

**MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICAL CULTURE:
AUTHORITARIANISM AND PRESS REPRESENTATIONS OF POLITICAL
DEVIANCE IN GREECE**

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**Thesis submitted for examination for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in Sociology**

Abstract

This study focuses on the role of the politics of signification, and in particular, on the role of the press in the reproduction and transformation of political culture.

It is suggested that the systemic/behaviourist approach to political culture initiated by the "Civic Culture Thesis" proposed by Almond and Verba limits the scope of the study of political culture. It is therefore argued that a reformulation of the concept of political culture premised upon post-Parsonian critical social science traditions (such as the work of R. Williams, the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and P. Bourdieu, provides a new interdisciplinary framework that permits the consideration of hitherto little explored aspects of political culture formation, reproduction and change such as the role of mass communications in these processes. In this, alternative theoretical context, a provisional attempt is made to examine the possible links between mass communications and the reproduction/change of political culture.

The empirical part of this work explores the process of formation and reproduction of authoritarian elements of Greek political culture through the political press and is divided in two sections. The first examines the social/historical processes which led to the formation and reproduction of contemporary Greek political culture and the development of the Greek political press. In the second part, I examine the Athens press performance with particular reference to press representations of the confrontation between the state and a social/political minority which has become known as "the marginals". The press "text" then is interpreted on the basis of the social/historical context, in which it is produced and interpreted, and its relationship with Greek political culture is examined.

The argument is concluded with a provisional consideration of the relationship of political culture and the press, based on the theoretical and empirical evidence, thus preparing the ground for further study of political culture and mass communications.

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SYMBOLS USED IN THE CASE STUDIES TEXT

< > : supplementary information not originally included in a quoted text

<=> : explanatory information not originally included in a quoted text

' ' : quotation originally included in a quoted text

" " : includes quotation of text or terms as they appear in the original

<...> : indicates the omission of part of the quoted passage

bold characters indicate emphasis in the original text

Note on Transliteration

The system of transliteration used in this dissertation represents an attempt to retain some balance between the orthography and phonology of modern Greek. Thus pronunciation following conventions of standard English will reasonably approximate the sound of modern Greek.

Exception has been made in the case of well-known names of persons and areas for which anglicized forms are more often used (i.e. Athens instead of Athina).

LETTERS

α	a	ν	n
β	v	ξ	x
γ	g	ο	o
δ	d	π	p
ε	e	ρ	r
ζ	z	σ, ς	s
η	i	τ	t
θ	th (as in "theatre")	υ	y
ι	i	φ	f
κ	k	χ	ch
λ	l	ψ	ps
μ	m	ω	o

DIGRAPHS

αι	ai (as in "paid")
ει	ei (as in "receipt")
ου	ou (as in "soup")
οι	oi (pronounced [i] as in "machine")
αυ, ευ	af, ef (before unvoiced consonants)
αυ, ευ	av, ev (before voiced phonemes)

COMBINED CONSONANTS

γγ, γκ	g, ng
μπ	b mb
ντ	d, nd

Acknowledgements

A simple expression of deep gratitude is not enough for thanking people who in a personal and intellectual way hold a unique place not only in the development of this thesis but, in the process of maturing that its author had to undergo.

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Dr. Howard Davis who over the years patiently read numerous papers and drafts and provided invaluable advice and constructive criticism. It is through his encouragement, his generous giving of time and ideas, his insightful comments and suggestions and his constant but polite reminding of deadlines that had to be met, that my disperse and chaotic thoughts found their way in this final form of the thesis.

At earlier stages of this research, I greatly benefited from the sincere, invaluable comments of a number of people; I am indebted to Nicolas Demertzis for discussing and patiently reading earlier drafts of the thesis, as well as for making me aware of the existence of valuable research material; Dave Reason for reading drafts and engaging in stimulating discussions on the thesis proper and on more general theoretical questions; Professor Ilias Katsoulis for his support and interest, his inspiring ideas and his continuous faith in the ultimate product of my research. My thanks are also due to Professor Thanos Veremis whose interest and encouragement were vital for the undertaking of this research. To all of them I want to express my gratitude and appreciation.

I must also thank the staff of the Benakeios Library in Athens, especially its director Mr Pavlopoulos, and the staff of the Eleftherotypia archives who made my research in Athens possible despite the long industrial disputes during the period of my fieldwork in Greece. The staff of the Templeman Library Photographic Unit at the University of Kent provided valuable advice and help which made possible the inclusion of the illustrations in the thesis.

I am grateful to the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Kent; the Latsis Foundation in Athens and the Alcorn-Box Memorial Fund Committee, for their financial assistance at various stages of the research and preparation of the thesis for submission.

I am profoundly grateful to Spyros Sofos for his constant love and understanding, and for providing endless

support and help throughout the research. His understanding and knowledge of the society this thesis deals with, his so generously given ideas, his scrupulous comments and criticism provided an inspiring atmosphere that kept my interest going even in periods of disillusionment and self-doubt. To him I am personally and intellectually indebted.

Valuable support and encouragement throughout the research and writing-up of this thesis has been offered by good friends; in particular I express my gratitude to Roni Ganiari, Laura Peters, Zuhail Akunal, Stefanos Christodoulou, Azar Zankaneh Lorpari, Maaji Yakub, Noorje de Heus and Alex Conner for sharing moments of joy as well as disappointments and for always caring.

I also thank my family; my parents for their moral and financial support, love and understanding; my grandfather Pandelis who did not live to see this thesis completed but whose life motivated me to formulate some of the questions underlying this thesis; and last but certainly not least, my grandmother Katina who, over the years has been an invaluable and much needed source of love and stability, and whose constant affection, support, and faith in me helped me overcome the difficulties that such an undertaking always entails. It is to her and to my grandfather's memory that this thesis is dedicated.

It goes without saying that responsibility for any errors, omissions and opinions expressed in this thesis is mine alone.

INTRODUCTION

The key questions that permeate this study might be summarized as follows: "What is political culture?", "what precisely is political about it?" and "how could we study it?". These questions are particularly important in the light of the relatively recent experiences of "decolonization" and "democratization" throughout the world as the debates on "democratic consolidation" in the European South, or "democratization" in the third world and, currently, in Central/Eastern European societies would indicate.

The late 1950s witnessed a process of introspection and transformation of mainstream political science which up to then had concentrated mainly on formal aspects of the political process, thus ignoring other less formal aspects of the "political". The first theoretical framework for the study of political culture emerged through attempts to develop adequate tools for comparative analysis of different political systems and to deal with the problems of decolonization and democratization of young states and societies. However, during the seventies, post-Parsonian theories transformed radically the theoretical landscape through their critique of mainstream political and social sciences and, as far as the theory of political

culture is concerned, through the rejection of the latter's behaviourism, psychologism and westernism. Post-Parsonian social science, recognizing the interrelation between culture, action and structure provided the framework for the development of a dynamic concept of political culture which shapes structures and is shaped by them.

The transition to "democracy" in Greece, and more generally in the European South, since the 1970s makes quite evident that the process of democratization could not be restricted only to the transformation of constitutional and other legal structures or of governmental institutions; it should involve the transformation of cultural relationships which affect the definition of the boundaries of the "political". Indeed, in the case of Greece, the fall of the dictatorship in July 1974, triggered a slow process of dismantling the post-civil war system of legal exclusion and discrimination against a substantial part of the population and raised hopes for the establishment of a democratic polity.

However the emerging political actors of the time through their political practices reproduced or introduced authoritarian elements in the organization of political and social life. Thus the political sphere was defined in rather restrictive terms, as a partocratic regime (including only mainstream social and political forces) monopolized the political arena and controlled the universe of political discourse at the expense of existing or emerging social or

political diversity. This was not a result of imposition of the political will of political parties through force and coercion, but rather - as I hope to demonstrate - it constituted the outcome of the attainment of hegemony of the mainstream political parties over a substantial part of Greek society, that is, of the successful articulation of elements of popular culture into their political project(s). The formation of an authoritarian political culture has therefore been the outcome of a complex - and often contradictory - process of hegemonic incorporation. This thesis will focus on the role of the politics of signification, and in particular, on the role of the mass media, in the reproduction and transformation of political culture, as mass communication constitutes one of the social processes which plays a crucial role in such an endeavour.

This study seeks to explore the processes of formation or reproduction of authoritarian elements of Greek political culture through the mass media. For this, I shall attempt a hermeneutic analysis of Greek media performance in selected situations in which the official discourse was challenged by sub-cultural groups which have been widely known in Greece as "marginals".

In Part I of this thesis I outline the theoretical shift that the concept of political culture has undergone from its original context of structural functionalist social science to post-Parsonian sociology and political science. Chapter 1 focuses on the emergence and development of the civic culture

theory and examines the theoretical, ideological and political background of its career. In Chapter 2, drawing upon post-Parsonian contributions in the study of culture such as those of R. Williams, P. Bourdieu, Z. Bauman, or the Birmingham School, I shall try to examine their contribution to the development of alternative conceptualizations of political culture, and assess the latter. In Chapter 3, I shall attempt to elaborate on the links between political culture and mass communication through a brief discussion of the relationship of basic theories of mass communication and political culture and their theoretical implications in the study of the latter.

In Part II, I explore the formation and the contours of contemporary Greek political culture and the contribution of the mass media - and in particular, the press - in shaping and reproducing the former. In Chapter 4, through a historical analysis of social developments in modern Greece, I examine the structural and institutional framework in which contemporary political practices unfold, while in Chapter 5, I concentrate on the institution of the press and examine the social, political and economic context in which it has developed, and explore its role in the production, or dissemination of definitions of the situation in contemporary Greece.

In Part III, I shall attempt to study the press representations of the confrontation between the state and social/political minorities which have become known as the

"marginals". I have selected four main "events" which attracted considerable coverage by the Athens press (the equivalent of national press). These "events" could be considered to be situations in which the official discourse was challenged by these sub-cultural groups, and therefore represent instances in which press performance might be crucial for the reproduction of the official discourse. In Chapter 6, I attempt to situate the selected the case studies in their social-historical context, while in Chapter 7, I analyse the texts which comprize the press coverage of these events. Finally, Chapter 8 constitutes an attempt to throw light to the ways in which the particular languages and inventories employed in the press coverage of these "events" are related to the reproduction of the hegemonic political culture in Greek society. In this way this interpretation of the press performance during these "events", serves as the "link" between the "text" of news coverage and the particular social-historical conditions in which it is produced.

Finally, drawing upon this analysis of press representations of political deviance in contemporary Greece and their relationship with the Greek political culture, I argue for the importance of further research on the interrelationship between mass communications and political culture.

PART I
POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS
COMMUNICATION

**PART I: POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS COMMUNICATION:
INTRODUCTION**

The concept of political culture was first introduced in the 1960's as an integral part of the then mainstream political theory. The civic culture theory with which the concept was closely linked, occupied a prominent position in mainstream political science throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's, and slowly declined towards the 1980's. After a period of stagnation, the concept reemerged in a quite different context as attempts were made to reconstruct it within different theoretical traditions.

In Part I, I shall attempt to outline the theoretical shift that the concept of political culture has undergone since its introduction, from the context of systemic political science to critical traditions of the social sciences. I shall also argue that the processes of reevaluation and reconstruction of the concept led to the emergence of a more interdisciplinary outlook in the study of political culture as they were informed by developments in the fields of cultural studies, linguistics and mass communication studies.

Chapter I traces the formative moments of the concept and attempts to provide a link with the political,

theoretical and ideological background of the civic culture theory. Although the civic culture theory constituted an original way of providing a link between micro and macro analysis, and the introduction of the concept itself appeared to resolve problems faced by developmental and comparative studies, the civic culture thesis was sharing the intellectual and political bias of the broader theoretical paradigm of which it was integral part. The "cultural"-consensual normative definitions of society and polity it sustained and reproduced were in fact reflecting the essentially conservative outlook of the theory, while the linear-evolutionist schema of political-cultural development and its cultural bias attracted considerable criticism, while a series of changes in the political sphere that took place in the three decades following the introduction of the concept of political culture challenged the model of politics upon which the concept was based. It is these changes in the political sphere that I shall try to identify as a movement towards the "authoritarian transformation of democracy" and as the "emergence of the new social movements". It should be pointed out that both "the authoritarian transformation of democracy" and "the emergence of the new social movements" should be viewed as processes which have been taking place over a substantial period of time, sometimes following parallel courses and sometimes not. What is more, I should emphasize that the order in which these developments are presented and discussed is not a chronological one; it is

rather a "thematic" one.

The second chapter focuses on alternative conceptualizations of political culture. Its first part constitutes an attempt to trace the theoretical premises of efforts to "rehabilitate" the concept of political culture and integrate it in critical traditions of the social sciences. Particular emphasis is given to developments in the field of cultural studies, and especially the work of Raymond Williams, as they have been influential in the development of alternative conceptualizations of political culture (cf. Gransow and Offe 1982; Demertzis 1985, 1989). In the second part, I attempt to draw an outline of these alternative conceptualizations, to discuss their theoretical implications and to propose a typology of political cultures that is premised on Gransow and Offe's notion of political "emancipation".

The final chapter explores and elaborates on the links between political culture and mass communication by discussing the basic tenets of theories of mass communication on the social and political significance of the mass media and examining how the latter affect political interaction, and especially, their role in the social determination, production and mobilization, of meaning, and its political ramifications.

CHAPTER 1

THE CIVIC CULTURE THESIS: AN OVERVIEW

During the 1950s, the processes of "de-colonisation" led to the creation of numerous new states which confronted quite different problems from those faced by their western counterparts. As the majority of them were artificial, ethnically or culturally fragmented entities, products of the colonial administrative legacy, virtually unable to sustain themselves as they had to overcome acute problems of political instability and economic and technological underdevelopment, they developed - or were forced to develop - different political systems from those of the Western societies. Even in cases where western prototypes and institutions were adopted, the different cultural and historical backgrounds and the sizeable obstacles they had to overcome, led to outcomes which did not resemble to their prototype in western democracy.

On the other hand, Western democracies seemed to experience a high degree of political stability and to enjoy a period of economic growth, in contrast with the "fragile democracies" and the economic stagnancy of the "developing" and "underdeveloped" countries.

It is in the context of this comparison between underdeveloped and developed countries that assumptions of economic, political and cultural superiority of the latter emerged; alongside it also emerging an "end of ideology thesis" (D. Bell, 1960) based on a strong optimism and faith in western democracy which came to be considered as the "telos" of historical evolution.

It is this atmosphere of enthusiastic and optimistic acceptance of the superiority of western democracy as a form of political organisation that provided the framework for comparative analysis of different patterns of development by - initially - American social scientists and, for the eventual establishment and influence of developmental studies and comparative politics within the social sciences. (cf. Almond, 1956; Apter, 1958; 1965; Pye, 1966; Lapalombara and Weiner, 1966).

Despite D. Apter's assurances to the contrary (Apter, 1965: 56-7), there is strong evidence suggesting that a conceptual convergence between modernization and westernization was underlying this newly developed trend in the social sciences as the concept of political modernization elaborated by most theorists of political development indicates.

It soon became evident however that the adoption of western democratic institutions by developing and

underdeveloped states could not itself guarantee the formation of what was considered to be a "genuinely democratic political system".

In their book "The Civic Culture", Almond and Verba (1963) elaborated on the reasons which, in their opinion, were rendering any attempt of modernization through the introduction of "western" institutions alone, ineffective. More precisely they argued that:

"If the democratic model of the participatory state is to develop in these new nations, it will require more than the formal institutions of democracy -universal suffrage, the political party, the elective legislature. ... A democratic form of participatory political system requires as well a political culture consistent with it." (p. 5)

Almond and Verba viewed the concept of "political culture" as the missing element in attempts to understand why institutional transformations alone were failing to initiate democratization of the political systems of "underdeveloped" societies, or, more generally, why political systems with similar structural-functional characteristics did not appear to attain the same degrees of democratization. Therefore, the introduction of the concept was intended to overcome these shortcomings which confronted the work of political system theorists. This, they attempted to achieve by relating the macro-political level of analysis which had been developed through the work of systemic social and political theorists (cf. Parsons, Easton and Lipset) with the micro-political level of analysis that had been established

through the work of American behavioural scientists and psychologists in the field of individual political psychology (cf. Lasswell and Lazarsfeld).

Their notion of political culture which was considerably influenced by the developments in the fields of anthropology and psychology in the United States (cf. Benedict, 1934; Lasswell, 1930; 1948; Mead, 1951), referred to the internalization of the political system in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of the population of a nation, or "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the members of the nation" (Almond and Verba: 14). The writers conceived as political objects the political system as a whole, its inputs and outputs in particular, structures and roles involved in the input and output processes, as well as the individuals in their capacity as political actors (p. 15).

Table 1: Dimensions of political orientation

	1.	2.	3.	4.
	System as general object	Input objects	Output objects	Self as object

Cognition
Affect
Evaluation

Source: Almond, G., and S. Verba (1963), p. 16.

Influenced by the theoretical framework introduced by Parsons and Shils (Parsons and Shils, 1951), Almond and Verba adopted and applied to the political level, their distinction of three types of orientations, that is, cognitive, affective and evaluational (Table 1). According to the distribution of different types of orientations towards different types of political objects, they distinguished three ideal-types of political culture (Table 2).

The first - the parochial type of culture - is characterised by lack of differentiation among political, on the one hand, and religious, economic and social roles on the other. Thus, a "parochial culture" is characterised by lack of any kind of active orientation towards the political system. As Almond and Verba claim, in a parochial culture individuals do not have any expectations from the political system, and, generally, remain politically indifferent (p. 17-19). A more "advanced" type of political culture is that of the "subject political culture", in which the individuals recognise the existence of a differentiated political - governmental - power, but are not predisposed to act towards participating in or transforming this power. In other words, individuals evaluate - positively or negatively - the outputs and the political system itself, but are not positively oriented towards expressing demands, therefore remaining essentially passive (p. 19). Finally, the "participant type of political culture" (p. 19) presupposes the recognition of

political roles and institutions by individuals who are oriented towards a more active role and participation in both the input and the output processes of the political system. In other words, individuals are predisposed towards expressing demands and manifesting their favourable or unfavourable orientations towards the system as a whole.

As the threefold distinction of parochial, subject and participant political cultures is a classification of ideal-types, and cannot in practice reflect the dimension of political development and cultural change, Almond and Verba introduced the notion of congruence between political culture and the structures of the political system. More precisely, they argued that they considered a type of political culture to be congruent with the political structure when the individual's cognitive orientations towards the appropriate political objects are, or tend to be, accurate, and his/her affective and evaluative orientations are positive (Table 3).

On the other hand, they claimed that incongruence occurs when cognitive orientations towards the appropriate political subjects are more or less accurate, but affective and evaluative orientations are not positive (Table 3). In order to reflect this incongruence between political culture and the political system in its historical dimension, Almond and Verba pointed out that in fact, the political culture of a nation does not correspond to the three ideal-types they

introduced, but rather to "systemically mixed political

TABLE 2
Types of political culture

	System as general object	Input objects	Output objects	Self as object
Parochial	0	0	0	0
Subject	1	0	1	0
Participant	1	1	1	1

Source: Almond, G., and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 17.

TABLE 3
Congruence/incongruence between political
culture and structure

	Allegiance	Apathy	Alienation
Cognitive orientation	+	+	+
Affective orientation	+	0	-
Evaluative orientation	+	0	-

(+): high frequency of awareness, or of positive feeling, or of evaluation towards political objects.

(-): high frequency of negative evaluations or feelings.

(0): high frequency of indifference

Source: Almond, G., and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 22.

cultures" or sub-types of political cultures, that could be classified as "parochial-subject", "subject-participant" and "parochial-participant".

According to Almond and Verba, political cultures are heterogenous not only in terms of the above classification, but also in terms of the existence of different political subcultures within a political culture, which correspond to differences in political orientation, or to the political object the orientation is directed towards.

Although Almond and Verba considered participant culture to be essential for the establishment and maintenance of a participatory democracy, they nevertheless claimed that for the sake of congruence between participant political culture and the political structure of a democratic polity, potentially uncontrollable participant orientations which might destabilize and eventually put in danger the very existence of the political system should be "managed", and therefore, ideally, commitment to politics should be moderated. This, they argued, can be achieved when the political culture is an essentially participant one, but subject and parochial political orientations are blended in it in such a way that participatory "excesses", which they considered harmful to democratic politics, would be counterbalanced by values and orientations congruent with parochial and subject cultures.

