SHARING REALITY:
AN INSIGHT FROM PHENOMENOLOGY TO JOHN BURTON'S PROBLEM-SOLVING CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY

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PREFACE

The starting-point of the thesis is the idea that conflict may be endemic and even functional. However, the question remains whether man is inherently aggressive and violent. It is assumed in the thesis that every theory of conflict and conflict resolution consists of an image of human 'being' and human nature, and that one of the most seminal analyses a conflict analyst can engage in deals with these images.

John Burton is one of the leading figures in the field of conflict and conflict resolution theory who introduced the notion of 'problem-solving workshop conflict resolution' to International Relations in the late 1960s. The thesis focuses on how Burton applies human needs thinking to conflict and conflict resolution theory. It examines also what kind of 'model of man' is included in his theory. It is argued that Burton's biologically-based image of human 'being' leads him to deny culture its constitutive role in conflict and conflict resolution. In other words, Burton's conception of universal human needs which function as motives of behaviour offers a potent way to defuse contextualism. As a consequence, problem-solving workshop conflict resolution is thought by Burton to be essentially the same for all peoples of all cultures.

In the second half of the thesis a social constructionist image of human 'being', which clearly challenges Burton's views, is introduced. It studies how social groups and institutions distribute knowledge, define reality through shared typifications and use language. Moreover, it is argued that reality as well as needs and identities are socially and culturally constructed. Given this notion of human existence, the thesis claims that problem-solving workshop conflict resolution can be best understood to be an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties in conflict.

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND METHOD

Over the past ten years 1.5 million children have died in wars and 4 million have been injured. In Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, thousands of children have died since the outbreak of the all-out war in 1992. A cease-fire has just broken out in Angola between Angola's government and Unita rebels bringing to a halt one of the longest and cruellest civil wars of the world leaving more than half a million deaths. In April, May and June 1994 one of the most horrifying conflicts in Africa took place in Rwanda, when somewhere between 500,000 and a million people died either in massacres or as a result of disease, starvation and exhaustion in refugee camps. These are figures I have gathered from the media over a week. The list could be longer. It is hardly an overstatement to claim that conflict, war and violence are among the most pressing issues that men and women of the twentieth century have had to face.

Are these figures a testimony of our inability to manage conflicts in constructive ways? Answers reveal often just the degree of pessimism or optimism of the person who entertains the question. However, statistics show that, for example, mediation has been used in a majority of the wars fought since 1945 involving at least 100 fatalities. The most active mediating body, the United Nations, has offered good offices or mediation assistance in over 100 disputes.[1] For example, the Angolan peace process was mediated at least by four different types of mediating bodies since 1989. Zaire's President Mobutu succeeded in bringing the rival leaders together for the first time in Zaire, in June 1989. Zimbabwe played a regional role in the context of African initiatives through a series of summit meetings in 1989-1990. The period from April 1990 to May 1991 was one of active Portuguese mediation, which resulted in the Bicesse Peace Accords. After the September 1992 general elections UN special representatives Margaret Anstee and Alioune Blondin Beye mediated a new round of peace talks on the war which followed the collapse of

1. Bercovitch, Jacob, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1986, pp. 155-168.

the Bicesse Accords. The most recent peace agreement, signed in November 1994, was mediated by Beye.[2]

Yet, there is a feeling that we do not understand war and conflict, let alone the mechanisms of productive conflict management and resolution. For example, John Vasquez argues that "much has been written on the causes of war; little has been learned about the subject".[3] Marc Ross, on the other hand, claims that our institutional practices for addressing conflicts are often deficient and yielding partial and inadequate solutions, because "theories of conflict tell us too little about how to manage conflicts, while conflict management theories fail to consider many underlying sources of conflict that conflict theories have identified".[4]

The study of conflict and war is not a new phenomenon, and conflict and war have been the subject of, for example, courses in International Relations (IR) from the time of the establishment of the discipline. However, it is only over the last four decades the field has obtained an independent academic identity. Now this area of study is called 'conflict studies', 'peace research' and 'conflict analysis'. It involves scholars in an interdisciplinary approach to investigate the causes of conflict, war and violence as well as the problems of achieving and maintaining a condition of peace. Many of the most recent attempts to theorise conflict, at least in the Anglo-American conflict analysis tradition, are based on the notions that conflict as such is endemic, and that conflict can be functional. It is, thus,

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2. Anstee, Margaret, "Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy, A Test Case for U. N. Peacekeeping", International Relations, Vol. XI, No. 6, 1993, pp. 495-511. Hamill, James, "Angola's Road from under the Rubble", The World Today, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1994, pp. 6-11. Patel, Hasu, "Zimbabwe's Mediation in Mozambique and Angola", in Mediation in Southern Africa, Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.), London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993, pp. 117-141. Simpson, Chris, "Peace or War?", African Report, Vol. 39, No, 2, 1994, pp. 55-57. United Nations, "The United Nations and the Situation in Angola, May 1991-June 1994", New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1994, pp. 6-8 and pp. 10-11. Venancio, Moises and Macmillan Carla, "Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-1991", in Mediation in Southern Africa, Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.), London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993, pp. 100-116. The Independent, 26 November 1994.

3. Vasquez, John, The War Puzzle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 3.

4. Ross, Marc, The Management of Conflict, Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 2.

violent conflict behaviour which is a matter of the greatest concern for scholars in the field.[5]

Although we may accept the view that conflict is endemic, the question remains whether human beings are inherently aggressive and violent. It is often assumed that man[6] was, and still is, tied to the game of survival in which the "more complacent, lazy, indifferent, non-aggressive man was less likely to come out alive".[7] The fact that human beings are capable of cooperation does not, according to this approach, break the power of the competitive and aggressive drives inherent in man. The concept of person evident in the view is founded on a conception of human nature. In fact, every theory and understanding of conflict includes, often implicit, assumptions of human nature and 'being'. Moreover, these assumptions and images shape the types of conflict resolution interventions the theories suggest. For example, a conflict resolution attempt would look quite different in the world of 'rational', 'calculating' and 'cost-benefit' oriented persons than in the world of actors determined by 'irrational drives'.[8] Thus, one of the most seminal theoretical analyses a conflict analyst can engage in deals with the images of human 'being' conflict and conflict resolution theories postulate.

1. THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

There has been a growing interest in conflict analysis and resolution over the past five years. However, it would be an overestimation to claim that the main impetus of this interest can be found in those on

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5. For the development of conflict and peace research see, for example: Lawler, Peter, "Peace Research and International Relations: From Divergence to Convergence", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1986, pp. 367-390. Nobel, Jaap (ed.), The Coming the Age of Peace Research, Studies in the Development of a Discipline, Groningen: Styx Publications, 1991. Olson, William and Groom, A.J.R., International Relations Then and Now, Origins and Trends in Interpretation, London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991, pp. 287-296.
6. The unsatisfactory word 'man' refers in this thesis to both women and men.
7. Isard, Walter, Understanding Conflict and the Science of Peace, Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, p. 2.
8. See: Avruch, Kevin and Black, Peter, "Ideas of Human Nature in Contemporary Conflict Resolution Theory", Negotiating Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1990, pp. 221-228.

average 50 armed conflicts which have taken place per year during the period.[9] Rather, the field has witnessed a substantial input from ex-strategic theorists, military security experts, Sovietologists and area specialists who now claim to exercise conflict research.[10] Thus, it is not a surprise that there is no agreement on the terminology of international conflict analysis. For example, the term 'problem-solving workshop conflict resolution' has come to denote any form of cooperative conflict resolution. When the concepts of 'workshop', 'problem-solving workshop' and 'controlled communication' were introduced to IR in the late 1960s and early 1970s by such scholars as John Burton, Herbert Kelman and Leonard Doob, they referred to international conflict resolution attempts which brought together representatives of nations or ethnic groups in an active conflict. The talks were designed to contribute directly to the resolution of an international conflict. Now, for example, conflict resolution training seminars are often confused with problem-solving workshops. The purpose of a training seminar is to train people in conflict resolution skills by teaching them theories, approaches and practices of conflict resolution.[11] Although there is an element of training in problem-solving workshop conflict resolution too, it is oriented toward carrying out a concrete task, toward the resolution of a particular conflict.

Problem-solving workshop conflict resolution as a means of constructive conflict management takes place in problem-solving workshops which are academically-based unofficial small group discussions. Workshops bring together representatives of parties in

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9. Wallensteen, Peter and Axell, Karin, "Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War, 1989-93", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1994, pp. 333-349. An armed conflict is considered to result in at least 25 battle-related deaths in Wallensteen's and Axell's data which deals with the period 1989-93.
10. Mitchell, C. R., "Conflict Research", in Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory, A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994, p. 128.
11. For conflict resolution training seminars and their principles see, for example: International Alert, "Conflict Resolution and Training in the North Caucasus and Georgia", a report of the Piatigorsk seminar (June 6-19 1993), London: International Alert, 1993. International Alert, "Conflict Resolution and Training in the North Caucasus and Georgia", a report of the Nalchik seminar (November 14-27 1993), London: International Alert, 1993. Rothman, Jay, "Bringing Conflict Resolution to Israel: Model-Building, Training and Institutionalization", in Practising Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies, Jay Rothman (ed.), Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1993, pp. 1-15.

conflict for direct communication. A panel of scholars which facilitates and promotes communication between the parties is an essential part of this type of conflict resolution. However, the role of the third party differs from that of the traditional mediator. Unlike many mediators, facilitators do not propose or impose solutions. Rather, the function of the third party in the problem-solving workshop is to create an atmosphere where innovative solutions can emerge out the interaction between the parties themselves. The objective of the workshop is both to create analytical communication and to generate inputs into political processes. Although problem-solving workshop conflict resolution is not meant to be negotiations, it is often in practice a complementary and parallel process to them.

As mentioned above, John Burton is one of the pioneering scholars and practitioners of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution, and his ideas have influenced widely academic works in the field of conflict and conflict resolution.[12] His theory of the relationship between basic human needs and the development of protracted conflict brought in a set of new issues and evoked a lively theoretical debate among conflict analysts.[13] Even for scholars who do not share Burton's enthusiasm for the idea of universal human needs, his theories or, rather, critiques of them have provided fruitful starting-points for the development of 'alternative' approaches and issues.[14]

Burton's contribution to IR and international conflict analysis is not limited to his version of human needs theory. For example, a variant of 'world society' approaches owes much to the thought and influence of Burton. In Burton's world society model the emphasis is put on transactions to the extent that the basic unit of analysis is considered to be a set of patterned interactions. It follows, that the level of analysis (e.g. interstate, intrastate, individual) varies

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12. One of the most recent works clearly influenced by Burton's thinking is: Sandole, Dennis and van der Merwe, Hugo (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993.

13. See, for example: Burton, John (ed.), Conflict: Human Needs Theory, London: Macmillan, 1990.

14. See, for example: Avruck and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature...". Avruch, Kevin and Black, Peter, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution", Peace and Change, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1991, pp. 22-45. Merry, S. "Disputing Without Culture", Harvard Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 8, 1987, pp. 2057-2073.

according to the issue.[15] Similarly, the topic of altering world environment and the need of governments for adapting policies to changing circumstances have been largely discussed by Burton.[16] Functionalism both at the regional and international level is studied in many of his works. In Burton's view, functional institutions play a positive role in conflict resolution. They encourage the growth of webs of interaction, which expand from specific areas of interests to political spheres.[17]

This thesis aims at studying John Burton's conflict and conflict resolution theory and its relationship to his version of human needs theory. His ideas of these issues are studied from World Society[18] to his most recent works. One could postulate a continuity in Burton's thinking and argue that there is a tentative notion of human needs in his earlier works too. However, there is a shift from the systemic framework to the human needs framework which is evident particularly in Deviance, Terrorism and War.[19] More precisely, a purpose of the study is to examine the image of human 'being' and nature underlying Burton's needs theory which forms, as it will be demonstrated, the very core of his conflict resolution theory during the period chosen to be studied.

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15. See: Burton, John, Systems, States, Diplomacy, and Rules, London: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Burton, John, World Society, Lanham: University Press of America, 1987 (originally published Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Burton, John, "International Relations or World Society?", in Classics in International Relations, John Vasquez (ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990 (2nd ed) (originally in Burton, John et al., The Study of World Society: A London Perspective, Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1974). See also a book by a group of scholars which is associated with Burton: Banks, Michael (ed.), Conflict in World Society, A New Perspective on International Relations, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984.
16. See: Burton, John, Peace Theory, Preconditions of Disarmament, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Burton, John, International Relations, A General Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Burton, John, "Conflict as a Function of Change", in Conflict in Society, Anthony de Reuck and Julie Knight (eds.), London, J. & A. Churchill, 1966, pp. 370-401. Burton, John et al., Britain Between East and West, Aldershot: Gower Press, 1984.
17. See, for example: Burton, John, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and the United Nations", Australian Outlook, Vol., 15, No. 1, 1961, pp. 73-87. Burton, John, "Functionalism and the Resolution of Conflict", in Functionalism, Theory and Practice in International Relations, A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), London: University of London Press, 1975, pp. 238-249.
18. Burton, John, World Society, Lanham: University Press of America, 1987 (originally published Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
19. Burton, John, Deviance, Terrorism and War, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Another purpose of the thesis is to identify unexplored and under-studied areas of problem-solving conflict resolution as a means of international conflict resolution, and to create an 'alternative' language for the study of problem-solving workshops. Alfred Schutz's phenomenology and social constructionist theories of human 'being' are employed in order both to criticise Burton's views of human nature and establish a conceptual framework which does not arise from human needs thinking. By applying phenomenological concepts an understanding of conflict and conflict resolution can be gained which differs in many respects from Burton's theories. The most important point of departure is the fruitful account of culture, which Schutz's theories, unlike Burton's biologically based views, can provide for conflict and conflict resolution theory.

William Connolly's description of a 'nontotalist' theory helps to grasp the aims of the thesis. Connolly writes:

> "One might seek, not to impose one reading on the field of discourse, but to elaborate a general reading that can contend with others by broadening the established terms of debates; not to create a transformation of international life grounded in a universal project, but to contribute to a general perspective that might support reconstitution of aspects of international life; not to root a theory in a transcendental ground, but to problematize the grounding any theory presupposes while it works out the implications of a particular set of themes; not merely in invert hierarchies in other theories (a useful task), but to construct alternative hierarchies that support modifications in relations between identity and difference."[20]

The phenomenological approach introduced in the second part of the thesis broadens the established terms of problem-solving conflict resolution theorising which derive mainly from socio-biological, socio-psychological and psychological discourses. By doing this, it contributes to a general perspective of conflict resolution which is an aspect of international life. The approach questions the ground of Burton's version of human needs theory and its relation to conflict

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20. Connolly, William, Identity/Difference, Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 56-57.

resolution theory by suggesting an 'alternative' image of human existence. Similarly, it constructs alternative hierarchies (e.g. society/nature, dialogue/strategic action) and new domains of study (e.g. socially constructed identity, discursive rationality).

In sum, the purposes of the thesis are:

(1) to study John Burton's conflict resolution theory from the perspective of basic human needs;
(2) to reveal the logic of argument and the image of human nature and human 'being' underlying his problem-solving conflict resolution theory;
(3) to suggest a social constructionist view of human existence and establish a critique of Burton's 'model of man' from that viewpoint;
(4) to study conflict and conflict resolution in the light the social constructionist ideas and with the help of the language they offer, and
(5) to uncover and discuss under-theorised areas of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution.

An overview of the mediation literature is given in the next chapter in order to locate problem-solving workshop conflict resolution in the context of peaceful third party involvement. Points of convergence and departure between traditional approaches to mediation and the 'third party consultation model', as problem-solving workshop conflict resolution is also called, are pointed out. In that chapter three pilot international problem-solving conflict resolution approaches are compared and their underlying theoretical assumptions studied. The third chapter discusses Burton's version of human needs theory and its relation to his conflict and conflict resolution theory. The chapter gives examples of human needs thinking and examines the similarities between these and Burton's thinking. The logic of Burton's argument is studied by means of metaphor analysis, by analysing the metaphors which can be found in his human needs theory. The study of metaphors broadens the area of discussion to other social sciences and, in particular, to the issues of political theory.

The fourth chapter studies further the image of human 'being' in Burton's problem-solving workshop conflict resolution theory. It is argued that every theory of conflict and conflict resolution includes a theory of action and a notion of rationality. The chapter examines Burton's views of action and rationality at the stages of behaviour outside the workshop context, entry decision and behaviour within the workshop structure. In other words, it is asked what mode of behaviour and form of rationality Burton assumes when he explains conflict and conflict resolution. The chapter studies also what type of behaviour and rationality Burton considers the facilitator to have. The summary of the chapter comes out with a model of explanatory layers included in Burton's conflict resolution theory.

The fifth chapter of the thesis moves into phenomenology. Alfred Schutz's philosophy is studied in order to develop an alternative ontological basis and conceptual framework for the study of conflict and conflict resolution. Burton's biologically based ontology is challenged by discussing the social construction of reality, needs and identity. Similarly, culture is given such an account that it can be placed in the centre of the study of conflict and conflict resolution. The sixth chapter presents a phenomenological understanding of conflict and problem-solving conflict resolution. It argues that problem-solving workshop conflict resolution can be best understood to be an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties in conflict. In order to justify the claim, the discussion started in the previous chapter on relevance structures, typifications and discursive rationality is continued. In the sixth chapter a great deal of attention is paid also to the role of the facilitator, and a new metaphor for describing his or her role in the workshop context is suggested.

2. METHOD

The thesis analyses texts and suggests interpretations of them. Thus, the method is clearly textual and interpretative. The hermeneutical question an interpretative approach poses is how to understand texts, speech, culture or objects 'alien' to us. In addition to the interpretative approach to read texts, the thesis advances, particularly in the fifth and sixth chapter, a hermeneutically-oriented understanding of conflict and conflict resolution.

What is it, then, about an interpretative approach that distinguishes it from the traditional, positivist-inspired one? One of the main ideas of the positivist tradition is that of the methodological unity of science. It is assumed that there is no fundamental difference between the social world and the natural world; both of them contain regularities independent of time and place. The ways to conduct scientific analysis in the natural world are, thus, thought to be appropriate to the social world too. Interpretative approaches, on the other hand, start with the understanding that the social world is partly constituted by human self-interpretation. Human beings are considered to be fundamentally self-interpreting and self-defining, who live in the world of cultural meaning. As a consequence, the object of study of social science must include the interpretations and definitions of the human subjects whose interaction makes the social world. Given this object of study, the methods and purposes of social science are thought to be different from the methods and aims of natural science.[21]

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21. Neufeld, Mark, "Interpretation and the 'Science' of International Relations", Review of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1993, pp. 39-44. For discussions on the applicability of hermeneutical approaches to IR see, for example: ibid. Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, Explaining and Understanding in International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 68-91 and pp. 196-216. Price, Richard, "Interpretation and Disciplinary Orthodoxy in International Relations", Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1994, pp. 201-204.

The quest for hermeneutical understanding expressed by interpretative approaches is not solely epistemological.[22] Rather, it arises from certain ontological commitments. It is assumed that human 'being' is a self-interpreting activity. This activity involves an understanding of what 'being' means, and it is this understanding which opens a clearing in which human beings can encounter objects, institutions and other human beings. In other words, "understanding is the original character of the being of human life itself".[23] Similarly, so-called hermeneutical circle has an ontological significance. In other words, the hermeneutical circle of understanding is not a methodological circle, but implies an ontological structural element of understanding itself. When interpreting the interpreter must begin the analysis from within the practices he or she seeks to interpret. The choice of phenomena to be interpreted is guided by a traditional understanding of 'being' which has already made the interpreter what he or she is. Interpretation begins with preconceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones during the event of understanding. Thus, understanding is ultimately an interplay between the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter.[24]

The idea of the hermeneutical circle has been brought from ontology to epistemological questions, and it has methodological applications too. From the point of view of the method of this thesis it is important to consider a text as a work of discourse, which cannot be reduced to the sentences whereof it is composed. Moreover, it is vital to recognise that, in the case of the written text, the intention of the author does not coincide with the meaning of what is written. In other words, the 'objective' meaning of the text is something other than the 'subjective' intentions of its author and, therefore, the problem of the right understanding cannot be solved by a simple return to the alleged intention of an author. A common mistake when describing interpretation is to confuse textual meaning with psychological meaning. However, the text transcends its own socio-

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22. The reference is here particularly to Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. For a summary of their thinking see: Bleicher, Josef, Contemporary Hermeneutics, Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 98-103 and pp. 108-127.
23. Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method, London: Sheed and Ward, 1979 (2nd ed), p. 230.
24. ibid., pp. 230-240 and p. 261.

psychological conditions of production and, thereby, opens itself to an unlimited series of readings. The text, thus, 'decontextualises' itself in such a way that it can be 'recontextualised' in a new situation by the act of reading.[25]

Another feature of the text is that it creates a version of a world or, rather, it 'makes a world': it does neither reflect nor represent a world. A world is created by dividing, combining, emphasising, ordering, deleting, filling in and filling out. Worlds are made not only by what is said literally but also by what is said metaphorically as well as what is exemplified and expressed. The 'truth' of a version of a world produced by a text cannot be defined or tested against 'the world', for not only do truths differ for different worlds but the nature of the relationship between a version and a world apart from it is nebulous. Moreover, the 'truth' of, for example, a theory is but one special feature and is often overridden in importance by its cogency, compactness, comprehensiveness, informativeness and organising power. However, a version may be taken to be 'true'. For example, within a frame of reference a version appears to be true. There can also be a convention which takes certain types of versions to be true.[26]

Given that the text creates a version of a world, a researcher participates in a 'world-making' activity. Nelson Goodman describes scientific activities:

> "The scientist who supposes that he is single-mindedly dedicated to the search for truth deceives himself. He is unconcerned with the trivial truths he could grind out endlessly; and he looks to the multifaceted and irregular results of observations for little more than suggestions of overall structures and significant generalizations. He seeks system, simplicity, scope; and when satisfied on these scores

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25. Ricoeur, Paul, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, John Thompson (ed.), Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne and Sydney: Cambridge University Press and Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1981, pp. 131-140. Thompson, John, "Editor's Introduction", in Ricoeur, Paul, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, John Thompson (ed.), Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne and Sydney: Cambridge University Press and Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1981, pp. 1-26.
26. Goodman, Nelson, Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978, pp. 1-19 and pp. 130-140.

he tailors truth to fit. He as much decrees as discovers the laws he sets forth, as much designs as discerns the patterns he delineates."[27]

Metaphor participates in making versions of worlds. According to a 'cognitive approach to metaphor', metaphor is essential to human understanding, and it is a mechanism for creating new meaning. Language structures what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. In other words, language plays an important role in defining our everyday realities. Our conceptual system is, in terms of which we both think and act, fundamentally metaphorical by nature. Thus, metaphor should not be thought to be transposing an unusual name. The essence of metaphor (metaphorical concept) is, rather, "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another".[28] Since metaphor is vital for understanding, it cannot be avoided in speaking 'objectively' or 'scientifically'.[29]

Such views of metaphor and 'world-making' clearly challenge an extreme objectivist picture of the world. The extreme objectivist position claims that there is an objective reality, and that we can say things that are objectively, absolutely, and unconditionally true and false about it. Science does not only provide us with a methodology that allows us to rise above our subjective limitations and to achieve understanding from an universally valid and unbiased point of view, but it will, in course of its development, give us also a correct and general account of reality. According to the objectivist view, to describe reality correctly we need words whose meanings are fixed, clear and precise. The ideas of metaphor and 'worlds-versions' challenge, on the other hand, an extreme subjectivist image of the world too. The extreme subjectivist position does not recognise the existence of intersubjective and socially conditioned frames of reference. The notions of metaphor and 'world-making'

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27. ibid., p. 18.
28. Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 5.
29. See more on metaphor: ibid. Dirven, René and Paparotté, Wolf, "Introduction", in The Ubiquity of Metaphor, René Dirven and World Paparotté (eds.), Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1985, pp. vii-xix.

introduced allow an interpretation according to which the intersubjective frame of reference constrains the imaginative understanding of the individual as well as his or her capability of 'creating worlds' and producing new meaning.[30]

The act of interpretation culminates in an act of 'appropriation'. The act of 'appropriation' does not seek to rejoin the original intentions of the author, but rather to expand the conscious horizon of the reader by actualising the meaning of the text. The 'distanciation' of the text from the author is, thus, not abolished by 'appropriation'. On the contrary, 'appropriation' is understanding at and through distance which is inevitably between the author and the interpreter. However, in 'appropriation' we do not impose our meaning to the text. Neither do we leave ourselves aside. Rather, we use our preconceptions so that the meaning of the text can be 'made to speak for us': we conjoin a new discourse to the discourse of the text. Thus, interpretation can be described to be a conversation with the text in which the horizon of the interpreter and the horizon of the text amalgamate.[31]

What is, then, looked for in interpretation? There are several answers. It is suggested that what is ultimately 'appropriated' in interpretation is the world the text proposes.[32] It is also thought that interpretative hermeneutics is a dialogue with past ways of understanding the world.[33] Anthropologist Glifford Geertz assumes that the interpretative analysis of culture is an attempt in search of meaning.[34] It is a search for meaning by sorting out the structures of signification of the social actors and by determining their social ground and import. The double task of the interpretative analysis is, thus, to uncover the conceptual structures that inform actors in a social world and to provide a vocabulary in which what symbolic action has to say about itself can be expressed. 'Critical

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30. For the objectivist and subjectivist views see: Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 185-228.
31. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 273 and pp. 326-331. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, pp. 142-144 and pp. 182-193.
32. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 143.
33. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 431-447.
34. Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays, London: Fontana Press, 1993, pp. 3-30.

hermeneutics'[35], on the other hand, suspects the claims to truth contained in the text or in the tradition one is inhabiting. It assumes the existence of 'ideological structures' which produce 'false consciousness', and aims at criticising, by employing critical interpretation, the misunderstandings of self and the reality that give rise to them.

The aim of interpretation in this thesis is moderate. The purpose is not to uncover the deep-structures of a tradition. Neither is it thought to be a conversation with past understandings for the truth they contain. The aim is, rather, to study the logic and underlying assumptions of Burton's texts. The analysis of metaphors, carried out in the third chapter, is considered to be one means of actualising this type of research orientation. Interpretation means also linking the texts with wider theoretical discussions. These are assumed both to locate Burton's work in traditions of thinking and give new perspectives. The interpretative approach used to understand the texts of Schutz and 'social constructionists' is more instrumental. Indeed, it includes interpretation, but it is employed in order to construct a conceptual framework which is an alternative to the framework suggested by Burton.

It should be emphasised that there are other ways of conducting interpretative research. There are three approaches with which the approach employed in this thesis should not be confused, namely, 'biographical', 'contextual' and 'critical' reconstruction. 'Biographical reconstruction' aims at understanding the intended meaning of the author, 'what the author said and meant', by constructing the biographical and historical details of the author in relation to his or her texts. As mentioned, this thesis takes a suspicious stance toward the possibility and fruitfulness of this kind of approach. 'Contextual reconstruction'[36], on the other hand, sees the precondition for understanding to be in an intellectual and social context within which the text should be placed. In other words, it is assumed that past

35. Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics, pp. 143-174.
36. On 'contextual reconstruction' and particularly on R. G. Collingwood, W. G. Greenleaf and Q. Skinner see: Lockyer, Andrew, "'Traditions' as Context in the History of Political Theory", Political Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1979, pp. 201-217.

ideas should be studied in their historical contexts, in the context of the circumstances in which they were written.

R. B. J. Walker's way to read Machiavelli exemplifies 'critical reconstruction'. He challenges the way Machiavelli has come to symbolise what the tradition of international theory is all about. Walker argues that "Machiavelli can be read in ways that problematise the most basic assumptions on which claims about the tradition are based".[37] For him, Machiavelli poses questions about political community and practice that may still be pursued even though Machiavelli's answers expose limited historical and conceptual horizons. Walker's aim is not to make a claim about 'what Machiavelli really said' nor to present an ahistorical reading of a historical problematic. It is, rather, to identify some of the discursive practices that have "turned a historical problematic into a historical apology for the violence of the present"[38] and use references to a tradition as a 'source of critical opportunity'.[39]

Neither should the interpretative approach employed in the thesis be confused with semiotic research. There is a great diversity in the current research of semiotics, but there is an agreement that semiotics studies systems of signs. Several writers agree also with C. S. Peirce's definition that a sign is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect and capacity. Not only are words signs, but also gestures, images, non-linguistic sounds, etc. Some authors think that what semiotics has discovered is the fact that there is a general social law, that this law is the symbolic dimension which is given in language and that every social practice offers a special expression of that. Semiotics suggests ways of interpreting and, therefore, its basic ideology does not differ from that of hermeneutics. However, semiotic research includes often detailed, and almost technical, analyses of, for example, texts, in which hermeneutical reading does not necessarily engage.[40]

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37. Walker, R. B. J., Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 31.
38. ibid., p. 31.
39. ibid., pp. 30-31.
40. See, for example: Sebeok, Thomas (ed.), The Tell-Tale Sign, A Survey of Semiotics, Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press, 1975.

In sum, the method employed in the thesis is interpretative, and it derives from the hermeneutical tradition. There are five main assumptions underlying the approach. What is said about Burton's texts applies to other authors too.

(1) John Burton is *not* considered to be a biographical person whose intentions the author of this thesis is interested in. In other words, the thesis is not an intellectual history of Burton.
(2) Burton's text are works of discourse.
(3) As works of discourse they create versions of worlds and 'distance' themselves from the intentions of the author.
(4) As an interpreter the author of this thesis approaches the texts through her foremeanings and horizons of understanding. However, these are bound to change in a hermeneutical circle during the event of understanding.
(5) The analysis of metaphors is one means of conducting the interpretative analysis which reveals the underlying logic and assumptions of Burton's texts.

CHAPTER II: PROBLEM-SOLVING AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

As Morton Deutsch maintains, there are two orientations to conflict resolution: competitive and cooperative. According to him, these orientations can be seen as a continuum with competitive on one end and cooperative on the other. Within the continuum there are such modes of conflict resolution as the use of deadly force (actual or threatened), litigation, adjudication, arbitration, conciliation, traditional mediation, facilitated problem-solving and unfacilitated problem-solving. The continuum can be also conceptualised by claiming that there are three procedures for dealing with opposing preferences, namely, struggle, mediation and negotiation.[1]

This chapter studies the cooperative end of the continuum and, more precisely, the modes of international conflict resolution which include third party intermediary activities. The scope is further narrowed down to traditional mediation and facilitated problem-solving. In the first part of this chapter an overview of the mediation literature is given. The literature is reviewed from the point of view of authors and seminal texts, not so much from the viewpoint of issue areas. The main aim is to place the so-called 'third party consultation model' into a wider context of mediation approaches. Some new and alternative ways to study third party activities are also introduced in order to locate this thesis among them. The chapter moves, then, from this overview to a more detailed discussion by comparing three pilot problem-solving workshop approaches. It should be emphasised, that the comparison includes only the pilot attempts. After those first workshops there have been

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1. Deutsch, Morton, "Conflict and Its Resolution" in Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences, Clagett Smith (ed.), London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971, pp. 39-49. See also: Carnevale, Peter and Pruitt, Dean, "Negotiation and Mediation", Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 43, 1992, p. 532. Sandole, Dennis, "Introduction", in Conflict Management and Problem Solving: From Interpersonal to International Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, p. 3.

several others (e.g. Edward Azar's[2], A. M. Levi's and A. Benjamin's[3], Jay Rothman's[4] and Berghof Research Centre's[5] attempts) which are not studied. In the last part of the chapter general philosophical and theoretical features which are common particularly to the pilot international problem-solving conflict resolution approaches are pointed out.

1. PEACEFUL THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION AS A FORM OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1. 1. Third party intermediary intervention

Third party activity has become the focus of an extensive amount of scholarly literature.[6] Concepts and definitions vary a lot in the field. Some guidelines for a reader could help him or her to see a text on peaceful third party intervention in wider theoretical contexts and debates of International Relations as well as of conflict analysis. One clue is the identification of the underlying theory of conflict. For example, if conflict is defined as a subjective phenomenon, then conflict resolution needs to be defined as a process which deals with subjective elements, i.e. perceptions, attitudes and images. In this view, third party roles are justified by third party activities which aim at perceptual and attitudinal changes. An objectivist definition of conflict, on the other hand, generates an idea of structural changes as a precondition for termination of violent conflict. The empowerment of a weaker party, which may take place in a mediation

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2. Azar, Edward, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990.
3. Levi, A. M. and Benjamin, A., "Jews and Arabs Rehearse Geneva: A Model of Conflict Resolution", Human Relations, Vol. 29, No. 11, 1976, pp. 1035-44.
4. Rothman, "Bringing Conflict Resolution...", pp. 1-15.
5. Berghof Research Center in Berlin organises problem-solving workshops on conflicts in Eastern Europe. A private communication with the head of the institute Dr. Norbert Ropers, July 1994.
6. For a bibliography see: Lakos, Amos, International Negotiations: A Bibliography, Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1989. See also: Journal of Social Issues, Special Issue on the Mediation of Social Conflict, Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt (eds.), Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985. Journal of Peace Research, Special Issue on International Mediation, Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991.

process, is seen to provide a means of creating such preconditions.[7] It can be also maintained that both psychocultural (subjective) and structural factors are critical in shaping the level of conflict and violence and in defining who the opponents will be. According to this view, a successful conflict resolution process needs to address both aspects.[8]

The identification of the assumed paradigmatic[9] context of third party intervention may also help to understand the mediation literature. For example, K. J. Holsti criticises the ideology of mediation, because it often forgets the reality of power politics. According to him, there are conflicts which derive from great ideological forces and which aim, for example, at the creation of nations and states. Holsti claims that these conflicts cannot be settled "through the technical quick fixes of mediators and conciliators".[10] Similarly, I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval create a framework of cost-benefit calculations and power politics "by taking mediation out of the realm of idealism and by bridging the distinction between the 'disinterested facilitator' and the 'interested manipulator'".[11] Thus, Holsti as well as Zartman and Touval refer to the paradigm of power politics as a legitimate general framework for the study of third party mediation. John Burton, on the other hand,

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7. For the subjectivistic and objectivistic definitions of conflict see: Mitchell, C. R., Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role, Westmead: Gower, 1981, pp. 12-42. Webb, Keith, "Structural Violence and Definition of Conflict", in World Encyclopaedia of Peace, Vol. 2, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986, pp. 431-434. For a strong objectivist argument see: Schmidt, Herman, "Peace Research and Politics", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1968, pp. 217-232. For a discussion about empowerment see: Groom, A. J. R. and Webb, Keith, "Injustice, Empowerment, and Facilitation in Conflict", International Interactions, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1987, pp. 263-280.

8. Ross, The Management of Conflict, p. ix and p. 116.

9. There seemed to be a consensus on the existence of three competing paradigms in International Relations (IR). However, this consensus has be challenged by post-structural approaches to IR. For a traditional account see: Banks, Michael, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory", in Conflict in World Society, A new perspective on international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. 3-21. For a post-modern point of view see: George, Jim, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1989, pp. 269-279.

10. Holsti, K. J. , "Paths to Peace? Theories of Conflict Resolution and Realities in International Politics", in International Conflict Resolution, Ramesh Thakur (ed.), Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1988, p. 114.

11. Zartman, I. William and Touval, Saadia, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics", Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, p. 43.

employs the frame of cooperation. According to Burton, strategies of conflict settlement inherent in power politics merely treat symptoms of conflict rather than sources. In his view, the real sources of conflict are dealt with in facilitated problem-solving workshops.[12]

Studies on third party intermediary intervention can be categorised in several ways. The approaches do not exclude each other, and yet they offer different starting points for theorising. Such writings as Oran Young's Intermediaries, Third Parties in International Crisis[13] and "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts"[14] study and theorise third party interventions from the point of view of intermediary activities. Young defines intermediary intervention to be "any action taken by an actor that is not directly party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself".[15] The 'intermediary activities' approach leads Young to study extensively third party tactics and identity. Since his work has largely set the agenda of mediation studies, these questions still dominate theoretical discussions about mediation.[16]

There is also a body of literature which deals with international conflict resolution in general, and places pacific third party activities among other forms of conflict resolution. Examples of the 'general conflict resolution' approach include such writers as Paul Wehr, Adam Curle and K. J. Holsti. Paul Wehr's Conflict Regulation[17] discusses origins of conflict and models of conflict regulation. According to Wehr, third party intervention is one form of conflict

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12. Burton, John and Dukes, Frank, Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement & Resolution, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 9. Burton, John, "The Means to Agreement: Power or Values?", in Perspectives on Negotiation, Four Case Studies and Interpretations, Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald, Jr. (eds.), Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1986, pp. 229-241.
13. Young, Oran, The Intermediaries, Third Parties in International Crisis, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
14. Young, Oran, "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1972, pp. 51-65.
15. Young, The Intermediaries, p. 34.
16. On the 'intermediary activities' approach see also: Carnevale and Pruitt, "Negotiation and Mediation", pp. 563-566.
17. Wehr, Paul, Conflict Regulation, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 28-43.

resolution among legal regulation, the deterrence model and bargaining and negotiation. Adam Curle's Making Peace[18], on the other hand, considers third party conciliation to be an element of peace making. Curle distinguishes psychological settlement from material. Conciliation deals primarily with subjective elements of conflict and leads to psychological settlement, whereas bargaining is needed for material settlement. K. J. Holsti claims that the purpose of pacific third party intervention is in the realm of conflict abatement or war-avoidance rather than conflict resolution.[19]

A large amount of literature considers pacific third party interventions to be a part of negotiation processes. Fred Iklé's seminal text How Nations Negotiate[20] establishes bases for further theorising, although it does not explicitly deal with third party intermediary interventions. Iklé defines negotiation as a "process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a common interest where conflicting interests are present".[21] Following Iklè's definition of negotiation, Thomas Colosi argues that mediation is simply an extension of the negotiation process. He maintains that effective mediators rely on the same tools as effective negotiators, namely, the creation and maintenance of doubt.[22] Similarly, Peter Carnevale and Dean Pruitt see mediation to be a "variation on negotiation in which one or more outsiders ('third parties') assist the parties in their discussion".[23] Jacob Bercovitch states that "mediation is the continuation of negotiations by other means".[24]

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18. Curle, Adam, Making Peace, London: Tavistock Publications, 1971, pp. 177-180.
19. Holsti, "Paths to Peace?", p. 111 and p. 114.
20. Iklé, Fred, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper & Row, 1964 (reprinted 1985).
21. ibid., pp. 3-4.
22. Colosi, Thomas, "A Model for Negotiation and Mediation" in International Negotiation, Art and Science, Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald, Jr. (eds.), Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1984, p. 25. See also: Druckman, Daniel, "Four Cases of Conflict Management: Lessons Learned", in Perspectives on Negotiation, Four Case Studies and Interpretations, Diane Bendahmane and John McDonald, Jr. (eds.), Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1986, pp. 263-288.
23. Carnevale and Pruitt, "Negotiation and Mediation", p. 532.
24. Bercovitch, Jacob, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations", in Mediation in International Relations, Multiple Approaches to Conflict

Within the 'negotiation' approach, Zartman and Touval claim that "mediation is a form of third-party intervention in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing to its abatement or resolution through negotiation".[25] According to them, a mediator transforms the bargaining structure from a dyad into a triad by promoting his or her own interests. In the negotiation triad the mediator is accepted by the parties not because of his or her neutrality but because of his or her ability to produce an attractive outcome.[26] On the basis of Zartman's and Touval's argument the notion of 'biased mediation' has been developed. Especially Touval's article "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations"[27] has paved the way to the recognition of the concept. For example, Vivienne Jabri uses and develops the concept further in her study on the involvement of the Western Contact Group in the conflict over Namibia.[28]

A subgroup of the negotiation approach can be found in 'cognitive' approaches to negotiation. Daniel Druckman's texts exemplify the approach where perceptions and information-processing procedures of negotiators are discussed. Transferred to the study of mediation, the cognitive approach is interested, for example, in the importance of positive sentiments and enhanced understanding for willingness to compromise in facilitated problem-solving workshops. Similarly, it focuses on the conditions that lead to cooperation or competition and their relation to the outcomes of mediation processes.[29] The

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Management, Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.), Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1992, p. 3.

25. Zartman and Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict...", p. 31.

26. Touval, Saadia and Zartman, I. William, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory", in International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (eds.), Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1985, p. 10. Zartman, I. William and Touval, Saadia, "Conclusion: Mediation in Theory and Practice", in International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (eds.), Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 255-256.

27. Touval, Saadia, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations", The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1975, pp. 51-69.

28. Jabri, Vivienne, "The Western Contact Group as Intermediary in the Conflict over Namibia", in New Approaches to International Mediation, C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb (eds.), Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 102-130. Jabri, Vivienne, Mediating Conflict, Decision-Making and Western Intervention in Namibia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.

29. Druckman, Daniel, "Four Cases of Conflict Management...", pp. 263-288. Druckman, Daniel, "An Analytical Research Agenda for Conflict and Conflict Resolution", in Conflict

cognitive approaches have some points of convergence with 'social-psychological' approaches, which, however, differ by placing the emphasis on social interaction rather than cognitions of individual actors.[30]

Two other approaches to peaceful third party intervention can be pointed out: a 'legal-normative' approach and a 'historical' approach. The legal-normative approach studies peaceful third party interventions in the context of international law. The basic assumption is that international law works as a normative framework for relationships between state actors. According to this view, international negotiations and mediation can be most fruitfully studied by using the normative framework.[31] The historical approach studies mediation through historical case studies. An example is Jean-Pierre Cot's International Conciliation[32] which offers detailed case studies on bilateral conciliation and conciliation in international organisations.

The legal-normative and historical approaches have different epistemological foundations from the three approaches introduced first. Although they establish some theoretical categories, they do not aim at universal theorising. The historical approach will possibly

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Resolution Theory and Practice, Integration and Application, Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993, pp. 25-42. Druckman, Daniel and Broome, Benjamin, "Value Differences and Conflict Resolution, Familiarity or Liking?", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1991, pp. 571-593.

30. For the key notions of the social-psychological understanding of conflict and conflict resolution see a summary: Deutsch, Morton, "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences", in New Directions in Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, pp. 28-29. See also: Volkan, Vamik, Montville, Joseph and Julius, Demetrios (eds.), The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vol. 2, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991. Since many of the problem-solving approaches of conflict resolution largely derive from social-psychology, the elements of this approach will be discussed later in the chapter.

31. See, for example: Lachs, Manfred, "International Law, Mediation, and Negotiation", in Multilateral Negotiations and Mediation, Instruments and Methods, Arthur Lall (ed.), New York: Pergamon Press, 1985, pp. 185-195. Luard, Evan (ed.), The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes, London: Thames and Hudson, 1970. von Mangoldt, Hans, "Arbitration and Conciliation" in Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1974, pp. 417-552.

32. Cot, Jean-Pierre, International Conciliation, London: Europa Publications, 1968.

get more attention in the field of mediation studies. New post-structural studies on international relations employ genealogical methods and can be seen to be, thereby, 'historical'.[33] Most of the studies under the categories of 'intermediary actions', 'general conflict resolution theory' and 'negotiation', on the other hand, proceed from hypotheses building to hypotheses illustration through case studies.

All three main approaches to third party intermediary intervention introduced discuss extensively third party roles, functions, qualities and resources. The issues will be briefly examined in the next part before moving to 'alternative and new' approaches.

1. 2. Third party: roles, functions, qualities and resources[34]

Deutsch's continuum of the orientations of conflict resolution can be related to third party roles and functions. Roles and functions are then considered to vary from active to passive. The third party can involve in conflict actively by using deadly force, whereas the third party facilitative role in the problem-solving workshop can be seen to be passive. Although the dichotomy of active and passive third party roles is entertained by many theorists, a simple postulation of the continuum is highly problematic and has got only a heuristic value. It is problematic, because it does not take into account the context of third party activities. For example, in a stalemate situation good offices carried out by a third party may prove to be extremely 'active' action.

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33. A sign of an interest in genealogy and in its 'historical' and intertextual methods is James Der Derian's, On Diplomacy, A Genealogy of Western Estrangement, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. See also: Cobb, Sara and Rifkin, Janet, "Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation", Law and Social Inquiry - Journal of the American Bar Foundation, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1991, pp. 35-62.

34. This part is written only from the point of view of the third party. However, mediation can be considered as a process, where such topics as mediation tactics, strategies, stages, objectives, procedures and outcomes are dependent on each other. For an extensive account of these topics see: Moore, Christopher, The Mediation Process, Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991.

Several examples of the implicit use of the active/passive distinction can be found in the mediation literature. Young distinguishes between third parties which impose a settlement on the original parties and intermediaries which facilitate a settlement.[35] Zartman's[36] and Laue's[37] categorisations of roles coincide with Young's categories. Zartman claims that there are basically three third party roles, namely, manipulator, formulator, and communicator, whereas Laue argues that there are five roles, namely, activist, advocate, mediator, researcher, and enforcer.

