Community, Autonomy, and Divinity:

Studying morality across cultures

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MEMORANDUM

The research reported in this thesis was conducted while the author was a full-time postgraduate student in the Department of Psychology at the University of Kent (September, 2005 – December, 2008) on a scholarship from the Brazilian government through the CAPES Foundation (Conselho de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, CAPES), scholarship number BEX 2768-04-6. The theoretical and empirical work herein is the independent work of the author. Intellectual debts are acknowledged in the text. The execution of the studies reported in the thesis required some limited assistance from other people. Their role consisted of assisting with data collection. The author has not been awarded a degree by this or any other university for the work included in the thesis.

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Do not believe in traditions simply because they have been handed down for many generations. Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumoured by many. Do not confirm anything just because it agrees with your scriptures. Do not foolishly make assumptions. Do not abruptly draw conclusions by what you see and hear. Do not be fooled by outward appearances. Do not hold on tightly to any view or idea just because you are comfortable with it. Do not accept as fact anything that you yourself find to be logical. Do not be convinced of anything out of respect and deference to your spiritual teachers. Do not believe in anything merely on the authority of your teachers and elders. But after observation and analysis, when you find that anything agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all, then accept it and live up to it.

- Buddha, in the Kaalaama Sutta (Nagapriya, 2001)

ABSTRACT

Moral rules are an important aspect of culture. Yet, to date no published scale exists to measure the endorsement of different moral codes. This thesis report the development of the CADS (Community, Autonomy and Divinity Scale), based on Shweder's (2003a; Shweder et al., 1987) anthropological theory of moral codes, as a means to measure cross-cultural, sub-cultural, and individual differences in the contents of morality. Scale development, confirmatory factor analysis, convergent and discriminant validity are reported in Studies 1, 2, and 3, as well as analysis for structural invariance and meaningful differences across British and Brazilian cultural contexts. Findings suggest the CADS to be a reliable and valid scale, thereby enabling the cross-cultural quantitative study of similarities and differences in endorsement of moral codes. Following CADS' development, this thesis presents one experiment (Study 4) investigating the relationship between moral judgement and emotional reactions, suggesting that emotions act as mediators of the relationship between perceptions of moral code violations and moral judgement. Finally, Study 5 studies the power of the moral codes to predict honour concerns, and Study 6 replicates these findings, and most importantly, tests the CADS in six different cultural communities (Brazil, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, the UK, and the US). The variation of the moral codes endorsement across cultures, here operationally defined as nations, genders, and religious groups, is also investigated. Limitations of this work, as well as its theoretical and empirical implications for research in social psychology are discussed.

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CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS MORALITY?

I have often thought that morality may perhaps consist solely in the courage of making a choice

- Léon Blum (1907)

Can morality stem from different sources and different contexts? Or to be considered moral an act must be truly universal? Are all moral norms and rules people enforce and follow based on conventions? Or only the norms and rules based on a particular content?

Although many would like to believe that morality follows universal precepts, many examples in the contemporary world seem to indicate otherwise. For example, in India it is considered sinful for Brahmin widows to eat fish (Shweder, 1990a), whereas even within Western culture, liberals and conservatives differ on whether consensual homosexual activity is moral (Haidt & Hersh, 2001).

This thesis reintroduces the study of morality to social psychology, by adapting an anthropological theory of moral codes, developing a standardised measure to allow the investigation of individual and cultural differences, and exploring the association of these moral codes to emotion and culture.

This chapter reviews theory and research on morality. Initially, definitions of morality will be introduced and mainstream psychological theories will be presented (e.g., Piaget, 1932, Kohlberg, 1981). These

theories assume that the moral domain is constituted by moral values and norms related exclusively to principles of justice, fairness, and protection from harm. Based on criticisms about the limitations of these models, it is proposed that the moral domain is broader than ideals of justice, and also includes norms related to social roles and spiritual beliefs. Individuals and cultures endorse these moral codes in different levels, according to individual and cultural differences. Finally, the chapter presents an overview on how this work will be developed.

Definitions of morality

All cultures have a sense of morality and the existence of moral systems is considered universal. Sunar (2002) points out the fact that the moral sense is so important for humans that its lack is understood as a pathological condition. However, it is also apparent that the contents of the moral domain are not exactly the same from culture to culture (Miller, 2001; Miller & Bersoff, 1992).

To define morality is not a simple task. There is no single definition of the term "morality" accepted by the majority of theorists (Sunar, 2002). The Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary suggests that morality is "a doctrine or system of moral conduct" and "particular moral principles or rules of conduct" (Morality, n.d.). Moral would be etymologically derived from the Latin term '*moralis*', which comes from '*mos*' meaning custom or conventions. It is defined as "relating to principles of right and wrong in behaviour; conforming

to a standard of right behaviour; sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience or ethical judgement" (Moral, n.d.).

In general, accounts of morality present it as a code of conduct that aims at distinguishing right and wrong actions or behaviours (Gert, 2005). Hare (2006) refers to morality as a set of customs and habits that define how individuals think about how they should live. For Sunar (2002), morality is a group of rules of conduct that is based on one's conscience or on one's sense of right and wrong. However, to this author, morality is not related to any type of right or wrong behaviour, but to relations between people, and how these relations should be regulated.

Relationships are central aspects to human life, and in order to regulate these relationships, individuals, communities, and institutions emphasise moral values or standards, which are conceptions of what is good, right, and obligatory, to influence human behaviour (Edwards, 1987). However, different cultures might emphasise different "beliefs, values and norms about how the self should relate to others" (Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer & Manstead, 2004, p. 193). Variations in the moral sense, consequently, can be due to individual, gender, and cultural differences (Sunar, 2002).

According to Geyer and Baumeister (2005), all cultural communities have sets of moral rules and values that define what the right and wrong actions are, and these moral rules are considered as self-evident truths that should not be questioned (Haidt, 2001). "In general, these moral rules condemn selfish, impulsive, short-sighted actions and instead promote acts

that provide benefits in larger perspectives" (Geyer & Baumeister, 2005, p.412).

According to Haidt (2001), moral judgements are positive/negative evaluations of the actions and/or character of a person, based on the moral values and virtues considered important by a culture. Moral reasoning, to this author, would be the conscious cognitive process of transforming the information one has about the actions and/or character of a person to reach a moral judgement.

Mainstream theories of morality

According to Gert (2005), philosophers have not traditionally been interested in cultural differences in morality. Plato (1984) and Kant (1789/1965), for example, while aware of the variation of moral conduct in different societies, nonetheless proposed universal theories associating ethics with virtue and rationality.

Mainstream psychological theories of morality have focused on the study of the development of moral judgement and moral reasoning. These theories usually suggest that the cognitive processes of evaluating and reflecting on all the information provided regarding an action, including its consequences, are the basis of moral judgement (Miller, 2001; Sunar, 2002). It is not the aim of this thesis to review in detail theories of moral development. However, the main ideas of the most important approaches will be briefly described.

Freud (1856/1939) considered morality a necessary, unconscious internalization of social rules, which would later become the voice of conscience (Paolicchi, 2007). His psychoanalytical approach focused on emotions, such as guilt and shame, playing an important role on human self-control.

Based on a developmental approach, Piaget (1932) proposed that individuals build and rebuild their knowledge about the world through interaction with the environment. Morality, for Piaget, results from social interaction, and the progressive development of rational thinking structures human action (Paolicchi, 2007).

In his classic work "The moral judgement of the child" (Piaget, 1932), this author suggests the child elaborates his/her own definitions of right and wrong based on these social interactions. This development takes place within an evolutionary sequence, where the child moves from a heteronomous morality (external, imposed by moral authorities) to an autonomous morality (internal, imposed by one's individual conscience).

Based on Piaget's theoretical approach, Kohlberg (1981) proposes a model of moral development that has been widely used and helped developing the field. His research with participants from different ages and cultures suggested the existence of patterns of moral reasoning independent from culture and language. These patterns helped him proposing a theory based on developmental stages that are rigid and hierarchical. He proposes a universal morality based on justice and fairness, and that cognitive reasoning processes are the basis of moral judgement (Araújo, 2000).

Kohlberg's (1981) model suggests that moral development is a hierarchical process, comprised of six stages. At the lowest stage (pre-conventional), moral decisions are based on punishments and obedience to authorities (e.g., parents, teacher). At the intermediate stage (conventional), moral decisions are based on normative ideas of *natural* and *good* behaviour, as well as on the laws and norms of the community. At the highest stage (post-conventional), moral decisions are based on abstract principles, aiming at respecting ideals of justice and the rights of all human beings, even when they are conflicting with social norms (Cottone, Drucker, & Javier, 2007).

Both Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1981) are considered universalists, because they propose the sequence of moral development is the same in all cultures, and culminates with the formation of a single legitimate moral domain, consisting of concerns with justice, rights and protection from harm (Bhatia, 2000; Biaggio, 1999; Miller, 2001).

For Turiel (1983), the moral domain is interpersonal. Moral rules should apply to all individuals in all situations, with the function of maintaining the social order. A person's actions are based on their possible consequences and effects on other people. This approach suggests that a specific set of issues are considered moral violations in all cultures: justice, fairness and rights are, universally, the central part of the moral domain. Violations of these moral rules would lead to harmful consequences.

However, in contrast with Kohlberg (1981) who proposed a fixed sequence of development, Turiel (1983) proposed that young children could distinguish between moral rules and other types of rules. This author

distinguishes three domains, used to categorise three types of events: personal, conventional, and moral domain (Turiel, 1983).

The personal domain refers to the set of actions that are not submitted to justified social regulations, emphasising the private aspect of life. Therefore, they cannot be judged as right or wrong, as they are a matter of personal preference, e.g., the clothes one likes to wear and music preferences (Nucci & Turiel, 2000).

The conventional domain refers to the set of actions that is dependent on the cultural context, e.g., eating with cutlery or with the hands (Biaggio, 1999). The difference between the moral and the conventional domain is on the principle of welfare emphasised on the moral domain (Turiel, 1983). According to Turiel's approach, moral rules universally involve concerns on justice, rights and harm.

Turiel's theory cannot be considered universalist in the same sense as Piaget and Kohlberg's theories, because his approach accepts a certain level of cultural variation (Biaggio, 1999).

Another proposal, based on a psychoanalytical approach, was Gilligan's (1982) theory of care and justice orientations. She proposed the existence of gender differences in morality, mainly based on research findings, suggesting two modes of moral reasoning: in the morality of justice, "the focus in on an ideal of reciprocity, fairness and equality" (Leitão, 1995, p. 27). In the morality of care, the focus is on the welfare of others and the moral importance of relationships, cooperation and affect.

According to Stander and Jensen (1993), Gilligan was interested in understanding gender as a cultural community, and her greatest contribution was to show that there is more than one way to perceive morality.

Critiques

Although these models have dominated research on morality, criticisms have been made to each theoretical approach. Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1981), and Turiel (1983) emphasise the cognitive aspect of morality, but deny the influence of emotional processes (Biaggio, 1999; Miller, 2001; Snarey, 1985). Gilligan (1982) places more emphasis on the affective aspect of morality, but her approach does not account for the cognitive aspect (Ma, 1989).

Snarey (1985) critiques Kohlberg's theory for presenting urban and middle-class biases (see also Kagitçibasi & Berry, 1989), and suggests that his theory should include "a wider range of cultural world views" (Snarey, 1985, p.228) at the post-conventional level in order to be truly universal. Cottone et al. (2007) suggest Kohlberg's theory reflects political ideology rather than moral reasoning. These authors also criticise the fact that Kohlberg believed in a total independence between religious orientation and moral judgement / reasoning (Richards & Davison, 1992). To Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1987), Kohlberg's approach applies exclusively to Western societies that emphasise individualism and liberal values.

Regarding Turiel's approach, research findings in Africa (Zimba, 1994) have shown that although participants can successfully distinguish between the moral, conventional, and personal domains, African respondents justified

with moral force a number of conventional actions. Based on these findings, Zimba (1994) suggests there is insufficient evidence to validate the distinction between the moral and conventional domains. Perceptions of what harm and just behaviour are depend on culturally bound conceptions of self, society, and nature. This opinion is shared by Shweder et al. (1987), who propose that convention is also morality-bound.

Paolicchi (2007) criticises the tendency of cognitive approaches to consider morality as originated by, and dependent exclusively on the individual; a morality that distances itself from relationships with peers and social groups. This author suggests that the most pervasive consequence of the cognitive movement in moral psychology was to consider morality as referring exclusively to the "abstract world of reasoning [and not] to the world of actions and choices" (p. 566).

Relativist approaches propose that the rights-based code emphasised in Western cultures does not account for the whole moral domain (Chiu, Dweck, Tong & Fu, 1997; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra & Park, 1997). They suggest that moral standards and norms are not universal, but relative to the specific culture and society they are part of (Harman, 1975; Shweder, 1990a). Although they recognize the possibility of moral universals, relativists do not believe the moral domain can be reduced to these. Instead, they emphasise the existence of moral beliefs beyond concepts of rights and harm that are not so extensively studied, such as duty, interpersonal relationships, religious norms, and social institutions (Darley & Shultz, 1990; Jensen, 2006; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Shweder et al., 1987).

It is not the aim of this thesis to propose that these cognitive-developmental theories are completely wrong and inadequate for the study of morality. In fact, there is plenty of evidence supporting the claims of these theories (see review in Aquino & Reed, 2002). Instead, Shweder (1984, p. 53) proposes that cognitive-developmental theories are "undoubtedly correct but terribly incomplete".

According to Blasi (1999), the definition of morality is too restrictive if excludes the content considered moral to lay understanding. Consequently, social conventions can be interpreted as moral rules, as they are held with moral conviction in many cultures (for definitions of moral conviction, see Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005).

In terms of relevance, these different contents of the moral domain across cultures might help understanding cross-cultural issues, for example, the cultural shock or acculturative stress experienced by immigrants (Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987). Additionally, recent studies have focused on understanding morality in in-group identification processes, emphasising its importance to a positive evaluation of one's self and one's in-group (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006).

Consequently, this thesis explores the existence of different groups of values, enforced with moral strength, which might be endorsed by individuals and cultures, and it addresses the lack of a standardised measure to evaluate the level of endorsement to these different moral codes in diverse cultural contexts. These general limitations have been addressed in a series of six studies, summarised in the following section.

Overview

Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) propose that new theoretical models of morality need to place less emphasis on the role of harm and consequences of actions. Instead, they need to emphasise the role of emotions and the role of culture. This proposal was chosen because it suggests a broader view of morality, focusing not only in the development of moral reasoning, but also in the expression of moral judgement and the importance of individual and cultural differences to morality. Consequently, this thesis is divided into three parts: Part I introduces theoretical approaches and measurement development; Part II presents one experiment regarding action tendencies and the influence of emotions; and Part III focuses on the influence of culture.

In Part I, the theoretical approaches on morality and culture will be presented. Chapter 2 provides a review of theoretical and empirical research on culture, focusing on theories of cultural dimensions. This chapter is composed of two main sections: the first section introduces different definitions of culture found in the literature, and it is followed by a presentation about the measurement of cultural dimensions, such as individualism - collectivism (Hofstede, 1984; Triandis, 1995) and human values (Schwartz, 1992). The second section proposes that morality is an important aspect of culture (Miller, 2001) and that it is not adequate to investigate concepts like justice, fairness, duties, and nature "outside the ways of life, or systems of lived relationships that give them meaning" (Paolicchi, 2007, p. 568).

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework on which this thesis is based. The proposal entitled the "big three" of morality is introduced (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Initially, the chapter briefly presents the definition of moral values and presents Shweder's view on how morality is intrinsically associated to culture (Shweder, 2003a). Next, this chapter outlines the ethics of community, autonomy, and divinity, and research conducted on the big three is discussed. And finally, it is proposed the construction of a quantitative way of measuring the endorsement of three moral codes. Previously introduced cultural dimensions are proposed to be associated to these different contents of morality (Shweder, 2003a), and the endorsement of these moral dimensions are proposed to vary according to the cultural community (Shweder et al., 1997).

Chapter 4 focuses on the development of the Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS). It includes one study (Study 1), in which the initial set of items is tested to identify its underlying structure and reliability. Study 1 also proposes nine hypotheses suggesting the CADS association to individualism and collectivism, religiosity, and disgust, as well as regarding the endorsement of the moral codes and gender differences.

Chapter 5 contains one study (Study 2), in which further psychometric properties of the CADS are investigated. The chapter presents results on test-retest reliability and attempts to replicate Study 1 results, in order to establish a nomological network for the proposed moral dimensions. New hypotheses are formulated on the association between the CADS and human values.

Finally, Chapter 6 includes one study (Study 3), which aims at validating the CADS in a different cultural community (Brazil). It presents results of a confirmatory factor analysis and multigroup invariance tests, and tests the previously proposed hypotheses cross-culturally.

Part II, entitled "The heart of the matter", focuses on moral violations, and how they can explain emotions and action tendencies. Chapter 7 includes one experiment (Study 4), where participants are asked to evaluate the wrongness of nine scenarios describing moral violations. Participants are also asked to provide their emotional reactions and action tendencies towards the violations, which are predicted by the moral codes.

And finally, in Part III, the focus will shift to the influence of culture. Chapter 8 incorporates two studies (Studies 5 and 6). Study 5 proposes that honour is a construct that links emotion and morality, and investigates the association between honour concerns and the big three. Study 6 presents the results of a cross-cultural research investigating the association between the CADS dimensions and honour concerns in six cultures: Brazil, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States.

Chapter 9 summarises the findings of the research presented in the previous chapters, discusses the limitations of these studies, and concludes by outlining the implications of these findings for future research.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT IS CULTURE?

The knowable world is incomplete if seen from any one point of view, incoherent if seen from all points of view at once and empty if seen from nowhere in particular.

- Richard Shweder (2003a)

This chapter discusses the important influence of culture on human behaviour. Specifically, it focuses on theories of cultural dimensions and their relevance for the study of individual and cultural differences.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. Firstly, it will introduce the concept of culture and discuss some of the definitions found in the literature. Secondly, the construct of individualism-collectivism will be presented, which has been widely used to measure culture. And finally, two theories of personal and cultural values will be discussed.

Introduction

The assertion that human behaviour does not happen in social isolation is one of the most heard, said and written in social psychology. The social environment that surrounds all human beings since birth is of vital importance to their full development.

While growing up, people in all parts of the world are usually taught what they should and should not do; how to distinguish right from wrong according to the rules of the cultural community they live in.

Although connected by their human condition, each of these groups develop their own tools, languages, traditions, religions, and norms, emphasise different virtues and values, relate to the natural environment that surrounds them in diverse ways, and have different ideas about many (basic and complex) human behaviours, such as sleeping arrangements or child rearing practices (Shweder, Jensen, & Goldstein, 2003).

These differences do not make people from other parts of the world more or less human. They only show the diversity of worlds that can coexist, as well as the extent of human abilities to develop, live and create in almost any environment or circumstance.

This diversity of ways of thinking, feeling, communicating, relating to nature and to others is what social scientists usually call "culture". According to the Merriam-Webster's On-line Dictionary (Culture, n.d.), the term "culture" originates in the 15th century, and it was first used to define *cultivation* or *cultivated land*. By definition, culture is:

> *"1) the act of developing the intellectual and moral faculties especially by education; 2) the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behaviour that depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations; 3) the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group; also the characteristic features of everyday existence (as diversions or a way of life shared by people in a place or time (e.g., popular culture, southern culture)".*

This dictionary definition of culture summarizes the several conceptions proposed by scholars, which perceive culture as: learned habits

(Tylor, 1964); learned meanings transmitted through the generations (Rohner, 1984); rules, meanings, and behaviours (Jahoda, 1984); systems of shared symbols (Geertz, 1975); or patterns of behaviour transmitted by symbols (Kroeber & Kluckholn, 1952; for a review, see Matsumoto, 2006). These many different concepts suggest the complexity of this object. To Matsumoto (2006), culture includes not only behaviours, but also a normative prescription of these behaviours, embedded in all aspects of life, such as "general characteristics, food, clothing, housing, technology, economy, transportation, individual and family activities, community and governmental systems, welfare, religion, science, sex and reproduction, and the life cycle" (p. 35).

Valsiner (2003) stresses the existence of three ways this term has been used in psychology. First, "culture" is used as a designation of groups of people that share specific features, such as geographical regions, nationalities or ethnicity. Along with this meaning, comes the idea that people "belong" to the culture. Second "culture" is used as an organizer of the individual's psychological systems. In this more individualistic approach, it "belongs" to the person. Third, "culture" is a relationship established between the person and the environment, mediated by institutions, objects, tools and / or signs. In this last definition, the term "belong to" does not apply. These shared goods and values are socially constructed and help in organizing psychological phenomena (Ratner, 2008).

When described as a relationship, culture can be understood only as a process of constitution between the person and the social world (Valsiner, 2000, 2003). This point of view is based on Vygotsky's concept of culture and

development, and his long tradition in educational psychology (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991). Culture is, therefore, "a shared set of physical and symbolic action, feeling and thinking tools that are socially created" (Valsiner, 2004, p. 6).

From an anthropological point of view, Shweder (1990a; Shweder & Haidt, 2000) defines culture as ideas, meanings, and interpretive schemes, activated or constructed by the individual's participation on normative social institutions and practices; that is: "culture, so conceived, can be defined as ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient that are made manifest in the speech, laws and customary practices of a self-regulating group" (Shweder & Haidt, 2000, p.398).

According to Adamopolous and Lonner (2001), Shweder perceives culture "as both antecedent to and a consequence of individual activity" (p.29). Culture, therefore, emphasises these ideas (and related practices) about what is "true, good, beautiful, and efficient acquired by virtue of membership in some group [because] they have a bearing on the perpetuation of their way of life" (Shweder, 2003a, p. 25).

Due to the high variability of forms of interaction between a person and his/her surrounding environment, it might seem impossible to compare different cultures. However, cultural communities also share meanings, ideas, and social norms with other communities, allowing the study of similar and different features of diverse groups (Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller, 2004; Shweder, 1973, 1990a; Triandis & Suh, 2002).

Based on these shared norms and values, many researchers propose that one can identify dimensions on which it would be possible to place

cultures, and consequently measure them (see Hofstede, 1984; Inglehart, Basañez, & Moreno, 1998; Leung & Bond, 1989).

Measuring culture

In order to study these similarities and differences, it is necessary to measure culture's characteristics. To identify the profile of a cultural community, a common research strategy is to investigate its individuals' shared values. People's value hierarchies have been consistently studied in psychology because they reflect the principles and beliefs favoured by their cultural community and embodied in their cultural practices (Wan, Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007).

Values are perceived as constructs that help understanding of a diversity of socio-psychological phenomena, influencing attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; see review in Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). From Rokeach's studies (1973), five basic assumptions about human values were established: 1) the number of values endorsed by an individual is relatively small; 2) individuals have the same values independently of culture, but they are endorsed at different levels; 3) values are organized on a system; 4) values can be determined by culture, social context and institutions, as well as personality; and 5) values manifest themselves in social behaviours.

Values are defined as "conceptions of the desirable that guide the way persons select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their actions and evaluations. Values express what people believe to be good or bad, and

what they think should or should not be done" (Roccas, 2005, pp.748; see also Schwartz, 1992). Both at the individual and cultural levels, different theoretical approaches have been proposed to identify and distinguish diverse cultures by measuring values (Hofstede, 1984; Triandis, 1995; Schwartz, 1992, 1994). The most widely used approaches in psychology are briefly presented here.

Individualism and collectivism

Hofstede (1984, 1991) defined culture as a "mind software" guiding the individuals in their daily interactions, and partially "programming" them for patterns of thought, feelings and actions. Based on this definition of culture, Hofstede (1984) proposed one of the constructs with the greatest repercussion on psychology research and literature: individualism and collectivism (Hofstede, 1984; Triandis, 1995, 2001).

Hofstede (1984) studied the values of more than 100,000 IBM employees in 40 different countries, performing factor analysis at the cultural level and identifying four dimensions through which he could investigate cultural values:

1) *Power distance*: aiming at identifying how the employees reply to power and authority. This dimension refers to hierarchical distance and the acceptance of unequal power distribution in society;
2) *Individualism-collectivism*: indicates how responsible the members of a community are for each other, as well as the degree of individuals' dependence on their social groups. In individualist cultures (e.g., US, Canada, France), individuals are expected to

take care of themselves and strive for their own personal objectives, whereas in collectivist cultures (e.g., Japan, Mexico, Spain), individuals are expected to take care of each other and strive for the objectives of their social groups;

3) *Masculinity-femininity*: indicates, respectively, a materialist culture which focuses on benefits and personal achievement, or a relational culture, which focuses on social interactions with others and stability for oneself and one's family;
4) *Uncertainty avoidance*: investigates the level of anxiety people feel when facing unexpected or uncertain situations. In cultures with high uncertainty avoidance, people feel uncomfortable with the lack of security and fixed plans, whereas in cultures with low avoidance, people feel less threatened by the unknown, and are open to risks and changes.

Among these four dimensions, individualism-collectivism (Ind-Col) has been the one to generate the most research, due to the theoretical significance of studying the relationship of person to group across cultures (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Differences between Ind-Col cultures have been noted in a wide range of psychological processes (for a review, see Kagitçibasi & Berry, 1989; Triandis & Suh, 2002), such as learning (Haruki et al., 1984), social perception (Bond & Forgas, 1984), distributive justice (Berman, Berman, & Singh, 1985), sexual behaviour (Ubillo, Páez, & Gonzállez, 2000), cognition and social behaviour (Triandis & Suh, 2002). Due to its emphasis on interpersonal relationships and social harmony, individualism and collectivism are proposed to relate to morality.

The construct, initially proposed at the cultural level, and being widely used to understand and predict cultural similarities and differences, was further developed by Triandis (1995) to be measured at both cultural and individual levels. According to Triandis (2001), individualism and collectivism are considered opposite poles of the same dimension only at the cultural level (Hofstede, 1984). However, at the individual level, they are proposed as multidimensional constructs (Triandis, 1995, 2001).

For Triandis (1996), Ind-Col is conceived as a cultural syndrome, which is a "pattern of shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, self-definitions, norms, role definitions, and values organized around a theme" (p. 408). Triandis (1995) suggests four main elements that distinguish individualism from collectivism: 1) the meaning of the self: autonomous vs. connected; 2) priority of goals: personal goals vs. group goals; 3) behaviour as a function of: attitudes / personal attributes vs. norms / roles; and 4) relationships based on: personal benefit / social exchanges vs. group needs / sense of connection (Grimm, Church, Katigbak, & Reyes, 1999).

In collective cultures, self-definitions are intertwined with the in-group. A sense of duty to the in-group, interdependence and relatedness to others, and an emphasis on harmony (Kim & Markus, 1999) and belonging are important collectivist attributes (Fernández, Paez, & González, 2005). Examples of collectivist cultures are Asia, Africa, and South America (Triandis & Suh, 2002).

In individualist cultures, self-definitions are independent and autonomous from the in-group. Independence, personal achievement, self-knowledge, uniqueness (Kim & Markus, 1999), and privacy are important

individualist attributes (Fernández et al., 2005). Examples of individualist cultures are North and Western Europe and North America (Triandis & Suh, 2002).

Gouveia and Clemente (1998) suggest a group of variables related to Ind-Col. Individualists consider the person as the basic unit of social perception, whereas collectivists consider the group as the basic unity. Collectivists feel more embarrassed in public and are more concerned about other people's perceptions and their personal public image. Social and sexual roles are more defined in collectivist societies (Gouveia & Clemente, 1998).

A recent study from Morling and Lamoreaux (2008) has shown the influence of Ind-Col on "cultural products", e.g., advertising, children's books or popular texts, through a meta-analytic approach. In each of these products, the authors looked for specific characteristics from individualist and collectivist cultures, e.g., the tendency to show respect for elders and for traditions in general, usually found in collectivist societies; or making dispositional attributions are associated to individualism, whereas situational attributions are associated to collectivism. Their findings suggested cultural products from East Asia (South Korea, China, and Japan), and Mexico emphasise collectivism, whereas cultural products from Western communities (U.S., Britain, and Germany) emphasise individualism. Effect sizes found were larger than effect sizes obtained with self-report measures of Ind-Col (see Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008).

An important critique of the Ind-Col construct is the opposition between these dimensions at the cultural level, with some scholars

suggesting the distinction was too broad and it needed more refinement (see Grimm et al., 1999). Gaines et al. (1997) also criticize the assumption that individuals can be categorized as individualist or collectivist, as well as the general tendency of comparing U.S. samples, as an example of individualist culture, with samples from other countries.

Due to this critique, Gaines et al. (1997) suggest that individualism should be conceived as "an orientation toward the welfare of oneself and collectivism as an orientation toward the welfare of one's larger community" (p. 1461). In studies across ethnic communities within the U.S., Gaines et al., suggested that Ind-Col represented distinct cultural value orientations and not opposite poles of the same orientation.

In response to the criticisms regarding the need for refinement of the theory, Triandis and Gelfand (1998) proposed a meaningful distinction between these two cultural dimensions, which is the vertical and horizontal attributes, emphasising different aspects of social relationships. These attributes produce differences in terms of self definition and relation to others, generating four types of patterns: horizontal individualism, vertical individualism, horizontal collectivism, and vertical collectivism (see Figure 1).

According to this distinction, there are differences and similarities among the four patterns: in both Ind-Col dimensions characterized by the horizontal attribute, individuals define the self as similar to others. This basic conception suggests a strong respect for others as well as a high concern for equality. In a similar manner, both Ind-Col dimensions, characterised by the vertical attribute define the self as different from others. This conception, then, suggests the existence of a hierarchical ranking of individuals as well

as low concern for equality. Dissimilarities can also be found, such as the importance of freedom, which changes on the horizontal-vertical continuum and on the Ind-Col dimension.

This classification of the Ind-Col dimension has proved to be useful in studies comparing their effect within (Chen, Meindl, & Hunt, 1997; Gouveia, Clemente, & Espinosa, 2003) and across cultures (Kurman & Sriram, 2002; Nelson & Shavitt, 2002). Chirkov, Ryan, and Willness (2005) suggest that horizontality and verticality are important and relevant attributes for the description of cultural communities.



Figure 1. Horizontal and vertical attributes of Ind-Col. Adapted from: Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002.

In terms of individual differences, a more recent development of the bipolar dimension has been Markus and Kitayama (1991)'s suggestion that a community's cultural orientation has a strong influence in individuals' self definitions or *self-construals*. "Self-construal is conceptualized here as a constellation of thoughts, feelings, and actions concerning the relation of the self to others and the self as distinct from others" (Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, & Lai, 1999, p.316).

Markus and Kitayama (1991, 2003) propose two ways of conceptualizing the self inside the culture: *Independent*, where one believes the self is unique and distinct from other people. The self's main goal is to express this uniqueness through a direct communication, by focusing on inner thoughts, personal abilities, feelings, and actions; and *Interdependence*, where one believes the self is flexible and interconnected to others, expressed through status, roles, and relationships. The self's main goal is the maintenance of harmonious relationships through reference to thoughts, feelings, and actions of others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

It is important to emphasise that these "views of the self fall at opposite poles of the individualism and collectivism continuum" (Singelis et al., 1999, p. 318) when analysed at the cultural level. At the individual level, the authors suggest both images of the self can coexist in all individuals, with one or the other made salient according to cultural demands (Markus & Kitayama, 2003).

Schwartz (1990) emphasises that the broad definition and categorization of individuals and cultures into individualist or collectivist would lead one to overlook values that can be endorsed by both individual and

collective cultures, such as wisdom. Based on this critique, he proposes his motivational theory of values as an alternative approach.

Schwartz's values theory

Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) define values as "concepts or beliefs, pertaining to desirable end states or behaviours, that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and are ordered by relative importance" (p. 878). At the individual level, values express different types of motivational goals, which might be organized in proposed 10 dimensions (Schwartz, 1992):

- Power (e.g., authority, wealth) – the main goal of this value type is obtaining and maintaining social control and prestige;
- Achievement (e.g., ambitious, successful) – the main goal is individual success and competence;
- Hedonism (e.g., pleasure, enjoying life) – the main goal is individual pleasure and gratification;
- Stimulation (e.g., daring, an exciting life) – the main goal is change, innovation, and variety;
- Self-direction (e.g., creativity, freedom) – the main goal is freedom of choice, action and thought;
- Universalism (e.g., wisdom, equality) – the main goal is tolerance and the welfare of humanity as a whole;
- Benevolence (e.g., helpful, honest) – the main goal is the welfare of close others and the maintenance of interpersonal relationships;

- Tradition (e.g., devout, respect for tradition) – the main goal is respect, commitment to normative behaviour and acceptance of cultural norms and values;
- Conformity (e.g., obedient, self-discipline) – the main goal is compliance to social norms and emphasis on social expectations;
- Security (e.g., social order, clean) – the main goal is social stability, harmony, and safety.

These values are organized in a bi-dimensional and circular structured relation among themselves (see Figure 2). *Openness to change* values (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism) are theoretically and empirically in opposition to *conservation* values (tradition, conformity, security), whereas *self-transcendence* values (universalism, benevolence) are theoretically and empirically in opposition to *self-enhancement* values (power, achievement).



Figure 2. Structure of values at the individual level. Source: Schwartz, 1992.

Power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction are personal values related to individualism, whereas benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security are personal values related to collectivism (Schwartz, Lehman, & Roccas, 1999).

Data collected from more than 75,000 participants (college students and teachers) in 66 nations around the world (Schwartz, 1992) have provided clear information on the structure of values and the relative importance of values in different cultures. Although cultural values have been studied as the average endorsement of personal values shared by individuals from a cultural community, Schwartz (2004) proposed they can present a structure of their own (Wan et al., 2007). Schwartz's cultural level dimensions suggest

a pattern of relationships between values that is different from the individual-level.

Three cultural dimensions were proposed: 1) *embeddedness vs. autonomy*, which distinguishes the relationship people establish with their groups, whether the self is considered embedded in the collectivity or autonomous; 2) *hierarchy vs. egalitarianism*, which distinguishes the way people recognize themselves as moral and responsible individuals, whether the behaviour is employed by using hierarchy and roles or by encouraging personal responsibility; and 3) *mastery vs. harmony*, which distinguishes the relationships between people and the natural and social world, whether the individuals are legitimate to change and exploit nature or to preserve and protect (Fischer, 2006; Schwartz, 2004). These cultural dimensions have also proved to be useful for cross-cultural research (Allen et al., 2007; Fischer et al., 2007; Wong, Bond, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 2008).