Therefore, the type of political culture which,

according to the writers, would be congruent with a "participatory democratic" polity is the civic culture, a combination of parochial and subject attitudes with participant political orientations within the context of an allegiant participant culture. They argued that a fusion between participant orientations and subject and parochial attitudes could lead to a culture in which political involvement would be "balanced" by a degree of passivity and an attachment to traditional values which would therefore guarantee citizens subject to law and authority who respect the "power and leadership" of the government" (pp. 473-76).

As Kavanagh observed, the civic culture is

"a dualistic orientation to political authority ... is a mixed political culture in which the subject orientations allow the elites the necessary initiative and freedom to take decisions and are countered by the participant orientations which make the elites sensitive to popular preferences" (Kavanagh, 1972: 14).

Working within the context of systemic theory, Almond and Verba, conceived political culture as distinct from, and external to political structure. Whereas political culture is effectively reduced to psychological orientations towards political objects, structure is conceived of in terms of roles or patterns of roles, independent of their incumbents and external to human action. As Demertzis has observed (Demertzis, 1985: 142-3), this relation of externality between what the authors regard as a "meaningful" culture on the one hand, and a "neutral" and "meaningless" structure

obscures the fact that both "culture" and "structure" are meaningful normative orders which both structure and are structured by human activity. If this premise is accepted, then the notion of incongruence between culture and structure should not be interpreted, as it is suggested, as a manifestation of the dysfunction of the political system, that is, its inability to satisfy demands informed by the political culture; rather it should be viewed as a manifestation of the contradictory reality of the societal order, or of "the conflict between two different and antagonistic historical temporalities within and over the same field of historicity" (Demertzis, 1989: 271).

The introduction of the concept of political culture by Almond and Verba has been a very significant attempt to introduce a linkage between the macro and micro-political level of analysis, and to theorize a relationship between the political system and its functions, and the political behaviour of individuals. However, Almond and Verba adopt a psychological view (Almond and Verba 1963: 12-16) which effectively reduces political culture to fragmented individual attitudes towards the political system, its inputs and outputs. Having adopted a "psychologistic" approach, by isolating individuals from their social-historical milieu, and ignoring the framework of sociopolitical relations and social interaction that shapes and influences their "psychological orientations towards political objects", the authors introduce an a-historical conception of culture. What

is more, as the authors conceive political culture as merely a set of attitudes and orientations formed through political socialization, they regard the individual as a passive receiver of transmitted attitudes, predispositions and political orientations. This presumed passivity of the individual is by no means affected by the authors' attempt to "expand" their theory of political socialization by arguing that socialization is not a necessarily "unidirectional" process, (p. 326) as their rejection of "unidirectionality" in fact refers to recognition of the mutual influence among different authority patterns and does not suggest any possibility of interaction between the individual and social institutions or authority patterns. Hence, the position of the individuals remains unaltered as they continue being "bombarded" by different sources of influence, without being recognized as knowledgeable agents, possessing the capacity to negotiate and internalize in a creative way their own life experiences and externalize these very experiences through their action.

It should also be pointed out that although Almond and Verba maintain throughout their analysis that a key concept in their "civic culture" thesis is that of "participatory democracy", their conception of "participatory democracy" appears to be a rather limited one, as it appears to be premised upon the assumption that "balanced disparities", that is, balanced contradictions between two sets of goals - governmental power and authority, and governmental

responsiveness to citizens' demands - are a necessary element for the effective function of the political system (Almond and Verba, p. 476; also Eckstein 1966). The implication of such an argument is the adoption of an "elitist" definition of democracy based upon a fundamental distinction between governmental elites, which are invested with governmental power and monopolize the decision making process, and non-elites, whose only political role is narrowed down to "participation in government" within the institutional constraints of the political system, that is, through the electoral process, or expression of demands through pressure groups, but in fact never attempting to participate in the decision making process, or to confront, reject or alter the system as a whole.

What is more, the elitist implications of the premises of the theory of political culture reduce the interaction between elites and non-elites to the "sensitivity" of the former to the needs of the latter (Almond and Verba: 477). In this context, as it has been argued, the "civic culture" thesis amounts to the "celebration of the role of political apathy and disinterest" (Pateman, 1980). As Almond and Verba maintain that the active citizen is in fact a utopian creature, they recognize a fundamental distinction between governing and governed, by accepting the existence of an "external" relationship between them, and in this way virtually reducing citizens to the role of rather a-political "subjects".

Related to these elitist-technocratic premises of the "civic culture thesis" is the fact that the underlying theme in Almond and Verba's analysis is not that of democracy but the maintenance of the stability of the political system, (Ch. 15) as the main concern of the writers shifts from citizens' participation to consensus on the political process, a consensus based on a shared set of values (political culture) that would prevent any disruption of political stability.

It should be pointed out that this essentially Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy in terms of a competition among elites for electoral approval by relatively apolitical and privatized citizens, with particular emphasis on the existence of strong leadership and effective governmental authority, was conceived by the authors as best realized in the sociopolitical reality of the United States and the United Kingdom.¹ The whole study conducted by Almond and Verba was based on the acceptance that the anglo-saxon democracies (or more precisely the United States and the United Kingdom) have been "successful experiments in democratic government" (p. 37). This, combined with the closeness of "civic culture" to the "set of values" that the writers associated to the participatory ideal of anglo-saxon democracy is indicating that the "civic culture" thesis is biased in the sense that it privileges and reifies the type of democracy that has developed in anglo-saxon

societies. In this way, Almond and Verba's theory of political culture reduces cultural and political diversity into a linear-evolutionist schema with civic culture, and therefore anglo-saxon democracy, acquiring a universal and prescriptive value within the context of the authors' "end of history" thesis which underlies the civic culture paradigm. To take this argument even further, it could be pointed out that their theory of political culture is "formalist", in the sense that it is preoccupied with the maintenance of the "form" through discovering the appropriate "content". It therefore does not address the issue of the "content" of democratic institutions, or, in other words, is unable to grasp the possibility of a "structural" change while the "structures" of the system remain apparently unaltered. In this way it remains committed to a "model" of liberal democracy, while it is unable to take into account the changes that liberal democracies have been, and are still undergoing, without substantial "formal" changes in their institutional framework. Taking this into account, we could argue that the "Civic Culture thesis" is not adequately equipped, in methodological and conceptual terms, to address the phenomenon of the "transformation of democracy" which I shall discuss later ² and, therefore, remains an essentially apologetic and non-critical theory.

Although the "civic culture thesis" was a significant attempt to expand the study of politics beyond the study of governmental institutions by focusing attitudes towards

political objects and their effects, it however developed within a functionalist-systemic context is premised on a view of politics as a subsystem, functioning for the maintenance of the equilibrium of the social system. This, in turn, implies that the sphere of the "political" is treated as distinct from other social spheres, as fixed boundaries between what is considered to be political and non political are being set and reified. This view of politics is based on the denial of the social-historical character of the "political", and ignores the possibility of the politicization of apparently non-political social spheres and/or the depoliticization of what would, at a different time or space be considered as political.

Beyond the Liberal-democratic Model of Politics: the
Changing Political Sphere of Western Democracies.

However, the changes which most of the advanced western societies have been witnessing since the mid-sixties, and which have frequently been interpreted from different points of view as aspects of a wider transformation of these societies into what some thinkers named one-dimensional societies (Marcuse 1991), or towards what others saw as post-materialist societies (Inglehart 1977b) have challenged, in different ways, the very premises of the theory of "liberal democracy" as it had been formulated by American political science.

The socio-economic and political trends in western societies, since the sixties, have undermined the plausibility and the theoretical and political credibility of the theories which had developed within the context of mainstream systemic comparative politics. As it has been pointed out in the previous pages, the theoretical paradigm of "liberal democracy", had been premised upon the characterization of western, or, more specifically, anglo-saxon societies as exemplary participatory democracies. The success of these polities, it was held, was to a significant extent due to their capacity to maintain social and political stability. The liberal-democratic model of politics presupposed the existence of a shared set of positive orientations and a consensus towards, at least the means, and possibly the ends of the democratic process. This consensus was of crucial importance as it was through the political forms of the liberal-democratic political process that demands and conflicting interests arising in civil society could be accommodated or limited, and conflict could be "absorbed".

What is more, underlying these considerations there seemed to be a certainty as far as the future of western democracies was concerned, as, it was thought, the continuation of the trends of economic growth of the sixties would decrease social tensions, strengthen the conflict-resolving capacity of the liberal-democratic polity and therefore sustain political stability.

However, it could be argued that the proponents of the liberal-democratic model of politics proved to be lacking a sense of historicity and to be based upon an inflexible and rather narrow understanding of the political. Although it should be acknowledged that their theory of democracy was informed by a deep concern about the conditions which might lead to the (re)emergence of totalitarian regimes, it was nevertheless unable to account for the changes which most of the advanced western societies were already undergoing.

Since the inter-war period the state had been abandoning its "watchdog" role and had been increasingly assuming a range of new tasks that were eventually to affect not only the economic sphere but also almost every aspect of social life. The post-war years in particular, have been characterized by a pattern of intensification of the expansion of the state: this expansion was necessitated by the objective of achieving long-term social stability and legitimation, which was linked, initially with the imperatives of the enterprise of economic reconstruction and, eventually, with the institutionalized undertaking of new complex tasks by the state, in the form of welfare (Offe, 1984c: 147) or other distributive and regulating interventions that would guarantee the physical and social reproduction of their populations, safeguarding, at the same time the internal dynamics of the economic system upon which the state itself depends.³

These new tasks aiming towards the prevention or the management of potential economic and political crises led to increased internal complexity of the state as well as to its engagement in a process of increasing involvement in economic and social life. As it has been suggested, this tendency of state expansion towards areas hitherto "uninhabited" by it, and the density that characterizes it, has led to the blurring of the boundaries between state and civil society + as the former has permeated the latter to such an extent that the political sphere, as it is understood in the context of the theory of liberal democracy, appears to be too limited to encompass the phenomena of multiplication and diffusion of political instances which characterize advanced, complex societies (Melucci 1989: 165, also 172-4).

The increased complexity of the state, characterized by the multiplication of its decision-making centres for a variety of differentiated tasks, has led to a complex relationship between it and civil society as almost every aspect of the production and reproduction of physical and social life has become the object of public policy, and, at the same time a potential conflict generating issue. These developments have led to the politicization of areas of social activity that had hitherto been situated outside the traditional political sphere of liberal democracy as new issues became open to public discussion and negotiation and could potentially generate confrontation. At the same time, a movement towards the restoration of the "authority" of the

state, constituted a parallel process of depoliticization of domains of social activity by restricting the scope of the legitimate participants in them, and by substituting invisible, non-political forms of negotiation and decision-making for political, and more or less publicly visible processes.

In view of this complex transformation of the political sphere, the traditional institutions and processes of liberal democracy appeared unable to fulfil the role which they had been accorded by liberal-democratic theory: the ability of traditional channels of the democratic political process to transform social conflict into what Lipset has called "democratic class struggle" has been considerably reduced - as the debate on the crisis of the democratic political institutions would suggest ⁵ - while new institutions have been formed in order to cover the conflict-articulation deficit of liberal democracy - the literature on the emergence of the new social movements is indicative of this.

The same appears to be true as far as the conflict-regulating capacity of the liberal-democratic institutions is concerned. As the ability of these institutions to regulate conflict has become less certain, a shift of the location of the decision-making centres from the conventional, parliamentary institutions to new settings located outside the liberal democratic political sphere seems to have been taking place. What is more, as it has been

pointed out, in addition to the "relocation" of decision-making centres, the policy-formation process has also been undergoing considerable change as governments appear to "rely increasingly upon criteria and standards of performance derived from other sources than the democratic political process" (Offe, 1984a: 166).

Thus, while it is evident that, contrary to the postulations of liberal-democratic political theory, the democratic political process and institutions are no longer performing a significant role in the political process of western advanced societies, they nevertheless continue to formally retain a central position in it (Offe, 1984a: 166-76; Melucci, 1989: 172).

As a consequence of this new state of affairs, behind the apparent "durability" of the democratic political process, the state, governing elites and citizens have been engaged in a radical redefinition of politics through by-passing the hitherto conventional democratic political forms and transcending the limits of the political sphere of liberal democracy.

The interpretations of these changes in the political sphere of advanced western societies appear to point towards the emergence of two interrelated phenomena, notably the shift towards instances of conflict regulation or even repression by the state through inaccessible, invisible and poorly legitimized processes and institutions, on the one

hand, and the formation of new channels of conflict articulation and political action, on the other.

The "Authoritarian Transformation of Democracy".

The shift towards increasing conflict regulation through the relocation of the decision making process to settings outside the conventional political sphere of liberal democracy, and towards new methods of conflict regulation and repression in western democracies provided the starting point for a series of critical interpretations⁶ of the developments in advanced capitalist societies, as particular attention was drawn to the existence and further development of an authoritarian dimension in the liberal democratic political process and the political culture of advanced western societies.

The critiques of the authoritarian transformation of western polities drew considerably upon European anti-liberal traditions, and especially Carl Schmitt's critique of liberalism. To a large extent, they constituted a renewal of Schmitt's argument - and of its elaborations within the context of marxian theoretical traditions - against liberal democracy, with particular emphasis on the distinction between "true" or "substantive" and "formal" democracy and on the totalitarian elements of liberalist social theory (Agnoli 1972; Ferrajoli 1985; Marcuse 1968).⁷

At the same time, they anticipated, and reflected, the experiences of the Western European extra-parliamentary Left and the political radicalism -and anti-liberalism- of the sixties, a period of social and political turmoil when the limitations and inflexibility of the liberal democratic political process were seriously challenged by unprecedented waves of political protest, when the first experiments for the formation of a "fundamental opposition", developing outside the conventional political institutions of the liberal democratic polity were greeted with enthusiasm and optimism (Agnoli 1972; Ferrajoli 1985; Marcuse 1991).

Despite the differing emphases in the works of exponents of the critique of the authoritarian tendencies within modern democratic polities, there appear to be some common underlying elements in most interpretations of the shift towards authoritarianism, as far as the developments in modern western democracies are concerned; emphasis is placed on the fact that western industrial societies are characterized by the emergence of an authoritarian technical rationality that is reflected in the development of modes of social organization premised on the centrality of regulation and disciplining, important aspects of which are the oligopolistic planning of production and distribution of commodities, the formation of massive private and public organizations which threaten to engulf social life (Marcuse 1991; also Habermas 1987) and the shift towards the establishment of increasingly authoritarian political

structures at the political level.

As it has been pointed out by the proponents of the authoritarian democracy critique, under these conditions of increased complexity of modern societies and polities, a necessary condition for the continuation of effective exercise of state power, and therefore of the ability of the state to neutralize social conflict and support the economic dynamics of advanced capitalist societies, is its extensive transformation through the recourse to new institutional, ideological and technical means of conflict regulation and social control that bypass the political forms of liberal democracy.

As Johannes Agnoli, one of the exponents of the "authoritarian transformation" thesis, has pointed out, in the post-war years parliamentary democracy has had the complex task of regulating and neutralizing social and political contradictions through the uncoupling of citizenship from the decision making process (Agnoli, 1972).

This task entailed the fundamental transformation of the political sphere and of the institutional framework of modern liberal democracies, which encompassed an extensive redefinition of the "political" through the displacement of traditional representative processes and institutions, by new, extraparliamentary, rather informal, and less visible forms of negotiation and decision making, such as the

increasing involvement of administrators and "experts" (Gransow and Offe 1982; Offe 1984a) the existence of "subterranean governments" or "cryptogovernment" (Bobbio, 1987), or often arrangements of a corporatist or neocorporatist character (cf. Schmitter, 1974; Panitch, 1976) that, contrary to the postulations of pluralist theories, establish and maintain unequal access of interests to the decision making centres of advanced western democracies and limit considerably the scope and the extent of popular political participation.

This transformation however, has been taking place while the institutional framework of liberal democracy has remained intact, at least at first sight. In fact, what has really taken place is the "modernization" of the state, in the sense of its adaptation to the new forms of collective life (mass society), and the improvement and updating of the means by which domination is secured behind the facade of the unaltered institutional framework of liberal democracy which, it is argued, has been providing the citizens with the illusion of self-government and popular power, and at the same time, has been concealing their "deactivation", as the loci of the decision-making process have remained inaccessible to them. Ferrajoli illustrated this illusion of self-government by pointing out the fact that the emphasis on, and the praise of liberal and democratic values is in fact concealing a shift, common to all western democracies, from the democratic ideal of "popular power" to the reality

of "popular consent" pointing out in this way the fact that the basis of democracy in western capitalist societies is not popular power, but consent, "not active participation, but passive acceptance" (Ferrajoli, 1985: 31-40). Furthermore, he argued that

"the popular participation in power is exercised as activation of authority through consent, that is, as canalisation (and manipulation) of popular consent towards an authority which is invested to the state." (ibid. : 36)

What is more, it could be argued that "the democracy of consent" could become in the long run, and, to an extent it has been, "democracy of indifference", a virtually "apolitical democracy" as the scope of political activity becomes drastically reduced. As Marcuse has pointed out, the spread of instrumental reason has significantly affected politics in modern "advanced" societies. The distortion of the universe of communication of modern societies by instrumental reason has brought about a "closed" culture, in the sense of the exclusion of dissent, opposition and critique from the universe of discourse, and has reified the "present" by eliminating historical consciousness (Marcuse, 1991: 84-120). In this context, as politics have effectively been reduced to a simple procedure of choice among different means to reach a given end, the political agenda in modern democracies has been considerably limited.

Consequently, the political forms of liberal democracy are being displaced and transformed in order to adapt to a

mass society characterized by the expansion of instrumental rationality. As para-parliamentary ways of negotiation, decision-making and consensus building have been developing at the expense of the parliamentary political process, the institutional framework of liberal democracy has been undergoing a significant transformation in line with the general trend of depoliticization. Thus a process of de-coupling of the decision-making from the democratic process could be detected in the tendency of governments to loosen their ties and accountability to parliamentary bodies or to the political parties upon which they formally depend (Agnoli 1972: 69-72; Offe 1984a: 171), or even in the convergence and transformation of political parties into "catch-all" parties with no clear identity and ideology, unwilling to represent sections of the electorate that might alienate them from the majority of the electorate and cost them a wide electoral support (Kirchheimer 1966; Agnoli 1972: 90-94; Ferrajoli 1985: 32-34; Offe 1984a: 169-70).

The argument concerning the changing nature of the political institutions of liberal democracy has been developed further by Agnoli who, in a way anticipating Offe's thesis on the separation of form and content in liberal democracy (Offe, 1984a), has pointed out that, in this context, the concept of representation which used to be central in early liberal discourse (in the sense of the representation of the bourgeois interests as a counterbalance to the power of an absolutist state) becomes inverted: in

western democracies the institutions and processes of democratic representation of the "liberal-democratic" state no longer retain their "popular representation" function. They rather function as means of legitimation of relations of power in society, offering "democratic" legitimation to decisions taken in centres outside the conventional political sphere of liberal democracy, that is, in organizational settings that are less visible and open to public scrutiny. In this way, Agnoli argues, power virtually represents itself to the people (Agnoli 1972: 64-84). Thus, while the political forms of liberal democracy remain virtually unchanged, their content is radically transformed; instead of forms of political representation of the enfranchized population, they legitimize decisions taken outside the traditional political sphere.

Another important aspect of the shift towards an authoritarian state that has been emphasized in analyses of "authoritarian democracy", has been the systematic undermining of rights and liberties with which the liberal state has often been associated, as the social status-quo, which is based on the consent of the majority of the citizens assumes the appearance of a supreme value which must be protected and sustained. Here, a second inversion concerning the rights and liberties that have been historically protected by conventional liberal democratic institutions takes place: the institutional guarantees of civil, political and social rights which protect citizens from the power of

the state and allow for choice and diversity within society, are being progressively displaced by institutionalized guarantees of "governability", "public order and security" (Ferrajoli, 1985: 60; Belsey, 1986) which in fact, safeguard the state from dissent and the potential resistance of its citizens.

