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THE NON-GERMANS IN THE

GERMAN ARMED FORCES

1939 - 1945

by

Philip Henry Buss

A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the University
of Kent at Canterbury.

September 1974.

I declare that this thesis is wholly my
own work and embodies the results of research carried
out under the supervision of Dr. M.J.M. Larkin.

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ABSTRACT

Lack of space precludes a detailed history of each non-German unit with the German forces during the Second World War, but it is possible to make generalisations and to reach certain conclusions. Before the War the German Armed Forces had little interest in recruiting foreigners because they were preoccupied with the process of rearmament. An exception was Amt Ausland Abwehr of the High Command, which made contact with, and even enrolled, resident foreigners with a view to using them to facilitate possible German thrusts.

The Schutzstaffel of the National Socialist Party meanwhile formed armed units whose members were required to be fitter than those of the German Armed Forces and to be able to prove pure Nordic origin. It was not essential for candidates to be German citizens. The leaders of the S.S. regarded it as a pan-Germanic force and even before 1939 had enrolled a small number of men who were not German nationals. After the outbreak of war the need to maintain its armed units obliged the S.S. to recruit Germans from outside the Reich, over whom the Wehrmacht had no claim. To these were added Germanic volunteers after the campaigns of 1940 were concluded - and Finns. To prosecute the war with Britain the German Army began to recruit Irishmen, Arabs and Indians.

The opening of the Russian campaign brought Germany offers of assistance from individuals in occupied and neutral countries. Volunteers of Germanic race were taken into national legions sponsored by the S.S.; volunteers of other races constituted foreign units and formations within the German Army. The prolongation of the campaign and unexpectedly heavy casualties

revealed the inadequacy of German manpower and forced a number of expedients upon the German ground forces. One of the most important of these was the use of Soviet citizens individually in German units and in a variety of indigenous elements. Such employment had not been foreseen and was initially forbidden. Moreover it called for political changes that the German authorities were unwilling to make until it was too late to affect the military situation. Faced with the collapse of her allies, Germany strove to retrieve some of their manpower. At the same time she drew upon the considerable numbers of refugees and foreign workers in the Reich.

National-Socialism, friendship for Germany, hostility to Britain and a wide variety of personal reasons caused foreigners to enlist in the German forces before June 1941. After that date anti-Bolshevism was added to the other motives for enlistment. When these motives and German propaganda failed to produce sufficient recruits various forms of pressure were applied.

Non-Germans were employed in a wide variety of roles at the front and in the lines-of-communication. Through their ranks passed possibly one and a half million men. The treatment they received at German hands varied from unit to unit but in general Eastern volunteers were treated with less consideration than those from other parts of the world. With so many men involved there had necessarily been a decline in the quality of the foreigners taken into the German forces which, coupled with inconsiderate handling and a deterioration in Germany's military situation, led to instances of defection and even mutiny. Nevertheless, hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers remained under arms until the German capitulation, many of them fighting bravely.

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INTRODUCTION.

In his work on the Waffen S.S., Professor George Stein states that "no serious study of the mobilisation of non-German manpower for the German armed forces has yet appeared."^{1.} This thesis attempts to fill in part this gap, dealing in the process with members of the German forces from five continents. For the purpose of this work a non-German is a person, irrespective of racial origin, who did not possess German citizenship on 1st September 1939.

The non-Germans who served in the German forces during the Second World War have not been neglected by writers. The foreigners who enlisted in the Armed S.S. have been noted by its historians. The Vlasov movement has attracted the attention of several authors, while the Eastern volunteers in general have been mentioned by the chroniclers of the German occupation of the western provinces of the U.S.S.R. Apart from these studies, there are many histories of individual units, formations and nationalities which served in the German forces. The only studies embracing a wide range of nationalities within the Wehrmacht and the Waffen S.S. have been those dealing with collaborators in general or with the details of their uniforms.

1. G.H.Stein, The Waffen S.S. 1939-1945, Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939-1945 (London, 1966), p.137.

In the absence of a comprehensive and accurate work on the subject of the military collaborators, a number of myths have become current, especially concerning their reliability and armament. It is one of the purposes of this thesis to clarify these issues by showing how the German authorities handled their foreign recruits and how the foreigners reacted.

Study of the subject has been hampered by the destruction and loss of many documents relating to the units and headquarters involved, by the division of the surviving material among a number of states, and by the security classification allotted to some of it.

Surviving non-Germans who had served in the German forces were punished on their repatriation, unless they managed to escape abroad. There was an understandable reluctance on the part of their compatriots to discuss these survivors, who in most cases were regarded as traitors. Nevertheless, a number of articles and books have appeared dealing with certain categories of non-Germans who served in the German forces. In some cases these have been written by apologists for the volunteers rather than by serious students.

In studying the "fifth columnists" and other traitors in occupied countries, one finds that they may be divided into five categories according to their relationship with the Germans and with the countries to whom they owed allegiance. In the first place, there were those non-Germans who were associated with German agencies, notably Abwehr, before the German forces attacked the non-Germans' country of origin

and who participated according to a pre-arranged plan in the German invasion of that country. The most flagrant example of this was the penetration of the Dutch defences by Dutch national-socialists from Western Germany, dressed in Dutch uniforms.

The second category consisted of those who gave spontaneous assistance to the German invaders. Since the co-operation of this category was unplanned, but possibly not unforeseen, by the German forces, the non-Germans involved did not officially become members of the German forces. In this category belonged Volksdeutsche of Poland, North Schleswig and Jugoslavia - also Croats and Balts.

The third class comprised the non-Germans who remained true to their home country during the German invasion, and in some cases resisted the German entry, but who became convinced that their exiled governments would never return, and who decided, in consequence, that they could join German units. Into this category fell many Western Europeans who volunteered to fight on the Eastern front.

A fourth category existed in those countries where native politicians took office in order to act as a buffer between the occupier and the native population, until such time as their government-in-exile could return. Into this category fell supporters of Nedic in Serbia and Rallis in Greece. The status of their régimes was not as independent as those of Croatia and Slovakia let alone of the Kingdoms of Roumania, Hungary and Italy, whose forces do not come within the scope of this work. The temporary "cushion" régimes were, however, assisted and empowered by the Germans to raise security units, which frequently operated alongside German

formations, served under German command, and were frequently listed together with German units, even though, strictly speaking, they did not belong to the German armed forces nor to the Waffen S.S. nor to the German police.^{2.}

The fifth category of military collaborators consisted of those who were loyal to their own governments during and after the invasion of their homelands, but who became so antagonistic to the Communist-led resistance movements that they co-operated with the security forces of "caretaker" régimes and with German units against the left-wing guerillas. This was the case with many of the "illegal" Cetnik bands of Mihailovic and with the minor Greek collaborators Poulos and Mikhalagas. These co-belligerents of the Germans in some cases continued to assist Allied aviators who crash-landed in their territory but fired upon Allied liaison officers with the pro-Communist partisans. These collaborators were not members of the German armed forces although they were often mentioned in German documents.

The collaborators who served in the armed units of "caretaker" governments and the resistance members who fought the Communists did not regard themselves as traitors since they believed that they were serving the interests of their

2. The government of Marshal Pétain, which continued to exist after the entry of German troops into the southern, formerly unoccupied, "Vichy" zone, did not fall into this category, nor did the Fascist Republic established by Mussolini after his rescue from captivity. In neither case was the government a "caretaker" one pending an Allied victory. In German eyes both were regarded as states with the same enemies as Germany; but the Italian régime was given greater encouragement and assistance in raising troops.

governments-in-exile by combatting Bolshevik insurrection. Many of those who threw in their lot with the Axis forces before, during or after the invasion of the country with which they were associated, did not regard their behaviour as treason, because they felt no obligation to that state, but rather looked upon the invaders as liberators or potential liberators. Into this classification fell the Balts who wished to re-establish the independence of the three republics.

Among the military collaborators who felt no obligation to their country of domicile were those ethnic groups, such as the Flemings and Croats, who felt themselves in an inferior position. The same was true of minorities, notably the Volksdeutsche communities, many of whom felt a sense of grievance against the host-nation for not granting them independence or equality. They had no qualms about rendering assistance to and even joining the German forces. In fact, thanks to active national-socialist propaganda amongst the Volksgruppen, many Volksdeutsche wished their "colonies" to be united or re-united with Germany. This was also the aim of some of the Native National-Socialists of the Germanic countries.

In the 19th and 20th centuries it has become common practice to describe foreign contingents in a nation's army as "legions". The choice of this term is unfortunate because alien detachments have more in common with the Auxilia of ancient Rome than with her Legiones, the backbone of her army

During the Middle Ages it was not uncommon for a state to hire units of foreign mercenaries, for example Genoese crossbow-men or Flemish hand-gunmen, for specific campaigns. Apart from these, there were instances of foreigners, for example Varangians and Scots, being employed as permanent bodyguards. During the 18th century several European states employed foreign professionals - Swiss, German, Scottish or Irish - as permanent regiments. Use of homogeneous units of mercenaries has declined, however, until only the Vatican Guard and the Gurkha units remain.

In the early years of the 19th century the term "legion" came to be applied to detachments of patriots seeking to free their country from a foreign yoke, notably the King's German Legion. The use of the term persisted with the raising of Czechoslovak and Polish legions during the First World War. These contingents did not form part of the standing army, and, although they contained many professionals, consisted largely of enthusiasts for a cause which they sought to serve by enlistment under a foreign flag.

During the 19th century France raised her Foreign Legion, an example which was followed by Spain in the 20th century. These form a permanent part of the armies of France and Spain, but differ from other foreign contingents, mercenary and idealist, regular and temporary alike in that they make no attempt to segregate members of the different nationalities from whom the volunteers are drawn.

The "legions" raised by the Wehrmacht during the Second World War had little in common with the Foreign Legions of France and Spain because the German authorities, except in the case of many of the Soviet citizens, attempted to organise

their foreign recruits into ethnically homogeneous formations and units. Only in the Waffen S.S. was there a deliberate mixing of foreign races, and even this was confined to the Germanic peoples. The foreign volunteers who served the Third Reich differed too in that they were not a permanent part of its forces. Most of the legions associated with the German forces were raised to fight against the U.S.S.R., but a minority had the United Kingdom as an enemy. Had the war ended in a German victory, most of the foreigners would have been demobilised, their purpose served. Only a limited number of volunteers of Nordic stock would have been eligible to join contingents to guard the new frontiers of the Greater German Reich and to maintain order behind them.

PART ONE

German Policy and Policy Makers.

Chapter One-The Vanguard.

The Wehrgesetz of 1921 confined membership of the Reichswehr to members of the German state and released 1. foreigners serving in the German armed forces at that time. Thenceforth, until Adolf Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, the German Army and Navy were limited in size and restricted to long-term volunteers. The Wehrgesetz of 1935 did not completely exclude non-Germans from service in the German forces and provision was made, on 26th June 1935, for those who did not belong to the Reich to enlist, once the 2. approval of the Führer had been given.

After the re-introduction of conscription on 16th March 1935, the German forces not only had to instruct each year-group as it came of military age, but also to provide supplementary training for the "white" age-groups - those who had not been conscripted during the years of official disarmament. Nor was the task simply a matter of absorbing manpower in order to expand the German Army and Navy on the basis of existing cadres, for a new air force had to be created almost from scratch. In the process, moreover, the German forces had to be trained and equipped with weapons which had in some cases been forbidden to them, notably tanks, heavy artillery, submarines and aircraft.

1. R. Absolon, Wehrgesetz und Wehrdienst, 1939-1945, Das Personalwesen in der Wehrmacht (Boppard am Rhein, 1960), p.123.
2. Ibid., p.123.

As a result of its preoccupation with these responsibilities, the Wehrmacht had no interest in recruiting large numbers of foreigners - an attitude it maintained until the first winter of the Russian campaign, when German casualties made the use of non-Germans imperative.

The Kingdom of Prussia had raised regiments of Masurians, while the Second Reich recruited native Askaris to defend her newly-acquired African territories. Nevertheless, the enlistment of non-Germans was not so deeply rooted in Prussian military tradition as it was in that of Austria, where there was a long history of employing Magyar, Croat and Czech³ regiments. During the First World War the German Army raised a small Irish Brigade,⁴ and a Moslem Legion⁵ which, while they achieved little, created few problems for their sponsor. Greater difficulties were posed by the legion raised in occupied "Congress" Poland, since Pilsudski, its commander, opposed German plans for deploying the force in circumstances which he considered unprofitable to Poland. Hitler himself was strongly influenced by Pilsudski's intransigence and developed not only a hostility to the Polish people but also an antipathy towards non-German legions.⁶ The close

3. A. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945 (London, 1957), p. 535.

4. E. Stephan, Geheimauftrag Irland (Oldenburg, 1961), p. 274.

5. G. von Mende, 'Erfahrungen mit Ostfreiwilligen', Vielvölker-Heere und Koalitionskriege (Darmstadt, 1952), p. 25.

6. Ibid., p. 26; Besprechung des Führers, 8 June 1943 - Nuremberg Trial Document 1384 PS, in B[undes]a[rchiv]-M[ilitär]a[rchiv] III W 100.

co-operation between Germans and Finns in the Prussian Jägerbataillon 27, during the struggle to establish the Finnish Republic, was largely forgotten, with the result that the German Army was not inclined to recruit foreign personnel. The converse was also true; Germany strenuously discouraged her subjects from joining the French Foreign Legion.^{8.}

The territorial conquests of the German forces brought into their ranks many who had been citizens of foreign states at the outbreak of war. The partition of Poland and the annexation of Danzig added two new military districts - XX and XXI - to the German recruiting framework^{9.} while German victories in the West brought Alsace,^{10.} Lorraine,^{11.} Luxemburg, Eupen,^{12.} Malmédy and Moresnet into existing Wehrkreise as additional sub-districts. Later events were to bring Northern

7. Mende, op.cit., p.25.

8. Der Politische Polizeikommandeur der Länder, Preussische Geheime Staatspolizei, Der Stellvertreter Chef, A99 VerschWl III 2Dg., 3rd April 1936, in T 175, Roll 414, Frames 2940029-32. .

9. G.Tessin, Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen S.S., 1939-1945, IV Band (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), pp.132, 154; U.S.A., Military Intelligence Service, Order of Battle of the German Army, April 1943 (Washington, 1943), pp.39-40.

10. Ibid., p.28.

11. Ibid., p.35.

12. Ibid., p.29.

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Slovenia^{13.}, Bialystok^{14.} and the South Tyrol^{15.} into the German recruiting system. In this way Germany's expansion drew de jure foreigners into the German forces.

The "Fifth Column"

One branch of the High Command of the German Armed Forces with an interest in recruiting foreigners, even before 1939, was Amt Ausland Abwehr, the intelligence organisation controlled by Admiral Canaris. Before the outbreak of war this department gathered racial Germans from Poland itself and in territories bordering upon Poland, in order to form Kampftruppes to seize important objectives, such as the Jablunka Pass and the Chorzow power station^{16.} In addition to these men, Ukrainians resident in Germany were persuaded to join another "commando" unit, known as Bergbauernhilfe, for use in

13. O.K.W. 3a 14 W.F.St./St.W.N.V./A Ia, 189/41, 24 April, 1941 - T 175, Roll 104, Frame 2626882; Military Intelligence Service, op.cit., p.38.

14. Ibid., p.24; O.K.W./W.F.St./Abt.L(IV) Nr.001543/41, 22 July 1941 - T 175, Roll 106, Frames 2628881-3.

15. On 14th October 1943.

16. L.de Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War (London, 1956), pp.153-5; Markblatt zur Bekanntgabe an die gegen Polen eingesetzten Truppen, 23rd August 1939 - "Nuremberg" document NOKW 083, Case XII, Doc.Bk.13.

18
19

17.
Eastern Poland. For the attack on the Netherlands, Abwehr recruited 190 Dutchmen, working in Germany, who belonged to the National-Socialistische Bond van Nederlanders in Duitsland, and used sixty of them dressed in Dutch uniforms, 18.
to seize important frontier crossings.

During the campaigns that preceded the assault upon the Soviet Union, the German Army used the topographical and linguistic expertise of these small units to assist the entry of its formations. In addition, the German forces received spontaneous but not entirely unexpected assistance from minorities within the countries under attack. Given the interests of military security, Germany was unable to warn well-disposed minorities to prepare for the German arrival; but once minority-members became aware of the outbreak of hostilities, assistance was generally quick in coming, thereby creating an often exaggerated fear of a German "Fifth Column."^{19.}

The minorities who assisted the German ground-forces in 1939 and 1940 were racial Germans who had in all cases been influenced by National-Socialist propaganda and encouraged to unify their political, cultural and athletic organisations.

17. de Jong, op.cit., p.153; Training Directive of B.B.H. No. 20/39 4th August 1939 - NOKW 423, Case XII, Doc.Bk.13; J.A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1945, 2nd Edition (New York, 1963), pp.42-43; Dallin, op.cit., p.115.

18. de Jong, op.cit., p.185; S. van der Zee, 2500 Landverraders (The Hague, 1969), pp.61-5.

19. de Jong, op.cit., passim.

In Poland, the German Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle had persuaded the racial German bodies to combine into the Bund der Deutschen in Polen.^{20.} Apart from recruiting individuals as secret agents, the German authorities were also able to encourage racial Germans to avoid mobilisation in the Polish forces or to shun combat with the Germans, if already conscripted. Partly as a result of this propaganda, many^{21.} surrendered when the German invasion of Poland took place. German agencies also arranged to smuggle arms across the Polish frontier to the Selbstschutz organisations within the Volksdeutsche villages, formed to protect them from anti-German popular feeling.^{22.} Once the German attack was launched, these armed groups were able to take the offensive against small parties of Polish troops and also to give organised assistance in clearing roads and guiding German troops. When the campaign was over, the Selbstschutz in the annexed areas provided the nuclei for units of the political S.S, and for the S.A.^{23.} But

20. Ibid., p.149.

21. Ibid., p.152.

22. Ibid., p.151.

23. Der Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer Danzig und Westpreussen, Ia/O Az.8b - 10/36.10.39, 31st October, 1939, in T 175, Roll 171, Frames 2704856-7.

four thousand served as Hilfspolizei or joined the S.S.

^{24.}
Totenkopfverbände, armed S.S. units, while racial Germans in the Generalgouvernement portion of Poland formed a Sonderdienst^{25.} which also carried out armed police duties.

In North Schleswig the racial German Volksgruppe was controlled by N.S.D.A.P. - Nordschleswig, the local National-Socialist party, which numbered among its sub-organisations the Schleswigsche Kameradschaft, corresponding to the S.A. in Germany. When German troops crossed into Danish territory, S.K. assisted with traffic control, disarmed and guarded Danish soldiers and collected abandoned Danish weapons.^{26.} In these ways the Volksdeutsche made their un-planned contribution to the Danish defeat, after which individuals served in German security organisations.^{27.} Many S.K. members, in the spring of 1944,^{28.} constituted a Selbstschutz, resembling the German Volkssturm.

24. S.S.Oberabschnitt Weichsel, Ia/O Az. 8/26.10.39, 8th December 1939, T 175, Roll 171, Frame 2704840.

25. Krakauer Zeitung, 21st May 1940, 16th August 1940, 9th April 1941 and also the correspondence relating to the absorption of the Sonderdienst into the German police, - T 175, Roll 67, Frames 2583925-8.

26. de Jong, op.cit., p.160; Denmark, Betænkning (Beretning) til Folketinget, XIV (Copenhagen, 1956, passim; N. Alkils, Besættelstidens Fakta (Copenhagen, 1945), I, pp.603-6; V. la Cour, Danmark under Besættelsen (Copenhagen, 1945) II, pp.479-506.

27. Alkils, op.cit., pp.630, 771-3 refers to the Zeitfreiwilligen dienst (Heimwehr) and to the Schweriner Wacht - und Schliessgesellschaft.

28. Ibid., p.620.

During the Western campaign of 1940 the only recorded assistance given to the German forces from within invaded territory took place in Eupen and Malmédy where the organisations of the local German minority endeavoured to seize public buildings.^{29.} This activity was in the best revolutionary tradition but it was probably of little practical benefit to the invaders and is possibly indicative of the unpreparedness of the German community.

In Yugoslavia events took a similar course to those in Poland in that racial Germans who were to be called up into the Royal Yugoslav Army were instructed by the leaders of their communities not to report for duty; and those who had done so surrendered on the arrival of German troops.^{30.} Selbstschutz organisations,^{31.} dating from before the invasion in many places, seized important points and even engaged in open warfare against Serbian units.^{32.} Croat soldiers likewise turned upon their Serb comrades

29. de Jong, op. cit., pp.197-8.

30. Extract from Dr. Sepp Jankers, Reden und Aufsätze (Beckerek, 1944), - NG 4630 /SSSR 357, Case XI, Doc.Bk.45; de Jong, op.cit., p.232; L.S.von Grote, Vol.I Mg., 28th March 1941, - NG 3243, Case XI, Doc.Bk.72F.

31. Telegramm Nr.31, 15th January 1941, NG 3375, Case XI, Doc.Bk.43; de Jong, op.cit., p.230.

32. Ibid., p.233.

encouraged by the presence of Croat nationalists with the Italian invaders. Although Yugoslavia was divided following defeat and a Croat state established, the German communities retained their arms and established security organisations of their own.^{33.}

The Anti-British

Before attacking the U.S.S.R. the German forces prepared to use three groups of foreigners against the British Empire. One plan was directed against the British Isles themselves, and involved the use of Irishmen who were to be dropped into Northern Ireland in company with German parachutists. The plan was probably over-ambitious because of the isolation of the parachutists from supporting troops,^{34.} but German estimates of the number of Irishmen willing to participate in the scheme were also exaggerated. The German Foreign Office, acting on behalf of the Sicherheitsdienst, the sponsor of the Irish Brigade, arranged for émigré Irish nationalists to visit camps containing Irish prisoners-of-war, but only succeeded in recruiting a couple of hundred men.^{35.} Operation Seelöwe was abandoned and

33. P .Wacker, 'Die Einsatzstaffel der Deutschen Mannschaft', Feldgrau, X.Jg., Heft 2 (1962), pp.65-8; F.Schweighofer, 'Die Wehrmannschaft des Steirischen Heimatbundes', Feldgrau, IX.Jg., Heft 5 (1961), pp.155-7.

34. Stephan, op.cit., pp.272-6; O'Callaghan, The Jackboot in Ireland (London, 1958), pp.124-5. German preparations for landing in Ireland were a deception measure -R.Wheatley, Operation Sealion (Oxford, 1958), p.162; W.Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, (London, 1960), pp.230-1.

35. O'Callaghan, op.cit., pp.107-10; Stephan, op.cit., p.275.

Hitler turned his attention eastwards; so plans for the airborne invasion of Ulster were dropped. Some Irishmen were trained by Abwehr for sabotage operations in the United Kingdom but nothing came of them. The scheme for dropping Irish parachutists into the Six Counties was revived by the S.S. when the arrival of U.S.troops there was imminent. But Admiral Canaris, the head of Abwehr, was sceptical about the operation. It depended upon the collaboration of the Irish Republican Army, of whose organisation and efficiency Major Goertz, the Admiral's agent in Dublin, had formed a poor opinion. So this plan, too, was dropped. Nevertheless, nine hundred Irish prisoners-of-war were segregated in a special camp, until January 1945, when Himmler apparently abandoned all hope of their fighting against Great Britain.

Although the Middle East had no specific place in German plans, the victories of British Imperial Troops in that theatre made it imperative that Germany should help her Italian ally.

36. Stephan, op.cit., pp.272-3; O'Callaghan, op.cit., p.153; T.P.Coogan, The I.R.A., 2nd Edition (London, 1970), p.221, refers to articles by Goertz, which appeared posthumously in The Irish Times, August 1947.

37. R[eichs] f [ührer] S.S. Pers[önlicher] St[a]b, T[a]g[eb]uch N[umme]r 1997/44, 15th January 1945-T 145, Roll 125, Frame 2650479; Slade, M.de, Yeomen of Valhalla (Mannheim, 1970), pp.95-6.

38. L.Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, 1966), p.85.

Furthermore, when the Iraqi rebellion led by Rashid Ali took place in May 1941, Hitler ordered the sending of a military mission to advise and assist the Iraqis, which necessitated securing air-staging facilities from the Vichy-French authorities in Syria. Although the Pétainist officials were cooperative, it was a case of too little and too late; and the Iraqi resistance collapsed. Nevertheless, the German mission, Sonderstab F., continued to exist, some of its personnel organising Arab bands to fight in Syria when it was invaded by British Imperial and Free French forces. Their efforts were handicapped by reluctance in Berlin to offer independence to the Syrian and Lebanese Arabs for fear of offending or weakening the Vichy régime; and the intervention ended in defeat.

On 11th June 1941, Hitler issued a further directive, instructing Felmy's staff to work with Arab liberation movements in order to undermine Britain's position in the Middle East.

39. Hitler, Weisung Nr.30, 23rd May 1941, to be found in H.R. Trevor-Roper Hitler's War Directives London, 1964), pp. 72-4.

40. Hirszowicz, op.cit., p.173. (Sonderstab F derived its title from the name of its commander, General der Flieger Felmy).

41. Ibid., p.185.

42. Hitler, Weisung Nr.32, in Trevor-Roper, op.cit., pp.75-82.

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The Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Muhammed Amin el-Huseini, the most prominent Palestinian Arab exile, made much of the claim that Germany and the Arabs had common enemies in the British, the Jews and the Bolsheviks. So much so, that he probably convinced the German authorities that there were thousands of Arabs waiting to respond to his call for holy war; but he failed to obtain a public declaration of intent. Hitler maintained that "only an assurance which rests on victorious armed forces is of real value." German thoughts of proclaiming support for a Pan-Arab state or for a Greater Syria were inhibited by the effect it would have, not only on Vichy France but also on Turkey, a potential ally, who coveted Aleppo and Mosul. Spain was another possible ally, who did not want her Moroccan subjects to be stirred up, while Italy not only had a North African empire but hoped to annex that of France.^{43.}

It was also true that Germany had no desire to burn her fingers twice in an Iraqi-type disaster. Ridicule of Allied governments-in exile was a constant theme in her propaganda; and she could hardly recognise a "free" Iraqi government for that reason. She made do with the argument that the Mufti was respected throughout the Arab world and that German recognition of his leadership would be tantamount to recognising an Arab nation covering a number of existing states. The German authorities were only prepared specifically to further the independence of Arabs under British rule.⁴⁴ Otherwise the Arab leaders had to

43. Hirszowicz, op.cit., p.218.

44. Hirszowicz, op.cit., p.218.

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be content with the undertaking to dissolve the Jewish national
home in Palestine.^{45.} To these ends a German-Arab Instructional
Unit was set up by Sonderstab F, using Arab refugees and
prisoners-of-war, as well as Arab students residing in German-
occupied Europe.^{46.}

The two Arab leaders, the Mufti and Rashid Ali, visited Italy, hoping to persuade the Italian government to issue the proclamation that the Germans would not provide. They suggested that Italy might establish an Arab Legion; but the Italian Government was worried about the possible repercussions on Italy's North African subjects, and was doubtful about the extent of its military advantages. Nevertheless, it agreed to raise one provided that the Arab nationalist movement remained under Italian supervision. The outcome was that the two Axis governments made an arrangement whereby Italy raised an Arab force and Germany raised an Indian one, both parties exchanging prisoners-of-war to make this possible. But neither party kept faith since the Germans retained the Deutsch-Arabisches Lehrabteilung and the Italians established a Centro Militare India. As it happened, the Indians under Italian command proved mutinous, while the Arabs of the Centro di Addestramento Militare per Arabi were insufficient in number to make the force a

45. Ibid., p.227.

46. Ibid., pp.250-2; O[ber]k[ommando des]H[eer]es Gen[eral]st[ab] d[es]H[eer]es Org[anisation] Abt[eilung], Nr.2653, 1st June 1942, in BAMA - H1/136.

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workable proposition. In consequence, Germany had units of both
Indians and Arabs, while Italy in effect had neither.^{47.}

The Deutsch-Arabische Lehrabteilung was sent to the Eastern Front in the summer of 1942 with the intention that it should follow German troops through the Caucasus and Iran to Iraq. This scheme met with the approval of Rashid Ali, but not that of the Mufti, who would have preferred to see the unit join Rommel in Africa and liberate Palestine and Syria via Egypt. As matters turned out, the ill-fated German attempt to reach the Caucasus brought the Arab volunteers no nearer than Stalino, where they stayed until the opening of a new front in French North Africa.^{48.} This new theatre of war offered the unit an opportunity to fulfil its original purpose - that of providing a nucleus for fresh Arab units.^{49.} The Vichy-French authorities in Tunisia handed over the Arabs of the Phalange Africaine and, with these^{50.}

47. Hirszowicz, op.cit., pp. 252-4; German Foreign Office, Aufstellung Indischer Legion und Arabischer Legion in Italien, D.Pol2 VII e Sdbd. 1 Band 1, 1 January 1942 to 31 December 1942, in F[oreign] O[ffice] Series 86, Frames 62 798 - 897; O[ber]k[ommando der] W[ehrmacht], K[riegs]t[age]b[uch], III/1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), p.416.
48. Hirszowicz op.cit., pp.254-8; O.K.W., K.T.B., II/1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), p.747; II/2 (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), pp.800, 836, 892, 1211; III/1, pp. 28, 195.
49. Gen.St.d.H./Ors. Abt.(II)Nr.938/43, Deutsch-Arabische Truppen, 23 March, 1943; O.K.W., K.T.B., III/1, p.p.249-50; Hirszowicz, op.cit., p.298.
50. Ibid., p.300. The Phalange was a unit raised by the Vichy government to defend Tunisia against the Western Allies.

and other recruits, Battalions Algerian, Marokko, Tunesien I^{51.} and Tunesien II were established. Once again it was a case of too little and too late, and the weak, under-trained Arab units were totally incapable of averting the Axis collapse in Tunisia.

After the defeat of the German-Italian forces in North Africa there was no Arab territory remaining under Axis control, and the Germans became dependant upon expatriates to reconstruct and maintain an Arab unit within the German Army. Such a battalion - Number 845 - was stationed in Greece, which was the nearest point to the Middle East remaining in German hands.^{52.} A small number of Arab parachutists were dropped into Palestine, but it became increasingly obvious that the unit could not be used in any Arab country. The Arabs were subsequently used to perform security^{duties} in Greece until the withdrawal of the German forces.^{53.} An attempt to form a duplicate German-Arab battalion, to be numbered II / 845, was abandoned in the autumn of 1944.^{54.} It was thus impossible to produce an Arab

51. Kommandeur der deutsch-arabische Truppen, Abt. Ia Nr.480/43, 31 March 1943. This document also refers to a weak Arab construction battalion and to the parachutist company of D.A.L.

52. H irszowicz, op.cit., p.307; O.K.H. Chef H[eer]e[r] R[ü]st[ung] und B[efehlshaber] d[es] E[rsatzheeres] / A[llgemeine] H[eer]e[r]a[m]t Ia VI, Nr.19584/43, 1st June 1943, BAMA 37616/2.

53. Brüsseller Zeitung, 15 December 1943; Völkischer Beobachter, 17 November 1944; Hirschowicz, op.cit., p.311.

54. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II), Nr.38915, 24th October 1944 - BAMA-HI/144 and T 78, Roll 413.

55.
counter-blast to the British-organised Jewish Brigade Group.

A third anti-British group, with whom German agencies negotiated shortly before the attack on the U.S.S.R., consisted of Indian nationalists. Subas Chandra Bose, leader of the militant wing of the Indian National Congress, reached Germany in 1941 via Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R. The members of the Indienreferat in the Informationsabteilung of the German Foreign Office wished to make use of Bose for psychological warfare against Indian troops in the Western Desert; and it was largely due to the activities of these German civil servants that a handful of Indians were persuaded to volunteer in May 1941 for propaganda work. Bose wanted the German authorities to recognise an Indian government-in exile, but the German Government was unwilling to do this, probably because it regarded India as being within the Soviet sphere of interest. Even after the start of "Barbarossa", however, the German government remained inhibited by hopes of making a separate peace with Britain, which might be jeopardised by German support for Indian nationalists.

55. Hirsztwicz, op.cit., p.312.

56. C. Sykes, Troubled Loyalty - A Biography of Adam von Trott zu Solz. (London, 1968), pp.351-9.

57. B. Martin, Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 1969), p.63; H. Toye, The Springing Tiger (London, 1959), pp.61-7.

Although their hopes proved chimerical, the German government still refused to make a pronouncement upon the future of India - at least until such time when Axis troops were on the threshold of India. As in the case of the Arabs, the Germans had no wish to invite ridicule by making a premature declaration of Indian independence. Nevertheless, the German government supported the creation of an Indian armed force and made it possible for Bose and his colleagues to broadcast to India. Care of the infant Indian unit was vested in Sonderstab F., which also bore the responsibility for training Arabs.

There were two theatres-of-war in which the Indian unit could have been employed. It could have been sent to the Eastern front in order to pass through the Caucasus, Iran and Afghanistan to India; or it could have been despatched to the Western Desert in an attempt to suborn troops of the Indian Empire before passing via Egypt and Asia Minor to India. The first alternative was ruled out by the halting of the German offensive in the U.S.S.R., while the second proved impossible because Rommel refused to conduct political warfare with the Indian unit. The British Imperial advance, after the battle of El Alamein, diminished and finally destroyed any prospects of usefully employing the Indian Legion in Africa.

58. Sykes, op.cit., p.364; Martin, op.cit., p.64; Hirszowicz, op.cit., p.218.
 59. Ibid., p.203.
 60. Sykes, op.cit., p.365; Toye, op.cit., p.74.

Since the Japanese forces were close to India and had many more Indians from whom to recruit than the Germans had, Bose arranged to be taken to the Far East in a blockade runner.^{61.} He left a complete Indian regiment in Germany, the 950th, which was too valuable a source of manpower to be left idle. Accordingly, this Indian Legion was sent to the Dutch coast among the earliest of many non-German units to serve in Western Europe.^{62.}

It is thus apparcent that the Wehrmacht was not initially disposed to recruit foreigners; and even when territorial expansion created new requirements, the men enlisted were mostly of German origin. But, under the influence of its own intelligence branch, the Wehrmacht started to recruit Ukrainians, Dutchmen, Arabs and Indians, with the co-operation of the German Foreign Ministry. The S.S., for its part, also enlisted Irishmen. These were the forerunners of the hundreds of thousands of non-Germans who were eventually to serve in Germany's armed forces.

61. Toye, op.cit., p.77; Sykes, op.cit., p.366.
 62. Ibid., p.367; Toye, op.cit., p.148; O.K.W. K.T.B.III/1 249; O.K.H., Chef Heeres Rüst. und B.d.E., A.H.A., I a VI, Nr.1734/43, 15 April 1943 - BAMA 59681/12; O.K.H./Gen.St.d H./Org.Abt.(II) Nr.12016/43; 17 April 1943 - BAMA - H 1/144; Donau Zeitung, 25 November 1943.

Chapter Two - The Élite Guard

In Mein Kampf Adolf Hitler described the Germany he envisaged - "As a State, the German Reich shall include all Germans. Its task is not only to gather in and foster the most valuable sections of our people but to lead them slowly and surely to a dominant position in the world." (1)

The Schutzstaffel of Hitler's National Socialist Party obediently furthered the aims of its Führer by taking men who were not German citizens by birth but who were of German blood, provided they met the physical and racial requirements of the S.S. As early as the autumn of 1934, Austrian National Socialist refugees, gathered together under the auspices of S.S. Hilfswerk Schleissheim, were naturalised and used to form the second battalion of the S.S. regiment, later known as "Deutschland". (2) The S.S. together with other Party organisations, fostered the Austrian Legion and the Sudeten German Free Corps. (3) When these territories were later annexed to the Third Reich, not only were units of the ordinary political S.S. established within them, but they also supplied recruits to the full-time, armed and barracked S.S. Verfügungstruppen. In the case of Austria, a new S.S. regiment, "Der Führer", was raised. (4)

1. A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, translated by J. Murphy, (London, 1939), p.334.
2. Truppenamt, T2 Nr. 5253/34, 5 October 1934. Anlage 2; Wehrkreis Kommando VII, Nr. 2656, 18th June 1935.
3. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. 1 (London, 1949), p.496; G. Berger, Affidavit, - 3036 PS.
4. O. Weidinger, Kameraden bis zum Ende (Göttingen, 1962), p.p. 15-17.

The Verfügungstruppen of the S.S. were originally restricted in size to a motorised infantry division, a strength which they had not reached before the declaration of war. Volunteers for the S.S.-V.T. enlisted for an initial period of four years and came for the most part from the ranks of the Hitler Youth movement via the Allgemeine S.S. Apart from meeting the strict racial standards of the whole of the S.S. they had to be perfect physical specimens. In this respect the Reichsführer S.S., Heinrich Himmler, was as fastidious as the Great Elector had been in the matter of the height of his Potsdam Grenadiers. If more men had been required, it would have been a simple matter to have relaxed the physical standards. It was not, however, essential for S.S. men to be of German origin, provided that they were of Nordic blood; and in 1938 Himmler authorised the enlistment of Germanen into the S.S.-V.T.,⁽⁵⁾ with the result that by the end of that year twenty had been incorporated.⁽⁶⁾ Although this score of volunteers was destined to be the first of many thousands, it did not represent a great accession of strength to the Armed S.S.; but it mattered to the S.S. because its leaders envisaged the Reich as not merely a German one but as a Greater German or Germanic institution.⁽⁷⁾ As an important organ of that Reich, the S.S. needed to be a Germanic and not merely a German body.

5. Stein, op. cit., p. 94.

6. Ibid., p. 94.

7. Rede des Reichsführers anlässlich der Gruppenführerbesprechung im Führerheim der S.S. Standarte "Deutschland", 8 October 1938, in TL75, Roll 90, Frames 2612559-82.

Shortly before the outbreak of war the Armed S.S. further increased its size by sending members of the Totenkopfverbände into the Free City of Danzig to provide a core for its Heimwehr⁽⁸⁾ which was later absorbed into the "Totenkopf" Division of the S.S.⁽⁹⁾ Since there were only two hundred and thirty-seven Danzigers in the Waffen-S.S. in May 1940, they clearly did not constitute an entire battalion.⁽¹⁰⁾

With the outbreak of the Second World War the Armed S.S. began to assist with the second task outlined by Hitler, that of achieving a dominant position for the German people. Hitler had arranged that the Verfügungstruppen, unless required to maintain order in the interior, were to be employed with the Army.⁽¹¹⁾ Not only did that force need all the trained men available, but Hitler felt the S.S. needed to prove itself in the field in order to perform its duties as State Police.⁽¹²⁾ The Führer insisted that the quality of the men in the S.S. units should remain high and consequently he limited the size of the Armed S.S. to between five and ten percent of the peacetime strength of the Army.⁽¹³⁾

- 8. Stein, op.cit., p. 28; Documents on British Foreign Policy, 3, VI, Nos. 155, 198 and 355; Documents concerning German - Polish Relations, Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939), Cmd 6106, Nos: 29 and 31; A. Mollo, Uniforms of the S.S., Vol. IV, S.S. Totenkopfverbände, 1933-1945 (London, 1971), p. 18.
- 9. Totenköpfbattalion 3, Stammtafel - B.A.M.A. - S 15-3/1.
- 10. Der Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen S.S. 7 Übersichtsplan, 4 May, 1940 [- BA - NS 19/380 and T175, Roll 104, Frames 262381 - 3.]
- 11. Der Führer und Reichskanzler, 17 August 1938, - 647 PS/USA 443, in N/azi/ C/onspiracy and/ A/ggression (Washington, 1946), III, 459-66; Stein, op. cit., p. XXXI.
- 12. Leaflet G. 42, captured in Libya, March 1942 - part of D665/G.B. 280, in N.C.A., VII, 170-2; W. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters (London, 1964), p. 104, indicates that Hitler expressed this view in the winter 1939-40.
- 13. O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Wes. Abt. Nr. 137/3. 41, 21 March 1941, - part of D665/G.B. 280, N.C.A., VII, 172-3; Stein, op. cit., p. 32; H. Hohne, The Order of the Death's Head (London, 1969), p. 457.

In spite of this limit upon the size of the Verfügungstruppen, the decision to commit them to the front-line created the problem of finding enough eligible men to replace casualties.

Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer - S.S., on 1 December 1939 established the Ergänzungsamt der Waffen S.S. within the S.S. Hauptamt. The new office was served by an S.S. Ergänzungsstelle in each S.S. Oberabschnitt, in effect in every Wehrkreis.⁽¹⁴⁾ Gottlob Berger was entrusted with running the Ergänzungsamt which meant that he was responsible for finding manpower for the Armed S.S. This he had to do in the face of the armed forces, who had no wish to see the growth of a military organisation independent of their control. Furthermore, they were not willing to permit the Armed S.S. to take the cream of German manhood.⁽¹⁵⁾ The efforts of the S.S. itself, and of the other organisations within the N.S.D.A.P., failed to produce sufficient recruits in 1940 from the age-groups either too young or too old to be eligible for the armed forces.⁽¹⁶⁾ So Berger took advantage of the fact that Himmler held the post of Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutscher Volkstums. This not merely gave the Reichsführer contacts with the communities of German origin outside the Reich, but also empowered him to register their members, classify them according to their degree of racial purity and to "resettle" them, either in the Reich proper or in the annexed Eastern territories.⁽¹⁷⁾

14. Dienstanweisung für das Ergänzungsamts der Waffen S.S., 29 October 1939 - T175, Roll 104, Frames 2626774 - 806; O.K.W. Az. 12a A.H.A./Ag./E(Id) Nr. 11447/39, Neuordnung des Ergänzungswesens der S.S. und Polizei, 30 November 1939 - T175, Roll 104, Frame 2626687; Der Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen S.S., Neuordnung, des Ergänzungswesens, 1 December 1939 - T175, Roll 104, Frames 2626770-3.
15. Stein op. cit., p.p. 35-7.
16. Ibid. p.p. 45-6; Der Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen S.S., VIII/Tgb Nr. 13/40, 1 February 1940 - T175, Roll 104, Frames 2626 688 - 90.
17. Ibid., p. 46; R. Koehl, R.K.F.D.V - German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-45 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), passim.

Volksdeutsche

There existed in the overrun territories communities of German origin.⁽¹⁸⁾ Since these Volksdeutsche did not possess German citizenship, they were not liable for conscription into the Wehrmacht. The German High Command could not object if Berger attempted to enlist them into the Armed S.S.; and by the end of January 1940 fifty-eight racial Germans from Slovakia had been accepted.⁽¹⁹⁾ Returns of 4 May 1940 show that the number of recruits from the same source had grown to eighty-three, and they also reveal considerable numbers from the rest of the former Czechoslovak republic and Poland.⁽²⁰⁾

Berger's recruiting efforts of January 1940 were not confined to territories under German control, for in that month the German Foreign Office was endeavouring to persuade the Roumanian government to permit a thousand racial German "farm-labourers" to come to Germany, where their real destination was the S.S. Verfügungstruppen.⁽²¹⁾ Negotiations were protracted because the Roumanian Army was reluctant to relinquish valuable manpower. Without Roumanian permission the departure of Volksdeutsche peasants would constitute desertion. There was also opposition within the German Volksgruppe itself to a scheme which would numerically weaken it.⁽²²⁾

18. In Slovakia, Bohemia-Moravia and in Generalgouvernement Poland.

19. Der Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen S.S., Slowaken Deutsche, 30 January 1940 - T175, Roll 104, Frame 2626692.

20. Übersichtsplan, 4 May 1940, - 799 from Bohemia and Moravia and 1,123 from the Generalgouvernement.

21. Auswärtiges Amt, Kult. A 1818, 23 January 1940, - part of NO. 1605, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 72 F.

22. Der Chef des Ergänzungs Amtes der Waffen S.S., Tgb. Nr. 156/40, 16 April 1940, - N05897, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G; R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. 794/40, 28 April 1940, - part of N01605, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 72 F.

Although the "phoney war" was still in being and the Armed S.S. was not sustaining any casualties, Berger persisted in his request, because ethnic Germans were not required simply to provide additional personnel. By joining the Armed S.S. and participating in the war, racial German Volksgruppen would be bound closer to the German people through the creation of a common Frontkämpfer generation.⁽²³⁾ Another important factor was that the Volksdeutsche would be subjected to the intensive Weltanschauliche indoctrination of the S.S.⁽²⁴⁾ By 4 May 1940 one hundred and ten ethnic Germans from Roumania were serving in the Waffen S.S., alongside members of other Volksgruppen and individuals from widely-scattered parts of the world.⁽²⁵⁾

The Soviet annexation of the Roumanian territories of Bessarabia and North Bukovina in June 1940, was followed by a Russian - German agreement which permitted the evacuation of racial Germans from the two territories. When Roumania ceded South Dobruja to Bulgaria, Germany arranged to "resettle" its Volksdeutsche population. The scheme expanded still further when Germany persuaded the Roumanian government to hand over the Germans of South Bukovina and North Dobruja. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, one of Himmler's agencies, was responsible for shifting the ethnic Germans to camps in the Reich or in German-occupied Poland.⁽²⁶⁾

23. Der Führer des S.S. Oberabschnitts Südwest, Tab. Nr. 663/41, Werbung für die Waffen S.S. in Elsass, 10 February 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2635018 - para. 1; Meldung Nr. 2, Ersatzlage, - February 1942 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2635090; Reichsleiterdienst, Folge 42, 28 December 1943 - N02015, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66G.

24. R. Herzog, Die Volksdeutschen in der Waffen S.S. (Tübingen, 1955), p. 6

25. Übersichtsplan, 4 May 1940, - including 3 from China, 1 from Australia and 1 from Mexico.

26. G. Castellan, "The Germans of Rumania", Journal of Contemporary History, VI (1971), No. 1, p. 63; Koehl, op. cit., p. 94, p. 96; German Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans [from Eastern Central Europe], III [(Göttingen, 1961)], pp. 44-55.

Yet another government, the Yugoslav, permitted the passage of the Bessarabian Germans through Semlin and Prahovo, where the local German community established a Freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst to erect the necessary transit camps. Under cover of the operation, officers of the S.S. examined and selected some of these Yugoslav subjects, and presumably arranged for them to be smuggled into Germany with the Bessarabian transports.⁽²⁷⁾ On their arrival they went to training units of the Armed S.S.

Membership of the S.S. was also open to non-Germans of Nordic blood and these, too, were exempt from conscription by the Wehrmacht. Germanic males resident in the Reich were in contact with National-Socialism - some even joined the Germanische Sturmabanne of the S.S. - and might be influenced into volunteering for the Armed S.S. But no form of pressure could be applied to those in territories where there were no German troops present at that time. Nevertheless, by May 1940 over one hundred volunteers of Germanic blood were serving within the Armed S.S., of whom the largest consisted of forty-four Swiss.⁽²⁸⁾

Western Slavs

Early in 1940 recruiting teams of the S.S. were examining Kashubes, members of a Slav minority domiciled in the territory incorporated into Germany from Poland.⁽²⁹⁾

- 27. Erg. Amt der Waffen S.S., Tgb. Nr. 463/40, 10 September 1940 - NO1821, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 43; Telegramm Nr. 678 from Belgrade, 13 September 1940- NO 5695, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 43
- 28. Ubersichtsplan, 4 May 1940. This category included one volunteer from the Dutch East Indies and eight from England.
- 29. Der Chef des Erg. Amtes der WaffenSS VIII/Tgb. Nr. 10/40, Untersuchung Von Kaschuben, 15 January 1940 - BA-NS 19/380 and in T175, Roll 104, Frame 2626482.

Yet when the ethnic Germans of the annexed areas were classified according to their racial purity and attitude to the Reich, Kashubes, in common with Masurians, Slonzaks and Upper Silesians, were relegated to the third of the four Abteilungen⁽³⁰⁾ a class which was only employed in the German forces with certain safeguards.⁽³¹⁾ Yet the S.S. compromised its standards of racial purity ^{by} ~~to~~ enlist^{ing} members of this minority, soon after the conquest of Poland. But the Kashubes were Germanised and had a long history of association with Prussia; so it suited the German authorities to claim the existence of an "ethnological closeness to Germandom".⁽³²⁾ It was also Himmler's intention to "split up the Eastern people from within", to acknowledge and cultivate the tradition of the Kashubes and the Ukrainian minorities⁽³³⁾ as part of a plan to drive a wedge between the Wasserpolen, Masurians and Kashubes on the one hand and the Poles on the other.⁽³⁴⁾ Yet it was envisaged that the Kashubes and the other minorities would be Germanised,⁽³⁵⁾ and that these islands on German territory would disappear.⁽³⁶⁾

30. Reichsgesetzblatt 1941 I S 1181, 4 March 1941; Der Reichsministerium des Innern, Ia 5125/41, 5000 Ost, 13 March 1941.

31. Luftwaffenverordnungsblatt Nr. 47, 16 November 1942, Z. 2804.

32. Erg. Amt der Waffen S.S., Ergänzungsstelle Weichsel (XX) Untersuchung von Kaschuben, 13 January 1940 in T175, Roll 104, Frames 2626484-6; I. Kamenetsky, Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe (New Haven, 1961), p. 32.

33. Ibid., p. 32

34. Ibid., p. 89.

35. Ibid., pp. 193-4, Appendix III - Himmler's Reflections on the treatment of Peoples of Alien Race in the East, 28 November 1940, - NO 1880.

36. Ibid., p. 32.

Perhaps more surprising than the examination of Kashubes was that of Goralians in early 1940⁽³⁷⁾ which by May produced ten members for the Waffen S.S.⁽³⁸⁾ For the Goralians belonged to a Slav minority which provided personnel for the Polish mountain troops. When Germany and the U.S.S.R. carved up Poland between them, Hitler annexed the territories which he regarded as historically German, leaving a German-garrisoned no-man's land, the Generalgouvernement. The Goralians, unlike the Kashubes, were situated in this central Polish reservation. Nevertheless, the S.S. recruited Goralians because Himmler insisted that they were of part-Germanic origin,⁽³⁹⁾ like the other Slav minorities, such as the Lemkes and the Huzules. The Goralians were to be acknowledged, encouraged and eventually absorbed like the Kashubes.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Service in the Armed S.S. would contribute to this end.

Germanic Volunteers.

As a result of Germany's campaigns of 1940, Berger's agents gained access to a large Germanic population, over whom the Wehrmacht had no claim. It was, moreover a population in which Hitler was interested on several counts.

37. Der Chef des Erg. Amtes der Waffen S.S., VIII, Tgb. Nr. 10/40, 15
January 1940 - BA - NS 19/380 and T175, Roll 104, Frame 2626482.

38. "Übersichtsplan, 4 May 1940.

39. Koehl, op. cit., p. 152.

40. Kamenetsky, op. cit., pp. 193-4.

He wished to use the superior racial stock of the Norwegians and Dutch to improve the racial composition of the German nation - reason enough, as far as he was concerned, to bring them into the Third Reich. One of Hitler's dreams, which he could have fulfilled, was to have reconstituted the Holy Roman Empire of the German People in its fullest geographical extent: to restore not merely the 1914 frontiers of the Second Reich, but to repossess all the land to which he felt Germany entitled. The Netherlands and Flanders clearly qualified for inclusion in Hitler's scheme, by virtue of their former mediaeval status. More practically, Hitler's Reich needed to control the mouths of the Rhine, the Maas and the Scheldt. (41)

Shortly after the Western campaign of 1940, two new Standarten of the S.S. Verfügungstruppen were established - "Nordland", on 20 April, (42) for Norwegians and Danes, and "Westland", on 16 May, (43) for Dutchmen and Flemings. Himmler strongly favoured these additions to the S.S., for he declared in September that the S.S. "must attract all the Nordic blood in the world to us, depriving our enemies of it, so that never again . . . will Nordic or Germanic blood fight against us". (44)

41. W. Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940-1945 (London, 1963), pp. 24-5.
42. Regiment "Nordland", Stammtaffel.
43. Regiment "Westland", Stammtaffel.
44. Ansprache des Reichsführers S.S. an das Offizierskorps der Leibstandarte S.S. Adolf Hitler am Abend des Tages von Metz, Fort von Alvensleben, - Überreichung der Führerstandarte, 7 September 1940, - 1918 PS/USA 304, N.C.A., IV, p. 553, and in BA-NS 19 HR/7.

Berger's Task

In June 1940 the S.S. at last received the "farm labourers" from the German colony in Roumania,⁽⁴⁵⁾ and the figures for 2 July show that the Armed S.S. was well-supplied with reserves.⁽⁴⁶⁾ The reductions of that summer cost the German Army several divisions disbanded or suspended.⁽⁴⁷⁾ But the S.S. lost only three of the Totenkopf-Standarten,⁽⁴⁸⁾ which existed to perform security duties. The reductions were necessitated by the release of older German reservists for the sake of the German economy⁽⁴⁹⁾ and constituted part of the preparations for the attack on the U.S.S.R. In July 1940 Hitler announced his decision to invade; and in the same month the first directives were issued and discussions held.⁽⁵⁰⁾

The German ground forces were first reduced in the summer of 1940, and then increased to 208 divisions.⁽⁵¹⁾ To make it more mobile the German Army doubled the number of its armoured divisions and more than doubled the total of its motorised divisions.⁽⁵²⁾

- 45. Erganzungsamt der Waffen - S.S., 16 May 1940, - NO2237; Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans, III, 56.
- 46. Erg. Amt der Waffen S.S., Tgb. Nr. 85/40, Zusammenstellung von Einberufungen, 2 July 1940 - T175, Roll 104, Frames 2626144-7.
- 47. Four divisions of the 3rd "Wave", four static divisions and the nine divisions of the 9th "Wave" were disbanded, and the nine divisions of the 10th "Wave" were not completed.
- 48. Numbered 12, 13 and 16. Another Standarte, 17, was not completed. Kdo. der Waffen S.S., Tgb. Nr. 890/40, 16 July 1940, - T175, Roll 104, Frame 2626161.
- 49. S.S. F/ührungs/ h/aupt/ a/mt/, Amt Mobilisation, Entlassung von Reservisten, 17 September 1940, in T175, Roll 158, Frame 2688540.
- 50. Stein, op. cit., p. 98; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 12-4; G. Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand (London, 1960), p. 49.
- 51. This was achieved by raising new "Waves" of infantry divisions the 11th to the 15th plus four light (infantry) divisions, nine security divisions and three new mountain divisions.
- 52. From ten to twenty and from four to ten respectively. This was achieved by converting the four light, i.e. mechanised cavalry, divisions and infantry divisions.

The Armed S.S. was affected by this reorganisation as it had been by the earlier reductions. But Hitler's insistence that the Armed S.S. should remain a small, exclusive police force⁽⁵³⁾ limited its enlargement. The bodyguard regiment was increased to a brigade and a new S.S. division was authorised on condition that it consisted for the most part of foreigners.⁽⁵⁴⁾ During the period of expansion the S.S. was to receive only 3% of the newly-enlisted age groups.⁽⁵⁵⁾ In spite of the limit to its size, the Armed S.S. was obliged to have recourse to foreign manpower, to supplement its German members. Hitler's sending the Armed S.S. to the front to be "blooded" put further strains upon its manpower. During the campaigns of 1939 and 1940 German casualties had been moderate, and the Armed S.S. had been able to make good its losses from its share of German manpower; but when Britain did not surrender and the war spread to new theatres the S.S. had to look further afield for personnel.

Himmler was one of the first to learn of Hitler's decision to turn to the East; and he probably informed Berger before 7 August 1940,⁽⁵⁶⁾ when Berger drew up his forecast of the manpower needs of the S.S.

53. Warlimont, op. cit., p. 104.
 54. O.K.W. 12 i k 10 W.F.St./Abt. L (II a) 21119/40, Heranziehung der Rekruten, 24 August 1940 - T175, Roll 103, Frames 2625 971-2.
 55. Stein, op. cit., p. 101.
 56. Ibid., p. 98; Der R.F.S.S. Tgb. Nr. 850/40, Demobilmachung, 11 July 1940 - T175, Roll 104, Frame 2626155.

From the beginning of the war, German recruits had been apportioned on the basis of 66% to the Army, 9% to the Navy and 25% to the Air Force, with those for the Armed S.S. being subtracted from the Army's percentage on a quota established by the Führer. In August 1940, with the invasion of Britain still in prospect, the Air Force and Navy were demanding an increase of their percentages to forty and ten respectively. (57)

On the basis of past allocations, Berger assumed that the S.S. would only be permitted 2% of the available manpower by the Wehrmacht. In his view, the Armed S.S. would need 18,000 recruits per year; but the yield of 2% would only be 12,000, falling in 1953 to 9,000 men, when the numerically weak year-groups of the 1920s and 1930s were enrolled. (58) To meet the deficiency, Berger recommended recruiting from the Germanic area of Western Europe and from the Volksgruppen of Roumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary, with the possibility of infusions from the U.S.A., Canada, South America and Australia. Berger foresaw no objections from the armed forces, provided the S.S. recruited German and Germanic men not available to the Wehrmacht; and he requested permission to establish a recruiting office of the S.S. to deal with foreign countries. (59)

57. Erg. Amt der Waffen S.S., Tgb. Nr. 110/44, 7 August 1940, - NO 1825, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 65.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

Hitler's insistence that the Armed S.S. should remain a small, select police force, which should serve at the front solely to fit it for its eventual duties within the Reich,⁽⁶⁰⁾ probably caused Himmler to regret that his men would not receive proper recognition until after the war. The Reichsführer S.S. probably observed that in order to influence Hitler an organisation had to produce achievements. The German Army had defeated Poland and conquered most of Western Europe; the Air Force had gained command of the skies during the campaigns of 1939 and 1940; the Navy was sinking a large tonnage of British vessels; while all the S.S. could show, apart from small-scale participation in the ground fighting, was an imposing list of arrests. This situation would persist, even if the forthcoming campaign against the U.S.S.R. were victorious, The rounding-up of Jews and Bolsheviks, the expulsion of Slavs and the "resettlement" of racial Germans would not fire the imagination of the German people like the armed forces' victories.⁽⁶¹⁾

It was clear to Himmler that his S.S. had to have more fighting formations in order to gain a greater share of the laurels in the struggles that were to come. In this way the S.S. would gain prestige in the eyes of the German people and its Führer, causing the power of the S.S. and Himmler's influence in the tight jealous circle round the Leader to be increased.⁽⁶²⁾

60. Warlimont, op. cit., p. 104.

61. Stein, op. cit., p. 102.

62. Ibid., p. 102.

Hitler permitted the S.S. to raise the extra division on condition that it consisted largely of foreigners.⁽⁶³⁾ Himmler was not prepared to abandon his standards and still insisted that the Armed S.S. should consist of volunteers who were fine physical specimens and of Nordic blood.

Before the summer of 1940 it was pan-German ideology that primarily led the Armed S.S. to enlist Volksdeutsche and Germanic volunteers. Thereafter it was mainly a matter of numbers. But the ideology remained the same and the physical and racial standards were unchanged. Those who volunteered were expected to believe in, or at least accept, the concept of a Greater German Reich; and Berger's office established a camp at Sennheim in Alsace, late in 1940, to provide Germanic candidates with indoctrination, language instruction and physical training.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Until June 1941 Britain was the only power still at war with Germany and although Himmler and Berger - and possibly other leaders of the S.S. - were aware of Hitler's intention to attack the U.S.S.R., potential volunteers could not be informed of this. These men had to be persuaded to become the mercenaries of Germany, a country against whom the Germanic peoples had recently been fighting. Moreover, Germany was still at war with Britain, a state which many people had regarded as friendly. Berger's recruiters had to convince potential Germanic recruits that they were enrolling in crack military units which were soon to revert to peace-time soldiering.

63. S.S. Division "Germania", later and better known as "Wiking". O.K.W. 1053 W.F.St./Abt. L. (II) 2385/40, Ausbau der Waffen S.S., 19 September 1940 - T175, Roll 106, Frame 2629681.

64. Stein, op. cit., p. 144; De Weg tot Germaansche Lotsverbondenheid-Opleidingskamp Sennheim (Amsterdam, 194?), passim, - a booklet, published by Storm, the weekly paper of the Netherlands' S.S.

No hint could be given that they were to participate in an attack on the U.S.S.R. The most that the S.S. dared to say was that members of Germanic National-Socialist organisations ought to join in a vague "European war of liberation",⁽⁶⁵⁾

Potential recruits for the two Germanic S.S. regiments were told that they were "to participate in the political reorganisation of Europe in the National-Socialist sense". This was not merely a recruiting slogan to be used as a variant of the "Greater German" theme; Berger wished to strengthen the Waffen S.S. in view of the forthcoming war against the U.S.S.R. that was his immediate object. But that war was not expected to last long, and it was to be only a step towards the establishment of the Greater German Reich.⁽⁶⁶⁾ It was intended that Germanic volunteers who joined the Armed S.S. would become infected with the ideas of the ordinary, political S.S. Dealings between the S.S. and national-socialist parties outside the Reich would be facilitated by the service of members of these parties and their compatriots in the Armed S.S. Finally it was anticipated that when Germanic Waffen S.S. men returned home they would further national-socialism and extend the political S.S. in their own countries, in the form of the Germanic S.S., that is to say the Vlaamsche S.S., Nederlandsche S.S., Norges S.S. and, later, the Schalburgkorps.⁽⁶⁷⁾

65. Das Schwarze Korps, 6 February 1941; E.A. Bartetzko, 'Military Collaboration in the Germanic Countries' (University of California thesis, 1966), p. 35.

66. Ibid., p. 35; E.A. Knoebel, 'Racial Illusion and Military Necessity - A Study of S.S. Political and Manpower Objectives in Occupied Belgium' (University of Colorado thesis, 1965), p. 79.

67. Ibid., pp. 140-4, 153; H. P. Taylor, Uniforms of the S.S., Vol. II, Germanische S.S., 1940-1945, 2nd. edn., (London, 1970), passim.

Berger's recruiting staff had sufficient return for its efforts in Western Europe to permit Regiments "Nordland" and "Westland" to be established, and to make the new S.S. division, "Germania", later called "Wiking", a feasible proposition. But even though an existing S.S. regiment, "Germania", was transferred to the new formation and other Reichsdeutsche provided the cadres of the division's units, there were still large gaps in its ranks as the recruiting figures began to drop.⁽⁶⁸⁾ One reason for this decrease was that the enthusiastic National-Socialists and pro-Germans joined early in the recruiting campaign - after which the number of potential volunteers was limited. Another reason was that right-wing nationalist groups, particularly in Flanders, had no wish to form part of a unified pan-German Reich and resented the extension of the political S.S. into their countries.⁽⁶⁹⁾ To make good the deficiencies in the Division, Berger drafted in Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche to such an extent that, when Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., Division "Wiking" contained a mere 1,142 Germanic volunteers.⁽⁷⁰⁾

68. Stein, op. cit., p. 143; S.S. F.H.A., Tgb. Nr. 184/40, Aufstellung der S.S. Division (mot.) Germania, 3 December 1940 - T175, Roll 106, Frames 2629471-8.

69. Knoebel, op. cit., pp. 157-8.

70. 630 Dutch, 294 Norwegian, 216 Danes, 1 Swede, 1 Swiss, - Chef des S.S. H.A., Germanische Freiwillige der Division "Wiking", 18 August 1941, - T175, Roll 107, Frame 2630559. The situation was not materially affected after the Germanic Legions were disbanded and their survivors absorbed into the Waffen S.S. proper, - III. S.S. Panzerkorps, Tätigkeitsbericht, 26 May 1943 to 31 March 1944 - BAMA - 64325 shows that in December 1943 the Germanic S.S. Corps contained 5,622 Reichsdeutsche, 8,431 Volksdeutsche and 4,902 Germanic members.

Finnish Volunteers

In order to find more non-Germans to bring Division "Wiking" up to strength, Berger turned his attention to Finland.⁽⁷¹⁾ In view of Hitler's intention to attack the Soviet Union the Finns appeared admirable candidates for the Armed S.S. Initially, Berger probably intended to recruit amongst the Swedish minority rather than the Finnic majority; but in the event, no distinction was made. The Finns had provided a "legion" in the German Army during the First World War, the 27th Jäger battalion; and strong ties of friendship existed between the two countries. Some of Berger's own contacts in Finland informed him that there were Finns who were willing to join the Armed S.S. Himmler told Berger that he was free to recruit Finns, but he was obliged to work through normal diplomatic channels and to take care not to offend the Finnish government in any way. Although Berger stood to gain trained men, experienced in fighting the Red Army, time was at a premium. In his impatience to procure Finnish manpower, Berger endeavoured to circumvent the Auswartiges Amt by dealing with the Finnish Ambassador in Berlin. Ribbentrop's ministry was annoyed; but the stratagem may have accelerated the process.⁽⁷²⁾

The Finnish spokesmen insisted that those Finns who volunteered should constitute a separate unit and not be obliged to serve alongside Dutchmen, Danes and Norwegians, who came from occupied countries.⁽⁷³⁾

71. G. H. Stein and H. P. Krosby, 'Das finnische Freiwilligen Bataillon der Waffen S.S. eine Studie zur S.S.-Diplomatie und zur ausländischen Freiwilligen Bewegung', Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, XIV Jg., 4. Heft, (1964), pp. 413-53.

72. Ibid., pp. 419-21.

73. Telegramm Nr. 153, 11 March 1941 - F.O. Series 6509.

The first contingent of Finns arrived almost on the eve of Operation "Barbarossa" and had to be attached in small parties to the companies of "Wiking". Later contingents, however, constituted a Finnish Battalion, "Nordost",⁽⁷⁴⁾ but with a number of German officers. Although the Armed S.S. included units consisting largely of Austrians and Danzigers, the Finns provided its first non-German national unit. Since 90% of the Finnish volunteers belonged to the Finnic majority their unit was the first one in the S.S. to consist of men who were neither German nor Germanic.

Apart from the privilege of forming their own separate national unit, the Finnish negotiators had endeavoured in vain to wring other concessions from Berger. The Finnish S.S. men were reluctant to fight against any state other than the U.S.S.R., particularly against Britain or Greece.⁽⁷⁵⁾ There were later to be other national groups such as the Norwegian S.S. Ski Battalion, who were allowed to select their enemies and who were not liable to be sent wherever the S.S. had need of them. But the Finns were, in fact, always employed on the Eastern front, as they wished.

Stundarte "Nordwest"

As the war with the U.S.S.R. drew closer, Berger still needed manpower for the Waffen S.S. It became abundantly clear to him that "Wiking" was to have far fewer Germanic members than he had hoped. Nevertheless he strove to raise more men from the Netherlands and Flanders by establishing a new regiment in April 1941, Freiwilligen Standarte "Nordwest".

74. S.S. F.H.A. Abt. Org./Tgb. Nr. 2413/41, Aufstellung des S.S. Freiw. Btl. "Nordost", 19 June 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634720-21.

75. Stein and Krosby, op. cit., p. 432.

Although its racial composition was the same as that of "Westland", it differed from the older regiment in that its members did not strictly speaking, belong to the S.S. In spite of the fact that the members of "Nordwest" had to meet the racial and physical standards of the S.S. and had the same rights and duties, their regiment was not regarded as part of the Armed S.S. proper. (76)

These fine distinctions satisfied Anton Mussert of the Dutch Nationaal Socialistische Beweging and Staf de Clerq of the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond. Although these men favoured the idea of a Dutch-Flemish state within the framework of a Greater Germanic Reich, they had no wish to see their countries swallowed up into a Greater Germany. De Clerq's honeymoon with the German National-Socialists was over, insofar as he was strenuously resisting the influence of the political S.S. in Flanders, and making it difficult for Berger to recruit from the Zwarte Brigade, the militia of V.N.V. As it was, he insisted on personal control of the recruiting for "Nordwest" in Flanders. (77)

It was not possible, of course, to employ the concept of the Greater German Reich in order to gain volunteers for "Nordwest"; and it was too early to call for volunteers for the Eastern front. So the S.S. said that the Regiment's raison d'être was "to build a New Europe". (78)

- 76. S.S. F.H.A., I Org./Tgb. Nr. 1071/41, Aufstellung der S.S. Freiwilligen Standarte Nordwest, 3 April 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frames 2634941-3; Stein, op. cit., p. 150; Bartetzko, op. cit., p. 49.
- 77. Stein, op. cit., p. 150; Bartetzko, op. cit., pp. 72-3; Knoebel, op. cit., pp. 159-60; C.A.S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr. 349/41, Flandern, 26 April 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frames 2634878-80.
- 78. Bartetzko, op. cit., p. 52.

This formula was sufficiently vague to satisfy the leaders of N.S.B. and V.N.V.; and although there was no apparent solid purpose behind the new Regiment, it attracted several hundred volunteers but not sufficient to fill its ranks.⁽⁷⁹⁾ As soon as Germany attacked the U.S.S.R. the true purpose of "Nordwest" and the Germanic Armed S.S. became clear; and the Freiwilligen Standarte grew in strength⁽⁸⁰⁾ But in spite of its increase in size the Regiment saw no action since it was broken up to provide the nuclei of Germanic national legions associated with the S.S.⁽⁸¹⁾

Germanic Legions

The non-German Legions authorised by Hitler in June 1941⁽⁸²⁾ did not represent a substantial increase in the size of the German Army which already had two hundred divisions at its disposal.⁽⁸³⁾

79. Ibid., p. 53; Chef des S.S. Hauptamtes, Tgb. Nr. -/41, Zusammenstellung der vom 1-30.4.41 eingereichten Einberufungs Vorgängen, 10 May 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634854-7.
80. Ibid., Erg. Amt der Waffen S.S., Abt. II - 2c; Az. 9h/19, Einberufung zur Waffen S.S., 1 August 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634571-2.
81. Bartetzko, op. cit., p. 54; Knoebel, op. cit., p. 177; An attempt to retain "Nordwest" as a regiment with one battalion each of Dutchmen and Flemings collapsed through lack of recruits - S.S. F.H.A., Abt. Org./Tgb. Nr. 3002/41, Gliederung der S.S. Freiw. Stdte. "Nordwest" und Aufstellung der Freiw. Legion Niederlande, 26 July 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frames 2634646-9 and ibid., Tgb. Nr. 4031/41, S.S. Freiw. Stdte. "Nordwest" und Legion Niederlande, 24 September 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frames 26346459-61.
82. R.F.S.S., Aktennotiz, 29 June 1941, - NO 1087 and T175, Roll 106, Frames 2629090-1; Pol. I M 4796, Report of Conference at Auswärtiges Amt, 2 July 1941 - F.O. Series 4641H, Frames 2092270-6.
83. H. Guderian, Panzer Leader (London, 1952), p.p. 150-1; A. Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-1945 (London, 1971), p.p. 74-5.

For the Waffen S.S., on the other hand, the Legions provided a considerable accession of strength. But, although its needs were great, Himmler was only interested in raising legions of Norwegians, Dutchmen, Swedes, Danes and Flemings.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Since Himmler did not at that time regard the French-speaking Belgians as Germanic he merely assisted in creating the Walloon Legion and relinquished it to the Army.⁽⁸⁵⁾ Although the Reichsführer S.S. had made exceptions of the Gorolians and Finns he was not prepared at that time to abandon the racial selectivity of the S.S. It is, of course, highly probable that the S.S. could not have provided the cadres and facilities for a division of Spaniards, a regiment each of Frenchmen and Croats and a battalion of Walloons over and above those it employed for the Dutch, Norwegian, Flemish and Danish national legions. Furthermore, it was anticipated that the campaign against the U.S.S.R. would be a short one, and it would not have been worth-while to have compromised the racial purity of the S.S. for the sake of units which might have been short-lived and might not even have seen action.

Apart from their numbers and the fact that they were token forces in the struggle against Bolshevism, the Germanic legions were important to the S.S. for other reasons. Although the Germanic legionaries were not required to meet the stringent racial and physical standards of the S.S. - it was sufficient to prove Aryan descent for two generations⁽⁸⁶⁾ - many of them would probably have been acceptable to the S.S. had they applied for a transfer.

84. Stein, op. cit., p.p. 153-4.

85. R.F.S.S., S.S.H.A., Erg. Amt. der Waffen S.S., II 2a Az 9a/G-Sa, 4 August 1941, includes Walloons among the Volksgermanen; Knoebel, op. cit., p. 83; Stein, op. cit., p. 153 (footnote).

86. This was no more than the Wehrmacht required - Absolon, op. cit., pp. 20-1.

The Germanic legionaries were not S.S. men and their units were with, rather than of, the Armed S.S.; but they came into close contact with members of the S.S., and were influenced by them. The Legions' personnel were drawn from a number of political parties not all of which were fascist or National-Socialist. Yet association with the German S.S. might have been expected to produce converts to the cause of National-Socialism and of the Greater German Reich. They could have acted as a bridge between their peoples and the German Reich.

Anti-Partisan Formations

The German attack on the U.S.S.R. not only led to the creation of Soviet partisan units but also brought Communist parties outside the U.S.S.R. into conflict with Germany. The situation in Yugoslavia was particularly difficult for the German forces from the end of 1941, when Tito's bands were tying down units which were sorely needed on the Eastern front. As early as 1940 Berger had noted the Volksgruppe of Yugoslavia as a potential source of recruits,⁽⁸⁷⁾ and in April 1941 the S.S. had even gathered up a few hundred Volksdeutsche in Serbia.⁽⁸⁸⁾ By the end of 1941, Hitler sanctioned the establishment of a new S.S. Division, the 7th, which was to consist of ethnic Germans from the Balkans, and which was intended to relieve German troops in that area.⁽⁸⁹⁾

87. Erg. Amt der Waffen - S.S., Tgb. Nr. 110/40, 7 August 1940, - NO 1825, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 65.

88. Chef des S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr. 347/41, Werbung in Jugoslawien, 26 April 1941 - NO 714, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 43 and T175, Roll 110, Frame 26342794.

89. Stein, op. cit., p. 170; S.S.F.H.A., Org Tgb. Nr. 1268/42, Aufstellung der Freiwilligen Gebirgs Division, 1 March 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frame 2633790.

When insufficient volunteers were forthcoming, Berger's subordinates resorted to coercion in an attempt to find the necessary manpower. (90)

Berger's organisation failed, nevertheless, to levy sufficient racial Germans in Yugoslavia to create the entire division. In consequence, "Prinze Eugen" had to be brought up to strength by drafting in Reich Germans to the extent of 8% and Volksdeutsche from Roumania, Hungary and Slovakia to the extent of 25%. (91) This seventh S.S. division, however, was only one of many calls made upon the manpower of the German settlements of south-eastern Europe. "Prinz Eugen" was the first of several racial German formations of the Armed S.S. (92) Moreover, the heavy casualties of the German and the Germanic S.S. divisions were to a large extent made good with Volksdeutsche replacements.

The later formations of the Armed S.S. owed their existence partly to Himmler's ambition to increase his "empire", partly to an increase in the responsibilities of the Armed S.S. behind the German lines. Like the German Army, the Armed S.S. was affected by the heavy fighting on the Eastern front and by the prolongation of the campaign beyond the winter of 1941-1942. But the situation in the occupied Eastern areas, where there was soon large-scale insurrection, was of the type with which the Waffen S.S. was intended to deal. (93)

90. Chef des S.S. H.A., V.S. Tgb. Nr. 3701/43, Adjtr. Tgb. Nr. 1884, 16 June 1943, - NO 5901, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G.; Chef des Hauptamtes S.S. Gericht. Ia 155 Tgb. Nr. 35/42, 12 July 1943, - NC1649, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66G.
91. 7.S.S. Freiwilligen Gebirgs Division "Prinz Eugen", Ia, 20 February 1944 - T175, Roll 174, Frame 2709734; Meldung, 5 March 1944 - T175, Roll 174, Frame 2709771; 7.S.S. Freiw. Geb. Div. "Prinz Eugen" Ia, 3 May 1944 - T175, Roll 174, Frame 2709767.
92. The others were the 18th, 22nd, 31st and 37th S.S. Divisions.
93. Stein, op. cit., pp. 15-16; D665/G.B. 280, N.C.A., VII, 172-3.

Heinrich Himmler combined in his person the command of both the S.S. and the Polizei and in every province of occupied Europe he appointed a representative as Higher S.S. and Police Leader to be responsible to him for maintaining law and order with the S.S. and police forces at his disposal. Since the German police units in the occupied Eastern territories were inadequate they had to be augmented by recruiting former policemen, former soldiers and civilian volunteers from the local population.⁽⁹⁴⁾ Many of the men who served as nationalist "partisans" or in Selbstschutz units were incorporated into the indigenous police, which from 6 November 1941 became known as the Schutzmannschaften, comprising four sub-divisions. These consisted of those performing ordinary constabulary duties, those organised into units, firemen and finally auxiliaries who assisted the armed forces when required.⁽⁹⁵⁾

The closed police units existed very largely because of the presence of anti-German partisans behind the German lines; and they included a number of indigenous units serving with the Northern Army Group in late 1941, and early 1942.⁽⁹⁶⁾ When German troops thrust into the North Caucasus the numbers of Schuma units grew and so did the number of races represented within them, for Crimean Tartars and Caucasians were added to their number. It also became the practice to move Baltic and Ukrainian units out of their home territories into others, notably Byelorussia, where there was a greater need for them.⁽⁹⁷⁾

94. For example the Lettische Polizeihilfsdienst established 3 July 1941 - Chef der Si/cherheits/ po/lizei/ und S/icherheits/ d/ienst/, IV A1-B Nr. 1 B/41, Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr. 24, 16 July 1941-NO 2938, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9-0.

95. H. J. Neufeldt, J. Huck, G. Tessin, Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei [(Koblenz, 1957)], II, 55.

96. Stein, op. cit., p. 174.

97. Neufeldt, Huck, Tessin, op. cit., II, 63.

Since the Schutzstaffel was an élite organisation of the National Socialist German Labour Party, it might be supposed that it would have obeyed the orders of its Führer implicitly. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the S.S. would have prevented non-Germans in occupied Eastern territories from bearing arms; but this was far from being the case. One of the units of the Sicherheitsdienst, Einsatzgruppe A, stated, "In view of the extension of the area of operations and the great number of duties which had to be performed by the Sipo it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the co-operation of the reliable population for the fight against vermin - that is mainly the Jews and Communists"⁽⁹⁸⁾ Earlier in the document another reason is suggested where it states, "not a single soldier was injured although these Latvian detachments suffered some killed and wounded in fighting with Russian stragglers".⁽⁹⁹⁾ That this practice was not confined to one S.D. unit is shown in the early reports of the Sicherheitspolizei und S.D., which contain many references to the use of Lithuanian "partisans",⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Latvian Polizei Hilfsdienst,⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Estonian Selbstschutz⁽¹⁰²⁾ and Ukrainian Ordnungsdienst.⁽¹⁰³⁾

98. Einsatzgruppe A, Report, 15 November 1941, Paragraph A, I, 1, - L180/USA276, N.C.A., VII, 983.

99. Ibid.

100. R.S.H.A., IV-A-1, Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr. 8, 30 June 1941, - NO 4543.

101. Der Chef der Sipo und S.D. IV A 1 B Nr. 1/B41, Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr. 88, 19 September 1941, - NO 3149, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9L.

102. R.S.H.A., IV A-1, Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr. 111, 12 October 1941, - NO 3155, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9-0.

103. A.O.K.11, O.Qu./Qu. 2/Br. B. Nr. 472/41, 3 August 1941, Anlage, - NOKW 2303, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 5A.

After the initial rounding-up of Jews and Communists was completed, the S.D. were obliged to disarm and reduce some of the native units⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ working with them, because they were composed of nationalists who could not be trusted towards the Germans, once they discovered that Germany had no intention of establishing independent states in the areas she had conquered.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ The services of many Balts and Ukrainians were retained by the S.S. to provide a police force, the Schutzmannschaften.

"Zeppelin"

Another branch of the security organisation of the S.S. to disregard Hitler's injunctions against the use of foreigners was Amt VI of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. At a time when the Einsatzkommandos were liquidating Communists in accordance with the Kommissarbefehl, Amt VI was gathering Red Army officers and political commissars for Operation "Zeppelin". This was the code-name of a scheme, initiated in the autumn of 1941, for converting prisoners-of-war into agents of the Germans who could be sent behind the Soviet lines to collect and transmit information for their new masters. The project was important to the German forces in general because, if successful, it could make their task of destroying the Red Army simpler; the project was important to the S.S. in particular because in this sphere it was competing with Abwehr.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

104. Der Chef der Sipo und S.D., IV A 1 B Nr. 1/B41, Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr. 66, 28 August 1941, - NO 2839, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9-0.

105. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 76, 91, 113, (footnote).

106. W. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs (London, 1956), p. 308; A. Dallin and R. S. Mavrogordato, 'Rodionov: A Case-Study in Wartime Redefection', American Slavic and East European Review (February, 1959), p. 26.

Schellenberg's subordinates collected more men for "Zeppelin" than could be inserted behind the Soviet lines. The residue was taken to assist with another important task of the S.S., that of fighting partisans. The superfluous personnel constituted a force known as Druzhina, under the leadership of a former Red Army officer known as Rodionov, alias Gil, who later defected to the Soviet partisans with some of his unit.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ The non-Russians who remained loyal were used later in another scheme of the S.S., that of raising its own combat units of Soviet citizens, when these men were absorbed by the Ostturkischer Waffen-Verband.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

The Balts

In spite of the assistance rendered to the German invaders by many Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians, Himmler made it clear on 17 October 1941 that legions were not to be established in the Baltic states nor in the Ukraine. These occupied areas were, however, to supply a large number of guard units.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Nevertheless the Balts had certain qualities to commend them to Himmler, largely arising from their geographic proximity to Germany. Their association with Germany could be traced back through the Hanseatic League to the Teutonic Knights.

107. Schellenberg, op. cit., p.p. 316-7; Dallin and Mavrogordato, op. cit., passim; G. Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 43.

108. S.S.H.A. Amt A I, 11 December 1943, in BAMA 78042/1; Oberzahlmeister Büniger, 21 January 1944, in BAMA 78042/1.

109. Knoebel, op. cit., p. 87 cites Brandt to Berger, 17 October 1941 - T175, Roll 22, Frame 2527C941;

The Baltic peoples were not Slavs and, consequently, were not classified as Untermensch.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ In fact the Estonians had the advantage that they were of the same ethnic group as the Finns and the Magyars, who were allied to Germany and in the case of the Finns, already providing manpower to the Armed S.S. The Balts were not among peoples specifically excluded from bearing arms by Hitler in his speech of 16 July 1941.⁽¹¹¹⁾ When the Red Army counter-attacked in the winter of 1941-1942, the Balts represented a convenient reservoir of manpower behind the German Northern Army Group.⁽¹¹²⁾ A serious stumbling block was that the Baltic states were earmarked for German settlement.⁽¹¹³⁾ This plan was opposed by Rosenberg and many of his colleagues in the Reichsministerium für ^{die} besetzten Ostgebiete; and it also ran counter to the aspirations of the Baltic nationalists, who wished to see the resurrection of the republics of the inter-war years. Himmler was sufficiently impressed by the Nordic appearance of some of his Estonian volunteers to suggest his own modification of Hitler's intentions - that the Estonians should join the Reich.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

The Russian counter-attack during the first winter of the Eastern campaign was so threatening that the German military authorities, in the absence of German replacements, toyed with the idea of mobilising the male population of the Baltic states, a task which the S. S. claimed it alone could carry out on the correct National-Socialist ideological lines.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

110. Dallin, op. cit., p.p. 184-5; Knoebel, op. cit., p. 88.
111. Aktenvermerk, 16 July 1941 - L 221, Case XII, Doc. Bk 9A and N.C.A., VII, 1086-93.
112. Stein, op. cit., p. 174.
113. A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, Chapter 14.
114. R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. 14/8/43, 13 January 1943 - NO 3301, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66G; Kamenetsky, op. cit., p.p. 90-1.
115. Stein, op. cit., p.p. 174-5; Telegramm Riga 848-1247, 25 January 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frames 2633024-31.

The threat receded but not before a number of Baltic units had been hastily put into the line, where they shared the heavy casualties of their German neighbours. Although in February 1942 the number of Baltic and Ukrainian units was supposed to stay constant, ⁽¹¹⁶⁾ they were needed in their own territories and also in those further east with the result that their numbers grew.

In May 1942 Himmler was tempted to establish S.S. legions for the Baltic peoples, on a par with those of the Germanic countries; but he decided that there were dangers in the idea, ⁽¹¹⁷⁾ presumably to the ideology of the S.S. Nevertheless, his desire to expand his private army caused him in August 1942 to select the Estonians as being racially the purest and as the most sympathetic of the Baltic peoples. ⁽¹¹⁸⁾ In consequence, Estonia was to provide the first Baltic S.S. formation. This was established on 1 October 1942 ⁽¹¹⁹⁾ and the privilege of serving at the front was extended to Estonians. ⁽¹²⁰⁾ Hitherto this concession had been granted to the Turkic and Caucasian races alone of the Eastern peoples. Estonia provided enough volunteers to create Eesti Leegioni, which, in accordance with the S.S. policy in 1943 of expanding or merging the national legions, grew to become a brigade and later a division of infantry. ⁽¹²¹⁾

116. J. Kramarz, Staufferberg, The Life and Death of an Officer (London, 1969), p. 98.
117. Dallin, op. cit., p. 597; Stein, op. cit., p. 175.
118. Stein, op. cit., pp. 175-6; R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. 14/8/43, 13 January 1943 - NO 3301, Case XI, Doc Bk. 66G.
119. 20. Waffen-Grenadierdivision der S.S. (estn. Nr. 1), Stammtafel - BAMA # S15-20/1.
120. Memorandum II 1, Nr. 1161/42, 25 October 1942, - 294 DS, N.C.A., III 248 and Trial of the Major War Criminals, (Nuremberg 1947-9), XXV, 337.
121. S.S.F.H.A., Kdo. Amt der Waffen S.S., Org. Tgb. Nr. 600/43, Umgliederung der 1.S.S. Brigade in der Estn. S.S. Brigade, 5 May 1943 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635256-60; S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 180/44, 24 January 1944 - T175, Roll 141, Frame 2669355.

In order to achieve this, several age-groups of Estonians were conscripted. (122)

Once the Estonians were permitted a Legion of their own, the Latvian representatives sought to raise a Latvian Army of 100,000 men, realising that this could represent a step towards obtaining political concessions. On learning this, Berger suggested that the Latvians should show their eagerness to fight Bolshevism by raising anti-partisan units or a Legion. (123)

At the end of January 1943, shortly before the German capitulation at Stalingrad, permission was given for the establishment of a Latvian and a Lithuanian Legion. (124)

Since the Lithuanian people were unwilling to serve in what was patently a German rather than a true Lithuanian national force, there were insufficient volunteers; and although the age groups 1919 to 1928 were called up, the German authorities abandoned the plan and rather ignominiously raised construction units instead. (125) Meanwhile Germany continued to use Lithuanian police units; and since Lithuania itself became an area of partisan operations the German authorities, at the beginning of 1944, agreed to the establishment of a Lithuanian Heimatwehr. (126)

122. Year Groups 1919 to 1924 inclusive in March 1943 - Association of Estonians in Great Britain in letter to author, 14 October 1969; Year Groups 1925, 1902 to 1904 inclusive, 1926 - Ametlik Teataja, 26 October 1943, 30 January 1944 and 3rd August 1944 respectively, - NO 4883, NO 4884, NO 4885, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G.
123. Chef der S.S.H.A., V.S. Tgb. Nr. 5081/42, 11 December 1942, - NO 3300, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G; Stein, op. cit., p. 176.
124. R.F.S.S. Aktennotiz, 30 January 1943, - T175, Roll 22, Frame 2527865; Knoebel, op. cit., p. 87.
125. Lietuviu Enciklopedija, XV (Boston, Mass, 1968), p.p. 376-7, XXVIII (Boston, Mass, 1963), p. 468; S. Rastikis, Kovose de Lietuvos (Los Angeles, 1957), p.p. 236, 329 translations supplied by the Committee for a Free Lithuania, 6 May 1969; O.K.W. K.T.B., III/2, p. 1329; O.K.H./Gen. St.d.h./Org. Abt. (II) Nr./7144/43, 25 April 1943.
126. Lietuviu Enciklopedija, XXXIV (Boston, Mass., 1966), p.p. 39-40, XV p.p. 376-7.

But it soon became apparent that the German forces regarded the new battalions as existing for German use rather than as a nascent Lithuanian Army. The number of volunteers who presented themselves for the Heimatwehr encouraged Himmler, with great optimism, to revive the project for raising a Lithuanian S.S. Legion, in the strength of a division, into which the construction units would be absorbed.⁽¹²⁷⁾ The Lithuanians of the Heimatwehr began to disperse rather than serve in German units,⁽¹²⁸⁾ with the result that, although numerous Lithuanians served as Hiwis, pioneers, Flakhelfer⁽¹²⁹⁾ and policemen, there was no Lithuanian element larger than a police regiment in the German service.⁽¹³⁰⁾ The denial of independence to the Lithuanians, which started with the suppression of their provisional government in the summer of 1941,⁽¹³¹⁾ deprived the German forces of manpower they sorely needed.

With the Latvians the German authorities had greater success in that eventually an army corps of two infantry divisions was established.⁽¹³²⁾ But this was only achieved by absorbing six of the Latvian police battalions⁽¹³³⁾ and by introducing conscription.⁽¹³⁴⁾ Nevertheless, there were sufficient men surplus to requirements, possibly unfit for combat, who were organised into construction units.⁽¹³⁵⁾

127. Stadtkommissar Kauen, 18 February 1944, - 204 PS, N.C.A., III, 215-7; Lieutuviu Enciklopedija, XXVIII, 468.
128. Ibid., XXXIV, 39-40, XV, 376-7.
129. Ibid., XV, 19, 377, XXXIV, 40, XXVIII, 468.
130. Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op. cit., II, p. 59.
131. O.K.W. K.T.B. I, 419.
132. S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 1471/43 Aufstellung des Gen Kdos. VI. S.S. Freiw. Korps 8 October 1943, T175, Roll 111, Frame 2635214-5.
133. i.e. Battalions 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 26; Chef des S.S.H.A., 23 May 1943 - No 3380.
134. Stein, op. cit., p. 178; Höhere S. S. und Polizeiführer Riga, Nr. 607 19 February 1943 - NO 3302
135. On the evidence of Field Post Office numbers, Latvian Battalions numbered XI to XV of the Rekruten Depot der 15. S.S. Division became lett. Bau-Regiment 1 and the nucleus of Regiment 2.

The approach of the Red Army made general mobilisation more acceptable in Latvia and in Estonia, too, than it would have been in other circumstances. (136) With those who were inducted by this method Frontier Guard Regiments were established in the two territories. (137) Among other measures that were taken were the mobilisation of the Estonian Selbstschutz (138) and the grouping of police battalions into regiments. (139)

In the case of the Baltic peoples Himmler abandoned the racial exclusiveness of the Waffen S.S. for a variety of reasons of which probably the most important to him was his wish to expand the Armed S.S.. Baltic manpower was available and it commended itself to him because the Schuma units of the three states had conducted themselves well and because a large part of their populations was willing to defend their countries against the Red Army. Initially Himmler was only interested in enrolling "Germanisable" Estonians, but he later also endeavoured to recruit politically unreliable and in his view, ethnically inferior Lithuanians for the S.S. (140)

136. O.K.W., K.T.B., III/2, p.p. 1328-9; Gen. Inspr. d lett. S.S. Freiw. Legion, 26 January 1944 - NO 2816; Chef des S.S.H.A., Adjtr. Tgb. Nr. 340/44, 16 February 1944 - NO 3308; Chef des S.S.H.A., V.S.Tgb. Nr. 475/44, Adjtr. Tgb. Nr. 408/44, 13 June 1944; Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer, Riga, Nr. 605, 23 July 1944, - NO 3044, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G.
137. Neufeldt, Huck, Tessin, op. cit., part II, p.p. 60-1.
138. Ibid., p. 61; Lieutenant-Colonel August Tomander, Interrogation Summary 3300, (Office of the U.S. Chief Counsel, Subsequent Proceedings Division).
139. Neufeldt, Huck, Tessin, op. cit., II, 59.
140. C.d.S.S.H.A., V.S. Tgb. Nr. 3097/42, Memorandum of Conference at the Führerhauptquartier, 17 August 1942, - NO 2703 also in Kamenetsky, op. cit., Appendix V, p.p. 200-3, p. 90; Dallin, op. cit., p.p. 184-5.

Bosnians

After the creation of the S.S. Division "Prinz Eugen" it still remained necessary for Germany and Italy to find men for south-eastern Europe. The Balkans were a constant drain on German resources, drawing off troops which were sorely needed on the Eastern front. In order to augment the forces under German command in Yugoslavia, in February 1943 Hitler permitted the formation of an S.S. Division which was to consist of Moslems from Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ The Führer had a great belief in the fighting qualities of Moslem tribesmen⁽¹⁴²⁾ which he had demonstrated when he permitted the raising of the Turkestanische Legion in the late autumn of 1941.⁽¹⁴³⁾ Since the Moslems of Yugoslavia had a long tradition of feuding with their Christian neighbours, they could be relied upon to fight partisans and Cetniks alike. The Bosnians had also provided regiments for the army of Dual Monarchy, as Hitler, himself an Austrian, must have remembered. In view of the Habsburg possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina before 1918 it is strange that, unlike Galicia, Hitler did not regard the provinces as rightfully part of the Greater German Reich. Instead, they were given to Croatia as compensation for Italian annexation of the Dalmatian coastline.

141. Stein, op. cit., p.p. 180-1; S.S.F.H.A., Kommando amt der Waffen S.S., Org. Tgb. Nr. 589/43, Aufstellung der kroatischen S.S. Freiw. Div., 30 April 1943, in T175, Roll 111, Frame 26353347 refers to an order of Hitler's of 10 February 1943. The formation of the Division was mentioned in a telephone conversation of Himmler to Phleps, Der R.F.S.S. Nr. 35/33/43, 13 February 1943 in T175, Roll 70, Frames 2587186-8.

