The Origins of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

International Politics on the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964)

by

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Abstract

United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) forms the basis for the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which is currently the longest running United Nations peace-keeping operation. However, the processes leading to the creation of an United Nations force, as opposed to some other peace-keeping force under NATO or the Commonwealth have not been adequately investigated in terms of the international political environment that existed at the time.

Part I sets the historical context of the work. Chapter I examines the historical development of the Cold War, the United Nations (particularly peace-keeping), and the doctrine of non-alignment. Chapter II evaluates the Greco-Turkish conflict, the intercommunal history of Cyprus, and the process of British decolonisation in Cyprus.

Part II presents a review of the period from the outbreak of intercommunal violence in Cyprus to the eventual passing of Resolution 186. A period which had three distinct phases: (1) a regional emphasis centred mainly on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, (2) a phase of Superpower involvement, and (3) the involvement of the Security Council, which, on 4 March 1964, resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964).

The thesis concludes that despite the efforts of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, President Makarios engaged in a determined policy to internationalise the essentially intercommunal situation in Cyprus in order to prevent a Turkish intervention in the island. In the course of pursuing such an aim he was able to prevent the formation of a NATO-based peace-keeping force by exploiting the Soviet Union's interest in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. This move led the United Kingdom to initiate a first-strike policy and have the Cyprus issue discussed in the Security Council. The eventual result of this was the formation of UNFICYP, and it highlighted, in practical terms, the degree to which peace-keeping relied on the consent of the host state in the Cold War international system.

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Part II

Abbreviations

A/...	General Assembly Document
AKEL	Cypriot Communist Party
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
CAB .../...	Cabinet Office Document (PRO)
C.M.	Cabinet Meeting
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office
EOKA	*Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston* Greek Cypriot Militia, (1955-)
FO	Foreign Office
FO .../.....	Foreign Office Document
JTF	Joint Truce Force
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PRC	People's Republic of China
PREM .../.....	Prime Minister's Office Document
S/...	Security Council Document
TMT	*Türk Mukavamet Teşkılatı*, Turkish Cypriot Militia, (1956-)
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNEF	UN Emergency Force
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan
UNOGIL	UN Observation Group in the Lebanon
UNSCOB	UN Special Commission on the Balkans
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organisation
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

A Note on the Transliteration of Names

At the start of the work I was confronted with the difficulty of transliterating Greek names from the Greek script into the Latin script. To overcome this difficulty I have chosen to refer to specific people by using the version used by themselves, or more usually recognised. Where this is not apparent I will use the standard technique of transliteration, *for example:*

Γλαύκος Κληρίδης	*will read as:*	Glafkos Clerides	(usual spelling)
	and not	Glafkos Klerides	(standardised)

However, Turkish names will not be transliterated, but will be retained in the Turkish Latin script, therefore,

Fazıl Küçük	*and not*	Fazil Kutchuk	*or*	Fazil Kuchuk

The Turkish script reads the same as the standard Latin script, and the sounds correlate to English equivalents, with the following exceptions,[1]

Consonants:		Vowels:	
C	*j* as in *jam*	A	*a* in French *avoir*
Ç	*ch* as in *chair*	E	*e* in *bed*
G	*g* in *goat*	I(ı)	*i* in *cousin*
Ğ	Lengthens preceding vowel	İ(i)	*i* as in *pit*
		O	*o* in *hot*
J	*j* in French *jour*	Ö	German *ö* in *König*
S	*s* in *sing*	U	*u* in *push*
Ş	*sh* in shall	Ü	German *ü* in *Führer*

[1] See Lewis, Geoffrey; *Turkish*; 2nd Edition (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989), pp.4-5

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was formed on 4 March 1964 as a result of United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964). As such UNFICYP is the longest running United Nations peace-keeping operation in existence, and, over the past thirty years, has played an important role in the political life of the island. Yet why did the United Nations, as opposed to a some form of alternative international organisation such as NATO or the Commonwealth, assume peace-keeping duties in Cyprus? This question lies at the heart of this thesis.

In order to answer it one must examine the international political environment of the Cold War. The origins of UNFICYP were not to be found in the immediate period leading to Resolution 186. Instead, the true genesis of the peace-keeping force in Cyprus was to be found at the end of the Second World War when the United Nations was founded by the victorious Allied Powers, whose aim was to create an international organisation that would take a cooperative and robust approach to the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet this idea proved to be short lived. Within a short space of time the international system was divided as the East and West fought for spheres of influence. This was a process that was intimately involved with the developing agenda of the newly de-colonised Third World. As the Superpowers scrambled to assert themselves on these states they sometimes found themselves engaged in situations that had the potential to escalate into something wholly more dangerous. In an attempt to prevent this the United Nations finally found a role and peace-keeping was born.

Yet it is my contention that Cyprus did not immediately seem to fall into this category. Although it was non-aligned with regard to the Superpowers, it was, through history, tied to Greece and Turkey - both of which were members of NATO. However, the situation could never have been handled within this forum. The perceptions held by the Greek Cypriots as to the relative importance attached to Turkey within the Organisation ensured that they would be firmly against any attempt to have the issue of intercommunal fighting addressed by NATO. The subsequent way in which the issue was manoeuvred into the Security Council by the development of a Cold War interest provides the answer as to why the United Nations Force in Cyprus was formed instead of a NATO-based force.

Yet does such a study really need to be undertaken? There are two particular arguments that may be levelled with regard to this question - both of which, I believe, can be answered. For a start one may challenge that the task of presenting a concise account of the period leading to the creation of Resolution 186 would not be a difficult thing to do. Indeed, at the most simple level, one could perhaps write the following synopsis of the events recounted in this work:

> *In December 1963 fighting broke out between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island of Cyprus. After an appeal for calm from the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey went unheeded a nominally tripartite military entity - the Joint Truce Force (JTF) - was established with the consent of the conflicting parties to try to restore order. However, the military pressures of trying to sustain the force coupled with the apparent failure of peace-talks held between the parties in London led to the suggestion that a new peace-keeping entity be created using contingents from NATO countries. This, however, proved unfavourable to the Greek Cypriots, and, after much diplomatic wrangling by a number of parties involved, including the two Superpowers, the matter of the peace-keeping was moved to the United Nations Security Council. After fifteen days of talks this process resulted in the passing of Resolution 186(1964), and the creation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.*

This outline represents, in a nutshell, the *narrative* of the thesis, but does not critically appraise the reason why the various actors followed the path outlined above. Such an account does not go any way towards telling us why things happened the way they did - why certain decisions were made, or why particular options were discounted by the parties involved. To this extent, this thesis is a presentation of a number of *'why?'* themes surrounding the *processes* that eventually led to United Nations Resolution 186.

Another criticism that may be ventured is that the subject under review is not a new topic. In surveying the literature one may look to a large number of accounts that have tried to address the events of the period from 21 December 1963-4 March 1964. Yet apart from the memoirs of those directly involved[1] and a limited number of other exceptions,[2] these accounts have tended to neglect the overall international aspects of the period for a number of reasons. Most accounts have, broadly speaking, been written from one of two viewpoints: (a) as a preface to a piece of work that examines the post-Resolution 186 operations of the United Nations in Cyprus,[3] or, (b) as review of the internal political situation in Cyprus which pays minimal attention to the presentation of an evaluation of the international politics beyond citing the decisions within the analytical context of a discussion of the domestic policy outputs of the Cypriot communities.[4] There seems, therefore, to have been little inclination to view the period leading to Resolution 186 as a subject unto itself. Instead almost all writers have tended to see it as a short period of transition within the greater picture of their individual projects.

Having stated this criticism, it would be wrong to say that this work will only focus on the international and peace-keeping element of the crisis. One cannot write about the wider implications of a problem without understanding the root cause of the problem. Therefore this work must inevitably - if not necessarily - constitute an account of the internal politics of Cyprus during 1963-64. Yet this is a period that has become highly politicised unto itself within the historical narratives of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in the years since Resolution 186. Unlike the later events of July-August 1974, the crisis of 1963-64 has been rather less open to critical examination. For the Turkish Cypriots 1963, rather than 1974, represents the true beginning of the intercommunal civil war.[5] It constitutes, in their mind, a period in which they argue that they were deprived of their constitutional rights and forced to congregate in enclaves in order to protect themselves. Yet in contrast to this, the Greek Cypriot community regards the events of 1964 as being in many ways a footnote, or, at most, a preface for the 'real' Cyprus Crisis - the events of summer 1974 - when the Turkish Army landed on the shores of the island's northern coast and, over a period of a month, captured 36% of the territory.[6] In justifying the emphasis placed on these respective views there are numerous arguments and a counter-arguments. Although not wishing to engage in these discussions I will, nevertheless, be working on the premise that 1963-64 was indeed important. To this extent this work will shed more light on both sides' views of the crisis, and present an account which may reveal why the respective communities have tried to focus on, or ignore this period.

As much as the thesis is an attempt to understand both the internal and international politics of the search for a peace-keeping force for Cyprus, there is another important aim inherent in the work. The difficulties of finding an alternative to a United Nations peace-keeping force for Cyprus raised some wider questions about the nature of peace-keeping in the political environment at the time. To this extent, another major aim of this thesis is an attempt to understand, in the words of Professor Alan James, 'the politics of peace-keeping'[7] as it related to Cyprus. To answer the question: Why was a NATO-based peace-keeping force for Cyprus such an emotive issue? In order to provide an adequate answer it is necessary to define what exactly we mean with the term 'peace-keeping' before moving on to present a more theoretical analysis of the viability of instituting non-United Nations peace-keeping in the international system.

Defining Peace-keeping

The term peace-keeping has, during the past forty years, entered the general vocabulary of International Relations. In doing so it has come to be linked almost exclusively, but somewhat incorrectly, with the actions of the United Nations.[8] Indeed, peace-keeping was not mentioned within the Charter of the United Nations. To this extent it became, as described by Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN, in effect Chapter 6 ½ of the Charter.[9] This was an apt definition insofar as the action of peace-keeping has fallen somewhere between Chapter VI of the Charter relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII that laid out 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'. As such it was an idea unforeseen and unplanned in the negotiations leading to the formation of the United Nations Organisation. Yet, in the course of the following fifty years it has, across the globe, had a profound effect, for better or for worse, on the international system.

Defining peace-keeping has proved an inexact art. Depending on whom one asks the results have proved to be widely differing. Given that the current use of the term has tended to be shaped by the actions of the United Nations it is perhaps a fitting idea that the United Nations' definition be tackled first:

> '[A] peace-keeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by the force of arms, thus contrasting them with 'enforcement action' of the United Nations under Article 42.'[10]

Yet there are a number of differing and wider definitions of the term 'peace-keeping operation'. By way of example we can look at the following, differing interpretations of the term.

> 'Operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict.'[11]
>
> 'Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defence actions), that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement.'[12]

There are, however, a large number of other definitions of both the substance and meaning of peace-keeping. But the widely accepted meaning of peace-keeping as a non-coercive action undertaken with impartiality and with the consent of the fighting factions seems to have been captured by these definitions. However, if one compares the term peace-keeping as presented by the United Nations with the other definitions one can see that there is an essential incongruity between the parties as to who or what may conduct peace-keeping. Within these definitions there is still a confusion about the extent to which the action of peace-keeping, under the principles listed above, can be undertaken by parties other than the United Nations.

The Applicability of Non-UN Peace-keeping

It is, perhaps, possible to state that in performing the actions of peace-keeping, the non-UN peace-keeper is, in a number of ways, simply replacing the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations makes

two clear and important points as regards the theoretical implications of non-UN peace-keeping. In the first instance the duties and obligations of a member state to the principles of the Charter are, under Article 103, paramount over and above any other duties and obligations under 'any other international agreement'. Therefore, for a state to enter into peace-keeping and be acceptable they must conform to the *consent* rule of peace-keeping, and therefore either become (1) a peace-keeper or (2) a military force on the territory of another state there with the consent of that state to assist in self-defence.[13] Although we are presented with two options, the second of the two is, or has the potential to be, coercive in its operation and cannot therefore be considered as a peace-keeping operation.

In addition, the second point that must be remembered is that within the Charter of the United Nations there is a clear role to be played by regional organisations. Indeed, the roles of these organisations are explicitly outlined in Chapter VIII of the Charter. Although such regional arrangements were, like the rest of the Charter, formulated without reference to peace-keeping, they are nonetheless theoretically open to peace-keeping interpretation. As White has noted, peace-keeping,

> '[c]an be lawfully undertaken by a regional organisation, or on an *ad hoc*, collective basis, or indeed by individual states. Consensual, non-offensive operations do not breach a ban on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, nor are they actions which require authorisation of the Security Council under Article 53 of the UN Charter, which is confined to enforcement actions.'[14]

Under this interpretation peace-keeping does assume a wider significance beyond the realms of those actions undertaken solely by the United Nations. As long as a state acts in accordance with the principles of the Charter and of peace-keeping generally, then there appears to be no reason why it cannot be done on a unilateral or regional basis. This is a point on which James, in line with White, has noted:

> 'A competent authority has to take the decision to establish a peace-keeping operation. This might well be an international organization of a universal or quasi-universal kind. But there is no reason at all why regional organizations of a political sort should not act in this way. Nor is there any reason why an ad hoc group of states should not organize a peacekeeping enterprise, nor even why such a task could not be performed by a single acceptable state.'[15]

Yet, in the period under review in this thesis, peace-keeping, even by the United Nations, was still in many ways a rather novel idea. While UNEF had proved a successful example of such an action, ONUC had exposed a number of teething problems that the UN would have to overcome in future operations.[i] This was especially so for those future operations that would be conducted within a state, rather than between states.[16] However, in the former category, there had already been an example of a non-United Nations peace-keeping operation undertaken. This was the Arab League force that operated in Kuwait from 1961-63.

The force came about as a direct result of threats made by Iraq on Kuwait - which it saw as a being a historical province - when the period of British protection came to an end in 1961. Given the real fear of an Iraqi invasion that existed in the Kuwaiti Government an invitation was sent to Britain to station troops in the country. Soon thereafter a British force arrived to protect the small state of Kuwait. Yet the Arab League,[17] indignant of the implications of such a move, and 'in an unusual unanimity of opinion, set about the task of engineering its early withdrawal.'[18] This was done with troops from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia. This allowed for the successful removal of the British troops, and the continued protection of Kuwait by the use of Arab troops against whom Iraq

[i] Both of these operations will be looked at in Chapter I

would find it extremely difficult to act. Thus the force maintained peace through the intra-bloc ramifications that would have arisen had one Arab state attacked another. However certain intra-organisational problems, coupled with the decreased belligerence of Iraq meant that the force had only a limited life-span. Indeed it had disappeared altogether by 1963.[19]

However, the presentation of information about the theoretical roots underlying peace-keeping practice must be put into context within the work if it is to prove of value. By providing an analysis of both what exactly we mean by the term peace-keeping as well as the questions related to the acceptability of non-United Nations peace-keeping actions we are, in effect, laying the foundations for an analysis of whether the plans for a Commonwealth, a tripartite Greek-Turkish-British, or even a NATO-based action were viable as alternatives for a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus. The thesis will show that, unlike the Arab force, the proposals for non-United Nations peace-keeping in Cyprus were complicated by a number of factors. In the first instance, and unlike the Kuwait-Iraq situation into which the Arab force was placed, the conflict scenario in Cyprus was, in essence, a mixture of an internal affair to the Republic of Cyprus that had certain international implications for other states, rather than a simple conflict between the Republic of Cyprus and a neighbouring state. Although, or perhaps because, it was an ethnic conflict, Greece and Turkey were intimately involved in the island's affairs, as was Britain. The second major consideration is the nature of the inter-organizational affiliations of the actors. Unlike the use of the Arab League in Kuwait to which all interested parties belonged, in the Cyprus situation, the three external actors were all members of NATO, but the Republic of Cyprus fell firmly within the Non-Aligned Movement. This necessarily made the situation more complicated than the intra-organizational, non-Cold War scenario that had paved the way for the Arab League Force.

Methodology and Sources

It is important that an historical thesis such as this has an adequate structure to allow a clear progression through the information presented in such a way as to minimise confusion without losing significant amounts of detail. To this extent I have chosen to proceed on a loose chronological basis that attempts periodic thematic analyses of the various subject areas under discussion. This has been done to allow the thesis to develop in such a way as to avoid repetition and, hopefully, create a clear strand of thought for the reader to follow.

On the subject of sources, there have, as noted above, been a large number of limited accounts written of the period. These narratives proved very useful in the initial structuring of the subject matter of the work. In addition these works have been important insofar as the gaps in the accounts have allowed an identification of the main questions relating to the processes of international politics that have not been adequately answered before. Given the general lack of sufficient depth of these accounts I have, within the main body of the thesis, attempted to move beyond these previously written histories and build-up a picture of the events based on the primary research of a number of different sources. Many of these, particularly the memoirs of those involved and the news media sources, have been widely cited before. Likewise the United Nations documents, letters and records of the Security Council debates have been utilised in several narratives. Yet these sources have only focussed on the information publicly presented. No account yet written has attempted to draw in the invaluable revelations contained in the archives of the British Public Records Office at Kew. This is where I have taken the chance to rewrite many of the previously held assumptions formed from the use of such sources about the events in Cyprus leading to Resolution 186. The value of this exercise is that it presents much of the untold story of the period. As the historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote, 'anyone who has looked carefully at declassified government documents from the post-1945 era will know how inadequate the public record [i.e. news media] is as a guide to what was happening.'[20] This is as true of the events in Cyprus as any other case, and this will become evident as the thesis progresses. In addition to this important evidence I have taken the opportunity to interview a number people - many of whom were directly involved in policy making or

implementation - who played a part in the processes being reviewed.

Chapter Outline

The work may be seen as having two distinct parts. Chapters I and II form Part I of the thesis and set the historical background to the work as a whole. **Chapter I** provides an account of a number of post-Second World War themes of international politics. The main focus is definitely centred on what might be termed the '*macro*-international' situation as it would affect the events in Cyprus. The main themes at play are the development of the Cold War, and the implications for US and Soviet foreign policy with regard to the Third World. The second element to be considered is the development of the role of the United Nations in the Cold War era and, more specifically, the development of peace-keeping and the problems associated with this development, especially the acrimonious relationship between the Soviet Union and the Secretaries-General of the UN over the structure, financing and conduct of peace-keeping operations. The final aspect of the chapter is the process of decolonisation and the impact that this process had on the formation of a third 'approach' to international relations in the period, the concept of 'non-alignment'. Both of these latter factors would be important with regard to the island of Cyprus - a colony of the United Kingdom - that began its final process towards independence by waging a guerilla campaign against British rule in 1955, and by doing so involved Greece and Turkey.

Chapter II sets the more specific historical stage for the thesis. If the theme of Chapter I is the '*macro*-international' stage, then Chapter II focuses its attention on the '*micro*-international' setting. In the first part of this chapter I will review the history of Greece and Turkey, and outline the depth of the historical antipathy of the two countries towards one another. Yet the work will show that the relationship between Greece and Turkey had, for a quarter of a century from the 1930s to the mid-1950s, also been shaped by a period of friendship during which both had become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and had seemed to have put most of their troubles behind them. Yet this improved state of affairs was broken by a downturn in the political situation in Cyprus - a small island where the Greek and Turkish communities were on the verge of civil war, as the Greek Cypriot community, in a bid to unite with Greece, fought against British colonial rule on the island.

In an attempt to stabilise the situation, the United Kingdom brought both Greece and Turkey into the political negotiations, and with this the relationship between the two began to crumble as each sided with its own national community on the island. The outcome of the British decolonisation of Cyprus in 1960 was the creation of a constitution for the new republic that was seen as unworkable by the leadership of the majority Greek Cypriot community. In December 1963, the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, presented plans to amend the constitution to the three guarantors of Cyprus's independence - Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. The rejection of these proposals by the Government of Turkey soon led to another round of intercommunal fighting.

Chapters III, IV, & V constitute Part II of the thesis and represent the main body of the work. **Chapter III** takes up the events during the first month following the outbreak of intercommunal hostilities. This period was marked by the involvement of the three Guarantor Powers, who, in a show of unity, created the Joint Truce Force to maintain the cease-fire between the Greek and Turkish communities. However, the tense political situation on the island, coupled with the rise in concern in both Greece and Turkey over the island, meant that the Force became a solely British enterprise. The chapter will outline the work of the Force as well as describe the peace-making attempts undertaken by the British Government. The failure of these peace-making efforts led to a plan to create a larger force made up of contingents from NATO member states.

Chapter IV looks at the reactions of the various parties to the dispute to this plan. Although favoured by the three Guarantor Powers, the Turkish Cypriots, and, importantly, the United States of America, the proposal for a force of NATO member state contingents was wholeheartedly opposed by the Greek Cypriot leadership, who feared that such a force would favour the Turkish Cypriots. The

counter-proposal of the Greek Cypriots was the idea for an United Nations force. This proved unfavourable to the other parties, who all remained steadfastly in favour of their original proposal. It was at this point that the Soviet Union became involved, and the matter became a Cold War issue. The resulting deadlock succeeded in forcing the British, who by this point were under considerable manpower constraints, to take the matter of the creation of a United Nations force to the Security Council.

The period of deliberations at the United Nations Security Council in New York forms the focus for **Chapter V**. Once at the United Nations, the position of the various parties still remained at odds with one another. The interpretation of the treaties forming the Republic of Cyprus were a significant concern for all involved, as was the legality of the Government of Cyprus as it now existed without the input of the Turkish Cypriot community. However, the bi-partisan Cold War element seemed to take lesser prominence as the position of the Soviet Union changed noticeably from outright support for the Greek Cypriots, to a policy that, while maintaining such support, more accurately reflected their traditional concerns about the structuring and financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations. After two-and-a-half weeks of deliberation and discussion, the Security Council eventually passed Resolution 186 (1964) and a United Nations peace-keeping force for Cyprus was created.

The **Conclusion** will draw all the points together and will evaluate the actions of the various parties in light of the wider international politics of the time. It will seek to address a number of questions relating to the processes leading to United Nations Resolution 186, and highlight any paradoxes that may have arisen between the general trend of international politics and the actions taken by the parties in Cyprus. In addition the Conclusion will assess the nature of the difficulties presented in the search for a non-United Nations peace-keeping effort.

Endnotes to Introduction

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5. As Michael Moran states, '1964 was one of the most eventful, indeed fateful, years in the history of modern Cyprus...the current political impasse in Cyprus is certainly the result of fundamentally the same seemingly irreconcilable forces that first came into play 32 years ago, in 1964.' Moran, Michael; *Sovereignty Divided: How the Turkish Cypriots were Deprived of their Constitutional Rights*; Cyprus Research and Publishing Centre (CYREP) Research Series No.17 (Lefkoşa: Cyprus Research and Publishing Centre, December 1995), pp.1-2

6. In accordance with the Turkish Cypriot view presented above, Moran notes of the Greek Cypriot presentation of 1974, '[the Turkish Cypriots] are constantly subject to the undiminished flow of Greek propaganda, issuing from numerous sources - and most effectively from the 3 million or so Americans of Greek origin - the principal aim of which is to cajole the international community into believing that the 'Cyprus problem' began in 1974 when Turkey, apparently for no good reason, 'invaded' a small, defenseless, happy, and innocent Greek island 40 miles from its southern shores - a political perspective

created specifically to render the very existence, as well as the constitutional rights, of the Turkish Cypriots invisible.' *ibid.*, p.1

7. James, Alan; *The Politics of Peacekeeping*; (London: Chatto Windus, 1969)

8. James; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; *op.cit.*, p.10. In defence of this assertion James presents a number of non-United Nations peace-keeping actions. For further information see also Wainhouse; *International Peace Observation*; *op.cit.*, and Edgardo Pax-Barnica; 'Peacekeeping within the Inter-American System'; in Wiseman, Henry (ed.); *Peacekeeping*; (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983).

9. Brady, Christopher & Daws, Sam; 'UN Operations: the Political-Military Interface'; *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 1994, p.65

10. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*; 2nd Edition (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), p.4

11. *Wider Peacekeeping*; (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1985), p.2-5.

12. US Manual: 'Peacekeeping Operations'; cited in *Wider Peacekeeping*, *op.cit.*, p.C-4.

13. In accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter. However, any such assistance must not conflict with Article 2(5) of the Charter. See Appendix A for texts. Yet the legalistic approach within the Charter of the United Nations is not the only way in which this, and other ethical issues and ideas have been tackled. Without wishing to engage in a full debate on the relative merits of normative approaches with regard to the subject of assistance given by one state to another Walzer has identified three main strands of thinking on situations when it is appropriate to give assistance to a state or a group within a state of which one is the above named self-defence category of assistance. For a more detailed argument see Walzer, Michael; *Just and Unjust Wars*; 2nd Edition (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p.90. Despite this differing approach this thesis will take as the given determinant of the legality of actions taken by parties the provisions as laid out in the Charter of the United Nations.

14. White, N.D.; *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*; (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p.211

15. James; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; *op.cit.*, pp.5-6

16. This problem of working within a state rather than between states is a problem under the strict interpretation of the Charter which under Article 2(7), makes clear the fact that the United Nations does not have any jurisdiction to act on the internal politics of a state. However, under the concept that the United Nations is charged to maintain international peace and security there is a certain case for presenting the argument that internal political situations - such as civil war - do pose such a risk to international peace and security. The consent rule of peace-keeping therefore maintains this defined separation but does, nonetheless, allow action. By entering into an intra-state conflict with consent, the peace-keeping force - UN or otherwise - does not breech Article 2(7) but does maintain the UN's ability to maintain international peace and security under Article 1(1).However this idea of consent, and indeed impartiality, in the intra-state context has been challenged with regard to post-Cold War operations. See Duke, Simon; 'The UN and Intra-State Conflict'; *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 1, Number 4, Winter 1994, pp.387-389.

17. As has been noted of the League, 'the Arab League is the only widespread indigenous effort to meet the persistent aspirations for unity rooted in a common language, religion, and culture throughout an area also torn asunder by the nationalistic rivalries that constitute the heritage of modern imperialism. That nationalism is the stronger force is evident from the accent on sovereignty and independence in the constitution of this organization as well as from its modest accomplishments.' Lawson, Ruth C. (ed.); *International Regional Organizations: Constitutional Foundations*; (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1962), p.227. However, it can be argued that it was precisely this common recognition of sovereignty within the wider realm of shared culture that made the mission of the Arab League ultimately successful.

18. James; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; *op.cit.*, p.93.

19. *Ibid.*, p.94. See also Nye, Joseph S., Jr.; *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*; (London: University Press of America, 1987), p.162.

20. Gaddis, John Lewis; 'Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies'; *International Security*, Volume 12, Number 1, p.7

Chapter I

International Politics, 1943-63

The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations

Introduction

To understand the significance of the events that took place in Cyprus in 1963-64, one must be forearmed with a knowledge of the international system within which those events are located. An informed picture of the processes and structures that developed the international environment in the post-Second World War period are an integral part of our understanding of the later events that are recounted in this work. With this in mind, this chapter is not a detailed account of every, or even of most of the incidents that occurred in this period. It is, instead, a presentation of themes. These themes, illustrated with accounts of a number of events that could, and have, filled numerous volumes, can be summarised as following three main lines: the Cold War, the formation and development of the United Nations, and the process and consequences of decolonisation.

To illustrate the shifting nature of international politics in this period, the chapter is divided into chronological sections that broadly reflect the changes taking place within the international system at a number of points. Although the exact details of 1945 may not now appear to play a direct role in the later analysis of the Cyprus situation almost twenty years later, the happenings of that period set in motion a train of events that did have such an effect. To this extent a study of the creation of the United Nations and the subsequent development of the Cold War plays a significant role in providing an important analytical tool by which we can explain the characteristics of the international system as it stood in 1963. This understanding will, in the main body of the thesis, allow us to evaluate the reactions of a number of international actors to the situation in Cyprus. Indeed, this thesis is, to a greater or lesser degree, an attempt to analyse and explain the reactions of actors in the international system to events on the island in the period leading up to the creation of United Nations Resolution 186 (1964) within the context of the themes and events of international politics described in this chapter.

1. The Formation of the United Nations, 1943-1945

As the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany became more and more likely, a number of meetings and conferences were held to decide the future of the world following the cessation of hostilities. The big four powers of the 'United Nations' - those states that had formed an alliance against the Axis Powers - came together to discuss the future of the international system and plan for an international organization to oversee global peace and security in the new post-War era. Indeed, such was the interest in finding a way in which to replace the failed League of Nations - that had been created as a result of the First World War - that the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China all participated in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held near Washington, DC that took place in the Summer of 1944 in order to lay out a plan for such a post-War international body. Although the exact

details of the Dumbarton Oaks process need not be recounted here, the meetings eventually produced a blueprint for an organisation which would seek to prevent, or terminate, outbreaks of international conflict.

After a further meeting between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union held at Yalta in February 1945,[1] the proposals were ready to put before the wider international community. In advance of this meetings were held by several groups, or *blocs*, during which strategies were formulated for the negotiations.[2] Once the preparatory stages were complete, the final plans for the United Nations Organisation (UNO or UN) were duly put before the delegates of the fifty states attending the San Francisco Conference - held from April to June 1945.[3] The Conference was designed to allow a final shaping of both the Charter and the structure of the new body by the wider international community that had been excluded from the initial drafting process. In fact during the course of the proceedings a number a proposals and amendments to the Charter by the participants were incorporated into the design of the new organisation as contained in the Dumbarton Oaks document. The end result of the Conference was a charter, signed on 26 June 1945, that, *inter alia*, laid out the mechanisms by which the Security Council - the main body entrusted with dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 1(1) - would conduct its work.

Indeed, the shape of the Security Council formed the basis of Chapter V of the Charter, and the details of the Council's peace and security remit were contained in Chapter VI, 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes', and Chapter VII, 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'.[i] Importantly, it was agreed that the Council would be made up of eleven members, five of which - the United States of America, France,[4] China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - would remain as permanent members, each of which would have veto powers. The remaining six members would be elected for two year periods with election held for three of the seats every year.

Concurrent with the formation of the Security Council, the General Assembly was formed as a forum of discussion in which all members would have technically equal voting rights, with no veto. The original proposals put forward at Dumbarton Oaks had originally envisaged a weak body,[5] but deliberation at San Francisco forced the larger powers to widen the scope of the Assembly. As Luard states,

> 'In a number of ways...the powers of the Assembly had been marginally increased. It was given wider powers of discussion, even in the area of security, and slightly increased responsibilities in the economic and social fields. But none of this altered the basic structure, or the general subordination of the Assembly in matters of peace and security which the Dumbarton Oaks powers had ordained.'[6]

2. The Developing Cold War, 1946-50

Despite the imperative of cooperation in the fight against Germany, cracks had begun to show within the wartime alliance at a fairly early stage following the cessation of hostilities. Within a short period of time the relationship between the Allies began to evolve to reflect the political realities of the post-War situation as both the West and the Soviet Union sought to make ideological gains in the post-War international system. And soon the ill-feelings between the two camps came to play an important part in the development of the new United Nations Organisation. Indeed, as early as 1946, the United Nations became a casualty of the increasing tensions.

In addition to the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Charter of the United Nations had established, under Article 47, the Military Staff Committee (MSC). Formed within the provisions of Chapter VII as a means of providing specialist military guidance to the Security Council, it was seen as

[i] For full details see Appendix A.

being of central importance to the future development of the United Nations' mandate to maintain international peace and security.[7] The MSC, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, was in effect created to oversee the formation of a military role for the new United Nations Organisation. Yet when the MSC was detailed to provide a report on this role the deadlock that ensued once the report was issued effectively precluded the Committee from taking any future action.[8] With the MSC now paralysed, the organisation would have to develop a new structure for dealing with international conflicts - a matter of some importance for the future.

Yet the Organisation's dealings with the wider international system were also shaped and affected by this breakdown of relations between the East and West. Within days of the first session of the Security Council portents of future difficulties came to light as the Soviet Union blocked an Iranian complaint - that they felt was supported by either the United States or the United Kingdom - about the continued Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan.[9] As if playing tit-for-tat the Soviet Union soon responded by bringing to the attention of the Council the continued British presence in Greece.[10] The problem surrounding Greece stemmed from the Second World War when the United Kingdom, after having initially supported a communist-led Greek resistance movement, had, in the latter stages of the conflict, switched to another, pro-monarchist, grouping. The communists, although bereft of British support, continued their actions against both the Nazis and the right-wing resistance. At the end of the War the British supported group formed a government, and the communists turned their attentions to fighting this.[11] Maintaining their position the communists used the mountainous north of Greece as their base from which to fight the ensuing civil war. In the conduct of this campaign reports soon filtered through that the communist guerillas were being supported by Greece's three northern, communist neighbours - Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Following a serious border incident with Albania, the Greek Government, supported by the United States, attempted to bring the issue before the Security Council, but were blocked by the Soviet Union. A second attempt to have the matter reviewed at the UN, this time in the General Assembly, was successful and the USSR had to accept that the matter would now be investigated. To this end a body was formed to examine the evidence and report back to the Organisation - the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). The Committee's work was important insofar as it made repeated accusations of interference from the three countries, and was therefore recognised as being the first significant example of East-West rivalry. As one commentator has put it 'UNSCOB was the first mission created directly as an instrument of the Cold War'.[12] However UNSCOB was not what we would today term a United Nations peace-operation.[13] Insofar as peace-keeping and peace-observation come under this title of 'peace-operations' then the first event to place a peace-operation in the field was the formation of the State of Israel.

1947 saw the end of the British mandate for Palestine and the formation of a Jewish homeland in the area. Within hours of the declaration of the State of Israel, on 14-15 May, the infant republic was attacked by its Arab neighbours. Although weak, the Israeli forces were able not only to defeat the combined armies of, amongst others, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, but were able to extend Israel's borders beyond those originally set out by, *inter alia*, the United Nations. This victory was soon followed up by the UN which, although originally trying to solve the problem, was eventually, following the assassination of its representative in Jerusalem, Count Bernadotte, forced to satisfy itself with containing the problem.[14] After working for over a year on the situation the Organisation saw the creation of a truce, in July 1948, which was to be supervised by a United Nations observation mission based in Jerusalem (UN Truce Supervision Organisation - UNTSO). Using military personnel from Belgium, France, Sweden and the United States the force was mandated to ensure that the cease-fire between the belligerents was maintained, a position it retains even to this day.[15]

Almost immediately following this, the United Nations was called upon to create another peace-observation mission. This time, however, the focus of attention was to be in South Asia.[16] The prospect of the British decolonisation of India had once again exposed the clear divide between the subcontinent's

Hindu and Moslem populations. The sheer enormity of the problem of successfully maintaining the peace between these two groupings was such that the British Government decided to follow a policy of partition rather than progress with the maintenance of a post-independence unitary state, as was favoured by the Hindu majority. The broad idea was that the Moslem community would form the state of Pakistan, and the Hindus the, secular, State of India.[17] Yet the division also granted independence to a large number of the Princely States. One of these was the northern border state of Jammu and Kashmir. With a Hindu ruler, but a predominantly Moslem population it was obvious that such independence could be a basis for future conflict between India and Pakistan and, on 19 October 1947, fighting broke out. In order to calm the violence, the ruler was forced to accept an Indian offer to send troops on the condition that a plebiscite would be held at a later date to decide the issue of the status of the State. Yet, the fighting continued, and, after an Indian approach to the United Nations, the Security Council passed a resolution - UN Security Council Resolution 39 (1948) - which set up a commission to investigate the issue. Importantly, the commission included a military adviser who in early 1949 presented India and Pakistan with a proposal for the introduction of an observer force. This was duly accepted by both countries and by the middle of February a small force - the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan- (UNMOGIP) - had taken its place on both sides of the cease-fire line. Like UNTSO, this operation is still in place.

Although the formations of both UNTSO and UNMOGIP were not as a direct result of the Cold War, it was the Cold War that was having the most significant impact on the development of the international system at this time. However, the main focus of attention for the East-West rivalry was no longer within the United Nations. Instead, Europe was proving to be the main battleground.

The Formation of NATO

The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West in Europe, although at the time unrecognised, preceded the end of the War. As the Allies closed in on Germany on both the eastern and western fronts in a pincer movement, the foundations for the post-War split were laid. The West's recognition of future Soviet influence in the region of Eastern Europe was brought to the fore at the Yalta Conference, as the advancing Red Army had marched through Czechoslovakia, and Poland and into Austria and Germany. Indeed, the reality of Soviet hegemony over of the eastern part of the continent arising from its advance on Berlin was quickly recognised following the cessation of hostilities in Europe. And in July 1945 the major European Allies met for a conference at Potsdam in Germany to discuss the future demarcation of the continent at which the Soviet position with regard to wider area of eastern Europe was again tacitly recognised. And the formation of the Cominform in 1947, '...to coordinate and centralize the political roles of the satellites'[18] was another important step towards the tightening of the Soviet Union's hold over the eastern European States. Yet the formation of the body came as a response to counteract the effects of the Marshal Plan for European reconstruction that saw the United States take a lead role in funding the rebuilding of those European states that were, in the difficult economic period following the War, most prone to the pressures of communist revolutions.[19]

Although Yugoslavia soon managed to withdraw from Soviet control, the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 ensured that although the Soviet Bloc was in many ways a limited force in the UN General Assembly - it had only five seats[ii] - it was becoming a powerful influence in Europe. The Czechoslovak experience ensured that the wider threat of communist expansion felt in western Europe could not be easily allayed. Indeed, prior to the events in Czechoslovakia, in January of that same year, the United Kingdom had in fact suggested that a organisation be formed to group together a number of European states most at threat. The events in Czechoslovakia only helped to consolidate this feeling, and in March the Treaty of Brussels was signed by Britain, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the

[ii] Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia and the Ukraine.

Netherlands that formed the Western European Union (WEU). Yet the situation in Europe was looking ever more perilous as in 1948 the Soviet Union attempted to institute a blockade of Berlin. With this in mind the United States and Canada were brought in to the Union with observer status. However, within months a plan had been put together by the United States for a wider security organisation to protect, both physically and psychologically, western Europe from the Soviet threat.[20] This 'upgrading' - though the WEU continued to exist[21] - of the Western European Union eventually led, in April 1949, to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. With a mutual pledge to one another under the 'purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations', the signatories 'resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.'[22] It was from this plan that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was later developed.

3. The Period of Strife, 1950-1955

Although there might now have been a greater feeling of stability within western Europe, 1950 was to prove a year of monumental significance for both the United Nations and the wider events taking place within the Cold War. Portents of the difficulties that the decade of the 1950s was to hold came only ten days into the new year when the Soviet Union walked out of the Security Council and all other organs of the United Nations after the General Assembly refused to recognize Chairman Mao's communist government of the mainland People's Republic of China (PRC) over and above that of the Chinese Nationalists' Government based in the island of Formosa (Taiwan). With the Soviet absence the events of later that year were to lead the United Nations down a unique path when, in late-June 1950, the communist Government of North Korea took the decisive step of intervening militarily in US-backed South Korea.

Korea

The source of the problem lay in the post-Second World War division of the Korean Peninsula. After the breakdown of reunification talks in 1948, two separate administrations emerged and with them came the animosities of the Cold War. Yet the United States in a number of ways failed to realise the strategic importance of Korea and had withdrawn its troops in 1949.[23] This undoubtedly altered the perceptions of Moscow to the opportunities presented in Korea.[24] After several months of heightened tension in which there had been numerous provocative incidents arising from both sides, a decision was made by the North Koreans to invade the South. When the operation began on 24 June 1950, such was the ferocity of the attack from the North Koreans that the invading communist armies had made significant advances before the United Nations Security Council was able, on 27 June, to pass a resolution that offered assistance to South Korea to try to halt the action.[25] Given the continued Soviet absence, the resolution passed unopposed. Calling for the creation of a United Nations Force to repel the North Korean troops, the resolution led to the creation of what has been interpreted as the sole example of true Chapter VII enforcement undertaken throughout the entire Cold war period. (Although in reality it can perhaps be argued that the nature of the war in Korea amounted to little more than a proxy war between the five permanent members of the Security Council.)

Indeed, in operational and structural terms the force - although under nominal UN authority - amounted to little more than an United States led action supported by contributions from a number of other states which sympathised with the Western position. Overall control of the force was vested in the veteran commander of US troops in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur. Under such supervision the UN sponsored action was soon able to repulse the North Korean armies well beyond the previous point of demarcation between the North and South, and almost as far back as the Chinese border. This provided the cue for Chinese intervention. Following a mass attack by Chinese troops the UN forces were forced to retreat to the 38th Parallel which in turn created the present point of demarcation - a cease-fire line that

has remained in place ever since.

The Soviet Union, furious at having been absent at the crucial moment of the vote on the Korean Resolution returned to the organisation in August 1950. With their return, they soon started to make clear their feelings on the issue of the United Nations' handling of a number of matters. Indeed, such was the fear that a renewed Soviet role in the organisation would lead to institutional paralysis, the Western bloc within the Organisation came together, on 3 November 1950, to pass a resolution - General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) - entitled 'Uniting for Peace' that envisaged the use of the General Assembly as a means of breaking deadlocks created within the Security Council whenever a matter came before the Council that involved directly any one of the five permanent members of the Council.[26] This manoeuvre was a clear statement of intent towards the USSR, and although a useful tool was yet further evidence to the Soviet Union that the UN was an inherently western biased institution.

The Soviet Tension with the UN Secretary-General, Part I

Indeed, the anger of the Soviet Union over a number of issues, not least of which was Korea, led to a direct criticism being levelled by the USSR against the Organisation's bureaucracy. Whereas previously the Soviet Union had maintained an anti-Security Council and General Assembly position, the Soviet perception of Secretary-General Trygve Lie's complicity with the US led action in Korea[27] meant that much of the Soviet attention was now to be directed against the Secretary-General and the Secretariat.[28] Such was the irritation of the Soviet Union that it began to obstruct the UN's work by refusing to cooperate with Lie. Soon it became apparent that this tension would not ease and Lie announced, in November 1952, his decision to resign as Secretary-General. With this the Security Council was now required to hunt for a suitable successor. Given the problems faced by Lie, this process proved to take longer than had been expected and it was not until March the following year that the Council was able to announce that they would be recommending to the General Assembly that the Secretaryship-General be given to a little known Swedish minister - Dag Hammarskjöld.

Hammarskjöld's appointment was made to ensure that the United Nations would now have a chief administrative officer rather than a political leader. Lie's actions had antagonised one of the permanent members of the Security Council to such an extent as to make his position as Secretary-General untenable. It was therefore considered necessary to appoint someone who would provide an uncontroversial slant to the operation of the Organisation. The appointment of Hammarskjöld within the events of the time is summed up well in the following comment,

> 'In spite of the reputation of ability and integrity which he had acquired among those who had met him in negotiations or at conferences, it cannot be said that he was, at the moment, the obvious candidate for this high international function. His election was much more due to this wish of the Big Powers to see - after Trygve Lie who had taken a strong position in several questions - at the head of the Secretariat someone who would concentrate mainly on administrative problems and who would abstain from public statements on the political conduct of the Organization. Such a careful and colourless official they thought to have found in Dag Hammarskjold.'[29]

Yet Hammarskjöld was eventually to prove everything but the 'colourless official'. Indeed, within a very short space of time he had set to work on reforming the structure of the UN Secretariat.[30] This meant the abolition of a certain number of posts and the streamlining of much of the hierarchy. Although this proved to be ill-defined at first, the end product gave the organisation a greater degree of overall flexibility in its handling of a number of issues. Indeed, the whole process was designed by Hammarskjöld to raise the prestige of the organisation; to this end the Secretary-General took personal charge of the reorganisation.

Once the changes to the organisation had been completed, Hammarskjöld set to work on increasing the prestige of the Secretaryship-General in the international arena. This, however, proved to

be less successful than the task of re-organisation. Although at the time of his appointment the Cold War seemed to be thawing slightly - Stalin had recently died, and Eisenhower was now President of the United States - the situation was far from warm between the two powers. This state of affairs was soon made more than clear to the Secretary-General during his first major foray into international diplomacy, when, in 1954, Hammarskjöld attempted to assert the primacy of each member's obligations to the Charter of the United Nations over all other duties and obligations that a particular member may have. In doing this he was pointing the finger specifically at the United States Government which, despite Soviet pressure, was steadfast in its opposition to bringing events occurring in Guatemala before the Security Council, instead preferring to see the matter handled by the Organisation of American States (OAS).[31] At this relatively early stage in his tenure, the difficulties of UN diplomacy within the Cold War environment became all too apparent to the Secretary-General.

However, this setback was somewhat alleviated by the success experienced by Hammarskjöld in his attempts to secure the release of a number of United States' airmen captured by the Chinese Communists during the Korean War. Although regarded by the US as prisoners of war, the aviators had been convicted of espionage by the PRC. After many meetings between the Secretary-General and the Chinese Premier, Chou En-Lai, at the end of December and beginning of January 1954-5, the PRC seemed to be moving towards granting an early release to the men. Although, due to continued US belligerence on the issue of negotiating with Communist China, the airmen were not released until August 1955, the Chinese noted that their freedom was a direct result of the Secretary-General's personal intervention. To this end, the incident brought a certain degree of autonomy to the Secretary-General.[32]

Superpower Détente, The Geneva Conference

The cold relationship that existed between the United States and China at this point did not seem to parallel the thawing of relations between the United States and its western allies with regard to the USSR at the same time. In July 1955 the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union met at a summit meeting in Geneva. The meeting, held at the *Palais des Nations* - the former home of the League of Nations - from 19-23 July proved to be a significant move towards East-West dialogue. During the five days a number of issues were discussed and the final directive (not a *communiqué*) issued at the end of the summit touched on the subjects of European Security and Germany, Disarmament, and the development of contacts between East and West. To this extent the four powers also agreed that a follow-up meeting between the foreign ministers of the countries should take place in Geneva during October.[33]

Yet the thawing in relations between the two powers did not undo the damage done by the bitter rivalry that had gone before. The strategy of containment within Europe remained and still left the main body of the continent divided. With NATO the predominant force of the West and the newly formed Warsaw Treaty Organisation providing a similar security arrangement for the East, the continent held little prospect of further gains for either Superpower. As has been noted,

> 'All the talk of peaceful coexistence emanating from the 1955 Geneva Summit could not alter the fundamental reality: the United States and the Soviet Union, far and away the pre-eminent powers in the world, were locked in geopolitical competition. A gain for one side was widely perceived as being a loss for the other. By the mid-1950s, the American sphere of influence in Europe was thriving, and America's demonstrated willingness to protect that sphere with military force deterred Soviet adventurism. But stalemate in Europe did not mean stalemate around the world.'[34]

Indeed, these Cold War difficulties were not just limited to Europe. The events between East and West had distinctly affected the tone of the UN in its workings. In summarising the United Nations during the first decade of its existence, Luard states,

> 'The shape of the UN in its first ten years was inevitably largely dictated by the political environment in which it existed: an environment of bitter distrust and hostility between the two super-powers and the nations which surrounded them, of competition for hearts and minds all over the world, of fanatical faith among the members of each group that they, and the things they believed, were right, while their enemies were the embodiment of evil - in a word, and environment of cold war.'[35]

4. Decolonization and Peace-keeping, 1955-1960

With the comment that 'stalemate in Europe did not mean stalemate around the world' in mind, 1955 was important for another reason. Although the East-West relationship had indeed been a dominant issue within the United Nations Organisation for the previous ten years, the situation was such that throughout this period it had been the case that the West had maintained the upper hand within the General Assembly.[36] Indeed for the first decade of the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc had consisted of the Soviet Union, the two Soviet Republics of Byelorussia and Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, by 1955 the situation was beginning to change markedly. Although the number of Soviet satellite states that had become members of the organisation still meant that the communist bloc represented a small, albeit tightly knit, minority within the Assembly - the Arab and Commonwealth groups were bigger[37] - there was, however, an ever increasing number of newly independent African and Asian states that were ensuring that the vested interests of the 'colonial powers' would be challenged within the organisation as they had never been before.[38] The emphasis was now about to change subtly from East-West issues to North-South debates.

One may argue, therefore, that the most important event of 1955 was not the Geneva Summit or the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Instead it can be ventured that it was the highly publicised conference of African and Asian States held at Bandung, in Indonesia, from 18-24 April that marked a fundamental change in the future developments within the international system and, more specifically, the United Nations. Attended by delegates from twenty nine countries,[iii] it represented the genesis of a firm movement on the part of the non-white peoples of the 'third world' to have their voice heard within the international system. At the meeting many prominent leaders of the third world met to form an agenda of issues that directly affected them. Indeed, if one looks at the speeches made by many of the delegates one can get a good feel of the diversity of approaches taken to this fundamental reappraisal of international politics that was being formulated. President Sukarno of Indonesia, during his address to the conference stated that 'this is the first inter-continental conference of the so-called coloured peoples in the history of mankind', continuing he told the assembled delegates,

> 'Do not think of colonialism only in the classical form...colonialism has also a modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, and actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation.'[39]

Although the Conference was attended by a large number of states that had ties to the western bloc - either

[iii] Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Persia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Siam, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Yemen. Of the states invited only one, the Central African Federation, did not attend.

by military ties[iv] or through the Commonwealth[v] - the Soviet Union nonetheless perceived that a natural alliance would form between itself and a number of the more 'neutralist' or communist leaning states. Given the stated aspirations of this body with regard to decolonization, the USSR felt that most of the members would naturally find themselves more in tune with the thinking of the communist bloc that they would with the West - the bloc whose membership consisted of so many of the former colonial powers. Indeed Prime Minister Nehru of India, in castigating Turkey for its membership of NATO did so on the basis that the Organisation was, 'one of the most powerful protectors of colonialism.'[40] However, and in the same speech, Nehru had, importantly, noted that it was 'an intolerable humiliation for an Afro-Asian country to degrade itself as a camp follower of one or other side.'[41]

Despite this apparent rejection by Nehru of the traditional bi-polarity of the international system, General-Secretary Khrushchev nonetheless actively sought to focus on this developing body of states in his attempts to direct Soviet policy against the West. Indeed, at the 20th Party Congress held in February 1956, he announced that,

> 'The new period in world history which Lenin predicted has arrived, and the peoples of the East are playing an active part in deciding the destinies of the whole world, are becoming a new mighty factor in international relations. In contrast to the pre-war period, most Asian countries now act in the world arena as sovereign states which are resolutely upholding their right to an independent foreign policy. International relations have spread beyond the bounds of relations between the countries inhabited chiefly by peoples of the white race and are beginning to acquire the character of genuinely world-wide relations.'[42]

It was undoubtedly the case that Khrushchev saw new international opportunities in the Afro-Asian states. However, the United States was not wholly oblivious to the opportunities presented. Yet there was an aggressiveness in the policy of the United States that alienated it from the Third World. Indeed, Khrushchev's targeting of these areas was in many ways a response to the failure of western attempts to bring a number of regions under its wing. As one commentator has noted,

> 'Whereas in Moscow a change in leadership brought with it a readiness to explore new approaches to a changing Third World, in Washington, by contrast, the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower ushered in an administration determined to globalize containment and to foist it on countries who neither felt threatened by Soviet attack nor saw anything emanating from the Soviet Union that necessitated alliance with the West. The driving force behind this policy was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who sorely misread the mood in the new nations. By uncritically extending to the Third World a strategy designed for Europe and the Far East, he was guilty, much like Stalin, of a rigid and parochial application of a policy perfectly good for one place to an environment for which it was ill-suited. His "success" in creating military pacts in the Middle East and South Asia proved a boon to Moscow: it did more to assure an eager welcome for Soviet wares and accelerate the decline of Western influence in these regions than any other development of the period. Khrushchev could not have accomplished as much so quickly in the mid-1950s without the inadvertent assistance of Dulles.'[43]

[iv] For Example, Turkey was a member of NATO. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) consisted of Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand alongside Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

[v] India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.

Yet these states would not, with the obvious exception of those in military alliances with the United States, be so easily cajoled into forming a direct alliance with either the Soviet Union or the United States. Bandung had been the first chance for a number of states to voice their concerns about issues that lay beyond the remit of the Cold War between the East and West. The issue of prime importance for the African and Asian states was the development of the southern hemisphere, as compared with the imperative of strategic issues prevalent between the East and West in the northern hemisphere. To this extent one may see the end result of Bandung as being the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a movement which in many ways embodied Nehru's ideals presented at Bandung. However, and despite the professed ideology of non-alignment with either the West or the East in its dealings on issues in the international arena, the Movement soon came to be perceived as being more sympathetic to the Soviet cause than to that of the West. As one former British senior diplomat wryly, and perhaps somewhat bitterly, observed,

> 'The newly formed Non-Aligned Movement sailed under the banner of 'anti-imperialism', a rhetorical firearm more easily levelled against Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and other Western European colonial powers than the Soviet Union which had skilfully concealed its direct descent from the Tsarist Empire and which, with outrageous but effective cynicism and hypocrisy, was quick to trumpet its championship of national liberation and total independence from the wicked West. Indeed, when I was in Cairo in the early 1960's, may of us concluded that the true meaning of non-alignment was giving the Soviet Union the benefit of all doubts, the West never.'[44]

The First United Nations Peace-keeping Force, UNEF

Although the NAM had not yet been formed and the doctrine of non-alignment was at its genesis, the birth of peace-keeping coincided closely with this new North-South agenda. Indeed, President Abdul Gamal Nasser of Egypt, the protagonist of future events, was one of the prominent leaders attending Bandung. During the course of the meeting he had made anti-colonialism a central tenet of his regional pan-Arabist ideology. In the year following the Conference, and indeed before that, he had focussed on voicing support for a number of states in the Mahgreb region which were engaged in conflicts against the French.[45] To further Egypt's important regional role - as well, it might be argued, as his own prestige - he engaged in diplomatic manoeuvres with both the United States and Britain on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on the other. When a deal to finance the building of a massive dam at Aswan fell through due to Western irritation at Nasser's dealing with the communist bloc, the Egyptian President used, as his tool to get back at the West, the strategically important Suez Canal that linked the Red Sea with the Mediterranean. As a vital oil transit route it was one of the most important shipping routes in the world. Given this strategic position it was therefore unsurprising that when Nasser nationalised the Canal, in late-July 1956, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France - both of which had significant financial interests at stake - took the decisive step, in the last days of October 1956, of attempting, with the collusion of Israel,[46] to invade the Suez Canal zone.[47]

Almost immediately the United States reacted by placing the matter before the Security Council and presented a draft resolution.[48] (This was done despite the fact that the United States knew that the United Kingdom and France, as permanent members of the Council, would veto any such resolution.) The reason for this move had therefore to lie in the wider geo-political view of the situation by the United States. Most important among these was the belief that the Soviet Union was making significant headway in developing ties with the Egyptian state as well as other Arab states. Therefore the Anglo-French action could be used by the Soviet Union as a propaganda tool against NATO and the West as well as being a more direct means of becoming involved in the region. By bringing the matter before the United Nations the United States more than likely felt that it could forestall any such Soviet involvement. In actual fact, the United States found support from the Soviet Union, which also presented a resolution.[49] When both

the US and Soviet texts were vetoed, the Security Council used the 1950 'Uniting for Peace' resolution to have the matter moved to the General Assembly. After several days of emergency debate in the Assembly, a resolution was eventually passed that called 'for an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of all forces being armistice lines and the reopening of the canal'.[50] However the text of the resolution proved to be of only limited value as it did not propose any practical measures to be taken. With this in mind the Canadian Government proposed the creation of an international emergency force 'to secure the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution.' When put to the vote in the Assembly the resolution passed.[51] The process of forming a peace-keeping force now began.

On the basis of the ideas presented, the Assembly envisaged the new force as one which would work on the basis of consent given by the Egyptian Government. It would be comprised of a number of troop contingents from several contributing states, and would work under the control of the United Nations Organisation - rather than the governments of the individual troop contributing countries. Although this plan of action was supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union, there were clear reservations expressed by Britain, France and Israel who all viewed the role of the UN as 'an instrument of pressure on the Egyptian government; the force, they felt, should not be allowed to leave Egyptian soil until desirable political settlements had been reached.'[52] However the United States was unwilling to be seen to side with the tripartite action. To take any action which could be construed as showing undue sympathy to the recognised 'aggressors' would jeopardise its relationship with the Arab states. Therefore the force was created with this all important element of consent as a fundamental principle.

With such an assurance, the Egyptians accepted the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). There was, however, one condition: namely, that the force not include contingents from NATO countries. This would effectively preclude any contributions from Norway, Denmark and, importantly, Canada - the initial sponsor of the resolution proposing the force.[53] In order to counter this Hammarskjöld asserted his belief that although contributions from any of the permanent members of the Security Council would be excluded,[54] and that the host state must have an important role in the consultations regarding contributions, the principle of 'universality' within the United Nations demanded that the UN itself - and the Secretary-General by default - must remain the final arbiter of a state's suitability for peace-keeping duties.[55] Nasser therefore relented and the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian troops duly took their place in the force when it finally arrived in Egypt, just over a week later, on 12 November 1956. Using troops from the above named countries as well as, eventually, Brazil, Columbia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, the force had, by March 1957, succeeded in achieving all its mandated tasks and was then deployed on the Egyptian side of the 273 km Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) with Israel. It remained in place, supervising the cease-fire, until 1967.

Yet Suez had been an important event beyond the creation of the UN's first peace-keeping force. The disastrous way in which the British and French had handled the whole crisis, coupled with the Superpower unanimity of action (if not intent), had led to the downgrading of these two powers in the international system.[56] This event, perhaps more than any other amount of pressure from the floor of the General Assembly, seemed to mark the beginning of the process of large-scale decolonization[57] - a point evidenced by the dramatic rise in the membership of the UN Organisation from sixty to one hundred in the five year period from 1955-60.[58]

Hungary

Concurrent with the events in the Middle East, the Cold War was still being played out in Europe. Although the containment policy in Europe had led to the Soviet Union's exploration of new vistas in the wider world, the bi-polarity existing in Europe was not always as stable as might have been suspected. In Hungary a number of large demonstrations at the end of the third week in October had led to the return of the former Prime Minister, Imre Nagy. Once in power he sent a clear signal to Moscow that he expected the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian soil. In addition, in a statement broadcast on 31 October

1956, Nagy announced that Hungary would be withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.[59] The Soviet Union, fearing the spread of such dissent to the other satellite states, took a decisive stand and moved their forces into Budapest to crush the uprising.

The Soviet Union's moves had been, even from the earliest days of the crisis, a matter of international concern, if not condemnation.[60] At the UN, the first response was a draft resolution put before the Security Council by the United States.[61] However, the events surrounding Suez pushed the Council's consideration of this aside within a day of it having been presented. When it next came before the Council the Soviet Union had launched its military operation to retake Budapest. The proposed resolution, although revised to take into account the changed circumstances,[62] was vetoed by the USSR. At this point the Council, once again using the 'Uniting for Peace' device,[vi] moved the matter to the General Assembly.[63] There the Soviet action was condemned and following a vote on a draft resolution,[vii] the Assembly assigned responsibility for the matter to the Secretary-General.[64] However, this would prove to be an impossible task for Hammarskjöld. The Security Council, as the main organ of the UN in its peace and security role had already failed through Superpower intransigence, so too, by its own reluctance, had the Assembly. To expect the Secretary-General to succeed where the others had been unable to do so was, in a number of ways, to expect the impossible. The Soviet Union remained firm in their refusal to move on the issue, and after several months the matter eventually fell by the wayside. As one commentator later noted, '[i]n Hungary there was no question of Soviet compliance with UN decisions, and, if no one was prepared to challenge the Soviet Union, the UN and the Secretary-General were impotent.'[65]

Berlin

> 'To put it crudely, the American foot in Europe had a sore blister on it. That was West Berlin. Anytime we wanted to step on the Americans' foot and make them feel pain, all we had to do was obstruct American communications with the city across the territory of the German Democratic Republic.'
>
> Nikita Khrushchev[66]

The situation in Hungary had refocussed the centre of Cold War attention on Europe. The gradual decline in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States that had occurred since the end of the Second World war had now reached a point at which their respective ideological territories within Europe had been almost wholly defined. As Hungary had shown, any attempt to encroach on the Soviet Union's sphere of influence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, either internally or externally, would be firmly resisted by the USSR at the United Nations and, failing this, by military methods.[67] Yet within this picture, the city of Berlin continued to remain a small outpost of the West within the Soviet Empire.

The status of Berlin had been defined in the post-Second World War as a form of 'free-city' that was not strictly part of Germany, but rather an area that was governed by the four main allied powers of the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the city fell within the Russian zone of occupation covering eastern Germany, land transit routes had been organised to link the city with the western part of the country. However, the difficult position of the western powers *vis-à-vis* Berlin was soon recognised by the Soviet Union. In 1948 Stalin precipitated a crisis over access to Berlin

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[vi] Although the Soviet Union voted against the move, all the other members of the Council, including Yugoslavia, voted in favour.

[vii] Fifty votes in favour, eight votes against (all communist states), and fifteen abstentions (all the Arab states and a number of Afro-Asian countries).

when he imposed a blockade of the overland routes to the city. In order to maintain its hold on the western zone of the town, the West had to organise a mass airlift to keep a regular supply of goods to the, effectively, besieged population. Although Stalin was eventually defeated in his aims,[68] the situation regarding the city was not completely resolved. In 1958, Khrushchev initiated another Cold War crisis over Berlin when he announced that the Soviet Union had decided to implement a policy whereby all access routes to the town would now come under the control of the East German Government. However, despite the inherent difficulties to the western position created by such a move, the United States was able to delay the matter through diplomacy, a move that did not find disfavour with the Soviet Union which had by now realised the seriousness of the situation.[69] This realization would mark the beginning of a protracted period in which the fortunes of Berlin would play a central role in the East-West relationship in Europe. Yet, in addition to the situation in Europe, East-West tensions in the Middle East still appeared to be a major concern as political trouble in the Lebanon once again threatened to polarise the Cold War ideologies in the region.

The Lebanon, 1958

The roots of the conflict in the Lebanon are complex and any brief account is unlikely to cover fully the intricacies of the problem.[70] In summarising the political situation in 1958 it is important to note that when the country achieved independence from France in 1943, the National Covenant that established the political system determined that the structure of the state would consist of a president drawn from the Christian community, a prime minister from the Sunni Moslem community, and a Shiite speaker for the parliament. However, this arrangement came under threat in the early part of 1958 when President Camille Chamoun announced that he intended to alter the Constitution to allow himself to stand for a second term as President. Almost immediately, there were sporadic incidents of violence by some members of the Moslem communities of the country, and within weeks large parts of Beirut and most of the area around the Lebanese Syrian border were in rebel hands.[71]

Yet President Chamoun interpreted these events as being a direct result of interference by President Nasser of the United Arab Republic (UAR) - the result of a political union between Syria and Egypt in February 1958 - who Chamoun believed was engaged in a regional policy of inciting the populations of the more moderate, pro-Western Arab states to revolt. Chamoun also argued that the UAR was supplying arms to the rebels. Therefore, on 13 May, he approached President Eisenhower about the possibility of some form of intervention by the United States to assist the Government of Lebanon in its defence against the communist threat posed by Nasserism. However, Eisenhower was not prepared to become involved unless any United States' action was supported by a least one other Arab state.[72] At this point Chamoun approached the United Nations to ask that an observer team be appointed to assess the threat posed by the UAR.

Following a six day delay caused by an Iraqi request that the matter be first handled by the Arab League - which failed to reach a conclusion - the United Nations Security Council finally met, on 6 June, to consider the issue. After four days of deliberation, a resolution - UN Security Council Resolution 128 (1958) - was passed with the support of both the Lebanon and the UAR, with only the Soviet Union choosing to abstain. By this point, Hammarskjöld had planned the structure of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), and within days the Group was up and running having drawn on observers, equipment, and facilities supplied by UNTSO, UNEF, and the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) in Beirut.[viii] In addition Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador, Rajeshwar Dayal of India, and

[viii] However, UNOGIL, at its greatest extent, consisted of 591 military observers (November 1958) drawn from Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Thailand.

Major-General Odd Bull of Norway were appointed to be the three man Observation Group that would report the findings of UNOGIL to the Security Council.[73]

On 1 July the Group's first report was released.[74] Noting that work had been hampered by the rebels, the report stated that was apparently no foundation to the Lebanese charges that the UAR was assisting the rebels. Chamoun was, as expected, furious about this and in a reply to the Secretary-General criticised the findings of the report.[75] However, the United States had by now made it clear that it would intervene to assist the President if it appeared that his government would fall.[76] The catalyst for this came on 14 July when a bloody *coup d'état* in pro-Western Iraq deposed and executed King Faisal and his Prime Minister, Nuri Said.[77] Fearing that this was the start of a regional move by Nasser to de-stabilise the pro-Western regimes in the region, Chamoun invited the United States to intervene.

On the morning of 15 July, fourteen thousand US Marines landed on a beach near Beirut. Immediately following this the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution that stated that the action of the United States was in direct contravention of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.[78] In return the United States put forward a plan that UNOGIL be converted into a full peace-keeping operation. This proposal was rejected by Hammarskjöld on the basis that any such change instituted by the Secretary-General would exceed his powers under the Charter.[79] A subsequent Swedish draft resolution claimed that the intervention of the United States in the Lebanon, even under Article 51 of the Charter, was unjustified insofar as the country was not under direct attack.[80] Yet two days later the United Kingdom landed three thousand troops in Jordan, following an invitation from the Jordanian Government, which had, like the Lebanon, argued that such an action was in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. Once again the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution that called for the withdrawal of the British and American troops from the two countries. This was vetoed by the United Kingdom and the United States, and a Japanese draft resolution that called for the strengthening of UNOGIL was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Yet the Japanese proposal had been favoured by Hammarskjöld,[81] who, despite his earlier comment about exceeding his role, took the necessary steps to strengthen the Group.[82] At the same time, moves were made to have the issue moved to the General Assembly.

All the while UNOGIL had been actively trying to disassociate itself from the forces of the United States, whose presence, it was now realised, was the result of an overreaction to the earlier events in Iraq. The new regime - although leftist in orientation and favoured by the Soviet Union[83] - had by now proven to be as hostile to Nasser as King Faisal had been. Therefore the United States was left in the embarrassing position of having to try to extricate itself from what was by now realised to be essentially a Lebanese domestic affair.[84] Indeed, President Chamoun had by now accepted that he could not stand for re-election and had been replaced. Therefore, by the time the General Assembly met, events had overtaken the need for there to be such a meeting. Nevertheless, the debate took place and an agreement was eventually reached when a resolution, sponsored by ten Arab states, was passed - General Assembly Resolution 1237 (ES-III) - that called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces was passed.

This resolution changed the nature of UNOGIL, which now became the mechanism to oversee the withdrawal of the British and American troops from Jordan and the Lebanon. This role took central prominence after the Group was able to report, on 29 September, that there had been no further incidents of fighting between the Government forces and the rebels since their last report,[85] thus indicating that the situation in Lebanon had been resolved. With the final departure of the United Kingdom and the United States from the two countries, UNOGIL submitted its last report, on 17 November, in which it noted that its work was done and that it should be disbanded [86] - a move that was completed by 9 December.[87]

In conclusion the words of Alan James sum up the situation in the Lebanon: 'It was all a rather crazy situation'.[88] Indeed, the situation had simply shown the extent to which the United States' paranoia over communist expansion had drawn it into a ludicrous situation. Yet, if the Lebanon was a crazy situation into which the United Nations had been drawn, the next situation was disastrous. In 1960, events in Africa were to lead once again to the formation of a United Nations peace-keeping force.

5. The Congo, Cuba and the Consequences, 1960-1963

In many ways the events and outcomes of the Congo crisis represented a new era for the United Nations. The situation developed out of the ill-planned and badly executed Belgian withdrawal from its huge colony in central Africa.[89] After mounting political pressure, the Belgian Government announced, following a conference in January 1960, that it would grant independence to the mineral-rich country in June of that year. Given that the country had almost no experience of autonomy, and that almost none of its population was educated beyond the primary level, this period proved to be a remarkably short period in which to put in place the mechanisms for the governance of an entire state by the Congolese themselves. However, this difficulty was somewhat alleviated by the agreement between the Congolese and the Belgians that ensured that Belgium would keep in place a large number of key personnel - both civilian and military - in order to assist in the transition.

Yet the continued presence of the large number of Belgian officers serving with the army proved to be a source of considerable resentment to the large body of Congolese who, deprived of the chance to take positions of command, took to open revolt within days of independence, on 1 July 1960. The bloodshed and violence of these mutinous troops was soon directed against the large number of Europeans living in the country and with tales of rape and murder soon reaching the outside world, the Belgian Government took the decisive step of conducting a military operation to halt the fighting.[90] This Belgian action, in turn, proved to be the cue for Katanga, the richest province in the new federation, to secede. It was at this point the Congolese Government approached the United Nations to secure military assistance to aid it in removing the Belgian troops and to put down the rebellion in Katanga.[91] In a rare move, the UN Secretary-General used Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations to bring to the attention of the Security Council the events in the Congo.[92][ix] After a short but heated debate,[93] the Council eventually passed Resolution 143(1960) that allowed for the creation of a UN force to assist the Congo. With this the United Nation's second peace-keeping operation came into being as the *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo,* (ONUC).

Within a week of its formation over three and a half thousand troops had arrived to serve with the force. Drawn almost entirely from African countries in the first instance,[x] by early September the size of the force had risen to fourteen thousand and included contributions from the European countries of Sweden and the Republic of Ireland.[94] By this point the force, led personally by the Secretary-General, had overseen the complete withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Katanga, but was still engaged in trying to bring about the re-integration of the region into the state. Indeed, this process had been made all the more difficult by the secession of another province, South Kasai, as well as the continuing feud between the President, Joseph Kasavubu, and the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. This rivalry had been simmering from before independence and had been a constant threat to the fragile stability of the country at the level of central governance, and when a direct threat of full-scale interfactional violence between the rival camps of supporters threatened to plunge the country into all-out civil war, the UN force took the unprecedented step of ordering the airport to be closed and all radio stations to break communications. This move was not only a departure from the accepted practice of non-coercive peace-keeping but also drew criticisms of partiality from Lumumba's supporters insofar as it effectively assisted Kasavubu who maintained his power base in and around the city whereas Lumumba had his main support from the distant Orientale province.[95] Soon after that Lumumba was ousted from power as a young army officer, Joseph Mobutu, took over the running of the Government, with support from Kasavubu, and immediately closed all the embassies of any communist countries.[96]

[ix] See Appendix A for text of the Article.