The shift towards strengthening the authority of the state, by reducing its accountability to the electorate, or even their representatives, and by compromising those democratic principles which could potentially undermine the consensus in western democracies, as well as its intellectual backing by the development of conservative theories of ungovernability by neo-conservative theorists (cf. Crozier et al. 1975; also Steinfels 1979; Habermas 1983; Offe 1984a, 1984b; Bobbio 1990) indicate that "governability", "social peace" and "public security" have become the ideals of modern democracies to the extent that civil, political and social rights or the protection of dissenting minorities have become luxuries which "democracy" is thought unable to afford. In this way, pluralism which, according to pluralist theorists, is held to be inextricably linked with modern western democracies proves in fact limited in scope, and applicable only in the case of those groups and organizations which accept the rules of the game:

"All the parties which have become "parliamentary" present themselves as "democratic" and as parties which have the ability to rule in the context of a "pluralism" the limits of which are rigidly determined by the established social and economic

order and the relevant political system. And the "democratic" or "constitutional" sphere, which is increasingly identified with the sphere of "governing" or "potentially governing" parties, determines the limits of political tolerance, as it is based on the **democratic distinction**, that is, the political de-legitimation of the forces of radical opposition on the basis of their being defined as "anti-democratic" or "subversive" (Ferrajoli 1985: 37).

Social pacification and de-legitimation and exclusion of any "fundamental" opposition seem to be complementary strategies for the consolidation of authoritarianism (Agnoli: 21) as the imposition of state authority becomes an absolute priority, not to be endangered by the action of dissenting and resisting marginal opponents: opposition and dissent are perceived as "irrational" and in some cases illegitimate refusal and are consequently neutralized through processes of delegitimation and exclusion.

The division between legitimate, "democratic" and "anti-social", subversive groups, values and behaviour is essential in the process of de-legitimation of alternative and oppositional social forces and the institutionalization of their exclusion from the political sphere provides the basis for the adoption of disciplinary, often repressive policies against them. This exclusion of undesirable social and political forces from the political process might even take the form of their criminalization at the ideological level, or even of de-legalization, or legal restriction (Ferrajoli, 1985: 37).

As Gransow and Offe have pointed out in their analysis of the political culture of West German Social democracy (Gransow and Offe 1982), there is a clear relationship between the "openness" of western democracies and their repressive character. More precisely, referring to the SPD, they argued that there is a threshold, beyond which its "normative unclarity", and consequently its "openness", intended to appeal to as many social groups as possible, reverts to "highly illiberal forms of repression (pp. 78-9); whenever the processes of "positive" integration of party members, voters and dependants cannot be achieved, then the problem of integration is solved in a negative way. Social minorities which can become critical of the party or the government, which refuse to cooperate with them, or which develop alternative values or practices and therefore become a potential threat to the processes of political integration are repressively excluded and subjected to discrimination.®

This "democratic distinction" facilitates the consolidation of support for forms of authoritarian rule, as, in accordance to it, social forces, or new domains and forms of non-conventional political action, are not only denied their political "qualities", but also are represented as illegitimate, illegal, or criminal, and are subjected to practices of symbolic and repressive discrimination, thus becoming easily identified as anti-social and subversive.

It is quite obvious that the authoritarian

transformation of western democracies extends beyond a mere transformation of the "political" institutions of liberal democracy; as the majority of the analyses of the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary western democracies appear to suggest, it rather involves changes in the ways politics is perceived and understood by citizens, as well as "defined" through their practice. In other words it involves processes of displacing and restructuring consensus, of depoliticization or delegitimation of domains and forms of political action, of changing attitudes towards politics, and of political behaviour. Despite however this widely shared awareness of the cultural character of this process, among the exponents of the critique of the authoritarian transformation of democracy, the concept of authoritarian political culture has not been adequately elaborated.⁹

A more systematic study of the authoritarian transformation of the political culture of western democracies has been offered by Hall's analysis of the emergence of "authoritarian populism" in Britain (Hall 1980a; 1980b; 1988a). Although his analysis focuses on the emergence of "Thatcherism" in Britain, it nevertheless offers useful insights for the study of the authoritarian transformation of western democracies in general. More precisely, one of Hall's most significant contributions in the debate on the authoritarian transformation of democracy has been the application of and elaboration on the Gramscian concept of hegemony, a key notion in the field of cultural

studies (see for example Williams 1980b; Bennett et al. 1986). As Hall suggested, the consolidation of authoritarian democracy could be best analyzed as a hegemonic strategy, as it entails not only processes of transforming the state but also of restructuring society.

This emphasis on hegemony first appeared in a systematic way in *Policing the Crisis* (1978), where Hall et al., emphasizing the link between hegemony, the state and processes of creation of moral panics through the mobilization of popular fears and anxieties, introduced a flexible and broad conception of the "political". It is this redefinition of politics that Hall et al. have used in their analysis of the political significance of the particular social definition of crime in Britain in the 1970s. This, they did by pointing out that the creation of moral panics, that is, the reconstruction of common sense and its articulation within an "authoritarian" hegemonic strategy, could be an effective means of political control, in the sense that it could be proved crucial in the process of consensus building and achieving hegemony.

Hall et al. went on to point out that the progressive convergence and politicization of social anxieties, and their eventual culmination into a moral panic about crime and law and order in Britain in the 1970s, were inextricably linked with a decisive move towards the depoliticization or the delegitimation of political issues and forces. Thus, they

argued, as the structural contradictions of British society were being manifested in various forms of social conflict, the crisis was - through the escalation of moral panics - experienced as a crisis of law and order. As their analysis of the British case suggests, it is at such a point that social anxieties become politically significant, as they are directed against "political extremism", oppositional organizations, or against the vague - and often exaggerated - dangers of "anarchy and terrorism", anticipate their eventual subjection of resistance into the sphere of jurisdiction of the police and penal justice, as well as open the way for the "disciplinary" intervention of the state which provides that sense of direction which the public feels that society has lost.

These arguments were later developed and incorporated in Hall's critical elaboration of Poulantzas's analysis of "authoritarian statism" (Poulantzas 1978; Hall 1980a; 1980b). While, like Poulantzas, Hall recognized that a movement towards an authoritarian form of politics, characterized by intensified state control of socio-economic life and repression of civil liberties was taking place behind the facade of an apparently durable, liberal democratic political process, he attempted to emphasize the complexity of such a process by focusing his attention on the complex ways of articulation of contradictory elements in authoritarian discourses and practices, the ways of incorporation of "strategic elements of popular opinion" into an authoritarian

hegemonic project.

The term itself - authoritarian populism - is suggestive of the coexistence of authoritarian discourses and practices together with elements of "popular practical consciousness" and popular discontents, of the deconstruction of the "them vs us" distinction that had been rooted in popular consciousness and practices (Hall 1980b: 140-144).

In this way Hall attempted to concentrate not merely on the institutional aspects of the authoritarian transformation of western democracies, but also to the ways of construction of popular consent, or even active popular support, for this transformation. According to Hall therefore, authoritarianism is not imposed from "above"; its consolidation is rather achieved through a complex process of interaction between popular anxieties, discontent and aspirations from "below", and the "restoration" of social order and authority from "above" (Hall 1980b: 137). This focus on the struggle for hegemony among competing hegemonic "projects" that has been central, not exclusively in Hall's work, but also in a series of analyses within the tradition of British cultural studies (cf. Bennett et al. 1986; Hall et al. 1978; Williams 1980b), offered the advantage of a flexible conception of the "political", as it was based on the recognition that a variety of ideas, themes, practices and domains of social action can be politicized or depoliticized through the particular ways they are articulated in, or excluded from

hegemonic strategies.

It could be argued that the introduction of the hegemonial dimension into the analysis of the authoritarian transformation of democracy has given to the latter considerable flexibility as it not only has widened the scope of such an analysis, but also because it has allowed us to take into account and make intelligible the complex and often contradictory character of such a process. From this perspective therefore, we can view the authoritarian transformation of western democracies as a cultural process that entails displacing, and reconstructing the common sense, the values, attitudes and practices, the consciousness "of the people who simply, in ordinary everyday life, have to calculate how to survive, how to look after those who are closest to them" (Hall 1988b: 163), a process that competes with other hegemonic strategies not only at the level of conventional politics but also in apparently "trivial" and non-political domains of social action.

The Emergence of the New Social Movements.

As it has been pointed out the theories of the authoritarian transformation of democracy have been stressing the tendency towards a new state of affairs in which the links between the political processes of negotiation and decision-making, and the citizen were being severed, leading

to a state of "autonomy of politics" (Ferrajoli, 1985: 39).

However, while the decision making process has been increasingly becoming inaccessible to the citizens, the expansion and density of state intervention have been increasingly affecting the individual and the sphere of everyday life to an unprecedented extent. While the conventional political sphere of liberal democracy has become devoid of its (political) content, a different set of substantial, and unanticipated changes in the political sphere overwhelmed advanced western societies as the "political" was radically redefined: a number of concerns such as the quality of life, gender and racial inequality, human rights, individual self realization or minority rights became politically relevant, and constituted the new foci of political conflict, contributing in this way to the broadening of the sphere of politics. What is more, new forms of political action hitherto "inappropriate" to liberal democratic politics emerged. The majority of advanced western societies witnessed a wave of protest politics that deviated from the conventional, legitimate forms of institutionalized political action; the French May of 1968, the student protests of 1967, which culminated into the "Maggio strisciante" and the "Hot autumn" that shook the major industrial Italian cities during 1968-9, the regular occurrence of student demonstrations and clashes with the police in major West German cities, over a variety of issues from the mid-sixties onwards, the "Black Power" politics, the

ghetto riots, and the rule-violation practices of the American civil rights movement and student protest, were the most explicitly political protest events which introduced into the repertory of political action, "unorthodox" practices such as civil disobedience, civil commotion and riots. However, the range of practices of political protest extended even further, from the undirected explosion of disturbances by groups that would not normally be considered as political, or the organization of alternative projects through occupations of buildings or through the establishment of alternative rural communities, to actions of political violence and terrorism. What is more, the rise of new social movements which have been based on grass-roots initiatives and involvement, and committed to informal and "anti-bureaucratic" modes of organization, has changed significantly the political scene by shifting its "established" boundaries, and altering the range of forms of political action. This broadening of the sphere of politics and of the repertory of forms of political action provided the impetus for a more systematic study of the changes that western societies seemed to be undergoing.

In a series of comparative studies, Inglehart suggested that these transformations were manifestations of the emergence in western societies of a new phenomenon which he called "new politics" (Inglehart 1971; 1977a; 1977b). These "new politics", as Inglehart showed, were associated with a shift of the values and attitudes of western publics from

material to post-material concerns. His studies detected a change in values with increasing emphasis on needs of "belonging", "social equality", "self-expression" and "self-realization" which was reflected in the change of the prevailing political issues, the declining legitimacy for existing political institutions and a change in the prevailing forms of political participation, as "elite-directed" political mobilization appeared to give its place to "elite-challenging", mostly issue specific practices. Inglehart's 'new value' thesis has exerted considerable influence among social theorists and has given the impetus for renewed interest in the study of values and attitudes in western societies in general, and among participants in new social movements in particular.¹⁰ The detection of this shift towards "post-materialist politics", or rather attitudes towards politics,¹¹ has also been supported by the results of a survey of political attitudes in five western countries conducted by Barnes, Kaase et al. (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979). The findings of their study indicated a high level of positive disposition towards engaging in unconventional forms of political action among western publics, and located a disproportionately high protest potential to relatively affluent, better educated middle class strata and the young, confirming in this way Inglehart's hypothesis of the emergence of the phenomenon of "new politics".

Drawing upon the empirical evidence of these studies,

Habermas attempted to develop an interpretation of the emergence of "new politics" in the context of his social theory (Habermas 1976; 1987). Thus, according to Habermas, the emergence of new loci and forms of political action, and the thematic shift from "old politics" revolving around themes of "economic, social, domestic and military security" to "new politics" which focus mainly on issues of "quality of life, equal rights, individual self-realization, participation and human rights" (Habermas 1987: 392), that is, politics based on a (post-materialist) critique of growth, is linked with the institutional changes that late capitalist societies have been undergoing.

In fact, Habermas is proposing a more complex explanatory schema that goes beyond merely the detection of changes in values and attitudes, as he articulates the emergence of "new politics" and, in particular of the "new social movements" with a critique of the expansion of functionalist rationality in late capitalism. The new social movements are thus perceived as essentially defensive movements which attempt to resist "tendencies towards a colonization of the lifeworld", to defend or reinstate endangered ways of life or to put reformed lifestyles to practice. These defensive practices against the erosion of the lifeworld by the extension of technical rationality associated to the growth of the economic-administrative system arise, according to Habermas, in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization, and are

manifested in mainly sub-institutional, extraparliamentary forms of protest (Habermas 1987: 392-3).

As these forms of protest are not "political" in the conventional sense of the term, Habermas appears to be suggesting that they have a "politicizing" effect, or, in other words, that they introduce political conflict, and therefore politics, in social domains outside the political sphere of liberal democracy. In this way Habermas seems to affirm, alongside other social theorists such as Melucci, Offe and Gorz (Melucci 1989; Offe 1984a; Gorz 1982) that the boundaries between what could be considered as "political", and what could not, are not pre-defined and could vary in time and space.

What is more, as the recent revival of the debate on civil society has indicated,¹² the formation of new social movements has generated pressures for the democratization of both civil society and the state. As it has been argued the new social movements possess a creative potential and a participatory-democratic orientation which might lead to the re-invigoration and democratization of civil society, by increasing "the scope for autonomous public initiatives developing outside and independently of the state apparatus" (Pakulski 1991: 165 and 211) as well as by asserting the principles of plurality, openness and visibility in civil society (J. Cohen 1982; Keane 1988a, 1988b; Melucci 1989).¹³

It is this increased awareness of and interest in the

processes of redefinition of the "political" and of the transformation of the political sphere through the emergence of social movements, that has undermined the basic assumptions upon which the civic culture theory as well as the theories of liberal democracy in general, had been based, notably, their rigid definition of the political, the limited repertory of legitimate political action, and the separation of human action from culture.

These observations had important implications as far as the concept of political culture was concerned. It soon became evident that if these limitations and deficiencies of the theory of political culture were to be overcome, an alternative and more holistic conceptualization of "political culture" had to replace the "civic culture" model.

CHAPTER 2

TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE

An Alternative Tradition: Raymond Williams and the field of Cultural Studies.

Despite its shortcomings and deficiencies, the civic culture paradigm continued to be dominant throughout the 1970s as it was used extensively by the majority of western political scientists for comparative research (cf. Kavanagh 1971; 1972; 1974, Pateman 1973; Parkin 1972) and, despite increasing criticism, it retained some of its influence in the 1980s (cf. Almond and Verba 1980).¹⁴

Yet, as the usage of the original concepts became increasingly problematic and the analytical framework that developed within the "civic culture" paradigm was losing its explanatory capacity, it became evident that, if the concept of political culture were to retain any explanatory value at all, it had to undergo a critical re-evaluation and a radical reconstruction. It was in this context that attempts were made to develop a more complex conception of political culture that would be capable of responding to the new social and political developments, to account in a satisfactory way

for political and cultural change, taking into consideration the conflictual relationships within a society. It was quite clear that those aims could only be met by a conception of political culture that would take into account the social-historical conditions in which a political culture is formed, reproduced and transformed, the sphere of politics to which it is circumscribed, and focus its attention to the social and political agents, whose role in the formation of political culture had hitherto been neglected. What is more, it was necessary for a new conception of political culture to be able to transcend the rigid definition of the "political" of the mainstream political theories and to be informed by a more flexible and "dynamic" understanding of what is "political" and what might be politicized in any given conjuncture.

As the mainstream theoretical approaches to political culture could not meet these criteria, the main theoretical sources for such an attempt had to be drawn from other "traditions". The developments in the emerging field of cultural studies, notably the rejection of the distinction between "high" and "popular" culture and the increasing interest in studying aspects of the latter, the theoretical attempts to point out the interdependence of structure and culture, or to formulate more inclusive definitions of culture, appeared to offer the stimulus for such an undertaking.

One of the most profound influences in the development

of cultural studies in general, and of the British tradition of cultural studies in particular, has been the work of Raymond Williams. Although Williams did not offer a single and clear definition of culture, his work has been characterized by an ongoing process of change, and, at the same time, remarkable consistency as far as the complexity of the concept was concerned. His work, since his first book **"Culture and Society"**, could be seen both as a rupture with older traditions of thought, and as a continual dialogue with them. Williams's conceptualization of culture developed through a continuous process of deconstructing these traditions, of recovering old elements of thought and articulating them with new ones that arose in the course of his work. What in fact shaped his work was the rejection, on the one hand, of the distinction between high and low culture - and its elitist implications - as it had been informed by the "idealist" definitions of culture, in accordance to which "culture" was seen as "a state or process of human perfection, in terms of certain absolute or universal values" (Williams 1961: 41), and, on the other, of the base/superstructure schema as it had been interpreted by variants of marxism which "treat either the general process or the body of art and learning as a mere by-product, a passive reflection of the real interests of the society" (p. 44). Apart from his critical distancing from both "idealist" and "vulgar materialist" traditions, Williams also seems to have been equally critical of a "documentary" definition of culture, which, he argued, "sees value only in the written

and painted records, and marks this area off from the rest of man's life in society" (pp. 43-44).

However this rejection of existing conceptualizations has not been "total" as Williams argued that the complexity of culture makes necessary for an "adequate" theory of culture to recover elements from these traditions, as all of them reveal aspects of that very complexity, and synthesize them in the context of a new problematic which broadens the scope of cultural studies: culture is understood as a social process constitutive of the meaning of reality for the members of a society. In this sense, Williams relates culture to the whole range of practices, significations and values through which societies understand and share their common experiences. The construction and sharing of meaning amongst the members of a society is the outcome of a process that encompasses the whole range of creative human activity that extends beyond art and intellectual work or "the best that has been thought and said", to institutions and forms of social behaviour:

"... but society ... is a specious whole. If the art is part of the society, there is no solid whole, outside it, to which, by the form of our question, we concede priority. The art is there, as an activity, with the production, the trading, the politics, the raising of families. To study the relations adequately we must study them actively, seeing all the activities as particular and contemporary forms of human energy." (p. 45)

However this definition of culture did not address satisfactorily the issue of cultural change, and of the

conflictual and contradictory character of culture as Williams placed particular emphasis on the notion of common culture, that is, of a common stock of meanings shared by the members of a society. Since his early works, while he recognized the possibility that the interests of the dominant class might be reflected in the production, transmission and distribution of the culture of a society, precisely because of the dominant social position of this class, he however maintained that culture should not be seen as the "product" of a class; instead he viewed culture as a common stock of meanings shared by the members of a society, to the production of which members of all social classes have contributed:

"the area of culture, it would seem, is usually proportionate to the area of a language than to the area of a class" (Williams 1987: 320)

An attempt to address the issues of cultural conflict and change, while at the same time maintaining this conception of culture, was the introduction of the rather vague notion of the "structure of feeling" which, in a way similar to Goldmann's notion of "mental structures" (Goldmann 1975: 156-166), it could be argued, refers to "a sense of life", "a particular community of experience" that informs the ways of thinking of the members of a society or a group, and of making sense of their world in a given period, or, to a common ground upon which communication can be realized and a cultural community can be established.¹⁵ It would therefore appear that the notion of "structure of

feeling" has been introduced by Williams in order to account for cultural variation, change and conflict among different generations and social groups. However, the lack of clarity of the notion has caused difficulties in attempts to understand the complexity of relations of domination and resistance within society, especially as the notion of culture as a "whole way of life" and the emphasis on a "common culture" continued to occupy a central position in Williams's thought.

It is this insistence on a "common culture" without any systematic consideration of processes of conflict that E. P. Thompson's critique of "The Long Revolution" attempted to address (Thompson 1961a; 1961b) by arguing for a conception of culture which would encompass a dimension of contradiction and conflict. Williams's response to these criticisms came with a reworking of his conception of culture based on the introduction of Gramsci's concept of hegemony into his work (Williams 1980b).