Laue considers the roles to be founded predominantly on the base and credibility of the intervenor. Thus, such questions as, whom does the intervenor work for, who pays him or her, and consequently what are the structured expectations for behaviour of the intervenor in that role are vital in evaluating intermediary actions. According to Laue, the role of an activist is characterised by organisational base and relationship with at least one of the parties. The activist works extremely closely with the parties and becomes almost one of them. The role of an advocate, on the other hand, is based on an advocation of certain values and parties within the organisation. The role of a mediator derives from the advocation of processes and interactions, rather than any of the parties *per se* or of any particular outcomes. The category of researcher includes such professionals as journalists and social science researchers. At the active end of Laue's continuum, the enforcer has formal power to sanction either or all of the parties.[38]

The role of a communicator in Zartman's account coincides with the role of a mediator in Laue's list. The communicator, like the mediator, is interested in developing a process where parties can

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35. Young, "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts", p. 52. See also: Touval, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical...", p. 52.
36. Touval and Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in...", pp. 11-13. Zartman, I. William, "Alternative Attempts at Crisis Management: Concepts and Processes", in New Issues in International Crisis Management, Gilbert Winham (ed.), Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 218-219.
37. Laue, James, "The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Third Party Roles in Conflict", in Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, pp. 26-28.
38. ibid., pp. 26-28.

achieve at least some of their goals.[39] In Jeffrey Rubin's terminology, the third party occupies a process-oriented role, i.e., the third party is likely to do whatever is necessary in order to help the principles to take charge of their own conflict.[40] Zartman considers the role of the communicator to be passive. A formulator who redefines the issues in conflict or finds a format for its resolution behaves more actively. Moreover, in Zartman's view, in some situations a third party may have to use his or her position and other available resources to manipulate the parties into agreement. The third party as a manipulator may pressure or help the parties to create a stalemate by strengthening the weaker or threatening the stronger.[41] The third party acting as a manipulator can also be seen to act as an enforcer, who occupies a directive and content-oriented role.[42] If it is assumed that a conflict has a natural life-cycle, it is justified to claim that during the cycle there can be many mediators fulfilling a range of roles.[43]

The functions of intermediaries are closely related to roles. In sum, third party functions include the facilitation of communication between the parties and influencing parties towards changing their positions in order to make agreement possible. By clarifying the issues in conflict, by helping the parties to withdraw from commitments, by reducing the cost of concessions and by offering compromise formulae and substantive proposals, the intermediary provides a framework within which concessions become possible.[44] When the third party involvement is seen from the point of view of a

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39. Touval and Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in...", pp. 10-11. Zartman, "Alternative Attempts at...", pp. 218-219.
40. Rubin, Jeffrey, "Introduction", in Dynamics of Third Party Intervention, Kissinger in the Middle East, Jeffrey Rubin (ed.), New York: Praeger, 1981, pp. 13-17. Pruitt, Dean and Rubin, Jeffrey, Social Conflict, Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, New York: Random House, 1986, pp. 166-169. For the notions of process intervention and content intervention see: Bercovitch, Jacob, Social Conflicts and Third Parties, Strategies of Conflict Resolution, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, pp. 121-142.
41. Touval and Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in...", p. 12. Zartman, "Alternative Attempts at...", pp. 218-219.
42. Rubin, "Introduction", pp. 13-17. Pruitt and Rubin, Social Conflict, Escalation..., pp. 168-169. Louis Kriesberg lists four intermediary roles, namely, enforcer, fact finder, trainer, and mediator. Kriesberg, Louis, Social Conflicts, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982 (2nd ed), pp. 266-270.
43. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity...", p. 15.
44. Jabri, Mediating Conflict, Decision-Making and..., p. 8.

negotiation process which changes a negotiation dyad into a triad, such additional third party functions as bargaining and making concessions emerge.

A part of the mediation literature suggests that the qualities of the third party imply the acceptability of intermediary activities. Young lists two basic qualities: impartiality and independence. He defines both to be perceived qualities. An intermediary is independent when he or she is perceived to be free from attachment to or dependence on a political entity that has a stake in the outcome of the crisis at hand.[45] The question of impartiality as it relates to the issue of acceptance is contested by Touval. She claims that the "theory of the impartial intermediary seems to be incompatible with historical evidence of intermediaries who were considered 'biased' by at least one of the parties, but were nevertheless accepted".[46] Touval's observation has expanded the area of theorising from the roles, functions and qualities of the intermediary to motivations, interests, and three-cornered bargaining processes.[47]

Following the research agenda set by Young, several writers suggest desirable third party attributes and characteristics. For example, Bercovitch mentions such attributes as patience; sincerity; friendliness; sensitivity; capability to accept others, to be non-judgmental and to control self; compassion; and tactfulness.[48] In a similar vein, C. R. Mitchell claims that salient third party qualities include a high degree of professionalism and personal expertise, a high level of independence from the case of conflict being considered, and a lack of any formal and recognised political position.[49] Some texts, on the other hand, shift the attention from qualities to resources and maintain that the control of resources is a major factor which contributes to the ability of the mediator to achieve a favourable outcome or desired objectives. For example, Bercovitch argues that the use of resources affects mediation strategy and

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45. Young, The Intermediaries, pp. 81-83.
46. Touval, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical..." p. 51.
47. For an expanded agenda see: C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb (eds.), New Approaches to International Mediation, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1988.
48. Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties, p. 53.
49. Mitchell, Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role, p. 120.

behaviour as well as the course and likely outcomes of mediation. Resources may include money, status, expertise and prestige.[50]

A clue which helps to put the variety of definitions in a wider context is the recognition that the traditional theorising on third party roles, functions, qualities and resources is influenced by the system-functional type of analysis. It is influenced in the sense that the conflicting parties and the third party are considered to form a system where the third party functions are understood as the activities of an agent accomplishing a purpose within the system. Third party roles, on the other hand, represent the behaviour expected of the occupant of a given position or status in the system. Roles are characterised by certain qualities and activities, and they change according to changes in the system.

1. 3. Model of third party consultation

The fourth main approach to third party intermediary activities can be found in problem-solving conflict resolution. Its roots are largely in social-psychology which emphasises the relationships and interactions between individuals, small groups and societies. The 'third party consultation model', as Ronald Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly call the approach, is a distinctive approach from the approaches introduced above and it can be seen to be an attempt to create an alternative theoretical discourse on conflict resolution. Fisher and Keashly do subsume various developments under the model of third party consultation, but they particularly refer to such writers as John Burton, Leonard Doob and Herbert Kelman.[51]

Despite the attempt to create an alternative discourse, the third party consultation model overlaps with the traditional mediation approaches introduced earlier, namely the 'intermediary actions', 'general conflict resolution theory' and 'negotiation' approaches. The intermediary actions approach generates studies on third party

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50. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity...", pp. 19-21.
51. Fisher, Ronald and Keashly, Loraleigh, "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, p. 29.

tactics and identity, which are also central themes in the third party consultation model. For example, John Burton's Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, A Handbook[52] is devoted to these questions. Seen from the point of view of the general conflict resolution theory approach, problem-solving approaches include or aim at developing a general conflict and conflict resolution theory. However, distinctions from the general conflict resolution theory approach are pointed out, for example, by clarifying the terminology. It is claimed in the third party consultation model that the terms 'settlement', 'management' and 'regulation' refer to short-term solutions. These processes may be appropriate for those cases in which authoritative determinations are required in order to preserve social norms, whereas resolution processes are appropriate when any in-depth analysis of behaviours and relationships is required.[53]

The third party consultation model does not accept the idea of a three-cornered negotiation system as an adequate means for conflict resolution. It is argued that negotiation processes and outcomes reflect the relative power of the parties and, therefore, while there may be a settlement, it is likely to be short-lived as it rests on power relationships remaining static.[54] Similarly, the legal-normative approach is rejected, because it is seen to be based on historical and elite norms which do not reflect norms based on the real needs of the individual.[55]

The third party consultation model discusses widely third party roles, functions and qualities. In terms of third party roles, problem-solving approaches support passive roles. They use the terms 'facilitator' and 'consultant' to refer to a panel which "seeks to help the parties arrive at a common definition of their relationship, define their separate goals clearly, and through facilitated analysis,

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52. Burton, John, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, A Handbook, Lanham: University Press of America, 1987.
53. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., p. 4.
54. Burton, John, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 191. Kelman, Herbert, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", in Mediation in International Relations, Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.), Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1992, pp. 67-68.
55. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., p. 90.

discover options which meet the needs of all".[56] The definition comes close to Zartman's communicator and Laue's mediator which are both characterised by process-oriented interests. Some writers also emphasise the capacity of the facilitator to act as a trainer who assists conflicting parties to learn to analyse their views about the conflict and conflict resolution.

Mitchell gives the facilitator four basic functions. According to him, one of the most important functions is simply to induce initially, and then sustain a sufficiently high level of positive motivation from both parties to confront their conflict with a problem-solving attitude. Having established a sufficient level of motivation to participate in a consultative programme, the next function is the improvement of the communication between adversaries. The third key function is to regulate in some manner the interaction between the participants. The final function, which in all consultative techniques is regarded as a central third party activity, is helping the participants to diagnose their conflict.[57]

Fisher summarises third party qualities in the third party consultant model by claiming that the third party has to have professional and personal expertise, professional knowledge regarding conflict, moderate knowledge regarding parties and their relationship, low power over parties, control over the situation, and he or she has to be impartial.[58] These qualities differ clearly from the qualities of the biased mediator in the mediated negotiation system. In the system the mediator has something at stake in the negotiation process and is, therefore, inclined to use power to control the situation. Moreover, the mediator in the negotiation triad is not and does not necessarily need to be perceived to be impartial. Fisher's summary also hints at the source of the resources the facilitator possesses in

56. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 7.
57. Mitchell, Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role, pp. 122-128.
58. Fisher, Ronald, "Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1972, p. 73.

the problem-solving workshop: the resources derive mainly from his or her professional knowledge and expertise.[59]

The third party consultation model can be summarised by identifying some of its theoretical roots. Most importantly, the model relies on the cooperative tradition in the study of peace and war and, thus, rejects the power tradition.[60] Although many problem-solving approaches challenge the legal-normative approach to conflict resolution, a strong normative element can be found in them. Their normativity does not arise from international law and its rule-oriented ethics, it, rather, arises from the commitment to peace. This commitment to peace, which is analogous to the commitment of the medical profession to the value of health, leads to an utilitarian, or, rather, instrumental and pragmatic relation to knowledge. In other words, it is thought that knowledge drawn from all social sciences should be fully utilised to deal with the intractable problems of the contemporary world. Knowledge and theory are seen to have an intimate as well as instrumental connection to reality.

1. 4. New approaches to conflict resolution and mediation

Even if we accept the view that the approaches to third party intermediary interventions introduced set the agenda for academic studies on mediation, and that the third party consultation model tries to challenge the traditional agenda, still there are studies which cannot be reduced to these categories. There are studies which are different because they are founded on alternative, and often sophisticatedly articulated, views of the nature of reality. At least four types of approaches can be identified from the mediation literature on the basis of their ontological claims. There are studies which emphasise (1) the complexity, (2) the cultural constitution, (3) the gendered nature or (4) the social and discursive construction of

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59. See also: Banks, Michael and Mitchell, C. R., The Resolution of Conflict, A Handbook on the Analytical Problem Solving Approach, Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 1993, pp. 95-97.
60. See: Lawler, "Peace Research and International Relations". Smith, Steve, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1987, pp. 189-206.

reality. Some of these approaches reflect the 'third debate' of IR which challenges the positivist and foundationalist views of social sciences and stresses social, historical, cultural and linguistic constituents of knowledge and reality. Some, on the other hand, rely on older philosophical views, but fruitfully transfer them from philosophy to the field of mediation studies.

(1) The view which notes the complex nature of reality contributes to the mediation literature by suggesting models to analyse dynamic and changing conflict and conflict resolution processes. There are older attempts of model-building (e.g. James Wall's 'mediation paradigm'[61] and Jacob Bercovitch's 'social-psychological framework for the analysis of international mediation'[62]) as well as more recent ones. Among the new attempts Fisher's and Keashly's 'contingency model' considers social conflicts to be processes which create opportunities for different third party interventions. In the model they postulate four stages of conflict escalation and claim that different management and intervention strategies would be appropriate and effective at different points.[63] Similarly, Bercovitch suggests a complex 'framework for the analysis of mediation strategy and behaviour'.[64] Mitchell's process model bears some resemblance to the contingency approach developed by Fisher and Keashly. Mitchell, however, argues that "that some of the 'consultation', 'mediation', or 'coercive intervention' functions might well be carried out concurrently by different third parties", not solely by single institutions as Fisher and Keashly seem to argue.[65]

(2) Several writers desire to demonstrate the importance of culture in conflict and conflict resolution. Their texts differ from the traditional mediation studies, because they do not consider culture to be a secondary variable which influences conflictual and cooperative

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61. Wall, James, Jr., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1981, pp. 157-180.
62. Bercovitch, Jacob, "A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International Conflict Resolution: the Camp David Experience", Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1986, pp. 43-65.
63. Fisher and Keashly, "The Potential Complementarity of...", pp. 29-42.
64. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity...", p. 20.
65. Mitchell, C. R., "The Process and Stages of Mediation, Two Sudanese Cases", in Making War and Waging Peace, David Smock (ed.), Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993, p. 140.

behaviour. Rather, they see culture as constructing reality. Raymond Cohen's Negotiating Across Cultures[66] paves the way to this type of approaches. He challenges an 'universal paradigm of negotiation' by pointing out differences in negotiation styles in different cultures. A step further is taken by Kevin Avruch and Peter Black who argue that culture is constitutive of human reality, and it offers a grammar for acting in and interpreting the world. Since culture produces understandings of conflict and conflict resolution, study of these is an important feature of any fruitful analysis of conflict.[67] Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives[68] is an example of case studies where conflict analysis is understood to include an element of cultural analysis. Marc Ross, on the other hand, claims that "culture shapes what people consider valuable and worth fighting over".[69] By using comparative methods, he examines conflict and violence cross-culturally and identifies psychocultural and structural factors which explain levels of conflict as well as patterns of cooperation. Seminal view-points to culture and conflict resolution are also presented by law scholars. S. Merry[70] and Laura Nader[71] criticise the idea of culture-free mediation and challenge attempts to bracket history and culture from the study of conflict.

(3) The gendered nature of reality as well as conflict and conflict resolution practices are focused on by an increasing number of feminist writers. The 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Washington, D. C. in 1994 included in its section of Peace Studies a subgroup titled "Feminist Interventions in

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66. Cohen, Raymond, Negotiating Across Cultures, Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy, Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.
67. Avruch and Black, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution". Avruch, Kevin and Black, Peter, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and Prospects", in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice, Integration and Application, Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993, pp. 131-145.
68. Avruch, Kevin, Black, Peter and Scimecca, Joseph (eds.), Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1991.
69. Ross, Marc, The Culture of Conflict, Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 22.
70. Merry, "Disputing Without Culture".
71. Nader, Laura, "Some Notes on John Burton's Papers on 'Resolution of Conflict'", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1972, pp. 53-58. Nader, Laura, "Harmony Models and the Construction of Law", in Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Kevin Avruch, Peter Black and Joseph Scimecca (eds.), New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1991, pp. 41-59.

Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution". For example, Terrell Northrup discusses in her paper the points of convergence and departure between conflict theory and feminist theory. She concludes that although conflict and conflict resolution theories and practices seem to be congruent with feminist goals, an analysis based on feminist notions of patriarchy and oppression is needed in order to understand the involvement of power in conflict and conflict resolution processes.[72]

(4) The idea of socially and discursively constructed reality is advocated in some texts on mediation and problem-solving conflict resolution. Anthony de Reuck analyses the notion of the problem-solving workshop by employing Erving Goffman's frame analysis. According to de Reuck, enemies in conflict have mutually exclusive frames of reference which preclude cooperation between them. These are psychological frames which are dependent on persistent patterns of behaviour, i.e., they reflect social structures. de Reuck defines the problem-solving situation to mean the dissolution of conflictual frames and substitution of them by a joint (cooperative) frame.[73] Deborah Kolb draws partly from the same literature as de Reuck and analyses expressive tactics used by mediators. She employs a dramaturgical framework to describe the specific ways mediators create impressions about themselves, their roles, and their abilities, and how these are sustained and supported. Kolb concludes that since mediators often lack formal authority, "much of their influence stems from their expressive management of their expertise, their rapport with the parties, and the parties' perceptions of their contributions to progress and settlement in the current case and in others external to it".[74]

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72. Northrup, Terrell, "Getting to Maybe: The Uneasy Partnership Between Conflict Theory and Feminist Theory", a paper presented at the 35th Annual Convention of International Studies Association, Washington, D. C., 28 March - 1 April 1994.
73. de Reuck, Anthony, "A Theory of Conflict Resolution by Problem-Solving", in Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 186-198.
74. Kolb, Deborah, "To Be a Mediator: Expressive Tactics in Mediation", Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, p. 23. Kolb's data comes from her participant observations over a three-year period in a state agency and a field office of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in the United States. The cases covered both public and private sector disputes.

Benjamin Broome introduces the concept of relational empathy which, according to him, can provide a means for understanding how to effectively manage differences in conflict situations. He refers to hermeneutics and phenomenology and studies such essential issues of conflict resolution as the possibility of the creation of shared meanings, the understanding of intersubjectively produced meanings and the fusion of interpretative horizons. Broome comes close to de Reuck's views by claiming that the development of shared meaning is important in managing conflict, because through it "we increase the prospect for mutual engagement in effective and productive resolution of differences".[75] Sara Cobb and Janet Rifkin, on the other hand, offer a "post-structural perspective on the mediation process, one that addresses the relationship between discourse and social processes and challenges the objectivism at the core of our understandings about mediation and neutrality".[76] They study how mediators produce and support in and through the rhetoric of neutrality dominant ideologies and positions of privilege. In other words, they explore how neutrality as a discursive practice actually functions to obscure the workings of power in mediation and makes invisible the political nature of mediation process.[77] Thus, Cobb and Rifkin contribute to the research agenda demanded by Northrup.

How is this study, then, to be located among the categories of literature identified? Since the thesis focuses on John Burton's conflict resolution theory, it could be placed among the model of third party consultation. However, it finds its proper home among the new and alternative studies on mediation, because it is based on an articulated conception of reality: it arises from the notion of socially and discursively constructed reality. It also takes into account the elements of power in constructing reality. Moreover, the work relies on textual methods characteristic to hermeneutics. Thus, the study bears resemblance to de Reuck's, Broome's and Cobb's and Rifkin's re-

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75. Broome, Benjamin, "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution: The Role of Relational Empathy", in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice, Integration and Application, Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 93.
76. Cobb and Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox", pp. 37-38. Their study is based on more than 30 mediation sessions and 15 interviews with mediators in six community mediation programmes.
77. ibid., pp. 60-61.

conceptualisations of mediation and problem-solving workshop conflict resolution.

2. GENERAL FEATURES AND A COMPARISON OF THREE PILOT PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACHES

2. 1. History and general features

The idea of problem-solving workshops was developed in the early 1960s when there was an increase of interdisciplinary research in social sciences in general, and in IR in particular. Such concepts as 'image', 'misperception', 'interaction', 'cultural understanding' and 'communication' became a more common usage of the scholars in IR. Psychological attempts to explain the perceptions and belief-systems of decision-makers became one of the most important areas of empirical analysis in the field. As Herbert Kelman notes, in the 1960s a growing interest was in identifying the points at which psychological factors - in the form of images and interaction processes - enter into international relations. Given this interest, problem-solving workshops were seen to be one way to operationalise them.[78]

Bringing psychological and social-psychological research into IR was meant to be an alternative to the dominant power politics approach. As John Vasquez demonstrates, the impact of social-psychology began to undercut the hold of the realist paradigm on at least a part of the field in the late seventies. The new approach challenged the realist paradigm by claiming that it may be possible to have a single theory of interpersonal, intergroup and inter-state behaviour, and that the view of international relations as a struggle for power may be incorrect. Power politics was considered to be simply an image of reality, not reality itself. Consequently, nation states were not any more the main focus of the research.[79]

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78. Kelman, Herbert, "Foreword", in Conflict in World Society, A new perspective on international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. xvii-xviii. See also: de Reuck, Anthony, "Controlled Communication: Rationale and Dynamics", The Human Context, Vol. XI, No. 1, 1974, pp. 64-80. Oppenheim, A. N., "Psychological Processes in World Society", in Conflict in World Society, A new perspective on international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, pp. 112-127.

79. Vasquez, John, The Power of Power Politics, A Critique, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983, p. 52 and p. 75.

The idea of problem-solving workshops as a form of international conflict resolution was also influenced by the development of social casework techniques and the conciliation procedures employed in handling industrial[80] and communal conflicts[81] in the 1960s. It was thought that these methods have in common the absence of enforcement and the encouragement of processes of self-adjustment and, therefore, it was assumed that they might be suitable for international conflict resolution too.[82]

The London school's leader, John Burton, organised one week long problem-solving workshops in 1965 and 1966 which paved the way to other practical attempts. In 1965 there was a meeting between nominees of the governments of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia during the violent Borneo dispute. Similarly, there was a meeting in 1966 between nominees of the Greek President and Turkish Vice-President of Cyprus. Both workshops were guided by a group of scholars facilitating face-to-face interactions between the parties.[83] These were followed by Leonard Doob's two week long Fermeda workshop in 1970 which consisted of academics and civil servants from Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya.[84] Two pilot workshops were conducted at Harvard University in 1971 and in 1972. In the first Palestinians and Israelis met over a weekend with a team of social scientists to discuss the conflict in the Middle East.[85] The

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80. Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties, pp. 59-87. See also: Blake, Robert, Shepard, Herbert and Mouton, Jane, Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry, Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1964.
81. See a summary: Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., pp. 54-60. See also Ronald Fisher's list of studies on intergroup conflict resolution: Fisher, Ronald, "Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1983, pp. 308-311. On Quaker conciliation see: Yarrow, C., Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978.
82. de Reuck, "Controlled Communication...", p. 65.
83. Burton, John, Global Conflict, The Domestic Sources of International Crisis, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, p. 160. Burton, John, "Three Qualities of a Secure Nation", in Solutions for a Troubled World, Mark Macy (ed.), Boulder, Colorado: Earthview Press, 1987, pp. 243-247.
84. Doob, Leonard (ed.), Resolving Conflict in Africa, The Fermeda Workshop, New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1970.
85. Cohen, Stephen et al., "Evolving Intergroup Techniques for Conflict Resolution: An Israeli-Palestinian Pilot Workshop", Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1977, p. 166.

second workshop focused on the conflict between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.[86] The Stirling workshop which brought together 56 Catholic and Protestant citizens of Belfast in 1972 was conducted by Doob's Yale team.[87]

Even this limited sample of pilot workshops demonstrates the variety of international problem-solving workshop attempts. It is easy to recognise differences in the number and level of the participants and in the duration of the workshops. However, an empirical comparison of the workshops is difficult, because the principle of confidentiality does not allow the facilitators to publish any detailed descriptions; for example the London school follows the principle of confidentiality strictly. Moreover, since actual workshops take place in a historically specific situation and context, simple empirical comparisons of different workshops and their outcomes may undermine the complexity of historical, societal, economical and cultural factors influencing them. Also the 'theoretical incompatibility' of the workshop approaches makes comparing demanding. The empirical case studies available on problem-solving workshops interpret and construct data according to certain theoretical frameworks. Observations of the behaviour of the participants, of the inputs of the facilitators, and especially the evaluations of the outcomes of the workshops are always filtered through a theoretical framework. All comparisons should, therefore, include a reflective account of the theoretical assumptions on which the compared workshops are based.

Despite these difficulties in comparing and studying actual workshops there seems to be a consensus among facilitators and scholars of many practical arrangements and objectives.[88] The goals

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86. Kelman, Herbert and Cohen, Stephen, "Reduction of International Conflict: An Interactional Approach", in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds.), Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1979, p. 291.

87. Doob, Leonard and Foltz, William, "The Belfast Workshop, An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1973, p. 489.

88. For the general features of problem-solving workshops see such summaries as: Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management... de Reuck, "Controlled Communication...". UNITAR Research Reports, "Social Psychological Techniques and the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes",

of the workshop approaches can be partly derived from the general objectives of action research. By creating a framework within which conflicting parties can generate ideas for creative conflict resolution, researchers become involved in an action programme which offers them the opportunity to make observations of continuing processes of conflict and conflict resolution.[89] The ultimate goal of third party consultation is, especially according to Burton, conflict resolution.[90] Kelman, on the other hand, postulates more moderate objectives. He emphasises that the workshop is designed to promote analytical communication which can be fed back and contributes to the resolution of conflict in a negotiation process.[91]

In some accounts problem-solving workshops are seen to be parallel to official diplomacy and they are also called 'track-two diplomacy'. Second track diplomacy is seen to support official diplomacy by offering a framework for the innovative search for solutions; solutions which lay stress on social-psychological factors of conflict.[92] Despite the emphasis on social-psychology, it is important to keep in mind that problem-solving approaches do not assume that international conflicts are simply products of

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Doob, Leonard (ed.), No. 1, New York, 1979. Fisher, Ronald, "Third Party Consultation: A Method for...". Fisher, "Third Party Consultation as a Method...". Fisher, Ronald, "Developing the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution: Issues in Training, Funding and Institutionalization", a paper presented at the 14th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Helsinki, Finland, July 1-5, 1991. Hill, Barbara, "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques, From Problem-Solving Workshops to Theory", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1982, pp. 109-138. Kelman, Herbert, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution", in Communication in International Politics, Richard Merritt (ed.), Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972, pp. 168-204. Kelman, Herbert, "Interactive Problem-Solving: a Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution", in Conflict: Readings in Management & Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 199-215. Kelman, Herbert and Cohen, Stephen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1976, pp. 79-90. Mitchell, C. R., Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role. This part derives from these sources. The ideas which can be particularly identified with an author are footnoted.

89. Kelman, "Interactive Problem-Solving...", p. 202.

90. Burton, World Society, p. 162.

91. Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", pp. 64-69.

92. Bendahmane, Diane and McDonald, John, Jr., (eds.), Perspectives on Negotiations, Four Case Studies and Interpretations, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1986. McDonald, John, Jr. and Bendahmane, Diane (eds.), Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U. S. Department of State, 1987.

misunderstanding and misperceptions. Rather, these are seen to characterise conflicts and to form substantial barriers to their resolution.

Since problem-solving conflict resolution attempts are founded on the perceived importance of subjective elements in conflicts, the manipulation of psychological and physical environments of the problem-solving workshop is thought to be necessary. The manipulation of the psychological environment is done also through managing the physical environment. Important physical arrangements range from the shape of the table to the location of the workshop. The manipulation is justified by claiming that none of the third party functions or supportive activities can actually be carried out unless the essential physical and social arrangements are present. It is assumed that when the parties are set free from their official and norm-oriented roles by offering them the unofficial, neutral, and relatively isolated setting of the workshop, they will engage in new thinking and behaviour. Kelman and Cohen clarify the notion of 'isolated setting' by claiming the creation of a 'cultural island' with an illusory atmosphere of friendship in which participants are encouraged to forget that they represent communities engaged in a bitter conflict can be negative for the purposes of conflict resolution. The participants should not be allowed to forget the reality of their conflict at any stage of the workshop.[93]

The principle of symmetry should work in all arrangements of the workshop. Symmetrical arrangements, in an ideal case, imply equality in the number of participants, their institutional links, their manner of recruitment, the conditions they are allowed to impose on their participation, the distances they have to travel, and so on. Although it is not always possible to fully carry out the principle, it can be seen to be actualised satisfactorily when the workshop achieves and maintains credibility in the minds of the participants and the groups they represent. It is emphasised that the identification of the participants is one of the most important and demanding tasks of the facilitator. The task is vital, because the selection is an implicit statement about the parties in and the nature of a conflict. In

93. Kelman and Cohen, "Reduction of International Conflict...", p. 299.

addition, the selection of participants is essential, because analytical problem-solving is considered to include intensive work at the level of perceptions, interactions and behaviours of individuals. Since the problem-solving workshop is often both process- and content-oriented, the capability of the participants to provide it with reasonable process and content inputs is important.

Opinions vary as to how close the participants should be to the decision-making processes. Burton and Kelman state that representatives have to be in a relationship with their principals because that enables the transmission of alterations in perceptions to decision-making structures.[94] Contrary to Kelman's and Burton's views, Doob's Fermeda workshop consisted of academics and civil servants who worked in areas unrelated to foreign policy. Similarly, the Stirling workshop, organised by Doob and Foltz, consisted of participants who were not major political figures.[95]

It is generally considered that the mediating body should be a panel of professionally qualified and experienced persons who are not committed to any particular settlement of the conflict, but are "committed to the search for peaceful and just approaches to conflict resolution".[96] According to Burton, it is preferable that those who comprise the facilitating party do not have a specialised knowledge of the area or the parties involved in the dispute.[97] Kelman and Cohen challenge Burton's view. They maintain that more extensive knowledge is necessary for the consultant to grasp the nuances of the analysis and to develop credibility with the participants.[98]

The third party facilitates communication between the parties, and draws upon social-scientific knowledge in interpreting communication, in analysing underlying attitudes and issues, and in injecting new concepts and ideas to the problem-solving process. The

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94. Burton, John, Conflict and Communication. The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1969, p. 41 and p. 45. Kelman and Cohen, "Reduction of International Conflict...", p. 292.
95. Doob, Resolving Conflict in Africa, pp. xii-xiii. Doob and Foltz, "The Belfast Workshop...", p. 496.
96. Kelman and Cohen, "Reduction of International Conflict...", p. 300.
97. Burton, World Society, pp. 159-160.
98. Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop...", p. 81.

facilitative, non-judgmental and diagnostic third party is supposed to create an atmosphere where the discussion can be raised to a higher system level from which it can flow back into constructive channels to the dispute in question. In terms of third party identity, there is a consensus about the necessity of third party impartiality and neutrality.

2. 2. Theoretical comparison of three pilot problem-solving workshop approaches

A comparison of three problem-solving approaches reveals that the Harvard group led by Kelman emphasises that international conflicts are not simply products of misunderstanding and misperception. Real conflicts of interest or competing definitions of national interests are often, according to Kelman, at the centre of disputes. Although conflicts are not caused solely by subjective factors, face-to-face communication in problem-solving workshops is important because it is a preparation for diplomatic and political negotiations where a conflict can be resolved. In other words, the workshop approach can have significant impact at those points in the policy process at which individual perceptions and attitudes play a determining role. Since most conflicts involve real clashes of interests, ideologies and structural commitments, the problem of transferring personal changes to the policy processes remains critical.[99]

According to Doob's Yale group, when a problem-solving workshop obliges participants to "look within themselves and their own experiences to understand their reactions to pressure and conflict", such understanding would facilitate changes in behaviour back home.[100] Thus, the problem-solving workshops of the Yale group are expected to produce perceptional, attitudinal and behavioural changes through development of self-awareness and awareness of others. The

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99. Kelman, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution", p. 169. Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop...", p. 79. Kelman and Cohen, "Reduction of International Conflict...", p. 301.
100. Doob and Foltz, "The Belfast Workshop...", pp. 493-497. Doob, Leonard, "A Cyprus Workshop: An Exercise in Intervention Methodology", The Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 94, 1975, pp. 161-178.

underlying assumption is that knowledge of self and circumstances can be applied to bring more control. Control, in turn, is thought to generate conflict management and cooperation in real life situations. However, Doob and Foltz doubt the possibilities of conflict resolution through the workshop approach. They note about the Stirling workshop that "we never dreamed that any workshop involving persons from Northern Ireland could ultimately resolve the destructive conflict there".[101]

Two distinct phases of development are perceptible in the Burtonian approach. Conflict and Communication[102] represents a communication framework and Deviance, Terrorism and War[103], on the other hand, consists of a fully developed human needs framework which is, to some extent, founded upon sociobiological premises[104]. The communication framework includes a 'triangular conflict theory'. The theory postulates three interrelated causes of conflict. It assumes that in a society where the demands of individuals are not fulfilled, the situation is perceived to be unjust. Perceived injustice and misperceptions may lead to ineffective communication and, finally, to conflict. Conflicts occur first at a domestic level and, then, spill-over to an international sphere. In this view, all three elements of conflict - needs, perceptions and communication - have to be dealt with in conflict resolution processes.

John Burton's needs theory holds the origin of conflict in such human needs as participation, identity and security which will be pursued by individuals regardless of the consequences to self or system. If the institutions obstruct the fulfilment of needs, conflict will result. In other words, international conflicts arise from the failings of

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101. Doob and Foltz, "The Belfast Workshop...", p. 492.
102. London: Macmillan, 1969.
103. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. See also: Burton, John "Conflict Resolution as a Function of Human Needs", in The Power of Human Needs in World Society, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati (eds.), Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. 187-204.
104. In fairness to other writers within the Burtonian approach, it should be noted that A. J. R. Groom and C. R. Mitchell have developed the needs theory in a non-deterministic and non-biological direction. Groom, A. J. R., "No Compromise: Problem-Solving in a Theoretical Perspective", International Social Science Journal, Vol. XLIII, No. 1, 1991, pp. 77-86. Mitchell, C. R. "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions about Basic Human Needs Theory", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 149-176.

domestic systems to provide for the needs of people. Conflict resolution within the problem-solving framework, therefore, involves differentiating interests from needs by identifying universal needs, improving communication, and deducing alterations in structures and institutions in order to fulfil the needs identified in the process.[105]

In terms of problem-solving techniques, the Yale group uses mainly two methods which can be subsumed under the categories of 'National Training Laboratory' (NTL) and 'Tavistock approach'. They are both experimental methods enabling participants to learn about psychological processes. The T-group (T for training) method can be considered to be a subgroup of NTL. In T-groups participants are expected to mobilise problem-solving behaviour. The task of a trainer (facilitator) is, therefore, to arrange the environment in groups in such a way that learning can take place in a collaborative growth-oriented environment which differs from the everyday competitive, survival-oriented environment the participants face back home. In T-groups members can learn about themselves, interpersonal relations, groups, and social systems. The often repeated phrase is that they can 'learn how to learn'.[106]

More precisely, at the Fermeda workshop the Yale group utilised a sensitivity training technique, which consisted of a series of small T-group sessions. In these the focus was on relatively free expression of feelings and interaction.[107] The Stirling workshop, on

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105. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 80-81. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", pp. 195-199.

106. Appley, Dee and Winder, Alvin, T-Groups and Therapy Groups in a Changing Society, London, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973, p. 85 and p. 91. See more on T-groups: Bradford, Leland, Gibb, Jack and Benne, Kenneth, "Preface", in T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne (eds.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. vii-x. Benne, Kenneth, Bradford, Leland and Lippitt, Ronald, "The Laboratory Method", in T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne (eds.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. 15-44.

107. The Fermeda workshop used T-groups in its first phase. In its second phase the general assembly was formed with the aim of achieving a joint solution. Doob, Resolving Conflict in Africa, pp. 9-11 and pp. 119-124. Foltz, William, "Two Forms of Unofficial Conflict Intervention: The Problem-Solving and the Process-Promoting Workshops", in Unofficial Diplomats, Maureen Berman and Joseph Johnson (eds.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. 204-208. See also a critique of the method as it was used in the Fermeda workshop: Eshete, Andreas, "Appraisal by an Ethiopian" in Resolving Conflict

the other hand, used a combination of Tavistock and NTL training. The Tavistock approach is not only concerned with the 'here and now' events, but also the 'there and then' regressive forces which constantly obtrude into the otherwise productive functioning of the group.[108] Learning in the Tavistock approach highlights such issues as authority, power and leadership. The Yale group argues that self-knowledge concerning these issues could be the initial step toward discovering ways through which communities might conceivably live together.[109]

Compared with the methods used at the Fermeda workshop by the Yale team, the Harvard group employs the laboratory method, but does not use solely T-groups nor sensitivity training techniques. Since the Harvard school emphasises intergroup processes, it claims to require some additional methods and techniques. The techniques the team utilises in their 'interactional analysis' include structured group-oriented interventions, such as role reversal. Workshop participants are also divided into smaller groups that could work separately, and they are encouraged to engage in conflict fractionation exercises. Although the methods are not pure training methods, they involve participants in learning processes. Kelman and Cohen claim that learning, for example, a common language and symbol system can foster a vocabulary of de-escalation.[110]

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in Africa, Leonard Doob (ed.), New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970, pp. 85-103.

108. de Maré, P. B., Perspectives in Group Psychotherapy. A Theoretical Background, London: Allen & Unwin, 1972, p. 73.

109. Doob and Foltz, "The Belfast Workshop...", pp. 500-502. Alevy, Daniel et al., "Rationale, Research, and Role Relations in the Stirling Workshop", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1974, pp. 276-284. Foltz, "Two Forms of Unofficial...", pp. 201-221. The Tavistock design has been criticised, because participants are put through what is essentially group psychoanalysis. A group of persons who were involved in organising the Stirling workshop writes about the method: "For some individuals, there can be no denying, this can be a very illuminating process, but inevitably involving the kind of punishing self-analysis which is the basis of psychoanalysis. The value of introducing psychoanalytic techniques into a foreign culture and unfamiliar situation is at the very least questionable". Boehringer, G. H. et al. "Stirling, The Destructive Application of Group Techniques to a Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1974, p. 266.

110. Kelman, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in...", p. 194. Kelman and Cohen, "Reduction of International Conflict...", pp. 291-295.

The method used by the Burtonian approach can be traced back to two origins, namely T-group and social casework methods. Casework techniques in social work, with their underlying psychoanalytic origin, consist of a wide range of activities.[111] Their ultimate goal is to develop in the individual the fullest possible capacity for self maintenance in a social group. However, the Burtonian approach does not claim that states are maladjusted individuals with whom a facilitator works. Rather, the London school is interested in the supportive approach of the caseworker and the professional relationships between the participants and the consultant involved in psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and group therapy.[112] In sum, the London group uses the same methods as the other groups, but the introduction of some elements from social casework clarifies the relationship between the facilitator and the participants .

The pilot problem-solving schools are founded upon the idea of analytical learning in an atmosphere where the participants can be set free from their everyday roles. However, the teams disagree what should be learned and at what level. At the workshops of the Harvard and London groups, learning is oriented also toward a content, whereas at the Yale group workshops it is mainly oriented toward group processes. The Yale group uses such concepts as 'emotions' and 'feelings', whereas the other two schools avoid this kind of discourse. The Yale group maintains that the expression of personal emotions is an integral part of conflict resolution in the workshop. The London and Harvard schools, on the other hand, do not consider it to be important, because they want to emphasise the intergroup nature of conflicts. Especially, the Harvard group focuses on the intergroup level and, therefore, criticises the focus of the Yale group on the interpersonal aspects.

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111. On social casework see: Younghusband, Eileen (ed.), New Developments in Casework, Readings in Social Work, Vol. II, London: Allen & Unwin, 1966.
112. Burton, Conflict and Communication, p. ix and pp. 66-69.

2. 3. Philosophical and social-psychological assumptions

An analysis of the stated objectives and the nature of parties and intermediaries in the problem-solving workshops reveals that there is a strong belief in rationality. Since subjective elements are considered to play an important part in every conflict and to form an obstacle to conflict resolution, it is thought that these elements have to be tackled in a rational way. It is assumed that human beings are capable of rational thinking and acting when an appropriate framework is offered. Problem-solving workshops are supposed to offer a framework for conflicting parties for scrutinising the nature of their relationships and for analysing the ultimate roots of their differences. The analysis is expected to take place by exercising both instrumental reasoning about means to ends and discursive reasoning[113] about definitions and values.

Moreover, social scientists are assumed to represent instrumental knowledge and rationality *par excellence*. With this knowledge they are supposed to be capable of social engineering within a problem-solving framework. In practice, they engage in social engineering by manipulating the setting and structure of the workshop; by choosing the participants; by acting themselves as intermediaries; and by controlling the conceptualisations of the conflict. There is an implicit assumption in problem-solving approaches that the control of an environment - that is, managing inevitable changes at all levels of the physical and social world - for example, in the form of problem-solving workshops is an integral part of human rationality. The Enlightenment idea of universal man who is essentially rational and who, because of the rationality, is determined to control social as well as natural environments is, thus, fundamental for this problem-solving ideology.

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113. Discursive rationality refers to interaction, where individuals construct and interpret the identities of themselves and others. The aim is neither the control nor the selection of means to an end, but the generation of normative judgements and action principles. Dryzek, John, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. The concept will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

Social engineering and instrumental rationality coincide with the principles of (neo)behaviouralism.[114] Behaviouralism is concerned with the under-utilisation of the social and behavioural sciences in practical affairs. It is based on an uncritical trust in the existence of objective scientific facts and in their value in solving practical problems. Universalising tendencies in the spirit of behaviouralism can be found in the traditional view of problem-solving. The conception of universal rationality leads problem-solving workshop approaches to assume that the methods used in workshops are suitable to all cultural contexts. The approaches consist also of an element of emancipatory interest. The emancipatory interest manifests itself in a wish to create non-distorted and reciprocal communication which generates emancipation from domination and, finally, helps men to achieve rational autonomy. It is assumed that the process of emancipation is forwarded by the 'therapeutic' methods employed in the workshop.

The relation between individual and society is at the theoretical centre of some problem-solving approaches. The founders of laboratory methods saw the group as the link between the individual person and the larger social structure: the group was assumed to facilitate change in the larger social structures upon which individual lives depend. In other words, the emphasis was neither psychological nor sociological, neither the individual nor the social group, but their interplay.[115] Kelman states clearly the importance of this interplay. According to him, workshop groups are designed to produce change in individuals as a vehicle for change in policies and actions of the political system.[116]

Laboratory methods are influenced by system theory and, especially, by its notion of feedback. Due to this influence, a workshop group is considered to form a system where transactions take place. It is thought that participants get feedback from other participants and

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114. See more on the relation between laboratory methods and behaviouralism: Bradford, Leland, Gibb, Jack and Benne, Kenneth, "Two Educational Innovations", in T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb and Kenneth Benne (eds.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. 8-10.
115. ibid., p. 5. de Maré, Perspectives in Group Psychotherapy, p. 21.
116. Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", p. 86.

from facilitators, and this feedback can serve to steer subsequent behaviour. Feedback is, thus, considered to be a stimulus which is responded to by a participant.[117] There is an idea of open systems in the type of system theories which form a basis for group therapy (and laboratory methods). Structures, within a group or in an environment, are seen to be "continuously opened and restructured by the problem-solving behaviour of the individuals experiencing and responding to concrete situations".[118]

All methods employed by problem-solving workshop approaches are based on theoretical and philosophical premises including an image of human 'being' and human behaviour. These premises are transferred to problem-solving workshops, to practices, by utilising different techniques. Moreover, the methods imply what is seen to be conflict resolution. For example, if the method used focuses on learning, the techniques chosen by the facilitator encourage the participants to conceptualise the workshop situation in terms of learning. Thus, what is considered to be the resolution of conflict is something which involves learning. On the other hand, if a content-oriented technique, for example through theoretical inputs, encourages the participants to see the conflict situation in the light of universal human needs, the settlement is supposed to tackle these basic needs. In other words, the methods set the framework within which the settlement can take place. The idea of the neutrality of the problem-solving methods and techniques suggested, for example, by the UNITAR report[119] is thus incorrect.

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117. Benne, Bradford and Lippitt, "The Laboratory Method", pp. 24-25. Lakin, Martin, Experiential Groups: The Uses of Interpersonal Encounter, Psychotherapy Groups, and Sensitivity Training, Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1972, p. 10.
118. de Maré, Perspectives in Group Psychotherapy, p.142.
119. UNITAR Research Reports, p. 21.

CHAPTER III: JOHN BURTON'S VERSION OF HUMAN NEEDS THEORY

There is a long tradition of human needs thinking in Western philosophy and social sciences. A starting-point for many theories is biology; needs are assumed to arise from man's biological nature. It is also argued that since needs are something biological, they are universal. Several theorists have tried to identify the most fundamental needs and have produced lists which have often only added to the number of needs considered to be essential. There are clearly two categories of needs which theorists have deduced: 'physiological' needs which are seen to be vital for living organisms to survive and 'psychological' needs which are assumed to contribute to general human welfare.

All these issues are challenged in a needs debate. It is claimed that all lists intended to identify needs are subjective, and potentially endless. Since there is no empirical evidence to support needs thinking, the lists are bound to remain subjective. Moreover, there cannot ever be any empirical evidence, because the concept of need cannot be operationalised. Since it cannot be operationalised, needs theories cannot be verified. Even worse, as Popper would point out, the concept is not falsifiable. It is also asked whether we know according to any objective criteria when needs are satisfied. In other words, there may be different degrees of needs satisfaction. The differentiation of needs from their satisfiers is also unclear, it is said, in many needs theories. Although needs are assumed to be universal, the satisfiers could still be seen to be culturally constituted. All these considerations are seminal and contribute to the discussion of needs. This thesis, however, directs its critique solely towards the ideas of biological nature and universality of needs: the needs ideology will be challenged from a social constructionist point of view in the second part of the work.

John Burton's texts include a version of human needs thinking. What is particular to the version is that it forms the very core of his conflict and conflict resolution theory. The chapter studies Burton's needs theory and locates his version of theory in a wider tradition of

thinking. Both points of convergence and departure between needs theories and Burton's version are pointed out. The study is mainly conducted by employing an analysis of metaphors: Burton's theory is treated as a narrative whose power is based on metaphors. By studying them, an understanding of the assumptions underlying Burton's thinking is achieved.