Human values: A functional approach

A recent proposal on the study of human values suggests a functional approach to this construct. Defining values as orientation criteria that help guide human actions and express human needs, Gouveia (2003; Gouveia, Fischer, & Milfont, 2008) suggests that *value functions* are important dimensions that can help explain social behaviour.

These functional dimensions can be mapped according to their type of orientation (social, central, or personal) and their type of motivator (materialistic or humanitarian). By crossing these two types, the author identifies six sub-functions in which the values are organized:

- Normative (social, materialistic, e.g., religiosity, tradition) – their function is to represent the need for control and the preservation of one's culture and norms;
- Interactive (social, humanitarian, e.g., affectivity, social support) – their function is to regulate and maintain interpersonal relationships, emphasising the need for belonging;
- Existence (central, materialistic, e.g., survival, health) – their function is to guide behaviour to satisfy the most basic human needs and the need for security;
- Supra-personal (central, humanitarian, e.g., knowledge, maturity) – their function is to organize and categorise the world, focusing on self-actualization and well-being needs;
- Promotion (personal, materialistic, e.g., success, prestige) – their function is to focus on material achievements and personal competence, providing the self with a hierarchical structure that improves self-esteem; and
- Excitement (personal, humanitarian, e.g., pleasure, sexuality) – their function is to express the human need for gratification and variety.

This theory of values has shown consistent results in Brazilian samples (Gouveia, 2003; Gouveia et al., 2008), predicting constructs such as group identification (Pimentel, 2004), anti-social and criminal behaviour (Santos, 2008), sexual liberalism (Guerra, 2005), and ambivalent sexism (Belo, Gouveia, Raymundo & Marques, 2005).

Moral dimensions: A new proposal

By using these theories and dimensions, cultural and individual values have been extensively used to study culture's influence in psychological processes (Cooper & Denner, 1998; Kashima, 2000; Lehman et al., 2004), associating the importance of these diverse sets of values to several constructs, such as personality (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002; Triandis & Suh, 2002); self-construals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003); self-concept (Kagitçibasi, 1996); and emotions (Lutz, 1986; Shweder, 2003b; Wong et al., 2008).

However, according to the definitions of culture suggested in the literature (Shweder & Haidt, 2000), other constructs or dimensions can also be used to identify cultural communities. Shared ideas of what is morally right and wrong are also considered an important aspect of culture (Miller, 2001; Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, 1999).

According to Miller (2001), one of the most important goals of enculturation is to guarantee the internalization of right and wrong norms, and the correct understanding of contextual moral rules (see also Keltikangas-Jarvinen, Terav, & Pakaslahti, 1999). From this point of view, to understand culture, it is necessary to examine the content of morality in different communities and how they relate to personal and cultural values.

Chiu and colleagues (1997) suggest that the main difference between cultural groups that emphasise rights and groups that emphasise duties is the underlying assumption of the "fixity or malleability of human behaviour" (p.924) and social norms. According to these authors, beliefs in a fixed and stable social-moral reality would orient the self towards supporting the *status*

quo. On the other hand, if one believes the social-moral reality is flexible and dynamic, one would orient the self "towards moral beliefs that allow and support changes" (Chiu et al., 1997, p. 924).

This view about the fixity or malleability of a culture is shared by Triandis and Suh (2002), which propose that in stable cultures there is low tolerance to deviation from norms, whereas in flexible cultures, deviation can be tolerated. According to Chiu et al. (1997), the importance of the moral code for a person will become apparent when its rules are violated.

Hinde (2002) suggests that the main sources of moral precepts are relations with relatives and non-relatives, status, rights, sex and gender-related issues, and the social and religious systems. Religious practices and beliefs are culturally defined (Tarakeshwar, Stanton & Pargament, 2003), and universalist approaches have largely ignored religion's role in morality. However, Geyer and Baumeister (2005) emphasise the importance of religion as a resource for the practice of self-control, in order to act morally. Religions prescribe morality, instructing individuals on norms they should abide, values they should pursue, and behaviours they should follow.

Campos (2000) suggested it is difficult for people to define themselves as part of a group in Western societies, due to a lacking sense of community. Consequently, religious groups, as well as other diverse cultural groups based on demographic characteristics and/or social roles (e.g., ethnic, gender, professions, etc.), become the basis for identity development and provide norms and rules to be followed and internalised. The individual is embedded in these cultural contexts and, based on daily experiences of the

moral rules emphasised in his/her culture, recreates and reinforces his/her own notions of right and wrong (Martins & Branco, 2001).

For Baumeister and Exline (1999, p. 1166), morality is a "cultural structure designed to enable people to live together in harmony, and virtue represents the internalization of moral rules". Based on this definition, it is possible to understand that different cultural communities present different requirements for social life and interpersonal relationships. This approach to morality is adopted by other researchers (Irons, 1991; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008).

However, the psychological study of morality has traditionally emphasised only the cognitive aspects of moral development and moral reasoning. The investigation of morality involves not only the cognitive process of moral development, but also the examination of its content, as well as the development of the self and the importance of individual agency (Miller, 2001).

Such a theoretical proposal does not exist in social psychology. Therefore, an interdisciplinary approach is suggested, with the adaptation of an anthropological theory of moral codes to investigate the content of morality within and across cultures (Shweder, 2003b; Shweder et al., 1987, 1997). This approach would highlight the importance of culture on morality, focusing on its content and on what basis individuals justify their moral judgements.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed theory and research on culture and cultural dimensions. Individualism / independence and collectivism / interdependence were dimensions proposed to categorise and measure cultures, allowing the investigation of culture's influence in several psychological processes and constructs.

Most research focused on values as cultural dimensions, showing the importance of investigating personal and cultural values to the study of social behaviour. Different theoretical approaches of human values were presented, suggesting the types of motivational goals and the functions they serve when influencing psychological processes.

Finally, this chapter introduced the proposal of studying and measuring moral dimensions at the cultural and individual levels of analysis, as an unexplored dimension in social psychology. The next chapter will introduce the morality theory on which this work is based.

CHAPTER 3

THE "BIG THREE" OF MORALITY

Are right and wrong convertible terms, dependent upon popular opinion?

- William Lloyd Garrison (1832)

This chapter focuses mainly on introducing Shweder's anthropological theory of morality. Specifically, the chapter presents Shweder's ideas on how people use different contents to justify their judgements of morally right or wrong actions. There are two main sections in this chapter: initially, the basic ideas of his moral theory are considered. These basic assumptions are based on ethnographic findings from research studies conducted in India and the United States by Shweder et al. (1987, 1997). Indians and Americans used different moral codes when asked to justify their judgements to different moral violations, and these codes were proposed to be found in all cultures. The second section of this chapter reviews studies where this theory was applied providing empirical evidence supporting the theory and the important role of culture on moral judgement.

Introduction

Different approaches to the psychology of morality suggest different ways of perceiving the sources of moral content. Mainstream theories have focused on cognitive processes and the importance of rationality to moral

reasoning and judgement. Cultural approaches have criticised these theories for presenting only a limited view of the content of morality, and suggest there are different types of moral values that should be addressed.

Moral values, or standards, are defined "as conceptions of the 'good/bad', 'right/wrong', or 'obligatory/voluntary' that influence choice in human action" (Edwards, 1987, p. 123). As human values, they are also considered guidelines or principles in people's lives (Maio & Olson, 1998), and are also associated to one's culture (Schwartz, 1994; Shweder, 2003a). The main difference between values and moral values is that the former are personal guidelines endorsed by individuals and reinforced by culture, related to many types of behaviours, whereas the latter are requirements imposed by other individuals or the society in general, that emphasise the regulation of interpersonal relationships. An individual may endorse a personal value without behaving accordingly; however, society expects an individual to act accordingly to moral values and norms.

Shweder (2003a) emphasises the diversity of moral values (or moral goods) privileged in a cultural community; for him, "they include such noble ends as autonomy, justice, harm avoidance, loyalty, benevolence, piety, duty, respect, gratitude, sympathy, chastity, purity, sanctity, and others" (p. 37).

Shweder et al. (1987) suggested that culture has an essential influence on the development of an individual's thinking, emotions, and morality. From this point of view, moral judgement and cultural context should not be analysed separately, as one provides meaning for the other (Kagitçibasi, 1996; Vainio, 2003).

For Shweder (2002), there are five main characteristics of moral judgements: first, they are ubiquitous, i.e., they exist everywhere; second, they are based on different sets of morally right and wrong actions, that do not necessarily converge over time; third, they are experienced as cognitive judgements, because individuals use rational reasons to explain them; fourth, they are also experienced as emotive and aesthetic judgements, because they happen quickly, do not need previous evaluation, and produce powerful emotional reactions; and fifth, they can be based on different contents, and not only one group of moral rules and values.

These groups of moral values do "not vary randomly from culture to culture, but rather tend to cluster into sets of related goods" (Shweder, 2003b, p. 1120). Consequently, it was suggested that the moral domain could be organized in such a way that it is broader than the ideas of justice, rights, and harm (Shweder, 1990b; Shweder & Haidt, 2000; Shweder et al., 1997). Relativist theorists state that this specific group of moral values is privileged in specific cultural groups, especially Western communities (Bhatia, 2000; Biaggio, 1999; Miller, 2001).

Using ethnographic methods to identify the moral standards and shared values of cultural communities, Shweder et al. (1987) compared North Americans and Indians, and found in the Indian culture, strict social rules that should be universally obeyed, that were based on duties towards the community and sometimes on religious rules. In contrast, in the United States, the subjects showed a greater liberality related to social rules, presenting a morality based on individual rights (Biaggio, 1999; Shweder et

al., 1987). Rights and duties were therefore suggested as important concepts for cultural differentiation in morality (Bhatia, 2000).

For Moghaddam and Kavulich (2007), conceptions of rights and duties are central to one's identity. Rights and duties, according to these authors, are constantly changing and in permanent negotiation within a culture, influencing one's sense of self (personal identity) and one's sense of their in-group (collective identity).

However, following more ethnographic research, a more complex taxonomy was later proposed by Shweder (1990b; Shweder et al., 1997), which differed from his first idea in which he used the categories of rights and duties. Shweder et al. (1997) aimed at identifying the main themes in the Indian moral discourse, and they were: virtue, social order, souls and feelings, tradition and customs, duties, sacred order, interdependence, hierarchy, nature, justice and fairness, purity, harm and well-being, chastity, respect for possessions, truthfulness and honesty, and transcendence (Shweder, 2003a). These themes were analysed and some of them were found to be conceptually linked.

The taxonomy was, consequently, increased to include three ethics: moral codes or orientations used to guide an individual's conception of right and wrong. As proposed by Shweder, the three ethics can coexist in the same culture, but with varying degrees of emphasis. This variation might suggest different moral conflicts within each culture and create different levels of tolerance to moral violations (Vainio, 2003). These different discourses can be based on institutions of moral authority (e.g., the church, God, the family, or the self) or on different contents (e.g., valuing tradition,

conformity to social norms, or freedom of choice). Also, the moral codes do not have a developmental sequence, but can be equally endorsed in any stage of life as they do not categorise individuals into high or low levels of moral reasoning (Jensen, 1998). They are described as follows.

Ethics of Autonomy

Defined by cognitive theorists as the moral domain by excellence (Edwards, 1987; Leitão, 1999; Nisam, 1987; Nucci & Turiel, 2000), the ethics of autonomy include the moral values related to justice, human rights, and prevention from harm. According to Triandis and Suh (2002), the ethics of autonomy is particularly important for people in individualist cultures.

This code defines the individual as the basic source of moral authority, restricted only by personal preferences (Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001). The moral concepts centre on equality of rights between individuals, independence, freedom of choice, personal well-being, needs, and desires (Jensen, 2004). For the ethics of autonomy, the central object of value is the individual.

The moral discourse of autonomy is based on possible harm, fairness, rights and justice, and it is reflected on the legal system (Haidt et al., 1993). In cultures that follow only autonomy ethics, an act cannot be condemned if there are no proofs that it may cause physical or psychological harm, restrict one's freedom or rights (Shweder & Haidt, 2000).

Toleration is an important virtue in these cultures, as it is essential to the acceptance of diversity, which is fundamental to the existence of liberalism (Ten, 1999). However, it is important to clarify that toleration does

not necessarily mean approval, recognition or social acceptance. According to Ten (1999), the term can include the actual approval or merely non-interference or coercion of other's beliefs and practices.

Jensen (1995) suggests that individual autonomy has been given a sacred status in contemporary societies, where individuals should aim at being free from social norms and tradition, expressing their true self and obtaining self-fulfilment.

Ethics of Community

Seen as the duty-based morality (Bhatia, 2000; Chiu et al., 1997), the ethics of community define the individual as a member of a group. As emphasised by Shweder (2003b, p. 1120), "the basic idea is that one's role or station in life is intrinsic to one's identity and is part of a larger interdependent collective enterprise with a history and standing of its own".

This code emphasises a moral based on loyalty, duty, honour, respect, self-control, obedience to authority, and actions that are consistent with one's gender, social position, age or any other element of social roles. For Triandis and Suh (2002), this category is essential for collectivist cultures, where the morality is contextual and the supreme value is the welfare of the community. People tend to behave according to the established social roles. Whenever an individual deviates from the expected normative behaviour, there is a possible loss of identity for both individual and in-group (Triandis & Suh, 2002).

The basis of one's beliefs and values are role responsibilities within family, school, community, nation, etc. (Arnett et al., 2001). In such moral

domain, personal choices (e.g. what to wear or whom to marry with) have moral meaning and importance, and the search for the success of individual's objectives may cause shame and embarrassment. Actions considered offensive to the community are seen as disrespectful, repulsive and morally wrong, even when they do not cause any harm (Jensen, 1995; Shweder et al., 1997). Shweder (2003a) suggests that honour, reputation and self-control are examples of moral goods with the function of maintaining the community and protecting it from deterioration.

The moral discourse of the ethics of community emphasises group membership (e.g., family, nation), role related obligations, duties, social order and social traditions (Jensen, 1995). This moral code understands the social groups as an essential part of one's identity, and the self aims at fulfilling one's duties towards others (Jensen, 2006).

Ethics of Divinity

The ethics of divinity expresses the important return of religiosity and spirituality to the moral domain. The mainstream cognitive-developmental approach to morality, as it is based on a secular view of the human being, has given priority to autonomy moral values, minimized the significance of a community-based morality, and overlooked spiritual or religious concepts (Jensen, 2006; Miller, 2001). Richards (1991; Richards & Davison, 1992) highlighted the fact that in research on Kohlberg's moral theory, adults presenting religious concepts as justification for moral judgements are usually categorized at the conventional level even when they present reasoning at the post-conventional level.

However, for some people, their moral values and concerns may be entirely related to their religious faith (Jensen, 2006). Religious and spiritual systems are important to around 90% of the world population, and their main function is to guide the individual towards the values they should strive for, and provide them with psychological (e.g., faith, devotion) and behavioural (e.g., rituals) strategies to reaching these goals (Emmons, 2005; Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003; Shah, 2004).

Cultural research has shown the importance of religiosity and spirituality to morality, as different spiritual perspectives are embedded with moral prescriptions (Haidt et al., 1993, Miller, 2001; Snarey, 1985; Zimba, 1994). Religiosity / spirituality can provide individuals with structured patterns of right and wrong behaviour. However, it does not guarantee that individuals who belong to a religious denomination will always act morally (Shah, 2004).

According to Shah (2004), a consistent social support system (i.e. family, peers, and educational institutions) may be an important factor that influences moral behaviour. Studying 100 male adolescent participants in Malaysia, Shah found that the individuals' level of religiosity associated with religious fathers and religious schooling directly influences their moral orientation.

Within the framework of the ethics of divinity, the self is described as a spiritual entity subject to a spiritual or natural order (Shweder, 2003a). The central moral values are related to a divine or natural law, including beliefs based on traditional religious authorities and texts (e.g. the Bible, the Torah), duties and obligations to a divinity, avoidance of God's punishment and seeking God's rewards (Arnett et al., 2001; Jensen, 1995).

People are viewed as holders of something sacred, and the body is experienced as a temple. Therefore, moral goods aim at protecting the divinity within each person by reaching for purity and avoiding contamination (Haidt et al., 1993).

Natural order is an important regulator of morality in divinity ethics. Individuals should act according to these natural guidelines (Arnett et al., 2001). The moral discourse under the ethics of divinity emphasises duties and obligations to a divinity, the authority of a god, spiritual entity or natural order, spiritual rewards or punishments (Jensen, 1995), following rules and traditions based on religious texts and authorities, and the search for meaning and connectedness. Faithfulness and humility towards God are important virtues (Shweder et al., 1997).

Haidt et al. (1993) emphasise an association of the ethics of divinity with the ethics of community, because of its conservative view of the social norms. Although the source of moral content (community or divine) and the moral authority (in-group or spiritual) are different, they both focus on duties, obedience and respect for authorities (Shweder, 1990b; Shweder et al., 1997). Similar to the ethics of community, personal choices (e.g., personal hygiene, sexual preferences) also have a moral meaning in divinity. Actions that disrespect one's spiritual nature are condemned, even if they do not cause any harm (Shweder & Haidt, 2000).

Summarising, autonomy is regulated by concepts such as harm, rights, and justice, to protect individuals' personal choices. Community is regulated by concepts such as duty, interdependence, and empathy, to protect the integrity of the community. Divinity is regulated by concepts

related to a sacred order, natural order, and tradition, to protect the soul from degradation (Shweder, 2003a).

Paolicchi (2007) suggested the three ethics were different modes of meaning-making for the individuals within each cultural community, allowing researchers to study universal themes, but paying attention to cultural specificities (Jensen, 1998). In this sense, one ethic might predominate in the social practices and norms of a particular culture, but to cover "the complexities of such an important area of human experience as ethics" (Shweder, 2003a, p. 100), multiple moral discourses are necessary.

It is important to clarify that Shweder's proposal was not developed as a relativist theory, but a necessary complement to universal approaches (Cooper & Denner, 1998). Shweder states he proposed a theory of "universalism without the uniformity" (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993, p. 507). Universalism means that human beings all over the world can present similar cognitive processes on their moral development; it also means that the content of morality is not infinite, but it can be clustered into sets of shared moral norms and values that can be identified across different cultural communities. However, it is not uniform because these clusters of moral norms and values present different relationships among themselves, and they are endorsed differently according to the context. Each culture reinforces the clusters that are in accordance with their conceptions of person, society, and nature, and consequently present different explanations for human behaviour and suffering (Shweder et al., 1997; Vainio, 2003).

A recent proposal developed by Haidt and Graham (2007; see also Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007), the Moral Foundations Theory, suggests the

existence of five foundations that serve as basis for human's morality: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity. Based on these five "psychological systems that give rise to moral intuitions" (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 104), they have developed (but not yet published) a scale to measure these concepts, the Moral Foundations Questionnaire - MFQ (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2007). The authors suggest an association between their theoretical view and Shweder's: the autonomy moral code would emphasize the dimensions harm/care and fairness/reciprocity; dimensions of ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect would underlie the ethics of community; and the last one, the purity/sanctity dimension is the basis of the ethics of divinity.

Research on the Big Three

Several researchers have shown the usefulness of Shweder's approach to morality, analysing the use of the three codes in the moral discourse of participants in Brazil (Haidt et al., 1993), Finland (Vainio, 2003), India (Jensen, 1998), Japan (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), Philippines (Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001), and the U.S. (Arnett et al., 2001; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt et al., 1993; Jensen, 1995, 1998; Rozin et al., 1999; Vasquez et al., 2001).

Haidt et al. (1993), studying 12 groups of people in two cities of Brazil and the United States, found cross-cultural and intra-cultural differences in both countries. Using both moral issues as proposed by domain researchers (Edwards, 1987; Nucci & Turiel, 2000), addressing questions related to fairness and justice, and issues related to respect, duty, in-group morality,

and disgust, the authors verified that university students in both countries used the ethics of autonomy more often than the other two. Cross-cultural differences were also found, with Americans using, in general, more the ethics of autonomy than Brazilian participants.

Collecting data within the general population and using participants' socioeconomic status (SES) as independent variables, low SES young adults in both countries justified their moral discourse on the basis of the ethics of community more than autonomy, whereas high SES groups used more the latter (Haidt et al., 1993).

Jensen (1995) conducted a series of interviews with 30 adults, involving six moral issues: four general issues chosen by the author (suicide in general, suicide in case of terminal illness, incest between consenting adults, and incest between an adult and a child), and two personal issues chosen by each participant. The moral discourse of the participants was analysed using the coding manual for the three ethics developed by Jensen (Felter & Jensen, 2003; Jensen, 2004).

She found that young adults based strongly their moral views in the ethics of autonomy; community values were less often used, and the divinity code rarely used. Adults and older participants used the three ethics in a more balanced way (Jensen, 1995). This author concludes suggesting that the language of autonomy is common among middle-class young adults, whose moral discourses centre on individual rights, fairness, and personal decisions; midlife and older adults, on the other hand, expressed their moral views balancing the importance of autonomy values with concerns for the demands of the community, nature, and God. Jensen suggests there might

be a change in individuals' moral discourse according to their developmental stage. Adolescents and young adults are part of the university environment, which favours individualism (Haidt et al., 1993). As they grow old, community and spiritual concerns might rise, integrating all three ethics in a more mature moral discourse (Jensen, 1995).

Similar results were found by Vasquez et al. (2001) with samples from the U.S, where participants presented moral judgments based on autonomy, and the Philippines, where a more balanced mixture of all three ethics was used.

Also studying non-university young adults in the U.S., Arnett et al. (2001) found no significant differences in the use of community and autonomy moral codes regarding low and high SES levels, with the participants showing a balance between these two ethics. However, participants with low SES use more the divinity code than those with high SES. In terms of educational level, the participants with the higher level of education more often cited autonomy values than those with less educational level. The authors concluded affirming that the balance found between the autonomy and community ethics in general population samples seems to be a more accurate portrait of community young adults' moral views, when in comparison to university students' samples.

Rozin et al. (1999) proposed an association of these three ethics with emotions. For Haidt (2003a), moral emotions are those connected to the interests and welfare of the society as a whole, and to the interest and welfare of people who are not the judge or the agent of an action. This author

suggests that moral emotions are human products of evolution as well as products of cultural patterns shaped by local values and meanings.

Based on these perspectives, Rozin et al. (1999) proposed the CAD Triad Hypothesis, which associates three emotions - contempt, anger, and disgust – with the violations of the three moral codes – community, autonomy, and divinity, respectively. That is, the violation of the autonomy code would mainly elicit anger, due to the theoretical association of anger with rights and harm; the violation of community would mainly elicit contempt, due to the relationship of this emotion with hierarchical relationships between individuals and groups; and violations of the ethics of divinity would mainly elicit disgust, because of the strong relationship of this emotion with avoidance of pollution, and purity for the body and soul (Haidt, 2003a). Data collected in the U.S. and Japan using emotion words and facial expressions of emotions supported the CAD hypothesis, suggesting the relevance of the proposed association between the moral codes and emotions.

Studying tendencies toward fundamentalism and progressivism related to moral, social, and political issues in religious samples in India and the United States, Jensen (1998) found similarities and differences in both countries. Participants who supported a progressivist view presented justifications basically in terms of the ethic of autonomy, whereas orthodox participants' discourse centred on the ethic of divinity. Fundamentalist and progressivist participants did not differ in the use of the community moral code. It was also found that American progressivists presented a moral discourse more based on the ethic of autonomy than Indian progressivists.

Vainio (2003) also identified the use of the three ethics when studying different religious groups of adolescents in Finland (Lutherans, Laestadians, and non-religious). Participants were asked about their judgements on moral (e.g., stealing, gender inequality) and non-moral (e.g., opening shops on Sundays, making moral education non-religious) issues. Non-religious adolescents used the ethics of autonomy more frequently, followed by the ethics of community. The ethics of divinity was not used by this group. Lutherans used all three ethics, whereas Laestadians used mainly the ethics of divinity, followed by the ethics of autonomy. Use of the ethics of autonomy was negatively related to high religiosity, whereas using the ethics of divinity was positively related, and the ethics of community was not associated to religiosity. Autonomy was directly related to the community, and inversely related to divinity in Finland. Community and divinity were not related.

Finally, studies in the U.S. compared liberal and conservative participants, suggesting that these two groups perceive morality in different ways (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Haidt and Hersh (2001) studied participants' moral evaluations of taboo sexual behaviour, and found the ethics of community and divinity were used in conservative groups, whereas the ethics of autonomy was used in liberal groups, whose speech emphasised the human rights and the freedom of choice of a person when participating in a private act.

For the authors, liberals presented a narrow morality, based on ideas of harm, individual's rights and justice, whereas conservatives presented a broader morality, encompassing values and norms of all three ethics (Haidt & Hersh, 2001).

These studies were conducted using exclusively ethnographic and other qualitative methods to measure different ethics. These methods provide more detailed and in-depth information regarding certain objects of study. However, they are "exploratory and inductive in nature", whereas a standard measure based on a quantitative methodology is "confirmatory and deductive in nature" (Trochim, 2006, Qualitative and quantitative assumptions, ¶ 3). In this sense, a reliable and valid instrument to measure different ethics is important and could improve data collection, for example, by reducing time for collection and easily dealing with large sample sizes. Also, it could be used to confirm and replicate theoretical and exploratory associations, and could also help revealing structures, enhancing theory modification.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed theory and research on the community, autonomy, and divinity moral codes. In summary, the three ethics are proposed as different codes of conduct, or different ways in which people of diverse cultures may structure their beliefs, values, and moral views, and through them, justify their moral judgements in response to environmental demands. These moral codes have been developed based on cultural research, and have been tested cross-culturally in different studies, suggesting the theory behind it supports cultural communities' universality and specificities in the moral domain.

According to Haidt and colleagues (1993), Shweder's works generated possibilities of constructing valid cross-cultural models of moral judgment.

These models should specify what is universal and what is contextual on the different existent moralities around the world.

Most research has been based on ethnographic methods, and it is argued that developing a quantitative measure of the relative endorsement of these moral codes can improve research on the topic and allow the investigation of these constructs, and their relation to cultural dimensions and individual difference variables.

The next chapter will present one study that develops an instrument that measures the endorsement of the three moral codes proposed by Shweder.

CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY, AUTONOMY, AND DIVINITY SCALE

> *To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.*
>
> - John Stuart Mill (1863)

This chapter focuses on the development of the Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale, analysis of its underlying structure and relationship to different psychological constructs. As suggested in Chapter 3, a standardised quantitative measure of moral codes endorsement would provide a different method for research on morality, allowing structural analysis. Specifically, this chapter presents the initial development of items for the scale, followed by exploratory factor analysis and validity analysis.

Based on previous theoretical and empirical evidence (Haidt et al., 1993; Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder et al., 1997; Triandis & Suh, 2002), six structural hypotheses were also proposed, focusing on the relationship of the three moral codes to horizontal and vertical Ind-Col, intrinsic religiosity, and disgust sensitivity.

Three further hypotheses were proposed, named cultural hypotheses, focusing on the mean endorsement of moral codes by British participants, and testing for gender differences.

Study 1

Study 1 was conducted with an initial version of the CAD Scales. Factor analyses were used to select the items that would compose the scale and psychometric properties were analysed in order to test its convergent and discriminant validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Pasquali 2003).

A pool of 107 items was generated based on a coding manual suggested by Jensen (2004; Felter & Jensen 2003), to represent the three ethics proposed by Shweder and colleagues (1987; 1997). Originally, the coding manual was used to categorise participant's moral justifications in interviews. These categories were used in item development because they were produced based on participants' freely given answers, suggesting the existence of the three moral codes in people's real moral discourse. In doing this, one novelty was introduced to research in this area. Previous research of the Big Three moral codes have generally focused on how these codes are used to judge actions as morally wrong. However, to measure how much individuals use moral standards to approve of actions seen as morally right is also important (Nisan & Koriat, 1989). While social psychology tends to focus on pro-social acts, such as undoing harm or affirming their rights, as the primary example of morally positive behavior (e.g., Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), it has not given as much attention to other types of action that can be considered to support community or divinity ethics, such as fulfilling duties or respecting sacred boundaries. Table 1 shows the definitions used to generate the items as well as some sample items.

These items were created in accordance with the three ethics, as follows: the *ethics of autonomy* consisted of 17 morally right and 18 morally wrong items; to the *ethics of community*, 19 morally right and 17 morally wrong; and to the *ethics of divinity*, 17 morally right and 19 morally wrong. All items were written in a Likert-type format, with responses made on a 7-point scale, ranging from **1** (*Not important at all*) to **7** (*Of the utmost importance*).

The main initial goal was to reduce this first pool of items to create a parsimonious and internally valid instrument. To select the items and test their content validity (Anastasi & Urbina, 2000), the 107 items were presented to 15 judges, who read definitions of the ethics, then were asked to read every item and categorise it into one of the three ethics. The items that reached 70% of agreement among all judges were included in the questionnaire. Twenty five items were excluded by this analysis, and the second pool was made up of 82 items, all included in the questionnaire presented to the participants in Study 1.

It was expected that exploratory factor analysis would yield three factors: community, autonomy, and divinity. In line with previous theory and research (Haidt et al., 1993), community and divinity would be more closely correlated with each other (*hypothesis S1*) than to autonomy, as both support a hierarchical system and conservative social norms, while families and communities often share religious beliefs.

Table 1. *Moral codes definitions and sample items*

Moral codes	Definition*	Categories *	Sample items on the CADS
Community	- The person is described in terms of his/her membership in groups (family, community, nation); - Persons act in terms of their social roles; - Importance of the welfare, the goals, needs and interests of the group; - Interdependence among the group members.	- Avoidance of social sanctions; - Customary and traditional authority; - Duty; - Social order and harmony.	- It is a customary practice of the community; - It is socially approved; - People disrespect the social order; - It opposes the beliefs of the family.
Autonomy	- The person is an autonomous individual who is free to make choices; - Discourse centres on individual rights, needs, feelings, and well-being; - Restrictions are based on a prohibition on inflicting harm to oneself and others, as well as encroaching upon the rights of other people; - Also includes a concern with equality.	- Self's interests; - Fairness; - Reciprocity; - Rights.	- It happens with voluntary consent; - It expresses personal choice and liberty; - It restricts the individual's rights; - It prevents someone from having their privacy.
Divinity	- The person is a spiritual entity; - His/her behaviours should be in accordance with a spiritual or natural order; - Avoidance of degradation; - Seeking for moral purity.	- Important spiritually; - Nature law authority; - God's authority; - Duty.	- It is a religious tradition; - It is God's will; - It is unnatural; - It is considered a sin.

Note. * Categories derived by Jensen (2004) to code participant's discourse.

No a-priori hypotheses were elaborated in terms of the relationship between morally right and wrong standards, due to the lack of information in the literature.

Although the titles "autonomy" and "community" might suggest a direct mapping to individualism and collectivism, conceptually these constructs are not the same. The ethics are domains of moral discourse theoretically related to the horizontal and vertical attributes of individualism/collectivism. In fact, the core concepts of the autonomy code emphasise values central to the horizontal attributes of both individualism and collectivism. Triandis and Gelfand (1998) suggest that *horizontality* gives importance to equality, whereas *verticality* emphasises hierarchical systems. Vertical individualism is more concerned with personal power, hierarchy, and dominance, and therefore, not expected to relate to the autonomy code, which emphasises rights, justice, and avoidance of harm. Horizontal individualism and horizontal collectivism would both be related to autonomy (*hypothesis S2*), because each can underlie concern for equality and the rights of others (Schwartz, 2007). Another clear conceptual mapping connects divinity and community ethics to vertical collectivism (*hypothesis S3*), as both ethics rely on a sense of hierarchy and duty – be it to family, group leaders or God. Horizontal collectivism was also predicted to associate with community, as assigning high value to relations with social equals can be seen as concern for community and high regard for the rights of others (*hypothesis S4*).

Based on previous findings associating religiosity with endorsement of the divinity moral code (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Jensen, 1998), it was expected

a positive association between intrinsic religiosity orientation and divinity ethics (*hypothesis S5).*

The emotion of disgust is usually associated in the literature with religious values (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Haidt & Hersh, 2001), as well as strong normative values (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). Rozin et al. (1999) have shown, in particular, an association between the emotion of disgust and divinity moral violations, when asking the participants to choose one of the presented facial expressions and emotion words. However, their results also showed a significant, if lesser correlation between some of the disgust facial expressions and violations of community ethics. Therefore, associations between divinity and community with general disgust sensitivity are expected (*hypothesis S6*).

Although examining a single cultural group does not provide conclusive information of the effects of culture, specific cultural predictions were proposed. This method is by no means ideal; nevertheless, it provides a 'rough' indication of possible differences that may be present within cultural communities. British students should present high scores in horizontality and individualism (*hypothesis C1*). Although the UK has high individualism (Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998), Schwartz and Ros (1995) show that Western European countries follow values such as egalitarianism and harmony more than hierarchy and achievement. Therefore British individualism might be more horizontal than vertical.

The literature offers contradictory findings about gender differences in moral judgment. Some researchers have suggested that women consider interpersonal context more than men in moral judgment (Gilligan, 1982; Ford

& Lowery, 1986). Therefore, women may score higher than men in divinity and community ethics (*hypothesis C2*). However, this hypothesis is only tentative, as other researchers have concluded there are no meaningful gender differences in moral judgment (Boldizar, Wilson, & Deemer, 1989; for a review, see Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), and concern for interpersonal context can also arise while balancing the rights of individuals.

And finally, as suggested by previous research on Western cultures (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993), British participants are expected to endorse the autonomy code most highly among all three ethics (*hypothesis C3*).

Method

Participants

Data were collected on a sample of 275 undergraduate students (180 women and 95 men) from a large British university. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 42 with a mean of 20.3 (*SD*=2.85). The majority of the participants did not have religious beliefs (52%), with a Catholic plurality among those who did (25%). Psychology undergraduate students were given research participation credit, which is a course requirement, for taking part in the study. Undergraduates from different courses were invited to take part in the study through an email, offering a payment of £3 (three pounds) for their participation.