[x] Ethiopia (460 men), Ghana (770 men), Morocco (1,250 men), and Tunisia (1,020 men)

The Soviet tension with the UN Secretary-General, Part II

Although the United States had supported Hammarskjöld's approach to the Congo,[97] the failure of the United Nations to prevent Lumumba's removal from power, the subsequent expulsion of the communist embassies and the personal way in which the events in the Congo had been handled by Hammarskjöld had, at an early stage, resurrected Soviet ill-feeling towards the role of the Secretary-General of the UN.[98] Indeed, such was the irritation that, in a speech made before the General Assembly on 23 September 1960, Chairman Khrushchev made a radical, and unexpected, proposal:

> 'It is necessary that the executive agency of the United Nations reflect the actual situation now obtaining in the world...We deem it wise and fair that the United Nations executive agency consist of not just one person, the Secretary-General, but of three persons enjoying the confidence of the United Nations.'[99]

Over the next few days, the Soviet Premier continued to make a number of personal attacks on the Secretary-General and took several chances to try to push forward his 'troika' idea. Hammarskjöld, although having attempted to avoid a direct confrontation as long as possible, was eventually forced to reply in no uncertain terms. Taking the podium he stated,

> 'I would not wish to continue to serve as Secretary-General one day longer than such continued service was, and was considered to be, in the best interest of the Organization. The statement this morning seems to indicate that the Soviet Union finds it impossible to work with the present Secretary-General. This may seem to provide a strong reason why I should resign. However, the Soviet Union has also made it clear that, if the present Secretary-general were to resign now, they would not wish to elect a new incumbent but insist on an arrangement which - and this is my firm conviction based on experience - would make it impossible to maintain an effective executive. By resigning, I would, therefore, at the present difficult and dangerous juncture throw the Organization to the winds. I have no right to do so because I have a responsibility to all those states members for which the Organization is of decisive importance, a responsibility which overrides all other considerations'[100]

Although the Secretary-General was applauded by the greater number of delegates present, the relationship between himself and the Soviet Government continued to remain on exceedingly unsteady ground, and it was not long before the final, severing blow, came between the two parties. The event that, for the Soviet Government, marked the final insult came in February 1961 when Lumumba was captured by Congolese 'Government' forces and delivered into the hands of the secessionist Katangan 'Government'. Once in their possession, the Katangans killed the deposed Prime Minister.[101] The Soviet Union, infuriated at the lack of UN control over the situation, immediately made it known that they blamed the Secretary-General for the United Nations' inability to protect Lumumba.[102] As a consequence of this perceived failure, they made it clear that they no longer recognised Hammarskjöld as the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation and that in future they would not work directly with him - although they did make clear that they continued to recognise the competence of the Secretariat as the Organisation's bureaucracy.

However, the Soviets were not alone in their suspicions towards the developing, and, it might be argued, far reaching powers of the Secretaryship-General. The French Government of General de Gaulle had also expressed its concern over Hammarskjöld's actions and even went as far as criticising the role of peace-keeping in general. Indeed both the French and Soviet Governments had played an instrumental role in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice when, in 1962, the Court had been asked to rule upon the validity of peace-keeping within the bounds of payments for such actions.[103] This had followed the announcements made by both countries in March-April of that year that they would no longer

continue to pay their share of the costs towards the operation.

The Appointment of the Third Secretary-General, U Thant

The situation in the Congo, although eased somewhat by the creation of a government under a new Prime Minister, still remained unresolved. In mid-September 1961, Hammarskjöld attempted to push forward stalled negotiations by making a personal trip to the Congo to meet with the various parties. After visiting Leopoldville, the Secretary-General left for Ndola in Northern Rhodesia in order to meet with the leader of the breakaway province of Katanga, Moise Tshombe. However, on the approach to the airstrip, the plane in which he was travelling crashed killing all aboard. With the death of Hammarskjöld the United Nations was deprived of its key figure. Beyond being the Secretary-General of the Organisation, Hammarskjöld had defined a new role for the UN during a period in office that had begun with political acrimony between the Superpowers and between the USSR and the Secretary-General. Although injecting new life into the Organisation,[104] Hammarskjöld was not totally removed from Lie in his relationship with the Soviets. Although his style was far more diplomatic than the Norwegian's approach, the outcome was, in many respects, the same.

The questions concerning the Soviet attitudes towards the Secretaryship-General and the question of financing posed the first of many problems for the incoming Secretary-General, the Burmese diplomat U Thant. An experienced hand at the United Nations - Thant had been his country's permanent representative at the Organisation - he was seen to be someone who could help engineer a reconciliation between the Secretariat and its critics. In many ways Thant seemed the ideal candidate as he was known to have a quiet demeanour that did not easily lend itself to criticisms of antagonistic behaviour. Indeed, Hammarskjöld himself had been on record as stating that he viewed Thant as a favourable replacement once he retired.[105] In addition to this, the Soviet Union regarded Thant favourably. As Khrushchev stated,

> 'We knew we could count on him to be more flexible than Hammarskjöld; U Thant wouldn't allow the UN to do anything detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union, the Socialist countries, and those countries that were unaligned to military blocs.'[106]

Immediately upon his appointment, Thant focused much, though not all,[107] of his attention on the Congo; which was still far from being comprehensively resolved. Although the force was still in position it was, by this point, substantially smaller than the 19, 828 troops that had been involved at ONUC's peak in July 1961.[108] Indeed, in February 1963, ONUC made the novel and, as yet, unrepeated move of incorporating a battalion of the Congolese National Army into its number. However, the overall political situation still showed no signs of easing and it was not until Tshombe was able to increase his overall power that the situation was broken when Katanga agreed to re-integrate into the Federation that the situation was resolved, and the force was eventually removed in 1964.

Indeed, the crisis had proved to be for the United Nations a lesson in how not to do things in the course of a peace-keeping operation. It remains, even today, the UN peace-keeping operation with the highest number of overall fatalities,[xi] as well as having cost the UN over $400 million.[109] One can therefore see the extent to which the Congo operation had been a major undertaking for the United Nations. However, it had also been a substantial point of friction between the Superpowers. Yet it was not the only such point of difference or antagonism between the US and the USSR. To this extent it is important to review the wider Cold War picture that existed by this point. In doing this there are two distinct events that stand out as major points of consideration: the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

[xi] 234, of which 195 were as a result of hostile action.

Berlin Revisited

The events surrounding the building of the Berlin Wall stemmed directly from the previously described events of 1958 during which the Soviet Union had attempted to assert the authority of the East German administration. The fact that throughout the period from 1945-61 Berlin had been a city occupied but not divided had meant that there had been a clear passage by which those seeking to flee the communist controlled areas could do so. Such a migration from the East to the West was proving to be a drain on the East German economy as a large number of those fleeing were in trained professions. Furthermore, such actions were a direct humiliation for the communists, who had repeatedly attempted to paint the picture of life in the East as being a socialist utopia.

Although the Berlin situation had been tense but stable since the events of 1958, the issue remained firmly in place as a potential source of further Cold War friction. In June 1961, General-Secretary Khrushchev - perhaps in an attempt to test the new US President, John F. Kennedy[110] - once again renewed the ultimatum to the West. The East German authorities, as if to highlight the lengths to which they would go to prove their serious intent on the issue of recognition, soon thereafter erected barricades around the western part of the city and thus created the Berlin Wall. With the flow of East Germans to the West now stemmed the Wall had the added benefit of placing the West Berliners in a state of psychological, if not physical, siege. Despite this, Kennedy did not respond with any overt action,[111] preferring instead to send 1500 troops to reinforce the city's garrison.[112] This action had the benefit of placing the Soviets in the difficult position of having to take the next step. Although the United States' action caused a furore in West German political circles and led to a cold period in relations between the two states, the tactic seemed to pay dividends as it delayed events until such time as Khrushchev made the mistake of allowing the United States to take the decisive position in East-West relations during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

This incident proved to be one of the most dangerous events of the entire Cold War period, and any attempt to try to explain the crisis in entirety in the bounds of this work would be doomed to failure in the space available.[113] To this extent the account presented here places a significant emphasis on the role of the United Nations during the crisis. This role was but one small element of the crisis and should in no way be interpreted to mean that the crisis was centred on the United Nations.

The roots of the crisis can be traced to a US fear that the Soviet Union was attempting to gain a foothold in the western hemisphere through the Caribbean island of Cuba, lying just off the US coast near Florida. Since 1823 and the adoption of the Monroe doctrine, the United States had made it a clear tenet of its foreign policy that the Americas, both north and south, represented its own sphere of influence and was not open to outside meddling. The fact that the reciprocal agreement by which the United States would not take an active interest in events beyond this area had been broken by the its role in both World Wars, and, more particularly, by the creation of the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction did not fundamentally effect the strongly held belief in the fact that the United States must control its own region.

With this in mind, the actions of the Cuban President, Fidel Castro, in attempting to solicit Soviet support came as a direct challenge to this doctrine. Therefore when the United States discovered, on 14 October 1962, that the Cubans were in the process of building a number of missile bases for Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles it became a foreign policy imperative that they act to prevent this extension of the Soviet Union's nuclear strike capability. In convening an emergency session of the Security Council, the United States made a claim that it had in its possession a number of aerial photographs that they claimed incontrovertibly proved that the Soviet Union was attempting to use the island of Cuba as a means of extending its influence over the Western Hemisphere. After a draft resolution[114] put forward by the United States was predictably vetoed by the Soviets, the United States

imposed a naval blockade around the island to prevent the importation of the Soviet missiles.

On the morning of 24 October, the Council met once again in order to hear the United States and the Soviet Union as they faced one another across the floor of the Council chamber. The situation had by this point reached a critical stage as a number of Soviet merchant ships were approaching the naval cordon around the island. Under these circumstances the meeting was of vital importance. On this occasion a resolution was put to the Council calling for the Secretary-General to confer with the parties, and to ask both the US and the USSR to refrain from actions likely to aggravate further the situation. Thant duly responded by sending messages to both President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev,[115] although many within the UN felt that there was little that the Organisation could do under the tense circumstances.[116]

Although the Soviet merchant vessels were eventually allowed to continue on their way to the island by the US naval forces, the situation still remained tense when the Council met once again the following day - 25 October. As the permanent representatives of the Superpowers once again engaged in debate, the US representative, Adlai Stevenson, was able to manipulate the proceedings in such a way as to expose the Soviet Representative, Velerian Zorin, as a liar.[117] Although this action caused much by way of consternation among the assembled onlookers, the United States had successfully managed to expose the Soviet manoeuvres to the international community. From this point on the Soviet position weakened, and although the crisis lasted several more days, the fact that the Soviet Union had been wrong footed by the United States meant that, on 28 October, Chairman Khrushchev was forced to publicly announce that the bases would be dismantled and the missiles returned to the Soviet Union.[118] (However, one must point out that the final outcome was not a complete disaster for the Soviet Union as it had managed to ensure recognition for Castro's Cuba, had led to the removal of US missiles from Turkey, and had resulted in a firm recognition of the Soviet Union as a nuclear Superpower alongside the United States.)

In later months both the Soviet Union and the United States were to thank the Secretary-General for the important role he played in diffusing the tension between the two states.[119] Yet the fact remained that the United States, in achieving a victory within the Security Council, reinforced the fact that it had won a political and strategic advantage - though not a full victory - in the crisis overall by not only highlighting its resolve in maintaining its historic position with regard to the American Hemisphere, but by also exposing a weakness in Soviet leadership. This had been aided by the disastrous way in which the matter had been handled on the floor of the Security Council. Indeed, so bad had been Zorin's performance before the Security Council that the Soviet Union soon replaced him with Nikolai Fedorenko - a man who 'gave the impression that he had always led a quiet, scholarly and indeed bourgeois life...[and who] seemed to have been picked because he made such a complete contrast with the old-guard hardliner Zorin.'[120]

The Cold War Post-Cuba

At the end of both the Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crises, the pattern of the Cold War had changed. The developing strategic superiority of the United States of America relative to the Soviet Union was by now becoming apparent, yet the dangers of the Crisis seem to force both the Superpowers to reappraise their positions. Over the next year there were significant moves made by both the United States and the Soviet Union to reach a disarmament agreement. The Cold War had not ended with the termination of the Cuban Missile Crisis or with the *détente* of the aftermath. Instead one may say that it had undergone a metamorphosis from a period of direct Superpower confrontation into an era in which the Superpowers fought for ideological territories through the manipulation of intra-state conflicts. The Soviets who were now wary - if not outrightly fearful - of the superiority of the United States now engaged in foreign policy 'opportunism'. A policy which might best be characterised as a process whereby Moscow would become involved in situations that presented themselves as being ripe for such involvement. Rather than deliberately create such situations by which to confront the United States or become involved in a state the Soviet Union now waited for events in the international system to present them with opportunities to

embarrass the West at minimal cost to themselves. A firm set of boundaries had been created to demarcate not only the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union but also the means by which they could achieve any such extension. Although it must be noted that this demarcation did not see any attempt made by the United States to encroach on the Soviet sphere, the end effect was a development of a strategic balance of power between the Superpowers which seemed to favour the West. As one commentator has noted of this period,

> 'The cumulative result of the failure of Kruschev's [*sic*] Berlin and Cuban initiatives was that the Soviet Union did not again risk posing a direct challenge to the United States, except during a brief flare-up at the end of the 1973 Middle East War...Instead, Soviet military pressure veered off in the direction of supporting so-called wars of national liberation.'[121]

Despite much of the good work done in the period after Cuba, it must be remembered that the personalities of the protagonists had been considered to be a major factor both in resolving the Crisis and working on the improvement of relations between the two Superpowers. It was therefore unsurprising that the world was shocked by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas in late-November 1963. Almost immediately Lyndon B. Johnson, the Vice-President, was sworn into office. A wholly different character from Kennedy, George Ball, a senior US official in the State Department, noted in his memoirs that,

> 'Rapport with Lyndon Johnson did not come so easily [as compared to Kennedy]. He was a breed I had only known from literature, legend, or at a distance...I assumed I would never understand Johnson as I had John Kennedy, for he was, as I saw it, a man from a different culture. Lacking the tone and manners one expected of a President - with a breezy Texan tendency to oversimplify and overstate, overpraise and overblame - he would not, I thought, be easy to work with. That I would never fully comprehend him was correct, since he was far more complex than Kennedy and, as I came to perceive him, capable of strengths he did not visibly display and weaknesses he could not effectively conceal.'[122]

Yet this man was now faced with the task of proceeding with the work that his predecessor had so ably managed, and to this extent the new President consciously maintained a sense of continuity between his and the previous administration.[123] Although there were a number of continuing international issues that the United States had on its agenda, there were to be many more challenges. Less than a month after taking office, an outbreak of intercommunal violence on the island of Cyprus proved to be the first new international crisis of the Johnson presidency. Indeed, the Cyprus situation would eventually involve a number of actors in the international system.

Summary of Chapter I

The United Nations was founded on the basis of the cooperation that had formed between the Allied Powers during the Second World War in order to defeat the Axis Powers. However, the goodwill that had been shown by the parties towards one another in adversity proved to be less than secure in a time of peace. One of the first casualties was the newly formed United Nations Organisation (UN). At the United Nations, the differences began to show at an early stage, and although the Organisation was able to form two important peace observation missions, the situation was such that much of the Organisation's other work in the field of peace and security was being marred by the pervasive 'cold' war. Indeed, in Europe the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States led to the formation of an East-West divide in the continent, and the creation of a security alliance, NATO, to protect vulnerable western European states against threats from the Soviet Union and its satellite states.

The death of Stalin in 1953, and the accession of Nikita Khrushchev presented a new period in East-West relations. The 1955 Geneva Summit meeting was a significant move towards *détente*. However, the Soviet Union was by now reappraising their international strategy. The Bandung Conference had, in many ways, led to the formation of a new form of thinking within the international system; a third way being shaped by the African and Asian states that sought to increase the pressure on the United States and Soviet Union over the issues of decolonisation and development. Although not strictly aligned with the Soviets, this movement seemed to show marked tendencies towards the Soviet position on a number of issues, and thus went some way towards redressing the uneven East-West balance that had existed in the United Nations throughout the previous decade.

With these key developments having occurred on the international stage in 1955, the UN was now faced with its biggest challenge of all: the creation of the first United Nations peace-keeping force. Suez marked a considerable turning point for both the Organisation and the wider international system. At the same time as the UN took charge of the ambitious project of overseeing the peace between Egypt and Israel, Britain and France effectively lost their positions of great power players. The US and the USSR, by acting together though not in collusion, came out of the crisis as the unrivalled Superpowers of the international system.

When contrasted to the success of UNEF, the Congo operation raised a number of important questions about the scope of future peace-keeping. The way in which the operation of ONUC had been handled by the UN, and in particular by Hammarskjöld, and the sheer financial cost of the operation had made it unpopular with both the Soviet Union and France. Indeed, the friction between the Secretary-General and the Soviet Union had proved to be a source of a concern since the 1950s. The fact that Trygve Lie had felt compelled to resign, and that Khrushchev had taken the step of openly criticising Hammarskjöld by proposing the creation of a 'troika' were both testaments to this. For Thant, the role of Secretary-General would be as much an operation of overseeing an improvement in relations between the position of the Secretaryship-General *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union as it would be the more traditional task of ensuring the overall smooth running of the Organization as a whole.

But perhaps the most significant event in terms of the overall Cold War, and, specifically, for the future of the direct relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was the Cuban Missile Crisis. This event effectively signalled the end of face-to-face period of confrontation between the two Superpowers. With the process of decolonization proceeding apace, and the containment of Europe now secure, the Soviet Union turned its attentions, more than ever before, to the opportunities presented by conflicts in Asia and Africa - and, as it would come to pass, Cyprus.

Endnotes to Chapter I

1. For more information of the Yalta Conference and the United Nations see Clemens, Diane Shaver; *Yalta*; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.44-58 & pp.216-243

2. Hovet notes that the Commonwealth met for consultations in London in April 1945, and that the Latin American caucusing group met for consultations in early 1945 at Chapultepec. See Hovet, Thomas, Jr.; *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*; (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp.64-65 & p.69

3. Goodrich, Leland M.; 'The UN Security Council'; in Barros, James (ed.); *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future*; (London: The Free Press, 1972), p.19

4. The status of France was interesting insofar as it had not been invited to attend the Dumbarton Oaks process, and it had only *'[e]n principe'*, by the wishes of General de Gaulle, sponsored the San Francisco Conference. Its final position on the Security Council was determined by the fact that soon after the

beginning of the Conference, France began to attend the meetings of the 'Big Four', and 'the Big Five had in fact made themselves manifest.' Boyd, Andrew; *Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council*; (London: Methuen & Co., 1973), pp.64-65

5. Luard, Evan; *A History of the United Nations, Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-55*; (London: Macmillan, 1982), p.54

6. Luard; *A History of the United Nations, Volume 1*; *op.cit.*, pp. 57-58

7. Urquhart, Brian; *A Life in Peace and War*; (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), p.105

8. Verrier, Anthony; *International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World*; (London: Penguin Books, 1981), p.xx

9. Luard, Evan; *A History of the United Nations, Volume 1*; *op.cit.*, p.107

10. Close, David H.; *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*; (London: Longman, 1995), p.161. Urquhart, Sir Brian; *A Life in Peace and War*; (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), p.99. Luard; *A History of the United Nation, Volume 1*; *op.cit.*, p.118.

11. James, Alan; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.87

12. Birgisson, Karl Th.; 'United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans'; in Durch, William J. (ed.); *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*; (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.78

13. James; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; *op.cit.*, p.91

14. Urquhart; *A Life in Peace and War*; *op.cit.*, p.114

15. For more details see, *inter alia*, Ghali, Mona; 'United Nations Truce Supervision Organization'; in Durch (ed.); *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*; *op.cit.*, pp.84-103.

16. The information for this section was drawn from Birgisson, Karl Th.; 'United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan'; in Durch (ed.); *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*; *op.cit.*, pp.273-284. And James; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; *op.cit.*, pp.158-163.

17. Chadha, Nivnita; *Confidence Building Measures in South Asia*; Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Kent, 1993, pp.75-77

18. Hovet; *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*; *op.cit.*, p.48

19. Beaufre, General André; *NATO and Europe*; (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), pp.14-15

20. Halle, Louis J.; *The Cold War as History*; (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), p.184

21. The WEU is, even today, in a slightly ambiguous position. See Myers, Julia A.; *The Western European Union: A Pillar of NATO or Defence Arm of the EC?*; London Defence Studies No. 16 (London: Brassey's for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993)

22. Preamble to 'The North Atlantic Treaty', signed in Washington, DC, on 4 April 1949.

23. Kissinger, Henry; *Diplomacy*; (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p.474

24. Halle; *The Cold War as History*; *op.cit.*, p.206

25. Verrier; *International Peacekeeping*; *op.cit.*, p.6

26. An analysis of the Uniting for Peace Resolution as it affects the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations can be found in Simma, Bruno; *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), *passim.*

27. Lie, Trygve; *In the Pursuit of Peace*; (London: Macmillan, 1954), p.342

28. Urquhart; *A Life in Peace and War*; *op.cit.*, p.120

29. Schurmann, Carl in his introduction to the Dutch translation of Hammarskjöld's book, 'Markings'. Cited in Urquhart, Brian; *Hammarskjold*; (London: WW Norton, 1994), p.15. Gordenker concurs with this appraisal of the reasons behind Hammarskjöld's appointment; Gordenker, Leon; 'The Secretary-General'; in Barros, James (ed.); *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future*; (London: The Free Press, 1972), p.128

30. Urquhart; *Hammarskjold*; *op.cit.*, pp.46-74 *passim.*

31. For a full account see: *ibid.*, pp.88-94

32. Newman, Edward; *The United Nations Secretaryship-General, Peace and Security, and the Global Political Environment*; Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Kent, 1996, p.45

33. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*,, 1955, p.

34. Kissinger; *Diplomacy*; *op.cit.*, p.522

35. Luard, Evan; *A History of the United Nations, Volume 1*; *op.cit.*, p.373

36. As evidenced by the title of Luard's book on the history of the United Nations: *The Years of Western Domination*; *op.cit.*

37. For an account of the structure of the various groups within the United Nations at this time see Hovet; *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*; *op.cit.*

38. When the United Nations was formed it was, under Chapters XII & XIII that related to the trusteeship system, vested with a limited, but symbolically significant, role to play in the question of decolonisation. As has been noted, '[s]ince the earliest days of the San Francisco Conference, the principal colonial powers have been on the defensive in the Organization. Their attitude, in general, was that they had nothing to gain and much to lose from the activities of the United Nations in the field of trusteeship and non-self-governing territories.' Sady, Emil J.; *The United Nations and Dependent Peoples*; (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1956), p.824. See also Kay, David A.; 'The United Nations and Decolonization'; in Barros (ed.); *The United Nations*; *op.cit.*

39. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 7-14 May, 1955, p.14181

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. N.S. Khrushchev; *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Part Congress, February 14, 1956*; (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956) p.23 & 26. Cited in Rubinstein, Alvin Z.; *Moscow's Third World Strategy*; (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp.19-20

43. *Ibid.*, pp.40-41

44. Parsons, Sir Anthony; *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Intervention 1947-1994*; (London: Michael Joseph, 1995), p.10

45. Indeed, Nasser had strongly criticised French colonial policy at Bandung. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 7-14 may, 1955, p.14181

46. The Israelis, unlike Britain and France, were less concerned about the Suez canal than the continuing number of raids conducted by *Fedayeen* guerillas against Israeli targets. A full list of these raids - from April 1956 until the time of the Israeli invasion of Egypt - can be found in the *United Nations Official Record of Security Council Debates*, S/PV.749, paras. 50-90

47. There are a substantial number of works on Suez, see, *inter alia*: Fullick, Roy & Powell, Geoffrey; *Suez: The Double War*; (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979). Higgins, Rosalyn; *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-67. Documents and Commentary. Volume I: The Middle East*; (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). Kyle, Keith; *Suez*; (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991). Louis, William Roger & Owen, Roger (eds.); *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Lucas, W. Scott; *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US, and the Suez Crisis*; (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991). Nutting, Anthony; *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez*; (London: Constable, 1967). Rikhye, Indar Jit; *The Sinai Blunder*; (New Delhi: Oxford, 1978). Rosner, Gabriella; *The United Nations Emergency Force*; (London: Columbia University Press, 1963)

48. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/3710. A full account of the debates of the Security Council can be found in the *United Nations Official Record of Security Council Debates*, S/PV.748-751

49. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/3713/Rev.1

50. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 997[ES-I]

51. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 998 [ES-I]

52. Rosner, Gabriella; *The United Nations Emergency Force*; (London: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp.31-32

53. *The Blue Helmets*; 2nd Edition (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), pp.52-53

54. *United Nations General Assembly Document*, A/3943, para.44. Although, as Verrier notes, '[e]ven today, Hammarskjöld's criteria for accepting UNEF contingents remains puzzling.' Verrier; *International*

Peacekeeping; *op.cit.*, p.23

55. *United Nations General Assembly Document*, A/3943, para.16

56. For more information see Vaïse, Maurice; 'Post-Suez France'; Louis & Owen (eds.); *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*; *op.cit.* and Lord Beloff; 'The Crisis and its Consequences for the British Conservative Party'; in *ibid.*

57. See Watson, Adam; 'The Aftermath of Suez: Consequences for French Decolonization'; in Louis & Owen (eds.); *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*; *op.cit.*

58. Information derived from *Basic Facts About the United Nations*; (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1992), p.259

59. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, November 10-17, 1956, p.15191

60. This concern can be gauged by the number of letters sent to the President of the Security Council by members of the United Nations. In addition there was condemnation from a number of leading figures. For example Dr. Fisher, the Archbishop of Canterbury, stated in front of a large audience at the Albert Hall in London that the leaders of the USSR were 'the instruments and slaves of the devil...[T]he rulers of Russia have expelled God from their belief, they are able in this day and age to violate and outrage not only all the laws of God but all the hopes and aspirations of the human spirit...The Soviet Government is known throughout the world as never before to be the universal enemy of mankind.' *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, November 24- December 1, 1956, p.15225

61. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/3730

62. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/3730, Rev.1

63. Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, *United Nations General Assembly Document*, A/3280

64. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1004 [ES-II]

65. Urquhart; *A Life in Peace and War*; *op.cit.*, p.139

66. Khrushchev, Nikita (trans. Strobe Talbott); *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*; (Boston: Little, Brown and Company), p.501

67. Eisenhower himself noted that the situation in Hungary posed a real risk of nuclear confrontation. Eisenhower, Dwight D.; *The White House Years*; (London: Heinemann, 1963-66), p.67

68. Khrushchev; *Khrushchev Remembers*; *op.cit.*, p.501

69. Halle; *The Cold war as History*; *op.cit.*, pp. 360-362

70. Although there is a wealth of material on the Lebanon, very little has been written that specifically covers the events of 1958. Among the more general texts are: Cobban, Helena; *The Making of Modern Lebanon*; (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1985). Salibi, Kemal; *House of Many Mansions*; (Berkeley

and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988). Salibi, Kemal; *The Modern History of Lebanon*; (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965).

71. Salibi; *The Modern History of Lebanon*; *op.cit.*, p.201.

72. Ghali, Mona; 'United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, 1958'; in Durch (ed.); *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*; *op.cit.*, p.167

73. *Ibid.*, p.170

74. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/4040

75. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/4043

76. James; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; *op.cit.*, p.287

77. As Khrushchev stated, 'Iraq had the most reactionary government of all the Arab states. The government was headed by Nuri Said, a puppet of British imperialism and faithful dog of the colonialists.' Khrushchev; *Khrushchev Remembers*; *op.cit.*, p.340

78. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/4047

79. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, S/PV.827, para. 64

80. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/4054

81. Burns, Arthur Lee & Heathcote, Nina; *Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces*; (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p.13

82. *The Blue Helmets*; *op.cit.*, p.181. '[Hammarskjöld] indicated that, should the members of the Council disapprove of the way these intentions were to be translated by him into practical steps, he would, of course, accept the consequences of its judgement.' *Ibid.*

83. Khrushchev; *Khrushchev Remembers*; *op.cit.*, p.340

84. Murphy, Robert; *Diplomat Among Warriors*; (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964), p.404. Murphy was the representative of the United States sent to the Lebanon to make an assessment of the situation.

85. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/4100

86. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/4114

87. *The Blue Helmets*; *op.cit.*, p.184

88. James; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; *op.cit.*, p.289

89. There is an extensive collection of work on the subject of the Congo and the events of 1960-64. For the main texts that focus on the UN role see, *inter alia*: Abi-Saab, Georges; *The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960-1964*; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). Cordier, Andrew &

Harrelson, Max (eds.); *Public Papers of the Secretary-Generals of the United Nations: Volume VI, U Thant, 1961-64*; (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976) Cruise O'Brien, Conor; *To Katanga and Back*; (New York: Grossett & Dunlap, 1966). Higgins, Rosalyn; *United Nations Peacekeeping. Documents and Commentary. Volume III: Africa*; (London: Oxford University Press, 1970) Hoskyns, Catherine; *The Congo Since Independence, January 1960-December 1961*; (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) Kanza, Thomas; *Conflict in the Congo*; (London: Penguin, 1972) Lefever, E.W.; *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation*; (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967). Martelli, George; *Leopold to Lumumba: A History of the Belgian Congo*; (London: Chapman & Hall, 1962).

90. It has also been more directly termed an 'invasion'. Cruise O'Brien; *To Katanga and Back*; *op.cit.*, p.85

91. 'Telegrams dated 12 and 13 July 1960 from the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo to the Secretary-General', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/4382

92. 'Letter dated 13 July 1960 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/4381. The role of the Secretary-General under Article 99 is considerable. This was the first occasion that it had been used, and as has been noted, 'in matters of the highest importance for the UN the Secretary-General is given a status equivalent to that of a member state'. Nicholas, H.G.; *The UN as a Political Institution*; (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.176

93. See *United Nations Official Records of Security Council Debates*, S/PV.873

94. For more information see, *inter alia*, *The Blue Helmets*; *op.cit.*, pp.435-437

95. Burns, Arthur Lee and Heathcote, Nina; *Peace-keeping by UN Forces*; (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p.47

96. James, Alan; *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; *op.cit.*, p.295

97. Verrier; *International Peacekeeping*; *op.cit.*, pp.40-41

98. As Khrushchev stated, 'We [the Soviet Union] felt that [Hammarskjöld] insufficiently supported the progressive forces which were locked in battle with the colonialist government of Belgium.' Khrushchev; *Khrushchev Remembers*; *op.cit.*, p.483

99. Cited in Dallin, Alexander; *The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objections*; (London: Methuen & Co., 1962), p.153. Dallin also notes the way in which the proposals appear to have been a plan created of 'haste and improvisation, it was not an impulsive or petulant response.' *Ibid.*, p.159

100. Urquhart; *Hammarskjold*; *op.cit.*, p.464

101. Gordenker, Leon; 'The Secretary-General'; in Barros, James (ed.); *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future*; (London: The Free Press, 1972), p.122

102. There have been rumours suggesting that Hammarskjöld had actively sought to see the removal of Lumumba. Just over a month after the formation of ONUC, the Secretary-General was reported to have

told the British Ambassador to the Congo that it was 'essential to "undercut" Lumumba before he returns [from New York]'. Contained in FO 371/146788 cited in James, Alan; 'The Congo Controversies'; *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 1994, p.46. More importantly, especially with regard to the Soviet criticisms of Hammarskjöld's role, the Secretary-General was reported to have stated that ONUC's actions in Leopoldville (at the time of the airport incident), 'in practice [the action of the United Nations] favoured and was designed to favour Kasavubu.' *FO 371/146643*, cited in *ibid.*, p.47. If these rumours are correct, then the Soviet Union would appear justified in its harsh actions towards the Secretary-General.

103. *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*, International Court of Justice Report, 1962. The problem of the financing of peace-keeping is dealt with by Luard; *A History of the United Nations, Volume 2*; *op.cit.*, pp.443-466.

104. As has been noted, 'Hammarskjold provided the most dynamic leadership that any Secretary-General of the League [of Nations] of the United Nations has ever provided.' Goodrich, L.M.; 'Hammarskjold, the UN, and the Office of Secretary General'; *International Organization*, Volume 28, Number 1, 1974, p.482

105. Urquhart; *Hammarskjold*; *op.cit.*, p.592

106. Khrushchev; *Khrushchev Remembers*; *op.cit.*, p.484

107. Thant's role has been noted as follows: '[u]pon taking office U Thant took an anti-Katangan - and characteristically anti-imperialist - line in the Congo, and although he distanced himself from the situation more than Hammarskjold, he can be associated with the crackdown which ended the secession.' Newman, Edward; *The United Nations Secretaryship-General, Peace and Security, and the Global Political Environment*; Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Kent, 1996, p.56

108. *The Blue Helmets*; *op.cit.*, p.435

109. *Ibid.*

110. Breslauer, George W.; 'Do Soviet Leaders Test New Presidents?'; *International Security*, Volume 8, Number 3, Winter 1983/84, pp.88-92

111. This includes taking the matter before the United Nations. As has been noted, '[throughout] the Berlin Crisis in the 1958-62 period, the UN remained aloof and did not take sides.' Simma, Bruno (ed.); *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.13

112. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, August 19-26, 1961, p.18277

113. See, *inter alia*, Allison, Graham T.; *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*; (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971). Garthoff, Raymond L.; *Reflections of the Cuban Missile Crisis*; (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989). Kennedy, John F.; *'Back from the Brink: Cuban Missile Correspondence between John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev: 25 Texts from October through December 14 1962 in English and Russian with Commentary'*; *Problems of Communism*, Volume 41, Special Edition, Spring 1992.

114. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5182

115. *United Nations Yearbook, 1962*; (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information), p.107

116. Boyd, Andrew; *Fifteen men on a Powder Keg*; *op.cit.*, p.173

117. For the main points of Stevenson's speech see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, November 3-10, 1962, p.19067

118. For the text of the letter as it was read out on Moscow Radio see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, November 3-10, pp.19069-19070

119. This one done in a joint letter sent by the US Permanent Representative and the First deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the UN Secretary-General. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5227

120. Boyd; *Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg*; *op.cit.*, p.39

121. Kissinger; *Diplomacy*; *op.cit.*, p.593

122. Ball, George W.; *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*: (London: WW Norton, 1982), p.317

123. *Ibid.*, p.318

Chapter II

The Problem of Cyprus

'...the breakdown of peace in Cyprus cannot be an isolated event. Turkey and Greece are inevitably involved, and with them the whole delicate strategic balance of the eastern Mediterranean and the southeast flank of NATO. Cyprus is wired like a detonator to other larger problems.'

Sir Brian Urquhart[1]

Introduction

Whereas the Cold War was affecting the general trend of international politics in the post-Second World War period, there were a number of other historical factors that influenced the course of regional politics on what might be called the '*micro-international*' level. In terms of the Cyprus issue the main driving force was the relationship between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots it is important to place the issue within the sphere of the wider Greco-Turkish relationship as well as reflect on the importance of the United Kingdom's input into the situation in the century preceding the events of 1963. This chapter is an attempt to relate this history and to highlight the role of a number of key institutions and actors within the development of the relationship.

The development of the Byzantine Empire and its early contacts with the Ottoman Turks which eventually led to the fall of Byzantium in 1453 is a theme that is still a strong and emotive influence on the Greek nation. There can be little doubt that the three hundred years of Ottoman domination certainly had an enormous impact on the cultural, political and social development of modern Greece. Likewise, the attitudes that Turkey - as the former imperial ruler - has had towards Greece were significantly altered in the early 1920's when Greece launched an attack on a weakened, post-First World War Turkey. However, both Greece and Turkey were fortunate to have been blessed with two of their strongest characters at the most opportune of moments. In 1930, Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece and Kemal Atatürk, President of Turkey, signed a friendship pact. This paved the way for a quarter of a century of peace and reconciliation between the two nations. A peace that was ended in 1954 when the issue of a small island, Cyprus, became a matter of national concern for the Turks in the face of a Greek attempt to have the matter discussed at the United Nations.

In many respects the history of Cyprus can be seen as running parallel to the wider events taking place between Greece and Turkey. Throughout the narrative it is important to remember the role of the Orthodox Church in the development of the island. In the Byzantine period it was the granting of autocephalous status to the church that gave an identity to the Christian Orthodox religious leaders. It was this identity that persisted through the persecution of the church under the Catholic Franks. It was also this identity that kept the Greek Cypriots together under the harsher periods of Ottoman rule. However, it was ultimately this identity that prevented the Greek and Turkish Cypriots from ever integrating and forming a Cypriot national consciousness under British rule, and, more importantly, it was this identity that launched the movement for the union - *enosis* - of Cyprus with Greece, and hence made the matter of Cypriot self-determination an issue of conflict between Greece and Turkey.

The penultimate major stage in the development of Cyprus came during the period from 1954-1960 when the Greek Cypriots engaged in a guerilla campaign in an attempt to force the withdrawal of Britain as a colonial power. It was at this time that the national interests of Greece and the Greek Cypriots diverged from those of the United Kingdom, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, and in doing so posed a serious threat to the unity of NATO in the eastern Mediterranean. In an attempt to prevent an irreparable breakdown in the relations between these countries, a peace plan was initiated that resulted in the Zürich-London agreements that saw Cyprus become independent with the formulation of a power sharing

agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Britain retained a number of military sites, and with Greece and Turkey had a constitutional position as a guarantor of Cypriot sovereignty.

This arrangement brings us to the last phase of the genesis of the modern Cyprus 'problem' which may be considered as being the events post-independence. The constitutional arrangements soon proved to be a cause for hostility from the wider Greek Cypriot community who resented both the fact that Cyprus had been denied *enosis*, and that in such a denial the Greek Cypriots had been forced not only to give a share of power to the Turkish Cypriots beyond their numerical strength on the island, but in doing so had, in effect, given Turkey a right of a say in the affairs of the island. It was therefore not very surprising that certain elements of the Greek Cypriot community saw the only option as being an armed struggle to push the Turkish Cypriot out of the constitutional arrangements. At the same time the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, formulated a plan to alter the constitution in an attempt to make it more amenable to Greek Cypriot wishes. The rejection of this plan, and the resulting rise in tensions between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island soon led to fighting.

1. The Greco-Turkish Conflict

The roots of the animosity between Greek and Turk can be traced back almost a thousand years.[2] In 1071 the troops of the Byzantine Empire led by their Emperor, Romanus IV, marched onto the field of Manzikert, north of Lake Van in eastern Turkey, and confronted the Seljuk Turks for the first time. By the end of the day Byzantium had been defeated, their emperor captured, and the Turks had won for themselves a place on the Anatolian peninsula. Yet the history of the Greeks in the region had extended back to the dawn of recorded history. A nomadic people, the early Greeks had descended into Greece several thousand years earlier. A strong civilization, aided by figures such as Alexander the Great, had extended this civilisation as far east as Persia, as well as around much of the Mediterranean basin. Indeed, at the time of Christ much of the Jewish aristocracy was Hellenised, and it was from among the Hellenised Jews that Paul of Tarsus came with the view of extending the message of Jesus beyond the Jews. A mission that would eventually end with his journey to Rome.

The eventual success of Christianity within the Roman Empire took time, but within three hundred years it had taken root even among the higher echelons of Roman society. However, by this point the Empire was facing a number of threats on its northern borders and in 293 AD the Emperor Diocletian split the Empire in an attempt to prevent the marauding Germanic tribes from destroying it in its entirety. His son and successor, Constantine, the first emperor to be a Christian reunified the two halves, and in doing so founded a city on the western shore of the channel connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. The city, eponymously named, was Constantinople. Built on the site of an older city, Byzantium, the area was particularly Hellenic in culture. Thus the nominal official language of Latin was soon replaced by the common vernacular - Greek.

As the Western Empire came under greater threat, so the Eastern Empire grew in strength. Long after the fall of Rome, Constantinople continued to thrive and was proving particularly resilient in the face of external threat. However, the growth of Islam and the formation of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad had also seen the institutionalisation of the slave army by the Arabs, the main body of which was drawn from the horsemen of the Russian Steppes - the ancestors of the modern day inhabitants of the Central Asian Republics better known to us as Turks. It was these Turkic horsemen who eventually overthrew the Arab rulers of the Abbasid Caliphate. In 1068, Alp Arslan, a leader of the Seljuk Turks, began his progress north-west. This movement soon brought them into contact with Byzantium, and from that day on the field of Manzikert the Greeks and Turks have led a symbiotic existence.

However, the Seljuks Turks did not become the Turkic rulers of the region. The Mongol advance into Europe in the middle of the thirteenth century severely weakened their presence in Anatolia, and they were soon uprooted by another band of Turkic tribesmen, the Ottomans. These Turks, originally

numbering in their hundreds, soon settled in cohabitation with the remaining Seljuks, but within fifty years had broken out from the Anatolian peninsula to attack the Byzantine Empire which, after over two hundred years of fighting Islam during the crusades had been irretrievably weakened. The new threat from the Ottoman Turks simply proved to be too much to defend against. On Tuesday 29 May 1453 the mammoth walls of Constantinople were breached by the Ottomans under their Sultan Mehmet II (The Conqueror) and, in a frenzy of looting and destruction, Byzantium, the thousand year old Greek Orthodox successor of the Roman Empire in the east, was brought to an end.

This final end of Byzantium had been preceded by the capture of Serbia in 1439, and immediately following the capture of Constantinople the Ottomans took Albania. From there they advanced into the Peloponnese, Hungary, and, in 1529, marched to the walls of Vienna. Although they never captured the city it represented the farthest extent of the Ottoman Empire, and represented a direct threat to Catholic Europe. However, the Ottomans were eventually to be the victims of their own success. In order to advance as they had done it was necessary to have a superior military structure, but in forming this structure the Empire had neglected many other social institutions. In effect the pursuit of territorial expansion rendered the maintenance of internal coherence almost impossible and the Empire began to breakdown. In this process of collapse the Empire was faced with both the threat of Russia,[3] and the rise of nationalism.

In 1820 the Greeks rose up against the Ottomans.[4] With a nationalist consciousness developed in the coffee houses of Europe, the independence movement drew together the key elements of Greek society. The Phanariotes, the Greek civil servant class of the Ottoman Empire joined with the Klephtes, thieving black marketeers, and were spiritually led by the Orthodox Church. The aim was self-determination, and the method was open armed rebellion. In this the Greeks were aided by the support of the Great Powers of Britain, France and Russia. On 20 October 1827, in an attempt to secure vital Greek naval communication routes in the Peloponnese, the forces of these states engaged the combined naval forces of the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II, and Mehmet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, at the Battle of Navarino Bay. The victory of the Great Powers proved significant for the Greeks insofar as it determined the success of their movement. The vanquished Ottomans were thus forced to accept, through agreements signed in London the following year, the idea of an independent Greece.

This weakening of the empire, coupled by other losses made the Ottomans ever more prone to predatory attacks from Russia. Such were British fears of Russian territorial expansion and possible control of the Mediterranean that Great Britain became involved in the Crimea from 1854-56 in an attempt to prevent precisely this outcome. In another war, in 1877, the Ottomans lost a number of eastern provinces. Thus on 4 June 1878, in a desperate bid to prevent further Russian expansion, the Ottomans again recruited Great Britain. The cost of such an alliance was the ceding of a small island, inhabited mainly by Greeks, to British imperial governance. That island was Cyprus.

Although now protected by a treaty with London, the Ottoman Empire continued its political decline. The Greeks, steadily expanding the territory of their state, had by this time articulated the political concept of the *Megali Idea* which envisaged constituting the country of Greece within the borders of the Byzantine Empire - thus uniting all Greek speakers. This thinking in part formed the underlying cause of the first Balkan War which broke out in 1912 when the Ottoman Empire faced a sudden attack by Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia on its remaining European territories. In a war lasting less than a month the Greeks managed to capture Salonika, and the Bulgarians were able to force a passage through to the Mediterranean. By the end of hostilities the army of the Empire had been routed and apart from a minuscule area of Thrace little remained of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. However territorial arguments amongst the tripartite alliance soon led Bulgaria to launch an offensive against its two former allies. This sparked the Second Balkan War and the Ottomans, in a temporary reversal of fortune, were able to retake the captured city of Adrianople (Edirne) and in doing so secure a position in Thrace, and therefore maintain a European foothold.

Even in spite of notable military successes such as Gallipoli, the outbreak of the First World War two years later effectively destroyed the Ottoman Empire. Weakened by the loss of its Balkan possessions, the Ottomans were by now but a shadow of their former selves. However, the spread of war in Europe coupled with an alliance concluded with Germany posed an opportunity for the Empire to regain some of its former strength. Great Britain, seeking to counter the Ottoman threat, invited Greece to enter the war against Bulgaria in return for territorial concession in Asia Minor and the ceding of Cyprus to Greece. The plan, although accepted by the Greek Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, was rejected by the Greek King, Constantine of the Hellenes. (This rejection on the part of the King was on the basis of his pro-German sympathies derived from the fact that his sister was married to the Kaiser.) However, when the King was forced to abdicate on 22 June 1917, Greece duly joined the war on the side of the Entente Powers.

In the east, the Anatolian peninsula had been fairly safe due to the neutralisation of the Russian threat following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. However, at the end of the War, the Ottomans soon found themselves subject to the mercy of the Entente Great Powers. Great Britain, Italy and France soon moved in to carve up the remnants of the Ottoman Empire of the Near East. This was to be done in accordance with the plans laid out in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. On the Anatolian peninsula, the heartland of the Ottoman Empire, the French and Italians quickly got to work planning their territorial divisions. Britain, abstaining from this on the basis of having gained control of the Ottoman Near East possessions, preferred to act as power broker and simply watched over the situation until a plan could be finalised. Yet in the confusion of the implementation of the Franco-Italian plans Greece became embroiled. On 15 May 1919 twenty thousand troops of the Greek Army landed in the port city of Smyrna (Izmir).

The Modern History

The thought of a Greek invasion proved too much to bear for the Turks. (The demise of the Ottoman Empire by now meant that almost all the Sultan's remaining subjects were Turkish as opposed to Arab, Serbian, etc.). As Kinross put it,

> 'Constantinople was dismayed at the news. But it was a dismay stiffened by deep indignation, which gave sudden reality to the Nationalist movement. Occupation by the Great Powers could be accepted as an inevitable evil; but occupation by the Greeks, insolent and disloyal subjects for a century past, was an affront which no patriotic Turk could endure.'[5]

It was from this state of turmoil that a young Turkish general and hero of the First World War stepped in and not only repulsed the Greek military threat, but also realised the dream of a Turkish state. His name was Mustafa Kemal, better known as Atatürk.[6]

Starting from a small power base centred around the town of Ankara, in the central plain of the Anatolian peninsula, Atatürk was able to push outwards inflicting several major defeats on the Greeks. At the same time he mobilised support for his ambition to abolish the Sultanate and form a Turkish Republic centred on the geography of Anatolia. In the ensuing months the war ebbed-and-flowed as the Greeks managed to make significant advances. Britain, remaining true to its original desires, took an impartial approach in the conflict. Indeed on two occasions British forces acted in a manner that might be considered as being 'proto-peacekeeping' in nature. In the first instance they attempted to prevent Turkish advances from progressing beyond Chanak - a move that could have had serious consequences as the Turks would have undoubtedly targeted Greece and thus provoked further war in Europe.[7] On the second occasion, the British forces attempted to prevent the slaughter by the Turkish army of the Greeks living in Smyrna (Izmir).[8]

By 1923, the Turkish military campaign against the Greeks had been completed. After notable

Turkish successes led by İsmet Paşa, a close friend of Atatürk, around the town of İnönü,[i] a final battle, the Battle of Dumlupinar, inflicted massive casualties on the by now demoralised Greek Army.[9] This defeat, and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 marked the end of a physical Greek presence in Asia Minor that had stretched back at least two millennia. Despite the dreams of the *Megali Idea*, the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, soon showed himself as being a realist about the existence of a Turkish homeland - notwithstanding the fact that Greece was unable, militarily, to challenge the Turks. With this in mind, Venizelos and Atatürk formally concluded, in 1930, the Treaty of Friendship between the two countries. The treaty in effect marked the first time that the two peoples had voluntarily chosen to live in proximity to one another with a spirit of cooperation, rather than conflict, as the guiding force behind their relationship.

Despite accusations made by certain Greeks against Turkey over its lack of assistance to Greece during the Second World War, the general spirit of cooperation remained.[10] At the cessation of hostilities in 1945 the post-War scramble for territory, ideological if not physical, by the Soviet Union and the West did not overlook Greece and Turkey. With Greece engaged in a civil war against the communists,[11] and Turkey being a neighbour of the Soviet Union, both seemed prime candidates for Soviet expansion. In an attempt to prevent this the United Kingdom, with support from the United States, undertook responsibility for economic and military aid to the two countries. However by late-1946 it had become all too clear that Britain was unable to continue in this role. After an approach made by the British Government to the United States,[12] President Truman quickly made clear his intention, '...to take over Britain's historic role of blocking a Russian advance towards the Mediterranean.'[13] This therefore laid down the roots for the wider policy of containment that became known as the Truman Doctrine, a policy that was cemented the following year when both were included in the announcement made by the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, to finance the post-War redevelopment of Europe.[14] From this point onwards the United States had marked them as being firmly within the Western camp.

In 1952 the special position of both Greece and Turkey was formally recognised by the West when they became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). For Greece and Turkey this step meant that they were both now recipients of a commitment from the other NATO members to treat any attack made upon them as an attack on all NATO members. For NATO, the accession of Turkey, in particular, was particularly vital as it now afforded NATO a non-Arctic route into the Soviet Union.[15] This position, coupled with Turkey's geographical contiguous position with the Near East and Iran marked Turkey out for special attention. This position was again strengthened by the 1954 signing of the Balkan pact between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, just a few months later, the quarter century of *entente* between Greece and Turkey was brought to a close as the issue of the small island of Cyprus inflamed nationalist passions in the region.

[i] The importance of these victories were later recognised when Atatürk instituted a policy of introducing surnames in Turkey, and İsmet Paşa became İsmet İnönü - the Prime Minister of Turkey in 1963-64.

2. A History of Cyprus

The island of Cyprus lies at the far eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. Its total land area is 3,572 square miles, thus making it the third largest island in the Mediterranean. Elongated in shape, the island is one hundred and fifty miles long and sixty miles wide. Just forty miles from its northern coast, Turkey is the island's nearest neighbour. Syria lies seventy-five miles to the east, Egypt two hundred and fifty miles south, and Rhodes, two hundred and seventy miles west. Mainland Greece lies over five hundred miles west of the island.

At first the island was inhabited by an indigenous population - the Etho-Cypriots.[16] Around three and a half thousand years ago the first Greek colonists came to the island where they settled in cohabitation with the original islanders.[17] As the region developed Cyprus was conquered by the Assyrians, the Persians, the Ptolemies, and, in 58 BC, by the Romans. In fact, it was during Roman rule that the island became the first territory in the world to be ruled by a Christian when in 45 AD the Roman Proconsul, Sergius Paulus, was converted by St.Paul and the Cypriot St.Barnabus.[18] And when the Roman Empire was divided, Cyprus was incorporated into the eastern half, where it soon came to play a part within the intricacies of Byzantine politics. An attempt by the Patriarch of Antioch to claim authority over the Church in Cyprus was thwarted when - miraculously - the tomb of St.Barnabus was discovered on the island containing an original copy of the Gospel of St.Mark. The Antioch claim was therefore rejected, and a synod convened by the Emperor Zeno, in 489, ruled in favour of giving self-governing (autocephalous) status to the Cypriot Orthodox Church. Furthermore the Emperor, 'gave to its archbishop in perpetuity the extraordinary privilege of carrying a sceptre instead of a pastoral staff and of signing his name in purple ink, as only the Emperor might do.'[19]

Despite these concessions to the Cypriot Orthodox Church, the island nonetheless remained an administrative province of the Byzantine Empire for another seven hundred years. This period came to an end in 1191 when the English King Richard I, on his way to the Holy Land as part of the Third Crusade, landed in Cyprus to rescue his bride-to-be, Berengaria of Navarre, who had been kidnapped by Isaac Comnenus the last Byzantine ruler of Cyprus. Richard, not content with the success of this endeavour, proceeded to capture the whole island. After the conquest he promptly sold the island to the Knights Templar for a forty thousand bezant down payment and continued on with his journey. The Knights, unable to control the unruly inhabitants quickly asked for their money back, and Richard grudgingly agreed. However, all was not lost as Guy de Lusignan, the nominal King of Jerusalem quickly came forward as a new buyer. Guy took the title of Lord of Cyprus and so began three hundred years of Frankish rule in Cyprus.

As has been stated, the history of the Lusignan rule was 'essentially the history of the Royal Court in Cyprus and not a history of the people of Cyprus.'[20] Given that the island was run under traditional feudal principles with the nobles all being drawn from prominent crusaders this appears to be a fair comment to make. Life was indeed pretty wretched for the greater, Greek, proportion of the population. However, for this narrative, the chief effect of the Lusignan rule was the change in the position of the Orthodox Church. In 1220, Guy's brother Amaury, the first King of Cyprus, replaced the Orthodox Archbishop and bishops with their Catholic counterparts. This was followed, on 3 July 1260 with the Bulla Cypria, a papal bull issued by Alexander IV, that officially subordinated the Orthodox Church to that of the Catholic. From this point on the autocephalous church gradually weakened. By the time the Lusignan dynasty was replaced by Venetian rule on 26 February 1489,[21] the Cypriot Orthodox Church, although still surviving, was in a fragile state. During the next eighty years of mercantilist Venetian rule the Church's fortunes, like that of the people, sunk even lower.

At the heart of the entire Venetian reason for holding Cyprus was the need to maintain a vital strategic military post in the eastern Mediterranean in order to prevent Ottoman and Egyptian attacks on their merchant fleet. Yet despite such intentions, the Ottomans proved to be too strong in their desire to

take the island. In 1570, the Ottoman Sultan, Selim II, made a demand to the Venetians that they leave Cyprus. The Venetians, somewhat unsurprisingly rejected this demand, and Selim ordered one of his senior generals, Lala Mustafa Paşa to take the island by force. The ill-treatment of the Cypriot Church by the Venetians coupled with the knowledge of Ottoman tolerance towards Orthodoxy did not make the Church an active partner to Venetian attempts to resist the invasion,[22] an invasion that was eventually marked by extreme cruelty by the Ottomans against the Venetian defenders of Famagusta when the city eventually fell in August 1572.[23]

The Ottoman Period

Within the year, the Orthodox Church was re-established as the sole Christian denomination in Cyprus. This was undoubtedly as a result of the considerable dealing the Ottomans had with the Patriarchate of Constantinople since the fall of the city just over a hundred years before. However, with the benefits to the Church that came with Ottoman rule, there was the arrival of a large number of settlers who had been part of the original invasion force. Numbered at around fifty thousand they were mainly Turkish in origin.[24] It was these settlers who formed the basis of the Turkish Cypriot population.

Despite the initial positive feelings that the Greek Cypriots may have had towards the Ottomans as a liberation force, the impression of the Turks as barbarians soon came to the fore. This was attributable in part to the events of 1571, but also became apparent as the Ottoman Empire weakened and the worst excesses of local Ottoman rule became apparent. The revolutionary events taking place in Greece in the 1820's proved to be a catalyst for a limited uprising by the Greek Cypriots against their masters. Although approached directly as a potential participant in the independence movement as early as 1818 the Greek Cypriot Archbishop recognised the precarious position that Cyprus was in. Rather than support the revolution in any outward manner, the Archbishop instead offered moral and financial assistance. However, in 1821 a number of documents inciting the Greek Cypriots to rebel fell into the hands of the Ottoman Governor of the island. As a means of both retribution and deterrence he ordered the execution of a large number of leading Greek Cypriot figures including the Archbishop. This action only hardened the position of the Church and in fact led to its wholesale politicisation. This factor would play a significant role in the future of the island, even after Cyprus was ceded to Britain on 4 June 1878 in an attempt by the Ottomans to prevent further Russian expansion.

British Rule

Even given the fact that there were specific geo-political reasons underlying Great Britain's move to take control of the island it was undoubtedly the case that for the Greek Cypriots the arrival of the British was heralded with an air of hope. Many saw Great Britain as a power that might have been sympathetic to the aspiration of *enosis*. For the British Government, which had obtained the island as a *place d'armes* in order to protect its interest in the Suez Canal and the Near East as well as to prevent a Russian push towards the Mediterranean, any idea that Cyprus might be relinquished in favour of some Greek nationalist ideal was out of the question. This remained the case even when the initially perceived value of the island was reduced by the recognition that without a deep water harbour the island could not be used as a naval base and that the 1882 creation of a garrison in Egypt rendered the island inconsequential. Furthermore, open opposition was expressed by the Turkish Cypriot community to any form of move towards *enosis* as they soon made it clear that should Great Britain choose to leave then the island should immediately be returned to the Sultan.

Yet the change in governorship, although not predisposed to Greek Cypriot ideas of union with Greece, soon elevated the position of the Greeks within the administrative structures of the island. With the departure of the Ottomans, the Turkish Cypriots quickly lost their privileged status. This was compounded by the fact that, '[a]t the beginning of British colonial rule, the Turkish Cypriots lacked both

a social structure and a significant political influence. They became an unimportant minority in a society controlled by the Greek Cypriots.'[25] This was compounded somewhat in 1881 when the British authorities instituted a legislative council to act in an advisory capacity. It was constituted in such a way as to give the Greek Cypriots nine representatives and the Turkish Cypriots six. However, within the civil service structures, the Turkish Cypriots still retained a modicum of power. Indeed, it could be argued that for all that they lost in political status the Turkish Cypriots were nonetheless 'treated favourably concerning new posts in the administration.'[26] Such over representation was, in turn, interpreted by the Greek Cypriots as the first manifestation of a British divide and rule - *divide et impera* - policy in Cyprus. Therefore, even at this early stage in the British rule, it was becoming apparent that a divide was beginning to open between the two largest communities on the island.

The outbreak of the First World War, and the siding of the Ottomans with Germany led to the British annexation of Cyprus. A failed attempt to lure the Greeks into the war with an offer of the island meant that the United Kingdom still retained the island as the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The fact that Atatürk set the territory of modern Turkey as the Anatolian peninsula meant that Cyprus ceased, with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, to be a political issue between the United Kingdom and Turkey, and instead became solely an issue between Britain and Greece. On 10 March 1925 Britain formally declared Cyprus a Crown Colony.

With the changed relationship between Turkey and Cyprus, the calls for *enosis* grew louder. Following the island's change of status in 1925 the composition of the Legislative Council was changed to increase the Greek Cypriot representation to twelve. This proved insufficient to meet the demands of the Greek Cypriot community and in October 1931 there was a mass uprising in favour of *enosis*. In response to what became a violent incident the British colonial authorities adopted a number of 'steps to prevent a repetition of similar incidents',[27] among these provisions,

> 'the display of the Greek flag was forbidden. All political parties were banned. Ten important communal leaders, including the Bishops of Kition and Kyrenia, were deported from the island for life. Two thousand Cypriots were jailed. A huge collective fine was imposed to pay for damage done by rioters, which included the burning of Government House. The press was censored even more severely that before. In fact, all the dreary arsenal of colonial rule was deployed.'[28]

Insofar as open agitation for *enosis* was held in abeyance until 1955, these measures certainly had the desired effect. Nonetheless, union with Greece remained an openly talked about aspiration among the Greek Cypriots. On 15 January 1950, a plebiscite was conducted by the Ethnarchy council that showed a 96% support rate among Greek Cypriots who participated in the vote in favour of *enosis*.[29] These figures were widely trumpeted by the Greek Cypriots as showing almost complete support amongst the community in favour of the union. However there was considerable open opposition to this plan expressed by the Turkish Cypriots. In a move supported by the United Kingdom, the Turkish Cypriot community presented a document to the United Nations that clearly stated their opposition to any form of union between Cyprus and Greece.[30]

The Greek Cypriot cause for *enosis* was given an important boost when thirty-five year old Michael Mouskos, was elected *in absentia*[31] Bishop of Kition, young by any standards for such high office.[32] And just two years later, on 18 October, Mouskos was elected, unopposed, Archbishop of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus, and in doing so took the title Makarios III. His appointment coupled with the development of a Greek political consciousness of the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots gave a new impetus to the question of Cypriot self-determination. On a visit to London late in 1953 the Greek Prime Minister, Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, met with the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, and broached the subject. The British response was an outright refusal to even consider discussing

the issue. An outraged Papagos returned to Greece where continued Greek Cypriot pressure eventually led, on 3 May 1954, to a public commitment by the Greek Prime Minister to take the matter to the United Nations. So began the difficult and violent process that would eventually lead to Cypriot independence.

3. Towards the Republic of Cyprus

Despite vehement British opposition to such a course of action, Greece attempted to take the matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Using its full diplomatic weight in a General Assembly still western orientated, the United Kingdom was able to argue that the matter was an internal problem and therefore not subject to scrutiny by the Organisation. Under a motion put forward by New Zealand on 17 December 1954, the Assembly decided to postpone discussion of the right of self determination by the people of Cyprus. This ensured, much to the fury of both the Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government, that the matter was not even put on the agenda.[33]

The failure of the Greek attempt to have the matter discussed at the UN impressed upon the Greek Cypriots, and indeed Papagos,[34] the need to assess alternative methods by which they might achieve their stated aims. In early 1951 Makarios had met for the first time a retired officer of the Greek Army, Colonel George Grivas - a Cypriot by birth. As the events progressed, Grivas became more and more involved in the planning for an armed uprising against colonial rule and under his guidance equipment was shipped to Cyprus in preparation. Rumours of such activity were largely ignored by the British authorities, until, in January 1955, *Ayios Georgios* a small Greek caique was stopped and boarded by *HMS Comet* off the coast of Cyprus. Onboard was discovered a considerable quantity of arms. The seriousness with which the United Kingdom now viewed the threat had come too late to have prevented a substantial build-up of weaponry on the island. On 1 April 1955, peace on the island came to an end with a series of explosions at a number of key administrative buildings around the island. The EOKA uprising had begun.

As an organisation EOKA[ii] was able to unite many disparate factions of the Greek Cypriot community.[35] But it was unable to reconcile its differences with the Greek Cypriot Communist Party - AKEL - whose members believed that non-violent political action was the correct path to follow, rather than the armed struggle favoured by the right-wing.[36] This led to a paradox 'which made Cyprus unique in fighting an anti-colonial struggle in part *against* the Communist party.'[37] Despite the stated intention of *enosis*, EOKA at first attempted to take a conciliatory line with the Turkish Cypriots. In July of that year it issued a pamphlet, in Turkish, explaining its position and clarifying that the struggle was aimed at the British and not the Turkish Cypriot community.[38] Nonetheless, the Turkish Cypriot community rejected any association with EOKA, preferring to remain under British rule. In fact, the community actively sided with the colonial authorities. Although always having been a feature of the Cypriot police, the Turkish Cypriots were making up for the absence of a large number of Greek Cypriots that had left the ranks following the start of the EOKA campaign.[39] Furthermore elements of the Turkish Cypriot community formed a counter movement called *Volkan* (Volcano) that employed similar guerilla tactics to EOKA but aimed its activities against the Greek Cypriots.[40] Later the organisation became even more structured with support from Turkey[41] and changed its name to the Turkish Resistance Movement, or TMT. In later years Rauf R. Denktaş the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and member of both *Volkan* and TMT,[42] explained the reasons for the Turkish Cypriot opposition to EOKA,

> 'Turkish Cypriots were killed because we would not concede the union of Cyprus with Greece. EOKA, the underground organisation, declared that anyone who opposed the union of Cyprus with Greece was to be eliminated. We were opposed as a whole community, as a national

[ii] *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* - National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.

> community, to Greece so we were marked enemies. EOKA declared that the fight with the British would be long-drawn, or might be long-drawn, but they would win it and when they had won it the fight with the Turkish Cypriots would be short and sharp.'[43]

By the summer of 1955, events had taken a considerable turn for the worse. Violence was engulfing the island and in August of that year the United Kingdom called a tri-partite conference to be attended by the Greek Foreign Minister, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, and his Turkish counterpart, Fatin Zorlu, in order to discuss issues of eastern Mediterranean peace and security, and, more particularly, the issue of self-government for Cyprus. This event marked a monumental turning point in the affairs of the island. By calling in Greece and Turkey, the United Kingdom was announcing that the matter did indeed have a wider aspect to it than just being an internal matter. As Eden explained in his memoirs written before the conclusion to the matter of independence,

> 'In geography and in tactical considerations, the Turks have the stronger claim in Cyprus; in race and language, the Greeks; in strategy, the British, so long as their industrial life depends on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. Progress in self-government could not be made until these claims were reconciled, and one of two methods had to be chosen. Greeks and Turks could be associated with the British in control of the island, or the island could be partitioned.'[44]

To the Greek Cypriots the invitation to Greece appeared to be an acknowledgement of their pan-Hellenic feelings over the issue. However, by inviting Turkey the Greek Cypriots accused the British Government of enticing a Turkish interest in an island over which Turkey had relinquished all open political claim to in 1923.[45] Under these circumstances Makarios refused to attend, viewing it as a trap. [46] In view of his absence, it came as little surprise that the conference soon broke down. With Greece working for self-determination and Turkey demanding the retention of British colonial rule the conference was doomed to failure on this basis alone.[47] The violence escalated once more in Cyprus. Indeed, in what appeared to be a Turkish retaliation to what they perceived to be overall Greek Cypriot political extremism in the island, there were a number of anti-Greek riots staged in Istanbul and Izmir just prior to the end of the conference.

The British response to this downturn in stability was to recall the civilian Governor, Sir Andrew Wright, and in his place install the former Chief of the Imperial Staff, Field Marshal Sir John Harding. True to military form, Harding soon set to work radically altering the United Kingdom's approach to the problem.[48] In addition to increasing the number of troops in the island, harsh measures were introduced including the imposition of the death penalty for a number of crimes, and the internment of suspected EOKA members. Aware, nonetheless, of a need to deal with the more specific problem of the political root cause of the violence, Harding entered into negotiations with the Archbishop.

Makarios however remained firm on his demand that the Greek Cypriots be granted the right of self-determination, and therefore *enosis*. Yet the overriding strategic importance of Turkey in the region in the eyes of the British Government necessarily meant that such a solution was ruled out.[49] The problem was that Greece, the United States and the United Nations were unwilling to accept the validity of the Turkish argument, and thus Makarios was able to retain his strength of position over the issue.[50] After five months of negotiation with the Archbishop, no drop in the level of violence, and no evidence that he was prepared to call for a cessation of hostilities over which he was regarded as having a considerable say, the decision was taken by the British Government in early-March 1956 to deport the Archbishop to the Seychelles.[51]

Hoping that such an action would deprive the EOKA movement of a good deal of its momentum, the action proved somewhat successful. However, the other aim of the move was to try to encourage a new, more moderate leadership of the Greek Cypriot community which might in turn prove more

amenable to British thinking. In this the deportation proved decisively unsuccessful.[52] In the meantime the British Government enlisted the aid of the eminent jurist Lord Radcliffe in an attempt to draft a new plan for self-government. With this new phase in progress, Harding went on an all-out offensive against EOKA. In the most controversial of moves, he began authorising the execution of convicted EOKA members.

By the autumn of 1956 the island was buzzing with British troops. The EOKA campaign had been given a high profile in the United Kingdom, and there were around thirty thousand troops engaged in island wide security. In addition the events concerning the Suez Canal two hundred miles south of Cyprus had placed a massive emphasis on Cyprus's strategic role. With the importance played by the British airbase in the events of early-November 1956 it was made even more apparent to the British just how important the maintenance of a military foothold in the eastern Mediterranean really was. Indeed, EOKA stepped up its attacks during November and in 416 attacks over forty people were killed many of whom were British soldiers.[53] Despite the failure of the Suez Campaign, and the resulting importance attached to the military facilities in to Cyprus, the situation now seemed to be changing with regard to the United Kingdom's wider interests *vis-à-vis* Cyprus. As a senior Foreign Office official noted at the time,

> 'On a long view, I think that the 'Turkish political' factor may become much more important that HMG's need for a base in Cyprus. As Turkish friendship really is essential to retaining any position in the Middle East, we can hardly throw it away just to be quit of our troubles with Cyprus. And as Kirkpatrick [Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office] always points out, the quickest way of killing NATO is to get out of Cyprus and start a Greco-Turkish war.'[54]

Yet the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the uprising that would appeal to all parties remained as distant as ever, especially so after Lord Radcliffe presented his ideas, in December 1956, which were immediately rejected by the Greek Government.

The resignation of Eden in early 1957 and his replacement by the Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, heralded a new phase in the negotiation process. Many commentators have remarked on the partitionist designs Macmillan held,[55] but at the same time Macmillan accepted the need for negotiation. However the Turkish Cypriots, under the leadership of Fazıl Küçük soon fell in-line with Ankara on this plan to divide the island and *taksim* (partition) became the slogan of the Turkish Cypriots to match the Greek Cypriot call for *enosis*. With no leader to replace Makarios emerging from the Greek Cypriot Community, the decision was taken by the Prime Minister, in March 1957, to free the Archbishop from his enforced place of exile from whence he went to Athens.

By the end of the year there had been no significant new developments to the whole question and when Harding's two year tenure of the post of Governor of Cyprus came to an end a decision was made to replace the Field Marshal with a civilian. On 3 December 1957, Sir Hugh Foot took over the post vacated by Harding, and with his arrival came a new approach to internal security. Downplaying the military attempts to beat EOKA, Foot chose to emphasise a desire on his part for constructive and open dialogue. Another idea was formulated, working on the principle of self-government leading to self-determination but this time it was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, on the advice of Ankara, as being a firm step towards *enosis*.[56]

A few months later, on 9 June, 1958 the details of the Macmillan plan were announced that saw the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey all take a direct role in the administration of the island for a seven year period after which there would be a decision taken on the future. The idea envisaged a system of cooperation to be worked out between Greece and Turkey which would strengthen their mutual ties and thus alleviate the need to oppose one another over the future of the island. Needless to say, the plan

was rejected. This time the Greek and Greek Cypriots came out firmly against it as they interpreted it as being the first step towards partition of the island. Yet it was by now clear that *enosis* was not going to be a viable way forward. In light of this realisation, the Archbishop made the monumental move in September of that year to an acceptance of outright independence for Cyprus.

By this time the internal situation had deteriorated massively. The EOKA action had now been running for over three years and the Turkish Cypriots had in that time mustered a considerable number of men and arms within their own militia, TMT. Despite the British attempts to beat EOKA, there had been no corresponding attempt to target the Turkish Cypriot group. However, with a serious prospect of civil war breaking out between the two communities, the British colonial authorities took the decision, on 22 July, to instigate a crackdown on any illegal organisation, whether it be EOKA, TMT, or any other such militia.[57]

Impressed by such a serious turn of events in the island, the Greek and Turkish Governments appeared to have taken a more concerned view of the situation. It was now becoming even more apparent that the events in Cyprus were having a seriously deleterious effect on the wider Greco-Turkish relationship and in doing so was posing a serious threat to the integrity of NATO's south-east European flank. With this in mind NATO stepped up its efforts to avert such a crisis. In conjunction with this the United Kingdom sought to introduce a bi-lateral negotiation regime in which Greece and Turkey would settle the dispute of Cypriot independence between themselves. Thus a meeting was organised between the Greek and Turkish Governments in Zürich commencing in January 1959. By 11 February an agreement had been reached that saw a power sharing agreement set in place. On 17 February, the week following Zürich, a conference was convened in London to be attended not only by Greece and Turkey, but by the United Kingdom, and both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

With the details of the constitution in place the Greek and Turkish Cypriots went to the polls on 13 December 1959. Despite opposition from a surprising coalition of the right and left sponsoring an eminent Greek Cypriot lawyer, John Clerides, Makarios was elected President with 66.28% of the Greek Cypriot vote. For the Turkish Cypriot community, Dr. Fazıl Küçük was elected unopposed as Vice-President. With this matter complete the process of decolonisation moved into its final stage with the result that, on the 16 August 1960, the Union flag came down for the last time and the Republic of Cyprus came into being.