1. HUMAN NEEDS THEORY

1. 1. Examples of human needs thinking

Although there is a vast literature on human needs, there is no consistent research programme. In other words, several versions of human needs theory exist. Common to most of them is, as noted above, the postulation of certain universal needs rooted in the biological conditions of man. Thus, the idea of human needs provides a foundation for certain types of assumptions about human nature. John Burton's view that the human needs approach is not ideological is not correct.[1] The approach is ideological, as are all social scientific constructs, because it includes a contestable image of human 'being' and human nature.

Two intellectual traditions in Western thinking have explicitly adopted the human needs approach to understand political phenomena. First, the concept of human needs receives considerable attention in the area of political theory. Human needs is a central concept in the language of Stoicism, classical tragedy, Augustinian Christianity, Enlightenment discourse and Marxism.[2] More recently, development

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1. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 30-35. Burton, John, "The Rôle of Authorities in World Society", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1979, pp. 78-79.
2. On the traditions of Liberalism, Marxism and Gandhism see: Roy, Ramashray, "Three Visions of Needs and the Future: Liberalism, Marxism, and Gandhism", in Power of Human Needs in World Society, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati (eds.), Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. 59-76. For a comprehensive account of needs thinking in political theory see: Springborg, Patricia, The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilization, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

studies discuss the notion of needs.[3] There are efforts to identify minimal standards of basic human needs, to determine levels of human needs deprivation, and to recommend how such needs can be satisfied.[4]

For Abraham Maslow the theory of human needs is a theory of the ends and ultimate values of an organism. Seen from the point of view of behavioural sciences, needs are organisers of behaviour. Maslow's well-known hierarchy of needs[5] includes such needs as physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem needs, and a need for self-actualisation. He claims that when the physiological needs are satisfied, higher needs emerge. An often forgotten element in Maslow's needs theory is that the hierarchy is by no means meant to be rigid. In other words, it allows a range of variations in needs satisfaction.[6] Maslow's views can be interpreted to have some direct relevance to conflict analysis, since he writes: "If it is easy to accept basic needs frustration as one determinant of hostility, it is quite easy to accept the opposite of frustration (i.e., basic need

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3. See, for example: Ghosh, Pradip (ed.), Third World Development: A Basic Needs Approach, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984. Lisk, Franklyn, "Conventional Development Strategies and Basic Needs Fulfilment", International Labour Review, Vol. 115, No. 2, 1977, pp. 175-191. Streeten, Paul, "From Growth to Basic Needs", Finance and Development, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1979, pp. 28-31. Streeten, Paul and Burki, Shahid "Basic Needs: Some Issues", World Development, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1978, pp. 411-421. van Weigel, B., "The Basic Needs Approach: Overcoming the Poverty of *Homo oeconomicus* ", World Development, Vol. 14, No. 12, 1986, pp. 1423-1434.

4. Coate, Roger and Rosati, Jerel, "Human Needs in World Society", in Power of Human Needs in World Society, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati (eds.), Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. pp. 3-4.

5. Maslow's list is a foundation for many accounts of needs in the current needs debate. For example, Johan Galtung mentions security needs, welfare needs, identity needs and freedom needs. Oscar Nudler assumes the need for identity, the need to growth and the need to transcend to be fundamental. Joseph Scimecca reduces all needs to the needs of self-reflectivity and freedom. Galtung, Johan, "The Basic Needs Approach", in Basic Needs. A Contribution to the Current Debate, Katrin Lederer (ed.), Cambridge, MA.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain; Königstein/Ts: Verlag Anton Hain, 1980, p. 66. Nudler, Oscar, "Human Needs: A Sophisticated Holistic Approach", in Basic Needs. A Contribution to the Current Debate, Katrin Lederer (ed.), Cambridge, MA.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain; Königstein/Ts: Verlag Anton Hain, 1980, pp. 143-147. Scimecca, Joseph, "Self-reflectivity and Freedom: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Conflict Resolution", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 205-218.

6. Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper & Row, 1970 (3rd ed), pp. 15-26; p. 30 and pp. 35-36.

gratification) as an *a priori* determinant of the opposite of hostility (i.e., friendliness)."[7]

According to Paul Sites, on the other hand, human needs are related to social control. In Sites' view, individuals attempt to control the physical world in order to gratify their biological needs. Sites lists in his Control: The Basis of Social Order[8] eight basic needs: a need for response, a need for security, a need for recognition, a need for stimulation, a need for distributive justice, a need for meaning, a need to be seen as rational and rationality itself and a need to control. Needs are essential in becoming a human being in Sites' account. He maintains that the primordial priority of needs stems from primary emotions which are prerequisites of the survival of the physiological organism and psychological self. Given this essentiality of needs, the influence of needs is many times stronger than the influence of the social forces which play upon man. Also Sites theory has got an element of political theory. He argues that the satisfaction and deprivation of individual human needs are the key sources of societal order and change. He assumes that many persons will fight and die to protect values related to needs gratification.[9]

Similarly, James MacGregor Burns studies the significance of needs gratification for political processes. According to him, needs for food, security, sex and the higher needs suggested by Maslow have to be gratified if a society is to be harmonious. Burns considers needs as 'wellsprings of political leadership'. Leadership arises from the capacity of a leader to induce followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations - the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations - of both leaders and followers.[10]

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7. ibid., p. 36.
8. Sites, Paul, Control: The Basis of Social Order, New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1973.
9. ibid., p. 3; p. 9; p. 11 and p. 43. Sites, Paul, "Legitimacy and Human Needs", in Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 117-144. Sites, Paul, "Needs as Analogues of Emotions", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 7-33.
10. Burns, James MacGregor, "Wellsprings of Political Leadership", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXXI, No. 1, 1977, pp. 266-275.

These three writers illuminate some typical trends in a branch of needs thinking. They all reduce the origin of human needs to biology. Since needs are seen to derive from the biological nature of the human being, they are also considered to be the primary motivations of human behaviour. Given that needs motivate behaviour, they relate to the social world too. The value given to needs satisfaction is assumed to provide a foundation for either social stability or disorder. In other words, a linkage between needs satisfaction and social harmony is established in the theories.[11]

Human needs thinking can be summarised by claiming that it postulates an idea of 'metaphysical originality'. According to the idea, there is something given in the human condition, for example, subconscious, emotions or human needs. The given is considered to be something original and authentic, and human nature is seen to have its main ground on this originality. The original human condition, for example characterised by human needs, is claimed to have priority over other conditioning factors of man's 'being-in-the-world'. Metaphysical originality is also used as a point of reference in scientific explanations concerning human beings. For example, human behaviour is derived from human needs by interpreting human needs as motivations of behaviour.[12]

1. 2. John Burton's functionalist view of human needs

John Burton's needs theory has several similarities with the needs theories introduced above. Burton also reduces the origin of needs to biology. He considers human beings to be determined to satisfy their needs, and postulates a linkage between needs satisfaction and social harmony.

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11. See more on the linkage: Roy, Ramashray, "Social Conflicts and Needs Theories", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 126.
12. Avruch and Black discuss the idea by employing a psychoanalytic metaphor. According to them, the psychoanalytic metaphor postulates an image of a manifest content that overlies - masks and distorts - a latent content. For example, human needs can be seen to be a fundamental stratum of the person which acts as the 'engine' that motivates behaviour. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 224.

In World Society[13] the notion of socio-biological values are developed by Burton.[14] His claim is that "people of all races and creeds have some common values and similar objectives".[15] The common denominator in different branches of social sciences and the common explanatory factor for human behaviour at different levels of behaviour can be found in universal socio-biological values. Socio-biological values are, according to Burton, the preferences of people, the drives that finally underpin or destroy institutions. These values are closely related to, if not direct expressions of, biological drives and motivations.[16]

A fully developed universalistic and biologically based human needs theory is presented in Burton's and Sandole's 'generic theory of human needs'. According to them, a generic theory implies an explanation that transcends observable differences in human behaviour. It is a theory which is universal and applies to all social levels. Burton's and Sandole's theory argues that there are fundamental drives and motivations that cannot be repressed. The drives and motivations are based on universal and genetic basic needs - such as drives for identity, development, meaning and consistency in response - and they direct human behaviour. Furthermore, in Burton's and Sandole's view, there can be no long-lasting and authentic social stability unless the basic needs satisfaction of individuals is met.[17]

Burton establishes his generic theory of needs by employing the methodological principle of abduction. For him abduction implies a trust in an original personal hypothesis from which deductions flow.

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13. Lanham: University Press of America, 1987.
14. In Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules Burton discusses the needs of systems and states and the wants of people. He notes that all individuals as well as national groups want to participate fully in decision-making and in the control of their environment. In Conflict and Communication the idea of human needs is still vague. Burton argues that fear and threat, denial of participation rights, perceived injustice, disappointment in expectations are the typical origins of conflict behaviour. Moreover, he considers the legitimisation of an authority to rest upon performance in the satisfaction of human values. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy, and Rules, pp. 22-23; p. 27; p. 134 and p. 136. Burton, Conflict and Communication, p. 24; p. 32; p. 38 and pp. 90-91.
15. Burton, World Society, p. 124. Burton lists in the book (ibid., p. 128) such socio-biological values as freedom, self-determination, group integrity, equal opportunities in education and employment, and the preservation of cultures and identity.
16. ibid., pp. 123-136.
17. Burton, John and Sandole, Dennis, "Generic Theory: The Basis of Conflict Resolution", Negotiation Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1986, pp. 333-344.

He maintains that abduction is vital, because rarely can there be realistic testing in politics. As the idea of abduction suggests, the emphasis on improving theory is more important than the processes of verification and falsification.[18]

A logic of functional analysis can be found in Burton's version of needs theory. Burton assumes that human needs will be pursued regardless of consequences. In every society there are, however, elite groups which gain most through the maintenance of *status quo* and, therefore, resist the demands of the needs satisfaction of other groups in the society.[19] Burton calls the phenomenon of resistance 'role defence'. He assumes that if the institutional values, which often reflect the interests of elites, do not fully allow the satisfaction of human needs of all groups in the society, conflict will emerge. Conflict may cause structural changes which weaken the elite positions.[20] Thus, it is maintained that unless elite groups or authorities allow the satisfaction of needs, they are not functional for the society, i.e. they do not contribute to its survival, because human needs satisfaction is the ultimate prerequisite for the stable existence of society. According to the logic, the functionality of authorities is dependent on the functionality of human needs fulfilment.

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18. See: Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 19-20 and p. 256. The term 'abduction' as it is originally used by C. S. Peirce suggests that "while Induction is the inference of the Rule from a Case and a Result, Hypothesis [abduction] is the inference the Case from a Rule and a Result". Eco, Umberto "Horns, Hooves, Insteps, Some Hypotheses on Three Types of Abduction", in The Sign of Three, Dupin, Holmes, Peirce, Umberto Eco and Thomas Sebeok (ed.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983, p. 203.
19. Burton notes that no blame can be attributed either to persons or elites as a group. They seek to pursue their interests within existing structures and institutions, and in the absence of real alternatives their interests are in maintaining existing institutional arrangements. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 35-36.
20. Burton, John, "Theory and Reality", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1975, pp. 258-259. Burton, John, "The Dynamics of Change in World Society", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1976, pp. 75-77. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 140-150. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 19. Burton, John, "The History of International Conflict Resolution", in International Conflict Resolution, Theory and Practice, Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986, p. 53. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 19. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 203. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 55-57.

This functional and instrumental view of society implies that if social forms do not satisfy individual needs, they must be changed. As Ramashray Roy points out, the underlying typically liberal views maintain that the individual is prior to society, society is created by individuals and society exist to serve individual purposes.[21] Although functionalist theories tend to stress the fulfilment of needs as leading to harmony and Burton stresses the non-fulfilment of needs as leading to conflict, the logic of a functional type of explanation prevails in Burton's needs theory.[22]

Similarly, problem-solving conflict resolution is seen in Burton's theory as a steering mechanism whose ultimate function is to contribute to the survival of the society. The survival is brought about through controlling and managing change, i.e. through non-cataclysmic change. According to Burton, problem-solving processes help parties in a conflict to cost accurately the consequences of change and the resistance to change. For Burton, "the processes of facilitated conflict resolution are designed to cut down the delays and upheavals that occur in change and to speed up the evolutionary process toward greater fulfilment of societal needs".[23] Steering of a society takes place within the framework set by the satisfaction of human needs. As noted earlier, if there is a tension between human needs and institutions, it is change in institutions that is necessary. Thus, the focus in Burton's needs as well as conflict theory is on the individual unit: the needs of the unit determine the effective operation of the social system of which it is a part.[24]

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21. Roy, "Three Visions of Needs....", p. 74.
22. For the functionalist logic see also: Avruch, Kevin and Black, Peter, "A Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Critique", Negotiation Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1987, pp. 93-94.
23. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 203. See also: Burton, "Theory and Reality", p. 259. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 213. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 112. Burton, "The History of...", p. 53.
24. Chris Brown's criticism is accurate at this point. He writes: "Groups, even states, enter Burton's world but they do so as forums within which individuals act; there is no sense of groups or states acting as they do in response to a structural logic distinct from the wills or intentions of their component parts." Brown, Chris, "International Theory: New Directions?", Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1981, p. 180. The ideas of function and steering are also an integral part of Burton's thinking. The scope of the thesis does not include those issues. For the issues see particularly: Burton, Peace Theory. Burton, International Relations.

2. METAPHORS AND THESES OF NEEDS THINKING

2. 1. Medical metaphor and a thesis of alienation

It should be emphasised that in Burton's view human needs as such do not lead to conflict, rather, conflict emerges from the frustration caused by unfulfilled needs. Human needs are, thus, seen to be something original and constructive in the sense that they include a potential for harmonious society. Institutional arrangements of a society may temporarily destroy the originality, and conflict arises. Deviance and dysfunctional violent conflicts are assumed to be symptoms of deeper problems in the society, manifestations of conflicts between human needs and structures. In other words, conflicts are political manifestations of system failures, the failures of a domestic system to provide the needs of people.[25]

The implicit medical metaphor in Burton's theory insinuates that dysfunctional conflicts and deviant behaviour are signs, like physical symptoms, of something else, of diseases. Thus, conflict, as symptoms of a disease, as such is not malign since it is merely a sign of system failings.[26] In order to understand how conflict can be a symptom, two things have to be kept in mind. First, conflict is considered to be endemic. Second, it is assumed that functional conflicts can be differentiated from dysfunctional ones, or, at least, the functional value of conflict from its dysfunctional consequences.[27] Since conflicts are endemic, the aim is to retain

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25. See: Burton, Global Conflict, p. 48. Burton, World Society, p. 143. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 195. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 247-248.

26. For an explicit use of the medical metaphor in the Burtonian tradition see: Banks, Michael, "Four Conceptions of Peace", in Conflict Management and Problem Solving: From Interpersonal to International Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, pp. 269-271.

27. Lewis Coser lists such as group-binding, group-preserving and internal cohesion increasing functions of conflict. Coser is criticised, because he overemphasises the normative order of the society. For the functionality of conflict see: Coser, Lewis, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956. Coser, Lewis, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, New York: The Free Press, 1967. Mitchell, C. R., "Evaluating Conflict", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1980, pp. 61-75. For a critique see: Sites, Control, pp. 95-96.

conflict which has functional value and "to control it so as to avoid perversions which are destructive of human enjoyment and widely held social interests".[28]

The medical metaphor and analogy have a long tradition in Western thinking. A general medical analogy of society and statesman can be found, for example, in Plato's Statesman[29]. According to Plato, the doctor cannot be challenged so long as he acts for the physical welfare of his patients, and by analogy the statesman cannot be challenged so long as he acts for the common social welfare of the citizens he governs. Plato considers the statesman as a specialist who practises an art upon a whole community of non-specialists. Plato seems to suggest that the statesman can have expertise about values. A true statesman has an insight into the nature of reality which, in turn, gives him moral strength to govern.[30]

The medical metaphor of conflict, on the other hand, has its roots in Talcott Parsons' sociology. He considers conflict to be primarily a disease. Conflict appears to Parsons as a partly avoidable, partly inevitable and endemic form of sickness in the body social. Similarly, Lewis Coser's idea of conflict relies on the metaphor. For example, in his discussion on the civil rights movement of the Afro-Americans in America in the 1960s, Coser notes that the riots in Los Angeles "indicate a sickness in the body social which demands immediate remedy if it is not to undermine social order altogether".[31]

The metaphor can be found in Maslow's texts too. He, like Burton, entertains the idea that deviance of an individual can be caused by a society. Maslow writes:

> "If we were to use the word *sick* in this way, we should then also have to face squarely the relation of people to their society. One clear implication of our definition would be that (1) since a person is to be called sick who is basically

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28. Burton, World Society, p. 138.
29. Plato, Statesman, J. B. Skemp (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952.
30. ibid., § 293b-293e, pp. 194-195. Skemp, J. B., "Introduction", in Plato, Statesman, J. B. Skemp (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 40-51.
31. Coser, Continuities in the Study..., p. 87. See also: Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 21-23.

thwarted, and (2) since such basic thwarting is made possible ultimately only by forces outside the individual, then (3) sickness in the individual must come ultimately from a sickness in the society. The good society would then be defined as one that permitted people's highest purposes to emerge by satisfying all their basic needs."[32]

Although Maslow does not explicitly relate unfulfilled needs to conflict, the medical metaphor in his text is powerful. It creates an image of sick society which is capable of producing defeated and alienated individuals.

If conflict is a sign, what is the disease? The disease in the body social is alienation. The notion of alienation has also a long tradition in Western thinking.[33] The term can be best understood through its negative connotations. The theological use of alienation established a meaning by speaking about isolation of human from God. Kant, on the other hand, took a first step to build a link between alienation and reification. The link imputes a negative value-judgement on the objectifying process of economic transfers.[34] Durkheim's description of anomie, which can be interpreted as alienation, brings in social norms. For Durkheim, anomie is a situation in which the social norms

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32. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 31.

33. For the notion of alienation see: Barakat, Halim, "Alienation: A Process of Encounter between Utopia and Reality", The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 20, 1969, pp. 1-10. Israel, Joachim, Alienation, From Marx to Modern Sociology, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971. Mizruchi, Ephraim, "An Introduction to the Notion of Alienation", in Alienation: Concept, Term, and Meanings, Frank Johnson (ed.), New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. 111-124. Schacht, Richard, Alienation, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971. For a criticism of alienation theses see: Denise, Theodore, "The Concept of Alienation: Some Critical Notices", in Alienation: Concept, Term, and Meanings, Frank Johnson (ed.), New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. 141-160. For seminal accounts of alienation see: Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955 (originally published 1651), chapter XIV. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality", in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, G. D. H. Cole (trans.), London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1973 (originally published 1755), pp. 66-75. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract, Maurice Cranston (ed.), London: Penguin Books, 1968 (originally published 1762), Book I.

34. Der Derian, On Diplomacy, p. 15 and p. 20. Johnson, Frank, "Alienation: Overview and Introduction", in Alienation: Concept, Term, and Meanings, Frank Johnson (ed.), New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. 6-7.

regulating individual conduct have broken down or are no longer effective as rules for behaviour.[35]

The human needs narrative of Burton postulates a version of the alienation thesis. The thesis consists of the idea of human needs as something original which cannot be suppressed. However, values imposed by institutions may try to alienate individuals from their human values, separate people from their needs and the metaphysical originality constituted by needs. As Burton explicitly argues, "alienation occurs in any system, if in practice, participation and identity are denied".[36] In other words, institutional values may cause alienation whose symptom is deviant behaviour and dysfunctional conflict. The result is a sick society which is characterised by a further denial of human needs satisfaction. Moreover, in the pathological society the major constraints of human behaviour, namely values attached to relationships, do not work and, as a consequence, authorities lose their legitimacy.

A quote from Burton reveals the thesis:

> "We arrive at the position that the individual in society will pursue his needs and desires (some of which may be programmed genetically and may include some elements of altruism) to the extent that he finds this possible within the confines of his environment, his experience and knowledge of options and all other capabilities and constraints; he will use the norms common within society and push against them to the extent necessary to ensure that they work in his interests; but if the norms of the society inhibit and frustrate to the degree that he decides they are no longer useful, then, subject to values he attaches to social relationships, he will employ methods outside the norms, outside the codes he would in other circumstances wish to apply to his behaviour. In doing so he will be labelled deviant by society; but this is the cost he is prepared to pay to fulfil his needs."[37]

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35. Seeman, Melvin, "On the Meaning of Alienation", American Sociological Review, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1959, p. 787.
36. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 94.
37. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 78-79. See also: Burton, "The Dynamics of Change...", p. 67. Burton, "The Rôle of Authorities...", p. 76. Burton, John, Dear Survivors, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, pp. 52-55. Burton, John, "World Society and Human Needs", in International Relations, A Handbook of Current Theory,

In the sick body social there is "generally an erosion of authority and defensive responses by authorities".[38] Decision-makers are not, according to Burton, perceived as being concerned with the common good, and this gives rise to revolutionary, and often violent, changes in leadership. Revolutionary attempts, in turn, lead to even more coercion and an endeavour to enforce law and order by the leaders who want to preserve old structures and institutions.[39]

2. 2. Sociality and a theory of social contract

It has been described above how an alienated individual becomes anti-social. Similarly, it can be asked how an individual becomes social. Burton's theory suggests that if the society offers relationships cherished by the individual, he or she will not challenge them by anti-societal behaviour. In Burton's version of human needs theory there is a belief that once the basic human needs of the individual are fully satisfied, individuality will merge into and become identical with sociality. By the same token, it is assumed that if basic human needs are fully developed, the individual will be a fully moral person.[40] Thus, the link between needs fulfilment and sociality established by many needs theorists can be found in Burton's texts too.[41]

According to Burton, needs theory "draws attention to means of promoting harmonious behaviour within a legitimized authority structure".[42] Unless there is the fulfilment of needs of individuals and groups, the social and political order cannot be harmonious.

Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. pp. 52-53. Burton,"The Means to Agreement", p. 235. Burton, John, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 23. Burton, John, "International Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving", in Conflict Management and Problem Solving: From Interpersonal to International Applications, Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1987, p. 254 and p. 256.

38. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 39.
39. ibid., p. 39
40. Roy, "Social Conflicts and Needs Theories", p. 128.
41. For a view which denies the link see: Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XIII.
42. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 213.

Burton notes that the more secure the identity of, for example, a minority ethnic group, the more likely it is to accord recognition to others, and to cooperate with wider social and political systems. Individuality becomes sociality, because needs provide objective and rational criteria for policy-making and, as a result, a type of society emerges which is acceptable to everyone.[43]

The logic of linking needs and harmony is not clear. The assumption that "only by satisfying or creating opportunities for individuals to satisfy their basic needs can there exist the possibility of a fully developed human person, a whole man, and a harmonious, progressive society" can be questioned.[44] The postulation of the compatibility between individuality and sociality may be necessary in order to mitigate the tension between the drive towards freedom and the requirements of order in needs theories. However, the conclusion that the satisfaction of needs should automatically produce this compatibility, as some theorists claim, does not logically follow from the premise.[45]

The question why authorities have to fulfil needs or offer possibilities for human needs satisfaction sheds some light on the 'individuality versus sociality' problem. Human needs fulfilment is a source of power in Burton's theory: authorities have legitimacy and can maintain power in a society which enables needs satisfaction. It is assumed, in this view, that legitimization does not derive from force. Rather, its source is in human needs which cannot be suppressed in a long-run. Burton notes the reciprocal gains attained from the legitimised relationship. He writes: "Legitimization, on the other hand, stresses the reciprocal nature of relations with authorities, the support given because of the services they render, and respect for legal norms when these are legitimized norms."[46] Thus, Burton's notion of legitimization implies a theory of social

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43. ibid., p. 63. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 26. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 147-148. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 21 and p. 106.
44. Roy, "Social Conflicts and Needs Theories", p. 129.
45. ibid., pp. 125-148.
46. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 127. See also: Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 123-139. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 123-136.

contract which is seen to suffice to explain the sources of sociality.[47]

Although traditional social contract theories define certain mutual obligations that generally link rulers and ruled, those in authority and those subject to authority[48], Burton's theory does not strictly define any tasks based on mutual obligations. It, rather, provides criteria for legitimised changes in political institutions and social structures in general. According to the tradition of social contract theory set by Rousseau, the obligations of the ruler are protection, the maintenance of peace and order, and the guarantee of the material security. In Burton's theory, on the other hand, the obligation of the authorities is the general promotion of such social conditions that human needs fulfilment becomes possible. Peace and order, sociality and social harmony, are assumed follow automatically.

Social contract is seen in contract theories to serve to regulate inherent and unavoidable conflict among (1) the demands and requirements of the individual worker or household for food, clothing, shelter and a share in amenities and pleasures of life; (2) the needs of the society as a whole and (3) the demands and requirements of the dominant individuals or groups.[49] According to Burton, (1) and (2) are functionally related in the sense that individual needs satisfaction is supposed to benefit the whole society. However, there can be conflict between the individual and the elite groups or, rather, reified institutional values imposed by the elite groups. The social contract serves to regulate the conflict, as mentioned earlier, by offering criteria for legitimate changes when institutional values undermine human values.

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47. For an introduction to social contract theories see: Lessnoff, Michael, Social Contract, London: Macmillan, 1986. For classical texts see: Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (originally published 1689), Book II, chapter VIII. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XIV. Rousseau, Social Contract, Book I, chapter 6. See also a recent version of social contract theory: Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

48. They are mutual obligations in the senses (1) that each of the parties is subject to a moral obligation to carry out certain tasks as its part of the implicit social contract and (2) that failure to either party to perform the obligation constitutes grounds for the other to refuse the execution of its task. Moore, Barrington, Jr., Injustice, The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1978, p. 20.

49. ibid., p. 32.

Social contract theories accept reciprocal obligations by free and rational human agents. Contractual obligations postulated by contract theorists are often founded on natural law or natural rights of human beings. Natural law is assumed to consist of a body of rules prescribing rights and duties that are considered to be 'natural' in the sense that they pertain to human nature.[50] In Burton's theory the ultimate source of natural law is in needs. As Burton argues, the "natural law is in this case a set of needs of the individual that must be satisfied if he is to be an effective unit in a harmonious society".[51]

It can be tentatively claimed that the form of rationality suggested by this type of human needs thinking is mainly instrumental. Since natural law is seen to be based on needs, the mode of human rationality which follows is a rationality of man who tries to maximise his or her needs and continuously reorganises priorities according to respective opportunity costs. This understanding of rationality does not undermine the idea of social contract. On the contrary, it supports the view by interpreting the contract as a way to guarantee mutual benefits for both the individual and the authority.

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50. For the connection between natural law and human needs thinking see: Rubenstein, Richard, "Basic Human Needs Theory: Beyond Natural Law", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 336-355.
51. Burton, "The Rôle of Authorities...", p. 78. See also: Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 91-92.

3. HUMAN NEEDS AND PROBLEM-SOLVING CONFLICT RESOLUTION

3. 1. Purification through professional cure

Since the problems are, according to Burton, 'sick societies' and 'alienated people', a professional cure is needed. When a conflict occurs, the authority of the traditional mediator is, however, undesirable because it is often based on power and coercion as a means of dealing with conflicts. Given the fundamental tension in many conflicts between the preservation of institutions in the interest of social stability and the satisfaction of the needs of individuals, problem-solving conflict resolution offers a way to take into account and cost conflicting interests and strategies. The professional facilitator needed in the problem-solving workshop feeds back to the participants knowledge about common patterns of behaviour in similar circumstances.[52]

In Burton's view, the authority of the third party has to derived from a recognition by the parties of a professional expertise. "The third party is an observer in a scientific role" is an often repeated phrase by Burton.[53] The third party is considered to be in a scientific role when he or she makes no assessments, judgements or value interventions and adopts a neutral position. The expertise of the facilitator arises from his or her superior knowledge of the 'natural law based on needs' and common patterns of human behaviour.[54] The ideal behaviour of the facilitator suggested by Burton can be traced back to the principles of positivist natural sciences. According to them, the scientist was to remain an outside observer of the processes of nature. This idea was challenged, for example, already in the 1920s by atom physicists. Heisenberg claimed then that even in science the object of research is no longer nature itself, but man's investigation of nature. His argument, thus, disputed the hypothetical

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52. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 202-228.

53. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 37. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 121. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 204.

54. Burton, John, "Resolution of Conflict", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1972, p. 6. Burton, World Society, p. 153.

distinction between the researcher and the research object prevailing in natural sciences at that time.[55]

Burton does relax the requirements of the ideal facilitator by employing a metaphor of doctor. He maintains that the study of conflict and its resolution and prevention are professions in the same way that medicine and engineering are professions. Moreover, they are all universal professions in the sense that the basics of their fields do not vary across cultures. As with any other profession, the profession of facilitator needs an ethical code which guides behaviour. Burton derives three general rules from the medical profession: professionalism, secrecy and perceived neutrality. The rules imply that the creation of a relationship of trust with a client is vital for a professional relation to emerge.[56] The facilitator, like the doctor, has the expertise to recognise the symptoms of the sick body social. Since the disease is alienation, he or she helps the individuals themselves to overcome the malady. The professional help is needed because individuals and groups are often so deeply involved in their conflict (symptoms) that they do not know how to get the resolution (healing) process started.

The type of skills needed in conflict resolution are not those possessed by a general practitioner. They are, rather, therapeutic skills. The connection between psychotherapy and needs gratification can be found already in Maslow's texts. He saw therapy as a way to satisfy needs on an interpersonal basis.[57] Similarly, the techniques used in the problem-solving workshops which derive from T-group experiments and social casework have a psychoanalytic origin. However, it should be emphasised that the medical analogy has limits. The participants in the Burtonian type of problem-solving workshop are not considered to be 'sick' or 'alienated' individuals

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55. North, Robert and Willard, Matthew, "The Post-Behavioural Debate: Indeterminism, Probabilism and the Interaction of Data and Theory", in Conflict in World Society. A new perspective on international relations, Michael Banks (ed.), Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984, p. 33.
56. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 149 and pp. 162-163. Burton, John, "The History of...", p. 41. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, pp. 27-29. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 214-216 and p. 228. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., pp. 186-188.
57. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 92-110.

neither are the techniques employed aimed at working at an individual level. Despite the limits, the doctor metaphor justifies certain types of facilitative techniques. The techniques employed in the workshop differ from the techniques used by the traditional mediator, because they are thought to deal with the real causes of conflict, not with symptoms.

A filter metaphor creates an image of the relationship between the facilitator and the participants in the problem-solving workshop. Burton writes:

> "What is required in a problem-solving forum is a 'filter' to screen out false assumptions and implications from existing knowledge, cultural and ideological orientations and personal prejudices. Probably the main task of the third party is to provide this filter. If the participants can use this filter, then they will be able to perceive realities accurately, to assess available theoretical and empirical knowledge, and arrive at reliable conclusions."[58]

In other words, the main contribution of the facilitator to a conflict resolution process is in checking the preconceptions of the participants and observing and testing their images of reality. Through the filtering processes purification from prejudices, cultural elements and ideologies is assumed to be achieved, and the metaphysical originality - defined now as knowledge of real human needs - is expected to be gained back.

Purification is achieved by a means of a negative and a positive process. The negative process is the filtering process, where the removal of all preconceptions about the existing state of affairs is done. The positive side is the replacement of conflict-loaded theories and information with alternatives that do not lead to conflict.[59] Disclosure is, from the point of view of the participants, the method of filtering. As the psychoanalyst helps the patient to reveal his or her inner feelings, so does the facilitator help the parties to disclose, first, their stereotypes and prejudices and, later, their

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58. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 208.
59. Brown, "International Theory...", pp. 176-177.

fundamental and real needs. The vacuum left by the filtering process is filled with 'perfect knowledge'[60] which is assumed to eliminate false consciousness about original human conditions.

Some tentative notes about the filter metaphor can be made. The metaphor suggests that the problem-solving procedures are not relative to culture and, moreover, that the aim of the workshop is actually to filter away cultural factors. The view clearly denies culture its constitutive role in conflict and conflict resolution. The denial leads to the assumption that there are culture-free techniques of conflict resolution. The underlying notion of acultural man derives from Burton's version of needs theory in which needs are rooted in biology and considered to be universal, ahistorical and acultural.

3. 2. The 'organic cell' metaphor and functional cooperation

How is it possible to maintain the healthy situation achieved in the problem-solving workshop that provides the society with preconditions for permanent, but dynamic, harmony? Functional cooperation is the answer for Burton. He maintains that conflict resolution must be based on functional arrangements which are designed to meet a specific set of social, economic or technical needs. Legitimate functional arrangements establish a control mechanism by building up and maintaining valued relationships in the society.[61]

David Mitrany's account of the New Deal's political strategy reveals the basic tenets of functional cooperation. He writes:

> "Each and every action was tackled as a practical issue in itself. No attempt was made to relate it to a general theory or system of government. Every function was left to generate others gradually, like the functional subdivision of organic

60. The term is employed by A. J. R. Groom in "No Compromise", p. 79.
61. Burton, "Functionalism and the Resolution of Conflict", p. 238. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 166-167.

cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to develop its functions and powers out of actual performance."[62]

The metaphor of 'organic cell' and its biological analogy are the very core of the functionalist approach advocated by Mitrany. The metaphor creates an image of evolutionary and teleological processes in which cells - as well as societies or even world society - develop internally towards more sophisticated specialisation and subdivisions. Specialisation occurs according to tasks or functions. As a cell responds to its environment, is sensitive to it, so will a society through functional arrangements become more sensitive to changes in its environment and will develop new ways of adaptation.

The approach is pragmatic in the sense that there is no need to, according to Mitrany, refer to general theory when tackling practical problems: praxis guides theory. In Mitrany's words, functionalism "knows only one logic, the logic of problem".[63] Moreover, problems should be dealt with in an incremental manner, because reality is considered to be in a constant flux where no fixed plans can be applied. The view is liberal and believes in human rationality. The argument is that people can work together most easily on functional, occupational and technical matters, and by working together in these roles, they begin to know and understand each other in other roles. Rewarding common activity, growing gradually as the result of the learning experience of previous success, is assumed to change the attitudes of rational people towards each other.[64]

Mitrany maintains that the state is unable to guarantee such basic needs as security and the maximisation of welfare. Functional institutions are needed because in them problems are dealt with in an open participatory way by the relevant experts. Gradually a sense of community, according to Mitrany, will arise out of interests held in common. Shared interests will further emerge through task expansion

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62. Mitrany, David, The Functional Theory of Politics, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, p. 163.
63. ibid., p. 258. See also: Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, p. 56.
64. Burton, World Society, p. 110. Taylor, Paul, "Introduction", in David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, p. xxi.

and spillover in which cooperation deepens in existing areas and spreads to new domains. States are expected to lose their salience, and loyalties are transformed from states to functional bodies. The greater the number and diversity of ties the less likely is war to occur. Mitrany recommends two types of actions: actions which take as many issues as possible out of the field of political competition and actions which develop a web of common activities. The network of activities which serves all people will gradually build up foundations for a 'living international society', for a 'working peace system'.[65]

Burton applies the idea of functional cooperation to conflict resolution. He maintains that resolution can be assisted by this type of cooperation. In order to tackle human needs conflict resolution processes must be concerned with finding the political structures which promote the full development of the individual. According to Burton, such structural arrangements might include the development of decentralised systems and forms of functional cooperation. Consequently, functional cooperation would work against elite power and reduce the danger of dysfunctional conflicts.[66]

More importantly, the logic of Mitrany's functional cooperation can be found in the notion of the problem-solving workshop conflict resolution as suggested by Burton. Similarly to a functional institution, problems in the problem-solving workshop are assumed to be dealt with in an open participatory manner. They are seen to be dealt with not solely by experts, but with their help. Gradually a sense of community is expected to evolve bringing the participants together more and more in a positive manner to resolve, or at least to discuss, problems which are perceived to be held in common. Problem-solving processes are seen to be learning processes where participants learn about themselves and others. Pragmatism prevails

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65. Mitrany, A Working Peace System. Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, p. 225. Olson and Groom, International Relations Then & Now, pp. 190-191.
66. Burton, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and the United Nations", p. 79. Burton, Conflict and Communication, pp. 88-94. Burton, "Resolution of Conflict", p. 19. Burton, "The Rôle of Authorities...", pp. 76-77. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 196. Burton, John, "Unfinished Business in Conflict Resolution", in Conflict: Readings in Management & Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 329.

in the workshop in the sense that the participants are also encouraged to discuss practical issues given that they reflect their real needs. In brief, the workshop is thought to be an 'exercise in reason' in which the liberal faith in human rationality is realised.[67]

Mitrany's functionalist approach is in accordance with some views of human needs thinking, because also "functionalists holds that violence has its roots in the social and economic circumstances of people, and that if we give them a moderate sufficiency of what they want and ought to have they will keep in peace".[68] As demonstrated earlier, in the Burtonian version of needs theory violence is partly a product of social circumstances. When social structures hinder needs satisfaction and violence emerges, the individual is not to be blamed. Social circumstances and their relation to social harmony as well as the 'common needs of people' as a foundation for cooperation are, thus, emphasised in both approaches.

Functionalist ideology offers a further justification for the trust in the expertise of the facilitator. Functionalism implies that benefits will accrue and spread widely in the society when specialists concentrate on a particular task, service or function. The specialists can consider problems of technical kind, and minimise the role of ideology. As a consequence, effective control and effective management are obtained.[69] This view of expertise supports the notion of acultural problem-solving conflict resolution in which the aim is to limit the power of ideological and cultural factors. The expert facilitator with a capacity to treat problems in a 'technical' manner can best fulfil the limiting function.

This chapter can be summarised by pointing out oppositions in Burton's human needs narrative. The ideas of voluntarism, learning and pragmatism which are rooted in Mitrany's functionalism are opposed by an element of determinism arising from human needs thinking. Since needs are, in the Burtonian version of needs thinking,

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67. See also: Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature...", p. 225.
68. Taylor, "Introduction", p. xi.
69. Taylor, Paul, "Functionalism: the Approach of David Mitrany", in Frameworks for International Co-operation, A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), London: Pinter Publishers, 1990, pp. 128-129.

derived from biology and interpreted as motivations, it can be tentatively argued that from this viewpoint needs determine to an extent human behaviour. At the same time, human beings are seen to be capable of learning and their behaviour is considered to be based on free will. Similarly, the liberal trust in universal reason which is assumed to actualise in the workshop context opposes the notion of individual and instrumental rationality found in Burton's needs theory. It should be emphasised that the oppositions do not necessarily demonstrate the inconsistency of Burton's texts. They, rather, illuminate internal tensions which characterise any text.

The oppositions and metaphors discussed above will be employed in the next chapter which will deal in a more detailed manner with the rationale of the Burtonian problem-solving workshop. The focus will be on the types of explanations of and the ways of explaining human motivations, actions and reason.

CHAPTER IV: THE RATIONALE OF THE BURTONIAN PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOP: EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR AND FORMS OF RATIONALITY

Theories of conflict and conflict resolution always include an image of human 'being' and human nature: a type of person engaged in conflict and conflict resolution is constructed in theories. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Burton's primary image seems to be that of the biologically conditioned human. Moreover, theories consist also of explanations of human action and rationality. In other words, every theory of conflict is part of some general theory of action. In order to 'reconstruct' Burton's problem-solving conflict resolution theory further, the chapter will study how he explains human behaviour.

For analytical purposes the Burtonian approach is divided into three: behaviour outside the workshop, the entry decision and behaviour within the workshop structure.[1] At every stage it is asked what is the mode of behaviour Burton assumes while explaining action, and what is the form of rationality related to the assumed form of behaviour. The chapter discusses also the assumptive basis of his explanations. The study of presuppositions leads us to such questions as, what it the ultimate motivational force underlying behaviour and, again, what kind of suppositions are made about human nature? The first three parts approach the questions from the point of view of the workshop participants and the last from the angle of the facilitator.

1. BEHAVIOUR OUTSIDE THE WORKSHOP

1. 1. Needs as an explanation of human behaviour

The aim of this part is to study the assumptive basis of needs thinking as it relates to the analysis of human behaviour. More

1. The phrase 'workshop structure' is employed, because it describes well the idea of workshop acting as a framework for behaviour.

specifically, the purpose is to examine needs theories - and especially John Burton's version of needs theory - as one class of explanation of motives. R. S. Peters' classification of motive explanations offers a starting-point for defining motive. According to him, if a human being has a motive, it must have a goal of some sort, however weak its influence or however obvious or attainable it may be. For Peters, there are four types of motive explanations: (1) explanations which deal with the reason of the actor, (2) explanations which postulate *the* reason, (3) causal explanations and (4) end-state explanations.[2]

Needs theories can be considered as one type of end-state explanation of human behaviour. An end-state explanation explains behaviour by reference to requirements of the organism which serve to organise and motivate behaviour. In this view, needs can be interpreted as a construct, a fiction or hypothetical concept, which stands, for example, for a force in the brain region. Furthermore, needs can be assumed to have substantial impact on the perception and organisation of reality as well as on behavioural activities within it.[3] Seen from another point of view, there is a 'psychologist's use of needs'. That is, needs are seen as hidden causes, whose discovery is made possible by the special technique of the psychologist. According to A. Louch, three senses can be noted in the 'psychologist's use of needs'. First, need is used in the sense of conditions for survival, whether of the individual or of the species. In the second sense it is not merely survival that is at stake, but quality of survival. The third sense, on the other hand, identifies need with homeostatic processes of a physiological nature in which certain kinds of activities restore an independently defined equilibrium.[4]

As suggested in the previous chapter where the idea of metaphysical originality in needs thinking was identified, the words 'force' and 'hidden causes' are vital for needs theories. If we assume, according

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2. Peters, R. S., The Concept of Motivation, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul and New York: Humanities Press, 1958, pp. 27-51.
3. Renshon, Stanley, "Human Needs and Political Analysis: An Examination of a Framework", in Human Needs and Politics, Ross Fitzgerald (ed.), Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1977, pp. 53-54.
4. Louch, A. R., Explanation and Human Action, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966.

to the logic of metaphysical originality, that there is a fundamental stratum of the person which acts as the 'engine' that motivates behaviour, we need to further specify what is the 'engine', force. It is not sufficient to state that needs as such act as a motivational force, because the questions 'why' and 'how' remain unanswered. As Patricia Springborg notes, almost all subsequent versions of needs theory agree that an explanation of human motivation and conduct is to be sought not in the metaphysical realm of the soul, divine will, or spirit, but in certain instincts, drives, propensities or powers of man as a physical being.[5] Thus, one way to specify the 'engine' is to claim that needs correspond with drives[6], whose demands seek immediate satisfaction at any cost subject only to the higher cognitive and moral constraints of ego and superego, or, as Burton would claim, of values attached to relationships.

Early attempts to specify human needs proceeded on the assumption that behind every behaviour one could find a corresponding drive. These attempts proved to be problematic, because it was assumed implicitly that every object and situation for which an organism aims must be accompanied by a characteristic drive for the object. Such instincts as an instinct for 'social behaviour' and an instinct 'to avoid eating apples in one's own orchard' became postulated by needs theorists. Neither did Freud's dualistic theory of human needs prove to be fruitful because of its high level of abstraction. Lists of needs (needs understood as drives), as described in the previous chapter, on the other hand, present difficulties of operationalisation and data gathering.[7] In sum, the problem of how to conceptualise the complexity and diversity of human motives in a way that permits empirical inquiry has not been solved by the conception of 'needs as drives'.

Although teleological (goal-oriented) forms of explanation are employed by many needs theorists, the concept of stimulus and its

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5. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 4.
6. 'Drive' is understood here as an explanatory concept referring to goal-oriented behaviour. For more detailed discussions see: Young, Paul, "Physiological Drives", in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, 1968, p. 275. Bolles, Robert, Theory of Motivation, New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967, Chap. 5.
7. Renshon, "Human Needs and Political...", pp. 56-57.

causal form of explanation can also be found in several theories. Causality enters into a needs explanation if drive is identified with the energy potentially available for behaviour, and it is asked what triggers that potential. It can be answered, as stimulus-response behaviorism does, that an aspect of the environment perceived by an organism acts as a stimulus and triggers behaviour. Some writers have expressed an extreme view by claiming that the use of the drive concept "reflects an ignorance of the stimulus: if more were known about the stimuli associated with each specific drive, one could dispense with a general non-specific drive factor".[8]

To sum up, needs theories form a class of prescriptive end-state explanations of human behaviour. Often a reference to needs implies a standard pattern of prescribed goals, but it does not really explain actions by reference to them.[9] Therefore, it is necessary, in order to establish a plausible explanation, for needs theories to postulate the idea of drives as the engine of behaviour. Yet, the problems of the use of the notion of drive illuminate the unsatisfactory capacity of needs theories for explaining behaviour.[10] The claim for the empirical and objective definition of needs can be understood in the light of these problems.[11] If we could specify a particular set of empirical needs, we would be able to explain at least a part of human behaviour by referring to them. As a consequence, we could repudiate prescriptive explanations based on a normative needs concept.