The main advantage the concept of hegemony presented to the analysis of culture, was the fact that it allowed for the combination of the concept of totality - a concept that had already been present in Williams's own conceptualization of society and culture - with a notion of cultural struggle and change. Williams argued that the concept of hegemony in Gramsci's thought was not situated within the confines of the "superstructure"; rejecting interpretations which equated the concept with that of ideology as a merely superstructural

category, he pointed out that "hegemony" should be understood in the context of its relationship with the Gramscian notion of totality.¹⁶

"Hegemony", according to Williams, is a process that permeates society,

"which ... even constitutes the substance and limit of common sense for most people under its sway, that it corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and superstructure" (Williams 1980b: 37).

Thus hegemony is seen as a complex process that goes beyond a strict distinction between base and superstructure, that penetrates the whole range of social practices and integrates and organizes them into a meaningful whole. What Williams considers of paramount importance in Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony is the fact that it takes on board the notion of "social intention", through which the dimension of domination becomes incorporated in the concept of totality. Domination here should not be conceived of as a "state" or as total domination, but as a process; it is not imposed, it is rather continuously negotiated. Williams therefore claimed that the Gramscian "hegemony" does not refer to a totality devoid of a dynamic and contradictory content; it is exactly that dynamic and contradictory character that gives hegemony its essence. Hegemony does not correspond to "static" notions of "domination", it rather refers to a complex process of incorporation and resistance, as counteracting hegemonic projects are continuously

interacting, constructed and deconstructed, challenging and challenged, renewed and modified.

Pointing out that the power of Gramsci's conceptual construction lay in his double emphasis on the notion of totality and on social-cultural variation and change, and arguing that this "hegemonial" dimension, should become a central concern in cultural analysis, Williams proposed a theoretical model that would take into account the dynamic character of domination.

The model proposed by Williams has been premised upon viewing "hegemony" as a goal for competing hegemonic projects, which however, is never totally achieved. In this context, it has been argued (Williams 1980b: 38-41) that in every society a set of practices, meanings and values constitutes the sense of reality for the majority of its members, and, in that sense, it constitutes the dominant culture of this society. This dominant, or hegemonic culture, Williams argued, depends on a process of incorporation that is based on cultural selectivity and reinterpretation. In every society meanings, values and practices are selected from the past and the present and, through processes of reinterpretation, become "neutralized" -that is, lose their antagonistic character to the dominant set of meanings and practices by supporting or at least not opposing it- and "relevant" while other meanings and practices are suppressed, displaced and excluded.¹⁷

However cultural practices are not exhausted within the domain of dominant culture as non-incorporated cultures compete with the former, either disregarding it or representing a threat to it. It is this potential threat to the dominant culture, or the lack of it, that Williams considers to be the criterion of a further distinction, of non-incorporated cultures into alternative and oppositional although, in some cases it is quite difficult to draw the line between them. "Alternative" roughly refers to those sets of meanings, values and practices that are simply "non-incorporated" and do not challenge the dominant culture, while "oppositional" refers to "non-incorporated", articulations of meanings, values and practices that threaten the dominant culture.

Finally, Williams introduced a temporal-historical dimension in the study of culture by distinguishing between "residual" and "emergent" cultures with "residual" corresponding to experiences, meanings and values derived from the past, which continue to exist in the context of the dominant or non-incorporated cultures and, conversely, "emergent" referring to new meanings, values and practices that are being created, and therefore not yet fully developed.

Thus the conception of culture as a set of meanings, values and practices through which the members of a group or a society make sense of their world, is linked with the Gramscian theory of hegemony, allowing in this way, the

inclusion of a continuous process of cultural differences and contradictions in the process for the formation of cultural domination, of the culture of a society carrying in its unity existing and potential difference. The social historical character of culture is recognized, through the recognition of the potentiality of difference in its unity, without however the adoption of strict class reductionist arguments. Culture therefore could be seen as a process of articulation of diverse meanings and practices, and not as the unique "property" of a class, or as the mere reflection of social relations of production. Here, the usage of the notion of articulation means that human agency is emphasized, providing mediation between determined conditions of a cultural practice and its outcome. Thus, more emphasis is placed on the process of the making of culture than on its determined conditions.¹⁸

The work of Raymond Williams has had a profound influence in the development of the British tradition of cultural studies. His emphasis on the ordinary character of culture, his interest on the role of social actors in its formation and the introduction of the Gramscian concept of hegemony in a central position in cultural studies provided a stimulus for the development of the field.

Influenced by Williams, and drawing upon the same theoretical traditions, emerged a body of theoretical work and research on culture, which was mainly concerned with the political significance of culture, the state and civil

society, or institutional policies and practices.¹⁹

Although there has not been any systematic attempt to construct a theory of political culture in the British tradition of cultural studies, a significant number of applied studies, and, to a lesser extent, theoretical work, have concentrated at the political relevance of even "trivial" cultural processes, and have made significant contributions in the study of class cultures and subcultures as loci of coexistence of elements of resistance and domination (see for example Hall and Jefferson 1975; Hall 1977; Gilroy et al. 1982, Willis 1977) or have pointed out the importance of various institutions, such as the mass media in the cultural process and their political impact.²⁰ Thus, they have been advocating a rather broad and historically informed conception of the political and attempted to illuminate the ways in which diverse, even contradictory, cultural elements are continuously selected, interpreted and articulated in the course of complex processes of hegemonic political and cultural struggle.

Towards an alternative conception of political culture.

Williams's proposals for the analysis of culture, were also influential in efforts to "rehabilitate" the concept of political culture (cf. Gransow and Offe 1982; Demertzis 1985). More precisely, in an attempt to elaborate and develop further the concept, Gransow and Offe, in their article on

the politics of the West German Social Democracy (Gransow and Offe 1982) proposed the application of Williams's analytical framework in the study of political culture. Criticizing the empirically oriented approaches to political culture that equated it with values, psychological predispositions and attitudes, as well as those approaches which had been informed by the traditional German conceptualization of culture and referred to political ethos and morality, they argued that it was important to retain the concept of political culture despite the shortcomings of the dominant contexts in which it had been employed. Despite the diverse sources and the variety of applications, they claimed that there are advantages not only in retaining, but also in elaborating further the concept:

We do not want to yield to this temptation (to let the political culture to lie fallow) simply because the study of political culture, first makes it possible to overcome the exclusive focus on political institutions and organizations, and, second, is more helpful in describing processes of political change. (p. 68)

Gransow and Offe argued that the concept of political culture is far more complex and definitely broader than a simple pattern of individual attitudes and psychological orientations, or political ethics and morality. By drawing upon Williams's conception of culture, they proposed an alternative conceptualization of political culture in a manner that would transcend the limits of these "traditional" views, and offer the advantage of taking into account material life-conditions and political action which had been

hitherto neglected (p. 69).

While such an approach would recognize the existence of a political community with a dominant, hegemonic political culture, at the same time, it would not entail that a political culture should be viewed as a homogeneous totality but as a contradictory one. Their approach emphasized the internal contradictions and the dynamics of change within a political community and political culture, through the recognition of alternative and oppositional forms of political action which challenge the dominant political culture and seek to take control of, or to change the life conditions of the members of the society.²¹ It is the degree of taking control, or changing the life conditions of the members of a society through their own political action, or "the extent of self-consciousness and self-determination of the social individuals" (p. 69) that Gransow and Offe propose as the criterion for evaluating the progress or regression of political culture, in contrast to the criterion of "compatibility" or "congruence" of political culture to the political system of "liberal democracy" upon which the "civic culture thesis", and mainstream theoretical and empirical studies on political culture were based.

Although the proposals put forward in **"Political Culture and the Politics of the Social Democratic Government"** by Gransow and Offe have not been developed further,²³ they have nevertheless provided the basis for the redefinition and the rehabilitation of "political culture".

A "reconstruction" of the concept along the lines suggested by Gransow and Offe seems to offer several advantages. More precisely, the application of a cultural analysis of the "complexity of hegemony" makes it possible to develop a concept of political culture that would be dynamic and complex and to conceive of it in terms of a contradictory process in which a variety of hegemonic projects compete.

What is more, by putting the emphasis on political action, such a concept of political culture extends beyond the sphere of orientations and predispositions, and includes meaningful social activity. This shift, in turn, has important implications, as far as the demarcation of the "political" is concerned. For it is political action that determines what is, or could be, political at a given time and - given the contradictory character of political culture - definitions of the "political" could vary considerably among members of a society at a given time. We are therefore in the position to adopt a broad and "open" conception of the political sphere, one that would not be equated to that of the "political system" and that would be adaptable to shifts in the boundaries of the "political" that political action would bring about.

Authoritarian and Democratic Political

Culture: a typology.

As it has been pointed out, the "civic culture" thesis, inspired by functionalist and systemic political theories has played an "apologetic" role in relation to established power and political structures because it is premised on the primacy of social and political stability and governability in modern western societies. It was developed in order to point out the "necessary" cultural, or psychological conditions that might guarantee the governability of western democracies, stressed the importance of cultural conformity, and took for granted the moral superiority of civic culture and of western democracies, albeit by rendering democracy devoid of its emancipatory elements.

In fact, democracy was conceived in predominantly "procedural" terms with particular emphasis on its ability to secure social and political stability. Accordingly, functionalists and systems' theorists, viewed political culture as essentially external to politics, as a part of the political environment of the society clearly separated from political structure and simply legitimating it and informing political behaviour. Moreover, in the context of the civic culture thesis, it is quite clear that the "political" has been understood as a pre-defined sphere of social activity, as a set of structures, and presumed independent of social

action.

However, the complex social and political developments in western - as well as in non-western - societies created a series of practical and theoretical problems which undermined the premises of the "civic culture" theory. On the one hand, the formation of inaccessible extra-parliamentary, administrative/bureaucratic settings which have virtually been monopolizing processes of government and decision making behind the facade of a durable liberal democratic political process, and, on the other, the emergence of "non-conventional" citizens' initiatives at local and national level, the formation of new social movements and concomitant decline of "old", especially labour movements, or, in other words, the development of new processes of conflict regulation and articulation and of political action have been suggesting that the political sphere of western societies has been undergoing considerable transformations.

These developments have proved that a notion of political culture that would be premised upon citizens' allegiance and deference to certain institutions and to political "procedure" alone would have significant limitations, as it would essentially be unable to account for changes in the "content" of the political process of a society; as the critiques of the authoritarian transformation of western democracies and the analyses of the emergence of "new politics" have made clear, it is not the liberal

democratic political forms that provide us with a safe criterion for evaluating the democratic character of a polity; rather, it is the extent of the social individuals' self-consciousness and self-determination that appears to be a more relevant criterion for assessing the "democratic" character of a polity, and, therefore - as Gransow and Offe proposed (1982) - for evaluating the progress or regression of a political culture.

What is more, analyses based on such a notion of political culture appear to be reifying the "political", to represent as natural what is considered to be political in liberal democratic political theory, as they are premised upon an a-historical, pre-defined and inflexible conception of politics and therefore are unable to address the issue of the social institution of the political, that is, of the politicization or depoliticization of domains of social action through the political action of social actors.

In the previous pages I attempted to present an outline of the alternative notion of political culture proposed by Gransow and Offe, and based on Williams's analysis of culture, and to point out the advantages such a notion presents. As it has already been pointed out, a "reconstruction" of the concept of political culture along these lines would bring to the centre of political-cultural analysis the hegemonial dimension and therefore make possible the development of a concept of political culture that would

be understood in terms of a contradictory process in which counteracting hegemonic projects are in continuous competition with each other. As it has been suggested, such a concept of political culture does not refer merely to orientations and predispositions of isolated individuals, but also extends to the domain of social interaction, to the political practices of social actors. In this way the rather artificial distinction between values and social action which the psychologism of the civic culture paradigm had established, can be overcome, while the emphasis on political action and its creative potential would allow for a different conception of the "political", as the way people define it through their political action, would become central in the analysis of political culture.

If we draw upon the theoretical model for the analysis of culture that has been proposed by Williams, the suggestions made by Gransow and Offe concerning the distinction of types of political culture, and their more systematic elaboration (Demertzis 1985: 159-72) we could employ a variety of criteria in order to analyze political culture.

While a principal distinction can be made between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic political cultures, more detailed distinctions can also be drawn in accordance to the temporal-historical dimension of cultural elements, or to the oppositional or "resistance" potential of counter-hegemonic

cultures or elements.

Thus, if we apply the "temporal-historical" criterion, along the lines of Williams's proposals for the analysis of culture (Williams 1980b; also Demertzis 1985: 167), we could distinguish between "residual" and "emergent" political-cultural elements. By "residual" we refer to practices, meanings and experiences which selectively "retrieved" from the past, and articulated in the "tradition" of a society or group. On the other hand, "emergent" political-cultural elements refer to those sets of new practices, experiences and meanings which are being formed in the course of the hegemonic struggle.

However it is the second criterion, of resistance or opposition potential of a political culture that seems to be more important, as it expresses the complexity of the struggle between alternative hegemonic projects for the attainment of hegemony. If we apply this criterion, we can distinguish between "oppositional" and "alternative" political cultures and cultural elements. This distinction is essential as it allows us to differentiate among counter-hegemonic political cultures and elements in accordance to the potential of a set of meanings, practices and experiences to challenge the hegemonic culture and transform the relations of power. Thus, an oppositional political culture challenges and seeks to transform the existing relations of power in a society, while alternative

cultures are merely emphasizing their distinctiveness, their difference and do not have an "offensive" character (Table 4).²²

Table 4. Types of Political Culture.

	Hegemonic	Counter-hegemonic Alternative Oppositional
Residual	residual incorporated	residual non-incorporated
Emergent	emergent incorporated	emergent non-incorporated

At this point I should emphasize that these distinctions between "hegemonic" and "counter-hegemonic", "residual" and "emergent", "alternative" and "oppositional" political cultures do not offer any measure of the extent of progress or regression, as in fact there can be both regressive and progressive residual, emergent, oppositional or alternative political cultures and cultural elements.

As I have emphasized above, the most important advantage of the proposed conception of political culture is the introduction of a new normative criterion for the evaluation of the progressive or regressive character of a political culture, notably the extent of the attainment of self-consciousness and self-determination by social actors

through their political action. It is precisely a differentiation on the basis of this criterion that appears to be the most significant in the analysis of political culture, as this, alternative notion of political culture becomes disengaged from an apologetic role of the model and ideal of "formal" democracy and acquires a critical edge. Thus, by being based on the degree of political emancipation of the members of a society, the proposed conception of political culture remains open to the possibility of development of forms of democratic politics that might differ from liberal democracy.²³

However, it should be pointed out that despite the increasing interest in an alternative conception of political culture, no comprehensive analytical framework has developed for the study of political culture, and therefore on the ways the emancipatory or regressive character of political culture, or the extent of the citizens' self-consciousness and self-determination should be evaluated and measured.

Yet, Gransow and Offe, in their essay on the political culture of the West German social democracy (1982) provide us with some valuable insights regarding such an analysis. According to these writers, the social democratic political culture, an essentially "authoritarian" culture, bears within it the traces of the German historical past as well as the marks of the social democratic governmental, and more generally political, praxis. In order to analyze the social

democratic political culture, they attempted a brief historical and social-structural analysis of West German society. Thus they distinguished the presence of long-lasting traditions of authoritarianism, statism and "political naturalism" originating in the centralist and authoritarian nation and state building methods of the nineteenth century, which were more recently reinforced by the traumatic experience of national socialism.

However, despite the importance of this authoritarian and statist tradition, Gransow and Offe point out that it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the objectives, policies and strategies of the SPD in shaping the social democratic political culture, as its emergent statist reformist policies have contributed considerably to limiting the autonomy of the citizens and increased their political alienation. Thus, although they recognize that social democratic reformist politics have to some extent "corrective" and emancipatory outcomes (for example in the case of welfare policies towards the unemployed and "disadvantaged" groups), they stress that the statist character of social democratic reformism reverses any positive effect these policies might have; the citizens' initiative and ability to bring about change through their own, autonomous political action diminishes considerably.

Gransow and Offe emphasize the "normative unclarity" or lack of political commitment of the West German social

democracy and the related existence of a limited universe of discourse within the social democratic political culture, which is translated into the "restriction of all alternatives in reformist politics to statist forms and procedures" (p. 74). As they point out, this limited scope of acceptable political action makes social democracy hostile to any alternative and oppositional forces and has, to a considerable degree, been responsible for the institutionalization of processes of exclusion, and for their culmination into symbolic and repressive discrimination.

Thus, the West German social democratic political culture is seen as a specific articulation of pre-modern or early-modern authoritarian political traditions with more recent, or current statist reformist political practices which are supported by a "mindless imperative of modernization without perspective" (p. 78). As Gransow and Offe claim, despite the incorporation of limited emancipatory cultural elements (e.g. reformist commitment and practices), the predominance of a particular combination of authoritarian and statist elements limits considerably the scope of autonomous popular political action and the opportunities for the attainment of the citizens' self-consciousness and self-determination through it, as it increases their dependence and heteronomy.

On the other hand, Gransow and Offe point to the

development of new forms of "class struggle" in the context of which one can detect the emergence of protest movements premised on new values and issues related to peace, ecology, and quality of life, the development of citizens' initiatives and alternative forms of life, and argue that they have been manifestations of the development of a counter-hegemonic "political culture" based on communal households, nursery schools, street festivals, economic self-help and self-organization" (p. 70) and characterized by the centrality of radical democratic, ecological and socialist goals. Insofar as this articulation of alternative and oppositional elements constitutes a challenge to the authoritarian and statist structures of West German politics, and because of its special emphasis on self-expression, community, solidarity, self-organization and democracy, this counter-hegemonic culture appears to have an emancipatory, democratic potential.

However, as Gransow and Offe seem to suggest, this emergent alternative and oppositional sphere is characterized by fluidity, ambivalence and fragmentation, which appears to be precisely a consequence of its "emergent" non-institutionalized character. Therefore, they argue, political culture in West Germany should "be seen as a complex hegemonic structure of incorporation and exclusion of alternative and oppositional political cultures" (p. 71) and not in terms of the Leninist dualism, that is of an opposition between one dominant (bourgeois) and one

oppositional (socialist) political culture.

Although, as it has been stressed, this analysis of the West German social democratic political culture by no means constitutes a fully comprehensive study, it nevertheless complements the outline of the theoretical framework which has been proposed for such an analysis and could form the basis for a further discussion.

It appears that Gransow and Offe do not consider quantitative techniques, such as attitude questionnaires, sufficient for the study of political culture. Instead they seem to favour social-historical analysis which would not reduce political culture to "attitudes", but would enable them to take into account structural and institutional aspects, as well as attitudes and practices, in their analysis of political culture.²⁴

What is more, it would seem to me that one important issue raised in their essay, is that of democracy, and even the possibility of a democratic political culture. More precisely, Gransow and Offe attempt to disengage the concept of democracy from the decisionist context of functionalist and systemic theories of politics, and to articulate it with notions of self-determination, self-organization and solidarity, which have been brought to the political universe of discourse by the new social movements that have emerged in the last three decades. This, enriched notion of democracy is then conceptually set in opposition to authoritarian forms of

political organization and action which, as I have already pointed out, are often present in liberal democratic and welfare-reformist politics, and which tend to deactivate and control citizens and to increase their political alienation.


It seems to me that this oppositional schema between democracy and authoritarianism is the point towards which different approaches to the study of political culture could converge, and form the basis for the development of a typification of political culture along the lines of its progressive or regressive character, provided however that we disengage the concept of democracy from the decisionist context of the liberal theory of democracy and the civic culture paradigm.

It would therefore be possible to synthesize the approach outlined by Gransow and Offe with other attempts to reevaluate the concept of political culture (cf. Mainwaring and Viola 1984) and, accordingly, to propose a typology that would be informed by the normative-emancipatory dimension in the analysis of political culture.

For example, Mainwaring and Viola's proposed classification of types of political culture ²⁵ on the basis of the distinction between democratic and authoritarian ideologies, and their treatment of the traditional Left-Right distinctions as secondary, seems to be not far from the conceptualization of democracy and authoritarianism by Gransow and Offe. More precisely, Mainwaring and Viola

suggested a classification of political cultures according to two main parameters: the first and principal parameter refers to political values which could range from authoritarian to democratic, while the second refers to social values ranging from elitist to egalitarian. Thus, four main types of political culture are derived from the particular combinations of these parameters: right and left authoritarian, liberal and radical democratic (see Table 5).