4. Independence and Constitutional Breakdown

With independence came the trappings of statehood. Within a year Cyprus had become a member of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and, following a vote in the House of Representatives,[58] the Commonwealth of Nations. This seemed to herald a new phase in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Greek Cypriots. Makarios, on his arrival in London to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in March 1961 took the opportunity to clarify his view on the future state of the Anglo-Cypriot relations. Speaking to reporters he stated,

> 'In spite of the differences and bitterness of the past, our relations with the United Kingdom are now very good. We shall do our utmost, in a spirit of goodwill, further to strengthen our relations with the U.K. as well as other participants in the Commonwealth...The past is forgotten.'[59]

However, and significantly, the Republic of Cyprus, despite the opposition of the Turkish Cypriots (although not, it seems, of Turkey),[60] also became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed, Makarios had attended the Bandung Conference in 1955 as an observer,[61] and had formed a good relationship with Nasser, Tito and Nehru.[62] Upon independence, Makarios's first foreign trip as President was not to Greece but to Egypt to see President Nasser, with whom he had formed 'a clear relationship'.[63]

Despite his exile in the Seychelles, Makarios had vaguely known about the events of 1956 and it was accepted that he had a good deal of respect for Nasser's stand against Britain and France.[64] Indeed, the Archbishop had been appalled by the use of Cyprus as the base from which the operation was conducted and the bombing runs launched.

In retrospect, it was hardly surprising that Makarios did not visit Greece. Greece did not particularly want to have much more to do with Cyprus. Having come perilously close to ruining completely the period of *entente* in the Greco-Turkish relationship, Cyprus had brought to an end a quarter century of close cooperation between the two countries. Indeed, both Greece and Turkey attempted to push Cyprus into the political background. As Woodhouse states,

> 'The interrupted progress of Greece towards a closer integration with the western world was thus resumed. Even with Turkey there was a renewal of friendly exchanges. On the other hand, the Cypriot nationalists were no longer treated as heroes. Grivas cut a ludicrous figure in Greek politics, and Makarios was received with marked coolness on his first visit to Athens as President of Cyprus in 1962.'[65]

In Cyprus, the situation remained nervous. There was still a significant proportion of the Greek Cypriot community for whom *enosis* remained *the* national aspiration. The fact that the EOKA years had brought about independence was as despised as the fact that this same independence had given the Turkish Cypriots a say in the government of the island. The difficulties presented to Makarios by these factions are well expressed by Markides who stated,

> 'One of the most difficult tasks that confronted Makarios from the beginning of independence was controlling the various EOKA guerillas who participated in the anti-British campaign, a problem characteristic of post revolutionary periods. As the heroes of the "revolution" and the architects of the new political order, many of them pressed for special privileges in the form of high government positions or jobs in the civil service commensurate with their rank in the underground. Leading members of EOKA usually aspired to ministerial positions or their equivalent. Dissatisfaction and frustration on the part of this segment of the population would have spelled serious trouble for the government and obstructed the implementation of the fragile agreements that launched Cypriot independence. The problem of appeasing EOKA members was all the more urgent as the goal for which the guerillas fought was not independence but union with Greece. Thus the legitimacy of they accorded to the new state was tentative at most.'[66]

For the Turkish Cypriots the political outcome of the Zürich-London Agreements was considered to be neither extremely good nor extremely bad.[67] As Dodd has put it, 'for the Turkish Cypriots a huge gain was that *enosis* was prohibited. But then so, too, was partition.'[68] Internally however things did certainly appear to be outwardly bright for the Turkish Cypriots. They had been given a role in the government that outweighed their numerical proportion in the population. As 18% of the island's populace they were given 30% of all civil service posts, 40% of all military posts, and at the ministerial level they held three of the ten appointments including one of the three key ministries, namely finance, foreign affairs, and defence.

Therefore the resentment of a large portion of the Greek Cypriot community was not entirely surprising.[69] Although the constitutional framework with its large number of rights granted to the Turkish Cypriot community succeeded in bringing about a Turkish Cypriot acquiescence to majority Greek Cypriot rule, these measures had included a number of details that gave the Turkish Cypriots considerable autonomy, such as the introduction of two communal chambers that took responsibility for

a large number of issues that were directly relevant to each community - matters such as religion and education. More irritating for the Greek Cypriots was the additional elements of the constitution such as the provision that the House of Representatives was forced to seek the agreement of the majority of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members before being able to pass legislation on matters fiscal, electoral or municipal. Furthermore, all legislation was open to veto by either the President or the Vice-President of the Republic. At the same time the constitution had given the Turkish Cypriots the right to veto legislation and governmental action. Thus the Greek Cypriots did not have the decisiveness in the affairs of the island at the unified governmental level that they felt was due to them by virtue of being the overwhelming majority. Given this situation it was unremarkable that the Greek Cypriots soon became resentful of the political bind in which they found themselves. Much of the resentment of certain elements of the Greek Cypriots to this was directed to the planning of violence against the Turkish Cypriots in an attempt to force them out of the political formula. Instrumental in these plans was the Interior Minister, Polykarpos Yiorgadjis, a former senior figure of EOKA.[70] Taking the codename Akritas, he circulated a secret document - the Akritas Plan - that outlined the measures by which the influence of the Turkish Cypriots would gradually be removed from the government.

As these measures were being planned serious political efforts were being made to find a means by which the Greek Cypriot community could alter the constitution in order to reduce, or even eliminate, the role of the Turkish Cypriots. Among the numerous difficulties presented by the Constitution, an opportunity for alteration presented itself with a problem relating to municipal boundaries. Articles 173-177 of the Constitution stated that, 'Provision is made for separate municipalities in the five main towns Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos.' However, such provisions overlooked the geographical realities underlying any attempt to implement such policies adequately. The Greek Cypriots at first approached the Turkish Cypriots with a proposal to introduce unified municipalities with the benefit of safeguards to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and the offer of certain financial incentives. The Turkish Cypriots, holding firm to their conviction that before any such change could be made the separate municipalities had to be instituted rejected such proposals. Makarios, stubbornly,[71] refused to do this and instead began to formulate a plan to change the Constitution as a whole.

The timing of any action to introduce such a plan posed the next problem. After more than a year of negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots over the municipalities issue, Makarios finally decided to approach the Greek Government with his ideas. The Greek Government in their turn advised that Makarios approach the matter delicately. In a secret letter to Makarios in April 1963, the Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas, stressed the geo-political dangers of a breakdown in relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Referring to the plans he stated,

> 'This has the greatest importance for the Nation.
>
> Firstly, in the terribly exposed - and for that reason dangerous - geographical area occupied by Greece, she is not surrounded by many friends. Certainly the security of Greece is not in any way served by the breaking off of her political relations with Turkey, the only neighbour who is also an ally in NATO.'
>
> Secondly, the Holy Ecumenical Throne, for which both we and all foreign churches feel deep respect, and the valued and important Greek Community in Istanbul will face great and serious dangers, which, as events have proved, are not fully averted by the existence of satisfactory texts of international agreements or by any political measures.
>
> Thirdly, other matters which arise as a result of the proximity of the two countries, matters which in their totality assume vital importance for Greece, become unavoidably difficult.'[72]

The position of the Karamanlis government was clear.[73] By this point, however, Makarios, despite Greek

concerns, had made up his mind to push on with presentation of the constitutional amendments. An opportunity came later that year when, on 17 July 1963, the eight year Greek Government of Constantine Karamanlis fell following a constitutional dispute between the Prime Minister and the King. Due to a number of difficulties successive attempts to form a new government proved short lived, and it was not to be until the following February that Greece would have another solid government. The time was now ripe for movement on the constitutional issue.

After the fall of the Karamanlis Government, Makarios almost immediately got to work on drafting a final set of points to present to the Turkish Cypriots and the Guarantor Powers.[74] After seeking advice from Sir Frank Soskice, QC - a former minister under Prime Minister Attlee - on the legality of intervention by one of the Guarantor powers in response to such a change, Makarios was left, on 1 November, with a legal opinion outlining the carefully considered views of this eminent jurist. Simply put, Soskice argued that intervention would not be legal if articles of the Constitution were left unimplemented but that intervention would be justified if constitutional amendments were made that could have a substantive effect as regards the security of the Turkish Cypriots.[75] Despite this Makarios had made up his mind and proceeded to the next stage. After drawing up of specific details he consulted with the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Clark.

The Breakdown of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus

The presentation of the proposals to Clark and his reaction to them has been one of the most controversial points of discussion in modern Cypriot history. Simply stated, the debate revolves around the degree to which the British Government acted in concert with Makarios in his plans to alter the Constitution. What we do know is that even before he had received the opinion of Sir Frank Soskice, Makarios had a meeting with Sir Arthur Clark on 23 October at which they discussed the Archbishop's proposals. Clerides states,

> 'Makarios assessed the reaction of Sir Arthur Clark as very encouraging. When Makarios showed him the working paper I [Clerides] had prepared, his advice was to limit the proposals for amendment to the most urgent issues...Sir Arthur, who represented one of the guarantors, did not express any reservations about the advisability of proposing constitutional amendments or any doubts about the need for amendments. On the contrary, he gave the clear impression that he agreed with the idea and recommended, in order to make them more acceptable to the other side, that the scope of the proposals should be limited.'[76]

On 12 November, Makarios submitted to Clark a list of proposed amendments. Although an unofficial document Clark is widely accepted, though not universally so, to have taken it away and have made handwritten amendments to the text before returning it to Makarios.[77] Just five days later Makarios sent a copy of his amendments to the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, for his inspection prior to an official submission to the Turkish Cypriots and the Guarantor Powers almost two weeks later. No rejection or warning was received and therefore Makarios, on 29 November, submitted officially his plans for a 13-point amendment to the Constitution. The details were as follows:[78]

(1) The right of veto of the President and Vice-President to be abandoned.

(2) The Vice-President to deputise for the President in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

(3) The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not by the Greek or Turkish members respectively.

(4) The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

(5) *The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.*
(6) *Unified municipalities to be established.*
(7) *The administration of justice to be unified.*
(8) *The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.*
(9) *The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a Law.*
(10) *The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.*
(11) *The number of members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from 10 to 5.*
(12) *All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.*
(13) *The Communal Chambers to be abolished and a new system to be devised. (Should the Turkish Community, however, desire to retain its Chamber, such a course should be open to it).*

These changes proved unacceptable to Turkey, and on 11 December it officially replied to Makarios with an outright rejection of the proposal. Despite assurances given by Makarios as to the intention of the amendments to facilitate a smoother working of the Constitution, the plans effectively wiped out Turkish Cypriot political power in the Republic of Cyprus, and almost immediately there was a marked heightening of tensions on the island.

On 19 December, Sir Arthur Clark visited Clerides on his way to the airport to depart for London. According to a memo submitted by Clerides to the Cypriot Government, Clark had remarked on his personal regret that Turkey had been so hasty to reject the plan. At the conclusion of their discussion Clerides notes that Clark stated,

> 'That in the event of clashes and fighting between the two sides, the use of the British forces in Cyprus to restore law and order was totally out of the question, for two reasons: firstly, the British forces in Cyprus were insufficient and would only be used to protect British nationals. Secondly, in the opinion of the British Government, the guarantors are not entitled to intervene in Cyprus without the consent of the Security Council, and this would take time.'[79]

With that clear statement of British policy from the man who supposedly knew the British reaction to Makarios's ideas, Sir Arthur Clark left Cyprus.[80] Two days later, fighting finally broke out between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Summary of Chapter II

Since their first interaction almost a thousand years ago, the relationship between the Greeks and the Turks has often been difficult. In fact it could be argued that since 1071, the peoples of both nations have drawn a certain amount of their identity from the periods of distrust, if not outright hatred, each has held towards the other. Yet in 1930, under the leadership of two of the greatest figures in the history of these two countries, Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Atatürk, an agreement was reached that sought to end the latent, if not manifest, animosity that had, at times, clearly existed between the two nations throughout the centuries. Indeed, for almost twenty five years a cooperative relationship between the two countries began to develop, and with it the roots of a friendship. This culminated in 1952 with both countries being accepted as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. However, in 1954, this improvement was disrupted by events on a small island. This island, Cyprus, had not undergone the process of harmonisation, albeit forced by national homogenisation, that had happened between Greece and Turkey.

On Cyprus the Greeks and the Turks still lived together in an uneasy peace watched over by the imperial governorship of Britain, a period of rule that was challenged by the Greek Cypriots who saw the realisation of *enosis* as being the ultimate result of any move for self-determination within their community. It was this desire of the Greek Cypriots, led by their Archbishop, to break free from this colonial yoke and be allowed self-determination that in 1955 that brought the Turkish and Greek inhabitants of Cyprus into conflict. It was, however, British attempts to retain control that brought the two 'motherlands' of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus - Greece and Turkey - into direct confrontation.

The Zürich-London Agreements, the end result of a four year attempt to rid Cyprus of British rule in favour of *enosis* presented the Greek Cypriots with independence rather than the sought after union with Greece. In recognition of Eden's claim that Britain, Greece and Turkey all had an interest in the island, this independence was granted in such a way as to give each a vested interest and presence in the island. In appeasing Turkish fears of a government in Cyprus determined to pursue *enosis*, extensive political rights were given to the Turkish Cypriots that allowed them a veto on the island's political affairs despite their minority status. For the Turkish Cypriots this was a recognition, perhaps grudgingly by the Greek Cypriots, of their status as partners with the Greek Cypriots in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. To the Greek Cypriots such participation was a problem to be endured until such time as alterations could be made. In November 1963, Makarios judged the time to be right and with scant attention to warnings issued from all quarters he unilaterally proposed constitutional amendments, and in doing so may have acted in collusion with the British High Commissioner.

The rejection of the constitutional changes by the Turkish Government proved to be a catalyst for intercommunal violence. However, as was noted, the end of the anti-colonial EOKA struggle was not the end to the EOKA aspiration for *enosis*. The power sharing agreement that had been forced upon the communities of Cyprus by Britain, Greece and Turkey had, through the Treaty of Guarantee, ruled out the options of both *enosis* and *taksim* as practical realities. This left both communities in a position in which room to manoeuvre was severely limited. For some within the Greek Cypriot community the rejection of constitutional proposals had underlined this. With this in mind, the time was therefore judged to be right by certain hardline elements of the Greek Cypriot community to settle the problem once and for all. A move that would undoubtedly once again embroil Greece, Turkey and Britain in the island of Cyprus.

Endnotes to Chapter II

1. Urquhart, Brian; *A Life in Peace and War*; (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p.199

2. For this section I have relied on a number of texts. See, *inter alia*, Clogg, Richard; *A Concise History of Greece*; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) Lewis, Bernard; *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*; 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) Lewis, Geoffrey; *Modern Turkey*; (New York: Praeger, 1974) Woodhouse, C.M.; *Modern Greece: A Short History*; (London: Faber and Faber, 1991) Zurcher, Erik J.; *Turkey: A Modern History*; (London: Tauris, 1993)

3. In addition to the texts cited above relating to Ottoman history see, Anderson, M.S.; *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*; (London: Macmillan, 1966)

4. The period of attempts to gain independence for Greece is covered in Woodhouse, *op.cit.*, pp.125-156, and it is from this chapter that I have taken a large amount of information.

5. Kinross, Patrick (3rd Baron); *Atatürk: Rebirth of a Nation*; (London: Weidenfeld, 1993) p.155

6. For an excellent account of Atatürk's life and achievements see Kinross; *Atatürk*; *op.cit.* There are also a number of other accounts of Atatürk including Kazancigil, Ali & Ozbudun, Ergun; *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*; (London: C.Hurst, 1981) an account of Atatürk's role in the events leading to Lausanne can be found in Sonyel, Salahi Ramsdan; *Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalist Movement*; (London: Sage Publications, 1975)

7. Verrier, Anthony; *International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World*; (London: Penguin Books, 1981), p.xvii. As noted by Verrier '[t]he Chanak episode is omitted from all accounts of international peacekeeping, probably because of its ebb and flow of threat, deterrence, and negotiation by a commander with persuasive talents appealed more to the pragmatist than the theorist, possibly because the force which deterred Turkish armies near the Dardanelles in the autumn of 1922 was mainly British, although responding to the orders not only of its own but of the French and Italian governments.' *ibid.*

8. Kinross recounts how the Turkish Army, approaching Smyrna, had caused a general panic in among the Greek community. A detachment of marines from HMS King George V, led by Captain Bertram Thesiger, was in the city at the time and when the Turkish Army arrived. The Captain, '[f]oreseeing unnecessary bloodshed, he determined to stop them. Getting between the Greeks and the Turks, he held up his hand, looking, as British eye-witness put it, 'for all the world like a London policeman', feeling none too confident since his white uniform was like that of a Greek naval officer. The Turkish commander, however, halted his men and dismounted. Captain Thesiger went up to him. In awkward French he explained to him that the Allies had landed troops to keep order and that if he would refrain from firing there was little danger of trouble. The Turkish officer, who bore the rank of colonel, replied that he did not intend to fire but wished to enter the city. He suggested doing so by a side street, but the captain advised him to follow the sea-front. He agreed to do this'. Kinross; *Atatürk*; *op.cit.*, pp.320-321. One may undoubtedly question the final outcome, but the means by which it was secured represents a clear case for consideration as peace-keeping. This incident has not, however, to my knowledge ever been cited as such though this may be simply because it has gone unnoticed. As for the captain, he rose to become Admiral Sir Bertram Thesinger. *Ibid.*, p.320n

9. Hale notes that half of the Greek army was wiped out at this battle. Hale, William; *Turkish Politics and the Military*; (London: Routledge, 1994) p.63

10. For an account of the effects of Turkish neutrality see Alexandris, Alexis; 'Turkish Policy towards Greece during the Second World War and its Impact on Greek-Turkish Détente'; *Balkan Studies*, Volume 23, Number 1, 1982

11. A full account of this can be found in Close, David H.; *The Origins of the Greek Civil War*; (London: Longman, 1995). See also the section covering the formation of UNSCOB in Chapter I of this work.

12. The British Government's two memoranda that it was no longer able to continue financing Greece and Turkey were made very suddenly and gave the United States only thirty-eight days to formulate a plan to respond to this. In many ways it marked a major turning point in the international system. As Halle notes, '[w]hat the two notes reported was the final end of the *Pax Britannica*. Now, after two World Wars, Britain had exhausted the last means with which, for almost a century and a half, it had maintained its power and discharged its responsibilities over the wide world.' Halle, Louis J.; *The Cold War as History*; (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971), pp.111-112

13. Kissinger, Henry; *Diplomacy*; (London: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p.451

14. This despite the fact that Turkey, like Portugal, had ended the War with a balance of payments surplus, and thus did not technically qualify for Marshall Aid. Deringil, Selim; 'Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk'; in Dodd, Clement (ed.); *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*; (Huntingdon: Eothen, 1992), p.2

15. Yet Turkey's entry was no easy matter, because it had maintained its neutrality for the greater part of the Second World War there were doubts about its reliability as an ally. As Deringil notes, '[t]he Korean War and active Turkish involvement in it was the price Turkey had to pay to shake off the stigma of unreliability that still hung over her as a result of her wartime policy. There was considerable suspicion, particularly in US and British military circles that, in the event of a Soviet move into Iran and the Arab world, Turkey would allow the Soviets safe passage. The engagement of Turkish troops in Korea dispelled those fears. (The war itself with 1,200 Turkish casualties was not popular in Turkish public opinion.) Despite this high price, Turkey's admission in NATO was anything but a foregone conclusion. Turkish membership was opposed by NATO members such as Norway who felt Turkish involvement would be an over-extension of Nato's commitments.' Deringil in Dodd (ed.); *Turkish Foreign Policy*; *op.cit.*, p.3

16. There are a number of works spanning Cypriot history see, *inter alia*; Alastos, Doros; *Cyprus in History*; (London: Zeno Publishers, 1955) Hill, Sir George; *A History of Cyprus*; 4 Volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952) Hitchens, Christopher; *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*; (New York: The Noonday Press, 1989) Hunt, Sir David (ed.); *Footprints in Cyprus: An Illustrated History*; (London: Trigraph, 1990) Kyrris, Costas P.; *History of Cyprus*; (Nicosia: Proodos, 1988) Salih, Halil Ihbrahim; *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*; (Alabama: Alabama University Press, 1978) Stephens, Robert; *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*; (New York: Pall Mall, 1966) Tornaritis, Criton G.; *Cyprus: Its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems*; 2nd Edition (Nicosia: [n.p.], 1980)

17. Karageorgis places the arrival of the Greeks in Cyprus in the late Bronze Age, around the 14th or 13th centuries BC. Karageorgis, Vassos in Hunt (ed.); *Footprints in Cyprus*; *op.cit.*, p.46

18. The Book of Acts, Chapter 13, verses 1-12.

19. Runciman, Sir Steven in Hunt (ed.); *Footprints in Cyprus*; *op.cit.*, p.142

20. Tornaritis; *Cyprus: Its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems*; *op.cit.*, p.13

21. The events leading up to the change of rule are covered in detail in a number of the historical texts listed above. For a good account see Alastos; *Cyprus in History*; *op.cit.*, pp.214-216

22. Kyrris; *History of Cyprus*; *op.cit.*. This fact is now often hotly denied by Greek Cypriots resentful of any historical implications associated with accusations of complicity with the Turks. Nevertheless, in their defence one must remember that the Ottoman Empire had a unique tolerance towards other religions under the *millet* system and autonomy was given to local churches. From the Greek Orthodox perspective this made the Ottomans a far more favourable option than continued rule by fellow Christians determined to eradicate the Orthodox Church.

23. On the fall of the city, the victorious Ottoman Army behaved in a particularly brutal and callous manner. If the island had resisted a little longer then it may have remained in Venetian hands following the victory of the Holy League over the Ottomans at the Battle of Lepanto, near the Peloponnese, which

effectively checked further Ottoman naval expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean. Hitchens; *Hostage to History*; *op.cit.*, p.1. See also Keegan, John; *A History of Warfare*; (London: Pimlico, 1993), p.67 & p.337

24. Choisi, Jeanette; 'The Turkish Cypriot Elite: Its Social Function and Legitimation'; *The Cyprus Review*, Volume 5, Number 2, p.7

25. *Ibid.*, p.9

26. *Ibid.*

27. Salih; *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*; *op.cit.*, p.7

28. Hitchens; *Hostage to History*; *op.cit.*, pp.35-36

29. Rumours that AKEL refused to participate were stated as being untrue by Mr. Andreas Ziartides, a member of AKEL's politburo at the time, during a personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 20 September 1996.

30. Michaelides, Michael; 'The Turkish Cypriot Working Class and Labour Movement'; *The Cyprus Review*, Volume 5, Number 2, p.47

31. Makarios was in the United States at the time of his election and did not actually return to Cyprus for another two months. Returning via Greece he made a detour to visit the Greek troops fighting the communists in the north of the country. See Crawshaw, Nancy; *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*; (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978) p.46

32. There are three main biographies of Makarios in English. Mayes, Stanley; *Makarios: A Biography*; (New York: St Martin's Press, 1981) Venezis, P.N.; *Makarios: Faith & Power*; (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1971) Vanezis, P.N.; *Makarios: Life & Leadership*; (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1979)

33. The events surrounding the rejection of the matter by the United Nations, and subsequent attempts to have the issue dealt with through the UN are covered by Xydis, Stephen G.; *Cyprus: Conflict and Reconciliation, 1954-1958*; (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1967) This work, and the works of Bitsios, Dimitri S.; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975) Clerides, Glafkos; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; Volume 1 (of 4) (Nicosia: Alithea, 1989) Crawshaw, *op.cit.* Foley, Charles; *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War*; (London: Penguin, 1962) Reddaway, John; *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection*; (London: K Rustem & Brother, 1986) form the main texts around which this section has been built. The accounts of Glafcos Clerides and John Reddaway are particularly important as they were influential figures on opposite sides of the fence throughout the events from 1954-1960. A personal account of the Greek Government's perspective is presented by Dimitri Bitsios. In addition to these 'official' accounts, the work of Charles Foley, who was a journalist based in Cyprus covering the events for the island's English language daily *The Times of Cyprus*, provides perhaps the most graphic detailing of day-to-day life in Cyprus throughout this whole period.

34. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.30

35. Panteli, Stavros; *The Making of Modern Cyprus*; (Nicosia: Interworld, 1990), p.165

36. Andreas Ziartides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 20 September 1996.

37. Hitchens; *Hostage to History*; *op.cit.*, p.38. To understand this we must remember that the communist party was, at this time, banned in Greece. Therefore if Cyprus were to unite with Greece, it would seem logical to conclude that AKEL would also be banned. Dr. Thomas Adams (author of ; *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*; (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1971) Interview, 30 March 1995, Nicosia, Cyprus. It was because of this fear that one author has noted that Britain was ill-advised to have banned AKEL and thus deprive itself of an ally, many of whose members were fairly moderate. See Holland, Robert; 'Never, Never Land: British Colonial Policy and the Roots of the Violence in Cyprus, 1950-54'; *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume XXI, Number 3, September 1993, p.159

38. Panteli; *The Making of Modern Cyprus*; *op.cit.*, p.165. A fact also acknowledged by Salih; *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*; *op.cit.*, p.9

39. An account of the period written from the perspective of British attempts to control the situation in Cyprus during the emergency period, 1955-1959, is the article by Anderson, David M.; 'Policing and Communal Conflict: The Cyprus Emergency, 1954-60'; *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume XXI, Number 3, September 1993. In the article, the author notes that the Commissioner of the Cyprus Police Force admitted that by this point EOKA had met with considerable success in its attempts to infiltrate the force, *ibid.*

40. Accusations made at the time, and subsequently, that Britain was involved in training the Turkish Cypriot militia are firmly rejected by John Reddaway in his book; *Burdened with Cyprus*; *op.cit.*, pp.90-91.

41. Rauf R. Denktaş, Minutes of Evidence; *House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Cyprus, 3rd Report*; (London: HMSO, 1987) p.1

42. Denktaş denied ever having been the leader of either organisation, stating instead that his role had been strictly limited to that of political adviser. The leadership, he said, was made up of former army officers from Turkey. *The Times*, 20 January 1978

43. Rauf Denktaş, Minutes of Evidence, 18 November 1986, *op.cit.*, p.1

44. Eden, Anthony; *Full Circle*; (London: Cassell & Company, 1960) p.415

45. 'The Turkish community on Cyprus was one of the matters İnönü had considered a lost cause in the Lausanne Conference of 1923.' Deringil in Dodd (ed.); *Turkish Foreign Policy*; *op.cit.*, p.5.

46. Tornaritis; *Cyprus: Its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems*; *op.cit.*, p.30

47. Bitsios; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; *op.cit.*, p.29

48. See Markides, Diana Weston; 'Britain's 'New Look' Policy for Cyprus and the Makarios-Harding Talks, January 1955-March 1956'; *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume 23, Number 3, September 1995

49. Eden; *Full Circle*; *op.cit.*, p.405

50. *Ibid.*, p.405

51. The Archbishop was actually on his way to the airport for a trip to Greece when he was arrested, and as Foley recounts, 'From the moment of his arrest Makarios treated the whole affair as a delicious joke, and one which he was thoroughly enjoying. He was interned at Sans Souci, the summer home of the Governor of the Seychelles, a most desirable residence', Foley; *Legacy of* Strife; *op.cit.*, p.49. Despite the lack of progress in the negotiation, it was reported that despite the differences between Makarios and Harding on the constitutional question Makarios actually rather liked Harding in a personal capacity. Senior commentator on Cypriot affairs in private conversation with the author, London, 23 February 1996.

52. Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis; 'Blocking *Enosis*: Britain and the Cyprus Question March-December 1956';*The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume XIX, Number 2, p.248

53. Vanezis; *Makarios: Faith and Power*; *op.cit.*, p.124

54. John Guthrie Ward, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 5 May [1956?], *FO 371/123882/724*, cited in Hatzivassiliou; 'Blocking *Enosis*'; *op.cit.*

55. Claims made that the United Kingdom was trying to engage in a policy of some form of partition in the period preceding Macmillan's accession are rejected on the basis that there has been no documentary evidence produced to substantiate such accusations. See Hatzivassiliou; 'Blocking *Enosis*'; *op.cit.*, p.261

56. Salih; *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*; *op.cit.*, p.12

57. Panteli noted that in the subsequent round of arrests only sixty Turkish Cypriots were held as opposed to two thousand Greek Cypriots. Panteli also highlighted the fact that it was during this period that a number of Turkish Cypriots first moved from their places in Greek Cypriot areas into areas predominantly Turkish Cypriot in composition. This was also matched by the first expulsion of Greek Cypriots from those same Turkish Cypriot areas. Panteli; *The Making of Modern Cyprus*; *op.cit.*, p.180

58. The vote was taken on 16 February 1961, and the resolution was passed by forty-one votes to nine. The supporters of the resolution were the twenty-one members of the Greek Cypriot Patriotic Front, the five AKEL members, and the fifteen Turkish Cypriot members. The nine opposing the resolution were all former EOKA members who had seceded from the Patriotic Front. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, February 11-18, 1961, p.17923

59. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, March 18-25, 1961, p.17987. Makarios desire to normalise relations with the United Kingdom was confirmed by Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, in a personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

60. Dr. Küçük did not want Cyprus to become a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, but Makarios "did not listen to this." Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996. In reply to this Clerides states, 'The decision, however, of the Council of Ministers that Cyprus should follow a non-aligned policy, which, of course, was in conformity with the views of President Makarios and out of line with those of the Vice President, Dr Kutchuk, began to show symptoms of a looming political crisis, which was avoided by Turkey advising Dr Kutchuk not to exercise his veto on the decision of the Council of Ministers and not to proceed with his recourse to the Constitutional Court.' Clerides; *My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.124. Clerides explains this policy by saying that Turkey

felt that if Cyprus were to become a NATO member then any future military action that Turkey would want to take against the Republic 'would have to be cleared with the NATO allies and that would create complications and delays.' *Ibid.*, p.126.

61. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, May 7-14, 1955, p.14181

62. Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

63. Vanezis, *Makarios: Faith and Power*, p.147

64. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

65. Woodhouse; *A Short History of Greece*; *op.cit.*, p.280

66. Markides, Kyriacos C.; *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*; (London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp.87-88

67. Ertekun states that the Turkish Cypriots were in fact "quite happy about the settlement" and that it was the Greeks who did not have their "heart in the agreement". Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

68. Dodd, Clement (ed.); *The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*; (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1993), p.6

69. These feelings were, however, more generally felt by those on the right of the political spectrum. AKEL, although opposed to the Zürich Agreement on the grounds that it placed conditions on the independence of Cyprus and had brought the Turkish Army onto the island, nonetheless felt that it could be made to work. Andreas Ziartides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 20 September 1996.

70. As has been noted, 'by far the most controversial and crucial appointment [made by Makarios to his Government] was that of Polykarpos Georkajis [*sic*] as the republic's first minister of the interior...Makarios allegedly appointed Georkajis because he was in a position to influence and control the various ex-EOKA guerillas who were a potential threat to the state. And so he did...Georkajis, an early convert to the idea of an independent Cyprus, lured potential support away from Grivas to Makarios. In the process of doing so, he became a leader himself with substantial popular support. Georkajis's rise to power caused embarrassment to Makarios, because as head of the Ministry of the Interior Georkajis often acted more like an EOKA section chief than a minister of a democratic republic...Many of the policemen who were hired after independence were former agonistes [co-fighters] and comrades of Georkajis.' Markides; *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*; *op.cit.*, p.91

71. Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

72. English translation appearing in Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.152

73. Although Averoff did seem prepared to broach the matter to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in May at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, the British Foreign Secretary apparently discouraged the idea of such a move, considering Ankara's opposition to any hint of such plans as being moderate. Bitsios; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; *op.cit.*, p.122

74. The information contained in this paragraph is almost wholly drawn from Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, pp.156-177

75. The exact details of the exchange between Glafcos Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives and Legal Adviser to Makarios, and Sir Frank Soskice can be found in Appendix F of Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, pp.445-465. Osman Örek, the Minister of Defence, claims that Makarios had told him that Soskice's view was that the Treaties were not correct under the terms of the United Nations' Charter. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996. If this was true, then this may have prompted the Turkish Cypriots to begin preparations in the event that Makarios attempted to abrogate the Treaties.

76. *Ibid.*, p.166

77. This is almost universally accepted. Clerides says he saw the amendments, Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.170. Bitsios refers to the handwritten amendments, Bitsios; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; *op.cit.*, p.124. See also, Crawshaw; *The Cyprus Revolt*; *op.cit.*, p.366. Stephens; *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*; *op.cit.*, p.179. Polyviou, Polyvios G.; *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980*; ([n.p.]: Duckworth, 1980), p.40. However, Sir David Hunt, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus from 1965, argues that any consultations between Clark and Makarios were done on the basis the Clark was acting as in a purely personal capacity. Reddaway has stated that although such reports have not been officially denied by the British Government, the actual document has never been produced. See Reddaway; *Burdened with Cyprus*; *op.cit.*, p.138. Osman Örek states that he questioned Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, about the whole subject and notes that Sandys, although furious at the insinuation of direct British involvement, did not officially deny the allegation. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

78. Taken from a full reprint of Makarios's letter for 'Suggested Measures to Facilitate the Smooth Functioning of the State and Remove Certain Causes of Inter-Communal Friction', appearing in Appendix F of Salih; *The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*; *op.cit.*, pp.132-143

79. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.195

80. In a final twist to this whole saga the Cypriot historian Chris Economides has noted that there are some who believe that Clark had been deliberately engaged in a campaign to misinform and therefore trap Makarios at the behest of the CIA and British Intelligence. (Chris Economides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 26 March 1996.) If this were true, and it seems a little too conspiratorial (even for Cyprus), then it could well have been the case that Clark had conducted his actions without the knowledge of the British Government.

Chapter III

Involving the Guarantors: The First Month

(21 December 1963-25 January 1964)

Introduction

Following the Turkish Government's rejection of the proposed thirteen-point amendment to the Constitution intercommunal relations on the island became markedly more tense, and by 22 December there were a number of serious clashes centred around Nicosia. After several days the situation still had not calmed and it became apparent that some form of interventionary action was needed in order to curb the fighting. This was done by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom - all of which had a vested interest in halting the events taking place in Cyprus - under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee. The resulting proposal for tripartite military action to try to prevent further fighting was accepted by both Cypriot communities and the Joint Truce Force (JTF) was created. However, the difficult situation on the ground in Cyprus meant that although the Force was tripartite in name, in practice it consisted solely of British troops and the full cooperation of both the Greek and Turkish Army contingents was never entirely realised. Yet, even on their own the British troops calmed the situation significantly. This was assisted by a high-profile visit to Cyprus by the British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, who managed to negotiate a number of agreements between the two communities including the creation of a forum for dialogue to find a political resolution to the situation. In addition a conference in London was convened to which both the Cypriot communities as well as both Greece and Turkey were invited.

At the London Conference the demands of the various parties were seen to be incommensurate with one another. The Greek Cypriots demanded a return to a unitary state with minority safeguards, while the Turkish Cypriots demanded some form of separation between the communities based on a federal system. With the eventual failure of the London Conference the task of the Truce Force became all the more difficult. Further rises in tensions on the island were coupled with the realisation that the role of the Force was no longer short term. However the manpower commitments required for the demands of such an action soon proved to be a major difficulty for the British Government which had other military concerns in, *inter alia*, Africa and Borneo. Yet all options for the creation of some form of international peace-keeping force seemed to be limited. The Commonwealth was deemed unlikely to be able to help, and the involvement of the United Nations posed a serious chance of anti-British interference from both the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian bloc - a factor that the United Kingdom was not prepared to risk given the strategic importance of the Sovereign Base Areas. The difficult nature of the problem eventually led to a Greek suggestion that some form of NATO-based peace-keeping be instituted. This was a plan which was eventually put to the United States, thus heralding a Cold War phase in the Cyprus Crisis.

1. The Beginning of Intercommunal Violence

One cannot be exactly sure of the cause of the outbreak of fighting. There are, however, a number of possible explanations. Most plausible among these was a report featured in a Turkish Cypriot newspaper, *Halkin Sesi*, that the Greek Cypriot leadership, in preparation for possible disturbances, had instituted a number of measures by which they would contain any intercommunal conflict. One of these was reported to be the creation of a number of road blocks to seal off the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia.

In an attempt to ensure that these procedures would be effective, the paper declared that practice exercises were being conducted after midnight within the old Venetian walls of Nicosia.[1] Thus when, on 20 December 1963, Greek Cypriot irregulars within Old Nicosia made a demand to see the identification papers of some Turkish Cypriots,[2] Turkish Cypriot tempers exploded.

At around twenty past three in the morning of 21 December 1963, Greek Cypriot forces engaged Turkish Cypriot irregulars in Nicosia following these alleged incidents earlier in the day. The extent to which this initial fighting had been organised is debatable.[3] However, the result was not. Following the first night's violence the casualty figures were put at two Turkish Cypriots killed, and eight wounded - including both Turkish and Greek Cypriots.[4] As the day progressed there were numerous accounts of sporadic gunfire around the old town, and that a large crowd of Turkish Cypriots were roaming around the streets, several of whom were armed with pistols.[5] Yet, appeals for calm issued both by President Makarios, and Vice-President Küçük, went largely ignored by the conflicting parties, and before long the fighting had spread to several other parts of the city.[6] Soon serious concern was being expressed by the representatives of both the United Kingdom and the United States of America. On 22 December the British acting-High Commissioner, Denis Cleary, and the US Ambassador, Fraser Wilkins, visited Makarios and Küçük to express their 'grave concern' over the situation and to appeal for 'calm and moderation'.[7]

Nevertheless, by the next day fighting was reported in the southern coastal town of Larnaca. Despite the fact that this was soon halted following a meeting held at the offices of the District Officer, the two communities in the town remained armed and hostile to one another.[8] By that evening the violence had also subsided in Nicosia. However, the situation in both places remained extremely tense,[9] and the Greek Cypriots were reported to be in exultant mood over a what they saw as their tactical victories. As one observer noted: '[the h]eadquarters at ex-EOKA club is [a] hive of activity.'[10] Fortunately, at this point it was reported that the other main towns on the island remained quiet.

By 24 December, it became clear to all that the situation was more serious than had at first been realised. The lull in violence that had occurred in Nicosia overnight erupted once again with heavy attacks being made on Greek Cypriot families living in the primarily Turkish Cypriot suburb of Omorphita, to the north of the city.[11] In addition, Famagusta, quiet until this point, had also seen a limited bout of intercommunal fighting as Turkish Cypriot gendarmes attempted to capture the headquarters of the gendarmerie. However, this limited action did not seem to be indicative of the general mood in the city - which had a Turkish Cypriot District Officer[12] - as there was still free movement of Turkish Cypriots within the Greek Cypriot quarter.[13] Likewise in Kyrenia, following a meeting at the office of the District commissioner, a 'peace pact' was announced between the town's Turkish and Greek inhabitants.[14]

Nonetheless, by this point London seemed to have become seriously concerned about the situation in Cyprus. Although the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou - who was then in London for a scheduled meeting of the Guarantor Powers - said, on 23 December, that the United Kingdom regarded the matter as being an 'internal affair',[15] by the next day this previously held view had apparently changed. Kyprianou was invited to the Commonwealth Office, where he met with several British Government ministers to discuss the events in the island.[16]

Yet such concern was not wholly limited to London. In Athens the Greek Government was becoming worried at the course events were taking, and in Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Erkin, had meetings with both the US Ambassador, Raymond Hare, and the Soviet Ambassador, Nikita Ryzhov, at which he alleged that genocide was being committed against the Turkish Cypriots. This was supplemented on the diplomatic front by the Turkish President, Cemal Gürsel, who issued appeals to Queen Elizabeth, King Paul of Greece, and Presidents Johnson, de Gaulle, and Luebke asking for their help in halting the fighting. In the text of his letter, presented in French, he placed the blame firmly at the door of the Greek Cypriots stating, *inter alia*,

> 'A Chypre des bandes de terroristes Chypriotes Grecs déchaînés aidés par des forces régulières de l'ordre composées également de Grecs Chypriotes se livrent en application d'un plan pré-établi à des atrocités sans nom contre les Turcs de Chypre sans discriminer femmes et enfants. Ces attaques barbares que se poursuivant avec une intensité croissante depuis le 21 Décembre vendredi soir ont pris l'ampleur d'un veritable génocide qui vise l'anéantissement de la communauté Turque Chypriote.'[17]

2. The Guarantor Powers Become Involved

With the breakdown of the cease-fire in Nicosia and a further increase in fighting on 24 December, the three Governments finally decided to act and issued:

> 'a joint appeal to the Government of Cyprus and the Greek and Turkish communities in the island to put an end to the disorders. The three Governments further offered their joint good offices to help resolve the difficulties which had given rise to the present situation.'[18]

Yet the Turkish Government's pressure did not stop at this.[19] At two o'clock in the afternoon of Christmas Day 1963, they sent three jet fighters to fly at low level over Nicosia.[20] As this was happening a large number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots clashed around the village of Günyeli, just north of Nicosia, on the strategically important Kyrenia road.[21] Both of which actions prompted Greek Cypriot fears that a Turkish invasion was imminent. With the fighting showing no signs of abating, the situation on the island seemed to have reached a decisive moment. The appeal of the Guarantor Powers had obviously failed to restore calm. As the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, noted of the situation:

> 'When it became clear that this appeal had failed, the three Guaranteeing Powers, on 25th December, informed the Government of Cyprus of their readiness to intervene, if invited to do so, to restore order, by means of a Joint Intervention Force, under British command, and composed of the forces of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey stationed in Cyprus.'[22]

With this offer to the Republic of Cyprus, Douglas-Home cut short his Christmas holiday in Scotland to return to London. Upon his arrival he called a meeting of a number of British Government ministers concerned to discuss the nature of the proposed intervention.[23] Following the cabinet meeting, a Prime Ministerial statement was released outlining the arrangements for the formation the tripartite force and stating the United Kingdom's input.

However, this decision was firmly opposed by the Labour Party, which interpreted such British actions as being fraught with danger - a sentiment clearly expressed during a meeting between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the shadow Foreign Secretary, Mr. Gordon Walker. After the meeting, the Labour Party stated that they felt, 'that the problem should be put before the UN, and expressed opposition to the use of British Troops in a police action.'[24] However, the decision had been already been taken by the Government and the United Kingdom was now committed. The question is why did the Government choose to take on such a role?

The British Reasons for Tripartite Intervention

The reasons for British involvement are not complicated. Indeed, they can indeed by reduced to reasons of direct national and strategic interests devolved from the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's), and from a direct concern that by not intervening as a Guarantor Power, then Britain was leaving the situation to

develop into something more serious if, or perhaps when, the other two Guarantor Powers, Greece and Turkey, chose to become involved.

In a 2 January memorandum, the Prime Minister informed the Cabinet of the reasons by which the British Government took the decision to become involved, he lay a heavy emphasis on the latter point - that of the effect on Greco-Turkish relations by not intervening. In his words the Prime Minister stated:

> 'I have not called the Cabinet together over Christmas and the New Year because the decisions which the Ministers most concerned had to take were related to whether or not we should accept a role which we were pressed to undertake by the Greek and Turkish Governments and the two communities in Cyprus. We saw no alternative to doing so if widespread civil war was to be averted which would inevitably have spread to Greece and Turkey.'[25]

In addition to this important explanation, there was also the national interest reason as to why the British Government should have chosen to take on board the responsibility of conducting a military action in Cyprus. First, there were a large number of British nationals, mainly attached to the military, resident in areas outside of the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). In fact, the total number was put at 15, 661.[26] In addition there were around five hundred nationals of what were called 'friendly states'[27] which the British Government evidently felt it had a duty to protect. However, this does not explain adequately why such a large and potentially hasardous operation was undertaken. If it had simply been a matter of protecting these civilians - who were mainly congregated in Greek Cypriot areas[28] - it would arguably have been far easier to move them into the Sovereign Bases or even to have evacuated them from the island altogether.[29]

The underlying reason for the offer to enter the Republic rather than withdraw into the Bases is perhaps best found by analysing the strategic role of the Sovereign Bases themselves. As was noted in Chapter II, these had been conceded to Britain in the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. In addition to the Sovereign Bases, the United Kingdom had also retained a number of sites that although they were within the Republic of Cyprus were used by the British Forces. The strategic importance of all these facilities was stated in a minute written, on 28 December, by the Minister of Defence:

> 'As I see it, at the moment, we have three main reasons to maintain a military base in Cyprus. Firstly, as a base for nuclear operations in support of CENTO in the area of the Russian/Turkish and Russian/Iranian frontiers. Secondly, as a staging post in the Near East particularly as a back-up should our free use of El Adem be restricted. Thirdly, as an advance base from which to supply United Kingdom Base Forces should they be committed to operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. For example, intervention in Jordan or Libya would be largely supplied from a stockpile located in the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus.'[30]

For the British Government there was undoubtedly a fear that any major change in the balance of power on the island could lead to either a political or military attack on the SBAs by the Greek Cypriots - for many of whom the Bases continued to represent an invasive presence on the island - during, or in the aftermath of, intercommunal fighting. It therefore seemed a logical move by the British Government to intervene in a proactive way in order to forestall any such fighting, and therefore preserve the delicate balance of power on the island. This would, in turn, protect the political foundations upon which the Bases existed. This whole thinking is best summarised, although perhaps over exagerated, by Anthony Verrier, a journalist covering the events at the time who stated,

> '...it is essential to correct a general impression that the British forces are in Cyprus solely to keep the peace. They are not. They are there first and foremost to preserve Britain's strategic

interests on the island, which, through bases and other installations, provide in theory the facilities for operations in the Middle and Far East. Since these interests cannot be preserved while the island is in ferment, the garrison, reinforced from the United Kingdom, has perforce switched to internal-security duties.'[31]

The Greek and Turkish Reasons for Tripartite Intervention

For the Turkish Government the idea for a tripartite force rather than an immediate unilateral action was certainly a good step forward. Given that the issue of Cyprus had proved to be emotive throughout the latter part of the previous decade when the EOKA campaign had brought the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to the verge of civil war, public opinion in Turkey tended to play an important role in shaping government policy on the issue of Cyprus. Indeed, there had been a number of large-scale student demonstrations during the first week or the crisis,[32] and although these passed off calmly for the most part, [33] the fact remained that the Turkish Government was being pushed to provide a means of protecting the Turkish Cypriots if the situation got so bad as to warrant such action. Indeed, there were a number of significant Turkish military actions that seemed to point to a general mobilisation.[34] Yet a commitment to go to war is, for any country, a dangerous course to take. To this extent, the joint intervention plan provided the Turks with an opportunity to avert a direct conflict and still be able to protect the Turkish Cypriots. It was perhaps with both of these courses in the balance, that Prime Minister İnönü held a meeting attended by, amongst others, the Chief of the General Staff, General Cevdet Sunay, and several other senior military commanders.[35] The result of this discussion was the support of the Turkish Government for the intervention action coupled with continued planning for an unilateral intervention if the tripartite plan failed.

At the same time there was a similar meeting in Athens of the Supreme Defence Council, at which Crown Prince Constantine chaired a session comprised of the joint service chiefs and leading ministers.[36] The primary Greek concern lay not with Cyprus *per se*, but with the effects of a possible Turkish action to intervene on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. An action that would necessarily require a Greek counter offensive in favour of the Greek Cypriots. Yet although the Greek Government wanted to take a moderate tone on the issue,[37] there was a degree of public feeling that wanted a more robust Greek approach. In the northern Greek city of Thessalonica, around a thousand Greek students demonstrated carrying placards saying '*Cyprus is Greek*' and '*Get out of Cyprus, Turkish Barbarians*'.[38] Although the issue of the joint intervention was discussed, the fears of a Turkish invasion were undoubtedly prominent in the minds of the Greek officials. Allegations of a Turkish mobilisation had proved a matter of great concern for the Foreign Minister Venizelos, as had a rumour that Turkish warships had been sighted off the coast of Cyprus - a worry communicated to the Ambassadors of both the United States and the United Kingdom.[39] However, and in line with Turkey, the Greek Government decided to adopt the plan for joint intervention at this stage in the hope that there would be no need to enter into direct conflict with Turkey.

Archbishop Makarios Accepts the Guarantor Power Intervention

Despite the fact that the proposal for tripartite intervention had been agreed to in London, Ankara and Athens, and that it had been put to the Government of Cyprus in unison by the three Guarantor Powers, the Greek Cypriot community was not quick to respond.[i] However, by the following day, 26 December,

[i] Although the Greek Cypriots maintained that they represented the Government of Cyprus at this point, the political situation had reached a stage where the central government of the island consisted almost solely of Greek Cypriots, and was no longer recognised by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In

an answer was needed. The fighting on the island was still continuing and Turkey was undoubtedly investigating the possibility of unilateral military action. [40] With this in mind, Makarios finally approached the British Government on the subject of the intervention, but before he gave his answer the Archbishop placed a single condition on the granting of his permission - that the command of the force would indeed be in the hands of a British General officer rather than vested in either a Greek or a Turk.[41] Thus 'fearing a Turkish invasion Makarios reluctantly agreed' to the proposed Joint Intervention Force.[42]

In line with the condition that the force would be commanded by a British officer, it was agreed that command should be placed in the hands of the commander of the British Army units in the Sovereign Base Areas, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Cyprus District, Major-General Peter Young.[43] In addition, Group Captain Campbell, Commander of the RAF station in Nicosia, was appointed as Deputy Commander of the Force. As such Campbell was detailed to work with the commanders of the Greek and Turkish contingents to the force, namely Colonels Tzouvelekis and Evsoz, to ensure full tripartite cooperation. However there was a problem insofar as neither the Greek nor the Turkish contingents were in their camps.[44] The Turkish troop contingent had withdrawn from their barracks on Christmas day,[45] and had been involved not only in fortifying Turkish Cypriot positions, but had also actively engaged in battles with Greek Cypriots, most notably around the village of Ortaköy to the north of Nicosia.[46] However, the Greek forces, which had also taken part in clashes, were soon persuaded to return to their barracks.[47] Yet this did not, however, mean that the Greeks were now willing, or necessarily able, to engage in the Truce Force operation. Greek participation in the force without a corresponding Turkish presence was seen as politically unacceptable. With the start of operations only hours away, it was clear that the force would begin its duties comprised solely of British troops.

3. The Joint Truce Force Begins Its Operation

Despite this drawback with regard to the numbers available for the task in Cyprus, in the early hours of the morning of 27 December the first British units serving in what was called the 'Joint Truce Force' (JTF) left their bases to take up their positions in Nicosia. In a ministerial statement released later, it was announced that the three regiments deployed for the task were the 1st Gloucesters (*the Glosters*), the 3rd Green Jackets, and the RAF Regiment.[48] Almost immediately the new role undertaken by these troops placed a severe strain of the personnel requirements for the SBAs which were primarily British military establishments. The manpower requirements of the SBAs meant that the units deployed with the JTF were replaced, in the first instance - and in accordance with previous plans - with the 1st Foresters who were flown out from the Strategic Reserve in Britain the same day.[49] At the same time, an armoured squadron of 14th/20th Hussars flew into Cyprus from their headquarters near Benghazi in Libya.

The same morning as the soldiers left the SBAs, *The Cyprus Mail* led with the headline *'Police Action to Restore the Peace'*,[50] under which it wrote: 'Britain, Greece and Turkey have decided to intervene jointly in Cyprus, with the full approval of both President Makarios and Dr. Kuchuk [*sic*], to enforce a ceasefire and restore peace and order in Nicosia.'[51] In addition to widespread newspaper coverage, throughout the morning an announcement was broadcast, in Greek, every fifteen minutes on the state radio station stating:

> 'General Young, commanding forces which will assist the Government of [the] Republic in its efforts to preserve the cease fire and restore peace had a meeting with His Beatitude and Minister of Interior late last night when view[s were] exchanged on best way to deal with situation. [It

order to minimise any confusion, I will henceforth refer to 'Greek Cypriots' and 'Turkish Cypriots', rather than the 'Government of Cyprus' and the 'Turkish Cypriots'. However Cypriots - both Greek and Turkish - who had been Government ministers will retain their titles.

> was] Agreed that forces under General's command will start patrolling in certain areas today. The public is called upon to be helpful so that task of forces assisting in restoration of law and order may effectively be achieved.'[52]

However, for the Greek Cypriots the matter of the acceptance of the tripartite intervention was a potentially explosive political issue. After the initial announcement of the deployment of the British troops in the Republic, Dr. Dervis, the leader of the staunchly anti-Treaty of Guarantee opposition Democratic Union Party,[53] cabled Makarios with the following statement:

> 'We are astonished that you have accepted intervention of Guaranteeing Powers, while the other day you declared that the Treaty of Guarantee was invalid...Acceptance of such intervention is a direct blow to the recourse to the Security Council and creates even greater dangers for the present and future of the Cypriot people. The only correct solution is recourse to the United Nations demanding self-determination.'[54]

Yet despite this minority voice of concern,[55] there can be no question that the fact that the majority of Greek Cypriots, and the Greek Cypriot leadership - worried that events had got out of hand and were posing a serious risk of Turkish action - supported the British/Tripartite action in Cyprus.[56]

Within hours of the green light from Makarios, all the units marked for duty had arrived in Nicosia and were in place at various points in the city. In addition to its function as a tool by which to maintain peace and order, the Truce Force was also detailed to develop a humanitarian function. Evidence of this could be seen almost immediately after the JTF deployed, when a British medical team, under an RAF Group Captain, entered into the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia to treat the large number of wounded[57] that had accumulated during the six days of bloody fighting in which both communities had suffered significant casualties.[58] Yet on the first day the dangers on the island were graphically highlighted to the Force by two particular incidents. In the first case a patrol that was ferrying a Greek Cypriot woman to hospital was stopped by Turkish Cypriot irregulars and the woman's husband was kidnapped.[59] The second incident occurred when a British patrol in Larnaca wandered into the firing line of a battle between Greek and Turkish Cypriot irregulars, with the result that one British soldier was wounded in the cross fire.[60]

However, hopes that the Force might expand and develop along tripartite lines, thus relieving the burden on the United Kingdom, did not seem to have any foundation. Only a few senior Turkish officers were available, and, despite orders to obey the command of General Young, it still appeared to be the case that the commander of the Turkish contingent was referring everything back to Ankara.[61] In addition, the continued absence of the Turkish contingent prevented the integration of the Greek contingent into the Force. Although the intervention had resulted in an 'immediate sense of relief' within the Greek Government that Cyprus had been 'pacified',[62] the general political support for the tripartite intervention,[63] and the Greek Government's commitment to steering as restrained course as possible, [64] was being endangered by the failure of the Turkish contingent to report back to their camp. With this in mind it was decided that any remaining Turkish and Greek troops either available, or able, would act as liaisons officers and interpreters between the Truce Force, combatants, and civilians. Yet even this reduced participation could only be implemented when an opportunity for such an integration availed itself.

Despite this drawback of numbers, within hours of the Truce Force's deployment the situation on the island had improved. Although there were still reports of a number of sporadic incidents of firing, and that Greek irregulars were continuing to fortify places that had previously been abandoned, there was nonetheless a feeling of optimism detectable in British communications.[65] On 28 December, the day following the appearance of the Force, General Young assessed the situation:

> 'Except for one or two regrettable incidents today, the overall situation has greatly improved...The Greek Cypriot side have moved out of certain areas and British troops are now located in these positions...Further posts will be taken over tomorrow as part of a general measure for the relaxation of tension.'[66]

In view of the risk of Turkish military action, a public comment from Prime Minister İnönü about this change for the better must have come as a relief to the Greek Cypriots as well as the Governments of the United Kingdom and Greece.[67] In addition, and perhaps more importantly in light of the operational environment within which the JTF was working, the Greek Cypriot leadership had accepted the military value of the British action. Indeed, within a day of the British troops having begun their operation, the Greek Cypriots stated that they, '[c]onsidered the first days activity as designed by Commander Joint Forces was excellent and they would like to see a gradual enlargement of the patrol activity based on the first days pattern.'[68]

With this positive development, General Young called for an exchange of prisoners, refugees, and hostages, as well as the negotiation of an accord for daily contact to be made between Greek, Turkish, and British Force commanders. This finally led to the partial integration of Greek and Turkish troops into the Joint Truce Force, although this was, as stated above, only at the liaison level. However, even with this improvement, the dangers inherent in the situation were once again impressed upon the British troops that same day as they came under fire from Turkish Cypriots. Although there were no reported injuries, it served once again to emphasise the difficulties that were being faced. At the same time as this was occurring there were a number of reports reaching the Greek Cypriots that warships of the Turkish Navy were between fifteen and twenty miles off the Cyprus coast.[69]

4. The First Security Council Debate

On the 27 December, rumours began to filter through that the Cypriot Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Zenon Rossides, was trying to involve the United Nations in the events in Cyprus, with a view to the possibility of a United Nations peace-keeping force being put together. Indeed, Rossides had even approached the Secretary-General of the Organisation, U Thant, with such a suggestion. In a report sent to London by Sir Patrick Dean, the British Permanent Representative to the Organisation, the main points of the Rossides-Thant conversation were cited as follows:

> 'Rossides' first proposal was that a contingent from UNEF should be transferred to Cyprus. U Thant had told him that this was quite impossible. UNEF had a particular mandate and the troops could not be transferred elsewhere without (gp undec) [*sic*] authority and it was in any case very unlikely that those countries from which the contingents were drawn would agree. Rossides appeared to accept this, but then suggested a United Nations presence. U Thant told him that this could take one of two forms, either something on the lines of the Graham Mission in Kashmir following a Security Council resolution, or a presence like that of Spinelli in Yemen, which had been made possible after informal consultation with members of the Security Council but mainly because the parties concerned were prepared to meet the cost...U Thant had then asked Rossides what the United Nations representative would be supposed to do. Rossides had in mind that he should study the constitution and presumably report on its implementation. He had been told, however, that this, too, was quite impossible and that the most a United Nations representative could properly do would be to observe the general situation and report to the Secretary General...U Thant told me at the end of our discussion that he personally was against the whole idea of United Nations involvement, and it was very hard to see what useful purpose it would serve.'[70]

However the reported Turkish military build-up finally moved the Greek Cypriot Representative to decide to have the matter of Turkey's military actions addressed by the Security Council.[71] At four o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1963, Rossides, acting on his own initiative,[72] addressed a letter to the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson - the President of the Security Council - in which he wrote of, 'intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus by the threat and use of force against its territorial integrity and political independence.'[73]

The Turkish Government expressed immediate concern about this move. After summoning the British Ambassador, Sir Denis Allen, to his office, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Erkin, made clear that the letter 'was impossible to reconcile with the present situation in which Turkey was one of the three powers invited by the Cyprus Government to restore order there.'[74] In writing back to London, Allen stated that,

> 'The Turkish Government earnestly hoped we would use our influence to persuade the Cyprus Government to withdraw the letter as no longer consistent with the existing situation. Failing that, the second best would be to avoid any meeting of the Security Council, in which case Turkish Government would no doubt have to make an answer in writing to M. Rossides charges but open debate could be avoided.'[75]

The United Kingdom, choosing to accept the Turkish point obviously viewed the Greek Cypriot allegations as being without merit. This was especially so given latest reports on the position of Turkish naval vessels, which were shown not to be in a threatening position.[76] With this in mind a British official approached the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, in an attempt to have him call off the Security Council meeting. Kyprianou, however, seemed less than sure as to whether this could be done.[77] Therefore the British Government informed Dean, that in the event that the matter came before the Security Council and that he was required to take a line, his position '...should be that there is no (repeat no) evidence that the Turkish naval force is making for Cyprus. There is a Turkish port at Iskenderun and ships making for there would have to pass close to Cypriot coast.'[78]

Despite this, the Greek Cypriots held to their position and the debate was eventually scheduled for that night. When the meeting began, the Turkish permanent representative at the United Nations, Adnan Kural, denied aggressive intent.[79] The fact that the vessels in question were travelling away from Cyprus seems to have convinced the Council, and the meeting was adjourned without producing any specific plan of action.[80] With this, the United Nations option was, at this stage, closed. Yet despite the Turkish account - and the earlier views of the United Kingdom - there were a number of telegrams sent to London at the end of December 1963 that expressed serious concern at the extent to which the Turkish armed forces were mobilising.[81] For example in a secret United Kingdom Security Warning, the situation was reported as follows:

> '1. The following appear to be indications of a Turkish build up on the South Coast. General Tural Martial Law Cdr Ankara but also Cdr 2nd Army went to Iskenderun 23rd and is still believed to be there. He inspected units 39 Inf Div and addressed Senior Officers.
>
> (b.) 39 Inf Div is reported to be at readiness and to have been issued with maps of Cyprus. Twelve to fifteen truckloads of soldiers passed through Adana to Iskenderun at 2100 hrs. 25th
>
> (c.) At 1455 25th fifteen F84s and three C47s arrived Incerlik from Diyarbakir. They had no unusual armament eleven were parked and four placed on alert. On 26th two F86s and two more C47s arrived. Five F84s were then placed on alert each armed with nose guns and four rockets The programme for sorties is extensive including Cyprus area.
>
> (d.) Reputed small concentration of Naval vessels at Mersin. Unconfirmed reports of

> Naval movements have been received. Of these most credible are that five submarines are near Cos Island and that two destroyers are off the South Coast of Turkey.
> (2) Most Turkish Officers invited to a party by US AMA on 26th turned up, my US colleagues got the impression that Turks are still determined on unilateral action in Cyprus if they consider it necessary.'[82]

Turkey, apparently realising the concern, engaged in a number of diplomatic moves to make it clear to the United Kingdom that despite the fact that it was conducting certain precautionary military build-ups in Iskenderun it was not necessarily going to proceed with a military intervention, but was instead aimed at providing 'moral support' for the Turkish Cypriots.[83] However the thought that Turkey might act unilaterally if the situation deteriorated had raised some interesting questions. In a meeting between Sir Denis Allen and Foreign Minister Erkin in Ankara on 29 December, the Turkish Foreign Minister raised the question as to whether an action taken by one of the Guarantor Powers in Cyprus would have to be opposed by another.[84] The Turkish view was that,

> 'They [the Turkish Government] considered that the reservation in the Treaty of the right of individual action by any one of the guaranteeing powers implied a clear obligation on the part of the other guaranteeing powers not to obstruct that action. Otherwise the provision was meaningless...Happily, with the agreement on the tripartite force, the necessity for such action had not arisen. But it nevertheless seemed to him urgently necessary...to clarify the matter, which risked creating serious misunderstandings between us. He hoped we agreed with the Turkish Government's interpretation.'[85]

The United Kingdom interpreted this statement as a dangerous signal. A decision was therefore taken that from this point on '...all communication with our Ambassador [is to be] done through the Foreign Office because we know how sensitive the Turks are...[it] would be healthy...I think to make a further offer through the Private Office that we are always available at any hour of the day or night to make communications to the Greeks or Turks.'[86]

5. The Arrival of the Commonwealth Secretary

It what appeared to be another signal of the importance attached by the United Kingdom to the developments in Cyprus the British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, arrived on the island on 28 December. And following separate meetings with both President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük,[87] as well as meetings with both the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors, Sandys was able to announce the formation of a political liaison committee.[88] This arrangement was arrived at in order to facilitate intercommunal cease-fire agreements and to try to ensure future cooperation between the Truce Force, the Greek and Turkish army contingents, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was decided that the members of the Committee would be the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors - Delivanis and Ozkol - both of whom would be assisted by a counsellor. For the Greek Cypriots the President of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, and a Greek Cypriot Minister, Polykarpos Yiorgadjis, would attend. For the Turkish Cypriots Osman Örek, the Minister of Defence, Rauf R. Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, and Halit Ali Riza, a member of the House of Representatives would be present. Furthermore, General Young and the commanders of the Greek and Turkish contingents were also invited to attend. It was also decided that the first meeting would be chaired by Sandys personally, later sessions would be chaired by Cyril Pickard, an official from the Commonwealth Relations Office.

The first meeting of this Committee took place the next day. At ten in the morning of 29

December the Committee met at the British High Commissioner's residence in Shakespeare Street just within the Turkish quarter of the city. At the end of a twelve hour session a seven point plan was arrived at that consisted of:[89]

> *1. Arrangements to ensure the complete freedom of movement of British patrols in both sectors of Nicosia.*
> *2. The withdrawal of Greek and Turkish Cypriot fighters from strongpoints on either side of the cease-fire line and their replacement by British troops. Thereby creating a neutral zone.*
> *3. Arrangements for the removal of Turkish dead and wounded from the Omorphita area.*
> *4. The exchange of refugees and hostages by both sides.*
> *5. The re-establishment of the telephone system between Nicosia and Kyrenia, thought to have been cut by Turkish Cypriots.*
> *6. The re-establishment of postal services in the Turkish sector of Nicosia.*
> *7. The possibility of restarting Turkish broadcasts, and steps to secure more objective presentation of news in both languages.*

Following another discussion with Greek and Turkish Cypriot military commanders,[90] Sandys also managed to gain the official and working acceptance for the second point - the creation of an officially recognised cease-fire line manned by British troops.[91] In line with the fourth point, the next day the Truce Force supervised the exchange of a large number of hostages in Nicosia, at which the Greek Cypriots released five hundred and forty six Turkish Cypriots, and the Turkish Cypriots released twenty six Greeks that they had been holding. This was further supplemented on 3 January when the Turkish Cypriots released another thirteen Greeks.[92]

Considering the successes of the Truce Force in reducing tensions on the island, another attempt was made to try to induce the Turkish contingent to return to barracks and come under the command of General Young. Indeed, following a meeting in Ankara between Erkin, İnönü, and General Sunay, a telegram was sent to the Commonwealth Secretary, via London, in which the Turkish Government assured Sandys,

> 'that they all agreed that the Turkish unit must accept the orders of General Young. Moreover, they are prepared to agree that Turkish unit should move from its present situation but only when a British unit is ready to take over from them. Reason for this is fear that if any incidents against Turks took place after move of Turkish unit reactions here would be very severe and confidence in ourselves [British] badly shaken. In present state of Turkish opinion there is truth to this.'[93]

Therefore further British troops were needed in order to maintain an adequate presence and hopefully persuade the Turkish troops to return to their camp. On 1 January 1964, six hundred men of the 2nd Artillery Regiment left for duty in Cyprus as infantry leaving their field guns behind in the UK.[94] In addition to this, the headquarters of the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade was moved to Cyprus as was a battalion of parachute troops.[95] Already, however, there were concerns expressed that the manpower stretch being imposed on the British army by undertaking the operation in Cyprus would result in a need to draw in extra troops from the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR).[96] A factor made all the more difficult due to the fact that Britain was also committed to a military presence in both Aden, and in Malaysian Borneo.[97]

Attempts made by President Makarios to abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee

However, no easing of the British presence in Cyprus could be envisaged until the overall political situation was addressed. As if to highlight the need for intercommunal dialogue over the future of

Cyprus, a potentially dangerous situation was created when, on the evening of the 30 December, Foreign Minister Kyprianou laid out a three point plan for future Greek and Turkish Cypriot relations. First he made it clear that the majority must rule, second, that this must include a means by which to safeguard the minority. The third, and perhaps most controversial point, was a plan to cut the treaty links with Greece and Turkey, and confine any future treaty links to the United Kingdom alone.[98] Justifying this he made mention of the fact that Cyprus, as a Commonwealth country, should naturally look to the United Kingdom - 'the leading country.'[99]

This idea, in which the original Treaty of Guarantee would be abrogated and a new treaty negotiated between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom without either Greece or Turkey being included, had first been put forward by Kyprianou during a meeting with the Duke of Devonshire on 23 December 1963.[100] However, this time the proposal was made by Makarios personally, but was rejected by the British Government. The reasons are explained in an internal British Government memorandum:[101]

> '(a) A bilateral treaty enshrining any form of guarantee of the internal regime in Cyprus would in the event of future disturbances between the communities impose on us the sole responsibility for intervening to restore law and order and protect innocent lives. This would clearly be a most unsatisfactory position.
> (b) The Turkish Government would almost certainly regard such a solution as providing an insufficient safeguard for the protection of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. Since the beginning of the dispute we have been hard put to it to convince the Turks that the measures we were taking were adequate to meet the requirements of the situation and in particular to safeguard Turkish lives. In these circumstances they would almost certainly think that they could not in every case count on us in any future dispute, if the responsibility for preserving the internal regime rested on us alone, to intervene effectively. Any appearance on our part of favouring a bilateral treaty would therefore almost certainly be interpreted as support for the position of the Greek Cypriot community, and, as a result, damage our relations with the Turkish Government.'[102]

Nevertheless, Makarios seemed intent on following the path of abrogating the Treaty. To this end he sent a telegram to all the world's heads of state, except those of the three Guarantor Powers, in which he stated that the Treaty of Guarantee had henceforth been abrogated.[103] Sandys, on receiving this news, immediately went to see Makarios and told him that should he be serious in this statement then he could expect to bear the consequences of the Turkish reaction. Following a two hour meeting,[104] Makarios clarified that due to a translation error from the Greek the term 'abrogate' should have read: 'desire to secure the termination of these Treaties by appropriate means'.[105] A crisis was therefore averted.