Needs as an explanation of behaviour raises the question of human nature and, closely related to it, the question of the ontological foundation of needs. As Springborg points out in her study on Western human needs thinking, a long line of philosophers, from Aristotle to Hegel, and the existentialists, has put emphasis on the concept of desire. It has been assumed that desire is some way symptomatic of the human condition. Desire is seen to be expressive of man's

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8. Quoted from Young who refers to Robert Bolles. Young, "Physiological Drives", p. 276.
9. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, p. 18.
10. See more on the difficulties needs theories have in explaining behaviour: Louch, Explanation and Human Action, pp. 70-79. Renshon "Human Needs and Political...". Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 252-274.
11. See, for example: Watt, E. D., "Human Needs, Human Wants, and Political Consequences", Political Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 4, 1982, pp. 533-543. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 64.

freedom, because it indicates man's own role in fulfilling his or her needs and in reinforcing his or her identity and development. On the other hand, the concept of needs can be used to argue a quite different case: one can establish a strong connection between human nature and needs by claiming that needs are embedded in man's biological structure.[12] For example, Abraham Maslow and John Burton argue that needs are biologically founded, genetically implanted. Maslow discusses the 'instinctlike nature of basic needs'.[13] Similarly, Burton's and Sandole's generic theory which assumes that we are dealing with universal patterns of behaviour and, moreover, with the explanation that transcends observable differences of human behaviour, is founded on a belief in the biogenetic origin of needs.[14] By embedding needs in man's biological structure these writers consider, thus, the basis of human nature to be in biology.

Burton's biologically oriented needs theory exemplifies also the idea of universal human nature. The logic of universalistic needs thinking assumes that what is true of human nature, must, because universality is one of its facets, be true of all individuals in all cultures. Needs represent a set of objective data that conforms to this requirement. The recourse to the universality of needs offers a potent way to defuse contextualism. Moreover, it is concluded by many needs theorists that what is universal, by virtue of its universality, can be accorded greater significance than any local variation: the universal is thought to be more basic than the parochial.[15] Discussions about needs may include also implicit statements about the sociality of needs. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in many needs theories there is a tendency to postulate the compatibility between individuality and sociality. As a result, it is supposed that human nature as such is good. Even the idea of biologically founded needs can include the axiom. The principle

12. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 252. It is important to note the difference between needs regarded as a human condition and needs regarded as the very essence of human nature.
13. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 54.
14. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", pp. 333-344.
15. Berry, Christopher, Human Nature, London: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 82-85.

characterises particularly the humanist psychology advocated, for example, by Maslow.[16]

1. 2. John Burton's needs theory and the explanation of behaviour

In Deviance, Terrorism and War Burton unconventionally differentiates action from behaviour:

> "The distinction between action and behaviour is important in this context. Action is observable. Behaviour is the motivation, the reason for action. It cannot be observed. Observing behaviour is interpretation of action and, as such, may not coincide with the actual motivation leading to action."[17]

The definition, thus, suggests that behaviour is something more original and deeper than action: it is the reason for action. Action as such is a surface under which it is possible to find a more fundamental stratum of causes.

According to Burton, the hidden sources of action can be found in human needs. He claims that "there are human needs more compelling in directing behaviors than any possible external influences".[18] Needs are defined by him as underlying and basic motivations, that cannot be bargained away. Therefore, according to Burton, needs can be used to explain, for example, dissidence, deviant behaviour and role defence.[19] Burton's way to use the concept of motivation can be

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16. Maslow argues that the gratification of basic needs leads to consequences that may be called 'desirable', 'good', 'healthy' and 'self-actualising'. Thus, Maslow's concept of self-actualisation follows from, and is logically dependent on, his belief that human nature is innately given and good. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 186.
17. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 32. Burton's differentiation between action and its hidden sources leads him to claim that traditional IR theory has missed 'hidden behavioural data' which explains why conflicts persist. Burton, "World Society and Human Needs", p. 47. The distinction between action and behaviour as it is suggested by Burton is not used in the thesis. Rather, action is identified with behaviour and the Burtonian notion of behaviour is identified with the motives of behaviour.
18. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 33.
19. Burton Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 59 and p. 73. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 75. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 23. Burton, John and Ramsden, Hedda, "Order and Change", in International Relations, A Bibliography, A. J. R. Groom and C. R.

classified as a 'psychologist's conception' in which the motive is seen to be the reason that is actually operative. Moreover, as Peters points out, "the logical force of the term 'motive' has been often interpreted causally by postulating a particular sort of causal connection between pursuing the goal and some inner spring of action".[20] Burton's interpretation of motive is in accordance with Peters' observation, because Burton postulates a causal connection between needs as reasons for action and pursuing the goal of needs satisfaction. His discussion on drives, on the other hand, can be seen to be an attempt to reinforce the causal connection, because drives clearly establish causal conditions which initiate goal directed behaviour.

In Conflict: Resolution and Provention Burton states explicitly that human beings have drives. He writes that "human beings, however, appear to have certain inherent drives that are not within their ability to control, and which certainly cannot be suppressed by external socialization, threats and coercion".[21] Moreover, Burton identifies needs with drives by claiming that "needs, in particular, are inherent drives for survival and development, including identity and recognition".[22] He uses here, thus, a typical end-state explanation by explaining human behaviour by reference to requirements of the organism which serve to organise and motivate it. In other words, in addition to establishing causal conditions which initiate behaviour, Burton's explanation relies on teleology in the sense that it postulates a striving or motivation toward something. The concept of drive, or 'needs as drives', lends itself to be understood, thus, also as a goal-oriented requirement in his version of needs theory.

Burton's mode of explanation can be summarised by saying that in his needs theory needs act as motives. Since needs are drives, drives are

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Mitchell (eds.), London: Frances Pinter, 1978, p. 132. Burton claims in World Society (p. 126) that socio-biological values (needs) are "closely related to, if not direct expressions of, biological drives and motivations". Thus, "they are a fundamental particle of human behaviour".

20. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, pp. 38-39.

21. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 32.

22. ibid., p. 39. See also: Burton, "The Dynamics of Change...", pp. 66-67. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 138. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", p. 338.

considered as ultimate motives for behaviour. The terms 'motive' and 'drive' become thus almost synonymous. Moreover, needs are assumed to be goals, since Burton writes that "needs relate to those goals that are universal" and the "claim for territory could be a tactic in the pursuit of the goal of security".[23] This type of use of 'motive' implies that whenever one explains an action by reference to a motive one both assigns a goal and a cause.[24] Thus, Burton uses both causal explanation by assigning a cause for behaviour and teleological explanation by using goals as an explanatory factor. However, it should be emphasised that Burton's list of needs, introduced in the previous chapter, limits the scope of causes and goals. Burton is not arguing that behind every action we can find a corresponding drive. Rather, he claims that there is a certain set of needs (drives) and the ultimate goal of an individual is the satisfaction of these particular needs.

Furthermore, Burton does not claim that he is explaining all behaviour. He states that he aims at explaining conflictual behaviour and studying the behavioural reasons that lead to conflict. Therefore, the notion of frustrated and denied needs - or needs satisfaction and obstruction of needs maximisation[25] - is fundamental for his theory: it helps to explain behaviour that is inconsistent with normal behaviour. In the Burtonian explanation of frustrated needs the classic Freudian mechanism is at work. It is assumed that the drives if frustrated in their original purpose must seek substitute outlets and, as such, may turn up in the disguise of opposites.[26] Burton assumes that, for example, the need for identity, if blocked, may end up taking the form of territory claim. The territory claim, in turn, may be perceived and conceptualised by the actors in terms of conflicting interests.

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23. Burton, John "About Winning", International Interactions, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1985, pp. 74-75.
24. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, p. 39.
25. The terms 'needs maximisation' and 'goal maximisation' refer in this context to the tendency of human beings to satisfy their needs at any cost. See: Burton, "The Dynamics of Change...", p. 75. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 15. Burton, "About Winning", p. 88. The notion of maximisation can be found also in Burton's discussion on the entry problem. The concept will be studied in a more detailed manner later in this chapter.
26. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 190-191.

Despite the aim to explain mainly 'deviant' behaviour, Burton's needs theory does imply a general theory of behaviour. It is not logical to argue that deviant and conflictual behaviour is motivated by certain drives and normal behaviour by something else. If we postulate a theory based on drives, that inevitably, to a certain extent, explains all types of behaviour. However, this is not to say that there may not be other causes that give arise to behaviour.

As noted earlier, the idea of metaphysical originality can be found in many needs theories. Burton's needs theory relies on it by equating needs with drives, and by giving drives a status of motivational force. However, drives do not act in a vacuum; they need a trigger to be activated. For Burton, environment plays an important role both as a trigger and as a constraint. He writes:

> "All behaviour is a response by an actor - an individual or a group - to the environment. Behaviour cannot be analysed without reference to the personality of the actor. Nor can behaviour be analysed in isolation from the physical setting, the institutional structures and the legal and social rules of the society in which it occurs. It is the result of interaction between the needs and interests of actors and environmental constraints (including the needs and interests of other actors)."[27]

The idea of biologically founded human nature is closely related to the notion of drive. In Deviance, Terrorism and War Burton postpones the explicit discussion of the bases of human nature. He states that "for the purposes of this study it is not necessary to enter into any argument whether such needs are genetic or environmentally induced".[28] On the other hand, while studying nationalism, he concludes that "these manifestations of nationalism have biological origins and protective functions".[29] Later Burton, in Olson's and Groom's words, "comes down heavily in favour of nature".[30] He

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27. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 183. See also: Burton, "The Dynamics of Change...", p. 70.
28. Burton Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 75.
29. ibid., p. 80. See also: Burton, "The Dynamics of Change...", pp. 66-67.
30. Olson and Groom, International Relations Then & Now, p. 212.

writes, for example, that "in ontological terms the individual is conditioned by biology".[31] Moreover, needs are "goals that are ontological or universal in the human species, and which are probably genetic, and which, therefore, are not subject to change even in changed conditions".[32]

The idea of universal and biologically founded human nature, thus, forms the ontological core of Burton's needs theory. The idea of universal human nature is, however, inherently problematic. As Springborg argues, it is not necessarily the case that the common denominator to which we refer in explaining uniform phenomena is necessarily a real entity as such, a simple or discrete thing.[33] She continues:

> "This is the problem posed by the theory of universals, raised first by Plato. It is not necessarily the case that the existence of tables in all shapes and forms must be explained in reference to a blueprint or archetypal table which represents their essence; no more is this the case with man."[34]

All notions of human nature denote 'models of man'. The medical metaphor discussed in the previous chapter insinuates the model of well-functioning, healthy individuals whose temporary alienation is caused by the sick society. In the model, pathologies, or deviant behaviour as Burton calls them, are, therefore, considered as an effect of dysfunction. This type of image points to a hidden prejudice in favour of the homeostatic model of man, and favours an account of behaviour as causally determined rather than intentional (goal-oriented).

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31. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 36.
32. ibid., p. 212. Earlier Burton saw human being to be more malleable, and made, therefore, more room for society. In Dear Survivors (p. 130) he claims that although drives are biologically based, part of them may be acquired, that is, they are generated by the experience of living within a society.
33. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 191-192.
34. ibid., p. 191.

1. 3. Needs, values, interests and culture

Burton maintains that "there are drives and motivations toward human goals that cannot be repressed; for instance, drives for identity, development, meaning, consistency in response (which implies distributive justice), and other ontological needs stated earlier".[35] The use of both words, 'drive' and 'motivation', implies that there are other motivations than drives. This brings up the traditional distinctions between needs and interests and between needs and wants.[36] Burton differentiates needs from interests and values. His argument is that human motivations include "some that are required for the development of the human species, some that are culturally specific, and some that are of a transitory nature".[37] For Burton, needs are universal in the human species, values are cultural and interests are transitory.[38]

According to Burton, values[39] are characteristic of particular social communities, and may alter over periods of time. They are acquired, not genetic. Values motivate behaviour in the sense that preservation of values may lead individuals to defensive and aggressive behaviours. It is the pursuit of needs that is the reason, for example, for the formation of identity groups, but it is values attached to identity groups, and the defence of these values from which aggressive behaviour arises. Interests, on the other hand, refer to the occupational, social, political and economical aspirations of the individual and identity group. They are typically related to material goods, and, therefore, transitory, negotiable, and competitive.

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35. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", p. 338.
36. As Springborg notes, already the Stoics made the disjunction between subjective desires and objective needs. The relation of needs and wants was also much discussed by the Epicureans. The utilitarians, unlike the Stoics and the Epicureans, removed the dichotomy between subjective desires and objective needs. In more recent needs theories, Maslow considered instinctoid needs good, and claimed that culture has the power to induce false or artificial needs. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 13-14 and p. 187.
37. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 36.
38. ibid., p. 36.
39. Burton's terminology varies; sometimes values are referred as 'socio-psychological' or 'cultural values' and needs as 'socio-biological values' or 'fundamental values'. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 57-58. Burton, World Society, pp. 127-129.

Interests are not in any way an inherent part of the individual as are needs and, moreover, they may conflict with needs. Interests motivate behaviour too, but only in a very limited sense: they motivate behaviour which is mainly aimed at an occupational, social, political or economical gain.[40]

Burton's theory, thus, consists of an 'onion model'. According to the model, the very essence of human being can be found in universal and ontological needs which resist cultural influences. The second layer of the onion is values, which are, to a certain extent, influenced by culture, and, therefore, are relative to societies. Since individuals attach values to needs, values impinge upon needs. The uppermost layer is interests which have a limited scope and which are largely under the influence of culture. Interests are mainly related to material gains. All these layers motivate behaviour. However, they motivate it differently: their scope and force vary. The ultimate motivation arises from needs. They are seen to be the 'engine' of behaviour. Values attached to needs have a narrow motivational power. Similarly, utilitarian interests motivate in limited fields.

The layer metaphor raises the question of culture. What is the role of culture in motivating human behaviour? Burton makes his view on culture clear by arguing that culture and needs must be differentiated. Although culture is of the vital importance - it is a satisfier and many deep-rooted conflicts have an inter-cultural dimension - "culture as such, however, we must conclude, is not an important consideration in a facilitated analytical problem-solving conflict resolution process".[41] Burton, thus, recognises the role of culture, but it does not and should not, according to him, intrude into

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40. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 145-148. Burton, "World Society and Human Needs", p. 50. Burton, "About Winning", pp. 74-75. Burton, John, "The Facilitation of International Conflict Resolution", in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, Luis Kriesberg (ed.), London: Greenwich, Connecticut, Vol. 8, 1985, p. 37. Burton, "The Means to Agreement", p. 234. Burton, John, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution", in International Conflict Resolution, Theory and Practice, Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), Sussex, Boulder: Wheatsheaf Books, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986, p. 96. Burton, John "The Theory of Conflict Resolution", Current Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. IX, No. 3, 1986, p. 128. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 16. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 194. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 37-39. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", p. 337.
41. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 215.

problem-solving processes.[42] As Avruch and Black summarise, culture is reasonably deep in Burton's theory, in the layer of values, but it is far from fundamental. Culture is interpreted in Burton's theory in a thoroughly individualistic and instrumentalist manner, existing so far as it can be identified with an instrumental needs satisfier.[43] Moreover, as Springborg notes, if human needs are innately prescribed in a needs theory, as they are in Burton's version, it puts a "heavy burden on culture for which the theory in general makes no room".[44]

Burton's way of differentiating values and interests from needs does not shift the image of a biologically bounded human being to a social constructionist direction. In other words, since cultural elements brought in by the notions of values and interest do not penetrate to the 'core of the onion', to the level of needs, these conceptions do not elicit discussions on the possibility of culturally and socially founded human existence. Furthermore, the distinction does not significantly extend the scope of motives, because the onion model gives priority to needs by placing them into the deepest motivational stratum.

Another way to differentiate needs from interests, and to introduce cultural elements, would be to claim that the basic division is between artificially (culturally) produced wants and objective needs - the argument used, for example, by Christian Bay.[45] In that case it could be argued that conflicts are caused by the discrepancy between needs and wants, and that the aim of the problem-solving workshop is to overcome the difference by making the participants aware of their

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42. The filter metaphor discussed in the previous chapter expresses also this view. On cultural expressions of needs see: Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 69. Burton and Sandole, "Generic Theory", p. 343.
43. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 227. See also: Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 211.
44. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 188.
45. Christian Bay bases his theory of human needs on the idea of artificially produced wants (synonymous desires) and underlying needs. According to him, wants do not always coincide with needs. His thesis is that "whenever superficial wants are fulfilled but underlying needs remain frustrated, pathological behaviour is likely to ensue". Bay, Christian, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1965, p. 48. See also: Bay, Christian, "Taking the Universality of Human Needs Seriously", in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, John Burton (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 235-256.

true needs. However, even this distinction is problematic. It means returning to the Marxist division between real and artificial, between true and false needs.[46] The notion of false needs (or rather wants) evokes easily the notion of 'false consciousness', that is, human beings under the influence of some forms of society or modes of production (e.g. capitalist) do not get to know their true needs. The problem is that the conception of 'false consciousness' presupposes a 'correct' diagnosis of needs and wants, which is likely to be a dogmatic diagnosis.[47] A 'correct', often also called 'objective', diagnosis of needs, by viewing real needs as independent of the perceptions, concepts and frames of reference of actors in the social world, tends to produces an authoritarian definition of needs which dictates what the real needs should be.

Burton does not use the terminology, but there is an element of this discussion in his theory. The aspect can be found particularly in his conflict resolution theory, where he supposes that many conflictual claims can be reduced to needs. For example, a claim for territory can be interpreted as a need for identity. The logic of the statement is that there is something more original underlying artificial wants. The idea of false consciousness enters into the argument, because it is implicitly assumed that the conflicting parties do not know their real needs, and, therefore, they operate at the level of false wants. The role of the facilitator becomes, according to the logic, justified with reference to a need to raise the level of consciousness of the participants.

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46. Such writers as Herbert Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm and Jean-Paul Sartre have tried to trace the doctrine of true and false needs back to Marx. To put it very simply, the recent Marxist tradition of needs thinking has argued that the capitalist society has forced to consume greater and greater quantities of commodities that an individual really does not need. Exploitation in this context, then, consists not in the failure to meet basic needs so much as in the creation of false needs. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 1-18.

47. Smith, M. Brewster, "Metapsychology, Politics, and Human Needs", in Human Needs and Politics, Ross Fitzgerald (ed.), Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1977, p. 132.

1. 4. Human needs and determinism

As it is tentatively argued in the previous chapter, human needs thinking includes often a form of biological determinism. Especially if needs are referred to as drives, we have little choice but to conform. Moreover, if needs are considered to constitute a natural law similar to physical natural laws, as Burton considers them to constitute, their determining force cannot be avoided.[48] The notion of determinism as it relates to the explanation of human behaviour is, however, not simple.[49] In the context of the previous chapter, determinism was seen as a framework which sets certain limits to behaviour. Avruch and Black, on the other hand, while discussing Burton, talk about biogenetic determinism without clarifying the notion.[50] They are correct that a form of determinism is implicitly included in the idea of genetically implanted needs. However, the definition of determinism should not be taken for granted.

Roger Trigg notes that a simple causal explanation favoured by a part of sociobiology which claims that everything can be explained in terms of genes, involves a biological determinism. Trigg argues that since determinism is the thesis that every event has a cause, a belief in determinism embraces the claim that all human behaviour is causally explicable.[51] It is important to keep in mind that Burton's explanation of behaviour outside the workshop structure relies on both the causal and teleological modes of explanation. Unlike Trigg's 'reductionistic determinist', Burton does not claim that *everything*

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48. Burton, "The Rôle of Authorities...", p. 78. Burton, "International Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving", p. 255.
49. A quote from Richard Dawkins illuminates the complexity. Dawkins writes: "Once the genes have provided their survival machines [e.g. human beings] with brains that are capable of rapid imitation, the memes [units of cultural transmission, units of imitation] will automatically take over." Dawkins concludes by claiming that it is perfectly possible to hold that genes exert a statistical influence on human behaviour while at the same time the influence can be modified, overridden or reversed by other influences. Dawkins, Richard, The Selfish Gene, Oxford, New York; Oxford University Press, 1989 (2nd ed), p. 200 and p. 331.
50. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 222.
51. Trigg, Roger, Understanding Social Science, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985, pp. 171-172. For more detailed definitions of biological determinism and reductionism see: Rose, Steven, Lewontin, R. C. and Kamin, Leon, Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985, pp. 5-7. For biological explanations of aggression and violence see: Webb, Keith, "Science, Biology, and Conflict", Paradigms, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1992, pp. 65-96.

can be explained in terms of genes. In other words, he does not reduce all behaviour to biology. Thus, in this sense his determinism is different from that which can be found in some versions of sociobiology.

Discussions about determinism should take into account different degrees of determinism. That is, it is vital to discriminate between such notions as biology 'determines', 'guides', 'puts constraints to' or 'sets a framework for' human being and behaviour. Burton's statement that the "individual is conditioned by biology" seems to suggest the extreme degree of determinism.[52] On the other hand, the sentence can be given another interpretation: the term 'conditioned' can be understood to refer to a set of biological conditions which establishes a framework for behaviour. The degree of determinism in this interpretation is, thus, lower than in the view hold by Avruch and Black.

However, whichever interpretation we choose, human nature is defined as a given, as a constraint, as a limit by Burton. Humans as humans are seen to have a limited range of options open to them, and that what is taken as a given sets the limits of action. The limited range of possibilities implies that there is a constancy and predictability about what humans will do in specific situations. As Berry puts it, "what is taken as a given maps out a conceptual space" within which theorising on human being takes place.[53]

There are several ways to relax determinism in needs thinking. For example, the study on needs satisfiers, as it is done by Mitchell, assumes that there are culturally and historically relative means to satisfy needs.[54] Marxist theory, on the other hand, supposes that man is infinitely malleable, because of the possibility of self-creation through praxis. Needs in a human being are considered to be expressive of an ability to transcend the limits of material

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52. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 36. Burton states also that "this biological approach is resisted by many who label it determinism. But if there are universal human needs their final description will be made possible through biology". Burton, Global Conflict, p. 142. He argues also that "needs theory is not biological determinism". A private correspondence between the author and John Burton.
53. Berry, Human Nature, p. 104.
54. Mitchell, "Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution", pp. 149-176.

existence. Thus, humans are self-conscious subjects who know the area of their dependence on the material world, and, therefore, understand the boundaries of freedom.[55] Furthermore, a way to relax biological determinism is to take into account the complicated effects of social learning. Social learning theory can be employed in needs theories by claiming that needs cannot be directly translated into human motives, but, rather, they acquire motive status through social learning.[56] Similarly, different socialisation processes can be seen to shape man to the extent that it overcomes biological conditions. Burton does not, however, agree with these arguments. He does not discuss praxis as a means to transcend man's limitations. Neither does he agree with social learning theories. On the contrary, he claims that the scope of socialisation is limited, and man is more conditioned by needs than society.[57]

Given the goals of this chapter, it needs to be also asked what type of rationality is included in the Burtonian needs thinking. Avruch and Black claim that in Burton rational behaviour (costing) masks an underlying, fundamental irrationality, the at-any-cost fulfilment of basic human needs.[58] Their conclusion needs modifying. Since Avruch and Black identify needs in Burton's theory with Freudian irrational *id*, they arrive at the conclusion that all behaviour is not controlled by reason, that is, it is irrational. Burton's needs theory can, on the other hand, be seen from a biological angle. In that view rationality denotes the survival value of the organism. Talcott Parsons calls views which advocate the explanation of action in terms of the ultimate nonsubjective conditions such as heredity and environment 'radical anti-intellectualistic positivism'. One form of radical positivism is instinct theory, which, according to Parsons, always refers to the concept of survival value.[59] Similarly, Burton's needs theory refers to survival of a 'human organism', and sees behaviour in

55. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., p. 10 and p. 99.
56. Renshon, "Human Needs and Political...", p. 60.
57. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 33 and p. 70.
58. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 227.
59. Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action, New York: The Free Press, 1967, p. 67 and pp. 115-116.

terms of nonsubjective conditions such as drives.[60] Given the idea of survival value, behaviour, even at the form of 'at-any-cost fulfilment of basic human needs', is rational - or at least functional - from the point of view of a biological organism. In other words, behaviour can be argued to be rational, because it contributes to survival.

60. Burton states that "needs are inherent drives for survival and development". Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 39. See also: Burton, "World Society and Human Needs", p. 52.

2. THE ENTRY STAGE: THE DECISION TO ENTER INTO THE WORKSHOP

2. 1. The model of strategic action and rational choice

The facilitator has an important role to play in organising the problem-solving workshop. As stated earlier, the facilitator manipulates the workshop in the sense that he or she chooses the participants, organises the workshop setting and chairs discussions. However, that does not explain why conflicting parties decide to enter into the workshop and choose to search for a problem-solving solution. The aim of this part is to study how Burton's theory explains the entry moment, and what kind of reasoning process is assumed to be gone through by the participants. It is tentatively supposed that Burton bases his explanation of entry on rational choice theory, or more generally, on a model of strategic action. Jürgen Habermas' notions of the teleological and strategic models of action which offers, at least, conceptual tools for the analysis of Burton will be studied first.

According to Habermas, since Aristotle the concept of teleological action has been at the centre of the philosophical theory of action. By teleological action Habermas means a situation where the "actor attains an end or brings about the occurrence of a desired state by choosing means that have promise of being successful in the given situation and applying them in a suitable manner".[61] Thus, the important notion is that of a decision among alternative courses of action. Habermas defines a strategic model:

> "The teleological model of action is expanded to a strategic model when there can enter into the agent's calculation of success the anticipation of decisions on the part of at least one additional goal-directed actor. This model is often interpreted in utilitarian terms; the actor is supposed to choose and calculate means and ends from the standpoint of maximizing utility or expectations of utility. It is this model

61. Habermas, Jürgen, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Vol. 1, London: Heinemann, 1984, p. 85.

of action that lies behind decision-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches in economics, sociology, and social-psychology."[62]

Habermas discusses the assumptions underlying the teleological model of action. He claims that the teleological concept of action can be viewed under the aspect of purposive-rationality. It is assumed in the model that there are actors who achieve their ends by way of an orientation to, and influence on, the decisions of other actors. Therefore, success in action is dependent on other actors, each of whom is oriented to his or her own success and behaves cooperatively only to the degree that fits his or her egocentric calculus of utility.[63]

The Habermasian definition of strategic action draws attention to fundamental questions which can be asked when studying Burton's explanation of the entry stage. First, does an actor calculate means and ends from the point of view of utility? Second, and more generally, how is an actor assumed to make a rational choice to enter into the workshop? Third, what is the mode of rationality which is included in Burton's notion of behaviour at this stage? It is worth noting that the model of strategic action is essentially individualistic. This does not contradict the Burtonian idea of actor, because for Burton the most important actor is the individual.

Before studying Burton, the theory of rational choice - or the rational choice paradigm as it is also called - needs to be studied further. The rational choice approach can be seen to be a subgroup of Habermas' teleological model. The approach proposes to analyse human choice behaviour on the assumption that actors are rational in the sense that they tend to maximise their satisfaction of preferences or expected utility.[64] Thus, it offers a model of optimising behaviour, or as

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62. ibid., p. 85.
63. ibid., pp. 87-88.
64. Mitchell defines expected utility (EU): "The essence of the EU approach is that those making a choice among options consciously calculate the overall value, or 'utility' outcomes likely to result from such options. They then combine this utility with their estimated probability of particular outcomes and make a choice regarding the optimum course of action to achieve the outcome offering the highest Expected Utility. Expected

psychologists see it, the rational choice paradigm is a heuristic device for interpreting behaviour. There are several versions of this theory, including utility theory, decision-making theory, game theory, and exchange theory, but they all focus on studying human choice behaviour. In the social sciences, the rational choice paradigm has found the most sympathetic response among economists.[65] In general, the paradigm is appealing, because it is seen to offer a way to model behaviour. As a model, and especially as it is employed by economists, the paradigm tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as far as possible. Unlike moral theory, rational choice theory emphasises conditional imperatives, pertaining to means rather than ends.[66]

Utility is obtained by combining three factors. First, there are the *benefits* to be obtained from a particular outcome. Secondly, there are the *costs* of pursuing and obtaining that outcome. Finally, there is the estimated *probability* that choosing a course of action will produce anticipated outcome, so that the benefits accrue while the costs are borne." Mitchell, C. R., "Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgement, Rationality and Entrapment", International Social Science Journal, Vol. 127, No. 1, 1991, p. 38.

65. For a comparison of how economists and psychologists use the rational choice paradigm see: Hogarth, Robin and Reder, Melvin, "Introduction: Perspectives from Economics and Psychology", in Rational Choice. The Contrast between Economics and Psychology, Robin Hogarth and Melvin Reder (eds.), Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 1-23.

66. Rational choice theorists themselves are well aware of the assumptions underlying the paradigm as well as of the critical readings aimed at disputing the assumptive basis. The tradition of critical readings of the rational choice paradigm is not new, and, moreover, the questions imposed have been partly answered by rational choice theorists. Neither the scope nor the aim of the thesis allow me to discuss all the problems of rational choice theory and, therefore, the level of critique adopted is ontological. The crucial question about rational choice theory as it relates to this thesis is, in Denzin's words, that "is the postulate of rationality which structures this theory suitable for the analysis of the structures of rationality and emotionality that organize daily life, or is its utility limited only to the ideal norms which organize certain forms of economic action and the activities of certain kinds of scientific theorists". Denzin, Norman, "Reading Rational Choice Theory", Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1990, p. 173. For an excellent introduction to the paradigm and to its criticism see: Elster, John, "Introduction", in Rational Choice, Jon Elster (ed.), London: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 1-33. See also: Hollis, Martin, Models of Man. Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 36-38. Hollis, Martin, The Cunning of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 15-46. For discussions on the rational choice paradigm in the analysis of international conflict see: Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict", American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, 1980, pp. 917-931. Edwards, Ward, "Utility, Subjective Probability, their Interaction and Variance Preferences", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1962, pp. 42-51. Mitchell, C. R. and Nicholson, Michael, "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1983, pp. 495-520. Nicholson, Michael, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Wittman, Donald, "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1979, pp. 743-763. For an

Burton's explanation of the decision to enter into the workshop starts with needs maximisation. He states that "parties to a conflict are responding to the situation in the ways that appear most beneficial to them in light of the knowledge that they have of the motivations of others and the options open".[67] In other words, actors in conflict "seek to maximize their satisfactions in the best way they know within the structural conditions existing and within the limits of their knowledge of options".[68] Thus, human beings, according to Burton, tend to maximise their satisfactions of needs in a way that appears beneficial to them. Following the logic of the argument, it can be claimed that the Burtonian actor is motivated by the possibility of maximising his or her needs turned into utilities.[69]

This form of needs satisfaction is different from the form discussed in the previous section for two reasons. First, it is assumed that the actor takes into account and anticipates other actors and their decisions. That is not the case in the 'everyday' type of needs satisfaction which aims at needs fulfilment at any cost. Second, the actor calculates means and ends and tries to end up with a best maximisation of utility. In 'everyday' needs satisfaction the actor does not calculate, because he or she is 'conditioned' to gain the fundamental goal, that is, to achieve needs satisfaction. The needs explanations are, thus, used by Burton in two separate ways and in two situations. Needs are employed to explain the behaviour of individuals in general, and, on the other hand, needs are used to explain behaviour in a conflict situation and in decision-making in

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example of a critical reading of the paradigm and an answer to it see: Denzin, Norman, "The Long Good-bye: Farewell to Rational Choice Theory", Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1990, pp. 504-507. Abell, Peter, "Denzin on Rational Choice Theory", Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1990, pp. 495-499.

67. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 121.

68. ibid., p. 175. See also: Burton, "Resolution of Conflict", p. 8. Burton, "Theory and Reality", p. 254. Burton, "About Winning", p. 88 and p. 91.

69. As Avruch and Black note, rational choice theory turns interests and needs into utilities. They write: "They [people] strive to fulfil their needs. They try to maximize that which they find desirable. When we follow the logic of this, we see that we have turned interests and needs into utilities; human motivation, in its entirety, is thus reduced to maximizing these utilities." Benefits are thought of in the light of the rational choice paradigm as utilities that can be maximised and minimised, and the choices which produce the greatest benefit are claimed to maximise utility. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature...", p. 226. Peters' definition of motive (as described in the first part of the chapter) and the notion of teleological explanation apply here.

conflict. Consequently, in Burton's theory meanings of the notions of 'needs satisfaction' and 'needs maximising' vary according to the context.

The main assumption in Burton's theory as it relates to the decision to enter into the workshop is that humans maximise their needs, utilities or gains (Burton's own terminology varies here). The maximisation takes place by responding to the environment, and that, in turn, produces behaviour. However, there are limitations, according to Burton, to utility maximising in terms of the knowledge available and in terms of the motivations of other actors. This implies that the 'Burtonian rational choice model' is not burdened with the game-theoretic assumption that the parties have perfect knowledge of such parameters as the rules of game and the ways to calculate utilities or probabilities. In brief, man is assumed by Burton to be capable of rational behaviour and taking into account the motivations of others and the options available. Thus, the Habermasian notion of strategic action applies to Burton's theory.

The conclusion that Burton employs the strategic model can be elaborated further by asking why the parties choose to enter into the workshop when other options may be available to them. Burton studies the point and asks whether it is realistic to expect conflicting parties to pursue the seemingly complex processes of problem-solving conflict resolution. He seems to give two sets of answers. According to the first, since parties cannot afford to have a decision forced on them on important matters of values, they prefer conflict resolution rather than settlement. Therefore, it is in the interests of participants that conflict is resolved analytically so that stability is the outcome. Moreover, Burton argues that traditional mediation processes have failed because they have not been able to offer a framework in which parties could meet without in any way prejudicing their power and bargaining positions, without attracting charges of appeasement and without making it appear that they are too readily seeking peaceful solutions. Given the failure of traditional mediation processes, parties seek alternative procedures. On the other hand, parties may not be aware of these and perceive no

options, and, therefore, continue conflict.[70] These descriptions do not yet explain anything. They simply assume that parties have certain interests, and that given the option of the problem-solving workshop type of conflict resolution and the failure of traditional means, parties will rely on problem-solving procedures.

The other set of explanations refers to costs and benefits and the capacity of actors to analyse them. For Burton, the crucial question is whether resolution processes will be preferred to the cost of conflict. The question dictates the mode of answer which states that the longer-term costs of conflict will be unacceptable in the absence of an agreement. Therefore, according to Burton, even the more powerful party is prepared to seek problem-solving solutions. Alternative conflict resolution procedures may have costs as well, but these are assumed to be significantly lower than the costs of social disruption in the future if the conflict continues. Thus, Burton states, "whatever ultimate goals we seek to promote or preserve" they are "most surely and most economically achieved by problem-solving procedures".[71] What, then, leads Burton to think that actors want the 'most economical solution'? He bases his argument on the presupposition that "all varieties of human species have abilities to think, and with or without help can follow a logical and analytical thought process".[72] Therefore, they are able to go through costing processes which help them to maximise their utilities.[73]

It is important to keep in mind two things: the Burtonian notion of game and the role of the facilitator at the entry stage. According to Burton, the conflict is perceived as a zero-sum game by the parties at this stage, and, therefore, the perception of other actors and the anticipation of their moves are important.[74] Since the parties are

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70. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 98. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 89; p. 100 and p. 117. Burton, "About Winning", pp. 78-80. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 217.
71. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 120.
72. ibid., p. 214.
73. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 131. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 47; p. 69; p. 120; p. 165; p. 202; p. 214 and p. 218. Burton, "International Relations or World Society?", p. 106. Burton, "Unfinished Business in Conflict Resolution", pp. 330-331.
74. For Burton's notion of game see: Burton, "About Winning", pp. 71-73. Burton, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution", pp. 92-94.

reasoning actors, the role of the facilitator is easy to justify. The facilitator acts as a 'pull' factor: he or she pulls the actors towards the problem-solving procedures by setting out the workshop option. On the other hand, the long-term costs of the conflict act as a natural 'push' factor in the minds of the conflicting parties.

In sum, Burton assumes that the actors engage in calculations about the expected utility of various outcomes. He does not discuss in detail how the actors consider costs, benefits, and probabilities, although he supposes that human beings are capable of rational choices, i.e., maximising satisfaction of preferences (utilities). The prevailing mode of rationality derives from the ability to cost means to an end and to assess consequences of actions. Thus, the assumption that Burton applies a version of the strategic model of action to theorise the entry stage seems to be confirmed.

2. 2. The entry mode of rationality

Contrary to Avruch's and Black's claim that Burton's version of biogenetic determinism leads to irrationality of behaviour, there are several elements in Burton's theory which suggest human tendency towards rational behaviour. The question is, however, what is the type of rationality which is postulated by Burton, and more crucially, is that form of rationality appropriate for explaining human behaviour in the contexts of workshop entry and problem-solving? The first question is studied in this part of the thesis. A study of wider, ontological, views of Western rationality are needed to understand the concept of instrumental rationality which characterises the Burtonian entry stage.

Cognitive-instrumental rationality has marked the self-understanding of the modern era. The type of rationality, according to Habermas, "carries with it connotations of successful self-maintenance made possible by informed disposition over, and intelligent adaptation to, conditions of a contingent environment".[75] The telos inherent in the cognitive-instrumental mode of rationality

75. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, p. 10

is instrumental mastery. On this 'realistic' model, rational actions have the basic character of goal-directed, feedback-controlled interventions in the world of existing states of affairs.[76] Similarly, Michael Oakeshott discusses the Rationalist whose reason is aimed at problem-solving and whose character is that of the engineer. The mind of the Rationalist is controlled by the appropriate technique, and his or her attention is related to his or her specific intentions. According to Oakeshott, the view takes purpose as the distinctive mark of rational conduct: rational conduct is behaviour deliberately directed to and governed solely by the achievement of a formulated purpose. As a consequence, the view reduces mind to a neutral instrument, to a piece of apparatus in service of purposes.[77]

Habermas' and Oakeshott's accounts of cognitive-instrumental rationality and the Rationalist come close to the Weberian notion of *Zweckrationalität. Zweckrational* (instrumental, means-ends rational) action is rational in the sense of employing appropriate means to a given end. It appears that a person acts rationally when his or her "action is guided by considerations of ends, means and secondary consequences", and when, in acting, he or she "rationally assesses means in relation to ends, ends in relation to secondary consequences, and, finally, the various possible ends in relation to each other".[78] *Zweckrational* action, thus, presupposes conscious reasoning in terms of means and ends. The type of action can be defined subjectively and objectively. Subjectively defined it refers to the expectations the actor has about the consequences of alternative ways of acting, and to his or her conscious efforts to bring about one or some of these expected consequences. There is, on the other hand, also an objectively rational correlate of *zweckrational* action in Weber's theory. The selection of means to a given end can be assessed in terms of objective rationality, since it is thought to be possible to discriminate objectively - for Weber, scientifically - between adequate and inadequate means.[79]

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76. ibid., pp. 10-12.
77. Oakeshott, Michael, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, London and New York: Methuen, 1984, pp. 1-36 and pp. 83-87.
78. Weber, Max, Max Weber. Selections in Translation, W. G. Runciman (ed.) and E. Matthews (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 28-29.
79. Brubaker, Rogers, The Limits of Rationality. An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, p. 4; p. 36 and pp. 51-53.

It should be emphasised that Weber's definitions of rationality refer to ideal types, and, moreover, they are not assumed to exist without other forms of rationality.[80] For the purposes of this study, Weber's definition of *Zweckrationalität* has to be relaxed. Instead, an useful definition is offered by John Dryzek who uses the term 'instrumental rationality', and defines it in terms of the capacity to devise, select, and effect good means to clarified ends. According to him, the ideas of instrumental rationality and analytic sensibility go hand in hand. Analytic sensibility implies that complex phenomena are assumed to be best understood through intelligent disaggregation into their component parts, and that these parts are then best apprehended in a piecemeal fashion.[81]

Since the problem faced by the Burtonian actor at the entry stage is to choose the combination of means and ends that will maximise his or her expected utility, Burton has to justify the basis of the choice. Rational choice theory often discusses at this point the issue of rational belief as it relates to probability.[82] According to Burton, however, the bases of a choice can be found simply in costs. In his view, every actor engages in costing through instrumental reasoning; through reasoning which evaluates means, ends, means-ends relations and consequences. Seen from the point of view of motivation, the actor is motivated[83] at this stage largely by the possibility of utility maximising.

Different criticisms are pointed at the rational choice paradigm and its notion of instrumental rationality. Several writers note that instrumental rationality has nothing to say about either the source or

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80. Weber classifies formal and substantive rationality, subjective and objective rationality and *Zweckrationalität* and *Wertrationalität* . See: Brubaker, The Limits of Rationality.

81. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, pp. 3-6.

82. For a summary see: Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of..., pp. 49-50.

83. The notion of motivation is problematic in this context. As Hogarth and Reder note, both economists and psychologists who refer to the paradigm of rational choice agree on the importance of motivation, but disagree about what constitutes appropriate motivation. For economists motivation is appropriate only if rewards are an increasing function of the correctness of responses. Psychologists, on the other hand, have greater difficulty in specifying the conditions under which subjects are appropriately motivated. Hogarth and Reder, "Introduction: Perspectives from...", p. 11.

the rationality of the goal of the agent. It only speaks about the most effective means to given ends.[84] In Burton's case, the rationality and source of goals can be ultimately derived from universal human needs: the goal is always needs satisfaction. A choice which satisfies a need maximises an utility and, on the other hand, often a maximised utility satisfies a need.

The notion of interaction is also limited in the rational choice paradigm and in its view on rationality. As Hollis points out, interaction is thought to be the sum of choices made by each actor.[85] Although instrumental rationality offers insights neither into the rationality of goals nor into interaction apart from the sum of choices made by each actor, the narrative of Prisoner's Dilemma can add to it - according to an unconventional interpretation given by Norman Denzin - a form of cooperation. For Denzin, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a narrative which principally produces an image of social actors. As he puts it:

> "The story of 'The Prisoner's Dilemma' thus contains the rational actor within the prison-house of rationality. For the sake of the theory, and its own narrative structure, the story argues that the actor can get out of that prison only by cooperating with others. In this way, rational choice theorists make the egoistical actor a social being. Once he or she is placed within the game-theory context, all of the assumptions regarding rational choice are brought back into place. What was previously rewarding for individuals now becomes rewarding for groups. Groups will attempt to induce members to accept and adhere to actions which maximize collective rewards."[86]

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84. Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 77. Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of..., p. 50. Herbert Simon holds the view too. He claims that in its treatment of rationality, neoclassical economics (and the traditional rational choice paradigm) is silent about the content of goals and values. In contrast, according to him, other social sciences in their treatment of rationality seek to determine empirically the nature and origins of values and their changes with time and experience. Simon, Herbert, "Rationality in Psychology and Economics", in Rational Choice. The Contrast between Economics and Psychology, Robin Hogarth and Melvin Reder (eds.), Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 26. The gap between the aims of economics and other social sciences has not, as Burton's case exemplifies, prevented social scientists from adapting some elements of the rational choice paradigm.
85. Hollis, The Cunning of Reason, pp. 23-24.
86. Denzin, "Reading Rational Choice Theory", p. 175.

Thus, an actor has a possibility for cooperation, but only in a form of game. Similarly, in Burton's theory the actor is basically self-interested since he or she wants to maximise his or her personal utility, but by making the decision to enter into the workshop he or she transcends personal interests and engages in a sphere of common goals.

In sum, in Burton's model we have the basic idea of rationality as an instrumental choice of what maximises expected utility. According to Hollis, one important feature of this idea is that it makes the rational agent a bargain-hunter. He or she never pays more than he or she must and never gets less than he or she could at the price. By adding the notion of marginal utility to rational choice theory, it is guaranteed that the actor will reject inferior choices where it is unclear what is his or her best choice.[87] The rational choice model turns interests and needs into utilities, and reduces motivation to maximising these utilities. The paradigm postulates rational, calculating and maximising human nature. Moreover, when the model is applied to conflict resolution, the sociocultural context is taken as given and its relationships to the dispute treated as unproblematic.[88] In other words, the model has universalising tendencies, and it does not discuss the cultural context of utility maximising. It can be argued that by keeping silent about culturally bounded utilities, it can neither explain nor understand choices made in a particular conflict situation.

In order to recall the aim of the phenomenological part of this thesis, some critical questions can be tentatively introduced in regard to Burton's explanation of the entry stage, in regard to his study of human choice behaviour. The structure of criticism which arises from the Burtonian version of the rational choice paradigm is similar to that which arises from his needs theory. That is, given the assumptive basis of strategic action and the rational choice paradigm, it can be questioned whether the universalising picture of

87. Hollis, The Cunning of Reason, pp. 22-24.
88. Avruch and Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in...", p. 222 and pp. 226-227.

human nature postulated by the paradigm is accurate. Moreover, it can be disputed whether the minor or, rather, non-existent role given to culture is based on an appropriate view of human existence.

3. BEHAVIOUR WITHIN THE WORKSHOP STRUCTURE

3. 1. Three modes of behaviour

This section of the chapter studies the workshop situation and its modes of behaviour and rationality. Burton's method is to build upon his previous theories and explanations, namely needs theory and the strategic model of action. A pragmatic notion of human action is introduced by Burton at this stage, and the conception of rationality enriched by discursive elements.