142. Warlimont, op. cit., p. 293.

143. By the authority of O.K.W./W.F.St./L, "Aufstellung einer türkischen Legion, M/L 474", 17 November 1941 according to Dallin, op. cit., p. 540 (footnote).

The Moslem S.S. Division was the second one to be formed from the minorities of the nominally independent state of Croatia,⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ and the agreement of the Croat government had to be obtained. Although the latter had permitted the enlistment of its German minority into German units, it proved reluctant to lose the services of its Moslems; and Himmler had to bring pressure to bear upon the Croat government through his representative in Zagreb.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

The Bosnian-Herzegovinan Division represents a change of policy on two counts. Racially, most of its members were neither German nor Germanic, but Southern Slav - although it pleased the S.S. Hauptamt to regard them as "predominantly Dinaric",⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ The Division was to have been one of three - the others were to have been Lithuanian and Latvian⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ - but the first was still-born and the second was delayed. These would have been the first three divisions of the S.S. to contain men who were of neither German nor Germanic stock. Even if the other two formations had been created in the first half of 1943, the Moslem one would still have been unique because the other two would have been composed of Balts.

The second way in which "Handschar", the Yugoslav Division, represents a departure from normal S.S. policy is in the matter of religion. Himmler preferred those who joined the S.S. to be Gottgläubig rather than to belong to any recognised sect. For this reason the Waffen S.S. had no chaplains before 1943.

144. The first one was S.S. Division "Prinz Eugen", which included Volksdeutsche from Croatia.

145. S.S.Freiw. Div. "Prinz Eugen", Tgb. Nr. 248/43, 19 April 1943, in T175, Roll 70, Frames 2587179-82; R.F.S.S., Nr. 1672/43, 1 July 1943, T175, Roll 111, Frames 26350371-2; Stein, op. cit., p. 180.

146. S.S.H.A., Amt A 1, V.S. Nr. 1222/43, A I V.S.Nr. 2/43, 19 May 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587013.

147. O.K.W., K.T.B., III/1, p. 127.

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Himmler set out deliberately to recruit Moslems rather than Catholic or Orthodox Yugoslavs. He favoured Islam because it promised heaven to those who died fighting. In consequence, the Division's regiments had a Mullah; each and every battalion had an Imam. Pork and alcohol were excluded from the Moslems' rations and arrangements were made for them to offer up their daily prayers and to celebrate the Islamic fasts and festivities. (148)

The completion of the Division encouraged the S.S. Hauptamt to consider further recruitment in the area, spurred on by the capitulation of Italy in September 1943. This event took place only four months after the loss of the German-Italian forces in Africa and seven months after the surrender at Stalingrad. It was not simply that Italy ceased to be Germany's ally; the German authorities felt that Italy's forces had to be disarmed if they could not be persuaded to fight on. Because of the strategic situation the German forces were obliged to occupy not only the Italian mainland but also to replace the Italian garrisons in Southern France, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. In all of these territories there were resistance movements which benefited from the Italian collapse.

Albanians

In Greece and Albania the Germans permitted a measure of political power to local collaborators and permitted them to raise their own security units. But the resistance groups, particularly the Communist-led ones, became so strong that German troops were required to bolster the local militia. Heavy pressure on the Eastern front made it difficult for the German Army to spare troops for the south-east of Europe. In April 1944 the Red Army arrived at the border of Roumania and threatened the Balkans themselves.

148. Stein, op. cit., p. 182; Der R.F.S.S., Nr. 36/175/43, V.S. Tgb. Nr. 585/43, 6 August 1943, in T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587014.

This was the background to the detachment of the Albanian members of "Handschar" to provide a nucleus for a new S.S. Division "Skanderbeg", in April 1944.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ On the 7 May, Arthur Phleps, commanding the Vth S.S. Mountain Corps mentioned plans for establishing a second Bosnian and a second Albanian division.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ These plans were dictated by the critical situation; but they were over-optimistic, for "Skanderbeg" was never completed and its desertion rate was so high that by November 1944 the Division had been reduced.⁽¹⁵¹⁾ In view of this, no second Albanian division was formed; but the second Bosnian division, "Kama", was set up⁽¹⁵²⁾ - although like "Skanderbeg" it was never completed. The Red Army reached the border of Yugoslavia and approached Hungary, where "Kama" was to have been organised. Consequently the scheme was abandoned and the Moslems were sent to the mother-division "Handschar",⁽¹⁵³⁾ at the beginning of October 1944. But the Moslem personnel of that formation were loth to leave their homes so it, too, was disbanded.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

- 149. S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 991/44, 17 April 1944, in T175, Roll 141, Frame 2669336.
- 150. A. Phleps, Letter to Himmler, 7 May 1944, in T175, Roll 70, Frames 2586899-903 and 2586904-15.
- 151. Oberbefehlshaber Sudost I, Nr. 14288, 16 November 1944; Stein, op. cit. p. 185.
- 152. S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 3253, 24 September 1944 in T175, Roll 141, Frame 2669151; Stein, op. cit., p 185.
- 153. S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 3466/44, 4 October, in T175, Roll 141, Frames 2669114-5.
- 154. Stein, op. cit., p.p. 183-4. The Division's name was kept alive by a German battlegroup built around its German cadre.

Eastern Slavs

An example of the early use by the Waffen S.S. of Soviet nationals is to be found in the order-of-battle of the 2nd S.S. Brigade in January 1943. This document unequivocally indicates that the Brigade included an Abteilung of artillery and a combat engineer company, both of which are marked to show that they contained Russian personnel. The S.S. Brigades at this time were loose formations controlling a variety of German and Germanic units together with Baltic Schuma units. Nevertheless, the use of men from the "old" Soviet territories in the Brigade's own supporting elements is interesting. It is also noteworthy that these Russians were entrusted with artillery by the S.S., even of the calibre of 12-2 c.m. (155)

Ukrainians

In April 1941, when Berger suggested that the Armed S.S. should recruit Ukrainians in Poland, the Reichsführer had vetoed the idea, (156) although his subordinates in Generalgouvernement Polen were using Ukrainian minority-members as policemen. (157) In spite of Hitler's specific prohibition of the arming of Ukrainians, elements of the German Army and the S.S. after the assault upon the U.S.S.R. raised police units, some of which were sent into Byelorussia to assist in combatting Communist partisans. (158)

155. O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt., Nr. 149/43, 7 January 1943, Anlage, (Chef Heeresstab/O.K.W. (I) Nr. 28163, 6 January 1943, Anlage) - T175, Roll 174, Frame 2709440.
156. Stoin, op. cit., p. 151; Cd.S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr. 358/41, Ukrainer, 28 April 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634861; R.F.S.S., Pers. Stab., Tgb. Nr. 945/41, Ukrainer, 3 May 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634860.
157. Armstrong, op. cit., p.p. 50, 53; H. Freutel, 'Ukrainische Polizei im Generalgouvernement 1940-1944' Feldgrau, XVI. Jg., Nr. 3 (1968).
158. Aktenvermerk, 16 July 1941 - L221, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9A and N.C.A. VII 1086-93; Der Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer Russland Mitte und Weissruthenien, Abt. Ia, Tgb. Nr. 641/43, 31 April 1943 - T175, Roll 225, Frames 2764107-11.

After the Abwehr-sponsored Ukrainian unit "Nachtigall" became involved in the establishment of the Banderist provisional government at Lvov, it was suppressed by the German forces but the S.S. combined its survivors with those of the other Ukrainian Abwehr unit, "Roland", to form a police battalion.

(159) But by this time - not five months after his initial refusal - Himmler had permitted a new supply company of the Armed S.S. to fill its ranks with Ukrainians. (160)

A year later he went further and ordered the raising of a Ukrainian guard battalion for the S.S. manoeuvre area at Debica. (161)

The official German policy towards the Ukraine was to exploit it as a granary and to regard it as a German settlement area. The attempts by the two wings of O.U.N. to form provisional regimes at Lvov and Kiev were put down by force. (162)

Apart from Rosenberg's circle there were few German officials who favoured the concept of a Ukrainian state. The Ukraine was not even administered as a whole, for Galicia formed part of the Generalgouvernement, while the Eastern Ukraine, the "old" Soviet territory, became a Reichskommissariat. Here Erich Koch extracted as much produce as possible, ill-treated the people and rounded up considerable numbers of them to work in Germany. (163)

159. Dallin, op. cit., p.p. 119-21; Armstrong, op. cit., p.p. 77-83, 153; Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op. cit., p. 53.

160. S.S.F.H.A., Org. Tgb. Nr. 40 30/41, Aufstellung einer Nachschub Kompanie für den Kommando Stab R.F.S.S., 24 September 1941, para. 4-T175, Roll 109, Frame 2633175.

161. Der R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. 1363/42, 16 September 1942 - T175, Roll 105, Frames 2627701-3.

162. Armstrong, op. cit., p.p. 79-83, 101-3, 106-8; Dallin, op. cit., p.p. 119-21.

163. Armstrong, op. cit., p.p. 122-5.

Frustrated nationalism and the ill-treatment of the population caused many Ukrainian policemen to desert, in some cases to the Soviet partisans, in others to join the nationalist guerillas, notably Ukrainska Povstanska Armia.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ For a period during 1943, U.P.A. was in control of the whole of the Reichskommissariat, apart from the towns.⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ By contrast, in Galicia the population were given better treatment than the Poles, not only to promote antagonism between the two communities but also because it was thought that many Galicians were suitable for Germanisation.⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

The loss of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad was prefaced by the shattering of the forces of Germany's allies on the Ostfront. The resultant critical situation caused Himmler to disregard the unreliability of his Ukrainian police units and to consider the suggestion of a subordinate, Gustav Wächter, the governor of Galicia. Wächter advocated the recruitment of Anti-Bolshevik Ukrainians into a military force.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ There are indications that the S.S. originally considered raising a police regiment, possibly one similar to those they were endeavouring to establish in other occupied Eastern areas.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ But by the middle of April the plan had grown to one for a Galizische Division to be raised from the Greek-Catholic Ukrainians, plus police regiments to be formed from the Greek Orthodox population of the Lublin area.⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ On 28th April 1943, Wächter issued his instructions for establishing the Division.⁽¹⁷⁰⁾

164. i.e. the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army, - Ibid., p.p. 143, 148.

165. Ibid., p. 156.

166. Ibid., p.p. 48-9; Kamenetsky, op. cit., p. 97.

167. B. Dmytryshyn, 'The Nazis and the S.S. Volunteer Division "Galicia"', American Slavic and East European Review, XV, No. 1 (February 1956), p. 3; Stein, op. cit., p. 185; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 169.

168. C. d. S.S.H.A., V.S. Tgb. Nr. 1684/43, C. Adj. V.S. Tgb. Nr. 923/43, 20 March 1943, - T175, Roll 67, Frame 2583688; Dallin, op. cit., p. 598; Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op. cit., II, 31.

169. Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Letter to Generalleutnant Winkelmann, 14 April 1943.

170. Der Gouverneur des Distrikts Galizien, Tgb. Nr. 104/43, 28 April 1943.

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"Wachter tried to persuade Himmler to permit the Division to be referred to as "Ukrainian" rather than "Galician", on the grounds that the latter was purely a territorial designation,⁽¹⁷¹⁾ but the Reichsführer remained adamant.⁽¹⁷²⁾ He was probably influenced by those who thought it dangerous to arm Ukrainians and who like Erich Koch, opposed Ukrainian nationalism.⁽¹⁷³⁾ Hitler made it clear on 19 June 1943, while forbidding the recruitment of Poles, that he had no objection to the enlistment of the White Ruthenian and Galician peoples who had long been associated with Austria.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ Himmler was, therefore, on firm ground in raising a Galician formation. Ukrainians were not deterred by the nomenclature of the Division and sufficient came forward to complete it without difficulty⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ and also to establish five regiments.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

On 3rd May 1944, "Wachter, in a report to Himmler, stated that the Galician Division had been worthwhile in that it had kept a number of Ukrainians from joining the nationalists⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ a factor which may have been in the minds of Wachter and possibly other S.S. leaders when the plan was first mooted.

171. B. Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p.p. 6-8.

172. Himmler, Teleprint to S.S. Kriegsberichterabteilung, 30 June 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frame 2586531; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 170

173. Chef des S.S.H.A., V.S. Tgb. Nr. 1173/43, Adftr. Tgb. Nr. 685/43, 10 December 1943, T175, Roll 155, Frames 2685825-6.

174. Der Reichsführer S.S., Nr. 39/147/43, 22 June 1943 in T175, Roll 70, Frames 2586505-6, and in T175, Roll 140, Frames 2667669-72.

175. B. Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p. 6; Stein, op. cit., p. 185; Dallin, op. cit., p. 598; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 174.

176. Numbered 4 to 8, of which the 8th was still-born while the other four were broken up to reinforce the Division. Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op. cit., II, 52-3; Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei, Nimwegen, B.H.O II 3160/30.10, 1 November 1943 and B.d.O. Ia, Organisationsbefehl Nr. 3 9 November 1943 - both documents in R/ijsinstituut/ v/oor/ O/orlogs-documentatie/

177. Dmytryshyn, op. cit., p. 9.

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In the same report Wachter criticised German policy towards conquered peoples and maintained that the Germans should have used nationalist slogans among the Ukrainians and other nationalities of the U.S.S.R. (178) Rather belatedly Wachter was in effect singling out the basic contradiction in German policy. The occupiers were anxious to make use of Ukrainians; but they were at the same time opposed to Ukrainian nationalism. The same could be said of other occupied areas. The Germans underestimated the strength of nationalist feeling and wrongly assumed, in the case of the Western Ukrainians, a strong nostalgia for the Dual Monarchy. (179)

The Galician Division marks an interesting departure in S.S. policy in that it was that body's first Eastern Slav formation, the first division to be formed from "Untermensch". (180) In the second place, like the Moslem Southern Slav Division, it included officers with spiritual functions - Greek-Catholic chaplains, the first Christian clergy to be appointed in the S.S. (181)

178. Ibid., p. 9.

179. Ibid., p. 9.

180. Himmler admitted that its members were really Ukrainians in Rede des R.F.S.S. auf den Appell des Führerkorps der Galizischen S.S. Freiwilligen Infanterie Division in Neuhammer, 16 May 1944, in T175, Roll 94, Frames 2614657 ff.

181. O.K.H., Gen. St. d. H., Org. Abt. II Nr. 9572/43, 15 November 1943, and Nr. 10788/43, 21 December 1943; P. Shandruk, Arms of Valor (New York, 1959), p.p. 261-2; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 173.

Turkic and Caucasian Formations.

The German withdrawals from the North Caucasus in early 1943 not only caused the Army's Eastern units to fall back but also those of the Schuma and the S.D. Reports of defection put the continued existence of the Army's units in jeopardy and they were transferred to Western Europe as an alternative to disbandment.⁽¹⁸²⁾ Himmler decided that the German Army had mishandled its Turkic units, thereby causing them to become unreliable.⁽¹⁸³⁾ He was probably influenced in reaching this decision by the Mufti of Jerusalem, who had assisted in establishing "Handschar", and by Major Meyer-Mader, one of the founders of the Army's Turkestani Legion.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ The Reichsführer decided that the S.S. could improve upon the Army's performance,⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ and agreed in November 1943 to create an Ostmuselm-anische or Turkmuselmanische S.S. Division.⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ This was to be achieved by taking Meyer-Mader and his battalion, the 450th, into the S.S.⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ and by adding 30,000 men from prison camps and labour companies.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

182. Dallin, op. cit., p. 582.

183. Chef der S.S.H.A., V.S. Tgb. Nr. 7899/43, A I Tgb. Nr. 1099/43, 14 December 1943, in BAMA - 78042/1.

184. Dallin, op. cit., p.p. 541 (footnote), 600.

185. O.K.H., Chef H. Ru. u. Bd.E., A.H.A., A/In, IV (Gr. III) Nr. 32347/43, 4 January 1944 in BAMA - 78042/1.

186. S.S.H.A., Amt A1, AI 2 Az. 16c Gr/Eh, 17 November 1943, in BAMA 78042/1.

187. R.F.S.S., Nr. 35/165/43, 8 November 1943 in BA-NS 19 Neu 297; Dallin, op. cit., p.p. 600-1. Not Bataillon 480, which was non-existent.

188. Chef der S.S.H.A., V.S. Nr. 7899/43, A I Tgb. Nr. 1099/43, 14 December 1943, in BAMA 78042/1.

Although the new Division also took over the Turkestani battalion I/94, which had been disarmed,⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ and Turkestanis from the S.D.,⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ it did not reach full strength because the Army was reluctant to surrender its Eastern legionaries and to give up prisoners-of-war.⁽¹⁹¹⁾ The effectives of the Division, known more realistically as the First Ostmuselmanisches S.S. Regiment, were merged with a Mountain Brigade⁽¹⁹²⁾ of Crimean Tartar refugees to form the Ostturkischer Waffenverband.⁽¹⁹³⁾ This force was not intended to serve as a tactical formation but to provide a framework within which Turkestanis, Tartars and Azerbaijanis could be organised and trained by the S.S.⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ A parallel development to this, in the autumn of 1944, was the setting up of the Kaukasischer Waffenverband,⁽¹⁹⁵⁾ which was intended to utilise the Caucasian refugees in Northern Italy.

Himmler's Compromise

When Himmler in his anxiety to enlarge the Waffen S.S. raised formations of non-Nordic peoples to fight in or near their homes, he did not entirely abandon the principle that the S.S. should be a Germanic order. The Baltic and Slav S.S. formations certainly excluded Jews and Gypsies, but in this they were no more selective than the Wehrmacht.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾

- 189. S.S.H.A., Amt A I, A 1, V.S. Nr. 1107/43, 15 December 1943 - BA-NS 31/43.
- 190. S.S.H.A., Amt A I, A 1, 11 December 1943, in BAMA 78042/1 VI G. RS. B. Nr. 1477/43, 14 October 1943, Anlage 1 - BA-NS31/43.
- 191. R.F.S.S., S.S.H.A., Amt A I, V.S. Nr. -/44, 12 January 1944, in BAMA 78042/1; Abt. Kriegsverwaltung (Gu. 5), Notiz, 7 January 1944 - BAMA 78042/1.
- 192. V.O.S.S., Nr. 903, 1 January 1945.
- 193. R.F.S.S., 20 October 1944, - T175, Roll 70, Frames 2586542-3.
- 194. Ibid.; Dallin, op. cit., p. 601.
- 195. Both Waffenverbände were forecast in R.F.S.S., S.S.H.A., Amtsruppe D, DI/5h, Zusammenfassung der nichtrussischen Gruppen, 2 October 1944, - BA-NS31/15.

Apart from this it was sufficient for volunteers to be fit by German Army standards and to have the right "outlook".⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ No attempt was made to turn Moslem recruits into National-Socialists,⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ while the Galicians, as has been shown,⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ were permitted the ministrations of their own clergy. Lowering of entry requirements and the toleration of organised religion were to some extent forced upon the S.S. by its need for manpower; but the concessions were permissible because the non-Germans of the Balkans and of Eastern Europe had been accepted into formations of the Waffen S.S. but not into the S.S. proper.

Those who belonged to the Waffen S.S. were separated into three racial categories. The first of these consisted of the German and Germanic members who were "Ordensfähige" and "S.S.-taugliche", that is to say who were fit for combat by S.S. standards. The second category comprised the German and Germanic Armed S.S. men who were neither "Ordensfähige" nor "S.S.-taugliche" and who were only fit by the standards of the German Army. The third consisted of Armed S.S. men who were neither German nor Germanic.⁽²⁰⁰⁾ The last were ineligible for Himmler's new Teutonic Order because of their racial origins.

196. Absolon, op. cit., p.p. 20-1. The Wehrmacht simply insisted on Arische Abstammung, in Paragraph 15 of the Wehrgesetz of 21 May 1935.

197. Bartetzko, op. cit., p. 57.

198. S.S.H.A., Amt A I, V.S. Nr. 1222/43, A I V.S. Nr. 2/43, 19 May 1943, - T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587102.

199. Shandruk, op. cit., p.p. 261-2; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 173

200. Document reproduced in K.G. Kläitmann, Die Waffen S.S. (Osnabrück, 1965), p.p. 471-2.

In the summer of 1944 there was a redesignation of the formations of the Waffen S.S. in accordance with the three categories. Up to that time the S.S. formations predominantly composed of personnel from outside the Reich, namely "Prinz Eugen", "Nordland", the Bosnian and Galician Divisions and the Baltic Brigades, included "Freiwilligen" - in their titles - even though in many cases it was already a misnomer.⁽²⁰¹⁾ This prefix was retained by the Volksdeutsche Division, "Prinz Eugen", and the Germanic Division, "Nordland". In time it was applied to the later S.S. Divisions to be formed mainly from racial Germans - the 18th, 22nd and 31st - or from Germanic personnel - the Dutch 23rd and 34th and the Belgian 27th and 28th. For Slav and Baltic formations the prefix "Waffen" - replaced "Freiwilligen" -. This was applied to the later Balkan S.S. Divisions - the 21st, 23rd ("Kama") and 24th - the Baltic 15th, 19th and 20th Divisions, the two Magyar S.S. Divisions, the Ukrainian Division, the two Russian S.S. Divisions, the Italian and French S.S. Divisions and the S.S. Regiments of Roumanians and Bulgars.⁽²⁰²⁾

The Western European volunteers who belonged to the Germanic Legions bore "Legions -" instead of the customary "S.S." as a prefix to their rank designations,⁽²⁰³⁾ because they had not passed the racial and physical examinations for entry into the S.S. proper.

- 201. Because of the pressure applied by the Volksgruppen or by the Germanic National-Socialist parties and because of the conscription measures applied in the Ostland.
- 202. Klietmann, op. cit., p.p. 471-2; Verordnungsblatt der Waffen S.S. Nr. 16, 15 August 1944, Z. 476. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 12th, which were predominantly German, and the part-Germanic 5th Division had no prefix. On the other hand, the 36th, presumably because of the moral character of its ex-convict members and its proportion of foreigners, bore the "Waffen -" prefix.
- 203. e.g. Legionssturmmann, Legionsobersturmführer - R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. 309/41, 6 November 1941, Para. 13; Bartetzko, op. cit., p. 57.

This principle was observed after the dissolution of the Legions when the prefix "Waffen -" was applied not only to the non-Nordic S.S. Divisions but also to their non-Nordic members' rank designations.⁽²⁰⁴⁾ The prefix "Freiwilligen -", on the other hand, was not, officially, used as part of the rank-designations of S.S. men. This meant that the inclusion of the term "Waffen -" before an S.S. rank designation differentiated those who were only considered physically fit for military service from those who might qualify racially and physically to belong to the S.S. proper.

An outward and visible sign of the discrimination between members of the Armed S.S. was the restriction put upon the wearing of the Sigrunen. Although there were violations of the rule, these runes were limited to the collar patches of the predominantly German S.S. divisions⁽²⁰⁵⁾ while "full" members of the S.S. serving with formations which were not allowed to bear this collar device wore the runes on the left breast.⁽²⁰⁶⁾

In keeping with the differentiation between the races within the Armed S.S., branches of the ordinary or political S.S. were established in annexed territories⁽²⁰⁷⁾ and in Germanic areas,⁽²⁰⁸⁾ not merely to assist in recruiting for the Waffen S.S. but because their populations contained many who were suitable to belong to the S.S. as a whole.

204. e.g. Waffen-Oberscharführer, Waffen-Standartenführer - Kletmann, op. cit., p. 494.

205. Der Reichsführer S.S., 15 July 1943, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, - T175, Roll 174, Frame 2709827.

206. Ibid., Para. 4.

207. e.g. S.S. Oberabschnitte "Weichsel" and "Warthe", in Western Poland.

208. H. P. Taylor, Uniforms of the S.S., II, Germanische S.S., 1940-1945 (London, 1969), passim.

On the other hand, no unit of the Allgemeine S.S. was set up in the Baltic states, Galicia, Bosnia or Italy,⁽²⁰⁹⁾ because the populations of those lands, with few exceptions, did not qualify for membership of Himmler's Germanic order.⁽²¹⁰⁾

Had the war ended in a German victory, the "Waffen" personnel would presumably have been discharged and their association with the S.S. terminated, with the possible exception of a few individuals who might have been deemed "Germanisable". All other members of the Armed S.S. who were not already members of the political S.S. would probably have been subjected to racial and physical examination to ascertain whether they were to become "full" members. From those who were admitted to the Allgemeine S.S. would have been drawn the members of the state police force of the Greater German Reich,⁽²¹¹⁾ which Hitler required, and the guardians of Germany's frontier in the Urals.

209. The Ukraine and "Ostland" both became Oberabschnitte for administrative purposes. The Generalgouvernement became S.S. Oberabschnitt "Ost" but had only one Sturmbann, to cater for Allgemeine S.S. men serving in the German administration.

210. Members of the Volksdeutsche minorities in these countries could be "resettled" in the "Old" Reich or in annexed territories, - Koehl, op. cit., passim.

211. Leaflet G. 42, Hitler's Licence for the S.S., part of D 665/GB 280, N.C.A., VII, 170-2.

Hitler's "Grande Armée"

Hitler expected the campaign against the U.S.S.R. to be a short one,¹ like those which had preceded it; and he considered the German forces earmarked for the operation to be sufficient to destroy the Red Army.² Nevertheless, Amt Ausland Abwehr enlisted the aid of Ukrainian nationalists, who were formed into the units of "Nachtigall" and "Roland",³ and of White Ruthenian activists⁴ to facilitate the entry of German troops into the territories concerned. These non-Germans did not substantially increase the forces at the German disposal, since only a few hundred men were involved. But they knew the land and its dialects; and they possessed a propaganda value - the members of "Roland" were even dressed in the uniforms of the former Galician Army.⁵

1. Döllin, op. cit., pp. 19, 62.

Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 19.

2. The German Army had no reserves to throw into the campaign - Döllin, op. cit., p. 19. Hitler even envisaged a reduction in the number of infantry divisions as early as July 1941 - Warlimont, op. cit., p. 180.

3. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 73-4,
Döllin, op. cit., p. 116.

4. Ibid., p. 213.

5. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 74.

When news of the attack upon the Soviet Union reached other parts of Europe, German diplomatic agencies received offers of assistance from individuals resident in the puppet state of Croatia⁶ in neutral Spain⁷ and Portugal⁸ and in France⁹ and other occupied countries. Volunteers of Germanic blood could join the armed S.S. and Clausen in Denmark¹⁰ and van Rappard in the Netherlands¹¹ encouraged their fellow-countrymen to do this. Norwegians¹² and Swedes¹³ were willing to enlist in the Finnish forces rather than the German. The German government decided to accept offers of assistance and to establish closed contingents of foreign nationals. A Spanish formation was established on 25 June¹⁴ and almost simultaneously Danish¹⁵ and Norwegian¹⁶ units were called into existence. On 29 June 1941 the S.S. Führungshauptamt announced the establishment of national legions.¹⁷

- 6. Völkischer Beobachter, 24 June 1941.
- 7. New York Times, 24 June 1941.
- 8. State Secretary Weiszäcker, Pol. I M Nr. 4822, July 1941, in F.O. Series 4641 H, Frames 209265-6.
- 9. O. Abetz, Telegramm Nr. 1862, 23 June 1941 - F.O. Series 386, Frame 21115.
- 10. Appeal by Frits Clausen, Partifører for Danmarks Nationalsocialistisk Arbejderparti, 23 June 1941, - T 175, Roll 67, Frame 2583354.
- 11. Pester Lloyd, 6 July 1941.
- 12. Ibid., 28 June 1941.
- 13. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 July 1941.
- 14. E. O'Ballance, 'The Spanish Blue Division,' R.U.S.I. Journal, Vol. CIX, No. 635, (August 1964) p. 240.
- 15. 28 June 1941 - M. Domarus, Hitler Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945, Bd. II, 1939-1945. (Wurzburg, 1963), p. 1740, Ronthe-Fink, Telegram Nr. 839, 29 June 1941.
- 16. 29 June 1941 - Bartotzko, op. cit., p. 68.
- 17. Stein, op. cit., p. 152; Aktennotiz, 29 June 1941 - NO 1087 - T 175, Roll 106, Frames 2629090-1.

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In order to settle the details relating to the new units the German Foreign Office convened a meeting of interested parties on 30 June 1941.¹⁸ At this meeting it was determined that non-German volunteers, because of international law, were to fight in German uniform but with national badges.¹⁹ They were to receive the same pay and allowances as German servicemen;²⁰ those with previous military experience were to hold a rank equivalent to their former one.²¹ It was not envisaged that the volunteers should receive German citizenship,²² as was the case in the Armed S.S. That body was already enrolling Germanic recruits for two years, the duration of the war or for an agreed period; the Wehrmacht had not yet decided the length of the engagement of its foreign candidates.²³

18. Aus.w.Amt, Pol. I M 4796, 2 July 1941 - N G 4652, in F.O. Series 4641 II, Frames 209270-6. Apart from the Auswärtiges Amt, Abteilung Ausland of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the Führungs Hauptamt of the S.S., the German Plenipotentiary in Copenhagen and the ~~E~~ External Political Department of the German National-Socialist Party were represented.

19. Ibid., p. 1 - Frame 209270.

20. Ibid., p. 2 - Frame 209271.

21. Ibid., p. 3 - Frame 209272.

22. Ibid., p. 2 - Frame 209271.

23. Ibid., p. 2 - Frame 209271.

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The meeting of 30 June 1941 considered how volunteers of the various nationalities were to be organized. It was laid down that volunteers were only to serve in complete units²⁴ some of which were already in existence at that time. The Armed S.S. had assumed responsibility for the volunteers from Germanic countries and had set up a Freikorps in Denmark separate from Regiment "Nordland," a Freiwilligenverband in Norway,²⁵ together with separate Freiwilligenkorps for the Netherlands and the Flemish parts of Belgium - these last were independent of Regiment "Westland,"²⁶ The Wehrmacht was responsible for the large volunteer formation that was being created by the Spanish armed forces and the Falange Spaniards were to serve in all three branches of the German forces²⁷ but there was to be no separate Falangist formation.²⁸ A Croat volunteer formation was to be established under the auspices of the Wehrmacht, whose High Command wanted Croats to serve in all three branches.²⁹

24. Ibid., p. 1 - Frame E 209270.

25. Ibid., p. 3 - Frame E 209272.

26. Ibid., p. 4 - Frame E 209273.

27. Ibid., p. 5 - 6 Frames E 209274-5 No Spanish naval unit was formed.

28. Separate formations drawn from the Spanish Army and Falange were, in fact, considered. Ausw. Amt, Pol. I M 4325, 7 July 1941, F.O. Series 4641 II, Frames E 209267-8.

29. Ausw. Amt Pol. I M 4796, 2 July 1941, p. 5-F.O. Series 4641 II, Frame E 209274.

The delegates considered that few volunteers could be expected from other European countries. Although Finns were serving in Regiment "Nordland", other volunteers from Finland could hardly be expected because she was herself a belligerent nation.³⁰ It was anticipated that Swedes would volunteer mainly for the Finnish armed services, but if enough opted for German service a Swedish volunteer corps could be created under the auspices of the S.S. If the Finnish military authorities were unable to cope with the training and equipping of Swedish volunteers they could be directed to German reception centres.³¹ Swiss volunteers were to be accepted but the delegates felt that there was no question of an approach to the Swiss government nor of an appeal for Swiss recruits. Consequently, large numbers of Swiss volunteers were not expected and the question of whether the Wehrmacht or the Waffen S.S. should receive them was not decided.³² It was also expected that there would be few volunteers from Portugal, but that if enough presented themselves it might be possible to associate them with the Spanish volunteer formation.³³

30. Ibid., p. 3 - Frame 209272.

31. Ibid., p. 4 - Frame 209273. It was also foreseen that some Danes would prefer to serve in the Finnish Army. This was not to be prevented although efforts were to be made to ensure that most would serve in the German armed forces - Ibid., p. 5 - Frame E 209272.

32. Ibid., p. 5 - Frame 209274. Some Swiss citizens joined the Armed S.S.

33. Ibid., p. 6 - Frame 209275. No Portuguese legion was formed.

The conference of 30 June 1941 reached no decision about whether Walloons and Frenchmen were to be accepted by the German forces,³⁴ but in other cases they opposed enlistment. In spite of the desire of some inhabitants of the Protectorate to take part in the war, no Czechs were to be accepted.³⁵ Russian emigrants, both All-Russian and national-separatist had expressed a willingness to serve with the Germans,³⁶ but they were not to be accepted, although they were to be treated in a courteous fashion. Only in special cases from time to time could Russian émigrés be employed, since there were political reasons against a German approach to these circles. The ostensible reason for the German refusal was the risk that "White" Russians ran if they were captured by the Red Army.³⁷ Inhabitants of the newly occupied Baltic areas were to be dealt with by the local German military commander, while Balts who were in Germany or who presented themselves at German offices in other countries were to be dealt with in a dilatory fashion.³⁸

- 34. Ibid., p. 5 - Frame 209274. The report in Muhlhauser Tagblatt, 28 June 1941, that Doriot was to form a French Battalion was premature.
- 35. Ausw.Amt, Pol. I M 4796, 2 July 1941, p. 5, F.O. Series 4641 II, Frame 209274. An offer of Czech troops by President Hacha was refused by the German government - Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des S.D., IV A1 - B, Nr. 1 B/41, Ereignissmeldung U.d. S.S.R. Nr. 13, 5 July 1941 - No 4532, Case XII, Dec. Bk. 9 L; D. Brandes, Die Tschechen unter deutschen Protektorat, Teil 1 (Munich and Vienna, 1969), p.148.
- 36. Telegramm Nr. 1862, 23 June 1941 - F.O. Series 386, Frame 211115; Telegramm Nr. 607, 5 July 1941 - F.O. Series 386, Frames 211179-80, makes the point that if émigrés were used, the Soviet government could make propaganda that Russia was threatened by a return to Czarist feudalism.
- 37. Ausw.Amt. Pol. I M 4796, 2 July 1941, p. 6 - F.O. Series 4641 II, Frame 209275. Russian émigrés in fact served as officers in the French Legion.
- 38. Ibid., p. 7 - Frame 209276.

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The employment of émigrés and Balts was forbidden³⁹ because they would have expected German endorsement of their plans for "White" or separatist régimes on conquered Soviet territory. Moreover the Soviet government could have made propaganda that the Germans were seeking to re-impose the Czarist system. The danger of using separatists was clearly demonstrated when the Ukrainian activists in Battalion "Nachtigall" proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine only a few days after the opening of the campaign and had to be suppressed by force.⁴⁰

39. O.K.W./W.F.St./Abt. 2 (IV/Qu)Nr. 01502/41, 26 July 1941; idem, idem., (IV/Verw) Nr.01502/41, II.Ang. 11 August 1941; O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Gen.Qu.,Az., Abt.Kr.Verw. (Qu, 5P) Nr. II/5193/41, 18 August 1941 - all in BAMA - Wol-6/577; Chef der Sipo und des S.D. IV D3-3B/41, 18 June 1941 - 1573 P S. Émigrés, nevertheless, found their way into occupied territory and O.K.W. was obliged to repeat that they were only to be used as interpreters and then only if they had German nationality and provided the Ostministerium agreed - O.K.W., Nr. 002152/42. W F St./Qu (II) 27 June 1942 - BAMA - III W 100; Dallin, op. cit., p. 111; W. Strik-Strikfeldt, Against Hitler and Stalin (London, 1970), p. 20.
40. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 77-83; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 119-20.

The non-German legions raised in 1941 were small forces intended only for a short campaign. The Spaniards were unique in providing a formation as large as a complete infantry division - the 250th or "Blue" Division.⁴¹ Croatia provided a reinforced regiment, the 369th,⁴² air units⁴³ and a naval detachment.⁴⁴ The French Legion also consisted of a reinforced regiment - the 638th-but this could have been expanded had the German authorities not feared a revival of French military power and deliberately curtailed the numbers of Frenchmen who were accepted into the German Army by demanding very high standards of physical fitness.⁴⁵

41. E. Infantes, Die Blaue Division (Leoni am Starhemberger See, 1958) passim; E. O'Ballance, op. cit., passim. There were also Spanish air units.
42. R. Kiszling, Die Kroaten (Grätz-Köln, 1956) p. 180; St. Martin, 'Die Kroatischen Legion', Zeitschrift für Heeres- und Uniformkunde, XVII. Jg. (1953), p. 74.
43. R. Kiszling, op. cit., p. 180; Pester Lloyd, 8 July 1941; Frankfurter Zeitung, 13 July 1941. Later, however, three German-Croat legionary divisions were raised, - 369, 373, 392.
44. R. Kiszling, op. cit., p. 180; Völkischer Beobachter, 24 July 1941.
45. Y. Barjaud, 'La Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme', Feldgrau, XIII. Jg., Heft 5/6 (1965), pp. 129-34.

To the S.S., the Germanic legions represented a considerable accession of strength, even though their members did not, strictly-speaking, become members of the S.S. Nevertheless only the Dutch Legion was of regimental strength,⁴⁶ while Denmark,⁴⁷ Norway⁴⁸ and Flanders⁴⁹ could only maintain battalions at the front. The S.S. could have had a larger share of Western European manpower, had it not relinquished the Walloon Battalion it sponsored⁵⁰ to the German Army⁵¹ on the grounds that the Walloons were not Germanic and that to associate them with the S.S. would offend the Flemings.⁵²

46. Organisation Chart of Kommandostab R.F.S.S., - T 175, Roll 174, Frames 2709451. A second regiment was started but its personnel were used to replace the casualties of the first one.
47. Organisation Chart of Freikorps Danmark, circa 8 May 1942, - T 175, Roll 174, Frame 2709443.
48. Organisation Chart of Freiwilligen Legion Norwegen in T 175, Roll 174, Frame 2709455. The Regimental Headquarters and cyclist unit shown in T 175, Roll 174, Frame 2709451 were short-lived.
49. Organisation Chart of Kommandostab R.F.S.S. in T 175, Roll 174, Frame 2709451.
50. Der Chef des S.S.H.A., Trb. Nr. 1240/42, 9 April 1942 - RVO - BDC - II 225 - 2541-4 says that the Walloon Legion "von Uns aufgestellt wurde"; R.F.S.S., S.S.H.A., Erg.Amt der Waffen S.S., II 2a Az. 9a/G-Sa, 4 August 1941, includes Walloons among the Volksgermanen.
51. O.K.H., Gen.St.d.H., Org. Abt. Nr. 2415, 7 August 1941. Organisation Chart of Wallonisches Infanteriebataillon 373 - T 175, Roll 174, Frame 2709435.
52. Der R.F.S.S., Nr. 35/64/43, 24 May 1943 - BA - NS 19 neu 27; Knoebel, op. cit., pp. 326, 333.

Small as they were in comparison with the two hundred divisions of the German Army, the legions had a considerable propaganda value. Finland, Italy, Roumania, Hungary and Slovakia were allied with Germany; and the adhesion of Western Europeans and Croats to the Axis cause broadened its basis and gave Germany's act of aggression the semblance of a European struggle against Bolshevism.⁵³ By raising legions in occupied territories, German authorities could entertain the hope that conquered peoples would align themselves alongside their masters, while the existence of Germanic legions with the S.S. encouraged its leaders to hope that they would help to bring about a Greater Germanic Reich.

53. I. Ehrenburg, Russia at War (Melbourne, 1944), p. 159 compares the German attack with Napoleon's of 1812, when the Russian people talked of the "invasion by twelve languages."

The Manpower Crisis

German failure to destroy the Red Army in the summer of 1941 prolonged the campaign and made greater demands upon German manpower than had been anticipated. Germany's eastward advance was achieved at great cost - by the end of November her forces had suffered some 740,000 casualties for whom there were only 400,000 replacements.⁵⁴ Reducing the manpower in the armies' rear areas did not produce sufficient men to make good the deficiency, with the result that the front-line infantry were deprived of a quarter of their strength before the hard winter battles began.⁵⁵ From that time onwards the German armed forces were obliged to employ makeshift measures to create new formations in the Reich, and also to meet the immediate needs of the units at the front.⁵⁶ Had the German time-table run smoothly, the foreign contingents would probably have arrived too late to have seen any serious action. Instead, they provided a welcome reinforcement for German ground formations, even though their numbers were entirely inadequate in the face of German needs.

54. B. Müller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 1933-1945, Bd. III (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), p. 19; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 80-1.
 55. Müller-Hillebrand, op. cit., III, p. 20.
 56. Ibid., p. 22.

Joseph Stalin called upon the population of the U.S.S.R. to evacuate or destroy material, such as locomotives, which could be used by the invaders.⁵⁷ This aggravated the difficulty of supplying the German forces, which increased with the depth of their advance. Roads became impassable through mud and snow, while the railways of the occupied areas had to be converted to the Western European gauge. These problems not merely delayed the arrival of fuel, food, ammunition and winter clothing but also of the replacement personnel available in Germany.

Stalin also incited the inhabitants of areas occupied by the invaders to wage guerrilla warfare against them.⁵⁸ This created a need for large numbers of German troops to fight the bands of partisans which came into being, to guard vulnerable points against sabotage and to protect the exposed roads and railway lines upon which the German Army depended.⁵⁹

57. Radio Broadcast - 3 July 1941 reproduced in J.V. Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (London, 1943), pp. 5-9; and in J.V. Stalin, War Speeches and Orders of the Day (London, 1946), pp. 7-12.

58. Ibid.; Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 130-42.

59. G. Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin (Cambridge, Mass, 1952), p. 45; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 74-5; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 147.

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German Plans for the East.

Adolf Hitler had not anticipated that any of the population of the U.S.S.R. would be friendly towards the invaders and made no plans for the use of any of its peoples.⁶⁰ On the contrary, he prohibited weapons to non-Germans, both the émigrés many of whom had been associated with Germany between the wars, and the Soviet citizens. As early as 16 July 1941 Hitler had announced "Only the German may bear arms - not the Slav, not the Czech, not the Ukrainian, not the Cossack".⁶¹ Two months later, in discussing how Communist insurrection might be suppressed, Hitler had stated that "Forces formed from the local inhabitants will generally fail to accomplish such acts of violence" and were to receive no further support because this endangered German troops.⁶² German headquarters echoed Hitler's orders by informing their subordinate units that neither the population in general nor para-military associations were to be permitted to take up arms.⁶³ As a result of this policy a number of Baltic nationalist groups were disarmed and disbanded. Events were to force the German ground forces to ignore Hitler's injunctions.

60. Dallin, op. cit., p. 56; Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 20.

61. Aktenvermerk, Bo/Fil, 16 July 1941 - L 221, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 A and T.M.W.C., XXXVIII, 88 and N.C.A. VII, 1086-93.

62. Chef O.K.W./W.F.St./Abt. L(IV/Ou.) Nr. 002060/41, 16 September 1941 - SEC 24-8 / C 148, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 A, para. 3 d.

63. Punzergruppe 3. Ic. Tätigkeitsbericht Nr. 2, January to July 1941 - NOKW 2672, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 A.

To some extent the Führer was motivated by his expectation that the Eastern campaign would only last six weeks - or, at the longest, until the winter - after which operations against Britain were to be resumed.⁶⁴ In view of this, it would not have been worthwhile to enlist any of the Soviet population, nor to have taken the necessary measures to organise, arm, and equip them. Above all, Hitler had no intention of making any promises to the people of the Soviet Union or to émigré groups to enlist their support.⁶⁵ It was not simply that he was reluctant to make political commitments in advance of realisation,⁶⁶ he intended to annex the western parts of the U.S.S.R. and to expel the majority of its inhabitants.⁶⁷ Most of them were to be moved eastwards leaving only sufficient people to act as serfs for incoming German settlers.⁶⁸ Furthermore, national-socialist racial theorists branded the population of the U.S.S.R. as "Untermensch",⁶⁹ on a par with the Jews. In the eyes of Hitler, Bormann and many other German National-Socialists, their enemy was not solely the government of the U.S.S.R. but also its peoples.⁷⁰ Those who saw the need to enlist Soviet citizens, and who wished to conduct political warfare against the Red Army advocated a departure from the official German policy, but differed in the courses they suggested.⁷¹

64. Hitler, Weisung 32, 11 June 1941, in Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp. 78-82.
 65. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 45-6.
 66. Hirszowicz, op. cit., p. 218.
 67. Hitler, Mein Kampf, Chapter 14; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 7-9; Strik-Strikfeldt, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
 68. Ibid., p. 40.
 69. S.S. Hauptamt, Schulungsamt, Der Untermensch (Berlin, 1942)- NO 1805
 70. Dallin, op. cit., p. 56.
 71. Ibid., p. 56; Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 287; Strik-Strikfeldt, op. cit., p. 39.

German Ministries - the Ostministerium.

Hitler appointed Alfred Rosenberg, the National-Socialist theoretician, to be Minister for the Occupied Eastern Areas, with responsibility for all the captured Soviet territories not retained by the military authorities.

Rosenberg needed the goodwill of those whom he had to govern, and this caused him to disagree with the official German policy towards the Soviet population.

He favoured the dismemberment of the Soviet Union into a Muscovite state which was to be girdled by separate Finnish, Baltic, Ukrainian and Caucasian states.

In pursuance of this objective, his Ostministerium collected a number of expatriates from German-occupied Europe who later formed national committees for the Caucasian and Moslem peoples of the U.S.S.R. These exiles and their German sponsors wanted the non-Russians of the U.S.S.R. to be accepted as allies by the Germans in a war against the Soviet Government. The national-separatists were also concerned for the welfare of prisoners-of-war of non-Russian race and of the civil population of those non-Russian areas that were

briefly in German hands.⁷² Rosenberg's staff became involved in extricating minority members from prison camps and arming them, so that they could provide nuclei for the armies of the future ^{buffer-states.} ~~immigrants~~ and, although less sympathetic ^{Rosenberg himself was considerably influenced by Georgian} towards ~~Armenians~~, he regarded an independent ~~Armenia~~ as an important barrier against the creation of a Pan-Turanic state, which had no place in his plans for the partition of the U.S.S.R.⁷³

72. Fischer, op. cit., p. 47; Dallin, op. cit., p. 49; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 104; Reitlinger, op. cit., pp. 288, 291; Strik-Strikfeldt, op. cit., p. 127.

73. Rosenberg, Vermerk über eine Unterredung beim Führer im Führerhauptquartier, 8 May 1942, - 1520 P S/ G B 156, T.M.W.C., XXVII, 288; Dallin, op. cit., p. 540 (footnote).

Rosenberg was hampered by territorial Commissioners who were nominally subordinate to him, but who, in practice, tended to disregard him. The worst culprit was the Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, Erich Koch, who pursued a repressive policy towards the native population. Koch governed a province that was intended to become the granary of Germany, and to which the German government had in consequence no intention of granting autonomy.⁷⁴ He resisted the establishment of a Ukrainian⁷⁵ military formation, and as a result of his measures Ukrainian armed police units became unreliable and in some cases joined the Soviet or Nationalist partisans.⁷⁶ It was he who was instrumental in ending the practice of releasing Ukrainian prisoners-of-war to their homes, because he feared that they would take to the woods,⁷⁷ and it was largely due to his opposition that the establishment of a Ukrainian national committee was delayed until March 1945.⁷⁸

74. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 114; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 124-33.
 75. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 597-8.
 76. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 148
 77. Dallin, op. cit., p. 414; O.K.W., Nr. 00378/42, 22 September 1942 - NOKW 019.
 78. After German troops had been expelled from the Ukraine.

Rosenberg and his supporters had a limited success although their policy was never given Hitler's approval. They managed to arrange for the separation of racial German, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Latvian, Estonian, Roumanian, Lithuanian, Finnish, Polish and Georgian prisoners-of-war from those of other races taken from the Red Army. They also arranged for the first eight categories to be sent to their homes in German-occupied territory.⁷⁹ This practice was stopped in September 1942, to conserve a valuable pool of labour and to deprive the partisans of a potential source of intelligence and trained reinforcements.⁸⁰ Although Russian, Turkic and Caucasian prisoners were not segregated, commissions visited the camps and selected many of them for indigenous police and combat units⁸¹ and labour companies,⁸² as well as for the non-Slav legions.⁸³

79. Anordnung für die Behandlung sowj. Kr.Gef./Merkblatt für die Bewachung sowj. Kr.Gef., Anlage Tgb. Nr. 3058/41, 8 September 1941, part of 1519 P S, T.M.W.C., XXVII, pp. 275-83; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 412-13.

80. O.K.W., Nr. 00378/42, 22 September 1942, - NOKW 019 - T 175, Roll 105, Frame 2627421.

Recruiting for the Legions continued. Dallin, op. cit., p. 414.

81. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 93; Sonderstab Hehlfeld raised Regiment Mitte in this way.

82. By Aufstellungsstüb von Pawel-Rammingen.

83. For example by the visits of Prince Veli Kayum Khan and Mustafa Chokai in search of Turkestanis; Dallin, op. cit., p. 421.

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During its brief occupation of the North Caucasus, the German Army kept control of the region instead of relinquishing it to Rosenberg's Commissioner for the area. But it did sponsor local self-government and encouraged the raising of indigenous armed units. Since the German government had not formulated plans for the North Caucasus, these measures of the Army encountered little opposition from the adherents of official policy.⁸⁴

The Auswärtiges Amt.

Under Joachim Ribbentrop the German Foreign Office played an important part in raising Finnish, Arab, Indian, Irish and later British volunteers for the German ground forces. Having a number of experts at its disposal with first-hand knowledge of the languages and peoples of the U.S.S.R., it could have helped to levy Soviet citizens for the German forces. Ribbentrop had a particular interest in certain southern regions of the U.S.S.R., because he wished to retain the friendship and, if possible, secure the alliance of Turkey where there was considerable concern for the Turko-Tartar population.⁸⁵ In October 1941, two Turkish generals visiting Germany suggested the creation of a Turk-Tartar Legion and may thereby have influenced the decision to permit commissions to select Moslem prisoners-of-war for the German forces.⁸⁶

84. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 238-47.

85. Dallin, op. cit., p. 234; Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 291.

86. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 234, 421.

Ribbentrop and his Auswärtiges Amt favoured the granting of independence to the Moslem areas of the U.S.S.R.,⁸⁷ while a former ambassador to Moscow, Werner von Schulenberg, advocated the conversion of the U.S.S.R. into a federation of separate states.⁸⁸ It might be supposed that the ministries of Ribbentrop and Rosenberg could have found common ground; but there was jealousy between the two men which resulted in Rosenberg's persuading Hitler to exclude the German Foreign Office from having any competence in the eastern theatre of operations.⁸⁹ The German exports whom Ribbentrop had gathered into his Russland Gremium were dispersed, together with some forty émigré separatists who had been collected together in April 1942 at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin.⁹⁰

Economic Authorities.

German Ostpolitik was also influenced by the economic agencies. Hermann Goering, in his capacity of Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, and Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments were not merely concerned to extract commodities such as oil and wheat,⁹¹ they also needed manpower. The occupied areas and the prisoner-of-war camps represented a valuable source of the labour which was badly needed in Germany.⁹² After the attack upon the U.S.S.R. began, German industry concentrated on producing U-Boats and other weapons which would be needed when Germany renewed her measures against Britain.⁹³ But when the campaign in the East ran into increasing difficulties, German factories were called upon to turn out supplies on an unforeseen scale, and they made unprecedented demands upon manpower.⁹⁴

- 87. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 291.
- 88. Ibid., p. 291; Dallin, op. cit., p. 134; Strik-Strikfeldt, op. cit., p. 57.
- 89. Rosenberg, Vermerk über eine Unterredung beim Führer in Führerhauptquartier, 8 May 1942, - 1520 P S/G B 156, T.M.W.C., XXVII, pp. 288-90; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 40-2, pp. 135-7; Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 292.
- 90. Ibid., pp. 291-2; Dallin, op. cit., p. 136.
- 91. Dallin, op. cit., p. 38 and Chapters XV to XVIII.
- 92. Ibid., pp. 411-2.
- 93. Hitler, Weisung Nr. 32, 11 June 1941, in Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.78-82.
- 94. Dallin, op. cit., p. 432.

The requirements of the German economy influenced the employment of non-Germans in a number of ways. A distribution of the lands of the state and collective farms among the peasantry might have won the Germans local support; but in order to obtain agricultural produce with the minimum of inconvenience, and to make the eventual introduction of German colonists simpler, few grants of land were made.⁹⁵ German appropriations and the deportation of Soviet citizens to work in the Reich created massive support for the partisans.⁹⁶ This, in turn, obliged the Germans to provide more security troops, part of whose duties was guarding reluctant workers. The plight of those workers shook the loyalty of many of the units raised in the East; and this provoked suggestions that they too might be better employed as labourers.⁹⁷

The Propagandaministerium

Another German official body with an interest in German Ostpolitik was the Ministry for Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels initially supported the official Untermensch theory, but came to realise the wisdom of promising concessions to the peoples of the U.S.S.R., so as to undermine their loyalty.⁹⁸ In order to implement this policy Dr. Taubert of the Eastern Department of the Propagandaministerium gathered a select group of Soviet prisoners-of-war in a building in the Viktoriastrasse, Berlin.⁹⁹ These men were later relinquished to the Propaganda Department of the Wehrmacht.¹⁰⁰

95. Ibid., pp. 320-39; Strik-Strikfeldt, op. cit., p. 40; Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 119-21.

96. Ibid., pp. 122-5, 141; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 430, 440-1.

97. Ibid., p. 582.

98. Ibid., pp. 42-3, 501-2.

99. Reitlinger, op. cit., pp. 315-6.

100. Dallin, op. cit., p. 509; S. Steenberg, Vlasov (New York, 1970), p. 41.

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When the German ground forces moved into the U.S.S.R. they became aware of three factors. In the first place, Blitzkrieg methods resulted in complete Red Army formations surrendering to the invaders on a scale that the Germans had not anticipated.¹⁰¹ Secondly, they were surprised when they were welcomed by villagers in the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Cossack settlements and the North Caucasus.¹⁰² The greetings were in some cases sincere and cordial, particularly where the German troops were regarded as liberators. But elsewhere reception ceremonies were either regarded as normal courtesy or were performed to placate a powerful conqueror. The German refusal to grant autonomy to the Baltic states and the Ukraine later antagonised many of those who had received the invaders with enthusiasm. In any case, the circumstances were not comparable with the acclaim that the Germans had met when they entered the Volksdeutsche settlements of Poland, Croatia and North-Schleswig, where the population had been organised by local National-Socialist parties and had been bombarded with propaganda from Germany. A third factor was the willingness of Red Army prisoners to perform menial fatigues and even take up arms for their captors.¹⁰³ The Soviet Government regarded surrender as desertion,¹⁰⁴ while hunger and disease in the Stalags and Dulags made service with German units an attractive alternative. At the same time the vast size and ethnic diversity of the Red Army made it uncongenial to many, especially those from minorities, and a friendly first encounter with German troops could have a profound effect upon them. These were all factors that the German invaders had not anticipated on such a scale.

101. Ibid., p. 69; Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 21; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 118; R. Gehlen, The Gehlen Memoirs (London, 1972) p. 95.
102. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 64-5; Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 21.
103. Ibid., p. 21; P. Kleist, European Tragedy (London, 1965) p. 101.
104. Order of the Day Number 55, in J.V. Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War, p. 23 and Idem., War Speeches and Orders of the Day, p. 26; Strik-Strikfeldt, op. cit., p. 34.

On the other hand, the Germans had been unduly optimistic in their forecasts of the impact of invasion on the Soviet government. Hitler told Jodl, "We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will collapse."¹⁰⁵ This belief caused German observers to misinterpret the factors just noted, and to believe that it was possible to bring down the Soviet government by using its subjects against it. Stalin's son was probably correct when he told his captors that his father feared internal revolution;¹⁰⁶ but German observations gave little reason for hope that a revolution was imminent. At the same time Stalin's declaration of a patriotic war¹⁰⁷ forestalled any German propaganda claim of a Russian "liberation movement." When on 23 rd February 1942 Stalin declared that the Soviet Union was not at war with the German people but with fascism,¹⁰⁸ there was no appropriate riposte from the German government, because it not merely considered the campaign to be a crusade against Bolshevism, but regarded it as a struggle against the population of the U.S.S.R.

105. D. Littlejohn, The Patriotic Traitors (London, 1972), p. 292.

106. Strik-Strikfeldt, op. cit., p. 33; Gehlen, op. cit., p. 94.

107. Stalin, Order of the Day No. 55.

108. Ibid.

The Hilfswillige

The German divisions at the front soon swallowed up the replacement personnel in their Feldersatzbataillone and then found that the general shortage of manpower and the chaotic state of the railway system severely restricted the flow of reinforcements.¹⁰⁹ Prisoners-of-war, deserters from the Red Army and civilians resident in the occupied areas were engaged as interpreters, drivers, grooms, cooks and labourers in order to release German soldiers for the firing line.¹¹⁰ The 134th Division, part of the Central Army Group, probably began to enlist Soviet prisoners-of-war as early as July 1941,¹¹¹ while at the beginning of August the 217th Division, of the Northern Army Group, was using members of the Estonian Selbstschutz and Finns to fill its ranks.¹¹² On 16 November 1941, in the rear of the Southern Army Group, the 454th Security Division ordered the attachment of forty Hilfswachmannschaften to each of its four battalions of Landeschützen,¹¹³ thereby showing that the use of non-German Hilfswillige, or "Hiwis," was not confined to one formation and that they were permitted weapons at that early stage in the campaign.

109. Müller-Hillebrand, op. cit., III, p. 19.
 110. Fischer, op. cit., p. 46; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 167; Dallin, op. cit., p. 535; Strik-Strikfeldt, op. cit., p. 47; Gehlen, op. cit., p. 96.
 111. Dallin, op. cit., p. 537 (footnote): In 1942 a "russische Hetman-Bataillon" replaced the normal Feldersatzbataillon. The unit became Ostbataillon 134 - O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II), Nr. 5381/42, 8 November 1942, Anl.8. An Ost Arbeits Btl.134 was also approved - O.K.H./ Gen.St.d.H./ Org.Abt.Nr. 10841, 22 November 1942.
 112. 217. Inf.Div., Ic, 3 August 1941 - NOKW 1527, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 5A.
 113. Sicherungsdivision 454, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1, 15 May 1941 - 31 December 1941, - NOKW 2589, Case XII, Doc,Bk.9-I- entry for 17 November 1941.

In February,¹¹⁴ June¹¹⁵ and August 1942,¹¹⁶ Hitler endeavoured to limit the growing use of Soviet citizens. He accepted the existence of individuals serving in German units; and they were among the categories covered in the "Rotes Heft", the set of regulations drawn up in August 1942 to cover the employment of indigenous auxiliary forces in the East.¹¹⁷ In the following month the O.K.W. drew up a directive arranging for Hiwis to be employed in the supply services of the German Army.¹¹⁸ As a result, the General Staff immediately authorised the use of prisoners-of-war as drivers in transport columns and as craftsmen and labourers in construction and supply units.¹¹⁹

114. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt(II), Nr. 736/42, 10 February 1942; Dallin, op. cit., p. 541; J. Kramarz, Stauffenberg, The Life and Death of an Officer (London, 1969), p. 98.

115. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 541-2; Kramarz, op. cit., p. 98.

116. Hitler, Weisung 46 otherwise O.K.W./W.F.St./Op.Nr.002821/42, 18 August 1942 in T 175, Roll 140, Frames 2268246-50 and in Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp. 132-5 and PS 477; Armstrong, op. cit., P. 168.

117. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II)Nr. 8000/42, Verfügung über landeseigenen Hilfskräfte im Osten, August 1942, in DAMA-III/224; Kramarz, op. cit., p. 100; Steenberg, op. cit., p. 103.

118. O.K.W., Weisung, 12 September 1942 - Müller Hillebrund, op. cit., III, p. 78.

119. VII.Armeekorps, 18 September 1942 - NOKW 2745. refers to O.K.H., Gen.St.d.H., Org.Abt.(I), Nr. 4450/42.

On 17 October 1942, the commander of Jagdkommando 207 commended the employment of prisoners-of-war as ammunition carriers, drivers, drivers' mates, grooms, assistant cooks, mess orderlies, blacksmiths and craftsmen.¹²⁰ There were other German units who were satisfactorily employing indigenous helpers,¹²¹ and the practice became so widespread that in January 1943 an entire directive was devoted to the treatment of Hiwis.¹²² In the same month, the commander of the Replacement Army promulgated an order for employing fifty thousand Soviet prisoners-of-war in a fixed proportion of places in a variety of equipment parks, vehicle repair units and construction units, also as drivers, grooms, cobblers, tailors, saddlers and other craftsmen in schools and units situated in the Heimatkriegsgebiet.¹²³ Until this time the employment of Hiwis had been confined to the formations and units of the Ostheer, which simply used captives and members of the local population. After January 1943 units of the Ersatzheer, in the Reich itself, many miles from occupied Soviet territory, received Hiwis through the prisoner-of-war organisation, permitting them to release German troops for the front.

- 120. Hauptmann Pretzl, Führer des Jagdkommandos 207, Erfahrungsbericht, 15.8.42 - 10.10.42, 17 October 1942, - NOKW 2513, Case XII, Doc.Bk.9 E.
- 121. P. Kleist, op. cit., p. 101, p. 107; Fischer, op. cit., pp. 45-6; Dallin, op. cit., p. 537.
- 122. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt., Merkblatt für das Verhalten gegenüber Hilfswilligen, January 1943; Kramarz, op. cit., p. 104.
- 123. O.K.H./Chef. Heeres Rüstung und B.d.E./A.H.A.(IaII)93/43, 27 January 1943, in BAMA - H1/441.

Indigenous voluntary helpers were again included in a directive of April 1943 dealing with the employment of Eastern troops.¹²⁴ German casualties were heavy in a year that opened with the investment of Stalingrad and continued with the destruction of the Axis forces in Africa. These losses necessitated the restructuring of German infantry divisions. The 2nd October 1943 saw the birth of the Infanterie division (neuer Art) with a complement of 10,708 Germans and 2,005 Hiwis.¹²⁵ Nearly 16% of the places in these reorganised divisions were reserved for non-Germans, and from that time other combat divisions of the Army, the S.S. and the Luftwaffe made provision for the use of Hiwis.¹²⁶

124. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II) Nr.5000/43, 29 April 1943; J. Thorwald, Wenn Sie verderben wollen (Stuttgart, 1952), pp. 246-7; Dallin, op. cit., p. 542.

125. B. Müller-Hillebrand, op. cit., III p. 135.

126. For example the "Panzer-Division 44" was supposed to contain 714 Hiwis, - W. Keilig, Das Deutsche Heer, 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim, 1958 onwards) p. 103 / v/10.

The bodyguard of the Führer, the première division of the S.S., Leibstünd-⁹arte S.S."Adolf Hitler" included approximately 1,800 Hiwis in its Sollstärke - L.S.S.A.H./Ia. Tgl.Nr.398/43, 1 September 1943, 446/45, 1 October 1943, 560/43, 1 December 1943.

Anti-Partisan Units.

As early as 8 September 1941, the 454th Security Division had recruited Ukrainian Hilfspolizei¹²⁷, and transported them into Byelorussia within the month.¹²⁸ The Reichskommissar for that province, Gauleiter Kube, had been disturbed by this development,¹²⁹ but was mollified by the fact that they were disciplined and kept in Barracks.¹³⁰ By November 1941, the commander of the rear area of the German 16th Army was deploying an Estonian and a Latvian Kampf Abteilung. The Northern Army Group was destined to employ many Baltic Units to protect its rear and on occasion to fill gaps in the line,¹³¹ but its use of non-German units was not unique. For example, on 15 November 1941, the 9th Army, of the Central Army Group, raised Gruppe Tietjen from the inmates of its prison camps and used it against partisans.¹³² In the southern sector, the 11th Army and Einsatzkommando D of the S.D. in January 1942 were likewise recruiting Crimean Tartars for the same purpose.¹³³

127. 454. Sich.Div.Ia, Divisionsbefehl 59, 8 September 1941, Anlage 2, - NOKW 2628, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9-0.

128. III B, Report of a Discussion between Heydrich and Gauleiter Meyer, 4 October 1941, Para. V, in BA - NS 19/ neu 1734.

129. Ibid.

130. Abwehr II b, Heeresgruppe Sld, 28 October 1941, - BAMA WO 1 - 6/577 - p.8. para 3a.

131. Kortück. 584 (16. Armee), November 1941, - NOKW 2035, Case XII, Doc. Bk.9 D.

132. Ostbataillon 630, Stammtafel.

133. AOK 11/D.Qu., 6 January 1942, - NOKW 1277;

AOK 11.Ic/A.D., Tataren Ersatz, 9 January 1942 - NOKW 1311.

German formations entrusted with military security were, nevertheless, circumspect in their use of Soviet citizens. The Commander of the rear area of the Southern Army Group made it clear in August 1941 that Ukrainian militia were fundamentally to be employed in supplying information and in security duties rather than taking part in combat tasks. If in exceptional cases it was imperative that Ukrainian militia should take part in fighting, they were to be used under German leadership and armed according to directives laid down by the new area commander.¹³⁴ Security Division 454, a pioneer in the employment of Ukrainians, laid it down that the Hilfspolizei was not to exceed 2% of the population and that it was to be armed in places where there were no German troops only if it was absolutely imperative and then only if its reliability had been established.¹³⁵

134. Befh. rückw.H.Geb.Süd,Abt.Ia/Ic, Nr. 1337/41, 24 August 1941, NOKW 2595, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 90.

135. 454. Sich.Div.Abt.Ia, Divisionsbefehl Nr. 59, 8 September 1941, Anlage 2 NOKW 2628, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9-0.



Directly subordinate to the Reichsführer S.S. was a Command Staff devoted to mopping-up operations. This headquarters, on 25 August 1942, ordered every police regiment in the area threatened by "bandits" to establish a Jagdkommando, each of whose four Gruppen was to have a local inhabitant, experienced in fighting partisans and dressed in civilian clothes, to act as a scout.¹³⁶ It was but a short step from using individual Soviet citizens to combat partisans to grouping them into units. The same captain of Jagdkommando 207 who had endorsed the use of Hiwis also proposed the employment of Soviet citizens to fight guerillas. He suggested that indigenous Jagdkommandos should be led by German interpreters, possibly men from Upper Silesia or from the Sudetenland, whose knowledge of Polish or Czech would enable them to communicate with their Slav subordinates - or so it was hoped. The personnel were to receive the same rations as German soldiers, and were to wear German uniforms - with the exception of a few "anti-partisans" to act as scouts.¹³⁷

136. Kommandostab R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. Ia 607/42, 25 August 1942, T175, Roll 140, Frame 2667576.

137. Haftmann Pretzl, Führer des Jagdkommandos 207, Erfahrungsbericht 15.8.42 - 10.10.42, 17 October 1942, NOKW 2513, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 E.
The use of Sudeten Germans as leaders of Eastern units was, in fact, practiced - 'Erfahrungen eines Betreuungsoffiziers für Freiwilligen aus den Völkern der Sowjetunion in der deutschen Wehrmacht,'
Vielyölker Heere und Koalitionskrieger (Darmstadt, 1952), pp.35-6.

Prisoner-of-War Labour

Throughout the Second World War the manpower requirements of the German armed forces and industry needed to be carefully balanced. The vast number of prisoners taken on the Russian front presented a means of alleviating the problem. But it was considered undesirable to bring "Untermensch^{en}" into contact with the population of the Reich while the overloaded railway system would face the task of transporting thousands of men to and across Germany.¹³⁸ The initial solution was to retain Soviet prisoners-of-war in the eastern theatre-of-operations or in the Generalgouvernement, and to keep them under military control, but as early as the beginning of July 1941 it was arranged to employ supervised columns of Russian prisoners in the Reich.¹³⁹ A few days later a directive was issued permitting prisoners to be employed as labour companies at supply dumps and in the constructional work of the operational areas and of the Ukraine.¹⁴⁰ The following month an O.K.W. conference decided that it was possible to use Soviet prisoners in complete constructional units provided they were supervised. This decision probably inspired the order creating the Kriegsgefangenen Bau-und Arbeitsbataillon, originally numbered 88, on 25 August, to which a further thirty-seven were added on 1st October.¹⁴¹ Goering himself pointed out on the 7th November that the use of prisoners-of-war could relieve German construction battalions and make their manpower available for industry.¹⁴²

138. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 410-11

139. Rll. IVd. Vermerk über Besprechung bei Wl.Rll.Amt, 4 July 1941 - 1199 PS, Case XII, Doc.Bk.5A and T.M.W.C., XXVII, 63.

140. O.K.W./W.F.St./Abt.L(IV/G₄), Nr.01239/41, 8 July 1941 - BAMA.

141. Chef.H.Rllst.u.B.d.E., A.H.A.IaIII, Nr.20531/41, 25 August 1941; Idem, Nr. 23607/41, 1 October 1941. The units were numbered between 101 and 151.

142. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 410-11.

Despite initial hesitation, the German Army soon decided that it could safely employ prisoners within German factories. On 31 October 1941, Field-marshal Keitel, the head of O.K.W., authorised the use of Soviet prisoners-of-war in Germany's war industries.¹⁴³ The forecast of manpower needs for 1942 prompted Hitler to order the replacement of young workers by prisoners and Russian civilians.¹⁴⁴ This need to help Germany's industry was probably the reason for disbandment of thirty-three of the thirty-eight ^{prisoner-}prison-of-war labour battalions on 3 March 1942.¹⁴⁵ German industry became a competitor for Soviet manpower, thereby posing a threat to the continued existence of indigenous armed units. Indeed, when Hitler intended to disband the Eastern units in the summer of 1943 he considered sending their members to German coal-mines.¹⁴⁶

143. Chef, O.K.W./W.F.St./Abt.C. (II Org./IVQu), Nr. 02588/41, 31 October 1941
 E C 194, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 5 A; Dallin, op. cit., p. 411.

144. Der Führer und Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht, O.K.W./W.F.St./Abt.L (I Op), Nr. 442090/41, Weisung Nr. 39, 8 December 1941, - 469 P.S.,
 Case XII, Doc.Bk. 5 A.

145. Chef, H. Rüst.u.B.d.E., A.H.A. I 9 III, Nr. 23607/41, 3 March 1942.

146. Besprechung des Führers mit General Keitel und General Zeitzler, 8 June 1943,
 - 1384 P S and in BAMA - III W 100.

Construction Units

The use of Soviet citizens was extended in October 1941 when the German Army permitted the recruitment of non-Russian anti-communists into engineer and construction units in the occupied areas.¹⁴⁷ Units of these types received a large number of men who were not fit for combat units; and they proliferated to the point where they required a separate recruiting organisation of their own, apart from the Legions.¹⁴⁸ Ultimately they included Russians as well as other races. When combat units, like Volga Tartar Battalion 825 and Armenian Battalion 814 were thought to be unreliable, they were converted into construction units¹⁴⁹ rather than disbanded outright - which was clear evidence of German dependence on foreign military labour. Moreover, when Eastern combat units were moved westwards in large numbers the labour companies of German construction and supply units were not affected.

147 Chef O.K.W., W.F. St./Abt. L (II Org./IV Qu) Nr. 02588/41, 31 October 1941 - EC194.

148 i.e. Aufstellungstab von Pawel-Rammingen - O.K.W., K.T.B., II/2, p. 1080.

149 Wolgatat. Inf. Btl. 825 became 1. and 2. Wolgatat. Bau-Kompanien 825 - OKH/ Gen. St. dH/Org Abt 16620, 13 March, 1943. Amen. Inf. Btl. 814 was disbanded and its remnants used to form Amen. Baupioniorkompanie 422 - O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./ Org. Abt. (II), Nr. 3741/44, 19 September 1944.

Legions of Soviet Minorities

The first front-line combat units of Soviet citizens to receive Hitler's sanction were those consisting of the members of minority tribes. A large number of Turcomen, Tartars, Georgians, Armenians and members of other non-Slav races occupied German prisoner-of-war camps during the autumn of 1941. They were not included among the categories of prisoner to be released because their homes were not in German hands. The plight of the Turkic prisoners aroused concern in Turkey¹⁵⁰ and two Turkish generals, towing German military installations in October 1941, paid a visit to Hitler's headquarters, where they urged better treatment for Turkic prisoners-of-war and suggested the establishment of a Turkic-Moslem formation, analogous to the one raised during the First World War.¹⁵¹ Since Germany valued Turkish friendship, commissions visited the camps to locate, register and ultimately enlist Turkestani prisoners-of-war¹⁵². Hitler had a high opinion of the fighting qualities of Turcomen¹⁵³, believed them to be anti-Bolshevik¹⁵⁴ and had no plans for annexing Turkey. In consequence, the creation of a Türkische Legion was announced on 17 November 1941.¹⁵⁵

150 Dallin, op. cit., pp. 234-5.

151 Ibid., p. 234; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 291; Kramaz, op.cit. p.97.

152 Dallin, op.cit., p. 421; Reitlinger, op.cit. p. 293

153 Dallin, op.cit., p. 540

154 Ibid., p. 540.

155 Ibid., p. 540 cites O.K.W./W.F.St./L, M/L 474, Aufstellung einer türkischen Legion, 17 November 1941.

The German Army planned a thrust into the Caucasus for the spring of 1942. With this in mind, Abwehr gathered together a number of Georgian, Armenian, North Caucasian and Azerbaijani prisoners-of-war at Neuhammer, where they constituted a unit known as Bergmann.¹⁵⁶ On 14 December 1941 Rosenberg was granted an interview with Hitler during which they discussed the Turkic Legion. The Führer confirmed an order of O.K.W. establishing, besides the "Turk-Azerbaijani" Legion, other Caucasian legions. This enabled the minister to voice his fears of a pan-Turkic movement. Rosenberg also mentioned the concern of the Crimean Tartar community at Istanbul for the safety of their fellow-tribesmen who had been captured by the Germans.¹⁵⁷ A secret memorandum of O.K.W. dated 30 December 1941 in fact mentioned the Turkestanische, the Kaukasische-Mohammedanische, the Georgische and the Armenische Legions.¹⁵⁸ But no reference was made to Crimean Tartars, probably because their recruitment was in the hands of the Sicherheitsdienst. In February 1942 permission was given for other races to raise units no larger than companies.¹⁵⁹ The mushroom growth of these non-legionary elements alarmed O.K.W. sufficiently to cause it to set a limit upon them on 10 March 1942, but this did not apply to the four legions nor to the Crimean Tartar units.¹⁶⁰ The Germans displayed further trust in the Legions in April 1942, when they gave permission for them to serve at the front rather than in a security role.¹⁶¹

156 Ausschuss für deutsche Einheit, The Truth about Oberländer (E. Berlin, 1960), p. 142; Anon., 'Oberländer-Baustein oder Dynamit', Der Spiegel, VIII. Jg., Nr. 17 (21 April 1954); Dallin, op.cit. pp. 513-4; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp.293-4.

157 Rosenberg, Vermerk über Unterredung beim Führer, 14 December 1941, - 1517PS, T.M.W.C., XXVII, 272; Dallin, op.cit., p. 540.

158 State Secretary Weizsäcker, 30 December 1941, - part of NG 4301; Fischer, op.cit., p.48; Dallin, op.cit., p. 540.

159 O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H/Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 736/42, 10 February 1942.

160 O.K.W., Nr. 00976/42, W.F.St./Qu.II, 10 March 1942, in T175, Roll 140, Frame 2668136.

161 Dallin, op.cit., p.299; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.294.

A month after this permission had been granted, the Bergmann unit and Turk. Btl. 450 were committed on the southern sector of the front.¹⁶² Between July 1942 and January 1943, the first-fruits of the legions were despatched from their depôts in Poland and the Ukraine, to join German combat divisions of the two southernmost Army Groups.¹⁶³ In August 1942 most of an Armenian battalion and the whole of a Georgian one were reported to have deserted -¹⁶⁴ circumstances which explain why Hitler issued his forty-sixth directive on the 18th of that month. In this document Hitler permitted indigenous units in the East to be maintained and extended. But the Führer insisted that they should not fight at the front.¹⁶⁵

162 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 293.

163 e.g. Turk Btl. 452 to 97. Jägerdivision, Turk Btl. 782 to 16. Inf. Div. (mot), Turk. Btl.^I/76 to 373 Inf. Div., Aserb. Btl. 805 to 71. Inf. Div.

164 Reitlinger, op.cit., p.306.

165 O.K.W./W.F.St/Op.Nr.002821/42, Weisung Nr. 46, 18 August 1942, C4,
In T175, Roll 140, Frames 2668246-50 and Trevor-Roper, op.cit.,
p.132-5; Dallin, op.cit., p.542.

There were, nevertheless, ~~on the~~ other hand, for the Germans, happier results from the drive to the Caucasus in the spring of 1942. In the North Caucasus there were even uprisings against Soviet authority which encouraged the German Army to grant local self-government to the Kabardins and Balkars.¹⁶⁶ Sufficient volunteers came forward to justify the conversion of the unwieldy Caucasian-Moslem Legion into the Azerbaijani Legion and to constitute a new North Caucasian Legion under the auspices of the Georgian.¹⁶⁷ A separate force was established from Kalmucks.¹⁶⁸ In order to prevent the Ostministerium from taking control and possibly antagonising the inhabitants, the General Staff secured the appointment of General Ernst Köstring as "General z.b.V." for the Caucasus.¹⁶⁹ But in the event these well-intentioned Army officers need not have worried, for the German occupation of the North Caucasus was short-lived; and by the beginning of 1943 the units there were in full retreat, taking the native collaborators and their families with them.¹⁷⁰ Units drawn from the Soviet Unions' minorities remained in the German order-of-battle until the end of the war.¹⁷¹ In fact, new ones were established.¹⁷² But as the German Army's hopes of ever approaching the Caucasus again diminished so did the political influence of the Legions and their supporters.¹⁷³

166 Dallin, op.cit., p. 246; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 297.

167 An "Idel-Ural" Legion was created for Volga Tartars and members of other tribes domiciled between the Volga (or Idil) and the Urals.

168 J. Hoffmann, Deutsche und Kalmyken, 1942 bis 1945 (Freiburg, 1974), pp.92-3; O.K.H./Gen.St. d.H/Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 497/42, 17 October 1942; Idem, Nr. 5128/42, 23 October 1942, both in BAMA-H1/136; Dallin, op.cit., p. 252 (footnote).

169 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 297, 551 (footnote).

170 Ibid., p.303.

171 General der Freiwilligenverbände, Nr. 702/45, Schematische Gliederung der Iandeseigenen Verbände, 27 March 1945, in BAMA-H1/153 and T78, Roll 413.

172 Notably those of the two Waffenverbände of the S.S.

173 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 328.

Cossack Units

Although Hitler's speech at Angerburg on 16 July 1941 specifically excluded Cossacks from bearing arms¹⁷⁴ this proved to be no more than rhetoric. Cossack exiles in Germany notably Generals P.N. Krasnov and Schkuro, constituted a Cossack Central Office in Berlin,¹⁷⁵ which may have influenced politicians in the German capital. Moreover, the Cossacks had a reputation for being anti-Bolshevik and for having a warlike disposition.¹⁷⁶ Fastidious racial purists consoled themselves with the theory that the Cossacks were not Slav Untermensch but Goths.¹⁷⁷ It is probable that Hitler gave his approval to the creation of Cossack sub-units on 22 October 1941¹⁷⁸ and the Organisation Section of the General Staff put this into effect on 16 November, when it authorised each security division to raise one Rotnia of Cossacks.¹⁷⁹ The permission was abused in three ways. In the first place, "centuries" were raised consisting of Ukrainians, Byelorussians or Russians, rather than true Cossacks.¹⁸⁰ In the second place, the Cossack Hundertschaften or Schwadronen frequently grew into complete Abteilungen, which in some divisions were even duplicated.¹⁸¹ Thirdly, German formations which were not strictly-speaking security divisions provided themselves with Cossack units and sub-units.¹⁸² In the eyes of German commanders the Cossacks had the double advantage that they were useful and that they made picturesque guards for headquarters.¹⁸³

174 Aktenvermerk, Bo/Fü, 16 July 1941-L221, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9A.

175 P. Longworth, The Cossacks (London, 1969) p. 332; Dallin, op.cit., p. 298; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 294.

176 Ibid., p. 296; Fischer, op.cit., p. 49; Dallin, op.cit., p. 538.

177 Ibid., p. 301; Longworth, op.cit., p. 322; Kleist, op.cit., p. 107.

178 Dallin, op.cit., pp. 298-9, 538.

179 O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org. Abt. (II), Nr. 75131/41, 16 November 1941.

180 e.g. Ukrainische Reiterschwadron 201 of the Security Division of that number; Armstrong, op.cit., p. 167.

181 At one time four Ostreiterabteilungen bore the number of 454. Sicherungsdvision.

182 e.g. Ostreiterabteilung 580, for the rear area commander of that number.

183 H. von Kälben, 'Das XIV. Kosaken Kavallerie Korps der Waffen S.S.', Teil I, Der Freiwillige, XV, Jg. Heft 12 (1969), p. 22.

111

When the German Army moved towards the Don and Kuban Cossack's' Stanizas the Organisation Section of the General Staff permitted the Southern Army Group to raise twenty Cossack Hundertschaften on the 17th May 1942.¹⁸⁴ Ten days later, the two Armies of the Northern Army Group, far removed from the Cossack settlements, were allowed to raise ten centuries between them.¹⁸⁵ This demonstrated the general usefulness of the Cossack elements.

184 O.K.H./Gen.St. d. H./Org. Abt., Nr. 4938/42, 17 May 1942.

185 O.K.H./Gen.St. d.H./Org. Abt., Nr. 2314/42, 27 May 1942.

By July 1942, Colonel Wessel Freiherr von Freytag - Loringhoven, chief intelligence officer of the Army Group B, was gathering Cossacks of the Don into military units.¹⁸⁶ In the same month German troops reached the Kuban where in October, they granted a measure of self-government to six Rayons inhabited by Cossacks and encouraged them to raise their own militia.¹⁸⁷ This was only possible for three reasons. Firstly, the Cossacks had little to offer the German economy. Secondly, they were held in high esteem by the German Army. In the third place, the German Army managed to retain the Kuban Cossacks under its own control instead of handing them over to the Ostministerium.¹⁸⁸ The interesting constitutional experiment with the Kuban Cossacks was short-lived, since by January 1943 the Cossack collaborators were fleeing before the wrath of the Red Army.¹⁸⁹ They were still useful to the German forces; but as it became increasingly apparent that the Germans would not reconquer the Cossack settlement areas, the Cossacks, like the Caucasians, declined in influence.

186 Longworth, op.cit., p. 331; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 295.

187 Ibid., p. 291; Longworth, op.cit., p. 332; Dallin, op.cit., pp.299-300.

188 Ibid., p. 300.

189 Ibid., p. 300; Longworth, op.cit., p. 333; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 303.

190 Ibid., p. 328.

The Reformers

Few of the German officers using indigenous manpower were initially motivated by a desire to enlist the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in a war against Communism. But when the German military situation worsened, and Soviet manpower was increasingly used, many officers came to appreciate the need to adopt a more liberal policy towards these Soviet elements and to provide them with a reason for fighting alongside their former enemies.¹⁹¹ There were two schools of thought with constructive suggestions to make. One school regarded the war as being directed against the Communist system and against Russian hegemony and, therefore, as a struggle in which the non-Russian races could be permitted to join.¹⁹² This was the attitude of Alfred Rose^{berg} and his circle at the Ostministerium; and of the German Foreign Office, until it was excluded by Hitler from any jurisdiction in the Eastern theatre-of-war.¹⁹³ Both ministries were influenced by Caucasian refugees resident in Germany. They had the satisfaction of seeing four legions, Crimean Tartar and Cossack units established before German troops advanced to the Caucasus.

191 Dallin, op.cit., pp. 506-10; Armstrong, op.cit., p. 167.

192 Dallin, op.cit., p. 56.

193 Rosenberg, Vermerk über Unterredung beim Führer im Hauptquartier, 8 May 1942, 1520 PS/GB 156, T.M.W.C., XXVII, 288-90.

The earliest legionary and Cossack units were obliged to draw the majority of their personnel from prisoner-of-war camps. In this the émigrés and their German civilian sympathisers were supported by a number of German Army officers serving in the southern sector of the Ostfront. These officers were also instrumental in establishing the local self-government areas for the Kuban Cossacks and the Karachai. These officers were not so much influenced by the ideas of Rosenberg and the Caucasian refugees, but they needed the goodwill of the indigenous population. Generals Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster-General, and Ewald von Kleist, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group in the Caucasus and the Ukraine, also hoped to forestall the appointment of a civilian Reichskommissar, who might precipitate partisan warfare by ill-considered policies.¹⁹⁴

194 Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 297-300.

With the exception of those who agitated for the independence of the Baltic states, those who worked for the creation of separatist states were to be found in the southern part of occupied Soviet territory.¹⁹⁵ These factions suffered a shock in December 1942 when the General Staff secured the appointment of a general to supervise all Osttruppen, not the Legions alone.¹⁹⁶ In the event all the Legions survived until the end of the war;¹⁹⁷ and the General der Freiwilligenverbände, as he was later known,¹⁹⁸ proved to be a strong supporter of the Legions. But when the post was created it appeared to be a triumph for the opposite school of thought.

195 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 288.

196 O.K.H./Gen.St.d. H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 11400/42, 15 December 1942; Allgemeine Heresmitteilungen, 7 January 1943, Z 17; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 288; Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 118-9; Dallin, op.cit., p. 543.

197 General der Freiw Verbände im O.K.H., Nr. 702/45, Schematischer Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, Stand 27.3.45 shows all six Legions - or to be more precise their depôts in the Freiwilligen Stammdivision.

198 Originally called "General der Osttruppen" O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 11400/42, 15 December 1942.

A far more serious blow befell the separatist movements early in 1943 when German troops fell back on the Caucasian and Don fronts. The Turkestani, Azerbaijani, Georgian and Armenian units had not reached their homelands; and now the North Caucasians, Kalmucks and Crimean Tartars also became exile-movements. Once German officers realized that their troops would not return to the Caucasus their interest in the separatist school of politicians waned and the non-Russian legions were regarded simply as additional manpower.¹⁹⁹ In the absence of the German Foreign Office from the field, Rosenberg's ministry provided the separatists' only mainstay until the S.S., in its turn, became interested in Soviet manpower.

199 Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 303, 328.

The other school of thought seemed initially to make less headway than its rival. This faction consisted of those who regarded the struggle as one against the Soviet government alone, and therefore as one in which all the races of the U.S.S.R. could join to establish a single "army of liberation".²⁰⁰ The concept of a single anti-Soviet force had much to commend it. Such a body would be more impressive than a number of separate legions, while it would be create the impression of a common front and be easier to administer than independent ethnic units. Furthermore, half the population of the U.S.S.R. and half the personnel of the Red Army consisted of "Greater Russians", who would be antagonised by suggestions of partition. Even among the non-Russians there were some who were not separatist, either because, like many of the Volga Tartars, they were strongly Russified, or, like many of the younger tribesmen, they could see no future for their ethnic group outside a Russian context.²⁰¹ The "all-Russian" movement among German officers found its support mainly in the Central and northern sectors of the front. Here, German staffs wished to recruit from among prisoners-of-war and deserters who were predominantly Russian and from the largely Russian indigenous population.²⁰²

200 Ibid., p. 287; Dallin, op.cit., p. 56.

201 Dallin, op.cit., p. 271 (footnote); R. Conquest, The Nation Killers (London, 1970), p. 191.

202 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 288.

The Memoranda

Many of the German officers associated with the Eastern volunteers, even among those who employed them for purely utilitarian reasons, realised that Soviet citizens could not be expected to work or fight indefinitely for little more than their rations. Before a change was possible, Germany would have to abandon her official attitude of regarding not only the government of the U.S.S.R. but also its peoples as her enemies. It would also require more detailed alterations in German policy - the granting of local self-government in occupied areas, distribution of lands to the peasantry, a limitation upon the produce and labour extracted by the German authorities. Other necessary changes were to give Soviet defectors a more cordial reception than incarceration in an ordinary Stalag and to improve the condition of these camps. Eastern workers in Germany, often relatives of the Soviet volunteers, would have to be accorded more humane treatment. The volunteers themselves would need to be granted good terms of service in units of their own, and under their own officers.²⁰³

203 Armstrong, op.cit., p. 167.

Recognition of the need for reform produced a spate of memoranda from German officers and officials who sought to persuade Hitler to change his mind. As early as the autumn of 1941, two colonels of the Central Army Group, Henning von Tresckow, its chief-of-staff, and Rudolf von Gersdorff its senior intelligence officer drew up a memorandum proposing a Russian army of 200,000 men. This was not quite as revolutionary as might at first appear, as the German Army had by that time already secured a similar number as Hiwis. Fieldmarshal von Bock forwarded a scheme, shortly before he retired from the command of Heeresgruppe Mitte, to Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in Chief, who endorsed it before he, too, left office.²⁰⁴ Hitler rejected the plan; but the matter did not end there, for on 29 January 1942 Otto Bräutigam of the Ostministerium, suggested a Russian "counter-government" led by a Russian "de Gaulle".²⁰⁵ The commander of the new area of the Central Army Group, Major-General Graf von Schenckendorff, on 18 March 1942, advocated the idea of a Russian national state. Such a state, free from Bolshevism, could be held up to the Soviet people as a goal, even if Germany had no intention of establishing one.²⁰⁶

204 Dallin, op.cit., p. 516; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 312-3; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., pp.14, 49; Gehlen, op.cit., p. 96.

205 Dallin, op.cit., p. 524.

206 Ibid., pp. 518-9; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 313, 322; Armstrong, op.cit., p. 167; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 65.

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General Wagner, Professor von Mende of the Ostministerium, Bräutigam, Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg and others interested in reform met on 25 June 1942 to discuss the status of the Eastern volunteers,²⁰⁷ as a result of which a number of regulations were drawn up to govern their conditions of service.²⁰⁸ The paper campaign continued with a memorandum from General von Rofques, Commander of Army Re~~g~~Area A, dated 14 September 1942, criticising the civilian administration of the Ukraine and stressing the need for the support of the population.²⁰⁹ Bräutigam wrote again on 25 October 1942 repeating the suggestions he had made earlier in the year.²¹⁰ On 25 November Colonel Reinhard Gehlen, of Department Fremde Heere Ost of the General Staff, wrote supporting a bogus declaration of independence.²¹¹ Von Tresckow spent Christmas Day 1942 compiling another plea for a political goal for the peoples of Russia.²¹² The authors' arguments could be supported by the statements of important Russian prisoners. A Russian engineer, in a paper he wrote on 21 February 1942, advised the constitution of a Russian counter-régime.²¹³ In the following August, Colonel Boyarski, later to lead a Russian collaborationist formation, declared that only a Russian movement could prevail against Stalin.²¹⁴

207 Khamarz, op.cit., pp. 98-9.

208 Ibid., p. 100.

209 Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet A, 14 September 1942, cited in Dallin, op.cit., p. 545.

210 Bräutigam, II 1, Nr. 1161/42, 25 October 1942, - 294 PS, T.M.W.C., XXV, 337 Dallin, op.cit., p. 525.

211 Dringende Fragen des Bandenkrieges und der Hilfswilligen - Erfassung, 25 November 1942, cited in Dallin, op.cit., pp. 545-6; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 322.

212 Heeresgruppe Mitte, Ia, Erfahrungen in der Verwaltung des Landes und politische Zielsetzung, 25 December 1942, cited in Dallin, op.cit., p. 560.

213 Oflag XIII D, Hammelburg, Abt III, Br. B. Nr. 87/42, 21 February 1942, in BAMA-OKW 689.

214 Dallin, op.cit., pp. 554-5; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 320.

The Development of Eastern Units

Although the memoranda with which Hitler and the High Command were bombarded appeared to make little impression, changes were taking place within the armies on the Eastern front, largely because of the prevailing military situation. The use of Hiwis continued, and anti-partisan units proliferated. These last were frequently as large as battalions; and in the emergency of the winter of 1941-1942 some of them served at the front.²¹⁵ Although the security units of Balts, Finns and Russians employed by the Northern Army Group were labelled as such,²¹⁶ those of Russians in other places were frequently concealed under other designations -the name of the commander,²¹⁷ of a geographical feature²¹⁸ or by some euphemism, such as "Freiwilligen"²¹⁹, "Selbstschutz",²²⁰ or "Bandenjäger".²²¹ By the end of 1941 when Slavic guard companies received official sanction,²²² they had already been surpassed in size. Non-Slav legions had been officially established by this time²²³, but Slav battalions were already in existence.²²⁴ Much of the credit for this was due to Major-General Graf von Schenckendorff²²⁵ and to Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt.²²⁶

215 Notably Baltic Police battalions in the line opposite Leningrad.

216 e.g. estn. Sich. Abt. 181, Finn. Sich. Abt. 187, russ. Sich. Abt. 188.

217 e.g. Weiss, Tietjen.

218 e.g. "Beresina", "Dnjepr", "Düna", "Pripjet", and "Wolga".

219 A term favoured by 2nd Pânzerarmee and 9th Army.

220 Used by 4th Army.

221 Used in 3rd Pânzerarmee.

222 Kramarz, op.cit., p. 96.

223 i.e. the Turkestani, Caucasian-Moslem, Armenian and Georgian Legions.

224 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 309; Notably the units "Beresina", "Dnjepr", etc.

225 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 309. Schenckendorff commanded the Rear Area of Heeresgruppe Mitte.

