and peaceful country was embraced by the majority of public opinion and a good part of the political elite. Nevertheless, when needed, the threat of coercion was never far away. While benevolent, the Occupation did not tolerate questioning of its aims and method, as the process of the birth of a new Japanese constitution illustrates. However, consistency of action in the re-moulding of the state, economy and civil society characterised the American policies of reconstruction and contributed to its favourable outcome.

On the contrary, in Iraq, the U.S. failed to achieve consistency in the design and implementation of its policies across the four dimensions of reconstruction. Indeed, in all four dimensions of the reconstruction, the U.S. failed to achieve consistency between policies, actions and outcomes. Influenced by pre-conditions far from congenial to what the American planners had in mind for the reconstruction of Iraq, the inability of the Occupation authorities to balance expressions of power based on coercion and on consent led to a rapid drifting to the adoption of policies and actions based on the use of force to tame those opposed to the American re-moulding of the Iraqi state, security environment, economy and civil society.

However, and constituting the last explanatory factor of effective post-conflict reconstruction, the influence of foreign policies and the degree of consistency achieved between reconstruction, regional and global policies eventually contributed to a progress of the reconstruction in Iraq. Indeed, a review of U.S. foreign policies in the light of international realities contributed in both cases to a solidification of the consistency of reconstruction policies across the four fields. In Japan, *The Reverse Course* embodies the effects of a redefinition of foreign policy objectives springing to a redefinition of the American national interest, itself a consequence of the new realities animating the international structure. Indeed, the rise of a Communist threat led to a review of the overall

democratisation of the Japanese state, economy and civil society in favour of a policy privileging social stability, economic development and anti-Communism in order to give Japan a new regional role: a bulwark of capitalist and democratic development, and of anti-Communism. The ongoing consistency of U.S. policies across the four fields in which reconstruction took place as well as the integration of these policies in a wider foreign policy scheme that posited the U.S. as benevolent leader of the free world, ready to support friends and allies, gave Japan a new regional and global role supporting American foreign policy objectives regionally and globally, namely prevailing over the USSR on the long-term.

In Iraq, *The New Way Forward* is the result of a similar review of foreign policy instruments and adaptation to conditions on the ground. The decision to finally engage with Iran and Syria, both supporting Iraqi factions opposed to the U.S. presence; to move away from unilateralism to multilateralism; and, to favour instruments of power based on consent generation instead of coercion, slowly impact on reconstruction policies. Reconstruction policies became more complementary, with exertion of coercion creating conditions congenial to progress in the political, economic and civil society dimensions of reconstruction. The impact of foreign policies consistent with reconstruction policies finally allows some measure of progress of the overall reconstruction project in Iraq. However, the Iraqi adventure put at risk American power. It constituted the strongest test of what American power can do and eventually led the U.S. with the opportunity to question itself and its understanding of what its power can do in the contemporary world. Such questioning is critical to the furtherance of the U.S. global supremacy as American coercive power is now overstretched and the U.S. soft power and global credibility seriously damaged, questioning to ability of the United States to generate consent to the maintenance of its global leader status.

Thus, in order to assess the outcome of a post-conflict reconstruction project, we contend that the approach we applied to the cases of Japan after World War II and to Iraq in the contemporary period provides a useful analytical framework that identifies essential explanatory factors, which once brought together, offer a comprehensive understanding of why some reconstruction projects succeed while others fail. Indeed, the impact of pre-conditions on the occupation, the security and stability of the country, the development and reinforcement of the state, the rebuilding of the economy, and the creation and strengthening of civil society constitute the frameworks in which power in pursuit of reconstruction objectives is implemented. Achievements are in direct correlation with effective and consistent implementation of power nuances expressed through coercion and consent; and,

on the degree of consistency achieved in the implementation of reconstruction policies with each other, and with regional and global foreign policies.

We hope that this study contributed to our knowledge of these issues by proposing an analytical approach that can open up the field of application of the concept of power in international relations. While we consider that there are limits to the scope of application of the analytical framework here developed, the general methodology consisting in relying on the concept of power and on an epistemology insisting on historicity, that is a historical understanding of the sources and effects of power, can be replicated in other International Studies fields.

Regarding Peace Studies and Nation-building, the same conclusions about the limitation in applicability are reached. Our work is limited to an understanding of U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction projects but a redefinition of the basic analytical parameters can allow for application to other post-conflict reconstruction cases. In addition, the study opens up interesting questions regarding power in international relations and the outcome of reconstruction processes:

Does the intensity of a conflict, and hence the intensity of exerting coercion, constitute a variable explaining the future outcome of the post-conflict reconstruction process? How do we account for the influence of levels of material and psychological destruction sustained by the country to be reconstructed? Does more destruction facilitate reconstruction or on the contrary, does it impede it?

Accordingly, what is the relevance of focusing on the development of military instruments and doctrines emphasising precision, limited collateral damage and speed?


Would an application of the same analytical process to the European Union and United Nations-led post-conflict reconstruction cases deliver similar conclusions about the effects of power on the outcome of reconstruction? Thus, do reconstruction projects have more chance to be efficient through unilateralism or multilateralism? Moreover, is reconstruction motivated by regime change and hence foreign intervention more conducive to success than if in the wake of internal political changes, as in the case of a civil war? These are questions to be considered further to advance our knowledge of the interaction animating power and post-conflict reconstruction.

This study has tried to shed light on reasons explaining the specific outcome of U.S. post-conflict reconstruction projects - effective for the reconstructed country as well as for the power in charge of the reconstruction effort -. We thus hope that the reader has acquired

a deeper understanding of what U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction in Japan and Iraq has achieved as well as where it has failed.

APPENDICE 1

The American Council on Japan and its Connections 1948-1952



¹ Also a friend of Clarence E. Meyer, Vice-President of Standard Oil - linked the ACJ with the National Foreign Trade Council)

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