As described earlier, Burton claims that needs relate to universal goals. Conflict is however never, according to him, over these universal goals. Rather, a question how to best achieve a goal causes disputes.[89] Given that needs are goals that are sought by all persons, in all cultures and in all circumstances, their satisfaction is also the ultimate target of any problem-solving workshop. Actions can be seen, thus, to be purposive in the workshop context, because they drive at needs fulfilment. In short, purposive actions are explained by reference to their goals in Burton's theory. These goals need not to be reached, but they motivate behaviour and affect the way the agent behaves. In terms of the mode of explanation, Burton employs the form of teleological explanation which assumes a goal at work.

However, the needs explanation is not the only one employed by Burton. According to him, the problem-solving workshop is always a costing process; a costing process which involves changes in values and means. Burton argues that "given a problem-solving forum, each party, in its own interests, will seek to find means of satisfying, not only its own needs and interests, but also those of others in order to avoid costly and dysfunctional conflicts".[90] In other words, the parties are assumed to solve problems by finding outcomes that are

89. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 145-147. Burton, "About Winning", p. 75. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 43.
90. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 22.

positive sum.[91] The Burtonian actor chooses something by costing different options in terms of ends and means. The actor is seen to maximise his or her own interests in the problem-solving forum in a way that also maximises the interests of others, and simultaneously transfers the zero-sum relationship into positive sum. For Burton, an option which satisfies the needs of all parties is the most beneficial to the participants. Burton, thus, employs the narrative of Prisoner's Dilemma to explain sociality and cooperation. By cooperating with others the rational actor is thought to be able to get out of the 'prison-house of egoism'. However, unlike the traditional interpretation of Prisoner's Dilemma, Burton does not assume that cooperation arises from the second best choice. He rather thinks that a most beneficial choice from the point of view of the individual participant includes the possibility of cooperation.

In addition to the needs explanation and the strategic model of action, Burton explains behaviour also by discussing the conceptualisation of the workshop in terms of common problems. The conception of 'pragmatic[92] mode of behaviour' is appropriate for describing this element in Burton's explanation. The ontological assumption of the view is, that reality, or at least parts of it, can be seen and interpreted in the light of problems to be solved.

Burton, however, denies the role of pragmatism in problem-solving. For him, pragmatism implies an "absence of knowledge, of theory and of predictive capacity".[93] He continues by defining pragmatism in relation to conflict resolution:

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91. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, p. 52; pp. 110-111 and p. 118. Burton, "The Facilitation of International...", p. 42. Burton, "The Means to Agreement...", p. 240. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 23. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", p. 197. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 27; p. 47; p. 88; p. 167 and p. 217.

92. The word 'pragmatic' refers also to the pragmatist movement in philosophy. It should be emphasised that although pragmatists are referred to in this part, the aim is not to study that heterogeneous philosophical approach. Attention will be drawn only to John Dewey's account of experience and the formulation of problems, William James' idea of human needs as a measure of metaphysical views, and the general notion of problem-oriented action.

93. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., p. 20. See also: Burton, John, "Conflict Resolution as a Political System", in The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vol. 2, Vamik Volkan, Julius Montville and Demetrios Julius (eds.), Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991, p. 75.

> "In other words, pragmatism is the process of exploring alternatives almost at random, though intuition and experience may guide. If these alternatives prove useful or beneficial they should be followed, even in the absence of any reasoned or theoretical justifications which would throw light on longer-term consequences. If they fail others must be sought, again by pragmatic means. Faced with a problem or a specific conflict, the pragmatist employs intuition, unconsciously held theories, trial and error, innovation and expediency."[94]

This view of pragmatism is restricted and based on limited aspects. Moreover, even these chosen elements are partly misinterpreted. To challenge Burton's view on pragmatism it is sufficient to summarise that although pragmatists deny the possibility of transhistorical knowledge, that implies neither rejection of reason nor trust in intuitive means.[95] Despite Burton's denial of pragmatism, it can be demonstrated how pragmatism opens up points of views to Burton's explanation of workshop activities.

According to pragmatism, a human being, in order to tackle practical problems and to bring change to an environment, has to be active. The notion of active experience is especially at the centre of John Dewey's thinking. He refuses to identify experience with a passive registry of the 'given'. Rather, the experiencing subject is seen to be active, a judging agent who takes what is presented to be such-and-such, selects and emphasises in arriving at a settled experience. This stress on the reconstructive function of experience means also blurring the edges of the traditional distinction between 'theoretical' and 'practical'. As John Smith notes, "the older empiricism saw experience primarily as the ultimate basis of theoretical knowledge; Dewey envisaged experience as a means and ultimately method

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94. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management..., p. 20.
95. For challenges of Burton's view see, for example: Lawler, Peter, "Pragmatism, Existentialism, and the Crisis in American Political Thought", International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 3, 1980, pp. 327-338. Rorty, Richard "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey", The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1976, pp. 280-305. Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism, Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982. Smith, John, Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.

oriented to the future and aimed at the selective control of consequences and outcomes".[96] Dewey's instrumentalism can be grasped by claiming that in his view "ideas are not mirrors, they are weapons".[97] The function of ideas is to prepare us to meet events. In short, the learning capacity of the human species, its ability to overcome obstacles that make for insecurity, are, for pragmatism and especially for Dewey, matters essentially related to the role performed by reflective intelligence in the course of experience.[98]

Similarly, Burton argues that "human decision making has, given appropriate concepts and insights into the nature of social problems and their future costs, capabilities that can and do influence future evolution".[99] Burton assumes that the problem-solving workshop provides a context for this type of decision-making, that is, decision-making which uses concepts and insights as 'weapons' for influencing and transforming reality and problems. The facilitator provides the participants with a conceptual and theoretical 'armament', if they do not have it already. Moreover, decision-making deals with the future in the sense that it evaluates future costs and tries to anticipate future obstacles to needs satisfaction. The human mind, within an appropriate framework, is for Burton an active instrument which constantly judges, selects and emphasises in order to avoid unpredicted and uncontrollable change and events.

Connotations that have become attached to the term 'experience' itself in its ordinary usage under the influence of pragmatism draw attention to some aspects of the workshop structure. The term 'experience' has a connotation of the personal undergoing, living through, or enduring of situations and events. It suggests also the acquisition of skills enabling one to respond in an appropriate fashion to the way objects encountered will behave, persons will conduct themselves, or systems will work. The term, thus, refers to active and transforming skills to accomplish a certain aim or to resolve a problem arising. On both connotations experience means interactions

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96. Smith, Purpose and Thought, p. 86.
97. ibid., p. 86. Smith refers to Santayana's discussion on Dewey.
98. ibid., pp. 78-87. See also: Hollis, Martin, "The Self in Action", in John Dewey Reconsidered, R. S. Peters (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 56-75.
99. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 72.

and transactions, commerce between the experiencing subject and whatever is encountered or needs to be handled.[100]

Burton regards the workshop as a place where active and constructive encounters between the conflicting parties can take place. In the workshop, according to Burton's explanation, the participants can acquire 'skills' to resolve problems and to consider consequences of their actions. The participants are encouraged to be analytical in order to discover options that are acceptable in terms of their interests, and that satisfy their needs. Moreover, the participants are encouraged to develop skills which enable them to respond to their environment in a more beneficial fashion in the future. Burton's conception of 'conflict provention' can be interpreted also in this light.[101] Conflict provention means, then, anticipating the future in order to produce controlled and unconflictual changes in the society by employing skills acquired in a problem-solving workshop.

There is a structural analogy between the Deweyian notion of knowing and the Burtonian explanation of workshop experience. Dewey discriminates four logical moments within a reflective experience. First, reflection arises when there is a discrepancy or conflict, a felt difficulty within our experience. Second, a careful formulation of the problem is essential if our inquiry is to be productive. The third moment demands suggestions of a possible solution. The last step involves reasoning of the consequences of suggestions, which can lead to testing and confirming hypotheses.[102] According to Burton's explanation, the methods used in the problem-solving workshop help the participants to conceptualise and perceive their conflict in terms of problems to be solved. As in Dewey's reflective experience, a problem has to be formulated in order to create a productive problem-solving process. The formulation of a problem is not,

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100. Smith, Purpose and Thought, pp. 94-95.
101. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, Part IV.
102. Bernstein, Richard, "Introduction", in John Dewey, On Experience, Nature, and Freedom, Richard Bernstein (ed.), Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1960, pp. xxvii-xxxiii.

however, enough. Considerations of practical actions have to be produced and tested against reality.[103]

As noted earlier, Burton's needs theory offers the fundamental targets for the workshop. The notion of needs can be given also another interpretation. William James considers needs as yardsticks of competing metaphysical (e.g. materialism and theism) views. Smith summarises James' idea:

> "At this point, however, James introduced another and quite different consideration, namely human needs and the possibility of their fulfilment. Instead of two alternatives differing solely in their account of 'what's what' in regard to the future, their difference is now to be estimated with respect to their 'appeal' to the person called on to believe them and this means what each of the alternatives implies about the life and destiny of the person."[104]

The Burtonian notion of 'needs as navigation points' denotes needs as universal yardsticks for the workshop: the participants can evaluate and reflect upon the workshop procedures, the options open to them and their own behaviour and others' behaviour from the point of view of needs. It should be emphasised that Burton's explanation of workshop behaviour does not suggest that using needs as navigation points should take solely an abstract form, rather, needs allow the evaluations of the practical consequences of the workshop too.

Particularly, dealing with functional problems involves the parties in evaluating the practical consequences of their actions. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Mitrany's functionalist approach has influenced the Burtonian notion of problem-solving. In Mitrany's functionalism, as well as in pragmatism, there is planning, but problems are thought to be best dealt with in an incremental manner. Similarly, Burton assumes that the workshop participants are guided by a practical interest to solve functional problems. These

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103. Burton speaks about 'reality testing' which means that the parties are helped in the workshop to test their perceptions of the conflict situation against 'reality'. Burton, World Society, p. 160.

104. Smith, Purpose and Thought, p. 39.

problems are assumed to be dealt with in an incremental manner, since the solution is not a final end product. Rather, the solution "is itself another set of relationships that contains its own sets of problems".[105]

Dewey's account of control offers also an angle to study some practical elements of problem-solving workshops. Dewey defines the problematic situation in general as some form of maladjustment between the interest and the needs of the organism and the potentialities of the environment. Given the problem of maladjustment as it is defined by Dewey, the control of an environment with the help of technology, social planning and engineering is regarded as solving problems. By comparison, self-control or, more important, reorientation of the self with respect to personal values and ideas, did not receive a great deal of attention in Dewey's thinking. Thus, it has been claimed that the type of problems where the organism 'becomes problematic to itself', and the problems consequent on that development, are not noted by Dewey. There are, however, problems which cannot be resolved solely in terms of controlling devices projected by an instrumental intelligence aiming at reshaping the environment.[106]

The Deweyian notion of control can be related to workshop activities by asking to what extent the behaviour of the participants is assumed to be motivated by the aim of control? The whole project of the problem-solving workshop can be seen in the light of social engineering which aims at controlling the environment, that is, managing inevitable changes at all levels of the social world by solving problems. However, Burton does not stop here; he goes further when he explains behaviour in the workshop. He introduces elements of discursive rationality which aim neither solely at controlling nor at purposive considerations of means to an end when resolving a conflict. Discursive rationality points strongly to reorientation and reinterpretation of the 'self' with respect to personal, as well as cultural, values and ideas. In other words, the aspect of control is important in Burton's explanation, but it is not, according to him, the

105. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 119.
106. Smith, Purpose and Thought, pp. 88-89.

only purpose the actors have within the problem-solving structure. The interactional nature and hermeneutical elements (actors' own interpretations of the situation) of the workshop suggested by Burton add, thus, a new layer to his explanation of workshop behaviour.[107]

To sum up, the study of Burton's explanation of workshop activities reveals how he builds upon the notion of biologically conditioned human 'being'. The layer following needs theory assumes that human nature is rational in the sense that it is capable of costing and evaluating the consequences of actions. A human being is, thus, considered to be able to learn voluntarily, and to change and control its natural and social environments. However, control of an environment is not always sufficient for resolving a conflict, and, therefore, Burton postulates an image of a person who engages himself or herself in self-reflective and interpretative behaviour.

3. 2. Instrumental and discursive rationality

Since the workshop, according to Burton, includes purposive cost-benefit analysis of means to an end for resolving the conflict at hand, the notion of instrumental rationality remains in his explanation. Similarly, the type of explanation referring to a pragmatic interest implies instrumental rationality, because it assumes the finding of instrumentally solvable functional problems in the workshop. Solving problems is seen to be instrumental for more general and important aims, namely conflict resolution and needs satisfaction. The communicative aspect of the workshop structure, on the other hand, suggests the form of discursive rationality advocated, for example, by John Dryzek.[108] Although Dryzek promotes partly uncritically discursive rationality, the concept as it is developed by him opens up an interesting insight into Burtonian problem-solving. It describes

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107. Burton, Dear Survivors, p. 120. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 135. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 204.

108. The notion of discursive rationality is developed by John Dryzek in his Discursive Democracy. Dryzek himself uses the term 'communicative rationality'. In this thesis, however, the term 'discursive rationality' is preferred, because it emphasises the dialectic and contextual nature of this type of rationality. The word 'dialectic' refers in this work solely to dialogue.

fruitfully an aspect of workshop rationality which is hinted at, but not fully theorised by Burton.

What, then, does discursive rationality mean, and how does it appear in the Burtonian notion of workshop behaviour? Dryzek's views rely heavily on the notion of communicative rationality developed by Jürgen Habermas. According to Dryzek, discursive rationality is rooted in the interaction of social life. Dryzek refers to Habermas and writes[109]:

> "Communicative *action* is oriented toward intersubjective understanding, the coordination of action through decision, and the socialization of members of the community [...]. Communicative *rationality* is the extent to which this action is characterized by the reflective understanding of competent actors. This situation should be free from deception, self-deception, strategic behavior, and domination through the exercise of power. Communicative rationality is a property of intersubjective discourse, not individual maximization, and it can pertain to the generation of normative judgements and action principles rather than just to the selection of means to ends. However, communication is concerned in part with the coordination of actions, so communicative rationality cannot totally replace instrumental rationality; rather it can only restrict the latter to a subordinate domain."[110]

According to Habermas, the proper home of communicative rationality is the life-world of social interaction, where individuals construct and interpret the identities of themselves and others. Communicative rationalisation, in its ideal form, is seen by Habermas to free the life-world from custom, myth and illusion on the one hand and from the domination of specialists and manipulators on the other. Dryzek

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109. There are, however, several differences between Habermas' and Dryzek's views. Dryzek claims that instead of limiting discursive rationality to the sphere of the life-world of social interaction, he expands it to the spheres of 'social' and 'systemic'. It follows, that he does not see the domains of instrumental and communicative rationality to be separate and incompatible. Dryzek also tries to overcome the critique levelled at Habermas' objectivistic position which seeks an objectivistic solid ground for both truth and morality. Moreover, he advances the view according to which communicative rationality provides only procedural criteria, not substantial, about how to disputes and arguments might be resolved and about how principles might be constructed. ibid., pp. 14-22.

110. ibid., p. 14.

claims that discursive rationality can contribute to the resolution of complex social problems, because it also allows for reasoned consensus on normative judgements that, if attained, could motivate actions. Moreover, it makes understanding across different frames of reference possible, since it constitutes generalizable rather than particular interests.[111]

Dryzek discusses 'discursive designs' which are the institutional manifestations of discursive rationality. He uses such examples as alternative dispute resolution procedures and problem-solving workshops. These are discursive designs, according to Dryzek, since around them the expectations of a number of actors can converge; individuals participate in them as citizens, not as representatives of states or a hierarchical body; no concerned individuals are excluded; collective and individual needs and interests of the individuals involved are included; they are oriented to generation and coordination of solution and actions situated within a particular problem context and within the design there are no hierarchy or formal rules, though debate may be governed by informal canons of free discourse and a decision rule of consensus obtains.[112] Following Dryzek's argument, it can be claimed that a third party is needed to facilitate communication within such a design, because he or she can help the parties to overcome instrumental rationality and to move into the sphere of discursive rationality.

If a problem-solving approach requires that all the actors involved scrutinise the nature of their relationships and analyse the ultimate roots of their differences in the interests of the extinction of the causes of conflict, it involves, according to Dryzek, discursive rationality. Beyond the continued pursuit of instrumental rationality, the workshop as a discursive design can allow for the exercise of discursive reasons about normative judgements, interests, goals, values and problem definitions. Given this understanding of the problem-solving workshop, possible different cultural backgrounds of the participants become highlighted. As Dryzek states, cultural

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111. ibid., p. 20 and pp. 53-54. See also: Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, p. 10 and pp. 95-101.
112. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 43.

differences are not merely semantic; they involve a lack of agreement on the very existence of certain objects. If an agreement is absent, participants can still reach consensus based on reasoned disagreement by striving to understand the cultural tradition and conceptual framework of the other participants.[113]

The Burtonian explanation of workshop behaviour lends itself to be interpreted in the light of the notions of discursive design and discursive rationality. Burton's explanation fulfils many of Dryzek's criteria of discursive rationality: interaction and intersubjective understanding are taken into account; the individuals participate as citizens; all relevant parties are assumed to be included; there is a particular problem context which does not, however, exclude the scrutinization of mutual relationships; the workshop is structured in a nonhierachical manner and discussions are informal and free to an extent. Moreover, the third party does not merely emphasise instrumental costing, he or she also guides the participants in the direction of the communicative possibilities of the workshop.

However, it would be a mistake to entirely identify the Burtonian account of workshop behaviour with Dryzek's idea of discursive design. In other words, it is not accurate to claim that Burton refers solely to the discursive mode of rationality while explaining behaviour in the workshop. What are the main differences? First, the ontological roots of Burton's explanation are in universal and biologically founded needs, and, therefore, it contains a certain degree of determinism. Unlike Burton, Dryzek claims that needs, such as identity, become constituted in a discursive design, in communicative social interaction. All forms of biological determinism are lacking from Dryzek's view. Second, Dryzek opposes social engineering and sees discursive rationality as a weapon against tendencies which enable engineering. As described in the previous chapter, Burton's texts suggest a form of social engineering within the workshop. Third, unlike Dryzek, Burton puts a lot of emphasis on analytical reasoning and instrumental costing processes in order to guarantee a purposive account of the conflict at hand. As pointed out above, Dryzek explains workshop activities mainly in the

113. ibid., p. 42 and pp. 90-108.

light of discursive, non-purposive reasoning. Furthermore, Dryzek emphases dialectic interaction, whereas Burton's views on utility maximisation reduce the notion of interaction to a 'sum of choices made by each actor'. Fourth, unlike Burton, Dryzek considers culture as a main constitutive factor of human 'being'. In sum, Burton's man is more determined by biological conditions than Dryzek's socially constituted human. Burton's actor is strongly tied to utility maximisation and instrumental rationality, whereas Dryzek's actor is largely communicative, and, therefore, eager to, through discursive designs, modify his or her socially and culturally produced needs, values and goals.

3. 3. Interaction

Until now the focus has been largely on the question how Burton explains human behaviour. However, the workshop concept leads us also to a study of interaction as the notion of discursive rationality clearly demonstrates. Although Burton does not fully theorise discursive rationality, it can be studied how and to what extent he explains interaction while discussing the workshop context. The title of the chapter reveals Burton's focus: his emphasis is on individual behaviour instead of interaction.[114]

There are three approaches to interaction as it relates to conflict resolution in the workshop context in Burton's texts. First, in Conflict and Communication (which does not yet present Burton's version of needs theory) there is an assumption that misperceptions, false interpretations, prejudice between national groups and unrealistic expectations about the policies of other states are elements, if not causes, of conflicts. It is argued that psychological factors play an important role in conflicts, and controlled communication is a means to tackle them. According to Burton, the virtue of controlled communication is that it is based on face-to-face discussions in which persons have to present viewpoints as well as re-assess and correct perceptions and interpretations. The

114. It is worth noting that, for example, in World Society there is no discussion on interaction at all. Neither does the word 'interaction' appear in any of his indexes.

improvement of communication, that is, making it effective, between the parties in conflict is thought to be important, because it enables the corrections.[115]

Burton approaches interaction from the point of view of communication by arguing that the improvement of communication in an interactive problem-solving process is a precondition for conflict resolution. The picture of communication given by Burton is narrow. He limits the discussion to the claim that communication needs to be effective: it needs to be effective in terms of the accuracy of conveying information and the exactness of interpretation. For Burton, "information must be received as was transmitted" and it is vital that "what was transmitted was sent deliberately and contained accurate information".[116]

The second approach to interaction suggests that the facilitator influences heavily direct interaction between the participants. Burton notes that the "seminar [Falklands/Malvinas workshop] format, including the third party panel of scholars, was designed to ensure an analytical and explanatory discussion that would reveal the hidden data of motivation and intention".[117] Moreover, Burton states that the "quality of the interaction and of the outcome depends almost entirely on the input from the facilitating panel".[118] Thus, the facilitator is seen to be largely in charge of the analytical interaction between the participants. He or she creates an innovative atmosphere and facilitates qualitative interaction which consists of direct and effective communication. Positive interaction is, in this view, something which seldom exists in a conflict resolution situation without the facilitator.

Third, Burton discusses interactive decision-making models. In that mode of decision-making decisions are made as a result of interaction among all parties concerned. For Burton, problem-solving

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115. Burton, Conflict and Communication, p. 11; p. 23 and pp. 49-59. See similar views also: Burton, "Resolution of Conflict", p. 17; p. 21; p. 23 and p. 27.
116. Burton, Conflict and Communication, p. 55.
117. Burton, "The Facilitation of....", p. 40.
118. Burton, "Three Qualities of a Secure Nation", p. 245. See also: Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 117-118. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 42; p. 45; p. 78 and p. 195.

workshops are a form of interactive decision-making in which the participants are assisted to monitor communication. According to him, the "system of interaction is an open one, that is, the parties are subject not merely to interaction among themselves, but to interaction with a wider environment over which there can be no control".[119] His argument is the same as earlier, namely, positive interaction can be created in problem-solving conflict resolution processes, and analytical and effective communication advances it.[120]

Since Burton only hints at the possibility of discursive rationality, interaction is an under-theorised and -explained field in his texts. He does, however, state that in the intimate and analytical interaction of problem-solving conflict resolution "the only reality which is relevant is that of the participants".[121] The statement can be seen to point to interaction which relies on the creation of a shared reality and shared interpretations of the conflict and conflict resolution situation. Since the dominant mode of rationality is then discursive, priority is given to multiple interpretations of reality instead of biologically based needs. If the problem-solving workshop is explained in this way, there is no need to postulate the notion of universal human needs. There is no need to find the universal denominators of man.

It should be emphasised that Burton does not accept the explanation. He argues that the interactive procedures of conflict resolution are essentially the same for peoples of all cultures, because there is an 'universal culture' based on needs.[122] In other words, there is the common reality founded on needs of which it is possible to find a common definition. Different interpretations of reality are referred to in the problem-solving context only in order to find the seminal 'needs-reality'. The workshop which acts as a filter, filters away

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119. Burton, Global Conflict, p. 135.
120. Burton, Dear Survivors, pp. 70-74. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 131-136. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Function...", pp. 190-191 and p. 199. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 183-187.
121. Burton Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 204.
122. ibid., pp. 206-207.

cultural influences, among them 'culturally-bounded' interpretations of reality.

In sum, Burton's version of needs theory, which extends its internal logic to his conflict and conflict resolution theory, explains human behaviour mainly from the point of view of the solitary ego. It explains behaviour from the point of view of the needs conditioned and utility maximising individual. The internal logic of Burton's needs theory leads him to assume that common goals are achieved through utility maximising behaviour and, therefore, there is no need to theorise interaction. The supposition is, however, problematic: it gives a narrow, biological, picture of man and prioritises instrumental rationality over other rationalities.

4. FACILITATOR: BEHAVIOUR AND RATIONALITY

4. 1. Two modes of behaviour

The study of Burton's views of the behaviour of the facilitator shows that he does not refer to needs as an 'engine', as a motivational force of facilitative behaviour. He gives lists of recommended behaviour but does not explain explicitly why the facilitator acts.[123] Burton's starting-point for explaining the expertise of the facilitator can be found, however, in his version of needs theory. When a need is theoretically established, it opens up a space for expertise since the means of satisfying it may very well be in the domain of an expert.[124] In Burton's view, human needs can be discovered, if not satisfied, with the right kind of expert knowledge. On this argument, then, one person may know what another person needs better than he or she himself or herself. Moreover, needs can be generally spoken about as realities to be studied disinterestedly by needs experts.

It can be asked, then, why Burton rejects discussion on the needs of the facilitator? The 'primitiveness' of needs, or more precisely, the simplicity of drives explains the lack of study. The facilitator has, as Burton seems to suggest, overcome the state of simple needs satisfaction, because he or she is fully aware of his or her own needs. He or she is, therefore, not any more entirely conditioned by biology, by biologically founded drives. Thus, in Burton's theory, the motivational force of a facilitator is not derived from drives, but, rather, from self-awareness and self-reflection. The claim can be supported and illustrated by studying the double role of the facilitator suggested by Burton.

According to Burton, the "third party is in an analytical, almost a teaching situation, drawing attention to false assumptions, and

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123. See especially: Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict

124. Louch, Explanation and Human Action, p. 70. See also critiques of expertise of needs thinking: Illich, Ivan "Needs", in The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power, Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), London: Zen Books, 1992, pp. 88-101. Watt, "Human Needs, Human...", p. 538.

opening up possibilities of arriving at potentially realistic ones".[125] Thus, the third party is a fully participating actor in the workshop. What makes his or her participation special, however, is his or her superior knowledge of the reasons of behaviour and of the alternative options available for the participants. The knowledge is superior because it implies an awareness of general theories of conflict and human behaviour. It enables the third party to be also an "observer in a scientific role" who "makes no assessments, judgements or value interventions".[126] Since the facilitator is not greatly influenced by culturally dependent values or wants, he or she can act as a filter. Burton emphasises the capacity of the facilitator for reasoning, and sees his or her mind as an instrument capable of dealing with complex problems and putting general theories into practice. The mind of the facilitator is filled with expertise knowledge, and it does not consist of prejudices and is neutral in relation to the values of the participants.

The motivational force of the Burtonian facilitator can be found in the purposive, instrumental mind which aims at solving problems and theorising on the basis of experience. Oakeshott calls this type of mind which is assumed to be unprejudiced and open without dispositions a 'purified mind'. Behind the belief in the purified mind there is a conviction that mental disinterestedness and absence of prejudice are intellectual virtues. Moreover, the notion arises from a desire for certainty and the conviction that certainty is possible only in respect of something we have been given, i.e. the capacity to employ the mind.[127]

If the instrumental mind is the ultimate basis of behaviour, in what kind of context is this mind, then, assumed to work? Given Burton's thesis of alienation and the notion of professional cure (the medical metaphor) which is needed to overcome alienation, the mind of the expert facilitator is assumed to work in curative processes. A parallel of the principles of psychoanalytic therapy and problem-

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125. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 199.
126. ibid., p. 204. See also: Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 116-122. Burton, Dear Survivors, pp. 119-123. Burton , Global Conflict, pp. 149-152. Burton and Dukes, Conflict: Practices in..., p. 144.
127. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 83-95.

solving helps to understand these processes. According to Springborg, therapy "puts a heavy emphasis, not on the causality of behaviour, since that is beyond the control of the individual to a certain extent, but on the ability of the individual to understand, adapt to, and monitor his own development and his relations to the external world".[128] Although the analyst helps to interpret the psychic processes of the patient with reference to metapsychological principles, the form which therapy takes is that of the patient telling the analyst, rather than the analyst telling the patient. Psychoanalysis is, thus, concerned principally with the subject and his or her interpretations.[129]

Similarly, the workshop context created by the facilitator is aimed at increasing the ability of the participants to understand the development of a particular conflict and relationships as they relate to that conflict. The subject's own interpretation of a conflict situation is important, but the third party is needed to refer to human needs as 'navigation points', as ontological principles and fundamental goals of the workshop. Human needs are employed by the facilitator in the same way as metapsychological principles are used by the psychoanalyst. Needs are depth metaphors of which the facilitator is aware, but the participants are not. The facilitator can help the participants to interpret the situation by referring to these ontological principles. The facilitator is supposed to be able to fulfil the task, if his or her mind is free from the burden of 'cultural prejudices' which hinder the understanding of the universal principles of human behaviour.

However, it should be emphasised that there are major differences between the ideas of psychoanalytic therapy and Burtonian problem-solving conflict resolution. For example, Freudian theory could never have engaged in postulating needs and drives in a behavioural manner; it never presumed to have a scientific knowledge of the causality of behaviour. Therefore, it rarely stepped outside the frame of reference that the patient himself or herself supplied.[130] Burton, on the other

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128. Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs..., pp. 195-196.
129. ibid., pp. 195-196.
130. ibid., p. 196.

hand, postulates needs in a behavioural manner giving them a status of a motivational force. Since needs are thought to be 'objectively' defined, they are employed as reference points outside the frames of reference of the participants. The facilitator uses them, for example, to conceptualise and interpret the commonalities between the participants although the participants themselves do not necessarily raise the question of common needs.

Although the Burtonian purified mind is abstract in the sense that it is free from prejudices and it aims at certainty, it is not alienated from practices. As described earlier, the notion of action research is vital for problem-solving approaches. The term 'experience' in its ordinary use is in accordance with the idea of action research. To speak of medical, legal or business experience is to refer to the encounter of an individual and his or her familiarity with the materials, operations and transactions appropriate for one of these practices. Thus, the primary emphasis falls on one being acquainted with, or actually having done the operation in question. According to the second connotation, to speak of the experience is to point to the ability to perform effectively.[131] Similarly, the Burtonian explanation of the behaviour of the facilitator does not arise solely from the notion of purified mind, it includes elements which emphasise the familiarity of the facilitator with the workshop practices. Familiarity, in turn, implies effective behaviour.[132]

4. 2. The rationality of the facilitator

The conception of rationality underlying the notion of a purified mind derives from Enlightenment rationality. The eighteenth century writer Condorcet exemplifies this type of rationality. Enlightenment means in this framework a political concept for emancipation from prejudice through the diffusion of scientific knowledge with its many practical consequences. For Condorcet, perfection no longer means the realisation of a telos found in the nature of a thing; it signifies instead a process of improvement that has a direction but is not

131. Smith, Purpose and Thought, p. 94.
132. See: Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict.

teleologically limited in advance. Condorcet advocates 'scientifically organising learning processes' which are based on scientific help in answering normative questions. He assumes that all problems to which religious and philosophical doctrines previously supplied answers can be largely transposed into scientifically manageable problems, and in this sense rationally resolved. Moreover, he supposes that rationality that has broken through in the natural sciences does not merely reflect standards peculiar to Western civilisation but is inherent in the human mind in general.[133]

The idea of the rationalisation process found in Condorcet's thinking is summarised by Habermas:

> "He [Condorcet] relies on an automatic efficacy of the mind, that is, on the belief that human intelligence is disposed to the accumulation of knowledge and brings about advances in civilization through a diffusion of this knowledge per se. This automatism appears in two aspects, which stand in an inverse relation to one another. From the *practical* perspective of those involved, the civilizing advances appear to be the results of a practice of disseminating knowledge, of the influence of philosophers on public opinion, of the reform of the schools, of popular education, and so on."

In addition to the practical perspective there is always a theoretical perspective of the scientist:

> "From the *theoretical* perspective of the scientists, the civilizing advances present themselves as phenomena that can be explained by laws of nature. Thus: from the practical perspective, rationalization appears as a communicative practice carried on with will and consciousness; from the theoretical perspective, it appears as a cognitive process flowing along in a lawlike way."[134]

The Burtonian problem-solving project as a whole is characterised by Condorcetian rationality, and, moreover, the mode of rationality is

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133. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, pp. 145-151.

134. ibid., p. 151. Note also the similarities between these views and those presented by (neo)behaviouralists (Chapter II).

embodied especially in the behaviour of the facilitator.[135] Three points from Burton's views support the claim. First, Burton's criticism of dogmatism and his attachment to 'scientific processes' reflect the Enlightenment tradition. Burton assumes that he rejects ideological constructs of humanity in favour of an advanced, scientific and non-ideological model.[136] Second, the Burtonian project is based on a belief in the existence of natural-law-like needs. By assuming that a set of needs can be discovered scientifically (objectively), Burton trusts in scientific procedures in finding the essence of humanism. Moreover, he supposes that because we can define objectively these needs, they can work as guidelines for future decision-making and policies. The problem-solving workshop can be, then, regarded as a 'scientific learning process' where science, based on knowledge of natural laws, helps in answering normative (value) questions. Third, the role of the Burtonian third party as a teacher is similar to that of Condorcet's Enlightener: both of them are assumed to contribute to the civilising process by diffusing knowledge.

Two other forms of rationality can be found in Burton's explanations of the behaviour of the facilitator. In addition to Enlightenment rationality, the facilitator is assumed to be capable of social engineering which demands instrumental rationality. The facilitator selects the participants, organises the workshop setting and chairs discussions. All these activities require instrumental rationality which is based on the capacity to devise, select, and effect good means to clarified ends. The end is conflict resolution, and the workshop procedures and setting are means to this clear end. Moreover, these are means which can be manipulated and engineered with the help of an instrumental mind. The workshop can also, on the

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135. Jean-Pierre Cot places Burtonian workshop rationality in a more recent tradition. He writes: "Burton's views belong to a respectable stream of thought, illustrated by the Quakers and by certain apostles of international conciliation. A patient discussion among reasonable men can solve any problem. A panel of specialists (even before World War I, Ludwig von Bar and Effremoff had proposed a council of wise men) must help the parties by giving them some technical information on their difficulties." Cot, Jean-Pierre, "Critical Remarks on John Burton's Paper on Resolution of Conflict with Special Reference to the Cyprus Conflict", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1972, p. 33.

136. See especially: Burton, Dear Survivors, pp. 22-26. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 16-24. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 30-35.

other hand, be considered to be a discursive design where the facilitator participates in and practices discursive rationality with the participants. The facilitator takes part in exercising discursive reasoning about normative judgements, staying, nevertheless, neutral in relation to the values the participants have.

4. 3. The rationality debate as an epistemological question

The question of the rationality of the facilitator and his or her modes of behaviour cannot be detached from the continuing rationality debate in the social sciences. The debate is vital, since the Burtonian facilitator is assumed to be a scientist theorising on the basis of his or her practical workshop activities.[137] The discussion can be seen from many angles. It can, for example, be reduced to the question, what does it mean to understand or explain social actions? Habermas summarises the essence of the debate by arguing that "different models of action presuppose different relations of actor to world; and these world-relations are constitutive not only for aspects of the rationality of action, but also for the rationality of interpretations of action by, say, social-scientific interpreters".[138] From the point of view of this study, it is relevant to limit the debate to two issues: the views of common rationality or common good reasons and of the access of a researcher to those reasons. In other words, it is plausible to ask do we have to postulate a certain form of common rationality to explain human action, and how does a researcher have an access to the domain of behaviour?

The rationality debate has been advanced by Peter Winch who employs Wittgenstein's notion of a language game.[139] In brief, Winch considers social action as rule-following. His thesis is that "our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given us in the language

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137. It is important to keep in mind Burton's methodological principle of abduction. He is not an empiricist in a strict sense.
138. Habermas, The Communicative Theory of Action, Vol. 1, p. 102.
139. Winch, Peter, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973 (first published 1958). See also: Winch, Peter, "Understanding a Primitive Society", in Rationality, Bryan Wilson (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 78-111. Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, pp. 82-88.

that we use".[140] The concepts we have settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world. In other words, language in some sense determines or constitutes what is perceived. The inevitable conclusion which follows from Winch's argument is that truth is relative to a language game or, rather, to a form of life from which a language game arises. In this view, reason becomes relativised: what counts as a reason is context-dependent. Hollis and Lukes clarify the difference between the rationalist and relativist positions:

> "The crucial point is that the giving of reasons involves a claim that what is cited would, if true, be a good reason. In other words it has to be objectively true that one thing is good reason for another. Where the relativist sees only differences in these standards for rating reasons as good, the rationalist insists on ranking the standards."[141]

For the purposes of the thesis it is sufficient to introduce the extreme poles of the debate suggested by Hollis and Lukes. Winch's relativist view has been already pointed out. Similarly, Ian Hacking claims that "our discoveries are 'objective', simply because the styles of reasoning that we employ determine what counts as objectivity".[142] Thus, candidates for truth or falsehood have no existence independent of the styles of reasoning that settle what it is to be true or false in the domain in question. Therefore, we cannot reason as to whether alternative systems of reasoning are better or worse than ours, because the "propositions to which we reason get their sense only from the method of reasoning employed".[143] At the other pole, Robin Horton claims that there is a "strong core of human cognitive rationality common to the cultures of all places on earth and all times since the dawn of properly human social life".[144]

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140. Winch, The Idea of a..., p. 15.
141. Hollis, Martin and Lukes, Steven, "Introduction", in Rationality and Relativism, Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 10-11.
142. Hacking, Ian, "Language, Truth and Reason", in Rationality and Relativism, Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, p. 49.
143. ibid., p. 65.
144. Horton, Robin, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited", in Rationality and Relativism, Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, p. 256. See also: Horton, Robin, "African Traditional Thought and Western Science", in Rationality, Bryan Wilson (ed.), London: Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 131-171.

Burton is closer to the extreme view of Horton than to that of Winch. Burton's position is, however, not simple. If we accept Avruch's and Black's interpretation of Burton's version of needs theory, needs lead inevitably to irrationality. We cannot, therefore, assume any common rationality or good reason which underlies behaviour. Unlike Avruch's and Black's view, the interpretation of Burton's needs theory which refers to survival value, can presuppose a certain form of rationality. That is, behaviour is rational when it contributes to the survival of an organism. Nevertheless, it is not justifiable to speak about common good reason underlying behaviour, because the notion of survival value does not necessarily imply any reasoning process. An organism may behave 'automatically', without reasoning, in a way that guarantees its survival.

On the other hand, Burton conceives a person to be calculating and cost-benefit oriented in a conflict situation as demonstrated earlier. Thus, he presupposes a common form of rationality and makes a claim to universality. Given these presuppositions, explaining human behaviour, even across different cultures, is possible, because persons are seen to behave similarly (and maybe also predictably) on the basis of their instrumental rationality in all conflict situations. Discursive rationality, however, brings in an element of situational rationality which opposes universalising tendencies. A discursive design, from which discursive rationality arises, is sensitive to different language games, and therefore, does not necessarily denote an universal good reason. In that view, an explanation, or rather understanding, of behaviour is, then, context-dependent.

The question about the access of the researcher to the domain of behaviour is here restricted to the question whether our explanation of behaviour, and especially behaviour in other cultures, is necessarily dependent on the rules of logic as we know and use them. It can be asked is our social inquiry inherently 'perspectival', that is, are the perspectives of actors and observers - sets of beliefs, attitudes and assumptions that specify how social reality is to be understood - different? 'Perspectivism' can be formulated in either a weak or a strong form. In a weak form, it asserts that interpretation and explanation must make reference to the perspectives of actors. In

a strong form, it asserts that the perspective of an interpreter cannot be divorced from the account he or she gives. In other words, the strong form assumes that there can be no perspective-neutral interpretation and explanation.[145]

As Steven Lukes notes, even weak perspectivism is incompatible with theorising based on the notion of utility maximising. The strategic action model which relies on the notion does not investigate the beliefs and motivations of actors, but imputes them for predictive and explanatory purposes.[146] It is included in the notion of utility maximising that the "concept of the objective world - in which the actor can intervene in a goal-directed manner - [...] must hold in the same way for the actor himself and for any other interpreter of his actions".[147] Habermas discusses that assumption:

> "An interpreter can go beyond this *subjectively* purposive-rational orientation and compare the actual course of action with the constructed case of a corresponding *objectively* purposive-rational course of action. The interpreter is able to construct this ideal-typical case in a nonarbitrary manner since the agent relates in a subjectively purposive-rational way to a world that is, for categorical reasons, identical for actor and observer, that is, cognitively and instrumentally accessible to both in the same way."[148]

By employing a rational choice framework, Burton presupposes a nonarbitrary access to the objective domain of behaviour on the part of the researcher. Although Burton does not rely on the rational choice paradigm in a strict sense[149], by postulating the utility maximising actor, he, however, accepts implicitly many of the underlying assumptions of the paradigm. To put it simply, as far as rational choice theory is concerned, Burton rejects perspectivism in

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145. Lukes, Steven, "Relativism in its Place", in Rationality and Relativism, Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 301-305.
146. ibid., pp. 301-305.
147. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, p. 102.
148. ibid., pp. 102-103.
149. His explanation does not involve in theorising, for example, on true beliefs, risks, probabilities or limited information. Neither does it explain *all behaviour* by referring to the paradigm.

his explanation of behaviour. Similarly, Burton's version of needs theory which suggests the existence of needs independently of the perceptions of actors, i.e. 'objectively', presupposes that the researcher has unproblematic access to the objective domain of needs, of motivational forces. Therefore, it is assumed by Burton that it is not necessary for the researcher while explaining behaviour of an actor to refer either to the perspective of the actor or to his or her own perspective.

Thus, there are two features in the Burtonian way of explaining behaviour which bring him close to the rationalist pole of the rationality debate. First, his version of needs theory gives needs the status of natural laws. Since they are seen to be objective laws, similar to those in natural sciences, there is no need to make any reference beyond them while explaining human behaviour. Second, Burton's explanation of the entry stage postulates an image of utility maximising man. The view presupposes a purposive-rational actor whose world is accessible to an interpreter. Moreover, the world is thought to be accessible to both an actor and to an interpreter in a same way.

There are, however, some discursive and hermeneutical elements in Burton's explanations which indicate relativism. He argues that the interpretations of the participants of their conflict are an important part of a workshop. It could logically follow - although Burton does not go this far - that these interpretations form the very core of theorising. The view would shift the emphasis from the rationalist to the relativist pole. Moreover, if the workshop was explained more explicitly by Burton from the point of view of discursive designs, as Dryzek suggests, the focus could be on culturally-bounded communication and interactions without reference to any universal ontological basis (e.g. needs). By developing the discursive and hermeneutic elements of the workshop further, Burton could move from the realm of explanation to that of understanding.[150]

150. To put it simply, to explain is to find causes in the scientific manner. Understanding, on the other hand, aims at reproducing how people order their experience.

4. 4. Concluding remarks

Summary table:

	Outside the workshop	The entry stage	Within the workshop	The facilitator
The 'engine' of behaviour	- needs as drives - (values and interests)	- personal utility maximisation - (needs)	- (needs) - utility maximisation - pragmatic considerations	- purified mind
The form of rationality	- survival value	- instrumental	- instrumental - discursive	- Enlightenment - discursive - instrumental
The mode of explanation	- causal - teleological	- teleological	- teleological	- teleological
The principal image of man	- biologically determined	- utility-maximisers	- utility-maximisers -(communicative)	- Enlightener

As the table above summarises, Burton's explanation of human behaviour consists of different layers which imply different forms of rationality, namely instrumental, discursive and Enlightenment rationality. It can be asked which one of Burton's explanatory layers has a priority over other layers? Avruch's and Black's answer is that since Burton postulates biogenetic needs as an ontological basis, needs and their irrationality form the most important layer in relation to which the other levels are inevitably of minor importance. The view can be widened further by claiming that the layers postulated by Burton are logically inconsistent. If we establish our explanations of behaviour on something irrational, on something which is not totally in our control (e.g. needs or irrational *id*), it is logically incoherent to establish parallel explanations which rely on inherent human rationality (e.g. utility maximising or communicative behaviour). It is, however, possible to relax the irrationality thesis

of needs theory, and claim that needs are rational, because they relate to the survival of the organism. That is, since needs contribute to survival, they are fundamentally rational given the foundational value of survival. In that case the assumption of the existence of different forms of rationality is plausible.

As it has been demonstrated, the way Burton establishes his explanatory models is complex. He builds up a model of a cost-benefit oriented person whose aim is personal utility maximising. On the other hand, he is in favour of discursive designs which aim at expanding communication, self-reflection and consensus. The role of the facilitator is crucial to bridge these two models: he or she, as a purified mind, is assumed to transfer the parties from the first, cost-benefit, to the second, discursive, realm. However, it should be emphasised that Burton himself does not articulate the move clearly.

The next part of the thesis moves into phenomenology. The aim is through sociological phenomenology to emphasise discursive and hermeneutical elements of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution. By employing a phenomenological interpretation an alternative ontological basis - which is lacking from many attempts to challenge the Burtonian approach - can be developed. For example, the following questions will be discussed in the second half of the thesis: the constitution of man (e.g. through needs or social interaction); the manner in which identities are produced in social interaction and through culture; the most fruitful way to understand human actions, if reference cannot longer be made to universal needs; and an understanding of the double role of the facilitator without an implicit reference to a purified mind.

