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PARTICIPATION AND ORGANIZATION IN LOCAL POLITICS:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CLASS AND CLIENTAGE

IN TWO SMALL TOWNS

by

AYŞE GÜNEŞ AYATA

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Kent

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

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Participation and Organization in Local Politics:

A comparative study of class and clientage in two small towns

by AYŞE GÜNEŞ-AYATA

ABSTRACT

A study of two branches of Republican Peoples Party based on field work carried out in two counties. In the two branches studied diverse forms of participation co-exist: patronage, brokerage, party directed patronage, class based corporate politics, ethnic politics, interest groups. Specific emphasis is given to the analysis of the relationships between the different forms of participation that coexist in these two towns.

Recent research on political participation in Third World indicates the significance of vertical forms of participation in politics. A fundamental argument in this is that an adequate understanding in local politics requires the construction of theoretical frameworks which take into account the analysis of diversification within political participation. An attempt is made to examine local politics in Turkey from this perspective.

Some approaches see two forms of participation vertical and horizontal as incompatible with each other. However the data from two branches, Kaleli and Taşlık indicate that they can co-exist and some vertical forms of participation, are made use of by specific classes. The nature of the vertical forms of participation used by specific classes vary according to their own sociological characteristics, ^{the} social context in which they are used, the expectation of different individuals and groups from politics. In this sense it is argued vertical forms of participation can be manifestation of class politics.

Dedicated to the memory of my beloved father,

with my deepest respect

A.G.A.

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INTRODUCTION

In this study, I examine the local organization of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) comparing two of its branches in two Turkish counties. At the very beginning I had in mind two broad areas of study; the organizational structure of the party and the major ideological changes which this party had to go through in the early 1970's. When I began my research in 1976, the latter was a current issue of debate among Turkish academics and intellectuals. Was the RPP changing the class basis of its politics to become a party of the Turkish workers and peasants? Was the age old RPP populism which was based on the assumption that Turkey is a classless society being changed into a working class ideology? To what extent was this new commitment to ^{the} "democratic left" was an outcome of new forces in the society released by changes in the economy and polity of Turkey? Or was this new preaching by the social democratic leaders something deliberately introduced from above to be imposed on the party's relic institutions and its grass roots activists? How far were its leaders prepared to carry on with the reforms which would make Turkey a democratic, egalitarian and industrialized country? After all what kind of leftism was the RPP's social democracy? I was influenced and guided by such questions and issues when I began to survey the literature on political parties, party ideologies and the political processes in the Third World.

Before going to the field I limited my interest to only one of these broad questions, namely, the role played by the local party organization and grass roots level politics in moulding and shaping the RPP's emergent social democracy, and the impact the latter had upon the daily round of political activities at the local level. Thus, my interest shifted from a study of the social bases of the RPP votes to a study of its membership. The high RPP support from the squatter housing

areas of the big Turkish cities in the 1973 elections made evident the fact that the class bases of the party was changing but very little was known and said about the role of the rank and file party activists.

The second thing I had in mind before I started the field work was to make it a comparative study. On the one hand I wanted to examine the relationship between economic development and political change. On the other hand, I was thinking that the ideological changes in the RPP were activated by macro transformations such as industrialization and urbanization which introduced into the political scene new forces, ^{such as} as the industrialists, the workers, and the ^{new} educated middle class. At that stage it occurred to me that I should be looking not for the similarities across the local branches of the RPP but for their differences to trace out the impact of these new social and political forces on the organization and the ideology of the party.

Taşlık, perhaps the most highly industrialized county in Turkey with an overwhelming working class population and Kaleli, a traditional Central Anatolian county where a small population of town dwellers live off and through servicing an agricultural hinterland provided me with the kind of contrast I was looking for. The former was a factory town of working classes with a marked swing in votes towards the emergent leftist parties, whereas the latter largely retained its traditional class structure with shopkeepers, artisans and peasants as a conservative stronghold.

However, most of the ideas, arguments and the theoretical assumptions of this study were not formulated prior to the field work. My interviews in these towns provided me with useful insights and new ideas which in turn helped me in limiting myself to the kinds of sociological analysis of the relationships discussed in this study. What I am trying to emphasize is that the theoretical framework which I use here was not

an early research hypothesis which was developed prior to and tested with the empirical research as such. I rather found myself reading the relevant book and articles, taking new ideas from them to be used in the field work while the questions that occurred to me during the field acted as a yardstick in dealing with theoretical concepts and frameworks. (See Chapter 1).

1) Research Methods

The empirical findings of this study are based on an extended field which I carried out between 1977 and 1980. I periodically visited the two towns (which are 1100 kms apart) and each time I spent about two months in each one town. I spent most of my time interviewing the party leaders and the delegates either in the party buildings, or in the shops and coffee shops.

My empirical data comes from four basic sources: interviews, questionnaires, participant observation and official statistics and other published first hand data. Making long interviews with the party activists proved from the very beginning a better way of gathering information about informal political relations and the political views of my respondents.

I had only 20 questions written down on paper to be used as a basic guideline in the interviews, all of which were open ended questions oriented towards making the respondents describe their views and activities in detail rather than making them give yes or no type of answers. The length of the interview varied from 2 hours to almost a whole day. With some of the delegates that I could establish good contact and with almost all the local leadership cadres I made not only "formal interviews" but had extended discussions about politics in Turkey, the RPP in general and RPP politics in the county, in the town, in the village and

in the unions. None of these discussions were structured, and I had little control over the issues that were being discussed and the lines of argument. I often limited my role to one of introducing issues and in most cases this approach proved to be very useful. Not being formally interviewed people felt they were not questioned, and they talked freely about their intentions, thoughts and political gossip. I was studying informal politics, the access to gossip was extremely important for me, because it was only through it that I could learn the activists motives and strategies. Once I labelled the conversation as interview I could only get positive gossip about people, only open opponents exposed each others abuses. Still these discussions and interviews complemented each other. In the interviews I gathered information about how individuals evaluated their own positions and relations in politics and in the discussions where more than one person was present I gathered information about how others evaluated them. So at the end of the research I did 50 unstructured interviews of various lengths at each branch, which were about a quarter of delegates in 1978. I participated in many discussions some of which I tried to organize.

Besides the delegates and the leadership in the two towns I also interviewed the provincial leaders of the two provinces, Kayseri and Kocaeli. I interviewed the members of parliament including some old ones from the party and those that have resigned during the 1972 Congress. All of these people were living outside the two towns, therefore I went to see them in the provincial centres, and in Ankara and Istanbul. I also visited the provincial centres of the party interviewing some members on executive committees on their views about the branches and their problems and the way the provincial organization approached to such problems.

Half way through the interviews, I thought it might be a better

idea if I could quantify some of the variables that were beginning to emerge. Therefore I decided to give a simple questionnaire of 40 questions to another 50 delegates in each branch. The questions were open ended but simple, requiring short answers in a few sentences, rather than long descriptions. This was especially useful in the case of those delegates who were not willing to talk in detail and reluctant to discuss the problems regarding the party. It included questions on personal and social backgrounds of the delegates such as occupation, education, age, place of birth, relations with the town, relations with the party, length of membership, the frequency of their visits to the party branch, the degree of commitment to the party activities and basic information about the town, the county and the party.

The questionnaires that I gave to Kaleli and Taşlık RPP delegates were not exactly the same; in addition to thirty core questions which remained the same in both cases I made up another ten questions in view of the markedly different social and political positions of the delegates in the two counties. For instance, although the majority of the Taşlık delegates were workers Kaleli delegates were mainly peasants and shopkeepers. Thus, I asked ten questions bearing in mind such divergent backgrounds and preoccupations.

I began my field work in 1977 which was a year of both local and general elections. This enabled me to participate, as an observer in the RPP propaganda carried out in Kaleli and Taşlık. I was around all through the primary elections for the nomination of the candidates, through the factional disputes over the candidates. I participated in the propaganda both in the villages and in quarters, I joined the party activists in their house visits. Such an opportunity was very important in understanding the internal mechanisms of party politics through strategies and decision making, the significance of elections for the sup-

porters and delegates and especially in collecting first hand information about party directed patronage. Also it helped me to realize that activity is periodical in the party, because the contrast of activity was very great between the election times and non-election periods especially in Kaleli. I joined the local party leaders following them on their visits to villages, quarters, unions and even government offices.

I personally went to government offices, banks, trade unions, chambers of commerce industry and agriculture, and some other relevant formal institutions in both counties collecting and sorting statistical data and documents.

In Turkey, statistical information at county level is difficult to obtain because the official publications are usually at the provincial level except voting statistics, so I had to sort out all the statistical data by myself. This however, gave me the chance to discuss politics with officials who are a very useful source of information in understanding the channels of clientage.

Although I did not intend to make it a town or county study I took all the chances of understanding the life and people of both counties. I spoke to people in the market, shops, going to weddings, religious ceremonies, tea parties, house visits, trade union meetings, strikes picketing lines, and such other daily activities, most of which were not directly related to RPP or not even to politics. However they were all very useful in understanding the cultures of the two areas, in establishing trust relations and in understanding the context in which RPP politics was operating.

ii) A Brief Summary of Contents

The first chapter of the thesis is a reassessment of some of the theoretical argument regarding local politics in Third World countries.

In this chapter I start by drawing some of the basic models. These are by no means the only models of local politics, [·] The contrary I try to make it explicit that there can be variations in models according to different social contexts, sociological characteristics of the participants and the nature of their political practices. However, the models have no claim of multi-purpose universal applicability other than being constructed to analyze and compare similar data in relation to the kinds of questions that I pose. I do not only discuss the models, but also the conditions of transition from one form of participation to another, and to what extent specific and distinct forms of participation are compatible with each other. Here, I elaborate on the usefulness of the 'corporate' and 'non-corporate', 'horizontal' and 'vertical', 'traditional and modern' and 'class and non-class' dichotomies in analysing the practices of every day politics of the participants.

The second chapter^{is} designed to be descriptive and informative on the basic changes that occurred in Republican Peoples Party, its politics and its ideology. However as the party was the founder of the Turkish Republic, and lived^{through} six decades of major changes in Turkish society and economy, it was impossible to separate Turkish political and economic history from the history of the party. The two are, obviously, closely intertwined, hence I include a brief account of the major social and economic transformations of the Turkish society. In this sense the most important change regarding my thesis was the social democratic movement of the late 1960's and early 1970's which I wanted to study in terms of its impact on local organization. After giving some basic information about the organizational structure and the ideology of the party in Chapter 2, I turn to the analysis of the two branches of RPP in Kaleli and Taşlık.

Chapter 3 focuses on Kaleli's economy and political structure

whereas chapter 4 looks closer into the delegates and the leaders of the RPP branch in this county. The history of the party in the branch follows three historical changes in forms of participation. In the one party period, the party was a caucus party, where the notables derived their authority from ^{the} central organization of the party and rank and file participation was minimal. Then there was a move towards a further participation of delegates by means of the patronage relation they developed with town merchants. However by early 1970's it was possible to see a new form of participation emerging, namely brokerage. I do not only discuss these forms of participation but also the social characteristics of the groups, classes and individuals involved.

Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on Taşlik branch of RPP. This county is very different than Kaleli mainly in its rapid industrialization and urbanization. In Chapter 6 I attempt to explain the consequences of these changes in terms of diversification in economic activities, occupational and class structures and ethnic composition. This chapter discusses the political implications of the emergent class and ethnic compositions relating these to ideological changes amongst RPP activists. One important aspect of this discussion is the integration of the migrants into the new society and the party. This, however, created new conflicts between the natives and migrants and between different sections of the population that were represented in the party. There were ideological conflicts, divergent interests and cultural conflicts. Each class was engaged in distinct forms of participation and in most cases they used different forms alternatively in accordance with their specific purpose.

In Chapter 7 I compare the structural and historical changes that took place in two branches. The similarities were more important until the late 1960's whereas from then onwards their differences began to be

more apparent. As a second task I discuss some of the theoretical points raised in Chapter I regarding the vertical forms of participation. Amongst my major aims are how can vertical and horizontal forms of participation co-exist, to what extent can there be alternative uses of contradicting forms of participation by specific classes and to what extent is clientelism an exclusive system used by specific classes.

Much of this thesis is written in the past tense. This I did quite deliberately because on the 12th September 1980 the activities of all political parties were suspended and then in 1981, ^{the} fifty eight years old RPP together with other political parties were closed. . A new constitution was drafted and this in turn led to significant changes in the Municipal and Administrative Laws.

In this sense, the material I present is historical although it is very recent history.

CHAPTER 1

MODELS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Studying local-level politics, especially in an Third World country such as Turkey, leads one to concentrate on the interpersonal relations between the people involved. This by no means implies a denial of the macro-political, economic and social systems of the country, merely that in less developed countries the local level politics reflects a higher degree of individualized politics. In short, "micro-politics" is an essential part of "macro-politics".

It has been argued in the literature that to be professionally involved in politics, regardless of the political system, demands time and money. The individuals that can afford it expect a return on their "investment". If politics is conceptualized in this sense, the maximization of profit will be a primary motive.

On the other hand most Third World countries suffer from a relative scarcity of resources, and lack impartiality in their distribution. In such a situation it is argued that various types of patron-client relations are widely practiced. Although concepts such as patronage, patron-client relations, clientelism and party-directed patronage are used widely to describe and analyze local politics, no clarity has been achieved in their use, despite various attempts at classification. One difficulty springs from the use of the same concept by different disciplines. Naturally various approaches emphasize different aspects. For example, political scientists, when trying to relate the concept to macro-political problems, emphasize the system as a whole, such as machine politics, clientelism, party directed patronage (Weingrod 1968; Lemarchand and Legg 1971; Powell 1970; Scott 1969; Silverman 1965). Social anthropologists emphasize the interpersonal aspect of micro-

politics, in patronage, patron-client relations, dyadic contract patrimonialism etc. (Foster 1961; Kenny 1960; Boissevain 1966a). Rural sociologists have emphasized the exploitative relations, the domination of patrons and the class bases of politics (Littlewood 1980; Wolf 1966) so they also brought a different approach.

Another difficulty originates from the different historical, social and political conditions of the communities or societies in question. If patronage denotes particularist personal exchange between two individuals of unequal status and power, than it can be readily used to analyze a vast range of social settings. Personalistic and paternalistic exchange of favours can be found in feudal serf-lord relations, in kinship relations or in the machine politics of the USA. When "patronage" is used in all these contexts, it has little analytical value.

Additionally there is also the problem of the level of analysis. On one level "patronage" denotes personal behavioural analysis, while on another level it is applied to local subsystems, political parties and even international systems.* So there is always a problem of transition from micro to macro analysis. (Kaufman 1971). Bearing in mind the existence of the problems I have referred to I will now try to classify the different types of patron-client relations. It is possible to construct any number of different models of the same phenomena: according to which aspects of it are deemed most significant for any given purpose. These different models may vary in their fruitfulness for research.

1.1 The basic assumptions of the different models

"A patron-client relationship is a vertical dyadic alliance i.e. an

* For a usage of patron-client concept in international relations see Rosenau (1969).

alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources each of whom find it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself". (Lande 1977:xx) There are different models of patron (or broker) client relations as defined above, so much so that each different empirical case itself is also a variation from the models. However, irrespective of these variations, when a relation is described as "patron (or broker) client relation" we can assume that it is dyadic but asymmetric. The relation is dyadic because the link is between two individuals or two families independently of others. However, unlike "colleague contracts" (Foster 1962:217) which are also dyadic, patron-client contracts do not operate between individuals that have similar social standing in terms of power, status and prestige but are contracts between unequals; between people of different socio-economic status.

The relation is personalistic and informal, there is no legal binding between the sides. In some cases such a relation can be against the laws of a particular country. However there is an informal morality built in to the relation, the underlying factor being reciprocity (Gellner 1977). Each side expects that each "favour" that is done will be reciprocated, even though the exchange in most cases is unequal. This unequal exchange is the basis of political and in some cases economic domination. The relation is voluntary, at least the ideology of the relation stresses it to be voluntary, although in most cases this

can be disputed.* Why then do people engage in such a relation voluntarily when it entails power relations? This leads us to another basic assumption: the scarcity of resources. Patron-client relations are a means of benefiting from limited resources and a preferential distribution of resources by those in higher social positions to those in lower positions, thus building a power base for themselves through reciprocity.

Dyadic-vertical relations may differ in different context and historical periods. Since one of my major aims in this study is to construct abstract models for understanding the empirically different forms of vertical-dyadic relationships I first want to elaborate on those factors which I see important in shaping and determining the nature of patron-client relationships. In other words it's possible to analyze the variations between factors as independent variables. Hence I argue variations as to (1) the historical, economic and political context in which the relationship occurs, (2) the sociological characteristics of the people involved in such a relation, (3) the resources that each side can exchange, (4) the expectations each side has of such a relationship, which also includes the ^{moral} legitimization of the relation and (5) the strategies developed to continue or discontinue the relation by both sides. These five sources of variation lead to different types of relations, and each empirical case may show its own specificity.

However, it is possible to come across two general and basic

* Stressing voluntariness is important in patron-client relations. Otherwise distinguishing between early forms of patronage relations and feudalism is very difficult. The emphasis here is that feudalism entails non-voluntary contracts while patron-client relations entail voluntary contracts. However, as in the critique by Asad of Swat Political Systems the voluntariness of the relation is highly debatable. In some models of patron-client relations that I will discuss later, voluntariness is highly questionable because for the client the endurance of the relation is vital.

models in the literature: these differ from each other in all sources of variation: patronage and brokerage. * I will try to outline the distinctions between the two, the variation in each model, the conditions for changing from patronage to brokerage and the transitional forms between the two.

1.2 Patronage as a Model of Political Participation

Patron-client relations occur in situations where there is limited penetration of the state or where the state has only partial control of a territory. Economically it occurs in historical situations where there is a subsistence oriented peasant economy.

The patron owns the resources that can be distributed to clients while the client wants to make use of resources that belong to the patron. In this he wants preferential treatment, individual and personal, and he is willing to reciprocate with political defense. The relation, then, is both a matter of political power and domination mixed up with economic profit. With patronage the resources are scarce, and they are owned by the patron himself. Therefore, for the client, access to the resources necessitates patronage relations with the patron. Usually the resources are very important to the client, a matter of life and death. Therefore the client wants to extend the relation for as long as possible. On the other hand, the patron wants to continue the relation to retain his power position and the profits that accrue to him

* Scott very clearly distinguishes two categories and argues that the role of the patron ought to be distinguished from such role designations as "brokers", middleman or "boss" with which it is sometimes confused. However, in the role of a middleman he claims that there is a three party exchange in which the middleman functions as an agent and does not himself control the thing to be transferred. A patron, by contrast, is a part of a two-person exchange and operates with the resources he himself owns or directly controls (Scott 1982). Boissevain, on the other hand, sees brokerage as part of a dyadic contract, (Boissevain 1977) because the relation is still in dyads.

through the relation. So the relations, with the cooperation of both sides, are made durable, at least in the life span of both the client and the patron. Such a relation necessitates loyalty and considerable reciprocity in a holistic fashion that is, in patronage relations calculations of reciprocity are not based on single favours, but on the whole relation. The ideology of the relation stresses generosity. The legitimacy of the relation is based on paternalistic attitudes that is, the participants will act as members of a family.

As the relations are extended they usually overlap between generations. As their duration lasts over generations, this suggests that the positions of patrons and clients are both hereditary. The resources are inherited by the children (usually sons) of the patrons, and so are the patronage relations. Because the children of clients will continue their demand for resources, they will benefit from the protection arrangements their father had with the patron. There is always the possibility of breaking the contract, but the expenses of such an act *Maybe* too great to afford for the client, while for the patron it means reestablishing similar relations which may not be as worthwhile. Such an inheritance shows a very clear class distinction between the patron and the client, with almost no social mobility in between.* The patron, by building networks of patronage, also gains power in the territory. As the state does not have total control over the area the patron can be highly autonomous, or can be seen as the agent of the state. Thus the patron creates a position for himself vis-a-vis the state. He may also use such a position to strengthen his patronage network by intervening on behalf of his clients with the state bureaucracy. However such

* As there is almost no social mobility, and clear political and economic exploitation, it is easy to show and verify the class basis of both the patrons and clients in patronage. This is why some scholars see the relation as a form of class relations with clear exploitation on a class basis. (Littlewood 1980, Bodeman 1980, Licausti 1975).

relations are of secondary importance because the peasant has very limited relations with the state. Therefore the cases where the patron may be asked to intervene are usually very limited and such a relation is of secondary importance to the client.

In the literature there are two basic models of patronage relations. In the first model the patron is a landlord and the client his share cropper. In the second model the patron is a merchant and the client is a subsistence oriented peasant. There are historical cases where, in time, a merchant patron may acquire land and become a landlord or a landlord may divert his interests to trade. In those cases a single patron is involved with two types of relations, one as a merchant patron and the other as a landlord patron.

1.2.1 Model IA: Patronage relations between landlords and peasants

One type of patron-client relation analyzed is that between the landlord and the peasant as patron and client respectively in a subsistence oriented agrarian economy where there is limited penetration of the state. These rural patrons are from the large landholding families and the clients are share croppers that either have no land or very limited land that is not sufficient for their subsistence. Dependence on land as the sole or main means of livelihood for both parties, of course, strengthens the relation. Labour intensive agriculture necessitates peasant share-cropping families, and limited opportunities outside agriculture make the peasants hesitant about leaving their village.* The most important resources for exchange are land and labour. The patron provides either land or access to land, which the client reciprocates by labour, either as a share-cropper or as a worker. Such labour requirements are not limited by agriculture but will extend to other spheres of

* This is why patronage relations are seen by some as feudal and semi-feudal (Gilsenan 1977, Bodeman 1980).

life. For example, the clients' family could provide a helping hand in a feast as servants. A part of the agreement is that the client will be engaged in extra work of a private nature for the landlord.

In a subsistence based peasant economy the local patron will provide the basic needs of the peasant, including credit and some of the means of production, and will help in the marketing of the product if there is any surplus. For the peasant, the patron is a social security institution. The patron secures the peasant against all kinds of misfortune, including involvement with the state. He is continually willing to help financially and morally. In a subsistence economy, where the cash income resources of the peasants are extremely limited but where there are infiltrations of a cash economy into peasant life, the peasants may periodically find themselves faced with cash bottlenecks. The patron, who is a large landowner with more extensive farming or has diverted some of his capital to other cash income trades such as commerce, always has available cash. Therefore one of the most extensive uses of the patronage system by peasants is for their cash needs. This informal credit mechanism is preferred, even in cases where there is a possibility of formal credit from an institution such as a bank, because the cash needs are for wedding expenses, unexpected misfortunes such as sickness or death, or for the subsistence of family in an unproductive year. This security function seems to be vital to the peasant. The reciprocity of the relation involves the peasants political loyalty, selling his surplus product to the patron if there is any, or working on the patrons land in his free time and when needed.

The peasant is protected by the landlord from outside forces, such as the state, given advice, information, and protection as part of the bargain, which may also include major contributions to the community funds such as the church, roads, fountains etc. In return for this the

landlord expects almost absolute loyalty: loyalty to the community; to the system; and personal political and ideological loyalty (Silverman 1970; Colclough 1969; Scott 1972). The expectation from both sides of patronage relations is personal. The patron is the paternalistic figure of justice and aid. He is the protector, both generous and kind. The client is indebted to his protector, he is a loyal man, part of a family. The ideology stresses a relationship of kindness and generosity, although implicitly both the patron (landlord) and the client (peasant) balance the profits and costs of such a relationship and eventually decide on the desirability of continuing the relation. The peasant is dependent on the patron, for land and for social security mechanisms, because there are none other than those provided by the landlord. If the patron ends the contract with one client, this is a matter of life and death for the peasant. For the patron this type of moral linkage provides greater permanence of tenancy, a convenient supply of labour, and greater control of economy and polity in the area.

It is to the advantage of both sides that they should adopt the strategy of long term, loyal relations. Therefore they do not calculate on the basis that each favour should be reciprocated one at a time. There will be an overall calculation over the period that the relation endures. To secure long term relations, strategies that will entail extra linkages are adopted such as kinship, ritual kinship or religious obligations. (Kenny 1960; Boissevain 1964; Campbell 1964; Kudat 1971). The most common of such practices is "godparenthood", where the patrons are asked to be godparents to clients' children to ensure that the relation will last longer than a generation. Another strategy is described by Rassam (1977) in which holy families use their ability to breach them of religious resources.

Such patronage relations between landlord and share-cropper are

very widespread in most of the Third World countries; for example, it has been argued that such patron-client relations have been the dominant form of social and political control in Latin America (Guasti 1977). The colonial governments allowed semi-autonomous rule of the hacienda owners in their area. The hacienda owners were the paternalistic patrons and the share-cropper/workers were their clients. It is argued by many scholars that the hacienda owners by adopting this image were able to control the economy of the community. The peasants were totally dependent on the patron and in most cases this was deliberate (Friedrich 1968; Schmidt 1974; Chalmers 1972; Guasti 1977; Soiffer and Howe 1982). The Latin American system is seen as a dependency system; from the local level to international level every class is dependent on a superordinate class, and patronage is one of the main links in such dependency (Chalmers 1972; Guasti 1977).

Another example is the Italian patron-client system, which is studied in depth and in detail by many social scientists. In its essence Italian patron-client politics does not seem to be very different from the Latin American. Italy was not a colony like Latin America, but unlike to Latin America it has been fragmented during the same period. The unification of Italy was completed in the second half of the 19th century. In this sense, Italy also had to go through a nation building process. Before unification, a semi-feudal, patron-client network type of politics was dominant in Italy. (Boissevain 1977; Bodeman 1980) In other words, all southern Italian princedoms were somehow self sufficient patron-client units. The basis of such a political organization is usually seen as the mezzadria arrangement (Silverman 1965). Mezzadria was a form of share-cropping arrangement, similar to other types of share-cropping arrangement. The landlord provided land, fixed capital goods, technical directions, entrepreneurial leadership, and decision making, while the peasant provided labour and part of the working

capital. They shared the product, the peasant being protected against disaster and outside influences (Schneider 1969; Silverman 1965, 1970; Bodeman 1980; Colclough 1969; Graziano 1973, 1978). Other examples of patronage relations between landlords and peasants can be seen in the Middle East (Rassam 1977; Khalaf 1977),^WAsia, (Lande 1973; Scott 1972) and^WAfrica (Lemarchand 1972).

1.2.2 Model IB: Patronage relations between merchants and peasants

In the subsistence oriented peasant economies, where there are no large landholdings on which peasants share-crop, but where they own their own land, there is a change in the sociological characteristics of the patrons and clients, and the resources that they exchange, even if the legitimizing ideology of the relation and the strategies adopted are similar. In places where small peasant holdings are widespread as a form of production, the problem of peasants is not finding a plot of land to cultivate, because they are small proprietors themselves, but to market their surplus product, or to obtain necessities that are not available without cash, such as salt, soap, clothing etc. In these places where small peasant holdings are predominant the local patron is a town merchant, who supplies the peasants with necessities and markets their surplus. Once more, the cash needs of the peasants, and their marketable surplus are limited, agriculture is subsistence oriented, and there is limited state penetration of the area.

The most important aids provided by the merchant are credit, access to credit and marketing of the surplus. The merchant patron's biggest advantage is that he has ready cash for lending money and for buying products. But although the accounting of transactions is carried out in cash terms usually neither of the parties receive cash, or give cash. The merchant has a general store in which the peasant can find almost all he needs, so when he brings his product to the merchant there is an

almost immediate barter for his produce. The peasant has almost endless credit in the store and this credit extends to bad harvest years when he can buy his subsistence needs from the store as well. The merchant will also be expected to help through difficult times by lending money in such events as weddings or sickness and death. The merchant also carries out extra-economic activities as favours to the peasant. Although the interaction of peasant and state is limited, peasants are involved in paying taxes, in having lands registered and with court in their various disputes. Patrons (landlords or merchants) built networks with the local bureaucracy so that they can help their clients (peasants) with their problems in the state offices. The merchant expects political deference to his authority from his clients. He uses this influence over the peasants to secure his position as the person in charge of the area. He is the local notable, the local boss, an important link in his relation with the central authority in a specific locality.

The merchant, besides gaining political advantages also acquires economic profit from these transactions. He will buy the next season's product cheaply when he is asked for credit or he might foreclose on the peasants' land if his debt is unpaid. Most importantly, he keeps a permanent clientele for his merchandise as the debts (in kind and in favours) are never totally paid and the peasant is obliged to maintain economic relations with him.

As in the patronage relations between landlords and peasants, the ideology of legitimation stresses paternalism, generosity and kindness, mutual help and loyalty. As maintaining the relation is important to both sides, there may be an extension of the duration of the relation, reinforced by kinship and other linkages. Examples of patronage relations between peasants and merchants can be found in the works of Campbell (1976), Kiray (1980), Kudat (1971) and Loizos (1977). Each one of

these examples have their specific characteristics, but two are outstanding in terms of their variation. Campbell describes the patronage relations between merchants and shepherds. The Shepherds are dependent on the merchants for their cash needs and the marketing of their products. Therefore similar relations prevail, although the actual product is different. Loizos, on the other hand, describes the relations between the money lender and the peasant, which was only converted into a patronage relation when the economic returns in the transaction was no longer satisfactory to the money lender. This suggests that political patronage relations are a by-product of the economic relations existing between the people in question.

1.3 Factors that lead to the transition from patronage to brokerage

With the expansion of the capitalist economy and the penetration of nation states we see some changes occurring in patronage relations.

Economically the most important change is the commercialization of agriculture. With the expansion of a cash economy, subsistence farming, even in the remotest areas, is replaced by cash-cropping. The small peasants divert their production to cash cropping, and the old patrons increasingly move towards capitalist farming and commerce. The use of patronage for a subsistence plot or a few hours work on the patrons land becomes less meaningful for both sides. Wage relations may replace patronage relations and reciprocity and loyalties can be calculated in money terms. One of the basic changes occurs in the resources distributed by patronage. The needs of both sides change, and so does the nature of the relationship. As both of the sides are not as dependent on each other economically as they previously were, there is a strengthening of the political nature of the relation.

Politically the major change is in the nature of the state. The

colonial governments, or autonomous political entities, are replaced by nation states. For an understanding of the new forms of patron-client relations the nation state is extremely important. Under a colonial state a relative autonomy of the local notables is possible. But the nation states aim at total territorial control and the integration of relatively autonomous areas is itself a major problem for the nation state. However, this integration has to be accompanied by the expansion of state services to the periphery. The well known problems of the Third World countries, such as the lack of resources, does not allow the complete expansion of such services. So on the one hand we have a state that wants to reach every single citizen, while on the other hand there are limits to the powers of the state. This results in a "lag", a delay in the perfect and direct integration of the peripheral areas. It is because of this "lag" that, although the new economic and political system affects the peasants as well as the notables, in the new order the same relations are perpetuated under different forms.

The new "nation state" has the legitimization process as citizens participation, so the state does not only aim at integrating the nation as a whole but also at the participation of the citizens at different levels the degree of which depends on the type of political system. So, not only does the state intervene in individuals' lives more directly but also individuals as citizens can make direct demands and contributions to the state.

Under the political and economic changes outlined above it might be expected that there would be a change from patronage to more horizontal forms of participation, where the individual interest could be better expressed in class and group politics. So theoretically there is no necessity that patronage must precede brokerage, or that patronage will convert to brokerage. However, by referring to some empirical cases, we

can outline three different types of fluidity between patronage and brokerage.

- (1) Empirically the most common type of relation seems to be patronage relations evolving into brokerage relations with increasing importance of institutional resources. (Scott 1977; Weingrod 1968; Colclough 1969; Boissevain 1977). However within this type of change there are also variations. In some cases the patrons may evolve into brokers. The patrons can use their existing power relations to establish new types of networks with the institutions that distribute resources. Therefore for a time, for example in a transitional stage from patronage to brokerage, they can mobilize their own resources and institutional resources simultaneously. Thus they have the characteristics of both a patron and a broker. For example, in such cases we can see different members of the family performing different roles, being engaged in diversified tasks and professions (Bodeman 1980; Colclough 1969).

With a different type of transition from patronage to brokerage it may happen that the patrons cannot transform themselves into brokers or that there is no direct link between patrons and brokers. This also depends on the sociological characteristics of the patrons and the social contexts of the transition. For example, if the patron does not have direct links with the institutional resources he may lose his legitimacy (e.g. landlords after the Mexican revolution). He may then be replaced by brokers, who are not related to him. The brokers are those people that can take advantage of the new situation and can establish links with both the clients and the institution that distribute resources. (Friedrich 1968; Wolf 1973).

- (2) With the increasing penetration of a market economy, integration to a nation state and the expansion of state resources to the periphery, democratization and competition of political parties may lead to a greater possibility of horizontal forms of participation replacing patronage (Almond & Verba 1963). As many empirical studies clearly indicate, patronage can also develop directly into brokerage, there is no reason to suppose that brokerage is a necessary evolutionary stage. In other words, patronage can be replaced by horizontal forms of participation. For example, in urban areas there may be a development of means of horizontal participation through professional associations, trade unions and other interest groups, whereas in rural areas patronage may change into brokerage.
- (3) Brokerage is not necessarily a direct outcome of patronage. It may develop in new areas, and it may also develop in areas where there are means of horizontal participation such as trade unions (Sandbrook 1972).

1.4 Brokerage as a Model of Political Participation

Brokerage exists in nation states where the state is attempting to control a whole territory but has not yet achieved this, or in cases where the state has territorial control but lacks the technical resources to implement its will in some areas of life. This is usually accompanied by an expansion of state services to the periphery and a greater integration of society and state. In most cases there are also growing expectations of, and demands upon, the state from its citizens. In most Third World countries, however, state resources are limited.* So

* Per capita income in the countries in question, such as Turkey, the Latin American countries and South East Asia, is low. In some cases the areas where clientellistic politics are dominant, such as in Southern Italy, have a relatively low per capita income.

brokerage relations are based upon discriminatory access to desired goods that the client is sometimes already entitled to (Davis 1977, p.142). In most cases the bureaucracy is actually partial or its impartiality is questioned by its citizens (Corbis 1979; Boissevain 1966 p.31).

So the brokers do not own the resources that they distribute. They are mediators between the real owners of the resources and the people that want to benefit from these resources; the clients. Their mediating role is significant and useful for the client but brokers are dispensable as individuals if not as a system. Because the client knows that the resources are not owned by the broker he sees him as replaceable. In fact the best broker in this situation is the person with the best networks for access to resources. The brokers are thus competing to establish networks that provide access to resources and are competing clients as well. This leads to a choice of brokers and in fact as most brokers cannot develop a wide range of networks compatible with the diversity of resources needed by the clients, they tend to be function specific. So one client may have relations with different brokers, using them interchangeably. Thus the strategies adopted are very instrumentalist, short lived and based upon bargaining. Although political support is essential as a return for favours, the nature of the reciprocity is very much dependent on the bargaining positions of each side.

There are various models of brokerage relations, which change according to the political and social context in which they are operating. Thus these models tend to entail different people with different sociological characteristics, having access to different kinds of resources and adopting different strategies and ideologies.

1.4.1 Model IIA: Brokerage in non-competitive political systems

In the context where a market economy incorporates small scale agricultural production, but where state intervention in agriculture is prevalent we can see a specific type of brokerage relation. The state not only intervenes in the economy but also tries to distribute state resources and services. The distribution is carried out by the bureaucracy, which should be ideally based on impartiality and rationality. However, in the society there are doubts about this aspect of the bureaucracy. In cases where there is no political competition, as in military dictatorships or one party regimes, we see a specific type of brokerage relation.

The broker is in this context an agent of the state, although he may or may not have an official title, and he derives most of his power from the state. He supplies his clients, who are usually small proprietors, with the resources distributed by the state, such as land, credit, access to state offices, schools, hospitals, etc. Although he is an agent of the state he may take protective measures against the state as well. For example, he may get special permission for his client to delay payment of taxes. In some cases such favours are at his personal disposal. He expects his favours to be reciprocated by political obedience to his authority, deference and recognition of him as the agent of the state.

Such a broker is the protector of the community, therefore his paternalistic outlook has to be preserved to maintain the existing relations. However, as he is the agent of a dictatorial state which does not allow any kind of opposition, he can be oppressive and demand absolute obedience. However the brokers in such a context seem to be very limited in the power they derive from the central authority. They may even be salaried agents of the central authority, for example of the

party (Harik 1973). The party may find it useful to convert the already existing patrons in the area into its agents through such brokerage roles (Mardin 1973; Meeker 1972).

One of the best studied examples of brokerage relations where there is no political competition at the national level is that of the Mexican Caciquismo. I will briefly summarize it as an illustration of the model.

The Cacique is a relatively new figure in Mexican politics, and his introduction was a result of state intervention. The land reform which was carried out after the Mexican Revolution established the local power of the cacique as the protector of the revolutionary ideals. The cacique himself is neither a formal nor an institutional leader, nor has he an economic resource such as land that binds his clients to him directly through holding their means of life.

As Frederick puts it, (Cacique) holds strong individual power over a territorial group held together by some socioeconomic or cultural system..." (Frederick 1968: 247). He bridges the gap between the peasants and the law and government, so he has been described by Wolf as a "political middleman" (Wolf 1967). He is as paternalistic, personal and informal as any "patron", but because of his militaristic background he is more inclined to use violence and threat. In his book, Wolf notes that under Diaz there was a nation-wide system of patronage, and this formed the basis for the concentrated power of the dictator (Wolf 1973). With the revolution the legitimacy of the old patrons was challenged, but the "cacique" emerged as a new figure. The revolutionary Cacique, was seen by the peasant as a protector of their community against the landlord and reform.

However with the intervention of the state, the formal bureaucracy

also makes demands upon the peasantry which are alien to their way of life. In this situation, they retreat to their traditional protection from the local leader. The state's bureaucratic functions may be too complex for the illiterate peasant to handle. Even if something is to his benefit, for example getting his land registered, it may be beyond his understanding. In the Mexican case this has been intermingled with the preservation of Revolutionary ideology. The cacique is on the one hand a semi-agent of the state, and is asked by the state to see that the rights of the "peasants" are guarded, and on the other hand he is regarded by the peasants as their only protector against the old regime and their "mediator" with the state benefactor. A similar militaristically based patronage can be seen in other parts of the world, for example in Jordan (Farrag 1977).

1.4.2 Model IIB: Clientellism; Brokerage in party politics

In those contexts where there is a penetration of the market economy to reach even into the remotest corners of the periphery, the lives of the peasants are deeply affected. It is not only the changes in the village life, where cash cropping and capitalist agriculture are becoming dominant, but also the peasants' increasing resort to wage labour. The peasant acquires a wider acquaintance with the world outside the village, a public transport system, the mass media and compulsory education. All these inform him about the opportunities beyond the village. In addition, there is "an expansion of the state throughout society and political parties themselves become even more closely linked within the state structure". (Weingrod 1968 p.383). This new role of the state is not limited to law and order and tax collection, but is aimed at changing the social conditions in the periphery, providing social security, jobs, educational facilities, a health service, credits etc. Development plans (projects) and other state businesses are controlled by

elected governments, and thus, in competitive systems, by political parties. In countries where "the politics of development" is a central issue, and the resources for development programmes are controlled by the party officials, they later adopt the role of a party boss, a patron, by distributing state funds.

So the expanding role of the state in most underdeveloped countries or regions, can spread patronage, if patrons can have access to resources. The state begins with limited resources and the country is poor. Even with economic growth people's expectations grow faster than their income. In such a situation to meet all the demands is impossible. By definition it is this relative scarcity of resources that leads to clientellistic politics. Otherwise, everybody could get a fair share from what is allocated and there would be no need for nepotism, favouritism and clientelle politics. Another factor even in cases where there is no scarcity, is the citizens' dislike of bureaucracy,* and their inability to deal with an inefficient bureaucracy and its formalities. Where the educational level is low and where the illiteracy rate is high, even if rights were granted and resources distributed, it can be very difficult for citizens to obtain their share when they do not know how to make their rights effective.

In this context the role of party politics has a primary importance. In a parliamentary democracy not only can political parties be in a position of decision making, in allocating resources, but it also

* "Ties of dependency exist because there is still a need for protection that neither the state nor the family is able to provide. The Sicilian requires protection not only from his neighbours, who are trying to protect and advance themselves at his expense, but also from the powerful government which he feels has been imposed upon him and which he regards as corrupt. He also needs protection from a law which he not only believes can be manipulated by his enemies to his detriment, but with which he is also often in conflict because of the differing requirements of the legal system and those of traditional justice.." Boissevain 1966 p.31.

creates a medium through which reciprocity can be measured, i.e. votes. Universal suffrage and general elections provide the context for reciprocity to take place. The "voting right" every individual citizen has in return for the favours done for him by the party, constitute a system whereby a "client can pay his debts to the party". If and when politics becomes a matter of bargaining for individual voters in return for favours done to them then the political parties become formal organizations in which the informal system of clientage can very easily live and flourish. So in elections party politics integrate the individual client to the national polity in two different ways: as a voter (a citizen) and as a client.

So the clients are not only peasants, everybody with a vote is a potential client. If there were enough resources to be distributed to all the voters, then there would be no necessity for preferential treatment, i.e. there would be no clientel e system. So the most important problem is to choose the clients as carefully as possible. As resources are scarce, one have to allocate them with maximum efficiency. So whom do the brokers choose to bestow their favours upon, to be their clients?

The two main characteristics of brokers are their specialized knowledge and their access to the available resources. The best brokers, unlike the best patrons who own most resources, are the persons with the best networks. They have to have influence on, or access to, decision making bodies and they have to have information on the resources. This implies that they have to be educated in order to collect information and to deal with the bureaucratic formalities of resource allocation. They have to have links with the local and national bureaucracy and/or political parties that can be influential with the bureaucracy. Thus we can see that the local brokers must have institutional backup (such as political parties or the bureaucracy) and

they must have formal education.

The brokers themselves constitute a status group if not a social class, and mobility into this group is relatively easy (Tarrow 1977). Unlike traditional patrons, brokers do not have inherited rights and resources, and they can come from humble origins. With limited resources and some knowledge of bureaucracy, a skillful professional can acquire a broker's position (Tarrow 1977, Loizos 1977), so they are not as closed a social class as the old patrons were.

Increasing votes is one of the primary problems of political parties. In a developing country an increase in votes can only be assured by promising, and giving, some tangible benefits either to the community or to individuals. For individuals these benefits are usually credits, licences, jobs etc., for the community they are roads, irrigation, electricity, schools, hospitals etc. So what brokers distribute as resources are institutional resources not owned by themselves. With the increasing complexity of government and the collectivization of decision making concerning the allocation of newly available resources, it is very difficult for a single individual to influence all of the responsible bureaucracy. Thus the "clients" or those people that seek the favours of others find it more efficient to have specialized brokers, and normally these brokers have institutional support.

Of course there are also pressure groups or associations defending particular interests. However, these representative institutions may also be involved in clientelle systems. (see section 1.5.1.) It is often the case that the differentiation and specialization of "patrons" follows the growth of a market economy and the introduction of a complex, bureaucratized modern state. The client in such a system not only has more bargaining power, but can use more than one broker according to the specific tasks in which he is involved. For example, a client may have

one broker to deal with his legal problems and another for his health problems. In this situation the local broker has two sets of relations. One with the "clients" that seek his favours, and the other with the party or the politician (usually a member of parliament) that seeks support.

In brokerage the nature of reciprocity and loyalty differ from that in patronage. The broker himself has a very insecure position because he is only a mediator between the people that obtain favours and the real distributor of the resource (the state, the bank, the employer, etc.) He is a broker if he is delegated the positions of mediator or agents. Moreover, because the resources vary and because different agents want to capture the "mediator" position, they are in continual competition. So to be an agent necessitates strong support from the clientele groups. What is more, some of the brokers are not even local. For them affective ties such as kinship, neighbourhood and friendship are not relevant. They may be officials sent on business by appointment. So with brokerage the ties of loyalty are weaker. The relations are also less comprehensive than patronage relations because the clients use "function specific" brokers depending upon their needs. So the relation between a broker and a client is more instrumental and calculations of reciprocity are explicit, for both sides it is almost a matter of bargaining. The instrumentality of the relation, and the calculation of the reciprocity, makes the relation less durable and short term. The clients are not bound by loyalty and reciprocity ties to one patron only but, depending on their specific needs, they use different brokers.

Brokerage is not a matter of possessions but of skill in the mobilization of resources for allocation to your present, or potential, clients. Closeness to the bureaucracy, as a result of ones professional

training, is one of the assets in gaining access to resources. It is more important, however, to be close to the decision making bodies that are politically powerful.

There are various examples of clientelle party politics as a model of brokerage relations. The concepts "broker" or "mediator" have been used interchangeably (Powell 1970; Silverman 1965; Scott 1977; Blok 1969 and Boissevain 1964, 1979) All the above authors emphasize state resources distributed to clients by a mediating group. The empirical studies describe professionals, especially lawyers, as brokers in this system. In terms of occupational and social background it is quite natural that professionals occupy such a role. The lawyers, and other local professionals, are not only brokers, obtaining favours on behalf of their clients, but in a way they adopt the role of an agent of modern society in the locality. They are the people who can act on behalf of the state as representatives of modern institutions; they are university graduates and this implies that they are familiar with bureaucratic formalities, their profession also gives them a general idea of "modern life", and they have been a part of city life and the modern institutions for some time. So depending on their social background, when they come to the province, they may become political, legal and moreover social intermediaries. However there are empirical cases where patrons and brokers are closely related through kinship networks (Colclough 1969; Bodeman 1981; Tarrow 1977). Although they represent two different types of participation models, this suggests that brokers and patrons may have similar social origins. Even if they are not different sections of the same social class, in most empirical cases there are suggestions that brokers form status groups. (Colclough 1969; Bodeman 1981).

As a model party clientellism suggests that everyone with a vote is

a potential client. But the scarcity of resources implies that some will not be able to benefit. The demand on the various resources changes with the social composition of the community, the economy, history, developmental level etc. So some resources may not be in high demand depending on the situation, such as agricultural credits in an urban setting, but others may be in high demand. What ever the resource, there are groups in the community that will never become real political clients because they have nothing to offer, no leverage to bargain for. Is there a qualification which decides whether one can become a client or not? Are the clients members of a social group, a class, as are the patrons and brokers?

There are also ethical questions involved in party clientellism. Voting and elections are the means through which citizens can directly participate in politics. The citizen is expected to vote and choose his representatives on the basis of his class interest, ideology and belief. His choice of a political party will be dependent on the correspondence between his political attitudes and the programme and the ideology of the party. However the party through the clientelle system tries to develop loyalty by bargaining for immediate favours reciprocated by votes. The introduction of the clientelle system, of course, introduces a major political, ethical and social problem; namely the question of political representation because, in such a situation, the direct and indirect means of integration of the citizen to politics, voting and clientage, are intermingled. This raises the question of whether the results of the elections are true indicators of the class interest and belief of the voters, or are the votes "bought" in return for favours?

Though this ethical problem is of great importance, the clientelle system as I have pointed out is very widespread in political parties of underdeveloped countries, irrespective of their ideology or whatever

social class they claim to represent. The new brokerage system that developed with clientelle party politics is not only a system for increasing the votes of a political party. It is also a system in which the brokers themselves compete for positions in the party. If they can allocate the resources for their present and potential clients, they will increase the number of their followers and thus be able to bargain with more votes in the party. They may be able to stand for elected offices, or be appointed to positions that have a greater power over the distribution of resources. Clientellist party politics has such a snowball effect that once a political party adopts such a mechanism all the rest of the parties have to adopt similar organizational and propaganda methods regardless of their ideology. (Powell 1970). The best example of this is the use of clientellism by the Italian Communist Party (Tarrow 1967). Because tangible resources distributed to communities and individuals seem to have more effect than ideological propaganda, the parties that adopt such strategies gain more votes than parties that do not. Some parties have to adopt it as "protective measures" against the unfavourable situations in which their supporters find themselves.

Political parties in these contexts will not only use individualized relations between brokers and clients but they will also use their control over resources, supposedly for the benefit of the whole community, for electoral purposes. In an Third World country, such as Turkey, services such as irrigation programmes, primary schools, drinking water or electricity are extremely important for the local community. Although specific individuals may benefit more from such a programme, if their garden is particularly well irrigated, or they can sell land expensively to the state for building a school, their individual benefit is of secondary importance. As the communities are in competition with each other for such resources, they exert continuous pressure on governments and their only bargaining power is their votes. Villagers will

bargain with votes for services with the party in power, or with the opposition which has a good chance of forming the next government. The propaganda of the local party organizations also concentrates mainly on such promises. Whether the promises are fulfilled is another question, but the party may feel that it has to reward the communities that vote for it.

This bargaining system must be distinguished from individualized politics though it is intermingled with it. Using Weingrod's concept I will call it "party-directed patronage". (Weingrod 1968). By giving information on such resources to the community, and organizing pressure to obtain it, some brokers may gain power and a following. The position of local party leaders especially can be strengthened by such practices. So brokerage relations in the party itself and using party directed patronage for attracting votes can reinforce each other.

1.4.3 Model IIC: Urban Brokerage

It is often assumed that in cities classes will be better represented. There will be more class based organizations to defend their interests and there will not be particularistic, individualistic politics based on different types of "traditional relations". However, empirical studies show that clientellistic politics persist in many cities of the Third World. The most common usage of clientellism occurs amongst the migrant populations who may have some previous experience of patronage and/or brokerage. However, the existence of such an urban clientellism can only partially be explained by the habitual political practices of the migrants. It is usually expected that they will change these habits when they come to the city, becoming part of the working class. They will be living with people that share the same problems. They will be able to form associations of their own, be represented by their trade unions and exert more direct influence on the municipal and

national government through their political parties. Even if habitual political behaviour does not explain a great deal, the reasons for the existence of clientage in urban situations are similar to those for rural clientage: limited class based politics, limited resources, competition between communities and individuals for the allocation of resources, and preferential treatment by political parties.

In terms of the social class background of the urban broker there can be some differences. Although some urban professionals may deliberately go to the squatter housing areas to gain political support and adopt the role of urban broker, the more common type is the old, successful migrant. Being an old resident of the area having spent more years in the town than most of the migrants, he has the advantage of access to information about available opportunities, and knowledge of the means of access to them. Being successful he has established a settled life with his family, a good job, a legally owned house and probably a small business. On the one hand this is an asset as he shares a very close social and cultural background with his clients, so they can communicate with and understand each other. On the other hand it is a disadvantage because the same social background limits his own skills and resources, just like those of his clients. This makes him too dependent on his influential contacts in maintaining his position in the community. In return for the recognition of his authority over the area, and granting him a minimal autonomy in the area, he is expected to bring votes, keep the political demands on the government under control, and keep a close eye on the community to ensure tight social control. (Purcell and Purcell 1973).

The urban broker thus has a "derivative power" (Cornelius 1972) and this is strategically both an advantage and a disadvantage to him. He has to use his resources, and ability to find resources, to their full

extent in order to legitimize his position. One of his most useful personal skills is effective self expression. One of the main obstacles in solving the problems of squatter housing areas is the difficulty of verbal communication between residents and bureaucrats. The ability to articulate their demands to government agencies is an asset in itself. He also organizes the community and residents believing that organized groups are better able to negotiate with government authorities. Through this organization he is also able to impress outsiders with his effective control over the community. (See section 1.5.2. and 1.5.3.)

In terms of the origin of the resources that are distributed there is a difference. I have discussed previously the increasing tendency to use state resources in clientage, but a rural broker may still contribute his own skills and resources: lawyers may look at court cases, doctors may cure a few patients. Analysis of urban clientage in almost all the studies (Roberts 1978, 1972; Peattie 1968; Lloyd 1979; Cornelius 1972), shows that the resources distributed by these people are only to a very, very limited extent, and very exceptionally these are his personal resources. When they sell land they are not selling their own property, but information about state-owned land that can be squatted, and the privilege of living in that land. They are not able to offer a job as an employer but they will mediate in finding a job, or bringing a service to the community.

For the new migrant, the most important reason for being a client is probably the patron-broker's control over land. To obtain permission for the illegal squatting of land he has to pay his dues to the broker and in a sense accepts his power. Then he may ask his broker to mediate for a job or other available services. The residents of the squatter housing areas are more aware than the peasants about the opportunities open to them. They are more exposed to various political currents and

the mass media, which continually remind them of the exploitative relations that surround them. This in itself makes the position of the broker very difficult. The illegality of his activity is another source of his weakness. The more the migrants became aware of what he does the more hostile they become. But they know that he has influential contacts and having such a person as a broker is useful.

The broker will try to expand his networks as widely as possible, especially within the party apparatus, and show his followers that he has such contacts. He is tied to almost all of the crucial people, and in the event of a loss of their support, or if it becomes known publicly that he is out of favour, he will lose his influence in the area and this will encourage opposition to his position. So an urban patron/broker has a much less durable and stable position than his counterpart in the countryside. (Cornelius 1973).

Comparing the urban patron/broker with his rural counterpart we can thus argue that he has a much more dependent and insecure position. The limits of his own resources, and not being able to enforce loyalty, in an environment where there are forces which disintegrate traditional loyalties, leaves him in an insecure position. The relations between the broker and his client is extremely instrumental and pragmatic, once a transaction of favours is over, then the relation ceases to exist. Although in a rural community a local patron/broker may spend on his previous favours for some time, for his urban counterpart a continual flow of benefits to the community and maintaining his charismatic image are essential for preserving his position.

The brokers are function specific, although some brokers try to extend their relations to different areas. The urban broker and his client have no affective ties, and consequently most of the clients dislike their brokers. Therefore brokers, to extend the relationship, try

to use extra linkages such as kinship and ethnicity. Ethnicity is important as a means of perpetuating the relation, especially when there is competition between ethnic community over resources.

