

Thesis Code on

Local Environmental Movements.

by

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Eliot College

A thesis submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the
University of Kent at Canterbury.

May 1997

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Abstract.

This thesis is based on a critical ethnography of “Local Environmental Movements” in and around East Kent. Starting from the office of the Canterbury and District Environmental Network, and moving through and beyond the C.D.E.N.s affiliated membership, my research led to participation in over three hundred meetings, protests and events, as well as to innumerable personal meetings, informal interviews, conversations, letters and discussions. In total I encountered 187 different groups and organisations that saw themselves as in some way part of an environmental movement locally. There was no natural unity of beliefs, ideals or action. This problematic issue for my research became the problematic addressed by my research.

I begin with a review of existing social theory and research into the dialectical relations between “agency and structure” (movement), “”society and nature” (environment) and between proximity and distance (locality). After an outline of existing case study research into Local Environmental Movements from Geography, Anthropology and Sociology, I set out the case for my qualitative, critical and participatory, ethnographic method.

The empirical research is presented in five chapters, each bringing together a number of themes, disputes and organisations. The five chapters are centred around the themes of: the network in general; translocal locations and dis-locations of locality; local activism within relations of autonomy and integration; local action within trans-local environmental actors; and party and network forms.

In the conclusions the empirical materials are brought together within a discussion of the three theoretical themes. The construction of the “local” (within translocal or “glocal” discourses and practices), and the “environmental” issue (Knowledge claims about ‘nature’, as well as Conservation, Ecological and Environmental relations to the non-human) are related to the issue of ‘movement formation’ within the field of my research.

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Local Environmental Movements.

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1. Introduction.

This thesis is based on a critical ethnography of “Local Environmental Movements” in and around East Kent. Starting from the office of the Canterbury and District Environmental Network, and moving out through the C.D.E.N.’s fifty (a fluctuating number) affiliated groups and organisations, and beyond, my empirical research, from 1993 to 1995, led to participation in over three hundred group meetings, protests and events, as well as innumerable personal meetings, conversations and discussions. In total I encountered 187 different groups and organisations that saw themselves as at least in part a part of an environmental movement locally. There was no natural unity of beliefs, ideals or action. This problematic issue for my research became the problematic addressed by my research.

1.1. The Time, the Place, the Thesis.

1.1.1. The Time.

My theoretical research began in October 1992, following the April 1992 United Nations Rio Conference on Environment and Development. The conference debated “man’s” relationship with the planet, focusing “world” attention on “Global” “Sustainable Development”. Nevertheless the outcome was largely stalemate between Northern industrial interests and Southern states over responsibility and resources (centrally “over-population” versus “over-consumption”, and Southern deforestation vs Northern pollution emissions). Largely deadlocked globally, the conference placed central emphasis on “Local Agenda 21”, local strategies for sustainability into the twenty first century. Great store was placed on involving local people, minorities, women, trade unionists and other “grass roots” actors. Local authorities, as government closest to the people, were given a deadline early in 1996 to have “consulted and involved” local people in developing “Local Agenda 21”, these being considered the cornerstone of future “Global” strategies for sustainability. My research into “Local Environmental Movements” analyses this focus of attention upon the local as site for the development of sustainability strategies.

1.1.2. The Place.

In December 1993 a national Greenpeace monitoring team intercepted and analysed a three

hundred tonne shipment of chemicals labelled as “chemicals for fertiliser production” at a Kent port. The cargo, from a Midlands chemical firm, was destined for transport from the Medway port to a third world destination, via a paper destination in Hong Kong. The shipment was in fact toxic waste including zinc, cadmium and arsenic. The port authority had neither the time nor the expertise to investigate all materials shipped through its jurisdiction, and anyway its legal obligation relating to “dangerous” cargoes mainly concerns products that are dangerous in transit (explosive or liable to poison on route). Only a globally organized movement could track the waste through localities largely unaware of, and ill equipped to deal with, them. The shipment, one of a large trade in toxic wastes from O.E.C.D. countries to the third world, highlighted the difficulty of locating resistance to global activities that threaten the environment at the level of the “grass roots”. Can the local be an effective or appropriate site for developing strategies for sustainability?

1.1.3. The Thesis.

The thesis takes the following format: the remainder of this introduction

- (1) will elaborate on the logic of each chapter and its relationship to the overall thesis.
- (2) Introduction to Movement Theory.
- (3) The Environment and Sociological Theory.
- (4) The Glocal. The Global and the Local.
- (5) “Local Environmental Movement” Case Studies: A Research Context.
- (6) Methodology and Method.
- (7) The Canterbury and District Environmental Network.
- (8) Moving Places.
- (9) Dis-locations.
- (10) Local Pressure.
- (11) Party/Networks: Green Party Politics in East Kent.
- (12) Conclusions.

This thesis attempts to demonstrate how the terms “local” “environmental” and “movement” are articulated in the political struggles of diverse groups in defining the site being contested, the problem at hand and the agents through whom solutions to those problems will be brought about. While not simply reducible to social construction within competing discourses of power, the environment is not strictly external from society. The

environment is only metaphorically a pure externality. Metaphors, masquerading as concepts, Nietzsche's "will to truth", naturalise truth claims.

1.2. The Review of the Literature.

The literature review outlines major developments within the three interrelated fields of study around which my thesis hinges, relations between local and global, between social stability and social change, and between human and non-human. The three reviews are then followed by an outline of relations between them emerging from an array of case studies into "Local Environmental Movements". This review contextualizes the themes which my empirical research address, whilst at the same time problematizing the belief that the themes can be straightforwardly operationalized as empirical categories or variables within a pre-emptive hypothetico-deductive research agenda.

It is essential to question many common sense conceptions about what a "social movement" is, what brings movements into existence, and what might help, hinder, or even count as success. Chapter 2 outlines the state of social movement theory both to outline advances in our understanding and to overcome obstacles encountered and often put in place by previous theory. After a brief outline of the largely redundant Mass Society Theory (with its Weberian elite theory overtones) and the equally flawed functionalist Collective Behaviour Theory (with its Durkheimian account of "social pathology") (Section 2.2.1), I elaborate a number of still useful paradigms, though also highlighting their weaknesses and limitations. These are the Resource Mobilization Theory (e.g. Oberschall, Olson, McCarthy and Zald, McAdam), the Political Opportunity Structure Models (of Kitschelt and Kriesi et al), and Political Competition Theory (e.g. Rootes) and the New Social Movement perspectives of Touraine, Habermas and Melucci (among others). Each of the four paradigms gives priority to particular aspects of movement development: resource mobilization theories to the instrumental rationality of movements; political opportunity structure theory to the comparative analysis of the conduciveness of different "political systems" to movement development, form and success; political competition theory to more longitudinal analysis of changing degrees of conduciveness within political systems; and new social movement theories to the formation of new cultural sites of resistance and the new social formations in which they arise. These specific theoretical questions provide useful dimensions for

empirical work, though my research suggests limitations to general theory when dealing with an issue as complex as “local environmental movements”. Beginning within a particular network, and moving within and beyond its boundaries, I do not begin with a prior definition of either the essential centrality of a movement or its necessary boundaries. The relationship between social stasis and social movement, and the actors engaged within this dialectic, is explored, rather than prescribed.

The attempts of classical sociologists like Marx, Weber and Durkheim to separate the level of social explanation from those of the physical, chemical and biological (and also the psychological) follow the lead set by Comte and were indicative of the emerging industrial society which their work was both part of and an attempt to explain. Contemporary social theory continues and questions their work. Writers are now addressing themselves to a number of analytically distinct themes which circulate around contemporary awareness that industrial society has not abolished the natural world (incorporating it fully “as man’s [sic] external body” as Marx suggested), nor separated itself from the natural. “Man’s” intervention within the non-human realm is seen as creating unforeseen consequences that must both be recognised and addressed in social theory and practice. The themes can be separated, analytically, into four categories; the pure rational (knowledge), the practical (instrumental interest), the ethical, and the aesthetic. Chapter 4 addresses these four themes.

Social theory has increasingly come to question the neutrality and objectivity of pure rational and scientific knowledge, raising the possibility of relativism against the naive faith in human knowledge characteristic of the enlightenment. The consequences for the “environmental movement”, and the role of the “environmental movement” in raising such issues is highly contradictory, the critique of “objective science” being a weapon in the hands of both environmentalists and those who defend the status quo. In this regard I address the work of Mary Douglas and Ulrich Beck as well as Mannheim and Bloor.

The increased concern over the unintended consequences of technological development, and the increased ability to manipulate and exploit nature, has placed a wedge into accounts of human instrumental knowledge, between present strategies for achieving economic “development” and concerns over their “sustainability”. A central aspect of the environmental movement has been fear that human action in relation to the non-human may

be detrimental to humans. I refer to this instrumental environmentalism as “Environmentalism” with a big E, as opposed to Ecology and conservation, outlined below.

The view that humanity represents the sole source of moral value went hand in hand with the industrial society’s self-confidence in revolutionising both the social world and in transforming nature to accord with its interests. The growing recognition that the non-human has not been eliminated, and industrial societies’ scientific undermining of ideas of man’s spiritual separation from nature has led to wide ranging questions concerning the ethics of “man’s” relation to the non-human. This dimension of the environmental movement I refer to as the “Ecological”, with a capital E. Ecological theory questions the ethics of “man’s” behaviour towards the non-human and asks whether there are lessons to be learnt from that natural world for the organisation of society. Whilst in line with proto-sociologists such as Rousseau and Montesquieu, this view radically challenges the legacy of the sociological classics. Here I address “Deep Ecology”, “eco-centrism”, animal rights and eco-feminism.

Finally the “Conservation” wing of the environmental movement seeks to attribute value to the non-human neither for its instrumental value to humans nor for its intrinsic value beyond its relation to humans. Such value is said to lie in the aesthetic value of nature, in both its beautiful and sublime qualities, able to move humanity beyond individual selfishness towards a higher state of being. Whilst the debate around the aesthetic has gone on since the ethical and the instrumental were separated by the scientific and industrial revolutions, and before, it takes on a new significance in its relation to the contemporary environmental movement. These analytically divergent relations to nature, while not intrinsically antagonistic, lack natural unity. Their actual relation (in articulation, opposition or in detachment) requires empirical analysis.

From its beginnings, sociology, in its attempts to explain the transformations wrought by the rise of industrial capitalism, focused attention on relations between face to face interactions between people and wider stretches of human interaction mediating the (often misconceived) immediate. Tönnies’ *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, Durkheim’s division of labour and the possibility of organic solidarity, Weber’s rationalization and bureaucratization thesis, Simmel’s discussion of the stranger, money and urban life, as well as Marx’s analysis of the

commodity within capitalism all address the intensified interpenetration of the “local” and “trans-local” within modernity. In chapter 4 I look at literature on “community”, the shift in theory from urban ecology to urban politics, from urban villagers to affluent workers and from housing classes to a nation of home owners. Local state autonomy (or lack of it) and the socio-economic destructuring /restructuring of localities, regions, states and wider areas is then examined. Finally, contemporary debates about globalization are shown to continue old debates. Chapter 4 locates locality within sociological theory.

The relationship between the three theoretical axes have been addressed by researchers in a number of social science fields using case study methods. In chapter 5 I begin with Steven Yearley’s (1995 and 1996) use of “case studies” to build up an account of the relationship between environmental movements and “globalization”. I outline weaknesses in this rather ambitious attempt, and go on to elaborate on these themes using case studies drawn from geography (i.e. Kimber and Richardson (eds) 1974, Gregory 1971, and Blowers, 1980, 1984 and 1991 et al), anthropology (i.e Milton 1996, Peace 1993, Prato 1993 and Harries-Jones 1993) and sociology (Jamison and Eyerman et al 1990 and Eyerman and Jamison 1991). These particular studies highlight a range of issues and themes that contextualise my own ethnographic research. Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) cognitive approach to movements in general is then assessed for its attempt to outline an open “research agenda”. Their approach raised the dual themes of contingency within movement development and the possibility of formulating a general theoretical model of movement unity and diversity, between movement fields, across time and across space. I suggest, however that there are serious limitations to their account. I conclude this chapter with a provisional account of unity and difference patterns within the worker’s/socialist movement, the women’s/feminist movement, the anti-racist/civil rights movement and the environmental/green movement. This will be based upon Kristeva’s trichotomy of identity, difference and transformation.

1.3. Chapter 6: Methodology.

How should such an agenda, on relations of identity, difference and transformation /synthesis within “local environmental movements”, be researched? In this chapter I outline the components of my own methodology; critical ethnography, participatory action research, grounded theory, as well as framing and network analysis. This attempt at a synthesis of qualitative methods is then oriented to the practical task of conducting a case study of local

environmental movements in East Kent.

1.4. Empirical Research (Chapters 7-11).

The empirical research is presented in five chapters, each bringing together a number of themes, disputes and organisations. The five chapters are centred around the themes of: the network in general (chapter 7); translocal locations and dis-locations of locality (chapter 8); local activism within relations of autonomy and integration (chapter 9); local action within trans-local environmental actors (chapter 10); and party and network forms (chapter 11).

The office of the Canterbury and District Environmental Network was where I began my empirical research. Chapter 7 gives an introduction to the network, the initial questionnaire I negotiated with the network coordinators, the problems with it, and the movement of the research, after that point, out into the many groups and organizations within and around the network who were, in one sense or another, seen as part of the “environmental movement” locally.

In chapter 8 the themes of local agenda 21, transport and conservation aesthetics/tourism are brought together to elaborate the theme of the translocal processes that construct the “local”, its interests, identity and its responsibilities/powers. The specific issues addressed are, firstly, the process leading to and from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, at which such great emphasis was placed on locality in the tackling of “Global” environmental problems. Secondly, the location of place within integrated systems of place displacement, i.e. transportation infrastructures (a powerful metaphor for the abolition of the binary of local and global within glocality that runs through this thesis). Finally conservation aesthetic themes are addressed with regard to the location of the local within the “tourist gaze”.

In chapter 9 the issues of Animal Rights, University Greens and Local Economic Trading/Transfer Systems are brought together to develop the theme of how local issues and the groups that seek to generate and articulate them relate or fail to relate to the wider discourses and practices of translocal actor networks whose resource are crucial in local group attempts the oppose other translocal groups. Particular attention is paid to potential misconceptions over the singularity of single issues in single issue campaigns, and over the glocality of local issues, activities and activists in “local” environmental campaigns.

In chapter 10 material on Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth is brought together, to address the relationship between the so called “grass roots” and processes of movement institutionalization. Habermas’s discussion of system/lifeworld is drawn on here to highlight the dialectic of autonomy and integration, the false dichotomy between local agency and global structure. Parallels with the research of Peter Harries-Jones, on the dialectic of local and trans-local within Canadian Greenpeace activism are also drawn out.

Chapter 11 addresses the relationship between party and network through the study of the Green Party and its relationships with others within the environmental movement (and beyond). The tension between party and network is forcefully illustrated in the case study of the campaign against the Criminal Justice Bill/Act, in which a wide range of environmental organisations, left wing parties and groups, as well as anarchic and alternative cultural vanguards failed to organise (or perhaps successfully disorganised) themselves in the face of state repression.

1.5. Chapter 12. Conclusions.

Here the empirical material will be brought together within a discussion of the three theoretical themes of local, environment and movement construction. The construction of the “local” (within translocal or “glocal” discourses and practices), and the construction of the “environmental” issue (Knowledge claims about ‘nature’, as well as Conservation, Ecological and Environmental relations to the non-human) are addressed first and then related to the issue of ‘movement formation’ within the field of my research. Given the insights and limitations of resource mobilization, political opportunity structure and political contingency theory, the empirical material will be discussed in relation to the work of Gramsci and Melucci (on the party and network/state and civil society dialectic), Sartre and Touraine (on the question of unity, difference and totality within the “movement”), and Marcuse/Habermas (on the system/lifeworld relationship). Finally the empirical orientation towards “movement” unity and difference, by means of framework and network analysis, and the more theoretical orientation towards “movement” identity, difference/opposition and totality/transformation are brought together to set a provisional agenda for future research.

2. Introduction to Movement Theory.

As Jean Cohen (1985) suggests, the Resource Mobilization perspective has tended to focus attention on questions of “how” movements are built, maintained and organized, while New Social Movement theory has tended to focus on questions of “why” new forms of protest and radical identity formation have emerged in the present period. Between micro and macro, political process theory and theories of “political opportunity structures” have adopted the comparative or meso theoretical level of analysis. In this chapter I outline these theories and review their uses and limitations, beginning briefly with mass society and collective behaviour, moving onto resource mobilization and political opportunity theory. Then I give a developmental account of European perspectives on movements from the early 20th century left (social democrats and communists), to the new left and finally to the “new social movements” and theories of them. In each case the theories need to be located in their social context, the European experience of the polarity between capitalism and communism across the short 20th century. I conclude with a brief fractured synthesis, an attempt to draw together, at least partially, the micro mobilization and the macro theoretical accounts.

2.1. Social Movement Theory.

2.1.1. Mass Society and Collective Behaviour Theory.

Mass Society Theory has its origins in the “structure of feeling” (Williams 1981) of European bourgeois minds facing the revolutionary masses. While 19th century writers and critics displayed compassion for the poor individual they reeled in horror at the collected mass of the poor rising up. Fear of the dislocation, alienation and de-moralisation of the urban masses lies behind the theory and it is no surprise that the theory’s most vocal exponents in the 19th century were French (Tocqueville, 1962 and 1966 and LeBon 1960) and in the 20th German (Mannheim 1948, Arendt 1962, Adorno et al 1969). Tönnies’ (1955) society of lonely strangers was the site of LeBon’s susceptible crowd, a mass just waiting to lose their heads and follow a leader.

The systematisation of this structure of feeling by Kornhauser (1959) sets out a grid based on two axes, the accessibility of elites to non elites and of non-elites to elites. Kornhauser

calls the society where both are inaccessible (traditional society) “communalistic”; where elites are accessible but masses are not, he uses the term pluralistic, the reverse being a totalitarian society. Where elites and non-elites are highly accessible to each other Kornhauser sees what he calls the “mass society”, a society, he believes that will easily collapse into totalitarianism. It is the loss of distance between the governed and the governing, the politicization of all things and the decline of intermediate institutions that is said to lay the conditions in mass society for the rise of totalitarian government. The thrust of the masses into direct political life de-stabilises rational government, the irrational masses can only operate with primitive and massified conceptions, so giving rise of demagogues.

Halebsky (1969) reviews the evidence to show the rational basis of mass protest. William Allen’s (1965) study of Fascism’s rise in a German Town showed how, far from being the mobilisation of dispossessed masses, the Nazi Party build itself up within the “small platoons” of middle class life, the very institutions mass society theory sees threatened by the rise of mass society and politics. As Maurice Pinard points out (1968), it is not isolation and fragmentation that produces political action, it is the fear of it in the resourced and relatively integrated. The very groups who felt squeezed by big business and big labour were the agents of Fascism within civil society. The same structure of feeling that produced mass society theory, with its elitist contempt and fear, also produced totalitarianism.

Halebsky points out that while Mass Society theorists opposed “mass society” to “pluralism”, (accessibility to elites by non elites without its reverse) they all suggest highly elitist forms of pluralism so as to preserve those “fit to govern” from destabilizing “mass politics”. This paradox is best exemplified in Weber’s (1991a and b) inability to resolve the contradiction set up by Michels (1959) that democracy needs bureaucracy. Weber wanted democracy to regulate bureaucracy but wanted an elite form of democracy to avoid the violent “politics of absolute ends” that participatory democracy would entail. Thus he advocated professional politics over mass participation, though aware this would encourage bureaucratic accommodation and oligarchy. His solution was charismatic leadership.

Collective behaviour theory draws more on Durkheim’s (1970) theory of social pathology than on Weber. The social system is viewed as rational, the state its highest agent. Non-institutional protest is to be explained in terms of the pathological conditions of its emergence

rather than in the understanding of its actors (Pakulski 1991). The term has its origin in the Chicago School. Robert Park (1967, p. 226) defines collective behaviour as; “the behaviour of individuals under the influence of an impulse that is common and collective, an impulse in other words, that is the result of social interaction.” Applied to Fascist politics Talcott Parsons (1942, pp. 138-47) argues movements can be judged as progressive or reactionary on the basis of their stance towards modernization. After world war two America became the template of the “modern” and rational. Challenges to it could only be understood as irrational “short circuits” within a system in need only of minor engineering at home and major Americanization abroad.

The classic “Collective Behaviour Theory” is Neil Smelser’s “The Theory of Collective Behaviour” (1962), which views social movements as irrational behavioural responses to “structural strains” within the modernising process of differentiation, change and upheaval. Smelser uses a value added model of six stages, each stage being the precondition for the next. Firstly is “structural conduciveness”, the general “background noise” of modernity, the wheels of change shifting the ground slowly from under everyone’s feet. Second is “structural strain” particularly intense instances of disruption within the lives of people thrown up by social change. Thirdly is “collective redefinition”, a contagion-like theory of how a group comes to experience a disruption as a grievance. The theory assumes the status quo is legitimate and so tends to view grievance formation as largely an irrational form of crowd psychology. It is at this point that orderly publics may give way to irrational crowds especially in the presence of the fourth step in the value added process, the existence of “precipitating factors”, tangible events that get taken up within the “collective redefinition” as evidence of the injustice of the situation and hence the legitimacy of their grievance. Only after all this does Smelser introduce the role of organisation and formal communication, and this fifth stage is only introduced as a precondition to the sixth which is the “institutional response” of rational authorities to the collective behaviour. As numerous critics have pointed out, such an account fails to consider the role of leadership, and of organisation in the formation of “grievances” because it assumes the behaviour is not rational action but simply a behaviour thrown up by structural pathologies in need of address by the institutional mechanisms of social engineering. It is against these two models that more recent and more useful theories of social movements have developed.

2.1.2. Resource Mobilization Theory and its Critics.

McCarthy and Zald (1973, p. 1214) argue in their seminal outline: “Recent empirical work... has led us to doubt... the assumption of a close link between pre-existing discontent and generalized beliefs in the rise of social movement phenomena”. Prior theories sought to understand Fascism and Bolshevism as irrational responses of dislocated masses thrown up by the social, economic, military and cultural ruptures in Europe in the early twentieth century. Explanations of such non-liberal, non-representative and non-democratic politics were initiated in the interwar years but, after the second world war, developed against a background of unprecedented social stability and economic growth within Western states. Many declared an end of ideology in the West and a high degree of “consensus” reflecting rational conduct of social life. Non-institutional political action was marginal.

The quiescence noted in Bell’s writings on the 1950s gave way in the 1960s to radical political and cultural action not easily fitted into the pigeon holes developed by structural functionalism. Jenkins (1983, p. 528) argues that “of the wide ranging effects that social movements of the 1960’s had on sociology, one of the more significant was the re-orientation of the study of social movements”. Myra Marx Ferree (1992, p. 29-30) writes: “The judgement that all earlier work was tainted by an unacceptable premise of participants “irrationality”- and the derogatory view of movements this implied- inspired researchers to look for models that would instead concur with Michael Schwartz’s postulate that social movement participants are at least as rational as those who study them (Morris 1989).”

A first principle of resource mobilization theory was to disentangle discontent and action. Any connection had to be mediated through the vehicle of conscious and reflexive organization. For a grievance to become an active focus of collective mobilization it required articulation.¹ The central tenet of collective behaviour theory is rejected by McCarthy and Zald (1973 p. 1215): “We are willing to assume (Turner and Killian [1972] call the assumption extreme)... that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply grass roots support for a movement if the movement is efficiently organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group.”

¹Oberschall (1973): “Ideas and beliefs that have a revolutionary potential are usually present and are available for use by a protest leadership, sentiments of opposition, of being wronged, are also frequently present in the lower orders...”

Jenkins (1983, p. 528) combines the organizational and rational dimensions of the new perspective in his five point outline of the resource mobilization perspective:

- a) Movement actions are rational responses to costs and rewards of different lines of action.
- b) The goals of a movement are defined through conflicts of interest.
- c) “grievances generated by such conflict are sufficiently ubiquitous that the formation and mobilization of movements depend on changes in resources, group organization, and opportunities for collective action.”
- d) The development of movements requires the strong role of “centralized formally structured movement organizations”. This is particularly true in the modern context.²
- e) In the light of the above points “the success of movements is largely determined by strategic factors and the political process in which they are enmeshed.”

At the very heart of the R.M. perspective is the supposedly universal “problem of the free rider”, given prominence by the economist Mancur Olson (1965). Olson studied trade union organization and the problematic relationship between individual participation and collective outcomes. Friedman and McAdam (1992, p. 159) define the free rider paradox as follows: “The free rider problem means that many people benefit from a successful collective action, and only participants will bear the cost of failure.”

If calculated purely in terms of individual gains and sacrifices, the rational individual of Olson’s utilitarianism free rides on the collective participation of others whilst using personal resources to maximise individual advantage. Resource mobilization theorists study how movement organizations and entrepreneurs overcome free riding, using the term “selective incentive” to describe the modes of individual reward allocation by which individuals are motivated to participate within the struggle for collective outcomes. Whilst Zald (1992, p. 332) points out: “Different contributors to resource mobilization research may well specify different core assumptions of the perspective” a core unity remained.³

² See also Tilly (1978).

³Zald (1992, p. 332-3) outlines the core heuristics (after Lakatos’ (1978)):

“First, behaviour entails cost; therefore grievances or deprivation do not automatically or easily translate into social movement activity...”

“Second, mobilization of resources may occur from within the aggrieved group but also from many other sources.”

“Third, resources are mobilized and organized; thus organizing activity is crucial.”

Individual cost/benefit calculation permeates the perspective. McCarthy and Zald (1973, p. 1216) admit “an explicit, if crude supply and demand model is sometimes applied to the flow of resources toward and away from specific movements.” Whilst McCarthy and Zald are the most explicit advocates of utilitarianism, micro-economic theory stands behind talk of rational choice and cost/benefits of movement participation.

The perspective adopted “methodological individualism” against earlier theories of de-individualization and pejorative “crowd psychology”. Potential supporters are compared to individual consumers being persuaded to give their resources to competing movements. Movement activists are entrepreneurs and organization is said to mirror the technical rationality and bureaucratic efficiency of profit making firms. However in adopting such a conception of the rational individual the R.M. account “normalizes” movements within bourgeois liberal conceptions of reason and individualism, and is therefore unable to account for some features of social movements that fit badly with the liberal world view which many movements are explicitly struggling against.⁴

As Jenkins (1983) points out McCarthy and Zald’s model best describes American 1970s public interest movements which were single issue campaigns pursuing highly centralized and instrumental pressure group tactics to reform specific policies. These movements were founded by dynamic individuals, appealed to potential supporters as isolated individuals and had only limited and specific goals and could therefore be judged by simple criteria of success or failure in a way that more general and less instrumental movements could not. Advantages stand against limited generalisability.

While prioritizing instrumental rationality, great emphasis is given to “conscience constituencies”, as essential to social movements. “Those who would benefit directly from S.M.O. goal accomplishment we shall call potential beneficiaries.” McCarthy and Zald (1973, p. 1221). However movements must attract “Conscience Adherents” without purely

“Fourth, the cost of participation may be raised or lowered by state and societal supports or repression.”

“Fifth,... There is no direct or one-to-one correspondence between amount of mobilization and movement success.”

⁴ McCarthy and Zald write (1973, p. 1229): “Treating Social Movement Organization target goals as products, then, and adherence as demand we can apply a simple model to this competitive process. Demand may be elastic...”

self interested motives. Potential beneficiary constituencies tend to be non-elites whilst conscience adherents tend to be elites, at least in relative resource terms. Those that need most have least. Movements require “elites” to mobilize resources necessary to collective action. McCarthy and Zald (p. 1225) write: “Regardless of the resources available to potential beneficiary adherents, the larger the amount of resources available to conscience adherents the more likely is the development of S.M.O.’s [social movement organizations] and S.M.I.’s [social movement industries] that respond to preferences for change.” They are forced to admit such a hypothesis “turns Olson (1965) on his head” (p. 1226).⁵

Ferree’s critique begins by recapping core assumptions; “(1) that social movement activities are not spontaneous and disorganized and (2) that social movement participants are not irrational” (1992, p.29). However valid these two hypotheses may be, the resource mobilization perspective, she points out, is flawed. She writes: “The absence of a plausible account of values, grievances and ideology in the basic model... has increasingly been recognized as a problem, even by researchers who see themselves as working within the approach” (1992, p. 29). Without a sufficiently developed account of values and motivation selective incentive becomes a tautology, whatever motivates the individual to participate is so labelled. This acts to individualize and instrumentalise motive, reducing ethical values to utilitarian value (derived from Olson). Mueller argues: “In contrast with the economistic rational actor of early resource mobilization theory, the New Social Movement actor both actively constructs and is constructed by a world of social meanings rooted in specific historic contexts and... identities” (1992, p. 29).

The Olsonian foundations of R.M.T., drawn from the micro-economic realm of homo-oeconomicus, cannot provide a realistic account of how individuals act in their world, or experience it. “Conventional microeconomics defines rationality with reference to a simplifying but misleading postulate, namely that individuals will always act to maximize their personal benefits and reduce their costs” (Ferree 1992, p. 30). Charles Perrow (1986, p. 41) calls this account the invasion of the body snatchers, a one dimensional and unrealistic conception of human rationality. Value rational action and the commitment to a defence of thought through principles are either given little attention or are otherwise wedged un-

⁵Why beneficiary constituents free ride while conscience constituents don’t is not explained.

helpfully into the pigeonholes of a utilitarian calculus.

“Moral behaviour distinctively expressed the *affirmation* of a value rather than its accomplishment or consumption” (Ferree 1992, p. 32). It cannot be assumed that actors assess the “value” of participation purely by technically rational criteria of means ends calculation. **External** goal orientation certainly plays a significant part in the emergence and development of movements but the participation of individuals within movements also involves the dimension of **internal** value consistency. Because human beings live in complex networks of social interaction, individual identity cannot always be reduced to economic self interest. Moral bonds of solidarity as well as strategic calculations of self interest regulate the individual’s relationship to society.⁶

While prior theories denigrated collective behaviour for supposedly lacking rule-governed organizational structures, the resource mobilization approach attempted to rehabilitate movements as rational and rule governed, instrumental and organized in line with the rationality of self interested individuals. The central binary distinction within the collective behaviour model, that between the rule governed individualized public, and the unruly de-differentiated crowd, is not negated by resource mobilization theorists. R.M. theorists only move social movements from one box to the other. The logic of liberal individualism retains its priority over community and solidarity.

The communitarian impulse emerges from ideals of solidarity and community. Movements cannot be understood from the point of view of instrumental individualism. As Ferree (1992, p. 46) points out: “Many, but not all, S.M.O.s [social movement organizations] struggle to maintain a value rational structure, in which people are treated holistically, division of labour is minimized, and authority is vested in the group as a whole.” This mode of organization stands at odds with the technically rational modern organizations, to which resource mobilization theorists often conflate social movements.

Breines (1982) argues 1960s New Leftism tempered strategic impulses with organizational forms that were “prefigurative”. Movements not only aimed to challenge hierarchical power,

⁶Ferree (1992, p. 39) asks: “how can the individualistic view of strategic rationality deal with the fact that some people would apparently prefer to be tortured or killed themselves than to contribute to the suffering or death of family or friends?”

they sought alternatives, participatory forms of democracy, grass roots action and local initiative; bureaucratic division of tasks replaced whenever possible by holistic forms of cooperation. The resource mobilization perspective's narrow conception of rationality forced it either to neglect these distinctive "value rational" phenomena or to reduce them to the level of expedience. Whilst R.M. accounts rightly point to material conditions making certain actions possible for certain groups at certain times, this account only explains how certain actions are possible. Virtue is rendered necessity. Solidarity can be understood as a latent or potential resource if we move beyond an excessively individualized conception of movement potential constituencies. Solidarity may also be developed through participation and can therefore be an emergent resource within movements. As Friedman and McAdam (1992) point out, the formation of a valued identity is a social practice not an individual affair.⁷

Solidarity and the affirmation of a collective identity, a shared sense of what is good in itself, undermines resource mobilization's straw man, the calculating egoist. Gamson (1975, 1992) argues collective identity "is central in understanding people's willingness to invest emotionally in the fate of some emergent collective entity and to take personal risks on its behalf" (1992, p. 60). "[T]he free rider problem presents a radically individualized view of both costs and rewards. Well socialized actors are not likely to be insensitive to the costs their actions impose on others" (Ferree 1992, p. 38).

Cohen (1985) contrasts the R.M. focus on strategic utilitarianism with the European N.S.M. (new social movements) theories focus on identity formation through collective action. "The problem [with R.M.T.] arises however, in applying this model to movements of personal change in which expressive actions are intertwined with rational instrumental actions... The central concern of the resource mobilization model is the link between collective interests and the pooling of resources. Collective interests are assumed to be relatively unproblematic and to exist prior to mobilization, instead of being socially constructed and created by the mobilization process. The critique of Olson however, suggests collective interests are often emergent" (Jenkins 1983 p. 549).

As L. van Zoonen (1992) pointed out about media coverage of the women's liberation

⁷ They write: "One of the most powerful motivations of individual action is the desire to confirm through behaviour a cherished identity." (p. 169-70).

movement in Holland in the early 1970's, an instrumental conception of politics made it impossible for the press to come to terms with consciousness raising as a form of political self transformation. The utilitarian slant put on the concept of rationality must be understood as part of a broader social and political environment. It must be asked just how this conception of rationality became dominant. Community, belonging, esteem and worth through the recognition and recognizing of others cannot be measured by the accountants slide-rule. Gamson (1992, p. 57) writes "when people bind their fate to the fate of a group they feel personally threatened when the group is threatened".⁸

Sociologists should beware of economists bearing gifts. Rational choice models introduce bourgeois individualism into the study of social movements, an outlook many movements rebel against. European N.S.M. theorists such as Melucci (1988), Offe (1987), Touraine (1985), and Habermas (1987) all begin their analysis of non-conventional political action where R.M.T. breaks down, i.e. with the role of values, identity and solidarity.

2.1.3. Mobilization, Political-Opportunity-Structure, Competition and Contingency.

The "Political Opportunity Structures" model is outlined by van der Heijden et al (1991): "In our opinion, the country specific trajectories of [new social movements] development are determined to a large extent by country specific political preconditions summarized in the term "political opportunity structure" (p. 3). These "structures" are "formal institutional structures", "informal procedures and dominant strategies" for relating to non-conventional political actors, and finally the "configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the challengers" (Kriesi et al 1992, p. 220). Structural features ("latent impact potentials") are the relative receptiveness of states to change-oriented movements. Environmental factors crucially define "strategic options" available to challengers. Comparative analysis outlines variance in "structures" by which movement action repertoires and success are explained. "Comparison can show that political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment" (1986, p. 58).

⁸"One Historically constructed value central to the rational choice perspective and especially significant for social movement theory is the false dichotomy imposed on reason and emotion... Hirschman (1977 [1985]) documents in detail how the accounts of behaviour that arose after capitalism employed this division uniquely to exempt self interest from being a value or expressing an emotion" (Ferree 1992).

Kitschelt counterposes middle range comparative analysis to Marxist macro-generalization and micro-structural accounts of resource mobilization and value change. However attempts to overcome blanket macro and micro accounts of social movements by defining states as bounded units of comparative analysis, understates both internal political fluidity of intra-state politics, and growing trans-national processes undermining nation states as coherent levels of analysis. While the state may, at certain times, and on certain issues, be the appropriate level of analysis, this cannot always be assumed. The limits of P.O.S. theory illustrate the importance of my methodological approach to “Local Environmental Movements”. The appropriate level of analysis cannot be prescribed in advance.

Kitschelt’s (1986) study of anti-nuclear movements in the United States, Sweden, West Germany and France builds up a two by two grid, of relatively open/closed political structures, and relatively strong/weak states in enforcing decisions once adopted. Open regimes tend to assimilate protest while closed regimes exclude or repress new movement demands. Kitschelt argues openness depends on four factors (closure on their opposites): i) number of political parties, ii) legislative autonomy from the executive, iii) plural channels of access to state, iv) high levels of viability for political coalition building. Strong states are better able to put new policies into effect. Kitschelt outlines three factors: i) degree of state centralization over federal autonomy, ii) state control over macro-economic activity, iii) executive state is not countered by an effectively autonomous judicial system. Thus Kitschelt (p. 64) proposes a two by two grid of political opportunity structures:

Inputs	Open	Closed
outputs Strong	Sweden	France
Weak	United States	West Germany

This is then shown to correspond to movement action strategies (p. 69). Difficulties lie in Kitschelt’s concentration on formal political structures - as open/closed, strong/weak - and their use as independent causal variables explaining movement strategies and success. Kitschelt’s structural features of output and input are themselves “open” to other factors effecting relations to protest politics. Openness is said to be a feature of political systems where the legislature has a degree of autonomy from the executive. This tends to be a feature of non-corporatist forms of government, where politicians are not bound by complex

compacts with other parties, business and trade union bodies. However it is in those regimes that state control over macro economic activity is lowest, and so output structures are weakest. Equally, the plurality of channels of access to state decision making that render movement issues a better chance of entering the mainstream go hand in hand with the decentralized state (such as a federal system) and the autonomy of the judiciary that are said to weaken implementation of movement demands once taken up. Formal political factors said to aid movement's development, viewed from another angle, inhibit them.

Kitschelt remarks elsewhere (1988) on the differential development of left libertarian political parties: they are most successful in the very corporatist political systems they most oppose. Similarly with input and output structures he demonstrates advantages on the one hand of what on the other are detrimental. Kitschelt's focus is on formal state "structures", rather than the social and political substance filling them. While right about the different forms of specific nations' "anti-nuclear power movements" tactics, his method masks the tendency for levels of "openness" and "closure" to vary (as Rucht (1990) points out in his re-evaluation of anti-nuclear movements in France, West-Germany and the United States). "Political Opportunity Structures" are vehicles through which fluctuating, and nationally distinct social, political and economic interests struggle and don't fit neat tables.

America's relative openness to the anti-nuclear lobby in the late 1970's did not reflect "intrinsic" openness of fragmented two party systems. "Closure" to the Anti-Vietnam war movement preceding the Carter period demonstrated "openness" as only "openness" to ideas complementary to elite interests. The Carter period was relatively open on nuclear power in the period of "detente". As Kitschelt points out, the Reagan years closed this window of openness. Similarly, in reverse sequence, the German political system that excluded anti-nuclear politics during the 1966-9 S.P.D./C.D.U. and then the S.P.D./F.D.P. coalition governments, saw the rise of an independent green party as a coherent leadership forum for environmental issues, in particular the anti-nuclear movement, in the 1980's. Such examples illustrate what Rootes (1996) calls "political contingencies". He cites the British Green Party's 15% vote in the 1989 European election, and the success, and form, of the British Anti-Poll Tax campaign as similar illustrations of contingent factors.

Whilst Kitschelt (1986) rightly points out the distinctive histories of France's fifth republic

and post-war Sweden, formal differences are not enough to explain the responses in each country on the issue of nuclear power. It is not a natural characteristic of corporatist states to take a pro-nuclear stance (see Austria). The explanation of France's nuclear "consensus", between communists, socialists and bourgeois parties, lies in its lack of energy alternatives and its legacy of invasion and occupation. Sweden's neutral military posture and alternative energy sources render the anti-nuclear agenda more acceptable. To look at Sweden's relatively open consensus-building polity at the level of "formal structures" is not enough. Kitschelt (1986, p.60) wrongly suggests the nuclear threat was the same for each country.

Though movements clearly act differently depending upon opportunities and constraints, it is essential to understand how specific economic and social conditions condition the conduciveness of formal political structures over issues. Correlations between what Kitschelt sees as intrinsic features of political structures and movement strategies is not a demonstration of his argument that "P.O.S.s" condition movements. It is more useful to note that "P.O.S.s" are themselves conditioned by social and economic conflicts. Kitschelt mistakes correlation for causation. Contingent factors are objectified as structurally determined, while nationally specific characteristics of a more deep rooted and enduring nature are reduced to formal political processes.

However comparative analyses can provide valuable insights. As Rüdiger and Lowe (1986) point out: "Extrapolations of political action based on attitude surveys exclude an adequate appreciation of the context in which actions do or do not occur. Where authors of the post-materialism school have tried to relate their results to actual political developments, they have done so in the most impressionistic manner illustrating the supposed meaning of particular survey results" (1988 p. 264). Values and value change do not explain action. While most new social movement activists have "postmaterialist" values, so called, the reverse is not the case. States with more movement activity do not necessarily have more "postmaterialists" Kitschelt (1988, p. 206). He concludes that while "theories of post industrial society and value change at best account for changing individual orientations, preferences, and capabilities to engage in [N.S.M.] collective protest", we need more to explain why, when, how and if potential gets used. It should equally be stressed that with political opportunity structures, more substance and specifics are always needed in accounting for movement

strategies and achievements.

Kriesi et al (1995) suggest a crucial political opportunity “structure” impacting on the success or failure of Green Parties is electoral openness to small non-geographically specific parties. However Rootes (1996) cautions against viewing such electoral environments as simply “structural” constants, and suggests that contingency here too plays a role. Nevertheless such openness/closure has major implications for environmental politics in general as an elected Green party can focus environmental movements, giving credibility to Green Parties with lobby groups and the political mainstream. The West German constitutional party system which in the 1960’s and 1970’s acted to exclude the environmental agenda, in particular nuclear power, from party political life, in the period after the formation of the green party in 1979 acted to channel state resources and credibility to a party able to win five percent of the vote even if only, at first, in the republic’s smallest state. This can be counterposed to the British Green Party which pays thousands of pounds to fight elections, with no realistic prospect of winning. The electoral and party system in the U.K. (U.K. parties, unlike German ones, receive no direct state funding) makes elections an expensive drain on money, time and morale, whilst in Germany elections are financially rewarding. While those Green Parties that are able to win representation on legislative bodies are able to claim a practical role in the representation of a wider array of environmental lobbies within the political process, those that are excluded from political representation find it difficult to attract the patronage of lobby groups as they are largely unable to offer such lobbies a foot in the parliamentary door. In such circumstances, such as in Britain, Rootes (1996) points out that lobby groups have tended to push at other doors that are at least half open; the courts, public enquiries and the ears of civil servants.

Whilst “bureaucratic accommodation” as expert witnesses, at enquiries and within government departments, allows the British environmental lobby a voice, they lack the leverage of other lobbies (industry, farmers, bankers etc) whose “expert” opinions carry economic and political muscle. While conservationists in particular often claim a place amidst elites this puts a highly conservative damper on deeper environmental strategies. While any institutional apparatus cannot be read as an impervious and objective monolith, these conditions heavily constrain actors with limited resources. The absence of a coherent green agenda, around a viable green party, leaves the multiplicity of dimensions that, in

theory, make up the environmental movement divided and often at odds. The possibility for a united environmental movement, a coherent platform rendering a diversity of interests and issues non-antagonistic comes only through a party. The dispersed and ad-hoc British “movement” can be seen as non-controversial, and pragmatic, but this might be reinterpreted as weakness, so dependent on not offending anybody, fearful to challenge the status quo and losing its only threads of influence. Rüdiger and Lowe write: “In general... environmental groups [in Britain] have exhibited a basic confidence that they could best advance their aims through working within the established system” (1986, p. 271). It may be suggested that the British political system makes such a choice for the movement, and whilst such an outlook may be second nature to traditionalist conservation group leaders, it is a pragmatic choice, borne grudgingly by more radical activists. The electoral system significantly affects the space open to more radical ecological politics. Rootes concludes: “It would be a mistake to abandon structural analysis entirely [but] The trouble is that so much which is not really structural has been collected under the umbrella of “political opportunity structure”; by purporting to explain more than can be explained in structural terms, analysts risk bringing the concept into disrepute. We should not abandon structural analysis, but we need to recognise its limitations, and to complement it with other strategies” (1996, p. 17). My use of critical ethnography is one such alternative strategy.

While Kriesi et al’s (1992) model of “P.O.S.” is more refined than Kitschelt’s, it does not escape the approach’s basic distortions. However they do reflect upon a central problem for the approach when they write; “we have to conclude that the national political opportunity structures in Western Europe will partly lose their relevance in favour of the international political opportunity structures” (1992, p. 234), undermining strictly comparative analysis of differences. The E.C.’s relationship to British environmental politics is a case in point (see McCormick 1991, and my chapter 3). What “P.O.S.” models do least well is account for the global factors Kitschelt claims are the arena of Marxist macro theorists. However much global forces are nationally mediated, trans-national factors are crucial, as nation states become weaker units of action and analysis. As I detail in chapter 4., globalization has major implications for “Locality”, the definition of the “environmental agenda”, and the relationship between power holders and movements challengers. The changing nature of the object of social research poses critical questions for methodology. The where, the what and the why/who/how questions that correlate to the local, the environment, and the movement

are shifting relations, requiring research that describes rather than prescribes conceptualization and operationalization practices, prior to any subsequent attempt to understand their contingent and political nature. Here the works of “New Social Movement” theorists, particularly Touraine and Habermas, are useful in posing questions of ontology and methodology for the sociological study of social life and social change.

2.1.4. The Left, the New Left and the New Social Movements.

As radical critics of the status quo, New Social Movement perspectives confront both “Elite Pluralism” and “Elite Marxism”. Michels and Lukacs came to represent the two sides of cold-war elite politics. It has been the project of “western marxists”, the new left, and new social movements to overcome this freezing of radical politics. Three cases, from Italy (Gramsci and Melucci), France (Sartre and Touraine) and Germany (Marcuse and Habermas) illustrate this narrative.

Lukacs and Michels shared disdain for the bureaucratic capitulation of German Social-Democracy over World War One. The working class revolution did not come. Both attribute this to the fragmentation, rationalization and bureaucratization, characteristic of capitalism. Gramsci and Melucci share a focus on what Gramsci called “pre-figurative” politics, the direct and immediate creation of new kinds of politics and life, an appropriation of the means of self production . Both reject historical determination and reduction of politics and cultural identity to “underlying” economic positions. Melucci is more extreme, focusing exclusively on civil society and the private sphere. Gramsci, whilst keen to develop resistance and creativity in the field of “everyday life” also stressed that confrontation with the state was unavoidable. He refused to abandon a class analysis. Sartre and Touraine stress “historicity”, that “men make their own history”, against static meta-social principles of order, e.g. God, biology, and Historical laws. Both see society presently in a “third” stage of modernity, humanity’s highest level of reflexivity about existential freedom. Both reject Durkheim; taking Marx’s categories beyond Marx. Touraine takes Sartre’s beyond Sartre. Marcuse and Habermas both critique instrumental rationality and positivism. However their accounts of human liberation rely on different sources, Marcuse on marginal and residual elements, Habermas from the very heart of society, in language production. Marcuse’s Freudo-Marxism and Habermas’ psycho-analytical and historical materialist accounts differ.

I outline below a theoretical narrative from which contemporary debates over the nature of the present and its sites of antagonism emerged. The accounts given by these theorists of the nature of agency and the social totalities within which and against which such radicalism may or may not emerge raise key questions that my empirical research relates to. The narrative charts the movement by radical intellectuals and activists in Western Europe from a view of the proletariat as singular, and yet universal, agent of social transformation beyond capitalism. What would be the sources of radicalism in the absence of the unified working class revolutionary agent? Would these forces represent a unified or pluralized set of oppositions, identities and interests? Would new antagonists be revolutionary or reformist? What would such terms mean in changed conditions?

While my empirical research was not designed as a hypothetico-deductive attempt to test the particular theories discussed below, my conclusions do attempt to locate my research (into how the terms local, environmental and movement, are operationalized within competing discourses drawing on different resources) within a broader theoretical context. These theorists all related themselves to the “radical” movements that have emerged in Western Europe to oppose elite pluralism and elite Marxism. In one sense therefore, the study of their work can be seen as part of an anthropology of social movement praxis within the Western European “locale”, while the extent to which the theory and the empirical research may not correspond raises further questions about this reflexive relationship (see Rootes 1990).

2.1.4.1. Robert Michels and Georg Lukacs.

2.1.4.1.1. Michels.

In 1914 the German Social Democratic Party leadership backed their “progressive” bourgeoisie in war against feudal Russia and colonialist England and France, in the name of historical necessity. Millions marched to their death. For Michels, the S.P.D.’s 88 million marks in the German states banks ensured its support for war credits in August 1914. This confirmed for Michels the party’s capitulation to the state and internal oligarchy.⁹ Whilst enlightenment enabled democracy, bureaucracy and technology subverted it. The paradox for the weak lay in their need for a collective organization which easily led to subordination by

⁹“In the society of today, the state of dependence that results from the existing economic and social conditions renders an ideal democracy impossible” (1959, p. 11). “Democratic evolution has a parabolic course” (p. 33).

the very organizations claiming to protect them, “we escape scylla only to dash ourselves on charybdis” (1959, p. 22). To work best the leader must be detached from the members. This is the birth of oligarchy. Chapter ten of Michels’ “Political Parties” is entitled: “Superiority of the professional leaders in respect of culture and their indispensability; the formal and real incompetence of the mass” (p.80). In order to compete in an oligarchical political environment political parties become mirrors of that they sought to transform. Socialism was to be achieved for, but not by, the people. Organization counters the weakness of the weak, but in ordering the masses reinforces dependence. The party settled into the status quo on the pretext that the system would inevitably transform itself. The party was reduced to its most passive electoral elements and its most conservative leaders.¹⁰ In Weber’s “Iron Cage”, Pareto’s “Circulation of Elites” (1935), and Spengler’s “Decline of the West” (1932) democracy only circulates elites to avoid stagnant dictatorship.

Michels saw democracy as the least of evils. “The ideal government would doubtless be that of an aristocracy of persons at once morally good and technically efficient. But where are we to find such an aristocracy?” (p.407). Alvin Gouldner argues this tragic inevitability of oligarchy is an excuse, the “metaphysical pathos of the intellectuals” (1955). Michels in the last few paragraphs of “Political Parties” does give some hope. As people become more educated they will be better able to articulate a multiplicity of interests and demands without mass parties. This enables more democratic participation, even if partial and limited.¹¹

2.1.4.1.2. Lukacs.

Lukacs’ first major work “The Soul and forms” (1974), popularized Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel. While for Hegel history was movement towards freedom and truth, Kierkegaard saw man’s descent from the absolute. Adopting a stoical resignation world war sent Lukacs into despair. Only a miracle could save Europe. The miracle came in 1917. Lukacs was active in the 1919 Hungarian soviet. The wave of revolution was for Lukacs a sign that humanity could break from mechanical determination to make history. “History and Class

¹⁰“one dominant class inevitably succeeds to another... far from contradicting with or replacing the materialist conception of history, completes that conception and reinforces it.” (p. 390).

¹¹“The democratic current of history resembles successive waves. They break ever on the same shoals. They are ever renewed. This enduring spectacle is simultaneously encouraging and depressing... It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end” (p. 408).

Consciousness" (1971, [1923]) reformulated his romantic critique of capitalism within Marxism. Central to capitalist society was the commodity. People became objects, whilst the products of their labour appear independent, what Lukacs calls "reification". Lukacs' worker in capitalist production parallels Michels' mass in the modern political party. In political terms bourgeois democracy, for Lukacs, and Michels, renders voters alone before the state. Reification, fragmentation and commodity fetishism subordinate the masses.

Revolutionary failure in Germany and Hungary saw Lukacs adopt Lenin's vanguard party, seeing the world as the worker would, if liberated from false consciousness.¹² While Rosa Luxemburg (1986) attacked the anti-democratic tendencies of Lenin's vanguard, paralleling Michels', Lukacs did not address this. The party was to fight fire with fire. As revolution stalled, Lukacs came to terms with Soviet bureaucracy. Lukacs' reconciliation with this "stabilisation" self consciously paralleled Hegel's pragmatic reconciliation with post-Napoleonic Prussia. In "Art for Art's Sake and Proletarian Poetry" (1972a, orig. 1926) he attacked post-revolutionary avant-gardes who sought to create a whole new art and to abandon non-proletarian forms. He endorsed classical 19th century bourgeois realism, redubbed socialist realism, the appropriate style to depict building socialism. Also in 1926 Lukacs wrote "Moses Hess and the Problem of Idealist Dialectics" (1972b), in which he counterposed the ultra radicalism of the romantic Hess to the pragmatic politics of the mature Hegel.¹³ In 1935 Trotsky's "The Worker's State and the Question of Thermidor and Bonapartism", characterized Stalin as Napoleon. In Lukacs' reply "Holderlin's Hyperion" (in "Goethe and His Age" 1968) Trotsky's parallel is tacitly accepted whilst the conclusions are rejected. Trotsky is characterized as utopian. Holderlin, a forgotten idealist and ultra-revolutionary, is counterpoised to the wise system builder.¹⁴

Just as Michels' work became the prop in the "metaphysical pathos" of the Western cold

¹²Through Marxism, "it becomes possible to infer the thoughts and feelings which men would have in a particular situation if they were able to assess both it and the interest that arise from it in their impact on immediate action and on the whole structure of society." (p. 259).

¹³As the heroic phase of the bourgeois revolution faded so Hess became marginal and utopian. Lukacs was laying the foundations for a theoretical defence of the Soviet Union's internal entrenchment in the face of international isolation.

¹⁴"The world historical significance of Hegel's accommodation consists precisely in the fact that he grasped... the revolutionary development of the bourgeoisie as a unitary process, one in which the revolutionary Terror as well as the Thermidor and Napoleon were necessary phases." (cited in Lowy 1977, p. 65).

war “democrats”, so Lukacs’ work became the intellectual justification for “really existing socialism”. Caught between Soviet and capitalist military-industrial complexes, “western” marxism, and later new social movements sought to transcend either/or.

2.1.4.2. Gramsci and Melucci.

2.1.4.2.1. Gramsci.

Gramsci’s key concepts, “Ideological Hegemony”, “the Organic Intellectual”, “Prefigurative Politics”, “the Myth Prince”, and “the Revolutionary Historic Bloc”, reformulate socialist “Praxis”, the dialectic between material conditions and thought, away from Bernstein’s (1961) “Evolutionary Socialism”. Gramsci characterized the Russian revolution as “the revolution against capital”, i.e against mechanical interpretations of *Das Kapital* (1977a).¹⁵ Mechanical historical determinism, like religion, gives messianic security in the hereafter, pacifying those awaiting socialism’s inevitable coming. Politics reduced to statistical laws. The masses are objects influenced by external events. Mechanical marxism comes, like social arithmetic, to reify its categories of “class”, “state”, and “party”. “The individual expects the organism to act, even if he does not do anything himself” (1971b, p. 187). Gramsci’s prefigurative politics attempted to overcome objectification. A politics of the imminent possible future over the sealed present was a theory of the creative will. Against ultra left and fascist volunteerism Gramsci sought a dialectic of actuality and possibility.¹⁶

After world war one Italy saw a series of workers struggles. Gramsci engaged in the Turin movement as editor of “*Ordine Nuovo*”, the newspaper of the Turin factory councils. Appropriation of the means of production created the possibility of grass roots democratic control over everyday life. Such a movement, Gramsci argued, enabled people to take control of their lives at the very point of its self production within civil society. Revolution is not a singular act against the state, but a multiple process of empowerment from below.¹⁷

¹⁵“When you don’t have the initiative in the struggle and the struggle itself comes eventually to be identified with a series of defeats, mechanical determinism becomes a tremendous force of moral resistance...” (1971c, p. 336)

¹⁶“The class presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism, that every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and explained as an immediate expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism...” (1971a, p. 407).

¹⁷“The existence of the councils gives the workers direct responsibility for production, leads them to improve their work, institutes a conscious and voluntary discipline, and creates the

Council democracy embodied a new society within present conditions. Gramsci distinguished Russia, where the state was everything and civil society nothing (fitting Lenin's model), and Italy where civil society flourished making frontal assault on the state futile. Rather than such wars of maneuver, Gramsci argued for struggle over cultural power, moral, political and economic leadership, not just the state. Factory councils were only the most explicit form of the hegemonic struggle. "Common Sense", the sedimented culmination of hegemonic struggle, was not, as in Lukacs' "Reification", absolute false consciousness, but a state of fluid self contradiction. Revolution would be a long multiple process, not a singular event. Rather than a pure vanguardist elite party, Gramsci argued the role of the revolutionary party was to overcome narrow definitions of class "interest", building a counter-hegemonic bloc of solidarity between struggles within civil society into a strategic programme. Whilst championing factory councils as prefigurative embodiments of a new society, Gramsci feared isolation. The formation of the Italian Communist Party (in 1921) was a reaction to Socialist party failures to support the councils against military repression, but initial ultra leftist posturing led Gramsci to criticise the C.P.I.. A focus only on democratic self production within civil society failed to address state power.

Caught between the Comintern's 6th (ultra-leftist) and 7th (popular frontist) congresses (in 1928 and 1935) Gramsci's prison notebooks, as in his earlier Lyons thesis (1978), set out a political strategy to build a bloc of national popular forces- organized through the networks of civil society and the revolutionary party. Revolution must build from popular struggles into a totalizing movement for a new society; by-passing the state but also coordinating popular support to rebuff and overcome repression. Contrary to Lenin's intellectual vanguard, Gramsci argued movements within civil society would form organic intellectuals. The party encouraged the formation of "organic intellectuals" not imposing "outsiders".

2.1.4.2.2. Melucci.

Melucci's sociology of "new social movements", adapts many Gramscian concepts. "Marx's old problem (how to pass from class in itself to class for itself, from class condition to class action) remains unsolved" (Melucci, 1988a, p. 329). For Melucci "unity, if it exists, should be considered as a result rather than a starting point, a fact to be explained rather than evidence" (1988a, p. 332). Like Gramsci, Melucci rejects Leninist revolution. "In complex psychology of the producer, the creator of history..." (1977b, p. 248).

societies conflicts develop in those areas of the system which are crucial for the production of information and symbolic resources” (1989, p. 55), i.e. civil society.

Melucci argues an ever more differentiated civil society fragments the field of social movement struggles. He retains the Gramscian focus on struggles to control fields of self production within everyday life (what he calls “The Democratisation of Everyday Life” (1989 pp 165-180)). However he abandons Gramsci’s strategy of building an “integrated culture” of united opposition within civil society. Opposing with Gramsci “metaphysical assumptions about the teleological course of history” (1989, p. 188), Melucci rejects the idea that history can take totalizing forms. Struggles remain always for him micro-struggles within the fabric of the present. “The dream of many 19th century utopians... to harness social actors to the project of transforming the state” (1989, p. 219) is outdated. Melucci states four characteristics of “new social movements”, the first three restate Gramsci, the fourth is a vague generalisation: i) The shifting emphasis of struggle from economics to culture, ii) development of prefigurative politics within everyday life - participation is an end in itself: direct self production, iii) “movements are networks of laboratories of new experiences and identities”, iv) movements develop “global Consciousness”.

Following Habermas, Melucci writes: “The colonization of the lifeworld is certainly an observable trend in complex societies” (1989, p. 196). “In the current period, societies’ capacity to intervene in the production of meaning extends to those areas which previously escaped control and regulation: areas of self definition, emotional relationships, sexuality and biological needs” (1989, p. 45). Struggle extends to new fields of potential self production, politicizing new areas of life, whilst “the transformation of raw materials into commodities is no longer in control” (1989, p. 46). Melucci writes: “In my view, systematic trends in complex societies are slowly destroying traditions” (1989, p. 212). New social movements increase the process of fragmentation, not aiming at counter synthesis, collective counter hegemony to challenge the dominant bloc. Rejecting confrontation with the state and institutional opponents, is, for Melucci, a movement’s paradoxical strength.

Political reductionism misses the power of new movements because; “the manner in which this conflict is expressed cannot be measured in terms of “effective action”” (1989, p.55).

This is “The hidden efficacy of social movements” (1989, p. 73). “The forms of action that I am referring to are at one and the same time prior to and beyond politics: they are pre-political because they are rooted in everyday life experiences; and metapolitical because political forces can never represent them completely.”¹⁸ Key to Melucci’s silent mini-revolutions is rejection of “protest” as sole indicator of movement scope.¹⁹ Hidden forms of “prefigurative politics” lie buried in everyday life.

Melucci resists all politics and theory that would unify movements, much as Gramsci resisted reductionist marxist accounts of “class”, “state”, and “party”. Avoiding complete collapse into vagueness, movements as anything that move, he distinguishes movement as solidarity, conflict and transgression, from other forms of social action characterised by aggregation, consensus and adaptation. However Melucci’s account of movements’ subterranean, experiential nature, and his failure to address movement relations to the state, (1989, p. 230) leaves his account abstract. “Rather than re-affirm the Leninist model, which assigned movements the fate of either taking state power or failing completely (e.g. in trade unionism) it becomes possible to prefigure other roles for collective action; the movement produces reforms, provides new elites for the political system and the market, while at the same time serving to locate and reveal relations of power” (1989, p.79). Negating his distinction between movements and other forms of action, where movements are said to avoid aggregation (the marketplace), consensus (mainstream politics), and adaptation to the system (reforms), this conclusion reveals the limits of a conception of new social movements that refuses to raise questions of class, state and totality. Setting Lenin against his liberal conception of movements bypasses Gramsci’s more sophisticated account.

2.1.4.2.3. Conclusions on Gramsci and Melucci.

Two fundamental questions arise from the above discussion that need to be addressed in any study of social movements. In the absence of a foundational account of either agency and historical change, the issue of unity and difference comes to the fore. Firstly, with regard to agency, the question becomes in what forms collective identity and action will emerge. Unity and difference becomes topics of empirical study. Secondly, with regard to historical change,

¹⁸Like Blanquot’s secret army.

¹⁹ “If the concept of protest is explicitly limited to the political level that is, to the forms of collective action which implicate a direct confrontation with authority, then necessarily other levels of the collective action are not included in the concept” (1988a p. 337).

movements require study in terms of their “radical” potential. While the reform/revolution distinction is impossible to prescribe, the question of what should count as radical becomes an open one requiring empirical investigation.

2.1.4.3. Sartre and Touraine.

Sartre and Touraine unite around a series of concepts, “praxis/action”, “totality”, “freedom and historicity”, “alienation and objectification”, the critique of “functionalism” and “teleology”, and the reformulation of class from “being-in-itself” to “being-for-itself”. Touraine’s project follows Sartre’s “existentialist philosophical anthropology of revolution”.

2.1.4.3.1. Sartre.

Whilst increasingly critical of the communist party and the Soviet bloc, Sartre remained a left wing “man of action” until his death in 1980. “The Ghost of Stalin” (1956), following the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising, defended “socialism” against bureaucratic counter-revolution and imperialist interference. Stalinism had turned marxism into a state ideology, the very antithesis of its radical potential. Marxism, for Sartre, represented the third great philosophical revolution of the modern age, after Descartes and the Enlightenment. These philosophies proclaimed the scientific and bourgeois revolutions, each giving new depth to human reflexive self understanding. Marxism was for Sartre the highest expression of human self-making, and embodied in the struggle for a socialist society, became the leading force for human freedom. There could logically be only one movement struggling for total progressive transformation at one time. Sartre’s task was to return marxism to its original task, human emancipation. Sartre’s work from the 1950’s is distinct from his pre-war writing as a phenomenological existentialist student of Husserl and Heidegger. In “Nausea” (1938) he outlines his ideas of existential freedom, absurdity, bad faith and of his then purely individualist distaste for bourgeois self deluding comfortableness. The desire to render the contingency of one’s essence objective and secure is what Sartre calls “bad faith”. In “Being and Nothingness” (1957, org. 1943) this drive to flee in the face of absurdity is called a “futile passion” which gives rise to “anguish”, the sense that “we are not what we are and we are what we are not”.

Humans “are” more by decision than definition. Where as objects exist “in themselves”, without regard to their being an object of consciousness, human beings exist only through

consciousness and goal directed action. *Being and Nothingness* is subtitled “an essay in phenomenological ontology”. Humans are beings whose ontological foundation lies not in objective essence, external or prior to consciousness, but through consciousness itself. This marks the distinction between objects that exist “in themselves”, prior to any phenomenological appropriation in consciousness, and beings that exist only through consciousness and therefore exist “for themselves”. Whilst Sartre rejects Husserl’s idea of a “transcendental self”, being for itself is always, as for Heidegger, “being in the world”,²⁰ Sartre maintains that “consciousness” is an inescapable human characteristic, the ontological foundation of being for itself, existence through the awareness of its existence. Non-identity with present being and lacking an objective being in itself, nothingness haunts our being, leading to anguish. Nothingness is awareness of future negation, not absence of a thing.²¹

Only after world war two did Sartre’s take up the historical dimension of the struggle for human freedom within the political sphere. In “*Being and Nothingness*” he wrote: “The world is mine because it is haunted by possibilities... it is these possibilities which give the world its unity and its meaning as the world” (1957, p. 104). These possibilities are counterpoised to the “Facticity” of the world, its apparent givenness as it is imposed upon me by the demands of others. These possibilities rising up against the facticity of the world through action adopt a new significance in Sartre’s latter attempts to reformulate Marxism as a general theory and practice of human freedom in action.²²

Class doesn’t exist “in-itself”, prior to class consciousness. It is only through a project that collective identities form. For Sartre, human identities, individual and collective, are not discovered, they are decided, unity emerges from fragments in action. “Our historical task, at the heart of the polyvalent world, is to bring about the moment when history will have only one meaning, when it will tend to be dissolved in the concrete men who will make it in common.” (1963 p. 90). Whilst positivists reify the synchronic moment, orthodox marxists reify the diachronic process of change. Sartre emphasises contingency. While empiricism

²⁰Sartre thus pre-empts post-structuralist rejection of the Cartesian transcendent cogito

²¹Such a knowledge, the reflexive potential of consciousness, is the basis of existential freedom, what Sartre calls the philosophical anthropology of revolution.

²²“Only the project, as a mediation between two moments of objectivity can account for history, that is for human creativity. It is necessary to choose. ” (1963, p. 99)

objectifies the specific, functionalist theories objectify the totality.

Sartre, as did Marx, rejecting Hegelian dialectics, sees being as irreducible to pure knowledge, being embedded in the facticity of past action. However where Hegel equated “alienation” with the objectification of mind, Marx had, in his “mature”, work tended to focus only on exploitation. Sartre saw alienation as the general condition of “bad faith” through which social life becomes an object above its own creators. He uses the term “practico-inert” to describe the otherness of alienated social existence. This is very much in line with Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, but broader than the exploitation of Marx’s “Labour Theory of Value”. Though Sartre retains a focus on the proletariat as the primary agent of revolutionary change his conception of alienation opens up far wider areas of social life for critical examination into “inauthentic” or alienated existence. Class identity cannot be reduced to one alienated relation, multiple sites only gain class unity through relations to an adversary; “the class is connected to its transcendent unity through the mediation of the other classes. It is united outside of itself in the suffered freedom of the other” (1990, p.795).

Sartre argued that without recourse to historical teleology or structural determination the totalization of the field of social conflict must be built up from the diversity of social struggles to the point where a transformation can occur that transcends the “need” to negotiate with the facticity of present powers. For Sartre revolution is absolute human authenticity, the social construction of reality in its most pure and uninhibited form.²³

2.1.4.3.2. Touraine.

Touraine avoids idealist utopianism, and the metaphysical assumptions of orthodox marxism, applying the existential theory of action to emancipatory social movements, measuring their approximation towards action at the level of totality. Scott (1991, p. 31) claims Touraine sets up a “teleological periodization of societies” with “his insistence that we can identify a single social force, in the form of a social movement”. Whilst Touraine can be reproached for his predictions about the programmed society, his work is less an “insistence” that there is, or will be, a single social movement for each historical period, than

²³“The working class is neither pure combativity, nor pure passive dispersal, nor a pure institutional apparatus. It is a complex and moving relation between different practical forms, each of which completely recapitulated it, and whose true bond with one another is totalization.” (1963, p. 103)

the logical point that there can only be one totalizing conflict at any moment. Critics have mis-understood Touraine's existentialist conceptualizations of "class", "historicity" and "totality", assuming teleological or functionalist intent, equating possibility and imperative.

Touraine set out to write "tomorrow's social history", the transition to a post-industrial (programmed) society. Like Sartre he sees modernity as three great epochs, mercantile, industrial and post-industrial. In the post-industrial information society Marx's exploitation is not an adequate measure of human alienation. "Today, it is more useful to speak of alienation than of exploitation, the former defines a social, the later merely an economic relationship" (1971, p. 7). Touraine's sociology follows Sartre's examination of the practico-inert. Hence the shift from the economic to the entire realm of social life. The dividing line, Touraine argues, is, increasingly effaced as state and market increasingly intervene in previously taken for granted areas of identity, desire and behaviour, "ways of life" are replaced by "standards of living".

Touraine rejects universal laws of historical development and class identity, social life is self-production, not pure conflict and random change. It is an error "believing that overall social conflicts have been reduced to a great number of particular tensions or conflicts" (1971, p. 74). Touraine is critical of post-68 intellectuals who, in rejecting Sartre and abandoning totality in pursuit of fragmentary micro-politics, moved all too easily from ultra-left libertarians to the "new liberalism" of the late 1970's onwards, epitomised in France by the "New Philosophy", with its slogan "Totality Equals Totalitarianism".

Such micro-politics cannot, Touraine argues, contrary to symbolic interactionists, engage in an authentic social construction of reality, only its negotiation. While social life is human self-production, the social re-construction of reality, as opposed to merely negotiating fragments, can only occur fully at the level of society as a whole, what Touraine calls totality. Locked into macro structure and micro negotiation, the ideologies of technocrats and liberals respectively, sociology will remain the "bad conscience" of a society that denies its origins in human action.²⁴ The struggle raised to the level of social totality is what he, after Sartre, calls struggle over historicity,²⁵ struggle between ruling and subordinate class to control

²⁴ Rejecting Jacobin voluntarism Touraine defends the idea that men make history.

²⁵ "In every society there is a field proper to social movements, i.e. that of class relations and

social life. Touraine defines classes fully relationally without recourse to marxist meta-social principles. Labour, or action cannot be restricted to the economic sphere.²⁶

Relational class theory steps beyond the “in-itself”/“for itself” distinction. “There is no class without class consciousness” (1981, p. 68). Shared economic conditions do not constitute a “class”, only a strata. Class unity develops in struggle with an adversary. “One cannot speak of class conflicts simply because the inequality of social participation has been recognized” (1971, p. 43). “A choice must be made between a philosophy of contradiction and a sociology of conflicts” (1981, p. 58). Touraine argues all social action is guided by cultural orientations. Economic man was an illusion of the industrial age. Sociology must abolish this myth. Nevertheless “class” cannot be reduced to fragmented antagonisms. If society is self-production, then relations of production characterise all social action. Base/superstructure is replaced by inclusive self-production. “Men make their own history: Social life is produced by cultural achievements and social conflicts, and at the heart of society burns the fire of social movements” (1981 p 1).

New movements “penetrate into many domains which were hitherto the preserve of the gods or of custom” (1981, p. 2). Post-industrial society intensifies “de-traditionalization”, through increased state and institutional interference in everyday life, and in the struggles of new movements. “The self production of our societies through labour is - and continues to be - what is mainly at stake; this is why class relations and social movements must increasingly become central to our analysis” (1981, p. 8). The multiplicity of struggles within diverse fields of social self production are not isolated incidents. They occur within a social totality dominated by an elite bloc, led by a ruling class, defined by their collective appropriation of historicity, the subordination of societies energies to a particular form of development. While the diverse struggles of new movements have no intrinsic unity, the unity of the dominant bloc and the ruling class (itself a contingent project) represent an opponent which a counter-movement would have to unify against to challenge for control of historicity with an historicity, and that conflict by rising up towards social movement draws closer to the principle stakes of society” (1981, p. 80).

²⁶ “Nowadays, societies work upon itself is no longer carried out only in the economic order but in almost all the domains of culture... I no longer agree to define class relations within a strictly economic mechanism, and instead to portray society as a cultural field torn apart by the conflict... for the collective re-appropriation of this historicity” (1981, p.62).

alternative project of development. “A social class or a class movement always strives to interpret in its own terms or bring under its influence the special interest and pressure groups which are related to it” (1971, p. 68). The more elements within its project the closer it gets to unifying the field and posing a totalizing opposition.

Touraine develops his Identity, Opponent, Totality model to outline the ideal typical fully developed movement/class. In its highest form a movement embodies a confrontation with an adversary over control of historicity. To act at this level a movement must construct its unity across the widest possible spectrum of specific disputes, totalizing its struggle with the ruling class leaving no aspect of societies self re-production neutral. Action purely based around “identity” would be simply interest groups, those purely around an opponent might be referred to as confrontational, forms of terrorism without a mass base, and those just focused on totality would represent abstract “doctrine” (1971, p. 132). These formal types do not constitute movements in anything but the most limited way. Partial movements, combining two elements (Identity-Totality, Identity-Opponent, Opponent-Totality) would give rise, respectively, to “professional/identity defensive” movements (developed interest groups), “social struggles” (conflict being conducted without a view to challenging the present order), and “political programmes” (where opponent and totality are condemned but where the identity of the movement’s constituency is vague).