CHAPTER V: SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED HUMAN EXISTENCE: A CRITIQUE OF JOHN BURTON'S IMAGE OF HUMAN 'BEING'

The previous chapter, where the rationale of the problem-solving workshop was studied, clarified further the image of human 'being' and nature postulated by Burton. As demonstrated, his version of human needs theory is an inseparable part of his conflict and conflict resolution theory. Burton establishes an 'onion model', and gives biologically based needs priority over, for example, culture in the structuring of human existence. This part of the thesis discusses the social constructionist view offered by phenomenologist Alfred Schutz. His view erects non-biological foundations for human existence and, thereby, challenges the Burtonian biological account. Moreover, it provides us also with conceptual tools which can be employed to give the problem-solving workshop a phenomenological interpretation.

In order to understand the philosophical context of phenomenology a short study of its general features will be presented. From the point of view of this study it is important to see how phenomenology differs from positivist social sciences and especially from political behavioralism. Similarly, it is vital to understand the points of departure between such phenomenologists as Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz whose philosophy is inclined towards phenomenological sociology. Given that Schutz's main focus is on the social world, his theories offer notions which are applicable to the study of conflict and conflict resolution. The second part of the chapter discusses the dimensions of the social world on the basis of Schutz's views. The last part continues the discussion, but shifts the emphasis to the idea of socially constructed reality, needs and identity.

Phenomenological philosophy and sociology tend to stress the 'subjectivist' view-point: the point of view of the experiencing 'I' (consciousness) which is the starting-point of experiences, actions and interpretations in the social world. Unlike many other philosophical approaches, it derives from structural accounts of the everyday experiences and world. In other words, it does not hide behind the notion of a philosopher who is an outside observer, a

purified mind. This feature of phenomenological literature explains the way how the pronoun 'I' is employed in the text as a parallel to the pronoun 'we'.

1. GENERAL FEATURES OF PHENOMENOLOGY

1. 1. Phenomenology and the theory of science

Phenomenology is described as a return to the traditional task of philosophy, that is, to a search for wisdom and to an understanding of the nature of the cosmos and the position of man in it. By the end of the nineteenth century the scope of a part of philosophy became severely limited, because the success of natural science in describing the physical world gave rise to the conviction that there is nothing about the physical world that cannot be investigated by empirical means. Moreover, the acceptance of the Cartesian division of mind and body led many philosophers to the study of 'objective realities as they are in themselves', with the result that the subjective factor in consciousness was ignored as irrelevant and of no philosophic importance. A kind of philosophy developed which attempted to treat consciousness as an empirical phenomenon, as an objective reality, that can be investigated by the quantitative methods of natural science.[1]

In the same spirit, in some approaches of the social sciences the study of man became understood to be a genuine natural science of individuals in society, differing in degree and not in kind from the well established natural sciences. The centrality of empirical theory characterised this, in many other ways heterogeneous, social science movement. Two models of legitimate knowledge became recognised by the 'positivist temper', as Richard Bernstein calls the essence of the movement; namely, the empirical or natural sciences and formal disciplines such as logic and mathematics. The focus on empirical theories was based on the idea that once we achieve empirical

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1. Stewart, David and Mickunas, Algis, Exploring Phenomenology. A Guide to the Field and Its Literature, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990 (2nd ed), pp. 4-5.

theories in the social disciplines, these disciplines become genuine 'natural' sciences. The task of the social scientist was thought to be, therefore, to describe and explain social phenomena as accurately as he or she can and not to advocate normative positions.[2] Bernstein summarises the 'positivist temper' as it manifests itself in the social sciences of this century:

> "At the core of this naturalistic interpretation is the conviction that the aim of the social sciences is the same as that of the natural sciences. Collecting and refining data, discovering correlations, and formulating testable empirical generalisations, hypotheses, and models, all have important roles to play, but they are not sufficient to establish the social disciplines as mature sciences. There must be the growth of testable and well-confirmed theories which explain phenomena by showing how they can be derived in nontrivial ways from our theoretical assumptions. At the heart of scientific explanation there must be discovery of and appeal to laws or nomological statements."[3]

The naturalistic interpretation of the social sciences was, thus, and to a certain extent still is, based on the assumption that there is a distinction between empirical and normative theory. Moreover, it was assumed that theory is different from praxis; theory has its own sphere and praxis its own. The task of the social scientist was seen to be to theorise from the point of view of a disinterested observer. The objects in the social world were assumed to be accessible to a study in a similar way as those in the natural world, because it was thought that there is no qualitative difference between these worlds. In other words, the quantitative and experimental methods of natural science were expected to be suitable for the social sciences. For this doctrine of science theories and laws were formulated for the sake of prediction, which, according to the view, was an essential feature of scientific explanation.

Some remains of the 'positivist temper' can be still found, for example, in political behavioralism whose *a priori* method and

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2. Bernstein, Richard, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1979, pp. xi-xxiv and pp. 4-54.
3. ibid., p. 43.

presuppositions are largely based on the ideals of the natural sciences. However, in political behavioralism a clear distinction is made between what is human and what is merely natural. The starting-point for the analysis of human behaviour is the meaning the actor attaches to his or her action. The meaning of action is studied from the point of view of overt behaviour. Thus, the study of large areas of the intended meanings of the actor are neglected. As Hwa Yol Jung argues, "political behavioralism as a scientific method abandons the relevance of the vast universe of experiential data of everyday life simply as 'subjective' or 'private' and thus unscientific and unempirical".[4] 'Private' and motivational phenomena are reduced to 'public' and observable events or the external components of action with the result that the intentional meaning-structure of human conduct becomes completely rejected by political behavioralists. Similarly, the internal structure of consciousness is interpreted narrowly or not noted at all.[5]

Edmund Husserl's The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenology[6] can be read as a seminal critique of the limited and distorted interpretation of the modern natural sciences. Husserl's point of departure is an analysis of Galilean physics which created, according to him, the Galilean style of sciences. The Galilean style is characterised by a cleavage between the world as it presents itself in the perceptual experience of everyday life and the world as it is in scientific truth and in 'reality'. According to Husserl, modern science of the Galilean style refuses to accept the perceptual world at face value. Instead, reality is believed to contain, embody, and conceal a mathematical structure. The universe is seen by modern science as a construction resulting

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4. Hwa Yol Jung, "A Critique of the Behavioral Persuasion in Politics: A Phenomenological View", in Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, Maurice Natanson (ed.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, Vol. 2, 1973, p. 139.
5. ibid., pp. 138-143. For a similar criticism see also: Schutz, Alfred and Luckmann, Thomas, The Structures of the Life-World, Vol. II, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1989, p. 294. From now on the abbreviation SLW, 2 will be used to refer to this book. On behavioralism see also: Wagner, Helmut, Phenomenology of Consciousness and Sociology of the Life-World: An Introductory Study, Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberta Press, 1983, pp. 11-15.
6. Husserl, Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenology, David Carr (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

from, being the correlates of and conceptualisation of a specific sort, namely, idealisations, mathematizations, algebraizations, and formalizations. As a consequence, the universe is thought to be uncovered by means of mathematical notions.

Husserl's explication of the presuppositions of modern science does not mean their denial or nullification. Rather, it means the delimitation of their legitimate validity. He argues that the reference to an ideal mathematical order must be eliminated from our experience of the world and the latter must no longer be seen from the perspective of the former. Thus, for Husserl, the mathematization of nature implies the ever growing alienation of the universe of physics from the world of perceptual experience. Therefore, the restoration and reinstating of the life-world is one of his main themes in Crisis.[7]

Alfred Schutz's works, on the other hand, can be read as an advancement of Husserl's insights, which Husserl himself never systematically developed with regard to the social sciences. In other words, Schutz lays the phenomenological foundations of the social sciences.[8] Schutz does not explicitly discuss the Galilean sciences, although he agrees with Husserl's conclusions. His starting-point is a critique of the Weberian understanding of the concept of subjective meaning. Schutz accepts Weber's axiom that the social sciences must be value-free. He likewise accepts Weber's methodological individualism and his contention that social phenomena are properly

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7. Gurwitsch, Aron, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, Lester Embree (ed.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, pp. 17-19 and pp. 34-38. For a detailed analysis of the processes of matematization, formalization and idealisation see: ibid., pp. 33-59. See also: Husserl, Crisis, pp. 52-53 and pp. 65-66. Alfred Schutz discusses the issue too. He writes: "The phenomena of productive subjectivity, which alone constitute the life-world, remain closed off to the mathematical/natural-scientific point of view for essential reasons, and the natural scientist forgets that he himself, with his subjectivity which produces science, cannot find an understanding of himself and his action in any objective science. Only recourse to this sphere of productive subjectivity, which is of course made use of by natural science and by psychology which is oriented toward the natural sciences although it is never brought to a self-understanding, can on the one hand free mathematical natural science from the crises concerning its foundations and on the other hand ground for a true science of man (*Geisteswissenschaft*)." The quote is from Schutz's letter to Aron Gurwitsch in Grathoff, Richard (ed.), Philosophers in Exile. The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1959, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989, p. 11.
8. Bernstein, The Restructuring of ..., pp. 135-136.

understood in terms of ideal types.[9] However, Schutz maintains that Weber fails to state clearly the essential characteristics of understanding (*Verstehen*), of subjective meaning, and of action. In The Phenomenology of the Social World[10] Schutz questions the Weberian idea that subjective meaning is attached to experience or action and studies how lived experience gets meaning rather through reflection. On the basis of Bergson's philosophy of life, Schutz discovers the importance of the meaning-giving stream of consciousness, the *durée*, and states that "meaning is a certain way of directing one's gaze at an item of one's own experience".[11] He, then, distinguishes subjective meaning from objective. According to Schutz, an action or experience has only one subjective meaning, that of the actor himself or herself.[12]

Schutz's clarification of the Weberian understanding of the task of the social sciences implies a challenge to the basic Cartesian ontological and epistemological dichotomy that infects the various forms of naturalism and empiricism. The dichotomy between behavioralists who study what is observable and psychologists who limit themselves to study what is mental is overcome by Schutz. Schutz's thesis is, in Bernstein's words, that "to understand[13] human action we must not take the position of an outside observer who 'sees' only the physical manifestations of these acts; rather we must develop categories for understanding what the actor - from his own point of view - 'means' in his actions".[14]

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9. Ideal types or second degree constructs, as Schutz calls them, are constructs of the social world, action and actor produced by the social scientist in accordance with the scientific problem he or she sets for himself or herself. They are based on the first degree constructs of the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily life within the social world.
10. Schutz, Alfred, The Phenomenology of the Social World, George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967 (originally published 1932).
11. ibid., p. 42
12. ibid., pp. 15-44.
13. Understanding has multiple meanings which, according to Schutz, must be distinguished from each other. Understanding is: (1) the experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs; (2) an epistemological problem, and (3) a method peculiar to the social sciences. Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers II, Studies in Social Theory, Arvid Brodersen (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, p. 56. From now on the abbreviation CP, 2 will be used to refer to this book.
14. Bernstein, The Restructuring of..., pp. 138-139.

Schutz, likewise Husserl, turns to the study of the everyday world to understand the actor. He considers the everyday world to be the social reality which the social sciences have to investigate and upon which understanding as a method peculiar to the social sciences needs to be founded. The way the social sciences should approach this world is through second degree constructs (ideal types), which must include a reference to the subjective meaning an action has for the actor.[15]

Although Schutz's contribution to the issue of understanding in the social sciences is based on original thought, there is a hermeneutical tradition in Western philosophy which discusses the topic. For example, Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert argued in the turn of this century that there is a fundamental difference between natural science, on the one hand, and studies such as history, jurisprudence, and economics, on the other. Dilthey maintained that the distinction is one of content, and he insisted on using the term *Geisteswissenschaften* to refer to sciences of socio-historical phenomena. He focused on mind and especially on *Erlebnis* , lived experience or immediate experience, which achieves an outward expression. According to Dilthey, by interpreting this outward expression in terms of what lies behind it, we come to understand others. Understanding takes place, therefore, by reconstituting our own lived experience in the other person. Rickert, on the other hand, introduced the term *Kulturwissenschaften*. According to him, the content of these sciences was the study of cultural products and institutions. It is these and their meanings the cultural sciences seek to understand, not inner psychological processes as some other hermeneutically oriented philosophers would claim. In Rickert's view, *Kulturwissenschaften* dealt with values, because it is in terms of values we approach actuality and organise reality.[16]

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15. Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality, Maurice Natanson (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 57-66; p. 149 and pp. 209-210. From now on the abbreviation CP, 1 will be used to refer to this book. See also: Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, pp. 128-131.

16. Walsh, George, "Introduction", in Schutz, Alfred, The Phenomenology of the Social World, George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967 (originally published 1932), pp. xix-xx. See also: Bleicher, Josef, The Hermeneutic Imagination. Outline of a Positive Critique of Scientism and Sociology, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, pp. 52-68. Dallmayr, Fred, "Phenomenology and Social Science: An Overview and Appraisal", in

Three things should be emphasised from Schutz's and Weber's position in relation to this tradition. First, Weber and Schutz claim that the task of the social sciences is to understand the subjective meaning of the other. However, they argue, the interpreter never comprehends the meaning in its totality, because the other's stream of consciousness always eludes that of the interpreter. Thus, they do not consider *understanding to be simply re-experiencing and* reconstruction of the experience of an author as *Dilthey saw it to be.* Second, Schutz is in agreement with Weber that Dilthey's basic approach is unscientific, because Dilthey's notion of understanding is unsatisfactory, and his theory lacks the conception of ideal types as a resource of scientific objectivity. Third, on the basis of Rickert's discussion on values, Schutz and Weber argue that although questions are asked in terms of a value or interest, they can be answered from an objective, that is, scientific, point of view.[17]

In addition to Schutz's attempt to lay the phenomenological foundations for the social sciences and to clarify the task and concepts of these sciences, his impact on other philosophers and social scientists is remarkable. In the contemporary social sciences, the impulse of Schutz's work is most prominently displayed in ethnomethodology and recent developments in the sociology of knowledge. For example, Harold Garfinkel's Studies in Ethomethodology[18] studies the everyday world and what is taken for granted by actors within it. The study is conducted by experimentally disturbing and testing the limits of the everyday world. Peter Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction of

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Explorations in Phenomenology, David Carr and Edward Casey (eds.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 135-138 and pp. 146-148. Srubar, Ilja, "On the Origin of Phenomenological Sociology", Human Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1984, pp. 164-170.

17. ibid. It should be strongly emphasised that although there are several similarities between Weber's and Schutz's projects, Schutz criticises and clarifies many of Weber's views. See a summary: Barber, Michael, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1988, pp. 25-33. Schutz's account of ideal types as a resource of scientific objectivity will be discussed in the next chapter.

18. Garfinkel, Harold, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall, 1967. See also a summary of Garfinkel's views and their relation to Schutz's phenomenology: Psathas, George, "Ethnomethodology as a Phenomenological Approach in the Social Sciences", in Interdisciplinary Phenomenology, Don Ihde and Richard Zaner (eds.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 73-98.

Reality[19], on the other hand, has a Schutzian origin in terms of its focus on the distribution of knowledge in the life-world. The book studies what people 'know as reality' in their everyday, non- or pre-theoretical, lives. For Berger and Luckmann the task of the sociology of knowledge is, in other words, to concern itself with the social construction of reality.

1. 2. Basic concepts: intentionality, the life-world and phenomenological reduction

According to Husserl, all conscious acts have a fundamental directional character: they point toward some object, whether objectively real or not. All thinking is thinking of or about something, all remembering is remembering of something, etc. All consciousness is, thus, consciousness of something. This is an essential feature of intentionality. For phenomenologists, intentionality of consciousness does not mean planned or purposeful thought as the common-sense usage of the word may suggest. Rather, intentionality in Husserl's sense refers primarily to the phenomenological structure of acts of perception, in the broad Cartesian sense of the term 'perception'. Neither are the acts of intentionality psychological events. The structure of intentionality is purely *a priori*, that is, logically necessary. The object intended (noema), as intended to, corresponds to the objective side of intentional experience. The intentive process (noesis), the intending as such, is a subject dimension within the structure of the intentional act.[20] Noesis and noema are, in other words, the poles of the structure of consciousness which cannot be separated from each other. As Schutz describes the connection, "every experience is, thus, not only characterized by the fact *that* it

19. Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Penguin Books, 1991.
20. Cox, Ronald, Schutz's Theory of Relevance: A Phenomenological Critique, The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, p. 61. Natanson, Maurice, "Introduction", in Essays in Phenomenology, Maurice Natanson (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 14-15. Stewart and Mickunas, Exploring Phenomenology, pp. 8-9.

is a consciousness, but it is simultaneously determined by the intentional object *whereof* it is a consciousness".[21]

Earlier in this chapter there have been references to the everyday world of the social actor as the basis for philosophy and the social sciences. The everyday world, the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) as it is called by phenomenologists, is encountered in everyday life. It is given in direct and immediate experience - especially perceptual experience and its derivatives, memory, expectation, and the like - independent of and prior to scientific interpretation. The life-world is the world within which we pursue all our goals and carry on all our activities, including scientific ones.[22] Schutz describes the life-world:

> "The following considerations concern the structure of what Husserl calls the 'life-world' (*Lebenswelt*) in which, in the natural attitude, we, as human beings among fellow-beings, experience culture and society, take a stand with regard to their objects, are influenced by them and act upon them. In this attitude the existence of the life-world and the typicality of its contents are accepted as unquestionably given until further notice."[23]

Schutz's description brings up some fundamental elements of the life-world. First, it is a cultural world and refers to a social group. According to Gurwitsch, the term 'life-world' has a socio-historical meaning: there is no life-world *per se* . Every concrete life-world refers to a certain social group at a certain phase of its history. Thus, every life-world gets its interpretation and is conceived of by a social group whose life-world it is.[24] Second, the natural attitude prevails in the life-world. Through the natural attitude the world appears to us taken for granted and self-evidently real 'until further notice'. In other words, in that attitude we do not question the

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21. Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers III. Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, I. Schutz (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 4-5. From now on the abbreviation CP, 3 will be used to refer to this book.
22. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, p. 3.
23. Schutz, CP, 3, p. 116.
24. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, p. 57.

existence of the intersubjective life-world and its objects.[25] Third, since the life-world is the world within which we act, within which we can understand our fellow-men, and be understood by them, it is our paramount reality. Fourth, we act and operate not only within the life-world but also upon it. Thus, we modify it and it modifies our actions by setting limits to them. As a world of action and work the life-world is pervasively determined by a pragmatic motive. Fifth, in the life-world we confront objects and events from the outset in their typical character.[26]

The socio-historical meaning of the life-world refers also to its intersubjective nature. Schutz states that "the world of everyday life is from the outset an intersubjective one".[27] That is, the life-world is shared with fellow-men, experienced and interpreted by others: it is a world common to all of us. The life-world is also the area where we encounter the other. Moreover, it is the area where we perform our acts directed toward others. The life-world does not depend on our birth or death, because it is historically based. It is historical in terms of moral codes, economic situations, religious practices, etc. The life-world is intersubjective also in respect of the future generations.[28]

In order to understand the origins of Schutz's phenomenology and a seminal difference between Schutz and Husserl, we need to return to the notions of the natural attitude and intersubjectivity.[29] Although Husserl and Schutz share the claim that we have to go back to the

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25. In the natural attitude of everyday life the following is taken for granted without question: (1) the corporeal existence of other men; (2) that these bodies are endowed with consciousness essentially similar to my own; (3) that the things in the outer world included in my environs and that of my fellow-men are the same for us and have fundamentally the same meaning; (4) that I can enter into interrelations and reciprocal actions with my fellow-men; (5) that I can make myself understood to them; (6) that a stratified social and cultural world is historically pregiven as a frame of reference for me and my fellow-men and (7) that therefore the situation in which I find myself at any moment is only to a small extent purely created by me. Schutz, Alfred and Luckmann, Thomas, The Structures of the Life-World, Vol. I, London: Heinemann, 1974, p. 5. From now on the abbreviation SLW, 1 will be used to refer to this book.
26. ibid., pp. 3-8.
27. Schutz, CP, 1, p. 312.
28. Stewart and Mickunas, Exploring Phenomenology, p. 127. See also: Schutz, CP, 3, p. 312.
29. These writers have distinct periods in their thinking whose study is rejected in this account of phenomenology.

life-world to find the most fundamental ground for philosophy and the social sciences, their approaches are different. Husserl attempts to establish a transcendental philosophy upon a transcendental ego, whereas Schutz rejects the Husserlian transcendental interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity and maintains that intersubjectivity is a mundane problem.

In order to uncover the sphere of transcendental subjectivity Husserl introduces a phenomenological method based on reductions. The reductions are the device of phenomenology to go beyond the natural attitude of man living within the world he or she accepts. The purpose of such a technique is to reach a level of indubitable certainty which lies beyond the realm of mere belief. The aim is, in other words, to disclose the pure field of consciousness. The means of conducting reductions is called 'bracketing' which implies 'putting in brackets' the existence of the outer world, along with all the things in it, including fellowmen, cultural objects and society. Furthermore, our belief in the validity of our statements about this world has to be suspended too. Thus, not only our practical knowledge of the world but also the propositions of all the sciences dealing with the world have to brought within brackets. Similarly, I[30], the human being as a psycho-physiological unit has to be bracketed: I have to suspend belief in my mundane existence as a human being within the world.[31]

In more technical terms, the bracketing is the methodological suspension of what Husserl terms the 'general thesis of natural standpoint'. That means placing in phenomenological doubt my traditional common-sense taking for granted the very reality of the everyday world. As a result, I now review reality with a phenomenological attitude. This changing of the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude is called by Husserl 'performing the

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30. It is the conscious and concrete 'I' which can perform the reduction, not an abstract 'we'.

31. Natanson, "Introduction", pp. 7-14. This description of the phenomenological reduction is the most primitive. For more detailed studies see, for example: Natanson, ibid., Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 104-109 and pp. 122-126. Vaitkus, Steven, How Is Society Possible? Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as Problems of the Social Group in Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, p. 138. Wagner, Phenomenology of Consciousness and..., pp. 40-45.

epoché ' or 'transcendental phenomenological reduction' which brackets the very worldliness of the ego and returns to the pure stream of consciousness as such. What is left after this reduction is the transcendental ego in whose constitutive activity the world arises.[32] Steven Vaitkus describes the result of the reduction:

> "Having carried out this reduction in which transcendental ego is isolated from all references to others, it now becomes possible to describe the constitution of the sense of 'the other' from within this primordial sphere of ownness and, in so doing, to demonstrate that the transcendental ego is indeed the founding stratum upon which the constitution of intersubjectivity is based."[33]

Schutz, however, asks "how can the isolated philosopher, the nonparticipating transcendental observer who performs *epoché*, mediate with someone else".[34] In other words, Schutz notes the danger of solipsism with regard to the transcendental ego. Schutz's conclusion concerning Husserl's reduction is that the attempt to constitute transcendental intersubjectivity in terms of the operations of the consciousness of the transcendental ego does not succeed. Therefore, according to Schutz, it is clear that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but it is a problem belonging fundamentally to the life-world. He argues that the products of the sense determination of other subjectivities and our consciousness of them are socially determined. Schutz's philosophical project carries out a 'relative natural analysis' of intersubjectivity in the everyday world by providing an analysis of the relative natural conception of the world[35] held by the actors in everyday life. In other words, he analyses the fundamental structures by which the actors take for granted and produce a particular social world for themselves. He, thus, establishes the foundation for intersubjectivity to the mundane

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32. ibid.
33. Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, p. 138.
34. Schutz, CP, 3, p. 80.
35. The relative natural conception of the world is conception which is given in society as an *a priori* to individual experience. The conception, although it is relative to a particular socio-historical situation, appears to the individual as the natural way of looking at the world.

sphere. However, it should be emphasised that Schutz's suspicious stance towards the transcendental ego does not mean that he moves into the realm of the empirical social sciences where the focus is on the contents of the natural attitudes of different social groups. Rather, he is interested in seeking the *a priori* structures to be found in any relative natural conception of the world.[36]

36. Schutz, CP, 3, p. 82. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p. 64. Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, p. 141.

2. DIMENSIONS OF THE SOCIAL WORLD

Schutz's constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude which rejects the study of intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem permits the inclusion of sociality. As mentioned, Schutz's theory does not involve the assumption of a solipsistic ego. His notion of person points to the intrinsically social character of consciousness. Thus, his philosophical project points to the analysis of the dimensions of the social world, such as intersubjectivity, interaction, communication, social groups, institutions and language.

2. 1. Typifications, interests and systems of relevance

In the natural attitude things in the factual world are from the outset perceived as types: my experience of the world takes place in terms of typifications. In other words, the outer world is not experienced as an arrangement of individual unique objects, dispersed in space and time, but as, for example, 'books', 'lakes', 'animals', 'fellow-men'.[37] Typifications are taken-for-granted, that is, I do not question them until further notice. Typifications become problematic when my attention is directed to some feature not included in them. Since a type is originally formed by ignoring certain individual features not pertinent to the situation or purpose in which or for the sake of which it arises, a new relevant information may make it necessary to revise, expand or form a new type. When a new typification is formed it will be sedimented in my stock of knowledge and it will be valid until further notice.[38]

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37. Schutz claims, however, that I may take the typical apperceived object as an exemplar of the general type, but I do not need by any means to think of, for example, the concrete cat as an exemplar of the general concept of 'cat'. For example, the cat of my neighbour, Jonas, shows all the characteristics which the type 'cat', according to my previous experience, implies. But what he has in common with other cats does not concern me. I look at him as my friend, as such distinguished from all other cats. Thus, I am, without a special motive, not induced to look at Jonas as a mammal, an animal, an object of the outer world, although I know that he is all this too.

38. Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 7-9 and p. 306. Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 233-234. Schutz, Alfred, Reflections of the Problem of Relevance, Richard Zaner (ed.), New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970, pp. 56-64. Schutz, Alfred, On Phenomenology and Social Relations. Selected Writings, Helmut Wagner (ed.), Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970, pp. 116-120. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, pp. 142-146. Cox,

Typifications, thus, represent the world to me in typical form. Four aspects of typifications need to be highlighted. First, typifications include expectations of the world. For example, I expect cats behave in a typical way, and I would be surprised to find an animal which looks like a cat but enjoys fetching sticks thrown for it. Second, my network of typifications does not simply consider human individuals, but it also considers their course of action patterns, their motives and goals and the social products which originated in their actions. Third, every typifying of objects, events and others necessarily involves self-typification, taking on roles. Fourth, as described earlier, typifications are stored in my stock of knowledge.

Why, then, are certain typifications selected from my stock of knowledge to be employed in certain situations? Why am I merely concerned with some aspects of particular typified objects? Schutz argues that all types are in relation to the particular purpose at hand. This purpose is, according to him, nothing but the theoretical or practical problem. In other words, whatever types I employ to interpret experience will depend on my practical interest and the problem at hand. The relationship between interest and a set of typifications is mutual. Typifications determine the interest, because in the light of a certain set of typifications certain objects or aspects of objects stand out for me in any experience and certain objects or aspects will go unnoticed. Furthermore, a set of typifications itself carries with it interests which, in turn, determine types.[39]

In Reflections of the Problem of Relevance Schutz discusses in a detailed manner interest structures or, rather, what he calls relevance structures, and answers why certain typifications come into play in certain circumstances. He studies why and how our attention is focused on this or that object or aspects of them, and how the experience of objects becomes thematic. For Schutz, even perception involves choice, because one may choose which perceptual

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Schutz's Theory of Relevance, pp. 5-10. Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, pp. 115-116 and pp. 140-141.

39. Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 124-127. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p. 37. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, p. 9.

elements will become thematic, and hence subject to interpretation. Something becoming subject to interpretation does not, however, mean that it becomes predicative: all this may happen at the pre-predicative level. The basic concepts with regard to the systems of relevance are 'theme' and 'field'. When something becomes a focal theme of thought it is presented in a field, in relation to a 'background'. As a part of the field is given, for example, the autobiographical situation which is unique to me alone, that is, the history of my past experiences as it is sedimented in my stock of knowledge.[40]

Schutz's thesis concerning relevances and typifications is that which is relevant to a person in his or her current situation and for his or her current purposes serves to select traits for subsumption under a typification. Schutz distinguishes three types of relevances: topical, interpretative and motivational. By virtue of topical relevance something is constituted as problematic in the midst of unstructuralized field of unproblematic familiarity. Topical relevance is, thus, the relevance by virtue of which an object is made a problem, made the theme or topic of thought, is segregated from the background of unquestionable and unquestioned familiarity. Topical relevance, therefore, brings material from the unquestioned and marginal background, from the habitual knowledge, into the thematic field. Topical relevance can be either imposed or intrinsic. If an unfamiliar experience imposes itself upon me by its very unfamiliarity, the relevance can be called imposed. On the other hand, the relevance is intrinsic if an object becomes topically relevant to me through voluntary attention. The categories of imposed and intrinsic extend themselves to other relevances as well.

When something has become a theme of my thought, it needs to be interpreted. That is, it needs to be subsumed under the various typical prior experiences which constitute my actual stock of knowledge at hand. In interpretative relevance an aspect of present or previous experiences takes an importance for interpreting a new set of perceptions. In other words, by virtue of interpretative relevance

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40. Schutz, Reflections of the Problem..., pp. 3-5. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, pp. 72-72. See also: Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 9-10.

certain typifications are selected as relevant to the interpretation of an object or aspect of it. The selection is done on the basis of the recognition of similarity and difference. Motivational relevance, on the other hand, is founded on the interpretative decision for the planning of future conduct. Motivational relevance can be in the form of 'in-order-to' and 'because' relevances. The 'in-order-to' relevances emanate from the already established project of action and the 'because' relevances deal with the motivation for the establishment of the paramount project itself. The forms of relevances (topical, interpretative and motivational) are interdependent.[41]

The systems of relevance are items of one's stock of knowledge at hand. The stock of knowledge itself is a collection of typifications, sedimented from previous experiences and formed according to the relevance systems. It is made up of typifications of the common-sense world. As mentioned, through these typifications the objects in the life-world are perceived typically and within a horizon of familiarity. Experiences and interpretations of the world included in the stock of knowledge are mainly handed down from the social stock of knowledge. In other words, knowledge included in the individual stock is largely socially derived, distributed and approved. The stocks of knowledge, and the systems of relevance as parts of them, are not static. Rather, they are in a constant process of change.[42]

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41. Schutz, CP, 3, pp. 122-132. Schutz, Reflections of the Problem..., pp. 26-30; pp. 35-36; pp. 45-52 and pp. 68-71. On relevances see also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, pp. 182-229. For an excellent summary of Schutz's theory of relevance see: Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, pp. 72-91. Schutz's example (here simplified and modified), originally presented by Greek sophist Carneades, suggests the following. I come home from a pub and perceive that there is something unexpected in the corner of my room. I think that it may be either a pile of rope or a coiled snake. Thus, the object has become by virtue of topical relevance a theme of my thought. By virtue of interpretational relevance I subsume this unknown object under the type 'pile of rope' instead of the type of 'snake', because in my stock of knowledge there is the type 'rope' which corresponds with or, rather, is relevant to this experience. The interpretational decision to choose the type of 'pile of rope' determines my future action in a way that I go to bed and start reading James Joyce's Ulysses instead of taking a knife and stab the object.

42. All temporal and social arrangements of subjective experience of the life-world are fundamental elements of the stock of knowledge. The focus is here on the social arrangements. In sum, the types of knowledge included in the stock are the knowledge of the fundamental structures of the life-world, the routine knowledge (including skills and useful knowledge), and the specific knowledge at hand. For a summary of these see: Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, pp. 94-98. For detailed discussions on the stock of knowledge see: Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 120-134. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, ch. 4. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, p. 111. For the social nature of the stock of knowledge see: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, pp. 261-262.

It can be tentatively argued that the study of the relevance systems is important in the context of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution, because they form a precondition for communication. Schutz claims that communication presupposes the holding of common relevance systems by the partners in the communication. He states that "successful communication is possible only between persons, social groups, nations, etc. who share a substantially similar system of relevances".[43] In other words, the disparity of the systems of relevance makes the establishment of a common discourse impossible.

2. 2. Intersubjective understanding

In several problem-solving conflict resolution theories the notion of understanding is taken for granted and, therefore, not clarified. It is assumed that an understanding of the position of the other party can be gained in the problem-solving workshop. John Burton implicitly establishes his notion of understanding in the idea of universal human needs. Needs are assumed to be the common human denominator from which the understanding of an other person derives. Intersubjective understanding is, however, not that simple. Neither should it be regarded as a psychological concept which denotes empathy or feelings. In order to discuss intersubjective understanding we need to return to the notion of the life-world.

As mentioned earlier, in the life-world I look at the world within the natural attitude. What is characteristic to the natural attitude is that in it I take the existence of fellow-men for granted, just as I take for granted the existence of natural objects. Thus, I assume that intelligent fellow-men exist as elements of the life-world. Furthermore, I assume that the objects of the life-world are, in principle, accessible to the experience of other persons. Schutz calls

43. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, p. 261. See also: Schutz, CP, 2, p. 238. Schutz, CP, 3, p. 132. Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations, p. 121.

these two assumptions the fundamental axioms of the natural attitude.[44]

The axioms rest upon two idealisations. First, the idealisation of the 'interchangeability of standpoints' consists of the idea that if I were there, where he or she is now, I would experience things in the same perspective, distance, and reach as he or she does. And, if he or she was here where I am now, he or she would experience things from the same perspective as I. Second, the idealisation of the 'congruence of relevance systems' implies that he or she and I learn to accept as given that the variances in apprehension and explication which result from differences between my and his or her biographical situations are irrelevant for our present practical goals. These two idealisations together form, according to Schutz, the 'general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives'. For Schutz, the thesis is the presupposition for a world of common objects and therewith for communication.[45]

The Schutzian theory of alter ego and intersubjective understanding gets its full meaning in the context of the discussion on the spatial and temporal structures of the life-world. According his view, I experience the world as spatially organised so that the place my body occupies at a certain moment within this world is the starting-point from which I take my bearing in space. Schutz describes body as a 0-coordinate in the space in relation to which other objects are perceived:

> "It [my body] is, so to speak, the center '0' of a system of coordinates which determines certain dimensions of orientation in the surrounding field and the distances and perspectives of the objects therein: they are above or underneath, before or behind, right or left, nearer or farther. And, in a similar way, my actual 'Now' is the origin of all the time-perspectives under which I organize the events within

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44. Schutz , CP, 1, pp. 11-13. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 97-99. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, pp. 208-209.
45. Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 11-13 and pp. 315-316. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, pp. 59-61. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, pp. 41-42. See also a case study: Pollner, Melvin, "Mundane Reasoning", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 35-54.

the world, such as the categories of fore and aft, past and future, simultaneity and succession, sooner or later, etc."[46]

It is the temporally, spatially and socially structured life-world which forms the basis for the understanding of the alter ego. Although my body is the natural 0-coordinate around which my world is arranged, I accept the existence of fellow-men in the everyday world. I accept that their bodies form their 'here' and that their time is organised around their 'now'. I also assume that they have access to the objects of the life-world. Moreover, I assume that we can gain sufficiently congruent relevance systems for the purposes of practical goals in the everyday world. However, despite these assumptions prevailing in the natural attitude, the intended (subjective) meaning of the other is to a certain degree unreachable to me.

In the everyday world, in the sector of it which is accessible to my immediate experience, I do not merely experience the body of another person as an object, but I experience it as a field of expression. As a field of expression it expresses something about other consciousness. In other words, through his or her expressive movements or acts[47] I can know something about his or her consciousness and thoughts. However, the body I perceive refers to something I cannot perceive, to 'inwardness', to his or her inner life. This inner life is something which transcends my immediate and direct experience. Schutz calls this phenomenon 'medium transcendencies of the boundaries of the life-world'. Through these transcendencies a distinction is made between one's own and something other.[48]

In the natural attitude I take for granted that I can master the medium transcendencies. In other words, the boundaries of experience that I run into are crossable. I can cross the boundaries, for example, with the help of indications, marks, signs and symbols as means of conveying news from beyond the boundaries of immediate

46. Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 306-307.
47. According to Schutz's terminology, expressive movements have meaning only for the observer, whereas expressive acts have meaning for the actor too.
48. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, pp. 109-117.

experience.[49] Signs[50], and especially language as a system of signs, are important from the point of view of this study, because even though essentially news-bearers, they are a precondition for communication with other people. Given that language is a precondition for communication, the study of it could be at the centre of the theories of problem-solving workshop type of conflict resolution. This is, however, not the case: the area is under-theorised in many problem-solving conflict resolution as well as in many mediation theories.[51]

In sum, language as a system of signs facilitates the crossing of the boundary between fellow-men. However, although signs facilitate intersubjective understanding, they do not make it automatic. The subjective and occasional meanings of signs add something 'vague' and 'uncertain' to interpretation. In other words, the interpreter never fully discovers the subjective meaning of the speaker. Moreover, as Schutz notes, language is neither an ahistorical nor a neutral sign system. On the contrary, language is socially and historically pregiven: its structures are built up intersubjectively, stored historically and transmitted socially. Schutz writes:

> "In any case, one thing ought to be clear with respect to human society: the multiply grounded forms of communication in social action presupposes language as a quasi-ideal system, as the authority for clarification, appeal, and mediation. Language is the principal means for the social construction of every *human* reality; but it is also the chief medium for transmitting a particular, hence historically and socially already-constructed reality."[52]

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49. ibid., pp. 131-147. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 118-126.
50. A sign has three different types of intermingled meanings. A sign (e.g. word) has an objective meaning within a sign system (e.g. language) when it can be intelligibly coordinated to what it designates independently of whoever is using the sign or interpreting it. A sign has also a subjective meaning which arises when the user or the interpreter of the sign associates the sign a certain meaning having its origin in the unique experience in which he or she once learned to use the sign. A sign has always in it something of the context in which it is used, that is, it has an occasional meaning. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 124-125.
51. For an exception see, for example: Folger, Joseph and Jones, Tricia (eds.), New Directions in Mediation. Communication Research and Perspectives, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994.
52. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, p. 154.

In this view, language is a storehouse of typifications, and it pre-typifies the world to us. In other words, by using language we accept certain ways to typify the world; we accept a pre-constructed reality.[53]

Schutz's and Burton's views of understanding clearly differ. Burton assumes that there are fundamental similarities, arising from human needs, between people, and that these form the foundation for intersubjective understanding. Therefore, such issues as communication and language do not appear problematic in his theory. Schutz's theory of intersubjective understanding, on the other hand, points to the preconditions for communication. As argued above, we can never fully discover the subjective meaning of the other, of his or her experience, action and speech. However, the general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives implies that a sufficient understanding for the purposes of everyday life can be gained. Moreover, language facilitates understanding. Language as a socially constructed system of signs which consists of typifications forms the most fundamental element of communication.

2. 3. Action, social action and interaction

As demonstrated earlier, Burton's theory of conflict resolution sees the resolution process from the point of view of the behaviour of the individual. His emphasis is on behaviour which originates in needs and which aims at individual utility maximisation. Schutz's theory, on the other hand, shifts the emphasis from behaviour to action and from action to interaction which is the domain of communication.

Schutz differentiates action from act. In his theory, the term 'action' means human conduct devised by the actor in advance, that is, conduct based on a preconceived project. The term 'act' designates the outcome of the ongoing process, that is, the accomplished action. Action, or performance as Schutz also calls it, may be covert or overt. By 'working' he means overt actions which require bodily

53. Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 100-101.

movements and which aim at changing of the surrounding world. What is crucial in action is that it consists of projecting. Projecting is anticipation of future conduct by way of 'fantasising', of placing oneself in fantasy at a future time when the action will already have been accomplished.[54]

Actions are motivated behaviour. Schutz redefines the concept of motive by distinguishing the 'in-order-to' motive from the genuine 'because' motive. The 'in-order-to' motive means the state of affairs, the end, which brings about the action that has been undertaken. The 'because' motive, on the other hand, refers to the point of view of the actor and his or her past experiences which have determined him or her to act as he or she did. For example, we may say that the motive of a PhD student to finish his or her doctoral studies is to get a lectureship. That is the 'in-order-to' motive. We may say also that the student has been motivated to undertake doctoral studies, because he or she grew up in this and that environment, had these and those experiences at school, etc. That is the 'because' motive.

Action has, in Schutz's view, a different meaning for the actor and for the outside observer. Since action gets its meaning through a meaning bestowing process, through a reflective glance in the consciousness of the actor, the meaning cannot be the same for the actor and for the observer. 'In-order-to motive' is, according to Schutz, an essentially subjective category and is revealed to the observer only if he or she asks what meaning the actor bestows on his or her action. The genuine 'because' motive, however, is an objective category and, therefore, accessible to the observer who can reconstruct from the accomplished act the attitude of the actor to his or her action.[55]

For Schutz, examples of social behaviour are feelings of sympathy and antipathy, erotic attitudes, and feeling-activities of all kinds. If such experiences have the character of being previously projected

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54. Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 19-20 and pp. 67-69. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 57-66. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, pp. 6-18.
55. Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 21-22 and pp. 69-72. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 25-43 and pp. 86-99. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, pp. 18-21. Subjective means in Schutz's terminology the meaning for the actor and objective for the observer. Objective meaning does not, thus, refer to 'detached' or 'scientific' meaning.

they are, according to him, social action. When social action has as its 'in-order-to' motive the bringing-about of a certain conscious experience in the other person it is 'social affecting'. For example, I can originate a sign for someone else to interpret which implies that I am affecting another by an act of communication. Interaction, on the other hand, is based on an act of affecting another with the aim of leading the other to have conscious experience of a desired sort.[56] In Schutz's words:

> "An interaction, then, exists, if one person acts upon another with the expectation that the latter will respond, or at least notice. It is not necessary that the partner reciprocally affect the actor or even act himself. All that is required is that the partner be aware of the actor and interpret what he does or says as evidence for what is going on in his mind. All the partner's subjective experience will, naturally, be modified by his attention to the actor. Every interaction is, therefore, based on an action of affecting another within a social situation."[57]

Schutz considers social interaction to be a motivational context. There is a reciprocal change of motives by the partners in social interaction. In interaction I anticipate the 'in-order-to' motive of myself to become the 'because' motive of my partner and, conversely, he or she is prepared to regard my 'in-order-to' motive as the genuine 'because' motive of his or her behaviour. Thus, interaction involves mutual expectations of behaviour and reactions. However, as Schutz notes, the intermeshing of motives does not necessarily mean agreement of interest and goals.[58]

Social relations originate in social action and interaction. Schutz's thesis is that the motivational context of interaction derives its validity from the direct social relationship of which all other interactions are mere modifications. In the direct relationship the partners are face-to-face, their streams of consciousness are

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56. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 144-155.
57. ibid., pp. 158-159.
58. Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 22-24. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 159-163. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, pp. 84-86.

synchronised, geared into each other, and each immediately affects the other. Schutz calls this type of direct social relationship a We-relationship. If the face-to-face relation and the directness of experience are essential for the We-relationship, in a They-relationship, on the other hand, the relation is more remote, indirect, and anonymous. In the They-relationship the other person is not known to me in his or her vivid present. Rather, he or she is indirectly accessible to me in the form of general types: he or she is an ideal construct of my own. The terms 'anonymity' and 'intimacy' relate to social relationships. Every concrete experience of others is experienced with some degree of intimacy or anonymity. For example, making love with my partner involves a higher degree of intimacy than buying a stamp from a postal clerk. As Schutz seems to suggest, the mediate They-relationship based on a hypothetical personal type is characterised by a greater degree of anonymity than the direct We-relationship.[59]

In the face-to-face relationship 'what you are' is continuously available to me. In the We-relationship I can constantly check my interpretations of what is going on in your mind by observing your expressions and by asking you about the interpretative schemes which you are applying to our common environment. In the process, I can correct, expand and enrich my own understanding of you. In other words, I do apprehend the other through typificatory schemes even in the face-to-face situations, but as Berger and Luckmann note, these schemes are more 'vulnerable' to interference than in 'remoter' form of interaction. I can also modify my typifications in more anonymous They-relationships. The modification occurs, however, only to a small extent, and as long as the sphere of interest which determines the use of type remains unchanged.[60]

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59. Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 109-112. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 163-207. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, pp. 61-92. Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, pp. 126-128. Vaitkus suggests that one can choose either intimacy or anonymity independent of the relationship. He writes: "He [the person] is able, if he so desires, to act quite intimately within the context of the anonymous typifications of a region or, vice versa, to act quite anonymously within the given context of the specific typifications of a region." ibid., p. 186. It can be argued, on the other hand, that a relationship can be so structured that this choice does not arise. See also Druckman and Broome who use the terms 'familiarity' and 'lack of familiarity' in the context of conflict resolution. Druckman and Broome, "Value Differences and Conflict Resolution", pp. 571-593.
60. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 43-45. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 169; p. 171; p. 185; p. 192 and p. 204. Schutz

Schutz argues that the face-to-face relationship is important also in harmonising relevance structures between partners in interaction:

> "In the second place, every communication with other men in the life-world presupposes a similar structure of at least the thematic and interpretational relevancies. This similar structure will occupy a privileged position within the social domain involving fellow-men in face-to-face situations because the sector of the spatial life-world, common to partners, by necessity makes some elements to be equal thematic relevancy for both partners, and furthermore because the body of the partner with his field of physiognomic expression, his gestures, his actions and reactions discloses an interpretationally relevant field which otherwise would not be accessible to the same extent."[61]

Although the face-to-face relationship may impose some elements of equal thematic relevancy for partners in the situation, experiences which do not become problematic do not, according to Schutz, change typifications and other relevance structures. In other words, unless an experience is presented as a problem, it rather confirms the efficacy of 'old' relevance structures and typifications than modify them.[62]

Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn from Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding and interaction. First, seen from the point of view of conflict resolution, interaction, although based on

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and Luckmann, SLW, 1, p. 68; p. 77 and p. 85. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, pp. 46-47. In the phenomenological literature based on Schutz's ideas there are two approaches to typification and to the understanding of the subjective motives of the actor. Richard Zaner emphasises that refraining from typifying is required to grasp the other's subjective meaning. Maurice Natanson, on the other hand, claims that a certain degree of typification and anonymization is needed for understanding. Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, p. 87. See also: Zaner, Richard, "Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz", Social Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1961, pp. 71-93. Natanson, Maurice, Anonymity, A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. See also Druckman's and Broome's discussion. They seem to be closer to Zaner's position that Natanson's, although they do not employ the phenomenological terminology. Druckman and Broome, "Value Differences and..", pp. 571-593.