The broker is fully aware that there is a limited loyalty. But he is also an agent of the state or party from whom he derives his power. To keep his own patrons or brokers he tries to control information to limit the hostility and channel the political behaviour of his clients. In some extreme cases he may use repressive measures. There have been cases in which the brokers employed their own guards or made use of the state police (Ray 1969).

Urban clientellism as a means of political participation used by migrant populations in different contexts and in different political systems, is widespread in the Third World (Allum 1972; Cornelius 1972, 1973; Chalmers 1972; Chubb 1981, 1980).

1.5 Migrant Participation in Politics through Associations and Clientellistic Politics

In the cities of the Third World, just as in the cities of the Western countries, there are institutions such as banks, churches, mosques and schools. Legally they are open to all that want to participate. However, in practice the middle classes benefit more from such institutions. Moreover, the middle classes can organize themselves into professional organizations and they make better usage of political parties to defend their interests.

The migrant population is usually less educated and often illiterate. They speak different languages, and have different customs. Migration and resettlement in the city implies the acquisition of a different way of life and a different outlook from those of the rural conditions in which they were brought up. Townsmen are more westernized

and sophisticated than is the ordinary migrant, and he may customarily regard them with suspicion and hostility. How then does he change his attitude and aspire to identify with such a different social group?

There is no single or simple answer. Nevertheless a major factor in this regard are the voluntary associations. With the exception of professional associations and trade unions, which are class associations anyway, the two most common types of association are neighbourhood associations and place-of-origin associations (ethnic associations). Such organizations can be used as a pool of potential supporters by the urban patrons, who develop brokerage relations in these associations. The primary aim of the broker in these cases is to increase his "derivative power" by adopting the image of community leader to outsiders. Even in class based associations in the Third World there are cases of clientele practices as in the trade unions.

1.5.1 Trade Unions

Getting a job in industry as a wage worker is extremely difficult for a migrant, not only because job opportunities are limited, but also because they may lack the required skills for such jobs. (Lloyd 1979; Holmström 1976; Mangin 1973; Roberts 1978). Therefore those that have found such jobs are as extremely lucky. Having industrial work not only provides relative security and a better income for the migrant, but also generates a common experience in their daily lives. This is assumed to be a prerequisite for class consciousness in the marxist sense. To acquire such class consciousness, working class organization is seen as essential. In most Third World cities there are trade unions and some migrants are their members. What is the effect of such membership on the migrant's political behaviour?

To answer this I will begin by looking at some characteristics of

Third World unions. Working class organizations are usually initiated and controlled by the ruling party (Sandbrook 1977). However there is still a "trade union consciousness" as the workers see trade unions as vital for their economic welfare. There are also cases where they have political (not necessarily revolutionary) consciousness. For example, the anti-colonial movements were supported by workers (Gutkind 1974), and some segments of workers have evolved a populist political consciousness (Gutkind 1974; Jefferies 1975; Peace 1975).

The internal organizational structure of the Third World unions is an important factor in determining their approach to the working class and its political role. Authority in most of the Third World unions is highly personalistic. Even so, the union leaders are normally quite responsive to the rank and file, not because of internal democracy, but in order to maintain their positions of power. They have to ensure that their decisions are congruent with the interests of their members. To keep the members contented the leaders have to build personal machines, through kinship, calculated personal advantage or the belief that the leader is articulating a committed ideology (Sandbrook 1977). In any case, the union leaders have quite important resources which they can distribute. Unions usually have substantial funds themselves, through government agencies, international bodies and, most important of all, through the subscriptions that members pay.* Unions are also influential in job allocations and the promotion of workers. Therefore, being in a leadership position in any union is itself a great source of patronage, both with the workers that they directly control and through promising jobs to the unemployed.

In some cases one of the strategies used for increasing followers

* Especially with the introduction of the check-off system the available resources have increased.

is ethnicity. Whether ethnicity will become a reason for cleavage formation will also depend on the strategy adopted by the union leadership. If the membership is predominantly from his own ethnic group, then he will attempt to exploit ethnic loyalties, otherwise a "non-biased" or "neutral" reputation will be more advantageous. In the cases where ethnicity is used to develop loyalty, favours are also distributed depending upon ethnic identity. In this case, resentment by the members of other ethnic groups will grow, usually ending in a power struggle between ethnic groups and not in a struggle against ethnicity itself (Sandbrook 1977).

Although there is a strong tendency to adopt traditional loyalty strategies such as patronage, ethnicity or kinship, in the unions themselves, these can also be imposed upon them by the local and national political agencies. The resources of the unions can be used in this way by politicians, and political party organizations to build up their patronage links, to carry out party directed patronage and ideological propaganda, and even to find readily available voter and militant support. The support of the party reinforces the power bases of the union leadership, and they gain a political seat as well. So trade union politics can be very interrelated with party politics and the organization of political parties.*

1.5.2 Urban Ethnicity

Third World cities are not "melting pots" for migrants from rural areas with diverse cultural (tribal, ethnic etc.) backgrounds. Even after living in an urban environment for generations, they may still retain their ethnic identity and membership in rural society. A great many activities are directed towards forming and keeping alive urban

* See the articles in Sandbrook and Cohen (ed) (1975).

based ethnic institutions which maintain ties of kinship with the rural village. Ethnic traits persist in the social, economic and political life of the city. Even industrial employment may strengthen ethnic ties and loyalty to ethnicity. Urban associations and ceremonial cults based on ethnic membership both express and reinforce ethnic solidarity, which may be connected with competition for trade and employment (Cohen 1969).

Urban ethnicity persists primarily because of the ambivalent position in which most migrants find themselves in towns. The majority of the migrants when they come to town, look for the area which is predominantly occupied by their own ethnic group. Ethnicity for them is one way of classifying the heterogeneous masses in the town into manageable categories. This helps them to locate themselves as individuals and groups in the society. (Schildkrout 1979). Many migrant groups in the town first develop and maintain their ethnic exclusiveness, and then they build an internal organization of political functions, communication, decision making, authority, ideology etc. (Rowe 1973; Little 1973; Harries-Jones 1969). Their principal aims are preventing infiltration from other ethnic groups into the same occupation, coordinating the activities of other members of the community in maintaining and developing their economic-political organization and cooperation with other communities of the same ethnic origin (Eades 1979). The residence pattern of separate ethnic quarters localizes the culture, inhibits social interaction with other groups, and increases the informal social interaction within the group. They may speak their own language, dress differently, eat differently, practice their own customs, norms, values and beliefs, and there may be an absence of inter-ethnic marriage. All these may lead the migrants to overemphasize their differences. As a result, instead of greater integration with city life there may be cases where living in cities increases the cultural divide between the migrants and the urbanites. This type of segregationist policy is

reinforced if the ethnic group dominates a specific type of trade or other economic activity, for example the Indians in East Africa. In this case ethnicity itself is not only a political phenomenon. Ethnic organizations, like class organizations and pressure groups also defend economic interests. Therefore it becomes essential to maintain a strict ethnic identity to prevent infiltration from other groups (Cohen 1969).

However, there are also cases of ethnic associations that aim at integration. In this case the structure of the association itself is usually different, people from different occupations and social groups, but from similar ethnic background, are brought together (Little 1973).

So in a town, on the one hand, we may have situations in which cultural differences between people are eroded by various cleavages which cut across ethnic differences. This gives rise to close cooperation and alliances between people from different ethnic groups. While the cultural traits are dissolving, there may still be ethnic associations for mutual help, but these associations are specific in terms of their aims. They are voluntary, irregular, and perform specific services for fixed charges. They still have political connotations but are in the process of adaptation to, and participation in, city life (Cohen 1969).

At the other extreme, we have situations where people emphasize their identity and create a super ethnic identity, in order to stay separate and adjust in terms of their own distinct culture. In this process the longer the migrant stays in town the stronger will be his ethnic identity.

The present form of ethnicity that migrants to large cities are faced with has more dimensions than a mere difference of cultures. It is a result of intensified relations between ethnic groups. Ethnicity involves a rearrangement of customs; tradition is also there but it has

to be adapted to new situations. It is essentially a political phenomenon, Customs and tradition are used as symbols for political alignment. Men do not quarrel because they have different cultures, but because cultural differences are associated with serious social cleavages. This is why the sharpest struggles arise with a new social order, in which people with different ethnic backgrounds compete with each other for resources, such as employment.

When and if there is a competition amongst different ethnic groups for resources, such conflicts can easily be used by brokers to establish a following. Ethnicity can be a legitimizing ideology for the required preferential treatment by brokers and clients. Thus the client will ask favours from the brokers of the same ethnic origin, basing such a demand on ethnic support. Similarly the broker may ask his clients for political support on an ethnic basis. For the broker this will usually have a two-fold effect because he may also be recognized as the "community leader" who will give him extra power. He will then have the position of mediating with the outside world (for example local government) and the community.

1.5.3 Neighbourhood Associations

Migrants live in distinct parts of town, known as shanty towns and squatter housing areas. These areas have similar problems, they lack the facilities available in the town proper, such as electricity, running water, schools, etc. Such neighbourhoods may form associations through which they aim to improve their conditions (Mangin 1973; Roberts 1978, 1968). Neighbourhood associations differs from ethnic or place-of-origin associations in that they unite people with similar social backgrounds and similar social standing. So they may have more of a class connotation. Yet, they do not integrate on class lines because, although people that have similar problems in the same area are united

as a neighbourhood, they are in competition with other neighbourhoods in solving their problems. Therefore people from similar social classes can also be divided on neighbourhood lines.

Neighbourhood associations however play an important role in informing communities. These communities aid in greater political participation because they facilitate a rapid flow of information and they constitute a milieu in which politics (local or national) can be discussed (Roberts 1968).

Affiliation to political parties is common because, besides being an information source, allegiance to a political party is also a tie into the national and local political system. Such a linkage brings readily available representatives in the city councils, parliament etc. Political parties also initiate relations because it ensures readily obtainable votes. Through the neighbourhood associations, the squatter housing areas exchange services for votes, and they are a good medium where party directed patronage exchanges can take place. Also, for the urban brokers such associations can be helpful in increasing their derivative power. (Cornelius 1975: Roberts 1973).

1.6 Clientelism and "Political Development"

From the Second World War onwards, Western political scientists began to be interested in the political culture of the developing nations being mainly concerned with the problems of adjusting to imported Western political systems, such as democracy. Democracy even if it was accepted as a political system, either took the form of electoral politics or did not last for very long. One of the reasons was later found to be the political culture. It was argued that non-western countries did not have a political culture that was compatible with democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963). Clientelism, nepotism and favouri-

tism are regarded as non-western forms of politics that are loaded with negative values. If the primary aim is to achieve democracy, what is the role of such "non-modern" means of participation in "political development"?

There are various, quite contrary, arguments over this. Boissevain (1966) Powell (1970), Weingrod (1968 and 1974) and Silverman (1967) argue that clientelism a step forward in terms of political development. The main assumption of this argument is that during nation-building there is very little connection between centre and periphery, there is low political consciousness, and direct participation of the individual is limited. In such societies, patronage segmented the society into small clusters, yet there was a hierarchical order which made it possible for the centre to be linked with the periphery. Of course, modern Western Democracy necessitates a totally new mode of participation.

As corporate politics is not developed as soon as such a system is imported, then a medium of information circulation and participation is created by converting, or replacing, the patronage channels into party clientellism. In such a way the citizens become conscious that they have a bargaining power with their votes, and even if it is not on the basis of class interest or ideological preferences, the citizen has a choice of rulers in the form of political parties. Thus the sense of the responsibility of the state to the citizen, at least ideologically, is achieved and, without changing the "traditional" forms altogether, a familiar type of participation is adopted. Clientellism is both a part of the political culture and a structural necessity, due to lack of sufficient resources and due to the youth of the regime. In this sense clientelism is not only inevitable but also functional. It provides cohesiveness for the system and ensures equilibrium. If clientelism, as described above, is an almost unavoidable stage in the westerni-

zation and modernization of a political culture, then it can be seen as a good symptom indicating development.

Challenging this approach Lemarchand and Legg (1972), Zuckerman (1977), Barnes and Sani (1974), and Schneider et al (1972) claim that clientellism does not lead to either democracy or modernization. On the contrary, it has a constraining effect on the development of direct participation of citizens in politics, and the usage of universalistic values. Still as in Schneider et al (Schneider et al 1972 p.349) industrialization and modernization are seen as inevitable. Economic characteristics of Western societies, such as capitalism and industry are developing in the under-developed countries, but the organizations are not bureaucratized, impersonalized and rational. It is this aspect of the culture that is obstructing modernization. (Lemarchand and Legg 1971 p.153). What is more, if the argument is carried further the cultural characteristics of the people in such countries, being highly individualistic in their approach to daily matters, are not able to adopt a communal approach to matters of political decision making.

Lemarchand and Legg are probably the most forceful critics of the scholars who see clientellism as an integrative mechanism through the transitory stages of political development and modernization. They see it as a segmentary mechanism that increases social inequality especially when clientellism is combined with other "traditional" loyalties such as caste and ethnicity. Distribution of resources through clientage, even if it is in the form of party directed patronage, which implies a voting basis, and thus participation of all citizens, is still fragmented, personalized and oriented towards the status-quo. Through clientellism resources will be channelled to patrons, and then filtered to their clients. Such a mode of distribution will create and reinforce the segmentary power structure already existing in underdeveloped societies.

Such a process, of course, will depend on the relative balance of resources in the periphery and the centre and their dependency upon one another.

Modern politics, as understood in western societies, is based on class interest, group interest and communal interest. Even if this is the ideal form, not actually the reality, ^{the} non existence of such forms in the Third World, is seen as one of the primary obstacles to the modernization of political structures.

Kaufman selects 13 different aspects relating clientellism to "political development", most of which conflicts with each other (Kaufman 1974 p.303). He argues that some of these contradictions are related to empirical gaps. However, there are also major conceptual gaps that make it very difficult to develop a consensus among political scientists as to the relation between clientellist politics and "political development". Most of the disagreement stems from disciplinary differences. The levels of analysis and the approach to the problems vary between anthropology political science and sociology. It is not always possible to know whether they are talking about the same issues.

However, another issue which Kaufman raises as a problem is the concept of "functional". Even if the internal characteristics of the structure are well explained, he argues, the inputs to clientellism from the environment and its effect on the environment need also to be explained. Related to the first problem, when the level of analysis is not clear, the "functionality" can be continually debated. According to Kaufman's argument two preconditions are necessary to clarify the relation between clientellism and "political modernization": a clearer definition of concepts and levels, and an analysis of non-clientelist political formations for comparative study.

However, one point may be made regarding the relations of political modernization and clientellism, and that is, although most of the scholars that study clientellism are not directly affected by modernization theory, one major assumption of the theory is persistent in their work including that of the Marxists: they have a clear and strong bias for western political structures.

1.7 Is Clientelism Disintegrating?

One of the major arguments in the study of clientelist politics is that patron-client relations are changing from one structure to another, adapting to new socio-economic conditions. Just as patronage relations have been converted to brokerage, and there has been an introduction of party directed patronage in time and with the development of capitalism and western democracy, new forms of representation and participation will develop. This development is towards class representation and a politics based on class and community interest.

Loizos (1979), Mouzelis (1978), Boissevain (1966, 1979), Littlewood (1980), Bodeman (1980), White (1980) and others, all agree that clientellism is a transitory stage. According to Marxists, the exploited classes will develop a class consciousness. For the others they will be integrated into western democracy's impartial system. In either case, representation on a class and group basis is inevitable. To prove this they refer to empirical cases where clientellism is disintegrating.

Boissevain in his article "When the saints go marching out" (1977), as is implied by the title, is very clear that patronage as a system is changing to a brokerage system; if there is differentiation amongst the brokers this makes each broker function specific. The next step is the formalization and bureaucratization of politics, then impartial and impersonal formal organizations become decision makers. The last form

is "organizational brokerage" in which "the party or union secretary represents the interest of his client/constituent/fellow member to civil service decision makers. He does this not as a personal friend but as a representative" (Boissevain 1977 p.90).

For Marxists (Mouzellis 1978; Li Causti 1975, 1981; Littlewood 1981), clientellism is an ideology in which there are clear cut relations of exploitation. The patrons-brokers and the clients are differentiated not only in terms of their relative political power, but also in representing different social classes in the Marxist sense. Even if the local patron is not the local capitalist himself, he is still a representative of that class's ideology, or that of the capitalist system. The notions of dyadic contract, reciprocity, or exchange of favours, only partly legitimize and conceal the brutal domination relation between social classes. In the Marxist analysis of clientellism the emphasis is on the class basis of the clientellistic relations.

For Li Causti there is almost an intentionally designed ideology, devised by the patrons themselves: "If we analyze the economic position of different actors, the economic and political structure and the ideological makeup under which all of this is operating, we will reach the conclusion that the relations of the clientelle system constitute only a form of ideological system." (Li Causti 1975).

P. Littlewood who criticizes Li Causti for not considering the functions of clientellism, cannot, however, escape from the same trap. For Littlewood, patronage has the function of ensuring the reproduction of the labour force. The landlord, an agrarian patron, by helping his client/tenant in times of need and acting as a social security mechanism is ensuring the reproduction of the labour force. However, this explanation is only valid where there are direct economic ties between patron and client, and where there is no welfare state. For Littlewood, party

clientellism is what the petty bourgeoisie carries out on behalf of himself and his allies (probably Littlewood has the capitalists in mind). In this the "petty bourgeoisie and its allies" are discriminatorily distributing and controlling state welfare resources. This last point is similar to Li Causti's arguments. Clientellism is an ideology that is almost intentionally devised to conceal the exploitative relation between the class of patrons (agrarian or industrial) and the clients (peasants and workers), via agents (brokers as professionals and petty bourgeois) or directly.

For Mouzelis no such direct correspondence exists between "political practices" and "class locations," (Mouzelis 1978 p.489). However, he argues, the "autonomous organization of disadvantaged classes" is missing. When the masses are being mobilized in to the political process, the capitalist state keeps such disadvantaged classes silent by preserving "precapitalist" political relations. So clientellism is not only a direct exploitative relation, but a form of political domination. (Mouzelis 1978).

In conclusion, the Marxist authors would expect a decline in clientellism with the development of the working class. The working class in time will acquire a class consciousness and develop horizontal autonomous class organization of its own to participate independently in politics. Empirical studies provide examples of such a development (Mouzelis 1978; White 1980).

Marxism's basic contribution has been in bringing the class dimension into party clientellism. Whether the relation is a form of exploitation, or capitalist ideology or of political domination, these all imply a relation between classes, not between isolated individuals of various social positions. Brokers are merchants, agents of different industrial firms and local professionals. They are acting on behalf of

political parties or governments. By definition, even if they contribute a little from their own resources, the majority of their favours involve mediation, between the state and their clients, in the allocation of state resources. Such mediation and favouritism is a result of the relative scarcity of resources. So, by definition, given a scarcity of resources and favouritism in their allocation, some people will be benefiting from this system, either as clients or as patron/brokers.

In some types of patronage, the patrons and the clients constituted two distinct classes: the share-cropping peasant and the landlord (See section 1.2.1.) Patronage exists in a specific form of economy and type of state. Is there a specific type of state intervention that leads people to change their patronage relations to brokerage relations? Can we differentiate distinct social classes that become clients and patrons in brokerage systems, as we can in patronage relations? (See section 1.2.) Can we therefore say that brokerage and party clientellism are types of political participation peculiar to specific classes? If this is so will there be a decline of clientellism? I will try to elaborate on these points in the forthcoming chapters.

1.8 Some Concluding Remarks on Various Models

Patronage, clientage and party directed patronage are all types of political participation systems. They are not only individualized participation forms, but they also have implications for the political and economic relations of different classes to each other and to the state. Given the forms of state, historically people from definite classes engage in patronage relations, and there is a change in the class background of people that engage in brokerage (see section 1.4.). The superiors, the power holders and distributors in both brokerage and patronage, have been analyzed in the literature in terms of their social class background. I will argue that not only are patrons and brokers

from definite social classes, but the scarcity of resources (which is a primary condition for such systems) implies that there is competition to be a client, and I will examine the social origins of clients and whether becoming a client has any social prerequisites.

With economic and social development and westernization, there seems to be a movement from patronage to brokerage in most of underdeveloped countries. This is also facilitated by multiparty democracy. However, the acceptance of Western institutions, does not immediately end "traditional" means of participation in politics. The expected trend, the shift from vertical forms of participation to horizontal participation forms, as in class politics, seems to be slow, if it is occurring at all. But in most Third World countries there are class based organizations such as trade unions. Moreover "traditional" means of participation can prevail in class based organizations. So class based politics can coexist with "traditional" politics (Davis 1977 p.128). Individuals and social groups can make use of both forms, depending on their particular interests.

On the other hand, depending on the specific social and historical context, some forms of "traditional" means of participation may reinforce class politics or rather be manifestations of horizontal forms of participation. But, their coexistence is not a contradiction as such. Changing forms of participation may result in multiple and complex forms, rather than following a unilinear path of evolution as is commonly suggested in much of the current literature.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORY, THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE IDEOLOGY

OF REPUBLICAN PEOPLES PARTY

In this chapter I want to give background information about the history of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), whose two local branches I studied within the context of the major social and economic changes that took place in Turkey since the early days of the Republic.

In writing this chapter I have tried to concentrate on the points which have direct relevance to my own empirical data. So I have stressed the party. The material on Turkish social economic and political change comes at points where I find it to be illustrative for either the changes in the party as a whole or for my own data.

The information in this chapter is based on secondary sources, statistics and party publications.

2.1 Aftermath of the War of Independence and the Foundation of Republican Peoples Party

The Peoples Party (Halk Firkasi) was founded by Atatürk on 9th September 1923, and was a direct successor of "The Society to Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli". (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Cemiyeti).^{*} In April 1923 the war time parliament had dissolved itself and "The Society" group entered the elections on a nine point programme, the first programme of ^{the} Peoples Party. On 29th October 1923 the new parliament declared Turkey a republic. A few months later the party changed

^{*} This society was very active in the war of independence and was the biggest group in the Ankara Parliament during the war.

its name to the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party, (RPP)) the name it was known by for 58 years until it was dissolved by the military on 15th October 1981.

The RPP was born as a parliamentary party. In fact until June 1924 there was no movement to organize a peripheral party.* For the first 27 years of the republic, the party ruled the country, but this 27 years was uniform neither in terms of party ideology, nor in terms of its policies. One major policy, however, remained dominant and virtually unchanged over the years: nation-building. Atatürk and his colleagues believed a nation state had to be created and for this the party would be the motor force. In this attempt two principles were important: first modernization and secularization and second populism and peoples sovereignty.

From 1924 onwards, upon Atatürk's initiative the party took major steps towards modernization. The first was the amendment of the "caliphate". Later they adopted a new constitution based upon the sovereignty of parliament. The Westernization movement continued with the reforms in education, alphabet (adoption of the Latin script), adoption of western style dress, adoption of the Swiss civil code, and the adoption of the other translated codes, (Italian, Swiss and German). These annulled Islamic law and were aimed at replacing the duality of Islamic and Western codes that existed from Tanzimat onwards with an open^{more clear} preference towards the West and secularization. The party leadership tried to undermine the traditional, the Islamic Ottoman life. They wanted to create a rational, positivist, anti-traditional society. In a way they tried to establish a new

* However, it must also be remembered that, as the party was a direct descendent of the ARMHC which was organized in the periphery, it had some kind of a peripheral support.

religion, a different type of Islam, one which was reformed, modern and Turkish.* They were never opposed to religion, or Islam as an institution. It was recognized in the constitution that the majority of people in Turkey were Muslims. But it was expected that nationalism would take the place of religion, as a unifying consciousness.

The second principle was populism. The controversy in the party began when it adopted the name Peoples' Party. It was argued that "people" had a left wing connotation and the name Nation (millet) Party would be more appropriate after a War of Independence. Atatürk, himself denied very quickly that the party had any kind of leftist tendencies. He *denied* ; that there were any classes or social groups in the country, the party was to unite the interests of all, and he repeatedly said that the party was to be built upon the "whole" society. The idea of populism meant more or less a government based upon people's sovereignty. It was a way of justification of the new western principle of "people's rule". The party leadership rejected any idea of class or social groups. Instead they agreed that there were occupational groups, such as businessmen, government officials, farmers, craftsmen etc., which were dependent upon each other with no conflicting economic interests.** As there was no difference of interests, therefore there was no need for more than one party. Populism was the means of uniting the whole country and not yielding to segmented class interest.***

However there were many major obstacles towards building a nation state which originated from the Islamic identity of the Ottoman Empire.

* Karpat claims that this idea was borrowed from Z. Göhalp, an eminent sociologist, who was one of the architects of Kemalist ideology (Karpat, 1959 p.50) M. Tuncay arguing in the same direction, cites examples of studies made to reform Islam and replace it by nationalism (Tuncay 1981, p.218) see also Mardin (1977).

** Speeches of Atatürk, Izmit and Balıkesir 1923 January.

*** From the 1931 RPP Programme.

There were ethnic and national revolts that came with this emphasis on the nation state. By that time Panislamism and Pan Turanism had proven to be unrealizable. The Christian minorities left Anatolia by 1930 and this had left a relatively homogenous population in Turkey. However there were islamic minorities, such as religious sects and a Kurdish population. In fact from 1924-1938 there were 18 Kurdish revolts, all of which were unsuccessful. Cultural Westernization and secularization were seen as part of the nation building process. In this way by emphasizing nation and suppressing religion Republican leaders thought the religious differences and sects would come to be of secondary importance. Everybody would be united as "Turks" rather than being separated through belonging to different sects.

There was opposition, and resistance was organized in parliament and was supported by the public. The first opposition party, Terakki perver Cumhuriyet Firkasi, (the Progressive Republican Party) wanted to use this opposition which was both anti-secular and anti-western. However, martial law was declared, the party was banned and opposition was suppressed.

The RPP did not have a detailed programme until 1931. In fact the first programme was very general and very short. It included items on independence, national security, law making and their application. It said the party should support agriculture, commerce and industry by building railroads, by defending private initiative, and revising taxation. It promised to shorten the length of compulsory military service and to spread educational facilities to the country. It did not include a major economic policy or a detailed programme.

Being a parliamentary party, the party statutes included a strong parliamentary discipline. Later with the opening up of the party to a broader membership, anybody who had not taken part in the resistance to

the war of independence was accepted into the party as a member. The members of parliament were appointed. Atatürk and his close circle nominated the candidates, and the elections were held through an electoral college. However, Parliament was very active and could still develop arguments and opposition to the government. In 1927 new elections were held. The result was an overwhelming majority for the RPP (there was no other party), and moreover the electoral college members and members of parliament themselves were all direct candidates of Atatürk himself.

It ^{has been} argued that the war of independence was won by the collaboration of the civil and military bureaucracy and the local notables in the periphery.* In various cases this collaboration was very clear. For example, the peasants were mobilized for waging war only with the help of the notables. These notables were the people that were active in "The Society to Defend the Rights of Anatolia, and Rumelia", and were the members of the first parliament. The occupational background of the first parliament was 43% official, 28% professional and 19% economic. (trade agriculture banking) In 1923, the proportions were 54%, 20% and 14% respectively, and amongst these with very similar percentages the supporters of RPP are divided (52%, 21%, 15%). When we compare the localism of the Progressive Republicans and the Republican Peoples Party, we see that the RPP was more local and less intellectual.** From this we can deduce that being a state party the RPP, despite its tendencies of Westernization and secularization did not lose the peripheral notable support until later in its history.

* See Avcioglu (1978) Tezel (1981) Timur (1971) Tuncay (1981) Mardin (1973) for the part played by local notables in the foundation of the republic, the RPP and the war of independence.

** 61% of the RPP members of parliament represented the constituency they were born in. 50% of the Progressive Republican Party members of parliament represented the constituency they were born in. (Frey (1965)).

The RPP gained its support from two social groups, bureaucrats who believed in Westernization and small town notables with vested interests in agriculture and commerce. This social background was important in developing an economic policy based on liberalism and belief in private initiative. However, the party claimed to be preserving the interest of all social classes. This solidaristic and populist ideology was reflected in its regulative economic policy. The state carefully preserved the capitalist order and private property, but regulated it as well.

The first steps towards a detailed economic programme were taken in February and March 1923, when the Turkish Economy Congress assembled in Izmir. At the end of the congress different groups demanded different things from the state: the industrialists wanted protectionist measures, the agriculturalists wanted modern inputs, roads and tax reductions, the merchants wanted transport and banking facilities. They all agreed that the population of Turkey was not large enough for rapid economic development, so there should be incentives to encourage population increase. Throughout the 1920's the party tried to carry out all of the objectives suggested in the 1923 congress (Tezel 1981).

The first economic aim of the republican leaders, was to industrialize the country. In this target the sectors that were encouraged were those that could easily substitute imports, and the industries based on raw materials which were produced in the country, like sugar and textiles. Until 1930's, however, there was no economic plan although the government wanted to increase productivity and output, and develop a transportation infrastructure and banking system, so that through this it would help industrial and agricultural production. The Government did not aim at the distribution of wealth but invested in education, and some other public expenditure, as a necessary step towards moderni-

zation.

A liberal attitude was adopted towards foreign capital and in 1929 Turkey was opened both to foreign merchandise* and to foreign investment. Moreover the Government granted some new privileges to foreigners.** The "nationalism" in this was the partnership of the Turkish merchants and industrialists, instead of minority (Christian and Jewish) businessmen, with the foreigners.

The Kemalist RPP leaders believed that the economic development they longed for could be achieved by Turkish merchants, industrialists and Anatolian/merchant/landowner notables. These groups wanted a capitalist liberal programme and they were optimistic about the future.

In accordance with economic liberalism there was a move towards political liberalism.

In 1930 another attempt was made towards forming a new political party, the Free Republican Party. It was founded by the former ambassador to Paris and a former Prime Minister Fethi Okyar, almost by the direct orders of Atatürk. The experiment in democracy was also a part of the Westernization programme.

It was so much a part of deliberate planning by Atatürk that he ordered the RPP to give 70 seats to the new party in the coming elections. But the new party proved to have very strong support among the voters. In the municipal elections it had great success for a new born party (2 months old). This support had a tendency to be anti-Atatürk and anti-republic and the party was dissolved after only three months. There were other minor political parties, but except for the periods

* This was one of the items in the Lausanne treaty (1924).

** Tuncay (1981) p.199-218 where he discusses the special privileges given to foreigners.

when the Progressive Republicans and the Liberal Republicans were established, the RPP ruled the country unopposed from 1923 to 1946.

2.2 The RPP as the State Party

2.2.1 RPP Rule in Turkey Between 1931-1946

From 1931 onwards the Republican Peoples Party consolidated its power, and opposition was limited to intra-party oppositions. Despite its authoritarian structure under Atatürk and İnönü, however, the party retained mechanisms of self-criticism (Tunaya, 1952 p.561).

In 1931 new elections were held and there was a general congress of the party. The 1931 party congress is important for understanding the background to the ideological developments of later periods. For the first time the main principles of party doctrine were discussed and written into the programme. They were republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism and reformism. These 6 principles remained the essence of the party ideology until it was dissolved. The principles of republicanism, nationalism, secularism and reformism, stayed unchanged from 1923 onwards. They were intended to establish a Turkish nation-state which was purified of the traditionalism of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, and the reforms were necessary both to westernize the society and to give it a national identity.

However, first in the 1931 congress and later in the 1935 congress, the concept of etatism was introduced while the concept of populism became increasingly important. Populism in the single party period was not only used for nation building, but it also legitimated the existence of only one party. As I have mentioned above, Atatürk himself, and his followers, *denied* the existence of social classes in society. Class consciousness and class struggle according to the leaders of the RPP was a waste of resources, and a hindrance to national

development. National harmony and unity were the essence of the existence and development of the Turkish State.* It was also argued that as Turkey was a classless society, there was no need for a multiparty democracy. In fact such a political system would provoke class differences, would create groups in society, and prevent the nation being a whole. Real democracy was in the one party system, and in the solidarity of the people. There were also suggestions for a corporate state, that should be based upon the solidarity of occupational groups following the division of labour in the society.

The second major development was "etatism". By the 1930's the liberal economic policy had not led to the expected results in terms of economic development, especially in industry. until 1929 there was no possibility of having a strict protectionism because of the customs agreements contained in the Lausanne treaty. But from 1930 onwards, with the influence of the crisis in the west, etatism and protectionism were adopted for rapid industrialization. Although there were various arguments amongst the influential circles on what "etatism" was and should be in relation to private enterprise, there were no serious arguments for the abolition of private enterprise altogether, as in a socialist system.** The main lines of argument were whether the state should take the initiative in those sectors where private enterprise could not try or be successful.*** or whether the state should also invest in those areas crucial for the general welfare and security of society.**** The first position which was nearer to liberal thought and

* See references to R. Peker in Toprak (1977) p.24

** Socialism as a system was attacked because it created class conflict and was against the principles of populism.

*** This idea was defended by A. Ağaoğlu, a prominent M.P. See Tekeli & Ilkin (1982) p.97.

**** It was defended by R. Peker and I. İnönü. See Tekeli and Ilkin (1982) p.102.

gave importance to the liberty of the individual principle, did not attract much support. The second position was initially adopted in 1931, but with more enthusiasm at the 1935 congress.

The party secretary Recep Peker in his 1931 congress speech argued that "the present understanding of the state is not only law, order and security, but to take the initiative in individual necessities, and the production of agricultural and industrial products.... to see the individuals and companies as the only components of work, and not to recognize the right of the state as organizer and intervener is an attitude left only in books on the history of liberal thought."* The RPP claimed that etatism was a guarantee for private property, because under protectionism there were great advantages to private initiative. However protectionism was not enough.

By "planning" and by taking the initiative the state had to invest directly in the economy. In 1932, with the help of Soviet economists, the first five year plan was launched. This plan aimed at reducing Turkey's needs for imported consumer and intermediate goods. The industries were encouraged in areas where they used domestic raw materials. The state directly or indirectly (through state owned banks) invested in sectors such as textile, paper, glass and chemical products. In 1933 and 1935 two state owned banks were established, one to finance textiles and the other mining. In 1938 a new law was passed to regulate the State Economic Enterprises. These State Economic enterprises were a new tool to enable the leadership of the RPP to control the economy. The extension of state expenditure in this period meant Turkey was less affected by the world crisis. There was a decrease in the import of consumer goods and a decrease in the number of importing companies. The

* R. Peker 1931 Congress speech. See Tekeli and Ilkin (1982) p.105.

opposite tendency was seen in the private industrial sphere and there was an increase in the number of new companies compared to the 1920's.* The only direct state intervention in the economy was by the National Defence Law in 1940 which empowered the government to fix prices, nationalise property and enforce compulsory labour in war conditions.

In agriculture, from 1930 onwards, there were attempts at price support and increasing credit facilities. But it was not until 1938 that the Office of Soil Products was established to buy grain and had a monopoly of grain importing and exporting. There were also a few unsuccessful attempts at land reform. In 1936 a Labour Law was passed, which did not grant the right to strike or lock out but did give a 48 hour week in accordance with the early Republican conception of a classless and solidaristic society.

Turkey experienced a very satisfactory rate of growth during this period with the establishment of some major industries, which are still important in the Turkish economy, such as textiles, steel, etc. Etatism was very much industrially biased therefore did not stimulate agricultural investment as was hoped (Hale, 1981). This later proved to be a major political problem. In terms of building an infrastructure the Government was successful. During this period 2000 km of new railways and 3000 km of roads were built. Although Turkey was not affected as much as it might have been by the world crisis due to the protection of etatism, during the 1939-45 war major social and economic problems developed. The RPP leadership was very successful in remaining neutral, but a war economy was unavoidable.

There was increasing inflation from 1939 onwards and the war economy made the government unpopular.** Low income groups, such as

* See Y. Tezel (1981) p.226-228 for the figures.


** Prices increased 5 fold from 1939 to 1943.


government employees, peasants and workers were hit most by the inflation. As a precaution against wartime shortages the government decided that the peasants should sell all their products, excluding their consumption needs and seeds directly to the state. The harvest would be assessed in the fields, and before the products were completely harvested, the amount due to be given to the state would be determined. At about the same time, a distribution office was founded that provided most of the consumption goods, and regulated consumption and prices, with a ration card system. This precaution was enormously disliked by the peasants because the state officials were too strict on controlling production. Moreover the ration card system was unpopular amongst the urban masses.

From 1939 onwards, although inflation was high the government did not try to balance the value of the Turkish Lira with inflation and mainly the importers benefited from this. In 1941 the government tried to control the prices of most of the marketable goods, including imports and exports, through an office. In 1942, despite these precautions there were still enormous profits made on imports and in the black-market. In 1942, for the first time there was a direct attack on the importers with a Property Tax which aimed to get back profits made by the speculators through inflation. However, the nationalist policy was evident in this as 53% of the tax was paid by non-muslims. Although Turks were relatively unharmed by this tax, the RPP leadership lost its credibility as a protector of "private business" with all the private sector irrespective of religion and profession. From 1945 onwards the RPP leadership tried to re-establish its old social and economic support. For example, knowing the damage done to its peasant support by compulsory grain purchases, the RPP leadership tried to pass a land reform law. This did not improve relations, however, but worsened them by attracting the opposition of the large land owners.

In 1947 Turkey applied for credit to Europe but it failed. During the same year the Americans began to pressurize for changes in the etatist policy, as a condition for granting credit. In 1948, as part of the Marshall Plan, credit was given for making roads and merchanzation in agriculture.* By that time the party was abandoning its etatist policy, and there was a strong movement for the opening of new political parties.

2.2.2 Party Structure in the Etatist Period

Between 1931-1950 the RPP held 7 general congresses, 

 However, in 1931, as I have pointed out, for the first time the basic principles of the party ideology were formulated. The party also decided to open an auxiliary organization called "Halkevleri" which would both encourage the penetration of modern values and be at the same time a gathering place for party members. Party democracy was very weak from the beginning. The most important factor in this was that the members of parliament and the members of the committee's in the party were chosen only with the strict approval of the leadership. But by 1931 there was a tendency to regulate the intra-party choices by statutes. From 1931 onwards the RPP became a party in the modern sense, with a formal organization.** By 1935, the RPP had not only become a party, but the state party as well. The Political party conception of the leaders was neither democratic nor pluralist. The party was the symbol of "national unity", which could respond to the needs of every single citizen. The party was in the same category as the state, moreover it gave momentum to the state. This momentum was not dependent on the ideology of a class, but was claimed to be practical. The party

* Tezel (1981) p.243

** "Modern party" concept is used here in the sense that Duverger differentiates between old and modern parties. See Duverger (1965) introduction.

required very strict discipline. The meaning of democracy in the party was to replace the separation of powers by the convergence of powers, and parliamentarism. Democracy was what was called "Dilekler Sistemi" which meant that local party members made their demands on the party when they came to the congresses. Democracy should be for unity, therefore discipline was essential.

There was a legal bond between the state and the party. The party secretary was the Minister of Interior Affairs. The local party leaders were the governors in the area (Tunaya, 1952). In this the local administration and the central administration were increasingly intermingled with the party. Moreover, the principles of party ideology were written into the constitution as the ideological principles of the state.

In 1938 when Atatürk died, İnönü became the party leader for life. In the 1939 congress, the main issue was still the direct relation between the party and the state and intra-party discipline. But again upon the direct initiative of İnönü there was an attempt at founding an "independent group" which would be a loyal opposition. Of course by time loyalty became more important than opposition - after all they were members of the party. (Kili, 1976 p.96).

Duverger has a very favourable view of the RPP and the one party state system in Turkey. For him the RPP had democratic intentions and its main aim was to educate a political elite that could successfully rule the country. It was struggling, following a very oppressive regime, to establish a westernized country. He claims that the party was not totalitarian, because there was no enforced membership, and factionalism was possible, but he admits that the election system was not very democratic. (Duverger, 1965 p.280) The understanding of democracy and pluralism in the party until the 1950's was loyal opposition. All

during the one party state any groups that could have formed a strong opposition were closed. The party argued that there was no class struggle, and did not even allow a discussion of plurality.

The party was a "caucus" party, in that the participation of individual members in party politics was extremely limited. The leaders counted much more than the members. As the party had an organization corresponding to the local organization of the state, the local party organization was a coalition of local notables and party-state officials that were relatively independent of the masses.* The existence of factions in the single party system was quite common. There have been factions and power struggles in the RPP, under the single party system, which does not mean that there was inner party democracy.** It was more a struggle for leadership, without necessarily being based on any approval of the party membership or the voters. As well as not allowing pluralism in the party itself the party ideology tried to eliminate the plurality of interests in society under the ideology of "national interest".***

2.3 Multi Party Democracy and the RPP in Opposition

2.3.1 Establishment of Multi Party Democracy

After the War, upon the initiative of İnönü himself, there was a movement for a multiparty democracy within the parliamentary party. There were several reasons why İnönü supported the idea of establishing

* T. Günes (1961)

** Sartori (1976) claims that although factions are common in single party systems, this does not show a tendency towards democracy. p.42-45.

*** In one party states the decision to postpone pluralism and democracy for the national interest is very common, particularly amongst the recently independent societies of the 20th century in their nation building process. Wallerstein (1966) Bendix (1964).

an opposition party. Partly because it would prove Turkey to be liberal and democratic and partly the Etatist policy of the war years began to be less successful after the war. Moreover the foreign creditors, such as the USA, preferred a liberal economy and polity. Being a member of the new United Nations, and a supporter of the democratic countries in the war obliged the leaders of the RPP to allow political liberalization (Karpas, 1959). In late 1945 and early 1946, the movement towards a multiparty democracy gained momentum and in January 1946 the Democratic Party was established under the leadership of ^{Celal} Bayar.

The Democratic Party began to expand rapidly, though the RPP leaders had thought initially that the DP would limit its organization to a few provinces, and would not be able to expand in the next 20-30 years. Astonished by the rate of expansion, they called for early elections being afraid of DP winning the elections if they were delayed too long. In May 1946 the General Congress of the RPP abolished the independent group, announced a direct election system based on one man one vote and allowed associations based on class interest. (Karpas 1959 p.152). The July 1946 elections, were controlled by the party, and ^{with} open voting, secret counting, enormous pressure on the voters and interference with the votes gave the RPP 396 seats against 62 seats for DP and 7 independents. However, with these elections, for the first time, the notions of representation of the people and peoples' sovereignty, were publicly discussed. İnönü went on an election tour and the other candidates went to visit their constituencies for propaganda for the first time in 22 years.

During the period between 1946 and 1950 the RPP's major aims were to liberalize the economy, and to democratize the party and the country. In the 1947 Congress, there was some decentralization of power giving rights to the General Congress over the choice of the executive commit-

tee, and the state was ~~exbound~~ from the party. Some initiative was also given to local party organizations. Being influenced by the liberal economy of the west, and the liberalism of the opposition, the party modified etatism as an economic policy. During the same period the RPP passed laws that allowed opposition parties to use the radio, and a new election law based on secret voting and open counting system under the supervision of the courts. Contrary to the expectations of the RPP leaders the Democratic party won the elections in 1950. (DP. won 408 seats and RPP only 69).

2.3.2 Why did the RPP Lose the Elections?

The RPP lost the elections by a 13.4% margin.* The DP victory has been given much more importance in Turkish politics, than this margin would suggest. It was argued that it was not only a transition from a one party state system to a multiparty democracy, but it also indicated class cleavages and changes in the choices of the major social groups and classes in Turkey.

The Turkish Liberation War and the Turkish Republic, as I have said, were implemented by a coalition of military and civil bureaucrats and local notables.** RPP support in the provinces of Anatolia, was based on these notables. During the first years of the Republic, support of other groups such as big merchants, industrialists and capitalist farmers had been gained.*** Until the 1940's this coalition of

* The electoral system was based upon large constituencies, list voting and simple majority. Therefore although the RPP had 39.9% of the votes they had only 14.4% of the seats in parliament.

** Avcioglu 1968, Cem, 1968, Mardin (1973), (1983), Sunar (1974). By "notables" what one usually meant are well to do people that are respected in the provinces, that have direct or indirect patron-client contracts with the peasants. Most such people are large landowners and/or small merchants, they are assumed to have influence on the political attitudes of the voters.

*** Tezel (1981) argues that overwhelming support to the party in Izmir economy congress is a proof of this.

support remained behind the RPP, backed by an electoral college election system, with limited participation of the masses. The wartime measures, however, made the RPP unpopular amongst many social groups (see chapter 4 and chapter 6) and these groups searched for a means of opposition.

The first real possibility of opposition that was allowed was the Democratic Party. In understanding the support for the DP we have to begin by considering the climate of liberation and democratization after 27 years of one party rule. For most of the alienated bureaucrats and intellectuals this was the most important reason for voting DP.

The peasants, for the 27 years of RPP rule, saw the state as a tax collecting institution ^{for which} they performed various obligatory services including military service. During the war years, the taxes increased. Moreover state pressure to control agricultural production also increased. The RPP did not even try to legitimize the existence of such a pressure, after all it was an elitist party that ruled the country on the principle "in spite of the people, for the people" (Ahmad, 1977 p.100). The westernized, modern, educated bureaucrats knew what was best for the country and for the people, because they loved their country. The peasants were ignorant and traditional, they could be easily fooled about what was best for them, so they should not be exposed to opponents of the regime. The RPP also did not try to explain its policies because the masses were "ignorant", and were incapable of understanding. Being the state party, and the state officials being the party officials in a state where there was no representative and responsible government, the state officials became authoritarian towards the people with their elitist world view. They knew what was best for the people, and they commanded all the non-officials, including the notables.*

* See Günes (1961,1962) and Cem (1968) about the relation between people, notables, and RPP officials.

Westernization and secularization had very little appeal to the masses. In most cases such a movement was even unheard of because of inefficient communication, but in the rest of the rural population it carried a strong negative element because it was thought to be a direct attack on Islam. On this issue, local notables supported the peasants but could not openly express their views because of their close relations with the state party. Even the idea of religious freedom by itself had a major appeal to the masses.

The economic problems of the war years were added to the oppressive past of the RPP and notables, capitalists, peasants and liberal intellectuals joined forces with the DP opposition.* So the DP came to power on 14th May, 1950, ending the 27 years of RPP rule.

2.3.3 The RPP in Opposition

The RPP had not expected to lose the elections, and what is more they did not believe they really had lost the elections. This was only an unfortunate coincidence, an accident.** They were not used to being in the opposition, and they had to adapt to this new situation. (Kili, 1976 p.111, Ahmad, 1977 p.104, Karpat, 1959 p.242). The first 10 years of opposition were spent getting used to the new situation and changing the party programme. Most of the RPP leaders believed that they should develop an aggressive opposition against the views expressed by the DP, and meanwhile, a transfusion of new blood was necessary both in the leadership and in ideology. When the general congresses gathered in 1950 and 1951 the meaning of the new multiparty democracy and adapting to opposition were the major issues. There was confusion, and the

* Sunar (1974) and Mardin (1973) argues that the supporters of the DP were a new group of notables which emerged after the war.

** Arcaytrek (1983) describes in his memoirs how the RPP leadership was shocked that "all the things they did for the people were not appreciated".

discussion amongst the various groups went as far as asking for the resignation of İnönü. For the first time, we can see discussions about the RPP becoming a peasant party, with the new ideas of reform for the villages. (Ahmad 1977 p.105.)

In the 1951 congress there was a change in attitudes towards the local organization of the party. From 1927 onwards the party had been extremely centralized. The party leader, depending on the power balances within his immediate circle, appointed the central executive committee as well as candidates for membership of parliament. The general congresses were important for consultation rather than electoral purposes. The local party organizations were based on a caucus system, where party activity was very temporary. Party democracy was almost non-existent, especially because the state and the party were too much interwoven with each other.

For the first time, being influenced by the "localistic" trend in the DP,* provincial party organizations argued that the central decision makers were making wrong choices in nominating the party candidates. Eventually the right to elect the candidates was given to the local organizations. The congress was also given the right to choose the party council, the party leader and the general secretary. Moreover, for the first time there was open opposition to İnönü, and the congress elected as general secretary the candidate that İnönü did not favour, who was very localistic and particularistic in outlook. Between 1950 and 1954 the general congress assembled almost annually.

The local party organizations wanted to become more active, and the

* Amongst the DP members of parliament 67% represented the constituency they were born in. Amongst the RPP members of parliament only 56% represented the constituency they were born in. University graduates constituted 69% and 74% of DP and RPP members respectively.

party was increasingly structured as a branch party where the branches had responsibility and rights. Despite all their attempts, however, the provincial organizations could not bring a new outlook to the party until 1954. Even in the 1954 elections "eliteness" of the RPP cadres was the major topic for canvassing. (Kili, 1976 p.120). In those 4 years RPP could decide neither on a new economic policy nor on a new strategy for democracy or indeed on any kind of ideological change. The 1954 elections were an even worse defeat, the party gaining only 34.8% of the votes and 31 seats. Then it became more clear that a change was necessary in the party. Members of the party council that included some social democrats advocated some major attitudinal and ideological changes. After 1954 there was a decline in DP support. A large group from the parliamentary Democratic Party resigned and formed another party. They opposed the repressive measures of DP government. This new party, the Freedom Party wanted to join the power of all the opposition parties but DP passed a law which made it almost impossible.

In the early elections of 1957, the RPP came up with almost a totally new manifesto. This programme included items on allowing unionized workers the right to strike, giving autonomy to universities, new privileges to the bureaucracy, the repeal of antidemocratic laws and the repeal of National Defence Law.* The 1957 elections showed a decrease in the support of the DP. The total votes of the opposition parties for the first time were more than the DP total. (DP 47.3%, RPP 40.6%, RNP 7%, FP 3.8% **) But with the help of the majority system DP could get 419 seats, and the opposition seats increased to 181. This loss of support made the DP leaders increase their repressive measures, which increased the alienation of the masses, especially the middle classes,

* 1957 RPP programme.

** The Republican Nationalist Party (RNP) was a right-wing party that existed from 1950 onwards.

from the DP.

In the meanwhile, the Freedom Party joined the RPP. With a growing spirit of liberalism in the party, the party programme was changed again in the 1958 congress. The new programme advocated major constitutional changes; a bi-cameral system, proportional representation, rule of law, social justice and security. There were also critiques of the Democrats economic policy and suggestions that development should be based on plans. The new programme of the RPP attracted support from the middle classes and the intelligentsia. We do not know whether it would have been enough to win the elections because on 27th May 1960, before the elections could be held, the first coup in Turkish Republican History took place.

2.3.4 Changes Brought by the Democratic Party to the Turkish Economy

When the DP came to power, it decided to implement serious limitations to etatism. The DP economic policy was much clearer about capitalism than that of the RPP. For them the hindrance to the development of Turkey was too much state intervention in the economy and the bureaucratic control of the single party regime. Once the legal prohibitions were removed, then private initiative would bring about development. A similar optimism was adopted regarding foreign capital, in which there was no significant increase despite incentives. Two major policies of the etatist period were reversed, the plan was ignored and they tried to denationalize the state economic enterprises. Denationalization of the oil industry was also carried out as a concession to foreign capital and private business at home. Except for oil, denationalization was not successful, nor did a boom occur in private industry. The Democrats were determined to expand the economy, and when this was not achieved by economic liberalism, they turned back to the state sector, increasing the productivity of the old factories and adding new ones.

One of the major contributions of the Democratic Party to the Turkish economy was in the transport sector. With American technical and financial assistance the DP increased the hard surfaced roads from 1,600 km to 7,500 km, the loose surfaced roads from 3500 km to 61,000 km in 10 years integrating all but the remotest villages into the national economy. (Hale, 1981 p.90.)

However, the major concern of the Democrats was with votes, therefore we begin to see in this period the extensive usage of party-directed patronage, (Ahmad 1977). In 1950, 76% of the population were rural. The DP's main concern in taking new economic decisions was to increase votes. They therefore diverted their party-directed patronage expenses to rural areas and agriculture. Using the facilities of Marshall Aid funds they increased agricultural production, imported large numbers of tractors, (increasing their number from 1,750 in 1948 to 31,415 in 1952 and 44,144 in 1957) and harvesters, (during the same period their numbers increased from 994 to 6,523) and increased the area sown from 19,900,000 hectares in 1948 to 22,940,000 hectares in 1959. Turkey became an exporter of grain (Ahmad, 1977 p.135). Agricultural Bank credits increased from 412 million Turkish Liras in 1950 to 2392 million in 1960. Agricultural incomes were not taxed and the Soil Products Bureau bought crops at inflated prices, and this resulted in strong support from rural voters. (Bulutay & Yildirim 1969). The portion of land cultivated by tractors rose from 8.6% in 1950 to 14% in 1960, and this shortened the time spent on ploughing for the peasants enormously. (Hale 1981 p.95) This was one of the factors that resulted in high rural-urban migration, the percentage of urban residents increasing from 24% in 1950 to 32% in 1960. (Sunar 1974 p.96).

The DP regime, however, were not so interested in dealing with the problems of urban workers and they continued the policies initiated by

RPP governments without altering the essence of those policies. Similarly there were not many changes in education and health service policies.

The Democrat's success was helped by favourable weather conditions and foreign aid and Turkey experienced rapid growth. They revolutionized agriculture, and they consolidated the idea that members of parliament and the political parties are nothing but the representatives of the people. (Syliowicz, 1966).