226 Commander-in Chief, 2nd Armoured Army.

Although he had no clear appreciation of the size and numbers of the indigenous units, Hitler became apprehensive of them; and in February 1942 he forbade further recruiting²²⁷. In putting Hitler's orders into effect Stauffenberg managed to confine their impact to the Baltic and Ukrainian units.²²⁸ The Red Army's offensive early in 1942 soon caused Hitler to modify his attitude. His announcement of 10 March that no new combat or security units were to be created from inhabitants of the Eastern theatre-of-operations²²⁹ made exceptions of the Crimean Tartars and the four non-Slav legions.²³⁰ Apart from these, existing units could remain in the operational area and be brought up to strength; but they were not to exceed the strength of the battalion²³¹. Nor were they to be employed in the front-line²³². The Führer appreciated the political implications of employing Soviet citizens; and he was unwilling to jeopardise his schemes by endorsing the idea of a new state or states in the territory of the U.S.S.R.²³³ Although the order of 10 March 1942 gave expression to Hitler's misgivings about the military recruitment of Eastern peoples - doubts he retained throughout the war²³⁴ - the measures he took in the early part of 1942 were tantamount to recognition of the existence of the Eastern units.

227 Kramarz, op.cit., p. 97; Dallin, op.cit., p. 541.

228 Kramarz, op.cit., p. 97; Dallin, op.cit., p. 541 cites O.K.H./HGen. St. d.H./Org. Abt (II), Nr. 736/42, 10 February 1942.

229 O.K.W., Nr. 00976/42, 10 March 1942, T 175, Roll 140, Frame 2668136, Paragraph 1.

230 Ibid., Paragraph 1.

231 Ibid., Paragraph 2.

232 Ibid., Paragraph 2.

233 Warlimont, op.cit., p. 293.

234 Hitler, Lagebesprechungen, (Stuttgart, 1962), pp.968ff.

Hitler probably learnt either that the Osttruppen were more numerous than he had been led to believe by his advisers, or that they were being increased contrary to his orders.²³⁵ Whatever the reason he again forbade the establishment of new Eastern units in June 1942. Eastern units were permitted to continue and Hiwis were given official acceptance; but the Führer said that, except for the Turkic and Caucasian battalions, they were to be employed in rear areas, not in the line.²³⁶ In the course of the German drive into the Caucasus, members of an Armenian and a Georgian battalion were reported to have deserted.²³⁷ This prompted Hitler to issue his forty-sixth Directive of 18 August 1942, permitting the expansion of Eastern units, but stipulating that the volunteers were only to be used in small groups against partisans, not at the front.²³⁸ More positively, Hitler at the same time instructed the Army's High Command to draw up regulations governing the employment of indigenous Eastern units.²³⁹

235 Ibid., p. 97; Dallin, op.cit., p. 541.

236 Permission to serve at the front was later extended to Estonians. Bräutigam, Aufzeichnung II 1, Nr. 1161/42, 25 October 1942, - 294PS, T.M.W.C., XXV, 337.

237 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 306.

238 O.K.W./W.F.St./Op. Nr. 002821/42, Weisung Nr. 46, 18 August 1942, in T 175, Roll 140, Frames 2668246 - 50 and Trevor-Roper, op.cit., p. 132-5; Armstrong, op.cit., p. 168.

239 These included the "Rotes Heft" - O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 8000/42, August 1942 - BAMA - H1/224.

Experimental "Armies"

There were also a number of bold steps taken by German staff officers, notably in the Central Army Group, without the approval of higher authority. In the late summer of 1941, General Rudolf Schmidt commanding the 2nd Panzerarmee of that Army Group, established a self-governing area in Lokot. After the death of the first Burgermeister, the area was entrusted to an engineer named Bronislav Kaminsky²⁴⁰. He not merely suppressed local partisans but paid tribute to his German masters, in the form of agricultural produce. Kaminsky's realm had refinements such as a ballet company and also its own National-Socialist party,²⁴¹ organised by a delegation from the Russian émigré fascist National'no Trudovoi Sojuz,²⁴² Kaminsky expanded the small police force by enrolling the local peasantry, by extricating prisoners-of-war from nearby camps with the connivance of the 2nd Panzer-armee and even by "converting" partisans. Abandoned Soviet military material was pressed into the service of what was grandiloquently known as Russkaia Osvoboditel'naia Narodnaia Armia.²⁴³ Although R.O.N.A. contained infantry cavalry, artillery and even tanks it was only a field army in microcosm. Nevertheless, the German officers involved in the constitutional experiment considered it to have fulfilled its purpose. So much so that, when the approach of the Red Army drove Kaminsky's force and its dependents westwards, an attempt was made to re-establish them at Lepel in White Russia.

240 Fischer, op.cit., pp. 42-3; Stein, op.cit., p. 264-5; Kleist, op.cit., p. 102 Anon. 'Die Brigade Kaminski', Der Freiwillige, X, Nr. 8 (August 1964) pp. 13 ff; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 310; Steenbey, op.cit., pp. 76-9; E. von Dohnanyi, 'Combatting Soviet Guerillas', Modern Guerilla Warfare (New York, 1962), pp. 100-11.

241 Abwehrtrupp II/14, 5 February 1942 in BAMA-OKW 689.

242 National Labour Alliance.

243 Russian Popular Army of Liberation.

Amt Ausland^{Akwehr} not only needed Russians for "commando" undertakings but it also appreciated the subversive possibilities of a Russian "army of liberation". Accordingly, it arranged with Colonels von Tresckow and von Gersdorff to establish an experimental Russian force at Osintorf, near Smolensk, late in 1942.²⁴⁴ The formation was a rarity in that it was commanded by two Russian émigrés, Sacharov and Kromiadi, in spite of Hitler's strictures against the use of "Whites" in the occupied Eastern areas. When the two leaders were withdrawn in belated compliance with Hitler's orders, they were replaced by two former members of the Red Army. An interesting feature of the force was that instead of using modified German or Red Army uniforms, some members wore dress reminiscent of that of the Russian Imperial Army with white-blue-red cockades and with stiff shoulder pieces. The unit was referred to as Verband Graukopf or Versuchsverband Mitte or Brigade Boyarski, all of which served to conceal its true nature. But its Russian members and the more whole-hearted of its German supporters knew as Russkaia Nationalnaia Narodnaia Armiya, the Russian National People's Army, even though it does not appear to have exceeded half-a-dozen battalions.²⁴⁵ One of these battalions was made responsible for the security of a district; and it is possible that had the "Army" survived it would have been entrusted with the control of an area like Kaminsky's.²⁴⁶ For R.N.M.A. to live up to its title it needed to be used at the front but this was contrary to Hitler's Weisung Nr. 46.²⁴⁷

244 Fischer, op.cit., p. 43; Dallin, op.cit., pp. 531, 538 (footnote); Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 325-6; Steenberg, op.cit., pp. 55-62; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., pp. 91-2.

245 Ostbataillone 631 to 637 inclusive were formed from it.

246 Ost. Btl. 634 was entrusted with an area to pacify early in December 1942—Der Höhere SS. und Polizeiführer Russland Mitte, Abt. Ia, Tgb. Nr. 1416/42, 5 and 9 December 1942, in T17s, Roll 225, Frames 2754151-2.

247 O.K.W./W.F.St./Op.Nr.002821/42, Weisung Nr. 46, 18 August 1942, in T175, Roll 140, Frames 2668246-50 and Trevor-Roper, op.cit., pp. 132-5.

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When Fieldmarshal von Kluge, von Bock's successor in command of the Central Army Group, learnt of the size and nature of R.N.N.A., he ordered its disbandment, a course which would have precipitated either armed mutiny or mass desertion to the Soviet partisans. Instead a compromise was reached, whereby Zhilenkov and Boyarski returned to Berlin, while the units of R.N.N.A., retaining their Russian-style uniform, carried out security duties behind the German lines,²⁴⁸ where they were numbered among the Ostbataillone.²⁴⁹

248 Fischer, op.cit., p. 43; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 326; Steenberg, op.cit., pp. 61-2.

249 Although von Kluge ordered the dispersal of R.N.N.A. on 16 December 1942 - Steenberg, op.cit., p. 61; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 325 - in fact the constituent battalions had been renumbered on 8 November 1942 - O.K.H./ Gen. St. d. H./ Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 5381/42, 8 November 1942, Anlage 8.

The "Greater Russian" School

Outside the combat area, various German agencies were gathering Soviet citizens for their own purposes. Department Fremde Heere Ost of the High Command of the Army collected important members of the Red Army for interrogation at Schloss Boyen near Lötzen.²⁵⁰ The same department ran another camp at Vinnitsa²⁵¹, many of whose members later departed to serve as propagandists. The Ostministerium maintained its own camp for training propagandists at Wustrau²⁵², while the Propaganda Ministry and the Propaganda Section of the Armed Forces showed a similar institution at Wulheide.²⁵³ Though its Eastern Section, the Propaganda Ministry ran another establishment in the Viktoriastrasse, Berlin²⁵⁴ which it handed over to the IV the Department of the Armed Forces' Propaganda Section. This institution later moved to Dabendorf near Berlin, where it absorbed a number of high-ranking prisoners-of-war and several members of N.T.S. Apart from the school's official task of producing propaganda and propagandists, its most important members formed a "shadow" general staff for a future Russian "army-of-liberation".²⁵⁵

250 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 315.

251 Ibid., p. 320.

252 Ibid., p. 316.

253 Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 95.

254 Ibid., p. 83; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 315.

255 Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., pp. 15, 95-102; Gehlen, op.cit., p. 101.

Propaganda directed at the Red Army provided a cover for the search for a commander-in-chief of the future Russian "Army of liberation."²⁵⁶ The captive Russian General Andrei Andreivich Vlasov helped to draft an aerial propaganda leaflet in September 1942, which was directed at Red Army officers. It drew their attention to faults in the Stalinist régime and called upon them to revolt and make peace with Germany. Vlasov's code of honour prevented him from putting his name to an appeal for desertions; but, in spite of this he was sent to the Viktoriastrasse rather than back to an Oflag.²⁵⁷

256 Botschafter Hilger reported on 8 August 1942 that he had interviewed General Vlasov, Colonel Vladimir Soyersky and Regimental Commissar Joseph Kerness - O.K.W., K.T.B. II/2, p. 1287; Dallin, op.cit., p. 555 (footnote).

257 Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., pp. 79, 81; ...Gehlen, op.cit., pp. 98-9.

A number of events in December 1942 gave encouragement to those who wished to see a Russian "army of liberation". On the 15th Heinz Hellmich was appointed the first General der Osttruppen,²⁵⁸ while, three days later, Alfred Rosenberg met in conference with the commanders of the rear areas. These officers were alarmed at the prospect of coping with partisans for the second winter of the campaign, particularly at a time when the southern sector of the front was in a precarious condition. Although the commanders tended to favour the idea of one Russian "army-of-liberation", Rosenberg cooperated with them in the hope of gaining their support against his nominal subordinate in the Ukraine, Erich Koch. Those who attended the conference agreed on very little except to send a joint memorandum to Hitler, expressing their view that the façade of a Russian liberation movement should be erected.²⁵⁹ A third hopeful sign was the publication of Vlasov's "Smolensk" manifesto, in which he laid down his thirteen points for the reform of the U.S.S.R., including the reintroduction of private enterprise²⁶⁰. At the same time, the "Smolensk" Committee was established and Rosenberg was persuaded to agree that leaflets should be dropped behind the Soviet lines announcing these developments - but with the proviso that their distribution should be confined to the purely Russian ethnographic areas.²⁶¹

258 O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./Org. Abt. (II), Nr. 11400/42, 15 December 1942; Dallin, op.cit., p. 543; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 288, 326.

259 Ibid., p. 323; Dallin, op.cit., p. 155; Armstrong, op.cit., p. 168; Gehlen, op.cit., p. 102.

260 Ibid., pp. 101-2;

260 Dallin, op.cit., pp. 557-8; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 327-8.

261 Ibid., p. 328; Dallin, op.cit., p. 560.

In all three respects the "Greater Russia" school suffered disappointment, General Hollmich was not a firm believer in the value of using Soviet citizens against Stalin. For his chief-of-staff he chose Colonel Wessel von Freytag-Loringhoven, who had raised Cossack units. For his intelligence officer he selected Lieutenant Carl Michel, who supported Ukrainian nationalism. The new department of the General der Osttruppen, in consequence adopted a separatist not an all-Russian bias.²⁶² In the matter of the memorandum, the fieldmarshals commanding the army groups would not endorse it through faint-heartedness. Hitler rejected it and censured its authors because he was not willing to make even a bogus declaration to the peoples of the U.S.S.R.²⁶³

262 Ibid., p. 543; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 327.

263 Ibid., pp. 323-4.

In spite of the other set-backs, the "Smolensk" operation could have led to the creation of a genuine Russian liberation movement. Its backers hoped to present Hitler with a fait accompli by arranging for some of the leaflets to be "accidentally" dropped over German-held territory.²⁶⁴ This stratagem did, in fact, cause the civil population on both sides of the front to believe that there was a Russian national committee at Smolensk. In fact there was no liberation committee there; and Vlasov himself was many miles to the rear in Berlin. Smolensk had been selected as the seat of the bogus committee, simply because some of the city fathers sent a loyal address to Hitler in September 1941.²⁶⁵ Rosenberg apparently believed in the committee's existence, for, on 8 February 1943, he met Hitler and suggested that it should be subordinated to the Ostministerium, on a par with the committees for the Caucasian and Moslem races. Rosenberg calculated that if he secured control of the "Smolensk" committee, he could arrange for Vlasov to be only one Russian general among several sitting upon it.²⁶⁶ There were also other candidates for the leadership of the all-Russian movement.²⁶⁷

264 Ibid, pp. 328-9; Dallin, op.cit., p. 562.

265 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 327; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 46; Gehlen, op.cit., p. 96.

266 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 329.

267 Kaminski's name was put forward by 2nd Panzerarmee - Dallin, op.cit., p. 568 (footnote) - a Colonel Shapalov was passed over - Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 76.

The commanders of the German lines-of communication areas were demanding immediate measures to follow up the "Smolensk" Manifesto, and it was necessary to act before the interest of the Russian population cooled.²⁶⁸ Vlasov was sent on a tour of prison camps and occupied areas, where he was received with interest.²⁶⁹ The caucus of Russian collaborators in the Viktoriastrasse had to increase its output of propaganda; and it was this that necessitated their transfer to Dabendorf, while Vlasov himself moved to Dahlem.²⁷⁰ One piece of propaganda which deceived even many of those involved in it, was the use of the term "Russkaia Osvoboditelnaia Armia".²⁷¹ This "army" was simply a collective term for all the Ost units that were mainly composed of Great Russians. Vlasov had no control over them.²⁷² R.O.N.A. and R.N.N.A., although considerably smaller, were at least homogenous bodies under Russian officers.

268 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 329.

269 Ibid., pp. 329-31; Dallin, op.cit., p. 566; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 135; Gehlen, op.cit., pp. 102-3.

270 Dallin, op.cit., p. 569; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 329, 331; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., pp. 95-102, 133.

271 i.e. Russian Liberation Army. Ibid., pp. 140-1.

272 Dallin, op.cit., p. 566; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 331.

As part of its planning for the offensive code-named 'Zitadelle', the German Army intended to direct a subversive propaganda action, called "Silberstreif", against the Red Army. In this, Vlasov's co-operation was required. A group of German officers drew up a new psychological warfare leaflet, numbered Thirteen, to be used in the operation. The leaflet offered deserters from the Red Army three choices - service in the minority legions, the R.O.A. or in German industry. It made no promises regarding the political future of the U.S.S.R. An important part of the plan was an attempt to make the Red Army believe that it was confronted by Russian national units; and this necessitated the attachment of a Russian team to each German division on the line.²⁷³ Unfortunately for those who conceived the scheme, Himmler complained to Hitler about the utterances Vlasov had made during his tour of the occupied areas, with the result that Keitel prohibited Vlasov from making any political statements. In fact, he was in danger of being returned to an Oflag, since he was still technically a prisoner-of-war. This restriction on Vlasov's activities blighted "Silberstreif."²⁷⁴

273 Dallin, op.cit., p. 570; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 333; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., pp. 136-41.

274 Gehlen, op.cit., pp. 103-4; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 332-3; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 137.

In spite of official disapproval of Vlasov, Fieldmarshal von Kluge, who had overcome his earlier hostility to the idea of a Russian liberation army, was willing to instal him in a Russian Centre behind Heeresgruppe Mitte; and the idea was passed to General Zeitzler, the chief of the General Staff.²⁷⁵ Zeitzler was to have put the matter forward at a conference with Hitler on 8 June 1943;²⁷⁶ but the Führer made it clear that he regarded R.O.A. as a "phantom" and wished it to remain so. Any line crossers who arrived as a result of Leaflet Thirteen were to become Ostarbeiter or Hiwis. There was now no mention of their joining R.O.A. Hitler was only willing for Vlasov to be used for propaganda purposes because he was haunted by his recollection of Pilsudski's Polish Legion. The atmosphere of the meeting was such that Zeitzler gave a deliberately low estimate of the number of Eastern units - which may have influenced Hitler into permitting them to continue.²⁷⁷ Hitler also gave his approval for new regulations governing the service of Osttruppen.²⁷⁸

275 Ibid., p. 143; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 333.

276 Besprechung des Führers mit General Keitel und General Zeitzler, 8 June 1943 - 1384 PS and in BAMA - III W 100
Fischer, op.cit., pp. 176-85; Idem, 'Vlasov and Hitler', Journal of Modern History, XXIII, No 1 (March, 1951), pp. 58-71;
M. Domarus, Hitler - Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1945, Band II, 1939-1945 (Würzburg 1963) pp. 2018-9; Dallin, op.cit., pp. 574, 581 (footnote); Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 336-8; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 145; Gehlen, op.cit., pp. 104-5.

277 78 battalions, One regiment, 122 companies, 60,000 men in gMARD units, 220,000 Hiwis.

278 Dallin, op.cit., p. 582; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 329.

The memoranda campaign still continued. On 23 March 1943, Hellmich, the General der Osttruppen, had contributed a memorandum in which he outlined the benefits accruing from the use of Eastern troops, in which he pointed out that they would save German blood from being shed.²⁷⁹ Even this idea did not commend the Ostruppen to Hitler. Hellmich also encountered considerable criticism from Hitler and his circle because of the bad conditions in the Ost units.²⁸⁰ Furthermore, Hellmich disliked Vlasov, so he resigned,²⁸¹ and was relieved after some delay by General Köstring, a former military attaché in Moscow, who had been acting as a species of military governor in the Caucasus.²⁸²

279 H. Hellmich, Vortragsnotiz betr. Osttruppen, 2 March 1943 - NG 3534; Fischer, op.cit., pp. 46-7; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 335.

280 Ibid., p. 334.

281 Ibid., p. 336.

282 Dallin, op.cit., p. 543 (footnote).

The activities of the "Greater Russian" school had been noted by the Minister for Propaganda. Joseph Goebbels after conceiving the idea of a proclamation to the peoples of the U.S.S.R. - only to have it rejected by Hitler - studied Vlasov's account of his itinerary. He also consulted Vidkun Quisling, who had carried out relief work during the Russian Civil War. The result was that the Propaganda Minister probably came to support Vlasov's cause - in any event the "Untermensch" propaganda came to an end and the "Smolensk" Manifesto was reported in the German press.²⁸³

283 Ibid., pp. 577-80; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 339-41.

The idea of a proclamation to the Russian peoples had been mooted in May 1943 by a group of German officers,²⁸⁴ but Hitler's tirade on 8 June clearly ruled it out.²⁸⁵ In the same month, Professor Theodor Oberländer published his Twenty Propositions in which he maintained that Germany had one last chance to counteract Stalin's appeal to the Soviet people and recruit an estimated 800,000 men. Oberländer was relieved of his command of the Bergmann formation, not so much for these views but because he distributed fifty copies of them to influential people in Germany.²⁸⁶ Hitler reaffirmed his opposition to the idea of a Russian liberation movement on 1st July during a speech to military commanders.²⁸⁷ The memoranda had had little effect upon him; and in spite of the need to make good the loss of the German forces in Stalingrad and Africa, Hitler did not favour the recruitment of a Russian Army. On the contrary, he forbade the creation of any new Eastern formations after 1 July 1943 and instigated a reorganisation of existing ones.²⁸⁸

284 Ibid., p. 333.

285 Besprechung des Führers, 8 June 1943 - 1384 PS and in BAMA IIIW100

286 Dallin, op.cit., p. 514; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 341; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 167.

287 Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 341-2.

288 O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./Org. Abt. (II), Nr. 20125/43, 15 August 1943.

The set-backs of 1943 resulted in desertions from Eastern units engaged in fighting partisans.²⁸⁹ Meanwhile, the German need for workers from occupied Soviet territory had led to an improvement in their conditions of work. This coincided with Fritz Sauckel's attempts in the spring of 1943 to recruit one million Eastern workers in four months. In July, Hitler, had advocated sending the Eastern volunteers to the mines;²⁹⁰ and when he learnt on 14 September that R.O.A. personnel had been committed to the front and had allegedly deserted, he ordered that 50,000 of the volunteers should be despatched to the French coal-fields.²⁹¹ This ruling of Hitler's, like others dealing with the Eastern troops, was not implemented in the manner he had intended.²⁹² Units containing some 5,000 men were disbanded but many of the personnel became Hiwis rather than Ostarbeiter. On the 10th October, Hitler ordered the remaining Eastern units to Western Europe, whither several legionary battalions had already departed.²⁹³

289 Dallin, op.cit., p. 582; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 344; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 173.

290 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 343.

291 Ibid., pp. 344-5; Dallin, op.cit., p. 582; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 173-4.

292 The Italian capitulation in September 1943 may have influenced the situation by creating a need for personnel to replace Italian troops and to occupy Italian-held positions. It is, perhaps, significant that some Eastern units, e.g. Ost. Btl. 661, Aserb. Btl. 807, were employed on the Riviera coast, previously in Italian hands.

293 Fischer, op.cit., p. 51; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 345; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 174.

Nevertheless, some Eastern combat units and most of the ancillary units remained in the Eastern combat zone.²⁹⁴ Even so, the westward transfer was a blow to those Germans and Russians who favoured a real Russian army-of-liberation. After the actual and rumoured cases of desertion, Hitler would not have sanctioned the genuine article. Real or phantom, a Russian army of liberation could not operate from Western Europe.

294 General der Freiwilligen Verbände, Nr. 601/44, Nr. 602/44, Nr. 603/44, Nr. 701/45, Nr. 702/45, Schematische Gliederungen der landeseigenen Verbände, for 15 January 1944, 17 March 1944, 9 June 1944, 8 October 1944, 8 January 1945 and 27 March 1945 respectively in BAMA-HI/153 and T78, Roll 413; Fischer, op.cit., p. 51; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 181.

Vlasov was so despondent that he considered reverting to prisoner-of-war status; and he refused to sign a letter to the Osttruppen telling them that their move was only a temporary measure to facilitate their reorganisation.²⁹⁵ It was clear to the Eastern soldiers that instead of being concentrated for training upon German manoeuvre areas, as Claus von Stauffenberg had, in fact, wanted,²⁹⁶ they were spread from Denmark²⁹⁷ to the Balkans.²⁹⁸ Some were attached to German regiments as additional battalions²⁹⁹ or - what was worse - embodied in German regiments as replacements for German battalions which had been sent to the Ostfront.³⁰⁰ Vlasov was forbidden to visit the units in the West; and it appears that he regarded them as lost to him, because they were under German command and serving against Germany's western enemies.³⁰¹

295 Fisher, op.cit., p. 51; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 178-9.

296 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 349.

297 e.g. Ostbataillone 603, 653, 662, 667 and 674; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 181.

298 e.g. 1. Kosakendivision.

299 e.g. IV. (Armen. Btl. 812)/Grenadier Rgt. 743; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 180.

300 e.g. I. (Ost. Btl. 630)/Grenadier Rgt. 857;
G. Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt (London, 1952), p. 78.

301 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 349; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., pp. 176, .
201.

The year 1944 saw further set-backs to the cause of Russian "liberation". The Propagandaschule at Dabendorf had met with considerable hostility from the Ostministerium, which disliked its Greater Russian bias and consequently sought to exclude non-Russians from its courses.³⁰² To make matters worse, the School attracted the attention of the Gestapo, who regarded it as a hot-bed of enemies of the Reich, suspected of negotiating with the British and with the French "Underground".³⁰³ In March 1944, several of the N.T.S. members at Dabendorf were arrested and consigned to a concentration camp.³⁰⁴ Further blows fell in the summer of 1944 when many of the Eastern units in France ceased to exist or were severely mauled.³⁰⁵ To make matters worse there were reports of Eastern troops surrendering or deserting to the Allied forces.³⁰⁶ The remnants of the Eastern units were brought back to the Reich,³⁰⁷ although some were used for labour, other units remained in position in the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy and the Balkans.³⁰⁸

302 Ibid., pp. 167-8.

303 Ibid., p. 168; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 346.

304 Strik-Strikfeldt., op.cit., p. 199.

305 Ibid., p. 200; Dallin, op.cit., p. 614; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 350.

306 S.S.H.A., Amtsgruppe D, Oststelle, DI5h Ref. 2d III/34b, 26 October 1944 - BA - NS31/38 deals with the re-establishment of the Freiwilligen Stammdivision in Germany.

307 Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 350.

308 Oberkommando des Heeres, General der Freiw. Verbände, Nr. 604/44, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, Stand 8.10.44 - BAMA - H1/153 and T78, Roll 413 - and subsequent orders-of-battle.

The time-bomb with which von Stauffenberg attempted to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944 caused reverberations which affected the Eastern units. Both before and after being wounded in Africa, von Stauffenberg had done much to further their cause.³⁰⁹ He and others of his circle may have considered the volunteers as potential bargaining counters in future negotiations with the Western Allies if the plot had proved successful.³¹⁰ The plotters may have looked upon the Eastern volunteers as a bridge to bring them into contact with Stalin or they may have regarded these troops as a means of creating a balance of power between Hitler and Stalin.³¹¹ On the other hand, the plotters may have kept their sympathy for the Osttruppen completely separate from their assassination plans.³¹² Hitler's handling of the Eastern units was only one of his policies with which the conspirator's disagreed.³¹³ In spite of their close links with the Osttruppen,^{they played no part in the attempted coup.} the code-word "Walküre" mobilised German troops, as it had done previously,³¹⁴ not Eastern units. Stauffenberg is credited with saying "This business must be carried through by Germans,"³¹⁵ for he realised that the conspirators needed the support of the German people, which they could not gain if they used foreign mercenaries to impose a new régime. The failure of the plot cost the lives not only of von Stauffenberg but also of other friends of the Eastern units - von Treskow, Wagner, Freytag-Loringhove, and others.³¹⁶

309 Kramarz, op.cit., pp. 96-104; J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, 2nd edition (London, 1964), p. 618; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 348-9.

310 Ibid., p. 348.

311 Ibid., p. 348.

312 Ibid., p. 349.

313 Ibid., p. 349.

314 For example, the Divisions of the 17th Welle, numbered 328 to 331 inclusive.

315 Kramarz, op.cit., p. 231 (footnote).

316 Gehlen, op.cit., p. 113; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p. 202; Dallin, op.cit., p. 202; Dallin, op.cit., p. 613.

In the aftermath of the plot, Hitler granted increased powers to those whom he felt he could trust, now that his faith in the loyalty of the German Army was destroyed. One supporter of the use of Vlasov, Goebbels, became Plenipotentiary for Total War; on the other hand one of Vlasov's bitterest critics, Himmler, became commander of the German Reserve Army.³¹⁷ Himmler also took charge of the prisoner-of-war camps and the considerable pool of manpower they represented³¹⁸, most of it of Soviet origin. Faced with the need to find men for the front, the Reichsführer was obliged to abandon his criticisms of Vlasov and to examine the Osttruppen to find what strength could still be derived from them.

317 Ibid., p. 613; Reitlinger, op.cit., pp. 350, 359.

318 Führerbefehl 30 September 1944 - 058PS/USA 456 - N.C.A., III, 103.

Chapter Four - The Rearguard

Following the circulation of Vlasov's "Smolensk" manifesto in 1943, Himmler was critical of the use of the Russian general and expressed himself to that effect in speeches he made in April¹ and October² of that year. But Himmler's subordinates had begun to recruit men from the occupied Eastern areas as early as 1941.³ One of his henchmen, Gottlob Berger, had become the head of the Political Main Office in Rosenberg's Ostministerium with Himmler's approval.⁴ The Reichsführer himself sanctioned the recruitment of a Galician S.S. Division in March 1943.⁵ It was, consequently, difficult for him to oppose the use of Vlasov on strict ideological lines. Himmler was obliged to admit that it was better that a Russian should die than a German;⁶ but he would not go further and accept the hypothesis of Schiller, which he attributed to Vlasov, that Russia could only be conquered by Russians.⁷

Other influences were also working upon Himmler of whom Gunter d'Alquen, head of the propaganda organisation of the S.S., was one. D'Alquen had observed the effect of psychological warfare for himself and had studied the results of Operation Silberstreif. When he was empowered to mount a new propaganda campaign against Germany's enemies, Operation Skorpion, he sought and obtained permission to mention the Russian

1. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.351. The speech was made on 17 April 1943 at Gatchina.
2. Himmler, Speech at Posen, 4 October 1943 - 1919PS/US170, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 Band G, T.M.W.C., XXIX, 110-73- and his Speech at Bad Schachen, 14 October 1943 are virtually identical; Dallin, op.cit., p.593.
3. e.g. the native police forces, "Zeppelin" and the Travniki guards.
4. In July 1943 - Reitlinger, op.cit., p.p. 353-4.
5. On 28 March 1943 - B.Dmytryshyn, 'The Nazis and the S.S. Volunteer Division "Galicia"', American Slavic and East European Review, XV, No.1 (February, 1956), p.4; Dallin, op.cit., p.p. 598-600.
6. Himmler, Speech at Posen, 4 October 1943.
7. Ibid.; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.352; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.193.

Liberation Movement, but not to refer to Vlasov.⁸ He was allowed to use two of Vlasov's closest supporters, the former political commissars, Zhilenkov and Zykov. The latter disappeared in Berlin, in mysterious circumstances; but Zhilenkov was sent eastwards, where his presence, according to d'Alquen, produced several thousand deserters from the Red Army.⁹ D'Alquen was sufficiently impressed to suggest that Zhilenkov should become the Russian leader-in-exile; but he remained true to his master, Vlasov.¹⁰

Another influence upon Himmler was a report prepared by the S.D. which concluded, rather disappointingly for Germany, that she would derive no advantage in the event of Stalin's sudden demise. Himmler appointed Woldemar Von Radetzky, a German born in Riga, as his adviser on Russian matters; and Radetzky recommended Himmler to make use of Vlasov.¹¹ In the summer of 1944, Himmler obtained Hitler's permission to negotiate with Vlasov; but the meeting that was arranged had to be postponed because of the attempt upon Hitler's life on 20 July 1944.¹² During the delay that resulted, there were a number of developments which assisted Vlasov's cause.

The Red Army struck the German ground forces in the summer of 1944 with a force that cost Germany many divisions.¹³ In June came the Allied landings in Normandy - and with them the opening of a second major front. They also put an end to the practice of sending troops from the East to recuperate in Western Europe. Henceforth the West was a drain upon German manpower, not an asset. Himmler was aware of these problems before 20 July 1944; but after that date they became his responsibility. Once the Reichsführer took command of the Replacement Army he was obliged to

8. Dallin, op.cit. p.p. 64-65; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.p. 355-7; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.194.
9. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.p. 357-8; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.195.
10. Dallin, op.cit., p.605; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.358; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.195.
11. Dallin, op.cit., p.603; Reitlinger, op.cit. p.355.
12. Fischer, op.cit., Chapter VI; Dallin, op.cit. p.606; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.358; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.p. 197-8, 204.
13. Müller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 1933-1945, III, 132- Forty-one divisions against the thirty-two lost in Stalingrad and Tunisia.

maintain the formations of the whole of the German ground forces and to increase their number. He no longer had to find manpower for the S.S. alone; he now had to perform this task for the German Army as well.¹⁴

Himmler was to some extent assisted in finding manpower by the numbers of refugees from occupied countries who sought sanctuary in the Reich. In the same way that North Caucasians and Cossacks had fallen back in 1943, Balts, Ukrainians, Frenchmen and Belgians who had worked with the German occupiers began to fill refugee camps. Some of the men were so demoralised by their experiences that they were unwilling to fight; but there were others who felt that they had nothing to lose by continuing the struggle. Some collaborators had not belonged to armed German organisations while they were in occupation but had become sufficiently deeply implicated that, once they had been expelled from their homes and occupations, they had no course but to take up arms.¹⁵

Sufficient French and Belgian refugees were available for the existing three S.S. Sturmbrigaden from those lands to be expanded, although they were never complete divisions.¹⁶ In the East, two armed and trained groups fell back before the Soviet advance, Kaminsky's R.O.N.A. and Brigade Siegling, the remnants of the Schuma units which had been serving in

14. Dallin, op.cit., p.613; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.359.
15. It is estimated, for example, that 1,000 refugees were added to the Walloon Sturmbrigade to form the 28th S.S. Division - L. Degrelle, op.cit., p. 379. Members of the Netherlands' (political) S.S. fleeing to Germany from the Southern provinces in September 1944 were directed into Landstroom Nederland - van der Zee, op.cit., p.p. 192-3. Two thousand members of the French Milice were taken into the French Division of the Waffen S.S. - France, Les Procès de Collaboration - Le Procès Joseph Darnand (Paris, 1948), p.246.
16. S.S. Freiw. Sturmbrigade "Langemarck" became (27th) S.S. Freiw. Gren. Div. "Langemarck" - Der R.F.S.S., Tgb.Nr. 1998/44, 18 September 1944 - T175, Roll 141, Frame 2669166, S.S. Freiw. Sturmbrigade "Wallonie" became (28th) S.S. Freiw. Gren. Div. "Wallonie" - Der R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr.2000/44, 18 September 1944, T175, Roll 141, Frame 2669164, Waffen Gren. Brig. d.S.S. "Charlemagne" (frz.Nr.1) became a division in February 1945 - O.K.H./Gm.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(I) Nr.21654/45, 17 February 1945.

Byelorussia.¹⁷ The S.S. while not controlling Kaminsky, had maintained close and cordial links with him so with effect from 1st August 1944, his motley force became the 29th Division, the first Russian division, of the S.S.¹⁸

A Byelorussian Legion had been considered in June 1943, when the Galicians had been permitted their own S.S. division, but nothing had been done to implement the idea.¹⁹ The refugee policemen, not all of whom were White Ruthenians, became the second Russian division of the S.S., its 30th.²⁰

Several of the staff officers implicated in the plot of 20 July 1944 had been involved in raising Eastern units.²¹ This factor may have influenced the decision of 26 August 1944 to transfer all the German Army's foreign units to the Waffen S.S.²² There were precedents for this in the transfer of the Walloon battalion, the French and the Indian regiments;²³ but the administrative work involved and more pressing matters made the order a dead letter. In consequence, the Army retained control of the majority of the surviving Osttruppen.²⁴ One of the strongest single foreign elements, the Cossack division, was transferred, however, and simultaneously doubled.²⁵ In practice, the Cossacks were put under a corps headquarters belonging to the S.S.,²⁶ but the individual troopers were almost totally unaware of any change.²⁷ Nevertheless, by the time Himmler finally met Vlasov, on 16

17. 'Reichsführer S.S. Himler auf der Gauleitertagung am 3 August 1944 in Posen', Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte I.Jg., 4. Heft, (1953); Stein, op.cit., p.p. 187-8, 265.
18. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt. (II) Nr.46479, 3 August 1944; Dallin, op.cit. p.614.
19. Ibid. p.599.
20. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb.Nr.2590/44, 18 August 1944
21. Notably Stauffenberg, Freitag-Loringhoven and Wagner, -Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit. p.202; Gehlen, op.cit., p.113.
22. Müller-Hillebrand, op.cit., III, 167.
23. On 1 June 1943, 19 August 1944 and 8 August 1944 respectively.
24. Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, Gen.der Freiw Verbände in O.K.H., Stand 27.3.45, Nr. 702/45 BAMA Hi/153 and T78 Roll 413.
25. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb.Nr.4080/44, 4 November 1944, para. 1 and 2.
26. General Kommando XIV, later renumbered XV.
27. H.D. von Kalben, 'Zur Geschichte des XV. Kosaken Kavallerie-Korps, VI. Teil', Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch, XVI. (1968) p.124.

September 1944, the S.S. had two Russian divisions in the course of organisation,²⁸ the remains of the Galician Division,²⁹ one embryonic Waffenverbund³⁰ of Soviet minority races, control of two Cossack divisions and a claim upon the Army's Eastern units.

The prompt action taken by the German forces, in March 1944, to prevent a Hungarian capitulation enabled them to retain part of the country, at least, for a further year. During the later part of this period the German government supported a fascist Arrow Cross régime which still controlled a large part of the Royal Hungarian forces. Not only did this situation enable the S.S. to continue to organise Hungary's Volksdeutsche for the front but also to evacuate a large part of the Volksgruppe.³¹ Furthermore, the German and Hungarian governments drew up a treaty by the terms of which Germany undertook to set up four Magyar divisions of the S.S. and four Honved divisions.³² Shortage of time and material prevented the scheme from being fully implemented; but under its terms the S.S. received its only two Magyar divisions, the 25th "Hunyadi"³³ and 26th "Gombos"³⁴ while one Honved division, "Kossuth"³⁵ was started and possibly another "Gorgey"³⁶ The German forces created a number of Magyar fortress³⁷ and anti-tank³⁸ units in late 1944 and in 1945; indeed they may have found this easier and perhaps safer than creating complete divisions - bearing in mind that it was

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28. 29 and 30 Waffen-Grenadier - Divisions der S.S.
 29. 14. Waffen-Grenadier - Division der S.S. (gal. Nr.1)
 30. i.e. Osttürkische Waffen-Verband der S.S. Its Caucasian counterpart was ordered later in the year.
 31. German Fed. Ministry for Refugees, Documents on the Expulsion, II 36-7, 114-24
 32. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr.47270/44, 30 November 1944, Anlage 40 - BAMA - ~~p. 114-24~~ H1/224.
 33. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 4021/44, 2 November 1944.
 34. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 587/45, 29 January 1945 - T175, Roll 140, Frame 2668425.
 35. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 70559/45, 28 January 1945 - BAMA - H1/355.
 36. G. Tessin, Verbände und Truppen der deutsche Wehrmacht und Waffen S.S. 1939-1945, II Band (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), p.151.
 37. Numbered 210 to 221 inclusive, BAMA H1/355.
 38. Ungarische Panzer Jagdverbände 1 to 7 - BAMA - H1/355.

the unreliability of Hungarians and other unspecified foreigners which led to the order 9 April 1945 to disarm all foreign units.³⁹

The Russian offensive of the summer of 1944 also deprived Germany of her allies because Rumania and Bulgaria changed sides and Finland capitulated - all within the space of three weeks.⁴⁰ In order to ensure Slovakia's continued alliance with Germany, German troops had to stamp out an armed uprising. German Military intervention nipped in the bud a further Hungarian attempt to obtain an armistice in October. Developments in the five countries bore similarities to those in Italy after September 1943, in that German troops clung to the territory of their former allies and had to be expelled by enemy troops with the assistance of forces belonging to those countries. Another similarity was that the German government endeavoured to salvage manpower from the countries whose governments had "betrayed" Germany.

On 6th September 1944, the German High Command announced that it had received numerous declarations of willingness to serve from Slovak, Finnish, Roumanian and Bulgar soldiers,⁴¹ although by that date only Roumania had changed her allegiance. The situation was clearer, albeit more critical, for the Germans on the 13th of the month when O.K.W. recognised the need for special regulations to cover the members of the four nations who were willing to fight on alongside Germany, irrespective of the new policy of their countries. At the same time there was to be no separation of the volunteers into soldiers and labourers,⁴² similar to that which had taken place after the Italian capitulation, presumably because Germany needed combatants. The regulations covering the service of the four nationalities were promulgated on 20th September,⁴³ with a supplement appearing on the 28th.⁴⁴

39. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II)Nr.80429/45, 9 April 1945-BAMA-HI/419.
40. On 23rd August, 9 September and 10 September respectively.
41. O.K.W./W.F.St./Qu.2, 6 September 1944 -BAMA III W89.
42. O.K.W./W.F.St./Qu.2(Ost), 13 September 1944 - BAMA III W89.
43. O.K.W. Nr.3847/44, W.F.St./Org.III, 20 September 1944 - BAMA III W89.
44. O.K.W., Nr.3847/44, W.F.St./Org.III,2. Ang., 28 September 1944-BAMA III W89. Magyars had already been covered by OKW ,Nr.4782/44, W.F.St./Org. III, 23 November 1944.

Finns, Roumanians and Bulgars were to be the responsibility of the S.S.; Slovaks were to be the Army's. All four nationalities were included in an omnibus set of regulations of 20 December 1944 - a document which also supplies further proof that the S.S. had not taken over all non-Germans in German service. Apart from three races allocated to the S.S. in September, that body took Estonians, Latvians, Cossacks, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Indians, Dutchmen, Norwegians, Belgians, Frenchmen and personnel for the Osttürk formation. But, apart from Slovaks, the Army received Poles, Magyars, Italians, Spaniards, Croats, Lithuanians, Arabs and the Eastern peoples not allotted to the S.S.⁴⁵

When Marshal Antonescu fell out with the Iron Guard, a number of its members found asylum in Germany where they worked in German industry. The Sicherheitsdienst kept them under surveillance⁴⁶ because supervision of foreigners was one of its duties and also, probably, in case they proved useful at a later date. After King Michael's coup d'état, the leading Roumanian fascist exiles constituted a "government" which for a brief period "ruled" the rump of Roumania. This territory was held by German troops, aided by Iron Guardists and the racial German Heimatschutz.⁴⁷ Once these were flushed out, the "government" became a "government-in-exile". But it still had sufficient Roumanian legionaries at its disposal for the S.S. to plan an infantry division⁴⁸ of which one regiment certainly existed, for it fought at Schwedt on the Oder.⁴⁹

An attempt to raise a new Finnish S.S. regiment to continue the struggle alongside Germany came to nothing, although until July 1943 the S.S. had

45. Gen. der Freiw. Verbände im O.K.H., I/E, Nr.20400/44, 20 December 1944-BAMA Folder H33/2 and T78 Roll 272 Frames 6219290 ff.
46. Der. Chef der Sipo und S.D., 8 January 1942 -T175, Roll 125, Frames 2650328-52.
47. German Fed. Ministry, for Refugees, Documents on the Expulsion, III, 74.
48. R.F.S.S.S. Amtsguppe D, V.S.Tgb.Nr. 94/45, D. Tgb. Nr. 54/45, 9 January 1945.
49. O. Skorzeny, Skorzeny's Special Missions (London, 1957), p.189.

included a battalion of Finns.⁵⁰ In the case of the Bulgars, a "government-in-exile" was formed in Vienna and the S.S. began to raise a regiment of Bulgars⁵¹ to fight, in the words of the oath of the refugee contingents, for "the future of Europe" and for their Fatherland.⁵²

During the Slovak insurrection in the summer of 1944, a Heimutschutz of Volksdeutsche fought alongside the German forces.⁵³ After the rising was suppressed some of these armed racial Germans covered the evacuation of Volksdeutsche families⁵⁴ while those who remained were enrolled in Army or Waffen S.S. units.⁵⁵ The German authorities did not - probably could not - afford to dismiss the Slovaks themselves as a source of manpower. The existing Slovak Army was disarmed and used as labour but the fascist militia, the Hlinka Garde, continued to exist. A new but small Domobran was created to take the place of the disarmed units,⁵⁶ in addition to which the German Army began to raise construction battalions of Slovaks.⁵⁷

By the time he eventually met Vlasov on 16 September 1944, Himmler was faced not only with the task of making good German losses but also with the need to find substitutes for Germany's vanished allies. Inside the Reich were thousands of Soviet prisoners-of-war, refugees and Ostarbeiter who

50. G.H. Stein and H.P. Krosby 'Das Finnische Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen S.S.', Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte XIV. Jg., 4. Heft (1966), p.453. The original battalion was disbanded at the request of the Finnish government, which needed the personnel and which was also contemplating making a separate peace.
51. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt.Ia/II, Tgb.Nr.4211/44, 13 November 1944 - Waffen-Grenadier Regiment der S.S. (bulgarisches) was to have been the nucleus of a complete Bulgar division.
52. O.K.W., Nr.3847/44, W.F.St./Org.(III), 20 September 1944 - BAMA Folder III W89 Anlage, Ziffer IID.
53. German Federal Ministry for Refugees, Documents on the Expulsion, IV, 530, 566.
54. Ibid., p.p.157, 161, 567.
55. Ibid., p.162.
56. OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt. Nr.80235/45, 20 February 1945.
57. Two, numbered 921 and 922, are shown in the Schematische Gliederung, Gen.der.Freiw.Verbände Nr. 702/45, 27 March 1945 - BAMA- H1/153 and T78 Roll 413.

might help to solve Himmler's problems. The surviving Eastern units needed replenishing and reinvigorating if they were to be of any use. Consequently the Reichsführer offered the Russian general the power to raise his own army, in other words, to make R.O.A. a reality.⁵⁸ Vlasov for his part wanted the separatist Eastern Legions and the national committees associated with them to be wound up, so that there would be one army and one committee for all the peoples of Russia. Hitler was only interested in obtaining sufficient mercenaries to hold the front; and Himmler who had the responsibility for finding the men, was inclined, at that time, to do as Vlasov wished.⁵⁹

The National Committees of the Soviet minorities were certain to object to Vlasov's schemes; and on 2nd October 1944 the liaison staffs of the Aserbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians met with the North Caucasian Commission. They demanded recognition by the German government not only for themselves, but also for a Crimean Tatar Committee they wished to establish.⁶⁰ They wanted to be allowed to constitute a Caucasian Council in direct opposition to the all-Russian committee which Vlasov was establishing. Rosenberg, even though his ministry no longer controlled any Soviet territory, opposed Vlasov's plans and threatened, on 12th October, to resign.⁶¹ Himmler encountered more effective opposition within the S.S. itself for several of his subordinates supported the national committees notably those in the S.S. Hauptamt who dealt with the Ukrainians, Caucasians, Tartars and other Eastern races in the Waffen S.S.⁶²

58. Dallin, op.cit., p.p. 617-8; Reitlinger, op.cit., p. 362; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.p. 206-7.

59. Fischer, op.cit., Chapter VI; Dallin, op.cit., p.p. 618-9; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.209.

60. R.F.S.S. & S.S.H.A., Amtsgruppe D, Oststelle DI/5L Zusammenfassung der nichtrussischen Gruppen, 2 October 1944- BA-NS31/15.

61. Reichsministerium für den besetzten Ostgebiete, Nr. 1418/44, 12 October 1944 - Rosenberg Defence Document 14, T.M.W.C., XLI, 186; Dallin, op.cit., p.630; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.366; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.210.

62. Dallin, op.cit., p.611.

Himmler probably began to have doubts about the wisdom of supporting Vlasov when he learnt from Ernst Köstring, the General der Freiwilligen Verbände, that there were nearly one million Eastern Volunteers in the Reich, of whom nearly half were Russian.⁶³ His misgivings were reinforced by Rosenberg's revelation that there were five million Soviet nationals in Germany.⁶⁴ Since he was ultimately responsible for internal security, the Reichsführer could not ignore so many political dissidents. His fears were not allayed when Keitel, Jodl and Guderian would have nothing to do with his plan.⁶⁵ In consequence, Himmler apparently decided to proceed slowly, permitting Vlasov one division by the beginning of 1945, with another to follow. Meanwhile Vlasov was to be in nominal command of the scattered Eastern units.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, Himmler permitted preparations for the inaugural meeting of Vlasov's committee to go forward.

In order to make the constituent assembly of Vlasov's movement as large and as representative as possible, Himmler's subordinates applied pressure to leading members of the non-Russian races. The Chief of Security, Kaltenbrunner, endeavoured, without success to persuade his protégé Kedia, of the Georgian National Committee to join Vlasov.⁶⁷ Efforts were made to induce the Turkestani leader, Kayum Khan, to associate with Vlasov - including, if the Prince's testimony is to be believed, attempted assassination.⁶⁸ In fact the smallest and least important of the national committees, that of the Kalmucks, was the only one willing to adhere to the Vlasov movement.⁶⁹ In his anxiety to broaden the basis of the movement, Himmler arranged for an important group of dissenters, the Ukrainian

63. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.364.

64. Der Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Nr.1418/44, 12 October 1944 - Rosenberg Defence Document 14, T.M.W.C., XL1, 186.

65. Dallin, op.cit., p.641; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.364.

66. Ibid., p.364; Dallin, op.cit., p.644.

67. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.366.

68. Interrogation of Prince Veli Kayum Khan in Summaries 1388 and 1456; Dallin, op.cit., p.p.610, 630.

69. Ju/Sch Z, 13 December 1944 - BA-NS31/39, Hoffmann, op.cit., p.p.154-63; Dallin, op.cit., p.634.

nationalists languishing in Sachsenhausen to be released⁷⁰ together with a number of N.T.S. members. Although Vlasov's organisation contained a number of Ukrainians, the newly-released nationalists refused to join it.⁷¹ Instead they, and other Ukrainians constituted their own committee on 17 March 1945,⁷² in which a number of hitherto separate political groups came together as a counter-balance to Vlasov's committee.⁷³

The Komitet Osvobozhdenia Narodov Rossii⁷⁴ was inaugurated on 14 November 1944 in Prague, a city chosen because it was a Slav capital. The new Committee issued a declaration based upon the "Smolensk" manifesto - as far as many of the Germans involved were concerned, the meeting was simply an exercise in political warfare directed at the U.S.S.R. Only one German ministry, the Foreign Office, was officially represented at the meeting although S.S. officers were present in a number of capacities.⁷⁵

Many of the participants were Vlasov's supporters from Ostpropaganda Abteilung Dabendorf and from N.T.S., together with Eastern workers nominated by the Gestapo.⁷⁶ The Cossacks were represented, although some of the "old" emigration, notably General Piotr Krasnov would have nothing to do with Vlasov.⁷⁷ The five hundred persons present included the National Committee of the Kalmucks but not those of the other nationalities.⁷⁸ The Galician S.S. Division, now referred to as "Ukrainian" refused to recognise the Ukrainian politicians who attended the session.⁷⁹ The Baltic peoples sent no delegates because Vlasov was only concerned with territories

70. Armstrong, op.cit., p.178; Dallin, op.cit., p.p.621-2; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.364.
71. Ibid., p.p.364-5; Armstrong, op.cit., p.180; Dallin, op.cit., p.623.
72. Ibid., p.622; Armstrong, op.cit., p.181; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.365
73. Fischer, op.cit., p.p.90-1; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.365; Armstrong, op.cit., p.186.
74. The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.
75. Fischer, op.cit., Chap. VII; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.213; Steenberg, op.cit., p.p.153-6; Dallin, op.cit., p.633; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.p.367-8; Armstrong, op.cit., p.p.181-2.
76. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.368.
77. Dallin, op.cit., p.656(footnote); Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.210
78. Dallin, op.cit., p.634; S.Steenberg, op.cit., p.p.155-6.
79. Armstrong, op.cit., p.185.

within the 1939 boundaries of the U.S.S.R.⁸⁰ Because German authorities had not troubled to apply pressure, there were no representatives from the Byelorussian and Caucasian peoples.⁸¹

An order was issued on 23 November 1944 establishing Vlasov's first division, to which the number 600 was given. This was created by combining remnants of Kaminsky's 29th S.S. Division, alias R.O.N.A., with the Russian members of Siegling's 30th S.S. Division. To these were added survivors of a number of Ostbataillone which had been reclassified as "Russian". Onto this stock were grafted Ostarbeiter.⁸² After years of building up the size of the armed S.S., Himmler was giving away two divisions; but the gift was not a generous one. Kaminsky's force, after its move from Lokot to Lepel and thence to refugee camps, became demoralised; but it sent a composite regiment to put down the uprising in Warsaw, where it indulged in rape and pillage. Allegedly in consequence of this Kaminsky was liquidated,⁸³ thus removing a possible rival to Vlasov. The other divisions' history was marked by several cases of desertion and mutiny, which resulted in a drastic purging.⁸⁴ The Reichsführer may have thought that Vlasov was the only person who was likely to achieve anything with these undisciplined men. The result was worse than Himmler could have anticipated; the 600th Division only served briefly in the Eastern front before withdrawing to Prague where it assisted the Czechoslovak Resistance to expel German troops.⁸⁵

Attempts were made in October 1944 to bring together Bandera, leader of the activist wing of O.U.N. and Vlasov but failed to secure their

80. G. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.368;

81. S. Steenberg, op.cit., p.p. 155-6; G. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.368.

82. OKH/Gen.St.d.H/Org.Abt.(II) Nr.39004/44, 23 November 1944 -BAMA-HI/418; Fischer, op.cit., chapter VIII; Dallin, op.cit., p.644; Steenberg, op.cit., p.p.168-9, 171-8; Kleist, European Tragedy, (London,1965), p.108.

83. Stein, op.cit., p.265.

84. Some members were executed, others sent to concentration camps. From the rest two Schanzregimenter were formed, leaving a rump from whom the Division was reconstituted.

85. Dallin, op.cit., p.657; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.237; Steenberg, op.cit., p.p. 199-201.

co-operation.⁸⁶ Himmler still had hopes of securing Ukrainian inclusion in K.O.N.R.; and at the beginning of 1945 he opposed the setting up of a separate Ukrainian committee.⁸⁷ The Reichsführer stated that he attached great significance to the Vlasov movement⁸⁸ but talks that were arranged between Vlasov and the Ukrainian émigré general, Shandruk, at the end of January 1945 ended in deadlock since Hitler had spoken critically of Vlasov on the 27th of the month,⁸⁹ Himmler could hardly brow-beat the Ukrainians into accepting Vlasov's leadership. In consequence, the Ukrainian National Committee was recognised by the S.S. and by the Ostministerium.⁹⁰ On 17 March 1945 the existence of a Ukrainian National Army was announced.⁹¹ In the same period the German government recognised the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Crimean Tartar committees as the official representatives of their peoples.⁹² This meant that in spite of Vlasov's hopes and Himmler's promises, K.O.N.R. ^{officially} represented the Russians ~~officially~~ and Kalmucks alone.

A further batch of Russian battalions was used to establish Vlasov's second division the 650th.⁹³ There was also a Russian brigade, the 599th, in Denmark⁹⁴ which could have provided the core of a third division and which did, in fact, despatch a couple of battalions to the Eastern front.⁹⁵ The three infantry formations together with air and anti-tank units, reserves and schools constituted Vlasov's armed forces.⁹⁶ R.O.A. had ceased to be

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86. R.F.S.S./S.S.H.A., V.S.T.gb.Nr. 1183/44, Adjtr.Tgb.Nr.970/44, 6 October 1944- T175, Roll 125, Frame 2650497; SS.Gruppenführer Dr. Wendler 'Ostpolitik', 20 November 1944- T175, Roll 125, Frames 2650555-2650560.
87. Vermerk über die Besprechung beim R.F.S.S., 8 January 1945 - BA-NS31/33.
88. Himmler to S.S. Obergruppenführer Wolff, Bra/H, 30 January 1945 - T175, Roll 29.
89. Lagebesprechung im Führerhauptquartier, Nr.24/45, 27 January 1945 - 3786 FS, also in W. Warlimont op.cit., p.503.
90. Fischer, op.cit., p.p.207-8; Armstrong, op.cit., p.186.
91. Armstrong, op.cit., p.184.
92. Dallin, op.cit., p.654
93. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II)Nr.70074/45, 17 January 1945; Steenberg, op.cit., p.172; Kleist, op.cit., p.122.
94. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II)Nr.40019/44, 10 January 1945, -BAMA-H1/421.
95. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II), Nr.80274/45, 24 February 1945; Steenberg, op.cit., p.173.
96. O.K.W./W.F.St./B/Org.Abt.(II), Nr.72012/45, 28 April 1945, -BAMA - H1/419; G. Fischer, op.cit., Chapter VIII; A. Dallin, op.cit., p.644 (footnote).

a phantom, but it was far from being a field army in strength and in organisation. The inclusion of the Cossack Cavalry Corps would have brought Vlasov's army closer to reality. But although it was nominally under Vlasov's command the Corps did not effectively come under his control,⁹⁷ nor did the "White" Russian Schutzkorps, which had also been operating in Yugoslavia.⁹⁸

As a result of German recognition of the committees of the Soviet minorities the S.S. did not relinquish control of the two Waffenverbände to Vlasov. The Russians of the 30th S.S. Division were surrendered to Vlasov's 600th Division;⁹⁹ but the S.S. retained the Byelorussians of Siegling's Division as a independent brigade.¹⁰⁰ In keeping with German practice at that time, this brigade was upgraded, in name, to become a new S.S. division, its first Byelorussian division, taking again the number 30.¹⁰¹ This division, too, was not handed over to Vlasov.

Himmler had finally been persuaded to make use of Vlasov; and at some small expense to the S.S. in manpower, he had made him^a Russian leader - but not an all-Russian leader. Himmler's master, Hitler, remained unconvinced to the end; and at a conference on 27 January 1945 he expressed his distaste at the idea of Russians in German uniform. The Führer was critical of Vlasov, himself, and expressed the belief that his soldiers would desert if given the opportunity.¹⁰² Almost two months later, at a similar conference, when the question of apportioning weapons arose, Hitler made it clear that

97. A. Dallin, op.cit., pp.644,⁶⁵⁶ (footnote); Steenberg, op.cit., p.156.
 98. Ibid. p.219; Kleist, op.cit., p.199.
 99. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II), Nr.39004/44 23 November 1944 - BAMA-H1/418; V.D.S.S., Nr.944, 17 January 1945; S.S.F.H.A., Amt.II Org.Abt.Ia/II, Tgb. Nr.164/45, 15 January 1945 - T175 Roll 140, Frames 2668448 to 2668451.
 100. Ibid., Weissruthenische Leitstelle C2, Nr.328/45, 9 January 1945, - Nu. 2586.
 101. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(I), Nr.21654/45, 17 February 1945.
 102. Lagebesprechung im Führerhauptquartier, Nr.24/45, 27 January 1945 - 3786 PSI and in W. Warlimont, op.cit., p.503.

if it was a choice between giving arms to Vlasov's personnel or to a German division, the latter should be given preference.¹⁰³ He went further and ordered the disarming of all foreign units of little value.¹⁰⁴ A week later an attempt was made to put the spirit if not the precise letter of Hitler's ruling into effect when the General Staff ordered that the Ukrainian S.S. Division should be disarmed and its small-arms given to a new German parachute division.¹⁰⁵ When this, apparently, proved to be impossible, an attempt was made to absorb the Ukrainians into the 10th Parachute Division.¹⁰⁶ But this, too, failed for, on 27 April 1945, Shandruk assumed control of the Ukrainian formation as the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army.¹⁰⁷

Refusal to fight and instances of defection¹⁰⁸ obliged the General Staff to issue an order on 9 April 1945 disarming foreign units irrespective of nationality, although the Hungarians were the only race singled out for mention!¹⁰⁹ This order, too, was probably not very widely applied. It was certainly not put into immediate effect, in every case. Ten days later it was necessary for the Commander-in-Chief West to order the disarming of Vlasov's second division, the Indian Legion and the Volunteer Depot Division. Their heavy weapons were to be turned over to German forces in the West.¹¹⁰ The fault of these three formations, as in the case of the Ukrainian Division, was not that they were of proven unreliability but that they were unready for combat. In the case of the 650th Division, the order could not be enforced because on the day of issue the formation

103. On 23 March 1945. W. Warlimont. op.cit., p.511; Stein, op.cit., p.p.194-5

104. Chef des Gen.St.d.H., Nr.1000/45, 25 March 1945.

105. Ibid., Nr.1097/45, 30 March 1945;

Ibid., Nr.1135/45, 1 April 1945.

106. O.K.W., W.F.St., Opz.Abt., Ia, Nr.4178, 4 April 1945.

107. Armstrong, op.cit., p.185 (footnote); Fischer, op.cit., p.208; P.Shandruk, Arms of Valor (New York 1959), p.271.

108. O.K.W., K.T.B. IV/2 p.1224.

109. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II), Nr.80429/45, 9 April 1945.

. Roumanians had also gone over to the enemy.

110. Chef.Gen.Stab.Ob.West Ia, Nr.414218/45, 19 April, 1945, citing O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II), Nr.72076/45.

had to leave its assembly area at Münsingen to avoid the advancing Red Army, taking its equipment with it.¹¹¹

German salvage operations in the last year of the war produced a number of units and created or expanded a number of formations. They were totally insufficient to make good Germany's casualties let alone to alter the course of the war. Several of the formations were undertaken too late to have been completely ready before the German capitulation. Of the foreign elements to reach the front, those from Western Europe in general distinguished themselves, while their comrades from Eastern Europe and Asia justified Hitler's lack of faith in them by their unwillingness to fight and even by their unreliability.

111. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.384.

Part II
Motivation
Chapter Five - Before "Barbarossa"

Since the end of the Second World War a myth has gained currency that the non-German volunteers in the Waffen-S.S. constituted a multi-racial army of idealists who had enrolled in order to preserve Western civilisation from "Asiatic Bolshevism." The Waffen-S.S. has been portrayed as a prototype of the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and members of the former have been depicted as men whose fault lay in that they had lived before their time and who were unjustly punished after the war for taking their stand against the U.S.S.R. in advance of their governments and peoples.⁽¹⁾ The fact that most of the non-Germans who enlisted in the German armed forces were employed in the Eastern theatre-of-operations for at least part of their service appears to support the view that hostility to Communism was the force that drove them to don German uniform. Although this was true in many cases it was not true in all of them. The earliest non-Germans to enrol in the German forces did so well before the German attack on the Soviet Union. Indeed with the exception of the few non-German members of the S.S. Verfügungstruppe who had enlisted before 23 August 1939, the earliest non-German recruits volunteered at a time when the Third Reich was on cordial terms with the U.S.S.R.

The First Volunteers

Non-Germans in barracked S.S. units before 1939 were few in number - there were a mere twenty Germanic members in 1938⁽²⁾ - but the motives that impelled these men to enlist were to influence others

1. Stein, op.cit., pp. 137-8.

2. Ibid., p.94.

throughout the war even though other factors were later to play a part in bringing in recruits. The Armed S.S. was untried in battle; yet non-Germans without any obligation to serve in the German forces, were attracted to it, although their physique would have secured their membership of "crack" units in their own countries. The nature of the S.S. Verfügungstruppe provided the reason why racial German and Germanic volunteers applied to join it; it was a full-time National-Socialist armed force. Political conviction drove keen non-German National-Socialists to volunteer for it. Although there were National-Socialist parties in Scandinavia and in Western Europe many of which had their own para-military bodies only in Germany was there a National-Socialist party in power and nowhere else in consequence, could a barracked Nazi militia be found. Even if there had been an alternative National-Socialist military force, many of those who in fact found their way into the S.S. Verfügungstruppe would still have opted for the S.S. because they believed in the concept of a Germanic Reich. Citizens of foreign states who felt an affinity for the German people and who wished their home countries to be associated with Germany were welcomed by the S.S. V.T., provided they met its racial and physical requirements⁽³⁾

The ethnic German and Germanic volunteers in the S.S. V.T. before the war, by virtue of their membership of a National-Socialist

3. As an alternative to the Wehrmacht and S.S. V.T. German National-Socialists could perform their compulsory military service in the full-time Standarte "Feldherrnhalle" of the brown-shirted SturmAbteilungen. It attracted youths from a Brownshirt rather than S.S. background. Since the S.A. was less selective than the S.S. and had declined in importance after the Rohm purge of June 1934, "Feldherrnhalle" was less prestigious than the Armed S.S.

organisation, were opposed to Communism; but the German Communist Party had been driven underground. The Sicherheitsdienst of the S.S. Hunted down German Communists, while its Totenkopfverbände guarded them in the concentration camps. Although the Armed S.S. existed to maintain internal order, the possibility of a Communist insurrection in the Reich itself was remote. The conclusion of the German-Soviet agreement in the summer of 1939 made an uprising even more improbable. This made the anti-communism of the S.S. V.T. largely theoretical and hardly provided non-Germans with a strong motive for enlistment.

Men were impelled to join the pre-war Verfügungstruppe in much the same way that men volunteer for the Guards, the commandos or the parachutists. Although the full-time barracked units of the S.S. were devoid of traditions and were untried in battle they were few in number and could in consequence, afford to be very selective. In the eyes of fanatical National-Socialists, the Armed S.S. had the virtue that in its Leibstandarte, it provided the guard for the Führer, Adolf Hitler, at his residences and during his journeys. In order to be admitted to the Armed S.S. in peacetime, candidates were required to be physically, fitter than was required by the German armed forces and to be of Nordic blood. To the young German National-Socialist before 1939, membership of the Armed S.S. meant belonging to a racial and physical élite. It was for many the culmination of years of hard training and anxious waiting in the Hitler Youth, in the ordinary, Allgemeine, S.S. and the Labour Service.

The German armed forces were less attractive to non-German National-Socialists than the S.S. because of their traditional aloofness to politics. They had no strong tradition of employing

foreign soldiers and neither needed nor sought foreign recruits who would only create administrative difficulties if they were enrolled. The Wehrmacht, in spite of its much greater size, had few elite units to compete with the armed S.S. The Army maintained Guard Battalions at Berlin and Vienna for performing public duties, units which in 1939 provided the basis for Regiment Grossdeutschland. The German Air Force contained General Goring's own regiment, part of which carried out ceremonial functions in the capital but which consisted in the main of anti-aircraft units. It had a parachute battalion which was detached in 1939 to form, with the Army's sole parachute unit, the nucleus of Germany's first airborne formation. None of these elements had traditions of its own and none had received its baptism of fire, so in these respects they were no better than the S.S. Verfügungstruppe.

Nevertheless in spite of the armed forces' general reluctance to use foreigners, the Armed S.S. did not have a total monopoly of the non-Germans who served with the invader during the Polish campaign. The Kampftruppen of Polish subjects of German origin, who slipped across the frontier into Poland ahead of the German ground forces were the responsibility of the armed forces' Amt Ausland Abwehr.⁽⁴⁾ The S.S. did not get its hands upon these men and the other non-Germans, who joined them in the "Brandenburg" formation until after the downfall of Admiral Cänäris, the head of Abwehr.⁽⁵⁾ For the

4. de Jong, op.cit., pp. 153-5; G. Peis, The Man who started the War (London, 1960), pp. 118-9, also mentions the groups of Volksdeutsche organised by the Sicherheitsdienst to provoke incidents on the German-Polish frontier in 1939.

5. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(I), Nr. 19280/44, 13 September 1944, S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org.Abt.Ia/II, Tgb.Nr.3473/44, 4 October 1944.

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attack on Poland, Abwehr also recruited Ukrainian exiles into a penetration unit, "Bergbauernhilfe". The members of B.B.H. hoped to secure autonomy for the Ukrainian - populated areas of Poland. They were not concerned to establish a National-Socialist régime there and, naturally, had no interest in Pan-Germanism. They were anti-Polish and insofar as they envisaged the eventual union of Galian with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, they were anti-Russian, if not specifically anti-Communist. Their use during the Polish campaign was restricted for fear of offending the Soviet government, with whom Germany partitioned Poland. (6)

The racial Germans who filtered across the Polish frontier, those who spontaneously assisted the passage of German units and the troops of the Free City of Danzig were all moved by the desire that their homes should once again form part of the Reich. The burgers who joined Heimwehr Danzig could have served this purpose equally well by enlisting in the Landespolizei or the Flakabteilung of their city; but National Socialist ideology and high standards attracted them to the unit representing the Armed S.S. in Danzig. When the German Army and Airforce absorbed the land (8) and anti-aircraft (9) units of the Freie Stadt, the Heimwehr was taken into the Totenkopfdivision of the S.S. (10)

6. Armstrong, op.cit., p.42; Dallin, op.cit., p.115.

7. L. de Jong, op.cit., p.151.

8. Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op.cit., II, 27.

9. H.A. Koch, Flak (Bad Nauheim, 1954), p.32.

10. Totenkopf-Regiment 3, Stammtafel - BAMA - S/5 - 3/1.

Before the Western Campaign of 1940

Statistics of 4 May 1940 indicate the extent to which non-Germans enlisted in the Armed S.S. during the early months of the war. Although it still possessed a majority of men from the "old" Reich and had received contingents from Austria, the Saarland, Sudetenland and Memel, it had also attracted recruits from the more recently - incorporated territories of the Upper Silesia, the Warthe and Vistula regions, from the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and from the German-occupied General gouvernement area of Poland.⁽¹¹⁾

In addition to these there were Germans from the Baltic states and Volhynia who had been "re-settled" in Germany, by agreement with the U.S.S.R. Although these men enlisted for the S.S. on German soil or in territories where Germany had taken control and where, consequently, S.S. recruiters could freely operate, in many cases the question of the recruits' nationality was not immediately clarified; and for that reason, the men were not obliged to join the German forces straightway. It may not have needed great foresight for a West Prussian or Volhynian German to realise that eventually German citizenship - and with it conscription - would be extended to him, but he was not required to anticipate events.⁽¹²⁾

11. [Der Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen S.S.,] Übersichts plan, 4 May 1940, in BA - NS19/380 and T175, Roll 104, Frames 2626381-3.

12. The Wehrpflicht was extended to Danzig on 13 October 1939 - ReichsGesetzblatt 1939 I, S2030 but not to the other incorporated Eastern areas until 30 April 1940 - ReichsGesetzblatt 1940 I, S907 - Absolon, op.cit., p.7.

Regulations establishing the Deutsche Volksliste were not published until 12 September 1940 - Koehl, op.cit., p.81. Racial examiners of the S.S. were able to select candidates before this date by genealogical and anthropometric study of those who presented themselves.

The Germans who had previously been citizens of Danzig, Poland and the Baltic republics had in many cases belonged to the political, cultural and athletic organisations of their minorities, through which the German National Socialist Party circulated its propaganda. They welcomed the reincorporation of their homes into Germany or regarded their "resettlement" in Germany with optimism. A feeling of affinity for the Reichsdeutsche inclined racial Germans to volunteer for the German forces, while those who were strongly National-Socialist favoured the Armed S.S. which was less concerned about the legal quibbles of enlisting men who were still technically citizens of foreign states, even of Poland, with whom a state of war persisted.

Material considerations probably played an important part in persuading "resettlers" and occupants of German - controlled areas to enlist in the German forces. To bear arms for Germany was a qualification for German citizenship⁽¹³⁾ and had the advantage that the volunteer and his family were accepted as Germans and received better treatment than the Polish population. In the case of the "resettler", enlistment provided him with employment and helped to dispel uncertainties about his future. Since this was the period of the "phoney war", many an Umsiedler must have imagined that by enlisting he was only exchanging one kind of camp for another; but that in so doing, he was drawing himself and his family to the favourable attention of the German authorities.

No unit of the Armed S.S. participated in the very brief campaign against Denmark but Berger quickly sent in a recruiting commission and in less than a month the S.S. had forty recruits

13. Chef des S.S.H.A., VI/A/Az. 1k/8.1.40, Einbürgerung von S.S. Angehörigen nichtdeutscher Staatsangehörigkeit, 8 January 1941 - T175, Roll 156, Frame 2685953.

from the Kingdom's German minority.⁽¹⁴⁾ Of that total, however, only five were still with Ersatz units of the Verfügungstruppe, which would appear to indicate that the majority had made their way across the frontier before April 9th, while Denmark was still a neutral state. The passage of German troops through North Schleswig provoked sympathetic military action on the part of its German population,⁽¹⁵⁾ demonstrating its pan-German and National Socialist feelings. The few North Schleswigers who had already enlisted in the German forces before 9 April 1940 were influenced by the same feelings but to a greater degree, with the result that they took positive action while the bulk of their Volksgruppe remained passive until German troops arrived. There is here a similarity to Poland, where a small minority crossed the frontier and were enlisted by Abwehr while the vast majority remained in their homes.

The figures for May 1940 also include Germans domiciled in states friendly to Germany - in Italy, Roumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia.⁽¹⁶⁾ Germany and Italy concluded a treaty in May 1939 permitting the former to extricate South Tyrolese in order to "resettle" them.⁽¹⁷⁾ The process was never completed, but it gave officials of the S.S. an excuse for visiting the German settlements, which probably accounts for the high total - 781 recruits - compared with those of Germany's other potential allies. Although the

14. Der Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen S.S. Tgb.Nr.156/40,
16 April 1940 - NO5897, Case XI. Doc.Bk.66G; Übersichtsplan, 4 May 1940.

15. de Jong, op.cit., p.160.

16. Übersichtsplan, 4 May, 1940.

17. R.L.Koehl, R.K.F.D.V. p.40

governments of the other three kingdoms wished to ingratiate themselves with Germany, they were reluctant to lose manpower and sovereignty and to compromise their neutrality by permitting their German subjects to serve in the German forces. Nevertheless, the propaganda disseminated within the Volksgruppen induced 110 Germans from Roumania, 48 from Yugoslavia and 24 from Hungary to find their way to the Fatherland and enlist in the Armed S.S.⁽¹⁸⁾ The comparatively low number from Hungary is possibly indicative of the extent to which its German minority had become Magyarised.

Numbered among the Volksdeutsche in May 1940 were, as might be expected, a few from Germany's former overseas colonies who, like their colleagues from England, France, Australia and Palestine may have been spurred on by the possibility of internment, had they remained. There were, on the other hand, individuals from countries that had recently been neutral states - the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg - from the still neutral and friendly U.S.S.R. and from South American states whose neutrality lasted longer.⁽¹⁹⁾

These men had been under no pressure to join the Armed S.S. The S.S. was not, however, the only recipient of Germans from abroad since those who had retained their German citizenship were liable for service in the Wehrmacht. A Wehrbezirkskommando Ausland existed in Berlin for the purpose of supervising the call-up of Germans from abroad.⁽²⁰⁾ These men, like those domiciled in the Reich, could perform their service in the Armed S.S. and, on the evidence of the figures for May 1940, a few were attracted to it. Abwehr also sought out Germans with a knowledge of foreign languages and topography for its "Brandenburg" formation which, to quote one example,

18. Übersichtsplan, 4 May 1940. 19. Ibid. 20. A. Absolon, op.cit., p.136

employed Palestinian Germans in the Arab unit it sponsored. (21)

The figures provided by the Ergänzungsamt of the Armed S.S. do not indicate whether the Volksdeutsche it received from China, Bulgaria, Brazil and other places (22) had in fact retained their German nationality or whether they were first, second or third generation emigrants who felt themselves to be German. These "stray" Germans were impelled by patriotism in the same way as were the British settlers in Latin America who joined the forces of the Mother country in two World Wars. Other parallels were the Poles from France, Belgium and the Americans who enlisted in Sikorski's forces-in-exile and the Dutchmen from Canada and South Africa who enrolled in the Royal Netherlands Brigade in the United Kingdom.

Between May 1940 and the assault upon the U.S.S.R. the German armed forces received further infusions of Volksdeutsche, but they represented no new categories. The conclusion of the Western Campaign had brought Alsace, Lorraine and Luxemburg into the Third Reich and into the military administrative system; but conscription was not initiated in those territories until 1942. (23) Those who enlisted before 22 June 1941 were impelled by a feeling of Germanness, by National-Socialism, by the glamour of the uniform, by hope of adventure or by material considerations. The same motives impelled "resettlers" from the Bukovina and Bessarabia (24) and

21. O.K.H., Chef.H.Rüst. and B.d.E.,A.H.A. Ia VI, Nr.19584/43, 1 June 1943, Para. III 2 - B.A.M.A. - 37616/2; Gen. Kdo.z.b.V. LXVIII, Abt. Ia, Nr.0243/43, 30 June 1943, Para 2c - B.A.M.A. - 37616/2.

22. "Übersichtsplan, 4 May 1940.

23. Absolon, op.cit. p.7.

24. Documents on the Expulsion, III, 57

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frontier-crossers from Yugoslavia⁽²⁵⁾ and Roumania⁽²⁶⁾ to enlist in the German Forces. Enlistment in the S.S. was made easier for the ethnic Germans of the two kingdoms when S.S. Division "Reich" passed through them during the Balkan campaign - literally picking up recruits in transit.⁽²⁷⁾ The strength of pro-German feeling may be gauged by the uprisings that took place in Eastern Belgium⁽²⁸⁾ and in Yugoslavia⁽²⁹⁾ when German troops entered, reminiscent of earlier incidents in Western Poland and North Schleswig.

Some of the manpower figures of the Armed S.S. for May 1940 are those of volunteers of Germanic, but not German blood. By far the largest contingent consisted of forty-four Swiss, while Germany's enemies, France and England contributed eight each.⁽³⁰⁾ The French contribution possibly included Alsatians and Lorrainers who felt themselves to be German rather than French; perhaps their fathers had served in the German forces during the First World War. The eight Englishmen were perhaps ardent National Socialists who may have risked internment under the terms of Defence Regulation 18B, had they remained in the United Kingdom. The same section includes men from East Africa, South-Western Africa and Palestine,⁽³¹⁾ who, because they were not counted among the Volksdeutsche were perhaps

25. Erg.Amt d. Waffen S.S., Tgb.Nr.463/40, 10 September 1940, - NO1821, Case XI, Doc. Bk.43. Telegramm Nr.678, 13 September 1940 - NO5695, Case XI, Doc. Bk.43.

26. Documents on the Expulsion, III, 57.

27. R.F.S.S., Chef des S.S.H.A. Tgb.Nr.347/41, 26 April 1941, - NO714, Case XI, Doc. Bk.43 and T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634796, deals with those from Yugoslavia; Ergänzungsstelle Donau XVII Wien, Spruch Nr.40, 27 April 1941 - NO3362, Case XI, Doc. Bk.43 concerns those from Roumania.

28. de Jong, op.cit., pp. 197-8.

29. Ibid., p. 233.

30. Übersichtsplan, 4 May 1940.

31. Ibid.

of mixed but part-German origin; all three areas contained German settlers. These men, too, probably risked internment, if they remained with German nationality. If they were not German nationals, they risked prosecution on their return.

The decision to join the Armed S.S. was less serious for the volunteers who came from benevolent-neutral countries, such as the Soviet Union, Italy, Hungary Roumania and Yugoslavia, and even for Americans the consequences were limited. The volunteers may have committed a technical offence in joining the forces of a foreign state - it could even be argued that the S.S. did not constitute part of the German armed forces - but they could not be tried for treason. On the other hand, the S.S. could not easily bring pressure upon them. Political or racial commitment was the main motive for enlistment. A man wishing to pursue a military career could do so more simply in the forces of his own country. It was not necessary to join the Armed S.S. to satisfy a love of adventure or a desire to travel. Indeed, from the end of the Polish campaign until the attack on the Low Countries, the Armed S.S. had little of either attraction to offer. It is significant that in the countries from which the Germanic volunteers came there were either National-Socialist parties or German "colonies" which may have influenced the volunteers. (32)

Neither National-Socialism nor Pan-Germanism can account for the presence of ten Goralians in the list of 4 May 1940. (33) Although they were included among the volunteers of Germanic blood, they

32. There was a branch of Musserts' N.S.B. in the East Indies.

33. Übersichtsplan, 4 May 1940.

belonged to a Śląw minority in the Generalgouvernement which had ~~had~~ supplied mountain troops to the Polish Army. They were not in the same situation as the Masurian, Kashube and Slonzak minorities in the incorporated territories. These peoples had a long-standing association with Prussia which resulted in their inclusion in the third of the four divisions of the German Volksliste. By collaborating with Germany, these minorities would be allowed to retain their property and not be dispossessed by German settlers. Nevertheless there were advantages for the Goralians, too. After the upheaval of the conquest and partition of Poland, volunteers may have felt economically secure in a German uniform. By enlisting, a Goralian might qualify for German citizenship. In any case he and his family could expect better treatment from the occupiers than his Polish neighbours received. It would, moreover, be a natural reaction in unsettled times for members of a small minority to side with the conqueror.

The statistics of 4 May 1940 only covered non-Germans enrolled by the S.S., not the few serving in the German Armed Forces. In preparation for the attack upon the Netherlands Abwehr recruited members of the German branch of the Dutch National Socialist movement.⁽³⁴⁾ Some of the men had probably lived in Germany long enough to regard themselves as German rather than Dutch. Others may have feared that refusal to serve Abwehr might cause the German authorities to rescind their right to live and work in the Reich. Small parties of these Dutchmen led German troops across the Dutch frontier, compounding their treason by wearing Dutch uniforms. In spite of heavy casualties, survivors and other Dutchmen from the expatriate Sport en Spel organisation, undeterred, enlisted in the S.S. Division "Wiking".⁽³⁵⁾ Although some deluded individuals may

34. de Jong, op.cit., pp. 185-6; van der Zee, op.cit., pp. 59-65.

35. Ibid., p.66.

have been under the misapprehension that they had merely enrolled for police training, these particular Dutchmen appear by their actions to have wished their motherland to be associated with the Reich and to have wanted to see National-Socialism extended to it.

After the Western Campaign

The Campaigns of 1940 brought S.S. recruiters into contact with considerable numbers of Germanic men. In consequence the majority of the Germanic volunteers who had enlisted, in the Armed S.S. before the attack on the U.S.S.R. were subjects of the four monarchies defeated during those campaigns. These men became members for the most part of the Standarten "Nordland"⁽³⁶⁾ in the case of the Norwegians and Danes and "Westland",⁽³⁷⁾ in the case of the Dutch and Flemings. The men who volunteered so soon after their countries' defeat were affected by the political situation in the occupied Western European countries following the German victory.⁽³⁸⁾ The monarchs and governments of Norway and Holland had taken refuge abroad. A number of prominent Belgian politicians had fled to England where they acted as a government-in-exile. These three groups endeavored to continue the war against Germany, although in the case of the Netherlands there was no constitutional provision for the exercise of governmental authority from abroad.⁽³⁹⁾ Potential recruits for the S.S. could adopt the attitude that their rulers, by abandoning their subjects, had

36. Established by order of Hitler, 20 April 1940 - O.B.d.H./A.H.A./Ia IV, Nr.8301/40, 7 May 1940.

37. Established by order of Hitler, 25 May 1940 - N05743, Case XI, Doc.Bk.66F.

38. Steiner op.cit., p.60.

39. DLittlejohn, op.cit., p.91.

abdicated their powers and thereby absolved their subjects from their allegiance. In Denmark, the sovereign, government and parliamentary institutions had survived but were powerless to prevent recruitment for the S.S.; as were the King of the Belgians and the Secretaries - General who administered his occupied Kingdom.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Those who were inclined to join the S.S. could interpret silence as approval, overlooking statutes against enlistment in foreign armed forces and ignoring the absence of any peace treaties with Germany.

The Germanic members of the Armed S.S. who volunteered before the opening of Operation "Barbarossa" did so at a time when Britain was the only power still waging war against Germany. A former commander of Germanic volunteers has suggested that his charges felt that Britain had betrayed their countries,⁽⁴¹⁾ but this belief does not stand up to examination. The four kingdoms overrun in 1940 had all wished to pursue a policy of neutrality and, in consequence, had no military alliance with Britain or France, yet both these countries had rendered assistance when time permitted. Denmark's rapid capitulation prevented her from receiving any Allied help, while there was little that French or British troops were able to do to assist the Dutch. Allied assistance to Norway proved unavailing, but that country was "abandoned" by the French and Free Polish forces as well as by British troops. Belgium was assisted by both French and British formations until the Belgians' own capitulation made evacuation imperative. The defeat of the Danish, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian forces was due to German military superiority, not to British betrayal. Nevertheless, there were probably some among the volunteers who believed or professed

40. Knoebel, op.cit., pp.134-5.

41. Steiner, op.cit., p.60.

(42)

to believe in the perfidy of Albion.

In the case of Norway, German propaganda claimed that the intervention of the Wehrmacht had foiled a British plot to occupy the country.⁽⁴³⁾ Even after the German occupation of Norway was complete, Anglophobia was a theme upon which the Germans and their sympathisers could still harp. On 13th January 1941, Vidkun Quisling broadcast an appeal for volunteers for Standarte "Nordland", who were to participate in "the war of freedom and independence against English despotism".⁽⁴⁴⁾ None but the most naive of Norwegians could have felt oppressed or threatened by the United Kingdom at that time.⁽⁴⁵⁾ When another collaborator, Jonas Lie laid claim to the Orkney and Shetland Islands and the Outer Hebrides,⁽⁴⁶⁾ few Norwegian patriots can have taken his utterances seriously.

The brevity and nature of the campaign of 1940 meant that casualties were not heavy. Many citizens of defeated countries were relieved that the fighting was over so quickly,⁽⁴⁷⁾ in fact the whole war seemed to have ended, or to be about to end, in a German victory. There was no basic antipathy between the Germans

- 42. Some Frenchmen regarded the evacuation of the British Expeditionary force as an act of desertion.
- 43. German Government, Note to Norwegian Government, 9 April 1940.
- 44. Fritt Folk, 13 January 1941; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13 January 1941. J. Andenaes, O. Riste, M. Skodvin, Norway in the Second World War (Oslo, 1966), p.72; Littlejohn, op.cit., p.27; Keesings Contemporary Archives 1941, p.4513.
- 45. The British commando raid on the Loften Islands did not take place until 3-4 March 1941.
- 46. Fritt Folk, October 1940; Littlejohn op.cit., p.30.
- 47. Steiner, op.cit., p.60.

and the Germanic peoples whom they had defeated, while the vanquished felt a certain reluctant admiration for the war machine that had overwhelmed them. Its healthy, young members behaved correctly and created a good impression in the occupied Western countries.⁽⁴⁸⁾ No resistance movement had developed sufficiently in 1940 to set the population against the occupiers, and they, for their part, had little time to make the political blunders which were later to antagonise the vanquished⁽⁴⁹⁾ to many of the people of occupied Western Europe, it must have seemed that Germany would be in control for the foreseeable future and that, for the sake of their countries, it was advisable to work with the Germans in order to make the association a harmonious one.⁽⁵⁰⁾ These considerations may have inclined some young men to listen to the blandishments of S.S. recruiters; but those who were relieved that hostilities had ceased would not have joined an armed German organisation particularly while there was the possibility of conflict with the British.

The first commander of the "Wiking" Division suggested that Western European volunteers enlisted not because they were opportunist or National-Socialist, but because of the disillusionment of Europe's youth with their governments following the great depression.⁽⁵¹⁾ Steiner maintained that young men were impressed by Germany's economic recovery at the hands of ~~the hands of~~ the National Socialists, but that their sympathies with the Reich were

48. Ibid., p.61.

49. Ibid., p.60.

50. Ibid., p.66.

51. Ibid., p.41.

destroyed by the arrival of German invaders. This was followed by the destruction of the most powerful army of Western Europe; but this caused young men to blame their own governments rather than the Germans for the disaster. At this time of disillusionment, according to Steiner, they observed the German occupiers and were so impressed that they began to make favourable comparisons. Steiner maintained, in conclusion, that these factors coupled with fear for the future of their countries led Germanic youths to decide to enter the German forces.⁽⁵²⁾ Steiner's analysis, however only explains the situation which made Germanic adolescents listen to the appeals of the S.S. The depression of the 1930's caused thousands of young men to seek a solution in ~~the~~ left-wing politics rather than in Fascism or National-Socialism; and many young men recovered from the shock of defeat and occupation to become members of the resistance. Even for those who decided to collaborate, enlistment in the S.S. was not the only course open to them. When the S.S. recruiters approached the shaken young men of Western Europe it was probably the opportunists and National-Socialists amongst them who were first to respond.

Apart from National-Socialist slogans and attempts to whip up Anglophilia, the recruiters for the Germanic armed S.S. had little to offer potential recruits before 22 June 1941. This mattered little to opportunists who hoped to earn the gratitude of the occupiers by joining the S.S. Verfügungstruppe. While serving, they were entitled to the same pay and allowances as their German comrades, with the possibility of becoming officers in the S.S. after one year's service. On the conclusion of two years' service

52. Ibid., p.41.

volunteers could receive German citizenship in addition to that of their mother-country, while after four they became eligible for twenty-five to thirty hectares of farmland in occupied Poland. Men with dependents could receive up to 85% of their earnings in civil life. After serving in the Armed S.S. its members were eligible for training to fit them for a civilian trade or for positions in the German civil service or police. (53)

These terms were less attractive to established married men, for whom membership of the Armed S.S. entailed a financial sacrifice. (54) Service in the Armed S.S. appealed more to young men without training and qualifications and to landless peasants. It was necessary to survive the war in order to enjoy the retirement benefits of the S.S.; but from the summer of 1940, with Britain isolated, it must have seemed to the potential recruit that the war was nearly over. This feeling would have persisted until the beginning of the winter of 1941, when it became apparent that the U.S.S.R. was not to be rapidly defeated. Many who volunteered for the two Germanic S.S. regiments must have done so in the belief that they were committing themselves to peace-time soldiering, which would culminate in their obtaining a favourable position in association with the German victors. There was little in this to appeal to those with a sense of adventure except the possibility of travelling to other parts of German-dominated Europe.

53. Ergänzungsamt der Waffen S.S., Overzicht voor Plaatsing adjs Vrijwilliger in de S.S. Standarte Westland (undated recruiting leaflet) - T175, Roll 159, Frame 2690394; Bartetzko, op.cit., pp. 45-6; Knoebel, op.cit., p.109.

54. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.123.

The rather woolly appeals to "participate in the political reorganisation of Europe . . . in the National-Socialist sense"⁽⁵⁵⁾ or to join in the "European war of liberation . . . of your own free choice"⁽⁵⁶⁾ can have found little response in those who were not already National-Socialists. But the German recruiters were aided by the fact that the Germanic National-Socialist parties were also urging their members to enlist in the Armed S.S. Some parties, namely the Nationaal-Socialistische Nederlandsche Arbeiders Partij,⁽⁵⁷⁾ the Duits-Vlaamsche Arbeids gemeenschap and a wing of the Nationaal Socialistische Beweging in Nederland,⁽⁵⁹⁾ favoured annexation of the Netherlands and Flanders to the Reich and were unreserved in their assistance to the German recruiting campaign.

Other parties wished to establish right-wing régimes in their own countries without subscribing to German annexation. Danmarks National Socialist iske Arbejder Parti,⁽⁶⁰⁾ the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond,⁽⁶¹⁾ Quisling's Nasjonal Samling⁽⁶²⁾ and most of the Dutch Nationaal Socialistische Beweging⁽⁶³⁾ were all separatist. These parties lent their support to the S.S. recruiters for their own

55. Ibid., p.34.

56. Ibid., p.35.

57. Ibid., p.28; the N.S.N.A.P.

58. Frequently called Deutsch-Flämische Arbeitsgemeinschaft, or simply Devlag. Ibid., pp.30-1; Knoebel, op.cit., pp.204-7.

59. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.28; the N.S.B.

60. Ibid., p.29; the D.N.S.A.P.

61. Ibid., p.30; Knoebel, op.cit., p. 148; the V.N.V.

62. Bartetzko, op.cit., p. 29; the N.S.

63. Ibid., pp.27-8.

ends, in the hope that by serving the Germans well they would be rewarded with political power. They naively hoped that, by providing the S.S. with recruits, the S.S. might be weaned away from the idea of a Greater German Reich. Nevertheless, by encouraging their members to join the Armed S.S. they gained influence with the S.S. by making it dependent upon them for manpower. They could threaten to dissuade their party-members from enlisting or re-engaging in the Armed S.S. Even allowing for exaggeration on the part of the Germanic National-Socialist parties, they appear to have supplied a number of the original members of the Regiments "Nordland" and "Westland"

The national-separatist political parties were displeased when the ordinary, political S.S. was extended into Flanders⁽⁶⁴⁾ and the Netherlands,⁽⁶⁵⁾ in September 1940, and into Norway,⁽⁶⁶⁾ in May 1941. This was a logical step in the development of the S.S. as a Germanic order; but it was also intended to increase the influence of the S.S. in the occupied countries and to assist recruiting for the Waffen S.S.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The leaders of the autonomist parties were alarmed because the S.S. was dedicated to the idea of absorption of the Germanic lands into the Reich.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Furthermore, the creation

64. Ibid., p.33; Knoebel, op.cit. pp.140-5; H.P. Taylor, Uniforms of the S.S., Vol. II, Germanische S.S., 1940-1945, 2nd edition (London, 1970), pp.22-5.

65. Bartetzko, op.cit., pp. 32-3; Taylor op.cit., pp. 2-5.

66. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.33; Taylor, op.cit. pp.31-5; Denmark's political S.S., the Schalburgkorps was not established until 1943.

67. Knoebel, op.cit., p.140.

68. Bartetzko op.cit., pp.71-2; Knoebel op.cit., pp. 152-3.

of the Germanische S.S. made the S.S. less dependent upon the right-wing separatist parties for obtaining recruits for the armed S.S.. To make matters worse, the new Allgemeine S.S. of the Germanic lands poached members of V.N.V.'s militia, the Zwarte Brigade,⁽⁶⁹⁾ and of Quisling's Hird⁽⁷⁰⁾ and even took over the whole of the Mussert-Garde, the bodyguard of N.S.B.'s leader himself.⁽⁷¹⁾

Some of the nationalist groups which initially assisted in recruiting for the S.S. Verfügungstruppe advocated policies which ran directly counter to those of Germany. The Flemish nationalists wished to secede from the Kingdom of the Belgians because they considered it to be Walloon-dominated,⁽⁷²⁾ but many of them had no wish to exchange Walloon hegemony for German. Another solution favoured by the Flemings was a union of the Netherlands and Flanders in a Greater Dietsche state.⁽⁷³⁾ In this most of Mussert's N.S.B. concurred; and, for that reason the German authorities prevented the leaders of V.N.V. and N.S.B. from meeting.⁽⁷⁴⁾ A "Low German" state, even federated to the German Reich, had no place in German plans.