Measures

The pilot CADS was formed by 82 items: 26 that were agreed to represent autonomy, 28 representing community, and 28 representing divinity. The items were preceded by these instructions:

> *The following sentences express standards that different people may have when judging something as morally right or morally wrong. When YOU are judging something as RIGHT / WRONG, to what extent is each of the following standards important to your judgment?*

All its items were presented in a Likert-type format, with responses made on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*Not important at all*) to 7 (*Of the utmost importance*).

Other scales introduced in the questionnaire to verify their relation to the extracted dimensions were:

Individualism and Collectivism. Proposed by Triandis and Gelfand (1998), this is a reduced and modified version of the Individualism and Collectivism 32-item scale (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995), and it measures the horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism. With four items for each dimension (ex.: *Winning is everything*), it is presented with a 7-point Likert response scale, ranging from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly agree*). This scale has previously been used successfully and presented low, but acceptable reliability in this sample (Cronbach's α = .60 for horizontal individualism; α = .69 for vertical individualism; α = .61 to horizontal collectivism; and α = .68 for vertical collectivism). Although most of these indices are below the .70 cut-off criteria, they can be considered acceptable (Garson, 2007) and they are consistently

similar to values found in previous research (Gouveia, Andrade, Jesus, Meira & Soares, 2002; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

Intrinsic Religiosity. This 9-item scale is constituted by the items measuring the intrinsic religiosity dimension (ex.: *My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life*) in the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). The participants are asked to answer it using a 5-point Likert type scale, with extremes 1 (*Strongly disagree*) and 5 (*Strongly agree*). Previous studies have demonstrated the validity and reliability of this scale (Brewczynski & MacDonald, 2006; Lewis, Maltby, & Day, 2005). In the current sample, the Cronbach's alpha was .93. Despite the fact that the intrinsic religiosity scale is usually presented with the extrinsic scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), we decided to include only the intrinsic-related items due to space constraints, as it represents personal religiosity, which is more related conceptually to divinity ethics, rather than participation in religious practices due to external reasons, which is less of a moral than a social choice. Although morality is related to social relationships, it has to be internalised by the individual (Baumeister & Exline, 1999). A person who presents an extrinsic religiosity has not necessarily internalised the beliefs that would be associated to the ethics of divinity. Instead, community ethics would be the reason behind their beliefs.

Sensitivity to Disgust. Developed by Haidt, McCauley, and Rozin (1994), this scale is a revised, reduced version, chosen due to time and space constraints, with only four of their proposed subscales: Core disgust (e.g.: *If I see someone vomit, it makes me sick to my stomach*), Death / Envelope violations (e.g.: *It would bother me tremendously to touch a dead*

body), Interpersonal disgust (e.g.: *I have no problem buying and wearing shirts from charity shops*), and Sexual disgust (e.g.: *It would bother me to see photos of two people having oral sex*). The participants should rate the 16 items, based on a four-point scale, if they strongly disagree (1) or strongly agree (4) with each one of them. Cronbach's alpha was .77.

Finally, the participants were asked to answer demographic questions, such as sex and age, and one question related to their level of religiosity/spirituality, with the responses given on a five-point scale, with 1 indicating "no religiosity/spirituality" and 5, a "strong religiosity/spirituality" (Inglehart et al., 1998).

Procedures

Initially, the students were asked to read an information sheet, with details about the importance of the project and explaining that they were free to take part on the study, as well as to leave the study at any time without consequences. It was also informed that theirs answers would be confidential and anonymous. The students who agreed to take part were asked to sign a consent form, providing their names, student number, email, and signature. These consent forms were placed in an envelope, and the questionnaire was handed in to the participant.

The order of scales within the questionnaire packet was randomly distributed, with two different orders, one having the CADS as the first instrument, and the other with the CADS as the last measure. In general, 15 minutes were sufficient for the students to complete the questionnaire.

Results

Item analysis

The indices used in the item analysis were the inter-item and item-total correlation. Each item that did not correlate with any other item or with its proposed subscale at r = +/-.40 or more was discarded, excluding 11 in total (two items were excluded from the Divinity subscale, four items from the Community subscale, and five from the Autonomy subscale). The remaining 71 items were submitted to separate maximum likelihood factor analysis using an orthogonal (*Varimax*) rotation.

Exploratory factor analysis

To be retained, an item had to present a factor loading equal to, or higher than +/-.45 in only one factor; any items presenting factor loadings higher than +/-.40 in more than one factor, or in no factors, were discarded. These limits were chosen in order to have a more parsimonious instrument, with only strong items in each factor. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index for sample adequacy was .89, and the χ^2 index of the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was 14,490.93 ($p < .001$), indicating the matrix was suitable for factor analysis.

From the set of 71 items, 59 presented acceptable factor loadings in the expected categories. The initial solution presented five factors with *eigenvalues* higher than 1. However, two out of the five factors were not meaningful, i.e., grouping items from all three codes in the same factor. Also, a *scree plot* analysis (Cattel, 1966) suggested three main factors to be

retained. Their wordings and factor loadings are reported in Table 2. It is important to emphasise that there are no reversed items in the scale, only items that focus on morally right and morally wrong actions or behaviours, which loaded in the same factors for each moral dimension.

Table 2. *Factor analysis of CADS items with orthogonal rotation*

Items*	Factor loadings		
	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
Morally right items:			
33 - It is in accordance with true faith	.85		
32 - People will gain God's approval from it	.85		
12 - It is God's will	.84		
29 - It is in accordance with religious authority	.80		
19 - It is in accordance with the scriptures	.79		
03 - It respects the laws of nature	.72		
17 - People may be rewarded for it after death	.69		
01 - It is a religious tradition	.66		
15 - It is in accordance with the natural order	.60		
28 – It respects someone's privacy		.59	
21 – It happens with voluntary consent		.58	
27 - It express personal choice		.55	
05 - It allows the person to defend herself		.54	
41 - It protects interests and needs		.52	
08 – It expresses someone's autonomy		.51	
09 - It promotes physical well-being		.50	
11 - It promotes psychological well-being		.49	
24 - It is in accordance with their personal beliefs		.49	
14 - It socially approved			.75
10 - It socially accepted			.74
13 – The person gains respect from society			.66
31 - It follows the rules of the group			.66
40 - It respects social order			.65
04 – It is a common practice of the community			.63
16 - It respects family traditions			.57
37 - It is accepted by family			.56
02 – The person gains respect from family			.53
Morally wrong items:			
64 - It is against God's will	.84		
47 - It is against the scriptures	.82		
55 - It is against true faith	.81		
42 - It opposes religious authority	.77		
75 - It is considered a sin	.73		
49 - It is unnatural	.68		

82 - It opposes the laws of nature	.66		
46 - It pollutes the spirit	.65		
48 - It is degrading to the soul	.57		
70 - It opposes the natural order	.55		
54 - It degrades the sanctity of the body	.50		
80 - People may be punished for it after death	.49		
66 - It restricts the freedom of choice of a person		.75	
74 - It restricts personal choice and liberty		.74	
77 - It restricts the possibility of defence		.73	
57 - It restricts the individual's rights		.72	
71 - It restricts someone's privacy		.69	
79 - It happens without voluntary consent		.65	
78 - People involved fail to take responsibility for their own acts		.62	
67 - It restricts someone's autonomy		.60	
65 - It causes psychological harm to the people involved		.54	
59 - It fails to protect someone's interests and needs		.53	
62 - Society considers it unacceptable			.75
63 - It opposes the rules of society			.73
52 - It is socially condemned			.69
58 - It is against the rules of one's social group			.66
51 - It brings disorder to society			.55
56 - The family considers it unacceptable			.54
68 - It opposes the beliefs of the family			.54
45 - People disrespect the social order			.51
72 - It opposes the interests of society			.51
73 - It is against the customary practices of the community			.46
Number of items	21	19	19
Eigenvalue	12.85	10.03	7.24
% of variance	18%	14%	10.20%
Cronbach's Alpha	.96	.94	.89

Note. * Items ordered according to the magnitude of their factor loadings.

The first factor, with 21 items, expressed divinity ethics, with factor loadings from .85 to .49. This dimension presented an *eigenvalue* of 12.85, explaining 18% of the variance (Cronbach's α = .96). The second factor, formed by 19 items, expressed community ethics, with factor loadings from .75 to .49, with an *eigenvalue* of 10.03, 14% of explained variance (Cronbach's α = .94). The third factor, with 19 items, expressed autonomy

ethics, with factor loadings from .75 to .46. It explained 10.20% of the variance, with an *eigenvalue* of 7.24 (Cronbach's $\alpha = .89$).

The three main factors explained altogether 42.2% of the variance. Similar analyses were performed with both morally right and morally wrong items separately, obtaining similar structures.

Structural hypotheses

Initially, possible order effects were tested, but no significant results were found. Correlations among the CADS dimensions were next examined, and the factor means were also analysed to verify the endorsement of each of the extracted factors (Table 3). Among the dimensions, divinity and community presented the strongest correlation, corroborating hypothesis S1. Community also presented a positive correlation with autonomy. These two correlations were significantly different from each other, t (272) = 2.25, $p <$ .05. Autonomy and divinity were not correlated, and this lack of association was also significantly different from the correlation between community and autonomy, t (272) = 3.53, $p < .01$, and between community and divinity, t (272) = 5.83, $p < .01$.

Table 3. *Correlations between CADS dimensions, horizontal-vertical ind-col, religiosity and disgust in Britain*

	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Community	4.43 (.92)	-								
2. Autonomy	5.10 (.83)	.26**	-							
3. Divinity	3.53 (1.13)	.43**	.04	-						
4. Horiz. Individualism	5.21 (.79)	-.08	.17**	-.03	-					
5. Vertical Individualism	3.98 (1.00)	.11	.01	.07	.19**	-				
6. Horiz. Collectivism	5.44 (.71)	.47**	.30**	.22**	.01	-.19**	-			
7. Vertical Collectivism	4.04 (.96)	.50**	.09	.40**	.01	.11	.31**	-		
8. Intrinsic Religiosity	2.13 (.98)	.04	-.10	.59**	-.09	.03	.01	.32**	-	
9. Level of religiosity	2.12 (1.15)	.03	-.08	.54**	-.12	.03	.03	.23**	.82**	-
10. Disgust	2.47 (.46)	.23**	.05	.33**	-.15*	.08	.08	.36**	.23**	.21**

Note. N = 275; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

Horizontal individualism correlated only with autonomy, whereas vertical individualism did not correlate with any of the CADS dimensions. Horizontal collectivism was positively associated with all three dimensions, but more strongly with community versus divinity, t (272) = 4.27, $p < .01$, and autonomy, t (272) = 2.53, $p < .05$. Vertical collectivism had near-identical correlations with divinity and community. These results support hypotheses S2, S3, and S4.

Despite the fact that the intrinsic religiosity scale is usually presented with the extrinsic scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), we decided to include only the intrinsic-related items as it represents personal religiosity, which is more related conceptually to divinity ethics, rather than participation in religious practices due to external reasons, which is less of a moral than a social choice. Both religiosity variables correlated only with divinity, supporting hypothesis S5. Sensitivity to disgust also presented the expected association with community and divinity (hypothesis S6).

Cultural hypotheses

British students were expected to score highly on the horizontal attribute and the individualist dimension (*hypothesis C1*). In a 2 (Dimension: individualism-collectivism) x 2 (Attribute: horizontal-vertical) repeated measures analysis of variance there was a main effect of dimension, F (1, 274) = 118.47, MSE = 113.92, $p < .001$, with individualism generally higher than collectivism; a main effect of attribute, F (1, 274) = 257.18, MSE = 183.27, $p < .001$, with the horizontal dimension higher than the vertical; and a significant interaction, F (1, 274) = 107.52, MSE = 47.88, $p < .001$, where

participants endorsed horizontal individualism (M = 5.44), vertical individualism (M = 5.03) and horizontal collectivism (M = 5.21) highly, but vertical collectivism (M = 3.98). These results support the proposed hypothesis C1.

A 2 x 3 (Gender, Ethics) mixed analysis tested both for overall differences in endorsement of the three ethics (hypothesis C3), and gender differences in ethics endorsement (hypothesis C2). A main effect of ethics was found, F (2, 544) = 218.34, MSE = 159.89, $p < .001$, with the ethics of autonomy endorsed most highly, as expected in a Western culture, whereas divinity had the lowest mean, and community fell between divinity and autonomy. These findings confirmed hypothesis C3. Gender also had a significant main effect, F (1, 272) = 25.38, MSE = 32.01, $p < .001$, suggesting an overall stronger endorsement of morality items among women. However, there was no significant Gender x Ethic interaction, so hypothesis C2 was not confirmed.

Discussion

The present study aimed at developing a scale to evaluate the endorsement of the moral codes proposed by Shweder (1990; Shweder et al., 1997) and testing its psychometric properties.

The original scale consisted of 82 items, equally divided between the standards proposed to judge something as morally right or morally wrong. The CADS was administered to a sample of undergraduate students to analyse their factor structure. From the original set of items, 59 were retained

after item (item-total and inter-item correlations) and exploratory factor analyses. The three proposed main factors were extracted by the analysis, with all factors presenting satisfactory internal consistency indexes (Cronbach's Alpha).

Testing the convergent and discriminant validity of a new measure imposes a difficult task, especially when the construct in which the scale is based has not been fully developed in the literature, allowing the comparison with different instruments. Although the moral domain has been extensively discussed and studied in social science research, the moral codes proposed are a different way of looking at this domain, embracing the influence of culture and acknowledging the fact that the moral world is not restricted exclusively to harm, rights and justice ideas (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt et al., 1993).

Following the factor analyses, the mean of each factor was calculated, indicating the participants' endorsement of the moral codes. Autonomy standards obtained the highest approval by the participants, and divinity has presented the lowest mean, indicating that the participants do not consider it important to use religion-related standards to judge an act as morally right or wrong. Previous qualitative studies made in the U.S. (Jensen, 1995) have shown that in general, young adults (from 19 to 24 years old) apply mainly the ethics of autonomy to explain their moral views, with the community code following in second place in the frequency of answers; the divinity code is rarely used by this group (Jensen, 1995), suggesting the relevance of the findings. This author has replicated the same pattern of support for the three ethics among university students in a different study (Arnett et al., 2001).

In terms of the relationships between the factors, divinity correlated only with community, which also correlated with autonomy, showing that the moral codes share values and standards among themselves.

The associations found within the Horizontal and Vertical dimensions of the Individualism and Collectivism scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) presented an interesting pattern. In terms of the relationship between the factors of individualism and collectivism, it is possible to observe that autonomy was associated with both horizontal dimensions, suggesting shared equality ideals (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). In this sense, a relationship between autonomy and Collectivism may be found if this equality is guaranteed.

All expected associations with disgust sensitivity, with the divinity and community factors were found, as suggested by Rozin et al. (1999), as well as the association between divinity and intrinsic religiosity. As the intrinsic religiosity scale (Brewczynski & MacDonald, 2006) includes only items related to religious rules and beliefs, the participants who do not belong to any religious denomination but consider themselves as spiritual persons might have not been included in these analyses.

According to Hatch, Burg, Naberhaus, and Hellmich (1998), spirituality is a broader term that is not a synonym of religiosity. There is no definition of spirituality accepted by most theorists; however there is a general agreement that non-religious people may define themselves as spiritual and have spiritual experiences (MacDonald, 2000; Moberg, 2002). Therefore, one of the objectives of the following study is the inclusion of a spirituality scale, to verify the relationship with this factor.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the development of the Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS), focusing on its underlying structure and validity. As expected, exploratory factor analysis has shown the existence of three main factors. These factors have shown the expected association between them and with other psychological constructs, as proposed.

The developed CADS have shown good psychometric properties, suggesting its use for future research. While the results of Study 1 were encouraging, Study 2 was designed to provide further information on the psychometric properties and correlates of the CADS. Expanding the selection of measures given to participants, Study 2 also collected more responses to the CADS to conduct test-retest reliability analysis in a two-session administration.

CHAPTER 5

CADS RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what's right.

- Isaac Asimov (1994)

This chapter focuses mainly on further psychometric properties of the CAD Scale. Specifically, this chapter aims at presenting the results for the test-retest reliability analysis of the CADS. Expanding the selection of measures given to participants, Study 2 also aimed at replicating Study 1 results, establishing a nomological network for the proposed moral codes and providing information regarding the "big three" convergent and discriminant validity.

Study 2

Study 2 aimed at evaluating the test-retest reliability of the CADS among the British participants, further investigating the psychometric properties and correlates of the CADS.

Structural (S1 to S6) and cultural hypotheses (C1 to C3) proposed in Study 1 were expected to be replicated in Study 2. Reviewing, these hypotheses were: S1 – community and divinity would be more closely correlated with each other; S2 – autonomy would be correlated with horizontal individualism and horizontal collectivism; S3 – community and

divinity would be correlated with vertical collectivism; S4 – community would be correlated with horizontal collectivism; S5a – divinity would be correlated with intrinsic religiosity; S6 – community and divinity would be correlated with disgust sensitivity. In terms of cultural hypotheses, they were: C1 – British students would present high scores in horizontality and individualism; C2 – women would score higher than men in divinity and community ethics; and C3 – British students would present higher endorsement of the autonomy moral codes among all three ethics. This study also introduced a number of different constructs.

Personal religiosity or spirituality is an important aspect to be considered. The British culture nowadays is known for its secularity (e.g. Gill, Hadaway, & Marler, 1998; Voas & Crockett, 2005). However, Hatch et al. (1998) suggest that spirituality is a broader dimension than religiosity. Individuals can be spiritual (e.g. having mystical experiences) and not religious (e.g. taking part in a specific religious denomination). According to a recent study conducted by the German foundation Bertelsmann Stiftung (Bucher, 2007) in 20 countries, the proportion of young adults affirming they are spiritual rather than religious is higher in 11 countries, with Great Britain, United States and Spain among them. We have already seen that British individuals were low in adherence to religion, therefore it is possible they consider themselves more spiritual than religious (*hypothesis C4*), and that spiritual beliefs correlate with endorsement of divinity ethics (*hypothesis S5b*).

By definition, moral codes are sets of values organized around conceptions of morality expressed culturally by the people of a particular

community (Shweder et al., 1987, 1997). Therefore, personal and cultural values are central constructs to this definition and it is essential to investigate their association to the Big Three.

Based on the content of values dimensions proposed by Schwartz (1992) and also by Gouveia (2003), three further structural hypotheses were proposed. The ethics of community is expected to correlate directly with benevolence, conformity and security in the SVS (*hypothesis S7a*), and with the interactive function in the BVS (*hypothesis S7b*); the ethics of autonomy is expected to correlate directly with hedonism, self-direction, and universalism in the SVS (*hypothesis S8a*), and with the excitement function of values in the BVS (*hypothesis S8b*); and the ethics of divinity is expected to correlate directly with tradition in the SVS (*hypothesis S9a*), and with the normative function in the BVS (*hypothesis S9b*).

Although the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) is the most widely used values instrument, the Basic Values Survey (BVS), proposed by Gouveia (2003) will also be used in order to investigate the association between the moral codes and the functions of values, providing more empirical information on the relationship between values and morality.

Another construct related to individualism and collectivism, but proposed to be used exclusively at the individual level, is the independent and interdependent self-construals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In terms of relationship with the ethics, divinity and community are expected to correlate only with the interdependent dimension (*hypothesis S10a*), whereas autonomy is expected to correlate with the independent dimension (*hypothesis S10b*).

A construct largely associated to religiosity and concerns for social opinion is social desirability. Crowne and Marlowe (1960) proposed that social desirability is an unconscious tendency to provide a positive impression of the self, avoid criticism and receive general approval. For Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky, and Sagiv (1997), social desirability may be understood as a personality trait. Previous research has shown that religious participants present high scores in social desirability measures (Gillings & Joseph, 1996; Lewis, 2000), and moral conservatism (Rowatt & Schmitt, 2003). Consequently, it is expected that high social desirability scores correlate with the divinity and community factors (*hypothesis S11*).

In terms of social attitudes, Robinson (1993) suggests the domain that clearly expresses the divergences between liberal and conservatives are related to morality and life styles, such as the use of marijuana or sexual acts. This difference in attitudes scores decrease when discussing economic or fire arms policies, for example. Conservative participants usually present higher scores in religious fundamentalism, obedience to rules and norms, and self-control; whereas liberal participants present higher scores in values that represent independence, intellectual curiosity, hedonism, and freedom (Joe, Jones, & Miller, 1981).

As previously shown in Study 1, the distinction between the moral codes cannot be restricted to the bipolar dimension of liberalism and conservatism, as proposed by Knight (1993). However, the autonomy moral code is most used by liberals, as well as the community and divinity codes are used mainly by conservatives when justifying an action or behaviour (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). Consequently, it is expected to show a direct relation

of moral traditionalism scores with divinity, and an inverse relation with autonomy (*hypothesis S12*).

Inglehart et al. (1998) proposed that religious and conservative participants present low level of sexual liberalism and low belief in sexual freedom, which is in accordance with Robinson's (1993) previous statement. Therefore, it is hypothesised that participants who show high scores in both sexual liberalism and belief in sexual freedom will present a higher support for the ethics of autonomy, whereas sexually conservative participants will endorse the ethics of divinity (*hypothesis S13*).

Method

Participants

One hundred and forty two university students, from a large British university, participated in this study, which was divided in two parts in order to assess test-retest reliability. Students who registered for the study were informed they would be asked to return after four weeks to complete the second part, with a total of 138 returning participants (97%). Psychology students took part for partial fulfilment of a course requirement, on a voluntary basis, whereas students from other courses took part as paid respondents, having received £3 (three pounds) each[1].

Sixty-two percent of the total sample were women, and the mean age was 20.3 (*SD* = 2.85), ranging from 18 to 42 years old. British-born students were 68% of the sample; the other 32% of the sample was originally from 27

[1] Unfortunately, in all studies the number of participants from different courses was not enough to analyze the differences between them and psychology students.

different countries[2]. In terms of religion, 47% of the total sample affirmed to belong to a religious denomination, with a Catholic plurality (37%).

Measures

Besides the CADS, which was administered in both sessions and included as the first scale in the questionnaire in both sessions, Sensitivity to Disgust Scale (Haidt et al., 1994), Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism Scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), both administered in session 2, several other measures were included in order to analyse the nomological network of the final scale. Each values scale (SVS and BVS) was included in a session, so the content would not feel repetitive to participants. The placement of the other instruments was based on space and time constraints in each session. According to the session, they were:

1st session:

Schwartz Values Survey. Consists of a scale with 57 items developed by Schwartz (1994), in which the participant should indicate the importance of each specific value as a guiding principle in his/her life, using a scale that ranges from **-1** (*Opposed to my principles*) to **7** (*Of supreme importance*). The values are presented followed by a short definition, for example, '*FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)*'. The SVS measures 10 broad values, which presented the following Cronbach's alpha in this sample: Tradition (α = .68), Conformity (α = .74), Security (α = .71), Power (α = .72), Achievement (α = .65), Hedonism (α = .66), Stimulation (α = .67), Self-

[2] Participants were from the following countries (number of participants in parentheses): Argentina (2), Brazil (1), China (1), Cyprus (2), Denmark (1), France (3), Greece (2), Hong Kong (3), India (6), Indonesia (1), Ireland (1), Italy (1), Jamaica (1), Kenya (2), Lithuania (1), Malaysia (2), Mauritius (1), Netherlands (1), Nigeria (3), Pakistan (2), Poland (2), South Africa (1), Sudan (1), Sweden (1), US (1), Zimbabwe (2).

direction (α = .55), Universalism (α = .68), and Benevolence (α = .64). It has been studied with more than 40 samples in 20 different countries, and cross-cultural similarities in the content and structure of values have been observed (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). Low values are mainly a reflection of the small number of items per scale.

Social Desirability Scale. The Crowne and Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), is one of the mostly used social desirability scales. However, its content is highly dependent on the social standards of the period of time in which it was created. Stober (2001) developed a shorter and newer version of this scale, with 17 items (ex.: *In traffic, I am always polite and considerate of others*). To answer to the questions, the participant should write *true* (T) or *false* (F), according to his/her behaviour. This version has presented good convergent and discriminant validity, as well as acceptable reliability indexes (Cronbach's alpha = .65 in this sample).

Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale. Developed by Hatch et al. (1998), this scale aims at assessing spiritual beliefs not necessarily connected to a specific religion or religious practices. It consists of 19 items (ex.: *A spiritual force influences the events in my life.*) expressing beliefs, answered on a 5-points scale ranging from **1** = *Strongly disagree* to **5** = *Strongly agree*; and 4 items (ex.: *I solve my problems without using spiritual resources*), expressing behaviours, answered using a 5-points scale based on the frequency of the behaviour expressed by the item (**1** = *Never* to **5** = *Always*). The internal consistency found in this sample is .87 (Hatch et al., 1998).

Socio-demographic questions. Questions such as age, sex, religion, country of origin and years living in one's own country were included, as well as one-item scales (Inglehart et al., 1998), assessing the level of religiosity/spirituality (*How much do you consider yourself a religious/spiritual person?* ***0*** *= Not at all* to ***4*** *= Very religious/spiritual*), level of sexual liberalism (*In relation to sexuality, do you consider yourself to be...* ***0*** *= Very conservative* to ***4*** *= Very liberal*), and belief in sexual freedom (*If someone said that any individual should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would you tend to agree or disagree?* ***0*** *= Disagree* to ***4*** *= Agree*). Although religiosity and spirituality are different constructs, they were added in the same item as they are both related to beliefs in God and/or a natural order, and it was necessary to include non-religious but spiritualist participants in the correlation analysis with divinity.

2nd session:

Basic Value Survey (*BVS*). Developed by Gouveia (2003; Gouveia et al., 2007), this scale is composed by 18 items expressing specific values (such as, Affectivity – *To have a deep and durable relationship of affection*; Tradition - *To follow the social norms of your country*). The participant should indicate the level of importance that each value has as a guide principle in his/her life, using a seven-point scale, ranging from **1** = *Completely unimportant* to **7** = *Of the utmost importance.* Cronbach's alpha found in this sample is .60.

Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals Scale. Elaborated by Singelis (1994), it is constituted by 24 items equally distributed to express the two types of self: independent (e.g., *I like being unique and different from*

other people in many aspects), and interdependent (e.g., *If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible*). The participants should answer the items using a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from **1** = *Totally disagree* to **7** = *Totally Agree*. Reliabilities found in this sample were .63 for the independent self-construal, and .65 for the interdependent self-construal.

Moral Traditionalism Scale. A set of eight items (Conover & Feldman, 1981, 1986), aimed at measuring the support of social and moral conservative values (e.g., *There is too much sexual freedom these days*). The items to be answered in a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from **1** = *Totally agree* to **5** = *Totally disagree*. The alpha reliability index found was .74.

Procedures

The students were given an information sheet, providing details on the importance of the study, as well as their rights to leave the study at any time without having to give any explanations. They were asked to provide their university emails as identification for the questionnaire, due to the need to match the 1st and 2nd parts of the study. Although there was the need to identify the questionnaires, the confidentiality of the answers was guaranteed to the participants.

The two sessions were separated by four weeks. In both sessions, counter-balanced questionnaires were distributed, and the participants needed around twenty minutes to answer the first part, and around fifteen minutes for the second part.

Results

Test-retest reliability

Initially, CADS averaged scores were calculated for Time 1 (T1) and Time 2 (T2). They were followed by correlation analysis, in order to test the level of association between T1 and T2 scores. Generally, correlations indicated acceptable test-retest reliability. Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics, internal consistency (α) and correlations among the 1st and 2nd administrations of the CADS.

Divinity score in T1 correlated at .87, $p < .01$ with Divinity in T2; Community in T1 correlated at .73, $p < .01$, with the same score in T2, whereas Autonomy (T1) correlated at .60, $p < .01$, in T2.

The averaged scores were submitted to a paired-sample *t* test to verify whether there was a significant means difference after the four-week interval.

Table 4. *CADS descriptive statistics, internal reliabilities and scales inter-correlations after four-week interval*

Factors	Time 1			Time 2		
	M	SD	α	M	SD	α
Divinity	3.41	1.32	.94	3.32	1.29	.95
Community	4.32	.94	.93	4.28	.97	.92
Autonomy	5.23	.78	.86	5.33	.75	.85
	Test-retest correlations					
	Divinity 2		Community 2		Autonomy 2	
Divinity 1	**.87****		.12		-.19*	
Community 1	.27**		**.73****		-.02	
Autonomy 1	-.14		-.02		**.60****	

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01.

No significant test-retest difference was found for any of the factors. The means showed a stronger endorsement of the autonomy factor when compared to community and divinity across both parts of the study, replicating findings from Study 1.

Nomological network

The factors' mean averages were calculated and these scores were used to test the theoretical hypotheses proposed, aiming at corroborating Study 1's results.

Initially, correlations among the factors showed that community presented a direct correlation with divinity (r = .26, p < .01), corroborating hypothesis S1. Autonomy presented an inverse, but marginal, correlation with divinity (r = -.16, p = .05), and did not present a significant correlation with community. Table 5 provides correlation coefficients between the moral codes and other proposed constructs.

Corroborating Study 1 results, horizontal individualism was correlated only with autonomy. Unexpectedly, vertical individualism correlated directly with the community dimension, whereas horizontal collectivism presented only a marginal correlation to community, partially corroborating hypotheses S2 and S4. Vertical collectivism correlated directly with both community and divinity, and inversely with autonomy (marginally), corroborating hypothesis S3.

The expected direct association between the divinity dimension with intrinsic religiosity and spirituality was found, corroborating hypotheses S5a

and S5b. Hypothesis S6, proposing the direct association between both divinity and community dimensions with disgust sensitivity was also corroborated.

Table 5. *Nomological network of the CADS dimensions*

	Community	Autonomy	Divinity
Horizontal Individualism	-.08	.20*	-.04
Vertical Individualism	.23**	.13	.08
Horizontal Collectivism	.15†	.11	.04
Vertical Collectivism	.27**	-.14†	.18*
Intrinsic religiosity	.01	-.14	.67**
Spirituality	-.03	-.15†	.71**
Disgust	.21**	-.07	.35**
Independence	.02	.32**	.14
Interdependence	.30**	-.08	.36**
Social desirability	.19*	-.09	.40**
Moral traditionalism	.29**	-.36**	.58**
Sexual liberalism	-.13	.21*	-.52**
Belief in sexual freedom	-.03	.28**	-.31**

Note. † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

The independent self-construal correlated directly and exclusively with the autonomy dimension, whereas the interdependent self-construal correlated directly with both community and divinity, corroborating hypotheses 10a and 10b.

Social desirability was also directly correlated with both divinity and community, corroborating hypothesis 11. Moral traditionalism was expected to correlate directly with divinity, and inversely with autonomy (hypothesis 12). These results were found, and moral traditionalism also correlated

directly to community. Sexual liberalism and belief in sexual freedom were both directly associated to autonomy, and inversely related to divinity, corroborating hypothesis S13.

In terms of human values, three hypotheses were proposed on their relationship with moral codes and results are presented in Table 6. Before conducting any analyses, Schwartz (2005) recommends the ipsatization of the value scores, i.e., centering each value item by calculating the individual total average across all values and dividing by the standard deviation. This procedure controls individual tendencies to rate all values as important.

Table 6. *CADS dimensions' association to human values*

	Community	Autonomy	Divinity
Power	.31**	.09	.07
Achievement	.30**	.11	.24**
Hedonism	.10	.19*	-.35**
Stimulation	-.23**	.04	-.18*
Self-direction	-.08	.46**	-.19*
Universalism	-.05	.20*	.29**
Benevolence	.31**	.14	.28**
Tradition	.22*	-.20*	.64**
Conformity	.25**	-.23**	.26**
Security	.40**	.03	.29**
Excitement	.21**	.36**	-.20*
Promotion	.24**	.20*	.04
Existence	.41**	.19*	.16
Supra-personal	-.06	.24**	-.16
Interactive	.40**	.11	.19*
Normative	.33**	-.19*	.72**

Note. † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Community was directly correlated with benevolence, conformity, and security values as measured by the SVS. Other direct associations were also found with power and achievement, and an inverse association was found to stimulation. Community was also directly correlated with the interactive sub-function of values as measured by the BVS, and to the excitement, promotion, existence, and normative sub-functions. These results corroborate hypotheses S7a and S7b.

Autonomy was directly correlated with hedonism, self-direction and universalism, as measured by the SVS, corroborating hypothesis S8a. Other significant associations found were inverse correlations to tradition and conformity values. Autonomy was also correlated with excitement and promotion functions, as measured by the BVS, corroborating hypothesis S8b. Other positive correlations were found with existence and supra-personal functions, as well as a negative correlation with the normative function.

Divinity was directly correlated with tradition, as measured by the SVS, corroborating hypothesis S9a. Other significant correlations were found with achievement, universalism, benevolence, conformity and security (directly), and with hedonism, stimulation and self-direction (inversely). Divinity was also correlated with the normative function as measured by the SVS, corroborating hypothesis S9b. Another significant direct correlation was found with the interactive sub-function, and inverse correlations with the excitement sub-function of values.

Cultural hypotheses

British participants were expected to score highly on the horizontal attribute and the individualist dimension (hypothesis C1). In a 2 (Dimension: individualism-collectivism) x 2 (Attribute: horizontal-vertical) repeated measures analysis of variance, there was a main effect of dimension, F (1, 140) = 35.76, MSE = 33.04, $p < .001$, with individualism generally higher than collectivism; a main effect of attribute, F (1, 140) = 131.49, MSE = 80.06, $p <$ .001, with the horizontal dimension higher than the vertical; and a significant interaction, F (1, 140) = 88.49, MSE = 35.00, $p < .001$, where participants endorsed horizontal individualism (M = 5.47), vertical individualism (M = 5.20) and horizontal collectivism (M = 5.45) highly, but not vertical collectivism (M = 4.22). These results support the proposed hypothesis (C1).