2.4 Towards an Ideological Change: RPP between 1960 and 1972

2.4.1 The 1960 Coup, the New Constitution, and the RPP Coalitions

38 members of the military staff took over the country on 27th May 1960. The Democratic party was closed, its MP's were charged with treason, tried and sentenced. The military rule lasted just over a year, during which period a new constitution was drawn up. The new constitution was very much influenced by the RPP programme because the military had some ideological affinity with the RPP views. The RPP had 49 direct, and 125 indirect representatives in the Constituent Assembly.* The new constitution contained ideas directly taken from the 1958 RPP programme such as bicameral parliamentary system, proportional representation, a constitutional court to safeguard the constitution and state planning organization to regulate the economy. The 1961 Constitution also referred to broad economic and social goals, establishing targets such as land reform (which was also one of the policies the RPP advocated) free trade unionism with a right to strike and collective bar-

* After the coup in 1960, the army called a constituent assembly to write the new constitution, to this assembly representatives of various groups were called, including the political parties. These indirect representatives were not from the RPP list but had RPP tendencies (Killi (1976) p.165).

gaining, universal social security system and medical care.

Before the elections in 1961, taking advantage of proportional representation, 3 political parties were established, one of which was Justice Party (JP Adalet Partisi) which claimed to be a direct descendent of the Democratic Party. In the 1961 elections, although the principles of the RPP were then in the new Constitution passed through a referendum, the party gained less support than it did in the 1957 elections (40% in 1957, 36% in 1961). It was the largest party in the parliament but not the majority party.

The new parliament produced 4 coalition governments, in 3 of which the RPP was present. Between 1961 and 1965 the RPP governments tried to re-establish democracy, and revitalize the economy. The RPP established the State Planning Organization, and in 1963 gave the right to strike to workers. The RPP was not a part of the last coalition which was dominated by the Justice Party. In fact in the 1965 elections the JP came to power with an overwhelming majority (52%).

2.4.2 The Struggle of Social Democratic Factions in the Party

The election results were a major defeat for the RPP. With the loss of 8% of its votes the RPP only had 28.7% of the vote. There are various reasons why the RPP was defeated so badly. Being a supporter of the 1960 coup, the RPP was left in the position of a party seeking power with the help of the military. Also all the problems generated by coalition governments, were seen as originating from the RPP. The members of the party organization were frustrated because during the coalition governments the demands of the branches were ignored, so they did not have the enthusiasm for hard party work.

However, the blame was put on the newly introduced concept of "the left of centre". which was frequently mentioned in the elections: a

short time before the 1965 elections, İnönü and the leadership cadre of the party had identified the party ideology as "left of centre". Being left of centre at that point did not necessarily mean to change the party ideology and programme, but rather to redefine the existing party views, through the use of concepts that became fashionable after the 1960 coup. There was already a programme based on republicanism, democracy, planned economy, statist development, social justice and reformism. İnönü, described the place of such a programme, in the spectrum of ideologies, as "the left of centre".

This identification, as the election result showed, was neither liked by the voters, nor the party organization itself clearly understood what it actually meant and therefore was not well equipped in fighting against the counter propaganda that accused "the left of centre" as being nothing but "communism". In fact, ever since the secularization movement such accusations were made by deliberately using the term "communism" as something similar to blasphemy. Calling the party left of centre was considered as an open declaration of "communism" by its opponents. As there was no discussions amongst the party rank and file about this concept they did not know how to reply to such accusations. It was argued in the party that this was one of the major reasons for such a major defeat. (Abadan 1966). After the elections there were discussions within the party on whether this actually meant ideological change for the party. However, there was a major conservative group in the party that argued for a retreat from the left of centre.

From 1965 to 1972, the RPP held a series of general congresses, and there were group resignations from the party during two of them. The first congress was in 1966. Bulent Ecevit, who later became the leader of the party, and his friends argued that the ideology of the party should be labelled "left of centre". Moreover, they argued that this

concept was not content free but it had a clear left wing connotation. It was defined as "the democratic left, that is represented by the RPP in accordance with both the 1960 Constitution and the meaning of social democracy of our age". (Ecevit, 1966 p.26). In the 1966 Congress İnönü supported Ecevit's group, however, he was dubious about whether Ecevit should be the general secretary of the party. Still the Congress elected Ecevit despite İnönü's mild opposition.

In 1966 the left of centre movement had a populist ideology different from the populism of the 1930's. It recognized the existence of classes but opposed class struggle. It was in favour of social justice, social security and liberty and free enterprise was considered one of the basic liberties. It mentioned social democracy in the sense of some social reforms which would lay down the preconditions for a more democracy. (Ecevit, 1966).

The victory of Ecevit's group did not end the factional disputes but further stimulated them. After the congress the factional opposition ^{attempted} to force the central executive committee of the party to declare that the party was not socialist. However, such a declaration did not satisfy the opposing faction and they called for an extra ordinary congress, in which ^{ironically} they were expelled from the party.*

The 1969 election manifesto of the RPP was called a programme for change, and it advocated social reforms.** However İnönü's propaganda strategy was to avoid controversy. He did not like to use the word "progressive" and instead he talked about social and economic reforms. He refused to discuss secularism, religion and Atatürk. Despite his

* Those that were expelled from the party formed a new party called Reliance Party, their leader was T. Feyzioglu.

** "İnsanca bir düzen Kurmak için Halktan Yetki İstiyoruz, CHP nin düzen değişikliği Programı." (1969)

insistent silence. Ecevit made radical promises, making his sentence "land to the tiller, water for the user" a slogan of party propaganda, which was seen by many as a threat to private property. Ecevit did not hesitate to criticise Atatürk's reforms (Ecevit, 1968) for not reaching the people and for not being radical enough. He declared that individuals should be able to practice their beliefs openly, and this seemed a direct attack on secularism. So there was a dual approach to election propaganda; İnönü and the conservatives were moderate and careful in their speeches while Ecevit and his followers were radical.

The 1969 elections were a worse defeat than 1965. The Party received only 27.4% of the votes. But because of the changes in the election system it increased its seats in parliament from 134 to 143. After 1969 elections new conservative opposition groups emerged in the party. They claimed that the left of centre movement and Ecevit's radical slogans were the reasons for the defeat in the elections. Their interpretation of the party programme was very different. They wanted strict loyalty to the Kemalist principles of the RPP and to preserve the elitist nature of the party. In the 1970 congress the conservatives were again defeated, and Ecevit was backed by İnönü. In his congress speech Ecevit emphasized again that he would be loyal to the left of centre movement and to social democracy. He rejected the idea that the RPP was a mass political party, and he said "nothing can stop us from declaring that the party is against the parasitic intermediaries in agriculture, and that it is in favour of land reform".*

* An item in 1974 statute but it was denounced in 1976.

2.4.3 12th March 1971 Coup and the Victory of Social Democracy in the Party

It was not an ~~inter~~party dispute but a military coup that made İnönü withdraw his support from Ecevit. On 12th March 1971 there was a military intervention which led to the resignation of Demirel, the prime minister, and a new government was formed under Nihat Erim who was an MP from the RPP. İnönü declared his support for the Erim government, and Ecevit announced his opposition emphasizing that he would not support any military backed government against an elected government, and he did not want the party's name to be associated with the military once again. This declaration of open conflict with İnönü was a major step towards the establishment of a social democratic ideology in the party. İnönü had backed Ecevit until 1971 but it was clear to most people that İnönü represented the status quo, and for any radical change in the party ideology and structure he was a major obstacle. However, forcing İnönü to resign was not easy. The RPP was a party of Republican traditions; loyalty to the War of Independence and the Republic was symbolized in the person of İnönü himself.

Ecevit resigned from his post as general secretary knowing that the parliamentary group was dominated by the followers of İnönü. He thus turned to the local party organizations for support and indeed he found strong backing. Ecevit's grass-roots politics threatened the conservative RPP members of the parliament. They began their accusations using the old rhetoric that Ecevit wants to make the party socialist. This again had very little effect.

Despite İnönü's efforts Ecevit was victorious in the big cities; Ankara, Izmir, Adana and Istanbul. Seeing that Ecevit was increasing his followers in the provincial congresses, İnönü called for an extraordinary general congress arguing that there was no need to continue with

the provincial congresses. İnönü called only the previously elected delegates to the congress and this was ardently protested by Ecevit's supporters. The day before the general congress, 43 provincial leaders, 8 provincial representatives, 55 provincial youth branch representatives and 7 youth branch leaders signed a declaration of open support for Ecevit protesting the non-legal procedures used in gathering the general congress.

On 5th May, 1972, the general congress gathered with the old delegates. İnönü tried to use all means; he played a sick man, the saviour of the country and founder of the Republic, warned that Ecevit and his friends were irresponsible socialists, that he would not work with them and that he would resign if there was a vote of confidence in the central party committees, which was dominated by Ecevit's supporters.

The arguments of the conservatives were based on accusations of Anti-Kemalism and communism. Ecevit and his friends based their arguments on intra-party democracy, and what they called the ruling of the party by "the party organizations". The basic slogan used by the Ecevit supporters was "örgüt" which means the local party organization. Ecevit emphasized over and over again the point that what he wanted was the independence of the party in taking decisions. The final sentence of his speech was "are we going to be members of a democratic party that has respect for laws or are we going to be servants?". His supporters, including the secretary of the party, all made speeches praising party rule by the local organizations against rule by the central committee and the leader himself. (Kili 1976). The congress ended with the victory of Ecevit and İnönü resigned from leadership the next day. A new congress elected Ecevit as the leader of the party on 14th May 1972. It was argued that Ecevit restored the self confidence of the Provincial

Party. By voting for Ecevit the delegates voted for themselves (Cem 1972). Such a climate of opinion had major impact upon the future of the party.

The RPP since its formation by Atatürk had very strong leadership and very strong central organization. It had been the state party for 27 years and this also had affected its structure. The central organization dominated the local organization and the local leaders controlled the party members. The RPP was a very strong elite and cadre party, with a formal structure of the branch system. Therefore the provincial and sub-provincial leaders were relatively less powerful. However, from 1950 onwards the right wing parties strengthened the position of their local leaders, with increasing localist tendencies. The RPP leadership blamed right-wing parties for partisanship, particularism and localism, and argued that they would not adopt such policies. But although the local party organizations' members could accept this principle, this did not end their growing uneasiness with their ineffectiveness in the locality vis a vis their right-wing counterparts (See Chapters 4 and 6).

Besides there was a change in the voters support for the RPP which was reflected in the 1973 elections. Those new groups, which I will discuss later, wanted to participate in the local party organizations. They knew that the existence of the status quo and its representatives in the peripheral organizations would be a major hinderance to their domination. The victory of the left of centre movement and Ecevit as its leader therefore, was not only an ideological change, it was also an organizational change, a renewal in the structure of the party, appropriate to its ideology. The result of this was expected to be a strong branch system, inner party democracy and freedom, and greater responsibility of the leadership and central organization to the peripheral organization and its demands. These were all things that were

promised by Ecevit in his first speech as the leader of the party. General Congress in 1974 changed the party statutes, enabling permanent participation of provincial party representatives in the central committees.*

2.5 "Left of Centre", "Democratic Left" or "Social Democracy" The Ideology of the RPP after 1972

Soon after Ecevit came to power the "left of centre" concept was replaced by the "Democratic Left" as the label for RPP ideology. Both of them, however, were described as social democratic. The RPP became a member of the Socialist International but never had a well defined socialist ideology. The most striking themes in the party ideology were "populism" and "democracy".

After 1972 the meaning of populism in the party ideology changed in more than one respect. It was so much changed that the new understanding of populism was a reaction to and a weapon against the populism of the 1930's. One of the aspects that changed in the 1972 Congress was the previous understanding of classless society. Whereas the previous populism attempted to establish a classless society (see section 2.2.2.) the new populism accepted the existence of classes and social injustice stemming from class inequalities.

In an interview, Ecevit said openly that "The people are the oppressed class" and that populism means defending their rights and interests. The RPP was to fight for the underprivileged and the oppressed: "the RPP tries to unite the forces of those people who do not seek privileges in the society, whose income is not dependent upon the exploitation of others and those that cannot use the welfare services, those that cannot defend their rights on their own, so that they will

* An item in 1974 statute but it was denounced in 1976).

have some weight in the ruling of the country, so that their voices will be heard; for the party this a humanitarian duty". (1976 RPP Programme p.12) It was also a reaction to the intellectualism and the strict elitism of the RPP before the 1950's. (see section 2.3.3.)

There were major discussions both inside and outside the party on the nature of the single party regime in Turkey. It was argued that the oppressive regime of the 1930's and 1940's, the secularist reforms of Atatürk and the elitist nature of the RPP were the major reasons for the repeated electoral defeats (Günes 1961, 1962, Cem 1968, Ecevit 1968). The RPP used to be in power for a very long time and this alienated people from the party itself and from the single party system. The new approach is uniting and acting together with the people.

So the populism of the RPP after the 1970's became closer to the Democratic Party's conception of populism in the 1950's. In the early 1970's the RPP began to emphasize the points which were closer to the classical interpretation of populism "belief in the people, and their superior morals, and anti-intellectualism" (Ionescu and Gellner 1968). Another aspect of the RPP populism was direct contact between a great leader and the masses. Ecevit became the hero of meetings. Similar to Latin American versions of populism the RPP had some kind of concern for the workers, the urban poor and the small farmers. However, it was clear that the RPP, like most populist parties, did not aim at a revolution based on class struggle nor did it emphasize class consciousness (Pollack, 1967).

RPP Populism in its economic policy put the emphasis on collective forms of production, ^{such} as cooperatives which do not always necessitate state ownership; such as Köy Kent (Rural towns) which was to be based on rural cooperatives, Halk Sektörü (peoples sector) and cooperatives in industry. Özdalga argues that there is no irreconceivable opposition

between populism and social democracy and interprets the RPP's position as fluctuating between the two. (Ozdalga 1978). Although populism can be seen as a primary motive, as Ozdalga argues, in RPP ideology, from 1971 onwards democracy and the meaning of democracy in Turkey have taken up a greater proportion of party programmes. The military coup of 1971 and the possibility of another military intervention were the primary reasons behind such a concern.

The social democratic movement also effected the further democratization of the party organization. Ecevit described social democracy as a democratizing process through which there would be more participation by the people in the various levels of politics regardless of their class backgrounds: "Our understanding of left gives more emphasis to democracy in the sense of liberal democracy, than to leftism". "It is necessary to expand democracy, from a representative democracy to a system in which people will directly take decisions and control. That is why we want worker's participation in management, the strengthening of the people's sector, the establishment of "rural towns" and to give more rights to local administrations". (Ecevit 1975). To achieve such democracy the social, economic and political rights of the people had to be diffused and increased, and the people had to be activated into using their rights.

One of the means of implementing such a policy was increasing the voluntary organizations in society and democratizing the structures of such organizations. Through this not only would different interests be organized and represented in the society, but also individuals would achieve a greater fulfilment of their abilities and liberties. The RPP always argued that its organization did actually go through such a democratization process after the 1970's.

Social equality was seen by the RPP quite essential in consolidating democratic rule. Equality was to be achieved by the diffusion of ownership of the means of production. The RPP did not aim at a major limitation of private property by nationalization, however, it did aim to increase "cooperative ownership" where individuals had shares in industry, including distributing shares to the workers in industry. There would be a self-management system at the factory level, and as there would be a diffusion of private ownership, there would be fewer limitations for the individual's democratic participation. A similar participation and democratization was proposed for the rural areas in "rural-towns" programme, that would be carried out with the initiative of the rural cooperatives (1976 Programı).

Although the RPP had elaborate programmes about democratization of the country, it was insufficiently prepared on other issues. The RPP did not have a detailed programme for development, although it claimed to be a party of reform and change.

The RPP was not a socialist party, although there were cases where it adopted socialist terminology. The RPP wanted to be a social democratic party in the European sense, reforming but not undermining the capitalist economy. Its aims for the distribution of resources were policies such as social security for all of the working population, unemployment benefits, old age pensions and health insurance for all citizens and social security for the housewives.

However, given that Turkey was an underdeveloped country, there had to be rapid economic growth which would make possible the distribution of such vast resources. A major criticism raised against RPP was over its deficiency in not having a detailed and comprehensive development programme especially for speeding up growth in industry and in agriculture.

The RPP argued for planned development, that would give priority to agriculture and it aimed at having democratic participation in planning. In fact, nationalization took place^{only} in energy and mining sectors. Otherwise private enterprise "as long as it acts responsibly towards a balanced development in the country and acts according to the principles of social justice" was to be stimulated, especially in industry as opposed to commerce. Probably the only social class that the RPP directly attacked were the intermediary merchants.

Most of the state incentives, however, should go to cooperatives, that would carry out production, marketing and even exporting. Cooperatives would get low interest credits and direct assistance from the state in getting inputs. These principles all caused major arguments over their applicability to Turkish conditions and in terms of their compatibility with the aim of rapid development. However the RPP encouraged major discussions on Turkey's development policy and democratization process.

2.6 A Very Brief Note on Some Changes in Turkish Social and Economic Structures after 1960

From 1960's onwards the Turkish economy achieved rapid economic growth. Between 1960-78 GNP grew at 6.2% a year on average, per capita income rising from 188\$ in 1960 to 279\$ in 1970 and 1109\$ in 1978.* The highest rate of growth, which exceeded plan targets, was 7.4% per annum between 1970 and 1976.

2.6.1 Agriculture

The plans after 1960 gave primary importance to industrialization. Agriculture grew more than expected, but lost its dominating role in the

* Source: SPO, 4th Development Plan.

national income and by 1973 its percentage contribution to GNP had fallen below industry and services (Hale 1981. p.174). There were some difficulties in planning agriculture, because of small ownership and the great dependency on natural resources.

Turkish agriculture was dominated by small proprietors, but between 1963 and 1973 there was an increase in the percentage of the peasants that owned less than 20 decars.* The existence of such a high proportion of small proprietors was due to two main factors: the fragmentation of land due to population increase and inheritance rights, and the migrants in the cities wanting to retain their properties, however small, as a kind of security (Kepenek 1983 p.314). In 1973, the proportion of landless rural families was 21.9%. Their proportion was 9.1% in 1963, showing a doubling effect in 10 years. The period from 1950 to 1960 saw an increase in the area of arable land and from 1960 onwards there was an increase in agricultural productivity through the use of modern techniques and inputs.** In 1973, 57.82% of families used insecticides, 1/3 of the total arable land was irrigated and 85% of peasant families used a combination of modern inputs. The increase in the use of inputs was so great that, during the 1970's, Turkey was continuously importing

* In terms of landownership, between 1963 and 1973, the percentage of peasants that owned less than 20 decars increased from 40.7% to 44.6% and the proportion of land they own has decreased from 11.3% to 8.4% showing a decrease in the amount of land owned per family. The reverse is happening among the largest landholdings over 500 decars, an increase of 0.3% in terms of households, but about 4% in terms of land. There is relative stability among the top section that owns between 20 and 50 decars of land and there is a slight decrease in the percentage of households and the ratio of their land to total arable land among the families that own 50 to 200 decars.

** The number of tractors increased from 42,000 in 1960 to 325,000 in 1977, even by the year 1976 88% of the total land was cultivated by tractors. The mechanization was not limited to tractors, seed drills for instance, increased from 50,000 in 1960 to 140,000 in 1977, the amount of chemical fertilizers used has increased from 300,000 tonnes in 1960 to 6.5 m tonnes in 1970 (66.03% of the enterprises in agriculture used fertilizers in 1973). (Hale 1981, Kepenek 1983).

fertilizers and insecticides. The productivity increase was not as high as the increase in the use of inputs, but some improvements were achieved. For instance, the production of wheat increased from 1273 kg/hectare in 1963 to 1829 kg/hectare in 1980. During the same years production of cotton increased from 410 kg/hectare to 744 kg/hectare, of tobacco from 560 kg/hectare to 1018 kg/hectare, and of sunflower seeds from 925 kg/hectare to 1300 kg/hectare (Kepenek, 1983).

All through the 1960's and 1970's there was a continuous increase in the amount of products that were bought by the state with subsidized prices. Amongst these products the most important were wheat and other cereals, figs, hazelnuts, cotton, tobacco, sugar beets, sunflower seeds and tea. With the price support system the peasant's terms of trade, from a base of 100 in 1965, had risen to 130 by 1973-74 falling back to 118 in 1976.* There had been permanent increases in the net payments made to the peasants from state funds to help them in purchasing various agricultural products. These purchases were instrumental in improving the living standards of the peasants. They also helped to stabilise the production of certain crops such as sugar beets and cotton, and have been very important in the extension of cash cropping to the periphery. In the 1950's, 30 to 50% of farmers used credit from non-institutional resources, such as landowners or merchants, paying interest rates of up to 100% per year. By 1980 the Agricultural Bank was the biggest institution that gave credit to farmers.

In short, after 1960 the Turkish peasants were more integrated into the national and international markets as producers and consumers. As a result of these changes Turkey became almost self-sufficient in producing its own food.

* Source: SPO, 4th Development Plan p.9.

2.6.2 Industrialization

In the case of the textiles and cement industries the demand from the home market was almost completely met. This was one of the aims of the import substitution policy that was adopted after 1960. Since 1960, the output in industries using more sophisticated technologies such as chemicals and machinery had been higher than the output of industries producing basic consumer goods. Amongst the wide range of durable consumer goods that were introduced into the market were cars, lorries, household appliances and tractors and ^{of which} some were directly tied to international markets in terms of their spare parts and raw materials.

The average annual growth rate between 1968 and 1978 was about 9.6% in manufacturing industry. When we look at the composition of output in the manufacturing industry we can see a shift from consumer to intermediate and capital goods.* During the same years the share of Industry in the GNP increased from 17.0% to 25.5%, and the value-added in industry almost quadrupled. The projected rate of growth in industry was high in the first three plans, and the realized rate was very close to what the Development Plans foresaw.

During the Justice Party governments (1964-1971) the policy of the government was to expand the private sector. As a result, although the ratio of fixed capital investments between the public and private sector did not show improvements for the private sector, in terms of value

* In 1962 consumer goods constituted 62.3%, intermediate goods 27.8% and capital goods 9.9% of industrial output. By 1977 these figures had changed to 49%, 37.7% and 13.3% respectively. (Hale 1981, Kepenek 1983).

added in industry we do see a shift towards the private sector.* Private industrial development was largely due to high rates of tariffs on imports. Another major trend in industry was the increase in the proportion of capital intensive industries. In the 1970's, with the planned economy, Turkey had a high industrialization rate and the private sector was the motor force in this.

2.6.3 Population Trends in Turkey

Turkey has experienced rapid population increase; in 1923, Turkey's population was about 13 m, in 1960 about 35 m, and in 1980 it was about 45 m. The rate of increase was at its peak of 3% in 1950, but it fell to about 2% in 1980. Parallel with this population increase, there was also massive rural-urban migration and after the 1960's there was also the migration abroad of workers (Shorter and Macura 1983, p.25-30). The percentage of urban residents to total population increased from 25% to 48.8% between 1950 and 1980, with a net increase of 14.4 m. The net increase in the rural population during the same period was only 9.4 m. Most of the migrants live in squatter housing areas (gecekondu) of the cities, which constitute 65% of the population of Ankara, 40% of Istanbul, Adana, Izmir, in cities of over 100,000, the gecekondu residence rate is 35%. (Kartal 1983 p.40).

There were changes in terms of employment as well. The percentage of agricultural employment has fallen from 74.9% to 64.2% between 1960 and 1975, whereas there was a rise in industrial employment (7.4% to 8.3%) and particularly in the services sector (12.6% to 23.4%). Simi-

* In 1963 52.7% of value added was in the public sector and 47.3% in private. In 1977 these figures were 29.7% and 70.3% respectively. In terms of employment we see the same trend. The employment share of big factories in the private sector rose from 55.9% in 1963 to 63.7% in 1970, and if we consider the small businesses, which were predominantly privately owned, the share of private business is even higher.

larly there was an increase in the proportion of wage earners from 18.8% to 27.7%, whereas the ratio of self-employed, unpaid family work actually fell.* All through the 1960's and 1970's Turkey ^{was alleged to have} a slightly increasing unemployment rate that was around 10%. After the 1960's new opportunities were opened for migration abroad. The demand for unskilled labour in Europe motivated Turks to leave their country. Between 1961 and 1967 200,000 workers left for jobs in Western Europe and by 1973 600,000 were resident abroad. By 1977 this number had reached 895,000 including their families, in 1979 it was estimated that 1.5 m Turks lived abroad, about 3.3% of the population. (Hale 1983, p.248-252).

In the 1960's and early 1970's Turkey did not only experience rapid economic development and industrialization but also there were major changes in the services available to the people. In 1975, only 8.6% of villages (most of which had populations under 250) had no schools and the illiteracy rate had fallen from 59.1% in 1960 to 38.1% in 1975. In terms of transport there was a shift from rail to road, 85.3% of transport was by road in 1963 and this increased to 95.7% in 1977, whereas the railway's share decreased from 13.3% to 2.8% during the same period. In accordance with this policy improvements in roads were made and "four season" roads were built to almost all the villages of Turkey. All parts of Turkey were integrated into the postal system, the telephone services were extended and after 1975 it became possible to dial direct between the cities and for international calls. Radio services transmitted to the whole of Turkey, T.V., which was introduced in the late 1960, by 1976 could be watched by 81% of Turkey's population.

* Insurance policies were introduced for workers in 1965 and for the self-employed in 1972. So from 1960 to 1977 the percentage of non-agricultural workers that were insured increased from 28.8% to 71.3%.

The changes in agriculture and industry, population increase, migration, improved life chances and wider awareness of the outside world had important political implications. Besides these socio-economic changes political participation patterns of the various social groups were changing as were their expectations from politics. The RPP, with its new social democratic outlook, was trying to appeal to some of these new demands.

2.7 The RPP Between 1973-1980

2.7.1 1973 Elections and the Shift in Voter Basis for RPP

The RPP won the elections in 1973. This victory was not so much due to the increase in their percentage of votes but due to the votes of the other political parties. The RPP had 33.3% of the votes which was a 6% increase from 1969, but it was still lower than it was in 1961 and the period before that. (see table I). Having the biggest group in parliament with 185 seats (out of a total of 450 seats in the parliament) was a surprise even to the RPP leaders themselves. Such an increase indicated that the left of centre ideology was not the reason for the loss of votes in the 1965 and 1969 elections. It was then the structure of the party, its attitudes, its way of appeal to the masses, its image and its leadership that the voters rejected.

Especially in the west of Turkey and in the big cities there were readily available groups of voters that could shift to social democracy. The major victory was in Therace; the average increase in 5 Theracean provinces was 11.6%. In the Marmara and Aegean regions the average increase was 10% and 7.3% respectively. Also there were increases in the Alevi votes with a 7.7% shift from the Unity Party to RPP.* In cities with a population over 120,000, there was a steady increase in

* Unity Party (Birlik Partisi) was an Alevi based left wing party.

RPP votes, and it reached its maximum in cities over 400,000 where it was above 40% of total votes. (Tekeli & Gökçeli, 1977, p.42). In the biggest cities of Turkey (Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, Izmir) the average increase was 12.25%. The RPP in the 1973 municipal elections won 32 of 67 city municipalities. The increase of votes in big cities came from the lower class population. (Özbudun 1975). In Izmir's gecekondu areas there was a 20% increase in RPP votes, (from 22.6% in 1969 to 44.2% in 1973), similarly in Istanbul's gecekondu areas there was a 26% increase. (From 21.8% in 1969 to 47.5% in 1973). (E. Özbudun, 1975). Also in places where workers were concentrated such as the Zonguldak mining area there were considerable increases (9% from 1969 to 1973). Two groups were notable among the RPP supporters. One of these was the people living in the ~~square~~^{squatter} housing/areas of the big cities; the working class and the urban poor. Amongst the industrial workers, especially unionized industrial workers such as those in manufacturing industry, mining and in the big privately owned industries, RPP support was very high. Secondly, RPP flourished in the areas where there was a prosperous small proprietor dominated agriculture. The Aegean, Marmara, and Thrace, (Western parts of Anatolia), regions were the most developed in terms of agriculture, had the most widespread production of cash crops, some of which, such as cotton, were used as inputs in industry. Those were the areas in which the standard of living had risen very sharply in the 1960's.

TABLE 1
Voting Statistics from 1950 to 1980 in Turkey (%)

Years	JP	RPP	RP	RPNP	RNP	DP	DP (new)	FP	NP	NAP	NSP	TLP	NTP	VP
1950	-	39.9	-	-	-	53.3	-	-	3.1	-	-	-	-	-
1951	-	38.7	-	-	-	52.7	-	-	8.0	-	-	-	-	-
1954	-	34.8	-	-	4.8	56.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1957	-	40.6	-	-	7.0	47.3	-	3.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
1961	34.8	36.7	-	14.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.7	-
1965	52.9	28.7	-	2.2	-	-	-	-	6.3	-	-	3.0	3.7	-
1969	46.5	27.4	6.6	-	-	-	-	-	3.2	3.0	-	2.7	2.2	2.8
1973	29.8	33.3	5.3	-	-	-	11.9	-	0.6	3.4	11.8	-	-	1.1
1975	48.6	38.0	-	-	-	-	2.8	-	-	2.3	7.9	-	-	0.3
1977	36.9	41.4	1.9	-	-	-	1.9	-	-	6.4	8.6	0.1	-	0.4
1979	47.22	27.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.2	10	-	-	-

Source: State Statistical Institute

JP = Justice Party
 RPP = Republican Peoples Party
 RP = Reliance Party
 RPNP = Republican Peasants Nationalist Party
 RNP = Republican nationalist Party
 DP = Democratic Party

FP = Freedom Party
 NP = Nation Party
 NAP = National Action Party
 NSP = National Salvation Party
 TLP = Turkish Labour Party
 NTP = New Turkish Party
 UP = Union Party


2.7.2 RPP in Power and in Opposition (1973-1980)

Three months after the elections the RPP formed a coalition government with the National Salvation Party.* There were wide discussions about the feasibility of partnership. It was pointed out that the basis for the coalition was the belief in the fundamental freedom of the individual, the nationalization of mineral resources and oil and to curb the power of the big capitalists.

But there were major differences in terms of policy and social philosophy between the two political parties. However, political calculations rather than similarities in social views was the basis of this coalition. The coalition's protocol was the first programme to dwell so much on the question of "Democracy" (F. Ahmat 1977 p.338). One of their Government's first actions was to pass an amnesty law to release ordinary and political prisoners. The 1973 RPP and NSP Government was important in Turkish history not because of what they did in the country in terms of social democratic ideals, but because of their foreign policy.

In the summer of 1974 the Turkish Army invaded Cyprus, and this was regarded as a patriotic and courageous deed on part of Ecevit. People thought "he found a radical solution to the Cyprus problem, that no prime minister before himself could even dream about". This view of the situation raised RPP support to its peak by the end of 1974. After the Cyprus crisis was over, it became more evident that such a coalition of a traditional Islamist party and a progressive republican party could not persist. The RPP leadership ended the coalition, expecting either to go to early elections or to form a coalition with the Democratic

* National Salvation Parti (Milli Selamet Partisi) was a small party that had on average about 10% of the votes from 1973 to 1979. It was strongly Islamic and it was also pro-industrialization.



Party (new).* But the plan failed and a coalition of right wing parties was formed under the leadership of Demirel, called the National Front Government. This Government included the neo-fascist National Action Party.**

The result of the 1975 bi-election was a victory for the RPP, increasing its votes from 35.4% in 1973 to 43.9%, the Justice party also recovered from its losses in 1973, but it was a major defeat for the smaller parties. Both the NSP and the DP suffered serious losses. Therefore they did everything to prevent an early election.

In the period from 1975 to 1977 the National Front Governments were in power and there was increasing political terrorism. In left wing and democratic circles there was considerable unhappiness with the National Front Government. There was an increasing polarization of ideologies both to the left and to the right.

In the 1977 elections, this polarization *led to* a greater victory of the RPP. (41% of votes and 213 seats in parliament.) However, the number of seats was not enough for the RPP to form a government by themselves. Ecevit did not want to form a coalition, so the RPP waited for some MPs to resign from the other parties and join the RPP as ministers. Such a government was formed in 1978. The 1978 RPP government was unsuccessful both in terms of maintaining law and order and in controlling the economic crisis.

* The Democratic Party was formed in 1972 after factional disputes in the Justice Party. It was conservative and it had lost its importance by 1977.

** The National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) was a neo-fascist party. It was involved in many terrorist activities before the 1980 coup. Although the party was formed in the early 1960's (with a different name) until 1975 it did not have much support in terms of voters or followers. However from 1974 to 1979 it increased its support to 30% in some areas as Yozgat. It was a coalition partner in all the National Front Governments which helped it in building support.

In the economy, there was a major shortage of foreign currency, so there was rationing of petrol and oil products. This led to a shortage of many consumer goods, including margarine. By the time of the 1979 bi-elections, there was a severe economic crisis, and about 5000 people were killed per year in political terror

The 1979 bi-elections were a major defeat for the RPP government. The vote of the RPP fell to 27.4% only in the course of two years from 1977 to 1979. A number of provinces, including Istanbul, which were the strongholds of the RPP, went through a net decrease of 20% in their votes (58.2% in 1977, 37.9% in 1979) and in Istanbul the Justice Party vote was higher (40%). The Government resigned to be replaced by a new Justice Party Government. This government was in power until 12th September 1980, when the Turkish army carried out a coup, and the activities of all the political parties were suspended. On 15th October, 1981, the parties were closed, and it was made a clause in the constitution that no party could be founded claiming continuity with the parties that existed before the 1980 coup.

2.8 The Party Organization and Statutes

2.8.1 Articulation System of the Party

The party statute was changed a few times after 1972. However the basic structure of the party remained the same because it had to be in accordance with the Political Parties law dating from 1961. RPP organization was based on a branch system, where there was only a direct participation system. Membership was restricted by various clauses in the Political Parties Law, and membership was only possible in that branch where one was permanently resident or in one's place of work. Two references from two former party members were required and the county (ilçe) executive committee had the right to reject or accept applica-

tions for membership. There were channels for further appeal for both sides. Party members could vote in inner-party elections one year after their joining. Members were supposed to pay dues of from 12 to 1200 TL. a year, but the party could never collect the dues and its financial resources were mainly the Government and donations. It was a duty for members to engage in propaganda, and not to use membership to obtain any specific privileges.

As in many branch type organizations, the party organization was a reflection of the Turkish Administrative articulation system. The smallest unit was the village or quarter that had a "muhtar".* Each unit had party representatives called delegates who were responsible to the county organization which was responsible to the provincial organization, which in turn was responsible to the central party organization. Therefore we see a strict hierarchical structure in the party. The essence of party organization was the "delegate" system. Delegates were extremely important for everything that was decided in the local level and could influence the central party organization as well.

The delegates elected the party candidates for parliamentary elections, the county (branch) leaders, the executive committee members and the representatives of the county in the provincial congresses. The "delegate" was a party activist who took part in all the local activities. The "delegates" were supposed to be elected by the party members, but in most cases there was no record of membership and no desire to carry out such elections neither from the local party organization nor from the delegates themselves. Except in very big cities, such elections were never held. I shall elaborate on this in the later chapters.

The appointment of delegates was based on the number of votes the

* Muhtar is headman.

party received from the unit (quarter or village) for first 50 votes one delegate was appointed, another one was nominated for the second 50, but from then onwards every 100 votes counted for one delegate. The number of delegates could not exceed 600 from any one county, which was to the disadvantage of large centers in the nomination of M.P. candidates.

Inner party elections were held every two years. The lowest level at which genuine elections were held was county level. Depending on the population of a county and the votes the party had received from that county, the number of executive committee members varied from seven to eleven. The party leader and the executive committee members were elected by the delegates. The committee later met to elect a secretary to do the office work and a treasurer. All the party political activity in the locality was planned, organized, and carried out by this committee.

The leaders and the representatives of the counties of each province gathered for a provincial congress. At this congress they elected the provincial leader and his executive committee, (11 to 15 members) the representatives to join the general congress, and a nominee for the central party council (which was a clause in the 1974 statute, given as a concession to the peripheral organizations). At the local level executive committees were expected to meet weekly; at the county level this was never carried out and even at the provincial level this was extremely rare. The general congress was constituted of provincial leaders and representatives, members of the party council, the leaders of auxiliary organizations in the provincial level, Members of Parliament and Senate, and the members of the discipline committee. The general congress was not only an electoral body; it alone was entitled to change the party programme, ideology statutes, and organization. It was expected to discuss the problems of the party, and the state. It

elected the party leader and members to the party council and the discipline committee. It was also entitled to control the finances of the party.

The number of members of the party council varied little after 1960. The original party council was numbered 40, in the 1974 Congress it was enlarged to 62, forty of which were directly chosen by the Congress, 22 of which were provincial representatives. The provincial representatives were expected to be resident in their constituency, and they were thought to be the voice of the periphery. However, the central party organization gave up this idea after 2 years and the party council membership was reduced to 20 in 1976. The party council elected the general secretary, and 2 to 4 deputy general secretaries. The Party council was the most important body in the party administration according to the statutes. It had powers to call a general congress, to announce the party programme and to take all decisions in between general congresses including forming or dissolving a government.

The party had two auxiliary organizations, the youth organization, which was open to members aged from 18 to 28, and women's organizations. Both of these were organized as an exact replica of the main organization, and their leader at every level was considered a member of the executive committee or council at that level. For example provincial youth and women organizations' leaders were members of provincial executive committee. These organizations also held separate general congresses.

2.8.2 Delegates and Elections

The most important role of the delegates was the nomination of candidates for elections. The principle of nomination was that only the delegates of the constituency could vote. For example, the members of

Parliament and Senators were elected on the basis of the province as a constituency, so all the delegates in the province, irrespective of their county, voted. However, in the municipality the basis was the city or the town and only the delegates resident in the city or town voted. Rural residents of the same county could not vote.

The shortcomings of the delegate system were always pointed out and criticised. But, despite calls for its abolition, ^{this} was never carried out. The major criticism was that it was not democratic. Although who became a delegate was largely a matter of consensus it was dependent on privilege and power, rather than genuine elections.* This limited the number of people who actually became delegates. The delegates accumulated power over the members and in the higher echelons of the party. The only alternative solution found was the members themselves to carry out the function of the delegates. This also proved to be highly impractical since there were no correct records of membership. It was not known what could be taken as a criterion of membership (registration? paying fees?). And as soon as it was announced after the 1976 congress that the 1981 Elections would be held on the basis of membership, the delegates began to register their whole family, including their children and their dead fathers, ^{in order} not to lose their power base. But there was no increase in the real membership. So in practice, the membership system was almost the same as the delegate system.

The delegates were the activists and the core, the mobilizing force of the local RPP. They not only shaped the structure of the local organization, but also determined the different emphases of RPP ideology in different branches, and the different patterns of participation in different branches. In the following chapters, I will discuss how dif-

* Duverger argues that one of the means of concealing autocracy is through a delegate system. Duverger (1965).

ferent groups of delegates that have different social origins can shape the party branches to different ideologies and forms of participation.

CHAPTER 3

INTEGRATION OF A SMALL TOWN AND ITS PERIPHERY WITH
MARKET ECONOMY AND NATION STATE! KALELI

3.1 Kaleli County and Life in the Town of Kale

Kaleli* is an old settlement area in the Central Anatolian plateau within the boundaries of Kayseri province. In that area, there are prehistoric remnants from 2500 B.C. Modern records of Kaleli as a county began from 1902 when there is a mention of Kale (the town) and its quarters.

In 1902 Kaleli had a mixed population of Christians and Muslims. The county population in 1902 was 37,787, of these 13,560 were non-muslim. Of the population of Kale, the town, the christian and muslim groups were about equal in 1908, 7,418 muslims and 6,994 non-muslims. (Gürlek, 1975). During and after the war of independence the non muslims left Kaleli and the . Kale town especially suffered a major loss of population. The first census of the republic showed a 40% decrease in the population to 8,500 in 1927. During that period the county population did not undergo a similar loss, because rural non-muslims were not as significant.

In the early 20th Century, Kale was a relatively important centre for trade and crafts. Around that time the provincial centre Kayseri was not as dominant as it is now, and Kale, because of its nearness to the south ^{of Turkey} and the population of its hinterland was more important. After the republic, first with the ~~the~~ migration of the non-muslim population that controlled trade and the crafts, later with the loss of administrative control of some villages, it lost its importance.

* Kaleli is a pseudonym.

In 1954 and 1957 two of the villages of Kaleli became county centres themselves. This led to a loss of 29,000 people in the villages who were integrated into different counties, which also reduced its relative importance. Before 1957, the number of villages that were under Kaleli county was 98, by 1957 it had fallen to 49, and now it is 52.

However, being an important centre for years had its impact on the life of Kale. It had a municipality since 1866. In 1902, there were 73 primary schools, 1 secondary school, and 3 religion schools in Kaleli, and there were also Christian schools connected to the churches. In 1974, there were primary schools in all the villages, and 10,000 students and 310 teachers in all the schools of Kaleli. The modern secondary school was established in 1933, and was later followed by 3 other village secondary schools, one Lycee (1957), two technical Lycees and an imamhatip school for religious officials.

From 1935 the town of Kale has had electricity and running water since 1952. The nearest big city is 86 kms away and there are regular hourly bus services during the day. Kaleli's population in 1979 when I was doing my research was estimated to be 63,000, including Kale (20,000) and its 52 villages. (See Table 2).

Kaleli is an administrative unit, and in the central town there are representatives of all the governmental branches, including courts.

3.2 The Town - Kale

Within Kale municipality there were two separate areas. The one known as Yukari Kale is a different village, still considered to be

TABLE 2 Population in Kaleli

	Town	Villages	Total
1909	14,412	26,457	40,869
1927	8,506	41,568	51,074
1935	10,100	55,504	60,169
1940	10,885	54,518	65,403
1945	11,362	56,660	68,022
1950	11,127	59,739	70,866
1955	11,610	30,941	42,551
1960	12,923	38,826	49,749
1965	13,111	40,748	54,159
1970	15,553	41,478	57,031
1975	17,318	45,389	62,707

within the municipal boundaries but about 2 miles away. This was predominantly a small scale peasant area, similar to any village in the county. Therefore for the moment I will concentrate on the main town rather than the municipal unit.

The town is located at the cross-section of 3 main roads, which meet to form the town square. One of these roads was the highway from Kayseri, the other two lead to villages. The road to the largest village ran through the retail shopping centre in the town. The government offices and most of the schools were also around the newly built road. The central square was occupied by branches of various national banks. The differentiation between residential and non residential areas was vague. However, the rich natives of the town tend to reside nearer to the central square which was considered to be a better area. Poorer natives had 50 to 100 year old houses in gardens.* The newcomers to the town live on the outskirts of the town. For them there were two kinds of residences available. Richer migrants, such as workers from Germany or government employers appointed to Kaleli, lived in a newly built area, near the government offices. Poor migrants from the villages lived in squatter housing areas around the Hill of Ilibe.

Kale was the shopping centre of the area, nearly all the villagers of Kaleli and Yahyali went there to buy their retail shopping and usually to sell their products as well. In addition to the shopping area, where there were shops that sell almost every kind of consumer goods available in Turkish markets, there was also a weekly market on Tuesdays, where peasants came to sell their products. The peak season for trade was September, when the peasants had cash, and the busiest times

* The size of gardens depends on their wealth. Only the rich can afford to have a large garden for their own pleasure. Otherwise they are used either for agricultural activity, or as storage space for building contractors.

were Monday afternoons, when the peasants began to come from the villages, and Tuesday mornings during the market.

3.3 Town Economy and Class Structure in Kale

In Kale . . . *There are* . . . five major types of economic activity: small scale business including also a few wholesaling firms and manufacturing workshops, public and private services, small scale agricultural production mainly in the form of gardening, and wage labour. *A* large scale carpet producing factory was just founded in the outskirts of Kale when I began my field work. Since it was so new and not yet integrated into the town economy in any way I think it should be mentioned separately.

The natives of the town were generally better off. Every native household, irrespective of its wealth, had a plot of land and/or a vegetable garden and/or a vineyard and/or an orchard. The families either cultivated them themselves, or practiced share cropping. Some of them had cows and poultry, and the richer ones owned sheep as well. Farming of this kind provided some basic subsistence needs of the town people. Almost all of them owned their houses and paying rent was rare amongst the natives. In addition, most natives had accumulated some capital to invest in small business.

3.3.1 Business and Businessmen

There were 857 registered businessmen in Kaleli, 540 in services and 317 in small scale industry.* There might be a few more who were unregistered, but as unregistered businessmen cannot get credit at least one of the partners was always registered. To indicate the scale of business transactions, another figure might be significant: 750 businessmen

* Calculated on the bases of statistics provided by Kaleli Esnaf Kefaret Kooperatifi, and the Chamber of Commerce.

TABLE 3 Occupational Distribution of the Membership of the Chamber of
Commerce

Occupational Groups	No:
1. Cereal merchants	118
2. Wholesale and retail grocers	75
3. Fabric and ready made cloth sellers	62
4. Transportation and car dealers	55
5. Building and contracting agents	56
6. Livestock merchants	83
7. Timber and fuel dealers	40
Total	489

used credits in 1979, and had 110 m. T.L. in credits from 9 banks.*

- i) Trade: Kaleli was the centre of local trade, both in terms of wholesale purchases of grains and other peasant products and of retail trade for the needs of the population in the immediate vicinity. The 1968 village inventory studies show that 50 villages of Kaleli and 25 villages of other counties used Kale as their main shopping centre and this means it served as a trade centre to roughly 100,000 people. It had a well differentiated shopping centre, serving all possible needs of the peasants, from gold coins and bracelets to most consumer goods.

The market was very much oriented to the peasants' needs with cheap and low quality goods and consisting of items that would be needed by peasant households, such as bakraç (to carry milk), or plastic utensils which were very fashionable amongst the peasants. Such a market did not attract the educated or richer groups of the town, who prefer to buy in Kayseri creating a new consumption pattern of their own. Even the traders themselves would not use the utensils and goods in their own shops. They would also buy their consumer goods from Kayseri. The styles of consumption of the peasants and the educated town residents were incompatible with each other. The market for the goods required by the richer and more educated population was very limited and so no trader even tried to cater to them. For the upper sections of society shopping trips to Ankara or Kayseri were part of their monthly entertainment.

Shopping for the peasants was highly seasonal. During winter and spring shopping was oriented towards daily needs, mainly food. If

* Compiled from the data given by the banks and Chamber of Commerce.

there was an absolute necessity to buy something other than food, it was done on credit. The peak time for business was from mid-August to the end of October, when the peasants had readily available cash after the harvest, they pay their debts, buy new items that would be needed in agriculture or for the household in the coming winter, or for other events like weddings. Hire purchases were also available to the peasants, for buying durable consumer goods like fridges, T.Vs or sewing machines. Most of the merchants personally knew the peasants who had been customers for years.

Kale was also a centre for marketing agricultural products, 41% of all the merchants in Kale traded in agricultural products and/or livestock. However T.M.O. (the state office for buying grain and other products) bought most of the wheat (except semolina for pasta), rye and barley from the peasants. The semolina was bought by a nearby factory. Sugar was a state monopoly, sugar beets were bought by the Kayseri sugar factory. Therefore there was little dependence of the peasants on merchants for marketing the majority of their products. The merchants intervention in the grain trade was limited to cases where the market prices were over and above the state subsidized prices, a factor which led peasants to sell their products to merchants or when they became agents for pasta factories. Their main areas of merchandise were peas, potatoes, onions, fruits, especially apples, and some other products. They also traded in dairy products and wool.

Agricultural inputs were also sold by the town merchants, particularly the agricultural implements, spare parts, and manufactured animal food. Insecticides, fertilizers and other chemicals were distributed by the state according to the estimated needs of the peasants based on the area of land and the kind of crop they had but some peasants sold their

reserved rights to merchants if they did not need these inputs or could not afford them. Thus the merchants created a black market for inputs for people who need extra, or would not otherwise get them in time. The relations between merchants and peasants were highly personal in nature. They knew each other personally and they mutually helped each other. Merchants were guarantors in the banks for credit to the peasants, and in their hire purchases, while helping them in government offices. In return the peasants felt obliged to buy from their shops, or to sell their products in the merchants shops.

ii) Small Industry: The small industrial estate in Kale was also oriented towards the needs of the peasants. The shopkeepers in this area either repaired various items from household goods to tractors, or they manufactured simple objects. Some of the craftsmen did both, switching from one to another according to demand. In this sector, there were 317 registered self-employed craftsmen. Their workshops were concentrated in a specially reserved area. On Tuesday, the market day, the peasants bought some of these manufactured goods and left their goods that needed repair while they went to other parts of town for other things, and later came back to collect the repaired goods. The town artisans employed a few apprentices each. They were not usually graduates of a technical high school, but learned their craft through apprentice training themselves. Recently, graduates of the technical high school in Kale were also opening new workshops, competing with them. The artisans also had personal relations with their peasant customers. However, the relation was more dependent on the skills of craftsmen, and the prices of their services than on established credit relations as in the case of merchants.

iii) Transport: 11.2% of all the registered businessmen in Kaleli were

registered under the transport sector. Transport was also carried out by small scale entrepreneurs of various sizes in Kaleli. Owners of small capital, such as migrant workers that managed to save enough money to join a partnership, preferred to invest it in lorries, small buses, etc. There were credit facilities available, and in a few years they made modest profits. All season roads were available to almost all of the villages, and there was no other means of transport from Kaleli except by road. Transporting the marketable surplus of Kaleli peasants and transporting the peasants themselves to Kale every week and transporting the products from Kaleli to other places in Turkey, all proved to be good business especially when few partners who were all drivers could use their vehicles for 24 hours working in shifts. The number of registered transporters with the Kaleli Chamber of Commerce is 55 and their numbers would increase if the non-registered partners in the villages were included.

iv) Industry and Mining: Kaleli has iron ore mines very near to Kale, rented to private companies by the state usually on very long term contracts. It is surface iron which is very unproductive because of its degree of impurity and low quality. Until the early 1970's, big merchants in the town had obtained long term, cheap contracts and were extracting iron ore. They made good profits and accumulated considerable capital. But later the costs became so high, that they eventually closed all the mines.

After 1970 a very slight move towards industry in Kaleli could be observed. Some well to do merchants began to invest their capital in various factories nearby, and were trying to found a few in Kale itself. They sold shares to workers in Germany and bought substantial amounts themselves. In 1978, when I was in Kaleli, there were 3 factories still

under construction and one had recently opened.* The recently opened carpet factory was the nearest to the town, and a flour mill was still under construction. About 30 km. from the town there was a tannery which was also under construction, and about the same distance from the central town a big metal processing factory was being built. In all these factories some rich Kaleli people had some shares. But all this is very new and it is difficult to know whether these enterprises are going to operate successfully in view of the fact that the construction of the tannery had been going on for some ten years since 1967.

In summary, there was a lively business community in Kale oriented to the needs of the peasants, but also in search of other profitable areas. The big merchants of Kale were native townsmen. Even amongst the old migrants from the villages, successful and rich entrepreneurs were rare. The recent migrants, if they have capital (e.g. the workers from Germany) open either small workshops in the small industry sector (if they have skills), or open retail shops, especially for durable consumer goods. Wholesale trade required personal contacts

the migrants did not have.

3.3.2 Government Services and Officials

There were 14 State Departments in Kale, all highly differentiated in terms of their functions. They ranged from religion, agricultural production, schools, roads, the registration of births to courts. In short the major government functions were represented in Kale. The state was one of the major employers in Kaleli if both the army and seasonal employment (mainly construction) are included. The state employed two groups of people with different statuses; wage workers and salaried officials. In the section below, I will describe the salaried officials.

* In 1980 the flour mill and the metal processing factory had also recently opened.

In Kale itself 790 people were employed by the state as salaried officials. If Kaleli as a whole county was considered this would rise to over 1,000. Among the 790, 110 were university graduates. They constituted the upper echelons of the local bureaucracy. All the department heads were university graduates. These were in the major decision makers bodies. Under them worked Lycee graduate clerks without high qualifications. These clerks were usually natives of the town, they were low paid, and their jobs were not so prestigious.

All the heads of departments, and most of the bureaucrats that had decision taking powers were appointed from all over Turkey. By law they cannot be natives for the Government wants to secure the impartiality of the bureaucracy. Kaleli was one of the better places bureaucrats could be appointed to in Turkey. It was a medium sized town. There was electricity, tap water, educational facilities for children and medical services. It had all season roads and was near big cities as Kayseri and Ankara. Therefore, most bureaucrats were happy to be there and wanted to stay as long as possible. From the 1950's onwards, but increasingly after the 1970's, the impartiality of the bureaucracy had declined and this led to political appointments. (see chapter 6).

3.3.3 The Professionals

In Kaleli, there were a considerable number of university graduate self employed people in such areas as accountancy, law, agricultural engineering and various kinds of health services. The professionals formed a closed social group in the town. Except for one or two, they were all natives of the town. Nevertheless, they saw themselves as temporary residents in Kale. They had been to Ankara and Istanbul for their university education, and had to return for financial and family reasons. They made substantial amounts of money, so they frequently visited large cities, bought from expensive shops in Istanbul and

entertained themselves in places where most of their friends from university who live in the big cities could not. Still, they longed for their university years and life in the big cities. They thought they would migrate as soon as they could save enough money for this. On the other hand, they knew that they would not be able to make ends meet in the big cities, therefore most probably they were stuck there for the rest of their lives. Their immediate reactions to living in Kale had been to partially segregate themselves from the rest of the town. The reason they give is that, "the ordinary people of Kale are ignorant, parochial and uneducated". Of course in their case, this was never individualized because this would mean insulting their immediate family who were part of that culture. They were thus very reluctant to establish social relations outside the circle of professionals, educated government employees and their immediate family. The outcome was a closed social group with a "westernized" micro-culture of its own, their main frame of reference being big city life.