Attempts to reformulate the totality without displacing the established ruling class and their institutions and organizations would amount only to “modernization”. At the institutional level, avoiding totality, leads struggles into forms of institutional bargaining, whilst at the level of organization within institutions failure to question the totality results in interest group pressure for inclusion, i.e. social mobility. Failure of institutional elites to deliver on promises may give rise to movements demanding restoration of “order”, either through demands for an elite shake up, or, in what Tilly calls violent reformism, for the complete replacement of a discredited elite within the same framework. Vanguard revolutionism whilst raising the question of the totality, and the opponent that must be overcome, takes power from a very limited identity base and from there attempts to impose its own totality from above. Movements that do not effectively unify the three crucial dimensions, are liable to degenerate to the depths of micro marginality, or the heights of utopian blueprints. Touraine posits ideal typical “class” action, existential freedom, as a benchmark.²⁷

Touraine is not predicting the coming of “the social movement which in programmed society will occupy the position held by the worker’s movement in industrial society and the civil liberties movement in the market society” (1981, p. 24), though he is keen to “discover” such a movement, if and/or when it creates itself. Saying that his research is an attempt to “discover” such a movement may appear to suggest, that it exists, in itself, pre-formed in embryonic slumber within post-industrial society. Touraine sees only possibilities for action pre-existing. In “discovery” he is as much interested in challenging specific existing movements to reflect on these potentialities, as he is to dissect their course. Hence his anti-positivist method of “sociological intervention”. Is this teleological? It is necessary to distinguish first of all between the goal-directed nature of any reflexive action, which is in one sense teleological by definition, and the more illegitimate form of teleological argument (transcendental teleology), the assumption of some “governing” meta-goal, above and beyond the conscious goal directed actions of individuals and self-conscious collectives.²⁸ Touraine’s attempt to get movements to think about their aims and objectives, their methods and their contradictions, involves the immanent form of teleology, thinking about means in terms of ends. This is not to impose a transcendental teleology. But what of his benchmark for movements? Does this not impose a goal over and above the goals of actors themselves?

It is necessary to distinguish substantive teleology, the presumption of an underlying meta-social principle the realization of which a movement is unknowingly enacting, and a formal, or methodological, teleology, limited to facilitating reflection within the movement on its own internal contradictions and limits in relation to its expressed goals. Totalizing the field is not a goal, but a means to the full realization of a goal. The benchmark of totalization is designed to confront movement activists with the limitations and contradictions of often disparate and divided elements. Touraine’s method starts from an existential rejection of transcendental, or substantive, teleology, focusing on the phenomenological ontology of human subjects (an immanent teleology), whilst retaining the belief, founded on Sartre’s existential anthropology of revolution, that the highest and most effective form of human

²⁷ “The more closely these three dimensions of social movements (I-O, O-T, I-T) are integrated, the more one tends to describe the project level of a movement as being raised. When the movement acts effectively according to the I-O-T formula, its capacity for historical action is extremely strong” (1981, p. 84).

²⁸ Equation of teleology and unintended consequence should be avoided.

action is self-reflexive activity at the level of the social totality (what might be called its formal teleology or benchmark). Touraine's work doesn't impose a transcendental teleological direction upon movements.²⁹

Is Touraine's project still valid? Scott concludes his critique of Touraine saying: "The diversity of new social movements' demands and forms, and the plurality of social conflicts, suggest that an interpretation of contemporary society which stresses the potential unity of social movements is highly suspect." (1991, p. 42) In the late 1960's Touraine argued that the May movement in France revitalized the existential hope, consciousness of human self production raised to the level of social transformation. Even then however he warned of the rapid relapse into micro-difference and structural determination, liberal and conservative forms of "realism", "sociology will then be only the bad conscience of society" (1971 p. 232). In the late 1970's he wrote of the "doubt and mistrust of society which scarcely believes any longer in its power to shape the choice of its future... crushed by the constraints of the cold war" (1981, p. 5).

By the end of the 1980's, in the light of Fukayama's "end of history" thesis (1989 and 1992), and the apparent triumph of liberalism over second and third world state/nationalist development projects, Touraine asks himself; "can the idea of a central social conflict - which I here identify with the recognition of social movements - survive what now appears as the irremediable decline of historicist thought..." (1992, p. 125). In the face of liberal fragmentation he asks "isn't it obvious that the American concept of "minority" has by and large replaced the European concept of social class? (1992, p. 128). Social fragmentation, raises a question about the very subject of sociology itself. This reflects his overestimation of the degree to which the post-industrial/programmed society superseded the market, theories developed in the era of Keynesian macro economic regulation, and thrown into crisis with the resurgence of the "free" market on a trans-national basis in the 1980's.

Scott (1990 p. 30-45) is correct to criticize Touraine's over-extended theory of programmed society's surpassing of the era of market economics. However the drawing of an overly distinct line of demarcation between the old and the new is also made by Scott. This overly

²⁹ His work is bound up with both the immanent teleologies of actors' own goals and his own formal, or methodological, teleology of action, but these are not themselves impositions.

unified conception of the “old”, “working class/socialist” politics fails to recognise, as Sartre did, that class action was a contingent phenomena, built from multiple conflicts. Present division lacks “natural unity”, unity falsely attributed to the past. It is necessary to reject some of the connotations attributed to the “the programmed society”, one of which being that the “ruling class” constitutes a unity, in and through the medium of the state, directing historicity from that site. The nature of the social movement that can challenge a ruling class increasingly able to act above states, raises the “stakes” to a global totality. A social movement today that fails to recognize how historicity, the struggle to direct human self-production, is increasingly played out within global systems of interaction and power falls short of an authentic social construction of reality. While the restructuring of the global ruling class has thrown into confusion many of the old collective/class identities, the programmed society itself being the result of a period of social negotiation of reality between class forces now in decline, it should not be assumed that the idea of unified class identities must be abandoned, as if the absolute limit of possibility is always the limit of present reality. Empirical observation does not justify liberal triumphalism. Touraine and Sartre’s existential anthropology of revolution warns against falling into the empirical world as if it were a collection of immovable objects, and as an immanent critique of an alienated condition masking humanity’s potential to make history, to change the world and itself.

2.1.4.3.3. Conclusions on Sartre and Touraine.

The existential philosophical anthropology of revolution, in challenging the agency /structure dualism, opens the relationship between movement and “status quo” in relation to the totalizing field of historical action. Firstly the boundary between constructed movement identity and its opponent shifts within the struggle itself, as do the components within each. Action is not set upon a structural stage. Secondly the question of of movement or minority, raised by Touraine, reiterates the question of unity and fragmentation (discussed above in relation to Gramsci and Melucci).

2.1.4.4. Marcuse and Habermas.

Both writers ground the possibility of radical social critique and movements in the face of the reification of the western working class as subject/object of revolutionary change. Both attempt to think beyond received “Marxist” orthodoxy, whilst retaining the dialectical and critical core of Marx, resisting positivistic objectivism and phenomenological subjectivism.

However similar origins produce radically distinct conclusions. Marcuse sought foundations for radicalism external to the “totally administered society”; in existential phenomenology, Hegelian Marxism, Freudian theory, marginal groups, and in “true” art. Habermas seeks sources for critical praxis at the heart of social life, in language, a post-foundational foundation, or what he calls “universal pragmatics” or “communicative competence”. I present six themes by which the writers’ similarities and differences emerge.

2.1.4.4.1. Dialectics, Negation and Positivism.

While Horkheimer and Adorno followed Nietzsche’s anti-enlightenment, Marcuse retained a stronger affiliation to Hegelianism and Habermas developed a more limited attachment to Hegel, all maintained a critique of positivism, and empiricism. All assert dialectical negativity, the immanent transformative character of phenomena. The principle of “negativity” - that all things are not simply what they are (their being) but the possibility of otherness (becoming) - asserts that all phenomena exist in potentiality, not simply in actuality. Positivism, asserting the positive actuality of neutral facts negates otherness.

Adorno’s “critical rhetorics” (1968) pushed negativity beyond any systematic totalization. Marcuse, after Hegel, defends more fully the view that the specific and the individual are always mediated by their relations within totality. Habermas, in his early “A Positively Bisected Rationalism” (in Adorno et al 1976) outlines a fourfold critique of positivism and defence of dialectical totality: i) Theory/object relation: researcher is internal, the object is a subject, research is hermeneutic, ii) Between theory and experience: quantitative methods cannot appreciate the nature of the lifeworld, iii) Between theory and history (Dilthey’s “moral science” of *verstehen* over the logic of objectivist causal science, though rejecting Weber’s (1949) methodological individualism), and iv) Between theory and practice: theory is never value neutral, all knowledge is value implicated. The is/ought binary folds.

While Habermas tends to accept the objectivity of the natural sciences and accepts a positivist/instrumentalist approach to the non-human, Marcuse argued that positivism and instrumental rationality in relation to nature was suppression of the otherness within nature, and argued for an empathetic natural science. This distinction has significant implications for the environmental debate (Eckersley 1992).

2.1.4.4.2. Marx, Capitalism and Revolution.

Marcuse insisted Marxism isn't a set of universal laws, its dialectical and historical nature requires constant transformation. His early work under the influence of Lukacs (1920's) and Heidegger (1930's) sought to theorise historical agency against economic determination. However his romantic and then existential phenomenological themes gave way to a "return to an authentic Marx" after the publication of Marx's "humanist" 1844 Paris Manuscripts (1977). Freud's repressed bodily desire, and repressed memory supplements Marx's theory of Ideology. "Since history had not provided a guarantee of revolution, Marcuse turned to *nature* to provide a foundation for revolutionary possibility" (Kellner 1984, p. 162).

In post-war industrial society Marcuse saw "reification of the proletariat" within "affluence" as a decisive shift, a shift from ontology to technology. However the new society created a new working class of educated workers and Marcuse saw radical potential within the student movement. The late 1960's revival of utopian thought saw renewed interest in the transformative force of spontaneous revolution. The 1970's saw Marcuse return to his earliest interest, the transformative potential of the aesthetic.

Habermas traces enlightenment as both liberator of instrumental rationality, via the rise of modern capitalism and natural science, and critical rationality within the emerging public sphere. Marxism's economic focus is supplemented by accounts of communication, determination of the economic over superstructures is rejected. Within "post-industrial societies" Marx's "labour theory of value" fails. Legitimation crisis along with economic, rationality and motivational crises overdetermine each other. The Marxist focus on class relations needed overhauling within a radicalized account of citizenship, personal autonomy and lifeworld integrity. With the decline of the traditional proletariat as revolutionary agent, Marcuse's "Great Refusal" (in "One Dimensional Man" 1964) and Habermas's "Legitimation Crisis" (1976) raise the possibility of new social movements.

2.1.4.4.3. Heidegger, Phenomenology and Historical Criticism.

2.1.4.4.3.1. Marcuse and Heidegger.

Marcuse was drawn to Heidegger's existential materialism which avoided mechanical materialism and idealism. *Being and Time* (1962, orig. 1927) blended Husserl's

phenomenological return to “the things themselves” with existential concern for “authentic” individual experience. Heidegger’s “new beginning” was “being in the world” - the presence - being there “mit sein” - thrown into, and yet a part of, a world, not transcendent observers. Heidegger’s project is to recapture authentic historicity - one’s active participation in creating the world that is “for you” and “through you” and so “is you” - against the fallenness of the they, the projection onto others of one’s own contingency.

Marcuse (in his first published article - republished in 1969a) writes of how Heidegger returns the actor to the centre of “his” own self creation, but asserts the need to render Heidegger’s historicity into concrete history, his radical act beyond personal resoluteness into concrete political struggle. Against the weight of history and social conditions, “men” must accept their authenticity as makers of the world. The individual radical act must unite with historical social conditions. Heidegger’s general conception of existential authenticity is wedded with Marx’s account of capitalism as reified being. The union enables a theory of practice “...in so far as it addresses in its analysis the present human existence, it forces one to take a practical position with one’s whole existence and, accordingly to act in one’s historical situation” (1969a, p.59). “Heidegger’s phenomenology of human existence [must] be driven to dialectical concreteness... And on the other hand the dialectical method of knowing must ... become phenomenological so as to incorporate concreteness in a complete account of its object.” (p.13). With publication of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts Marcuse found a more concrete and humanist philosophy of action. Heidegger’s complicity with fascism, and the loathing of his work by the Frankfurt Institute turned Marcuse’s vocabulary, after leaving Germany in 1932, from authenticity and ontology towards “human needs”, “potentialities” and “historical tendencies”.³⁰

2.1.4.4.3.2. Habermas and Heidegger.

Like Marcuse, Habermas’ first published article concerned Heidegger, though this was a scathing critique (of Heidegger’s “Introduction to Metaphysics”, republished in 1953). However a more sustained dialogue with existential phenomenology came between Habermas and Heidegger’s pupil Gadamer over language, knowledge and tradition. In

³⁰ “But I soon realized that Heidegger’s concreteness was to a great extent a phony, a false concreteness...” “Martin Heidegger: An Interview with Herbert Marcuse” by F. Olafson, in Kellner 1984, p. 385).

“Truth and Method” (1975) verstehen, for Gadamer (after Heidegger) is to be sought within the horizon of language, the hermeneutic circle of culture. The subject is displaced, language speaks its own history through the heritage of subjects, their being in the world of their culture. The abstract knower is dis-placed. For Gadamer truth is prior to cognition, in practical social life and action within “modes of life”.³¹ Prejudice - fore-knowledge - is an inescapable aspect of any social life. One cannot go beyond the limit of one’s culture, the horizon of one’s historical and cultural location. Gadamer defends the authority of tradition.

Habermas criticizes Gadamer’s use of Wittgenstein, the idea that languages are self contained incommensurable frames of reference. Habermas argues that beneath surface grammar lies universal grammar enabling translation and questioning. Fetishization of language rules fails to recognise that such rules also include the conditions of possibility of their interpretation. Habermas argues language is the site and possibility of dialogue (over monologue), challenge and critique, not simply the bearer of tradition. Habermas writes: “Language is also a medium of domination and social power, it serves to legitimate relations of organized force” (1977, p. 360). While Gadamer insists that “authority” (within a heritage) cannot be criticized from outside itself, only from within the horizons of that very tradition, Habermas draws on developmental linguistic and moral psychology (Piaget and Kohlberg) to suggest that rational and critical faculties can become reflexively critical, to go beyond “surface hermeneutics” towards a “depth hermeneutics” unpacking “taken for granted” assumptions.³² Behind Gadamer’s taken for granted acceptance of tradition, Habermas sees false consensus and domination. Habermas defends a dual critical theory of psycho-analysis (contra-repression) and ideology critique (contra-oppression).³³

⁴¹ Cartesian thought has separated us from the fore-knowledge of the Greeks wherein truth was unified as and with correct practice.. Truth for Gadamer and Heidegger lies in our preconceptions - the truth of our being in the world.

³² “...explanatory understanding in the sense of depth hermeneutical decoding of specifically inadequate expressions, does not only necessitate the skilled application of naturally acquired communicative competence, as in the case with elementary hermeneutical understanding, but also pre-supposes a theory of communicative competence.” (“Hermeneutics and Ideology Critique” in Bleicher 1980, p. 202)

³³ Habermas summarises Gadamer’s position (1970a): “Any attempt to suggest that this (certainly contingent) consensus is false consensus is meaningless since we cannot transcend the discussion in which we are engaged. From this Gadamer deduces the ontological priority of linguistic tradition before all possible critique...” Habermas counters; “...every consensus, in which the understanding of meaning terminates, stands fundamentally under suspicion of being pseudo-communicatively induced ... the pre-judgemental structure of the understanding of

2.1.4.4. Freud, Psychoanalysis and Emancipation.

For Marcuse Psychoanalysis supplements Marx with a theory of desire and emancipation of the sensual body. For Habermas it is a “talking cure”, the overcoming of repressed memory and distorted language, an emancipatory self-knowledge.

Marcuse’s “Eros and Civilization” was written at a time of cold-war stabilization and radical pessimism. Marcuse questioned whether sexual desire offered resistance to the emerging consumer society. Freud’s theory of instinctual desire offered an account of repressive socialisation and its inevitable resistance. Freud’s fatalistic and conservative acceptance of the necessity of repression is questioned. Marcuse argued the reality principle is historically specific. He seeks the “hidden trend in psychoanalysis”, the role played by the ego in repressive ideological socialisation of the body. He argues capitalist production creates false scarcity, through “false needs”. The ideological “reality principle” renders subjects compliant in two ways; through “surplus repression”, the unnecessary compulsive work ethic (analogous in social reproduction to Marx’s “surplus value” in social production), and (secondly) the “performance principle”, the reduction of the body to a tool, over pleasurable creativity (analogous in personal sensuality to Marx’s “alienated labour” in work). Surplus repression is a contingent consequence of a particular organisation of technology.

Surplus repression can be reduced through redistribution and shorter working hours, enabling free time for creativity. Marcuse’s post-war work sets out to outline new conditions for de-Oedipalized and non-repressive personality and politics. The declining need for repression, enabled by affluence, could enable a weakening of patriarchal ego-identification towards polymorphous and liberated desire. The critique of “false needs” and the false “cold war” paranoia sort to expose what Marcuse refers to as “repressive-desublimation” (the manipulation of desire by consumer culture) in the name of a truly emancipatory desublimation. Analysis enabled the memory of unrepressed desire to be brought out of the unconscious into liberated self-understanding. Drawing the parallel between Nietzsche’s genealogical method and Freud’s theory of the unconscious, Marcuse argues that repression in memory, learning to obey and forget instinctual pleasures preserve duty and order. Such memory structures facilitate bad conscience and guilt. Analysis of phantasy, dreams and meaning does not guarantee identification of an achieved consensus as a true one.”

repression enable bodily critique of domination and ideological manipulation.

Habermas' "depth hermeneutics" draws upon these aspects of psychoanalysis. "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1972 org. 1968) and "Theory and Practice" (1974 org. 1963) set out Habermas' appropriation of Freud. Sharing Marcuse's ideas on "Surplus Repression" Habermas develops an "Institutional Analysis" which parallels individual development and analysis. Scarcity causes "the conflict between surplus impulses and conditions of collective self preservation" (1974), generating both personal and social repression. The social organisation of scarcity in advanced societies calls for a dual critique of surplus repression in the forms of psychoanalysis and ideology critique.³⁴

As "therapeutically guided self reflection" psychoanalysis is a model for critical sciences. Habermas uses Freud to enhance his "depth hermeneutics" against superficial hermeneutic verstehen. Habermas divided his use of psychoanalysis into three, the conceptual framework of depth hermeneutics and its two practical sites of application; the general social level of institutional analysis and the "reconstructions of individual life-stories with therapeutic intent" (Held 1980, p. 322), "rational reconstructions" and critical self-reflection.

Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989, Org. 1962) charts the rise of a public political sphere (in an urban literate public), between the private economic and family sphere and the state/court, and its decline into bureaucratic, scientized politics and manipulated public opinion. "Theory and Practice" (1974) defends "communicative pragmatics" against the bureaucratization and scientization of the public life. In Kantian fashion he defends the ideal of un-distorted communication "the force of the better argument" as a method of decision making. In "Knowledge and Human Interests" (1972) he sets out linguistic foundations for defence of critical rational dialogue against relativism and instrumental rationality. Three cognitive interests (based on Popper's three worlds; external, internal and intersubjective), the technical, the emancipatory (critical/ reflexive) and practical understanding, centred around three media; work, power, and interaction/language, give rise to three sciences; empirical/analytical, critical, and historical hermeneutic.

While encroachment by one into the sphere of another is inappropriate (see below) each shares a common linguistic foundation. A fourth category of communication is put forward,

³⁴.. as self knowledge (individual and social) is often inhibited by unacknowledged conditions, self reflection leads to insight" (1974, pp.22-3).

“comprehensibility”, based on the “propositional rules” of any attempt to communicate clearly. Habermas draws on Chomsky (1968), Searle (1969) and Austin (1962) to outline underlying foundations of all language, what he calls “universal pragmatics”, a normative standard embedded in language, the implied intention to communicate. Beneath surface hermeneutic differentials lies a “depth hermeneutic” of translational grammar. The structure of speech is held to involve the anticipation of a form of life in which truth, freedom and justice are possible. In the ability to use language, “communicative competence”, each user bares the potential to question and critically evaluate. Hence within imminent pragmatics lies a “universal pragmatic” tendency towards what Habermas calls the “ideal speech situation”, where distorted communication is questioned.

While in the mid 1970’s Habermas toyed with a social psychoanalysis, his 1980’s “Theory of Communicative Action” is built around different themes, the relationship between system (instrumental action in relation to the non-social, and strategic action in relation to the social; its media being money and power) and lifeworld (built around an orientation to understand: communicative action in two spheres, the private and the public). The colonisation of the lifeworld by system represents an imposition of instrumental and strategic logics within the realm of intersubjective communicative action.

2.1.4.4.5. Technology and Advanced Capitalism.

Marcuse’s “One Dimensional Man” (1964) distinguishes authentic individuality (autonomy, creative self, reflection and power/will) from “one dimensional man” (mimesis, un-reflexivity, conformity and powerlessness). The misuse of technology and affluence negates freedom. Marcuse’s “The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man” (1963) suggests the patriarchal father figure has been displaced by the mass culture of advanced capitalism, “the administered reality principle”. In “One Dimensional Man” “people recognise themselves in their commodities”. Man is reduced to an object within the technologies of administration, production and consumption. Technology replaces ontology. “Domination is transfigured into technology”. The political universe is closed within the frozen dialectics of cold war and western binary party democracy. Ideology becomes reality and reality ideological; the base and superstructure implode within Keynesian welfare and warfare systems. Art becomes a market adjunct. Sex becomes business and business becomes sexy;

repressive desublimation channels permissiveness back into the repressive apparatus. Historical amnesia, within the advert, fashion, pop chart and sound bite, closes off past and future. Research becomes tautology, empiricism mirrors an ideologically constructed reality. America is democratic because it conforms to democratic definitions drawn from what America is. Facts become their own ideological props. "Marxism is obsolete precisely to the degree which the obsolescence validates the basic concepts of the theory" (1965a, p. 151).

Habermas's "Towards a Rational Society" (1970b), as well as his dialogues with Niklas Luhmann (1971), focus on the danger of politics being reduced to technical administration (something he accuses Marx of (1979)). His essays (1970b) on science as politics present four aspects of the collapse of value rational dialogue into instrumental management: i) social questions become technical questions, ii) choice is reduced to "scientific" strategies, iii) values are instrumentalized, iv) politics becomes scientific management.

State administered capitalism has displaced the traditional class cleavage through the reduction of social reproduction to the same logic as social production. The conflict has been displaced to the margins of production, the ghetto and the campus. The reduction of society to productive efficiency is found on both left and right, east and west. "Theory of Society or Social Technology: What Does Systems Research Accomplish?" (1971) contains a dialogue between Habermas and Luhmann. Meaning, for Luhmann, is an ordering principle within systems, as is language money, power, love etc., vehicles through which action and identity is ordered and enacted. System is the ordering of relations between the social and its environment (including people for Luhmann). With truth as a "system induced medium for action", there is no external validation. Luhmann rejects ideology critique.

Habermas points out the "performative contradiction" involved in Luhmann's claims. He sees such a theory as indicative of the distorted communication that represents the social as a thing. "The key to Luhmann's argument is that the internal complexity of developed social systems can be increasingly better managed to the degree that the centrally regulated programmes of action are severed from the motivations of action of those who are affected" (p. 263). The post-script to the book is entitled "On Complexity and Democracy". While Luhmann recognises the existence of "rationality deficits", Habermas wants to refer to them as "legitimation crises". Habermas wants to argue that the "consensual" view of systems

theory masks growing social contradictions between system conceptions of “efficiency” and personal “motivation” and political “legitimacy”.

2.1.4.4.6. Agency, Students, the Great Refusal and Legitimation Crisis.

Both find sources of resistance to system logic in the lifeworld of human non-instrumental interests, though for Marcuse this combines surplus consciousness and the bodies desire for sensual emancipation, while Habermas retains a more rationalist account of intersubjective dialogue resisting system defined efficiency.

The “reification of the proletariat” left a vacuum. Marcuse’s “great refusal” links an array of struggles from third world liberation to the disaffection of students and the new white collar working classes in advanced states. Drawing on Breton’s surreal anarchism and Heidegger’s existential “radical act”, the “great refusal” contains strong irrationalist elements, and Marcuse advocated violent and confrontational provocations. His critique of “pure (or repressive) tolerance” (1965b) called for intolerance towards the intolerable. He distinguished the violence of oppressor and oppressed. “An Essay on Liberation” (1969b) endorsed the flower-power generation. As national liberation struggles sent the contradictions of global domination back to the metropolitan centres the essay foresaw a growing legitimation crisis within working class youth and middle class students. A new militancy was seen growing within the new white collar working classes, critical not only of working conditions but the “affluence” supposed to reward it. In general emphasis shifted from exploitation to the oppression and repression.

The 1970’s saw Marcuse critical of the “Jacobin” tactics of German terrorists for taking his critique of tolerance too far. Marcuse turned to the Eurocommunist “long march through the institutions” against the Bolshevik “myth of October”. Nevertheless he still supported anti-institutional resistance, in particular the citizens initiatives in West Germany and the charter movements in Eastern Europe. He adopted Rudolf Bahro’s theory of “surplus consciousness” (1978), the overproduction of reflexive resources by the productivist system. Marcuse did not seek to impose unity on emerging movements while retaining the Marxist belief that the totality must be overturned if the particulars were to be emancipated.

For Habermas (1976a) advanced capitalism had displaced economic crisis tendencies through increased state directed macro-economic rationality. The emergence of welfare capitalism, was designed to offset the difficulties of capital. However displacement of economic contradictions is only partial, re-emerging within the political and cultural sub-systems, as legitimation and motivational crises respectively. Increased pressure falls on the state to rectify the market's "rationality deficits", undermining "fair exchange". This rationality crisis within politics feeds a legitimation crisis at the level of political identity. The logic of rights pushes the state towards further intervention, to tax and borrow; weakening the economy further.

The rationality and legitimation crises at the level of political system and identity also generate a motivational crisis at the level of socio-cultural identity. Civic privatism and competitive success orientation give way to a greater desire for equality and justice, collective life and cooperation. New movements emerge to challenge the logic of bourgeois "private" and "public" life. While economic crisis and the withdrawal of the state in many areas of regulating inequalities has weakened the force for radical change engendered in the legitimation crisis thesis, new social movements at the political level and personal cynicism at the motivational level (see Sloterdijk 1988) bear out significant aspects of the thesis, though not fully as originally formulated.

Habermas, like Marcuse, attacked 1970's ultra left terrorism, and was a keen supporter of the citizen's initiatives. He was also, like Marcuse, particularly positive about the feminist challenge to "private" and "public" convention. Habermas was more critical than Marcuse of the irrationalist tendencies of the flower power phantom revolution for its withdrawal and utopian mysticism. Habermas places strong emphasis on the increased level of education within new social movements. Struggles in the lifeworld of non-instrumental communication, oriented towards understanding, against the logics of money and power. In common with new social movement theorists in general he examines the formation of both identity and rationality within the transformed conditions of "post-industrial society".

2.1.4.4.7. Conclusions on Marcuse and Habermas.

Central to my research are two dimensions of the System/Lifeworld relationship.³⁵

³⁵ Habermas (1987 vol. 2, p. 151): "The fundamental problem for social theory is how to connect

2.1.4.4.7.1. Lifeworld: Locality, Community and Communicative Action?

In criticizing the philosophy of consciousness which underpins phenomenology, as well as structural functionalist role theory, Habermas attempts to reconstruct a critical theory based on intersubjective communicative action. Developing (using linguistic theory) Mead's communicative reconstruction of Durkheimian theory, Habermas seeks to reformulate the relationship between systematic differentiation of lifeworld spheres (based upon the division of labour in society) and normative consensus formation (the conscience collective) so as to "conceive of societies simultaneously as systems and lifeworlds" (1987 vol. 2, p. 118).

The differentiation of lifeworld spheres of action (instrumental, normative and expressive) brought about by the increasing division of labour in society does not lead simply to either anomie or disillusion. Rationalization is not only reification. Reconstructing Durkheim, through Mead, Habermas refers to the linguistification of the sacred. Weber's complaint about the reduction of life to instrumental rationality is shown (Habermas 1987, Vol. 1) to be largely based on Weber's own reduction of rationality to instrumentality in his accounts of modern science, bureaucracy art and in particular law. Habermas suggests that far from being eliminated: "the socially integrative [normative] and expressive functions that were at first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action; the authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus" (1987, Vol. 2, p. 77).

As suggested above, phenomenological accounts suggest: "The lifeworld is given to the experiencing subject as unquestionable" (Habermas, 1987 Vol. 2, p. 131). The linguistification of the sacred, lifeworld rationalization, understood as intersubjective communication, autonomous self-development (Mead's communicative and individuated "I"), as well as, and not reducible to, instrumental mechanical and strategic action, creates the possibility for a democratizing and "open" field of "discursive will formation".

Lifeworld is neither a detached realm of personal pre-social experience, nor the sealed realm of taken-for-granted shared understanding; neither the realm of authentic personal experience in resistance to social rationalization (qua Weber) nor the residual realm of the sacred through which social integration can be salvaged as an essential addition to functional system

in a satisfactory way the two conceptual strategies indicated by the notions of "system" and "lifeworld".

integration (qua Durkheim). The lifeworld, site of normative orientation towards shared understanding, in the process of the linguistification of the sacred, becomes the locus for the emergence of challenges to those forms of social rationalization based on strictly instrumental (mechanistic and strategic) principles. The colonization of the lifeworld by reified systems (i.e. modes of instrumental rationality inappropriately applied to human intersubjectivity and/or personal identity) is seen as the generalized tendency of state and market to objectify people as functional elements. Resistance to reified modes of rational action emerge in the lifeworld through the emancipatory side of the rationalization process.

System and Lifeworld, both sites for social rationalization, thus, should not be equated with community and society, at least as formulated in the developmental accounts of Tonnes, Durkheim or Parsons. Equally Habermas's rejection of "the phenomenological, linguistic and ethnomethodological variants of interpretive sociology, which as a rule do not get beyond reformulations of a more or less trivial everyday knowledge" (1987, Vol. 2, p. 148), mean his conception of lifeworld should not be equated with micro-interactional situations as such. Lifeworld is not "the local" set in counter-position to system as "the social whole". Society is system and lifeworld simultaneously, a totality of instrumental and normative action. While communicative action may lead to the questioning of strategic modes of action in the form of local or community protest against state or market power, lifeworld is neither locality or community in opposition to totality as such. Communicative action, intersubjective will formation, may occur at any level of geographical scale. Universalizing critical normative and expressive discourses (such as for liberty, equality, free speech etc) may be localized in particular struggles but are not local as such. Equally the confrontation between instrumental and communicative rational orientations (between system and lifeworld) occur within all social institutions (within the media/cultural, educational, legal, political and economic sub-systems). Avoiding equation of lifeworld/system with community/society or with local/global has important implications for the study of movement in relation to "the system", in particular when thinking about the question of the local and the global (see chapter 4).

2.1.4.4.7.2. Lifeworld: Differentiation or Natural Harmony?

Habermas suggests that the radical potential of the lifeworld stems from the differentiation of the instrumental, normative and expressive modes or rational action. With the instrumental

being itself divided into the mechanical (in relation to object/physical world) and the strategic (in relation to the social world), the normative and expressive dimensions resist intrusion of strategic action into the domain of social interaction and personal experience, while freeing social understanding from mechanistic bio-physical reductionism. However Marcuse's suggestion that the lifeworld of sensual experience is a site of resistance to instrumental knowledge and control formulates the meaning of "lifeworld" differently and suggests a de-differentiation of mind and body, nature and society that is radically at odds with Habermas's conception. This question of differentiation and/or de-differentiation of instrumental, normative (ethical) and expressive (aesthetic) forms of rationality, with particular regard to human relations with the non-human raises a crucial question over what is to be understood by "environment" in its relationship to "movement" (again a key theme in my empirical research). "Lifeworld" and "system" is taken up in the next chapter.

2.2. Social Movement Theory and the Question of Agency and Structure.

In the preceding analysis of social movement theory I have shown the centrality of the need to overcome binary oppositions - between agency and structure, base and superstructure, resources and sources of identity. Nevertheless this gives no blueprint for understanding social movements. While the gulf between Resource Mobilization and New Social Movement theories may in places be artificially exaggerated, for instance in Klandermans and Tarrow (1988), just as the R.M. perspective exaggerated its break with Collective Behaviour theory in the 1970's (see Rucht 1991), a wide divide still separates the more empirically narrow studies of the former, aimed at understanding micro-mobilization- the "how" question of particular movement practices and potential- and theoretical endeavours to locate particular instances of protest and cultural transformation within a general theory of social change in advanced industrial societies. In chapter five I outline my own limited research agenda, and its relationship to this divergence. Chapter six outlines a methodology that attempts to realise that research agenda.

Outlining the work of a series of European theorists I have attempted to demonstrate a fundamental transformation in thinking about radical social change across the twentieth century, whilst also showing a coherent narrative. The terms within which radical politics has been conceptualized in Western Europe, I suggested, were themselves set between two polar

opposites, those of “Elite Pluralism” and “Elite Marxism”, manifested institutionally as the “West” and the “East”, and intellectually in the works of Michels and Lukacs. While diametrically opposed each drew legitimacy from the belief that within advanced industrial societies participatory democracy was simply not possible as the fragmented experience of the “masses” made elite domination/leadership inevitable, whether for maintaining order or overthrowing it. The thread that binds “Western Marxism”, the New Left, and the New Social Movements is the attempt to conceptualise and promote modes of political practice that challenged this frozen polarity - the Cold War binary sameness of two mill stones.

The question of unity and difference (in Gramsci and Melucci), of totality and historicity (in Sartre and Touraine) and over the meaning and potential of lifeworld as site of resistance to oppressive instrumentalism (in Marcuse and Habermas) relate centrally to the study of “local environmental movements”. What is a movement to be understood as? Where does such a term stand in the spectrum between “party” (as understood, differently, by Michels, Lukacs and Gramsci) and “network” (as found in Melucci’s writing)? While Touraine’s benchmark of historical action, the orientation towards totalization, plays a similar role in his work, as Habermas’s “ideal speech situation” (each one a pure form of human intersubjective collectivity to be set against reified forms of human interaction), Habermas is primarily engaged in a defensive theorisation of plural resistance to the colonization of the lifeworld by modes of objectification, while Touraine’s focus is on the possibility of going beyond a multiplicity of sites of resistance towards a radical overhaul of the social whole. As for Marcuse’s “spontaneous revolution”, its impossibility cannot be theoretically grounded. The question: “what is meant by movement?” is left open.

The relationship between the human and the non-human, as well as between agency and totality pose similar questions, how is the lifeworld of non-instrumentality to be understood and what are the sources of identity and difference in the absence of foundations? What is the relationship between community (ethical identification and expressive harmony) and the environment (extra-human) as well as locality (place)? These issues are addressed below.

3. The Environment and Sociological Theory.

3.1. Introduction.

This chapter begins with the theme of “man’s” separation from “nature” and goes on to address four rational relations between the “human” and the “non-human” and questions of agency leading from them. These are (i) knowledge of the “external” world and the question of relativism (Section 3.2. on Mary Douglas and Ulrich Beck, Mannheim and David Bloor); (ii) the instrumental relation to nature or “Environmentalism”, (with a capital E), as “enlightened” self-interest (Sections 3.3.); (iii) “Deep Ecology’s” “ethical” relation to the non-human, including “eco-feminism’s” critique of masculine domination, and the “animal rights” critique of anthropo-centrism (Sections 3.4.); and finally (iv) where the aesthetic conception of natural value is related to questions of agency and resource mobilisation (Sections 3.5.). It should be recalled that “environmentalism” (with a small e) will be used to refer to the spectrum of discourses and organizational practices within which “Environmentalism” (with a capital E), as the instrumental orientation to protection of the non-human on grounds of human self-interest, can be distinguished from “Ecology” (as non-anthropocentrically ethical in motive) and “conservation” (as aesthetic orientation to the value of the non-human). The three conceptual distinctions are ideal types, not empirical categories or variables.³⁶

Conceptions of “social ecology”, like the functionalist “organic analogy” objectify the social world in which individuals act. Similarly representing nature as purely external and unchanging stage ignores the role of people in reconstructing nature. However the social constructivist critique of objectification is misleading. Marx’s idea of nature as man’s

³⁶The position of “environmental science” (the pure rational relation to the non-human), is also of central importance to the general field of “environmentalism”. The deployment of such translocal discourses within disputes is a regular feature of campaigning and counter-campaigning. However my research, not being within the translocal arenas of scientific production, tended to cover receipt, application and contestation over interpretation, rather than the kinds of fascinating data that would emerge from ethnographic study of laboratory and scientific culture (such as in the work of Woolgar (1988), Latour (1993), Knorr-Cetina and Mulkey (1983) etc). The application of the sociology of scientific knowledge to what Beck calls the reflexive technostructures of late modernity (the translocal networks of science, media, pressure groups, corporations and politicians) represents a key site for future research.

external body, which the rational enlightenment project must come to master, is perhaps the most explicit formulation of the “internalization” thesis which has been of crucial importance, but is highly problematic, being based on a mechanistic model of natural processes, reflecting the technological impulse to reduce nature to a series of simple processes to be applied in control and re-organization. Modern ecology has replaced simple mechanistic accounts of nature with awareness of complex interrelations, a degree of density that cannot be mapped with simple linear models of cause and effect. The unforeseen consequences of interventions in the natural world are only now “coming home to roost”. The rational planning model of human/natural relations is weakened as our ability to map the effects of our actions falters. Yet the environmental movement cannot abandon human reason, unless it believes that the earth will rectify itself, and, this is not necessarily reassuring to those humans who figure such a restoration may not spare them. Heightened consciousness of indetermination, what Beck calls the “risk society”, limits enlightenment self-confidence, whilst requiring that we act upon the shakey knowledge that we may still have good enough reason to trust.

Edward Goldsmith (1988), distinguishes “the real and the surrogate worlds”. The modern industrial society understands itself as autonomous. Goldsmith argued “It is the biosphere that is being industrialized. In this way, a new organization of matter is building up: the techno-sphere or world of material goods and technological devices: or the surrogate world” (p. 185). Benton (1994) writes, sociology emerges with the industrial revolution, seeking to explain the new society by the internal social relations of that society, avoiding biological and psychological reductionism. Durkheim, Weber and Marx all saw the social world as “real” in its autonomy from nature. The environmental movement is embedded within the very social relations it questions. Accounts must address the social construction of both knowledge and action over “nature” within the “social”³⁷.

My intention here is to examine the interconnection between knowledge and action in relation to the “environment” through examining relations between environmental science and environmental movements, avoiding objectivism (hard science driving political action) and

³⁷Knee jerk sociological relativism needs caution. It is necessary to distinguish between “co-evolutionary” approaches which look at the physical influence of man on the non human world, and the relativistic accounts.

relativism (the pure cultural construction of threats). I suggest a Mannheimian relational approach to knowledge. Dobson (1990, p. 24) sets out four “Lessons from Nature”, guides to social conduct derived from scientific ecology and political Ecology.

Nature.	Diversity	Interdependence	Longevity	Nurturance
Society.	Tolerance	Equality	Tradition	Feminism

Political Ecology (Green Politics with a capital G) insists society must both restore its own embeddedness within a “natural order”, and respect the intrinsic value of the non-human. However, as Gorz (1983), Ryle (1983) and others point out, the social application of such “lessons of nature” has no necessary form. From the above list it would be possible to derive liberal tolerance, socialist equality, conservative tradition and eco-feminist maternalism. Whilst it is possible to claim ecological politics represents a synthesis of all the above traditions (“neither left nor right but in front”) the question of how that synthesis is constructed cannot simply graft nature and society.

As O’Riordan (1981) points out ecological lessons can be applied in at least four distinct forms, new global democracy (reformed United Nations), new global authoritarian regime of trans-national elites, authoritarian autarchic communalism (new dark ages), or neo-anarchist commune model based on Bahro style communitarian brotherhood. Critics of the Rio summit point out that its “sustainability” was largely the projection of northern definitions of the problem, its final programme for “sustainable development” endorsed G.A.T.T. and structural adjustment programmes. Areas of deadlock, such as forest sovereignty, and responsibility cannot be overcome through simplistic recourse to scientific evidence. Constructions of the “problems” and “solutions” go on within the social sphere, and cannot be read off as an objective “crisis” with neutral solutions. Any alteration can be borne by a variety of different groups. Who pays when the polluter pays (companies, employees, customers, or their employers)? Kitsuse and Spector (1981, p. 201) set out the constructivist account: “The existence of social problems depends on the continued existence of groups or agencies that define some condition as a problem and attempt to do something about it”. What Becker (1963) calls “moral entrepreneurship” is a first principle of resource mobilisation theory. It is through movement mobilization that “problems” are “created”.

Social constructivists are accused of fuelling the “business as usual” school of thought, who play on scientific uncertainty. The bracketing out of “external” questions, i.e. the objectivity or otherwise of the “crisis”/“problem” that movements mobilize around, is defended as a form of ethical neutrality by resource mobilization theorists. However such an approach tends to underrepresent the ability of those in highly resourced positions to bury and defuse issues before they become “problems”³⁸. Playing on uncertainty over exact cause and effect polluters escape liability, pointing out the impossibility of using statistical correlations to demonstrate individual causation. Claims from the environmental lobby are dismissed as “unconfirmed” (when “absolute” confirmation is impossible). For others the principle of uncertainty is the foundation for a “precautionary principle”. This requires a gestalt shift in outlook, not simply “better” evidence. As Buttel and Taylor (1994) point out, there is a tendency in environmental sociology, to adopt a form of selective relativism. Mary Douglas claims to explain these “cultural biases”.

3.2. Environmental knowledge.

3.2.1. Mary Douglas: Risk and Blame - an anthropological view.

“In *Purity and Danger* [Douglas 1966] the rational behaviour of the primitives is vindicated: taboo turns out not to be incomprehensible but an intelligible concern to protect society from behaviour that will wreck it” (Douglas 1994, p. 4). Douglas attempts to overcome the view that “... they [the primitives] engage dangers politically on behalf of the constitution, [while] we have disengaged dangers from politics and ideology, and deal with them in the light of science.” She suggests that while cultures vary “... the anthropologist notices that for any misfortune there is a fixed repertoire of possible causes among which a plausible explanation is chosen, and a fixed repertoire of obligatory actions follow on the choice. Communities tend to be organized on one or another dominant form of explanation.”

Industrial society accounts for human suffering from the viewpoint of individual as victim rather than as punishment for moral transgressions. Blame lies in the “system”, individuals are blameless: “Whose fault? is the first question... Under the banner of risk reduction, a new blaming system has replaced the former combination of moralistic condemning the victim and opportunistic condemning the victims incompetence.” “The new sense of the word risk

³⁸ Crenson (1971) called this the “un-politics of air pollution”, the systematic under-playing of objective problems by those with an interest in business as usual.

works because it can be strongly biased towards emancipation. The context of a shared commitment to emancipation bends its meaning to refer only to danger. Whereas originally a high risk meant a game in which a throw of the die had a strong probability of bringing great gain or great loss, now risk refers only to negative outcomes. The word has been pre-empted to mean bad risks. The promise of good things in contemporary political discourse is couched in other terms. The language of risk is reserved as a specialized lexical register for political talk about the undesirable abuse of power. The charge of causing risk is a stick to beat authority... to exact restitution for victims” (p. 24).³⁹

At this stage at least the question is not that of the reality of the threat but of the way responsibility is laid only at the door of the “system”, while the individual is seen as moral victim: “This argument is not about the reality of the dangers, but about how they are politicized....” (p. 24). “Within the cultural debate about risk and justice opponents seek to inculcate the other side and exonerate their own supporters from blame.” According to “cultural theory” (the stunningly general sounding epithet which Douglas (et al) give their perspective), there are four types of culture which can be distinguished, based upon four kinds of organisation structure, or what Douglas (1994, pp. 211-34) refers to as “thought styles” characteristic of such institutional structures. She presents four myths of nature; which, she contends, structure perception of the strength of the natural world to the pressures put upon it by human economic activity. Each view can be represented by a ball on a line: a) Nature as Capricious - ball on flat surface - it could go anywhere - grounds for a fatalist account of predicting or tackling environmental threats; b) Nature as Fragile - ball on top of curved line - liable to roll down if disturbed - grounds for frugalist/ regulative /communitarian outlook seeing imminent danger and demanding tough action; c) Nature as robust - ball in dip - cornucopian model - ball always returns to equilibrium - no need to panic - grounds for free market expansionist faith endorsing risk; d) Nature as robust within limits - ball in shallow lipped dip - ball won't stray if disruption is limited - market with some regulations - “hierarchicalist” desires flexible but ordered system.

³⁹“Being “at risk” in modern parlance... is equivalent to being sinned against... The sin/taboo rhetoric is more often used to uphold the community, vulnerable to the misbehaviour of the individual, while the risk rhetoric upholds the individual, vulnerable to the misbehaviour of the community.”

Having ordered all possible outlooks into a structural schema, reducing each to cultural pre-conceptions - largely immune from empirical refutation - Douglas selects her preference - both in relation to environment and in regard to the condition of Western culture which she feels needs overhauling. For Douglas the best attitude to adopt in relation to nature is that which best serves the culture's "needs" - that which best approximates her quasi functionalist conception of culture's role in ordering social life. She rejects the "nature as robust" free marketeer account - on the grounds that the individualist account of risk and blame is solely concerned with individual emancipation rather than social responsibility. She rejects the fatalist account by an even more tortured route - redrawing Pascal's wager into a bet in favour of the existence of a predictable reality beyond sensation, and recruiting Isaiah Berlin's critical account of Russian intellectual pessimism in the mid 19th century as an allegorical expose of today's post-modern nihilistic fatalists. Finally she rejects "communards", those demanding radical overhaul of society, drawing on Mancur Olson (1965). Such groups, lacking resources and selective incentives needed to develop political alternatives (so becoming sectarian and insular), are good at setting off alarms, but tend to do so through internal dynamics rather than objective external threats. They are "well adapted to pick up and relay warnings of low probability, high consequence disasters because [their] internal structure creates problems which are habitually solved by identifying distant dangers and associating them with [a] large conspiracy..." (p. 74). In her rejection of these vaguely described "voluntary" organisations (so vague as to imply all while naming none) via Mancur Olson's (1965) rational choice model of collective action and the problem of the free-rider and selective incentives, she seems blithely unaware of a glaring inconsistency. She applies Olson's homo-oeconomicus to discredit groups that openly reject its logic, yet reiterates at all other junctures the need to abandon methodological individualism in understanding motivation, rationality, perception and identification.

She chooses the "hierarchicalist" "thought - style", as this outlook provides the best means of overcoming the problems she identifies in the other accounts. She concludes that: "Today I am arguing that unless we learn to control our cultivated gut response against the idea of hierarchy we will have no choice among models of the good society to counter our long established predatory, expansionary trend. By sheer default, among cultural forms hierarchy is the rejected Other... Yet hierarchy is the social form that can impose economies, and make constraints acceptable" (p. 266). The ruthless use of convenient (though incompatible)

theories, selected from every possible social science, and stratospheric abstractions, gives Douglas's account the superficial appearance of sophistication. However her account is simple structural functional reductionism. "This thesis is an extension of Durkheim's thesis about the political uses of crime to the political uses of misfortune" (1994, p. 6).

I conclude with an account of Douglas's interpretation and critical comments on Ulrich Beck's "Risk Society" (1992). I suggest that what she finds in Beck to be at odds with her own account is largely what her account lacks, and that her attempt to substitute her "cultural theory" for Beck's "critical theory" is deeply self-limiting for social theory. After outlining Beck's suggestion of the reflexive shift towards concern over the distribution of social "bads", over focus on the distribution of social goods, Douglas attacks Beck's conception of risk. "Like the general public, he uses the word "risk" as danger, disregarding its origins and its technical applications and its intimate present connection with probability theory and the theory of rational choice. Risks, as Beck uses the term, are uncontrollable scientific, technical or social developments which were started long before their side effects or long term consequences were known... He has brought the experts' arcane discussions of individual perception of risk full into the light of politics and into the impassioned intellectual debates on consciousness in modernity and post-modernity" (p. 45.)

"His [Beck's] expectation of the new risk society is that all, and especially scientists, should lose their innocence, no longer pretend to be apolitical, but instead try to possess fuller consciousness. This would mean trying to know where the political stakes lie and also where the individual stands in relation to them. Beck exhorts rather than proposes a method for achieving this consciousness. But cultural theory is such a method" (p. 50). As regards the first element (association of risk with danger and victimhood) Douglas asserts her anti-emancipatory claim that risk should be understood as personal responsibility and obligation to the group and not simply with authorities' responsibility for the hazards which face individual subordinates. Her disagreement with Beck lies in his attention to relations of power within society which lead him to attribute responsibility for the unequal production and distribution of "bad" risks unevenly between those with more or less control, just as earlier critical theorists focused on unequal relations of production and consumption of social goods. Douglas's functionalist account, lacking an account of domination, sees in Beck's work a one sided account of responsibility.

As for the second argument about opening up scientific debate to “possess fuller consciousness”, Douglas appears to appropriate Beck’s arguments and then shrink them to a functionalist remit. Beck’s claim that scientific knowledge is intimately bound up with political relations of selection, application and interpretation, is taken by Douglas to endorse “Cultural Theory”. However, Beck’s dialectical theory of relations between science and politics derives from Habermas and Mannheim, not from Durkheim. While the German tradition attempts reflexivity, the French tradition in sociology has tended to normative reductionism. Cultural theory, in this regard, is the more one sided account.

3.2.2. Mannheim’s Relational Theory of Knowledge.

These debates mirror Mannheim’s criticism of left and right antagonists in politics. In “Ideology and Utopia” (1948) Mannheim sets out a theory of knowledge beyond objectivism and social constructivism, beyond, but indebted to, Marx’s theory of ideology. Antagonists attempt to reveal blind spots within opponents’ arguments. This Mannheim calls the “particular” account of ideology. This is superseded by a “total” account of ideology when an antagonist’s whole world view is said to be a manifestation of their social background, class position and interests. Mannheim argues that this form of critique is exemplified in Marx. Mannheim goes one step further, to a general theory of ideology, where reflection is brought to bear upon the ideological foundations not only of opponents’ worldviews, but also of one’s own. The general theory of ideology attempts to demonstrate that all knowledge emerges out of interested social relations. Mannheim’s “relational theory of knowledge” attempts to show both that no knowledge is absolutely “objective”, but neither is all knowledge relative. To say that a particular construction is embedded within the social relations of its production is not to say it is reducible to them.

For Mannheim, the intelligentsia occupy a relatively detached social position. Relative autonomy from directly class bound economic activity, intellectual competition and a degree of heterogeneity and openness, encourages heightened critical distance and ambivalence. He believed that members of this “stratum” were best able to overcome crude ideological thinking.⁴⁰ The development of a large middle class in welfare capitalism can be seen as the realization of his hope that a relatively mobile middle mass and a large higher educated

⁴⁰ This argument resurfaced in the 1950’s in Germany with the Adorno-Popper debate over the social preconditions for science (Adorno et al 1976).

intelligentsia, would mitigate the politics of class polarization. This middle mass lacks strong class identification, and is intellectually and materially resourced to engage in non-mass party politics, the politics of new social movements. The relative classlessness of the middle mass produces a political spectrum from careerist materialists to socialist egalitarians and ecological frugalists. It is this combination of diversity and resources that Mannheim hoped would allow a more non-dogmatic and self-critical social production of knowledge. Mannheim's relatively classless intelligentsia should not be confused with Merton's idealized open and egalitarian community of scientific knowledge production. Conflict between the culture of critical discourse and career/status within the present order exists. It was only in the 1960's that the social sciences began to take on a pluralistic aspect, and in the physical sciences corporate and military interests even in the conduct of primary science, is only in the last two decades really beginning to face challenges from a well resourced counter-science. That the environmental lobby has resourced both the production and distribution of counter-science has made science political, or, as Beck argues, reflexive (i.e. self-confronting). Whilst each side attempts to reduce its opponents "science" to the interests of its production base, the reflexivity of science need not, if we follow Mannheim, mean relativism. Complexity, reflexivity and openness have led to awareness of uncertainty. Yet absence of certainty does not leave us with nothing. That knowledge production is never pure is not to say it is pure ideology. The discovery that the correspondence theory of truth is not tenable leads relativists to claim that all knowledge claims are equal, but this is an immense logical mistake, and is perhaps contrary to relativism's own premises.

David Bloor (1991), coming from a position close to relativism, makes a useful observation. Bloor defends the "Strong Programme" (the strong version of the social construction of scientific knowledge) against those who suggest that the thesis is self refuting. He writes: "If someone's beliefs are totally caused and if there is necessarily within them a component provided by society then it has seemed to many critics that these beliefs are bound to be false or unjustified. Any thorough-going sociological theory of belief then appears to be caught in a trap... Must they not therefore admit that their own claims are false in proportion to the strength of this determination?" (p. 13). Bloor counters by suggesting such a criticism is only valid if one accepts that socially constructed knowledge must always be distorted knowledge, whilst truth stems only from unmediated rational thought or purified empirical

perception. “This approach can be summed up by the claim that nothing makes people do things that are correct but something does make, or cause, them to go wrong” (p. 8).

Another variant is the view that Sociologism must assume its own exclusion from social determination if it is to put forward its claims as “valid”. Bottomore (1956, p. 52) relativises the relativists : “For if all propositions are existentially determined and no proposition is absolutely true, then the proposition itself, if true, is not absolutely true, but is existentially determined.” Bloor points out that animal senses and thinking are not sufficient to produce knowledge. “First, it would be wrong to assume that the natural working of our animal resources always produces knowledge” (p. 14). Contrary to the view that the sole role of the sociologist in the study of knowledge production is to show how social influence induces “misperception”, Bloor suggests that social influences in constructing both perception and conception must also be seen as potential sources of insight and clarification. “Thus the knowledge of our culture, as it is represented in our science, is not knowledge of a reality that any individual can experience or learn about for himself. Knowledge then, is better equated with Culture than Experience” (p. 16).

“A steady stream of unavoidable misperceptions are always going to take place at the margins of scientific concern.” Is scientific knowledge thus invalid? Bloor suggests not: “What these case studies really show is not how unreliable perception is, or that it is a function of our desires, but how compelling is the demand by science that its standardised procedures be adhered to” (p. 30). Scientific knowledge is a particular social practice, of training, authority and career; and cannot claim recourse to any natural vantage on the “real”. “We never have the independent access to reality that would be necessary if it were to be matched up against our theories. The processes of scientific thought can all proceed, and have to proceed, on the basis of internal principles of assessment.” (Bloor, 1991, p. 40). Is science then merely a convention? Bloor rejects this view. “It is often assumed that if something is a convention then it is “arbitrary”. The reply is that conventions are not arbitrary. Not everything can be made a convention. And arbitrary decisions play little role in social life” (p. 43). “To say that the methods and results of science are conventions does not make them “mere” conventions” (p. 44).” Bloor concludes that the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge stands opposed to the role of “unmasking” science, a role often attributed to it: “...it has long been apparent to the more sophisticated sociologists of knowledge, like

Mannheim, that this approach will not stay the course... Sceptics will try to use the explanation of a belief to establish its falsehood. They will then destroy all claims to knowledge because there is no natural limit to the scope of causal explanation. The conclusion will be a self-defeating nihilism or incoherent special pleading” (p. 81). Science is not simply a method of observation, it is a set of social relations. Science’s partial closure and relative openness are socially constructed rules demanding self-critical discourse, even if reflexivity is never absolute. The emergence of counter science within science in late modernity, denies absolute knowledge, but does not deny knowledge absolutely.

Following Mannheim, it should not surprise us that the new middle classes should contain both scientific knowledge producers and the main protagonists of new social movements, including environmental movements. What is of significance is whether their “relatively classless” social position, while enabling their critical and material resources to be high, also disables them as coherent political actors, leaving them only the role of social engineers, rationalizing a system they have no capacity seriously to challenge. The role of non-governmental organizations at the Rio-summit can be viewed in this fashion. That heightened scientific reflexivity has both generated new knowledge agendas and denied them any naive certitude leaves open the possibility of doubt and question. Beyond the pure rational relation to nature, instrumental, ethical and aesthetic relations to the non-human are likewise neither naturally given, harmonious or antagonistic.

3.3. Instrumental Rationality, Environment and Industrial Society.

Instrumental relations to the non-human, based upon “interests” (however arrived at: whether “authentic” or “distorted”) contain two dimensions. They are social relations to the non-human, rather than individual relations. Just as the production and distribution of economic goods involve technical relations to nature and social relations between people, so in relation to the production and distribution of social bads, “interest” (in avoidance) involves both issues of what is to be produced, and questions of who is to receive the (in this case negative) output. Exposure to risk, like exploitation, is therefore physically and politically differential. However differential risk exposure, in itself, does not generate ‘risk consciousness’. The dull compulsion of everyday life, within both sets of “material” (intersubjective and physical) constraints ensures that those most at risk do not automatically

react, and may in fact be less likely to do so than those in better social and physical conditions. That the environmental agenda has been taken up by members of the Western middle classes, some of the world's most affluent people, raises the question of how a sustainability will be achieved that neither calls for the abandonment of the very affluence that marks out the movement's key constituency nor places the burden of sustainability on the poor. Whilst Marx saw the working class of the advanced capitalist countries as bearers of progress, can the new middle classes of advanced capitalism be given such a role? Trainer points out (1988, p. 3) "Our society does not constitute a model that can be achieved by all people; that is only a possibility for a few. So long as the majority of the world's people do not attain it, that determination on our part to retain our affluent way of life must eventually generate more and more serious resource conflicts". For all the "post-materialism" of the affluent middle classes, few have renounced their affluence. Bahro's claim that "with a pinch of salt one might say... the path of reconciliation with the third world might consist in our becoming third world ourselves" (1986, p. 87) hasn't swayed voters. While the preceding discussion (in sections 3.2 and 3.3.) highlighted difficulties in attributing objective risk, the following section examines "instrumentalist" approaches to environmental protection, the problematic suggestion of "universal human interests", and the question of agency able to bridge economic and environmental "human" self-interest.

While Marx saw the working class as bearer of the new society in the womb of the present, environmentalists have tended to see everyone as both guilty and potential redeemers. Jonathan Porritt writes: "The politics of the industrial age, left, right and centre, is like a three lane motorway, with different vehicles in different lanes, but all heading in the same direction... to the abyss" (Porritt, 1984, p. 43). Far from the road leading us to a better future, perhaps with a change of car, the road itself must be dug up! Rejecting class interest based models, greens often assume weight of valid argument represents their best vehicle for changing the behaviour of individuals and institutions. Porritt advocates a "change of consciousness". There is a strong tendency to mix abstract idealism with naive opportunism in the language of "universal interest". As Buttel and Taylor point out "within both science and politics, the "globalization" of the environment has served to steer attention away from analysing the different politics that result from different social groups and nations having highly variegated -if not conflicting- interests in contributing to and alleviating environmental problems" (1994, p. 228-9). The idea of "Natural" and "Neutral" solutions to environmental

threats is misconceived as any practical solution will involve choices that are differential in their effects, each interest seeking to secure “solutions” tailored to their particular needs.

Porritt sees industrialism’s concern with differentials as analogous to fighting over the deck chairs on the top deck of the Titanic, unequal or equal shares in oblivion. Garrett Hardin’s (1977) “Lifeboat Ethic” takes this view to survivalist extremes, if the boat is sinking then it is only those with the power and influence who will get a seat in the lifeboat, and once full, it would be madness to help others on board as this would sink all. Porritt and Hardin represent populist and elitist poles of a collapse scenario. Porritt calls for a sustainable democracy, whilst Hardin calls for a Leviathan to regulate the selfish “tragedy of the commons”. The M.I.T. Club of Rome “population time bomb” scenario (1983), envisaged barbarian hordes descending on civilization, across the Mediterranean and Rio-Grande, and just as the horde sacked Rome, so the lifeboat of the civilized west would be sunk. Samuel Huntington’s solution (1993) is to keep them out.

The focus on population growth as the main threat to “world” resources is generally taken to implicate the third world. Critics have picked up on the hypocrisy of affluent Europeans condemning the profligacy of southern family size. “The spectre of the hungry mob supports Hobbesian politics: a world of struggle and inadequate resources cries out for Leviathan” (Barnet 1980, p. 297-8). Whilst, under the impetus of the 1973 oil crisis, Western elites woke up to the issue of rendering their positions sustainable, Porritt’s more humane approach still lacks agency. To this end it is all the more understandable that, despite his and many green N.G.O.s’ criticisms of present global institutions, it is still these agencies that are called upon. Marx and Engels called such politics utopian.

Jonathan Porritt (in Dobson 1990, p. 158) writes: “It is the middle classes that have the flexibility to weather the traumatic shifts in social and economic patterns; by and large they are not the ones to suffer most from mindless jobs”. They have the time, energy, skills and self-confidence to take up politics. But these are the very resources that enable such strata to accommodate themselves to the system, regardless of their heightened sense of reflexive self-doubt. Many Greens, such as Bahro and Gorz, have looked to the margins of society to find agents of change, insulated by marginality from seduction by consumer society. Marcuse looked to “lumpen bourgeois” students, the unemployed and unemployable and the

non-white under-classes as marginal populations in the first world and in the south, as well as to women excluded from the paid labour market. Gorz (1982) sees the unemployed, not those in work, as potential sources of a new “prosumer” culture beyond production/consumption. Bahro saw in his “The Alternative in Eastern Europe” a similar development in both east and west of increased disaffection with the present industrial society and a growing gulf between de-skilled labour process and rising standards of education and access to information. Bahro, with Marcuse, talks of a growing “surplus consciousness”. However Gorz’s “non-class of post-industrial neo-proletarians”, Bahro’s “external proletariat” and Marcuse’s “Marginals” while not beneficiaries of present arrangements, are not likely agents of transformation, isolation and lack of resources making them weak candidates for revolution, more prone to apolitical passivity. As Raymond Williams (1986 and u.d.) argues, it is not realistic to found a strategy on an alliance of lumpen bourgeois radicals and lumpen proletarian marginals. He argues that so long as the environmental new social movement’s agenda fail to find resonance with the manual and routine non-manual working classes, this “effective majority” will provide a ready constituency for elite strategies for maintaining capitalist growth. How then can economic and environmental “interests” be rendered compatible? Under whose leadership and in whose dominant interests will the “material” constraints of nature and market be either integrated or transformed?

3.3.1. Green Consumerism and Environmental Economics.

One attempt to bridge the gulf between environmental and economic interests has been “Green Consumerism” and “Environmental Economics”. The ability to mobilize resources within the present economic/cultural system towards their change is to be achieved by turning the environmental agenda into a series of “valuable” commodities, which then have “weight” “in the real world of financial decision-making” (Jacobs (being ironic) 1994, p. 69). Pearce et al. argue the separation of the economic world from the natural is best overcome by internalizing nature within economic reasoning. “Free-goods”, like clean air and water, are given no economic value so long as they are not commodified and are therefore vulnerable to over-use, whilst economic waste production is equally externalized from economic valuation so long as pollution is not also commodified. For environmental economists of neo-classical persuasion the price mechanism is the best way to value both

consumer preferences and the natural world. To value the environment: “First we must create markets in previously free services” (Pearce et al 1989, pp. 154-5).

Neo-classical economics argues that homo-oeconomicus can be made the most efficient friend of the earth, marketing nature’s latent, though not intrinsic, value. The “polluter pays” principle, marginal cost rated pollution permits, contingent valuation and “willingness to pay” surveys, preference curve manipulation through re-jigging opportunity costs (via differential taxes and permit pricing) are part of the neo-classical armoury, effecting agency within the existing economic “real world”. Elkington and Hailes in “The Green Consumer Guide” write: “more and more of us want to do the right thing- we simply don’t know how”, and proclaim that their solution is no “hair coat scenario” (1988, p. 1). “It is designed to appeal to a sandals-to-Saab spectrum of consumers”. Whilst this spectrum is narrow, the book sold 350,000 copies in the U.K. by 1990, and was translated into nine languages. “Twenty years on from the heady days of the late 1960’s many baby boomers still subscribe to the idea of a “low input lifestyle”” (p. 4).

The hope of redirecting existing power relations finds an extreme formulation in Elkington and Burke’s “The Green Capitalists” - “Perhaps what we are seeing is the emergence of a new age capitalism appropriate to a new millennium, in which the boundaries between corporate and human values are beginning to dissolve” (1987, p. 250). Although Bell (1976) argues that contemporary capitalism is suffering the dislocation of economic efficiency and cultural personal self-realization, it is the logic of green consumer capitalism to efface the distinction between ethics and profit.⁴¹ The attempt to market ethical commitment, McCormick (1991) comments, may in an age of neo-liberal individualism be the individualized “conscience collective” of a society unable to think or act collectively. Such privatized morality goes hand in hand with the lifestyle ethics of those that neither believe in the political system they live in nor in their ability to change it radically. The mixture of ethical, health, psychological and lifestyle dimensions that make up “green” consumerism created and was created by the increasing sophistication of marketing and production

⁴¹As Anita Roddick puts it “I am still looking for the modern day equivalent of those Quakers who ran successful businesses, made money because they offered honest products and treated their people decently, worked hard, spent honestly, saved honestly, gave honest value for money, put back more than they took out and told no lies. This business creed seems long forgotten” (1992, p.8).

specialization offering personal salvation in the absence of government action. Maurice Hanssen's "E is for Additives" (1987) became a bible for parents, at a time when the government did not seem willing to intervene in the issue of corporate policies on food additives. As Rosalind Coward points out (1989), the contradictory relationship between "holism" and the marketing of personal responsibility and privatized self-protection, from exercise bikes to bottled water, reflects an individualistic and a-political cultural climate.

In 1989 Friends of the Earth initiated its "Green Con of the Year" scheme to weed out the half truths peddled by companies trying to persuade the world of their environmental credentials, whilst since 1986 F.o.E. have devoted an increasing amount of their resources to research to show companies how best to improve their performance. Corporate sponsorship, and even Greenpeace's increasing role as marketing agent, as well as the consultancy role increasingly played by environmental experts raises thorny questions of increased influence/co-optation. Yearley (1991) asks whether "Green shopping day" in 1989 should have been green no shopping day. The danger of co-optation reverses the "poacher turned gamekeeper" scenario.

Herman Daly's January 1994 departure, after six years of "internal exile", in the World Bank is a salutary lesson in global capitalism and environmental economics. Daly's "Steady State Economics" (1992) sets out an acute critique of free market economic dependence on "throughput", i.e. G.D.P., as prime register of success. Building to last, low entropic degradation and low throughput, principles of quality over quantity, are needed. Daly blamed the blinkered quantification of American social sciences and economics in particular for the absence of critical alternatives, a culture Adam Smith, as moral philosopher, would have disliked. Pearce's time as consultant to Environment Secretary Chris Patten (discussed next) equally showed up problems in "greening" capitalism.

3.3.2. Mrs Thatcher and the Environment.

On September 27th 1988 Mrs Thatcher made her now famous speech to the Royal Society (1990). She proclaimed the need to defend the ozone layer and halt climate change. On October 14th she told the Conservative Party conference that stewardship had always been at the heart of conservative thought and that the Tories were the true and traditional friends of the earth. She promoted nuclear energy as a safe, efficient and non-polluting "alternative" to

fossil fuels. This pro-nuclear Environmentalism was again her theme at the July 1989 Paris economic summit. That month Nicholas Ridley was replaced as Environment Secretary by the less hostile Chris Patten. Patten was set to drafting the government's "Environmental Protection Bill" and recruited Pearce to help wed Thatcherite economics to environmental protection. The white paper was presented to the cabinet on September 25th 1990 by which time much had changed. Mrs Thatcher's atomic Environmentalism had been thrown askew by the Nuclear Installation Inspectorate's report (released just after Patten's appointment) which concluded that each of Britain's seven remaining Magnox reactor stations, all reaching the end of their working lives, would cost around two billion pounds per station to decommission. The report was quickly followed by the resignation of Lord Marshall, chairman of the C.E.G.B., amidst allegations that he, along with the then energy secretary Cecil Parkinson, had misled the House of Commons over the true cost of nuclear energy.

Mrs Thatcher's commitment to reducing greenhouse gases evaporated. Just as her strong stance on the abolition of C.F.C. use had been based on the actual rapid replacement of C.F.C.'s by alternatives (largely other hydro-carbons) by most British companies in the three years prior to her speech (see McCormick 1991), so her commitment to reversing the greenhouse effect itself went into reverse as soon as it was no longer economically expedient. By the time "This Common Inheritance" was presented at cabinet in 1990, environmental economic measures like the polluter pays principle and graduated carbon taxes, along with commitments to reducing emissions of carbon dioxide, later to be re-affirmed at Rio and then sidelined again, were shelved. Parkinson (then transport secretary), Wakeman (energy), and the treasury duo, Lamont and Major, united to weed out elements in the bill that put sustainability before growth. The shock of the 1989 green vote in the euro-elections was fading and recession replaced climate change in Whitehall priorities.

Pearce's brand of environmental market research is based largely on the individual rational calculating actor drawn from neo-classical economic theory. Jacobs (1994, pp. 67-91) points out that most people do not think of nature's "value" simply as "exchange value". People are not the profit-maximizing individualists which neo-classical models of rational knowing homo-oeconomicus present as universal. Market mechanisms do not necessarily work in re-orienting human behaviour, as the theory of methodological individualism suggests.

Behaviour is not governed solely by rational calculation of individual self interest, fully understood, in conditions of “perfect knowledge”. Preferences are governed by institutional and personal routines, community standards and values. Legal restrictions and state intervention, rather than market mechanics, are often more effective means of bringing change in energy use, pollution control, or protection of a particular species.

Equally, the neo-classical belief that demand is exogenous to the market place, and so should be held constant in calculating appropriate market solutions, is false. Methodological individualist assumptions that preferences precede social and economic context are equally absurd. The market is not merely a neutral vehicle servicing prior intrinsic preferences. The market structures our lives and needs. Rendering present demand “sustainable” is just one strategy towards sustainability; no more neutral than suggesting alternative institutional frameworks. Environmental economics (whilst attempts are made to market ethics and aesthetics) has often been accused of limiting its conception of the “value” of the non-human to its utility to humans, in other words its market value. I now address the other two dimensions of the three sided question of “value” as it relates to environmental movements.

3.4. The Ethical.

The ethical dimension comes closest to purity in deep Ecology which seeks to reformulate human relations to nature based on the intrinsic value of the non-human. The “arrogance” (Ehrenfeld 1978) of humanism’s ethical self-referentiality is what deep Ecology refers to as “anthropocentrism”. Eckersley’s “eco-centric” ethics attempts to re-orientate “man’s” relation to nature. Lynne White writes that: “Despite Copernicus, all the cosmos relates around our little globe. Despite Darwin, we are *not*, in our hearts part of the natural process, we are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim” (in Eckersley 1992, p. 3). Deep Ecology goes beyond these “despites”, to follow through the logic of humanism’s self-undoing; science’s own logical undermining of the very humanist anthropocentrism of which science was such a crucial part. Man, Nietzsche wrote, has, since Copernicus, begun to spin out from the centre of the universe towards X.

Earth First!, the self-proclaimed political wing of deep Ecology, caused a stir with a letter in its newspaper suggesting that: “the possible benefits of [AIDS] to the environment are staggering... Just as the plague contributed to the demise of feudalism, Aids has the potential

to end industrialism” (cited in Dobson, 1990, p. 64). Arne Naess’s “Biospherical Egalitarianism - in principle” (1973), whilst drawing back from some of the practical connotations of an absolute adherence, in practice, to granting all life forms equality, still sets a challenge to the view that human life is, in principle, always of absolute priority over all other life-forms. Naess’s distinction between “the shallow and the deep” in ecology separates environmental protection as an extension of enlightened human self interest, and a defence of nature on the basis of intrinsic value and the ethical rights of all life-forms under threat of human abuse and “mammalian crowding”.

Arne Leopold’s “Land Ethic” goes further, extending principles of intrinsic value to habitat and environment. “The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, water, plants and animals, and so, collectively, the land” (1968). All aspects maintaining the biotic community are given intrinsic value. “A thing has a right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community”. The principle of “integrity” and the precautionary principle led Naess to a Burkean conservative approach to natural and political Ecology, whilst others have seen radicalism in its principle of equality.

Singer’s (1975) ethical defence of animal rights, on the basis of sentience, whilst accused of “zoocentrist sentientism” by some, has related deep ecological principles to one active dimension of the environmental movement. The animal rights movement, along with Earth First! represent the most radical challenge, in theory and practice, to the anthropocentric world-view. However eco-centrism has the rather debilitating consequence of down playing humanistic values and achievements at the same time as attempting to mobilize resources within the social world. Its critique of humanism’s arrogant rationality parallels a distrust of organization and existing social structures. The most radical form of despair at man’s folly has been to look to the planet, or Gaia the earth goddess, to put humanity in its place; but as “Gaia hypothesis” author James Lovelock writes: “The philosophy of Gaia is not humanist but I cannot help being moved by the thought of the future of the earth... I have eight grandchildren and wish them to inherit a healthy planet” (Lovelock 1986, p. 28).