A 2 x 3 (Gender, Ethics) mixed analysis tested for differences in endorsement of the three ethics (hypothesis C3), and gender differences in moral codes endorsement (hypothesis C2). The main effect of ethics found in Study 1 was corroborated, F (2, 280) = 135.88, MSE = 120.38, $p < .001$, with the ethics of autonomy endorsed most highly (M = 5.29), as expected in a Western culture, whereas divinity had the lowest mean (M = 3.39), and community fell between divinity and autonomy (M = 4.25), supporting hypothesis C3. Contrary to Study 1 findings, gender did not present a significant main effect, F (1, 140) = .14, MSE = .15, p = .71, and no significant Gender x Ethic interaction was found, so hypothesis C2 was not confirmed.

To test hypothesis C4, regarding differences in religiosity and spirituality in the British sample, a repeated measures analysis was

conducted, with the intrinsic religiosity scale and the spiritual beliefs scale entered as within-subject variables. Results have shown a main effect of the scale on the scores, F (1, 140) = 28.09, MSE = 22.02, $p < .01$, with higher means found for the spiritual beliefs scale (M = 3.17) in comparison with intrinsic religiosity (M = 2.03), corroborating the proposed hypothesis. Religiosity and spirituality are proposed as different constructs and this method of comparison is not ideal. However, it provides a general indication of possible differences between participants within the British culture.

Discussion

The present study aimed at investigating CADS's test-retest reliability and nomological network. In general, test-retest results were adequate. Although the correlation for autonomy on T1 and T2 is modest (r = .60, $p <$ .01), below the proposed ideal value of 0.70 or above (Anastasi & Urbina, 2000), it is important to take into consideration the fact that the longer the interval between the first and second administrations of the scale, the lower this index will be. A four-week period was chosen due to the fact that two weeks may be considered short to prevent the participants from remembering the answers, inflating reliability values (Anastasi & Urbina, 2000).

It is also important to consider whether the low correlation between T1 and T2 autonomy scores could derive from a qualitative difference between moral codes, e.g., participants who endorse the autonomy ethics could take longer to present a moral judgement because the moral authority is the

individual and they would need to consider other people's rights, as well as the fairness and equality of the situation. On the other hand, participants who endorse community or divinity focus the moral authority on the society or on God, which is an "external" source of authority, and they would not need to evaluate the situation, but could just follow the rules. Although these questions cannot be answered with this study, the reliabilities found suggest the instrument can be considered reliable over time. In both sessions, the three proposed factors also presented satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha).

Hypotheses testing followed the reliability analyses, aiming at corroborating Study 1 results and testing new hypotheses. As proposed and found in Study 1, autonomy was more highly endorsed by the participants than the other two moral codes, and divinity was the least endorsed, corroborating previous studies (Arnett et al., 2001; Jensen, 1995). The relationship between the factors was also replicated, with divinity correlating exclusively to community.

The structural hypotheses proposed on the relationship between the moral codes and horizontal and vertical IndCol (S2 to S4), were partially corroborated. Horizontal individualism was related only to autonomy, whereas horizontal collectivism has presented only a marginal correlation to community. As proposed, vertical collectivism correlated directly to both community and divinity. Unexpectedly, however, vertical individualism presented a significant correlation with community. A possible explanation for this unexpected result might be that participants in this sample who endorse

the community moral code also endorse stronger and structured hierarchical relations, even when endorsing an individualist orientation.

In accordance with this explanation, the ethics of community was also directly correlated with self-enhancement values (power and achievement) in the SVS, and to the promotion sub-function of values in the BVS. Although the promotion function is part of the personal dimension of values, as proposed by Gouveia et al. (2008), it is not expected to relate to the ethics of autonomy, due to its emphasis on values such as power and prestige. According to Triandis and Gelfand (1998), these values are usually important for vertical individualists and collectivists, which emphasise the importance of a social ranking or hierarchical system that is not associated with the egalitarian ideas of the ethics of autonomy. These findings were not predicted but may represent a crossing over of hierarchical thinking from individuals who endorse vertical individualism.

Although self-transcendence and self-enhancement values are theoretically proposed as conflicting dimensions (Schwartz, 1994), each value type is associated to a different concern within the ethics of community: benevolence is related to the inherent concern for the welfare of one's in-group (Schwartz, 2007), whereas power and achievement are related to hierarchical concerns. It is also likely that self-enhancement values are related to concerns for security of individual status within the community. Universalism values, in contrast to benevolence, emphasise the welfare of all humanity (Schwartz, 2007), which are more consistent with concerns for both the autonomy and divinity moral codes.

Saying that a person defines a specific value as important means that this person has a strong belief on which principles are important for one's life and one's social groups (Rim, 1984). All proposed associations between moral codes and human values were corroborated. In terms of motivational goals, community presented direct associations with self-enhancement values (power and achievement), conservation values (tradition, conformity and security) and also with self-transcendence values (only benevolence). An inverse association was also found to openness to change (only stimulation).

In terms of value functions, as measured by the BVS (Gouveia et al., 2008), community correlated directly to the interactive sub-function (social orientation and humanitarian motivator), as proposed. It has also presented significant correlations to the normative sub-function (social orientation and materialistic motivator), excitement (personal and humanitarian), promotion sub-functions (personal and materialistic), and the existence sub-function (central and materialistic).

These associations show that the ethics of community is highly endorsed by participants who value harmony, stability, affectionate and neighbourly relationships, respect for tradition and social norms, fulfilling their duties and obligations, and the welfare of others; and it is not endorsed by participants who value novelty, change and excitement in their personal lives.

The autonomy dimension, in terms of motivational goals, presented direct associations to openness to change values (hedonism and self-direction) and self-transcendence values (universalism only). Inverse associations were also found with conservation values (tradition and conformity). In terms of value functions, autonomy correlated directly with the

excitement (personal and humanitarian) and promotion sub-functions (personal and materialistic), as proposed. It has also presented significant correlations with the existence (central and materialistic) and supra-personal sub-functions (central and humanitarian), and a negative association to the normative sub-function (social and materialistic).

These associations show that the ethics of autonomy is highly endorsed by participants who value freedom of choice and action, the search for novelty, challenges and individual pleasure, tolerance, acceptance, maturity, and the welfare of all humanity; and it is not endorsed by participants who value respect for tradition, stability, and the *status quo.*

Divinity, on the other hand, presented direct associations to self-enhancement (achievement only), self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence), and conservation values (tradition, conformity, and security). Additionally, an inverse association to openness to change (hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction) was also found. In terms of value functions, divinity correlated directly to the normative sub-function (social and materialistic), as proposed. It has also presented significant correlations to the interactive sub-function (social and humanitarian), and a negative association to the excitement sub-function (personal and humanitarian).

These associations show that the ethics of divinity is highly endorsed by participants who value the welfare of others (one's in-group and the humanity as a whole), respect for tradition and social norms, stability, harmony, affective relationships, security of one's own status, and personal success; and it is not endorsed by participants who value freedom of choice and action, stimulation and satisfying their individual desires.

IndCol as well as human values are conceptualised at both individual and cultural levels of analysis. Although Markus and Kitayama's (1991) proposition on the independent and interdependent self-construals is conceptualized at the individual level, it is also strictly interrelated with the notion of culture, where the independent image of the self "requires construing oneself as an individual whose behaviour is organized and made meaningful by reference to one's own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions" (pp.226). The interdependent self-construal, on the other hand, would place the emphasis on the social relationships established and one's roles and self-image based on these social interactions (Markus & Kitayama, 2003).

Based on these definitions, divinity and community were expected to correlate with the interdependent dimension, whereas autonomy was expected to correlate to the independent dimension. These hypotheses were corroborated. Consequently, the associations found with the three ethics are in accordance with the theoretical basis of the relationship between self and culture.

Associations with religiosity were found as expected, suggesting the strong link between inner spirituality and organized religious rules with morality's content. In relation to disgust, the expected associations with divinity and community were also found, corroborating Study 1 results in addition to previous findings (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Rozin et al., 1999, 2000).

Social desirability tendencies were associated with both divinity and community. The stronger association to the divinity code shows that participants who endorse a morality based on religious authority have a

higher tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner. Previous research studies have shown that religious people present higher scores in social desirable scales, especially when they reflect impression management as opposed to self-deception (Gillings & Joseph, 1996; Lewis, 2000; Rowatt & Schmitt, 2003).

Consistently, participants who endorsed the ethics of divinity also scored high on moral traditionalism, which was also directly associated to the ethics of community, and inversely to those of autonomy. Divinity was also associated to belief in sexual freedom and inversely to sexual liberalism, whereas autonomy was directly correlated with both constructs. These findings are more in agreement with previous studies with student samples (Knox, Cooper, & Zusman, 2001; Rowatt & Schmitt, 2003).

In terms of cultural hypotheses, British participants mainly endorsed the ethics of autonomy, prefer horizontal-based relations and individualist orientation, and tend to consider themselves as more spiritual than religious. These results are in accordance to the proposed hypotheses and corroborate previous findings regarding the British culture (Schwartz & Ros, 1995; Suh et al., 1998). Regarding gender differences in moral content endorsement, Study 2 did not confirm the hypothesis that women would score higher than men on divinity and community. Although differences were expected between men and women, similar results were found in Study 1, corroborating, in fact, previous findings on the lack of meaningful gender differences in moral judgement (Boldizar et al., 1989; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Women's higher endorsement of all moral codes found in Study 1 could be a particularity of that sample. Study 3 will test this difference, or lack of, in order to have

clearer results in this matter. Overall, the results of the second study have confirmed our hypotheses. In general, these results are consistent with predictions made by the literature, in terms of the core ideas and judgment pertaining to each moral code (Shweder, 1990b; Shweder et al., 1997).

Conclusion

This chapter has presented CADS's test-retest reliability and nomological network. Test-retest reliability results suggested the instrument is stable over time. Structural and cultural hypotheses proposed were generally confirmed, implying a support for the content of the theoretical model proposed.

The main objective of these two previous studies was to develop a measure of endorsement of differing moral content, that can be used to study differences between individuals and cultures in the content of their morality, which can be considered achieved. In general, the results have supported Shweder's proposal regarding the existence of the ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity.

After the development of the scale (Study 1), and testing for its reliability and validity (Study 2), Study 3 was designed to further validate the results of Study 1's exploratory factor analysis by conducting confirmatory factor analysis, followed by multigroup invariance tests (Clark & Watson, 1995; Garson, 2007).

CHAPTER 6

CADS UNDERLYING STRUCTURE AND CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom.

- Michel de Montaigne (*1595/1927*)

This chapter aims at confirming the underlying structure of the Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS), testing for multigroup invariance with samples from Great Britain and Brazil, and investigating cultural differences between these two groups.

Initially, the chapter presents an introduction to Study 3, focusing on the characteristics of the two cultures under study and the proposed hypotheses, based on the theoretical associations and empirical findings. This section is followed by confirmatory factor analyses and multigroup invariance tests, in order to provide statistical information on the stability and equivalence of meaning of the CADS. Finally, the chapter also includes a cross-national hypotheses testing, where the structural and cultural hypotheses from previous studies will be investigated and discussed.

Study 3

Study 3 aimed at testing the underlying structure of the CADS through a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), also investigating possible cultural differences between British and Brazilian samples.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is a statistical method commonly used in social science studies. It is considered one example of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) use and it can provide useful information for the testing of hypotheses on a group of measured variables (Flora & Curran, 2004). A confirmatory factor analysis presents clear advantages in examining the factor structure because it allows: the construction of theoretically relevant models; the identification of 1st and 2nd order factors; the test of the same model in more than one sample; and the comparison of alternative models to determine the best fit for the data (Bisquerra-Alzina, 1989).

There are several goodness-of-fit indexes when using SEM to conduct a CFA, with multiple indicators being generally mentioned in order to demonstrate the adequacy of the model (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). In the present study, the following goodness-of-fit indicators were used:

a) Chi-square (χ^2) – widely used, the chi-square index is a measure of the lack of quality of the model. If significant, the model is not considered adequate. However, one disadvantage of this index is its dependence on the sample size (Garson, 2007): it is usually significant when more than 200 participants are used. Therefore, it should be used with caution, with other indices also used to reach a decision regarding the fit of a model;

b) *Chi-square divided by its degrees of freedom (χ^2/d.f.)* – usually, models that present values below 5.0 can be interpreted as adequate. Due to its dependency on the sample size, it is recommended that the model presents values around 2.0 and 3.0 (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985);

c) *Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI)* – Values above .90 are recommended, but researchers usually indicate values from .80 as acceptable (Garson, 2007; Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996);

d) *Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)* – According to Garson (2007), the RMSEA is the average lack of fit per degree of freedom. Values around .06 are recommended, although it may be acceptable if the model presents values around .08.

The CFA was also used to test the existence of second-order dimensions. The initial part of the analyses will provide more information to decide the final set of items for the scale. After this important step, the averaged factor scores will be correlated with measures of several different constructs from previous studies.

Cross-national differences

British participants were compared with Brazilian participants in order to test for possible cross-cultural differences between these two cultural communities. These two nations (United Kingdom and Brazil) were selected as examples of collectivist and individualist cultures (Brazil IC Rating = 3.90, indicating collectivism; UK IC Rating = 8.95, indicating individualism;

Fernández et al., 2005), while having similarities in other respects (e.g., both are Western cultures and subscribe to Judeo-Christian traditions).

Brazil is a very unique Latin American country. As the only Portuguese-speaking country in South America, its society was historically influenced by several colonising and immigrant groups (for a review, see Rabinovich, 2008). Genetic research has shown that the ethnic composition of Brazilian's population is mainly based on female genes from African and Native Brazilian women, and male genes from European men, mainly Portuguese and Spanish (Rabinovich, 2008).

According to Rabinovich (2008), two important concepts still present in Brazilian's culture are the concepts of *casa* (*house*, in Portuguese), which is the patriarchal and hierarchical domain imported by the Portuguese colonisation, and *senzala*, which is the house of slaves within the land. These two groups created the current state of Brazilian society, where the hierarchy is still maintained, with the power in the hands of the richest groups (usually white), and the poor population (formed by the interbreeding of all different ethnic groups) lacking power and resources. Both aspects, the mixed biological composition and the hierarchical system, are the basis of one of the most important aspects of Brazilian society, which is the mixture of different (sometimes conflicting) cultural orientations.

Although Brazil has been identified from previous cross-cultural studies as presenting a collectivist tendency (Fleith, 2002; Gouveia, Albuquerque, Clemente & Espinosa, 2002; Gouveia & Clemente, 2000), Chirkov et al. (2005) suggested that "Brazil cannot be unambiguously classified as individualist or collectivist, horizontal or vertical (p. 428)". The

interplay between the Portuguese / Hispanic patriarchal and hierarchical traditions, and the egalitarian values derived from the immigration of other European groups and the Japanese community, created strong cultural changes in Brazilian society.

In relation to IndCol, Brazil is in a middle position but still considered more collectivist than individualist, scoring 38 on this dimension (26th place among 53 countries), and it is considered more vertical than horizontal (Hofstede, 1997). In comparison, Great Britain appears to be more individualistic than Brazil, scoring 89 on IndCol (3rd place among 53 countries), and it is considered more horizontal than vertical (Hofstede, 1997).

In terms of values, it was found that Brazilians emphasise values such as conformity and adaptation to social rules (Dessen & Torres, 2002), survival, personal stability, belonging, and social support (Gouveia et al., 2008). Schwartz (2007) has also proposed that values define how inclusive is the moral universe of different cultures. He suggests that people from cultures with a narrow moral universe apply moral values (e.g., universalism, benevolence) only to their in-groups, whereas people from cultures with a broad moral universe apply the same moral values to other groups as well and ultimately to all humankind. Based on his studies of moral inclusiveness, Brazil presents a narrow moral universe (scoring 1.5 in moral inclusiveness), whereas Britain presents a broad moral universe (scoring 4 in moral inclusiveness) (Schwartz, 2007).

Previous research on moral codes has shown that Brazilian university participants tended to use more divinity and community-based discourse than

American university participants (Haidt et al., 1993). Religiosity and spirituality, in general, are extremely important for Brazilians, and a sense of community and family is still strong, even in big cities. Out of the total Brazilian population, 75% are Catholic (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2001). Other research studies (see Gouveia & Clemente, 2000) have shown a high level of religiosity of the Brazilian population, even when the sample was formed of university students.

These findings and theoretical proposals suggest that the ethics of divinity would be more highly endorsed among young people in Brazil than in Britain (*hypothesis C5*), as British youth today shows low levels of religious belief (Gill et al., 1998; Voas & Crockett, 2005), findings replicated by Studies 1 and 2 in this thesis.

All previous structural hypotheses were expected to be corroborated in both cultural samples. However, adaptations were made regarding the cultural samples, which now incorporate possible cultural differences with the Brazilian sample. Not all constructs from Study 2 were repeated in Study 3. Consequently, there are fewer hypotheses to test. Reviewing, the structural hypotheses are: S1 – community and divinity would be more closely correlated with each other; S2 – autonomy would be correlated with horizontal individualism and horizontal collectivism; S3 – community and divinity would be correlated with vertical collectivism; S4 – community would be correlated with horizontal collectivism; S5 – divinity would be correlated with intrinsic religiosity; S6 – community and divinity would be correlated with disgust sensitivity; S7a – community would be correlated directly to benevolence, conformity, and security in the SVS; S7b – community would

be directly correlated with the interactive sub-function in the BVS; S8a - autonomy would be directly correlated with hedonism, self-direction, and universalism in the SVS; S8b – autonomy would be directly correlated with the excitement and promotion sub-functions of values in the BVS; S9a – divinity would be directly correlated with tradition in the SVS; S9b – divinity would be directly correlated with the normative function in the BVS; S10 - high social desirability scores correlate with the divinity and community factors; S11 - direct relation of moral traditionalism scores with divinity, and an inverse relation with autonomy; S12 - participants who show high scores in both sexual liberalism and belief in sexual freedom will present a higher support for the ethics of autonomy, whereas sexually conservative participants will endorse the ethics of divinity.

Cultural hypotheses were: C1a – students from both countries would present high scores in horizontality and individualism; C1b – Brazilian participants would score higher in collectivism than British participants; C2 – women would present higher endorsement of divinity and community when compared to men in both countries; C3 – students from both countries would present higher endorsement of the autonomy moral codes among all three ethics; C4 – Brazilian participants would present higher endorsement of the ethics of divinity than the British.

Overall, we expected that the structure of the CADS and its relations to other scales would be replicated in the Brazilian sample, whereas the mean levels of our dimensions would vary.

Method

Participants

The participants consisted of 288 undergraduate students (56% females) from two universities in the Northeast of Brazil, with ages ranging from 17 to 68 (M = 25.8, SD=8.48). 54% of the participants stated they were Catholic. The students were invited to take part in the study in the end of their lectures, without payment or reward.

Measures

CADS. The scale tested in Studies 1 and 2 consisted of 59 items (21 on divinity, 20 on community, and 18 on autonomy). To attempt a validation of the CADS for the Brazilian context, a translation and back-translation of the instrument was made by two bilingual psychologists. The items were presented to a group of first-year university students to test for difficulty in comprehension, and revised accordingly.

Horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. The same instrument proposed by Triandis and Gelfand (1998) was used. Cronbach's alphas in the Brazilian samples were: Horizontal individualism = .63; Vertical individualism = .62; Horizontal collectivism = .60; Vertical collectivism = .65. As previously suggested, these indices are consisted with the literature (Gouveia, Andrade, Jesus, Meira & Soares, 2002; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

Intrinsic Religiosity. Also used in Study 1, the Intrinsic Religiosity Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) presented a Cronbach's alpha of .90 on the Brazilian sample.

Schwartz Values Survey. Proposed by Schwartz (1992), this scale presented the following Cronbach's alphas on the Brazilian sample: Power α = .64, Achievement α = .60, Hedonism α = .58, Stimulation α = .66, Self-direction α = .60, Universalism α = .66, Benevolence α = .60, Tradition α = .62, Conformity α = ..64, Security α = .55.

Basic Values Survey. Previously used in Study 2, the BVS was developed by Gouveia (2003; Gouveia et al., 2008) and presented the following Cronbach's alpha on the Brazilian sample: Promotion α = .50, Excitement α = .54, Existence α = .54, Supra-personal α = .58, Normative α = .63, Interactive α = .64.

Sensitivity to Disgust. Previously used in Study 2, the Sensitivity to Disgust Scale (Haidt et al., 1994) presented a Cronbach's alpha of .73 on the Brazilian sample.

Social Desirability. Proposed by Stober (2001), this scale presented a Cronbach's alpha of .62 on the Brazilian sample.

Moral Traditionalism. Developed by Conover and Feldman (1981, 1986), and previously used in Study 2, this scale presented a Cronbach's alpha of .81 in Brazil.

Socio-demographic questions. Participants were asked to answer about their sex, age and religion, and the one-item scales assessing the level of religiosity, sexual conservatism, and belief in sexual freedom (Inglehart et al., 1998).

Procedure

Participants answered the questionnaires individually, in a collective classroom environment. After obtaining the lecturer's permission, the researchers presented themselves asking for the students' voluntary collaboration. They were informed that the study was about social attitudes. The students who agreed to take part answered the questionnaire in an average of 15 minutes.

Results

Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA)

To confirm the structure of the CADS in the UK and Brazil, all items were submitted to a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS Software, version 7. For this and all subsequent analyses, the British sample from Study 2 was reduced to include only British-born participants (N = 97), allowing comparison between natives of both countries. Before conducting the analysis, however, CADS items were centered separately for each group, in order to control possible acquiescence and extremity bias (Fischer, 2004; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997), with further analyses conducted with the standardised scores.

The three-dimensional model suggested by the exploratory factor analysis was the first to be tested. Initially, fifteen items (3 community items, 9 autonomy, and 3 divinity items) were dropped due to non significant factor loadings and/or significant factor loadings in a different dimension; after these

items were dropped, the final scale formed by 44 items (see Appendix A[3]) was tested again. Model 1 results (Table 7) show the goodness-of-fit indices for the final scale analysis and suggests the original three-factor, first order structure is not suitable for this data.

An examination of modification indices and residual matrix suggested stronger associations between five items in the divinity dimension, such as 03 (*It follows nature's law*), and 39 (*It is unnatural*). In terms of item content, these were items that used the idea of 'obedience to laws of nature' as a means of justification for moral judgment.

The same was observed for five items in the community dimension, such as 13 (*It respects family traditions*), and 45 (*The family considers it unacceptable*), which emphasised the importance of family rules and beliefs. For the ethics of autonomy, stronger associations were suggested for the five positive items (e.g., *It expresses someone's autonomy*), and the five negative items (e.g., *It restricts the individual's rights*), also creating two groups.

Based on these modification indices, Models 2, 3, and 4 were developed. Model 2 proposes the existence of two factors for the divinity dimension (first, nature, and second, other items) and two factors for the ethics of community (first, family, and second, other items), with autonomy remaining as a single factor. Model 3 proposes a further subdivision in two sub-factors for the positive and negative items in the autonomy dimension.

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[3] Some of the analyses conducted in Studies 1, 2, and 3 were incorporated into a manuscript, which was accepted for publication in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.

Table 7. *Confirmatory factor analyses of the CADS*

Models	df	χ^2	χ^2/d.f.	CFI	NNFI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	ΔCFI
First order models									
Model 1 – Three factors	1626	3998.70**	2.459	.85	.80	.056	-	-	-
Model 2 – Five factors	1606	3554.98**	2.214	.89	.82	.051	443.72**	20	.04
Model 3 – Six factors	1564	3099.78**	1.982	.91	.89	.046	898.92**	62	.06
Model 4 – Eight factors	1540	3408.16**	2.213	.89	.81	.051	590.54**	86	.04
Second order model									
Model 5 – Three 2nd and six 1st order factors	1598	3289.62**	2.059	.90	.85	.047	-	-	-

Note. χ^2/d.f. = chi-square divided by its degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; N = 397; ** $p < .01$.

Finally, Model 4 was testing the hypothesis that the subdivision in the factors is due to item wording, separating right and wrong items from both community and divinity dimensions. Results for the testing of these models can also be observed in Table 7.

Dividing the dimensions in six subscales improved the model significantly, as suggested by the $\Delta\chi^2$ results. However, the model presenting eight sub-factors based on the right/wrong items decreased the goodness of fit indices, suggesting the subdivision based on the items wording is not adequate. One further test was performed: Model 5 investigated the existence of the three CAD higher order dimensions predicting the six first-order factors found in Model 3. This analysis was conducted by including three extra latent variables directly predicting the six latent factors found in Model 3, and indirectly, the items (see Figure 3 for the second-order model). Although in general CFI and NNFI values are lower than adequate, they can still be considered an acceptable fit to the data (Byrne, 2004).

This generally confirmed the "big three" structure of the CADS while indicating the existence of important subscales in the instrument. Community is divided into *Family* and *Social rules*. Cronbach's alphas were recalculated for each sub-scale. For the British and Brazilian samples, they were respectively .90 and .79, for social rules; .87 and .70 for family (.91 and .83 for the complete Community scale). Divinity is divided into *Nature* and *Religious rules*. In the British and Brazilian samples, Cronbach's alpha for religious rules were, respectively, .95 and .90; .88 and .77 for nature (.94 and .89 for the Divinity dimension).



Figure 3. CADS second order structure

The division between autonomy right and wrong items suggests that the autonomy moral code shows a distinction between positive and negative rights. *Positive rights* presented Cronbach's alphas of .72 (British) and .78 (Brazilian), and *Negative rights* indices were .83 (British) and .88 (Brazilian), with complete scale indices of .86 (British) and .84 (Brazilian).

Multigroup invariance

Further multigroup invariance tests were also conducted, in order to test models for measurement equivalence, an important aspect when

developing cross-cultural measures (Byrne, 2004; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). According to Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998), the two forms of invariance that must be established are configural invariance (the measure shows the same factor structure in two groups) and metric invariance (invariant factor loadings across groups). However, if the intention is to compare countries on a mean level, full or partial scalar invariance should also be tested (Byrne, 2004; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). All three scales were tested for configural (or structural) equivalence, and these results were used as the baseline model for subsequent analyses. After metric invariance (factor loadings constrained to be similar across groups) was obtained, scalar invariance (constraining intercepts across groups) was tested (see review on measurement invariance in Lucas et al., 2008). Results for all three scales have suggested the instrument cannot be considered fully invariant (see Table 8).

However, according to Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998) and Byrne (2004), further tests of partial invariance can be conducted by constraining the intercepts of each item individually to identify the non-invariant items. After this identification, these items may be removed or unconstrained (see Cheung & Rensvold, 2000). Scalar invariance has to be found for at least one item, besides the marker item, in each factor for possible cross-national comparisons (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998).

Table 8. *Cultural Invariance of CADS with Brazilian and British University Students*

Models	df	χ^2	χ^2/d.f.	CFI	NNFI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	ΔCFI
First order models									
Community									
Step 1: Configural	146	281.57	1.929	.94	.88	.057	-	-	-
Step 2: Metric	158	302.20	1.913	.93	.87	.056	20.63	12	.01
Step 3: Intercepts (all items)	170	357.07	2.100	.91	.85	.062	75.50**	24	.02
Step 4: Family intercepts	162	306.94	1.894	.93	.87	.056	25.37	16	.00
Step 5: Partial invariance	166	311.90	1.880	.93	.87	.057	30.33	20	.01
Autonomy									
Step 1: Configural	62	99.54**	1.605	.98	.95	.036	-	-	-
Step 2: Metric	70	108.23**	1.546	.98	.94	.034	8.69	08	.00
Step 3: Intercepts (all items)	80	151.75**	1.898	.96	.92	.046	44.66**	18	.02
Step 4: NR intercepts	75	114.49**	1.527	.98	.94	.033	14.95	13	.00
Step 5: Partial invariance	78	120.72**	1.548	.98	.94	.034	21.18	16	.00
Divinity									
Step 1: Configural	242	527.57**	2.180	.93	.89	.064	-	-	-
Step 2: Metric	256	542.29**	2.118	.93	.88	.062	14.72	14	.00
Step 3: Intercepts (all items)	276	671.63**	2.433	.91	.86	.070	144.06**	34	.02
Step 4: Nature intercepts	260	545.88**	2.100	.93	.88	.062	18.31	18	.00
Step 5: Partial invariance	267	557.64**	2.088	.93	.88	.062	30.07	25	.00

Note. χ^2/d.f. = chi-square divided by its degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; N = 397; ** $p < .01$.

After conducting these analyses for each dimension, in the community scale, from a total of 15 items, four were considered non-invariant and unconstrained in further analysis, all belonging to the Social rules subscale (17. *It follows the rules of one's social group;* 28. *It is socially condemned*; 33. *Society considers it unacceptable*; and 34. *It opposes the rules of society.*). Partial invariance was, then, obtained, with a non-significant difference found between the partially constrained and the configural models.

The same analyses were performed for the autonomy dimension, with two non-invariant items found in the positive rights subscale from a total of 10 (05. *It allows a person to defend oneself*; and 21. *It protects someone's interests and needs*), and for the divinity dimension, with three non-invariant items belonging to the Religious rules subscale, found in a total of 18 (01. *It is a religious tradition*; 16. *It is in accordance with religious authority*; and 18. *People will gain God's approval from it*). General findings suggest the acceptability of the measure for cross-cultural research.

Structural hypotheses

Once the final set of items was established, their mean averages were calculated for British-born (N = 97) and Brazilian participants (N = 288).These scores were used to test the theoretical hypotheses proposed, aiming at corroborating Studies 1 and 2 results. Although the British sample has been previously tested in terms of its nomological network in Study 2, correlation analyses were conducted again in order to investigate the associations of the proposed constructs and each ethics sub-scale.

Initially, correlations among the sub-factors showed strong associations between both sub-factors in each dimension (see Table 9). For both British and Brazilian samples, respectively, social rules presented the highest correlation with family; positive with negative rights; and religious rules with nature. In the UK, social rules also had a significant correlation with nature, whereas in Brazil it was correlated with all other sub-scales. Similar associations can be observed with the family sub-scale, which is related to religious rules and nature in the UK, but to all other sub-scales in Brazil.

In the UK, positive rights presented only a marginal negative correlation to nature, whereas in Brazil this association was positive and significant. Negative rights presented a direct association to nature in Brazil only. In terms of moral codes, the pattern of endorsement was similar to the one found in the British sample, with the autonomy factors highly endorsed, the divinity factors with the lowest scores, and the ethics of community scores in between.

Hypothesis S2 suggested a direct association between the horizontal attributes of individualism-collectivism and the ethics of autonomy. Results in both countries partially corroborated this hypothesis (see Table 10). In the UK, only horizontal individualism was associated with autonomy and its subscales, whereas in Brazil horizontal collectivism presented the proposed association. Hypothesis S3, suggesting direct associations between divinity, community, and vertical collectivism, was corroborated for both countries.

Table 9. *Correlations among CADS sub-scales and descriptive statistics in the UK and Brazil*

	UNITED KINGDOM						BRAZIL					
	SR	F	PR	NR	RR	N	SR	F	PR	NR	RR	N
Family	.56**	-					.57**	-				
Positive rights	-.03	.01	-				.27**	.26**	-			
Negative rights	.04	.12	.68**	-			.27**	.20**	.40**	-		
Religious rules	.11	.28**	-.09	-.13	-		.27**	.43**	-.04	.01	-	
Nature	.40**	.36**	-.17†	-.05	.48**	-	.32**	.43**	.18*	.31**	.47**	-
Mean	4.17	4.22	5.06	5.30	2.94	4.04	4.34	4.37	5.23	5.07	3.70	3.86
SD	.98	1.10	1.05	.87	1.48	1.25	1.00	1.16	1.06	1.43	1.43	1.42

*Note.*UK N = 97; BR N = 288; SR = Social rules; F = Family; PR = Positive rights; NR = Negative rights; RR = Religious rules; N = Nature; † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis S4 suggested the correlation between horizontal collectivism and community and results corroborated this hypothesis in both countries. Horizontal collectivism has also presented a significant relationship with the negative rights sub-scale of autonomy in Brazil.

Intrinsic religiosity presented direct correlations to the religious rules sub-scale of divinity in both countries, but it was not correlated with the nature sub-scale, partially corroborating hypothesis S5. This could result from the fact that intrinsic religiosity items might refer to organised religions (e.g., *If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church*). Nature, on the other hand, could emphasise a relationship to spirituality through nature that does not necessarily involve belonging to a religious denomination.

To test this association, we conducted a correlation analysis between both divinity sub-scales and spiritual beliefs for the British sample only (as this scale could not be included in the Brazilian version, due to space constraints). Spiritual beliefs were directly correlated with both religious rules ($r = .71$, $p < .001$) and nature ($r = .35$, $p < .001$), confirming this association in the British culture.

Hypothesis S6 suggested a direct association between community, divinity and disgust sensitivity. In the UK, disgust presented a direct correlation to the family sub-scale of community, and to both sub-scales of divinity, whereas in Brazil, disgust was only correlated with the religious rules sub-scale of divinity. Similar results were found for the proposed association between community, divinity, and social desirability, partially corroborating hypotheses S6 and S10.

Table 10. *Nomological network of the CADS dimensions in both countries*

	UNITED KINGDOM						BRAZIL					
	SR	F	PR	NR	RR	N	SR	F	PR	NR	RR	N
Horizontal Individualism	.10	.13	.20*	.18*	-.04	.04	-.07	-.11	.13	.12	-.08	-.13
Vertical Individualism	.13	.28**	.10	.14	-.05	.12	.07	-.04	.16	.06	-.05	-.01
Horizontal Collectivism	.20*	.16*	.10	.10	.06	.11	.17*	.17*	.06	.20*	.13	-.01
Vertical Collectivism	.24**	.35**	-.14	-.13	.17*	.17*	.22**	.33**	-.04	-.03	.32**	.10
Intrinsic religiosity	-.14	-.02	.07	.08	.65**	.10	-.05	.18*	-.23**	-.07	.71**	.04
Disgust	.15	.28**	-.03	-.07	.30**	.29**	-.01	.10	-.04	-.04	.28**	-.10
Social desirability	.16†	.25*	.11	.08	.38**	.38**	.08	.14	.15	.05	.16*	-.01
Moral traditionalism	.05	.24*	-.23*	-.27**	.55**	.38**	.06	.21*	-.34**	-.34**	.60**	-.02
Sexual liberalism	.07	-.25**	.19*	.11	-.49**	-.37**	.09	-.24**	.25**	.07	-.42**	-.17*
Belief in sexual freedom	.04	-.06	.12	.30**	-.34**	-.22**	-.01	-.15	.16†	.22**	-.49**	-.23**

*Note.*UK N = 97; BR N = 288; RR = Religious rules; N = Nature; SR = Social rules; F = Family; PR = Positive rights; NR = Negative rights; † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

The association between moral traditionalism and the ethics of divinity (direct) and autonomy (inverse) was proposed in hypothesis S11, which was corroborated in both countries. Moral traditionalism has also presented direct associations to the family sub-scale of community in both samples.