At the same time there was a totally contradictory life experience for the professionals. Their job was very much oriented to face-to-face activity with the peasants. The peasants were one of their important sources of income and the professionals were becoming indispensable to the peasants as the penetration of state activities, and the relations between town and village, increased. For example, lawyers have been gaining importance in the periphery of Turkey in the last three decades. The penetration of state legislature functions into the villages, the peasants frequent involvement with a non-rural environment intensified by migration, all increased the need of the peasants for legal advice at various times. Migration and intensified relations with the central state, have altered the traditional forms of dispute settlement and replaced them by courts. Increases in the number of court cases have been disproportionate to the increase in population, always exceeding

the latter.

It is not only in cases of dispute settlement, but in other areas as well, that the advice of lawyers was ~~sought~~. This was not always due to the complications of bureaucratic procedure, but because of the peasants being unused to the issue, i.e. buying real estate. Although town residents rarely go to lawyers for buying and selling real estates, peasants do, especially when they buy property in the town. Migration has affected village customs to the extent that, not only are marriages registered, but given *çeyiz*, (*trousseaux*) is also recorded in a notary (usually a list including items even not given as well as the girl's true personal belongings) so that in case of a divorce, the husband will be obliged to give all these items back. In the absence of village social control mechanisms as for instance in the case of the marriages with the workers in Germany, marriages are seen as highly vulnerable and the only kind of security for a girl is a large loan forced on the husband to be repayed in case of divorce. Such intricate and detailed contracts are done through the notary with the help of lawyers.

The services of other professionals were increasingly indispensable to the peasants. Agricultural engineers, doctors, pharmacists, dentists and other professionals lived in Kale, and they acted as intermediaries between the state and the peasants. Therefore their position was crucial for understand theing the town and county politics. However they were a small and limited number of people.

3.3.4 Agriculture and Farmers

As I mentioned earlier, almost all the natives in town had some form of agricultural income. For many this came from a yearly supply of fruits and vegetables, and was marginal to family income, either because it was very small in absolute terms, or because, as in the case of mer-

chants, their income was so high that the agricultural income constituted only a small proportion. But some were small scale farmers like the villagers. They had social relations, economic positions and political ideologies similar to those of the peasants, but of course there was the impact of town life upon them and their land holdings were much smaller. Despite this their incomes could be higher than their village counterparts. They practiced more diversified farming and had better facilities for intensive farming. Orchards and vineyards, which brought higher income per acre, were more frequent than rye or wheat fields. Living in town, these people had better access to services provided for the public, such as education, medical care etc., so they had better standards of living.

They were more aware of the opportunities available, like credits or high market prices for crops that last for short periods, simply because of their nearness to sources of information. Because of their higher level of education they were less dependent on "learned people" for advice. And their children tended to have Lycee education, or at least the equivalent, and aimed to work in the lower echelons of the bureaucracy.

3.3.5 The Wage Workers in Kale

In 1977-78, when I was doing my fieldwork. although there were new factories opening or being built, the industrial workforce was limited to those workers employed in the newly opened carpet factory and, except for those working for the municipality and the state, to those in the small industry quarter. But according to the 1979 figures, when the factories under construction are completed, there will be 9800 workers in Kaleli including uninsured seasonal workers, 3,100 of whom were working in 4 big factories. Only two of these 4 factories were in Kale, but 3 of them ^{may} recruit some of their workers from Kale who ^{will} commute to it

every day.

The carpet factory was the biggest in Kale but paradoxically, its management recruited their workers from outside. This was a matter of worker management relation; in fact, when the factory first started production its workers were mainly from Yukari Kale, but soon these tried to unionize and launched a strike. After some trouble, they were sacked and replaced from a village very far from Kaleli, in order to establish a more loyal workforce. This is one major reason why Kale and its politics remain almost totally unaffected by this large scale factory in addition to the fact that the carpet factory neither buys input goods from the local area nor markets its goods through Kale merchants.

The municipality employed 95 workers, while the State needed temporary seasonal workers especially in summer to work on various projects such as road building or in forests or other projects. For these there was a readily available unemployed workforce either living in squatter housing areas or poor peasants that do not have land in the villages.

The small workshops often employed apprentices, who were very badly paid, usually below the minimum wage. Usually the shopkeepers also keep young boys to fetch things for them but often these were family members.

Except for the seasonal workers the wage labourers lived in Kale, mostly in its squatter housing area. Kale did not attract much migration. In fact the relatively stable population shows that there must be some net outmigration (see table 2). But some people came to town from nearby villages usually moving to bigger cities later. These were landless peasants, or peasants who owned negligible land. They lived in the squatter housing areas, usually near the Ilibe hill. Housing conditions were much worse than in the squatter houses of big cities, because there were no municipal services, no electricity and no water. There were

very few employment opportunities, and being unskilled, they lived on seasonal work and wages from carpet weaving.

3.4 Kaleli Villages

This section discusses the economy and the social structure of Kaleli villages. Peasants constituted the major part of the county's population. About 4,500 people live in the 52 villages (72% of the county's population). Villagers mainly grew rye and wheat.*

76% of the arable land was dry and this means that fallow agriculture was 93.5% of total arable land. Rye was the main product. There has been attempts for cultivating Mexican wheat, but they were unsuccessful. Since the 1970's, with the increase in the usage of fertilizers and the introduction of irrigation facilities there was a move towards cultivating some vegetables, especially potatoes, beans and onions and there has also been a move towards multiple products. But these were still at the "trial phase". (Table 4A). There has also been a move towards intensive agriculture. For example, the number of tractors in Kaleli in 1963 was 37, in 1973 it was 261 and in 1978 it was 578. By 1979 almost all the land was tilled by tractors and cultivated by combined harvesters. In 1973, 8 villages had local irrigation systems, and in those areas other crops, especially sugar beets, gained in importance.** Since 1975 there has been state incentives for animal husbandry which led to an increase in the number of livestock in the area and beekeeping is also encouraged (Table 4B).

* All the figures for agriculture are compiled from A. Gürlek Memleketim (Kaleli), the Agriculture Office of the town, and Kayseri ili yilligi. Köy envanter etuleri, Kayseri.

** The number of villages that has irrigation water was 19 in 1981.

TABLE 4 Economic Activity in Kaleli Villages

(A) Agricultural Products 1973

	Hectares
Rye	37,500
Wheat	3,000
Barley	7,500
Mahlut	850
Corn	90
Bean	630
chick peas	2,000
lentil	220
Potatoes	550
Sugar beets	814
Sunflowers	170
Onions	500
Garlic	60
Melon	600
Fodder	1,000

TABLE 4

(B) Livestock in Kaleli

	Horses	Cows	Buffaloes	Sheep	Goats	Donkeys
1970	1,399	37,823	993	126,900	44,888	150,028
1973	1,021	35,529	1,010	123,102	42,680	16,279
1978	650	42,071	1,300	140,485	51,388	23,900

Source: Kayseri il yilligi

In almost all the villages, there was the possibility of earning non-agricultural income by weaving carpets. This traditional handicraft industry was highly commercialized, and this led it to penetrate more households and villages.

In the last 10 years the state has spent 23,587,000,000 Turkish liras in Kaleli county, . The number of villages that have electricity has risen from 1 in 1963 to 50 in 1978, those with primary schools . from 48 to 52.

there were no secondary schools in the villages in 1963, by 1978 there were eight. The number of village teachers has increased from 101 to 297. In 1963 40% of villages had all season roads, in 1978 all villages had such roads. The state has brought local modern irrigation systems to 18 villages and a major irrigation system that will cover the whole of Kaleli county was under construction. The number of village midwives increased from two to fifteen in 20 years, the number of village health officers in the area has increased from none to 17 between 1963 and 1978.

The number of cooperatives organized by the villagers has also increased, from five in 1963 to seven in 1973, and to twenty in 1978. This increase was primarily due to the fact that cooperative members have priority in going abroad as workers. As a result of migration to foreign countries, the standard of living has improved to some extent. In the villages with electricity, in almost every household there are T.V. sets or tape recorders, the total number of registered (in fact the majority are not) T.V. sets in the area is 6897, and there are 9640 radios.

The people of Kaleli take their ^{religion seriously}, there are mosques in all the villages. In a few villages there is an Alevi population, but the population is overwhelmingly Sunni. In these 52 villages there have been 40

voluntary organizations, all but one being religious associations, such as associations for building mosques.*

3.5 Social Stratification in Villages

To give a more complete picture of village life in Kaleli, I will look at the different sections of the the villagers; differentiating them according to incomes and status. The village community is not egalitarian, however the differences are not as marked as they are in the town.

In fact the economy of the villages is undergoing rapid change in which different households were affected very differently. Very roughly I distinguish four sections of peasants according to land tenure statistics. In doing this my aim is to be illustrative of one aspect of village stratification, which is relevant to party politics.

It should be emphasized that there was no large landownership in the area, either in a semi-feudal form or in the form of capitalist farms. The rich peasants in the area owned sufficient land to practice capital intensive agriculture for cash cropping, and had a marketable surplus. They mainly used family labour but had to hire temporary help. The middle peasants owned insufficient land for practicing capital intensive agriculture, but they could produce a marketable surplus. They had to subsidise the family budget with non-agricultural income usually by carpet weaving or wage work in the building industry. The third section consists of the poor peasants. They either did not have any land, or if they had it was so little that they could not even earn a subsistence income from it. Their livelihood was dependent on wages from agricultural or non-agricultural sources. From this group migra-

* Religious associations constitute 52% of all associations in the county including Kale Town.

tion to the cities was common. A fourth category was new in the Turkish rural scene. This was an "entrepreneurial group". Economic changes in the villages were partly due to improved technology and higher yields, but largely due to remittances of the migrant workers, both in Turkey and abroad. Some have used cash earnings to found small enterprises, doing various services in the villages, such as *building* contractors, bus owners, small shopkeepers and mill owners.

As the productivity of land varied as did the yields of different crops figuring out the differences in incomes is extremely difficult. But, dependence upon wages can be shown by pointing out that 54.4% of peasants had less than 25 dönüms* What is more, slightly more than half of these were landless. (See Table 5). About 39.5% of the peasant families owned anything between 25-100 dönüms of land. There were significant differences amongst them due to variations in the size of their land holdings, the fertility of soil, the availability of irrigation and the kind of crops raised. The middle peasants relied on income from agriculture but supplemented this with small earnings from carpet weaving and seasonal work.

Only 4.6% of the families owned between 100 and 200 dönüms of land and these families could earn their living from agriculture alone, which provided income for the whole family. If the family also earned a non-agricultural cash income, this was used to improve agriculture, e.g. to buy tractors or better seeds, or for non-routine expenses like weddings.

A limited number of peasants owned more than this amount (only 0.7% of total peasants, exactly 41 families). They practiced modern capitalist farming, sometimes extending their cultivation area by hiring land from migrants. They employed wage labour seasonally, and accumulated

* Dönüm: 1/10 of a hectare = 1 decare

TABLE 5 Size of Family Holdings and Land Distribution in Kaleli

Size of family holdings	Number of households	%	Area of land	%
0-10	1,325	23.5	7,928	3.9
11-25	1,769	31.4	15,356	15.4
26-50	1,190	21.1	44,359	21.6
51-75	729	12.9	45,011	21.9
76-100	313	5.5	27,661	13.5
101-200	274	4.9	13,927	18.0
201-	41	0.7	12,699	6.2

Source: Kayseri Village Inventory Study (1965)

enough capital in agriculture to invest in non-agricultural activities like building contracting, lorry and bus ownership or carpet trade. In fact only in the use of these 41 families can we talk about a class of large landowners however their share is negligible.

Hiring wage labour in agriculture was dependent on the type of crops raised as much as on landholding size. If the household size was not exceptionally large, some crops like sugar beet necessitated hiring non-family labourers even if the land was small. With such crops, small peasants had various kinds of labour exchange arrangements among themselves, whereas the rich peasants would only employ labour and not work for others.

Migration to the cities or Europe was common to all sections of the peasantry. However the reasons for migration were different for different people. The poor peasants could hardly have survived if some of their members, or a whole family, had not left the village to earn cash. The rich peasants migrate to earn extra cash to meet the expenses of weddings or financing investments. The younger members of such a family might have spent a few years in the bigger cities, either for the sake of gaining experience or for earning pocket money. Migration abroad was a different matter. Workers in Europe saved considerable amounts of money compared to what they would earn in Turkey. This enabled them to spend lavishly back home, with a totally new style of life known as "Almanci".* They bought securities and real estate and their new experience of urban life brought them prestige at home. This kind of migration attracted all sections of society, from professionals and teachers, to skilled workers and ordinary landless peasants.

Who, then, has prestige and power in the village? Traditionally,

* A worker in Europe, especially in Germany.

old age, piousness, honesty, education (especially religious education) and relative wealth would bring prestige and power in the village, and such factors are still important. With the change in the agricultural structure of Turkey, however, wealth became more and more important; it is not income in itself, but the possibilities that become available with money. With money not only could one buy education, go on the pilgrimage to Mecca, have a higher standard of living, afford to be generous to friends and neighbours, but one could also afford to make frequent trips outside the village to Kayseri and Ankara, thus be a link between the village and the outside world. Wealth also brought power and influential networks, (to be further discussed in chapter 4). Also these rich peasants could afford to keep a guest room to entertain villagers and visitors. They enjoyed prestige in their home villages. They would not do any wage work normally, but their younger sons would be encouraged to go to school to learn skills, and migrate outside the village to prevent the division of land. So despite the appearance of similar life styles, the village community is a differentiated one and this is reflected in politics.

3.6 Politics in Kaleli

3.6.1 Political Participation in Kale

Before the coup in 1980, all the political parties that existed in parliament were fully organized in Kaleli. Kaleli county and Kale town itself, had always been dominated by right wing parties. However, in the elections of 1973 and 1977, the Republican Peoples Party had increased its vote and the difference between the two big parties was only 8% in 1979. Two political parties that did very well in Kaleli were the Reliance Party and the National Action party. The Reliance Party was a small centrist party but for local reasons it ^{managed to} retain a voting base in Kaleli (The leader of the party was from Kayseri). The

National Action Party, a neofascist party, had been very active in the area, especially in the villages. It was claimed by members of the other parties that they had designated Kaleli as a pilot area. Although I have no systematic evidence on this, the appeal of the N.A.P. for the youth was very apparent. From 1978 to 1980, there was a great ^{and violent} political tension between the youth of the left and the fascists which in a few cases ended in homicide. One of the people killed was the RPP candidate for mayorship in the 1977 municipality elections.

Kale was a conservative town, and this was reflected in the political behaviour of all the social groups. Businessmen were organized in two associations, both founded under the tutelage of the state: ^{the} small businessmen credit cooperative and the Chamber of Commerce. Their main activity was credit allocation and in this created conflicts between the traders and small industrialists. However taken as a whole they acted as a pressure group, had overriding interests in the town economy and openly pushed them to their full extent. Their organizations acted on their behalf against banks, government and the municipality. They bargained with parties in terms of their relative weight in municipal councils. They were usually supporters of right wing parties, especially the J.P.

Business, big or small, largely tended to be outside of RPP politics. There were local and ideological reasons for this. Firstly, such a small town petty bourgeoisie had been the primary target of the RPP election programmes. The capitalists, the intermediaries between the peasants and the consumers, and merchants that were the representatives of big national firms, had been attacked fiercely in the party propaganda. Although, when in power the party had done nothing directly to damage their interests, nevertheless most of the town bourgeoisie had been repelled from the RPP. Secondly, RPP candidates in Kaleli, in all

elections had little chance of winning.

Thirdly, the Justice Party had been in power for a very long time. Credits, licences and all other state or municipal spoils had been distributed by the Justice Party, and in 1978 it seemed very likely that locally, it would stay in power. The businessmen tried to maintain good relations with the party in power. The local small business credit cooperative and the Chamber of Commerce were run by the local Justice Party to the extent that their executive committee was almost a replica of the Justice Party leadership in town. Even the only RPP member on the executive committee tried to maintain very intimate contact with the J.P. so that his personal interests would not be threatened. The Reliance Party was the second alternative, but it had little chance of getting in power except as partners in the coalition governments. Therefore its support was small.

Another organized pressure group was amongst the government employees. Government employees did not have the right to unionize in Turkey, so that they would not be able to engage in political action. Paradoxically, however, the most politicized groups were amongst the government employees. Teachers, especially and primary school teachers, were organized under two political organizations: TOB-DER, a left wing teachers association and Ulkü-Bir a fascist teachers union. In 1978, when I first went to Kaleli, TOB-DER had more members, but after one year the balance was changed. The importance of these two associations extended beyond representing teachers and their interests. Teachers were dispersed to every corner of rural society. They had the means to influence youth in relatively isolated areas where there was less distraction from other ideologies. When I was there in 1978, it was claimed by the local people, both in town and in the villages, that such a rapid and widespread growth in support of the National Action Party was mainly

because of the propaganda of the teachers.

Another politically active group were the Imams, and they were also very widespread in the villages. Traditionally the imams were respected in the villages. However they were considered as "one of us" by the villagers. The new imam school graduates claimed a very good knowledge of Islam, and with this advantage they carried out religious political, and ideological propaganda. They had been active supporters of the National Salvation Party (N.S.P.) and later some of the younger militant ones joined the National Action Party. But all of them supported the claims that all parties of the left were communist and blasphemous, and this included the RPP.

Eventually, with the help of the Imams, right wing teachers managed to get rid of all the non-RPP left in Sunni villages. The left was confined to Alevi villages in which no right wing elements could live. The government employees with higher offices had a more practical approach to politics. As Kale was one of the places that was preferred by such officials, and most of the appointments were political, they wanted to have good relations with the politicians and party officers in the town. Bureaucrats wanted to establish good personal and political contacts in the locality to avoid reappointment. This linkage was usually carried out by professionals with whom they have cultural similarities, both having been educated in big cities and oriented towards western lifestyles. These two groups mutually helped each other politically.

The state employees with higher status helped the professionals by giving information on state resources; this helps them both in their professional work and in their political ambitions by enabling them to practice political patronage.

Amongst the professionals the lawyers are the most important in

terms of their political ambitions.* Besides their knowledge of legal and political procedures, the lawyers have been the institutionalized intermediaries between the peasants and the outside world. Most of the lawyers were young (on average about 40 years old), and were educated in the universities in the early 1960's when left wing ideologies were popular. So most of them were involved in RPP politics.

The other professionals' services are also indispensable to the peasants. However, the agricultural engineers, although they had close relations with the peasants, they were not involved in politics. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, their individual personalities, and secondly their relations were very technical and only with a handful of peasants that could afford to employ them. The other peasants used state engineers for consulting and this was free of charge. Medical professionals, i.e. dentists and doctors, were employed by the government on a part-time basis. This prevented them from being directly involved with politics, although they had their preferences and campaigned for them.

The working class in Kale was also conservative. Their nearness to the village, usually about half an hour by bus, kept them still under the villages social control. Moreover, they were very recent migrants; even the early comers had not been in the town for more than 10 years, and these were the lucky ones that had found proper jobs. Those who could not find jobs emigrated to the cities.

What is more this was an unorganized working class. In some cases attempts to unionize were initiated by some young intellectuals but later the employers prevented this. The few existing unions were all

* Tan argues that the lawyers have been increasingly involved in politics. (M. Tan, 1972, Meslek olarak Hukuk ve Siyasette Hukukçu) TODAIE yay, Ankara.

initiated and controlled by the employers. They took no political action and limited their activities solely to collective bargaining.

Such a working class was not very different in terms of their political participation than the peasants in the villages. For example, in the 1977 elections the RPP was the only one that supported such working class interests as collective bargaining, welfare services, increasing job opportunities, etc. The casual workforce in Kale had very poor living conditions so one might expect support for the left. But on the contrary unorganized first generation migrants, the casually employed workforce under the influence of village life, was also conservative. Thus they voted for the Justice Party and in some cases voted for the National Action or National Salvation parties.

From the account above, it may sound to the reader that there were crystalized and clear cut social classes with strongly conflicting interests. Even though, there may be different opinions and opposing interests in the town, there was no clear cut class antagonisms. This was mainly due to the conservative nature of the working class. If we set aside the state officials who were transients, the upper classes in Kale were formed by the merchants and the professionals, i.e. the traditional eşraf (town notables) and their educated children. So whatever their cultural differences they were members of the same family. This was a native group. The newcomers to the town were a new phenomena in Kale, whereas out migration, including upper class migration, had always been common. There were cultural and economic discrepancies between the newcomers and the old residents. In such a social mileau, the notables constantly longed for the "good old days" when the town was not invaded by "dirty peasants" and old Kale folk were all present.

Of course, economically, this upper class had benefitted most from the migration, out-migrating notables left positions available for them

and migrants opened new markets. Even the old migrants who had accumulated money have been only marginally integrated into this upper class. Women especially were more antagonistic towards the newcomers and more conservative about keeping their class identity. The men who were in continuous contact with the newcomers accepted the fact that this phenomena was irreversible, and it was also good for business. But migrant men, especially those in business, were conscious that natives were economically a more advantaged group in the town, and they tried to perpetuate this by all means, including the political^{positions} ^{that}. This made them hostile to the natives. In Kale, as there was no working class opposition, such minor factional disputes became important in the articulation of local politics.

Workers had their traditional reasons for voting for one party or another, and perhaps saw no reason to change. It was very likely that as they became ^{more settled in town}, they might revise their political attitudes. In fact, I had been told that there were some signs of a movement towards the left among them, but it was very difficult to prove. In fact in the 1977 elections in the squatter housing areas there had been an increase in the RPP vote.

The RPP stronghold was among workers from Germany. These come home every year to visit their families. Their experience of Germany makes them eager to change institutions at home and at the same time more aware of and open to new ideas. Many of these, and some of the permanently returned to Kale support the RPP and influence others to do likewise.

In Yukari Kale, the upper part of town, there was traditionally strong support for the Justice Party. The reasons were not different than any other village in the area. In fact, the percentage of National Action Party and National Salvation Party votes in this quarter was

higher than the town average. Another reason was that the then mayor of the town, who was leading Justice Party figure, had good patronage relations with this quarter.

However, in Kale traditional reasons for voting to one party rather than other also prevailed. Many voters were affected by kinship, patronage, neighbourhood loyalties and honour questions regarding the change of party support. Therefore voting was not always ^{normally} and necessarily based on class interests.

3.6.2 Politics in Kaleli Villages

Kaleli villagers were conservative and religious, and this is reflected in their voting behaviour. Since the foundation of the Democratic Party in 1946, Kaleli has been a right-wing stronghold (see Table 6). In 1965, the Justice Party still had more than half of the rural votes (52.35%). Since then the Justice Party has lost ground, not to the left but to more extreme right wing parties. The 1969 victory of the Reliance party had local reasons. It showed the desire for party directed patronage rather than an ideological choice, because the leader of the party was from that province and the expectation was that he would bring services to Kayseri towns. The National Salvation Party and increasingly the neo-fascist National Action Party had ready support from rural Kaleli. The N.S.P. in 1973 won 20.69% of rural votes, which were higher than the RPP votes. In 1977, as a reaction to this, there was a move in the RPP to create an Islamic identity (see section 4.7). The N.A.P. also began to gain support with its thesis of an "Islamic-Turkish synthesis" in which they created an Islamic identity alongside nationalism.

TABLE 6 Voting Behaviour in Kaleli (%)

	Years	J.P.	R.P.P.	R.P.	N.S.P.	N.A.P.
	1965	53.35	38.11	-	-	1.35 (CKMP) *
4a Total	1969	44.33	20.80	28.13	-	2.56
	1973	28.41	23.19	14.10	20.17	7.18
	1977	34.66	26.47	13.53	10.05	13.24
	1965	56.18	46.89	-	-	1.56 (CKMP) *
4b Town	1969	46.17	23.58	22.22	-	4.81
	1973	31.65	30.34	6.64	19.48	7.76
	1977	36.77	30.37	6.82	14.21	11.32
	1965	52.35	35.09	-	-	1.29 (CKMP) *
4c Rural	1969	43.74	19.65	30.14	-	1.18
	1973	26.99	20.45	16.96	20.69	6.96
	1977	33.70	24.68	16.61	8.15	14.11

* CKMP was the previous name of the N.A.P.

Who were the people in the villages that were involved in politics as activists? As a beginning let us review what was expected of party activists in a village. The formal requirement was that the members would have to be present at the annual congress of the party branch, in election primaries, and visit the party branch occasionally. The primary job of an activist in any party was to raise votes. This means he had to maintain close contact with the public, with neighbours, relatives and friends. Being the representative of the party in the village or in the quarter he had to defend the party in long hours of arguments in the coffee shops and guest rooms, and had to help voters with their problems in town. All these activities were very time consuming, so they necessitated time free from productive activity.

Secondly, political activists had to be readily available, and permanently resident in the locality. The seasonal migrant worker had 6 months free time in winter, but as he was absent the other half of the year, when there would be congresses, propaganda and elections, he would not be useful to the party.

Thirdly, although ^{even} the activists did not pay their dues, which were as low as 12 TL. per year, they had to spend money for the party. These small expenses such as buying tea for friends, travel expenses to the town and Ankara, being hospitable to party officials when they came to the villages, offering them meals, etc., added up to large sums of money, considering the budget of a small peasant.

In summary, politics consumes time and money. And the above three conditions made the migrants and peasants without substantial incomes stay out of active politics. Political parties also helped this process by choosing the influential, the respected and the rich of the village as their representatives. Associating the party's name with a person not respected was not helpful to the party. Therefore political parties

selected among the volunteers. In this sense politics was not that voluntary.

Quite paradoxically, even in the RPP, which claims to have left wing ideals, the people that volunteered to be active in politics were a group of "rich and powerful villagers". Being actively involved in politics enabled them to acquire the resources distributed by the state. The state intervened in agriculture, the majority of agricultural inputs were subsidised and distributed in Turkey by the state. Credit, providing improved seeds, fertilizers, some agricultural implements such as tractors, as well as other aids to farmers such as infrastructure, the marketing of the crops, and buying crops above market rates were all provided by the state. State intervention varied with the kind of crop, for example, whereas sugar beet was totally controlled by the state in terms of the acreage and quality of land to be cultivated, the times of hoeing, ^{with} some crops like wheat, ^{relation with state was} simply an option open to the peasant. As state resources in Turkey were scarce and what was more, the bureaucracy was inefficient in resource allocation there were further delays, and the peasants were trying to influence the local state apparatus to overcome this barrier in various ways. The best areas for such an activity were the political parties. When the party was in power the officers of the state had to obey its orders, otherwise they were afraid of being appointed to "undesirable places".

However, changing parties was difficult because of intra-village rivalries and this was a matter of honour. Since 1946 when the 2 party system was introduced, families have been divided between parties according to village rivalries, and had stayed loyal for years. The families, lineages and lineage alliances act together in the choice of the party. Party differences were reflected in quarrels, feuds and various other non-political activities. Changing the party would mean

changing the alliance, and if this involved siding with enemy groups it would be an insult to the honour of the family. As changing to the other side was difficult, those dissatisfied with the party stayed in, resulting in various factions and later in splits. Complaints about one's own party were very common. A statement such as, "The other parties help their members, we are at each others throats, we do not help each other", might mean, "I want to leave this party, but I cannot face the ridicule."

In the unstable political atmosphere of the 1970's when the small parties had chances of getting into coalitions and therefore being influential in the state, they found a readily available membership base in the villages amongst these dissatisfied members of the old parties. What is more, in terms of distributing resources to their members, they had been more active as their primary target was to increase votes. Supporters of these parties in the local bureaucracy, knowing the importance of patronage, were militant and efficient. In any case, in terms of their peasant policies, there was no great difference between the parties (Payaslioglu 1973). Therefore shifting between them was not an ideological embarrassment. Still, the peasants have preferred to change to parties with similar ideologies rather than to totally different ones. For example, RPP members preferred the RP, whereas J.P. members preferred to join the National Action Party or the National Salvation Party. Membership of two parties was also common. This was both a matter of securing oneself against an election defeat, and of the embarrassment caused by the act of resignation and facing the old party leaders in town. Their number should not be exaggerated, but I did come across ^{or} a few muhtars who were members of both the RPP and the Reliance Party.

Previously, village notables did not seek elected positions. They

would rather have their men acting on their behalf. Outsiders to the village quite wrongly thought that the village leader was the muhtar. However as contact with the outside world increased, the position of the muhtar became important, especially in the link between peasants and the government. State intervention in the village life, from various subsidies on agriculture to the basic needs of the village, made the muhtars aware of the importance of their position, and they began to accumulate political power. The political parties approached them with promises of party directed patronage in return for votes. If they were in a party they approached the government, as a member of the party in power, to do various services to their villages. The coalitions and unstable governments of the 1970's made it difficult for members of one party to get a continuous supply of services to the village, as any one party could not stay in power for long. I was told by some muhtars, whose aim was primarily to get services to the village, that they claimed not to belong to any party and bargained the votes of the village to the party that was willing to do the most. Apart from political tricks small gifts to the bureaucracy also helped in getting services to the villages.

Corporate political action in Kaleli villages was rare. Except for one incident in the 1977 elections, when a village managed to have a high abstention rate as a protest, I could not record any. It was either the differences of interests between various classes in the villages, or the lineage rivalries prevented corporate actions. The single incident of abstaining from elections occurred because although the peasants repeatedly asked for electricity and drinking water from the authorities, their demands were not met.

The political tendencies of independent peasants in history is widely discussed in the literature (Wolf, 1973, Barrington Moore,

1969). Very briefly, the following reasons have been given to explain non-existence of corporate action: peasants are rivals with each other for the immediate necessities of life; the production process is individualistic and reduces the potential for collective action; the nature of the peasant economy itself makes political activity difficult for ordinary peasants because the loss of labour time in agriculture is difficult to make up, the security of being able to retreat to subsistence agriculture makes peasants conservative and apolitical; extended kinship ties make the formation of class relations difficult, the peasants maintain close contact with kin that have been socially mobile, and this has negative repercussions on the formation of their class consciousness.

The peasants of Kaleli were interested in politics. Although voting is not compulsory, the average participation rate in the elections was as high as 80%. Villagers of Kaleli knew that through politics they could achieve things for themselves, for their families and villages. Especially some groups in the villages seemed to be very active in politics such as the party representatives and the delegates. In the following chapter I will discuss, who were the representatives of the RPP in Kaleli villages? What were their social backgrounds? why were they in the party politics? and what were the relations of village delegates to town politicians?

CHAPTER 4

FROM PATRONAGE TO BROKERAGE: REPUBLICAN PEOPLES PARTY IN KALELI

4.1 The History of the Republican Peoples Party in Kaleli

The history of the establishment of the party in Kaleli begins in 1919, when Atatürk sent orders from the Sivas congress to organize a branch of the society to Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli in Kale so that they could help in the war of independence. Despite resistance from the rest of the population, which was loyal to the Sultan, the association was organized with 18 members who were all notables of the county (M. Özdemir 1973). In 1920 they sent a representative to the first parliament, and they were also involved in the war.

With the foundation of the Republic the association transformed itself into a branch of the Republican Peoples Party. Despite some factional disputes in the local branch at that time integration into the party was not difficult. However the local branch did not have much effect on the central party organization until the 1930's. This was due to the organization of the party ^{in Ankara} and its attitude to the periphery. So until the 1930's we see neither influential politicians nor members of parliament in Kaleli.

Kaleli notables, as with some other town notables of the period had "multezim" * origins and were relatively rich. This gave them a kind of connection with the peasants that I will analyze below. Some of the notables were educated in Istanbul to modern professions. Therefore Atatürk's westernizing reforms had little negative effect on notables of Kaleli.*

* The Multezim was a specific kind of tax collector in the Ottoman empire. The multezim guaranteed a certain amount of tax from an area and collected the taxes from the peasant himself.

* This may be due to close contact with the Christian population.

Kaleli itself had been Christian influence. Half of the population were Greek and Armenian, though these later migrated to the West. The Muslim population was religious, but was under the influence of the local Istanbul educated elite. In the town itself there was no opposition to Kemalism, though it never infiltrated fully into the villages. (Stirling, 1965). The party's central organizations did not have any programme for integrating the peasants into a western society, nor did the local elite attempt such an impossible task.

Who then were the party activists in the villages? In most of the villages there were no members and there was no need for a representative system. The party list was drawn up in Ankara and the candidates were appointed by Atatürk himself, although local forces were always considered carefully. In the very rare cases where villages had delegates, the delegates were very influential peasants with large land-holdings. For example, amongst the 18 founders of the society in Kaleli, there was a villager, whose descendents were still in the RPP in 1979.

The first leadership of the local party had their political power delegated to them from above and their political relations with the peasants were minimal. They had a patron-client relation with the peasant, dependent upon economic bondage and protective support.

Kaleli notables were representative of the party and state in the area and were almost semi-autonomous. They were the representatives of the centre in the periphery and were responsible for the penetration of the modern Turkish state into the periphery.** As none of them were alive in 1979, I could collect no first-hand information, but from their

** Such a role is typical of the town notables in the periphery (Mardin, Avcioğlu).

children and friends, and from secondary sources, I could determine that they had direct relations with the peasants.

Even after the mültezim system was abolished, they still owned large areas of land in the villages, which were sharecropped by the peasants. These peasants also accepted their political authority. The peasants owed the notables loyalty in return for the right to use their land, while the notables were also expected to be hospitable and generous to them when they were in need. However, establishing one-to-one relations of loyalty and patronage was not necessary because the electoral system did not require the direct participation of the peasants, and they did not even have effective votes. All the notables were members of the electoral college and the peasants did not voice any objection to this. Therefore creating the image in the town of being a notable was more important than establishing good relations with the peasants. The fundamental link was with the state, and thus with its representatives in the locality. So they entertained the local bureaucracy and helped them with their problems in the town and the area. Creating the image of a town notable, therefore, depended upon being generous to both the bureaucracy and the peasants. The aim of political activity was to gain recognition from central authority, as all the positions of power were distributed from above. With the help of the central party organization, Kaleli notables became mayors, members of the municipal council, and members of the privy council in the province.

From 1930 onwards, with the move initiated by the central party organization to establish a party in the modern sense, with a formal organization and membership, the local notables began to gain more power. The first anti-centre reaction came after 1935 when the Kaleli organization refused to accept the candidates nominated for Kayseri province and wanted to have a representative of their own. However, it was

not until 1939 that an RPP member could enter parliament as an independent.* This demonstrates that, although locally the notables were very influential, this was not enough for them to get a seat on the RPP list.

Kaleli was one of the first places that opened a women's organization when civil rights were given to women in 1934. The local notables, to prove that they were in agreement with Kemalism's westernizing principles, immediately made their sisters, daughters and wives form a local RPP women's organization. In fact this organization was especially active amongst village women, introducing them the Kemalist image of women. They carried on such activity until 1950, when the party was defeated. After that it was not until 1977 that women in the party became active again.

Until 1950 the RPP was dominant in Kaleli, not because it was accepted by the large majority of the population but because it was the state party. In terms of understanding the structure of party two important events took place in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The local notables that were so influential left either the party or Kale itself, and the party did not gain much support from the recently integrated peasants.

Most of the local notables left the area. By that time Kale was losing its importance as an urban centre and these people had westernized ambitions (some had already gone into business before leaving Kale (Başer, 1945)). They wanted to have their children educated and have comfortable lives. They had the financial means to obtain these so they left the area for the bigger cities. Some of the notables joined the Democratic Party. What is more, due to reasons I have already described (see section 2.3.2.), the peasants, that now had full voting rights,

* Kayseri İli Yilligi, 1973.

overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party. The minority that supported the RPP had no hope of being represented in parliament or on other councils because there was a simple majority electoral system.

During the period of Democratic Party rule, Kaleli lost administrative control of 46 villages which meant that it lost importance in terms of provincial politics as well. In Kaleli after 1950 the RPP have always been the second, and in some cases the third, party. Except for the 1955 elections, it has never won the municipal elections in Kale either.

The real political participation of the peasants was introduced to Turkey by the Democratic Party. But by the time such an expansion of political participation came the RPP had lost power and the local party had disintegrated. With the introduction of the new party a few of the notables had joined the new force and the election defeat had produced a sense of despair in the party leadership. Later, the old cadre began to look for new opportunities and most of them migrated from Kale, leaving the party branch almost leaderless.

In time a new group, that had begun to accumulate some capital and status, seized the opportunity to rebuild the party. The most important role was played in such a revival by the Aksoy family. Cemal Aksoy himself re-founded the party carrying out a lot of work and fighting for the party cause. In many ways this was not an easy task as the Republican Peoples Party had lost all of its popular support. The difficulties endured by the peasants during the war years were seen as the outcome of wrong RPP policies. Although the D.P. was using repressive measures against the supporters of the opposition, Cemal Aksoy fought and, almost alone, reestablished the local branch of the party.

The Democratic Party had not only enabled peasants to participate in politics (Stirling, 1965; Kolars, 1976), but had also introduced

patronage into politics (Sayari, 1975). Stirling describes the 1950 elections in a former Kaleli village, as peasants being considered in politics for the first time in years. This was alien to the RPP politics for two reasons. Firstly, until 1946 peasants had not voted in direct elections and so their opinions were not important in determining party policy. Secondly, until the 1954 elections the party had not conducted election primaries (see Chapter 2, Section 3.2). Until 1954 even the local notables could not elect the candidates for the general elections. In that sense even their influence was limited. The years from 1950 to 1955 were years of chaos in the RPP. The shock of defeat came at the same time as the desertion of the party leaders. Unfortunately, in the countryside there was no recording of election results. But in 1950 the Democrats won 66.9% of the vote in Kayseri province. We do not have any information on what proportion of these were rural votes, but, considering that the rural support of the D.P. was considerable (Stirling, 1965; Szyliowich, 1962), we can assume that a similar thing happened in the villages of Kaleli as in the towns. The RPP suddenly found that either they had lost their support in the villages or they had not had any support despite ^{the} silent deference peasants showed during the 27 years of the republic. However, this does not mean that the RPP was left without any support at all. Because of personal loyalties to the party, because of a belief in the leaders of the war of independence, because of village rivalries or personal interests, in every village a group remained that supported the party. But they were also disappointed by the electoral defeat and they could not find any party representatives or leaders in the town.

It was Cemal Aksoy, and his few friends, that took advantage of this situation. In the central organization of the party in 1951 there was a localistic trend (see section 3.3.3.) which corresponded to the demands of the peasants. They demanded protection against the state and

solidarity amongst party members. Until 1950, the leadership of the party had acted as agents of the state. In that sense too people like Cemal Aksoy were lucky. They were young, and they came from humbler origins and not very educated, but they were ambitious entrepreneurs. The best way of making money then was by trade, and in Kaleli trade was conducted with the peasants. Cemal Aksoy and some of his friends, a very small group of people, tried to imitate the tactics used by the Democratic Party in its approach to the peasants. They established patronage relations in support of the RPP. This in fact combined very well with their business interests (see section 4.2.1.). They traded in merchandise that was needed or sold by the peasants such as cereals. Money lending or providing credit was common, as was advance payments for next seasons harvest. Kaleli peasants did not have much marketable products in the 1950's (Stirling, 1965). However, to buy some of their necessities from the market, such as clothing, salt and gasoline, they sold some of their products to the town merchants; in fact this was their only link with the market economy. State purchases of products were limited and besides the state did not make advance payments, or open credits. So most of the peasants' relations with the market were through the town merchants. From information I have received from living members of that caucus, I understand that each one of them established good relations with peasants who were party members based on business and political loyalty. As they (usually) put it: "They used to come to us for everything they needed in town, every problem. We helped them: by opening credits, giving loans, solving their problems. We expected nothing in return. These were all for the party."

But they definitely wanted political loyalty, especially in the local party organization. They developed such permanent, loyal relations with the peasants that in the local party congresses, and in election primaries, they could predict the result before the elections. Even in

1979 they could say how many delegates they had in every single congress or election primary. In these patronage relations reciprocity was not calculated on a one-to-one basis as it was mixed up with business relations. Political loyalty was essential. But how much credit corresponded to how many votes, or how many elections, was not clear. The peasant delegate was always indebted; he voted as Cemal Aksoy wanted but at the same time neither he himself nor Cemal Aksoy or any member of the caucus thought that he actually paid his debt with his vote. The "patron" was generous, kind and good and the peasant owed him loyalty all the time.

The RPP leadership in Kaleli was not able to mobilize a great deal of state resources for the benefit of their own supporters because they were not in power. But the leadership caucus had good relations with the local bureaucracy which compensated, though in only a very limited way, for not being in power. In the 1950's the relation of peasants to the state was still limited (see section 2.3.4.) and so this was not much of a problem.

In 1954 and 1957, Democratic Party votes decreased sharply to 61% and 48% respectively in Kayseri. In fact in the 1955 local elections the RPP candidate was elected mayor, but was removed from office after 7 months. Such an increase in support was aided by an imitation of D.P. patronage relations and, in turn this in itself strengthened the patron-client ties. The bureaucracy, being sensitive to political changes in the country, reverted to its RPP origins. People like Cemal Aksoy benefited a great deal in this period. They dominated the local party as the votes of the delegates were important in the election primaries, whom they controlled through patronage. The parliamentary election candidates and the central party organization had to recognize their power. Therefore in terms of obtaining credits from banks or privileges such as licences, and in terms of being agents of larger

firms, such patronage relations were profitable.

In a situation where all the town merchants were leaving the party to join the D.P., they became indispensable. Therefore members of parliament and party leaders used all possible means to keep them contented.

The RPP did not come to power until 1961. Even then it was not the biggest party in Kaleli. Until 1969 the old caucus of patrons could remain in power almost unchallenged in the Kaleli RPP branch. From 1969 onwards, however, the left of centre movement began to change the structure of the RPP in Kaleli. The leftists were young professionals whose political aims articulated well with the changing demands of the peasant delegates. Increasingly after the 1970's they dominated the local party branch, although they did not totally control it.

4.2 The Republican Peoples Party in Kaleli

The RPP in Kaleli had 1000 members* and 200 delegates.* The party had a leader, and 9 members on the local executive committee including 2 auxiliary organization representatives.

Village delegates constituted three-quarters of the total delegates, so in terms of numbers the town delegates were not very important, but there was at least one delegate from every quarter and former party leaders and mayors were delegates for life. There were also members of municipal councils and local executive committee. Therefore, when people spoke of delegates, they meant village delegates, and the townspeople were considered as leaders of varying power. To some extent

* An estimated number. There are no real members except the delegates and the old delegates. But when it was announced by the central party organization that all members would vote in the 1981 election primaries the local leaders registered all their families in the party, which included the dead and young babies.

** The number of delegates can vary to a small extent because it is dependent on the number of votes RPP gets.

most of the people in town were directly in competition for power and positions. There were various positions and levels of power available in the local RPP structure, the formal positions were (1) being nominated as a candidate for parliament, (2) being elected to the provincial executive committee in Kayseri, (3) the local party leader, (4) being nominated for the provincial privy council of the governor, and (5) being elected as a delegate to the Provincial Congress. All of the above require some form of election with the participation of the delegates. There was also an informal power structure in which some people without official positions in the party were known to have a lot of support from delegates. With these bargaining powers they could influence the formal leaders, and they were considered as "the men behind the throne" or "the real representatives of the RPP."

No matter whether formal or informal, all the positions had to be earned by developing good relations with the delegates and earning their personal confidence. This had only been possible with patronage. There were three groups that were involved in RPP politics in Kaleli and they had their different approaches to politics and used different types of vertical relations.

4.2.1 Remnants of the Old Patronage Relations that Existed Before 1969

This model was epitomized by a group of well to do merchants that did not want to have direct political power, such as any formal positions on the party executive. If forced they preferred secondary positions because primary formal positions, such as that of a local branch leader, were almost a full time job, which meant a loss of time from their business. Moreover, they did not want to commit themselves to the party policy to any great extent. Because their immediate interest was to be friendly with the opposing forces, they wanted to criticise party policies, and change their party allegiance. They were not committed to

the party ideologically, in fact they ^{subtly} opposed the whole philosophy of social democracy. They had been in the party before the emergence of the left of centre movement and even, most of them, before 1950. In 1972, when social democracy was adopted, they went through a difficult stage but could not leave the party because they were known to have been members of the party. When they wanted to change their party the positions available in the other major parties were filled. So instead they stayed in, to use the RPP for their own interests and to bargain, using their influential position in the RPP, with the other parties. They had established patron-client relations with village delegates since 1950 and they counted on this loyalty for preserving their power positions in the party. But as the village delegates became more powerful in the party they began to demand more resources than the merchants could distribute, and the merchants began to lose their importance. In 1978-79 they were still influential, but their power was declining to the advantage of different kinds of patron/brokers.

4.2.2 The Newly Emerging Brokers

This group ^{in the RPP} was composed of young, ideologically committed professionals. They considered having relations with any other party immoral, even having a relative that was a member of a rival party was an embarrassment. They competed for leading formal positions, such as membership of parliament, the local leadership or mayorship. The time and money they spent on politics was an investment in this competition that would bring power and prestige. Eventually they might earn some money if politics combined with their professions, but primarily they were professional politicians.

They did not, unlike their predecessors, distribute their own resources in return for political loyalty. They built their patron-client relations on the knowledge and information ^{to which} they had access .

because of their social position in town. The system worked through providing brokerage in the allocation of state resources. State investment in Kaleli in the last 20 years has been considerable

As the state's penetration of the rural society increased, these new brokers became dominant in RPP politics, especially after the 1970's. Their dominant position was closely reflected in the increasing power of the village delegates and the silent acceptance of the social democratic ideology.

The village delegates were aware of their increasing importance in the election primaries and local congresses and therefore they saw the "favours" granted them by the brokers as almost their right. Hence we can see that brokers were replaceable, and the only limit to this were their small numbers. Therefore there was much more calculation of reciprocity, and loyalties were weaker.

4.2.3 The Middlemen

The middlemen were more ambitious in their attitudes to politics. Politics was a means to more income or power to only a very minor degree. They neither competed for top political offices, like mayors, M.P.s or local leaders, nor had the business resources to gain from political access to massive credits. The best they could do was to get onto the municipal council and get a regular salary, obtain a licence or solve a disputed land problem. They were ambitious neither in politics nor in business. They were not powerful enough in local politics to be ambitious. Instead, they aligned interchangeably with various factions, playing a middleman role with the votes of a very small number of delegates whom they influenced. They had no ideological commitment to the party, but no serious opposition to it either. Though they had been in the party a long time they were not particularly loyal to it.

4.3.1 Case A: The Aksoy Family

Aksoys were a large and respectable family in Kale. They had four sons, one of whom died in 1972. The family was known to be one of the richest in the area, whose wealth was accumulated by the 65 year old enterprising father during his lifetime. In addition to a few orchards and vineyards here and there, they ran two petrol stations, an iron mine, a few petrol tankers, and act as the representatives of large industrial companies selling tractors, tyres and spare parts. As stockholders they invested considerable amounts in ^{the} large carpet factory, ^{the} flour mill and the recently founded giant zinc processing plant.

The father, Cemal Aksoy, has been active in town politics for nearly forty years, which made their family name synonymous with the local Republican Peoples Party branch. Except for a brief period of major crisis in the central party organization (1969-1972), when their second eldest son Hasan Aksoy became the local RPP leader, they have never competed for primary positions such as mayorship, leadership of party branch or membership of parliament. However, they maintained secondary posts as members of municipal council and as members of local party committees. For example, one of the politically active and business minded sons, Ali Aksoy, a recent university graduate, was elected to the municipal council in 1977.

During the late 1930's, Cemal Aksoy started his political career as a young militant organising the party in the villages. Some of his early acquaintances became his major supporters whenever he attempted to extend his influence in the party. Cemal Aksoy's progress in politics went hand in hand with his success in business where political and economic success indisputably reinforced each other. During the 1950's he combined trade in agricultural products with moneylending to peasants. His relations with the peasants gained a new momentum with

the increasing use of tractors in Kaleli villages. In other words, Cemal Aksoy established two way relations with the peasants, as the marketeer of their agricultural products and as a supplier of modern agricultural inputs.

No doubt, such intricate business relations with villagers could be readily mobilized in politics. Indeed until the 1970's his authority in the local party branch was unrivalled by any person or opposition factions. On the one hand, he enjoyed great freedom in playing the candidates off against each other, choosing members of local committees as he wished and deciding on the content of party propaganda. On the other hand, he had the final word in distributing various party resources. However it should be remembered that the family's ability for distributing party and government resources was limited due to the fact that the RPP was not in power for almost three quarters of this period.

By the late 1960's he had two grown up sons who could help him in business and politics. In 1969 Hasan Aksoy graduated from university and returned to Kale. During his university education Hasan had been influenced by the social democratic movement which was gaining strength in the RPP. In the absence of an urban proletariat in Kaleli, Hasan's populist sentiments found expression in making the peasants the main issue of local politics. During his leadership the village delegates' increasing power tended to threaten the traditional influence of the town merchants. The declining influence of the merchants was partly due to increasing state intervention in agriculture through the extension of agricultural credits, regulation of prices for agricultural product and direct sales of some inputs to peasants.

In other words, another aspect of the increasing power of village delegates was a new relation of alliance between professionals and peasants in which paradoxically a member of the Aksoy family played a

leading role. Until his death in 1972, Hasan was known as a man of the peasants. Yet the direct participation of peasants in RPP politics soon aroused the hostility not only of the town merchants in general but of Hasan's father as well. Apparently Cemal was disturbed by the new ideology that regarded merchants as parasitic intermediaries, an accusation which originated from the new social democratic faction in the party centre in Ankara and was mediated into town politics through his son. This led to family quarrels, especially in the form of worsening relations between Hasan and his step mother and step brothers, such as young Ali.

Nevertheless, against his father's wishes Hasan voted in support of the social democratic faction in the crucial National Party Congress of 1972. In many ways the family conflict and the party conflict were not a straightforward clash between right and left. On the one hand, Hasan's father-in-law was in Kayseri, though I do not know exactly how this might have entered into the family conflict and influenced Hasan's opinions at that time. On the other hand, my study of village delegates indicated that the group of peasants that gained power in the party was a peasant bourgeoisie perhaps not directly representative of the poorer peasants. (See section on village delegates).

After the social democratic faction's victory in the Congress, Cemal was squeezed between the hostile elements of the new ideology and the successful political career of a son. Even though his eldest son joined the more right wing Reliance Party to safeguard the family's and his own separate business interests, Cemal himself seemed very reluctant to resign, and to his clients who impatiently questioned him he replied, "I am listening to the sounds from the earth", which later became a proverb in the town. This means that he had great difficulty in finding a way out which would balance his family interest and his party committ-

ment. Meanwhile Hasan died in a mine accident. Mainly due to this and to his long years of commitment, Cemal decided to stay in the party. From then onwards the Aksoy family retained their pivotal position in the party but their power was, to a large extent, challenged by new elements.

Members of the Aksoy family were very explicit about how their family business was merged with and promoted by their political involvement. Especially when the RPP was in power, politics brought them licences, government contracts and easy credits. As Ali expressed it: "The only means to the RPP's success is to give plenty from Government resources so that we have something to give to the voters. We have to fight against the Justice Party with its own weapons. They made some people rich and they have money to distribute free soap, sugar and rice to people before elections". Yet the family was always careful not to break their good relations with the Justice Party. For example, rich Justice Party members elected Ali the general director of the flour mill in which he was the only shareholder who was not a member of the Justice Party (JP). Other cases of such delicate balances indicate how town merchants protect themselves against possible damages that party commitment may bring.

The Aksoy family was always quick to greet high ranking civil servants when they arrive in the town. They helped them to find accommodation, entertained them at feasts given in their honour and in various ways demonstrated the town's hospitality and respect for the new comers, or indeed any other important short term visitors. A few of the ^{town} ~~the~~ bureaucrats were tenants in the ostentatious block of flats located in the town centre, which was boasted of as the first centrally heated building in the town. The tenants were carefully selected: a government doctor, a bank manager, a former RPP leader and the primary school teacher who

had taught the Aksoy children and grandchildren. Downstairs the shops were rented to a bank and some retailers who support the Aksoy family claimed that they were the town's modernisers, being the first family to introduce radio, TV, a centrally heated house, tractors, etc. into town life.

When I was in Kaleli in 1977 and 1978 the Aksoy family still seemed a crucial element in party politics to any outsider. Partly this was because the father's name and reputation ^{had been} maintained by Hasan. In a way, Ali was also successful: filling the gap arising from his father's old age by keeping up close relations with young party leaders and village delegates. For the family he was crucial for all kinds of daily contacts, but, unlike his elder brother, Ali was regarded as a greedy businessman, by the town professionals. The family's overall influence had declined despite the energetic efforts of Ali. The expectations of village delegates were changing and so were the nature of the patronage relations. Therefore a loss in their influence in local RPP politics was inevitable without a change in their approach to politics and style of patronage. However some informal party meetings still took place in their flats or offices, and the former local party leader staying in their flat considered their views on practically every decision. Although establishing dyadic relations with the peasants by using the family business and resources, as Cemal did during the 1950's and 1960's was no longer possible, nothing stood in the way of a young member of the Aksoy family who wanted to promote business interests and become the main figure in RPP politics by forming new relations with village and town delegates. In this they had the great advantage of the family's past reputation and economic resources.

4.3.2 Case B: Ahmet Dervis

Ahmet Dervis came from a well-to-do native family which had migrated out of town when he was a student in Lycee. He returned to Kale in 1969 after graduating from the Ankara Faculty of Law. He married a local pharmacist and settled in Kale as a *lawyer*

Even then Dervis was deeply interested in politics and a close friend and supporter of Hasan Aksoy and he joined the local RPP branch in 1969. After Hasan's death he became RPP leader in Kaleli and retained that post for six years until 1978. By Kaleli standards, Dervis was quite rich, owing some urban real estate which he managed to buy with his savings. Dervis had an office near the weekly market and the government building both of which were the main destination of villagers visiting the town. His wife's pharmacy was in the very centre of the shopping district. The villagers often visited one of the shops to get the local news and gossip even if they did not have any specific personal business.