The leader of the V.N.V., Staf de Clerq, was so incensed by the activities of the S.S. in Flanders that he criticised it publicly. To avoid jeopardising recruiting for the Armed S.S. a few weeks before

69. Bartetzko, op.cit. p.35.

70. Ibid., p.35.

71. Ibid., p.32; Taylor, op.cit. pp. 2-3.

72. Knoebel, op.cit., pp.145-55; Bartetzko, op.cit., p.30.

73. Knoebel, op.cit., pp. 148-54.

74. Höhere S.S. and Polizeiführer beim Reichskommissur für die besetzten niederländischen Gehiete, Tgh.Nr.787/42, 10 September 1942, in T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587305.

the launching of "Barbarossa", the S.S. made a truce with de Clerq.⁽⁷⁵⁾
 Under the terms of the agreement the Flemish S.S. discontinued its attempts to obtain members from V.N.V.'s Black Brigade; in return de Clerq undertook to persuade members of the Black Brigade to join Freiwilligen Standarte "Nordwest". This new Regiment was not strictly-speaking part of the Armed S.S., and it was to contain Dutchmen as well as Flemings.⁽⁷⁶⁾ This regiment was broken up before it saw any combat, but while it existed it attracted a number of Netherlanders and Flemings, who saw in it a symbol of the "Greater Dutch" idea. Regiment "Westland" already existed to receive members of the two peoples, but so many of its soldiers were annexationists that the Regiment faithfully represented the "Greater Germany" viewpoint of the S.S. For that reason, many Dutch and Flemish National-Socialists felt that they could not join "Westland", but had no objection to associating with the Germans by serving in "Nordwest". Before 22 June 1941, the recruiting slogans of "Nordland" and "Westland" were vague. The propaganda for "Nordwest" had to be deprived of any Pan-Germanic content and was consequently, vaguer still - it existed to "build a new Europe"⁽⁷⁷⁾

Although the Western European National-Socialist parties tended to increase in size following the German occupation, they only represented a minority within the countries concerned.⁽⁷⁸⁾ They provided some, but by no means all of their countries' volunteers

75. Knoebel, op.cit., pp. 157-9; C.d.S.S.H.A., Tgb.Nr.349/41,NFlandern, 26 April 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frames 2634878 - 80.

76. Knoebel, op.cit., p.159; Bartetzko, op.cit., pp. 49-53; S.S.F.H.A., I Org./Tgb. Nr.1071/41, Aufstellung der S.S. Freiwilligenstandarte Nordwest, 3 April 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frames 2634941-3.

77. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.52.

78. Littlejohn, op.cit., pp.20,71.

for "Nordland", "Westland" and "Nordwest". This fact was recognised by the Germans themselves. (79) There were many Germanic National-Socialists whose age, occupation or health prevented them from enlisting in the German forces. But there were others without any valid impediment, who preferred to remain in the comfort of their own homes as members of the various National-Socialist organisations at or locally-raised guard or supply units of the Germans. (80)

The needs of the Armed S.S. for manpower and the decline in enlistments from the Germanic communities caused Berger to enrol Finnish subjects. Since only 12% of the volunteers were Swedish-speaking, the concept of a Greater Germanic Reich can have little influence, if any, upon the volunteers. The committee sponsoring the Finnish S.S. unit, represented a wide spectrum of political parties from the Fascists to the Social-Democrats and it is probable that the volunteers reflected their opinions. Many of the Finnish sponsors were former members of the Prussian Jägerbataillon 27, respected members of the Finnish community and armed forces, and their close ties with Germany provide one of the reasons, possibly the main one, why young Finns were willing to join the S.S. As a result of the Winter War, Finland had been obliged to cede territory to the U.S.S.R., and it was prudent to remind Germany of old ties and to strengthen them. Although the Finnish negotiators failed to obtain formal agreement to their terms, they made it clear that they did not want the volunteers to fight against Britain or Greece or in Africa or against any state except the U.S.S.R. In the event of a resumption of hostilities between Finland and the U.S.S.R. in which Germany was not involved, the negotiators wanted the volunteers

79. Chef des S.S.H.A. Tgb.Nr. 1240/42, 9 April 1942, in RVO-BDC-H225-2541-4 and T 175, Roll 111, Frames 2635463-6.

80. e.g. Vlamsche Wacht and Garde Wallonne in Belgium and Kraftfahr Transport Dienst, in the Netherlands.

to return home. (81) Germany was still overtly friendly to the U.S.S.R; but the Finnish volunteers were hostile to the Soviet Union, not so much because of its political system but because they wished to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of their republic. Their feelings would have been the same had the Kremlin had other occupants. Another race from whom the Germans recruited in the period before "Barbarossa" were the Ukrainians. Abwehr raised two units, one - "Nachtigall" - from members of Poland's Ukrainian minority who had been captured while serving in the Polish forces. The other - "Roland" - consisted largely of Ukrainian exiles. Both units were strongly influenced by Ukrainian extremists who aimed to unite the two parts of the Ukraine into one independent state. (82) Like the Finns they were hostile to the U.S.S.R. primarily for nationalist rather than anti-communist motives.

The three units raised by the German government to assist it in operations against the British Empire had entirely different motivation from the other non-German elements raised before 22 June 1941. The Irish Brigade was originally intended to take part in the invasion of the United Kingdom itself; Its members aimed to bring about the Union of the Six Counties with the Irish Free State. (83) Other motives imputed to non-German volunteers were clearly irrelevant; they wished to dissolve the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, not to extend the Reich. Nor did they intend to introduce the National-Socialist system to Ireland. In fact the leaders of the Brigade, in keeping with their association with the I.R.A. had left-wing sympathies - Frank Ryan had even

81. G.H.Stein and H.P. Krosby 'Das Finnische Freiwilligen - Bataillon der Waffen - S.S.'. Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, XIV. Jg., 4 Heft, (October 1966), pp. 413-53. Ausw.Amt Nr.PolVI 1350, 28 March 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634966.

82. Armstrong, op.cit., pp.73-82,

83. O'Callaghan, op.cit., pp. 107,124-5.

served with the International Brigades in Spain.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Individual Irish volunteers may have felt later that they had a stake in the preservation of Western, in particular Catholic, civilisation;⁽⁸⁵⁾ but this was not the raison d'être of their Brigade.

Since the Irish Brigade depended mainly on prisoners-of-war for its strength, its members' attitudes were found to differ from those of Irish expatriates at large in Germany. Although Irish prisoners-of-war wanted to leave their camps they were infertile soil for the I.R.A. recruiters.⁽⁸⁶⁾ If Britain, or later the U.S.A. had invaded Eire, those of her citizens who were in Germany prison camps might well have reconsidered their attitude but few of those who had sworn loyalty to George VI were willing to break their oath in the cause of unification alone.

In the weeks preceding the attack on the U.S.S.R. arrangements were made for recruiting Arabs.⁽⁸⁷⁾ These men were trained and then despatched to the Eastern theatre-of-operations, but the Red Army was not their enemy. The Arabs had no interest in combatting "the Bolshevik threat to Europe;" they were concerned to reach the Middle East via the Caucasus in order to expel the British from Iraq and Palestine.⁽⁸⁸⁾ In different circumstances they could have passed from the Western Desert through Egypt to their destinations, happily fighting British troops en route. To the Arab nationalists Britain was an enemy since she was one of the European states in possession of Arab lands. For the same reason the Arabs were hostile to Vichy France, to Spain and to Italy as well.⁽⁸⁹⁾ In spite of Germany's

84. Stephan, op.cit., pp. 162-4
85. This may account for the presence of Irishmen in Skorzeny's special S.S. units, later in the war - Slade, op.cit., pp.133-4
86. O'Callaghan, op.cit., p.110; Stephan, op.cit., p.273
87. Hitler, Directives Nos. 30 and 32, 23 May 1941 and 1 June 1941 respectively, in Trevor-Roper, op.cit., pp.72-4 78-82
88. Hirszowicz, op.cit., p.250
89. Ibid., p.218.

desire not to offend these states, some of the Arab volunteers may have joined Germany's forces in the hope of ultimately freeing other Arab lands. The U.S.S.R. on the other hand, did not possess any Arab territory. The Arab volunteers had little interest in National-Socialism; and pan-Germanism was an irrelevance to them, but they shared with the Nazis a hostility towards the Jews. The Arabs were, however, not concerned with racial theories nor with the "final solution" of the question of Europe's Jewry, but with the dissolution of the Jewish national home in Palestine. Since the Arabs were Semites themselves, they opposed the Jews for territorial rather than racial reasons.

Personal reasons were also a factor. Arabs working or studying in German-occupied Europe became increasingly dependent upon the German authorities for their welfare, and were put under a growing obligation to join the Arab Freedom Movement. There was less heart-searching required for Arabs than for volunteers of many other races. The first North African Arabs to serve in Tunisia were recruited by the Vichy French authorities and fought the Anglo-American and Free French forces with its approval. The Palestinian Arab prisoners were drawn from war-formed pioneer companies⁽⁹⁰⁾ which did not have a strong esprit de corps; they were military labourers rather than soldiers and with memories of the Palestine Arab revolt still fresh in their minds, they were receptive to the appeals of the Germans and of the Mufti of Jerusalem.

Indians resident in Germany or occupying German prison camps were subjected to similar pressures to those affecting their Arab counterparts. An important difference was that many Indian prisoners, like the Irish captives, were professional soldiers from units with strong traditions. They had taken an oath of fealty to the British

90. Ibid., p.65.

Raj which strong religious scruples made it hard for them to break. Many of the sepoys knew little of the activist wing of the Indian nationalist movement and tended to take their cue from their NCOs, who had their positions and pensions to consider.⁽⁹¹⁾ The opportunity to leave captivity and the possibility of reaching India, coupled with nationalist propoganda caused several hundreds to volunteer for the Indian Legion. It is significant that in 1943, as the Legion's prospects of going to India diminished so its members became discontented to the point of mutiny.⁽⁹²⁾

Other motives can safely be ruled out where the Indians are concerned. They had little knowledge of, let alone concern for Western civilisation. They were not hostile to the Jews nor to the Soviet Union. Indeed the Indian Congress leaders were sympathetic towards the U.S.S.R.⁽⁹³⁾ The Indians were not interested in National-Socialism, nor were they concerned to expand the German Reich.

Foreigners who enlisted in the German forces before 22 June 1941 fall into two main groups. Firstly there were those of German or Germanic blood who were attracted by Germany by National Socialism or by the panache of the Armed S.S. They were free men living in many cases in countries that were not occupied by German troops. The other group consisted of émigrés and prisoners-of-war who insofar as they had any motive other than a desire to return home

91. H. Toye, The Springing Tiger (London, 1959), p.63; C. Sykes, Troubled Loyalty. A Bibgraphy of Adam von Troitz zu Holz (London, 1968), p. 360.

92. Indische Legion, Br.B.Nr. 101/43, 3 May 1943-BAMA - 59681/12; Toye, op. cit. p.149; Sykes, op.cit. p. 367.

93. Sykes, op.cit. p.362.

were driven by nationalistic reasons to side with the Germans. Waging war upon the Soviet Union led to an increase in the first group but provided little additional incentive for Arabs, Indians and Irishmen to join their compatriots in the second group. The opening of "Barbarossa" brought expatriates and prisoners of other nationalities into the German forces.

Chapter Six - The Crusaders

Free Men

The outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union not only explained why the S.S. had been so anxious to raise the regiments "Nordland", "Westland" and "Nordwest" and the Finnish battalion, but also enabled the German government to employ anti-Bolshevik propaganda as a means of recruitment. An immediately noticeable effect of this was a marked increase in the existing Germanic personnel. Men who had not wished to be "Asphalt Soldiers" in the S.S. Verfügungstruppe were attracted by the prospect of action in the East. Division "Wiking" on the day of the German attack upon the U.S.S.R. had 1,142 Germanic volunteers;¹ yet almost three months later, having suffered casualties in the meantime, its Germanic content had risen to 1,416.² During April 1941, when "Nordwest" was founded it received 920 volunteers;³ yet by the beginning of August, when it was in the process of dissolution, it contained 1,968.⁴

"Nordwest" was broken up to provide new units to receive the "second wave" of West European volunteers⁵ which resulted from the widening of the war. The earlier volunteers included many National-Socialists who sought to remodel Europe, either by creating one unified Reich of German and Germanic peoples or a German Reich associated with a number of Germanic states. The new volunteers were more conservative in that they wished to preserve their existing way of life and the culture of Western Europe, both

1. Chef des S.S. Hauptamtes, Germanische Freiwillige der Division Wiking, 18 August 1941 - T175, Roll 107, Frame 2630559.
2. S.S. Division Wiking, IIb, Aufstellung über Verluste und Auszeichnungen der Germanischen Freiwillige, 19 September 1941-T175, Roll 107, Frame 2630532.
3. C.d.S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr.125/41, Ersatzlage, 30 April 1941-T175, Roll 110, Frames 2634787-8.
4. Bürtetzko, op.cit., p.53, Chef des S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr.572/41, 20000 Mann Aktion, 6 June 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634765; S.S.H.A. Erg.Amt. der Waffen S.S., Abt.II 2c Az 9h19, Einberufung zur Waffen S.S., 1 August 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634571.
5. Verordnungsblatt der Waffen S.S. Nr.22, 1st December 1941, Z452. An attempt to retain "Nordwest" as a regiment consisting of Flemish and Dutch regiments, separate from the new Dutch legionary regiment failed through lack of recruits - S.S.F.H.A., Org.Tgb.Nr.4031/41, S.S.Freiwilligen Standarte Nordwest und Legion Niederlande, 24 September 1941 - T175 Roll 110, Frames 2634459-61.

of which they felt to be threatened.⁶ They enlisted not to fight for Germany but against the U.S.S.R. This distinction enabled devout Christians to fight against godless Communism alongside anti-Christian National-Socialists. The volunteers were drawn from many non-Communist political groups of Western Europe, including staunch nationalists who, although they had endured defeat and a year of occupation, nevertheless felt that they could serve in the German forces against the Soviet Union without contradicting their political beliefs. Indeed they may have seen in their units the nuclei of future national armies, and they may have hoped that by serving alongside the Germans they would secure better treatment for their countries from the occupiers.

These motives may be imputed not only to the Germanic volunteers of the "second wave" who were taken under the wing of the S.S.,⁷ but also to the members of the newly-tapped French-speaking communities who served with the German Army.⁸ Some of the factors that influenced the volunteers from occupied countries also affected those who came from a neutral state, Spain, and a puppet state, Croatia. In the case of the Spaniards, the forces they sent to the Eastern front were to some extent a thank-offering for the assistance rendered to the Nationalists during the Civil War by the German Legion Condor. No doubt many Spanish regular soldiers, veterans of the Civil War and young Fulangists saw their service in Russia as a quid pro quo. Some of the volunteers may have welcomed the opportunity to fight another round with the Communists, whom they had previously encountered in the Republican forces. There were probably some among the volunteers who had found it hard to settle down to a peaceful existence after the end of the Civil War and who welcomed an opportunity to see action again. For the regular soldiers the Russian campaign represented an opportunity to gain a wider

6. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.55.

7. i.e. Freikorps Danmark, Freiwilligenlegion Niederlande, Freiwilligenlegion Norwegen, and Freiwilligenlegion Flundern.

8. i.e. Infanterie Regiment 638 (La Légion des Volantiers Français ^{Contre} le Bolchevisme) and Wallonisches Infanterie Bataillon 373.

experience than the Civil War had offered by participating in large-scale operations with a modern, well-equipped army; experience which would enhance the volunteers' prospects of promotion in Spain. If Spain were later to declare war on the Soviet Union, the volunteers' experience would fit them as leaders and instructors.⁹

The Croat nationalists were also moved by a sense of gratitude to the Axis powers, for creating a separate state out of the ruins of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. But their thanks were qualified by deep regret that Italy had annexed the coast-line.¹⁰ Croat dissatisfaction did not prevent the attachment of a legion to the Italian Army, but the Croat contribution to the German forces in the East was larger.¹¹ Croats served against the Soviet Union as members of the German forces, because they belonged to or were influenced by the Croatian fascist Ustase, party which was sympathetic towards Fascism and opposed to Communism. But there were other reasons, not the least of which was the hostility of the Catholic Church to Communism. There was, moreover, a little nostalgia for the Dual Monarchy and there were many Croats who remembered or had served in the "K. und K. Heer", to which the army of the Third Reich was residuary legatee. In addition, to this, the Balkan campaign, during which Croat units either surrendered or turned upon their Serb colleagues had given Croat professional soldiers little opportunity to gain experience or to win laurels.

The material inducements for joining the Western European legions were fewer than those of the Armed S.S.,¹² for the simple reason that the former were

9. E. Infantes, op.cit., p.9; E. O'Ballance, 'The Spanish Blue Division in the Second World War', R.U.S.I. Journal, CIX, No.635 (August 1964), p.240.
10. R. Kiszling, Die Kroaten, p.173.
11. Ibid., p.205 speaks of 3,000 Croat legionaries but Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16 December 1941, mentions a battalion while the organisational chart of the Italian 8th Army for May 1942 shows Legione Croatic as a battalion of two rifle companies, one mortar company and one anti-tank company only. It is possible that the Italian authorities expanded the Croat force to the size of a regiment. Even so it was grossly outnumbered by the three Croat Legionsdivisionen raised by the Germans plus the Croat air and naval contingents.
12. Batzeko, op.cit., p.126.

only temporary creations in which a volunteer was not expected to make a career - unlike the Armed S.S., in which one could enlist for as long as twelve years. Foreigners joining the Armed S.S. became eligible for German citizenship and, like their German comrades, on retirement could take up a career in the German police or civil service or receive land in the incorporated Eastern Territories. Since membership of the legions was only temporary it did not carry with it these privileges. In many cases the legionaries were not affected by this because they left businesses behind them or positions which had to be held open for them during their absence.¹³ Nevertheless, most of the legionaries received less pay than they would have done in civil life,¹⁴ but many of them probably anticipated a brief and victorious campaign, after which they would return home in triumph.

The Contribution of Political Parties.

The National-Socialist and Fascist parties of the countries which provided legions supported their recruiting drives. This was true of the Falange in Spain and the Ustase in Croatia as well as of the parties in occupied Europe; but the latter were influenced by considerations other than pure anti-Communism. The leaders of the parties in occupied Europe realised that it was in their own interests to introduce as many of their members as possible in an effort to turn the legions into instruments that the parties themselves could use.¹⁵ German authorities appear to have been aware of this risk, given their attempts to limit the number of adherents of Parti Populaire Français who entered the French Legion.¹⁶ A legion might become virtually a party militia or a potential national army.¹⁷ That this was the attitude of Mussert is revealed by his attempts to have the Dutch Legion

13. Knoebel, op.cit., p.307.

14. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.127.

15. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.71.

16. S. Larbât, Les Places Étaient Chères (Paris, 1951) p.p.5, 9-10

17. The authorities at Vichy were certainly aware of the danger of a coup d'état carried out by the French Legion and raised Légion Tricolore as a counter-blast to it - Ibid., p.p.6-7.

brought home to combat the resistance¹⁸ and for a half-brained scheme to conquer South Africa.¹⁹ In the case of the French Legion the Germans feared a revival of French military power and restricted its size.²⁰

As in the case of the Germanic Armed S.S., the parties could make the German authorities dependant upon them for personnel and could use the threat of discontinuing recruiting or recalling their party members to wring concessions from the occupier.²¹ The suspension of the support of V.N.V. in 1943 did reduce the number of enlistments in Brigade "Langemarck".²² Conversely, the Walloon Parté Rex supported the Walloon infantry Battalion, which fought so well that Himmler not only admitted it to the Waffen S.S., but decided that the Walloons were Germanic.²⁴ It is noticeable that the Walloons gained influence with the Germans while German relations with the Flemings deteriorated.²⁵

The political parties of the occupied countries also saw in the legions a means of increasing their own membership.²⁶ Men who belonged to other political persuasions or none were obliged to train, work and fight alongside National-Socialists and were exposed to National-Socialist ideas to an extent that was not possible in a civilian Milieu. From the point of view of the National-Socialists there was the risk that the legionaries, their own party-members included, would become infected with the annexationist brand of National-Socialism rather than with their own autonomist variety. Steiner himself admitted that many of the volunteers only became anti-Communist as a result of their experiences at the front;²⁷ and it may well be

18. Chef des S.S.H.A., Tgb.Nr.107/42, 31 March 1942 BA-NS neu 1558.
19. Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer beim Reichskommissär für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, Tgb.Nr.20/42, 1 April 1942.
20. Auswartiges Amt, Nr.662, 14 July 1941 in F.O. Series 386, Roll 680, Frames 211,208-9.
21. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.p.70-1.
22. Ibid., p.71; Knoebel, op.cit., p.p.243,247 (footnote).
23. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II)Nr.18301/43, 31 May 1943; S.S.F.H.A., Kommandoamt der Waffen S.S., Org.Tgb.Nr.820/43, 3 July 1943; Knoebel, op.cit., p.p.332-4.
24. Der R.F.S.S., Nr.35/64/43, 24 May 1943; in BA-NS19/neu 27;Knoebel op.cit., p.p.325-6,333.
25. Ibid., p.p.260-1,357.
26. Bartetzko, op.cit.,p.71.
27. F. Steiner, op.cit., p.50.

that volunteers were converted to National-Socialism through membership of the legions or of the Waffen S.S.

The leaders of the N.S.B. and V.N.V. had another reason for supporting the Dutch and Flemish Legions - hostility to the Germanic S.S., the political wing of the S.S. in their countries, which advocated absorption of the Netherlands and Flanders into the Reich. Both branches of the Germanische S.S. were endeavouring to obtain recruits for the armed S.S.; and de Clerq and Mussert feared that the Flemings and Dutchmen in the Waffen S.S. would become strongly annexationist and confirm the German government in its intention to absorb the two territories.²⁸ The two leaders decided to put their resources behind the Legions as a counter-weight to the Germanic S.S. Mussert even hoped to recruit a regiment from members of N.S.B.'s Weer-Afdeling²⁹ and went so far as to call one contingent a "W.A. Bataljon".³⁰

Some Western European volunteers were undoubtedly members of Fascist and National-Socialist parties, both annexationist and separatist, but it would be wrong to suppose that these men were in a majority. Dr. Knoebel, in his work on the activities of the S.S. in Belgium, gives the party affiliations of the Flemings who had been accepted for the Waffen S.S., and for Legion Flandern by the summer of 1943.³¹ These figures clearly show that the

Political Affiliation	Waffen S.S.		Legion Flandern		Totals ³²
	Total	%	Total	%	
Allgemeine Germanische S.S. ³³	202	13.32	246	9.35	448
Devlag ³⁴	26	1.71	31	1.17	57
V.N.V. ³⁵	156	10.29	563	21.39	719
N.S.J.V. ³⁶	46	3.03	56	2.12	102
Inaffiliated	1,086	71.63	1,735	65.94	2,821
Totals	1,516		2,631		4,147

28. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.p.71-2.

29. Ibid., p.74; R.V.O., Het Proces Mussert, (The Hague, 1948), p.p.164-5
The Weer Afdeling was the para-military force of N.S.B.

30. Ibid., p.42; Völkischer Beobachter, 15 October 1941; Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer beim Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, Tgb.Nr.20/42, 1 April 1942. The unit was, in fact, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Dutch Legion.

31. Knoebel, op.cit., p.381.

32. Percentages and final totals added by the present writer.

33. i.e. the political wing of the S.S. in Flanders, Algemeene Schutsharen Vlaanderen alias Germaansche S.S. in Vlaanderen.

34. Deutsche-Flämische Arbeitsgemeinschaft alias Duitsch-Vlaamsche Arbeidsgemeenschap.

35. Vlaamsch National Verbond.

36. Nationaal Socialistische Jeugd in Vlaanderen, the youth organisation of V.N.V.

majority, 2,821, of the 4,147 Flemings accepted were not members of the main National-Socialist political organisations. The figures are interesting, too, in that they indicate that there was no polarisation of annexationists into the Waffen S.S. and autonomists into the Flemish Legion. In fact, more members of the integrationist Germanische S.S. Vlaanderen and Devlag joined the "nationalist" Legion than the pro-German Waffen S.S. This may indicate that the S.S. had higher standards than the Legion, or it may reflect an attempt to influence the other legionaries in favour of a Greater German Reich. Another possibility is that the bureaucrats of the S.S. simply sent recruits where there were gaps to be filled, which may account for the presence of some of the separatists of V.N.V. and N.S.J.V. in the Waffen S.S. That the Flemings were not unique in the small number of National-Socialists among the volunteers is apparent from a comparison with the Dutch Legion. According to German calculations only 30% of its members were drawn from the N.S.B.³⁷ In the case of the French Legion, although, it was sponsored by seven right-wing political parties, idealists constituted a minority, according to the Legion's German liaison officer.³⁸

Anti-Bolshevism

Hostility to Communism became an important motive for joining the German forces, after 22 June 1941, but it was not the only one, and it did not supplant earlier motives. Volksdeutsche of Roumania, Hungary and Italy could fight against the Red Army equally well in the armed forces of those three Kingdoms; but some of them preferred to enlist in those of Germany. Some Transsylvanian Saxons even deserted from the Roumanian Army and attached themselves to units of the Waffen S.S.³⁹ These men were affected by the poor treatment they had received in the Roumanian forces and expected to find a more congenial environment in German units. But above all, they felt that they were German and belonged with German troops.

37. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.75.
 38. Hauptmann Winneberger, Führer des deutschen Verb. Kommandostabes zur Französischen Legion, Bericht, 14 February, 1942, in F.O. Series 855 Roll 376, Frames 285160-4.
 39. Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans, III, 57-8; E.von Manstein, Lost Victories (London, 1958), p.207.

German propaganda frequently described the Eastern enemy not simply as "Bolshevik" but also as "Asiatic".⁴⁰ Associated with this line of thought was the portrayal of the peoples of the Soviet Union as Untermensch. Although Western civilisation was supposed to be menaced by hordes of Asians this did not prevent German recruitment of Indians and Arabs. This line of argument became completely untenable once the German forces themselves recruited legionaries from Soviet Asia. Substitution of "Jewish" for "Asiatic" in describing the supposed threat - which frequently occurred in German propaganda⁴¹ - excited only those who were already anti-Semitic. It was clear to many Western Europeans that the U.S.S.R. was not, in fact, dominated by Jews. Mention of a Jewish menace could not persuade Indians and Irish volunteers that the U.S.S.R. was their enemy rather than the British. Not even the Arab recruits could be so persuaded, because they were opposed to Zionism rather than to Soviet Jewry.

Some of the Eastern races represented in the German forces on the Russian front fought to preserve the identity of their own nations rather than for Western civilisation as a whole. Many Balts, Finns and Ukrainians would have fought against Russia, irrespective of its political system. Any Russian government, Czarist or Communist alike would have met their resistance if it controlled or sought to control the Baltic lands and the Ukraine. Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians and Ukrainians bitterly resented German occupation policies. Some of them resisted,⁴² but others hoped that by serving alongside the occupier's forces they would not only prevent a Russian return, but also influence the Germans into granting independence. Although their

40. e.g. the poster displayed in a number of camps containing British prisoners-of-war "The Red Menace of Asia. Stop this fratricidal Struggle. Let us combine to fight the Reds!" - M.de Slade, op.cit., p.33. As late as 1945 a leaflet addressed to British and U.S. prisoners-of-war associated "Bolshevik-Communism" with the "barbaric Asiatic East" - Ibid., p.p.110-2.

41. The "British National Representation Proclamation" displayed in April 1943 at the camp for British internees at Saint Denis, associates Bolshevism with "Asiatic and Jewish bestiality" - Ibid., p.p.17-18. The "menace of Jewish Communism" is mentioned in another recruiting leaflet of the British Free Corps - Ibid., p.p.62-3.

42. i.e. The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army - U.P.A.

volunteer battalion was formed before Operation "Barbarossa" took place,⁴³ the Finns were impelled to join the S.S. through motives which later influenced Balts and Ukrainians. They not only wished to conserve Finland's independence, but also to regain territory lost to the U.S.S.R. in the Winter War. By serving these ends in the Armed S.S. rather than in their own forces they simultaneously strengthened Finland's ties with Germany. Felix Steiner the general officer who probably had the closest contact with the European non-Germans in the Armed S.S., admitted that the Eastern volunteers fought primarily for the freedom and independence of their countries.⁴⁴

During the closing months of the war, a new "wave" of Eastern European units was raised to serve on the Eastern front. These units consisted of Roumanians, Bulgars and Hungarians whose governments had changed sides and whose homelands were subsequently occupied by Russian troops.⁴⁵ The units existed to drive out the Red Army from these lands and to replace their governments by régimes sympathetic to Germany. These "armies-of-liberation" were not completely voluntary since they contained survivors of the forces of the three Kingdoms who had simply been taken under German control.⁴⁶ Furthermore, in two cases there was a puppet government⁴⁷ capable of issuing mobilisation decrees⁴⁸ which were enforceable by the German police. But not all those who volunteered for these expatriot units were compelled by purely nationalistic motives, since among the Magyars and Roumanians were members of the Arrow Cross and Iron Guard movements who were ideologically opposed to the Soviet system.

43. On 15 June 1941. This is the date laid down in S.S.F.H.A., Org.Tgb.Nr. 2413/41, 19 June 1941 -T175, Roll 110, Frames 2634722.

44. Steiner, op.cit., p.57.

45. O.K.W., Nr.3847/44, WFSt./Org.III, 20 September 1944, for Roumanians, Bulgars also Slovaks and Finns; O.K.H. Der Chef der Heeresrüstung und B.d.e., A.H.A./Stab/Ia(3), Nr.30931/44, 4 November 1944 for Hungarians.

46. Notably Hungarians, whose "Ersatzheer" was transferred to the Reich - O.K.H.Gen.St.d.H.Org.Abt.(II) Nr.47206, 19 November 1944 in BAMA - H1/224.

47. Those of Bulgaria and Roumania were at Vienna, later at Aussig.

48. Pester Lloyd, 19 November 1944, and Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22 November 1944, both reported measures by the Bulgarische Nationalregierung to conscript Bulgars aged 16 to 55 years residing in Germany, Italy, Hungary and Croatia.

The European Army

The question naturally arises as to whether the volunteers of the Western European countries genuinely represented a pan-European, anti-Communist Army. The Germanic founder-members of "Nordland", ^{"Westland"} and "Nordwest" can be discounted since they enlisted before 22 June 1941. Of the other West Europeans in the German forces there were some who were virtually ordered to enrol by the political parties to which they belonged.⁴⁹ Others were workers or prisoners in Germany who were put under pressure to transfer to military service.⁵⁰ Many volunteers did not enlist to fight in the East until the autumn of 1944, after they had evacuated their homes to take refuge with the Germans.⁵¹ Felix Steiner was obliged to admit that many West Europeans did not become ardent anti-Bolsheviks until after they had "experienced war in the East"; and he had to concede that many had had doubts about associating with the Germans in general, or the S.S. in particular, until they saw the "results of the Bolshevik diotatorship".⁵²

Those who maintain that the defence of Europe from Bolshevism was the driving force that caused non-Germans to volunteer for the German forces overlook the fact that many volunteers who donned German uniforms did not do so in order to serve on the Eastern front at all. A considerable number joined Wach units of the S.S., some of which simply protected installations of that body but others guarded prison camps.⁵³ Other non-Germans joined

49. Le Pays Réel, 26 February 1942; Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 27 April 1942.
 50. For reports of attempts to recruit foreign workers in the Reich see T175, Roll 15, Frames 2518296, 2518312, 2518314 and T175, Roll 70 Frames 2586748-57.
 51. e.g. Members of the French Milice, Flemish and Walloon collaborators who fled before the Allied forces.
 52. Steiner, op.cit., p.50.
 53. Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer beim Reichskommissar für die bestzten niederländischen Gebiete, Tgb.Nr.787/42, 10 September 1942 - N02256 and in T175, Roll 70, Frame 9587309; R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, (Chicago,1961), p.377. These sources relate to the employment of Dutchmen in S.S. Wachbataillon "Nordwest", later S.S. Wachbataillon, 3, which guarded prison camps at Westerbork and Vught. In addition Volksdeutsche were employed guarding concentration camps. The S.S. Guard Battalion "Nordwest" had no connection with the earlier, disbanded Freiwilligen Standarte of that name.

the Schutzkommandos of Organisation Todt which watched over its construction sites and supervised its forced labour.⁵⁴ Many served as drivers in the National Socialistische Kraftfuhrkorps⁵⁵ and in Legion Speer.⁵⁶ Normally, the duties performed by these categories of volunteers took them away from their own countries, but no nearer to the Ostfront than its lines-of-communication. Sometimes their activities brought them into conflict with resistance movements; but, particularly in Western Europe, these were frequently non-Communist in political complexion.

The existence of resistance movements in occupied Europe in fact prompted the creation of local German-sponsored armed organisations. Native National-Socialists and others joined guard units to protect, for example, airfields in Denmark,⁵⁷ railways in Holland,⁵⁸ and factories in Flanders.⁵⁹ Some of those who took up arms in this way were disqualified by age or physique from service in the field; but there were others who for the privilege of staying at home and lording it over their neighbours were willing to fight those of the same race and nationality as themselves. When the Landwacht Nederland was created in 1943 it was to defend the Netherlands against "external and internal enemies", that is to say, to combat an invasion by the Western Allies and to operate against the Dutch resistance.⁶⁰

Apart from the Dutch Landstorm, there were others who enlisted in local security organisations in the knowledge that they would come into conflict with non-Russian and non-Communist elements. Members of indigenous guard

54. This organisation included Danes, Belgians and Volksdeutsche from south-eastern Europe.
 55. Originally the motorised para-military force of the German National Socialist Party, the N.S.K.K. expanded by recruiting Dutchmen, Flemings, Walloons and Frenchmen.
 56. R.J. Bencher and H.P. Taylor, The Luftwaffe (Mountain View, 1972), p.p.194-8.
 57. e.g. Sommers Vagtkorps.
 58. i.e. the Spoorwacht.
 59. i.e. the Flämische Fabrikwacht
 60. Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, 12 March 1943, Nr.24, p.p.112-8. Landwacht Nederland was renamed Landstorm Nederland in October 1943. In spite of its terms of service, elements of the Landstorm were employed against Allied troops in Northern Belgium in the early autumn of 1944.

organisations in the West should have realised that they were liable to be employed against Allied agents or parachutists or in pursuit of shot-down airmen and escaping prisoners-of-war. Service near the Atlantic Wall entailed the likelihood of confrontation with sea-borne or air-borne Anglo-American invaders. The Danes who joined the Heimät-flak-batterien at Copenhagen and Aalborg in 1943⁶¹ and the Flemish refugees who joined the anti-aircraft defences of Western Germany in 1944⁶² knew that they would be required to engage aircraft of the Allied Air Forces rather than those of the Red Air Force. The individual aviators and seafarers from Western Europe who enrolled in the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine, were as likely, if not more likely, to confront the air and naval forces of the Western Allies than those of the U.S.S.R. Perhaps the most flagrant example of Western Europeans being enlisted to fight against the Anglo-American forces was the recruitment of Italian S.S. men specifically to serve against the Allied beachhead at Anzio.⁶³

It might be argued that because the Yugoslav Army of Liberation, the E.L.A.S. in Greece, the L.N.C. in Albania and the F.T.P. in France were Communist-led that those who opposed them in German-sponsored organisations were as anti-Bolshevik as the legions in the Eastern front. The character of some of these security organisations, notably the "White" Russian Schutzkorps in Serbia, appears to lend weight to the argument. But it does not take account of the fact that there were other resistance groups often co-existing with the Communist Underground, who were far from being Communists themselves. There were for example monarchist groups in Denmark and Norway, the Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten in the Netherlands, the White Army in Belgium, the Gaullist F.F.I., a wide spectrum of armed bands in North Italy, the Home

61. O.K.W., K.T.B., III/1, p.45.

62. Knoebel, op.cit., p.276.

63. Recruiting posters bore the appeal "Gioventù d'Italia I volontari che combattono sul fronte de Nettuno. Chiamono a raccolta i valorosi Arruolatri nella Legione S.S. Italiana" - H.P. Taylor collection; The Italian S.S. units which fought near the Allied beachhead were the IIInd battalion of the 1st Regiment and the "Fusilier" battalion.

Army in Poland - where there was also a Fascist resistance group - and E.D.E.S. in Greece, none of whom was Communist by any stretch of the imagination. The Volksdeutsche of "Prinz Eugen" and the Bosnians of "Handschr" were mainly engaged against Tito's forces, but they were also hostile to Royalist Cetniks until many of these reached an accommodation with the Axis authorities.

On the other hand, the existence or activities of Communist-inspired resistance groups frequently drove men into the German camp. Many of Mihailovic's "illegal" Cetniks were so hostile to Communism and so critical of the methods used by Tito's partisans that they did not think it incongruous to work with Italian and later with German troops while still regarding themselves as the Royal Yugoslav Army.⁶⁴ In Greece, E.L.A.S. endeavoured to absorb or destroy all other resistance groups and, in the attempt, drove a number of conservative peasants⁶⁵ and remnants of the Greek Army⁶⁶ into collaboration with the Germans. Armed bands who were put into this predicament found themselves helping Allied airmen while harrying Allied missions attached to the Communist partisans.⁶⁷

The transition from resistance to military collaboration in the Balkans was made easy by the existence of puppet régimes. In several of the occupied regions men, like Nedic in Serbia and Rallis in Greece, were persuaded by the Germans to establish an administration. Those who accepted authority did so in the hope that they could act as a cushion between the occupiers and the indigenous population, and in so doing, protect their compatriots, from oppression by the Germans. In some cases the politicians concerned regarded themselves as "caretakers" until the war should end and the former rulers return. But in spite of their good intentions, political collaborators of this type were obliged to suppress resistance movements

64. Fitzroy Maclean, Disputed Barricade, (London, 1957), p.p. 209-10.

65. Led by Mikhalagos - C.M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord (London, 1948) p.p. 184, 206, 214, 219.

66. e.g. the forces of Colonels Poulos and Khrysokhoou - Ibid., p.p. 168, 184.

67. Ibid., p. 95.

and to supply materials and labour to the German war machine. These indigenous authorities were empowered, even encouraged, by the Germans to raise armed forces of their own for maintaining internal security. In Greece this function was performed by the Security Battalions,⁶⁸ in Serbia by the Serbisches Freiwilligen Korps.⁶⁹ Their membership varied from those who simply wished to see law and order preserved to those who were rabidly anti-Communist. Many of the members of these armed bodies would have refused to have served in overtly German-inspired organisations but were willing to serve in nominally national units. This did not prevent survivors of these puppet forces from being taken into the German forces following the evacuation of the Balkans.⁷⁰ While they existed, however, these security forces were able to find common ground with the right-wing resistance groups and even succour their members when they came under pressure. This is exemplified by the way in which "illegal" Cetniks of Mihailovic took refuge with the "legal" Cetniks serving Nedic.⁷¹

German recruiters frequently directed their appeals to minorities - to German communities outside the Reich or to National Socialist parties in Germanic countries. But often the minority to which they appealed did not have an affinity to the German National Socialists - this was the case with the Goralians of Poland and the minority races in the U.S.S.R. In other parts of Europe the Germans exploited minority manpower to assist them in their military tasks. A Breton nationalist militia, Bezenn Ferrot, entirely separate from the French Milice, was employed against the Maquis of Brittany.⁷² In Greece the German authorities cultivated the Slavophone Macedonians and the Chams.⁷³ Minority members lent the Germans their support in anticipation of concessions after the war. But the German government

68. Ταγmata Ασφαλιας - Woodhouse, op.cit., p.p. 27-8, 56-9, 96-8; W. Byford-Jones, The Greek Trilogy (London, 1945), p.p. 8, 18, 114, 117-8.

69. O.K.W., K.T.B., III/1, p.50

70. e.g. Serbisches Freiw. Korps became Serbisches S.S. Korps - O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II) Nr.47133, 27 November 1944 in BAMA-HI/426 and T78, Roll 432.

71. Fitzroy Maclean, op.cit., p.156.

72. R. Aron, De Gaulle before Paris (London, 1962), p.191; St. Loup, Les Hérétiques (Paris, 1965), p.517; Der Spiegel, XX, Jg. Nr.42 (10 October 1966), p.154; Sunday Telegraph, 31 March 1968.

73. Woodhouse, op.cit., p.93.

made no firm statement of intent because it needed the assistance of majority members in the states concerned and because the aspirations of one group of collaborators ran counter to those of another.⁷⁴

Motivation of Individuals.

One of the earliest studies of the motives of those who joined the armed forces of their conquerors is that of Dr. A.F.G. v&n Hoesel who took as his subjects 450 Dutchmen who were imprisoned, after the war, for military collaboration.⁷⁵ All his subjects were born between 1926 and 1929 and were separated into two groups - those who came from "bad", that is to say National-Socialist, homes and those who came from "good", that is politically reliable, homes. Having interrogated the young men, interviewed their families and studied their court records. Dr. v&n Hoesel assessed the dominant motive in each man and listed these, with the following results:-

Dominant Motives	% from "good" homes	% from "bad" homes	% of total volunteers
"Automatic" enlistment	-	63	41
Scarcity of food at home	47	4	19
Thirst for adventure	17	14	15
Family tension at home	13	1	5
Escape from police after a crime	7	2	4
Political idealism	1	4	3
Escape from reform school	4	-	2
Desire for occupational training in army (as mechanic, pilot, etc.)	3	1	2
Other motives	8	11	9

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74. Littlejohn, op.cit., p.337

75. A.F.G. v&n Hoesel, De Jeugd die wij Vreesden, (Utrecht, 1948), passim. His findings are discussed in H.L. Mason, The Purge of the Dutch Quislings, (The Hague, 1952), p.p.22-5; and in Bartetzko, op.cit., pp.123-8.

76. v&n Hoesel, op.cit., Tabel X, p.25; Reproduced in Mason, op.cit., p.23, from which the translations of the motives are derived.

The separation of the sample into two main groups is itself important, since although "bad" or politically unreliable families were probably no more than four percent of all the families in the Netherlands, nearly two-thirds of the subjects came from an N.S.B. milieu. Apart from this marked discrepancy in the proportions of National-Socialists, the motives for enlistment were different in the two groups.⁷⁷ It can be seen from the table that the most common motive was "automatic" enlistment which, not surprisingly, was limited to those volunteers who came from National-Socialist homes. Young men with this background had been fed National-Socialist propaganda from an early age, until they came to feel that enlistment in a National-Socialist armed organisation was expected of them; that it was the "done thing" in their circle.⁷⁸ They had much in common with the German youths who graduated from the Hitler Youth to the Armed S.S. They joined the Waffen S.S. in much the same way that other young men responded to their nations' needs in two world wars, with the difference that these particular foreign volunteers for the S.S. regarded it as right and proper to serve a political ideal whereas others served their countries. There is evidence that these circumstances applied in other Western European communities. By the Summer of 1943, 102 of the 4,147 Flemings in the Waffen S.S. and the Flemish Legion - 2.46% - had come from the Nationaal Socialistische Jeugd in Vlaanderen⁷⁹ and probably had National-Socialist parents.

The second most important single motive in the table is shortage of food which, while it caused only nineteen percent of the sample to volunteer, was the reason why nearly half of those from "good" homes enlisted. The inhabitants of occupied countries were, on the whole, poorly fed; but National-Socialist families either received or could procure extra rations, so shortage of food was less of an incentive to volunteer in the case of their young men. The population of the still-

77. Ibid., p.23.

78. Ibid., p.24.

79. Knoebel, op.cit., p.381.

occupied provinces of the Netherlands, during the final winter of the war, when no food was imported, was in a particularly bad situation.⁸⁰ France, Belgium and the Southern Netherlands had been liberated by this time, which makes a comparison of motives difficult, but the possibility of receiving food on the same scale as the German forces and making one's family eligible for larger rations may have induced inhabitants of other parts of Europe to enlist. Hunger may also have impelled a number of prisoners-of-war, particularly from the U.S.S.R., to volunteer for the German forces. The third dominant motive, which affected nearly as large a percentage from "bad" as from "good" homes, was the quest for adventure,⁸¹ a motive also put forward by Léon Degrelle, the leader of the Walloon Legion.⁸² There was a considerable feeling of depression in the occupied countries, from which the excitement of the front, as described in the newsreels and communiqués, promised an escape. The volunteer could "join the Army and see the World". Until 1943, the German forces could even offer service overseas; and the minarets of Bokhara and Samarkand seemed to beckon the young men who wished to travel - until the German retreat from the Caucasus shut them off.

Stresses within the family circle drove thirteen percent from "good" homes to volunteer for the German force. On the other hand, only one percent from N.S.B. homes gave this as their reason for joining.⁸³ This is not difficult to understand; when boys rebelled against non-Nazi or even anti-Nazi parents they could demonstrate their independence by joining the German forces. But youths from National-Socialist homes would oppose their parents' will by not "automatically" enlisting in German units, as their parents expected of them. If they gave the matter any consideration at all, youths from "good" homes may have regarded the German forces as a haven from which their families could

80. Mason, op.cit., p.24; Bartetzko, op.cit., pp. 125, 127.

81. Mason, op.cit., p.24; Bartetzko, op.cit., p. 125.

82. L. Degrelle, op.cit., p.7.

83. van Hoesel, op.cit., Tabel X, p.25; Mason, op.cit., p.23.

not extricate them. For youths with National-Socialist parents the German forces may not have represented such a secure asylum since fathers with influence in the Party might succeed in annulling their sons' enlistment. Many who enrolled in the German forces following a domestic disagreement, probably did so on the spur of the moment. Had circumstances been different some of them might have found their way into the Resistance.⁸⁴

National-Socialist parents undoubtedly influenced their sons' decisions to join German-sponsored units; and it is known that numbers of members of N.S.J.V.,⁸⁵ Hitler Jugend Flandern⁸⁶ and other National-Socialist youth movements enlisted in the German forces. Many youths joined National-Socialist youth organisations and later the German forces with parental approval; but Himmler himself reckoned that at least a third of the young men who enlisted in the Waffen S.S. had been disowned by their parents.⁸⁷ Volksdeutsche minors from Hungary had to be prevented from returning home on leave because of the risk that their parents would report their presence to the royal authorities. The Hungarian Gendarmerie would then have arrested the youths as deserters from the Honved, thereby denying them to their German units.⁸⁸ One Norwegian S.S. man, in a letter to a friend, confided that when he returned home on Christmas leave, his father ejected him from the house.⁸⁹ Himmler also had to admit that a number of married volunteers were deserted by their wives as a consequence of membership of the German forces.⁹⁰ When membership of the Walloon assault brigade was thrown open to prisoners-of-war one high-ranking Belgian officer was dissuaded from enlisting by his wife's threatening to leave him.⁹¹

84. Ibid. p.25; Bartetzko, op.cit., p.126.

85. Knoebel, op.cit., p.381.

86. Ibid., p.278.

87. Rede des Reichsführers S.S. auf der Tagung für Befehlshaber der Kriegsmarine in Weimar, 16 December 1943, in T175, Roll 91, Frame 2613345.

88. Generalkommando III. germ. S.S. Panzerkorps, Adj. Abt.II b. Be Tgb. Nr. 165/43, 15 December 1943, in BAMA 64325.

89. Auszug aus einem Brief eines Norwegers Zur Heimat - Soldat Leo Larsen, in T175, Roll 22, Frame 2527277.

90. Rede des Reichsführers S.S. auf der Tagung für Befehlshaber der Kriegsmarine in Weimar, 16 December 1943, in T175, Roll 91 Frame 2613345

91. Knoebel, op.cit., p.363.

The German forces provided a haven not only for youths who had run away from home but also for those who were wanted by the police. Seven percent of the volunteers from "good" homes and two percent from "bad" homes belonged in this category. Clearly a small minority regarded the S.S. as a refuge from justice. This is borne out by the fact that four percent from "good" homes - but none from "bad" ones - were juvenile delinquents who had absconded from corrective institutions.⁹² That there were any criminals at all is indicative of the seriousness of the German manpower problem. When Germanic recruits were first brought into the Armed S.S. and the Legions, scrupulous care was taken to exclude men with a criminal past,⁹³ and any who were identified after enlistment were discharged. But Berger's search for manpower made him less fastidious and he came to take the view that criminals could make good soldiers.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, vdn Hoesel's sample indicates that the percentage was low.

Only three percent of the sample volunteered from conscious political idealism, and it is not surprising that only one percent of those from "good" homes did so. In the case of men from N.S.B. homes, only four percent admitted to enlisting for political motives.⁹⁵ Dr. vdn Hoesel noted that those whom he interviewed simply repeated German propaganda slogans. As relations between the western democracies and the U.S.S.R. deteriorated, he increasingly encountered claims, from those he interviewed, that their enlistment was motivated by anti-Communism - claims that were patently insincere.⁹⁶ In the case of volunteers from a National-Socialist home environment it must have been difficult to separate the political idealist from those whose enlistment was "automatic". Even if all the members of this category were enthusiastic to fight the Red Army they and the "political idealists" do not constitute a majority, even though two-thirds of the subjects surveyed had a National-Socialist background.

92. vdn Hoesel, op.cit., Tabel X p.25; Mason, op. cit., p.23.
 93. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.34.
 94. Chef des S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr. 1240/42, 9 April 1942 in RVO-BDC-H225 - 2541-4 and T175, Roll III, Frames 2635463-6.
 95. vdn Hoesel, op.cit., Tabel X, p.25; Mason, op.cit., p.23.
 96. Ibid., p.24.

The survey has certain drawbacks arising from the nature of the sample taken. Since the 450 military collaborators were all born between 1922 and 1929, none was more than twenty-three years old at the end of the war,⁹⁷ all had been aged between eleven and eighteen at the time of the German invasion of the Netherlands. Clearly many of those interviewed went into the German forces straight from school or university. None of them had time to establish a career or a family before he took up arms. Although the percentage of volunteers who enlisted in order to obtain vocational training is small, it is possible that those who gave any thought to the future were impressed by the prospects of a career in the German Civil Service or police or as a settler in conquered territory. The survey cannot tell us why older men who already had an occupation or land left their homes and families to serve alongside the Germans,⁹⁸ for a smaller financial reward than their civilian employment provided. Few of Dr. van Hoesel's cases were old enough to have served in the Dutch Legion or the short-lived Regiment "Nordwest", or to have been founder-members of Regiment "Westland" and Division "Wiking". Most of them joined after the Germanic Legions had ceased to exist; and therefore the survey gives us no indication of why men enlisted in them.⁹⁹ The material benefits bestowed upon those who made their career in the Waffen S.S. were greater than those granted to members of the Legions. Perhaps there was a greater concentration of "pure" anti-Communists in the Germanic Legions, while they existed, than there was in the Germanic Waffen S.S. units before 1943, when the two groups were merged.¹⁰⁰ The survey has the further limitation that it takes into account only the dominant motive affecting each subject - and only conscious motives, not deeper psychological driving forces.¹⁰¹

Mr Mason in his work on collaboration in the occupied Netherlands¹⁰² draws attention to a dissertation of Mr J.R. ten Horst, in which he

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97. Ibid. pp.22-3.
 98. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.126.
 99. Ibid. pp.125-6.
 100. Ibid. p.126.
 101. Mason, op.cit., p.23.
 102. Ibid. pp.25 (footnote), 169.

compiles the results of his study of eighty-seven "political delinquents".¹⁰³
 Unlike Dr. van Hoesel, Mr. ter Horst included men born before 1922; but even so, most of his subjects were youths:-

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Motive	Number	% of whole
Ill-defined "Profiteers" in a wide sense of the word	23	26.4
Adventurers	18	20.7
Economic hardships or difficulties at home	8	9.2
Idealism	8	9.2
N.S.B. milieu	7	8
Tricked or forced into enlistment	7	8
Fear of the Police	5	5.7
Anti-Communism	5	5.7
Victims of propaganda	4	4.6
Desire to escape ("Escape" motive)	2	2.3
TOTAL	87	

In spite of the vagueness of the most common motive - "profiteering" - it would appear that over a quarter of Mr. ter Horst's subjects were influenced by material motives. In his sample, the second most common motive - thirst for adventure - occupies a slightly more prominent place than in Dr. van Hoesel's. On the other hand the third motive, which presumably includes shortage of food, occupies a less prominent position than in Dr. van Hoesel's table. The influence of a national-socialist home, leading to "automatic" enlistment, which accounted for forty-one percent of Dr. van Hoesel's subjects only affected eight percent of Mr. ter Horst's sample. Both surveys agree in putting escape from the police and other motives low on the list, even if the percentages differ and the motives themselves are ill-defined. Even if Mr. ter Horst's idealists and subjects from an N.S.B. background are added to his anti-communists, the number of "crusaders" is not a large one. Fifty-two of

103. J.R. ter Horst, Het Problem der Politieke Delinquenten (University of Utrecht, 1949) is the work to which he refers.

104. Percentages added by present writer to table reproduced in Mason, op.cit., p.169.

the eighty-seven subjects were married - in itself an indication that many in Mr. ter Horst's sample were more mature than Dr. v&n Hoesel's. Of the fifty-two, twenty-two had German wives who, no doubt, exercised a pro-German influence upon their spouses.¹⁰⁵

By way of comparison, Mr. Mason introduces percentages indicating the motives of Belgians for joining German organisations. Of these, 68% enlisted for material benefit; 26% were adventurers; and 6% were moved by political idealism. Few of the Belgians corresponded to the "crusader" image presented by the apologists of the S.S. An interesting aspect of the Belgian volunteers was that 90% of them received higher wages from the Germans than they had done in civil employment, while 45% earned twice as much.¹⁰⁶ There was a provision for subsidising volunteers for "Westland" until the income of single men was 45%, of married men 85% of their civilian earnings.¹⁰⁷ This was clearly a dead letter in the case of most Belgian volunteers. It should be noted that only a quarter of the Belgian military collaborators served in combat units since the vast majority belonged to guard and transport organisations.¹⁰⁸

Dr. Knoebel, in his study of recruitment by the S.S. in Belgium, without giving any percentages, gives several reasons why men enlisted in the Flemish Legion. Like the other analysts he mentions adventure. He also lists the desire of Germanophiles, who were dissatisfied with belonging to a small nation, who wished to belong to the Reich. Dr. Knoebel also gives as motives the desire to escape from the petty bourgeois way of life and, in some cases, a genuine desire to keep Europe free from Communism. In the majority of cases, however, Dr. Knoebel claims that Flemings volunteered in obedience to the call of the Flemish nationalist leaders.¹⁰⁹ But Dr. Knoebel's own table¹¹⁰

105. Ibid. p. 170.

106. Mason, op.cit., p. 170, quoting Belgium, Revue de droit pénal et criminologie (1946-7), pp. 843-55.

107. Bartetzko, op.cit., p. 127, Erg.Amt der Waffen S.S., Overzicht voor Plaatsing als Vrijwilliger in de S.S. Standarte Westland, undated - T175, Roll 159, Frame 2690394.

108. Mason, op.cit., p.170.

109. Knoebel, op.cit. pp.172-4.

110. Ibid. p.381.

indicates that 2,821 of the 4,147 Flemings accepted into the Waffen S.S. and Legion Flandern by the summer of 1943 were "unaffiliated" to the Germanic S.S., Devlag or V.N.V. It is, of course, possible that Flemings who did not belong to any of these Flemish National Socialist groups were inspired to enlist by the appeals of the leaders of those organisations. Although the war had another two years to run, the disillusionment of the Flemish nationalist leaders with the German authorities made them less willing to participate in recruiting drives. It is, therefore, probably truer to say that the followers of the leaders of V.N.V. were the largest identifiable group within the Armed S.S. and the Legion.

For the Walloons, Dr. Knoebel puts forward as a motive the desire of professional soldiers to follow their vocation.¹¹¹ As in the case of the Flemings, there was in some a genuine conviction that they should defend Western culture and civilisation.¹¹² Again he mentions the thirst for adventure. Finally he repeats that Walloons, like Flemings, obeyed the call to arms of their party in the hope of betterment in civilian life or simply from loyalty to their leader. The participation of regular soldiers in the early life of the Walloon Legion must have been severely restricted by the German retention of Walloon prisoners-of-war, while releasing Flemings. It was not until September 1942 that the German government arranged to release Walloon volunteers from custody.¹¹³

The German liaison officer with the French Legion divided its members into three categories. In the first place there was a group of idealists, but these represented a minority. Secondly, there were adventurers who already had military experience and who were cut off from an ordinary life. This group was mainly represented by former members of the French Foreign Legion. Finally there were those who sought security in the L.V.F.¹¹⁴ At about the same time, Doriot stated

111. Ibid. pp.308-9.

112. Degrelle, op.cit. p.7

113. Knoebel, op.cit. p.294, pp.319-21.

114. Hptmn. Winneberger, Bericht, 14 February 1942 - F.O. Series 855, Roll 376, Frames 285160-4.

that members of the L.V.F. were drawn from his own Parti Populaire Français and the other three parties which had established it.¹¹⁵ One report credited the Rassemblement National Populaire and Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire with providing the majority of the members of L.V.F.¹¹⁶

In spite of the discrepancies in the various studies of the motivation of the West European volunteers, they all clearly indicate that their subjects were not a homogenous body of anti-Bolshevik "crusaders".¹¹⁷ Even those who were activated by National-Socialist ideology fell into two main groups; those who wanted a unified Reich and those who advocated a federation of Germanic states. Apart from these, there were men motivated by other brands of nationalism, by thirst for adventure and by a number of family and personal reasons, not all of which were laudable. Gottlob Berger, himself, was forced to admit "We will never be able to stop men from joining the Legions and the Waffen S.S. who are not national socialist and who join for materialistic not idealistic reasons. That is the case everywhere in the world."¹¹⁸

Social Classes

Mr. Bartetzko, in his work on the Germanic volunteers has investigated the civilian occupations of those who served in the SS.¹¹⁹ This he did by consulting obituary notices in the periodical "Storm" of the Netherlands' S.S. and also lists of missing men in "Der Freiwillige", the monthly magazine of the old comrades' association of the Waffen S.S. He considered 671 men, of whom 373 were Dutch, 166 Flemish, 76 Danish and 56 Norwegian, upon whose occupations he based the following table of percentages. Mr. Bartetzko draws attention to the predominance of the working class in these figures.

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115. J. Doriot, Note sur la Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme, 7 March 1942 - F.O. Series 855, Roll 376, Frames 285166-73.
116. Comité Central de la Légion des Volontaires français contre le Bolchevisme - 6 September 1941, Para.3, F.O. Series 464 7H, Supplement 3780 H, Roll 2399, Paris Botschaft Ordner 137, Frames E209509-11.
117. Bartetzko, op.cit., pp.127-8.
118. Der Chef des S.S.H.A., Tgb.Nr.1240/42, 9 April 1942 - RVO - BDC - H225 - 2541 - 2544 and T175, Roll III, Frames 2635463-6.
119. Bartetzko, op.cit., pp.122-4.

Occupations	Dutchmen	Flemings	Danes	Norwegians
Factory Workers	52	48	58	61
White collar workers	16	15	12	13
Students	11	21	17	11
Peasants	8	6	4	3
Public Employees	6	6	4	4
Artists and artisans	2	2	-	3
Uncertain	5	2	5	5

He maintains that this is not surprising, because the workers in the Germanic countries saw the good life of German workers under Hitler's government, especially when compared with their own plight in the nineteen-twenties and early thirties. He also points to the large student participation and suggests that this was possibly due to their low age, but more probably due to the attraction of national-socialist propaganda, especially anti-Communism, which influenced them more than those with a secure place in society.¹²¹ The Netherlands' Central Bureau of Statistics gives a figure of 21,351 Dutch students out of a total of three million males aged between 17 and 65 years of age, giving a percentage of 0.71.¹²² This seems to indicate that the percentage of Dutch students in the S.S. was considerably larger than those in the country as a whole.

The figures are interesting because they also reveal that few professional soldiers, whether they are regarded as "public employees" or "uncertain", are apparently included in the table.¹²³ The statistics are more revealing when the percentages of occupation groups in the Germanic Armed S.S. are set against the percentages of those groups in their mother-countries. A comparison of workers and peasants in Holland, Denmark and Norway may be seen in the following table.

120. Ibid. p.123.
121. Ibid. pp.124-5.
122. Figures supplied by Drs. N.K.C.A. in't Veld, of R.V.O., in letter to the author of 21 December 1972.
123. Germanic prisoners-of-war were released from German custody and were available, therefore, for the SS-sponsored legions.

Percentages	Dutchmen		Danes		Norwegians	
	Bartetzko's	of the population - 1960	Bartetzko's	of the population - 1950	Bartetzko's	of the population - 1950
Factory Workers	52	44	58	38.2	61	35.7
Peasants	8	11.9	4	27	3	25.9

From these figures it appears that the proportion of factory workers in the S.S. was greater than the proportion of that class in the countries concerned, while in the case of the peasantry the situation was reversed. The Germanic volunteers in the S.S. did not, then, represent a typical cross-section of their society. The percentages may indicate that urban workers were more influenced by the depression and by National-Socialist propaganda than the rural population, or it may have been that the peasants were set in their ways and reluctant to leave their farms, in spite of the lure of land in the East. On the other hand it may have been difficult for S.S. recruiters to contact the scattered farming communities; or there may even have been a reluctance to enrol food-producers. But it is difficult to understand why Norway, with the smallest national percentage of factory workers, should have the largest urban working-class percentage in the S.S., whereas the Netherlands, with the largest national figure, should have the smallest in the S.S. Furthermore, the Dutch peasantry, although fewer in proportion than Denmark's and Norway's, appear more strongly represented in the S.S. The apparent under-representation of the Dutch Industrial workers may be accounted for by their working in German factories, as many of them had done before the war, in preference to military collaboration. It is noteworthy that the percentages of peasant participation are low, yet a high proportion of the pre-war German Verfügungstruppe came from a peasant background.¹²⁵ Nazi theorists had a predilection for peasants and were

124. Percentages of the three populations taken from Pergamon World Atlas (London, 1968), pp.111,122,119 respectively.

125. This point is made by Drs. in t'Veld, in his letter to the author of 21 December 1942.

probably able to select them for the infant barracked S.S. in preference to townsmen. In the Germanic countries the recruiters could not afford to be so discriminating.

Percentages also exist for the Finns. These emphasise the high proportion of youths - 30.1% - which appears to be higher than those for the volunteers of the Germanic Armed S.S.¹²⁷ Comparison of the figures

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Occupation	Percentage of volunteers
School-leavers (<u>Schuler</u>)	15.7
Students and <u>Abiturienten</u>	14.4
Workers	20.2
Peasants	15.7
Miscellaneous	34.2

for students indicates that Finland provided proportionately more students than the Netherlands and Norway but fewer than Denmark and Flanders.¹²⁸ Compared with Mr. Bartetzko's other figures, the percentage of Finnish Workers is considerably less than those from Germanic countries, while the percentage of peasants is greater. Comparison with the percentages of these categories within the Finnish population - 31.3 and 35.8 respectively¹²⁹ reveals that, like the Germanic peasantry, those of Finland appear to be under-represented while, unlike the Germanic factory workers, those of Finland appear to be more heavily represented.

Although Mr. Bartetzko's sample is larger than those of Dr. van Hoesel and Mr. ter Horst, it ^{nevertheless} is ~~is~~ small and the stratification too imprecise to permit firm conclusions. It is clear, however, that Western European volunteers for the Armed S.S. were drawn from every social class. Industrial workers probably constituted the largest segment within each national contribution to the Armed S.S. from the Western European countries.

126. Stein and Krosby, op.cit., p.442.

127. It is not possible to be precise because "students" are the only classification of Mr. Bartetzko's which can with certainty be identified as young men - Bartetzko, op.cit. p.123.

128. These are 11%, 11%, 17% and 21% respectively - Ibid, p.123.

129. Taken from Pergamon World Atlas, p.119 - figures from census of 1961

This was hardly surprising in view of the predominance of industrial workers in the countries concerned.¹³⁰ It would appear, however, that the exact proportion of urban workers and other classes within the national contingents did not correspond with those of the nations concerned.

Captives.

Non-German volunteers from outside German-occupied territory were drawn in the main from prison camps. Some men with homes in areas overrun by German troops also volunteered while they were in German custody. Potential recruits at large in occupied countries were in a different situation from those in German camps in that they could more easily ignore German appeals for recruits. If they were tempted by the blandishments of the German recruiters they could procrastinate. Men in detention could be subjected to intensive recruiting measures directed at individuals. In most cases, however, they were in close and continual contact with compatriots who could exercise influence over them. During the years 1940 to 1945 the German authorities and their foreign associates endeavoured to recruit Irishmen, Indians, Arabs, Britons, South Africans, "White" Russians, Albanians, Italians and, finally, Frenchmen and Walloons from prison camps.¹³¹ Recruiters found that there were several obstacles to overcome in persuading captives to volunteer for the various non-German units. Many captives, while wanting release and repatriation, could take the attitude that they had become the responsibility of the Germans until the end of the war and could accept the fact that their captors would look after them until that time. In many instances, before their capture, inmates of camps had come very close to death, but as prisoners they stood a good chance of reaching home safely. Prisoners were reluctant to exchange the near-certainty of eventual repatriation for the strong probability of death, by risking

130. Bartetzko, op.cit. p.128.

131. R.F.S.S., Nr. 1893/44, 23 March 1944 - T175, Roll 125, Frames 2650957-8 - permitted the release of Albanian, British and Walloon prisoners-of-war.

their lives again, this time in concert with their captors. Apart from this, there was the risk of backing the losing side and returning to a victorious homeland, not to be received with sympathy and perhaps honours, but with execration and punishment.

German and foreign recruiters often found that prisoners-of-war were ignorant of the causes to which they were asked to subscribe - even though in some cases, the "White" Russians for example, the issues were clear. Professional soldiers frequently held themselves aloof from party politics. Many captives had not heard of the minority politicians who sought to enlist their aid and had little understanding of the meaning of National-Socialism or Communism. In some cases this very ignorance may have caused men to swallow the claims of the recruits and to enlist in the non-German units but there must have been many occasions where prisoners obeyed the old soldiers' maxim: "Never volunteer for anything". Many who had already volunteered once before for their countries' forces and, consequently, arrived in a prison-camp were reluctant to volunteer again. When prisoners were in doubt whether to enlist or not, they tended to take their cue from their seniors who were frequently professional soldiers. These men had no wish to jeopardise their pension rights or their reinstatement after the war by having dealings with the enemy. Not only were they themselves reluctant to volunteer for German-inspired units, but they exercised a negative influence upon those junior to them. For this reason it was found necessary to separate Irish and Indian prisoners-of-war from their N.C.O.s to obtain any results from recruiting drives for their respective units.

An ideological obstacle to volunteering for the German-sponsored units was not merely patriotism itself but the fact that the prisoners had sworn an oath of allegiance to their own governments. After the capitulation of Italy, Italians needed to be assured by Mussolini and Marshal Graziani that they were absolved from their oath to Victor Emanuel, before they would adhere to the Italian Social Republic.¹³²

132. Auswärtiges Amt, 2 October 1943, in BAMA - III W 121/1.

Many of the Italians were in a vulnerable position, as were all those prisoners of states which had been conquered by Germany. But men who had served in the forces of the British Commonwealth knew that their families were safe and were still in receipt of allowances, which might be cut off if the captives joined the German forces. That it was possible to conceal one's treachery is demonstrated by the fact that prisoners who enlisted in the British Free Corps continued to receive Red Cross parcels.¹³³ Where a prisoner's home was on the soil of Germany's enemies he could expect that his family would, at least, be ostracised. When a prisoner was domiciled in occupied territory, there might be retaliation against his family from the Underground,¹³⁴ but they could expect favourable treatment from the occupiers.

Categories of Volunteers

During a court-martial after the war, the Judge-Advocate divided former members of the British Free Corps into four categories.¹³⁵ Although the B.F.C. was not a typical "legion" his classifications may also be applied to former prisoners-of-war of other nationalities who enlisted in the German armed forces. In his first category, he put those who deliberately volunteered to assist the enemy of the country to whom they owed allegiance. It made no difference in law that they did not enlist to fight against their own countrymen. The Judge-Advocate probably had in mind the small number of Fascists and National-Socialists who joined the B.F.C. But men with right-wing views were to be found among the Francophone prisoners the "White" Russians, and, later, among the Italian internees. Many volunteers from these groups engaged themselves to fight against the U.S.S.R., not against the country in whose forces they had served. The situation of the Italians who aligned themselves with the Republican Fascist regime was different; they felt they were saving their country and redeeming its honour. They volunteered to serve the Republic of Salo not on the Eastern front but in Italy itself, knowing that this would bring

133. Slade, op.cit., pp.73,75,88,114.
 134. Knoebel, op.cit., pp.344-7.
 135. Evening Standard, 28 November 1945.

them into conflict with the Allied forces in Italy and their Italian "co-belligerents" or the Yugoslav Army of Liberation or with Italian resisters of a number of political persuasions.

Apart from political idealists there were opportunists in, as well as outside, the prison-camps who decided that Germany was going to win the war and intended to ingratiate themselves with the future victors. Opportunists at large in German-occupied countries had various forms of collaboration open to them, many of which involved little risk. Collaboration within prison camps was limited to working for the Germans - which every non-commissioned prisoner could do - and supplying information. To leave a prison-camp a potential collaborator had to be prepared to fight or, in fewer cases, to conduct propaganda. Another sub-category of the whole-hearted collaborators consisted of professional soldiers. These were also to be found amongst the inhabitants of occupied countries. Enforced confinement in a prison camp rarely brought promotion. Having seen their own armies destroyed or badly shattered, some regular soldiers, like other opportunists, must have judged Germany to be the victor and decided to throw in their lot with her. With some it was simply an overwhelming desire to practise their vocation, like the French artillery officer who merely wished to command once more a battery of guns.¹³⁶

Of the Judge-Advocate's four categories,¹³⁷ the "keen types" who constituted the first were probably the easiest to identify, although it was in the interests of the other three to simulate enthusiasm for the German cause. Separation of the other three categories is more difficult because prisoners who had merely volunteered in the hope of a more comfortable existence, particularly if they were disappointed in this, could endeavour to convince others and even themselves that they had really intended to escape. Those who sought comfort and those who failed to escape from the German forces could maintain that they had

136. Littlejohn, op.cit., p.267.

137. Evening Standard, 28 November 1945.

continued in those forces in order to undermine them. The second category consisted of prisoners who volunteered in order to have a comfortable time. For most of their service members of the B.F.C. had a "cushy billet".¹³⁸ But the B.F.C. was so weak that its members saw no action until the closing stages of the war.¹³⁹ Before that time, the main purpose the B.F.C. served was propaganda. Prisoners-of-war were hungry, frequently cold and living in squalid, uncomfortable and unhealthy conditions for what must have seemed an interminable time. For minor offences prisoners could be condemned to solitary confinement. But there was a limit laid down by international convention to the measures German gaolers could take against their charges, who were the responsibility of protecting powers and the concern of the International Red Cross. Not all prisoners were confined to a camp, however, because many of the junior ranks were employed, with varying degrees of supervision, in industrial undertakings, in repairing bomb-damage and in agriculture. Had the volunteers paused to consider, they would have realised that they were exchanging their camps for barracks from which they would still not be allowed to wander without permission of their German superiors. They were committing themselves to strenuous Frederician training, culminating in active service at the front, in conditions which were far more uncomfortable and less safe than those in the camps.

Conditions within the camps also influenced the third category - those who enlisted with the vague idea that they might thereby escape,¹⁴⁰ but who, in fact, through apathy or procrastination did nothing. In many cases the volunteers probably used their nebulous schemes for escape as a salve to their consciences, or to justify their actions to their colleagues in the camps. Desertions took place, for example, from the B.F.C.¹⁴¹ and from the Indian Legion,¹⁴² but it is impossible to say to

138. Slade, op.cit., pp. 55-6, 88, 101.

139. Ibid., pp.129-33, 135-42.

140. Evening Standard, 28 November 1945.

141. Slade, op.cit., pp.115-7.

142. Toye, op.cit., p.152.

what extent they were planned from the outset. In many cases opportunities did not present themselves or, if they did, were not recognised and seized. The Judge-Advocate's fourth category consisted of those who enlisted in the German forces in order to serve their own country by undermining the organisation they joined.¹⁴³ Members of this class ran the double risk of being detected by the Gostapo or of being disbelieved by their own authorities. In spite of this, there were prisoners-of-war who joined German-inspired units for the purpose of finding information about them and gaining evidence against their members. Two Irish volunteers having been trained for salvage operations against the United Kingdom, were consigned to the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, which suggests that they were at least suspected of betraying German trust.¹⁴⁴

Soviet Prisoners

The situation was different for Soviet prisoners-of-war, whose living conditions were considerably worse than those of other nationalities. To some extent this was due to sheer numbers. By the end of 1941 nearly four million had been captured - far more than the German Army could properly manage.¹⁴⁵ During the early months of the Eastern campaign, the transfer of captive Untermensch^{en} to the Reich, where properly run camps existed, was prohibited.¹⁴⁶ This created gross overcrowding in the make-shift camps in the occupied Eastern territories, which was only partly alleviated by the release of the captive racial Germans, Ukrainians, Balts and Finns.¹⁴⁷ German camp-commanders were frequently reservists, brought out of retirement and not selected for their ability. Even when the will was there, they could not cope with the vast problem of caring for thousands of men, without resources. Prisoners were herded into public buildings or left in the open to dig holes for themselves. There was insufficient food and drinking water,

143. Evening Standard, 28 November 1945.

144. Stephan, op.cit., pp.277-9; Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Second Report, Session 1967-8, p.8.

145. Dallin, op.cit., p.409.

146. Ibid., p.411

147. Ibid., p.413.

totally inadequate sanitary facilities and little medical attention. Because the U.S.S.R. was not a signatory to the international conventions governing the treatment of prisoners-of-war, there was no protecting power to champion the cause of captive Red Army men, and no Red Cross parcels for them. In consequence, they died in their hundreds of thousands from cold, hunger, exposure, disease and wounds. Nearly two million deaths were recorded and this was an incomplete figure.¹⁴⁸

Apart from deaths attributable to neglect, there were those who were shot - and not merely for attempted escape. The camps were guarded by over-age German soldiers who were insufficient in numbers for the task, overworked, apprehensive and, in consequence, inclined to be "trigger-happy". In addition to haphazard violence from the guards, the prisoners had to fear the visitations of the Einsatzkommandos of the Sicherheitsdienst, who sought out enemies of the Reich for extermination. These enemies, who, in the jargon of the S.D., were classified as "Judeo-Bolshevik Commissars", were in reality two separate classes, although a few individuals qualified for membership of both. The Jews were singled out for execution in accordance with the racial theories of the Nazi party. The political commissars were the targets of the notorious Kommissarbefehl. The commissions of the S.D. were competing against one another to achieve a high score of liquidations and this tended to make them careless in their selections. Prisoners were classified as Jews on the evidence of circumcision alone, which caused a number of Tartars to be executed and obliged Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the S.D., to issue instructions against the practice. He also endeavoured to curb the enthusiasm of his subordinates for murdering non-Jewish prisoners as Bolsheviks on the grounds that they were literate.¹⁴⁹ Those who were shot outright were more fortunate than their colleagues, who were selected for medical experiments - notably on the effects of low temperatures upon the human body. The precise fate of these unfortunates was not known at the time to their comrades; but their disappearance was probably noted.

148. Ibid., p.415,426-7; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.446.

149. Der Chef der Sino und des S.D. 28 June 1941 - 078 PS;
Ibid. 12 September 1941 - No. 3416.

Western prisoners-of-war remained a matter of concern for their people and, where they had survived, their governments. On the other hand, members of the Red Army who were captured were regarded as traitors.¹⁵⁰ This was the official and generally-maintained attitude, even if it occasionally suited the Red Army or Soviet partisans to encourage former Soviet prisoners-of-war to rejoin their comrades. Such opportunities were not open to those in prison camps; if they occurred at all, it was in the field. The Soviet prisoner, realising that he was regarded as a criminal outcast, had little more to lose by siding with his captors; and by so doing, he put prison behind him and increased his life expectancy. He might be restricted to a barracks or to uncomfortable hutments on a training area; he would possibly be bullied, abused and treated as an inferior being; but at least he was fed, sheltered, clothed and given some medical attention. Nevertheless, only a very small percentage of the prisoners took the opportunity. The majority preferred to continue in the camps, even though in many cases it cost them their lives. In those cases where inmates of camps were virtually drafted into Eastern units, recusants risked being branded as Bolsheviks and executed.

In spite of differences in the circumstances of the Soviet prisoners-of-war, those who volunteered to serve with the Germans may still be classified in the same four categories as those from Western Europe.¹⁵¹ In the case of the first category there was one important difference: since the Soviet system did not tolerate alternative ideologies, there were no self-professed National-Socialists and Fascists among the Red Army men who fell into German hands. Consequently there were no "ready-made" recruits for the German forces. One group of Soviet officer-prisoners sought to remedy this deficiency by creating their own Nazi party in Oflag XIII D at Hammelburg.¹⁵² Others sought to ingratiate

150. Order of the Day Number 55, in J.V. Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War, p.23 and Idem, War Speeches and Orders of the Day, p.26; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.34.

151. Evening Standard, 28 November 1945.

152. Dallin, op.cit., p. 525.

themselves with their captors by compiling memoranda explaining how, in their opinion, Stalin could be defeated and by offering their services towards this end. In time, propaganda of the N.T.S. found its way into the camps from the school at Dabendorf and gained converts to its policies.¹⁵³

Although Eastern volunteers fought alongside those from Western European countries they did so with different motives. They were not concerned with saving Western Europe from Bolshevism and had no wish to assist Germany's eastward expansion. Enthusiasts among the former Red Army men may have wished either to establish a new form of government for all the Russias, or a number of separate governments. The "keen" Soviet volunteers, like their counterparts among the Indians, Arabs and Irishmen, were willing to work with the Germans but for their own ends. Like their "White" colleagues, they sought to overthrow Stalin's government; but they and their sponsors differed in the régimes they advocated. They had grown up under a Soviet system and knew no other. The number of national-separatists amongst them was limited by the fact that few could envisage their tribes existing apart from the Russians.¹⁵⁴

The conditions in the camps, and the often haphazard method of selecting recruits from the camps and conditions in the 6st Units themselves, produced a number of men who intended to escape when the opportunity offered. But it is impossible to say how many former Red Army men went into the Eastern units with the express intention of escaping. A serious draw-back for the would-be escaper was that he could not be sure of his welcome. It sometimes suited local Communist party officials to increase their partisan groups by encouraging defection, such as that of Gil-Rodionov.¹⁵⁵ The Soviet government also sought to undermine the German-sponsored units by propaganda.¹⁵⁶

153. Ibid., p. 526.

154. The Volga Tartars and the Ossetians were strongly Russified.

155. A. Dallin and R.S. Mavrogordato, "Rodionov", A Case-Study in Wartime. Redefection, American, Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XVIII No.1 (1959) pp.25-6, 29-33.

156. General der Osttruppen b. Gen. St.dH., IV, Nr.6061/43, 2 October 1943-
BAMA - H3/853.

But the official attitude remained the same - Red Army men were not supposed to be taken prisoner. It was not necessary, however, for the escaper to link up with the Red Army or with partisans. He could simply take to the woods, as did thirty-eight Turkestanis near Tolotschiñ.¹⁵⁷ Those in the Ukraine might possibly join "third force" bands of the Ukrainska Povstanska Armyia, the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army.¹⁵⁸

In other parts of Europe, the deserter could throw himself on the mercy of the Resistance or the Western Allies. All these options were taken up by escapers from Eastern units, but it is not possible to say how many were carrying out deeply-laid plans. Escapes in Western Europe can probably be discounted because the Eastern volunteers cannot have anticipated the westwards move of so many of their units, nor would they have possessed detailed knowledge of the Underground and they could not have accurately forecast the Allied landings.

The fourth category - those who volunteered in order to undermine the German-inspired units - was certainly represented among the Soviet prisoners-of-war who volunteered for the Osttruppen. Numbers of Communist Party members escaped the execution decreed for them by the "Commissar Order" and found their way into Ost units in which former Red Army officers also served. Although these groups provided key men, notably Zhilenkov and Zykov for the Vlasov movement, they also set up Communist cells within German-sponsored units. These cells conducted propaganda and laid plans for taking the units over to the Red Army or to communist partisans. Such a cell was uncovered in the Bergmann unit.¹⁵⁹ Another that was wiped out was in the "cultural brigade" of the Idel-Ural Legion.¹⁶⁰ Probably only the cell-leaders had entered the units to disrupt them, but they recalled to their allegiance others who had joined for less worthy reasons. These leaders probably have to their

157. ¹Erfahrungen eines Betreuungsoffiziers für Freiwillige aus den Völkern der Sowjetunion in der deutschen Wehrmacht, Vielvölker Heere und Koalitionskriege (Darmstadt, 1952), p.37.

158. Armstrong, op.cit., p.156.

159. F.L. Carsten, "A Bolshevik Conspiracy in the Wehrmacht", Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XXXVII, No.109 (1969) pp. 483-509.

160. L. Nebenzühl, "Mussa Dshalil-Dichter and Kämpfer", Probleme der Geschichte des Zureiten Weltkrieges (E.Berlin, 1958), pp. 367-78.

credit those instances where large scale defection took place early in an Eastern unit's career.

Where mass-desertion was delayed and opportunities missed, it probably indicates that it was caused by a growing dissatisfaction with the Germans and a desire to transfer to the winning side. Gil-Rodionov's Drushina worked with the German Security forces during the atrocious anti-partisan operation "Kottbus";¹⁶¹ yet only a few weeks later he arranged to take part of his force over to the Soviet partisans.¹⁶² The Tárcomen in the S.S. assisted in putting down the Warsaw uprising¹⁶³ and it was not until the last Christmas of the war that Alimov attempted to take them over to the Slovak partisans.¹⁶⁴

The motivation of the foreigners who enrolled after 22 June 1941 was affected by the nationality of the individual volunteer and whether he was at liberty or not. Even among volunteers of the same racial group in the same circumstances there were variations in motive. Where contingents came from countries where National-Socialist parties existed the number of party members appears to have constituted approximately one-third of the total number of volunteers. In other respects the volunteers appear to have provided a cross-section, but not an accurate one, of their communities. Every social stratum, every religious¹⁶⁵ or local group was represented. A high percentage came from the working class. They included hirelings, misfits and adventurers with a small percentage of idealists.

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161. R.F.S.S. Chef der Bandenkampfverbände, Sondermeldung Über das Unternehmen "Kottbus", 23 June 1943 - NO 2680, Case XI, Doc. Bk 66C.
162. Dallin and Mavrogordato, op.cit., pp.25-33.
163. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 October 1944.
164. Bericht, 11 January 1945 in BA - NS 31/45.
165. It is possible that Jews or part-Jews served in the Dutch Legion - van der Zee, op.cit. p.141.

PART THREE
METHODS OF RECRUITMENT
CHAPTER SEVEN - VOLUNTEERS

Free Men

Spontaneous Attachment.

Among the earliest non-Germans to serve with the German forces were those who offered assistance without any inducement from the German side. Many men virtually pressed their services unasked upon German Units and authorities without any prior arrangement, although in most cases their activities might have been predicted by the German forces. In spite of the fact that they were not privy to German plans, Volksdeutsche living in North Schleswig and Croatia took up arms against the royal forces of Denmark¹ and Yugoslavia² respectively. Similarly, pro-German groups in Eupen - Malmédy assisted the entry of the German troops³. This kind of adhesion to the German cause was local and temporary and did not constitute membership of the German ground forces. Nevertheless there were Volksdeutsche who took advantage of the proximity of German troops to enlist in the forces of their fatherland.

Gottlob Berger received many Volksdeutsche from Roumania, where his son-in-law, Andreas Schmidt, led the Volksgruppe, after September 1940. Marshal Antonescu had become dictator of Roumania shortly before this and on 30 August 1940 he had granted a privileged position to the German minority. The German government wished to avoid any action which might weaken the Marshal, his forces or the Volksgruppe itself⁴. Nevertheless, individual racial Germans to attach themselves to the German Lehr units which were helping to train the Roumanian Army from October 1940⁵. The Balkan campaign provided further opportunities for racial Germans who wished to join the German forces. Perhaps the most direct method was to board a hospital train returning to the Reich⁶, but there were instances

- 1. L. de Jong, op.cit., P.160
- 2. Ibid., P.233
- 3. Ibid., pp. 197-8
- 4. Documents on the Expulsion III, 57 Ambassador Killinger, Telegramm, 26 February 1941-NO1782; Idem, Telegramm Nr.260,21 January 1942-NG3391-both telegrams in Case X1 Doc. Bk. 72F
- 5. Documents on the Expulsion, III, 57. The 13th and 16th Panzer Divisions performed this task.
- 6. Ibid. III, 57

of racial German attaching themselves to German divisions on their way through the Balkans.⁷ It was in this manner that the S.S. Division "Reich" brought six hundred men back to Vienna at the end of April 1941⁸, while it simultaneously enrolled other racial Germans from the Banat area of Yugoslavia into Rekrutenkompanien⁹. In the latter case the Division was acting under Berger's orders, since with the defeat of Yugoslavia there was no government to complain. On the other hand, the Volksdeutsche from Roumania who enlisted during the campaign were men whom Antonescu's government was unwilling to release and whom it now regarded as deserters. But Berger was only interested in securing men for the Waffen - SS.¹⁰

Another class of Volunteer consisted of men who joined the German forces in preference to those of one of Germany's allies. Racial German youths, fit enough for the Armed S.S., were under a legal obligation to serve in the forces of their country-of-domicile. There were even instances of ethnic Germans serving with Roumanian units on the Eastern front deserting them to join neighbouring German units¹¹. It would, however, require a study of every case to decide which volunteers arrived at their decision to enlist entirely of their own volition and which were influenced, by their families or friends, by pan-German propaganda emanating either from the Reich or from the Volksgruppe, or by the efforts of the German units concerned.

7. Ibid., III, 57.

8. SS Ergänzungsstelle Donau XVII Wēfn., Spruch Nr. 40, 27 April 1941 - No 3362, Case XT, Doc. Bk. 43; R. Herzog, Die Volksdeutsche in der Waffen S.S. (Tübingen, 1955) p.4. These men were probably part of the 2,000 Schmidt had gathered by May 1940, only 1,000 of whom had been permitted to leave for Germany - Erg. Amt der Waffen S.S., 813/40, 16 May 1940 - No 2237.

9. Herzog, op. cit., p.12, G.d. S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr. 347/41, Werbung in Jugoslawien, 26 April 1941 - No 714, Case X1 Doc. Bk. 43 and T175, Roll 110; Främe 2634794.

10. Ergänzungsamt der Waffen S.S., Tgb. Nr. 110/40, 7 August 1940 - No 1825, Case X1, Doc. Bk. 43.

11. E. von Manstein, Lost Victories (London, 1958), p.207; Documents on the Expulsion, III, 57.

Spontaneous assistance, however, was not confined to those who felt a racial affinity to the Germans, as the invaders discovered during their assault upon the Soviet Union. Some of the inhabitants of areas immediately affected turned upon the local representatives of the Soviet government and of the Communist Party and eliminated them before the arrival of German troops. Reports of the Sicherheitsdienst during the early weeks of Operation "Barbarossa" attested to the existence of armed Latvian¹², Lithuanian¹³, and Estonian¹⁴ nationalists who later provided nuclei for Hilfspolizei¹⁵. These new-found friends of the German forces expected the German government to reconstitute the three independent Baltic republics. Lithuanian activists even went so far as to establish a provisional government only to suffer the bitter disappointment of seeing it ignored and later dissolved by the German authorities¹⁶. In consequence, the flow of spontaneous co-operation dried up. Ukrainian nationalists also rebelled against Soviet control¹⁷, but their activity was not entirely spontaneous because two German-sponsored Ukrainian units, "Roland"¹⁸ and "Nachtigall"¹⁹, were introduced into the Ukraine and a number of nationalist propaganda teams also contrived to make their way forward from German-held and Roumanian territory²⁰. The presence of these organisations caused the population of the Ukraine, not unnaturally, to suppose that the German government favoured independence for the Ukraine. Nothing could have been further from the truth, however, and the insurgents, like those of the Baltic states, were rapidly disillusioned²¹.

12. Einsatzgruppe A, Report, 15 November 1941 - L180/USA 276, NCA., VII, 983.
13. Der Chef der Sipp und des S.D., IV A1B/41, Ereignismeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr.88, 19 September 1941 - NO3149, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9L.
14. Idem, B.NR. IV A 1 - 1 B/41, Ereignismeldung U.d.S.S.R.Nr.111, 12 October 1941 - NO 3155, Case X11, Doc. Bk. 9 - 0.
15. Idem, IV A 1 B Nr. 1B/41, Ereignismeldung U.d.S.S.R.Nr. 24, 16 July 1941 - NO 2938 Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 - 0.
16. O.K.W., K.T.B., I, 419.
17. Armstrong, op.cit., pp. 76-7.
18. Ibid., p. 74, Dallin, op.cit., p.116.
19. Ibid., p.116; Armstrong, op.cit., p.76.
20. Ibid., pp. 84-6.
21. Ibid., pp.81-3, 106-8; Dallin, op.cit., pp.119-120.

It was not uncommon for German agencies, once they were firmly established in occupied territory, to receive unsolicited offers of help. In some cases these came from those who lacked food, shelter or friends, but others were solid citizens who wished to see a rapid return to normal conditions and were willing to help in re-establishing public services. Often they were willing to do little more than to re-open roads, but others were prepared to assist in maintaining law and order even to the extent of bearing arms ²². Another category of spontaneous volunteer consisted of enemy soldiers who changed sides in the field. Often those who defected were members of minorities within the states to which they belonged. During the Balkan campaign of 1941, ethnic Germans serving in the Royal Yugoslav Army were advised by the leaders of their Volksgruppe that if they could not evade mobilisation they were to surrender to the Axis forces, which many of them did ²³. At the same time Croats carried out hostile acts against Serbs wearing the same uniform as themselves ²⁴. During Operation "Barbarossa" Lithuanians serving in the Red Army's XXIX th Corps swelled the numbers of nationalists who rose against Soviet control ²⁵.

Nevertheless, many of those who came over to the German side on the Eastern front did not belong to disaffected nationalist groups. An officer in the Red Army named Kononov, brought over his entire unit ²⁶, but it was more usual for individuals to find their way across. The German ground forces came to realise that, with a little encouragement, the numbers deserting the Soviet forces might be increased. So they sent out loud-speaker vans and supplied leaflets in an effort to stimulate the traffic towards the German positions. These operations were not conducted haphazardly nor half-heartedly, for there were periods of intensive propaganda known by the codenames "Silberstreif"²⁷ and "Skorpion Ost"²⁸ directed against the Red Army.

22. AOK.11.Ic/A.O.Kriegstagebuch, 22 June 1941 to 31 March 1942 -NOKW 1465, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9-I-mentions requests by anti-Soviet Russians for employment with or without weapons.
 23. Dr.Sepp Jankers, Excerpt from Reden, und Aufsätze (Beckerek,1944)- N.G.4630/SSSR 357, Appendix to Report of Yugoslav War Crimes Commission, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 43; de Jong, op.cit., pp.124,232.
 24. Ibid., p.233 V. Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom, (London,1957), p228
 25. Lietuviu Enciklopedija, Vol. XV (Boston,Mass,1968),pp 119,376.
 26. S. Steenberg, op.cit., pp.73-4; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.309. Pester Lloyd, 5 August 1944, credits Kononov with bringing over twenty men.
 27. Dallin, op.cit., p.570; Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit., p.136.
 28. Dallin, op.cit., p.604.

Of those who surrendered to the German ground forces there were many who expected and perhaps would have preferred - to be sent to the rear, but who were retained as Hiwis by their actual captors. Conversely, there were "Überläufer" who came over, even flourishing German leaflets, fully intending to serve the Germans but who were, nevertheless, despatched to a prison camp.²⁹ In some cases the camps had special enclosures set aside for defectors³⁰, but in other instances they were treated no differently from those who had surrendered reluctantly. The incarceration of line-crossers was justifiable on the grounds that enemy agents could penetrate the German armed forces in this way,³¹ but it dampened the enthusiasm of genuine defectors for the German cause. Nevertheless, in many cases those who were consigned to an "Übeläuferlager" were freed to join the German forces or German industry, once they had been "screened"³².

Recruiting Propaganda.

The majority of the non-Germans who volunteered for service with the German forces probably did so with some prompting from the German side. Methods used in the occupied Western European countries to attract recruits differed little from those used in other lands. The Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS both published posters in the vernacular of the countries from which they sought volunteers. Material of this sort appeared in reduced size in the press of the countries concerned and was supplemented by a wide range of leaflets and pamphlets distributed from German recruiting offices. Predictably, many of the slogans employed in the recruiting literature were simply anti-Communist - young men were exhorted "Contre le Bolchevisme! Engage-toi à la Legion Wallonie",³³

29. Der General kommissar für die Krim, Gauleiter A.E. Frauenfeld, Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete, 10, February 1944 - NO5394 - NS19 neu 1478- T175, Roll 125, Frame 2650449; Dallin, op.cit., p.422.

30. Panzerarmee, Kriegstagebuch, 1 July 1943 to 31 December 1943, Anl.4-NO2386, Case XII Doc.Bk. 9H, mentions an Überläuferlager Süd of Lager II/Dulag 230

31. SS.F.H.A. Amt II, Abt Ic Az. Is/O/K/Eh, Tgb.Nr.11/140/44 Abwehr zunehmende Agentätigkeit in Reichsgebiet, 7 January 1944- T175, Roll 140, Frame 2668624.