Sexual liberalism and belief in sexual freedom presented similar associations to the moral codes. Hypothesis S12 proposed an inverse association with the ethics of divinity, which was found in both countries, as well as an inverse correlation between sexual liberalism with the family sub-scale of community. The direct association expected between the ethics of autonomy, sexual liberalism and sexual freedom was also observed, corroborating the hypothesis.

In terms of human values, three main hypotheses were proposed on their relationship with moral codes and results are presented in Table 11 (SVS) and Table 12 (BVS). In both countries, community sub-scales were directly correlated with benevolence, conformity and security values as measured by the SVS. They were also correlated with the interactive sub-function of values as measured by the BVS, corroborating hypotheses S7a and S7b.

The direct associations previously found in Study 2 with self-enhancement values show that, in the UK, these values correlate to both community sub-scales, whereas in Brazil the correlation is significant only with social rules.

Table 11. *CADS association to human values (SVS) in both countries*

	UNITED KINGDOM							BRAZIL						
	Mean	SR	F	PR	NR	RR	N	Mean	SR	F	PR	NR	RR	N
Power	2.36	.19*	.17*	.07	.00	-.15†	.03	5.00	.16†	.09	.05	-.03	.00	-.08
Achievement	4.72	.26**	.29**	.10	.11	.20*	.26**	6.25	.18*	.02	.19*	.10	.00	-.01
Hedonism	4.65	.31**	.16†	.21*	.15†	-.14†	.13	6.00	.10	-.15†	.34**	.12	-.30**	-.19*
Stimulation	4.31	-.22*	-.18*	.06	.03	-.19*	-.11	2.33	.03	.03	.10	-.03	-.18*	-.07
Self-direction	5.06	-.33**	-.44**	.38**	.29**	-.52**	-.47**	5.60	.01	-.11	.35**	.16*	-.34**	-.16
Universalism	4.76	-.06	-.03	.17*	.21*	.28**	.21*	4.00	.13	.05	.27**	.16*	-.06	.08
Benevolence	5.32	.26**	.34**	.09	.18*	.25**	.26**	6.20	.20*	.24**	.15†	.16†	.17*	.15†
Tradition	3.14	.03	.08	-.34**	-.36**	.59**	.32**	5.40	.10	.35**	-.17*	-.13	.36**	.05
Conformity	4.32	.26**	.45**	-.11	-.04	.37**	.31**	5.25	.14†	.23**	-.01	-.04	.33**	.08
Security	4.45	.27**	.33**	-.11	-.08	.06	.21*	5.00	.20*	.23**	.03	-.08	.24**	.03

*Note.*UK N = 97; BR N = 288; RR = Religious rules; N = Nature; SR = Social rules; F = Family; PR = Positive rights; NR = Negative rights; † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Table 12. *CADS association to human values (BVS) in both countries*

	UNITED KINGDOM							BRAZIL						
	Mean	SR	F	PR	NR	RR	N	Mean	SR	F	PR	NR	RR	N
Excitement	5.19	.23**	.11	.30**	.36**	-.24**	.02	4.88	.18*	-.05	.20*	.11	-.27**	-.06
Promotion	4.51	.24**	.19*	.19*	.19*	.03	.07	4.66	.19*	.03	.23**	.12	-.04	-.01
Existence	5.76	.40**	.33**	.16†	.20*	.10	.28**	5.90	.26**	.22**	.15†	.18*	.18*	-.05
Supra-personal	5.29	-.07	-.03	.13	.30**	-.18*	-.05	5.67	.13	.04	.30**	.20*	-.15†	-.06
Interactive	5.82	.36**	.39**	.05	.14†	.17*	.20*	5.71	.44**	.24**	-.07	.10	.24**	.02
Normative	3.75	.26**	.39**	-.18*	-.18*	.73**	.41**	4.61	.24**	.36**	-.17*	-.13	.68**	.09

Note. UK N = 97; BR N = 288; RR = Religious rules; N = Nature; SR = Social rules; F = Family; PR = Positive rights; NR = Negative rights; † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

In both countries, autonomy subscales were directly correlated with self-direction and universalism, whereas the positive rights subscale was correlated with hedonism only, as measured by the SVS. Autonomy was also correlated with the excitement and promotion sub-functions as measured by the BVS, corroborating hypotheses S8a and S8b. Other significant relationships were found with achievement, benevolence and tradition (SVS), as well as the normative, existence and supra-personal sub-functions (BVS).

Both divinity subscales were directly correlated with tradition and to the normative sub-function in the UK, whereas only religious rules presented the expected relationship in Brazil, partially corroborating hypotheses S9a and S9b. Other significant correlations were found with achievement, universalism, benevolence, conformity, security, stimulation and self-direction (SVS), as well as the excitement, existence, supra-personal, and interactive sub-functions (BVS).

Cultural hypotheses

The differentiated association of autonomy ethics with horizontal individualism in the UK, and horizontal collectivism in Brazil, could be an expression of the more collectivist tendency of the Brazilian culture (Gouveia & Clemente, 2000). To test for this tendency, as well as our hypothesis C1 that higher scores would be found for horizontality and individualism, a 2 x 2 x 2 (Dimensions, Attributes, Country) mixed analysis of variance was conducted. There was a main effect of dimension, F (1, 366) = 161.45, MSE = 129.88, $p < .001$, with individualism presenting a higher mean than collectivism across both countries. A main effect of attribute was also found, F (1, 366) = 406.88, MSE = 280.70, $p < .001$, with a higher endorsement of

the horizontal attribute in general in comparison to the vertical attribute. A main effect of country was not found.

A significant three-way interaction was found between dimension, attribute, and country, F (1, 366) = 8.89, MSE = 3.66, $p < .01$, with Brazil presenting significantly higher scores in horizontal collectivism (M = 5.85, SD = .61) than the UK (M = 5.40), F (1, 367) = 23.17, $p < .001$; and marginally higher scores in vertical collectivism (Brazil M = 5.17; UK M = 4.98), F (1, 367) = 2.95, p = .09, corroborating the proposed hypothesis.

Of greater importance, a further 3 x 2 x 2 (Ethics, Gender, Country) mixed analysis of variance was conducted, in order to test for the endorsement of the three ethics and possible gender and country differences on the CADS dimensions. No main effect of gender was found, F (1, 363) = .116, p = .73, nor was any interaction found that involved gender. These results go against our predictions, but they are in accordance with the findings from both studies and a growing amount of research suggesting a lack of association between morality and gender (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000).

A main effect of ethics was found, F (2, 726) = 199.68, MSE = 170.43, $p < .001$, with the averaged autonomy scale presenting the highest level of endorsement across countries and gender. These findings replicate Studies 1 and 2 results and corroborate our hypothesis C3 (see Table 9 for means for each sub-scale). A main effect of country was not found, but a significant ethics x country interaction was observed, F (2, 726) = 7.86, MSE = 6.70, $p <$ .01. Brazilian participants presented a higher endorsement of the averaged divinity scale (M = 3.75) in comparison to British participants (M = 3.26), F (1,

367) = 11.37, $p < .001$, corroborating our fourth and final cultural hypothesis (C4).

Besides differences in the endorsement of the ethics of divinity, both samples answered a one-item scale (Inglehart et al., 1998) regarding their level of religiosity and the intrinsic religiosity scale. Analysis of variance results showed that Brazilian participants presented a higher level of religiosity (BR: $M = 3.04$; UK: $M = 2.20$), F (1, 365) = 16.62, $p < .001$, and intrinsic religiosity (BR: $M = 3.25$; UK: $M = 2.03$) than British participants, F (1, 365) = 100.16, $p < .001$, replicating previous findings (Gouveia & Clemente, 2000).

In terms of values endorsement, two separate analyses were conducted. Initially, a 10 x 2 (Value type, Country) mixed analysis of variance was performed. A main effect of value type was found as expected, F (9, 837) = 2.69, $MSE = 2.53$, $p < .05$. Averaged scores varied from 3.32 (stimulation) to 5.76 (benevolence) across both countries. However, no main effect of country was found, as well as no interaction between country and value type. A further 6 x 2 (Sub-functions of values, Country) mixed analysis was performed. A sub-functions main effect was observed, F (5, 3030) = 384.12, $MSE = 259.29$, $p < .001$, with averaged scores varying from 4.18 (normative) to 5.83 (existence). A main effect of country was also observed, F (1, 606) = 15.16, $MSE = 29.99$, $p < .001$, with Brazil scoring higher than Britain across all sub-functions. And finally, a significant interaction was also found, F (5, 3030) = 36.11, $MSE = 24.37$, $p < .001$. Brazil presented higher averaged scores in the promotion, existence, supra-personal, and normative

sub-functions of values, whereas Britain presented higher averaged scores in the excitement and interactive sub-functions.

Discussion

The present study aimed at confirming the underlying structure of the CADS, testing it for measurement equivalence and replicating previous findings on a different cultural community. Overall, the results of the third study have confirmed our hypotheses, which are consistent with predictions made by the literature, in terms of the core ideas and judgements pertaining to each moral code (Shweder, 1990b; Shweder et al., 1997).

Confirmatory factor analyses

As a result of the confirmatory factor analysis, the original 59 items retained from Studies 1 and 2 analyses were reduced to 44 items in the final version. Each moral code has been subdivided into two first order factors. Community consists of two factors: *Family*, with items emphasizing the importance of the family group as an authority in the moral domain; and *Social rules*, which accords moral authority to the society as a whole, with its rules, laws and sanctions. Divinity consists of concerns on *Religious rules*, involving respect for religious tradition and authority when justifying right/wrong actions; and *Nature*, highlighting the importance of the laws of nature and an ideal of purity associated with moral character.

Regarding the autonomy dimension, the subdivision was made between the morally right and morally wrong items, and the factors were named, respectively, *Positive rights* and *Negative rights*.

Gewirth (2001) defines positive rights as the ones that "entail positive duties, i.e., duties to [respect and] help persons to have the objects or their rights" (p. 322). An example could be found in the following item: "expressing someone's autonomy" is in accordance with positive rights, as well as acts that help other persons to express their autonomy, such as laws that defend freedom of speech. Negative rights are those that "entail negative duties, i.e., duties to forbear or refrain from interfering with persons' having the objects of their rights" (p. 322). Using the same example, the law or norm emphasizing that no one can restrict someone else's autonomy is an example of negative right.

Although the items in both sub-dimensions seem to present a similar content, the actions that are justified by these standards are different. Right and wrong, in this case, might not entail a bipolar dimension. An action that is not "morally wrong" is not necessarily right; one person might be more concerned with positive promotion of rights than negative restriction of rights, whereas another might take the opposite view. Even if the right and wrong scores present the same pattern of association with other constructs, this further development of the autonomy moral code is very important in theoretical and practical terms. Being centered on the self, the ethics of autonomy might seem very simple and straightforward. However, the differentiation of positive and negative rights in the structure of the autonomy moral code indicates more complexity in this dimension.

Mainly, the CAD Scale measures people's more general understanding of the reasons for moral judgment, and includes items on the sources of moral authority – religious scriptures, a sense of what is natural, the concept of "rights," or the family, for example. Interestingly, two of the three dimensions of the CADS presented show an internal structure based on the source of authority rather than content; divinity split into religious rules and nature sub-factors, which contain a mixture of content items (e.g., "It pollutes the spirit") and authority items (e.g., "It opposes religious authority"), and likewise for community's family and social rules sub-factors. This suggests that it might be difficult for people to view authority and content independently in self-reported reasons for moral judgment.

Structural and cultural hypotheses

In terms of associations between the sub-scales, there seems to be less of a separation between autonomy moral concerns and other moral concerns in Brazil than in the UK. Although the ethics of community and divinity seem to be more associated to each other across countries, supporting our initial hypothesis, both autonomy sub-scales were related to both community sub-scales and to the nature sub-scale of divinity in Brazil.

This association could be a reflection of the more religious and collectivist nature of the Brazilian culture, confirmed in country differences analyses. The lack of significant differences in community and autonomy overall between Brazilian and British participants might seem to contradict findings from previous research, which found differences between Brazil and the U.S. Of course, it is possible that British students may have themselves

been more community oriented than American students. Schwartz and Ros (1995) discriminate between West European countries and the U.S. in terms of values, although both regions are described as presenting individualist characteristics (Schwartz & Ros, 1995). According to the authors, West European countries are similar to the U.S. in the importance of personal autonomy and egalitarianism; however, these countries also emphasise harmony values (e.g., equality, social justice), whereas the U.S. emphasises mastery and hierarchy values (e.g., ambition, success, social power). This different importance attributed to values "expresses concern for others rather than self-promotion" (Schwartz & Ros, 1995, p. 111).

University students might also be considered more similar than different in terms of community moral discourse, not clearly reflecting their national culture, but almost expressing a culture of their own. It should be noted that a similarity between university samples when compared to non-university samples was also found by Haidt et al. (1993) in terms of the use of the three ethics, even as they also found differences between nations.

Another possible explanation comes from the value domain. Bond (1988) reports results from studies in nine cultures with the Chinese Value Survey, indicating the existence of two main dimensions in which the cultures were compared: *social integration* (tolerance of others, harmony, non-competitiveness) vs. *cultural inwardness* (filial piety, respect for tradition, observation of social rituals); and *reputation* (protecting your face, wealth, reciprocation of favours) vs. *social morality* (chastity in women, sense of righteousness, keeping oneself pure). According to Bond, the reputation pole of this bipolar dimension is related to one's role in society, and to SVS

domain of social power, whereas the social morality pole is related to maturity and conformity. His findings show that England (M = 2.62) and Brazil (M = 2.00) were the two cultures with highest scores on the *reputation* dimension, both being different from the U.S. (M = 1.20).

In general, the values sub-functions presented similar association patterns with the moral codes across both countries, corroborating all proposed hypotheses. Country differences were found only in the endorsement of values sub-functions, with Brazilians emphasising a more materialistic type of motivator, whereas British emphasised two out of the three humanitarian motivators. These results might be due to economic differences between the two countries. As proposed by Gouveia et al. (2008), "people guided by such values tend to think in more biological terms of survival, giving importance to their own existence and the conditions under which it can be secured" (p. 6). Humanitarian values, on the other hand, emphasise an orientation based on abstract principles and ideas, suggesting "less dependence on material goods" (p. 7). No country differences were found on the value types proposed by Schwartz (1992).

That rough similarity in terms of values might explain the similarity on the community and autonomy scores, and suggests follow-up studies to explore even further the CADS relationship with human values. However, it should not be forgotten that the significant differences found on the ethics of divinity correspond to a known greater religiosity of the Brazilian culture, indicating that the CADS can identify differences between known groups.

Results have also suggested an interesting pattern of association between the moral codes and individualism-collectivism. Country differences

found regarding IndCol dimensions and attributes were in accordance with the proposed hypotheses. In general, Brazilians tended to present themselves as slightly more collectivist than British participants. Both countries, however, emphasised horizontality as an important attribute across both dimensions. As Triandis and Gelfand (1998) and Schwartz and Ros (1995) propose, the distinction between individualist and collectivist cultures is not sufficient to describe a country's cultural characteristics. The horizontal and vertical attributes suggest an essential difference in the way people in these countries value their moral judgments: emphasizing equality or being part of a hierarchical system (Chirkov et al., 2005; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

No gender differences were found, replicating previous findings (Boldizar et al., 1989; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), suggesting that men and women use the same dimensions of moral content to justify their judgements. As results were consistent across three previous studies, gender differences will not be tested in further studies.

All other expected associations of the three ethics with intrinsic religiosity, disgust, social desirability, and moral traditionalism were observed. However, an interesting pattern was observed regarding both sexual items. Sexual liberalism was directly associated only to the positive rights sub-scale of autonomy in both countries, whereas belief in sexual freedom was directly associated only to the negative rights sub-scale.

This pattern of association is believed to be due to the different content between both items. Sexual liberalism asks the participants about their general attitude toward sexuality ("*In relation to sexuality, do you consider yourself to be... very conservative / very liberal*"). A direct

association between this item and positive rights would indicate that participants who endorse individual decisions and freedom of choice regarding sexuality consider themselves as sexually liberal. Belief in sexual freedom, on the other hand, asks the participants about their agreement regarding someone's complete sexual freedom without any restrictions ("*If someone said that any individual should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would you tend to agree or disagree?*"). This association would indicate that participants, who endorse the lack of restrictions and harm to individual independence, extend this concept to include sexual expressions.

Conclusion

This chapter presented CADS confirmatory factor analysis, its measurement invariance, and nomological network in different cultures. The three previous studies have shown that the Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale is a reliable and valid instrument across groups. These findings suggest that the three moral codes can be found in different levels according to the cultural context, and they are related in different ways to a large array of individual and cultural constructs. Results suggested important structural differentiations within each moral code, and these sub-factors present different justifications for moral violations.

After developing the CADS and testing for its psychometric properties, it is important to use the scale to show the existence of individual and cultural differences regarding the endorsement of different moral codes. The next

chapter will apply this scale to investigate the existence of individual differences on the endorsement of the moral codes when identifying moral violations, and also test the relationship between moral violations with emotions. Most of the studies which used Shweder's proposal in social psychology have tested the relationship between moral judgements based on each moral code and the moral emotions of contempt, anger and disgust (Haidt et al., 1993; Rozin et al., 1999). However, these studies were conducted with a qualitative methodology. Therefore, Study 4 aims at testing the association between endorsing different moral codes with moral emotions by using the CADS to replicate previous findings.

CHAPTER 7

THE HEART OF THE MATTER: EMOTIONS AND ACTION TENDENCIES TOWARDS MORAL VIOLATIONS

If moral behaviour were simply following rules, we could program a computer to be moral.

- Samuel P. Ginder (August 15, 1987)

This chapter focuses on investigating the relationship between the moral codes and the judgement of actions, and the emotional and behavioural tendencies associated with the moral violations performed.

As reviewed in Chapter 3, violations of moral rules are context dependent (Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder et al., 1987). Although conceptions of the correctness of an action seem to be based on cultural norms, some actions related to fairness, rights and justice are considered moral violations in most cultures (Haidt et al., 1993; Nucci & Turiel, 2000). Previous chapters have already dealt with some aspects of individual differences regarding the three moral codes; however, what factors explain why some people tend to approach and punish transgressors of moral rules, whereas others tend to move away and avoid them? It is possible that participants who endorse specific ethics also show a preference in terms of behavioural reactions.

This chapter contains one experiment: Study 4 included short stories describing moral violations of each of the three moral codes proposed, asking participants' judgement towards the moral violations, as well as behavioural and emotional reactions. It was expected that each moral code

would be associated to a specific emotion, as proposed by the CAD hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999), and these emotions could mediate CAD's association to judgement and action tendencies towards each respective violation.

Study 4

Previous research on morality has focused on the consequences of actions; positive or negative outcomes would predict whether an action was considered right or wrong without focusing on the emotional reactions to them (for a critique, see Haidt, 2001; Haidt et al., 1993). However, alternative theoretical approaches suggest that emotions might have an important effect on this judgement process (Haidt, 2001; Nichols, 2004; Turiel, Hildebrant, & Wainryb, 1991). The social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) proposes the judgement of a moral violation can happen without a necessary rationalization process, especially if the evaluation is fast and does not involve thinking about the action's consequences.

Previous findings identified emotions as the primary regulators of moral behaviour (Leitão, 1999). Feelings such as guilt, regret and shame are usually described as indicators of comprehension and internalization of the social standards and personal responsibility. Haidt (2003a) conceives "moral emotions" as those which are connected to the interests and welfare of the society as a whole, and of people different from the judge or agent. The two moral emotions which have been studied with greater attention are anger and disgust, both part of the *hostility triad* (Haidt, 2003a), aroused by

violations of moral rules. Research studies (Haidt & Hersh, 2003; Haidt et al., 1993) have shown that emotions are usually better predictors of moral judgements than consequences of the actions.

Haidt (2001) proposes that emotions come first, quickly and effortlessly, influencing participant's moral reasoning. However, emotions could also follow the endorsement of moral codes, as proposed by the CAD hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999). This hypothesis, as presented in Chapter 3, proposes that moral violations of community would arouse the emotion of contempt, violations of autonomy would arouse anger, and violations of divinity would arouse disgust. Consequently, emotions would mediate the relationship between perception of moral violations and moral judgement. Based on this hypothesis, the moral codes would have an indirect influence on action tendencies and judgement of an action.

Study 4 intended to investigate whether the three moral codes could explain the extent to which participants would perceive violations of each moral code, and whether this perception of moral violation could explain judgements of right / wrong, as well as emotions and action tendencies.

Chiu et al. (1997) propose that the importance of a moral code to the individual is only perceived when this moral code is violated. Consequently, there is no direct link between the endorsement of moral codes and behavioural or emotional tendencies: the endorsement of a specific moral code makes easier for participants to identify its violations. When its moral rules are violated, the individual will judge and react appropriately.

A high endorsement of community is, consequently, expected to predict an increasing tendency to perceive community violations; a high

endorsement of autonomy is expected to predict perceptions of autonomy violations; and a high endorsement of divinity is expected to predict perceptions of divinity violations (*hypothesis 1*).

The high endorsement of autonomy ethics in both British and Brazilian cultures, as seen in Studies 2 and 3, suggests participants will judge autonomy-related violations more negatively, also presenting stronger action tendencies and emotional reactions towards these violations. Consequently, in terms of hypotheses, it is expected that the present sample of British participants will present higher scores on judgement, emotional reactions and action tendencies towards autonomy-related violations (*hypothesis 2*).

Based on previous research (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007), an association between anger and punishment is expected (*hypothesis 3*), and between disgust and avoidance (*hypothesis 4*). Associations between violations of community and contempt (*hypothesis 5*), violations of autonomy and anger (*hypothesis 6*), and violations of divinity and disgust (*hypothesis 7*) are also predicted based on the CAD hypothesis. Building on these associations, emotions could act as mediators between moral code violations and moral judgements. This mediating role will also be investigated.

Method

Participants

Participants were three hundred and seventy six university students, mainly females (85%), with a mean age of 19.5 (SD = 2.89). The majority of the sample (84%) was British, living in their own country for an average of

18.5 years (SD = 3.83). Non-British participants were from 17 different countries[4]. Psychology students took part for partial fulfilment of a course requirement, on a voluntary basis, receiving two credits for their participation. In terms of religion, 48% did not have religious beliefs. The largest plurality (13%) was Catholic, with a moderate level of religiosity (M = 2.5; SD = 1.18).

Measures

Nine different fictitious stories were developed, each one presenting an action that was initially thought to violate one moral code, but support another. The stories used were: 1) *Muslim veil*: "A 14-year-old girl (person A) is not allowed to attend her classes in school because she is wearing a *hijab* (Muslim veil), covering her head. She refuses to take it off. All religious objects were banned from the school by the headmaster (person B), including the Jewish *kipah* (head covering), and cross pendants". This is considered to violate divinity and support community, with high values indicating the headmaster's action was wrong. 2) *Monitoring e-mail*: "The parents (couple) of a 14 year old child monitor (open and read) their child's e-mail every month, for safety reasons". This is considered to violate autonomy and support community, with high values indicating the parent's action was wrong. 3) *Incest*: "A 28 year-old man (person A) and a 26-year-old woman (person B) are brother and sister, but were raised separately. When they finally meet, they fall in love and decide to get married, although they don't want to have children". This is considered to violate divinity and

[4] Participants were from the following countries (number of participants in parentheses): Bahrain (1), Belgium (1), China (15), Egypt (1), Estonia (1), Finland (1), France (10), Germany (7), Greece (1), Hong Kong (1), India (5), Italy (4), Lithuania (1), Netherlands (3), Poland (1), Sweden (1), Uganda (1).

support autonomy, with high values indicating the couple's action was wrong. 4) *Houses on graveyard*: "Your town is in need of more space for housing. So, the council decides to build new houses on the site of an old graveyard, which was no longer being used". This is considered to violate divinity and support community, with high values indicating the council's action was wrong. 5) *Age of consent*: "A 30 year old man (person A) regularly has consensual sexual intercourse with a 14 year old girl (person B)". This is considered to violate community and support autonomy, with high values indicating the couple's action was wrong. 6) *Kissing portrait*: "A woman decides to hang in her house a painting portraying the main figures of her religion kissing on the lips, even though from a religious point of view it is considered somewhat sacrilegious". This is considered to violate divinity and support autonomy, with high values indicating the woman's action was wrong. 7) *Teen centre*: "The council of your town decides to transform an unused church building into a centre for teenagers". This is considered to violate divinity and support community, with high values indicating the council's action was wrong. 8) *Infidelity:* "A 28-year-old woman (person A) is having an affair with a work colleague. She is married to a 30-year-old man (person B), and he does not know anything about it". This is considered to violate community and support autonomy, with high values indicating the woman's action was wrong. 9) *Dog meat:* "A man living in poverty decides to kill a dog and cook it so his family will have some meat to eat, instead of just rice". This is considered to violate community and support autonomy, with high values indicating the man's action was wrong.

Emotion terms. In the word measures, presented after the scenario, participants were asked to indicate on a eight-point scale (1 = not at all; 8 = very), the extent each story made them feel angry, compassionate, depressed, disgusted, happy, infuriated, outraged, pity, pleased, repulsed, sad, satisfied, sick, sorrowful, sympathetic, grossed-out, and contempt.

Judgement of the action. The questionnaire contained three evaluation items, ranging from 1 (*Completely right / good / positive*) to 7 (*Completely wrong / bad/ negative*).

CADS' violations. Four questions regarding the subscales of the community and divinity moral codes, and one for the ethics of autonomy were also included after each story: "Do you think his/her action violates the natural order of things?"; "Do you think his/her action has violated someone else's rights?"; "Do you think his/her act has disrespected community rules and traditions?"; "Do you think his/her action violates religious rules and traditions?"; and "Do you think his/her action disrespected family values?". Each question was answered on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Extremely*).

Action tendencies. Participants were then asked to indicate their punishment and/or avoidance action tendencies, measured by four items: "Do you think person A/B deserves to be punished / condemned?" for punishment, and "Do you think person A/B deserves to be avoided / have people moving away from him/her?", for avoidance. These questions were indicated on a scale from 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Extremely*).

Students were also requested to answer the CADS and questions regarding their age, sex, country of birth, and religion.

Procedures

Students were presented with an information sheet, providing details on the importance of the experiment, as well as their rights to leave the experiment at any time without having to give any explanations. The experiment was conducted on-line. Although there was the need to identify the questionnaires in order to reward the participants, the confidentiality of the answers was guaranteed. Participants needed around twenty minutes to complete the questionnaire.

Results

Initially, analyses were conducted including only British-born participants, in order to control for this possible confounding variable. However, results were not different from those including all participants. Therefore, findings reported here were obtained with the complete sample.

CADS endorsement and moral violations

Initially, regression analyses were conducted with the three main moral codes dimensions as independent variables across all scenarios and perceptions of moral violations as dependent variable. This approach was chosen in order to investigate whether the endorsement of the expected moral code would predict the perception of the scenarios as moral violations, further validating the CADS scale.

Endorsing community was the only significant predictor of the perception of community violations, $\beta = .28$, $t = 5.64$, $p < .001$. Endorsing autonomy, $\beta = .23$, $t = 4.60$, $p < .001$, and community, $\beta = .12$, $t = 2.31$, $p < .05$, significantly predicted perceptions of autonomy violations. This difference, however, was only marginally significant on a *t*-test between dependent betas, $t\,(370) = 1.72$, $p = .08$. Finally, endorsing divinity, $\beta = .32$, $t = 6.54$, $p < .001$, and community, $\beta = .16$, $t = 2.47$, $p < .05$, significantly predicted perceptions of divinity violations. On a *t*-test between dependent betas, this difference was significant, $t\,(370) = 1.98$, $p < .05$. These results partially corroborate hypothesis 1 and indicate that the expected CADS dimensions are the main predictors of the extent to which participants perceive a violation of its respective moral code.

This is the only analysis where the CADS is used. After showing this direct association between the endorsement of these moral codes and the perception of moral violations, this experiment will focus on these perceived violations and their associated emotional and behavioural reactions.

Perceptions of moral violations by scenario

A 9 x 5 (Scenario, Violations) mixed analysis was performed, to investigate which moral codes (social rules, family, autonomy, religious rules, and nature) the scenarios (Muslim veil, houses on graveyard, teen centre, monitoring e-mail, kissing portrait, age of consent, infidelity, incest, and dog meat) were violating according to the participants' perception.

A main effect of the type of violation was found, $F\,(4, 1424) = 1282.14$, $MSE = 16.36$, $p < .001$. Moral codes were considered violated and/or wrong

when they presented averaged scores equal or higher than 4, indicating some degree of violation and/or wrongness. Participants perceived the actions presented as mainly social rules violations (M = 4.14), followed by autonomy (M = 4.12) and religious rules violations (M = 4.11), across all scenarios.

There was also a main effect of scenario, F (8, 356) = 5.77, MSE = 57.03, $p < .001$. Age of consent presented the highest score across all types of violation (M = 5.42), followed by infidelity (M = 4.75) and houses on graveyard (M = 4.70).

As expected, a violation x scenario interaction was also found, F (32, 1424) = 17.55, MSE = 22.92, $p < .001$. Table 13 presents means for violations, judgement, emotions and action tendencies for each scenario.

Age of consent was considered a violation of all five moral codes, and not only a community violation as anticipated. Infidelity violated four moral codes, including community, which was expected, but not nature. Incest was considered a violation of nature, family, and social rules, and not only divinity as anticipated; the Muslim veil scenario violated autonomy and religious rules, when only a divinity violation was expected, and houses on graveyard violated religious rules, social rules, and autonomy, and not only divinity, as expected. Autonomy was also violated in the monitoring email scenario; and social rules in the dog meat scenario, as expected. The teen centre and kissing portrait did not violate any moral code, but the highest scores for both scenarios were on religious rules violations. In general, scenarios were considered violations of the proposed moral codes.

Table 13. *Scenarios' means according to type of violation, judgement, emotional and behavioural tendencies*

Scenarios	Violation		Judgement	Emotion		Action tendency	
	Type	M	M	Type	M	Type	M
Muslim veil	Autonomy	4.86	4.09 [b, c]	Anger	3.52	Avoidance	2.21
	Religious rules	4.79		Disgust	3.05	Punishment	2.34
	Social rules	4.40		Contempt	1.98		
Houses on graveyard	Religious rules	5.11	4.75 [c, d]	Anger	4.07	Avoidance	2.99
	Social rules	5.06		Disgust	4.12	Punishment	3.06
	Autonomy	4.91		Contempt	2.98		
Incest	Nature	5.26	4.95 [c, d, e]	Anger	2.00	Avoidance	2.32
	Family	4.51		Disgust	4.37	Punishment	2.19
	Social rules	4.29		Contempt	2.12		
Monitoring email	Autonomy	4.76	3.86 [a, b, c]	Anger	3.67	Avoidance	2.11
				Disgust	3.24	Punishment	2.16
				Contempt	1.83		
Kissing portrait	Religious rules	4.35	3.44 [a, b]	Anger	1.93	Avoidance	1.91
				Disgust	2.00	Punishment	1.98
				Contempt	1.39		

Note. For each scenario, judgement marginal means without a shared subscript differ from each other by Scheffe at $p < .05$.

Table 13. *Scenarios' means according to type of violation, judgement, emotional and behavioural tendencies*

Scenarios	Violation		Judgement	Emotion		Action tendency	
	Type	M	M	Type	M	Type	M
Age of consent	Autonomy	5.73	6.10 [e]	Anger	5.17	Avoidance	5.06
	Social rules	5.59		Disgust	5.78	Punishment	5.28
	Family	5.59		Contempt	3.61		
	Nature	5.25					
	Religious rules	4.92					
Infidelity	Family	5.38	5.90 [d, e]	Anger	4.29	Avoidance	4.17
	Autonomy	5.31		Disgust	4.48	Punishment	4.33
	Religious rules	4.76		Contempt	3.05		
	Social rules	4.50					
Teen centre	Religious rules	3.90	2.69 [a]	Anger	1.98	Avoidance	2.13
				Disgust	1.83	Punishment	2.08
				Contempt	2.05		
Dog meat	Religious rules	3.79	3.33 [a, b]	Anger	2.98	Avoidance	2.36
				Disgust	3.90	Punishment	2.34
				Contempt	2.24		

Note. For each scenario, judgement marginal means without a shared subscript differ from each other by Scheffe at $p < .05$.

However, the moral codes judged more negatively were considered violations of more than one moral code.

Differences in judgement by scenario

Initially, reliability analyses regarding judgement items (right/wrong, good/bad, and positive/negative) were performed, in order to investigate if they could be averaged into single scores. These items presented a satisfactory index of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .94). Therefore, the analysis was conducted with the averaged judgement index entered as a dependent variable, with higher values indicating more negative judgements of the scenario (see Table 13).

Analysis of variance was performed to investigate how participants judged each scenario. The expected effect of scenario was observed, F (8, 373) = 28.83, MSE = 56.83, $p < .001$. The scenarios judged more negatively were age of consent, infidelity, incest and houses on graveyards.

Hypothesis 2 suggested that higher scores in judgement, emotions and action tendencies would be observed for autonomy-related violations. Based on results presented in Table 13, this hypothesis is only partially corroborated. The two scenarios judged more negatively (age of consent and infidelity) were considered violations of autonomy, but they were also considered violations of community and divinity. Also, other autonomy-related violations were not considered wrong, and have not presented strong emotional or behavioural reactions.