Dervis's greatest success was in establishing close personal ties with influential politicians in Kayseri and Ankara. He had good family connections with high ranking civil servants in Kale, sometimes acting as a link between them and political decision making bodies. Since politics played a crucial role at various points in the bureaucratic careers of Government employees, Dervis used his political connections for his friends' promotions and new appointments. Friendships established on the grounds of similar social backgrounds and similar educational experiences had benefits for Dervis's friends and for Dervis's own political career. In the absence of public recreational facilities in the town the frequent informal family meetings among lawyers, bank managers, doctors, government officials and some teachers formed a culturally segregated group which was hardly penetrated even by most of the towns big merchants. Obviously, in the competition for power in local political par-

ties this enabled the native lawyers to gain greater access to government officials and resources.

In fact Ahmet Dervis's superiority over other local notables should be considered within this framework. For example, he prepared partly false documents against the previous prefect and sent them to the Ministry of the Interior. Meanwhile, he went to Ankara to lobby with politicians to support his case. His efforts proved successful and the prefect was removed after a few months. Underlying this was the prefects hostile attitude towards some RPP members. By contrast Dervis was helping another prefect to be promoted to governorship when I was there. When the RPP came to power Dervis and the former Kayseri provincial leader of the RPP went to Ankara to see ministers in order to promote the prefect who had good relations with the local party branch.

Establishing such good relations with local bureaucrats was significant in party politics. For example the Justice Party government sent rationed coal to Kaleli just before the municipal elections, but delivery was delayed by the prefect on purpose. Meanwhile the Government doctor, who also supports the RPP, closed down all schools on the grounds that, in the absence of proper heating, they were unhealthy for the students. Apparently, Dervis who arranged all of this, then had the opportunity to criticize the Justice Party for not caring about students.

Another case was that of the government doctor whom Dervis was often with, outside of office hours. People visiting his wife's pharmacy were sent to the private surgery of the doctor, who treated these patients sent by Dervis freely or very cheaply. The doctor is also an employer at the carpet factory, and in that role he provides jobs for Dervis's clients. In return for all the favours the doctor had done, Dervis cancelled the decision of the Ministry of Health which had

appointed the doctor to an Anatolian subprovince in the east. Everybody was surprised about the new decision because the doctor's reappointment seemed virtually impossible. Dervis had to spend weeks in Ankara to persuade a few ministers to cancel the appointment.

Another dimension of Dervis's politics was rooted in village delegates, a strategy which he inherited from Hasan Aksoy. Peasants sought advice in legal matters and in understanding and manipulating bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the peasants increasing demands upon various Government agencies was a result of more intense relations with town life and institutions, and on the other hand it reflected the growing significance of land disputes, divorce cases, and disputes with the Government in the villages. For uneducated peasants, lawyers were the best people to consult. All the lawyers in Kaleli were members of political parties. Clients from the villages consulted the lawyer who was a member of their political party and often through the mediation of a party delegate from their village. But this required some material sacrifice on the part of the lawyers at least in the short term. This could be best expressed in the own words of Dervis: "Since I do not charge any fees for some legal advice and services to party members my monthly income is reduced by half. But I would not have even half of my present clients without being committed to a political party. In the long run greater numbers of clients bring a higher monthly income". The apparent underpayment for services was made up for by the loyalty of village delegates in crucial elections. In this respect, law as a profession merged with politics, the office was turned into a waiting room or coffee house and office clerks became organizers of political relations. In his competition for party leadership Dervis had to confront some opposition from party affiliated local merchants, but this did not lead to worsening relations in other respects. His father-in-law, uncle and other relatives and old

family friends with whom Dervis maintained daily contacts were merchants in the town. He was the legal representative of the town businessmen and was regularly paid by the carpet factory for legal advice. Yet his crucial relationship with the merchants was the one with the Aksoy family, which I shall try to explain by giving a few examples.

To begin with, Dervis was indebted to the Aksoy family who had made him party leader after their son's death. Furthermore, he never decisively attempted to end his business and personal relations with the Aksoys. He recognised the fact that a withdrawal of the Aksoy's support would curtail his bargaining power in provincial politics and seriously affect his control over some of the delegates of Kaleli. Dervis had to maintain a delicate balance without damaging all of his resources in order to be elected as an M.P., which he was quite explicit about. On the other hand, as long as the Aksoy family retained their power in the RPP Dervis's position remained insecure. So he struggled to establish a power basis of his own. To a large extent this was due to the increasing weight of village delegates which he and his predecessor Hasan Aksoy mobilized against "parasitic intermediaries". Another factor which helped Dervis was the conflict in credit cooperatives over the distribution of the funds. This time he had small traders and workshop owners against the big town merchants, who united in deciding upon credit distributions in order to get the lions share. Another element of tension between Dervis and the Aksoy family was thus introduced: this was reflected in important quarrels when the party had to choose the candidates for the "municipal" council. Dervis's tactic of appointing/supporting Ali as assistant to the mayor, but ignoring all other supporters of the Aksoy family created animosity on the part of the Aksoys. In all cases Dervis reserved the important posts for village delegates or small town businessmen who were directly loyal to himself.

Thus at all levels, Dervis both collaborated and competed with the Aksoy family, often with ideological disagreements. For example, the content of the electoral campaign and methods of propaganda was a serious area of dispute between Dervis and Ali Aksoy. Dervis criticised Aksoy's methods as being obsolete, corrupt and disloyal to party ideology. Buying votes by distributing material benefits was prevented by Dervis. Nevertheless, he used the Aksoy family's assets, such as cars, shops and money, directly for the election campaign. When I was there Dervis was ambivalent about his relations with the Aksoy family, even though he seemed decided when he kept saying that the Aksoys and the merchants should be removed once and for all from the RPP.

Thus, Dervis had to share power with others whom he disliked and had to know when and where to manipulate the major forces skillfully, gradually building up his own power but keeping all elements of support in the party. He could not easily dispense with people that he did not approve of. His brokerage relations were not based on absolute loyalty, therefore he had continually to find new clients to make up for losses. He was a socialist so he wanted to shift his political relations to a class basis. As he was not one of the town bourgeoisie, class antagonisms did not disturb him as it did the Aksoy family. But such an ideology did not appeal to delegates either. He had combined class ideology and brokerage in a peculiar way. He used class ideology against the "old patrons" to limit their power, while he used brokerage to delegates to increase his own power.

4.3.3 Case C: Mahmut Oz

Mahmut Oz was 44 years old and a primary school graduate. He was originally from a village and migrated to Kale as an apprentice 20 years ago. After he learned the skill of repairing metal tools, he worked for others for some time until he accumulated enough capital to open a

business of his own, a shop for repairing metal tools. Later he developed the business into trading in the same utensils. He owned 600 sheep, the management of which was left to female members of the household during the winter, while in summer they hired shepherds to take them to high land. His house, like the houses of most of the migrant population, was on the outskirts of town. It was new but lacked any comfort. Oz led a very traditional life. Women were secluded, and had to deal with household problems. His son and himself used to wear western style clothes and had more contact with town people as part of his business. The appearance and lifestyle of the women and men of the family were very different.

Oz had been a member of the executive council of the RPP in Kaleli for 12 years, and later he became a member of Municipal council. His family as a whole supported the RPP. His nephew, Ismail Oz, who was a solicitor, was a candidate for Membership to Parliament in the 1977 elections. Although there was no doubt about his commitment to the party, in the 1977 local elections Oz supported the previous mayor against the RPP candidate. He said he did not betray his party by doing so because in 1973 the RPP supported Demir, the previous mayor, as an independent candidate. In fact, in the 1973 elections the local party had made a tactical decision to support Demir who was an old Democratic Party M.P. who had later resigned and in 1968 joined the Reliance Party. But when Oz backed Demir in the 1977 local elections against the RPP candidate Ankarali, he was labelled a renegade.

But Demir and Oz had other mutual interests, about which Oz was very open. They had worked together in the municipal council for 4 years by then, and Demir had openly shown that he was willing to help businessmen. On the other hand, Ankarali, the RPP candidate and a socialist, declared as a part of his propaganda that he would fight against all the

illegal deeds of the municipality, including the licencing of business and buildings. Oz and other candidates for the municipal council saw this as a threat to themselves. Oz said: "This man is a communist, everybody knows him as such and we will lose votes. Instead we should form a coalition between us and either the Reliance Party or the National Salvation party and have an independent candidate, then we can increase our votes". Thus if the party increased votes and there would be more people from the party list to be elected into council, this of course raised his personal chance. In this case Oz placed his individual interest over the party's interest.

He said there was another reason behind his support of Demir; they lived in the same quarter. In the local elections it has always been argued that the mayor will bring services first to his own neighbourhood, i.e. to his own house. Therefore such neighbourhood solidarity has always been demanded.

Contrary to his behaviour in the municipal elections, Oz supported the most radical socialist candidate in the national elections. This was due to his family loyalties, rather than any ideological commitment. His nephew Ismail Oz, who was a lawyer, was the only university graduate in the family. Oz himself thought that whatever his political beliefs were his nephew would bring honour to his family if he was elected, and so he mobilized all his delegates.

Oz had good relations with peasant delegates. As the living conditions of peasants improved, they began to build new houses or renovate their old houses, using modern materials. They needed small metal building materials, such as door handles, that he made, or the construction material he sold. He sold things on credit, but on short term credits only as his capital was very small. However this kept him in contact with the peasants. He had regular customers and RPP delegates came to

him because they knew him personally and thought that they would not be cheated, and would be helped with sales on credit. But Oz's shop was on a small industrial estate, which was outside the central town and peasants did not usually go there. So it was not an information centre and this was a great disadvantage for him.

Still he had been in the local party administration for some time, and knew all of the delegates. His good relations with peasant delegates helped him to influence a few of them in election primaries. This gave him, in turn, a bargaining base in the party for a position for himself.*

Oz was conservative, anti-communist and very religious. He was so religious that he voted for Alkiş although it meant defeat for his nephew.**

Oz was not happy about the RPP's policies in general. Ideologically it was too far left, or at least had relations with left wing people. In terms of practical appeals to voters and members, he thought other parties, especially the Justice Party were much more effective in using patronage channels for its supporters. He often pointed out the Small Business Credit Cooperative where the RPP had no influence at all. Moreover, influential RPP members such as the Aksoy family, instead of helping the RPP members, worked with the Justice Party to promote their personal business interests. Also, being culturally alienated from the

* To continue to maintain at least his membership of the local RPP executive council was very important to his power base. His clientage relations with delegates were too fragile and if he lost his position for 4 years it might be impossible for him to get it back.

** In the election primaries 5 names were put forward for 8 positions. The weak candidates wanted their supporters not to support any of the potential winners, so that the votes should be divided and then there would be a chance of getting into the list with a slight margin. So when Oz voted for Alkiş, a strong candidate, he was reducing his nephew's chances.

professionals in the party, he said, "this is not the party for ordinary people like us, it is a party for people like Dervis that have ties with influential outsiders". Why did he stay in the party then? Firstly, his traditional loyalties prevented him from leaving the party. He had a nephew who was important in provincial politics, and all of his family supported the party. Therefore he could not betray his lineage. Secondly, he enjoyed an independent position in the RPP, which would take him a long time to establish in another party. He established a brokerage link, which he used in mobilizing the votes of a small number of delegates. This position gave him bargaining power to get into some formal offices. Leaving the party would mean giving up all hopes of positions in the councils that helped to expand business.

4.3.4 Case D: Selahattin Kaynak

Selahattin Kaynak was 55 years old. He had a household goods shop in the town centre which was rented from the Aksoy family. In the past, he had various jobs, including 4 years of stay as a worker in Germany. When he came back he opened a shop in the town and later moved to Aksoy's building.

His family had been in the RPP for a long time in the 1950's when he was running a greengrocery. He had a dispute with the DP dominated municipality, which ended up in court and he was fined 1000 TL., which bankrupted him. He blamed the DP for his misfortune, and strengthened his ties with the RPP. Among his activities were membership in the youth organization, in local executive committee and the municipal council in 1977.

Kaynak was known to be very clever, with a good knowledge of politics. His personal closeness to the Aksoy family were also well known, and the combination of these two factors gave him good relations with

the peasants. For the delegates, there might be various reasons for not going to the Aksoy family directly when asking for favours. The most common reasons were either having failed to return a favour in the past, or having been refused a favour in the past which could happen for factional reasons. Another reason was not knowing the Aksoy family well enough to ask for a favour, or, for tactical reasons, the delegate might calculate that it was better to have a mediator. In such cases Kaynak was asked to mediate between the delegates and the Aksoy family.

The Aksoy family also took advantage of the mediator. Because Kaynak rented one of the shops of the Aksoy family, he always wanted to avoid unpleasant relations with neighbours which could lead them to move their business to different sites. Moreover, Kaynak wanted to ensure a low rent for the shop. As the Aksoy family knew that Kaynak was willing to accept their superiority, they used his mediating role. They let him do the "dirty work" of politics, i.e. it was embarrassing for both of the parties to bargain for something. An old and respectable man like Cemal Aksoy, did not want to say to a young muhtar, "I will do what you ask me to do, but in return, you have to tell other delegates that MP candidate is a communist, which in fact is a lie". But someone like Kaynak could say that, and even persuade the muhtar that it was true. Secondly, the Aksoy family knew that Kaynak's business interests obliged him to defend their political interests. In the 1977 local elections the professional group in the RPP tried to persuade Kaynak to accept the deputy mayorship. He refused, leaving the place to Ali Aksoy, although he accepted election to the municipal council. What the professional's faction was trying to do was to eliminate some of the middle level men, such as Kaynak, to isolating the Aksoy family. But for Kaynak, the balance between his political power and business interests was very delicate, therefore to offer greater him only a position was not enough for him to leave his factional alliances, as long as one did not offer

economic inducements. Thus a mediator like Kaynak was bound to stay a loyal agent of the Aksoy family.

But his position as a mediator gave Kaynak a certain autonomy. He was clever enough to understand what was going on in terms of factional interest disputes and took advantage of them. The more he acted as mediator to the Aksoy family, the more political concessions he could ask from them. He knew that the Aksoy family was obliged to press the party leadership to secure a position for him on the municipal council. During these years, he had known a lot of delegates and had learned the ways to help them with their problems. For example, he acted as a guarantor for hire purchases in the town, or filled in forms required by the bureaucracy. He also advised the delegate to go to a certain office rather than another even if he was not very influential in the final stage. However, he would never break his loyalty to the Aksoy family, to have an independent influence on delegates and establish a patron client relationship of his own, on the contrary, he would try to secure his relations with his "patron" but also trying to maintain an autonomous power bases of his own vis-a-vis the Aksoys in order to bargain with them to his advantage.

Nobody in Kaleli, including Kaynak himself, would question his devotion to the Republican People's Party. Still, as with many others like him, it was difficult to find reasons for his being a member to the party other than tradition. He did not approve of the party programme in 1979. When İnönü resigned in 1972, leaving his place to Ecevit, Kaynak was left in an ambivalent position. He wrote to an M.P. from Kayseri, asking him for his opinion, and on his advice stayed in the party. The choice for him was not a matter of ideology or conscience, but a matter of securing his patronage ties.

Although patron-client relations were vital for Kaynak in terms of his political life, he was very much against them morally. He denied the presence of any such relationships in the RPP. He said they were used by Justice Party members, which was why they got richer and richer whereas RPP supporters stayed the same. On the other hand, he said the best way of securing votes, was through party directed patronage, therefore the RPP had to use the JP's weapons: "Until we get into power we have to get together, help with each other's problems, do some patronage, so that we can fight it when we come to power".

There were about a dozen people like Oz and Kaynak that acted semi-independently, aiming for secondary positions in the party and they were all small businessmen. They all tried to maintain good relations with the Aksoy family who had a great influence in the small business cooperative, and therefore in the allocation of credits. In addition, years of working together in the same party, and family and neighbourhood relations, strengthened such bonds. But the Aksoy family, at times, have acted against their party to secure their own business interests. Therefore they provoked opposition in the party. This opposition, and some family ties, have helped the professionals to gain the support of some intermediaries.

All the people in this group had been in the party for a long time. They were middle-aged, and known as honest, religious, reliable men by the peasants. They had little ideological commitment, but a great deal of loyalty to the party. Their dependence on local leaders, and bargaining power, varied in individual cases, and changed according to the relative position of the factions they supported.

4.4 The Social Origins of Village Delegates of the RPP

Most of the 1,000 members and three quarters of the 200 delegates of the local RPP branch in Kaleli were resident in the villages. They were from various occupational groups, merchants to retired workers from Europe, though for three-quarters of village delegates agriculture was the main activity and source of income. No matter how small the plots of some village delegates were, all owned land of various sizes. Among the people who cited agriculture as their main source income, there was a wide discrepancy in terms of the size of their tenures. In one exceptional case a family owned as much as 1000 dönüms.

The concentration of large numbers at the two extremes of Table 7 is striking. Leaving aside the middle group for the moment, I will try to explain some of the important implications of these concentrations at the top and the bottom of the table. A plot of land exceeding 200 dönüms was of considerable size even on the agriculturally poor uplands. To carry this argument one step further, one third of the village delegates had more than 400 dönüms each. In fact these were a group of wealthy peasants engaged in capitalist agriculture, well equipped with agricultural machinery, such as tractors. A few of them even bought combined harvesters. They all used modern inputs, such as fertilizers, improved seeds and chemicals. Some of these families had a few migrant workers in them but they were working abroad. Finally, these wealthy peasants had capital to invest either in agriculture or in non-agricultural spheres. Some owned brick kilns, lorries and minibuses which they rented to drivers whereas the majority owned real estate in Kale. Furthermore, some took trading in grain marketing the produce of other farmers. Bearing in mind the fact that 75% of the peasant households in Kaleli are poor peasants having not more than 50 dönüms of land, we can safely conclude that an important proportion of of the direct RPP activists

TABLE 7

Land Ownership of the Village Delegates

Area in Decars	%	
0-49	42	
50-199	12	
200-399	18	
400+	27	45

in the villages, i.e. the delegates were wealthy peasants. I shall call these agricultural capitalist entrepreneurs.

But was the active support of the party confined to this section of the villagers alone? If that was so, how do we explain the case of the 42%, who have less than 50 dönüms of land. Paradoxically however, these were also men of considerable fortunes. More than two-thirds of those delegates who owned less than 50 dönüms earned their living through non-agricultural activities. Indeed poor peasants in the Kayseri area could derive the greater part of their households' incomes from casual work in the carpet and building industries, or as workers abroad. None of my respondents (the village delegates who owned less than 50 dönüms) however, mentioned casual work as a source of income, despite the fact that they regarded their small plots of land as of secondary importance. The following occupations were most frequently mentioned by these people, village building contractors, self employed minibus and lorry drivers, carpet and cloth traders, village grocers, natural gas distributors and former workers in Germany.* I call these non-agricultural village entrepreneurs.

The flow of cash to villages in the last two decades, improvements in the standard of life, the commercialization of agriculture, and increasing dependency of peasants on the market for various necessities all helped a class of village entrepreneurs to flourish. Thus so far we can argue that the majority of the delegates of the RPP in Kaleli (some 87% in fact) all various kinds of village entrepreneurs. This explains the main features of the social basis of active party membership in Kaleli branch of RPP, a social category made up of agricultural and

* The workers in Germany have considerable amounts of cash both in terms of savings and of pensions from the German government. With frequent devaluations of the Turkish lira, their income evens become greater.

non-agricultural village entrepreneurs. The third category consists of those village delegates who own anything between 50 - 199 dönüms of land. These well to do peasants hired labourers on their farms only occasionally and some members of their families took on non-agricultural wage work. Differences in their incomes varied according to the kinds of crops they cultivated, i.e. low yield grain or high yield sugar beets. Any how these made up only 12% of the RPP village delegates and as such were relatively insignificant.

The evidence above suggests that all the above three categories of common elements amongst the villagers were somehow able to meet social and economic requirements to become involved in politics: at least a modest amount of free time and money. To include all the three groups of the village delegates, I will call them rich villagers.

Firstly being involved with village politics was not only a system of getting as much as possible from the authorities and paying it back through personal votes. The local delegates were expected to show hospitality when important party members or other people came to visit the village. The delegate was expected to bring information to the village. Therefore, he had to visit Kale frequently to attend formal and informal party meetings. His main duty was to raise votes for the party and to persuade others to change their loyalties. He had to help fellow villagers and kin in times of need, sometimes even with financial support. He helped the RPP voters in Kale with all their needs and difficulties.

It was very difficult to estimate how much a delegate had to spend for politics. This depended on many things, from the number of RPP votes in the village to the distance of the village from Kale and, most important, how enthusiastic the delegate was. But obviously to spare some money for politics needed an income higher than the average peasant can afford. As a prominent Kayseri RPP MP told me, "the delegate is a

person who had rugs in his house when everybody else lived on straw mats, now he is the person who has a carpet when the rest of the village lives on rugs".

Secondly, none of them went to earn money as wage labourers themselves even seasonally. On the contrary, most delegates told me they hired labour in the peak seasons, and most of them had grown up sons or close relatives to look after the fields while they were carrying out managerial tasks in Kale, such as finding credits, fertilizers, selling the product etc.

Thirdly, as most agricultural production was subsidized and controlled by the government, including credits which require a minimum amount of land, the richer peasants needed good relations with the government. If a peasant had only 10 dönüms of land that might or might not yield his winter need of wheat, it was not worth while to wait in the queue for fertilizers and chemicals for days. But for someone who planned to cultivate 300 dönüms of wheat, such inputs were indispensable.

Moreover, obtaining such inputs on the right time was very important for even a few days delay might ruin the crop. Not only inputs and credit were distributed by the government agencies, but also technical advice was available from the agriculturalists in the agencies. Such advice and inputs, an indispensable part of agriculture, were vital to rich peasants, and so they needed to have good relations with the government offices. Politics was an important means of developing these relations.

The village entrepreneurs also enjoyed relatively high incomes compared with the poor peasants, but their motives for political activity were slightly different. Every day contact with Kaleli, greater

knowledge and awareness of world affairs and even experience in foreign countries were among their important advantages. Many left the village temporarily to earn cash elsewhere and came back with savings sufficient to establish small enterprises.

For all the delegates, considerable knowledge of outside world was a major advantage. many had prolonged experience of city life, a fifth had spent five years or more abroad, and three-fifths had lived in towns other than Kale at an early age. All of them had travelled widely in Turkey, to major cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Adana on business, to visit kins or for sight seeing.

Almost all my respondents in Kaleli are literate (96%), but amongst the village delegates only one had had secondary education. But on the other hand, most of them gave me the impression of being self-made men, wise, relatively informed and certainly ambitious. They often read newspapers (on average buying 3 a week), regularly listen to T.V. and radio news (sometimes twice daily) and followed political discussions on T.V.

In the following sections I will consider why a group of rich villages were interested in RPP politics and what sorts of political participation did they use.

4.5 "Rich villagers" and Social Democratic Movement in RPP

These rich villagers have benefited most from the "welfare" state, expansion of capitalism and multi party politics. Capitalist expansion has opened new routes for increasing wealth: new technologies, new investment possibilities and demand for agricultural products. "The welfare state" has brought them new opportunities such as education and medical services. Party politics, in a democratic parliamentary system, have opened new means for their participation through competition for their votes. Besides, party directed patronages brought schools,

mosques, public water supplies, roads and electricity to the villages. The rich villagers benefited more than the rest of the village from these services as they were better able to afford them. Every political party added a few more benefits and subsidies such as low interest credits to agricultural products used almost exclusively by these groups.*

The Republican Peoples Party, however, claims to be a social democratic party that wants to attract the votes of the poorer sections of the peasantry. So why are the rich villagers dominant in the RPP?

The presence of these people in the party is due to traditional and historical reasons, but their increasing influence in the party politics is new. In 1923, when the Republic was founded by Atatürk, the party was inseparable from the state. (See section 2.1). Depending on the conditions of the village, and the structure of agrarian society party notables in the towns picked out agents in the villages to represent their personal interest and the party. It is possible that, in such conditions, they would search for a community leader both respected by, and influential with, his co-villagers. When multi-party democracy was introduced in 1946, many of them stayed in the party as it was the party of the establishment. In the years to come, they identified with the party, especially as their rival lineages followed other political avenues.

So most of the present village delegates of the RPP in Kaleli have been in the party for many years. But the present power structure in the local party was new. In the traditional system the delegates were agents of the party and not the representatives of peasant voters. From 1928 to

* There is a minimum land requirement for agricultural credits, and the richer peasants benefit more from high prices because they have more marketable surplus.

1946, it is doubtful whether they could actually vote in local congresses. They did not expect anything from the party itself, their main relation was with local notables to whom they owed loyalty and respect. Anyway, state and politics were peripheral to the village community, only occasionally embodied by the army, and tax collectors.

1946 was a turning point for the political awareness of the peasantry, because there was then competition for their votes, which implied that they could influence political decision making. Some RPP supporters left the party and joined the D.P. while some of them stayed in and waited for the support from the party notables in town. As the Democrats were using patronage links to help their members, militants and delegates in the villages, why shouldn't the RPP supporters do it? Such a policy orientation and expectation worked to the benefit of people like Cemal Aksoy. Even if we assume that the village "rich" were dominant amongst RPP delegates, they needed the help of town merchants.

In the 1950's the cash economy was spreading widely in Turkey (See section 2.3.4) and there was also the increasing penetration of the state. But productivity was still low and even the rich peasants did not have enough marketable surplus to accumulate capital. The former had to find markets in order to sell their products. In the bottlenecks the rich peasant frequently found himself in, he had to find some help. Moreover, party directed patronage channels in the village worked to the advantage of the Democrats. He had to ensure his own position in the village, by getting a few of the resources for himself.

All of these expectations led the village delegates to develop patronage relations with the town merchants influential in Kaleli RPP politics. Reinforced by the debt that the peasant found himself in, a

strong network of patron-client relations was established where loyalty was strong, the relation was permanent, and reciprocity was never calculated on a one-to-one basis. Until the mid 1960's, political loyalty was paid in local branch elections and election primaries. The branch notables would rarely go to the delegates and ask them to repay the favours by voting for the candidate they supported. They would either send messages or the delegate would personally come and ask. In both cases the local patron would not declare himself in need of reciprocity. In this period, the party was relatively inactive because it was not in power and it had no hopes of being so.

Until the late 1960's the relations with the village delegates and party branch remained the same. Through the years the delegates began to develop a higher political consciousness. This also coincided with the expansion of capitalism in Turkey, which brought cash cropping, roads, better education etc., to the village community.

With the new ideological movement of the left of centre, there was a move locally for breaking the bondage of the local notables over the delegates and to have a more direct representation. The increasing communication networks enabled the village delegates to be aware of the opportunities available. The new ideological movement was also helpful in emphasizing that the "parasitic intermediaries", the merchants must be overthrown if the peasants were to benefit fully from the resources. The agents of the new ideology as I discussed before were the professionals in the town. Their understanding of social democracy was helping the poor peasants and agricultural workers. They searched for poor peasantry among the party cadres in vain, they found instead a class of rich villagers ready to take action to promote their interests in town, who had doubts about this new ideology. The rich villagers were trying to build a power base of their own. They wanted a better share of

the spoils and benefits distributed by the political parties. They knew that the mediation of the old town notables acted as a sieve allowing only tiny shares to reach them. The rich villagers in 1979's were no longer contented with the few thousand liras of credit allowed to them by the local merchants, or the advance payment for next years harvest.

Allowing credit to delegates for buying tractors or lorries for example was beyond the capacity of the local merchants, however rich they were. It was even more difficult to bring electricity or irrigation water, and the delegates wanted these more than they wanted a few thousand liras of cash as loans.

In 1971 there were two conflicts which reinforced each other. There was a struggle between social democratic and centerist ideologies in the party, and this struggle was carried out by two different groups: the young educated professionals versus the town merchant/notables. The village delegates saw that this struggle gave them the opportunity of establishing their own power. Thus the delegates shifted their class alliance from the merchants and notables that had allowed them markets and credit facilities in the 1950's and 60's to the professionals who promised them a better distribution of state resources and more direct participation in local party politics. (See section 4.3.2.)

I did not make a comparative study of the structures of different parties in the villages. However, during the interviews I asked questions about the members and delegates of other parties and especially those of the Justice Party. Therefore the information I gathered was through third parties.

Regarding the people who joined the Democratic Party in 1950 which later became the Justice Party, there were two kinds of arguments, both of which I heard from local party officials of the RPP and village

delegates. To check them would be the subject of another thesis. I can only describe what they said without much interpretation.

One of the arguments was that J.P. members in the villages were from the middle and poor sections of the peasantry. In town the local leaders were merchants, particularly those involved in the wholesale trade of grain. When I checked the origins of the leading J.P. figures in the town I found that they came from a merchant class that had direct relations with the peasants. It can be argued that, as poorer sections of peasantry cannot benefit from state subsidies to agriculture, they were more in need of merchants and use credit for reinvestment and marketing. So different kinds of relations can be expected between the members and leaders of the J.P. which are more directly economic in nature. On the other hand, somewhat contradicting this argument, was the fact that the J.P. and the Democratic Party have been the major distributors of state resources to their supporters. There was a good chance that even their poorer members, after 30 years of Democratic party and Justice Party governments, grew richer. Whether the peasants actually benefited from the channels of patronage needed to be investigated. If the distribution was made through the merchants in the town, it might be expected that the bonds between the merchant and the peasant were strengthened. But this was all based on information from third parties, and assumptions which needed to be empirically validated.

4.6 The Party Delegates' Activity in the Village

Day to day politics was one of the main topics of discussion in the village coffee shops and guest rooms of village notables. By listening to news on the radio and watching T.V. every day, they got the information on national political issues, and people coming from Kale and Kayseri transmit the local political gossip.

In addition, as I mentioned earlier, people of different lineages belonged to different parties and therefore some traditional disputes, such as feuds, have often been mixed up with politics. Besides this, even if there were no lineage rivalries, until recently there has been some hostility between the supporters of different parties, and, if there was the chance, they tended to go to different coffee shops and guest rooms to prevent every day confrontations.

Between 1977 and 1980 the ideological polarization in Turkey was so great that in some villages the traditional unity and the solidarity of the community was broken. This led to intense conflict between factions and parties in the villages, which in cases even led to homicide. During this period (1977-1980) the lives of some RPP delegates were threatened. This, of course, changed the meaning of politics and political activity. During normal times, the delegates main duty would be to defend the party and to increase its votes in future elections. To achieve this he was expected to be kind and generous to friends and neighbours, and help them in their small every day problems though he was at the same time expected to act slightly preferentially towards the supporters of the RPP, i.e. to employ party members in the fields when he needed labour, or to take them to town when they had legal or bureaucratic problems and introduce them to influential people that might help them. If the party was in power he would be expected to convey the needs of the village to the local leader and M.P.'s, and try to get some services to the village. Through these activities he would both consolidate his power in the village and increase party votes in future elections.

During the elections, party propaganda was carried out as dictated by the local party branch. The means of propaganda used by the RPP included broadcasting on radio and T.V., talks in the coffee shops by eminent party members and meetings in the big town centres. Although the

delegates would go to meetings in Kayseri, only strong supporters would be prepared to spend money and time to go to town meetings. Therefore, in terms of increasing votes, coffee shops meetings and broadcasting were more important. An M.P. might need to visit almost 600 villages during the election period in the Kayseri province, so it was impossible to do it very frequently. I discussed with the delegates, the benefits expected from propaganda which involved bringing eminent members of the party, usually from Ankara, to explain the party ideology and programme. Did such propaganda change the votes of peasants or was it only rhetoric that they repeated over the years with no practical use? The content of the speeches included everything from Ismet Inönü preventing fathers from being killed by not getting into the second World War (that line was repeated for 35 years), to the meaning of social democracy, to the latest foreign currency problems. It seemed to me that the actual content of the speech had little effect in converting people to the RPP.

Such propaganda had two other kinds of political effect, however. The delegate of the party demonstrated to the leaders of the local party that he was an eminent person in the village and could gather many people to listen, which might influence their vote, and he assured his prestige in the village community because he could show his co-villagers that he was respected in town and could ask eminent people to come and visit him in his village.

Secondly, but more importantly, the peasants had a chance to meet the country's eminent politicians, the people they heard on the radio and about whom they read in the newspapers. The peasants considered themselves honoured in shaking hands with such men, especially if the politician showed some personal interest. The local party seemed to agree on the whole that the only use of village propaganda was meeting politicians and shaking their hands.

Some of the more active delegates intensified their village political activity during an election. They called on the support of kinsmen and friends, especially those who owed them favours. They visited the houses of these people and asked for their votes as a family. In such activity, their most reliable support is from their kinsmen.

Another means of attracting votes were the promises of party directed patronage. In the village coffee shops, in the party headquarters, in every possible contact with the villagers, the local leaders and other politicians would promise a few things to the peasants. The local leaders of the party would know, through the various petitions sent to them, the needs of each village. They would then inform M.P. candidates, politicians from Ankara or Kayseri, or whoever was going to speak about the needs of the village. Sometimes during the talk, these people will mention that, "God willing", they would do whatever was required if they come to power.

In the 1977 elections, the road to Demir was the major such issue. Demir was a large village, and half of the villagers use the road every day. It had not been repaired for years, and was making transport to many villages very difficult, especially in winter. Whether promising such patronage actually brought votes was difficult to determine, but it certainly had an effect when the service was actually provided. The consequences of not fulfilling a promise were not clear. If this was repeated a number of times, the prestige of the party delegate in the village was reduced. The power of the party was questioned and there was a chance that the floating voters might back another party. It was usually in vain that the delegate tried to explain that the party was not in power or there was a serious reason for not keeping the promise. The delegate, especially if his party was in power, might be ridiculed in

the village, in some cases even to the extent of threatening his honour, and he might resign from the party. Such people constituted the majority of converts to other parties, or the founders of new parties.

Whether the voting behaviour and the attitudes of delegates towards the party would change if party propaganda concentrated on party ideology and party programme, is difficult to say. It had never seriously been tried anywhere in Turkey, by any party, to my knowledge. I discussed the possibility of more continuous propaganda, not limited to election times, such as tours through the villages every six months, more discussions about the party programme with the delegates, seminars open to delegates to discuss everyday politics and party policy with the local leaders.* Local leadership said it was impossible to arrange such activities because of financial and time problems. They also argued that the village delegate would not even want to participate in such an activity. They say the delegates were not interested in party ideology and the voters did not want to know about it. Moreover they argued the more we tried to explain to voters, the more mixed up and alienated they became and the less they voted. They said, "For example, take a problem such as "workers participation in management" or "land reform". If you went to a village and gave a talk around these topics to the peasants, they would not be able to understand, because they do not know the basic concepts. The more they do not ~~comprehend~~ the more they are alienated from the party. A straightforward promise of electricity is simple enough for everyone to understand, especially if it is made by an M.P. after a long talk about how İnönü won the war of independence, Ecevit was courageous against Greece and invaded Cyprus and the RPP is for the poor and against the rich". They also argued that the party programme

* This kind of education technique was used by most socialist and social democratic parties. It was tried by the RPP in urban areas and working class areas.

was explained by the radio in propaganda hours, to which all of the peasants listened and if they were keen on ideology they could learn it from there.

The delegates, on the other hand, complained about their lack of knowledge of what went on in the party. But this complaint was rooted more in their relations with their own co-villagers. The ordinary delegate thought involvement with politics on an ideological basis was a privilege of the educated also thinking that they could not understand or change it however hard they tried. So a vicious circle was formed through delegates not being informed by the leading figures, and in turn not asking any questions. As their membership of the party was to a large extent, non-ideological, it was not important for them personally. However, there were various issues in the party ideology, an explanation of which was extremely important for village delegates, such as the relation of social democracy to religion.

4.7 Party Ideology and Village Delegates

Except for two Alevi Kurdish villages, all of the 50 villages in Kaleli were Sunni Muslims. The villagers were devoted, practicing Muslims, and religion was a very important part of daily life in the villages. The delegates of the RPP, just like their co-villagers, were believers and practicers. So one of their most difficult problems was to find a compromise between the secular and left wing ideology of the party, and Islam.

It is not my intention here to discuss at length whether orthodox Sunni Islam is compatible with left wing ideologies. For the peasants it was a matter of finding plausible explanations in trying to interpret party ideology within the boundaries of religion. For the delegate, who lives in the village all his life, the most important thing was to con-

form to the traditions and religious practices of the village, otherwise he might be totally rejected by the community.

In this situation, the first accusation the delegate faces was that of "communism". The RPP faced this accusation long before RPP adopted a left wing ideology. The peasant's definition of communism had nothing to do with political and economic systems, but varied from a form of taxation to advocating diplomatic relations with the USSR. But the most accepted definitions were those of "blasphemy", "infidelity" and "sexual immorality". The initial accusations began when secular laws were passed by the republican regime in the 1920's. But it was difficult to discuss the matter because it was the state ideology. With political democracy after 1950, these questions began to be discussed. Particularly after 1971 and with the left of centre movement, even the moderates thought that the party was helping the Communists although they were quite sure that the RPP people themselves were ^{not} communists.

Thus every peasant delegate was faced with a major dilemma. His personal desire was to stay in the party and defend it, but he knew what the accusation of "communist" meant in terms of his position in the village. He did not want to believe the accusation, but he could not find any arguments against it, especially as he himself was very much under the influence of religious propaganda.

Individually, every delegate had to prove that the party as well as he himself, had nothing to do with communism. Each developed a different defence mechanism but all stem from practicing Islam. As all of them were devoted muslims, it was difficult to prove them blasphemous or infidels, but they told me that they felt obliged to practice more strictly than the members of other parties. Most of them were over 36 years of age, had been married for years and even had grandchildren, and so accusations of communist against these people were meaningless.

Therefore people from other parties used it as a joke. However, serious personal accusations could end bitterly, as this was a threat to honour. I have been told by the delegates of a few cases of homicide, and there were reports of them in the newspapers. But to determine how much of it was politically motivated was not easy because rival lineages were also in different parties. It might be a village rivalry and feud, with politics used only as an excuse.

The rebuttal of accusations against the party as a whole was carried out in three ways. One of them was to regard it as a matter of honour, and therefore use physical threats to stop the accusers through fear. The second solution was to give an example of being religious, praying 5 times daily, going on the pilgrimage, and being a good father, while still being in the RPP, thus demonstrating that the party cannot be communist. This was convincing when it was done by a 55 year old village elderly, with 400 decars of land, three sons and tens of grandchildren, practicing Islam strictly for 30 years, and gone on the pilgrimage perhaps twice. But for a migrant who had been in Germany, only coming back within the last 2 years, or a primary school teacher from outside or even for a low status native delegate, personal conduct was irrelevant. So, instead of their own example, they used the examples of eminent religious leaders who have joined the RPP, such as the head of the religious affairs department who became an M.P., or a mufti who was elected an M.P. for Kayseri. The point of such examples was that if the RPP was communist, these people would not join the party. Another defense was to refer to the actions of the RPP opposing communists or non-Muslims. For example, the war of independence against the Christians, İnönü keeping Turkey out of World War II, not to take side with Russia, or Ecevit's invasion of Cyprus.

Primary Elections in 1977 for Kayseri Province was very significant

in illustrating the importance of religion and the embarrassment of accusations of communism. Ahmet Alkiş was a native of Kayseri (not Kaleli). He was the son of a poor family. He went to secondary school to become an Imam, and later, after years of work as a village Imam, joined the faculty of religion to become a mufti. His first relations with the party occurred when he was an Imam in Kayseri province. The party helped him to find a scholarship to get into higher education. Later, although he was a devoted RPP supporter, he did not have any formal relations with the party because he was appointed as an Imam to Germany. In February 1977, he resigned his job in Germany and moved to Kayseri. In June of that year he was elected an M.P. As being elected an M.P. usually involved years of work, building support among the delegates, all of the Kayseri county leaders were angry and opposed to him. Nobody, not even very influential M.P.'s, could prevent him from being elected,, and being nominated onto the first position on the list. However, the delegates saw Alkiş's case as a good answer against accusations of communism and blasphemy. Even those that were against him eventually had to vote for him, saying, "We do not believe in his sincerity, he did not work for the party when we were in difficulties, but if we do not elect him the opposition will say "see, the communists have not elected the mufti"". His supporters argued that his nomination would take votes from the other parties. It was doubtful whether his presence actually influenced voting behaviour in the 1977 general elections. In rural areas, there was no significant shift to RPP and the small change might have been effected by other factors. But voting for him was a matter of conscience for the delegate, proving that he was a good muslim.

When I interviewed Alkiş he was fully aware of the reason behind his nomination. He rejected the allegation that he had used his religious position by saying that he had contacts with the party for decades, and that he worked for it even in Germany. Nevertheless, he

gave me the impression that he deliberately used religion. His reason for using religion was that he had given the delegates confidence against accusations of communism by being helpful in explaining why the RPP was not communist.

I have already discussed the limited means available to village delegates for learning the party programme and ideology. Their knowledge of such issues was often confused and/or incorrect. For example, there were substantial numbers of people amongst the delegates I spoke to, who thought that the RPP was not left-wing, social democratic or left of centre. Such an attitude was not only due to disinterest and ignorance, but also due to opposition propaganda equating the left with communism and communism with blasphemy.

The village delegate was occasionally faced with other issues from the party programme. For example in the three month propaganda period, when all the villagers listened to the broadcasts, it was impossible not to hear slogans, pieces of the party programme, and policy issues raised. These were discussed in village coffee shops, and the delegates could not answer accusations or innocent questions regarding the party ideology or programme. This inability to face their co-villagers was the real source of complaint. On the other hand, there was the indifference of delegates towards long term policies, even towards those that might effect the daily lives of the peasants.

In the 1977 elections a village planning programme, under the title "Koykent" was widely discussed in the media as this was one of the subjects deliberately chosen to appeal to the villagers and attract votes. Most of the RPP broadcasting programmes were designed to explain the core plan. As with any long term plans, if implemented it would have very little impact on the lives of the peasants in the immediate future. The peasants saw that it would not affect their lives immediately and so

ignored it until they were asked questions about it by their co-villagers. When I asked them what it meant, some had a vague, but correct, idea of what it was about, such as a social welfare programme, but most of them were ignorant of it or had a totally wrong ideas.

Were there then no ideological principles that the village delegates believed in and were willing to fight for? Since 1950, democracy and populism as a principle, has had the greatest appeal. The village delegates were still very much influenced by the terms used in the early explanations of these principles by the Democratic Party. It was argued that citizenship rights were just pieces of paper, and the D.P's conception of democracy was the ability to use lawful rights fully, while politics should be designed according to the needs of the voters. For older delegates, democracy was precious and had to be preserved so as not to go back to the days of gendarme repression (See section 2.3.2). Later, under the influence of the left wing movement in the 1960's, democracy was given some other dimensions as equality, welfare state, social democracy and workers' rights. Thus, sometimes the meaning of democracy was extended to cover everything from liberty to human rights, the welfare state, and political rights and duties. My impression during the fieldwork was that this view was widespread regardless of party affiliation. In terms of RPP delegates, democracy also had a practical meaning. It permitted a party system which allowed delegates to articulate their interests. Because democracy also meant inner-party democracy, this meant the recognition of the power of village delegates in the party.

In conclusion, I would like to stress once again the point that a rigid habit of party loyalty applies only to the party activists, i.e RPP delegates, and not to ordinary voters. Voting behaviour is less rigid, although in rural areas the conservative vote seems to be more or

less stable as compared to the cities. However, there have been studies showing that, even in rural areas, shifts in voting behaviour continually occur, depending upon ideology, the economic conditions of the peasantry and their expectations from governments and parties (Sayari, 1975; Ozankaya, 1970, 1971; Bulutay, 1970; Abadan, 1966).

4.8 The Town Delegates

The bulk of party activity was carried out by village delegates. The number of town delegates was small, and they were less influential in the party. There were only 40 seats for the town delegates.* Most of these seats were occupied by the local leadership and executive committee, therefore they were outnumbered by the village delegates.

The town delegates were from various occupations. They were more educated and exclusively native. In terms of occupational background small shopkeepers such as shoe repairers, corner shop owners, grocers outnumbered others. But there were also people of diverse backgrounds; anything from agriculturalists to retired primary school teachers. They were also well off but not very rich; each had a house, perhaps rented another, and had a stable income. Most have lived outside Kale for some time earlier in their lives. The majority were in their 50's and all of them had some form of secondary education. Being natives they did not have much difficulty finding educational facilities.

Better education of course gave them a better understanding of political affairs. They knew more about the ideology and programme of the party, and when compared with the village delegates they were better informed about the state of affairs. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, and most importantly, they had enough basic education to be

* The number changes after each election according to the previous election votes.

interested in and to understand political ideology and policy. They could evaluate the simple information given to them. Secondly, they had better access to sources of information. Not only media such as newspapers, radio, T.V. were available to Kale people more than the villagers, but also they could discuss this kind of information amongst themselves daily in the local party branch and elsewhere.

They were changed very often, depending on their factional loyalty. Because they did not have voting support they were not unchangeable as were the village delegates. The most votes they ensured were their immediate family's (wives, children, parents) and perhaps a few friends and relatives, who voted for the party even if they were not elected as delegates. Often the faction in power replaced them with someone of similar background, but closer to their own faction. Although they were small in number, they could play a decisive role in local branch congresses, so all the competing factions tried to get their supporters elected as town delegates.

In terms of patronage they were much less demanding than the village delegates. First of all their education enabled them to do without any help with small bureaucratic formalities such as filling in forms, applications or acquiring information on resource. Secondly, they knew some of the clerks in the bureaucracy as friends, neighbours and relatives. They could ask for their advice, working their way from the lower ranks upwards. Only in cases of real difficulty with the bureaucracy would they attempt to involve one of the local party leaders in the matter.

They were more ideologically committed to the party and this gave them a better understanding of the ideas brought by the professional group to the party. Therefore, as a faction, most of them supported the professionals.

These town delegates gained importance in the elections for mayorship because in that election the village delegates were not eligible to vote. Primary elections in municipal ^{nominations never occurred} either because the local party executive committee decided to support an outsider, forming coalitions with other parties as in the 1973 elections, or they decided not to hold election primaries and instead appointed a name already agreed upon. The RPP candidates have little chance of winning so it often proved better not to open any discussions at all and this was what happened in the 1977 elections.

4.9 Strategies for Mobilizing Vertical Linkages

The various forms of vertical forms of participation described earlier were very important both for increasing votes and in the party structures. Therefore, in the next section, I will describe the importance of this relation to the village delegates.

"Patronage" was not the same thing as corruption in the eyes of the delegates. Corruption was something immoral like writing a false document or making up a false list of delegates. But both corruption and patronage were "evil" and should be fought against. However, patronage and corruption were often distinguished. Like all "evil" deeds, patronage was practiced extensively by the rival parties, mainly by the Justice Party. Therefore the RPP should take precautions against this in order to preserve its own members.

As the delegates explained it: "The only way of attracting votes is either through promising services to the community or doing preferential treatment to supporters. Although we know it is wrong, we still think it should be done because other parties do it, and we have to fight the enemy with their own weapons. Justice Party members promise services to the villages and carry them out when they come to power. They protect

their members' interests vis-a-vis the outside world. This is an injustice to non-members of the J.P. The RPP has to do the same, with only one difference, we will do only what is "just", we will help individuals to attain their rights without corruption". Of course all this was a plausible justification of what the delegates, using the party, did. There was no significant evidence in Kaleli that the Justice Party in Kaleli was more corrupt. However, there was significant evidence of the Justice Party practicing patronage during the years they were in power.

The delegates, however, had other reasons for using vertical linkages. According to the villagers, the bureaucracy tried to make things difficult for them. In a sense this was correct, the petty officials, instead of helping the peasants with their various problems, continually demanded papers and documents usually beyond the capabilities of an illiterate peasant to produce. Also, because they were unaware of the rituals and rules of bureaucratic procedure, even when a job was properly done, because of the length of time taken it would be considered to be deliberately delayed or a denial of rights.

Even if the bureaucracy was impartial and willing to help, the peasants thought their enemies in the village, would try to affect the bureaucracy by espionage and slander. So they had to take precautions to protect their interests. The villagers thought that there was a considerable chance of things going wrong in the middle of procedures. They knew the influence of politics on the bureaucracy in a highly centralised state such as Turkey, and they knew that from the higher echelons of the bureaucracy to the lowest secretary, almost everybody was politicized and had loyalties to political parties. They knew that they could affect the bureaucracy via the parties, which in turn will promise the officials job security, promotion and appointments to better locations in Turkey.

The crucial people in the relation between the peasants and the bureaucracy were the members of parliament. They were the supreme manifestation of political power accessible to delegates, perceived as having absolute power. M.P.'s made the rules, they argued, so they could easily change them, and even if they could not change them they ought to be able to find ways round the law. Therefore, if the M.P., when asked for a favour said, "I am sorry, I cannot help you as I am legally forbidden to intervene", this was interpreted as a refusal of help.*

The number of delegates that came to Ankara to see Members of Parliament varied. Some M.P.'s had little influence and would probably lose their seat anyway, so there was no point in approaching them. Some, such as party leaders, were inaccessible. But some attracted a lot of delegates because they were "good at solving problems". These were asked perhaps 25 favours per day and, if the party was in power and they became ministers, the number increased. Of course it was impossible to help all of these people, but they pretended they were helping and doing their best. In deciding as to whom to help the M.P.s took into consideration the power of the delegate in his village, the loyalty they could expect, his prestige amongst other delegates, and his closeness to the local elite.

There was a differentiation in rank between M.P.'s as well. Backbenchers would try to help as many delegates as possible, while front benchers, with a few exceptions, would only intervene in extremely important cases. A front bencher would not do a personal favour to an ordinary delegate from a village unless it was somebody with great local power. The front bencher interfered in the appointment of the prefect of every county and saw that his wishes were complied with. The

* For example, it is almost impossible to intervene directly in court cases because the judge has an independent position, although I know of cases where attempts have been made.

delegates and the local political elite were also aware of this difference and acted accordingly. The sick went to one M.P. to gain admission to hospital, complaints ^{against} the governor went to another M.P.

The brokerage relation with the local party elite was also important for the delegates. After all, most of them did not have problems that only the intervention of an M.P. could solve. The majority of problems were trivial, for example having a son called up for military service, buying or selling land, registering a piece of land, having a son married, or a dispute in court. However important these problems may have been for the peasant delegate himself, he knew that it may not be too tactful to seek M.P.'s help. It was best to keep him in reserve for more important problems or for cases where local leaders might fail.

Closeness to the local party leaders, and good relations with them, were also important for establishing contact with the M.P.s. Before going to Ankara most of the delegates tried to get a letter of introduction from the party branch in Kaleli. Of course, the M.P.s that had served for many years knew most of the delegates, at least the important ones, personally. Letters of introduction were a precaution taken with the new M.P.s. Even such letters did not always ensure that the favour would be granted. The local leaders of the party gave a letter of introduction to divert blame from themselves to the M.P. But if they really wanted the favour to be granted they went to Ankara themselves, made several calls from Kale to the M.P. and persisted until it was granted.

In summary, there are various brokerage channels and, depending on his purpose, the client used one or the other. For instance, if a local service was required, the delegate would go to one of the local patrons or ask a mediator to ask a leader on his behalf. If the problem needed to be solved outside Kaleli, the delegate would either go directly to

the M.P. in Ankara, or the Kayseri provincial branch, or ask a local patron to write a letter of introduction and take it with him. Carrying this a step further, the delegate may ask in the town for a letter of introduction from a local patron, then take it to the M.P., or a back-bencher may ask a front bencher.

The number of intermediaries the delegate used was dependent upon his power and prestige in the party branch. A powerful village delegate who was powerful in the village and who had been a representative of the party for decades, went straight to a front bencher, whereas a newcomer needed to take all the steps in between.

During the elections at all levels, when favours were expected to be returned, the candidates tried to use any number of these relations. In this case the more powerful the candidate, the more links he used to call upon loyalty and reciprocity. The years in power multiplied his brokerage relations. A well established M.P. appealed to all delegates personally, but still bargained with local leaders and promised a few concessions to local middlemen, whereas a newcomer was at the stage of establishing brokerage relations.

If either an M.P. or a local politician refused or failed to carry out a favour, it was known to almost all of the delegates very quickly. Although the delegates lived in separate villages, and therefore it seemed that they did not have much contact, they met in Kale RPP branch quite often, they knew each other very well, and they continually gossiped about party affairs. In such circumstances, they usually influenced their friends, and could create a hostile feeling towards the M.P.s and local politicians who refused them. In this event it was very likely that the person in question lost a lot of votes and support in the inner party elections which might lead to a loss of office.

One of the basic principles of the literature on patron-client relations, is that the clients can never engage in collective action. Another basic assumption is the lack of horizontal relations among the clients. Patron-client relations are by nature vertical and dyadic (see Chapter 1). If there were horizontal linkages these would prevent the formation of vertical relations and would lead to class solidarity and action.

In the case of the Kaleli RPP structure, the delegates who form the core of the clients had a similar social background, i.e. they were rich villagers. For them brokerage was a means of participation in politics useful in order to promote their interests. They knew that if brokers repeatedly tried to avoid helping them then they could not get what they wanted from politics. Their only recourse was to defeat them in the party elections and replace them with people more willing to act in accordance with their interests. Thus informally, with gossip they developed a client to client relationship and preserve the status quo.