3.4.1. Eco-Feminism.

Eco-Feminism takes up this parental, or in Lovelock’s case grand-parental, motivation to

agency, with a strong emphasis on the maternal life bond as link between Ecology and the feminine. Whilst differences exist over the biological or social foundations of women's feminine atunement with "mother nature", central to eco-feminism is the distinction between masculine competitive/aggressive domination and self/body/other autonomy and feminine equality and body/social proximity. Plant argues that "women's values, centred around life giving, must be revalued, elevated from their once subordinate role. What women know from experience needs recognition and respect" (n.d.). The subordination of women and nature go hand in hand, and masculine detached "rationalism" (freed from body, emotion and compassion), is given absolute authority and prestige. The conquest of virgin territories, woman and nature, becomes an end in itself, a productivist performance principle, detached from emotional reciprocity. Shiva (1988, p. xiv) writes: "A new awareness is growing that is questioning the sanctity of science and development and revealing that these are not universal science and progress but the special project of modern western patriarchy".

It is not only the Indian Chipko movement of women hugging trees as barrier to the axes in the foothills of the Himalayas that can be cited as "women as nature and human agent". Eckersley argues women's "flesh and blood" embeddedness in the natural cycles of the eco-sphere means "most women do occupy a vantage point of "critical otherness" from which they can offer a different way of looking at the problems of patriarchy and ecology" (1992, p. 67). However "non-instrumental and emotional" bonds of motherhood and "embeddedness" in the family do not easily fit with political activity. As was the case at the Greenham Common peace camp, only a limited number of women and mothers could leave families behind and camp outside a nuclear missile base. While it is the detachment from the "embeddedness" of family and human emotional proximity (Bauman 1990) that allows a rationally planned and instrumentally efficient war machine, lacking those things weakens effective counter-protest. The counter-position of women creating life and war destroying life, without effective political vehicles remains a minor symbolic irritant to authorities.

Rejecting "masculine" competitive politics is not helpful when this arena monopolizes power. Whilst Beck et al (1994) point out the potential of what he calls the "sub-politics" of everyday life to radically alter the nature of our experience, beliefs and behaviours, in the spheres of family, consumption and work, such micro-political movement cannot develop any coherent challenge to elites, and change will, however radical its effects on the lifestyles

of individuals, be accommodated. Restricting women to the sub-political sphere of family and reproduction may merely reinstitute subordination as a rejection for masculine power.

Edward Goldsmith retracted his early advocacy of women's re-domestication, as part of a pseudo-peasant communalism. The British Green Party, which he co-founded, keenly promotes an "equality" for women platform. However Schumacher's "Small is Beautiful" argues: "Women, on the whole do not need an "outside" job and the large scale employment of women in offices or factories would be considered a sign of serious economic failure" (Dobson, 1991 p. 157). Andre Gorz (1982) is equally critical of paid housework, as this would sully the emotional and physical bond of mothering with the cold cash nexus.⁴²

Whilst it could be argued that the rise of industrialism relegated the home to dependent site of consumption, so weakening women in the home, it remains the case that even if society moved directly to a post industrial cottage economy (electronic or not), by-passing the industrial dualism of home and work, consumption and production, dependence and autonomy (Toffler/Gorz's "prosumer" society) the questions of domestic subordination, a feature of home-work in the present, would still not be resolved. Nor would the question of effective action in the public sphere.

Valerie Plumwood (1986) argues the association between women and nature is too heavily loaded with reactionary connotations to assist feminists.⁴³ The issue is whether women should relinquish the stigma of proximity to nature by renouncing the proximity or negating the stigma. Plumwood and other feminist writers argue for the former, Eco-feminists the latter. Whilst attacking deep Ecology and eco-feminism, Biehl's (1988, p. 13) parody can be read one way or the other. "Never mind becoming rational; never mind the self; look where it got men, after all; women were better off than men all along without that tiresome individuality". Biehl suggests rejecting reason for intuition and emotion, asking women to "think like a mountain", is detrimental after the long feminist struggle to persuade men, and women, that women are capable of rationality.

⁴² " The last enclave of individual/communal autonomy would disappear; "socialisation, "commodification" and pre-programming would be extended to the last vestiges of self-determined and self-regulated life" (1982, p. 84).

⁴³"The concept of nature... has been and remains a major tool in the armoury of conservatives intent on keeping women in their place..." (1988, p. 16).

Green politics finds a space in a climate of diminishing faith in the all conquering force of reason. “Post-modern” doubt over the “meta-narratives” of the enlightenment project of truth and liberation parallels green critiques of the growth system and the arrogance of human reason. However, while postmodernism tends towards a sceptical relativism in ethics, culture and knowledge the green challenge has come in the form of a combination of reflexive science and a new-age mysticism that mixes the pre- and the post-modern in its rejection of the misguided self-confidence of modernity. It is here that eco-feminists challenge dominant conceptions of both progress and rationality, not as a rejection of either, collapsing into pure emotion, but reformulating relations between reason and emotion, mind and body, humanity and nature. Nancy Fraser argues (1992) it is dangerously misguided to reject reason, autonomy and subject-hood as a modern plague upon humanity, as post-modernists do, at the very moment women assert theirs. These are very necessary resources needed in changing the present.

3.5. The Aesthetic.

The aesthetic concerns conceptions of the beautiful and the sublime. The separation of “fact” and “value”, between science and ethics, that became acute in the thought of many 18th century philosophers and writers, reflecting on the breakdown of the feudal/church order, highlighted the “aesthetic” as an attempt to fill the vacuum between instrumental rationality and super-structural forms of law, custom and morality. The aesthetic became a bridge between isolated self and alien otherness by means of feeling and sensibility rather than the strictures of ethical obligation or callous exchange (see Eagleton 1990). Kant’s aesthetic appreciation was, in the beautiful, a fleeting recognition of some inner truth about ourselves in the otherness of a landscape, sunset or moonlit night (the principle of harmony), while sublime recognition is to be challenged to awe and wonder by the mystery of being in the raging chaos of a swollen river or the naked power of a thunder storm (the principle of the incomprehensible and humbling). There is no desire to consume the otherness but to appreciate its autonomy. Nature, Kant argues, shows us our position in a greater scheme, and our aesthetic sensibility allows us to reconcile ourselves to universal ethical and rational principles that are themselves joyless and inhuman. The English sensibility movement of Shaftesbury, Hume and numerous writers/poets, and the Romantics in England, France and Germany, in philosophy, literature, poetry, music and art, sought to develop this sensibility.

English love of the countryside, German love of forests, American frontier romance, has been strongly identified with the conservationist wing of the “environmental movement”. Its emphasis on tradition and continuity, the natural bonds of community, identity and place, sees stability of the natural as crucial to psychological and social wellbeing. Often the socially constructed nature of such environments are either ignored or “man’s” role is tied up with blood and soil myths of natural belonging.

Nevertheless this often conservative outlook has given rise to radical romantic reactions to the settled domestication of man and nature, the sublime violence of nature as disruptive otherness taken as a metaphor of rebellion against oppression and domination. Radical romantics from Rousseau to William Morris and beyond have seen in nature a force resisting the mechanization of the human and non-human alike. Aesthetic representations of this “sturm und drang” give powerful evocation of transgressive impulses.

3.5.1. British Conservation Organisations.

The world’s first private environmental organization (according to McCormick 1991, p. 9) was the English “Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society”, established in 1865 to defend the countryside from industrial society. John Stuart Mill and William Ruskin feared mechanical instrumentalism and utilitarian ethics would reduce man to a soul-less materialism. The beauty and serenity of the English countryside, it was hoped, would counteract, a site of intrinsic value in a world of commodities and artifice. Mill even advocated a steady state economy, of moral rather than quantitative growth, as alternative to pure capitalism (McCormick 1991).

Whilst Eckersley points out the tendency of conservationists to develop “freeze-frame” images of the natural world in which to project their own “freeze-framed” social continuities as legitimation of the status quo, this Burkean sensibility did also produce some of the first English socialist critiques of 19th century capitalism, counterposing an “Englishness”, against the decadence, artifice and corruption of the market. The “enchanted mirror” of English nature became the rallying cry from all sides in critiques of “the heartless coldness of the times”. William Morris’s post materialist craft ethic, combined tradition, conservation and radicalism within a romantic union with nature.

The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds began as an animal rights campaign against killing birds for hat feathers. The organization soon broadened out promoting bird watching and protecting birds in the wild for their aesthetic beauty. Founded in 1889, receiving its royal charter in 1904, the R.S.P.B. is Britain's oldest surviving conservation group, soon expanding to wider issues of habitat preservation, first within the British Isles and then outward to the habitats of migratory birds as far afield as Africa and Siberia (see Samstag, 1988). New media encouraged interest in wildlife, and birds in particular. "The attractiveness of birds and their suitability as subjects for photography and television, have contributed to the R.S.P.B.'s successful advocacy of their case" (Yearley 1991, p. 67). However, as McCormick points out, "with the help of lithography- invented in 1796-8- the visual beauty of nature was made available to a wider public" (1991, p. 29), and tales from the colonies sparked wide interest in the otherness of nature before television. With a £13m budget in 1989 the society's resources make it a crucial player in many campaigns. The R.S.P.B. was the first environmental organization to set up a European office to lobby the European Commission. The office was set up in 1979 to influence commission thinking on its wild birds directive that came into force in 1981, largely to the satisfaction of the society. Success led Greenpeace and F.o.E. to follow suit in the mid to late 1980s.

By far the largest conservation organization in the U.K. however is the National Trust, with a budget in 1989 of over £56 million and over 1.75 million members. The trust and the R.S.P.B. combined own or manage more than three quarters of a million acres, well over double that of the government's Nature Conservancy Council. Beginning life as the "Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves" in 1912, founded by natural historian Charles Rothchild, today's Royal Society for Nature Conservation was a consciously elitist organization that maneuvered itself into a position of considerable authority during WWII, taking up the post-war role of national coordinator of a series of county trusts, of which there are now forty eight. They oversaw the foundation of the government's N.C.C., often coordinating the management and local volunteers needed to run N.C.C. sites. The Society helped local trusts organize and while the county trusts generated the financial and personal resources to run their own sites the national body acted to promote the scientific and historical research that enabled local sites to be designated as areas of special scientific

interest and/or outstanding natural beauty. It became the Society for the Promotion of Nature Conservation in 1977, and with the patronage of Prince Charles in 1981 the Royal Society for Nature Conservation. Whilst Rye-Smith and Rose (1984, cited in Yearley 1991) point out the predominance of the “county set” within the Society’s county trusts, McCormick (1991) demonstrates demographic shifts in the rural population, and the recent rise in public interest in conservation/environmental issues (especially amongst rural ex-urbanities) changing the composition and outlook of trusts.

There is no small irony in these demographic shifts and the not unconnected rise in non-rural interest in the countryside. 19th century railways opened the countryside to both industrial revolution and urban “nature lover”. Today the car makes access even easier and is seen as a critical threat to the countryside. The Council for the Protection of Rural England was founded in 1926 to oppose urban sprawl and ribbon development. For a long time the Council was allied to the National Union of Farmers, but with the increasing penetration of suburbia and exurbans into the countryside alongside the industrialization of agriculture, the image of the farmer as defender of rural traditions came into question. During and after world war two the depressed and backward farms of the interwar period adopted increasingly intensive agriculture. Between 1947 and 1974 a quarter (120000 miles) of hedgerows were removed and half Britain’s ancient woodland was removed or replaced by fast growing plantation (McCormick, 1991, p. 71). While farmers became more industrial, urban migrants fleeing industrial and de-industrializing heartlands became an increasingly dissident voice in the countryside, seeking to preserve the idyll of old England to which they had sought to escape. While Robert Nash’s (1973) hypothesis that conservation concern increases with, and is due to, the very process of industrialization that threatens nature, has been criticized for American ethno-centrism (Redclift and Benton 1994), the contradiction between conservation and encroachment/accessibility seems an accurate description of the situation in British conservation. My research points out such contradictions.

Greenpeace’s dolphin, whale and seal emblems and the World Wide Fund for Nature’s panda are powerful aesthetic symbols of global environmental “crisis”/movement. The power of the aesthetic to naturalize an idea or belief as if beyond language is, as Paul deMann (1971) argues, crucial to its centrality in all ideologies. All environmental politics contain an aesthetic dimension, deep Ecology’s intuitive and poetic empathy is often conveyed by

forms that evoke an ethical relation with an otherness that cannot be, or should not be, subordinated to rationalistic equivalence. The science of ecology and environmental “realists” have also created an aesthetic out of our unfolding knowledge of the ungraspable complexity of natural systems, inspiring humility.

3.6. Conclusion.

The rational instrumentalist attitude to environmental threats to human self interest is rarely utterly detached from ethics and aesthetics. F.o.E., Greenpeace, and W.W.F. have their origins in a combination of ethical and aesthetic concerns as well as with human self preservation. Such actors have been most successful in resource mobilization when the former concerns have been wedded to the image of humanity cutting its own throat through its abuses of the natural world. F.O.E. and Greenpeace are particularly skilled at splicing scientific research with evocative images and slogans, emotive challenges to our sense of security, backed up by the “authority” of science. Their recognition as experts in the areas in which they speak has rendered the discourse of science reflexive, and their pronouncements are often treated as more reliable than the “science” set out by the companies and states whose authority they are challenging.

While deep Ecologists criticize mainstream politics and the more successful pressure groups for pandering to anthropocentrism, the difficulty remains that staying out in the cold, unwilling to compromise, leaves the “anthropocentric” system unchallenged. Greenpeace perhaps best illustrates the difficulties of an organization that has done well in a system it disapproves of. The world Greenpeace budget for 1995 was estimated to be \$145 million. Greenpeace has global reach but also something to lose. W.W.F.’s successful corporate sponsorship drive included the infamous “Greens Means Heinz” advertising campaign which backfired amidst revelations about Heinz’s use of tuna caught in dolphin unfriendly nets. F.o.E.’s “Bike to the Future” sponsored bike ride, funded by Halfords⁴⁴, as cycle and bike equipment sellers, but also major contributors to the roads lobby and Britain’s leading car care product shop, illustrates the difficulty in avoiding compromise in the real world of resource mobilization. However, claims that success always corrupts ignore successes.

⁴⁴the organisational funds being provided by the company, the actual fund-raising being collected by the participants in the form of sponsorship from friends, family, colleagues, employers etc.

While Elkington and Burke's green capitalist revolution may be naive, blanket pathos is too simplistic.

Accounting for the diffuse elements that he sees as parts of the environmental movement, McCormick estimates the total 1990 membership in the U.K. at 4.5 million, but adds: "The words "movement" and "lobby" imply homogeneity, cooperation, singleness of purpose, unity and steady evolution. But this is misleading" (1991, p. 35). The flux of unity and difference characterising the environmental movement reflects the dual problems of agency and knowledge construction. The parallels between Tourainian movement construction and the Mannheimian theory of knowledge construction provide a place to start.⁴⁵

The dangers of relativism, and the giving up of rationally defensible foundations for knowledge, need to be set against the dangers of a naturalized account of environmental issues. The danger of the environmental movement adopting a neutralized "science as politics" (Habermas 1970b) lies in the ease with which mainstream political and economic actors adopt such a language of "re-engineering" existing institutional systems, such that the environmental agenda is rendered as being in "everybody's" interests, hiding the intra-social relations of conflict conditioning social relations to the non-human. "Science Knows Best" hides politics behind "foregone conclusions".

Wynne (1994) argues that social science has a crucial role in understanding the hidden assumptions behind "global" constructions of the environmental crisis, as propagated by such international agencies as the United Nations and the International Panel on Climate Change. The neutrality of science myth is exposed in his example of radio-caesium penetration of the soil in Britain after Chernobyl. Wynne argues "sociologists, by uncritically swallowing global environmental science constructs, have been caught unawares by the force of the radical critique of "global environmentalism" and its rich world agenda, now emanating from the developing world" (p. 185). The claim of Southern regimes that the only "real" problem is northern over-development must be equally challenged.

This Chapter outlines two key sociological questions taken up by my empirical research:

⁴⁵ Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) cognitive account of social movements similarly combines Habermas's intersubjective communicative rationality and Gramsci's organic movement intellectuals engaged in counter-hegemonic theory and practice.

those of *knowledge of* and *action towards* “the environment”. The two themes hinge around each other, and while neither is reducible to the other, each is intimately bound up in the other’s production. It is not simply the case that the analytically distinct aesthetic, instrumental and ethical dimensions of the environmental movement are socially mobilised motivational bases for political action drawing on neutral and undisputed “scientific” evidence. Yet neither is our knowledge about the environment reducible to a set of strictly determining cultural identity filters or institutional interests.

The social construction of environmental discourses is a complex political process wherein multiple “interests” “identities” and “evidences” contest. “Evidence” is mediated (both in construction and communication) by interest and identity based filters of selection. “Identities” are mediated by “evidences” and “interests”. “Interests” are mediated by “identities” and “evidence”. It is not possible to give a full resolution or reduction of these intermediations “in theory”. My empirical research attempts a start. Just as in the question of what a movement is, where we cannot begin with prescriptive definition but only with the intent to study the struggles over definitional practices and the power relations of such struggles, so it is with definitions of the “environmental problem”. A non foundational critical ethnography need not adopt the crude cultural reductionism of “Cultural Theory” but neither can its “Critical Theory” naturalize itself on straight-forward scientific evidence. The absence of foundational referents for either the subject (movement) or object (environmental problem) goes hand in hand with the absence of a natural geographic site, or referent, called “the local”. It is to this dimension of my proposed “object” of research, to which I now turn.

4. THE GLOCAL. The Global and the Local.

Any study of locality and local movements must address the context in which locality is located; the extrinsic relations through which it is constructed. Locality has no natural, or primordial referent. Locality is a shifting and empty signifier in a permanent process of combination and contestation. In the following section I outline issues around which the local has been theorized, in particular the relationship between the locale and “globalization”. This debate ranges across many fields; culture and identity, nation and regional formation, politics and the nation state, the rise of international governmental and non-governmental organisations, the emergence of new sub-national movements, and the rise of transnational economic integration and dependence. I outline the essentially fluid relationship between the local and the trans-local (beyond a binary relation) at the cultural, political and economic levels of analysis. The association of locality with immediacy, proximity, unmediated presence and authenticity is unpacked; a crucial first step in understanding attempts to construct environmental resistance at a local level, and the weaknesses of such practices. Relations between local and global in many ways, and by different names, characterises sociology. Saint-Simon, Durkheim, Marx, Tönnies, Simmel and Weber all saw the development of an industrial society as increasingly breaking down regional specificities and ways of thinking, replacing them with increasingly universalistic forms of life and thought. The vehicle for this homogenizing was variously, industry, the division of labour, capitalist production, and various modes of instrumental rationality. The work of Lash and Urry (1987) points to the rise of a new fragmentation, diversity and difference between and within national “localities”. However such difference is not to be understood as either prior to or in opposition to globalising processes. It is the very manifestation of the global force of transnational capitalism, now better able than before to play one place off against another.

4.1. The Community and the Local.

Durkheim’s “organic solidarity”, that could emerge within a society based upon a highly specialised division of labour, was a direct response to conservative romanticism (Tönnies’ “Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft”) where organic community based on close bonds of interpersonal integration is counterposed to mechanical relations of exchange and association

characterising urban industrial society. While Durkheim was keenly aware of the anomic effects of urban industrial society, it was his contention that a higher form of solidarity, based on the increased specificity that mutual interdependence of each individual upon the whole society had brought, could be achieved, though the more anarchic tendencies of capitalism would have to be modified by state regulation and welfare provisions. The “decline of community” thesis and its critics have carried on this debate in different forms. I begin with a brief, and critical, sketch of the Chicago School of Urban Ecology.

4.1.1. The Ecological account of the “Built” Environment.

Significant confusion derives from the different meanings that can be given to the term environment. This has been keenly pointed out by Dunlap and Catton (1983). They show how, in the course of this century, sociologists, keen to avoid forms of reductionism that would limit the explanation of social facts by recourse to other social facts, came to counter “environment” to “heredity”. As such this conception of the environment was social, rather than biological. Such a conception of the environment as social world, stands at odds with the more common sense conception of the “environment” as the “natural” world. This conception of the social environment, as the sum of social relationships to which an individual is exposed, forms a central theme in the emergence of urban studies and the study of “locale”. The built environment as a system of “urban ecology” is the controversial legacy of the Chicago School. As was suggested in the previous chapter, it is naive to see the non-human as “natural” in distinction from the human, either at the level of ontology or epistemology. Human action has affected everything on the planet, to some degree or other, even while it is misconceived to see “nature” as a pure screen upon which are projected the technical and ideological constructions of human activity. Likewise, I wish to suggest, theories of urban ecology tend to “naturalize” social relations in an urban context taken as objectively given and universal in its formal qualities. Just as it is the question of cultural meaning and the openness to change, through human agency, that undermines conceptions of “nature” as an pure externality, so questions of meaning and agency challenge conservative conceptions of “urban ecology”.

For Robert Park, the founder of the Chicago School, the city was to be understood (1916) as a “social organism”. Rather than the form of individualistic social Darwinism popular at the time he was writing, Park rejected genetic accounts of individual failure, in favour of an

“ecological” account of what he called the “webs of life” in which individuals were formed. While competition for scarce resources underpinned social life in general, the theory of urban ecology sought to demonstrate, in Durkheimian fashion, that pathologies were the consequence of particular social milieu, but that social, and in particular urban, development followed a generally evolutionary trend. While specialisation in the division of labour, and its geographical correlate, spatial differentiation, might generate strains and disjuncture, these were no more than could be coped with through the paternalistic social engineering of state (and sociology). E.W. Burgess’s (in Park and Burgess 1967) “Zonal Model” of the division of the city into specific areas imposed a quasi universal modernisation account upon the understanding of urban life, an account, whose conception of social mobility, incorporated inequality and the spatial concentration of the poor and socially dislocated into a general theory of social consensus, social mobility and meritocracy. While it is cultural processes that distinguish the human ecological system from animal and plant systems, this cultural superstructure is seen largely as a “given”, as a recurrent and external factor in the lives of those within it, while at the same time the “biotic substructure” of universal competition for resources is equally presented as given. As Peter Taylor suggests; “Park’s ecological processes are eternal and natural. As such they provided a new justification for the inequalities of the city to supersede the increasingly discredited genetic explanations. As Castells (1977) points out, the competition Park describes is not ecological: it is merely a particular expression of *laissez-faire* capitalism” (Taylor 1993, p. 289). In what follows I want to draw out the political and contested nature of locality. I will focus on three sets of questions: Firstly I discuss “local identity”, drawing upon the 1960s debates over urban communities, housing classes, and the suburbanisation and privatisation of “affluent workers”, 1970s debates over “urban social movements” and the supposed “legitimation crisis/fiscal crisis of the state”, and 1980s debates over supposed privatisation of formally collective modes of consumption and consciousness. Secondly I address issues surrounding the nature of local government. I go on, finally, to address the work of David Harvey, Phillip Cooke (et al), Peter Taylor and others, on urban restructuring in relation to trans-local economic changes and over local economic autonomy/dependence. Each of these themes have attracted significant intellectual attention, and raise key issues for the study of locality. This chapter concludes with contemporary debates over globalization, and the “glocal”, with particular attention to “glocality” in relation to the themes of identity/community, political

sovereignty and economic self-determination around which locality was discussed.

4.1.2. From Urban Villagers to Affluent Workers?

In the 1950's Gans' "The Urban Villagers" (1962) and Young and Willmott's "Family and Kinship in East London" (1962) refuted simplistic accounts of the "death of community" with evidence of thriving community life in poor urban areas in both America and Britain. Their work showed the centrality of community and extended family relations in the economic and social lives of inner cities. In particular, Willmott and Young pointed out strong and close relations between mothers and married daughters, and the centrality of collective and class-based work and leisure activities for men. They argued it was premature to write off extended family and class community in the lives of the urban working class. Nevertheless Willmott and Young did point to increasing formality in extended family relations as younger workers moved away from the east end to work in "new town" industrial estates, taking their families to live in new housing estates away from their extended family and community networks. The increased formality that characterised visits to grand-parents, dressing up and getting out the best china rather than popping over the road for a cup of tea and a chat, was given as a general metaphor for this shift.

While this process was only noted at the end of Young and Willmott's study, the theme of the privatisation of the "affluent worker" became central to the debate over whether the working class were becoming "embourgeoisified" in the 1960s. While the thesis that the working class would become middle class with increased income was largely rejected by Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1969), who demonstrated that in fact poorer workers were more likely to vote Conservative, while the new "affluent workers" were more likely to join unions and vote Labour, their research pointed to the instrumentality of these affiliations and the decline of a geographically concentrated and work-centred class community. Goldthorpe and Lockwood found increased "home centredness" among relatively well paid and highly skilled workers employed in new light engineering factories on the outskirts of London. These workers lived in housing estates increasingly distant from work, made possible by private cars, and the focus of their leisure activities was the increasingly comfortable home, with fitted kitchens, central heating, and perhaps most of all the television set (with colour). The holiday also became a private family affair. Out went the mass exodus to Blackpool or to a holiday camp and in came the package air-tour and the caravan holiday.⁴⁶

4.1.3. From Housing Classes to a Nation of Home Owners?

While the move from the inner cities to the new towns and suburban industrial and housing estates had been a focus of attention for those who studied the skilled white working classes in the 1960's, writers like Rex, Moore and Tomlinson (Rex, 1986, Rex and Moore 1967 and Rex and Tomlinson 1979) were at the same time drawing attention to the existence of what would later be called the "urban underclass", made up of those left behind, and those recently arrived, in the economically declining inner cities. In particular they drew attention to the unequal access to housing and employment which marginalized the poor, especially ethnic minorities and the unskilled working class. These Weberians argued the emergence of "housing classes", based on access, or the lack of it, to better quality housing, through public and private agencies, created significant differentials in "life chances", while at the same time focusing the poor and the marginal minority groups into geographically specific inner city areas. Rex argued that this process created the conditions for community based struggles centred around often ethnically-based voluntary associations and churches.

This Weberian account of the struggle over access to public and private means of consumption as a basis of urban community formation and conflict, is in many respects similar to the work of Manuel Castells, who, while a Marxist in the 1970s, adopted an increasingly Weberian theoretical position on the nature of urban social movements. Castells' "The Urban Question" (1977) presents a modified Marxist account of Urban Social Movements and urban class based communities. While the city in capitalist society is itself historically bound up with the concentration and centralization of production, it has in the post world war two era become increasingly the centre of consumption. Access to consumption in a capitalist society is bound intimately to ones relationship to the means of production, through wages, salaries or through profits. However Keynesian economics and social management raised the alternative of "political entitlement" or "rights" as opposed to

⁴⁶The combination of housing estate, private car, television set and family holiday symbolised the privatisation of family life, even as the relationship between the income needed to support it and strong union and labour support in the public realms of work and politics seemed to refute "embourgeoisement". It was only with the onset of economic crisis, that the decline of working class community identity became identified with forms of "political de-alignment", though this process also shadowed the absolute and relative decline of the manual working class itself, which may better explain the weakening of the Labour Party vote.

“effective demand” in the market place as a means to access consumption goods. Thus Castells distinguishes private consumption, achieved through the market, and collective consumption, achieved through collective struggle. Access to publicly provided housing, transport, education and health care etc became sites for urban social struggles which paralleled those over the means of production in the work-place, and which, in Castells’ later works, would increasingly overshadow them. Collective identity formation through urban social movements, Castells suggested, would increasingly challenge the dominance of the market as a vehicle providing means of consumption, an argument following from Habermas (1976) and Offe’s (1974 and 1984) contention that increasing state intervention in the free market, while initially a stabilizer, would increasingly undermine the ideology of acquisitive individualism and foster a more general fiscal, legitimation and motivational crisis within the state, economy and individual respectively.

Castells assumed that increasingly radical and generalizing urban social movements would challenge capitalism’s mode of distribution (linking up with similar radicalising challenges to the capitalist mode of production). The economic crisis that intensified in the late 1970’s was however not resolved in the way accounts such as those of Castells and Habermas predicted. The fiscal crisis of the state was taken up by the new right as a sign that Keynesianism had failed and that the primacy of market forces should be restored. Castells’ own work increasingly abandoned the idea that struggles over collective consumption were intrinsically bound to class relations of production. In “The City and the Grassroots” (1983) he proposed the primacy of cross-class community-based struggles around defence of local autonomy from central state, and addressed the problems associated with such movements as well as their relationship with established class parties, and political systems in general.

The focus on autonomy over solidarity was taken up in the 1980s by Peter Saunders, who, while influenced by Castells, became increasingly associated with the new right and its “return of consumption to the private sphere” agenda. In the 1970s Castells suggested an increasing movement away from collective identification based on production relations, towards identification based on consumption relations. Saunders (1984, 1986 and 1990) argued while this was in fact the case, the shift towards consumption-based identification had in fact gone hand in hand with a shift from collective to individualized identification. Private consumption, in particular housing, had become associated with quality and satisfaction;

collective state provision becoming associated with frustration and inferiority.

In Saunders' account of "a nation of homeowners" (1990) the community is replaced with the privatized family, very much the reiteration of the claims made by Goldthorpe and Lockwood in the 1960s. However in addition to home-centredness in the sphere of leisure, Saunders suggested that the increased identification with consumption had also undermined class identification and traditional patterns of political identification as well: "[the] majority satisfies most of its consumption requirements through private purchase... while the minority is cast adrift on the waterlogged raft of what remains of the welfare state" (Saunders, 1986, p. 318). Like Goldthorpe and Lockwood's affluent worker Saunders' home owner stands in marked contrast to those left behind in inner cities. As Bauman suggested (1992) the postmodern shopping centre with its security cameras to keep out marginals and beggars, may have put in question the very idea of the need for state legitimacy in the first place, let alone the notion that it might be in crisis. However Savage and Warde (1993) suggest that Saunders' vision of a nation of homeowners may have been as much the ideological bubble of a single decade (the 1980s) as the fiscal crisis of the state and the inexorable legitimation crisis was to the 1970's.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the 1980s casts a serious question over the nature of local, in particular urban, collective identities and urban movements. Increased *geographical* mobility, both in long term movement from place to place (to university, from job to job, or at retirement) and in the everyday expansion and diffusion of personal private mobility (driving the kids to a school a few miles away every day because it has better G.C.S.E. results, out of town shopping centres, working in the next town or driving to the countryside at the weekend) seriously effect relations between physical proximity and personal networks of interaction. In addition the restructuring of work has disrupted established social identifications (both inter- and intra-generational) between place and collective consciousness.

⁴⁷The home owner society was a politically manufactured event, built on giving away billions of pounds of state assets and only supportable through continued tax relief. It can be seen as confirming the basic premises of the legitimation crisis thesis (even if the new right managed to privatize the form). As the benefits of these state handouts to the top two-thirds of society dried up, so too did the opinion poll fortunes of the party that gave them. Saunders' example of housing cannot be generalised. Private householders still demand state schooling and health care.

The political geographer Peter Taylor (1993, p. 45) argues that locality is to be equated with the level of experience. He writes that: "The scale of experience is the scale at which we live our daily lives. It encompasses all our basic needs including employment, shelter and consumption of basic commodities... But the day-to-day activities we all engage in are not sustained locally... the crucial events that structure our lives occur at a global scale." The local level of experience is for Taylor mediated in its relation to reality (the global totality which we experience manifestations of locally) through the nation state, which acts as a filter with ideological consequences. The problem with such a position is not that it renders the local as a passive realm of experience, rather than of action. There is no preclusion of action at the local level implied by suggesting that locality itself is epiphenomenal, only that action at the local level can only be understood as manifesting conflicts and relationships that exceed the locality as a level of analysis and which bring such sites into and out of existence. The problem with equating experience and locality is that the latter term is too easily objectified as a physical slice of turf just as the above discussion suggests that experience is becoming increasingly detached from the kinds of bounded and collective shared spaces in which identity was the fusion of place and community. Locality is not a site of resistance to a seamless and extrinsic structure, rather it is the emergent site of conflict and compromise between coalitions of actors whose "localness" requires as much sociological attention to its constitution within translocal discourses and practices, as does the locality within, around and over which such actors operate. The debate over the nature of local government as either a conduit for the central state or as a vehicle for local resistance manifests many of the problematic binaries which I suggest need to be overcome.

4.2. The Local State.

"Local states are not agents of the [central] state or agents of opposition to the state. They are both simultaneously: that is their hallmark" (Taylor 1993, p. 322). Peter Saunders (1986, pp. 299-300) suggests that while Pahl's urban managerialist thesis (Pahl 1970) gave too much autonomy to local bureaucrats, Cockburn's (1977) local state thesis went too far in the opposite direction, giving local government no autonomy at all. Saunders argues: "The different bits and pieces of the system operate according to different logics, are accountable to different publics and are responsible for managing different types of problems" (1986, p. 305). This diversity divides out into what he calls an ideal typical framework for a "dualistic theory of politics" (p. 306), which, he suggests, goes beyond either superficial pluralism or

reductionism, to address seriously the problematic relative autonomy of the state in capitalist society (p. 307). He distinguishes a politics of production from a politics of consumption. The former tends to gravitate towards the central state arena, centres around organised class interest groups, thus displaying corporatist tendencies to exclude non-production based interest and pressure groups, while fundamentally defending property and profitability. The latter (the politics of consumption) gravitates towards the local political arena, displays a greater openness to the diversity of non “class” based interest groups, and so becomes the typical site for an imperfect pluralism of citizen politics. The local-state is seen as the (ideal) typical site around which “citizens” organize in resistance to the growth strategies of the central state and corporatist interests. The local state is not therefore merely the conduit for the centre’s policies. Saunders suggests: “The significance of the tension between local and central state levels is revealed in the mounting chaos surrounding relations between central and local authorities in a country like Britain [in particular since 1979, though the history of this tension is much older]...” (p. 309). Two questions however, can be raised at this point: What level and form of autonomy does local government really have in relation to the central state, and secondly, who are the competing forces “within” a locality, that act through and seek to influence local government or to challenge the centre?

Pickvance (1990, p.2) suggests: “If local government is strongly controlled centrally then the possible impact of political parties, council officers, local pressure groups and local economic conditions is limited. Conversely, evidence of the strength of these forces is evidence of the weakness of central control.” While superficially self evident this opposition is questionable. Despite an array of central state attempts to discipline local government (via capping of local revenue generation and spending, controlling central support grant allocation and direction, forced privatization of local council assets, forced competitive tendering and out-sourcing of local state services, setting up of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations to run services, and even outright abolition of metropolitan authorities (Pickvance 1990, pp. 12-16 and Taylor 1993, p. 319)), Pickvance suggests that until the late 1980’s central government had failed to control either local spending or large amounts of local policy discretion in the U.K. for three reasons, each having since been eroded radically.

Firstly, the concentration of administrative and delivery expertise at the local level rendered

local authorities significant discretion. Secondly local legitimacy and local democratic mandates render heavy handed central dictation problematic, especially, and thirdly, if political party machines in central government require grass roots activists at the local level to canvass for the re-election of their M.P.s once every five years. However, each cushion has been eroded. As Pickvance suggests “for the first time the centre is intervening in the provision of services rather than in their financing” (pp. 17-18). Education would be a clear illustration of this though there are many others. As for local political legitimacy and grass roots political mobilisation for national elections, Pickvance and Preteceille (1991, p. 10) point out: “Dunleavy (1979) has mounted a strong case that in countries where national parties contest local elections, local factors have negligible influence on voting since people vote according to national party popularity rather than local council policy”. As local authority autonomy is eroded so this tendency increases as voters rationally perceive that local elections function only as a glorified national opinion poll for the minority willing to make the effort on such occasions. Far from stimulating local outrage, the undermining of local authority autonomy may act to diminish its legitimacy still further (as local electoral turn outs suggest). As for the need to sustain the loyalty of “grass-roots” door-knockers, the diminishing role, influence and even autonomy of the constituency party in the face of national (and often media based) recruitment, policy making and campaigning, undercuts the power of local activists in bargaining with the centre.

G.L. Clark’s “Theory of Local Autonomy” (1984) proposes that in the U.S.A., in regard to both autonomy to initiate policy (discretion) and from central state intervention (immunity), local government is more like a form of local administration than a sovereign agency. Taylor (1993, p. 322) suggests we “can extend this conclusion increasingly to the situation in Britain”, but urges caution in the face of too hasty a recourse to pessimism, suggesting “the variability of local government “outputs”... clearly implies some local “choices” that are overriding the formal limitations of autonomy.” However the nature of such variation and choice brings me to the second of my two questions concerning the relative autonomy of the local state, that of the composition of competing pressure groups operating at the local level, and of the differential resources and constraints operating in particular places which differentiate one “locality” from another.

While Pickvance and Preteceille (1991, p. 10) point out, contrary to Saunders’ dual-state

thesis, that “the abundance of national level pressure groups suggests that competitive politics may be a more appropriate label at that [the national] level”, at the local level too national pressure groups (or local affiliates) play a significant role in planning disputes and inquiries. Contrary to the assertion that influential and powerful pressure group action at the local level demonstrates the relative autonomy of that level of action and analysis, it may simply demonstrate that local government is as much under pressure from translocal non-governmental actors operating within its jurisdiction as it is from central governmental actors “above” them. To the extent that growth coalitions as well as environmental alliances mobilising within a given space draw upon, and are integrated within, wider discourses and practices, the local autonomy/central state control duality is rendered problematic. Central state restraint from imposing uniform national policy may render localities more pliable in the face of trans-local pressure precisely because local policy discretion enables one place to be played off against another - with regard to commercial and residential land allocation, road building, tax “holidays” and so on. Formal political freedom is not actual freedom, and may (without power) facilitate more flexible forms of dependence.

It is also misguided to counterpose (as Urry 1990, pp. 191-193 does) local conditions (extrinsic factors that constrain and enable local agency) and resources (internal sources of action potential) in accounting for differential local action strategies. Local financial, geographical and organisational “resources” are intimately bound up with the trans-local political, economic and cultural “conditions” that Urry counterposes them to. While the history of a locality may be seen, at any given moment, as an internal feature, it is, as Doreen Massey suggests (1984 cited in Taylor 1993, pp. 312-3), the manifestation of the layers of investment cycles which characterize that location’s historical integration within a general economic system. While Urry is right to point to the revival of interest in local specificities, the reasons behind this revival illustrate precisely the need to study the local as a manifestation of translocal processes, rather than as a site of autonomous agency. In line with his (and Lash’s 1987) account of the rise of “Disorganised Capitalism”, Urry (1990, pp. 187-8) writes: “Two decades ago... societies were viewed as increasingly “organized” and industrialized. Differences between places were seen as being eroded and local specificities dissolved... However, more recently, several changes have led to the resurgence of interest in the study of developments that appear to have heightened local differences and the symbolization of such differences. These changes include: the increased ability of large

companies to subdivide their operations and locate different activities within different local labour markets; the breaking up of previously rather coherent regional economies, the competition among councils for jobs, the growth of intraregional differences, and the localizing of the previous regional policy..."

The increasing stress on the value of local growth coalitions, in the attraction of inward investors, or the retention of those in place, renders local specificity as a beauty contest, in which each area politically stage-manages its economic and cultural (for tourists) self-presentation. This leads me to question not only the autonomy of the local but also of its coherence as an entity. This is not to say that political action is impossible in the face of a global system, only that the local should not be seen as a site for autonomous resistance. Spaces for resistance are systematic, emerging through the re-articulation of the multiple dislocations within discourses, practices, and resources that exist at all levels of action, and are not simply geographical detachments, as might be assumed from a simplistic projection of the structure and agency dualism onto that of system/core and local/periphery. The nesting of a micro-Weberian theory of local action/resistance within a macro-structural Marxist theory of "the system", is unsustainable.

4.3. Economic Restructuring or Disorganisation?

Philip Cooke suggests (Cooke et al 1989) local life "is increasingly controlled by global political and economic forces" (p.1). One of the key themes in this account of the restructuring of U.K. localities is the decline of traditional economic activities, mainly the decline of manufacturing, and the rise of various service industries. Of particular interest is the restructuring of economic activity from traditional urban centres towards the suburbs and countryside. This raises questions about the impact such shifting patterns will have on both urban and rural environments. Whether this process is best described as re-structuring or de-structuring is open. Lash and Urry (1987) suggest we are now entering a period where the structures of state/economic regulation (characterised by Keynesian economic policy and welfare state social policy) are increasingly being undermined by a more dynamic and "disorganising" mode of trans-national capitalism. This process has further undermined already flagging (largely class based) local community identities. A similar case is made by David Harvey (1989), who, like Lash (1990) and Lash and Urry (1994), argues this process

of disorganisation at the level of the nation state, is bound intimately with the “condition of postmodernity”, in which the rationalist and ordering forms characteristic of “modernity” are challenged and undone, by forces of plurality and difference. Recent articles in “Environment and Planning A” (C.C. Williams 1996, R. Lee 1996, and L. Thorne 1996) have addressed the question of Local Exchange Trading Systems (L.E.T.S.) in relation to questions of community self-reliance in the face of increasingly powerful trans-national flows of capital. Williams and Lee tend to suggest that such schemes reproduce, at the level of such quasi-informal economies, existing relations of exclusion and marginality apparent in the money economy. This is in line with the findings of Pahl (1984), that far from compensating for disparities in the formal economy, informal exchange and work activities tended to rely on access to resources from within the mainstream; either money, employment based networks, skills and tools. Thorne, on the other hand addresses the question of relative embedding and disembedding of work and exchange activities within an area, and takes a more positive attitude towards the role of community exchange schemes in relation to disembedded flows of capital in the wider economy.

Cox (1993, p. 434) however suggests that the “capital verses community” thesis, in which global is equated with capital while locality is equated with spatially fixed urban communities, is misleading. While in agreement with this point, I disagree with Cox over why such an equating of these two sets of binary oppositions misrepresents the world today. Cox argues (p. 444) that the hyper-mobility of capital versus community overstates the relative mobility of productive capital (rather than finance capital) and tends to assume a simplistic strategy of cheap-labour chasing on the part of transnational corporations which is neither viable or actual. “Cheapening, in terms of particular strategies, is a contingent matter. It may indeed be achieved, as per NUP [new urban politics thesis], by deskilling and the changes in transportation and communication that allow the location of branch plants in areas of cheaper labour, but clearly it may not be; it may be that, given particular combinations of machinery, raw materials, skill, productivity, the cheapening strategy lies in *reskilling*.” Investment in the intensification of the labour process, through technology and skill, may in fact intensify the embeddedness of capital within a particular locality.

Cox suggests the local level of politics cannot be replaced fully by pliant externally dictated administration (the replacement of politics by policy) as the local accumulation of relatively

immobile capital assets, human, built, transportation and even geological, prevents full “substitutability” of localities, maintaining the spatial embeddedness of capital rather than enabling an absolute “hyper-mobility”. Production capital, rather than finance capital, is always situated. Cox also argues that local government’s dependence on the local tax base, and so on the continued profitability of localised capital, is limited to the degree that services and revenue sources can be shifted to higher levels of government. In this regard Cox (p. 445) cites Storper (1992, p. 91), who questions the fixation upon the ephemeral sphere of capital circulation and finance, rather than on the always embedded sphere of production; “the image of the global economy as a sort of delocalized ‘space of flows’ of human, physical and financial capital controlled from major corporate headquarters, manifestly fails to grasp the nature of the the new competition. It fails to grasp the complex ties among these global agents (especially the technology-based oligopolists) and the painstakingly constructed, territorially specific economic tissues without which they cannot function.”

While correct to question an exaggeration of the cheap labour chasing strategy on the part of trans-national corporations, Cox’s argument is questionable on a number of counts. Reskilling has gone hand in hand with an intensified technical upgrading of the productive process, so increasing the “productivity of labour”, as well as enabling increased trans-local integration of production, even if absolute “substitutability” of localities is not feasible. The computerized production and communication revolutions have radical implications for skill, necessary labour and location. This intensification and integration of production has enabled a streamlining of localized workforces (reskilling has also meant increased unemployment, at least in conditions of generalised global recession). This has intensified pressure on localities to attract large scale capital investments, as each placement is highly contested and yields only modest numbers of jobs. While productive capital is never fully mobile, the relative bargaining positions of local government and labour has diminished markedly.

This is tacitly acknowledged by Cox when he suggests that one strategic manouver on the part of local government would be to relocate service provision and revenue generation to higher levels of government. To do so would be to further diminish the significance of local government as a level of both action and analysis. With regard to the earlier discussion of the “local state” in the U.K. in the 1980’s and 1990’s such a strategy can hardly be seen as a

means of maintaining local autonomy, rather the opposite. Cox concludes that the prominence of urban-growth coalitions (over more class-oppositional forms of urban politics) reflects “a concept of capital that is... rooted in the appearances of everyday life”, i.e. capital as money, rather than as physical plant, machinery and skilled labour. However, despite sharing Cox’s critical attitude towards aspects of the hyper-mobility of capital thesis, Pagan and LeHeron (1994, pp. 265-285) suggest it is through a better understanding of the present relative significance of the the globalized circuit of capital reproduction (i.e. investment cycles), over the circuits of production and realisation, that existing theoretical weaknesses within the globalization/localization debate will be overcome.

While Fagan and LeHeron (pp. 267-8) point out that state and inter-state trade and development policy is central in the realisation of trans-national capitalist investment strategies, and that investment between the developed states of North America, Western Europe and the Pacific Rim far outweighs Northern investment in Southern “cheap labour economies”, they also point to the growth of the global financial system in facilitating and driving economic and political processes at the inter- and intra-state levels (inter-state trade and financial deregulation and intra-state development policies). “Capital still *requires* nation-states to secure economic, social and political conditions under which accumulation can continue” (Fagan and LeHeron 1994, p. 271), but the global fraction of capital has increased exponentially in terms of production (TNC ownership of means of production), realization (through international trade) and reproduction (internationally integrated finance). Fagan and LeHeron suggest that it is the third circuit, that of capitalist reproduction (i.e. finance capital) that has taken the most advanced global form, and leads the former pair (production and realization), through pressure on states to, firstly, deregulate international ownership (through “an epidemic of mergers and takeovers in all of the world’s major markets throughout the 1980’s” (p. 268) rather than just building new subsidiary sites abroad), and, secondly, open up bilateral trade agreements.

Fundamentally, Fagan and LeHeron argue that while globalist theories of the new international (or spatial) division of labour have tended to neglect the central and containing role of nation-states in facilitating situated capital accumulation, theorists of state centrality, such as the regulationist school, underplay global circuits of capital. Both fail to account fully for the financial circuit of capital reproduction. Fagan and LeHeron stress that “for a given

nation-state, the impacts of globalisation vary according to contingent circumstances and there is a two-way flow between global and local” (p. 278). However this argument is justified on grounds that require a deeper analysis of the differential determinations involved in the reciprocating “flows”. They write that “deregulation is just as much an intervention in the capital accumulation process as was the Keynesian regulatory regime which it is designed to replace” (p. 281). While it is true to say that deregulation is as much an “intervention” as was Keynesian regulation, the nature and determination of such “interventions” need to be distinguished. While Keynesian regulation was premised upon the relative dominance of nationally based circuits of capital (hence the state’s capacity to quasi-manage macro-economic economic policy through manipulation of intra-state and inter-regional multiplier effects), deregulation reflects the weakening of such internal circuits which accompanied the growth of international financial capital flows. State policies of deregulation were driven by the state’s undermining as a level of sovereign action, even if a freer market still required the state to enact crucial functions. Fagan and LeHeron give too little attention to the shifting relative powers of state and trans-national market when they talk of reciprocal flows. They write: “We have sought to develop a framework for reinterpreting the geography of accumulation in which the stark dichotomy between global and domestic production is abandoned without removing the national and local scales from their crucial positions of importance” (p. 282). While the local and national levels of policy formation and action remain crucial, as Fagan and LeHeron suggest, the shift from regulation to deregulation as policy paradigms suggests a significant shift in relations of dominance between the political and the economic in the shift from state directed macro-economic policy formation towards local and national state facilitated micro-administration of globalizing macro-circuits of capital. As was the case in the earlier discussion of the local-state, it is not a question of the existence or non-existence of significant action at the local level. Rather the questions of dominance, autonomy and discretion need to be addressed. This leads on to “Globalization” and to changing relations between locality, identity and community.

4.4. The theory of Globalization/Glocalization.

A largely linear conception of “modernization” and its universalisation continued after 1945 with Parsons and Marxists like Warren (1980). The contemporary debate has shifted to discussion of “globalization” (a concept developed in the 1960s by Robertson and Nettl (1968) but which only became central to sociological debate in the 1990s). This angle

examines relations between the “local” and the “translocal” at a time of increasingly powerful transnational (rather than international) “flows” of money, power, people and culture. Most “globalization” theory starts from the premise that the nation-state is increasingly undermined by sub- and supra-state forces. Bell argues: “The nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems in life and too big for the small problems in life” (Bell 1987, p. 1). Burton (1972) points out the “Billiard Ball” theory of international relations between internally homogenous and externally discrete entities is incapable of explaining non-state based activity across borders. Ohmae (1990, p. 18-19) writes: “On the political map, the boundaries between countries are as clear as ever... [but] of all the forces eating them away, perhaps the most persistent is the flow of information” carried by economic, political and cultural carriers. Rosenau (1990) sees a “post-international politics” of “transnationalization” and “interdependence” resulting from technology (after Kerr (1963) on convergence and Levy’s (1966) “logic of industrialism”). Giplin, on the other hand (1987) sees profit as key.

Robertson (1992, p. 8) argues: “Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole... both concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the global whole in the twentieth century.” Robertson denies any single economic or technical dynamic to globalization and instead charts a transformation of consciousness. He suggests four levels of analysis, individual self, national society, international system and humanity in general. Globalization intensifies the latter two and further mediates the inter-relationship between the former pair. “Personal phenomenologies become increasingly trans-local”.

Robertson (1990, p. 23) notes James der Derian’s (1989) point that it was in the year of the formal declaration of the rights of man (1789) that Edmund Burke coined the term international. Robertson is well aware that the local - global relation has always been one of intermediation. He cites Polybius on the unification of the Roman empire: “Formerly, the things which happened in the world had no connection among themselves... But since then all events are united in a common bundle” (Robertson, 1990, p. 21)). Robertson argues that intensification of this process is particularly acute in our present period.

4.4.1. The weakening of the Nation State.

As Held (1992) argues, the rise of trans-national interactions weakens nation-states, their ability to exercise effective control over the economies of the regions they govern has declined, and sovereignty becomes increasingly limited, requiring greater international agreement, limiting the “autonomous” powers of individual states further. The historic rise of the nation state (at least in Europe and a number of other advanced countries) reached its climax in the social-welfarist era between the second world war and the 1970s, argue Crook et al (1992). Since that time the “legitimation crisis” of the state (Habermas 1976a) has increasingly been resolved by attempts to detach the state from areas of social and economic life which had previously come under state macro-management (though in policing and other forms of surveillance and regulation states have strengthened with “freed markets”).

Attention has been paid to the rise of trans-national and international political organizations (International Non-Governmental Organizations and Inter-Governmental Organizations). Giddens (1984 and 1985) and Archer (1991) point to the Versailles agreement after WWI as a significant point in the rise of trans-governmental organizations. The foundation of the United Nations after 1945 was another. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc (itself indicative of the general undermining of state domination over economic and political life) and the rise of what is often called “a new world order” has been trumpeted as the potential dawn of a new era of international cooperation over significant transnational issues. Talk of an “international community”, whatever the limitations of any such reality, is everywhere. Luke (1995, p. 91-107) points out, “new world order” is better described as “neo-world order”, no longer simply bounded by agreements of territorial nation-states guarding “real-estate” (geographical neighbour-hoods) but a system of “hyper-real-hoods” guarding “Hyper-real-estate” (the flow of digital capital and information within a system of global mobility). Copyrights and human rights become crucial sites of struggle across boundaries. In each case claims to rights, held at some hyper-real universal level of international community law, corrode state power to control sovereign space. The liberation from the state promises a liberal combination of freedom from coercion and freedom to starve.

In the same way that the modern or pre-modern nature of the “national character” of the nation-state was given considerable attention by scholars, so the local nature of local identity has become a central area of interest for theorists of globalization. Central to debates over

national identity in the modern world of states, was whether the newly formed nation-states created or expressed the national identities their nationalism embodied. Modernists (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1990, and Hobsbawm 1990) and quasi-primordialists (such as Anthony D. Smith 1986) were all agreed that the formation of particular states in particular places was more the result of the external formation of other states within a growing inter-state world system in the 19th and 20th centuries than of the intrinsic push of authentic national identities into statehood. What was disputed was whether the selected national identities to which states were “attached” were the pre-existing dominant identities of the people living in the region subsequently to become the state. The two sides in the debate were able to justify their arguments as both were making claims on slightly different issues. While Gellner can claim “it is the national [state] which engenders nations, and not the other way around” (p. 55) and that: “In brief, the mutual relationship of a modern culture and state is something quite new, and springs, inevitably, from the requirements of a modern economy [for rational and uniform law, language administration, taxation and communications]” (p.140), it is equally possible for Smith to claim: “Put simply, modern nations are not as “modern” as modernists would have us believe. If they were, they could not survive” (1986, p. 212). While the modern state is founded on a legitimating claim that it represents the “people”, and that all within its boundaries share some common past, present and future, as a nation, a claim usually drawing on some historical precedents, the selection of historical genealogies from the multiplicity of options usually available to trace one’s blood and belonging leaves such historical narration very much to the discretion of the modern author (described in Anderson 1990). German and French national identities have more to do with their relations, one to the other, than with intrinsic self (volks soul or Holy Roman legacy). Arnason argues: “Nations and nation-states do not simply interact with each other; under modern conditions, they form - or tend to form - a world, i.e. a global context with its own processes and mechanisms of integration... [T]he national imagery and its nationalist articulations constitute themselves by relating to various other aspects of the broader context, and the different ways of doing so are reflected in their self-definitions as well as in their impact on the overall pattern of modernity” (1990, p. 224).

The idea of locality (in relation to the global) can equally be understood as the consequence of contemporary and continual reformation of narratives of i. continuity, ii. shared memories



and iii. common destiny, within trans-local discursive practices. Both the identities of “locals” and “cosmopolitans” are inescapably tied to trans-local arenas.

4.4.2. Globalization & the breakdown/reconstruction of “traditional identities”.

It is usually presumed that globalization eliminates localities, turning places into spaces within a homogenous world system. Writers like Meyrowitz (1985) argue: “People no longer seem to “know their place”... our world may suddenly seem senseless to many people because, for the first time in modern history, it is relatively placeless” (1985, p. 309). Lash and Urry argue that mobility of people and images acts to “disembed” the individual from “traditional” modes of being and perceiving, acting and thinking. They conclude their discussion of “Globalization and Localization” as follows: “Where economies of signs and spaces function as flows the result is individuation... Either through the emptying out of shared meanings of the “we” ...or [through] discourses of individuation, normalization and atomization...” (1994, p. 314).

Lash (with Featherstone 1995) argues that: “A central implication of the concept of globalization is that we must now embark on the project of understanding social life without the comforting term “society”” (1995, p. 2). However he suggests globalization is not only disembedding but also “the reconstruction and/or creation of individual and communal identities”. Such new identities are not equivalent to pre-modern *gemeinschaften*, or Heidegger’s customary non rule-governed “being-in-the-world”. They are reflexive, and draw on the very resources of global integration to constitute particular modes of place and difference (Lash and Urry (1994) call these invented rather than imagined communities).

Robertson (in Featherstone et al 1995, p. 33) argues that Wallerstein’s (1983) distinction between systematic and anti-systematic movements within a world system is misconceived. Robertson argues McWorld and Jihad World are both aspects of “glocalization”, “a global creation of locality” that complements the local appropriation of aspects of the global. He points to the “establishment of great numbers of nationalisms with similar characteristics or a worldwide spread of suburbanization”. The “global institutionalization of the expectations and constitution of local particularism” enables local identities to express themselves within universal discourses of human rights. Robertson argues globalization is not Westernization.

However, his work has tended to present a positive presentation of the “glocal” that needs to be set against the more negative implications of trans-local processes within locality. While he is right to suggest that so called “Jihad Worlds”, the modes and sites of resistances that emerge and challenge the forces of corporate “MacWorlds”, are themselves intimately bound up within, and in large part emerge from, trans-local discourses and practices (such as over rights, autonomy, sovereignty and nationhood), he pays little attention to the repressive aspects of the “MacWorld”. As such, while I agree with Robertson’s criticism of Wallerstein’s conception of “anti-systematic movements” as “local” in origin, rather than “glocal”, as Robertson suggests, Robertson’s general neglect of the repressive aspects of “MacWorld”, and therefore to the significance of resistance to it, requires that a more critical account of the “Glocal” goes beyond both the superficiality of Robertson’s neo-Parsonian theory of the global social system and forms of neo-Marxist theory that, in the rush to demonstrate the coherence of “the system”, tend to equate all trans-local activity with the interests of capital, and therefore tend to relegate resistance to the margins of space and theory. Forms of resistance, even when un-systematic in the fullest sense, are never the pristine counterposition of the primordial locale to the outside. Resistance always engages in the rearticulation of the outside within subversions of trans-local discourses and practices.

Arjun Appaduria argues (1995) the homogenization thesis fails to recognize “indigenization”, the appropriation of global products into local practical meanings. Locales are adaptive and dynamic. Appaduria claims the core-periphery distinction collapses in “disorganized capitalism” (see Lash and Urry 1987); new fluid “scapes” emerge where groups and individuals negotiate identities. The five scapes: ethnoscapas, technoscapas, financescapas, mediascapas and ideoscapas, increasingly enable new identities to emerge at the very moment they undermine and transgress states. Re-invented homelands become hot political and military projects, gray routes emerge for transmitting of all manner of subversive ideas, technology and substances to sustain “anti-social” forms of life.⁴⁸ Friedman (1995) shows the population of North American Indigenous Peoples rose from 700000 to 1400000 between 1970 and 1980 as the unintended result of state policies aimed at assimilation. New “self-authenticating” cultures can emerge, for example “La Sape”,

⁴⁸ “It is because labour, finance and technology are now so widely separated that the volatilities that underlie movements for nationhood... grind against the vulnerabilities which characterize the relationships between states” (1995, p. 304-5).

migrant workers from former French colonies who have developed an extreme status cult associated with European cultural commodities. Tourism has enabled some poor groups to cash in on Western desires to experience authenticity. Stuart Hall (1991 a, b) argues nation-state cultures are hybrids anyway; the notion of pollution or corruption of authentic purity is ideological. Nevertheless at present the pace of cultural cross-fertilization renders hybridity more obvious. Pieterse (1995) argues “globalization” is hybridization on a world scale, not multi-cultural but inter-cultural. Creolization and “cross-over” culture occurs at individual and institutional levels. Globalization creates new and more diverse original particularisms through the very processes of universal communication, movement and rights.

The above authors’ focus on cultural identities fails to address effectively power relations that operate within an intensified global capitalism. While it is important to point to modes of accommodation and re-invention, mixing and diversification; such processes (debunking the globalization as homogenisation thesis at one level) tend to gain prominence at the expense of accounts of intensification and centralisation of economic power. While Lash and Urry do discuss these dangers with some clarity, debate is characterised by the tendency to celebrate fragmentation and difference in the cultural sphere, the collapse of state economic/political management, and the intensification of consumerist pluralism in a global cultural sphere.

4.4.3. Economic Forces of Globalization and the Ecological Crisis.

The weakness of the nation state to control its economy reflects the rise of trans-national capitalism, and what Castells (1989) calls the “informational mode of production”. Global cities (King 1995, Sassen 1991) are more deeply connected with each other than they are to the nations in which they are located, controlling vast stretches of trans-national space through computerized financial markets. As Lash and Urry (1994, p. 280) point out: “Globalization is really advanced capitalist globalization”. As money becomes “de-territorialized” so nation-state financial sovereignty becomes diminished. Agger (1989) suggests that “Fast Capitalism” can now out-pace states in determining social and economic priorities. James Field referred to the transnationals as a new tribe (1971), and Sauvart (1976) argues that such groups represent a bridge-head not only of a new global economics but also a global consumer culture, a theme developed more recently by Sklair (1995). It used to be said that locals felt at home while cosmopolitans had no home. It may now be suggested that it is the cosmopolitan elites that have now rendered the world in their own

image, and that it is the immobile who now feel alien if they do not possess the resources to participate in the new consumer world culture, even if only through television and at the supermarket. David Harvey (1989) vividly portrays the recent burst of space-time compression, induced by the crisis tendencies within Western capitalism after the post-war boom years. From the early 1970s the drive to intensify communication infrastructures within the world economy came from the desire to coordinate increasingly specialized global divisions of labour. Technological change enables a greater freedom of capital from the spatial constraints of national political compromises and trade-unions power.

As I suggested in the previous chapter the increased quantity and integration of human economic activity has given rise to growing concern over the unintended consequences of industrial society's capacity to produce more "goods". Beck (1992) refers to this as the increased reflexivity over the production of environmental "bads" in the process of producing economic "goods". The relationship between economic globalization and cultural globalization, the increased availability of trans-national forms of media and knowledge, has had contradictory effects. Yearley (1996) shows how universalizing aspects of globalization are combined with increasing awareness of counterpoints. Economic integration combines with intensified awareness of economic inequality and the inability of individuals, regions and nations to control destinies; the globalization of environmental problems is combined with intensified conflict and division over defining the problem and apportioning responsibility. The increasing power of non-accountable trans-national economic actors weakens the power of nation states over internal activities just as awareness increases about the need to control production of environmental "bads" along with economic goods.

4.5. Conclusions: Think Glocally - Act Glocally.

The burden of the above account has been to question the assumption that the local represents the site from which disruption of trans-local practices emerge. This is not to say that forms of resistance are un-situated, or that they are, or must be, as systematic as the practices they oppose. It is only to emphasize that spaces of resistance emerge within the very trans-local discourses and practices they oppose rather than from an "outside" made up of authentic and prior "communities" or "identities". Sklair is correct, in one sense, to suggest (1995, p. 495) that: "While capitalism is increasingly organised on a global basis, effective opposition to

capitalist practices tends to be manifest locally". However, the sense in which he is correct is that all manifestations (in as far as they are manifested) are located. If, as he goes on (p. 495): "The local is defined in terms of sub-global communities that can be meaningfully represented through collective action", then the equation of resistance and locality becomes tautological, while lacking any necessary geographical referent, scope or scale, bar not being as systematic as capitalism. Such a definition of the spaces of resistance could be applied to the gay community, the feminist community or the Friends of the Earth. As such the term local is, at least in its commonly understood meaning, inappropriate. While suggesting that: "The burden of my argument has been that while capitalism increasingly organises globally, the resistance to global capitalism can only be effective where they can disrupt its smooth running (accumulation of private profits) locally and can find ways of globalizing these disruptions", Sklair goes on to say (p. 507): "The irony is that so many of these Social Movements actually rely on funding from foreign agencies to grow." As my above discussion suggests, this is no irony. Far from disruptions emerging out of primordial resistance to outside imposition, only later gaining outside aid and publicity, resistance draws upon the resources made available by trans-local discourses and practices from the word go. The capacity to act at a more global level is indicative of relative dominance. Dominant groups are those able to act more systematically. However anti-systematic actors are not best understood as innocent locals rising up against devious cosmopolitans. To set up such an opposition would reproduce the very failures of Piven and Cloward's (1977) poor people's movements (marginalization and the incapacity to mobilize the resources of the system against itself), which Sklair wishes to avoid. To reproduce the successes of such movements requires the capacity to re-articulate the resources of the trans-local at the very moment of disrupting its local manifestations. Next I discuss case studies of "Local Environmental Movements", drawn from sociology, anthropology and geography, which combine the themes discussed above, and contextualise my empirical research.

5. “Local Environmental Movement” Case Studies: A Research Context.

What Chapter 2 attempts to demonstrate is the dialectical interrelation of agency and structure. Contrary to collective behaviour and mass society theory, protest and anti-/non-institutional politics cannot be seen as either structurally determined behaviour or pathological hysteria. Non-institutional politics draws upon institutional resources and, even in the case of seemingly directionless rioting, usually contain a goal-directed rationality. Resource Mobilisation Theory sought to show that protest was often as rational as conventional political action. However its conception of rationality mirrored that of the institutions many movements opposed. In their reaction to theorists of the group mind and of crowd psychological de-individuation, resource mobilisation theorists reified the instrumental rationality of the calculating homo-oeconomicus. Political Opportunity Structure and Political Contingency Theories seek to show that movement development and success is largely determined by their “environment”. Movement tactics are understood as rational responses to the opportunities and dead-ends political systems throw up - either comparatively (P.O.S.) or longitudinally (P.C.T.). While useful the P.O.S. theory tends to reify political structures, and so limits a fuller understanding of deep seated social, economic and cultural processes operating through them, while P.C.T. tends equally to avoid deeper social, cultural and economic questions while focusing on the empirical fluidity of openness and closure.

New Social Movement Theories have sought to analyse the changing nature of the social totality and of the individual identities which create and are created through such social systems and social change. Such theories have sought to conceptualize and challenge the dominant modes of “rationality” - at both the system level and at that of the individual - at the centre of the previously mentioned accounts. While such accounts overcome many shortcomings in preceding theories the attempt to understand the logic of advanced industrial societies in general has led to a weakness in the accounting for specificities. Equally, while the R.M.T. approach is criticised for overly instrumental conceptions of interests, identities and organization, the N.S.M. theorists’ focus on totality and identity has neglected questions of political tactics and involvement within institutions of the polity and beyond.

The relationship between the “natural environment” and the social movements which have attempted to “defend” it raised an array of questions, fundamentally around the question of whether movements are the product of an increased understanding of an external and objective threat, or whether the increased sense of an external threat is the product of the campaigning of movements. To this can be added the question of whether, if we concede that our sense of the environmental threat is itself socially constructed, we must then also concede that the threat is not real. Neither a correspondence theory of truth, nor the relativist conception need be accepted. Human conceptions of the non-human are inevitably bound to the institutional commitments of the actors developing and advocating them, but this does not justify relativism. Bloor (1991) argues increased awareness of the socially constructed nature of scientific discourse should not lead us to conclude that scientific knowledge is therefore invalid. After Mannheim, Bloor argues awareness of social influences on variables selection, techniques, and interpretation of correlations lets us take scientific endeavour to the understanding of science; i.e. the attempt to discern causal relations determining science against the naive view that science is driven by non-causal processes of logic and reason alone. These views are shared by Beck (1992) who has suggested increased reflexivity towards the hidden omissions and orientations of a science driven by industrial and military competition in the 19th and 20th centuries has both encouraged and been encouraged by the rise of environmental movements. Beck’s argument is that far from debunking science, reflexivity has undermined the process by which political decisions were being naturalized by recourse to scientific arguments (what Habermas calls the scientisation of politics). Increasing competition between scientists (working for different interests and campaigns) has both intensified the scientific scrutiny with which research is conducted and reviewed, and has reinforced the realization that science cannot solve moral and political questions even while remaining crucial to any reasoned debate. Reflexivity increases the clarity of debate over what science can and cannot do. Science has become political as increased scrutiny is now addressed to the biases that exist in scientific conduct and interpretation, but as an ongoing and contested arena of reflexive debate it cannot be said to be reducible to the interests discernably influencing one side in a dispute or another. Science is political but science is not reducible to politics. This is essentially Mannheim’s claim for relational rather than relativist knowledge. Politics relies on science but is not reducible to it, essentially Habermas’s defence of the lifeworld of value-rationality from reduction to technocracy.

The debate over the local/trans-local again hinges around agency and structure, but it is crucial to avoid reducing agency to the local and structure to the trans-local. Crucially, any attempt to study the social construction of locality needs to address two key questions, that of the practical operationalisation of the term “local” as a spatially bounded entity, and that of the struggle over definitions of that location’s identity and interests. A locality has no primordial boundary (there is no natural discreteness) outside of those struggles, and similarly, “its” lack of internal homogeneity renders any attempt to define a locale’s interests and identity contingent. The object of empirical research cannot be “discovering” the essential nature of locale; rather it must chart conflicts in attempts to attribute such a nature, and to document their relative success and failure. Insofar as locality is a relational social construction, both within its emergent and shifting boundaries and across them, study must focus on those power relations that transcribe space in the creation of place. In the above sociological account of “social movements” (social change and social reproduction), “the environment” (between the human and the non-human) and “locality” (between place and space), I sought to justify a non-prescriptive approach to sociological research.

The relationship between the three theoretical axes have been addressed by researchers in a number of social science fields using case study methods. In this chapter I begin with Steven Yearley’s (1995 and 1996) use of “case studies” to build up an account of the relationship between environmental movements and “globalization”. I outline weaknesses in this rather ambitious attempt, and go on to elaborate on these themes using case studies drawn from geography (i.e. Kimber and Richardson (eds) 1974, Gregory 1971, and Blowers, 1980, 1984 and 1991 et al), anthropology (i.e Milton 1996, Peace 1993, Prato 1993, Harries-Jones 1993 and others) and sociology (Jamison and Eyerman et al 1990 and Eyerman and Jamison 1991). These particular studies highlight a range of issues and themes that contextualise my own ethnographic research. Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) cognitive approach to movements is then examined for an open “research agenda” to be carried forward into the following methodology chapter. Their approach raises the dual themes of contingency within movement development and the possibility of formulating a general theoretical model of movement unity and diversity, between movement fields, across time and across space. I conclude this chapter with a provisional account of unity and difference patterns within the

worker's/socialist movement, the women's/feminist movement, the anti-racist/civil rights movement and the environmental/green movement. This will be based upon Kristeva's trichotomy of identity, difference and transformation.

5.1. Global Environmental Confusion.

Steven Yearley's discussion of globalization and environmental movements suggests that: "The question of how global environmental issues got their "globality"... are standardly sociological..." (1996, p. 144), and he offers a "case study approach" (1996, p. ix) to support: "The argument of this book... that "global environmental problems" are global problems because people and organizations have worked at making "the environment" a world wide phenomenon" (1996, pp. 143-4). However the nature of this "phenomenon" is left ambiguous. While globalizing political, cultural and scientific discourses may have constructed the "globality" of environmental issues in an "ideological" fashion, globalizing economic, technical and military practices may have generated genuinely global environmental threats. Yearley's "multiple spurs" approach to globalization enables him to offer a superficial pluralistic description of diversity and ambiguity as "the nature of things". While chapter two of "Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization" (1996) outlines an array of environmental problems of growing severity in a compressed world, and chapter three outlines the players involved in framing the debates within a new "global consciousness", chapter four offers a number of case studies of international negotiations.

Showing how disagreement emerges between actors over generation and interpretation of scientific data, and over practical implementation of sustainable development, Yearley makes three claims; i. that the "globality" of environmental issues is socially constructed, ii. that scientific discourses cannot be accepted as universally valid knowledge, and iii. that there is no universal human interest upon which to found objective and consensual policy. He suggests his "deconstructions" are eminently sociological contributions to the understanding of environmental movements and globalization, based upon exposure of institutional bias. While useful, Yearley's account needs questioning.

5.1.1. How Global is the Global?

Yearley suggests that many environmental issues are largely "local", and only become "global" when taken up by actors with an interest in so representing them. He suggests "...

the stimulus to a great deal of environmental campaigning remains local, whether opposition to landscape destruction resulting from road building or to the dangers from chemical or nuclear plants” (1995, p. 212), and that: “The greatest effects of discharges from chemical works are usually felt only locally. And even apparently major environmental catastrophes such as large tanker wrecks have their predominant impact in a restricted area” (1995, p. 221). Yearley clearly fails to grasp Robertson’s conception of globalization (despite repeated references). While correct to suggest “grounds for accepting that the globalization of production and commerce tend to spread even local environmental problems until they become global” (1995, p. 222), he fails to see how the localized effects of road building, chemical/nuclear plants, and tanker wrecks are manifestations of how increasingly globalized economic, political and military processes impact locally. Also his conception of “local actors” “drawing on global-level justifications for their local action” (1995, p. 211) is not elaborated upon, as a manifestation of “glocality”, rather Yearley maintains the dualism of local and global. As Yearley writes “the uneven consequences [of globalization] ... result in fragmentation rather than global uniformity” (1995, p. 212). As such localized fragments often manifest globalizing subversions of “the coherence of cultures and politics at the national level” (p. 212). Local difference does not refute globalization, as Yearley suggests.