61. Schutz, CP, 3, p. 132. See also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, p. 254. It should be emphasised that equal relevancy does not imply identicality. Rather, it implies the congruency of relevance systems.

62. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, p. 226.

the intermesh of motives, does not create common interests and goals in the conflict resolution situation. Therefore, the study of the processes of communication and typification as well as of the formation of relevance systems is needed to obtain more sophisticated conceptual tools with which we can approach problem-solving workshop conflict resolution. Second, if all interaction is affecting the other, as Schutz claims, the solitary and utility-maximising ego postulated by Burton as a foundation for conflict resolution theory is irrelevant or, at least, it is not fruitful. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in Burton's theory interaction is largely reduced to the sum of choices made by each actor. His view is not fruitful, because it does not create space for communication. In brief, Schutz's theory brings us to the point where it is necessary to reject the Burtonian theory of behaviour which emphasises the solitary ego if we want to study communication, language and interaction as a means through which shared typifications and a common reality are created in the problem-solving workshop.

2. 4. Rationality

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Burton postulates two main types of rationality when explaining behaviour. For him, instrumental rationality founded on utility-maximising calculations is the most prominent. On other hand, Burton hints at the possibility of discursive rationality too. Schutz's account of the rationality of action differs fundamentally from Burton's views. Schutz's main thesis is that the everyday action may be reasonable, but not rational. People act in everyday life on the basis of routines and rules of thumb rather than on the basis of instrumental calculations. Schutz writes:

> "We may say that a man acted sensibly if the motive and the course of his action is understandable to us, his partners and observers. This will be the case if his action is in accordance with a socially approved set of rules and recipes for the coming to terms with typical problems by applying typical means for achieving typical ends. If I, if We, if 'Anybody who is one of us' found himself in typically similar circumstances he would act in a similar way. Sensible behaviour, however, does

not presuppose that the actor is guided by insight into his motives and the means-ends context."[63]

Schutz calls this type of rationality also practical rationality. Practical rationality becomes constituted under the limiting conditions of everyday reality. Actions based on it are, thus, rational relative to subjective factors and everyday goals. Schutz notices also, that a course of action can be perfectly rational from the point of view of the actor and appear non-rational to the partner or observer.[64]

Schutz justifies the 'non-rationality'[65] of everyday action by claiming that the knowledge of the actor is always incoherent and confused. In the stock of knowledge at hand clear and distinct experiences are intermingled with vague conjectures and prejudices with well-proven evidences. Motives, means, ends, causes and effects are strung together without clear understanding of their real connections. Furthermore, there are rules, habits and principles whose origin and validity is beyond our control and never verified. In other words, our knowledge in daily life is approximate and typical. Schutz argues that in the everyday world "we are satisfied if we have a fair chance of realising our purposes".[66] Thus, in everyday life we have 'cookery-book' or 'recipe' type of knowledge with help of which we rather anticipate the likelihood of events and orient ourselves in the life-world than engage in strictly rational means ends calculations.[67]

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63. Schutz, CP, 1, p. 27.
64. ibid., pp. 29-30. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, p. 58 and p. 229.
65. Schutz does not actually claim that action is irrational or non-rational. He, rather, wants to redefine the notion of rationality. For him, rational action is "always action within an unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of typicalities of the setting, the motives, the means and ends, the courses of action and personalities involved and taken for granted". Thus, it is reasonable to speak about degrees of rationality or partial rationality. Schutz, CP, 1, p. 33.
66. Schutz, CP, 2, p. 73
67. ibid., pp. 72-74. Schutz defines the 'cookery-book' type of knowledge: "This kind of knowledge and its organization I should like to call 'cook-book knowledge'. The cook-book has recipes, lists of ingredients, formulae for mixing them, and directions of finishing off. This is all we need to make an apple pie, also all we need to deal with the routine matters of daily life. [...] Most of our daily activities from rising to going to bed are of this kind. They are performed by following recipes reduced to automatic habits or

Given that the knowledge of the actor is of such a kind, the question arises, is rational choice of action possible. And if we assume that it is possible, what are the criteria for knowledge that guide rational choice? Points of departure between the traditional rational choice paradigm and Schutz's theory are evident. The rational choice paradigm takes the first question for granted and tries to answer the second. As noted in the previous chapter, for example Burton, who employs elements from the paradigm while explaining the entry and workshop stages, does not question the idea that the parties in conflict are capable of instrumentally rational choices.

Schutz's answer clarifies first the criteria of the rationality of knowledge. He argues that the rationality of knowledge presupposes that all the elements from which the actor has to choose are clearly and distinctly conceived by him or her.[68] The choice itself is rational if the actor selects from all means within his or her reach the most appropriate for realising the intended end. Thus, rational action presupposes that the actor has clear and distinct insight into ends, means, secondary results, alternative means to the end, relations of the end to other possible means and different possible ends. The complications increase when the action in question is social, that is, when it is directed towards other people. Then clear and distinct knowledge of the situation as defined by the partner is needed. Schutz concludes by claiming that this ideal of rationality, rational action and interaction is not and cannot be a peculiar feature of everyday thought and action. He, thereby, disagrees with the rational choice model.[69]

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unquestioned platitudes. This kind of knowledge is concerned only with the regularity as such events in the external world irrespective of its origin." ibid., pp. 73-74.

68. See a more detailed list of the criteria of knowledge: ibid., pp. 79-80. See also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, pp. 58-65.

69. Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 27-34. Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 77-80. Hartmunt Esser challenges the interpretation that Schutz disagrees with the rational choice paradigm. Esser studies the moment of choice in Schutz's theory of action, and notes that Schutz assumes that action that has now become habitual, and may be categorised as sensible or reasonable, once originated in action that was problematic, and therefore was chosen on the bases of subjective expected utility. Esser concludes that, in fact, there is no contradiction between Schutz's theory of action and rational choice theory. Esser, Hartmut, "The Rationality of Everyday Behavior. A Rational Choice Reconstruction of the Theory of Action by Alfred Schutz", Rationality and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1993, pp. 7-31. See also Ilja

Schutz's theory of action and rationality differs from Burton's views of human behaviour at least in three major respects. First, Schutz does not assume that simple instrumental, means-ends, rationality prevails in the everyday world. His theory of choice - which Schutz does apply, but to rare situations where the usual rules of thumb no longer yield results that fit the expectations - is complex and takes into account situational factors. Burton, on the other hand, does not recognise that the workshop participation can be routine action which does not constitute a problematic situation for the participants. In other words, the participants do not necessarily calculate utility.

Second, Schutz's emphasis is on the socially formed stock of knowledge of the individual. Given the social construction of knowledge, the origins of the choices and actions of the individual are in the social world, in its interactive and communicative processes. Schutz's main theme is not the action of the individual and the choices made by the individual. It is, rather, how typifications and relevances intersubjectively regulate social action, interaction and communication. In Schutz's theory the 'because' motives of the actors are important, whereas Burton does not give any importance to this 'social background' of the actor. For Burton, the actor is the solitary ego whose 'because' motives are not relevant. The Burtonian solitary ego is not culturally and socially conditioned, rather, it is largely biologically determined. Thus, there is no need, in Burton's views, to discuss the culturally constructed interactive and communicative processes in and through which the individual, his or her stock of knowledge, relevance structures, typifications and 'realities' are formed.

The third point of departure derives from the second: Schutz's theory allows the study of the social groups and their notions of rationality, whereas Burton limits his theory to the study of the individual actor. Due to his limited understanding of interaction, Burton dismisses the influence of the socially approved rules on conduct. Unlike Burton's

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Srubar's critique of Esser: Srubar, Ilja, "On the Limits of Rational Choice", Rationality and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1993, pp. 32-46.

views, Schutz's views make it possible to understand how social groups influence, for example, decisions. According to Schutz, the actor orients his or her action on standards which are socially approved as rules of conduct by the in-group he or she belongs to.[70] Moreover, the following of these socially constructed standards does not imply that they are rationally understood. Thus, the ultimate origin of the entry into and action within the problem-solving workshop is in socially approved conduct. This conduct is founded on the relatively similar typifications and relevance systems of the members of the group the participant represents.

To conclude this part of the chapter it can be claimed that several of Schutz's themes and ideas, such as the 'because' motive, the idea that the basis of rationality is in the social world and the notion of socially approved standards of conduct, shift the attention to socially and culturally conditioned human existence. The theory of alter ego, as Schutz presents it, on the other hand, establishes the foundations for the study intersubjective understanding and communication in the problem-solving workshop.

70. See, for example: Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 32-33. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, pp. 230-231.

3. SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED REALITY AND IDENTITY

Problem-solving workshop approaches stress that the solution of a conflict must be based on an analysis of the needs, motivations, hopes and fears of conflicting parties. However, a question arises are needs, motivations, hopes and fears individual and 'subjective' mental, or even 'objective' biological, factors or are they, rather, intersubjective and produced in the processes of the social world. As demonstrated, Burton discusses these issues. He derives needs and motivations from biology and ends up emphasising the solitary actor. Schutz, on the other hand, focuses his phenomenological analysis on the life-world and the relative natural views of the social groups. Following the tradition of seeing human existence as socially constructed, as the most recent sociological terminology expresses it, this part challenges the image of solitary ego postulated by Burton and continues to study how social actors are constructed in and through the social world and how they, in turn, construct their reality, needs and identity in that world. In brief, this part argues that human 'being' can be defined without reference to biology.

3. 1. Cultural patterns and social groups

Schutz approaches the question of socially constructed reality in terms of cultural patterns. According to him, the cultural pattern peculiar to a social group functions for its members as an unquestioned scheme of reference. The cultural pattern consists of all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (e.g. mores, laws, habits, customs and fashions) which characterise or constitute any social group at a given moment in its history. Schutz claims, that "any member born or reared within the group accepts the ready-made standardised scheme of the cultural pattern handed down to him by ancestors, teachers, and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all situations which normally occur within the social world".[71] The knowledge included in the cultural pattern consists of 'recipes' for interpreting and for

71. Schutz, CP, 2, p. 95.

handling things in the social world. These 'recipes' work also as guides for actions which tell what to do to gain certain results in certain social situations. In other words, the cultural pattern provides in its 'recipes' typical solutions for typical problems available for typical actors.[72]

Any society considers itself as a little cosmos, and the maintenance of the cosmos requires symbols to keep it together. Societies, social groups, need their central myths, or dominating ideologies, to justify and to establish foundations for self-interpretation. Social groups can be distinguished in virtue of their commonly held relevance systems from which typifications arise. Thus, typifications included in cultural patterns vary from one social world or culture to another.[73] As Barber claims, "social conditioness is an essential property of typifications".[74]

A group has a relative natural world view which is taken for granted and commonly shared. As noted, on the basis of the relative natural world view all subjects organise their experiences as members of the group. Furthermore, on the basis of the view they understand the other as a member of their group. The group has, according to Schutz, the subjective and objective meaning. It has a subjective meaning to a person who considers himself or herself a member of it and speaks of it in terms of 'we'. The objective meaning is that which the group has for outsiders who speak of its members in terms of 'they'.[75]

Schutz discusses the processes through which a member of an out-group adapts himself or herself to a new group. The stranger does not have 'tools' offered by the cultural pattern of the in-group to act or react typically in the new group. Moreover, he or she does not know what kind of conduct to expect from the members of the in-group. What is missing is a 'scheme of translation' according to which the stranger could translate and interpret the cultural pattern of his or her own group into the new group and *vice versa* . Furthermore, the

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72. ibid., pp. 91-105. The scheme of orientation is unquestioned 'until further notice'. Thus, it may break down in unexpected and new situations.
73. ibid., pp. 244-245.
74. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p. 78.
75. Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 95-104; pp. 113-114; p. 121; p. 129, p. 227; p. 230; p. 236 and p. 255. Vaitkus, How Is Society Possible?, p. 82.

knowledge he or she has about the new group is not necessarily adequate, because it does not provide him or her with tested 'recipes' for behaviour. It may provide him or her with 'recipes' for interpretation, but not with 'recipes' for action which have been tried out in actual situations. Therefore, according to Schutz, the process of cultural adjustment takes place through trial and error, and is slow.[76]

The Schutzian account of the outsider and cultural adaptation offers a view-point for the conceptualisation of the problem-solving workshop. In the case of the workshop, the other party does not need to adapt itself to the world view or culture of the other. Rather, both parties need to find ways to encounter each other in the workshop without one-sided adaptation. Moreover, the parties as well as the facilitator need to find a 'scheme of translation' in order to understand each other and to create a shared reality. Thus, the workshop can be seen to be a place where 'strangers' meet without well-tested 'recipes' for the interpretation of and action in the situation, and where trial and error are a means of slow adaptation to a shared culture.[77]

3. 2. Individuals, institutions and social structures

Berger's and Luckmann's analysis of socially constructed reality focuses on the relation between the individual actor and institution through habitualized actions, that is, actions which are repeated frequently. Habitualization implies also that the action in question may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort. Habitualized action becomes instutionalized "whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors".[78] As mentioned, the reality of everyday life contains typificatory schemes in terms of which other people and objects of the life-world are apprehended and dealt with. What is

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76. Schutz, CP. 2, pp. 91-105.
77. Benjamin Broome uses the phrase 'third culture' to describe culture in which the parties in conflict resolution are able to operate. The creation of such a culture is, according to him, a precondition for successful problem-solving workshop conflict resolution. Broome, "Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution", p. 104.
78. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 72.

peculiar, according to Berger and Luckmann, to the typifications of habitualized actions that constitute an institution is that typifications are shared by the actors participating in reciprocal action. Moreover, the relationship between the actor and typifications is mutual: typifications are available to all members of the institution in question and the institution, on the other hand, itself typifies individual actors as well as individual actions. Thus, institutions control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of action and interpretation and, thereby, participate in the creation and definition of realities.[79]

Berger's and Luckmann's account rejects the study of organisational or institutional structures as such, as social realities of their own. However, although organisational structures are created in an interplay between the actor and institution, the actor may experience the institution possessing a reality of its own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact. As long as institutions are, according to Berger and Luckmann, constructed and maintained only in the interaction of A and B, their objectivity remains tenuous and changeable. The case is different when the institution is transferred to the new generation. Then the individual confronts a comprehensive and given reality which may not be altered and which appears as self-evident. In other words, an institutional world can be experienced as an objective reality.[80]

How, then, does the actor act as a member of an institution or organisation? Acting as a member of an organisation does not differ essentially from acting as an individual. There is something also in the organisational world which is taken for granted by the actor: the organisation presents him or her with a number of anonymous and

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79. ibid., pp. 65-109. See also Roger Jehenson's application of the idea of institutionalisation to the study of a psychiatric hospital and its shared typifications. Jehenson, Roger, "A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of the Formal Organization", in Phenomenological Sociology, Issues and Applications, George Psathas (ed.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973, pp. 219-247.

80. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 76-77. Berger and Luckmann employ the concept of role as a mediation between the objectivated reality and the subjective conception of it. By playing roles the individual participates in a social world, and by internalising these roles, the same world becomes subjectively real to him or her. It is important to note that the actor can establish a distance between himself or herself and his or her role-playing. ibid., pp. 91-96 and p. 108.

functional typifying schemes that are 'passively' received and that help him or her to orient his or her behaviour and interpret the world. In other words, the actor becomes socialised to the organisational world too. The relationships in that world are organised on the basis of anonymous roles which guarantee the smooth functioning of the organisation. However, face-to-face relationships within the organisational structure influence typifications in a way that the actual experience the organisational member has of the other members rarely maintains the characteristics of pure anonymity.[81]

Larger social structures (e.g. feudalism, industrial society) condition human existence too. They offer, according to Schutz, the individual a range of typical biographies:

> "The individual experiences the social world which is already given to him and objectivated in the relative-natural world view, as a scale of subjective probabilities related to him, as an ordering of duties, possibilities, and goals attainable with ease or with difficulty. In other words, the social structure is the rigid boundary in which his age, his life-plans, and thus his priority structures and daily plans gain concrete form."[82]

Social structures are, in this view, differentiated through their degree of freedom in the various courses of life. The individual places himself or herself in the social structure through biographies and typical biographies work as a means of socialisation, for the knowledge of typical biographies, consisting of what and how type of knowledge, is socially transmitted to the individual in different phases of his or her life.[83]

In sum, reality or, rather, 'what is known as reality' is socially and intersubjectively constructed and shared. Schutz sees the influence of the group on the individual in terms of the cultural patterns which form a basis for a shared reality, whereas Berger and Luckmann emphasise institutionally defined reality. In Schutz's view, the cultural pattern offers an unquestioned scheme of orientation in the

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81. Jehenson, "A Phenomenological Approach to...", pp. 219-247.
82. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, p. 95.
83. ibid., pp. 94-96.

social world. According to Berger's and Luckmann's theory, on the other hand, the individual is influenced by the institutions which provide him or her with knowledge and rules of conduct. Despite these differences, they share the view that reality of an actor is defined through knowledge which consists of typifications of the world and which is mainly handed down to him or her by other actors belonging to the same social group or institutional world.

Given this notion of reality, the study of conflict and conflict resolution presupposes the study of social groups and institutions. The way groups and institutions distribute knowledge, define reality through shared typifications and use language are, thus, fundamental issues. Similarly, it is seminal to study the points where typifications break down, shared reality collapses and communication becomes impossible.

3. 3. Needs and identities

If we accept the view that reality is socially constructed, the notions of needs and identity get a new interpretation. The emphasis shifts, then, from the universalist definition of needs and identity to such questions as how the actor experiences them, what meaning they have for him or her and how they are created.

Peter Manning's and Horacio Fabrega's study on self and body offers analytical tools to criticise Burton's universalist needs theory from a phenomenological point of view. They study structure and meanings in one area of cultural practices, namely, health and illness. They claim that social scientists tend to postulate a 'radical equalisation of the social significance of the human body'. Manning's and Fabrega's analysis can be applied to Burton's version of needs theory where there is a 'radical equalisation of the social significance of human needs'.

Manning and Fabrega claim that social scientists suppose that "since the body is composed of universal features, it necessarily is experienced as such; furthermore, given this 'universality', it needs not be accounted for within any special system of propositions

bearing on the explanation of human behavior".[84] The universalist, and often also biological, view of body consists of seven assumptions: (1) the body can be partitioned internally into named organs, systems and functional relationships; (2) unless external or internal causes intervene the body functions normally; (3) the senses are universal; (4) diseases are universal; (5) boundaries between self and body are nonproblematic; (6) death is a biological process that occurs when the body ceases to function and (7) the body should be seen by persons as a natural, objective, valuationally neutral entity.[85]

Similarly, the Burtonian view of human needs supposes that needs can be partitioned into named parts such as a need for identity, a need for security and a need for co-operation, and that there are functional relationships between these parts. As discussed earlier, Burton's argument is that when, for example, elites hinder needs satisfaction conflict will result. When individuals are free to satisfy their needs, society functions normally. Needs are universal in Burton's theory: everybody has them. Consequently, according to Burton, deviance and conflict are an universal and cross-culturally invariant phenomenon. Boundaries between the self and needs are nonproblematic, in Burton's view, because needs express themselves through and in the self. Finally, needs should be seen as an objective and neutral entity, because seeing them as such is the very precondition for successful conflict resolution and avoidance of violent conflict.

Moreover, Burton assumes that needs are universally experienced as such, that is, needs are experienced as such that variations between persons, situations, groups, and even larger social units are of minor empirical significance. Burton does not deny that needs are expressed through different cultures: they may get cultural expressions. These differences are, however, of minor importance from the point of view of theory-formation, conceptualisation, and, finally, conflict resolution. Thus, seen from the angle offered by Manning and Fabrega,

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84. Manning, Peter and Fabrega, Horacio, "The Experience of Self and Body: Health and Illness in the Chiapas Highland", in Phenomenological Sociology, Issues and Applications, George Psathas (ed.), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973, p. 254.
85. ibid., p. 255. For a similar critical account of needs see: Smith, Gilbert, Social Need, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 66-67.

Burton's theory, which clearly equalises the social significance of needs, denies the social construction and production, if not expression, of human needs.

However, needs can be seen to be produced in social practices. Needs can be defined as a socially constructed reality which is closely dependent on the concepts of, for example, professional practitioners. Attention can be, then, focused on the contexts of needs and the ways how practitioners use the concept of needs in different situations and in different effect.[86] It should be emphasised that this view does not deny the importance of the needs concept in social practices. It, rather, denies its universalist understanding.

For example, in the Burtonian type of problem-solving context the notion of needs is often employed by the facilitator to point out common interests the participants seem to have. However, the fact that the facilitator uses the notion should not be confused with the idea that the participants actually have objective and universal needs which are recognisable in the workshop. The participants may participate in the needs discourse created by the facilitator in order to, for example, rhetorically (by convincing and persuading) to justify certain actions, but that should not be interpreted to prove that there are universal and biologically based needs independent of the milieu in which they are discussed.[87] In other words, if the concept of needs is employed in conflict resolution practices and in theorising on conflict and conflict resolution, the process of its creation and its situational nature should be reflected.

Closely related to the issue of the social production of needs is the question of identity. As noted, Burton maintains that identity is a need in which behaviour originates. According to Schutz, on the other hand, identities are structured in accord with the numerous social groups to which we pertain and that pressure us from different directions. There is no single identity, rather, there are multiple

86. Smith, Social Need, pp. 65-85.

87. The idea of the rhetorical justification is from a study which discusses how medical practitioners employ different frames to justify certain actions in relation to dying patients. Peräkylä, Anssi, Kuoleman monet kasvot. Identiteetin tuottaminen kuolevan potilaan hoidossa (Multiple Faces of Death. The Production of Identities in the Care of the Dying Patient), Tampere: Vastapaino, 1990.

identities. Multiple membership in numerous groups is experienced as a set of self-typifications. A conflict may arise within the personality, because the endeavour to live up to the various expectations inhering in the membership in various groups is difficult. Despite the difficulty, the individual or, rather, his or her identity, is not determined by the social groups, because he or she is free to choose for himself or herself with which part of his or her personality he or she wants to participate in group membership.[88] In Schutz's theory, thus, there is no single coherent identity which could be the source or the aim of behaviour as Burton suggests. Neither can identity be denied. Its expressions can be suppressed and the ways of confirming it can be banned, but this does not necessarily imply deviant behaviour as Burton argues in his conflict theory.

In sum, realities are defined through and in the social groups. Conflict is also a reality which is defined in social processes. In other words, what counts as conflict is culturally constituted.[89] Similarly, a problem-solving workshop is a socially constructed reality. The participants bring into the conflict resolution situation their definitions of reality, conflict and conflict resolution which are mediated through socially constructed typifications. As a consequence, in order to understand and study a conflict, the sets of understandings about conflict held by the people involved in a dispute are crucially important. By shifting the focus from the functional questions of what causes conflict and what conflict accomplishes materially and politically to the contextual and interpretative question of how people think about conflict, we start to see the importance of the culturally constructed interpretations of the world for the study of conflict.[90]

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88. Schutz, CP, 2, p. 254. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p. 60. See also: Schutz, CP, 1, p. 14. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 194-200. Schutz's position does not imply social determinism. Although cultural patterns offer us approved knowledge for conduct, the selection of 'recipes' for conduct to a given situation is done by us. In other words, cultural patterns do not determine which 'recipes' we employ in a given situation, although they offer us a selection of 'recipes'.
89. See also: Black, Peter and Avruch, Kevin, "Some Issues in Thinking About Culture and the Resolution of Conflict", Humanity and Society, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1989, p. 187 and p. 193.
90. See also: Avruch and Black, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings", p. 132. Greenhouse, Carol, "Cultural Perspectives on War", in The Quest for Peace, Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), London: Sage, 1987, p. 34.

Culture is seen in many conflict and conflict resolution theories as an artificial label or custom which produces simply differences between the parties in conflict. Burton's conflict theory does not expand the view, because, as demonstrated, culture is interpreted in his theory in an individualistic and instrumental manner. However, culture is vital, because, for example, the 'identity' of a person is created through the social groups and in accordance with the cultural patterns which prevail in the groups the person belongs to. Even the use of language implies being influenced by the cultural pattern.[91] This view, which denies the existence of the person independently on the cultural patterns, challenges also the Burtonian notion of the conflict resolution workshop as a filter through which cultural influences can be filtered away.[92] As the next chapter will show, with the help of the social constructionist view 'cultural influences' can be set to the very centre of conflict and conflict resolution theory.

91. Schutz, CP, 2, p. 101.
92. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, p. 208.

CHAPTER VI: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOP CONFLICT RESOLUTION: LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES

In this chapter a phenomenological understanding of conflict and problem-solving conflict resolution is presented. Problem-solving workshop conflict resolution is reassessed and its area of applicability evaluated. The chapter continues the discussions introduced in the previous chapter: it clarifies the role of relevance structures, typifications, language and discursive rationality in conflict and conflict resolution processes. Some new themes are included. For example, power and politics are discussed in relation to conflict resolution. Similarly, a great deal of attention is paid to the double role of the facilitator. The sources of his or her expertise, ethical conduct and theorising are explored. Given that the facilitator is assumed to be both the third party and the social scientist, the notion of participant observation offers a fruitful metaphor to describe those roles. The metaphor denotes also the 'epistemological positions' the facilitator possesses. An account of these is given in the last part of the chapter.

1. AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT

Conflicts are characterised by a break-down of shared reality. As discussed in the previous chapter, the individual makes his or her world through typifications, through interpretations. This does not, however, imply solipsism: typifications are produced and distributed in and through the processes of social interaction. Typifications are also a foundation for 'sociality' and cooperation. In other words, a common reality is defined through shared typifications. Maurice Natanson maintains that to be with others is to share typifications, to respond to them, to participate with them, and to assume that others typify in the same way as I (or we) do. He argues that "when such typification breaks down or is for certain reasons denied or severely circumscribed, then we have, at least in descriptive terms,

evidence of fundamental differences or basic prejudices".[1] If shared typifications break down, a common reality, the undergirding structure of shared reality, collapses. The breakdown of language and communication is merely a symptom of 'fractured sociality'. When breakdown is far-reaching, according to Natanson, we have some form of anomie in the society.[2] Natanson's idea can be further developed by claiming that anomie may take the form of conflict and, furthermore, what finally counts as conflict is culturally constituted.

The location for conflict is over definitions of reality. Conflict involves the struggle to impose one's definition of reality upon the other. In other words, the question is whose description of reality is taken seriously, and even acted upon. Since the location for conflict is over definitions of reality, the study of power is of a great importance for conflict analysis. However, power should not be understood to be manifest in conflicts and visible in overt actions of coercion and domination. Neither should it be thought to lie in relationships and be manifest in the suppression of differences. Rather, power should be considered to be an attribute of discourse and manifest in the production and contestation of consensus.

Struggles to discipline and control definitions of reality involve the play of power which takes place in 'knowledgeable practices'. These practices of power are not negative. Neither do they *necessarily* give rise to conflict. The practices of power are continuous as well as productive, because they participate in the defining and transforming of the social world, often without conflict. Given the notions of conflict and power introduced, the study, not only of the sets of understandings about conflict held by the people involved in a dispute, but also of the machinery in and through which dominant definitions and positions are reconstituted in both conflict and conflict resolution practices are important for the understanding of a conflict.[3]

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1. Natanson, Maurice, The Journeying Self, A Study in Philosophy and Social Role, Reading, Menlo Park and London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970, p. 59.
2. ibid., pp. 58-60. For a similar view see also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, p. 255.
3. For the traditional views of power see: Lukes, Steve, Power, A Radical View, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1979. For more sophisticated accounts see: Cobb and Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox", pp. 35-62. Ashley, Richard, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War", in International/Intertextual Relations, Postmodern

The idea of conflict entertained differs from that of traditional conflict theories at least in two major respects. First, it differs from subjectivist and objectivist approaches to conflict which claim either that conflict is caused by subjective perceptions, misunderstandings and attitudes or by objectively recognisable, often structural, factors. The view introduced, on the other hand, pays attention to the interplay between the individual actor and the social group. Definitions of reality, as well as the breaking down of these definitions, are dependent on socially shared typifications. Second, the approach does not postulate a universal causal explanation of conflict. That is, it does not establish the cause or causes of conflict (e.g. structures, human needs, communication, misperception) outside the notion of 'fractured sociality'. Thus, there is space for situational factors to enter into the explanation or, rather, into the interpretation. For example, Natanson's unspecified notion of 'denied shared typifications' implies that shared typifications may be denied for several reasons which we, cultural analysts - to use Avruch's and Black's expression - need to study and understand separately depending on the case.[4]

If we accept the idea that 'sociality' and cooperation are based on shared typifications and that there are 'fractured' interpretations of reality, 'not-any-more-shared' or 'not-yet-shared' typifications, at the centre of conflict, we need to return to the relevance systems from which typifications arise. The systems of relevance are important also, because they form, for example, a precondition for communication. The native language of a given linguistic group is one of the most important forms of relatively congruent systems of

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Readings of World Politics, James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 296-297. For views which discuss conflict and definitions of reality see: Black and Avruch, "Some Issues in Thinking About Culture", p. 192. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 70-109 and pp. 125-127.

4. It is important to note that Natanson's account of anomie can be given a different interpretation, the interpretation which many traditional conflict theorists would give. According to the traditional view, anomie is caused by, for example, unsatisfied human needs, unjust structures, misperceptions, etc. Ultimately, we are dealing with the question of the role of theory in social sciences and with the 'universalistic/particularistic' debate as well as with the 'explanatory/interpretative' stances to social sciences.

relevance. Cox writes about the relevance structures and social groups:

> "In fact, to a very large measure, various groups may be defined by the relevance systems held in common by the members of that group. Further, the relevance systems may function to 1) perpetuate the group, 2) polarize the group (the in-group) from another (the out-group), and 3) even constitute the basic '*raison d'être* ' for the group itself."

He continues by giving examples:

> "As examples of these, consider national loyalties, team spirit, and religious beliefs usually contain within themselves the urgency to perpetuate, to pass along to new members of the group, the attitudes and feelings about the group held by the current members. Further, there are groups, such as political parties, iconoclastic religions, and even nations which manifest antagonist stances toward other such groups, this antagonism being rooted in typifications and certain interpretative relevances of the group.[...]"[5]

Thus, the relevance systems influencing typification and interpretation are of vital importance while studying conflict. Applied to conflict resolution, it can be argued that it is necessary that the resolution process deals with these by harmonising relevance systems and (re)creating shared typifications. The question in what kind of processes the harmonisation of relevance systems and the creation of shared typifications take place brings us to an understanding of conflict resolution. Underlying the idea of conflict resolution is, thus, the assumption that relevance systems and typifications need to be changed, a new interpretation of a reality found, in order a form of cooperation to emerge. In other words, a new reality needs to be 'negotiated' in the conflict resolution process.[6]

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5. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, p. 113.

6. The idea of 'negotiated reality' is from Cohen, Raymond, "Negotiating Reality: International Relations and the Metaphor of the Holy Sepulchre", a paper presented in the 35th Annual Convention of International Studies Association, Washington, D. C., 28 March - 1 April, 1994. Cohen emphasises that reality as a social construct has two interlocking sources: the heritage of the past and negotiation. See also: Scheff, Thomas, "Negotiating

2. AN UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOP CONFLICT RESOLUTION

2. 1. Face-to-face interaction

As suggested in the previous chapter, problem-solving workshop conflict resolution can be seen to form a framework for mutual cultural adaptation. The participants, including the facilitator, need to find a 'scheme of translation' to produce ways to understand each other and to create a shared reality. As also noted, the other, the alter ego, is always elusive to us, i.e., his or her inner life transcends our immediate and direct experience. Moreover, we never fully understand his or her subjective meanings as he or she understands them. However, language partly bridges the gap between 'us' and 'the other': language as a system of signs facilitates the crossing of the boundary between fellow-men. Similarly, in the face-to-face situation the subjectivity of the other is available to us through a maximum of symptoms.

Given that the problem-solving workshop can be seen to offer a context for mutual adaptation, it needs to be studied how typifications change in that context. Face-to-face interaction between the conflicting parties is one of the core ideas on which most of the problem-solving conflict resolution approaches rely. It is assumed that when conflicting parties have a chance to meet face-to-face in an analytical and supportive environment, it will encourage them to change, for example, misperceptions and to "humanize their mutual images".[7] The notion of We-relationship is, thus, implicitly referred to in many problem-solving approaches when the foundations of interpersonal understanding are theoretically constructed.[8]

Reality: Notes of Power in the Assessment of Responsibility", Social Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1968, pp. 3-17.

7. Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", p. 76.

8. For a clear statement of the importance of the face-to-face situation see: ibid., pp. 84-85.

However, the limits involved in understanding the problem-solving workshop as a face-to-face encounter should be emphasised. Even in a face-to-face encounter, it is possible to maintain an anonymous They-relationship.[9] The participants can approach each other through, for example, the anonymous ideal type of 'enemy' in the workshop. It would be, therefore, premature to conclude that a problem-solving workshop as a face-to-face encounter automatically reduces the possibilities to found the interaction on anonymous ideal types and, thereby, produces changes in typifications. Second, although face-to-face situations make some elements to be equal thematic relevancy for both partners, changes in thematic relevances do not necessarily bring about the harmonisation of other relevance structures.[10] It is easy to imagine a case where the face-to-face encounter confirms typifications the participants hold. Third, and most importantly, enriched and changed typifications of the individual participants of the other participants (i.e. increased interpersonal understanding in the workshop) do not necessarily produce changes in the way the participants typify the conflict in question.

In brief, the harmonisation of thematic relevances, especially if added with enriched typifications of the other, can facilitate interpersonal communication which can be seen to be one aim of the problem-solving workshop. However, two questions remain. How to broaden the area of interpersonal understanding and how to transfer that understanding outside the workshop? Problem-solving workshop approaches which solely encourage, for example, 'free expression of feelings' and produce 'interpersonal understanding' are, according to this view, not likely to facilitate the finding of a shared reality which extends itself outside the workshop context.

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9. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 192-194. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, p. 64 and p. 77. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 2, p. 94.
10. Schutz and Luckmann, SLW 1, p. 226.

2. 2. Problem-solving workshop as an attempt to find a shared reality

Although thematic relevances harmonise in the face-to-face situation, the problem-solving workshop needs to deal also with the interpretative and motivational relevance structures of the participants. As discussed earlier, unless an experience is presented as a problem, it does not change the relevance structures. Something becoming problematic can be either imposed or intrinsic. There are several possibilities of a problematic situation to emerge in the workshop context: hypothetical ideal types do not apply, the workshop situation itself is unexpected, a problem is imposed by the facilitator or by the other party so that something becomes relevant and an 'old' typificatory scheme does not apply, etc. Thus, instead of 'solving problems' in the workshop, it could be described as a place where 'something becomes problematic' for the parties. Similarly, the encouragement of discursive rationality between the participants may help to find a shared reality. Discursive rationality will be discussed in the next section.

Before redefining problem-solving workshop conflict resolution it should be emphasised that the problem-solving workshop has a situational nature, and it does not ever capture the 'whole' conflict. For example, the participants bring into the workshop a 'sector' of a conflict. Although we may agree with Michael Banks and Christopher Mitchell that the principle in the workshop type of conflict resolution "must be that the conflict situation defines its own parties and issues", it cannot be avoided that the participants determine the 'sector' of conflict which is represented in the workshop by defining and interpreting the conflict and, finally, by 'negotiating' a reality in their own manner.[11]

A new definition, a definition which is very moderate, and a task can be given to the problem-solving workshop. The problem-solving workshop is an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties in conflict for the purposes at hand without causing a further break-down of 'sociality' and cooperation. The problem-solving workshop

11. Banks and Mitchell, The Resolution of Conflict, p. 27.

deals *mainly* with the interpretative schemes of the participants by giving them a chance to 'negotiate' a shared reality. The finding of a common language game both presupposes and facilitates that.

The question how to avoid a further break-down of 'sociality' in the workshop emerges from the definition. A shared acknowledgement of conflict and a shared need for conflict resolution offer a foundation for 'negotiating' a shared reality based on harmonised relevance structures. If the parties themselves ask for problem-solving workshop conflict resolution, their relevance structures have already some similarities: they both acknowledge the existence of the conflict. Furthermore, the conflict is constituted as a problem for both of them. These shared relevance structures facilitate the further harmonisation of relevances.

Also a problem imposed by the workshop structure can facilitate the harmonisation. John Burton's discussion of functionalist solutions of conflict can be interpreted to point to this idea. For example, the question of the declining tourist industry in Cyprus may appear as a common problem for both Turkish and Greek communities of the island. The parties may be willing to discuss the topic in the workshop context and try to find functionalist solutions. They may be willing to discuss the issue despite that, for example, the causes of the conflict may be differently constituted to them.[12] In Dryzek's words, "individuals can then seek consensus on *what* is to be done while differing about *why* ".[13]

However, before the parties can even discuss a common problem, some harmonised relevance structures are required: something appearing as a shared problem presupposes some equal relevances. Thus, unless the parties possess some equal relevances before the

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12. The origin of this type of cooperation can be in grass-roots level interactions. For example, Edith Miguda describes the networks created by interactions among women between the conflicting parties in western Kenya during the 1990s ethnic and land clashes. Miguda, Edith, "Harnessing Internal Local Resources for Conflict Resolution and Self-Sustaining Peace in the Face of Ethnic Violence", a paper presented in the XVth General Conference of International Peace Research Association, Malta, 30 October - 4 November, 1994.
13. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 43.

problem-solving workshop conflict resolution attempt takes place, it is not likely to produce desired results.

A certain degree of similarity of languages or, rather, language games needs to be found in the problem-solving conflict resolution process in order, at least, communication to be effective. Dryzek's account of regulatory negotiations between representatives of the coal industry and environmental groups in the late 1970s in the United States describes the importance of language games:

> "With a little prodding, the participants began talking in a language new to both sides, that of welfare economics. The overarching value implicit in this language is allocative efficiency, which again was of little prior concern to either side. Now a switch from the language of strategic interaction to the language of welfare economics is perhaps little more than the replacement of one kind of distorted discourse by another that is equally distorted. Yet it suggests the possibility of a reciprocal scrutiny of normative judgements, penetrating beyond particular concerns such as profits of the coal industry or the preservation of a hillside in Utah."[14]

A typificatory schema is given in language. If the schema of a social group differs from the schema of another group, it is reflected in the languages of these groups. Although the native language of a given linguistic group is one of the most important forms of relatively congruent systems of relevance, Dryzek's example demonstrates how different language games can be played with the language. Since the relationship between language and typifications is mutual, a shared language game enforces shared typifications founded on equal relevances.

The role of the native tongue is important in the workshop context. For example, the use of English as a dominant workshop language cannot be justified in all cases. Since it may not be the mother tongue of the participants, they cannot fully participate in language games available in it. In other words, the interpretative schemes offered by the language are less clear to the participants than those

14. ibid., pp. 47-48.

offered by their native languages. Moreover, English may well represent, for example, colonialism and alienation for the parties. In some cases, on the other hand, the use of English can be justified: as a foreign language it 'frees' the participants from the interpretative and typificatory schemes built in their mother tongue. However, even in that case English is not a neutral language, because it gives the world to the parties in a certain way.

It should be emphasised that the harmonisation of relevances does not need to rely on the finding of similarities between the conflicting parties. At a pragmatic level, the concept of human needs serves exactly this purpose: it helps the parties to recognise commonalities they are assumed to share. However, it can be argued that the parties must go 'beyond similarity' and learn 'how to deal with difference', instead of trusting in abstract similarity.[15] Rather than postulating, for example, the abstract notion of a 'need for identity', the facilitator can direct the discussion in the workshop to the issue of multiple and coexistent identities which are defined and emphasised in accordance with situations. Learning to live with these as well as with the continuous struggles and 'negotiations' in which the identities are defined could, then, be seen to be one aim of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution, rather than the reduction of differences, for example, to the conception of universal human needs.

Problem-solving conflict resolution, as all forms of conflict resolution, is a highly political activity: the problem-solving workshop is not a 'neutral', 'non-political', space. The struggles over the definitions of reality do not cease to exist in the workshop and, therefore, their intrusion into it cannot and should not be artificially prevented. In other words, the struggles over meanings and interpretations should not be neutralised in the workshop. Since politics is these continuous struggles, it cannot be argued, as Banks and Mitchell argue, that the workshop "is not a commitment to anything political at all".[16] On the contrary, since the workshop

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15. Se also: Broome, "Managing Differences in...", pp. 104-105. International Alert, "Conflict Resolution and Training in the North Caucasus and Georgia", a report of the Piatigorsk seminar (June 6 - 19 1993), p. 7.
16. Banks and Mitchell, The Resolution of Conflict, p. 63.

produces definitions of reality and, thereby, creates versions of a world, it is a political process, commitment to politics.

The workshop facilitator participates in the political processes by asking questions, making summaries and shaping the grounds on which agreement and disagreement can take place. Therefore, the language of the facilitator plays an important role. The psychological language and vocabulary (e.g. emotions, fears, hopes and concerns) which the facilitator may use refer to individuals and their intrapsychic processes, rather than to communication patterns and interpersonal processes. As Cobb and Rifkin argue, "rather than reduce adversarial communication patterns, the mediator's psychological vocabulary contributes to maintain problematic patterns, obscuring the process of the production of consensus in sessions".[17] In other words, the psychological language allows the political processes and struggles over meanings and interpretations to go unchecked: the psychologised vocabulary dismisses the struggles and 'negotiations' over intersubjective reality by giving priority to individual psychological processes. The facilitator should, therefore, be at least aware of the language he or she employs and avoid the 'psychologisation' of issues.

2. 3. Discursive rationality in the workshop

As argued, everyday action may be reasonable, but not rational. Action in everyday life is often based on routines and rules of thumb rather than instrumental utility estimations. There are, however, other rationalities too. All rationalities are products of traditions and, therefore, historically and culturally constituted. In other words, a rationality does not transcend particular traditions. Furthermore, human beings are capable of different forms of rationality (e.g. instrumental, practical, discursive), but certain structures or frameworks of action encourage certain forms of

17. Cobb and Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox", p. 60. Cobb and Rifkin demonstrate in their study on more than 30 mediation sessions of community mediation programmes in western Massachusetts how the use of psychological language contributes to the marginalization of the other disputant and to the reconstruction the story of the other party as dominant. ibid., pp. 35-62.

rationality. For example, the biography of the army officer in the 20th century modern army may encourage instrumental rationality at the cost of discursive rationality. Similarly, the conduct of modern warfare may have a logic which imposes the pursuit of instrumental rationality.

Discursive rationality is fundamental in the context of problem-solving conflict resolution, because it can contribute to the prevention of the further breakdown of 'sociality' and facilitate the finding of a shared language game. Discursive rationality ultimately celebrates plurality. John Dryzek writes:

> "In sum, differences across contexts, traditions, opinions, and paradigms of personhood are profound and perhaps ineliminable. But debates among partisans are not only possible but also more or less communicatively rational. And rational consensus is no empty hope."[18]

The type of rationality which is needed in the problem-solving workshop deals with the typificatory and interpretative schemes of the participants. That mode can be found in discursive rationality whose main domains are, because of its dialectic and procedural nature, both intersubjective understanding and typificatory and interpretative schemes. Since the workshop, as argued, is an encounter where mutual cultural adaptation can take place, problem-solving workshop conflict resolution consists of discursive possibilities. Through discursive rationality a consensus across cultural and interpretative differences can be gained, a consensus which does not arise from instrumental rationality. As Dryzek states, "important social problems are pervaded by conflicting values, which instrumental action cannot resolve".[19] Similarly, conflicts are permeated by unshared typifications of reality and, therefore, instrumental rationality which appeals mainly to individual utility maximising does not necessarily contribute to their resolution.

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18. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 19.
19. ibid., p. 53.