However, the continuing matter of the integration of the Turkish contingent into the JTF was still a major source of friction between the Guarantor Powers. Although the United Kingdom had been attempting to handle the matter by diplomatic means, the Greeks seemed to want a more forceful approach. To them it was a subject of considerable importance, even to the point that if the Turkish contingent were not forced to come under British command then neither could the Greek contingent be expected to obey General Young - a fact communicated by the Greeks to the British Military Attaché in Athens.[106] (However, the Greek Chief of Staff, General Pipilis, later withdrew this threat.) It was obviously the case that both the Turkish military build-up in Iskenderun and the failure of the Turkish contingent to come under the effective military control of General Young rankled with the Greek Government. However, and despite this grievance, the Greek Government did choose to cooperate fully with the British Government on the question of the scheduled relief of Greek soldiers serving with the Greek contingent in Cyprus. This operation, due to have taken place at the end of December, was delayed following British concerns that it may be interpreted by both the Turkish Cypriots as well as the Turkish

Government as being a ploy by which to bolster the Greek army presence on the island.[107] With the United Kingdom working as hard as possible to prevent these two issues from overflowing into wider Greek-Turkish affairs, plans were also made to provide a full briefing to the incoming caretaker government of Greece[108] - created under the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece, John Paraskevopoulos - that was to be sworn in on 31 December.[109]

However the Greek Cypriots were proving to be less willing to accept the United Kingdom's approach with regard to the continued failure of the Turkish contingent to report for duty. A statement from the Greek Cypriots alleged that the Turkish contingent were simply disregarding the orders of General Young by remaining placed outside of their barracks.[110] In reply to these claims, which were undoubtedly designed to disrupt the integrity of the military relationship between the British and Turkish contingents in Cyprus, General Young sent a diplomatically phrased letter directly to the commander of the Turkish contingent in order to allay possible fears that the Turkish commander may have had about some form of 'alliance' between the Truce Force and the Greek Cypriots. In it he said:

> 'Makarios has made a statement to the effect that you declined to obey my orders. I would like you to know that the statement is completely in conflict with the truth. To-day I assured our Ambassador in Ankara that with you I have been working in complete cooperation.'[111]

Yet, the absence of the Turkish contingent was a direct result of the their perceived need to assist the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek Cypriots. However, the military hostilities were, after all, symptoms and not causes of the inter-communal differences. The fact that the two parties had now been separated in a geographical sense, the Turkish Cypriots in northern Nicosia, and the Greek Cypriots in the south of the city, did not necessarily mean that the non-violent conflict element of the problem could now be resolved. This was graphically highlighted by a statement made by Küçük that the Constitution was dead and that Greek and Turkish Cypriot cohabitation was impossible.[112]

Proposals for a Peace Conference

With this clear political polarisation the British Government proposed the creation of a peace conference at which the main political issues would be tackled. The idea for a conference seems to have been first articulated at the time when the JTF took up duties,[113] but it was not until Sandys arrived in Cyprus that the idea was formally presented to the two communities. It was suggested that London would be the best venue for such a conference.[114] The Turkish Cypriots accepted almost immediately, on the condition that the conference would be 'five-partite'[115] - i.e. composed of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities - a condition to which Sandys seemed to have agreed. (However when the Conference began and there was a place for the Government of Cyprus the Turkish Cypriots felt that the promise made by Sandys was little more than a manouevre to get them to accept the proposal. They would never have accepted this arrangement had it been the one presented originally by Sandys.[116]) In any case, once armed with this, perhaps dishonestly gained, Turkish Cypriot acceptance, the Commonwealth Secretary approached the Greek Cypriots. However, Makarios was not willing to answer then and there. While Sandys prepared to depart from the island, the question of whether the Greek Cypriots would attend the London Conference still remained to be answered. With just minutes to spare before Sandys's plane left, Makarios finally gave his assent to the Conference.[117] In a statement read out by Sir Arthur Clark after his departure, the Commonwealth Secretary remarked that,

> 'I have tonight received from Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kuchuk [*sic*]their acceptance of the offer of good offices of the British, Greek and Turkish Governments to help in the solution of the problem of Cyprus. For this purpose a conference of these three Governments and of the two communities will be convened in London at an early date.'[118]

6. Settling Down

On 3 January, the day following Sandys departure, Archbishop Makarios gave his first press conference since the outbreak of intercommunal violence thirteen days beforehand. The questions at the session were mainly focussed on the approach that was going to be adopted by the Greek Cypriots in London. Despite a generally positive atmosphere about the prospects offered by such a meeting, Makarios made it clear that should the Conference fail, then he would again bring the matter to attention of the United Nations.[119] Yet thoughts on the Conference were not just limited to Cyprus. In Ankara there was a meeting of the Turkish Cabinet during which instructions to their delegation to London were planned. At the end of the meeting, the Minister for Tourism and Press, Ali İhsan Gogug, announced that a ministerial committee had been formed, and Foreign Minister Erkin would head the Turkish delegation.[120]

At the same time there was a similar meeting in Athens at which King Paul chaired a joint session of the new caretaker government under Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos.[121] At the end of the meeting - which was also attended by George Papandreou, leader of the Union of Centre Party (EK), and Panayiotis Kannelopoulos, the leader of the Radical Union Party (ERE) - it was announced that the new Foreign Minister, Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas, would fly to London that weekend where he would confer with Greek Ambassador Melas.[122]

Meanwhile, the JTF continued trying to ensure that the general island wide cease-fire was being observed. The movement of the troops earmarked for duty had by this point been completed, and with fifty nine transport sorties having been completed since 26 December the number of troops in Cyprus lay at around five battalion sized units which, in amongst the established units, had been bolstered by the arrival of two hundred and fifty army technicians, eighty men of the Royal Pioneer Corps, as well as a number of helicopters that had arrived in order to assist patrolling.[123] With such a significant presence established in Cyprus the Ministry of Defence took the opportunity to state that 'no further moves were contemplated so long as situation remained calm.'[124]

Within Nicosia the Truce Force continued its all important role of keeping a close watch on the situation, as *The Times* put it, the British troops were now 'out on foot, patrolling roads and showing the uniform at important junctions and roofs.'[125] And General Young had by now established in his headquarters on the top floor of the Cornaro hotel on the outskirts of the city.[126] By this point however there had been an official extension of the JTF's area of activity beyond the confines of Nicosia, and British troops with the aid of a number of jeeps, twenty Ferret armoured cars, and four helicopters began to collect information on Turkish Cypriot and mixed villages.[127] Indeed, under the supervision of the Truce Force, Greek and Turkish community leaders met in Larnaca and Famagusta. In the latter case, the meeting had positive results in returning the city to normal after a few intercommunal skirmishes had disrupted what had otherwise been good Greek-Turkish relations within the city.[128] In Kyrenia a possible clash between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was averted when an RAF patrol interposed themselves between the fighters.[129]

Such actions were undoubtedly of considerable benefit in fostering peace between the communities in a number of areas. Yet such support was not universal. While most of the Turkish Cypriot leadership viewed the JTF favourably,[130] almost all remained firmly of the opinion that Turkey remained their ultimate guardian.[131] In addition the Turkish Cypriot leadership, like the Greek Cypriots, viewed the JTF as a temporary measure. For example on 8 January, Rauf Denktaş stated that 'we hope [the JTF] will hold the line while the talks are on but we do not visualise them staying forever.'[132] However, suspicions were growing that the Turkish Cypriot leadership were actively engaged in trying to realise their old political aim of *taksim* (partition).

The Spectre of Partition

Any discussion on the issue of the physical separation of the two main communities of Cyprus into separate autonomous areas necessarily reaches into the heart of the Cyprus Problem. Over the years there has been a strong debate about whether the violence that occurred in December 1963 was engineered by one or other community in an attempt to achieve wider political aims. While there has been a tendency to view Makarios's proposal for an amendment to the constitution as the final manifest cause of the intercommunal fighting, the evidence seems to suggest that both communities had been engaged in a gradual process of building up arms supplies since the first days of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.[133] The Greek Cypriot Akritas plan was but one side of the coin, as it seems to be the case that certain elements of the Turkish Cypriot community had been planning for partition as a response to this idea for the realisation of *enosis*.[134] While the intercommunal fighting represented the reason for calls for partition by some of the Turkish Cypriots, the actual process of the formation of two separate entities was an equally important consideration. That the Greek Cypriots would oppose such an action was expected. However, there were a number of Turkish Cypriots who also appeared to be against partition.

Following the first outbreak of intercommunal violence on 21 December, almost all of the Turkish Cypriots civil servants in Nicosia had, by midday 22 December, withdrawn from their government posts. Furthermore, the withdrawal from the government was also matched in some areas by the congregation of Turkish Cypriots into enclaves. Although there is evidence to suggest that in some areas this was forced by the Greek Cypriots,[135] even today the Greek Cypriots insist that this withdrawal by the Turkish Cypriots from their government posts was entirely voluntary.[136] The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, are adamant that they were forced out.[137] The final answer is perhaps midway between the two, i.e. that some Turkish Cypriots deliberately withdrew from the Government, while a number of others did not go to work for fear of planned attacks that they felt would be made on them, by Greek Cypriots, as they travelled to work.[138] In either case the *de facto* situation was that by this time the central government of the Republic of Cyprus was almost wholly Greek Cypriot, and that although the Turkish Cypriots' chief delegate to London, Rauf Denktaş, made a statement with regard to the Conference that the Turkish Cypriots were not necessarily aiming at partition but wished to see a movement of peoples,[139] it was becoming ever clearer that there were strong separatist tendencies at play. One of the most disturbing pieces of evidence that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was actively seeking to disestablish itself from the Greek Cypriot community came on 7 January when the Turkish Cypriots put on trial the Chief of the Gendarmerie, Mr. Niazi, and the Deputy Commander of the Police Force, Mr. Refik. These two had been amongst the last of the Turkish Cypriots to leave the Greek Cypriot areas of Nicosia and Niazi had been the one to read the appeal for calm from Makarios and Küçük. At the opening of the trial at what was called a 'Turkish Special Court' the two were charged with failing to obey the orders of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to set up an independent Turkish Cypriot police force.[140] Although both were eventually acquited[141] - perhaps on the grounds of political expediency to show a united Turkish Cypriot position[142] - the outcome of this case nonetheless highlighted the fact that there did appear to be a number of Turkish Cypriots who still saw the entity of a bi-communal Republic of Cyprus as being a valid and living entity. Even at this point the main locations of the fighting were still around Nicosia and Larnaca. In a number of other areas, most particularly around Famagusta and Limassol, there were numerous instances of Turkish Cypriots continuing to engage in intercommunal commerce and work alongside the Greek Cypriots.[143] Indeed, in Famagusta, the Turkish Cypriot civil servants, under the District Commissioner continued working in their Government posts. However, it certainly appears to be the case that there was a concerted attempt by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to engage in a policy of partition between the two communities. Vice-President Küçük, in an interview with *Le Monde* on 10 January, went as far as to openly say that he wanted partition,[144] a call that was repeated in his newspaper *Halkın Sesi* when he stated that it had now become impossible for the two communities to live together.[145] (However, and to be fair, it is perhaps worth remembering that Makarios had also challenged the status

of the Republic of Cyprus by making claims in favour of *enosis* in the period since independence.[146])

Despite the many successes of the Truce Force in ensuring intercommunal peace across much of the island, there were, nonetheless, allegations made by certain elements of the Greek Cypriot community that the JTF was taking what could be construed as too impartial a role and that they were not adequately protecting those Turkish Cypriots who had remained loyal to the Government.[147] Luckily, such reports did not seem to result in any backlash against the Truce Force, who maintained their position in a number of places. Indeed, General Young noted the way in which the widened area of JTF operations was leading to greater freedom of movement, and that food and medical supplies were now being distributed to areas of need.[148] In order to meet these demands for food the Greek Cypriots went so far as to allow a number of Turkish warships to dock at Famagusta where, under the auspices of the JTF and Greek Cypriot police, they brought several large consignments of aid for the Turkish Cypriots.[149]

Preparing for the London Conference

With the physical separation of the communities becoming more entrenched the Greek Cypriots decided to formulate their approach to the London Conference. It had by this point been decided by the Greek Cypriots that - in line with previous Turkish Cypriot concerns - they would have two groups at the Conference - a group representing the Government of Cyprus, and another which would represent the Greek Cypriot community. What was not clear, however, was whether or not the Greek Cypriots ever made an attempt to include Turkish Cypriots in the delegation representing the Government of Cyprus. From the evidence available it appears to be the case that the decision was made by the Council of Ministers, which, by this point, consisted solely of Greek Cypriots. In any case it was now decided that the delegates representing the Republic of Cyprus should be Foreign Minister Kyprianou and the Attorney-General, Criton Tornaritis. For the latter group, those representing the Greek Cypriot community, Glafkos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Stella Soulioti (the Minister of Justice) were chosen. In addition the Greek Cypriots would be accompanied by Paschalis Paschalides, the Government's economic advisor, and Sir Panayiotis Cacoyannis - an eminent lawyer from Limassol.[150]

With these appointments decided, Makarios called together all the delegates at a meeting of the Council of Ministers.[151] During the discussions the Greek Cypriots proved to be divided between those who appeared willing to negotiate on the Constitution and those who felt that the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee should be abrogated and the Turkish Cypriots given minority status.[152] Makarios was apparently committed to the more hardline point of view, and, perhaps realising that this would never be agreed to in London, the Greek Cypriots began to prepare themselves for a recourse to the United Nations on the basis that all peace-making had failed.[153]

The Turkish Government's main representative, Foreign Minister Erkin, arrived in London on 11 January, and soon thereafter he met with Sandys and R.A. Butler, the Foreign Secretary. During the meeting Erkin took the opportunity to stress the importance Turkey attached to the Greco-Turkish alliances, but that any attempt by the Greek Government to side with Makarios would constitute a significant threat to that relationship.[154] In addition he sought to absolve the Turkish Cypriots from any guilt in the recent events in Cyprus. In dealing with a question from Erkin regarding the British position at the forthcoming talks, Sandys stated that the British Government was not going to present a proposal at the beginning.[155] However, when Sandys asked Erkin about the aims of the Turkish Government at the Conference, the Turkish Foreign Minister proved unwilling to reveal any substantive points.[156]

With the start of the Conference just a couple of days away, the British Government presented the following appraisal of the strategies that would be adopted by the various parties to the London talks:

> '...2. The attitude of the Turkish Cypriots. Dr. Kutchuk has called for partition. This however would be a drastic solution of the problem and, because of the distribution of the Turkish population over the whole of Cyprus, extremely difficult to implement.

3. The attitude of the Turkish Government. The Turkish Government have all along been primarily concerned to secure the safety of the Turkish community in Cyprus. Their military build-up at Iskenderun was undoubtedly undertaken in order to save Turkish lives. M. Erkin said that new and better safeguards for the Turkish community must be worked out but the Turkish Government has so far avoided calling for partition or taking any formal attitude. They have also been careful to maintain the tripartite approach and they are undoubtedly fully alive to the dangers of any clash with Greece.
4. The attitude of the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots have said that they want a conference to agree upon a unified administrative system for Cyprus which will be free from the possibility of outside interference. They have also said that if partition is suggested they will leave the conference.
5. The attitude of the Greek Government. The Greek Government are anxious to maintain their friendly relations with Turkey and have so far done their best to restrain the Greek Cypriots. But the present Greek Government is only a caretaker and will probably be unwilling and unable to take any final decisions. It may also be too weak to exert any effective pressure on the Greek Cypriots. It is always possible that the Cyprus issue will become an element in the Greek electoral campaign.
6. The attitude of Her Majesty's Government. Our principal objective is to arrive at a solution which will preserve our own good relations with the Turkish and Greek Governments as well as those between Turkey and Greece themselves. We do not at the moment wish to exclude any solution which will be satisfactory to all the other parties concerned.'[157]

7. The London Conference

With these seemingly irreconcilable differences looming on the horizon, the London Conference officially opened on 15 January 1964, with representatives present from the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus, and the two Cypriot communities. The Conference, held at Marlborough House, began with Sandys as chairman. In his opening speech the Commonwealth Secretary referred to the events in Cyprus and the way in which the United Kingdom had become involved:

> 'In accordance with the Treaty of 1960, we consulted the other two Guaranteeing Powers and jointly offered to help in the task of restoring order. Our offer was readily accepted by the leaders of both communities and the Joint Force was created. Britain has provided over 2,500 troops for this job. They have so far been successful in their peace-keeping because they enjoy the confidence and good will of both races...But if, for any reason, we were to lose the co-operation of the people, we would no longer be able to discharge this task. Nor should we feel justified in exposing our men to the dangers involved. Britain cannot, of course, go on acting as police man in Cyprus indefinitely; nor, I am sure, would you wish her to do so. The Joint Force has a specific task to perform, namely, to help separate the combatants and to hold the ring while a settlement is being worked out. Our action has given Cyprus a breathing space, but that must be used for something more than breathing. It must be used with a sense of urgency to find an honourable and workable solution to the problems out of which the troubles arose.'[158]

At the end of the speech the floor was given to the Turkish Foreign Minister, who emphasised the historical 'separateness' of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, and noted the strategic importance of Cyprus to Turkey as a 'continuation of the Anatolian Peninsula'.[159] After these remarks Erkin began to offer a number of examples of speeches made by Greek Cypriot politicians which, he said, indicated their total disregard for the Cypriot Constitution. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister

stopped short of calling for the outright partition of the island.

In reply, the Greek Foreign Minister, Christian Palamas - after thanking the United Kingdom for its action in Cyprus - referred to the situation in Cyprus as one that had arisen from the complexities of the Constitution. Complexities that had led the Greek Cypriots to 'the point of seeing in their Turkish compatriots their opponents, their enemies.'[160] Palamas, clearly aware of the delicacy of the issue, proceeded by stating,

> 'On the other hand the Turkish Cypriot community felt it was under constant threat from the majority...the Governments [of Greece and Turkey] tried in Zurich to make a synthesis of the existing opposing views of the two Communities and produced as a compromise the Cypriot constitution...[however] we should in all fairness add that if the texts were lacking in efficiency their application by the Cypriots did not make things easier.'[161]

After these speeches came the turn of the Cypriot delegates. Thanking the British Government for their, 'human interest in the tragedy of Cyprus as one of the Guaranteeing Powers', the Turkish Cypriot Representative, Rauf Denktaş, avoided stating the case for complete partition by presenting the argument for some form of federation.[162] In his address he noted that as far as the Turkish Cypriots were concerned:

> 'We are ready to live in Cyprus with the Greeks but we cannot, from henceforth, afford to live amongst them. We must find a solution so that we can live in peace and security side by side with them as good neighbours. There can be no better real guarantee for us than this after having witnessed these atrocities...We must save those Turks who are trapped in Greek areas. There must be complete physical separation of the two communities who should undertake to live in Cyprus, I repeat, side by side as good neighbours in peace and harmony on the basis of a political framework to be agreed upon. But this principle of separation is fundamental.'[163]

Clerides, speaking on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community, stated,

> 'We are prepared to reach agreement on the form of a democratic constitution, the essence of which must be that, in accordance with all accepted democratic principles, all citizens shall have equal political rights and consequently the government of our Republic shall be controlled by the will of the majority of its citizens.. We wish to see incorporated in our constitution universally accepted provisions about human rights of the citizen of the Republic irrespective of race, religion or creed, and in this respect we are prepared to consider all reasonable proposals with an open mind; but we are not prepared to accept any system whereby rights are conferred on each community separately in the form of checks and balances which create insuperable obstacles to the smooth and effective functioning of the State, raise artificial barriers between its citizens, divide our people and bring about frustration resulting in conflict and destruction.'[164]

The final delegate to speak at this opening session was Foreign Minister Kyprianou. As the representative of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, he presented the more hard-line view favoured by Makarios:

> 'The causes for the recent tragic events...are to be found in the Agreements and the Constitution. The Constitution of Cyprus contains not only unworkable and undemocratic elements, but also...it has as its main feature the division of the people, which is the main source of the friction...[a] point which has been mentioned is that physical separation is the only way of safeguarding the citizens. Three mixed villages were mentioned, yet there are 250 other mixed

villages in which not a single incident occurred. Turks and Greeks in the majority of these villages still live together peacefully in spite of some efforts by other quarters to move them forcibly.'[165]

The next day, at the start of the committee session, a major row broke out as the Turkish Cypriots protested about the fact that part of the Greek Cypriot delegation present at the table were attempting to present themselves as the Government of Cyprus. Threatening to walk out of the Conference the Turkish Cypriots declared that the Greek Cypriots must be recognised as a community and not the Government of the Republic.[166] Yet, this was not the first time that this issue had threatened the Conference. Osman Örek, a member of the Turkish Cypriot delegation had actually wanted to walk out at the beginning of the Conference as he had sneaked into the Conference chamber prior to the start of the proceedings and had seen that there was a place for the Government of the Republic of Cyprus as well as for the two communities. After this he claims to have warned Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin that by accepting this arrangement the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots would be acquiescing to the aims of the Greek Cypriots. However, Erkin persuaded the Turkish Cypriot delegation to stay and participate.[167] Now, on this second occasion, it was on the basis of efforts made British officials, desperate to keep the Conference together at this early stage, that a negotiated agreement was reached whereby the Greek Cypriots would have a community representation as well as a separate delegation to represent the Government of the Republic. Likewise, the Turkish Cypriots could have some form of representation within the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, and that the Minister of Defence, Osman Örek, could be the delegate.[168] Although this offer was never taken up, the Turkish Cypriots eventually agreed to this idea and the Conference proceeded as planned. Yet, this decision of the Turkish Cypriots not to walk out was important insofar as it has been, in subsequent years, seen by the Turkish Cypriots as amounting to a *de facto* recognition of the supremacy of the Greek Cypriots as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.[169] However, and possibly of greater significance, it is worth noting that this arrangement had been reached not only with the agreement of Turkey, but as a result of direct Turkish pressure.

The Decision to send an United Nations Observer to Cyprus

One piece of news that arrive on the second day of the Conference was that, following an approach made by the United Kingdom to the United Nations Secretary-General, made on 3 January and accepted by both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots,[170] a decision was made to appoint a United Nations Observer to the island. The various parties to the Cyprus dispute, including the three Guarantor Powers, had all agreed that the appointed observer should have freedom of movement and communications over the island and that his personal security would be secured. However, the one proviso to this plan was that the observer would not be able to receive any individual complaints on cease-fire violations.[171] Thus, on 16 January 1964, U Thant announced that his nominee for the position had fallen on the former commander of both UNEF and UNYOM, Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani of India.[172] In addition Senor José Rolz-Bennet of Guatemala, the Secretary-General's deputy *Chef de Cabinet*, was appointed by the Secretary-General to be his personal representative in Cyprus. Almost immediately Rolz-Bennet flew to London in order to confer with the leaders of the various delegations,[173] before flying to Cyprus for a thirty-six hour trip during which both he and Gyani met with General Young and went on a tour of the Nicosia and its suburbs in order to view the situation at first hand.[174]

The Conference reaches deadlock

However, the sending of both the Observer and the Special Representative did not constitute a significant movement forward in terms of creating an effective political solution for the island. In London the situation was proving to be as difficult as ever. The divergence of views between the parties as was

expressed at the opening session of the Conference was not easing. In the committee sessions of the conference that were held between the Cypriots, without a Greek or Turkish Government presence, the intransigence had remained. In an attempt to overcome these problems there were separate meetings held that weekend (18-19 January) between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and Sandys, Carrington, Devonshire and Sir Arthur Clark.[175] However, the parties refused to yield on their original demands.[176] In an attempt to break the deadlock the British Government presented to the parties a document entitled 'Points for Further Discussion' which was made up of two alternative proposals. The first of these was the movement of Turkish Cypriots into one or two large areas which would then be administered on the basis of a 'territorially divided Cyprus'.[177] The second proposal put forward the idea of an international peace-keeping force, with the suggestion that NATO countries could be persuaded to participate. In addition, this second alternative envisaged a limited, voluntary population movement with the formation of local Greek and Turkish administrative arrangements with a maintained 70/30 arrangement at the national administrative and political level.[178]

Both these arrangements proved to be unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots who responded by sending a draft memorandum outlining their own views on the future structure of a unitary Republic of Cyprus. Once again the United Kingdom tried to find common ground between the parties and presented three alternatives that were a synthesis of Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and British comments on the previous proposals.[179] This time the communal differences came out even more strongly. The Greek Cypriots held their line on a unitary state, and the Turkish Cypriots made clear their desire to see physical separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The British for their part suggested, once again, the formation of a peace-keeping force, this time omitting the word NATO from the text, but in all other ways presenting a half way house between full integration as suggested by the Greek Cypriots and complete separation as demanded by the Turkish Cypriots. On 22 January the Greek Cypriots rejected these latest proposals.[180] From this point forward, the London conference existed in name only.[181]

Yet right up until this last moment the Greek Cypriots obviously still felt that there was a part to be played by the United Kingdom. Evidence for this comes from the fact that two days before the final Greek Cypriot rejection of the British proposals, Kyprianou once again went to the Commonwealth Relations Office where he met with the Duke of Devonshire. Again he pushed for the idea of an Anglo-Cypriot bilateral treaty to replace the Treaty of Guarantee. In addition Kyprianou also pressed for a Commonwealth force.[182] Once more he found himself being rebuffed by the British Government on the first of these two issues, and the plan for a Commonwealth force was also rejected. From this point forward a rift would develop in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Greek Cypriots. No longer would the Greek Cypriots consult closely with the British Government, a marked change in the international politics of the Cyprus situation would now develop.

Yet in addition the deadlock meant that the intercommunal situation in Cyprus changed noticeably for the worse. The irreconcilable political differences of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as between the Greek Cypriots and the United Kingdom, being experienced at the London Conference now began to pose a threat to the actions of the British troops. Because the United Kingdom had not taken a direct view on the issue and come out on the side of the Greek Cypriots, feelings within the certain parts of the Greek Cypriot community were running high. In a number of editorials over the previous days before the Greek Cypriots rejected the British proposals, the Greek Cypriot newspapers began openly to question the motives of the British Government with regard to their handling of the Conference.[183] One of these commentaries even went so far as to state that 'British partiality for the Turks is hardly concealed.'[184] Yet in amongst these accusations the situation on the ground was proving to be less than clear as to where, if at all, the United Kingdom's loyalties lay. On 21 January several members of the Truce Force were assaulted by Turkish Cypriot police as they attempted to escort two Greek Cypriot policemen to investigate a water leak in a village. Despite the on site protestations of the British troops, the two Greeks were then taken away to the local Turkish Cypriot police station where they were

held.[185] In addition to this dangerous event, the overall intercommunal situation took a turn for the worse when it was reported that the Armenian community in Nicosia had become a target for Turkish Cypriot militias who were alleged to be attempting to force them out of their traditional area.[186] Furthermore, in what amounted to one of the most serious, if only symbolic, attacks of all, the minaret of the historic Bairaktar Mosque in Nicosia was ripped off when a series of bombs placed near to it exploded.[187]

By now an all-out civil war appeared to be looming with attacks across the island increasing. Once again there were reports of a Turkish military mobilisation. Yet the United Kingdom's room for manoeuvre with regard to a further manpower expansion of the Truce Force was at this point limited due to the fact that it had been forced to respond urgently to a number of incidents in the east African countries of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya where local troops had mutinied against their British officers.[188] Given the deteriorating situation both in Africa and Cyprus, as well as the troop requirements for Aden and Borneo, the question of creating a new, international peace-keeping force was now of utmost and immediate importance. At the moment when the Greek Cypriots finally rejected the United Kingdom's proposals at the London Conference a possible solution was now offered by the Greek Government.

On 22 January the Greek Foreign Minister, during a meeting with Sir Ralph Murray in Athens, put to the British Ambassador the suggestion that should the London Conference show 'signs of breaking down or of being very prolonged...He would put to [the Foreign Office] the idea of an allied police force to undertaking pacifying duties in Cyprus at considerably greater strength than the force which had hitherto provided.'[189] This idea was expanded on as follows:

> '[Palamas] explained that by allied he meant our own force with the addition of a substantial American contingent, possibly an Italian one and perhaps French. He thought that if there was anything in this idea it should be negotiated in the capitals concerned rather than in the NATO Council...He envisaged a force strong enough to "impose" disarmament upon the irregular organisations of both sides in Cyprus and to bring about an elimination of auxiliary police...and eventually a reduction and so a withdrawal of Turkish and Greek contingents.'[190]

The reaction of the Foreign Office to this news was extremely positive, 'M. Palamas' idea of sending an "allied policing force" to Cyprus to keep the peace is very much in accordance with what our own first preference would be.'[191] Indeed, the options for peace-keeping by this point had seemed closed, and the Greek Foreign Minister's suggestion appeared to present a way forward.

8. International Peace-keeping Options Appraised

Despite outward appearances, over the first month of the Cyprus Crisis the issue of the creation of an international peace-keeping force had been a major issue in the corridors of Whitehall. On the very day that the Joint Truce Force took up positions, a telegram was sent by the Foreign Office to Ankara which noted that 'the tripartite intervention may succeed in restoring law and order. If so, our next problem will be how the Guaranteeing Powers are to disengage from their peace-keeping role. We are naturally anxious to do this as quickly as possible.'[192] This was no doubt affected by the large number of newspaper editorials across the political spectrum that saw British involvement in the Cyprus Crisis as being either dangerous or without merit. For example *The Daily Express* wrote on 28 December:

> 'It is deplorable that British troops should be used for police action in Cyprus. It is in no sense a proper part of their duties to interfere in troubles between one part of the population and the other in a foreign land.'[193]

With disengagement in mind, and a political solution unlikely, the British Government began looking for possible alternatives available to replace the operation. Several newspapers saw perhaps the most obvious way in which to replace the JTF was by the creation of a United Nations' force.[194] However this was opposed by the Government for a number of reasons, namely:

> '(a.) Experience of the Congo suggests that the despatch of United Nations military contingents might have unfortunate consequences. Observers might be another matter;
> (b.) We would lose virtually all control over future developments. Hitherto our position as the neutral among the three Guaranteeing Powers has given us considerable influence.
> (c.)The United Nations may start suggestions that our occupation of the Sovereign Base areas is undesirable and has a disturbing effect. The Afro-Asian element in the United Nations would probably seize any opportunity which might arise to try to oust us altogether from the island;
> (d.) The Turkish government would almost certainly be opposed to any invitation to the United Nations. In view of the fact of the Greek majority on the island and of the fact that they enjoy much better contacts in United Nations circles, the Turks would almost certainly regard any United Nations initiative as most unlikely to favour the Turkish community.'[195]

However, the Government's public opposition to a United Nations presence was stated in somewhat different terms to this behind the scenes objection. Indeed, the subject of some form of United Nations action had first been brought-up by the Labour Party when Gordon Walker met with the Prime Minister on 26 December, and a letter written to the Foreign Secretary by the Labour MP Tom Driberg on 29 December said,

> 'although it was natural and inevitable that our troops, being on the spot, should have been called in to help, if the emergency should unfortunately be prolonged it would be better that the 'peace-keeping force' should be organised through the UN and should be supplied by nations that have not been involved directly in the Cyprus troubles in recent years.
>
> This is obviously an international, not a domestic, issue; the presence of Greek and Turkish troops could be a constant provocation, in a way that a UN 'presence' consisting of, e.g., Swiss or Norwegian troops would not be; I don't see why our troops should sustain further losses and attract the odium so lavishly available in Cyprus.'[196]

To this Lord Carrington, replying on behalf of Butler, presented the public opposition to the plan by the Government when he wrote,

> 'I agree with you that keeping the peace in Cyprus is a thankless task and that the use of British troops for this purpose does carry the risk of incurring odium from both sides as well as the possibility of casualties. But I think you will agree that the presence of British troops has prevented a full-scale war between the two communities backed by Greece and Turkey. Their presence is likely to be required for a while yet and we could not very well withdraw them unless a satisfactory alternative existed. To do so would be quite irresponsible.
>
> The United Nations Charter of course provides for regional attempts to resolve problems before their submission to the Security Council. We have nevertheless considered whether, and if so how, we should bring the United Nations into the crisis. One possibility is of course a United Nations peace-keeping force; but this would raise a number of serious difficulties. No doubt on account of his experience of the financial and other problems caused by earlier peace-keeping forces, for example in the Congo, the Secretary-General is evidently reluctant to take on another commitment of this kind unless it were absolutely necessary. It is also plain from the

> debate on the Cyprus complaint last Saturday morning that the Security Council has no immediate wish to get involved in the Cyprus problem. Even more important is the fact that a further debate in the United Nations, which would be necessary before a peace-keeping force could be established, would inevitably stir up controversy between Greece and Turkey, and consequently between the two communities in Cyprus, which could easily jeopardise the present uneasy truce.'[197]

This reply seemed not only to encapsulate the stated policy against some form of United Nations peace-keeping action but also closed the door on the idea of any United Nations involvement at any level. In the event, the fact that U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, was opposed to the force - as seen in his earlier conversation with Rossides - certainly helped the Government's case.[198] However, the British Government seemed to close every other door to a potential role for the United Nations. Even an early request made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations that he be allowed to have a representative present at the London Conference was turned down on the basis that it might be opposed by Turkey.[199] However, Sir Harold Caccia, the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, had at the earliest stages stated his concern about the British Government's fear of United Nations involvement and the United Kingdom's overall position with regard to the Truce Force in Cyprus. In a letter, dated 5 January, to Lord Carrington he said, 'I do not think it is worth trying to retain prime responsibility for handling the crisis as a long-term British interest.'[200] He continued the letter with his view of the role of the United Nations:

> 'The Secretary-General of the United Nations has already asked whether his representative should attend the London conference and we have said no. But I trust that this is not an irrevocable decision. I realize that certain kinds of United Nations involvement, particularly those for which Archbishop Makarios is working, may lead to a position where the Sovereign Base Areas are called into question. But if our attempts to resolve the crisis on the present basis fail, this may happen anyhow and the shape of United Nations involvement be less at our discretion than it is now.'[201]

Despite this accurate warning, the British Government still remained opposed to such a course of action.[202]

Instead it chose to focus on a possible NATO peace-keeping role. Yet even this idea had actually been opposed at first by the British Government. In a telegram to Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh dated 30 December 1963, the Foreign Office asked that Shuckburgh, '...emphasise to General Lemnitzer [Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR)] that [the British Government] think the best means of restoring law and order lies in continuing the tripartite intervention undertaken by the three guaranteeing powers at the invitation of the Cyprus Government.'[203] The General, apparently pleased with the Commonwealth Secretary's efforts agreed that the tripartite action 'should be left unmolested in their efforts to calm the situation down and subsequently to find a settlement.'[204]

However, on 7 January, another telegram was sent to the British representative at the NATO Council. After mentioning that, '...one obvious solution would be to propose the dispatch of a United Nations peace-keeping force. But there is a good deal to be said for avoiding this', the telegram asked for Sir Evelyn's opinions on the possibility of a NATO force being sent to Cyprus.[205] In his reply, Sir Evelyn stated,

> 'It should in theory be possible for Her Majesty's Government to ask her NATO allies to relieve her of some of the military responsibilities in the Island or at least to supplement the forces under British command already engaged in maintaining law and order there...I am afraid, however, that

> I do not regard prospects in this respect to be very favourable. Our NATO allies would, as you say, be very reluctant to become involved in the dispute and still more to send forces to the Island. Moreover, I cannot at present see which NATO country could provide troops whose presence would contribute to pacification and which have the necessary aptitude and training for internal security duties. Certain nationalities (notably Mediterranean ones) would surely have to be ruled on political grounds. Others (Scandinavian) would not be likely to agree. One is soon left with the Americans, Canadians and Germans. If we are to invite American help we might do better to do so direct and if Canadian, as a Commonwealth rather than a NATO country.'[206]

At this point the British High Commission in Nicosia, which had been informed of such an idea, dispatched a reply in which they noted that although the idea of a NATO force would be popular with the Turkish Cypriots, '...the Greek Cypriots would plump for a United Nations and probably resent, if not resist, NATO intervention.'[207] Foreign Minister Kyprianou in his 20 January meeting in London with the Duke of Devonshire had stated that:

> 'He [Kyprianou] was opposed to an international force being set up under a NATO umbrella. His reasons were that Greece and Turkey were both members of NATO; that he feared other members of NATO would leave "things to them" and that the result would be perpetuation of what he regarded as the undue influence of Turkey in Cypriot affairs. He did <u>not</u> [sic] consider that the pro-Communist leanings of some Greek Cypriots would be a major factor in rendering undesirable a NATO force. His own preference was for a Commonwealth force to undertake whatever peace-keeping duties were necessary.'[208]

Therefore, if a United Nations force was out of the question to the British Government, and a NATO force was likely to be opposed to the Greek Cypriots, the idea of a Commonwealth force presented a third way forward. There had been several mentions made of the possibility of such an action. Indeed, when the idea was first put to the Greek Cypriots that a tripartite action be taken, both Kyprianou and Makarios had remarked, 'that they would be far happier if one or two other unbiased Commonwealth countries were invited to assist.'[209] However, it does not appear as if the British Government took them altogether seriously. Makarios, throughout January, had made numerous comments referring to the desirability of this course, a position that culminated with Kyprianou's meeting with the Duke of Devonshire of 20 January at which the idea was once again mooted. However, on this occasion the British Government finally responded to the idea. In the conversation the Duke stated that,

> '[the British Government] preferred Australia and New Zealand to send troops to Malaysia rather than Cyprus whatever forces they could send abroad; among white Commonwealth countries therefore that left only Canada which was already engaged in a number of international peace-keeping roles and which might not be able to make a major contribution to Cyprus; India had her hands full with China and Pakistan was Muslim; that left only African Commonwealth countries as likely contributors on any significant scale and Mr. Kyprianou intimated that they would not be welcome. However he hoped that the Irish and the Swedes might be willing to help too.'[210]

Although the argument against the Commonwealth looked superficially convincing, it is less than clear as to whether the United Kingdom actually made any attempt to sound out Commonwealth countries as to the extent to which they would be interested in such a proposal. In any case the idea put forward by Palamas that a force consisting of individual NATO members rather than NATO itself came at a time when the United Kingdom considered it necessary to find a means by which to limit its burden with

regard to the Truce Force in Cyprus. Given that all other options seemed closed, this suggestion was welcomed by the British Government as providing the only realistic way forward.

9. The Decision to Approach the United States

The fact that the British Government had been unsure as to what reception such a request to the United States would meet in the weeks preceding this suggestion did not stop them from seizing the opportunity at this point to approach the United States with the plan for a NATO-based force. In a telegram to Washington the Foreign Office stated,

> 'Hitherto we had assumed that it would in fact prove impossible to persuade any NATO countries to contribute troops for a peace-keeping force...If there is any likelihood that they would in fact be prepared to give such an idea their active support we should like to pursue the possibility further...Please therefore ask the State Department urgently for their views on Mr. Palamas' suggestion.'[211]

However, it appears as if the British Government was not sure as to what would be the reaction of the United States. Indeed, it had seemed as if there were only two real concerns that the United States had over the issue of Cyprus, (a) the danger to NATO, and (b) the danger of having the matter brought before the United Nations. Nonetheless, throughout the first month the United States had taken a remarkably low key approach, preferring to see the matter handled directly by the United Kingdom whom it no doubt considered to be more influential in the situation given its historic position in the island. Despite their NATO concerns, the United States seemed to disassociate itself from the issue as far as was possible. Prior to the opening of the London Conference, a telegram from the United Kingdom's Ambassador in Washington stated that the idea of a British move to suggest that the United States might consider being involved as a participant in the London Conference would, in all likelihood, be met by a cool response. He felt that the United States wished to avoid an emphasis on the NATO interest and a suggestion was made by the US that perhaps a move be made to have a Commonwealth country attend in the role of an external participant, thereby avoiding an overt NATO interest.[212] Even in early January when the United Kingdom was first considering the idea of a NATO force this was still seen as being the prevalent attitude of the Johnson Administration.[213] Indeed, the public face of US thinking was neatly captured in a statement made by the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk:

> 'We feel that we should not inject ourselves into the substantive matters under discussion, but rather use our maximum influence to urge moderation upon the two communities and upon the governments most directly concerned without taking sides.'[214]

Therefore, if the Palamas idea was to work it would require a far more substantial input from the United States than had been the case up until this point. Despite this concern about the level of the United States' interest in becoming involved in Cyprus, on 25 January 1964 the United Kingdom's Ambassador in Washington, Sir David Ormsby Gore, officially asked the United States for its assistance in forming a force made up of contingents from NATO countries in order to help maintain peace in Cyprus.[215]

Summary of Chapter III

The outbreak of intercommunal fighting in Cyprus posed a real danger to all three of the Guarantor Powers. For the United Kingdom, any serious disturbance in Cyprus could endanger British lives and had the potential to overspill in such a way as to threaten directly the strategically important Sovereign Base Areas. For Turkey, the domestic political situation was such that any perceived attempt by the Greek Cypriots to pursue a policy of either reducing the rights of the Turkish Cypriots or to target them systematically in an attempt at - to use a currently fashionable term - 'ethnic cleansing' would necessitate some form of intervention. Yet for the Greek Government any such Turkish intervention would, in turn, require some sort of reprisal to assist the Greek Cypriots. With the ramifications of such a descent into regional conflict in mind, the three Guarantors approached the Government of Cyprus with a proposal for tripartite intervention in order to pacify the warring parties.

This approach was, somewhat reluctantly, accepted by President Makarios who, aware of Turkish sensitivities over the Cyprus issue, agreed to the joint intervention on the condition that it be commanded by a British officer. This was accepted by the Guarantors and the Joint Truce Force came into being on the morning of 27 December 1963. However, the Greek and Turkish contingents which had been allocated duties with the Force were never able to take up their places for a number of reasons which meant that in the end the JTF was simply a British action.

Nevertheless, once the Truce Force was in place the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Duncan Sandys, flew to the island where over the course of several days he succeeded in calming the situation and was able to negotiate several notable agreements between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. However the delicate political situation required considerable manpower in order to be maintained, and the United Kingdom was forced to increase steadily its commitment to the island at a time when there were a number of other pressing international problems at hand. With this in mind several new options were explored in an attempt to widen the Force. Of these, the United Nations was discounted on the basis that any recourse to the Security Council would be open to manipulation by the Soviet Union, and the Sovereign Base Areas could be threatened. Furthermore, the United Nations itself proved to be less than willing to undertake any such commitment. The next option, that of a proposal for a Commonwealth force was rejected as being unworkable, but was not, I believe, full explored by the British Government. With these two ideas proving less than viable, the final choice lay with some form of NATO action. However, this was known to be contrary to the wishes of the Greek Cypriot community. The situation was therefore put on hold while the political situation at the root of the problem was dealt with.

To this extent, a conference was called in London to investigate means by which to address the continuing political difficulties. However, these talks failed due to the intransigence of the various parties attending - in particular the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the Government of Turkey. With the effective breakdown of the London talks, the Greek Government proposed that a peace-keeping force be formed with contingents drawn from NATO members. The British Government, desperate to extricate itself from Cyprus, therefore presented this idea to the United States in an attempt to relieve this burden.

Endnotes to Chapter III

1. *Halkın Sesi*, 19 December 1963. This newspaper, which was owned by Vice-President Küçük, was considered to be the main voice of the Turkish Cypriot community. Therefore any such report would have been taken extremely seriously within the Turkish Cypriot community. Rauf Denktaş maintains that the actual plan being worked on by the Greek Cypriots was an operation to surround the Turkish sector of Nicosia and 'finish off' the Turkish Cypriot leadership within twenty four hours. At the same time Makarios intended to abrogate the Treaties and present a new set of moderate Turkish Cypriot leaders. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996.

2. *The Cyprus Mail*, 22 December 1963

3. Denktaş directly implicated the architect of the Akritas Plan, the known 'Turk hater' and former EOKA 'hit-man' Polykarpos Yiorgadjis who was at that time the Minister of the Interior. Rauf Denktaş in front of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on Cyprus, Minutes of Evidence, 18 November 1986 (London: HMSO, 1986), p.2.

4. *The Cyprus Mail*, 22 December 1963. *The New York Times*, 22 December 1963, cited that there were nine injured.

5.*The Cyprus Mail*, 22 December 1963

6. To the extent that a *New York Times* report of 24 December put casualty figure for the previous day at 10 killed, 20 wounded.

7. *The Cyprus Mail*, 23 December 1963

8. The reasons for such an outbreak of violence in Larnaca with its limited Turkish Cypriot quarter may have had had something to do with the fact that the Turkish Cypriot leader in the area was also the Deputy Chairman of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber and was known to be hardline in his views. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

9. *The Cyprus Mail*, 24 December 1963

10. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1050, 25 December 1963, *FO 371/168892*. Clerides states '[i]mmediately after the incident of 21 December in the red light district, both sides mobilised their paramilitary forces and deployed them in Nicosia along the perimeters of their respective quarters.' Clerides, Glafkos; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; Volume 1 (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989), p.223

11. This area proved to be the scene of much fighting in the future months. As Clerides states, 'it is true that the Greek Cypriots attempted to bring under their control the northern suburbs of Nicosia, which were predominantly inhabited by Turks. This was necessary in order to keep open the road connecting Nicosia and Kyrenia, which was the shortest road to the northern coast, where Turkish landings were most likely to take place. In fact, that is where the Turkish forces landed in 1974.' Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1) *op.cit.*, pp.226-227

12. Mr. Veniamin, the District Officer for Limassol, stated that his colleague in Famagusta was actually 'a very nice chap', and seemed to intimate that he in fact was a supporter of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

13. *The Cyprus Mail*, 25 December 1963

14. *Ibid.*

15. *The Cyprus Mail*, 24 December 1963

16. *The Cyprus Mail*, 25 December 1963. The meeting was attended by Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations; the Duke of Devonshire, Minister of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office; and Sir Arthur Clark.

17. Letter from Cemal Gursel to King Paul of the Hellenes, reproduced in *FO 371/168981*

18. 'CYPRUS: Memorandum by the Prime Minister', 2 January 1963, *CAB 129/116*

19. In fact, the Turkish Government had only been formed that day. After disastrous results for the ruling Republican Peoples Party (RPP) of İnönü in the local elections in November 1963 the RPP Government

resigned on 2 December and President Gürsel asked the leader of the Justice Party, Ragıp Gümüşpala, to form a government. After this proved unsuccessful, the President returned the mandate to İnönü. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 11-18, 1964, p.19846

20. Telegram from Ankara to FO, No.1440, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

21. By this point, there is considerable evidence that both Greek and Turkish mainland troops stationed in Cyprus had entered the fighting. Ibrahim Salih claims that, 'The Greek and Turkish nationals left their barracks in Nicosia and took an active part in the fighting between the two communities. The Commander of the Turkish contingent justified his action as being necessary for the safety of his troops, since their barracks were located in the Greek Cypriot sector of Nicosia.' Salih, Halil Ibrahim; *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*; (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978), p.31. However, Salih states that in his interviews with Turkish Cypriot leaders, they denied the Turkish involvement, as it was claimed that the Turkish Commander refused to let his troops participate. This was backed up by Ambassador Kural (the Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus) who also denied Turkish troop participation, *The New York Times*, 28 December 1963. Despite this, these claims are rejected by Salih, *op.cit.*, pp.31-32. Yet in the course of an interview with the author, Osman Örek, the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus, mentioned that Turkish troops had indeed participated. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

22. 'CYPRUS: Memorandum by the Prime Minister', 2 January 1964, *CAB 129/116*. In fact the Greek Foreign Minister, Venizelos, took credit for the plan to place the forces of the three Guarantor Powers in Cyprus under British command for the purpose of an intervention to restore order. See *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 December 1963. In true Greek-Turkish fashion, Foreign Minister Erkin of Turkey claimed that the idea was Turkey's, *ibid.* In the event we are unlikely ever to know who exactly made the first suggestion for such an action.

23. The fact that this was not a full cabinet meeting is evidenced by the fact that the Prime Minister wrote a memorandum to the Cabinet in which he explained why he did not call 'the Cabinet together over Christmas and the New Year'. See 'CYPRUS: Memorandum by the Prime Minister', 2 January 1964, *CAB 129/116*. We can take a guess at who were present at the 25 December meeting from the roll of those present in a meeting the next day to review the situation; The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Air, and Lord Carrington - Minister without Portfolio. See telegram from CRO to Nicosia, No.1093, 26 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

24. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20 1964, p.20114

25. 'CYPRUS: Memorandum by the Prime Minister', 2 January 1964, *CAB 129/116*

26. Of this total, 13,811 were 'civilian dependents of the Services living outside the Sovereign Base Areas and RAF Nicosia, and 1,850 classed as other British Subjects'. See file in *FO 371/168983*

27. *Ibid.*

28. As Mr. Veniamin, the District Officer for Limassol, stated, 99% of the British families were in Greek Cypriot areas, but that the buses that took the children to school were all owned by Turkish Cypriots. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

29. Evacuation plans were in fact mentioned in the document cited above, with the capacity of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, and the Army being assessed. *FO 371/168983*. This idea has been rejected by Verrier who states: 'The notion that the [British service families] can withdraw into the SBAs, and

that these can remain operational is quite false. The bases depend on local labour, water, and power. Their role of providing a launching-pad for V-bombers or staging facilities for east-bound troops is quite capable of being destroyed by the activities of a small number of terrorists.' Verrier, Anthony; 'Cyprus: Britain's Security Role'; *The World Today*, March 1964, p.132

30. Telegram from FO to Nicosia, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168985*

31. Verrier; 'Cyprus: Britain's Security Role'; *op.cit.*, p.131

32. For example in both Ankara and Istanbul on 28 December 1963. Indeed the situation in Istanbul was almost farcical as seventy five Turkish Cypriot students tried to persuade a 330 ton motorboat to take them to Cyprus in order to deliver a consignment of guns. The plan was thwarted by Turkish authorities. *The Cyprus Mail*, 29 December 1963

33. A fact noted by the NATO Commander-in-Chief South, Admiral Russel, in a briefing to General Lemnitzer. Telegram UKDEL NATO Paris to FO, No.505, 31 December 1963, *FO 371/168892*

34. Telegram from Athens to FO, No.832, 30 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

35. *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 December 1963

36. *Ibid.*

37. A few days later King Paul replied to the letter with a text that laid the blame for the events in Cyprus firmly at the feet of the Turkish Cypriots, stating: 'The information received by my Government previous to your message of the 25th of December in no way agrees with the view that the riots against the Sovereign State of Cyprus were provoked by Greek-Cypriots. On the contrary the information clearly proves that armed groups of Turk-Cypriots provoked the regular police forces, thus causing the tragic events of the last days.' Letter from King Paul of the Hellenes to President Cemal Gursel of Turkey, *FO 371/168981*. This was a significant step taken by the Greek monarch. Indeed, the potential ramifications were such as to risk a split between the Greek and Turkish Governments at a point when both were working, contrary to public opinion, to remain as friendly as possible. The British Ambassador referred to the fact that the 'Greek Government's attitude remains steady although issue of King's deplorable message to President Gursel...is a sign of willingness to play to the local gallery.' Telegram sent from Athens to FO, No.823, 29 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

38. *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 December 1963

39. *The New York Times*, 23/12/63, p.3

40. On the same day as Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, arrived in Nicosia, Makarios had clarified his position on the British intervention as a response to the fact that the Republic was 'under threat from Turkey'. *The Cyprus Mail*, 29 December 1963. Rauf Denktaş states that he was told by Osman Örek, the Minister of Defence at the time, that Makarios had tried to stall for time when Sir Arthur Clark, by then back in Nicosia, initially presented the plan for tripartite intervention on Christmas day. At which point Sir Arthur pointed to a group from the Turkish army contingent in Cyprus in the distance and warned Makarios of the possible consequences of not agreeing to the plan. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996. Although it was not Sir Arthur Clark who pointed to the Turkish troops in the distance but was, instead, the British Military Attaché, the main elements of this story were later confirmed by Osman Örek during a personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

41. Telegram from CRO to Nicosia, No.1093, 26 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

42. Crawshaw, Nancy in Koumoulides, John T.A.; *Cyprus in Transition*; (London: Trigraph, 1986), p.2

43. General Young was not, however, the Commander of all British Forces in Cyprus. That Command was in the hands of Air Chief Marshall Barnett. This reflected the position of the SBA's as primarily air bases. In terms of research, the private papers of General Young are held at the Liddell-Hart Military Archives at King's College London. Unfortunately, they are to remain closed until 2003.

44. *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 December 1963

45. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.2162, 25 December 1963, *FO 371/168982*. It is interesting to note that the original text of the message 'We are much concerned by report in Cypcos 23 that Turkish army contingent has left barracks [SPACE]' is held under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958, and that the photocopy has two lines blank. Given the freely available material pertaining to this event, one cannot help but wonder what was of such significance in that message as to render it closed to public scrutiny indefinitely.

46. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

47. Harbottle, Michael; *The Impartial Soldier*; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.15. The relationship between the two contingents had actually been fairly good in the post-independence period, although their mere presence in the island had often caused friction between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

48. Statement issued following an emergency meeting of British Ministers on 26 December. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20 1964, p.20114

49. *CAB 129/116*

50. *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 December 1963

51. *Ibid.*

52. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1084, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*. In addition Makarios and Yiorgadjis instructed the CBC to stop broadcasting biased reports, *ibid.* The Turkish Cypriots, via Osman Örek, the Minister of Defence, stated that they too would respect the British forces, *ibid.*

53. As noted 'Dr. Dervis has been a bitter opponent of the Zurich and London agreements on Cyprus, and an outspoken advocate of the abrogation of the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee.' *The Cyprus Mail*, 4 January 1964. One prominent Greek Cypriot politician confirmed that Dr. Dervis had been a staunch opponent of Makarios and was known to oppose anything said by the Archbishop. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

54. *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 December 1963

55. Dr. Lyssarides, a prominent member of the House of Representatives and personal physician to Makarios, did in fact state that he had also been opposed, like Dr. Dervis, to the tripartite action on the grounds that it, "created borders manned by foreign troops". Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

56. For example, the Cyprus-European Economic Community Association wholly opposed a recourse to the United Nations, preferring instead to see the matter dealt with by the drafting of a new constitution written by the United States and Great Britain with help from the EEC. *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 December 1963

57. There are no wholly reliable figures for the total number of Turkish Cypriots dead or wounded by this point although *The Cyprus Mail* put the total number of fatalities at around three hundred, 28 December 1963. Indeed, in a telegram from Nicosia to the CRO it was stated that the 'British element of the force is engaged as first priority in relief of injured and in provision of medical supplies etc. to Turkish quarter of old city and other badly affected areas.' *FO 371/168984* In later days the RAF continued to conduct the relief operation in Nicosia, as well as take food supplies into the Turkish quarter of Larnaca. Inward telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1105, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*.Given that the Turkish threat was a major influence on the actions of the Greek Cypriots, Makarios proved to be broadly sympathetic to the desire shown by the Turkish Government to conduct a humanitarian operation in Cyprus. A request by the Turks, on 29 December, to send a Red Crescent field hospital to Cyprus was accepted by the Cypriot Government. As was the arrival, on several occasions, of Turkish warships carrying humanitarian supplies.

58. It is a matter for debate even to this day as to just how large the casualty figures actually were. Vice-President Küçük claimed a figure of 300. *The New York Times*, 27 December 1963

59. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20, 1964, p.20113

60. *Ibid.*

61. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1095, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

62. Telegram from Athens to FO, No.828, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

63. This was seen as the main opposition leader, George Papandreou, in a comment made off the record to the Greek Press on 27 December, said 'We must be grateful to Britain for her intervention at a critical stage in the crisis in Cyprus. British intervention has helped, for if it had not taken place serious clashes could have occurred between Greek and Turks in Cyprus.' Telegram from Athens to FO, No.812, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168981*. This statement was later carried in the right-wing Greek newspaper *Mesimvrini*, on the afternoon of 28 December 1963.

64. A fact noted by the British ambassador to Athens, Sir Ralph Murray. Telegram from Athens to Nicosia, No.821, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*. In fact the Greek Prime Minister specifically called on the 'Greek Press to check the accuracy of their news so as not to exacerbate the situation.' Telegram from Athens to FO, No.826, 29 December 1963, *FO 371/168891*

65. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1095, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

66. *The Cyprus Mail*, 29 December 1963

67. *The New York Times*, 28 December 1963. George Papandreou sent a 'message of appreciation' to the Turkish Government for this comment. Telegram Athens to FO, No.829, 29 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

68. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1101, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

69. FO Telegram to Ankara, No.2247, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*. What was more interesting to note was that the Greek Cypriots had 'received [this] information from R.A.F. sources.' *ibid.* The Foreign Office, in asking the British Ambassador in Ankara to approach Erkin for clarification specifically requested that he not reveal to Erkin that the Greek Cypriots had been informed by the R.A.F., *ibid.* At the same time, there were further reports that three Sabre jets of the Turkish Air Force once again buzzed Nicosia. *The Cyprus Mail*, 29 December 1963. However this was denied by both the Turkish Ministry of National Defence, and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs when asked by the United Kingdom. Telegram from Ankara to FO, No.1440, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

70. Telegram from UKMIS UN New York to FO, No.2346, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

71. Rossides had approached the Council two days prior, but Adlai Stevenson - the US Permanent Representative and, at that time, President of the Security Council - had managed to stall him. Telegram from Washington to FO, No.4050, 25 December 1963, *FO 371/168981*. In a telegram to London Sir Patrick Dean wrote 'I have spoken to Plimpton (in Stevenson's absence) and to Bunche and Narasimhan in the United Nations Secretariat. Plimpton and I have urged on the United Nations Secretariat the undesirability of holding a meeting of the Security Council for the time being...Secretariat agree and U Thant who is seeing Rossides later today will take the same line with him.' Telegram from New York to FO, No.2340, 26 December 1963, *FO 371/168981*

72. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; *op.cit.*, (Volume 2), p.21. Although one former diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, intimated that Rossides was particularly close to Makarios and could call him directly at any time - thus casting doubt upon this assertion. However, even if this is true, it does not mean that Clerides was being deceitful in this comment. Clerides may simply not have been told by Makarios that such an approach had been agreed to by him.

73. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5488, 26 December 1988

74. Telegram from Ankara to FO, No.1425, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

75. *Ibid.*

76. Namely: '(1) 4 destroyers were 38m north of Kyrenia steering east north-east at 20 knots at (0030 local).(2) 5 submarines were 60m north-west of Akamas peninsula steering east at 10 knots at (2359 local).(3) Other three vessels are Fleet Auxiliaries and not repeat not troop transports. They are well in rear.'Telegram to FO from Nicosia, No.1098, 28 (Cyprus), 27 (London) December 1963, *FO 371/168984*. Despite this the United Kingdom was undoubtedly concerned about the Turkish position and requested that the United States try, '...to persuade the Turks to issue urgently a reassuring statement of their intentions.' this was accordingly agreed to be the Americans. Telegram from Washington to FO, No.4078, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

77. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1103, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

78. Telegram from FO to UKMIS UN New York, No.5130, 28 December, *FO 371/168984*

79. *The New York Times*, 28 December 1963

80. At the time, Greece had placed its navy on four hour alert. *The Cyprus Mail*, 29 December 1963

81. See file 'Cyprus: Build-up of Turkish Forces; possibility of invasion' in *FO 371/168983*

82. Report from British Military Attaché in Ankara, MA83/650, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

83. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No. 2313, 30 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

84. Telegram from Ankara to FO, No.1444, 29 December 1963, *FO 371/168981*

85. *Ibid.* Allen was concerned at the tone of this statement. Asking London for advice, he had stalled a reply by stating to Erkin,'that the exercise of the right of individual action under the last sentence of Article IV [see Appendix B] of the Treaty of Guarantee presupposed that the process of three Power consultation under the first part had been exhausted. We had not at present reached that stage. M. Erkin did not dissent.' *ibid.* A reply from Nicosia to Allen revealed the lack of insight in Erkin's comment: 'it is obviously absurd for the Turks to argue that if any one of the three guarantor powers decides to exercise its right of separate intervention, this deprives the other two powers of their similar right to

intervene also. If Greece intervened separately I am quite sure that the Turkish Government would not feel that they had in consequence a duty not to obstruct the Greek action. If this interpretation were accepted it would give a totally unjustifiable advantage to whichever Government intervened first, and would encourage hasty intervention before the possibilities of joint action had been fully exhausted.' Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.214, 1 January 1964, *FO 371/168981*

86. *FO 371/168981*

87. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20 1964, p.20113

88. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1114, 29 December 1963, *FO 371/168985*

89. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20, 1964, p.20113

90. By this point the Colonel Evsoz had been replaced as the Turkish Commander following what had been called a nervous breakdown. His replacement, Colonel Hasan Saglan, may well have been put in place as a result of his previous position as the Director of Public Relations at the Turkish General Staff and at Radio Ankara. Information from a telegram from Ankara to FO, No.1463, 30 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

91. *The New York Times*, 31 December 1963. Clerides states that this agreement was reached by Makarios after considerable consultations with the Greek Embassy. The full text of the agreement can be found in Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, pp.230-232

92. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20, 1964, p.20113

93. Telegram from Ankara to FO, No.1458, 30 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

94. *The Times*, 2 January 1964

95. *Ibid.*

96. *Ibid.*

97. *Ibid.* In the case of Borneo, the United Kingdom had almost seven thousand troops in place in an attempt to prevent insurgencies from neighbouring Indonesia, which had been threatening the newly formed Malaysia Federation. A summary of the situation in Borneo can be seen from the following report: 'The Indonesian-organized guerilla attacks and infiltrations along the 980-mile jungle frontier between Malaysian and Indonesian Borneo continued at frequent intervals during the first six months of 1964, in pursuance of Indonesia's "confrontation" policy and of President Sukarno's proclaimed intention to "crush" the Malaysian Federation. A threat which he repeated on numerous occasions during this period. The danger to the peace of South-East Asia inherent in the Borneo situation caused much international concern...' *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 18-25, 1964, p.20181. The British role in this period was as 'the U.K. Secretary of State for War (Mr. Hugh Fraser) stated on July 15th that up to the end of June RAF transport aircraft had carried more than 32,000 men and 2,700 tons of stores between Singapore and Borneo, as well as many helicopters, light aircraft, and more than 350 vehicles and trailers.' *ibid.*

98. *The Cyprus Mail*, 31 December 1963

99. *Ibid.*

100. 'Cypriot Greek Proposal for a Bilateral Treaty with Britain', 6 January 1964, *FO 371/174745*

101. *Ibid.*

102. At the bottom of the memorandum appeared several handwritten notes of agreement. N.J.A. Cheetham wrote: 'I agree that we should have nothing to do with this dangerous idea. It was incidentally very much discouraged by the Duke of Devonshire when Mr. Kyprianou put it to him [23 December 1963], but I fear that the Greek Cypriots , if not the Greek Govt [*sic*], will revive it at the Conference'. Sir Harold Caccia noted: 'I also agree with this prudent warning: there is nothing for us in this idea, though flattering in appearance'. Lord Carrington nodded his agreement with Caccia's remark with the comment, 'So do I'. Foreign Secretary Butler, simply signed the document. The idea was thus rejected. However, Cheetham was correct in his appraisal that the matter would be revived. Indeed, Kyprianou mentioned it again at his meeting with the Duke of Devonshire on 20 January. 'Note of a talk with Mr. Kyprianou on 20th January 1964', *FO 371/174745.* On this occasion the Duke of Devonshire promised to bring the idea to the attention of the Secretary of State, but, in light of previous appraisals, nothing was done about it. This is evident from the fact that there are no further documents at this time that make mention of the idea. It is therefore possible to conclude that the Duke was simply humouring Kyprianou as a means of stalling on the issue.

103. On the matter of the abrogation of the Treaty of Guarantee and its replacement by a bilateral Anglo-Cypriot treaty, the Greek Government seemed to be in accordance with the views of Makarios. This was communicated back to London following a meeting, on 28 December, between the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Ralph Murray, and Foreign Minister Venizelos. Telegram from Athens to FO, No.814, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

104. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20, 1964, p.20113

105. 'CYPRUS: Memorandum by the Prime Minister', 2 January 1964, *CAB 129/116*

106. Telegram from Athens to FO, No.833, 31 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

107. Telegrams from Nicosia to Athens, No.9 and No.10, 1 January 1964, *FO 371/168981*

108. Telegram from Athens to FO, No.833, 31 December 1963, *FO 371/168984*

109. The period from June 1963 to 16 February 1964 was an extremely complicated one in Greek political history. For a good overview of the situation see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 20-27, 1964, p.20141.

110. Telegram from UKDEL NATO Paris to FO, No.10, 6 January 1964, *FO 371/168984*

111. *Ibid.*

112. *The New York Times*, 31 December 1963

113. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.2237, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

114. This seemed to have been favoured from the start by the British Government, and also by the Turkish Government. In a telegram from Ankara, the British Ambassador stated: 'London would almost certainly be acceptable to the Turks as the venue for the conference. They would not relish Nicosia, which could hardly be said to provide a favourable atmosphere for the conference'. Telegram from Ankara to FO, No.1434, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

115. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

116. Osman Örek insists that he made Sandys confirm this promise in writing and sign under the text. Sandys did in fact do this but under his signature wrote the words 'Good Luck to You', thereby negating the promise by insinuating that the Turkish Cypriots would have to enforce this. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

117. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.230

118. *The Cyprus Mail*, 3 January 1963

119. *The Cyprus Mail*, 4 January 1964

120. The entire Turkish delegation would include two officials of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Haluk Bayulkan and Turgut Tulay; Professor Suat Bilge, Dean of Political Science at Ankara University; General Turgut Sunalp, Chairman of the Operational Directorate of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff; and Ambassadors Birgi (NATO), Küneralp (United Kingdom), and Eralp (Cyprus). *The Cyprus Mail*, 8 January 1964

121. *Ibid.*

122. *Ibid.*

123. *The Times*, 3 January 1964

124. *The Times*, 4 January 1964

125. *Ibid.*

126. *The Times*, 6 January 1964

127. *Ibid.*

128. *The Cyprus Mail*, 8 January 1964

129. *The Cyprus Mail* 9 January 1964

130. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996. Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996. Zaim Necatigil, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

131. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996.

132. *The Cyprus Mail*, 9 January 1964

133. Almost everyone I spoke to on both sides of the Green Line seemed to accept the fact that there had been a significant amount of arms stored at the end of the EOKA period, as well as significant amounts of arms imported in the post-independence period. However, many claimed that the arms build up as having been conducted by the 'other' community, and that their 'own' community had not engaged in such activities.

134. Tassos Papadopoulos, who was Minister of Labour at the time, states that after the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the Government he was appointed as acting-Minister of Agriculture. When he went to the Ministry he found that there was a safe in the wall, and that after following the correct legal procedures the safe was opened. Inside he said that he found the minutes of a meeting between the President of Turkey, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Vice-President Küçük, and Mr. Denktaş which outlined plans for the movement of the Turkish Cypriot population to the north of the island in the event of the outbreak of intercommunal fighting. Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996. What is not entirely clear, however, is the extent to which this plan was proactive or reactive. In other words, was the movement of the Turkish Cypriot population planned with the intention that the Turkish Cypriot community would create the necessary reason for such a plan to be implemented, or was it created as a contingency measure in the

event that the Greek Cypriots launched an attack?

135. For example in Lefka, west of Nicosia, it was claimed that there were six thousand Turkish Cypriots, one thousand of whom were refugees, held in an area of just four square miles by Greek Cypriot irregulars. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20, 1964, p.20113

136. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

137. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Lefkoşa, 10 January 1996. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

138. Dr. Özdemir Özgur, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 30 August 1996. Dr. Özgur - a Turkish Cypriot who did in fact remain in the Government - explained that although he wanted to go his place of work at the Ministry of Finance, the difficulties and dangers in Nicosia forced him to go to his family in Paphos at a time (around 8 January 1964) when the roads were clear. However, renewed fighting left him stranded there and he was unable to return to his place of work.

139. *The New York Times*, 7 January 1964

140. *The Cyprus Mail*, 8 January 1964

141. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996. In a letter of resignation written by Niazi to Vice-President Küçük on 10 January 1964, the Commander of the Gendarmerie had stated, 'Being aware that, instead of helping, I have harmed the heroicTurkish Cypriot community from my position and that from now on I shall not be able to be useful, I tender my resignation from the post of Gendarmerie Commander', taken from a photostat reproduced in *Halkın Sesi*, 9 March 1964.

142. Evidence for this may be drawn from the fact Mr. Veniamin, who personally knew Mr. Niazi, stated that the Gendarmerie commander was known to have been "happy and hopeful" about the creation of the Republic of Cyprus and had harboured a sincere desire to see it work. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

143. For example in Limassol Greek and Turkish Cypriot dockers at the port worked together for the entire period of this chapter. See reports in *The Cyprus Mail*, 9 January 1964. This was confirmed by Christodoulos Veniamin, the District Officer in Limassol at the time, in a personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

144. *Le Monde*, 10 January 1964. A supplementary comment in which Küçük stated that he had no confidence in the United Nations was later denied. *The Cyprus Mail*, 13 January 1964. *The Times* had also noted that Küçük had stated that partition remained the best solution. *The Times*, 6 January 1964.

145. *Halkın Sesi*, 16 January 1964

146. A selection of comments made by Makarios during the period from the signing of the London-Zürich Agreements to the outbreak of intercommunal violence can be found in Reddaway, John; *Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection*; (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), pp.192-194.

147. *Eleftheria* and *Haravghi*, 8 January 1964

148. *The Cyprus Mail*, 10 January 1964

149. *The Cyprus Mail*, 14 January 1964

150. *The Cyprus Mail*, 10 January 1964

151. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.236

152. *Ibid.*

153. *Ibid.*

154. 'Record of a meeting between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs and the Foreign Minister of Turkey at the Foreign Office at 11.30 a.m. on January 13, 1964', *FO 371/174745*

155. The British preparations for the London Conference were intimately tied up with British discussions about how to extend the Truce Force if the Conference failed. The latter point will be looked at in greater detail in section 8 of this chapter. For information on the preparations see file 'Concern for degree of responsibility HMG are assuming for law and order in, and, for a new deal for Cyprus; aims at handling of conference', *FO 371/174745*

156. 'Record of a meeting between the Secretary of State...and the Turkish Foreign Minister at the Foreign Office at 11.30 a.m. on January 13, 1964', *op.cit.*

157. Briefing prepared for Professor Erhard's [West German Chancellor] visit, January 15-16, *FO 371/174746*

158. Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Duncan Sandys, in a written answer to the House of Commons, 16 January 1964. House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Period from 13th-24th January, 1964, p.48

159. Speech as reproduced in Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, pp.243-257

160. Speech as reproduced in Clerides, *ibid.*, pp.257-262

161. *Ibid.*

162. Denktaş maintains that this step would not have been a major move at that point. In a comment on the 1960 Constitution he noted that what had been created was a 'functional federation' with both communities having a significant degree of autonomy on several issues such as education, sport, and religion. What he therefore envisaged from the London Conference was a move from this functional federation to full federation that would give sovereignty to both communities and thereby create, what he called, a 'partnership state'. Rauf R. Denktaş, in a personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996. However, one can perhaps challenge the degree to which this was an accurate appraisal of the aims of the Turkish Cypriot leadership at the time rather than an evaluation of the aims developed in the period since 1964.

163. Speech as reproduced in Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, pp.262-273

164. Speech as reproduced in Clerides, *ibid.*, pp.273-276

165. Speech as reproduced in Clerides, *ibid.*, pp.276-278. In response to the question of the mixed villages, a Greek Cypriot spokesman stated, on 17 January, that in fifty two villages 4,452 Turkish Cypriots had been forced to move by Turkish Cypriot extremists, but that in those same villages 5,548 Turkish Cypriots had chosen to remain despite such threats. *The Cyprus Mail*, 18 January 1964.

166. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

167. *Ibid.*

168. *Ibid.*

169. Denktaş now insists that this capitulation on the issue was a mistake as it granted legitimacy to the Greek Cypriots as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus at a time when the Turkish Cypriots were arguing for a recognition of the two communities within the stated idea of a federal system. Rauf R. Denktaş, during a personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996.