5.1.2. Universal Environmental Science?

Yearley claims his “cases studies” (in particular on the international politics of ozone depletion and global warming) demonstrate the non-universality of scientific “truths”. However he confuses research and policy formation despite his suggestion (1996, p. 119) that he is not simply questioning the legitimacy of drawing moral (policy) implications from neutral research. “The point I am highlighting is that values and value laden assumptions enter into the formulation of the issues before the “facts” are even established” (1996, p. 119). However, despite usefully teasing out facts and values in both case-studies, his bold challenge to the universality of science is not sustained.

5.1.2.1. Global Warming and Ozone Depletion.

Yearley highlights the dispute between the Washington based World Resources Institute (W.R.I.) and the Indian Centre for Science and Environment (C.S.E.) over CO₂ and methane emissions. While noting difficulties in data collection, Yearley’s focus is elsewhere.

While WRI's "net" emission figures offset "gross" national outputs by average percentage absorption rates from ocean, soil and plant sinks, their CSE critics argued such national accounting ignored national population differences, the distribution of remaining sinks, and differences between survival outputs and those based on luxury consumption. On the basis that the WRI data sought to allocate proportionate "blame" using its "data", all the CSE criticisms hold true. But Yearley goes further, suggesting the non-neutrality of the "facts". This claim is not borne out by his account. Both parties accepted the output calculations and the absorption potentials, i.e. the physical science data. What they disputed was the allocation of rights and blame to be attributed either nationally, per capita or by criteria of social equity in terms of both output and sinks. The WRI can be criticized for incorporating value judgements in their scientific data, and Yearley is right to suggest that the CSE's counterpoints are based on criteria of social equity rather than scientific data, but this extrication of facts and values only serves to reinforce the distinction, it fails to undermine it. Yearley is right to refer to Habermas's warning against the "scientization of politics" (Yearley 1996, p. 117) but fails to appreciate that science's inadequacy as a yard stick for moral judgement does not demonstrate the relativistic "politicization of science".

Likewise his account of EU and US positions on ozone depleting C.F.C.'s crudely counterposes the reduction of politics to science with a reduction of science to politics. While correctly suggesting 1970s US legislation and 1980s EU reluctance "leads to some problems for the idea that science commands global assent" (1996, p. 108), he fails to demonstrate that this failure is based on the absence of rational grounds for acceptance rather than on social and political questions of interest and priority. He claims that "evidence" was not decisive in generating an international agreement and that "even when it was agreed that the scientific evidence did indicate the existence of a humanly-caused environmental problem, the evidence did not of itself reveal what kind of solution should be adopted" (1996, p. 111). Again he only reiterates the fact/value distinction and shows that interests are not often subordinate to the force of "better" argument. While right to point to the impossibility of absolute "truth", and the problem of "experimental regress" (the continual possibility of reformulating the question and the methodology of a test) Yearley exaggerates the implications of this for science as a universalizing (rather than a pre-established universal) discourse and practice. His account does not "deconstruct" Western science, merely reiterating the need to understand the limits of science in making value judgements, and exposing attempts by

dominant elites to hide self-interest behind “data”.

5.1.3. Universal Human Interests: Vested Interests and Social Movements.

Yearley points out the uneven distribution of environmental threats. But while the Dutch may have more to fear from sea-levels rising than the Swiss, the underlying issue of global warming may affect Swiss snow as much as Dutch dikes. Yearley does admit that money more than physical geography underlies differential risk distribution, yet fails to fully appreciate the de-localizing implications. Might talk of global problems be a North Western elite ploy to pass their agenda off as the common interest? No doubt the focus on deforestation, southern population, and solutions to ozone depletion reflect the balance of power in the world, not the neutral facts of the matters addressed. This however does not refute the globalizing nature of the problem (in origin and consequence), only the neutrality of dominant accounts of “globality”. That “it benefits some people to advance claims about “globality”” (1995, p. 222) implies neither that those marginalized or subordinated by a particular call for “restraint and responsibility” in the “global” interest, would be best served by the re-localizing of environmental responsibility, or that identification of interests in the advocacy of a point of view constitutes an automatic “deconstruction” of its truth claims.

Yearley’s greatest weakness is not a failure to recognise the importance of conflicts of interest (something he rightly criticises Robertson for), but his inability to go beyond a deconstruction of “universal human interests” to an account of how dominant cultural, political, military and economic elites (which Yearley, after Robertson, sets apart as multiple and autonomous “spurs” to globalization, in a superficial pluralism) prohibit the formation of equitable and democratic solutions to environmental problems, while pursuing a globalization path that magnifies environmental threats. Yearley’s inability stems from his crude and invalid “deconstruction” of science, and his failure to recognise that the invalidity of dominant elite claims to be representing “universal interests” does not invalidate “universalising” moral discourses in general. Because there are, for Yearley, no acceptable universal discourses he can only outline competing claims. While “... there is a danger that the conviction that science speaks objectively and disinterestedly means that one need have no qualms about excluding other people from decision-making since they would, in any event, have arrived at the same conclusion as oneself” (1996, p. 149) to find this conviction dangerous implies that “excluding other people from decision-making” is wrong. Such a

universalizing democratic discourse of communicative ethics in the field of moral decision making is entirely consistent with the Habermasian critique of the scientization of politics, if not with Yearley's relativism. That Yearley fails to grasp the universalizing moral force of the critique of domination and exclusion from democratic participation, implicit in his pluralism though in contradiction with his relativism, leads him to his most naive proposition about the dual dynamics of "global environmental problems". He writes: "Because of the competitive relations between firms, industrial and commercial interests have not always found it easy to cooperate as have NGOs. However, this disadvantage is compensated by the greater wealth and resources available to the commercial sector" (1995, p. 238). While, to exclude smaller (often Southern) firms, TNCs do, in some cases, campaign for higher environmental standards, that Yearley can see their unaccountable and global "wealth and resources" as compensating for their self-interested and undemocratic nature, makes a mockery of his critique of science as exclusory and domineering. Far from compensating for their lack of democracy, the power and resources of TNCs lie at the heart of their undemocratic and environmentally destructive globalization path.

It is to this opposition that Yearley alludes when he concludes (1996, p. 150): "More than any other contemporary social movement, environmentalists offer a comprehensive alternative... Greens have, as Dobson recently argued (1990), a coherent green political philosophy; they have distinctive views on the economy." While it is questionable whether such a comprehensive and coherent movement really exists, on the question of economic and philosophical comprehensiveness and coherence, Yearley's account is very clearly lacking. I now turn to case study material from the field of political geography.

5.2. Something in the Air. But Where?

Roy Gregory's 1971 "The Price of Amenity" presents a series of local disputes to highlight how "amenity" vs "utility" disputes have intensified in the twenty years since 1950. "All the signs suggest that as a result of a growing preoccupation with "the quality of life", it will figure even more prominently in the annals of future decades" (p. 1). Gregory's attention to empirical detail tends towards a surface pluralism without recourse to deeper and more theoretical questions concerning systematic relations of power. The thread running through the accounts is the changing balance of preference between utility and amenity, and questions

of how far externalities are internalized by developers as a result of local protest. Utility is never absolutely at odds with amenity as the local preference for developers to internalize costs is set off against local need for developers' resources. Each side has an array of weapons at their disposal when bargaining. Developers can exert pressure for low cost internalization but have to balance this with costs arising from protests, inquiries and other potential planning delays. As: "Calculated dishonesty is not a widespread feature of British public life" (p.29), Gregory is primarily concerned to outline shifting values that have given rise to increased preference to defend amenity against utility. He concludes: "Some years ago, when he was Minister of Town and Country Planning, the late Lord Dalton declared to a friend, "My dear fellow, preserving the countryside doesn't win votes, you know." As we enter the seventies, politicians are evidently having second thoughts. Even the handful of cases described in this book reflect a change of outlook. In chapter one an important public authority could argue, without turning a hair it would seem, that the natural beauty of the countryside was no business of theirs. A similar avowal today in the same circumstances would be almost unthinkable... the Abingdon gasholder that raised such a furore in 1966 and 1967 had been approved virtually without a murmur in 1951" (p.303).

Kimber and Richardson's (eds. 1974) "Campaigning for the Environment" brings together a range of case studies documenting campaigns over historic city centres, clean air, visual pollution, water supply and a range of transport issues. While sharing Gregory's somewhat superficial pluralism, Kimber and Richardson do note two features whose interrelationship (which they do not address) is central to my own work. Firstly they argue: "The transition from recognition of the need for unity to its achievement presents virtually insuperable difficulties, simply because of the enormous range of interests and attitudes encompassed by the conservation movement. While the many local and national groups are united in the broad desire to maintain or improve the quality of the environment, they differ widely on the urgency of the predicament, the solutions advocated, and on the means to be used to obtain these solutions" (p. 224). Secondly they suggest, while environmental concern is not new "what is new is... the global approach to the problem both figurative and literal. The emergence of the concept of "system" in so many spheres of intellectual activity has encouraged a global approach to many problems" (p. 224). What Kimber and Richardson (as well as Gregory) were unable to do was raise the question of power that could begin to unravel the relationship between local plurality and global "system".

Through case studies of a series of local environmental disputes between the 1970s and 1980s in Bedfordshire Andrew Blowers (1980, 1984, 1991) attempts to integrate the empirical and often superficial case study method with structuralist theoretical concerns with underlying questions of power. Like Gregory, Kimber and Richardson, Blowers starts with the premise that British local government is neither riddled with corruption nor in the pockets of “rampant capitalism”, and is run by men of good-will (including Blowers for a time). However the theme of his 1980 text is “... why planning policy tends to reflect the existing pattern of power in society” (1980, p. x). This study details four case studies of Bedfordshire County Council decision making in the mid 1970’s. Each study demonstrates uniqueness in both the formulation of alliances and around the issues contested. However three central themes emerge; relations between planners and councillors, those between national and local government, and relations between council and private groups (citizens and business interests). Planners adopt a more corporatist view in relation to central government directives and the interests of developers, while politicians are more responsive to local citizen constituents. Politicians are often in a weak position when in dispute with planners as scope for autonomous action is limited by national policy which planners are professionally better able to understand and manipulate, while council policy is largely reactive in regards to planning as development is dependent upon private investment. Citizens too are largely reactive when they lack organisational forms that would either encourage or enable pro-active participation. “The greater the conflict the more likely will it be that policy-making responds to short term pressures rather than long term strategy” (p.4). While democracy interferes on occasion, it is only a limit factor in regard to the business as usual of a practising elite. Blowers concluded that for the 1970s in Bedfordshire sporadic pluralistic disputes belied a deeper continuity of local elites and structural processes.

However even as that text was going to print, the calm acceptance and continuity of corporatist relations between planners and Bedfordshire’s then largest employer (London Brick) was being shaken by a bitter and prolonged anti-pollution and dispoilation dispute. This dispute is documented in Blowers’ “Something in the Air” (1984). The emergence of the dispute and its propulsion of the company’s planning applications into the public arena, of open council sessions rather than bureaucratic planning meetings, out-flanked the

company's traditional mode of operation. This supported a seemingly pluralistic account of citizen politics against "backroom" elite jockeying. However closer inspection of the character and influence of the respective protest groups revealed the elite base of the most successful opposition coalition. "P.R.O.B.E. can be seen as an example of an elitist organisation representing business, farming, landed and political interests" (p. 236), deploying significant resources of access, influence, money and organisation. This implies an elite theory reading of events, even if in regard to an intra-elite dispute that suggests a form of elite plurality. However deeper questions concerning the causes and outcomes of the dispute suggested a structural explanation beyond local intra-elite wrangles.

The structural decline of the brick making industry in the region led to a decline in its influence as other economic sectors developed that were detrimented by the heavy pollution. This split the corporatist political consensus along new lines of cleavage. The Conservative group was split between London Brick's allies and new enterprises as well as the rural sector, while the Labour group was likewise split between constituency pressure and union support for the companies expansion plans. While the company was weakened by recession and structural decline: "The environmental cause had constructed a brittle alliance which collapsed once the issue of jobs and investment withdrawal became paramount" (p. 270). While the dispute fractured class unities the course of events largely reinforced a materialist or structuralist account. A weakness in Blowers' argument lies in his counterposition of local "actors" and "structural" processes. He suggests that: "While structuralism offers an explanation of outcomes, it seriously ignores the role of local actors, and the intensity of a local conflict which involved a council for three years" (p. 249). He suggested that while pluralism accounts best for the complexity and tenacity of the disputes that emerged, elite theory helps explain the general routine of "non-decision making", and structuralist accounts help paint in the background. However on the basis of his account of the changing balance of interests in the area the complexity of the events described might be better explained as "structural contradiction" than as structure mediated by local agency. To avoid the misleading counterposition of agency and structure I prefer to refer to trans-local discourses and practices manifested and contesting in a particular location. That the proposals were eventually scrapped due to general market depression only reinforces this point.

Again, the publication of this account in 1984 coincided with the emergence of a new dispute

which would redraw the political landscape. It is interesting that the epilogue to “Something in the Air” adds a dimension to this subsequent dispute that is never made explicit in Blowers’ (et al 1991) account of it. The epilogue records that at 3.20 p.m. on February 28th 1984 the Hanson Group announced their securing of a 58% holding in London Brick. By that time Bedfordshire County Council was embroiled in a dispute with the national government over proposals by the nuclear waste disposal company NIREX to site a shallow burial waste dump in the county. Days before the Hanson group’s third and successful attempt to take control of London Brick, in an attempt to prevent the NIREX proposal, the county council encouraged the brick makers to apply to quarry clay on the site. By February 28th the council had a trans-national corporate heavyweight in their corner.

“By the close of the 1980’s the problem of nuclear waste was being perceived in a broader, more global context” (1991, p. xxi), but, excluding two high profile cases, Blowers suggests “most opposition to nuclear waste disposal has been organized at the local level” (p. 25). This local action versus trans-local system depiction pervades his account. Local councils “could pose as Davids facing Goliath and achieve widespread public sympathy and media support” (p. 96). Blowers, as an activist and researcher, promotes this representation. While showing the lack of local economic benefits from the buried nuclear waste, and the potential blight, Blowers avoids, throughout the 1991 book to mention that David was actively supported by one of the world’s largest conglomerates (Goliath’s big brother). While events occurred locally; a local versus trans-local gloss is misleading. While depicted as a defence of local autonomy, the campaign was heavily integrated within a range of trans-local discourses and practices. Blowers points to the 1976 county council approval, without local opposition, of plans to site a nuclear power station on the same site, a plan which would have created many jobs and business opportunities, unlike an infilled waste dump. The waste dump threatened to isolate the area from future outside investment, while offering little integration (in terms of incoming investment and jobs). Other externally originating factors had also changed the situation. Critical media coverage of Windscale/Sellafield and the Sizewell B inquiry, plus the escalation of the cold war, fuelled fear of nuclear-radiation in the 1983-4 period, and groups like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace rapidly became involved in the local campaign. The Labour Party had adopted a more nuclear un-friendly tone, so making the issue party political nationally. Unlike in 1976 the trans-local economic and political leverage exerted by the nuclear option was weaker than that which was rallied against it. As

such local action was part of one set of trans-local discourses and practices set against another array. The local stand against the translocal was a rhetorical device.

Blowers details the conflict showing how the county council united with other councils also opposing dumps, and how, in the end, the government dropped all the proposed sites. However his suggestion that: “In a conflict lasting nearly four years the local community eventually achieved total victory” (1993, p. 139) may rather overstate the role of the “local community” in securing the final outcome. No doubt they played a vital part but not as locals against “the system”, agency versus structure. Blowers writes: “The chances of success were greatly increased by the event which, more than any other in the history of nuclear energy, had a transforming impact on the nuclear debate” (p. 173), this being the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor on April 26th 1986. The nuclear industry and its political allies were thrown onto the defensive. A subsequent government white paper in July 1986 seeking to allay public fears over radiation emphasised that only low level radioactive waste should be shallow dumped. While local protests continued at the four sites proposed, the crunch came on April 30th 1987, when NIREX announced that the exclusion of intermediate level wastes from shallow sites undermined their economic viability. They announced that they would pursue deep burial under the sea, and on May 1st the government announced that all four land sites had been dropped. A general election was called the following week. “Local communities had successfully asserted their role in decision making” (p. 186). But in this David and Goliath story David’s alliance with powerful forces that moved in mysterious ways around and beyond the local is largely underplayed. I do not wish to dismiss local action, simply to point out that success is highly dependent upon integration within translocal discourses and practices, even in the act of resisting other such trans-local forces.

5.3. Ethnographic Case Studies.

In the following section I address three ethnographies of local environmental disputes and Kay Milton’s (1993 and 1996) attempts to formulate key questions about locality, nature and knowledge/action, from an anthropological perspective. What is key in these accounts is the contested and ambiguous nature of both the relationship between the ‘human’ and the ‘non-human’, and between proximity and distance, identity and otherness. Milton’s critique of the ‘myth of primitive ecological wisdom’ serves to highlight key features of my own account

of 'local environmental movements' and the 'myths' that surround these terms, singularly and when taken together.

Guiliana Prato outlines the 1980s dispute over the construction of a coal fired power station in the Southern Italian town of Brindisi, highlighting the complexity of both movement and locality construction. National politicians saw the station as part of Italy's drive to achieve independence in energy, the regional government saw it as developing southern self-reliance, while the unconsulted local government and people were divided between Christian Democratic politicians, business leaders and trade-unionists who saw the station as benefiting the local economy's self-reliance, and opponents of the scheme who argued the station would blight the area's environment and economy as: "Since Roman times, Brindisi's economy and fortune had been linked to the city's geographic position and, therefore, to the port's activity" (1993, p. 118). Protesters from across Italy joined protest locally, while organisers sought to represent themselves as defenders of local peasants. From the start the Italian Radical Party adopted the issue within its national programme of challenging centralized government, and the "Catholic and Lay People for Change" (CLC) list, who acted as leading coalition in the protest movement locally, brought together a wide range of national and local parties, groups and discourses. The Left Wing Social Council sought to link defence of local culture and land with opposition to the station's proposed burning of South African coal. While both sides sought to identify the local interest within their trans-local alliances of discourses and practices, the "pro-coal" coalition's greater economic and political power enabled their conception of the 'local interest' to dominate.

Adrian Peace describes the confrontation between Dow Chemicals and the Womanagh Valley Protection Association over plans to site a chemical plant in rural East Cork. The WVPA was led by wealthy and well organized property owning families.⁴⁹ The "construction of popular opposition" involved the mobilization of both "external resources and commonsense understandings" (p. 193). The local landowners combined their

⁴⁹ Peace writes: "I assume that a political anthropology of environmental movements in the modern global order starts from the premise that warring with words, managing meanings, and negotiating with knowledges is what much environmental politics is about. Areas of political opposition over environmental resources are to be approached as sites in which rival discourses are perennially in conflict with each other. To comprehend the processes on-going within these sites of struggle, it becomes imperative to explore how certain discourses come to exercise paramouncy over others" (1993, p. 189-90).

community authority with wider socio-economic and political resources to recruit external consultants and an investigative reporter within the national media networks. “Cosmopolitan-based knowledge was to be thoroughly integrated with the commonsense resources of local political culture” (p. 193). In addition, media coverage of the Piper Alpha oil platform disaster, the Karan B fiasco, Sellafield and Chernobyl generated additional ammunition for the campaign. However the December 1988 inquiry in Dublin sought to localise the issue, against the strategy of the protesters and in favour of the developers. All non-specifics were discounted, objections were broken down into particular local technical questions over which the company could offer constructive negotiations. Peace calls the inquiry a “theatre of control”, its containment function to localize the problem and neutralize the solution via the bureaucratic facade of rational practice and through the discourse of science. The struggle revolved around attempts to localise the opponent’s truth claims (the companies’ self-interest versus the communities “bad” science) while appealing to local interests (jobs verses a clean environment) and dislocating the opponents claims from wider issues (world environment versus world economy). Successful deployment depended upon the integration of local and global discourses and practices, not setting one against the other, even if this impression could be used rhetorically. The eventual withdrawal of Dow Chemicals’ development plans, despite victory in the inquiry, was most likely the result of the combined pressure of local resistance and trans-local economic slump.

Peter Harries-Jones outlines five shades of green within the Toronto/Ontario environmental movement. He suggests that the Ontario Environmental Network and the Conservation Council are “light green” “pragmatic reformers”, the former operating as a professional/entrepreneurial firm in focusing citizen protest campaigns, while the latter operated within the more closed circles of corporatist state planning committees. The two “dark-green” organizations were Greenpeace and the Temagami Wilderness Society (TWS and later Earth Roots). The former was integrated within a global campaign and propaganda network, the latter emerging as a militant action group around a specific local logging dispute. Harries-Jones’ fifth shade was the First Nation’s land claims movement. While in British Columbia and Quebec such movements had allied with other shades of green, in Ontario/Toronto disputes raged over traditional husbandry and the patronising depiction of first people’s culture as a “surrogate wish-fulfilment of the new environmental age” (1993,

p. 49). First people's leaders derided white middle class new age spiritualism as a form of misguided "shamanism", and demanded the right to develop self-governing economic and environmental policies that combined modern aspirations with traditional husbandry. They objected to being cited as wise primitives whose local knowledge was both pre-modern and uncorrupted. Such disputes over the authenticity of the local are indicative of trans-local environmental discourses about the natural harmony of localised pre-modern cultures, while the issue of "traditional" culling of now endangered species problematizes such attributions made in the practices of trans-local campaigning, even as the significance of such "indigenous" practices are transformed within trans-local networks of trade and politics.

Kay Milton (1996) outlines an array of ethnographies to discuss the "myth of primitive ecological wisdom", the modern projection of the idealized small scale (local), naturally harmonious gatherer-hunter (environmentally friendly) primitive (historically immobile) identity onto "pre-modern" peoples. Milton suggests it is not simply "cultural" wisdom that tends to limit gatherer-hunter impact upon their environment, it is a combination of relative isolation, high mortality rates, low population levels and limited technological development. Seeing nature as powerful and spiritual is a "cultural" manifestation of more than just a different, and more benign, outlook. Milton draws upon two conceptual distinctions; firstly Bird-David's (1990) distinction between gatherer-hunter conceptions of giving and reciprocating environments; and secondly Dasmann's (1976) distinction between small scale "eco-system" peoples and globalising and industrial "bio-sphere" people. Giving "environments share one important feature: they are all more powerful than the human communities that interact with them... the balance of power lies with the environment, not with the people" (Milton 1996, p.123). Milton counterposes this outlook with the "environmentalist" cultural construction of nature, with its "concern that the environment be protected through human effort and responsibility" (p.124). "Thus, while [many] hunter-gatherers... live in powerful environments, nature conservationists live in an environment that is fragile and needs their protection" (p. 125). Richards (cited in Milton 1996, p. 125) found that to the Mende of Sierra Leone the conservationist slogan "Save Gola Forest" was incomprehensible as it was the forest that protected people and not the other way around. However other gatherer-hunters have Bird-David's reciprocating conception of nature. The Canadian Cree (Milton p. 127-9) offer gifts to nature in exchange for its gifts to man, and believe in the necessity of reciprocation between all living things, rather than the domination

of nature over man. Milton (1996, p. 130-1) cites Strehlows (1970) and concludes: "The idea of saving the environment... appears to be entirely compatible with the cultural perspective held by at least some indigenous Australian societies" (p. 131).

Concerning Dasmann's distinction between ecosystem and bio-sphere people, Milton suggests (p. 139) that: "ecosystem people might be expected to value their immediate environments highly because they depend upon them. Bio-sphere people might be expected, not only to attribute less value to their immediate environment, because the resources on which they depend come from elsewhere, but also to attribute less value to those distant environments whose resources they use. These environments, because they are distant, do not impinge on their lives, if their resources fail, they can always move on to exploit some other equally distant environment." However different cultural values (primitive reverence and modern irreverence) do not translate naturally into environmental action/inaction. Beyond the cultural valuing of nature there are questions of power and efficacy. While for Bio-sphere people it was possible to reduce respect for nature by means of technology; science, technology, trade and media have globalized strategies to address this. Milton suggests: "Environmental campaigners [in the bio-sphere world] often found it difficult to persuade even a concerned and attentive public to take personal responsibility for environmental change. Within a liberal democracy, the public and the government tend to delegate responsibility to each other" (p.137). Here Milton's critique of environmentalism's "myth of primitive wisdom" falls prey to a bio-spherical equivalent, liberal democracy's "myth of personal responsibility". While critical of the idea that gatherer-hunter "cultural outlooks" are responsible for their modest environmental impact (rather than their relative powerlessness), Milton seems to accept that in the bio-sphere world, where power has shifted from nature to large-scale political and economic networks of coordinated interaction and domination, that the solution lies in individuals taking "personal responsibility" for environmental damage. Such a view relies on the liberal democratic myths of individual autonomy, the determining power of good ideas and the transformative effect of progressive cultural outlooks. The liberal democratic myth of personal responsibility parallels the myth of primitive wisdom in both "localism" (setting the small scale primitive band or isolated individual up as agent of change) and culturalism (placing ideas and "ways of seeing" outside of material power relations). Globalizing environmental movements have largely swallowed both myths.

Milton eloquently critiques the former only to fall for the latter.

An effective account of “environmentalism” must address the relationship between localised (eco-system or individual) apathy (with its noteworthy but limited exceptions), and globalizing (bio-sphere and collective) power which both enables large scale destruction and makes possible belief in its prevention. The question facing bio-sphere environmentalism is how to overcome localized/individualised apathy and challenge global power relations at a level of “collective” (rather than personal) responsibility and action that is credible and effective. This means abandoning both the mythologies of primitive ecological wisdom and liberal individualism as strategies (if not as ideals, or for rhetorical effect). Milton points out that a key “reason why the myth of primitive ecological wisdom persists, among environmentalists is that, within the context of global environmental discourse, non-industrial societies have themselves helped perpetuate the myth by adopting the image that industrial society has constructed for them” (p. 135). As such, even those hunter-gatherer groups that profess their traditional environmental outlook may be seen as more glocal than local, waxing lyrical about their noble savagery to the press delegation flown in to cover the latest Bodyshop “trade-not-aid” deal, or to the United Nations legal team assessing their land rights claim. Such localist and culturalist self-presentations offer powerful rhetorical resonances within liberal mythology, even while globalizing discourses and practices as well as material resources underpin both their articulation (the ability to be heard), and the reality they mythologically re-articulate.

The ethnographies cited above, as well as Milton’s more ambitious, though flawed, attempt at a general framework for an environmental anthropology, give clear illustrations of both the construction of knowledge about nature within specific disputes, and the constructed nature of the localities and identities in and through which such disputes take shape and which themselves shift and are adapted to the course of the disputes over them. While drawing upon ‘traditional’ discourses about nature and locality, parties to disputes are engaged in selecting, interpreting and integrating such elements, whilst at the same moment presenting, to self and others, resulting ‘localities’, ‘natures’, ‘identities’ and ‘opponents’ as self-evidently the case. My research studies myth making, the attempts by competing groups to cast culture as nature through language and action integrated within discursive practices.

5.4. A Sociological Comparative Case Study Approach to “the New Environmental Consciousness”.

Jamison, Eyerman, Cramer (and Laessoe) (1990) adopt a comparative case study approach to environmental movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, seeking to tread between the empiricism/utilitarianism of resource mobilization theory and the utopianism of new social movement accounts, while combining elements of both. The three case studies are used to show general processes and local particularity (in line with political opportunity structure theories discussed above). Even as the authors seek to promote comparative highlighting of differences their results suggest a “glocal” longitudinal convergence path.

Besides the three national units of comparison, the account draws out three longitudinal units of analysis and a final present period (1962-8 - rising scientific and political disquiet, 1969-73 - new organisational forms, 1974-80 - the increased specialization of activists and organisations, and finally 1980 on - characterized by fragmentation and accommodation within the mainstream). Also introduced are three dimensions of “knowledge interest” within the environmental movement; these being “cosmological” (cultural innovation), “organisational” (political innovation) and “technological” (economic innovation). It is this final set of “knowledge interests” which structure both the comparative and longitudinal differences drawn out by the authors. The longitudinal analysis represents a linear unfolding of the knowledge interests: stage one (1962-8), the rise of a new cosmology - the fusion of biology and politics within a systematic Ecology; stage two (1969-73), the development of new participatory or professional forms of political and/or cultural organisation; stage three (1974-80) the professional specialization of activists through new technology/science; and finally stage four (1980 on) where absorption and fragmentation within the mainstream starts to blur the distinction between movement and status quo.

While presenting this cross-national longitudinal narrative of stages (1990, p. 9-11) the authors also suggest the three nations studied highlight significant differences (again mapping onto their three “knowledge interests”). The Netherlands is said to have been characterized by “a comparatively early professionalism that permeated all three dimensions of knowledge interest” (1990, p. 187). The dominant dimension of knowledge interest is seen as the organizational one, the cosmological stage being relatively truncated, leading to a pragmatic, rather than a utopian, outlook, while the resulting early organisational pragmatism

enabled rapid movement towards a technocratic role for activists turned new service providers. In Sweden both the cosmological and organisational phases are relatively truncated as the Swedish corporatist system tended to incorporate activists within class based cosmologies and organisational forms. Thus the technological dimension of knowledge interest formation was said to have been the dominant element within the Swedish environmental movement from very early on. "In Sweden, a more technocratic environmentalism was apparent right from the beginning. The emergent concern with environmental pollution, which was expressed in each country during the period of awakening in the 60's, was assimilated into the Swedish political culture as for the most part technical problems of management and engineering as an unplanned and unwanted, yet unnecessary side effect of the industrial state" (1990, p. 188). Predictably this left Denmark to carry forward the cosmological dimension as dominant knowledge interest within its environmental movement. The Danish movement is said to be more value-oriented, idealistic and to have drawn from the student movement not only members (as in Sweden and the Netherlands) but also models of belief and participatory organisation. Even the technological dimension is said to have been heavily cosmologically driven according to principles of alternative technology. Even so, such technology became more commercial in the 1980's.

While the authors conclude that: "Subject to similar international influences and propagating a common environmental message, the new environmentalism, as it emerged in Western Europe took on different national colourations" (1990, p. 198), this colouration is rather overdrawn by the attempt to use the three nations studied as ideal types for their three dimensions of knowledge interest. Interestingly, while their comparative analysis builds up national differences, their longitudinal analysis renders national differences as largely superficial and transitory phenomena. While particular national contexts may have led to different relations of dominance within the cosmological, organizational and technological dimensions of knowledge interests during the "emergence of the new environmental consciousness", the authors' fourth time period (that which comes after the three phases of the emergence period) is characterised by a general incorporation, diffusion and fragmentation of environmental movements along the line of technological innovation and accommodation: environmentalism as efficiency. "The worldview of systems ecology provided environmental activists in each of our countries with a common framework of

reference, a shared cosmology. According to the ecological worldview, all is interconnected, the local, the national and the global... While systems ecology formed a common denominator for environmental activists in each of our countries, the critique of modern society was primarily framed in technological terms" (1990, p. 186). While the authors are keen to highlight the different colourations within different national movements, the singular movement towards an orientation towards offering technological fixes to render the present more efficient suggests a deeper set of interconnections (despite local specificities) between the local, the national and the global than is accounted for either in biological accounts of systems ecology, or in a sociological case study approach that projects three ideal typical conceptual colourations upon three northern European mini-states.

5.5. Unity and Difference within Social Movements.

Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) "Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach" develops their account of knowledge interest formation within social movements generally. They focus attention on working class movements, the environmental movement and the civil rights movement. They centre attention upon the role of intellectuals within new movement formation and likewise "organic" intellectual formation within emerging movements. Intellectuals articulate the cosmological, organizational and technological dimensions of a movement's "cognitive praxis", marking out the space that a new movement represents. While such new frames of reference emerge initially within established sites of cognitive praxis, an emerging movement becomes itself a site for such cultural production (Eyerman and Jamison liken their account to that of Melucci - discussed above). While interesting and innovative, Eyerman and Jamison's account fails to fully outline what they mean by intellectuals (despite devoting chapter four of their book to the question). Understood as Gramscian praxis all activists can be considered intellectuals but Eyerman and Jamison tend to focus upon theoretical, organizational and practical "leaders". This ambiguity enables their account of the centrality of intellectual praxis within movements to take on a sense of being the whole movement while their account seems largely content to catalogue the actions and interactions of movement leaders. Equally, their knowledge interests, used as general measures for social movements, fit rather better the environmental movement for which they were developed, than they do the worker's or civil rights' movement. While highlighting interesting parallels - in particular to blur the boundary between "old" and "new" social movements - their conceptual framework does not serve well as a general frame within

which to examine questions of unity and difference within movements, comparatively or longitudinally, or of relative unity and difference between different movement issues.

Julia Kristeva (1986), in an account of the development of the women's movement offers a three stage account of identity, difference and transformation that offers a more effective framework for such analysis. She suggests that first wave liberal/existential feminism sought "identity" with men, the right of women to be brought fully within the historical narrative of progress and liberty, to be judged by the same standards as men. A second stage, which became more vocal after 1968, sought not "identity" with men, the right to be "masculine", but the right to "difference", the defence and reclamation of the feminine against its historical subordination to the masculine. Against the linear disembodied historical model of masculine progress and time, was counterposed a cyclical and embodied feminine ideal of fulfilment and temporality. Kristeva notes the limitations of both accounts and suggests a third emergent feminism in which the binary of masculine/feminine is deconstructed in favour of a new and more fluid array of sexual and personal subjectivities. This conceptual scheme not only enables comparative analysis, across time and between places, within the women's movement, it may also offer an interesting model for the comparative analysis of other social movements. While it would be impossible within the confines of this work to answer the question of whether the women's movement, the workers' movement, or the civil rights movement are more or less unified than the environmental movement, Kristeva's framework (of identity, difference and transformation) enables at least a tentative outline of how the question might be approached.

The workers' movement contains within itself elements that promote social mobility, the right of those at the bottom to share in what the society takes to be success, a meritocratic demand for equal rights to compete for promotion and betterment, as defined within the status-quo. Such action may be either collective or individualist, but either way the demand is for incorporation. Another dimension has promoted a less instrumental conception of working class action, based upon a defence and celebration of collectivity against the individualism and consumerist conception of "success" promoted by the ruling class. Certain forms of syndicalism developed this rejection of incorporation and success in terms of upward social mobility into struggles for autonomous self-production and welfare self-

reproduction. Finally, there are those elements within the workers' movement who reject either identity or difference in relations between classes, and advocate transformation of the very subject positions and social order in which they operate.

Likewise, while the "liberal" civil rights organizations in America sought identity between black and white within a white society, others sought to promote autonomy and difference, the rediscovery and reclamation of black history and culture. Afrocentrism sought to challenge not only the Eurocentrism of white America, but also a perceived Eurocentrism within the aspirations of those civil rights activists who encouraged black Americans to demand the right to be treated as if they were white. The visit of Malcolm X to Mecca shortly before his assassination in 1964, after which he spoke of moving beyond both Eurocentrism and Afrocentrism, towards a vision of a common humanity not based upon any racially founded ideal typical "man", represents, again, Kristeva's third stage.

Again within the environmental movement, there are those for whom the issue is that of enlightened self interest, the identification of the environment as a set of essential human resources, to be promoted and valued in their relation to human priorities, hitherto ignored or underestimated. Similarly there are those for whom the environment contains value on the basis of its otherness, rather than on the basis of its identity with human interests. Such a defence of difference and reclamation of the value of otherness can be seen in particular in the defence of wilderness and in many forms of conservation oriented aesthetic conceptions of environmental protection. Lastly, those who adopt a deep ecological perspective suggest that the binary between human and non-human needs to be transcended, rather than either identifying "nature" within man's interests, or defending the right of "nature's" difference. These three dimensions only give a formal sense of the difference and diversity that may exist within a movement. Substantive questions of the balance within a particular movement at a particular time, and in a particular place, or of the relative balance, integration and fragmentation between such elements in one movement compared to another constitute areas for detailed empirical and theoretical research. This thesis is only one contribution to this.

6. Methodology and Method.

6.1. Introduction.

The questions raised so far, over resource mobilization, context and identity formation, raised deeper interrelated questions with regard to the practical uses given and contested within discourse and practices of the terms “local”, “environment” and “movement”. With regard to movement, the account of Gramsci and Melucci highlighted issues of unity and difference within movements as well as over relations between movements, civil society and the state. Similar themes were developed in the discussion of Sartre and Touraine, both of whom focused on how a movement may be measured according to its own latent totalizing possibility for self-realization even in the face of manifest fragmentation and difference. Likewise Habermas and Marcuse’s work centres on anti-systematic resistance to instrumental rationality within the lifeworld understood either as the sphere of normative orientation towards the understanding of the other, open to critical self-examination with emancipatory intent (as in Habermas), or as the embodied resistance to the instrumental subordination of life to efficiency (as in Marcuse). With regard to the meaning of “environment”, the issues of unity, difference and totality within an “environmental movement” centre around divergences between an environment “identified” in terms of human self interest (Environmentalism), as a defence of the “otherness” of “nature”, or naturalised embodiments of history in nature (Conservation), or in transcending the separation of man and nature (within Ecology). Lastly, over “locality”, questions arose over the unity of identities, interests and boundaries. To what extent are power, responsibility and place attributed to locality from outside, and to what extent are these things actual attributes of a locality? On the question of identity, difference and totality/transformation/ synthesis; how do calls for global-integration (identity), local autonomy (difference), and glocal abolition of the local/global dualism (transformation/synthesis) operate in practice?

How should such an agenda: over relations of identity, difference and transformation /synthesis within “local environmental movements”; be researched? Below, I briefly outline the components of my own methodology; critical ethnography, participatory action research, grounded theory, as well as framing and network analysis.

6.2. Towards an Adequate Methodology.

Herbert Blumer (1956) berated much of what passes for variables in social scientific research. The ideal in experimental or quasi-experimental (longitudinal or comparative) method is to measure the relationship between independent and dependent variables, correlations between variations in the former and the latter allowing attributions of causal relations by deduction and, through induction, prediction about future relations. Blumer argued that in the social sciences categories passed off as variables are in fact loose collections of phenomena, being neither internally homogenous, nor externally discrete. Attempts to measure quantitative relationships between such “quasi-variables” ignore the qualitative nature of social phenomena, their openness and lack of quantitative objectivity. Quantitative regularity, the quest of the positive sciences, is misleading if it gives too much priority to methodological reliability over qualitative validity.

The danger lies in the priority given to the quantitative operationalization of concepts over the subject matter’s qualitative openness. The presumption that social reality *ought* to conform to the rigours of mathematical regularity, and statistical measurement, should not be allowed to override the question of whether this actually *is* the case. The presumption of numerical ontology, quantitative regularity beneath the diversity of surface phenomena, justifies the quantitative operationalization of methodological variables **imposed** upon the supposedly superficial diversity of qualitative phenomena; allowing **real** processes and causes to be revealed. The quest to “discover” regularities in relations between methodologically constructed variables “representing” real regularities between underlying “forces” and “processes” may lead too quickly to methods that distort that which they purport to explain.

Whilst quantitative research can be useful, it can only facilitate understanding in the light of detailed qualitative investigation into the multiplicity of meanings that emerge around terms like “environment” and “green” within the discourses and practices of actors; discourses and practices outside of which, or at least in the ignorance of, quantitative “data” will be either misleading or meaningless. As most quantitative researchers are only too well aware of these limitations, my comments can best be understood as emphasising the role that qualitative research plays in the formulation and interpretation of quantitative research. My own empirical research undertakes a small part of that qualitative groundwork.

My research project set out to study “local” “environmental” “movements”. The first

question that arose was that of the parameters of the “local”, the “environmental” and the “movement”. It cannot be assumed such terms possess essential meaning or that the limits of the terms can be established in advance. To assume the existence of an unproblematic relationship between word/signifier and either a concept/signified or an object/referent is both intellectually naive and practically misleading. Such inadequate assumptions about language, assumptions which posit some direct correspondence between words and things, allow for simplistic methodological strategies in which the charged and non-neutral properties of signification practices, the construction of meaning and interpretation within language, are ignored. If we accept the problematic nature of terminology, both at the level of practical social activity and at that of theory and investigation, then the very notions of “local”, “environmental” and “movement” become crucial sites of investigation. The study of local environmental politics cannot be separated from an investigation into the construction of the terms themselves. In other words the field cannot be defined by recourse to essential referents, true objects, external to language. Terms gain political significance within a field of signifying practices, this field being the spectrum of struggles and practices attempting to appropriate and operationalize the terms.

My research attempts to investigate the use of signifiers, namely “environment, locality and movement”. Insofar as these terms are “empty signifiers” (to use Barthes’ 1972 phrase) what will be of interest is the way meaning is contested within movement and institutional practices. Dislodging the Lockean dream of an empirical language able to mirror the world in itself (Rorty 1980) from our epistemology has led some to pronounce an abolition of any future quest for a “truth” external to language in favour of relativist pragmatism. The post-modern negation of the binary distinction between the ontic and the epistemic cannot be understood in the same fashion for the natural sciences as it can for the social sciences. The “linguistic turn” in the philosophy of science, and its main tenet that all objects of knowledge are linguistic constructions, has different implications for the different fields of enquiry. Drawing on Bhaskar’s (1989) “critical realist” philosophy of science, it is possible to move beyond the symmetry of naive empiricism and its sceptical mirror, relativism, though the logic is not the same for social and natural sciences⁵⁰. While distinct, such a position is not

⁵⁰Bhaskar (1989) and Sayer (1984) discuss the possibility of “Realism” in the social sciences, and the need to develop the qualitative side of “scientific” research: going beyond abstract empiricism, context independent abstraction and its implicit idealism.

intrinsically opposed to the arguments, developed above, concerning Mannheim's relational theory of knowledge (beyond simplistic cultural and critical theories) and the work of Bloor, and others, in the sociology of scientific knowledge.

6.2.1. Avoiding Methodologically Driven Ontology.

Methodology can only justify itself in relation to ontology - the presumed nature of the thing itself which it is claimed the methods chosen will be able to illuminate. The adoption of a numerical ontology saves time and effort in this regard as the object of study is said to correspond to the numerical nature of the statistical procedures developed in reference to mathematical regularities. To question the view that social reality is reducible to, or explicable in terms of, numerical regularities mapping structural regularities, beneath the level of conscious or individual knowledge, is to raise Blumer's point that just as in social research, so in social life itself, the concepts and categories, the rules and institutional regularities, by which action is both understood and carried on, are never closed off from interpretation and question. Meaning is open to reinterpretation and the struggle over interpretation by social actors introduces a qualitative and disruptive element into the methodological and structural regularities researchers seek to discover.

The focus on interpretation and the construction of meaning (the social construction of reality) has however tended to centre, empirically, on that which is accessible to the researcher that abandons the belief that numerical regularities can take us beyond the individual and group interpretations of the worlds they inhabit. Where numerical ontology attributed to reality the qualities of its own method, so much phenomenological and ethnographic sociological and anthropological research equates ontology to that which its method is best able to uncover - i.e. the beliefs and interpretations of the world articulated by the relatively small and geographically (or culturally) specific group they engage with. In my own research I have attempted to avoid both forms of ontological/methodological reduction. In referring to "Local Environmental Movements" it is necessary to avoid both the view that an objective referent exists beneath the empirical profusion, and the assumption that each investigated group's self-conception should be uncritically endorsed. Questioning the power relations between actors in struggles to define issues is central to my research.

Whilst critical of post-modern nominalism, it is necessary to abandon the foundational

assumptions made about our language and concepts, i.e. that they exist in any direct correspondence to external reality. Thomas (1991) points out that: “Post-modernists tend to be “armchair radicals”.” Whilst: “To show their irony” such relativist theorists attempt, in highly abstract fashion, “to strip away the familiar social and perceptual coordinates that comfortably anchor our common sense meanings” (Thomas 1993, p. 24), such theorists tend not to engage in mundane practices of detailed ethnographic studies of how “familiar social and perceptual coordinates” are put together, fought over and remade.

6.3. Mixing Qualitative Methods in Researching Local Environmental Movements.

6.3.1. Ethnography.

Anthropology’s ethnographic focus on, and approach to, “culture”, once detached from the objectifying notion of “culture” as being a unified, homogeneous and discrete unit of analysis (such as Thomas seeks to go beyond in his “critical ethnography” (1991)), provided the appropriate approach for my research into “local environmental movements”. As Milton (1993, p. 5) writes: “The Australian aborigine who avoids hunting animals on sacred sites, and performs ceremonies to ensure the continued existence of edible species, is, like the Greenpeace campaigner, implementing environmental responsibilities.” The relationship between culture and ‘nature’ is also a central concern of anthropological research. The extreme culturalist point of view of Sapir (“the world’s in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached” (1956: 69)); is balanced by more dialectical approaches such as that of Geertz (1975).

Milton suggests ethnographic methods are key tools for investigating the social construction of human conceptions of nature. Such an approach need not be limited by traditional ethnographic methods of study, confined to bounded space: “Environmentalism as a discourse, then, is the field of communication through which environmental responsibilities (those which make up the environmentalist quest for a viable future) are constituted. Of the myriad ways in which human activity and the natural world impinge upon each other, some are identified as problems. Groups crystallise searching for solutions, messages are articulated, responsibilities are defined and allocated... this may happen within a local community or on the international stage” (Milton 1993, p.9). Disputes emerge over division

and power: “Those who most influence the definition of environmental responsibilities are those who can make the most effective use of the tools of discourse”. Milton suggests traditional political sociology has focused attention on formal structures, and movement organisations, rather than cultural aspects of issue identification and amplification. “[S]ociologists, at least in recent studies, have seen environmentalism primarily as a [formal] social movement, and political scientists have analysed it as an ideology. Both these ways of conceptualising environmentalism are narrower than that [she] suggested” (p. 10).

Robin Grove-White (1993, p. 27) suggests: “In particular, seen in anthropological terms, it is environmental groups - for an adventitious mixture of reasons, moral institutional and cultural - who have helped give definition to the risks and dangers which British society now recognises as part of its description of the “natural”; hence their immense resonance and credibility with the public at large over the past few years.” It is this process that my own critical ethnographic method seeks to address.

It is not the purpose here to identify the essential meaning of “local environment movements” in order that it be counterposed to a false consciousness induced by false or superficial interpretations of the concepts. However the danger of traditional ethnographic, and also to a degree Wittgensteinian, affirmation and reification of a “culture” as a coherent and cohesive symbolic and behavioural universe needs avoiding. The structural anthropological view of culture as an internally consistent system open to understanding only from within its own logic is premised on the misconception that such systems are sealed and free of internal contradiction.

Critical ethnography is not simply the construction of cultural anatomy, outlining a series of meaning systems, each, in this case, acting to operationalize the concept of “local environmental movements”. Critical ethnography is concerned with questions of power and the ability to promote and/or limit certain perspectives and practices. The Hegelian notion of critique is essentially an internal working out of contradictions rather than the opposition of a given to an externally mounted account. The critical ethnographer requires the inside view as this is the only means to get to grips with the struggles that make up the subject matter. Central to any study of meaning formation is “hegemony”. The work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Laclau (1990) and Mouffe (1993) has been concerned to free this term from the

logic of Marxist class-based theories of ideological domination. Whilst this project clears away reductionist misconceptions, its emphasis on the arbitrary and open nature of signification processes and consequent identity formations leads it to neglect the organizational forms through which definitional conflicts are conducted, and the differential resources available to such actors by which hegemonic constructions predominate.

Following Laclau and Mouffe's thrust in undermining notions of foundational identities in the study of "hegemonic" processes of meaning construction, in positing the arbitrary nature of any particular articulation of a concept within a political movement, we must however avoid the misconception that as meaning is "free-floating" it is so as if in a void. Whilst meanings, identities and interests are not rigidly given by deep underlying structural forces of determination, and are, therefore, always potentially open to re-articulation within political movements, such struggles are not spontaneous. They must be built within existing forms of life. Existing patterns of life, as Giddens (1984) suggests in his theory of structuration, give rise to both limits and opportunities. As Giddens points out, systems of coordinated action (economies, political bureaucracies, legal frameworks) extend beyond the limits of individual action and control, both in time and in space. This gives such systems an objective appearance as they are relatively "closed" at the level of individual action. This "practico-inert" is what Marx refers to as the dull compulsion of everyday life. To posit the openness of social systems to re-articulation in the absence of foundational structures may give rise to an overtly idealistic and voluntaristic conception of political action. To overcome this we need a "neo-pluralist" account of the multiple and contradictory collective social formations that operate in the process of constructing and defining social reality, avoiding both crude reductionism and abstract idealism. Such an approach must study the multiple organizations and institutions involved in the definition and operationalization of the concept of "local environmental movements" without ignoring relations of power, expedience and exclusion. Any re-articulation of a concept, if it is not to represent only a utopian and impotent abstraction, must mobilize 'resources'. As was pointed out in chapter 2.1.1. 'resources' may be a misleading term if it is understood in a utilitarian sense, in which issues of identity, solidarity and interest are reduced to crude economic forms, or are taken as pre-political givens. In the absence of an alternative terminology I would only seek, at this point, to reiterate my earlier assertion that it is essential to see what movements mobilize to effect

results as being as much cultural as it is economic, and that the study of social movement struggles may, as Touraine suggests, best illustrate the dialectical relationship between the two. My focus is on how such 'resources' and constraints interact with political initiatives in the formation/limitation of "environmental" action. This project does not concern "attitudes" but practices, neither mechanical behaviours or abstract utterances, but with meaningful and situated action.

6.3.2. Participatory action research.

I adopted what William Foote Whyte (Whyte, Greenwood and Lazes 1991, p. 21) refers to as "Participatory Action Research", an approach advantageous in both practical and ethical terms. If we accept that the meaning attached to a term such as "environment" is generated through negotiation and struggle, rather than by its recourse to a singular objective external point of origin outside signification, then it is necessary to go to where such meaning is made rather than assuming the right, as researchers, to give the term a fixed meaning, or to use the term as if meaning was self evident. Whilst seeking to avoid the excessively pre-emptive agenda-setting built into traditional hypothesis-testing deductive methods, it is not the case that we should abandon all attempts to formulate and ask questions about the world around us. My question concerned the nature and meaning of 'local environmental movements' while suspending a pre-emptive defining of both the essence and boundaries of the three terms being investigated. Participatory action research develops an emergent agenda, one which is in "opposition to the primacy of the researcher in establishing and guiding the research agenda [and] challenges what Collins (1979) has called "credentialing"" (Thomas 1993, p. 28). Thomas (1993, p. 28) claims "knowledge is transformed into a collective enterprise in which its production and use are to be shared by those who are its focus". Whilst this sounds very good in theory the privileged role of the researcher in the construction of knowledge cannot be so easily wished away in reality (see Rootes 1990). It must be recognized that the participatory action research method does involve the researcher in making selections and choices. Their de-centring is only partial. Participatory action research cannot avoid in full the privileged position of the researcher in selection and definition. The methodological, and ethical, advantage of this approach is the researcher's *negotiation* with actors rather than the researcher's *negation*.

Participatory action research starts from the assumption that action cannot be adequately

understood without an input from the actors' themselves. However the interpretations and intentions of actors cannot be understood as "mental states", existing in abstraction, or as discrete "ideas" accessible to straight forward plucking out. As Wittgenstein wrote in the *Blue and the Brown Books* there is nothing more meaningless than to state that "the fashion changes because the tastes of the people change" (1958, p. 143). Thought occurs in the world, and our plans, intentions and beliefs are part of that world and cannot be understood in abstraction from it. It is essential to study the practical operationalization of concepts, not merely opinions. Participatory action research, by taking the researcher to the heart of the agenda forming process, and bringing the participant's activities closer to the researcher's analysis, enacts a form of ethnography close to the work of Glazer and Strauss.

6.3.3. Grounded Theory.

Glaser and Strauss suggest (1968, p. 2): "The basic theme in our book is the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research." In essence their approach is to counterpose traditional hypothetico-deductive method, where empirical research is given the role of hypothesis verification; to their use of empirical research in generating theory, in situ. The advantage they claim for their method is that it conforms to their imperative that: "... the categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data under study..." (p. 3). "To be sure one goes out and studies an area with a particular sociological perspective, and with a focus, a general question, or a problem in mind. But he can (and we believe should) also study an area without any preconceived theory that dictates, prior to the research, "relevancies" in concepts and hypotheses. It is presumptuous to assume that one begins to know the relevant categories and hypotheses until the "first days in the field," at least, are over" (p. 33). Substantive theory is emergent. Prior theory acts to sensitize the field but cannot set either substantive content or conceptual boundaries. I begin with formal concepts of the local, the environment and movement, as well as a primary research question in relation to these three concepts: i.e. how do the interrelated but distinct issues of identity, difference and transformation/totality/synthesis within each of the three categories operate in practice in the unification and/or fragmentation of those actors who define themselves as, or part of, local environmental movement/s. However, with Glazer and Strauss, it is through deep hermeneutic study of the practices and discourses of actors that those categories and that primary research question gain content and substance. The question is not formulated in the style of a hypothesis, which, through the grid of bounded and quantifiable concepts, rendered

as variables, could be used to direct the data-gathering and interpretation process.

“Whether the sociologist, as he jointly collects and analyses qualitative data, starts out in a confused state of noting almost everything he sees because it all seems significant, or whether he starts out with a more defined purpose, his work quickly leads to the generation of hypotheses” (p. 39). I started with a question, concerning the formation of that which is called “local environmental movements”. Glaser and Strauss (p. 37) make the suggestion: “An effective strategy is, at first, literally to ignore the literature of theory and fact on the area under study, in order to assure that the emergence of categories will not be contaminated by concepts more suited to different areas.” While my research in one way follows this ideal, attempting to operationalize the primary concepts only in the process of discovery of their practical operationalization by those calling themselves “local environmental movements”, I do not follow their suggestion further. Their strategy of abandoning all prior theory is both impossible and misconceived, if it is an attempt to achieve some kind of purified empiricism. They suggest two modes of writing up empirical research from substantive theory to more general “formal” theory: “The sociologist can simply omit substantive words... He can also rewrite a substantive theory up a notch... By applying these rewriting techniques to a substantive theory, the sociologist can change the focus of attention from substantive to formal concerns” (p. 80). This rather naively assumes that the reality of an issue can be discerned purely by abstracting from a particular set of empirical referents discernible, in some purified form, to the gaze of the grounded theorist *ex-nihilo*. This ignores how situations are part of wider social processes beyond the phenomenological researchers reach but not outside wider spans of social construction. Empirical research cannot avoid prior theory.

The authors’ approach, when they state that: “in discovering theory, one generates conceptual categories or their properties from evidence; then the evidence from which the category emerged is used to illustrate the concept... [thus] the concept is undoubtedly a relevant theoretical abstraction about what is going on in the area studied” (p. 23), comes close to the tautologies which Marcuse pointed out (1964) within 1950s and 1960s empirical research in America, where concepts were reduced to particular instances, e.g. America is democratic because democracy is pre-defined by reduction and equation with what America is. As such

the concept is reduced to the instance such that America is not only democratic but is democracy! This kind of insularity in empirical-conceptual equivalence is the danger of the extreme form of naive empiricism to which grounded theory can all too easily fall prey. I suggest that social theory has a crucial role in the under-labouring of empirical research, the task of formal clarification, not of the substantive content of concepts. Often this is to empty concepts out. The value of the extensive review of prior theoretical and empirical research into “locality”, “environment” and “movement” in this thesis, is exactly to avoid misconceived and pre-emptive filling of formal categories prior to the conduct of the empirical research. Such theoretical clarification or self-limitation acts both to clear up theoretical preconceptions that may impede or distort empirical research, and it is also able to steer empirical researchers away from naive equation of their own findings with the concepts they employ. Concepts do not simply emerge from grounded research. Formal concepts are negotiated, even transformed, through empirical research, but they cannot “emerge” pristine.

6.3.4. Framing and Network Analysis.

Here I draw on the work of a number of social movement researchers who have approached “Social Movements” using qualitative research methods. Klandermans (1991, p. 8) suggests “interpretations of reality rather than reality itself guide political actions”. As I have suggested, the researcher cannot rely on objective referents to define the field. As Diani and Eyerman point out (1992, p. 10); “social movements are not stable phenomena”. “Social movements create new systems of meaning which make visible to a society as a whole that new conflicts and issues have emerged. At the same time, social movement networks are places where belief systems are elaborated and reinforced, fostering commitment from activists and sympathizers alike” (1992, p. 9).

The agenda set by such a perspective is to study how diverse organisations, actors, and issues are brought together within a matrix of concrete networks of interaction and conceptual frameworks of seeing. “In analytical terms, it may be convenient to distinguish between two different dynamics. The first refers to the development of collective identity (Pizzorno 1978; Melucci 1989); the second, the creation of actual linkages between specific movement actors (inter-organisational exchanges, or multiple memberships of activists)” (Diani 1995, p. 9). Diani (1992, p. 107) writes: “A network may be conceived of as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of actors or nodes... The first difficulty is that

social movements are not empirical entities with clear cut boundaries... Second, social movement actors are highly heterogeneous, as they range from single individuals to loosely structured grass-roots groups to organized bureaucracies... Third, multiplicity of actors entails multiplicity of types of relation.” He defines three levels of network relations, inter-organisational, between individuals and organisations and finally between individuals within and between organisations. However a “movement” develops form as much through “relations of opposition” and towards “external audiences”, as through internal identification. “In order to identify a social movement, we need some criteria for defining its boundaries, to differentiate it from the broader set of actors that it relates to, i.e. other political actors, state institutions, public opinion, community organisations” (1992, p. 112).

6.3.4.1. On the question of framing processes.

“To elaborate the conceptual connections between framing and identity construction, we take as our focus social movement organization (SMO) actors’ claims about the relevant sets of actors within the context in which they operate” (Hunt et al 1994, p. 186). The research process studies the extent to which movements emerge through “interactional accomplishments” by which identity is secured across interests, issues and prior identities. Using Goffman’s 1974 “Frame Analysis” - a frame is “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environments” (Snow and Benford 1992, 137). Frame analysis, applied to movements by Hunt et al (1994, 191) looks at “...micromobilization processes whereby SMO actors seek to affect various audiences’ interpretations regarding the extent to which SMOs ideology and goals are congruent with targeted individuals’ interests, values, and beliefs.”

Diani (1992, p. 113) writes: “The presence of shared, yet internally differentiated, identities and beliefs provides a valuable clue to the structural analysis of social movements. It defines the boundaries of a movement by restricting it to those actors sharing a given identity and belief system... Moreover, the presence of a loose collective identity notwithstanding, a differentiated belief system accounts for cultural segmentation within a social movement. Finally, its changeable nature calls attention to the fact that both boundaries and internal segmentation may change over time, and that attention must be paid to the analysis of the

patterns of such changes, as well as to their determinants.” Movement contingency as well as internally and externally contested constructions provide a site for research.

Diani distinguishes two modes of movement network identification; the realist and the nominalist. The former begins with actor self-definitions in tracing frame identification and network affiliation. The latter admits conceptual pre-definition and external attribution of inclusion criteria. While realist analysis is based on identification of “social cohesion criteria” where “actors are aggregated together into a position to the degree that they are connected directly to each other by cohesive bonds” (Diani 1992, p. 116), nominalist analysis draws on “structural equivalence criteria” by which “actors are aggregated into a jointly occupied position or role to the extent that they have a common set of linkages to other actors in the system. No requirement is imposed that the actors in the position have direct ties to each other” (p. 116). The question is therefore whether a “movement” can bring itself into existence (the realist position), or to put it in less extreme terms, to what extent are the fragmented dimensions of a proto-movement able to achieve identity out of the plural non-identity of social movement organisations within the field (by nominalist attribution).

Those, like Diani (1992 and 1995), Diani and Eyerman (1992), Hunt, Benford and Snow (1994) and Snow and Benford (1988), who have put forward the frame analysis perspective of qualitative research have tended to do so in conjunction with a critique of Resource Mobilisation and New Social Movement perspectives. In the case of RMT the critique is much the same as that which I outline above. The criticisms I made above of Political Opportunity Structure theory are also compatible with those made by frame analysts. However I want to qualify the basic assumption that seems to underpin the various critical comments made by frame analysis writers in relation to New Social Movement theory. Essentially an ontological difference is set between the two approaches, which in reality amounts to differences of method. Snow and Benford (1988, p. 197) write: “In the case of the former [NSM theory], movements are seen primarily as the carriers or transmitters of programs for action that arise from new structural dislocations. Collective action or social movement activity is seemingly contingent upon a kind of imminent awakening that expresses the conditions of or divisions within a population’s material situation.”

To this supposed attribution of structural determination in the formation of social movements

frame analysis sets the phenomenological notion of “interactional achievement”. While a part of this “achievement” stands in relation to the wider social actors in relation to which movements develop, the distancing from “structural determination” sets a more limited and pragmatic research agenda to the grand theory found in the work of New Social Movement theorists like Habermas and Touraine. This attribution of structural determination, and its opposition to interactional achievement, grossly misrepresents the conception of structure and of system in the works of these authors. Habermas’ use of the term system and of the structural characteristics of money and power are precisely set against the intersubjective emergence of social movement identities from within the life-world of phenomenological interaction and attempts to develop and sustain shared understanding. Far from reifying structures that determine the emergence of new social movements, Habermas has sought to show the fundamental communicative preconditions for resistance to structural determination, even if this has required him to develop a systematic account of those objectifying tendencies. Likewise, Touraine’s conceptions of totality and historicity, which are repeatedly cited as evidence of latent structural functionalism, are products of his phenomenological ontology, which attempts to understand social life as a whole in terms of what frame analysts call “interactional achievement”. The theoretical work of these “theorists” is highly compatible with the empirical methods advocated by frame analysts.

In practice, however, frame analysts tend to cite in chorus the anti-totalizing work of Melucci. As I suggest in my account of Melucci (above), his phenomenological account, in its attempt to avoid the reification of movements as bearers of structural imperatives by means of a focus on the creativity of identity formation within “civil society”, and outside of relations to the political and social structures of power, tends to reify, by omission, existing relations of power. Diani (1995, p. 16) refers to extreme movement organisations in times of high social conflict as tending towards sectarianism. He suggests that at such times flexibility and compromise are reduced. Surely this is to take for granted the general condition of reification of social values and institutional authority to which movements are forced to compromise at times of low social protest. It is the wider frame of reference in terms of “interactional achievement” which Touraine’s work in particular attempts to highlight in distinguishing social production and social reproduction. The more self-limited empirical remit of frame analysis and network analysis tends to equate the limits of its own phenomenological methodology with a general social ontology. Touraine’s attempt to outline the general

implications of a phenomenological ontology stands as an essential corrective to the rather weaker application of the philosophical position put forward by his critics. While Snow and Benford (1988, p. 207) suggest the key factor “affecting the mobilizing potency of preferred framings is the phenomenological life world of the targets of mobilization”; to address such “phenomenological constraints” consistently as “phenomenological” begs the question of their reification as objective constraints in the first place.

While (as I point out above) I am in no position to conduct the kind of research that Touraine calls sociological interventionism, the logical outcome of his fully developed phenomenological ontology, neither do I wish to fall prey to the self-limitation of such an ontology as I have pointed out in more pragmatic qualitative micro-research. Drawing together strands of qualitative research, as well as outlining the more abstract ontological foundations of phenomenology, I suggest it is not impossible to avoid the latent sense of ‘structure’ set against local ‘interactional achievement’ that underpins much micro-research, and the more manifest sense of “structure” found in much ‘macro-theory’ and research. Having made the above criticism of network and frame analysts, it is nevertheless the case that my own research draws upon its strengths.

6.4. Advocacy.

Peter Harries-Jones (1991, p. 10-11) suggests that anthropology need not detach itself from advocacy: “Governments, together with dominant political elites, like to convince the public that “objective knowledge” is on their side and that evidence to the contrary is worthless... It is the task of the advocate to ensure that such knowledge is put to the test of alternative interpretation... The advocate has to show that the supposed “commonly shared assumptions” or the “irrefutable evidence of science” (Gusfield 1981, 22) has in fact been constructed by social processes of selection and interpretation. In that process, political and bureaucratic interests intervene at every point.”

In my own research I have adopted a participatory action research approach which seeks to conduct research through participation with social movement actors. Inevitably, in the selection of this topic of research, I show a degree of personal commitment. Insofar as all social issues are moral questions, all relations to them are non-neutral (at least never fully

so); even indifference is a moral stance. Amoralism is simply a form of alienation, such as in the economist's study of the commodity form. Their "objectivity" "objectifies" what they study. Such objectification feeds back onto its "object", giving contingency the appearance of object-hood. There can be no absolutely neutral vantage point or vocabulary in social science, though disputation over the basis upon which claims are made ensures some degree of control and reflexivity. Social research is not reducible to moral commitment. Study at a lofty distance (through abstracting devices such as questionnaires and formal interviewing), may enable the impression of a more value neutral stance as one is detached from the actors one studies. However detachment should not be equated with neutrality. A degree of attachment is essential in the data collection process if what the researcher is interested in are the practical activities and meaning generating processes that emerge within social movements and/or social life in general. While the researcher must attempt a degree of detachment, too much detachment would negate their ability to understand, while too little would negate their ability to critically evaluate what it is they have sought to understand.

6.5. Getting Involved.

The quarterly Canterbury and District Environmental Network Newsletter listed fifty "member" organisations on its back page. After casual attendance at various group meetings in the early months of my research, and after having been asked by the C.D.E.N. coordinator to "assess" the network's activities, my empirical research began in earnest in late 1993 with the list and a telephone. I rang each contact number until I got a reply and asked if I could "come along", as a sociologist and as a participant. This led to attendance at over three hundred meetings and events, as well as countless informal interviews, conversations, letters and discussions, with members, participants and those working in and for one hundred and eighty seven different organisations in and beyond the C.D.E.N.

As participant and observer my presence was explicit. My entry into each group on the C.D.E.N. listing followed my contacting the person listed as coordinator/contact. In each case I said I was a researcher studying 'local environmental movements', and asked if I could meet the contact to find out what their organisation did and to collect any literature they had to give me. I then asked if I could come along to future meetings and activities. This, of course, did not imply the same thing for each organisation. The local Green Party, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace groups, the University Green Committee and other campaigning

organisations were open and invited participation in their policy and action organisation, as dis the C.D.E.N.. Council and business groups were less open and 'events' open to involvement and observation were more formal and passive. Conservation groups organised regular practical activities and education/publicity events. All produced regular newsletters and literature. More specific protest and direct action groups and campaigns, such as over the Criminal Justice Bill, live animal export, Lyminge Forest, fox hunting, road building, nuclear waste transport (and many others) were more sporadic, but still held meetings and organised events. Involvement within the campaigns and within wider organisations like F.o.E., Greenpeace and the Green Party meant being fairly well informed about upcoming events, but I was often not told of illegal actions until after the event. As I was never invited to engage in any explicitly illegal actions I was not put in difficult positions as a researcher. Local group memberships meant national and international flows of post, telephone calls and e-mail messages, as well as invitations to national training, publicity and action events.

Participation ranged from attendance at events, helping put away the chairs, preparing the food, taking minutes and conducting an examination of the network for the coordinators, to leafleting (and writing leaflets), picketing, digging, planting and clearing litter, representing/assisting groups on committees, examinations and inquiries, to standing and canvassing in elections. My activity as a researcher, while generally known, was non-obtrusive in that taking notes, collecting literature and asking questions was not untypical behaviour for activists. Sometimes, such as in interviewing council officials, organisational officials and managers, being a researcher made it easier to ask questions and get access to reports and plans, and I did not emphasise my protest participation. Likewise I did not make a point of reiterating my status as a researcher at every campaign meeting and protest event. Beyond the normal reflexivity of activists, the empirical material, in early drafts, was given to twenty activists to comment on (each activist being given sections related to them). While a useful exercise in clarification, my interaction with the activists during the course of the events being written about ensured there were not too many surprises in their feedback.

7. The Canterbury and District Environmental Network. Towards an Assessment.

My empirical research began with an invitation by the Canterbury and District Environmental Network (hereafter referred to as C.D.E.N.) to evaluate the network, and moved to the wide variety of movements and issues within and beyond it. My focus here is the initial evaluation, its results as well as the further questions that emerged, and which led me to a deeper engagement with the meaning and practice of “Local Environmental Movements”. As such the issues covered in this initial chapter are not chronologically prior to those initiated by other organisations discussed subsequently. The complex interrelationship of membership and cooperation renders it impossible to present the data in some atomised fashion. It is therefore necessary to draw the reader’s attention to the problematic nature of the subdivisions into which this research is placed for presentational purposes. Each chapter spills over; specific parts cannot be understood in isolation. The logic of the sequential presentation is to allow the reader a point of entry into the density of overlapping empirical fields. That point of entry is, as it was for me, the “Canterbury and District Environmental Network”. The problematic nature of such terms as “environment”, “locality” and “movement” is explored in these chapters.

The C.D.E.N. was founded in November 1991 by the Canterbury Urban Studies Centre, with financial support from Canterbury City Council. At its initial meeting (21st November 1991) a statement of “Draft Aims and Objectives” was drawn up:

1 To be a network of organisations and individuals working at the local level to improve both the natural and built environment.

2 To provide a forum for the exchange and dissemination of ideas, information and working practice.

3 To facilitate cooperation and planning of joint initiatives for improving the local environment.

4 To promote this work and make information on local environmental matters easily available to the public.

The Network aimed to be both communicator and facilitator, to communicate information between member organisations, and to individuals and groups beyond the Network, and to make possible coordination of activities between individuals and groups. The members present approved a set of proposed “ways of working”. This list reads as follows:

1 It is proposed that meetings will take place four times a year for practitioners both voluntary and professional.

2 Following each meeting, a quarterly information sheet will be produced. This will contain: organisations and local contacts, resources and services available, the promotion of activities and special events.

3 This information sheet will be widely circulated and available to the public.

It was suggested the C.D.E.N. establish a data base of local issues and information. “It was noted that, for example, parish councils hold considerable quantities of information” that is widely dispersed and so is hard to access easily and to utilize. It was also suggested that C.D.E.N members should fill out index cards about themselves for a data base, to facilitate greater understanding, knowledge and cooperation.

The Network’s geographical area of coverage was also discussed. The initial title of the Network was the “Canterbury Environmental Network”. The meeting was attended by members of a variety of “local” groups, many of which were not from the old city of Canterbury as such, but from the wider district’s villages and the coastal towns to the north of the old city. Such non city groups included the “Joint Villages Committee”, the “Herne Bay District Residents Association”, Kent Trust for Nature Conservation, Whitstable Society and Whitstable Improvement Trust, the Chartham Conservation and Re-Cycling Enterprise (C.A.R.E.), Kent County Paths Group, and a representative of the Green Party from Herne. The Network’s final name, “The Canterbury *and District* Environmental Network” reflects this.⁵¹

As such, even at the moment of the network's inception, the meaning of the C.D.E.N.'s "locality" became problematic. It should be pointed out that the originators of the network, the Canterbury Urban Studies Centre, was itself rather "glocal", being the fusion of national and international discourses, practices and resources and the energy and enthusiasm of particular Canterbury residents (with the financial assistance of Canterbury City Council). As my research developed, the problematic nature of "locality" emerged both in terms of defining boundaries (the question of external discretion) and in terms of the homogeneity of those "working at the local level to improve the natural and built environment". The broad remit set by the C.D.E.N. for itself, attempting to encompass commercial, professional, statutory and voluntary organisations, as well as actors ranging from residents, national/local state employees, members of trans-local pressure groups and parties, to representatives and functionaries of international corporations raised the question of internal coherence both with regard to locality, and to movement. To give just one example, the network contained conservationists employed or sponsored by corporations to manage their sites, and ecologists and environmentalists opposed to the activities of those corporations.

Such difference could lead to radical conflict within a network, or to detachment (either in the sense of dis-affiliation, expulsion or indifferent passive co-existence). What then of the meaning of the term movement? In the course of my broader research, beyond the initial evaluation, forms of action coordination, such as party, pressure group, tactical alliance as well as, or within, network forms of organisation were manifest in a variety of instances. In addition, the role played by government agencies (local, national and international), as well as the activities of corporations and smaller commercial organisations further complicate any single conception of the movement.

Whilst the C.D.E.N. contained elements of both rural and urban, its coverage of the "environment", both built and "natural"; one of the greatest difficulties it faced, in attempting to, as its above objectives set out, "facilitate cooperation and planning of joint initiatives for improving the "local" *environment*", was to attempt to bridge diverse, and not always evidently complementary, conceptions of "the environment". This "difference" as weakness

⁵¹ Membership embraced a far greater rural space than urban, and, to some degree this conflicted with the Network's origins within the Canterbury *Urban* Studies Centre.

and strength was the recurring theme in the research.

From the initial aims and intentions of the C.D.E.N. three central questions were put forward in my discussions with the C.E.D.N. organisers, around which the assessment was to focus. These were:

1 To what extent is the C.D.E.N. successful in developing communication and mutual awareness between local organisations, whether voluntary, statutory or commercial?

2 How successful is the C.D.E.N. in spreading information about local environmental issues and activities to the wider audience of individuals and organisations whose energies, ideas and resources are needed to develop local awareness and action?

3 How successful is the C.D.E.N. in facilitating cooperation between local environmental groups and others in developing joint initiatives?