If a substantially shared background of community norms does not exist in the workshop, "participants can still reach consensus based on reasoned *dis*agreement, by striving to understand the cultural tradition and/or conceptual framework of the other participants".[20] In other words, in discursive designs and through discursive rationality an understanding of the cultural and conceptual framework of the other party as well as a shared language game can be achieved. This type of understanding advances 'sociality' and cooperation, because it presupposes an openness to the harmonisation of relevance structures through a dialogue. The facilitator can, thus, encourage discursive rationality by helping the participants to overcome their instrumental rationality and instrumental expectations of the workshop outcome. The overcoming can be facilitated by focusing on the preconditions and nature of this type of rationality and by avoiding strategic 'means-ends' as well as psychologised language games.

Discursive rationality does not refer to either universal consensus or the uniformity of the typifications of the participants. It, rather, refers to a limited area of dialectic situations where intersubjective understanding and attempts to find a shared reality are in question. Moreover, as the reassessment of the problem-solving workshop states, the area of this type of rationality is ultimately limited to the problems at hand. In other words, it arises primarily from the reasoning for the purposes of a particular task at hand. This task may be 'practical', but it may be as well a question of, for example, ethical principles. The problems dealt with in the workshop context may be generalizable, but they are not universal. Similarly, the consensus which possibly emerges in the workshop does not derive from universal reason or transcendental intersubjectivity: it derives from the issues which are discussed.

2. 4. Re-entry

Most problem-solving approaches are based on the assumption that something can be transferred, in one way or another, from the

20. ibid., p. 42.

workshop to a context outside it, to the 'world of political decision-making'. The issue is often reduced to a discussion on the political status of the participants. However, the crucial issue is, rather, how the harmonised relevance structures which are gained in the workshop context are transferred outside the workshop. It cannot be assumed that these structures are either lasting or automatically transferred. In other words, the relevance structures may be harmonised only for the purposes of the workshop. They may also be inapplicable to the world outside the workshop, especially if they create simply interpersonal understanding. In this view, the issue of re-entry does not pose a psychological problem of how the participants adapt themselves back to their own environment without 'embarrassment'.[21] Rather, it poses a question of the importance of the relevance structures.

As argued, the importance of the relevance structures is not solely dependent on the status of the participants. It is, rather, dependent on the issues through which a shared reality is achieved. If the issues discussed relate to the 'real' problems of the conflicting parties and a shared language game is created to deal with these, the relevances are more likely to be transferred than, for example, in the case where personal feelings are focused on in the workshop. Moreover, if the changes in the relevances do not extend to the level of motivational relevances, they are unlikely to produce new patterns of action.

Re-entry can be approached also from the angle of the individual and his or her knowledge. An individual is a 'carrier of social groups' and his or her stock of knowledge is largely socially derived. However, individual experiences can be intersubjectively and socially sedimented. In other words, experiences of individuals can be incorporated in a common stock of knowledge, and if objectivated in a sign system (e.g. language) these experiences can be transmitted from one generation to the next, and from one collectivity to another.[22] Language is fundamental in the process of transmission:

> "Language objectivates the shared experiences and makes them available to all within the linguistic community, thus

21. See: Banks and Mitchell, The Resolution of Conflict, pp. 136-137.
22. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 85.

becoming both the basis and the instrument of the collective stock of knowledge. Furthermore, language provides the means for objectifying new experiences, allowing their incorporation into the already existing stock of knowledge, and it is the most important means by which the objectivated and objectified sedimentations are transmitted in the tradition of the collectivity in question."[23]

This insight seems to encourage to transmit changed typifications from the workshop structure to the tradition of the collectivity in question. It, thus, challenges the extreme rule of secrecy supported by many problem-solving approaches.

The evaluation of the workshop success can be done in two spheres: in the workshop or outside it. The facilitator may hastily conclude immediately after the workshop that the harmonisation of some relevance structures took place, because, for example, communication was more effective in the end of the workshop than in the beginning. On the other hand, the success can be measured sometime after the workshop in the sphere of political decision-making where there may not be any major changes. Moreover. the participants can see the importance of the workshop differently than the facilitator.

In sum, in order to cooperate with our fellow-men in the social world we need to find shared definitions of the situation in question. The sources of shared definitions are in cultural patterns, institutions and structures as well as in 'negotiations'. Actors do take interpretations of reality for granted, but man's being in the world is also characterised by continuing 'negotiations' of these definitions. Human beings or reality as such are neither conflictual nor harmonious. The processes of definition are guided by rules.[24] Cultural patterns guide the 'negotiation' processes by offering interpretative and actional frames. Also typical biographies provide individuals with guiding principles and rules: individuals live up the

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23. ibid., pp. 85-86. See also: Schutz and Luckmann, SLW, 1, p. 278; pp. 285-286 and pp. 292-299. Jehenson, "A Phenomenological Approach to...", p. 234.
24. See, for example: Gonos, George, "'Situation' versus 'Frame': the 'Interactionist' and the 'Structuralist' Analyses of Everyday Life", American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, No. 6, 1977, pp. 854-867.

social biographies provided by structures, and these biographies consist of rules how to 'negotiate' and communicate in typical situations.

Given that cooperation is based on a joint definition of the situation which is often 'negotiated', there is no absolute resolution of a conflict. Problem-solving conflict resolution is, rather, conflict transformation. In it conflict is transformed into 'negotiations' of reality which are founded upon discursive interest and rationality. Through and in the transformation process the parties can find shared typifications and forms of cooperation for the purposes at hand.

3. FACILITATOR: AN ETHICAL PARTICIPANT WITH A THEORETICAL INTEREST

The facilitator is often assumed to have two roles in the problem-solving workshop: an expert mediator and a social scientist. Some theorists speak about 'action research' which comprises these two elements. Kelman describes the double role of the facilitator:

> "While we have not emphasized formal research procedures, however, we are very much engaged in research. Indeed, it is our role as researchers that provides the rationale and legitimacy of our action involvement and that allows representatives of conflicting parties to interact with each other under our auspices in ways that deviate from the norms generally governing their relationship. Our research interest, moreover, cannot be feigned because we would lose credibility very quickly. We must be genuinely interested in learning about conflict in general and about the particular conflict at hand; we must demonstrate this interest and show what we have learned from our action research program through publications [...] and other means. Thus, our action requires involvement in a research program just as our research requires involvement in action program."[25]

Burton, on the other hand, emphasises that the workshop facilitator is an 'outside observer in a scientific role'. Neither of these descriptions of the position of the facilitator are satisfactory. Kelman's view implicitly derives the expertise of the facilitator from his or her academic status. Burton's phrase points to the scientific objectivity as a source of expertise and to the outside nature of the position of the facilitator as a source of legitimacy. However, it can be argued that the facilitator is an ethical participant with a theoretical interest whose position arises from three sources: ethicality, participant observation and theorising.

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25. Kelman, Herbert, "Interactive Problem Solving: The Uses and Limits of a Therapeutic Model for the Resolution of International Conflicts", in The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vamik Volkan, Joseph Montville and Demetrios Julius (eds.), Vol. 2, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991, p. 149.

3. 1. Facilitator and ethical expertise

Burton assumes that the facilitator has a superior knowledge of the causes and processes of human behaviour compared to the knowledge of the participants. In other words, the expertise of the facilitator is derived from a particular type of knowledge. What is, then, considered to be good and ethical facilitative conduct? The idea of impartiality or neutrality is employed in many mediation theories to refer to good conduct: impartial behaviour is thought to be ethical behaviour from the part of the mediator.[26] On the other hand, there are attempts to define a set of rules for desirable behaviour. The most elaborate work is Burton's Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict. A Handbook which sets a detailed list of principles of ethical conduct for the problem-solving workshop facilitator.[27] Burton justifies the need for rules:

> "Ethics used in this context has more of a function connotation than a moral one. There are rules to be observed that are designed to ensure success. It is the possibilities of failure because rules were inadequate or were not observed that draws attention to the ethics of intervention."[28]

Despite this call for rules, the source of good facilitative conduct in Burton's conflict resolution theory can be ultimately found in his theory of human needs. Since the facilitator, according to Burton, has distinctive knowledge of human needs and human behaviour related to needs satisfaction, his or her conduct is ethical when it is geared towards the recognition and satisfaction of needs of all the parties in conflict. Facilitative behaviour may take different forms, but the fundamental justification of it as well as the yardstick for the measurement of its ethicality can be found in the equal and free satisfaction of human needs. In brief, human needs are employed as an

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26. It is important to note that not all writers support the idea of neutrality, but it forms, however, one of the core metaphors of mediation theory. See also: Cobb and Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox".
27. For a handbook see also: Banks and Mitchell, The Resolution of Conflict. A call, on the other hand, for the 'institutionalisation and professionalisation' of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution is presented in: Fisher, "Developing the Field of...".
28. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, p. 27.

universal tribunal, as ultimate maxims, of ethical behaviour by Burton.

However, it can be argued that the expertise of the facilitator derives from skill acquisition, and that ethical conduct follows a similar structure as skill acquisition.[29] The underlying assumption is, thus, that the conduct of the facilitator can be approached from the point of view of the decisions which are made when he or she faces moral problems; moral problems such as what is good and ethical conduct in a particular situation. The facilitator responds, in this view, to situations in a manner which involves ethical participation. Ethical expertise is seen to be a desired 'quality', a desired way of behaviour, from the angle of the facilitator.

This type of expertise is needed in the problem-solving workshop context, because, as argued, the problem-solving workshop is situational by nature. Edward Azar's evaluation of the limitations of the 'Maryland workshops' of conflict resolution in Lebanon illustrates the need for situational conduct and ethics. The example shows how a handbook cannot answer demands which arise from a workshop situation itself. Azar writes about the workshops:

> "During both sets of meetings we concentrated on domestic political issues to the exclusion of regional political and economic development issues. This was fine as far as it went, but we exhausted the usefulness of analyzing these issues prior to the end of the second forum. Our concern was with avoiding discussion about issues that the participants, and the groups they represented, could themselves do nothing or little about."[30]

The result was:

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29. This section is based on an application of: Dreyfus, Hubert and Dreyfus, Stuart, "Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise", Human Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991, pp. 229-250. Only direct quotes from the text are footnoted. The article is levelled against the views which maintain that the highest level of moral maturity consists in judging actions according to abstract and universal principles.
30. Azar, Edward, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict", in The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vamik Volkan, Joseph Montville and Demetrios Julius (eds.), Vol. 2, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991, p. 107.

> "There was agreement that the outside actors created problems, but no analysis was made of what the proper role was of these countries in Lebanon. The participants became impatient with the progress, and although they left feeling good about each other as individuals, they did not feel good about the prospects for resolving conflict. This might not have been the case had we incorporated discussion and analysis of substantive and perhaps even technical issues into the two forums."[31]

Skill acquisition consists of five stages: novice, advanced beginner, competence, proficiency and expertise. At the stage of the novice the skill acquisition is based on recognising context-free rules for determining actions. This level is characterised by a 'handbook type of knowledge'. The stage of the advanced beginner includes incorporating situational aspects to instructional maxims. With an increasing competence at the third stage, the performer learns to choose a "plan, goal or perspective which organizes the situation and by the examining the small set of features and aspects that he has learned are relevant given that plan, the performer can simplify and improve his performance".[32] This stage consists of also an 'emotionally involved experience of the outcome', because the choice and successful completion of a goal can be frustrating.

Proficiency as the fourth stage is characterised by stopping reflecting on problematic situations as a detached observer. At this stage a plan, goal or perspective is noticed rather than looked for. A proficient performer, thus, sees what needs to be done, but must decide how to do it. An expert performer, on the other hand, knows how to perform the action without calculating and comparing alternatives. The stage of the expertise is largely based on intuition, not on analysis and comparison of alternatives. The expert does not solve problems. Neither does he or she reason. Rather, he or she spontaneously does what has normally worked.

This five stage model can be applied to the skill acquisition of facilitative conduct. A beginner tries to follow the rules available,

31. ibid., p. 107.
32. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise", p. 233.

whereas an expert performs the actions needed without deliberation of either rules or a plan, goal or perspective. Learning through experience is a basis of the expertise of the facilitator. Thus, the expertise, in this view, does not arise from a superior knowledge, it rather arises from learning and acquiring skills by performing.

Ethical comportment, on the other hand, is a form of expertise and follows, as argued, a similar structure as skill acquisition. An ethical expert behaves depending on the situation without appealing to rules and maxims. The greater the expertise, the rarer the need for deliberation. In other words, principles and theories serve only for early stages of learning: an expert ethical response to a situation is not grounded on them. In problematic situations, the expert deliberates rather about the appropriateness of his or her intuitions than abstract principles:

> "Yet, as we have seen, principles can never capture the know-how an expert acquires by dealing with, and seeing the outcome of a large number of concrete situations. Thus, when faced with a dilemma, the expert does not seek principles but, rather, reflects on and tries to sharpen his or her spontaneous intuitions by getting more information until one decision emerges as obvious."[33]

Expert performance in ethics is doing what those who already are accepted as ethical experts do and approve. Therefore, there is an element of convention which derives from the community of the ethical experts. However, being a master, according to this view, means also responding to the unique situation 'out of a fund of experience in the culture'. Reaching a stage of maturity does not mean transcending tradition. Rather, it implies leaving behind the rules of conventional morality for a new contextualisation, for being more open to the contextual properties of moral dilemmas. In a case of ethical disagreement, two experts should be "able to understand and appreciate each other's decisions. This is as near as expert ethical judgements can or need come to impartiality and universality".[34]

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33. ibid., p. 244.
34. ibid., p. 242. Compare this idea also with the notion of discursive rationality.

Ultimately, "there is no final answer as to what the appropriate response in a particular situation should be".[35] A single individual and situations he or she responds to are constantly changing, and his or her responses become constantly more refined. A sign of maturity is not reflective detachment from an unique situation to universal principles. On the contrary, maturity means being able to learn from experiences, use what one has learned, stay involved and refine one's intuitions.

In sum, the ethical conduct of the facilitator does not need to rely on the maxim of impartiality, a set of rules or the idea of universal human needs. It, rather, can rely on an openness to different and variable contexts, on an openness to 'relativise' each situation. Sensitivity to uniqueness and difference means ethical expertise. This is, however, not to say that rules and maxims may not be needed in the context of problem-solving-workshop conflict resolution. They may be needed, for example, to clarify the idea of the workshop for the participants or to offer instructive advice for an inexperienced facilitator. However, rules should not be understood to be universal maxims according to which the facilitator should guide his or her conduct independent on the situation.

3. 2. Participant observation

The face-to-face relationship is reciprocal between the two or more partners, whereas in direct social observation the relationship is one-sided. In the face-to-face relationship I can verify my assumption that my experiences correspond to those of the other person by directly appealing to an object of the external world which is common to both of us. This is not possible in direct social observation. If it is done, the nature of the relationship changes. The change is described by Schutz:

> "But in any direct social observation carried on outside a social relationship, my interpretation of another's behavior cannot be checked against his own self-interpretation, unless

35. ibid., p. 246.

> of course I exchange my role as an observer for that of a participant. *When I start asking questions of the person observed, I am no longer a mere observer.*"[36]

In direct social observation the observer does not influence the behaviour of the observed. Neither does the interchange of motives take place. However, in some occasions the observer can be in an advantaged position. When observing two participants in interaction he or she can be aware of the whole interactional situation, whereas the participants themselves tend to be only aware of each other. It may even happen that the observer is acquainted with the interpretative schemes of one participant better than his or her partner.[37]

The problem-solving facilitator is not an outside observer. Rather, he or she is a participant in a communicative situation. The facilitator participates in the workshop situation by facilitating communication, offering theoretical insights and keeping discussion within an analytical framework. Moreover, the participation constitutes the context of his or her theorising. The facilitator may occasionally adopt the role of the observer, but the type of observing is not accurately grasped in the Burtonian notion of 'scientific observer', which denotes, as demonstrated, a 'purified mind'. A more fruitful metaphor to describe the facilitator and his or her position in the workshop can be found in the conception of 'participant observer'. The metaphor can be employed to describe the active and participant position of the facilitator in the workshop without a reference to epistemological commitments. On the other hand, it can be seen to imply certain epistemological stances.

Participant observation is traditionally understood to be a methodological device to conduct anthropological and sociological field work. Although participant observation has this specific and limited meaning which implies a research method, the notion brings up questions and discussions which are also vital in the problem-solving workshop context. Moreover, given that the facilitator is a

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36. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, pp. 173-174. Schutz's own italics.
37. ibid., pp. 172-176.

part of an 'action research programme', the epistemological implications of this participation are difficult to dismiss. Participant observation is conventionally defined in a following manner:

> "For our purposes we define participant observation as a process in which the observer's presence in a social situation is maintained for the purpose of scientific investigation. The observer is in a face-to-face relationship with the observed, and, by participating with them in their natural life setting, he gathers data. Thus, the observer is part of the context being observed, and he both modifies and is influenced by this context. The role of participant observer may be either formal or informal, concealed or revealed; the observer may spend a great deal or very little time in the research situation; the participant-observer role may be an integral part of the social structure or largely peripheral to it."[38]

Participant observation is characterised by two distinctive features. First, the status of the investigator of being an outside agent is reduced to a minimum. Second, the emphasis is on dialogue. Participant observation is dialectical in that the 'subject' and 'object' of the research remain in communicative contact. Moreover, the observer becomes socialised to a certain extent into the life-world of the research 'objects'.[39] Similarly, the active behaviour of the facilitator displaces his or her role as an outside agent. His or her research activities derive from this active participation where the facilitator is inevitably to a certain extent socialised to the worlds of the participants in the workshop, if not to their entire life-worlds. Moreover, the facilitator is, as noted earlier, in a communicative contact with the participants, with the 'objects' of the research.

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38. Schwartz, Morris and Schwartz, Charlotte, "Problems in Participant Observation", in Issues in Participant Observation, A Text and Reader, George McCall and J. L. Simmons (eds.), Reading, Menlo Park, London, Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969, p. 91.
39. Bleicher, Josef, The Hermeneutic Imagination, p. 143. See also: Reinhartz, Shulamit, On Becoming a Social Scientist, From Survey Research and Participant Observation to Experiential Analysis, San Francisco, Washington and London: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1979, pp. 155-157.

The symbolic interactionist tradition claims that the ability of the researcher to perform and to be accepted as a member of the life-world of the 'objects' indicates that he or she knows and can analyse the ways in which 'objects' perform their activities. On the other hand, it can be argued that the social scientist is concerned with understanding and explanation and, therefore, the socialisation into the ways the 'objects' perform their activities is not enough for the search of the formal or invariant properties of human activities.[40] Furthermore, in the case of the problem-solving workshop the participants often expect the facilitator to take a professional role; a role which limits his or her socialisation to the world of the parties.

As a field work method, participant observation is often described by using the notion of 'surrender-and-catch'. It is assumed that field work begins with a 'surrender' of a social researcher to his or her subject matter so that the difference between subject, act and object disappears. This is thought to imply total suspension of the received notions concerning subject matter, method and theory. In other words, 'surrender' means not to select. 'Catch', on the other hand, is assumed to be a new conceiving or new conceptualising of the result of 'surrender'. At the stage of 'catch', the researcher tries to find out what he or she has 'caught' and returns from the prescientific sphere to the scientific sphere. In the scientific domain the researcher, then, proceeds with the help of the conceptual and methodological tools offered by his or her own science.[41]

The idea of 'surrender' refers to the possibility of an 'empty mind', of *tabula rasa* . However, as argued in the introduction of the thesis, the precondition for all understanding is in foremeanings and prejudices, not in an 'emptied mind'. Moreover, it is not possible to purify one's mind from these, because they are an ontological condition of man's

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40. Psathas, George, "Approaches to the Study of the World of Everyday Life", Human Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980, p. 14.

41. Wagner, Helmut, "Between Ideal Type and Surrender: Field Research as Asymmetrical Relation", Human Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. pp. 154-156. It should be emphasised that the idea of 'surrender-and-catch' as it is introduced here is based on a simplified reading of Kurt Wolff's original idea. See also Wolff's critique of Wagner's article: Wolff, Kurt, "A Very Brief Commentary on Helmut R. Wagner's 'Between Ideal Type and Surrender'", Human Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. 165-166.

'being-in-the-world'. A person trying to understand a text must be sensitive to the text's quality of newness. Sensitivity involves neither neutrality in the matter of the object nor the extinction of one's self, but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices. Similarly, the familiar horizons of the interpreter are an integral part of the event of understanding any alien object: his or her prejudices open up an object. The idea of hermeneutical circle, thus, emphasises that all understanding inevitably involves in prejudices, which can be, however, critically reflected.[42]

The facilitator enters into the workshop with his or her prejudices. These fore-meanings are bound to change when the past and present meet with in the situation. If the facilitator aims at theorising on the bases of his or her workshop experience, his or her fore-meanings consist of, for example, his or her understanding of that particular field of science he or she identifies himself or herself with, i.e., its concepts and theories. Thus, giving them up, suspending the notions concerning the subject matter and theories is not, in this view, possible as the notion of 'surrender' suggests.

3. 3. Theorising and the sources of objectivity

The problem-solving workshop facilitator is a participant who has a theoretical interest and who, on the other hand, has "already contributed, as a participant in interaction, to establishing the context of action that he then analyzes as an object".[43] The issues of obtaining data and the validity and 'objectivity' of data arise in a following manner:

> "If we conceptually enrich the first-level models of action to the point where interpretation and understanding appear as basic features of social action itself, the question of how the interpretative accomplishments of the social-scientific observer are connected with the natural hermeneutics of the everyday practice of communication, of how communicative experiences can be transformed into data, can no longer be

42. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 238-239 and p. 263.
43. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, p. 125.

trimmed down to the size of a technical subproblem in research."[44]

The topic can be approached from the angle of view-points too. The social world is given us in a complex system of perspectives. There is, however, a fundamental difference between my interpretation of my own subjective experiences and my interpretation of the subjective experience of someone else. Although the social sciences try to determine what an action means to the actor, they are undertaken from the view-point of an observer.[45]

Several positions can be claimed in relation to the question of the sources of scientific objectivity. John Burton's discussion on the issue can be described as 'modified positivist' standpoint. Alfred Schutz's answer, on the other hand, illustrates a hermeneutical stance. Although his answer to the quest for objectivity may not be fully satisfactory, it discusses in a highly sophisticated manner several vital ontological and epistemological issues of science. Similarly, the relativist position advocated by some ethnomethodologists, and the genealogical method employed by post-structuralists introduce topics which are important also to problem-solving workshop theorising.

For Burton, the scientist has a corrective function. The role of the scientist is, according to him, to find explanations that better fit modern conditions and problems. A paradigm shift in social sciences in general, and in International Relations in particular, is needed, because 'vague thinking' based on false assumptions and imprecise meanings influence reality and cause harmful policies and dysfunctional conflicts. The epistemological problems faced by the social scientist are, according to Burton, threefold: how to construct imaginative hypotheses through abduction, how to produce corrective hypotheses through deduction and how to test hypotheses. He admits the limits of hypotheses testing and argues that there can seldom be verification; there are, rather, processes of falsification. The

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44. ibid., p. 120.
45. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 8. Barber, Social Typifications and the Elusive Other, p. 31.

ultimate task of the scientist is, according to him, to offer 'objective' and 'non-ideological' viewpoints on which the construction of universal laws of human behaviour can rest.[46]

According to Schutz, on the other hand, the social scientist obtains his or her data through understanding meanings, meanings which are created by actors in the life-world.[47] The social scientist encounters symbolically prestructured objects on the basis of which he or she, then, constructs the 'objective' reality within which the science operates. Theorising belongs essentially, in Schutz's view, to the 'sub-universe of science' which differs from everyday life. In the 'scientific sub-universe' the theorising self is solitary: it has no social environment and it stands outside social relationships. Moreover, in it the social scientist adopts a scientific attitude. Schutz describes the attitude and its implications:

> "This attitude of the social scientist is that of a mere disinterested observer of the social world. He is not involved in the observed situation, which is to him not of practical but merely of cognitive interest. It is not the theatre of his activities but merely the object of his contemplation. He does not act within it, vitally interested in the outcome of his actions, hoping or fearing what their consequences might be but he looks at it with the same detached equanimity with which the natural scientist looks at the occurrences in his laboratory."[48]

In brief, when theorising the scientist detaches himself or herself from his or her biographical situation within the social world. He or

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46. See, for example: Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, pp. 29-30. Burton, "The Rôle of....", pp. 77-78. Burton, "World Society and Human Needs", p. 57. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention, pp. 19-20; pp. 30-33; p. 44 and pp. 256-257.
47. The following account of Schutz's ideas is based on: Schutz, CP, 1, pp. 5-7; pp. 34-36; pp. 40-44; pp. 245-255. Schutz, CP, 2, pp. 17-19. On the world of science see also: Schutz, Reflections of the Problem of Relevance, pp. 258-262. Schutz The Phenomenology of the Social World, ch. 5. Bernstein, The Restructuring of..., pp. 152-156. Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, ch. VI. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, pp. 121-124. See also critiques of Schutz: Cox, Schutz's Theory of Relevance, pp. 218-228. Bernstein, The Restructuring of..., pp. 167-169. Valone, James, "A Critical Theory of Knowledge and the Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz", Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1976, pp. 199-215.
48. Schutz, CP, 1, p. 36.

she enters into the world of science which constitutes its own frame with pre-organised knowledge. In other words, the scientist shifts himself or herself into the relevance systems of science.

All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves, according to Schutz, constructs, that is, a set of abstractions, formalizations, idealisations, etc. An everyday actor uses the common-sense constructs to orient himself or herself and to act in his or her life-world. The scientific constructs, on the other hand, form a general model of a sector of the social world which is constructed from the point of view of the scientist and his or her particular problem under scrutiny. These 'second degree constructs' do not, therefore, refer to unique acts of an unique individual occurring within an unique situation.

The scientific model of the social world creates, according to Schutz, 'puppets' with artificial consciousness. When observing social action or interaction the scientist constructs patterns of typical action. Then he or she coordinates to these typical 'course-of-action patterns' a personal type, a model of a typical actor whom he or she imagines to possess a fictitious consciousness. This type of model of the actor does not have biography nor history, because it is placed to a situation by the scientist. Furthermore, the "puppet and his artificial consciousness is not subjected to the ontological conditions of human being".[49] In such an artificial model of the social world, for example, pure rational acts, choices from rational motives, are possible, because all the difficulties the real actor has in the life-world can be eliminated by the scientist.

Schutz maintains that the social sciences deal in an objective way with the subjective meaning of human action. However, the question arises how it is possible to gain valid knowledge through scientific models if they are based on the 'subjective creativity' of the scientist? In order to be objective, according to Schutz, the models postulated by the social scientist must conform to the canons of verifiability and testability set by the scientific community. Schutz refers to three postulates which restrict the construction of models.

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49. ibid., p. 41.

The 'postulate of logical consistency' states that the constructs designed by the scientist have to "be established with the highest degree of clarity and distinctness of the conceptual framework implied and must be fully compatible with the principles of formal logic".[50] The 'postulate of subjective interpretation' enables the scientist to discern what is distinctive about the models that are appropriate for an adequate social theory. The 'postulate of adequacy', on the other hand, maintains that the model of social action created by the scientist must be constructed in such a way that the act indicated by the model would be understandable for the actor himself or herself in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life.

As demonstrated in the fourth chapter, the Burtonian scientist is assumed to have nonarbitrary access to the objective domain of behaviour. Moreover, the perspective of the interpreter is supposed to be similar to the perspective of the actor. Schutz's account of science challenges Burton's view. For Schutz, the scientist does not have nonarbitrary access to the world and meanings of the actors. The scientific constructs as second degree constructs offer access, but they are neither equal nor similar to the constructs created by the actors in their life-worlds. Moreover, according to Schutz, the subjective and objective meanings never fully coincide. Thus, the scientist can never grasp the meanings of the actors as these meanings appear to the actors themselves. It is, however, important to keep in mind that Schutz does not underestimate the task and value of science. Rather, he reassesses its realm in relation to the everyday world.

Burton's utility-maximising actor can be considered to offer a scientific model. His theory of conflict and conflict resolution as well as his 'need-man' can, thus, be seen to be one possible model and 'puppet' created by a theorist. However, if evaluated according to the criteria of objectivity suggested by Schutz, it may be the case that Burton's model does not fulfil them. Moreover, both the criteria and the whole notion of scientific objectivity can be disputed.

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50. ibid., p. 43.

The argument presented by, for example, some ethnomethodologists who challenge the idea of objectivity can be summarised in a following manner. Social research and theorising can be seen to count only as one particular form of life alongside of others. Theoretical work may be distinguished like, for example, religion and art, by its reflexivity, but that does not imply objectivity. Theorising takes place in the sphere of the life-world as any other activity and, therefore, interpretative (social) sciences can give up the claim to produce objective knowledge at all. There are, thus, no criteria of truth and validity outside the domain in which theorising is carried out. The constructs of the social sciences have the same status as the everyday, first degree, constructs of lay members, because they too are bound to a social context and values. In other words, the validity standards of science are just as particular as any other types of criteria of validity that function in other departments of life.[51]

The most recent phase of this 'post-empirist' movement employs the genealogical method to demonstrate that knowledge does not simply reflect or represent the world. Rather, in this view, there are discourses of knowledge whose success derives from their connections with networks of power. It is argued that in all societies power-knowledge functions to produce some forms of truth and to disqualify others. In modern society the production of truth has taken a disciplinary and normalising form. Genealogy offers a reading of the effect of present social practices which does not claim to correspond either to the everyday understanding of being in those practices nor to a deeper repressed understanding. Genealogy does not, like hermeneutical approaches, seek a frame of analysis that shows how the behaviour of various actors can be recovered if we know their cultures or fields of meanings. It, rather, seeks to distance us from the various linguistic practices that give us objects, subjects and the

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51. For a summary see: Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, pp. 126-130. See also, for example: Blum, Alan, "Theorizing", in Understanding Everyday Life, Toward the Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge, Jack Douglas (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, pp. 301-319. Feyerabend, Paul, Against Method, Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge, London: Verso, 1980. McHugh, Peter, "On the Failure of Positivism", in Understanding Everyday Life, Toward the Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge, Jack Douglas (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, pp. 320-335.

more general valuing within which they function. Thus, the question of the sources of and the whole quest for scientific objectivity appear in the light of historical discourses for post-structuralists.[52]

All these epistemological stances are available for the facilitator who studies problem-solving workshop conflict resolution. He or she can approach the topic from the angle of the meanings held by the persons involved in a conflict and in a conflict resolution attempt. That is the approach explicitly advocated in this thesis. The facilitator can also take part in abstract 'model-building' as Burton suggests. The researcher can, on the other hand, study problem-solving workshop conflict resolution practices, such as the practice of neutrality. In that case the focus is on neutrality as a discursive practice that may, for example, function to obscure the workings of power in mediation.[53] Similarly, the emphasis can be, for example, on patriarchal relations which are reproduced in the power relations of conflict and problem-solving conflict resolution.[54] This type of post-structuralist approach is also hinted at in the thesis when the political nature of conflict resolution and the elements of power are discussed. Rather than seeing the hermeneutical and post-structural positions as opposite to each other, this chapter has tried to demonstrate points at which these could coincide.

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52. See, for example: Dreyfus, Hubert, "Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent Foucault", in Interpreting Politics, Michael Gibbons (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 203-220. Foucault, Michel, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", in Interpreting Politics, Michael Gibbons (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 221-240. Shapiro, Michael, Reading the Postmodern Polity, Political Theory as Textual Practice, Minneapolis, Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
53. See: Cobb and Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox".
54. See: Northrup, "Getting to Maybe".

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

John Burton's conflict resolution theory assumes the origin of conflict to be in such human needs as identity, participation and security. Burton claims that people will pursue those needs regardless of the consequences to themselves or a system. International conflicts arise from the failings of domestic systems to provide for the needs of people. Given that the origin of conflict is in basic human needs, preconditions for conflict resolution, on the other hand, can be found in the analytical differentiation of needs from interests, in the improvement of communication between the parties in conflict and in the alterations of structures and institutions which hinder the processes of needs satisfaction. Burton considers problem-solving workshop conflict resolution to be the best means for the creation of such preconditions.

Burton's conflict resolution theory is founded on a version of human needs thinking. Burton gives needs priority over other characteristics of human 'being'. He assumes that basic needs form a fundamental stratum of the person which acts as the motive of behaviour. In his view, needs are thought to be equal to drives whose demands seek satisfaction at any cost subject only to minor constraints. Burton's theory implies universal and biologically founded human nature and, thereby, it offers ways to defuse contextualism. For example, contextualism is defused by considering problem-solving conflict resolution to be applicable and suitable for all cultures.

Burton does note the existence of cultural values, but he assumes them to motivate behaviour in a limited sense. According to him, the preservation of values may lead individuals, for example, to defend their identity, but it is eventually the pursuit of needs that is the reason for the formation of such valuable entities as identity groups. Since culture is of a minor importance in Burton's conflict theory and since it is thought to be an unimportant element of human 'being', it is not taken seriously into account in his conflict resolution theory and the practices it implies. Moreover, the emphasis on shared needs leads conflict resolution to look for similarities between the parties

in conflict rather than encouraging the parties to accept and live with differences, the border between 'us' and 'them'.

Burton's focus is on the individual actor whom he assumes to behave in an instrumental and utility-maximising manner, especially in situations of choice. In other words, while the social actor is expected to be 'conditioned' by the satisfaction of his or her needs, he or she is thought to be engaged in continuous calculations about the expected utility of various options and outcomes of behaviour. When Burton applies this notion of rational choice to his conflict resolution theory, he takes the sociocultural context of conflict and conflict resolution again for granted. He does not recognise, for example, the existence of 'culturally bound' utilities. Moreover, given that the focus is on the individual actor and that the individual is assumed to employ instrumental reasoning, the conception of interaction becomes largely reduced to the sum of choices made by each actor in Burton's conflict resolution theory.

There are elements of discursive rationality in Burton's conflict resolution theory, but they are not fully developed. For example, Burton considers the problem-solving workshop to be an attempt to scrutinise the nature of the relationship of the parties in conflict by the parties themselves. According to him, it is fundamental for this mode of conflict resolution that the analysis of the relationship takes the form of facilitated dialogue. He, thus, hints at the possibility of discursive rationality through which a consensus across cultural and interpretative differences is achieved. However, this view of communicative and culturally conditioned human 'being' is not explicitly discussed in Burton's conflict resolution theory which ultimately derives from a biological and universal 'model of man'.

As mentioned, Burton's problem-solving conflict resolution theory focuses on the individual actor. Furthermore, he does not clarify the nature of the relationship between the individual and the social group. In Burton's view, needs belong fundamentally to the individual, not to the group. Neither do needs derive from the social world; their origin is in biology. A question arises as to whether the utility maximising and 'needs-conditioned' individual represents the group or

is he or she considered, rather, to be an atom-like and solitary unity in the problem-solving workshop. Although Burton claims that the problem-solving workshop operates at the level of intergroup conflict and that the individual participant transfers something from the workshop to the world of political decision-making, the relationship between the individual actor and the social group remains ambiguous.

However, an understanding of conflict and conflict resolution can be built upon a 'social constructionist' image of human 'being' which takes into account the organic relationship between the individual and social group. There is, thus, no need to appeal to the existence of universal human needs in order to understand and practice problem-solving workshop conflict resolution. Phenomenological sociology and its picture of the person suggest a theoretical language for the conceptualisation of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution. They offer a language which arises neither from socio-biology nor psychology.

According to phenomenological sociology, we experience the world in terms of typifications. Why certain typifications come into play in certain circumstances is determined by relevance structures. Our typifications and relevance structures are sedimented in our stocks of knowledge, which are socially derived and approved. As members of social groups, we accept the ready-made standardised schemes of the cultural patterns of these groups as unquestioned guides for interpreting of and acting in the social world. Social groups can be distinguished in virtue of their commonly held systems of relevance from which typifications arise. Moreover, social groups have relative natural world-views which are also taken for granted and shared by the members of the groups. Social groups and institutions participate in 'creating' and defining realities for individuals: through intersubjective typifications and shared world-views realities, 'what is known as reality', are defined.

Applied to conflict resolution, the participants bring into the conflict resolution situation their definitions of reality, conflict and conflict resolution which are influenced, if not determined, by socially constructed typifications. The problem-solving workshop facilitator

may create, for example, a 'needs-discourse' in order to point out similarities and produce a shared ground for the discussions between the parties. However, that should not be taken to imply or prove the existence of 'universal basic human needs' which are independent of the situation. Rather, needs are dependent on the milieu in which they are discussed and, moreover, what ultimately counts as a 'basic need' is culturally constituted. Given the fundamentality of the social world and cultural pattern, the problem-solving workshop is not a filter where culture is filtered away, or put aside, as Burton argues. On the contrary, the dimensions of the social world continue to exist in the workshop. The workshop is a place where a cultural encounter takes place, and where the socially and culturally produced border between 'we' and 'they' can, therefore, be reflected, not abolished.

Conflicts are characterised by a break-down of shared reality. Being and cooperating with others presuppose shared typifications through which a shared reality is defined. If typifications break down or are denied the society faces anomie which may take the form of conflict. Applied to problem-solving conflict resolution, it is necessary that in the problem-solving workshop the participants can engage in 'negotiations' in which typifications and relevance structures can be harmonised. The problem-solving workshop is, thus, an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties in conflict. It deals mainly with the interpretative schemes of the participants by offering them a framework for 'negotiations over realities'. The finding of a common language game both presupposes and facilitates the finding of a shared reality.

One of the main tasks of the facilitator is to advance discursive rationality. Despite the differences of, for example, traditions and cultures, dialogue across them is possible. Since the workshop deals mainly with the interpretative frameworks of the parties, discursive rationality can contribute to the finding of a shared reality. In cultural encounters where there is a need to find a shared reality and cooperate despite fundamental differences, a common reality does not arise from instrumental cost-benefit calculations. Rather, it arises from an 'openness to dialogue' and discursive mode of rationality.

Do the Burtonian and 'social constructionist' images of human 'being' and nature, then, condition conflict resolution practices in the context of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution? Since the theoretical introductory talks and other theoretical inputs provided by the facilitator are an essential element of problem-solving conflict resolution, the idea of human nature held by the facilitator is directly fed into the conflict resolution process. In other words, by typifying and conceptualising conflict in a certain manner and by emphasising and rejecting certain theories of conflict and conflict resolution, the facilitator projects his or her understanding of human 'being' onto the resolution process. Moreover, the choice of facilitative techniques and procedures reflects that understanding too. The facilitator contributes to the creation of a conflict resolution discourse in the workshop and, thereby, he or she participates, for example, in the shaping of the 'horizon of expectation' of a successful and desirable mode of resolution. In more general terms, the facilitator contributes to the constitution of conflict and conflict resolution for the workshop participants.

The conceptual and theoretical framework suggested in the thesis has practical implications which can be summarised in ten points:

(1) It is desirable that the parties in conflict ask themselves for problem-solving conflict resolution, because it implies that their relevance structures have already some similarities. In other words, the conflict is constituted as a problem for them and their 'horizons of expectation' include the notion of peaceful resolution of their conflict. If the relevance structures have enough points of convergence, the parties may be willing to discover solutions for their problems, despite the fact that the causes of the conflict may be differently constituted for them. The problem-solving workshop also provides an outside recognition of the conflict and its parties, and that can have an empowering effect particularly on the party which perceives itself to be in a disadvantaged position.

(2) It is also desirable that the facilitator trains the participants in the ideology of this type of conflict resolution before the workshop begins. Training minimises the risk that the participants have false and empty hopes of the workshop, and builds up more 'realistic'

expectations. During the training sessions the limits of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution should be emphasised. The parties should know that the workshop deals mainly with interpretative frameworks, and that it is fundamentally an attempt to find a shared reality between them. It should be also accepted that the parties may not need this particular form of conflict resolution.

(3) Although the isolated location of the workshop brings the participants away from the 'reality' of their conflict and although this itself may harmonise their relevance structures, the political nature of the workshop exercise should not be forgotten or hidden. The struggles over the definitions of reality continue in the workshop, and it should not be artificially neutralised from them. The conflict becomes constituted and defined in certain ways in the workshop and, therefore, the workshop 'negotiates' and creates 'versions of reality'. The facilitator participates in these constitutive processes by delivering theoretical talks, asking questions, making summaries and shaping the grounds on which agreement and disagreement take place.

(4) The facilitation team should have a shared agenda, and it should be well aware of it. The individual facilitators have their images of successful problem-solving workshop outcomes as well as of human nature and 'being'. If the pictures vary, it is reflected in the ways the facilitators both conceptualise the conflict and choose facilitative techniques and procedures. For example, a workshop which aims at analysing 'basic human needs' requires different mediation techniques than a conflict resolution attempt which intends to negotiate a set of 'practical action principles'. Similarly, the facilitative techniques which steer the participants towards discursive rationality differ from those which advance instrumental rationality. Discursive rationality presupposes an understanding of the possibility and fruitfulness of dialogue, whereas instrumental rationality presupposes a context of strategic action which can be created, for example, by encouraging the parties to negotiate on their utilities. Although the workshop is always situational by nature, a shared conceptual and theoretical framework among the facilitators brings in a structural element to the mediation process.

(5) One of the most essential parts of the facilitative techniques employed in the problem-solving workshop is the theoretical talks delivered by the facilitator. In them the facilitator expresses his or her conceptualisations and understandings of conflict and creates a basis for a common discourse, for a common point of reference. The facilitator should, for example, emphasise the intersubjective nature of our ways to perceive conflict. Similarly, he or she should discuss the role of cultural patterns in shaping our interpretations of the world. Moreover, the characteristic of language as a container of typifications and the importance of the finding of a shared language game should be focused on in the theoretical inputs of the facilitator. Also the ideas that realities are 'negotiated' and that a shared reality can be found through dialogue should be introduced. By doing this, the facilitator steers the parties towards discursive rationality.

The goal of the workshop the facilitator has in mind should be 'going beyond similarity' and learning 'how to live with difference'. The purpose should not be the neutralising of the border between 'we' and 'they' nor the reduction of differences to abstract similarities. The facilitative team should be capable of reflecting the ideological and political task it is committed to. It should be also capable of controlling the language games it employs. For example, the team should avoid psychological language games which reject the recognition of the struggles and 'negotiations' over reality and the play of power by emphasising an analogy between the psychological processes of the individual and the 'political' processes of the group.

(6) A strength of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution compared with many other forms of conflict resolution lies in the discursive potentiality the workshop provides for the parties in conflict. The potentiality should be fully utilised in the workshop context. The workshop gives the parties a chance to express their own typifications and interpretative frameworks of the conflict. In other words, in the workshop they can present as well as 're-negotiate' their typifications, definitions of realities. This is vital, because a set of shared typifications is a precondition for the mapping out of cooperative options.

However, since the conflict is often constituted in different ways even among one party, the workshop does not grasp the whole conflict. For example, a conflict may be constituted differently for grass-roots people, intellectuals and political decisions-makers. Thus, a 'sector' (or 'sectors') of the conflict is represented and interpreted in the workshop. Even the so-called 'contingency models'[1] of conflict resolution are not able to answer the challenge put forward by the notion of the 'sectors of conflict'. Contingency models postulate for conflict a life-cycle, in the form of the stages of conflict, during which different forms of conflict resolution, and especially third party interventions, are thought to be effective. The idea of 'sector', on the other hand, suggests that different 'sectors' of the conflict, which ultimately represent the various patterns the conflict is constituted, may require different forms of conflict resolution. For example, farmers living in a border area, may require functionalist arrangements with farmers living on the other side of the border. The arrangements may presuppose pragmatic rationality which can be advanced in pragmatically-oriented conflict resolution attempts. At the same time, a political decision-making 'sector' may require a form of conflict resolution which engages the participants in a dialectic examination of multiple group-identities. The tasks of the third party are clearly different in these cases.

(7) Instead of conflict resolution, it is better to refer to conflict transformation in the problem-solving workshop. There are conflict transformations in which struggles over, for example, identities are continued by new means. These transformations may become constituted for the parties in conflict as a 'resolution'. By means of the problem-solving workshop conflict can be transformed into 'negotiations over reality' which are founded on discursive interest and discursive rationality.

(8) Re-entry does not pose a psychological problem: it poses a question of the importance of relevance structures and of the transfer of these structures outside the workshop context. The over-emphasis put on interpersonal and psychological understanding in the workshop does not necessarily facilitate the return of the

1. See chapter II, p. 33.

participants to their own communities. Rather, if the issues discussed in the problem-solving workshop are perceived to be 'real' from the point of view of the parties themselves, the changed relevances are likely to be transferred outside the workshop.

(9) Follow-up should be a part of the workshop. The following up process could include, for example, the linking of the various 'sectors' of the conflict with each other and with the parallel forms of conflict resolution attempts.

(10) The research agenda and possibilities opened up by the position of the participant observer of the facilitator should be fully explored. The position of the participant observer is advantaged, because it gives a means to study the understandings of the conflict held by the people engaged in it. In other words, it is possible to study what conflict means to the parties and how it is constituted for them. Moreover, the position gives means to study how, for example, ethnic identities are formed in the processes of conflict and conflict resolution and how the dominant definitions of ethnicity are reconstituted through and in conflict resolution processes. These research questions demand new, qualitative, methodological devices, whose development has been, however, largely neglected by the scholars working on the area of problem-solving workshop conflict resolution.

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