Differences in emotions and action tendencies by scenarios

The terms for anger (Cronbach's alpha = .94) and disgust (Cronbach's alpha = .95) formed reliable indices, and correlated with each other at r (372) = .70, $p < .001$. Contempt also correlated with anger at r (372) = .53, $p < .001$, as well as with disgust at r (372) = .52, $p < .001$. In order to analyse the effect of the scenarios on the emotions reported by the participants, a 3 x 9 (Emotions, Scenario,) mixed analysis was performed.

A significant main effect of emotion was observed, F (2, 712) = 125.95, MSE = 163.96, $p < .001$, with disgust presenting the highest score (M = 3.64) across all scenarios. The main effect of scenario was again observed, F (8, 356) = 19.79, MSE = 114.77, $p < .001$, with age of consent presenting the highest emotional reaction across the three types of emotion (M = 4.85), followed by infidelity (M = 3.94).

An emotions x scenario interaction was also found, F (16, 712) = 9.86, MSE = 12.84, $p < .001$. Disgust was the emotion with the highest score in the age of consent, infidelity, incest, houses on graveyard, and dog meat scenarios, whereas anger was highest in the Muslim veil and monitoring e-mail scenarios. The other scenarios presented very low levels of emotional reactions (averages equal or below 2).

The action tendency items were combined to create two scores: punishment (Cronbach's alpha = .92) and avoidance (Cronbach's alpha = .93). The scores were correlated at r (125) = .87, $p < .001$.

Regarding possible preferences for action tendencies, a 2 x 9 (Action, Scenario) mixed analysis was conducted. Only the main effect of scenario was found, F (8, 356) = 24.36, MSE = 105.54, $p < .001$, with the age of

consent and infidelity scenario presenting the highest scores across action tendencies. No main effect of action and no interaction were observed.

Associations between emotions and action tendencies

Hypotheses 3 and 4 suggested the association between emotions and action tendencies. Correlations analyses were performed to test for the associations between the action tendencies and the emotions of anger, disgust, and contempt. A partial correlation approach was used, to control the high associations among the three emotions. Results are shown in Table 14, in the top two rows.

Table 14. *Partial correlations between action tendencies, moral violations, and CAD emotions*

Action tendencies	Contempt	Anger	Disgust
Avoidance	.12*	.31**	.25**
Approach	.15**	.41**	.17**
Violations			
Social rules	**.10***	.16**	.31**
Family	.02	.26**	.34**
Autonomy	.05	**.49****	.03
Religious rules	.07	.12*	.18**
Nature	.08	.10	**.51****

Note. Each column controls for the other two emotions; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

Contempt was significantly correlated with both avoidance and approach, and these correlations were not significantly different from each other, t (367) = .81, p = .42. Anger was also correlated with both action tendencies, but the association between anger and approach was

significantly higher than its association with avoidance, t (367) = 2.93, p < .01, and these results corroborate hypothesis 3. Disgust was also correlated with both action tendencies, and the expected association with avoidance was significantly higher than the association with approach, t (367) = 1.21, p < .05, corroborating hypothesis 4. It is important to emphasise, however, the small size of these differences and the large association between emotions.

Associations between emotions and perceptions of moral code violations

Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 proposed an association between moral code violations and emotional reactions. After controlling for its association with anger and disgust, contempt correlated only with social rules and no other CAD violation. This correlation, however, is only marginally different from the lowest non-significant correlation found with family, t (371) = 1.88, p = .07. These findings partially corroborate hypothesis 5; a tendency can be observed of an association between contempt and community, but it is not a strong one. Also, it is not completely consistent with the CAD hypothesis, due to the fact that the lowest correlation found was with family, which is part of the community dimension.

Anger correlated with both community violations, highly with autonomy, and also with religious rules violations, after controlling for contempt and disgust. Testing for the difference in dependent correlations, the association between anger and autonomy violations was found to be significantly different from the second higher correlation, between anger and family, t (371) = 5.52, p < .001, and therefore different from all other associations with anger. These results corroborate hypothesis 6.

Finally, after controlling for contempt and anger, disgust correlated with both community sub-scales and both divinity sub-scales, especially with nature. The association between disgust and nature was found to be significantly different from the association between disgust and family, the next highest association, $t(371) = 4.53$, $p < .001$, and therefore different from all other associations with disgust, partially corroborating hypothesis 7 due to the low (although significant) association with religious rules, which is part of the divinity dimension.

The mediating role of emotions

Based on the associations between moral code violations and emotions, and on previous research findings (Rozin et al., 1999), it is possible that emotions act as mediators (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004) in the relationship that the perception of moral codes violations establishes with judgement (right/wrong) and action tendencies.

A path analysis approach was used to evaluate a model predicting moral judgement (right / wrong) from emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust), and perceptions of moral code violations, in order to test the mediating role of emotions in this relationship. The initial model tested included all possible associations between the variables. After the first round of analysis, the non-significant paths were excluded, and the associations between the error terms of emotions were included (see Figure 4).

The final model included the associations between the participants' perceptions of CAD violations leading to the emotions of anger and disgust. The perceived violation of all three moral codes was significantly associated

to the arousal of anger, whereas the violation of community and divinity was associated to the arousal of disgust. From the emotional reactions, there were direct paths leading to moral judgement. Although the chi-square index was significant, χ^2 (4) = 43.58, $p < .001$, all other indices were considered adequate and indicated the model fits the data, GFI = .97, CFI = .97, NNFI = .97, RMSEA = .07. Similar analyses were conducted for predicting the action tendencies of avoidance (Figure 5) and punishment (Figure 6).



Figure 4. Path analysis predicting moral judgement (right / wrong) towards moral violations directly from emotions, and indirectly from perceptions of moral code violations



Figure 5. Path analysis predicting avoidance action tendencies directly from emotions, and indirectly from perceptions of moral code violations

Goodness of fit indexes for the model predicting avoidance from perceptions of moral code violations mediated by emotions were also considered adequate, χ^2 (4) = 40.93, $p < .001$, GFI = .97, CFI = .98, NNFI = .97, RMSEA = .11. Disgust presented the highest direct association with avoidance, replicating previously found associations.



Figure 6. Path analysis predicting punishment action tendencies directly from emotions, and indirectly from perceptions of moral code violations

Punishment was also significantly predicted by emotions (directly), and by perceptions of moral code violations (indirectly), and anger presented the highest association with this action tendency (see Figure 6). Goodness of fit indexes were also considered adequate, χ^2 (4) = 44.79, $p < .001$, GFI = .96, CFI = .97, NNFI = .97, RMSEA = .10.

Discussion

This chapter investigated the associations between the endorsement of the CAD moral codes and its association with the perception of moral violations. It also investigated the association between these moral violations

with the emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust (CAD triad hypothesis, see Rozin et al., 1999), and between emotions and action tendencies (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007).

CADS endorsement and moral violations

Although this was the only analysis where the CADS was used, it further validated this scale by showing that the endorsement of a moral code directly predicts participants' perception of its moral violation.

Although hypothesis 1 was only partially corroborated due to a marginal difference between the endorsement of autonomy and community dimensions when predicting the perception of autonomy-related violations, there is a clear tendency towards the expected associations.

Differences in judgement, emotions, and action tendencies by scenario

For each scenario, participants were able to identify the type of moral code being violated, to judge whether the action described in the scenario was wrong or not, and to express their emotional reactions and possible action tendencies towards the transgressor. The scenario describing an adult having sexual relationships with a person below the age of consent was perceived as a violation of all five moral codes. This action was judged more harshly than any other scenario, presenting the highest levels of emotional reactions and action tendencies.

The second scenario with the highest negative overall evaluation was the infidelity scenario, where a married woman is having an affair with a work colleague. This action was perceived as a violation of four out of five moral

codes (except nature), and presented judgement scores similar to the age of consent scenario. Emotions and both action tendencies also presented high scores.

The house on graveyard scenario was considered a high violation of religious rules, social rules, and autonomy, moderately wrong, arousing moderate reactions of anger and disgust, and no strong action tendencies. Another scenario describing an action considered moderately wrong was the Muslim veil scenario. However, emotional and behavioural reactions were low.

Incest was considered mainly a violation of nature, but also of family and social rules, and it was considered wrong. It aroused mainly a disgust emotional reaction, but no strong or specific action tendency towards the transgressors.

The other scenarios were not considered wrong at all, and did not arouse any emotional or behavioural reactions (monitoring e-mails, kissing portrait, teen centre, and dog meat).

It is interesting to observe that the two scenarios considered more harmful (age of consent and infidelity) were considered violations of all three moral codes, were judged more negatively and also presented the highest levels of emotional reactions and both action tendencies. These scenarios also describe improper sexual relationships (infidelity and age of consent), which is an important content of moral codes: the ethics of divinity are the basis for extensive religious rules that regulate the proper use of the body; and the ethics of autonomy, which was used to serve as the basis for liberal

movements defending sexual freedom, culminating with the Declaration of Sexual Rights (World Association for Sexual Health, 2008).

This association between morality and the regulation of sexuality is a central issue in cultures described as honour cultures. Even though reputation/honour concerns are not mentioned as a cause of distress in liberal and Western communities, they are present and reinforced by the culture: aggressions and attacks through offensive language are made by mentioning the sexual reputation of someone's family (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Consequently, considering these scenarios a violation of all ethics could be explained by beliefs in reputational concerns.

Associations between emotions, action tendencies, and perceptions of moral violations

Correlation analyses confirmed the previously observed associations of anger with approach and of disgust with avoidance action tendencies (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007), corroborating the hypotheses proposed. No specific action tendency was associated to contempt, although Fischer and Roseman (2007) propose this emotion would also be associated to avoidance tendencies.

Further correlation analyses confirmed the previously proposed associations of anger with autonomy, disgust with divinity, and contempt with community (Rozin et al., 1999). Anger's association to autonomy, and disgust's with divinity were confirmed in a *t*-test of difference between dependent correlations, but the association between community and contempt was not considered significantly different from a non-significant

correlation. These findings suggest that this association between community and contempt proposed by the CAD hypothesis could be due only to shared variance with the emotions of anger and disgust. Effect sizes found are not consistent or strong enough, when compared to the other two emotions.

In general, these results partially corroborate the CAD triad hypothesis proposed by Rozin et al. (1999), and suggest that even though anger and disgust are also aroused when other moral codes are violated, their main association is with the proposed moral violations of autonomy and divinity, respectively.

The mediating role of emotions

Path analyses were conducted to test for the mediating role of emotions on the relationship between perceptions of moral violations, moral judgement, avoidance and punishment action tendencies. When predicting moral judgement, both emotions of anger and disgust presented similar associations. Different results were observed, however, when predicting action tendencies. For avoidance, disgust presented the highest association with this action tendency, whereas anger presented the highest association when predicting punishment. These findings corroborated previous results and literature findings (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007).

Limitations of the experiment

Although the experiment described in this chapter presented interesting findings regarding the evaluation of moral violations and its

association to the proposed moral codes and emotions, results are not clear regarding the moral codes being violated in each scenario.

Because participants suggested that some scenarios were violations of many moral codes (e.g., age of consent, Muslim veil), a clear picture on the associations between emotions and moral violations could not be observed. However, even considering this limitation, the experiment reported here was able to provide more information on the validity of the CADS, replicate the CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999), and successfully test a model predicting moral judgement and action tendencies towards moral violations.

Conclusion

This chapter presented one experiment regarding the association of the moral codes with emotions, action tendencies, and the judgement of moral violations. Results corroborated previous theoretical and empirical associations proposed between emotions and the moral codes (Rozin et al., 1999), and between emotions and action tendencies (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007). Although this was a brief and exploratory experiment, it confirmed the associations proposed and showed that the endorsement of moral codes can be used to develop models that help explain different moral judgements and action tendencies, including the effect of emotions.

After developing the CADS, testing its psychometric properties and its potential to identify individual differences in moral codes endorsement, the focus of this thesis will shift to the identification of cultural differences and test the association between moral codes and honour concerns.

CHAPTER 8

A MATTER OF HONOUR:

MORAL CODES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF HONOUR CONCERNS

Mine honour is my life, both grow in one. Take honour from me, and my life is done. Then, dear my liege, mine honour let me try; in that I live, and for that I will die.

- Shakespeare (1595 / 2001)

This chapter investigates the relationship between the CADS and honour concerns. Honour concerns, defined as concerns for the normative standards of interpersonal relationships and the implications that disrespecting these norms might have on one's social and self image (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a, 2002b), are associated with strong emotional and behavioural reactions when violated (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Sev'er & Yurdakul, 2001). This thesis examines the association of these honour concerns with the Big Three moral codes.

This chapter is divided into two main sections: Study 6 explores the individual-level association between the CAD dimensions with the four types of honour concerns proposed by Rodriguez-Mosquera et al. (2002a, 2002b). Study 7 aims at exploring the cross-cultural differences of the CAD scales and honour concerns in different cultural communities. It also aims at testing whether the moral codes can predict these associated honour concerns beyond personal values.

What is honour?

The reputation of a thousand years may be determined by the conduct of one hour.

- Traditional Japanese proverb (The Quotes Garden, 2008)

Proverbs are popular maxims that capture a culture's common observation or point of view, and traditional proverbs about honour can be found in many different cultures. For example, in Vietnam, one would say: "Better to die than to live on with a bad reputation"; in Africa, "Where there is no shame, there is no honour"; in Brazil: "Honour is something one washes with blood"; and in India: "Every man is the guardian of his own honour" (all proverbs extracted from Baer, 2001).

The Merriam-Webster's online dictionary (Honor, n.d.) defines honour as "a good name or public esteem: reputation; a showing of usually merited respect; chastity, purity; a keen sense of ethical conduct: integrity". The proverbs above and the dictionary definition illustrate the strong association the concept of honour has with emotions and morality (Barrett & Sarbin, 2008).

Wikan (1984) proposes that an individual's concept of honour is strongly associated to his/her concept of morality; to have honour means to have character, moral strength. A threat or disrespect to one's honour is associated to the arousal of strong emotions, such as anger and shame (Fischer, Manstead, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999; Ijzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007; Wikan, 1984).

Barret and Sarbin (2008) suggest that the term *honour* was initially associated to public displays of courage and strength, which served to reinforce a status hierarchy. In this sense, honour was generated externally, and not an innate characteristic. According to these authors, the term started to be used in association with someone's class and nobility in medieval times, and it shifted from something extrinsic to an intrinsic characteristic of the individual. However, the external signs of honour persisted as ways of declaring one's worth.

Pitt-Rivers (1968, p.503) suggests that "the notion of honour is a sentiment, a manifestation of this sentiment in conduct, and the evaluation of this sentiment in conduct by others, that is to say, reputation". Having and maintaining honour guarantees the respect of others. "Thus, being an honourable person is determined not only by one's own attributes, actions or status, but also by one's social reputation, or the actions or judgements of members of one's ingroup" (Fischer et al., 1999, p. 151).

Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a) define honour as "one's worth in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others" (p. 17). In another work (Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008), they elaborate this definition and suggest that honour is "a form of collectivism based on social image or reputation" (p. 1472). Cultures of honour define the self as interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and place strong emphasis on family values, harmony and respect. According to these authors, self and social images are more interconnected in cultures of honour than in more individualistic cultural groups. Consequently, a threat or disrespect to one's name or social image is a direct threat or disrespect to one's self image.

However, honour is not a synonym of collectivism and, therefore, is not in opposition to individualism (Fischer et al., 1999). Not all collectivist countries are described as cultures of honour, but it is more common to find normative honour codes in collectivist societies. Fischer et al. (1999) also emphasise that non-honour cultures usually present higher scores in individualistic values (e.g., self-direction, independence, mastery).

Types of honour

According to Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2004), honour cultures avoid dishonour in social interactions by abiding to an honour code. This honour code is constituted of "a set of values that define normative standards for what is considered honourable and dishonourable, disgraceful behaviour" (p.194), and these values are divided into domains, emphasising different types of concerns (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a).

Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2004) refers to *honour concerns* as relational norms the individual cares about, and the more he / or she cares about them, the more intense will be his / or her emotional reactions towards threats to these norms. They suggest the existence of four main types of honour concerns.

First, concerns for *family honour* express the interdependence of the self with the most fundamental social group, and consequently, one's personal honour is interdependent on the family's honour. This interdependence is based on a common identity shared with the individuals that are part of the family. This implies that individual behaviours have an impact on one's personal as well as on one's family reputation, and

emphasises the importance of respecting the *family name*. This connection between one's personal honour and one's family honour implies that any dishonour caused by inappropriate behaviours of one's relatives affects one's personal reputation. Family honour is, therefore, "the value and status of the family in the eyes of others" (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a, p. 17).

Second, concerns for *integrity or social interdependence* express the interdependence of the self with the larger social group and involves the individual's reputation in any interpersonal relationship. This interdependence emphasises the need to maintain and strengthen harmony in social relations, and these are obtained through maintaining one's integrity. Integrity is associated to an internal sense of honour, which guarantees the respect of others. It values generosity, honesty, and loyalty not only to others, but to one's own principles (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a, 2002b).

Although these two types of honour concerns may be important to any individual who is part of such a culture, there are also gender-specific honour codes that emphasise what it is to be a *man* or a *woman* in these cultures.

The third type of honour concern is *masculine honour*, which expresses "the need to appear strong and capable of responding to offenses that undermine one's manhood, one's own honour, or one's family honour" (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a, p. 18). It is associated with a man's reputation regarding his virility and responsibility for maintaining the male authority of the family, and defending the family's name.

Nisbett and Cohen (1996, p. 86) suggest that "Who a man is in such cultures has everything to do with how much of a man he is – defined in

terms of toughness and respect". However, this honour code is not perpetuated exclusively by men. Women are also part of it, by teaching it to their sons, by reinforcing it to their partners and other family members, and by abiding to their own honour code.

Concerns for *feminine honour* express the need to maintain sexual chastity and social restraint. It is strongly associated with family honour, as the woman's behaviour can disgrace the family reputation. Women in honour cultures are not requested to actively defend the family's name, but to protect it by acting appropriately (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b). Veiling, for example, is considered an external display of a female's honour and modesty in Muslim societies (Werbner, 2007).

Feminine honour is also associated with masculine honour, as men are expected to protect their women's honour. When the man's and the family's honour has been threatened by a woman's sexual misconduct, aggression and violence are common outcomes (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Vandello & Cohen, 2003).

Research on honour concerns

> "*We were afraid to stop... Afraid of the women at home... They would have been ashamed of us*" - Veteran of the Civil War in the US, when asked why Southern soldiers had fought so bravely (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996, p. 87).

The majority of the literature on honour emphasises the violence and criminal offences committed by individuals in honour cultures (for a review, see Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b).

Sev'er and Yurdakul (2001) studied killings of women in rural Turkey, defined as *honour killings,* a premeditated murder of a girl/woman by a member of the family (immediate or extended) due to suspicion or proof of sexual misconduct by the victim. Similar cases were observed in other countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan (Sev'er & Yurdakul, 2001), Spain (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a) and the United States (Nisbet & Cohen, 1996).

Although the United States is not particularly known as a culture of honour, Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle and Schwarz (1996) suggest the existence of several subcultures within the country that emphasise norms related to honour concerns.

Nisbett and Cohen (1996) verified the existence of a Southern culture of honour in the US, where individuals show a certain degree of approval for certain types of violence (e.g., those used for responding to insults) and normative ideas on what it means to *be a man* (Cohen et al., 1996). These norms are perpetuated not only by the population (male and female), but also by Southern institutions, that see honour-based violence as more justifiable. In order to protect one's own, or the family's honour, the use of aggression and violence can be tolerated, especially when masculine honour is threatened (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008).

Nisbett and Cohen (1996) identified the attitudes and behaviours that are related to honour norms in this region: higher rates of homicides based on arguments and insults; approval of violence only when it is used to protect the self, the family, and responding to insults; and higher levels of stress, anger, and overt aggression when southerners are insulted. Humiliations and

insults have a strong impact on individuals, arousing similarly strong emotional reactions (e.g., anger) because they are perceived as an attack on one's reputation (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b).

Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a, 2002b), studying data from Spanish and Dutch participants, proposed that honour concerns are related to the cultural values emphasised in that community. They measured honour concerns by asking participants how bad they would feel about behaviour describing a lack of concern for each of the four types of reputation: family, integrity, masculine, and feminine.

These authors found that honour concerns vary according to the participant's nationality: Spanish participants considered all four types of concerns as central to the maintenance of one's reputation (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000), and they considered these concerns more important overall than did Dutch participants. Spanish participants also presented a higher association between their self-esteem and their family honour when compared to Dutch participants.

Dutch participants associated achievement and self-direction with personal honour, whereas Spanish participants associated honour with loyalty, honesty, generosity and fulfilling social obligations. However, Dutch participants also considered conformity to social norms and family reputation more important to honour concerns than Spanish participants (Rodriguez et al., 2000).

Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002b) also found a significant effect of gender in concerns for feminine honour, but no interaction with nationality

was observed. Female participants from Spain and the Netherlands did not differ in their levels of endorsement of feminine honour.

Ijzerman et al. (2007) studied how Dutch male train travellers reacted to insults and found that participants who endorsed honour norms were angrier and less fearful than participants who did not.

Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2008) also studied reactions to insults among Moroccan / Turkish (high honour culture) and ethnically Dutch people in the Netherlands (non-honour culture). They found that, although both groups (high vs. low honour) feel anger and shame when disrespected and insulted, a high concern for honour influenced the desire to protect one's social image.

Vandello and Cohen (2003) studied Brazilians, Americans and Hispanic immigrants in the US, and showed that male Brazilian participants, as well as the Hispanic immigrants, tended to endorse a certain level of violence towards female infidelity, when compared to male American participants. Vandello, Cohen, and Ransom (2008) concluded that South Americans still endorse the protection of one's self and family reputation through violence more than other Americans.

Based on this variation of endorsement of honour concerns according to the participant's cultural context, it is proposed that the endorsement of different types of honour could be explained by not only cultural and personal values, but also moral dimensions. Barret and Sarbin (2008) emphasise that "the vocabulary of honour (...) continues to be used as a strong discriminator between right and wrong" (p. 20). Consequently, honour concerns are based

on specific notions of right and wrong, and the justification of their attitudes and behaviour could be made by endorsing different moral codes.

Two studies were conducted to investigate hypothesised associations between the moral codes and honour concerns, at the individual (Study 5) and the cultural levels (Study 6). Structural hypotheses propose associations that should be replicated across cultures, whereas cultural hypotheses propose variations in the mean endorsement of moral codes and honour concerns.

Study 5

Study 5 aimed at investigating the association between moral codes and honour concerns. Based on the definitions of each honour concern in the literature (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a, 2002b) and on the description of each moral code, theoretical associations between these two constructs were proposed. Due to their emphasis on the importance of protecting the family, concerns for family honour are expected to be predicted by the family sub-scale of community (*hypothesis S1*).

Due to their emphasis on individual dignity and protection of one's own reputation, concerns for integrity are expected to be predicted by the autonomy dimension (*hypothesis S2*).

Due to their emphasis on showing strength towards defending one's manhood and one's family reputation, concerns for masculine honour are expected to be predicted by the family sub-scale of the community dimension (*hypothesis S3*).

And finally, due to their emphasis on chastity and sexual shame, concerns for feminine honour are expected to be predicted by the religious rules sub-scale of divinity (*hypothesis S4*).

As previously suggested in Study 1, comparing differences within a cultural community (e.g., Britain) may not be the adequate method to evaluate the effects of culture. However, it provides a rough indication of possible differences that may be found and tested afterwards. Therefore, cultural hypotheses were also developed. Based on the proposed association between concerns for integrity and autonomy, it is also expected that a sample of participants principally from a Western culture would present a higher endorsement of integrity as opposed to the other honour concerns (*hypothesis C1*).

It is also suggested that female participants will present a higher endorsement of feminine honour (*hypothesis C2*), based on previous findings in the literature (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b).

Method

Participants

One hundred and two Psychology students participated in this on-line study. They were recruited through the research participation credit system, as a course requirement. Females represented 72% of the total sample, and the general mean age was 21.13 (*SD* = 3.92), ranging from 18 to 37 years. British students constituted 78% of the total sample; the other participants

were from 16 different countries[5]. In terms of religion, 53% of the group affirmed to not belonging to any religious denomination, and there was a Catholic plurality (20%).

Measures

CADS. Cronbach's alphas found in this sample were: α = .91 for social rules; α = .89 for family; α = .92 for the total community dimension; α = .82 for positive rights; α = .91 for negative rights; α = .91 for the total autonomy dimension; α = .96 for religious rules; α = .90 for nature; and α = .95 for the total divinity dimension.

Culture of honour scale. Twenty five items, developed by Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002b), presented on a list, completing the main question "How bad would you feel if...", to which the participant should answer using a scale that ranges from 1 (*Not bad at all*) to 9 (*Very bad*). The scale is divided into four sub-factors: family honour (e.g., *your family had a bad reputation*), integrity (e.g., *you betrayed other people*), masculine honour (e.g., *you lacked authority over your own family*), and feminine honour (e.g., *you had sexual relations before marriage*). The authors report reliability indexes above .70 for all sub-scales. Cronbach's alphas found in this sample were: α = .84 for family honour; α = .90 for integrity; α = .76 for masculine honour; α = .81 for feminine honour.

Socio-demographic questions. Questions such as age, gender, religion and country of origin were included, as well as a one-item scale

[5] Participants were from the following countries (number in parenthesis): Argentina (2), Belgium (1), Brazil (3), France (1), Germany (2), Gibraltar (2), Greece (1), Ireland (1), Netherlands (1), Nigeria (2), Norway, (1), Pakistan (1), Poland (1), Portugal (1), Saudi Arabia (1), and United States (1).

(Inglehart et al., 1998) assessing the level of religiosity (*How much do you consider yourself a religious person? **0** = Not religious at all* to ***4** = Very religious*).

Procedures

The students were invited to take part in the study through an email sent by the research participation scheme, and answered the questionnaire as a course requirement, on a voluntary basis. The questionnaire was answered on-line, taking around 10 minutes to be completed.

Results

Initially, correlation analysis among the CAD factors was performed. Results, in general, replicated the findings from previous studies. Social rules and family correlated at $r = .54$, $p < .001$; positive and negative rights correlated at $r = .71$, $p < .001$; and religious rules and nature correlated at $r = .41$, $p < .001$. In this sample, social rules also correlated with positive rights ($r = .25$, $p < .05$) and with nature ($r = 44$, $p < .001$). Family also correlated with positive rights ($r = .33$, $p < .001$), religious rules ($r = .46$, $p < .001$) and nature ($r = .47$, $p < .001$), and marginally with negative rights ($r = .19$, $p = .07$). Positive rights also presented a significant correlation with nature ($r = .39$, $p < .001$), as well as negative rights ($r = .30$, $p < .001$).

Types of honour concerns were also correlated. Family honour correlated strongly with integrity ($r = .62$, $p < .001$), and also with masculine ($r = .57$, $p < .001$) and feminine honour ($r = .50$, $p < .001$). Concerns for

integrity correlated directly with masculine (r = .35, p < .001) and feminine honour (r = .27, p < .001). And finally, masculine and feminine honour were also directly correlated (r = .43, p < .001).

In all subsequent analyses, an averaged autonomy score was used due to the strong association between positive and negative rights. Also, in order to control for the associations between the ethics dimensions, which were more balanced in this sample, a regression approach was used to test further hypotheses. CADS' scales (social rules, family, autonomy, religious rules, and nature) were entered based on a stepwise procedure as predictors of all four honour concerns. Results are presented in Table 15.

Hypothesis S1 proposed that the family sub-scale of community would predict concerns for family honour. Results showed that family honour was predicted by the family sub-scale, as expected, but also by the autonomy dimension. In a test of difference between dependent betas, no significant difference was found between these two effect sizes, t (99) = 1.15, p = .25.

Table 15. *CADS sub-scales predicting honour concerns (UK)*

	Predictors	R^2	F	β	t
Family	*Autonomy*	.14	16.89**	.38	4.11**
	Family	.21	12.76**	.21	2.74**
Integrity	*Autonomy*	.10	10.63**	.31	3.26**
Masculine	*Nature*	.06	6.58*	.25	2.57*
Feminine	*Religious rules*	.14	16.60**	.38	4.07**

Note. CADS factors entered based on a Stepwise procedure; * p < .05; ** p < .01.

The autonomy dimension predicted concerns for integrity, as proposed by hypothesis S2, and the religious rules sub-scale of divinity predicted concerns for feminine honour, as proposed by hypothesis S4. Unexpectedly, the nature sub-scale of divinity predicted concerns for masculine honour, and therefore, hypothesis S3 was not corroborated.

Hypothesis C1 proposed the highest endorsement of integrity among all four types of honour concerns, and hypothesis C2 proposed that women would show more concern for feminine honour than men. A 4 x 2 (Honour, Gender) mixed analysis was performed to test these hypotheses. Results showed a main effect of honour, F (3, 300) = 124.44, MSE = 156.72, $p <$ .001. Paired sample t tests indicated a higher endorsement of integrity concerns (M = 7.22) when compared to family (M = 6.43), t (101) = 5.78, $p <$ .001; family concerns were more endorsed than concerns for masculine honour (M = 4.98), t (101) = 10.03, $p <$ .001, which were in turn significantly higher than concerns for feminine honour (M = 4.21), t (101) = 4.87, $p <$ .001, corroborating the proposed hypothesis.

A marginal main effect of gender was observed, F (1, 100) = 3.81, MSE = 20.56, p = .06, with women presenting higher scores (M = 5.86) than men (M = 5.36) across all types of honour. Further analyses were conducted, and significant differences were found for family honour, F (1, 100) = 4.31, MSE = 11.80, $p <$ .05, and for feminine honour, F (1, 100) = 5.35, MSE = 13.07, $p <$ .05, with women presenting higher scores than men (Family honour: women M = 6.64, men M = 5.89; Feminine honour: women M = 4.44, men M = 3.65), corroborating hypothesis C2. No significant differences were found for integrity and masculine honour. Further tests were performed

excluding participants from other countries in the sample, and results remained the same.

Discussion

The present study aimed at exploring the association between the community, autonomy, and divinity moral codes and concerns for family honour, integrity, masculine and feminine honour (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b, 2004). It was hypothesised that concerns for family honour would be predicted by the family sub-scale of community; concerns for integrity by the autonomy dimension; concerns for masculine honour by the community dimension; and concerns for feminine honour by the religious rules sub-scale of divinity.

Regarding hypothesis S1, concerns for family honour was predicted directly by the family sub-scale of community, but also by the autonomy averaged score. As proposed by Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a, 2002b), concerns for family honour are strongly associated to one's self image. Consequently, this association with the ethics of autonomy could be a result of the shared variance with concerns for integrity. It could also suggest that autonomy-based justifications (e.g., it is unfair) could be used as responses towards family honour violations.

Hypotheses S2 and S4, proposing that integrity would associate with autonomy, and feminine honour would associate with religious rules, were both corroborated. Concerns for integrity and the autonomy moral code share common values and ideas, centred on the self as the basis for moral

judgement. Concerns for feminine honour and religious rules also share values and norms related to what could be considered the appropriate female behaviour. Therefore, when one's integrity is disrespected, autonomy-related values and justifications are used, whereas when one's feminine honour is disrespected, religious rules justifications are often the basis of defence (Werbner, 2007).

Regarding masculine honour, hypothesis S3 proposed an association between this honour concern and the community dimension. Results, however, did not corroborate this hypothesis. Masculine honour was predicted exclusively by the nature sub-scale of divinity.

The nature moral code abides by the laws of nature to consider an act as right or wrong. Behaviour considered unnatural or against the natural order of things is considered a moral violation (Haidt et al., 1993; Shweder et al., 1997). This association could imply that participants attribute a man's strength and role as guardian of the family and female honour as due to a natural law, or as a characteristic trait of the male gender. Therefore, when masculine honour is disrespected, one's actions would be justifiable under the idea that it is a *natural* male reaction to defend one's manhood.

These results will be investigated again in the next study in order to verify whether they were specific to this sample, or whether nature-related justifications are used towards masculine honour violations across different cultural communities.

Due to its association with the ethics of autonomy, it was also hypothesised that integrity would present the highest level of endorsement among all four types of honour, and results corroborated this hypothesis.

Integrity was highly endorsed, even considering that this is a student sample from a non-honour culture (Britain).

Results also indicated a significant gender difference in the endorsement of family and feminine honour, with female participants scoring higher than male participants in both types of concern. Findings regarding gender differences in feminine honour are in accordance with the literature (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b).

Study 6

Building on findings from Study 5, this study intends to extend the analysis to a cultural level, investigating cross-cultural differences of the CAD moral codes and honour concerns in seven cultural samples: students in Japan, New Zealand, and the UK; open internet participation in Brazil, Spain, and the US; and also members of religious denominations in Brazil.

Measures of human values were also included, to investigate whether the moral codes could predict honour concerns beyond the influence of personal values. Previous hypotheses proposed in Study 3 (Chapter 6) and Study 5 (previous section of this chapter) will be tested.

Reviewing previously proposed structural hypotheses which are: Community and divinity would be more closely related than community and autonomy (*hypothesis S1*); Community would be related to benevolence, conformity, and security values (*hypothesis S2a*); Community would be related to the interactive function of values (*hypothesis S2b*); Autonomy would be related to hedonism, self-direction, and universalism values

(*hypothesis S3a*); Autonomy would be related to the excitement function of values (*hypothesis S3b*); Divinity would be related to tradition values (*hypothesis S4a*); Divinity would be related to the normative function of values (*hypothesis S4b*); Family honour would be predicted by the family sub-scale of community (*hypothesis S5*); Integrity concerns would be predicted by the autonomy moral code (*hypothesis S6*); Masculine honour would be predicted by both sub-scales of community (*hypothesis S7*); and Feminine honour would be predicted by the religious rules sub-scale of divinity (*hypothesis S8*).

Previously proposed cultural hypotheses were: Participants from all cultural samples would present the highest endorsement of the autonomy moral code, among all three ethics, as previously found in Studies 1, 2, and 3 (*hypothesis C1*); consequently, participants from all cultural samples would present higher endorsement of concerns for integrity (*hypothesis C2*); and female participants would present a higher endorsement of feminine honour, when compared to male participants (*hypothesis C3*).