At the Winter 1993 quarterly meeting of the C.D.E.N. (on November 19th) the following dimensions of a potential evaluation process were put forward:

- *that the evaluation must be both qualitative and quantitative
- *to evaluate relations between the Network and Canterbury City Council (C.C.C.)
- *that we should clearly evaluate the different C.D.E.N. initiatives
- *how do we judge the effectiveness of the informal contacts created by the network?
- *the evaluative process should establish guidelines for improving the network.

Questionnaires sent to readers, members and schools inside the January-March 1994 C.D.E.N. Newsletter were an attempt to measure some of the above aspects of the networks activities, i.e. the first, third and fourth dimensions listed above, whilst attempting to draw in ideas about improvement. They did not however touch directly on the networks relationship with C.C.C.. The response rate was very low, as might have been expected of a questionnaire about such a diffuse organisation. In total twenty readers, ten member groups, and nine local schools responded. This provided no basis for a quantitative assessment giving

representative statistical findings. It was necessary to restrict the evaluation of the responses to gleaning suggestions and ideas.

7.1. Conclusions.

Perhaps the two most important features of the results were the diversity of responses and their limited number. These are different but related issues. What comes across is an overall positive, but rather limited, support for the network. As many of the responses show, there was a lot of activity in the area, and the network was part of that. However the diversity of the issues seemed to militate against a higher degree of coordination between groups through the network form. It is likely that the low response rate reflects the rather passive relationship most people involved with environmental issues in the area have with the network, of which they are a nominal part. The diversity of interests and conceptions of the environment represent the potential of the network but such spread produced thin coverage. People have only limited time and energy, and are not regularly involved in anything close to the full spectrum of local activities. The Network could only, in such circumstances, facilitate interaction at this small scale level. The role of the newsletter was to pass out information precisely to those who would not otherwise have the time or the energy to find out everything that is going on. This lent itself to a degree of passive consumption, with most readers keeping up with what is going on by turning a page, rather than getting involved. However, some of those individuals, some of the time, were going to want to get involved with some of the events and organisations listed. It is to that kind of audience that the eclectic “pick-n-mix” approach of a network, rather than the more demanding and directed focus of a pressure group or party, is aimed. This is not to say that the network had not facilitated the coming together of those willing to take a more focused position on specifics. The network could not be reduced to one of its dimensions, nor did it attempt to introduce ‘order’. This left the network diffuse and passive in relations between elements.

The role that the network set for itself, as communicator and facilitator, rather than active fulcrum of leadership, was manifested in the questions around which the initial evaluation questionnaire was structured. This was the small scale, consensual and consciousness-raising agenda which the C.D.E.N. coordinators saw as the one appropriate for a local environmental network. As a researcher fresh to the field I was fairly uncritical of this self definition. In the aftermath of the poor returns, combined with the passivity, in relation to the

network, expressed in the responses, I was forced to address methodologically the taken for granted assumptions about locality, environment and movement built into the network coordinators' sense of themselves. This meant, implicitly, a questioning of the questions the network coordinators felt it important to ask about themselves.

The assessment enabled only limited insight into the scope and relationships within the C.D.E.N.. My substantive research then involved almost two years' intensive involvement with activists within and around the network. Beginning with phone calls and visits to each member organisation on the network address page, I began to circulate within the network, through meetings, protests, lectures and other events. As well as accumulating literature produced by groups and by others around issues taken up by network members. I attended over 300 meetings and events over a period of 22 months (October 1993 to July 1995)⁵² and was involved with 187 different organisations, from local societies to government agencies, departments, companies, pressure groups, conservation groups and political parties. The resulting material, a densely woven mass of relations and conflicts does not wear comfortably the straight-jacket of tidy presentation.

The following empirical material is divided into four chapters. These chapters attempt to avoid some of the problems that would occur in presentation on an "issue" by "issue" basis, which would have been rather atomistic, tending to obscure connections and overlapping of themes, and presentation according to a set of abstracted categories (such as i. Conservation, Ecology and Environmentalism, ii. Networks, Parties, Tactical Alliances, Institutions and Pressure Groups, or iii. Local, Environmental and Movement). The second option would have tended to distort the material within the chosen frame, as in each case the units of classification are no more stable than that which they would be meant to organise. Of course it would be possible to organise the presentation according to the array of classification systems available. However this would lead to an unacceptably long text unless each

⁵² while the original research time frame had been one year (from October 1993 to September 1994) the continuation of a range of issues central to the research, such as the controversies over the burning of Orimulsion at Richborough power station, the proposed siting of a leisure village in Lyminge Forest, the building of the Thanet Way bypass, the export of live animals from Kentish ports, the Energy Conservation and Criminal Justice Bill to name but a few, well beyond the first year's field work, led me to continue for almost another full year (until July 1995).

presentation of the material was very short. As this second option would require abandoning the ethnographic depth of the case studies involved it is also an unattractive option.

Each of the four chapters below hinges around relations between locality, environment and movement, their formation and contestation; the meaning and significance of place, within the construction of “locality” and “trans-local” relations to “it”, conservation, Ecology and Environmentalism within the construction of “nature” and human relations to “it”, and finally over responsibility and power within the construction of a movement and its field of potential opponents and allies

Chapter 8 addresses mobility and place - the location of locality. The specific issues addressed are, firstly, the process leading to and from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, at which such great emphasis was placed on locality in the tackling of “Global” environmental problems. Secondly, the location of place within integrated systems of place displacement, i.e. transportation infrastructures (a powerful metaphor for the abolition of the binary of local and global within glocality that runs through this thesis). Finally conservation aesthetic themes are addressed with regard to the location of the local within the “tourist gaze”. Chapter 9 takes three case studies, one of animal rights actions, one of university environmental activities, and finally that of the Canterbury Local Economic Transfer System. These three case studies are taken together to address the question of success and failure (or at least relative impact), with particular reference to misconceptions over the singularity of single issues in single issue campaigns, and over the glocality of local issues, activities and activists in local environmental campaigns. Chapter 10 addresses the local activities of the high profile international pressure groups Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The chapter draws out a range of specific campaigns and attempts to draw lessons from comparison between the local actions of these two global actors. Finally, in chapter 11 I address the relationship between party and network through the study of the Green Party and its relationships with others within the environmental movement (and beyond). The tension between party and network is forcefully illustrated in the case study of the campaign against the Criminal Justice Bill/Act, in which a wide range of environmental organisations, left wing parties and groups, as well as anarchic and alternative cultural vanguards failed to organise (or perhaps successfully disorganised) themselves in the face of state repression.

8. Moving Places.

The following chapter addresses three related areas of my empirical research that converge around the general theme of “locating the local” within translocal discourses and practices. These three areas of study are the localizing of responsibility in the aftermath of the Rio Summit, the attempts to develop local strategies for sustainable transport within translocal spans of mobility and action, and finally the attempt to locate the local within aesthetic practices and discourses of conservation and tourism. All these three areas of my empirical research highlight the problematic and contested construction of place, the distribution and attribution of power, responsibility and aesthetic value, within the translocal discourses and practices of actors able to displace and replace along all three of these dimensions. The Agenda 21 material highlights most clearly the translocal attribution (buck-passing even) of responsibility to the local. The material on transport highlights the problematic relationship between such attributions of responsibility to localities and the powerlessness of local authorities to effectively control translocal mobility patterns. The material on conservation aesthetics and tourism centres around the flawed attempt to use the aesthetic as a mediator between both power and responsibility as mapped onto the translocal/local divide as well as between instrumental and ethical approaches to the non-human (as discussed in chapter 3). However there is considerable cross over between the three empirical fields (Agenda 21, transport and conservation/tourism), the three analytical dimensions of place (local responsibility, local power and aesthetic identification), and the four analytical dimensions of relations to nature (understanding of, ethical relation of responsibility to, instrumental relation of interest in and aesthetic relation of harmonious/sublime identification with). Each empirical field, while highlighting one set of dimensions more than others, displays elements of all. Taken together these three studies highlight key processes in the social construction of locality and the non-human, as well as introducing key actors engaged in the constructing.

8.1. Local Agenda 21-From Rio to the Regions.

8.1.1. U.N.C.E.D.

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio in June 1992, received its U.N. General Assembly mandate in December 1989, following the 1987

Bruntland Commission. The Summit looked back to the 1972 U.N. environment conference, and forward to the twenty first century.

Maurice Strong, appointed U.N.C.E.D. General Secretary, set in motion four preparatory conferences. The first, in Nairobi, setting “basic principles for the conduct of nations and peoples, with respect to environment and development, to ensure the viability and integrity of the Earth as a home for human and other forms of life”. Strong announced Rio to be “the most important meeting in the history of mankind” (cited in Holmberg et al 1993). At the second prep-con, in Geneva, divergent and competing agendas heralded stalemate. At prep-con three, also in Geneva, Strong imposed a chair’s draft “Earth Charter”, reflecting mainly northern concerns over climate change, deforestation, population growth and the loss of biodiversity, which was then amended and enlarged to reflect G77 proposals on northern industrial pollution, southern development needs, poverty, debt, world trade, as well as N.G.O. concerns for increased grass roots participation. The final agglomeration of ideas, principles and issues became the 500 page Agenda 21. Lacking “a central theme, the charter slowly became a distillation of the political and conceptual arguments dogging the North v’s South debate” (Holmberg, et al 1993, p. 30).

Strong appointed, in 1991, the Swiss billionaire Stephan Schmidheiny as chief business and industry advisor to U.N.C.E.D.. Schmidheiny coordinated a northern business lobby to block demands to regulate Northern corporate interests. Uniting 48 leading trans-nationals, the Business Council for Sustainable Development published its 350 page “Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on Development and the Environment” in six languages just prior to the summit. This argued that “eco-efficient” companies were naturally market efficient, that free trade best facilitated economic development, and that any interference with multi-nationals would be environmentally and economically detrimental. Self-regulation was proposed to head off external regulations.

The Business Council was strikingly successful. It was the largest delegation at the summit, and with the ear of the General Secretary its view was put inside and outside of every meeting, press conference, formal and informal gathering. The final Summit outcome was a series of agreements, principles, statements, declarations and one treaty making no legally binding restriction on northern business. The “Rio-Declaration on Environment and

Development” and “Agenda 21” endorse G.A.T.T., World Bank Structural Adjustment programmes, and the free-market as vehicles for sustainable development. The Rio Summit resulted in five documents being produced:

The Biodiversity Treaty, the only legalistic Summit outcome, was a loose collection of ideals and best practice, reflecting deadlock over sovereign territorial rights claimed by southern states, and northern concerns for the common value of such resources for the “global human inheritance”. Negotiations were dogged by disputes over funding bio-diversity maintenance and rights over revenues derived from commercial derivatives in particular those developed from southern sites by the northern bio-chemical industry (Grubb et al 1993). The treaty is a collection of “where possible” agreements, e.g. to share research, to locate research in the south and to share royalties derived. Seventeen northern states signed the treaty only on condition that financial obligations were left open for them to interpret. The U.S.A. refused to sign until Clinton became president, by which time the text had been diluted still further.

The Statement of Forest Principles did not even get to the treaty stage, remaining only “Principles”. Southern states refused to accept that their development should be denied so their forests could act as carbon sinks for ‘overdeveloped’ and deforested northern industrial polluters. Malaysia led the critique of “northern double standards”. If the North wanted balanced books then they would have to cut their emissions or pay the South to keep their forests. The Statement of Principles calls for financial transfers without provisions. National resource sovereignty is endorsed while responsibility to other countries is also. Worst of all, there is not even a minimal framework to relate issues of deforestation to bio-diversity or Climate Change.

The Convention on Climate Change. “The intensely political process of drafting the convention has resulted in a text not so much characterised by compromise but by an effort to avoid the resolution of conflicting positions through vagueness and ambiguity” (Holmberg et al 1993, p. 25). The Convention states: “The ultimate objective of this convention... is to achieve... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that could prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.

Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change” (Article 2).

Article 3 sets out the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”, and the need for precautionary measures. Remaining Articles 4 to 21 set out aims and mechanisms, all provisional on finance, articles 5 to 9 setting out a research and monitoring programme, while Article 11 sets out the principle that the developed world funds the developing countries in this research. This funding is to be provisionally sourced through the World Bank Global Environmental Facility, itself a controversial body, unaccountable to the southern states which it oversees.

Difficulties developed around unspecific references to “dangerous levels” of greenhouse gases, and time scales, as well as over funding monitoring and standardizing this monitoring. Major differences emerged over Article 4’s reference to the “target” reduction of CO₂ emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000, some (particularly the U.S.A.) interpreting this as a speculative suggestion, others as a more binding benchmark. The Article sets the target for advanced countries to demonstrate that developed nations are taking the lead in modifying long term trends. They demonstrated rather the opposite tendency. The resolution set no endorsable targets, and north/south division over forest sinks and northern pollution was not resolved.

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Initially to be called the “Earth Charter”, a punchy new sound bite ethic for the new millennium, the tensions between north and south ensured the fracturing of the title and its content (Middleton et al, 1993 and Grubb et al, 1993). In brief the final declaration was another cobbled collection of good ideas and vague promises. North/south divisions were un-resolved and the Charter doesn’t commit parties to more than a rhetorical endorsement of the need to address the issues facing the “planet”. It was a document of the lowest common denominator in action, yet the highest ideals in words.

Agenda 21. This 500 page 21st century action plan, is a non-legalistic collection of ideas and issues, watered down to the point where almost 170 nations could sign. It collects “best policy” suggestions, reflecting northern business interests, southern delegations and

N.G.O.s. The Agenda is based on a bottom-up approach, with the “United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development” set up only to supervise and assist it, lacking both powers and resources.

Strong told the summit: “Humanity stands at a defining moment in history... No nation can achieve this [transformation] on its own; but together we can, in a global partnership for sustainable development”. Nevertheless it was left to individual national governments to enact the Agenda. Developing states were said to need assistance. Strong suggested \$600 billion before the year 2000, which was lowered to \$100 billion at the summit’s outset, and then to \$15b. Finally the ‘North’ pledged \$2.5 billion to 2000. The Agenda’s endorsement of G.A.T.T. and the free market left international affairs largely to existing economic and political powers. Even the section on war was watered down to placate nuclear states and the arms trade. While national government is given a role, local government is given a crucial role in bringing the global agenda to the people. Down-loading global problems to the lowest, rather than the most appropriate, level of action, diffused potential, allowing trans-local actors, national states and international actors, to avoid regulation and responsibility.

Local Agenda 21. Agenda 21 (chapter 28) states: “Because so many of the problems and solutions being addressed by Agenda 21 have their roots in local activities, the participation and cooperation of local authorities will be a determining factor in fulfilling its objectives... As the level of governance closest to the people, they play a vital role in educating, mobilizing and responding to the public to promote sustainable development” (U.N.C.E.D. 1992 Agenda 21, p. 200).

8.1.2. Local Agenda 21 “Locally”.

The U.K. Local Government Management Board, Agenda 21 Steering Group, in its “Local Agenda 21 U.K.- Principles and Process: A Step by Step Guide” writes: “Agenda 21 singles out local government as having a special role. Two thirds of the actions in Agenda 21 require the active involvement of local authorities” (1994, p. 4). The management board refer to the European Community Fifth Environmental Action Plan’s emphasis on subsidiarity, which delegated responsibility to the lowest “appropriate” level of action. They point out that the U.K. government’s “Sustainable Development-the U.K. Strategy” (Department of the

Environment 1994), whilst lacking in clear commitments and devoid of new resources and powers, has placed a great emphasis on the local level of government as site for action in accordance with Rio. The Board says it has: “A moral responsibility (although not a statutory obligation)”.

Kent County Council’s response to local agenda 21 was a day conference “2001- What Kind of Kent”, (February 26th 1994). This conference consisted of individuals from 40 organisations and discussed the county’s environmental needs in relation to Rio, fulfilling K.C.C.’s obligation to “consult” the local population. The speakers were: Clive Gilbert - K.C.C. Environment Unit Manager; Richard King - Kent Transport Action Forum chair; Rindy Bakker - G.P. and holistic healing advocate; Caroline Simpson - Canterbury Urban Studies Centre director; and Pete Raine - Kent Trust for Nature Conservation director.

The event was covered in newspapers across the county, the Kent Messenger calling the event “one of the first steps towards helping councils across the county draw up an agenda for action... Although firmly rooted to county based discussions, solutions, and activities, the event ... had a global origin”. The article was entitled “People-Power Day in the Wake of Rio”. Jacqueline Leach (the event chair, argued: “It is difficult for us as individuals to do something about the rainforests, but we can do something about what is happening in our own neighbourhood”. Clive Gilbert informed the conference of Kent’s lack of any permanent air monitoring station, and its sole water monitoring facility, but hoped to encourage, aspiration, empowerment, “the vision thing”, and informed choice for the future, even while “we just don’t know what’s going on” now. He paraphrased Marx’s thesis XI: “while Agenda 21 had interpreted the world’s problems, local people had to change them”.

Knowledge was crucial, but empowerment required resources. Clive Gilbert argued that utopian aspirations must be grounded in reality. He suggested K.C.C. needed local people’s support and involvement, just as local people needed the Council’s strategic scope. He suggested the national government’s Local Government Review, in threatening K.C.C.’s future, threatened local environmental action and urged people to channel their energy through County structures, sustaining local government legitimacy. Local Agenda 21 provided that opportunity. The other four speakers spoke on their specialist areas of transport, health, the built and natural environments, and then the group divided into four

workshops. These developed “shopping lists” for action. The meeting ended with reports back and discussion. The “shopping lists” were developed by the organisers into a leaflet, circulated to local councils and concerned groups in April, in time for the County Council’s Structure Plan Examination in Public (E.I.P.) (discussed in more detail in chapter 10). By December, with further elaboration, an update of these suggestions was re-circulated stating: “It is our hope that local groups will themselves now take part in consultations with their local authorities, so that the aim of the Rio-Summit is achieved, and that by 1996 every local authority will have consulted with its citizens and developed a “Local Agenda 21” for the communities in its area.” While event organisers saw a prelude to consultation K.C.C. could claim it had fulfilled its obligation by informing local people that it was up to them.

The structure plan E.I.P. was also meant to be a public consultation forum, and K.C.C. claimed in its “Kent Structure Plan-Third Review Deposit Plan and Explanatory Memorandum (May 1993)”, that whilst in earlier structure plans “priority was accorded to the encouragement of growth in economic activity and employment in the county” (p. 11), “With the Third Review of the Structure Plan the overall requirement is to improve the quality of living and standard of environment within Kent... in short to move towards a strategy of “Sustainable Development””. K.C.C. affirmed its commitment to Rio and the “best possible use of land and the sustainable management of resources”. “Indeed it is the objective of this Third Review Structure Plan that the overall effect of the sum total of its policies reflects the concept of sustainability” (p. 11).

The examination in public is discussed at more length in chapter 10, so here it only need be said that for all the “fine talk”, in the midst of an economic recession and under pressure from “inward investors” and the Department of the Environment, environmental considerations in practice still took a back seat in relation to economic growth (see also the discussion of Lyminge Forest later in this chapter). The local level, stripped of resources to monitor pollution or promote energy efficiency etc, and lacking powers over crucial factors such as transport and economic activity is not in a strong position to act. That developments occur locally does not mean that they can best be controlled there. Canterbury City Council’s draft local plan received over 350 objections, comments and suggestions, and this has been referred to in the council’s “Environmental News” as public consultation on Agenda 21, though it was not made explicit at the time. Resource poor, the city council was reluctant to

invite costly initiatives.

Nevertheless the city council appointed an “Environment Action Coordinator” at the beginning of 1994, with the task of developing environmental policy and practice, within and between councils departments and beyond. In the June 1994 edition of the council’s “Environment News” she wrote: “One of the main ideas behind Agenda 21... is that local people should be better informed and have more of a say in how things develop and change in their community. Agenda 21 goes on to say that local people should also be prepared to take on more responsibility for what happens to the environment through their own activities, and patterns of living.” When I asked her to develop this point she explained that government restrictions on local spending meant consultation with local people meant priorities. If people wanted environmental protection this would impact on existing services. The issue had been passed down to local government without funds.

This funding problem made her job difficult. For the June 1994 meeting of the council’s Environment Committee she prepared detailed suggestions, drawn from extensive research on “best policy” developed elsewhere, that would have allowed the council to begin the process of informing its members, officers, staff, and constituencies about Local Agenda 21, a step by step guide to drawing up its own Local Agenda 21, and set out actions for adoption. However the Environment Committee had other priorities. It spent the first two hours discussing the principle of fining old age pensioners whose dogs stray without collars, dangerous cyclists in the pedestrianised high street, noise pollution from bottle banks, an appraisal of its 1989 environmental appraisal, and difficulties the council was having persuading Rail Track to put a “Please Switch Your Engine Off” sign on the St. Dunstan’s level crossing. There was also time for councillors to pose for a press photograph with Rogers Waste Management publicizing their glass recycling figures. Only as a final footnote to the meeting was Local Agenda 21 raised. It was given nodding approval and then dropped. Councillors did not seem convinced that Rio was their business.

The next edition of “Environment News” reported the level crossing controversy and contained an article on the virtues of dog collars. This story was accompanied by a cartoon. At the time local papers had run stories concerning the menace of cyclists, even quoting the

Conservative councillor Kim Nichols' assertion that cyclists produce more methane than people sitting in cars. The local press however had nothing to say about Local Agenda 21. Neither did the subsequent (after the June edition cited above) copy of 'Environment News'.

The Environmental Action Coordination Officer (E.A.C.O.) even had difficulties getting appointments to see her own head of department. Almost a year was spent developing an initial "corporate commitment" to a "local Agenda 21" programme, itself only the outline of local suggestions and aspirations that each local council needs to submit to central government for submission to the U.N. by 1996. She conducted a survey of officers within the council, revealing high abstract awareness, but low practical awareness of what they could do.

The first stage of the E.A.C.O.'s programme, i.e. developing corporate commitment, staff training and awareness raising, environment management systems, environmental budgeting guidelines, and a cross-departmental environmental policy working group, were all held up at every step. Stage 2 of the programme "integrating sustainable development aims into the local authority policies and activities", across areas of "Green Housekeeping", i.e. land use planning, transport, economic development, tendering and purchaser/provider splits, housing, tourism and visitor strategies, health strategies, welfare and environmental services, is still only paper.

Awareness-raising, education in the community, consulting and involving the general public, partnerships via meetings, workshops, conferences, working groups, advisory groups, round tables were irregular, though the Coordinator brought the message informally to a number of local group meetings. She often called on local activists to pressure councillors on issues. Holding a "politically sensitive" post she had been unable to move the pace of change any further inside the whale. Her main ambition was to arrange a day conference at the University of Kent's Durrell Institute for Conservation Ecology (D.I.C.E.) at the end of British Telecom's National Green Week (in May 1995). The aim was to invite councillors and other influential local people, business, media and the like, rather than local environmentalists. The ideal was to set the tone for the period after the May local elections.

As regards "sustainability indicators" she admitted the council could not afford its own

equipment to monitor air and water quality, and suggested that it was premature, at present, to ask the Council to adopt the Friends of the Earth “Climate Change Resolution”, committing Councils to reducing local greenhouse gas emissions. The council still had to wake up to Local Agenda 21 “in principle”; practice was something for the next millennium.

A kerb-side re-cycling scheme has been set in motion in parts of the city, thanks to a Department of the Environment £200,000 soft loan, the money having to be paid back over the coming years out of savings made in the cost of waste dumping and from re-cycling paper and metals reclaimed. The “subsidiarity principle”, dressed in the language of “local empowerment”, has the effect of leaving decisions, and the burden of paying for them, to local government at a time when it is expected to make significant savings and to adopt other responsibilities. Local government is becoming an increasingly saturated sponge, absorbing responsibilities whilst denied the powers to raise additional revenues. While it is the level of governance “closest to the people”, it is not the level most appropriate for action.

8.1.3. Conclusions on Agenda 21. From Rio to the Regions.

Events “on the doorstep”, in the physical sense, are aspects of wider social systems of activity and control. Transport issues, pollution, food production, energy use and generation, employment and economic activity, span the globe. Local manifestations are only aspects of broader systems of action. “Community”, so often referred to in the vocabulary of “Local Agenda 21” as the site of real face to face activity and empowerment, is a concept strangely out of step with the trans-locality of issues which the “Earth Summit” set out to address. The very self-contained “communities” bearing so much responsibility for enacting the commitment to Rio, are themselves undermined by the forces that undermine sustainability. That they should be resurrected in an attempt to prevent environmental damage is fine, but these local communities are not being resurrected, only exhorted to act. For those whose activities the Rio Summit left tellingly alone (i.e. trans-local interests), in spite of rhetorical exhortations of “everyone” to do their bit, it is business as usual, and send the bill to the locals.

8.2. Transport Issues.

The ‘local’ dimensions of transportation existed in the context of global, European, national and regional structures of economic and political interest. My research into Kent County Council and Canterbury City Council transport policies showed local interests are managed within systems of trans-local control often taken as “given”. The conflicts and contradictions of such “local strategies within trans-local practices” emerged in studies of “The Kent Transport Action Forum” and “The Kent Action Group”.

In both cases well set-out accounts of the environmental problems that go with increased traffic were produced, combined with “pragmatic” proposals to deal with them. Such a “pragmatic” attempt to address environmental concerns within the confines of economic “imperatives” imposed from outside, by “inward investors” and to fulfil Kent’s role as main transit route between Britain and Europe, led to accusations of getting the balance wrong, either turning the garden of England into a gateway to Europe, or sacrificing economic prosperity on the “altar of environment”. The transport agenda is also bound up with Tourism; Conservation; Local production relative to global comparative advantage; resource depletion and Pollution (so connecting with the final section of this chapter and the following chapter).

8.2.1. Movement.

Between 1980 and 1990 Kent road traffic rose 66%, (U.K. average 49%⁵³). Heavy goods vehicle movements rose 60% (national average 39%⁵⁴). Average motorway traffic density in North and West Kent varies between 85000 and 100000 vehicles per day (national average 55000). Density on A roads in the county is around twice the national average, whilst on B roads it is three times higher⁵⁵. County council estimates are that traffic density will rise by a further 100% by 2010 for private cars and 50% for commercial goods vehicles. Meanwhile estimates for rail use suggest only an 8% increase in demand and local park and ride schemes struggle to survive⁵⁶.

Between 1980 and 1990 car ownership rose in Kent from 300 to 400 per 1000 head of

⁵³Kent Transport Action Forum, *County at the Crossroads*, 1992, p. 10.

⁵⁴Kent County Council, *Transport Plan for Kent*, August 1993, p. 29.

⁵⁵Kent County Council *Environmental Programme, Elements*, No. 5, 1993.

⁵⁶Kent Transport Action Forum, *County at the Crossroads*, 1992, p. 5.

population, 9% above the national average. However 30% of households in Kent have no car. By 2015 county planners expect 600 cars per 1000 people. Already the U.S.A. can match this figure while figures for West Germany, France and Italy are 437, 433, and 417 respectively⁵⁷. Between 1986 and 1991 freight transit through Kent ports rose by 39% whilst the national average increase was only 8%⁵⁸. 97% of freight in and out of Kent is containerized/roll on-roll off shipments destined for the county's road network.

E.C. trade accounts for over half Britain's physical exports and is likely to rise rapidly. Kent will see a disproportionate share of this increase. This has led to the claim that the garden of England is being transformed into the concrete gateway to Europe⁵⁹. The channel tunnel, with fully operational rail link in place, could only cope with around 12% of estimated unitized cross channel freight expected by 2010⁶⁰. The port of Dover generates annually two and a half million lorry movements across the county. Dover also deals with around sixteen million passenger journeys each year, with 65% of international sea bound traffic in and out of Britain passing through Kent ports⁶¹.

The county's low-density population distribution, increasing distance between work, home, shopping facilities, family and friendship networks, and leisure activities, in part brought about and now maintained by private car ownership, combined with increasingly flexible work routines and locations, render a limited public transport infrastructure incompatible with the patterns of life of most of the population. This also renders "normal lives" inaccessible to the 30% of households in Kent without cars.

8.2.2. P(RIO)MISES.

* The Rio-Summit signatories agreed to cut greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.

* The E.C. Fifth Action Plan sets similar goals requiring Euro-Regions to develop "sustainable transport strategies" by 1994.

⁵⁷Kent County Council, Transport Plan for Kent, August 1993, p. 12.

⁵⁸K.C.C. Kent Transport Action Plan, August 1993, p. 30.

⁵⁹Council for the Protection of Rural England, From Garden to Gateway, Heathrow Publ's, 1992.

⁶⁰Kent Transport Action Forum, County at the Crossroads, 1992, p. 14.

⁶¹Kent Transport Action Forum, County at the Crossroads, 1992, p. 11.

* The U.K. government's Department of the Environment has issued, in "Our Common Inheritance" and "Sustainable Development", pledges to tackle, "by all reasonable means", pollution and global climate change.

* On December the 11th 1992 Kent County Council and its Euro-Region partners in Belgium and Nord-Pas de Calais drew up their own "Environmental Charter".

* Kent County Council's 1994 Structure Plan commits Kent to "Sustainable Development" as a first priority.

Between these promised environmental commitments and reality/predicted trends there is much square-circling to be done. Is it possible to develop "sustainable mobility"?

Kent County Council see their role as balancing supposed "transport need" with protecting the environment. However their powers are limited when dealing with "inward investors", transcending and traversing the county. They exert significant economic pressure on planners. As such the council claims⁶²: "Ensuring the capacity of the county's primary route network to accommodate traffic growth into the next century is seen as vital to the economic viability of the county." Whilst, they write (a page later): "the fullest regard be given to protecting and, where possible, improving the environment in the inter-urban corridors."

The local population are exhorted to ride bikes, walk and use public transport and told that Kent's environmental problems are caused by "all of us", while trans-county freight routes are being built and upgraded at great expense. Whilst the population only vote, the transit traffic have economic power. Kent is an "inter state corridor" within the European Community's "Trans-European Road Network".

The fundamental problem faced by local activists in relation to transport issues is the trans-local nature of mobility. As has been mentioned earlier, the Channel Tunnel created serious knock on effects across the area. In East Kent this was particularly the case for Ramsgate and Dover, the ports thought most under threat. The prospect of intensified competition led to demands to improve the transport infrastructure to the two towns to offset any prospective reduction in demand. Improving one areas communications led to demands for

⁶²K.C.C. Transport Plan for Kent, August 1992, p. 44.

improvements in other areas. Dover and Thanet District Councils, along with Kent County Council gave top priority to this offsetting.

Most directly affecting Canterbury District was the proposed- now under construction- “Blue Route” by-pass of the existing Thanet Way (A299) which runs across the North Kent coast above Canterbury. The route cuts across a swathe of countryside and divides a number of scattered villages and hamlets, and was opposed most vehemently by the local amenity society and the Herne and Broomfield proto-parish council campaign. The Council for the Protection of Rural England also opposed the scheme on the grounds that such by-passes both destroyed the countryside along the route itself and encouraged “in-fill” development between the by-passed towns and the road itself. It pointed out the effect of an earlier upgrading of the road. Such development had rendered dualing the existing route impossible as housing, industrial estates and a supermarket complex now straddled the existing road.

Local campaigners were faced with a double constraint, of defending local “quality of life” in the face of demands for the same, by means of the road, in the neighbouring district, and of having to negotiate the objective consequences of past actions along the existing route. Both these constraints, spatial and temporal “objectifications”, outside the control of the campaigners, weakened their hand in relation to those acting at wider levels of spatial and temporal scope. As the C.P.R.E. coordinator for the Canterbury district told me, the campaign, whilst aware that division was imposed upon them by a national transport strategy they opposed, set itself against the immediate interests of the child growing up in the economically marginal Thanet, to defend the interests of children in the future who will otherwise be deprived of countryside. The Herne and Broomfield Amenity Society, with help from the Kent Federation of Amenity Societies, spent thousands of pounds and hours of investigative time and effort commissioning lawyers and consultant engineers to find fault in the “Blue Route”, but, despite their relative affluence, their isolated campaign was largely ignored, and the scheme was approved in the Summer of 1994.

One knock-on effect of the approval, actually pre-developed by the county council to fit the proposed route, was the proposal in the Kent structure plan to site a large number of the district’s housing quota for the next twenty year period in the road’s infill region. Predicted

increased traffic flows into and out of Canterbury, it claims, could best be managed if the proposed by-pass around the village of Sturry (to the immediate East of the city) is pushed ahead. Traffic build-up in the village produced a flurry of debate, in the local press and elsewhere, over the proposal, the primary line of cleavage being between those for and against the by-pass. Again the limitations of spatial and temporal reach make it difficult to advocate, at a local level, policies that would ease a local bottleneck caused by trans-local pressure, so adding to the argument that the only “pragmatic” local solution is a by-pass for the village. The conservation dimension has strong local support but the “pragmatic” argument gains weight in the absence of trans-local options, options not delivered by the city or county council.

This leaves traffic levels rising. Just as the second national budget of December 1994 raised taxation on petrol to balance treasury figures, with a weak environmental fig leaf, none of the revenue being directed towards alternatives to the car (the suggestion of the Royal Commission on Transport and Pollution), the cut-backs that have shelved the Sturry by-pass do nothing to tackle the fundamental traffic problem. The cork is just left in the bottle, while the pressure keeps rising.

The proposed A259 “extension” (part of the proposed Folkestone to Devon south coast dual carriageway) is again a case of the trans-local running up against the local in a clash of unequal forces. The road goes beyond even national policy, attempting to render British firms more competitive in Europe, through the channel tunnel. Again Kent lies in the path of a network of cross cutting powers and interests transcending local boundaries but crucial for its economic, political and environmental future.

Within Canterbury transport campaigns focused on pollution and congestion. The City Council’s park and ride scheme and its parking permit system aim to reduce traffic into the city centre, while more radical measures to increase public transport, subsidise fares, pedestrianize more streets, or restrict access to outside traffic are largely dismissed. The council claims its hands are tied nationally, politically and economically. At a meeting organized by “Spokes”, a cycle action group, David Ledger, the city council’s senior environmental health officer clearly illustrated this with two slides of the same roundabout in Canterbury taken on two Monday mornings (about 8.45am), one with a traffic jam the other

with only a few cars, the latter during the school holidays. The council was asked to provide a school bus service for all children in the district regardless of the existing three mile ruling, but found such a policy infringed their legal powers to use council tax payers' money. The council claimed it was unable to act. Parents afraid to let their children walk or cycle to school add to the problem by driving their children to school as well. At the same meeting (May 18th 1994) Mr Ledger also admitted that local pollution monitoring was shambolic. The district's monitor for ground level ozone pollution, at Grove, had in fact been largely out of order over the 1993 Summer period when its occasional readings were used to claim that breaches of safe levels had rarely been recorded ("readings rarely being recorded"). The department's testing of sulphur dioxide emissions from the tops of lamp posts, ostensibly to avoid vandalism, caused some consternation in the audience.

Evidence released by the county council's environment unit, almost at the cost of their jobs, in October 1994, revealed the results of national ground level ozone pollution data for the summer 1994 period. Kent came out top of the league table, having the highest number of hours in breach of E.C. recommended safety limits of any county, considerably embarrassing a county council whose roads policy flagrantly contradicted its claims to be pursuing sustainable development. The Environmental Action Coordinator for Canterbury City Council suggested the evidence was based on data from only one full time monitoring station in the centre of the county, and did not directly demonstrate the problem in Canterbury. This being true, of twelve random monitoring periods across the summer in Canterbury the E.C. guideline levels were exceeded on a greater number of occasions than in any other part of Kent (seven times out of twelve), and were in fact worse than the single full time county monitoring station's results.

Increased ground level ozone, according to the British Medical Association, is a major contributory factor in the increased incidence and/or severity of asthma amongst children in Britain, breathing difficulties in older people, and tree/crop damage. The ironic twist is that the government's recommendations, given in a telephone helpline, to those concerned about their breathing in times of high smog build up, 'Avoid strenuous exercise', such as cycling, only further increases car use. Whilst the two doctors at the "Spokes" meeting demonstrated cycling's health benefits and the detrimental effects of car use, this health dividend has to be measured against the risks of cycling on congested and deteriorating minor roads.

While the County Council spent over half a million pounds promoting and facilitating the passage of the Tour de France through Kent for one day in July 1994, setting up road blocks and diverting traffic, long standing commitments, some dating back to the 1970's, given at both county and city level to increase provision for cyclists on a day to day basis remained painfully slow in being realised. Protests by pedestrians and the increased congestion on roads are given as good reasons for not giving cyclists more space. The publication by the city council of a map of cycle paths around Canterbury was welcomed, though it also highlighted the many black spots and omissions where cycling was either prohibited or dangerous. Plans to build a Canterbury to Ashford off-road cycle route along the Stour Valley are still under negotiation. The construction, after three years of negotiation and persistence, of a cycle path alongside the existing footpath from the university's Eliot college, towards the city, in the 1993-4 academic year, was the result of a prolonged low key campaign by a few staff but not students.

8.2.3. Conclusions on Transportation.

Finally I want to return to the issue of Local Agenda 21. Both county and city councils welcomed the Rio decision to give local authorities a central role. Kent county council used the opportunity to defend itself from the threat of its own dismantling in the Local Government Reorganization Process. It held itself up as a crucial strategic planning body responsive to the needs and wishes of the people of the county, in the language set out in the declarations that emanated from Rio. Putting 'sustainable' on almost every page of every document it produced the council still went ahead with its road building plans, and its "transport strategy" amounted to verbal encouragement to local people to get on their bikes, while trans-county traffic was given a more substantive green light. It was keen to explain that it was government restrictions that forced it to develop the road-based transport infrastructure and that it was powerless to solve national/transnational problems alone. Alone it could only become a bottleneck or a backwater even if it could legally choose. County and City councils profess a desire to put their house in order but claim they can not help it if their landlord (the government) builds a motorway through their living room.

The city council's appointment of an Environmental Action Coordination Officer bears out

the many limits. As the E.A.C.O. pointed out at a talk at the university (Dec 1994) with no additional money the thrust of Local Agenda 21 in the U.K. will be to make people feel the problem is for them to sort out and if they “choose” to act on environmental issues this will be at the expense of other services such as schools or care for the elderly, unless the schemes pay for themselves immediately. The E.A.C.O. gave the example of random exhaust emission testing as an example of how Local Agenda 21 will give new powers to local government to act to clean up the environment. Previously council environmental health departments could not stop cars and conduct random tests, and had to get the police to stop the vehicles. The Environment Bill (1995), gave local authorities new powers. What was missed out of this picture was that at the very moment the Minister for Roads, Dr Brian Mawhinney, announced a national crackdown on dirty exhausts and the plan to give local authorities the legal power to act, he also withdrew all funds from the Department of Transport’s own pollution inspectorate. No additional funding for the local authorities expected to take up the slack ensures only token efforts in the future.

Defending their failure to conduct adequate air quality testing in previous years the city council claimed that the expense involved was prohibitive and that they were waiting for a national government standard to be set. In the future an increasing tendency to push responsibilities onto local authorities, whilst restricting their rights to generate the income needed to pay for it, will add to the gulf between responsibility and power to act that already consumes many crucial issues of environmental concern. Buck-passing and falling between the stools characterizes the U.K. response to the Rio Summit. Transport issues being only one illustration of the musical chairs.

8.3. Conservation, Aesthetics and Tourism.

Deep Ecologists like Aldo Leopold (1949) and Arne Naess (1973) argue the non-human world contains intrinsic value and need not account for itself to human interests. Defence of wilderness from human encroachment is the primary site of “Deep Ecological” struggle. Refusing to take humanity as the sole point of ethical reference “Deep Ecology” claims to be anti-anthropocentric, claiming an eco-centric foundation for ethics. The difficulty Deep Ecology faces is generating agency within the human realm to take up eco-centric struggle. Unless it is assumed that nature will regulate itself, putting “man” in “his” place, the question of how human resources will be engaged on behalf of “intrinsic values”, is crucial.

It is possible for environmentalists to put forward rational, self interested, arguments for the protection of non-human systems with utility value to humans. Such arguments carry weight regardless of any intrinsic worth of the non-human. However arguments founded on “enlightened self interest” do not begin to address the issues raised by the deep ecological claim that relations to nature must be founded on an ethic of non-self-interested compassion. Conservation, premised on an aesthetic relation to nature, may overcome dualistic eco-centric/anthropo-centric conceptions of man’s relationship to nature. Gaining significance in the mid eighteenth century, with Western Europe’s enlightenment rupture of ethics from “pure” reason, the aesthetic as a category in English high bourgeois sensibility and German intellectual idealism sought to heal the rift between instrumental and moral reasoning.

I only came across this angle in discussion with Canterbury Council’s conservation officer (altering chapter 3), who explained how, in order to justify conservation expenditure, he promoted conservation as an amenity, rendering sites as attractions to money-spending tourists and “rate” paying residents. While council motivation was largely instrumental and the conservation officer’s was more ethical/intrinsic, the aesthetic, the promotion of nature “appreciation” acted as mediation. My studies of the Kent County Council/K.T.N.C.’s Nightingale Project, and the Lyminge Forest Oasis Holiday Village explore this strategy.

Ideally the aesthetic resolves the eco/anthropocentric divide. In the cases below it only disguised a continuation. In particular emphasis placed on proximity or immediate presence in relation to nature as the site of some “authentic/authenticating experience”, whilst justifying preservation of areas of the non-human, is also premised on accessing sites; tourism and transport feeding into wider environmental problems. Within the present socio-economic framework, conservation and tourism aesthetics very often take on the role of immunization points, ideological screens within a reality that is both the source of their demand and their very antithesis, laying waste to the sense of proximity and authenticity in everyday experience and so encouraging the supply of, and demand for, substitute forms of authenticity in conservation/heritage tourism. However, insofar as conservation aesthetics creates sites of non-instrumental space in a technologically disenchanting social world, its creation of places, of unique and intrinsic value, may challenge spatial homogenisation.

8.3.1. The Nightingale Project.

The Nightingale Project was founded in July 1991 on a three year initial programme, managed by the Kent Trust for Nature Conservation and funded by Kent County Council (who paid half the £300000 costs), the Countryside Commission and English Nature. The council's Economic Development Department wanted the project to promote conservation areas as lucrative tourist sites. The county structure plan greatly stressed development of the countryside as a "valuable [tourist] resource". Compression of large numbers of visitors into centres of attraction, like Canterbury with 2.25 million visitors each year and a population of 40000, was seen as needing diffusion, encouraging tourists to explore the area, stay longer and spend more. The ever-expanding road network through the county facilitated greater transit, conservation sites would encourage stopping over. The Trust, alternatively, wanted to build an information and co-ordination centre for itself.

The Nightingale Project funds were used in part to sub-lease and renovate Tyland Barn, a 17th century building near Maidstone, severely damaged in the storms of 1987. The barn (restored with local materials and traditional techniques) became home for both the Project and the Trust. Remaining money was used to appoint a coordinator to produce literature promoting conservation sites covered by the project, selling conservation aesthetics to tourists. The project promoted 25 sites across Kent, belonging to the Trust, English Nature, Kent County Council, the R.S.P.B., Southern Water, National Trust, Woodland Trust, Forestry Commission and a number of district councils.

Tensions soon emerged between council and Trust. The former wanting hard sell while the Trust attempted to promote the conservation benefits whilst minimising potential dangers of over-development. A number of its sites were not promoted because they were considered too sensitive. In its second year the Project sought council backing for a "West Coast U.S.A." environmental exchange programme on the issue of wetlands. The American Organization selected north Kent wetlands as a site of global significance for bird migration, and wanted to hold an international conference locally. Kent County Council refused to back the project. Promoting the industrial redevelopment of the "East Thames Corridor" the council wanted the "coast clear" for potential road schemes or perhaps a channel tunnel rail link bridge across the Thames. North West Kent's reputation as a dirty and polluted region is

a major reason given by many potential developers for not locating there. However, the opportunity to develop the regional image and support a wetland rehabilitation programme as part of a long term strategy to promote clean and sustainable development was rejected because, in the words of the head of the economic development department, “it wasn’t sexy” (no immediate gratification). This attitude came to characterize the economic development department’s relationship with the Trust and with the Project.

The problematic relationship was further aggravated by council support for Centre Parcs’ proposed holiday village in Lyminge forest, between Folkestone and Canterbury, the largest stretch of “ancient” woodland in Kent. Kent Trust was opposed. The director of the trust leaked the council’s plans to The Guardian newspaper, and the council backed down. Whilst this occurred in the late 1980’s, prior to the foundation of the Nightingale Project, its consequences haunted the relationship between council and Trust due to the 1990’s proposals, made this time by the Rank Corporation, to turn the West Wood part of the forest into an “Oasis Village”.

By the beginning of the third year the council began to question the “economic accountability” of the Nightingale Project, and made veiled suggestions that continuation of funding was in danger and that payments might be late if the project did not take a more vigorous economic outlook. The project coordinator initiated a series of accounting surveys into: i) Public perceptions of conservation work, ii) Supervised site visitor perceptions of conservation work, iii) Site manager views on the balance between increased visitor access and environmental damage, vandalism, wear and tear at sites of conservation work. K.C.C. were not impressed. They wanted hard sell, “concrete” data on visitor numbers, expenditure, secondary spending and employment possibilities. Payments were delayed.

K.C.C. commissioned an audit of the project, the results of which vindicated the project, so frustrating the council. The conflict between conservationist and economic conceptions of “value” remained unresolved and the project’s future was in jeopardy. The coordinator, unable to ensure the continuation of her position, resigned to take up the post as Canterbury City Council’s Environmental Action Coordination Officer. A consultant was hired to supervise the last six months of this attempt to manage the contradiction between economic

and intrinsic “value” via conservation aesthetics.

Prince Charles, at the official opening of Tyland Barn, on the 27th of March 1993 said: “The Kent Trust for Nature Conservation has a long and successful history of conserving wildlife and wild places, both of which are currently under great pressure. If our descendants are to enjoy their natural heritage as we do now, there is a pressing need to make the case for nature conservation to as many people as possible.” It was ironic that the centre he opened was paid for by the very people exerting the pressure.

8.3.2. Lyminge Forest: the plans for an Oasis Village.

After Centre Parcs’ failed proposal to build a holiday village in Lyminge Forest, a new proposal, this time from the Rank Leisure Group, came to build an “Oasis Village” of around one thousand chalets, with ninety acre lake, leisure centre, shops and church. The company promised 1000 (mostly part time) jobs, in an area of high unemployment, and gathered considerable support from district and county council. Opponents pointed out that while the proposed site belonged to the Forestry Commission, Rank bought additional woodland from a number of parish councillors (some of whom continued to table council motions despite declared interests), and bought four hundred acres of nearby woodland from the local district councillor. This, it is alleged, effectively silenced local people on Shepway District Council.

The company suggested turning the additional woodland into a community forest for the local population to make up for the loss of the “West Wood” site. These other sites are, however, at present non traditionally-managed woodland and would require decades of coppicing and replanting to approximate the site on which, for precisely these reasons, the Rank Group want to build their “Oasis”. Protesters argued that if the company wanted to develop a site it should convert the plantations it has already purchased. The company claimed it needed to develop the site within a “reasonable”, i.e. profitable, time-frame. Rank claimed the site’s proximity to the recently extended M 20 between Ashford and Folkestone would ensure extra traffic does not increase congestion. Nevertheless the company has still arranged to pay K.C.C. £250000 for minor alterations to the Roman road between Canterbury and Hythe, itself legally protected from “significant” alteration.

It may be argued that Rank, in selling conservation aesthetics, is translating natural value into some kind of commercial value and so may encourage the investment of resources into environmental protection; increased scarcity value alone may make such investment profitable. Rank learnt many lessons from Centre Parcs' failure and keenly promoted their environmental credentials, while admitting the bottom line was profit. They claim that, because the wood suffered severe damage during the storms of 1987 and 1990, the site was in need of renovation and that their sensitive management of the development could supply the much needed resources. Rank argue this is only possible if development is profitable within a "reasonable" time-frame and scale.

The Kent Trust were promised a position managing some of the conservation projects proposed for the alternative sites and Rank claim they will employ people to manage nature reserves on them. The Kent Trust acted as consultants on the project since 1993, before the scheme was made known to "local" residents. The Trust director, a Lyminge resident, was obliged to keep quiet about the proposals as part of the consultation arrangement. Again a powerful, and potentially highly critical, community voice was effectively co-opted.

The difficulties in making an objective assessment of the dangers and the potential benefits of the scheme were further complicated by the lack of impartial assessments. The district and county council were effectively silenced, county council environment programme officers were told by their superiors not to look into the issue, and the parish council was internally divided, with generous payments to some councillors for incidental woodland seen by protesters as anything but incidental politically. The National Rivers Authority claimed that the water required by the project would be no problem. However a Women's Environmental Network report into the activities of the Kent area N.R.A. found the authority reticent to prosecute companies breaking their emissions quotas and that they had tended to adopt a relaxed attitude to the demands made on water by commercial concerns. The Authority is under pressure to generate additional revenues, to compensate for government plans to withdraw financial assistance, making the authority stand on its own two feet. A potential conflict of interest exists between the obligation to protect and monitor water quantity and quality and the need to sell extraction and emissions licences to finance the former. Standing on its own two feet may lead the N.R.A. to tread on its own toes, making water purity and financial liquidity incompatible. Southern Water's claim that the scheme is quite compatible

with projected water supply may have more to do with its commercial interest in providing the water than with the levels of the county's aquifers (see chapter 10).

Whilst the claims made by Rank in its self-commissioned environmental report about its "total" water re-cycling system, may be true, the commercial nature of the research made its findings suspicious to local residents who smelt a rat each time Rank's cash registers could be heard ringing behind the pronouncements of supposedly independent bodies meant either to inform, protect or represent them. Those bodies Rank had not given funds to they tried to infiltrate and undermine. Meetings of local residents received delegations of snoopers, taking down names, a number of activists had their employers notified of their activities and employers grilled about their employees' particulars. The company had resources and scope of action that far outstretched those of localized opponents either to match, or often to comprehend. That these resources are such a double edged sword, promising potential good and bad for the local residents and their environment, made Rank all the more difficult to oppose outright.

Rank's plans and promises are all premised on an existing transport system that is highly problematic. That this road network is both the heart of the county's economic sustainability, within present arrangements, and environmentally unsustainable is not caused or overcome by Rank's proposal. That natural aesthetics, in its creation of green "Oases" in the "desert" of modern development, feed upon a sense of the damage done and the threat it poses, is not to say it breaks out of the compensation role into opponent to the destruction.

8.3.3. Conclusions on Conservation Aesthetics and Tourism.

What is clear is that the "Aesthetic", as a relation to the natural world, cannot somehow be "independent" of social and economic processes. This is not to say the "Aesthetic" is reducible to existing social relations. It can come to challenge them, again from within. It is this very containment within the social, combined with its attempt to construct a non-instrumental relationship to the non-social, that makes the aesthetic a powerful vehicle for attempts to naturalize claims about the world. The appeal to the non-instrumental and "intuitive" sensibility of people is better able to pass itself off as self evident because it presents itself as immediate and physical "presence". The creation of such limited sites of

authentic experience, however, can easily be accommodated, as sites of escapism, only breathing spaces. These spaces, as a part of the wider social system they seek to compensate for, are economically dependent on the continuation of the practices they oppose, increased traffic and economic activity. In order to defend such spaces, as a first step to wider measures, activists compromise themselves.

Whilst a powerful potential ideological weapon in the wider struggle to overcome existing environmental destruction, the aesthetic will not be such in isolation from an ethical and rational programme of radical social change. The “aesthetic” is not a free floating abstraction. The attempt by local activists to operate within the constraints imposed by powerful players, shows how local space, whilst potentially compatible with market interests, through the medium of tourism, is, in the end, heavily debilitated if it cannot challenge trans-local power but only “aesthetize” its imposition. This illustrates what I would call the “social negotiation of reality”, as opposed to the “social construction of reality”. Local actors require the economic and political resources of wider action fields to bring to bear against trans-local actors (who themselves bring these resources to bear) if they are to radically challenge the latter. Without successful translocal resource mobilization, the “locals” will be left accommodating powerful actors.

8.4. Conclusions: Locating the Local.

Clearly the attribution of local responsibility, power and aesthetic value, central to the formation of a sense of place over space, is never simply local in origin, but is bound up within translocal discourses and practices, even in the instances where one construction of locality, itself built up from translocal resources, sets itself against what it represents as “alien forces”, aliens who, to be sure, will be attempting to maximize their integration within constructions of local interest, identity and boundary formation, so giving them the “authority” to call themselves, if not local, then at least friends of the “locals” in their struggle with the, in their eyes, “misguided or deceptive” first party who oppose them. The translocal, or the glocal, is neither local or global, but the ongoing practical accomplishment of space/time coordinated actions, which, in practice, move beyond the frozen theoretical separation of agency and structure. The translocal is the movement through.

9. Dis-Locations.

This chapter brings together three campaign fields, student environmentalism, alternative economics (and their reverse side - the environmental actions of mainstream economic actors), as well as animal rights campaigns. Each field, crossing over with the others, displayed the problematic of coordinating translocal action in the face of, and in conjunction with, existing translocal practices, and disputes/disjunctures over the nature of the “environmental problem” (in particular between instrumental and ethical approaches to the non-human).

9.1. University Green Group(s).

Why student politics takes the forms it does may be a matter for argument⁶³, but it became clear from my own research that student environmental activities displayed a lack of coherent organization and a tendency to short-termism. The annual turnover of students, extended holidays, start of year confusion and end of year exams weakened continuity and coherence. While most activists ended up cooperating, this reflected inability to sustain independent entities rather than shared strength. Coordination, internal communication and ability to tackle issues at source were largely lacking.

Starting the 1993 academic year the Canterbury Green Party attempted to found a campus group. As a new society, they were unable to get a stall at the “freshers fair”, but were able to share a stall in late October with Greenpeace, at a second societies fair. The Greenpeace group had started the year with six core members, some already at the college, others being new students who were national and international members of Greenpeace and who had contacted the Canterbury town group before the start of term. They recruited around 80 new members at the “Freshers Fair”. The Green Party group recruited enough members at the 1993 late fair (around 20) to start a society, and organized a meeting. Unlike the Greenpeace group, whose first meeting had outside speakers and an up-to-date Greenpeace International Campaigns video and drew around 50 students, the Green group meeting was attended by myself, the active campus Green Party member and two others, one being the students union

⁶³ See Rootes (1975, 1977a and 1977b), Flacks (1967), Parkin (1968) and Brym (1980).

green committee representative for Eliot College. It was decided that it would be sensible to work with the Students Union green committee rather than carry on as an independent group. The Friday committee was mainly concerned with campus recycling issues. Though issues from the Green Party and Greenpeace were raised they were not acted upon by the committee.

The Greenpeace group on the campus began with high hopes, a large membership and an enthusiastic and well attended first meeting. However the leading members, all final year students or postgraduates, soon became overloaded with academic work. It was hoped the group would find its own direction after the initial kick start but it didn't. Monthly meetings became informal inactive discussions. There were no further outside speakers, videos, or campaigns, except for a mini-bus load of members going up to London to join a national anti-Th.O.R.P. protest outside the High Court (see Chapter 10). By December the two leading campus Greenpeace activists were focusing their energies on the town group, claiming that they could not do all the work for lazy students.

The Students Union green committee did continue for most of the academic year with representatives in each college and one elected for the whole university (none were sabbatical). The committee, lacking resources and with only a short working time span, avoided abstract issues and was keen to get things done in the here and now. Initial ideas for a ride-sharing scheme for students from the nearby towns and villages fell down for lack of logistical means to pool information and communicate it, and despite regular meetings the actual number of activities proposed, let alone enacted, was very limited. Representatives hoped for student initiatives and students looked for organisation. The two events that did happen, both in term two, were a campus "Green Week" (with stalls in all colleges, displays from the Kent Trust for Nature Conservation, a Green Quiz, video night and a centre spread of green articles in the student newspaper "Kred") and the arrangement with a local aluminium recycling company to place can crushers across campus. The Green week began with a large mountain of rubbish being dumped outside the library to signify the average Briton's annual rubbish⁶⁴. It was hoped Green week would be an eye opener for the can-crushers initiative. It was hoped that, as a fairly effortless alternative to the routine practice of

⁶⁴though it is questionable that all the students going past it were aware of this "significance" as there was little "how to change your ways" information to go along with it.

throwing used cans into the bin, the can crushers would be used. The choice of “Royal Cancer Research” to receive all profits, however, angered animal rights activists.

The university college system proved problematic. With four college bars the logistics of collecting the cans proved difficult as college representatives responsible for emptying and cleaning the crushers and depositing cans centrally fell away after Easter, leaving crushers clogged and dirty, annoying college masters and recycling company alike. The union representative too became tied up in finals, promptly leaving university to work after the last exam and leaving communications between colleges, representatives and the re-cycling company disconnected. Regulation and coordination across the university campus was almost impossible. A rival firm even started opening up the crushers and “stealing” the cans. The nearby, and smaller Christ Church College, with a single union, collected many more.

The green representative also attempted to get better recycling facilities for the “Parkwood” student village. Many German, Dutch and Scandinavian students had arrived with the habit of separating out their domestic waste into paper, metals, plastics and food wastes. However the lack of recycling facilities rendered this futile and many complaints, enquiries and requests were passed to the environment representative. Even though the representative had long since been replaced by the next year’s occupant, the following year did see some suggestions that in future recycling facilities would be developed in the student village. Though this invisible future seemed to discourage the representatives it is possible that those past requests had been filtering through the college authorities. The cultural logic of the more advanced European states may have actually had some gradual diffusion effect.

However as one German student pointed out, the whole logic of can re-cycling is a capitulation to the misguided policies of soft drinks companies, as reusable (rather than recyclable) glass bottles are vastly more energy efficient. In Germany the law is much tougher on the sale of cans and few shops and dispensers stock them. However it would require a national legal framework to impose this policy on trans-national companies, and the university green group was hardly in a position to clean its own can crushers let alone clean up by crushing the can makers. Pragmatics clearly showed how the logic of local action easily finds itself playing within environmentally questionable practices, when more radical action would require wider scope and power.

An illustration of the same problem was given when the Women's Environmental Network (W.E.N.) asked the university women's officer to organise a stall in the Canterbury city centre to publicise the toxic pollution of women workers and their children, born and unborn, as well as western consumers, caused by poisonous pesticides used to increase cocoa yields in Africa.⁶⁵ Armed with Oxfam organic chocolate, the women's officer distributed chocolate and leaflets to Saturday shoppers. This was all very well but the university campus vending machines were stocked only with multinational products. To change this would mean persuading suppliers controlled by producers and hardly keen to withdraw their own products. Again, tracing an issue to source went beyond local scope.

At the end of the academic year most of the organisers had already left, leaving activities and ideas hanging in the air, either to evaporate or to be gradually pieced together by the next year's activists and representatives. The staggered end to the year, with exams finishing at different times and with revision rendering the time after Easter a political no-mans-land, the gap in continuity between years was more than six months.

The 1994-5 academic year started with the taking up of representative posts by new appointees. Greenpeace recruited over 100 students at the freshers fair while Third World First recruited about 50, and C.N.D. about twenty. Again the Greenpeace group started the year with about six core activists, one who had been in the previous year's initial core. The college representatives were divided between two first years and two final year students, while the students union representative was a fourth year who had returned from a year's study abroad and was unaware of previous activities, not even knowing the previous representative. The 1994-5 year carried a strong sense of *deja-vu*.

Greenpeace started with high expectations of sustaining the group with regular college stalls and monthly campus meetings, speakers and events. The initial meeting was attended by 50 new recruits, with a video and talks on local events, though without help from the by then floundering town group. Though the core group changed in the first month of the term, a regular group of around six did sustain itself for longer than its predecessor did the previous

⁶⁵ With a world cocoa glut, increased yields only reduce prices to multi-nationals, while the toxic effects are passed on to workers, their families and Western consumers.

year, though they experienced similar difficulties sustaining activity becoming closely integrated with the union green committee as term one progressed, except over orimulsion (see chapter 10). Producing its own leaflets at first on the issue of orimulsion-burning at Richborough power station, after a small but enthusiastic protest outside the station, the group was unable to sustain momentum. Attempts to raise the issue of car pollution and cars on campus failed to develop concrete proposals. A leaflet outlining the problems of car pollution generally and in Canterbury in particular, was written and circulated.

C.N.D. sold white poppies in the colleges during poppy week, while Third World First organised regular meetings on third world debt, human rights issues and environmental issues related to the south, but didn't develop concrete activities. A Dutch student continued to press for "something to be done" to save an old orchard on the university grounds, but apart from suggestions of useful contacts, nothing actually got done in practice. Rather like the cycle path, mentioned above, the long term nature of such a project slid over the horizon. The students union green representative again focused attention on recycling issues, in particular paper, cans and the disposable plastic cups in college bars.

It was policy in all college bars to use plastic "throw away" containers, the pint "glasses" so flimsy that two sometimes had to be used together, just to avoid the contents spilling out as the sides split when lifted. Hundreds of thousands were used annually. When college and union representatives asked for glass glasses they were told that in previous years thousands of pounds a year was spent on replacement glasses for those broken or that simply went missing. It was also said plastic cups prevented serious injuries. When asked to use reusable plastic cups bar staff insisted that it was not up to them. The representatives did not know how to pursue the issue to any higher authority. In an attempt to publicise the problem of throw away plastic cups the green committee decided to collect plastic cups for a week to display them outside the library during "Green Week". The plan was to string all the cups together and hang them outside the library. The glasses were duly collected and strung together, but due to bad weather and even worse communications the students involved did not turn up at the same places at the same time, each thinking the event had been called off. As one student said at the time, a piece of string has in fact got three ends, two ends of its length, and one its end in time. In the end the inability of the group to hold the three ends together led to its abandoning the idea altogether. The Eliot College representative wound up

with somewhere between one and two thousand plastic cups in her bed/living room and resorted to keeping them in the shower room of her wing.

The major issue that arose during the December 1994 green week was the problem of using recycled paper for the college student newspaper "Kred". The policy of using recycled paper had necessitated using a printing company in Bristol that could print newspaper print onto recycled paper in the limited quantities required. This was considered by many to be environmentally absurd and caused problems of earlier deadlines and delays in getting the paper out to students. The environment committee felt that the policy was a good one as it was essential in the long run to create and sustain the market for recycled paper printing so as to encourage others to adapt their printing technology. Immediate difficulties, if allowed to smother demands for change would ensure no change came. The conflict between recycling and long distance transport it was hoped, would be solved in the future. A motion to the students union general meeting during green week suggesting "Kred" use "sustainable forestry" paper that could be printed locally was seen by the union representative as a short term solution, sacrificing the future. The motion was narrowly defeated ⁶⁶.

The December 1994 Green Week was loosely organised, except on the part of the raffle prize organiser who had secured prizes from almost every shop, theatre, cafe etc in the city, a source of some embarrassment, as up until the day before the draw the prizes outnumbered the tickets sold. A last minute rush ensured the sale of 400 tickets, raising around two hundred pounds, though the proportion of prizes going to ticket sellers suggests face saving. Apart from the raffle two external speakers were attended by audiences of six and eight respectively, the Monday leafleting sessions largely unable to enthuse students to meetings on recycling and council policy. Leaflets suggesting links between male impotence and organic chlorines contained in plastics was a source of amusement but little activity.

9.1.1. Conclusions on University Green Groups.

In general, the main characteristic of student politics around environmental issues that came out of my research was its lack of continuity and coherent organization, its inability to tackle

⁶⁶ though the low turn out and disproportionate number of environmentally minded people present due to green week, and the drawing of the green week raffle immediately after the vote on "Kred" printing may help to explain the union rep's success

issues at source or to effect long term programmes of action. Spurts of superficial action followed by fragmentation and a feeling of inability to make a difference seemed to repeat themselves, with both union reps coming to resent the time spent trying to organize students who didn't appear interested. Wider issues passed groups by, being seen as abstractions.

9.2. L.E.T.S. and Other Business.

The Canterbury L.E.T.S. Scheme (Local Economic/Exchange Trading System) was established at an initial public meeting on the 27th January 1994, with a large and enthusiastic attendance, at the Canterbury Centre. The core group of organisers met regularly in the preceding months developing and publicising the scheme, naming the "currency", and printing cheque book style commitment books. The meeting heard a speaker from the successful Gloucester L.E.T.S. introducing the practicalities and ideals behind L.E.T.S.. Relations between L.E.T.S. and tax/benefit systems was a major issue for the organisers. Schemes are based on exchange of notional local currency units (Canterbury's Tale was named after the Canterbury tales, the Saxon word Taley meaning sum, and the hippy expression tail as opposed to (bread) head). Currency rather than barter was to facilitate non-direct circulation of services.

"Normal Taxable Trading" regulations exempt certain kinds of non-commercial transactions, such as baby-sitting and selling the vegetables from one's allotment to neighbours as too trivial as income to tax. The guidelines on what constitutes "regular" and "significant" income are vague and combine official pragmatism with discretion. Liberal ideals that taxation be rational/regular/simple and reasonable blur at the margins of economic life where "work" and "income" slide into "leisure" and "reciprocal obligation". Selling your bicycle or car in the local paper or doing the housework in exchange for a share of a "family wage" all problematise the boundaries of the economic. While these examples are considered for tax purposes outside "normal taxable trading" many L.E.T.S. services are without precedent.

To avoid accusations of facilitating tax fraud, the organisers maintained accounts of all trading. As the L.E.T.S. currency is purely notional, commitment slips being like cheques rather than actual currency, all transactions have to go through a computer clearing system. The storage of such records are available to tax and benefit officers if requested. The

organisers wanted to develop green economics not a black economy. The example of Sweden was given by one of the organisers, where the “local community council schemes”, which were in many ways like L.E.T.S., were dissolved by the central government because they could not be effectively tax regulated. In relation to the benefit system other U.K. schemes had mixed reactions. Generally schemes had not come under D.S.S. scrutiny in assessing benefit claims because they were not understood by benefits officers. In some instances notice has been taken but there have been no conclusive test cases.

Direct barter can be taxed or valued for benefit purposes through estimations but there is no specific criteria for calculating L.E.T.S. exchanges. The five pound rule, which allows those claiming supplementary benefit while out of work to earn up to five pounds a week without it affecting benefits, may act as a fence under which L.E.T.S. transactions can be conducted. No case studies have come to light as yet. Disability allowances are also another area as yet undecided. In the main it would seem that schemes whose overall scope and membership remains restricted do not attract the attention of state officials, though the Canterbury group was cautious and keen to ensure that they did not open themselves up to adverse accusations. It was suggested that anyone wishing to use the system without fear of being detected could simply use L.E.T.S. slips as “cash”, without going through clearing.

The initial meeting attracted great interest and within weeks the scheme had produced a directory with over 100 members offering services, from craft work, baby-sitting, accountancy work, gardening and architectural work to dog walking, knitting and dress making, computer consultancy work and language teaching. Canterbury wholefoods and a number of local craft style shops offered partial exchange arrangements. There was initial talk of future arrangements with utilities like British Telecom. However the need, were this to occur, to place the Tale on an anti-inflationary programme, restricting levels of commitment individuals could run up, was controversial. The tax question would have complicated matters if the scheme became too wedded to wider economic systems.

The organisers set up L.E.T.S. trading fairs in Canterbury, arranging office space for receiving post, administrative work and keeping records. However the unpaid organisers soon found time consumed administering the project was gruelling and unrewarding. Users claimed that the organisers lacked administrative, communication and organisational skills,

further upsetting the organisers.

A crucial issue is the type of work and goods on offer, and what that says about the idea of local exchange systems in relation to trans-local economics. The services and goods on offer were individual services and products, things that can be offered by individuals detached from wider systems of production. The purpose of L.E.T.S. is to encourage local skills to be applied locally. The services offered in the directory divide into high skill autonomous professional services and low skill manual work. Most intermediate work is conducted within large scale trans-local systems and so most working knowledge is largely locked into those systems, and inoperative within local trade systems. The question of how to price individual services was simply left to market forces. While the re-skilling/de-skilling debate is too complex to enter into here, I would suggest a crucial dimension of the debate is the relative system independence of particular job skills, the capacity to transfer knowledge from complex systems to autonomous work. While the rise in the 1980's in self employment, consultancy and contracting over in-house employment allows increased system autonomy, for some the reverse is also true. Contract consultants are often only able to work within large institutional contexts even if they are now able to move from one to another, private tendering for state services offers little additional skill to those employed, and franchising, such as in shops and financial services, gives only the flexibility to tailor the trans-local more effectively to the local, rather than encourage local skills and autonomy. Most people cannot apply work skills outside trans-local divisions of labour as these skills have little autonomous use value.⁶⁷

Reliance on extended space-time systems for consumption and employment diminishes local autonomy. An illustration of this would be Canterbury Wholefoods' inability to find local organic suppliers to provide even basic "northern european staple products" like potatoes, bread, fruit and vegetables. It is all the more difficult to imagine manufactured goods being supplied at a local level. These factors make scope for local provision limited, and whilst it can be argued that present trends towards globalization are unsustainable, until these issues are addressed at a trans-local level they remain externalities rendering internal costs of global

⁶⁷ Even where organisationally detachable use value can be derived it is unlikely to be as "efficient" as system produced values. As Durkheim, Weber, Marx and others were keen to point out the modern rational, capitalist division of labour tends on its own terms to be unrivalled.

production superior to localized production. For local craft goods and personal services to compete generally on grounds of “authenticity” would require a radical shift of preferences.

Geographical mobility constitutes another headache for L.E.T.S.. What happens when somebody leaves the area having run up a large commitment? This may create suspicion and inflationary pressure. The idea of regular time bands after which effective “credits” and “debts” are eliminated would generate many difficulties.

9.2.1. Other Business.

Companies like Southern Water, The National Grid, Brett’s Extraction and Construction as well as British Nuclear Fuels Limited are large local landowners and invest in conservation on their sites while being heavily criticized for their environmental impact.

Southern Water’s extraction policies, which have led to the salination of one aquifer (now restored after an extensive programme) and the depletion of all other underground water supplies at rates that have led Kent to become a net water importer to avoid salinating other sites, and their plans (now on ice) to meet increased future demand through the flooding of the Broad Oak valley to the North East of Canterbury, have received heavy criticism from local environmentalists, in particular the Canterbury Friends of the Earth Water Working Group (see chapter 10). Aware of negative publicity, Southern Water keenly represents its sites as “safe havens for wildlife” through numerous site projects, alone or with local conservation groups. The company uses its image as environmental protector to defend price rises. Criticism from environmentalists can set in motion shifts within major institutions, while the meaning of such criticism is open to rearticulation within the company’s interest.

National Grid is similarly keen to promote its environmental credentials with conservation work on its sites, a regular self-promoting magazine, and fully funding the Canterbury Environmental Education Centre, operating on its land by the Vauxhall lakes to the East of the city. Geared to the needs of local schools, the C.E.E.C. is run full-time by a qualified teacher, whose salary was, up until 1993, paid by the local education authority. With the introduction of Local Management of Schools (L.M.S.) and the move, by some schools in the area, to “grant maintained status”, the salary was to be funded through partial payment

from the L.E.A. and the rest was to be made up from charges made to schools using the centre. The L.E.A. insisted grant maintained schools should pay a higher fee, while budget pressure ensured fewer schools could afford the services of the centre. A number of special needs schools, some in the charity sector, were ones the coordinator felt most upset to lose as the quasi-market began to produce a spiral of increasing prices and reduced demand.

National Grid's facilities were largely being squandered. The Grid even came forward to offer the C.D.E.N. a number of full-time employees that the company had wanted to make redundant but whose union had ensured continued employment. However the members of the network were not coordinated enough to find any use for these skilled manual workers. Monopoly companies create vast pools of resources that can be exploited by local conservationists, environmentalists and others, even as the very profits making such resources available are based on unsustainable practices. However if local activists are not coordinated enough to organise effectively, autonomously and coherently even at a local level, it is improbable that they can challenge the power of large corporations through action at a national or international level. This produces a "negotiation of reality" by which environmentalists attempt to alter the conditions in which companies maximize their profitability, rather than any genuine social construction of reality in which the overall logic of production is challenged. In such conditions companies bind environmental improvement to their continued profitability. Local conservationists were bound into local relations of compromise and cooperation with systems that at a global level of theory they condemned.

Similar conditions exist in relation to Brett's (a major quarrying company) and British Nuclear Fuels Limited's fuel plant at Dungeness. Examples of new negotiations occurred with the Rank Organization, the Euro-Tunnel Consortium and with the Regency Property Management, each of which introduced major planning proposals backed up by extensive environmental compensation packages. In each case developers used the language of sustainable development to legitimate their activities.