170. *The Cyprus Mail*, 8 January 1964

171. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5514, 13 January 1964

172. *The New York Times*, 17 January 1964. General Gyani had commanded UNEF from December 1959 to January 1964. During this period he spent a brief period from 12 September to 7 November 1963 as Commander of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM). Information taken from *The Blue Helmets*; (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1991)

173. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20, 1964, p.20113

174. *The Cyprus Mail*, 20 January 1964

175. The presence of Sir Arthur Clark at the meeting was perhaps an unwise move as it may have made the Turkish Cypriots all the more suspicious. Osman Örek states that he believed that Clark had been involved in the drafting of the thirteen points and that at the London Conference he had told Sandys that the Turkish Cypriots did not trust Clark. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

176. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20, 1964, p.20115

177. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.291

178. *Ibid.*, pp.291-292

179. The full details of all these proposals can be found in Clerides, *ibid.*, pp.291-300

180. *Ibid.*, p.314

181. *Ibid.*

182. *FO 371/174745*

183. *Eleftheria* and *Ethniki*, 19 January 1964

184. *Haravghi*, 18 January 1964

185. *The Cyprus Mail*, 22 January 1964

186. *The Cyprus Mail*, 23 January 1964

187. *Ibid.* In the case of the Mosque, both Yiorgadjis and Makarios were quick to denounce those who committed such an action against a 'sacred place.' *ibid.*

188. These mutinies occurred between 20-24 January 1964, and in all three countries requests were put forward for British assistance in quelling the violence. To this extent Britain committed six hundred men of 45th Royal Commando to Tanganyika. Four hundred and fifty men of the 2nd Battalion Royal Scots Guards and a battalion of the Staffordshire Regiment went to Uganda. In Kenya, the British operation was conducted by 3rd Royal Horse Artillery, seven hundred men of the 41st Royal Marine Commando (who had been on call for Cyprus two and half weeks earlier), and a company of the Gordon Highlanders. For more information see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, March 21-28, 1964, p.19963

189. Telegram from Athens to FO, No.114, 22 January 1964, *FO 371/174746*

190. *Ibid.*

191. Telegram from FO to Washington, No.1058, 23 January 1964, *FO 371/174746*

192. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.2237, 27 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

193. *The Daily Express*, 27 December 1963

194. *The Guardian*, *The Daily Herald*, and *The Daily Mail*, 27 December 1963. However, *The Telegraph* saw Britain, Greece and Turkey as 'obvious mediators'. *The Daily Telegraph*, 27 December 1963

195. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.2237, *op.cit.* In a return telegram, Dean agreed with all these points. Telegram from UKMIS UN New York to FO, No.2353, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

196. Letter from Tom Driberg, MP to the Foreign Secretary, 29 December 1963, *FO 371/168981*

197. Letter from Lord Carrington to Tom Driberg, MP, 2 January 1964, *FO 371/168981*

198. The fact that *The Sunday Times*, in referring to the 28 December UN Security Council debate, chose to comment that 'judging from the way in which the Security Council left the matter hanging in the air in the small hours of yesterday morning, the UN has no burning desire to get involved in this most intractable problem' must have been helpful to the Government in presenting a public face to this. See *The Sunday Times*, 29 December 1963

199. 9 January 1964, *CAB 128/38*

200. *FO 371/174745*

201. *Ibid.*

202. Having said this, the British Government did take pains formally to distribute a letter, on 9 January, to all 113 members of the United Nations in which it explained the facts about Cyprus and explain why it had become involved. *The Cyprus Mail*, 10 January 1964. The letter can be found as *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5508, 8 January 1964

203. Draft telegram from FO to UKDEL NATO Paris, No.2119, 30 December 1963, *FO 371/168982*

204. Telegram from UKDEL NATO Paris to FO, No.505, 31 December 1963, *FO 371/168982*

205. Telegram from FO to UKDEL NATO Paris, No.177, 7 January 1964. *FO 371/174745*

206. Telegram from UKDEL NATO Paris to FO, No.16, 8 January 1964, *FO 371/174745*

207. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.110, 8 January 1964, *FO 371/174745*

208. 'Note of a talk with Mr. Kyprianou on 29th January 1964', *FO 371/174745*

209. Telegram from Nicosia to CRO, No.1066, 25 December 1963, *FO 371/168982*

210. 'Note of a talk with Mr. Kyprianou on 20th January 1964', *FO 371/174745*. On the subject of the role of African troops, Dr. Lyssarides, although an opponent of peace-keeping, stated that he could not recall such an objection from the Greek Cypriots but in any case such troops would have been preferable to the British troops insofar as he regarded them as being more objective. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

211. Telegram from FO to Washington, No.1058, 23 January 1964, *FO 371/174746*

212. Telegram from Washington to FO, No.4080, 28 December 1963, *FO 371/168983*

213. Telegram from the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir David Ormsby Gore, to the Foreign Office in London, 9 January 1964, *FO 371/174745*

214. *The Cyprus Mail*, 4 January 1964

215. Ball, George; *The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs*; (London: WW Norton & Company, 1982), p.340

Chapter IV

Involving the Superpowers: The Cold War and Cyprus

(25 January-15 February, 1964)

Introduction

Whereas international involvement during the first month of the Cyprus situation had been almost wholly limited to the Guarantor Powers, the period after the United Kingdom's approach to the United States of America in the search for a peace-keeping force for Cyprus threw the doors open to wider international involvement. The proposal put forward by the British Government envisaged the creation of a force made up of contingents drawn from a number of NATO member states. It was a NATO-based proposal, and was never a plan for a NATO peace-keeping force *per se*. However, the idea was wholly opposed by Archbishop Makarios on the basis that he felt that any force based on a NATO structure would automatically be biased in favour of Turkey. Therefore, after several days of consideration, the Archbishop formally rejected the plan. This rejection was made easier by the fact that in his opposition to such a force he was supported by the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Soviet Government even went so far as to make clear their feelings over the issue through the international distribution of a letter that outlined their position in no uncertain terms.

This important action by the USSR effectively stalled plans to widen the force. With a potentially dangerous East-West split now beginning to become apparent the plans for a NATO based force were again put to Makarios in such a way as to try to make them more palatable. However, the Archbishop proved to be implacable. Indeed, the backlash resulting from the wider Greek Cypriot community as a whole to the idea of any form of NATO involvement was such that it made the United Kingdom's military position in Cyprus untenable. Unable to replace the JTF as planned, the options for the British Government, and for the western alliance as a whole, were now extremely limited. With this in mind the British Government approached the United Nations Security Council, on 15 February, and asked for the Security Council to be convened.

1. The United States Becomes Involved

It is clear from the events in the period leading up to the end of the London Conference that the United Kingdom was far more concerned about the Cyprus Crisis than the United States. However, the military pressures on the British Government arising from keeping the Truce Force at a size necessary to meet its requirements meant that some alternative arrangement had to be found. If the NATO-based option were to be an option then the United States would have to be encouraged to take a more positive role than had hitherto been the case. Realising this, the British Government highlighted the possibility of wider organisational problems for NATO arising from a Greco-Turkish split as their main tactic to try to encourage the United States' participation in the plans as presented at the end of January. However, as United States Undersecretary of State George Ball wrote in his memoirs:

> '[I] stated emphatically [to the British] that the United States did not want to become involved; we [the US] already had far too much on our plate...But the British were adamant. They would no longer carry the Cyprus burden alone, even though involving the United Nations risked giving the Communist countries leverage in that strategically placed island. The United Nations would dither and the Turks would not wait; tired of continued outrages against Turkish Cypriotes [*sic*], they would invade. Then we would have a full-scale war between two NATO allies in the eastern Mediterranean.'[1]

Although this threat to go to the United Nations was in all likelihood a bluff by the British Government,[2] there is evidence that the United Kingdom was ready to follow the United Nations path if the United States declined to assist in the formulation of a NATO-based peace-keeping force.[3] The United Kingdom had, by this point, a considerable number of troops engaged in the operation in Cyprus, and given both the apparently open ended nature of the operation and the manpower difficulties, such a role could not continue indefinitely. If the United States chose to neglect the issue on the grounds that it was not vital to the West, then the British could not be expected to adopt a hardline attitude on the issue simply for the sake of NATO. Although such an approach could constitute a threat to the SBAs both politically and militarily, this would have to be risked if the United States declined to become involved directly.

It therefore was now clear to the United States that it would have to take notice of the British threat to leave Cyprus to its own devices, as this move by the United Kingdom could pave the way for a Turkish intervention and thus lead to a Greco-Turkish war. Indeed, the British threat seemed to set the alarm bells ringing in the State Department, and Undersecretary Ball, seeking advice from colleagues, met with the United States' Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson. Stevenson's reaction proved to be strongly in favour of United States' intervention in the crisis stating: 'the only way to deal with Makarios...was by "giving the old bastard absolute hell".'[4] This meeting was followed by a discussion between Ball and the United States' Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, that same afternoon, 25 January. McNamara although expressing his concern at the widening of US responsibilities was nonetheless able to appreciate the seriousness of the situation in the Mediterranean.[5] Perhaps on the basis of these two opinions expressed to Ball, President Johnson, later that evening, directed the Undersecretary to come up with, 'an acceptable solution.'[6] Although this did not amount to a firm agreement to the British proposal, it undoubtedly represented a sign of hope that the United States was by now taking a serious interest in the difficulties presented by the evolving Cyprus situation.

The next day, 26 January, the British Government took another chance to outline its position to the United States' Government when Prime Minister Douglas-Home, as well as the Foreign, Defence and Commonwealth Secretaries met with the visiting US Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, at Chequers. At the meeting Sandys again outlined the initial British reasons for intervening in Cyprus referring to the United Kingdom as the 'closest fire brigade available.'[7] He went on to explain that by this point, however, the intercommunal situation was such that a total military presence of around ten thousand troops was needed in order to continue to preserve order:

> 'Britain was not prepared to undertake this commitment alone, some form of international force would be necessary. No one was very keen on encouraging the United Nations to take too prominent a role and the most promising idea was perhaps not a NATO police force, but a force comprising contingents from individual NATO countries.'[8]

At this point Sandys specifically mentioned the role of the United States stating: 'if the United States agreed, other NATO powers, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany for example, will be prepared to play their part.'[9] Kennedy responded to this by asking a number of questions about the force, for example: how the British saw the situation developing in the long term? and how long did the British

expect the force to remain in place?

Without answering either of these questions directly, Prime Minister Douglas-Home responded using the threat to NATO's organisational coherence once again, stating: 'if violence got out of hand, the British troops had orders to return to the Southern [*sic*] Base area. When they withdrew there would undoubtedly be a war. Unless therefore we constituted something like an international force a war would be inevitable. As to the end result, no one could see with any certainty; but it looked as if partition would be the only answer.'[10] At this point the conversation on Cyprus ended with Kennedy promising, 'to take the matter up with the President on his return to Washington'.[11]

Indeed, the idea must have been of concern to the United States, as the next morning the group assembled once again, this time in London. At the meeting the Foreign Secretary told Kennedy that, following a request from the State Department, the British Government was sending the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Harding Baker, to Washington to discuss a number of questions relating to the structuring of an international police force to be sent to Cyprus.[12] In addition, the Prime Minister noted that by all accounts the Turkish Government were moving for *de facto* partition of the island, a move that would be wholeheartedly opposed by Makarios: 'since he wished to control the whole island.'[13]

Despite a number of contacts between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States over the previous few days, the initial public reaction to the proposal by the Johnson Administration was non-committal.[14] However, a further Turkish threat - substantiated by another military build-up at the port city of Iskenderun - given on 28 January by Prime Minister İnönü to US Ambassador Hare seemed to set alarm bells ringing. In reporting back to Washington, Hare stated: 'that the Turks were going to invade unless [given] some kind of answer [to the proposal] by the next morning'.[15]

With this renewed threat by Turkey and the British threat to withdraw, President Johnson decided to call a high-level meeting attended by Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Undersecretaries of State George Ball and Averill Harriman as well as several Congressmen.[16] At the end of which the President had reached a decision. The next morning, 29 January, the British government was told that United States did have an interest in participating in the NATO force. However, this offer was presented on the condition that two important provisions be met: (1) that the Cyprus Government approve of such a force, and (2) that the three Guarantor Powers suspend their rights of intervention for three months. Perhaps in order to give weight to this Johnson sent General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), to both Athens and Ankara to warn the governments of both countries of the danger that a Greco-Turkish split over the issue of Cyprus could have on the NATO alliance as a whole.[17]

The fact that the plan for a peace-keeping force made up of contingents from NATO countries had been approved behind the scenes meant that there were press rumours that Turkish Government had begun seriously to consider withdrawing from the ailing London Conference. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister went to see Butler at the Foreign Office to explain that, contrary to the media reports, no firm decision had yet been made by Prime Minister İnönü. However, Erkin did state that a stand would be taken on the basis of the conversation he would now have with them.[18] At this point Butler asked Erkin about whether Turkey had accepted to join the proposed international force. In replying to this Erkin laid down two conditions. In the first instance he stated that the Turkish Government believed that the Turkish contingent to the force should be numbered between 2,000 and 2,500 men, and that the Greek contingent should also be raised. The second was that the commander-in-chief of the force would have executive powers to handle military matters given the fact that these were at present being 'held up by the Cyprus Government [*sic*]'.[19] Butler responded to this by making it clear that both these proposals would be extremely difficult to meet, at which point the Turkish Foreign Minister attempted to introduce a third condition, 'namely that some indication should be given of the nature of the constitutional

settlement before the force was created.'[20] Butler made it clear that this demand would be impossible to meet, at which point Erkin asked whether the British Government might prove to be sympathetic to the idea of federation. In his reply, Butler stated that the United Kingdom had not discounted any idea as far as a solution to the continuing situation was concerned. At the end of the meeting Erkin left without indicating his decision on whether to continue in the Conference, but in any case he stated that he would be staying in London a few days longer.[21] Yet, given the rejection of many of the demands made by Erkin, it came as little surprise to the British Government that the next day, 29 January, the Turkish delegation decided to withdraw from the Conference.[22] This was officially cited by the Turks as having been done on the grounds that there had been no significant movement forward on the various constitutional problems that had been put before the delegations.[23] An interesting statement indeed if one considers that an equal degree of the intransigence leading to this had been as a result of the wish of the Turkish Government not to move on its proclaimed demands.

2. The Greek Cypriots Oppose NATO Involvement

The plan for an international peace-keeping force, as introduced by Palamas, was in fact first discussed with the Greek Cypriot leadership on 24 January when Palamas urged the Greek Cypriots to accept the idea on the basis that should Turkey decide to act then Greece would be unable to defend the island.[24] At the same time the Greek Foreign Minister: 'warned the Cyprus delegation that Turkey was threatening to take unilateral military action and that it would do so even if we made a recourse to the Security Council.'[25] Although the matter had been brought up as a proposal by the United Kingdom earlier and rejected by the Greek Cypriots, the fact that Greece was now seriously considering the whole subject made the issue all the more important. However, the Greek Cypriots were opposed to the NATO option for precisely the reason why Greece was in favour of it, i.e. because Turkey was militarily stronger than Greece. In other words, Greece, realising that it was militarily weaker and that any war between itself and Turkey would be catastrophic, therefore decided that NATO would prove to be the best available framework within which to work. As for the Greek Cypriots, the case against NATO is explained by Glafkos Clerides, the then President of the House of Representatives, who states:

> 'There was a school of thought and certainly there are still certain people who believe that the proposal for the establishment of a NATO peace-keeping force and its stationing in Cyprus should have been accepted. They believed that if Cyprus became a NATO country or, after the events of 1963, invited a NATO force into Cyprus, the objective of Enosis could have been realised and Turkey would have been prevented from intervening.
>
> This view is erroneous. If Enosis had been declared unilaterally, NATO would not have used its forces to prevent Turkey from landing forces in Cyprus. Its role would have been confined to preventing war between Greece and Turkey and by pressing Greece to offer Cypriot territory to Turkey. This would have led to partition. If, after the events of 1963, a NATO peace-keeping force had been stationed in Cyprus, non-aligned and Eastern Bloc support would have been reduced to a bare minimum. NATO interests in Turkey, which were always stronger than NATO interests in Greece, would have continued to be so.'[26]

Despite this concern, the Greek Government pressed the Greek Cypriots to accept the plan, and, if not, then at least to reconsider the British proposal presented at the London Conference (which had been rejected by the Greek Cypriots on 22 January): 'as an agenda for discussion.'[27] However, the Greek Cypriots refused to discuss the idea of accepting the British proposal on the basis that the Turkish Government had, by this point, declared partition to be the only solution, and had left the conference.[28]

The Greek Cypriot Backlash to the Rumours of NATO Involvement

The final failure of the London Conference caused by Turkey's withdrawal coupled with considerable speculation over the United Kingdom's move to seek the support of the United States - although at this point still publicly unconfirmed - resulted in an almost immediate and vehement backlash from within much of the Greek Cypriot community. Indeed, there had already been a considerable revision of opinion about the whole nature and agenda of the Conference, with considerable media energy being expended on claiming that the United Kingdom had deliberately set out to deceive the Greek Cypriots. For example, *Makhi*, a right wing pro-*enosis* newspaper stated: 'the West has betrayed us. We have waited long enough. Our warnings have gone unheeded. We shall not commit suicide in the smothering embrace of the so-called free world.'[29] The liberal newspaper *Eleftheria* went even further in its criticism of British, and Western, political action. Although taking pains to defend the actions of the British peace-keeping troops with the comment: 'the British Army cannot be blamed for its mission. It simply executes its duties assigned to it, and let this be understood by all'[30], it nonetheless went on to say that: 'those guilty are the politicians. Let us invite the protection of France, even of Russia, since those on whom we have reckoned are denying it to us.'[31] As rumours about a NATO-based force spread, the Greek Cypriot press continued to oppose the idea vehemently. Using vast amounts of editorial commentary the press made numerous references to NATO being a means by which to allow Turkey to intervene, comments that persisted despite the fact that there was a rumoured acceptance for the 'NATO force' idea from the Greek Government - an accusation made by the communist party.[32] As the days went on the increased anti-NATO rhetoric[33] was matched by a corresponding increase in active support for the option of developing a role for the Soviet Union in the continuing Cyprus situation. A view favoured across all sections of the political spectrum,[34] including the political right for whom Greece was 'the Motherland'.

Although rejected by the wider Greek Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriot reaction to the rumoured proposal appeared to be favourable as Turkey, the most likely to use these powers, had already announced, through deputy-Prime Minister Satir, that NATO troops were on their way.[35] Indeed, the wider NATO support of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States to the idea would, under other circumstances, have almost surely have meant that the danger of an escalation beyond Cyprus to Greece and Turkey would have diminished. Yet the Greek Cypriots under President Makarios were not so easily led. With it becoming ever more clear that the decision over some form of NATO force would be officially announced at any moment the situation took a turn for the worse. Makarios, speaking at a news conference, on 30 January, insisted that if troops were to be placed in Cyprus they should come from the UN.[36] In his statement he said:

> 'The stationing of troops in Cyprus from Nato or any other countries with the object of preventing possible clashes between the island's Greeks and Turks is not necessary at all. I think that, on the contrary, the presence of Cyprus of these troops would complicate the situation and lead eventually to many adventures. Turkey can greatly contribute to the internal pacification of the island and the return to normality if she stops her threats of intervention, which constitute a constant encouragement to the Turkish Cypriots to resort to provocative acts and disturbances. If the presence of troops is required, these troops must be United Nations troops whose main object should be to repel outside intervention.'[37]

3. The Soviet Union Becomes Involved

As if to add further weight to this, the Soviet Union suddenly became involved. The Soviet Government, like that of the United States, had seemed curiously detached from the events in Cyprus at the beginning of the fighting. In looking at statements made by the Soviets during the first month following the start of the Cyprus situation there are two things that are immediately striking: (1) the general lack of comment on the subject, and, (2) the relatively low level that these comments came from. For example, on 31 December the Soviet Ambassador in Nicosia, Mr. Yermoshin, in a meeting with Foreign Minister Kyprianou stated that the Soviet Union rejected external intervention in the situation and that Turkey had been made aware of this feeling.[38] Thus perhaps indicating that while the Soviet Union supported Cyprus in its attempts to prevent Turkish intervention, it did not take a direct stand on the formation of the Joint Truce Force.[39] Following this comment, the Cyprus Public Servants Trade Union sent a cable to Yermoshin expressing thanks to the Soviet Union, and AKEL, the Greek Cypriot communist party, sent a telegram to Moscow in which it congratulated the Soviet Government for, 'its expressed unreserved support towards the Government and people of Cyprus.'[40]

Yet somewhat embarrassingly, the reply from Moscow to these was that the statement from Ambassador Yermoshin was from the Soviet Union's Embassy in Nicosia and did not reflect hard and fast policy on the part of the Government of the Soviet Union.[41] Indeed, in terms of the decision-making hierarchy of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time, Andrei Gromyko, was not even a member of the all-important Politburo.[42] It was therefore likely that a variance had thus arisen between Soviet Foreign Ministry and the party on the issue which thus forced the Foreign Ministry to recant somewhat on their earlier statement.[43]

The only other direct voice of support from the Soviet Union in this period was a statement released in Nicosia by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which, purporting to speak, '[i]n the name of millions of Soviet people', accused 'some NATO members' of armed intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus.[44] In addition, it declared its solidarity with the, 'courageous and peace-loving people of Cyprus who are fighting selflessly for the abolition of unequal treaties and for complete independence.'[45] Yet, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee was not strictly an organ of the Soviet Union's Government. It was in fact a non-governmental, anti-colonial wing of the Non-Aligned movement which had affiliates in a number of countries.[46] The role of such an organisation was therefore not to present official Soviet foreign policy, but may instead be seen as a mechanism by which to send out feelers as to the extent to which possible foreign policy options would be acceptable. As such any statement made by it emanating from the Soviet Union must be regarded with caution if used to interpret Soviet foreign policy on Cyprus. Indeed, the Soviet Union seemed more than a little touchy about any inference of involvement with Makarios at this point. When Denktaş made a claim in January that the Soviet Ambassador had a meeting with Makarios on the evening of 28 December, at which the constitutional issue had been discussed, the Soviet Embassy in Nicosia was quick to reply with the following statement.

> 'The Embassy of the Soviet Union considers it imperative to state that the statement of Mr. Denktash constitutes a big slander and is the result of imagination from beginning to end...this provocative statement aims at taking away the attention of the public opinion from the real causes of the bloody facts in Cyprus.'[47]

However, on 13 January, the same day as the Butler-Erkin meeting was occurring in London prior to the opening of the Conference, Denktaş made another statement in which he played on the West's fear of communist expansion in the region, stating that once the 'Turkish factor' had been removed, there would be, 'a communist coup in Cyprus and it would be a communist base. That is why Cyprus is a Cuba in the

Eastern Mediterranean.' In addition, he once again claimed that Makarios had the backing of the Communists in his proposal to amend the constitution.[48] Indeed, Denktaş had been noted as saying that Makarios deliberately worked to bring the Soviet Union into the Cyprus Crisis. The main point of interest surrounding this argument is the release of a statement to the press condemning any moves made by NATO in Cyprus.

On 29 January the official Soviet *TASS* newsagency, released a statement in which the Government of the Soviet Union noted that the, 'tense situation that has lately developed around Cyprus is a matter of acute concern to the international public.' On the subject of the London Conference, the statement continued by stating that,

> 'They [the Western Powers] are aiming at an encroachment on the freedom and independence of Cyprus...They are busy on a plan for some kind of an international force allegedly to protect Cypriots from Cypriots. The force is presented as an international one, but in reality it proves to be a force of the aggressive military-colonial Nato grouping...It is the major Nato Powers which intend to send the troops to Cyprus, primarily those who are already accustomed to using their troops against the national liberation movement of the peoples...It is claimed that these troops would bring order to Cyprus, protect Cyprus and Cypriots. Do they think in certain western capitals that people...become so obtuse as to believe that a force of this kind could serve such a purpose? Commonsense indicates that a State which for decades sought to subjugate Cyprus, to suppress its population, to maintain its military base there and hence to threaten the neighbouring Arab States is least suited for protecting the people of Cyprus...Certain participants in the London conference on Cyprus are aiming to bring the situation to the point of incandescence...to say that only machineguns, guns and aircraft are the means which can be used for ensuring order on Cyprus.'[49]

In addition a letter was addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by Dr. Fedorenko, the Soviet Union's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, which berated U Thant for having sent an observer to Cyprus, and stated: 'It is the Security Council which, under the charter, is responsible for taking practical measures to maintain international peace and security.'[50]

With regard to Denktaş's allegations that Makarios encouraged the Soviet Union to become involved in Cyprus, there have been many arguments presented discussing whether the Soviets took an interest in the issue out of pure opportunism or whether such opportunism was encouraged by Makarios. There are pros and cons to both views, and answers to this point do not seem to present a split along clear communal lines. Although most Turkish Cypriots assert that Makarios approached the Soviet Union,[51] there are those who see it in terms of each approaching the other at the same time.[52] And although there are those, including one prominent communist figure on the island,[53] who have stated that they believed that Makarios went to the Soviet Union,[54] many Greek Cypriots deny this.[55] But like the Turkish Cypriots, there are those who see the diplomatic process as being two-way in nature.[56] It is this blurred middle ground which seems to present the most convincing answer. If one assesses the debate by incorporating other pieces of evidence then it would seem to be the case that, on balance, Makarios encouraged the Soviet Union, which had itself become interested in the discussions about a possible NATO force. The emphasis must however remain on the fact that Makarios encouraged the Soviet Union, rather than the argument that the Soviet Union deliberately pressured Makarios. Further evidence for this was the fact that the *TASS* statement had noted that '*the Government of Cyprus had informed the Soviet Government*' [emphasis added by the author] that there was now 'a serious danger of aggression against Cyprus.'[57] This fear on the part of the Greek Cypriots could well have been expressed at what was described as a 'long meeting' between the acting-Cypriot Foreign Minister Araouzos and the Soviet Ambassador Yermoshin on 27 January.[58] In addition the fact that the Soviet Union had not become involved earlier

was directly attributed by some press editorials to the fact that the Greek Cypriots had not approached it. For example *Eleftheria* stated 'It is not the fault of the Soviet Union if its representations against foreign intervention in Cyprus has been a little late. The fault lies with the Cyprus Government, which has fallen into the trap of the London Conference by giving faith to promises which have proven false.'[59] In answer to this point one could perhaps state that the Soviet Union's apparent lack of interest until this point had been a result of their caution arising from becoming too concerned with a potential Cold War issue in the aftermath of Cuba. However, and in contrast to this, one may also argue that such concern expressed by the Soviet Union at this point, especially if encouraged by the Greek Cypriots, fits neatly into the pattern of the opportunistic foreign policy that had been followed by the Soviet Union since 1955, and especially since the Cuban Missile Crisis just over a year previously. Indeed, the post-Cuba Soviet foreign policy certainly provides a plausible explanation for the *volte-face* in the attitude of the Soviet Government once the Cypriots wished to bring the Soviet Union into the picture. However, in choosing to respond to a Greek Cypriot approach, the Soviet Union may have viewed their interference as a means of acting on any one, if not all, of three elements inherent in the situation:[60]

(1) an increase in NATO's field of operation beyond its more traditionally defined area to incorporate a Non-Aligned Movement member state,
(2) a chance to embarrass the NATO alliance on the World stage,
(3) The Soviet Union's feelings that any such action should be taken within the United Nations Security Council where they could have a say in the outcome - a point which becomes more plausible if we consider the letter sent to the United Nations' Secretary-General, U Thant.

4. The Anglo-US Peace-keeping Plan

Whatever the reason for the delay, or, for that matter the purpose, of the Soviet Union's statement, are relatively unimportant given that the United Kingdom and the United States finally revealed the details of the plan on 31 January 1964. In doing so it may perhaps be argued that they had decided to interpret the Soviet comments as being a result of Soviet attempts to embarrass the alliance, and not as a result of serious Soviet concern over Cyprus' neutrality, or a lack of UN control.[61] Following a meeting in London between the US Ambassador, David Bruce, and the Greek, Turkish and British Foreign Ministers, the plan was publicly unveiled and proposed that a force of 10,000 drawn from various NATO countries be put in place - a fact that had been stated the previous day in some news reports.[62] Somewhat controversially, given Erkin's comments at the Foreign Office just prior to Turkey's withdrawal from the London Conference, the stated number of 10,000 troops would include a limit to Greece and Turkey's participation in line with the Treaty of Guarantee, with only 950 Greeks and 650 Turks being allowed to be stationed within the Republic of Cyprus. In addition the peace-keeping force would come under a unified British command, with central political authority coming from a committee based in London. With this the United States and the United Kingdom hoped to allay fears of it being a force controlled by the NATO Council. On the basis of this plan, one may therefore note that the proposed force would not be a NATO force *per se* but an action in Cyprus conducted by the individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation who wished to participate.[63] Furthermore, the initial period of the force would be set at a period not exceeding three months.[64]

In Turkey, Foreign Minister Erkin, in accordance with his earlier comments, expressed serious concerns over the issue of troop limitations on the Greek and Turkish contingents to the allied force. However, following an all-night session of the Turkish Cabinet, the Turkish Government announced that they had decided to agree to the plan.[65] Similarly in Greece there had been a Cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos and attended by military and political leaders,[66] after which Foreign Minister Palamas, speaking in London, announced that the Greek Government had also reacted

favourably to the plan.[67]

Needless to say, the plan was almost immediately rejected by the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou.[68] In this Kyprianou was backed by five of the main Cypriot labour organisations, including the Civil Service Association, which denounced any NATO activity in Cyprus and held true to Makarios's line by insisting that the United Nations alone should be responsible for such a force.[69] However, President Makarios initially chose to remain silent on the matter. This was diplomatically achieved by the release of a statement that noted that the Archbishop had not been officially presented with the plan.[70] Yet this was obviously a delaying tactic as Makarios had by this point already made up his mind on the substantive points of the plan. Evidence for this comes from a meeting of the Greek Cypriot Cabinet, held on the morning of 1 February, when the plan was reported to have firmly rejected as being 'totally unacceptable'.[71] Despite this, the next morning acting-British High Commissioner Pickard paid a visit to Makarios at which he officially presented the President with a full set of the draft proposals for the establishment of a peace-keeping force.[72]

With it now looking likely that Makarios would formally reject the proposals, the military position of the Truce Force, which was considered to be very fragile within the overall political situation, was once again highlighted, and the United Kingdom attempted to use this weakness as a bargaining tool with Makarios in order to persuade him to accept the peace-keeping plan. Indeed, Cyril Pickard, by now the acting-High Commissioner in Cyprus, went to see Makarios to deliver a message in which the following appraisal of the situation and plans for action were presented:

> '1. I wish clearly to state that in the view of the British military authorities the situation in the island is such that it is urgently necessary to augment the peace-keeping force. Any delay will be dangerous to the maintenance of peace in the island.
> 2. Any negative response will add to the already tense situation.
> 3. I therefore formally request that in no circumstances should any indication be given to the Press that the Government of Cyprus will reject the proposals now being mutually considered in London. The Government of Cyprus bears a heavy responsibility for the continued maintenance of peace in the island. Its responsibility is not only to the people of Cyprus themselves but also to Britain as the country providing the peace-keeping force.'[73]

Despite the urgency of the appeal no answer was forthcoming and so US Ambassador Wilkins and acting-High Commissioner Pickard made another, joint visit to the President.[74] Yet still Makarios refused to give his answer and therefore several days of tension and speculation began as a formal reply was awaited. Once again the Greek Cypriot press took to attacking the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.[75] One newspaper even went as far as to invoke the spirit of Suez and called upon the Soviet Union to come to the assistance of the Republic of Cyprus.[76] However, and in contrast to the attitude of President Makarios, Vice-President Küçük announced that the Turkish Cypriot community accepted the peace-keeping plan 'in principle', and that a firm reply would be given soon.[77]

Greek Cypriot Political Violence Against the Peace-keeping Proposal

The next day there was a demonstration held in Nicosia by thousands of Greek Cypriot students. Marching past the Embassies of both the United States and the Soviet Union, they chanted anti-NATO slogans, and protested about the proposed allied force by carrying banners proclaiming, '*Down with Nato*', '*Shame on Nato*', and '*Wir Wollen kein neues Berlin*' (We do not want a new Berlin).[78] Although the group was later broken up by Makarios himself, these tensions naturally gave way to further intercommunal fighting. Indeed that day there was another serious incident in Nicosia as a number of Greek Cypriot police crossed the Green-Line near the Paphos gate to the east of the old town. Almost immediately the Truce Force went to the scene where a lieutenant of the Parachute Regiment assisted by

troops of the Royal Artillery managed to disarm the Greek Cypriots all the while trying to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from firing upon the Greeks as they retreated.[79] In what proved to be an unfortunately realistic appraisal, *The Times* stated that following this incident 'concern was being expressed in Nicosia tonight that the growing tension may lead to incidents involving the British Truce Force.'[80] Indeed, the next day, editorials in the Greek Cypriot press stated that the United Kingdom had 'collaborated' with the Turkish Cypriots.[81]

These demonstrations further exemplified the extent to which the Greek Cypriots were adopting a pro-Russian, anti-NATO line in order to have the issue of peace-keeping taken to the United Nations Security Council. In order to counter this, the State Department informed the Foreign Office that they had developed a six-point warning to present to Makarios (as well as Cypriot Permanent Representative Rossides in New York) in order the try to dissuade him from following the recourse to the United Nations. The threats - and that is not too contentious a word in this case - were as follows:

> '(a) If the Archbishop goes to the United Nations the United States Government will take the position that the question is not one of a threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus but of a dispute between two groups within the state.
> (b) The United States will insist that both parties to the dispute should be heard by the Security Council (Mr. Eilts [the US State Department official who communicated the message] said that Mr. Rossides could therefore expect company!).
> (c) In any debate the United States will place the full blame for the situation on Archbishop Makarios personally and contrast his attitude with the constructive attitude shown by Dr. Kutchuk.
> (d) The United States will ask the Security Council to instruct the Secretary-General to mediate the dispute and will express the hope that he will choose a European mediator.
> (e) The United States will oppose any United Nations peace-keeping operation. They will do this on the grounds that in the past it has fallen on them to finance by far the largest part of most U.N. operations of this sort and that the Russians have not so far paid for any.
> (f) If unrest develops in the island and the Turkish Government decide to intervene, the United States Government will take the line that they are perfectly within their rights under the Treaty of Guarantee.'[82]

This particularly strong approach found favour with the British Government who felt that it went a considerable way towards communicating to Makarios the need to avoid any recourse to the United Nations.[83] However the United States soon sent another message through in which they stated that they had dropped point (d) on the basis that this is probably what Makarios would like to see happen, and instead had chosen to include a further point in which they would state that,

> 'If the Cypriots and the Russians try to take the Cyprus question to the General Assembly the American Government does not think that they can get very far because of the liability of the Russians to lose their vote in the General Assembly under Article 19 by reason of their arrears in payment of financial contributions.'[84]

Whether Makarios was given this warning is unclear.[85] In any case on the following day, 4 February, Makarios finally returned his answer. Stating that he had accepted the plan in principle, he nonetheless maintained his position on the question of some form of overall United Nations' Security Council responsibility for the force.[86] Despite the superficially positive aspect of an acceptance, the continued desire to have the matter overseen by the Security Council was a major obstacle to the implementation of the proposal.

Despite the fact that Makarios had agreed to accept the plan in principle, popular feelings against the United States took a drastic turn for the worse. That evening, in a move reminiscent of the EOKA years, two bombs exploded outside the US Embassy in Nicosia.[87] Makarios, in a public statement, stated that, 'the culprits are the worst enemies of Cyprus...they have betrayed their country.'[88] Indeed, the extent to which the Greek Cypriot community was by now relying on the Soviet Union to protect its interests was perhaps beginning to worry the Greek Cypriot leadership. In London, Foreign Minister Kyprianou, in conversation with the Greek Ambassador, allegedly spoke of the fact that he had got the impression that back on the island the Greek Cypriot leadership was 'increasingly worrying about the increase of communist pressure, and the bomb incidents yesterday had clearly scared them.'[89] In addition Kyprianou noted that while 'he was now rather more optimistic, he was depressed by the way in which pro-Communist and pro-Russian sentiments were now being used indiscriminately by all shades of Cypriot political opinion.'[90] Indeed, there were now signs that some factions of the Greek Cypriot media were engaged in trying to moderate the fiery tone of their compatriots.[91] Perhaps with a perception of the need to draw some sections of the Greek Cypriot leadership back towards the West, the United Kingdom and the United States responded to Makarios's conditional acceptance with a statement in which they agreed to UN Security Council authorisation, but only on the condition that the composition and instructions of the force be decided on beforehand.[92]

With this attempted movement forward on the issue of the political control of a peace-keeping operation there was at last a feeling that a credible force might soon be put in place. Yet, a questionable signal as to how much the United Nations Secretariat wanted to avoid a further commitment on its part - thus *de facto* favouring the Anglo-US proposal - came with a statement made by the Secretary-General which made it clear that the Organisation could not afford to foot the bill for any proposed operation even if it did nominally come under United Nations auspices.[93] Indeed, in a highly important move that seemed to indicate the personal support of the United Nations' Secretary-General for the ideas put forward by the United Kingdom and the United States, U Thant deliberately set on record his thanks to the United Kingdom for its efforts since the beginning of the crisis and noted that the **'British actions were fully in accordance with Article 33 of the U.N. Charter - dealing with peaceful settlement of disputes and were "very appropriate".'** [special emphasis added by the author][94] This was followed the next day by meetings between Thant (assisted by his advisor on Cyprus, Ralph Bunche) and the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union at which, 'a lot of ground was covered.'[95]

However any such optimism at the diplomatic level was being tempered by the continuing intercommunal violence across the island which the British troops of the Truce Force had to deal with. For example a press report noted: 'British Parachute troops today [5 February] set up a neutral zone in the village of Ktima, near Paphos, where the situation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was "very, very tense", a British military Spokesman said.'[96] Nearer Nicosia the situation was just as bad, if not worse. The village of Ayios Sozomenos, about fifteen miles south of the city, experienced some of the worst intercommunal fighting of the entire period when a number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were killed or wounded before troops of the 16 Parachute Brigade were able to establish a cease-fire in the village. In spite of this agreement the situation in the village, like Ktima, remained on the verge of another outbreak of violence. Indeed, the intercommunal fighting on the island was getting so bad that there were renewed fears that Turkey might take the opportunity to intervene, in which case certain elements of the Greek armed forces had made it clear that they would make a concerted effort to react.[97]

Yet at this point there was another important consideration to be taken into account with regard to the formation of a NATO-based force: the extent to which NATO members were willing to participate. In the initial plan, as put forward by Greece, the idea was that the force would be made up of contributions from the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy and France. However, the French had maintained a certain degree of disinterest in the proposals, even though the idea for a NATO-based force,

as opposed to a NATO force had been pushed precisely because it was felt to be more favourable to the French.[98] However, on 5 February, the French Government announced that it refused to send troops to participate in the Anglo-US proposed force for Cyprus.[99] The reasons for this were officially cited by M. Peyrefitte, the French Information Minister, as being the result of a lack of desire on the part of France, 'to become involved in an operation based on the Zürich statute, in whose elaboration she did not participate, and which moreover does not seem to her to be capable of lasting forever.'[100]

Two days prior to this, a special conference of the West German Cabinet - that had included the Chief of the *Bundeswehr*[101] - called to discuss some form of participation had adjourned without reaching a decision.[102] By this point the situation was appraised as follows:

> ' The following Governments have agreed in principle to participate; Denmark, The Netherlands, and Belgium. The following have said that they will probably participate and have agreed to start military planning with the War Office through their attaché in London without commitment; Canada.
> 2. The following have agreed to start military planning with the War Office without commitment; Norway and Italy. The following have said that they cannot send troops; France, Portugal and Luxembourg.
> 3. This leaves only the Germans outstanding from the point of view of military planning.'[103]

It was by now clear that there was a degree of interest in the plan being shown by various members of NATO. Despite the fact that France had refused to participate, it looked as if a credible force might yet still be formed. However, the any plans to institute the force was still reliant on a firm acceptance from Makarios, who was against the idea. With pro-Russian sympathy rife in the Greek Cypriot community, if not the Greek Cypriot leadership, the Soviet Union finally took a stand on the issue of a NATO-based force for Cyprus.

5. Khrushchev's 'Offensive' Letter

On 7 February, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko summoned the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Greece and Turkey to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. There he presented each of them with a letter from Chairman Khrushchev. In the letter Khrushchev warned each of the countries that NATO should not interfere in Cyprus. This was in turn backed up with statements expressing both support for Makarios, and for the Cypriots, as well as a clear statement of Soviet backing for United Nations Security Council action.[104] The long Soviet letter to Douglas-Home outlined, in considerable detail, the Soviet position on the Cyprus Issue. In summarising the text, it can be seen as containing the following main points:[i] ([105])

- That the situation in Cyprus is essentially a problem between the majority Greek population and minority Turkish population, and that this difference is being exploited by other countries to become involved in the internal affairs of the independent Republic of Cyprus.
- That those outside powers are, 'trampling on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the universally accepted norms of International Law', in the search for a solution that suits them, and not the Cypriots.
- That this '"solution"' is an attempt aimed at the 'factual occupation by the armed forces of N.A.T.O. of the Republic of Cyprus'.

[i] The full text of the letter can be found in Appendix C.

- That a small state such as Cyprus, even though it may not possess atomic weapons, is as important as those states that do, and that the Cypriots alone should be the ones to sort out their problems.
- That open discussion of the Cyprus issue in the UN Security Council is being directly opposed, even in the face of Cypriot requests, and that everything is being done to intimidate and threaten the Republic of Cyprus in an attempt to pressure it to drop such proposals.
- That the Soviet Government condemns such actions and asked that the US and Great Britain show restraint in their actions, and consider the effects and consequences of a 'military invasion'.
- That, 'the area of the Eastern Mediterranean...[is] an area which is not so far removed from the Southern frontiers of the U.S.S.R., especially if account is taken of how the concept of distance has changed in our time.'
- That the various international Statesmen involved in the Cyprus issue would be far better employed if they put their best efforts to prevent further outside intervention in the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.

This action clearly went beyond the boundaries of trying to embarrass the NATO alliance. It was a clear show of the Soviet Union's political intention to force a recourse to the United Nations over the issue.[106] The fact that they had so pointedly accused NATO of trying to manipulate the situation to gain ground for military purposes threatened to have severe consequences for the British troops engaged in the Truce Force. The United Kingdom, furious about the allegations, claimed that not only had Khrushchev totally misrepresented the situation, but that by doing so had made matters worse. Although the press were not informed as to whether Douglas-Home would reply to the letter,[107] the Prime Minister did in fact respond quickly, sending his reply the next day, 8 February. The decision to reply so quickly was made because 'the Prime Minister and I [possibly Butler] consider that this requires a quick and plain reply. We do not think it is worth taking Khrushchev up in detail but prefer to drive home the simple fact that he is mischief making and that we are not prepared to take this sort of thing from him.'[108] Without consulting with the United States Government,[109] Douglas-Home in his letter of reply stated:

> 'Dear Mr. Chairman,
>
> I will not conceal from you that I have been surprised and disappointed to receive the message which you sent me on February 7 about the situation in Cyprus. I am surprised that the Soviet Government should have formed a view of this question which is so divorced from reality and I am disappointed that, on the basis of that view, you have seen fit to make charges which are as offensive as they are unfounded.
>
> Her Majesty's Government have one object in Cyprus. This is to help maintain peace and security of the island. This was why we acceded to the request of the Government of Cyprus for the help of British troops in maintaining order. This is why, in consultation with other governments whose interest in a peaceful solution of the island's problems is beyond question, we have been seeking agreement of all concerned on further measures to assist the Cypriots in the task of preserving their security. In all this there is no question, as you claim, of infringing the sovereignty, independence and freedom of a small state. I must say frankly, Mr. Chairman, that this is a matter on which the British Government and people consider that they know without prompting how they should conduct themselves in accordance with their Commonwealth traditions and in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.
>
> I sincerely hope that you will, on reconsideration, understand that the motives and actions of the British Government are not the motives and actions described in your message. I share entirely your view that the situation in Cyprus can only be made more difficult if passions

are roused, especially when this is the result of external influences. This view has governed and will govern the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) Alec Douglas-Home'[110]

6. The JTF Begins to Break Down

The fact that Douglas-Home had replied so swiftly to the communication from Khrushchev did not reduce the damage incurred from Khrushchev's letter. Though a statement on the search for a NATO-based force, and not a direct reference to the Truce Force, the letter nonetheless put the British troops of the JTF in a position of potential danger. For example there was an incident soon thereafter between the Force and local Greek Cypriot police in Larnaca when the police questioned the rights of the Truce Force to conduct checks and searches.[111] This led to Greek Cypriot criticisms of the political guidance that was been given to the JTF. [112] Indeed, the next day at a rally in Nicosia Dr. Dervis stated that the intention of the United Kingdom and the United States was, 'to invade Cyprus under the cover of NATO.'[113]

In order to counter the problem of a possible Greek Cypriot backlash the British Government, despite the extreme manpower pressures already being felt, decided to increase further their troops numbers in Cyprus by sending the 1st Battalion Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment from their position in Malta.[114] In other words, the United Kingdom was being forced to send more troops in an effort to ensure the operational security of the Truce Force. However, this simply made Greek Cypriot perceptions of British attempts to influence the situation by overt military means even worse. A spiral of escalation was now fully in place, and would need to be broken quickly.

With such an increase in violence, the fear that Makarios, now bolstered by Soviet support, might reject the slightly revised peace-keeping plan now forced the British Government once again to reappraise the options for the creation of a peace-keeping force. By this point the United Kingdom seemed to have become increasingly weary of its unilateral action in Cyprus and old options were dusted off within the corridors of Whitehall. Once more two proposals of specific peace-keeping plans stood out - both of which had been rejected on a number of other occasions - (a) a Commonwealth force, and (b) an United Nations force. Of the two the British Government seemed to be more interested in the idea of a Commonwealth force, an idea that had been rejected on numerous occasions in the previous month. In a draft policy document on the subject it was stated that this idea could be acceptable as,

'Archbishop Makarios has himself all along said that he would welcome a Commonwealth force. One means of procedure might therefore be to say to him that, since he has refused the offer we have put, he must make his own arrangements to obtain the sort of force he wants. If this is to be from the Commonwealth it is up to him to make approaches to those countries from which he would wish to obtain troops. We would undertake to support his request in the Commonwealth capitals concerned and would offer to provide the commander and command structure for a Commonwealth force, on the understanding that a force sufficient for the requirements of peace-keeping could be produced. The Archbishop could either ask the Security Council to take note by consensus of its formation or alternatively he could ask the Security Council to pass a resolution approving its despatch to Cyprus. Although the Americans have been opposed to this idea in respect to the allied force, we would have no particular objection to it ourselves. Insofar as it could possibly be argued that the effect of such a resolution would be to increase the degree of United Nations responsibility for the force, this would seem a good thing.

The principal difficulty with this solution is the likelihood that it will in fact prove

> impossible to assemble a sufficiently large or sufficiently varied Commonwealth force (on the latter point it would seem desirable that there should be a minimum of three other participating countries in addition to ourselves.'[115]

Although Canada looked to agree to participate given the fact that it had shown some desire to become involved in the NATO-based peace-keeping force, the problems that had been outlined before with regard to other participants in a Commonwealth force still seemed to remain. To this extent the pragmatic option of a United Nations Force needed to be examined once again. On this subject of discussion the British Government considered there to be a number of organisational problems facing this option, of which the main practical obstacle was by now the difficulty of financing the force.[116] If the Greek Cypriots did make a move to the United Nations, then it was more than likely that the United States would, in line with their earlier statement to Makarios, refuse to finance any resulting force, in which case the financial burden would be borne by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.[117] The next problem would be that of structuring the force. If the matter was put before the United Nations then any such structure would most likely be undertaken by the Secretary-General,[118] and that would mean that the doctrine of universality with regard to potential contributors would be applied. However, the British Government by this point considered that the presence of Eastern European countries, or Afro-Asian bloc, would, likely as not, be prevented by Greek Cypriot prejudices.[119] The final problem was that, under the rules set in place by Hammarskjöld during the Suez Crisis, the United Kingdom would in all probability be wholly excluded from such a force, not least because the United Kingdom had a direct interest in the problem.[120] In perhaps the most telling words of the general feeling within the British Government on the subject of peace-keeping at this point it was stated:

> **'It would therefore seem to be in our own interests to go for a Commonwealth force...should this prove impossible to produce, however, it would seem preferable to accept a United Nations force rather than continue to bear the whole burden of peacekeeping on our own.'**[121]

However, any such decision to advance on a plan to institute peace-keeping by an international organisation other than the United Nations was not solely limited to the issue of British acceptance. More importantly, the Turkish Government had to be persuaded to accept it. Yet possible deadlock to the plan arising from Turkish intransigence over the introduction of a United Nations force was broken when Turkey announced, on 10 January, its acquiescence to a plan to link the idea of an international force with the United Nations rather than specifically to NATO countries. The only provision attached to this was the Turkish Government's insistence that there be Turkish troops in the force.[122] Despite this change on the part of the Turks, the United States was still judged to be less than likely to accept any move away from the suggested NATO-based peace-keeping plan towards a United Nations force.[123] In any case, the genesis of a United Nations peace-keeping force as a serious proposal had now come about.

Indeed, the Greek Cypriots remained firm in their intention to see a peace-keeping force that was solely under the authority of the United Nations. Therefore even the 'improved' plan of a peace-keeping force sanctioned, though not controlled, by the United Nations had fallen short of their expectations. Although it omitted the term NATO, it had in fact only mentioned the vague term of seeking a "consensus of approval" from the Security Council for the plan.[124] Unaware that the British Government was itself looking seriously at the creation of a United Nations force, the fact that five NATO members - Canada, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway[125] - had already come forward to state publicly their intention to send contingents to join an United Nations force if it were put in place must no doubt have worried President Makarios, as it was now increasingly looking as though a United Nations force would, by default of the contingents ready and available to participate, present a NATO based force even

if the term NATO was omitted. Perhaps with this in mind he once again suggested, in an about turn, that the previously rejected idea of creating a Commonwealth force be investigated further.

7. The United States Takes the Lead in Diplomacy

Although the British Government was becoming ever more in favour of both the Commonwealth and the United Nations options as possible means of extricating itself from its role in Cyprus, the United States remained intent on pursuing the original plan for a peace-keeping force. With the United Kingdom's support obviously wavering, the United States now took the prominent role in trying to get Makarios to accept the proposal. To this end, President Johnson despatched an envoy - Undersecretary George Ball of the State Department - to the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, such was this change in the attitude of the United States, that *The Economist* saw fit to comment that: 'Not much is now seen of the initial American irritation that the British should have needed American help at all. What remains is an air of harassment.'[126]

On 11 February, Ball met with Prime Minister İnönü, who insisted that in his opinion federation remained the best solution to the continuing situation in Cyprus.[127] This was followed immediately by a trip to Greece where the Undersecretary discussed the Cyprus Crisis with Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos. In the event, this round of shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara seemed to provide lop-sided results. Although the Turkish Government expressed their continued acquiescence to the Anglo-American plan, this was being tempered by a lack of commitment on the part of the Greek Government who by now refused to accept any plan without prior approval from Makarios.[128] With this in mind Ball now went to Nicosia.

Noticeable in amongst this round of shuttle-diplomacy was the fact that a representative of the British Government was absent. George Ball had in fact invited the Commonwealth Relations Secretary to join him on the trip, but the offer had been declined. This refusal was attributed by Ball to be, '...out of a desire to limit Britain's responsibility.'[129] Indeed, the British Government, evidently concerned that the end of the road may have been reached in attempting to keep the matter out of the United Nations Security Council, at this point approached the United Nations' Secretary-General for consultations. On 12 February, Foreign Secretary Butler paid a personal visit to UN Secretary-General Thant in New York. Once there, he reportedly discussed a course of action to be adopted in the event of a further rejection by Makarios of the peace-keeping plan after his meeting with Ball, due to take place the next day.[130]

The Ball Mission to Cyprus

When Undersecretary Ball arrived on the island, the situation in Cyprus was extremely tense as there had been a large-scale outbreak of intercommunal violence in the major coastal city of Limassol - which had previously been calm - over the preceding three days. This situation had developed after a number of Turkish Cypriot irregulars had made several attempts to capture Limassol castle as well as set up fortified positions in and around the Turkish quarter of town.[131] The fighting had eventually been stopped after members of the Truce Force took Mr. Veniamin, the District Officer, to meet with the town's Turkish Cypriot leader, Ramadan Djemil, and a cease-fire agreement had been reached.[132] Despite the fact that the main bout of fighting appeared to be over by the time of Ball's appearance, this serious event had in many ways set the stage for his meeting with Makarios, scheduled for the next day.

At about one in the afternoon (Cyprus time) on 13 February Ball contacted Rusk back in the United States to discuss the course of action to be taken with Makarios. Noting that the situation in Cyprus was 'deteriorating', and that the cease-fire agreement in Limassol had just broken down,[133] Ball stated that: 'our one hope of salvaging much from the present situation is for me to take a very tough line.'[134] Rusk, agreeing with this decision, praised the continuing role of Cyril Pickard, the British High Commissioner, in presenting the Anglo-US position. However, it by now appeared as if Makarios had

'delivered himself into the hands of local gangsters and that even a large force might be insufficient to restore order so long as Government does not want to maintain its responsibilities.'[135] Ball responded by stating: 'the real difficulty of course is that he does not want an international force and his bloody minded colleagues would much prefer to leave situation as it is so that they can conduct their murderous activities with impunity. However, I shall hit him hard on this this afternoon.'[136]

At the two meetings between Makarios and Ball, which were also attended by Pickard, the Undersecretary took a very hardline position As he notes in his memoirs:

> '[I described] in lurid detail the consequences if he [Makarios] persisted in his cruel and reckless conduct. The Turks, I said, would inevitably invade, and neither the United States nor any other Western power would raise a finger to stop them. Though Makarios tried to conceal his discomfiture, I had the odd feeling as we left the room that, as I reported to the President, "even his beard seemed pale".'[137]

In a report sent back to London, Ball notes that he had called on Makarios as a man of God as well as a Head of State to accept the plan, however,

> 'at the conclusion of my speech he said sadly and emotionally that he has to go to the SC [Security Council] because of commitments that had been made. Otherwise, he made clear, his government would be not only out but dead -- in fact, he said later in the presence of certain of his ministers, that, if he does not go to the Security Council, "some of those present in this room will not have their heads on their shoulders." Nobody smiled'[138]

It was by now obvious that the Greek Cypriots had made their minds up that the Security Council was the only viable option left open. However, the Undersecretary proved to be unfazed by the reaction. Instead, Ball improvised another set of proposals for a peace-keeping force which he immediately put to Makarios. In a report to London he explained them as follows:

> '1. The GOC [Government of Cyprus] would hold up going to the SC until the latter part of next week.
> 2. Meanwhile the US, and hopefully the UK would put their full energies to the establishment of a force drawn from the UK, India, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland -- and, "if necessary", Sweden.
> 3. The Greek and Turkish contingents would not be included in this force, but they would remain on the island.
> 4. The terms of reference of the force would be to "assist the Cypriot Government in restoring law and order and normal conditions". We shall insist dropping out the words "the Cypriot Government."[ii]
> 5. We had long hassle on the mechanics for guidance. The best proposal I could evolve with him was that guidance would be under chairmanship of the representative of the UNSYG [United Nations Secretary-General] who is now on the island or of some other representative of the UNSYG who would be sent for this purpose.
> 6. We had a major argument on the last point. Makarios insisted that he be the chairman of the

[ii] It is important to note that this statement seems clearly to indicate that the United States had by this point recognised the Greek Cypriot leadership as the Government of Cyprus, and that the threat to withdraw this recognition was being used as a stick to get them to agree to the proposals. (Rather than the promise to recognise them being used as a carrot for such a purpose.)

> committee providing political guidance; otherwise he could not explain it to his people. Alternatively, he would accept his own Minister of Justice. I made it categorically clear that any plan was impossible if his government provided the chairmanship of the committee.'[139]

Although Makarios at this point called in three senior members of the Greek Cypriot Government who had a legal training - Glafkos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Spyros Kyprianou - to discuss the plan, the situation did not look hopeful. Indeed, Makarios called Ball back to his office later that evening and presented the Undersecretary with a new set of counter-proposals that had been drawn up by the three ministers.[140] In the document the Greek Cypriots made clear their intention to seek a recourse to the United Nations Security Council to obtain a resolution: 'calling upon all states to refrain from any act of aggression or from the use of any threat of aggression against, or from any action which may tend to undermine, the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Cyprus.'[141] Once this had been done a force, according to the principles outlined by Ball, would be created.[142] Ball, in an attempt to change their minds, called on them all to sleep on the various plans before meeting again the next morning to discuss them.[143]

However, it was now more than obvious that the Ball mission had failed. Although the Archbishop's final answer was still pending, the United States now saw there to be two further options. Either Ball could return to Ankara and Athens for further consultation, or Sandys could call a conference in London.[144] President Johnson supported the latter option as did Douglas-Home and Butler who both agreed to support Sandys if he went ahead in arranging such a conference between the Turkish and the Greek Governments.[145] However, the hopelessness of the situation was summed-up in a message received from Undersecretary Ball. In it he said that he would now visit Ankara, in order to prevent the Turks from invading, and not to try to sell them a new plan, and that afterwards he would visit Athens, 'for reasons of politeness.'[146] With this, the United States now seemed to have accepted the inevitability of a Greek Cypriot recourse to the Security Council. To this extent the State Department explained that if this came about '[the United States w]ould resist any resolution which undermined the Guarantor Powers or the Zurich Agreement. The Americans did not mind a "waffly" resolution (e.g., a resolution calling for no aggression against Cyprus) since nobody would pay attention to it.'[147]

8. Makarios Rejects the Ball Proposals

On the morning of 14 February Makarios told Ball that he had decided to reject the new proposal.[148] The Archbishop had decided - in light of the domestic political situation within the Greek Cypriot community - that it was imperative that he pursue a debate at the United Nations Security Council.[149] Once the rejection of the proposal became public Dr. Küçük again stated his belief that Turkey had a duty to intervene to protect the evermore beleaguered Turkish Cypriot community on the island. This comment aroused considerable concern as Turkey was reported to be once more gathering its Navy at the port of Iskenderun.[150] Indeed, the situation was now such that a full-scale civil war seemed to be looming large and that such intervention would become necessary. The renewed fighting in Limassol to which Ball had referred to in his telegrams of 13 February had been intense, and although it fortunately had not resulted in large-scale casualties,[151] it did nonetheless prove to be a source of concern. Furthermore, political negotiations between Minister of the Interior Yiorgadjis and Ramadan Djemil, a Turkish Cypriot leader in the city, had meant that in the difficult political climate that existed by this point the Truce Force had been forced to sit back and watch until a cease-fire agreement could be negotiated in the early evening. However, this agreement was broken by Greek Cypriot fighters in the early hours of the morning of 14 February. Deeply concerned about the continuing situation in Limassol, especially after the announcement that the Ball-Makarios meetings had now failed in entirety, the British High Commissioner, Cyril Pickard, sent a note to Makarios that indicated his thinking on the events. Laying

the blame firmly at the door of the Greek Cypriots, the letter stated:

> 'I propose now to make certain recommendations to my Government as to its future course of action. Despite reiterated assurances by the President that the forces of the State would not fight even if provoked, and a specific assurance by the Minister of the Interior last night of a cease fire in Limassol, at 6 a.m. this morning the Government of Cyprus forces launched a heavy attack. So far 150 casualties have been reported. Although a cease fire is now precariously maintained, we cannot ensure peace unless we occupy certain posts, in particular the Turkish Community Centre, the Castle and the Keo factory, and have the right to patrol. These arrangements have been refused by the Cypriot authorities. This, taken together with the reluctance of the Government to agree to the necessary peace-keeping forces and its policies as now explained, leads me to the conclusion that despite all assurances it is the policy of the Government of Cyprus to attempt to suppress the Turkish population by armed force. This makes any attempt at peace-keeping quite impossible. Unless I now have categorical assurances to the contrary, and these assurances are translated into immediate and public action, I propose to make recommendations to my Government on the basis of this conclusion.'[152]

General Carver becomes Commander of the Truce Force

The outbreak of serious fighting in Limassol and the inability of the JTF to handle such intercommunal strife had profoundly demonstrated that the Truce Force's ability to counter any outbreaks of fighting had diminished significantly. This had no doubt been assisted by the numerous attacks made on the Force in the Greek Cypriot press.[153] Indeed, three days earlier, in what amounted to one of the most serious incidents concerning the Truce Force, a British soldier had been forced to fire a number of warning shots over the heads of demonstrators in what was the first incident of its kind since the troops had first been deployed in December.[154] The viability of the Truce Force was now seriously in doubt. If the force was to regain the initiative it would have to be restructured to meet the organisational pressures that had now developed as a consequence of island wide fighting.

With this in mind, and despite the tacit threat to withdraw the British forces as indicated in Pickard's note to Makarios, the British Government replaced Major-General Young as Commander of the Joint Truce Force. Returning to his duties as GOC Cyprus District, General Young - who had in fact been well regarded by the Greek Cypriots[155] - was replaced by Major-General Michael Carver who arrived on the same day as the Pickard note was delivered. Almost immediately, Carver aroused the suspicions of the Greek Cypriot leadership as he attempted to change the Truce Force from an *ad hoc* humanitarian action into a full-scale military force.[156] Indeed, with General Carver came the divisional headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division - the principal operation army headquarters of the United Kingdom Strategic Reserve. Although there were some comments that tried to link Young's replacement to criticisms about the way in which he had handled the Limassol fighting,[157] the official reason for this change-over of command was cited as follows:

> 'The urgency of establishing the Joint Force made [the appointment of General Young] necessary as a short-term arrangement, but it was recognised that if, in the absence of an early political solution, the life of the Joint Force had to be prolonged, it would be essential to appoint a full time commander. This has now been done.'[158]

The replacement of General Young by Carver was done in order to facilitate a general restructuring of the force needed in light of the events of the previous few weeks. Throughout the month of February, there had been a steady increase in the number of troops arriving in Cyprus and this had seen a corresponding increase the number of men participating in the force. In addition to the battalion from

Malta, two armoured car squadrons of the Life Guards, the 26th Regiment; Royal Artillery, the 1st Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and a squadron of the Royal Dragoons had by now arrived for duty in the island. With these new troops the total number of men in Cyprus participating in the Truce Force now lay at around 7,000.[159] Although General Carver was not due officially to replace General Young until the 19 February,[160] on his arrival Carver began the process by which the force was restructured in such a way as to place two intermediate headquarters between Carver's Divisional HG and the troops in the field carrying out operations. To this extent the island of Cyprus was divided into two areas; the Eastern and the Western Tactical Headquarters. According to defence commentators writing at the time, this change meant that British troops serving on the island would now be able to react more quickly to local disturbances.[161] However, this expansion of operations in Cyprus placed Britain in a very tight position as regarded its overall worldwide position. As *The Times* noted: 'with the departure of the HQ [3rd Division], the UK Strategic Reserve is now, for all practical purposes, totally committed to operations outside the United Kingdom.'[162] With the departure of this important part of the United Kingdom's military structure Britain would now be unable to counter any new threats that could arise elsewhere on the international stage.

9. The United Kingdom Moves to the Security Council

In light, or even despite, of this pressure on Britain's military capabilities Undersecretary Ball made a final last-ditch attempt to secure a peace-keeping force within the bounds of the West. Under a new plan put to the British Government, the United States suggested that Makarios and the Greek Cypriot Government be bypassed. Instead, the Guarantor Powers would form a new tri-partite peace-keeping force in Cyprus. Ball, explaining the operational mechanics of the proposal, stated:

> 'All patrols would be organised on the pattern followed in Vienna during the four-power occupation after World War II - only this time, three, rather than four, men in a jeep - and all operations would be conducted together. The force would stay in Cyprus until an effective international force, within the framework of the United Nations, had not only been created but was actually on the Ground, or until a political settlement had "been reached and translated into a viable organic document."...If the British went along with my scheme, I had no doubt that Inonu would accept it. But the British wanted above all to divest themselves of responsibility for Cyprus; my scheme would reinject them into the mess.'[163]

However, by this point the difficulties inherent in peace-keeping in an increasingly unfriendly, if not hostile, environment[164] ensured that the British Government had had enough. On 15 February 1964, the British Government, in a policy shift that surprised most external parties, took the step of addressing a letter to the President of the Security Council in which it presented an overview of the situation in the island and noted:

> '[S]ecurity in the island of Cyprus has seriously deteriorated and tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities has risen gravely. This deterioration culminated in a serious act of violence in the town of Limassol on 12 February 1964. In these grave circumstances, I have been instructed by my Government to request that an early meeting of the Security Council be called to consider this urgent matter and to take appropriate steps to ensure that the dangerous situation that now prevails can be resolved with a full regard to the rights and responsibilities of both the Cypriot communities, of the Government of Cyprus and of the Governments party to the Treaty of Guarantee.'[165]

With this letter the matter of the formation of an international peace-keeping force for Cyprus was now moved to the United Nations Security Council in New York.

Summary of Chapter IV

The situation in Cyprus during this period is best characterised by the interaction of the United States and the United Kingdom with the Greek Cypriots and the Soviet Union in the context of a search for a viable peace-keeping force for the island. The involvement of the Superpowers in this period marked a shift from their respective positions during the initial period reviewed in the last chapter. In the first instance the United States was brought into the situation following the United Kingdom's move to widen the Joint Truce Force under the terms of the Anglo-Greek proposal for a NATO-based peace-keeping force. Although intitially reticent about any such involvement, the United States soon took a prominent part in the process.

However, the NATO option was not favoured by the Greek Cypriots who felt that any NATO involvement would be naturally skewed in favour of Turkey - a factor that would, in turn, result in the partition of the island. Thus Makarios, manipulating latent concern about the situation in the Soviet Union, moved to bring about a Soviet interest in the Cyprus situation. Conducting a clear diplomatic campaign, Makarios created a Cold War bi-polarity on the issue of a peace-keeping force for Cyprus. This approach initially paid dividends to the Greek Cypriots as the Soviet Union began to exert some pressure to prevent any NATO involvement in the affairs of the island. A strategy that culminated in a letter from Chairman Khrushchev to a number of NATO leaders in which he warned of the possible consequences arising from an attempt to force the peace-keeping proposal upon the Greek Cypriots. However, there is perhaps a temptation to make too much out of the role played by the Soviet Union. In the first instance it must be remembered that the initial Soviet statement was ignored by the United States and the United Kingdom. In the second instance, when the letter from Khrushchev was sent there is a good case to be made that by this point the opinion of several NATO members - the most important of which was France, which had challenged the viability of the Zürich Agreement - were against becoming involved. Therefore, it is perhaps better to interpret Khrushchev's letter as the straw that broke the camel's back, rather than see it as the sole factor blocking the NATO-based force.

In any case, the deadlock on the issue of the peace-keeping plans, especially following the Soviet intervention, was such that the British Government sought, and successfully managed, to relinquish its responsibility for overall peace-making with regard to Cyprus. Instead the United Kingdom focussed on its role within the Truce Force, and although it assisted in reworking the peace-keeping plan, it also continued to investigate alternatives such as Commonwealth or United Nations' peace-keeping. This change in British attitudes was reflected in the way in which they avoided the chance to send a representative to accompany George Ball on his mission to Cyprus. Indeed, for the United States the overall effect of the way in which the plans for a NATO-based force had been rejected by the Greek Cypriots, albeit with some, though not necessarily substantively important, assistance from the Soviet Union, changed the way Ball eventually approached Makarios on his visit to Nicosia. Rather than dictate the terms of the allied force agreement the US Undersecretary tried to cajole the Greek Cypriots towards the idea of the allied police force by using threats of a Turkish invasion.

However, when this attempt to introduce the NATO-based force failed the United States came to realise that the end of the road on the NATO-based peace-keeping proposal had been reached. The United Kingdom, seeing this in advance of the United States had already considered the options available. The Truce Force in Cyprus was at its uppermost manpower limit and the situation on the island, despite best British attempts to halt the fighting, seemed to be descending towards outright civil war. Thus, when the Ball mission failed, the British Government took the important, and somewhat unexpected, step of moving the issue to the Security Council in advance of a Greek Cypriot request

thereby securing for the United Kingdom the procedural advantage.

Endnotes to Chapter IV

1. Ball, George; *The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs*; (London: WW Norton & Company, 1982) p.340

2. In a Cabinet meeting held on 28 January 1964, the Commonwealth Secretary noted 'if it becomes impracticable to create a force drawn from member countries of NATO, it might become necessary to move to the United Nations to establish a military presence in the Island, in order to maintain law and order and to enforce the political solution, whatever it might prove to be. This course, however, was open to certain objections.' Cabinet Meeting, C.M. 7(64), 28 January 1964, *CAB 128/38*

3. The two options were by now being discussed in tandem. See, *inter alia*, 'Cyprus: Action should Conference Fail', 24 January 1964, *FO 371/174746* and 'Cyprus', *FO 371/174746*

4. Ball, *op.cit.*, p.341. This is substantiated by a telegram sent from the UN Headquarters to the Foreign Office in which Sir Patrick Dean stated 'Stevenson has just told me that he has been kept fully informed about the conversations between Sir D. Ormsby Gore and Mr. Rusk, and that he entirely agrees with our proposal for an early dispatch of a force drawn from individual NATO countries is by far the best...Stevenson is therefore urging President Johnson (or so he says) both to accept our proposal and also to consider sending, with us if we agree and possibly with the Turkish and Greek Governments also, strong messages to Makarios to support our proposal without delay and to agree to receiving reinforcements drawn from individual NATO Governments to help in keeping the peace and lessening tension.' Telegram from UKMIS UN New York to FO, No.122, 25 January 1964, *PREM 11/4704*

5. Ball; *The Past has Another Pattern*; *op.cit.*, p.341

6. *Ibid.*, p.341

7. 'Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the United States Attorney-General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, at Chequers at 2.30 P.M. on Sunday, January 26, 1964.' *PREM 11/4704*

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. 'Extract from a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the United States Attorney-General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, at 10 Downing Street, at 11.00 a.m. on Monday, January 27 1964.' *PREM 11/4704*. See also *The Times*, 28 December 1963

13. *Ibid.*

14. *The New York Times*, 28 January 1964. When a US State Department official was asked if the United States had already agreed to take part in the action, the reply noted that although the US was reviewing, 'the entire range of problems in Cyprus...we have not agreed to anything yet.' *The Cyprus Mail*, 30

January 1964

15. Ball; *The Past has Another Pattern*; *op.cit.*, p.341

16. *The New York Times*, 29 January 1964

17. *Reuter*, 28 January 1964. See also Adams, Thomas W. & Cotterill, Alvin J.; *Cyprus Between East and West*; Studies in International Affairs Number 7, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, p.61

18. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.475, 28 January 1964, *FO 371/174747*. This seems to contradict the Minister's statement outside the Foreign office made to waiting reporters. 'Turkey has decided "in principle" to withdraw from the present London Conference on Cyprus, Mr Erkin, Turkey's Foreign Minister, said here today. The Foreign Minister was speaking when he arrived at the Foreign Office before a meeting with Mr Butler, British Foreign Secretary. Asked about reports that Turkey would withdraw from the Cyprus Conference, he replied: "There is a decision in principle to withdraw"...Asked if he would have anything further to say after his talks with the Foreign Secretary, he replied: "It all depends".' *Reuter*, 28 January 1964

19. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.475, 28 January 1964, *op.cit.* The role of the commander-in-chief had in fact been a central item of discussion in Washington, see 'Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Force', in *FO 371/174747* and telegram from FO to Washington, No.1325, 27 January 1964, *FO 371/174747*

20. Telegram from FO to Ankara, No.475, 28 January 1964, *op.cit.*

21. *The Times* obviously took this to mean that the Turkish Delegation would be staying, as it reported as such in its edition the next morning. *The Times*, 29 February 1964

22. *The New York Times*, 29 January 1964

23. *The Cyprus Mail*, 30 January 1964

24. Clerides, Glafkos; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; Volume 1 (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing) pp.314-315

25. *Ibid.*, pp.300-301

26. *Ibid.*, p.323. Although Clerides stated that there was a 'school of thought and certainly there are still people who believe that the proposal for the establishment of a NATO peace-keeping force' there appear to be few who would admit to such a sentiment. In my discussions with a number of people, commentators and politicians alike, I have been presented with the universal view that NATO would have always favoured Turkey for the same organisational reasons presented by Clerides.

27. *Ibid.*, p.305

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Makhi*, 28 January 1964

30. *Eleftheria*, 28 January 1964

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Haravghi*, 29 January 1964

33. 'Only UN can solve the problem' *Eleftheria*, 29 January 1964. 'UN over NATO' *Phileleftheros*, 29 January 1964. See the general Greek Cypriot press on 30 January 1964. In addition, 'NATO force a 'Trojan Horse' for Turkey' *Phileleftheros*, 31 January 1964, and *Eleftheria* spoke of a NATO 'conspiracy', *Eleftheria*, 31 January 1964.

34. The right-wing pro-*enosis* newspaper *Makhi* stated that Turkey would face another Suez if it tried to invade Cyprus and that 'Russia will be better able to provide its support to Cyprus than it was in the case of Suez', *Makhi*, 29 January 1964.