32. NO2386 also mentions the release of Hiwianwärter from Dulag 230 to 5. (Ost) / Nachschub Btl 608.

33. Poster in Musée Royal de l'Armée, Brussels

"Med Waffen-S.S. og. Den Norske Legion mot den felles Fiende ... Mot Bolsjevismen".³⁴ Other captions were nationalistic in sentiment - "Vlamingen op ! Meldt U aan als Vrijwilliger bij de Waffen-S.S., of, bij het Vrijwilligerslegioen Vlaanderen"³⁵ or "Viens donc L& Legion c'est l'Armée du Peuple".³⁶ Sometimes the wording implied that the nation concerned was in danger as in "Tu defends la Belgique en Luttant au Front de l'Est",³⁷ and in "Die Waffen S.S. ruft dich - schütze auch du Deine Heimat"³⁸. Others were straightforward in content - "Engagez-vous à la Sturm-Brigade Wallonien"³⁹ or "Nederlanders kunnen zich ter opname in de S.S. Standaard Westland en Nordwest melden",⁴⁰ or simply "Kaemp med"⁴¹ or "Vaar uit met de duitsche Kriegsmarine"⁴² Others attempted to attract youths to the Waffen S.S. by pointing out its career prospects in "Een Loopbaan voor U - S.S.",⁴³ and in "Vlaamse Studenten! De Waffen S.S. vormt mannen, vormt leiders".⁴⁴ In some cases the slogans insinuated that enlistment was the comradely thing to do by statements such as "Uw plaats is nog mij in de Waffen - S.S."⁴⁵ and "Toi aussi ! Tes camarades t'attendent dans la Division française de la Waffen S.S."⁴⁶ and in "Schouder aan Schouder".⁴⁷ In other instances the posters and pamphlets implied that men should volunteer out of a sense of honour by using phrases such as "Legione S.S. Italiana - Onore, coraggio, fedelta",⁴⁸ "Honneur a la Legion"⁴⁹ and "Volg de roepstem van eer en geweten"⁵⁰

34. Poster in H.P. Taylor collection.

35. Poster, in Musée Royal de l'Armée, Brussels

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. R.F.S.S., S.S.H.A., Brochure (Bremen, 1941?), intended for camps containing Germanic workers in Germany.

39 Post-card with enrolment form.

40. Poster.

41. Poster.

42. Poster in Legermuseum, Leiden

43. Poster in Musée Royal de l'Armée, Brussels.

44. Poster

45. Poster.

46. Poster, reproduced in Bundesverband der Soldaten, der ehemaligen Waffen S.S., Wenn alle Bruder schweigen (Osnabrück, 1973), p.279

47. Press advertisement in Legermuseum, Leiden.

48. Press advertisement.

49. Poster for the Walloon Legion.

50. Poster in Legermuseum, Loiden.

Since the S.S. had amongst its objectives the establishment of a pan-Germanic Reich, this is indicated in the phraseology of some of its recruiting material "Wegen tot Germaansche Lotsverbonden heid" was the title of a booklet ⁵¹ which sought to persuade young Dutchmen to visit the indoctrination centre of the S.S. at Sennheim. The slogan "Volken van Gelijkten Bløede strijden gemeenschappelijk tegen denzelfden Vijand" ⁵² also appeared in Danish translation. ⁵³ In time the S.S. was obliged to widen its basis by posing as a pan-European body, issuing such calls as "Avec tes camarades europeens sous le signe S.S. tu vaincras," ⁵⁴ or "Te Wapen voor Europas Bescherming" ⁵⁵ Frequently the propaganda of the S.S. combined a couple of themes in one slogan. A joint appeal was made to nationalist and anti-Communist feeling in the simple "For Danmark ! Mod Bolchevismen" ⁵⁶ Other slogans associated the interests of particular nationalities with those of Europe as a whole; "L'Avvenire e il benessere dell'Italia e dell'Europa sono nelle mani dei soldati Italiani !" ⁵⁷ and "Pour une Europe Nouvelle la Waffen S.S. t'appelle Protège ta Patrie" ⁵⁸ are examples of this. Another variant consisted of propaganda for a European front against Communism typified by "Europa is aangetreden met de S.S. Standaard Westland in den strijd tegen het bolsjewisme" ⁵⁹ and "L'Europe unie contre le bolchevisme" ⁶⁰

Recruits were not required for the Ostfront alone, hence the long-winded "Gioventu d'Italia i volontari che combattono sul fronte di Nettuno chiamano a raccolta i valorosi. Arruolatavi nella Legione S.S. Italiana" ⁶¹. Although the Flemish S.S. Brigade "Langemarck" fought, as intended, on the Eastern front, one of its slogans simply stated "De Langemarck beschermt Uw Land tegen de bevrijders" ⁶² while another, Unusually, indicated Britain as the foe and, for good measure, endowed John Bull with Semitic facial features. ⁶³

51. Published by Storm (Amsterdam, 194). Copy in H.P.Taylor collection.

52. Poster.

53. "Samme Slags Blød Kjemper I Felleskap mit Samme Fiende"-part of RF 1153

Reproduced by R.J.Bender and H.P.Taylor in The Waffen - S.S., Vol II (Mountain View, 1971), p.21.

54. Poster for the French S.S. reproduced by H.Landemer in Les Waffen S.S. (Paris, 1972) between pp. 260 and 261.

55. Press advertisement in Legermuseum, Leiden.

56. Poster.

57. Press advertisement.

58. Booklet for the French S.S. Division

59. Poster.

60. Poster.

61. Poster.

62. "Sticker"

63. Information supplied by D. Littlejohn in letter to the author 30 August 1973.

Other media were also employed in an effort to win volunteers: for example when recruits were required from a particular racial group, special radio broadcasts were directed towards them. The German station at Hamburg transmitted appeals in its Danish service for volunteers to join Freikorps Danmark.⁶⁴ To induce Alsations to join the Armed S.S. the interview of an S.S. officer by a radio announcer was broadcast.⁶⁵ German-controlled transmitters in occupied countries allocated time for appeals by collaborationist leaders of the countries concerned. For example Ambassador de Brinon on 21 March 1943 called upon Frenchmen to volunteer for the German forces.⁶⁶ Once a nucleus of volunteers had been secured, interest maintained by broadcasting accounts of the swearing-in or the departure of contingents and of their subsequent experiences. On 14 March 1942 for example, Radio Hilversum broadcast an account of the departure of the Dutch Ambulance unit.⁶⁷ Every formation of the S.S. and every legion had a minor unit of war-correspondents who reported its activities for the German and foreign press and for radio.⁶⁸ In addition, newsreels were made and photographs taken to publicise the activities of the foreign volunteers. Oral appeals for volunteers were issued at a variety of meetings. Mass rallies, attended by local National-Socialists and fascists, were held in a number of Western European countries, when their legions were launched and on important dates thereafter. The sponsors of the French Legion convened a meeting in Paris on 18 July 1941 at the Vélodrome d'Hiver.⁶⁹

It was common practice for German recruiters to turn their attention to those, like the volunteer-workers, who had already set foot on the slippery path of collaboration. In other circumstances, potential recruits were persuaded to participate in some form of German-sponsored activity so that the recruiters could work upon their minds, in an attempt to recruit them.

64. Bartetzko, op.cit., p. 65.

65. The text is given in T175, Roll 110, 2635021-3.

66. France, Haute Cour de Justice, Les Procès de Collaboration (Paris, 1948), p.32.

67. To give another example on 12 November 1943 there was a broadcast of the swearing in of the first 10,000 Italian volunteers for the Waffen S.S. in S.W. Germany.

68. The propaganda platoons of the Waffen S.S. formed part of the S.S. Kriegsberichter Standarte "Kurt Eggors" commanded by Gunter d'Alquen.

69. M. Cotta, La Collaboration, 1940-44 (Paris, 1964), p.271.

Germanic and racial German youths were persuaded to enter Wehrertüchtigungslager,⁷⁰ run jointly by the Hitler Jugend and the S.S., counterparts of those which prepared Reichsdeutsche boys for service in the German forces. As for the indoctrination camp at Sennheim, so great was Bergers' faith in its powers of persuasion that he arranged for a number of Norwegian students, who had been arrested, to be sent there rather than to a concentration camp.⁷¹

Recruiting Offices.

If a young man of German blood lived within the newly annexed territories or in the Protectorate of Bohemia - Moravia he became liable for conscription once the German authorities had made their preparations. But if he felt compelled by the recruiting posters and other mass media to volunteer for the German forces there was nothing to prevent him from offering himself as many Germans from the "old" Reich did, at the office of Wehrbezirk or at the Ergänzungsstelle of the S.S., before the time when he would have been required to register with the rest of his age group.

The recruiting machine of the Wehrmacht expanded into the annexed territories by creating additional Wehrkreise, Wehrersatzbezirke and Wehrbezirke but it did not extend its offices into the occupied territories that were not absorbed into the Reich.⁷²

70. Three camps are known to have existed for Germanic youths - G1 at Stegskopf, Westerwald, G2 at Heiligenstand, Thüringen and G3 at Seeblick Kärnten - listed in T175, Roll 156, Frames 2686686 - 7 among papers of the S.S.Hauptamt. For young Volksdeutsche, the following are known - V.D. 1 at Kiev, for those from the Ukraine, V.D.2 at Neukühren, Samland, for those from Estorin and Latvia, V.D.3 at Frauenberg, Admont, for those from the Banat and Slovakia, and V.D.4 at Eisenratten bei Gmünd, for those from Croatia - T175, Roll 156, Frames 2686690-1. A reference to V.D.6 at Ossenholz seems to indicate the existence of other camps.

71. Chef des S.S.H.A., V.S.Tyb.Nr.164/44, Adj.Tyb Nr.148/44, 3 March 1944, in T 175, Roll 37, Frame 2685757, ~~Page 1~~ - No.5907, Case XI Doc.Bk.66H.

72. The military commanders in Bohemia - Moravia and in the Generalgouvernement also fulfilled the tasks of Wehrkreis - Kommandeure.

There was, however, in Berlin the Wehrbezirkskommando Ausland which was originally answerable for the conscription of the Reichsdeutsche living abroad.⁷³ When Hitler permitted non-Germans to participate in the "crusade against Bolshevism", W.B.K.Ausland was entrusted with the task of enlisting isolated volunteers in the Reich.⁷⁴ In France the Kriegsmarine set up a recruiting office in Caen⁷⁵ but in the Germanic countries, candidates for the German Navy could enrol through the medium of the recruiting offices of the S.S.⁷⁶ The poster "Forsvar Norge - Meld Deg til den Tyske Krigsmarine" tells volunteers to report to offices of the German Order Police, static headquarters of the German armed forces, German harbour authorities or the S.S. Ersatzkommando for Norway.⁷⁷ In order to cater for Germanic volunteers a naval depôt unit, 28. Schiffsstammabteilung, was set up with Himmler's blessing, at Sennheim near to the indoctrination camp of the S.S.⁷⁸

When the German Army raised its anti-Bolshevik legions in 1941, those interesting^{ed} in enlisting could learn from the publicity material the addresses to which they could report. Frenchmen were told to report - rather appropriately - to the former Intourist office in Paris⁷⁹, while Walloons were directed to a reception centre in Brussels.⁸⁰ When a new legion became sufficiently well-established it was moved to a training area in another occupied territory⁸¹ or in the Reich itself⁸² but it left behind in its homeland a recruiting office. This had the task of attracting and despatching further recruits to bring the legion up to strength, to establish its Ersatz unit and to keep it supplied with a flow of replacements for its casualties.

73. Absolon, op.cit., pp. 136, 148.

74. O.K.W. 14g/W WFST/Org(I), 19/42, 10 January 1942, Para. 1 e.

75. At 75, Boulevard des Alliés, Caen - Le Petit Parisien, 27 February 1944
Belgians could report to Marine Annamestelle West - Brüsseller Zeitung,
19 November 1943.

76. Allgemeine Heeresmitteilungen, 1941, Z.681

77. Part of RF 1153 - a collection of posters.

78. RF.S.S., Nr.36/140/43, V.S.Tgb.Nr.4554/43, Adj.Tgb.Nr.2237/43,
13 July 1943 - RVO -BDC 826 - 5991-2 (563)

79. Bureau central des engagements a la L.V.F., 12 rue Auber - Ausw.Amt,
Nr.2035, 7 July 1941, F.O.Series 386, Roll 680, Frame 211186.

80. Annahmestelle Brüssel, Grand Place 36 - R.F.S.S., S.S.H.A., Erg.Amt
der Waffen S.S. II 2a AZ. 9a/G-Sa, 4 August 1941.

81. The French volunteers were despatched to Poland - Le Temps, 27 August 1941.

82. For example, the Danes were moved to Hamburg - Völkischer Beobachter, 21
July, 1941, the Spaniards to Grafenwöhr - E. Infantes, Die Blaue Division,
p.11, the Walloons to Meseritz - E.Knoebel, op.cit., p.310.

In this way, the Walloon Battalion was served by Kommandostab Z in Brussels⁸³, while the French Regiment had its Siège Nationale in Paris.⁸⁴ In territories under German occupation the potential recruit could present himself at practically any static headquarters of the German forces or to any German unit. One poster advertising the French Waffen S.S. listed the addresses of nineteen Kommandeure der Ordnungspolizei in France.

For most of the war the Armed S.S., had its own recruiting organisation, separate from that of the armed forces.⁸⁵ In 1939 the responsibility for recruiting for all branches of the S.S. still lay in the hands of the commanders of the Oberabschnitte of the S.S., its main territorial divisions, corresponding geographically with the Wehrkreise.⁸⁶ As additional Wehrkreise were created to keep pace with the expansion of the Reich the S.S. followed suit.⁸⁷ At the end of 1939 recruiting functions were removed from the commanders of the Oberabschnitte and entrusted to the Ergänzungsamt within the S.S. Hauptamt. This office maintained an Ergänzungsstelle in each Oberabschnitt, that is to say within each Wehrkreis,⁸⁸ thus giving the S.S. a recruiting organisation parallel to that of the Wehrmacht and to some extent competing with it. Since the S.S., unlike the Wehrmacht, was anxious to enlist foreigners of German or Germanic blood, the S.S. established recruiting offices beyond the expanded Reich in areas where there were populations which were racially eligible for the S.S.⁸⁹

83. Knoebel, op.cit., P.311.
 84. At 19, rue St. Georges - J. Delarue, Trafics et Crimes sous l'Occupation (Paris, 1968), p.205, Y.Barjaud, 'La Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme', Feldgrab, XIII. Jg., Heft 5/6, 1965.
 85. Until the recruiting offices of the army and WaffenS.S. were combined on 15 December 1944 - Absolon, op.cit., p.356.
 86. For example S.S. Oberabschnitt "Spree" was identical with Wehrkreis III - Berlin and Brandenburg.
 87. S.S. Oberabschnitte "Weichsel" and "Warthe" were Wehrkreise XX and XXI
 88. Stein, op.cit., pp.36-7; Der Chef des Erg.Amtes der Waffen S.S. VIII/AZ, 8g/2.12.29, Neuordnung des Ergänzungswesens, 2 December 1939 -T175, Roll 104 Frames 2626685-6. Examples of Recruiting offices of the S.S, an Ergänzungsstellen "Spree" (III) in Berlin and "Warthe" (XXI) in Poznan.
 89. e.g. Erg.Amt der Waffen S.S. Nr. 335/40, Errichtung der Aussenstellen Elsass und Luxemburg, 3 July 1940 - T175, Roll 104, Frames 2626148-9.

At the time of the German campaigns of 1940 the territorial organisation of the S.S. did not extend into the Germanic countries. Before the S.S. Verfügungstruppen could recruit Danes, Norwegians, Dutchmen and Flemings for the regiments "Nordland" and "Westland", the S.S. had to establish recruiting offices in Copenhagen, Oslo, The Hague and Antwerp respectively,⁹⁰ This procedure was later to be followed in other countries from which the S.S. wished to obtain recruits.⁹¹

Apart from "passive" recruiting measures - the opening of recruiting offices and the dissemination of propaganda - which entailed waiting and hoping for candidates to present themselves there were more "active" steps taken to recruit personnel. One of these measures was the recruiting commission, which visited the communities from which it was hoped to draw recruits. German recruiters for example, visited Amsterdam, Heerlen, Groningen, Arnhem, Breda, Deventer and Utrecht, establishing themselves in hotels or in other premises for limited periods.⁹² Recruiting commissions visited eighty-seven Danish towns and villages between 28 August and 20 September 1941.⁹³ In doing this they were merely setting up temporary recruiting offices to which candidates reported, but by meeting potential recruits half-way, the recruiters made the enlistment easier and more probable.

90. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.32; Erg.Amt der Waffen S.S. Tgb.Nr. -/40, Errichtung der Ergänzungsstelle "Nordwest", 29 June 1940.

91. e.g. Ergänzungskommando Frankreich in Paris, Ersatzkommando Prizren, ErsatzInspektion "Ostland" in Riga.

92. Press advertisement in Legermuseum, Leiden.

93. Bartetzko,op.cit.,p.65; Völkischer Beobachter, 10 July 1941 refers to seventy-seven recruiting centres.

Foreign Recruiting Agencies.

Volksgruppe

Outside the Reich the S.S. depended to a considerable extent upon native agencies to persuade or coerce young men to present themselves at the recruiting offices of the S.S. In the German settlement areas of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia, Roumania and Denmark the S.S. was assisted by the fact that the Volksgruppen had been penetrated by National-Socialist ideas and were led by National-Socialists even if non-Nazi organisations remained in existence in some cases.⁹⁴ Initially the leaders of the Volksdeutsche had to persuade young men to cross the borders into the Reich in order to join the S.S. Surreptitiously.⁹⁵ Later they had to persuade racial Germans to opt for the German rather than the host-country's forces.⁹⁶ Finally, in Hungary, there was a problem of making Volksdeutsche identify themselves as such, rather than masquerade as Magyars.⁹⁷ Berger himself admitted that much depended on the leadership of the Volksgruppe; when it was well led conscription was unnecessary.⁹⁸ The enthusiasm of the ethnic German leaders for sending their youths into the S.S. was dampened by the knowledge that heavy casualties would reduce the strength of the Volksgruppe in relation to the "host" population.⁹⁹

Political Parties

The S.S. was assisted in raising Germanic personnel for the Verfügungstruppe and later for the national legions by the existence of pro-German political parties - the Nationaal Socialistische Nederlandsche Arbeiders Partij and the Duits - Vlaamsche Gemeenschap. The collaboration of the second organisation was so close that candidates for the Waffen -S.S. and Vrijwilligers Legioen Vlaanderen were exhorted to reports to its cells as an alternative to the recruiting organisation of the S.S.¹⁰⁰

94. Documents on the Expulsion, II, 26-8, III, 40.

95. German Embassy, Belgrade, Telegramm Nr. 678, 13 September 1940 - N05695 refers to the smuggling of Yugoslav Volksdeutsche from Zemun (Semlin) and Prahovo.

96. Herzog, op.cit., p.4.

97. Documents on the Expulsion, II, 36; RFSS, Chef de S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr. 1617/42, 22 May 1942, - T175, Roll 139 Frames 2667416-7

98. Ibid., V.S. Tgb. Nr. 3701/43, Adjtr. Tgb. Nr. 1884/43, 1 June 1943
NO 5901, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 6 6 G.

99. Documents on the Expulsion, III, 56.

100. Posters "Gevaar voor ons Land ! Meldt U aan als vrijwilliger bij de Waffen- S.S. of bij het Vrijwilligerslegioen Vlaanderen and "Vlaamingen op ! Treedt aan in S.S. - Standaard "Westland" S.S.-Vrijwilligers Legioen "Vlaanderen" - example in Musée Royal de l'Armée, Brussels.

The support of the annexationists for German recruiting put the right-wing nationalists under an obligation to assist to the same extent. Consequently the posters directing young men to the offices of Dovlag also told them that they could present themselves at those of the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond.¹⁰¹ Similarly Danmarks National Socialistiske Arbejder Parti, even though it had no annexationist rival to fear, put its premises in Copenhagen at the disposal of the Freikorps.¹⁰² Some nationalist leaders went further; Mussert in August 1941 ordered all male members of the Nationaal Socialistische Beweging in Nederland aged between eighteen and forty to join the Weer Afdeelingen in order to form a reservoir of manpower for the Dutch Legion, which he hoped to expand into an N.S.B - Division.¹⁰³ In April 1942 he went a stage further and ordered all W.A. men to volunteer for the Legion.¹⁰⁴ In much the same way, Rexists were ordered to report for the Walloon Legion on pain of losing rank in their Party.¹⁰⁵

The German task was made easier when native committees were established to conduct the recruiting, particularly in those cases where otherwise the Germans would have had to deal with a number of different parties and organisations. In Finland a committee was established from representatives of a wide spectrum of political parties, varying from the Fascists to the Social-Democrats. Associated with the politicians were a number of eminent men, some of whom had served in the Finnish Jägerbataillon.¹⁰⁶ In France no less than three committees supported the Légion des Volontaires français contre le Bolchevisme - an action committee in each zone and an honorary committee in the occupied zone. The action committees contained representatives from the right-wing parties while the comité d'honneur included eminent churchmen and academicians.¹⁰⁷ A precedent was established and when in 1942 the Vichy government created the Légion Tricolore as a counter-blast to the L.V.F., it, too, was sponsored by a committee.¹⁰⁸

101. Ibid.

102. Bartetzko, op.cit., p.75.

103. S. van der Zee, op.cit., p. 141.

104. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 27 April 1942.

105. Le Pays Réel, 26 February 1942.

106. Stein and Krosby, op.cit., pp.430-1.

107. Auswärtiges Amt, Nr.435, 8 August 1941, in F.O. Series 386, Roll 680, Frames 211314-6; S.Labat, op.cit., p.5, St.Loup, Les Volontaires, p.16; St.Paulien, Histoire de la Collaboration (Paris, 1964,), p.242; Barjand, op.cit.

108. St.Loup, op.cit., p.137.

Foreign Governments.

The German invasions preceding the attack on the Soviet Union normally caused the departure of the governments of the countries concerned, thus simplifying the later recruiting activities of the invaders. There were instances, however where the German authorities had to negotiate with foreign governments in order to obtain recruits. The Finnish government permitted the Armed S.S. to enrol its subjects from April 1941 until June 1943.¹⁰⁹ The Danish governments, largely on the initiative of the Foreign Minister, Scavenius, sanctioned the raising of the Freikorps and even permitted members of the country's armed forces to join it, in spite of the fact that foreign military service was contrary to Danish law.¹¹⁰ Shortly afterwards the Danish government had second thoughts and sought to dismiss Danish servicemen who joined the Freikorps and to deprive them of their pension rights.¹¹¹ By comparison the head of the French state, Marshal Pétain, was more obliging. In November 1941, he wrote thanking the commander of the L.V.F. for a loyal address sent by its members on the eve of their departure for the front. At the same time he thanked eighteen of the Legion's N.C.O.s for a photograph they had sent him.¹¹² This was tantamount to an expression of official approval of the French Legion.

109. Stein and Krosby, op.cit., passim.

110. Danish Foreign Ministry, Aide Memoire, 7 July 1941, Danish War Ministry, Circular, 8 July 1941; Nalkils, Besættelsestidens Fakta, (Copenhagen, 1945), I, 690; V. La Cour, Danmark under Besættelsen, (Copenhagen, 1945), I, 619.

111. C.D.S.S.H.A., Tgb.Nr.851/41, Bericht der dienstreise nach Dänemark, 19 July 1941 - T175, Roll1110, Frame 2634672.

112. Auswärtige Berlin Nr.3461, 5 November 1941, Deutsche Botschaft Paris Nr. 9003/41, 5 November 1941; Délégation Général du Gouvernement Français dans les territoires occupés, 5 November 1941; Auswärtige Berlin Nr. 3487, 6 November 1941 - all in F.O. Series 4647 H, Supplement 3780 H, Roll 2399, Frames 209516 - 24.

In order to extract Volksdeutsche from the territories of her allies, Germany was obliged to abandon the policy of smuggling small groups out of the countries concerned and specifically to conclude agreements with the governments of Hungary,¹¹³ Roumania,¹¹⁴ Croatia¹¹⁵ and Slovakia.¹¹⁶ The agreement of the government of Croatia had also to be secured before Bosnian Moslems could be levied for the Armed S.S.¹¹⁷ The Royal Roumanian Government was also prevailed upon to permit the recruitment of "White" emigres for the Russische Schtzkorps in Serbia.¹¹⁸

The Political S.S.

Recruiting for the Armed S.S. and the Germanic Legions was considerably facilitated by the extension of the German political S.S. into the annexed Polish areas,¹¹⁹ into the General gouvernement¹²⁰ and Alsace.¹²¹ A Germanic political S.S. was created with branches in Norway,¹²² the Netherlands,¹²³ Flanders¹²⁴ and later Denmark.¹²⁵ The pro-German attitude of the Germanic S.S. antagonised the National separatists in the Netherlands and Belgium and jeopardised recruiting for the Armed S.S. in those countries.¹²⁶ The task of the Germanische S.S. - the dissemination of pan-German National Socialism - was also seriously hindered by the large number of Germanic S.S. men, notably in Flanders who enlisted in the Armed S.S.¹²⁷ To prevent the "leakage" of potential Germanic recruits for the Waffen S.S. into other bodies, for example the N.S.K.K., the S.S. secured the sole right to communicate with the Germanic right-wing parties. Thenceforward the S.S. controlled the contacts of the other organisations of the N.S.D.A.P. with the Germanic countries.¹²⁸

113. On 1 February 1942, 1 June 1943 and 14 April 1944 - Documents on the Expulsion, II, 35-36.
114. On 13 May 1943 - Ibid, II, 58-60 with text of the agreement - N02236 in Annex 8 on pp.148-151.
115. In the summer of 1943 There was no formal treaty - Herzog, op.cit., p.11
116. On 7 June 1944 - Documents on the Expulsion, IV, 148-9.
117. S.S. Gruppenführer*Telegramm Nr.001619/2.43, 19 February * Phleps. 1943, T 175, Roll 111, Frames 2635345-7.
118. Agreement was reached on 20 August 1943 - O.K.H./Gen St.d.H/ Org.Abt II Nr.12652/43, 9 September 1943, BAMA -H1/436.
119. C.d.S.S.H.A., Ia/O-Az.8 (Wei)/8.12.39, 30 January 1940, T175, Roll 171, Frames 9704811-16.
120. By the establishment of S.S. Sturmbann "Ost".
121. It constituted Abschnitt XXXV.
122. Norges S.S. Later known as Germaniske S.S.Norge.
123. Algemeene S.S. in Nederland or Nederlandsches S.S. finally Germaansche S.S. Nederland.
124. Algemeene Schut Scharen Vlaanderen or Algemeene Vlaamsche S.S. or S.S. Vlaanderen finally Germaansche S.S. Vlaanderen.
125. Germanisk Korps finally Schalburgkorps.
126. Bartetzko, op.cit. pp.71-2; Knoebel, op.cit., pp.157-9.
127. Knoebel, op.cit., pp.203-4
128. Reichsverfügungsblatt der N.S.D.A.P., Partei Kanzlei, Ausgabe A, Folge 34/42 18 August 1942, Anordnung A54/42-T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587330: Der R.F.S.S. Teil.Nr. A35/258/42, 26 August 1942, T175, Roll 70 Frames 2587331-2.

Émigré Communities.

When the Wehrmacht and Waffen S.S. recruited from the populations of Western Europe they were helped by the existence of native National-Socialist and Fascist parties. These conditions ~~did~~ not apply in the occupied Eastern areas, where the Soviet regime had suppressed other ideologies. This obliged the German military authorities to bring in suitable non-German recruiters selected from among the émigré communities west of the Curzon Line. The Bandera faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists - known as OUN-B- played a leading part in the "Nachtigall" unit while the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Nationalists in Austria provided men for "Roland". The extinction of the provisional governments established by OUN-B in Lvov and by the rival Melnyk faction -OUN-M- in Kiev soon alienated many Ukrainian nationalists.¹²⁹ "Imported" recruiters also included national-separatists, like Kayum Khan, and the "Whites" who combed the prisoner-of-war camps in search of recruits although it was contrary to official German policy to permit expatriates to enter Soviet territory.¹³⁰ One Volksdeutsche "resettler" Buschmann, who returned from the Reich as an interpreter was instrumental in raising Baltic air units.¹³¹

129. Armstrong, op.cit., p.74.

130. OUN-M representatives also raised a police force by this means-
Ibid, p.93.

131. Association of Estonians in Great Britain in letters to the author, 30 May 1969, 14 October 1969; A.S.Silgailis, Latviesu Legions (Copenhagen, 1964), pp.273-4.

German Agencies.

Abwehr.

Although the Wehrmacht, before the outbreak of war, was content to restrict its entry almost entirely to Reichsdeutsche, one of its departments, Amt Ausland Abwehr, actively sought out foreigners. This office had a responsibility for counter-intelligence which brought it into contact with non-Germans living in the Reich. It established connections with émigré groups who helped it to find men for its more aggressive tasks. Abwehr recruited Sudeten Germans in anticipation of war with Czechoslovakia and when they were not required, retained them for use against Poland, together with members of that country's German minority. These Volksdeutsche provided the basis for the Division "Brandenburg".¹³² Abwehr also organised the Ukrainian unit "Berghauernhilfe" for use during the Polish campaign.¹³³ This unit was not used, but Abwehr organised two more units using Ukrainians taken prisoner while serving in the Polish forces - "Roland" and "Nachtigall".¹³⁴ For the seizure of Dutch frontier bridges in 1940, Abwehr recruited members of the expatriate national-socialist Sport en Spel organisation.¹³⁵ In its pursuit of recruits with a knowledge of foreign parts and a mastery of alien tongues, Abwehr selected German explorers and missionaries, German colonists from Palestine, Volksdeutsche from the various scattered settlements and a selection of foreigners who acted as nuclei for special operations in places as remote as Afghanistan.¹³⁶ Responsibility for long-range penetration made Abwehr one of the sponsors of early Turkic and Caucasian units.¹³⁷

132. H. Freud, 'O.K.W./Amt für Auslandsnachrichten/Abwehr,' Feldgrah, XI. Jg. Heft 6 (1963); H. Töpelmann, Die deutsche Kompanie z.b.V., Ibid., XI Jg. Heft 1 (1963) G. Buchheit, 'Die Anfänge des Regiments Brandenburg,' Ibid., XVIII Jg. Heft 6 (1970)

133. Armstrong, op.cit., pp.42-3.

134. Ibid. p.74.

135. Van der Zee, op.cit., pp60-65; de. Jong, op.cit., p.185.

136. H. Kriegsheim, Getarnt, Getäuscht und, doch Getreü (Berlin, 1958), passim ; S. Spaeter, Die Geschichte des Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland, III (Duisburg, 1958), passim.

137. i.e. Sonderverband Bergmann - W. Brockdorff, Geheimkommandos des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Wels, 1967), pp243-8, The Wakestoni Legion was derived from Sonderkommando Tiger B of Abwehr II - G. Tessin, Freiwilligenverbände (unpublished M.S.) - B.A.M.A.

The Auswärtiges Amt.

Germany's Auswärtiges Amt, like Abwehr, had a number of contacts with emigre circles in the Reich. It also had teams of officials who were responsible for collating information about foreign countries. In the absence of any organisation of its own the German Army found the facilities of the German Foreign Office of prime importance in raising foreign units. The Indien Referat worked to raise personnel for the Legion "Azad Hind";¹³⁸ while colleagues of theirs participated in the recruitment of Irishmen¹³⁹ and Arabs.¹⁴⁰ In 1943, the England Committee set up by the German Foreign Office, sponsored the abortive English Legion of Saint George and supported its successor the tiny British Free Corps.¹⁴¹ The Foreign Office could have assisted in raising legions of Soviet citizens had it not been prevented by the jealousy of the rival Ministry for the Eastern Occupied areas.¹⁴²

In its more proper field of diplomacy the German Foreign Office was instrumental in securing far more recruits for the Wehrmacht and Waffen S.S., than it produced as a recruiting agent within the Reich. In 1940 German diplomats negotiated on behalf of the S.S. with the Finnish government to obtain recruits for an infantry unit. The efforts of the Auswärtiges Amt were not fully appreciated by Gottlob Berger, mainly because of their protracted length at a time when "Barbarossa" was imminent. Berger endeavoured, in vain, to circumvent normal diplomatic channels - an experiment in foreign relations that caused considerable annoyance to Ribbentrop and his staff.¹⁴³ Berger's impatience may have been aggravated by the fruitless attempts of the German diplomats to persuade the Roumanian authorities to relinquish several hundred racial German "farm labourers" for the ultimate benefit of the Armed S.S.¹⁴⁴ In spite of Berger's interference, the German Foreign Office continued to act as a channel of communication between the S.S. and the countries from which it desired to recruit Volksdeutsche, finally securing treaties with Roumania, Hungary and Slovakia for this purpose.¹⁴⁵

138. Sykes, Op.cit., pp.352,358.
 139. O'Callaghan, Op.cit., p.107.
 140. Hirszowicz, op.cit., pp.203,218.
 141. Slade, op.cit., pp.1-2, 29-30,46
 142. Rosenberg, Vermerk über eine Unterredung mit dem Führer im Führerhauptquartier, 8 May 1942 -1520 PS, T.M.W.C. XXVII, 288-90.
 143. Stein and Krosby, op.cit., passim. Negotiations with the Swedish government in July 1941 failed to secure its agreement to a Swedish Legion - see correspondence in T175, Roll 106, Frames 26290 26-45.
 144. Ausw.Amt,Kult A1818,II,23 January 1940; RFSS., Tyb.Nr.794/40, 28 April 1940 - both in NO1605, Case XI, Doc.Bk.72F.
 145. See above, p.242.

During the summer of 1941 the Auswärtiges Amt played a leading part in arranging with the governments of Spain, France, Denmark and Croatia for the creation of anti-Bolshevik legions from the subjects of those states.¹⁴⁶ Once the details had been satisfactorily settled the work of the German Foreign Office did not end there since it was called upon to deal with problems affecting the Legions. The need to find support in Denmark for the Freikorps, the Vichy régime's attempt to raise a rival Légion Tricolore,¹⁴⁸ the Caudillo's decision to recall the "Blue" Division,¹⁴⁹ all created work for the German diplomatic service. The task increased as the war continued and new races were drawn into the German forces. Ribbentrop's subordinates were obliged, for example, to thrash out with the Croat government the details of the Bosnians' service in the S.S.¹⁵⁰ The collapse of Germany's allies did not diminish the burden since German diplomats continued to negotiate with rump régimes, like Mussolini's, and the "governments-in-exile" that were established on German soil.¹⁵¹

The German Army.

The German attack on the U.S.S.R. found the German Army unprepared to cope with the offers of military service which came from members of races in which the S.S. was not, at that time, interested. It was a simple matter to impose the responsibility for enlisting Germany's resident aliens and seafarers upon Wehrbezirk Ausland they were individuals and comparatively few in number.¹⁵²

146. F.O. Series 4641H.

147. Particularly when the Danish government cooled towards the Freikorps and when the D.N.S.A.P. proved to be a broken reed - see correspondence in T175, Roll 67, Frames 2583250-396.

148. J. Delarue, Trafics et Crimes sous l'Occupation (Paris, 1968), pp. 201-9, German occupation of the "Vichy" zone scotched the nascent French unit.

149. In 1943 Allied diplomatic pressure obliged General Franco to reduce the the Spanish contingent from a division to a regiment and in the spring of 1944 to order its complete withdrawal - Infantes, op.cit., pp. 122, 131, 135.

150. The German Foreign office was even drawn into a discussion of the Bosnians' insignia and dress - Auswärtiges Amt, Inl. 11 1305, 31 May 1943 - T175, Roll 70 Frame 258155.

151. Bulgar and Roumanian "régimes" were situated in Vienna.

152. Ausw. Amt, Telegramm Nr. 612, 6 July 1941, 3d - T175, Roll 106, Frames 2629033-40, O.K.W. 14g/W, WF St/Orv(I), 19/42, Richlinien für den Einsatz ausländischer Freiwilliger im Kampf gegen die Sowjetunion (Neufassung), 10 January 1942, 1f; Allgemeine Heeres Mitteilungen VIII. Jg. (1941), Z. 681.

Other measures had to be employed in raising complete ground combat units outside the Reich where no German recruiting organisation existed. The Allgemeine Heeresamt of the Oberkommando des Heeres was responsible for training the Walloon battalion and retained the task of creating non-German volunteer units of the Army after it was decided, in January 1942, that department Oberquartiermeister IV of the General Staff should supervise the Walkons in action.¹⁵³

Because the enlistment of Soviet citizens was not merely unforeseen but forbidden, the German ground forces entered the U.S.S.R. with no machinery for enrolling any of its inhabitants. Static headquarters behind the lines soon realised the need to raise local police forces, for these offices were among the earliest German employers of Soviet manpower. In occupied Eastern territories these local security organisations largely depended for their manpower upon civilians' offering their services. This enabled the Commander of Rear Area 553 to raise Selbstschutz and also Miliz,¹⁵⁴ probably the same categories as those levied by lesser headquarters, notably Ortskommundantar I(V) 277,¹⁵⁵ and Feldkommandantur 810.¹⁵⁶ The 454th Security Division and Orts kommandantur I/853 recruited Hilfspolizei in the same way.¹⁵⁷ Until it became customary to draw Hiwis from training schools attached to Stalags,¹⁵⁸ German units and formations at or near the front were dependant on the prisoners-of-war, line-crossers and civilians who adhered to them.

153. Knoebel, op.cit., p.312; W.Keilig, Das deutsche Heer 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim, 1956 onwards), pp.50/1944/33 (formerly 55/3), 50/1944/37 (formerly 55/7), 56/II/2.
154. Köbruck 553, Qu./tgb.Nr.6945/41, Zuständigkeit der Wi-Kdos, 5 December 1941 - N.O.K.W. 1454; Köbruck 553, Abt. Ia, Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilungen, 16 to 31 December 1941, 1 January 1942 - N.O.K.W. 1866, both in Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9M
155. O.K.I.(V) 277, B.B.Nr. 365/41, Tätigkeitsbericht, 11 to 20 December 1941, 21 December 1941 - N.O.K.W.1727, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9N.
156. F.K.810, Feldgendarmarie, Tätigkeitsbericht über die im Gebiete der Feldkommandantur durchgeführten Streifen, 15 February 1942- N.O.K.W. 2256, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9 J.
157. 454.Sich Div., Abt. Ia, Anlage 2 zum Div.Befehl Nr.59, 8 September 1941, A,III, 2 - N.O.K.W. 2628, Case XII Doc.Bk. 9 - 0; O.K.I/853, B.Tgb.Nr. 948/41, Tätigkeitsbericht, 14 November 1941, III - NO.K.W 1573, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9M.
158. c.g. Dulag 180 (Hiwischule) - A.O.K.6, Qu.2, Kriegstagebuch, Beitrag Qu.2, 21 January 1944 - N.O.K.W. 2921, Case XII, Doc. Bk.7G.

Once the need to recruit Soviet citizens was recognised in Berlin and permission had been granted for enrolling members of specific minorities, various branches of the High Commando became involved. Abwehr already had an interest in raising long range penetration units, but another department of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, namely Abteilung IV of Wehrmacht Propaganda, became involved. Two of the leading lights of the department, Colonels Hans Martin and Nicholas von Grote, saw how their efforts directed against the Red Army would be made easier if there were indigenous units serving alongside German troops in the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁹

Within the High Command of the German Army, as opposed to that of the Armed Forces, were several officers who were anxious to recruit Soviet citizens. Inside the Organisation Department of the General Staff, until he was transferred to Africa, Major Graf Claus von Stauffenberg, faced by the problem of organising and rebuilding German units, became concerned to form them from non-Germans.¹⁶⁰

The Army's High Command had its own intelligence organisation, separate from Abwehr, to serve the formations on the Eastern front. This was Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost and was led by the sometime Lieutenant-Colonel Reinhard Gehlen with the assistance of Lieutenant-Colonel Alexis Freiherr von Roenne. This department's appreciation of the situation in the East led it to give its support to the raising of units drawn from the population of the U.S.S.R.¹⁶¹

Prisoners-of-War and Internees.

The German prisoner-of-war camp structure served the German recruiting machine by supplying many of its foreign volunteers. The races recruited varied considerably from Ukrainians, who had served in the Polish Army, Irishmen, who had served in the British Army, Indians, Palestinian Arabs, Albanians of Yugoslav nationality, Englishmen; Canadians, South Africans, Walloons and Frenchmen to the many races of the U.S.S.R. Several methods were used to induce captives to volunteer.

159. Dallin, op.cit., p.508-9.
 160. Kramarz, op.cit., pp.96-104.
 161. R. Gehlen, The Gehlen Memoirs (London, 1972),pp.94-106; Dallin, op.cit., p.508.

German Recruiters.

Since the potential volunteers were held under restraint it was inevitable that the Germans had to send teams of recruiters into the camps themselves. Abwehr put its agents into the earliest Stalags in order to extract Ukrainian nationalists for "Nachtigall".¹⁶² The rival of Abwehr, the Sicherheitsdienst later sought Soviet prisoners in general, for "Zeppelin"¹⁶³ and Crimean Tartars for security units.¹⁶⁴ Outside operational theatres, the German Foreign Office lent its support to the procurement of Irish, Arab, Indian and British prisoners-of-war. Officers from the Afrika korps were also used in an attempt to influence Arab prisoners.¹⁶⁶

Where the prison camps were within the Eastern theatre-of-war, frontiers of the German Army ordered teams of officers to gather from them those who were willing to bear arms, to labour or to move supplies. The Commander of Rear Area 584, of the 16th Army, raised its Freijäger formation in this way.¹⁶⁷ The staff of the Commander of Prisoners-of-War with the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ukraine brought to life a number of Cossack regiments.¹⁶⁸ A German Security Division, the 203rd established Sonderstab Hohlfeldt to comb the camps of the Central Army Group and create Freiwilligen Ersatzregiment Mitte.¹⁶⁹ The 9th Army raised Gruppe Tietjen in the same way.¹⁷⁰ A special Aufstellungsstab von Pawel-Rammingen had the duty of organising labour units from Turkic captives who were not fit for combat.¹⁷¹

162. Armstrong, op.cit., p.73.
 163. Schellenberg, op.cit., p.308.
 164. A.O.K.11,Qu.2. Beitrage für das Kriegstagebuch, 31 January 1942,-NOKW 1741, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9N; R.T.Paget, Manstein- his Campaigns and his Trial (London,1951), p.92.
 165. O'Callaghan, op.cit., pp.107-10; F.O.Series 86,1168,1292.
 166. Report on captivity for the attention of the French delegates at the International Court of Justice, Nuremburg, - R.F.46, Chap.I/I/4.
 167. Kordück 584, Kdr.d. Osttruppen z.b.V., May 1943 - N.O.K.W.2397, Case XII
 168. Lebenslauf von Hauptmann (r) Sergius von Braude - BAMA - H3/501
 169. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.Nr. 8501 of 11 August 1942, Nr.9566 of 24 September 1942 and Nr.9846 of 12 October 1942.
 170. 2./Gruppe Tietjen and 4./Gruppe Tietjen, Stammtaffeln.
 171. O.K.W., K.T.B., II/2, p.1080.

Expatriate Recruiters.

Apart from using German, foreign recruiters were introduced into the camps in order to raise men for the units with which they were associated. William Joyce, better known as "Lord Haw-Haw", and the veteran I.R.A. leader Sean Russell made a joint appeal to Irish prisoners-of-war.¹⁷² Subhas Chandra Bose and members of his Free India Centre, entered the camps containing Indian prisoners.¹⁷³ John Amery attempted, with little success, to suborn British prisoners-of-war and internees.¹⁷⁴

The same process was employed with men taken from the Red Army. Three Russian aviators toured German camps on behalf of General Vlasov.¹⁷⁵ "White" Russians even were used to persuade Cossack prisoners to join the Germans¹⁷⁶ while Kaminsky sent his representatives into the camps of Heeresgruppe Mitte to find reinforcements for his private army.¹⁷⁷ Of the National-separatists, Prince Veli Kayum Khan extricated a number of Turkestanis, probably saving their lives in the process but losing through disease, his associate, Mustafa Chokai.¹⁷⁸

Segregation.

When the missionary efforts of their collaborators failed to evoke a large number of enlistments, the German Army had recourse to segregation. This took several forms - in the case of Indian and Irish captives the German authorities, having first concentrated them at Lamsdorf and Altdamm respectively, separated the N.C.O.s from the men to stop the former from using their influence to obstruct German efforts.¹⁷⁹ Another method to select and concentrate the potential candidates for the legions - Indians, to use them as an example again, were despatched to Arbeitskommando Frankenberg.¹⁸⁰

172. O'Callaghan, op.cit., pp.107-10.

173. Toye, op.cit., p.63; Sykes op.cit., p.360

174. Slade, op.cit., pp.14-20

175. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 March 1944

176. Lebenslauf von Hauptmann (r) Sergius von Braude, BAMA-H3/501

177. Anon. 'Brigade Kamininski', Der Freiwillige, X.Jg. Heft 8, 1964.

178. Prince Veli Kayum Khan, Interogation Summaries 1388 and 1456; Dallin, op.cit., p.236.

179. Toye, op.cit., p.63; Sykes, op.cit., p.360; O'Callaghan, op.cit., p.109

180. O.K.H. Gen. St.d.H., Org.Abt.Nr.2724/42, 5 June 1942, in BAMA-H1/144, T.78. Roll 413.

Where British prisoners were concerned, newly-captured men were subjected to harsh, unpleasant conditions, even solitary confinement.¹⁸¹ Then by way of contrast, selected prisoners would be sent to one of two "holiday" camps, Oflag Steinburg a subsidiary of Stalag 383 for officers, or Arbeitskommando 517 of Stalag III D at Genshagen, for other ranks.¹⁸² Steps were also taken to indentify men who had once belonged to British National-Socialist or Fascist parties or who had German blood.¹⁸³

Other Methods.

British prisoners returning from working parties found posters displayed in their huts and leaflets left by their beds. These methods may also have been employed with other nationalities, but in the case of the British they met with a singularly poor response.¹⁸⁴ At one stage in 1944, the German authorities considered using German students as "stool-pigeons", in an attempt to uncover potential recruits.¹⁸⁵ As a last resort British prisoners-of-war who were guilty of contravening German regulations - for example "fraternising" with German women while serving in working parties - were threatened with draconian punishments unless they volunteered for the German forces.¹⁸⁶

Although many prisoners-of-war with homes in German-occupied territory were released,¹⁸⁷ others were retained for the benefit of the German economy or, in the case of the French, because they were virtually hostages for their government's good behaviour. They were not available for recruitment into the German armed forces. In January 1944 a Frenchman recruiting for the S.S. amongst compatriots working in East Prussia, enlisted one who was in fact a prisoner-of-war who had been put on parole. Since this volunteer was ineligible by virtue of the fact that he was still a prisoner-of-war, even though he was free to move about, he was returned to work.¹⁸⁸ In the following month Hitler permitted the French S.S. to recruit from prisoners-of-war, both those in camps and those in a "civil" status.¹⁸⁹

181. Slade, op.cit., pp.34-5

182. Der B.d.E., Chef des Kriegsgefangenenwesens, Az.2 f 24 11 (Gr.I/1), Nr.500/44,
5 December 1944 - T175 Roll 155 Frames 2684512-3

183. Botschafter Ritter, Nr.134, 17 March 1943, T77, Roll 889, Frames 5639894-7;
O.K.W., Az.2 F 24.73, A.W.A./Kriegsgef. Allg .I(a), Nr.1055/43
W.F.St/W.Pr.IV, 31 March 1943, T77, Roll 889, Frames 5639911-4.

184. Reynold's News, 20 May 1945; The Scotsman, 20 June 1945; Slade op.cit., p.81

185. C.d.S.S., H.A., V.S.Tgb.Nr.3302/44, Adj.Tgb.Nr.1555/44, 13 June 1944-
N0909 - T175, Roll, 125 Frames 2650462-3.

186. Slade op.cit., p.52; idem, 'The Frustrated Axis' (unpublished MS.), p.86

187. Notably Danes, Norwegians, Dutchmen, Flemings (but not Walloons) and later Ukrainians, Poles, Finns, Balts and Volksdeutsche,

188. O.K.W. Az.2f24.18f. Kriegsgef.Allg.(VI)Gr.1/5 Tgb.Nr.086/44, 31 January 1944 in T175, Roll 125, Frame 2650961

189. Der R.F.S.S., S.S.H.A., Amtsgruppe D, Germanische Leitstelle, VS Tgb.Nr.982/44,
Tgb.Nr.332/44, 29 February 1944, in T175, Roll 125, Frame 2650959.

Himmler had in fact, repeatedly asked the High Command of the Armed Forces, which controlled prisoners-of-war, to release any who wished to volunteer for the Waffen S.S. and also those who were close relatives of men serving in that body.¹⁹⁰ On the 23rd March it was announced that Himmler could recruit all the prisoners-of-war he could use in the Waffen.S.S., including Englishmen, Rexistis and Albanians.¹⁹¹

Selection.

Selection was of the utmost importance in recruiting prisoners-of-war; indeed, one authority stressed that in levying Turkic recruits quality not quantity was the objective.¹⁹² There is evidence that in the East the Sicherheitsdienst, the Geheime Feldpolizei or the Feldgendarmerie "screened" potential recruits.¹⁹³ Since these agencies were often assisted by indigenous policemen and must have frequently depended upon native interpreters, it is possible that these investigations were not always reliable. In some cases enquiries into the background of candidates was very sketchy or did not take place at all, as German unit commanders were later to complain.¹⁹⁴

Parallel to the selection of individual volunteers for the Eastern Legions was the drafting of prisoners into labour service, where the inmates were kept under restriction in Kriegsgefangenen Arbeits units and were guarded. Nevertheless, it was a short step from these units to turning over the complement of camps into the Ost units. Individual camp-commanders were, no doubt, anxious to demonstrate their zeal by producing the maximum possible number of volunteers. The camps and their facilities, such as they were, could then be employed for different purposes. An additional benefit was that the Landeschützen units guarding the prisoners could be redeployed.¹⁹⁵ The legionary depôts subordinated to the H.Q of 162nd Division had formerly been transit camps for prisoners-of-war, while Oflag 65 at Lubny and Stalag 388 at Chorol became reception camps for that Division.¹⁹⁶

190. Der.R.F.S.S.,C.d,S.S.H.A.,DII/2 Az,Lu/Ma,6March 1944, in T175, Roll 125, Frame 2650956.
191. Der.R.F.S.S.,Nr.1893/44, 23 March 1944, in B.A.-N.S.31/27 and T175 Roll 125, Frame 2650957.
192. Oberkommando Heeresgruppe A.Ia,Nr.2686/42, 6 October 1942 -B.A.M.A.-H3/492. This was also the aim in recruiting British prisoners - Botschafter Ritter,Nr.134, Notiz über Propaganda unter englischen Kriegsgefangenen, 17 March 1943 -T77 Roll 889, Frames 563984-7
193. For example Gruppe G.F.P.722,Tgb.Nr.62/43, Tatigkeitsbericht,25 February 1943-NOKW 2210,Case XII Doc.Bk. 9E.
194. For example Korück 584,Kdr,d,Sttruppen z.b.V., May 1943 -NOKW2397,Case XII
195. O.K.W., K.T.B., III/2, p.1036.
196. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H/Org.Abt.Nr. 8175, 12 August 1942.

Induction Machinery.

Former prisoners-of-war were sent to the reception camp or replacement unit of the legions for which they were recruited. For example when the Free Indian Legion moved westwards, in 1943, it left an Ersatzkompanie behind it, at Königsbruck.¹⁹⁷ The British Free Corps was so small that new adherents joined it immediately upon enlistment.¹⁹⁸ The Eastern Legions, unlike the Western European ones, were not tactical units; each Legionslager took recruits from its Vorlager, formed them into battalions, trained them and despatched them as Feldbataillone to their place of employment.¹⁹⁹ By creating and maintaining a number of independent battalions from one depot the Eastern Legions bore some resemblance to British infantry regiments. The amalgamation of the Soviet-minority legions' depots into the Freiwilligen Stammdivision in 1944²⁰⁰ did not materially affect the replacement system, but like the Reservedivisionen formed from German training battalions,²⁰¹ the newly-trained and the refitted battalions associated with it were called upon to perform security duties.²⁰²

When a Western unit was formed "from scratch" the recruiting offices in the Germanic countries despatched volunteers intended for it to replacement units of the S.S. in Germany. In this way the Ersatz unit of S.S. Regiment "Der Führer" in 1941 trained Norwegians at Graz for the new S.S. Regiment "Nordland"²⁰³ Once the two Germanic S.S. Regiments were completed each left a replacement battalion behind it in Germany.²⁰⁴ From this time onwards, the normal system of replacement applied.

197. O.K. H/Gen.St.d.H/Org.Abt.(II) Nr.12255/43, 23 May 1943 in B.A.M.A.-H1/144 Qnd T78, Roll 413
198. Slade, op.cit., passim.
199. B.A.M.A. - H1/136.
200. Allgemeine Heeres Mitteilungen, XI.Jg., 8 Ausg., 8 April 1944, Z.184
201. These were stationed in occupied areas from the summer of 1942 - Müller Hillebrand, op.cit., III, 71-2.
202. Armeegruppe G (Führungsabteilung), Kriegstagebuch Nr.2 - N.O.K.W. 2663, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9E - entry for 8 July 1944.
203. Anon., 'Der Schicksalsweg der norwegischen Freiwilligen-Division der Waffen S.S.', Der Freiwillige, XII Jg., Heft 4, (1966), Similarly that of Regiment "Deutschland" received Dutchmen - Erg.Amt der Waffen S.S., Abt.III Az 9x.Tgb.Nr. 72/40, Zusammenstellung von Einberufungsvorgängen, 4 June 1940, IV, a - T175, Roll 104, Frame 2626261.
204. Ers. Btl.S.S."Nordland", Breslau, and Ers.Btl.S.S."Westland", Klagenfurt were both formed with effect from 15 March 1941 - S.S.F.H.A., I Org/Tgb.Nr. 51/41, 26 February 1941, in T175, Roll 110, Frame 2635005
Because of the dearth of recruits Ers. Btl. S.S. "Nordland" was absorbed into Ers.Btl. S.S. "Westland"- S.S.F.H.A., I/Org./Tgb.Nr. 1119/41, 4 April 1941, in T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634937.

When the Western European legions were established, their founder-members were gathered in barracks in their home countries and drafted to manoeuvre areas in the Reich or the General gouvernement,²⁰⁵ where they were fitted out, organised and trained. When each Legion was ready for action it left an Ersatzkompanie behind it - part of the Ersatzbataillon der Legionen at Graz,²⁰⁶ in the case of the Legions sponsored by the S.S. The Eastern formations of the S.S. were formed in their home areas while this was feasible.²⁰⁷ An exception was S.S. Division "Handschar", whose personnel were assembled near Zagreb and later moved en bloc to Southern France and later to Neuhammer,²⁰⁸ where conditions were more peaceful than in Croatia. When these S.S. elements were ready for combat, each left an Ersatz element behind it to train later recruits and hold them, together with convalescents, until required. In this way "Handschar" left S.S. Gebirgsjäger Ausbildungs und Ersatzbataillon 13 behind it at Neuhammer.

205. Norwegian volunteers were collected in Galskogen and sent to Fallingbostel, Danes went from Hellerup to Posen-Treskau via Hamburg, Dutchmen from Den Bosch to Arys via Cracow, Flemings from Antwerp to Debica via Radom, Walloons from Brussels to Meseritz, Frenchmen from Versailles to Deba, while Croats were sent to Döllersheim and Spaniards to Grafenwöhr.
206. S.S.F.H.A.Org./Tgb. Nr.4311/41, Zusammenfassung der Ersatzeinheiten der Freiwilligen Verbände der Waffen S.S., 8 October 1941 - T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634417. Originally the unit was called the Freiwilligen Ersatz Bataillon. The Norwegian Legion had a separate replacement unit.
207. The Galician S.S. Division trained at Debica, the elements of the 15th S.S. Division were formed in various places in Latvia but some units of the second Latvian S.S. Division, the 19th, were formed at Beneschau while parts of the Estonian S.S. Division were established in Debica. The 22nd S.S. Division was created near Budapest while the 24th S.S. Karstjäger Division began forming in Istria.
208. S.S.F.H.A., Kdo. Amt der Waffen S.S. Org.Tgb. Nr.589/43, Aufstellung der Kroat. S.S. Freiw.Div., 30 April 1943 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635334-7; ibid. Org.Tgb.Nr. 747/43, Aufstellung der kroat. S.S.Freiw. 2 July 1943, T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635376-84. The daughter-division of "Handschar" was to have trained in Hungary.
209. Verordnungsblatt der Waffen S.S. Nr.21, 1 November 1943, Z.411. Similarly the Galicians had their depot at Debica, the Latvians at Mitau and the Estonians at Klooga near Reval.

Later recruiting drives undertaken by the S.S. amongst non-Germans, caused a large influx of recruits from particular areas, with which the normal Ersatz units could not cope. In such cases, the S.S. would establish a Rekrutendepot on an manoeuvre area, such as Debica,²¹⁰ where the new entrants could be trained, before dispersal to new formations or, often via the Ersatz units, to existing ones.

Methods of enlisting and inducting foreign volunteers from among the "free" populations of accupied Europe differed little from those employed in other countries in peace and war. Similar methods were applied to the occupants of Germany's prisoner-of-war camps, although obtaining recruits from sources such as these was unusual but not unprecedented. Many of the so-called volunteers of both groups even when they were apparently responding to German collaborationist propaganda were not really exercising their free will so much as submitting to pressure.

210. This was established to receive Volksdeutsche from Hungary - S.S.F.H.A., Org.TGB.Nr. 1620/42, Aufstellung eines Rekruten-Depots der Waffen S.S. auf dem S.S. Tr. Üb. Pl. Debica, 17 March 1942, T175, Roll 109, Frames 2633750 - 1. Another example was that of the Latvian Legion.

CHAPTER EIGHT - Pressed Men

Conscription in the Annexed Territories

A considerable number of men who were not German subjects on 1st September 1939 were later conscripted into the German forces. Many of these were Volkesdeutsche of foreign nationality to whom German citizenship was extended after the outbreak of war. Although no peace treaties were signed between Germany and the countries she defeated, she annexed territories to which the German government felt entitled and bestowed German citizenship upon those inhabitants who were deemed to be eligible.

Before the Anschluss with Austria, the Reich had been divided into thirteen Wehrkreise or military districts¹. The annexation of Austria added two new Wehrkreise, numbered XVII and XVIII². Every Wehrkreis was divided into Wehrersatzbezirke and subdivided into Wehrbezirke to enable it to cope with the induction of conscripts³. When Germany occupied the Sudetenland this territory was split between Wehrkreise IV, VIII, XII and XVII⁴. In 1939 the East Prussian Wehrkreis I was extended to embrace Memel⁵ which had been ceded by Lithuania. These pre-war expansion of the

1 U.S. Army, Military Intelligence Service, Order of Battle of the German Army, (Washington, 1943), p. 11. The Wehrkreise were numbered from I to XIII.

2 The numbers XIV to XVI inclusive were used by the headquarters of mechanised corps - Ibid., p.12.

3 Ibid., p.13.

4 Ibid., pp. 27, 31, 37.

5 Ibid., p.24.

German recruiting system established precedents that were followed when further territory was incorporated following Germany's victories. After the conclusion of the Polish campaign the territories of Western Poland were annexed to the Reich as the new Wehrkreise XX and XXI, the Free City of Danzig becoming part of the Wehrkreis XX.⁶ At the same time Zichenau and Sudauen were absorbed into Wehrkreis I⁷ and south-western Poland into the Silesian Wehrkreis VIII.⁸

None of Germany's acquisitions of 1940 and 1941 warranted the creation of further Wehrkreise, and it was sufficient to extend the further military districts to embrace the newly-won territories. In 1940, Wehrkreis V was expanded to include Alsace⁹, Wehrkreis VI took over Eupen and Malmédy¹⁰, while Wehrkreis XII was increased by the addition of both Lorraine and Luxemburg¹¹. In 1941, Wehrkreis XVIII received

6 Ibid., pp. 39 - 40. The number XIX was used by the headquarters of a mechanised corps.

7 Ibid., p.24.

8 Ibid., p.31.

9 Ibid., p.28.

10 Ibid., p.29.

11 Ibid., p.35.

Northern Slovenia¹², and Wehrkreis I was further augmented by the Bialystok region.¹³ Additional territory was integrated into the frontier Wehrkreise, in the case of Strassburg, Metz and Kattowitz as new Wehrersatzbezirke.¹⁴ Where the area concerned was not large enough to merit this solution, it became a Wehrbezirk within an existing German Wehrersatzbezirk. This was the procedure adopted for Zichenau, Luxemburg, Marburg, Cilli and Krainburg.¹⁵ Where the annexed territory was too small for this treatment - for example Eufen and Malmédy - the boundaries of existing German Wehrbezirke were re-drawn to enclose them.¹⁶

In peacetime, each Wehrkreis provided one army corps of the German Army.¹⁷ The units took in recruits and trained them themselves. On the outbreak of war as each regiment was mobilised it left behind in its home station a replacement and training unit to maintain the flow of reinforcements to the parent regiment, to provide a nucleus for new units and to supply these in turn with reinforcements.¹⁸ The exigencies of war caused

12 Ibid., p.38, O.K.W. 3a 14, WFSt/St.WNV/Z1a, 189/41, 24 April 1941. T 175, Roll 104, Frame 2626882.

13 Military Intelligence Service, op.cit., p.24

14 Ibid., pp 28, 36, 32

15 Ibid., pp 24, 36, 39

16 Ibid., pp 29 - 30

17 Ibid., pp. 11-12. Each Armeekorps bore the (Roman) numeral of the military district in which it was raised. The Three mechanised corps, XIV, XV and XVI drew their units from several Wehrkreise.

18 e.g. Infanterieregiment 19 left Infanterie-Ersatzbataillon 19 behind in its home station, Munich (Wehrkreis VII).

the system to be modified but, in essence, the plan operated until the German capitulation.¹⁹

After the Polish campaign the German Army absorbed Danzig's two regiments of Landespolizei as Infanterieregimenter 243 and 244,²⁰ and established replacement units for them. Simultaneously the city's anti-aircraft unit became Flakabteilung II/2²¹ of the Luftwaffe and Heimwehr Danzig was absorbed by the SS Totenkopf division.²² Other incorporated territories had no military units of Germans to be taken over and in consequence no replacement units could immediately be established for these areas. One remedy for this deficiency was for recruits who lived in newly-annexed territories to cross the former frontier into the "old" Reich for training in one of its garrison towns. The alternative was to transfer replacement units from peacetime stations to the newly-acquired territories. In this way, training units of Wehrkreis II were displaced

19 The main departure was that each replacement unit was called upon to supply reinforcements to a number of new units who had no Ersatz unit of their own e.g. Grenadier-Ersatzbataillon 46, Neumünster (Wehrkreis X) served 89th and 190th Infantry Divisions and, after the overrunning of Wehrkreis I, the 61st Division as well.

20 H. J. Neufeld, J. Huck, G. Tessin, op. cit., II, 27 - 8.

21 H. A. Koch, Flak. (Bad Nauheim, 1954), p.32.

22 Totenkopf Regiment 3, Stammtafel

from Mecklenburg and Pomerania into the neighbouring military districts XX and XXI²³ while training units of Wehrkreis VIII made the long journey from Silesia to Alsace and Lorraine.²⁴ The shifting of depot units served the additional purpose that they acted as quasi-occupation force - a use of training units that was to be extended to territories which had been conquered but not annexed by Germany.²⁵

In some cases liability for military service was extended to a population soon after its territory was annexed to the Reich. For example, the Wehrpflicht was introduced into Danzig of 13 October 1939²⁶ and into Eupen - Malmédy and Moresnet on 18 May 1940.²⁷ Conscripts from the incorporated areas were posted to depot units of the German forces in the same way as those born within the frontiers of "Versailles" Germany. In several cases where the sympathies of the "new" Germans were in doubt, conscripts appear to have been sent out of the appropriate Wehrkreis. A list

23

i.e. the units subordinated to Div.Nr. 152 and 192 respectively.

24 i.e. the units subordinated to Div.Nr. 158 and 148 respectively.

25 For example 141 Reserve Division was stationed in White Russia, 143 in the Ukraine, 160 in Denmark, 187 in Croatia, 157 in France.

26 Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1939, S.2030.

27 Ibid., I, 1940, S.777. Conscription had been extended to Austria, on 15 June 1938, by Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1938, S.631. Sudetenland, on 21 February 1939, by Ibid. I, 1939, S.287-NG 3723, Case XI; Memel on 23 March 1939, by Ibid. I, 1939, S.559. It was extended to incorporated areas of Poland, 30 April 1940, Ibid. I, 1940, S.707, Protectorate of Bohemia - Moravia, 12 October 1940, Ibid. I, 1940, S.1364 - NG 3733, Case XI; Lorraine 19 August 1942; Alsace 25 August 1942; Luxemburg late 1942; - Absolon, op. cit., p.7.

of Luxemburgers who deserted show that their units were affiliated not only to Wehrkreise XII and VIII, as might have been expected, but also to Wehrkreise I, II, V, X and XVIII ²⁸.

In some annexed areas conscription was delayed by doubts concerning the eligibility of some of the inhabitants. Apart from residents who were patently not German, there were many who were of mixed origin. Another obstacle was that many whom the German authorities were prepared to accept did not regard themselves as Germans. In the areas seized from Poland, those who considered themselves to be Germans and who wished to share the privileges accorded to Volksdeutsche by the German authorities were invited to register, following which the candidates were put into four categories. The first section of the Deutsche Volksliste consisted of racial Germans who had been sufficiently conscious of their origin to belong to German political, cultural or sporting organisations. The second comprised those ethnic Germans who had not participated in German associations in Poland. Both these sections received German citizenship immediately. The third category consisted of Germans who had come under Polish influence, people of mixed origin and the Masurian, Kaschube and Slonzak minorities, who had long been associated with the Prussians. Members of this section were regarded as being in the process of naturalisation. The fourth section, those of German origin but hostile to Germany, could earn German citizenship, as could Poles who were deemed to be

28 Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres, Behandlung Luxemburgischer, Deserteure,
8 February 1944, Anl. 2 and 3, T175, Roll 155, Frames 2685683-6-N02771,
Case XI.

"Germanisable". Until the German authorities identified and classified the racial Germans they could not be conscripted. This did not prevent individuals from volunteering, provided they could convince the recruiters of their racial origin.²⁹

"Resettlers" in the Reich

Racial Germans from outside the Reich who participated in "resettlement" scheme were not immediately conscripted into the German forces. In August 1941, the High Command of the Wehrmacht deferred all settlers aged twenty-eight or over. In the case of the small age groups born between 1914 and 1918, the individual settler's employment, home situation and financial status were taken into account in deciding whether he was to be called up. None of the settlers aged between eighteen and

29 The German Racial Register programme was publicised on 12 September 1940 and implemented in March 1941. Nevertheless, racial Germans from Poland were serving in Totenkopf Standarte 12 in August 1940 at the time of its disbandment - Kdo. d. Waffen SS Ia/Tgb. Nr. 92/40, 17 August 1940, T175, Roll 107, Frames 2630253-4.

twenty-one was deferred.³⁰ In April 1943, the O. K. W. differentiated between the racially inferior settlers of Group A - "Altreich"- who were obliged to stay within Germany's original boundaries, and the superior ones of Group O - "Ost" - who were eligible to settle in the conquered Eastern areas. Of the first group, no settler under the age of forty-three was deferred. In the second group, those of the small age groups, twenty-five to twenty-nine years old, were only deferred in special circumstances. Those between thirty and forty-two could only be deferred until one year after the date of their final settlement. Those over forty-three years of age could be used as linguists or in other special capacities, if the resettlement authorities agreed. These new regulations were a severe blow to the settlers because only those who had been installed in 1940 had had time to establish their farms or businesses.³¹ But German plans for eastward colonisation had to give way to the need for manpower following the German defeat at Stalingrad.

30 R. L. Koehl, op. cit., p. 194, Luftwaffenverordnungsblatt Nr. 35, 31 August 1942, Z 2234; Racial Germans from Roumania were serving in Totenkopf Standarte 16 at the time of its dissolution in August 1940 - Kdo.d.Waffen ss. Ia/Tgb.Nr. 91/40, 17 August 1940, T.175, Roll 107, Frame 2630255.

One under-age "resettler" from Riga, intending to enrol in a German school, joined an "SS.Schule" and found himself at the front, -without his father's approval - Edgar Graf, 25 August 1941 - T175, Roll 108, Frames 2632029 - 31.

31 Koehl, op. cit., pp. 194 - 5.

Volksdeutsche outside the "Reich"

As a result of the partition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbia was put under German military administration until the popular uprising in the summer of 1941 caused the occupiers to instal a puppet regime there.³² The Banat, where there was a German population, was treated as an autonomous area with its own Volksdeutsche administration.³³ It would be wrong to suppose, however, that the S.S. encountered few obstacles to its attempts to obtain racial German recruits from Serbia. Some members of the Volksgruppe were reluctant to leave their homes, possibly to fight in distant parts, while their own families and property were increasingly endangered by Chetniks and Partisans.³⁴ The racial Germans of Serbia had already armed themselves and formed Selbstschutz units, even before the Balkan campaign.³⁵ In view of the unrest these continued to exist and provided a basis for the seventh S.S.Division, "Prinz Eugen".³⁶ But the Swabian settlers were understandably reluctant to join a formation which might, in the interests of grand strategy, have been sent many hundreds of miles away. In consequence the recruiting

32 Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op. cit., p.68.

33 Ibid., p.69

34 Stein, op. cit., p.170

35 Heeren, Telegramm Nr.31, 15 January 1941 - NG 3375, Case XI.

36 S.S.F.H.A., Org. Tgb. Nr. 1268/42, Aufstellung der Freiwilligen Orebirgs Division, 1 March 1942, in T175, Roll 109, Frames 2633790-4.

campaign of early 1942 did not produce sufficient volunteers and those responsible for forwarding serious Germans to enlist had to resort to coercion in addition to propaganda.³⁷

Volksdeutsche who had been officers and N.C.O.s of the Royal Yugoslav Army were ordered to report in March and April of 1942, ostensibly for the police but were drafted into the new S.S. division instead. In April, too, racial Germans aged between seventeen and fifty years were called upon to participate in a military exercise of the Heimatschutz. The opportunity was taken, however, to register and examine the participants, many of whom, in consequence, found themselves in the Waffen SS. These measures and those employed in the other Volksgruppen of the Balkans enabled Division "Prinz Eugen" to be completed but compulsion had also to be employed to maintain a flow of reinforcements to the Division. The German government was unable legally to apply conscription because the Banater Swabians were subjects of a defeated state with which no peace treaty had been concluded. Gottlob Berger maintained that conscription was necessary where a Volksgruppe was well-led. In such a case he argued everyone volunteered or had his house pulled down.³⁸ Nevertheless, the Banat was declared to be an area under German sovereignty and a law was drafted on the lines of the Landsturmordnung of 1782 which had been formulated for the Tirol.³⁹

37 Herzog, op.cit., p.12.

38 C.d.S.S.H.A., VS Tgb. Nr. 3701/43, Adjtr. Tgb. Nr. 1884/43, 16 June 1943 - NO5901, Case XI, Doc.Bk. 66G.

39 Ibid; Herzog, op.cit., P.13.

The novelty of recruiting methods in Serbia did not escape the attention of the Judge-Advocate of the S.S. who reported to Himmler that racial Germans were being drafted into S.S. Division "Prinz Eugen" under threats of punishment. The division, nominally a "Freiwilligen" formation, was no longer voluntary in character.⁴⁰ The complaint does not seem to have had any effect. In October 1943, from fifteen thousand Banater Germans aged between eighteen and twentythree years, mobilised for eight-week's service with the Heimatschutz, four hundred were persuaded to join the German forces.

In Croatia the situation was more delicate than it was elsewhere in Yugoslavia, because here with Axis partners created what was nominally a kingdom, ruled by an absentee Italian prince, but what was in reality a fascist dictatorship, dependent upon their support. Nevertheless, the government of this client-state had to be consulted before any German recruiting took place among her Volksdeutsche, because these were liable for service in Croatia's own armed forces. The Croat government treated the Volksgruppe as an imperium in imperio, with its own department in the ministry of defence, its own military district and its own German-speaking units. Moreover, ten per cent of each year-group were free to enlist in the German forces instead of in the Croat Domobran.⁴¹ In June 1942 Berger expected to net between 3,500 and 4,500 men for the Waffen S.S. from Croatia⁴² but even this concession was inadequate for his purposes.

40 Chef des Hauptamtes S.S. Gericht Ia 155 Tab. Nr. 35/43 12 July 1943 - No 1649, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G, Stein, op.cit., p.171.

41 P.Wacker⁶, Die Einsatzstaffel der Deutschen Mannschaft, Feldgrau, X, Jg., Heft 2 (1962) p.66.

42 C.d. SS.HA. Tgb. Nr. 20/42, 11 June 1942, N0776, Case XI Doc.Bk. 72F.

In order to procure more recruits, the S.S. resorted to diplomacy, as it did in other cases, and persuaded the Croat government to permit the Waffen S.S. to have all suitable racial Germans of Jahrgang 1907 and younger. A commission of the S.S. was sent to complete the necessary racial and physical examinations by 10 September 1942.⁴³ The Volksgruppen fuhrer was responsible for making the racial Germans present themselves for examination. It was also envisaged that the para-military Einsatzstaffel of the Volksgruppe and the "Bataillone" presumably those of ethnic Germans serving in the Croat Army,⁴⁴ were to be taken into the S.S. For the sake of simplicity the Volksgruppe was assumed to have volunteered en masse. In accordance with this principle of Pauschal Freiwilligkeit,⁴⁵ racial Germans of thirty-five years and under were called up from their homes during the autumn of 1942.⁴⁶ As Berger admitted in June 1943, pressure was applied to make reluctant Volksdeutsche register for service.⁴⁷ Anti-partisan operations tied down the Volksdeutsche units serving with the German and Croat forces so it was not until 1943 that the second part of the agreement could be put into effect and their members compulsorily transferred into the Armed S.S. The S.S. Division "Prinz Eugen" received the fittest racial Germans. Those less fit were taken to form mixed Croat and ethnic German police battalions.⁴⁸

43 C.d.S.S. H.A., V.S. Tyb. Nr. 315/42, - 1942 - NO 2049.

44 Wasker, op.cit., pp. 65 + 7.

45 SS Gruppenfuhrer K. Kammerhofer, Interrogation Summary 4396.

46 R.F.S.S., Feldquartier, 25 November 1942 - NO 2048, Case XI Doc.Bk. 66G.

47 C.d.S.S. H.A., V.S. Tyb. Nr. 3701/43, Adjtr. Tyb. Nr. 1884/43, 16 June 1943, No 5901, Case XI, Doc.Bk. 66G.

48 Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op.cit., Teil II, pp. 74-6.

Berger's office began to put his policy of recruiting Volksdeutsche into effect in Hungary in the summer of 1941 by taking advantages of the privileges the Hungarian government had granted in August 1940 to its German minority in return for Germany's arbitration of Hungary's territorial dispute with Roumania. The concessions did not permit ethnic Germans to leave Hungary to serve in the German forces, but they guaranteed free cultural relations with the Reich. Recruiters of the S.S. used this facility to invite healthy young Volksdeutsche to attend camps and courses in the Reich. In many cases it was only on their arrival in the Fatherland that they discovered that they were regarded as candidates for the Armed S.S. The young men who were brought to Germany in this surreptitious fashion were, of necessity, not numerous and some of them refused to enlist. Since any Hungarian citizen who volunteered for the German forces, irrespective of the circumstances, was liable to be arrested on his return home, this was a disincentive to enlistment.⁴⁹

49 Documents on the Expulsion, II, 34, 111 - 14.

In order to obtain recruits legally and in larger numbers from Hungary, the Armed S.S. was obliged to enlist the support of the German Foreign Office to secure the treaty of 1st February 1942. This arranged for joint German-Hungarian commissions to register Volksdeutsche aged between seventeen and thirty and permitted those who wished to join the German forces.⁵⁰ The Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn began a campaign to persuade eligible racial Germans to opt for the Waffen S.S. rather than for the Honved. Surviving documents tell something of the course of the recruiting drive. Between 23 March and 3 May 1942, for example, 16,527 men were despatched in twelve contingents from eleven towns.⁵¹ One special demand was met - a call for between one thousand and twelve-hundred trained cavalrymen who had previously served in the Yugoslav Army.⁵² Men meeting these specifications could only be found in the Batschka, which Hungary received as her share of the spoils from the Balkan campaign of 1941. These troopers were required by the S.S. Cavalry Brigade which expanded in the summer of 1942 to become a Division.⁵³

50 Ibid., p.35; C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth, Vol.II (Edinburgh,1957) pp. 68-9, 96-7.

51 Cd.S.S. H.A., Tgb. Nr. 1490/42, Ungarn Aktion, 3 May 1942, NO 5024, Case XI, Doc.Bk. 66G.

52 Cd.S.S. H.A., Tgb. Nr. 885/42, Freiwillige aus Ungarn, 16 March 1942, Para. 4.

53 Schematische Kriegsgliederung, 2 September 1942, T175, Roll 109, Frame 2632164.

The recruits obtained as a result of this recruiting drive of 1942 passed through the training units of the S.S. to its field formations. This meant that the men left Berger's control for that of Max Jüttner, the head of the S.S. Führungshauptamt. Jüttner discovered that some of those now entrusted to him were epileptics and consumptives, while others were not volunteers because they had been misled or coerced into joining. Some of the men were Magyars, not racial Germans. There were even some who had permitted themselves to be sent to Germany in the belief that it was for sports training only. Jüttner blamed the ethnic German Volksbund for the methods used to produce such unsuitable recruits. He still expected his soldiers to be volunteers and to meet the physical and racial requirements of the S.S.⁵⁴

In order to assist the expansion of the S.S. still further, the German Foreign Office concluded a second agreement with the Hungarian Government on 1st June 1943 which permitted the German forces to receive Hungarian Volksdeutsche of a further six year-groups, up to the age

54 S.S.F.H.A., 9h/Kdo. der Waffen S.S./IIb (1) Nr. 52/9.42, 5 September 1942 - N02476, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66G.

of thirty-five.⁵⁵ Since those who volunteered for the German forces, rather than for the Honved, lost their Hungarian nationality, they were to some extent compensated by the offer of German citizenship to racial Germans who served in the Wehrmacht, Waffen S.S., Police or Organisation Todt.⁵⁶

From the German point of view, what was needed was a more thorough-going agreement than the two that were in force, both of which left the potential recruit freedom of choice between the German and Hungarian forces, subject only to the moral pressure of the Volksbund. In March 1944, German troops moved into Hungary to forestall the government's attempt to make a separate peace. This strengthened the German position to such an extent that a third, and last, agreement of 14 April 1944 was concluded. This abolished the right of ethnic Germans to decide which armed forces they should join. The other terms were equally stiff. Henceforth Volksdeutsche up to the age of sixty could be enlisted and up to ninety percent of the racial Germans in the Honved were to be withdrawn and, whether they liked it or not, sent to the Armed S.S. Since many of the Volksdeutsche were in the "kgl. ungarische Wehrmacht" because they preferred it to the S.S., this constituted forcible transfer. A mere ten percent of the Volksdeutsche serving in the Honved were permitted to stay but only in technical branches, not in combat units. In deciding which Hungarian subjects were of German origin, the onus lay upon the Volksbund, which was anxious to supply the Fatherland with the maximum number of soldiers.⁵⁷

55 Documents on the Expulsion, II, 35; Macartney, op.cit., II, 151, 153.

56 Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1943, S315, 19 May 1943, NG 4932; Absolon, op.cit., p. 24.

57 Macartney, op.cit., II, 268; Documents on the Expulsion, II, 36.

Even so, there were still some racial Germans who posed as Magyars when German recruiters were in their vicinity.⁵⁸

Since Slovakia was under German military protection its Fascist régime tolerated the recruitment of Volksdeutsche volunteers into the S.S. At the beginning of 1944 the task of making good the heavy losses of the German forces caused the leaders of the S.S. to re-appraise every source of manpower open to them. Berger proposed the introduction of compulsory military service for the Volksgruppe in Slovakia, preceded, in the case of the seventeen-year old youths by compulsory labour service, as was the case in the Reich. Berger also suggested that the ethnic Germans already serving in the Slovak forces should be transferred to those of Germany. To make sure that the effect of these measures were not reduced by evasion or desertion, Berger proposed to set up a "Streife" of S.S. reservists and members of the Volksgruppe.⁵⁹ On 7 June 1944 an agreement based on Berger's suggestions was signed. Under its terms, Slovakian citizens of German blood were conscripted into the German forces while German citizens of Slovak origin served in the Slovak forces. In addition, all the members of the closed Volksdeutsche infantry and artillery units of the Slovak Army were transferred to German control, thus providing another example of the abandonment of the voluntary principle.⁶⁰

58 Ibid, II, 31, 115, 123; SS Sturmbannführer H.J. Kubitz, Interrogation Summary 4220.

59 C.d.S.S.H.A., Vg, Tgb, Nr. 247/44 BI 4a 52/44, 24 January 1944; SSHA, SS. Ers. Insp. Sudostraum, Insp. VS Tgb. Nr. 54/44. 19 January 1944, NO 3067, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 72 F.

60 Documents on the Expulsion, IV, 148-9.

Although volunteers from the German community in Roumania found their way into the German forces from 1940 onwards, no treaty similar to that made with Hungary, was concluded with the Roumanian government until 13 May 1943. This agreement permitted Volksdeutsche, over the age of seventeen, to enter the Wehrmacht or Waffen S.S. without losing Roumanian citizenship. Racial Germans serving at the front with the Roumanian forces and certain specialists behind the lines were excluded because neither government wished the Roumanian forces to be hamstrung by the loss of key men. Volksdeutsche who had already entered the German forces illegally were amnestied.⁶¹ A few days after the signing of the treaty, Hitler's extension of German citizenship to foreigners of German descent serving in the German forces provided an added incentive to Volksdeutsche to enlist⁶². The recruiting office of the S.S. in Vienna opened a branch in Roumania to list and examine Volksdeutsche who wished to join the German forces. The Volksgruppe saw to it that not only genuine volunteers, of whom there were many, presented themselves but also applied pressure to others who were eligible but unenthusiastic.⁶³

61 Agreement of 13 May 1943 - NO2236, reproduced in Documents on the Expulsion, III, 148 - 51.

62 Reichsgetzblatt I, 1943, 5315, 14 May 1943, NG 4932

63 Documents on the Expulsion, III, 60.

Conscription of Balts.

Racial Germans were not the only inhabitants of territories outside the Reich to be conscripted into German-sponsored units. In Latvia on 26 February 1943, a few days after Hitler decreed the formation of a Latvian volunteer legion,⁶⁴ members of the year-groups 1919 to 1924 were ordered to register.⁶⁵ Of the sixty thousand men expected, seventeen thousand were to be drafted to the new Legion, twenty-five thousand were to become Hiwis while the rest were to perform other duties, including work in factories.⁶⁶ The young conscripts were not permitted to select the type of service they wished to perform. The approach of the Red Army towards Latvia in the autumn of the same year determined the German authorities in "Ostland" to mobilise the whole of the age-groups 1910 to 1924. During the winter of 1943-1944, these age-groups were called up in batches.⁶⁷ For a brief period the German authorities entrusted the operation to the Latvians themselves, but the inadequacy of the number yielded caused the resumption of German control.⁶⁸ During the

64 Führerbefehl, 10 February 1943, reproduced in A. Silgailis, op.cit., p. 340

65 This was forecast in Höhere SS.u.P.F.Riga, Nr.607, 10 February 1943-NO 3302, Case XI, Doc.Bk. 66 G.

66 Silgailis, op.cit., pp. 24,30,4-8.

67 Gen. Inspr. der lett. SS Freiw. Legion, 26 January, 1944, calling up Jahrgang 1917, NO2816, Case XI, Doc.Bk. 66 G; Summons of a member of Jahrgang 1910, 7 February 1944-NO 2804, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G.

68 Berger to SS Standartenführer Hierthes, 23 May 1943; O.K.W., K.T.B., III/2, p.1328; Stein, op.cit., p.178 (footnote).

remainder of 1944 further year-groups were called up, the youngest being used as auxiliaries for the Luftwaffe.⁶⁹

German conscription measures in Latvia were paralleled in the two other former Baltic republics. In Lithuania, response to German mobilisation orders in February 1943 was so poor that the Germans abandoned plans to raise a "volunteer" legion and instituted repressive measures.⁷⁰ Lithuanian reaction to German mobilisation measures of February 1944 was good until it was realised that the men involved were not to serve in Lithuanian national units. The consequences were desertions, skirmishes and shootings. Many men were imprisoned but the majority were sent to joint Flak units in Germany.⁷¹ In spite of this lesson, at the eleventh hour the Germans endeavoured to mobilise age-groups 1925 and 1926.⁷²

69 Höhere SS u P.F.Riga, Nr.605, 23 July 1944, NO 3044, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66G; SS Militärbezirkskommandant Liepaja, 22 August 1944, NO 2812, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66G.

70 O.K.W., K.T.B., III/2, p.1329, 2 December 1943; S. Rastikis, Kovosė del Lietuvos (Los Angeles, 1957), p.326. (Translation supplied by Committee for a Free Lithuania, New York, 6 May 1969).

71 Lietuviu Enciklopedija, (Boston, Mass., 1966) pp 39-40. (Translation from same source).

72 Höhere SS u P.F.Riga, Nr.605, 22 July 1944, NO 3044, Case XI, Doc.Bk. 66 G.

In Estonia, too, the announcement of the intention to raise a volunteer legion was soon followed by measures to call up year-groups 1918 to 1926.⁷³ The advance of the Red Army towards Narva obliged the Estonian leader, Dr. Mae, to proclaim general mobilisation of all males between seventeen and sixty.⁷⁴ This measure produced numbers of men far exceeding German expectations simply because the Estonians wished to defend their own country in units of their own,⁷⁵ notably their Selbstschutz.

Eastern Adolescents.

The recruitment of SS Helfer from the occupied Eastern areas has been stigmatised as a form of kidnapping and it may be linked with the contemporaneous Heu-Aktion which moved young people from the Central Army Groups over to the industries of the Reich.⁷⁶ German young people

73 J.Hampden Jackson, Estonia, (London, 1948), p. 251; Ametlik Teataja, 26 October 1943, NO 4883, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G; Association of Estonians in Great Britain in letter to author, 14 October 1969; General der Infanterie H.K. Both, Interrogation Summary 3659.

74 Ametlik Teataja, 30 January 1944 and 3 August 1944, NO 4884-5, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66 G; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28 January 1944, 3 February 1944, 5 February 1944; Pester Lloyd, 4 February 1944.

75 Pester Lloyd, 16 February 1944; Hampden Jackson, op.cit., p. 251.

76 Chief of the Political Directing Staff, Personal Referent, Heu Aktion, 12 June 1944, 031 PS, TMWC, XXV, pp. 88-92; Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Telegramm, 20 July 1944, 345 PS.

were not free agents, either, since they were obliged by law to join the Youth movements of the Nazi Party⁷⁷ and, later, to participate in the capacity of Flakhelfer, in the air defence of the Reich.⁷⁸ German young people were, however, only obliged to man anti-aircraft positions on a part-time basis and near to their homes or to their place of evacuation. The Eastern young people, on the other hand, were uprooted and sent westwards where many of them were absorbed into German industry, notably the Junkers aircraft works.⁷⁹ Those who manned anti-aircraft equipment were not defending their own homes but targets in Germany. The young men were destined, as soon as they were old enough for the Armed S.S.⁸⁰

77 Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1939, S.710, 25 March 1939, 2115 PS;

78 R.d.L. und Ob.d.L.Az.11b Nr1/43 (Chefd.Lw/L. Wehr 1 III) 26
January 1943; O.K.W., K.T.B., III/1, p.71; Absolon, op.cit., p.101.

79 Reichsmin. f.d. bes. Ostgebiete, Dienststelle Hauptbannführer Nickel
Nr. 717/44, 19 October 1944, No. 1759, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 68.

80 Many of the youths were classified as "SS Helfer". Two hundred and fifty Ukrainians were ear-marked for the Galician S.S.Division - Ibid.

It should be borne in mind, however, that Eastern young people who had joined German-sponsored movements, like the S. B. M. in Byelorussia⁸¹ or who came from collaborationist families, if they had not been collected by Hauptbannführer Nickel's mixed commissions and despatched to Germany, would probably have reached that destination as participants in the numerous civilian "treks", which fled before the approaching Red Army. The existence of recruiting leaflets for the various linguistic groups involved appears to indicate a German intention, at least initially to raise genuine volunteers.⁸² If young people from the occupied Eastern territories had not participated in the Flakhelfer scheme but had arrived in the Reich as fugitives their employment would probably have been the same. They would, perhaps, have been sent to German factories as happened to refugee French miliciens,⁸³ or possibly drafted into the Flakartillerie, as were émigré French Flemish nationalists.⁸⁴

81 Soyuz Belaruskay Molodzi, Union of Byelorussian Youth, Dallin, op.cit., P.223; Reitlinger, op.cit., p.158.

82 Leaflets intended to persuade Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Volga Tartar, Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian youths to become Flakhelfer are contained in BA - NS 31/28.

83 France, Haut Cour de Justice, Les Procès de Collaboration - Joseph Darnand, (Paris, 1948), p.248.

84 Knoebel, op.cit., p. 276.

Forcible Transfer.

Another form of compulsion was a process of "upgrading", by which non-Germans serving in ancillary organisations of the German forces found themselves transferred to employment that was more strenuous and frequently more dangerous, often to the Waffen S.S. Although the men involved may have volunteered quite happily for limited service, even for a restricted period or within a prescribed area, they had not bargained for combat at the front or for the duration of the war. An extreme example of this method of recruitment was the case of Flemings who volunteered to work in Northern France found themselves in the S.S.⁸⁵

Non-German police units were particularly vulnerable to transfer to the Armed S.S. Since Heinrich Himmler combined in his person the offices of Reichsführer-S.S. and Chef der deutschen Polizei, it was a simple matter for his subordinates to convert foreign policemen into members of the Waffen S.S. Units of Latvian police were taken over en bloc as S.S. units,⁸⁶ while other police units, for example those of

85 Staf de Clerq, S.S.-Dol-17-2-225/42, Vermerk, 25 March 1942 - T175, Roll iii, Frame 2635483. There had been a campaign to register these Frontarbeiter early in 1941 - c.d. SS H.A., Chef/be/KY, Az.A.I.N. 20 February 1941 - NO 3015, Case XI.

86 The battalions numbered 16, 19 and 21 - Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op.cit., II, 102.

Galicia, were broken up to provide reinforcements for the 14th S.S. Division.⁸⁷ For the policeman of "Front" units, in the line facing the Red Army or involved in security duties behind the lines, the alteration in their status probably had little immediate effect. Some, perhaps, welcomed the change because it increased their chances of obtaining new uniforms and better weapons and carried with it the likelihood of a rest for reorganisation. But for those who had only been willing to perform ordinary constabulary duties who had, at most, wished to perform armed service in their home areas, the change was for the worse.

Police units formed from Volksdeutsche were also absorbed into the Waffen S.S. The Polizei Regiment Brixen, raised in the South Tirol, was used to bring the 31st S.S. Division up to strength.⁸⁸ Less formally organised security units of the racial German minorities had already been swallowed up by the S.S. before that date. The Volksdeutsche pockets of Eastern Europe, in many cases spontaneously, formed themselves into armed self-protection groups. Of these, the Einsatzstaffel of Croatia

87 Galizische S.S. Freiwilligen-Regimenter 4-7 (Polizei) - Ibid., p.52.

88 O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.Nr. IZ/31600/45, 1 March 1945, Anlage 7.

lost its fit men to Division "Prinz Eugen",⁸⁹ while the Selbstschutz of Transnistria was called upon to supply men to the original S.S. Cavalry Division.⁹⁰

After the capitulation of Italy, the German forces were obliged to police not only a large part of Italy itself but Southern France and the Balkans, where there had been Italian garrisons. Wherever possible, the Germans lightened their task by enrolling local inhabitants into security units some of which were soon absorbed into the Armed S.S. Units of the Italian fascist Milizia Armata, for example, were taken to form the second S.S. division to bear the number 29.⁹¹

Another category of policeman to be absorbed by the armed S.S. consisted of refugees who had withdrawn with the German forces. In the East, O.D. Männer,⁹² Kaminski's Volkswehr⁹³ and members of the indigenous Heimatwehr⁹⁴ fell back, in many cases with their families. In the West the same situation applied to members of the Belgian

89 P. Wacker, 'Die Einsatzstaffel der Deutschen Mannschaft', Feldgrau, X. Jg., Heft 2(1962), C.d.S.S. H.A., V.Stgb. Nr. 315/42, 1942, NO 2049. Case XI.

90 Der R.F. S.S., Tgb.Nr. 35/27/43, 4 February 1943 - NO 4643, Case XI, and in T 175, Roll 70, Frames 2587566-7.

91 S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb, Nr. 2940/44, 7 September 1944, T 175, Roll 141, Frame 2669175.

92 Oberkdo.He.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./Su 2/VII (Mil.Verw.) Br.B.Nr. 10886/44, 27 August 1944, NO 2545, Case XI, Doc.Bk. 68.