Rank's proposal to build a holiday centre in Lyminge Forest was backed by extensive proposals for environmental compensation. The large areas of woodland and farmland purchased was said to be designated for community woodland and nature reserves, with local conservationists as paid wardens. The company was able to recruit conservationists like

the director of the Kent Trust to do consultancy work in developing the planning application for the site, and employed an international commercial environmental assessment company to give their plans a ringing eco-vote of confidence. The company spent or committed millions to the environmental image of its proposal. Rank's plans were approved by Shepway District Council in September 1994, much to the dismay of protesters, but the environmental lobby had been a crucial player in the increased, even if only pragmatic, environmental provision displayed by the company.⁶⁸

Regency Property Management proposed developing a service station along the A2 between Canterbury and Dover, at Barham Down, an area of outstanding natural beauty containing Roman and pre-Roman archeological remains. Their proposals were again steeped in the language of Sustainable Development presented as the need to ensure that development sustains the local economy while ensuring it doesn't spoil the view (not quite what the Bruntland Commission had in mind). Rank had their proposal to develop the site in the mid 1980's rejected on environmental grounds, while Regency promised a Roman Archeological Museum and an extensive programme of aesthetically sensitive grass verges and trees to cover the line of sight around the proposed service station. It was even promised that parts of the complex would be underground, but, after local protests, it failed to gain planning permission. The scheme's environmental credentials failed to satisfy the council/public.

The channel tunnel is the largest man-made construction in the history of Kent, and its environmental impact gained significant attention amongst local environmentalist groups. The Eurotunnel consortium keenly promoted its green credentials and developed links with local conservation groups to sponsor their work, or to set up new projects linking itself with their work. One central feature was the promotion of the tunnel as a "green gateway" entry point for "green tourism" between northern France and East Kent. The White Cliffs Countryside Project, set up with money from Eurotunnel, the East Kent Initiative⁶⁹ and local councils aimed to encourage "green tourism" and a greater interest in the South East Kent chalk downs. It was ironic then that the tunnel's construction with road and rail

⁶⁸ Another contradiction lay in the fact that Rank had only gotten involved with schemes to develop woodland holiday villages as a result of the increased potential demand for new natural holidays in the heart of nature.

⁶⁹ itself set up to create alternatives to the jobs expected to be lost in the East Kent ferry business as a result of the tunnel and in part funded by the consortium

upgrading through that very chalkland has been condemned by the C.P.R.E., Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Green Party as environmental vandalism. The promotion of the tunnel through “green” exchanges where tourists are able to visit a combination of East-Kent and North French gardens in a sort of grand tour, was promoted by Kent County Council as part of the Tunnel’s official opening festivities in 1994.

The spoil generated by the enormous excavation work is itself to be turned into a nature reserve and it is said already to be a rich source of bio-diversity! The railway tunnel’s claim to represent an alternative to road freight transport, is as yet rather suspect as most coming out of the tunnel into Kent goes straight onto the roads. The local Green Party and Greenpeace in particular suggested the tunnel will only serve to increase the advantages of long distance economic integration, so increasing freight movement. As the Kent Transport Action Forum pointed out, even at today’s projected estimates for cross channel freight movement the tunnel will only be able to take a fraction of the total (see chapter 8). The Faustian contract between such supra-national development projects and conservation work they sponsor in the name of sustainability, which binds the problem to its supposed solution, is captured rather well by the winning entry in the C.P.R.E.’s “Changing Face of Kent” photography competition. The winning picture is of a Bacus and Philiman -like couple sitting having a picnic on a hillside overlooking the town of Folkestone in the middle distance and the sea beyond. Driving up the hillside beneath them lies a sprawling mass of metal and concrete rising up as if to consume them. The photograph is however only the central frame from a wide panorama of ten photographs which scan the horizon showing the immensity of the site, which stretches literally for miles and is hundreds of meters wide.

9.2.2. Conclusions on L.E.T.S. and Other Business.

The problem that L.E.T.S. seeks to address - the vulnerability of localities to become dependent on trans-local production systems they cannot control, rendering the productive activities of local people valueless except within trans-local systems - is reminiscent of Durkheim, Weber and Marx’s characterization of the rise of capitalism in general, the replacement of local produce by mass production, the decline of craft and the rise of integrated systems of specialized labour division. The question of whether the local and the particular could hold out against economies of scale and rationality was certainly answered in

the negative by the above three. Nevertheless it can be suggested that a combination of traditional professional and/or craft skills do survive precisely because of the “efficiency” and impersonality of mass production and service, while at the opposite end of the economic scale the failures of the capitalist, rational division of labour, create semi-marginal groups of individuals who also seek and offer forms of authentic personal exchanges to supplement the failures of global economies, and national welfare. In and of themselves, in the absence of a wider and deeper political, economic and cultural challenge to present arrangements, local economic trading systems combine practical, ethical and aesthetic needs that are themselves at odds with the present but are relatively powerless to challenge it (see chapter 9.3.3.1. on the BodyShop).

9.3. Animal Rights.

Animal rights raises many questions about the ethics of human relations to the non-human and forms a key dimension of the Deep Ecological wing of “environmentalism”. Deep Ecology challenges philosophically and practically humanist assumptions that “man” is the sole moral “standard”. My research identified three main dimensions of such a politics active in the period of my fieldwork, interesting both for their internal relations within “Ecological” politics and for their relations with the “conservation” and “Environmentalist” dimensions discussed above: i) Mistreatment of farm animals- in particular live animal exports from Kentish ports, ii) Hunting- for sport and for profit; and iii) Animal experimentation, in particular at Pfizer’s laboratory near Ramsgate. Whilst local animal rights activists are also engaged in sanctuary work for domestic animals, this dimension is not addressed here.

9.3.1. Live Animal Exports.

The single largest animal rights “issue” in the 1993-5 period was live animal export for slaughter abroad by three ferry companies, Stena Sealink, Brittany Ferries and P. & O., from Kentish ports, particularly Dover. The campaign to stop the practice which enables evasion of U.K. rules on slaughter, with regulations on conditions and distance travelled hard to regulate, was led by “East Kent Animal Welfare” and nationally by “Compassion in World Farming” (an all party lobby group including Alan Clark, Simon Hughes, Tony Banks and Joanna Lumley, who all spoke locally). Single market deregulation makes trans-national practices more economical. Open borders and expanding transport infrastructure enable unethical/unsustainable practices to evade national regulations.

Over Summer 1994 P. & O. (July), Stena Sealink (early August), and Brittany Ferries (just afterwards) announced their withdrawal from live cattle exports. Stena spokesman Brian Rees said: "In this instance the weight of public opinion has simply overtaken legislation. We have received literally thousands of letters from the public opposing live animal transportation" (Kent Messenger Extra August 1994). Recruiting a non partisan array⁷⁰ of celebrities, plus a network of local activists around a focused campaign issue, with visible and viable targets (vigils at Dover docks gaining regular media attention), was crucial to this success. After many threats the offices of Stena Sealink in Ashford were letter-bombed injuring a number of employees in early 1994, while a bomb sent to P. & O. was defused. It is likely that "public opinion" was aided by the messy, smelly and unpleasant nature of the practice for ferry staff and the threat of direct action. Kent N.F.U. spokesman Trevor Richards warned the decision would cost local jobs. He was reported to have said: "During the past three years exports to E.C. countries have the quality of British lamb has been recognised" (?!?) (KM Extra, August 1994).

The decision was however in part circumvented in October when Ferrylines began carriage of live animals from Sheerness. Demand for the service rendered the opportunity to monopolize the trade highly lucrative. In the absence of wider regulation, local victories were rapidly evaded. Just as the trade itself acts to evade national regulations, so the market evades local difficulties. After a running series of disputes at ports across the South-East of England, spreading out from Dover, the live export trade resumed in Dover in spring 1995. I was about to begin writing up when the live animal exports issue really took off again in Dover. While attending a number of protests in the port town of Dover where the protests had begun, and to which they returned after the new carrier had been found, I was not in a position to follow the issue fully. This issue is certainly one of the most important points of departure for any future research into locality, environmentalism and movement activity.

9.3.2. Hunting.

Hunting divided into two categories in my study of local campaigns, commercial whaling, campaigned against mainly by local Greenpeace activists within an organized international

⁷⁰One Trotskyist vegetarian recalled, many times, how Alan Clark had reduced her to tears with a story of how his tortoise had been run over outside his castle near Folkestone, which she then visited.

framework, and blood sports, tackled locally by hunt saboteurs.

9.3.2.1. Whaling.

Greenpeace International's campaign focused mainly on Norway's (and to a lesser extent Japan's) resumption (or illicit continuation) of "traditional" and "scientific" whaling, after the International Whaling Commission's 1982 decision to suspend whaling from 1986. The debate has become more subtle and nuanced since the 1970s. Now few publicly favour "commercial" whaling. The international campaign against the Norwegian decision was up against more sophisticated opposition, made so by Greenpeace's earlier victories. The ramming and seizure of the Greenpeace vessel sent to coordinate disruption of Norwegian whalers angered activists but deprived the organization of valuable media images. Local activists, as part of a global protest, organized a postcard petition to Norway's embassy, put "No-Way Norway, Stop the Bloody Whaling" stickers in Norwegian holiday brochures, and boycotted Norwegian prawns, and Sainsbury's who stocked Norwegian seafoods.

In a global recession it is difficult to estimate the impact of such a global campaign. Similarly the I.W.C. decision in 1994 to isolate Norway can be interpreted as holding the line or as a failure to get tough. Again the consequence of earlier victories meant the terrain became gray, business as usual viewed as either failure or containment. Lacking clear resolution left local activists unable to see tangible effects flowing from their efforts (see chapter 10).

9.3.2.2. Blood Sports.

While opinion polls show most people nominally oppose blood sports, hunt saboteurs have a rather detached and distant relationship with other "environmental" groups. While the British Green Party has a clear anti-blood sports position, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth avoid the question, for fear of alienating existing or potential supporters, and some conservationist groups support "traditional" "countryside husbandry".

Saboteurs I spoke to felt Greenpeace avoided controversial local issues for safely distant issues. Saboteurs tend to advocate direct action and anti-conventional lifestyles, seeing Greenpeace as wedded to middle class politics, publicity stunts, safe protest, legalistic actions and affluent green consumerism. The contrast between members is significant. Greenpeace local support group members were almost exclusively graduates (plus students) employed in

white collar non-managerial positions. Hunt saboteurs were mainly in a state of semi-student-unemployed-alternative employment. While most Greenpeace members opposed blood sports, some supported them. The issue was not controversial as it was never discussed. One Greenpeace supporter was a sab but didn't make an issue of it.

Hunt-saboteurs' adoption of an "outsider" strategy of direct disruption with little regard for publicity (winning over of the reasonable majority), meshes with their own social make up, as members (chosen or un-chosen) of the marginal sectors of alternative youth culture, detached from and disdainful of mainstream values and lifestyles. Sabbing aims to stop hunts, not to publicize them. Saboteurs tend to dismiss "winning the argument", the "democratic consensus" model of ethics, and tend to advance a purist, outsiders' ethic of no compromise. Despite the direct actions of the national and international Greenpeace organizations, local activists were more often engaged in a mixture of "insider/outsider" politics- playing the media game to win the opinion war, attempting to influence local and national government, politicians and businesses by persuasion and information, and raising money from the general public through street stalls, fund raising events, sponsored activities, subscriptions and merchandising. This did not preclude direct action, but these are more publicity stunts than "effective" direct intervention. Greenpeace adopts an insider /outsider ethic of consensus-building within bounds of acceptable behaviour, only quasi-vanguardist. Saboteurs mix an anarchist conception of anti-organizational direct politics with anarchic transgressions of consensus, a vanguard impulse to do right regardless.

While Canterbury saboteurs are a loosely organised local network, itself a part of a national, but not centrally coordinated, network, the Greenpeace local support group was a more restrained and centrally directed body. While the former can act locally without fear of loss of corporate assets, whilst unable to coordinate beyond the local, the latter can mount globally coordinated campaigns, whilst at the same time local activists are unable to take initiatives if it offends less radical fellow local activists, local population, public opinion in general or the guardians of the Greenpeace corporation.

9.3.3. Vivisection.

The central local vivisection issue concerned Pfizer animal experimentation laboratories south

of Ramsgate. I want to examine here the contradictory relationship between the local/trans-local and the concrete/abstract nature of action, protest and alternatives, in relation to both local protests at the point of production/operation and the alternative options made available at the point of consumption (i.e. the local Body Shop's ethical alternative marketing strategy and its local campaign work). Pfizers receive contracts from around the world for cosmetic, medical and chemical experiments. The buildings, the site of many past protests, are heavily secured. High fences and finance ensure, with high local unemployment, high insulation from local protest. Such strength contrasts with the disordered local opposition. During my research a proposed demonstration failed to materialise due to disorganisation. Local activists are in a weak position to attack a large local employer, and sponsor of local conservation projects.

Unlike live animal export, the practice of animal experimentation has not been successfully presented as “unnecessary”, and therefore unjustifiable.⁷¹ The assumed necessity of animal research renders the ethic of the lesser evil immune to anti-vivisectionists arguments. The view that there is no alternative, if we want to improve human health, renders the moral arguments anti-human extremism. Vivisectionists have sustained the view that their work is the only alternative, marginalizing opponents. While anti-vivisectionists point to the draw backs of conventional bio-medical/chemical cure models, and in particular the dubious contribution of animal experimentation to our understanding of how drugs, cancers etc work in humans (Coleman 1994), in the absence of alternatives, sick people will tend to stick with those who if nothing else offer hope. Proximate campaigning at a local level restricted to moral protest is liable to be brushed aside as “abstract”, out of touch with “real issues”.

9.3.3.1. Body Shop.

What is interesting is that Body Shop, in its high street campaign marketing of non-animal tested products, is able, through its international research and marketing, to render alternatives locally accessible. In talks at the university and in the city, its marketing campaigners demonstrated existing research alternatives to animal experimentation, discussed in abstraction by other anti-vivisectionists. Purely local activists are bereft of the resources necessary to create alternatives in the here and now to those offered by trans-local

⁷¹The argument of the lesser evil “it’s you or the rat” only holds up in the absence of an alternative.

corporate bodies.

An illustration of the contradictions of pragmatic localism came when the university green group agreed to operate recycling banks for aluminium cans across the campus with profits going to charity. The chosen charity was Royal Cancer Research who were criticised by animal rights activists for conducting animal experimentation. The complaint never generated discussion or question. The students in the green group seemed just to assume that there was no alternative to animal experimentation and therefore there was no “issue” to discuss. Such a “taken for granted” attitude to animal experimentation can be counterposed to the “practical consciousness” that ensured, at least at the level of expression, that all members of the group claimed that they did not buy cosmetic products tested on animals. Whilst it might be thought that this reflects the moral distinction between cosmetic and medical research, that it is a choice at all, and one people know about, preceded personal lifestyle ethical choices.

The Body Shop acted as much to create a moral market as it did to reflect some prior market waiting for vivisection-free cosmetics to come along. The power of the bio-medical and chemical industry to sustain the “no-alternative” to vivisection position as one accepted by most people, thus sustains a practical attitude that precludes morality as an option. Under such successful hegemony those holding a pure moral stance, at a local level or otherwise, become marginal and abstract, even on one’s own doorstep.

9.3.4. Conclusion on Animal Rights.

The questions raised by animal rights are multiple; firstly the ability of local actors to prevent the practice of trans-local animal transportation, the very notion of proximity itself being brought into question in the relationship between abstract and practical action in relation to vivisection. The ability to generate results and alternatives at a “practical” level requires resources, and this inevitably involves compromise with states of affairs being opposed. Greenpeace in relation to more radical animal rights activists draws out the difficulties here, while Body Shop have, in their willingness to trade with companies who tested products on animals in the past (as an incentive and reward for companies to cease) and with subsidiaries of companies that still test, received criticism. The response is usually to point out the reforming effects of gradualism. The very notion of what is practical is a product of prior struggles and developments, such as many in-vitro experimental techniques, developed by

the Body Shop. It is in the light of such reforms that radical aspirations anchor their roots. However, as the whaling issue demonstrates, the danger of defending a partially reformed status quo are great. Further research into the relationship between the European Union and animal rights would enable fascinating material to be unearthed about two contradictory axes. One being the opening up of national boundaries by transport infrastructure and single market law, and the second being the more recent controversies over “mad cow disease” .

9.4. General Conclusions.

The central theme emerging from the above cases, I suggest, is the dual processes of integration and dis-location by which activists seek to oppose the present while at the same time attempting to organize resources from within the present and aligning with resourced actors, either individual supporters, established pressure groups and parties, or commercial/state institutions, whose very “established” and “resourced” positions stem from their being a part of the “present” which movement actors (self defined) seek to challenge. Failure to integrate within the space-time translocality of the present seems paradoxically to mitigate against attempts to disintegrate and reformulate the existing state of affairs. Only in understanding the translocal present of integrated space-time as a set of distancing practices, rather than as a structure to be counterposed to agency, can this apparent paradox be disposed of. Power is organization of action. Structure is simply its ideological objectification. Failure to coordinate action may be the best place to begin an analysis of the fragmented conceptions of the environmental problem. This is not to say that the “environmental problem”, what is wrong with “man’s” relationship with the non-human, is an objective unity, unattained only because of organizational failure, but to say that, as a spectrum of instrumental, ethical (as well as aesthetic) agenda without intrinsic unity or antagonism, their successful or unsuccessful articulation within a singular movement programme depends upon the power of the translocal organization of actors. This theme is taken up in the following chapter, which deals with Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, as well as in the final empirical chapter on the Green Party and wider networks.

10. Local Pressure.

In this chapter the local activities of two international pressure groups, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, are examined. Central to the discussion will be the relationship between the translocal nature of the discourses and practices of these pressure groups, as well as those of the actors and issues they opposed, and the localised campaign activities initiated or enacted by their local “members/supporters”. Tensions between translocal coordination and local “grass-roots” autonomy emerged on numerous occasions. Ironically however, the ability to effect coordinated action, by means of centralized, or translocal, leadership and command cannot be set in straight forward opposition to demands for local independence and freedom of movement, as it was only on the basis of translocal resources, both in terms of knowledge and organization, that local group structures and local awareness of issues, arose in the first place. Demands for local autonomy led to dislocation and failure on the part of pressure group actors in the face of corporate and state strategies and discourses able to easily out-flank them organizationally and marginalize their arguments and knowledge claims. This will be related, in the conclusion of this chapter to Habermas’s often misunderstood discussion of system and lifeworld.

10.1. Greenpeace: the whole world in your back garden?

On November 4th 1994 Greenpeace International Board member Susan George spoke in Canterbury on the World Bank’s fiftieth anniversary, and its environmental impact. An economist and former bank employee defended the bank’s policy of “governance”, by which economic and political policy is dictated to nations indebted to the bank. He claimed it was only right that a commercial concern with an interest in a country should play an active part in “assisting” it. With a pile of Greenpeace internet press releases, I raised questions about the bank’s involvement in Amazon dam building programmes, and their relationship to illegal logging Greenpeace opposed. Unlike the bank, Greenpeace had been asked to leave Brazil over its “interference”. Having access to up to date and respected information, Greenpeace is able to supply local activists with knowledge resources.

Another internet release outlined Greenpeace International’s 1994 A.G.M.. With an

international support “membership” of over four million and total budgets, for its national and international organizations in 158 countries of over 145 m USD, Greenpeace is a global actor. Founded in 1971 to oppose US nuclear tests off Alaska, in 1972-4 the organization succeeded in stopping French atmospheric tests in the Pacific. In 1975 the organization expanded, confronting whaling and baby seal culling. Since then the organization has campaigned on chemical and radioactive waste emissions and dumping, as well as the destruction of endangered species and the forests, air and water in which they live.

Issues like the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, loss of bio-diversity, pollution of land, sea, rivers, lakes and air, have been brought to the attention of the world by non-violent direct action and publicity stunts, mobilizing money and moral outrage in the generation of “issues”. Greenpeace international “mother” vessels, the new “Rainbow Warrior”⁷², Sirius, Beluga, Moby Dick, Greenpeace, Vega and Gondwana, are platforms from which many direct actions are launched. National offices own smaller ships and buses.

The organisation is centrally administered by the Greenpeace International Office in the United States, and in Lewes, Sussex, while national offices control national activities, in negotiation with the centre. National offices coordinate fund raising, mainly through direct media appeals, and from “member” (supporters) fundraising. 150 local support groups exist in the U.K.. Their role is fundraising and implementing national and international campaign goals. Local groups have no right to act as ‘Greenpeace’ unless directed. The Greenpeace logo and name are strictly copyrighted. As Eyerman and Jamison (1989) point out, the Greenpeace organizational form, centralized and deploying hierarchy as an organizational resource, is not the ideal typical “new social movement” depicted in the post-1970’s literature, on the grass roots decentralizing logic of 1968. Greenpeace defines itself as an a-political/non-ideological, pressure group rather than a socio-political movement. “Greenpeace believes that a concern for the environment transcends party political barriers and the organization does not endorse individual politicians nor involve itself in the electoral or party politics of any of the nations in which it operates.” (Greenpeace Briefing 1992).

Local activists are unable to campaign on local issues under the Greenpeace banner without central approval (though modification of this line is discussed below). However, when acting

⁷² replacing the original bombed by the French government in Auckland harbour in 1986

alone, there are equally severe limitations. The nature of the organization enables local activists to be part of global campaigns and have access to up to the minute, world respected scientific research and campaign information. My research within Canterbury's Greenpeace Support Group highlighted many tensions between the grass roots and central coordination, local decision-making and international scope and power.

In what follows I address the formation and three initial objectives of the Canterbury Greenpeace group. These objectives, to raise funds locally for the centre, to conduct campaign and publicity work locally in line with the national and international Greenpeace agenda, and finally to address local issues beyond the official agenda of the wider organization are discussed in that order, as in the short duration of the Group's active life the activists followed a trajectory which took them from largely pliant conduit for the centre towards eventual fragmentation into dislocated local campaigning.

10.1.1. Birth.

A Canterbury Group had existed before but had dissolved before its re-invigoration over the summer of 1993. A new core group had come together, made up of national and international supporters living in the Canterbury area. There were many hundreds of national supporters living 'locally'. The formation of a support group can be largely put down to the presence of a charismatic group organiser drawing enthusiastic individuals around him, whereas passive "support" from many hundreds gave no necessary compulsion to cohere.

The local group met formally on the first Thursday of the month, meeting socially every third Thursday, to discuss fund raising first, then national campaigns they had been asked to help with, and finally local issues members felt important, not always with the prior approval of the centre. This routine was maintained from September 1993 to July 1994, the summer months being utterly chaotic. In September 1994 regular monthly meetings were resumed but events had largely overshadowed the group, its leading activists had become largely disillusioned, and from Christmas the group lost impetus.

10.1.2. Fund Raising.

Monthly stalls held in the town (September 1993 to July 1994) enabled merchandising, tin

shaking, leafleting, petitioning and recruiting. Local Greenpeace support groups have to raise at least £1000 per year, in exchange for receipt of campaign materials etc. Between summer 1993 to summer 1994 the Canterbury Group raised over £3000. The university group was not allowed to become a support group because they could not raise the minimum, and so tried without much success to get campaign materials from the town group and from the local area coordinator. As part of the contract between national organisation and local support groups, local coordinators have to agree not to use Greenpeace's logo for any event, publication or activity not centrally sanctioned. With money being paid regularly to the centre resentment was often felt. However local group's fund raising was dependent on the "symbolic value" of the Greenpeace logo. The name's value relied on controlled use.

Over the year the group were involved in a number of fund raising activities, beyond street stalls. In the Summer of 1993 the embryonic group raised several hundred pounds through a house to house collection. A Sponsored swim in February 1994 raised £1000 and generated local press coverage, as did the annual sponsored walk in June 1994. Both the "Dolphin Dive" and the "Walk on the Wildside", as well as the annual house to house collection, are nationally publicised events, with national literature, posters and envelopes distributed to supporters. With sponsored events all "passive" national members are contacted and told how to contact their nearest local event. The prestige and organizational resources of the national organisation enable local groups to generate significant amounts. These three events were major fund-raisers. Events organized locally often only covered costs. Effort put into raising money on a local basis rarely paid itself back. The national division of labour was "efficient". The group received information on a number of Greenpeace campaigns both nationally and internationally. National office sent out instructions for local groups to follow in support of campaign objectives.

10.1.3. Local Action within a Translocal Actor.

10.1.3.1. TH.O.R.P.

Late one evening (in November 1993) the Greenpeace local telephone tree rang around Canterbury to mobilise local members to Dover docks at 6 a.m. the following morning to go to Brussels, via France, to protest to the European court about the proposed Thermo-Oxide reprocessing plant, waiting to go ahead within the Sellafield complex. The boat tickets and transport from France to Belgium had been booked by Greenpeace national office and the

next morning a group of Canterbury activists were standing shoulder to shoulder with protesters from all over Europe. The campaign against TH.O.R.P., called “React”, mobilized multiple resources. “React” recruited bands like Public Enemy and U.2. local activists and national scientific researchers, spending £250,000 taking the British Government and B.N.F.L. to the High Court, over whether the government, in collusion with B.N.F.L., had acted illegally in giving the go-ahead for TH.O.R.P. without instituting a public enquiry. Whilst Mr Justice Potts decided that the government had not acted illegally, he agreed it had breached existing nuclear regulations. While the plant did open, Greenpeace vindicated their claim that future dangers posed by the development of the nuclear industry warrant the detailed examination of a public enquiry. Local activists joined thousands outside the high court on February 7th 1994, the day the High Court proceedings got underway, while others protested outside the Cumbria plant.

Local Greenpeace activists, along with members of F.o.E. and the Green Party, had been concerned at the increased shipments of radioactive fuel transported by rail through East Kent, Canterbury and Folkestone to Cumbria. Already there were around 30 shipments per month, and TH.O.R.P., it was believed, would double this. The new reprocessing plant, to be economically viable, had to sell reprocessing of spent uranium, for enrichment into plutonium, to the nuclear energy industries of other countries, so, potentially, giving weapons grade materials to the highest bidders, according to Greenpeace, the Green Party, Friends of the Earth, the International Atomic Energy Authority, and Canterbury’s Conservative M.P., Julian Brazier.

The scandalous photograph of a train carrying nuclear flasks over a viaduct, one hundred feet above Folkestone town centre, when the flasks in question had only been drop-tested from 30 feet and the structural safety of the viaduct had been thrown into doubt by British Rail and independent engineers, caused alarm amongst activists, backed by national and international organisation. After a flurry of local protest and letters in the press, towards the end of 1994, B.N.F.L. announced that the traffic through Kent was to be stopped.

10.1.3.2. Dungeness.

In November 1991 Greenpeace nationally produced a leaflet exposing the safety record of the Dungeness A Magnox nuclear power station at the tip of Romney Marsh. This leaflet was

still being used by the local activists during the course of my fieldwork. The leaflet cited the government's nuclear safety watchdog, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (N.I.I.) expressing concern over the welding around the reactor core. The whole core, contained in solid concrete, cannot be opened up for examination or repair, while the intense heat and radioactivity inside the core ensures that if the outer welds have been corrupted, then the inner welds, and even the concrete, will be heavily compromised, brittle and aged.

Opened in 1965, the technology is older and designed to have a 25 year working life. The cost of decommissioning the station, estimated as perhaps as much as two billion pounds, as Nuclear Electric, the company within B.N.F.L. that runs Dungeness, attempted to defend the cost-effectiveness of nuclear energy, would blow the company out of the economic arena altogether, so the company has kept the plant running, decreasing the level of energy production each year, but still operating the station in the full knowledge that the protective environment around the reactor is gradually disintegrating. B.N.F.L. and nuclear electric have thus engaged in an ongoing containment policy of publicity and pollution. Greenpeace, alongside other global activists, have repeatedly demanded immediate decommissioning of the station, routinely the site of scares about the condition of its superstructure.

Some local activists, not satisfied with either Greenpeace's publicity campaign or the campaign of denials and trumpeted improvements from the plant, organized a stunt to "close down" the site. While not operating as "Greenpeace" most of the activists were Greenpeace members, thought they kept the group treasurer and chair in the dark. Under the banner of "Kent Against a Radioactive Environment" (K.A.R.E.) the half-dozen activists collected white boiler suits, masks, oil drums, chains and a transit van. The barrels were painted yellow, radioactivity signs added, and filled with concrete. The activists would meet up after Greenpeace meetings to train in empty car parks in the middle of the night, unloading the barrels from the van, lining them up, and then chaining themselves in a line between them.

At 8 a.m. on March 4th 1994 the team drove up to the front gate of the Dungeness complex, chained the gates together, and then chained themselves barrel-person-barrel across the entrance road, to prevent the morning shift entering. While staff easily entered through back gates, and the police got activists to unchain themselves without arrests, the event gained

publicity about safety at the station, and for the campaign to close it. It was felt by the activists that the event, which had been in fact organised nationally to coincide with blockades outside other stations across the country, at least indicated to the management of the plant that they were under constant observation. At the end of 1994 the station was temporarily closed for tests. The Advanced Gas Cooled reactor next to it, Dungeness B, which has only been open since the mid 1980's was also closed, because of similar faults discovered in its welding, only reopening in mid 1995. Whilst it would be impossible to claim a direct and immediate success, activists could claim to have "told you so".

10.1.3.3. No Way Norway.

The Greenpeace International campaign to isolate Norway over its decision to resume "scientific whaling" caused tensions within the local group over what counts as success, and whether Greenpeace was going soft, "holding the line" with quasi-victories, publicity stunts and smooth media work, rather than assertive and confrontational tactics to achieve more.

Greenpeace can justly claim the key role in the decision of the International Whaling Commission in 1982 to suspend all commercial whaling from 1986. Since then Greenpeace has campaigned to defend the moratorium. With the Japanese fleet in the Antarctic, and the Norwegians in the North Atlantic threatening to resume commercial whaling, and flouting regulations, under the auspices of "Scientific Whaling", the I.W.C. conference in May 1994, in Mexico, looked as though it might collapse in disarray, leaving no regulative body.

The American Government proposed "Revised Management Plan" (R.M.P.), in the event of the I.W.C. collapsing, suggested a quota system for whaling rights enabling whaling nations to remain within the "international consensus". Such a play to the lowest common denominator was condemned by Greenpeace, although reports fed to The Observer suggested that Greenpeace had given approval to the American plan as a last ditch measure. Greenpeace deny this ⁷³.

Greenpeace organised an international day of action on the 30th of April 1994 to draw attention to its "No Way Norway! Stop the Bloody Whaling" campaign. The boycott

⁷³ The issue of dirty tricks campaigns against Greenpeace came up a number of times in the Canterbury Greenpeace newsletter, with exposes at local, national and international levels.

focused on Norwegian seafood products and holidays in Norway, the U.K. being Norway's largest export destination. So on the 30th of April around a dozen local activists gave out leaflets, asked people to send printed postcards, declaring refusal to buy Norwegian goods, and placed stickers on Norwegian holiday brochures. 140 postcards were sent off to the Norwegian Tourist Board from Canterbury, and this was replicated across Britain, Europe and the world. Greenpeace claims that the boycott was costing the Norwegian economy £70 million per year, vastly greater than its whaling benefits. In May it was announced that the I.W.C. had upheld the 1986 moratorium. It also voted to set up a whale sanctuary in the Antarctic by a majority of 23:1 (Japan) with Norway abstaining. Japan, at a stroke, lost its entire hunting ground. Nevertheless the decision did not enforce Norwegian suspension of whaling, not questioning Norwegian "Scientific" grounds for "Limited" culling, in what amounts, in Greenpeace's view, to commercial whaling. .

This led some local activists to feel Greenpeace's campaign failed. Whilst it had been Greenpeace's initial suggestion that the Antarctic, where 80% of the world's surviving whale population are believed to live and breed, be made into a sanctuary, and this had been adopted by the I.W.C., all the efforts of the local activists had been on the issue of Norway. Though Greenpeace International claimed the line had been held, Norwegian resumption being contained, the line appeared one beyond which Norway could whale with impunity. It seemed to some local activists that all their effort had achieved no change, while all the changes had been no thanks to them. These activists felt demoralized and saw Greenpeace's celebrations over "holding the line" as hollow. The centre failed to persuade the local group of their valuable role, despite sending a delegate down from London to cheer them up. This delegate in fact came to the same meeting (in November 1994) at which a new group coordinator was selected, someone who later (in 1995) dis-affiliated the local group from Greenpeace and set up a branch of Earth First!.

In June 1996 this particular individual suggested that while Greenpeace had offered the nominal opportunity for local groups to become more active in campaign work in their local areas from late 1994, this had largely been a nominal improvement in scope for action, and he suggested that it did not satisfy his own sense of urgency over issues, such as road building, that were going on under his nose. The Greenpeace group gradually transformed itself into an anti-roads campaign group from early 1995, only retaining residual vestiges of

Greenpeace identification (apart from a brief spell of stalls against Shell over Brent Spa and the execution of Ken Sarowira in Nigeria - though on the latter Greenpeace said little, its main focus being at that moment in the Pacific).

10.1.3.4. Toxic Waste.

In the early months of 1994 the local support group were involved with Greenpeace's international campaign to shore up the loopholes in the Basel convention on the export of toxic wastes from O.E.C.D. countries to poorer nations, and in particular the export of mercury waste by Thor Chemicals. On March 16th 1994 the Greenpeace "Toxic Waste Tour" staged a meeting in Margate's Lonsdale Hotel to discuss with local people the case of Thor Chemicals. In January 1994 a number of former Thor employees, which closed its mercury recycling operations in Margate in 1987 (following investigations by the Health and Safety Executive), began legal proceedings to gain access to their company medical records.

The company, on leaving Margate, simply increased its operations in South Africa, where more than a quarter of the workforce at its plant near Durban suffered from mercury poisoning; two having died from brain damage. Unfortunately for Thor Chemicals, the election of an A.N.C. government meant mistreatment of black employees has ceased to be a matter of government indifference. The A.N.C., with scientists and doctors from Greenpeace, found the waters of the river Mngeweni, supplying water to Durban, contained mercury emissions 8000 times what the U.S. government considers safe.

Since then the A.N.C., with the help of Greenpeace, has pressed charges against three of the plant's senior directors for culpable homicide, in relation to the deaths of employees Peter Cele and Frank Shange. In 1993-4 during an inspection of the Cato Ridge site delegates from the A.N.C. discovered a stockpile of approximately 16000 barrels of mercury waste. Greenpeace claimed that company records showed, over half the waste had originated in the U.K.. Greenpeace demanded the waste be immediately returned to the U.K. and that the plant be closed. Greenpeace also campaigned for the release of medical files from the Margate plant. When Thor advertised for secretarial staff for the Kent site in early 1994, it was suspected the company was preparing for expulsion from South Africa.

This is only one of many hundreds of examples in the global trade in toxic waste, but one which raises the issue of interpenetration of global and local environments for people in East Kent, as well as difficulties in tracking, across time and space, flows of waste as they evade regulation finding the cheapest available option, without regard for human welfare.

The company refuses to release medical files, making it impossible to prove they knew about any adverse health effects on employees, effects that are now being diagnosed by G.P.s, but which cannot be directly attributed to mercury poisoning, as mercury leaches out of the body after a number of years leaving only the effects on brain and nervous system.

The company had successfully put temporal and spatial distance between its actions and their consequences. Greenpeace's resources were essential in revealing the hidden connections, making the space-time extensions of cause and effect beyond the here and now. The example (on page 1) of tonnes of toxic waste being shipped to Hong-Kong under the label of "Fertilizer" clearly demonstrated the incapacity of port authorities to regulate the coordinated actions of waste traders at a local level. Locality loses its specificity, as site of authentic action and experience, when merely a switching station in the flow of trans-national systems.

Greenpeace U.K. activists trailed lorries leaving known producers of mercury waste to their destinations at various U.K. ports. Without such action it would be impossible to know what was being exported under the rainbow of creative naming strategies used by companies at ports to evade regulations and responsibility. The U.K. government decided regulation of such activities should be left to local authorities to enforce. With national monitoring diminished, companies have a freer hand in space-time displacement. Local authorities have neither resources nor expertise to act coherently, and central government's decanting of monitoring responsibilities to local actors without the power to enforce them undermined its own 1990 Environment Protection Act (not accidentally it is suggested by Greenpeace).

Because "toxic waste" is not classified as a "dangerous substance" (for transit) there is no requirement to notify local councils of what is being transported through their areas. Sealed containers pass through Kent ports daily and, it is difficult for effective action to be taken, as authorities can ill afford to hold up freight traffic as each cargo is inspected. Due to legal protection of "commercial confidentiality" it is not possible to enforce disclosure of what

companies known to be producing toxic waste do with their waste, as long as they do not cause a pollution problem within Britain. Cargos mislabelled for transit, passing through several intermediate carriers, often paper companies that merely act as screens, are almost impossible to trace without physical tracking. As such it requires an immense investigative commitment across time and space, transcending local action. The A.N.C. have suggested they will ban mercury imports, though economic pressure may squeeze this commitment. The shipment from Medway to Hong-Kong suggests markets are easily found.

While technologies exist to recycle more safely in the O.E.C.D. countries, cost and ease makes export cheaper. As long as production of toxic substances goes on at present rates so the incentives will remain. Thor is only one link in the chain, as are the localities through which traffic flows. The complete ignorance of the local Greenpeace supporters of the activities of Thor Chemicals up until the invitation by Greenpeace U.K. to help organise the meeting, or of the legal action brought by former employees, is again indicative of the near invisibility of global processes on the ground. The local support group was in no position to offer support to that campaign after the nationally organized meeting, as local activists were not sufficiently qualified, coordinated or resourced.

10.1.4. Local Actions without Translocal Coordination.

10.1.4.1. Roads.

While Greenpeace, nationally and locally, over the 1993-4 period became more interested in road traffic and road building, in particular the European transport ministers' plans for a "Trans-European Road Network", I have dealt with the issue in more detail in the transport chapter. It only remains here to point out again the difficulty of local activists developing strategies to challenge policies and practices that have their origins in trans-local systems. Whilst activists to the north of Canterbury opposed the development of the A299 Thanet Way Whitstable-Herne Bay by-pass, and activists to the south of Canterbury opposed the A259 Dymchurch by-pass, coherent opposition was not forthcoming.

10.1.4.2. Lyminge Forest.

Lyminge forest has been discussed at greater length in the section on conservation aesthetics. The local Greenpeace group were strongly opposed to the scheme but were unable to maintain a coherent opposition campaign. With greater levels of planning on the part of the

developers, and their ability to divide local residents (on the issue of jobs), local councillors (with large cash payments made to some of them, for land), as well as local conservation groups (with proposals for funded nature reserves and conservation projects), Rank isolated the environmentalists and local opposition.

Looked at from the reverse angle the developers had proposed a far more environmentally friendly package than would have been likely in the absence of an opposition campaign. Nevertheless the ability of Rank to operate with coherence across time and space, demonstrates yet again the fact that while localized actor networks can affect local decisions, they are only able to negotiate the implementation of larger actors' strategic plans, rather than socially constructing reality on their own terms. The Canterbury Greenpeace group went into moth-balls over the summer of 1994, with the core activists unable to be in the same place at the same time often enough to hold the group together. By the time order had been restored, Rank had already won planning permission from Shepway District Council. It was only due to the company's wider financial difficulties, at a time when protest was minimal, that Rank volunteered to suspend development of the site until the Secretary of State gives full and formal approval to the scheme, something the company was not obliged to do.

10.1.4.3. Orimulsion.

The "crunch" issue for the local Greenpeace group was the burning of orimulsion at Richborough power station, on the coast 13 miles East of Canterbury. Orimulsion contains high levels of sulphur, 156 tonnes of sulphur dioxide being released from the station, making 25 million litres of sulphuric acid in the atmosphere, each day according to Thanet Friends of the Earth. Heavy metals, greenhouse gases, health implications and rainforest destruction in Venezuela, plus neglect of renewable alternatives became issues as did *whether this* was a scandal or just normal for a fossil fuel power station, or both.

Orimulsion is a bitumen/water emulsion developed by the Venezuelan government with the British Petroleum subsidiary B.P. Bitor. B.P. withdrew from the consortium in January 1992, when Her Majesty's Inspectorate for Pollution refused licences to National Power to burn the fuel at two previously oil powered stations, in Pembroke and Padiham. However PowerGen was able to gain permission from the H.M.I.P. to burn orimulsion at

Richborough and Ince (in Cheshire) in early 1993. Because Powergen had started experimental testing of orimulsion in 1990, prior to the coming into force of the government's "Integrated Pollution Control" (I.P.C.) public register, part of the policy package outlined in the Environment Protection Act, the company could claim burning orimulsion at Richborough constituted an "existing process" - and so did not have to comply, until 1998, with the more stringent plant standards which were used to turn down National Power's two bids. National Power were told they would have to fit additional Sulphur Dioxide abatement equipment to its plants at Pembroke and Padiham in order to gain orimulsion burning licences. PowerGen did not have any such obligation at either of its two sites.

The H.M.I.P. claim that because Richborough is not close to other carbon fuel power stations it can be safely permitted to exceed its "National Plan" quota for SO₂ emissions by 50% as there is a large "unpolluted" area around the station. The "National Plan" is supposed to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions from combustion plants, but economic pressure ensures limits are set close to existing output levels, and only apply to stations within the I.P.C. regulations. Its quota allowed it to expand, not reduce, its SO₂ emissions.

The additional 50% allowed Richborough to push its sulphur emissions ceiling from 17000 tonnes per year to 25500 tonnes. The station was already emitting 19950 tonnes per year, exceeding its prior quota, but within the new. The company made good use of its new ability to claim its emissions were well within the limits set by the H.M.I.P. Local protesters were not so impressed with the argument that the area's relatively clean air, could tolerate an extra 50% SO₂ emission. Local campaigners felt what was not good enough for Pembroke was not good enough for their lungs. Powergen and National Power claim that it would be commercially damaging to reveal both their future abatement programmes and past monitoring of emissions (interesting since they are a duopoly), fuelling speculation that they have something to hide. Powergen, in the case of Richborough, was keen to control the release and production of information about orimulsion burning to channels it could control. Thus it refused to jointly fund monitoring of air quality with K.C.C. and instead produced its own figures. Local campaigners felt deceived, but could not circumvent the wall of corporate and central government information tailoring and management. The next few pages attempt to outline the attempts that were made, the window of opportunity the local support group

sought to campaign through, and finally the closure of that window.

The relationship between the H.M.I.P., Power Gen, B.P. Bitor, "Independent Consultants", and Conservative government ministers is an area for crucial investigation. In a letter to Canterbury's Greenpeace coordinator (March 1994), the M.P. for South Thanet, where Richborough is located, the then junior minister, Jonathan Aitken, claimed; "H.M.I.P. is independent of both government and industry. Its scientists and pollution experts are respected throughout the world and they would certainly not have allowed the burning of orimulsion at Richborough, or anywhere else, if they had not been totally satisfied of its environmental acceptability".

However, as McCormick (1991, p. 60) points out, since the resignation of the three chief H.M.I.P. scientists in 1989 due to government interference, it has been seen by most environmentalists as a body staffed and directed by Department of the Environment appointees whose first task is to balance the government's economic priorities with its environmental proclamations. Its deployment as "independent arbiter" between environmentalists and corporate/state interests is seen as a disarming mechanism, by which the state lays claim to "truth" in its own interest, while appearing to take recourse to an impartial third party. Protesters find they are out-manouvered when their claims are countered by an "objective" judgement which coincides with their opponent's view.

Initially letters of protest in the local press came from residents around the station whose car paint work had been damaged, and whose clothes, hanging out to dry, had been soot ridden by a shower/cloud of dust emanating from the station at around the time Richborough began to burn orimulsion. Fears were added to by the complaints of the owners of a car import storage park whose new cars also received paint work damage, as well as other commercial interests in the area. The soot deposits were first recorded at the very end of 1992 and the letters began in early 1993. It was in summer 1993 that the very small Thanet Friends of the Earth produced a leaflet outlining the complaints and giving details of the toxic contents of the fuel. However it was only in late 1993 that the County Council expressed concern.

In October 1994 "An Environmental Report of the Use of Orimulsion at Richborough

Power Station For Kent County Council: Final Report” was Submitted to K.C.C. County Planning Officer and the next month saw its presentation to the environmental sub-committee under the heading “Orimulsion Burning at Richborough Summary: “Reporting the conclusions of an independent assessment of the environmental impact of orimulsion burning at Richborough”, classified unrestricted.” These reports had been the result of a decision by the council sub-committee to respond to protests. The committee had written to the D. o. E. secretary of State asking for an environmental assessment and for the results to be made public. This led to a council press release on November 12th 1993 entitled: “Call for investigation into controversial fuel” which asked for an open government investigation, relayed public anxiety, questioning the “existing process” status that had allowed Richborough to evade tighter emission standards, and expressed concern about potential pollution effects on sensitive local habitats, such as Blean Forest, the Sandwich heath-lands, the Stour Valley marsh-lands and the wetlands of Pegwell Bay. This press release led to an angry letter from Jonathan Aitken, claiming the manager at Richborough, Mr Arthur Purdy, had not been consulted, and had only heard about the decision in the press. Mr Aitken wanted to know whether K.C.C. could demonstrate its suggestion that a potential risk to the local population existed, against the claims of the power station manager and the H.M.I.P..

Even more unusual was the letter sent, by a company calling itself “Parliamentary Monitoring Services”, to the council after the press release. The company is a commercial lobby agent, working, in this instance, for the Kent Chamber of Commerce. The letter, to the council’s Director of Corporate Communication adopts a highly personal and yet bullying style: “You may have noticed from the attached [newspaper clipping] that fun and games are in prospect over Richborough Power Station as a result of a K.C.C. report, the authenticity of which must be highly doubtful. I have seen the monitoring figures and can assure you that Richborough is one of the cleanest power stations in Britain. We have now gained Powergen’s agreement to make these more widely available and if your officers did not take advantage of an earlier offer to inspect them, they would be wise to do so now. They should contact Arthur Purdy if they wish to do so, mentioning my name. Jonathan Aitken is hopping mad over this and is likely to take action at the highest level. Some of us believe K.C.C. should be creating local jobs, not putting them at risk.” Douglas Smith

The same Douglas Smith wrote a biting letter to the East Kent Mercury (January 1994),

attempting to discredit the councillors who had called for an investigation. In response to Jonathan Aitken and Mr Smith, Robin Thompson, County Planning Officer, wrote: "I can assure you that the officer who prepared the report discussed orimulsion burning at Richborough with Arthur Purdy (and other station staff) both prior to the report being prepared and some twelve months ago when public concern about local sooty deposits was first brought to the attention of the county council."

While pointing out the original report's findings that the station's emissions of nitrous oxide and particulates were superior to heavy fuel oil or coal burning emissions in the past, and whilst Dover District Council had given the station a "clean bill of health", Mr Thompson pointed out that this decision had been made without reference to vanadium pentoxide and nickel oxide. "My report states that the former is toxic and the latter carcinogenic but is unable to comment on the possible impact in East Kent because of the absence of data. Also the Dover DC Committee did not look at the cumulative impact of the increased levels of SO₂ Richborough is now permitted to burn."

"A copy of the report was sent to Mr Purdy prior to the KCC Committee meeting. Indeed Mr Purdy provided some emissions data which were distributed to all members before Committee. A key issue which KCC Members reflected in their decision is why H.M.I.P. refused National Power a licence to burn Orimulsion at Pembroke and Padiham in late 1992 for environmental reasons but gave a licence to Power Gen to burn the same fuel at Richborough some six months later without demanding an environmental assessment..." "Further, it is not clear why, if Richborough must fit flue gas desulphurization equipment by 1998 because of its detrimental effect on local and global environments, it must not do so immediately, as would have been the case if it had been a new process or plant."

It was from late 1993, with the issue in the local press, and with some degree of dispute between institutional actors, that the Canterbury Greenpeace support group began to take up the issue. It put the issue at the top of its local agenda from November 1993 until the October 1994 protest outside the gates of the station. The group wrote regular letters to local M.P.s, councillors, the press and to the Secretary of State for the Environment, expressing concern and collecting literature and cuttings on orimulsion.

It was also after these exchanges that the County Council commissioned its “independent” report, to defuse criticisms from Conservative politicians, business people and the likes of Mr Douglas Smith. This “independent” assessment was conducted by Dr. Lawrence Thorpe of DNV Techica. His credentials were stated as being his prior employment by both the D.o.E. and B.P. Bitor, the company that had first developed and promoted Orimulsion. The report was published at the end of October 1994, within days of the small protest outside the station which had been organized mainly by the Canterbury and Thanet Green Parties with the weak support of Canterbury Greenpeace support group (by then heavily demoralized by the inability to effect action). The university Greenpeace group was able to send a mini-bus with ten students to the event, which had only a total turnout of around thirty people. However the city group’s leading activist had felt a protest outside the station would be pointless without concrete objectives. While the event was lively, and received local media coverage, the announcement by the council only days later of its full endorsement of the station confirmed the leading Greenpeace activist’s sense that the campaign was marginal. It reinforced his decision to resign from the group shortly afterwards.

In the County Planning Officer’s preamble to the report, Robin Thompson writes; “that members can be reassured that on the basis of the information presently available there appear to be no significant local environmental problems arising from the current operation of Richborough Power Station.” However because the report had been compiled by a former employee of B.P. Bitor, it was not trusted by protesters, and many of the findings already questioned by protesters about Orimulsion are simply reiterated. The County Council accepted the report’s view that the fuel was superior to either heavy fuel oil or coal. It effectively accepted that there was no issue to investigate further. The local groups were left in the cold. Without an institutional door half open, they were without the necessary resources to challenge the report further. Interestingly the details of the report shed new light on the construction of those conclusions, used by Powergen, H.M.I.P. and government politicians, in their defence of the fuel. While the report defends these conclusions, it actually reveals some highly questionable foundations on which seemingly supportive quantitative figures were manufactured. The H.M.I.P. (1993, reproduced also in Thorpe 1994) cite figures, originally produced by the station management, for emissions at Richborough for the burning of Orimulsion and heavy fuel oil (which had been burnt at the station prior to the

switch to Orimulsion):

Release	Units	Orimulsion	Heavy Fuel Oil
SO ₂	Tonnes/day	limited to 156	Limited to 156
SO ₃	v ppm	<5	15
Particulates	mg/m ³	35	140
Oxides of Nitrogen v	ppg	240	460
Vanadium	mg/m ³	7	11
Nickel	mg/m ³	1	2

The figures seem to suggest the superiority of Orimulsion. However, these figures are constructed in a highly misleading fashion. Before heavy fuel oil Richborough had burnt coal. The report outlines figures for the unabated pollution emissions of the three fuels.

For Unabated Flue Gas Emissions:

	Orimulsion	Coal	Heavy Fuel Oil
SO ₂ (mg/Nm ³)	6500	4240	5010
NO _x (mg/Nm ³)	990	1200-1400	1025
HCl (mg/Nm ³)	6	340	3
Particulates (mg/Nm ³)	275	8000	70-450

Typical Unabated Emissions per GJe of energy Produced:

SO ₂ (Kg/GJe)	5.3	3.6	3.4
NO _x (Kg/GJe)	0.81	1.1	0.77
Particulates (Kg/GJe)	0.23	7.9	0.06
CO ₂ (Kg/GJe)	162	198	159

What these figures demonstrate is that in terms of pollution per unit of energy produced Orimulsion is in all respects inferior to heavy fuel oil, though better in most respects than U.K. coal, being inferior to both in emissions of SO₂. Other figures buried in the report show similar disparities for most heavy metals when analysed in terms of unabated emissions per unit of energy produced. What allows the figures reproduced by the H.M.I.P. to appear as they do, a ringing endorsement of Orimulsion, over its two prior rivals, is that

the technologies have changed radically, for coal before the early 1970s and for heavy fuel oil until the 1990s. The report concludes "Orimulsion burning creates greater emissions of SO₂ per unit of electricity than for most other fuels. However the emissions of oxides of nitrogen and particulates are much lower than when the plant was burning coal or heavy fuel oil...it is likely that current emissions of Vanadium and Nickel for Richborough Power Station are significantly lower than when the plant was burning either coal or heavy fuel oil."

Richborough was built and commissioned in 1962-3 for burning coal from the Kent coalfields converting to use heavy fuel oil in 1971 and then to Orimulsion in 1990-91. During the conversion to use of Orimulsion the station underwent upgrading of its burners and its electro-static precipitators, increasing its capacity to limit emissions of nitrous oxides and particulates. Coal produces vastly more particulates and stations are fitted with electrostatic precipitators to extract 80% of it. Oil powered stations do not have E.S.P.'s and so when compared to orimulsion burning in stations fitted with E.S.P.'s the figures for Oil come off worse. If oil stations had E.S.P.'s they would win hands down. The H.M.I.P. figures are based on present applications of technology, not best available alternatives.

As for sulphur dioxide, Orimulsion has a higher sulphur content than coal and almost all forms of heavy fuel oil, its sulphur content, relative to its calorific value is even worse. This goes some way to explain the decision to allow Richborough to emit an extra 50% sulphur dioxide. As for vanadium and nickel by weight orimulsion comes out far worse in comparison to U.K. coal and heavy fuel oil. Again the comparisons made with prior figures for the station ignore the 1990 upgrading of the E.S.P.'s. If heavy fuel oil was burnt at Richborough with present technology, it would be the least polluting.

The report states; "Orimulsion will produce a higher SO₂ emission than other fuels. Due to the use of E.S.P.'s particulates would be at their lowest and it is likely that Vanadium and nickel would be at their lowest when the station is burning Orimulsion [now that the technology has been upgraded- i.e. now that like is not being compared with like]. NOx would also be lowest due to the introduction of low NOx burners." ⁷⁴

⁷⁴again introduced in 1990 and, if used with heavy fuel oil, would have been even more efficient

All in all the report claims to vindicate the view that the station today is no greater threat than it was before. However, all claims about the superiority of orimulsion are shown to be manufactured artifacts of a particular way of presenting the evidence. This leaves the picture more complex, with partial reduction in emissions, enabled by the application of superior technology to an inferior fuel. Whilst the deterioration may not have been as dramatic as protesters feared, the chance of a major improvement through the application of superior technology was lost. An inferior fuel was almost brought up to scratch.

While the scare over heavy metals was down-played by claims that the technological improvements would strip the toxic substances out of the smoke released to a greater extent, storage of what then remains in the solid waste left over, much more heavily laced with toxins, becomes a major, though scarcely addressed issue. While it was claimed by the station that the initial panic, triggered by the stripping off of paint-work from cars in 1992, was caused by residues from the old oil burning period dislodged by vibration caused by a faulty fan motor in the flue, the question might be asked exactly what would happen if residues from Orimulsion, a much more heady cocktail of toxins, were to be similarly “dislodged” in the future, either into the air or the water around the plant.

The final report, itself claiming to be independent, but very much addressing itself to the task of vindicating the new fuel, left protesters little space in which to act. They were in no position to stand up to large corporate interests, the D.o.E. and the H.M.I.P., and with K.C.C. willing to accept the findings of the report, not wanting more confrontations and fearing threats from government and corporate lobbies, the initial platform that the protesters had been able to use, the call by K.C.C. for a full environmental assessment, had been turned into an exercise in vindicating the company. Controlling the expertise and the knowledge of past facts and figures the company and its associates conducted an effective operation to manage the presentation of facts to suit their case. Having detached themselves from Greenpeace centre in enacting the anti-Orimulsion campaign without central clearance and control, the local activists, lacking respected and resourced organisations to generate alternative data and to publicise it effectively, were out-manouvered both in generating “data” and proposing policy.

Ironically, the station will close in 1998 after all. It would seem that the European Union regulations on de-sulphurization (whose enforcement had been delayed to 1998 by the British government's Environmental Protection Act's "existing practices" loop-hole) render the station financially unattractive after the date by which time the necessary improvements must be made. Powergen claim excess capacity renders the station unnecessary. Again local protesters got what they wanted, even if their trans-local opponent was in the end defeated by an even greater trans-local actor, and not the local activists themselves. Big fish eat little fish, and it would seem that big fish are eaten only by very big fish indeed.

10.1.5. Conclusions.

Local leadership and the need for resources, in terms of information, money and personnel to match those laid against campaigns, bring out the essential contradiction within an organization that is both bureaucratic and yet offers scope for local involvement within dynamic and radical actions. Local activists were not in a position to take effective action except when backed, and yet at the same time the structures and rules which enable such a back up to exist is often seen as a negative burden. Greenpeace national and international campaigns were able, with at least as much success as its opponents, to work within the media system of presentation at at least three levels: that of the visible event, that of the emotive image and argument, and finally at the level of "hard" science. When members attempted local campaigns they were scientifically out-done, visually lacking and rhetorically unconvincing.

The group coordinator's departure after banging his head against a "brick wall" illustrated the sense of local actors defeated by what appeared to be impervious structure. "They" became "it", an object, that which exists as an external constraint, and which is able to enforce its actions, in its own terms. While this objecthood can be shown to be the result of a particular set of coordinated actions, the resulting externality, the extent to which the local actors failed to undercut its construction, gave the impression of "structure". The common sense counterpositioning of agency and structure, the local versus the global, and of the grass roots versus the dead hand of money-grabbing and order-giving central authority led to dislocation rather than any substantive autonomy.

10.2. Local Friends of the Earth.

10.2.1. Introduction.

While “local” Friends of the Earth groups exist in Canterbury, Thanet, and Folkestone, my focus here is the activity of the Canterbury groups and their interaction with the others. While the Thanet group was fairly passive, the Folkestone group was more active, and without a Greenpeace group in the Shepway (Folkestone) area, F.o.E. was the primary “environmental protest group”. While Shepway F.o.E. was better organized than the Canterbury group, the issue is confused because the Canterbury F.o.E. was not the most active F.O.E. group in Canterbury. The Canterbury F.o.E. “Water Working Group” was established by a particularly competent activist who opposed plans to flood a valley just north of Canterbury to create a reservoir. However this group became engaged with other issues. The WWG was instrumental in founding Kent’s F.o.E. Network.

The Kent Structure Plan, Third Review and Examination in Public, became a focus around which the Kent network, through the Water Working Group, attempted to put forward a county-wide position, to challenge the development of Kent into a transit route between London and mainland Europe. Other issues, themselves touched on within the structure plan debate, included the A259 Dymchurch bypass (see chapter 8), and the issue of the Broad Oak Reservoir. Cycling issues also got taken up around the time of the Tour de France’s Kent stage, in July 1994, while new leadership within the Canterbury town group alienated older, more “conservative” members, who disliked “Greenpeace-ization” by younger, allegedly more “confrontational” members. However the “young” F.o.E. faced the same problem - lack of resources and coordination. The group’s time, money and transport did not, unlike the issues being addressed, stretch across the region. The biggest difficulty was that the issues addressed locally had roots beyond the reach of local activists, who found themselves arriving too late, ill equipped or simply out-manouvered. These issues are developed under three headings: i) The Kent Structure Plan, Examination in Public; ii) Water Matters, From Broad Oak to K Factors; and iii) Leadership and direction, autonomy and coordination. Lyminge Forest and nuclear waste/Dungeness nuclear power station(s) were joint issues between F.o.E and others addressed elsewhere.

Canterbury F.O.E. met each month. At the first meeting I attended (14/10/93) there were four prior members and four first timers. The first announcement was that the coordinator

was no longer willing to chair the group. None of the others wanted the post. The new arrivals were told if they wanted things done they would have to do it themselves. At the next meeting (11/11/93) of the four first timers, I was the only one to return. The group carried on meeting each month but nothing was achieved. Only because I phoned all groups listed in the Canterbury and District Environmental Network newsletter did I hear about the Water Working Group. Having met the coordinator, I was invited to a meeting (27th February 1994), held at the University, between the W.W.G. and members of the newly developing Kent Friends of the Earth Network, to discuss submissions to Kent County Council's Structure Plan Examination in Public.

10.2.2. The Kent Structure Plan.

The Structure Plan is a provisional 20 year framework for county council priorities and development designed to coordinate with the various district council local plans. The second structure plan, approved in 1990, looking ahead to the 21st century, took as its overriding priority economic development. The third review was initiated in 1990 with a consultation draft replacement issued in June 1992. Public consultation was invited from June to September 1992 after which "consideration" was given to the 800 plus representations submitted by the "public". The Deposit of a Draft Replacement Structure Plan in May 1993 gave the public six weeks to lodge objections and representations. A selection of those were invited to the April 1994 Structure Plan Examination in Public.

Invitations were made in accordance with the county planners' criteria of "interest". Many issues and voices had been ignored because they did not address issues that county planners felt to be "in need of clarification". After the June 1992 consultation draft numerous F.o.E. groups across Kent made submissions across a wide range of distinct district and county-wide issues. However, when the May 1993 Draft Replacement Structure Plan was put on deposit, it appeared that despite constant reference to "sustainable development", the F.o.E. objections, on water use and abuse, housing development, transportation, out of town shopping, and loopholes had been ignored.

Kent F.o.E. network and all the local F.o.E. groups that had subsequent objections to the May 1993 draft were not invited to the E.I.P.. Only the Canterbury Water Working Group

was. Kent F.o.E. Network and local groups had to operate through the Water Working Group. The leading activist, almost single handedly, prepared a dense, point by point, critique of the May 1993 draft, and local groups could hang whatever they saw fit around its skeletal frame. However, lack of resources meant only focusing on the issue of balance “between sustainability and development” (issue one in the E.I.P. timetable) and transport (issue 5). The E.I.P. lasted three weeks, and activists didn’t have resources to sit through the whole event. The examination was to be held in Maidstone, which, for Canterbury activists, was not convenient. Getting ready to present was a major undertaking. The documentation alone was daunting.

The Kent F.o.E. Network attempted to coordinate local groups and activists in developing presentations. However, as the co-ordinator, Heather Knight, pointed out, at the February 27th meeting, Kent-wide coordination was slow and patchy. She admitted that the “Network” was in “a fair degree of chaos”. She explained that most of the local “groups” were made up of individual “hyper-activists” with their own projects and agendas; communication between activists was poor.

I suggested a Greenpeace style telephone tree. This was not well received. People exchanged numbers on an ad-hoc basis afterwards. Heather was keen to involve as many groups as possible in the formulation of the E.I.P. presentations, but admitted paper membership rarely amounted to substantive involvement. Sometimes groups affiliated to the network had dissolved leaving nobody to inform the network of their non-existence. Activists tended to stick to their patch. They were not keen to lose themselves in the alien environment of county bureaucracy. As much policy determining local developments occurs at county level and above, this was an extreme debilitation. However, with lack of coordination above the small, local and interpersonal, such attitudes became self-sustaining.

Such sporadic coordination rendered comprehensive involvement impossible. The W.W.G. organizer coordinated the presentation on the issue of sustainable development, while Shepway F.o.E. (with the W.W.G.) put together the transport presentation. People who could get along were welcome, but regular county-wide meetings were not envisaged. The transportation working group arranged to meet on March 6th 1994, the sustainable development group on the 10th, both at the University of Kent.

The real difficulty in the transport working group was finding an angle from which to enter the debate at a level county planners have power to act. Central government policies had removed county council control over public transport, and councils were left to bid for central government funds for road building schemes that fitted central government policy and serviced “inward investors”.

Kent County Council’s transport policy was to mitigate increasing private vehicle use in and across the county. It claimed powerlessness to do otherwise. Whilst cycling and walking, as well as using public transport was to be “encouraged and promoted”, the funds available for these schemes were minute relative to the budgets for road building. The county council could not directly challenge central government policy. While the Plan “recognised that providing fully for the private motor car is no longer a sustainable long term strategy” the council was committed to satisfying projected traffic demand, even when such accelerated demand may itself be an artifact of increasing road supply.

Being a county with 18 towns of more than 15000 inhabitants, without a centre, Kent has a sprawling road structure, and its position between London and mainland Europe makes it a natural transit/gateway. The planners distinguish primary routes, mainly trans-county freight routes, and secondary routes, used mainly by local people. It was argued that Kent cannot ban traffic through the county in order to restrict demand, so it must only manage the supply of roads to best cope with this “externally determined demand” to avoid forcing trans-county traffic off the primary routes onto the secondary, local, road network.

How to address national and international transport policy within a county planning debate without sounding abstract, or reducing it to a collection of localized complaints, about bus timetables, rail line faults, lack of specific cycle routes, became the major headache for the F.o.E. transport group. The March 6th meeting produced a shopping list of issues, none effectively targeted at the county planners. The structure plan “admitted” the heart of the real issues lay beyond the local, exactly as the F.o.E. group felt, making it difficult to challenge.

The critique took the form of a close reading of the text, questioning specific instances of

“demonstrated need”, “normally”, “will be encouraged”, “will be “permitted””, “given full account”, etc, showing where loopholes left open wide space for unspecified future development without proper restraints “if a pressing need arose”. The critique lacked substantive alternatives effectable at county level given existing external pressures.

The working group looking into Issue One, the balance between sustainability and development, met on March 10th, and faced similar difficulties; county planners were heavily constrained by pressure from investors and a government which allowed companies to take councils to the High Court if policies prejudiced economic “efficiency”. The group concluded that: “We are in general agreement with the policies in the Structure Plan [the strategy policy statements at least, if not the actual proposals] most of which support our principles. Our main serious concern is that K.C.C. is not abiding by the present policies... We see no point in K.C.C. producing plans, forcing local people to spend a great deal of time and effort, and involving important national experts at great expense (as at the E.I.P.). if the county is going to ignore them - or, worse, is prepared to ride roughshod over its people and their environment” (F.o.E. covering letter to the E.I.P. March 1994).

The Third Review Draft (1993, p. 14-15) Strategy Policies 1-3 read as follows:

Policy S1. “Local planning authorities will seek to achieve a sustainable pattern and form of development, which will facilitate the conservation of energy and other natural resources, and minimise pollution.”

Policy S2. “The quality of Kent’s environment, including the visual, aural, ecological, historic, atmospheric, and water environments, will be conserved and enhanced, and measures will be taken to minimise any adverse impacts arising from development and land use change.”

Policy S3. “It is strategic policy to stimulate economic activity and employment in Kent by the growth of existing industry and commerce and the attraction of new forms, capitalising on Kent’s particular relationship with mainland Europe. Provision for such development will be made in a manner which respects the environment. Priority will be afforded to East and North Kent.”

Drawing on the U.K. Government’s white paper “This Common Inheritance”, the European Commission’s “Fifth Action Programme Towards Sustainability” and the United Nations’

Rio Summit, the new Structure Plan proclaims a shift away from total devotion to economic development towards sustainable forms.

The local F.o.E. argued; “on balance, we perceive that the overriding emphasis [beneath the fine sounding policy soundbites] remains on the 1990 plan’s principle objective of stimulating and strengthening economic expansion.” “... it is felt by the Kent Federation that environmental issues need to have the highest priority accorded to them over and above the objective of supporting and enhancing Kent’s economic prosperity.” “The environment cannot be attended to or repaired as an after thought, such as “landscaping” ... or the “management” of small open spaces...”

While the rhetoric was fine the loopholes, qualifications and small print rendered the veneer less substantial. On March 15th an E.I.P. preliminary meeting was held. Ground rules were laid out by Mr. Justice Batho (retired) setting strict limits around the practical application of the terms debated keeping “things” within the bounds of what the county planners might find useful. After being pressed to expand the remit and discuss wider issues, from a number of protester groups, Mr Batho declared “Whither the environment”? His claim, that the “environment” could lead in all directions without natural limit, direction or conclusion, while quite valid, did not justify his assertion that the need for “order” justified his arbitrary right to delimit the uses of issues and terms.

After this preliminary meeting each F.o.E. working group met twice before the examination itself. The Issue One group, the W.W.G. organiser, I and one other person, discussed how best to remain “of interest” within the now prescribed limits. It was felt necessary to challenge the term “balance” that pervaded submissions. Each applauded the principle of sustainability, then proclaimed how, in the interests of balance the plan needed to accommodate the particular interest they represented, commercial, electoral or environmental. Most contributors were developers, demanding “balance” as greater growth “flexibility”. F.o.E., felt the “balance” was already overbalanced towards economic growth, at the expense of the environment. Logically it was felt economic prosperity and environmental protection cannot be set one against the other. Rather one sits upon the other.

Day one set the tone for a rude awakening - distinguishing bargaining and communicating. The County Planning Officer set out the issue of balance between sustainability and economic development, asking for dialogue and understanding. He pointed to Kent's unique gateway position, its "environment of change". He counterposed prosperity and environment, but suggested reconciliation in "quality of life". Again after setting apart "human needs" and "environmental needs" he hoped the two would not remain in conflict. He then counterposed "local interest" with "wider interest" (inward investors). He suggested that these needs must be brought together.

Rapidly it became clear who was expected to fall in line with whom. The district councillors all approved the plan in general, giving differing emphasis to one side of the development/sustainability see-saw, the more prosperous giving weight to preservation and conservation, the poorer focusing on their needs for economic growth. None of the district councils made developed criticisms of the Structure Plan. On the whole, comment was seen as a formal responsibility.

The Council for the Protection of Rural England argued the strategy statements were completely out of sync with the road building plans, plans to allow 100,000 new houses in the county over the first ten years of the plan's twenty year duration (many on green-field sites), business development opportunities on green-fields, and resource, land use and pollution implications contained in the plan. The Kent Association of Amenities Societies argued the strategy statements were at odds with many of the policy initiatives contained within the substance of the plan, especially those for the proposed "East Thames Corridor", especially the encroachment onto green-field sites (in particular the siting of a shopping complex in the "strategic green lung" between Gravesend and Dartford).

The Kent Trust for Nature Conservation suggested that the transport and housing plans were un-sustainable. The King's Hill Action Group claimed Kent County Council had misquoted county rainfall averages by four inches to justify claims that extra housing would pose no environmental problems due to excess drainage or forcing water imports from other counties, a practice that already goes on at times in Kent. They were, in particular, concerned that the proposed development of a major business park within green-belted land between Maidstone and the Medway Ports was completely against the sustainability rhetoric of the

plan, especially when transport implications were accounted for. They argued the issue had been left out of the structure plan, and fed in via loopholes, which they wanted closed. The U.K.'s, and Kent's, commitment to Rio were at odds with such developments.

The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds suggested the actuality of the plan was unsustainable and that inviolable aspects of the natural environment were being weighed in the balance against short-term economic interests. They wanted far greater attention paid to distinguishing and protecting the inviolable. Short term-ism was seen as a danger. Counterposing economic development and the environment in the short term may be to the detriment of the economic appeal of a "dirty" county in the future. The R.S.P.B. suggested the aesthetic value of the county's environment was key to investor and tourist interest.

Friends of the Earth argued the constant reference to balance between environment and economy ignored the fundamental balance of the economy on the environment. Constant use of projected demand figures for housing, transport, water and waste etc was questioned, suggesting that in all these areas projected demand was not an actual demand. Actual demand for all these things could be better managed by long-sighted policies (most particularly urban housing, business and transport regeneration), rather than blind adherence to projections based on the continuation of the present policies, or lack of them. The logic of balance seemed to assume that the direction of economic development and demand were natural and unalterable, while the environment was flexible and accommodating.

Next the business representatives presented their case. They "pointed out" what they needed, to profit, and then "pointed out" that if they didn't get it, they would go elsewhere. The Port of London Authority claimed Strategy Policy 1 too "restrictive" & "onerous", too great an emphasis on protection threatened jobs. The representative demanded that the need to demonstrate "overriding need" when applying to develop an area was too restrictive. He argued that such a policy was contrary to Department of the Environment Planning Policy Guideline 7, which demands that environmental protection must not be used to hamper the "legitimate" interests of business. Legal measures would follow if Kent added restrictions.

The speaker from the Kent Chamber of Commerce started by stating his commitment to protecting the environment. But, he said, it was essential to "weigh heavily the needs of the

unemployed, the small business and the competitive economy”. “We need the other leg ...”. “We need to recognise that we are in a competitive environment”. Land use flexibility is essential. Green-field sites are cheaper to develop than old degraded sites. “Business can’t afford to pay” he argued. **“That’s the real world”**. If a factory in a green-field site can create hundreds of jobs, who will weigh the balance in favour of the field? “Kent Enterprise Initiative’s speaker demanded flexibility. “The plan moved one way, the economy moved the other”. He suggested divergence between “reality” and “the environmental issue.”

The Kent C.B.I. spokesman started by pointing out that for the first two hours of discussion, from the council officers, the issue of “wealth creation” had not been mentioned. Like a teacher, he tutored the council officers on the virtues of a dynamic economy: “A strong economy from which all else follows”. He suggested the C.B.I. supported the principle of sustainable development but was afraid that the misuse of “protection” would deter business and wealth creation.