Table 5. Types of Political Culture according to Mainwaring and Viola (1984).



Although this typification is predominantly concerned with cleavages in the conventional political sphere of liberal democracy, it is clear that it constitutes an attempt to overcome some of its limitations by not focusing on the significance of the Left vs Right divide and introducing a normative dimension in the analysis of political culture. If we attempt to synthesize this typification with the emancipatory criterion proposed by Gransow and Offe, we could argue for an ideal-typical differentiation between "democratic" and "authoritarian" political culture.

As stated earlier, such a notion of "democratic" political culture, would be based on a revised conception of democracy, clearly disengaged from its conventional decisionist context. Although Gransow and Offe do not explicitly propose such a conception, their emphasis on the centrality of self-expression, autonomy and self-determination are quite suggestive. Melucci (1989) seems to argue along the same lines, although more extensively, by emphasizing the need for the creation of public spaces for representation and negotiation, independent from state institutions or the party system, in which conflicts and demands emerging in civil society could be expressed. According to Melucci, the existence of such spaces is crucial for the democratization of modern societies, as the expression of collective action through them renders power visible and negotiable, and therefore demystifies power relations. Access to these public spaces would be open to

social actors while their individual or collective identities would not be compromised by their participation in processes of self expression and collective action.

Political democracy, Melucci argues, should be characterized by its ability to "hear", to guarantee the autonomy of such public spaces as universities, welfare agencies or the mass media in which social actors could express demands, and achieve the politicization of the questions raised by collective action, without however becoming institutionalized. What is more, according to Melucci such a conception of democracy entails the continuous redefinition of these spaces as new forms of difference emerge continuously, "the conflicts shift" and "new forms of domination are constantly emerging" (p. 77).

Therefore, a democratic political culture would comprize cultural patterns which actualize a political domain characterized by a high degree of openness, publicity, plurality and solidarity, and enabling citizens to attain a high level of autonomy and self-determination and retain their identities. A democratic political culture is characterized by openness, in the sense that it maintains an open universe of public (and political) discourse the boundaries of which would be continuously redefined through collective action.

On the other hand, an authoritarian political culture would comprise sets of meanings, and practices which tend to maintain a closed and rigid universe of discourse in a

society, and reproduce the deactivation of the citizens, the depreciation of social and political contradictions, or their resolution through symbolic and repressive exclusion of oppositional and alternative cultures or forces.

Towards a multi-dimensional conception of political
culture: some propositions.

In concluding this part of the discussion, I should re-emphasize the value of an analysis of political culture along the lines of a critical reconstruction of the concept, that would take into account not only phenomena, processes and agents restricted in the conventional political sphere of liberal democracy, but also be more sensitive to much wider concerns as it would take into account the political significance and ramifications of "non-political" agents and processes, as well as the possibility of their politicization.

More precisely, as recent research has shown (Gaffney 1991; Moores 1991; Townson 1991) an inclusive notion of political culture would take into account not only "what is political", but also "how" social domains, practices and problems "become politicized", or "politically relevant". This enlargement of the scope of the analysis of political culture, and the inclusion of not only the "political", but also of the potentially "political" or the "politically significant", as it has been pointed out is possible by

integrating the concept in the context of the Gramscian problematic of hegemony, and its subsequent elaborations within the field of cultural studies, and thus opens the way for the enrichment of the study of the political culture with the theoretical and empirical developments in relevant disciplines and fields such as cultural studies, social and political anthropology, linguistics and sociolinguistics or mass and political communication. If an emphasis on the hegemonic character of political culture prevails then we should focus on phenomena that had hitherto been neglected by political culture research. More precisely, the recognition of the social construction of the "political" as well as the emphasis of an alternative analysis of political culture on action as opposed to behaviour, would entail that research priorities and methods that had been tailored for study of attitudes and values towards, or behaviour in the conventional political field would have to be modified. Instead, research should be directed to spheres of social activity where "common sense is constructed" as, it is there, according to Gramsci, that the struggle for hegemony is taking place. It is at the level of everyday practices, practical ideas and popular values where hegemony is produced and challenged by strategies of signification and symbolization, as the struggle of hegemony is primarily situated in everyday language and in communication.

What is more, such an extension of the scope of the study of political culture would also present the advantage

of extending the range of methods of analysis beyond quantitative methods such as attitude questionnaires, or opinion polls, integrating alongside them qualitative methods of analysis such as ethnomethodological research, or discourse analysis within a framework of interpretative analysis.

Such an expansion of both the objects of the study of political culture, and of its methodology and techniques is even more necessary today, as the increased complexity of modern societies has rendered most aspects of social life politically salient, and as the experience of politics is increasingly of an indirect character, mediated by an increasingly complex mass media industry.

On the other hand however, the vast thematic scope a comprehensive study of political culture would entail, suggests that while we should look forward to the prospect of a synthesis of the different thematic and theoretical aspects involved, piecemeal research on specific aspects of political culture might, at the moment, be a necessary step towards this goal.

CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE MASS MEDIA

The development of mass communications in modern societies has influenced to a great extent the ways in which we acquire knowledge, we interpret information and transform it into a meaningful and coherent whole, into practices, perceptions, ideas and attitudes about individuals, groups and events of which we do not have any personal or immediate experience. The mass media, together with other institutions, contribute to the diffusion and availability of a common stock of experience and knowledge, and help us to make sense of it, thus playing a major role in the cultural process. Culture can no longer be separated from the means by which it is communicated.

The development of mass communications has therefore been one of the most recent and significant changes to affect cultural processes in modern societies. In modern societies culture is to a considerable extent mediated by the media of mass communication as the latter, by extracting selectively from the existing cultural stock and creatively extending it, reproduce and produce the cultural forms of everyday life (see for example J. B. Thompson's concept of 'mediation' (1988); also Hall 1977: 340-44).

The emergence of new technical media of mass communication, or rather of mass production and diffusion of symbolic forms has become a highly significant and pervasive feature of modern societies, as mass communication has replaced or affected considerably other forms of communication and social interaction. As Thompson points out, the mass media should not be regarded simply as channels for the circulation and diffusion of symbolic forms, but also as mechanisms which create new kinds of action and interaction, and contribute to the establishment of new kinds of social relations (1990: 265). Mass communication is substantially different from previous forms of communication that had developed in the context of face-to-face interaction. The development of new media, capable of multiple reproduction and diffusion of symbolic forms appears to produce a link mainly between collectivities rather than individuals as it involves organized groups engaged in the production and diffusion of symbolic forms, and collectivities - albeit not organized, self-conscious or undifferentiated - at its receiving end.

It should also be emphasized that the interaction involved in mass communication is in fact "mediated" and essentially constitutes a one-way process in the sense that it primarily involves the transmission of messages from a source to an "audience", while the "audience's" opportunities to respond are rather limited. In a mass communication

setting, the social conditions that would enable the audience to respond effectively and directly to the "sender" of the messages are missing, and the audience is less organized, less self-conscious, and less able to exert effective and direct control over the communicative process. The social relationship which is established through mass communication between "sender and receiver" is therefore asymmetrical. What is more, this asymmetrical relation of power is further enhanced by the high cost and relative inaccessibility of the technology of mass communication, which appear to restrict the opportunities to gain access to the "transmitting" or "communicating" end of the process, and therefore to place at an advantage those few who have gained this access.

Moreover, the development of the new technical media of mass communication has established new contexts and forms of interaction that have made possible for "communicators" and "audiences" to "interact" across spatial and temporal distances - and in some cases "social" distance. As Thompson (1990: 230-32) has emphasized, mass communication has enabled individuals - and, we should add, collectivities - to transmit information for, and act in response to distant others. The emergence of different media of mass communication has, then, considerably altered the ways in which people act and interact with one another and the ways in which they produce and mobilize meaning. However, mass communication should not be seen as a mere supplement to pre-existing social relations, as a simple addition to the

repertory of social interaction. Rather, it has profoundly affected already existing forms of social interaction as the latter have been, or are being either displaced or modified in order to be able to co-exist alongside new forms of interaction which were developed as a result of the former. The technologies of mass communication have provided the opportunities for the development of new communicative processes in the context of everyday social interaction and they have modified or even undermined old forms of social interaction. The emergence of the mass media made it possible to bypass traditional communication channels and authority structures in most domains of social life, and contributed to the formation of new channels for interaction and alternative structures and institutions (McQuail 1969: 12; Thompson 1990: 225-235) and, to a certain extent, to the establishment of new power relations. As McQuail has pointed out, mass communication has penetrated most domains of social life, displaced and replaced established processes and institutional frameworks of communication and interaction in the spheres of kinship, religion, education, the economy and politics, and gradually became a powerful, "direct" link between a variety of social institutions and the "public", emphasizing in this way the potential of the mass media to bring about significant changes in existing institutional orders and authority structures (McQuail 1969: 11-12).

Although mass communication has considerably affected the ways politics is defined and experienced in contemporary

societies, it has until recently been neglected in the study of political culture. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, developments in the fields of media and cultural studies (Cohen and Young 1973; Glasgow University Media Group 1976; 1980; Hall et al. 1978; Bennett 1982; Davis and Walton 1983) have been reflecting the increasing awareness among researchers of the need to reassess the concepts of culture and political culture, taking into account their "mediation", that is, to explore the ways in which mass communication is linked to its political context and affects the relations of power at the political level. The development of critical perspectives in the study of mass communication has led to intense debate in the field of media and cultural studies and provided a common ground upon which a critical approach to mass communication, an "alternative, critical paradigm" according to Hall (1982), has been slowly taking shape. It would seem to me that these traditions of cultural and media studies which emphasize the links between the relations of political domination on the one hand, and the mass media and their "reality defining" power on the other, could bridge the gap between studies of political culture and mass communication and cultural studies.

In the following pages I shall attempt to outline the contours of the debate through which critical perspectives to the study of mass communication emerged, and to reassess the concept of mass communication and its relationship with culture and political culture in the light of these new

perspectives.

Mass Communication and Political Culture:

Theoretical Approaches

The social and political role of the mass media has been the focus of persistent controversy and debate since the emergence of mass communication. Entirely dominated in the early phases of the debate by essentially conservative theories apprehensive of the tendencies of homogenization in modern societies, the first approaches to mass communication were highly negative, emphasizing its complicity in the creation of undifferentiated, alienated, passive and manipulable masses. Equally pessimistic, regarding the role of the mass media, although developed within a Marxian framework was also the work of the Frankfurt School which emphasized the suppression of critical reason in a society where mass communication offers ready-made definitions of 'reality', promotes the closure of the universe of discourse, and the formation of what we could call anti-democratic political cultures.

As a reaction to the pessimism of such approaches, a body of empirical research focused on the "effects" of the media of mass communication, and its findings refuted the all-pervasiveness of the media messages upon which mass-society theories were premised. The development of structural-functionalist and pluralist theories, also

emphasized the limited influence of the media of mass communication over audiences. The central argument of these theories was that the mass media reflected the diversity of interests and actors within society and politics, and therefore did not have any significant effect beyond disseminating information and reinforcing pre-existing views of the audience.

However, the prevalence of structural-functionalist approaches to the study of mass communication was progressively challenged by the emergence of marxist and other critical analyses which emphasized the centrality of the mass media in the reproduction of ideology and of asymmetrical relations of power in society. The critique emanating from these traditions focused on the assumed neutrality of media messages by structural-functionalist approaches, and on their inability to account for the role of the media in the political and cultural struggle for the construction of consensus. This theoretical shift entailed the recognition of mass communication and the mass media as a crucial factor in the construction and reconstruction of hegemony. In the next pages I shall try to outline some of the main arguments in the ongoing debate and to examine their relevance to my earlier discussion about political culture.

Mass Society Theories and Mass Communication.

Although mass society theories do not constitute a

unified theoretical tradition, one could discern that they share a number of common themes and similar concerns. Although a variety of versions of mass society theory have been developed by a large number of social, political and cultural theorists (M. Arnold, T.S. Eliot, J. S. Mill, A. de Toqueville) with diverse emphases, from Mill's fear of "tyranny of the majority, to Arnold's emphasis on the spread of cultural and moral disorder and, despite the diversity of the contributions and substantial differences in conceptions of mass society, we could attempt to outline some main characteristics which underpin the mass society tradition.

More precisely, drawing upon the background of conservative critiques of modernity, mass society theories have been highly critical of the processes associated with its advent, such as industrialization, popular education, the extension of the franchise, political democracy and mass communication. Employing the conservative themes of loss of organic solidarity, of the destruction of community and of the decline of authority (see for example Nisbet 1967), mass society theorists argued that the various processes of modernization were leading to the homogenization of society, the decline of democracy, the emergence of totalitarian forms of government and the debasement of culture. Mass communication was perceived as a powerful force, which was eroding traditional institutions, by-passing traditional authorities and destroying identities by detaching

"individuals" from their communal collectivities and alienating them from the traditional authorities which gave meaning to their lives. The mass production and dissemination of cultural forms in non-traditional contexts and the increasing dependence of cultural production on the "market" were interpreted as a major threat to the traditional cultural values and as the cause of cultural and moral disorder (Arnold 1971; also Williams 1987: 110-29).

In this pessimistic context, mass communication was rejected as it was associated with the process of modernization and was thought to undermine traditional authority and modes of social integration (McQuail 1987: 91-2). Emphasizing the emergence of rather large-scale, remote and inaccessible media institutions, and the tendency towards a monopolistic organization of the media market, mass society theorists have treated the mass media with mistrust. According to mass society theorists the process of mass communication would, alongside other factors such as the extension of the franchise, or the expansion of the market economy, or the emergence of popular education lead to the homogenization of society, to the creation of masses of displaced, disoriented and isolated individuals which could be easily manipulated as audiences, electorates and consumers. As the mass media were viewed as sources of social power, mass society theories gave primacy to the media as institutions for the maintenance of mass society; they were thought to offer a view of the world in which the mass of

anonymous individuals would displace the community, organic solidarity and authority.

Mass society theories have certainly pointed out the homogenizing tendencies of modern societies, which are to some extent linked with the emergence of mass communication. They have correctly in my opinion identified some aspects of the transformations that modern societies have been undergoing, and the centrality of mass communication in the shift to new modes of social interaction and social relations. However, they have been criticized (see for example Bennett 1982; Curran and Seaton 1988) for their exaggerated emphasis on the integrated, cohesive and unified character of modern societies and their underestimation of the capacity of the audiences to retain some degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the mass media as other factors such as the integration of individuals and groups in other contexts of social interaction, play a major role in the reception and consumption of cultural products and therefore counteract the powerful processes of homogenization of modern societies.

The emphasis placed by mass society theorists on the homogenizing tendencies of the mass media does not allow any room for alternative conceptualizations of mass communication. Indeed, mass society theories do not see any possibility of the media acquiring a representational and expressive role and thus becoming a crucial component of a public sphere where social diversity would be safeguarded,

the boundaries of the political would be negotiated and redefined and a democratic political culture nurtured. Thus, their essentially conservative approach supports a model of society with an authoritarian political culture, where deference to traditional authority would reproduce the heteronomy of citizens and in some cases might even contest the very concept of citizenship. Indeed, as it has been pointed out in the first chapter, the civic culture thesis appears to have been partly influenced by the emphasis of mass society theories to the need for deference to authority and cultural and moral consensus. Both theories seem to share a conservative ideological background, and a fear towards 'excessive' citizen participation in political and social life. Their critique of the mass media is therefore not merely a critique of the homogenizing tendencies promoted by mass communication - and therefore of their potential contribution to the emergence or reproduction of an authoritarian political culture - but also a rejection of the potentially democratizing role which the mass media could play in modern societies.

Structural-functionalist theories.

Informed by structural-functionalist and systemic approaches which view society as a system comprizing linked parts of sub-systems, each one of them making a contribution towards meeting the essential needs of society, namely the

preservation of continuity, order, integration and of the capability of adaptation, structural functionalist theories of mass communication focus on the contribution of the media towards the preservation of organized social life. This is achieved as the mass media perform a series of functions which provide an accurate, coherent and consistent picture of society in general, and of its constituent parts in particular. Thus, by performing "essential" functions such as providing information, linking the various social sub-systems, or preserving the cultural heritage and collective memory of the society, the mass media contribute to societal integration, to the maintenance of continuity, the preservation of order and of social equilibrium, and thus ensure "[society's] capacity to respond to contingencies on the basis of a common and reasonably accurate picture of reality" (McQuail, 1987: 52).

Structural-functionalist theories are based upon the assumption that the contribution of the mass media to the preservation of the social system is achieved rather unintentionally, as the former tend to respond to the "needs" of individuals and collectivities, and their response - it is argued - has unintended consequences which "satisfy" the "needs" of the social system as a whole. Thus, in the context of structural-functionalist theories, the media are considered to be essentially neutral and to possess a self-directing, self correcting, and self-regulating capacity that is derived from their presumed tendency to respond to

the competing cultural needs of members of the society. According to structural-functionalist theorists, the content of media messages is considered to include diverse and often competing views, while their production is thought to be unregulated and free of any intervention.

The autonomy and self-regulation of the means of mass communication postulated by the functional-structuralist theorists was further echoed in pluralist interpretations which emphasized the importance of professional values and practices among media workers as the ultimate safeguard of the "neutrality" of media institutions and the objectivity of media messages. As Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott point out,

"A strict pluralist interpretation would accept that media professionals' claims to autonomy and their commitment to the principles of objectivity and impartiality indeed operate as guidelines for their work practices and as regulators of their professional conduct. It would therefore, see ultimate control of the production process in the media as resting in the hands of professionals responsible for it, in spite of the variety of pressures and influences to which they may be subjected" (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982: 19).

Structural-functionalist approaches appear to be rather apolitical in formulation as, mass media organizations are viewed as objective, virtually self-regulated and "immune" from external or internal pressure or influence, performing socially "necessary" functions such as the maintenance of social stability and the promotion of societal integration

and continuity. Thus, the media are held to be "reflective, or expressive of an achieved normative consensus.

Throughout the 1950s and 60s, media effects research conducted in the framework of systemic theories provided ample empirical evidence of this postulate: the mass media reinforced the values and norms that were already enjoying a widespread consensus within modern pluralist societies; they simply reflected the social and political reality and, therefore had merely cognitive effects, and virtually no persuasive impact (see for example Lazarsfeld 1944; Klapper 1960; Schramm 1961; Trenaman and McQuail 1961).

As consensus and integration were uncritically accepted by structural-functionalism as part of the "needs" of society, the main conclusion of empirical research was that media effects were essentially negligible, as no considerable behavioural change could be detected. In fact, by adopting an essentially cultural-consensual definition of society - a definition upon which, as it has already been pointed out, the civic culture thesis had also been based - with special emphasis to a broadly-based normative consensus and, focusing on the media as a means for reflecting a "natural" social and political stability and equilibrium, structural-functionalist theories of mass communication are in fact reifying social and political reality as they accept unproblematically the existing social arrangements, inequalities and asymmetrical relations of power.

Thus, in the context of this apparently apolitical outlook, the origins, content and structure of this normative consensus, remained unquestioned, or even reified as, according to the "end of ideology thesis" which was underlying structural functionalism, social conflict was reduced to debate over means within a broadly-based normative consensus.

It could be argued that the "a-political" premises of structural-functionalist theories in fact conceal their essentially conservative bias as they "normalize" and "reify" a socially constructed consensus which as Stuart Hall pointed out "entailed the enforcement of social, economic and political structures" (Hall, 1982: 63). Similarly, the structural-functionalist assumption of the neutrality of the media, and the consequent emphasis upon their presumed more or less self-directing and self-regulating capacity also dissimulates the involvement of power relations in cultural production as it detaches and isolates the mass media and their products from the social-historical contexts in which they are situated; it overlooks the fact that while professional ethics and practices constitute a significant factor in mass communication, so are political and economic relations and influence.

The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School.

A rather influential and systematic attempt to develop a

"marxist" analysis of the relationship between culture and mass communication, and an important variant of marxist critique of the emergence of mass communication and its consequences was developed by the members of the Frankfurt School. In an attempt to retain the critical edge of Marxism in the 1930s and 1940s, that is, at a time when the economic determinism of Soviet Marxism and the political practices of Stalinism were prevalent in marxist political and theoretical discourse, the members of the School drew their attention to cultural and ideological transformations which led to the rise of national socialism to power and to its subsequent destructive course. As the spread of national socialism forced the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research to move to the United States, the contact of the School members with aspects of North American commercialized - and in many cases manipulative - mass culture, provided a further stimulus for the development of the the School's critique of the "culture industry" and of its role in the one-dimensional and cohesive character of post-war western societies.