35. However, at this point the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Duncan Sandys, in an oral answer to the House of Common on 30 January 1964, House of Commons, Official record of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Fifth Series-Volume 688, Period from 27 January-7 February 1964, p.518. However, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations declined to go into greater detail about the exact composition of the force, or what countries, including Commonwealth, had been consulted.

36. *The New York Times*, 31 January 1964

37. *The Cyprus Mail*, 31 January 1964

38. The Soviet Union delivered a letter to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow on 31 December 1963 in which the Soviet Union 'considered the disagreements between the two communities in the island were an internal affair of Cyprus, that any intervention would be a violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus and would create a grave situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.' British Embassy covering letter to the official Turkish reply to the Soviet letter submitted to the Foreign Office, *FO 371/174747*. The Turkish reply amounted to a restatement of Turkish aims and rights with regard to the Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus. Letter to the Soviet embassy in Ankara, *FO 371/174747*

39. The relative unimportance attached to this message by the British Government can be seen from the fact that although the Prime Minister thought that a reply might be in order he was advised against doing so as, 'there is nothing surprising in the Soviet message; it is an entirely standard statement of the attitude which the Soviet Union can be expected to adopt in situations of this kind...There might be considerable disadvantage in giving the Soviet Union a pretext for opening a round of correspondence on an issue with which they are not really concerned...Since the Soviet attitude has so far been reasonably restrained we would be wiser to give them no opening which might encourage them to interfere.' *FO 371/174745*. This advice was accepted by the Prime Minister in a letter dated 3 January 1964, *ibid.*

40. *The Cyprus Mail*, 3 January 1964

41. *Ibid.*

42. At this point I would like to thank Professor Richard Sakwa at the University of Kent at Canterbury for his very helpful advice and comments with regard to general aspects of Soviet Foreign Policy decision making during this period.

43. Gromyko later stated that: 'From the *very* beginning the Soviet Union came out in defence of the inalienable rights of the state of Cyprus.' [emphasis added by the author] Gromyko, A.A.; *Only for Peace*; (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), p.130. On evidence, as we have seen, this statement was not entirely true. However, this may stand as a vindication of Foreign Minister Gromyko - and by default the Soviet Union - as he had in fact shown an interest from the earliest point in the crisis.

44. *The Cyprus Mail*, 15 January 1964

45. *Ibid.*

46. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, former Vice-President of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

47. *The Cyprus Mail*, 19 January 1964

48. *Reuter*, 13 January 1964

49. *Reuter*, 30 January 1964

50. 'Letter dated 29 January 1964 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5526

51. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996. Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

52. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996. Zaim Necatigil, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

53. Andreas Ziartides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 20 September 1996.

54. Among the more prominent writers on Cyprus who have supported this view see Coufoudakis, Van; 'United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A Case Study in Cold War Diplomacy'; in Attalides, Michael A. (ed.); *Cyprus Reviewed: The Result of a Seminar on the Cyprus Problem Held in June 3-6 1976 by the Jus Cypri Association and the Coordinating Committee of Scientific and Cultural Organisations*; (Nicosia: The Jus Cypri Association, 1976), p.112. Joseph, Joseph S.; 'The UN as an Instrument of National Policy: The Case of Cyprus'; *The Cyprus Review*, Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 1989, p.49. Perhaps the most important comment on the issue comes from the former Greek Consul-General in Cyprus during the EOKA years who goes as far as to identify when the approach was made: 'On 27 January 1964 the Archbishop - bearing in mind that Greece has very limited possibilities of acting effectively not only for bringing the situation under control but also for warding off worse developments - makes a serious mistake. The Acting Minister of Foreign affairs in Cyprus, Araouzos, seeks from the Ambassador of the USSR in Cyprus the assistance of Moscow.' See Vlachos, Angelos; *Deka Chronia Kypriakou*; (Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem), (Athens: Estia Publishing, 1980) English translation cited in Reddaway, John; *Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection*; (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), Appendix V, p.222

55. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides stated that he, "did not believe that Makarios would approach the Soviet Union", personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996. Tassos Papadopoulos stated that, "Makarios was not a communist...and would not approach the Soviet Union as a Castro." Personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

56. Christodoulos Veniamin noted that, "immediately after the clashes Makarios sent diplomatic missions everywhere, including the Soviet Union", personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996. Chris Economides states that it is difficult to say whether Makarios approached the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union approached Makarios. Chris Economides, personal interview with the author, 26 March 1996.

57. *Reuter*, 30 January 1964.

58. *The Cyprus Mail*, 28 January 1964

59. *Eleftheria*, 1 February 1964.

60. These ideas are in line with the thinking of Thomas Adams, a former US State Department official who has been a commentator on communism in Cyprus for over thirty years (see Bibliography for examples). Dr. Thomas Adams, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 30 March 1995. Mr. Andreas Ziartides, a member of AKEL's politburo at the time, stated that these three points were, "in direct relation to the Soviet Union's Cold War policy." Personal Interview with the author, Nicosia, 20 September 1996. Osman Örek also concurred with this assessment, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

61. Perhaps the most telling point as to how little the Americans regarded the seriousness of this threat, was the commissioning of a US Army Area Handbook for Cyprus. This handbook was put together in three months by one author (instead of the usual eighteen months by five or more contributors), this shows how sure the US Army was that they were about to take up peace-keeping duties. Dr. Thomas Adams, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 30 March 1995. See Adams, Thomas; *US Army Area Handbook for Cyprus*; (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1964)

62. *The Times*, 31 January 1964. From a survey of available British Government documents it does not seem to be the case that there were any important *unstated* elements to this plan. Obviously the entire operational details would not have been known at this point, but it certainly appears to be the case, on the evidence available, that the US intended to be forthright in their intentions and not pursue some form of hidden agenda.

63. As stated by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. R.A. Butler, in an oral answer to the House of Commons on 3 February 1964, House of Commons, Official Record of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Fifth Series-Volume 688, Period from 27 January-7 February 1964, p.815

64. *The New York Times*, 1 February 1964, a full reprint of these proposals can be found in Stegenga, *Op.cit.*, pp.41-42

65. *The New York Times*, 1 February 1964

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Reuter*, 1 February. It was also stated by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. R.A. Butler, in an oral answer to the House of Commons on 3 February 1964, House of Commons, Official Record of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Fifth series-Volume 688, Period from 27 January-7 February 1964, p.815

68. *The New York Times*, 1 February 1964

69. *The Cyprus Mail*, 1 February 1964. The other four organisations were; the Old Trade Unions, the Independent Trade Unions, the Democratic Trade Unions, and the Army Civil Service Union.

70. *The Cyprus Mail*, 2 February 1964. This despite the fact that the Cyprus Mail had reported (with a front page photograph) that Makarios had been visited by Pickard and Wilkins, and that during the course of his two hour meeting with them the plan had been presented. *The Cyprus Mail*, 1 February 1964

71. *The Cyprus Mail*, 2 February 1964. The meeting was attended by Clerides and Kyprianou, amongst others.

72. *The Cyprus Mail*, 3 February 1964

73. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, p.310

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Eleftheria, Phileleftheros, Haravghi*, 2 February 1964

76. 'We must ask Russia to guarantee our territorial integrity in the same way as Russia did for the UAR during the Anglo-French invasion.' *Ethniki*, 3 February 1964

77. *The Cyprus Mail*, 3 February 1964

78. *The Cyprus Mail*, 4 February 1964

79. *The Times*, 4 February 1964

80. *Ibid.*

81. *The Cyprus Mail*, 4 February 1964. There were numerous allegations made to this effect. In an interview with a Greek Cypriot ex-militia fighter who had been involved with the events of the time, I was told that he had actually witnessed British troops assisting Turkish Cypriot militia in their attempts to forcibly move a Turkish Cypriot community from their mixed village into a Turkish Cypriot enclave. Diometis Kyprianou in personal interview with the author, Nicosia, January 1996. This allegation was denied by Rauf Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996.

82. Document dated 3 February 1964, and contained in *FO 371/174747*

83. At the bottom of the document the Permanent Secretary, Sir Harold Caccia wrote 'This is the sort of stuff that Lord Palmerston would have rejoiced to use or to hear from an Ally. Perhaps the P.M. as well as Commonwealth Secretary should be told.' Butler in turn wrote 'Prime Minister, As Sir H. Caccia suggests you may find some comfort from this.' Beneath this comment, and written in the Prime Minister's own hand were the words 'Good Stuff'. *Ibid.*

84. Document dated 3 February 1964, and contained in *FO 371/174747*

85. In the document it was stated that Eilts had said that Ambassador Wilkins would not 'seek a special interview' with Makarios in order to tell him these points but that the United States might approach Kyprianou in London to convey the message, or that Rusk may give it to Rossides in New York. *Ibid.*

86. *The New York Times*, 5 February 1964

87. *The Cyprus Mail*, 5 February 1964. The newspaper noted: 'Two bomb explosions last night damaged a side-entrance of the United States Embassy in Nicosia in an unprecedented attack on a foreign diplomatic mission.', *ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*

89. Note written by J.O. Rennie, 5 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*

90. *Ibid.* Kyprianou cannot, however, remember having had this conversation. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996. Dr. Lyssarides noted the way in which Khrushchev's name elicited applause whenever it was used at political rallies at the time. Personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

91. See *Makhi*, 4 February 1964

92. *The New York Times*, 6 February 1964. Indeed, this was a more than desirable turn of events as the NATO epithet was doing considerable harm, as Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh noted 'I hesitate to intervene from this post but I have been struck by the following combination of facts:- (a) Nobody wants a NATO force, and indeed the misleading but unavoidable NATO label is becoming an increasing handicap to the current proposal.' Telegram from UKMIS NATO Paris to FO, No.85, 6 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*

93. *The New York Times*, 7 February 1964. *The Economist*, 15 February 1964, p.581

94. *Reuter*, 7 February 1964

95. *Reuter*, 8 February 1964

96. *The Times*, 6 February 1964

97. Telegram from Athens to FO, No.220, 7 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*. The actual text of the telegram read 'Although Greek military hierarchy are breathing fire and [? Grp. omitted] politically conscious minority will do their utmost to avoid a major conflict for the sake of Greek-Cypriots, whom they dislike, and the vast majority of Greeks would have no stomach for such a conflict if it actually arose. What is involved is an issue of Greek pride (filotimo) over [? Grp. Omitted] against the Turks rather than a [grp. Undec ? National] interest. I think a substantial military gesture rather than a conflict would be welcome to everyone here.'

98. Telegram from UK DEL NATO Paris to FO, No.51, 24 January 1964, *FO 371/174746 (?)*

99. *The New York Times*, 6 February 1964

100. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20 1964, p.20116

101. *The Times*, 4 February 1964

102. *Ibid.* 'The Germans would like to help over the peace-keeping force but do not want to engage German soldiers.' Telegram UKDEL NATO Paris to FO, No.85, 6 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*. In fact, it had been noted that the prominent West German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine* had warned

the Bundeswehr and Bonn to avoid police action in Cyprus. *The Times*, 4 February 1964

103. 'The International Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus: Military Planning', *FO 371/174747*

104. *The New York Times*, 8 February 1964

105. The text of the letter was published as a written answer produced by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd on behalf of the Prime Minister in response to a question put by Mr. Warbey in the House of Commons Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*) Fifth Series-Volume 688, Period from 27 January-7 February 1964, pp.107-111. The text can also be found in the 'Letter dated 8 February 1964 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5534

106. 'They are trying to stiffen Greek Cypriot opposition to the proposals of the London Conference, to bring the whole question to the Security Council and secure an outcome which will increase their influence in Cyprus and strengthen their demand for the withdrawal of the British bases.' Telegram from Moscow to FO, No.235, 7 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*

107. The details of how the Government decided to handle the issue with regard to the media is contained in 'Mr. Khrushchev's Message on Cyprus: Guidance to the Press', 7 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*

108. Telegram from FO to Washington, No.2146, 8 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*

109. For the texts of the later replies from the United States, Greece and Turkey see Appendix C.

110. 'Text of a letter from the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, to Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.', 8 February 1964. Contained in the House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Fifth Series-Volume 689, Period from 10th-21st February, 1964, p.111 (Written Answers). The text can also be found in the 'Letter dated 11 February 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5537

111. *The Cyprus Mail*, 8 February 1964

112. *Eleftheria*, 9 February 1964

113. *The Cyprus Mail*, 10 February 1964

114. *The New York Times*, 9 February 1964

115. 'Cyprus: Action should Archbishop Makarios not accept the revised Four-Power proposal', 8 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*

116. *Ibid.*

117. *Ibid.*

118. *Ibid.*

119. *Ibid.*

120. *Ibid.*

121. *Ibid.*

122. *The New York Times*, 10 February 1964. However, if the comments of Ambassador Küneralp (Turkish Ambassador to the United Kingdom) are correct, it appears as if Turkey may have accepted some form of United Nations involvement three weeks prior to this. See comments in a memorandum dated 22 January 1964 in *FO 371/174746*

123. 'Cyprus: Action should Archbishop Makarios not accept the revised Four Power proposal', *op.cit.*

124. *The Economist*, 15 February 1964, p.580

125. *The New York Times*, 12 February 1964. The Governments of Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium had stated their agreement in principle to become involved by 9 February. As had Canada which had agreed to begin planning with War Office through their Military Attaché in London. In addition Norway and Italy had agreed to start military planning without commitment, and France, Portugal, and Luxembourg had said that they cannot participate. See 'The International Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus: Military Planning', 9 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Dr. Joseph Luns, on a visit to London in late February 1964, at which he had a meeting with Butler, stated that the Dutch Government had agreed with the Anglo-US plan for a force made up of NATO troops for Cyprus. Indeed, it had accepted to send between 700-800 men. *The Cyprus Mail*, 28 February 1964. However, on the issue of a United Nations force Luns stated that 'we are reserving judgement until we see what is going to happen at the UN. It is not certain the Dutch will take part in any force sent by them', *Ibid.*

126. *The Economist*, 15 February 1964, p.591

127. *The Cyprus Mail*, 12 February 1964

128. *Ibid.*, p.343

129. Ball; *The Past has Another Pattern*; *op.cit.*, p.343

130. *The Cyprus Mail*, 12 February 1964, *The New York Times*, 12 February 1964. *The Economist* refers simply to a meeting between U Thant and Mr. Butler, 15 February 1964, p.580

131. Christodoulos Veniamin, District Officer of Limassol at the time, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

132. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

133. Mr. Veniamin notes that the cease-fire agreement collapsed after a decision was taken, in Nicosia and without consulting him, that certain Turkish Cypriot positions were to be retaken. Personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

134. 'Following is a report of a Telecon conversation between Mr. Rusk and Under-Secretary Ball at about 6 a.m., Washington time, 13 February', *FO 371/174747*

135. *Ibid.*

136. *Ibid.*

137. Ball; *The Past has Another Pattern*; *op.cit.*, p.345

138. 'Following is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Ball in Nicosia (U.S. Embassy, Nicosia, telegram no. 736) received by the State Department in the early hours of February 13', *FO 371/174747*

139. *Ibid.*

140. 'Record of a Teletype Conversation Between the Under-secretary of State, Mr. George Ball in Nicosia, and the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Rusk in Washington, D.C. at 12.30 p.m., Thursday, February 13, 1964.', in *FO 371/174747.* Ball notes that: 'the paper had obviously been drafted by his three young Ministers (unhappily all lawyers) of whom he is a prisoner. From time to time he glanced uneasily at them to see if they gave him the nod. It was clear that they are calling the tune and that he fears both for his job and his life.' *Ibid.*

141. 'The Views of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus', 13 February 1964, *FO 371/174747*

142. *Ibid.*

143. 'Record of a Teletype Conversation Between the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. George Ball in Nicosia, and the Foreign secretary and Mr. Rusk in Washington, D.C. at 12.30 p.m., Thursday, February 13, 1964', in *FO 371/174747*

144. 'Note of a Telephone Conversation between the Secretary of State [Butler] and Mr. Duncan Sandys 2.30 p.m., Thursday, February 13, 1964.' *FO 371/174747*

145. President Johnson, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary all met at the White House that day. See 'extract from the Record of a Conversation held at the White House on Thursday, February 13, 1964 at 11.00 a.m.' in *FO 371/174747.* The meeting was also attended by Sir Harold Caccia, Sir David Ormsby Gore, Sir Burke Trend, Sir Timothy Bligh, and, for the United States, Dean Rusk, Averill Harriman, David Bruce, McGeorge Bundy, and William Tyler.

146. 'Note of a Telephone Conversation...2.30 p.m.', 13 February, *op.cit.*

147. *Ibid.*

148. *The Times*, 15 February 1964

149. Dr. Lyssarides notes that Makarios had told Ball about his intention to move the issue to the Security Council in a way that seemed to indicate that he had no other option. He was not belligerent in his tone, instead it was said in a very matter of fact way. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

150. *The New York Times*, 15 February 1964

151. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996.

152. Contained in Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 1), *op.cit.*, pp.320-321

153. *Ibid.* See also *The Economist*, 15 February 1964, p.580

154. *Reuter*, 11 February 1964

155. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996. Tassos Papadopoulos states that he both liked and got on well with him. Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

156. Christodoulos Veniamin, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 10 September 1996. Tassos Papadopoulos notes that while General Young was not in Cyprus to, "enforce a long-term policy", General Carver has, "a lot to answer for". Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand liked General Carver. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

157. As *The Times* stated 'Although there was no question of General Young being formally relieved of his command, there is little doubt that the incident in Limassol last week, when the General accepted assurances of a Greek Cypriot official that an attack about which intelligence warning had been given would not in fact take place, persuaded the Minister of Defence that the time had come to set up a stronger command structure on the island.'*The Times*, 17 February 1964

158. The Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in a written answer to the House of Commons. House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Fifth Series-Volume 689, Period from 10th-21st February 1964, pp.185-186 (Written Answers). The decision to do this was taken at a meeting between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir Arthur Snelling, and Sir Harold Caccia at a meeting held at 10 Downing Street at 7.00 p.m. on 5 February. *PREM 11/4704.* At the meeting there was, however, some concern that this change might be construed as being some form of prelude to the creation of an international force and the Commonwealth Secretary asked if it could be delayed as 'our threat to withdraw was one of our trump cards with President Makarios.'*ibid.* On the matter of General Young, the MOD also denied that he had been dismissed or had failed in his duty. *The Times*, 15 February 1964

159. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20 1964, p.20118

160. Carver, Michael; *Out of Step: Memoirs of a Field Marshal*; (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p.316

161. *The Times*, 17 February 1964

162. *The Times*, 14 February 1964

163. Ball; *The Past has Another Pattern*; *op.cit.*, p.348

164. As Carver notes:'[t]his reinforcement coincided with increasing signs of anti-British feeling, which was developing in the press and being shown not only by the local population, especially the Greek Cypriot irregulars, but also by the Regular police.' Carver; *Out of Step*; *op.cit.*, p.317

165. 'Letter dated 15 February 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5543

Chapter V

Involving the United Nations: The Road to Resolution 186

(15 February-4 March 1964)

Introduction

The differences that had developed between the Greek Cypriots and the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States continued at the United Nations. The United Kingdom, desperate to have the matter of the introduction of peace-keeping force to replace its own troops dealt with at the first opportunity, maintained a position in the Security Council that sought to have any such force created in such a way as to avoid the risk of a challenge to any of its strategic interests - especially the Sovereign Base Areas. To this extent the talks at the Security Council proved to be less than easy. The Greek Cypriots held the discussion of the 1960 Treaties as a central tenet of their policy. In order to counter this, a means had to found that would minimise the role of the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian bloc in such a way as to ensure that the Soviet Union did not become obstructive in its approach to the matter. To this end, the British Government maintained its relationship with the United States, although, as will be seen, the United States once again retreated out of the spotlight, preferring instead to play a more private part. Indeed, during the negotiations in New York, the United Kingdom seemed to take the public lead in the proceedings.

The Greek Cypriots, realising that they had, in no small measure, won a victory in having the matter taken to the Council, were nonetheless faced with the fact that the United Kingdom maintained the procedural advantage, and was, as a Permanent Member, a major force to be reckoned with inside the Chamber. In order to counter this difficulty, the Greek Cypriots tried to lobby the other members of the Council. However, most of the other members of the Council were content to play the role of interlocutor in order to reach an outcome that was broadly acceptable to all the parties. Indeed, this chapter will attempt to show that once the matter had been taken to the United Nations, the Cold War element that had played an important part before took less of a role as the matter developed along two, more bi-lateral lines: firstly, between the Greek Cypriots on the one hand, and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other, with a vocal, though substantively minimal Soviet interest being displayed, and secondly, between the Greek Cypriots and the Government of Turkey. The former proved substantially more productive than the latter, which appeared to be an opportunity for the two parties to vent their anger at one another. The end result of this period of bargaining was United Nations Security Council Resolution 186, which, although imperfect in many ways to all parties, put in place a United Nations peace-keeping force.

1. The Move to the United Nations

The United Kingdom's recourse to the Security Council, although opposed by the Turkish Cypriots who felt that the United Nations did not have the power that the Guarantor Powers had,[1] was nonetheless done with the acceptance both of the United States[2] and Turkey.[3] However, the Greek Government was not so impressed as it had 'constantly been advised by her allies in recent weeks to persuade President Makarios to abandon the idea of resorting to the Security Council.'[4] Yet the United Kingdom and the United States seemed to have little room to manoeuvre with regard to the Cyprus situation once Makarios rejected the final Ball plan, a fact they communicated to the Greek Government.[5] In any case, the

decision by the British Government to pursue the Security Council option moved the search for a peace-keeping force into a new period.[6] Indeed by now it was regarded by the United Kingdom as being a necessary move considering that the continued intercommunal situation in Cyprus was draining the resources of the entire British military establishment and cracks were now appearing in the operational effectiveness of the Force. British troops were unable, despite their significant numbers on the island, to be everywhere at once - a deployment that was required in order to prevent the situation from becoming totally out of hand. As this became more obvious the Turkish Government had once again appeared to be mobilising in preparation for an intervention.[7] However, the British move to the United Nations forced Turkey - albeit with pressure from the United States - to state that they would hold moves for intervention in abeyance subject to the condition that renewed heavy fighting did not occur in the meantime.[8] As if to emphasise the importance of maintaining wider peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, issued a statement in which he specifically called on the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey to avoid taking any action that could aggravate the situation on the island.[9]

Upon receiving the news of the British request for a meeting of the Security Council the Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, flew to London in order to confer with Commonwealth Secretary Sandys and other British Government officials.[10] And when asked about the British application for a meeting Clerides, somewhat stoically, replied:

> ' "Presumably they wanted to put their own point of view ahead of ours". The basic difference between the two recourses, he said, was that the British seemed to refer more to the internal situation, and also underlined the Treaty of Guarantee rights, whereas the Cyprus resolution "will be based on the external threat which we consider of paramount importance."'[11]

Despite this less than antagonistic tone,[12] the delegates had nonetheless left Cyprus amid bitter allegations by the wider Greek Cypriot community of British treachery in attempting to out-manoeuvre the Greek Cypriots at the Security Council by taking the procedural advantage.[13]

Yet, in an attempt to counter this, Ambassador Rossides decided to make an application for an emergency convening of the Council in the face of the perceived imminent Turkish intervention. In his letter to the President of the Security Council, Rossides stated that, '[i]n the vital interest of the people of Cyprus as a whole as well as in the interest of international peace and security, I...request Your Excellency to convene urgently an emergency meeting of the Security Council under rule 3 of its provisional rules of procedure in order to consider the matter and take appropriate measures under the relevant Articles of the Charter.'[14]

Within hours the various representatives to the Security Council had been informed of the two requests, and that same afternoon, 15 February, they all met in the room adjoining the Security Council chamber in closed session - without any officials of the UN Secretariat present[15] - to consider both the British and Cypriot applications.[16] Opening the discussions, the President of the Council, Señor Carlos Bernardes (the Brazilian Permanent Representative) noted that Rossides had been to see him to ask for the Council to be meet that same evening. Upon asking for the opinion of the Council, the British Permanent Representative, Sir Patrick Dean, suggested that it would be better if the Council met on the Monday in order to allow the assembled representatives from the other member countries to seek advice from their respective governments.[17] However, the Soviet Representative, Nikolai Fedorenko immediately took the side of the Greek Cypriots and supported their application for an emergency meeting, citing the fact that the previous meeting held in December 1963, had simply been adjourned and therefore, '[i]t was the clear duty of the Council to take the question up again at any moment when the Cyprus Representative brought to its attention facts which threatened the security of his country.'[18] When asked, the Chinese Representative took the same position as the United Kingdom. However, the

French Representative noted that without having seen the letter from Rossides he could not make a decision, and therefore asked that Rossides be allowed to address the Council to present his case. This was duly accepted and Rossides proceeded to repeat, 'more or less the same speech which he had made at the Council on December 27 in which he claimed that at the very moment Turkish naval forces were approaching Cyprus'[19], stating:

> 'On the last occasion it was only the timely action of the Security Council in bringing these Turkish intentions before the eyes of the world that had at the last minute deterred them from actual aggression. The Council should meet at once before it was too late. The world would never forgive it if it did not rise to its responsibility. Monday would be too late. If the council could not meet at once, then it should meet at latest that night in order to pass a resolution designed to prevent or deter aggression by Turkey.'[20]

Once again Fedorenko called for an emergency meeting. However, Adlai Stevenson, the Permanent Representative of the United States, noted that Rossides had not, 'added in any way to what he had already told the Council on December 27...[therefore] [h]e took the same view as Sir Patrick Dean.'[21] Indeed, by this point several other representatives - France, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Norway - seemed to be coming around to support the United Kingdom's view that a meeting be delayed until Monday. However, the Bolivian Representative took the Cypriot position, as did the Czechoslovak Representative who, 'repeated almost verbatim the remarks which had been made earlier by the Soviet Representative.'[22] The figure now stood at four in favour of an emergency meeting and six against. Bernardes therefore proposed that the meeting be held on Monday. However, he noted that, '[h]e would remain in close touch with the situation through the Secretary General [*sic*] and would be at the disposal at the shortest possible notice of other members of the Council so that a meeting could be held if necessary within a matter of an hour or so.'[23]

At this point Fedorenko accused the Council of acting irresponsibly and that Cyprus was entitled to bring the *continuing* matter to the attention of the Security Council. Despite this outburst the broader membership of the Council had made its decision and therefore the meeting would take place, as scheduled, on Monday 17 February. Not content with this outcome Rossides addressed another letter to the President of the Security Council the next day in which he stated: 'In view of the urgency of my request, I respectfully submit that [the Cypriot] urgent request [S/5545] should take priority over the request for an early meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom [S/5543]'. Despite this further appeal, Bernardes remained firm on the decision. The Security Council would meet on 17 February to discuss the Cyprus situation.

2. Planning the Debate

Meanwhile, in London, the Greek Cypriot delegates had by now had the opportunity to discuss the Security Council meeting with the British Government. Speaking to the press prior to his departure for New York, Foreign Minister Kyprianou noted that the Greek Cypriots were, 'in agreement with the British Government that an early meeting of the Security Council is necessary.'[24] However, there appeared to be major differences on the approach that the two were going to take with regard to the Security Council debate. Nonetheless, it seemed clear that now that the matter had been referred to the United Nations, the issue of whether a resolution would be passed was less of a question as compared with the form that a resolution would take.

When the Greek Cypriot delegation landed in New York later that same day, they were immediately joined by Zenon Rossides, as well as Tassos Papadopoulos, the Minister for Labour, who had been in New York for the previous month following his departure from the London Conference.[25] Soon thereafter they were visited by Dimitri Bitsios, the Greek Permanent Representative at the United

Nations. In the private discussions that followed the Greek Cypriots, seemingly contrary to their public statements, not only allegedly expressed their bitter feelings about both the British and Turkish positions with regard to the events in Cyprus, but also took the chance to complain about the lack of support they had received from the Greek Government throughout the preceding period.[26] However, as Bitsios noted in his account of events, the Greek Cypriots were nonetheless nervous about forthcoming events at the United Nations, and asked the Greek how he saw their chances in the Council.[27] Having been the Greek Representative to the United Nations since 1961, Bitsios was well aware of the more delicate intricacies of the workings of both the Organisation as a whole and of the Security Council in particular.[28] In affording assistance to the Greek Cypriot delegates the Greek Representative raised a number of points regarding the wording of a possible Greek Cypriot draft resolution that might be presented to the Security Council.[29] He explained that any draft prepared by the Greek Cypriots would have to be put to the Security Council through the representative of a friendly state.[30] With regard to the wording of a possible text, he specifically warned Clerides and Kyprianou about the danger inherent in the use of the word 'recognise' in respect of the Government of Cyprus, informing them that the term 'respect' immediately made the issue of recognition redundant and therefore unlikely to be a discussion point.[31]

Yet this role taken by Bitsios is certainly confusing. As the representative of Greece, a Guarantor Power, with whom the United Kingdom had worked closely, Bitsios was certainly presenting a confusing picture of the exact nature of the position of the Greek Government. Despite the fact that there was a certain irritation in Greek political circles that the United Kingdom had unilaterally moved the issue to the Security Council, it would appear unlikely that this irritation would have resulted in an immediate directive issued to Bitsios to begin assisting the Greek Cypriots in their planning. On the basis of available evidence one can perhaps conclude that the Greek Representative was, at this point, acting as a free agent with minimal political guidance from the Government of Paraskevopoulos - a government that had been markedly pro-Western - i.e. supportive of the United States and the United Kingdom - than pro-Greek Cypriot in its overall orientation.[32] Although this criticism is somewhat mitigated by the fact that Greece had gone to the polls that very same day, and that political guidance would have been sparse anyway, one would assume that he would have taken a neutral course until such time as new orders came through.

While the Greek Cypriots formed their own strategy - albeit with the assistance of the Greek Representative - the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States were involved in planning their course of action. Given the success in the gaining the procedural advantage, the British Government was in a fairly strong position. It had the outward support of the United States, as well as a declaration on the part of the Johnson Administration that it would respect Makarios's wishes and not send troops to Cyprus as part of a force.[33] (It is perhaps worth noting that the pressures exerted on the Truce Force had by this point made British interest in participating in a future United Nations force less than certain.[34]) In any case, the main aim now was to try and ensure the best political result with regard to any United Nations' resolution. In this the British Government's position was considerably strengthened with the announcement by President Gursel of Turkish support for the United Kingdom at the Security Council.[35] With these two important endorsements it was by now clear that the next move was to try to isolate Makarios as much as possible diplomatically, and thus try and ensure the easiest passage of an acceptable resolution through the Security Council.

The Greek Cypriot Negotiating Position

By the day of the first session the political tactics of the two main camps were becoming more apparent. On the morning of the first debate Clerides and Kyprianou met with the Secretary-General, Dr. Ralph Bunche, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs (who, incidentally, was to decide upon the acronym UNFICYP[36]), and José Rolz Bennet, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Cyprus. The latter two attended the session to explain in detail the exact provisions as laid down in

the Secretary-General's proposals.[37] Indeed by this point the Greek Cypriots were able to articulate their position on a number of questions. Finding that U Thant was very interested in what they had to say,[38] the ensuing discussion covered, *inter alia*, the perceived threat from Turkey, and how the Turkish Cypriots were, in the opinion of the Greek Cypriot leadership, being manipulated by the Turkish Government.[39] In return they were presented with a copy of an *aide-memoire* pertaining to Thant's plans for a peace-keeping force in Cyprus.[40] In brief the plan presented six points, the key elements of which were as follows:[41]

> *1. A plan should be submitted to the Security Council by the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom for approval by the Council. A plan should be envisioned which would give full weight to the primary responsibility of the Government of Cyprus and of the three other Governments principally concerned, while providing for an appropriate United Nations participation*
> *2. A force to be stationed in Cyprus for not more than three months would be established by agreement among the Governments concerned.*
> *3. The purpose of the force would be to preserve international peace and security and to that end prevent intercommunal fighting*
> *4. The appointment of a mediator, designated by the Secretary-General, with the approval of the four Governments.*
> *5. No costs arising out of the foregoing arrangements would be chargeable to the United Nations.*
> *6. The Security Council would by resolution endorse the foregoing arrangements, call upon all Member States to respect the independence and territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, and appoint an advisory group of three of its Members to be consulted by the Secretary-General on matters pertinent to the resolution.*

However, in a telegram to Makarios submitted by Clerides the same day, the Secretary-General's plan proved unsatisfactory on four counts, namely:

> *(a.) The terms of reference are not adequate. It does not specifically state that the force is for the purpose of assisting the Government to restore law and order, which is very material, and to bring about conditions of normality.*
> *(b.) Although it gives a hint that the force will also be entrusted with the defence of the Republic from external attack, it does not make that object sufficiently clear.*
> *(c.) The provisions about a mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General still leave out the terms of reference of the mediator.*
> *(d.) No direct reference is made to the question of the of the Treaties as forming part of the dispute.*[42]

Despite the unsatisfactory nature of the *aide-memoire* on these four points, it was now becoming obvious to Clerides that at least some of these main points of issue would have to be open to negotiation on the part of the Greek Cypriots if a resolution on the introduction of a United Nations force was to come about.[43]

The Security Council Meets

When the eleven members of the Security Council convened later that day, the session was, on the basis of a Norwegian motion, almost immediately adjourned for twenty-four hours.[44] This was done to allow Thant to seek further agreement from the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on his proposals

for a force.[45] With this delay Clerides sent another memo to Makarios in which he once again outlined his thoughts on events at the United Nations and laid out his views as to the course of action that should be followed. Makarios, in his reply, proposed that a delineation be introduced between the matter of the recognition of Cyprus' territorial integrity and the issue of the introduction of a force.[46] In countering this proposed separation of the issues, Clerides replied that, in his view, any such attempt to distinguish on the matters without a full agreement of the issues overall would be doomed to failure as it would be opposed by the western powers.[47] Makarios, responded by stating his belief that it was, nonetheless, a risk worth taking.[48]

It was perhaps with this in mind that George Ball, Adlai Stevenson, the United States's permanent representative, and two more under-secretaries at the State Department, namely Phillips Talbot and Harlan Cleveland paid a visit to the Greek Representative the same afternoon as the postponement of the Security Council meeting.[49] In the ensuing discussions it soon became apparent that the United States' intention was to try to use the Greek representative to lean on the Greek Cypriots to approve a draft resolution that they had drawn up in conjunction with the United Kingdom. Within this plan both the United Kingdom and the United States saw the 1960 Treaties as being of central importance in any consideration of the events. Furthermore, the draft clearly reflected the Turkish position on the issue, referring to 'states and authorities', and arguing that the Republic of Cyprus lasted only as long as the Treaties were respected.[50] Bitsios refused to show the proposed resolution to the Cypriots. The delegation, clearly frustrated by this reply then asked Bitsios for his advice, to which the Greek replied that the proposal put forward by U Thant should be seriously considered.[51]

Fighting Increases in Cyprus

In Cyprus, the situation once again took a turn for the worse.[52] In the west of the island there was a renewed bout of fighting around the village of Polis, where five hundred Turkish Cypriots were under siege in a school as Greek Cypriot fighters, dug in about eighty metres away, used searchlights and loudspeakers to intimidate them.[53] At the time the Truce Force was not present as the troop contingent that had been based in the village had moved earlier in the week to help deal with the increased fighting in Limassol. However, a hundred men of the 9 Independent Parachute Squadron quickly left for Polis. As did General Gyani, who met with Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to arrange a three-day cease-fire.[54] At the end of the meeting the General praised the Truce Force saying that 'the British Officers were showing much tact in an extremely difficult task on the island.'[55]

By this point the combined number of fighters in both communities was estimated to be in the tens of thousands with a constant supply of weapons flowing in to the Greek Cypriot community from abroad[56] - mainly from communist East European countries.[57] This increase in arms resulted in further increases in intercommunal fighting as the newly replenished Greek Cypriots attempted to break the deadlock in a number of areas around the island. To this end the Truce Force was being placed in an increasingly desperate position as the manpower provided was incapable of meeting such a dispersed pattern of fighting. Therefore a further one hundred and forty officers of the 3rd Infantry Division left RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire for Cyprus, and in Britain a brigade headquarters and a further infantry battalion were placed on seven days notice, as was the 6th Infantry Brigade of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR).[58] By this point however the British troops in Cyprus had, for the first time, found themselves directly threatened by Greek Cypriots when three unarmed military police dog handlers in a private car were abducted by Greek Cypriot irregulars as they drove to Larnaca on the evening of 15 February.[59] Although they were handed over to the British Army the next morning - following strong protests from Air Chief Marshal Barnett and the acting-British High Commissioner - it was becoming obvious that the situation for the Truce Force was becoming untenable. As *The Times* noted: 'the incident is regarded as serious in that once the authority of the British truce force [*sic*] is no longer respected there will no longer be a dike against political bloodshed.'[60]

3. The Security Council Debate Begins

With the political differences between the Greek Cypriots and the United Kingdom and United States in New York still existing, and the military situation in Cyprus proving to be extremely dangerous, the stage was now set for a potential showdown when, on 18 February 1964, the Security Council reconvened. With a large audience present the proceedings began at 3 p.m. Despite an immediate Soviet demand that the opening statement be made by the Cyprus Government,[61] the floor was instead given, by Bernardes, to the British delegate - Sir Patrick Dean.[62] With the opportunity to present the United Kingdom's position[63] to the assembled onlookers, Sir Patrick began by outlining the process leading to the independence of Cyprus and the Treaty of Guarantee. After explaining each article of the Treaty, he told the Council that the Basic Articles of the Constitution of Cyprus, of which the Treaty of Guarantee was part, were, 'not subject to amendment whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. Their principal purpose is to ensure that the rights and interests of the two major communities, that is to say, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, in the island shall be fully respected and kept in balance.'[64] There then followed a synopsis of the events leading to the British involvement in the island following the outbreak of intercommunal fighting, during which the British Representative gave the Council an overview of the various events that had occurred, including the presentation of the two international plans for a peace-keeping force - although the word NATO was omitted altogether. The rejection of these had led to the decision to move the matter to the Security Council. At the end of his address, Dean gave a few examples of the nature of the situation in the island.[65] On the all important matter of the British Government's policy with regard to Cyprus, Sir Patrick noted the following six points:

> 'First, the United Kingdom's actions in regard to the situation in Cyprus have throughout been within the framework of the Treaty of Guarantee.
> Second, the presence of British forces in the territory of Cyprus stems from an invitation by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
> Third, my government's efforts since the beginning have been directed to one end only - namely, to calming the situation and restoring peace.
> Fourth, my Government does not wish to continue to bear the burden of this peace-keeping operation alone for a day longer than necessary. It is for this reason that it has on several occasions made proposals for augmenting the peace-keeping force with contingents from other countries.
> Fifth, we have at all stages made it clear that our intention is to act with the agreement of the duly constituted authorities in Cyprus, and there had been no question of any proposals being implemented without such agreement.
> Sixth, the inability of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to accept any of the proposals put to it, coupled with the recent and rapid deterioration in the situation in the island, makes it essential for this Council to be apprised of the situation and to take appropriate action.'[66]

Given that the British Government now felt that '[i]n these circumstances, the first essential is to restore peace in Cyprus...the peace-keeping force must be substantially and rapidly augmented', Sir Patrick noted that he 'had considered whether it would be helpful to the Council if [he] were now to introduce a draft for consideration. But it seems to my delegation that this is premature at this stage.'[67] In any case, the British Representative ended his speech by noting that any draft resolution presented,

> '[s]hould contain endorsement by the Council of the appeal which the Secretary-General has already made; it should call upon all parties concerned, including the Guarantor Powers, and in consultation with the Secretary-General, to secure the establishment of an effective peace-keeping force as soon as possible; it should also provide in appropriate form for an agreement

> to be reached on the designation of an impartial mediator who may assist the parties in achieving an agreed settlement. The Council will no doubt wish to call on all States and authorities concerned to respect the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, *in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee and as established and regulated by the basic articles of the Constitution.*'[68] (Emphasis added by the author)

Next to speak was the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou, who had taken the opportunity to represent the Republic of Cyprus despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot did not recognise him as being competent to speak on their behalf.[69] Noting that, '[t]he Representative of the United Kingdom gave what in his view is the historical and the legal background of the situation',[70] Kyprianou went on to state:

> 'One thing which has not been explained is why, suddenly, at a certain stage in the history of Cyprus, there was inter-communal fighting, whereas for years in the past the people of Cyprus as a whole, whether Greek or Turk or Armenian or Maronite, have been living peacefully together without any incidents between them, and in fact, in the course of two world wars, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus were together on the same side of the Allies. So one is led to believe that the present situation in Cyprus - and we are quite convinced about it - is not the cause. The incidents which occur in Cyprus and which have been occurring recently are just symptoms of other causes.'[71]

As he continued to address the floor he outlined the numerous threats posed by Turkey,[72] and went on to accuse Turkey - by using numerous statements made by both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders[73] - of pursuing an active policy of partition in Cyprus. In closing his speech, Kyprianou declared:

> 'As far as the Government of Cyprus is concerned, we are open to suggestions and ready for discussions both on the political solution of the problem and on the peace-keeping aspect of the problem within the framework of the United Nations. I must, however, make it clear that the territorial integrity, the unity, the sovereignty and the complete independence of our country are not negotiable. These are the very things we call upon the Security Council to safeguard and protect. We are an equal member of the United Nations, and we feel that we are entitled to this protection. We are confident that the Security Council will not fail us. If the fundamental elements which form the basis of the existence of the Republic of Cyprus are protected and the threat of aggression is done away with, peace in Cyprus can easily be restored. To this end, my Government is pledged to do its utmost, with the assistance of the Security Council.'[74]

At this point the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union called a point of order. After commenting that following, 'the brilliant explanation by our British colleague, I think that no one has the slightest illusions left about how British diplomats understand the question of tact, prestige, and so forth',[75] Fedorenko went on to ask if, given the late hour, the Council might be allowed to adjourn to consider Kyprianou's comments in full. However, after hearing no point of objection to the specific question that the Council *continue* its work that evening, the President called upon the Turkish Representative to speak.[76]

In replying to Kyprianou, Turkey's acting-Representative, Turgut Menemencioğlu,[77] noted that the Greek Cypriot application to the Council was unconstitutional given that it had been made without due consultation with Vice President Küçük or the Turkish members of the Cabinet. In any case, the Turkish Representative, although accepting that there had indeed been an overflight of Turkish jets on 25 December, firmly rejected the accusations that there had ever been a real Turkish military threat to Cyprus. Indeed, he charged that the Greek Cypriots had used the forum of the United Nations on that occasion as a means of diverting international attention away from the 'hideous crimes' that were, at that

point, taking place in Cyprus.[78] He then went on to provide another interpretation of the history of Cyprus - both before and after 21 December 1963 - before concluding:

> 'As I have already stated, the Turkish Government has done all in its power to help stop the bloodshed and violence ever since the beginning of these tragic events. At the same time, Turkey has shown remarkable restraint and moderation in its own attitude, in spite of great provocations. Turkey, which initiated the tripartite peace actions; Turkey, which appealed to all the Heads of State and to a great number of international organizations, urging their moral support for ending the bloodshed; Turkey which asked the European Council for an international investigation of the massacres; Turkey, which has accepted all practical and useful methods which could put an end to the existing situation in Cyprus - Turkey will be at the side of any practical solution which can be found to this tragic situation.'[79]

The final speaker of the day was the Greek Representative, Dimitri Bitsios. Taking a stand that was definitely in favour of the Greek Cypriots, Bitsios ensured that he did not alienate either the United Kingdom or Turkey. Giving a brief presentation that was perhaps the most moderate of the day, he presented a picture of Cyprus as a state with both internal and external security difficulties, before stating:

> 'The three guaranteeing Powers and the Republic of Cyprus must pursue a single, common end - the restoration of order in Cyprus so that a basic solution to the problem may be sought, something which is not possible so long as the disorders continue and the threat of international conflict persists. Differences exist only as to method. We do not pretend to know the precise answers to all the questions before us. But we are certain that, whatever answers are given by the International Organization, before which the Cypriots have in full confidence placed their problems, they cannot but be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Charter.'[80]

Before closing the day's session, the President allowed Kyprianou to state that during the course of the debate, despite the Turkish Representative's assurances, the Turkish Minister of Information had told reporters that Turkey would intervene if the efforts at the United Nations failed. It was thus on somewhat of an ominous note that the Council adjourned, at twenty past seven in the evening.

The Second Day

Whereas the first day of the debate had been characterised by the presentation of the views of the Greek Cypriots and the three Guarantor Powers, the second day saw the first real involvement of the Superpowers. Ambassador Federenko - the first representative of the day to speak - immediately introduced a Cold War element by noting that there was a strong NATO presence in the region around Cyprus.[81] Taking the opportunity to criticise the United Kingdom directly, he castigated the British Government for its 'intolerable lectures addressed to the Government of Cyprus.'[82] Indeed, in the view of the Soviet Union, the problems in Cyprus were the direct result of pressure on a small state from larger Powers. Referring, albeit indirectly, to the Khrushchev letter, the Soviet Representative once again asked if sovereignty was, 'a right only to be possessed by the strong?'[83] At this point Fedorenko stated that Makarios had in fact been cajoled into accepting the Joint Truce Force as a *fait accompli*.[84] As for the later proposals put forwards for an international peace-keeping force, the Soviet Representative stated: '[t]he dangerous actions of the NATO Powers in Cyprus are aimed with cynical frankness at nullifying the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, tying Cyprus to NATO and converting it to one of their military bridgeheads.'[85] For his parting shot, Fedorenko indirectly accused the United Kingdom and the United States of trying to outdo everyone, with the result that they even brought the matter to the UN by devious means.[86] Concluding what was in fact a long speech, the Soviet Representative stated:

> 'The Security Council must take urgent measures to protect the Republic of Cyprus from aggression and to prohibit and stop any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of this small State Member of the United Nations. It is the duty of the Security Council to safeguard the national independence and the territorial inviolability and integrity of Cyprus, and to ensure respect for the sovereignty, freedom and independence of the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the purposes and basic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.'[87]

Although an opportunity to speak was now due to be given to the Representative Stevenson, the President had taken note of the fact that Sir Patrick Dean wished to reply to Fedorenko's statement. In taking the floor the British Representative stated that,

> 'British troops have been operating in the Republic of Cyprus since 26 December 1963, by invitation of the Government of Cyprus, in order to keep the peace between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to restore tranquillity and normal conditions of life for all - I repeat: all - the inhabitants of Cyprus. Over a period of nearly two months, British troops have interposed themselves on a number of occasions between the two warring communities, often a great risk to themselves. They have saved numerous lives, stopped many fights, and secured the release of a large number of prisoners and hostages on both sides. The Government of Cyprus and both communities have publicly acknowledged their debt to these British troops and thanked them for their efforts. Without them, the present situation - bad though it is - would by now have been infinitely worse. I repeat: all this has been done at the invitation of the Government of Cyprus, including both communities.
>
> What is more - and what is without parallel, so far as I know, in such circumstances - is that all this has been done without a single casualty being caused by British troops among either the Greek Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriots. Not a single casualty, I repeat, has been caused.
>
> My country is proud of this record, and in the circumstances I am content to let the facts of our actions in the Republic of Cyprus over the last seven weeks speak for themselves and constitute a categorical refutation of the insinuation against my Government implied in the words used by the representative of the Soviet Union.'[88]

Fedorenko, deciding to reserve his reply until a later time, allowed the President of the Council to now pass the floor to the Representative of the United States of America, who although maintaining that, 'the Treaty of Guarantee forms an integral part of the organic arrangements that created the Republic of Cyprus',[89] insisted that the United States held no position as to either, 'the form or shape of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem...[and] that neither the United States nor any other Western Powers are seeking to impose their will on the Government of Cyprus.'[90] As for the earlier Soviet assertions of a NATO based conspiracy, Stevenson simply replied:

> 'I shall not dwell at this time on the assertions of the representative of the Soviet Union whereby the anxiety that most of us have that peace must be restored to Cyprus is some form of NATO plot. No one is even proposing that the international force be comprised just of NATO military units. The parties will have to agree upon the participants in any such force.'[91]

However, Stevenson did pay special attention to trying to foster a continued spirit of Guarantor Power cohesion. Having by now taken a solid line in favour of the United Kingdom's position on the Treaty of Guarantee, the US Representative concluded:

> 'the United States values the spirit of co-operation which Greece and Turkey have shown in

> these dangerous weeks. They have demonstrated great restraint at a difficult moment in history. Both Governments, I believe, are to be commended for approaching Cyprus' problem, which has sensitive implications for both of them, with a sense of responsibility not only to the respective communities in Cyprus but also, more importantly, to the entire world community. We should be grateful to both of them.'

At this point Bitsios once again took the floor and stated that Greece nonetheless felt that any solution would have to be acceptable to the Cypriots. Although his speech the previous day was intended 'to strike a note of moderation, of conciliation', his action now seemed to reveal his pro-Greek Cypriot position more than at any time before. The first chinks in the Guarantor Power/Western unity on the Cyprus issue had now appeared. The meeting was now adjourned the meeting until Friday, 21 February.

4. The Role of the Non-Aligned Movement

At this juncture it is perhaps worthwhile to examine the meaning of Fedorenko's comments about the NATO's desire to see Cyprus as a 'bridgehead.' This comment can only have had meaning if one considers the importance of Cyprus *vis-à-vis* the states of either North Africa or the Middle East - states which were predominantly in the non-aligned camp. Before analysing the role of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), it is worth mentioning a few details about the Movement as it was by 1964. First, and foremost, it must be remembered that the Non-Aligned Movement was not formalised in the way that both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation were. (Indeed, the NAM had only had one full conference by the time of Cyprus - the meeting in Belgrade in 1961.) Instead, it is best viewed as a grouping of states that held a common viewpoint on a number of issues and, as such, felt that issues arising in international politics should be judged not by the criteria of the Superpowers but instead should be appraised on the merits of the individual case.

In any case, it is interesting to note that up until this point the Non-Aligned Movement - as a collective association of states - had remained remarkably quiet on the subject of Cyprus, which was, after all, a fellow member. Although there had been a degree of interest shown by certain individual members of the Movement - including Yugoslavia which, from the evidence available, had alone called the active support of the Movement as a whole for Cyprus as an 'urgent necessity'[92] - there had been little overt action taken by the other member states to support directly, and as a collective whole, the case of the Cypriots in the earlier period of the crisis. Indeed, the few members who did state an opinion did tend to be the Arab states, of which Egypt was the most prominent,[93] which appeared to be far more concerned about the Cyprus situation being orchestrated by the West as a means to provide a staging point in support of Israel,[94] than concerned about the way in which the Greek Cypriots were being pressured by Britain and the United States as a subject unto itself. One cannot be entirely sure as to why this might have been the case. Such a course of action on the part of the Arab states may possibly - though unprovable with any certainty - have been as a result of the dilemma faced by the states who realised that although Makarios had a prominent position within the NAM, the minority group in the conflict were Moslem, albeit Turkish. Yet this does not adequately explain the wider lack of voiced support. In the event, the answer to this problem may have been fairly simple, namely that the support of the Movement was not directly asked for by the Greek Cypriots. Although this may sound an easy way out of trying to address this problem there are several good reasons why this may have been the case. In the first instance, the Greek Cypriots had apparently shown a marked disdain for the idea of some form of African involvement in a potential Commonwealth peace-keeping force. This seem to signify a certain xenophobia with regard to potential non-white involvement in Cyprus. While the NAM may have been a good forum by which to participate in the general airing of third world views on a number of important developmental issues, there was not, perhaps, a marked interest at this stage, on the part of the Greek Cypriots, to have such an involvement in the affairs of Cyprus. This in some ways ties in with a second

argument that may be presented to explain the reason why the Greek Cypriots may not have gone looking for the support of the NAM as a first option, namely that the Soviet Union had presented itself as that first option.

In the initial phase of the crisis when the matter was held within the sphere of the Guarantor Powers, events seemed to be progressing in such a way that the need overtly to internationalise the problem beyond the general forum of the United Nations, was not, perhaps, deemed necessary. However, when the matter of the force made up of contingents from NATO member states arose, the matter immediately became of direct concern to the Soviet Union. This therefore by-passed the NAM as an option. Indeed, there may well have been a general perception that the Movement would not have been able to provide an effective means of countering the NATO 'threat' anywhere nearly as well as the Soviet Union could. If one reviews the Greek Cypriot press at the time it becomes noticeable that almost all the commentaries refer to the potential role of the USSR, and there is almost no mention made of a possible role to be played by the NAM. In fact, one may argue that even if the NAM had decided to become actively involved as a whole its voice may hardly have been heard in amongst the more general intrigues being pursued by the Superpowers and their allies in the middle phase of the crisis.

Yet it was certainly the case that the increasingly difficult international political situation in which Cyprus found itself was taking a toll on its relations with both the East and the West. Indeed, as if to prove the above observation, there were press reports within the Greek Cypriot Community that the Government was planning to strengthen its ties to the Movement as a means of drawing away from such partisanship.[95] However, a Greek Cypriot spokesman stated in reply to this that, 'we have always followed a policy of non-alignment, so there is no question of changing now and becoming more non-aligned.'[96] Furthermore, the spokesman noted that Cyprus had just accepted an invitation to attend the Colombo Conference of the non-aligned states, a reply given to the United Arab Republic's (UAR) Ambassador in Cyprus. Indeed, in his statements made at this point in time President Nasser of the UAR implied that he would back Cyprus on the position it had put before the United Nations. Considering the fact that Nasser held a great degree of status within the NAM and was regarded as having pro-Communist tendencies, this immediately resulted in accusations from the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Erkin, that Cyprus was deliberately trying to pull the Soviet bloc into the crisis.[97] This accusation was once again reiterated by Vice-President Küçük in a wire transmitted a few days later to Western and UN leaders.[98]

Given the Greek Cypriot leadership's clear statement of supposed policy with regard to the NAM, there was certainly a lot of room for confusion in the minds of the Western Powers and the Turkish Cypriots as to where the true position of the Greek Cypriots now lay. On the same day as it was announced that Cyprus was pursuing a non-aligned policy, many newspapers led with a story that Cyprus was increasing its trade links with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and were actually negotiating an aviation agreement with the Soviet Government.[99] In conclusion to this debate, it seems as if the NAM was not a priority for the Greek Cypriots in the same way as the Cyprus situation was not a priority for the members of the Movement beyond the possible effects that it may have had on certain Arab NAM members.

5. The Secretary-General Consults the Parties

Meanwhile, Secretary-General Thant was trying to make progress in his attempts to secure Greek and Turkish support for a planned United Nations force. On the morning of 20 February he had a second meeting with the Greek Cypriot delegates.[100] In the course of the ensuing ninety minute discussions[101] the Secretary-General outlined the developments that had taken place noting that the plans for the force had been drawn up in such a manner as to put the Secretary-General in charge of the day-to-day control of the force, with advice from the proposed three-man committee of members of the Security Council.[102] Furthermore, the composition of the force would be such that the consent of the Republic of Cyprus

would have to be obtained.[103] On both these points the Greek Cypriots were particularly in favour as it meant that the link to the Security Council would not only be strong, but that the contingents drawn for the force would be subject to Cypriot scrutiny.[104] In addition the Greek Cypriots also mooted their feelings about the advisability of putting forward two more proposals for a resolution, the first of which would clarify the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and the second would pertain to the formation of a peace-keeping force.[105] On this idea, Thant promised to sound out the various members of the Security Council.

Commenting on the Turkish position, the Secretary-General explained that Turkey wished to see any clause relating to such territorial integrity include a specific clause referring to the rights of the Guarantor Powers.[106] In addition Turkey believed that the Committee of Three proposed to guide the Secretary-General should be comprised of the three Guarantor Powers. The Turks also sought to oppose the use of the term 'Republic of Cyprus' preferring instead the term 'Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus', however Thant was of the opinion that the Turkish Government would not press this point.[107] More controversially, the Turkish Government also proposed the setting-up of a committee to investigate contraventions of the Convention of Genocide and the Convention of Human Rights.[108] At this point, the main Greek Cypriot concern was that there should be no mention of the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee within the text of the resolution. In addition, political demands within the Greek Cypriot community meant that the resolution should contain specific reference to the territorial integrity of the Republic, in which case Makarios would be able to sell the resolution as being a political victory for the Greek Cypriots.[109] At this point Thant gave a brief synopsis of the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, both of whom were against the creation of a committee on the basis that it undoubtedly posed significant problems as to the nature of its composition.[110]

The meeting was now adjourned for the day with the Secretary-General undertaking to put forward the results of the meeting with the Greek Cypriots to the other members of the Security Council. Indeed, later that same day Thant had a joint meeting with Norwegian Representative Nielsen and US Representative Stevenson, as well as a 'private discussion' with Representative Menemencioğlu of Turkey.[111] The result of which meant that by the next day the Secretary-General was ready to present a new set of proposals to the Greek Cypriots. Thus, once again, the Greek Cypriots were called to the United Nations' Headquarters but were this time were surprised to find that the new proposals were worse than the previous ideas.[112] A lengthy preamble referring to the various Treaties was now proposed. In the course of the next five hours, another draft set of ideas was created which was more in tune with the Greek Cypriots' ideas. However, Thant, concerned that Turkey (which had not been happy about the earlier ideas) would flatly reject these,[113] noted that at this point the only major point of difference between the parties lay with the Treaties:

> *'The Turkish, American and British point of view is that reference to the Agreements should be made. The Turks insisted that the reference should be in the operative part of the resolution. The British and Americans would possibly be satisfied with a reference to the Treaties in the preamble. The Cypriot point of view is that no reference to the Treaties should be made either in the preamble or the operative part.'*[114]

The Secretary-General now, 'saw no possibility of establishing common ground and that it would be better to continue with the debate.'[115] In a further complication, the Soviet Union was once again stirring things up. Rejecting the overall ideas presented, the Soviet (and unsurprisingly, Czechoslovak), view was:

> *'(a) The question should be limited to a resolution calling all countries concerned to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, etc. of the Republic and to abstain from any threats or use of force in accordance with the Charter.*

(b) No reference should be made to the Treaties whatsoever.
(c) No need exists for sending an international force to Cyprus.'[116]

Given the state of the negotiations, the planned Council meeting for that day was postponed. It was now clear that the issue of the Treaties would take a greater prominence in the Security Council as the behind-the-scenes process was going nowhere.

The Deteriorating Situation in Cyprus

The deliberations taking place at the United Nations were at that time doing little to ease either the overall political situation in Cyprus, or the problems faced by the British Army. The continued expansion of the Truce Force to meet the requirements of its ever more difficult job meant that a further one and a half thousand men were on their way to Cyprus with around five hundred men drawn from the 26th Regiment Royal Artillery, six hundred men of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and a squadron of the Royal Dragoons - which arrived with their Ferret armoured cars. In a statement it was announced that they were 'being sent there to assist with international peace-force. Once there there will be 6.000 British troops "engaged in internal security duties in Cyprus, as well as 3.000-4.000 officers and men of all three services in the Sovereign Base areas."'[117]

In structural terms the entire British presence in Cyprus by now consisted of five infantry battalions, two artillery regiments (without their field guns), four armoured car squadrons (one of which was involved in patrols and communications without their cars), as well as a divisional headquarters and a brigade headquarters. Further to this, the 1st Battalion The Devonshire and Dorset regiment stationed in Northern Ireland were on call, as was the 2nd Battalion The Coldstream Guards.[118] Soon thereafter a further six hundred men of the 20th Regiment Royal Artillery had been placed on stand-by amid comments that,

> 'The British Government are becoming worried at the growing hostility which is being shown in Cyprus to the presence of British troops. This is being fanned by the Greek Cypriot press, and the idea is catching on among the people that the British are bent on recolonization, and that they are favouring the Turks - a cry often heard in the days before independence...Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots, in the present delicate situation, are tending to say that the British are treating them badly...one of the fears in Whitehall has always been that the British peace-keeping force might lose the confidence of both sides, in which case its effectiveness would naturally be gravely impaired.'[119]

Perhaps with this increase in mind Makarios now made clear his belief that the international force should be limited to 7,000.[120] This figure was three thousand troops short of the figure previously produced for the NATO-based force. Yet the internal situation in Cyprus had changed to such an extent as to raise the possibility that any potential force would need in excess of the ten thousand earlier projected. This had been made all the more clear after an increase in the numbers within the Cyprus police force to around five thousand, the Greek Cypriot security forces had grown massively from the previous December.[121] More seriously, there were now reports that Makarios was not wholly in control of the situation. Although serious intercommunal fighting had diminished noticeably since the beginning of the Security Council debate,[122] it was nonetheless reported that the two main Greek Cypriot militia leaders - alleged to have been Nicos Sampson and Interior Minister Polykarpos Yiorgadjis - were in competition against each other as well as Makarios. In addition both were engaged in violent conflict with the Turkish Cypriots.[123] With events threatening to spiral completely out of control, the only positive piece of news received - no doubt equally by Makarios, the United Kingdom, and the Turkish Cypriots - was that General Grivas had made a public declaration that, contrary to expectations, he was not planning to

return to Cyprus to resume what were euphemistically called 'underground activities'.[124]

While events in Cyprus were in a state of flux, there appeared to be an ever greater risk that the situation in Cyprus could escalate into a full-scale war between Greece and Turkey. In commenting to a British official, the Secretary-general of NATO, Dirk Stikker, raised the matter of a possible role for NATO in the event of such hostilities. Indeed, '[Stikker] said that the idea had been put forward (he did not say by whom) that a NATO force might, with the agreement of both countries, be stationed across the Greco/Turkish border in Thrace, so as to keep the forces of the two countries apart.'[125] With an increase in tensions apparent in the wider eastern Mediterranean, the situation back at the United Nations could not have been more different to that in Cyprus. U Thant was by now reporting that he was at an impasse with regard to his negotiations.[126]

The Council Reconvenes

At three thirty of the afternoon of 25 February, the Security Council met again. The President of the Council, noting that Thant wished to address the assembled members, duly passed the floor over to the Secretary-General. Reading a personal statement to the Security Council, Thant said, *inter alia*:

> 'Since the last meeting of the Security Council, and, indeed, even before that meeting, I have had discussions with the parties principally involved for the purpose of exchanging views in an effort to clarify and define major issues...As you know, I have engaged in these informal discussion because it was clearly the wish of the parties that I should do so, and especially because in view of the seriousness and urgency of the Cyprus situation, it is my desire to do everything possible to help resolve this dangerous crisis...The discussions have been devoted primarily to expositions by the parties of their views of the problem and how it might be dealt with. It has not been my purpose to offer solutions, but as I said earlier, to seek common ground...I am convinced that there is an earnest desire on the part of all concerned to seek a peaceful solution, although, as may be expected, the positions on certain key issues have been firmly taken and maintained...may I express the hope that a reasonable and practical way out of the impasse will be found by this council. I will, of course, continue to be available and to do whatever may be appropriate in the circumstances to assist towards reaching a solution.'[127]

Bernardes now gave the floor for the first time to a member of the Security Council that did not have a direct role in the situation - the acting-Representative of Morocco. Noting that the independence of Cyprus had been 'welcomed by a number of friendly countries',[128] Sidi Baba went on to state that examples of the harmonious coexistence within a state could be found in many Arab countries.[129] Citing that once there was a mutual understanding of the need for peaceful coexistence within the state, the principle of independence and sovereignty should be accepted. To this end, in the view of the Moroccan delegation was that, 'the less interference there is from abroad, the better it will be for the Cypriot people and the stability of its institutions.'[130] Continuing his speech the Moroccan then stated, with regard to the London-Zürich Agreements:

> 'This state of things, we consider, can hardly be reconciled with the effective exercise of national sovereignty, especially in a country which is a State Member of the United Nations and whose basic position and guiding principles are those of non-alignment, as Archbishop Makarios himself said at the Belgrade Conference in 1961.'[131]

The Greek Cypriots must surely have been pleased to see that the Moroccans were now apparently swinging to their position. However, the Moroccan view was soon revealed to be much more along the lines of non-alignment that the Greek Cypriots must surely have wanted. Sidi Baba, in commenting on

why the Turkish Cypriots, as a minority, might attach importance to the London-Zürich Agreements stated that,

> '[i]t is therefore to be hoped that these guarantees will not be challenged abruptly and unilaterally, since there is reason to fear that in their absence the island's very existence as a State might in present circumstances be gravely jeopardized at any moment. We accordingly agree with those who believe that any changes in the Constitution which affect the guarantee clauses should be undertaken in a spirit of national fraternity and respect for the rights of the communities. A constitution amended in such circumstances, while incorporating the desired improvements would afford the necessary guarantees to the Turkish minority. In achieving this goal the Cypriot leaders would strip off all moral value those provisions of previous agreements which they regard as inconsistent with their country's national sovereignty, and would deprive those who might at any time be tempted to interfere from abroad in the affairs of Cyprus of any excuse for doing so.'[132]

Thanking the Secretary-General for his role in the search for an acceptable way forward, the Moroccans made a final note of the fact that they hoped, 'that this Mediterranean island will not become the theatre, and subsequently the victim, of a trial between the antagonistic forces traditionally bent on maintaining or establishing a foothold in the Mediterranean basin...we, as non-aligned nations, are profoundly anxious that this part of the world should be progressively withdrawn from exposure to the out-and-out competition of the cold war.'[133]

The next to speak was the Norwegian Representative. As a representative of a NATO member - which had also shown some interest in participating in the NATO-based force - Nielsen broadly took the side of the the United Kingdom. Indeed, he declared: 'It is the view of my Government that it is not for the Security Council to pronounce on the Constitution of a Member State, nor to pass judgement on a set of treaties which were negotiated as an integral part of the whole process of granting independence to that State.'[134] In continuing his speech the Norwegian made the first real move taken on the floor of the Council to establishing the *modus operandi* of a peace-keeping force:

> 'So far, none of the parties has objected to the creation of an international peace force. It is sufficient to remind the Council of the many successful peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. My delegation would request the parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General in order to reach agreement on the establishment of an international peace force in Cyprus. In our view, the Security Council would not be well advised to prescribe in detail how this task would be carried out. We, on our part, would only like to add that the force should be set up without financial obligations to the United Nations, taking due account of the present financial situation of the Organization.'[135]

The next to take his turn was Representative Hajek of Czechoslovakia. Given the pro-Soviet Czech position up until this point, it came as no surprise to hear that Hajek took the same stance as the Soviet Representative. However, at the start of his speech he neatly, though with no uncertain bias, caught the dilemma facing the Security Council in its continued debate of the Cyprus issue:

> 'The present discussion on the question of Cyprus has so far produced two distinct points of view. On the one hand, the opinion has been voiced that our task is to ensure and strengthen the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, which have been seriously threatened by interference and aggression from outside. On the other hand, we have witnessed an attempt to achieve through the United Nations a measure which would enable a group of States to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. These points of view

> are diametrically opposed to each other, and it is obviously extremely difficult, I am sorry to say, to find a compromise between them.'[136]

Proceeding to elaborate the same views as had by this point been heard over an over again, the Czech Representative finally said something of interest when he sought to parallel the situation in Cyprus with the events that befell his country in 1938, arguing:

> 'An aggressor from the outside used the leadership of an ethnical minority for unleashing disputes and conflicts and bringing about the disintegration of the State, for the purpose of furnishing alleged evidence that not only made the coexistence of that minority with the majority impossible, but also the very existence of Czechoslovakia untenable...In order to facilitate an agreement between the West and Hitlerite Germany, Czechoslovakia was continually asked and pressed to grant more and more concessions to the detriment of its sovereignty and security. It is interesting to note, for instance that one of those demands urged a change be made in the Czechoslovak Constitution which, in effect, provided that the leadership of the minority, directed from abroad, would have been virtually able to block any political decision of the Government and open the door to intervention by the neighbouring State whenever suitable for it...In the name of peace, the Munich Diktat and the partition of the country was imposed upon Czechoslovakia, followed six months later by the occupation of Prague. Six months later the Second World War burst out.'[137]

Comparing the situation in Cyprus to that which had befallen the Congo a few years earlier, Representative Usher of the Ivory Coast,[138] noted that the UN, 'should not encourage a repetition of it in the Cyprus case.'[139] Usher then went on to comment that although the Cypriot Constitution evidently had faults, and that international treaties should not be 'fixed or static',[140] 'we must acknowledge that the unilateral denunciation of a treaty is bound to be a source of conflict and war.'[141] Agreeing that a force should be created the Representative of the Ivory Coast concluded by noting that the issue of the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus should also be addressed in any final resolution.

With three of the non-permanent members of the Council now having spoken their minds on the issue of Cyprus, the debate now returned to the parties with a direct interest. Taking the floor the Turkish Representative took the opportunity to reply to the Czech statement and made a somewhat veiled criticism of their policy of kowtowing to the Soviet Union. In drawing a particular criticism he referred to the relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks in the Czechoslovak State,[142] and noted that although the Soviet Union had a Constitution that guaranteed the rights of many minorities, this had not made a 'sovereign identity'.[143]

Fedorenko, by-passing the Turkish comments, at this point asked if he might be able to reply to the statement made by Sir Patrick Dean at the previous meeting, and once again challenged the British assertion that Makarios invited the Guarantor Powers to intervene in December 1963, and accused the United Kingdom of the 'flagrant infringement of the sovereignty of Cyprus.'[144] Concluding his comments Fedorenko invited the United Kingdom to state categorically that it would not use 'armed force against Cyprus and that it intends, in the Cyprus situation, to abide strictly by its obligations as a State Member of the United Nations.'[145] Dean, in what may perhaps be interpreted as an effort to buy time in order to formulate a response to the statement, asked that Fedorenko's speech be translated into both English and French. At this point, the Czech Representative asked that he be allowed to respond to the Turkish Representative's earlier statement, and proceeded to give a detailed rebuttal to the comments, and offered to send Menemencioğlu a copy of the Czech Constitution to show that, 'the existence of the two national entities is fully respected.'[146] By this time the meeting had clearly degenerated into a series of accusations and counter-accusations. At which point Sir Patrick Dean replied to the earlier Soviet charges by asking the Soviet Representative to refer back to the six points that he had made in his address before the

Council on the 18 February.

Kyprianou taking the chance to thank the Secretary-General for his efforts to find a solution, and emphasising the important role of General Gyani and Mr. Rolz-Bennet, went on to discuss on the importance, or lack thereof, of the Treaty of Guarantee. In fact, the Greek Cypriot attempted to argue that under Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the instruction put before all members of the United Nations was:

> *In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.*

Placing an explicit question before the three Guarantor Powers, Kyprianou threw down the gauntlet by stating,

> 'I should like, with permission to put a simple question to the Members signatories to the Treaty of Guarantee. I do not insist on an answer tonight. Is it the view of the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom that they have the right of military intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee, particularly, in view of the Charter? On this I must insist on having an answer. It is very relevant to the whole issue, and I think the Council must have an answer to it before it forms a final opinion.'[147]

Although the Soviet Representative took another opportunity to question Dean, Menemencioğlu replied to Kyprianou's vital question by seeking to accuse the Greek Cypriots of hiding behind the United Nations as a means of doing 'away with all their commitments, including treaties, and to give them the right to jump upon the remaining Turks, to finish what they have started.'[148] Kyprianou immediately responded: 'As far as the exaggerations and distortions about genocide are concerned, those are words which can be found more often in the vocabulary of his own country - and I am referring to the past, when unfortunately there was no Charter of the United Nations.'[149]

To end the session, the Greek Representative decided to reply to Kyprianou's earlier question. Stating his Government's policy on this issue, Bitsios simply stated 'No'.[150] In other words the Greek had stated his belief that intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee was indeed subject to authorization by the Security Council. However, this answer did not solve the overall question of how to deal with the issue of the conflicting aims of the parties that still remained. The Greek Cypriots still wished to see a resolution that explicitly spoke of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and effectively abrogated the Treaty of Guarantee. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Turkey all held that respect for the Treaty of Guarantee was integral to any resolution.