Britain, New Zealand, and the US are considered individualist cultures (Hofstede, 1997) and, according to Schwartz (2005), English-speaking countries present similar cultural value dimension scores (Schwartz & Ros, 1995). Therefore, it is expected these three countries will present similar scores across ethics (*hypothesis C4*) and honour concerns (*hypothesis C5*), presenting a high endorsement of the autonomy code and a high concern for integrity.

Although Japan, Spain, and Brazil are considered more collectivist countries (Hofstede, 1997), with a more balanced endorsement of cultural

dimensions, each presents its own specificities: Japan is balanced throughout, but low in hierarchy. Its religion also places a strong emphasis on nature and honour (Jun'ichi, 2005); Brazil is higher in embeddedness, hierarchy, and mastery; and Spain is higher in harmony, autonomy, and egalitarianism (Schwartz, 2005). Tentative hypotheses for each country were formulated based on these associations with cultural dimensions.

Japanese participants are expected to present high endorsement of autonomy, community, and the nature sub-factor of divinity (*hypothesis C6*); and high endorsement of all four honour concerns are also expected (*hypothesis C7*). Spanish participants are expected to present a higher endorsement of autonomy when compared to the other two moral dimensions (*hypothesis C8*), and a high endorsement of all four honour concerns (*hypothesis C9*), as this is reportedly a culture of honour (Rodriguez-Mosquera et al., 2002a). Brazilian participants are also expected to present high endorsement of all three ethics (*hypothesis C10*), but due to the fact that members from religious groups took part in this study, Brazil is also expected to present a higher overall endorsement of the divinity moral code (*hypothesis C11*), in comparison to any other country. Brazilian participants are also expected to present a high overall endorsement of honour concerns (*hypothesis C12*), as this is a Latin American culture and inherited many norms and traditions from Spain due to its colonization period (Rabinovich, 2008).

Finally, we would also like to test whether there are any differences in the endorsement of moral codes and honour concerns according to the participants' religious denomination. Cohen and Hill (2007) propose that

religious groups could be investigated as cultures by themselves. According to these authors, religions are systems that emphasise not only obedience to a religious authority and abiding to nature's law, but also other moral values, such as respecting one's family, social justice and equality (Bucher, 2007; Geyer & Baumeister, 2005).

The religious group analysis was conducted exclusively within the Brazilian sample. Before conducting the analyses, however, participants who did not present a high level of religiosity and spirituality ($M >= 4$, on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with high numbers indicating a high religiosity/spirituality) were excluded from the samples. This decision was made in order to guarantee that similarly religious participants would take part in the analyses.

The reference group for these analyses will be the Catholics sample, as they constitute the vast majority of the Brazilian population (75%, according to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2001). Tentative hypotheses proposed are based on sociological research indicating that conservative Protestant groups, such as Baptists, when compared to Catholics, place more emphasis on socialisation of traditional rules and on women's participation on religious activities, which helps perpetuating religious commitments within family units (Sherkat & Ellison, 1999; Woodberry & Smith, 1998). These studies suggest that Baptists will present a higher endorsement of the religious rules sub-factor of divinity (*hypothesis C13*), and a higher endorsement of feminine honour (*hypothesis C14*). Spiritists, on the other hand, believe in the existence of spirits or immaterial beings living inside the physical human body. They also believe that humans, animals and all nature are interconnected, for they all share a

vital energy, named *vital principle*, that maintains life (Kardec, 1996). Consequently, Spiritists will present a higher endorsement of the nature sub-factor (*hypothesis C15*).

Method

Participants

Brazil. Brazilian participants were divided into two different samples: open internet participation and participants from religious groups. The internet sample was constituted by 123 participants, mainly women (68%), with a mean age of 32.3 years (*SD* = 10.9). Forty percent of the participants were Catholics, presenting a moderate level of religiosity (*M* = 3.41, *SD* = 1.17). A Portuguese version of the questionnaire was created on-line and the link was sent by e-mail to universities and student societies.

The religious sample was constituted of 312 participants, contacted in churches and temples from the three religious denominations with the highest number of members in Brazil: Catholicism (N = 144), Baptism (N = 109), and Spiritism (N = 59), constituted mainly of females (63%), with a mean age of 31.9 years (*SD* = 15.28) and a high level of religiosity (*M* = 4.05, *SD* = .84). All participants from both sub-samples have never left the country, living in Brazil for an average of 32 years (*SD* = 14.07). No reward or payment was offered, and participants took part in the research on a voluntary basis.

Japan. One hundred Japanese university students answered a paper-based questionnaire. The sample was mostly female (69%), with a mean age

of 20.1 years (*SD* = .98), living in Japan for an average of 20 years (*SD* = 1.15). They were mainly non-religious (35%), with a Buddhist plurality (20%), with a low level of religiosity (*M* = 2.30, *SD* = 1.05). No reward or payment was offered, and participants answered the questionnaire on a voluntary basis.

New Zealand. One-hundred and eight New Zealander university students answered a paper-based questionnaire. The sample was mostly female (79%), with a mean age of 19.5 years (*SD* = 3.99), living in New Zealand for an average of 18.4 years (*SD* = 4.75). They were mainly non-religious (38%), with a Catholic plurality (10%), with a low level of religiosity (*M* = 2.20, *SD* = 1.10). Psychology undergraduate students were given research participation credit, which is a course requirement, for taking part in the study.

Spain. Sixty-three Spanish participants answered an on-line questionnaire. The Spanish version of the questionnaire was created on-line and the link was sent by e-mail to universities and student societies. Mainly men (56%), with a mean age of 35.7 years (*SD* = 7.64), living in Spain for an average of 34 years (*SD* = 7.18). They were mainly Catholics (37%), with a moderate to low level of religiosity (*M* = 2.4, *SD* = 1.31).

United Kingdom. Participants were 298 British Psychology undergraduate students, mainly women (73%), with a mean age of 22.3 (*SD* = 8.25), living in the UK for an average of 21.8 years (*SD* = 8.15). A plurality affirmed not having religious beliefs (26%), followed by atheists (19%). The main religious plurality was formed by members of the Church of England (16%). In general, participants presented a moderate to low level of

religiosity (M = 2.5, SD = 1.26). Students were given research participation credit, which is a course requirement, for taking part in the study.

United States. Eighty five American participants answered the questionnaire on the internet. The questionnaire was created on-line and the link was sent by e-mail to universities and student societies. Formed mainly by men (55%), with ages ranging from 19 to 60 years old (M = 34.8, SD = 10.5), living in their own country for an average of 33 years (SD = 11.1). A plurality (24%) affirmed being members of various Christian denominations (e.g., Mormons, Disciples of Christ, Methodists), followed by participants who did not have religious beliefs (17%). The main religious plurality was formed by Catholics (15%), with a moderate level of religiosity (M = 3.53, SD = 1.2).

Measures

A bilingual committee approach (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997) was used to translate all necessary scales to Japanese, Portuguese and Spanish. This approach was chosen to enhance the quality of the translation, because it uses a group of experts in both languages discussing the meaning of the items.

CADS. In addition to the existing CADS English and Portuguese versions, the scale was translated to Spanish and Japanese. As Japan was the only non-Christian country in our sample, six new items were developed to cover values associated with the country's religious views. New items in the "morally right" scale were: *It follows Buddha's teachings*, *It shows respect for their ancestors*, and *It brings harmony to the world*; and new "morally wrong" items were: *It is contrary to Buddha's teachings*, *It disrespects their*

ancestors, and *It disrupts the world's harmony*. Consequently, the English, Portuguese, and Spanish versions of the CADS included 44 items, whereas the Japanese version included 50 items.

Short Schwartz Values Survey. Developed by Lindeman and Verkasalo (2005), this scale is the short version of the SVS (Schwartz, 1992). It consists of 10 items, each reflecting one of the ten value types (e.g., power, self-direction, tradition). According to the authors, it presents good reliability and replicates the quasi-circular structure of values as proposed by Schwartz (1992). The Portuguese, Spanish and Japanese versions of the questionnaire were provided by Prof. Shalom Schwartz, through personal communication.

Honour Scale. Twenty five items, developed by Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002b), presented on a list, posed the main question "How bad would you feel if...", to which the participant should answer using a scale ranging from **1** (Not bad at all) to **9** (Very bad). The scale is divided into four sub-factors: family honour ("*your family had a bad reputation*"), integrity ("*you betrayed other people*"), masculine honour ("*you lacked authority over your own family*"), and feminine honour ("*you had sexual relations before marriage*"). The English and Spanish versions of this questionnaire were provided by Dr. Patricia Rodriguez Mosquera, through personal communication. The scale was also translated to Japanese and Portuguese.

The Basic Values Survey (Gouveia, 2003) was also included in the final questionnaire, with all versions provided by Dr. Valdiney Gouveia, through personal communication. Due to space constraints, it was not possible to include the BVS in the Japanese version of the questionnaire.

Age, gender, religion, country of birth, years living in country of birth, religion and level of religiosity were also asked from the participants.

Procedure

Data were collected in two ways. An on-line questionnaire was developed in three languages (English, Portuguese and Spanish), in order to extend the number of international participants. This on-line survey was used to collect data in Spain, United States, United Kingdom, and part of the data in Brazil.

Paper-based questionnaires were also used to collect data in Brazil, Japan and New Zealand. This type of questionnaire was chosen in Brazil in order to reach a different type of population, due to the fact that the majority of the Brazilian population does not have internet access, and participants were approached in churches and temples. Japanese participants were approached after lectures and invited to take part in the research. New Zealand participants registered in the research participation system, and answered the questionnaire in their registered time-slot.

Results

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)

Initially, the CADS was factor analysed separately in the Japanese sample, in order to verify whether the new Japanese items would load into any existing moral dimension or generate a separate dimension (see Table 16).

Table 16. *Exploratory factor analysis of the Japanese CADS*

Items*	Factor loadings		
	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
Morally right items:			
it is a customary practice of the community	.730		
it is socially approved	.666		
it follows the rules of one's social group	.606		
it is accepted by the family	.651		
it respects family traditions	.629		
the person gains respect from the family	.610		
the person gains respect from society	.570		
people respect the social order	.534		
it is socially accepted	.416		
it respects someone's privacy		.596	
it allows a person to defend herself/himself		.579	
it protects someone's interests and needs		.432	
it expresses personal choice and liberty		.421	
it expresses someone's autonomy		.414	
it is in accordance with religious authority			.826
follows Buddha's teachings			.823
it is in accordance with true faith			.762
it is in accordance with the scriptures			.746
people will gain God's approval from it			.693
it follows nature's law			.619
it is God's will			.589
it brings harmony to the world			.550
it is a religious tradition			.519
it respects the natural order			.498
it shows respect for their ancestors			.412
Morally wrong items:			
it is against the rules of one's social group	.850		
society considers it unacceptable	.850		
it opposes the rules of society	.777		
it brings disorder to society	.687		
the family considers it unacceptable	.625		
it is socially condemned	.491		
it opposes the beliefs of the family	.446		
it restricts the possibility of a person to defend oneself		.679	
it restricts the freedom of choice of a person		.639	

it restricts someone's privacy		.634	
it restricts personal choice and liberty		.560	
it restricts the individual's rights		.510	
it is against true faith			.793
it is against the scriptures			.757
it opposes religious authority			.721
It is contrary to Buddha's teachings			.711
it is against God's will			.639
it disrupts world's harmony			.588
it is unnatural			.553
it disrespects their ancestors			.546
it is degrading to the soul			.540
it is against nature's law			.532
it is against the natural order			.480
it pollutes the spirit			.452
it is considered a sin			.405
Number of items	16	10	24
Eigenvalue	7.32	7.31	7.22
% of variance	14.64%	14.62%	14.44%
Cronbach's Alpha	.91	.83	.89

Note. * Items ordered according to the magnitude of their factor loadings.

EFA results indicated the three-dimensional solution as the best fit for the data, with all new items loading into the divinity moral code. A subsequent EFA was performed, including only the divinity items, in order to investigate in which sub-factors the items would load. The two items regarding Buddha's teachings (*It follows / It is contrary to Buddha's teachings*) and the two items regarding respect towards the ancestors (*It respects / disrespects the ancestors*) loaded into the religious rules sub-factor, whereas the two items regarding harmony (*It brings harmony to the world / It disrupts world's harmony*) loaded into the nature sub-factor.

Correlations were performed with the divinity sub-factors with and without the new items, in order to verify their degree of association. The Religious Rules factor (13 items) correlated at $r = .98$, $p < .001$ with the new

Religious Rules factor (17 items), whereas the Nature factor (5 items) correlated at $r = .95$, $p < .001$ with the new Nature factor (7 items).

A paired samples t – test analysis was conducted, to verify whether there would be a significant difference between the factors with and without the new items. No significant difference between mean scores was found. Due to the fact that the new items are a better representation of the Japanese culture, the factors including the new items will be used in the subsequent analyses.

Following the factor analyses, reliability analyses were performed with all the scales used in the study. Reliability indices (Cronbach's alpha) are presented in Table 17. Cronbach's alpha for the CADS were considered acceptable for all samples. However, both values instruments (SSVS and BVS) presented low alphas in New Zealand (below .60), as well as the integrity sub-factor of honour concerns. The SSVS also presented low alphas in the U.S. and across all cultures. Regarding the SSVS, the alphas presented are consisted with the literature (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005) and are related to the small number of items in the scale. Nevertheless, the low inter-item correlation among integrity items in New Zealand is a concern that needs to be taken into consideration when analysing the results of this sample.

Table 17. *Reliability indices of all instruments in seven samples and across cultures (Cronbach's Alpha)*

	Brazil		Japan	New Zealand	Spain	United Kingdom	United States	Across cultures (1,227)
	Internet (123)	Religious (312)	Students (100)	Students (106)	Internet (89)	Students (298)	Internet (87)	
Community	.89	.82	.90	.78	.93	.92	.95	.90
Social rules	.86	.76	.90	.70	.89	.90	.94	.87
Family	.81	.64	.84	.78	.91	.84	.93	.80
Autonomy	.83	.68	.82	.75	85	.85	.90	.82
Positive rights	.76	.50	.75	.63	.70	.81	.75	.67
Negative rights	.86	.80	.86	.83	.94	.89	.90	.87
Divinity	.92	.83	.89	.80	.95	.93	.97	.94
Religious rules	.92	.81	.87	.84	.95	.94	.98	.95
Nature	.86	.75	.81	.80	.90	.83	.89	.79
SSVS	.66	.72	.63	.57	.70	.63	.56	.58
BVS	.77	.78	-	.53	.75	.80	.77	.75
Family honour	.79	.77	.86	.86	.81	.82	.83	.84
Integrity	.76	.75	.71	.33	.84	.83	.85	.73
Masculine honour	.72	.60	.79	.69	.68	.71	.76	.86
Feminine honour	.80	.84	.73	.83	.79	.80	.88	.67
Honour scale	.87	.87	.89	.66	.87	.87	.90	.88

Note. Values in parentheses are the sample sizes; indices in bold are below the acceptable.

Structural hypotheses

Before conducting any analysis, the items of each instrument used were centred within each sample or sub-sample to control for possible acquiescence and extremity bias in correlation analyses (see Fischer, 2004).

Correlation analyses

In terms of associations between the CADS dimensions, correlation analyses were performed to investigate these associations in each country and across cultures (see Table 18). According to Leung and Bond (1989), pancultural (defined as a sample with participants from different cultures forming just one sample, across cultures) and cross-cultural analyses (participants from different cultures identified by their background, comparing one country to another) produce similar results. As proposed by hypothesis S1, community is consistently correlated with divinity across all samples.

Table 18. *Correlations among the CADS dimensions in each sample*

	BRAZIL						UNITED KINGDOM		
	Internet			Religious groups					
	C	A	D	C	A	D	C	A	D
Community	-			-			-		
Autonomy	.21**	-		.49**	-		.42**	-	
Divinity	.25**	.24**	-	.46**	.47**	-	.49**	.18**	-
	JAPAN			NEW ZEALAND			SPAIN		
	C	A	D	C	A	D	C	A	D
Community	-			-			-		
Autonomy	.61**	-		.23*	-		.29**	-	
Divinity	.50**	.48**	-	.39**	.21*	-	.53**	.11	-
	UNITED STATES			PANCULTURAL					
	C	A	D	C	A	D			
Community	-			-					
Autonomy	.23*	-		.36**	-				
Divinity	.65**	-.01	-	.50**	.26**	-			

Note. † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Community also presented significant correlations with autonomy in all seven samples. In the pancultural sample, these two correlations were significantly different from each other, t (1224) = 4.70, $p < .001$. Similar results were observed for five out of seven samples, with community and divinity consistently presenting the strongest correlations with each other, corroborating hypothesis S1 and replicating findings from previous studies.

Autonomy and divinity were also correlated, and this association was also significantly different from the correlation between community and autonomy, t (1224) = 3.75, $p < .001$, and between community and divinity, t (1224) = 8.49, $p < .001$.

CADS and honour associations with human values were also tested (see Table 19). Across cultures, community was directly correlated with tradition, conformity, and security (conservation values); and inversely correlated with hedonism, stimulation, self-direction (openness values), universalism, and benevolence (self-transcendence). No correlation was observed with self-enhancement values (power and achievement). These associations partially corroborate hypothesis S2a; benevolence was significantly correlated with community, but not directly as predicted. Community was also expected to correlate with the interactive function of values. This association was found, corroborating hypothesis S2b. In terms of the other functions, community was also associated to the promotion, existence, supra-personal, and normative functions.

Autonomy presented direct correlations only with self-direction and universalism, partially corroborating hypothesis S3a, and an inverse correlation with power. This moral dimension also correlated with the

excitement function, partially corroborating hypothesis S3b, and with the existence, supra-personal, and interactive functions.

Divinity was directly correlated with all three conservation values (tradition, conformity, and security), corroborating hypothesis S4a. It also presented inverse correlations with self-enhancement (power and achievement) and with openness values (hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction). Divinity was also correlated with the normative function, as proposed in hypothesis S4b. Other correlations were found with the existence and interactive functions (direct) and with the excitement function (inverse).

Table 19. *Pancultural correlations of CADS dimensions with personal values*

	Community	Autonomy	Divinity
Power	.01	-.09**	-.07*
Achievement	-.00	-.05	-.07*
Hedonism	-.06*	.05	-.20**
Stimulation	-.11**	.00	-.12**
Self-direction	-.16**	.07*	-.17**
Universalism	-.08**	.06*	-.04
Benevolence	-.06*	.00	.02
Tradition	.08**	-.04	.24**
Conformity	.14**	-.00	.22**
Security	.19**	.04	.14**
Promotion	.21**	.03	.04
Excitement	.06†	.08**	-.09**
Existence	.19**	.07*	.08**
Supra-personal	.08**	.12**	.05†
Normative	.29**	.03	.45**
Interactive	.26**	.14**	.19**

Note. † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Explaining honour concerns across cultures

Four structural hypotheses were proposed regarding the influence of moral dimensions on honour concerns. Due to previously proposed associations between honour concerns and human values (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b), these hypotheses were tested including value types and sub-functions to investigate whether the moral codes would predict honour concerns beyond the influence of values.

This approach was chosen in order to control for any shared variance between values and the moral dimensions that could be responsible for the association. Also, a model that includes both personal values and moral dimensions as predictors of honour concerns is a more informative and accurate way of explaining this psychological construct.

According to hypothesis S5, family honour would be predicted by the family sub-scale of community. To examine this hypothesis, a hierarchical regression analysis, based on a stepwise procedure within each block, was performed. In the first step, all ten value types and the six value sub-functions were entered as predictors of family honour. In the second step, the six moral code sub-factors were entered. Results are presented in Table 20.

In the hierarchical regression, predicting family honour, the interactive, normative, promotion, and existence sub-functions of values, as well as the security, conformity, and achievement value types (entered as predictors in the first step of the analysis) predicted family honour positively. More importantly, the family sub-factor of community and the religious rules sub-

factor of divinity (entered in the second step of the analysis) predicted family honour beyond the influence of value types and functions, corroborating hypothesis S5.

Table 20. *CADS sub-scales predicting family honour across cultures*

	Predictors	R^2	F_{change}	β	t
Family honour					
Step 1	BVS Interactive	.29	163.99**	.36	12.81**
	BVS Normative			.28	9.62**
	BVS Promotion			.18	6.35**
	SVS Security			.17	6.25**
	BVS Existence			.11	3.63**
	SVS Conformity			.08	2.86**
	SVS Achievement			.10	3.21**
Step 2	Family	.34	61.74**	.22	7.86**
	Religious rules			.09	2.92**

Note. Values and CADS factors entered based on a Stepwise procedure; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Similar procedures were used to test the hypotheses regarding integrity, masculine and feminine honour. According to the hypothesis S6, integrity concerns would be predicted by the autonomy moral code. This hypothesis was also corroborated (see Table 21).

In the first step, the interactive, existence, and supra-personal sub-functions, as well as the benevolence and achievement value types predicted concerns for integrity directly, whereas power predicted integrity inversely. In the second step, negative rights entered as a significant predictor of integrity beyond values.

Table 21. *CADS sub-scales predicting integrity across cultures*

	Predictors	R^2	F_{change}	β	t
Integrity					
Step 1	BVS Interactive	.18	123.19**	.32	11.10**
	SVS Benevolence			.19	6.77**
	BVS Existence			.14	4.51**
	SVS Power			-.12	-3.81**
	SVS Achievement			.08	2.68**
	BVS Supra-personal			.08	2.79**
	BVS Excitement			-.07	-2.24*
Step 2	Negative rights	.19	14.35**	.11	3.79**

Note. Values and CADS factors entered based on a Stepwise procedure; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Hypothesis S7 suggested that masculine honour would be predicted by the nature sub-scale of divinity (based on the findings from the previous study) and by the family sub-scale of community. The promotion, interactive, excitement, and existence value sub-functions predicted masculine honour directly in the first step, as well as security, conformity, and power values (see Table 22).

In the second step, the family sub-factor of community was the exclusive predictor of masculine honour, presenting a direct association. Consequently, hypothesis S7 was only partially corroborated.

Finally, concerns for feminine honour were proposed to be predicted by the religious rules sub-scale of divinity (hypothesis S8). In the first step, the normative and interactive sub-functions of values predicted feminine honour directly, whereas the excitement sub-function, universalism, hedonism, self-direction, and power values predicted feminine honour inversely (see Table 23).

Table 22. *CADS sub-scales predicting masculine honour across cultures*

	Predictors	R^2	F_{change}	β	t
Masculine honour					
Step 1	BVS Promotion	.19	126.00**	.32	11.22**
	SVS Security			.18	6.27**
	BVS Interactive			.14	4.59**
	BVS Excitement			.08	2.74**
	SVS Conformity			.09	3.04**
	SVS Power			.12	3.37**
	BVS Existence			.07	2.12*
Step 2	Family	.34	20.87**	.13	4.57**

Note. Values and CADS factors entered based on a Stepwise procedure; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Table 23. *CADS sub-scales predicting feminine honour across cultures*

	Predictors	R^2	F_{change}	β	t
Feminine honour					
Step 1	BVS Normative	.29	208.94**	.40	14.42**
	BVS Excitement			-.23	-8.63**
	BVS Interactive			.22	7.69**
	SVS Universalism			-.07	-2.83**
	SVS Hedonism			-.11	-3.39**
	SVS Self-direction			-.06	-2.06*
	SVS Power			-.07	-2.29*
Step 2	Religious rules	.34	9.00**	.22	7.61**
	Positive rights			-.08	-3.00**

Note. Values and CADS factors entered based on a Stepwise procedure; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

In the second step, religious rules presented a direct association, and the positive rights sub-factor of autonomy presented an inverse association to feminine honour, corroborating hypothesis S8.

Cultural hypotheses

Nations as cultures

Hypothesis C1 suggested that participants from all cultural samples would present a higher endorsement of the autonomy moral code. In order to test for this hypothesis, a 6 x 7 (Ethics, Sample) mixed analysis was conducted.

A main effect of Ethics was observed, F (5, 6065) = 353.77, MSE = 289.74, $p < .001$, and across all cultural samples, positive and negative rights presented the highest endorsement, whereas religious rules presented the lowest endorsement (see Table 24), corroborating hypothesis C1.

A main effect of sample was also found, F (6, 1213) = 38.10, MSE = 128.10, $p < .001$, with the Brazilian religious sample presenting the highest overall endorsement, and Japan presenting the lowest endorsement across all ethics.

An Ethics x Sample interaction was also observed, F (40, 6065) = 31.92, MSE = 26.16, $p < .001$. The Brazilian religious sample presented the highest scores across all ethics. Brazil, Japan, and New Zealand presented the highest scores in the social rules sub-factor. In the family sub-factor, on the other hand, Japan presented the lowest endorsement, and Brazil the highest.

Table 24. *CADS means in each cultural sample*

	Community			Autonomy			Divinity		
	SR	F	T	PR	NR	T	RR	N	T
Brazil									
Internet	4.30 ^{b,c,d}	4.03 ^{b,c}	4.22 ^{b,c,d}	4.69 ^{a,b}	5.21 ^{b}	4.95 ^{b}	3.53 ^{d}	4.63 ^{b,c}	3.83 ^{c}
Religious	4.63 ^{d,e}	4.79 ^{d}	4.69 ^{e}	4.92 ^{b}	5.14 ^{b}	5.03 ^{b}	5.50 ^{e}	4.90 ^{c}	5.33 ^{d}
Japan	4.81 ^{e}	3.54 ^{a}	4.40 ^{d,e}	4.42 ^{a}	4.24 ^{a}	4.33 ^{a}	2.18 ^{a}	4.20 ^{a,b}	2.73 ^{a}
New Zealand	4.44 ^{c,d,e}	4.20 ^{c}	4.37 ^{c,d,e}	4.65 ^{a,b}	5.28 ^{b}	4.97 ^{b}	3.43 ^{c,d}	4.34 ^{a,b,c}	3.68 ^{c}
Spain	4.12 ^{a,b,c}	3.67 ^{a,b}	4.00 ^{a,b,c}	4.78 ^{a,b}	5.12 ^{b}	4.95 ^{b}	2.45 ^{a,b}	3.99 ^{a}	2.88 ^{a}
UK	4.25 ^{a,b,c,d}	3.81 ^{a,b,c}	4.12 ^{a,b,c,d}	4.60 ^{a,b}	5.00 ^{b}	4.80 ^{b}	3.37 ^{c,d}	4.15 ^{a,b}	3.58 ^{b,c}
US	3.92 ^{a,b}	3.70 ^{a,b}	3.85 ^{a,b}	4.59 ^{a,b}	4.95 ^{b}	4.77 ^{b}	3.49 ^{d}	3.84 ^{a}	3.59 ^{b,c}
Pancultural	4.35	4.06	4.26	4.71	5.04	4.88	3.76	4.36	3.93

Note. SR = Social rules; F = Family; PR = Positive rights; NR = Negative rights; RR = Religious rules; N = Nature; T = Total; Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$ in the Tukey HSD test.

In the autonomy dimension, Japan presented the lowest scores in positive and negative rights, whereas the religious sample in Brazil presented the highest scores in the positive rights sub-factor, and all other countries differed from Japan in the negative rights sub-factor.

A similar pattern was observed in the divinity dimension: Japan presented the lowest score in the religious rules sub-factor, whereas the Brazilian religious sample presented the highest score. In the nature sub-factor, the lowest level of endorsement was observed in the US and Spain, with Brazil presenting the highest endorsement.

Hypothesis C4 suggested that English speaking countries (Britain, New Zealand, and the US) would present similar scores across ethics. This hypothesis is partially corroborated: no difference was found between these three countries for the autonomy and divinity dimensions, but New Zealand and the US are more different than similar in the community dimension. The UK presented a pattern of endorsement similar to the other two countries.

Hypothesis C6 suggested a more balanced endorsement of all moral codes in the Japanese sample. Table 24 shows that the Japanese averaged scores are relatively balanced across all moral codes, except for family and religious rules. To further test this hypothesis, paired samples *t*-tests were performed with the three moral dimensions. Community and autonomy were not significantly different, t (99) = .86, p = .39, and this result partially corroborate hypothesis C6. However, community is significantly different from divinity, t (99) = 19.40, $p < .001$, as well as autonomy, t (99) = 18.47, $p < .001$.

Hypothesis C8 suggested that Spain would present a higher endorsement of the autonomy moral code. Paired samples *t*-test were conducted, and autonomy was significantly higher than community, t (88) = 8.94, $p < .001$; community was significantly higher than divinity, t (88) = 10.33, $p < .001$, and autonomy was also higher than divinity, t (88) = 14.50, $p < .001$, corroborating the proposed hypothesis.

Regarding the Brazilian sample, a more balanced endorsement across the three ethics was expected (hypothesis C10). An analysis of variance was conducted to test any initial differences between the two Brazilian sub-samples in the three ethics. Internet participants were significantly different from religious participants in the endorsement of the ethics of community, F (1, 431) = 31.32, $p < .001$, and in the ethics of divinity, F (1, 431) = 195.39, $p < .001$. No difference was observed in the ethics of autonomy between the two sub-samples, F (1, 431) = .82, $p = .37$.

In the religious sample, divinity presented the highest endorsement when compared to community, t (310) = 13.13, $p < .001$, and to autonomy, t (310) = 5.83, $p < .01$. Autonomy was also significantly higher than community, t (310) = 7.41, $p < .001$. In the internet sample, autonomy presented the highest endorsement when compared to community, t (120) = 7.20, $p < .001$, and to divinity, t (310) = 9.24, $p < .001$. Community was also significantly higher than divinity, t (310) = 3.21, $p < .01$. Therefore, hypothesis C10 was not corroborated.

Hypothesis C11 suggested that Brazil would present a higher overall endorsement of the divinity moral code in comparison to any other country, due to the religious sample. This hypothesis was corroborated (see Table

24), especially due to the high religious rules endorsement in the religious sample.

Regarding honour concerns, similar cultural hypotheses were formulated. In order to test hypothesis C2, suggesting a higher endorsement of concerns for integrity, a 4 x 7 (Honour, Sample) mixed analysis was conducted. The expected main effect of honour was observed, F (3, 3564) = 1163.12, MSE = 1564.55, $p < .001$, with integrity presenting the highest endorsement across all countries, followed by family honour, and feminine honour presenting the lowest endorsement. Results corroborate hypothesis C2 and they are presented in Table 25.

Table 25. *Honour concerns means in each cultural sample*

	HONOUR CONCERNS				
	Family	Integrity	Masculine	Feminine	Total
Brazil					
Internet	6.94 ^{b,c}	8.18 ^{c}	5.90 ^{c}	4.63 ^{b,c}	6.41 ^{d}
Religious	7.60 ^{c}	8.03 ^{b,c}	5.87 ^{c}	6.31 ^{d}	6.95 ^{e}
Japan	6.80 ^{b,c}	6.44 ^{a}	4.52 ^{a}	4.79 ^{b,c}	5.64 ^{a,b}
New Zealand	6.78 ^{b,c}	7.61 ^{b,c}	5.34 ^{b,c}	4.95 ^{c}	6.17 ^{c,d}
Spain	5.82 ^{a}	7.48 ^{b}	5.29 ^{a,b,c}	2.70 ^{a}	5.32 ^{a}
UK	6.44 ^{a,b}	7.41 ^{b}	5.03 ^{a,b}	4.54 ^{b,c}	5.85 ^{b,c}
US	5.62 ^{a}	7.89 ^{b,c}	5.06 ^{a,b}	4.18 ^{b,c}	5.69 ^{a,b,c}
Pancultural	6.77	7.65	5.37	4.89	-

Note. Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$ in the Tukey HSD test.

A main effect of sample was also observed, F (6, 1188) = 36.32, MSE = 171.36, $p < .001$, with Brazil presenting the highest overall endorsement

across all types of honour concerns, corroborating hypothesis C12. Unexpectedly, Spain presented the lowest endorsement overall.

An Honour x Sample interaction was also found, F (24, 3564) = 22.63, MSE = 30.44, $p < .001$. Spain and the US presented the lowest scores in family honour, whereas the religious sample in Brazil presented the highest score. Regarding concerns for integrity, Japan presented the lowest score, which was significantly lower than any other country, and Brazil presented the highest score.

English-speaking countries did not differ in their overall scores of honour concerns, corroborating hypothesis C5. Japan also presented the lowest score regarding masculine honour, and once again Brazil presented the highest scores. In feminine honour, the highest score was found in the Brazilian religious sample, and Spain presented the lowest score. Consequently, hypotheses C7 and C9, which proposed similar mean endorsement across honour concerns in Japan and in Spain, were not corroborated.

Genders as culture

A 4 x 2 x 7 (Honour, Gender, Sample) mixed analysis of variance was conducted to test for differences between genders in the four types of honour concerns. A main effect of gender was observed, F (1, 1177) = 12.47, MSE = 57.29, $p < .001$, with women presenting higher overall scores (M = 6.12) than men (M = 5.84). A significant Honour x Gender interaction was also observed, F (3, 3531) = 14.61, MSE = 18.95, $p < .001$, with women presenting higher scores than men in family honour, integrity, and feminine

honour, whereas men presented higher scores than women in masculine honour. A significant Sample x Gender interaction was also found, F (8, 1177) = 3.14, MSE = 14.41, $p < .01$. Results for the pancultural sample and for each country where differences were found are presented in Table 26.

In the pancultural sample, differences were found in concerns for family honour, with women presenting significantly higher scores than men. They were also observed in concerns for masculine honour, presenting the opposite pattern, with men scoring higher than women. And finally, as proposed by hypothesis C3, female participants presented significantly higher scores in feminine honour, corroborating this hypothesis.