93 H. Himmler, 'Rede auf der Gauleitertagung in Posen', 3 August 1944, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, I.Jg., Heft 4 (1953).

94 Dallin, op.cit., p.223

Wachabteilungen⁹⁵ and to the French Milice.⁹⁶ Some of these refugees were taken over by the German war industry but others were absorbed by the Waffen S.S. Since these men must have realised that an early return to limited employment in their home areas was out of the question, they must have accepted their enlistment in the Waffen S.S. with resignation. For some, perhaps, their new aployment was preferable to rotting in refugee camps, though not as comfortable as serving German industry. Thanks to Allied bombing, the last was hazardous, but it was probably safer than facing the Red Army. Some of the new émigrés may even have deluded themselves that by augmenting the Armed S.S. they would increase the possibility of their returning home.

Nor were ardent national-socialists exempt from transference into the Armed S.S. Members of the Nederlands S.S. - the ordinary S.S. not the Waffen S.S., in the Netherlands on the strength of their oath to Hitler as Germanic Leader were obliged to join the S.S. Division "Landstorm Nederland" rather than the less military Nederlands Landwacht.⁹⁷ In the case of the Germanic S.S. in Denmark, the Schülburgkorps, its members were used as auxiliary police, later as a training battalion of the S.S. Regiment "Danmark", and finally as the S.S. guard battalion on Sealand.⁹⁸

95 Anon., 'Die 27 S.S.Freiwilligen Panzer-Grenadier Division Langemarck', Der Freiwillige, XI. Jg., Heft 4 (1965), pp 12-16.

96 96 France, Haut Cour de Justice, Les Proces de Collsboracion - Joseph Durnand, p.248.

97 Not to be confused with the Landwacht Nederland, the original name of the Landstorm. N.J.G. Sikkel, Documentatie, Status en Werkzaamheid van Organisaties en Instellingen uit de Tijd de Duitse Bezetting van Nederland (Amsterdam, 1947) pp. 182-7; S. von der Zee, op.cit., pp. 192-4.

98 T. M. Terkelsen, Front Line in Denmark (London 1944) pp.21,23,28; N. Alkils, Besaettelsestidens Fakta (Copenhagen, 1945), I, 719-729, 753-4.

In its quest for manpower the Waffen S.S. poached men from such ancillary organisations as the N.S.K.K., Organisation Todt and even from German industry. Foreigners who were willing to construct fortifications, guard dumps or drive vehicles for the Germans, but not to risk their lives at the front, were displeased when the Waffen S.S., in its desire for manpower, extracted and enrolled them. The organisations which lost these men, in spite of their performing essential work, were also vexed by the transfers. Correspondence has survived dealing with the cases of some Volksdeutsche of South-Eastern Europe, serving in the Schutzkommandos of "Org. Todt". These men were not builders' labourers, who could be replaced by impressed civilians, but men, drilled, trained in the use of arms, employed to protect construction sites and to guard forced workers, men whose duties frequently involved them in fighting partisans. Once the S.S. arranged with the governments concerned to conscript their Volksdeutsche manpower, these "S.K.Männer" were liable for service in the armed S.S. and did not have any exemption by virtue of the vital task they were performing.⁹⁹

99 Albert Speer, Chef der Org. Todt, 9 June 1943 - NO 3307, Case XI., Doc.Bk.66G. and in B.A. Folder NS19 neu 372;
Der R.F.S.S. Tpb. Nr. 36/159/43, 19 June 1943 - NO 3314 Case XI., Doc.Bk.66G. and in B.A. Folder NS19 neu 372.

Western European Workers.

In the summer of 1943 the Armed S.S. conducted a recruiting campaign among Western European civilian workers in Germany. Afterwards, a report was compiled based upon the censorship of letters from men who had been the targets for the recruiting propaganda.¹⁰⁰ The campaign was supposed to attract volunteers to the S.S. but considerable pressure was applied to French, Belgian and Dutch workers. In the first place, every worker received a personal summons to attend a meeting under threat of punishment for non-attendance. German speakers at the meetings were Police or Waffen S.S. officers. Non-German speakers were members or officers of the French or Belgian Legions or delegates of the French Government. In one instance a Russian officer and fifteen Russian soldiers addressed a meeting of Western workers in Magdeburg.¹⁰¹

Once the audiences assembled the halls were sealed and police guarded the exits. Some of the workers in Dortmund escaped through the windows because they were told that a quarter of those present must volunteer or be forcibly enrolled. In Essen the audience was told that 300,000 Frenchmen had to be obtained for the S.S., irrespective of the means

100 Abt. C II, Frankfurt am Main, Bericht über die Auswirkung der Werbung zum Eintritt in die Waffen S.S. unter den ausländischen Arbeitern der besetzten Westgebiete, 21 Jule 1943, T 175, Roll 70, Frames 2586748-57

101 Ibid., Frame 2586749

employed.¹⁰² The workers were offered leave if they volunteered. At Magdeburg they were plied with alcohol in order to make them drunk enough to enlist. In Minden the audience was promised food, money and women in the belief that these were the weaknesses of the French. In most cases the workers realised that they were needed for the Eastern front but the minority were asked to believe that they were required for security duties in occupied territory, that after three months' training they would be employed as prison guards, policemen, drivers and mechanics in the interior.¹⁰³

In Mühlheim, the foreign workers were given a few days to think the matter over with the warning that, if insufficient men were forthcoming, coercion would be used in a few weeks' time. Workers were required to enlist for between four and twelve years.¹⁰⁴ After twelve years' service a volunteer was entitled to a plot of land in Russia. French volunteers could enter the public administration after their service, but not that of France. The recruiters promised lump-sum payments to volunteer, allowances and free medical treatment to their families together with two or three weeks' leave. But in Oberhausen where these benefits were offered, all men born between 1908 and 1915 were simply told to report in fourteen days for medical examination.¹⁰⁵

102 Ibid., Frame 2586749. The technique of assembling potential recruits in large halls and then blocking the doors had been employed earlier in the year, but then the targets of the S.S. recruiters had been Reichsdeutsche boys, in camps of the Labour Service and of the Hitler youth, who were required for two new motorised divisions of the S.S. - Father's letter, early 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frame 2586837; Parteikanzlei, 24 February, 1943 - ibid., Frame 258630; Arbeitsfuhrer R.A.D. Meldeamt 57 Halle Sud, 26 February 1943 - ibid., Frame 2586824-5; Stein, op.cit., p.p.204-5, O.K.W., K.T.B., III/1, p.20.

103 T175, Roll 70, Frame 2586750.

104 Ibid., Frame 2586750

105 Ibid., Frame 2586751

Sometimes, members of the audience were afterwards interviewed singly.¹⁰⁶
 Some meetings produced no volunteers - indeed they sparked off nationalistic demonstrations in several places¹⁰⁷ - but in other towns workers volunteered to serve their colleagues from being taken because the Germans would have press-ganged them in any case.¹⁰⁸

Salvage Operations

Italy was the first state to abandon her alliance with Germany but Mussolini was rescued to head a "Social Republic", which lasted until the capitulation. To provide the regime with troops fascist volunteers were grafted onto remnants of the royal forces and Blackshirt units. Several age-groups of young men were called up in the territory under Mussolini's nominal control.¹⁰⁹ These were supplemented by military internees from German prison camps. Many of these men were used in the four infantry divisions¹¹⁰ and in the multiplicity of security¹¹¹ units of the puppet state but the remainder provided the Germans with an S.S. Division,¹¹² a number of units¹¹³ and hundreds of Hiwis.¹¹⁴

106 Ibid., Frame 2586750 - in Birlzersdorf.

107 Ibid., Frame 2586753 and 2586760 - in Bielefeld and Gevelsberg

108 Ibid., Frame 2586751 - Iserlohn

109 F. W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship (London, 1962), p.575.

110 Named "Italia", "Littorio", "San Marco", "Monterosa".

111 e.g. Cacciatori degli Appennini

112 i.e. 29. Waffen Grenadier Division (italienische Nr.1).

113 Including a number of coastal artillery, fortress and engineering units.

114 O.K.W., K.T.B., III/2, p. 1136.

When German ground forces were driven out of territory they had occupied, considerable numbers of collaborators fled towards the Reich, with and without German assistance. In making use of these refugees the German authorities had no foreign regime to consult, save the refugee French government at Sigmaringen. Salvage operations of another type took place when the territories of Germany's allies were threatened and they faltered in their allegiance. In every case except Finland, Germany was able to draw upon the manpower of the country concerned with the connivance of a puppet regime.

In two cases - Hungary and Slovakia - German troops were able to scotch attempts to take the countries concerned away from the alliance with Germany. Even before the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy, attempted to capitulate, on 11 October 1944, the German Army drew up orders to cope with Hungarian soldiers serving with it.¹¹⁵ The badly-mauled remnants of the Royal Hungarian Army needed reorganising and reequipping both of which were undertaken in Hungary and in the Reich, with German assistance. As long as Hungarian territory remained under German occupation it was possible for the fascist Arrow-Cross government of Szalasi to call up its subjects for military service. The German authorities created an Auffangs- und Betreuungsstab (ung.) at Bruck a. d. Leitha, identical in location and purpose with that for Slovaks, in order to cope with Hungarian Hilfskräfte.¹¹⁶ There was,

115 Heeresverordnungsblatt 1944, Teil B, Blatt 21, 11 October 1944, Nr. 471, Abfindung der in Bereich des Heeres eingesetzten ungarischen Soldaten, p. 286.

116 O.K.H. Der Chef d. H. Rust and B.d.E., A.H.A./Stab/Ia(3)Nr. 30931/44, Rechtsstellung und Verwendung ungarischer Hilfskräfte in der Deutschen Wehrmacht, 4 November 1944.

however, reluctance on the German part to arm new Magyar units, particularly those raised by means of conscription, on the grounds that they were politically untrustworthy. The only exception the Germans were prepared to make was that Magyars could join the armed S.S. Szalasi would not, at first, approve of this, nevertheless an agreement was reached between the German and Hungarian Governments under the terms of which Magyars were to continue to serve as allies rather than as foreigners within the Wehrmacht. Four Honved divisions were to be created in Germany and four S.S. divisions, to be composed in the main of Magyars.¹¹⁷ The Wehrmacht issued orders relating to Hungarians serving in the German Army on 23 November 1944¹¹⁸ and also included them in an omnibus set of instructions of 20 December 1944.¹¹⁹

Following the suppression of the Slovak insurrection the Slovak Army's divisions and brigades were converted into military engineering organisations but a small beginning was made with new combat units.¹²⁰ On 20th September 1944 the German High Command associated Slovaks with Bulgars, Finns and Roumanians in the arrangements it made for taking

117 O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H/Org. Abt (II) Nr. 71356/45, 24 March 1945, Pester Lloyd, 15 February 1945.

118 O.K.W., Nr. 4782/44, W.F.St./Org. III, 23 November 1944

119 General der Frewilligenverbände im O.K.H., I/E, Nr. 20400/44, 20 December 1944.

120 O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H/Org. Abt II Nr. 47212/44, 26 November 1944, Nr. 70416/45, 29 January 1945, Nr. 71867/45, 8 April 1945 in BAMA-HI/141, T78, Roll 413

volunteers of those races into the Wehrmacht.¹²¹ Three months later these provisions were amplified when an Auffang - und Betreuungsstab (slow) was set up at Bruck in Austria to act as a depot for those Slovaks who declared themselves willing to perform Arbeitsdienst in the German Army.¹²²

A critical situation developed on the Eastern Front when, Roumania, Germany's ally of three years' standing abandoned her. On 23rd August 1944, King Michael seized control from Marshal Antonescu and initiated peace negotiations with Roumania's enemies. The German government retaliated by bringing out of obscurity a number of members of the Roumanian fascist Iron Guard, then living in exile in Germany and creating from them a National Roumanian Government. The bulk of the Roumanian Army accepted the King's authority and facilitated the passage of the Red Army through their territory, thereby reducing the status of the Iron Guard regime to that of a government in exile.¹²³

121 O.K.W., Nr.3847/44, W.F.St./Org III, 20 September 1944- BAMA III W 89. Details were also covered in Heeresverordnungsblatt 1944, Teil B, Blatt 25, 26 Jg. 27 November 1944, 22 Ausg. Nr. 534, Verwaltungsbestimmungen für slowakische Freiwillige in der deutschen Wehrmacht, p.337

122 General der Freiwilligenverbände im O.K.H., I/E, Nr. 20400/44, 20 December 1944.

123 Documents on the Expulsion, III, 74.

A mere three days after the royal coup d'état the German High Command, assuming that there would be Roumanians willing to fight on alongside the Germans or at least to work for them, arranged for members of the Roumanian Army to be made available to the Reichsführer S.S. He was to use them to establish new Armed S.S. units, releasing any surplus personnel to the Germany Army as Hilfswillige.¹²⁴ Roumanians were also included in the sets of regulations of 20 September¹²⁵ and 20 December 1944, relating to "new" nationalities serving in the Wehrmacht. The latter stipulated that Roumanians were a responsibility of the Reichsführer S.S. and were to be sent to the Austrian manoeuvre area of Dollersheim,¹²⁶ where, since November, a Roumanian S.S. regiment had been forming.¹²⁷

Bulgaria was not in the same category as Germany's other allied because she did not participate in the war against the U.S.S.R. When the Red Army approached Bulgarian territory the Bulgarian government declared war on Germany on 8 September 1944 and there was a Communist coup d'état. These events precipitated the flight of a minority of Bulgar soldiers and politicians into territory still held by the German forces where a "Free Bulgarian Government" was established.¹²⁸

124 O.K.W./W.F.St./QM.2 (Ost) Nr.06601/44, 26 August 1944.

125 O.K.W. Nr. 3847/44, W.F.St./Org.III, 20 September 1944 - BAMA III W89.

126 Gen. d. Freiw. Verbände im O.K.W., I/E, Nr. 20400/44, 20 December 1944.

127 S.S. F.H.A., Amt III, Org.Abt. Ia/II, Tgb, Nr. 4024/44, 3 November - 1944.

128 Gen. d. Freiw. Verbände im O.K.H., I/E, Nr. 20400/44, 20 December 1944.

Consequently, the German High Command included Bulgars in the provisions it made on 20 September for employing foreign refugees in the German ranks.¹²⁹ Himmler was, however, anxious to expand the Waffen S.S., so on 13 November an order was issued creating a Bulgarian S.S. Regiment, the nucleus of a projected division, on the training ground at Dollersheim.¹³⁰ In connection with this, on 13 December 1944, the Generalstab der Bulgarischen Nationalregierung inserted a notice in the Völkischer Beobachter, telling all Bulgars in the Reich to volunteer for the Bulgarische Nationale Befreiungsarmee by the 24th of the month, failing which they would be conscripted. A week later The General der Freiwilligenverbände ordered that Bulgar "volunteers" were to become the responsibility of the Reichsführer S.S. by the simple expedient of despatching them to S.S. Ersatzkommando Südost at Vienna.¹³¹

129 O.K.W., Nr. 3847/44, W.F.St./Org. III, 20 September 1944.

130 S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb, No. 4211/44, 13 November 1944.

131 Gen. d. Freiw. Verbände im O.K.H., I/E, Nr. 20400/44, 20 December 1944.

Although there was in Germany a tradition of compulsory military service and this principle was recognised in many of the foreign countries from which the Wehrmacht and Waffen S.S. enlisted personnel, it was not sound policy for the German forces to enlist foreigners who were not genuine volunteers. It was safer to restrict reluctant elements to the German war industry, keeping them in closed and guarded camps, making them work without arms under the supervision of armed reliable Germans. Even this course was not without its risks to internal security and there was the added danger of sabotage.¹³² Nevertheless, thousands were conscripted from the occupied territories for factories, construction sites and farms where they were employed under constraint and coercion. Many prisoners-of-war worked for German agencies either individually or in groups without losing their status in international law. To these forced labourers were added volunteer workers who were, in general, more reliable than their reluctant colleagues and to whom, in consequence, their German employers could grant a certain amount of latitude.

Throughout the Second World War the needs of armed forces and essential industry had to be nicely balanced, with the result that the German economy could release manpower to the armed forces only if the labour force lost was replaced by its equivalent in foreign workers. The use of Non-Germans in agriculture and industry was an important alternative to their recruitment as fighting men. So great were the

132. Abschrift GV (Abw. III Wi) S 750-O.K.W. Nr. 95011-40 Abw. III (Wi 2) Beschäftigung von Ausländer in geschützten Betrieben
- ¶ 175, Roll 103, Frames 2625792-3, 7 October 1940.

demands for foreign labour that on one occasion a directive pointed out that prisoners-of-war employed as auxiliary guards were lost as a source of labour.¹³³ When, in June 1943, Hitler believed Eastern units in general to be treacherous and ordered their disbandment, the mines were instantly nominated as an alternative employment for them.¹³⁴ When Eastern units were suspected of being unreliable as were those of the 30th S.S. Division in the autumn of 1944, they were immediately set to work building fortifications.¹³⁵

Most of the Osttruppen survived the threats to their existence¹³⁶ and they and their other non-German counterparts constituted a force which by sheer numbers exceeded the armies of many of the belligerents and dwarfed many peace-time armies. Nevertheless, the Germans generally recognised that it was preferable that the non-Germans whom they recruited should be volunteers. Several of the armed organisations of non-Germans embodied "Freiwillige" in their titles, but the needs of the German forces for replacements and reinforcements, the ambition of Himmler to increase his "Empire", the zeal of individual recruiters, all caused the abandonment of the voluntary principle on several occasions.

133 A.O.K.6, O.Qu./Qu.2, Nr. 584/43, 16 April 1943 - N.O.K.W., 2740, Case XII Doc. Bk. 21, para 5a.

134 Besprechung des Führers, 8 June 1943 - 1384 PS - BAMA III W 100.

135 30. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. (russ. Nr.2) Ia, 11, 14, and 20 September 1944

136 Gen. d. Freiw. Verbände im O.K.H., Nr. 702/45, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, 27 March 1945 - BAMA-HI/153-T78, Roll 413.

PART FOUR
The Use of Non-Germans

Chapter Nine - Employment

Deployment - The Front

A very high proportion of the non-Germans who served in the German forces during the Second World War fought in the front-line itself. Apart from the fact that it was at the front that the need for manpower was always greatest, the anti-Communist legions raised in the West during the summer of 1941 existed solely to fight on the Eastern front, and many who volunteered for other foreign units had the same intention.

Infantry

The eagerness of many young Western legionaries to serve in the line made it almost inevitable that they should join infantry units or formations, either old-style or mechanised. There was also a large percentage of infantry among the foreign elements recruited later in the war. There were several reasons for this, apart from the normal preponderance of infantrymen and the high incidence of casualties amongst them. The German Army had a great need of infantry to maintain its front in the East. The numerical superiority of infantry over other arms was probably also reflected among the enemy soldiers taken prisoner, so when German agencies began to convert captives into allies, it was logical to employ these men as infantry again. Although the foot-soldier

of the 20th Century needs a greater knowledge and training than his predecessors, in cases where "volunteers" had little or no previous military instruction, it was simpler to prepare them for the infantry than for one of the technical arms. This was particularly the case where recruits came of peasant stock, as did so many in Eastern Europe and Soviet Asia, and had few technical qualifications and often little general education. Furthermore, it was easier for the German forces to find arms and equipment for riflemen than for soldiers employing more complicated weapons. In the case of units formed in occupied Soviet territory, the weapons and ammunition were there for the taking, among the large quantities of booty obtained from the retreating Red Army, and these were the arms with which Germany's indigenous levies were already familiar.

In practice the independent foreign units had to be attached to German formations for both tactical and logistic reasons. Freikorps Danmark, for example, served with the S.S. Totenkopf Division in the Demyansk pocket¹, while the Croat 369th Regiment was lost at Stalingrad with the 100th Jägerdivision.² The original

1. Anon., 'Freikorps Danmark', Der Freiwillige, XIII. Jg. Heft 6 (1967).
 2. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 February 1943; St. Martin 'Die Kroatische Legion', Zeitschrift für Heeres- und Uniformkunde, XVII. Jg. (1953).

French legion was attached to the 7th Infantry Division³ and the first French S.S. battalion joined the battle-group of the 18th S.S. Division "Horst Wessel".⁴ The Walloon battalion, 373, was put under command of a number of German light infantry divisions⁵ whereas the Finnish S.S. Battalion became an integral part of Regiment "Nordland"⁶ in Division "Wiking".

The Eastern legionary battalions were also originally intended to serve at the front. Divisional Staff 162 in the Ukraine established several Turkestani, Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian battalions for the German infantry divisions - for example 4th Mountain and 384th Infantry - whose numbers they bore.⁷ In some cases they were allocated to divisions for which they were not initially intended.⁸ The legionary battalions created for the divisions of the German 6th Army were, fortunately for them, not ready in time to be involved in the débacle at

3. St. Loup, Les Volontaires (Paris, 1963), pp. 505-6 reproduces an Order-of-the-Day of the commander of the 7th Division.

4. O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./Org. Abt. I Nr. 17988, 9 July 1944; ibid., II Nr. 46423, 30 July 1944.

5. Degrelle, op.cit., pp. 61, 120.

6. Regiment "Nordland", Stammtafel.

7. Namely Aserbaidshisches Bataillon I/4 Gebirgs and Turkestanisches Bataillon I/384 - O.K.H./Gen St. d.H., Gen d. Osttruppen Nr 402/43, Schematische Kriegsgliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, 5 May 1943 - BAMA - H1/153

8. e.g. Turkestanisches Btl. I/76 joined 373rd Division and Turk. Btl. I/389 joined 45th Division - O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt. Nr. 15169, 8 January 1943

Stalingrad.⁹ Instead, they were taken to recreate the 162nd Infantry Division.¹⁰ Meanwhile the legionary depôts in the General gouvernement had also produced battalions for despatch to combat divisions requiring them.¹¹ Elsewhere Slavs were organised into units by and for other front-line formations.¹²

The Germanic volunteers for the S.S. Verfügungstruppen became part of the motorised infantry division "Wiking".¹³ When the Germanic legions were merged in 1943 they, too, provided a motorised division, "Nordland".¹⁴ But when "Wiking" was upgraded to become an armoured division,¹⁵ "Nordland" continued as one of armoured infantry with a

9. e.g. Turk. Btle. I/44 and I/100 Jäger.
10. O.K.W., K.T.B., III/2, p. 797.
11. e.g. Armenisches Btl. 808 was attached to the 1st Mountain Division, Aserbaidshisches Btl. 804 to 4th Mountain Division - O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./Org. Abt., Nr. 3631, 29 July 1942.
12. e.g. Ostkompanie 25 of the 25th Motorised Infantry Division, Ostkompanie 85 of the 5th Armoured Division.
13. S.S. F.H.A., Tgb. Nr.184/40, Aufstellung der SS Division (mot.) Germania, 3 December 1940 - T 175, Roll 106 Frames 2629471 - 8.
14. Himmler, RF/Bn, Aufstellung des Germanischen Korps, 3 March 1943, - T 175, Roll 111, Frames 2635157 - 62, part II.
15. S.S. F.H.A., Kdo, Amt der Waffen S.S. Org. Tgb. Nr. 442/43, Umgliederung der S.S. Division Wiking, 29 March 1943 - T 175, Roll 111, Frames 2635184 - 5. Although this and other motorised S.S. divisions were re-named "Panzer Grenadier" they, in fact, had a tank regiment each.

smaller tank component than the older Germanic formations.¹⁶ The only other nominally foreign motorised infantry formations were the 18th S.S., which was brought up to strength by filling its gaps with racial Germans from Hungary,¹⁷ the 23rd, which was a redesignation of the Dutch brigade,¹⁸ and the 31st.¹⁹ No foreign formation, apart from "Wiking", was fully armoured. The two Belgian legions and the French S.S. provided a motorised assault brigade each,²⁰ but when they were expanded to become divisions, shortage of fuel and of time prevented them from being anything other than Grenadier divisionen in embryo.²¹

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16. It was originally intended to have a tank regiment - S.S. F.H.A. Kdo. Amt. der Waffen S.S., Org. Tgb. Nr. 800/43, 28 June 1943 - but the armoured element was cut back to an Abteilung thereby preventing "Nordland" from becoming a "Panzer" division when "Wiking" and others did.
17. The Division adopted the prefix "Freiwilligen" early in 1944 - Verordnungsblatt der Waffen S.S. Nr. 4, 15 February 1944, Z. 72.
18. O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt. I, Nr. 21654, 17 February 1945. A Plan to create a Dutch division in 1943 - S.S. F.H.A., Kdo. Amt der Waffen S.S., Org. Tgb. Nr. 917/43, 19 July 1943 - T 175, Roll 108, Frames 2631191 - 2 - was reduced to one for a brigade - S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 1612/43, 26 October 1943 - T 175, Roll 108, Frame 2631165.
19. Ibid., Nr. 3466/44, 4 October 1944 - T 175, Roll 141, Frame 266914. The 32nd S.S. Division contained sufficient Volksdeutsche to bear the prefix "Freiwilligen" - ibid., Nr. 714/45, 2 February 1945 - T 175, Roll 140, Frame 2668412-7 - until it was renamed "Panzer Grenadier" - T 175, Roll 174, Frame 2709479.
20. S.S.F.H.A., Kdo. Amt der Waffen S.S., Org. Tgb. Nr. II/680/43, 31 May 1943; ibid., Nr. II/820/43, 3 July 1943 - T 175, Roll 111, Frames 2635303-6 and 2635312-8 Respectively; S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Tgb. Nr. 2710/44, 26 August 1944 - T 175, Roll 141, Frames 2669189-93.
21. Ibid., In/II, Tgb. Nr. 332, 16 January 1945 - T 175, Roll 140, Frames 2668431-2 - O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt. I, Nr. 21654, 17 February 1945

Although the three Croat legionary divisions, 369, 373 and 392, were normal infantry formations²² the terrain of the Balkans caused the foreign S.S. divisions raised in that region to be organised as mountain troops. The 7th Division "Prinz Eugen",²³ the 13th, "Handschar",²⁴ the 21st, "Skanderbeg",²⁵ the abortive 23rd "Kama"²⁶ and the incomplete 24th "Karstjäger"²⁷ were all Gebirgs-
divisionen. The critical situation in South-Eastern Europe tied all the German-sponsored divisions to that theatre, while the nature of the fighting condemned them all to engage in fluid anti-partisan warfare rather than to serve in a conventional front-line.

- 22. F. Schraml, Kriegsschauplatz Kroatien - die deutsch-kroatische Legionsdivisionen (Neckargemünd, 1962), passim.
- 23. S.S.F.H.A., Org. Tgb. Nr. 1268/42, Aufstellung der Freiwilligen Gebirgs Division, 1 March 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frame 2633790. The original idea that the formation should have two unwieldy brigades of eleven battalions each was not implemented - O.K.W., W.F.St. (Org.) Nr. 3025/41, Aufstellung von Volksdeutschen Verbände in Serbien durch den R.F.S.S., 30 December 1941 - T175, Roll 109, Frame 2633913.
- 24. S.S.F.H.A., Kdo. Amt der Waffen S.S., Org. Tgb. Nr. 589/43, Aufstellung der kroatischen S.S. Freiwilligen Division, 30 April 1943 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635334-7. Waffen Gebirgs Division S.S. (kroatische Nr. 2), 17 June 1944 - T175, Roll 141, Frame 2669304.
- 25. S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 991/44, Aufstellung der Waffen Gebirgs Division S.S. Skanderbeg (albanische Nr. 1), 17 April 1944 - T175, Roll 141, Frames 2669335-6.
- 26. Ibid., Nr. 1667/44, Aufstellung der Waffen Gebirgs Division S.S. (kroatische Nr. 2), 17 June 1944 - T175, Roll 141, Frame 2669304.
- 27. Ibid., Nr. 2045/44, Aufstellung der Waffen Gebirgs- (Karstjäger) Division S.S., 18 July 1944, T175, Roll 141, Frames 2669239-40.

Cavalry

During the Second World War cavalry still formed a large part of European armies. Vast areas of Eastern Europe were suitable for the deployment of cavalry; but the German desire to raise armoured divisions caused most of Germany's mounted troops to be mechanised by 1939.²⁸ In 1941, the remaining 1st Kavallerie Division was itself converted into the 24th German Armoured Division,²⁹ but the need for cavalry caused the German Army in 1943 to bring together the horsed reconnaissance squadrons from infantry divisions in the East in order to form three composite cavalry regiments.³⁰ The removal of their only cavalry squadron frequently left German infantry divisions without a reconnaissance element or with cyclists alone; and it led to the emergence of the divisional Füsilier bataillone, reconnaissance units which were little more than extra-regimental infantry battalions.³¹

28. H. Radke, 'Die deutsche Kavallerie im Zweite Weltkrieg', Teil I, Deutsches Soldaten jahrbuch, XVI (1968), p.256.

29. Ibid., p.257.

30. Idem, 'Die deutsche Kavallerie im Zweite Weltkrieg', Teil III, Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch, XVIII (1970), pp.161-4. The regiments were "Nord," "Mitte" and "Süd."

31. In some cases these were simply ordinary infantry battalions which had been redesignated.

The Red Army made extensive use of cavalry at the front; and among prisoners-of-war in German hands there were considerable numbers of cavalrymen. Among the Cossacks and Caucasians in German camps, there was, moreover, a long tradition of horsemanship. The training of troopers was more complex than that of riflemen and the equipping and mounting of cavalry presented difficulties not encountered in raising infantry. Nevertheless, mounted units made few demands upon the German economy because horses, saddlery, fodder and sabres were all available from captured stocks. Short of cavalry of their own, German formations in the East made use of indigenous mounted forces when the tactical situation became sufficiently fluid. Apart from the Schwadronen and even Abteilungen serving German divisions, like the 385th and 126th Infantry Divisions,³² there were the independent Cossack Regiments "Platow"³³ and "von Jungschultz."³⁴ The German 16th Motorised

32. Kosaken Schwadron 385, later Ostreiter Schwadron 385, is shown, with others, in O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 5920/42, Anlage 6, 30 November 1942. Kosakenabteilung is listed in Heeresgruppe Süd I, Nr. 1315/43, 30 April 1943, in BAMA - H1/143 and T 78, Roll 413.

33. O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 1630/43, 25 March 1943, Anlage, 1) Heeresgruppe A

34. Ibid., 2) Heeresgruppe Süd.

Division faced with the task of patrolling the vast gap in the German line between Army groups A and B, raised two squadrons of Kalmucks, which grew to form Kalmückenverband Dr. Doll of twenty-five squadrons mounted on ponies.³⁵ Following the expulsion of German troops from the settlement areas in the regions of the Don and the Kuban, many Cossacks became refugees. From these and existing Cossack units a cavalry division was formed.³⁶ In 1944 this formation was taken over by the Waffen S.S. and expanded to form two cavalry divisions.³⁷ The resultant cavalry corps was employed in Yugoslavia where it was engaged in fighting against Tito's Army of Liberation.

The Cossacks were by no means the only foreign cavalry at the disposal of the Armed S.S. Although the German Army whittled away its horsed formations and did

35. 1. und 2. Kalmucken Schwadronen 66, shown in O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 5920/42, 30 November 1942, Anlage 4, in BAMA - H1/143 and T 78, Roll 413; J. Hoffmann, Deutsche und Kalmyken 1942 bis 1945 (Freiburg, 1974), pp. 90-138.

36. O.K.H. Gen. St. d. H., Org. Abt. II Nr. 17877/43, 12 May 1943; Ibid., Nr. 18198/43 27 May 1943; Ibid., Nr. 18932/43, 29 June 1943.

37. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt. Ia/II Tgb. Nr. 4080/44, Aufstellung des GenKdos XIV Kos. Kav. Corps und der 1. und 2. Kos. Kav. Div., 4 November 1944.

not reverse the process until late in the war,³⁸ the S.S. increased its mounted component as the war ran its course, only to have it reduced by enemy action during the final months. An infusion of Volksdeutsche enabled the Cavalry Brigade of the S.S. to develop into its 8th Division, "Florian Geyer."³⁹ This formation in 1944 produced a daughter division, the 22nd, by making use of several thousands of ethnic Germans from Hungary.⁴⁰ Both divisions went under at Budapest, but the S.S. still disposed of sufficient cavalrymen to form a new Volksdeutsche cavalry division, the 37th, "Lützow."⁴¹

38. The Cavalry Regiments "Nord", "Mitte" and "Süd" were used as the nuclei of the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, later upgraded to cavalry "divisions".
39. S.S. Kavallerie Division, IIa, Divisions Tagesbefehl 10/43, 22 March 1943 - NO4644, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 66A.
40. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt. Ia/II, Tgb. Nr. 1070/44, 29 April 1944.
41. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt. Ia/II Tgb. Nr. 975/45, Aufstellung der 37. S.S. Kavallerie Division, 26 February 1945 - T 175, Roll 140, Frames 2668404-7. Rumours of a 33rd S.S. Cavalry Division formed of Magyars appear to be without foundation.

Anti-tank Units

The repeated irruption of Soviet tanks through the German defences during the closing phases of the war caused the German Army to improvise Panzerjagdverbände from whatever personnel were available, in an attempt to seal off the breaches. These hastily-contrived formations depended on close-range infantry anti-tank weapons to achieve their purpose - not high velocity, towed or self-propelled guns, firing armour-piercing shells, but projectors for dispensing hollow-charge bombs. For mobility the units frequently relied upon bicycles. Apart from Germans, considerable numbers of Magyars, Caucasians, Russians and Ukrainians were pressed into service to man these forlorn hopes.⁴² Since the German depôt units were repeatedly called upon to provide men for a succession of scratch divisions, battle groups and alarm units, it is possible that the collecting centres for non-German stragglers, labourers and refugees were better able to provide manpower for these creations of the eleventh hour.

42. Heeres Panzer-Jagd-Verbände (ungarische) 1 to 9;
(russische) 10, 11, 13, 14 and Heeres Panzer-Jagd-
Gruppe (kaukasische) 12.

Engineers

Behind the German lines in the East there were a few "pure" Pionier units formed from Soviet citizens. Some like Ost-Pionierbataillon 454, of the security division of that number,⁴³ and the Russian company with the 2nd S.S. Brigade,⁴⁴ were the combat engineers of the formations they served. Others, for example Ost-Pionierbataillon 666, were severed from their original affiliation and became liable for employment wherever the German Army had need of them.⁴⁵ Soviet nationals were organised far more frequently into Bau units, which did not normally participate in actual fighting, than into combat engineers. They frequently consisted of "B - Legionäre", who were not considered fit enough to fight. A small but interesting segment of the foreign military force at the disposal of the German Army were the companies numbered from 1001 to 1008, composed of personnel from Soviet Asia. These were originally intended to be supply companies but

43. Heeresgruppe Süd, Ia, Nr. 1315/43, 30 April 1943 - BAMA - H1/143.

44. Organisation chart of 2. S.S. Inf. Brig., January 1943 - T 175, Roll 174, Frame 2709440.

45. Btl. 666 was originally a security unit of the 18th Army - O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt.II, Nr. 4971/42, 23 October 1942, Anlage 3 - BAMA - H1/143.

were, in fact, used in mining operations.⁴⁶ Even further removed from the firing line were Arbeits units which provided unskilled labour for construction projects⁴⁷ and for ration dumps.⁴⁸ There were even a number of labour units whose members retained their prisoner-of-war status.⁴⁹ In this last category were a number of units of Western prisoners, some of whom were employed in replacing the tiles and glass of bombed German cities.⁵⁰

46. These Turk-Minierkompanien (Tiefbau) exemplify units formed from "B - Legionäre" - O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Org. Abt. II Nr. 18636/43, 14 June 1943.

47. For example the Turk Arbeits Brigade with units in Polish towns - BA - NS 31/55.

48. Specifically the Turk Arbeitskompanien at the Heeresmagazinen Minsk, Kauen and Riga later expanded to eleven, numbered 51 to 61.

49. For example Kriegsgefangenen Bau - und Arbeits - Btle., Kriegsgefangenen Arbeits Btle. (Pl.), Kriegsgefangenen Hafen Arbeits Abteilungen.

50. Kriegsgefangenen Dachdecker Btle. III, V, VI, IX-XII, XVI; Kriegsgefangenen Gläser Btle. III, VI, X, XII, XV, XVI.

Behind the Lines - Security Units

In rear areas the use of non-German infantry took two forms - mobile and static. In the first category fell operations against partisans and parachutists intended to track them down, harass, surround and ultimately destroy them. Amongst these were the sweeps which went by the names of "Erntefest", "Hamburg", "Winterzauber", and others, in which Eastern battalions and Schuma were involved. An operation code-named "Karlsbad" brought together the 1st S.S. Brigade, a Lithuanian Schuma unit, an indigenous Batterie, a French legionary battalion and a Cossack Abteilung.⁵¹ For the undertaking "Donnerkeil" an Ost battalion and four Cossack battalions worked together with German units.⁵²

Secondly there was the guarding of vulnerable points - German headquarters, for example Oberfeldkommandantur 365 at Lvov,⁵³ and communications.⁵⁴ In some cases

51. Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer Russland Mitte, Abt. Ia, Tgb. Nr.1066/42, 6 October 1942 - T175, Roll 225, Frame 2764193.

52. Kriegstagebuch Unternehmen "Donnerkeil" Beilage zum Kriegstagebuch der 201. Sich.-Division, March 1943 - part of NOKW2137, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 G.

53. By a Ukrainische Wachkommando, later to become Ukrainische Schuma-Bataillon 205 - Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op.cit., II, 106; Another example was (ukr.) Ostkompanie (Sich.) Standortkommandantur Wjasma, later Ostwachkompanie 639 - O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt (II) Nr. 5381, 3.Ang., 15 January 1943.

54. Nordkauk Btl. 802 provided protection for ferries and bridges.

guard duties were carried out by units as small as platoons - this was the case with those attached to German Landeschützen battalions⁵⁵ but the number of non-Germans tied down in this role was frequently greater, as in the case of the Ukrainian guard companies numbered from 606 to 611.⁵⁶ Although, if the need arose, units could be switched from this static employment to the mobile role, some units performing guard duties were composed of "B - Legionäre", those not fit for the more active task.

Native cavalry were also used to deal with hostile activity behind the German front in the East. In March 1943 the headquarters of the XXXIIIrd Army Corps recommended the use of cavalry, directed by radio and supported by tanks as a means of fighting partisans.⁵⁷ That this staff was not alone in holding this view is ~~shown~~ ^{revealed} in an order-of-battle of May 1943, which reveals

55. Notably battalions 439, 568, 351, 783, 353, 560 and 842 in the Ukraine and 268, 377, 618, 619, 405, 614 and 310 in Poland - O.K.H./Gen. St.d.H./Gen.d. Osttruppen, Nr. 405/43, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, Stand 5.9.43, in BAMA - H1/153 and T 78, Roll 413.

56. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II) Nr. 5381/42, 8 November 1942, Anlage 8, 1) b)Kdr. d. Versorgungsbasis Mitte.

57. Generalkommando XXXIII. A.K., Abt. Ia, Nr. 462/43 (471), 29 March 1943 - NOKW 457, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9F

that rear area commands, such as Korück 584⁵⁸ and security regiments, like the 57th, had mounted units of their own.⁵⁹ Mobility was so important in partisan warfare that, in the absence of horses, bicycles were introduced into some Eastern units, for example into two of the squadrons of Kosakenabteilung 600⁶⁰ and into one squadron each of Ostreiterabteilungen 207, 281 and 285.⁶¹

The staff of the XXXXIIIrd Army Corps also advocated the use of tanks against partisans.⁶² With their mobility and fire power, tanks could provide a valuable support to troops fighting irregulars, particularly if the latter lacked any effective means of countering armoured fighting vehicles. Several German independent tank companies, equipped with obsolete light tanks or vehicles captured in earlier campaigns, operated against

58. Namely Kosakenschwadron 655 - O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Gen. d. Osttruppen, Nr. 402/43, Schematische Kriegsgliederung der landeseigenen Verbände. Stand vom 5.5. 1943, 16 Armee.

59. Namely III (Kos.) Abt./Sich. Rgt. 57 - Ibid., 2. Pz. Armee, ruckw. Ar. Geb. 532. This had formerly been Kosakenabteilung 213 of the Security Division of that number.

60. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org. Abt.(I) Nr. 5000/42, Schematische Kriegsgliederung, 15 October 1942.

61. O.K.H. Gen.St.d.H., Org.Abt.(II) Nr. 4971/42, 17 October 1942, Anlage 3 in BAMA - H1/143 and T 78, Roll 413. When the 285th was transferred to France it was completely converted into a cyclist unit.

62. Gen. Kdo. XXXXIII. A.K., Abt. Ia, Nr. 462/43 (471), 29 March 1943 - NOKW 457, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 F

communist partisans.⁶³ It is incorrect to assume that the native troops levied by the Wehrmacht in the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R. were never entrusted with armoured vehicles. Prisoners, in some cases trained and experienced in tank warfare, were available; and so were abandoned Soviet tanks, either stranded through lack of fuel or broken down because of a mechanical defect. If these resources had not been tapped to create a few minor tank units, it would have been necessary to call upon front-line Panzer troops in their place. Sufficient crews were scraped together and tanks salvaged to provide the commander of the rear area of the Southern Army Group with two Ost-Panzerkompanien,⁶⁴ and for the commander of Army Rear Area 580 to form one.⁶⁵

As early as November 1941, the German 11th Army was advocating the use of single guns in support of troops and police who were fighting partisans.⁶⁶ Abandoned Russian guns and their prime movers were available to the

63. Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op.cit., II, 43; Müller - Hillebrand, op. cit., III, 126.

64. 1. und 2. Ost-Panzerkompanien/Befh. He. Geb. Süd - O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./General der Osttruppen Nr. 405/43, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände. Stand 5.9.1943, Befehlshaber Heeresgebiet Süd.

65. Ibid. 2. Armee - All three tank companies disappeared from the order-of-battle early in 1944. None of them reached the West.

66. A.O.K.II, Abw. Offz., Bekämpfung der Partisanen, 14 November 1941 - N.O.K.w. 588, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 917, para. 4.

German forces, together with dumps of ammunition, so were men, in many cases trained gunners. In the event more artillery units than tank companies were formed from Soviet citizens. The commander of the Southern Rear Area controlled three batteries,⁶⁷ while the Freijäger formation of the 16th Army had two.⁶⁸ The 2nd Panzerarmee⁶⁹ and the 2nd S.S. Brigade⁷⁰ contained a complete Abteilung each.

Armed Police

When German ground forces moved into enemy territory they were closely followed by police units. Apart from maintaining law and order these policemen conducted "mopping up" operations, fought partisans and performed other duties which in many states would have been regarded as the province of the army. German police authorities, like the military commanders, found that the Germans allocated to them were insufficient for the tasks

67. 1., 2. und 3 Ostbatterien/Befh. He. Geb. Süd - Ibid., Befehlshafer Heeresgebiet Süd.
68. 1. und 2. Freijäger-Batterien 16, later 1 und 2. Ost-Batterien 670 - O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org. Abt.(II) Nr. 4971/42, 23 October 1942.
69. Ost Artillerieabteilung 621 - O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org. Abt.(II), Nr. 5381/42, 8 November 1942, Anlage 8 - BAMA - H1/143 and T 78, Roll 413.
70. Organisation chart of 2.S.S. Inf. Brigade, January 1943 - T 175, Roll 174, Frame 2709440.

they were called upon to carry out; and they began to recruit indigenous policemen to assist in their work. These locally-raised policemen were provided with firearms in the course of their duties and a large number of Schutzmannschaften units were called upon to perform tasks other than normal civil constabulary duties. Indigenous police units combatted partisans by participating in search-and-destroy operations,⁷¹ by protecting vulnerable points⁷² and by patrolling communications.⁷³ Other duties they performed were watching frontiers,⁷⁴ safeguarding the harvest⁷⁵ and guarding prison camps.⁷⁶ Some Baltic units even served on the Leningrad front.⁷⁷

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71. Schuma Btle. 57, 102, 118 participated in Operation "Kottbus"- Der Chef der Bandenkampfverbände, 23 June 1943 NO2608 Case XI, Doc.Bk. 66C.
72. e.g. Schuma Btle. 6, 9, 10, 14, 30, 37, 38, 251, 267 - Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op.cit., II, 101-7.
73. Notably Durchgangstrasse IV using Schuma Btle. 4, 7, 8, 17, 27, 28, 124-6, 134-5, 159-61, 268 - ibid., II, 101-7.
74. Schuma Btle. 43, 45, 49, 108, 269 - ibid., II, 103-7.
75. Schuma Btle. 11, 25, 268 - Ibid., pp. 101-7
76. Schuma Btl. 2 - ibid., p. 101.
77. Estn. Schuma Btle. 29, 33, lett. Schuma Btle. 19, 21, 24, 26, 29 - Documents of Gen.Kdo. L. A.K., 1942-3 - BAMA 32340/1-3, II.

The diversity of the work of the Schuma is indicated by the variety of its units. Although the majority were "Front",⁷⁸ or combat, and Wach⁷⁹ battalions, there were several cavalry,⁸⁰ engineer⁸¹ and construction⁸² units. Among the depôt units⁸³ was one specifically for artillery.⁸⁴ The classification of these units as police rather than military was of two-fold importance - in the first place their use against partisans implied that the latter were not of sufficient consequence to warrant the use of proper military units against them, in the second place, since they were police units they were a responsibility of the S.S. rather than the Army.

78. e.g. Estn. Polizei Front Btle. 37 and 38 - Verbindungs-offizier der Waffen S.S. beim Gen. St.d.H./Org. Abt. Tgb. Nr. 348/44, Aufstellung Über landes. Verbände der Ordnungspolizei, 29 April 1944 - T 175, Roll 174, Frames 2709403-5.

79. e.g. Lett. Polizei Wach Btl. 320 - ibid.

80. Schuma Abteilungen 68, 72-4 - Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op.cit., II, 104

81. Schuma Btle. 42, 270 - ibid., II, 103, 107.

82. Schuma Btle. 314-5, 326-8 - ibid., II, 108-9.

83. e.g. Schuma Btl. 266, ibid., II, 107

84. i.e. Schuma Abt. 56 - Der S.S. und Polizeiführer Weissruthenien, Tgb. Nr. 968/43, - 27 December 1943 - T 175, Roll 225, Frames 2764052-9.

Drang nach Westen

In 1943 a new sphere of employment was found for many of the Eastern Combat units, namely to use them in garrison and coastal defence duties in Western Europe. From the time of the German attack upon the U.S.S.R. until the Allied landings in Normandy the German troops in the West fell into two main categories. Firstly, there were German formations consisting of men who by reason of their age or health were judged to be unfit for the Eastern front. These divisions were stationed permanently in Western Europe where they guarded the coast and maintained internal security.⁸⁵ In these tasks they were assisted to some extent by formations of a second category - those which were training and preparing to go - or to return to - the Eastern front and which were in consequence only temporarily stationed in the West. As the situation in the East worsened for the Germans their static divisions in the West were creamed off to provide reinforcements for the combat divisions.⁸⁶ The "West" divisions could ill afford to relinquish their fittest members because they had to cope with the growing menace

85. e.g. the divisions of the 13th and 14th "Waves".

86. e.g. I./Gen. Rgt. 362, I./Gen. Rgt. 334, II./Gen. Rgt. 367, II./Gen. Rgt. 767, I./Gen. Rgt. 523 were despatched to Heeresgruppe Mitte in September 1943.

of resistance movements and at the same time by prepared for commando raids, if not actual invasion. The strain on the German forces in the West was further increased in November 1942 by their entry into the previously unoccupied zone of France.

To relieve the strain upon the formations in the West, as early as January 1943, the High Command of the German Armed Forces was planning to transfer forty to fifty "Turk" battalions across Europe and to incorporate them on the basis of one per regiment in the Westdivisionen. Ten battalions were to be transferred immediately for the German coastal divisions.⁸⁷ A few days later, on the 31st of the month, the High Command thought it feasible to use "Turk" battalions to protect U-Boat bases in France.⁸⁸ But on 20th February the General Staff ruled that increased "bandit" activity in the East precluded the transfer of indigenous units to the West.⁸⁹ Although foreign units could not immediately be spared from the Eastern theatre-of-operations, there were two battalions of Indians lying idle at Königsbrück who were despatched to the Dutch coast in April 1943, ostensibly for training.⁹⁰ These were, of course,

87. O.K.W., K.T.B. III/1, p.75

88. Ibid., III/1, p.87

89. Ibid., III/1, p.150

90. Ibid., III/1, p.249.

inadequate in numbers but by early May one battalion each of Turcomen, Armenians, North Caucasians and Volga-Tartars and two of Georgians had reached the West to join them.⁹¹

Allegations of defection by some of the units raised from Soviet citizens caused Hitler, on 8 June 1943, to suggest that the Osttruppen should be used in Germany as coal-miners.⁹² But the German Army could not afford to surrender its Eastern units. Instead, they were transported across Europe. On 10 July the Armed Forces' High Command recorded an arrangement to send one Turcoman and two Tartar battalions to the south of France to supplement ten which had already been earmarked.⁹³ The Italian capitulation not merely made it necessary for more German units to be sent into Italy itself but obliged the Germans to provide substitutes for Italian garrisons in Southern France and the Balkans. On 25th September the High Command noted a request by the Commander-in-Chief West for Cossack and "Turk" formations.⁹⁴ In consequence, O.K.W. ordered an exchange of German battalions in Norway, Denmark and the West against Eastern units in the ratio of one German to two foreign. Sixteen Eastern battalions were to be detached from the Central

91. Ibid., III/2, p. 1141.

92. Besprechung des Führers, 8 June 1943 - 1384PS - BAMA III W 100

93. O.K.W., K.T.B., III/2, p. 765. They were numbered 782, 827 and 828.

94. Ibid., III/2, p. 1141.

Army Group, from Poland and from the Ukraine and sent West. It was noted by O.K.W. on 30th September that the Osttruppen were to be employed in coastal defence in order not to offend the local population.⁹⁵ But the Atlantic coast was not the only recipient of Ost units, for the War Diary of O.K.W. noted on 22 October 1943 that it was prepared to take ten Ostbataillone for Italy and twelve for south-eastern Europe.⁹⁶ On 31 October it mentioned a further five battalions for Denmark but none was sent to Norway.⁹⁷

In his speech of 7 November 1943, General Jodl stated that there were approximately one hundred Eastern battalions in existence of which hardly one was serving in the East.⁹⁸ The order-of-battle for 22 November, however, shows that sixty-eight Eastern units of battalion size had shifted from the Eastern theatre-of-operations, while the Cossack Division had gone to the Balkans and the Turcoman Division had moved to Italy.⁹⁹

95. Ibid., III/2, p. 1153.

96. Ibid., III/2, p. 1213.

97. Ibid., III/2, p. 1235.

98. General Jodl, Strategic Position at the Beginning of the Fifth Year of War, 7 November 1943 - L172, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 18.

99. O.K.H.Gen.St.d.H. General der Osttruppen Nr. 406/43, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, Stand 22.11.1943 - BAMA - H1/153.

Not only were Eastern combat units extricated from the lines-of-communication and even from the front in the East but they were joined in the West by the very "Legions" which acted as depôts for the soldiers from Soviet Asia.¹⁰⁰ By 15 January 1944 seventy-two battalions, apart from the depôts, had made the journey westward.¹⁰¹ After that date there were small increases in the Osttruppen in Western Europe but they can in part be accounted for by new units that existing ones provided from their own resources rather than by new units from the East.¹⁰²

It would be incorrect to suppose that all the Osttruppen were transferred to the West. On 16 December 1943 the War Diary of O.K.W. noted that two thirds of the indigenous formations were still in the East because of the situation there.¹⁰³ Examination of the list of units posted to the Western theatres¹⁰⁴ shows that they were,

100. Ibid., Early in 1944 they were grouped with Russian and Ukrainian depôts to form the Freiwilligen Stammdivision.

101. O.K.H., General der Freiwilligen Verbände, Nr. 601/44, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände. Stand 15.1.1944 - BAMA H1/153.

102. e.g. Ost-Artillerieabteilung 752 and Ost-Pionierkompanie 752 of the Ost-Regimentsstab of that number, Pionierkompanie (r) 174 of 74. Sicherungsbrigade, Bataillon Huber formed by Waffenschule Ost.

103. O.K.W., K.T.B., III/2, p.1364

104. e.g. the fifteen battalions, one Abteilung and one company earmarked in O.K.W./W.F.St./Op. (H) Nr.5616/43, 24 September 1943.

with few exceptions, those of "teeth" arms while many of the "tail" units to arrive in the West did so simply because their parent-divisions happened to be there.¹⁰⁵ It is true to say that the bulk of the Eastern infantry units were shifted westwards but that the majority of the Eastern ancillary units stayed with the army groups on the Ostfront. This was certainly the case as late as 27 March 1945, when the order-of-battle shows that the German Armies from Poland to Austria still contained a large number of Eastern units.¹⁰⁶ Most of these were construction and supply companies who were only lightly armed but there was also a sprinkling of reconnaissance and guard sub-units, who were certainly armed, and even a few infantry battalions.

The units which made the journey across Europe consisted nominally of Cossacks,¹⁰⁷ Georgians,¹⁰⁸ North Caucasians,¹⁰⁹

105. e.g. the two Ost. leichte Fahrkolonnen 1/54 and 2/54 of the 1st Mountain Division in the Balkans - O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./General der Osttruppen Nr. 406/43, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, Stand 22.11.43 - BAMA H1/153

106. General der Freiwilligen Verbände im O.K.H. Nr. 702/45. Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände. Stand 27.3.1945 - BAMA - H1/153.

107. Kosaken Grenadier Regiment 360

108. e.g. Georg. Btle. 797 and 823.

109. e.g. Nordkünk Btle. 809 and 835.

Turcomen,¹¹⁰ Armenians,¹¹¹ Volga Tartars,¹¹² Azerbaijanis,¹¹³ and the sole unit of Volga-Finns,¹¹⁴ to whom were added Ost battalions which later revealed themselves to be Russian.¹¹⁵ The units thus represented a wide selection of those nationalities of the U.S.S.R. from which the German Army recruited. Of the ethnic groups not included in the transfer, the main Kalmuck formation did not leave for the south-east until 1945.¹¹⁶ The Crimean Tartars were the responsibility of the S.S., not of the Army,¹¹⁷ while the Byelorussian volunteers were concentrated mainly in the 30th S.S. Division, itself present in the West from the autumn of 1944. As for the Balts, they remained in the East, some being absorbed by the Armed S.S.¹¹⁸

110. e.g. Turk. Btle. 781 and 787.

111. e.g. Armen. Btle. 813 and I/198.

112. e.g. Wolgatatar Btle. 826 and 837.

113. e.g. Aserbaidisch. Btl. 807.

114. i.e. Wolgafinn. Btl. 837.

115. e.g. Russ. Btle. 600, 666 and 673.

116. Hoffmann, op.cit., p.154.

117. In Waffen Gebirgsjäger Brigade S.S. (tatarische Nr.1) later absorbed by the Ostturk Waffenverband der S.S.

118. Into its 15th, 19th and 20th Divisions.

Eastern units posted to inland locations in the West performed counter-insurgency duties similar to those they had conducted while they were still in the East. Service in coastal emplacements was a new experience for the vast majority of the Osttruppen - equivalent to service on a quiet front until 6 June 1944. Before that date, beach defence was an acceptable employment for Eastern units in the eyes of their German critics because the risks of defection to the Allies were minimal. The Allied operations of the summer of 1944 caused intense activity for the Eastern units engaged in the interior of Western Europe and then drew first the coastal and later the internally-situated units into fierce fighting. Eastern units, in spite of Hitler's ban, were once again in the front line.

Armament

It has been suggested that non-Germans, particularly those recruited in the occupied eastern areas, were equipped with inferior weapons by the German armed forces. Examination of the facts reveals that this suggestion needs qualification on a number of grounds, even without making a detailed technical comparison of the weapons involved. The arms in question were not so much inferior as foreign; the Scandinavians, Netherlanders and ethnic Germans who formed the bulk of the personnel of S.S. Division "Wiking", the Western Europeans who joined the anti-Bolshevik Legions and the S.S. Divisions which succeeded them were treated like German troops and given German weapons. In fact the German military authorities had no alternative, because the non-Germans were intended to fight alongside German formations, whose safety would have been imperilled if their foreign neighbours in the line had had sub-standard weapons. Moreover it would have taxed the German supply organisation sorely if the fire-arms of non-German units had required rounds and spare parts of unusual types. The Western European units were fitted-out near dumps and factories in Germany itself. Western volunteers were taught by German weapon-training instructors, familiar with German rather than with foreign arms. It was simpler to issue German weapons to Western European recruits than to import captured foreign weapons into the German manoeuvre areas and then find men capable of instructing in their use.

The practice of despatching Western volunteers to the Eastern front with German weapons was adhered to even at the eleventh hour when a few of the "free" British arrived in Eastern Germany with the latest pattern of assault rifle.¹¹⁹

The outbreak of war found the German forces with their expansion still unfinished; the German rearmament programme would not have been complete until 1943 had war not intervened.¹²⁰ The resultant shortages obliged the German Army to make extensive use of booty - even before the attack on Poland the German Army had absorbed material seized in Austria and Czechoslovakia.¹²¹ From the summer of 1939 onwards the German forces employed weapons taken from every country with whom they came in contact. For the attack on France, S.S. Divisions "Totenkopf" and "Polizei", consisting in the main of Reichsdeutsche, were supplied with Czechoslovak material,¹²² while for the assault upon the U.S.S.R. the 7th, 8th, 12th,

119. M. de Slade, op.cit., p.129.

120. W. Keitel Memoirs (London, 1965), p.83; S. Westphal, The German Army in the West (London, 1951), pp.37-8; W. Gbrlitz, The German General Staff (London, 1953), pp. 347-8.

121. H. Guderian, Panzer Leader (London, 1952), p.64.

122. O.K.H., B.d.E., A.H.A., Ia (I), Nr. 8139/39, 27 October 1939; Nr. 857/40, Bericht über die tachechischen Waffen beim Kampfeinsatz, 5 August 1940 - T 175, Roll 104, Frames 2626128-43.

19th and 20th Panzer Divisions still used Czechoslovak tanks.¹²³ The shortage of German weapons persisted throughout the war. One consequence of this was that the German batteries of the Atlantic Wall were not only using the French, Dutch, Danish, Belgian and Norwegian pieces already emplaced there but also cannon of Yugoslav, Polish, Russian and Italian origin.¹²⁴ At one stage in the war the lack of a suitable tank-destroyer obliged the German Army to mount Russian 7.62 c.m. field guns on Czechoslovak tank chassis and to despatch them to the Western Desert.¹²⁵

Even when the "teeth" units of German combat divisions possessed German weapons, their "tail" would frequently have Beutewaffen,¹²⁶ as would fighting units operating behind the lines. This was in accordance with the policy laid down on 14 July 1941 in the supplement to Hitler's thirty-second Directive¹²⁷ - that all formations not intended for actual combat, including security, guard

123. Guderian, op.cit., p.64.

124. General J.J. de Wolf, letter to the author, 9 October 1973, "guns of five decades from ten nations and twenty-eight calibres" quoting H.H. Lebram, 'Kritische Analyse der Artillerie des Atlantikwalles,' Marine Rundschau (1955), Nr. 2, p.34.

125. i.e. Sonderkraftfahrzeug 139 - Keilig, op.cit., p.11/88.

126. For example the Kampfgruppe of 4 S.S. Polizeigrenadier Division possessed a considerable quantity of Italian weapons on 1 April 1944 - Generalinspektor der Panzertruppen 00512/44.

127. Trevor-Roper, op.cit., p.83.

and construction units, were to be armed basically with captured weapons and second-line equipment. Early in the Eastern campaign, the German 17th Army arranged for its construction troops to receive rifles, machine-guns and ammunition "aus Beutebeständen".¹²⁸ In January 1942, a surprise Russian attack upon Eupatoria caused a German static headquarters to employ "Beute M.G.".¹²⁹ The same headquarters later complained of the inadequacy of its armament, arising largely from the failure of two hundred "russische Beutegewehre" to fire.¹³⁰

When German weapons were in short supply or inadequate, captured weapons were used by German troops actually confronting the Red Army. In April 1942, the German 11th Army listed its shortages of heavy weapons and explained that as an immediate stop-gap, Russian 4.5 c.m. anti-tank guns had been distributed to its units.¹³¹ The armament situation deteriorated to such an extent that in 1942 German infantry divisions refitting behind the Eastern front received thirty per cent of their divisional

128. Oberquartiermeister Abt., A.O.K.17, Kriegstagebuch, 15 May 1941 - 12 December 1941 - NOKW 2357, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 5 A

129. Ortskommandantur I (V) 297, Tätigkeitsbericht, 1 January 1942 - 15 January 1942 - NOKW 1687, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 J.

130. Ibid.

131. A.O.K.11, O.Qu., Nr. 33/42, 6 April 1942 - NOKW 1329, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 5 A.

artillery in the form of old models or French booty.¹³²
When a number of Volksartilleriekorps were established in 1944, each was intended to have one Abteilung of Russian 13.2 c.m. howitzers and another of Russian 15.5 c.m. gun-howitzers.¹³³

In the light of Hitler's statement that he wanted no-one but the Germans to carry arms, German units which recruited Soviet prisoners-of-war, stragglers or civilians, even if they wished to employ them in the front line, could not send back requests for weapons for them. Individual Hiwis could take over the rifles of the dead and wounded Germans they replaced, but providing arms for larger numbers presented difficulties. German headquarters in the East could not request equipment for units which were not supposed to exist. Even after minority legions and Cossack "centuries" had received Hitler's blessing, obtaining arms for these and other Eastern units remained a problem. German war industry was geared to support limited German ground forces for a short period. It was not organised, early in the Eastern campaign, for a long war with larger forces than had been anticipated.

132. B. Müller Hillebrand, op.cit., III, 61.

133. Ibid., III, 176.

In the occupied areas of the U.S.S.R. there were large supplies of weapons of all descriptions, left by the Red Army in its retreat. It was natural and convenient for the Germans who seized them to make these weapons available to their local levies. The process was simpler and quicker than procuring arms from Germany; and while many of the Eastern units were still unofficial it attracted less attention. Even after Ost units had been recognised and the need for secrecy was past it was still easier to use locally-available firearms, while munitions lasted, than to burden German factories and supply lines with the task of providing extra weapons, ammunition and spare parts. In many cases Eastern volunteers had served in the Red Army and it was sound policy to re-equip these men with the arms in which they were trained and experienced. This expedient eliminated any delay in obtaining weapons and reduced the time taken to train Eastern units for their duties. The practice of fitting out Osttruppen with captured Soviet equipment became so well-established that German soldiers were forbidden to take binoculars and Cossack sabres as souvenirs.¹³⁴

Captured Russian weapons were not the only non-German ones in use behind the German lines in the East as a result

134. Kommandierende General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber im Heeres Gebiet Mitte, Abt. IIa, Br.B. Nr. 1320/42, Korpsbefehl Nr. 88, 14 September 1942 - T 175, Roll 225, Frame 2764210, para. 3.

of Hitler's decree of 14 July 1941. In July 1942 one one Gruppe of the German Secret Field Police reported that its personnel were dutifully drilling with "englische M.G."¹³⁵ As late as February 1943, the German 201st Security Division included a company of tanks of Czechoslovak manufacture.¹³⁶ This use of non-Russian weapons certainly extended to the Schutzmannschaften. Some Estonian home guards received British rifles formerly in the possession of the Estonian Army.¹³⁷ The documents of the 30th S.S. Division reveal that the White Ruthenian policemen who retreated with the German forces had machine guns of French and Czechoslovak manufacture.¹³⁸

Considerable stocks of foreign weapons fell into German hands in the West as well as in the East and it was convenient to make these available to German and non-German units alike. In May 1943, five hundred and thirty-four French tanks were deployed in Finland, Norway and the West, together with one hundred and sixty-two

135. Gruppe G.F.P. 713, July 1942 - NOKW 2373, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 6.

136. Div.Get.Stab, 201. Sich.Div., Kriegstagebuch, 25 February 1943 - NOKW 2137, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9 G.

137. Association of Estonians in Great Britain in letter to the author, 11 October 1969.

138. 30. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. (russ. Nr.2), Ib, Einheitliche Ausstattung mit Waffen, 13 August 1944 - T 354, Roll 160, Frames 3806400-1.

tanks of French and British origin in south-eastern Europe.¹³⁹ Division "Prinz Eugen", because of its membership of the S.S., might have been expected to possess up-to-date German weapons, yet, on the evidence of its organisation charts, it was given Belgian anti-tank guns, Austrian mountain guns, French howitzers and Yugoslav medium guns.¹⁴⁰ Landstorm Nederland, another part of the S.S., received French rifles¹⁴¹ in common with many of the Germanic drivers in the N.S.K.K.¹⁴²

In the German forces, then, Russian and other non-German weapons were frequently used, some of which were probably inferior in accuracy, reliability, durability or rate-of-fire to their German counter-parts. But, because German units serving in the rear often had Beutewaffen, the supplying of captured Russian weapons to Osttruppen who were fighting Soviet partisans did not imply that the Eastern troops were inferior.

139. Müller-Hillebrand, op.cit. III, 126, Tabelle 52.

140. e.g. the Division's Schematische Kriegsgliederung for 10 February 1943.

141. Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer beim Reichskommissar für den besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, Az. Nr. 5140/43, 22 October 1943 - R.V.O.

142. N.J.G. Sikkel, Documentatie, Status en Werkzaamheid van Organisaties en Instellingen uit de Tijd der Duitse Bezetting van Nederland. (Amsterdam, 1947), pp. 266-80.

Although the weapons of the Osttruppen serving in the Eastern theatre-of-operations may in some cases have compared unfavourably with those manufactured in Germany and supplied to German combat units, they were no worse than those of their opponents. With the exception of the few "Turk" battalions which served experimentally at the front during the early part of their existence, Eastern units were mainly employed in the rear areas of the German formations on Soviet territory. In performing their duties they used captured Russian weapons supplemented in some cases by firearms of German types and perhaps by others of Polish, Czechoslovak, French or even British origin. The partisans, stragglers and parachutists with whom they clashed were also equipped with Russian weapons, augmented, sometimes, by arms captured from the security forces. There is even a record of partisans employing Japanese rifles,¹⁴³ presumably some of those sold to the Imperial Russian Army during the First World War. In general, then, there was little to choose between the armament of the landeseigene Sicherungsverbände and their antagonists behind the German lines. There were certainly complaints from German and indigenous units that captured Russian weapons were unserviceable¹⁴⁴

143. Der Chef der Sipo. und des S.D. IV A1 - B.Nr. 1 B/41, Ereignissmeldung UdS.S.R. Nr.136, 21 November 1941 - NO2822, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9 M.

144. For example Ortskommandantur I(V)297, Tätigkeitsbericht, 1 January 1942 - 15 January 1942 - NOKW 1687, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9 J; 39 estn. Schutzm. F.Batl., Erfahrungs und Tätigkeitsbericht für August 1942, 24 August 1942 - NOKW 2513, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9 E.

but this may have been due to sabotage or to neglect while these arms lay idle in former Russian magazines or in German salvage dumps. In these cases partisans who filched weapons from the same parks probably suffered from the same drawbacks. It is noteworthy that when a company of the 39th Estonian Police Battalion was detached for service at the front, it received German weapons, while the companies remaining on security duties retained their Russian Beutewaffen.¹⁴⁵

When emergencies arose, particularly when the German front in the East crumbled, Eastern units which had been serving against partisans found themselves opposing conventional Red Army units. Here again, those with captured Russian weapons found themselves facing an enemy similarly equipped,¹⁴⁶ except in those cases where Soviet industry had provided up-dated material or where Soviet units had received Lend-Lease equipment. What was more serious was that the Red Army had far greater fire-power not solely by virtue of having superior numbers but because it deployed heavier weapons. When Ost units found themselves on the Eastern front they suffered from the Red Army's massive artillery and rocket concentrations

145. Ibid., Erfahrungs und Tätigkeitsbericht für Juli 1942, 24 July 1942 - NOKW 2513, Case XII, Doc.Bk.9E.

146. Infantry weapons of the types used by the Red Army and the Osttruppen were used by the Communist forces during the Korean War.

and from large scale attacks by tanks and aircraft. In this experience they were no different from their German comrades-in-arms, but the Eastern volunteers may well have believed that if they had had German weapons they would have been in a better condition to withstand the onslaught of the Red Army.

In 1943, the majority of the Eastern combat units were transferred to Western or South-Eastern Europe, taking their Maxim and Degtyarev machine guns and the rest of their Russian armoury with them.¹⁴⁷ On arrival, the units from the U.S.S.R. were called upon to guard military objectives, to conduct patrols and to fight resistance groups, for all of which their armament was probably adequate. When the resistance movements were increasingly supplied with parachuted British and American equipment, the security units found their task correspondingly harder. This was the experience of the Albanian S.S. in combatting Montenegrin partisans.¹⁴⁸

147. Küsten verteidigungsabschnitt Dordrecht (719.Inf.Div.), Ia, Nr. 584/43, Az.G.16b1, 9 April 1943 - Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis, Filmdoos 13 (196/2), R.G. Nr. 1030, DRB 33114/2, Frames 1307904; 347.Inf.Div., Ia, Nr. 1685/43, Turk Bataillon, 24 March 1943 - ibid., (195/3), R.G. Nr.1030, DRB 38739/2, Frames 130437-40.

148. 21.Waffen Gebirgs Division der S.S. Skanderbeg, Kdr., Ia, Tgb.Nr.175/44, Zusammenfassender Bericht, 2 October 1944 - T 354, Roll 160, Frame 3305943.

Security units in the West, German and non-German alike, were eventually committed to fighting in the line, in the same manner as were their counterparts in the East. In the West, too, they faced enemies who were well-supplied with artillery and tanks and who had an absolute superiority in the air. But in these respects the experiences of the non-Germans were no different from those of their German colleagues, except where their foreign weapons were inferior to those of the Western Allies. On 28 September 1944 Rosenberg alleged that the Osttruppen in the West had had no artillery.¹⁴⁹ But this is not literally true because two Russian artillery Abteilungen, 621 and 752, and one independent batterie, 582, were present in Western Europe.¹⁵⁰ Meanwhile the Turcoman, Cossack and White Ruthenian formations all had their own integral artillery units.¹⁵¹ Guns, sometimes as large as the Russian 7.62 c.m. gun, were frequently distributed among the rifle battalions.¹⁵² Some Eastern units were deployed in beach sectors manning fixed defences and covered by German coastal artillery

149. R.M.f.d.bes.Ostgebiete, Nr.1404/44, Die politische Betreuung der Angehörigen der Ostvölker, 28 September 1944 - NO2464 and NO2544.

150. O.K.H., Gen. der Freiw. Verbände, Nr.603/44, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, Stand 9.6.44.- BAMA - 41/153.

151. Art.Rgt.236, reitende Kos.Art. Abt.Don I/55 and Kuban II/55, Waffen Art.Abt. der S.S. 30 respectively.

152. Waffen Gen.Div.der S.S. (russ. Nr.2), Fv.Btl. Murawjew, 24 October 1944 - T 354, Roll 160, Frame 3806530.

batteries. These, incidentally, were manned, in part, by members of the Third Division of the German Volkstliste¹⁵³ and by Marine-Ostlegionäre.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, most of the Eastern units had been completely incorporated into German divisions, on whose own artillery they could call for support, in exactly the same way as the German units of the formation to which they belonged.

Difficulties arose when stockpiles of captured ammunition became exhausted or were lost through enemy action. Once the German Army began to fall back, it seized little booty from its enemies. Even when the factories which had produced foreign weapons and ammunition, like the Skoda works, remained in German hands, they had often been converted to produce other items for the Wehrmacht. German and non-German units alike, particularly in Western Europe, employed weapons for which the production of ammunition and spare parts had ceased. The situation was aggravated by the transfer of Beutewaffen across Europe, which divorced these weapons from whatever supplies of cartridges and components were still available in their country of origin. This complication led to the re-equipment of one Russian

153. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(I) Nr.4263/43, 22 September 1943.

154. 8.Bttr.,Mar.Art.Abt.607, BNr.XIV/45/2, 13 January 1945 - Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis Filmdoos Nr 8 (186/9), R.G. Nr.1030, DRB Nr. 75975.

battalion in Italy¹⁵⁵ with Italian weapons. Other Ost units, in the Atlantic wall, retained their Russian armament. The problems of munitions supply became complex. When rounds of ammunition could be interchanged between types of weapon, the problem of replenishment was simplified, but apart from some mortar bombs this was rarely possible because with rifled weapons, the calibre and length of a round, the size of the breach and the presence or absence of a rim were all factors that had to be taken into account.

It remains to consider whether non-German units had arms in sufficient quantities. Formations and units of the German ground forces established in German manoeuvre areas were supposed to have weapons according to the scale laid down in the tables of organisation for their particular type; and in so far as German industry could supply them, this was done. In the occupied areas locally-raised units were similarly limited by the availability of material, but also by the feelings of the local German authorities.

Some of the native policemen recruited soon after the beginning of the German attack on the U.S.S.R. were not armed,¹⁵⁶ but this was not surprising since it was

155. A.O.K.10/Ia, Kriegstagebuch 6, 24 April 1944, Anlage 299, para 5.

156. Gen.Kdo.XXXXIV. A.K.,Ic, 9 November 1941 - NOKW 2671, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9 B.

intended to use these men on normal constabulary duties alone. Furthermore the German authorities had experienced attempts by nationalist elements to establish independent régimes. Some of the new Byelorussian police behaved in such a criminal fashion that it was inadvisable to entrust them with arms.¹⁵⁷ In time, the S.D. and the G.F.P. were able to "vet" individual militiamen to find which of them were reliable.¹⁵⁸ Some policemen having been disarmed were later employed in duties which necessitated their bearing firearms. One solution was to supply only sufficient rifles to arm those on duty at any one time.¹⁵⁹ Another principle that guided German security headquarters was that arms could be more safely entrusted to indigenous policemen living together in the comparative safety of a barracks than to individual constables living at home and liable to be robbed or intimidated by partisans.¹⁶⁰

157. Chef der Sipo und des S.D., IVA1 Br.B.Nr.1313/41, Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr.67, 29 August 1941 - NOKW 2837, Case XII, Doc.Bk.9L.

158. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Ausb.Abt.Ia, Nr.1900/41, 25 October 1941 - NOKW 2258, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9 B.

159. Ortskommandantur I/853, B Tgb.Nr.903/41, Tätigkeitsbericht, 29 October 1941 - NOKW 1529, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9 M.

160. Gen.Kdo.XXXXIII. A.K.,Abt.Ia/Nr.462/43(471), Erfahrungen in den Bandenbekämpfung, 29 March 1943 - NO 457, Case XII, Doc.Bk. 9 J.

When local inhabitants or prisoners-of-war were organised into fighting units they received weapons appropriate to their size and task. Those of proven or suspected unreliability, like the 30.Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S., were disarmed. In some cases, like the Turkbattailon mentioned by an officer associated with Osttruppen, they were later rearmed.¹⁶¹ Towards the end of the war Hitler learned that there were, in fact, Indian and Ukrainian S.S. men, armed to the teeth, resting on German Truppenübungsplätze and exhibiting little sign on resuming the struggle. The Führer cannot be criticised for ordering that these particular foreigners should be deprived of their idle weapons for the benefit of new German formations.¹⁶²

161. Steenberg, op.cit., p.116.

162. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II) Nr. 72026/45, 19 April 1945; Hitler, Laiebesprechungen (Stuttgart, 1962), p.492.

Chapter Ten - Numbers

A variety of factors make it difficult to ascertain the exact number of non-Germans who served with the German forces during the Second World War. Even where strength returns have survived and are available to the researcher, they do not always indicate the precise number of foreigners present in a particular German unit. Strength returns normally ~~and~~ were required to tell German commanders how many fighting men were available or how many rations were required; they did not show the proportion of non-Germans unless this information was specifically requested.

Imprecise terms - for example "Ostvolker" or, little better "Turkvolker", in the case of Soviet citizens - are used to describe non-Germans. Sometimes Soviet citizens are loosely described as "Hiwis" when it is apparent that they belonged to indigenous combat units. Even where the non-Germans constituted clearly-identifiable units of their own it is necessary to take into account the size of the German cadre or liaison staff. Where individual non-Germans did not serve with others of their race but in German units or even in those of another nationality, their numbers are hard to calculate.

Post-war writers have been hampered by the inadequacy of the surviving records. Even where an author was in personal contact with non-Germans of the German forces, due allowance must be made for the fallibility of human memory and for the fact that the contemporary observer, unless highly placed, rarely saw the whole picture. Allowance must also be made for the possible bias of post-war writers some of whom have wished to stress the "pan-Germanic" or "pan-European" aspects of the non-Germans in the Wehrmacht or, more particularly, in the Waffen SS.

Volksdeutsche

On 28 December 1943, the German National Socialist Party published figures showing the war effort of six of the colonies of racial Germany-North Schleswig, Slovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Serbia, with the Banat, and Croatia.⁽¹⁾ These statistics may be criticised in that the sizes of the Volksgruppen are at variance with those given in official censuses. For example, the figure of 1,250,000 Volksdeutsche in Hungary is at variance both with the 719,749 given by the Hungarian authorities in 1941 and the 1,193,692 estimated by the Volksgruppe itself.⁽²⁾ Nevertheless even if it suited the N.S.D.A.P. to include many who did not regard themselves as Germans, German Authorities were in a position to assess fairly accurately the number of ethnic Germans who had actually enlisted in the Waffen SS the Wehrmacht and in German para-military bodies. They were also capable of making an estimate of the numbers who had joined the forces of the states in which they lived.

A study of the statistics of 28 December 1943 reveals that the Roumanian contingent in the Waffen SS numbered 54,000. Even if this round figure is an over-estimate it is easy to understand why racial Germans from Roumania were to be found in practically every part of the Armed SS. Nor with over twenty thousand men each, is it hard to appreciate how the "colonies" in Hungary and Serbia were able at that time to provide the backbone for the S.S. Cavalry Division and for S.S. Division "Prinz Eugen". The total number of ethnic Germans drawn from the six communities into the Waffen S.S. was 121,861 at that time. Since the Roumanian racial Germans' contribution to the Wehrmacht is not separated from that to the

1. Reichsleiterdienst, Folge 42, 28 December 1943 - NO2015, Case XI Doc.Bk. 66G
 2. German Federal Ministry for Refugees, Documents on the Expulsion, II, 5.

Royal Roumanion Armed Forces it is not possible to be precise but of the six groups a maximum of 10,393 could have been serving with the German forces while a minimum of 39,376 served with the forces of Germany's satollites. (3)

The totals given for 28 Deccember 1943 are useful, interesting and probably reliable, but the war had another sixteen months to run, so they cannot give a complete picture of the contribution to the Fatherland of the six German groups. Throughout the whole war, pressure and propaganda were directed towards adult male Volksdeutsche of military age to cause them to enlist in German units rather than in those of the states in which they were living, where these forces still existed. It was also possible for the German war machine to take hold of racial Germans with the acquiescence of the governments of the "host" states. The totals of 28 December 1943 owed much to the arrangements Germany had made with Roumania on 12 May 1943, with Hungary on 1 February 1943 and on 1 June 1943 and, informally, with Croutia in autumn 1942. There was no further agreement concluded with Roumania and it is possible that there was no great increase in the number of racial Germans from that kingdom serving in the Waffen S.S. (4) An agreement with Hungary of 14 April 1944 permitted German recruiters to take Volksdeutsche even if they were already serving in the Honved. One writer has calculated that whereas each of the earlier treaties brought in 20,000 Volksdeutsche from Hungary; the final one netted 35,000. (5) The agreement with Slovakia of 7 June 1944 permitted the Armed S.S. to take over the two German units in the Slovak Army and to call up civilian Volksdeutsche. (6) It was anticipated that 4,000 to 5,000 men would be brought in by this

3. N02015

4. Documents on the Expulsion, III, 61

5. Macartney, opcit., pp. 97, 153, 267-8. But the Statistisches Bundesamt, in a letter to the author of 26 September 1974 draw attention to the figure of 62,300 given in their Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste-Bevölkerungsbilanzen für die deutschen Vertreibungsgebiete 1939/50 (Wiesbaden, 1958), p.392.

6. Documents on the Expulsion, IV, 148-9.

means.⁽⁷⁾

As Germany's allies began to collapse under external or internal pressures she was able to disregard the conventions she had entered into and take whatever Volksdeutsche she could find, irrespective of whether they were already mobilised or not. Events in the "host" countries drove their citizens of German race to cleave to the German forces or to Volksdeutsche para-military bodies as a means of protection. This was the case in Slovakia during the uprising, when men up to the age of fifty were incorporated into a Heimatschutz which later covered the retreat of ethnic German families.⁽⁸⁾

The increase in the numbers of racial Germans in the German forces during the closing months of the war may be seen in the ability of the Hungarian Volksgruppe to supply some personnel to the 8th S.S. Cavalry Division and the bulk of those in the 22nd S.S. Cavalry, 18th S.S. Panzergranadier and 31st S.S. Infantry Divisions and to assist in building 37th S.S. Cavalry Division upon the ruins of the 8th and 22nd. The Balkan Germans for their part kept the 7th S.S. Mountain Division in being and supplied cadres to the Modern S.S. Division in the theatre and to the Karstjäger formation["] apart from supplying individuals in large numbers to the German and Germanic S.S. formations.

Some measure of the war effort of the Volksgruppen may be gathered from a study of their casualties. The German communities of Hungary, Yugoslavia and Roumania sacrificed a total of 107,000⁽⁹⁾ Even if one makes due allowances for the incorporation of Northern

7. SS.H.A., S.S. Ers.Insp. Südostraum, Insp.V.S.Tgb.Nr.54/44, 19 February 1944 - NO3067, Case XI, Doc.Bk.72F.

8. Documents on the Expulsion, IV, 157, 161-2, 530-2, 549, 566, 578.

9. G.C.Paicert, The German Exodus (The Hague, 1962), Table I quoting Statistische Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden, 1960), p.79.

Slovenia into the Reich itself and for the preference of a minority within the Volksgruppen for service in the Wehrmacht, it would appear that the estimate of 280,000 to 300,000 for the contribution of the Volksdeutsche of South-Eastern Europe to the S.S. is not excessive. (10)

The Germanic Waffen S.S.

Since several of the Western European nationalities had their own formations within the S.S. it might be thought possible to assess each nationality's numerical contribution from the perusal of strength returns. That this is not the case is revealed by the figures of one such formation - 4.S.S. Freiw. Panzergrenadierbrigade "Nederland" - at the end of 1943. At that time of the Brigade's 129 officers 728 non-commissioned officers and 4,569 men, 94 officers 497 NCOs and 457 men were Reichsdeutsche, 1 officer 32 NCOs and 2,115 men were Volksdeutsche, 34 officers 199 NCOs and 1,997 men were Germanic of whom 33 officers the 199 NCOs and 1,984 men, were Dutch. (11) The bulk of the Brigade's Germanic volunteers, admittedly, came from the Netherlands but, overall, the Dutch provided little more than 26% of the officers, 27% of the NCOs and less than 44% of the men in "their" formation.

10. T.M.W.C., XX,343.

11. III S.S. Panzerkorps, Tätigkeitsbericht, 26 May 1943-31 March 1944 - BAMA 64325.

Minimum figures for "Germanic" Countries may be taken from
a document of 31st January 1944:- (12)

Country	Stand der Frei- Willige	Killed	Wounded	Total
Norway	3,878	346	596	4,820
Denmark (Danes)	5,006	601	1,049	6,656
Netherlands	18,473	1,281	2,255	22,009
Flanders	5,033	454	937	6,424
Walloon provinces	1,812	304	-	2,116
Sweden	101	9	7	117
Switzerland	584	44	52	680
France	2,480	52	5	2,537
Finland	-	222	557	779
TOTALS	37,367	3,313	5,458	45,359

Of these totals, that for Norwegian Armed S.S. men - 4,820 -
needs to be increased in the light of a document of 4 October 1944
which shows the numbers of Norwegians and Swedes recruited in
Norway. The figures for Norwegians were:- (13)

Norwegians	Waffen S.S.	Wach ^t bataillon _h	Kriegsmarine	German Red Cross	Total
enlisted	4,133	1,025	318	335	5,811
released	2,093	384	42	80	2,599
killed and died	606	5	1	4	616
actual strength	1,434	636	275	251	2,596

12. C.d.S.S.H.A., Auf dem Weg zum germanischen Reich, 31 January 1944. Totals added by the author.

13. Der Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer beim Reichskommissar für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete, Anlage zu II, 00 - 12 Nr. 408/44, 4 October 1944.

Although listed separately, the Guard Battalion at Oslo was part of the Armed S.S.,⁽¹⁴⁾ while the Norwegian nursing sisters were also probably wearing S.S. uniform. Consequently the figure for 31st January needs to be increased by a further 673.

With regard to the Dutch contribution to the Armed S.S. a larger total may be derived from a return of 1st August 1944.⁽¹⁵⁾

	Enrolled	actually serving	dead	missing
Armed S.S. ⁽¹⁶⁾	16,022	9,673	1,571	338
Landstorm Nederland	3,538	3,360	-	-
German Red Cross	892	715	4	

There are clearly peculiarities in these figures. Nevertheless assuming that the Red Cross personnel are those raided for the legionary ambulance,⁽¹⁷⁾ it would appear that 20,452 Dutch subjects were associated with the Waffen S.S. This makes it necessary to increase the figure given on 31st January by a further 1,979.

Although the Armed S.S. had absorbed the remnants of the Walloon Legion, its members were not included in the survey of January 1944, while the figures for France were those of "S.S. Regiment Frankreich". Since the Finnish S.S. Battalion had ceased to exist, only its casualties were covered in the document. The unit probably did not exceed the 1,180 at which it stood on 15 January 1942.⁽¹⁸⁾

14. S.S.F.H.A., K/do.Amt der Waffen S.S. Org.Tgb. Nr.7657/42, Aufstellung eines Wach-Btls. bei den H.S.S.P.F. Nord, 24 November 1942 - T175, Roll 105, Frame 2627313.

15. "Fürsorgeführer der Waffen S.S. in den Niederlande, 1st August 1944 - R.V.O. Quoted by Drs. in't Veld in letter to the author, 22 Oct.1973

16. Apparently including membership of the former Dutch Legion

17. S.S.F.H.A., Org. Tgb.Nr.4750/41, Aufstellung eines verst. Feldlazarettes für den Kommandostab R.F.S.S. 31 October 1941 - T175, Roll 109, Frames 2633135-6

18. Abschrift einer Aufstellung des S.S. Hauptamtes, Amt VI/2, Übersicht über die in der Waffen S.S. befindliche germanische Freiwilligen 15 January 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frame 2633910.

It is possible that during the remaining fifteen months of the war a small number of pro-Germans arrived from Sweden and Switzerland to swell the contingents - 117 and 680 respectively - of their countries in the Waffen S.S. (19) The deterioration in Germany's fortunes, which probably deterred Swedes and Swiss from absconding to join Germany's forces, tended to increase the number of collaborators in occupied countries who enlisted in German - inspired organisations. The Armed S.S. was considerably expanded by the adhesion of French, (20) Belgian (21) and Dutch (22) refugees. In addition, after September 1944 a number of "hunger volunteers" enlisted in Northern Holland. (23)

Allied troops did not reach Norway and Denmark until after the German forces in Northern Europe had capitulated. Consequently there was no exodus of Scandinavian Collaborators to the Reich to reinforce Division "Nordland". The capitulation of Finland and the subsequent withdrawal of the Norwegian Ski Battalion removed one source of attraction of recruits. It is probable, therefore, that apart from a few who felt compelled to make a desperate attempt to halt the Red Army, few Norwegians joined the German forces in the last half-year of the War. The security forces in Scandinavia on the other hand, may well have received an accession of ~~the~~ strength from Danish and Norwegian national-socialists who

- 19. C.d.S.S.H.A., Auf dem Weg zum germanischen Reich, 31 January 1944.
- 20. Notably 2,000 members of Darnand's Milice
- 21. Knoebel, op.cit., p.275 states that Jef van der Wiele, of Devlag claimed to have recruited 2,000 Flemish refugees and workers.
- 22. Van der Zee, op.cit., pp. 192-3
- 23. Drs. in't Veld, in letter to the author, 22 October 1973, puts the figure of Dutchmen to volunteer after September 1944 at 1,000 to 2,000.

who were too deeply involved with the occupiers to be able to make their peace with the Resistance. It is possible that if all the additional volunteers are grafted onto the 45,359 of January 1944 the total of 50,000 volunteers from Germanic countries, which was quoted at Nuremberg,⁽²⁴⁾ was probably surpassed but not sufficiently to reach the total of 120,000 given for Northern and Western Europeans within the Armed S.S.⁽²⁵⁾

Other Races in the S.S.

The International Military Tribunal was informed that in addition to its 410,000 Reichsdeutsche, 300,000 Volksdeutsche and 50,000 Germanic members, the Armed S.S. contained 150,000 other foreigners.⁽²⁶⁾ A substantial part of this figure was represented by the Baltic nations who provided three of the infantry divisions of the S.S. A former staff officer of the Latvian Legion has published figures giving 31,446 as its strength on 1st July 1944 when it contained two divisions, a replacement brigade and a Rekrutendepot. The figure does not include those who had already fallen nor those later taken into the S.S. from civil life and from other armed organisations.⁽²⁷⁾ Estonian refugees calculate that 25,000 passed through the ranks of the 20th S.S. Division.⁽²⁸⁾

- 24. T.M.W.C., XX, 343.
- 25. G. Berger, 'Zum Ausbau der Waffen S.S.', Nation Europa, III, Nr.4 (1965), p.55.
- 26. T.M.W.C., XX, 343.
- 27. A.Silgailis, Latviesu Legions (Copenhagen, 1964) p.325.
- 28. Association of Estonians in Great Britain in letter to the author 24 October 1973.

German salvaging of Magyar manpower produced the 25th S.S. Division "Hunyadi" which since it was to have been ready by 30 April 1945 probably reached a size appropriate to an Infanterie Division Typ 45 - 11,900 men. Its sister division the 26th S.S., "Gambos", was to have been ready a month later and may not have reached full strength. It may, however, have been as strong as 9,000 men. The next largest non-Germanic contingent may have been provided by the Ukrainians whose Division grew to 14,000 men again after it had lost possibly as many as 11,000 men at Brody. (29)

The Armed S.S. took a considerable share of the Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Germans. Apart from the Eastern Ukrainians who served in the 14th S.S. Division there were Russians in Kaminsky's 29th S.S. Division and an assortment of Russians, White Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Cossacks and Poles in Siegling's 30th S.S. Division. Between them they may have had as many as 20,000⁽³⁰⁾ men but, with the exception of some 3,000 White Ruthenians,⁽³¹⁾ they were whittled down by casualties and punitive measures and then handed over to General Vlasov. The S.S. retained a few thousand members of Soviet minority races in its two Waffenverbände, but since these were not complete they probably possessed at most 10,000 men between them.⁽³²⁾ The members of the Cossack Cavalry Corps possibly

29. Hitler, Lagebesprechungen (Stuttgart, 1962) p.940-1. By 2 July 1943, 28,000 men had been recruited for the Division, some of whom were superfluous to its needs and were used in the Galician Police Regiments - Dmytryshyn, op.cit. p.6.

30. Himmler, Rede auf der Gauleitertagung in Posen, 3 August 1944 reproduced in Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, I.Jg., 4.Heft (1953)

31. The White Ruthenian "Division" formed in 1945 was probably never more than a reinforced regiment.

32. If the seven Waffengruppen of the two formations were each no larger than 800 - the size of Alimov's at the time of his defection - the total would be considerably less.

no more than 30,000 men may not have been included in the reckoning of the S.S. since the parent Cossack Division was still included in General Köstring's list of 1st November 1944. (33)

From Yugoslavia the S.S. obtained Bosnian Moslems for Division "Handschar" and its replacement unit. The formation's strength returns during the first half of 1944 show that it had over 21,000 men. In June its strength dropped by 2,000 men - almost exactly the size of the short-lived Division "Kama". When the Bosnians were dismissed a German cadre of a little over 6,000 remained. The Bosnian contribution to the S.S. was therefore in the region of 15,000 men. The S.S. received another Yugoslav formation on 27 November 1944, when it took over the survivors of the Serbisches Freiwilligen Korps as the Serbisches S.S. Korps. (34) These numbered 4,000 when they reached the comparative safety of Istria in October. (35)

Thanks to the report of S.S. Oberführer Schmidhuber it is possible to ascertain the precise number of Albanians in the Armed S.S. On the 1st October 1944, shortly before the Albanians were released, they numbered 38 NCO's, 499 trained men and 3,504 recruits. Up to that date 3,425 had deserted and 373 had been released. To these must be added the 48 who had been killed, the 152 missing and probably the 72 wounded giving a total of 8,111 who had passed through Division Skanderbeg and its nucleus, the Albanian battalion of Division Handschar. (36) It is not possible to be exact about other minor component of the S.S.; the Indian Legion had 2,300

33. Gen.d.Freiw. Verbände b.Chef. Gen.St.d.H. I Nr. 17449/44, 1 November 1944. The total number of Cossacks in the document is 25,980.