By the end of the day's session it had become clear that while the Greek Cypriots could undoubtedly call on the support of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, they faced opposition from within the Council from the United Kingdom, Norway and the United States. Of the other states, China had not spoken, nor had France, Brazil or Bolivia. And both the Ivory Coast and Morocco had taken a position that fell somewhere between the two respective camps. With the Secretary-General now unable to find a solution behind the scenes, and a real split having taken place within the Security Council it was becoming increasingly obvious that if the Cyprus situation were not addressed soon, then the debate could well lapse into an East-West verbal scrap. A solution, now more than ever, was needed. In any case, the meeting was now adjourned by Bernardes, and was scheduled to meet again on 27 February.

6. Breaking the Deadlock

Although the Secretary-General had announced the end of his attempts to find common ground, there were hopeful rumours filtering out that five of the six *non-permanent* members of the Security Council, under the leadership of Dr. Bernades of Brazil, were about to introduce a new draft resolution for discussion. In a memorandum written by an official attached to the Greek Cypriot delegation following a telephone conversation with a member of the Brazilian Mission at the United Nations, the following was noted:

> *'Brazil's feeling is that the efforts of the Secretary-General did not result in complete failure and that if the matter was taken up from there and agreement was reached between the non-permanent Members, that agreement would be communicated to the parties concerned, with a view to minor modifications.*
>
> *At a meeting held yesterday evening a Paper was drafted containing a possible resolution. Three approaches were represented in the preamble. The first preamble contained no reference to either the integrity question or to the Treaties. The second draft preamble made clear reference to both the integrity question and to the Treaties. The third draft preamble made reference to both these issues in a diluted form.'*[151]

It was by now clear that the difficulties that needed to be addressed focussed on the preamble, and that the operative aspects of the draft were by now settled. In attempting to go *some* of the way towards satisfying *all* the various parties, three options were now presented. In analysing the three proposals, it was clear, on the basis of earlier arguments, that the first option - with no mention of either the Treaties or the integrity issue - was for obvious reasons going to be unacceptable to all parties. For the Greek Cypriots it did not provide an international guarantee against Turkish intervention. For Turkey and the United Kingdom, it would not have established the fundamental importance of the Treaties. Therefore, options two and three were likely to be the most viable routes forward. In any case, this timely intervention proved to be the beginning of the end of the political bargaining over a suitable resolution for a peace-keeping force for Cyprus.

On Wednesday 26 February, the day following Thant's statement, Bernardes informally distributed to the other members of the Council the first draft of the text of a resolution for the setting up of a United Nations force.[i] In a meeting held by Bernades with the Greek Cypriots that same morning, the Greek Cypriot delegation took the chance to make some, 'observations on his draft resolution'.[152] However, it was clear that the Greek Cypriot delegation were generally positive about the draft and saw it as an attempt "to find something acceptable to everybody."[153] Indeed, Makarios, in spite of the certain difficulties with the wording of the UN resolution, appeared to be general supportive of the idea for an United Nations mediator and peace-keeping force although the issue of the exact nature of the proposed resolution continued to prove to be a sticking point.[154] In particular the Greek Cypriots noted that the draft resolution failed:

> (a) To get Turkey specifically mentioned as the country towards which the admonition to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, was directed.
> (b) To abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee
> (c) To include as a term of reference of the Force to be stationed in Cyprus, either to defend Cyprus from aggression, or to prevent or restore the de facto situation created, or that which might be created in the future.[155]

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[i] See Appendix D

Despite the fact that the proposed resolution failed to meet these points, the draft certainly seemed to meet the perceived security needs of the Greek Cypriots. As Clerides later noted about the general reaction to the Resolution within the Greek Cypriot community after the Resolution had been passed:

> 'The main shortcomings...of the resolution escaped the attention of the general public and the press. This was due to the fact that the attention of everyone was concentrated on the issue of removing the danger of military intervention by Turkey and not on the issue of abrogating the agreements.'[156]

Indeed, it seemed to be the case that the need to prevent a Turkish intervention was the main concern within the Greek Cypriot delegation by this point. And the draft resolution, noting the integrity issue, did meet this requirement. Therefore following consultations with the Greek Cypriots, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and France all stated that they would support the draft resolution.[157]

Therefore it now appeared that the final decision would lay in the hands of The United Kingdom, the United States and Turkey. As far the British Government were concerned, they 'did not see any alternative to supporting the Resolution which the Five are proposing.'[158] Although the text went a considerable way towards the Greek Cypriot aim of having the independence, territorial integrity, and the like, of Cyprus recognised, it did nonetheless make reference to the Treaty of Guarantee, and did not specifically refer to Turkey. Yet, the Foreign Office seemed to be concerned that the United States might be against such a resolution. Therefore a request was put through to the US Ambassador in London that not only should the United States accept the resolution but that they should assist the British Government by trying to persuade the Turkish Government to accept the draft.[159] However, later that same day, the US Ambassador returned a message to the Foreign Office in which he explained that the United States was, at that time unwilling to accept the draft resolution as it stood, for the simple reason 'that it would be unacceptable to the Turks.'[160] This was because under the proposed resolution there was the all-important preamble referring to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. As for the position of the United States there appeared to be some, albeit limited, progress being made. It was now reported that there was,

> '...a telegram on the way from H.M. Ambassador in Washington regarding his conversation with Mr. Ball this morning. He understood that it ended on the note that the Americans would not try and prevent the Resolution from passing for the sole reason that the Turks disliked it. This was comforting to a point, although it probably meant that they would now try to manoeuvre so there was objection to the Resolution from the Greek or Greek-Cypriots as well as the Turks. I said that, before the Americans went ahead on this line, they must understand that we saw no, repeat no, alternative compromise to a resolution on the lines now under discussion. If this were to fail, the result would not be a meeting of the three Guarantor Powers. Sir P. Dean said that he fully understood this, and that the most likely next step would be a meeting of the Assembly, which everyone in their senses wished to avoid.'[161]

A French Role?

At the same time, in an apparent attempt to break the deadlock - or perhaps to break the Western unity[162] - Makarios was at this point reported to have approached President de Gaulle to act as a mediator.[163] This had been publicly mooted by Makarios the previous day in another interview with *Le Monde*.[164] In Cyprus, pro-French feeling had been on the increase throughout the previous week. On 16 February, *Makhi* had written that Makarios had decided to establish diplomatic representation in Paris at ambassadorial level,[165] and on the subject of a French mediatory role, a commentary written in the newspaper *Ethniki* had suggested that de Gaulle would be the 'ideal neutral mediator.'[166] Yet despite this

open statement of intent by the Greek Cypriots in favour of a prominent French position in a negotiation process, officials within the United States' Government stated that they felt that France would be unwilling to undertake this role.[167] However, the United States could surely have not been so confident about predicting the attitude of the General de Gaulle. Indeed, the role of the French Government throughout the crisis period had proved to be both enigmatic and quietly important. On the latter point, it is worthy remembering that both Makarios and Küçük had chosen to give high profile interviews to the French newspaper *Le Monde* earlier in the crisis - perhaps with a view to swaying the views of the French. Indeed, it was now being reported that Makarios had decided to upgrade its diplomatic representation in Paris to full ambassadorial level.[168]

Given the earlier French refusal to contribute to the NATO-based force, the issue of France acting as a mediator seemed to concern the British. The reason why Makarios may have been willing to see de Gaulle acting in that role was because of certain views that the General was reported to have had with a view to solving the continuing difficulty. A letter submitted to the Foreign Office by the United Kingdom's Delegation in Paris noted that the question of Cyprus had apparently not come up in a meeting between President Segni of Italy and General de Gaulle,[169] but that,

> '...the Italians had gathered from French officials that it was General de Gaulle's view that a really radical solution was called for. Furthermore, General de Gaulle had said to the Italian Ambassador here [Paris] before the State Visit that any lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem would have to be based on a large-scale repatriation or re-settlement of the Turkish community on the island.'[170]

However, despite the degree of attention given to the idea of a role for General de Gaulle, French Government officials denied knowledge of an official request for mediation,[171] and the idea did not appear again as a serious proposal.

Contingency Planning

Without realising that the draft resolution was basically acceptable to the Greek Cypriots, there was concern being expressed within the British Cabinet that while the draft resolution was acceptable to the United Kingdom, and possibly the United States, it was still unlikely to find favour with the Turkey, and indeed by now, Greece.[172] This appraisal of the Greek Government's position had been made following a note from the United States' Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office in which George Ball had noted that in the event that the Security Council did not come up with an acceptable resolution the possibility of a bilateral meeting between Papandreou and İnönü would be unlikely to occur without some form of 'third party invitation and a juridical excuse for conferring.'[173] However, Ball suggested that some form of conference may succeed if it were done under the auspices of the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee. Indeed, as Ball commented,

> 'I feel more than ever that some move of this kind is imperative. It seems evident that the Greek Cypriot game is to keep the United Nations proceedings going. This is a forum where they can draw support from their Communist friends. It provides them with insulation against a Turkish move while eroding Turkish intervention rights.'[174]

Assessing the profile of the Security Council, Ball noted that the Greek Cypriots were having some success in wooing the support of the Moroccans and the Permanent Representative of the Ivory Coast - both of which had previously seemed to be 'neutral' from their respective speeches at the Security Council.[175] To this end the idea of a meeting of the Guarantor Powers seemed, to the United States at least, to have afforded the following opportunities:

'(A.) To convince Makarios that the Turks mean business and that he is playing too risky a game;
(B.) To press Makarios to accept and support a peace-keeping force along the lines of the Thant plan; and
(C.) To *undertake contingency planning* for a possible tripartite intervention as an alternative to unilateral Turkish move.'[176]

Yet to expect to cajole Makarios once again would be difficult to say the least. Whereas previously the Archbishop had the support of the Soviet Union, on this occasion he would have not just Soviet backing, but also support from the Greek Government. In the case of the which, it was interesting to note that the British Government had, by the day following the Ball message, almost completely ruled out another meeting of the Guarantor Powers on the basis that it was almost certain that the Greek Government would refuse to attend.[177]

7. The Changing Position of the Greek Government

Changes in the political scene in Athens meant that there was a Greek Government in place that supported the Greek Cypriots in a way that the caretaker Government had been unable to do. The General Elections held in Greece on 16 February had brought to power the veteran liberal politician George Papandreou, whose arrival was heralded by significant anti-British and anti-American violent demonstrations in Athens.[178] Although Papandreou had welcomed the initial British intervention in Cyprus back in December, he had campaigned on a platform that, *inter alia*, opposed the London-Zürich Agreements.[179] Yet a coherent policy on Cyprus was not articulated in the initial week or so after the election - during which the incoming Government was forming a Cabinet.[180] However, the changed policy of the new Government over that taken by Paraskevopoulos took a very strong hold by the point at which Thant announced that his attempts to break the deadlock at the United Nations had failed. Indeed, the same day as this announcement was made, the new Greek Foreign Minister announced that he was re-examining Athens Radio broadcasts of Greek language BBC World Service and Voice of America (VOA) news items on the basis that such accounts were 'unfavourable' to Cyprus.[181] And, on 27 February, Papandreou told the Ambassadors of Britain and the United States that his government had decided to support Makarios's views and help restore the 'peace and the principles of democracy' in Cyprus.[182] The next day the threatened ban on BBC broadcasting came into effect, although VOA and *Radiodiffusion Française* (RDF) were allowed to run as usual. However the day after this a blanket ban was imposed (including the RDF) with only one Greek language broadcast by VOA allowed per day, in the evening. At the same time Papandreou made an announcement to the Greek nation in which the clear shift in Greek policy was revealed when he commented that: 'The Greek Government gives its unqualified assistance to the just struggle of Cypriot Hellenism...[t]he tragic consequences of the Treaties of London and Zurich are now being revealed.'[183] This had followed a warning given by Foreign Minister Kostopoulos to Turkish Ambassador İlkin: 'if Turkey decided to make a unilateral intervention in Cyprus, Greece would intervene.'[184]

With this Makarios was now in a position where he could now play on pan-Hellenistic feelings, as support for his position was now being actively voiced in the new Greek Government.[185] The change in Greek attitudes no doubt affected the United Kingdom's perceptions of its military position in Cyprus, as it could no longer rely on a broad Guarantor Power coalition. However, such changes in Greece were mediated by the continued support of Turkey towards the British Government and the Truce Force. With such increased Greek support for the Greek Cypriot community the Turkish Government would surely have been expected to support the Turkish Cypriots with threats against any Greek attempts to overwhelm the island. However, with the prospect of a resolution looming large on the horizon, the Turkish position seemed to have softened considerably. In a statement to the press, Prime Minister İnönü

said that Turkey would try 'all imaginable measures' to avoid the 'last resort' of intervention in Cyprus.[186] Of course one must show a degree of scepticism towards statements made by politicians to the press, but in this case the actions of Turkey seemed to support the idea that by this point Turkey had indeed been persuaded to take a softer line on the issue of Cyprus, and accept the draft resolution. To this extent its role at the United Nations seemed to reflect this. However, if the Turkish Government was by now trying to be conciliatory in its dealings with the Cyprus problem, the Turkish Cypriots were not. Before the draft resolution could be passed, the Turkish Cypriot case would have to be heard by the Council.

The Council Meets Again

As had been scheduled at the last meeting, the Security Council reconvened on the afternoon of Thursday 27 February. The first item of discussion was a letter submitted, on 19 February, in which the acting Permanent Representative of Turkey had requested that Rauf Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, be allowed to address the Council.[187] Although the Greek Cypriots investigated the means by which to prevent such an address from happening, they soon became aware that as they were not a member of the Security Council they would have no chance of preventing Denktaş' appearance if the majority of Security Council so wanted.[188] Thus, resigned to having to accept the will of the greater number of the Council, they remained quiet on the issue. And when the Council session began the immediate response of the Soviet Representative was to reject the application on the grounds that, '[t]he Security Council has already invited the accredited delegation of the Republic of Cyprus...to participate in the discussion of the complaint of Cyprus...[and that] the Council cannot and must not become a party to the exertion of pressure on the Government of Cyprus through diplomatic and political isolation.'[189]On the other hand Representative Sidi Baba of Morocco, though voicing sympathy with the Republic of Cyprus, felt that 'hearing him might be particularly useful for our debate and might considerably facilitate our discussion of the case.'[190] Señor Castrillo Justiniano, the Bolivian Representative - speaking for the first time - also noted that the Cypriot delegation before the Council represented the Republic of Cyprus, and to hear the Turkish Cypriot delegate could be viewed as an infringement of the United Nations' principle of non-interference in the domestic jurisdiction of states. To this end, he asked that the President clarify the exact issue at stake if the Turkish Cypriots wanted to address the Council.[191] At this the Bernardes asked if there were any further comments, and after another brief interjection by the Soviet representative, the President asked that a formal proposal, under United Nations' Security Council Rule of Procedure 39, be made by the Council.[192] Despite some further procedural debates, Rauf Denktaş was duly called upon as an individual - not as the representative of the Turkish Cypriots - to present his case to the Security Council at the next session.[193]

However, before this could be done there were still a number of speakers listed to participate that day - the first of which was Sir Patrick Dean. In referring to the direct question on the Treaty of Guarantee *vis-à-vis* the Charter of the United Nations posed by Kyprianou at the previous meeting, Dean made note of the fact that provisions were made, under Article 51, for the use of force.[194] In addition, Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee did not permit the use of force unilaterally, but instead allowed for, "*the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.*" [emphasis added by the author] Making an important point as to the question posed, the British representative said that it was not, '...part of our present task in this Council to consider hypothetical situations which, if the Government of Cyprus and all other Governments concerned do their duty, will remain hypothetical for ever.'[195] Indeed, in a comment of considerable significance, Sir Patrick, stated: '*It was not therefore, under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee that the United Kingdom Government sent its troops to Cyprus. We sent our troops because they were asked for and because they were generally considered necessary and helpful in preventing further serious strife.*'[emphasis added by the author][196] Continuing on from this note, Dean made another important point:

> 'When I spoke last week [1095th meeting], I warned the Council that for any one nation to carry the main responsibility of peace-keeping is, at the least, unwise. Events since then have underlined the dangers of this and the need for an international force. My Government is prepared to take such part as may be thought appropriate in an international force properly constituted, but *I must warn the Council that it is neither helpful nor fitting for us to continue alone to carry out this thankless task if there is no prospect of an international force or steps towards an agreed solution of the problems of Cyprus.*'[197] [emphasis added by the author]

The British Representative had just made two important points. In the first instance the United Kingdom had chosen to emphasise, in a very public setting, that the Joint Truce force was not an imposed interventionary force placed in Cyprus by the Guarantor Powers with little concern for the wishes of the Cypriots. By doing this Dean was in fact reserving the United Kingdom's, if not Greece and Turkey's, position on the question of the rights of the Guarantor Powers to intervene at a later stage. This important point, coupled the United Kingdom's open declaration of its intention to withdraw from its role if no suitable resolution could be found[198] meant that Sir Patrick Dean had - in a move that was either unwitting or supremely intelligent - just threatened the Greek Cypriots by throwing the door open to a direct intervention by Turkey in Cyprus. However, the British Representative had also made such an intervention all the more politically dangerous for Turkey as it would clearly have to invoke the Treaty of Guarantee - a move that had, on the basis of Dean's previous comment, clearly not been done by this point.[199] In effect, Dean had just tried to emphasise to both the Greek Cypriots and to Turkey the importance of accepting the presented draft resolution.

Kyprianou, seemingly ignoring this vital speech, instead chose to make made another effort to try to produce a definite answer to his earlier question. The Cypriot Foreign Minister noted: 'since the day the Council took up the question there has in fact been, with the exception of a few minor incidents, considerable improvement in Cyprus.'[200] This had come about, according to Kyprianou, as a result of the reduction in concern about an external intervention. A result of which had been a limited amount of Greek-Turkish Cypriot co-habitation in a number of areas.[201]

At the end of Kyprianou's statements, Representative Seydoux presented France's position in the Council for the first time. After the various rumours that had been bandied about as to a possible French role in the crisis as a mediator, Seydoux made what was in fact a fairly short speech relative to many that had gone before. In the course of his comments he seemed to disassociate France from its rumoured ties to the Greek Cypriots by noting despite the tragic state of affairs in the island the Council had no right to interpret the agreements forming the Republic of Cyprus,[202] but that the duty of the Council was to urge the two communities and the Government of Cyprus to exercise restraint.[203] The Bolivian Representative then followed and took the chance to give a more comprehensive account of his Government's view of the situation than had been given in his earlier address. Noting some parallels between his country and Cyprus, Justiniano noted that a small state such as Cyprus with only limited military power had no option but to seek the 're-negotiation or revision of unjust treaties.'[204] Indeed, referring to events in the Americas, the Bolivian drew the Council's attention that even that morning there had been press reports that the United States was about to renegotiate the 1903 Treaty with Panama: '[A] magnificent example, because here we have a powerful country, one of the most powerful in history, approaching Panama, the small country, in order to review a situation and find a solution to the problem that has arisen between them.'[205] In concluding, Justiniano restated his support for Cyprus' desire to have the Treaties reviewed, but also expressed clear agreement with the United Kingdom's desire to see a peace-keeping force put in place.[206]

At this point the Turkish Representative clarified a number of accusation that had been made over the previous few days and once again held that the Treaties were important documents needed to secure the vital interests of a number of countries, and were signed on this basis. However, given the situation in Cyprus the most urgent and pressing task of the Council was the issue of a peace-keeping

force. In reply, Kyprianou made a brief comment in which he accused Menemencioğlu of calling for partition,[207] and that the fact that Makarios had signed the various agreements did not mean that they were signed willingly.[208] After a further, brief comment by the Greek Representative in which he took note of the fact that the Turkish Representative had called Kyprianou the representative of the Greek Cypriots, rather than the representative of the Government of Cyprus,[209] the meeting came to an end.

The day had once again highlighted the deep division within the Council as to how the Cyprus situation should be handled. It was by now obvious that any move to have the members of the Council pronounce on the invalidity of the Treaty of Guarantee would fail, especially as it now seemed that those Treaties were designed to facilitate non-violent negotiation rather than permitting military intervention of any kind. However, it was also becoming clearer that there were positive moves towards the idea that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the island should be addressed. With some sort of clarity now becoming apparent, the Greek Cypriots were on the verge of being recognised by the international community as the Government of Cyprus with or without the continued role of the Turkish Cypriots. The final chance to have this state of affairs avoided by the Turkish Cypriot community lay with the presentation of the their case to the Security Council by Rauf Denktaş. The next day would, in many ways determine the final shape of a Security Council resolution.

8. Denktaş Presents the Turkish Cypriot View

It was within this context that the members of the Council reconvened the next afternoon, 28 February, to hear the presentation, in a purely personal capacity, of Rauf Denktaş. Yet immediately, the Soviet Representative called a point of order, and asked the Turkish Representative to clarify the point raised by Bitsios as to his use of terminology with regard to the representation of Kyprianou as a Greek Cypriot.[210] Menemencioğlu, questioning the role of the Soviet Union to make such a point, replied by drawing Fedorenko's attention to the fact on the important issue of foreign affairs, decisions could only be taken after a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Cyprus, and with the agreement of both the President and Vice-President of the Republic.[211] Seeing as this had not been done 'it is only natural for me to say that these opinions [presented by Kyprianou at the Council] reflect only the opinion of those who made them.'[212] Not content with this answer the Soviet Representative launched into a polemic about the important rules laid down by the United Nations about such matters. At the end of this, Bernardes called upon Kyprianou to make some comments to the Council. At this point the Greek Cypriot declined from criticising the Turkish Representative directly, but made note of the fact that the insult inherent in the comment was directed not at himself but at the Security Council as an institution.[213] In replying, the Turkish Representative noted that he had presented his case and would henceforth cease to participate in debates of this kind, especially as the Soviet Union was seeking to separate the interested parties.[214] Yet again Fedorenko tried to call Menemencioğlu to account for his statement.[215] Yet the Turkish Representative made no move to answer. At this point, Bernardes called upon Denktaş to address the Council.

Almost immediately upon beginning his address, the Turkish Cypriot launched into an attack on the Greek Cypriots, and Archbishop Makarios in particular. In drawing the Security Council's attention to the continuing fighting in Cyprus, Denktaş questioned the intentions of the Greek Cypriots to see a United Nations' peace-keeping force put in place.[216] In elaborating the difficult nature of the situation, he went on to describe the historic nature of Greek and Turkish Cypriot cohabitation:

> 'Turks and Greeks have lived in Cyprus together since 1571. They have so lived always as Greeks or Turks. They have each stuck to their separate culture, religion, tradition and national heritage. They are in effect Turkey and Greece projected into Cyprus for the Turkish and Greek populations respectively. Any attempts to make them anything but Greeks or Turks have met with strong opposition from these groups in Cyprus. They have lived as autonomous

> communities together, yet always separate. Down to the smallest village there have always been, and there is, Greek and Turkish authorities looking after the affairs of their communities separately. As long as they enjoyed equality and justice, they lived together happily. As soon as one side attempted to dominate the other politically, trouble brewed and their relations were momentarily estranged.'[217]

The speech continued with an account of the EOKA period, before moving on to present a number of examples that sought to show that the Greek Cypriots saw independence as a transitionary stage that would eventually lead to full union with Greece, thus rendering the Turkish Cypriots a small minority. This had resulted in the outbreak of fighting. In attempting to present the Turkish Cypriots in a more conciliatory light, Denktaş read out a letter from Vice-President Küçük to President Makarios in which the Turkish Cypriot leader had attempted to highlight the numerous mistakes that Makarios had made with regard to his policy *vis-à-vis* the Turkish Cypriot community.[218] Through the use of a 'propaganda machine', the impression given by the Greek Cypriots of the Turkish Cypriots to the international community was one of a rebellious minority, and not of partners in the Republic of Cyprus. It was for this reason that the Security Council had not seen the importance of the need to ensure that the Constitution, and therefore the Treaty of Guarantee, would not be abrogated or amended.[219] Following on from this, the Turkish Cypriot categorically denied a plot designed to bring about partition in Cyprus. However, in his final words he said:

> 'Today no constitution is in effect in Cyprus. None of the provisions of the Constitution are being complied with or applied. In the circumstances which have been created it cannot be applied. So the two communities have fallen apart. It is not the fault of Mr. Kyprianou that he has not been able to get full instructions from Dr. Küçük and the Turkish Ministers to have this discussed fully in the Ministerial Council. The Greek gunmen will not let the Turks go to the other side and the ministerial function is finished. But with due respect to him, I do not think he can say or that he can claim in justice and fairness and humanity that he can represent the Turkish voice, that he can fully represent the Turkish side in this Council. He cannot.'[220]

The Turkish Cypriots had now had their opportunity to present their case. Kyprianou, by not even bothering to respond to the statement at once,[221] made it clear that he felt that he had successfully managed to create the impression the Government of the Republic of Cyprus did still exist with or without the active participation of the Turkish Cypriot community. However, with this concession gained it was also clear that the question of the Council determining the fate of the Constitution of Cyprus was at an end. The full picture of the Cyprus situation had now been presented by all the interested parties and it was obvious that most of the assembled representatives now wished to bring to an end the discussions and proceed with a vote on a resolution. Yet, as a note of warning, Liu Chieh of China stated that despite the complexity of the Cyprus situation, the Security Council must refrain from becoming a judicial rather than a political body.[222]

The next to speak was the Greek Representative. First he thanked both the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council for their 'untiring efforts...to reconcile diverging views and to work out procedures which, with due regard for the interests of the parties involved in the Cyprus question, might cope constructively with the extreme gravity of the situation we are considering.'[223] After this, Bitsios went on to present the two views originally brought before the Council, and, in the course of his statement, he stated that the Greek Cypriots had justified their claim against Turkey, and criticised Denktaş as a man 'whose personal responsibility for the difficulties Cyprus now faces and in recent years has had to face is...heavy'.[224] Kyprianou, upon finally taking the floor, then announced that he would not reply to Denktaş there and then, but instead wanted to refer back to the situation in Cyprus which, although calm, was again under a renewed threat of attack from Turkey. In once again pronouncing the

Greek Cypriot position on a resolution, Kyprianou commented:

> 'I am confident that, if the Security Council decides to protect the territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus, peace will be restored in the island. As we have said on various occasions, in order to allay certain fears - which we believe have no basis - we do not object in principle to having an international force under the United Nations. Some people have tried to say that we have attempted by tricks to avoid having such a force. We feel that, if Cyprus is protected, a force is not necessary - but nevertheless we are prepared to have it. However, having a force is not the goal. Having a force is one of the means towards the restoration of normal conditions and order. You cannot have a force there to restore normal internal conditions for a period of three months - and yet have Turkey feel that it has the right to intervene whenever it likes. You will not thereby be serving any purpose.'[225]

In reply, Representative Menemencioğlu made an attempt to be conciliatory in his comments. Seeming to try to calm the situation down and move forward on the issue, he stated that Turkey had no territorial claim on Cyprus, and that, as a founder of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey wished to see it prosper.[226] In what was a vital statement, the Turkish Representative then drew the Council's attention to the fact that the issue brought before the Council by the Greek Cypriots was the need to have the territorial integrity, and the like, of Cyprus respected and for the Treaty of Guarantee to be abrogated, and yet, under Article II of the Treaty:

> *Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence , territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus*

In other words, these issues were, in the view of Turkey, redundant. This was emphasised by the fact that, 'Turkey has never said that it feels free to invade or intervene whenever it sees fit.'[227] At this point Kyprianou asked the Turkish Representative if he would therefore object to having such phraseology used within the text of a resolution.[228] Menemencioğlu again refused to answer directly,[229] stating that his earlier comment was on record, and that he accepted responsibility for his comments.[230] Representative Bitsios, therefore noted that there could no longer be any difficulty with this clause as Turkey had already recognised it.[231] A point picked up by the Soviet Representative who again asked the Turk for a direct answer,[232] which was once more avoided by Menemencioğlu who drew the Council's attention to his earlier statement.[233] At which point Fedorenko made another attempt to elicit an answer from the Turk.[234] Kyprianou, seeing the pointlessness of this, tried a different approach by noting that if it were the case that the Turkish Government had already made clear that the Treaty of Guarantee was in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and that Cyprus was a member of the United Nations, then it would not be difficult for the Turkish member to accept a resolution calling for the sovereignty, and the like, of Cyprus to be accepted. Again Fedorenko pushed for a direct answer. Menemencioğlu having made his important comment, simply referred to the fact that he had answered this question twice,[235] at which point the President of Council called the meeting to an end, and scheduled the next session for 2 p.m., on Monday 2 March.

It was now obvious that the political situation within the Security Council was such that no particular party was going to get all their demands met within a resolution. Given Menemencioğlu's comment, it seemed as if the Turkish Government had, by this point, obviously agreed to accept a resolution that called upon unspecified states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, but which also recognised the current validity of the various Treaties signed in 1960 - especially the Treaty of Guarantee.[236] The United Kingdom, seeking to have a peace-keeping force put in place - while not alienating Turkey - had seen its difficulties overcome. The United States likewise had

the same result. The Greek Cypriots though unhappy with these points were about to be recognised as the effective Government of Cyprus, and had made a Turkish military intervention unlikely. However, the final stumbling block to the agreement was the Turkish Cypriots, who were wholeheartedly against any such recognition of the Greek Cypriots as the Government of Cyprus. To this end the United Kingdom and United States formulated an approach to be taken to the Turkish Cypriots with regard to a diplomatic solution to the problem. The two countries - with the knowledge of the Turkish Government[237] - asked that the Turkish Cypriot community's concern about the question of recognition be put to one side as the United Kingdom and the United States would ensure that once the resolution had been passed then they would continue to press for the Turkish Cypriot case.[238] Although this promise is now regarded by the Turkish Cypriots as having been a lie,[239] it was on the basis of this promise that the Turkish Cypriot leadership - pressured by Turkey[240] - agreed to co-operate.[241] The final major difficulty had now, apparently, been overcome.

9. The Resolution of the Five

On 2 March, the Security Council met again. The Presidency of the Council had by this point rotated and Liu Chieh of China had replaced Carlos Bernardes. After taking the chance to thank the Brazilian representative,[242] Liu passed on to the substantive matter of the day - the presentation of a draft resolution to the Council. This document was the final version of the proposal that had been formulated by five of the six non-permanent members of the Security Council - Bolivia, Brazil, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Norway. To this end the President gave the floor to the Brazilian representative. Speaking on behalf of the five, Bernardes explained the thinking behind the draft, stating:

> 'My colleagues and I, benefitting from the groundwork laid by the Secretary-General, are thus in a position to put before the Council a draft resolution which we consider to be a fair and balanced document. This draft is the result of lengthy negotiations, much give-and-take and compromise, and if it fails to give entire satisfaction to any of the parties concerned - and this may be its greatest value - we earnestly believe that it will not be unacceptable to them.'[243]

At this point the Brazilian took the chance to run through the document and explain each of the seven paragraphs that made up the proposed resolution,[244] the main aim of which was stated as be the prevention of any fighting that might threaten international peace and security. To this end the draft resolution presented, under operational paragraph 4, to

> 'recommend the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus, whose composition and size would be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and whose commander would be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General would keep the Governments providing the force fully informed and would report periodically to the Council on its operations.'[245]

At the end of his speech Representative Bernades expressed his 'earnest and sincere wish that the Council may see its way clear to giving its approval to the draft resolution before it'. Realising that the various representatives to the Council might need time to consult their respective governments, Liu accepted the Brazilian's proposal that the council be adjourned and reconvened the following day, 3 March.

As it stood, the resolution as a whole took no stand as regards any of the participants to the conflict, a result that by now proved acceptable to Turkey. Indeed, they even saw fit to express their overall satisfaction with the draft resolution. And, importantly, four of the five Permanent Members -

Britain, the United States, France and the Chinese - also saw the draft resolution as being broadly acceptable. It was therefore left only to the Soviet Union to support the resolution. However, at this juncture the Soviet Permanent Representative expressed his concern over the resolution.[246] Despite the previous assurance given the Greek Cypriots that the draft resolution was acceptable, Fedorenko's specific worry now lay with the role given to the Secretary-General in the creation of the peace-keeping force. In light of the Congo experience, the Soviet Union did not favour giving the Secretary-General power which they felt should be solely in the hands of the Security Council.[247] Therefore, before Fedorenko could vote on the resolution as a whole, the Soviet delegation had to cable the draft back to Moscow for guidance.[248]

By the afternoon of 3 March this had still not been given and the Security Council reconvened. After Permanent Representative Liu noted that none of the representatives wished to speak formally on the draft he suggested that the Council reconvene the following morning. At this point the British Representative made the following statement:

> 'Of course I will bow to your wishes, Mr. President, and to the wishes of my colleagues that there should be a further adjournment, but I am bound to say that the proposal for a further adjournment does not at this moment seem to my delegation to be very satisfactory. I do not know quite what the reason may be, but if some of my colleagues are still waiting for their instructions, I can of course well understand that position; at some time or other we all find ourselves in the position of needing further time. But in this particular case I would urge that the Council, if it has to adjourn, should not adjourn for long. Events do not wait in Cyprus. The situation is urgent as well as important, and if it really is impossible for all concerned round this table to proceed this afternoon, I am bound, for the record, to express my Government's concern at the further delay involved.'[249]

The same day, the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons, in response to a question asking whether it would have been 'wiser' for the Government to have taken the matter to the Security Council earlier, Douglas-Home stated:

> '[w]e have had to play this hand in a way which would get the agreement of the Greeks and the Turks, and we had to put a resolution to the United Nations which would not be vetoed by the Russians. That has been an extremely tricky thing to do and we should not have had a chance if we had done it earlier.'[250]

Although the tabled resolution now looked almost certain to be passed, the pressures on the Truce Force were almost unbearable by now. Despite the fact that there had been a certain drop in fighting since the matter had been moved to the Security Council, the troops of the Joint Truce Force found themselves totally incapacitated and unable to intervene in any situations, often physically being prevented from doing so by Greek Cypriot police.[251] This inability to control the situation was mainly due to unrelenting attacks on its role - by now appearing daily - in the Greek Cypriot newspapers. In the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber, a representative had referred to the, 'untimely and provocative actions of the British soldiers',[252] and a large demonstration conducted by the organisation of right-wing trade unions (SEK) in Famagusta had seen large numbers of people carrying placards with slogans such as '*Englishmen get out of Cyprus*', and '*English, do not provoke our feeling more, our patience will be exhausted*'.[253] This ill-feeling was exacerbated by reports that British soldiers were carrying mail for Turkish Cypriots. This accusation was made after letters were found in a British Forces postal bag which had been given to a soldier of the Glosters at the Turkish Cypriot police station in Ktima.[254] Although British troops were ordered not to do it again, the Greek Cypriots took the opportunity to claim that this was a clear example of British attempts to undermine their authority and foster partition.[255] Such was the

paranoia of the Greek Cypriot community towards the United Kingdom's actions by this point that there were even accusations that the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, Rauf Denktaş, was being used as a 'tool' by the British to ensure partition.[256]

Furthermore, there were significant doubts being expressed as to the United Kingdom's operational ability to continue with the task of policing the situation. During Prime Minister's questions in the House of Commons on 3 March, the Labour Member for Dudley West, Mr. Wigg, suggested that this was because of the fact that British Army units in Cyprus were acting below strength. In reply to this question the Prime Minister denied that this was as a result of such weakness as implied by Wigg, and that Britain had, 'some 8,000 to 12,000 men there.'[257]

The Council Meets for the Final Time

With the deterioration in the situation now more than clear, there was a tension surrounding the reconvening of the Security Council. Meeting at ten thirty in the morning of 4 March 1964, two days after the presentation of the draft resolution, the first to speak was the Permanent Representative of Soviet Union. Taking the opportunity to address the Council, Fedorenko briefly restated the Soviet position on the Cyprus question as being an internal matter best left to the Cypriots to handle.[258] However, in returning to the issue of the resolution the Soviet Representative stated:

> 'We consider it necessary to draw attention to those provisions in the draft resolution - we have in mind, in particular, paragraph 4 - which concern the procedure for settling matters relating to the composition, size and command of the United Nations force that it is proposed to send to Cyprus. Although the agreement of the Government of Cyprus is required for the establishment of a United Nations force in Cyprus and although the composition and size of that force are to be decided in consultation with the Governments of the so-called guaranteeing Powers - namely, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey - there is no escaping the fact that this procedure in practice bypasses the Security Council.
>
> Moreover, the provision in the draft resolution to the effect that the commander of the force will report to the Secretary-General, who will report periodically to the Security Council, is, of course, not adequate.'[259]

To this extent Fedorenko requested that, 'paragraph 4 be voted upon separately'. This would allow the draft resolution to be passed in entirety but also allow the Soviet Union to register their disapproval on this particular point. Before ending his speech the Soviet Representative landed a parting shot and took the opportunity to present their view on the 'illegal occupation of the Presidency of the Council, and of the place belonging to the People's Republic of China.'[260] Liu, choosing to avoid the issue for the sake of being able to press on with the matter at hand, passed the floor to Bernardes.[261] After making some comments about the structure of the resolution Bernardes noted that the Secretary-General wished to make an statement. Taking the floor, Thant, obviously wishing to allay Soviet concerns, explained that it was his intention to keep the Council fully informed of a number of operational aspects pertaining to the force. In addition he made note of the fact that the United Nations force for Cyprus would, unlike UNEF or ONUC, be set in place for a three month period, after which any extension would have to be agreed to by the Security Council: 'In sum, although the responsibilities for the Secretary-General foreseen by the draft resolution are serious, they do not differ substantially from past experience and I have no hesitation in undertaking them.'[262]

With this concluded the President then called the votes on the resolution. The first vote to be taken was on paragraph 4. This was passed eight (8) votes to none (0) with three abstentions, namely the Soviet Union, France, and Czechoslovakia. With the concern of these three officially registered, a vote could now be taken upon the entire text. At which point the resolution was passed unanimously with no

abstentions. The floor was now handed to the French Representative in order to allow him to explain the French reasons for abstaining of paragraph 4.[263] In his speech Seydoux pointed to a concern that the Secretary-General was assuming too much responsibility and that this consequently reduced the responsibilities of the Security Council.[264] Although not a personal criticism of the Secretary-General,[265] Seydoux stressed that the French Government did not regard the responsibilities contained in the Resolution as forming a precedent.[266] The next speaker, the Czechoslovak Representative, also took the stand that the Secretary-General was being given powers that rightly belonged to the Security Council.[267] In commenting on the text of the resolution as a whole Hajek noted:

> 'In spite of the weaknesses of the resolution, which we have had occasion to criticize in the course of conversations with its sponsors, the Czechoslovak delegation voted for it out of respect for the fact that the Cyprus delegation considers it to be acceptable and in the hope that its implementation will speedily create conditions that will facilitate the Cyprus Government's efforts to maintain and strengthen the country's independence and unity. By so doing, we have shown - as we shall never fail to do - our support for the just cause of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the defence and consistent application of the principles of the Charter.'[268]

Liu, as President stated the belief that all the members of the Council felt 'gratified' that the resolution of the five non-permanent members had been passed. After thanking the Cypriot Foreign Minister and the Representatives of Greece and Turkey 'for their participation and co-operation in the deliberations of the Council', the President of the Council then passed the floor to Foreign Minister Kyprianou for a final comment:

> 'I would like, on behalf of my Government, to express to the Council our appreciation for the understanding shown by all the members and for their sincere desire to help in solving the problems of Cyprus. Thank you, Mr. President.'[269]

At this the floor returned to Liu who simply stated: 'Since there is no further business, the meeting stands adjourned.'[270]

'The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.'

RESOLUTION 186 (1964)

The Security Council,

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: " All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations",

1. *Calls upon* all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;

2. *Asks* the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. *Calls* upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4. *Recommends* the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. *Recommends* that the function of the Force should be in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6. *Recommends* that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for the purpose;

7. *Recommends further* that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom a mediator who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well- being of the people as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

Summary of Chapter V

The move to the United Nations Security Council had highlighted the rift in the views between the Greek Cypriots and the Governments of Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America as to the root of the problem that needed to be addressed in Cyprus. For the Greek Cypriots, the threat of Turkish military action against the Republic of Cyprus and a debate on the Constitution remained the main issues and therefore the main aim of the Security Council debate was to abrogate the 1960 Treaties. For the British Government - who wished to maintain a good relationship with Turkey and retain its military facilities on the island - these aims were to be avoided. Instead, it was the need to resolve intercommunal differences within the bounds of the Constitution and the creation of a peace-keeping force to replace its own presence on the island that formed the backbone of the United Kingdom's policy. These differences ensured that any debate would be fraught with the potential for considerable acrimony. Indeed, the realisation of this within the Greek Cypriot community had meant that there was a considerable backlash against the the United Kingdom which had been viewed as attempting to usurp the Greek Cypriots' position. However, events revealed a wholly more calm and considered approach by the Greek Cypriot representatives in New York, who saw the need to negotiate. In the final analysis, it was clear that by this stage all parties desired an outcome that would reduce the tensions on the island.

Paradoxically, this was both facilitated and constrained by the difficulties presented in the public forum of the Security Council chamber. In the numerous meetings of the Security Council there was a strong tendency for the debates to degenerate into volatile and vitriolic mud-slinging between the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, and the Soviet Union. Fedorenko, who took the opportunity to speak at almost every possible juncture, was apparently determined to call all those who expressed any dissent with the Greek Cypriots to account for their statements and in doing so undoubtedly created more ill-will between the parties than had hitherto been the case in the international arena.

Yet in reaching a final resolution the Security Council showed itself to be more than a talking shop at which anger could be vented. The degree of sensitivity and the perceived need for conciliation expressed by most of the non-permanent representatives at the Security Council - the Czechs being the exception - whose countries were not involved with the situation contributed in large degree to the final outcome. As did the final overall view of the Security Council that it could not pronounce upon the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee. And although U Thant had, by 25 February, decided to end his personal attempt to reach an agreed solution with the various parties over the text of a draft resolution, five of the six non-permanent members took up the issue with great aplomb. Continuing to work alongside the Secretary-General, they had, over the days of debate leading to the Secretary-General's statement, made it clear to all parties concerned that there were limits to the demands that were being made. To this extent, the process at the United Nations was shown to be structured by a pragmatic understanding of the difficulties involved with the Cyprus situation. The parties were therefore eventually forced to consider their positions and negotiate on terms that they themselves could agree. This was assisted by the realisation that *no* single party was going to achieve *all* their demands. However, the one difficulty in this situation was that the Turkish Cypriot community - which had not been given an official role in the proceedings - clearly objected to the process. However, by the time that Rauf Denktaş was allowed to present the Turkish Cypriot case to the Council the process of reaching an agreement on the text of a draft resolution was almost complete. The Governments of both the United Kingdom and the United States, not wishing to see a difficulty in having the text approved, therefore asked the Turkish Cypriots to accept the resolution, with a view to later negotiations taking place. In this endeavour they were assisted by the Government of Turkey, and, for the second time in the period since the outbreak of intercommunal violence, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves again being pressured by their closest ally to accept an agreement that amounted to a *de facto* recognition of the Greek Cypriots as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

At this point a new difficulty was presented by the Soviet Union. Although the important

political differences between the main protagonists had by now been solved, there remained the question of financing the force, and the powers accorded to the Secretary-General in the structuring and operation of the force. This was not a new issue, and it was only because the Soviets were able to see that by obstructing the resolution they were going against the wishes of the Greek Cypriots that they accepted the Resolution. Though this was done with a separate vote in order to register their disapproval. Therefore, on 4 March 1964, the initial phase of the Cyprus situation came to an end with the passing of Resolution 186 (1964), and the establishment of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

Endnotes to Chapter V

1. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

2. *The New York Times*, 16 February 1964

3. *The Cyprus Mail*, 18 February 1964. However, the Turkish acceptance was described by 'diplomatic sources' as having been given 'if only because it forestalled recourse to the Council by President Makarios 'as a plaintiff against Turkey.'' *Reuter*, 17 February 1964. Although, the Turkish Cypriots tried to "impress upon Turkey that this was not the correct approach", the Turkish Cypriots realised that the Government of Turkey, as a coalition, was not very strong, and "therefore responded to pressure from the United States". Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

4. *Reuter*, 16 February 1964

5. *Ibid.*

6. This US acquiescence came on the back of an acceptance by Johnson that, 'the United States had gone as far as [it] could to try to deflect a tribal conflict. Now [their] only available course was to work through the United Nations' Ball; *op.cit.*, p.348

7. A news report at the time noted: 'Turkish Air Force jets are patrolling continuously over Iskenderun Bay and international waters nearby, according to press reports reaching here from Iskenderun today. The reports added that Turkish naval vessels were waiting in a state of readiness at Iskenderun port, which is about 100 miles from Cyprus. The only civilian ship in the port, the freighter Giresun, belonging to the Turkish Maritime Bank, official shipping company, was now under navy orders and had marines aboard, the reports said. All roads to Iskenderun were under army control and suspect cars were being searched. Large crowds of civilians were going to Iskenderun quay each morning and shouting to sailors: 'Take Cyprus we have no more patience left', the reports said.' *Reuter*, 17 February 1964

8. *The New York Times*, 16 February 1964

9. 'Telegrams dated 15 February 1964 from the Secretary-General to the President of Cyprus and to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5554, 15 February 1964. The replies from the Greek and Foreign Ministers can be found in S/5554, and the reply from President Makarios is contained as S/5554/Add.1

10. *The Cyprus Mail*, 16 February 1964

11. *The Cyprus Mail*, 16 February 1964

12. In an interview with the author, Spyros Kyprianou confirmed that the Greek Cypriot leadership were not annoyed at the British action, as they had wanted the issue moved to the United Nations Security Council. He also stated the belief that, in line with established thinking, the United Kingdom had rushed to the Security Council in order to have a leading role in the matter. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

13. The term 'ugly plot' was applied by *Eleftheria* (16 February 1964) who commented that the Cyprus Government should never have involved either Britain or America in its attempts to ensure law and order. *Haravghi* (16 February 1964) saw the move as an attempt by Britain and the United States to ensure NATO control of the Cypriot people. *Phileleftheros* (16 February 1964) noted that the NATO threat now seemed to have abated, but that there was now a real chance that Britain was attempting an 'occupation' of Cyprus.

14. 'Letter dated 15 February 1964 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5545

15. *Ibid.*

16. The proceedings of a closed session of the Security Council are not usually open to scrutiny. Unlike the open sessions, public records of the meetings are not made available. This is particularly frustrating as much of the work of the Security Council is conducted in meetings held behind closed doors. This was confirmed to me in conversation with a former permanent representative of a permanent member state in private conversation in June 1996. However, in this case a record was kept by the British representative and can be found as 'Record of Private Meeting of the Security Council at about 5 p.m. on Saturday, February 15, 1964.' *FO 371/174748*

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. *The Cyprus Mail*, 17 February 1964

25. Clerides notes that: 'Makarios had doubts whether Spyros Kyprianou, Tassos Papadopoulos and Rossides could work well together. He felt also that it would be difficult to tell Rossides to take a back seat and let the case be presented by Spyros Kyprianou. Rossides was an old member of the Ethnarchic Circle and Kyprianou a relative newcomer. Moreover Rossides had attended, before independence, many debates of the Cyprus problem at the U.N. and other international conferences.' Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; Volume 2, (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989), p.45. Tassos Papadopoulos had some strong views about Rossides, but he was keen to point out that for all his faults, he was honourable in his

intentions. Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

26. Bitsios, Dimitri S.; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan studies, 1975) p.138

27. *Ibid.*

28. Despite his views on Rossides, Tassos Papadopoulos, like Clerides, notes that the Cypriot Representative at the United Nations was in fact considerably more experienced than Bitsios with the workings of the Organisation. Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

29. On the matter of Bitsios's assistance to the Greek Cypriots, Spyros Kyprianou noted that Bitsios had indeed been "very helpful". He also went on to say that the Greek Government had been on the whole supportive of the Greek Cypriots, "especially at the United Nations". Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996. In contrast with this view Tassos Papadopoulos, the Minister of Labour at the time, who had been in New York and had worked with Bitsios, stated that in his view the Greek Representative had not always shown the "heart to look out for the best interests of Cyprus". Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996. The tone with which this was said perhaps suggests that there were those who saw the whole process - including the advice given by Bitsios - as being geared to establishing a quick-fix solution that would favour the United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey.

30. Bitsios; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; *op.cit.*, p.139

31. *Ibid.*

32. As was noted, Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos's Government, as a caretaker administration, had no real power, and that although it never actively sided against the Greek Cypriots, it was clear that it had its "own agenda". Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996. However, Dr. Lyssarides went further than this to state that the Greek Government was not only "weak", but that it accepted "pressure from the US and NATO countries". Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

33. *The New York Times*, 16 February 1964

34. In a meeting of the British Cabinet, Duncan Sandys noted that, 'the function of maintaining law and order in the island was imposing an increasing strain on our troops, whose relationship with the Greek and Turkish communities were inevitable deteriorating. We must therefore seek to ensure that, if a new peace-keeping force were established under United Nations auspices, United Kingdom troops would not be called upon to play too prominent a part in it.' C.M. (12), 18 February 1964, *CAB 128/38*

35. *The New York Times*, 17 February 1964

36. 'Bunche wrote a long list of possible acronyms for the Cyprus force, including UNFIC, UNCYMED, UNFINC, UNCYMFI, and UNFORIC.' Urquhart, Brian; *Ralph Bunche: An American Life*; (London: WW Norton and Company, 1993), p.369n.

37. Bitsios; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; *op.cit.*, p.140. When asked about the relationship that the Greek Cypriots had with these two men, Spyros Kyprianou noted that they "had all got on very well indeed". Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

38. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

39. Clerides, Glafkos; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; Volume 2 (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989) p.47

40. Commenting on Thant's overall approach to the Cyprus issue, Spyros Kyprianou notes that in his view the Secretary-General was "very objective, and very honest". Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

41. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.48

42. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.49

43. *Ibid.*, p.49

44. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, 1094th Meeting, Monday 17 February 1964, S/PV.1094

45. Address made by the Norwegian Representative to the Security Council. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, 1094th Meeting, Monday 17 February 1964, S/PV.1094, paras. 4-5.

46. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.50

47. *Ibid.*, p.50

48. *Ibid.*, p.50

49. Bitsios; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; *op.cit.*, p.143

50. *Ibid.*, pp.144-145

51. *Ibid.*, pp.145-146

52. Lord Carver, in his memoirs gives only the briefest of accounts of the period of the Security Council's debate leading to UN Resolution 186. In an account limited to one paragraph he characterises the period as being of 'comparative calm...disturbed by two abductions of Turks by Greeks, which involved me bringing pressure to bear on the leaders of both sides to prevent the incidents escalating and to obtain the release of the hostages, of whom both sides held a considerable number.' Carver, Michael; *Out of Step: the Memoirs of a Field Marshal*; (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p.317. Given that the chapter in which he discusses his involvement in Cyprus in 1964 continues for another twenty two pages one can immediately see that he, like a number of other commentators, has focussed on the period following Resolution 186.

53. *The Times*, 18 February 1964

54. However, the Greek Cypriots seemed to feel that the events in Polis had been dramatically over exaggerated, for example, '[a]n official Greek Cypriot spokesman yesterday charged Turkish Cypriot

extremists with exploiting the situation at Polis and circulating unfounded and malicious rumours in a frantic effort to increase tension and cause, wherever possible, incidents as a means of countering the Government's move in the Security Council.' *The Cyprus Mail*, 18 February 1964

55. *The Times*, 18 February 1964

56. This accusation was made by Sandys to the House of Commons on 17 February and was greeted by groans from across the floor. *The Times*, 18 February 1964. The Cyprus Government did not deny the fact that it had acquired arms stating that it had approached Britain on 31 December 1963 about possible arms purchases from the United Kingdom but had been refused. After this they therefore 'went to other [unspecified] sources.' *Reuter*, 17 February 1964.

57. Chris Economides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 26 March 1996

58. *The Times*, 17 February 1964

59. As Major Dawson, a British military spokesman explained, '[t]hey were confronted with four armed men and ordered out of their car at gunpoint and into another car, where they were held down so they could not see where they were going. They were taken to a building where there were more armed guards and where...they were threatened not to try to escape. But they were not harmed in any way. Later in the morning, they were led out of the building, and blindfolded with coats over their heads and bundled into a Landrover.' *The Cyprus Mail*, 17 February 1964

60. *The Times*, 17 February 1964

61. In fact the Soviet Union Permanent Representative chose to give a long address on this point of order, in which he demanded that Foreign Minister Kyprianou be given the right to speak first. The President then took the opportunity to call upon Sir Patrick Dean to speak, at which point the United Kingdom Permanent Representative restated the British belief that the Cypriot Foreign Minister should indeed have the opportunity to speak, but that it should come after the British address. At this point the Czechoslovak Representative took the opportunity to voice its support for the Soviet proposal. At the end, the President of the Council noted that under rule 27 of the procedure of the Council, 'The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they desire to speak'. And that seeing as the British Representative had made his desire to speak first known first, then the floor was now given to him. For the verbatim account of this longwinded process see *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, 1095th Meeting, Tuesday 18 February 1964, S/PV.1095, paras. 4-32

62. Dean had actually made both an oral and a written request to the President of the Council to be allowed to speak first. The oral request was made at the end of the meeting held on the afternoon of Saturday, 15 February. See 'Record of Private Meeting of the Security Council at about 5 p.m. on Saturday, February 15, 1964.' *FO 371/174748*

63. There was some concern that the United Kingdom would be best represented on the floor of the Council by the British Foreign Secretary rather than Dean. In a parliamentary debate the same day Mr. P. Noel-Baker, a Labour Party MP, asked the Foreign Secretary whether he intended to in fact represent Her Majesty's Government, to which Butler replied: 'No, Sir. I have every confidence in the ability of the United Kingdom Permanent Representative at the United Nations'. Noel-Baker then went on to say 'We all have confidence in Sir Patrick Dean...but, with all due respect to Sir Patrick, may I ask the Foreign Secretary to consider that the lives of thousands of British soldiers and civilians will be at stake

if the situation in Cyprus should develop into serious fighting?...Will the Foreign Secretary also bear in mind that an official, however eminent, who has to telegraph home to the Secretary of State for approval of everything he says, cannot have the authority to negotiate the sending of an international force or the long-term settlement that will be needed? Will the right hon. Gentleman therefore reconsider the matter and go to New York himself as soon as possible, staying as long as necessary?' Butler, in turn, replied 'No, Sir. I adhere to my original Answer...Sir Patrick has done all the initial work, it is quite right that he should continue to represent us.' House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Fifth Series-Volume 689, Period 10th-21st February, 1964, pp.1031-1032.

64. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, 1095th Meeting, Tuesday 18 February 1964, S/PV.1095, para. 41

65. S/PV.1095, paras.66-75. The incidents highlighted included events at Khoulou village (Paphos area, 3 February), Ghaziveran (4 February), Ayios Sozomenos (7 February), Limassol (12 February), Ktima (13-14 February), Polis (14 February), and the arms discovery at Famagusta (15 February).

66. S/PV.1095, paras. 80-86

67. S/PV.1095, para. 93. This was presumably the same draft that had been shown to Bitsios.

68. S/PV.1095, para.94

69. Foreign Minister Kyprianou had decide to represent the Republic of Cyprus at the meetings of the Security Council. This was communicated in a 'Letter dated 17 February 1964 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council', *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5552. This acceptance of Kyprianou as the voice of the Republic of Cyprus at the Security Council made "a joke of the United Nations in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriots." Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

70. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, 1095th Meeting, Tuesday 18 February 1964, S/PV.1095, para.98

71. S/PV.1095, para.98

72. S/PV.1095, paras. 104-110 & paras. 115-122

73. S/PV.1095, paras. 130-141

74. S/PV.1095, para 145

75. S/PV.1095, para.147. Despite this Soviet comment about the United Kingdom Representative, Dimitri Bitsios, the Greek Representative, noted of Deans's overall handling of the Security Council debate: 'The British Representative, both as permanent member of the Council and as one of the three guarantor Powers, could be expected to adopt a hard line. Sir Patrick Dean chose another tactic and with his moderation and sober handling of the issue, confirmed his diplomatic ability.' Bitsios; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; *op.cit.*, pp.147-148

76. In fact the Turkish Representative asked specifically that he be allowed to address the Council then and there. In justifying this he stated: 'The statement which the Council has just heard was directed

against my Government and my people and the Turks of Cyprus. I am sorry to detain the members of the Council, but I feel that in this particular case, since we have been directly attacked and since a distorted picture has been given, a picture contrary to the true situation in Cyprus and in Turkey, I should in all fairness be allowed to present our side of the story this evening. I shall make brief replies and shall make my statement, reserving the right to speak again tomorrow.' S/PV.1095, para.151

77. Kyprianou states that Menemencioğlu had in fact been the Turkish Ambassador in Washington at the time and had been called upon to lead the Turkish delegation at the United Nations because the Turkish Government "did not trust" its Permanent Representative to handle the debate. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996. The Turkish Cypriots favoured Menemencioğlu because of the fact that he was "an able diplomat" as well as figure "well known in Cyprus" and supported by the Turkish Cypriots. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

78. S/PV.1095, para.167. The Turkish representative then proceeded to give example of press accounts written at the time describing the situation with regard to the Turkish Cypriots. S/PV.1095, paras.168-175

79. S/PV.1095, para.230

80. S/PV.1095, para.254

81. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, 1096th Meeting, Wednesday 19 February 1964, S/PV.1096, para.4

82. S/PV.1096, para.10

83. S/PV.1096, para.20

84. S/PV.1096, para.26

85. S/PV.1096, para.18

86. As Fedorenko stated: 'This undisguised manoeuvring brings to mind the ancient fable of how animal signs were invented for the zodiacal system of symbolic chronology. According to the fable, in the hour of trial, the Almighty summoned emissaries of the animal kingdom and they responded to His call. The honest ox was the first to set forth on the road and to arrive at the gates of Heaven, and so by rights he deserved to take precedence. But, to everyone's surprise, in front of the ox appeared a mouse, who had concealed itself inconspicuously in the ox's tail at the very beginning of the journey and suddenly jumped over the head of the animal at the gates of Heaven and in this way acquired undeserved honour.' S/PV.1096, para.39

87. S/PV.1096, para.56. This speech was well received across the Greek Cypriot political spectrum. See *Haravghi, Makhi, Eleftheria, Phileleftheros*, 20 February 1964.

88. S/PV.1096, paras. 60-62. When asked about Dean, Spyros Kyprianou noted that he "did not have any real complaints about him". However I got the impression that he had not really got on well the British Representative. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

89. S/PV.1096, para.74

90. S/PV.1096, para.78. Spyros Kyprianou maintains that despite the differences between the Greek Cypriots and the United States, Adlai Stevenson was "honest", and that they two men had a good relationship. Indeed, Kyprianou recounted a conversation between the two of them one day over lunch when Stevenson commented that he would have handled the Cyprus matter differently from the way in which Washington had done so. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

91. S/PV.1096, para.79

92. *The Cyprus Mail*, 16 February 1964

93. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 25 September 1996.

94. *The Times*, 3 February 1964

95. Cited in *The Cyprus Mail*, 25 February 1964

96. *The Cyprus Mail*, 25 February 1964

97. *The New York Times*, 24 February 1964

98. *The New York Times*, 26 February 1964

99. *The Cyprus Mail*, 25 February 1964

100. *The Cyprus Mail*, 21 February 1964

101. *Ibid.*

102. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.53. The plan was also cited by *Reuter*, 20 February 1964

103. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.53

104. *Ibid.*

105. *Ibid.*, p.54

106. *Ibid.*

107. *Ibid.*

108. *Ibid.*

109. *Ibid.*, p.55

110. *Ibid.*, p.54

111. *The Cyprus Mail*, 21 February 1964

112. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.55

113. *Ibid.*, p.56

114. *Ibid.*

115.*Ibid.*, p.57

116. *Ibid.*

117. *The Times*, 20 February 1964

118. *The Times*, 20 February 1964

119. *The Times*, 20 February 1964

120. *The New York Times*, 22 February 1964

121. This move caused a certain degree of indignation and concern in the Turkish Cypriot community. Dr. Küçük immediately sent a cable to the President of the Security Council in which he alleged that the increase of the police directly violated Article 130 of the Cyprus Constitution and that it was a deliberate act designed 'to give a cloak of legality to Greek terrorist hordes which in fact number more than forty thousand according to a Greek minister'. See 'Text of Message sent by Dr. Küçük, Vice President of Cyprus, to the President of the Security Council, on Makarios' decision to establish additional security forces in Cyprus', *FO 371/174748.*

122. General Carver noted that the process at the United Nations had, 'to a certain extent lowered tension in the island, but tension could build up again quickly.' *The Cyprus Mail*, 21 February 1964

123. *The Economist*, 11 January 1964, p.104.

124. *The New York Times*, 23 February 1964

125. Letter from the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO to the Foreign Office Central Department, February 21, 1964, *FO 371/174748*

126. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 13-20 1964, p.20119

127. *United Nations Press Release*, SG/SM/18, 25 February 1964

128. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, S/PV.1097, para.12

129. *Ibid.*

130. S/PV.1097, para.14

131. S/PV.1097, para.15

132. S/PV.1097, para.22

133. S/PV.1097, para.32

134. S/PV.1097, para.39

135. S/PV.1097, para.44

136. S/PV.1097, para.47. When asked about the Czech Representative's performance at the United Nations, Spyros Kyprianou was full of praise for Hajek. Not only did he say that he had been "very supportive", but that his "brilliant interventions" had "explained the political and legal aspects of the whole question". Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

137. S/PV.1097, para.56. It is interesting to note that although there are a number of parallels that can indeed be drawn between the two cases, the whole presentation of the historical events cited by Representative Hajek displayed an interesting phenomena, namely, how certain facets of history - especially with regard to inter-war events - were being presented in Communist countries at the time.

138. It is perhaps worth noting that the Ivory Coast's Ambassador to Cyprus had presented his credentials a month earlier on 25 January 1964. See *The Cyprus Mail*, 26 January 1964.

139. S/PV.1097, paras. 62-63

140. S/PV.1097, para.73

141. S/PV.1097, para.74

142. S/PV.1097, para.93

143. S/PV.1097, para.97

144. S/PV.1097, para.102

145. S/PV.1097, para.117

146. S/PV.1097, para.128

147. S/PV.1097, para.139

148. S/PV.1097, para.157. After further comments directed towards Kyprianou about the intentions of the Greek Cypriots towards the Turkish Cypriots there were interruptions - most probably from assembled Greek and Greek Cypriot citizens of the US - from the public gallery, at which point the Turkish representative said, 'Mr. President, will you please throw these savages out. This is not Limassol.' S/PV.1097, para.159. This incident was clearly remembered by Osman Örek during a personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996. In its report of the events *The Cyprus Mail* stated that the Turkish Representative had, 'withheld reply to a blunt question from Kyprianou.' *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 February 1964. In criticising Kyprianou, Menemencioğlu stated that the situation in Cyprus was, 'too tragic to use this kind of strategy.' *Ibid.*

149. S/PV.1097, para.164.

150. S/PV.1097, para.168

151. 'Memorandum by Mr. A.J. Jacovides, re: Information obtained in a telephone conversation with Mr. Houaiss, Minister Plenipotentiary, Brazilian Mission, 25 February 1964.' cited in Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.62

152. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.74. Clerides does not go into any specific details as to what these observations were but simply states that, 'some of which he [Bernades] accepted and incorporated into his second draft.' *ibid.*

153. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

154. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op.cit.*, p.20119

155. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.78

156. *Ibid.*

157. *Ibid.*, p.76

158. Memorandum dated 28 February 1964, *FO 371/174748*

159. *Ibid.*

160. *Ibid.*

161. *Ibid.*

162. *Cumhurriyet*, 29 February 1964

163. *The Times*, 27 February 1964

164. *Le Monde*, 26 February 1964

165. *Makhi*, 16 February 1964

166. *Ethniki*, 23 February 1964

167. *Reuter*, 5 February 1964

168. *The Cyprus Mail*, 27 February 1964

169. Letter from the United Kingdom delegation to NATO, Paris to the Central department of the Foreign Office, February 27, 1964, *FO 371/174748*

170. *Ibid.*

171. *The New York Times*, 28 February 1964

172. C.M.15 (64), 27 February 1964, *CAB 128/38*

173. Message from Undersecretary Ball to the Foreign Secretary, R.A. Butler, and the Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, dated 27 February 1964, *FO 371/174748*

174. *Ibid.*

175. *Ibid.* Indeed, as Clerides notes: 'While the President of the Security Council was busy negotiating the second draft of his resolution with the non-permanent members of the Security Council, we were busy talking with them, in particular to Bolivia, Morocco and the Ivory Coast, in an effort to get them to propose certain amendments.' Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, p.74

176. Message from Undersecretary Ball to the Foreign Secretary...dated 27 February 1964, *op.cit.* Ball ended his message with the following comment, 'I think it very likely that if the Security Council fades out and the Cypriots prove unable to secure an emergency General Assembly meeting the present superficial calm will give way to a bloodbath.' *Ibid.*

177. Memorandum dated 28 February 1964, *FO 371/174748*

178. It is interesting to note that despite the fiercely anti-NATO demonstrations that had taken place earlier in Athens during which there had been a strong show of support for the Soviet Union, the percentage of the vote taken by the United Democratic Left, the 'legal cover' party of the Communists (who were still banned by law), actually fell from around 25% in the 1958 elections to around 11% (22 of the 300 seats) in the February 1964 election.

179. *The Cyprus Mail*, 19 February 1964

180. Having said this it is worthwhile to note that within a day of the election, 'Greece...warned all neighbouring countries that the Greek armed forces had received instructions to shoot down any foreign plane intruding into her air space.' *The Cyprus Mail*, 18 February 1964. A factor closely linked to the continuing tensions with Turkey over the Cyprus issue.

181. *Reuter*, 25 February 1964

182. *Reuter*, 27 February 1964

183. *The Cyprus Mail*, 1 March 1964

184. *The Times*, 29 February 1964. Soon afterwards a report on Kostopoulos appeared in a Turkish newspaper in which it was claimed that the new Greek Foreign Minister was, 'a close friend of Grivas and responsible for encouraging EOKA and enosis.' *Tercuman*, 3 March 1964

185. Tassos Papadopoulos notes that not only did the new Papandreou administration support the Greek Cypriots, it also had a clear policy on Cyprus. Tassos Papadopoulos, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996

186. *Reuter*, 27 February 1964

187. *United Nations Security Council Document*, S/5556

188. Clerides; *Cyprus: My Deposition*; (Volume 2), *op.cit.*, pp.65-67

189. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, S/PV.1098, paras. 4-5

190. S/PV.1098, para.7

191. S/PV.1098, para.10

192. S/PV.1098, para. 11

193. S/PV.1098, paras. 61-62

194. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, S/PV.1098, para.65

195. S/PV.1098, para.69

196. S/PV.1098, para.79. Bitsios notes of this moment in the debate '...the Foreign Minister of Cyprus asked point blank the representatives of Britain, Greece and Turkey, whether they considered that the Treaty of Guaranty [sic] conceded to their Governments the right to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus. The Turkish Representative, rather annoyed, said that he had answered that question in one of his previous speeches. My answer was categorically negative. The Council was waiting to hear the British view: it could tip the balance. Sir Patrick skilfully side-stepped the issue: "The British Troops" he said, "presently on Cypriot territory, are not there under the provisions of the Treaty of Guaranty". The tension subsided and the debate was allowed to proceed in a more relaxed atmosphere.' Bitsios; *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*; *op.cit.*, p.148

197. S/PV.1098, para.82

198. This comment was considered important enough as to be made the headline of *The Cyprus Mail*, 28 February 1964. However, in Turkey there was a general feeling that, 'Britain was not likely to withdraw its troops.' *Milliyet*, 29 February 1964

199. Nonetheless, *Milliyet*, citing sources at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, noted that if the United Kingdom chose to withdraw, 'Turkey will not hesitate to use its intervention rights.' *Ibid.*

200. S/PV.1098, para.117

201. S/PV.1098, para.117

202. S/PV.1098, para.144

203. S/PV.1098, para.146. *Ethniki* (1 March 1964), noted its disappointment at France's attitude in the Security Council, as did *Eleftheria*, 3 March 1964

204. S/PV.1098, para.159

205. S/PV.1098, para.160

206. S/PV.1098, para.165 & 167

207. S/PV.1098, para.183

208. S/PV.1098, para.186

209. S/PV.1098, para.187

210. *United Nations, Official Record of the Security Council*, S/PV.1099, para.5

211. S/PV.1099, para.12

212. S/PV.1099, para.13

213. S/PV.1099, para.34

214. S/PV.1099, paras. 36-37

215. S/PV.1099, para.38

216. S/PV.1099, para.46

217. S/PV.1099, para.56

218. S/PV.1099, paras.69-70. The letter was submitted to Makarios on 19 February 1964.

219. This raises an important point about the extent to which the Treaty of Guarantee represents an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. If it is considered to be part of the Constitution then it is not, technically at least, open for discussion by the United Nations as it is essentially a domestic matter - unless, of course, it is brought to the Council's attention by the Government of Cyprus. By merely recognising an issue in the Treaty of Guarantee, it could be argued that in this case there seems to have been a clear recognition by the Council, whether intentional or otherwise, of the Greek Cypriots as the Government of Cyprus.

220. S/PV.1099, para.99

221. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

222. S/PV.1099, para.107

223. S/PV.1099, para.110

224. S/PV.1099, para.115

225. S/PV.1099, para.127

226. S/PV.1099, para.131

227. S/PV.1099, para.135

228. S/PV.1099, para.136

229. Kyprianou notes the way in which the Turkish Representative made a number of attempts to avoid the question, and stated that it was not difficult for him to argue with the Turkish Representative for no

other reason than the fact that Menemencioğlu had "no arguments". Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

230. S/PV.1099, para.137

231. S/PV.1099, para.138

232. S/PV.1099, para.140

233. S/PV.1099, para.144

234. S/PV.1099, para.152

235. S/PV.1099, para.156

236. One of the reasons why the Turkish Government may have accepted the Resolution lay with the fact that İnönü's personal envoy to advise the Turkish delegation, Professor Nihat Erim, was known to have favoured the resolution. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

237. Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

238. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

239. Osman Örek, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

240.Foreign Minister Erkin of Turkey is claimed to have told the Turkish Cypriots 'not to play on words', as the delay would mean more 'Turkish blood would be spilled'. Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

241. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996. Dr. Necati Ertekün, states that the Turkish Cypriots went along with the deal as they felt that the United Nations could deal with the immediate situation, but that despite this they never gave up hope that Turkey would intervene if necessary. Dr. Necati Ertekün, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 23 September 1996.

242. 1100th meeting of the Security Council, 2 March 1964. *United Nations Official Records*, S/PV.1100, para.1

243. S/PV.1100, para.7

244. S/PV.1100, paras. 8-17

245. *The United Nations Yearbook: 1964*; p.154

246. Reports of French opposition proved to be unfounded, see *The New York Times*, 4 March 1964

247. They had already made clear their position on this when they had chided the Secretary-General for sending an observer without recourse to the Security Council - see previous chapter. Yet again this position was very much in line with the overall Soviet position on the Secretary-General.