4.9.1 A Case Study of Brokerage: The Politics of Mr. Bulut (MP) from Kayseri

Every M.P. had a style of his own, but amongst Kayseri M.P.s and Senators, Mustafa Bulut had a special place. Bulut was nationally famous for his brokerage relations, and all the delegates saw him as the ideal representative. I will use his case to demonstrate the various brokerage relations of the M.P.s. In 1979 Bulut was a 57 year old engineer. He was first elected M.P. in 1961 from another party list. 9 months later he was expelled from that party and joined the RPP. He became a minister twice. He was an M.P. continuously for 20 years. He claimed that he would be re-elected from any party at any time if he wished, because he claimed to have the most extensive clientage network in Turkey.

Bulut led a very modest life by Turkish middle class standards. His small flat was full of RPP delegates, and even a few people from other parties, for at least 8 hours every day. Parliament met at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and, although attendance was not compulsory, most of the M.P.s tried to be there by that time. Therefore delegates who were called "seçmen" by the M.P.s* come early in the morning, at about 6 o'clock. Bulut said they came straight from the bus terminal to his house for breakfast. During breakfast they discussed the details of their problems, and by 9 o'clock about 15 people would gather in the house. When the offices opened at 9 a.m., Bulut began to make phone calls to various people, or took the delegates personally to the offices in question. He said most of the cases that came to Ankara were for admissions to hospital. But requests for jobs, land disputes, services to villages, and other problems were also very common. His wife continually served tea, coffee and food to the delegates in the house and some of them stayed overnight. For a time, Bulut rented another flat which he used as a hostel for the delegates, but later all Kayseri M.P.s decided to jointly rent an office for the delegates to use, in order to take the burden off their own houses and wives. But, for factional reasons, they continued to see the delegates in their houses so that they could keep a loyal group to themselves without giving them a chance to become involved with other M.P.s

Some of the favours that were asked of Bulut could be solved immediately, but others took long periods in the bureaucracy even if there was a positive answer eventually. Most of the delegates cannot wait that long so Bulut himself followed the procedure. on their behalf. Sometimes the delegate came back to learn the results later, otherwise Bulut wrote to him at every step of the procedure. He said

* "Seçmen" means voter. But in this case it implies a voter in election primaries i.e. delegate.

that during weekends, when the delegates did not come except for emergency hospital treatment, he wrote up to 100 letters. I was impressed by his efficiency, without a secretary and with the most primitive recording system he managed to remember all the details of the personal problems of the delegates and followed many cases in various offices simultaneously. He claimed he was asked, on average, 50 favours per day. During the times he was Minister this increased to 200, but this was easier because he could then mobilize all ministerial staff.

Although he claimed that he would be elected from any party because, irrespective of their party affiliations, he had helped everybody, he was bound to the RPP for the extent of his clientage. The long years he spent as an M.P. and minister gave him a considerable place in provincial RPP politics. Most people thought he was indispensable and so did not fight him. If he resigned from the party, and was elected by another party, he would lose that favourable, mature network of clientage.

In fact, in 1972 he was actively opposed to the social democratic movement and he thought of resigning together with Inönü. But he calculated that in the RPP he had more chance of being re-elected so he stayed.

He said he was a man of practical politics, for him politics meant helping the poor with their immediate problems in life. He thought that the RPP should be more respectful to the beliefs and customs of ordinary people than it had been until then. As he put it: "There is no point in describing the party ideology in terms of socio-economic principles or historical origins. I explain the equality of man or land reform in the form of verses taken from the Kuran. Anything regarding party ideology can be found in such religious or traditional stories. The problem is to explain things to the people so that they can understand them, rather

than mixing up their minds, thereby alienating the voter from the party".

Such a practical attitude towards politics was resented by the professional groups then beginning to control the local party branches. But, as Bulut based his power on such an extensive clientage, they could not oppose him effectively. In every election primary, the local leaders of various counties agreed that they would oppose Bulut in favour of a radical candidate, but they could neither declare it openly nor tell the delegates. They could not declare it publically because they knew that, despite their opposition, Bulut would be elected, and when elected they would ask favours of him in Ankara. Amongst the M.P.s, he was the only one who genuinely worked to help them in times of need. His effectiveness in patronage was well known among the delegates, and most of them owed him loyalty and reciprocity. The rest knew that having Bulut was a guarantee of goodwill in brokerage, therefore even if the delegate was asked not to vote for him, he would probably refuse. Even if he did not openly refuse, because of his links with the local brokers, he still voted for him in the secret ballot. Opposition against Bulut with ideological weapons was not successful.

Bulut's indispensability in Kayseri politics helped him with his ambitions in Ankara. After the 1972 changes in the party, people like Bulut with little ideological commitment to Social democracy were discredited for some time. But on the other hand, the 1972 changes also brought more consideration of the ideas and demands of the local party cadres. The members of parliament who had strong clientage networks soon gained importance in the party through being powerful in their local organisations. Kayseri was an important province in terms of political power. The influence and indispensability of Kayseri RPP gave Bulut ministerial positions twice and effectivity in the central party organisa-

tions which he uses to extend his client network. Everybody saw him as an M.P. for life. The bureaucracy regarded him as powerful because even if the RPP was in opposition, the officials thought, "when the party comes to power, he will not forget what I have done for him, and will help me in the future with my promotion".

Bulut had a very interesting place amongst the other members of parliament. The two other Kayseri M.P.s tried very hard to be like Bulut. Once there was someone like him in the party the delegates expected more from the other. Therefore he reinforced the patron-client relations and raised the expectations of delegates.

Another M.P. from Kayseri, however, followed a different line. He was in the top bureaucracy for 20 years. He had never been involved in local politics, but he was suggested for Kayseri province by the central organisation of the party, when the party was seeking respectability with the bureaucracy and with business. He said that no matter how hard he tried it was impossible to avoid brokerage completely. So he dealt in only the bigger problems such as appointing a governor or prefect, or deciding on an industrial project. Bulut nevertheless involved him with such problems using his influence on the bureaucracy, whereas he sent relatively unimportant matters and non-influential delegates to other M.P.s. With his manipulative control of conflict, with his extensive clientage and influence in the central party organisations that were rooted in clientage, Bulut was the key figure that linked local political brokerage to Ankara.

4.9.2 Strategies for Being Elected into Political Positions:

In general elections the candidates from all over Kayseri visited Kaleli. Before the primary elections, there were about 20 candidates, only eight of whom could get onto the RPP list and out of those only

three would be elected in general elections. There were two ways open to candidates to be elected, and most of them tried both. They either got in touch with the delegates directly, or tried to bargain with local leaders who had loyal delegates bound to them who would vote for whoever they were told. All the candidates sent letters to delegates, including a curriculum vitae. On the whole, there were about 2500 to 3000 delegates in Kayseri, depending on the previous elections voting percentages. Therefore, for a new candidate it was quite impossible to know each of them well enough to ask for support. Only the long term members of parliament knew most of them personally.

New candidates only knew the delegates of their own county. All candidates had the backing of their county, irrespective of factional difference, unless there were two or more of them from the same county. Every delegate wanted someone he knew personally elected as an M.P. because he knew then he could ask endless favours without any inhibitions or intermediaries. It was argued that such a candidate attracted votes because voters thought that he would bring more services to his own county to show his gratitude and to keep their support.

But it was impossible for every county to have a candidate at the top of the list. Therefore, there was a lot of bargaining between the candidates and the counties through local leadership and middlemen. In this case, every county, or each faction in the county separately, tried to calculate a method of voting that would get candidates they wanted onto the list and not the others. It was easier to prevent somebody getting onto the list than vice versa, because if three counties agreed not to vote for someone, they could at least mobilize 500 delegates not to vote for the candidate in question. This put them into fourth position, and from there it was impossible to get elected.

Knowing that county leaders can do the trick above, the eminent long serving M.P.s therefore appealed to delegates loyalty directly. Their activity in the counties was more oriented towards keeping good relations with all the factions, if possible, instead of forming direct relations with one.

This was a relatively closed system for the new candidates. Every county wanted their own candidate elected. The rivalry between the counties was so great that they ^{never} agreed on conditions and names. In any case, there were ten counties that had to agree on three names out of twenty. They had to vote as a whole without missing any vote, which was impossible. It was also difficult for new candidates to establish direct relations with the delegates. They did not have much means of brokerage unless they were elected, and without such relations they could not be elected. In this competition the provincial leaders stood the best chance. They knew all the county leaders well, Kayseri city delegates that were very numerous and they expected their loyalty. What was more, some county delegates and muhtars went to Kayseri to solve their problems at the provincial level, especially with the governor. The provincial leaders helped them, and demanded reciprocity during elections. But in the 1977 elections, there occurred an exception to this rule, in the case of Bulut (see section 4.9.1.).

In the general elections, the peak of party activity was during election primaries. At that time all the bargaining went on, which meant long hours of discussion for candidates and local leaders lasting for weeks, taking to delegates and reminding them of the favours they owed. Party propaganda was carried out in a limited period of two months after the primary elections. This was more or less a routine of going around villages asking for votes (see section 4.6). The outcome of the election was not important as long as there was no decrease in the RPP's

percentage of votes in the county, even if the RPP won nationally. If the RPP lost votes in the election, there might be a change of branch leaders, enforced by the provincial party and central party organization.

In the local elections, anxiety continues throughout the elections. Usually there was no election primary, drawing up the list was done gradually over a few years. Every candidates' place was decided more or less with a consensus. Nobody from the leadership of the local party wanted to be the candidate for the position of mayor, because there was no chance of winning. Still, if there was no candidate this dishonoured the party and decreased the percentage of RPP votes. So the aim was to get a respectable honest man as the candidate, and in this way not to threaten either the honour of the party or the reputations of established local politicians. For example in the 1977 local elections, the leadership invited a veterinarian teacher, H. Ankarali who was a native of Kale, but who had lived outside for 20 years (see p??). In those years he was not politically active, but after he retired he intended to get into politics. He lost the mayoral election in 1977, but stayed in town to continue in politics. After 2 years he became the local leader.

But there was severe competition for membership of the municipal council. Towards the end of the term, the candidates for the next one were more or less known, although there were one or two last minute suggestions. Who got onto the list, and onto a position that had a good chance of being elected, depended upon their relative bargaining power, in which factions they were and which potential votes they controlled.

In the 1977 local elections, the professionals argued that the main basis for deciding on the candidates should be their potential votes. They said that one representative from every major occupation group in town should be put onto the list. For example, one from the

transporters, one from the teachers and one from small industry. The rest of the party leadership opposed this, claiming that it should be decided on the basis of years of service to the party.

These differences of principle in selecting the list were interesting in terms of showing the different factions' conceptions of the party and political activity. The professionals claimed an ideological bond with the party. They wanted to increase votes, but they wanted ideologically committed votes. The principle they proposed was, "the just representation of all classes" and this they associated with their socialist ideology. For the old RPP notables, including the Aksoy family, an increase in votes was secondary in importance. The first thing was to achieve a balance of power in the local RPP that did not threaten their existence and influence. They could not claim any ideological commitment, their asset was the years they had served in the party. They claimed that if the loyal supporters were rewarded, the vote would increase because it would show the party's goodwill towards loyalty.

After long hours of discussions, they drew up the list on neither of these principals, but on the relative power of the candidates, and their factional loyalty. The outcome was in accordance with both of these principles, because there were a variety of occupations amongst the people that had served the party for many years.

The question of what kind of local election propaganda to pursue generated a lot of discussion in the party. Everybody agreed that the best method was to visit the voters house by house, introducing the candidates for mayorship and membership of the municipal council, asking for their demands from the municipality and promising them some services. But to visit all the households was impossible. The next best thing was to give talks in the coffee shops. Larger meetings were not favoured because there could be no discussions with the voters. In every

election members of other parties tried other means. In the 1977 elections there were rumours that the Justice Party was distributing soap and sugar to bribe the voters. The members of the Aksoy family suggested that some money should be raised and then distributed to the very poor for buying votes, but the professionals disagreed claiming that the RPP should appeal to conscience rather than to the pocket.

Although there may be disagreements among the leadership, to win the local elections was very important to all the members. For the professionals it was a step towards socialism, and consolidating their success in the party. They might gain a few economic benefits from it, for example solving a disputed land problem or something similar, but this was of secondary importance. For the rest of the leadership, it was a major economic asset. A businessman had hundreds of problems with the municipality, and they hoped that by winning elections there would be solutions to some of them.

The municipal elections and other local elections were more important to the party activist in town in terms of its immediate returns. Irrespective of their work, there would be some votes for the RPP in general elections, enough to elect 2 or 3 M.P.s, whereas only their hard work could lead to success in the local elections. For the peasant delegate, the only important thing was the general elections. He did not expect much from the local ones.*

4.10 Fund Raising in the Party

Running the party was very expensive, especially during election times. Renting cars to go to the villages, renting coffee shops in the town to make propaganda, publishing and distributing leaflets and pro-

* The village elections for muhtar are outside my discussion though of course it was important in terms of village politics.

viding transport for delegates all added to the expenditure. Each member agreed to pay a small fee in the statutes. Although the fee was trivial (from 12 T.L. to 120 T/L/ a year), it was almost impossible to make them pay. In any case, during election periods the needed funds were over 200,000 T.L. (in 1977), and even if all fees were payed it would not be of much help.

The central party organisation sent some money to the provinces, but little reached the counties, and therefore whatever funds were needed had to be raised locally. The routine expenses like paying the rent of the party office, the paperwork, or similar things, were paid by the local leadership from their own pockets. Some money was made by sub-letting the coffee shop, the rest was usually paid by the leader himself.

It was understood amongst the leading members, however, that they had to contribute small amounts during the year. This included the opposing factions, and in fact they tried very hard to pay bills to show they were contributing. But election expenses were beyond one man's capacity. The party was run on a voluntary basis, with the local leaders carrying the burden. Each candidate had to pay a certain amount to be registered as a candidate. Then he, or his supporters, paid all the expenses of his personal propaganda. This included visits to delegates in the villages, meals with local and provincial leaders, trips to Kayseri, buying meals in town for delegates, paying for their transport, or sending cars to villages during the election primary day to transport delegates. Once the list was set and the RPP candidates for the elections were known, then those on the list, especially the ones with higher positions on the list, had to contribute again for party propaganda.

The money raised by the local leadership and the contributions from the candidates, constituted the basis of party election funds. The rest involved voluntary work rather than money contributions. Car owning supporters worked voluntarily, paying for their own petrol, either in propaganda or transporting voters to ballot boxes. The print house owners printed free if the party bought the paper. The youth group distributed the pamphlets. The delegate bore the expenses of propaganda in the village. The group that came to the village from town only paid for their own transport. They were usually given a meal in one of the delegates homes. Later they went to a coffee shop to make the propaganda with the voters (only male voters). The bill for the tea drank there was paid by the delegates of that village.

In every stage of activity, every active participant had to spend some money from his own pocket. For the delegates and local leadership this constituted one to six months income. For the candidates this went up to a million Turkish Lira in some cases, because they had to spend for the 10 counties of Kayseri. The less chance a candidate had, the more money he had to spend. The established M.Ps standing for re-election only recalled the loyalty and reciprocity owed, but new candidates had to establish a clientage from the beginning. They had to introduce themselves to the delegates and show their willingness to help by spending generously.

As some cash had to be spent by the active membership of all levels, the delegates had to have the necessary income to afford this. Obligatory expenditure imposed on such people limited political activity to those people with more than moderate incomes.

4.11 Auxiliary Organizations

4.11.1 The Women's Group

The first women's group in Kale was founded in the 1930's (see section 4.1). After 1950 there was no women's activity in the party, but in every primary election a few names, usually the wives of leading local politicians, were included amongst the delegates, to give the impression to the central organization that there was a women's group.

The first moves towards forming a real women's group in Kaleli began in 1970 and was initiated by Hasan Aksoy. The first members were young university graduate women or the wives of the professionals. This was seen as a part of social democratic ideology and bringing a western outlook to the town. Until the 1977 local elections, the only activities of the group was to defend the party in tea party discussions and vote in election primaries as their husbands wanted them to.

In the 1977 municipal elections the leader of the women's group, Nihal Vanli, who had carried out the job for 8 years wanted to be elected onto the municipal council. The local leadership that was drawing up the candidates list (there was no election primary) agreed to this. They claimed that it would appeal to the women voters in Kale; municipal services such as electricity and water were most needed by women, if these services were poorly provided women suffered the most for they had to draw water from the well and work under gas lamps. If there was a women on the list women voters might think that, without any sexual inhibition, they might go and appeal to her. But in fact the leadership of the party knew very well that most women voters would not even know there was a female candidate. Even if they knew they would not change their voting just for this. Vanli's name was suggested at the most appropriate time when she was the best solution to a lot of intricate factional problems.

Her husband, Sadi Vanli, a lawyer, was an active party supporter. In the general elections of 1977 he worked very hard and discovered certain illegalities with the Justice Party list; because of this some of them were disqualified in certain villages. He helped I. Kaynak a great deal going from village to village, night and day, and he spent a lot of money for the party. It was understood that he would require a position in the municipal council. Dervis and his friends in the professionals faction thought that it was his natural right. But if he was given a place, this would attract a lot of opposition from the other factions, because in the balance of forces, the people from the professional faction would have the advantage. Still, Dervis did not want to give any more places to the opposing factions. So N. Vanli came out as the best option. The opposing factions and some individuals argued that having a woman on the list would cause reactions from the conservative community, but N. Vanli was the least westernised, most traditional woman in the group, so the argument did not last long. In fact, N. Vanli had a good reputation in Kale, as the daughter of a native bureaucrat. She was a technical Lycee graduate, honest and very religious, and a respected housewife, and mother of two children.

After N. Vanli was put at the top of the list, the women's group decided to make some propaganda. After two incidents they have decided to stop. I was with them during both of these events. The first trip was to some of the newly built areas where mainly workers from Germany lived. This area was chosen because the male population was low there, as most of the husbands lived in Germany. It was thought that having no husbands around wives were more open to RPP propaganda. The local party leader Dervis suggested the place, so his wife, N. Vanli, another pharmacist and a native woman whose husband was a technician in a carpet factory and who knew the area, went for propaganda. I soon discovered that what they understood by propaganda was visiting some acquaintances

that already voted RPP. The only political sentence uttered in the few houses we visited was when N. Vanli said that she was a candidate, so they should go to her in case of a problem. Otherwise, we drank tea, saw some girl's trousseaux, talked about the weather and local gossip. The whole trip lasted for about an hour. Such a visit would have only one political value, it showed that the candidate was willing to help if needed. Otherwise there could be no increase in votes through visiting the people that already voted for the party, apart from factional reasons.

The second one was in a totally different setting. In the recently built carpet factory, about 10 families of managers and engineers lived. The plant was just outside Kale, but it was so self-contained that they did not even go to Kale for shopping. The wives of these managers and engineers gathered every afternoon in a specially kept social area to play cards. The second afternoon the group decided to go to this tea party. The same group, apart from the woman who knew the previous area, but with the addition of a local doctor's wife who was very friendly with the people living in the carpet factory went there. Now, as the people they visited were a westernized group that came from bigger cities, there were no cultural problems in communication. But this time other problems emerged. The women in the carpet factory began to complain about the present mayor, saying that he was not controlling prices and added that Kale shopkeepers were cheating them. Then, instead of being tactful, the women from the RPP group began defending the mayor (he was from a different party but he was a native). These two meetings ended the political activity of the RPP's Women's group, except for N. Vanli herself, she was elected to municipal council.

Another imposed participation of a woman in politics was in a village municipality. In 1972, the mayor, a young primary school teacher,

was shot dead in a semi-political feud. His wife, a primary school graduate, was nominated as a candidate by the Kaleli branch to show the support of the party for the previous mayor. She was elected, but her term ended after about 8 months. During this time, I was told, she remained a housewife at home, and all the work was carried out by a deputy mayor with the help of the local RPP leader, Hasan Aksoy. Later she gave up politics, fleeing to Kale away from the feud.

There were many reasons why the political activity of women was so limited, and most of them were cultural. It is not seen as proper for women to take part in politics in Kale. Turkish men, including some of the intellectuals, think their wives, daughters, or any female members of the family, should not be involved in politics. Even for women working outside home, political activity was inappropriate because it implies intimate relations with men outside working hours. For native men and women, this kind of traditional control was more obvious. In one's own territory, one does not want to endanger one's honour by letting female kin have close links with politics.

Also, women have little to expect from politics. For example they knew that the government party created inflation, so they blamed the government and might vote for the opposition in the next elections, but they did not think in terms of ^{party} ideology. They reacted to concrete situations, which was why ideological propaganda was less appealing to them. Women of all classes were very much influenced by their husband's political attitude, but not always positively. I often met women who voted differently from their husbands, not because they think differently, but as a reaction against politics. They were angry with their husbands for their heavy involvement in politics. They saw politics as involving a power struggle, sometimes by immoral means. But what dispelled women most was the money spent by their husbands on politics and the long

hours and nights away from home, often drinking "raki"* and discussing intricate political tactics. Working class women were outside the political sphere in Kale because there was little active participation in the working class as a whole. As for the town businessmen's wives they despise politics and there is no possibility of them actively participating because control over them is very strong.

The wives of professionals were the only active people in the women's group. However, they also had cultural problems. Being involved with active politics meant interaction with people from different social classes. The women's group were natives of Kale, or from outside, and see the migrants as peasants and inferior. The difference between them was so great that they could not even address each other. They did not have much in common to speak about. The non-professional women had little interest in politics, if their husbands were not active participants they would have none. Housework and the burdens of raising children were too much for them and they could not spare time for politics, so there was no reaction to the propaganda from women voters. The group that I went with was very embarrassed with me about the "ignorant" community in which they live. They began discussing whether cultural modernization and westernization precede socialist reforms, showing to me, a western educated outsider, that they were not a part of this traditional community, even if they were born and lived in Kale.

However, as they were partly outside of the traditional community, could they use the privileges of their semi-independent positions to take part in politics? Ironically, politics for this group was a family matter, and their activity was oriented towards promoting their husband's ambitions. All of them dreamed of their husbands being members of parliament, so that they could get away from Kale. They joined this

* A spirit mostly drunk by men.

group with a view to bringing modernity to the women of Kale, and making them aware of Social Democracy so they formed the group to take part in politics. The group has never had any reaction from the rest of the female population, including the members of the Aksoy family because they were inhibited by tradition. So the best they could do under these conditions was to discuss local political gossip in tea parties. In summary, politics in Kale was male dominated. Even if women were involved in some cases, they were bound to be only marginally active. Their total activity was oriented towards helping the male members of their family.

4.11.2 The Youth Group

There had never been an established, permanent youth group in Kaleli. The youth organization was only a show piece for the central party organization. But there were youth group activities that were partly autonomous from the party.

In the Kaleli local branch nobody knew who the delegates for the next youth branch congress would be. They were elected a few days before the congress by the local youth leader and the local leadership, from the list of members that were below the age of 30. Sometimes in the congress non-members would also vote. In many cases there was no congress, the leading local factions wrote a list of names for the executive committee with the help of some young supporters that were around helping the local leader. Only the local youth leader was chosen by an election, or at least by the general consensus within the party. Otherwise not having elections was very common. Even if the local youth executive committee was elected by a proper congress, in 4 years time most of the names in the executive committee would change being replaced by substitutes. Most of them resigned for factional reasons, for ideological reasons or because they went on military service or to the university or had to work away.

During the elections the youth groups activity was to act as ballot box controllers on behalf of the RPP. Before every election the party had to prepare final lists of delegates and voters. It was a simple but time consuming job. The youth group was expected to write these lists and their copies. They also checked that the delegates that were expected to vote for their faction were on the list. They controlled the voting lists in the prefecture in which all expected RPP voters were included. They controlled the ballot box during the elections and tried to cheat for the RPP if there was any possibility.* When the elections were over this group would disperse until a new group gathers in the next elections.

Although, as can be understood from the description above, there was no proper youth organization, there was a core of young people that worked for the party continually and carried out the bulk of the work during elections. They were young students, in the Lycee or in the university, or recent graduates. They were supporters of a broad left ideology within the RPP., arguing that it was the only real alternative to fascism.

In the 1977 elections in Kaleli, such a coalition was very important. The Fascist party was increasing its support. Most of the young population, especially those in the technical high schools or in high schools for men, were affiliated to the National Action Party. The left wing youth were either the sons of RPP supporters, or had been influenced by such ideology in the big cities. As they were a minority they decided to join forces to support the RPP. In the municipal elections this support grew because the RPP candidate was known to have left tendencies.

* Repeated voting was common amongst the young voters, some boasted of voting up to 5 times in separate boxes.

From 1976 to 1978 a youth group, under the protection of the professionals in the town, worked for the party and the left. Such work often involved street fights with the fascists. From 1978 onwards the National Action party began to control the bureaucracy and the army, including the police and gendarme, in Kale and Kaleli. Gradually the group of students gave up, and eventually had to leave Kale because of threats to their lives. In June 1978, a group of fascists beat the Aksoy family's 22 year old grand-daughter, a secretary in one of the banks, in front of their own house. Although Cemal Aksoy himself went to the Governor of Kayseri to persuade him to arrest those that did it, nothing happened and this was seen as a show of strength by the fascist youth against the left even if she was a girl. This marked the end of any left wing youth activity.

4.12 Concluding Remarks to the Structure of RPP in Kaleli

The Republican Peoples Party in Kaleli experienced major changes from 1960 to late 1970's. The party organization was dominated by local notables who had patronage relations with the peasant delegates, to secure themselves with votes. They used this political power to bargain for favours. In this sense RPP had a very vertical structure which it preserved ever since it was founded.

Being vertically structured however, there were major changes in the party during early 1970's which ended up the dominance of merchants in the party branch with the transfer of power to local professionals. It was a factional dispute, but both sides represented different forms of participation and different ideologies. Whereas the merchants represented the centrist Kemalist tradition of the party, the professionals advocated for more inner party democracy and social democratic ideology. The principles of the professionals which became prevalent in RPP organization after the 1972 congress in the party, implied ending

the vertical forms of participation to be replaced by corporate forms of participation. It also implied that the poorer sections of the peasants should be defended and there should be more powers given to the party rank and file, i.e. delegates and members.

The inner party democracy principle had a great appeal to the delegates, although they were not, as professionals wrongly expected, poor peasants. On the contrary, they were a group of rich peasants: a peasant bourgeoisie and rich village entrepreneurs who wanted to take advantage of party politics. For this class the vertical means of participation such as brokerage relations, was important in maintaining access to resources. In such a relation, the professionals were more efficient and responsive than the old patrons. As a summary, we can draw the two following conclusions.

- (1) In case of Kaleli not only brokers were from a distinct social class but so were the clients, i.e. they were a group of rich villagers - the agricultural capitalist entrepreneurs and non-agricultural village entrepreneurs.
- (2) The brokerage relations formed between these rich villagers and urban professionals, in RPP structure was not accidental. This was a form of participation for the delegates, and it was to their advantage as a group to preserve it as an exclusive system. Brokerage in this political context is a specific form of participation by which certain classes use the party machine to articulate their interests.

CHAPTER 5

MIGRANTS AND NATIVES: THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON POLITICS

5.1 The General Outlook of the Taşlık County

Taşlık* is a county on the road from Istanbul to Izmit. It is among the places that have experienced the most rapid social change in Turkey. What was only a small town in 1960 became a medium sized city in 20 years. It is a very old settlement (established more than 1000 years ago). In the last 100 years before 1960 it had a more or less stable population and subsequent rapid population increase was due to migration. The migration boom came with industrialization, multiplying the population twelvefold in a short time. (See Table 8A.)

At first sight Taşlık seems to have no clear boundaries on the main route from Istanbul to Ankara. Taşlık is part of a chain of administratively separate villages and a small city that forms a single stretch of housing and industry from Istanbul to Izmit. This stretch of urban land runs parallel to the sea, and is almost 90 km long. Taş, the administrative centre, is in the middle of this stretch. It is one of the most industrialized areas of Turkey. The only motorway in Turkey is between Taş and Istanbul, the extension to Izmit is currently under construction.

Before the massive population explosion and industrialization Taş was a town serving the nearby villages. Even in that sense it was not very developed as a commercial centre and its hinterland was small. The only reliable transport to Taş until 1950 was a railway which passed about 10 km from Taş. But having a mild climate helped the inhabitants to earn substantial incomes by providing Istanbul with fruits

* Taşlık is a pseudonym of the country and Taş is a pseudonym for the town.

and vegetables. Whatever agricultural land that has remained, however small, is still covered with fruit trees, most of them barren now as a result of pollution.

The rapid industrialization of Taşlik began in 1960's. The first industrial plant was established in 1845, a state owned cloth factory, which had a carpet factory annexed in 1884.* But this did not have a significant result in terms of industrialization in the area.

In 1950 the new road from Istanbul to Ankara was built, passing through Taş. Industrialization begun with this new road. Proximity to Istanbul, cheaper land prices, transport facilities, being near to the sea and having access to railway and roads, ample supply of labour, attracted Istanbul's industrial capital to Taşlik. The land prices were much lower than those in Istanbul and with this new road** it became almost a part of Istanbul, about 45 minutes away by car, 60 minutes by slow suburban train and 90 minutes by sea. In the meanwhile the Istanbul municipality increased pressure on new industry to move out of the city boundaries. Taşlik proved to be the best alternative offering all the facilities plus an ample supply of labour.*** The first steps towards industrialization in the area began in 1955 with Arcelik, an assembly plant for household goods. This had a take off effect on Taşlik industry together with the more efficient transport system. Eventually by 1978 there were 50 factories employing more than 100 workers in Taşlik, and some more smaller ones.

* This was one of the Ottoman projects for industrialization.

** A second road was built in the 1970's, not shortening the distance between Istanbul and Taş but reducing travelling time from 45 minutes to half an hour

*** There was a land shortage in terms of industrial location in Istanbul. The geographical location of the city eventually forced the big industry to Anatolian side with cheap land, and smaller industry to European side with cheap means of transport but expensive land.

TABLE 8A

Population increase in Taslik

Years	Population of Tas	Rural Population in Taslik
1955	5812	19.594
1960	8018	22.427
1965	9269	24.405
1970	18773	28.208
1975	33110	36.934

Source: State Statistical Institute 1975 Population Statistics

TABLE 8B

Rate of population increase in Taslik

Years	Tas % (urban)	Taslik % (rural)
1955-1960	37.9	14.4
1960-1965	15.6	8.8
1965-1970	102.5	15.5
1970-1975	76.3	30.9

Source: State Statistical Institute 1975 Population Statistics

TABLE 8C

Causes of Population Increase in Taslik

Years	Migration	Natural	Total
1960	1013	4022	5035
1965	865	2367	3232
1970	10679	2628	13307
1975	19138	3927	23065

Source: State Statistical Institute 1975 Population Statistics

The location of industry is quite regular. Almost all of the factories from Istanbul to Izmit lie on the south side of the road towards the sea, the residential areas are to the north of the road, with a few quarters scattered amongst the industries. The location of industries is not accidental. The south has the best means of transportation being nearer to the sea. The industry forced the residential areas out to the north and the town centre is also north of the motorway.

Even by 1973 Taşlık was quite a developed area in terms of the services available. There were 4 primary schools in the town and 36 in the villages. There were 58 teachers in the town and another 101 in the villages. The first secondary school in Taş opened in 1935 and by 1973 there were 3 secondary schools once Lycee, 2 technical Lycees. There were a few health centres in the area, there were 15 midwives, 5 nurses and 10 doctors (including 7 specialists) besides 10 health officers. People could also use the nearby facilities available in Istanbul or Izmit.

Taşlık was the administrative centre of 29 villages. Since the villages on the road can not be separated from the urban area, I will look at the county in terms of three residential categories. First there is the town Taş within the boundaries of the municipality. Second there is the industrial belt and the residential area surrounding it, which have been integrated with the nearby villages in time. Thirdly there are about 10 villages inland, more or less outside the industrial area, about 20 minutes to 1 hour by bus to Taş.

5.2 Taş - the Town

Taş as a town attracted most of the migrants. The municipal boundaries, although revised every 5 years, do not include some of the quarters very near to the town. The municipal population was multiplied by

12 in 25 years. (See Table 8A and 8B). This had major effects on the social structure of the town and its outlook. Unlike Kaleli and most of the other Anatolian small towns, central part of Taş resembled a small city with 5 or 6 storey modern buildings, regularly paved roads, and shops that appealed to the different consumption patterns of various classes. Like most cities in Turkey that attracted a lot of migrants there were huge areas of squatter houses, although they were not visible from the town centre.

Taş had no shopping centre although there were two areas where there was a relative concentration of retail shops: on the old Ankara - Istanbul road that passed through the city centre and the road coming from the new highway to the city centre. In these areas there was about 70 shops involved with various retail trades. In Taş, wholesale trade was almost absent, because in terms of bulk deals it was very near to Istanbul. The indigenous capital in Taş was therefore limited to retail, and (except one factory) shares in some industries in the immediate vicinity. As the labour force was imported to Taş, so was capital. 49 out of the 50 large factories that were established in Taş had their capital imported from outside, and based their management outside. They did not use inputs from Taş, nor did they establish their administrative units there. Their managers and engineers did not live there and they did not have any deals with banks in Taş. Their only daily relation to town was with workers and with transport. This is why 200 transporting firms of various sizes was registered in Taş.

Just as Kale was a town that served the villages in its hinterland, Taş was a working class town. Such a huge influx of migrants led to prosperous retail business in the town. Therefore Taş had a relatively simple class structure. 63.2% of population were wage earners, 21.2% were self employed, and only 8.4% were employers (see Table 9B). The

remaining 7% included the unemployed and the seasonal employees.

5.3 The Class Structure of the Town

5.3.1 Middle Classes

As pointed out before the factory owners, with the exception of one or two families, did not live in Taş. But most natives of the town were rentiers and/or small business owners.

A large part of the urban land in Taş and its immediate vicinity where the "gecekondus" were situated, previously belonged to one family. They sold that land later, founded an electrical motor company which is very modern and capital intensive and employing 400 workers. This family were still living in Taş in 1978. Besides the factory they were involved in various other kinds of business, including exports and imports on large scale.

The rest of the native population did not have large amounts of land to invest in such big projects. As the land prices increased at such enormous rates, some ended up quite rich. The natives of the town still control the greater part of the land market. Their safeguard against inflation was to sell land gradually. Therefore most of them still own land. Their power was not only based on land but also on their ownership of the shopping district and town centre.

The natives of Taş were generally richer than migrants and proportionately less natives worked in the factories as unskilled labourers. Most of the natives were professionals, highly skilled labourers and shop keepers of varying affluence. Such an occupational composition was by no means surprising or accidental. As the small unused plots of land of the natives became more and more valuable they put the money received from land speculators into their old businesses and/or opened new shops.

TABLE 9A

Distribution of Active Population into Sectors (1977)

	No	%
Agriculture, forestry & fishery	1607	7.66
Manufacturing Industry	13985	66.68
Electricity, water, Gas	157	0.7
Construction	765	3.64
Trade (retail & wholesale)	617	2.94
Transportation & Depots	842	4.01
Financial institutions	548	2.61
Social services	1726	8.22
Non defined	676	3.22
Total	20973	

Source: Chamber of Commerce and Industry

TABLE 9B
Employment in Tas (1978)

Working population	%
Wage earners	63.2
Self-employed	21.2
Employer	8.4
Indefinite	7.2

Source: Municipality Research Report (Taş) (1978)

TABLE 9C
Family Incomes in Tas in 1978

0-3000 (below minwage)	23.4%
3000-7500	60%
7500 ->	16%

Source: Municipality Research Report (1978)

Such an increase in incomes made it possible for them to send their children to universities and technical schools. Upon their return their children not only made good money in the factories, in which they were in great demand, but also opened small businesses and private consultancies. In the town centre, where the rents for shops were very high, business was dominated by the natives. The natives also dominated durable consumer goods shops and the trade in construction materials. In these areas the capital investments needed were higher, there were longer time spans for the returns on purchases.

But neither all small business owners nor all professionals in Taş were natives. Being a prospering and developing area Taş attracted professionals and small businessmen from outside. In terms of small businesses, the corner shop keepers in the gecekondü areas were almost without exception migrants* Some early migrants also either through land speculation or from savings have managed to open shops in the town centre. There were also people who came with a small amount of capital, to open businesses there, considering the future of the town and the area. Amongst them a small proportion had thrived, particularly as the building industry continued to expand until the early 1980's.

The migrant traders relied on hire purchases. Native traders did not want to give credit to migrants whom they did not know personally because of the difficulty in getting money back in the absence of informal control mechanisms. Thus in buying and selling on credit ethnic networks were to the benefit of both sides. The migrant without much difficulty bought his necessities. On the other hand, he was obliged to buy from traders from his place of origin who charged them very high prices. In these shops not only were prices higher but credit terms

* The corner shopkeepers are extremely important in the political structure of Taş and I will discuss them in due course.

were also difficult.

In the repairs and small industry sector there was also a mixture of migrant and native population. Some natives had invested in small workshops. Amongst the migrants with skills there had been a movement towards opening repairshops and small manufacturing firms. Also in transport, especially the smallest partnerships were dominated by the migrant population.

Some professionals who lived in Taş were not natives. They were attracted to Taş by its rapid development and therefore the chances of earning good money were high and, on the other hand, unlike some small places where such services were in high demand, it was near to Istanbul.

5.3.2 Working Classes

Although the middle classes of Taş had mixed origins, the working classes were predominantly migrants to the town from various places. The majority of the migrants came from three basic areas. The largest ethnic group was the 'Laz' population coming from the Eastern coast of the Black Sea (29.8%). The second largest was the group coming from the immediate vicinity of Taş, Marmara region (25.4%). The third group from the East (18.4%) came mainly from one province, Kars. The Kurdish population in Taş was relatively small* (See Table 10A).

The majority of migrants population came from rural areas (see Table 9B); half of them were engaged in farming before migrating (46.2%). Comparing this with their present work shows the drastic change that has occurred; only 0.2% in agriculture now.

* Although there was a small Kurdish problem the most important ethnic division was between the Alevi's and the Sunnis. I will discuss this later.

Migration seems to follow some definite patterns. First, the young male population migrate. Coming to Taş with the whole family was rare. The first jobs were usually in casual labour markets or in the building industry. They were unskilled. Even the literacy rate in Taş was lower than in other cities (about 65%). Without a skill it was difficult to find a job. But usually the new migrant counted on the help of previously migrated relatives, friends and co-villagers. For some time he stayed with them, whereas the building industry worker slept at his place of work. The wages in this sector were high but work was seasonal. At first many migrants went back to their villages in winter when the season was over, but later they began to look for more secure jobs. With the help of a personal network, and with luck many found one, the next step was to bring the family (if they did not come by then) and to build a gecekondü.

1) A place to Live

The major problems of an ordinary migrant family in Taş were employment and shelter. Rented accommodation was expensive and rare* Also it was not desirable. To own a house was considered better and more secure however degrading its conditions may be. So every migrant preferred to build a "gecekondü",** a house of his own. The land for the house was either free or very cheap. The problem was to find such land. Formally the state owned most of the land: but once one occupied them, it virtually became one's own. The law made it extremely difficult to demolish houses once the roof was on. The original gecekondüs were built in one night, to protect the building from being seen before

* 58.6% of households were living in their own property, only about 37.9% were renting accommodation. This included the town proper where renting rate was very high. (Source Taş municipality report.)

** Squatter house.

the roof

The migrants preferred to build their houses on state land, although there were cases of occupying private property. Mainly because there was little protection of state land. There were frequent amnesties for occupation of state land* but the problem was to find state land. The land registry office in Taş claimed to be very secretive about such information. They said it was only by years of experience that migrant families knew the areas of state land. However, migrants told me that the best way of learning was by bribing the officials (which seemed to be true because there were bribery accusation charges against almost all land registration officers in Taş). Even bribing was difficult for an ordinary migrant. Finding the right man, paying the right amount, the timing of the bribe all constituted great problems for him.

The bribery process was carried out by migrant entrepreneurs known as "gecekondü ağası".** They designated the land to the migrant. Previously they had enclosed a piece of land illegally, on which they built a house of their own, and had large gardens. The migrant contacted this man through the help of relatives. In some cases the migrant knew the "gecekondü ağası" from his hometown. He sold pieces from his garden on credit. Besides this transaction, they would also own small businesses in the quarters. Usually it was either a general store or a coffee shop, or both, but in most cases it was mixed up with estate agency titles to cover up for his illegal land dealings.

* Eviction is through a court case. The court cases take a long time and one is bound to be included in one of the pardons that occur during almost every election.

** This figure was very similar to what is described as the urban patron and urban caciquismo in the literature. A few examples of which were described by Cornelius (1973), Karpas (1976) Lloyd (1979). He also has political connections and could use repressive measures.

TABLE 10A
Places of Origins of the Migrants

	%
Marmara	25.4
Aegean	6.8
Mediterranean	5.2
Black Sea	29.8
Central Anatolia	7.9
East	18.4
South east	2.5
Unknown	4.0

Source: Tas Municipality Survey Report (1978)

TABLE 10B

The Previous Economic Activities of the Migrants

Activity	%
Agriculture	46.2
Minerals	1.1
Manufacture	8.5
Construction	1.7
Trade	0.9
Professional	12.0
Public Service	3.6
Transport	1.7
Others	10.7
Indefinite	13.6
	100.0

Source: Tas Municipality Survey Report (1978)

Such people made up the heart of the migrant community. They helped to find people jobs, they promoted ethnic and communal solidarity, and in their grocery shops they sold goods on credit basis to the unemployed and the workers on strike (79.3% of daily necessities were bought from such people and 43.6% of such expenditure was done on credit)*. The "Gecekondu agasi" was also an important figure in politics. But will come back to this later.

If the migrant built a house on such a site he was under the protection of "gecekondu agasi", although he paid some money for ^{the} land. If the land was state owned then he counted on being able to own it acquiring a pardon later. With private ownership he had to pay more money to buy the land from the real owner. Although pardons did not cover private land, the landowners, (once their land was occupied by squatters) tried to sell the land to the occupiers. To evict squatters through court procedure took a long time. Of course the way the owner proceeded depended on the value of the land itself. For valuable land going through court was worthwhile.

"Gecekondu" was a highly organized institution. The owners and future owners were highly conscious of their problems and ready to protect their rights. They had voluntary associations and acted as pressure groups on the municipality and on the government.

Once the migrant family decided on a site, they began to live on it. Gecekondu was a do it yourself business dependent on family labour. 45% of Gecekondu's in Taş were built solely by family labour, another 38.5% used some professional help but relied mainly on family labour. As land was nearly free the major costs of housing were building materials and the professional builder's charge. Building materials were

* Source - Taş Municipality Survey.

expensive. This was why most of the houses were built with one room initially and rooms were added as the family members and income increased. As building material prices increased with inflation, some new migrants could not even afford a gecekondü and it became profitable for wealthier workers to convert their houses to 2 storey buildings and rent the flats to newcomers. Gradually the outlook of gecekondü areas (especially older areas) became more like that of regular housing areas of the town.

ii) Finding a job

The other major problem for the migrant was to find a job. In a survey carried out by Taş municipality ^{in 1978} it was found that 63.2% of the workforce were employed as wage earners in factories. A closer look at this workforce reveals that 66.1% of this 63.2% were in the manufacturing industry (see Table 10C and 10D). The minimum wage rate in 1977 was 1800 T:L. About 85% of the population earned more than the minimum wage. This meant that once the migrant found a job, it was relatively secure and it brought a regular income. But how did he find such a job?

There was no formal organization in Taş that dealt with job allocation. In its absence the migrants used informal networks. Until the economic crises hit the Taşlik industries (roughly from about 1977 onwards), the factory management preferred to recruit people from the same ethnic community to the plant or to sections of the plant, to maintain a peaceful workforce. Which ethnic group was initially recruited depended upon the origin of the factory managers, engineers and the foremen.*

* See A. Dubetsky (1977) p.366. where he argues that recruitment to jobs in Istanbul factories were done through ethnic networks.

TABLE 10C

The Occupation of Migrants in Tas

Sector	%
Agriculture	0.2
Manufacture	61.0
Construction	6.2
Commerce	3.9
Professional	18.3
Public Service	5.3
Transport	5.1
	100.0

Source: Tas Municipality Survey Report (1978)

TABLE 10D
Causes of Migration

To find a job	74.9
Appointment	4.7
Family reasons	6.0
Personal reasons	1.1
Others	5.8
No answer	7.5
	100.0

Source: Tas Municipality Survey Report

As finding skilled foremen was difficult, skilled personnel were first recruited to the factory. Then these people were given a say in the recruitment of the unskilled workers, because after all they were going to work as a team. These foremen tended to recruit their co-villagers, relatives, and people either from their own neighbourhood or from their own ethnic community.

The foremen lived in Taş as part of the working class in gecekondu areas, usually in better built flats. They were part of the community, and respected members of the ethnic group. To find jobs for their neighbours and co-villagers brought them prestige, status and power in a factory. Once there was a majority of one ethnic group amongst the workers, then it was difficult for the others to stay. The strategy of the majority was to eliminate strangers so that other people from their own group could find jobs.

Besides the informal networks (including the kinship and ethnic networks) the labour unions were also active in job allocation. However, this was also effective through informal networks that workers had to establish. Some factory managements allowed the unions to employ workers on their behalf. So the unions, within some limits, could provide jobs. To have access to such jobs, the migrant either had to know about a vacancy and call on the union's help, or he had to know an influential unionist to help him. Such linkages were still through ethnic networks, family networks and neighbourhood networks. Influential people like "gecekondu ağasi" could also through their patron-client networks find jobs for the residents of their area. They also helped the migrants contact the unionists in case they needed help.

Another source of information about jobs were the voluntary associations. Both ethnic associations and neighbourhood associations, had meeting places or coffee shops, in which the exchange of such

information could take place.

It is possible to identify three major social classes. The class composition of Taş and its immediate vicinity can be summarized in Taş; the working class, a large section of the migrant population^{were}, either unemployed or casually employed, trying to join the working class by finding jobs and a middle class of small entrepreneurs and professionals.

With such a class composition the prosperity of the working class serves, in both the short and in the long terms, to the interests of all the social classes involved.

5.4 Trade Unions and Working Class Consciousness*

A working class town such as Taş was almost unique in Turkey. Managers and owners chose to live in Istanbul as commuting daily was both cheap and easy.

Except for the unemployed, the marginally or casually employed and a few other people, such as workers in the construction industry, the majority of the working class was unionised. In 1973 there were 15 locally based unions and branches of national unions. Such a high degree of unionization was important in itself. It was not the consciousness or the militancy of the working class that led to such intensified union activity, but the scale of industry in Taş.

* I use the term class consciousness in a restricted sense. In Turkish the workers themselves as well as some leftist intellectuals use the words such as "biling" and "bilinglenmek" when they talk about organized workers who try to promote their class interests i.e. in collective bargaining, union-management disputes etc. vis-a-vis other classes, and sometimes despite the influence of what is called the yellow union leaders. These terms also imply voting for leftist and radical political parties such as the RPP and Turkish Labour Party. The nearest term I could find in English is "consciousness" although I am well aware of the fact that this concept has diverse usages in the sociological literature.

There were 80 factories, none of which employed less than 50 workers and 50 of which employed over 100. Two factories Sişecam and Arcelik were within the municipal boundaries. The former employed more than 4,000 workers and was one of the largest glass factories in the world. Arcelik another major plant, employed 5000 and was one of the biggest in Turkey. Outside the municipal boundaries there were Alsas, Borusan, Cimento which also employed very large numbers of workers.

The unionisation of the workers in such factories was encouraged by the management in the early years of the Union Law.* Unions made things simpler for them since they could leave most of the labour recruitment tasks to the unions and collective bargaining only eased wage settlements. Union militancy was low in that period. It proved to be more difficult to run a factory of 1,000 employees without any representatives, than to deal with the problems generated by unions.

In 1979 there were four major trade union confederations in Turkey; **Turkiş**,** **Disk***** and **Misk**,**** and there were also small independent unions. In Taşlık there were factories that were organized by **Turkis**, some others under **DISK** and there were a few independent unions. These three groups adopted different attitudes towards the working class movement. **Turkis** (The Confederations of the Trade Union of Turkish Workers) the biggest union in Turkey was an economically orientated union. According to **Turkis** view collective bargaining was to be the major job of the trade union. **DISK** (The Federation of Revolutionary Trade Unions) was politically active, defending the shop floor

* 1963 Labour Law allowed for unionization, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts.

** **Turkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu** (**Turkiş**)

*** **Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Disk**

**** **Misk - Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu**. This was a fascist union which had no local support in Taşlık.

rights of the workers. DISK was the most effective union amongst the workers in Taş, although in terms of membership it had less workers enrolled. There were also independent unions that were locally based. This made them less political but more conscious of the immediate needs of their members. They were less liable to strike, but they did care more about their member's needs, although they were poorer. They had the best collective bargaining agreements and their membership dues for each individual worker were much less than those of ^{either} DISK or Turkis.

In larger factories like Arcelik, Alşaş, etc. the workers were members of DISK. The medium sized factories were divided more or less equally between DISK and Turkis and the smaller factories were controlled by the independent unions and Turkis. This was in a sense coincidental. The bigger factories were in the metal industries (except the glass factory). The metal industries branch of DISK was very active and very politicized. It was also very active in the confederation and tried to control the executive of the confederations. The number of members recruited were important therefore with hard work they tried to activate and ^{to} gain support from the workers.

^{was,} Disk ^{it} in general even if not numerically, dominant in Taş, ^{it} controlled most of the workers' activities and influenced their ideological makeup and consciousness. Being a political organization more than anything else, Disk by regular, organized political propaganda not only influenced its own members but outsiders as well. Disk devoted a great deal of time and money to the political education of its members. The periodical seminars that took place in Taş as well as Izmit, Ankara and Istanbul, were attended by almost all the shop stewards that I talked to. The legal rights of shop stewards to attend these seminars on full wages was one of the first items that were included in the collective

bargaining agreements.

In 1977, when I was engaged in the first part of field work in Taşlik Disk was publishing a daily paper, called Politika, which was widely read by the workers. After the 1977 wave of strikes the union could no longer afford to subsidize such a daily, but began to publish occasional free leaflets for its members. As no other union devoted such extensive efforts to the education of the working class, the ideology of workers in Taş was largely shaped by the Disk. Except a few old and religious workers, (usually ^{of} Bulgarian origin) most of the workers were deeply influenced. They thought that the primary objective of a union was political. It was not exactly the capitalist system that the workers themselves were against, as much as the individual capitalists that were exploiting the workers. The workers were anti-communist on religious grounds. Mixed up with two very influential ideologies, the political propaganda of Disk and Islam, they had a very strong trade union consciousness, but not necessarily class consciousness in the Marxist sense. They were very keen about workers' rights believing that collective bargaining would in no way be suspended or sacrificed. Although they were strongly affected by Disk most of them were not prepared to leave other unions individually to join Disk, because the dues for entering DISK were very high. On the other hand Disk had a reputation as a tough bargainer, though in reality the wage differences between members of different unions were not very wide.

There were also other factors that helped Disk to expand its influence. Disk was very strict on redundancies. It was the only union that was willing to call strikes to protect individual workers from being sacked. The union was prepared to strike and did strike very often. Although the strikes were difficult for the workers they helped in the strengthening of their economic and political consciousness.

The unions in Taş were run from above by the skilled and relatively better off workers. There was little union democracy and there were no elections on the shop floor. The only elections were in the branches and they were dominated by the candidates of the central organization. This by no means implied that the union leadership was not sensitive to the interests or demands of the ordinary workers. Although this section of the working class was doing better in terms of job security and relative affluence, it would be wrong to see them as the aristocracy of labour.* Not only did they share the same jobs, the job insecurities, the strikes with the unskilled ordinary members, but also they had similar social origins and experience as other migrants. Moreover, they had similar customs and views and they frequently exchanged ideas in the coffee shops of different ethnic quarters. They were politically more ambitious than the ordinary members and they saw the union as a step in jumping into party politics. Moreover, their relative job security and higher incomes made it possible for them to participate in party political activities.

Unions had huge funds compared to the political parties. These funds were largely at the disposal of the union executives (local or national) with little control on their spending. This was a mutual interest that linked the parties and the unions. The union leaders were sponsored (or they sponsored others) in their political activities with this money. To be elected to any political office locally or nationally needed money. For a worker no matter how high his income in terms of wages, to be able to undertake such expenditure was quite difficult. The Unions subsidized politically active people, or the people of other occupations who shared the same ideology. They not only subsidized in terms of money but they assisted them with their own communication

* There is of course an abundance of literature on the aristocracy of labour (Arrighi 1970; Fanon, 1967).

channels. They gave orders to shop stewards to encourage the workers to vote for them. In their communication leaflets they wrote about these candidates. In short they supported them to the limit of the means available to the union.

To be a leader of a union^{or} a member of an executive committee in a union in itself brought prestige. The parties knew that these people brought votes with them and because of this they tried to draw them in. But to be in such a position necessitated struggle in the unions, including establishing followers. To establish a following, candidates for leadership tried to appeal to workers in many ways; they used ideology, they used primordial ties such as kinship, ethnicity or they offered jobs or money.*

Although in Tas all three were practiced at once, three types can be distinguished.

The ideological appeal was more relevant in terms of attracting younger members. Appeal to ethnicity was precarious because it could immediately alienate the other ethnic groups. The strategies that divided the working class through using such primordial relations, was seen as improper, especially by the left-wing unions, although such practices were very widespread. The most important factor that related union leaders to politics and enabled them to form patronage groups to promote the interests was their control which exercised in the labour market. Although this control was not exclusively in their hands, through informal channels and by agreed quotas with management the unions had a decisive role in the allocation of jobs. The prospective leaders used this means to recruit followers. Therefore, all kinds of methods were used at once, for example a young Lycee graduate who is a left wing militant would be attracted by Disk,

* For similar methods of recruiting followers see Sandbrook 1972.

but the branch leader can be his "hemsehri" * or a relative that introduces him to the local branch of the union. This person may encourage him to come to "hemsehri" coffee-shop and club arguing that there he would be told where his best chances of finding a job are.