The House Builders Federation spokesman argued balance had been replaced by an emphasis on environment over development and prosperity. He reiterated the opinion that strategy policy 1-3 and Environment Policy 1 are contrary to Department of the Environment Planning Policy Guideline 7, and suggested that housing “provision limits based on need not price may end up in the High Court if it restricts the profits of the building industry”. He demanded “quality, range and choice”. He pointed out Berkshire, Surrey and Hampshire’s attempts to implement “Allegedly Sustainable Plans” against his members interests, were overturned by the business lobby. Kent would be foolish encouraging disinvestment. The point was reiterated by other house builders’ representatives.⁷⁵

The representative for the Kings Hill developers argued that market perceptions of Kent were weak. The county had an interest in offering “locations attractive to the market”. Vincent and Gorbin’s representative (for Blue Circle Properties) warned the council not to appear unduly

⁷⁵ For example Crowdace Homes’ speaker argued economic growth was the key government policy and councils should not forget that if they didn’t want to find themselves on the wrong side of the law. Bryant Homes’ speaker suggested unemployment was the most urgent problem. Environmental protection, at the expense of economic recovery, was not acceptable “to the market”. P.P.G.’s give the market the key role. Kent’s structure plan ran the risk of falling outside these guidelines.

negative towards business and development. The speaker from the Government Office for the South East demanded that Environment Policy 1 be changed to reflect a more “balanced” assessment of business needs. The Kent Chamber of Commerce, after the meeting, released a widely printed press statement, in local newspapers across the county claiming that “jobs are in danger of being sacrificed at the altar of environmentalism”.

The councillors were faced with information from the local objectors, while the business community engaged in bargaining- give the market what “it” wants, or else! The language of “the market” as invisible hand, acted to dress “blackmail” up as objective information, about the “real world” in all its brutal truth. The competing positions - the “real” worlds of environment and economy might give cause for thought as to the nature of each claim to be an external set of forces acting on people via supposed “natural laws”. The modes of dialogue reflected opposed modes of communication, one of “care” and need, the other of power and demand. The protesters deployed no resources of power, the threat of “action” to enforce their claims. Their concerns were not translated into demands. While council officials were often sympathetic to the case being made by protesters, they were intimidated by developers. This was reflected in the remainder of the E.I.P. proceedings and in the subsequent recommendations made by the E.I.P. chair, which, while reiterating the need for balance, conceded tacitly and sometimes explicitly to the business lobby. Whilst the plan retained its strategy themes, the teeth were largely pulled. Relative differences of presentational skills and knowledge were not significant; the key was economic muscle.

The examination in public demonstrated, in stark terms, both the balance between environmental and economic interest/pressure groups, and the problematic nature of the local-ness of such “local” groups. Local business representatives were as much representing local business interests as acting as the local representatives of wider business networks. The examples given by the house builders federation spokesman of the defence of “his” members interests in Berkshire, Hampshire and Surrey clearly identified the shared strategic outlook and organisation of “his” trans-local interest group, of which he was, in the Kent context, only the local manifestation. The C.B.I., the various chambers of commerce, and an array of other business and environmental lobbies were trans-local rather than local. The balance of trans-local forces operating and integrated locally was the decisive factor. As such

the role of local planning fora in altering policy cannot be seen as in counterposition to the imposition of outside influence. Such local fora are modes of glocalisation, the integration of the particular within wider spans of action, an integration that is far more subtle and embracing than that derived from straightforward dictation of local action by central government. The trans-local does not simply contain and suppress the autonomous action of local actors, it is constitutive of them.

10.2.3. Water Matters.

“The U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change anticipates that average temperatures will rise 1.1 C [degrees] by the year 2030 and by 3.3 C by 2090. That could lead to a rise in mean sea levels by as much as 20 cm over the next thirty years or so. Although this does not sound a dangerous increase, it means that storms such as the one that hit Kent in 1953, which usually occur every 100 years, would happen on a five year cycle instead.”

in K.C.C. Elements, no. 6, Summer 1994.

“Groundwater can be an effective barrier to saline intrusion if levels are maintained. Extraction of water from the Denge aquifer in Dungeness had reduced the underground level of fresh water below that required to stop saltwater from creeping inland.

“A tidal surge in November 1984 allowed saline water to wash up the Denge Marsh sewer and contaminate the aquifer. The N.R.A. now imposes tight restrictions on ground water extraction [at Denge] as it rebuilds the aquifer to a healthy level.”

K.C.C. Environment Team Statement in Elements, no. 6, Summer 1994.

In relation to housing, retail, tourism and business development projections in the Kent Structure Plan, the National Rivers Authority spokesman at the E.I.P. claimed the required abstraction rates posed no danger of exhausting or threatening supplies, however this was premised on importing water from other counties, and on the N.R.A.’s national recommendation that the water companies adopt stricter water management policy, something, the companies are not keen to do. This ignores implications of global warming for a county whose major water supplies are aquifers at low levels close to the coast, and which are thus particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels and storms. However reassessing extraction levels has not been started by the companies, county planners or the N.R.A..

The summer of 1994 saw both the “mothballing” of the Canterbury Friends of the Earth Water Working Group, and the announcement by the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), the water company regulator, of revised “K factors” (the limit placed on water price increases). The local and national events were linked in that the latter set limits on water companies’ right to raise water prices to fund long term investment projects that would themselves save the companies vast sums in the future. The joint plan between Southern Water and Mid Kent Water to create a reservoir by flooding the Broad Oak valley to the north east of Canterbury would therefore have to be paid for from money borrowed on the basis of future savings⁷⁶. Mid Kent Water’s chairman, in the 1993-4 company statement claimed: “We have very carefully re-examined the question of water resources in South-East England. This detailed reappraisal has led us to conclude that we are unlikely to commission the construction of the reservoir at Broad Oak within the short or medium term. It is our expectation that growth in demand will be met by a large number of smaller resource developments, thus spreading the cost over a much longer period.” This led the W.W.G.’s leading activist to put the group into “mothballing”, writing: “I am sure that it is only because of the activities of all of us both within and without these organisations, that has at last persuaded Mid Kent to put a reservoir on semi-permanent hold. I would therefore like to thank everyone for their support and help in bringing this twenty year campaign to a conclusion.”

The length of the dispute saw the water companies returning again and again to the proposal, each time moving one step closer to developing the site, only to meet local resistance. The companies would then allow things to lie for a while, until protest faded, then returning to push ahead a little further, buying the last of the land, allowing the listed building on the site to become derelict so as to get around the need to retain it; roofing tiles were removed on the pretext that they might be stolen thereby exposing the timbers to the elements. If it had not been for a preservation order from Canterbury City Council the building would have gradually fallen beyond repair, removing another obstacle to the development plans. The companies still own the land and may try again, despite arguments put by water specialists that use of surface water in an area supplied wholly by purified aquifer water would contaminate the aquifers and drinking water, and the anger of local people.

⁷⁶rather than from simply upping the bills of water users in the present

10.2.3.1. Standards. The semantics of water quality.

Southern Water produced a series of glossy publications outlining plans to invest £450 million over ten years to improve water quality and reduce pollution emissions from sewerage facilities, via new cleaning technology and longer off-shore pipelines. They pointed the finger at lazy and irresponsible people who pour oil down the drain and drop mattresses into water sources clogging purification equipment, and claimed that they were always the ones paying out in compensation for the actions of other polluters.

After Which Magazine published a “top ten” of Britain’s dirtiest beaches, two of which were in East Kent (Deal Castle and Sandwich Bay) the water company claimed its “Operation Seaclean” was on target to upgrade these beaches, and all the others in the area which failed to pass E.C.’s mandatory standards, within 2 years. However, comparison between Which’s findings and the claims made by the water company reveals that what is meant by “standard” is rather flexible. At least three levels of “standard” existed within the E.C. monitoring system, with an even tighter standard having been introduced afterwards, in February 1995, adding to the “who’s referring to what” semantic run-around. The three standards at the time of my research were the E.C. “mandatory standard” (the lowest grade), the “guideline standard” (which was the target set by the E.C. monitors for all “bathing” beaches to achieve), and the “Blue Flag Standard” (an E.C. supported pan-European award for “quality” not simply of water, but also of on-land and shoreline services).

Southern Water had adopted the mandatory standard as their benchmark, so as to lessen the cost of improving the region’s beaches, though they gave no indication, in their voluminous self-publicity, that there was a higher “guideline” standard. They only made reference to the Blue Flag Standard in order to point out that this involved non-water related criteria. This was left to stand as sufficient explanation for the fact that only one beach in Kent, Sheerness, actually qualifies for the Blue Flag. The new standards, introduced in February 1995, increased the number of harmful pollutants monitored, and so increased the difficulties of passing. While East Kent’s beaches pass at one standard, they are falling behind against new criteria. As long as the companies are able to sing their own successes at the lowest level they will both promote their own case for increasing prices, whilst reducing to a minimum the actual spending required. While the E.C. directives have had a major impact on the investment now being undertaken by the water companies in Britain, the semantic differentials over “standards” enable the lowest standards to set the U.K. benchmark,

ensuring that the U.K.'s coastal waters remain the second worst in the E.C..

The capital investment programme being undertaken by Southern Water, while in part a response to E.C. regulations, now that U.K. government blocking tactics have been overcome, should not be exaggerated. Water is a fixed capital based industry. Its raw material, water, is essentially free, and so the business is based on the development of fixed capital systems of collection, purification, distribution, removal, decontamination and disposal. The development and maintenance of this capital infrastructure consumes the bulk of expenditure, rather than the types of raw material costs, manufacturing costs, transportation, sales and marketing costs, involved in other industries. Whilst the estimated £450 million investment programme, over the next ten years, may appear high, this must be set against Southern Water's £350 million annual turn over in the 1993-4 tax year, and its post-tax profits, after investment in development and maintenance are deducted, of £120 million. Yet the K factor review gave Southern Water the largest allowance for price rises, above inflation, of any of the ten water and sewerage companies (4% per annum over the R.P.I. until 1999 and then 3% per annum until 2004, with national averages of 1.5% and 0.6%). It should also be borne in mind that the lower figures for the later 5 year period are liable to be revised in 1999, at the next Ofwat K factor review.

Southern Water's post-tax profits and dividends to shareholders have doubled in real terms in the first five years of private operation, while costs to consumers have risen by around 60%. While the company still wants to raise prices even higher, deliberating for two weeks after the K's were announced over whether to take Ofwat to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission over the regulators attempts to cap their profitability (eventually deciding not to), the K factors for Southern Water allow it to raise tens of millions of pounds more each year on top of its already extraordinarily profitable activities.

Playing the cost to the consumer off against the environmental costs of cleaner water as though the company were not absorbing a very large share of the money is like arguing that if you want more water to come out of one end of a pipe then you need to put more water in at the other end when the pipe itself is leaking massively, precisely the rationale behind the Broad Oak reservoir. Increased demand requires increased supply, if you ignore the leakages

in the delivery system, and don't adopt water saving "demand management" policies. Filling the holes in the financial piping would enable environmental improvements to be funded at a faster pace without any need to increase the price to consumers. While the local F.o.E. group attempted to bring these issues to the surface, it was European law that brought shifts in the water companies' actions.

10.2.5. Conclusions on Friends of the Earth.

As the above account suggests, the activities of the Canterbury Friends of the Earth were characterised by a mixture of local dislocation and wider disconnection. The issues outstripped the activists' ability to hold together. Lack of organisational resources was an extreme debilitation, especially given the high level of local knowledge resources possessed by many of the members, on different issues and in different areas. This led to sporadic bursts of local activity that failed to sustain itself either across time or space. Whilst national Friends of the Earth provided regular bursts of information on national research and campaign work, as well as documenting the activities of local groups (past and forthcoming), the centre adopts a very conscious hands off approach, giving wide "scope" to local groups to run their own agendas. Apart from regional "training" events, the publicity for national demonstrations (such as over the Newbury bypass) the centre leaves local groups to themselves. My research suggested that such centre sanctioned localism did not deliver the resources necessary for the conduct of effective action. The groups in question were largely unable to hold themselves together for long, let alone coordinate between themselves for long enough to systematically challenge the space-time coordinated actions of those they opposed. Whether (i) sporadically enlivened, such as Shepway FoE over the Tour de France and nuclear fuel transportation in the area, (ii) acting as one man bands, as in the Canterbury Water Working Group, (iii) appearing as flash in the pan epiphenomena, such as the Thanet group which appeared substantively only at the moment of its publication of a leaflet on the dangers of Orimulsion (a leaflet largely distributed by Greenpeace and the Green Party), or, (iv) as in the case of Canterbury's town group, a regular pub discussion group for a few middle aged individuals engaged in other environmental activities unrelated to their attendance at FoE meetings that transformed itself into a regular pub/cycle discussion group for a few twenty something individuals engaged in other environmental activities unrelated to their attendance at FoE meetings,⁷⁷ local F.o.E. groups lacked coherence.

⁷⁷The 1996-7 Canterbury FoE, after the demise of any local Greenpeace group, showed signs

10.3. Conclusions on Local Pressure.

Whilst in Habermas's discussion of system and lifeworld the latter is said to resist the former, it does so only from within the same social space as its institutionalizing rival. Lifeworld is not primordial community, but the normative orientation towards understanding that itself underpins systemic orientations towards instrumental organization and control. Likewise, the rationalizing resources deployed within systematic instrumental action, action oriented towards control, are resources which may be deployed in the formation of new critical and communicative actions. The linguistification of the sacred, by which instrumental rationality profanes the taken for granted in the pursuit of power, also, on the reverse side of the same coin, opens its own actions and motivations up to critical scrutiny on the grounds of substantively rational ethical and normative criteria.

The tension between the grass roots and institutionalization of pressure group actors is dialectical, rather than a linear movement from the former to the latter. The very institutionalization process creates the grass roots spaces in which new demands for radical action emerge. Failure to recognize the internal nature of such "local" spaces within the translocal discourses and practices from which they emerge, leads to misguided demands for detached and dislocated forms of autonomy, demands that, like demands for negative freedom (freedom from) in the absence of positive freedom, or freedom to (access to, and integration within resourced networks of translocal knowledge and organization), only serve to disempower the isolated individual/localized group in the face of those deployed or operating within wider spans of time-space coordinated action.

The local group's sense of wanting local autonomy of action - to address local issues - in their own terms - belies a misconceived notion of the authenticity of locality. While liberty, as the absence of external constraint, is seen as a virtue, the liberal view of such an "autonomy" is flawed to the extent that it is premised on a conception of a natural individual possessed of private property. Such an individual is self-sovereign, in the absence of external of a more dynamic and coordinated approach to local campaigning within and in conjunction with national initiatives and organizers. The group's remarkable similarity to the 1993-4 Greenpeace group (meeting in the same place at the same time, with a similar structure and campaigning agenda) owes no little part to the number of former members of the 1993-4 Greenpeace group who have now found their way into it.

constraint, through the exercise of “his” embodied will, i.e “his” properties. The liberal view, in masking the social nature of the recognition by which “his” personal property rights are established and enforced, is able then, to posit positive freedom, or agency, to the “autonomous” individual, rather than to the social relations of interaction in which individuals emerge and are sustained.

The extension of this liberal logic of autonomous self-possession, taken as freedom from without freedom to, however without properties, led the local Greenpeace support group to divest itself of its obligations to the centre and go it alone, to address its own issues in its own terms, without the recognition and accompanying resources to effect results. In similar fashion, though more in line with their own national and international policy, local Friends of the Earth groups splintered into local fragments, each addressing doorstep issues and being unable to coordinate activities, tending to ignore the practices that led to certain things arriving there from elsewhere. Believing the power to act, positive freedom, or agency, lay in their “autonomy”, the activists liberated themselves only to find they were unable to act.

An anthropological critique of liberal individualist ideology, along with the misconceptions of national and regional sovereignty which have been built upon it is essential, especially after the Rio Summit, where quasi-anthropological arguments about the value of grass-roots participation, and the voices of indigenous people’s were so heavily used to justify the passing down of problems to the local level of responsibility, while power moved in the opposite direction. The ethnographic method, in its tendency to look for explanation at the methodologically self-limited level of its own observation, can all too easily become a prop for citing that level as primary site of responsibility, to the exclusion of wider levels of action that pass through, but escape, the traditional ethnographic field of vision. The danger is all the greater to the extent that a failure by ethnographers to study global networks of interaction and power may reinforce a conception of the world beyond the immediate level of personal or local action as structural constraint, not only at the level of personal experience and of social theory, but also at the level of political action. Those with the power to manufacture ‘truth’ (the construction of the past by which the present is organised) and ‘reality’ (the construction of the present by which the future is organised), would have much to thank social scientists for if that were to be their only mistake.

11. Green Party Politics in East Kent.

The main themes to emerge within the East Kent Green Parties were between local “grass roots” pragmatic action and national, European and/or global strategic issues and activities, and between the social egalitarian left libertarian direction of party membership and the more conservationist and “conservative” orientated constituency to which it attempts to relate itself, within a political system giving the party little opportunity to promote a “radical” environmental agenda. After addressing the “radical” nature and scope of the Green Party the following issues and activities will be addressed: 11.2. “Local” campaigns, 11.3. Local work on national campaigns, and 11.4. Electoral work. From these themes, I draw initial conclusions concerning the role and scope of the Green Party within environmental politics both regarding tensions between local and national issues and arenas, and over tensions between activities oriented to “success” within the political mainstream of party politics and activities oriented towards gaining recognition and cooperation from the wider networks of social movement actors within and around the “environmental” agenda. The chapter concludes with an analysis of these tensions as experienced within the campaign against the Criminal Justice Bill/Act. In particular, this case study highlights tensions between party and network forms of action. In this case, the position of the Green Party, wedged between the extreme political vanguardism displayed by the “democratic centralist” Trotskyist parties, and the extreme cultural vanguardism displayed by the “anarchic de-centralist” network of ravers, squatters, hunt-saboteurs and travellers (which found expression in the anti-party, party, party philosophy of the Advanced Party), usefully illustrates both the weakness of the Green Party as mediator between the extreme formulations of party and network put forward by others, and the essential need for such mediation in the resistance strategies of the relatively powerless when faced with repressive state legislation in conditions of high social polarization and marginalization.

Nationally the Green Party’s attempt to give a focus to environmental politics in Britain remains ineffective, despite limited victories, failing as a vehicle channelling local and wider issues into a coherent “environmental agenda” within electoral politics. This is due more to external political factors, i.e. the electoral and party system in Britain, than to internal

difficulties faced by the party (the “right-left” splits within the party being consequence rather than cause). The party fights to avoid the impression of “abstraction” (the wasted time/vote syndrome) both internally and externally, attempting to transcend the rift between radicalism and accommodation, global vision and local pragmatism.

11.1. Radicalism in a Cold Climate? Re-Act Locally: Re-think Globally?

The Green Party in Britain is a radical party. However it is seen by many as a conservationist party (the orientation of its founders). The majority of its voters (see Rudig et al 1991) previously voted either conservative or liberal democrat⁷⁸. It is caught in a cleft stick, the Labour Party acts as a buffer between its own political space, as radical egalitarian and anti-global free market, and its electoral constituency, who are often politically moderate or conservative and often traditionalist/anti-global nationalist.

The Labour Party is quite happy seeing Green candidates draw crucial marginal votes from opponents. The possible Green-supporting left libertarian contingent drawn into Labour’s fold by dislike of the Tories, is held in place by the present electoral system. In Canterbury and East Kent, the Liberal Democrats play the same two party game they perpetually condemn when Labour and Conservative parties carve them out. This led to enmity between the Greens and the Lib Dems, seen as devious and politically opportunistic, condemning and then stealing green clothes. However, the Lib Democrats slippery and opportunistic “dog shit” politics rendered them the most accessible means of changing Canterbury City Council policy. In relation to the Labour party, the problem of the cleft stick emerged in East Kent during the European Elections, where most Greens refused to contemplate a Labour victory, as this would render it almost impossible to persuade people not to vote tactically either for or against the sitting Tory. Labour’s victory in both east and west Kent was something of a shock, the marginal votes that lost the seats for the Tories being largely lost to the anti-Maastricht U.K. Independence Party, rather than Greens, whose anti single market position was overshadowed. The Greens gained 3.5% of votes in each seat and lost both deposits.

The period after the European Election defeats saw a major heated debate in the party over

⁷⁸ Left-libertarian political formations tend to fail electorally, where the mainstream bureaucratic left is both out of power, and where those on the libertarian left are under pressure to vote “tactically”. The British “first past the post” electoral system reinforces this pressure (see Kitschelt 1988).

the decision to stand candidates in all 84 mainland constituencies (backing three peace coalition candidates in Northern Ireland). This developed into a repetition of the splits that had led to the resignation of the party's three principal speakers in 1991. The issue was whether the party should act as a genuinely alternative political party with a distinctive and prefigurative programme, or whether it had to act more as a pressure group within the main party framework to avoid "abstract pontificating of utopians" on the political margins. While standing candidates in all constituencies avoided the question of tactical voting for activists in areas without a Green candidate, Welsh Greens had been cultivating a relationship with the Welsh Nationalists in Ceridigion, where a joint Green Party Plaid Cymru member of parliament had been elected in 1992. Cynog Dafis had introduced the "Energy Conservation Bill" to parliament in February 1993, the foundation for Green Party non-electoral campaign work and strategic alliance building since then. The Bill became law in summer 1995, and other Green Party authored Bills, with support built up across the "environmental" spectrum, followed. Plaid wanted Greens to stand down in seats where Welsh nationalists stood. In the 1994 European election Jonathan Porritt, a former principal Green Party speaker and a keen advocate of "out of the wilderness" pressure group tactics, who had, as leading Green Party and Friends of the Earth activist, worked towards building "broad church" support for the Green Party's Bills, supported Plaid's tactical voting strategy in the European Parliamentary constituency in which the British Parliamentary seat of Ceridigion was located, against the Green candidate, who felt "stabbed in the back". This had not been Porritt's first public advocacy of tactical voting against Green candidates, and the Green Party regional council suspended him in July 1994. The debacle was immediately in the news and caused widespread upset and dispute through the summer and at party conference in September, where David Icke's banning from the event ⁷⁹ caused more headaches.

Local activists were much concerned with these issues and the political situation that brought them about. The issue of how to get "onto the political agenda", one way or another (Icke and Porritt being extreme cases) underlies the whole problematic faced by the party in what Rootes (1995) calls Britain's "cold climate". At the local level the party attempted to wed

⁷⁹ due to his (1994) book "The Robots Rebellion"'s assertion that the world was governed by an "illuminati", a secret world government/ "world Zionist Conspiracy", as set out in the "protocols of zion". Icke claims this version is based on a distorted forgery of the "principles" re-written to scapegoat Jews, and so hide the true global power elite.

local environmental issues with national and international political systems and activities. They also attempted to wed natural environment with justice, freedom and equality campaigns within the social environment, through campaigns on housing, homelessness, public transport, the criminal justice system, local government organisation, energy conservation, plus specific local problems.

11.2. "Local" Campaigns.

Of local issues taken up, some were initiated by the party, others were organised with or by others. Of the latter were the campaigns by local protesters (with most outside support coming from members of Canterbury Greenpeace and Shepway F.o.E.) against Lyminge Forest's development into a holiday camp and the campaigns against road building by local protest groups with sporadic involvement from an array of individuals from Greenpeace, F.o.E. and the Green Party. The protests against the burning of orimulsion at Richborough Power Station had been initiated by local people, then taken up by Thanet F.o.E., with Canterbury Greenpeace leading the campaign from late 1993 through the first half of 1994. The Green Party members within and beyond these organisations were also involved but largely as supporters of the other groups. At the time of the European Election the issue was taken up on the doorsteps as part of the Kent East Green Party agenda, and it was the Green Party that coordinated the October 1994 protest outside Richborough power station (see chapter 10). The Greenpeace coordinator at that time was a passive Green Party member as were a number of the group activists, and thus blurred boundaries. It was more a question of individuals in charge at a particular moment, than organisation, with events largely co-sponsored. What is of interest here was that the Green Party activists had greater freedom to initiate local campaigns, having less central direction, but lacking the coordination and resources of centralised organisation, they were often unable either to lead initiatives or establish major new campaigns.⁸⁰ Autonomy was often a "formal freedom".

The issues that the Party itself initiated at a local level tended to relate to the party strategy of working within local government district and parish areas building up a local profile on immediate issues to emulate the Liberal Democrats, who (being largely excluded from national political office) had pursued a strategy of building support within local government

⁸⁰The "grass roots" freedom to act locally, which the party activists hold up as their key advantage over Greenpeace's centrism, is also often to be free of the very resources necessary to act coherently and with success.

by taking up grass roots complaints against Labour or Conservative councillors. Within Canterbury district this had enabled the Liberal Democrats to move from no council seats in the early 1980's to being the largest council group by the early 1990's.⁸¹ Winning seats by amplifying doorstep grievances, the Liberal Democrat local party, lacking an overall agenda, often acted inconsistently and at odds with each other once in office. This caused frustration and opportunity, ideas adopted by one councillor often being condemned by another.

The Lib Dems appeared to illustrate how to get on locally in an inhospitable national political system. Most monthly Green Party meetings centred around targeting wards for local campaign work combining electoral and local issue-based campaigning. Activists were keen to avoid what they saw as the Liberal Democrats' opportunistic style. The Green Party tried to locate local issues within a wider environmental agenda relating green politics to immediate local interests. The two key sites of such targeting were district council wards where a long established and respected activist was living and around which visible locally relevant campaign work could be undertaken by other activists. In one target ward, south of the city, one parish councillor was a well-known local party member, the other was a prospective parish, made up of two villages north of Canterbury, in which a leading local party activist was a long-standing campaign organizer for a parish council and other local issues. In the former the party organised a green-fayre and attempted to start a campaign opposing a road widening scheme that would have allowed lorries to use the village as a rat run. The Party also attempted to deliver regular newsletters around the village called "Village Green", but this faltered as the village was difficult to get to, and around, without cars. Canterbury activists were unable to coordinate regular writing, printing and delivery routines. While the area was leafleted prior to elections, lack of resources, financial, human and transportational, prevented regular and routine local activity. In the latter ward the particular local campaigner got involved heavily in a number of local campaigns, over the gaining of a parish council, conserving and rejuvenating a pond in the area as an amenity and as a conservation site, and promoting schemes to renovate the nearby coastal town of Herne Bay. Her smallholding was also the site of a number of permaculture projects, reed bed filter sewerage disposal and organic animal and plant farming. She was a well known local and everyone was aware of her party ties. However as with the other area, logistic and resource

⁸¹ The strategy of articulating local grievances had led to the accusation that the Lib Dems were opportunists without a coherent agenda. This was referred to as "dog shit" politics.

limitations limited backup from the local party except around election time.

11.2.1. Dirty Beaches: “The Herne Bay Brown Flag Award”.

Although it occurred prior to my fieldwork, this event was held up and recounted as an example of effective media action. The scheme attempted to gain publicity for the polluted state of North Kent’s beaches. The idea was to generate an event that would allow the general issue to be “focused” on in a visible and immediate fashion, bringing invisible activities, practices and consequences into visible experience. It was an attempt to bring all the sewerage, oil and chemical emissions right into everybody’s living room, via television. The initial plans were conceived in light-hearted fashion in the Summer of 1992. While local T.V. radio and press had been informed that local “Greens” were going to award the local coastline a “Brown Flag” award, activists had not expected the event to attract significant media attention. However, the format of the event, an award ceremony (a symbolic media event well suited to the “event” orientated conception of news) drew in local radio, T.V. and newspapers. Discovering this the local activists, who had initially thought of the award as being notional, were forced to construct a large brown flag for the ceremony. They also put together a statement, to be delivered in the style of an award ceremony, to the effect that the “Brown Flag” award would be awarded again if the beaches did not improve enough to be awarded a “coveted” “green flag” award. The “event” allowed the “issue” to be raised. The event, for the media, represented a concrete focus. The irony of course being that the “event’s” *material* nature lay in its construction as a simulcra, an attempt to mimic the medium through which the “abstract” message would be sent. “The medium is the message”. its *material* quality defined by its proximity to the *material* practices of the media actors who come to perceive it as news because it is brought within the parameters of their “phenomenal reality”, it is made manifest within their “world”.

Thanet area attempted to replicate the event later that summer. The T.V. and newspapers, again, took an interest in the “event” and so gave coverage to the “issue”. However the publicity was not welcomed by everybody. A number of local traders, sensing bad publicity for the local beaches would be detrimental to their already precarious livelihoods, approached the activists and threats were made that if the “Brown Flag” award went ahead a lynch mob would send the greens to hospital. The event went ahead but only after police cautioned the

traders and isolated activists.

The scheme had been of some success in gaining publicity, putting pressure on the government and the companies to act. In conjunction with pressure from the E.U. for Britain to comply with the 1985 bathing beach directive, the action may have had some small part to play in Southern Water's decision to launch "Operation Seaclean" to publicise compliance with E.U. law, and to clean up its tarnished image (see section 10.2.3.).

11.2.2. Nuclear Demonstration.

April 30th 1994 saw a demonstration on the Canterbury ring road to remind people of the 8th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. While the eighth anniversary may seem a rather odd choice the event was also clearly focused on the issue of nuclear waste transportation through Kent to and from the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Cumbria. The planned opening of the Th.O.R.P. plant (see section 10.1.3.1.) added to fears of an increased movement of highly radioactive uranium and plutonium. The protest was jointly organized by the Shepway Friends of the Earth and the Canterbury Green Party, with help from the Canterbury Greenpeace Group, though they were rather busy that day with a special postcard collecting petition against Norwegian whaling, and sticking "Stop the Bloody Whaling" stickers inside travel brochures with Norwegian destinations. The circulation by Folkestone F.O.E. of a photograph of a shipment of waste going over a highly suspect viaduct over the centre of Folkestone acted to focus attention. As was mentioned in the Greenpeace chapter section on Th.O.R.P., the movement of waste through Kent was stopped in late 1994. It now takes a longer sea voyage to arrive in the North of England. The problem is no longer in "our" backyard. The logic of the local renders invisible that which cannot be seen locally.

11.2.3. Local Government Reorganisation and Unitary Authorities in Kent.

The review of local government to consider the introduction of "unitary authorities" to replace existing tiers of district and county elected local authorities came to nothing in East Kent, the commission concluding that the present division of responsibility was largely the most cost effective option. All the district councils in East Kent were retained. The Canterbury District Green Party and Association of Kent Green Parties advocated retention of existing structures, whilst believing that within the framework more authority should be delegated to the lowest level of appropriate democratic accountability, in particular the

demand for parish councils within urban areas.

While the three main parties fought to put forward new units of local government best suiting their own political and electoral fortunes (Canterbury Liberal Democrats advocating union with Faversham; Labour and Tories advocating union with Dover and Thanet), attempting to take advantage, of what seemed an inevitable abolition of Kent County Council, the Green Party, caught between the desire for local “grass roots” proximity of government to the people, and the need to retain broader strategic planning and development authority, opted to retain a principled defence of the tiered system. What appeared, at the outset, a rather abstract posture, in the face of apparent government determination to strip down local democracy to simple local administration for centrally determined policies, in the end proved victorious, though the victory had little to do with the Party’s stance.

The Home Secretary through late 1993 attempted to speed through the decision-making process. However a circular sent to local government reorganisation board officials to this effect was found to be unlawful, when Derbyshire County Council took Mr. Howard to the high court.⁸² With policing and education increasingly directed nationally, and with health transferred to district health authorities and self-governing trusts, Canterbury’s chief executive suggested that the hidden agenda was to turn local government into subservient administration. Remaining powers over transport, housing and social services were largely externally directed, and local councillors had little autonomy, as their powers to set budgets and spend money were almost entirely set for them. After Mr. Howard’s reprimand in the High Court, the actual costing made for the proposed reorganisation showed huge initial costs and few long term benefits either in terms of money to be saved or in increased central control, as the formal autonomy/flexibility of the local had its uses anyway (effecting flexible atunement to inward investors and providing central government with a dump site for expensive policies it did not want to fund and whose non-implementation locally could then be blamed on the profligacy of Labour and Liberal Democrat controlled local authorities). With John Major’s letter to one of Kent’s Conservative M.P.s expressing no principled objections to the maintenance of the existing structure, the scene was set for the Local Government Reorganisation Board’s decision, in May 1994, to leave things largely alone.

⁸²It was apparent that the government’s decimation at the 1993 county council elections had caused much dismay among the increasingly isolated ministers in Westminster.

11.3. Local action on National Green Party Campaigns.

Four national campaigns were taken up locally by activists during my research; The Homelessness Campaign, The Energy Conservation Bill, The Road Traffic Reduction Bill and the campaign against the Criminal Justice Bill/Act. The Energy Conservation Bill campaign was most interesting. Its architect, Ron Bailey, the party's campaigns coordinator, saw it as the cornerstone of the party's future direction. The Bill's progress was therefore a crucial marker of the party's ability to make an impact on the British political system. The Road Traffic Reduction Bill that followed it, and the "campaign for change" aiming to uphold Labour's commitment to proportional representation at the next European election and a referendum on its introduction for national elections, both follow the E.C.B.'s successful strategy where the party acted as a vehicle for an array of non-governmental organisations for passing legislation in parliament.

11.3.1. Homelessness.

The Green Party Homelessness campaign was launched in late 1993 nationally under the slogan: "Homelessness, the Green Party PILES-UP Pressure for action NOW!". The campaign specifically aimed to overcome the impression that the Green Party's focus on saving the environment, was at odds with people's needs. The egalitarian social justice and grass roots democracy agenda of the party was to be highlighted.

"THE CAMPAIGN WILL SHOW THAT SOMETHING CAN BE DONE IF THERE IS A WILL TO DO IT!

*There are countless properties held empty by Council bureaucracies.

*There are acres of authority owned land available for self-build and Housing Associations.

*There are Millions of £'s held in Council accounts because the government will not let them use the funds arising from Council house sales." National Leaflet

Ron Bailey, a central figure in the 1960's/1970's squatters' movement, working with a series of local authority and housing association schemes, and drawing on research into self build schemes in the U.K. and elsewhere, produced a book in 1993 entitled: "Homelessness: What can be Done?" outlining Britain's housing crisis. The book points out that there are more

unoccupied houses in Britain than family units or individuals without permanent accommodation, while billions of pounds of council funds, from the sale of council housing stock in the 1980's, remain "Frozen" by central government ⁸³. The present homelessness situation is shown to be the result of specific reversible policies, rather than being an unpreventable tragedy. Giving detailed examples of alternatives, combining micro self help with macro re-structuring of priorities, outlining policies to release the accumulated council funds, the book sets out a Green Party agenda on homelessness dovetailing its proposed "Energy Conservation Bill". It emphasised the role of local government and attacked the dictation of policies by central government, encouraged local cooperation, self-help and "grass roots" participation, setting out policies for urban regeneration to prevent flight to exurbia and so negate conflicts between housing people and saving nature.

At the local level the parties in Canterbury and Thanet organised high-street events on Saturday 12th February 1994 to coincide with the party's national "The Big "Pile-Up"" campaign. Party members in both places, and around the country stacked cardboard boxes in their main streets to form mini "cardboard cities", asking people to sign petitions, in the form of Valentine's card, demanding that, in the case of Canterbury, the city be allowed to spend the estimated five million pounds of frozen council housing sale receipts. These petitions were then handed to the area's respective Conservative M.P.'s on St. Valentine's day. In both cases the "Pile-Ups" received positive press coverage. The petitions were readily signed by most people regardless of political affiliations. It was an opportunity to explain to people the party's social agenda based on its green ideals, and show that policies at present destroying the fabric of urban social life were behind destruction of the natural environment. Housing regeneration, both in quantity of available housing in urban areas, and of their quality (especially regarding energy conservation) would save money, land, energy and reduce pollution, traffic congestion, as well as create jobs, rekindle local community, and reduce the devastating effects of homelessness.

On February 15th the Canterbury Housing Forum met and gave its support to the campaign. The Forum was made up of local housing groups, like the Cyrenians, the Canterbury Christian Council (who organise a soup kitchen for the homeless), and organisations that provide sheltered accommodation for the mentally ill, physically disabled and old. Whilst it

⁸³in order to keep the housing market "tight"

was possible to gain support for the Green Party campaign from such organisations, the party's own lack of resources and political efficacy made it difficult to offer concrete leadership or direction. The homelessness campaign fell silent locally after that, though the possibility of the party nationally getting its "Homeless Persons and Mutual Aid Bill" adopted as a private members bill, may give future focus.

11.3.2. The campaigns against the Criminal(-ization) of Justice Bill.

The Green Party both nationally and locally opposed the bill/act. At both the local and national level, due to the near bankruptcy of the party after its loss of over eighty £1000 deposits in the European Elections in May 1994, the party had few resources with which to lead the campaign. The party's central offices contracted in spatial, staff and activity terms, and local parties were exhausted. As most of the available national resources were being focused on the energy conservation bill, local parties were left to themselves to mobilise resources. As such whilst members of the party in Canterbury were involved from the inception with the campaign organisation, leadership was left mainly to Trotskyists, and the disorganised "Advanced Party" mobilizing around the rave and festival scene. The campaign against the C.J.B. will be discussed in more detail towards the end of this chapter.

11.3.3. The Energy Conservation Bill(Home Energy Conservation Bill).

Drafted by Ron Bailey, the Energy Conservation Bill was introduced to parliament, as an early day motion private members bill, on February 24th 1993, by the Plaid Cymru/Green M.P. for Ceredigion and Pembroke North, and supported by Sir Richard Body (Con.) and Clive Soley (Lab.). "...in a nutshell it will require district and borough councils to draw up, after extensive public consultation, energy conservation plans for their area in order to achieve savings of up to 30%. These plans will assess the job creation prospects of such a programme of works, the expected reduction of fuel costs and the resulting reduction in emissions of CO₂, SO₂, and NO_x" (Green File No. 11).

The bill instructs the Environment Secretary to facilitate Energy Conservation Boards to advise and monitor progress, and to draw up a timetable to implement local energy conservation plans, and provide implementation funds. "This can be raised by a fuel Levy - although costs incurred to households will be far less than energy savings that could accrue to that household." The bill sought to give local authorities responsibility and resources to

promote energy conservation strategies, within council offices, council housing and in private housing. The promotion of energy saving devices, sava-plugs and low energy light-bulbs, and better insulation, would save money, create jobs and help those least able to afford long term energy saving strategies, and who tend to live in energy inefficient housing (the low paid, pensioners, and the unemployed). The bill aimed to promote strategic long term efficiency at the lowest appropriate level of democratic action, local government.

By June 1993 over 300 M.P.s from all parties had signed up supporting the bill, with seventy one local authorities and a wealth of non governmental organisations, representing environmental interests, the “poverty lobby”, business and consumers. The Bill was predictably talked out of time at its second reading in July 1993, and reintroduced in the next parliament. By September 1993 the bill was backed publicly by 360 M.P.s, with private support from many junior ministers and other Conservative M.P.s. The bill was also supported, by this time, by 140 local authorities, and N.G.O.s giving support also multiplied. In the next parliament (1993-4) two of the twenty members of parliament selected to introduce private member’s bills (after extensive lobby work by the bill’s supporters) volunteered to re-introduce the E.C.B.. They were Alan Beith (Lib Dem), drawn second, and John McAllion (Lab), drawn seventeenth. Beith was given the E.C.B., while McAllion introduced the Green Party’s “Building Conversion and Energy Conservation Bill”, to extend present energy conservation rules to house conversions.

Whilst it was now a Liberal Democrat forwarding the bill⁸⁴ Cynog Dafis was still a key campaigner inside and outside the house. He came to Canterbury in December 1993, on the invitation of the Green Party. All the organisations on the Canterbury and District Environmental Network, were sent invitations explaining the bill. However only three members of Greenpeace came. The audience were local Green Party members, and a few other individuals, who may have been members of local groups but who did not come on behalf of, or as a result of being informed by those organisations. There were no city councillors and no M.P.s. In all there were only 18 people. This was embarrassing for both the local party and Cynog. That the city council, at the instigation of the Liberal Democrats, adopted the Bill soon afterwards was less the result of local “pressure” from Greens, than of

⁸⁴leading Canterbury Liberal Democrats to claim it was their idea in the first place, and getting city council support for the bill. While marginalising Greens, the Bill was promoted.

national events. While as one core Green activist correctly commented on reading this discussion, "I put this on the council agenda first", the key question was why it was taken up. Local Liberal Democrats could, by then, claim the Bill was a Liberal Democrat Bill, as it was forwarded by Alan Beith. While local Greens resented the omission of their part in the Bill's inception, they were powerless to redress what they saw as poaching. All the same they were pleased the Bill had been taken up.

By January 1994 the two bills had been introduced to parliament. The E.C.B. had its second reading on February 4th. Tabling 216 amendments and seven new clauses at the Report Stage, the government talked the bill out of time, which by that stage had received the support of over 400 M.P.'s. When the bill was reintroduced on July 11th, after the proposers compromised and accepted many government amendments, the government called a vote against its amendments and the bill was again out of time.

The new Parliamentary session (1994-5) started with a government three line whip on November 1st calling on all Conservative M.P.'s to "deplore" the bill, led by the newly appointed energy conservation minister Robert Jones (who, on December 2nd 1993 at a Commons reception, promoted the bill). His stance was evidently forced upon him by his superiors. His opposition to their directive was evident and he was instrumental in getting the three line whip removed when the bill was reintroduced shortly afterwards.

The bill was adopted in November 1994 this time by the M.P. Diana Maddock (Lib Dem), who was first in the draw for private member's bills, without any need to be lobbied over her decision. The government was then defeated in attempts to introduce the second stage of its V.A.T. on fuel proposals. Its environmental fig-leaf was condemned by every environmental and social N.G.O., opposition parties and many conservatives. The E.C.B. was renamed the "Warmer Homes and Energy Conservation Bill", under the slogan "No Taxation without Insulation". The bill acted to demonstrate that energy conservation and social justice could be wedded, against the government's attempt to increase non-progressive taxation on basic human necessities, under the pretext of the "polluter pays principle". The bill sought to show positive action towards energy efficiency, not negative sanction against energy inefficiency, was the way to help both people and environment.

Despite the whip, Tory M.P.'s began to break ranks⁸⁵ and the energy conservation minister's efforts to have the whip removed ensured the bill passed its second reading on January 20th 1995 and the third on March 17th. Subsequently the government effectively removed their opposition to the bill, officially supporting the revised draft. By summer 1995 the bill had passed through the Lords and became law. The victory has major implications for the future of the Green Party in the U.K.. As a party without M.P.s, in an electoral system that perpetuates this, the party's image has been of utopian marginality. The "coalition building" strategy, pushed by Ron Bailey, sought to show the party could play a decisive role within the British environmental movement.

"The Green Party often views itself as the political arm of the environment movement; the Party would obviously like to see itself as giving a lead in green politics. But all the resolutions of intent, and position statements to that effect, cannot make it so- **only action can do that, and in this campaign, action made it a reality.** The party gathered together the different strands of the environment movement, linked them to the anti-poverty lobby, mobilised vast numbers of people and won. This was an enormous achievement."

Green File 17 April 1995.

Ritualistic enthusiasm for electoral defeats was to be supplemented by the prospect of actually winning, and being seen to win, by the public, other parties and an environmentalist audience who have, on the whole ignored, or even avoided, the Green Party, in public at least, and by the media, who have written the party off, and seemed reluctant to report a body that refuses to stay dead. The Road Traffic Reduction Bill, introduced to the house by Cynog Dafis in January 1995, attempted the same union of all interested social and environmental groups, parties, organisations and individuals, and is seen as the first of an ongoing strategy of party-led coalition building.

The price paid to get the bill through as a symbolic victory as much as a real substantive one, lay in the compromises undertaken to render the bill acceptable to the government. Whilst the bill remained largely intact, bar a number of amendments, one crucial change was introduced to render it acceptable to the government, the alteration to the obligation on the secretary of

⁸⁵Gary Waller and Peter Temple Morris, two Tory M.P.'s, admitted fears for their seats.

state to fund the necessary actions of local authorities in drawing up and implementing their energy conservation plans.

“The secretary of State must also take appropriate steps to assist councils to achieve their targets. These steps may include financial help (there is a money clause in the bill providing for this).”

Green File 17 April 1995.

The “money clauses” leave the secretary of state wide scope to avoid funding initiatives and it is unlikely that resources will be forthcoming from authorities’ already depleted budgets. The bill in effect lacks substantive funding arrangements. The government was able to give the impression of adopting a strong stance on energy conservation, in line with its post-Earth Summit commitments, while in fact changing very little in substantive terms.⁸⁶ The compromise strategy also had its costs within the party, over the Ceridigian Green Party Plaid Cymru alliance. Jonathan Porritt’s suspension, for advocating tactical voting against Green candidates, is intimately bound up with the strategic choice between standing in elections as principled opponents of the mainstream “grey” politics of compromise,⁸⁷ and pressure group work with others to achieve incremental victories. This is discussed below.

As has been pointed out in regard to Local Agenda 21 and over transport issues, the ability of the government to enhance its environmental image by passing a new piece of legislation and placing the funding burden on cash strapped local authorities is indicative of the double action of power. As power moves away from the local towards higher and higher levels of trans-local organization, so, to further enforce its free movement, responsibility is passed down towards increasingly local organizations. Whilst the passing into law of the Energy Conservation Bill represented a positive symbolic victory for the Green Party, in the absence of large scale resources and power, its substantive hollowing out suggests that pragmatic political manouvering pays low returns to sheep dressed in wolves clothing.

11.4. Electoral Work.

There were three elections in Canterbury district during my research, the Tankerton ward by-

⁸⁶The trimmed bill may acted more as a fig leaf than as a genuine all over insulation policy.

⁸⁷Hoping the prospect of losing marginal votes to Greens will force green issues on other parties.

election in October 1993, the May 1994 European Elections, and the May 1995 District Council elections. Party members were co-opted onto Littlebourne, Marshside, and Ickham parish councils during the period.

In the Tankerton by-election, the Green candidate came last with 5%. While the Greens received 10% in the Ward at the 1992 district council elections, with very little canvassing, even with a more extensive canvassing of the ward, with leaflets and door knocking, the vote actually halved in the by-election. As was to be the case later, in the 1995 district council elections, the level of actual campaign work during election time seemed to have no perceptible effect on the result, except in Littlebourne where the popular and well known Green parish councillor stood in 1995 for the district seat.

In the European election of May 1994 the Green Party national average vote was 3.22% (15% in 1989). In Kent the results were 3% in West Kent, 3.5% in South Kent and East Sussex, and 3.6% in East Kent (compared to 19% in East Kent in 1989). In all three Kent seats Greens gained fewer votes than the U.K. Independence Party (5.2%, 4.2% and 4.6% in West, South and East Kent respectively), whilst comfortably beating the Natural Law Party (0.8%, 0.4%, and 0.9% respectively). In West and East Kent seemingly secure Conservative M.E.P.s were beaten by a very strong Labour Party, while the Conservative in South Kent and East Sussex just managed to hold on against a strong Liberal Democrat challenge. Throughout the campaign Conservative wins were assumed by greens, avoiding tactical voting quandaries internally and on the doorstep. The U.K. Independence Party's anti-Maastricht position was more forthright than the Greens'. The Natural Law Party's "Alternative" position also encroached marginally, while the Labour and Liberal Democrats were better able to benefit from the discredited condition of the government than they had been in 1989 (see Rootes 1995, pp. 68-75).

In East-Kent a number of interesting points can be raised about the European Election. First there was the £1000 deposit needed to stand in the first place. This required almost all the funds from the area's three active district parties, Canterbury, Herne Bay and Thanet, leaving very little money for election campaigning. Fortunately an anonymous national donation for electoral work provided funds for 220,000 postcard/leaflets to be posted around the area, except in Thanet where the money was used to place a quarter page advertisement in the local

newspaper. The local parties had enough money to print 9000 copies of a nationally produced "Ten Reasons to Vote Green" leaflets for street and doorstep distribution, whilst the party had 4000 "Jonathan Porritt" leaflets left over from 1992. Folkestone, Ashford, Faversham, Broadstairs, Margate, Herne Bay and Canterbury high streets were leafleted once each, by the candidate and local members in those towns. Canvassing was conducted in Dover, Broadstairs, Margate, Whitstable, Herne Bay, and in Canterbury. Limited resources meant pre-election work was patchy. Only Thanet and Canterbury/Herne Bay saw more than one stall and leafleting.

There were only three multi-candidate debates in the run up to the election, at Barton Court School in Canterbury, at the University, and at a meeting of the Soil Association on Modern Farming Techniques in Broadstairs. The sitting Conservative M.E.P. Christopher Jackson attended none. John MacDonald (LibDem), a barrister working in London, appeared to have little grasp either of electioneering or of the area. Labour's Mark Watts, leader of the County Labour Group, appeared professional and involved.

While the meeting in Broadstairs allowed the Green candidate to raise the party's position on the European Community, in particular the Common Agricultural Policy, and its promotion of high energy, chemically intensive farming, this was largely to a converted audience, the Soil Association representing organic farmers. They called the meeting to discuss the National Rivers Authority decision to declare the Isle of Thanet a Nitrogen Sensitive Area due to excessive concentrations of the chemical leaching into both fresh and sea water, and Thanet District Council's decision to ignore the recommendations. The council officer present and the National Farmer's Union speaker argued that blaming farmers solely for local water pollution was unfair as urban sewerage also contributed. Any attempt to force local farmers to adopt organic agriculture, they claimed, would bankrupt them.

While the local organic farmer on the panel and the Green candidate argued that alternatives were economically feasible, both agreed that the present Common Agricultural Policy deters organic farming and encourages overproduction. The Green candidate argued that the present £30 billion C.A.P. annual budget could be better spent promoting sustainable farming. However this did not resolve the problem as it existed in Thanet as farmers using intensive methods still argued that as long as organic farming was "uneconomic" they could not be

expected to change, and the council, keen to protect local jobs and profits, defended them. Mark Watts argued that *in the long term* C.A.P. must be abolished as it failed to protect farmers, workers, consumers or the environment effectively. John MacDonald questioned “set aside” policies that paid for land left uncultivated while intensifying remaining land use.⁸⁸

While standing a Green candidate in East-Kent forced other candidates to address environmental issues, however cynically, the overall result locally, as nationally, was very weak, and exhausting. Jonathan Porritt’s decision to advocate tactical voting prior to the election fuelled negativity. While his comments were aimed specifically at Ceredigion constituency, it was reported nationally as suggesting a general principle. This was embarrassing for East Kent activists having distributed 4000 “Green Britain Now - Time for a New Direction” leaflets written by Porritt for the 1992 election.

The whole Ceredigion affair centred around Ron Bailey’s attempts at a coalition based strategy producing pressures not to stand against coalition allies. The decision to stand candidates in all U.K. mainland constituencies was taken to demonstrate that the Green Party had not died, as the media suggested (often by omission) since the party’s 1991 splits. The strategy failed to generate significant media attention. Having retained only three of its 84 deposits (each at £1000) the cost seemed to outweigh any benefit, and the conflict between a coalition building campaign organisation and an independent political party with a “Unique Green Alternative” intensified as one contradicted the other.

The 1995 district council elections across Britain saw eight Green Party councillors elected, in Lincoln, Malvern Hills, Flintshire, and South Shropshire. However seats previously held were lost to Labour. Greens in Canterbury stood in all 20 wards, though not for each available seat as many wards were of 2 or 3 seats. Of the 50 seats (up from 49 in the previous elections) Greens won none, Liberal Democrats 24, Labour 16, while the Conservatives fell heavily to 10. The best Green result locally was 16.75% in Littlebourne,

⁸⁸The Natural Law Party candidate argued yogic flying in Washington reduced crime in the city by 25%. “Studies demonstrated” the effects of yogic flying as reducing “illness” by 50%, and if the N.L.P. won the election it would organise 10,000 yogic fliers in Hyde Park to eliminate crime, illness and “stress consciousness” from London, enabling instant abolition of V.A.T. on fuel.

where the candidate was already a parish councillor. Next best were 8.54% (291 votes) in Herne (again a locally known campaigner on local issues), 8.32% (239 votes), and 6.47% (182 votes) (both core local activists). The latter two wards were neighbouring urban wards.⁸⁹ The two best results were made by active local candidates in rural wards, however the worst four results were also in rural wards where inexperienced candidates were little known and canvassing difficult. Of the 3rd-6th best results three were urban and one rural, the three urban candidates being core activists in the local party. The rural ward candidate was not a core activist and the result may best be explained as the result of the ward's proximity to Lyminge Forest, centre of controversial development proposals. The European election candidate, who stood in the rural Blean Forest ward saw the vote there drop to just over 3%. While the Littlebourne parish councillor appeared to have built up a local profile that increased her vote, it is difficult to say whether the better results of other core activists was due to their profiles and campaign work or their self selection as candidates for wards which showed most Green support in previous elections. Those candidates who did better than average (within the spread of Green votes) tended to talk up agency. Those that did less well tended to talk up contingency and situational determinants.

11.4.1. "Sign Up for a Change."

One interesting development in relation to the Greens' electoral marginality within the British system was the campaign launched in June 1995 by a broad coalition, including the Green Party, for proportional representation. The "Sign Up for a Change" campaign, followed the European Parliament's 1994 decision, on a Green M.E.P.'s motion, to encourage the adoption of proportional voting systems for European and other elections within E.U. member states. The Maastricht Treaty also commits member states to P.R. for future European Elections, though lacking a common form. In the U.K. the Liberal Democrats (having most to gain from P.R.) have demanded it since the early 1980s, while Labour under John Smith's leadership edged closer after the Plant Commission advocated reform. Smith's referendum proposal enabled the party's fence sitting, but the prospect of a Labour majority put the issue on Labour's back burner, but makes P.R. attractive to some Tories.

The victory of the pro-P.R. campaign coalition in New Zealand spurred U.K. campaigners,

⁸⁹The average Green vote was 4.9%, 3.7% excluding the top 4, one result was above 10%, five between 5-9.9%, six between 4-4.9%, six between 3-3.9%, three between 2-2.9%, one below 2%.

and Charter 88 was instrumental in pushing Labour towards a referendum. The “Vote for a Change” campaign was launched to sustain the issue in the face of alleged new Labour attempts to bury it. Charter 88, Democratic Left, Common Voice, and the Green Party launched the campaign, recruiting members from all parliamentary parties, making the campaign eligible for charitable funds (e.g. The Rowntree Foundation). Other groups, such as the United Reform Church and the Methodist Church have also put their names forward as supporters, and, in a major coup, Friends of the Earth declared support. It was necessary to avoid campaigning for any one of the possible forms of P.R. as this would collapse the campaign into trenchant factions as Greens, Liberal Democrats, and in particular the well-resourced Electoral Reform Society⁹⁰ hold distinctive and strong beliefs about the virtues and drawbacks of single transferable voting (S.T.V.), additional member systems (A.D.S.), and combinations of the two). The organisers emphasised the primary focus of a referendum, as in New Zealand, which would be taken in two stages: a first stage asking whether to keep the present system or to change it, and a second, if change is favoured, to determine its substantive content.

The campaign aims were to publicise the problems with the existing system, and to point out the existing forces for change, in particular the obligation on the British government to conduct the 1999 European Elections under P.R., an obligation the Conservative party had promised to ignore, while Labour have promised to uphold. The issue of a referendum is also to be highlighted prior to the next U.K. general election. In all it can be argued that the Green Party has been marginalised in British politics, and this is also the case locally in the Canterbury district. Nevertheless the party has involved itself in a series of local, national and international campaigns though it is hard to measure its effectiveness. When larger and more “successful” actors take up an issue this may be positive. Nevertheless it is only positive in as far as what went before was weak. As the Energy Conservation Bill demonstrated, the ability to get a bill through parliament is possible without extensive resources. However the compromises required to succeed, put the advocate in a position where they must “persuade” others to side with them on the basis of “enlightened self interest”. However enlightened one might hope to convince the government to be, in the face of other interests with the power to

⁹⁰ ironically flushed with funds due to trade union electoral reforms introduced by a government, which the E.R.S. condemn for their unwillingness to democratise their own leadership selection

excerpt pressure, rather than persuasion, for the government to accept the view forwarded, it must be rendered compatible with their interests, and those whose interests they are pressured to take into account. On the question of electoral reform, it is likely that the Greens will have to hope that more powerful interests see a benefit for themselves in a change to the present political selection system. Their greatest hope in this regard will be from the European Union, though, since September 1996, the party as committed to leaving the E.U. in protest over Maastricht.

11.5. Provisional Conclusions.

In as far as the Green Party sets for itself the task of developing a unified political programme to promote a “radical ecological alternative” (its “Blueprint for a Sustainable Society” policy framework) the success or failure of the Party on this score may be taken as a reasonable measure of its achievements. It is not an aim achieved. The Party’s relationship with the wider environmental movement showed some significant alteration during my study, with a greater willingness to ally with the Party in public on the part of a number of prominent conservation, Ecology and environmental organizations. This is largely the result of the Party’s adoption of a more pressure group style of political action, its involvement in cross party campaign work, and its efforts to represent the “green” agenda within the political sphere, on terms acceptable to the movements, rather than in terms of vanguard leadership, the emphasis on the piecemeal over the grand design. The stance has also been to take up social issues within a justice and sustainability agenda, which has built many bridges between the welfare and poverty lobby and those associated with shades of green. Nevertheless, in the absence of a serious challenge to the present system, the unity of sustainability and social justice with efficiency can only occur at the lowest level before it infringes dominant priorities. Binding social and natural ethical debates, with sustainable resource management can be achieved with few resources in a blueprint, but not in practice.

As a weakly resourced actor, the Green Party is in no position to draw around itself the mainstream conservationist and more radical ecological lobbies, let alone the poverty lobby on a consistent basis. It cannot present itself as a viable or even reliable ally, especially given the political costs involved in direct political identification by pressure groups keen to maintain links with better resourced parties. Despite links across the U.K., Europe and

beyond, the party's low level of resources rendered it relatively weak in actually binding space and time, the local and the global. The attempt to adopt pressure group tactics over the Energy Conservation Bill raised interesting parallels with Greenpeace in terms of its single issue focus, its attempt to be "a-political" (i.e. non-party-political), and its adoption of a more top-down approach. The controversy in Wales saw centralized pressure group tactics infringe local autonomy.

An interesting dimension my research did not pursue in detail was that of relations between individual members and the national centre. Greenpeace have many hundreds of supporters in the Canterbury district, the vast majority being utterly unknown to the local activists. On the other hand the Green Party, to save money after the 1992 general election, devolved membership to local branch level and so all members in the district were in direct communication with the local activists, even those who had joined at national level. As such Green Party members were almost all local Green Party members, while for the vast majority of Greenpeace supporters locality was incidental. These themes of party and/or pressure group network strategies for both organisation and success, are highlighted in the following account of the campaign against the Criminal Justice Bill.

11.6. The Criminal(ization of) Justice Bill.

The Criminal Justice Bill brought together a wide spectrum of socially marginalized social groups and radical left activists, along with environmental movement activists, in particular the more youthful and radical. Though the leaderships of both U.K. Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace condemned the Bill/Act they did not deploy their financial and organisational resources to build the opposition campaign, or publicise the campaign in any significant way in the publications and press releases which they orient towards their mainstream audience/support networks. Its passage, opposition and implementation have significant consequences for the analysis of ecological politics and social change in general.

"We are living in dangerous times. A government battered and beset by divisions within its own ranks and massive unpopularity outside, have tried to deflect attention from its failings by the time honoured technique of turning on a scapegoat. Indeed, things are so bad for this government that it needs numerous scapegoats all at once. Single mothers, social security "scroungers", immigrants, trade unionists - and now anyone whose way of life doesn't fit

the Conservative conception of what is acceptable - all are lined up for moral approbation and contempt.” Steve Platt, New Statesman and Society Special, 1994, p. i.

“Fifty years from now Britain will still be a country of long shadows on county grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers, pool fillers and, as George Orwell once said, old maids bicycling to holy communion through the morning mist. Britain will remain unamendable in all essentials.” John Major, NS&S Special, p. i.

The Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill, law since November 1994, created a series of new offences and police powers, making criminal previously civil offences. The Bill addresses explicitly deviants, squatters, hunt saboteurs, anti-road building activists, ravers, free festival goers and travellers, and gives police powers to ban, break up and cordon off any place, event or suspected event they “believe” may lead to a criminal act.

The police have the right, by “discretion”, to decide what any person or group is allowed to do outside their private property. The principle that anything not actually illegal is permitted is reversed. With the undermining of the right to silence (refusal to answer police questions becoming evidence of guilt) innocence until proven guilty is effectively ended. Now express advance state permission is required for any public activity. Even then permission can be revoked at any time, on the suspicion that a crime may be committed if the event occurs.⁹¹

Making public protest a potential crime against the state caused fears amongst numerous environmental groups and activists. Section five of the Bill, dealing with squatters, ravers, protesters and travellers, received little media attention, which focused on genetic fingerprinting, child prisons, and the right to silence. The Bill introduced sweeping discretionary stop and search powers, with five mile radius exclusion areas being optional without evidence that those barred had any criminal intentions. Section Five (clauses 56 to 75) enables “anti-social” activities which affront the “way of life” of “normal” society, to be harassed, banned and criminalized, opening the door for vigilante policing of property.

⁹¹The need to establish the right to the freedom of expression, movement and lifestyles, and to ones non-criminality, intent or even potential, reverses the ideal that a liberal state acts to safeguard individual liberty, instead such a logic makes the police arbitrary judge and jury .

The Bill abolished the 1968 Caravan Sites Act requirement on local authorities to provide sites for travellers, and criminalizes any location of vehicles on land, public or private, that is not expressly for travellers. Just being on a site constitutes “an act of damage” so constituting an act of violence, rendering all trespass criminal rather than civil. Notices of eviction, making return within three months a crime, can be served on vehicles in the absence of their owners. No circumstances making immediate vacation difficult are legally valid, threat of confiscation of traveller homes is made permanent. The legislation applies to road sides, private, public and common land.

Clauses 67 to 69 allow violence or its threat by property owners or employees to enter squatted sites to forcibly evict squatters from properties previously unoccupied.⁹² Clauses 58 to 60 deal with “raves”, but gives police powers to suspend any outdoor gathering with electrically amplified music. Gatherings without music are covered by clauses 63, 65 and 66, referring to solstice festivals, giving police discretionary powers to prohibit gatherings of over 20, on public or private land without prior consent, even on roadsides by entrances to private property. If consent is given prior to an event the landowner is responsible for any actions those present take. Clause 65 refers to mobile gatherings travelling to an event, or those attending on public/private land without prior consent. Clause 63 aims at saboteurs “intimidating” hunters.⁹³

The legislation angered and activated many directly affected - squatters, ravers, saboteurs and travellers - and local and national condemnation from the Green Party, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, civil liberties groups, and other defenders of rights to protest. The New Statesman and Society, Red Pepper, and underground protest magazines covered the issue, the Guardian and the Independent occasionally. However the media largely ignored the civil liberties issues in the Bill. The Labour party dissociated itself from the marginals the bill lined up for vilification. Tony Blair even claimed the bill did not go far enough. Bar Lords’ amendments, reversed in the Commons, the bill passed easily into law. Respectable new

⁹²Resistance is a crime, and immediate removal regardless of circumstances is enforceable and irrevocable, even if the owner is found later to have fabricated evidence.

⁹³ It creates obstruction offences when protesters protest in the vicinity of those they are protesting against in such a way as to disrupt “lawful” activities. Shouting may be considered disruption. The new offence of aggravated trespass criminalises trespass with intent to disrupting lawful activity.

Labour's honeymoon continued through summer 1994 towards winter. Blair's "tough on crime" stance to marginal voters marginalized still further the margins of society. The campaign was almost entirely isolated from mainstream political and media resources.

The Canterbury campaign against the C.J.B. began in late Spring 1994 with initial meetings held in a small circular space on a strip of land between two strands of the river Stour, which was rather like an agora, with everyone sat around in a circle giving their points of view in an unstructured form, much to the dismay of the Trotskyists (R.C.P., S.W.P. and Militant), keen to establish more organisation, for planning events, fund-raising and publicity. While "democratic centrist" politics is much detested by anarchistic critics it was unlikely much organisation would have emerged from these early meetings if not for Trotskyist activists. The Trotskyists were able to deliver organisational resources not otherwise forthcoming. Rivalry between the Trotskyist groups may have explained the timing of key local protests; the Canterbury march, on the 9th of July, largely organised by the R.C.P., coincided with the S.W.P.'s annual theoretical conference (Marxism 94) leaving the R.C.P. to dominate the platform of speakers. The R.C.P.'s "Campaign Against Militarism" headed the march with its banner. There were around 150 people (relatively impressive for Canterbury) on the city centre march, an unusual sight for tourists and locals alike, which made a lively and friendly spectacle. At the Westgate Gardens speakers were from the Campaign Against Militarism (R.C.P.), Workers Against Racism (R.C.P.), the Kent University Critical Lawyers Group (R.C.P.), and a speaker from the R.C.P. (a leading member of all the above). There were short speeches by a hunt sab, a member of the Green Party, the Advance Party speaker and a non-aligned traveller and festival goer, while the R.C.P. coordinated their speeches to cover, the present crisis, the motives behind the Bill, the implications and the way to carry on general struggle against the Tories and the system they represented (a call to talk to the R.C.P.).

S.W.P. and Militant Labour organised events on July 23rd and 24th, while the R.C.P. had their "Towards 2000" conference. The 23rd saw a picket outside the surgery of Folkestone M.P. and Home Secretary responsible for the Bill, Michael Howard, a March of around 200 people and an "all-night" beach rave, laid on by the TVC (a rave music group). The next day coaches organised by the S.W.P and Militant went to London for a peaceful and well attended demonstration run mainly by Militant, S.W.P., Labour Left and trade unionists.

The Summer saw marches in Whitstable, Canterbury again, and other towns across east Kent, and across the country, while confrontation between the police and partying protesters dancing around a sound system in Hyde Park in October led to sporadic outbursts of violence across London, with protesters prevented by police barricades from leaving the park to reach coaches. Police closure of tube stations in the vicinity also created difficulty for protesters leaving and the ensuing violent events were taken as evidence of the need for the new police powers which protesters argued would only incite trouble.

Canterbury R.C.P. organised two post-mortem style events in November, organised like day-schools with lectures from R.C.P. activists (under various banners), with a collection of Hansards arranged on the front desk to add authority. The Campaign was pushed to the margins by mainstream media and opposition party refusal (with occasional exceptions) to publicise or oppose the Bill. The campaign was largely restricted to groups explicitly targeted, and the message that the legislation could easily extend to all protest, minority identity, or lifestyle largely failed to spread.

“Characteristic of campaign discourse at all levels was to say the Bill had created a new network of resistance and mutuality across a spectrum of oppositional, excluded and alternative groups and sub-cultures; that the law had unified in resistance those it had banded together with the intention of stamping out. Over recent years a remarkable network has grown up of travellers, dance people, squatters, and protesters, especially road protesters. Not everyone in these groups is part of the Network.... it has grown up organically.”

New Statesman and Society special p. vii.

However the unity of spirit that certainly existed was not to form the basis of an organisation resembling any conventional bureaucratic structure. The Advance Party (“anti-party party party”) was formed loosely out of the “Spiral Tribe” sound system and ran even more loosely from a front room in Edgware. Its motto “Free Music, Free People, Free Festivals” summed up its libertarian ethos. The Canterbury “Advance Party” people were a similarly loose collection of rave and free festival organisers around the TVC sound system (with the logo “party party for party people”). The local group was hardly a branch of a national organisation, more like ryzomic shoots (Deleuze and Guattari 1975) scattering and

subdividing without a centre. The Advance Party was more a cultural vanguard, defending alternative cultural dynamism from conservative convention, than a political vanguard; “it’s like the government is trying to hit us with a hammer, but it’ll only splatter the movement more and spread it further” (Sadie from “Elephant” cited in Red Pepper Summer 1994).

“it’s not just a group, but a widening spectrum.... Not so much political as moral” (John, a Student cited in Red Pepper August 1994, p. 14). Avoidance of “alienating”, “hierarchical” and “bureaucratic” policies, membership and conferences enabled the party party to be anybody loosely engaged in alternative lifestyles, activities or protest, or nobody. Locally this diffusion lacked a form that could match the Trotskyist Left who sought to fill the vacuum with their hierarchical conception of vanguard politics.

Anarchic distrust of established organisations and forms of authority, and faith in grass roots resilience and resistance, reflects the marginality of the activists and groups most threatened. The Labour party effectively created a no-man’s-land within the political spectrum, between the politically marginal centre-ground, and the socially marginalized (thereby made easier targets for scape-goating).⁹⁴ The mainstream was seen by most activists as a monolith which could not be internally reformed. It is perhaps somewhat disturbing that the very idea of mainstream politics providing any hope for those on the margins was so largely rejected, along with mainstream media and culture. The C.J.B. may have been an education for many as to the nature of British politics and society in the 1990s. It symbolised also, the deep malaise existing over how to change things.

11.6.1. Conclusions on the Anti-CJB campaign.

The Bill largely attempts to control, by force if necessary, a major breakdown in the legitimacy needed to govern by consent. The poll Tax/Anti-Poll Tax revolt’s discrediting of the law and state taxation was perhaps only the most extreme case of the erosion of faith that the state remains above the “me first” society. Direct actions by anti-roads protesters, the suspension of the formalities of property rights by squatters, disruption of hunts, the rejection of the strictures of licensing authorities and land law by ravers and free festival goers, along with other “sod the system” activities, deny legitimacy to a society seen to deny

⁹⁴Divisions between mainstream society and the marginals created by twenty years of liberal economics and conservative moral crusading create the very people needed for “moral panics”.

the rights of youth to a decent life and sustainable future. Such a libertarian de-legitimation of all manifestations of authority, whilst deeply disturbing to conservative defenders of moral standards and conformity, is perhaps only a subversion of the libertarian ethos of neo-liberal idealists. Can the libertarian defence of personal freedom against the state resolve the social conflicts over housing, employment, transport and the provision of facilities for young people and travellers to make their own lives? It seems unlikely. The campaign against the C.J.B. suggests that libertarian politics is a weak defence against an illiberal state. In addressing the underlying causes of an illiberal state, the margins are ill equipped.

The politics of the margins embodied in “do-it-yourself” (D.I.Y.) politics and culture, non-violent direct action, squatting, and free-festival/ravers, is exemplary radical Ecology, and is regularly justified in that language.⁹⁵ It also exemplifies the contradiction between a lifestyle politics which acts locally in the face of authority, and powers whose challenge require both a global conceptualization, and a wider organizational basis. The campaign therefore represented a microcosm of the issues of unity and difference at the heart of this thesis. The simplistic demand for discipline and hierarchy, centred around a call for a return to clear cut us and them politics, called for by the Trotskyists, while providing essential organisational resources from a devoted and single minded handful of devotees (modelling themselves on mainstream bureaucratic forms of political and economic organisation), failed entirely to generate any social base able to identify themselves with the homogenous “us” being incited to “come together” and follow the leader. As such the ultra-political vanguards were parasitic and scathing both in relation to the “rag-taggle” band of cultural vanguardists they sought to lead, and with regard to the system they opposed. The failure of the Green Party to effect any serious or effective mediation with regard to this polarity between political and cultural forms of vanguardism, with their disjunctive and exaggerated respective instrumentalist and utopian rationalities and practices, is addressed below. I want to suggest that this dual failure, the failure to mediate unity and difference within political action, and the failure of this particular campaign against repressive state legislation, goes to the very heart of environmental politics, its weaknesses, and the issues that must be addressed by activists if they are; firstly, to come to terms with them, and secondly, to overcome them. This theme will be taken up in the

⁹⁵It is worth pointing out that the “grass roots” elements of DIY culture are exemplary global products, discourses and practices, and not authentic and extrinsic to the systems of consumption and production they are opposed to.

concluding chapter of this thesis.

11.7. The Green Party, “Radicalism” and the Campaign Against the Criminal Justice Bill/Act.

As is mentioned above the Green Party nationally and locally opposed the Bill/Act, but were not able to lead campaigns or contribute greatly either in financial or human resource terms. The campaign was characterized largely by divergent cultural and political forms of vanguardism, and such extremes of cultural and political marginality were largely bereft of the resources either to challenge the state, or to promote their case within more mainstream social and political audiences. A deeply felt “common sense” within the non-Trotskyist majority of the anti-CJB campaign corresponds with both Michels’ “metaphysical pathos” towards institutions of the state and politics generally, as well as with Melucci’s rejection of hierarchical “political” forms of resistance and his celebration of the micro creativity of transgressions at the margins. However, such a positive gloss placed upon being smashed into a thousand pieces by the state, leading to wider dispersal of a subterranean culture of rejection, as was expressed by one of the activists cited above, raises the question of just how effective such a micropolitics of cultural vanguardism can be when faced with state repression. The Gramscian question of what effective resistance entails, i.e. his insistence on the role of a party that would attempt to bring together dispersed forms of resistant self-production, emerges by default in the experience of defeat, even if in practice the self-consciousness within the campaign was locked between a Trotskyist reading of Lenin/Lukacs’ purist vanguardism and an anarchic rendering of Melucci’s difference politics from the Advance Party and others.