248. This was not felt to be altogether surprising given the Soviet Union's known feelings about such United Nations operations. Spyros Kyprianou, personal interview with the author, Nicosia, 27 September 1996.

249. S/PV.1101, para.4

250. The Prime Minister as an oral reply to a question 3 March 1964. House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Period from 24th February-6th March, 1964, p.1131.

251. C.M.15 (64), 27 February 1964, *CAB 128/38*

252. *The Cyprus Mail*, 1 March 1964

253. *The Cyprus Mail*, 1 March 1964

254. *The Times*, 28 February 1964

255. *Ibid.*

256. Denktaş, in reply to this accusation, simply said that had the United Kingdom really wanted partition, then it would have happened. Rauf R. Denktaş, personal interview with the Author, Nicosia, 18 January 1996.

257. The Prime Minister, as an oral answer to the House of Commons, 3 March 1964. House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), Fifth Series-Volume 690, Period 24th February-6th March, 1964, p.1131.

258. 1102nd meeting of the Security Council, 4 March 1964. *United Nations Official Records*, S/PV.1102, paras.2-5

259. S/PV.1102, paras.8-9

260. S/PV.1102, para.15

261. Liu in fact stated, '[a]s the representative of CHINA [*sic*] I have the right of reply to the concluding remarks made by the representative of the Soviet Union. But being mindful of the urgent business that lies ahead of the Council, I have no intention of being provoked into any wordy discussion of the so-called question of representation. That question, as members of the Council must have noted, was disposed of only a few months ago by the General Assembly [*Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1248th meeting], which upheld the rightful status of my delegation in the United Nations. My capacity as representative of China in this council under the provisions of the Charter is not open to question, and as presiding officer for this month I would like to say to the representative of the Soviet Union that, even as I extend to him every consideration that is due to a representative on this Council, I shall expect of him a reasonable measure of co-operation with the Chair in the conduct of the Council's business.' S/PV.1102, para.16

262. S/PV.1102, para.24

263. S/PV.1102, paras.30-35

264. S/PV.1102, para.32

265. *Ibid.* However the French Representative was known to have been harsh in his personal attitude towards Thant. Although referring specifically to a later incident concerning the Kashmir Question, Urquhart states: 'At this time the French were also challenging the secretary general's [*sic*] authority over peacekeeping operations, and, to Bunche's annoyance, U Thant found it even more difficult to stand up properly to the French ambassador, Roger Seydoux. "U Thant," he noted, "at times chooses to give way rather than stand and fight."' Urquhart; *Ralph Bunche*; *op.cit.*, p.378

266. S/PV.1102, para.32

267. S/PV.1102, para.39

268. S/PV.1102, para.40. Hajek in fact ended his speech by echoing the Soviet Representative's comment on the Presidency of the Security Council being in the hands of Liu rather than 'the only lawful representative of China'.

269. S/PV.1102, para.45

270. S/PV.1102, para.46

Conclusion

International Politics on the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964)

This work set as its aim an appraisal of the international political process leading to United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), the Resolution that formed the United Nations Force in Cyprus. However, it would be wrong to suppose that a United Nations peace-keeping force spontaneously appeared as a result of the need to deal with the intercommunal fighting in Cyprus. The origins of UNFICYP were to be found within the development of international politics from the end of the Second World War - the most important features of which was the development of the Cold War and the resulting strategies of containment and expansion pursued by the Superpower states of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a number of areas beyond the delineations of Europe. To this end, Chapter I sought, among other things, to show that the evolution of United Nations peace-keeping came about as a mechanism to halt conflicts that had Cold War ramifications - the main examples being Egypt (1956), the Lebanon (1958) and the Congo (1960).

Yet the Cyprus crisis was never going to be a Cold War issue in the way that Egypt, the Lebanon, or the Congo had been. For example, Egypt, under the guidance of Colonel Nasser, had encouraged both the Soviet Bloc - purchasing arms from the Czechs - and the West - for funding for the Aswan High Dam. In the case of the Lebanon, President Chamoun, a pro-Western leader, perceived a threat to the borders of the Lebanon from the pro-Soviet President Nasser of the United Arab Republic. And in the Congo the Belgian action and the secession of Katanga threatened to split the country both geographically and politically. In order to prevent this the Congolese tried to involve the Superpowers at various stages. In all three instances the formation of a United Nations peace-keeping force presented a means by which to limit the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union. UNEF, the first example of United Nations peace-keeping, was a necessary move in order to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming directly involved as a means to counter the actions of the United Kingdom, France and Israel. Although the argument that the Soviet Union may not have wished to have taken a direct role given the events taking place in Hungary, the United States could not afford to run the risk of permanently alienating either Egypt, or the other Soviet leaning Arab states by being seen to condone or remain neutral on the British, French and Israeli action. (However, one could also argue that the United States was attempting to end the influence of the United Kingdom and France in the Near and Middle East.) In the Lebanon, UNOGIL was a means by which to extricate the United States - invited into the country by Chamoun - from a situation that was affecting the delicate balance between the pro-Western Monarchical regimes and the Arab nationalist Republics in the region. ONUC was, *inter alia*, a means of ensuring that the Congo - the heart of the African continent - did not become embroiled in Cold War intrigues as a response to the military intervention by Belgium - a NATO member. The Soviet Union was poised to make a stand once the United States had turned down a Congolese offer to intervene. To this extent the United Nations became a way of delineating the situation from the Cold War.

However, from the very beginning Cyprus was not an issue that immediately fell into the grey area of international politics of the Cold War. For the West, Cyprus was always regarded as being an essentially a Western matter - the three Guarantor Powers were, after all, members of NATO. Yet, paradoxically, the Cyprus situation could never have been handled effectively within the bounds of NATO. To have done so would have immediately forced the 'internationalisation' of the crisis by the Greek Cypriots beyond the Western realm into the United Nations. For the Greek Cypriots it was not the 'rebellion' of the Turkish Cypriots *per se* which was of most immediate concern, it was the perceived threat that Turkey would intervene to protect the Turkish Cypriots and thus force the partitioning of the island. In the post-independence period, if not after 1955 when Turkey was first brought diplomatically

into the affairs of Cyprus by the United Kingdom, Makarios's political outlook was fundamentally shaped by his perceptions of the Turkish threat to Cyprus. The Archbishop, supremely aware of the delicate nature of the regional NATO balance of power system, knew that despite the fact that Greece was a member of NATO, Turkey had, by virtue of geography, a relatively more important position within the Organisation. This therefore made any NATO proposal immediately unacceptable as it would favour Turkey in the wider interests of the Organisation. Perhaps in order to counter this Makarios had devoted his attention to developing Cyprus' ties with the Non-Aligned Movement. In any case, the fact that he had attended the Bandung Conference, and thereafter fostered ties with the anti-colonial third world leaders during the EOKA period had made Cyprus' membership of the NAM a logical step in the post-independence period.

Despite this tie, the Greek Cypriots nonetheless realised that any move to incorporate the wider international community into the Cyprus situation at an early stage could well have resulted in a unilateral Turkish move to preserve its interests in the island. Indeed, the political motive behind the initial acceptance of tripartite action by the Guarantor Powers - although not conducted under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee - was a pragmatic reaction to avert such an unilateral Turkish intervention. Nevertheless, this initial stop-gap measure could not be certain to succeed in which case a Turkish intervention would have been the likely result. Therefore the internationalisation of the conflict beyond the Guarantor Power alliance and NATO became a foreign policy imperative for the Greek Cypriots from the earliest stages. The initial move to the United Nations Security Council was a reflection of this aim. It was an early attempt to have the international community warn Turkey about the consequences of its actions if it did chose to intercede militarily on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. However, even this policy was not designed to have a Cold War nature. There was no move to try and involve the Soviet Union at this stage. Indeed, the debate at the Security Council did not even feature the Soviet Representative.

There was, at this point, absolutely no reason to suppose that Makarios had the intention to bring the Soviet Union into the situation. (Having said this, President Makarios would likewise never have approached the United States - a NATO member and the main supporter of Turkey since 1946 - for assistance in the same way as Chamoun had done in the Lebanon when he faced an external threat.) The Archbishop was not by natural inclination a communist.[1] He would not have sought, under usual circumstances, to involve the Soviet Union. Indeed, one may remember that throughout the period of British colonial rule in Cyprus the Orthodox Church had been a major force opposing communism on the island, and the fact that Makarios had been one of the leaders of the EOKA movement - a movement opposed by the Greek Cypriot communists - re-enforced this. However, the Greek Cypriots' desire to internationalise the situation - though not along Cold War lines - by taking it to the United Nations was something that the United Kingdom sought to avoid right from the very beginning. This was a decision based on the United Kingdom's misperception of why this policy would be pursued. The United Kingdom saw the Greek Cypriot policy as being one fundamentally designed to challenge the Treaty of Guarantee and therefore, by extension, eventually to threaten its position with regard to the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). (Although the SBAs were founded on the basis of the Treaty of Establishment, Article III of the Treaty of Guarantee held an important role in ensuring that the Republic of Cyprus would 'respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus'.) However, this view that Makarios would try to rid Cyprus of the SBAs was flawed in a number of ways. Following independence, Makarios had genuinely worked to improve the ties between Cyprus and the United Kingdom. The main forum within which this was done was the Commonwealth of Nations, which Makarios embraced warmly soon after Cypriot independence. Indeed, this move may have been a means by which Makarios could develop a separate channel of communication with the United Kingdom other than that which had been bequeathed by the Treaty of Guarantee. The Treaty, which had given the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey a say in the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, was simply unacceptable to many Greek Cypriots solely for the fact that it opened the door for overt Turkish interference. The ties with Greece were undoubtedly welcomed,

and the ties with the United Kingdom were seen as useful - if not beneficial - given the regional strength of Turkey. In effect, the Greek Cypriots for all the ill-feeling that may have occurred in the period 1955-59, did want to develop their ties with the United Kingdom, and were not, with the exception of a small, particularly nationalist group, too concerned with the issue of the Bases. This is not to say that the Bases were acceptable, but that they were never an overriding issue that soured Anglo-Cypriot relations. Another, important, piece of evidence to substantiate the degree to which the Greek Cypriots viewed the United Kingdom as being broadly sympathetic with their desire to change the Constitution comes from the - unproven - allegations that Makarios had been assisted by the British High Commissioner in formulating his proposals for constitutional change. Even if this were not true, Makarios nonetheless submitted his proposals to the British Government a full two weeks before he officially gave them to the Guarantor Powers. Indeed, Clark's comment stating that the United Kingdom would not intervene militarily in the event of intercommunal disturbances must have been yet another factor that would convince the Greek Cypriots as to the extent to which the United Kingdom would accept the changes to the Constitution.

And yet when the intercommunal fighting did occur, the United Kingdom did in fact become involved in a military operation, albeit with Greece and Turkey. The primary reason for this undoubtedly lies in the fact that the potential for the Greek Cypriots to challenge the presence of the Bases prevailed in the United Kingdom's analyses of the Archbishop's intentions. Thus it may be argued that the United Kingdom was either a victim of its own misperceptions, or else politically unaware of the tide of opinion in the Greek Cypriot leadership. Makarios was not anti-the United Kingdom, he was anti-Turkey. His development of Cypriot international relations was directed to this end, and not done as a means to challenge the United Kingdom's position with regard to the Treaty of Guarantee or the Treaty of Establishment - by which the Bases were founded. This point seems to have been missed by the decision-makers in the British Government. For the United Kingdom, the formation of the Joint Truce Force was therefore partly as a result of the need to protect the Bases in the face of intercommunal fighting. However, to ascribe purely national interest reasons for the creation of the Force would be wrong on two counts. In the first instance there is clear evidence to suggest that the United Kingdom, from the first days following the formation of the Truce Force, actively intended to have the Force develop a humanitarian function. The valuable work undertaken by medical teams attached to the Truce Force in areas of heavy fighting, as well as the negotiations for freedom of movement and the release of hostages provide examples to underline what would appear to be a genuine commitment to the relief of suffering on the island.

The second reason for the creation of the Truce Force lies in the wider strategic implications of the fighting in Cyprus. Therefore another vital, if not the primary, consideration in the mind of the British Government was the prospect of a Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus. It was undoubtedly the case that had Turkey chosen to intervene unilaterally, Greece would have been forced to have aided the Greek Cypriots. For the United Kingdom, the best means by which to counter the risk of Turkish intervention was to act within the framework of the Treaty of Guarantee - although not under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee - in conjunction with Greece and Turkey. Yet for the Force to remain viable the Treaty of Guarantee had to remain intact. Any attempt by Makarios to internationalise the issue of intercommunal fighting beyond the strict framework of the Treaty was highly dangerous. To close the Turkish option of intervention by attempting to abrogate the Treaty could have resulted in a 'first strike' policy being enacted by the Turkish Government, and would therefore have resulted in a full-blown Greco-Turkish conflict. Thus, at the earliest point in the crisis, it was made clear to the international community, in particular the members of the NATO Council, that the matter was being handled adequately within the existing arrangement of the tripartite intervention that had resulted in the Truce Force.

The rift between the United Kingdom and the Greek Cypriots, though unfounded on the issue of the Bases, was impossible to avoid on the issue of regional peace and security between Greece and

Turkey. Although there was in effect little to concern the United Kingdom with regard to Makarios's intentions with regard to the Bases, the United Kingdom, and indeed all of NATO, could not afford to have Turkey intervene in Cyprus with all the subsequent intra-NATO, inter-Superpower effects that such an action could entail. Thus, the Treaty of Guarantee had to remain in place, and the United Kingdom was presented with a no-win situation. Fortunately, in the initial period considered - 21 December 1963-25 January 1964 - the room for manoeuvre of the Greek Cypriots on the issue of the Treaty of Guarantee was limited. The fact that both Greece and Turkey had, to their credit, also prevented the internationalisation of the problem by working hand-in-hand with the United Kingdom left the Greek Cypriots isolated. There was no reason for the wider community to become involved, and although there were behind-the-scenes rumblings of a potential interest from the NATO secretariat to try to work to maintain the Alliance in the face of the difficulties in south-east Europe, the Guarantor Powers managed to quash this at an early stage.

As noted above, the main threat to the cohesion within the Guarantor Power alliance came from the possibility of wider United Nations involvement, the most likely forum within which any Greek Cypriot move would be made. A challenge to the authority of the Treaty of Guarantee on the floor of the Security Council could technically have had damaging effect on the legality, and legitimacy, of the tripartite action insofar as the question could then be raised about the right of the Guarantors Powers to be involved in Cyprus once the Treaty of Guarantee had ceased to exist. Although, having said this, in reality it would not - likely as not - have had much effect if one considers that Makarios had consented to the presence of the Truce Force in the first place, and that the Force had therefore not been conducted under the Treaty of Guarantee. However, with the success of the action by the Guarantor Powers there appeared to be little wider interest in the situation from the Council. Indeed, the United Nations' Secretary-General was at this time opposed to any direct United Nations role in the situation. The continuing peace-keeping operation in the Congo was undoubtedly a major influence on this decision, and Thant seemed to be wholly in accordance with the United Kingdom's desire to keep a lid on the matter by sticking strictly within the bounds of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Truce Force. This view seems to have been accepted internationally given the lack of comment by the wider international community - a situation that was, in my view, justified given the way in which the United Kingdom had conducted the political process.

In fact, it can be argued that the British Government followed the spirit of the United Nations Charter in the first month of the crisis. By both (a) proposing the London Conference and by (b) undertaking the Truce Force operation with the consent of both of the communities of Cyprus (or, in the view of the Greek Cypriots, with the consent of the Republic of Cyprus) it could clearly be argued that its role was entirely in accordance with a number of important articles of the United Nations Charter. The London Conference could be seen to represent a clear attempt under Article 33 to address the conflict within the regional framework - a fact recognised by U Thant. The use of the Treaty of Guarantee to form the Joint Truce Force could for all practical purposes under Chapter VIII of the Charter be interpreted in such a way as to allow the argument that the signatories of the Treaty formed a *de facto* regional organisation, and that this regional organisation had the right - without prior Security Council authorisation - to attempt to deal with the matter before it could be passed over to the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, by informing the Council of its actions the United Kingdom fulfilled its obligations according to Article 54 of the UN Charter. Within the remit of this chapter of the Charter, the fact that the United Kingdom had prevented the internationalisation of the crisis through the Truce Force and the London Conference was an intelligent, and internationally desirable move done in accordance with the original spirit underlying the founding of the United Nations Organisation.

However, the drawback to this approach became apparent with the failure of the London Conference. Due to the intransigence of Turkey and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it nonetheless left only the most limited room for the United Kingdom to continue to pursue this policy of regional containment of the issue within the Treaty of Guarantee, or under regional arrangements. One could

argue that Makarios actively intended the Conference to fail in order to swing the balance of international opinion and therefore open up room to have the matter discussed in a more international framework than the Treaty arrangements had allowed. However, such an allegation is difficult to prove on the basis of the evidence available. The closest one could come to such an argument about Makarios's intention to widen the debate is perhaps to regard the creation of a bi-lateral treaty with the United Kingdom to replace the Treaty of Guarantee as a cynical ploy to split the cohesiveness of the Guarantor Alliance and force the internationalisation of the situation along the lines favoured by the Greek Cypriots as there would no longer be a 'regional' element to the situation.

Yet, the failure of the Conference presented an enormous difficulty to the United Kingdom on another level - that of the operation of the Joint Truce Force. The fact that no political resolution to the crisis had been found meant that the operation of the Joint Truce Force now became open-ended. The manpower consideration required for such an operation, coupled with the intercommunal instability caused by the failure to find an acceptable cross-communal solution made the British position untenable in anything but the short-run. Although the JTF continued with support from the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey it could not run indefinitely. Given the above stated political reasons, there was undoubtedly a strong case in Makarios' favour for taking the matter to the United Nations by this point.

However, the British Government could not accept the validity of such a move as long as there was either a threat to the Bases, or a risk of Turkish intervention. Although the Truce Force was created to prevent the violent aspect of intercommunal political differences from being exposed, it could never be a solution to those differences. From this point onwards, the JTF would necessarily have to be a continuing operation - an option that was impossible for the United Kingdom to consider given the difficulties outlined above. With the decision to avoid a recourse to the United Nations, the Greek Government's option for a NATO-based force appeared to be the only way out that would ensure the maintenance of the British Bases, and limit the risk of Turkish military intervention. Yet, by pushing ahead with the plan to create a NATO-based force - an option that all knew was contrary to the wishes of the Greek Cypriots - the Guarantors finally gave Makarios all he needed to involve the international community. It should have been obvious that a collection of NATO states under British command could never hope to be a political broker in the search for peace, given the Greek Cypriot fears of Turkey's influence in the Organisation. Any NATO option would simply be a military action, albeit peace-keeping in nature, conducted with the constant threat of being open to international criticism and withdrawal if the Greek Cypriot leadership felt that its actions were in any way favouring the Turkish Cypriots. The partiality, whether real or imagined, of a NATO-based force would always be a handicap to its operations if it had come into being. Therefore, with the suggestion of the formation of a NATO-based force, the Cyprus crisis was finally internationalised. The Guarantor Powers should have known that if they pushed too hard on the issue, Makarios could use the non-aligned status of the island as the perfect tool to foil this move. From the moment that the Guarantor Powers sought to introduce the United States and NATO into the situation, the Cyprus situation was doomed to develop into a Cold War battleground.

Yet need this have necessarily been the case? There is a strong argument to be made that there was the option of creating a Commonwealth peace-keeping force. This was an idea which was known to have been favoured by the Greek Cypriots. Yet this was rejected on several occasions on the grounds that it was not viable. However, there never appeared to be any move made by the United Kingdom to investigate fully the willingness of Commonwealth countries to participate. And although one could argue that Turkey might well have been against such an action on the grounds that the force would have been pro-Greek Cypriot, this does not necessarily hold true. For example if the argument were made that Makarios' influence with the Third World was likely to mean that contributors would be biased misses the fact that the Commonwealth included Australia, New Zealand and Canada - all of which were essentially pro-Western states. Likewise a Commonwealth force could have included Moslem contingents from Pakistan, and possibly Nigeria. (The Malaysian Federation was unlikely to be another option given its continuing problems with Indonesia.) Yet the argument runs that this would have been unacceptable

to the Greek Cypriots, as would the participation of African troops. However, the Greek Cypriots would, in all likelihood, have been persuaded to accept such a contribution if the cost of not accepting the troops was a breakdown in the Guarantor Power alliance which could have resulted in a unilateral Turkish intervention. In any case, the United Kingdom chose to ignore this proposal for Commonwealth peace-keeping and instead approached the United States on the subject of a NATO-based force.

Although the United States acted in conjunction, though very cautiously, with the Guarantors in the initial phase of the crisis it was not immediately in favour of becoming overtly involved. Instead, the new Johnson Administration - just over a month old at the beginning of the crisis, and perhaps wary of overextending its direct role in the international system - chose to exert diplomatic pressure on Greece and Turkey rather than target the Cypriot communities. This was, on the face of it a stabilising move as it maintained the importance of the Guarantor Alliance as the directly interested parties to the crisis, and thus prevented the undesirable internationalisation of the situation. The mistake made by the United Kingdom with regard to the United States was that it played too heavily upon the dangers of NATO instability if such Guarantor cohesion broke down. Although there were undoubtedly problems in the Guarantor Alliance both Greece and Turkey had, nonetheless, acted with remarkable restraint. In the case of Greece, internal political instability had, in the earliest stages of the Crisis, resulted in the formation of a cautious and technocratic caretaker government that had also benefited from the fact that Greece clearly had less at stake on the island and therefore did not need to prepare for a unilateral intervention. Yet it was also the case that Turkey, which undoubtedly had more to play for in Cyprus displayed a willingness to refrain from intervening in order to allow peace-making and peace-keeping efforts by first the United Kingdom, and then by the United Kingdom and the United States. This remains so in spite of its numerous threats to intervene as well as its periodic military mobilisations Indeed, such was the willingness of the Turkish Government to work in conjunction with the United Kingdom and the United States that on two separate, but vitally important, occasions it actually avoided taking a stand in favour of the Turkish Cypriot community. The first time was in London when Foreign Minister Erkin persuaded the Turkish Cypriot delegation to remain despite the fact that the Greek Cypriots had managed to have two delegations recognised - one as the Greek Cypriot community and the other as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, from which the Turkish Cypriots were excluded. The second period was when Turkey sided with the United Kingdom and the United States and persuaded the Turkish Cypriots to accept the proposed terms of Resolution 186. These two incidents perhaps represent the most vital periods in securing for the Greek Cypriots recognition of their position as the legal Government of the Republic of Cyprus. One may contest the degree to which any Turkish opposition to these issues may have actually affected any outcome, but one cannot contest the fact that Turkey did, nonetheless, play a significant part in the events that led to the eventual alienation of the Turkish Cypriot community from the apparatus of the Government of Cyprus that resulted from the *de facto*, if not *de jure*, recognition of the Greek Cypriot leadership as the rightful holders of that title.

If the aim of the United Kingdom and the United States was to avoid a Greco-Turkish conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, the actions of both Greece and Turkey throughout the greater part of the period reviewed were to be commended. And it was not until the election of the Papandreou Government in mid-February that a return to more traditional Greek-Turkish animosity was reached - by which point the move to the United Nations had already been made. Yet, despite the essentially calm way in which both Greece and Turkey had handled the Cyprus crisis, the United Kingdom necessarily had to highlight the dangers of a potential Greek-Turkish split in order to develop the interest of the United States in the situation. It could not present a plan to the United States that asked for its involvement in Cyprus simply because it could no longer bear the burden alone - a move that had already been done once at the end of the Second World War. When the United Kingdom did try that tactic - in the period before the London Conference - the Johnson Administration asked the British Government to consider looking elsewhere, for example to the Commonwealth. However, this option had already been discounted on the, arguably weak, basis that the Commonwealth would not be able to meet the burden. Therefore in order to bring

the United States into the situation as a credible actor, it would have to be presented with a serious enough scenario to warrant its involvement. The threat to NATO stability was such a reason.

Once the United States had considered and accepted this danger, it took up the cause with ill-concealed gusto. Indeed, its diplomatic actions soon left the United Kingdom, for the most part, as a secondary actor in the process - a position that the British Government undoubtedly favoured. The burden of the Truce Force was taking enough of its energies and political resources, and to be relieved of the extra burden of trying to maintain the overall cooperation of the Guarantor Powers in the face of Makarios's internationalisation of the issue, was not something to be mourned. Yet such involvement by the United States was necessarily fraught with danger. Cyprus was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and not of NATO, and therefore to pressure the Cypriots to accept a NATO-based option could easily have been interpreted as an example of NATO expansionism. There was no way in which the situation could be regarded as one of containment at this point as the Soviet Union had taken only the slightest of interest in the conflict. By not considering the strength of Greek Cypriot opposition to the NATO-based plan, the United States and the United Kingdom gave Makarios the ability to have the matter internationalised. With NATO involvement, Makarios could encourage the Soviet Union to take a more robust role in the problem.

In analysing the role of the Soviet Union in the Cyprus situation, it is possible to say that in many ways it conducted its policy over Cyprus in almost textbook fashion in light of its overall international policies at the time. In the first stage of the crisis, when Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom had been involved it had remained somewhat aloof from the situation. One could argue that at this point the Soviet Union simply interpreted the events in Cyprus to be wholly within the Western realm and therefore a risky area in which to become embroiled as it could well have resulted in a direct confrontation with the United States. Indeed, the fact that Makarios had sanctioned the tripartite intervention by the Guarantor Powers could only have added to that perception. Even when the issue of a Turkish threat to Cyprus came up in the first Security Council session in December 1963, the Soviet Union remained quiet. (However, if one wanted to find a justification for the Soviet Union's lack of action at this point, one could argue that the Soviet Union was aware of the delicate nature of the Greek Cypriots position, but deliberately remained quiet in order not to upset the process of the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey that had secretly been reached during the Cuban Missile Crisis.) However, the idea for a force made up of NATO members was to alter the Soviet Union's position. Yet the impetus for this change was driven by Makarios. By approaching the already interested Soviet Union with the NATO threat posed against the island - a member of the Non-Aligned Movement - the Archbishop was able to encourage the typical opportunistic behaviour that had so often characterised Soviet foreign policy. For both Makarios and the Soviet Union, the actions of the United Kingdom and the United States with regard to Cyprus meant that the Greek Cypriots were now engaged in a form of national liberation movement to exert the right to express its own sovereignty in the face of NATO pressure.

Yet throughout this period the lack of non-aligned involvement in the Cyprus situation was somewhat of a surprise. Although there is the argument that the participation of the NAM was deliberately avoided by the Greek Cypriots, there is a clear case to be made that the various members of the Movement did not seek to develop a unified policy on the Cyprus in order to counter the Guarantor Powers and the United States on the issue of a NATO-based peace-keeping force. In any case, even if it had decided to formulate such a policy, the loose nature of the grouping would have made it difficult for the Movement to present a credible alternative to either NATO or the Warsaw Treaty countries in terms of power politics. The strength of the group lay solely at the level of moral authority - that small, or large states that chose to remain cut-off from the wrangles of the Superpowers should be allowed to do so. Makarios, chose to enlist the support of the Soviet Union, and the non-aligned states seemed to choose to accept that decision.

Yet although Makarios looked to the Soviet Union, instead of the NAM, for pragmatic reasons, the Soviet Union in reality reacted perhaps a little more forcefully - within the bounds of opportunistic

behaviour - than many could have expected. The letter of 7 February was undoubtedly hard-hitting in its tone, the question is whether it was hard-hitting in substance? On the basis of the resulting events it appears that it did have some effect, but this may have been as much a result of internal NATO problems than as an effect of Khrushchev's text. In any case, even if one were to ascribe a great deal of significance to the Soviet letter it did not stop the United States from pursuing the idea of a NATO-based peace-keeping force, although one could argue that it may have ensured that the United States could not force any peace-keeping option upon the Greek Cypriots. Therefore when, on 14 February, Makarios rejected the final appeal made by George Ball, the issue of a peace-keeping force for Cyprus had no other viable outlet but the United Nations Security Council - a move that had been the aim of the Greek Cypriots from the earliest stages.

Given that the United Nations had been the source of much political wrangling between the parties in the preceding period, it was unsurprising that the United Kingdom's action heralded a shift in the dimensions of the problem. The Cyprus situation had now been truly internationalised. Yet the outcome of the debate was not entirely in accordance with the way in which the Greek Cypriots had at first envisaged the move to the United Nations. In evaluating the role of the Security Council it is almost immediately apparent that the operation of reaching a decision within this forum worked on two levels: the private and the public.

In the case of the former, there was a considerable amount of effort expended by all the interested parties, all of which entered the proceedings at the United Nations with their own agendas. Yet, the private side of the negotiation leading to Resolution 186 was on the whole devoid of rhetoric and hard-line positioning, and the Secretary-General and the officials of the UN Secretariat proved to be important as in the course of the negotiations they acted as the third party with which each group would speak. U Thant exhibited considerable patience and determination in his efforts to produce a workable solution to the problem. The eventual failure of his efforts was not so much due to lack of work but instead perhaps points to a conclusion that the parties did not feel that they had to co-operate with the Secretary-General. The fact that the five non-permanent members' resolution, based on Thant's proposals, succeeded suggests that the authority given by states to the Secretary-General was somewhat less than the authority given by states to their peers. For all the Soviet Union's arguments in the preceding years that the Secretary-General was becoming too powerful, in the final analysis the position of the Secretary-General had not developed to the extent to which the Soviet Union claimed.

In contrast to this, at the public level there was a tendency for Security Council debates to degenerate into a series of accusations and counter-accusations. Yet this proved to be important for a number of reasons. First and foremost it was by this point necessary for the numerous parties to vent their frustration in the more civilised surroundings afforded within the Security Council chamber. In addition, the open process of decision making was important in order to allow all parties to be able to 'sell' the Security Council's final position to their domestic constituencies. If an agreement was reached solely behind closed doors then there would have been the potential for political discord if the reached settlement had proved to be contrary to the wishes of any of the parties. Therefore it became clear to the Greek Cypriot community that any hope that the Council would judge upon the validity of the Constitution or on the legitimacy of the Treaty of Guarantee was publicly seen to be considered as being beyond the remit of the Council and therefore Makarios could not be accused of sidelining the issue. In addition, the Turkish Cypriot community was given an important message by the international community that they were not going to be recognised as having the direct right to demand secession from the Republic of Cyprus. There was a similar effect on the Government of Turkey which was in essence told that although there were undoubted problems with regard to the intercommunal situation in Cyprus, the international political ramifications of their taking direct action to remedy this would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the international community. This therefore reduced the threat of Turkish intervention as the Turkish political leaders could use the UN as justification for having to take a softer position *vis-à-vis* the Cyprus situation, with the result that the prospect for a Greco-Turkish war was

diminished significantly. To this extent one can posit the argument that the role of the United Nations was of considerable importance insofar as it allowed for a general easing of tensions.

Yet there was almost no direct tension between the Superpowers by this point. Perhaps in light of the experiences of Representative Zorin during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Representative Fedorenko avoided any direct conflict with the United States on the floor of the Security Council chamber. Instead, he preferred to voice support for the Greek Cypriots against the representatives of Turkey and the United Kingdom. Although it must be stated that the United States also avoided criticising the Soviet Union, one may argue that the Soviet Union had little reason to force a Cold War showdown over Cyprus on the floor of the Security Council. They had done their job of preventing a NATO based force being forced upon the Greek Cypriots and to ruin the chances of further *détente* in the aftermath of Cuba by continuing the matter once the main issues of the problem of a NATO-based force had been settled could only lead to further problems. Both of the Superpowers displayed a pragmatic approach to the situation, and were prepared to let the process at the United Nations run its course, albeit with Fedorenko's theatrical outbursts that only served to emphasise his developing reputation for being a 'notoriously obnoxious' individual.[2]

Nevertheless, there was another aspect of the Soviet Union's role that needed to be considered. When the draft resolution of the five non-permanent members of the Security Council looked to have found a way in which to overcome the deadlock in the Council and result in the creation a United Nations peace-keeping force, both the Soviet Union - and France - chose to adopt their by now traditional position on the over extensive role of the Secretary-General in the structuring of peace-keeping. The fact that U Thant, who Khrushchev regarded in a positive light, was now at the helm certainly changed the attitude of the Soviet Union from one of vehement opposition to the man (as had been the case with Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld), to a more general suspicion of the development of the office - a fact that was made clear to Thant when the Soviet Union reproached him for sending an Observer to Cyprus without the prior consent of the Security Council.

In addition, with the massive cost of ONUC in mind, the Soviet Union also chose to question the proposals for the financing of the force. This move resulted in the unusual step to finance the force by voluntary contributions. Yet there was really very little new in these two points insofar as they simply reflected overall French and Soviet policy towards United Nations peace-keeping that had been developing over the previous decade.

Yet in the final analysis, it is possible to argue that United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 showed that both France and the Soviet Union accepted - along with the most of the international community - that United Nations peace-keeping had a valid and worthwhile role to play in the management of a conflict that was deemed to be a threat to international peace and security. This was despite the fact that the Cyprus situation was essentially an intercommunal conflict that had eventually been interpreted - despite all the best efforts of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the United States - to represent a threat to international peace and security through the dangerous and bloody minded determination of the Greek Cypriots led by Archbishop Makarios.

Options for Non-United Nations Peace-keeping in Cyprus in 1964

In spite of the fact that Cyprus eventually received a United Nations peace-keeping force, the question still remains as to whether there was any justifiable reason to assume that peace-keeping duties in Cyprus could have been undertaken by an alternative organisation. After almost a month of its operation, the British Government considered that the Joint Truce Force appeared unable to continue alone in its operation in Cyprus. The result of this was the need to find a peace-keeping force to replace it. This search revolved around three separate options: (1) a United Nations force, (2) a NATO-based force, and, (3) a Commonwealth force. Within the remit of an analysis of the acceptability of non-United Nations peace-keeping, Cyprus showed that peace-keeping undertaken by non-United Nations organisations - i.e.

options 2 & 3 - was theoretically a viable option but only in the case of Commonwealth peace-keeping.

The prospect of the creation of a Commonwealth force certainly seemed to have mileage. It was clearly acceptable to the Greek Cypriots, and although discounted by the United Kingdom for - unproven - practical reasons, it was never rejected on the grounds that it could not serve a useful purpose. The argument that it may not have been acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots or Turkey can not be proffered as it was not even presented to them, and even if it had been, there was little to say that the United Kingdom and the United States - known to have considered the option - could not have brought sufficient pressure to bear on the parties to accept the idea. What is perhaps more interesting to consider are the consequences that a Commonwealth Secretariat may have had on events - as it was the Secretariat was not created until 1965. At the time of the Cyprus Crisis the agenda of the Commonwealth was almost exclusively set by the United Kingdom's Commonwealth Relations Office, if for no other reason than the fact that it acted as the main conduit for matters relating to the Commonwealth to be brought to the attention of the wider membership. What may have happened had there been a Secretariat? It is not usually within the bounds of a work such as this to speculate, but one could imagine that the idea for a Commonwealth peace-keeping force would have been explored more fully. An independent Secretariat would, one would assume, have looked more deeply into the viability of the idea than the Commonwealth Relations Office - which appears to have been against the idea of a Commonwealth Force. In any case, the idea for the creation of some form of Commonwealth peace-keeping was to lay dormant for another fifteen years but did in fact eventually come to some sort of fruition when the Commonwealth Monitoring Force was established in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.[3]

As for NATO peace-keeping, the proposal for a NATO-based force would always have been problematic. In the first instance, one must remember that at the root of the problem was the Greek Cypriot fear of Turkey, and its role in NATO. Therefore although the idea was viable in the minds of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, it would always have been open to the criticism that it was not impartial. However, and importantly, the nature of the Cold War made such an idea a practical impossibility for geo-political reasons. Although Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations makes explicit provision for regional organisations to play a role in the prevention and termination of conflict in accordance with the rules laid out in Articles 34 & 35 of Chapter VI, the fact that the only two regional organisations which had the viable military capabilities to conduct such an operation were NATO and the Warsaw Pact made such an idea worthless in the prevailing political conditions of the time. The fact that the United Nations was never able to implement Chapter VI for reasons to do with the Cold War thus made it impossible for the regional organisations that represented the Cold War adversaries to replace the United Nations successfully. United Nations peace-keeping was the result of improvisation - somewhat accurately called Chapter 6 ½ - and had been developed to diminish the chance of Superpower conflict in areas that were not of direct national or strategic interest to either. This therefore meant that any proposal to put in place an alternative peace-keeper in an area not controlled by either Superpower necessarily required that the proposed alternative had to be removed from the Cold War. For this reason, NATO-based peace-keeping in a non-aligned state was always likely to be unacceptable. In Cyprus, NATO-based peace-keeping threatened to have a Cold War element precisely because to the Soviet Union and the NAM it represented an attempt at ideological expansion into a state which had rejected the principles of the NATO as a Western military bloc. Indeed, any NAM-member state that accepted such a NATO action would immediately cease to be an adherent to the principle of non-alignment. One could not accept NATO and still claim to be neutral in the Cold War. As much as Makarios dismissed NATO because of Turkey's role, he must have understood the exact nature of this point. The fact that he enlisted the Soviet Union's support for his attempt to beat off such an offer did not contravene this neutrality. In some ways it could be regarded as an acceptable use of one Superpower to intimidate the other, in order to pursue the longer-term goal of nonalignment.

In the final instance, overall conflict management in cases such as Cyprus would always have to remain the job of the United Nations or other regional organisations of that ilk, for no other reason than

the fact that the United Nations' role had developed to be essentially non-partisan in the Cold War. Thus the Commonwealth whose eclectic membership included prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement, fitted the bill. The loose nature of the Commonwealth as a body of states brought together through mutual history and not mutual politics ensured it fell beyond the Cold War in a way that NATO, by its purpose, could not.

United Nations Peace-keeping and Military Intervention in the Developing Post-Colonial International Environment, 1945-64

Although the events in Cyprus had demonstrated a number of problems that related to the issue of peace-keeping by non-United Nations actors, one could make a case in favour of seeing the Joint Truce Force as evidence that peace-keeping could be undertaken by parties other than the United Nations. However, this argument could more easily be made on the basis of the efforts of the Arab League in Kuwait - which predated the Joint Truce Force. What in fact we are left with is a much more difficult problem relating to the subject of military interventions in the developing post-colonial international environment rather than a problem concerning peace-keeping. Yet, before tackling this issue of military intervention, it is first necessary to review the Truce Force.

In the course of reviewing the criteria by which we judge the validity of attaching the title 'peace-keeping force' to a military action it is possible to say that there are three conditions that need to be met, namely that the force is there with the *consent* of the host state, that it follows the principle of *non-enforcement*, and that it is seen to be *impartial* in the conduct of its operation. In the case of the Joint Truce Force we can say that it met the two first conditions with little difficulty. The Force, from its inception, was in Cyprus with the consent of both the communities of Cyprus - indeed, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey deliberately chose to avoid taking conjoint action under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee and instead opted for a mission undertaken with the consent of the parties. And although there were a number of groups that became increasingly opposed to the Truce Force over the course of its operation, it was never openly challenged by either President Makarios or Vice-President Küçük. On the second point - concerning non-enforcement - we can say that although there was an incident when shots were fired over the heads of demonstrators, the JTF did conduct its overall operation in a non-coercive manner - in spirit as well as action - during the whole period under review. Evidence supporting the view that the intention of the Force was never intended to develop an enforcement policy can perhaps be drawn from the fact that although the units sent to Cyprus were diverse and included artillery units, in all cases the heavy guns attached to these units were left behind in the United Kingdom.

The final point that needs to be addressed is that of the impartiality of the Force. There have been a number of criticisms made regarding the alleged bias of the Truce Force towards one or other community during the Cyprus Crisis. However, and importantly, these have come from both sides of the Green Line, and, in the course of reviewing the actions of the Force, there seems to be little to merit such accusations. In the first instance, the troops serving with the JTF often found themselves targeted by both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot militias rather than just one of the factions. In the second instance, the fact that the Force came between the two must not be seen as evidence that they were attempting to protect the Turkish Cypriots who were often the weaker party. Peace-keeping involves interposition, and to argue that this action is biased is to argue that all peace-keeping forces must sit to one side for fear of being identified as being partial to the weaker, or 'losing' side. On the issue of impartiality, it would therefore seem fair to say that the JTF was impartial. It was an unfortunate outcome of the situation that the impartiality exhibited was interpreted by both communities, at one point or another, as being designed to favour the other. Yet, there are likely to be those within the Greek Cypriot community who will always maintain that the political guidance given to the JTF was designed to favour the Turkish Cypriots and therefore to assist in securing the partition of the island. The available evidence does not seem to support

this argument. Instead, during the course of the period under review, the operational orders given in the field remained true to the aim of ensuring that a peace was maintained between the fighting factions rather than follow a particular political agenda with regard to supporting either of the two communities. If impartiality means that a peace-keeping force displays no obvious bias towards any particular conflicting party, but that it displays a clear partiality towards the implementation of its mandate - even if this might be interpreted negatively by a party to the conflict - then the Truce Force was indeed impartial.

Yet there are two more criteria by which we can further the argument in favour of seeing the Truce Force as a peace-keeping entity. In the first case we can examine the various documents released by the British Government, which often refer to, if not emphasise, the fact that the Truce Force was peace-keeping, and, correspondingly, never cite it as being a coercive undertaking. In the second instance, we can point to the fact that very often peace-keeping forces are detailed to develop a humanitarian role. As Michael Pugh has stated, 'In a broad, philosophical sense, peacekeeping has humanitarian objectives.'[4] Even if we take this literally and demand examples of humanitarian actions beyond the operation of keeping the peace, we can clearly cite examples of cases where the JTF carried out such a functions and thus, seemingly, again met the criteria for being assessed as a peace-keeper.

However, the term peace-keeping nonetheless does not seem to sit comfortably when applied to the Joint Truce Force. What seems to be the enduring image in the minds the Cypriots about the JTF was the undeniable 'Britishness' of the Force. Although it seemed that everyone - on both sides of the line - when questioned on the matter of whether one can view the Joint Truce Force as a peace-keeping force agreed that it fulfilled an important role in calming intercommunal tensions at the time, there remained a clear recognition of the fact that the Force was always viewed in a slightly suspicious way by a large number of those in the Greek Cypriot community. This appears to devolve from the fact that the soldiers of the JTF were wearing the uniform of the British Army which had, less than four years earlier, been the sworn enemy of most of the majority Greek Cypriot population. And although it seems to be the case that most of those interviewed were able to differentiate clearly between the British Army as an entity trying to keep the peace in 1963-64 from the British Army which was the tool by which the United Kingdom attempted to retain its colonial position in Cyprus in 1955-59, the temptation to accuse the Truce Force of following a neo-colonial enterprise was too much to resist for elements in the Greek Cypriot community when events, unrelated to the operational actions of the Truce Force, went against them. This is an important point, which, to be answered, is perhaps best looked at within a wider context.

The answer to the problem of why the peace-keeping status of the Joint Truce Force is somehow inappropriate in the minds of many of the Greek Cypriot population appears to be related to the evolution of the international system since the end of the Second World War. During the early twentieth century the international system began a transformation that saw the erosion of the imperial holdings of the European Powers. At the termination of hostilities in 1945, the majority of the European Powers had been weakened so much by their war efforts that the economic costs of retaining an empire became unbearable. Allied to this, the political costs of having an empire also became more pronounced as the demise of the European Powers during the previous fifty years had been paralleled by the ascendency of the two new Powers - the United States of America and the Soviet Union - which, although having competing ideologies, both shared a world view that abhorred the very notion of imperialism. Therefore, and in spite of the acrimony of the Cold War, the new agenda in international relations developed around the ideal of a decolonised world. Although the United States had first brought pressure to bear on the United Kingdom to relinquish its Empire during the War, it was only during the formation of the Charter of the United Nations that the formalisation of the issue of decolonisation as an agenda item became apparent. The subsequent rise of the Superpowers during the following years only increased the pressures on the colonial Powers to relinquish their empires.

As the process continued, the membership of the United Nations grew which further increased these pressures. By 1960 decolonisation was in full flow. However, in the rush to relieve themselves of

the burden of colonial territories, the European Powers all too often paid scant attention to the issue of providing for post-colonial stability. Thus the result of these ill-planned and badly executed colonial withdrawals was, in many cases, civil unrest. In addition to this factor, the leaders who took the reigns of power were often drawn from the leadership of the anti-colonial struggle many of whom harboured a deep distrust, if not resentment, of the former imperial Powers. These two factors seemed to provide much by way of opportunities for the Soviet Union which was eager to exploit what seemed to be widespread post-colonial disillusionment with the West. In the atmosphere of the Cold War it was therefore not unnatural that this, in turn, served to focus the energies of the United States on these same areas as a response to what they saw as the Soviet Union's expansionist policies towards the Third World. Given the dangers of the Cold War, the problem of the two Superpowers jockeying for influence often appeared to threaten international peace and security, and therefore provided clear cases for the involvement of the United Nations.

Given the factors highlighted above it is perhaps no source of surprise, therefore, that the main UN peace-keeping missions undertaken in the period 1945-63 were as a result of untidy decolonisation processes which threatened to embroil the Superpowers. However, the cases that have had most influence in the course of the development of UN peace-keeping - rather than UN observation missions, such as UNTSO and UNMOGIP - were the ones undertaken in response to some form of military intervention by former colonial Powers. In the reviewing the cases resulting in UNEF, ONUC and UNFICYP (and to a certain extent UNOGIL[5]) there seems to be a case for stating the view that all too often the former colonial Powers were slow to realise that once they had left a territory the new state created would be less than eager to see them return. It did not seem to be clear to the former imperial Powers concerned that they could not simply walk out of a country and then expect to return when things did not go the way in which they wanted them to go in terms of their remaining national or strategic interests. Notwithstanding the fact that these Powers were sometimes sucked into a crisis (like, for example, the United Kingdom in the Cyprus situation), rather than willing interveners, there appeared to be a distinct aversion on the part of these Powers to acknowledge the positive effect that the United Nations could have. Despite the development of the United Nations as a body able to cope with certain specific instances of threats to international peace and security a number of these Powers seemed to still feel that they had a role to play. This in spite of the fact that the former colonies had often become hunting grounds for the East and West and therefore were risky areas to become embroiled.

This point seems to have been clear in the three examples of the Suez, the Congo, and Cyprus. In these three cases, all of which resulted in the creation of a UN peace-keeping force, there appeared to be a developing realisation that the traditional methods of strong-arm tactics were of a past era, but that they still had a right to intervene if necessary. The attempt by the United Kingdom and France to use the Israeli invasion of Egypt - which they had planned in conjunction with Israel - as a pretext to intervene in order to halt fighting was a thinly disguised attempt at blatant aggression to ensure that access to the Suez Canal remained under their terms rather than Egypt's. However, it nonetheless is interesting to note that both the United Kingdom and France by this point felt that they in fact needed some form of pretext in order to act. It would seem to be the case that had it been thirty years earlier neither would have felt compelled to find such a reason, instead one would imagine that they would have acted with little thought as to the means of justifying such an action. In the second case of Belgium in the Congo it was clear that the Belgian troops were at first responding to a clearly humanitarian problem arising from the civil unrest following the mutinies of the Congolese Army against their Belgian officers. The difficulties arose when they adopted a clearly coercive approach with little interest in performing an impartial role. (They were also implicated with the secessionist movement of Katanga in which a number of Belgian companies had mining interests). Yet by the time of the third case, that of the United Kingdom in Cyprus - which seemed to threaten, to a greater or lesser degree, both NATO and the Sovereign Base Areas - there finally seemed to have been a clear movement towards an acceptance of the principles of the United Nations. Yet the actions of the Force, as we have seen, were often regarded with suspicion which eventually

became hostility. This seems to indicate that there might, nonetheless, appear to be a case for arguing that the use of military forces by the colonial Powers were, in some instances, viable in the short term. However, such actions did not seem to be sustainable in the medium-long term. It is perhaps an unfortunate fact for these forces that by being initially successful they seemed, almost inevitably, to seal their own fate. Once the situation had moved beyond the initial crisis period the acceptability of the continued presence of a former colonial Power became open to question in a way that did not seem to happen when a United Nations peace-keeping force carried out the same task. In the case of Cyprus, the eventual formation of a United Nations peace-keeping force to act, by its commander's own admission, in a similar fashion to the JTF therefore leads us to question what it was that set the United Nations apart from the United Kingdom as a viable peace-keeper for Cyprus, or, indeed, as a peace-keeper in any other similar case in which a former colonial power was attempting peace-keeping. Given that the JTF met the criteria by which we judge peace-keeping, one can only conclude that the lack of success (the term 'failure' seems too harsh) of the Joint Truce Force was as a result of the fact that the United Kingdom was not the United Nations. It seems as though it was idea of the United Nations, rather than the idea of peace-keeping, that represented the vital element in the term 'United Nations peace-keeping'. The Joint Truce Force, for all its peace-keeping intentions, was always the army of the former colonial Power.

Endnotes to Conclusions

1. It is perhaps interesting to note that it is very difficult to say exactly who Makarios was in a psychological sense. Although much of this work is directed towards understanding the policies he adopted, there is, however, little by way of direct comment explaining how he himself viewed the events. This is a result of the fact that most of the accounts used have been from those who knew him. It is an unfortunate fact for historians that Makarios left no memoirs - that we know of - and therefore there has been precious little to draw upon that revealed the exact intentions of the Archbishop at various junctures in the modern history of Cyprus. In my conversations and interviews with people in Cyprus, I have often been struck by the fact that although Makarios excites often extreme emotions in people, no one, even those who knew him personally, ever made a claim fully to understand Makarios.

2. Urquhart, Brian; *Ralph Bunche: An American Life*; (London: WW Norton and Company, 1993), p.378

3. For more information see Verrier, Anthony; 'Peacekeeping or Peacemaking? The Commonwealth Monitoring Force, Southern Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, 1979-1980'; *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 1, Number 4, Winter 1994.

4. Pugh, Michael; 'Humanitarianism and Peacekeeping'; *Global Society*, Volume 10, Number 3, 1996, p.206.

5. I have not categorised UNOGIL with the others as it represented a slightly different situation insofar as the United States had not been the colonial Power in the Lebanon (although the United Kingdom had been in the Trans-Jordan). In addition, the mission had not initially been formed as a response to an intervention by an outside Power to internal troubles but, instead, had come about as a result of the fact that the United States had wanted to avoid becoming involved at the earliest stages. However, UNOGIL can be seen as conforming to the examples of UNEF, ONUC and UNFICYP insofar as its mandate was eventually changed in order to oversee the withdrawal of the US and British forces in the Lebanon and Jordan respectively.

APPENDIX A

Selected Extracts from the Charter of the United Nations

We the peoples of the United Nations determined

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

and for these ends

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed forces shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

Chapter I.
Purposes and Principles

ARTICLE 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

ARTICLE 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in this present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Chapter IV.
The General Assembly

COMPOSITION

ARTICLE 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

ARTICLE 10

The General assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organ provided for it in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

ARTICLE 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such questions on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10

ARTICLE 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

VOTING

ARTICLE 18

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Chapter V.
The Security Council

COMPOSITION

ARTICLE 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

VOTING

ARTICLE 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

ARTICLE 32

Any Member of the United nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a member of the United Nations.

Chapter VI.
Pacific Settlement of Disputes

ARTICLE 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means.

ARTICLE 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

ARTICLE 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

ARTICLE 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

ARTICLE 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Chapter VII.
Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

ARTICLE 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

ARTICLE 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

ARTICLE 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

ARTICLE 42

Should the Security Council consider that the measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of

the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

ARTICLE 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

ARTICLE 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

ARTICLE 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

ARTICLE 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities require the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the Strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

ARTICLE 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and

through their action in appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

ARTICLE 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording Mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

ARTICLE 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

ARTICLE 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VIII.
Regional Arrangements

ARTICLE 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

ARTICLE 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in any regional arrangement directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments

concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

ARTICLE 54

The Security council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter XV.
The Secretariat

ARTICLE 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instruction from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Chapter XVI.
Miscellaneous Provisions

ARTICLE 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

ARTICLE 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

APPENDIX B

I. Treaty of Guarantee
II. Treaty of Alliance
III. Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

I. Treaty of Guarantee

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of the Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taken note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly and indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on today's date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited in Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

II. Treaty of Alliance

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,

I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them,

II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defence and to consult together on the problems raised by that defence.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

Article III

For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

Article IV

Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty.

The said contingents shall provide for training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.

Article V

The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation for a period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Article VI

The present Treaty shall enter force on the date of signature.

The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of the present Treaty renders them necessary.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. 1

I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

II. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

III. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as well as other immunities and privileges and any other military and technical questions concerning the organization and operation of the Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than Treaty of Alliance.

IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of officers, charged with the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. 2

Article I

A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognizance of any question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied Countries shall agree to submit to it.

Article II

The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. In a matter of Urgency the Committee of Ministers can be convened in a special session by its Chairman at the request of one of the members of the Alliance.

Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.

Article III

The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special.

The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary for the fulfilment of its task

Article IV

The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee's ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account of the Headquarter's activities.

III. Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus on the other part.

Desiring to make provisions to give effect to the Declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on the 17th February, 1959, during the Conference at London, in accordance with the subsequent Declarations made at the Conference by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, by the Representative of the Greek Cypriot Community and by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community:

Taking note of the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed to-day by the Parties to this Treaty:

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the Island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast, with the exceptions of the two areas defined in Annex A to this Treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. These areas are in the Treaty and its annexes referred to as the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.

ARTICLE 2

(1) The Republic of Cyprus shall accord to the United Kingdom the rights set forth in Annex B to this Treaty.

(2) The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult and co-operate in the common defence of Cyprus.

ARTICLE 4

The arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex C to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 5

The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction human rights and fundamental freedoms comparable to those set out in Section I of the European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4th of November, 1950, and the Protocol to that Convention signed at Paris on the 20th of March, 1952.

ARTICLE 6

The arrangements concerning the nationality of persons affected by the established of the Republic of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex D to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 7

The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accept and undertake to carry out the necessary financial and administrative arrangements to settle questions arising out of the termination of British administration in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. These arrangements are set forth in annex E to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 8

(1) All international obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom shall henceforth, in so far as they may be held to have application to the Republic of Cyprus, can be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

(2) The international rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of their application to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties to this Treaty accept and undertake to carry out the arrangements concerning trade, commerce and other matters set forth in Annex F to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 10

Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled as follows:

(a) Any question or difficulty that may arise over the operation of the military requirements of the United Kingdom, or concerning the provisions of the Treaty in so far as they affect the status, rights and obligations of United Kingdom forces or any other forces associated with them under the terms of this Treaty, or of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot forces, shall ordinarily be settled by negotiation between the tripartite Headquarters of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the authorities of the armed forces of the United Kingdom.

(b) Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty on which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military authorities in the cases described above, or, in other cases, by negotiation between the parties concerned through the diplomatic channel, shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal appointed for the purpose, which shall be composed of four representatives, one each to be nominated by the Government of the United Kingdom, The Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey, and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, together with an independent chairman nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice. If the President is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or of the Republic of Cyprus or of Greece or of Turkey, the Vice-President shall be requested to act; and if he also is such a citizen, the next senior Judge of the Court.

ARTICLE 11

The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 12

This Treaty shall enter force on signature by all the Parties to it.

The Texts of the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment (excluding the Annexes to the Treaty of Establishment) have been taken from reprints appearing in the Supplementary Memorandum to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, Third Report, Sessions 1986-1987, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office) pp.27-31

APPENDIX C

I. The Text of the Letter from Chairman Khrushchev, 7 February 1964

7th February, 1964.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I consider it necessary to address you in the name of the Soviet Government in connection with the fact that of late the situation around the Republic of Cyprus is becoming increasingly heated, creating a danger of serious international complications in the area of the Mediterranean Sea. The causes of the tension which has arisen are well known: the disagreements between the two communities in Cyprus - the Greeks, who constitute the majority of the population, and the Turks - have long been heated from outside, and they are being used as a pretext for unconcealed intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus - a sovereign, independent State and a member of the United Nation Organisation.

Some Powers, trampling on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the universally accepted norms of International Law, are now trying to impose on the people and Government of Cyprus a solution favourable to these Powers of problems which affect only Cypriots, and furthermore they are conveying the impression that the solution of these internal problems can be brought to Cyprus only on foreign bayonets. In this connection variants of "solutions" are being discussed - for example, the despatch to Cyprus of N.A.T.O. troops or of troops from individual N.A.T.O. countries, although basically all these variants have one aim - the factual occupation by the armed forces of N.A.T.O. of the Republic of Cyprus, which follows a policy of non-adherence to military blocs. In other words, it is a question of a gross infringement of the sovereignty, independence and freedom of the Republic of Cyprus, of an attempt to place this small neutral State under the military control of N.A.T.O.

In the minds of all those who are interested in the preservation of peace, in ensuring for any States-large or small, strong or weak-the possibility of building their national life in accordance with their own interests and aspirations, there arises the question: if the sovereignty of States is not an empty phrase written in the United Nations Charter, if the right to freedom and independence is really a sacred right of all peoples, of all States, then why do they wish to exclude the Republic of Cyprus from the number of those who are allowed to enjoy the benefits of sovereignty and to build their own national life without intervention from outside? Do they not think that sovereignty is the right of only the strong, and that genuine independence is the privilege only of those who dispose of powerful armed forces? Do they not thus consider that small States, such as the Republic of Cyprus, which possesses neither atomic weapons nor numerous armed forces, constitute States of some other sort, to the sovereignty and rights of which consideration need not be paid?

Such views, if the Governments of Great Powers, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, were guided by them, could constitute a serious danger for universal peace, and could

become a source of international complications, fraught with grave consequences for the peoples.

Sometimes in justification of the plans for the dispatch of N.A.T.O. troops to Cyprus, the point of view is expressed that the Cypriots are not able to settle their own internal problems on their own, that they cannot reach agreement on how the Greek and Turkish communities should live together within the framework of a single State. But who can better know whether the Cypriots can overcome their internal difficulties independently without any intervention from abroad than the Cypriots themselves, who, under the leadership of their Government and of President Makarios, are manfully and firmly defending the sovereignty of their Republic, defending their national independence, their rights? Is there really a wish to make anyone believe that it is easier to deal with the internal problems of Cyprus in the capitals of other countries? And it is no secret that in N.A.T.O. circles discussion is proceeding on the question whether to send to Cyprus as part of the so-called "N.A.T.O. forces" soldiers of the German Bundeswehr, though in these regions memories have by no means completely faded of the steel helmets of the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, which during the years of the Second World war brought destruction and death to the area of the Mediterranean Sea.

We are convinced that the Cypriots are fully able to deal with their internal affairs themselves, as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has repeatedly stated, and to find for the problems which confront them solutions which will accord in the highest degree with their national interests. But we are prepared to admit that other States may have a different approach to this question, and in their evaluation the situation may be such that the people of Cyprus really needs help in overcoming its internal difficulties. But even if that were the case, at the utmost it could only be a question of giving the Cypriots good advice if they asked for it, and in no case of intervention in their internal affairs.

And if one is to speak of the review of the Cyprus question in an international forum, do there not exist between all States agreements, embodied in the United Nations Charter, laying down where and in which international organs such questions should be considered and how it is appropriate to do this without violating the Sovereignty of States? Yet at present everything is being done to prevent the discussion of the Cyprus question in the Security Council, on whose agenda it was placed at the request of the Government of Cyprus. And this is being done in spite of the fact that the Security Council is precisely the organ charged under the Charter of the United Nations with ensuring international peace and security.

Everything conceivable is being done at present in order to prevent the further consideration of the Cyprus question in the Security Council. The Government of Cyprus is being made the object of persuasion, it is being subjected to pressure. It is being threatened, military demonstrations are being conducted near the coasts of Cyprus, the flag of naval blockade is being waved, and meanwhile efforts of all kinds are being made to prevent a new appeal by the Government of Cyprus to he Security Council.

From all this it is evident that preference is being given to the consideration of the Cyprus question at closed conferences, where, having replaced the United Nations Charter by arbitrary methods, people are counting on breaking the resistance of a small State, the Republic of Cyprus, by means of pressure from outside.

Taking into account all the circumstances which have arisen in connection with plans for the organisation of military intervention against the Republic of Cyprus, I should like to state that the Soviet Government condemns such plans, just as it condemns in general the use of such methods in the practice of international relations. The Soviet Government appeals to all States concerned, and first to all the

permanent members of the Security Council who bear a responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, including the United States and Great Britain, to show restraint, to make a realistic and all-round assessment of all the consequences to which a military invasion of Cyprus could lead, to respect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus.

In making this appeal, which is dictated by care for the preservation and consolidation of peace and for ensuring the rights of peoples, I also start from the premise that the Soviet Union, although it is not immediately adjacent to the republic of Cyprus, cannot remain indifferent to the situation which is developing in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean, an area which is not so far removed from the Southern frontiers of the U.S.S.R., especially if account is taken of how the concept of distance has changed in our time.

I think that abstention from any plans which might make more acute the situation in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean and infringe the legitimate rights of the people of Cyprus to freedom and independence would be in accordance not only with the common interests of the Cypriots but with our interests. The leaders of the Great Powers have repeatedly stated that they are aiming at the reduction of international tension, irrespective of whether this concerns Central Europe, the Mediterranean or any other area. If this is so, then it seems to me that the whole of their weight, the whole international authority and influence of the leading Statesmen of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain, France and also of the States which are neighbours of Cyprus-Turkey and Greece-should now be used in order not to permit any further heating of the situation around Cyprus, in order to extinguish the passions which are being heated from abroad, and which have already exercised such a negative influence on the situation, and thereby to contribute to the consolidation of peace in this important area.

I should like, Mr. Prime Minister, to express the hope that your Government will correctly understand the motives by which the Soviet Government is guided in again raising its voice in defence of the just cause of the Republic of Cyprus and that it will take due account of the considerations set out in the present communication.

With respect,

(Sgd.) N. Khrushchev

Taken from the House of Commons, Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (HANSARD), Fifth Series-Volume 689, Comprising the Period 10th-21st February, 1964, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office) pp.108-111 (Written Answers)

II. Text of the Reply from President Johnson of the United States of America, 4 March 1964

I have carefully studied the letter you sent to me on February 7 concerning the situation in Cyprus, and I can only conclude that, whatever may have been the motivations of the Soviet government, your message was based upon a seriously mistaken appreciation both of the situation in Cyprus, and of the United States in agreeing to lend its assistance in improving that situation. The United States has been cooperating with the Governments concerned, including the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, for one purpose alone, that of assisting the Cypriots to restore a peaceful situation in Cyprus. I will, however, agree fully, Mr. Chairman, with one though that you expressed in your letter. It is certainly true that avoiding the aggravation of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is in the general interests of all of us. We should all strive not to inflame passions from without. I can assure you that this is the firm intention of my Government, and I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that it is also that of your Government.

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

Taken from a telegram from Washington to FO, No.883, 4 March 1964, FO 371/174747

III. Text of the Reply from Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos of Greece, 11 February 1964

I wish to thank you for your message of 7th instant regarding the developments in the question of Cyprus. The position of the Greek Government on this question is known, as well as its dedication to a policy of insuring the fundamental rights of the Cypriots and preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus. At the present stage and following the occurence of communalo strife our efforts are aimed at the pacification of the island, not through intervention, but through the granting of the international support and assistance requested for the above purpose by the Government of Cyprus.

(*Signed*) J. Pareskevopoulos

'Message dated 11 February 1964 from the Prime Minister of Greece to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the question of Cyprus' (Unofficial translation). Contained in 'Letter dated 15 February from the Representative of Greece to the Secretary-General', United Nations Security Council Document, S/5549

IV. Text of the Reply from Prime Minister İnönü of Turkey, 24 February 1964

Dear Mr. President,

I have received and studied the message dated February 7 which you sent via the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow. In spite of the comprehensive and open information given to the USSR by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its note dated January 29 about the nature of the Cyprus problem, the international Agreements which bear the signature of the Republic of Cyprus, the terrible events of the last months and Turkey's extremely patient and moderate behaviour based on the Agreements, I learn with astonishment and grief that your message dated February 7, without taking into account all these facts and the bloody assaults which are still continuing in Cyprus, makes several attacks on Turkey.

Mr. President,

Despite the cease-fire agreement which the Greek Cypriots signed on December 29, 1963, armed attacks on Turkish Cypriots are continuing. Almost every day, greek police in official uniform and EOKA bandits are attacking Turkish villages in the Turkish sectors of towns and, with no distinction for age or sex, are opening fire, burning Turkish houses and later destroying them. At present, over 15 thousand Turkish cypriots who have survived Greek attacks have left their homes, fields and flocks and squeezed themselves into the various Turkish Sectors. These refugees are living in tents, schools and cafés during the winter months under very hard material conditions and under the threat of fresh attack. On February 13, greek police and civilians held the Turkish Sector of Limasol [*sic*] under shell, bazooka and heavey machine-gun fire for 48 hours. Up to now, it has been proved that Turks in Limasol have been killed and wounded in large numbers. Continuous representations to the responsible Greek Cypriot administration in order to put an end to the bloodshed and guarantee security of life and property have unfortunately produced no result. Every day several Turks are killed and their houses destroyed.

The Government of the USSR is undoubtedly aware of the terrible events which are taking place before everyone's eyes and which have been publicised by the world press and television. It is seriously hard to understand why there is not the slightest hint, in your message, of the systematic attacks which are being made on innocent and defenceless people.

Mr. President,

There is no connection between the international force, whose despatch to Cyprus is being contemplated, and the aims and intentions which you mention in your message. The duty of the international force consists of guaranteeing complete security of life, property and personal liberty for all, of putting an end to today's terrorism and of creating the possibility of searching for a solution to the Cyprus problem for all the interested parties in a calm atmosphere.

It is a fact that Turkey has always carried out its relations with Cyprus scrupulously and in a manner conforming to the principles of existing contracts. It will be remembered that these contracts consist of the Agreements which came into existence after long and detailed negotiations to the mutual satisfaction of Turkey, Britain, Greece and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, in accordance with a motion, concerning the means of solving the Cyprus problem between the interested parties, which was proposed after many difficult discussions in the United Nations and accepted unanimouusly by the 13th General Assembly.

Among other things, these Agreements proposed and recognized reciprocal rights and obligations for both Greek and Turkish communities in the Island, and at the same time brought into existence the Republic of Cyprus to respect these principles and to guarantee them in a proper manner.

After the formation of the Republic of Cyprus within the framework of these Agreements, when its request for membership of the United Nations was being discussed, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, the internal Constitution and the special powers were submitted to the attention of the United nations and this request for membership was accepted unanimously.

Respect for international law and existing agreements and the peaceful solution of international disputes are the unchanging principles of Turkish foreign policy and will continue to be so.

My respects,

İsmet İnönü

This letter was originally submitted to the British Embassy in Ankara in Turkish. The Turkish Government apologised 'for the fact that it was not accompanied by a translation but explained that as the Russians had sent their note to them in Russian without even an unofficial translation, they had acted similarly and merely sent their note in Turkish.' FO 371/174748

APPENDIX D

First Draft of a Resolution prepared by the President of the Security Council in consultation with the six Non-Permanent Members of the Council

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

NOTING that the present situation in Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless further measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and seek out a durable solution;

BEARING IN MIND the duty of all Member States to respect, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus, and to refrain from the threat or use of force in respect to Cyprus;

RECALLING that Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertook to recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution;

CONSIDERING the positions taken by the parties in relation to these agreements;

1. APPEALS to all Member States to refrain from any action likely to worsen relations between the communities in Cyprus;

2. ASKS the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. CALLS UPON the two communities of Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4. RECOMMENDS the establishment of a peace-keeping force in Cyprus, the composition, size and command of which shall be determined by the Secretary-General. The commander of the force will report to the Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the force fully informed as well as the Security Council, to which the Secretary-General shall periodically report;

5. RECOMMENDS that the stationing of the force shall be for a period not exceeding three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents;

6. FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the Secretary-General designate in agreement with the Governments of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, a Mediator, who shall use his ggod offices, as appropriate, with the representatives of the local communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The Mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts:

7. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to provide, from the funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the renumeration and expenses of the Mediator and his staff.

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The Daily Express
The Guardian
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The Sunday Times
The Times
Keesing's Contemporary Archives
The Cyprus Mail (liberal/centrist Greek Cypriot Daily)

French Language:
Le Monde

Greek Language:
Ethniki ('Nation' right wing, pro-*enosis* Greek Cypriot daily)
Eleftheria ('Freedom' centre-right Greek Cypriot Daily)
Fileleftheros ('The Liberal' centrist Greek Cypriot daily)
Haravghi ('Dawn' Communist Party (AKEL) Greek Cypriot daily)
Makhi ('Battle' Nationalist, pro-*enosis* Greek Cypriot daily)
Mesemvrini ('Midday' right wing Greek daily)

Turkish Language:
Halkın Sesi ('Voice of the People' nationalist Turkish Cypriot Daily)
Milliyet ('Nationality' centre-right Turkish Daily)
Cumhurriyet ('Republic' Statist, centre-left Turkish Daily)
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4. Interviews

Dr. Thomas Adams	Former US State Department Official Author of '*US Army Area Handbook: Cyprus*' (1964) '*Cyprus: Between East and West*' (1968) '*AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*' (1971) 30 March 1995, Nicosia
Rauf R. Denktaş	President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber (1964) President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus/ Leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community 18 January 1996, Nicosia (Lefkoşa)
Chris Economides	Greek Cypriot Historian 26 March 1996, Nicosia
Dr. Necati Ertekun QC, OBE	Legal Adviser to the Constitutional Committee (1959) Special Adviser on Political Affairs to Mr. Denktaş 23 September 1996, Nicosia
Ahmet Gazioğlu	Special Advisor on Political Research and Enlightenment to Mr. Denktaş 18 January 1996, Nicosia (Lefkoşa)
Diometis Kyprianou	Greek Cypriot Militia Fighter, Koutrafas Area (1964) 16 January 1996, Nicosia
Spyros Kyprianou	Minister of Foreign Affairs (1964) President of the Republic of Cyprus (1977-88) 27 September 1996, Nicosia
Dr. Vassos Lyssarides	Vice-President Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (1964) Personal Physician to Archbishop Makarios Founder and Leader of EDEK, Socialist Party 25 September 1996, Nicosia
Zaim Necatigil	Author of '*The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*' (1989) 23 September 1996, Nicosia
Osman Örek	Minister of Defence (1964) Turkish Cypriot Representative, 1964 London Conference Lecturer in Law, East Mediterranean University 23 September 1996, Nicosia

Ozdemir Özgur	Official with Ministry of Finance (1964) Lecturer in Turkish Politics, University of Cyprus 30 August 1996, Nicosia
Tassos Papadopoulos	Minister of Labour (1964) A Greek Cypriot Representative at the London Conference (1964) 27 September 1996, Nicosia
Christodoulos Veniamin	District Officer Limassol (1964) Minister of Defence and the Interior (1978-88) Minister of the Interior (1988-92) 10 September 1996, Nicosia
Andreas Ziartides	General-Secretary PEO (1943-91) AKEL Politburo Member (1941-91) 20 September 1996, Nicosia