34. O.K.H., Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II) Nr.47133/44, 27 November 1944.

35. O.K.W.,K.T.B., IV/I, p.712

36. 21.Waffen Gebirgs Division der S.S. Skanderbeg, Kdr., Ia, Tgb. Nr.175/44, Zusammenfassender Bericht über die Zustand, 2 October 1944, Anlage 1 - T354, Roll 160 Frame 3805948.

men when its disarming was ordered⁽³⁷⁾ while the Italians in the S.S. consisted of approximately 9,000 men.⁽³⁸⁾

Roumans and Bulgars were the last races to provide manpower for the Armed S.S. Because their adherence came late, their contribution in personnel was small and ineffective, although in both cases the S.S. Führungs Hauptamt planned to create a division. Of the two races, the Roumanians serving in the S.S. were apparently the more numerous and founded two regiments of infantry.⁽³⁹⁾ Since one of these was sent to the Eastern Front where it served at Schwedt under Skarzeny's command, it was probably up to the correct strength of a Volks grenadier Regiment of 1,911 men. Whether the second Roumanian regiment was complete when it was swallowed up in the German collapse is not clear. Between them, the two regiments probably disposed of between 3,000 and 4,000 men. The Bulgars, on the other hand, succeeded in establishing only one regiment,⁽⁴⁰⁾ which saw no action until the eleventh hour. It probably did not reach the required 1,900 men and may have amounted to little more than a battalion in size, possibly 900 men. The accusation by the Bulgarian government that the Germans had enrolled 150,000 Bulgars to fight against their own people was certainly wide of the mark.⁽⁴¹⁾

37. Hitler, Lagebesprechungen, op. cit. p.942

38. Istituto Nazionale per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione in Italia, 'La Formazione delle Forze Armate di Salò attraverso i Documenti dello Stato Maggiore della R.S.I.', Il Movimento di Liberazione in Italia, III, 72 (Milan, 1963), pp. 37,67 puts the figure at approximately 10,000 in 1944.

39. S.S.F.H.A., Amt II, Org.Abt. Ia/II Tgb.Nr.794/45, 9 February 1945 - T175, Roll 140, Frames 2668410-1 also indicates an intention to create artillery, engineer and signals elements.

40. Ibid., Nr. 4211/44, 13 November 1944

41. New York Times, 5 October 1944.

The Osttruppen

It has been estimated by some authorities that the German forces included approximately one million inhabitants of the Soviet Union.⁽⁴²⁾ The total of 376,314 produced by the General der Freiwilligen Verbände at the beginning of November 1944 clearly falls far short of this but does not include casualties up to that date nor does it cover membership of the Armed S.S. and other branches of the Armed Forces.⁽⁴³⁾ A little over three months later Rosenberg's staff produced for him a rough and incomplete estimate of 573,850 men serving in a variety of Army, S.S. Luftwaffe, Police, Legionary and other units.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Neither set of figures takes account of Ostarbeiter and prisoners-of-war who may have joined the Eastern units during the closing stages of the war. After the war General Jodl estimated that apart from 43,000 men under the nominal control of Vlasov, the three armed services had over 665,000 "Hiwis" between them.⁽⁴⁵⁾

During the first two years of the Russian campaign the number of Hiwis probably did not reach the figures of 1,200,000 and 1,400,000 given by opponents of the Osttruppen.⁽⁴⁶⁾ General Zeitzler while seeking to minimise the numbers of Soviet citizens in German service put the figure of Hiwis at 220,000.⁽⁴⁷⁾ The real number of Hiwis

42. Mende, op.cit., p.24

43. Gen.d.Freiw.Verb.b. Chef Gen.St.dH.I. Nr.17449/44, 1 November 1944. From Köstring's total should be deducted the 10,972 security troops of Ob.Sudost since these were probably the "White" Russians of the Russische Schutzkorps. The estimate of one million legionaries and Hiwis in the Reich at this time appears excessive - R.M.f.d.b.O., Nr. 1384/44, 7 September 1944 - NO2997

44. R.M.f.d.b.O., 28 January 1945 - NO5800

45. Dallin, op.cit., p.657.

46. Dallin, op.cit., p.536 (footnote)

47. Ibid., p.581 (footnote); Besprechung des Führers, 8 June 1943 - 1384 PS.

fluctuated depending on supply and demand and upon German fortunes; the total was probably somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000 men.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The number of Soviet citizens who passed through Eastern combat and construction units possibly reached 650,000,⁽⁴⁹⁾ including some men who may originally have been Hiwis. There were possibly never more than 400,000 in Eastern units at any one time. In the last winter of the war, when the S.S. Hauptamt was endeavouring to compute the number of Soviet minority legionaries who had survived the holocaust of the summer, its calculations were in the region of 100,000 men.⁽⁵⁰⁾ This was after an estimated forty-eight percent of the Caucasian legionaries had perished.⁽⁵¹⁾

Apart from the large concentrations of non-Germans in the Osttruppen and the Waffen S.S. there were others who wore German uniform. The foreigners raised by Abwehr for coup de main operations, if they survived, ultimately became the responsibility of the S.S.⁽⁵²⁾ but most of the Army's legionaries avoided this fate. The German Army retained the three Croat legionary divisions and their replacement brigade. Through their ranks and the original regiment may have passed 50,000 men. Although Spain only provided

48. Dallin, op.cit., p.536 (footnote)

49. P. Kleist, European Tragedy (London, 1965) p.107

50. See estimates of S.S.H.A., Amtsgruppe D in BA-NS31/28,31,32, 34,36,37,38.

51. Mende, op.cit., p.32.

52. i.e. the Dutch of Sport en Spel were taken into S.S. Division 'Germania', 'Roland' and 'Nachtigall' were taken into the Schutzmannschaften. The Irish Brigade's members were taken over by the S.D. as were the legionary and Volksdeutsche members of the 'Brandenburg' Division.

one infantry division it was kept well-stocked with personnel so that it is reasonable to assume that the total membership of this formation and its successor-regiment and companies was in the region of 20,000. France supplied the 638th Infantry Regiment which had 5,800 men serve with it⁽⁵³⁾ from whom must be deducted 1,100 survivors drafted to the Armed S.S. In view of its heavy losses perhaps as many as 3,000 Walloons served in Battalion 373, but 1,600 were transferred to the S.S. in the summer of 1943.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Of the Legions which were not specifically anti-communist the Indian Legion had 3,115 members⁽⁵⁵⁾ of whom 2,300 were transferred to the Armed S.S.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Although the S.S. intended to take over the Arab Battalion⁽⁵⁷⁾ the military situation in the Balkans probably prevented this. The attempt to duplicate the unit appears to indicate that it and its replacement company were well up to strength and it should be borne in mind that Battalion 845 was founded on the wreckage of the Deutsch-Arabische Lehrabteilung and the five weak Arab units raised in Tunisia.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Taken together, possibly as many as 3,000 Arabs served under German command.

53. J. Delarue, Trafics et Crimes sous l'Occupation (Paris, 1968), p. 125.
54. Knoebel, op.cit., pp. 384-5.
55. Toye, op.cit., p. 152
56. Hitler, Lagebesprechungen, p. 942. Toye, op.cit., p. 152 puts the survivors at 2,450.
57. S.S.H.A., Amtsgruppe D, Oststelle DI/4hu.5h.Tgb.Nr. 398/44, 9 December 1944 - BA - NS31/42.
58. The battalions named Marokko, Algerien, Tunesien I Tunesien II and the Arab Labour battalion.

Germanic volunteers, (59) Balts, (60) Croats, (61) Spaniards, (62) Volksdeutsche, (63) Ostlegionare (64) and Hiwis (65) also served with the Kriegsmarine (66) and Luftwaffe (67) but by far the largest number of non-Germans served with the ground forces. The precise number is hard to ascertain because many fully-fledged foreign members of these two branches of the Wehrmacht served as individuals in German crews and squadrons, while many of the members of foreign units employed to protect naval and air force installations from ground and air attack were civilian "followers" not attested members of the German Armed Forces.

Since nearly one million passed through the Osttruppen or served as Hiwis and 400,000 foreigners served in the Armed S.S. the total of personnel who were not German citizens on 1st September

59. e.g. those in the N.S.K.K. units serving the Luftwaffe.
60. The Navy and Air Force received approximately 500 ^{Estonians} men each - Association of Estonians in Great Britain, letter to author, 24 October 1973
61. i.e. the Croat Luftwaffen Legion and Marine Abteilung
62. A sequence of four Spanish Jagdstaffeln served in the East.
63. Notably the scores of thousands conscripted in annexed areas and resettlement camps.
64. e.g. those in coastal artillery units.
65. At the end of the war General Jodl estimated that there were 15,000 Hiwis with the Navy and 50,000 to 60,000 with the Air Force - O.K.W./W.F.S.T./Org.Abt.(H) Nr. 2085/45, O.K.W./2024, 20 May 1945 - cited by Dallin, op.cit., p.658 (footnote)
66. 800 Frenchmen are alleged to have served in the Kriegsmarine - St. Loup, Les Hérétiques (Paris, 1965) p.125
67. Between 5 March and 20 September 1944, 18,917 boys and 2,500 girls were recruited as Air Force auxiliaries - R.M.f.d.b. O. Dienststelle Hauptbannführer Nickel, Nr. 717/44, 19 October 1944 - NO1759 and 1137 PS.

1939 and who served in the three branches of the Wehrmacht and of the Waffen S.S. was approximately one and a half million. Although this figure includes many who were drawn in from paramilitary bodies and puppet forces, tens of thousands remained in these categories until their destruction or until the end of the war.

Chapter Eleven - Trials and Tribulations.

On paper, the terms of service of the Germanic and Volksdeutsche members of the Armed S.S. and of the anti-Bolshevik Legions appeared to be fair and comparable with those of Reichsdeutsche in the Wehrmacht and Waffen S.S.¹ Similar terms were granted to other military collaborators and extended eventually to members of the Eastern peoples. Dissatisfaction resulted when German agencies deliberately disregarded the conditions of service or were prevented by wartime circumstances from observing them.

Officering

In seeking to obtain legionaries from Western Europe, the German authorities promised that volunteers would receive a rank equivalent to that which they had held previously in their own armies. The effect of this was two-fold: individuals were interested in the prospect of obtaining their former status and privileges, while there was the attraction of belonging to a complete national unit staffed by its own officers and N.C.O.'s. In practice the number of officers enrolled in a national contingent rarely tallied with the number required.² In one case far more officers enlisted than were required³ but it was common for the Western legions to be deficient in officers of their own⁴ and to have Germans imposed upon them. Frequently the officer-volunteers were not the fully-trained and experienced professionals who were required, but reservists, lacking in necessary qualifications.

1. Ergänzungsamt der Waffen S.S., Overzicht voor plaatsing als Vrijwilliger in de S.S. Standarte Westland (undated) - T 175, Roll 159, Frame 2690394; Ausw.Amt. Pol. I M 4796, 2 July 1941 - F.O. Series 4641 II Frames 209270-6.
2. Freikorps Danmark; alone had approximately the number of officers and N.C.O.'s laid down in its establishment.
3. i.e. the Finnish S.S. Battalion.
4. Notably the Flemish Legion.

Luitenant-Kolonel Stroink and the twenty-three reserve officers who joined the Dutch Legion soon became painfully aware that the S.S. was responsible for running it. On the grounds that the Dutch officers were insufficient in number and deficient in training and experience - grounds that were not without justification - German S.S. officers were attached to the Netherlands Legion. Friction between the German and Dutch officers led to the resignation of Stroink and five of his colleagues.⁵ Discontent spread rapidly downwards to the rank and file, aggravated by German insistence on an oath of loyalty to Hitler. The idea of annexation of the Netherlands to the Reich was anathema to the staunch patriots among the Dutch volunteers. Two hundred and sixty-six, no less, of the earliest members of the Legion left the manoeuvre ~~area~~ at Arys, without completing their training, and returned home.

The Dutch colonel was not the only legionary commander to resign, for the Norwegian Legion's first commanding officer Jørgen Bakke also resigned over a disagreement with the German authorities.⁷ In view of the shortage of native officers for all the Germanic contingents, except the Danish - the Flemish Legion was particularly deficient in this respect - the behaviour of the German S.S. officers with the Legions seems ill-considered. Regular army officers of Germanic countries were, in the main, reluctant to associate with the S.S.-sponsored legions, and it wasⁱⁿ an attempt to persuade them to enlist that the S.S. had promised volunteers ranks equivalent to those held in their own armed forces.⁸ This promise still attracted insufficient officers, while many who volunteered were reservists, not regulars, few of whom had experience of combat ~~wider~~ than the brief campaigns of 1940.

5. Steiner, op. cit., pp. 128-9; van der Zee, op. cit., p. 139

6. Freiwilligen Legion Niederlande, Regiments Sonderbefehl, 14 October 1941-RVO. Ninety-eight Flemings were sent home at the same time.

7. Bartetzko, op. cit., p.69.

8. Ausw.Amt, Pol I M 4706, 2 July 1941 - F.O. Series 4641 H, Frame 209272; Der R.F.S.S., Trb. Nr. 309/41. Aufstellung und Einsatz Ausländischer Freiwilligenverbände, 6 November 1941 - T 175, Roll 109, Frames 2633820-7.

The Finnish Battalion also suffered from inconsiderate handling by the Armed S.S. although its personnel were full members of that body, unlike the Germanic legionaries, and in spite of the fact that they were citizens of a free and friendly country, whose government was capable of taking up their cause. The Unit was well-provided with Finnish officers and N.C.O.'s, with valuable experience from the Winter War behind them. But these last two circumstances were, in fact, the causes of disagreement, for there were disproportionate numbers of Finnish officers - a factor which prevented some of them from holding the S.S. ranks which they had been promised. The other cause for dissatisfaction was that former regular N.C.O.'s, with years of service behind them, were treated like recruits by German instructors, at a time when their colleagues in Finland were teaching German troops. On the other hand, the Finnish battalions' German members had little or no war experience to compare with the three hard months of the Russo-Finnish War.⁹ The Führungshauptamt of the S.S. released a number of superfluous Finnish officers from their engagements, with the result that they returned home and spread the news of how they had been treated.¹⁰ The S.S. Hauptamt had taken considerable pains to recruit these Finns and had handed them over to the S.S. Führungshauptamt for training. When Gottlob Berger the head of S.S.H.A. learnt how the Finns had been treated he was considerably annoyed, since future recruiting was jeopardised and the continuation of the Finnish Battalion was imperilled. Berger managed to secure an improvement in conditions which enabled the Finnish unit to continue until 1943.

9. Abschrift/Bl. Telegramm aus Helsinki Nr. 1432 zu Pol. I M 8537,
2 December 1941 - T 175, Roll 109, Frame 2633665; Ibid., Aktenvermerk,
Unterredung mit dem Leiter der finnische Staatspolizei Aaltonen,
8 January 1942 - T 175, Roll 109, Frames 2633666-7; S.S.H.A., Amt. VI,
V.S.Trb.Nr. 473/42. VI Az. 207/42. Finnische Kriegsfreiwillige,
10 February 1942-T 175, Roll 109, Frame 2633663.
- 10 C.d.S.S.H.A., Trb.Nr. 26/42. Freiwillige aus germanischen Ländern,
9 February 1942 - T 175, Roll 109, Frame 2633657-8. The policy of repatriation also lost the Armed S.S. the goodwill of the Swedish officer corps - Ibid.

The Danish force raised for the Eastern front, since it appeared to have the approval of its government, was unique among the Germanic legions in having a high proportion of regular soldiers including more than sufficient officers to command all the companies and platoons.¹¹ The problem of finding enough native officers, which so sorely tried other national contingents, did not apply to the Danish Free Corps. But the presence of a Danish officer-corps created other difficulties for the S.S. authorities. Gottlob Berger at first saw in Overstløjtnant Kryssing, the Danish commander, the future leader of his country, but Berger expected the Danish volunteers, like the Dutch, to be National-Socialists. Kryssing maintained, on the contrary, that his unit existed solely to combat Bolshevism and that it should be above politics and political parties. In this he was supported by many of his officers; and so - in order to weaken Kryssing - his right-hand man, Kaptajn Thor Jørgensen, was despatched to the S.S. officer-cadet school, Bad Tolz, ostensibly for further instruction. The Danish colonel retaliated by delaying the training of his unit. Although the Danish legionaries had very little military experience, many were professionals who could have been ready for action in a short time. On 2nd February 1942, the head of the German training staff recommended Kryssing's removal on the grounds of unsuitability. Since he was a gunner not a foot-soldier, there

11. Faedrelandet, 10 August 1941; La Cour, op. cit., II, S 17-0

was a germ of truth in the reason given. Accordingly, on 8 February, Kryssing was transferred to an administrative post.¹² As a parting shot he recommended Kaptajn Schock as his successor but since he was a free-mason he was unacceptable in National-Socialist circles.¹³ Instead, a former Kaptajn-løjtnant of the Danish Kongens Livgarde, a National-Socialist youth leader of Baltic-German extraction named von Schalburg, was transferred from S.S. Division "Wiking" to command the Freikorps.¹⁴ He fell in action, while Kryssing, ironically, was the first Germanic officer to be promoted to general in the Waffen S.S.¹⁵

12. Bartetzko, op. cit., pp. 76-7; Stein, op. cit., p 156
13. Der Befehlshaber der Waffen S.S. Ost.Tgb. Nr. 853/42, 15 February 1942 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635498-500; S.S.D.-B.d.O. Posen Nr. 491, 22 February 1942 - ibid., Frames 2635496-7.
14. Der R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. AR 1271/42, 31 March 1942 - T175, Roll 67, Frames 2583328-9.
15. III S.S. Panzerkorps., Tätigkeitsbericht, 26 May 1943-31 March 1944 - DAMA 64325; CdS.S.H.A., Auf dem Weg zum germanischen Reich, 31 January 1944.

Another Western European Legion which seemed to be well-supplied with officers of its own was the French one. But the Vichy government did not encourage French regular officers to enlist in it. Consequently the L.V.F. was largely officered by reservists and "White" Russians.¹⁶ The publication of a letter from Pétain, apparently indicating the Marshal's approval of L.V.F., may have moved some French officers to join it.¹⁷ The German Army, the sponsor of the L.V.F., was apparently satisfied with the qualifications of the legionary officers. At all events it did not impose German officers upon the French regiment, but provided it with a liaison staff instead. When the French S.S. Assault Brigade¹⁸ was created its native officers were alumni of S.S. Junkerschulen¹⁹ but when it was merged with the L.V.F. and expanded,²⁰ the principle of granting foreign officers ranks equivalent to their former ones was interpreted in a surprisingly liberal fashion. It was applied to Darnand's Milice,²¹ which had operated against the French resistance, and more strangely to the Pétainist youth movement, the Chantiers de Jeunes.²² This offended the vieux grognards from the L.V.F., with many months of experience fighting the Red Army, who were now subordinated to youngsters without previous military service. Some ex-members of the L.V.F. took the unusual course of deserting from the French S.S. to the Walloon.²³

16. J. Doriot, Note sur la Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme, March 1942 - F.O. Series 855 (Roll 376) Framo 285170.
17. Auswärtige Berlin Nr. 3461, 5 November 1941, and Nr. 3487, 6 November 1941 - F.O. Series 4647H, Supplement 3780H (Roll 2399) Frames 209516-8, 209521-4.
18. O.K.H./Gen.d.H./Org.Abt. (I) Nr. 3086, 30 March 1944.
19. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org.Abt. Ia/II, Trb. Nr. 1297/43, Neuaufstellung des französischen S.S. Freiwilligen Grenadier Regiments, 16 September 1943, para. 6 - T 175, Roll 111, Frames 2635145-6, decreed a three months course for French officers and N.C.O.'s.
20. Ibid., Trb. Nr. 2710/44, Übernahme der Französischen Legion (L.V.F.) Aufstellung einer Franz. Brigade und des Franz. S.S. Gren. Ausb. und Ers. Btlts., 26 August 1944.
21. St. Loup, Les Hérétiques (Paris 1965), p. 156.
22. Ibid., p. 157; A. Brissaud, Pétain à Sigmaringen (Paris, 1966), p. 346. Aspirants were later despatched to S.S. Junkerschule - St. Loup, op. cit., p. 158.
23. Ibid., p. 155; Brissaud, op. cit., p. 346. Degrelle, op. cit., p. 199 appears to confirm this.

Young Germans intending to become officers in the Armed S.S. were obliged to pass through one of the Junkerschulen of the S.S. This meant that medical officers, for example, were obliged to qualify as platoon commanders before embarking upon their professional training.²⁴ This rigorous requirement no doubt affected the attitude of the German S.S. leaders to non-German officers who volunteered to join the Waffen S.S. at the Germanic Legions. When racial German and Germanic volunteers enrolled in the Armed S.S. they were entitled to the S.S. rank equivalent to that which they had held in their own armed forces.²⁵ The former ranks frequently did not correspond with vacancies in the Armed S.S. and the military knowledge of the foreigners often did not meet the standards of that body. In consequence in May 1942, the S.S. Führungshauptamt ruled that, although volunteers were to enter the Armed S.S. with ranks equivalent to their old ones, they were only to wear the insignia of the equivalent S.S. rank if they were actually employed in that rank. The Kommandoamt der Waffen S.S. was to decide questions of the assimilation of ranks, while Himmler himself was to decide questions of rank insignia.²⁶ Foreign officers who did not measure up to the requirements of the

24. W. Harzer, 'Die S.S. Ärztliche Akademie in Graz,' Feldgrau. XIII. Jg., Heft 5 (1967), pp. 9-10

25. Ausw. Amt. Pol I M 4796, 2 July 1941 - F.O. Series 4641 H, 209272.

26. S.S. F.H.A., Kommandoamt der Waffen S.S. II b (5) Az. B9 h10, Tgb. Nr. 896/4.42, 9 May 1942 - T 175, Roll 173, Frames 2707528-30.

Armed S.S. and who were not allowed to wear the insignia to which they thought themselves entitled, could take comfort from two provisions. First, they were supposed to be earmarked for further training to fit them for the appropriate S.S. rank; and, in the second place, irrespective of the rank in which they were employed and the rank badges they wore, they drew the pay and allowances indicated by the rank they had held in their own armed forces.²⁷

Relations between Germanic volunteers and the Germans improved as the number of Germanic officers increased. Former officers and N.C.O.'s were re-instated - following training courses, where they were necessary - in their ranks. New leaders were produced in the officer and N.C.O. schools of the S.S., which were expanded to cope with the task.²⁸ Once foreign S.S. officers passed out of the JunkerCschulen of the S.S., their German colleagues had no alternative but to recognise their qualifications. They could not deny the validity of ranks earned in the S.S. in the same way that they refused to recognise ranks gained in foreign armies.

27. Ibid.

28. e.g. new Junkerschulen were established in Klagenfurt and Prague; new Unterführerschulen were set up on Posen Treskau and Arnhem.

In officering its "Waffen" formations - those which were neither German nor Germanic in basic composition - the Armed S.S. appears to have been less fastidious than it had been with the Germanic units. The use of some Bosnian and Galician senior officers²⁹ may have been justified in German eyes by their having held commissions in the "K. und K." Army³⁰ but this was certainly not the case with the Latvian and Estonian officers who were commissioned into the armed S.S.³¹ Many Baltic officers reached the S.S. via police units or Ostbataillone, however, and such service appears to have exempted them from passing out of an officer cadet school of the S.S. The S.S. also took over men who had held commissions in the Italian, Hungarian, Roumanian and Bulgar forces.³² Granting equivalent officers' ranks to these men may have been justified by their previous service in Armies allied to Germany's.

29. S.S. Pers. Hauptamt, II W II Abt. 3, Az 21 c 13, "Übernahme von Offiziere fremder Wehrmachten, 7 October 1944 - T 175, Roll 107, Frame 2630869 lists several Bosnian officers.
30. Volksdeutsche, Croat and Moslem officers taken over from the Croat Army had to fulfil a six-month probationary period in order to hold their former ranks - S.S. F.H.A., Kdo. Amt der Waffen S.S., Orr. Trb. Nr. 589/43, Aufstellung der Kroatischen S.S. Freiwilligen Division, 30 April 1943, T 175, Roll 111, Frames 2635334-7 - para. 5d.
31. General der Freiwilligen-Verbände im Oberkommando des Heeres, I/E Nr. 20400/44, Fremdvölkische Verbände, 20 December 1944, Anlage 2.
32. Ibid., Anlagen 3, 5 and 6.

Some of the S.S. cadet schools were entrusted with providing leaders for the S.S. units of Slavs and of other Eastern races.³³ Although the S.S. had reservations about commissions obtained in foreign armies, it was normal to take German Army and also Ordnungspolizei officers into the armed S.S. with ranks equivalent to their former ones.³⁴ This principle was extended to foreign officers transferred from army or police units.³⁵ French, Walloon and Indian legionary officers become Führer in the Waffen S.S.,³⁶ together with the Turkic officers of the Turkestani battalions 1/94 and 450.³⁷ In commissioning Turkestanis into the S.S. that body was endeavouring to prove that it could run Turkic units better than the Army had done.³⁸

33. i.o. S.S. und Waffen Junkerschulen Posen-Troskau and Klagenfurt, S.S. und Waffen Unterführerschulen Lauenburg and Laibach.
34. Verordnungsblatt der Waffen S.S., Nr. 5, 1 August 1940, Z.128.
35. 30. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. (russ.Nr.2), Ia, 3 August 1944 - T 354, Roll 160, Frame 3806193.
36. e.g. the Rexist leader, Léon Degrelle, and the commander of L.V.F., Colonel Puaud.
37. e.g. Kompanie führer Asankulow of Btl. 450 became a Waffen-Untersturmführer in the Ostmuselmanische S.S. Division.
38. S.S.H.A., Amt. Al. Az. Sch., 11 December 1943 - BWMA 78042/1.

Initially the Eastern units raised by the German Army had two sources of officers available to them - the "Reds" and the "Whites". The first group consisted of men, like Vlasov himself who had been captured, or who, like Kononov, had defected from the Red Army. These two and many others, such as Malyshkin, Truchin, Duniatchenko, Blagoveschenski, Gil-Rodionov and even the political commissars Zhilenkov and Zykov, were eventually employed by the Germans in ranks and appointments comparable with those they had held before they changed sides. Some, like Kononov and Duniatchenko, were even promoted. The list of members of the "Bergmann" unit court-martialled in 1942 reveals former subalterns in the Red Army occupying ranks a little less exalted than those they had held in the Soviet forces.³⁹ Nevertheless, many officers and N.C.O's of the Red Army were taken at random from prison camps and drafted into Ost units as private soldiers. On the evidence of a company commander in Ostbataillon 630, these men could be a source of disaffection.⁴⁰

The "White" source of officers consisted of two major

- 39. F.L. Carsten, 'A Bolshevik Conspiracy in the Wehrmacht', Slavonic and East European Review, XLVLL, Nr. 109 (January 1969), p. 480.
- 40. 1. (Ost)/Gren.Rgt. 857. Stimmung in der Truppe, 14 April 1944; see also G. von Mende, 'Erfahrungen mit Ostfreiwilligen in der deutschen Wehrmacht während des Zweiten Weltkrieges', Viervölker-Heere und Koalitionskriege (Darmstadt, 1952), pp. 29-30

sub-divisions - the true "Whites" and the national separatists. The first sub-division was composed of those who had served in the forces of the Czar and the successor-armies of Denikin, Wrangel and Kolchak. The second consisted of those who had belonged to the armies of the short-lived Ukrainian, Armenian and Georgian states which existed briefly following the Revolution. Apart from those who, like Ataman Kulakov, had lain low in the U.S.S.R. since the Civil War, the "Whites" were émigrés. These suffered the drawback that they had not lived under the Soviet system and could not understand the psychology of those who had. Another serious disadvantage of men like Piotr Krasnov, Kromiadi and Sakharov was their age. There were, however, second generation émigrés, born and brought up in exile, whose knowledge of Russia was even less than their elders. They had the advantage that, in many cases, they had attended military academies in France, Yugoslavia and elsewhere and had even gained experience in the campaigns preceding "Barbarossa".⁴¹

41. Zulukidse, the Georgian leader, for example, had served in the French Army and the L.V.F.

After the German forces launched their assault against the U.S.S.R., official policy prohibited the entry of political refugees into the occupied Eastern areas.⁴² The German forces were only permitted to utilize the services of expatriates of German blood, for example Baltic Germans.⁴³ In spite of the official prohibition, many non-German émigrés found their way into the German-occupied territories of the U.S.S.R. A relaxation of official policy permitted "White Russians" to be employed as badly-needed interpreters⁴⁴ but circumstances caused many repatriated "Whites" to be employed as officers, frequently in situations where they were only supposed to be acting as interpreters. Documents of Ostbataillon 628 reveal that for several months in 1943 its 2nd Company was commanded by a "White" interpreter.⁴⁵ A far better-known example is the involvement of Sakharov and Kromiadi in the Verband Graukopf.⁴⁶

A third source of officers for Eastern units that was developed by their sponsors was for them to produce their own by taking N.C.O.'s and men, irrespective of their former ranks, provided they appeared to be officer material and training them in schools and courses run for the purpose. Selected soldiers from the Eastern units of the 9th Army were sent to the Ersatzkompanie at Vassikovo to attend courses for potential officers, while some N.C.O.'s were trained as platoon commanders.⁴⁷ An officer-cadet school for Osttruppen was established at Mariampol and another for Turkic aspirants existed in Legionowo.

42. O.K.W., W.F.St./Abt. 2 (IV/Ou.) Nr. 01502/41, 25 July 1941; Ibid., (IV/Vorw.) Nr. 01502/41, II. Ang., 11 August 1941; O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Gen.Ou. Az Abt.K.Vorw. (O 5P) Nr. II/S193/41, 18 August 1941.
43. Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (II) Nr. 3145/42, 12 June 1942 - BAMA III1/255.
44. P. 3(II), Aktennotiz, 18 June, 1942 - BAMA - III1/255.
45. i.e. Dolmetscher (Offz.) Gulaz - Regimentstab z. b. V. 709, Br. B. Nr. 428/43, 12 August 1943. Another battalion, 630, had given up four emigrant officers a few months earlier - Kdr. d. Osttruppen z. b. V. 700, Tgb. Nr. 16/43, 24 March 1943; Ostbtl. 630, Kdr. Tgb. Nr. 500/43, 3 April 1943.
46. Fischer, op. cit., p. 43; Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 325; Steenberg, op. cit., pp. 55-9.
47. Stabsoffizier der Ostbataillone 682, Tgb. Nr. 1272, 27 November 1942; ibid., Befehl Nr. 1, 3 December 1942.

Uniforms

A serious practical difficulty for the German armed forces in using foreigners was that of clothing them. The admirers of Germany, national-socialists and adventurers who volunteered for the two new Germanic Standarten of the S.S. Verfügungstruppen in 1940 made no recorded objection to wearing normal German S.S. uniforms. But many of those of the "second wave" who volunteered for the anti-Communist legions in 1941 wished to fight in their own countries' uniform,⁴⁸ and in many cases these volunteers wore the uniforms of their national forces at the beginning of their service with the Germans. There is pictorial evidence of Danish,⁴⁹ French⁵⁰ and Spanish⁵¹ recruits dressed as members of their countries' armies. Nevertheless, the Western European volunteers were soon dressed in German uniforms because it was not permissible under international law for them to fight in the uniforms of states which were not at war with the U.S.S.R. Since no peace treaties had been signed, the occupied countries were still technically at war with Germany, whose uniform the national legions adopted. The practice had the advantages that it protected captured legionaries from being shot out-of-hand, and it identified them as friends to the German soldiery who were already required to differentiate between their Italian, Roumanian, Hungarian, Finnish and Slovak allies and their enemies.

- 48. St. Loup, Les Volontaires (Paris, 1963), pp. 32-3.
- 49. H. Landemer, Les Waffen S.S. (Paris, 1972), opposite p. 196.
- 50. Y. Barjaud, 'Die Legion der antikommunistische französischen Freiwillige,' Feldgrau, XIII, Heft, 5/6 (1965).
- 51. E. O'Ballanco, 'The Spanish Blue Division in the Second World War,' R.U.S.I. Journal, CIX, No. 635 (1964).
- 52. Auswärtiges Amt, Pol. I M 4796, 2 July 1941 - F.O. 4641 II, Frame 209270; O.K.W. 14c/W F St./Org.(I) 1942, Richtlinien für den Einsatz ausländischer Freiwilliger im Kampf gegen die Sowjet Union (neufassung), 10 January 1942, para. 3.

Some Germans felt that German uniform was dishonoured if it was worn by non-Germans. Hitler, himself, criticised von Seeckt's sale of steel helmets to the Chinese.⁵³ Many Germans, on the other hand, would have been offended by the sight of foreign volunteers wearing the uniforms of armies that Germany had defeated. In the interests of legality and uniformity the foreign units organised in the Reich were supplied with German clothing which was distributed in the barracks and training areas with no more difficulty than when German recruits were inducted.

As a sop to national feeling the non-German legions were permitted to add insignia, usually in the shape of a shield, to their sleeves to indicate their country of origin.⁵⁴ When the S.S. took over the few "free" British volunteers they were permitted to stitch their Union Jack arm-shields on the right sleeve, rather than in the more normal place on the left, below the German eagle, because to the minds of the British renegades this would have implied British inferiority to Germany.⁵⁵

Units of the political S.S.⁵⁶ as well as the S.S. Verfügungstruppen wore titles on the lower left sleeve as a mark of honour. This distinction was extended to the Germanic regiments "Nordland" und "Westland" and to their Division, "Wiking".⁵⁸ The principle was also applied to the Germanic Legions⁵⁹ and to the S.S. Division that succeeded them.⁶⁰

53. F.H.Q. Lagebesprechung 24/25, 24 January 1945 - 3786 PS, T.M.W.C. XXXIII, 162-3

54. Ausw.Amt. Pol. I M 4796, 2 July 1941 - F.O. 4641 II, Frame 209270; O.K.W. 14r/W.V F St./Org.(I) 19/42, 10 January 1942, para 3. The German authorities also appear to have turned a blind eye to the wearing of Falangist blue shirts by the Spaniards, who fought on the Eastern front.

55. Chef des S.S.H.A., V.S.Trb.Nr. 3302/44, Adj. Trb. Nr. 1555/44, 13 June 1944 - No. 909 - T 175, Roll 125, Frames 2650462-3.

56. A. Mollo, Uniforms of the S.S., Vol. I. Allgemeine S.S. 1923-1945, 2nd edn., (London, 1969), pp. 34-5.

57. A. Mollo and H.P. Taylor, Uniforms of the S.S., Vol. III, S.S. Verfügungstruppe, 1933-39, (London, 1970), pp. 46-7.

58. R.J. Bender and H.P. Taylor, Uniforms, Organisation and History of the Waffen S.S., Vol. II (Mountain View, 1971), pp. 140-4; Verordnungsblatt der Waffen S.S. Nr. 17, 1 September 1942, Z 303.

59. S.S.F.H.A., Abt. Org. Trb. Nr. 3002/41, 26 July 1941, T175, Roll 110, Frames 2634646-9; C. Beadle and T. Hartmann, Waffen S.S. - its Divisional Insignia (Donley, 1971), pp. 84, 86, 88, 90.

60. Ibid., p.38, Bender and Taylor, op.cit., Vol. III (Mountain View, 1972, pp.90-3.

The S.S. also permitted members of its non-German formations and of the Germanic units it sponsored to wear special devices on their right-hand collar patches, in addition to any shields or titles they were allowed to place on their sleeves. Runic devices were introduced to identify the members of Stundarte "Nordwest" and, later, the Flemish⁶² and Dutch Legions and S.S. Division "Prinz Eugen".⁶⁴ Norwegian legionaries wore their national lion device.⁶⁵ Members of S.S. Division "Handschar" appropriately wore a scimitar design.⁶⁶ The practice was extended to Balts,⁶⁷ Galicians⁶⁸ and other races. But the compliment was double-edged since these collar insignia were for Waffen-S.S. men who were not supposed to wear on their collars the Sigrunnen of the divisions whose members met all the racial and physical requirements and who were eligible for full and permanent membership of the S.S.⁷⁰

Concessions in the matter of dress were made to the religious susceptibilities of certain groups of volunteers. The Sikhs in the Free Indian Legion were permitted to retain their uncut hair and beards and, in consequence, to wear the puggaree.⁷¹ Bosnian Moslems serving in the S.S. were allowed to wear the fez in two styles, one for parades, the other for operations,⁷² while the Albanian S.S. men retained their typical white skull caps.⁷³

61. S.S.F.H.A., Abt. Org. Tgb. Nr. 3002/31, 26 July 1941-T175, Roll 110, Frame 2634646-9.

62. Beadle and the Hartmann, op. cit., p.68.

63. Der R.F.S.S. Tgb. Nr. 1259/42, 7 June 1942 - T175, Roll 111, Frame 2635402.

The information on other collar patches in this document is inaccurate.

64. S.S.F.H.A., Kdo. Amt. der Waffen S.S., Abt. Ia, Krugenspiegel für die S.S. Freiw. Div. Prinz Eugen, 20 March 1942.

65. Der Freiwilligen XVI, Heft 6 (1970) p.17.

66. Bender and Taylor, op. cit., III, 156-9.

67. Beadle and Hartmann, op. cit., pp.50-1, 58-61.

68. Bender and Taylor, op. cit., Vol. I (Mountain View, 1969), p.106.

69. e.g. Albanians, Russians, Caucasians.

70. For example C.d.S.S.H.A., Adj. Tgb. Nr. 23/45/7158, 26 February 1945 - BA- NS 31/42 - forbids Turkestanis to wear the S.S. runes on the collar.

71. Der Freiwillige, XV., Heft 7, (1969) pp. 16-17 provides photographic evidence.

72. S.S.F.H.A., Kdo. Amt. der Waffen S.S., Org. Tgb. Nr. 589/43, 30 April 1943 in T 175, Roll 111, Frames 2635334 f, para 14 b and c.

73. Der R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. 35/168/43, 26 November 1943 in T 175, Roll 70, Frame 2587106.

The expansion of the German armed forces increased the demand for German uniforms. In consequence, German soldiers were frequently obliged to make use of stocks of captured uniforms for fatigue dress. Military and political collaborators were often supplied with items of dress captured by the German occupiers. For example, the Vlaamse Wacht was provided with Dutch steel helmets while its Francophone counterpart, Garde Wallonne, had Belgian ones.⁷⁴ Both of these organisations used dyed Belgian Army tunics.⁷⁵ The Schalburckorps received uniforms taken from the Danish Army⁷⁶ while the French anti-aircraft gunners were dressed in the dark blue of the French Air Force.⁷⁷ The Italian Armed S.S. wore Italian Army tunics and Italian steel helmets throughout its existence.⁷⁸

Although individual Eastern Hiwis could inherit the rifles of German casualties, there were practical difficulties in taking over their clothing, too. It was possible to utilise stocks of captured Red Army weapons almost immediately but not Russian uniforms. Apart from contravening international law there was a strong probability of confusion because partisans were wearing a mixture of civilian, Red Army and Germany dress.⁷⁹ Supplies of German uniforms were not available because the accession of large numbers of Soviet citizens to the invading forces had not been foreseen and the practice was initially forbidden. German quartermasters dared not insist for uniforms, even if the supplies were readily available.

74. Photographic evidence and surviving examples.

75. Examples in Musée Royal de l'Armée, Brussels.

76. Examples in Tøjhusmuseet, Copenhagen.

77. Example in Musée Royal de l'Armée, Brussels.

78. Storia delle Forze Armate della R.S.I., III (1967) Nos. 29-30, passim.

79. A.O.K. 2, Ia, Nr. 967/43, 2 April 1943, NOKW 473, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 21.

The provision of brassards for native policemen was a stop-gap measure instituted early in the campaign. These were rather surprisingly frequently manufactured in colours which had a nationalistic significance. The Ukrainian militia, for example, were soon wearing yellow and blue arm-bands.⁸⁰ Even when these items were rubber-stamped by German headquarters they were not a fool-proof means of identification since they could be stolen or copied by partisans. On one occasion, for instance, partisans were reported to be wearing the white-blue-red brassards of the Russian Militsopolizei.⁸¹ When, later, the Schuma were properly uniformed there was still confusion because many native policemen, particularly Ukrainians deserted to the partisans and continued to wear the clothing with which the Germans had supplied.⁸² Brassards in national colours returned to fashion, when Ostarbeiter from the Soviet minority races were permitted to discard the unpopular "Ost" badge, and when they were used to identify adolescent "S.S. Helfer" from the East.⁸³

- 80. Beauftr. des Reichministeriums für den besetzten Ostgebiete bei Heeresgruppe Süd Hauptmann Dr. Koch, 5 October 1941 - 053 PS. Feldkommandantur (V) 245, Abt. 1 q Nr.51/41, 14 December 1941, NOKW 659, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9F.
- 81. Befehlshaber der rückw. Heeres-Gebiete Nord. In. Tagesmeldung, 21 February 1942, 1 March 1942 - NOKW 2146, Case XII, Doc. Bk 9D. These were Czarist colours.
- 82. Der Reichskommissar für die Ukraine VI 7422, Tgb. Nr. 378/43, Bandenlage, 25 June 1943 - T 175, Roll 140.
- 83. Dallin, op. cit., p. 448; Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 279; Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 September 1944.

Some of the Baltic security units came into existence almost spontaneously when men who had served in the armies of the three Baltic republics coalesced, in many cases wearing their old uniforms.⁸⁴ They were hastily thrown into action and stayed there continuously giving little opportunity to dress those involved more appropriately. In July 1942, the 39th Estonian Front Battalion reported that its members were wearing torn trousers which they lacked the means to repair.⁸⁵ The following month the unit clarified the situation by explaining that in January 1942, sufficient German uniforms had been received to clothe half the battalion; but the other half had to wear Latvian and Estonian uniforms.⁸⁶ Many of the nationalists in the unit would probably have preferred to have worn Estonian uniforms, but fighting in the woods rapidly reduced clothing to rags, irrespective of its origin.

The initial classification of Soviet citizens as Untermensch led to actual discrimination in dress because sub-humans could not be allowed to wear German uniforms. The report of a conference, drawn up on 2nd August 1942 indicates that the principle was not being closely observed, because the German armed forces were putting their Russian Formationen into new German uniforms, while the S.S. still had to fall back on Latvian and Lithuanian uniforms.⁸⁷ Moreover, the Wehrmacht, so it was alleged, was permitting the Russian officers and N.C.O.'s of its units to wear German rank insignia, whereas the S.S. gave its Eastern auxiliaries "Fantasie" badges.⁸⁸

84. A. Silgailis, Latviesu Legions (Copenhagen, 1964), illustrations between pp. 16 and 17.

85. Estn. Schutzmannschafts Bat. 39. Erfahrungs - und Tätigkeitsbericht, 24 July 1942 - NOKW 2513, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9E.

86. Idem, Erfahrungs - und Tätigkeitsbericht, 24 August 1942 - NOKW 2513, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9E.

87. Aktennotiz für S.S. Obergruppenführer Wolff zu einer Besprechung mit Herrn Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, 2 August 1942.

88. Ibid.,

In the same month an omnibus set of regulations - the "Rotes Heft"⁸⁹ laid down that "Turk-Legionäre" and Cossacks could wear German uniforms or captured ones, altered to resemble German ones.⁹⁰ Schuma were to be supplied with uniforms by the German Army, but mostly from captured stock.⁹¹ Hiwis were simply to have whatever was available with the addition of a brassard showing they were serving the Wehrmacht.⁹² None of the categories was to wear German rank insignia or the German eagle device. A set of "Fantasie" insignia was laid down to indicate the appointments held by the indigenous volunteers as, in theory, they did not hold proper military rank.

Four months later, when new arm-shields and cockades were introduced for the Cossacks,⁹³ a favoured group, they were still obliged to wear German uniforms devoid of all German insignia and with the discriminatory insignia of appointment on the shoulder. Eventually arm-shields were introduced to identify the Eastern races serving with the Germans.⁹⁴

89 O.K.H., Gen. St. d. H., Org. Abt. II, Nr 8000/42, August 1942
- BAMA - H1/224.

90 Ibid., Anlage 4, 5)

91 Ibid., Anlage 5, III

92 Ibid., Anlage 6, 9)

93 Allgemeine Heeresmitteilungen, 9. Jg. 29. Ausg., 21 December 1942,
Z 1109.

94 The St. Andrew's cross device was introduced early in 1943 - Stabsoffizier der Ostbtle. 582, Befehl 8, 1 January 1943, Z.9. Devices for Russians, Ukrainians, Turkic and Caucasian peoples were in use by September 1943 - O.K.H./Gen. St. d. H./Gen. d. Osttruppen/I Nr. 5130/43, Mitteilungen für die Kommandeure der Osttruppen z. b. V. Nr. 5., 8 September 1943.

Together with the need to recognise friend and foe there was the serious problem of providing sufficient clothing to counteract normal wear and tear. Apart from causing Estonians to serve in torn trousers, shortage of material also obliged Byelorussian policemen of the Einzeldienst to perform their duties barefoot during the summer of 1942⁹⁵; at the time the Rotes Heft was being prepared.

Shortages and regional pride caused the Eastern troops to don fur caps and other portions of Cossack and Caucasian national costume⁹⁶ in addition to German and Russian uniform items. German headquarters frequently encouraged their private armies to adopt this picturesque attire. Former members of the "White" armies made their way, unofficially from exile or emerged from hiding and reached Ost units wearing their old Czarist uniforms and insignia. It was probably their influence that caused a system of shoulder rank insignia to be introduced for the Slav units which resembled in the main the one in use before the October Revolution.⁹⁷

The illegal wearing of German insignia continued; and in January 1943 the Stabsoffizier der Ostbataillone 582 had to remind his subordinates that the German national insignia were not to be worn.⁹⁸

95 Hohere S.S. und Polizeiführer Weissruthenien, Tgb. Nr. 109/42, Partisanenbekämpfung, 13 June 1942 - T 175, Roll 140, Frame 2667858.

96 W.H. Greehey, 'The German XVth Cossack Cavalry Corps, 1943-45', Adjutant's Call, V, Nos 3-4 (1967). This is supported by a wealth of photographic evidence.

97 Ibid.; Sonderheft of Signal, December 1943.

98 Staboffizier der Ostbataillone 582, Befehl 8, 1 January 1943, Ziffer 9.

By this time proper rank designation were in use but their holders were still forbidden to wear German rank insignia.⁹⁹ These were not permitted until 18 March 1944.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, a considerable number of volunteers by this time probably preferred to wear insignia which were not German.

Family Concern

An essential condition for good morale within military units is regular contact with family and friends which necessitates efficient postal communications and a regular allocation of leave. The German military authorities provided a postal service and also drew up routes for those of its members who took their furlough outside the Reich. Inevitably Allied bombing and the strategic situation interfered with both. Even before enemy advances ruled them out completely some areas had to be banned as leave areas because of the risk of desertion or retention of foreign volunteers. Comparatively early in the war North Schleswigers experienced delays in their mail service and found it difficult to cross into Danish territory to visit their families. Postal delay was partly due to the diligence of the German security service in censoring and summarising the contents of letters but both problems were attributable to the anomalous position of Denmark under German "protection". Danish civil servants were in

99 Ibid., Stabsbefehl 113, 30 January 1943.

100 O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./Gen. Qu. IV a/Gen. d. Freiw. Verb. b. Chef. d. Gen. St. d. H./Gen. St. d.H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 32003/44, 18 March 1944.

a position to "lose" items posted to German forces or to put paper obstacles in the way of volunteers wishing to return home on leave.¹⁰¹

Carelessness in notifying the next-of-kin of the death of racial German and Germanic volunteers caused considerable distress.¹⁰² In some cases relatives learnt of the death from the deceased's comrades before official notification arrived from the unit, while in others the dead man's personal effects were sent by his unit direct to his relatives. There were instances of letters intended for men who had fallen being sent straight back to the sender with "Gefallen" written upon them.¹⁰³ In one case when a Danish company commander wrote to the parents of a dead North Schleswiger, he informed them that their son had died for the future of Denmark. Since the bereaved parents hoped Germany would annex North Schleswig, if not the whole of Denmark, the officers' sentiment displeased them.¹⁰⁴ Early in March 1943 the SS Führungshauptamt laid down that it had to be informed of casualties and that the personal effects and post intended for the dead were to be sent to it for forwarding to the next-of-kin.

101 Abschrift/Bü, S.S. Freiwillige aus Nordschleswig, 29 January 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frames 2633689-95 and Roll 29, Frames 2575712-7.

102 ^{Ibid,} Para 4 - T175, Roll 29, Frame 2535714 and Roll 109, Frame 2633691; C.d.S.S.H.A. Tgb. Nr. 26/42, Freiwillige aus Germanische Ländern, 9 February 1942, para 3- T. 175, Roll 109 Frame 2633657.

103 S.S.F.H.A., B50g/Amt V/IIb(3)50/2.43, Verlust an Volksdeutschen und germanischen Kriegsfreiwilligen, 5 March 1943 - T175, Roll 173, Frames 2707399-400.

104 2. Kompanie Freikorps Danmark, 28 July 1942 - T175, Roll 29, Frames 2535708 and 2535722; Abschrift der Abschrift, 26 August 1942 - T175, Roll 29, Frames 2535718-9.

This did not absolve company commanders from the duty of writing to the families of their dead subordinates but they were obliged to state that they died for the Neugestaltung of Europe.

To prevent unnecessary grief, the private property of those who were wounded was to be despatched to the replacement unit, not to the casualties' families.¹⁰⁵

Non-Germans serving with the German armed forces were not unnaturally, concerned for the welfare of their dependants. In the matter of family allowances Volksdeutsche and Western Europeans were treated like Reichdeutsche, which might, on the face of it, appear satisfactory. In the case of foreign S.S. men, allowances were paid out by welfare officers in the main cities of occupied countries, or, by German consular officials in neutral states.¹⁰⁶ In practice, there were postal delays and the officers fell behind in their work causing anxiety to the dependants of the volunteers and, when they learnt of it, to the men themselves.¹⁰⁷ Although allowances were paid in the appropriate currency, hardship was caused when wartime inflation in Germany's satellites caused a drop in the buying power of the allowances. There was considerable dissatisfaction when currency difficulties obliged the welfare officers

105 S.S.F.H.A., B50g/Amt V/II b(3) 50/2.43, 5 March 1943 - T 175, Roll 173, Frames 2707399-400.

106 Ausw. Arnt, Pol IM 4796, 2 July 1941 - F.O. Series 4641H, Frames 209271; S.S.F.H.A. Kommando der Waffen S.S. IIb, Fursorge, 16.11.40, Familienunterhalt, 16 November 1940 - T175 Roll 173, Frame 2708584; Tabellose Übersicht über die Zahlungsregelungen für die Waffen S.S., 31 August 1943 - ibid., Frames 2708587-607

107 Abschrift/Bü, 29 January 1942 - T175, Roll 29, Frames 2535712 - Roll 109, Frames 2633689-93, Amt Ausland/Abwehr Az Ausland Nr. 107/43, Ausl. II A2, Spanien, 13 January 1943 - T77, Roll 889, Frames 5640062-4 mentions the case of a wounded Spaniard whose pension was delayed.

of the S.S. in Rumania to stop the payment of the allowances to dependant relatives of members.¹⁰⁸ The plight of the families of ethnic German S.S. men from Hungary caused the German authorities to conclude a new agreement with the Hungarian government in June 1943.¹⁰⁹

The German government was not the only source of financial support for the families of the Western volunteers. When the Vichy régime raised Légion Tricolore to counter-balance the L.V.F. members of the former body were granted pensions and allowances similar to those of the French Army. The German government obliged that of Vichy to disband its creation, but took into L.V.F. all those members of the newer unit who cared to enlist. Since the ex-members of the Tricolore Legion continued to enjoy the special financial benefits after their transfer, these were extended to all the Frenchmen of the L.V.F.¹¹⁰ In Belgium there was no government to provide support for volunteers families but the Reimond Tollenaere Foundation was set up to assist the dependants of Flemish volunteers. Two welfare committees were set up - Solidarité Legionnaire, later renamed Honneur Légionnaire, for Walloons and Voorzorgs Komiteiten for Flemings. These were merged in to form National Assistance for the Waffen S.S. in Flanders and Vallonia.¹¹¹

108 C.d.S.S.H.A., AI(1d) Az 2. Fürsorge für die Angehörige der S.S. Freiwillige aus Rumänien, 21 October 1943 - T175, Roll 156, Frame 2686760.

109 S.S.F.H.A., B12b20/Amt V/IIb(7), 100/6.43, 29 June 1943 - T175, Roll 150, Frames 2679291-2.

110 R.O. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy (Princeton, 1966), p. 273; St. Loup, Les Volontaires (Paris, 1963), pp. 137-8.

111 Knoebel, op.cit., pp. 181, 330-1; Littlejohn, op.cit., p. 176.

Many non-Germans in the German forces were concerned not only for the financial security of their next-of-kin, but also for their physical safety. Their fears were accentuated by the difficulty that sometimes existed of obtaining reliable news of their dependants. Only the volunteers whose families were domiciled in neutral territory could be complacent.¹¹² Eastern volunteers whose families were in territory controlled by the Soviet government feared reprisals by the N.K.V.D. That these fears were not idle is indicated by the banishment of the Kalmuck, Karachai, Chechen, Ingush, Balkar and Crimean Tartar peoples from their homelands after these were regained by the Red Army.¹¹³ Where the families of legionnaires lived under British rule they could expect ostracism and perhaps internment.

Even when the families of non-German volunteers lived in German-held territory the men had cause for concern, because although postal communication was possible, it could be delayed by censorship, military movements and the disruption of transport. Much of the news that filtered through was disquieting; initially the Western legionnaires knew that their dependants enjoyed preferential treatment in rationing and in their relations with the German authorities, but Allied bombing created anxieties. A more direct menace to volunteers' families came once resistance movements gained in strength and began to assassinate collaborators.¹¹⁴ Not only did the Germans institute reprisals but also the collaborators were obliged to form defensive organisations, like

112 Even so, the home of one Swiss volunteer was searched by the police - S.S.F.H.A., Kommandoamt der Waffen S.S. Az. Ic(1) Br. 20/10 KzW/G1, 9 October 1942 - T175, Roll 105, Frame 2627608.

113 R. Conquest, The Nation Killers (London, 1970), passim.

114 Knoebel, op.cit., pp. 344-5

the Sicherheitskorps in Flanders,¹¹⁵ and the Nederlandse Landwacht.¹¹⁶

Less serious were the slights and abuse to which volunteers' families were subjected, causing the German authorities in the Germanic countries to institute punishment for those responsible.¹¹⁷ When the Allied armies drew near to the German-occupied Western countries, the anxiety of volunteers from these lands for their families increased and German authorities and native national-socialists drew up plans for evacuation. Upon the arrival of the Allied troops the remaining families of volunteers, along with other classes of collaborators, were punished, sometimes without trial.

Volunteers with relatives in the occupied Eastern areas could derive some comfort from German efforts to re-establish law and order and to re-start public utilities. But the bitter struggle that was waged behind the lines caused deterioration in the relations of the Germans with the indigenous inhabitants and imperilled the families of members of German-inspired organisations. Partisans, to give one example, intimidated Byelorussian Schutzmäner by deliberate attacks upon their families.¹¹⁸ Such incidents more

115 Ibid., p. 269

116 Der Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederl. Gebiete, Verordnung 110/43, 13 November 1943.

117 R.F.S.S., Tgb. AR28/7/42, 19 September 1942; Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlande, 8 October 1942.

118 Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer Weissruthenien, Tgb. Nr. 109/42, Partisanenbekämpfung, 13 June 1942, para. 2c - T175, Roll 140, Frame 2667855.

than offset the rations and grants of land decreed by Hitler in August 1942 for families of members of native units.¹¹⁹ As the Red Army advanced, the danger grew and many families fled westwards. German military and civil authorities assisted these Trecks,¹²⁰ as they were later to help those of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe - by providing conducting officers and by establishing transit and reception camps. Not all the authorities in the Reich itself were as co-operative and sometimes used refugees as labour on defence works. If the experience of some of the Odessa Germans in the 4th S.S. Division is any indication, families frequently lost touch with their menfolk during the exodus.¹²¹

Once families of volunteers reached comparative safety they still presented problems to German agencies because they had to be housed, clothed, fed and, if possible, employed. Wives and families of Schutzmänner from White Russia, for example, were billeted in the area of Miustkova, Schaffenwiese and south of the Lomza. Policemen with more than four children, or aged more than forty-five years stayed with their families. A policeman, with another as his deputy, was put in charge of each village, to act as Treckführer while a German N.C.O. was put in charge of every thirty houses. This settlement

119 O.K.W./W.F.St./Op. Nr. 002821/42, Weisung 46, 18 August 1942 - Trevor-Roper, op.cit., pp. 132-5 and T175, Roll 140, Frames 2268246-50.

120 Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Mitte, O.Qu/Qu 2/VII (Mil. Verw.), Br. B.Nr. 10886/44, 27 August 1944 - N02545, Case XI, Doc. Bk. 68; Ibid., Br. B. Nr. 14671/44, 15 November 1944 - NOKW 2931, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 7G.

121 4. S.S. Polizei Panzer Grenadier Division, Schematische Kriegsgliederung; 1 June 1944, appended note; Ibid., Meldung, 15 June 1944 - T175, Roll 174, Frame 2709672.

could only have been a temporary solution because the areas lay in the path of the Red Army.¹²² The families of the Caucasian and Cossack volunteers were moved to Northern Italy in 1944 accompanied by those males whose age, youth or ill-health rendered them unfit for active service. It was intended that these men should maintain order in the settlement area while providing a reservoir of manpower for Cossack and Caucasian combat units. Since Northern Italy was in the throes of civil war, the old people, women and children had exchanged the frying pan for the fire.¹²³

Some of the apprehension felt by non-German volunteers for their families was caused not by their enemies but by German organisations, Ostruppen themselves took part in security operations in which old people, women, children were killed and in which farms and villages were destroyed. This caused Eastern volunteers to realise that their own relatives might suffer from indiscriminate methods of German Bandenbekämpfung. That this was a real danger was revealed when the German 118th Jägerdivision ranged through three villages killing among others, four candidates for S.S. Division "Handschar" and the wife of one of its members.¹²⁴ Even when German counter-measures were milder there was nevertheless, the possibility that a volunteer's family might suffer, for example, in the case of the Norwegian S.S. officer who feared that his father and father-in-law had been returned to prisoner-of-war camps during a German round-up of ex-officers of the Norwegian forces.¹²⁵ In another case a

122 Schuma Brigade Siegling, Unterbringung der Familien, 19 July 1944.

123 P.A. Carnier, L'Armata Cosacca in Italia 1944-1945 (Milan, 1965), passim.

124 Einsatzkommando 2, Tgb. Nr. 622/43, 15 July 1943 - T175, Roll 140, Frame 2667958.

125 Gen. Kdo. III germ S.S. Panzerkorps, IIa, Tgb. Nr. IIa/272/43, 23 September 1943, T175, Roll 37, Frames 2547433-4

Luxemburger in the German forces heard that his family had been been deported into the "Altreich" because they were not regarded as racially pure enough to remain in the newly-annexed Grand Duchy.¹²⁶

The arrival of collaborationist families in the Reich gave it a fresh supply of labour - and also of legionaires - but these were by no means the first foreign workers to serve Germany's war economy. Apart from prisoners-of-war, there were thousands of civilians from occupied countries in German undertakings. At first the German government had endeavoured to obtain voluntary workers, but when these proved to be insufficient, workers were conscripted for service in the Reich, who because they were not volunteers, had to be kept under surveillance. Of these, the Ostarbeiter, the labourers from the U.S.S.R., because they were originally regarded as Untermensch, were particularly badly-treated. One measure of discrimination the Eastern workers found particularly offensive was that they had to wear an "Ost" badge on their clothing. The only other categories of civilians obliged to wear distinguishing marks were Jews and Polish labourers in Germany. The Eastern workers likened the badge to a "Hundemark" or a "Judenstern". The leaders of the Russian "liberation movement" and their German supporters endeavoured to have the device discontinued or changed.¹²⁷ Since Eastern volunteers had relatives and friends working in the Reich, since disabled volunteers were re-mustered as Ostarbeiter and since also Eastern workers were potential recruits for the Osteinheiten it is clear why Vlasov and his colleagues worked for an amelioration of the conditions of the Soviet citizens in Germany.

126 Der Chef der Zivilverwaltung in Luxemburg, IRV Nr. 37/II/43,
6 July 1943 - T175, Roll 37, Frames 2546755-7.
127 Verb. Offz. des O.K.W. zu R.M. f. Volksaufkl. u. Prop., 30
July 1943 - T175, Roll 29, Frame 2537005.

Religious Observance

The German Army and Navy - but not the Air Force - had Lutheran and Catholic chaplains of their own to care for the spiritual welfare of German servicemen. When the German Army accepted Catholics from Spain, France, Belgium and Croatia, their religious needs created no problem. The tradition of religious observance was so well established in the two historic arms of the German forces that the German Army permitted the non-Christians in its Indian, Arab and Turkic-Caucasian units to obey the dictates of their faith.¹²⁸ The War Diary of a Turkestané railway-construction company reveals that its Sunnite personnel were enabled to observe the Moslem feasts and fasts.¹²⁹ Since the Mosaic method of slaughtering animals for meat was contrary to German law, a special exception was made of the Moslem units in the German forces.¹³⁰

The Waffen-S.S. although not a Godless organisation, initially had no chaplains, neither did the Germanic legions associated with it. This was a serious grievance of the devout Catholic Flemings, which was aggravated by the knowledge that their Francophone compatriots in the German army were ministered to by Catholic clergy.¹³¹ It was not until July 1944 that Flemish S.S. men were officially permitted to attend Mass.¹³² The Armed S.S. began to include priests, when it

128 Sikhs, for example, were permitted to retain their unshorn hair and beards and to wear the puggaree - pictorial evidence.

129 5. (Turkest.)/Eisenbahn Bau Btl. 2., Kriegstagebuch Nr. 2 - BAMA-H14/364 - entries for 20 August, 19 September, 26 November 1944.

130 O.K.W. Nr. 142/44/W.F.St./Qu. 2 (Ost)/Verw. 1, 2 February 1944 - BA - NS 31/29.

131 Knoebel, op.cit., p. 195; Himmler preferred S.S. men to be "Gottgläubig" - ibid., pp. 50-61.

132 RF/M, 22 July 1944 - BA - NS 19 neu 1666.

when it started to recruit non-Germanic formations in 1943. The Bosnian Moslems were allowed to have an Imam with every battalion and a Mullah with every regiment.¹³³ Himmler forbade the supply of pork, alcohol and tobacco to the Moslem units and prohibited any criticism of Koranic customs by his German subordinates.¹³⁵ It was decreed that there was to be no attempt to turn Moslems into National Socialists.¹³⁶ This principle was extended to the Albanian S.S. Division and to the Osttürkische Waffenverband.¹³⁷

The Galician S.S. Division was created in 1943, literally with the blessing of Greek-Catholic clergy and it was permitted to have a number of chaplains.¹³⁸ This opened the way for other foreign S.S. formations to have Christian clergy serving with them. But a number of the clerics who served with the Waffen S.S. had not originally been appointed by that body but were "inherited" by it from other organisations. When the French Legion was absorbed into the Waffen S.S. it retained its Catholic chaplains¹³⁹ as did the Walloon units.¹⁴⁰

- 133 S.S.F.H.A. Ia, Tgb. Nr. II/3000/43, 10 May 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frame 257158; Der R.F.S.S., V.S. Tgb. Nr. 4737/43, Adj. Tgb. Nr. 2335/43, 22 July 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frames 2587134-5; Der R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. 36/262/43, 24 November 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587102.
- 134 Der R.F.S.S. Nr. 36/178/43, 22 July 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587137; Idem., Tgb. Nr. 36/175/43, V.S. Tgb. Nr. 585/43, 6 August 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587014.
- 135 Ibid.
- 136 S.S.H.A., Amt. A1, V.S. Nr. 1222/43, AI V.S. Nr. 2/43, 19 May 1943 - T 175, Roll 70, Frame 2587012.
- 137 H.S.S.P.F. Ost, 19 January 1944 - BAMA 78042/1.
- 138 O.K.H./Gen. St, d.H./Org. Abt. (II) Nr. 9572/43, 15 November 1943 and Nr. 10788/43, 21 December 1943.
- 139 Saint Loup, Les Hérétiques (Paris, 1965), p. 133.
- 140 Der R.F.S.S. 35/64/43, 24 May 1943 - NS 19 neu 27 - para 14.

Orthodox clergy accompanied the Cossacks in their trek to the Balkans and remained after their flock came under the nominal control of the S.S.¹⁴¹ Priests accompanying the Byelorussian policemen who retreated with the German forces became Regiments-Seelsorger within the 30th S.S. Division.¹⁴²

Accommodation

Volunteers from Western European countries were at first held in barracks in their own countries. The French Legion, for example occupied the Caserne Borgnis-Desbordes at Versailles.¹⁴³ Once recruits were despatched to Germany or Poland they shared manoeuvre areas or barracks with German troops. A special depôt was set up on the S.S. property in Debica to take Volksdeutsche from Hungary,¹⁴⁴ but the station was already a training area of the Armed S.S.¹⁴⁵ Until their transfer across Europe in 1943, Eastern units were formed on Soviet or Polish soil. Apart from providing the recruits with an insight into how the Germans treated conquered populations the camps themselves were frequently insalubrious. In many cases prison camps became legionary depôts

141 H.D. von Kalben, 'Zur Geschichte des XV Kosaken-Kavallerie-Korps' I, Deutsches Soldaten-Jahrbuch, XV (1963), p. 68.
 142 30. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. (russ. Nr. 2), Regiment 4, Gottesdienst, 11 August 1944-T354, Roll 160, Frame 3806238.
 143 St. Paulien, Histoire de la Collaboration (Paris, 1964), p. 244.
 144 S.S.F.H.A. Org. Tgb. Nr. 1620/42, Aufstellung eines Rekruten-Depots der Waffen S.S. auf den S.S. Tr. Üb. Pl. Debica, 17 March 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frames 2633750-1.
 145 R.F.S.S. Tgb. Nr. 742/40, S.S. Übungsplatz Debica, 28 February 1940 - T175, Roll 106, Frames 2629767-8.

at the stroke of a pen. Of the concentration of camps in Generalgouvernement Pölan the Legions Sammellager and the Vorlager of five legions were subsidiaries of prisoner-of-war camps.¹⁴⁶

The situation in the smaller conglomeration of depôts in the Ukraine, controlled by the 162nd Divisional Headquarters was no different because the Georgian depôt had been Dulag 112,¹⁴⁷ the Armenian had been Dulag 127 and the second Turkestane depôt had been Dulag 120.¹⁴⁸

Decorations

In awarding medals and decorations the German authorities treated Western European volunteers and racial Germans in the same way as Reichdeutsche. Consequently these categories were awarded Iron Crosses of all classes and up to and including the Knights Cross, Wound Badges, Assault Badges and other insignia.¹⁴⁹ A special commemorative medal was struck for members of the Spanish "Blue" Division¹⁵⁰ but awards peculiar to individual national contingents were instituted by the appropriate collaborationist body with the approval of the German authorities. In this way the Free Indian

146 The North Caucasian and Azerbaijanian Legions used Vorlager subordinated to Stalag 307, Demblin, the Armenians used Stalag 372 at Zajezerze, the Georgians used Stalag 366 at Siedlce.

147 Stammtafel des Frontstalag 112.

148 G. Tessin, Verbände und Truppen der deutsche Wehrmacht und Waffen S.S. 1939-1945, VI. Bd. (Osnabrück, 1972), pp. 321,284.

149 e.g. Legions Sturmann Gerardus Moolmann, of the Dutch Legion, won the Ritterkreuz early in 1943.

150 D. Littlejohn and C.M. Dodkins, Orders, Decorations, Medals and Badges of the Third Reich (Mountain View, 1968), p. 201.

Centre instituted medals to be awarded to the Indian Legionaries and the collaborationist political parties created "Front-fighter" bodys for the Western volunteers.¹⁵¹ The Vichy government introduced a new issue of the Croix de Guerre for the French legionaries.¹⁵² Although the German authorities normally accepted the awards instituted by their collaborators, Anton Mussert's resistance to the pan-Germanism of the S.S. caused that organisation to ban the grant of the Mussert Cross to Dutch volunteers on the Eastern front.¹⁵³

Soon after the opening of the Russian campaign, Iron Crosses were awarded to a number of Baltic volunteers. But there was considerable reluctance on the part of the German government to award Iron Crosses to Untermenschen. Consequently on 14 July 1942 a special decoration was created for members of the Ostvölker.¹⁵⁴ The good effect on the Eastern troops having a special award of their own was counteracted by the German officers ^{who when} presenting these medals thrust them unceremoniously into the recipients' hands or when the appropriate ribbons were lacking.¹⁵⁵ In time, as the

151 Beadle and Hartmann, op.cit., p. 125.

152 Ibid., p. 124.

153 D. Littlejohn, The Patriotic Traitors (London, 1972), p. 124.

154 Allgemeine Heeres Mitteilungen, IX. Jahrgang, 19. Ausgabe, Nr. 667, 21 August 1942; X, Jg. 22 Ausg., Nr. 772, 21 October 1942; X. Jg. 15 Ausg., Nr. 527, 7 July 1943; Littlejohn and Dodkins, op.cit., pp. 200-1.

155 Der Generalkommissar für die Krim, Gauleiter A.E. Frauenfeld, 10 February 1944 - T175, Roll 125, Frame 2650439.

status of the Eastern volunteers improved, they became eligible for German awards and, conversely, their German cadre qualified for the Eastern Peoples' decoration.

Discharge

The German recruits offered attractive sounding terms to non-Germans who joined the S.S. - Verfügungstruppen and the Western European Legions. Although these terms included provisions applicable only to S.S. men who had completed their engagements a number of Germanic S.S. men who were released prematurely, felt aggrieved by the arrangements made for them. In September 1941, when one hundred Flemings were discharged to serve as Belgian gendarmes, more than half of them refused to serve in that capacity, on the grounds that they had been promised German citizenship after two years' service and a career in the German police. Since these men had clearly not completed the requisite period of duty the German authorities were within their rights; but the men concerned felt cheated in that they were expected to join the Belgian rather than the German police.¹⁵⁶ Even so, the plight of these Flemish S.S. men was a happier one than a group of Danish legionaries who were discharged in November 1941 and sent to work for German firms who treated them like forced labourers until their status was rectified.¹⁵⁷

156 Knoebel, op.cit., pp. 139-40.

157 An S.S. Scharführer of Ersatzkompanie, Letter to Freikorps Danmark, 9 November 1941 - T175, Roll 67, Frame 2583396;
S.S. Scharführer William Larssen of Ersatzkompanie, Report to Freikorps Danmark, 9 November 1941 - T175, Roll 67, Frames 2583391-5;
S.S. Untersturmführer Karl Walle, Bericht, 10 November 1941 - T175, Roll 67, Frames 2583387-90.

On the other hand, there were a number of Western European volunteers who had enlisted for one years' service in the Germanic Armed S.S. units during the early months of their existence. These men had not enlisted to serve on the Eastern front yet they were retained in the Waffen S.S. after their contracts had expired and it was clear that their services were required for the duration of the war.¹⁵⁸

Postings

The multi-racial character of the Waffen S.S. and its manpower needs inevitably resulted in some of its foreign members having to serve alongside men of other races. This was particularly true of the Volksdeutsche who were recruited into the Armed S.S. before it developed divisions consisting mainly of racial Germans.¹⁵⁹

A common difficulty experienced with these individuals was an inadequate knowledge of German. This deficiency nearly cost one Volksdeutsche his life when he was mistaken for a Russian.¹⁶⁰

The language problem was shared by Western Europeans when they were sent to predominantly German units rather than to the appropriate Germanic regiment or legion.¹⁶¹ A particularly serious case was that of nine Danes with only four weeks training who fell while serving with S.S. Division "Reich".¹⁶²

158 Abschrift/Bü - Bericht eines norwegischen Kriegsfreiwilligen,
2 February 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frame 2633670.

159 i.e. the 7th, 18th and 23rd S.S. Divisions.

160 Sturmbannführer Dr. Werner Knab, Mein Kriegstagebuch, 14 August
1941 - T175, Roll 109, Frame 2632641.

161 Abschrift/Bü, Bericht eines norwegischen Kriegsfreiwilligen,
2 February 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frames 2633669-70.

162 C.d. S.S.H.A., Tgb. Nr. 26/42, Freiwillige aus germanischen
Ländern, 9 February 1942 - T175, Roll 109, Frame 2633658.

Conversely a number of North Schleswigers who wished to serve in the Armed S.S. proper found themselves in the Danish Free Corps.¹⁶³ Even this would have been preferred by another group who found themselves in the Dutch Legion.¹⁶⁴

When the Germanic Legions were disbanded their survivors were simply taken into the new Germanic S.S. Corps without being consulted, since their continued service was essential to the strength and character of the new formation.¹⁶⁵ Men who had volunteered to fight Bolshevism in the ranks of national units rather than in the Armed S.S. itself maintained that with the dissolution of the Germanic Legions, their contractual obligations were at an end.¹⁶⁶ Some Dutchmen¹⁶⁷ and Flemings¹⁶⁸ felt sufficiently strongly about the issue to refuse to take the oath of the S.S.

- 163 Ortsgruppen Leiter Tingleff, Abschrift der Abschrift, 26 August 1942 - T175, Roll 29, Frames 2535718-9; N.S.D.A.P.N.S., Kreisleitung Hadersleben, 31 August 1942 - ibid., Frames 2535702-6. Such service was contrary to Himmler's order: R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. AK 1271, 22 April 1942 - ibid., Frames 2535707-8.
- 164 Sturmann A. Carstensen, F.P. Nr. 40112, 11 July 1942 - T175, Roll 29, Frame 2535711.
- 165 R.F.S.S., RF/Bn. Aufstellung des Germanischen Korps, 3 March 1943 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635157-62.
- 166 Bartetzko, op.cit., pp. 92-3.
- 167 De Heerbannleider J. Meulenberg, 14 January 1944 - RVO-BDC-H263-2915-6; Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer beim Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, Az. Nr. 6117/44, 9 February 1944 - ibid., 29012.
- 168 L. Moons, Letter, Der Freiwillige, X, Jg. Heft 3 (1964), p. 26. There were also French legionaries who resented their transfer to the Armed S.S. - Larbat, op.cit., p. 252; St. Loup, Les Hérétiques (Paris, 1965), p. 120.

Abuse

Apart from the failure of the German government to fulfil its contractual obligations to foreign volunteers, considerable ill-feeling was generated by comparatively junior German instructors entrusted with military training and the maintenance of discipline in foreign units. Not content with seeking to apply Frederician standards to their non-German charges they subjected them to racialist abuse when they failed to measure up to them.

Disillusionment came early in the military career of many of the Flemish legionaries. It was customary for recruits in training to be ridiculed and abused for their shortcomings by their instructors. But Flemings were stigmatised as "filthy people", "a nation of idiots", and as "a race of Gypsies". German instructors expressed such sentiments as "If these are the best, what are the others like" and "Such people want to be accepted into our Reich". In addition, they informed later drafts of Flemings that their predecessors who had died were cowards, who had not fired a shot and referred to the Flemish tongue as a "Russian language".¹⁶⁹ When Staf de Clerq, the Flemish national leader, brought the matter to Himmler's notice, the Reichführer was incensed, for he realised the detrimental effect this could well have on recruiting. The company commander who was

169 Staf de Clerq, S.S. - Dol - 17-2-225/42, Vermerk, 25 March 1942 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635482-6; Steiner, op.cit., pp. 124-5; Stein, op.cit., p. 154; Bartzko, op.cit., p. 79; Knoebel, op.cit., pp. 195, 197-8.

to blame had been killed but the sergeant-major at fault was ordered to report to Himmler in person. Thenceforward the Grand Master of the S.S. instituted courses at Sennheim for the German officers of the Germanic legions.¹⁷⁰

The Flemish legionaries were particularly unfortunate that they had no commander of their own race to champion their cause. The Dutch, Norwegian and Danish legions were led by officers from their own armies but these were soon involved in disputes with the S.S. These officers were not Fascists nor National Socialists so much as nationalists and anti-Communists who wished to keep their units apolitical. Had they been dealing with the German Army, which traditionally kept aloof from politics, they would probably have had no friction. Unfortunately for the Scandinavian and Dutch legionaries, the S.S. had charge of them and regarded them as potential S.S. men and pioneers of a pan-German state.

In view of the insults heaped upon Germanic volunteers from Flanders, the vilification of Eastern volunteers was predictable. The German national-socialist leaders categorised the population of the U.S.S.R. as Untermensch and regarded Slavs as being on a par with Jews. Himmler, himself, referred to his own police units as "wilden Völker".¹⁷¹ Even the Germans serving with the Ost units who should have realised the fallacy of the official German evaluation of the Eastern population addressed their charges as "Wilde", "Tuschen",

170 Der R.F.S.S., Tgb. Nr. 1177/42, 13 April 1942 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635395-7-BA-NS neu 1666; Knoebel, op.cit., p. 199: Himmler had in fact already reserved appointments in the Legions to himself - Der R.F.S.S., to Jüttner, 20 March 1942 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635393-4.

171 Himmler, Speech at Posen, 4 October 1943 - 1919PS.

"Hottentotten", "Mongolen", "Buschmänner", "Bolschewiken" and "Partisanersätz". These last two terms of abuse may have held a grain of truth in the case of many of the volunteers but, even so, it was tactless to use them. One of the mildest appellations was "Beutekameraden".¹⁷² Eventually, in order to gain the maximum advantage from the Russian Liberation Movement and to obtain Ukrainians for the S.S., the "Untermensch" booklet was officially discontinued.

German cadre members frequently had no wish to leave their own units to serve with Ostseinheiten and, consequently, were embittered against their charges. The situation was aggravated when other Germans called the cadre members "Raubtierbändiger", "Sklavenaufscher" and "Hottentotfürsten".¹⁷³ In these circumstances German officers and N.C.O.'s would vent their indignation upon their foreign subordinates. On some occasions strangers to the Eastern soldierry gave unnecessary offence, as in the case of the German officer from the notorious penal unit "Dirlewanger" who addressed members of the Moslem S.S. Regiment at Warsaw as "Schweine".¹⁷⁴

172 G.V. Mende 'Erfahrungen mit Ostfreiwilligen in der deutschen Wehrmacht während des zweiten Weltkrieges', Vielvölker-Heere und Koalitionskriege (Doomstadt, 1952), p. 30; Anon., 'Erfahrungen eines Betreuungs offiziers für Freiwillige aus den Völkern der Sowjetunion in der deutschen Wehrmacht', ibid., p. 35.

173 Anon., 'Erfahrungen eines Betreuungs offiziers für Freiwillige aus den Völkern der Sowjetunion in der deutschen Wehrmacht', op.cit., p. 35.

174 Der Kommandeur des Ost-türk Verbandes, 20 September 1944 - BA - NS 31/44.

The lack of consideration and ill-treatment shown to its foreign troops by the Third Reich and its servants had a depressing effect upon enlistments-in Norway, one group of former Waffen S.S. men conducted propaganda against German recruiting measures.¹⁷⁵ While most of the non-German soldiery accepted their lot, some deserted while visiting their homes, others did so at the front. Among the Eastern troops were some units which surrendered and others which went over to the enemy.

175 C.d.S.S.H.A., Amt VI Az. 2a 10, 12 October 1942.

Chapter Twelve - Non-Germans in Action

The Eastern Front

The record of the non-Germans serving with the Wehrmacht and the Waffen S.S. is punctuated by cases of misbehaviour and indiscipline. There are reports of friction between Germans and non-Germans, leading in some cases to assaults and even murder. The story of the foreign units is marred by accounts of individual desertion, mass defection and mutiny. The earliest evidence of an unsatisfactory state-of-affairs is found after the German attack upon the U.S.S.R. and among newly-raised Eastern units, even among the inhabitants of invaded territories who had sided with the Germans. Indeed, many of the incidents are attributable to frustrated nationalism. Baltic and Ukrainian nationalist had their hopes of independence dashed by the German suppression of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian provisional governments, following which their armed groups were dissolved often forcibly.¹ Yet when they were reorganised by the Germans into security units, nationalists still regarded these as the nuclei of future armies. There was, almost inevitably, friction with commanding officer and his replacement by a German.²

Indisciplined even criminal behaviour disinclined the German security forces to entrust the indigenous Ordnungsdienst with pistols³ but it had great need of local assistance in its task and there early developed partisan activity in the woods and swamps through which ran the communications of the German ground forces. In spite of German misgivings, indigenous security units were armed and expanded to meet the challenge of Soviet partisans.⁴

1. Der Chef der Sipo und des S.D.IV A 1B Nr. 1 B/41, Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr.14, 6th July 1941 - NOKW 2940, Case XII, Doc Bk 9N.

2. A. Silgailis, Latviesu Legions (Copenhagen, 1966), p.17.

3. Der Chef der Sipo und des S.D.IV A1 - B Nr. 1 B/41 Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.R. Nr.67, 29 August 1941 - NO 2837, Case XII, Doc. Bk.0L.

4. See, for example, the long list of Schutzmannschaft-Bataillone in Neufeld, Huck, Tessin, op.cit., II, 101-9

At the close of 1941, the counter-intelligence officer of Korück 553 collated reports from seven of its subordinate units, which had established Ortliche Selbstschutz. From these reports it appeared that part of that body was armed, part was not, while the general view of the German units was that the Selbstschutz was not absolutely reliable and needed to be carefully supervised.⁵ That the need for these measures continued is revealed by the report of another rear area commander, in the following autumn, which indicated that one member of the Ordnungsdienst had been shot by the S.D., while elsewhere two others had been arrested on suspicion of being "bandits".⁶

Although thirty Ukrainian members of a Reithundertschaft took to the woods near Polotsk⁷, it was more common and simpler for Ukrainians to desert in their own territory. German occupational policies and ruthless security measures alienated the native militiamen upon whom the invaders became increasingly dependent.⁸ Nationalists and anti-Communists were not inclined to desert to the Soviet side but in the Ukraine there was an alternative in the nationalist armed bands of U.P.A. or lesser organizations. Desertions from Ukrainian police units reached such a scale that large areas fell under the control of U.P.A.⁹

5. Tätigkeitsberichte der Abteilungen von Korück 553, 16.5.41 - 31.3.42, Abt. Ic., entry of 1 January 1942 NOKW 1866, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9M.

6. Tätigkeitsbericht des Korück 590, 1.10.42 - 31.12.42, entries for 23 October and 12 November 1942 - NOKW 2389, Case XII, Doc. Bk. 9F.

7. Sicherungsdivision 285, 13 June 1942 - NOKW 2211, Case XII. The unit was possibly a "century" belong to that Division.

8. Armstrong, op.cit., p.p. 143, 148-9.

9. Ibid., p.156.

Desertion also took place on a more modest scale which in some cases may indicate that it was motivated solely by personal dissatisfaction or homesickness. At the end of May 1942 one Secret Field Police group reported the absence of a member of a Freiwillige Tartarenabteilung,^{10.} while, a few days later, an Army Rear Area was organising the pursuit of three volunteers from Russische Sicherungsgruppe 188. The records do not relate why these men fled nor where they went but they do also indicate a small number of cases of desertion by German soldiers.^{11.} The comrades of the foreigners who deserted remained at their posts, performing their duties and suffering casualties. Nevertheless irregular warfare created fluid conditions which made desertion comparatively easy. There is, moreover, evidence that Soviet partisan groups deliberately set out to eliminate the Schutzmannschaften in Byelorussia by attacking solitary posts, murdering policemen and their families.^{12.}

Even where Eastern legionary battalions were involved there were cases of mutiny and desertion. OKW/Amt Ausland Abwehr II formed the Sonderverbänd Bergmann in the autumn of 1941, using prisoners-of-war and defectors, who had their roots in the Caucasus, in order to facilitate the German advance through that region. The unit later gave a good account of itself and was, in fact, expanded to form three battalions, all of which were still existing in March 1945.^{13.} But before the original unit was sent to the front a plot was uncovered which, had it succeeded, would have delivered the battalion to the Red Army. Members of a Communist cell endeavoured to win over machine-gunners and the crews of the unit's heavy weapons to their plan for killing the German officers and instructors and those legionaries who would not join the conspiracy. Some of the men approached by the conspirators gave evidence against them, which was confirmed by the diary of one of the plotters. Three officers, three aspirants, two junior NCO's and four private soldiers were convicted and executed, while one officer, one aspirant and two soldiers were acquitted.^{14.}

10. Gruppe G.F.P. 647, Tgb.Nr.183/42, 25 May 1942, para.5-NOK.W 852, Case XII, Doc.Blk.9J.

11. Koruck 583(?), Kriegstagebuch, 2 June 1942-NOKW 2119, Case XII, Doc.Blk 9E

12. H.S.S.P.F. Weissruthenien, Tgb.Nr.109/42, 13 June 1942-T175, Roll 11140, Frame 2667855

13. General der Freiw. Verbände im O.K.H., Nr.702/45, Schematische Gliederung der landeseigenen Verbände, Stand 27.3.45-BAMA-H1/153-T78, Roll 413

14. F.L. Carsten, 'A Bolshevik Conspiracy in the Wehrmacht' Slavonic and East European Review, 1969, XXXVII pp.483-509.

During the summer of 1942 an Armenian battalion, possibly 808, was taking part in the southwards thrust when part of it deserted. At the same time a Georgian battalion, possibly 705, reacted in the same way.¹⁵ These events were a contributory cause of Hitler's Weisung 46, relating to partisan warfare, which banned the use of indigenous units at the front.¹⁶ Defection was the reason for the conversion of the second Georgian infantry unit into Turk-Nachschubs-Bataillon (Georgisches) 706.¹⁷ This instance of unreliability probably prompted Hitler's expression on 12 December 1942, of his distrust of Armenian and Georgian units and of his preference for Moslem ones.¹⁸

The S.S. experienced disillusionment with some of the men recruited for Operation "Zeppelin" and despatched four Russian agents, who apparently knew too much - for them to be returned to prisoner-of-war camp, to Auschwitz for execution.¹⁹ Personnel surplus to the requirements of "Zeppelin" were organised into a force known as "Druzhina" and named after its Russian commander Rodionov, who also used the nom de guerre of "Gil". The "Bataillon Rodjanoff" stopped a gap in the line and served against partisans behind the central sector of the front.²⁰ During the night of 24th-25th November 1942, at Kolitschevo, the First Company, in the strength of one Russian Kompanieführer and sixty-three men took to the woods carrying their light and heavy weapons with them, having killed five Germans and wounded others. The defectors thereafter operated in the Stary Bychov area, where they represented a threat to the still-loyal part of the battalion and to the pro-Germans among the inhabitants of the area.²¹

15. Reitlinger, op.cit., pp.305-6. Neither of these units had reached its home area.

16. OK.W/W.F.St./Op.Nr.002821/42, 14 August 1942-T175, Roll 140, Frames 2268246-50 and Trevor-Roper, op.cit., pp.132-5.

17. Hoffmann, op.cit., p.132 (footnote).

18. Warlimont, op.cit., p.293, Fischer, op.cit., pp.50-1

19. Execution orders, 25 November and 5 December 1942-N0544-6, NG4742.

20. A. Dallin and R.S. Mavrogordato, 'Rodionov'. A Case-Study in Wartime Redefection, American Slavic and East European Review, Vol.XVII, Nr.1(1959) pp.26-7.

21. Höhere S.S. und Polizeiführer Russland Mitte, Abt.Ia, Tgb. Nr.134/42 27 November 1942 - T.175, Roll 225, Frame 2764163

The desertion of Gil-Rodjonov's first company was apparently the last straw for the Higher S.S. and Police Leader for the Central Army group who wrote to the indigenous units under his command, drawing their attention of the "Terrorakten, Sabotage, Desertationen, u.s.w." perpetrated by foreign units. His remedy was immediate and careful examination of foreign officers, N.C.O.'s and men, including seemingly-reliable Ukrainians because some who had been regarded as extremely reliable had only a short time before formulated plots and mutinies.²² Recognition of the importance of a thorough examination of volunteers had come too late. Another headquarters, nearly four months later, stated that the use of natives in complete Eastern units "hat sich bewährt". On the other hand, individual O.D. Männer in their own villages could not be adequately supervised and were exposed to danger from the "bandits".²³ By the time this was written, however Germany had lost a complete Army, thousands of Roumanian allies, the Croät Legion²⁴ and at least one Turk battalion.²⁵ From this time the behaviour of non-German units was to provide a barometer of the course of the war.

Hitler's faith in Moslem fighting men was found to be ill-placed for, on 4 March 1943, a Secret Field Police unit reported that a few days previously, no less than five hundred and fifty-seven members of a Volga Tartar battalion - clearly the majority of its members - had gone over to the "bandits".²⁶ These men possibly belonged to Bataillon 825, which was reduced in March 1943 to two companies of which the second became part of a German construction battalion.²⁷ The first company continued as an independent guard company and stayed in the Eastern theatre at least until March 1945, so its members, presumably, remained loyal to the German cause.²⁸

22. Ibid., Tgb. Nr. 1407/42, 4 December 1942-T175, Roll 225, Frames 2764153-4.

23. General-Kommando XXXIII. A.K., Abt.Ia/Nr.462/43(471), Erfahrungen in der Bandenbekämpfung, 29 March 1943-NOKW 457, Case XII, Doc.Bk.9F

24. H. Schroeter, Stalingrad (London, 1958) passim.

25. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 February 1943

26. Gruppe G.F.P. 717, Tgb.Nr.A/111/43, 4 March 1943-NOKW 706, Case XII, Doc. Bk.9F.

27. As 4.(volgatat.) Kompanie/Dau Btl.18

28. Gen. d. Freiw. Verb. im O.K.H., Nr.703/45, 27 March 1945-BAMA-II1/153

The defection of the bulk of this "Idel-Ural" battalion may perhaps be put to the credit of the Communists among the Legion's own propagandists, who were probably also responsible for escapes and attempted escapes from the depot at Radom.²⁹ The news that some Eastern battalions were being moved to Western Europe may also have been a contributory factor. In August 1943, the Gestapo, conducting a search of the Legion's quarters, found leaflets produced by the Communist cell and arrested those responsible, who were subsequently punished.³⁰ This did not stamp out disaffection among the legionaries for, early in 1944, a German munitions undertaking reported the desertion of twenty-one Tartars guarding a Jewish camp near Radom.³¹ Those men may have belonged to a Werkschutz group or to one of the three Tartar battalions left behind when their depot moved to France. It is perhaps, indicative of the limited faith the Germans had in these three units that two of them, 828 and 830, were converted into B&u units, apparently before they saw any service, and the other, 829, was dissolved in Poland.³² It should be noted, however, that these two construction battalions were still existing, and in the Eastern theatre as late as the end of March 1945.³³

Great-Russian battalions were not exempt from the restlessness which affected the battalions of minority-members. In May 1943, Koruck 584, the rear area commander of the German 16th Army, reported increasing cases of desertion from Ost (Freijäger) Bataillon 668, in spite of exchanging unsuitable German NCO's. The unit was, consequently, a very unreliable one with small battle and employment value. The majority of the unit's Russian personnel had come from prison camp from which they had been more or less drafted. They had not been selected for their reliability and those who had volunteered had done so for opportunist reasons, including the hope of escaping.³⁴

29. L. Nebenzahl, 'Mussa Dshalil-Dichter und Kampfer' Probleme der Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (East Berlin, 1958), passim

30. Ibid.

31. Armament Command Radom, Central Group, Wi./I.D.1.4, War Diary, 15 April 1944 and 5 May 1944.

32. It may have been destroyed in the Russian advance.

33. Gen. d. Freiw. Verb. im O.K.H., Nr.702/45, 27 March 1945-BALIA-III/153

34. Korück 584, Kdr.d.Osttruppen z.b.V., May 1943-NOKW 2397, Case XII.

Members of the Ukrainian militia continued to defect in order to join Nationalist or Soviet partisan groups but in the summer of 1943 they were not the only unreliable elements in the Ukraine since Hiwis were reported as deserters and Cossack battalions were alleged to have mutinied. These circumstances prompted Gauleiter Koch, no friend of the native population, to declare that the local formations employed by the Wehrmacht and Police had "wenig bewährt."³⁵

In 1943 "SS Verband Drushina" having participated in the anti-partisan sweep known as "Kottbus" served in Byelorussia until 18th August, when Gil-Rodionov took part of his force over to the partisans, killing a number of Germans and several Russians who wished to remain loyal to them.³⁶ The volte face of an Eastern security unit on 17th August and its handing over of a railway station to Soviet partisans allegedly provoked Hitler's decision to dissolve the Osttruppen which was later modified into their transfer to the West.³⁷ It may well have been the action of this particular S.S. unit which produced Hitler's order moving the Army's Eastern units to Western Europe. Nevertheless Rodionov's action was one of a series of events which continued after his defection, although the later examples of desertion may have been stimulated, at least in part, by the realisation that all Eastern combat units were being moved far from their homes.³⁸

35. Der Reichskommissar für die Ukraine VI 7422, Tgb. Nr. 378/43, Bandenlage, 25 June 1943-T175, Roll 140.

36. Dallin and Mavrogordato, op.cit. pp. 27-33

37. Reithinger, op.cit. p.344

38. The German field post-office number indicate that only those used by the headquarters and first battalion of Druzhina were cancelled in 1943, whereas those for the other three battalions remained in force until 1945. Since documents of the Ost-Turk formation of the S.S. reveal that it received men recruited by the "Zeppelin" organisation and later used by the S.D. it would appear that these men served the Germans satisfactorily until the time of their transfer.