The work of the School members on culture, ideology and mass communication has been extensive, comprising contributions from members and associates of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research - most importantly of T. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse and W. Benjamin - over several decades. Here, I shall focus only on the contributions of members of the Frankfurt School which bear most closely on the themes of the "culture industry" and mass communication,

notably on the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse (cf. Adorno and Horkheimer 1979; Horkheimer, Adorno et al. 1973; Adorno 1975; Marcuse 1968) although the work of other members of the Institute is by no means negligible.

The common underlying theme in these works, as well as in the work of the members of the School in general, has been the theme of "rationalization", or, more precisely, the theme of the emergence of instrumental reason. Sharing Weber's view that instrumental reason originated to modes of life which predated industrial capitalism, the Institute members argued that the progressive submission of nature to technical rationality, especially after the Enlightenment, led to the undermining and elimination of traditional worldviews and to the objectification of the natural world, including human subjectivity. However, it is under capitalism that human beings become further subordinated to the logic of instrumental reason as the latter colonizes everyday life through processes of rationalization, bureaucratization and commodification of the modern world and undermines the possibilities for the development of critical reason and autonomous thinking.

It is upon this account of the domination of instrumental reason at the expense of critical reason in modern societies that the Frankfurt School's analysis of mass communication and of the "culture industry" is premised. Horkheimer and Adorno use the term "culture industry" instead

of "mass culture" in order to emphasize the central position of the mass media in the cultural process of modern societies. As Adorno pointed out, the employment of the term "culture industry" was intended to refer to the "standardization" and "pseudo-individualization" of symbolic forms in modern society and to the rationalization of the process of diffusion (Adorno 1975: 14) that has taken place through the extension of instrumental reason into the field of cultural production. In this context, symbolic forms are in fact cultural goods produced for profit by capitalistic enterprises; "mass" culture is not culture produced by the masses (p. 12), it is rather commodified and subject to the logic of capital accumulation. According to the School members, the ideological effects of the culture industry are an intrinsic part of the process of consumption of "cultural goods"; as cultural goods reflect already "existing conditions" and reify the status quo, or a specific interpretation of reality (cf. Horkheimer, Adorno et al. 1973: 202). In this way the culture industry integrates consumers of its products into a reified social order dominated by instrumental reason. In this sense, as Marcuse argues, the culture industry "sells" the social system as a whole to its consumers, and creates

"a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behaviour in which ideas, aspirations and objectives that by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to the terms of this universe." (Marcuse 1991: 12)

Marcuse argues that the mass media play a crucial role in this process of containment of critical reason and autonomous thinking as they constitute the necessary powerful mechanisms which achieve mass uniformity and reification of the domination of instrumental reason by excluding from the universe of discourse of modern societies any subversive critique of the status quo and expression of dissent, and reducing politics to a simple procedure of choice among techniques for the achievement of given, reified ends, effecting in this way the closing of the universe of discourse.

A main point of criticism against the Frankfurt School's critique of the culture industry and mass culture has been the "monumental pessimism" incorporated in it (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott 1982: 23, also Curran and Seaton 1988: 221-27, J. B. Thompson 1990: 101-9) while critics have pointed out that the analyses of members of the School have not taken into account the fact that the "reception and appropriation of cultural products is a complex social process which involves an ongoing activity of interpretation" by audiences, and therefore, by disregarding the audiences' potential for resistance to the power of the culture industry they have failed to examine the impact of mass communication in a systematic way (Thompson 1982: 105). However it should be pointed out that Frankfurt School members did not view the culture industry as the only vehicle for the expansion of instrumental reason; they seem to have

been suggesting that the possibilities of critical appropriation of media messages have also become limited as a result of the expansion of instrumental reason in other spheres of social activity and other institutions. As Marcuse argued

"Objections are made that we greatly overrate the indoctrinating power of the media and that by themselves people would feel and satisfy the needs that are now superimposed upon them. This objection misses the point. The preconditioning does not start with the mass production of radio or TV. The people enter this stage as preconditioned receptacles of long standing. In this more complex view the public do not abdicate rational consideration of their interest blindly. More subtly, the whole basis of rational calculation is undermined." (Marcuse, quoted by Curran and Seaton 1988: 227)

It should also be argued that, despite the aphorisms of the "monumental pessimism" of the Frankfurt School, their analyses of the trends in modern societies constitute a valuable, insightful and critical contribution to the study of modern societies in general and mass culture and communication in particular. More precisely, the School's emphasis on the analysis of ideology constituted a powerful and plausible counteracting tendency to economic approaches within marxist thought. What is more, their emphasis on the domination of instrumental reason, and consequently on the commodification of forms of social interaction, including mass communication, or on the impact of the culture industry on the cultural processes and the nature of ideology in modern societies have to a considerable

extent retained their validity, as recent debates in the social sciences seem to indicate (cf. Habermas 1982; 1987). Avoiding the pessimism of the Frankfurt School, they nevertheless take up and reformulate the themes and the problematic originally developed by the Institute members.

What is of particular importance as far as the relationship of mass communication and political culture is concerned, is the importance the Frankfurt School attributes to the "culture industry" as one of the major forces which affect the "openness" of political culture of modern societies. As I already indicated in the previous chapter referring to Marcuse's interpretation of the spread of instrumental reason in modern societies, the distortion of the universe of communication, to which a major contributor is the "culture industry", is thought to have brought about a "closed" culture characterized by the progressive closure of the universe of political discourse through the exclusion of dissent and critique, and therefore, the political agenda has been significantly reduced to questions of simple choice among different means to reach given and undisputed ends. Although this interpretation of the changes in understanding the "political" and the nature and limitations of political action in modern societies could be criticized for its "pessimism", it nevertheless retains its importance as a critical approach to the political effects of mass communication, as the work of the Frankfurt School focused on the processes of "consensus construction" through mass

communication, and therefore provided the theoretical background for the development of critical approaches to the study of mass communication and political culture.

Political Economy of the Mass Media

The concern of social scientists with the mass media as industries led to the development of political-economic approaches to the study of mass communication which attempted to investigate the impact of media ownership structures or, more generally, the economic dimensions of mass communications in the activities of media institutions and the processes of the formation of ideology.

By emphasizing the dependence of ideology and culture on the economic base, studies of this kind have concentrated on the economic processes, market relationships and the structures of ownership and control of media organizations. One of the main tenets of the political-economic perspective in the study of mass communication is that media organizations operate in more-or-less the same way as any other economic organization. The mass media are regarded as an integral part of the economic basis of society (see for example Murdock and Golding 1974; 1977).

In one of the pioneering works stressing the importance of the political-economy perspective in the study of mass communication, **"Capitalism, Communication and Class**

Relations" (1977), G. Murdock and P. Golding, basing their analysis on classical Marxist theory argued that ownership and control are the determining factors in media activities and directly influence cultural production, and the content of media messages. Their analysis demonstrated the significance of the changing patterns in the ownership of media organizations from concentration to conglomeration, of the reduction of the number of media owners and of the diversification of media industries as it suggested the links between media owners and the capitalist class and the commonality of their interests (p.p. 32-3; also Murdock 1982). According to Murdock and Golding as the media organizations are economic organizations, the symbolic forms they produce are effectively commodities. In this context, economic considerations such as the need to increase profitability, or to expand to new markets (i.e. acquire new audiences) lead to conscious choices which entail less economic risk and affect cultural production.

Referring to the first of the consequences of market pressure for cultural production, Murdock and Golding point out that the material produced and diffused by the mass media tends to be limited to what could guarantee profitability; this situation could lead to increased selectivity and exclusion of symbolic forms on the basis of the criterion of potential commercial success (p. 37). What is more, they argue, as processes of concentration progress and monopolistic tendencies increase, the media increasingly tend

to exclude "voices lacking economic power or resources" (p. 37). As accessibility to the media market is determined by possession of substantial capital, the position of groups already established in the main mass media markets is consolidated at the expense of those groups which lack the necessary economic resources for successful entry (p. 37). Thus, Murdock and Golding claim,

"the voices which survive will largely belong to those least likely to criticize the prevailing distribution of wealth and power. Conversely, those most likely to challenge these arrangements are unable to publicize their dissent or opposition because they cannot command the resources needed for effective communication to a broad audience" (p. 37).

As economic considerations prevail in cultural production, Murdock and Golding detect an increasing tendency towards audience maximization, or rather, a preference to larger and wealthier markets at the expense of poorer and smaller sectors of the potential audiences. Therefore communities, or groups whose size or purchasing power are incapable to guarantee increasing profits tend to be neglected or served as parts of larger or wealthier populations (p.p. 38-9). The "need" for audience maximization, it is claimed, affects the content of media messages, as the latter have to be attractive and familiar to the audiences. In this way, the exclusion of media products that might not meet these criteria, hinders and discourages any creative or innovative effort in cultural production (p. 39).

As research progressed and gave rise to debate regarding the advantages and limitations of the political economy perspective, the interplay between the cultural and economic aspects of mass communication was conceived in a more flexible way than in initial approaches (see Golding and Murdock 1991: 19). In subsequent research new concerns emerged such as the relation between state regulation institutions and mass communication industries, obstacles to the sovereignty of the consumers of media products, the relationship between social and economical location and access to cultural resources and competences for differential 'readings' of media texts (Golding and Murdock 1991), or the relation of variations in audience response to media messages with their location in the economic system (Murdock 1989).

Political-economic approaches constitute an important contribution to the study of mass communication as they focus on the important implications of ownership, market pressure and other economic and political considerations to cultural production that had been neglected by approaches focusing exclusively on the content of media messages. However they appear to underestimate other factors of at least equal importance. It should be emphasized that media organizations do not always operate on the basis of the logic of profitability. As McQuail argues, difficulties for such approaches arise when the mass media are under public ownership (McQuail, 1987: 64), or, one might add, even in

cases of privately owned media, other priorities could be detected, such as political affiliations or loyalties, aspirations for political influence or control, or for the acquisition of other privileges. Thus in some societies the mass media could be an integral component of clientelistic networks - as in the case of the Greek press which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters - and therefore economic considerations might be of secondary importance, or even irrelevant in the production and diffusion of media messages. Having said that, it should be recognized that recent developments in the field (Murdock 1989; Golding and Murdock 1991) have indicated considerable progress towards expanding the scope of "political economy" approaches to mass communication.

Political-economic approaches offer valuable insights as far as aspects of the material context of cultural production are concerned, provided however that the economic aspects of mass communication are treated as an important and necessary, but not sufficient explanation of cultural and ideological media effects (Hall 1986: 46-7).

Hegemony and the Politics of Signification:

Towards a Critical Paradigm

Another critical approach to mass communication has developed within the context of British cultural studies. Premised upon the Gramscian concept of hegemony (Gramsci

1968) and the work of R. Williams on culture (especially Williams 1980b), the exponents of this approach saw culture as a continuous process through which hegemony is accomplished and challenged.

As I have already argued in my discussion of political culture, the concept of hegemony allows us to understand domination, not as total domination, but as the outcome of a continuous cultural and political striving for its achievement, and as the result of struggle, negotiation and compromise between dominant and subordinated classes and groups. The consequences of such a shift in the analysis of culture and ideology are very significant as the dominant schemata of perception, cognition and practice in a society, or group, that is, what Gramsci called "common sense" can no longer be considered to be a "product" of the dominant groups in society, imposed by them, nor can they be considered to be permanent and rigid. They are rather the outcome of a struggle for the definition of reality, of a "politics of signification", of social struggle over the determination of meaning (cf. Volosinov 1973; Hall 1977, 1982; J.B. Thompson 1984; Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

However, the adoption of a hegemonial approach to the study of culture and cultural production should not reach the culturalist extreme of discarding the notion of structure, as every culture is, in a sense structured, or, in other words, cultural production is subject to certain "constraints" and

made possible through certain "resources" which are rooted in objectified historical experience (see for example Giddens 1979, 1981, 1984; also Berger and Luckmann 1966). As Hall observes, the 'deep structure' of cultural products, which has been one of the main concerns of structuralist approaches, could, in the context of a hegemonial approach, be understood as a

"network of elements, premises and assumptions drawn from the long-standing and historically elaborated discourses which had accreted over the years, into which the whole history of the social formation had sedimented, and which now constituted a reservoir of themes and premises on which, for example broadcasters, could draw for the work of signifying new and troubling events" (Hall, 1982: 73).

It is precisely this "deep structure" upon which cultural products are formed and become intelligible, as it constitutes a common stock of taken-for-granted knowledge, or the basis for communication for the members of the society or the group. It is important to point out that signification or discourses premised upon this "deep structure" constitute a specific interpretation of reality. Thus as Hall points out, a statement about a situation is just a proposed definition of a situation, although in everyday interaction this is misrecognized (p. 74). This misrecognition, is an effect of the closure of the universe of discourse, a closure which makes us recognize specific propositions about "reality" as true, accurate and familiar.

This equivalence between language and truth, is achieved through discursive practice, or rather through the struggle in discourse. As Laclau has shown (1977; also Laclau and Mouffe 1985), discourses constitute an arena of social struggle for the achievement of hegemony, where signifiers are disarticulated from and articulated in competing meaning-systems in a continuous competition for the definition of 'reality'.

The mass-media, being as we saw, an important factor in cultural production are thus deeply involved in the processes of signification and the definition of reality. The mass media manufacture consent not primarily because they are under compulsion or constraint. Rather, their claim to objectivity, or their attempt to represent themselves as neutral increases their sensitivity to "common sense", to consensus. They are thus, rather unconsciously, enmeshed in the hegemonic struggle as they draw upon pre-constructed definitions of the situation in order to produce their messages. As Hall argues, the production of symbolic goods involves rendering "events" or "reality" intelligible by articulating them within the hegemonic framework of a society and thus by winning the consent of the audiences to "the preferred reading" (Hall 1977: 343-345).

Thus, it could be argued that recent developments in cultural studies have contributed to the emergence and convergence of critical approaches to the study of the

relation between mass communication and culture. What is particularly important is the fact that these approaches emphasize the contradictory nature of media performance. This is so as the centrality of the notion of hegemony in these approaches implies the recognition of the contradictory character of culture, and therefore of the contradictory work the media have to perform by reproducing not only the hegemonic culture but also the contradictions which structure its field (Hall 1977: 346).

Mass Communication and Political Culture:

Some Concluding Remarks

One of the spheres of social activity that has been profoundly affected by the pervasiveness of mass communications in modern societies is that of politics. The emergence of the mass media has had significant effects as far as the communicative process, institutional arrangements and authority structures relevant to contexts of political interaction are concerned. What is more, mass communication has become an important source of our knowledge about politics and has affected the ways we participate in the political sphere. Indeed, in modern societies, the mass media have become "definers" of the "political" as the experience derived from mass communication is partly constitutive of the domain of social activity which is regarded as politics.

Mass communication has led to the reorganization of

forms of political interaction. In societies penetrated by mass communications, the mass media are able to bypass the traditional channels of political communication and to disseminate political information without institutional control (McQuail, 1969: 12). What is more, as the mass media become an important channel of political communication, the nature of the latter is affected significantly. More precisely, the one-way flow of political communication establishes a rather asymmetrical relation between the "sender" and the "receiver" of political information, as it implies a limited capacity of the public or rather, the audience, to exert effective and direct control on the process. Furthermore, as the deployment of the technical media of mass communication makes political interaction across temporal and spatial distances possible, a new kind of mediated publicness, entailing the reconstitution of the boundaries between public and private life, emerges (Thompson, 1990: 245-8).

As Thompson argues, in contrast to the more traditional notion of publicness, this new notion of publicness which is dependent upon the media of mass communication, is non-dialogical in character, and does not depend on spatial limits (p. 246). Indeed, in societies penetrated by the mass media, it could be argued that experience of political events, especially events that are spacially and temporally remote, is an experience largely mediated by the institutions of mass communication. Consequently, it appears that mass

communication has the potential of practically extending the limits of the public sphere to an unprecedented extent, by introducing a mediated publicness.

It is important to point out that although Thompson's claim that the kind of mediated publicness created by the development of mass communication creates new opportunities for the restriction of invisibility and for the accessibility of a political domain that would normally be out of sight is quite valid, one should also be aware that its "mediated" character entails the "manageability" of this extended visibility. In this new, expanded realm of the political, which has been made possible and is sustained by mass communication, the relationship between political problems, events or personalities and audiences (i.e. the public) becomes increasingly mediated, and therefore manageable. While problems, or specific political actors such as governments, political personalities, parties or organizations and their activities become increasingly visible, it is also true that their visibility is in some way managed. Or, in other words, media products are not mere reflections of 'reality', but rather specific interpretations of it. These 'managed' accounts of 'reality' are first of all managed in the sense of being the outcome of processes of selective introduction and exclusion of issues from the universe of discourse (Bourdieu 1977), and of the way issues are introduced to the universe of discourse, that is, on the politics of signification. "Political reality" is therefore

not "natural", it is rather a product of representation, of processes of definition, or signification. Or, in other words, our understanding and experience of specific actions and situations depends on complex processes of selection and exclusion of alternative significations, through the struggle in discourse.

As I have tried to point out in the previous pages, the mass media are an important factor in the social struggle over the definition of 'reality'. They are therefore crucial in the study of political culture, as they play a major and decisive role in the definition and demarcation of what is political and what is not in a society, of what might be discussed or disputed, or also, in setting the terms under which such a discussion will take place, as well as the limits of acceptability or unacceptability of action. Thus, drawing upon the hegemonic culture, the media provide political realities where they did not exist before or alter existing political realities in such a way that they contribute to the determination of political acceptability or deviance. What is more, they do so rather unconsciously, by drawing upon pre-constructed definitions of the situation, which are held to be accurate and objective descriptions of reality, while in fact they are socially constructed, enmeshed in the struggle for hegemony.

However, bearing in mind that the media reproduce not only the hegemonic culture but also the contradictions which

structure its field, it becomes evident that one of the most important objectives of the study of the relationship between mass communication and political culture should concentrate on precisely how the mass media in specific circumstances facilitate or obstruct social and political change. Although the degree of rigidity or flexibility of the frames of political discourse and action is not sufficient, it is nevertheless indicative of the extent to which a political culture is closed and authoritarian, or open and democratic.

PART II

POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN GREECE:

A SOCIAL/HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

**PART II: POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN GREECE:
INTRODUCTION**

Part II constitutes an attempt to explore the formation and the contours of contemporary Greek political culture and the role the press has played within this context. As far as the analysis of Greek political culture - or of political culture in general for that matter - is concerned, I would argue that neither the organization nor the functioning of cultural practices can be understood if these are examined only from the point of view of their current forms and contemporary social articulations. They need also to be considered as the product of historical processes. Recovering this past, therefore, and attempting to explore the ways it is selectively articulated to current political and cultural practices, is an essential part of the analysis of political culture.

Based on this assumption, chapter 4 will focus on the analysis of the structural and institutional framework within which contemporary political practices unfold and in the light of which they become meaningful. Through a relatively brief overview of the history of contemporary Greece I shall attempt to examine the processes of reproduction and change of structural elements of the Greek social formation and

assess their impact in the formation and transformation of those institutions which have provided the frames of political action and debate in contemporary Greece. A social-historical analysis of the Greek social formation is important as it will make intelligible contemporary patterns of political action. Indeed, it seems to me that data from quantitative research of political attitudes and behaviour cannot be intelligible unless we interpret them in the light of such a background.

In chapter 5, I shall concentrate on the institutions of mass communication, and in particular on the Athens daily political press. Departing from a social-historical analysis of the institution of the press, that is, of the social, political and economic context in which it has developed, as well as the internal relations of power, I shall examine the part it has played in the definition of the political, and in the development and reproduction of political culture in contemporary Greece.

CHAPTER 4
THE FORMATION OF GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE

Greek society during the nineteenth century.

Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, Balkan societies, including Greek society, were subjugated parts of the Ottoman Empire and, as such, had not experienced the transition from absolutism to parliamentarism, and thus, followed a different path of development from that, or those, of western European societies. The Greek war of independence and the political crises of 1843-44 and 1862-63 were not fundamentally disruptive of traditional forms of social organization and behaviour. Despite the propagation of Western political institutions, Greek society was not "European", in the sense that it did not share the experiences of most European societies during their transition from feudalism to capitalism and from absolutism to parliamentarism.

The social and political system on which the Ottoman empire was based, was organized in such a way that it would secure the reproduction and perpetuation of the established relationship between the Ottoman central bureaucracy and the independent peasantry. More precisely, in rural Ottoman society, a mass of independent or semi-independent peasants

with a hereditary right on the use of the land, had to pay through taxation a significant portion of their economic surplus to the central bureaucracy.¹ For the majority of the independent and semi-independent peasants this relationship with the centre was acceptable, despite occasional extensive taxation, as the sultan and his central bureaucracy guaranteed their relative independence from the local functionaries in exchange for their cultivation of the land and for the extraction of economic surplus of their production through taxation. Any challenge to this relationship by local functionaries would constitute a threat to the reproduction of the social system, that is, to the status of the free peasant and to the ability of the central government to survive; consequently both the central bureaucracy and the peasantry were hostile towards attempts of local functionaries to transform themselves into powerful landed aristocracies, while Ottoman law posed serious obstacles to any attempt to transform the patterns of landholding or the mode of surplus extraction within the empire.

Despite frequent attempts - often successful - by local functionaries to appropriate land or the surplus extracted from the peasantry, it could be argued that the status of the free peasant, that is, the recognition of his/her personal or family right to cultivate land in exchange for part of his/her economic surplus constituted a very important feature of the Ottoman social formation. As long as central

government guaranteed social stability and the peasants' independence and land rights, the peasants were quite content with the status quo. Even in cases of social instability and upheaval the christian peasants' revolts were expressions of their resentment of local functionaries' and landowners' attempts to alter their status, with no intention to cede from the Ottoman empire (Stavrianos 1958: 144). Mouzelis points out the essentially conservative character of the Greek peasantry as he argues that the rural population in the early nineteenth century was "less interested in political independence and rather wishing to return to the good old ages when the powerful Ottoman government could secure their rights and limit the greediness of the landowners and the officials" (Mouzelis 1977: 30-31)

Surplus extraction was based on the communal administrative system of the empire, that is, on the recognition of the village as a communal/administrative unit with specific fiscal responsibilities towards the local delegated functionaries of the central government, and on the introduction of tax-collection through tax-farming, especially after the sixteenth century.² The communal system and tax-farming gave the opportunity to local - christian in the case of Greece - landowners or notables³ to acquire increased status and additional legitimation derived from their position in the Ottoman administrative system.

In contrast to these social groups which were more or

less content with the Ottoman status quo, as their land rights - in the case of the former - and authority and privileges - in the case of the latter - were linked with its preservation, the emerging middle-class groups which were formed by the growth of commercial and financial activities in the empire, were demanding more involvement in the political sphere and more independence in their economic activity, while an active Greek intelligencia, influenced by European enlightenment and the revolutionary movements of the time, provided the catalyst for the emergence and spread of Greek nationalism and the war of independence (Mackridge 1981).

As the combination of the catalytic role of the Greek intelligencia and the increasing erosion of the fragile equilibria which had held the Ottoman empire together led to the participation of all these groups, with their more or less contradictory interests, to participate in the Greek war of independence in the 1820s, it became evident that some of the main features of post-independence Greek society, state and politics were already in the making, or already present within Ottoman society, before the acquisition of statehood.

While it is true that the war of independence disrupted old administrative and economic institutions and networks which used to provide links between the insurgent provinces and other parts of the Ottoman empire and that the power

vacuum and confusion that followed the fall of Ottoman sovereignty, made necessary the construction of new centralist networks to consolidate and unify the insurgent provinces which had never before constituted a single administrative or economic unit, it is also true that social forms and practices that had been an integral part of Ottoman society, survived and adapted to the new realities of Greek independence alongside the introduced Western political forms and centralized administrative practices.

The land issue and the peasantry.

There is no doubt that during the first fifty years of the existence of the Greek state, Greek society was predominantly rural, while the economy was characterized by low accumulation of capital, a virtually non-existent industry and, in some cases, subsistence agricultural production. Given the predominantly agricultural economy of the independent state, and the association of land-holding with personal and family independence, land constituted a most important guarantee of economic security, and a very precious source of wealth and prestige. In the southernmost part of the Balkan peninsula - which eventually became the initial territory of the Greek state - small scale agriculture based on small-scale land property was the main productive activity. The majority of Greek peasants were working in their own small property and part of the surplus of their production was extracted by means of taxation.

Although, during periods of crisis of the central Ottoman government, local - mainly muslim - functionaries managed to appropriate land and become powerful landowners,⁴ most areas in what would become the territory of the Greek state retained their predominant small property character.⁵

After its formation, the Greek state nationalized most of the muslim-owned land (mainly chifliks) in an effort to prevent the concentration of the land (and, possibly, of power) in the hands of a few owners. The "modernizers", supporters of centralization, saw in the appropriation of land by the local notables, military chieftains and the landowning and merchant groups the danger of setting in motion a process which would eventually lead to increased centrifugal tendencies and, at best, to a fragmented state based on the principle of multicentrism. Thus they opposed any solution that might eventually lead to the formation of a class of powerful landowners. However, possibly as a result of a compromise between the rival elites the national lands were not distributed to the landless peasants, possibly because the former were anticipating the right moment for settling the land issue under more favourable terms. The fact that a few chifliks were not affected by the nationalization of the land proved to be of only minor importance as a series of laws allowed landless peasants to rent small parts of the national lands and therefore reduced the availability of land-workers for the remaining large estates. One of the main consequences of these developments was that potential

pressure for the creation of a rural proletariat which eventually might lead to consolidation of capitalistic enterprises in this area of economic activity was considerably reduced.⁶ In addition to this, the quite delayed distribution of the national lands by the government of prime minister Koumoundouros in 1871 contributed to the prevalence of small land holdings and functioned as counterbalance for the annexation of Thessaly - a predominantly chiflik region - which followed shortly.⁷ As Stavrianos observes, the prevalence of small land holdings "held potential industrial workers to the soil, particularly because going to the city and becoming a day labourer was regarded a step down in the social scale" (Stavrianos: 479). Greek society therefore, remained a society in which the prevalence of small family land property was a significant feature (Vergopoulos 1965).

The peasants earned their living by mainly subsistence agriculture and were essentially isolated from the centre through lack of transport and communication. The state was viewed, and in some respects is still viewed as an external entity (Papataxiarchis 1990). Widespread social and political mistrust also seemed to permeate Greek political culture as the government not only perceived as alien to the population, but also provided the peasant with minimal, almost non-existent services. As in the Ottoman Empire the relationship between state and population, especially peasant population, was limited to tax-collection.

The formation of the "political class".

The initial decentralized structures of the Greek state which were mainly due to the delicate balance of power among the various rival elites did not last more than a decade. After ten years of intense political confrontations, sectionalism gave way to a more centralized state. The destruction of the traditional unit of administration, the rural community, and of the communal system,^a combined with the succession of the absolutist regimes of Governor Capodistria and King Otto which favoured a centralized state, gave a decisive blow to any prospects of creation of autonomous regions, or of any other possible formula that would guarantee to members of the aspiring elites their reproduction at the regional level. What is more, the inability of the autochthonous elites to appropriate the national lands and to derive their social power on large scale ownership of the land, in conjunction with the prevalence of small scale land ownership in Greece, reduced significantly the possibilities for their social and economic reproduction as distinct social groups.

Facing this impasse, the majority of the autochthonous elites progressively shifted the basis of their power from land property to the colonization of the state, or, in other words from economic to "political paternalism" (Tsoukalas 1977: 224). This reorientation of the autochthonous oligarchy

of notables, landowners and merchants could be explained by the importance of the state in 19th century Greek society: as in many pre-capitalist social formations where large scale ownership of land is marginal, there are no established forms of exploitation in the field of production proper (Dedoussopoulos 1985). Instead, as it has been pointed out above as far as the case of the Ottoman empire was concerned, in these social formations, the agricultural surplus is extracted by the state and its delegated functionaries in the form of taxation (Dedoussopoulos 1985; also Tsoukalas 1977). Under these circumstances, it could be argued that the "dominant" social group is closely connected to the state and its political and upper level administrative personnel, so as to be able to appropriate or, more importantly, manage the appropriation of the extracted surplus. In the case of Greece, as it has already been mentioned, the establishment of a centralized state seemed irreversible as this was the form of statehood preferred by the foreign patrons of Greece and was definitely favoured by the regimes of Governor Capodistria and King Otto. It therefore became evident that any visions of sectionalism hardly constituted a realistic option. The advantages of controlling the processes of surplus extraction and distribution, given the fact that the possibilities of acquiring more landed property were quite remote, left open just one option for the notables and chieftains. Instead of continuing to base their power on their influence and prestige at the level of the local or

regional community - a strategy with a quite uncertain future as new authority and power relations were being developed in the centre as well as in the periphery of the new state, and threatened to erode the traditional bases of the power of the autochthonous elites - they sought to transform their local social influence into political capital. Thus, they turned to the state or, more precisely, they started to occupy political and high-level administrative positions and, later, to use parliamentarianism as a means of safeguarding their own power and interests. Their transformation into a political class meant that the autochthonous elites would in the future acquire influence and prestige, not as mere communal and regional potentates, but due to their access to political decision making processes and because of their management of the extracted surplus. In this way this new political oligarchy retained its mediating role between the local community and the "alien" and "remote" centres of power, by operating within the structures of the state. As Tsoukalas observes "in this way, a large part of the families of the notables and the chieftains, sustained their political influence in the countryside up to today" (Tsoukalas 1977). The "colonization" of the state by the autochthonous oligarchies was achieved rather easily as, although they were not powerful enough to challenge the central government of the absolutist regimes of Governor Capodistria and King Otto, they were still in a position to use their considerable

influence in their communities as a means of acquiring access to the state apparatuses. It was therefore quite clear that their presence in or influence on the state apparatuses presupposed their ability to sustain the reproduction of their influence and prestige at the local level through the establishment of quite sophisticated clientelistic networks. As clientelism is in principle a relation of exchange, the autochthonous elites had to secure their reproduction as a political class by directly or indirectly allocating resources and rewards to their local clients. This allocation could take various forms, the most common being public appointments, hiring the services of clients or offering state subsidies or other benefits. In any case, whatever form the exchanges might have taken, it is important to emphasize that clientelism played a formative role as far as Greek society and Greek state were concerned. It was important insofar as it provided the basis for the development of "state fetishism" in a society of aspiring candidates for public employment and state support. It was also central in the formation of the widespread social perception of the state as an instrument for the satisfaction of individual demands. The state bureaucracy was viewed as a mere appendage of the party/cliqye system, as a part of clientelist networks, and therefore was not considered to be a relatively neutral institution for executing policies and providing services as was the case in most Western European societies.

Thus, the integration of an individual into a patronage network would usually entail the possibility of upward social mobility as in Greek society, given the economic stagnation and insecurity that prevailed in the rural areas, employment in the continuously growing civil service was considered to be extremely prestigious in both financial and social terms.

Another important consequence of clientelism was the "vertical" organization of Greek society which it established and developed to such an extent that any "horizontal" way of social and political organization became almost impossible. The clientelistic rationale did not allow for the articulation of social contradictions and conflicts in the political sphere. As Psomiades observed, in Greek society

"[i]nstead of belonging to a number of functional groups, the individual tended to belong to one group, which served all of his needs" (Psomiades 1976: 150).

As needs were dealt with on an individual basis, collective interests tended to be misrecognized and fragmented. In this way, politics enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from social divisions and processes as the political sphere was disengaged from social structures and conflicts (Dertilis 1977a; 1977b), or rather, as Tsoukalas has pointed out "political conflict" reflected "class conflict only indirectly" (Tsoukalas 1979: 125). For example, in the first fifty years of Greek independence, the pauperization and insecurity of the rural population in Greece, which

constituted a potentially explosive political issue was not, or was marginally articulated in the discourses of the political elites and, therefore, peasant grievances were not translated into political issues and did not inspire any serious political action. On the contrary, these collective grievances were effectively neutralized as they were dealt with on an individual basis within the context of clientelistic relationships. The relative autonomy of the political sphere was very clearly manifested by the resilience of a particular mode of oligarchic parliamentarism in Greek politics (Mouzelis 1986), that is, of a particular type of "symbiosis" of parliamentary institutions with clientelistic forms of political exclusion of the majority of the electorate from the political process. Legg noted that the clientage system in Greece meshed so well with the institutions of modern representative democracy that it managed to reproduce itself and to remain a very significant factor in Greek politics (Legg 1969: 39-40). Thus, whereas the political institutions in Greece were representative-democratic in form, the majority of the electorate were effectively excluded from the political arena and political debate and their representation was annulled. Consequently, parliamentary, and more generally political debate, was focusing mainly on personal or legalistic issues while issues of relevance to the mass of the electorate were systematically ignored.

The autonomy of politics in Greek society could also be

demonstrated by an examination of the characteristics of the political parties of the nineteenth century - which are also closely linked to the phenomenon of oligarchic parliamentarism. More precisely, the formation of political parties in Greece was initiated from above, as they did not constitute the expression of any organized social interests and movements. They were rather political cliques formed on the basis of personal relations, with no principles. As Tsoukalas points out, the

"majority of rank and file, supporters or even simple voters of all parties, - even of those which were promising the formation of 'parties of principle', were regarding the party, mainly as an instrument that would enable their participation in the mechanisms of distribution of state funds" (Tsoukalas 1977: 97-98).

Therefore, political parties were not the product of any significant socio-political division and conflict, rooted in civil society; they were rather loose political groups rarely inspired by principles, and normally characterized by opportunism and fluidity. The composition of a political party was not certain or stable, as personal conflicts could easily affect political alliances and lead to the transfer of whole clientelistic networks from one political party to another.

A closely related issue to the "peculiarities" of the "political" in Greece was, and still is, what Mouzelis called "the formalistic character of politics" (Mouzelis 1978: 134-148). As politics was disengaged from social conflict,

and acquired a status of autonomy, political conflict was not focusing on social issues but rather, on issues of legalistic, or personal nature. So, while issues of social deprivation and inequality did not reach the universe of political discourse, political and parliamentary debate concentrated on legalistic issues and often took the form of personal feuds.

1850-1940: Towards Social Change.

Despite the defeat of sectionalism and the creation of a centralized state, it would be wrong to claim that the whole territory of the new state had reached a similar level of economic development. Certain parts of the Greek territory were characterized by a high degree of integration to the international market; we could briefly say that there were significant regional variations as forms of rural capitalism were just appearing in Thessaly in the 1880s, while Patras and Syros were mainly commercial centres. On the other hand, other areas were characterized by differing degrees of economic isolation, introversion, low monetarization and commodification of their local economies.

It is important to point out that recognizing the uneven economic development of the Greek territory does not imply recognizing the existence of two distinct sectors of development as dualist theories of development would suggest. On the contrary, the situation was far more complex as the

"extent" and the "quality" of development and underdevelopment in each area varied significantly. What might be interesting in these remarks is what these quantitative and qualitative differences in development suggest: the lack of a national economically dominant group, and the existence of a multitude of local dominant groups.

As it has already been shown, the autochthonous elites managed to establish a relationship with the state by adapting to the new realities of centralized administration and parliamentarianism. In contrast, the majority of the "bourgeois" groups which were emerging in areas where commerce, transportation, rural capitalism or manufacturing was developing remained quite isolated and did not transform into a national bourgeoisie. As G. Burgel observes both the political class and the economic class were mutually indifferent in the affairs of the other (Burgel 1976: 248-265). This could in part be explained by the extrovert character of the local economies, of the commercial and manufacturing centres of Greece, such as Syros and Patras; it could be argued that these centres, having their markets abroad, were more integrated in the international market than with the rest of Greece. Thus, their advanced integration to the international market, combined with the lack of any internal market, the relatively low monetarization of the economy and the almost complete lack of internal communications and transportation appear to have contributed to the lack of any interest by these economic elites in

direct or indirect participation in the political sphere.

This unequal economic development among the regions of the newly established state was perpetuated by the virtual lack of communication and transportation networks which inhibited any industrial venture or any effective attempt for further monetarization and commodification of these areas. It could therefore be argued that during the first half, and indeed throughout the nineteenth century, despite the incorporation of the Greek economy to the international market - or, precisely because of its peripheralization - its geographical and social fragmentation constituted an important obstacle to the formation of a unified internal, national market, and of national, social and political identities. As the only ways in which the population of the geographically and culturally fragmented realm were integrated in political life were the clientelist networks, which in any case distorted and mystified any collective grievances or demands, it was evident that the emergence of a civil society independent from the state, or any national social organizations was thwarted in advance.

What is more, the international economic climate did not facilitate the consolidation and possible expansion and strengthening of some of these groups. More precisely, international competition in the field of industry in general, given the fact that the Greek state had adopted a rather liberal duty and tariffs policy, did not provide

fertile ground for the development of the virtually stillborn Greek industry, while in the middle of the 19th century, the ship construction industry suffered a major crisis as the steamship was introduced in the field of maritime transportation and displaced the traditional sailing ships (Mouzelis 1978: 35).

It was only after 1860 when very cautious steps towards overcoming the physical and economic fragmentation of the realm and towards industrialization, or rather towards the creation of the infrastructure for industrialization can be detected. More precisely, in the period between 1880 and 1895 the governments of H. Trikoupis implemented a series of institutional - legal changes, complemented by extensive investment in the field of public works, transportation and industrial infrastructure. Despite the substantial effects of their investment policies, their overall vision of industrial or capitalist modernization failed and its insignificant results were wiped out when the traditionalist opposition returned in office.

It therefore seems quite misleading to link these reforms which focused mainly upon legal and institutional modernization, with the emergence of the middle classes as Tsoukalas claims (Tsoukalas 1981: 14), as it seems that there was no social base - at least, any significant social base - which would be able to support and sustain this process of institutional and economic change. Although it cannot be

denied that such an emergence took place it appears that the importance of these strata in the developments in Greek society has been exaggerated. A more plausible explanation which might throw more light to the developments near the turn of the nineteenth century would, in my opinion, emphasize the international conjuncture as the international economic recession the symptoms of which began to be felt in Greece around 1880 made imperative the implementation of protective and developmental policies. More precisely, an immediate result of the recession was the crisis of Greek exports which could be counterbalanced mainly by protectionist measures for the development of local industry. What is more, the reorientation of western capital towards investment in the underdeveloped peripheral countries as a response to the recession, and especially its transformation into finance capital provided an influx of capital in the underdeveloped countries - including Greece - which made possible the creation of an industrial infrastructure, railways and other important public works. It could therefore be more plausible to argue that under a favourable international situation the Trikoupis government attempted an "industrial revolution from above" (Tsoukalas 1977: 109). As Tsoukalas points out, this revolution was not eventually successful, as the weight of bourgeois elements or strata associated with industrial development in Greek society was rather minimal and, on the other hand, as Trikoupis's voluntarist legalism could never be successful without an

adequate social basis (p. 109). Similarly, most of the attempts to rationalize the economy, state administration and the political system had little success as they were restricted to the legal-institutional level (Kondogiorgis 1985: 126). It should be pointed out that even in this experiment of social engineering the state acted without attempting to engage society in this process of modernization, reconfirming in this way the "incongruence" of social and political processes and the autonomy of politics.

The first signs of success in attempts to modernize the infrastructure and the economy came in the beginning of the twentieth century when the national adventures, and especially when the products of the policies of these governments, that is, the numerous petty bourgeois strata faced the deadlocks of the policies of economic stagnation. As the communication between the previously isolated regions of Greece became easier - as a result of the investments of the end of the nineteenth century - and, as over 1,500,000 refugees from Asia Minor settled in the Greek state, the foundations for a unified national market were finally set. What is more, as the possibilities of emigration to the United States became restricted (Tsoukalas 1981: 27), a sufficient labour market was created for the first time.

Furthermore, if we take into account the global tendency of that period towards substitution of imports and self

sufficiency - a result of the inter-war recession - in conjunction with the unprecedented influx of foreign capital in the period between 1922 and 1932, in the form of either loans or investments (Vergopoulos 1978: 63-7), it seems that most of the preconditions for industrialization were then present in Greek society and economy.