The Green Party sees itself as a party that speaks for those on the margins of society. To what extent this party can live up to the Gramscian ideal of a unity built on and respectful of difference within itself, discussed in chapter two, a vehicle for the defence of self production within civil society/everyday life, is a key question. For hunt saboteurs, squatters, ravers and festival goers, the Green Party may support their rights and aims, in a way that no other electoral party does in the U.K., but this support is rather more rhetorical than material, in terms of substantive resources and results. The Green Party, just as it finds itself stretched to its limits in straddling the divide between parliamentary politics and pressure group actions, even in achieving the most modest legislative or recognitional gains (such as over the Energy

Conservation Bill), and just as its low level of resources chronically stifle its attempts to bridge the gap between local particulars and wider translocal processes, the party is also hard pushed to even begin overcoming the gulf between an orientation to the margins of society (the party's Deep Ecological cultural agenda) and an orientation to the marginal voters from whom the party's electoral support largely flows. This gulf is set in place by the ideological vacuum of the Labour party in British politics, a vacuum across which radical political parties must attempt to cross if they are to overcome the "wasted-vote"/lowest common denominator politics of a first past the post electoral system. As Rootes (1995) says, Britain is a very cold climate for the Green Party.

12. Conclusions.

12.1. Introduction.

As Blumer pointed out, the problem for the social sciences lies in its attempt to map or understand relationships between actors who are themselves engaged in attempts to map and understand their world. In the attempt to be more systematic mappers and understanders social scientists often attempt to objectify the relations they study. This leads to what Blumer called the formation of 'quasi variables', objects or artifacts of the research process that unite phenomena that otherwise lack both internal homogeneity and external discretion. The attempt to objectify social relations within concepts that enable classification, which then enables the formation of quantitatively measurable variables is itself not unlike the everyday classificatory practices of actors, whose 'ways of seeing' are intimately bound up within their 'ways of living'. Barthes' (1972) sought to study the mythologies that pervade everyday life in the modern world. My research is itself a study of such myth-making with regard to the practical and discursive construction and contestation of 'locality', 'environment' and 'movement/ opponent'. Such a project required the overcoming of assumptions about the objective nature of the three primary concept/metaphors themselves theoretically and methodologically.

While not wishing to abandon the merits of resource mobilization, political opportunity structure and political contingency theory, the weaknesses of such approaches warranted particular scepticism when addressing the fluid field of 'local environmental movements'. While mobilization of action is crucial to any politics, in a field of study as open and disputed as the one addressed here, it was essential to address multiple meaning as a crucial feature in the mobilization process. This stretches the concept of 'resource' beyond its usual limits. While it was possible to abandon Resource Mobilization Theory's Olsonian formulations of 'resource' and 'interest', while retaining an emphasis on the pragmatics of movement actors in mobilizing action, to do so required a phenomenological investigation of the very 'identities' and 'grievance formation processes' that resource mobilization theory takes for granted. Identifying multiple grievance and identity formation processes required a more ethnographic approach. Such a phenomenological mobilization theory is a useful addition to

existing framing and network analysis approaches, which, as I argued, constitute the empirical wing of the general phenomenological approach to new social movements which 'grand' theorists such as Habermas and Touraine represent. While Alberto Melucci's work is anti-totalizing, in the very act of generating a general theoretical critique of general theories, Melucci himself (1997) becomes a 'grand' theorist, and certainly lacks no generalizing zeal when condemning opponents' interpretations of 'the logic of' contemporary society.

What the 'grand' theorists (bar Melucci) demonstrate is that particular conflicts over 'meaning', 'identity' or 'interest' cannot be understood in abstraction from the practices of those dominant actors whose phenomenological projects of world making attempt to pass themselves off as objective reality, and whose control over social, political, cultural and economic production processes enables such projects, when unchallenged, to stand as near objective referents in the 'landscape' of social action. Just as empirical frame and network analysts have tended, pragmatically, to objectify the realms beyond the phenomenological accounts they develop of the limited numbers of movement actors they set themselves the task of researching, so political opportunity structure and political contingency theories tend to set action in state bounded contexts that enable comparative or longitudinal analysis respectively, but underestimate trans-national practices. While much insight can be gained from such research, any such insight is best gained when qualified by more phenomenological research into the processes by which the units of such analyses are themselves constructed. While my adoption of a critical ethnographic and participatory approach to researching the grounded construction processes by which the terms 'local', 'environment' and 'movement' were given meaning, abandoned the limitations of resource mobilization theory's conception of 'resource', it is nevertheless the case that differential allocation and mobilization of 'resources' (objectified relations of power such as money and bureaucracy) retain a crucial place in the work; it is simply that such 'resources' are not taken as objective givens, but are seen as manifestations of objectifying power.

Just as the value of the 'grand' theorists of the new social movements lies in their warding off the abstracting tendencies of empirical research, whether in abstracting resources and identities from their social relations of construction in the case of RMT, the abstracting of micro-phenomenologies from broader phenomenological construction processes in the work of network and frame analysts, or in the abstracting of the state as independent variable

in POS and PC theory, so the value of phenomenological empirical research lies in warding off the abstracting tendencies of 'grand' theory, the use of general statements about the ontological foundations of social life to manufacture crude and blunt accounts of particular issues and moments within ongoing struggles. However as I have argued in the methodology chapter, grounded theory cannot give a purified empiricism. Over more pre-emptive methods, grounded theory enables investigation of the qualitative composition of categories (the openness to change in what counts as the content of a category) rather than simply quantitative variation of given content. The abstract empiricism of imposing pre-emptive quantifiable content upon quasi-variables prior to the conduct of research, which grounded theory reacted against, is likewise what the phenomenological theories of Habermas, Touraine and Melucci argue against, even if their general theories tend to exaggerate their own predictive ability. While an ethnographic account guided, to some degree at least, by the methodological tenets of grounded theory, is, in principle, compatible with a phenomenologically based general theory of society (indeed a general phenomenological ontology of social life is the essential precondition for grounded theory as a methodological stance), the opposing theoretical and empirical drives towards their respective modes of abstraction ensures that a seamless resolution cannot be expected. The best that can be expected is that the tendency towards one can be balanced against the tendency towards the other. The reflexive nature of phenomenology in relation to its own accounts of the world and those of competing actors within society enable such a constant balancing act, even if it cannot guarantee in advance that the correct balance will be struck. In what follows I show how my empirical research into the array of crosscutting 'local environmental movement' frames within and beyond the Canterbury District Environmental Network, brought the abstract claims of new social movement theory down to earth.

From the account of the Canterbury District Environmental Network given in chapter seven, through the examinations of 'dis-placement' and 'dis-location' to the chapters on 'local pressure' and the Green Party, the empirical research demonstrated extreme variance in the meaning and significance of 'locality' (in space and over power/responsibility), 'environment' (in aesthetic, instrumental, and ethical terms, not to mention in disputes over the objective nature of the 'knowledge' of threats and the significance of 'risks'), as well as over 'movement' (its composition, internal relations, boundaries and relations to

others/opponents). This rendered the very meaning of the phrase 'local environmental movement' highly problematic. The conclusions to each of the five empirical chapters sum up the many divergent constructions, as well as pointing out the relations of power and relative powerlessness that help begin to explain how certain disputes were 'resolved', or at least practically 'suspended'.

12.2. "Local": glocal constructions and deconstructions.

At the most simple level, the problematic nature of the 'local' was illustrated in the initial discussions at the founding meeting of the 'Canterbury Environmental Network'. Where was the Canterbury to which the remaining E.N. was supposed to relate? The adding on of 'and District' between the C and the E only served to paper over the vague and inconsistent geographical criteria of inclusion and exclusion which enabled the inclusion of a recycling group from Folkestone while not including the Friends of the Earth Group from the same town. At another level of complexity the question of inclusion/exclusion around criteria of 'localness' saw the inclusion of the Canterbury branch of the BodyShop, while the Canterbury Branch of the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (whose campaigning focused heavily on the environmentally destructive nature of arms dealing) were excluded on the grounds that they were not 'local' enough. While the 'local' branch of the the Green Party was included on the grounds that it had no national or local political power (and so was not really political), the Canterbury branch of the United Nations Organization was allowed in precisely because it was a local representative of a politically powerful global actor.

On the one hand entry could be based upon criteria of 'localness' that referred simply to 'local' activity. In other cases the criteria became 'locally' controlled activity. The origins of the Canterbury and District Environmental Network within the Canterbury Urban Studies Centre, itself the product of national discourses and resources as well as local organization and fund raising, exemplified, as much as any of the other supposed 'grass roots' 'local' actor, the 'glocal' synthesis of the proximate and the trans-local, rather than some primordial 'locale'. The introduction and conduct of 'Local Agenda 21' illustrated the contradictory position of the local state in relations between 'grass roots' and 'trans-local'. The location of responsibility for implementing a significant proportion of the high ideals emanating from the Rio Earth Summit at the level of local government was not an imposition accompanied by an equal allocation of powers over fund raising and regulation. The fine rhetoric of

'empowering' the 'grass roots' (women, workers, indigenous peoples, and 'local' communities), in practice palmed off responsibilities that enabled powerful actors to continue trans-locally coordinated 'business as usual'. Local Agenda 21 might be better renamed 'Glocal Agenda 21'. The Canterbury City Council Environmental Action Coordination Officer's admissions that local environmental action would be just one new local responsibility amongst an array of others being passed to local government by the central state without additional funding, along with the illustration given of exhaust monitoring, tellingly illustrated the relations of power operating within such 'empowerment' of the 'local'. The account of the Green Party's 'success' in passing of the Home Energy Conservation Bill through parliament, and the limitation of that success without effective funding, again illustrated the general tendency of 'passing the buck to the grass roots' while leaving the hands of translocal actors unrestricted.

Just as issues of boundary formation, inclusion/exclusion, and the relations between local state, electorate and the translocal actors who operated upon and through 'localities', illustrated the 'glocality' of local action, so to did the practices of local 'identification' through natural aesthetics, conservation and tourism. The activities of the Canterbury City Council Conservation Officer, the statements within the Kent Structure Plan, the attempts by the Kent Trust for Nature Conservation to use County Council enthusiasm over tourist income to develop a centre for its activities, the promotion of Anglo-French conservation tourism by the channel tunnel developers, and the plans of the Rank Corporation to turn Lyminge Forest into an 'Oasis Village', help to locate the aesthetic construction of 'locale', within the trans-local 'tourist gaze'. Attempts by conservation groups to cash in on the potential tourist appeal of the sites they care for, in as far as this involves an appropriation of resources from economic practices that themselves destroy 'place' and 'nature' in the routine exercise of their business, demonstrated a 'localized' social negotiation of reality within a social construction of reality operating through wider spans of activity. Local actions made a difference, but were nevertheless contained. The creation of such limited sites of authentic experience were easily accommodated, as sites of escapism, only breathing spaces. These spaces, as a part of the wider social system they seek to compensate for, are economically dependent on the continuation of the practices they oppose, increased traffic and economic activity. In order to defend such spaces, as a first step to wider measures, activists

compromised themselves.

The international spread of Local Exchange Trading Systems, and the 'local' experience with the Tale in Canterbury, displayed the features discussed in the work of Lee, Williams and Thorne which I referred to in chapter four. While my findings tend to bear out the suggestions of Lee (1996) and Williams (1996), who both draw upon Pahl's (1984) study of formal and informal patterns of work and reward, in their suggestion that L.E.T.S. tends to reproduce and even reinforce existing differentials of skill and social network inclusion based upon 'trans-local' systems of exchange, Thorne's (1996) suggestion that L.E.T.S. do offer some space to some people excluded from the normal money economy to develop useful exchange relations on a local basis found some limited support. Thus LETS occasionally supplements, largely complements, in part reinforces and rarely challenges wider exchange and production relations.

Concerning animal rights, the ambiguity of 'locality' was highlighted in very clear terms on a number of occasions. While local animal rights activists, especially hunt sabs (who saw direct action as the only authentic form of 'protest'), saw Greenpeace's anti-whaling work as abstract and safe posturing in the face of more challenging domestic issues, it was nevertheless the case that where animal rights activities did demonstrate some success (however partial, as in the BodyShop's relations with semi-reformed suppliers, or temporary, as in the suspension of live animal exports), this was the result of well organised integration of local actions within national or international strategies. The relative immunity of the world's largest animal experimentation laboratory, despite its location only miles from the site of so many anti live animal export demonstrations, illustrated this, when 'local' protesters, without the backing of trans-local actors, failed to mount effective 'local' opposition.

In this regard, it was ironic that the Canterbury 'local' Greenpeace group, otherwise seen as being the mouthpiece of a trans-local actor, itself ran aground in its attempt to act as an autonomous 'local' actor, in its campaign against the burning of Orimulsion at Richborough. That the group fell apart after its failure to effect results when detached from its national and international foundations, and the success of the company in representing itself as the better defender of local people (saving jobs) illustrated the 'glocal' construction of local interests;

'local' people having an interest in being well integrated into the translocal resources that enable success, whether at a personal level or at that of effecting political action. The European Union's pollution regulations that forced the decision to cease burning the fuel again illustrates the leapfrogging of levels of action integration by which the company, that had out-manouvered its 'local' opponents, was itself 'localized' and defeated. The 'value' of the local activities of the Canterbury Greenpeace support group within national and international campaigns, and in raising funds, while prone to ambiguity over their impact, at least produced some return, while detached 'localism' tended to be at best ineffective, and at worst counter-productive.

Similarly the 'localism' of the various Friends of the Earth groups in East Kent also limited the effectiveness of their attempts to oppose the activities of 'trans-local' business and government. This was best illustrated in the cases of the Kent Structure Plan and over the decision of Mid-Kent and Southern Water to suspend plans to flood the Broad Oak valley. In the case of the former the FoE groups were easily out-manouvered. The Structure Plan Examination in Public also illustrated the ability of trans-locally integrated business actors to use local platforms as media through which better to integrate 'local' sites within wider plans. Such 'local' representative mechanisms provided useful opportunities to fine-tune the local, or to better constitute the 'glocal'. Contrari-wise, in the case of the non-flooding of the Broad Oak valley it was national and European Union regulations that scuppered the plan.

While a useful rhetorical device, the 'local' is not an effective basis for action when isolated from trans-local discourses and resources. As was pointed out in relation to the case studies of 'local environmental action' by Blowers, Prato, Peace and Harries-Jones, effective action is always glocal. Effective action does not involve a counterposition of the 'local' to the 'global' except in rhetorical terms. While the myths of local authenticity and the defence of local autonomy are powerful in ideological terms, the evidence here suggests that the power of such mythologies lie in the dis-empowering effect they have upon those who fail to penetrate them, even while deploying them within wider strategic practices aids in disarming the less integrated.

12.3. 'Environmental': Knowledge, self-interest, ethics and aesthetics.

This section is divided into four parts, dealing with the various constructions of nature found

in the fieldwork, and the various degrees of success and failure such constructions achieved. What are the facts of the matter? What are our interests? What are our ethical relations to the non-human? What is the basis of our aesthetic relationship towards 'nature'? Once again a simple glance down the list of members of the C.D.E.N. is enough to give an impression of the problem addressed in this section, the lack of 'natural' unity when addressing the 'environment'. The initial focus of the network, within the auspices of the Urban Studies Centre, to be "a network of organisations and individuals working at the local level to improve both the natural and built environment" set a parameter that was able to encompass a very diverse array. Defenders of the 'build environment' like the Northgate Ward Development Project and the Harbledown Conservation Association (themselves representing very different socio-economic areas), conservation groups like the Littlehall Pinetum and Woods Association and the Kent Trust for Nature Conservation (themselves representing radically distinct levels of resources and integration within wider networks of power), animal rights oriented groups like the BodyShop and East Kent Animal Welfare (themselves very distinct in form and method), instrumentalist bodies such as Canterbury City Council and Rogers' Waste Management, and others such as FoE, Greenpeace and the Green Party (each with their own particular conceptions of the 'issue') all found themselves sharing space on a single side of A4. In many other respects they were anything but close.

The question of what counts as knowledge, what and/or who gets believed, and which/whose beliefs get acted upon, were crucial themes in the research. While it is a rather meaningless truism to assert that there is a symmetry between power and knowledge, the questions of how 'knowledge' may reinforce power, and/or how other modes of power may reinforce the authority of certain 'knowledge' claims, represents an important field of investigation. Just as Mrs Thatcher's speech to the Royal Society in 1988 reinforced the authority of claims from less powerful actors as to the 'reality' of the greenhouse effect and the depletion of the ozone layer, so the Rio Summit's Agenda 21 documentation, with its focus on local action (Local Agenda 21) reinforced the claims of local actors in East Kent on issues such as the need for traffic reduction, better water preservation, and a range of anti-pollution and pollution monitoring measures. The appointment of an Environmental Action Coordination Officer to Canterbury City Council and the increased recognition of the 'environment' in the documentation, if less so in the practice, of Kent County Council both reflected increased

'acceptance' of the 'truth' of many threats by national government and international bodies, and reinforced the credibility of those promoting action at a 'local' level. Nevertheless such an adding of authority to the voice of actors at the 'local' level was counterbalanced by the continued, and in many respects intensified, authority of those trans-local actors operating at the local level who sought to discount such 'knowledge' and maintain 'business as usual'.

The constant cautioning against 'overly hasty' conclusions, and 'ill-judged' punitive measures, in the absence of 'sufficient' evidence, from both the City and County council, based, as this 'absence' was, on the very low priority placed upon the provision of costly monitoring facilities, as well as on the questionable location of those facilities that existed, the problematic calculation of 'levels' based upon such returns, and the contested interpretations made on the basis of them, were seen by those who saw pollution as a serious issue, as indicative of the institutional bias of those in authority to avoid measures that would lead to findings that themselves might justify calls for actions disruptive of the status quo. While such sceptics could draw upon the authority of a range of national and international sources, these could always be dismissed as being based upon evidence from incomparable situations, simply countered with other trans-local voices, or set against other priorities that over ruled their significance in particular circumstances. All three such approaches were manifested in Thanet when the district council sought to justify its decision to 'ignore' the recommendation of the National Rivers Authority to declare Thanet a 'Nitrogen Sensitive Area'. Decisions still depended upon the ability to enforce claims, interpretations and practices.

The evidence from the section on Greenpeace concerning 'data' on emissions from Richborough, the damage to the health of employees at Thor Chemicals, the safety of nuclear energy, over Rank's claims concerning the environmentally friendly nature of its proposals for Lyminge Forest, as well as the material within the Friends of the Earth chapter, all point to one general conclusion, that those with the most resources have their 'truth' vindicated. This, however, overlooks one crucial factor, one that prevents a full endorsement of resource mobilization theory. Whilst there is a high correlation between having better resources and being believed, the arrow of causation cannot be set in just one direction. Greenpeace International, and to a lesser, though still significant, extent, government and corporate organisations, must 'make a living' in a competitive 'political economy of truth claims'.

Each stands to gain in the discrediting of the truth claims of its opponents, and must guard against its own discrediting in the eyes of its 'supporters/consumers'. While trans-local actors can all too easily out-manoeuvre localised 'truth-claims', so giving the possibility of a 'truth' monopoly, such local victories became costly when aggrieved 'locals' allied themselves successfully with or within other trans-local actors or systems of action, whether this be another corporation, a European Union directive, or Greenpeace.

While, at one level, this is entirely compatible with a resource mobilization approach, such a competitive situation (when it occurs) forces actors to at least attempt to validate their claims in the face of actors sufficiently resourced and motivated to expose them. Truth and integrity (as the best defences), while scarce in any pure form, become 'resources', so stretching the concept of resource beyond RM's traditional disregard for such issues. In line with Beck, it might be suggested that intensified reflexivity within and between 'truth claims' drawing upon the authority of 'science', while demonstrating, all too often, the 'interests' that distort or lie behind such claims, does not eliminate the value of 'truth' as a criteria for trust and judgement, but only serves to demonstrate its frequent absence or abuse. However, Beck gives too much weight to the 'self-undoing' of authority that reflexivity within science may have within society at large. While a market based, de-centred, 'political economy' of competing truth claims curbs the monopoly powers of dominant actors in their dealings with relatively ill-resourced 'local' actors, such a curb is only a limit factor. Beck's reflexivity amounts only to an elite pluralism to the extent that the reflexivity he talks of is not taken up within more systematic and collective challenge to elites, systematic challenges which his account denies the possibility of.

A second dimension of human relations to 'the environment' lay in conflicts over self-interest, its promotion, its detriment, and the balance to be struck between detriments of one sort and benefits of another (such as pollution versus growth). On a number of counts cited above, conflict centred around, or was defused by, the use of one set of 'facts' or another to suggest that a 'risk' (over and above that seen as reasonable by 'authorities') existed or did not. Deeper conflict potential lay in contesting the figures and/or the standards being applied, or even in reversing the burden of proof from demonstrating danger to demonstrating safety. Such a deepening of the conflict required resources sufficient to challenge 'authorities' with

counter-authorities, and such resources were often absent. The ability to carry decisions on the basis of one's 'truth claims' correlates with political and economic power, as well as cultural legitimacy. Beyond 'truth claims' about levels and significance of risk, questions of 'interest' depend upon the balance of good and harm brought about by an action, between risks and benefits, relative to 'real' alternatives. How practical self-interest is operationalised is crucial.

Members of Spokes complained about car pollution but found it hard to convince people to switch to cycling. Canterbury City Council wanted to reduce traffic into the city centre but was unwilling to cut off the city on economic grounds. The County Council wanted to cut down traffic on its roads but continued to expand the county's road network. The residents of Sturry wanted to reduce traffic levels but came to feel that a by-pass, that would itself attract traffic to the area (if not along their main street), was the only viable option given the absence of a trans-local policy of traffic reduction. Many opposed the channel tunnel and the rail link that was to connect it with London, as it was seen to only encourage the expansion of unsustainable long distance freight movement through the county. Nevertheless when set against increased road traffic, the rail link was presented as the most environmentally friendly alternative 'on offer'. Dover and Ramsgate were said to be faced with economic marginality if their road infrastructures were not up-graded, so setting their relatively poor communities against more affluent rural residents living along the paths of the planned roads. Those who opposed the development of Lyminge Forest's West Wood were accused of opposing much needed employment. Likewise the local water companies claimed the demands for better water quality and retention policies would have to be bought at the expense of higher water bills.

Each of the above counterpositioning of 'interests', whether between one group and another or within an individual or group's 'interests', relied upon the options available to those individuals or groups being successfully limited by more powerful actors, able to play one 'interest' off against another, so protecting their own interests from criticism. The clearest illustration of this came in the claim, made by members of the business community at the Kent Structure Plan Examination in Public, that strict environmental protection in Kent would lead to higher unemployment. Based on the companies' ability to threaten councillors credibly with relocation of investment to other counties, themselves already cowed into

submission by similar assertions, the threat, represented as a neutral observation on the workings of the market, enabled companies to successfully equate their interest in profit making with the interests of those needing employment. Jobs could then be set against environmental protection.

Water companies could bear the cost of improvements in water quality and quantity using their large profits. Companies could rethink their activities in terms of long term cost cutting energy saving and resource depletion limitation. More equitable and effective forms of domestic energy conservation could be put in place (as was embodied in principle within the Green Party's Energy Conservation Bill, though practically undermined during its passage through parliament). A more long sighted transport policy could reduce present dependence on cars. These are only a small number of the things that *could* be done. That they are not, and other things are, expresses the ability of some 'interests' to better operationalize and promote themselves than others. The ability to control the choices available to others, is once again strongly dependent upon translocal coordination and mobility. While there is a cultural dimension to the maintenance of such power, the ability to maintain a degree of legitimacy for ones position of dominance, and while the liberal utilitarian conception of preference/grievance, which underpins classical resource mobilization theory's conception of interest, contain manifest limitations, it is the case that for much of the material discussed in this section the RM perspective is generally confirmed. It is necessary to focus particular attention upon the means by which dominant actors are able to shape preferences, or at least shape the parameters in which certain choices are made available.⁹⁶

As pointed out in the discussion about animal rights campaigning, the disunity between hunt sabs, those opposed to whaling, anti-vivisectionists (themselves a diverse array), and those opposed to the export of live animals, prevented a united identification of the 'ethical' relationship between humans and animals. While support for hunting is relatively marginal, and the claim that hunting is cruel is widely accepted, such practices are usually justified on 'cultural' grounds, rendering the two sides' claims incommensurable. While hunting may be successfully presented as 'unethical', the ability to translate this into political actions to

⁹⁶ While RM theory must be complemented by more phenomenological research into the formation of 'identities' and 'interests', such a proviso should not lead to any overly-hasty abandoning of the insights of this rather 'crude', but nevertheless powerful, conception of politics.

'suppress' the 'way of life' of those who practice it, requires political resources rather than just a coherent argument. The adoption of an anti-blood sports position by the British Labour party, and whether this will lead to new legislation, represents an interesting area for future research.

The counterposition of jobs and an ethical opposition to live animal export raised the opposition of human self-interest and environmental ethics in a fashion similar in certain ways to the opposition between human and animal welfare centred around vivisection. However, live animal export was contested over a more crude opposition of 'interests'. A cheap movement of profitable cargo (protecting the agricultural economy) was set against a representation of suffering creatures. Such a clear cut counterposition of selfishness and compassion represented the success of a well resourced oppositional coalition, faced with a farming lobby initially unprepared for the challenge. Interestingly, the farmers' response, in alliance with the state, simply to move to alternative ports, and to draft in more police, did little to redress the animal welfare lobby's representation of the issue. Animal experimentation was far more complex.

While few would argue that 'unnecessary' animal experimentation could be justified, and so tacitly accepting some form of ethical consideration towards animals, the battle rages over the parameters of 'necessity'. This raises two key questions: does animal experimentation work, and are there alternatives? With regard to the first dimension a paradox exists. The ethical objection to animal experimentation, that the biological make-up of animals is sufficiently similar to humans to suggest that they can suffer as we do, is also the foundation for the instrumental justification for experimentation, i.e. that the similarity between animals and humans is such that results gained from animal experimentation can be used to predict effects on humans. Likewise the ethical justification for experimentation, that humans and animals are sufficiently different as to limit ethical concerns over doing to them what would be unacceptable to do to humans, is also the basis of the instrumentalist critique of experimentation, i.e. that humans and animals are sufficiently different as to invalidate predictions about human biology on the basis of animal research.⁹⁷

⁹⁷To claim that sufficient parallels in certain aspects of physiology (justifying inductive generalisation from animal experiments to humans) need not imply parallels in nervous system complexity (that might imply consciousness of pain, fear and other forms of stress, and so

While opposition to animal experimentation could thereby be based upon strictly instrumentalist criteria, such a position would be logically antagonistic to wider ethical concerns for animal welfare. This leaves an 'ethical' opposition to vivisection that must accept, in the absence of alternative techniques able to replace vivisection, that ethical obligations towards animals requires a sacrifice of human welfare. This places the advocate of such a point of view in a difficult position, especially as those who defend vivisection are only too keen to present anti-vivisection as anti-human. Such a counterposition of human and animal welfare heightens the stakes of identification with such a deep Ecological rendering of environmentalism, and limits institutional openness to its advocates as well as limiting mobilization potential. Out of expedience most environmental organizations avoid the issue for fear of marginalization.

However this counterposition is premised upon a negative answer to the second key question raised above, i.e. are alternatives possible? If animal experimentation is the only means to gain answers to certain questions, and answers to these questions are essential to human welfare, then a conflict between animal and human welfare remains inevitable. But what if alternative questions and techniques could provide comparable outcomes? Those marginal actors unable even to organise an effective picket outside the Pfizer laboratories in East Kent were hardly in a position to develop alternative experimental techniques (such as complex in-vitro tissue cultures or computer simulations). As such, just as in so many cases of environmental protest outlined above, the weakness of those opposing the practices and proposals of more powerful actors forces them into an oppositional stance not only to the potential ethical consideration), would enable an instrumental justification of vivisection without its ethical counter. However this view must start from the premise that 'pain', 'fear' and 'stress', and the general condition of the whole organism that may result from such states, has no bearing upon the reaction of the experimenter's intervention upon those parts of the organism being experimented upon, at least in so far as results gained from research upon animals said to be less capable of sustained 'anxiety' because of their less developed nervous systems, are said to be generalisable to humans, who are seen to be ethically valuable because of their higher level of 'consciousness'. If this premise is invalid, and general 'anxiety' is an important factor, then results can only be generalised to humans if it can be assured that the animals felt the same 'anxiety' as similar procedures would induce in humans (so reintroducing the ethical dimension of contention). If the premise is valid, then it would be possible to conduct research with tissue cultures rather than with whole organisms, thereby bringing into question the necessity of vivisection upon sentient creatures.

powerful, but also to those whose livelihoods are bound up within the reproduction of the present. Unable to overcome the opposition of interests between the child growing up in economically marginalized Thanet and the child of the future, whose environment would be additionally damaged by the construction of the very road designed to bring more trade to East Kent, as they lacked the space-time coordination to challenge general developments, those protesting against the Thanet Way by-pass were forced to accept that salvation for one required the sacrifice of the other. If a systematic alternative were available, the counterposition of interests could be negated.

The BodyShop successfully mobilises around elements of the ethical, the instrumental, the aesthetic, and knowledge relations between the 'human' and the 'non-human'. In the very act of playing upon a combination of the first three (an ethical consumerism that associates the enhancement of personal wellbeing with an identification with the beauty of nature) the BodyShop generates resources sufficient to invest in research not only into new products but also non-animal based techniques for future research. While based in the sphere of cosmetics production, a sphere easily accused of being a manifestation of environmentally wasteful overconsumption, such work has implications for medical research, and, in promoting the possibility of alternatives, negates claims made by those locked into animal based techniques, that because such techniques were the only option in the past they must therefore be so in the future. That such a continuation may appear self-evident to those whose careers have been founded on a certain array of techniques can thereafter be seen as narrow mindedness, rather than as hard headed realism. That those marginalized and 'moral' protesters at the gates of experimentation laboratories were forced to play a part within the very counterposition of the moral and the instrumental, itself set in place by the linearity of past experimenters' conceptions of progress, because protesters lack the resources necessary to put forward alternatives that would negate the opposition, is itself negated by the introduction of an actor capable of mobilizing resources from within the present for the purpose of challenging at least one dimension of that present. While Anita Roddick's search for the modern spirit of the Quakers, those business pioneers whose enterprise within a corrupted world was directed to a higher ethical purpose, might beg the question of quite what the Society of Friends would have made of peppermint foot lotion, it should be borne in mind that while it is all too easy for today's ecological puritans to pour disdain upon the BodyShop's Green consumerism, it is a lot harder for them to demonstrate that their opposition to 'the system'

from the margins has had any beneficial impact upon the balance of forces in the struggle over animal welfare, or over the promotion of ethical and environmentally friendly consumption in general.

Environmental aesthetics, in the form of conservation and aspects of tourism, demonstrated, equally, the relationship between space-time coordination and environmental issue construction. Conservation aesthetics and tourism bear similar hall-marks in their identification of 'place', site of particularity and authentic presence, in the midst of a growing uniformity of 'space'. While the former may be a more traditionalist form of 'natural' aesthetics, and the later a more populist marketing of 'place', the counterposition of the locality of the former and the trans-locality of the latter should not disguise the singularity of the 'glocal' coin of which each is a side. Place is not a manifestation of primordial autonomy, but an ongoing practice of integration, building upon, in the very act of 'resisting', intensified spatial interdependence. Just as the localization of responsibility for environmental action within the Earth Summit's 'Local Agenda 21' documentation itself emanated from the highest level of global integration, while finding a resonance with 'grass roots' actors, themselves manifestations of glocal discourses and practices, so the localization of environmental aesthetic identification, the construction of place, drew upon the very processes they 'opposed'. While the tourist and the conservationist, in the two most prominent cases discussed above, were often counterposed, identification with the defence of 'the local' was never fully detached from its promotion within translocal markets, even if conflict within such negotiations was never far from the surface.

The ability to resolve conflicts (in practice rather than in theory) required resources. Such an accumulation of resources itself requires compromise within present relations of power, thus opening new sites of potential tension. Opportunities and limitations in the construction of the 'local environment', as a site of particular 'value', must engage with 'glocal' relations of power. This places questions of conservation aesthetics and tourism within wider conflicts over environmental issues, over transport, agriculture, urban and rural planning, and production and consumption in general. The aesthetic is not autonomous, and its form and impact, within constructions of 'locality' and 'environment', must be studied in relation to instrumental and ethical discourses and practices.

While organisations such as the Kent Trust and the Council for the Protection of Rural England, were seen, by more radical actors, as being too closely linked within wider elite circles to offer outright opposition to the environmentally destructive practices of such elites, the ability of the K.T.N.C. and the C.P.R.E. to mobilize identification and resources within the present, by means of a rather de-politicized defence of a 'traditional nature', despite the compromises such negotiations required, also created spaces in which more radical groups could mobilize. The ability to exploit and expand such spaces was itself often lacking as more radical protesters were marginalized and divided. In the instances when 'local' protesters did see their objectives realized, it was never by such groups alone or as singularly local actors. As the suspension of plans to flood the Broad Oak valley clearly showed, it was not the preservation of the sites aesthetic value, something prized by residents, that was singularly decisive. However, the strength of feeling it generated, and the additional cost protests based upon such feeling would have generated, had the companies gone ahead, must certainly have figured in the minds of water managers. While insufficient on its own to render the plan un-attractive, when taken together with the wider limitations upon the companies' actions imposed by the water regulators (over revenue generation for capital projects), as well as from the National Rivers Authority and the E.U. (over water quality), the 'local' conservation dimension became part of a coming together of aesthetic and instrumental dimensions of the 'environmental' sufficient to scupper the plans. To say that 'environmental aesthetics' is not autonomous, and so never sufficient as an explanation, always itself part of other environmental discourses and practices, is not to say that the aesthetic is therefore reducible fully to other things. Just as the 'local' is never autonomous, and so is never sufficient as an explanation of either action or outcome, always having to be located within those trans-local discourses and practices of which it is a part, so the 'aesthetic', as with the 'instrumental', the 'ethical', and for that matter the 'pure knowledge' dimension of 'human' relations to the 'non-human', must be understood as part of an ongoing synthesis of elements, each element never fully detachable and yet never fully reducible. While relative dominance is discernable, outright reductionism is not.

12.4. 'Movement': emergent forms, foundations, opponents and totality.

To ask 'what is a movement?' presupposes a concept against which empirical material can be measured. Here I only wish to consider my empirical findings and their relationship to the

theoretical questions raised in chapter two, the relationship between party and network (discussed in relation to Gramsci and Melucci), the meaning of 'system' and 'lifeworld' (between Marcuse and Habermas) and the issue of unity and difference, identity, opponent and totality (in Sartre and Touraine). These theorists do not give conceptual blueprints. The meaning of their concepts needs to be questioned in the light of fieldwork.

The contrast between Gramsci and Melucci's accounts of relations between diverse movement actors within 'civil society', and between such actors and the 'state', could not be resolved in theory alone. My own research demonstrated the absence of any 'natural' unity within the local environmental groups listed within the Canterbury and District Environmental Network. However the question remains whether such an absence of intrinsic unity requires the theorist to conclude that any imposition of order, the organising of an array of movement actors according to the principles of 'party' (i.e. centred leadership, singularity of position and action) is itself intrinsically invalid (as Melucci claims), or whether such an absence of natural unity requires the introduction of a party form of organisation precisely because such a unity is not otherwise forthcoming, while a large degree of centredness and coordination characterises the actions of elites, through the media of the state and market, and that the actions of such a dominant bloc directly impinges upon those singular actors within civil society seeking to realise change, both in defending the unity of the status quo, and in attempting to reinforce the fragmentation of challengers when such groups do attempt to act together (as Gramsci suggested).

My research tends to reinforce Melucci's suggestion that there is no natural principle of unity within the field of social movement action, no agent of history in general latent in the manifest diversity. However, while undermining crude reductionism Melucci's account fails to address the question of whether unity within challenger groups becomes an issue relationally through the relative unity of elites, and their attempts to subvert movement actions. My research points to the strong correlation between fragmentation and failure. Diversity and difference within the field of social movement action is the reverse side of the same coin as relative elite unity.

As the case of the campaign against the Criminal Justice Bill/Act highlighted, the absence of

an essential unity between those groups facing state repression should not be taken as proof of the invalidity of any attempt to build such a unity politically. While the Trotskyists presented an essentialist account of the natural unity of 'workers' and 'youth' under capitalism, to complement the political necessity of such a unity if the Bill/Act was to be effectively challenged, it is neither necessary to reject the latter if one rejects the former or to retain the former if one wishes to defend the validity of the latter proposition. While the Green Party attempted to articulate such a relational view, that the state's attack on one set of alternative lifestyles and protest represented a general threat to all alternative activities, the party's weakness ensured it could not coordinate the many 'identities' and 'interest groups' lined up.

The same can be said of the Green Party's relationship to the wider environmental network. While unity cannot be pre-given, neither can the fragmentation of issues and campaigns encountered in the course of the research be put down to some natural or inevitable separation. The capacity to achieve a practical unity over the definition of an issue and over the action needed to address it can be taken as one indicator of the relative success of a movement to overcome the lack of necessary unity and the drive to 'challenger' fragmentation by elites. Other dimensions of 'success' would be the capacity to carry such definitional and strategic unity through to the achievement of an objective, and the extent to which such a unity is able to overcome, incorporate or negate 'issues', 'identities' and 'interests' initially beyond or at odds with it. As such, difference is not ontological, as is suggested by Melucci, but neither is it an illusion, or form of false consciousness, as was suggested by the Trotskyists. Fragmentation and unity are outcomes of relational conflict. The relationship between party and network within the field of social movement action in relation to dominant elites and the state, can be seen as indicative of the relative state of play within the struggle.

It is also important to avoid an over hasty reification of the divisions between state and civil society, elite and challenger, as well as the internal unity of such categories. To suggest the relative unity of a dominant bloc is not to presuppose its essential homogeneity. Particular departments within the state, companies and other organisations at local or national level, come into conflict with each other, and in so doing create spaces in which challengers can engage and recruit resources. The example of the local Greenpeace support group's attempt

to exploit the window of opportunity opened up by the challenge to the central governments pollution inspectorate by Kent County Council over Richborough power station, while short lived, illustrates this, as did a number of instances when European Union legislation aided the cause of local actors. The listings in the C.D.E.N. newsletter of a number of Canterbury City Council Departments, while at odds with classical conceptions of movements as those political agents beyond the 'official' and 'institutional' realm of politics, does raise an interesting challenge to the binary opposition of state and movement, or between state and civil society.

Within the City Council's conservation department, its conservation officer sought to subvert or at least re-articulate aspects of the council's policies towards the promotion of sustainability. The Environmental Action Coordination Officer, while on the one hand acting to sell the council's line to local environmental activists, also acted to disseminate to activists information on issues she herself could not publicly promote, encouraging those outside the employ of the council to feed such issues back to her so that she could then represent them as the 'voice' of the people. The funding of the Canterbury Centre, in which the Canterbury Urban Studies Centre, which ran the network, was itself housed (the organisers of all three being largely the same), came mainly from the City Council. The County Council Environment Unit was a regular source of embarrassment to other departments, especially those devoted to the promotion of economic development, road building and planning. Even so within wider spans of the local government apparatus there were resources and contacts available to those seeking to challenge the very policies these arms of government were engaged in facilitating or actually implementing. Likewise powerful economic actors were not always at one with each other, so creating opportunities to play one against another. While a relative cohesion could be discerned amongst trans-local economic and political elites, such a dominant bloc should not be objectified. Its cohesion was not pre-given, and successful challenges to elements of it, often through the cracks wrought by conflicts within it, were frequent.

As such it is useful to recall Habermas's suggestion that the 'lifeworld' of interpersonal interaction based upon the orientation towards understanding (as opposed to 'system' orientation to instrumental control) should not be equated with the margins or the micro-level of everyday life, or the remnants of traditional community. Lifeworld resistance to system

occurs within even the most bureaucratic or technocratic institutions. Opposition emerges through the very rational resources of coordination and integration deployed by 'systems' in their instrumental attempts to control space and time, nature and society. Just as system should not be equated with the trans-local any more than lifeworld should be equated with the local, so the boundaries of state and civil society, status quo and movement, cannot be set in fixed opposition, either in their content or their relations of incorporation and/or antagonism.

What then of Habermas and Marcuse's respective and distinct conceptions of 'lifeworld' as either intersubjective orientation towards understanding, or sphere of harmony between reason and nature through a non-instrumental sensuality? While each is seen as site of resistance to the instrumental orientation towards domination and control, the former is centred upon undistorted consensus formation, while the latter centres around an undistorted reconciliation with the world through the body as both person and nature. While the nature of my research is much closer to the focus found in Habermas, the relationship between environmental politics and forms of personal and collective body-politics (from vegetarianism, organic food consumption, meditation, yoga, various forms of holistic therapies, medicines and lifestyles) represent an interesting area for future research. As my conclusions on environmental aesthetics suggest, attempts at an aesthetic reconciliation between instrumental and ethical relations with 'nature', contain the danger of misconceiving the aesthetic as sufficient to overcome the division without actually changing the existing instrumentalist practices themselves. While Marcuse was well aware of these difficulties, as his criticisms of the sexual revolution and the flower power movement demonstrate, his own individualistic resistance to and distance from collective political action did not provide answers. If it is not to retreat into irrational and private mysticism or become yet another marketing opportunity, the cultivation of a deeper non-instrumental sensuality entails a collective resistance to the excessive modes of instrumentalism that divide relations between other, self and 'nature'. While Marcuse saw the aesthetic as an integral part of any genuine emancipation, its reduction to kitsch can only be avoided when it is a part of a movement able to redeploy 'systematic' rational resources towards the critique of the present and a democratic future, a globalized and reflexive lifeworld politics.

What then of the question of unity and difference within what Touraine calls totality and the struggle to control historicity? While Touraine's critics attack his positing of social totality as benchmark for being an illegitimate and teleological imposition upon the evident diversity of action within the field of social production and reproduction, this criticism, while warding off certain forms of teleological presumption, rather misses the value and insight of Touraine's phenomenological approach to social life as a social construction. The relative coherence of dominant economic and political actors, in their control of and mobility across time and space, constitutes the obstacle, and so the benchmark, against which movement actors must then measure up, if they are to challenge, successfully, the organisation of social life.

However, just as movement 'identity' cannot be equated with the 'local', in relation to the dominant 'opponent' as 'trans-local', in the struggle to control totality, local and trans-local being integrated within 'glocal' struggles between system and lifeworld orientations, so the content of identity and opponent cannot be objectified and/or set in stone, one against the other. Actors may be co-opted one way or the other in the course of different conflicts. Successful alliance building, the integration of issues and groups within a campaign/platform/agenda, better enables the realization of particular goals. Failure so to do indicates a 'movement's' failure to overcome the fragmentation of challengers, and thus the failure to become a 'Movement' in the Tourainian sense. Such a failure to effect unity will prevent the realization of many of the particular goals which brought an array of groups together in the first place. It is helpful, nevertheless, to recall that movement membership is not pre-given, and neither is the form of collective platform such a movement must develop in order to unite fragments within itself in the attempt to change the present. The nature of the opponent, that any emergent movement must set itself against is itself partially developed in the practical cohesion of elites required and brought about by the exercise and control of ongoing social production and reproduction, and so sets, to some degree, the conditions and limits within and against which a movement must constitute itself. However, it is likewise the case that the course of a movement's development will change the nature and composition of its opponent through the co-opting and subverting of elements of its prior cohesion. Elites will likewise move to integrate elements of emergent movements, so as to secure themselves, and defuse challenges.

Following Touraine, it is still essential only to judge the success and failure of challengers in

terms of the teleological 'goals' they set for themselves (what I earlier referred to as substantive teleology). Nevertheless, in accounting for such success and failure Touraine insists on the value of a more formal teleology (what I called methodological teleology), the means of realizing such a goal. Such means involve the formation of a cohesive identity capable of acting effectively, the identification of the opponent to be overcome, and the field of social relations and resources both sides will contest, construct and draw upon in the course of conflicts.

Applying such an analysis to the Canterbury and District Environmental Network, required an assessment of the relationship between what the network set as its goal, the means by which it sought to achieve them, and the outcomes it achieved, or to which it contributed. Its aim to defend and enhance the local environment, built and natural, was not matched by any initial or emergent coherent specification of the meaning of locality (or its relations with and/or within the trans-local or glocal), the nature and significance/meaning of the environment (built and natural accounting for everything), or over the identity and strategy of the defendant (bar welcoming most comers), let alone the composition of the opponent against whom the defender was to do their defending. As this work has sought to demonstrate, this absence within the founding statement of the C.D.E.N. was replicated through the plurality of dis-locations that characterised the limited success experienced by the groups studied, while successes reflected conjunctures, whether achieved or fortuitous. While the weakness within the C.D.E.N. reflected the limits of the resources its members had at their disposal, the question of strategy was still important. While failure to secure and constitute an 'identity' capable of acting effectively reflects a relatively weak resource base, resistance to any form of leadership role, a tendency to encourage 'apolitical' localism and a tolerance towards divergence within and between member organizations that bordered on indifference limited the network still further in the deployment of those resources it did have at its disposal. This left more coherent economic and political actors greater room to enact their world-making projects, with little fear of effective challenge or even resistance to co-optation of parts of the network.

While 'totality' spans far beyond the nation state, the central locus in Touraine's work, this does not negate his general approach. It moves the parameters of action to a higher level. The

European Union, the United Nations, global communication media systems, world finance, production, trade and consumption systems along with a host of other such actors and networks become ever more crucial players in the unfolding of events in even the most proximate of interactions.

12.5. Summation and a new beginning.

It was the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 that focused my interest in relations between local and trans-local, human need and environmental sustainability, social movements and status quo. The Summit brought together the worlds most powerful actors and then passed much responsibility for 'global' problems to 'local' actors. The Summit set out to integrate human interests in general with environmental sustainability in general, but failed to address, let alone resolve, either the major conflicts of interest within the social world, or the multiple meanings, values and forms of sustainability. The relationship between states, international legal, scientific and political bodies, corporations and non-profit oriented NGO's, brought into question the boundary between social reproduction and social change.

This formed the background to my empirical study of 'local environmental movements', in East Kent, within and beyond the membership of the Canterbury and District Environmental Network. As I have sought to highlight in this work, the terms of the discussion map not an objective territory but the contours of social constructions and conflicts over their application. Investigation of their use, the success and failure of certain meanings to be believed and taken up as guides to action, as well as the unity and/or fragmentation of such meanings within and between the many actors attempting to operationalize them, became a key to the investigation of power relations.

The ability to bring together a 'shared' meaning, to develop a common understanding of the issues at stake and the obstacles to be overcome (the frame), and the ability to hold together a practical unity at the level of action capable of effecting the desired change (the network/movement), are the central issues addressed in this work. Such an empirical agenda highlighted what Touraine calls the questions of identity, opponent and totality within struggles over historicity, the control of social self-production. Neither ontologizing unity or difference (as discussed in relation to Gramsci and Melucci), or reifying the separation of system and lifeworld (either in the separations of state and civil society, global and local,

status quo and social movement, or nature and society - as discussed in relation to Marcuse and Habermas), the social constructions of locality, environment and movement embodied 'glocal' integrations and dislocations of time, space and meaning.


The value of ethnography lies in its orientation towards the frames and networks of actors themselves. The value of critical ethnography lies in an orientation towards the conflicts between such frames and networks of interaction. However such an approach has its limits in the study of the powerful, as while their actions have effects at the level of local empirical research, to actually study the decision making processes of such actors would require a form of ethnography capable of spanning the globe, and which would even then find itself barred from many of the key arenas of decision making. In addition, while proximate 'events', and the actors who highlight and contest them, are visible manifestations of 'local environmental politics', the question of how to study 'unpolitics' still haunts the empirical researcher, and particularly the critical ethnographer keenly aware of the non-natural nature of apparent consensus, or lack of overt conflict. While the case of Richborough illustrated the ability of those better integrated within translocal networks to de-politicize an issue, at least until they were themselves out-flanked, the example also highlighted the fact that the issue's emergence as a site of sustained 'contention' reflected a confrontation between well resourced actors. Not every potential event becomes a site of such contention.

Just as the absence of a necessary unity of identity and interest among those seeing themselves as a part of the environmental movement locally should not lead us to reify difference and fragmentation, so the non-identification of an 'issue' as bearing a deeper conflict of interests, cannot logically be taken to demonstrate the ontological absence of a conflict of deeper or concealed interests. Yet how is it possible to avoid equating absence of overt conflict with absence of deeper conflicts of interest without collapsing into foundational accounts of universal objective interests and primordial identities? Perhaps it is not possible, but the phenomenological account of human 'foundations' offers a way beyond the impasse. A phenomenological sociology, based on the work of Habermas, Touraine and indeed Melucci, would start from the irreducibility of human subjectivity to the status of object, and confront this non-foundational foundation with the systematic objectification of human subjects within social relations of economic and political organisation based upon

instrumental domination. It is not the objective essence of 'man' that 'founds' identities and interests in opposition to the present, but the resistance to objectification, and to the system of power relations that give rise to it. As such it is the study of such relations of control and domination that enables the sociologist to highlight latent conflict. As such the instrumental organization of social relations, and the extent to which such organization becomes systematic, sets the benchmark to which challengers must raise themselves if they are to overcome objectification, rather than be forced to compromise with it. It is within such a phenomenological ontology that more methodological forms of phenomenological frame and network analysis need to be set if they are to avoid both the pitfalls of a superficial empirical disregard for 'unpolitics' and a determinist theoretical imposition of foundational 'real interests'. It is thereby possible to avoid the superficial consensuality of Roland Robertson's assertion that the global and the local are in fact part of one 'glocal' construction, and not the imposition of an oppressive latter upon the authentic former, without accepting Wallerstein's version of such a local vs global opposition.

What then of the phenomenological sociologist's account of 'nature'. Are we to be given a relativism that debunks the objectivist claims on all sides as to the nature of the 'risks' we face? While a phenomenological approach to the non-human recognises human involvement in the construction of the 'environment', this involvement is distinct from the phenomenological nature of social life, in which the 'thing' itself is not merely transformed in the practical consciousness/conscious practice of human actors, but is that practical consciousness/ conscious practice itself. The phenomenological critique of science points out the false separation of knowledge of the non-human and human action in the world, but does not thereby reduce nature to that human intervention. It is because human constructions of nature are always bound up within socially constructed ways of seeing, that natural scientific categories can never be said to fully grasp the objective nature of the non-human in a positivist fashion. The things 'in themselves', the nomina beyond our phenomenal sense of them, resist subordination to social organisation in a manner distinct from the resistance of social beings to objectification. Things 'in themselves' (objects) resist reduction to social organisation because they are irreducible to consciousness, though shaped by it. Beings 'for themselves' (subjects) resist reduction to instrumental organisation because they are irreducible to unconsciousness, though conditioned by it, being both physical and mortal.

Within contemporary environmentalism, and beyond, there is a growing awareness of the weakness of positivistic science, a science unable to reflect upon its own relation (though not reduction) to the social relations of which it is a part, and so which is unable to perceive how its analytical concepts and tools for 'understanding' nature are shaped by the instrumental tasks of control and manipulation it is expected to deliver in a technocratic society. Likewise there is a growing recognition of the failure of such a science subordinated to technocratic objectives to deliver the prediction and control it was meant to. The unintended consequences of intervention in nature reveal both the limits of what we thought was known and the negative and potentially disastrous effects of such past and ongoing actions. The emergence of a counter-science informed by a phenomenological critique of positivism and technocracy in human relations to nature, is the logical correlate of a phenomenologically informed politics of resistance to systematic reduction of social relations to instrumental technocratic domination. Such a logical connection of course cannot be used as a predictor of the development of real social struggles. It is a benchmark for action and a starting point for future research, the premise of what Touraine calls permanent sociology.



LEGEND Légende, Zeichenerklärung, Verklaring, Clave

Motorway (with numbered interchange) Autobahn (Anschlussstelle nummeriert) Autosnelweg Autopista	Distance in Miles Entfernung in Meilen Distances en milles Distances en milles
A25 Primary Route Fertstrasse Route principale Hoofdwegverkeersweg Carretera de primera Other A Roads Hauptstrasse Autres routes 'A' Andere hoofdverkeerswegen Otras carreteras de primera	Railway Eisenbahn Chemin de fer Spoorweg Ferrocarril
A254 B Road Verbondingsstrasse Route 'B' Intersprekde verkeersweg Carretera de segunda	Car Ferry Autobus Buis present les autos Autobusverkeer Transportador para coches
A2169 Minor Road Nebenstrasse Route locale Lokaal weg Carretera de terceros	Hovercraft Ferry Luttilissatire Appareil à coque d'air
	Airport Flughafen Aeroporto Luchthaven Aeroporto

Scale 1:200,000
0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Km.

Chronology of Fieldwork

October 1993

- 7th Greenpeace Meeting
- 8th Green Party planning session for fair
- 9th Green Fair in Littlebourne
- 12th K.T.N.C. Talk on Forest Wildlife
- 13th Green Party Curry Evening
- 13th R.S.P.B. (Illust. Talk) and disc..
- 14th Friends of the Earth (C'bury).
- 21st Greenpeace informal meeting
- 23rd C.U.S.C. Fair and Exhibition- One World Week.
- 26th Green Party Canvass Tankerton
- 27th Paper on "Politics and Environment".
- 28th Tankerton By-election

November 1993

- 2nd Green Party (Canterbury) A.G.M.
- 4th Greenpeace Meeting.
- 9th K.T.N.C. Illust. Talk - Taxidermy.
- 10th R.S.P.B. illustrated Talk.
- 11th F.o.E. (C'bury) Meeting.
- 18th Greenpeace informal Meeting.
- 24th Canterbury Green Party meeting
- 25th Talk with Herne Bay and District Residents Assoc.
- 25th C.D.E.N. quarterly meeting
- 28th Talk with Mrs Bernhard Smith - K.T.N.C. Canterbury Area
- 29th Talk with V. Litten- C.A.R.E.
- 30th Talk with Mrs Larkinson - Harbledown Conservation Assoc.
- 30th Talk with Mr Brian Barnes of the Joint Villages Group

December 1993

- 1st Talk with Tony Harman from Canterbury Environmental Education Centre
- 1st Cynog Dafis M.P. speaking on the Energy Conservation Bill
- 2nd Talk with Elizabeth Walker-Kent Fed. of Amenity Societies
- 2nd Talk with John Carter- Broomfield Gate Amenity Society
- 2nd Greenpeace Meeting (Canterbury)
- 3rd Talk with Bob Baxter (C.P.R.E.)
- 3rd Talk with C.D.E.N. about appraisal
- 8th R.S.P.B. Illust. talk- The Living River.
- 9th F.o.E. (C'bury) meeting
- 15th Canterbury Green Party Meeting

January 1994

- 6th Greenpeace meeting
- 12th K.T.N.C. (C'bury) talk by Brian Whotmough on the locality.
- 15th Greenpeace Stall in Canterbury
- 20th Gulf War Video and discussion
- 22nd Green Party stall in Canterbury
- 22nd W.E.D.G.e Barn dance
- 26th Green Party Canterbury meeting
- 27th Canterbury L.E.T.S. meeting
- 30th Kent Fed. Green Party's meeting

February 1994

- 1st Northgate Ward Development Project: display and Talk at the C.U.S.C.
- 2nd Meeting C.D.E.N. on assessment
- 2nd Talk on "Marx and Nature"
- 3rd Greenpeace meeting U.K.C./town
- 4th Ms Olga Tsepitova: Environmental Movements in st. Petersburg
- 7th G'peace at high court over Thorp
- 8th K.T.N.C. (C'bury) talk: Martin Newcomb on Fungi/Lichens.
- 9th C.D.E.N. meet to finalise school and member questionnaires.
- 9th R.S.P.B. meeting and illust. talk about birds on Bartsy Island
- 10th F.o.E. (C'bury) meeting
- 12th C.N.D. roadshow in Canterbury
- 12th Green party housing protest in Canterbury High Street
- 12th Greenpeace Barn dance
- 13th Planet Cafe opens in Thanet
- 14th Green Party Housing petition handed in to Julian Brazier
- 15th C'bury Housing Forum meeting
- 15th C'bury Transport Forum meeting
- 16th Talk on "Socialism and Ecology"
- 16th U.K.C. Animal Rights Group meeting about/with Animal Liberation Front.
- 17th Wynott Aluminium meeting with U.K.C. Green Group.
- 17th East Kent Animal Welfare Group Vigil at Dover Docks
- 17th Informal Greenpeace meeting
- 18th U.K.C. Green Group Meeting
- 19th Greenpeace stall in Canterbury
- 20th Greenpeace sponsored swim
- 21st Canterbury Spokes first meeting
- 23rd Canterbury Green Party meeting

24th Informal Greenpeace meeting
25th U.K.C. Green Group meeting
25th Liberal Democrat meeting to discuss unitary authorities
26th "2001: What kind of Kent?" local Agenda 21 in Kent
26th Mclibel in Canterbury
27th F.o.E. Kent Network/WWG on K.C.C. e.i.p. submissions.
28th Start of U.K.C. Green Week (28/2 - 5/3) - activities each day.

March 1994

2nd N.W.D.P. display Parkside School
2nd C.D.E.N. quarterly meeting
3rd Greenpeace meeting at U.K.C.
4th Kent Christian Ecological Group- Agape meal
5th U.K.C. Greens/W.E.N. stall C'bury.
5th K.A.R.E. Demonstration at Dungeness nuclear power station
5th Amnesty International Wine and Wisdom
6th F.o.E. meeting (about K.S.P. e.i.p.)
8th K.T.N.C. (C'bury) A.G.M. and talk on Moths by T. Harman.
9th Seekaday meeting at C.U.S.C.
9th R.S.P.B. (C'bury) illust. talk
9th Critical Lawyers/Animal Rights Groups- "Do Animals Have Rights?"
10th F.o.E. (Kent and W.W.G.) meeting (on K.S.P. e.i.p. Transport issue)
10th Animal Rights Group/Body Shop talk/make-overs at U.K.C.
10th F.o.E. (C'bury) meeting in town
11th U.K.C. Green Group meeting
15th K.S.P. e.i.p. preliminary meeting
15th U.K.C. critical theory seminar. "Heidegger's Hero in Bladerunner"
16th Greenpeace "Toxic Waste Tour" in Margate: Thor Chemicals and the Basel Convention
17th Greenpeace informal meeting
18th Green Party Wine and Wisdom
21st Spokes meeting
23rd Canterbury Green Party Meeting
26th Herne Bay green Fair
27th F.o.E. (C'bury) Fun-walk
28th Greenpeace Pub Quiz
30th Green Party special meeting on C.C.C. Draft Local Plan

April 1994

2nd L.E.T.S. Forum
3rd Meeting of F.o.E. (W.W.G.) about Kent Structure Plan e.i.p.
6th L.E.T.S. Trading Market
7th Greenpeace meeting
10th Another meeting of F.o.E. (W.W.G.) about K.S.P. e.i.p.
12th Kent Structure Plan E.i.P. day one
25th Spokes meeting
27th Canterbury Green Party Meeting
30th No More Chernobyls Demo
30th Stop the Bloody Whaling Demonstration and Stall: Canterbury.

May 1994

3rd C.U.S.C. "Environmental Education Fair" opening ceremony.
4th L.E.T.S. Forum
5th Greenpeace meeting
6th L.E.T.S. Trading Market
9th Play of "Joan of Kent" in C'bury
12th F.o.E. (C'ury) meeting
15th Green Party Election Photo Shoot: Richborough/Dungeness
15th F.o.E. (Kent Net) meet Folkestone
17th Green Party European Election Canvassing: Ashford
18th Spokes "Cycling & Health" event
19th Informal Greenpeace meeting
19th National Trust talk: "Living History in the Countryside"
20th White Cliffs Countryside Project talk: "Wildlife of Chalk Downlands"
21st Greenpeace street stall Canterbury.
21st Green Party Euro get together and fund-raiser
21st F.o.E. (C'bury) B.B.Q. and party
22nd F.o.E. (Nat.) "Bike to the Future"
23rd Soil Assoc. sponsored Election Candidates Debate in Broadstairs: "Modern Farming Methods"
24th Green Party Euro Election Canvassing: Faversham
24th Green party meeting in Wye
25th Green Candidate B.B.C. interview
25th Canterbury Green Party Meeting
27th Proposed Candidates debate at Christ Church College Cancelled
28th Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:

Broadstairs
29th Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:
 Dover
29th Green Party Meeting in Dover
30th Maidstone Green Fair
31st Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:
 Folkestone
31st Green Party meeting in Dover

June 1994

1st Interview with Fay Blair
2nd Greenpeace meeting
3rd Visit Tyland Barn (K.T.N.C. H.Q.)
3rd Green Party Political Broadcast
4th Visit to Dungeness nuclear power
 station
4th Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:
 Herne Bay
5th Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:
 Broadstairs
6th Election candidates Debate at U.K.C.
7th Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:
 Margate
7th Interview with Green Candidate for
 Radio Thanet in Ramsgate
7th Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:
 Canterbury
8th Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:
 Canterbury
8th Talk with Green Party Member doing
 research on Water resource conflict in and
 around Israel
8th Talk with R.C.P. group about "United
 Front" over CJB Protests
9th Green Party Euro-Election Canvassing:
 Canterbury
9th F.o.E. (C'bury) meeting
10th Planning meeting with new F.o.E.
 coordinator
11th Spokes 5 Mile Challenge
11th F.o.E. (South East) Training Day in
 London: "Stand and Deliver"
12th G'peace "Walk on the Wild Side"
12th Kent East European Election Count in
 Margate
13th Visit to C.C.C. about A2 Development
 at Kingsdown
15th Spokes Biker's Breakfast: C'bury.
15th C.D.E.N. quarterly meeting
16th C.C.C. Env' Committee meeting
16th Campaign Against Militarism:

Criminal Justice Bill meeting
16th Greenpeace informal meeting
17th Joint group "Bike to the Pub"
18th Greenpeace Stall in Canterbury.
18th Green Party "The Way Ahead"
 meeting in Birmingham
22nd Canterbury Green Party meeting
26th Mass gathering at Lyminge Forest
29th Greenpeace trip to Calais
30th Spokes Editorial Meeting
30th Greenpeace Wine and Wisdom
July 1994
1st C.U.S.C. Tenth Anniversary Event
2nd "Not le Tour" Chartham Cycle Club
2nd Greenpeace Wine and Wisdom
6th Le Tour in Kent
6th Lyminge public exhibition
7th Anti-CJB meeting
7th Greenpeace meeting
9th Anti-C.J.B. march and rally C'rbury
9th Northgate Ward Development Project
 park clearance day
10th Green Party Event In Chilham
14th F.o.E. (C'bury) meeting
17th Greenpeace Treasure Hunt
17-18th Midnight "Signs of the Times" road
 sign stunt
23rd Anti-C.J.B. Lobby/beach party
24th Anti-C.J.B. March and Rally in London
27th Canterbury District Green Party
 Meeting in Littlebourne
29th East Kent Animal Welfare Vigil Dover
31st Save Lyminge Forest meeting in
 Bossington

August 1994

1st Local Government Review Announces
 No Change.
2nd Anti-Coach Park Leaflet Distribution to
 Tourists.
5th Green Party Stall in Canterbury.
9th Anti-Coach Park Leaflets to Tourists.
24th Green Party Kent Meeting.

September 1994

6th Meeting of C'bury councillors and Anti-
 Coach Park Residents.
10th Green Party Curry Evening C'bury.
21st Green Party Meeting Littlebourne.
24th Canterbury Anti-CJB Demo.
28th Canterbury CND A.G.M.

29th/30th Nat. Green Party A.G.M.

October 1994

1st/2nd National Green Party A.G.M.
 6th Greenpeace Meeting in Canterbury.
 6th Canterbury Anti-CJB Meeting.
 8th Anti-CJB Demo in London.
 9th Green Fair in Wickhambreux.
 10th Local Residents Against the Coach Park
 12th Thanet Green Party A.G.M..
 13th Canterbury Anti-CJB Meeting.
 15th Save Lyminge Forest Meeting.
 17th Greenpeace Pub Quiz.
 19th Green Party Local Gov't Election Meet.
 20th Canterbury Anti-CJB Meeting.
 22nd Greenpeace Stall in Canterbury.
 23rd Kent Green Party A.G.M..
 25th Local Inquiry into A259 Begins.
 26th Green Party Meeting (Canterbury).
 27th Canterbury Anti-CJB Meeting.
 29th Orrimulsion Demonstration at Richborough Power Station.
 31th Herne Bay Vegetarian Special.

November 1994

3rd Greenpeace Meeting in Canterbury
 4th "Who Runs the World?" Greenpeace meeting at U.K.C..
 5th Orrimulsion Leaflet Distribution Canterbury, Ramsgate and Sandwich
 5th Greensword Bonfire Bonanza.
 7th Orrim. Campaign Meeting U.K.C..
 12th Green Party Food and Fun.
 16th Greensword Campaign Against the A259 extension meeting.
 19th Greenpeace Stall in Canterbury.
 19th Green Party Electoral Reg. stall C'bury.
 23rd Canterbury Green Party Meeting.
 24th Green Party Northern Ireland Talk.
 30th Greensword Campaign Against the A259 extension meeting.

December 1994

1st LA21 Planning workshop.
 1st Greenpeace Meeting in Canterbury.
 2nd Greenpeace Pub Collection C'bury.
 3rd Greenpeace Barndance.
 5th/9th University Green Week.

5th Leaflet Distribution on Campus.
 6th Talk by Prof. Richard Norman on C.N.D. after the cold war.
 7th Mis-timed attempt to ring the Library in Plastic Cups.
 8th Campus meeting with Fay Blair.
 9th Students Union General Meeting and Green Week Raffle.
 10th March Against Dungeness Re-Opening.
 11th Formation of Kent Defiance Alliance
 13th Green Party Meeting Herne Bay.
 17th Green Party Christmas Gathering.
 21st Communication with Julian Brazier MP.

January 1995

8th Green Party Canterbury Meeting.
 25th Green Party Kent Meeting.
 28th Lobby outside Maidstone Court (to support Hunt Sabs.).

February 1995

2nd Friends of the Earth/G'peace Joint Meet.
 12th Kent Defiance Alliance Meeting.
 21st Wind Down of the Friends of the Earth Water Working Group.
 22nd Canterbury Green Party Meeting.

March 1995

2nd/5th Green Party Spring Conference.
 10th Green Local Election Meeting.
 10th Green Party Wine and Wisdom.
 11th Green Party Street Stall C'bury.
 15th Green Party Meeting in C'bury.
 16th Energy Conservation Bill Lobby
 19th Green Party Leafleting in Herne.
 25th Lobby of Michael Howard's Folkestone Constituency Surgery.
 25th Herne Bay Spring Green Fair.

April 1995

4th Selected as Green Party Candidate for Wincheap Ward. Remainder of month spent canvassing and leafleting in various wards.

May 1995

4th Local Elections.
 11th Kent Greenpeace Meeting.
 19th/29th British Telecom Env' Week:
 19th "Good for Business - Good for the

Environment" Meeting.

19th Illustrated Talk; Hoothfield Common.

20th Calling All Kids: Canterbury Today:
Tomorrow the World.

21st On Your Bike: C'bury's Cycle Net.

22nd The Climate Resolution: Too Hot to
Handle.

23rd Thinking Globally/Trading Locally:
L.E.T.S. is for Everyone.

23rd Friends of the Earth Video.

24th A Walk in Larkey Valley Woods.

25th Tackling Transport: Roads to Nowhere.

26th A New Agenda for C'bury.

27th The Green Ceiligh.

28th Up on the Hill - a UKC guided walk.

29th Maidstone Green Fair.

June 1995

17th Ban Live Ex/Ban the CJA Demo.

Glossary of organisations and campaigns.

A

Action on Canterbury Traffic.
The Advance Party.
Amnesty International (Canterbury).
Anarchist Communist Federation.
Anglican Environmental Issues Panel.
Animal Liberation Front.
Anti-Vivisection Association.

B

Bahai Community: Sevenoaks/Tonbridge and West Malling.
Barham Down Campaign.
Body Shop.
Brett's Extraction and Construction.
Bridge Irregulars.
British Medical Association.
British Nuclear Fuels Ltd..
British Telecom.
Broomfield Gate Amenity Society.

C

The Campaign Against the Criminal Justice Bill/Act.
Campaign Against Cruelty in World Farming.
Campaign Against the Arms Trade.
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
The Campaign for Real Democracy.
Canterbury City Council.
Canterbury City Council Environment Committee.
Canterbury Conservation Advisory Panel.
Canterbury Conservation Volunteers.
Canterbury Cycling Campaign.
Canterbury District Environmental Network.
Canterbury Environmental Education Centre.
Canterbury Housing Forum.
Canterbury Hunt Saboteurs.
Canterbury Society.
Canterbury Transport Forum.
Canterbury Urban Studies Centre.
Charter 88.
Chartham Action Recycling Enterprise's (C.A.R.E.).
Chartham Cycling Club.
Complementary Health Practice.

The Confederation of British Industry.
The Conservative Party.
Council for Social Responsibility (C.S.R.).
Council for the Protection of Rural England (C.P.R.E.).
Countryside Commission.
Cycle Touring Club.

D

Democratic Left.
Department of the Environment.
Department of Transport (Roads).
Dover District Council.
The Durrell Institute.

E

Earth First! Canterbury.
East Kent Animal Welfare.
East Kent Initiative.
East Kent Smallholders Group.
The Energy Advisory Board.
The Energy Conservation Bill Campaign.
English Heritage.
English Nature.
Environmental Action Coordinator's Office (C.C.C.).
Environmental News.
The Eurotunnel Consortium.

F

Faith in Action.
Faversham District Council.
The Flat Oak Society.
The Forestry Commission.
Friends of the Earth (Canterbury).
Friends of the Earth (Kent Network).
Friends of the Earth (Shepway).
Friends of the Earth (Thanet).
Friends of the Earth (Water Working Group).

G

Government office for the South-East.
Green Left.
Green Party U.K..
Green Party (Canterbury and District).
Green Party (Thanet).
Green Party (Folkestone).
Green Party (The Kent Federation).
Greenpeace International.
Greenpeace U.K..

Greenpeace Canterbury Support Group.
Green-Sword.

H

Harbledown Conservation Association.
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution.
Herne and Broomfield Parish Council.
The Herne Bay and District Residents Association.
Herne Parish Council Promotion Group.
Herne Promotion Group.

I

International Atomic Energy Authority.
International Whaling Commission.

J

Joint Villages Group.

K

The Kent Action Group.
Kent Against a Radioactive Environment (K.A.R.E.).
Kent Bat Group (East Kent).
Kent Building Preservation Trust.
Kent Chamber of Commerce.
Kent Christian Ecology Forum.
Kent County Council.
Kent County Council: Economic Dev. Unit.
K.C.C. Elements Team.
Kent County County: Planning Dept.
Kent Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group.
Kent Federation of Amenity Societies.
Kent Rural Community Council.
Kent Transport Action Forum.
Kent Trust for Nature Conservation.
Kentish Stour Countryside Project.
Kings Hill Action Group.

L

The Labour Party.
Libearty.
The Liberal Democrats.
Liberty (National Council for Civil Liberties).
Local Economic Trading System C'bury
Local Government Management Board.
Local Government review/Local Gov't Review Board.
Littlebourne Parish Council.
Littlehall Pinetum and Woods Association.

M

McLibal Campaign.
Militant/Militant Labour.
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries MAFF

N

The National Grid.
The National Trust (East Kent).
The Natural Law Party.
New Statesman and Society.
The Nightingale Project.
No M11 Link Campaign.
No M65 Campaign.
No Time to Waste.
Northgate Ward Development Project.

O

OfWat.

P

Parliamentary Monitoring Services.
Permaculture Association.
Pfizers.
Plaid Cymru.
Poultry Liberation Front.
PowerGen.

R

Radfall and Broomfield Gate Amenity Society.
The Ramblers.
Rank Organisation.
Red-Green Network.
Revolutionary Communist Party aka:
The Campaign Against Militarism;
Living Marxism; The Critical Lawyers Group; Kent Law Clinic.
Rogers and Son (Waste Management).
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (R.S.P.B.).
Rural Action For the Environment.

S

Save Lyminge Forest Campaign.
"Save our Trees".
Shepway District Council.
"Sign Up for a Change."
Small World- "Undercurrents".
Socialist environmental Research Association (S.E.R.A.).

Socialist Worker's Party (S.W.P.).
 Soil Association.
 South East Water.
 Southern Water .
 Spokes.
 Sustainable Economics.
 Sustrans.

T

Thanet District Council.
 The Way Ahead.
 Third World First.
 Trade Not Aid.
 "Transfrontiers".
 Transport 2000.
 T.V.C. (rave sound system).
 2001: What Kind of Kent?

U

United Nations Association.
 U.K.C. Animal Rights Group (1993-4).
 U.K.C. Green Committee (1993-4).
 U.K.C. Green Committee (1994-5).
 U.K.C. Green Party (1993).
 U.K.C. Greenpeace (1993-4).
 U.K.C. Greenpeace (1994-5).
 U.K.C. Women's Group (1993-4).
 U.K. Independence Party.

W

Watch Trust For Environmental Education.
 White Cliffs Countryside Project.
 Whitstable Mediation.
 Whitstable Natural History.
 Women's Environmental Network.
 Woodland Trust.
 Worker's Revolutionary Party.
 World Development Movement.
 World Education and Development Group
 (WEDGE).
 Whynott Aluminium.

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