The wave of dismay and dissatisfaction that passed through the indigenous Eastern units during the summer of 1943, affected those of Korück 580. There were, for example, desertions from the 2nd Company of Ostbataillon 630 on 1st August and 2nd September 1943.³⁹ That this Company was not particularly unfortunate in its personnel is revealed in a report of Regimentsstab z.b.V. 709, its parent headquarters, which shows that, between 1st and 4th September 1943, while the "Regiment" was passing through the Briansk Forest, it lost fifty-four Russian N.C.O.s and men through desertion.⁴⁰ The three infantry battalions were among those scheduled to move westwards and this probably stimulated further desertions. In any event, the 2. Kompanie of the 630th Battalion lost more of its members on 12th November 1943.⁴¹ An explanation of what happened in this Battalion, and perhaps in others, may be found in a report written later by a German officer to the headquarters of Ostbataillon 630, drawing its attention to the state of affairs in the 1st Company. He pointed out that most of its personnel were prisoners and defectors, taken in the Beloy pocket from an élite Russian division. After a short time in a prison camp at Jazevo, without proper investigation of the personnel, they had been sent to form the Company. The sub-unit had fought against Soviet partisans in the Briansk woods without causing any trouble until - significantly - the German front began to fall back. A long period in action without any respite caused an increase in the number of cases of defection and this led, in turn, to frequent changes in the Russian Company Commander.⁴²

39. Namenverzeichnis der 8.Kp. Freiw. Btl. 582, 13 February 1944

40. Regimentsstab z.b.V. 709, 7 September 1943

41. Namen's Verzeichnis der 8. Kp. Freiw. Btl. 582, 13 February 1944.

42. 1(Ost)/Gren. Rgt. 857, Stimmung in der Truppe, 14 April 1944

Indigenous personnel were not the only unreliable elements on the Eastern front. There were two cases of cowardice amongst Volksdeutsche serving in the anti-aircraft unit of S.S. Division "Nord" as early as August 1941.⁴³ The "Totenkopf" Division of the S.S. was another formation to receive Volksdeutsche, some of whom came under the criticism of their commander, Theodor Eicke. In November 1941, he complained about the ethnic Germans in his Division on two grounds of which the first was that they were not physically fit. The men concerned could hardly be blamed for this since they came from communities which had suffered during the economic depression or from the over-populous peasant societies of South-Eastern Europe; but they lacked the stamina for long periods of combat. Not only was the flesh weak but in many cases the spirit was not willing either, as Eicke noted, when he mentioned the tendency of racial Germans to disobey and to "dodge the column", using their inability to comprehend the German language as a means of avoiding unpleasant tasks. There had even been cases of cowardice in Eicke's Division, which caused him to declare that he had no use for indisciplined and dishonest scoundrels and criminals.⁴⁴

43. Sturmabannführer Dr. Werner Knab, Mein Kriegstagebuch, 14 August 1941 - T175, Roll 109, Frame 2632641.

44. Gruppenführer Eicke, Erfahrungen über den Nachersatz, 15 November 1941 - T 175, Roll 108, Frames 2632012-6

Volksdeutsche belonging to German units frequently deserted or went absent when stationed in or visiting their home areas. As a consequence of this, from June 1942, leave to Hungary was restricted.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, when minors from Hungary who had joined the S.S. illegally returned home it was not unknown for parents to report their sons' presence to the Hungarian Gendarmerie in order to prevent them from returning to their units.⁴⁶ Elsewhere the situation was worse, in June 1943 Himmler asked the Higher S.S. and Police Leader Vistula about the reported combination of deserters and "bandits" in Tucheler Heide.⁴⁷ The answer stated that the "bands" consisted of "Germanisable" men, who were avoiding military service or who had fled while on leave.⁴⁸ In the following month it was decided to restrict leave to Lower Styria and the Upper Krain since members of the Wehrmacht and Waffen S.S. had been forcibly recruited into partisan groups in the area. It is possible that some of the men involved did not go reluctantly.⁴⁹

- 45. S.S.F.H.A., Kdo. Amt. der Waffen S.S., Abt. Ia, Tgb. Nr. 3660/42, 23 June 1942 - T175, Roll 140, Frame 2668514.
- 46. Gen. Kdo. III. germ. S.S. Panzerkorps, Adj. Abt. I Ib Be, Tgb. Nr. 165/43, 15 December 1943 - BALA -64325
- 47. R.F.S.S., Fs. RF/Dn, 9 June 1943-T175, Roll 140, Frame 2667673.
- 48. H.S.S.P.F. Weichsel, Telegramm Nr. 11877, 13 June 1943-T175 Roll 140, Frame 2667682. There was a similar situation in neighbouring Danzig - West Prussia - S.S. Rottenführer Walter Wraase, 9 January 1944 - T175, Roll 140, Frame 2667917.
- 49. S.S.F.H.A., R31d 10/Amt. V/I Ib(5) II511e/43, 15 July 1943 - T175, Roll 140, Frame 2667644.

Indiscipline was also encountered among German personnel on the Eastern front. As early as March 1942, the Commander of Regiment "Nordland" noted that replacements for his regiment's casualties had low morale and were not the kind of men the Waffen S.S. wanted.⁵⁰ In that month a Norwegian and a Dane, both belonging to Division "Wiking", went over to the Red Army.⁵¹ In June of the same year it was felt necessary for the S.S. Führungshauptamt to ban home leave for volunteers not only from Hungary, but also from Sweden, except in special cases.⁵² Some Dutchmen, two racial Germans and two Swedes absconded from Division "Wiking" in September 1943.⁵³ Late in 1942 special punishment platoons had been established for legionaries and Germanic S.S. men.⁵⁴

50. S.S. Regiment Nordland, Anlage zu Ic, Tgb. Nr.21/42, 15 March 1942 - T175, Roll 107, Frames 2631091-2.

51. Ibid., 2./S.S. Regiment Nordland, Verlustmeldung, 12 March 1942 - T175 Roll 107, Frame 2631083-4, I./S.S. Regiment Nordland, Kdr., Stellungnahme, 13 March 1943 - ibid. Frame 2631090, I. Ehrenburg op.cit. p.168

52. S.S. F.H.A., Kdo. der Waffen S.S., Abt.Ia, Tgb. Nr. 3660/42, 23 June 1942 - T 175, Roll 140, Frame 2608514.

53. Gen. Kdo.III germ. S.S. Panzerkorps, IIa, Nr. 270/43, 20 September 1943 ibid., Nr. 293/43, 29th September 1943 - both in BAMA 64325

54. S.S. F.H.A., Kdo. Amt. der Waffen S.S., Org. Tgb. Nr. 6560/42, 20th October 1942 - T175, Roll 111, Frames 2635435-6.

Of the army-sponsored legions the Spanish Division gave a good account of itself in fighting on the Eastern front.⁵⁵ Behind the lines its behaviour incurred the criticism of the German security police for its tardiness in reaching the line which was in part due to the sale of some of the formation's horses. Members of the Blue Division sold other items of equipment, plundered and assaulted women.⁵⁶ Worse was to come, in the summer of 1942 twenty Spanish replacements deserted to the enemy.⁵⁷

The Osttruppen in the West

Although there were several cases of desertion by and from Eastern units facing the Red Army and Communist partisans, many of the charges of unreliability levelled at these units arise from their conduct while they were serving in the West. An assessment of the value of the Osttruppen must take into account the circumstances of their service in Western Europe. In the first place it had not originally been envisaged by the members of the Eastern units, nor by their sponsors, that they would serve anywhere but in the Eastern theatre-of-operations. The move westwards was a bitter blow for those who hoped to turn the Osttruppen into an army, or armies, of "liberation." For the individual legionary it meant that he was moved far from his home with hope of ultimate return steadily diminishing while the German cause suffered repeated set-backs.

55. O'Dallance, op.cit., passim.

56. Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des S.D. IVA1 - B Nr.1 B/41, Ereignissmeldung U.d.S.S.H. Nr. 136, 21 November 1941 - N02822, Case XII, Doc. Hk. 0M - ,II. The racial purists of the S.D. were particularly offended that the Spaniards had had relations with Jewesses. The general prohibition of contact with Polish women allegedly provoked a demonstration by the Spaniards near Warsaw - G. Ciano, Diary (London, 1947), p.403

57. Abschrift - Bericht vom 3.9.42 über die Lage in Spanien - 2. Bericht - T77, Roll Frame 5640391.

During 1943 and the first five months of 1944, the majority of the Eastern units which had been moved westwards occupied positions in or behind the Atlantic Wall.⁵⁸ Of the rifle battalions in the Seventh Army, twenty-three, one sixth, consisted of Soviet citizens.⁵⁹ Their presence in the West relieved German battalions for the Ostfront, which in other cases they expanded the static regiments with which they were associated.⁶⁰ Until the Allied landings the German command probably found that the arrangement was tolerable, although the Osttruppen did not always measure up to German standards of behaviour - one unit is alleged to have stolen barbed wire from its German neighbour.⁶¹ For the clash which the German commander in the West knew was inevitable he would have preferred to have had the German units which had been sent eastwards, even though they were numerically inferior to the Eastern battalions.

Apart from constructing and occupying coastal positions, the Eastern units in Western Europe were expected to participate in operations against resistance movements.⁶² The German security forces failed to suppress the various guerilla organisations, although they achieved minor successes, to which the Eastern units probably contributed. As in the East, counter-insurgency provided opportunities for individuals to defeat or desert, but with the important difference that the legionary was completely alien to the freedom - fighters against whom he operated.

58. e.g. Ostbataillone 635, 642, III. Mitte.

59. G.A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, 1951), p. 146. LXXXIV. Armeekorps of the 7th Army had forty-two rifle battalions of which eight consisted of Osttruppen.

60. Ostbataillone 629, 633, 642, 643 provided IVth Battalions for Grenadier Regiments 899, 852, 736, 582.

61. Reitlinger, op.cit., p.347.

62. Armeegruppe G (Führungsabteilung), Kriegstagebuch Nr.2, 8 July 1944 -

The westwards shift of the Eastern combat units had also been accompanied by internal reorganisation and changes in personnel that were not always for the better. The report on the 1st Company of Ostbataillon 630 reveals that it received unreliable elements from the former Stübskompanie.⁶³ In the course of the changes, the German cadre was increased and the Company received a German commander. Yet the former Russian commander remained with the Company. He, naturally felt that he had been demoted, and altered orders given by his German successor.⁶⁴

Other functionaries in 1./630 did not measure up to their tasks; the Russian Hauptfeldwebel - the Company Sergeant-Major, no less - was allegedly an alcoholic and had to be returned to a prison camp. The officers of the Company were satisfactory but the N.C.O.s, although experienced, were unsuitable as instructors. The German Rechnungsführer had been reported to the authorities as a Marxist. There was no trust between the German and Russian members of the Company and the author of the report did not consider his sub-unit to be reliable. At the time of writing the Company was peaceful because its politically unreliable members had been identified and their leaders expelled. Nevertheless, the author of the report advocated further expulsions - of the "old" Russian officers, presumably those who had been superseded, and of the former officers of the Red Army, who were probably serving in the ranks, together with all those men known to be trouble-makers. In all, these amounted to some thirty men - a substantial part of the Company.⁶⁵

63. 1.(Ost)/Grenadier Regiment 857, 14 April 1944.

64. The supplanting of foreign officers by Germans took place in other units, too. Some Turkestani officers were, in fact, discharged from the Osttruppen to become Ostarbeiter-Lebenslauf of Untersturmführer Kuliew - BAMA - 78042/2

65. 1.(Ost)/Gren. Rgt.857, 14 April 1944.

For the Osttruppen in the West, D-Day was the moment of truth when they had to decide whether to fight alongside the Germans or not. The legionaries had no quarrel with the Western Allies and could surrender to them without fear of immediate retribution. But they could only negotiate with these Western forces with great difficulty, far greater than in communicating with Soviet citizens. Nevertheless verbal contacts were sometimes possible and this enabled individuals and groups to surrender to the Allies or to defect to the resistance. This was often made possible by the presence of Allied soldiers of Russian origin who could act as interpreters^{66.} or because legionaries had learned the vernacular of the population among whom they were serving. It has not been established whether the Soviet security department, N.K.V.D., had agents operating in the West among Osttruppen^{67.} but individual Eastern units apparently contained their own cells which conducted clandestine propaganda^{68.} and established links with the Communists of the Resistance.

Accounts of the behaviour of non-German units in France vary considerably. Some Eastern units were quickly involved in the fighting for the beachheads. There is general agreement that the battalion numbered 439, commanded by a Major Becker, fought hard in the vicinity of Carentan.^{69.} In spite of the praise it earned, the unit was disbanded after the fighting.^{70.} A similar unit numbered 441 at La Riviere disintegrated, thereby jeopardising the whole German position.^{71.} Perhaps the truth is that it fought until it reached a point where army battalion, Eastern or German, would have broken. At all events it was not reformed. Two other predominantly Russian battalions were recorded as fighting well - these numbered 635 and 642⁷³ nevertheless the former was disbanded.^{74.}

66. Harrison, op.cit., p.342 states that a Russian-speaking, American prisoner-of-war persuaded the remnants of the 795 th Georgian Battalion to surrender.

67. M.R.D. Foot, S.O.E. in France (London, 1968), p.451

68. For example leaflets were circulated among Georgian legionaries - photocopies supplied to the author by Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis.

69. Berliner Borsen Zeitung, 15 June 1944.

70. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt(I)Nr.19938/44, 14 October 1944 - DAMA -III/178

71. Harrison, op.cit., p.323

72. J. Thorwald, Wenn Sie verderben wollen (Stuttgart, 1952), p.396, citing*

73. Thorwald, op.cit., p.396.

74. OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt(I)Nr.19938/44, 14 October 1944.

*the diary of Oberstleutnant Hansen, Chief of Staff to the Commander of Volunteer Formations in the West.

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Georgisches Infanteriebataillon 795 was in the vicinity of Sainte Mère Église, one of whose inhabitants recorded how the Georgians put up a hard fight against American parachutists.⁷⁵ Part of the unit at Turqueville, according to the official U.S. Army history, fought well until a Russian-speaking American persuaded them to surrender.⁷⁶ Nevertheless this unit is probably the one praised in the German press of the period.⁷⁷ Another Georgian battalion, the 799th, was recorded as fighting well⁷⁸ and, in fact, survived to be sent to Denmark.⁷⁹ Yet a sister battalion of these two, the 797th, mutinied on 11 June 1944 and allegedly murdered a German captain,⁸⁰ for which lapse it was disbanded.⁸¹

The staff officer who recorded cases of bravery and treachery by Eastern units had other instances of disaffection to register; on 6th September the remnants of Volga-Tartar Battalion 827 allegedly disbanded.⁸² Nevertheless the unit was still listed as late as 27 March 1945.⁸³ On 6th September he recorded that from the Brest "Fortress", two hundred and three absconded from the 800th North Caucasian Battalion, and fifty-three from the 633rd Russian Battalion.⁸⁴ On the other hand, Volga-Tartar Battalion 827 dug fortifications for a number of German formations. When these were relieved, the Tartars were not. The unit collapsed and was reported to have been disbanded on 20th September 1944.⁸⁵ In spite of this, the unit was still listed on March 1945.⁸⁶

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75. A. Renaud, Sainte Mère Eglise (Monaco, 1945), p.74, p.77

76. G.A. Harrison, ^{op.cit.} p.342

77. Kölnische Zeitung, 23 June 1944

78. Thorwald, op.cit., p.401, citing Hansen's diary for 9 August 1944

79. Gen. d. Freiw. Verb. im O.K.H., Nr. 702/45, 27 March 1945.

80. Thorwald, op.cit., p.396

81. O.K.H.; Org. Abt. (I) Nr. 19938/44, 14 October 1944

82. Thorwald, op.cit., p.403

83. Gen.d.Freiw. Verbände im O.K.H. Nr. 702/45, Schematische Gliederung, 27 March 1945 - BAMA - III/153, T78, Roll 413.

84. Thorwald, op.cit., p.403

85. Ibid., p.404

86. Gen. d. Freiw. Verbände, op.cit.

The Franco-American Landings in the south of France brought further Eastern battalions under fire. The discipline of some of the Eastern legionary units was already undermined, including that of their own depot division. In July 1944, forty-six men from a "Turk-Bataillon" at Carnaux, possibly part of that division, deserted to the "terrorists".^{87.} It was recorded that on 10th August 1944 the commander of the depot division was obliged to discuss the Volga-Tartar and ~~Armenian~~ Armenian Legions or, to be more precise, those parts of the legions serving with the division.^{88.}

87. A.O.K. 19, 16 July 1944 - NOKW 578

88. J. Thorwald, op.cit., p.402. The disarming of the Armenian Legion lends credence to a report in New York Herald Tribune, 1st August 1944, that 600 Armenians at Lodz had killed their German officers and deserted.

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Nevertheless some of the Ostruppen remained loyal to their oath to Hitler and even earned public praise for their conduct during the battles of the summer of 1944.⁸⁹ This may be accounted for by the fact that some members of the Eastern units felt isolated from everyone except the Germans and, in consequence, fought on alongside the only comrades they had.⁹⁰ The inability of the Ost units to repel Allied invaders and to suppress the Resistance was simply a part of the general failure of the German forces in the West to achieve these objects. Eastern units formed a large segment of the German forces in Western Europe, but they did not constitute a majority by any means. Although there were, undoubtedly, legionaries who did not fight bravely for the Reich it would be wrong to assume that every Slav, Turk-Tartar or Caucasion who failed to extricate himself from the mêlée in France and Belgium had gone over to the Allies. The Allied naval, air and ground bombardment was exceedingly heavy and did not discriminate between German troops and their foreign colleagues. The legionaries were as liable to be overrun by tanks or encircled as their German counterparts. German troops became demoralised or were surrounded and captured, instead of fighting to the last cartridge, notably in the Atlantic "fortresses." When Eastern units collapsed in similar circumstances, it did not necessarily warrant the assumption that the men involved were treacherous. In the course of fighting, which wiped several divisions from the German order-of-battle, Rosenberg reckoned the desertion rate of the Eastern troops as varying from 2% to 0.6%, except in the case of Volga Tartars where it was as high as 5%.⁹¹

89. Berliner Börsen Zeitung, 26 June 1944; Völkischer Beobachter, 27 June 1944.

90. The Observer, 18 June 1944.

91. Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Nr. 1404/44, Meldung an dem Führer, 28 September 1944 - NO 2484 and NO 2544.

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On 8th September 1944 the Commander-in-Chief West ordered that all Eastern units were to be put to work digging defences,^{92.} a decision that was, no doubt, prompted by the poor showing of some of the Osttruppen during the fighting of the previous three months. But although many of the surviving Ostsoldaten, at least for a period, were engaged in patching up the "West Wall", the shattering of the German forces in the West left the German Army exceedingly short of manpower and necessitated a number of expedients. In the circumstances the German command was obliged to retain under arms Osttruppen who had extricated themselves or who had not been engaged.^{93.}

92. Thorwald, op.cit., p.403

93. For example Ostbataillon 609 was one of the units containing the Schönberg pocket during the last German offensive in the West - H.M. Cole, The Ardennes - Battle of the Bulge (Washington, 1965), p.168

One of these last was Armenian Battalion 812 which had been in the Netherlands since April 1943. The German 710th Division had greeted its arrival with optimism, in the belief that the unit was reliable and "ready to go through fire for its commander".⁹⁴ Closer acquaintance soon caused the Division to modify its assessment of the Battalion and to record that the Armenians behaved well under close German supervision but not under their own N.C.O.s. At that date, it was not clear whether the Battalion would fight as well against Anglo-American troops as against the Russians, from whom they wished to free their homeland - the larger concept of a European fight for freedom made no appeal to them.⁹⁵ The attitude of the Armenians was, no doubt, conditioned by the bad treatment they had received as prisoners during the winter of 1941/1942.⁹⁶ Late in 1944, the Armenians of Bataillon 812 connived with the Dutch resistance to seize the islands of Overflakkee and Schouwen and to hand them over to Canadian troops. But the latter either failed to understand or feared a trap, so the plan came to nothing.⁹⁷ In December, 1944, the unit, not surprisingly, was converted into a construction battalion,⁹⁸ but continued as such at least as late as the end of March 1945.⁹⁹

94. Küsten verteidigungsabschnitt Dordrecht (719. Inf.Div.)Ia, Nr. 584/43, Az. G1601, 9 April 1943.

95. Ibid., Nr. 662/43 Az. G1601, 26 June 1943 - both these documents are to found in Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis Filmdoos/3(196/2)R.G. Nr. 1030 DRB 33/14/2 Frames 130790-4.

96. M. Shulman, Defeat in the West (London, 1947) p.93.

97. General J.J. de Wolf, late of Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis, in letter to author, 24 May 1970.

98. O.K.H./Gen. St.d.H./Org. Abt(II) Nr.47243, 21 December 1944.

99. Gen.d.Freiw. Verbände Nr. 702/45, 27 March 1945.

Desertion of Eastern volunteers in Western Europe was not wholly confined to groups, individuals could abscond singly and not only from Army units but also from the Kriegsmarine. In January 1945, the 8th Batterie of Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 607 reported that an Ostlegionär, a Kazan Tartar, had deserted, presumably to the Dutch Resistance, taking with him a Dutch rifle and cartridges. In retrospect the German authorities realised that since the absent Gefreiter had registered as an atheist, not as a Moslem, which one would have expected from a Tartar, he was probably a concealed Communist.^{100.} It was easy to be wise after the event.

Perhaps the best-known case of disaffection amongst Eastern troops serving in the West took place on the island of Texel in 1945, which was garrisoned by Georgisches Infanterie Bataillon 822. The legionaries, realising that Germany could not last much longer, established contact with Communists in the Dutch Underground. Believing that they might soon be moved to the mainland to fight British troops, Georgian officers, NCO's and men resolved to eliminate the Germans on Texel and hold it until Allied forces arrived. Although the Georgians killed or captured most of the Germans and seized most of the strongpoints, their commanding officer, Major Breitner, a founder of the Georgian Legion, escaped to the mainland and raised the alarm. The Georgians also failed to seize the batteries near the landing stage, thus enabling German troops to land, following a bombardment. Fighting continued until Canadian troops arrived, a fortnight after the end of the war.^{101.}

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- 100. 8. Batterie/Mar.Art.Abt.607, B.Nr.XIV/45/2, 13 January 1945 Gericht, Admiral in den Niederlanden, Nebenstelle Den Helder, JII 14/45, 14-14-14/45, 14 January 1945
B.d.S., Grenzreferat IV G-RVIRAL, 22 January 1945 - all three documents documents are reproduced in Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis Filmdoos Nr. 8 (186/9), R.G.Nr. 1030, DRB Nr. 75975, Frames 80589-97.

 - 101. J.A. van der Vlis, Tragedie op Texel (Amsterdam 1946), *passim*;
 C. Whiting 'Where War finished late' Soldier, XLIV, No.7 (1968) pp.20-2.

Foreign Units in Southern Europe

The German Army's grouping of a number of "Turk" battalions in the 162nd Infantry Division', produced a formation of doubtful value. On 11th March 1944, S.S. Gruppenführer Globocnik, Higher S.S. and Police-Leader for the Adriatic Coastal Area alleged that six hundred deserters from the Division were serving as a complete unit with the partisans. In denying this the Directing Staff of the Armed Forces maintained that there were only three hundred deserters and that they were not engaged as a complete formation on the side of the "bandits".^{102.} Nevertheless, even if the lower figure is nearer the truth, it represents a considerable drain upon the Division and possibly explains why it was moved from Slovenia to Italy where it could less easily communicate with the native population.

Committing the "Turk" Division to the Italian front proved to be a mistake. On 13 June 1944, the divisional commander, Generalmajor von Heggendorf, gave his evaluation of it, after a week in action. Half of the Division - its German component - was good but inexperienced; the other half - the legionaries - was dispirited by heavy artillery fire, by air attacks and by the generally critical situation. In particular, the legionaries were perturbed by Allied use of phosphorous and by the paucity of anti-tank weapons. They were concerned that they would be delivered up to the Russians if they were taken prisoner and the spreading of rumours to that effect was undermining their confidence.^{103.}

102. O.K.W./W.F.St./Qu2/Süd/Südost Nr. 002040/44, Dienstbericht, 20 March 1944 - DAMA III W 121/2 - p.17.

103. 162. (turk) Inf. Div. Kdr., Abt.Ia Nr. 550/44, 13 June 1944.

During the same period a German staff officer reported upon the condition of one of the Division's sub-units, the 4th Kompanie of its infantry-reconnaissance unit, Divisionsbataillon 102. He maintained that "Turk" legionaries did not want to fight and that their whole nation was weak and indisciplined and lacking in corporate spirit. Out of the line, he stated, a Turkic unit could only be held together by ruthless strictness, but at the front this was not possible because units were scattered. As soon as a weak enemy force approached, the officer alleged, Turkic soldiers ran away leaving their equipment and throwing away their weapons in their flight. In his opinion the "Turk" people lacked a political motivation for fighting. The retreat on the southern front, the invasion of North-West Europe and the latest Russian offensive had all caused a deterioration in morale. Although the 4th Company's casualties had been borne by its German members alone, its strength had dropped from 102 to 30 men. Most of the legionaries who were absent had gone over to the enemy, joined the partisans or simply concealed themselves in the countryside. For some time the "Turk" soldiery had stated that the enemy shot prisoners and this belief was holding some of the legionaries back from deserting. The staff officer blamed the Turkic N.C.O.s for much of the trouble and said that they represented a danger. The Division's German personnel felt degraded by having to associate with unreliable men. None of the Germans had been assaulted by any of the "Turk" soldiers however.^{104.}

On the other hand, a fortnight later, the Turkic Division received a favourable report from the High Command. The formation had been hurried south along the Via Aurelia by night and thrown into action piecemeal against a superior enemy. In spite of these adverse circumstances the Division hampered the Allied breakthrough and continued to fight well on the Adriatic coast. An artillery unit and the very same reconnaissance unit that incurred the staff officer's criticism were singled out for particular praise.^{105.} In any event, the Division continued to serve in Italy until the capitulation.

104. XIV. Pz. Kps. Ia, 13-30.6.44, 26 June 1944.

105. O.K.W., Bericht, 9 July 1944.

Members of the Italian Armed S.S. Perpetrated one of the most bizarre cases of desertion. Although their Brigade had between fifteen and twenty thousand men available, it only had five to six thousand under arms because the others had deserted to join other units where, allegedly, they might see immediate action. Other factors which may have influenced the Italians' decision were that the officers and N.C.O.s of the Brigade were better fed than their men and that the Brigade's daily cigarette ration of two per day compared unfavourably with the one hundred and fifty of the Fascist Republican Division X-M.A.S.^{106.}

106. Sturmbannführer Wenner, Vermerk, 13 February 1945. The R.S.I. Division was an expansion of the Italian naval special forces.

The Balkan S.S.

In the summer of 1943 the infant Division "Handschar" was moved to the south of France in order that it might train in comparative peace.^{107.} Rumours spread that the Germans needed cannon-fodder and that the Bosnian volunteers would lose their lives in Russia or in France.^{108.} The transfer of Indians and Soviet nationals to France in 1943 probably gave credence to the last allegation. To make matters worse, Kasche, the German ambassador to Croatia, pressed the S.S. to accept two thousand eight hundred Catholic Croats into the Division to act as N.C.O.s.^{109.} It may have been this which triggered off the mutiny of the divisional engineer battalion during the night of 16-17 September 1943, in which Bosnian officers and aspirants led the other volunteers in a murderous attack upon the unit's German cadre at Villefranche de Rouergue.^{110.} Not only did the Bosnian S.S. men fear that they would never see their families again, but they also knew that their kinfolk were subjected to petty annoyances by the Croat authorities, that they were short of food and defenceless against the demands of the resistance movements.^{111;} The Germans aggravated the situation by killing Moslems in the course of security operations^{112.} and by conducting clumsy recruiting measures.^{113.}

- 107. S.S.F.H.A., Kommandoamt der Waffen S.S., Org.Tgb. Nr.747/43, 2 July 1943-T175, Roll 111, Frame 2635362.
- 108. Moslem "S.S. Mann und F.A.", Bericht Zur Lage, 25 September 1943-T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587117.
- 109. C.d.S.S.H.A., V.S.Tgb.Nr. 5960/43, Adjtr.Tgb.Nr.7017/43, 25 September 1943-T175, Roll 70, Frames 2587123-4.
- 110. Der R.F.S.S., Persönlicher Stab, Tgb. Nr. 35/138/43, 29 September 1943-T175, Roll 70, Frame 2587122.
- 111. Moslem "S.S.Mann und F.A.", op. cit.-T175, Roll 70, Frames 2587115-8.
- 112. Ibid.,-Frame 2587117; Einsatzkdo.2, Tgb.Nr.622/43, 15 July 1943 - T175, Roll 140
- 113. Moslem "S.S. Mann und F.A.", op.cit., Frame 2587118. Recruits were removed from Travnik at a time when prayers were being offered in the mosque.

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The fears of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina were allayed to some extent by the return of the Division to its home area, early in 1941. The völte face of Roumania and Bulgaria in 1944^{not} merely encouraged the partisans but stimulated desertions from among the Ustase, the Moslem militia and, even more, among the Domobranen, many of whom were in close proximity to Division "Handschar". During September 1944 the Division had to be concentrated in a small area so that order could be maintained within it.^{114.} Even this policy of despair proved unavailing and "Handschar" had to be re-structured as a Regimentsgruppe using Germans evacuated from other parts of the Balkans.^{115.}

A report written by the commander of the other Moslem S.S. Division to serve in the Balkans, the Albanian, "Skanderbeg", reveals that it, too, was a cause for concern to its German masters.^{116.} The Albanians had one basic drawback in that they were unmilitary and had no conception of military discipline. The reason for this was that Albania had never possessed regular troops in the German sense, although there had been a militia during the period of Italian control.^{117.} Some members of the Division, especially those who had served in the Royal Yugoslav Army were excellent, but the majority were useless in action, and fell back before they were engaged - particularly when subjected to a heavy fire which the Division had no means of returning.

114. Gen. Kdo. IX Waffen Geb. Korps der S.S. (Kroatisches), S.S. und Polizei Org. Stab., Nr. 24/44, 30 September 1944.

115. Stein, op.cit. pp.183-4. It was apparently rebuilt as a Division of 10,000 men by January 1945 but few, if any, of these were Bosnians.

116. Zusammenfassender Bericht über die Aufstellung und den Zustand der 21. Waffen Gebirgs Division der S.S. Skanderbeg, Kdo., Ia, Tgb. Nr. 975/44, 2 October 1944 - T354, Roll 160, Frames 3805030-50.

117. Ibid., para.1.

A second serious drawback was the shortage of personnel caused by the opposition or apathy of the Albanian authorities. This was to some extent fortunate because the Division lacked facilities, offices, instructors, medical personnel, equipment and clothing.^{118.} But the numerical strength of the Division dropped as the German position in the Balkans deteriorated. In the Tetova-Gostivar region one thousand men who had been assembled to form the Division's First Regiment deserted with their arms and equipment. On a smaller scale, a picket on its way to guard-mounting deserted. Ten men, the off-duty members of a bridge watch, disappeared, but were considerate enough to leave the two sentries. Thirty men selected to attend a course for riding instructors deserted completely while a battle-patrol, one platoon strong, failed to return. Out of the Albanian battalion transferred from the Bosnian S.S. Division, Handschar, 607 men, clearly the majority of its Albanians, deserted, even though they were fighting in their home territory.^{119.} In fact, the proximity of the Albanians to their own villages may account for many of the desertions. Some Albanian S.S. men may have gone over to the partisans but there were probably others who absconded with their rifles to join their fathers and brothers in defending their homes. Whatever the cause, by 1st October 1944 no fewer than 3,425 Albanians had absented themselves leaving 3,094 still in the Division.^{120.}

In fighting partisans the Division had suffered the following casualties by the beginning of October 1944.

	Germans	Albanians	Total
Missing	14	152	166
Wounded	20	72	92
Dead	8	48	56 ^{121.}

These figures are noteworthy because of the high proportion of German casualties and also for the large numbers of missing Albanians, which may indicate that some Albanians took advantage of the confusion of battle in order to desert.

118. Ibid., para 21.

119. Ibid. para 4.

120. Ibid., Anlage 1.

121. Ibid., para. 3-Frame 3805948.

On the credit side, however, the commander of "Skanderbeg" could take comfort from the crippling of the communist organisation in the Kossovo region. In the south and west of this concert battleground "Red" bands were forced to lie low and await the arrival of Bulgar troops while in the east the nationalist bands were strong and confident having repelled a Bulgar thrust. They had become pro-German and welcomed the attachment of German parties to their bands.¹²² These were bolstered further by battle-groups formed from "Skanderbeg", weakened as it was and which was also called upon to occupy towns and protect railway lines.¹²³ The German decision to evacuate the Balkans led to the dispersal of its remaining Albanians. Thenceforward the name "Skanderbeg" was kept alive by three thousand German sailors.

The End-game

Many foreign units of the German Army and of the Armed S.S. remained in the Eastern theatre where they were affected by the rupture of the German front in the summer of 1944 and swept along in the retreat that followed it. Like their colleagues in other parts of Europe they were falling back but in the face of Soviet troops rather than from the pressure of the Western Allies. Once they were forced back or transferred to German or Polish territory they experienced a slump in morale in contradistinction to the volunteers from Western Europe who once their homelands were in Allied hands fought in many cases with a fierce desperation.

122. Ibid. para 5

123. Ibid. para 6. Oberbefehlshaber Südost (I), Nr. 14288, 16 November 1944

In determining how Eastern Troops behaved on being driven back by the Russian advance much depended on the leadership of the units and the relationship between officers and men. During the retreat in the East during the summer of 1944 an Armenian unit, possibly Bataillon 810, found itself behind the Soviet lines. The legionaries apparently considered killing their German cadre and taking to the woods but an Austrian sergeant-major persuaded the Armenians to break through the Red Army to reach German lines.^{124.} During the Soviet breakthrough in the Central Sector of the Eastern front in 1944, the German commander of a company in a Georgian Gebirgsträgerbataillon, possibly 1001, allegedly abandoned his charges at Minsk, whereupon a Georgian officer took the lead and brought stragglers through the German lines at Baranovitsche.^{125.}

Of the S.S. Men who were neither German nor Germanic the Latvians and Estonians were the only ones who showed any great aptitude for regular warfare with the possible exception of the Galicians. Although these were given several months of training they were overwhelmed in their first major engagement, fighting bravely but hopelessly at Brody in defence of their homeland.^{126.} Although the Galician S.S. Division was reformed, apart from detaching a force to Slovakia during the uprising there, it saw no further action.

124. Anon., 'Erfahrungen eines Betreuungsoffiziers für Freiwilliger', Vielvölker-Heere und Koalitionskriege (Darmstadt, 1952) p.36

125. Ibid. p.37

126. Armstrong, op.cit., p.174

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Estonians fought well alongside the German forces in spite of their dissatisfaction with German policy. The Estonian contribution to S.S. Division "Wiking", the "Narwa" battalion, earned public praise¹²⁷. while the Estonian commander of Ostbatallion (Estnisches) 658 was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.¹²⁸ When the Red Army approached Estonia, the authorities proclaimed general mobilisation¹²⁹. and, although Estonians would have preferred an army of their own, they reported in large numbers for the defence of their country.¹³⁰ After the Red Army overran their country the Estonian S.S. Division fell back. It was badly mauled in Silesia but retreated to Czechoslovakia where its survivors surrendered.¹³¹

Friction between Germans and Latvians continued after the Latvians had established the 15th and 19th Divisions of the S.S. After the 19th Division had suffered heavy casualties it was despatched to Eastern Pomerania late in 1944 to reform. Moving the formation from its homeland provoked a mutiny which had to be put down before the Division was engaged again on the Eastern front.¹³² Although the Division as a whole became unfit for further fighting it sent a battle group for the defence of Berlin. Meanwhile the 19th S.S. Division was amongst those cut off in Courland where it gave a good account of itself until the end of the war.¹³³

127. Berliner Börsen Zeitung, 23 March 1944

128. Völkischer Beobachter, 9 March 1944

129. Pester Lloyd, 4 February 1944; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5 February 1944

130. Pester Lloyd, 16 February 1944

131. Stein, op.cit., p.p. 194-5

132. Straube, 14 December 1944 - document in Rosenberg Files R207-N01717

133. Reichsarzt Grawitz, Memorandum, 15 February 1945-N0777.

The Lithuanians proved to be an even greater disappointment to the Germans than the other Balkans. German attempts to raise a Lithuanian Legion in the shape of a S.S. Division in the early part of 1943 and a year later failed through lack of recruits.¹³⁴ Nevertheless several Lithuanian police units performed a variety of tasks, apparently to German satisfaction until they were driven back to Lithuania by the Russian advance and for the most part disbanded.¹³⁵ A Lithuanian Heimatwehr was raised in 1944 but German refusal to treat it as a Lithuanian Army made its members unwilling to continue so they were disarmed and arrested, with some loss of life.¹³⁶ Construction units raised in April 1943 were whittled down in the course of the German retreat but their survivors provided companies within German construction battalions.¹³⁷ These and the remaining Lithuanian policemen were a poor substitute for the projected S.S. Division.

134. Lietuvin Enciklopedija, XV, 376-7.

135. Ibid., XV, 109

136. Ibid., XXXIV, 39-40

137. Ibid., XXVIII, 408. All these excerpts from the Lithuanian Encyclopedia were supplied in English translation to the author by the Committee for a Free Lithuania.

The Armed S.S. was also seriously embarrassed by the behaviour of its senior Russian division, the 20th.^{138.} While it had been the "army" of Kaminsky's self-governing area at Lokot, its discipline had been weak and after its move to Lefel the force had deteriorated to the point where some of its elements established contact with Soviet partisans and mutinied.^{139.} Shortly after the absorption of Kaminsky's Drigade into the S.S.,^{140.} it was forced to abandon Soviet soil an event which had a depressing effect upon morale. Before the reorganisation of the "Sturmbrigade" into an infantry division of the S.S.^{141.} it was called upon to assist in the suppression of the Warsaw uprising of August 1944. The composite regiment which Kaminsky's R.O.N.A. sent to the Polish capital may have contributed to the defect of the Polish Home Army, but it was its flagrant instances of looting, rape and drunkenness that were reported to Berlin. In consequence of this, Kaminsky was court-martialled and executed, but to avoid provoking a mutiny, Kaminsky's men were told that he had been ambushed by partisans.^{142.} In November, the remnants of the 20th S.S. Division were turned over to General Vlasov for use in his first division the 600th.^{143.} They were joined in this division by Russians from the unreliable 30th S.S. Division.^{144.}

138. It is totally wrong to maintain that Kaminsky's force was part of the Allgemeine S.S. i.e. the political S.S.

139. Pz.A.O.K.3, Kriegstagebuch, Tätigkeitsbericht Du2, 1.7.43-31.12.43 Anlage 4 N02386, Case XII, entry for 1 October 1943

140. Early in 1944-E. von dem Bach-Zelewski, Interrogation Summaries 38,3246 and 4810

141. O.K.H./Gen. St. d.H./Org.Abt(II)Nr.46479/44, 3 August 1944

142. Bach-Zelewski, op.cit.

143. O.K.H./Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.(II)Nr.30004, 23 November 1944.

144. See Appendix C.

The Eastern units moved, disarmed or disbanded in the summer of 1943, following cases of individual and collective desertion were the responsibility of the German Army. It pleased the leaders of the S.S. to overlook the cases of defection in its ranks^{145.} and to imagine that they could manage Soviet citizens better than the Army had done. One consequence of this belief was the decision to take the original Turkestani Battalion the 450th into the Waffen S.S. as the nucleus of a division.^{146.} The Ostmuselmanische S.S. Division was never more than a regiment in size. It combined with a Tartar Brigade to form the Osttürk Waffenverband.^{147.} From the outset the Turkestani S.S. suffered from indiscipline and the squabbles of political and tribal factions. There were plots and rumours of plots and instances of desertion until December 1944 when a large part of the Turkestani element defected.^{148.}

145. e.g. of the Travniki concentration camp guards and of members of Druzhina.

146. S.S.H.A., Amt. A1, A12Az. 16c Gr/Eh, Aufstellung der Ostmuselmanischen S.S. Division, 17 November 1943-BAMA 78042/1

147. S.S.F.H.A., Amt. II, Org. Abt. Ia/II Tgb. Nr. 4022/44, Aufstellung der Osttürkischen Waffen Verbandes der S.S., 2 November 1944-T175, Roll 141, Frame 2669029-30.

148. See Appendix D, p. 459.

The Kaukasische Waffenverband was one of the last formations of the of the armed S.S. to be ordered,^{149.} but it was never completed. It soon encountered reluctance to serve in the members of the Azerbaijanian Waffen-
gruppe who resented their transfer from the parallel Ost-Turk formation.^{150.} The new Waffenverband endeavoured to draw its personnel from the Caucasian refugees whom the Germans had established in North Italy as military colonists. Although they had retreated from the USSR with the Germans, some of the Georgians in North Italy had second thoughts about their alignment and joined the Italian partisans. When the German forces in Italy capitulated the Caucasian and Cossack settlers retreated northwards. At this eleventh hour Colonel Prince Zulukize, commander of the Georgian Waffen-
gruppe,^{151.} signed an act of adhesion to the Italian partisan movement on behalf of his subordinates.^{152.} Although too late to influence the course of the war, some Georgians tried to cut off their Cossack colleagues in an action which cost a Georgian captain and some of his men their lives.^{153.}

- 149. R.F.S.S., Tgb.Nr.III/7900/44, 11 December 1944-T175, Roll 140, Frame 2668443. The formation had been in preparation since the summer - SSHA, Amtsgruppe D, Freiw. Leitstelle, DI/3i-k, Aufstellung eines Kaukasischen Korps, 3 August 1944 - BA-NS31/34
- 150. Major Fetelibeyli Dudanginski, 16 January 1945-BA-NS31/51. Aserb.S.S. Btl. bfe Ostturk Waffenverband der S.S., 9 November 1944 - BA-NS31/34
- 151. S.S.H.A., Amtsgruppe D, Freiwilligen Leitstelle, DI/3i-k, 3 September 1944.
- 152. P.A. Carnier, L'Armata Cosacca in Italia (Milan, 1965), p.163 reproduces the document, signed on 20th April 1945.
- 153. Ibid., p.292

Apart from the organised defection of members of the two Eastern Waffenverbände another scheme of Himmler's, Vlasov's "army", also went awry. Vlasov's first division, the 600th, after a brief engagement on the Eastern front on 14th April 1945, withdrew and made its way despite German threats to Czechoslovakia. It intended to link up with the rest of Vlasov's force and possibly with other Slavic armed organisations in order that they might collectively negotiate with the Western Allies. Chaotic travel conditions and Allied advances made such a concentration impossible so the 600th Division endeavoured to ingratiate itself with the victors by helping the Czech resistance to flush the Armed SS from Prague.¹⁵⁴ This action of Vlasov's men availed them nothing but it constituted the largest instance of defection of foreign volunteers recruited by the Third Reich.

Assessment

Until Himmler admitted Finns and members of Poland's non-German minorities to the S.S. Verfügungstruppe, it represented the physical and racial élite he desired to establish.¹⁵⁵ Even with these exceptions and apart from Hiwis, the first twelve divisions of the Armed S.S. consisted of Reichsdeutsche, Volksdeutsche and Germanic personnel as did several of the later formations.¹⁵⁶

154. Strik-Strikfeldt, op.cit. pp.297-8, 237; Steenberg, op.cit. pp. 189-201. Dallin, op.cit., pp. 655-7.

155. Nevertheless these races provided only a small minority within the Armed S.S. before the attack upon the U.S.S.R. It should be borne in mind, too, that some of the Finnish citizens were of Germanic stock while the Kashubes and Goralians had been accepted by racial examiners of the S.S.

156. i.e. the 16th, 17th, 18th, 22nd, 27th, 28th, 31st, 32nd, 34th, 35th, 37th and 38th S.S. Divisions.

The behaviour of non-Germans under fire often merited German praise, particularly in the case of the West European volunteers, both in the Germanic Legions and in the Waffen S.S., who gave a good account of themselves. Their initial crusading zeal made them strong in attack and, when the volunteers came to realise that they had burned their boats and joined a losing cause, they became bitter in defence. It might be argued that the fighting qualities of "Wiking" and later "Nordland" and "Nederland" Divisions, which put them on a par with the "pure" German divisions, were due to the very high proportion of Germans and Volksdeutsche in the three S.S. Divisions. But the original Germanic Legions, in which the German component was small, had also fought hard, as Felix Steiner bore witness, in his final order-of-the-day to them, on 20th March 1943.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, Divisions "Langemarck", "Wallonie" and "Charlemagne", although incomplete, gave a good account of themselves, even though in their cases the German cadre was probably not large. It should be borne in mind, too, that the "pure" German S.S. Divisions were all eventually diluted with Volksdeutsche, Hiwis and stray Germanic volunteers. It would appear that in the Armed S.S., men from occupied Western Europe were as good as their Reichsdeutsche comrades in most cases.

157. III (Germ.) S.S. Panzerkorps, Korpsbefehl, 17 March 1943-BAMA 64323.

Himmler's Germanic volunteers were to have been a means towards the end of bringing all people of Nordic blood into one Reich, of which Hitler's Germany was to have been the nucleus. Even if Germany had won the war, it is questionable whether the Germanic Armed S.S. would have brought their homelands closer to the Reich. The numbers of Germanic volunteers were small, even within the Germanic formations of the Waffen S.S.¹⁵⁸. In the unlikely event of every Germanic member of the Armed S.S. becoming a convinced Annexationist there were still many other adherents of N.S.D., V.N.V. and other right-wing parties who were not pan-German in outlook. The fascist and national socialist parties all bore a stigma for their collaboration, which made their political views unacceptable to the majority of their compatriots. Even if they had adopted the idea of the membership of one Reich they could not have carried the bulk of the population with them. When Germanic national-socialist parties were merged it suited Himmler to exempt the Germanic S.S. - the political arm - from the reorganisation, on the pretext that it was a cultural and social organisation, not a political party.¹⁵⁹ But this dissociation from the right-wing nationalist parties did not make its annexationist policies any more acceptable to the peoples of the Germanic countries. The S.S. was too closely linked in the minds of the general population with the repressive acts of the occupier. Judging by the experience of the Norwegian volunteer who was ostracised by his own father,¹⁶⁰ it can not even be assumed that German S.S. men would have converted their own families to the idea of a Greater German Reich.

158. See, for example, the figures in III. (germ)S.S. Panzerkorps, Tatigkeitsbericht, 26 May 1943-31 March 1944, pp. 6-8 - BAMA 64325.

159. Knoebel, op.cit., p.p. 165-6.

160. Auszug aus einem Brief eines Norwegers zur Heimat-Soldat Leo Larsen-
BA-NS 10 neu 351.

The earliest Armed S.S. formations to be sent to the front fought hard and established the reputation which Himmler wished them to have, but it was achieved at a high cost in human life. Once it had been recognised as an élite fighting force, the Armed S.S. was prevented by the military situation from reverting to its true role of a state police force. Time and again the mobile formations of the S.S. were called upon to stage vigorous attacks or counter-attacks or to carry out a stubborn defence, in all of which the German and Germanic members suffered further heavy casualties. This created the demand for more S.S. men and for new S.S. formations, inevitably the quality of those inducted declined.

It is difficult to assess the value of the Volksdeutsche in the German forces, because in many cases they were employed as individual replacements inside German or Germanic formations of the S.S. and in the units of the Wehrmacht. Within the Armed S.S., however, racial Germans provided the bulk of the personnel for a number of divisions which gave a good account of themselves. The 7th S.S. Mountain Division "Prinz Eugen" served for the whole of its existence in Yugoslavia, engaged, for the most part, against Tito's partisans. The 8th and the 22nd S.S. Cavalry Divisions were annihilated in the defence of Budapest and the fact that their survivors provided the core for a new S.S. cavalry division, the 37th, named "Lützow",¹⁶¹ is probably indicative of the store the Germans set by them. The 18th S.S. Division "Horst Wessel" was a motorised formation of racial Germans from Hungary, which fought well against the Red Army and Slovak insurgents, while the 31st and 32nd S.S. Divisions fought hard during the short time in which they existed.

161. S.S.F.H.A., Amt II Org.Abt.Ia/ii, Tgb.Nr.975/45, 26 February 1945-T175, Roll 140, Frames 2668404-7.

The individual racial Germans serving in German formations and units included men with personal problems which impaired their dependability. Himmler exhorted his subordinates to be patient with the Volksdeutsche and to try to understand them,^{162.} and his instructions were echoed by the commanders of formations incorporating large numbers of Volksdeutsche.^{163.} It was the fault of over-zealous recruiters that many of the ethnic Germans were not genuine volunteers and that the German forces had absorbed men who would in some cases have preferred service in the armies of their host-countries. There were well-substantiated cases of Volksdeutsche deserting but instances of their devotion to duty did not receive great notice. Where Volksdeutsche served in good-quality German formations or units, they modelled themselves upon their Reichsdeutsche colleagues, but where racial Germans found themselves in low-grade elements, they could cause trouble for their superiors. It is, perhaps, significant that the First Company of Hitler's own bodyguard was composed of Germans from Roumania. Although this singular honour was in recognition of the large contribution of this particular Volksgruppe to the Manpower of the S.S. it would not have been bestowed if the expatriate Saxons and Swabians had been poor soldiers.^{163.}

In general, the non-Germans performed the functions their German recruiters had intended for them. Of these, the most important was the provision of military manpower over and above that which could be drawn from the population of the Reich. The numbers of foreigners recruited were far too few to stem the advance of Germany's enemies and to stave off Germany's defeat, but by releasing and supplementing German fighting men, the foreign soldiery probably helped to prolong Germany's resistance. It would have required a complete abandonment of German plans for post-war Europe and an adoption of far more liberal policies in the occupied territories to have brought in sufficient enthusiastic foreign troops to have influenced the course of the war. Even in these circumstances it is improbable that the ultimate outcome of the conflict would have been affected.

162. R.F.S.S. Letter to Obergruppenführer Phleps, 27 October 1943-T175, Roll 21.

163. S.S. Kavallerie division, Ia/V1, Besondere Anweisungen für die Weltanschauliche Erziehung, 5 April 1943 - T175, Roll 70, Frames 258711-8.

The infusion of non-German replacement personnel, irrespective of how they were recruited, served to keep German units and formations in existence, while the creation of complete combat elements of foreigners enabled a thickening of the forces deployed in the German front line and behind it. But forcible recruitment, haphazard selection and inconsiderate treatment produced foreign units which varied considerably in quality. Once the German forces began to retreat their non-German components became increasingly unreliable, frequently to the point of desertion and even mutiny.

Appendices.

Appendix A - Recruiting Organisation in Annexed Territories.

Wehrkreis V -

Additional territory = Alsace (Elsass)

Organised as :- Wehrersatzbezirk Strassburg

with :- Wehrbezirke Strassburg
 Mühlhausen (Mulhouse)
 Tann
 Kolmar (Colmar)
 Schlettstadt
 Zabern
 Hagenau

Allgemeine Heeres Mitteilungen. Paragraph 165

of 22 February 1943 indicates

<u>Wehrbezirk</u>	<u>Wehrmeldebezirk</u>	<u>Musterungsbezirk</u>	
(Recruiting sub area)	(Reporting sub area)		(Registration Sub area)
Strassburg	Strassburg 1	Stadtkreis	Strassburg
	Strassburg 2	Landkreis	Strassburg
Mühlhausen	Mühlhausen 1	Stadtkreis	Mühlhausen
	Mühlhausen 2	Landkreis	Mühlhausen
		Landkreis	Altkirch
Tann	Tann	Landkreis	Tann
	Gebweiler	Landkreis	Gebweiler
Kolmar	Kolmar	Stadtkreis	Kolmar
		Landkreis	Kolmar
		Landkreis	Rappoltsweiler
Schlettstadt	Schlettstadt	Landkreig	Schlettstadt
Zabern	Zabern	Landkreis	Zabern
	Molsheim	Landkreis	Molsheim
Hagenau	Hagenau	Landkreis	Hagenau
		Landkreis	Weissenburg

Wehrkreis VIII

Additional territory = South western Poland

organised as:- Wehrersatzbezirk Kattowitz (Katowice)

with Wehrbezirke Kattowitz (Katowice)

Königshütte

Loben

Rybnik

Teschen (Cieszyn)

Bielitz Biala

Oppeln

Neisse

Neustadt

Cosel

Gleiwitz

- this recruiting area includes sub-areas, e.g. Oppeln and Neisse which were German before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Wehrkreis XII

Additional territory = Luxemburg and Lorraine (Lothringen)

organised as : Wehrbezirk Luxemburg (in
Wehrersatzbezirk Koblenz)

and Wehrersatzbezirk

Metz

with Wehrbezirke

Metz

Diedenhofen (Thionville)

St. Avold

Allgemeine Heeres Mitteilungen, Paragraph 165

of 22 February 1943 indicates :-

<u>Wehrbezirk</u>	<u>Wehrmelde Bezirk</u>	<u>Musterungs Bezirk</u>
(Recruiting sub area)	(Reporting sub area)	(Registration sub area)
Metz	Metz	Stadtkreis Metz Landkreis Metz Landkreis Salzbirgen
Diedenhofen	Diedenhofen	Stadtkreis Diedenhofen Landkreis Diedenhofen
St. Avold	St. Avold	Landkreis St. Avold
Saargemünd	Saargemünd	Landkreis Saargemünd
	Saarburg	Landkreis Sa a rburg
Luxemburg	Luxemburg	Stadtkreis Luxemburg Landkreis Esch Landkreis Grevenmacher Landkreis Diekirch

Wehrkreis XX

H.Q. - Danzig

Territory:- Danzig, the Polish Corridor, Western East Prussia

Wehrersatzbezirk :-

Danzig

Wehrbezirke :-

Danzig

Neustadt

Preussisch Stargard

Marlenwerder

Graudenz

Bromberg (Bydgoszez)

Thorn (Torun)

Wehrkreis XXI

H.Q. - Posen (Poznan)

Territory :- Western Poland

<u>Wehrersatzbezirk</u>	:-	Posen (Poznan)
<u>Wehrbezirke</u>	:-	Posen (Poznan)
		Hohensalza
		Leschnau (Leszno)
		Kalisch (Kalisz)
		Litzmannstadt (Lodz)

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Appendix B

Non-German units and formations of the Wehrmacht, Waffen S.S. and Police

Albania

21. Waffen Gebirgs Division der S.S. "Skanderbeg" (Albanische Nr.1)

Albanische Jäger Rgtr.1,4.

Miliz Btle. Pec, Pristina, Prizren, Tetova.

Arabs

Deutsch-arabische Lehrabteilung/III/Sonderverband 287

Btle Algerien, Marokko, Tunesien I, Tunesien II

Arabische Baubataillon

Arabische Fallschirmkompanie

Deutsch-arabische Inf. Btle. 845, II/845

Ergtz Kompanie Döllersheim

Belgium

Wallonische Inf. Btl.373/S.S. Sturmbrigade "Wallonie"/28. S.S. Freiwilligen

Grenadier Division (Wallonische Nr.1)

Wallon. Ersatzkdo der Inf. Ers. Btl.477, Meseritz

S.S. Gren. A.u.E. Btl.,35, Konitz, replaced by S.S. Gren. A.U.E. Btl.36, Alfeld.

Legion Flandern/S.S. Freiw. Sturmbrigade "Langemarck"/27. S.S. Freiw.

Gren. Div. "Langemarck" (flämische Nr.1)

Ersatzkompanie (Ers. Btl. der Legionen)

S.S. Gren. A.u.E. Btl.36, Wohlau

Flämische Wachabteilungen I-IV and Nachrichtenzug (Vlaamsche Wacht)

Wallonische Wachabteilungen I - II and 1, 2 Kraftwagenkolonne (Garde Wallonne)

Flämische Wachbrigade

Flämische Feuerschutzwache.

Wachkompanie des Beauftragters des Chef der Sippt. des S.D.

Werkschutz

Kraftfahrzeug Überführungskommando z.b.v.

N.S.K.K. Regiment Flandern

Hilfsfeldgendarmerie

Brittany

Bezenn Perrot.

Bulgaria

Waffen Gren. Rgt. der S.S. (bulgarische Nr.1)

Croatia

Verstärkte Kroat. Inf. Rgt. 369 and Kroat. Art. Abt. 369.

369. dt.-Kroat. Inf. Division.

373. dt.-Kroat. Inf. Division.

392. dt.-Kroat. Inf. Division.

Kroat. Ausbildungs Brigade,

Kroat. Luftwaffen-Legion,

Kroat. Marine-Abteilung.

Verst. Kroat. Inf. Btl. 939.

13. S.S. Waffen Gebirgs Division der S.S. "Handschar" (Kroat. Nr.1)

23. S.S. Waffen Gebirgs Division der S.S. "Kama" (Kroat. Nr.2)

S.S. Gebirgsjäger Ausbildung Ers. Btl. 13, Neuhammer.

Denmark

Freikorps Danmark/S.S. Pz. Gren. Rgt. 24, "Danmark" in 11 S.S. Freiw Pz. Gren. Div. "Nordland".

Ersatzkompanie (Ers. Btl. der Legionen).

Schalburg Korps/ S.S. Ausbildungs Btl. Schalburg/S.S. Vagtbataillon Sjælland.

Civilvaegtere/Marinevaegtere.

Wachtkorps der deutschen Luftwaffe in Dänemark (Sommer's Vagtkorps).

Kombattendienst paa Flyvepladsen ved Lunde.

Kombattanter (Flugplatz Ry).

"Det graa Korps" (Flugplatz Kastrup).

Brandmandskorpset.

Finland

Finnisches S.S. Freiw. Btl.

Ersatzkompanie (Ers. Btl. der Legionen).

France

Verst. franzos. Inf. Rgt. 638 (Légion des Volontaires français contre le Bolchevisme)

Ausbildungs- und Ersatzkommando der L.V.F.

Französische S.S. Freiw. Sturmbrigade

Franz. Ausb. Kp. and Franz. Stamm Kp. der Franz. S.S. Freiw. Sturmbrig. Konitz.

Waffen Gren. Brig. d.S.S. "Charlemagne" (franz. Nr.1)/33. Waffen Gren. Div. d.S.S. "Charlemagne" (franz. Nr.1)

Franz. S.S. Gren. Ausb. und Ers. Btl.

Franz. Flakartillerie

Great Britain

Legion of Saint George

British Free Corps

Greece

Freiw. Btle. Wichos, Euböa I and II, Saloniki

Poulos Verband Verria/Pol. Freiw. Btl. Poulos

2. (griech.) Pol. Ausb. und Ers. Kp. Griechenland

Evzonen Rgtr. 1,2,3.

Pol. Freiw. Btle. I - IX (II,VI,VII = I-III Maz.)

Hungary

25. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. "Hunyadi" (ung. Nr.1) including Ski. Btl.

26. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. "Gambös" (ung. Nr.2)

S.S. Kampfgruppe Ney

Auffang und Betreuungsstab (ung.), Bruck a.d. Leitha

Panzerjagdverbände (ung.) 1-9

India

Indisches Inf. Rgt. 950/Indische S.S. Legion

Sonderkompanie (ind.)

Ersatzbataillon, Königsbrück later Wildflecken

Ireland

Irish Brigade

Italy (R.S.I. elements under German control)

Waffen Grenadier Brigade der S.S. (ital. Nr.1)/29 Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. (ital.Nr.1)

Rekruten Auffangdepot Cremona

Ital. Bau Pi.Btl.1,2,5,10,117,131,138,142.

Ital. Techn. Btl. 147

Ital. Brückenbau Btl.1, ital.ßi.Btl.2

1. (ital.)/Pi. Btl.3.

4. (ital.) Kp. of Bau Btle. 430,432,488,789,792,820

Stell. Btle. 1-3, 14-17.

Art. Abt. II-V, IX-XII

ital. Nachsch. Btl.54 , 4 (ital.)/Nachsch. Btl.497

ital. Nachsch Kp. 50,52,57,1/487

Bäckerei Kp.1, 2/665

ital. Sich.Kp., 1/1003, 1-3/1004, 1-2/1005, 1-3/1006, 1-4/1007, 1-3/1008, 1-2/1009, 1-3/1011, 1-2/1013, 1-2/1014, 1-3/1015, 1-4/1016, 1/1017, 1/1021, 1/1020, 1/1022.

Freiw. Legion Kreta

I.Freiw. Btl. Meria, II Freiw. Btl. Piazzai, III Freiw Btl., Fasch Kp./Sich. Rgt.639, 13 (ital.)/Sich. Rgt.639.

Eisenbahnbau Pi. Kp. 1-16

~~4. (ital.) Kp. of Baupionier Btl. 430,432,488,789,792,820.~~

1. (ital.) Pol. Ausb. und Ers. Kp. Griechenland

Pol. Freiw. Btle. Italien I-XI

Pol. Freiw. Ers. Btl. I, II

4. (ital.) Kp. of Techn. Btl.10.

Friaulische Freiw. Rgt. Tagliamento

Pol. Freiw. Btle. Görz, Udine, Fiume, Pola

Corpo di Sicurezza Trientino

"M" Btle. 115, 29

Sturm. Btle. Pontida, Verelli

Auffang und Betreuungsstab (ital.) Bruck a.d. Leitha

Montenegro

Montenegrinisches Freiwilligen-Korps (three regiments of two battalions each)

Montenegrinische Miliz, I.Btl. (Cetinje), II. Btl. (Podgorica), III. Btl. (Niksic).

Netherlands

Legion Niederlande/4.S.S. Freiw. Pz. Gren. Brig. "Nederland"/23.S.S.

Freiw. Pz. Gren. Div. der S.S. (niederl. Nr.1)

Ersatzkompanie

Landwacht Niederlande/Landstorm Nederland/S.S. Freiw. Gren. Brig.

Landstorm Nederland

S.S. Wach Bt. "Nordwest"/3.

Hulppolitie/Nederlandse Landwacht

Ijsselmeer Flottille

Arbeits Kontrolle Dienst "Kontroll-Kommando", absorbed into Pol. Freiw. Btl. Niederlande

Wachabteilung des Chefintendanten beim Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in den Niederlanden

Spoorwacht

Kraftfahr Transport Dienst und Kraftfahr Überfuhrungs Kommando/N.S.K.K.

Alarmdienst (Nachschubbataillon)

Transportactic

Norway

Legion Norwegen/S.S. Freiw Pz. Gren. Rgt. 23 "Norge" in 11. S.S. Freiw. Pz. Gren. Div. "Nordland"

Ers. Btl. Frw. Legion Norwegen, Holmestrand

Ersatzkompanie

S.S. Wachbataillon "Nord"/6

1-4. Polizei Kompanien

Norwegisches S.S. Jäger Schi Btl./S.S. Schi. Btl. (norweg.) 506 z.b.V.

Hirdens Bedriftsvern

Polizei Freiw. Btl. Norwegen.

Poland

Poln. Baupolier Btl.

Poln. Schuma Btl. 202

Serbia

Serbische Freiwilligen Korps/Serbisches S.S. Korps (five regiments of three battalions each)

Slovakia

Slow. Baupionier Btle. 921, 922.

Auffang und Betreuungsstab (Slow.) Bruck a.d. Leitha

Spain

250. span. Inf. Division (Division "Azul")

Spanische Jagdstaffeln 1-4

Spanische Freiwilligen Legion Russland

Ersatzkommando der span. Legion

Freiwilligen-Einheit Stablack

17. (span.Freiw.) Kp./Gebjg. Rgt. 138.

Freiw. Ausb. Btl. (span.) Stockerau, Freiw. Ers. Btl. (span.) Hollabrunn

Span. Freiw. Kp. 101,102 (attached to 357. Inf. Div.)

"White" Russians

Russisches Schutzkorps (five regiments)

Mixed Germanic Units and Formations of the Armed S.S.

S.S. Verfügungstruppen Standarte "Nordland"

S.S. Verfügungstruppen Standarte "Westland"

S.S. Division "Germania"/"Wiking"/ 5.S.S. Panzer Division "Wiking"

11.S.S. Freiwilligen Panzergrenadier division "Nordland".

III. (germanisches) S.S. Panzerkorps

Ers. Btle. "Nordland" and "Westland".

Ers. Btl. der Legionen, Graz/S.S. Pz. Gren.A. und E. Btl. 11.

Freiwilligen Standarte "Nordwest".

Volksdeutsche Units and Formations

Landespolizei Danzig

Flakabteilung Danzig

S.S. Heimwehr Danzig

- S.S. Btl. Eimann
- 7.S.S. Freiw. Gebirgs division "Prinz Eugen"
- S.S. Gebjg. Ers. Btl.7; S.S. Gebjg Ausb. Btl.7
- S.S. Kavallerie Brigade/8.S.S. Kavallerie Division "Florian Geyer"
- S.S. Kav. A.u.E. Abt., Warsaw/S.S. Kav. A.u.E. Rgt., Beneschau
- 1.S.S. Inf. Brig. (mot.)/18.S.S. Freiw. Panzergrenadier Division "Florian Geyer"
- S.S. Gren. Ers. Btl. "Ost"/31/18, S.S. Gren. Ausb. Btl. "Ost"/31/18
- 22.S.S. Freiw. Kavallerie-Division
- 31.S.S. Freiw. Gren. Division
- 32. S.S. Freiw. Gren./Pz.Gren.Div. "30.Januar"
- 37.S.S. Freiw. Kav. Division "Lützow"
- Pol.Freiw.Rgtr. 1,2,3 Serbien
- Pol.Freiw.Rgtr. Montenegro
- Pol. Freiw. Btl. Montenegro
- Pol. Freiw. Ers. Btl. Serbien
- Pol. Freiw. Rgtr. 1-5 Kroatien (fifteen battalions of Volksdeutsche, and Croats. Included the racial German Eisb. Sich Btle.11-13)
- Pol. Freiw. Ers. Btl. Esseg; Pol. Freiw. Ausb. Btl. Kroatien.
- Pol. Rgt. Südtirol/Bozen
- Pol. Rgtr. Alpenvorland, Schlanders, Brixen
- Pol. Res. Btl. Defregger
- Standeschützen-Ausbildungs-Lehrgänge Meran, Gossensaas, Mals
- Südtiroler Ordnungsdienst
- Südtiroler Stadt-und Landwacht
- Res. Pol. Btl.33 (Baltic Germans)
- Selbstschutz/Hilfspolizei (Poland)
- Sonderdienst (General gouvernement)
- Oftsschutz (Croatia)
- Einsatzstaffel de Deutschen Mannschaft (Croatia)
- Heimatschutz/Selbstschutz (Serbia)
- Selbstschutz (U.S.S.R.)
- Steierische Heimatbund-Wehrmannschaft

} formed from Hilfspolizei of the Volksdeutsche Banat.

1444
Zeitfreiwilligen Dienst (Heimwehr) (Denmark)

Selbstschutz/Volkssturm (North Schleswig)

Heimatschutz (Slovakia, Roumania)

Formations consisting of several nationalities.

Division "Brandenburg".

S.S. Karstwehrebataillon/24. Waffen Gebirgs (Karstjäger) Division der S.S.
Waffen. Gebirgs (Karstjäger) Brigade der S.S.

S.S. Karstwehr Ersatzkompanie

S.S. Sonderkommando Dirlwanger/36. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S.

38. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. (Gruppe Schwedt)

Eastern Units

Ostbataillone 7, 134, 207, 229, 263, 268, 308, 339, 406, 412, 427, 439, 441, 446,
I/447, II/447, 448-9, 455, 4, 456, 541, 551, 556, 559-61, 600-605, 615-20, 628-30,
633-7, 642-3, 646-9, 653-4, 661-3, 665, 667-9, 674, 675, 680, 681.

Ostkompanien 10, 14, 25, 34, 37, 45, 59, 1/75, 2/75, 1/84, 2/84, 85, 98, 102, 110, 113,
129, 1/131, 2/131, 3/131, 145, 152, 156, 176, 178-9, 182-3, 188, 1/195, 2/195, 198,
1/203, 205, 1/221, 252-3, 255-6, 260, 1/263, 2/263, 1/267, 2/267, 268, 299, 321, 323,
331, 337, 340, 377, 383, 387, 407, 409, 420, 448, 453, 455-6, 473, 552-3, 555, 612-3, 626,
632, 641, 690.

Ostreiter abteilungen 207 (Grossrussen), 281 (Ukrainer), 285 (Ukrainer),
580

Ostreiterschwadronen 57, 201 (Ukrainer), 339 (2/203) (russ), 2/221, 286 (russ.)
448.

Ost. Pi. Btl. 454, 666.

Ost. Artillerie Abteilungen 621, 752.

Ost. Batterien 1/203, 214, 582, 614, 1/670, 2/670, 2/Mitte, 1, 2 and 3/B.H.G. Süd.

Ost. Panzerkompanien 709, 1, 2/B.H.G. Süd.

Ost. Nachrichten Kompanien (of various types) 1/515, 2/515, 644-6, 671, 673

Ost. Fernsprechbauzüge 15, 27, 31, 43, 51, 55-6, 59-60, 62-3, 66A-C

Ost. Nachschubkompanien 221(350), 286(354), 424, 444, 448, 457(turk), 580,
650-1(Lit), 652(lett), 725(Ukr.), 726(turk).

Ost. Nachschub bataillone 574, 651, 663.

Ost.(Ukr.) Nachsch. Kolonnen abteilung 551

Nachsch Btl. (K) 47, 56, 58, 122.

Kgf. Gebirgsträger Btle. 94, 97, 101.

Ost. leichte Fahrkolonnen 1/54, 2/54, 1/125, 2/125, 3/125, 1/128, 2/128, 3/128, 3/139, 1/150, 2/150, 3/150, 403,452(turk), 793(lit.).

Ost. Minenraum Kp. 554.

Ost. Feldzeug Btl. 550.

Eastern companies in German Feldzeug-Bataillone 2-8, 10, 12-19, 22-26.

Eastern companies in German Nachschub Bataillone 23-4, 43, 47, 49, 51, 56-8, 99, 102,106-7,117-8,136,142, 144, 147, 151, 177, 306, 320,349,419 501, 508,522,533,543-6,548-53,561-3,571-3,591-3,602,604,606-8,610,612,617, 619,622,627,687,690,720.

Eastern companies in German Technical Abteilungen I-IV, VI, X-XI.

Eastern companies in German Technical Bataillone 3-8, 10, 13, 15, 23-4, 26, 33, 43.

Eastern companies with German Eisenbahn-Baubataillone 2, 12, 83, 106, 111, 404, 511, 515-8.

Eastern companies with German Strassenbaubataillone 506-7, 523, 538, 544, 551, 559, 562-3, 584, 597, 676,679-80.

Eastern companies with German Baupionierbataillone 9, 17-18, 20, 24-5, 31, 40,41,44,46,51-3,55,57,59,63-4,78-81,87,91, 94-6,98,100-1,107-9,119-21, 123-5, 127,129,131-2,134-7,141,144,146,153-4,156,213-4,216-9,221-2,244-6,248,254, 257,305-6,320,370,401,403,407,410,413-21,430,432,488,502-5,508,532,571,576, 591,677-8,725,728-30,732,734-5,737-9,781-3,785-6,789,792-3,795-7,799,801, 803,820,823.

Eastern platoons or companies with German Landeschützenbataillone 232, 245, 268,307,310,351,353,377,405,439,446,529-531,558,560,614,618-9,667,675,694, 778,783,826,842,861,868,875,894,898,968,981.

Eastern Platoons or companies with German Sicherungsbataillone 555,557, 611, 692-3, 830,930,954-5, 965-6.

Eastern companies with German Wachbataillone 43,99,122,456,508,551-2, 571, 581-2,591,603,722.

Eastern Platoons with German Propaganda Companies 612,637,666,670,689,691, 693-5,697.

Schutzmannschaft-Bataillone / Abteilungen 52-3,55-6,72-3,103-8,110,113-4,116-7, 119-123,130-1,136-140,143-6,149-58,162-9,203-5,207-8,212.

Polizeischützenregimenter 31-38.

Fremdvölkische Wachmannschaften des S.S. und P.F. in Distrikt Lublin, Ausb. Lager Trawniki / Kommandeure der Osttruppen z.b.v. 700-4,709-12,720-1,740-1,853.

Ost. Regimentsstäbe z.b.v. 750-6.

Freiwilligen Stummdivision

Art.Abt.der 2.S.S. Inf.Brigade; Pionierkompanie der 2.S.S. Inf. Brigade.

S.S. Drushina Verband.

Brigade Kaminski R.O.N.A./S.S. Waffen Sturmbrigade R.O.N.A./29.Waffen.

Gren. Div. Der S.S. (russische Nr.1)

Schutzmänner Brigade Siegling/30.Waffen Gren. Div. der S.S. (russ. Nr.2)

600.Inf.Div. (russ).

650.Inf. Div. (russ).

Russ. Gren. Brig. 599.

Ostfliegerstaffel1/Ostfliegergruppe

Panzerjagdverbände (russ.) 10,11,13,14.

Feldlazarette (S) 741-54

Kriegslazarette (S) 905,919,941,943-8,952,954-5

Reslazarette (S) Hindenburg, Habelschwerdt, Linsdorf, Weidenau, Langenbielau, Sanitätskompanie(Arlon).

(Estonians)

Security units raised by 18th Army:-

Ostbataillone (estn.), 658-60

Ostkompanie (estn.) 657

} Absorbed by Waffen S.S.

3. Estn. S.S. Freiw.Brigade/20.Waffen Gren. Div. der S.S. (estn.Nr.1)

Estn. S.S. Pz. Gren. Btl. Narvva, (with S.S. Div. "Wiking". To 20.S.S.Division.)

S.S. Gren. Ausb. und Ers. Btl.33/S.S. Gren. Ausb. und Ers.Einh.20.

Estn. Schuma/Polizei Btle. 29-45, 50, 286-93

Estn. Pol. Rgt.1

Estn. Grenzschtz. Rgtr. (Pol.) 1-6.

Estn. Grenzschtz. Ers. Rgt.1

Estn. Grenzschtz Ers. Btl. (Pol.)

Estn. Rgt. Reval (absorbed by 20 S.S. Division)

Estn. Ers. Btl. Narwa

Estn. Selbstschtz. Rgtr. Fellin, Pernau, Kivi, Ihäne-Harju

Estn. TN.Abt. IV/2

Estnische BauPionier Btle. 1-5.

Sonderstaffel Buschmann/Fliegergruppe 127

Estn. Pol. Reiterzug

(Latvians)

- Ostwachkompanie (lett.) 652
- Ost. Pionier Btl. (lett.) 672
- Let. S.S. Freiw. Legion/15.Waffen Gren. Div. der S.S.(lett.Nr.1)
- 2.lett.S.S. Freiw. Brigade/19.Waffen Gren. Div. der S.S.(lett.Nr.2)
- VI.S.S. Freiw. Armeekorps
- Waffen Gren. Rgt. der S.S.106 (lett.Nr.7)
- S.S. Gren. A.u.E. Btl.15/S.S. Gren. A.u.E.Brig. 15/lett.S.S. A.u.E.Einh.15
- Let. Bau Rgtr.1-3
- Let. Bau Btle. 1-7
- Let. Ausb. Btle.1-4
- Let. Grenzschutz Rgtr. 1-6
- Let. Pol. Btle. 16-28, 266-83, 311-322
- Lettgall. Pol. Btle. 325-8
- Let. Pol. Kradschützenzug; Lett. Pol. Reiterzug.
- Let. Pol. Rgtr. 1,2,3, Riga, Kurland.
- Let. Luftwaffenlegion
- Let. Pol. Kdo.(mot.) IW, IIK,IIIS.

(Lithuania)

- Lit. Pol. Btle. 1-15, 250-7, 263-5, 301-10
- Lit. Pol. Rgt.1
- Lit. Bau. Abt. 1-6
- 4. (lit.) Kp. of Baupionier Btl. 80,532,576,725,728,730,732,738-9,783.
- Lit. TN.Abt. IV
- Lit. Pol. Reiterzug
- Pol. Ausb. Btl. Litauen

(Ukrainians - including Galicians)

"Bergbauernhilfe"

- Ukr. Wachkompanie 606,1/607,2/607,3/607,608-9,1/610,2/610,3/610,611,639-40,644-5
- Ukr. Schuma. Btle. 47,51,54,57,61(102), 62(115), 63(118), 101, 109,124-5, 129,134,201(Roland-Nachtigall), 205-6,284.

Ersatzbataillon für Ukrain. Freiwilligen (f.Ukrain.Ost Wachzüge)

Freiw. (Ukr.) Stamm Rgt.3

Ukrain. (Feldzeug) Btl.101

Nachschub-Kompanie Kommandostab Reichsführer S.S.

Ukrain. Wach Btl., S.S. Tr. ^{II}Üb.Pl. Debica

14.Waffen Gren. Div. der S.S. (gal.Nr.1/Ukrain. Nr.1)

S.S. Gren. Au.E. Rgt.14 (gal. Ausb. Rgt.1)

Ukrain. Pz. Jagd Brigade

Ukr. Btl. 683

Ukr. Baupionier Btl. 690-2

Gal. S.S. Freiw. Rgt. 4-8(Pol.)

Gal. S.S. Freiw. Ers. Btl. Heidenheim

Gal. Freiw. Ers. Btl. (Pol.) Tarbes

Ukr. Inf. Btl.6

(Byelorussians)

Weissruth. Schuma Btle. 46-49, 60, 64-7, 69

Weissruth Heimwehr-Pi. Btl. 1-13

Führerschule weissruth. Heimatwehr

Waffen Gren. Brig. der S.S.(weissruth)/30. Waffen Gren. Div. der S.S.
(weissruth Nr.1)

Weissruth. Lehrbataillon

(Cossacks)

Kosaken Abteilungen 69, 102(600), 161, 213, 318, 403, 443, 1/444, II/444,
I/454, II/454.

Kosaken Bataillone 126, 557-8, 570-5, 622-5, 631.

Kosaken Kompanie 8, 1/137, 2/137, 157, 404

Kosaken Schwadronen 68, 1/82, 1/299, 2/299, 385, 510, 551

Kosaken Batterie 553

Kos. Schuma Btle./Abt. 68,74,111,126,135,159-60,209-11

Kos. Gren. Rgt.360

1. Kos. Kav. Div./XV. Kos. Kav. Korps

- 1. Kos. Kav. Div.
- 2. Kos. Kav. Div.
- 3. Kos. Inf. Div.
- Freiw. (Kos.) Stamm Rgt.5,
- Kos. Div. (in North Italy)

(Finns)

Ostbataillon (finn.) 664

(Turkic and Caucasian Minorities)

Sonderverband Bergmann

Kauk. Schuma Btle. 70,71

Turk.Arbeits Brigade (four battalions)

Freiw. Stamm Rgt.1 (Turk, Georg., Nordkauk Legionen)

Freiw. Stamm Rgt.2 (Idel-Ural, Armen, Aserb. Legionen)

Turk.Ers. Rgt.162/Freiw. Stamm Rgt.3(Turk)/Turk Ausb. und Ersatz brigade

Ostmuselm S.S. Division/Ost-Turk Waffen Verband der S.S.

Kaukas. Waffen Verband der S.S.

Kaukas. Volksregiment (in North Italy)

162. (turk) Inf. Division

Turk. Nachschub bataillon 1

Turk. Nachschub Kompanien (Tiefbau) 1001-8

Turk. Träger bataillon 1000

Turk. Gebirgsträger Btl. 1001

Turk. Trägerkolonnen 54, 100,104,114,117,118,227,721,724,734,738,739, 741,749,750.

Turk.Feldzeug Btl.1, 8, 11

Turk. Arbeits Btl. 46

Turk. Arbeits Kompanien 51-61

Turkvölkische-Kaukasische A.und.E. Btl. für Nachschub-Bau-und
Arbeits Einheiten

(Turkeistani Legion)

Turkeistani Inf. Btle. 450, 452, 781-94, 811, 831, 1/44, 1/76, 1/94, 1/100 Jg.,
1/295, 1/297, 1/305, 1/370, 1/371, 1/384, 1/389.

(Georgian Legion)

Georg. Inf. Btle. 795-9, 822-4, I/1 Geb., I/9, II/4 Geb., (II/298),
I/298 (II/4 Geb.), I/9, II/198

(North Caucasian Legion)

Nordkaukas Inf. Btle. 800-3, 835-6, 842-3, Kp. 1/844, Zug 2/844.

(Azerbaijani Legion)

Aserbaidshan. Inf. Btle. 804-7, 817-21, I/4 Geb., I/73, II/73, I/97 Jg.,
I/111.

(Armenian Legion)

Armen. Inf. Btle. 812-6, II/9, I/125, I/198

("Idel-Ural" Legion)

Wolgatatar Inf. Btl. 627, 825-34

Wolgafinn. Inf. Btl. 837

(Kalmucks)

1, 2 Kalm. Schwadronen 66/Kalm. Reiter Rgt. Dr. Doll

(Crimean Tartars)

Tataren-Selbstschutz-Kompanien in Karassubasar, Bachtschissarai, Simferopol,
Yalta, Alushta, Sudak, St. Krim, Eupatoria, Kasanly, Ortalan, Kousch,
Savatka, Skelja, Bijuk-Usenbusch, Kokosi.

Tat. Schuma Btle. 147-8

Waffen Gebirgsjäger Brigade der S.S. (tartarische Nr.1)

Panzerjagdgruppe (kauk.) 12

- Sources for these lists, which are not exhaustive, include documents
contained in T78, Roll 413, T78 Roll 415, T175 Roll 174, also H.J. Neufeld,
J. Huck, G. Tessin Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei (Koblenz 1957),
G. Tessin Fremden verbände (BAMA), G.M.D.S. Manpower Study (Washington 1946?)

Appendix C

It might have been supposed that the members of Brigade Siegling would conduct themselves with rectitude, since they were policemen from the former occupied Eastern areas. As early as 30 July 1944 the Brigade headquarters announced that thirteen Russian N.C.O.'s and men had deserted, mainly from its First Regiment.¹ When the formation, now a "division", prepared to move, it ordered that Poles serving in its ranks were to be closely watched, for this was the period of the Warsaw uprising.² Nevertheless, in early August five desertions were reported from the Fourth Regiment.³

Because of misbehaviour in its former billeting area the new 30th S.S. Division was put under canvas on its arrival in West Prussia - barns were only to be used in an emergency.⁴ Discipline on the march was the subject of a number of directives,⁵ and not without reason, for the misconduct of elements of the Division had been reported to Hitler's headquarters. In consequence, Generaloberst Guderian, the Chief of the General Staff, told the Central Army Group to investigate the allegations, which it did by sending a General z. b. V. to Zichenau.⁶

There were, nevertheless, further cases of desertion; four men and an UnterKorporal left the Fourth Regiment on the 11th and 12th August 1944. The Regiment endeavoured to put the blame for these upon enemy propaganda. In addition, members of the Regiment's 1st Battalion were distressed by the way German officialdom treated their families. Many of the soldiers themselves had belonged to the Einzeldienst, performing ordinary constabulary duties and were not accustomed to active service conditions. German N.C.O.'s were accused of being inflexible - a common complaint. The pitiful plight of three hundred survivors who had just arrived from the Pripet region,

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1. Brigade Siegling, Abt. III, 30 July 1944 - T354, Roll 160, Frame 380632.
 2. 30 Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. (Russ. Nr. 2) Ia, 3 August 1944.
 3. Ibid. III/Rgt. 4, 12. Kp., 5 August 1944 - T354, Roll 160, Frame 3806237.
 4. Ibid., Ia, 6 August 1944.
 5. Ibid., Ia, 6 August 1944; Ibid., Divisions Stabsbefehl Nr. 1, 6 August 1944.
 6. Ibid., Divisions Sonderbefehl, 7 August 1944.

insufficient green uniforms to clothe the whole Regiment, shortage of bread and the lack of field kitchens were all given as contributory factors of the desertions.⁷

The desertions may provide the reason for the order to shift the Division westwards, as had been done already with many Ost units, or the order may have been dictated by the precarious position of Germany's Western front in the summer of 1944. The transfer of the Division provided no solution to either problem for desertions continued and the formation became patently unreliable. Two battalions of the First and Second Regiments turned on their German cadre and joined the Resistance. In consequence it was announced that discipline was to be tightened and defaulters were to be sent to concentration camps. More positively, relations between the nationalists were to be improved and V-Männer, informers, were to be appointed to keep the German command informed of the state of mind of their foreign comrades.⁸ But, before these measures could take effect, a further five men absconded on 28 August 1944, taking their arms and uniforms.⁹ Two days later the 9th Company of Regiment 4 was drunk and mutinous during an operation against "terrorists". For this the sub-unit was disbanded.

In view of the flagrant indiscipline of parts of the Division it was ordered to the rear by the C-in-C of Army Group G, where the Reichsführer S.S. was to deal with the situation.¹⁰ Once again, discipline was to be tightened and defaulters were threatened with consignment to a concentration camp. Yet in spite of its unreliability the Division obliged its components to hold cyclists ready to deal with emergencies.¹¹ In September the Division moved again, was purged and reorganised. The opportunity was taken

7. Regiment 4, 12 August 1944.
8. 30 Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S. (russ.Nr.2), Divisions Befehl 3, Tgb.Nr.80/44, 27 August 1944.
9. Ibid., III/Rgt.4, 12 Kompanie, Fluchtlinge Waffen grenadiere, 24 August 1944 - T354, Roll 160, Frame 3806341. The men were apparently Poles and probably deserted to Switzerland.
10. Ibid., Marschbefehl, 30 August 1944.
11. Ibid., Divisions Befehl 3, 3 September 1944; Rgt.4, Zusatz zu Div. Befehl 3, 4 September 1944.

to reconstruct the Division on more conventional lines with three infantry regiments in place of four.¹² Apart from those who were executed and incarcerated, several hundred members of the Division were taken to form two Schänzregimenter, working on the western defences.¹³ Himmler may have experienced some feeling of relief when the Division's Russians were handed over to General Vlasov's first Division.¹⁴ The White Rutherians continued in the S.S. as a Brigade¹⁵ and later a Division.¹⁶

12. 30. Waffen Grenadier Division der S.S.(russ Nr.2), Divisionsbefehl Nr.4, 14 September 1944 - T354, Roll 160, Frames 3806028-30.
 13. Ibid., Ia, 14 September 1944; Ibid., Ia, Zusatzbefehl, 14 September 1944.
 14. S.S.F.H.A., Amt.II, Org.Abt.Ia/II Tgb.Nr.164/45, 15 January 1945 - T175, Roll 140, Frames 2668448-51.
 15. Weissruthenische Leitstelle C2Nr.328/45, 9 January 1945 - NO.2586.
 16. O.K.H., Gen.St.d.H. Org.Abt.(I) Nr.21654, 17 February 1945.

Appendix D

An important aspect of the Turkmuselmanische S.S. Division was that Major Meyer-Mader, its originator, intended it to have Turkic officers and N.C.O.s. The German Army's system of providing legionary officers with German advisers had not worked well because the officers had been forced to tolerate the interference, in some cases, of lowly German Gefreite.¹ The Turkic formation of the S.S. did not, in consequence, adopt this system with results that became immediately apparent to German officers and draft-conducting N.C.O.s visiting the nascent Ostmuselmanische S.S. Division. German officers found the Turcomen paid them scant respect, while N.C.O.s were even assaulted. The divisional depôt at Poniadowo was reported to be in chaos with little trace of organisation. Control was in the hands of Azerbaijani and Turkic officers who had been promoted by Meyer-Mader. He himself was not often present in the camp and in his absence a more subaltern deputised for him.² When the paymaster Bunger, formerly of Turkestanisches Infanterie Bataillon I/94, another of the nuclei of the division, wrote to its erstwhile commander, Captain Billig, the Division's liaison officer in Berlin, he admitted that the force was a collection of soldiers, not a well-run "Turk" unit. Bunger did not know whether the Turkic officers and N.C.O.s were suitable but he felt that there was a need for more Germans.³

The indiscipline in the Turkic coned S.S. manifested itself in late January 1944, in an attempt by three "Turk" N.C.O.s to force an entry into the S.S. labour camp at Poniadowo, which led to an exchange of fire with the "Travniki-men" guarding it, and to cases of drunkenness and of assaults upon Polish women.⁴ Rather more serious, a plot was uncovered on 28 February

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1. S.S.H.A., Amt.A1, AI.Az.Sch, Turkmuselm, S.S. Div., 11 December 1943 - BAMA 78042/1.
 2. S.S.H.A., Amt.A1/MAz.Her/Sch., Ostmuselm S.S. Div. S.S. Stubaf. Meyer-Mader, 20 January 1944 - BAMA 78042/1.
 3. Oberzahlmeister Bunger, 21 January 1944 - BAMA 78042/1.
 4. S.S. Wachmann, S.S. Ausb.Lager Travniki, Kdo.Poniadowo, 31 January 1944 - BAMA 78042/1.

1944. Berger's office, possibly on Billig's information, reported the uncovering of a plot by Meyer-Mader's henchmen to attack the force's units, shooting Billig and another officer, Herrmann, in the process. This was part, allegedly, of a plan of Meyer-Mader's to overthrow Kayum Khan and the existing Turkestani Committee. Apparently it was intended that the murderous assault was to be blamed upon partisans and that the legionnaires were to be taken over by the Wehrmacht from the Waffen S.S.⁵ In spite of the plot the formation beat off a partisan attack on the 2nd April 1944 although one hundred of its members took the opportunity to defect.⁶

Although one must make allowances for possible bias against his Turkestani colleagues, the senior Azerbaijani officer provided an insight into the state of the Moslem S.S. when in May 1944 he listed three mistakes he felt that Meyer-Mader had made. First of these was his failure to maintain proper contact with the S.S. Hauptamt and with O.K.W. resulting in the dispatch of personnel intended for the Moslem S.S. to the wrong place. This clearly had an unsettling effect upon the men involved. Secondly, the Turkestani officers did not recognise the National Committee in Berlin but said that a new national organisation would be established within the Division. Suleimanov, the deputy commander, regarded himself as President of a New Turkestan and Azerbaijan. This attitude antagonised the adherents of the existing National Ausschuss and also the Azerbaijanis, who had no wish to enter into a political union with Turkestan. For good measure the Azerbaijani Sturmbannführer,¹¹ rather puritanically, mentioned as the third mistake the procurement of twenty-five Tartar maidens to stock an officers' brothel.⁷

The Azerbaijani officer continued by describing the situation after Hauptmann Billig left the Berlin liason office of the East-Moslem Division

5. S.S.H.A., AI/M, V.S. Nr. 1541/44, AI/M, V.S. Nr. 376/44, 27 March 1944 - BA - NS31/43.
 6. Stubař Alijev, Bericht, circa 20 May 1944 - BAMA 78042/1.
 7. Ibid.

in order to take command of it, bringing his protégé Alimov with him. Alimov assaulted Suleimanov and another subaltern yet went unpunished. The Turkestanis then squabbled among themselves mainly because Alimov favoured his fellow Usbeks in preference to Khirgiz or Kazaks. Suleimanov and a colleague spread the rumour that Billig, while serving with the Turkestan Legion, had ill-treated and shot some of its members - a story which gained credence when three members of the new formation were executed for theft. Suleimanov was later packed off to Lublin to run the collecting centre there, while his henchman was shot. Of Meyer-Mader's "old guard" there only remained an ambitious Khirgiz,⁸ who once sought to ingratiate himself with Gottlob Berger during a routine visit to Berlin.⁹

A German, who, because he had been seconded by the S.D. to act as intelligence officer, was probably able to ascertain some of the truth, reported that numbers of Kazaks and Khirgiz who had served loyally at the front in the S.D. had deserted. He confirmed the antipathy between Kayum Khan, a "little" Turk, and the "Greater" Turk faction of Meyer-Mader's. Billig on replacing Meyer-Mader had confined Suleimanov to his room. The new German Commander put an end to the practice of German and Turkic officers eating together. He ordered German personnel to carry pistols and to take other precautions. On the grounds that he had uncovered a plot, Billig had Suleimanov's friend shot and dispatched Suleimanov himself to Lemberg. Not content with that, Billig gathered evidence against the (possibly forged) Meyer-Mader faction which enabled him to have Suleimanov and three others shot.¹⁰

The Azerbaijani major had been critical of Meyer-Mader but he was clearly hostile to Billig for he listed several of that officer's alleged errors such as throwing a grenade at a ~~satrap~~ for not knowing the password, issuing unintelligible instructions, causing desertions by mishandling his

8. Stubaľ Aliew, Bericht, circa 20 May 1944 - BAMA 78042/1.
 9. S.S.H.A., Amt. AI/M Az. Her/Sch., 20 January 1944 - BAMA 78042/1.
 10. Obersturmführer Fürst, 11 May 1944 - BA-NS 31/43.

men and permitting a shooting affray between Turkestanis and Azerbaijanis that was witnessed by the local population. The writer maintained that Billig was opposed to the Ostmuselmanische S.S. Regiment, but the Azerbaijanis realised that suitable German officers were hard to find.¹¹

When the Polish Home Army rose against the German troops in Warsaw, during August 1944, the ill-disciplined Moslem regiment was dispatched there and succeeded in earning official praise for its share in putting down the insurrection.¹² Instead of expanding to form a Division the Ost-Muselmanische S.S. Regiment 1 became one of the nuclei of the Ost-Turk Waffen Verband.¹³

This formation had a serious set-back early in its existence - Obersturmführer Alimov's contribution to the Christmas festivities of 1944 was an attempt to take his entire command over to the partisans near Neustad. Only a mad gallop through the woods to the headquarters of Harun al Rashid Bey¹⁴ at Mijava, by the Untersturmführer commanding the IIInd Battalion prevented the whole of his unit from following Alimov and the Ist Battalion.¹⁵ Nevertheless, it was clear that any hopes the S.S. had of succeeding in its dealings with Soviet tribesmen where the German Army had failed were now shattered.

11. Stubaf. Aliew, op.cit.
12. Radio report, 30 September 1944.
13. C.d.S.S.H.A. V.S. Tgb.Nr.4216/44, Adj.Tgb.Nr.1930/44., Vermerk fur Amtsgruppe D, 20 July 1944 - BA-NS 31/27.
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