The unions, being the most organized force in Taş, were influential both in the local and the national political scene. They bargained for seats on the municipal council and the party executive committees. They acted forcefully on local issues, such as municipal services. They tried to create jobs in the vicinity, they organized housing cooperatives and put pressure on both the municipality and the state for providing free land for migrants.

5.4.1 Political Consciousness and the Strikes of 1977

Finally I want to mention a series of strikes which took place in Taş. in 1977. Maden-is, a union affiliated to DISK, carried out a series of nationwide strikes, the majority of issues under dispute being political**. Maden-iş was the most militant of the left wing unions. Against its militancy the employers in this sector (metal extraction and metal working industries) formed a syndicate, to react to the union activity. There were various stories and novels about the causes of the strike and how the strike was encouraged by the employers themselves who wanted to mitigate the effects of raw material and foreign currency shortages by stopping production. Whatever the reasons were, the outcome was that the strike continued for nine months in some factories and the majority of these were in Taş area. 1977 was also an

* Someone from the same place of origin.

** Maden-iş was an organization in the metal industries sector. The strikes started from collective bargaining disputes, it quickly grew into a major political issue. The government then wanted to pass strict security laws to be enforced on left wing movements and it included the unions. This law was fiercely attacked by the union leadership.

important year in terms of the political life of Turkey being an election year when all the left wing factions were mobilized against a right wing coalition. The strikes began just before the general elections, and were at their peak during local elections which took place 6 months after the national elections.

The strikes began with a massive left wing public support, with dancing and celebrating the occasion and speeches to promote working class solidarity. Maden-iş, which is a rich union, promised to give 1,000 T.L. every month to each worker; this was about one fifth of the average worker's wage. Since the strikes began in late spring most of the workers also had some savings. They went in for casual work in the building industries, or back to their villages for agricultural work. Their expectations of the strikes were high, the weather was good, the schools were closed, there was an opportunity to earn some supplementary income, and their expenses were low in the summer months.

There was no progress in terms of talks between sides during the summer and with the winter approaching the difficulties began to grow.

Nearly half of the work force in Taş was on strike, therefore finding jobs when the building season was over was impossible. The small savings were soon gone. There was no money to buy the winter stocks and when the schools opened fathers could not afford to buy books for their children. The union tried to help but it began to run out of money because its financial resources were also depleted. The local left wing parties tried to help by distributing some foodstuff but except for the RPP they did not have sufficient funds, and the RPP could only manage to give a few pounds of sugar and rice per family.

Most of the workers survived during that period by using their informal networks. In such a situation the crucial people were the relatives, co-villagers, and the grocers in the gecekondü areas willing

to extend credit to the workers. In some cases whole households began to live with neighbours or relatives to minimize their expenditure. In other cases the families accumulated massive debts to grocer shops. Some families lived on whatever income the children and wife could bring (usually from weaving luxury carpets). Some migrated back to their villages and returned when the strike was over. But all of them had to experience difficult times. During the strike, I was told, many workers began to think that the people who helped to the extent of sharing their small resources with the strikers were the relatives, neighbours and co-villagers. A political party or union can be understanding and helpful but it can do very little to find food for children. The union or party may defend one's rights as individual workers and the workers' rights and interests, but one's immediate livelihood depends more on people in one's social networks. This made such people as relatives and neighbours indispensable in the eyes of those workers who went on to strike in 1977.

After the local elections of 1977, the RPP came to power and began to seek ways of getting the two sides together to begin talks again. The pressure of the starving workers upon the unions was developing. A few months after the ^{RPP} government took office the strikes ended. The general expectation amongst both many journalists and the employers was that Maden-iş would disintegrate all over Turkey. On the contrary however, the union emerged even strengthened. The workers were pleased with the political outcome of the strike and they showed that they were willing to strike and starve not only for their collective bargaining rights but also on political issues. Being politically conscious sections of the working class, they saw their strike as helping a left wing government to come to power, and were proud of it. However, whether Maden-iş could actually call such a massive strike once more remained doubtful in the minds of many people.

5.5 Ethnic Identity and Conflict

One of the major outcomes of the vast migration to Taş was a change in its ethnic composition.* What was a small community of people with similar cultural backgrounds and close personal relations changed into a small city composed of people with multiple languages, sects, and cultures. This in itself has created tensions, conflicts between the groups involved. Two distinct types of conflict can be identified: native-migrant conflict and conflicts between the different ethnic groups among the migrants themselves.

The conflict between the natives and migrants was deeply rooted. There were various reasons why such a conflict was maintained despite the fact that the native population was so small. Natives and migrants did not compete with each other in the labour market. As I mentioned earlier competition for jobs was most severe in the unskilled labour market and the native population was out of it. Even at the peak of the economic crisis the opportunities for skilled labour were good and in this market the people with the required qualifications could always find jobs. But the conflict of interest manifested itself in the second biggest issue, namely land.

The aim of migrants was to find free land. They preferred state land, but if this was unavailable they occupied private land that was generally owned by the natives. If their land was occupied by squatters, then it was difficult for the natives to evict them through a court case. Even if at the end of the proceedings an eviction was

* I use the word "ethnicity" as many anthropologists do to cover a number of different kinds of cultural backgrounds language groups, people from the same area of Turkey (hemsehri) and religious groups. In the surrounding area there are various ethnic groups such as the Abaza, Cerkez etc., but Taş was relatively homogeneous. Therefore cultural differences were not totally alien to people in Taş. However, the extent of ethnicity in Taş is a result of 20 years of vast migration.

granted to the owner, the damage to the land was still great. The land surrounding Taş was occupied by orchards, that were later considered to be within the city boundaries. Although the trees were almost barren, due to industrial pollution, the few surviving fruit trees and olive trees could still easily provide subsistence for a large family. Once the migrants move into the area they immediately cut down these trees, to be used either as wood or timber, and sell them to offset their building expenses. The landowner could not claim compensation for this loss.

The biggest problem for the landowners was not the individual migrant family whom they could evict by a court order. There had been individual cases where the police was persuaded, without a court case, to take action. It was the "gecekondü agalari" that the landowners found difficult to deal with. The former fought back as effectively as they could. They even organized armed bands to protect the people in the occupied area. Against such people even the court cases proved useless as they bribed the officials not to take action. Evictions in their areas took the form of bloody battles reported in the newspapers, and the police and the municipal officers did not wish to implement such orders. The only option left to the landowners was to sell the land to the occupiers. In this case the price was next to nothing, so the occupation of one's land meant a lot for the landowners. Even the squatting of state land worked to the disadvantage of the landowner. Freely available land reduced land prices and thus also the bargaining power of the landowner vis a vis the squatters. Furthermore, the landowners emphasized the ideological importance of such an action as being against the security of private ownership. They said "today they took state land, tomorrow they will take mine."

Although open confrontations between natives and migrants took

place over land disputes, another major source of conflict were the cultural differences. Proximity to Istanbul, and the general welfare of the native population enabled them to obtain higher education than migrants and this led Taş to become more 'westernized' than most such towns. The Youth Club of Taş had existed since the early sixties, regularly organising shows and concerts. Lycee and university boys and girls met in coffee shops, went to Istanbul for theatre and cinema trips, and even to discos on the coast in the summer. This was a totally alien culture to the migrants and was considered sinful. It should be noted here that 46.2% of the migrants came straight from villages. Turkish villages all over Anatolia are highly religious and closed communities. For their daughters to go to primary schools with boys was a revolution in itself, let alone theatre trips to Istanbul. Migrant women were secluded. All the women in Taş that walked around in the town centre without head cover were native, if not professional or government employees.

This westernized outlook and life style of the natives created resentment on the side of the migrants. The natives were regarded as blasphemous. The natives on the other hand, did not differentiate between different groups of migrants. They tended to perceive them as one group; "yabancı".* Migrants were considered to be uncivilized and uneducated. In most of the interviews I conducted they complained about the scale of migration to Taş: "We were a civilized small community, they came in and ruined the town", "They are beastly, they do not know how to talk, how to eat, they do not have proper manners", "The Turkish state should not allow them to go outside of the country, even as workers to Germany. Seeing them, foreigners have a wrong impression of our people". As a result of such a cultural segregation, there was little "social" contact between the migrants and the natives. They lived quite

* Stranger.

separate lives.

There were cultural differences within the migrant groups as well. Contrary to the perception of natives, they were aware of the differences amongst themselves. There were groups coming from all over Turkey. They had different languages, religious sects, customs, that were reflected in their appearances and life styles. They were not only alien to the place they migrated to and its natives but also they were alien to each other. They lived together in a town and this necessitated day to day interaction in the job, in the neighbourhood or in the market.

Open clashes occurred between the migrant groups in three areas. First, and the most frequent ones were those involving family honour, usually arising from cultural differences. Different practices led to conflict amongst the groups. I was told that cultural differences even led to court cases. When I was there such a conflict occurred over an elopement. A young man from the Black Sea and a Bulgarian migrant's daughter eloped. For the people from Black Sea elopement is quite common, so in such an event the families of both sides negotiate a settlement and the dispute is usually resolved peacefully. In this case the girl's father, thinking that this was kidnapping, reported the incident to the police. The couple were caught by the police and the boy was put in prison. When the girl's father understood the situation he was willing to accept their marriage, but as the case had been reported the police had no choice but to keep the boy on the grounds that the girl was too young. The case was sent to court to the surprise of both parties. Such traditional differences dominated the daily relations amongst the migrant groups.

However there were more deeply rooted conflicts. Some of the migrants were Shiites or Kurdish. Shiite groups in Turkey have a

different practice of Islam, which creates a conflict between them and the Sunnis. A conflict which is centuries old in the villages is carried to the towns. With the Kurdish people there is rarely a religious difficulty, but usually a language problem.

Therefore ethnic groups tried to minimise interaction between the groups. One of the solutions was segregational settlement. The quarters were separated in terms of ethnic groups, and each quarter was named after one group such as "Karslilar mahallesi" or "Tokat mahallesi". Through segregational settlements, the residents claim, they preserve family honour. There was also a social control system in the neighbourhood areas reinforced through ethnic and kinship networks. This gave the migrant personal security and protection of honour against the outside world.

A second area of conflict between the migrants was over land distribution. As there was a continual inflow of migrants to the area, ethnically based quarters were growing all the time. However the pressures on land was great because there was also industrial expansion into the area. State land was preferred, but it was limited. So every expansive movement of an ethnic group was at the expense of other ethnic groups, especially the neighbouring ones. There were frequent cases of disputes amongst the migrants for the occupation of state lands. This usually took place between the armed bands of "gacekondü agalari".

A third source of conflict was competition in the labour market. This was mainly reflected in the work place and in the unions (see section 5.3.2.); due to the fact that the migrant's ethnicity and ethnic network was very important. So the migrant tried his best to preserve these relations.

5.5.1 Migrant associations

The migrants to Taş were organized in two kinds of voluntary associations: community of origin associations (such as Karşlilar Association, Trabzonlular Association) and neighbourhood associations (such as Kars quarter improvement association). As there was segregational settlement based on ethnicity, these two types of associations usually replicated each other in terms of membership.

These kinds of organizations were for mutual support in the town. They had been the major source of support to workers during the great wave of strikes in 1977 that affected the whole population of Taş in one way or another. The associations helped to promote and sometimes to create ethnic identities. They organized entertainment and religious ceremonies to give some colour to the social atmosphere of the home town. Through informal networks they developed a social control over the individual migrant. They taught traditional customs and practices to the younger generations.

In an ethnic community two kinds of people had particular importance. The influential people in the factories such as skilled labourers and foremen who remained part of the working class and lived in the ethnic community areas and secondly the "gecekondü agalari", who were important for their control of the land market, who were not part of the working class, but whose whole livelihood depended on being part of the community.

As might be expected voluntary organizations were run by the "influential people", i.e. the "gecekondü agasi" or skilled workers and, if present, professionals. To be active in such an organization gave the individual the prestige of being recognized as a community leader by outsiders. The functions of such organizations were to organize enter-

tainment for their members, to open carpet weaving courses for women and to provide a regular meeting place for the members of the ethnic group. A room in the building was reserved for meetings and operated as a coffee shop. But some of the main functions were to provide accommodation and jobs to newcomers, to reinforce informal networks amongst the community members and to preserve ethnic identity. The association operated as an information centre for recently arrived migrants but was oriented more towards the residents. The help to newcomers was provided by the older migrants. The newcomer stayed with a relative or friend who activated the influential members of the association that he knew to find the newcomer a job or a gecekondu area. The members went there to meet co-villagers and friends, thus reinforcing their previous personal networks.

In a cosmopolitan and industrial area like Taş where working class identity beyond ethnic boundaries was enforced by the unions and workmates. In the long run, ethnic identity may begin to lose its importance. Second generation migrants, especially those who had hardly been to their home towns, might not care very much about their father's co-villagers. At this point such associations were very important in preserving, reinforcing and creating ethnic identities. By mutual help and by emphasizing the importance of personal networks in achieving almost anything, they teach the youngsters the idea that success in life is almost impossible in the absence of ethnic solidarity; "you cannot find a job or a gecekondu site without such a network, migrants must keep the old home town ties". For the migrants one of the ways of keeping such an identity was through forming associations.

The most generally discussed issue regarding ethnicity in urban situations is whether ethnic ties of the sort discussed above hamper the development of class solidarity.

As far as Taş is concerned they did not. Such a network in itself is primordial. But on the other hand consciousness at the individual level was highly compartmentalized. The ethnic identity did not necessarily prevent one being a member of working class and a union activist. On the contrary such ethnic associations in Taş had adapted themselves to the new concerns of their members and acted as political bodies to defend working class interests. In this sense the class composition of the associations was very important. Although the leader of the associations were the skilled workers, wealthier people, more petit-bourgeoisie their class interests were such that far from hampering class consciousness among their members, they themselves actively promoted left wing ideology amongst workers. However, the ideological beliefs and convictions of the leaders did not prevent them from using any kind of primordial relations in gathering a following for their political ends.

5.6 Political Participation in Taş

Taş between 1960 and 1973 was a Justice Party stronghold but massive migration changed the voting behaviour (see Table 11). In the last two elections before the 1980 military coup, the RPP did better than the Justice Party, although ^{in 1973} the total number of votes for the right wing parties (51%) was still more than the RPP vote. By 1977 the total right wing votes was 11% less than the RPP votes. This trend towards left was related to the close connection between the RPP and the unions. The unionized workers were exposed to continual political education. The Republican Peoples Party was the only party that had a good chance to win because it was the only party openly defending workers' rights.

However, political participation in Taş was also partly determined by the ethnic factors. Maintaining close links within the ethnic group was politically important. Not only did they bargain for their total

vote, but they also tried to promote the interests of their leading members who were usually politically active. The politicians in Taş knew which ethnic group would vote for which party; for instance, Karşlilar voted for the RPP whereas the immigrants from Bulgaria voted either for the J.P. or the N.S.P.

The Turkish left also had some ethnic affiliations. For instance, the secularist policies of RPP were known as ^{being} supported by the Alevi population, who were traditional supporters of the RPP. Taş was a working class area and class consciousness was high amongst unionized workers. But still ethnic organizations were used to promote their ideology. This alienated some migrants. Therefore amongst some migrants right wing voting patterns persisted over time despite their unionization. For instance, migrants from Bulgaria were very suspicious towards left and ~~voted~~ conservative.

Ethnic groups, however, were very open about their political interests. Acting like an interest group, they openly bargained with political parties over the votes they brought and the number of seats to be reserved in return in the municipal councils, party executive committees etc. A similar kind of bargaining continued between the unions and the RPP, which I will discuss later.

5.7 Life and Politics in the Industrial Belt

What I differentiate as the Industrial Belt was neither an administrative unit nor had any entity of its own. But it was a distinct geographical area. It included some small villages and a few that had grown to fairly large sized towns*. Except for administrative purposes

* Even as early as 1973 6 of the villages had over 1500 residents, and 2 of them had over 6500 residents. On the other hand, the average population of inland villages in the area was 400.

it was difficult in 1978 to determine where one village ended and the next began. This area did not end with the administrative border of Taşlık, but went so far as Izmit and even Adapazarı, about 110 km. from Istanbul. Nevertheless about 50% of the Taşlık population lived there. It was an area that attracted a great deal of industry, usually large firms including petro-chemical factories, some heavy industry and assembly plants producing durable consumer goods. Such an industrial area, of course, attracted a lot of migration from various parts of the country. The villages in the area were also affected by this rapid urbanization.

Before its rapid industrialization, this area was known to have fertile soils, and was producing various fruits for the consumption of the big cities. In the patches between residential areas or industry a few orchards still remained. The area was dominated by a small peasantry, each household having a few acres of orchards. In those villages near the Industrial Belt, the villagers sold some of their land to migrants for housing, but sold most of it as industrial land.

The pollution in the area in the late 1970's was so high that even those areas not invaded by industry were left with almost no chance of maintaining agricultural production. So the villagers had to become industrial workers. However, like the natives of Taş, the villagers of the area enjoyed more affluent lives than their migrant neighbours. They had houses already built to start with. Most of them had accumulated some capital by selling their fields at higher prices than their worth as agricultural land. This helped some to form capital to invest in small businesses. However, only a small proportion were successful because they did not know how to run businesses. Some of them tried to go to Germany as workers, and some bought or built flats in their village, in Izmit or even in Istanbul. But the natives of the villages

did not have as much wealth as the natives of the town. I was told that sudden cash income brought into the villages lead to lavish expenditure in the peasant families rather than investment. When the huge amounts of money obtained by selling land were spent, they were left with no choice but to work in factories as wage labourers.

Just as in the town, the rapid inflows of migrants had led to some cultural conflicts. However, the conflicts between the natives and migrants in smaller areas were less acute compared to those in Taş. The villagers themselves led a secluded life. The number of natives in an area was either the same as, or less than, the number of migrants. There was no segregational settlement in the smaller areas. This made natives and migrants develop personal relations with each other and this helped to moderate conflicts. Only in the larger villages, migrants and natives tended to be hostile, as they were in Taş.

TABLE 11

Voting Behaviour in Taşlık

(A) Town: (%)

	JP	RRR	CKMP /NAP	NP	TLP	RP	YTP	BP	NSP	DP
1965	58.90	26.59	0.9	5.4	5.45		2.24			
1969	52.64	30.46	1.3	2.9	5.8	1.6	0.4	1.2		
1973	27.00	39.73	1.01	0.2		2.28		1.2	13.27	13.35
1977	28.94	54.34	2.32		0.5	0.9		0.4	11.32	1.95

(B) Industrial Belt: (%)

	JP	RPP	CKMP /NAP	NP	TLP	RP	YTP	BP	NSP	DP
1965	57.81	33.3	0.95	5.09	3.14		1.12			
1969	57.32	32.47	0.82	2.83	1.96	3.20	0.1	0.82		
1973	39.24	39.82	0.6	0.2		2.17		0.5	7.05	9.43
1977	41.71	46.63	2.62		0.18	0.86		0.2	6.14	1.59

(C) Villages: (%)

	JP	RPP	NAP	NP	TLP	RP	YTP	BP	NSP	DP
1965	57.99	15.21	2.51	29.20	1.4		0.5			
1969	52.73	22.44	1.01	16.56	1.06	4.35	0.5	0.9		
1973	30.62	16.86	1.5	0.7		5.05		0.5	18.82	25.06
1977	48.28	24.28	2.21		-	1.5		-	17.82	5.67

Source: State Statistical Institute Voting Statistics, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977

5.7.1 Halili

One town in this area, Halili,* has rather different characteristics. In Halili one of the earliest industries was built in 1843. This textile factory was opened by Ottoman State Initiative and was a workshop of hand looms both for cloth and carpet weaving. It was still owned by the state in 1978 and included a modernized textile plant in addition to the old hand looms. Since 1845 the town has been famous for the quality of its hand woven cloth and carpets. The presence of such a skilled workforce later attracted industrial investment.

In 1978 an industry for the production of good quality handwoven silk carpets was established. The native population and early migrants constituted the core of the skilled labour force and the factory employed about 700 workers. Most of the old workers, besides working in various shifts in the factory, were small entrepreneurs putting out work to houses.

This established workforce voted conservative parties and in fact the area had been the stronghold of the Justice Party for many years. The involvement of the established workers in small businesses was the primary reason for their conservatism. They tended to identify themselves with the petit bourgeoisie. Their petty trade and small businesses became very important and they considered themselves directly threatened by the working class ideology. Secondly, in the factories these people were employed in highly skilled jobs and were paid relatively high wages compared to unskilled workers. Besides, the state owned factories tended to pay higher wages than the private sector. Most of the workers were employed through party directed patronage

* 17 km from Taş on the main road between Ankara and Istanbul. It is by the sea and has a small port as well. The population in 1973 was 7208. In the 1977 elections the number of voters were above 10.300 (the population over the age of 21).

during the Democratic ^{Party} and the Justice Party periods. Therefore they owed loyalty to the party that provided them with jobs.

The economic structure of Halili, and its voting patterns, began to change slowly after the 1970s. Besides the old textiles mills, new plants were built by then. In a short time the employment capacity of industries in the town tripled, and quadrupled if the building industry is industry workers are also included. Halili became one of the centres that attracted migrants. These new migrant workers did not have dual interests, divided between small business and the working class, as did the established ones. They were class conscious, militant workers, with definite political ideals and highly unionized. Along with the rest of the Taşlik workers they began to vote for the RPP.

The case of Halili was interesting because there were two groups within the working class that had totally different loyalties and political behaviour. The old workers lived either in the accommodation provided by the factory or the houses they had bought with their savings. The newcomers lived on the outskirts of the town in the squatter housing areas on the hills. The old workers had very secure jobs and good wages and they were immune even to redundancies in crisis because the factory was owned by the state. The new migrants could only find jobs with difficulty. Their jobs required less skill and therefore their wages were lower. Their jobs were insecure, in fact their only security was the bargaining power of the unions. Besides, some of them were only seasonal workers. The established workers could afford better education for their children, and provided them with better facilities. The new migrants could not afford to educate their children. The children above the age of primary school were regarded as breadwinners in the household economy. More important than all of these, the established workers and the new ones confronted each other as employers and employees in the

carpet weaving industry.

The wives and the daughters of the new migrants worked as weavers for the established workers who organized the putting out system. Unlike their husbands, these migrant women were skilled. Weavers with high skill were difficult to find and to train unskilled workers took time. Thus there was always a shortage of skilled workers, although there was a massive reserve of unskilled women. The merchants competed with each other for skilled weavers, and the bargaining was carried out by the menfolk of the household.

This factor also increased the antagonism between the established and the new workers. The old workers saw the new migrants as uneducated, unrefined peasants, that were willing to occupy their properties. Whereas the new ones saw the old migrants as a part of the bourgeoisie betraying their own class just because they earned a few ^{Turkish} Liras extra. This was reflected in their views, ideology and political behaviour. The established workers were conservative and voted for the right wing parties. The new migrants were class conscious, left wing, activists who voted for the RPP. This was reflected in the voting patterns in the town. In 1969 the RPP had 35% of the vote which increased to 46% in 1977, while the Justice Party lost 12% of its votes during the same years, dropping from 57% in 1969 to 45% in 1977.

Similarly in the other areas of the industrial belt there was a move towards the left wing parties as a result of migration and massive proletarianization. The increase in the left votes had not been as drastic as it had been in the town itself because the town had a greater migrant population which lived there much longer. The unionization rate was greater amongst them, and they worked in larger factories. However, by 1977 the percentage of right wing votes was more or less the same as left wing votes in the area (50% right wing and 47% left wing as

opposed to 1965, 63% right wing 36% left wing).

5.8 Life in the Villages Outside the Industrial Belt

Taşlık was constituted of 29 villages and about half of it was inland, outside of what I call the industrial belt. The inland villages are all at most one hour travelling time by bus to the industrial belt. The villages in the area are small, the average village population was 470 and the average number of households in each village was 78.* What is more these are administrative villages; the actual villages are smaller clusters but they are joined into larger entities for administrative purposes.

One of the reasons for such small settlements was that 65% of Taşlık county is ^{officially} regarded as forest, but this includes the land that later became the urban. Due to Government control the woods cannot be cut down to be made into agricultural land. So this left villagers with only small patches of land between the woods and only small groups of people could live on these patches. In 1968 the land open to cultivation was small; 27% of the total arable land was used for the cultivation of field crops; and 6% of the land was used for the vineyards and orchards. Development in agriculture has been negligible, and in some areas agricultural production has deteriorated because of industrial pollution. Taşlık used to be a fertile area, the land was suitable for some industrial cash crops like sunflower, linen, maize and tobacco. Moreover, its proximity to Istanbul had encouraged some gardening and the growth of orchards (especially cherry trees).

Taşlık was predominantly an area of small peasants. There were no big landlords, except a family in Taş city itself who owned a large amount of land, that later became an industrial and working class area.

* Source: Kocaeli il Yilligi 1973.

Because of the variety of crops, a minimum land requirement for the upkeep of an average peasant family is difficult to assess. A 1966 study showed that 42% of families had something between 25 and 100 donums of land on average, an amount sufficient for the family subsistence in view of the high fertility of the soil. Some 26.5% of families had only 10 donums each and they can depend on the small plots only in so far as they use it for growing orchards. Agriculture in the area was mechanized, and all of the 29 villages were using fertilisers. There has also been an expansion in animal husbandry in the area after 1970 due to increased demand from Istanbul for dairy products.

9 out of 15 villages in Taşlık are in the forest. Thus in addition to small scale cultivation they worked as wage labourers in the woods for the state. Since work was on a seasonal basis the pay was low. Consequently it had been difficult for these people to earn their livelihood, but increasingly after 1965 they had new sources of income. The industrialization of the area has affected the peasants. All the villages of Taşlık acquired all-season roads and had regular daily bus services. The villagers formed cooperatives to invest in buses and sometimes there were two or three buses on the same route. Transport itself was also an area of investment for the workers returning from Germany.

Such ease in transport encouraged the peasants in the villages not to leave their homes but instead to commute to work. In this way not only did they save on rents and make use of the relative cheapness of transport in Turkey, but they were also able to look after their agricultural land and earn some extra income from it. This kept the family in the village. The elders, who did not have to commute daily to work, were left in charge of the household and agricultural work.

Another widespread source of income was the weaving industry; carpet and cloth weaving and embroidery. The area was traditionally a

weaving area. What is called Sile bezi, a kind of cheesecloth, has been woven in the area since Ottoman times. It is a simple cloth made of cotton yarn. With the development of the tourism these cheesecloths found a good market both in Turkey and abroad. A putting-out system in both weaving and embroidering the cheesecloths soon developed. In the meantime another handicraft industry began spreading towards the villages: luxury carpet weaving from Halili. These two handicrafts, together with seasonal migration for men, provide the main income of the inland and remote villages in the forest.

The furthest villages, those with ~~non-prospering~~ economic conditions, have seen a lot of migration to Taş town itself. But this is limited to only 10 villages that are relatively far from the industrial centres. Some migrants settled in the nearer villages to Taş and they also commute with their co-villagers to the factories.

The villagers of Taş were conservative. Here, I am not talking about "traditional peasant conservatism" but a reactionary attitude towards migration and its effects on Taş. The villagers had to interact with people from different cultures in the town. Being a part of the Taş working class, these new groups were under the influence of left wing ideologies and so were in conflict with the peasants in two respects. There were cultural and ethnic differences and there were ideological conflicts. Old villagers considered the migrants to be "communists" usually meaning blasphemous. The old villagers were not influenced by new ideologies. The small plot of land they owned gave them a sense of security and added to their conservatism.

For many years, including the 1977 elections, the villages had voted for right wing parties. In these villages not only is the vote of Justice party high but the National Salvation Party also did very well because they benefited from the reactionary ideology of the peasants. I

have been told by my local informants that even people that traditionally voted for the RPP have sometimes changed to the NSP as a show of their disapproval of the working classes in the town. (See table 11C). The RPP vote in the villages was either from workers, younger members of the village or migrants that commute to Taş daily or from traditional RPP supporters. To increase votes for the RPP in these villages had been impossible except for changing a few young minds. The historical reasons for not voting RPP, such as Inonu collecting taxes from the peasants in the war years, were supplemented by the new ideology and social formation of the party in recent years, which alienated the villagers. I mentioned earlier, amongst the older generation of voters, there have even been some losses. But this was not important for the party, the net gain of voters from town, in working class areas was so great that the stabilization or decrease of votes in the villages was of negligible importance.

To conclude Taşlik was an area of change; rapid change in fact in the economy in terms of social structure and in terms of culture. As such it stands in sharp contrast with Kaleli. These changes are reflected in the organization and structure of the local branch of the Republican Peoples Party in Taşlik to make it radically different than the small Central Anatolian town politics.

CHAPTER 6

FROM PATRONAGE TO WORKING CLASS POLITICS:

REPUBLICAN PEOPLES PARTY IN TASLIK

6.1 The Historical Background of the RPP in Taşlık

The Taş branch of the Republican Peoples Party was founded in 1923, upon the orders of Ataturk, by a prominent figure in the area - Elmacioglu Ibrahim Aga. Ibrahim Aga had fought in the war of Independence, but he was not active in politics until the establishment of the party. He was a rich landowner, with quite a large area of land that stretched from the sea to the town centre (this area was urban land in 1978) and 2,000 sheep. Most of the peasants in the area either worked for him or share cropped his land. His influence on the peasantry extended when he began a business selling timber from nearby forests. As a classical type of old style landlord and employer, he was known as being generous, gracious and helpful. Until 1950 Taş was outside the influence of Istanbul industry, and he ruled the area. Taş was a very small town then, almost a big village. Everybody in the town and the surrounding villages had personal contacts with the Elmacioglu family.

From 1923 to 1950 he was the sole representative of Tas in the Provincial Privy Council*. He was the head of the party, and sometimes acted as mayor. The RPP in Taş was Ibrahim Aga, he decided who would be a delegate, he decided whom the delegates would nominate as candidates for membership to parliament. He decided whom the candidates would talk to, where the party propaganda should take place and which issues would be discussed in talks. Ibrahim Aga's control of the party was total,

* This is an elected body under the provincial governor, which has its own budget and can decide on various issues to do with administering the province.

arising from his control of the lives of the peasants living in the area who were indebted to him for employment, for share cropping and for the little favours he offered them. As was the practice of such landlords in those days Ibrahim Aga used his relations with the peasants to gain prestige and power in the eyes of the state, which he in turn used to control the peasantry. The prefecture and the gendarme were virtually controlled by him. Although he was known to help people to get out of trouble with the state and he also used this control to punish the peasants that were not obedient.

Until 1950 the RPP was the state in Turkey and the state was the party, even in the towns. The party was in the same building as what is known as governing building (hukümet) . . . Ibrahim Aga was the state and the party in Taş. He maintained close relations with the state officials, the prefect, the army officers and the doctor. The state officials knew that he was the intermediary between them and the peasants, the peasants knew that he was the only person that could solve their problems with the government officials.

Taş politics began to change from 1947 onwards. The Minister of Construction, a member of parliament from the province of Kocaeli, started to construct a new road that would pass through Taş. He told me that Ibrahim Aga and his followers were critical of the road and came repeatedly to Ankara to persuade him to stop the orders for construction. The road eventually ended the political dominance of Elmacioglu family. I do not think Ibrahim Aga's resistance was because of his foresight in seeing the end of his political reign, it must rather have been because of various short term interests which is difficult to appreciate now. Before the road reached Taş however, Ibrahim Aga died. He had four sons, the eldest of which was doing his military service, so there was nobody to succeed him immediately. A local doctor took the

post of leadership in the party. In 1950 and 1954, unlike the rest of Kocaeli and Turkey, the RPP still held the majority of votes in Taş. But after 1954 D.P. governments began to use pressure against the members of the RPP. Threatened with an appointment in the east, the doctor resigned as leader of the local party and until 1957 the party was left in a chaos.

In the meantime the road reached and passed Taş. The land around the road, some of which belonged to the Elmacioglu family, began to increase enormously in value. This increase in the value of land encouraged the sons of Ibrahim Aga to sell and divert their main interest from agriculture to commerce. Other families that had smaller plots of land by the road also sold and moved into commerce. Agriculture also prospered with the shift to gardening and orchards mainly for supplying the fruit needs of Istanbul, and it kept its importance in the Taş economy until air pollution created by industry made cultivation impossible.

In 1957 the Democrats began to lose their overwhelming support, both locally and nationally and in 1956 the D.P. split into two. Although the newly emerging Freedom Party could not be successful in the elections, its later merging with the RPP began to threaten the D.P. Given this new political milieu, RPP members in Taş gathered to revive the party.

The Elmacioglu family was still the centre of this revival. In 1957 their eldest brother was the leader of the party, but they did not dominate it as they had before. A newly emerging entrepreneurial group began actively to participate in the party and share power with them. These people were natives of Taş. Before the road and industrialization they had owned small orchards and vineyards, maybe a few acres of land, a house, and perhaps a very small corner shop selling consumer goods to

the townspeople. Amongst them were also some craftsmen such as bakers, tailors, coppersmiths etc. The road increased the value of their land enormously and brought a new vigour to the town's economy. Being on the main road from Istanbul to Ankara was important in this. Moreover industry and migration added to the profitability of trade in the town. For these people the shift of the main economic interest to business was slow. They did not wish to sell their orchards all at once and instead began dividing them into pieces to sell later. They engaged in agriculture, the product of which was becoming more valuable with the improvement in transport. However, as the land prices increased along with the revenue from agriculture, they began selling land and investing in trade. Their first stores were general stores, and the first customers were townsmen and the peasants of nearby villages. But as the town developed trade became specialized. Dealing in merchandise for the migrants became more profitable than for the peasants. The first specialization was the separation of the foods and non-food trade, the second major area was in materials for construction.

The businessmen of Taş were dominant in the party leadership from 1957 to 1970. Why were they so involved in politics? Why did they choose the RPP and what was their power base? The reasons behind their interest in politics were mainly the changes taking place in Taş. In a rapidly growing area which was becoming more and more prosperous, the allocation of resources gained sudden importance. These people controlled the land market exclusively. Land was, and still was in 1978, one of the major areas of struggle in Taş. In control of land the municipal policy was very important. As new infrastructure facilities had to be built, the values of land altered. Even where a lamp post stood could mean a change in the value of the land. The only means to achieve direct control of the municipality was through the political parties. Although until 1977 municipal elections were won by the D.P. and later

by the J.P., some people from the RPP could get onto the council.

A second reason was that the control of trade was in the hands of the municipality. The trade licencing and the direct quality control of trade by the municipality encouraged businessmen to take part in the councils. So the town businessman was mainly interested in municipal activities. Party politics enabled them to have seats in municipal councils, and recognition from the local bureaucracy as town notables. Being party officials and members of the municipal council enabled them to have contact with the locally important officials such as the prefect and the governor, and also with the members of parliament in Ankara. Through these contacts they strengthened their position in the local branches by being able to provide patronage for the delegates who supported them. This also enabled them to gain a few other advantages such as bank credits.

Merchants could also influence decisions in Izmit, through the provincial privy council, and in Ankara through the members of parliament. They were primarily interested in industrial locations, and allocations of state resources, such as roads.

However, during the time the RPP was in opposition members of the party in power locally and nationally would obviously be more influential. So why did they choose the RPP? As choice implies intentionality, it might be better to ask "why were they in the RPP?" so that their reasons of presence can be better understood. The commonest reason given was that they were the traditional members of the party. Long before the multi party system, and during the split of 1946 their families had been in the party. They stayed there for Ataturk and Inönü and believing that the people voted for DP would eventually understand who the "real patriots" were and would join the RPP under the leadership of Inönü. In later years it became more difficult for them to leave

because their power base was in the RPP. They knew the delegates who would elect them to the councils and they knew the MP's and the provincial leadership of the party for any outside help. Although the party was repeatedly losing elections, and therefore its credibility was low, it was still better than being in an unknown milieu, where there was little chance of newcomers gaining access to powerful positions that were already filled. During this period the ideology of the RPP was favourable to these kind of people. It emphasized the development of the country on capitalist lines without any major programme of redistribution. This gave the flourishing merchants of Taş the opportunity to express their own interests in terms of modernization, westernization and development.

The question remains, what was their power base? Paradoxically enough although the main interest of the RPP notables at that time was the town itself, their power base remained rural. These people, like most of the town notables in Turkey, had good relations with the peasants. Their relations with the peasants were not based on share-cropping arrangements, as with the Elmacioglu family, but they were known to the peasants as good, honest and generous in their trading relations. To understand the relations of these merchants to the peasants I will describe the nature of the transactions between them.

The peasants of the area, as I described earlier, were not well to do. Most of them did not have cash to buy necessities during the winter and spring, as their cash income came to the villages in the Autumn after the harvest. Although most of the yearly necessities were bought in bulk early in the Autumn, the rest had to be bought on credit. As there was no cash in the peasants' hands in winter, the merchants knew that trade was only possible with credit. The goods bought on credit were usually charged higher than their market price, but the peasants

were willing to pay the extra. Moreover, selling on credit obliged the peasant to buy the bulk winter necessities from the same merchant after the harvest. Some of these merchants bought the crop of the peasant, so payment in kind was also possible, though this was more common in the earlier periods.

The village delegates who were their customers were also the people that voted them into power. They in turn would help illiterate peasants with their problems in the town, ranging from court cases, to land registration, to the military service of their sons. They had received formal education to various degrees, so they could manipulate the bureaucratic formalities if nothing else. Their town residence acquainted them with the bureaucracy in the town, more than that, the influential bureaucrats and professionals were their tenants, neighbours, customers and friends. So they could help peasants with their small problems in return for votes.

The merchants' power base were the "patronage" relations they established with the peasants in the villages. These patronage relations had a two fold benefit for them. Firstly they kept regular customers for their shops from whom they made good profits. Secondly they established political loyalty relations with the peasant delegates, who would give them a power base in the town. Before the vast urbanization in the area, the relative weight of the village delegates was much greater than that of the town delegates. Therefore having a power base amongst the village delegates was essential. Their patronage relations were loyal and reciprocal. They retained remnants of their clients' loyalties and enjoyed a power base of their own even in 1979. These people did not, and could not, control the party in the sense that the Elmaciouglu family had. Their control was not absolute because they were in competition with each other.

From 1965 onwards, the left of centre movement began in the Taş branch of the RPP. In the early years of the movement, the merchants willingly invited the workers and unionists into the branch. They thought this new movement could bring vitality to RPP politics, and the party could attract the migrant votes and thus be more powerful. It would also be to their individual and group benefit. As the town was growing the merchants could not control the new quarters of the town. Squatter housing became their biggest problem. Maintaining good relations with the newcomers meant for them a solution to two problems: a) that of squatter housing for they needed to control the land through their agents; b) attracting new customers to their shops as the scale of trade grew larger and towards the needs of the city people rather than those of the peasants. By then they were transforming their shops from general stores into shops for the merchandize of workers who paid cash. Later, hire purchase agreements developed between the town merchants and workers. In this sense they were successful, their trading capacity increased not only because of their political relations but because of the extent of migration. However, the party agents and delegates in the squatter housing areas did not help the merchants to control the land market. On the contrary, they became squatters themselves and helped others to occupy land.

Later they themselves were very reluctant in accepting the migrants and workers into positions of power but by then the growth momentum of the town was so great that it was difficult to keep them out. The power of the merchant capitalists in Taş lasted for 2 decades and eventually the same forces that gave them power deprived them of it. The road brought industry, which pulled thousands of people from all over Turkey. This new migrant group wanted to establish their own power base in the town. The social democratic image of the RPP created by the left of centre movement, and Ecevit as the leader of the party, made the party

more attractive to workers. Union policies and RPP politics and ideology interlocked with each other, creating almost a new party in Taş in terms of its base of support and in terms of organization.

6.2 Local RPP Organization in Taşlik

The Republican Peoples Party in Taşlik was highly organized. It had representatives, militants and activists in every quarter of the town and the surrounding area. It had increased its vote and membership in the area. It is not difficult to see that the party was enjoying the full support of a highly conscious working class. The party office, which had a coffee house as well, was full of young energetic workers, discussing politics and trade union policies. It was obvious that the members were active and interested in politics and party ideology. The party was in the ascendant, attracting voters, members supporters and activists. From the discussions in the party, high hopes for the future were evident. The RPP had not enjoyed such a majority for very long. Even in the 1969 elections it was still in the minority. I think it may help to explain the recent structure of the party in the town if I begin with the 1960s.

From 1960 onwards the vast migration to Taşlik began. The migrants activated the party and the bulk of changes in voting habits or patterns came from the migrants. Amongst the migrants that were affiliated to the party there were two kinds of people. One group had traditional reasons that they had brought from their old residence, for supporting the party; for instance migrants from Kars, a province in the East that had always been a stronghold of the RPP. Another example is provided by Alevi migrants. Alevis had always supported the RPP because they saw its secularism as a protection against the Sunni oppression and the RPP had been the founder and a great supporter of the secular state.

The bulk of the migrant population that voted for the RPP, however, were converted in Taş itself. This was mainly for two reasons, though it may be difficult to differentiate their sequence. As Taş underwent very rapid industrialization, creating an organized working class concentrated in thousands and living in the squatter housing areas near the town, the RPP underwent a major ideological change, culminating in 1972 with the resignation of the old cadres. The new populist left of centre ideology gathered the uprooted migrants around the party with promises of trade union rights, a welfare state, better opportunities in life and a more egalitarian society. If the vote of the party since 1965 is examined it is easy to see that, although the migration was continuing with considerable intensity, there were no significant changes in voting patterns until the 1973 or even the 1977 elections. Therefore we can conclude that even for migrant workers to convert to the RPP took some time, perhaps up to 10 years. But with migration the community pressure of loyalty to the party that the village traditionally voted for, had ended. With the help of the unions, neighbourhood communities and their workmates the migrants learned that their interest as workers and as members of the working class as a whole, was to vote for the RPP.

These workers not only voted for the RPP but later many of them began to take an active part in party politics. Now it was the migrant workers' turn to hold power in political offices, on the municipal councils and on the party branch. The increase in their voting strength helped the workers to get into power. The constitution of the party required 1 delegate for every 100 party voters and, as the number of voters increased in the squatter housing areas, so did their representation. After the 1973 elections there were roughly 193 delegates and this increased to 400 in 1979 after the 1977 elections (see section 2.8). All of these 200 newcomers were from squatter housing areas, i.e. they were migrant labourers. These delegates had a different pattern of

voting for they preferred representatives of their class in positions of power. A new era of working class politics began, with new rules and new relations.

The old village delegates stayed in the party, as did some of the town merchants. However, they were neither happy about the party, nor were used to the new type of relations. In 1977, the RPP won the municipality elections in all 8 of the municipalities in the area. They also won the majority of seats in all of the ~~these~~ municipal councils. In 1977 the county executive council of Taş had 11 members, only 2 of whom were natives (a polytechnic graduate and a student), the rest, including the party leader, were migrants, and 5 of these were unionized workers. However 2 of the old town merchants were included in the municipal council from the party list.

6.3 Working Class Politics in the RPP

Factory workers, by a great majority, dominated the delegates in the RPP. They were not only the representatives of the squatter housing areas of Taş, but the delegates from the industrial belt and nearby villages were also workers in the factories. Favouring workers had been a deliberate policy of the local executive committee in the last few years. They believed workers were the true supporters of the social democratic movement in the party. There were also some factional reasons because workers supported the leadership of the party against the town merchants. Eventually, in the 1980 congress, the proportion of workers amongst delegates was more than seventy five per cent. In general most of these workers were migrants, and there was a large proportion of people from Kars, the Black Sea and some Alevis. They were young; the majority of the worker delegates were 35-40 years old. They had migrated to Taş 5 to 15 years ago, so they were not newcomers. All of them owned their own house, usually a gecekonu. Some of them had

converted these to two storey apartments, and rented one of the flats. All of them were married and their families were with them in Taş. Most of them had grown up children going to school. All of the delegates in Taş, including the village delegates, were primary school graduates and their educational standard varied; there were even university graduates among the young native delegates. But about half of them were technical school graduates, and worked as foremen and/or technical staff in the manufacturing industry.

Until 1977 almost all of the worker delegates worked in manufacturing industry. But when the RPP won the local elections and gained control of the municipal workforce (200 workers in 1979) the mayor, to establish a power base loyal to himself in the party, tried either to give jobs in the municipal workforce to the party delegates or encouraged the existing workers to take an active part in party politics, often bargaining for positions for them with the local leader. This led to a larger representation of service workers in the party cadres of up to 20%, but even then, the manufacturing industry workers predominated among the worker delegates.

As can be estimated from their educational level the workers are skilled or semi-skilled. Manufacturing industry in Taş was largely automated, requiring a semi-skilled workforce that was adaptable to different work situations. But there was also a great demand for technical school graduates, as foremen, technical advisers to workers and repairers. Therefore Taş attracted such skilled people from all over Turkey because of its proximity to Istanbul and good salaries. Educational level, however, did not correspond exactly to skill, because some of the craftsmen with only a primary education acquired skills through their apprenticeship. For example there were several worker delegates in the glass factories blowing sections with very high skills but little formal

education.

On average these workers earned wages considerably above the minimum wages, sometimes up to 10 times as much. (The minimum wage in 1980 December was 5,000 T.L. monthly). The average ranged between 15,000 - 25,000 T.L. depending on skill and one's period of stay in work. Only very few ~~declared~~ over 25,000 T.L. though there were three among the technical college graduates that earned more than 50,000 T.L.; these had engineering jobs, leading positions in the unions and income from various other sources e.g. rents.

Most of ^{migrants} did not return to their hometown regularly. They had cut all their ties with agriculture, including the yearly supplies of flour that it was customary to bring from the village. But they had close links with the ethnic groups in Taş. They were very keen on issues like mutual help and promotion of ethnic group interests. Mostly they resided in their ethnic group districts in Taş. A few of them with increasing incomes had moved towards the city centre so that they had better housing, benefited more from municipal services and their children were nearer to school. Still, this did not mean that they lost their relations with their ethnic community. They still kept up close contacts, saying that ^{this} was the only time they could relax and entertain themselves. Nearly all of them were very active unionists, either in the factory organizing the workers or in the union branch as members of executive committees. They were much more interested in and aware of union affairs than of party affairs. This was understandable because the union determined many more issues relevant to the immediate livelihood of the workers, than the party. But this does not mean that they were uninterested in party affairs, on the contrary they were interested in party politics both at the national and local levels. They had a wide knowledge of political, economic and social problems. They had

their own ideas about politics, and quite freely expressed and discussed them. All of the town delegates read newspapers every day and some of them even bought two papers. The most commonly read paper was Cumhuriyet, which was generally regarded as left wing. In 1977 when I was there, Politika was the most widely read paper because it was owned by DISK and supported the RPP until it was closed. Everybody listened to Radio and TV news and the political discussions on the TV. A few even claimed that they listened to the Turkish section of the BBC or Voice of Germany to get a second point of view.

Delegates often went to Istanbul for shopping, sightseeing and general entertainment. Most of them had travelled widely in Turkey and the union officials had even been abroad. All of them were or had been members of various voluntary associations, and were certainly members of their ethnic association. On average they claimed to be members of 2 to 4 associations, which included sports clubs, neighbourhood associations and unions.

Thus, a distinct group of people dominated and controlled the local branch of the RPP in Taş, a section of the working class, migrant, educated, skilled and unionized. It is difficult to find a descriptive concept that will subsume all of these characteristics without carrying any political or sociological connotations. This group was neither a working class aristocracy nor a group of privileged workers. They had neither middle class life-styles or aspirations nor did they have significant privileges denied to the rest of the working class. Therefore I will use the concept of 'better off workers' to describe them.

These people were ideologically bound to the party, although there were variations in their commitment to working class politics and ideology. The young workers saw their daily life and the working class struggle as a whole, as a continuum that has to be proven all the time.

They had some inconsistencies, in their views, but in general they were very loyal to left and were militant in defending workers rights. These were the people that went to meetings, that shouted slogans on the streets against the "capitalists" and the "fascist governments", that stopped work first, during strikes, that fought the "fascists", and that maintained relations with other left political parties.

Energy and debate were brought to the party by the young workers. The older delegates were less militant but more useful in terms of party activity. The older workers were also the leaders of the union branches or were on the executive committees of both the party and the union. They linked both the ethnic communities and the unions to the party. In one sense they were more social democratic than their younger counterparts, They had less class consciousness and more union consciousness.

6.4 Union Activity and the Relations of the Party Branch with the Unions

The unionized members of the party regarded unions and union activity as indispensable parts of their political lives. For them the union was more important than simply determining the outcome of their everyday life since it had the power to promote workers interests in general. Worker delegates gave primacy to their union activities, and they had more responsibility in their unions. Most of them were shop stewards in their unions or labour representatives of the factories.

They had close relations with management and had to confront the employers in their working life in defending the rights of their work mates in different kinds of disputes. I think this daily confrontation made them aware of the problems of the worker's in their relationships with the employers. They saw the indispensability of the union in

disputes if anything was to be gained in terms of workers' rights. In the process of developing class consciousness these steps were very important. Such conflicts brought them face to face with the management and this had two contradictory effects upon them. Firstly they developed personal relations with management and once the "enemy" was personified it became more difficult to be against them. But on the other hand, their conflicting interests made both sides experienced in the daily disputes.

There was also ideological propaganda by the union branches to support this confrontation. The individual shop steward was under a two-sided pressure both from the union and from his workmates. In a way he had to keep the factory going as it provided a living for his fellow workmates. The lengthening of disputes was disliked by management and frequent strikes created more and more problems for the workers. However, when he took a soft line towards the management, he was seen as betraying the working class. So, ^{such shop stewards} were both opposed to management and ^{felt} bitter about their workmates. As they described it, the workers did not appreciate the troubles through which they went.

The extent to which these delegates were class conscious depended upon which union they belonged to as much as upon their age and education. In terms of age the equation was simple, the younger the worker delegate the more active he would be in his union and the more class conscious he would be. However, in terms of education the equation was more complicated. The workers in skilled jobs tended to be less enthusiastic about the union or left wing politics, because of their closeness to the management and their responsible positions in the unions. The years of experience in work amongst skilled and educated workers led to low left wing militancy and more union consciousness. Whereas amongst the unskilled, the period of stay in work only added to

the workers political enthusiasm^{and political} consciousness.

All the union branches in Taş supported the RPP for two very important reasons. First of all the vast majority of their members voted for the RPP. Secondly it was the only left wing party that had a chance of coming to power and was willing to defend workers rights. Even if the union was more to the left than the RPP, as for example Madeni§ was, it still continued its activities in the RPP branch. In the last few years the local RPP branch in Taş had been the discussion centre for the left.

On the other hand the RPP deliberately tried to establish links with the unions. When in 1972 the left of centre factions in the party came to power, an item was added to the statute saying that there should be representatives of the workers in the executive committee where the worker population was above a certain limit. Even before this in Taş there were moves towards integrating the workers into the party. After 1972, instead of having individual workers participating, the local policy became to integrate union branches by having influential people from them on the executive committee. Thus in this way they thought they would be able to influence the votes of the members. Eventually, as other parties came up with the same idea, all political parties began to fight for influence in the unions and for helping those candidates that were affiliated to them in the union referendums.

Irrespective of their social background, ethnic origin, education, age or ideology, all the delegates of the RPP that I interviewed believed that some kind of relation should be established between the party and the unions. However they differed widely in terms of their attitudes as to how this should be achieved. The ideas ranged from leaving the party administration totally to the unions to infiltrating the party officials onto the union executive committees so that the party would control the unions§. There had been suggestions for

establishing relations with individual workers, but not with the unions. There had even been suggestions of allowing membership only after an ideological check so that no infiltration from left wing tendencies would be allowed.

The most debated issue however, was which one of them the union or the party should be in control. In terms of executive control both the party and the unions were controlled by the same individuals. The party executive committee had representatives from various unions and therefore was very much under the influence of union policies. The party also as a deliberate policy tried to have its members appointed as shop stewards, so that they would dominate the unions.

Having close relations with trade unionists was very important for votes. The union leaders could influence their workmates directly by asking them to vote for one or other party. The unions declared their support for the parties before elections. They could also affect the choice of candidates in election primaries. In fact, DISK was very influential in mobilizing its members, in support of an MP candidate in the 1977 elections*. Therefore the party leadership was very keen to have followers in the unions.

The unions also provided a very good milieu for patron-client relations. The unionists could find jobs for the unemployed to ensure their loyalty, then motivate them for support in the elections and election primaries. In the 1977 elections this was not an issue because both of the confederations of unions, the TURKIS and DISK, declared their support for the RPP. In terms of the local unions, most of them supported the local RPP branch anyhow.

* This candidate was leader of a union that was affiliated to DISK.

In most elections the unions' role was greater in election primaries than in terms of voting. The young workers were unhappy about the degree of politization in their unions. Some members of independent unions complained to me about the lack of political activity. The older delegates were worried about the degree of involvement with left wing politics and their relationship to the party. They thought this would get the party and the young workers into trouble.

Another issue was how the party should help the workers and the unions. Two kinds of suggestions were most common. First, the party should make it possible for the workers to organize, at the political and ideological level nationally by passing laws etc. Secondly, on the local level the party should help workers on strike, by giving them money and food, helping to find them work and supporting them in their plight.

The unions, especially DISK, were very influential on the ideological makeup of the worker delegates. The party, on the other hand, did not have any education programmes or seminars for the delegates and the workers.