Table 26. *Honour concerns means according to participants' gender*

	GENDER				
Pancultural	Male	Female	Total	*F*	*MSE*
Family	6.49	6.91	6.77	16.94**	48.63
Masculine	5.50	5.30	5.37	5.22*	10.33
Feminine	4.34	5.18	4.90	47.48**	190.09
Brazil (religious)					
Masculine	6.04	5.77	5.87	4.12*	5.37
Feminine	5.69	6.66	6.30	21.21**	68.02
Spain					
Family	6.39	5.24	5.82	8.70**	27.17
Masculine	5.77	4.81	5.29	9.55**	18.96
UK					
Family	5.60	6.75	6.44	31.90**	75.45
Feminine	3.81	4.81	4.54	22.06**	57.17
US					
Feminine	3.56	4.90	4.18	9.29**	37.41

Note. Only honour concerns with significant gender differences were included; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

Regarding gender differences within each culture, data was split according to the sample, and further multivariate analyses of variance were performed. In Brazil, male religious participants presented higher scores in masculine honour than female participants, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for feminine honour. In Spain, male participants presented higher scores than female participants in both concerns for family and for masculine honour. In the UK, female participants presented higher scores than male in both concerns for family and feminine honour. Finally, in the US, the difference observed between genders was regarding feminine honour, with female participants presenting the highest scores.

Religions as cultures

Following Cohen and Hill (2007) proposal that religious groups can be investigated as cultures in their own right, differences in the endorsement of moral codes and honour concerns between different religious groups were investigated. Data collected with religious participants in Brazil was analysed to investigate if different sub-cultures within the same country would vary in the endorsement of moral dimensions and honour concerns.

A 6 x 3 (Ethics, Religious groups) mixed analysis was conducted. The expected effect of ethics was observed, F (5, 1165) = 21.20, MSE = 13.64, p < .001. However, as expected from a religious sample, the moral dimensions more highly endorsed were religious rules and negative rights, whereas the dimension least endorsed was social rules (see Table 27).

A main effect of religion was also observed, F (2, 233) = 5.45, MSE = 15.82, $p < .01$, with Catholics and Spiritists presenting a higher overall endorsement of all moral dimensions. And finally, an ethics x religion interaction was found, F (10, 1165) = 8.33, MSE = 5.36, $p < .001$. In the social rules sub-factor, Baptists presented significantly lower scores than Spiritists, whereas Baptists endorsed less the family sub-factor than Catholics. Catholics and Spiritists presented higher endorsement of positive rights than Baptists, and no difference was observed in relation to negative rights.

Table 27. *Mean differences on the endorsement of moral dimensions and honour concerns in Brazilian religious groups*

Moral dimensions	Baptists	Catholics	Spiritists	Total
Social rules	4.46 [a]	4.77 [a,b]	4.90 [b]	4.71
Family	4.58 [a]	5.01 [b]	4.85 [a,b]	4.81
Positive rights	4.60 [a]	5.20 [b]	5.07 [b]	4.95
Negative rights	4.99 [a]	5.18 [a]	5.36 [a]	5.17
Religious rules	5.69 [a]	5.58 [a]	4.98 [b]	5.42
Nature	4.49 [a]	4.96 [a]	5.52 [b]	4.99
Total	4.80	5.12	5.11	-
Honour concerns	Baptists	Catholics	Spiritists	Total
Family honour	7.75 [a]	7.95 [a]	6.90 [b]	7.53
Integrity	8.23 [a]	8.03 [a]	7.96 [a]	8.07
Masculine honour	5.94 [a]	5.87 [a]	5.71 [a]	5.84
Feminine honour	7.21 [a]	6.28 [b]	5.43 [c]	6.31
Total	7.28	7.03	6.50	-

Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$ in the Tukey HSD test.

Hypothesis C13 suggested that Baptists would present higher scores in religious rules. This hypothesis was only partially corroborated, as Baptists and Catholics presented a similar high endorsement of religious rules. Hypothesis C15 suggested that Spiritists would present higher scores in nature, which was fully corroborated.

In terms of honour concerns, the main effect of honour was observed, F (3, 702) = 236.12, MSE = 228.73, $p < .001$. Across the different religious groups, integrity was the type of concern most highly endorsed, whereas masculine honour was the least endorsed overall. A main effect of religion was also observed, F (2, 234) = 11.31, MSE = 37.52, $p < .001$, with Baptists presenting a higher overall endorsement across honour concerns, whereas Spiritists presented the lowest means overall.

Finally, a significant honour x religion interaction was observed, F (6, 702) = 11.46, MSE = 11.10, $p < .001$. Baptists and Catholics presented higher endorsement of concerns for family honour than Spiritists. No difference was found between the three religious groups for concerns for integrity and masculine honour. In terms of concerns for feminine honour, Baptists presented the highest endorsement, corroborating hypothesis C14. Baptists differed significantly from Catholics, and these also differed from Spiritists, which presented the lowest endorsement for this type of honour concern.

Discussion

The present studies investigated the association between moral dimensions, personal and cultural values, and honour concerns. They also tested a number of hypotheses, based on the literature on morality and honour, regarding nationality, gender, age and religious differences in the endorsement of moral codes and honour concerns. Different samples took part in the research, i.e., data was collected with students and also on the internet, and this difference could interfere in the patterns of relationships expressed in each cultural group. Results, therefore, cannot be considered representative of each cultural community studied. However, overall, results confirmed the proposed hypotheses, suggesting the relevance of this data.

Correlation analyses

In terms of associations between community, autonomy, and divinity, all three moral codes were directly associated among themselves in Brazil, the UK, Japan, and New Zealand, showing less of a separation between the endorsement of these codes in these countries, when compared to Spain and the US.

The only exclusively religious sample in the analysis (with data collected in Brazil) presented balanced (and strong) associations between the three moral codes. This pattern was found most strongly in the religious groups studied (Baptists, Catholics, and Spiritists), but similarly balanced associations were found in the Brazilian internet sample, although presenting

weaker correlations. Japan also presented similarly balanced associations among the moral codes.

The pancultural correlation analysis presented significant correlations among the three dimensions and a significantly stronger correlation between the community and divinity moral dimensions. These results confirm theoretical associations between community and divinity moral justifications (Haidt et al., 1993).

The expected associations between moral codes and both measures of human values were also found, replicating most findings from Study 3. Although no correlations were found between self-enhancement values (as measured by the SSVS) and community, this previously found association was observed with the promotion sub-function of values (as measured by the BVS).

This could indicate a difference in the wordings of both value instruments. Maybe, the SSVS is too short to identify these associations, whereas the BVS presents more items that could be responsible for the correlations. It could also indicate that this could be an association found specifically in the British culture, as it was not observed in Brazil in Study 3. Consequently, when the pancultural sample was used for the analysis, the association was not observed. And finally, it could also indicate that the previously observed association was not specific of the British culture, but of that particular sample. More detailed analyses between the two value instruments within each cultural sample would provide more information regarding this issue.

Predicting honour concerns

Although the association between values and honour has been previously proposed in the literature (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a), no study that presented the axiological basis of each honour concern was found. The analyses conducted in this thesis were more detailed, providing more information regarding these associations. Overall, results indicated a general similarity with the patterns of association proposed by Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a), with all four types of honour concerns presenting direct associations with conservation values. However, detailed analyses for each country are also suggested, to investigate any differences in the associations between the honour concerns and personal values.

Moral codes were proposed to predict honour concerns beyond the influence of personal values. Concerns for family honour, in the first step of a hierarchical regression, were predicted by the interactive, normative, promotion, and existence functions of values, and also by security, conformity, and achievement values. In the second step, family and religious rules successfully predicted family honour beyond the influence of values.

The association of family honour with all three sub-functions from the materialistic dimension of values, as proposed by Gouveia (2003; Gouveia et al., 2008), indicates that the endorsement of family honour could represent a practical and basic necessity of family maintenance for one's survival.

Concerns for integrity were predicted, in the first step, by benevolence, power, and achievement, and also by the interactive,

existence, supra-personal, and excitement sub-functions of values. In the second step, integrity was predicted by negative rights, as proposed.

In opposition to what was found with family honour, integrity concerns were predicted by all three sub-functions from the humanitarian dimension of values (Gouveia et al., 2008), which emphasise more abstract principles and "interpersonal relationships are appreciated as a goal in themselves" (p. 7).

Concerns for masculine honour were predicted, in the first step, by security, conformity and power values, and also by the promotion, interactive, excitement, and existence sub-functions of values. In the second step, the family sub-factor of community also entered as a predictor, corroborating the hypothesis based on theoretical associations.

The influence of power and promotion values suggests the importance of self-enhancement and personal materialistic values when explaining masculine honour, along with normative ideas of conformity in interpersonal relationships. These findings could indicate that being *a man*, across these cultures, means to show strength, ambition, to be able to support his family and to conform to social rules.

The observed relationship between masculine honour and nature in Study 5 (this chapter) was not found in the pancultural analysis. This could indicate a pattern specific to that sample or to the British culture that should be analysed in further studies.

Concerns for feminine honour was predicted, in the first step, by the normative and interactive sub-functions of social values (directly), by the excitement sub-function of personal values (inversely), and also by

universalism, hedonism, self-direction, and power values (inversely). In the second step, further predictors were religious rules and positive rights.

These associations indicate the importance of normative and social values, and religious rules justifications to the endorsement of feminine honour, in opposition to self-transcendence, openness to change values, and positive rights justifications. That is, being *a woman*, across these cultures, means to abide by traditional social norms of behaviour.

Overall, results regarding the hypotheses for predicting honour concerns were in accordance with the literature (Barret & Sarbin, 2008; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a, 2002b, 2004; Werbner, 2007).

Cultural hypotheses

Different conceptions of culture were used to test the hypotheses proposed in this study. *Cultural* differences could be investigated across different nations, different genders, and religious groups.

Nations as culture

The autonomy dimension presented the highest endorsement across national samples, as well as concerns for integrity, as expected.

Differences were found in Brazil according to the sample. The internet sample presented a pattern of endorsement similar to the one found in Study 3 (Chapter 6), showing high autonomy scores, moderate community scores and low divinity scores, whereas the religious sample presented a fairly balanced endorsement of the three dimensions. Participants from the

religious sample also presented the highest overall endorsement across moral codes, when compared to the other cultural samples.

A similar pattern was observed in Brazil when investigating honour concerns. The religious sample presented the overall highest endorsement, but within the country, the only significant difference observed was regarding feminine honour, which was highly endorsed in the religious sample.

These results indicate a strong tendency to consider Brazil as a culture of honour, although results could be generalised only to a more religious population, which constitutes the majority of the sample in this study.

Japan presented a moderate endorsement of community and autonomy moral codes and of the nature sub-factor of divinity, presenting a low endorsement of religious rules. Regarding honour concerns, Japanese participants highly endorse concerns for family honour and integrity, but presents low endorsement of masculine and feminine honour.

It is important to emphasise that these results could be due to the fact that the Japanese sample is constituted exclusively of adolescents and young adult university students, who could present a different endorsement of gender-specific honour codes when compared to a general population.

The two European samples included (Spain and the UK) presented similar endorsement of community and autonomy, differing only on the endorsement of religious rules, which was higher in the UK than in Spain. Similar endorsement patterns were also observed among the three English-speaking countries, with differences found only between New Zealand and

the US in the family sub-factor, and in concerns for family honour, whereas the UK was intermediate between these two countries.

Unexpectedly, Spain presented the lowest endorsement of the divinity dimension. A general low endorsement of honour concerns was also found, despite the fact that Spain is reportedly considered a culture of honour (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2000, 2002a, 2004).

Findings regarding Spain could be explained by a particularly secular sample or could indicate a currently more secular and individualist tendency of the Spanish culture (Schwartz, 2004).

Genders as culture

Gender differences were not tested regarding the moral codes, following no significant results found in Studies 1, 2, and 3 in this thesis. However, one hypothesis was proposed regarding gender differences in honour concerns, based on previous findings in the honour literature (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b).

Female participants presented the highest endorsement of family and feminine honour, whereas male participants presented the highest endorsement of masculine honour. Within each national sample, similar results could be observed. The only national sample that presented a different pattern was Spain, with male participants presenting the highest endorsement of family honour when compared to female participants. These differences towards gender-specific concerns are in accordance with the literature (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2004).

Religions as culture

Interesting results were found when considering religious groups as cultural groups and investigating possible differences on the endorsement of moral codes and honour concerns. Most importantly, the moral dimensions successfully identified sub-cultural differences within the same country, indicating once more its adequacy for cross-cultural research.

Differences were observed between the three religious groups studied in the Brazilian sample. Baptists, Catholics, and Spiritists presented similar endorsement to negative rights. Overall, Spiritists and Catholics presented higher endorsement of most moral codes, whereas Baptists were significantly higher (but similar to Catholics) only on the endorsement of religious rules, as expected. Baptists are characterised in the literature as presenting a stronger tendency towards perpetuating religious normative attitudes and behaviour (Sherkat & Ellison, 1999; Woodberry & Smith, 1998). However, this similarity with Catholics was unexpected. The significantly higher endorsement of the nature sub-factor of divinity by the Spiritists is in accordance with precepts of this religion (Kardec, 1996).

Regarding honour concerns, Baptists consistently presented the highest scores, although no difference was found regarding integrity and masculine honour among the three groups. Results regarding the high endorsement of feminine honour by the Baptists are consistent with the hypothesis proposed and the sociological literature (Sherkat & Ellison, 1999).

Conclusion

This chapter presented two studies regarding the association between moral codes and honour concerns. Study 6 explored which moral codes could predict the different types of honour concerns, in order to provide an empirical basis for the development of hypotheses.

Study 7 investigated this association even further, by using the moral codes to predict family, integrity, masculine and feminine honour concerns beyond the influence of personal values. This study also explored cultural differences in the CAD dimensions according to the participants' nation, gender, age, and religion.

Findings provide a strong basis for considering the moral codes as an important construct for explaining honour concerns. They also provide another dimension through which cultural and individual differences can be analysed, allowing the development of cultural moral profiles.

CHAPTER 9

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Background and aims of the thesis

The main objective of the present research was adapting an anthropological theory of morality to social psychology through the development of a measure of endorsement of different moral codes that can be used to study differences between cultures and individuals. Additionally, these moral codes were used to develop models to predict behavioural tendencies and honour concerns.

This proposal is based on Shweder's (2003a; Shweder et al., 1997) theory of moral codes. This author suggests the existence of three groups of moral values that people refer to when justifying their moral judgements.

The usefulness of this approach was indicated in several research studies, conducted mainly with qualitative methods (Haidt et al., 1993; Rozin et al., 1999; Vainio, 2003; Vasquez et al., 2001). The construction of a reliable and valid instrument to measure the endorsement of the three moral codes could help confirm and replicate this theoretical proposal, allowing the use of this construct in models for the explanation of individual and cultural differences.

In general, results have confirmed the meaningful structure, validity, and consistency of our scale, supporting Shweder's proposal. The sections presented below summarise the main findings of this thesis. The chapter will then follow discussing implications of these findings together with limitations of the current research. To conclude, possible future research is outlined.

Summary of results

Part I: CAD Scale

Three studies were conducted to develop the CADS and test its psychometric properties. Study 1 aimed at developing the Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS). Items were based on a coding manual elaborated by Jensen (2004; Felter & Jensen, 2003) to categorise participants' answers in interviews. Initially, an exploratory factor analysis suggested the existence of three main factors, presenting acceptable internal consistencies, and explaining 42% of the variance. Factors expressing community and divinity standards were directly correlated, and community also correlated with autonomy. The stronger association between community and divinity was replicated in Studies 2 to 6, and in seven different cultures.

Study 2 showed the CADS presented acceptable test-retest reliability. Finally, in Study 3, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted, and details on multigroup invariance, comparing the English and Portuguese versions of the CADS were also presented.

These studies also helped establishing a nomological network for the three moral codes, validating the scale against other values and cultural orientation measures. The ethics of community consistently presented direct associations with horizontal and vertical collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), and with sensitivity to disgust (Haidt et al., 1994). Community also correlated with social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Stober, 2001), an interdependent view of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994), and moral traditionalism (Conover & Feldman, 1981).

In terms of value types (Schwartz, 1994), community was directly related to self-enhancement, conservation and self-transcendence values, and inversely to openness to change. Regarding value functions (Gouveia, 2003), community was associated to personal, central and social functions, showing direct correlations with both humanitarian and materialistic orientations. These associations indicate that a moral discourse based on community standards is in accordance with the maintenance of the status quo and conformity with social norms, but also with hierarchical systems that emphasise leadership and social power over others.

The ethics of autonomy consistently presented direct associations with horizontal individualism and collectivism, an independent view of the self, sexual liberalism, and belief in sexual freedom (Inglehart et al., 1998), and inversely with moral traditionalism. In terms of values, autonomy was associated with openness to change and universalism values, and inversely with conservation values. Regarding value functions, they mainly serve humanitarian and personal functions. These associations indicate that a moral discourse based on autonomy standards is in accordance with individual freedom of choice, respect for other people's rights, and an egalitarian and independent view of the self.

Finally, the ethics of divinity presented direct associations with horizontal and vertical collectivism, intrinsic religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967), level of religiosity, sensitivity to disgust, spiritual beliefs (Hatch et al., 1998), an interdependent view of the self, social desirability, and moral traditionalism, and inversely to sexual liberalism and belief in sexual freedom. In terms of values, divinity was associated with self-enhancement,

self-transcendence, and conservation values, and inversely with openness to change. It serves materialistic and social functions. These associations indicate that a moral discourse based on divinity standards is in accordance with a spiritual and traditional view of the self, maintenance of the status quo and obedience to social rules.

In accordance with previous definitions of morality, which suggest that morality consists of codes of conduct to regulate relationships between individuals (Geyer & Baumeister, 2005; Sunar, 2002), all three moral codes are directly associated to a notion of the individual embedded within a collectivity (Schwartz, 2004). Even the ethics of autonomy, which centres the moral authority on the self, presents this direct association, indicating individual needs to relate to others in order to be moral.

The term "autonomy" has been consistently used in psychology as "conflicting with relatedness, reflecting tendencies toward independence from others" (Kagitçibasi, 2005, p. 403). However, according to Kagitçibasi (2005), 'autonomy' is not opposite to relatedness, but reflects a sense of agency, which means to be a self-controlling agent, and individual that acts "willingly, without a sense of coercion" (p. 404). Consequently, based on this definition of autonomy, an individual can be autonomous in interpersonal relationships or within interdependent or embedded cultural communities. This might suggest, in fact, that the term 'autonomy' might not be the more adequate to express the ideals of this moral code, because it could be mistakenly interpreted as independence and individualism.

This thesis also introduced a further development to Shweder's proposal: each moral dimension was divided into two sub-factors. The ethics

of community was divided into social rules and family standards; the ethics of autonomy was divided into positive and negative rights; and the ethics of divinity was divided into religious rules and nature standards. In these sub-scales, different contents of morality (e.g., respecting social and religious norms, protection from harm, freedom of choice) and different moral authorities (e.g., family, society, self, church, nature) are emphasised.

This innovative approach to the big three of morality shows that there is a differentiation within each main moral dimension. Some individuals and / or cultural groups can endorse divinity, for example, only through nature standards. This was the case with the Japanese sample observed in Study 6, and it was also the case with New Zealand and the UK. Without investigating these sub-divisions, Japan would be considered a nation with low endorsement of divinity, which does not characterise it adequately.

Summarising, the main structure holds in both cultures with sound psychometric properties. As expected, each culture presents specificities and similarities in terms of the relationship among the factors and their endorsement.

Part II: The heart of the matter

Haidt et al. (1993) suggested that models of moral judgement and behaviour should include the influence of emotions. As proposed by Rozin et al. (1999), when faced with a moral codes' violation, participants' emotional reactions have a direct effect on their judgement of the wrongness of an action, as well as on their action tendencies.

Part II consisted of one experiment investigating the indirect path from participants' perception of moral codes violation to moral judgement, mediated by emotions. Participants were presented with nine moral violations and were asked to provide their perceptions of how right or wrong the action described was, what emotions they felt and whether they would prefer to punish or avoid the transgressor.

Interestingly, the moral violations judged more negatively by the participants were considered violations of all moral codes. These results could indicate that participants might associate the moral codes when faced with strong moral violations, and might attempt to justify one moral code in terms of another.

Partially corroborating Rozin et al. (1999)'s, the emotion of contempt was associated to violations of community, the emotion of anger was associated to violations of autonomy, and the emotion of disgust was associated to violations of divinity. Also corroborating previous findings (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007), feeling anger was directly associated with approach and punishment action tendencies, and feeling disgust was directly associated with avoidance action tendencies.

Most importantly, this experiment provided more information regarding CADS' validity, showing this scale can be successfully used to predict participants' perception of moral violations for each moral code.

Part III: A matter of honour

Finally, Part III consisted of two studies that attempted to test the CADS cross-culturally in seven cultural samples. British participants

presented a higher endorsement of autonomy when compared to the other two moral codes, indicating that the moral discourse of this culture is mainly centred on moral values that emphasise principles of justice and fairness. This endorsement of autonomy in Britain was replicated in all studies. A similar higher endorsement of autonomy over community and divinity was observed in all other cultural communities studied (Brazil, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and US in Study 6). Described as the moral domain *par excellence* (Edwards, 1987; Nisam, 1987; Nucci & Turiel, 2000), the ideas of justice, fairness and rights were strongly supported by all the participants as standards for judging morally right or wrong actions.

Although Brazilian participants presented a high endorsement of autonomy, they also presented a significantly higher endorsement of the divinity moral code, when compared to Britain (Study 3) and to other countries (Study 6). In Japan, participants presented a balanced mean endorsement of community, autonomy, and nature standards (Study 6).

These studies also tested the usefulness of the big three moral codes to explain honour concerns in these cultures. Honour concerns are defined as relational concerns for one's reputation in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). As these concerns pertain to the domain of relationships regulation, it is undoubtedly related to morality.

The moral codes were, therefore, used to predict honour in six different cultures, beyond the influence of human values, which have been previously associated to these types of concerns (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). Each type of honour concern was predicted by different human

values and moral codes, helping in the elaboration of an empirical model that can be tested and replicated in different groups.

The incorporation of values and moral codes into the research on honour provides more complete explanations of this phenomenon, observed in different cultures worldwide (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a, 2002b).

Implications of the research

The findings summarised above can expand our understandings of morality and how its investigation can be used to explain other constructs. As discussed before, research in this field has mainly focused on cognitive theories, and only a few studies have been conducted in social psychology (Haidt et al., 1993; Vasquez et al., 2001). Alternative research has shown the importance of culture and emotions to the moral domain (Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder et al., 1997).

Consistently across studies and cultural communities, the highest endorsement found was of the ethics of autonomy, suggesting this moral code is truly universal, as proposed by cognitive-developmental theories (Kohlberg, 1981; Turiel, 1983). These results confirm the universality of justice and fairness standards, but do not go against relativist proposals (Shweder et al., 1997). As discussed in Chapter 1, alternative relativist proposals do not deny the existence of universals in morality, but suggest the moral domain cannot be restricted to the ethics of autonomy (Darley & Shultz, 1990; Miller & Luthar, 1989).

As suggested by previous research (Snarey, 1985) on Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral development, a discourse based on autonomy

standards would be categorised at the post-conventional level, which emphasises abstract principles like justice and rights. On the other hand, a discourse based on community and divinity standards would be categorised at the conventional level, emphasising normative rules derived from external authorities. However, Kohlberg's theory is based on a developmental approach, suggesting a hierarchy of moral reasoning, where the highest level is considered better than the other levels. Although the three moral codes can be placed on such hierarchy, they do not emphasise development, but express the contents of participants' moral discourse (Shweder et al., 1997). Also, by categorising community and divinity discourse at the conventional level, Kohlberg suggest these participants cannot reason at the post-conventional level, which has been proved not to be true (Richards & Davison, 1992).

The same argument can be applied to Turiel's (1983) approach, where autonomy would be the only code to be part of the moral domain. Community and divinity would be categorised as belonging to the conventional domain. The findings of this thesis do not suggest that the differentiation between moral and conventional domains is irrelevant; in fact, it suggests a certain degree of confirmation of this theory, by presenting the universal endorsement of the autonomy moral code and the varied endorsement of community and divinity in different cultures. However, the findings do suggest that the conventional domain can be emphasised with moral force in many cultural communities, supporting Shweder's proposal that this domain is morally-bound (Shweder et al., 1987).

The development of this instrument can bring numerous benefits to the study of morality. A quantitative measure helps in collecting data and can be translated into different cultures. Also, this instrument attempts to measure not only morally "wrong" standards, but also covers morally "right" actions, poorly studied in the psychological literature (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Camacho, Higgins, Luger, 2003; Wilson, 1997).

Previous researches have already shown the use of different ethics in participants' moral discourse (Arnett et al., 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Jensen, 1995; Vasquez et al., 2001), influenced by the anthropological studies conducted by Shweder and colleagues (1987, 1997). The present studies allow us not only to verify the use of moral codes in a quantitative, theoretically based way, but also to study the association of the moral codes with various constructs. Consequently, a theoretical implication of the results of this thesis is the advance of an expanded view of moral content, adequately representing the moral domain (Miller & Bersoff, 1992).

Limitations and future research

It is also important, however, to discuss possible limitations of this work. Our participants were mainly university students, exclusively from urban areas, and samples were not representative of each culture. Specific findings could be a result of the university environment and also an age effect, especially if considering that around 90% of the samples consisted of people from 18 to 24 years old.

Another important limitation to discuss is the use of a morality scale developed in two Christian cultures. Although they are different cultural contexts, they also present similarities due to shared values. Therefore, the adequacy of the proposed scale for use in non-Christian cultures has to be evaluated by the researcher in terms of construct and cultural biases (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Due to the lack of full scalar invariance in multigroup comparisons for community and divinity dimensions, alternative explanations for the results are needed, such as differences in the meaning of the items in both cultures. However, it is important to emphasize that full scalar invariance is not usually found; partial measurement equivalence allow us to compare correlations, explain variances and patterns of scores across cultures, as well as average scores, but with caution (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998).

Although it is important to validate a scale against existing morality instruments, the use of the chosen measures was due to the main interest of associating the moral codes with cultural orientations and values. CADS' items were developed strictly based on free moral discourse registered by Shweder and colleagues (1987, 1997) and Jensen (2004) in ethnographic studies. This discourse does not express the levels of moral reasoning of these cultures, but it does express specific contents used with moral force in judgements of actions. Research is already being conducted to validate the CADS against already validated morality instruments, including the MFQ (Haidt & Graham, 2007), which is also associated to Shweder's proposal, in order to test for the associations between their five moral foundations with the CADS factors and sub-factors. An association between the autonomy

dimensions and the harm/care, fairness/reciprocity foundations would be expected. The ingroup/loyalty foundation would be expected to associate with the community dimension; the authority/respect foundation would be expected to associate with both community and divinity dimensions; and the purity/sanctity dimension would be associated with the divinity dimension.

However, it is important to emphasise that the MFQ's main interest is to evaluate the role of underlying functional concerns supported by moral codes, such as maintaining hierarchy or avoiding harm. The CADS, differently, measures people's more general understanding of the reasons for moral judgment, and includes items on the sources of moral authority – religious scriptures, a sense of what is natural, the concept of "rights," or the family, for example. Interestingly, two of the three dimensions of the CADS presented show an internal structure based on the source of authority rather than content; divinity split into religious rules and nature sub-factors, which contain a mixture of content items (e.g., "It pollutes the spirit") and authority items (e.g., "It opposes religious authority"), and likewise for community's family and social rules sub-factors. This suggests that in people's self-reported understanding of reasons for moral judgment, authority and content are hard to view independently.

Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002b) raise objections regarding the use of ethnographic research findings in social psychological research, due to the fact that these are two very distinct methodologies, with different research goals and population studies. However, the hypotheses developed in this thesis were not based exclusively on ethnographic methods, but also on

some experimental research conducted by social psychologists (e.g., the CAD hypothesis, by Rozin et al., 1999; see also Haidt et al., 1993).

Although it is important to recognize the power of culture in guiding human behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), it is also important not to forget that cultures do not imprint on humans what they are going to be (Chirkov et al., 2005; Nussbaum, 2000). Individual differences, as well as within-culture variability of these constructs, do exist and should not be taken lightly.

For future research, a few questions have already arisen. Does the use of moral codes change according to the culture the group is in? Do acculturation processes have an impact on moral judgement and moral orientation? Immigrants and sojourners, for example, have to deal daily with values and standards that are different from the ones in their culture of origin and that might affect their moral judgment. Different daily experiences, cultural tools, and traditional rituals that are not in accordance to one's cultural and personal moral prescriptions could influence the endorsement of these different moral codes. How might these changes influence the use of the different ethics in moral discourse?

An even more interesting possibility for research might examine the degree to which cultures justify one moral code in terms of another, for example, justifying fidelity to the community through religious rules, or asserting that individuals have rights only as part of a community. The greater correlation among ethics, in Brazil and Japan for example, might imply that this cross-justification goes on to a greater extent in these countries than in others, such as the UK or Spain.

As a cross-cultural proposal, it is also important to increase the sample of nations, as well as studying in more detail how moral codes vary within the same country, helping to understand the different cultures inside the same nation. Culture is often confounded with "nation", with a meaningful critique regarding the use of cross-national research as the most widely used type of cross-cultural research (Georgas, Van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004). This thesis presented a certain degree of concern regarding this issue, by proposing and testing hypotheses for different conceptions of cultural groups (e.g., nations, genders, and religious groups). Other groups, such as those based on socioeconomic status (Haidt et al., 1993), could show significantly different endorsement of the moral codes.

Findings showed how important it is to understand this within-nation variability, which could expand the knowledge of moral norms and values expressed in the moral discourse of individuals and groups. When studying other cultures, it is possible to test the unique relationship moral dimensions might have, expressing culture-specific features. Additionally, the instrument presents potential for detecting not only cultural, but also individual differences. An individual-level approach to the moral codes would propose the existence of different individual moral orientations (Forsyth, 1980), which could easily be applied to the study of human values and social attitudes.

Based on Chiu et al. (1997) proposal that the importance of a moral code is only perceived when the moral code is violated, future experiments could also manipulate the accessibility of these moral values (see Roccas, 2003) to the participants, and test whether this manipulation would have an

effect on participants' perception of moral violations, and indirectly on their emotional reactions.

Future research emphasising the endorsement to morally right actions and their association to positive emotions (e.g., awe, pride, admiration) is also suggested. Unfortunately, this thesis could not investigate in detail this type of moral behaviour, but positive psychology is a flourishing area and such research could bring benefits for the study of morality (Haidt, 2003b; Keltner & Haidt, 2003).

Conclusion

Results show differences and similarities in the cultural communities studied in terms of moral values. In other words, the notion of morality in different cultures refers to similar sets of moral values, authorities and behaviours; what varies across cultures is the emphasis given to some of these values, authorities, and behaviours. Also, this variation is consistent with the types of values emphasised in each country: those that are centred on embeddedness and hierarchy, such as Brazil and Japan, and those that are centred on autonomy and egalitarianism, such as the UK and the US.

The content of morality merits further cross-cultural research, and the development of the CADS facilitates such research. This theory-based questionnaire was found to have a clear structure, good reliability and validity, and good replicability across different cultures. We hope that this questionnaire will elicit more studies into the content of moral discourse, as

well as cross-cultural similarities and differences in the way the moral codes are used, thereby advancing cross-cultural understanding.

Can morality stem from different sources and different contexts? According to the findings of this thesis, the answer is yes. For an act to be considered moral, or for conventional rules to be enforced with moral conviction, they do not need to be truly universal.

Finally, accepting the existence of different moral codes with varied endorsement across cultures guiding moral behaviour and judgements, the "view from manywhere" (Shweder, 2003a), does not mean that any behaviour has to be accepted on the basis that it reflects a contextual morality. It only means that "the other's point is considered to be worth a second look to be understood" (Paolicchi, 2007, p. 572).

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APPENDIX

Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS)

INSTRUCTIONS: The following sentences express standards that different people may have when judging something as morally right or morally wrong. When YOU are judging something as **MORALLY RIGHT**, to what extent is each of the following standards important to your judgment?

When judging an act as morally RIGHT, I consider this standard...

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all important	Not Important	Not Very Important	More or Less Important	Important	Very Important	Of the Utmost Importance

If you think that the standard is **not at all important** in your judgment, write the number **1** in the space provided before the sentence. If you think that the sentence is **more or less important**, write the number **4**, and so on.

1. _____ It is a religious tradition.
2. _____ By doing it, the person gains respect from the family.
3. _____ It follows nature's law.
4. _____ It is a customary practice of the community.
5. _____ It allows a person to defend herself/himself.
6. _____ It expresses someone's autonomy.
7. _____ It is socially accepted.
8. _____ It is God's will.
9. _____ By doing it, the person gains respect from society.

10. _____ It is socially approved.
11. _____ It respects the natural order.
12. _____ It respects family traditions.
13. _____ It is in accordance with the scriptures.
14. _____ It expresses personal choice and liberty.
15. _____ It respects someone's privacy.
16. _____ It is in accordance with religious authority.
17. _____ It follows the rules of one's social group.
18. _____ People will gain God's approval from it.
19. _____ It is in accordance with true faith.
20. _____ It is accepted by the family.
21. _____ People respect the social order.
22. _____ It protects someone's interests and needs.

In the next section, the questions cover what YOU would consider a morally wrong action or behaviour. Therefore, when YOU are judging something as **MORALLY WRONG**, to what extent is each of the following standards important to your judgment?

When judging an act as morally WRONG, I consider this standard...

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all important	Not Important	Not Very Important	More or Less Important	Important	Very Important	Of the Utmost Importance

23._____ It opposes religious authority.
24._____ It pollutes the spirit.

25._____ It is against the scriptures.

26._____ It is degrading to the soul.

27._____ It is unnatural.

28._____ It brings disorder to society.

29._____ It is socially condemned.

30._____ It is against true faith.

31._____ The family considers it unacceptable.

32._____ It restricts the individual's rights.

33._____ It is against the rules of one's social group.

34._____ Society considers it unacceptable.

35._____ It opposes the rules of society.

36._____ It is against God's will.

37._____ It restricts the freedom of choice of a person.

38._____ It opposes the beliefs of the family.

39._____ It is against the natural order.

40._____ It restricts someone's privacy.

41._____ It restricts personal choice and liberty.

42._____ It is considered a sin.

43._____ It restricts the possibility of a person to defend herself/himself.

44._____ It is against nature's law.