DISK held seminars for teaching both the technical side of union activity and working class ideology. These seminars were very important in determining the ideological background of the delegates. Through them they learned the meaning of social democracy, socialism, trade unionism, the teachings of working class philosophers, and ideologies.

However, DISK was not in full ideological agreement with the RPP, although they supported the party tactically during the elections for the sake of preserving liberty and workers rights. Therefore most of the teaching in the seminars organised by the unions was not of RPP

ideology. The intense relations of unions with the party activists led them only to move away from the party line. Most of the teachings of DISK were incompatible with the RPP line and the delegates were affected by it. Especially among the youth organizations, some were affiliated to parties left of the RPP, although they stayed in the party as delegates. Close relations between the party and the unions was however an essential part of the workers life in Taş. The case of Alsas* is a good example of how the relations between the various unions and the party were interlocked into each other.

6.4.1 The Case of the Alsas Factory

Alsas was founded in 1969. It was a metal working factory employing more than 1000 workers. Until 1974 Alsas workers were unionised within Otomobilis which was a locally based independent union. There were conflicting rumours about this union. The workers of Alsas that had previously been represented by Otomobilis say it was a "yellow union" that cheated its ^{members} the leaders accepted money from the employers and sold the workers' rights. When I spoke to other members from other factories, they were very happy with the union. I doubted whether there was any actual bribery, but like any independent locally based union, Otomobilis was small, oriented mainly on collective bargaining and had instrumental attitude towards workers' rights. The dues were very low and the union did not hold extra activities such as seminars or meetings.

In 1972 a group of technicians came to work in Alsas from a state owned steel factory on the Black Sea. They, along with some other young technicians, started an opposition to Otomobilis. They wanted the factory union to be associated with Madenis ^{for} ideological reasons. At

* A pseudonym.

that time Otomobilis' leader was on the executive committee of the RPP in Taşlık. The union leader was trying to establish a delicate balance between his union members, the employers and the party. He was not willing to use the union's money and forces to support the party. What is more, he was opposed to the local party leader for factional and ethnic reasons. The local party leader was a Laz, while Otomobilis' Leader was a native. The local party leader was trying to get rid of the natives from the administration of the party, and he would not tolerate a native as a representative of workers when nearly all of the workers were migrants. Therefore the party backed the supporters of Madenis in Alsas. The leader of the party approached them and promised them help. He told the delegates of the RPP and its members to vote for Madenis in the coming referendum. It was a difficult decision for workers because not only were the membership dues for Madenis higher but it had a history of long strikes which some workers disliked. On the other hand, however, they were good militants in collective bargaining talks. Eventually with the help of the party, Madenis won the referendum.

The leader of Otomobilis resigned from the local executive committee of the party immediately. The fact was that the party he had been working for, helped his opponents in the Alsas factory to bring about his defeat. He was immediately replaced by one of the migrant technicians from Alsas who had organized the referendum. Madenis in return for all this, promised to give money to the party in the coming elections and support it locally. For the leader of the party it was another step towards the defeat of the opposition factions.

6.5 Class or Ethnicity: Conflicts in the Local RPP

After 1972, the small businessmen that had previously dominated the party began to lose their importance, though there was a considerable number of them still in the party. They were the remnants of old party

cadres and their presence was resented by the rest of the members. After the 1977 elections their presence in the party was questioned widely by members and in some incidents they were not allowed into the party building although they were members and delegates. Eventually one of them who owned the party building and let it to the party free of charge, was not allowed into his own building. He took the party to court and evicted it from the building in two months. Such a high degree of resentment had historical, economic and ideological roots. Class antagonisms were mixed up with native/migrant clashes. Ethnic identity, interest and power conflicts, all manifested themselves in the form of hatred towards the shopkeepers of the town centre and the small businessmen of Taş.

The hostility towards these small businessmen went hand in hand with the peasant delegates loss of power in the party. Previously this group, with the patronage they bestowed to the peasants, had the support of the great majority of the delegates. Later, the working class began to control the local party branch and replaced the peasant delegates by workers in the villages of the industrial belt. Thus there was an increase in the relative weight of the town vis a vis the villages. Workers did not need small businessmen as their representatives, they had unions and other voluntary associations that represented their interest. Moreover, they had no reason to identify with and relate themselves to the native small businessmen through patron-client relations. Besides, they often confronted each other in the market as buyers and sellers. With inflation and increasing prices, the worker could not make ends meet and, seeing the relative wealth of the shopkeepers, blamed them for their own sufferings and recalled the anti-capitalist teachings of the party and the union.

In the antagonism between these two classes the ideological teach-

ings of the party was also important. The primary target of RPP anti-capitalist sentiments had been the small capitalist merchants. Abstract statements against the usurers, the intermediaries and the black marketers found concrete expression in the case of the native capitalist merchants and this was coupled by the union's anti-capitalist propaganda. It was not always easy for the workers to understand how exploitation in the factory took place. Whereas if the prices of some basic necessities were increasing, getting to the point where workers could not afford them, while the shopkeepers were increasing their profits, it was easy to locate "exploitation".

There was also a cultural background to this conflict. The worker delegates were migrants that came from various parts of Turkey. There were differences of custom and lifestyle, but deeper than these were the religious and ethnic differences. Amongst the migrant population there were Alevi, who ^{supported} secular, but also there were peoples from the East who were religious and secluded. They did not like the liberal attitudes of the town merchants. On the other hand the young workers were socialists. Although these socialist workers maintained their religious convictions as well as their political ideology they were accused of being blasphemers by the shopkeepers.

Class cleavages backed by cultural differences, resulted in a major ethnic dispute within the RPP: native-migrant conflict. Not only did they fight with each other over power in the Taşlık branch of the party, but also they had different political views on various issues. The businessmen thought that close relations with the unions meant leaving the party to the left-wing activists. The natives wanted the party to pay more attention to the villages, and to do more party directed patronage in return for votes in the villages. They considered Ecevit himself a part of the "left-wing unionist gang" so they supported the

centerists in the party. They wanted even the left wing factions within the party to be smashed nationally.

Initially, like all the natives of the town, the shopkeepers benefited from the migration to Taş. But it later caused a lot of problems for them. Their land was occupied by the gecekondu owners and there was an increase in the crime rate. Not only had the migrants brought their traditional feuds, kidnappings etc, with them to Taş, but also the lack of traditional social control on them created new problems. Thus the native merchants were alienated from their own town and their own party, that had been invaded by "barbarians from the East". In fact this was the term they used for the migrant population. Besides this they were "communists".

The shopkeepers who had been RPP members for years were left with a major dilemma. On the one hand, there was the party they had worked for for many years. They did not approve of the present cadres or ideology, but they had been critical of other parties for so many years that they did not have the courage to leave the party. They were known as a "Halkci"* by the native population. They also had a power base, however limited, amongst the peasant delegates and other natives. The small villages outside the industrial belt still kept some of their traditional patron/client ties with the merchants in the town. The native small entrepreneurs also had very good relations with the M.P's and the central organizations which they had developed over the years. During elections the executive committee was forced to ask for their financial support as well as their votes and backing. They were indispensable in the local elections because of their experience of being on the councils for a long time. The party wanted to make use of this by giving them

* "Halkci" means populist. It was used to refer to supporters of the RPP.

pride and bargaining power vis a vis the new party cadres. They could make use of this in obtaining seats in the municipal council, which was very important for them (see section 6.1.). If these small entrepreneurs joined other political parties, establishing such relations would take a long time and they would not, initially, have bargaining positions.

Nevertheless the small capitalists of the town were highly critical of the party and its cadres. Some of them told me that they would not even vote for it if there were elections in 1981. They longed for the good old days, before the changes of 1972, when the local branch was not left to such ignorant migrant workers. They not only opposed the new cadres because of their class background and ideology but on practical issues as well. They deeply resented the alignment and coalitions between the left wing organizations, the unions and the party. They said that the main orientation of party propaganda should be towards the villages and the peasant delegates as it used to be in the past; this they thought would help them in bringing back the power that they lost.

But in a social democratic party where the working class was dominant, and ideologically saw the petite bourgeoisie as one of its primary enemies, there was not much room for the old cadres to manoeuvre and stay in powerful position. Still on the basis of their years of service to the party, their financial help, on the leftovers of the old patron-client relationship with the peasants, and their respectability on native Taş population, some were party candidates to the municipal elections of 1977. But from 1977 to 1980 the cleavages widened. It was unlikely that they would have been candidates if there had been elections in 1981.

Native workers were left with similar dilemmas although their antagonism was less acute. They were more skilled and educated than migrants and as natives they owned some property which made them better off. As

neighbours, relatives and old friends they had close relations with the native businessmen. Their workmates considered them renegades, because of such links. Moreover, they were dubious about the relations with left wing movements, especially among the middle aged such relations were disapproved of. However as they were active unionists they did not attract as much opposition as the native businessmen.

As opposed to the merchants of the town centre the shopkeepers of the squatter housing areas identified with the cause of the working class and were getting more and more involved with the party. This was a migrant group that had close primordial ties with the workers from the same ethnic background. They were the group of people that were known as "gecekondur agasi", and they had been migrants for longer than most members of the same ethnic group. They managed to save a little capital to open a corner shop, a coffee shop or an estate agency, and in the meantime, they enclosed some land to build gecekondus which they sold to newcomers. Thus they built a community around themselves.

These people had various reciprocal arrangements with the workers. They provided the workers with land and building equipment to make their own "gecekondur" and they provided them with food in times of need, such as unemployment and strikes. Moreover, they had ethnic and kinship ties with the workers in the neighbourhood. So they were recognized as the representatives of the ethnic community and neighbourhood. In fact through these loyalty relations which they established with migrants, they could bargain with the political parties. In fact most quarter delegates were from this group.

They were deliberately recruited to the party by the party administration in the 1970s. The party thought that through these people they would mobilize votes. The party leader in 1979 told me that his policy of expanding the party vote was by "creating some 'fat cats' that could

catch mice and bring them to him". He said he was deliberately supporting the squatter housing patrons in their areas because through their ethnic and kinship relations they could attract votes. Why did such migrant businessmen choose the RPP, when the party ideology was against them? The major reason was that their customers and community members were unionised workers that supported the party passionately. They themselves also had a working class background. Ideologically they supported the party to use party channels to increase their influence; some managed to get onto the municipal council and local executive committee representing their ethnic community or the quarters.

The migrant groups were divided amongst themselves ethnically. Each ethnic group had its own settlement area, so ethnic groups were organized both in ethnic associations and neighbourhood associations. As most of the migrants voted for the RPP, they had their disputes in the party similar to their disputes in the trade unions. In this sense the division of seats on the municipal council and the local executive committee was very important. The leaders of the ethnic community and neighbourhood association would bargain with the local leaders for seats in return for votes.

For example, in the 1979 branch congress the major ethnic quarrels were between Karsli, Alevi and Laz groups. The leader of the party was a 'Laz' but, no other Laz was allowed to the executive committee, and the seat in the executive committee was divided between natives, Karsli and Alevi groups. The Karsli population was disadvantageous despite its weight in numbers of membership in the party, because most of the members were ordinary workers. Whereas amongst the Alevi population the union activists and foremen were more common. Therefore they attracted support from non aligned groups. However their disadvantage was their religion which alienated the sunnis. But eventually it was agreed that

each ethnic group should be given two seats in the executive committee besides various other favours to be done to the members of this ethnic community i.e. finding jobs.

The problem for the local party organization was to keep a balance between the various ethnic groups and the natives, besides keeping a balance between the different unions. An unfair share given to one of them could mean the loss of many votes.

Usually the local leaders were sensitive to increasing votes. However, in the case of Taşlik, increasing votes were of secondary importance because no matter what happened in the local branch, the votes were increasing. Therefore, in some cases ethnic demands were refused by local leaders on factional grounds. This also depended on the relative weight of the ethnic group in the party. Some ethnic groups' demands were very difficult to refuse because of their dominance in the party, for instance the Kars, the Laz and the Alevi.

In this sense another major difficulty was with the natives. Although the natives made continual demands they were not organized as were other ethnic groups and this, in some cases, was to their disadvantage because they could be easily refused on personal grounds. As demands came in on individualized forms, it was difficult in some cases to refuse an individual because of his personality. However, on the whole not being organized was a disadvantage to the natives. The best organized and the most populous group had a better chance of getting what it wanted.

6.6 The Village Delegates

As I pointed out earlier, there were two kinds of villages in Taşlik and their socio-economic problems, as well as their political alliances were quite different. In the villages outside the industrial

belt, the party made no progress in the last 20 years. Their votes and therefore the number of their delegates remained constant and hence, their relative weight in the county's politics declined sharply.

There were various reasons for this stagnation in their votes. These areas of Taş were not directly influenced by industrialization, and there has not been much development in terms of agriculture. There has been a lot of migration from them to Taş and other places. Moreover the peasants were conservative and religious and the social democratic movement did not appeal to them because they saw it as "communist" and "blasphemous". They had not previously supported the RPP anyway, claiming that İnönü left them starving during the war years, and that all the services to their villages were brought to them by the Justice Party and the Democratic Party. The local branch of the RPP in Taşlık did not try hard anyway to restore their relations with the inland villages as their vote was very small and to reach the villages to make propaganda took time. The same time spent in the town quarters not only appealed to more voters, but as there was a potential for a left wing ideology the results were better. Therefore the cadres in the local branch have deliberately neglected the villages. This was openly admitted by the local executive committee members, to the resentment of the businessmen in the town.

The peasant delegates were also alienated from the party. Most of them had been in the party for many years and they were used to having their political contacts with the town notables, who had now been out of power in the party. They had patronage relations with these notables who helped them with their various financial problems, such as credits, and in various government offices, with legal disputes for instance. The peasants owed loyalty to these notables and now instead of these familiar faces whom they saw as their protectors against any mischief,

they met migrant workers in the local branch. Not only were their outlooks, customs, accents and religions different, but also their ideology and their expectations from politics were different.

In ^{some} cases that he did know the the new leaders, ^{in others} like union leaders ^{or the new comers} were not interested in him because he was of no use to them in returning favours. What is more, when he came to the party meetings he could not follow conversations that went on about issues such as unions, fascists, left-wing organizations and the ethnic association; too remote for him to share and understand.

Nevertheless there were still some 30 delegates in the party that came from the remote villages. They were much older on average than the other delegates and they had more conservative attitudes. They did not come to the party office except when they had a specific purpose and they also visited the offices and shops of the old town notables. They still tried to keep their old patronage ties with them, which was reciprocated because the businessmen wanted a power base of their own. They voted as they were told by the businessmen, but their weight in Taşlık politics was negligible because they were outnumbered by workers.

Like their patrons in the town, the peasants also could not change their party even though they did not approve the current state of the party. They were the people that had fought the Democratic and the Justice Party members in their villages for years and they were known to be "Halkci". They thought of the party as inherited from İnönü and Atatürk. After all these years, however, these "blasphemous communists" had invaded the party. They could no longer identify with it nor could they leave it to join their enemies. They also had patronage relations stemming from their membership of the party, with the town businessmen. Although the power of the businessmen was declining they could still make use of each other for their political and economic

ends. Establishing such relations in other political parties would take time, even if it was possible.

The situation in the villages of the industrial belt was totally different. These villages received migration like Taş town itself. They were on the coast and the agricultural land in the area was more fertile. They grew apples, cherries and olives, all of which yielded good money when the crops were not ruined by pollution. Besides their land gained enormously in value due to industrialization and migration. Their sons had been able to find jobs in industry and having improved means of transport to Istanbul and Izmit had increased their access to education. They were thus directly affected by industrialization.

The votes of the RPP had increased enormously in this area during recent years so the number of delegates from the area increased as well. As a part of the working class solidarity policy followed by the local party leadership, the party tried to mobilize the workers in the area. In the past, some peasant delegates had been similar in outlook to the inland village delegates. For some time they kept the same delegates, but as their votes and thus their delegates increased, they began to introduce some young migrant or native workers to the party cadres as delegates. Later they replaced the old delegates, usually with a worker from the same family. The average age of the delegates from these villages was very young. Some of them had just reached their voting age (21). Such a gradual change was necessary to ensure that the native population did not react fiercely.

The village had a stratification structure of its own. The natives were considered higher in status, and they were definitely richer. If the party replaced a native by a migrant in the village this provoked a reaction from the old folk in the village and certainly from the family of the old delegate. Even if he would not join another

party, as his honour might be involved, the least he would do was to abstain from elections, leading to a loss of votes. To maintain the honour of the family, if he was to be replaced they thought someone from his own family, preferably his son.

The worker delegates from the villages were not very different from workers in the town, although they tended to be more moderate in their politics. There were various reasons for this. Firstly they were still partially controlled by the village community and therefore they could not go along with the left wing ideology too far. If they did, they would risk the family getting a reputation of being "communist, i.e. blasphemous". Secondly, they still had interests in land and property. Most of them had agricultural land however small it was, and some had a few rooms converted into a flat that they rented to migrants. This might have affected their views to make them more moderate. Thirdly they had cultural differences with the migrants that now dominated the party, and identification with them was difficult. Therefore they were less united than the rest of the worker delegates. But they were still part of the working classes in Taşlık and participated in working class politics in the local branch of the Republican Peoples Party.

I was told in many interviews with the local and provincial leaders of the party that there had been changes amongst the villagers even in the remotest corners of Taşlık. They said that interest in RPP politics, and politics in general, was increasing. Although accusations of communism and blasphemy still occur, the villagers, due to increasing interaction with workers, were more interested. Another reason for such a change, they said, was the spread of the mass media, especially television. However, the village delegates that I interviewed seemed to be unaffected by this interaction, if not negatively affected.

6.7 Ideological Disputes in the Party

The worker delegates of the RPP in Taşlık, were very much aware of the problems that Turkey was facing. What was the party's reaction to these problems, what were its policies? What was meant by social democracy, democracy and socialism? So the range of topics they discussed was very wide. The young workers especially were very much interested in discussing issues such as foreign currency shortages, imperialism, private enterprise, capitalism, fascism, the export economy or workers rights. Their knowledge of the issues and their convictions were deeply influenced by the socialism of the unions.

The RPP was not a Marxist party and nor were its voters Marxists. In the party itself there was a large group (businessmen, an older generation of workers, delegates of the villages) that were anti-marxist, anti-socialist and quite religious. This created major conflicts within the party in terms of party-union relations and relations with other parties. There were many national and local reasons for this. The most important ~~was~~ the party's undecided attitude towards the left. The RPP, as a social democratic party with massive support from all sections of society, had been the major defender of the rights of the left. But the party had not aimed at collaboration with the left, although it certainly wanted the votes of the potential left wing parties. The left, on the other hand, saw the RPP as their sole defender, but still opposed it ideologically and some of them even thought that the only way for the left to develop was by crushing the RPP. So both sides also had some hostile attitudes towards each other and because of this did not have a consistent line of action. In places like Taşlık however, where they came side by side it was difficult to find the dividing line between them.

During late 1970's the major political clashes in Turkey were between left and right. However, in Taşlik such a problem was of secondary importance in the daily lives of party members. National Action Party was almost non-existent in the area and, besides, the other right wing parties were losing their support. Therefore in the Taşlik branch of the RPP the most important issues ~~was~~^{were} the factional ideological disputes the central organization of the party and the relations with other left wing parties. The other left wing parties neither had organizations in the forms of branches in Taşlik nor did they have a considerable voting base. However, they had some support in the unions and had some activists in the area. As they did not have enough voters they did not have any candidates in any local or general elections, they supported RPP in the elections.

The members of RPP had contact with the other parties especially through unions. This effected their views on both the left in general and the factional disputes in the party. The influence of multiple forces on the worker delegates were evident in the party discussions. Therefore most of their ideas showed inconsistencies. However, the major dispute still in 1979 was what the social democracy of the party should look like and its relation to other left wing parties. On that line there were two major tendencies in the party, the social democrats and their opponents; within each side however there were minor factions and differing views.

The workers, the newcomers to the party after 1970, called themselves leftists or social democrats. They openly declared their support for Ecevit, and the social democratic factions in the party including some of the socialists. Although this group in itself in its attitude to left, all believed that the party should defend the basic democratic rights of the individuals and groups irrespective of ideology. They

admired Ecevit and praised the social democratic movement as the true protector of working class rights. They seemed to be concerned about the allegations of communism to the party, and said it should be pointed out to the peasants that communism was not blasphemy. "Social democracy" they claimed, "is based on sharing and that is in the Koran." They were hopeful about the future of RPP and they believed that it could do great things for the country. The local version of this optimism about the RPP's future can be expressed in the words of a Taş politician: "In our social democratic order there will be factories all over Taşlık but they will not create pollution, so the patches of land in between will be covered with cherry orchards".

The elderly supporters of social democratic movement in the RPP branch of Taşlık were concerned about violence which was becoming more common at that time. They whole-heartedly supported Ecevit to the extent of naming their sons after him. They were cautious and instrumental in the relations with other leftist parties. They believed the democratic rights of ^{the} left should be defended, but as they were concerned with votes, they knew that ordinary voters, even workers in Taşlık, could be negatively affected by too much of leftism. However they carried out bargaining with the unions and the other parties, as far as they could gain votes.

Despite the dominance of the supporters of the social democratic movement in the party there was a group of old native members who were anti-leftist. They believed that the RPP should have nothing to do with left, not even defend their democratic rights. They thought that people were not voting for the RPP because of the "leftists" in the party. They said that "foreign" and "dangerous" elements should leave the RPP and there should be a purer party on Kemalist lines. They wanted to retreat to pre-1970 ideology in the party, for the changes in the party

that they did not like, they not only blamed the local organization but also the national leadership of the party. "It was Ecevit's mild attitude towards left" they said "that enabled them to act so freely in the party". "This is Atatürk's and İnönü's party and it should stay like that". "If it was not for İnönü we would have never stayed in the party after the social democratic movement took over."

Such a centrist attitude towards the party ideology was supported by the groups that were losing power in the party such as the town merchants. However, they were also influencing their clients and the village delegates against the domination of the workers and the relation of the party with the unions.

The allegations of communism were most effective in the villages and amongst the most recent migrants. For the vast majority of migrant delegates, however, it was not a major problem because of the influence of their workmates and they did not feel subject to intimidation. The village delegates seemed to be used to it. They said that such an allegation had been said for 30 years since 1950. They added that the Mufti's* that joined the party in 1973 and 1977 elections, helped a lot against accusations of blasphemy.

From the interviews I conducted with the delegates of the RPP in Taşlık one point seemed particularly outstanding. From leaders to voters every level of membership and support in Taş were interested in the ideology of the party, and the politics of the country. There was a great desire to learn and discuss politics and to participate in politics.

* Mufti's are State officials with high training in Islamic affairs.

6.8 Elections and propaganda

Until the local congress of the RPP in Taşlık in 1979, the delegates were selected by the local leadership, depending upon the factional disputes and communal relations of the delegate himself. For the first time in 1978 there were delegate elections in the quarters, even if the old procedure was retained in the villages. The change of policy towards selecting delegates was due to pressure from the delegates themselves rather than to changes of attitudes amongst the leadership. There was a lot of competition amongst the candidates to become delegates in the quarters. This was mixed up with factional disputes, union disputes, ideological disputes, and ethnic conflict. It was such a complicated situation in terms of issues and groups involved that it became very difficult for the local leadership to decide without their participation. They decided that they would hold elections for the delegates. Of course they tried to persuade the members to vote for their own factions, and in this sense it was controlled and influenced by the local leaders. Still it was the first time there were delegate elections in Taşlık. Holding elections, however, could not stop the allegations against the leaders. Their opponents insisted that the worker delegates were not eligible, asking for residence requirements or registration requirements, to be fulfilled.

After the nomination of delegates (by election or by appointment as in the villages*) the same procedure of bargaining was still carried on. How many natives or migrants should be included on the executive

* There was no opposition to the appointment of delegates in the villages for two reasons. Firstly it was very difficult to change them because the party did not have many supporters, and for kinship and honour reasons the whole lineage might go against the party if they were removed. Secondly the village delegates supported the businessmen, so changing ^{the} inner village. Delegates did not necessarily mean loss of support for the businessmen in the RPP.

committee? Which ethnic group would the leader come from? From which union would the delegates to the provincial congress be chosen? The total number of positions demanded by ethnic groups, unions, neighbourhoods and various professions were more than the available positions and they usually had to choose individuals that represented more than one of the conflicting groups. So individual candidates who had links with more than one group had a better chance. For example, an Alevi worker from Tokat, belonging to a certain neighbourhood area and affiliated to Madenis, approved by all the groups involved, can be seen as a representative of all these four groups.

In ~~contrast~~ ^{contrast} to Kaleli, there were many candidates competing for official positions. The party was prosperous, there were high hopes for the future and so most of the people tried to take advantage of the situation. Therefore there was a great deal of competition among different candidates for the position of mayor and for the leadership of the local party. Each candidate tried to mobilize as many links as he could in the elections. This of course increased the conflicts between the ethnic groups as the differences were emphasized by the candidates to increase their followers.

Once the election primaries were over, the intra party bargaining ended, although it usually resulted in bitterness between some groups. But the discussions were continued over as to how the election propaganda would have had been carried out to get better results.

The dominant groups in the party, the workers factions, decided in 1977 elections that the propaganda should only be carried out ^{within} the town boundaries and in the industrial belt. They said, "Even if we double our votes in the villages we increase it only by the amount of one block of flats in the city". The party had always had financial difficulties and it was not worth going to the villages, as it was too

expensive and inefficient. The village delegates and businessmen were furious with such a decision. They thought election tours to the villages were the duty of the town leadership. In fact when they were in power in the local RPP branch they had toured the villages even though it was more difficult then.

The whole propaganda campaign until 1970 had been in the villages, promising mainly, party-directed patronage. I was told by some former members of parliament from the province that they toured the villages every election from 1950 to 1970. They promised electricity, water, roads and schools. I was told that the villages of the area were very poor at that time and party directed patronage promises attracted many votes. The peasant delegates complained about the absence of party directed patronage in the villages. "Our opponents", they argued, "win votes in this way". The villagers wanted concrete promises of party directed patronage. The party leadership on the other hand complained that the villagers were not interested in policy issues such as development programmes for the villages or cooperatives, and were more interested in international problems such as the invasion of Cyprus. For example, the party leadership talked about land reform as an issue in election propaganda. The villagers were not interested, arguing that this idea has no tangible promises in it. When the villagers asked questions they wanted explanations on accusations of communism in the party or what the Greeks were up to in the Aegean. These issues were considered irrelevant by the local party leader and his immediate followers.

However, through interacting with different people, and under the influence of the mass media, the villagers were also changing. To the astonishment of the local leadership, in some cases during the propaganda they raised questions about inflation and prices, collective

bargaining and even, in a case, about imperialism.

Although a major complaint was the lack of party directed patronage and favouritism on party lines, the party leaders were engaged in both of them though these were carried on in the squatter housing areas rather than in the villages. In all the quarters, they promised that they would not demolish houses even if there were court orders and they would provide electricity, water, roads for the area. They also promised jobs in the municipality.

Winning the municipality, in terms of patronage resources, was very important. This not only enabled the party to provide party directed patronage through the allocation of services, but it also helped the factional leaders to build up their following. About 2 years after the municipal elections just before the local congress of the party, there was a major dispute between the Mayor, who was in the RPP, and the local leader of the party. Compared with the mayor, the local leader had very few means to build up a following. In two years the mayor had employed more than 100 workers to the municipality and most of them were elected as delegates. He was trying to establish a power base of his own independent of the local leader. This meant that instead of the mayor being dependent upon the local leader for votes to be re-elected as the RPP candidate, the local leader was becoming dependent on the mayor to be re-elected. The delegates also sensed the potential of the patronage in the mayor's hands. Therefore the links with his followers began to be established directly by him rather than by going first to the local leader to ask his consent. The local leader therefore had to activate other ties. His major advantage was the native-migrant conflict, he stayed in power by manipulating this conflict to his advantage.

There were patronage offers in Taşlık, as in Kaleli, but similarly there was no actual buying of votes. The patronage relations were seen

as reciprocal obligations to be paid by votes, whereas buying votes would be immoral, and certainly against "working-class ethics". Most of the delegates were not in need of small amounts of money as they were highly paid skilled workers.

6.9 Fund Raising in the Party

The RPP branch in Taşlik did not have many financial problems as far as the routine expenses of the party were concerned. Thanks to one businessman in the town they did not pay any rent for their headquarters in an old building that had been converted into a two storey apartment. The party was squeezed into two rooms, one of which was used as a coffee house which helped to raise a small amount of money for the party. The other routine expenses were met by the local leader of the party. During elections, when expenses were too large for any single person to afford, party finance was undertaken by some well to do members and the unions.

The unions could not give direct cash donations to the party so they helped in printing the propaganda leaflets and with transport. Usually the union could only provide the facilities and the expenses had to be paid by the party because the unions had no formal relations with the party, and they had to have their accounts clear. However there were some cases where the unions actually paid the expenses, or even donated cash. In those cases the union leaders had to fiddle the accounts. They did it only when there was a good reason for it, for example when they were candidates themselves.

Another major source of income for the party was the donations of businessmen in the town. During the elections the local leadership of the party asked for donations from their internal opponents. This made the businessmen furious because they felt as if they were tolerated in

the party because of these donations. Still, it was very difficult for them to refuse because they too wanted the party to win the elections.

The party also expected the candidates to contribute towards its expenses. They set minimum contributions required from a candidate, though it was only a nominal fee. However, the candidate himself was also expected to meet "his personal expenses," the money he spent for his propaganda.

The youth organization was another financial burden on the local party. The womens' organization was financially self-sufficient, but the youth group expected the party leaders to pay for all their expenses, even including the tea they drank in their meetings.

Due to such multiple resources that the local party could call upon, they were hardly short of cash during the election periods.

6.10 Auxiliary Organisations

6.10.1 The Womens' Group

The womens' group in Taşlik seemed much more permanent than its counterpart in Kaleli. However, the level of activities in Taşlik was very dependent on the local leader of the womens' group. Before 1975, the wife of an eminent member was the local leader of the womens' group. In this sense, the womens' group was an extension of the main organization and was susceptible to all kinds of influences from the main organization. Thus, when the local leader of the party resigned as a result of factional the leader of the womens' organization also resigned. All the womens group's leaders until then were native being the wives of small entrepreneurs.

In 1975, when the main branch leader was elected from the migrant workers faction, they did not want the womens' group leader to be a

member of an opposing faction. There were problems, however, in choosing somebody from the migrants. Most of the migrant workers' wives were not brought up to meet such a challenge for above all they were not educated enough for such a job. They were not used to meeting alien men in political discussions, nor were they very much exposed to the outside world. Besides, their husbands were not quite prepared to have them join circles that were dominated by men. They finally elected a housewife with secondary education, who was a migrant and the wife of an ex-army officer. Her husband, though, was not involved in politics. They came to Taş on duty and settled there when the husband retired. She was interested in politics and wanted to get onto the municipal council, so she was appointed by the main branch. One year later she held a congress with 20 members and was elected again. There were 5 other members of the executive committee but the bulk of the work however was still on her shoulders.

Since 1975 the local womens' group had managed regular monthly meetings, which were only tea parties with political gossip. Besides this, however, they had also arranged some activities in the squatter housing area. In 1976 they organized a large tea-party in the town hall and collected about 8000 T.L. With this money they opened a course in carpet weaving for the migrant girls. This enabled them to develop close contacts in the squatter housing areas.

They were very active during the local election campaign and received help from the wives of the local leaders. For about a month they visited squatter housing areas during the day and held meetings in the coffee shops. They were very organized; people living in the area to be visited were notified beforehand, to make sure that they would attend and listen. In some cases, a second notification was necessary. The propaganda mainly involved promising party directed patronage and

introducing the womens' group leader as a candidate. After the elections the womens' group carried on their work although with little enthusiasm. It was more routine meetings and fund raising activities that they were interested in.

The factional disputes were reflected in the womens' group too. By 1979 there were two factions fighting each other, the businessmen and the workers and it was the same in the womens' group. In the 1979 congress the supporters of the workers group won.

6.10.2 The Youth Group

The youth group was the most active of all in Taşlik. They had a permanent organization, and although formal meetings were only once a month, the executive members gathered whenever possible and they were usually joined by the other members. They were either young workers or university students. Depending on their working hours, they came to the coffee house of the party to discuss politics. Most of what they called political activity involved long hours of discussion. They discussed socialism, union politics and national and international political problems. They were enthusiastic and wanted to be active which led them to develop close relations with the other leftist parties, which promised them more action.

The youth organization too took part in election propaganda. They distributed leaflets, put up posters, organized action groups to protect the candidates, and they were active at the ballot box during the day of the elections, checking the results. But the main branch saw them as a burden as trouble makers rather than being of any help. They got involved with the police and they were uncontrollable. Besides this, they were a financial burden as well.

However, the youth group could be activated in factional disputes and they supported the workers faction in the party. They were active both in the squatter housing areas and in the unions and were influential on some delegates. So votes could be increased through them and that was why they were endured by the leaders of the party in Taşlik.

6.11 Relations with Members of Parliament and Provincial Organizations

In 1977, although there were three RPP members of Parliament and a senator from Kocaeli, the province, none of them were from Taşlik. The delegates of the local branch seemed not to be happy with any of the members for they seemed to want an MP of their own. In fact as a county they had not had anybody representing them in parliament since the beginning of the republic. Taşlik was a small county and during the single party period they were not influential enough in the central organization of the party, nor at the provincial level, to have somebody that they favoured elected. In 1954 they asked a medical doctor that resided in Istanbul but who was from Taş originally, to come and represent Taşlik in the RPP list. He could get into the list, but he was not elected because of the majority system and the RPP lost the elections in Kocaeli. They tried again in 1969 with a lawyer who was also from Taş originally but this time someone who was living in Ankara. However, he could not even get onto the list.

The number of delegates from Taşlik in 1969 was less than 200, and the province was dominated by delegates from the provincial centre and other counties. By the 1977 elections, the number of delegates in Taşlik was large enough to have a bargaining base in the province, but then there was the problem of who would be the candidate. There were so many ethnic, social and ideological conflicts over the positions that eventually nobody dared to become a candidate. If they did, they would fail to get onto the list because the opposing groups (ethnic or

otherwise) would not vote for them.

The representatives from Kocaeli differed in their relations with the delegates from Taşlık. The most important factor in this relation was that they were natives and most of the delegates were migrants. So none of them had any direct personal relation with the "new delegates". They only knew the old delegates in town, i.e. businessmen or village delegates. This in itself was a source of conflict. It created antagonism towards the representatives irrespective of their attitudes towards migrants, or their commitment to left wing ideology. The representatives, not being able to establish direct links, used mediators, such as local leaders of the party or union leaders. Being dependent on the mediators made the representatives more susceptible to factional disputes. Mediators not only presented the images of parliamentarians as they wanted, but also invoked them, sometimes without consultation, for or against an issue. They also controlled the information networks for them.

For example, in the 1977 elections a candidate who was the leader of a branch of DISK was strongly opposed by the local leaders of Taşlık. The confederation supported him openly by sending messages to its branches all over the province. However, none of these messages reached the worker delegates as the candidate was not on good terms with the union officials in Taşlık, or with the local branch leaders. He was from a very small ethnic group that had lived in Kocaeli for two centuries and he tended to support men from his ethnic background in his own union. Therefore despite DISK, he was opposed in Taşlık.

The older representatives had the support of the village delegates and businessmen. The worker delegates tended to vote in accordance with union leaders, ethnic community leaders or gecekonu ağasi, or local party leaders. They bargained with votes for patronage. The individual

delegates had no means of establishing direct links. In cases of need, instead of going to the representatives of Kocaeli, they tended to reactivate their old links and went to representatives from their home town. However, the representatives usually did what they could, even asking representatives from Kocaeli to be helpful, because they too believed in ethnic solidarity and they knew that if the delegate got what he wanted he would notify his relatives back home. In the course of time, however, at least some migrant delegates also established personal relations with Kocaeli members of parliament. They used various relations interchangeably depending upon their respective effectiveness.

A similar problem occurred between the county organisation in Taşlık and the provincial organisation of Kocaeli. In Izmit itself similar changes took place because of migration and industrialization. But still the core of the old party leadership managed to dominate the provincial party. They were not happy with the conflicts in Taşlık because for them unification behind the party cause was more important than either ethnic conflicts or class conflicts.

6.12 Some Concluding Remarks on the RPP in Taşlık

The working classes in Taşlık dominated both local politics and the Republican Peoples Party. However, in the party itself there were people with divergent class backgrounds. This resulted in various factional conflicts. Some of the issues were ideological and reflected different class interests. The major factional disputes were between migrants and natives, workers and small capitalists, and old members of the party and new ones. Small capitalists, natives and the old party members constituted one group whereas the workers, the migrants and the new members constituted a different group. The people in the overlapping area of these two circles, such as native workers, were very small in number.

In the decade before 1980 the structure of the Taşlik branch of RPP had changed radically. A party that kept losing elections converted into a successful party. With the social democratic movement the migrant workers entered the local branch and later began to play a primary role. They changed the party from one based on patronage relations between peasants and small businessmen, to a working class party, largely based on class interests and solidarity. However, this was only partially achieved. The workers themselves were involved in multiple traditional relations in their unions, their neighbourhoods, and their ethnic communities.

Workers by experience in their daily lives knew that preserving the traditional networks were essential to the workers, such networks helped them through difficult times. They did not see how these could be replaced by institutions such as trade unions, because of the differences in the kinds of services each provide. However, such networks, though essential for the individual worker, made people from the same social group, the migrants, compete with each other for the same limited resources. To the extent that ethnicity creates conflict and competition between subgroups of working class, such traditional linkages divide the working class politics and solidarity.

However, if one adapts not a restricted but an extended conception of ethnicity, it may then be possible to argue that ethnicity reinforces class solidarity and politics. For instance, although such terms as "natives" and "migrants" refer to ethnicity rather than class, in the case of Taşlik, such ethnicity also has social class connotations. In this sense ethnicity is reintegrative of class solidarity.

Thus for individual delegates and for distinct social classes that participate in RPP politics, there are complex and multiple forms of participation. Depending on their specific causes and interests the

delegates use one or the other, sometimes mobilizing more than one, of the forms of participation available to them.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1 A Historical Comparison of the Two Local Branches

Forms of participation in the Kaleli and Taşlik branches of the RPP differ widely. Being branches of the same party, similarities are to be expected more than differences but the socio-economic development of the two towns differed so much in the last 60 years that the kinds of social classes and their forms of participation, in the two towns were drastically different. This was also due to the social democratic movement in the party. This movement appealed to different classes in these two towns.

The relative weight of these two towns in provincial RPP politics from the 1920's onwards was different. Kaleli was a small centre in its province, Taşlik was much less important both politically and economically. However, both of the RPP branches had a similar outlook.

Patronage relations dominated the party, being helped by the fact that the peasants had limited means of participation. In both of the branches, although the empirical cases vary according to context, we see the relation between the landlord/patron and the peasant/client as the basis of the patronage relations. The landlord patrons, by distributing their own resources such as land, built up a group of loyal supporters which enabled them to project the image of being "the people in charge of the area" - the notables. The aim of building political support for the patron was the recognition of his authority in the area. The Turkish State in the 1920's and 1930's did not have the means to take the state services to the towns and the villages of the periphery, therefore it had to give a relatively autonomous position to the local agents of the party. The relationship between the patrons and the state was

strengthened by the single party regime. In fact the degree of participation of the masses was not important as long as they showed deference to the rule of the party and state, and recognized the positions of the patrons and party leaders (who were in most cases also state officials). Therefore the political activity of the local notables was oriented towards the higher positions, rather than ^{to} their clients. In this sense increasing the participation of the clients was not a problem; keeping them quiet and content was politically more important for the patron because he owed this to the state.

In both the Kaleli and the Taşlik branches of the RPP there was a period of dissolution and chaos between 1950 and 1955. During this period not only was the central party organization trying to adapt to being out of power after 27 years but the local organizations were also suffering from the same problem. In both Kaleli and Taşlik I have not encountered many local notables leaving the party to join the Democratic Party, rather they simply left the town and/or politics. The landowner-patron model was no longer dominant in the party by 1955 in either of the towns giving place to different models of patronage, between merchant/patron and peasant/client. Such a change in the social characteristics of the patrons may be quite coincidental in these two towns, but similar developments in the newly established Democratic Party suggest that with the increasing participation of the peasants in politics with the direct elections of 1946, the demands voters made upon the state were changing. The introduction of electoral democracy and the new dimensions brought by the Democratic Party to Turkish economy effected also the structure of the Republican Peoples Party. The new merchants' groups that dominated both of the branches were not new members of the party, they only gained power and prestige in the party after 1950. The merchant/patrons had a transitory character. In the early 1950's the patronage functions of the merchants were very

important for marketing the products of the peasants, providing them with goods and cash as credit. By 1965 the changing nature of state intervention in agriculture and the nature of agriculture itself, meant that it was no longer directly based on merchants credits. The demands of their clients were changing. So in time there was a shift from the patronage functions of merchants to establishing new networks for brokerage. Such brokerage networks with the institutions that distribute resources were also to the personal benefit of merchants because through them they had personal access to the resources. So in time in both Kaleli and Taşlik, we see a change towards brokerage and in the 1960's the dominant model became patron/broker-client relations.

Although until 1970, the participation forms in both Kaleli and Taşlik branches of the RPP followed similar patterns of changes, after 1970, there was a divergence of forms of participation in the two branches. From 1965 onwards the difference between the social characteristics of the two counties was no more a matter of quantity and scale but a matter of quality. As Taşlik became a small industrial town, increasing its population 12-fold in 25 years, and Kale remained a small centre serving the peasants. By the early 1970's the differences between the structure of the two towns were growing although, due to the domination of merchant groups in the local party, the structure of the party organization had been similar since the 1950's. The expectations of party members, and delegates were changing. They wanted to have tighter control over the party, they wanted new resources to be distributed, and they did not want the resources to be passed through the merchants. The delegates were either new groups that had to be integrated into the party, as in Taşlik, or old groups that had existed in the party almost since its foundation but had changed their expectations. This complemented the new movement of "Social Democracy" in the RPP in the 1970's.

The social democratic movement had a great appeal to the delegates in the party organization of both Kaleli and Taşlık. Not only because of the ideological changes, which were accepted to a limited extent initially, but because it was presented as a means of organizational revival increasing party democracy and giving greater powers to rank and file. Not only was there a change to brokerage from patronage but also the social characteristics of the people that participated in the RPP politics changed.

In Kaleli the social democratic movement meant that the merchants lost power and prestige in the party to the "professionals". The professionals did not have personal resources of their own to distribute to their clients but they proved better and efficient as intermediaries influential in the allocation of state resources. Their social closeness to the state bureaucracy (locally and nationally) and their closer control over the central organization of the party enabled them to have better access to resources by establishing new networks. The brokers in Kaleli had to establish two way relations, one with the authorities over resource allocation, the other with their clients. The networks with the authorities were dependent on their political commitments and relations. Therefore the "brokers" were much more directly bound to the party than patrons. Changing parties amongst patrons were also rare. Although, theoretically, there was no reason to suppose that this could not take place: as the patrons distributed their own resources they could establish similar relations in other parties.

But for brokers this seemed even more unlikely. Once they established a network in one party they could not take the network to other parties with them.

The broker not only had to build up networks to gain access to resources but also had to develop strategies for their allocations. Whom

he chooses as his client was an extremely important decision just as it was vital for the client to make the best possible choice among the available brokers. Such factors as the scarcity of resources and one's limitation in appropriating these resources prevent the broker extend the number of his clients infinitely. In the Kaleli branch of the RPP the clients were the delegates for the brokers, their votes in the elections were of secondary importance, while the party power structure was more important. The clientellistic politics that was carried out by dyadic contracts in Kaleli were limited by the number of delegates acting as clients. Votes were secured to a larger extent by party directed patronage. Intra party politics was dominated by brokerage. These two were not only compatible but also complementary.

Another major question is what are the social characteristics of the delegates and what makes them interested in RPP politics? With the shift from patronage to brokerage the professionals brought social democratic ideology to Kaleli. They sought the support of the poor peasant, however, they had to end up with a party dominated by "rich villagers" at the level of delegates. The latter were the people who could benefit from the resources which they wanted to make use of. Social Democracy as an ideology had little appeal to them. They were in the party generally for traditional reasons and also as a rational choice. On the other hand they were trying to use brokerage and clientellistic party politics quite deliberately, which was very much in line with the organizational revival of the party. This not only enabled them to use brokerage channels by claiming that "populism implies that the people should be served by the state", it also enabled them to force the "brokers" to act responsibly towards them in finding resources. So the clients of Kaleli RPP politics were not only voters but were the party activists, the delegates. Because of the vertical nature of brokerage - it might be expected that there were no client-client relations. In the case of

the Kaleli Delegates client-client relations were a common feature of politics, although corporate action was rare. However when we look at RPP politics in Kaleli historically we see one major and a few minor corporate actions. In replacing patronage with brokerage, i.e. in supporting the professional's factions against the merchants they played a very decisive role. They also supported the brokers that were more efficient in resource allocations (see section 4.9.1.).

Brokerage in Kaleli was not only an individualized form of politics it is also a form of participation of a specific class. Given the scarcity of resources for the village petty bourgeoisie they competed with each other for resources, therefore they sought preferential treatment for access. As their main aim was to have access to resources they wanted to maintain brokerage as an exclusive system. For example, there was always a limit to which the brokers could refuse favours without sacrificing the legitimacy of their position. The repercussions of refusing favours to clients were greater than the number of favours refused. Brokerage is an individualized form of participation, but it is used by a specific class, which find it to its advantage in view of the specific conditions of the locality and the county. So it is not only appropriate to discuss the social characteristics of patrons and brokers but the clients should also be analyzed. As is suggested by the Kaleli material on brokerage there is an exclusive system contrary to what has been discussed in the literature. In brokerage and clientellistic politics the voting right does not necessarily give the client a means of bargaining. Making use of clientellistic politics is different from voting in an election which may involve party directed patronage.

Taşlik politics changed drastically after the social democratic movement; it did not only involve the transformation of its previous structure but also it entailed the integration of new groups into the

town and the RPP. Increasingly from 1970 onwards the conflicts in the party diversified. Due to industrialization and vast migration, the social composition of the town changed drastically. Besides being integrated into the town, the new groups were also converted to voting for the RPP, making the party dominant in the town. So in Taşlık by 1979 over 50% of delegates were newcomers to the town and to the party. The new delegates were members of the working class and all were organized in trade unions.

The new developments in the RPP caused major conflicts mainly on such areas as ethnicity, ideology and class. Divisions along these lines gave rise to competition among various groups and to complex forms of participation. In the case of Taşlık most of the issues of conflict overlapped with each other. The unionized working class dominated RPP politics in Taşlık. Increasingly from 1970 onwards, with the social democratic movement, the unionized workers gained power in the party. In most cases the unions and the party were closely linked to each other in terms of membership, ideological influence, and financial support. The worker delegates saw social democracy and the political teaching of the trade unions, ^{the} compatible. Almost all of them were political activists in the unions and the party, and believed in the political and economic struggle of the working class.

Such a trade union and working class consciousness may be expected to end the non-class forms of political participation. However, in the case of Taşlık, both workers and unionists also retained non-class forms of participation on two main lines: clientellism and ethnicity. Clientelle networks and ethnic loyalties extended to trade unions beside the party. Although for the workers the political class struggle was extremely important, much of their daily lives were shaped by non class channels, where preferential treatment of resource allocation was more

possible. The ^{unofficial} social security mechanisms were carried out largely by ethnic networks, the information resource allocations such as for jobs and urban land were carried out by networks based on ethnicity and clientellism. The immediate livelihood of the worker was determined to a large extent by such loyalties.

Some authors argue that different forms of participation are incompatible with each other. It is expected that class based participation will replace vertical participation and corporate politics will replace non-corporate politics. However in Taşlik they coexisted, and reinforced each other. Ethnicity and class based politics did not face each other as polar opposites. They were manifestations of horizontal linkages. However the working class (although it was a total unit vis-a-vis the town merchants) migrants were homogeneous in any way. The non class factors, such as ethnicity and kinship, acted as divisive forces long as working class individuals or groups were competing with each other for resources. In this allocation vertical linkages such as clientellism have also been important. Working class clientellism in Taşlik unlike Kaleli was not a linkage between different classes. It is a linkage between members of the same class with differences of power such as trade union officials and workers or individuals who think that they belong to the working class because of their migrant origin, such as some ethnic community leaders.

However, clientellism between different classes existed in Taşlik mainly amongst the village delegates and town merchants. Town merchants have diverted their relations from patronage to brokerage. In this Taşlik politics was very similar to Kaleli politics although the social characteristics of the brokers involved were very different. The RPP branch in Taşlik never had a fair representation of the educated middle classes resident in the town. If the political domination of the work-

ing class had not been so rapid, ^{the} social democratic movement might have replaced the merchants with professionals who seem to be more efficient in brokerage. But rapid changes in the party in terms of social composition of membership has led to more radical changes in forms of participation and not only to a transition from patronage to brokerage.

The delegates of Taşlik were left with multiple and complex means of participation in local and national politics. They made their choices depending on which strategy best fitted the specific cause at hand. In the case of Taşlik, the worker delegates were not only choosing between function specific brokers but also between the different types and forms of participation which coexist in Taşlik politics without necessarily contradicting each other.

Depending on individuals' and classes' specific expectations from politics, the issues of RPP ideology that appeal to them tend to differ. Whereas the left wing tendencies, debates on democracy, the unionization rights of workers appealed to worker delegates in Taşlik populism, the principles of the participation rights of voters and representative government appealed more to the village delegates of Kaleli. However the debate on social democratic principles of the RPP was important for the worker delegates because this change in ideology attracted them to the party. For the village delegates being in the party was a part of the available strategies open to them for the ^{to get what they wanted} of clientellistic politics. Therefore they were not that keen either to defend the ideology as a whole or to get into detailed discussions about it.

The empirical material on the Kaleli and Taşlik branches of the RPP suggests that the party members from different social backgrounds conceptualized the party differently in terms of forms of participation, party policies and ideologies. The party organization was in a relation with different social classes and institutions and each had its own

impact on the party. The intricate and complex relation between the impact of individuals, classes, institutions on the party were very diverse because of rapid social change that Turkey has experienced since 1923. The historical development of the party ideology and structure made possible the existence of such a diversity in forms of participation. Thus the participants engaged in multiple strategies depending on their interests, and interpreted the party ideology according to their own social backgrounds. It may be expected that in this case the RPP was "a machine political party" (Scott 1969) without ideological preferences. However the change in the power structure of the party in the 1970's indicates that despite the differences in attitudes, its organizational support was limited to specific classes, and it was losing the support of some groups such as merchants that previously existed in the party.

7.2 Some Critical Notes on Clientellism

It is suggested by the empirical research on Taşlık and Kaleli that clientellism is not always an inclusive system where every single citizen with a vote is a client. Clientellism should be considered exclusive due to scarcity of resources. In my study the clients were political activists, delegates. For them this was not only an individualized form of participation, they were members of distinct social classes whose interest was to use this specific form of participation. The strategies they adopted between corporate and non corporate, class and non-class, modern and traditional forms of participation and the multiple and complex way they used all these suggests that they are calculatedly aware of their interests and can pursue them.

It has been argued in the literature that participation based on class and clientellism can coexist (Davis, 1977; Zucherman, A. 1977) and there are also accounts of reports of clientellism in class based

institutions (Sandbrook, 1972). But it is not suggested that clientellism is a form of participation of specific social classes in specific context. When we approach from this aspect the two major questions of whether clientellism is compatible with "political development" and whether clientellism is disintegrating with development can lead to different conclusions.

Clientellism, as it exists in the RPP, is neither a continuation of traditional forms of participation that endure as a part of archaic political culture in the Third World nor is it a hindrance to the formation of class based politics, or it is established because of a "lag" in between traditional and modern politics. Clientellism is continually changing in terms of participants, legitimating ideologies practices, strategies, and it is adapting itself to its context and most probably affecting the context as well to reinforce its existence. Therefore the present form of clientellism is different from patronage relations between landlords and peasants, both in content and style. Even though the traditional contexts change, clientellistic politics can endure and moreover can emerge in totally modern conditions. As they coexist, "traditional" forms of participation do not necessarily hinder the formation of class based interest politics. Being together with modern forms of participation also indicates that clientellism does not occur out of necessity to fill a lag in participation and integration of the nation state. On the contrary it diversifies the means of participation, but on the other hand as it is not an inclusive system it does not necessarily increase the integration of the nation state or for that matter does not necessarily increase the rate of participation in the political system.

When conceptualized as a form of participation of distinct social classes, all of whom are not necessarily "disadvantaged", it becomes

more difficult to discuss clientellistic politics as a deliberate policy of the state to keep the disadvantaged classes silent as Mouzelis argues (Mouzelis 1975). Such an interpretation underestimates the autonomy of some social classes in their political practices, and conceptualizes the clients as helpless individuals. The clients may act autonomously vis-a-vis their brokers, as with function specific brokers, besides alternating between different forms of participation.

As a concluding remark, I would like to make the point that the decline in clientellism can only be very indirectly related to "political development". Western political institutions such as parliaments, elections or political parties do not necessarily abolish clientellism and other forms of "traditional" participation, but usually change their style and content. Therefore when formal political mechanisms are studied it may become more difficult to detect clientellism. Individuals may shift from using clientellism in one specific area to another. A closer look at the existence or non existence of clientellistic politics should take into account the class positions of the sides that are involved. In this sense the decline of clientellism can only be assessed by the relation of the classes that are engaged in it and their position in society in general.

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