As a result, in the same period, the rate of increase of industrial production was rapid, and the principle of self sufficiency made the Greek market less dependent on imports, and Greek industry more independent as it increasingly relied on the use of raw material coming from the national primary sector. What is more, as Mouzelis points out, the late twenties and thirties were a period of unprecedented concentration of capital, and of the establishment of forms of collaboration between banking and industrial capital (Mouzelis 1978: 24). On the other hand, it should also be pointed out that during the same period, Greek industry, which concentrated on the production of consumer goods, continued to be characterized by low productivity and by small scale capital investment. As Vergopoulos observes, while the total number of those employed in the industrial sector rose from 154,600 in 1920 to 350,000 in 1938, about 93% of them were working in small enterprises which employed 1 to 5 persons (Vergopoulos 1978: 77). What is more, Greek capitalists abstained from investment in heavy industry as capital investment in that sector of industry demanded significant capital (Vergopoulos 1978: 75).

Therefore, it could be argued that the inter-war years constituted a transitory period during which the Greek social formation was characterized by an articulation of a dynamic emerging capitalism, mostly concentrated in pockets or islets, with a persistent simple commodity mode of production which was characterized by relatively low productivity and low level investment.

It was also marked by the eruption of an intense political conflict, the "ethnikos dichasmos" or national schism which tore Greek society into two bitterly opposed and irreconcilable camps with conflicting loyalties; one loyal to the throne and its incumbent, King Constantine, the other supporting the liberal leader Eleftherios Venizelos. As Mouzelis argues the national schism, being primarily an intra-dominant class type of conflict had managed to displace other, potential forms of inter-class conflict, as it disoriented the peasants and the masses of the Asia Minor refugees and involved them into a formalistic political conflict bearing little relevance to their own grievances and interests (Mouzelis 1978: 25) - the schism constituted primarily a conflict between traditional and liberal elements of the bourgeoisie regarding the bourgeois hegemony over the nature and the pace of the transformation which Greek society was undergoing during the inter-war period (Mavrogordatos 1982: 74-77, also Diamandouros 1981: 4-5). However, Mouzelis points out that this, intra-dominant class type of conflict

"gradually gave way to a 'masses v. the dominant classes' type of conflict" (ibid.). Indeed, the rapid socio-economic change of the period, the creation of an industrial proletariat and the influx of dispossessed refugees gradually affected the political debate, as the political conflict tended to transcend the formalist character of Greek politics and to articulate social issues. It should however be emphasized that these changes were rather marginal as the only notable political organization associated with this qualitative shift in Greek politics, that is, the newly founded Communist Party assumed a marginal role in the political arena, and was unable to challenge the political supremacy of the dominant class (see for example Elefandis 1979: 44-45). This inability of new social forces to overcome the restrictions of the "closed" universe of political discourse, was also reflected in the futility of the attempts of Venizelos to dismantle the clientelistic system. As it has been noted, the persistence of clientelism was such that "idealistic" attempts for political and structural reform, soon reverted to "pragmatism", that is, acceptance of the status quo while several "new politicians" followed the example of more traditional patrons and founded new "local" parties (Mavrogordatos 1983: 82-87).

However, the inter-war period witnessed a transformation in the political sphere as beside the persistence of clientelist politics, and the existence of a multitude of "local" parties, emerged the "charismatic leadership" of King

Constantine and of Eleftherios Venizelos, and an essentially bi-polar, multi-party system. The significance of these changes was that they tended to set limits to the flexibility and political mobility of local and national clientelist bosses, as the allegiance, or lack of allegiance, to the charismatic leader and the creation of a "political consciousness" on the basis of the national schism, were progressively gaining equal importance with the clientelistic loyalties (Mavrogordatos 1982: 33-34).

However, the dominant class, affected by the military defeat of 1922, which led to the abrupt end of the irredentist ideology of "Megali Idea" (Grand Idea) and its consequent ideological divestment and problematic legitimation, took a defensive stance and eventually resorted to the physical and symbolic repression of the emerging working class activism, and of the Communist Party. According to Diamandouros

"Indeed, anticommunism and the defensive mentality that it represents and exemplifies can be regarded as the mechanism employed by the Greek middle class to fill the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of the Great Idea, following the defeat in Asia Minor. Put somewhat differently, anticommunism was the ideological instrument of legitimation adopted by a weak, fragile and insecure liberal regime faced with a situation marked by territorial loss, psychological withdrawal, a profound sense of malaise, moral crisis and despair, and by the need to consolidate itself against real or perceived enemies, external or internal." (Diamandouros 1981: 7)

Indeed, facing the prospect of the loss of its hegemonic

supremacy, the dominant class attempted to rebuild its hegemony upon an anticommunist ideology. The establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship, in contrast to the numerous previous coups d'etat which constituted forms of intra-dominant class political conflict (Veremis 1977) and reflected the relative autonomy of politics, was the first dynamic political reaction to the potential threat to the hegemonic arrangements, posed from below. The destruction of the clientelist networks during the German occupation that followed the Metaxas dictatorship, the massive support of the rural population to the Communist-led resistance coalition, EAM, and the civil war that followed the liberation of Greece, were some of the decisive factors which led to the institutionalization of processes of exclusion and intolerance under the ideological guise of the threat of communism in the post-war period.

The post-War period: aspects of continuity and change.

World War II and the civil war which followed it had quite important economic, cultural and political consequences for Greek society. The destruction of the country's industry, productive infrastructure and the disorganization of its economy in general had altered the economic and social map of the country.

A series of factors such as the suspension of "democratic" political life which had been imposed by the

Metaxas dictatorship and went on throughout the German occupation, EAM's efforts to establish more participatory political institutions in the countryside during the occupation, in an attempt to organize the rural populations and to prepare its post-war power base, had dismantled the traditional patronage networks which constituted the most important channel of integration of the rural population to national politics. What is more, the problem of mass destitution that followed the war constituted a potential threat to the fragile legitimation of state power. As regime viability imperatives coincided with the emerging U.S. post-war policy objectives for European reconstruction (i.e. the Truman doctrine for the restoration of national economies of 1947 and the Marshall plan), two basic aims were set. The first priority was the achievement of national, social and economic integration of the population, while the second concerned the closely related process of strengthening the role of the post-war state (Vergopoulos 1981).

While most other western European states were responding to the challenges of reconstruction and to crises of legitimation by developing welfare institutions, the Greek political elites chose a more "traditional" and familiar way: A rather rapid establishment of 'modernized' patronage networks seemed to be the most effective means of securing legitimation and, at the same time, increasing their control over a substantial part of the population. However, as we have pointed out there were numerous obstacles for an

enterprize of this sort. First, the establishment of national, social and economic integration was dependent upon the "restoration" of the petty bourgeois strata and their political presence, as they were perceived to be a reliable source of potential domestic support for the reproduction and stabilization of the regime (Vergopoulos 1981).

The achievement of such a task was undertaken by the state whose responsibility for the creation of the petty bourgeoisie was both direct and indirect: In the first case it resorted to the traditional method of recruitment for the civil service and the numerous state controlled organizations and companies, creating in this way the problem of a gigantic state with an enormous bureaucratic organization the creation of which did not correspond to any productivity increase imperatives.

On the other hand, as most economic activities were dependent upon a series of loans permits and licences established by the increasingly bureaucratic state, a system of allocation of access, or influence privileges over the distribution of public as well as foreign aid funds and resources was established which eventually led to the creation of a mass of self-employed professionals who were more or less dependent on the redistributive and reproductive functions of the post-war state. This policy of "social engineering" soon proved succesful, as the mass of the petty

bourgeois strata were integrated to the reestablished clientelistic networks, thus providing a conservative basis for the legitimation of the status quo. Soon, as their per capita earnings increased due to the rise of invisible earnings, the growth of the paraeconomy and industrialization, the hegemony of the dominant groups was based on the promotion of a "dynamic pattern of consumption" (Dedoussopoulos 1987: 27-34; also Tsoukalas 1986b: 287-316). However this dynamic pattern of consumption, coupled with the industrialization which reached its pre-war levels in 1954 (Tsoukalas 1981: 110), and despite its disappointing increase rates in the following decade, was soon to affect the post-war consensus and more importantly, its social base.

During the 1950s and early 1960s as a result of the process of urbanization a considerable increase in the investments in the field of housing construction was observed (Burgel 1976: 383). The relatively low prices in the housing market, combined with the continuously increasing incomes soon resulted to the formation of a society of small-property owners. Urban property ownership, became a widespread phenomenon, in many cases being a substitute for land ownership in the rural areas of Greece. This easy access to housing ownership constituted both an economic and an ideological mechanism for the "petty-embourgeoisment" of Greek society, which was of major significance as far as the post-war developments were concerned. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the sharp rise in investment in

the housing industry, although it could be used as a barometer of the economic situation, at the same time constituted the basis of a fragile development as this form of economic growth was dependent upon the political and economic conjuncture and could easily be reversed. Indeed, as it has been argued, the rapid development of the housing construction sector affected the structure of the Greek economy as a whole as it diverted needed investment from sectors of the economy - notably the industrial sector - which could reduce the country's economic dependence and constitute a solid basis for long-term growth (Burgel 1976: 394, Dedoussopoulos 1987: 31, Vergopoulos 1986).

Indicative of this pattern of "fragile development" were the developments in the industrial sector. Although the technical and economic planning, combined with the introduction of a liberal legal framework concerning the regulation of foreign investments during the 1950s had created favourable conditions, such as preferential low rates for the use of public goods, and relaxing of the currency export regulations for foreign investors (Mouzelis 1978: 27-8), and prepared the ground, and eventually attracted, foreign - and some domestic - capital investments, it has been demonstrated that this type of capital investment perpetuated and enhanced the underdevelopment of the Greek economy, as the chosen pattern of industrialization was based on, and reproduced, technological and financial dependence (Dedoussopoulos 1987: 30, Vergopoulos 1986: 27), and the

beneficial effects of its growth were transferred abroad (Mouzelis 1978: 29).

Although the importance of industrial investment should not be disregarded, there is ample evidence to support the argument that the economic development of the country was premised on the rapid growth - apart from the housing construction and technical industry - of the services sector, with particular emphasis on the tourist and maritime transportation industry (Fotopoulos 1985: 94-99; Karapostolis 1984: 206) while the rapid growth of incomes in Greece between the years 1960-75 was achieved through the massive export of labour to industrialized countries, and the high demand in maritime transportation which was characteristic of the period. Thus, if we take into account the positive, albeit ephemeral, impact of invisible earnings (mainly income generated by the maritime transportation sector, from remittances of Greek migrants to their families and by the tourist industry) which occasionally reached 20% of the GDP (OECD, Economic Studies: Greece; quoted in Vergopoulos 1986: 189), it is quite clear that the pattern of growth of the Greek economy would not be easily sustained in adverse international economic conditions.⁹ Behind the facade of a rapidly developing economy, the reality was one of easy and ephemeral growth without the necessary institutional and social transformation for modernization and sustained development (Vergopoulos 1986: 169-203).

Despite its fragility, this process of economic development, characterized by the creation of employment opportunities, the extension of house ownership, diversification of sources of family and individual income (Karapostolis 1984: 227-229) combined with substantial injections of imported income through the remittances from Greek migrant workers, which supplemented rural and petty-bourgeois family incomes, led to the formation of new consumption patterns and to the progressive convergence of consumption patterns of different social strata, especially between the urban and rural populations (Karapostolis 1984).

As it has already been mentioned, these aspects of Greece's economic development constituted the basis of the post-war "hegemony" circumventing the potential problems the emergence of an industrial proletariat would entail.¹⁰ The convergence and creation of new consumption patterns based on the availability of new and multiple sources of income, had such a profound effect that consumption became one of the prominent modes of 'social hypostatization' (Karapostolis 1984: 269). In a society with limited opportunities for upward social mobility ¹¹ the sphere of consumption - and the practice of conspicuous consumption - became a central activity,¹² a reaction to the inequalities and discrimination which were reproduced in the socio-economic sphere and a way of transcending them (Karapostolis: 250-51).

Thus, the distribution of imported wealth and its impact

in the sphere of consumption constituted an important form of socio-economic integration and the basis of consensus formation or at least reduced and put under control social tensions and conflicts, and helped to maintain the bases of the social, economic and, to an extent, the political status quo (Vergopoulos 1986: 188).

However, at the political level, the situation was considerably different. The civil war ended with the total defeat of the Left and its anti-capitalist project. The post-civil war state did not express a balance of power between contradictory social forces. On the contrary it manifested the dominance of the victors. Thus, while the Greek state attempted to retain a semblance of democratic legality through the introduction of a new constitution, and the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy, it introduced a number of administrative and legal "emergency" measures in the post-war constitutional order. This was achieved by "institutionalizing" the supremacy of the latter over the former within the framework of a "constitutional dualism" (Alivizatos 1981: 220-228; 1986, esp. 447-600). This dualism made possible the formal political integration of those who could be classified "nationally minded" (*ethnikofrones*) through the 1952 liberal constitution, while the "emergency" legal and administrative para-constitutional framework (*parasynagma*) excluded those who were not considered to be loyal to the regime, and sanctioned the coercive core of the post-war state. This

institutionalization of anti-communism was not confined to banning the communist party or to the persecution of those who had actively supported the communist party and related organizations, but was extended to the creation of a network of state organizations and government departments dedicated to the categorization of the population on the basis of expressed or even suspected political allegiance or sympathies, not only of the individuals concerned, but also of even distant relatives and friends. This categorization was used as the premise of systematic discrimination against those who were classified as sympathetic to the communist cause and made possible the establishment of exclusivist political structures. On the other hand, by issuing certificates of "healthy social beliefs", the part of the population which supported the established right-wing hegemonic project was preferentially treated, and was able to gain access to the significant resources and employment opportunity offered by the state, and state-controlled organizations and enterprises.

Another aspect of this constitutional dualism was the central position of the Greek army in post-war politics. Despite the typical introduction of the 1952 constitution and re-establishment of a parliamentary system, the army¹³ had established its tutelage over the political process, by setting the limits of acceptable political action or reform (Haralambis 1985; 1989) and by guaranteeing the supremacy of the para-constitution and of the cryptogovernment operating

outside the formal political institutions.

This exclusivist and coercive political system, soon became incongruent with the process of economic integration associated with the economic development, as the reasons of its reproduction were increasingly becoming irrelevant and losing their tenuous legitimacy. Whereas social tensions were considerably reduced as a result of the economic processes outlined above, the rigid political system was reproducing divisions and tensions through its inbuilt institutionalization of exclusion and coercion (Haralambis 1989: 184-200) thus endangering the reproduction of consensus. As it has already been pointed out, political exclusion meant simultaneously economic exclusion, and therefore negation of the integrative effects of the process of economic development, as access to the benefits of this development, participation in the sphere of consumption was to a certain extent linked with access to clientelistic networks and to the state which was denied to the victims of the processes of political exclusion.

It is in this context, of the incongruence, and in some cases, contradiction between the process of social integration through participation in the market, and the process of political exclusion, that the political events in post-war Greek society can be interpreted. It highlights the importance of the army - the real centre of power - in frustrating attempts and demands for the modernization and

rationalization of the political system ¹⁴ and the reasons for the 1967 coup d' etat.

It could be argued that the 1967 coup and the ensuing dictatorship constituted the ultimate attempt to counter the tendencies and efforts to modernize the political system through the activation of the "contractual" content of the inactive 1952 constitution, and therefore, to rationalize the modes of political integration through the establishment of political democracy. The dictatorship, in fact, in its attempt to perpetuate the exclusivist political system by reversing the slow process towards the "normalization" of parliamentary democracy (Diamandouros 1983: 52), tried to introduce a semblance of political normalization by integrating the para-constitution and the constitution in a single constitutional text (Alivizatos 1981: 228), that is, by giving to the former, formal parity to constitutional rules, and by turning the "exceptional" emergency character of the post-civil-war regime into a permanent one, while the colonels' regime based its legitimation on the forms of economic integration that have been outlined.

The fall of the dictatorship signified the collapse of the post-war balance of political power, as the army lost its privileged position in the political structure, and the para-constitution was abolished. The political scenery changed as the vacuum left by the demise of the old centres of political power was soon filled by the political parties

of the post-dictatorship period as what has been called "the state of the parties" (Karabelias 1989: 167), that is, the Greek equivalent of the Italian "partitocrazia" emerged in the political landscape.¹⁵ In very little time the political parties managed to establish their hegemonic role in areas of political, cultural or other social activity. The post-dictatorship period is characterized by the colonization of economic, trade union, cultural, and other "voluntary" associations by political party organizations to the extent that most spheres of social life become arenas for party competition. It is characteristic that in this period emerged four major peace, women's, or students' "movements" dominated by the four major political parties. Similar divisions, reflecting party antagonisms could be seen in most trade union, technical, scientific, commercial or cultural associations and organizations (see Mavrogordatos 1988). The impact of the "colonization" of social life by the political parties was highly significant in two respects. First, the political parties gradually managed to displace other forms of social and political representation, and to effectively monopolize the universe of political discourse, and to dominate the processes of articulation of "legitimate" political, or social issues. This ability of the political parties to shape the outlines of the "definitions of the situation" was reinforced as the main signifying agents, that is, the media of mass communication, have until recently been under the influence or control of the major political

parties, as I shall attempt to demonstrate later, reproducing therefore a closed, party-dominated universe of discourse.

This occupation of "strategic" positions in social and political life by political parties permitted and perpetuated the continuation of practices of extra-institutional political integration, notably of clientelistic practices. However, it should be pointed out that the collapse of the post-civil-war political structures had also affected the conditions under which the clientage networks could be reconstituted after the fall of the dictatorship; the progressive transformation of the political parties from parties of personalities to centralized political organizations gradually reduced the importance of individual patrons, and transformed considerably the relations of clientage as political parties assumed the role of the patron, and party members became the clients.

This adaptation of clientelism to a party-dominated political system was appropriate to the fundamental choice of the political party leaderships to sustain the consumption patterns which had emerged during the period of rapid economic growth, although the economic crises of the seventies and the repatriation of migrant workers had affected adversely the economic situation of the country. This decision entailed the reproduction and expansion of the distributive role of the state, sustained by external and internal borrowing, and therefore the creation of a

hydrocephalous public sector which functioned mainly for the meeting the needs of the bureaucratic clientelist system (see for example Tsoukalas 1986b; Lyrantzis 1984).

The new clientelistic practices were coupled with populist rhetorics which reproduced extra-institutional forms of political integration and perpetuated the "privatization" and political other-determination of the "citizens". With differing degrees of success, both "Left" and "Right" wing parties addressed a homogenous, indivisible community, the people; denying in this way the social divisions, the plurality of conflicting and contradictory collective interests. If recognized, they would fuel demands for social and political integration on the basis of contractual regulation of conflicting collective interests - that is, through the activation of the "content" of the liberal democratic institutional framework - and therefore threaten the parties' central position in the political system.¹⁸

State, Political Parties and Civil Society.

The above historical and sociological analysis shows that the circumstances under which the Greek State was formed in the nineteenth century were quite different from those which lead to the emergence of western European states. Despite differences among western societies, it is generally argued that the processes of the formation of the modern state in western Europe were inextricably linked with the

simultaneous creation of a legally recognized domain free of state intervention and control, the civil society. 17

Although the reasons for the formation of civil society as a social domain of non-state activity, are of course quite complex, it could be argued that the specific role the state was called to assume in the context of the rise of capitalism has definitely been one of the main factors in the emergence and consolidation of civil society. More precisely, the non-interventionist, restricted role of the state in early capitalism left free space for autonomous, voluntary social organizations and activities to be established. In this way, a number of social organizations expressing social solidarity and cooperation could be considered to be part of the civil society as all of them were characterized by their voluntary, public and non-state character.

However, the Greek state was formed under completely different circumstances and assumed a quite different role from that of its western counterparts. I have already demonstrated that the social dynamics that led to the formation of the modern state were absent in the Greek case. As a matter of fact, the Greek state was not formed after a long historical process which in the case of other European states coincided with the period of absolutism (Anderson 1974); rather, the Greek state was "forced" into existence and built not as the outcome of a long social process, but "in the image" of its western counterparts (see for example

Tsoukalas 1986a: 108-109).

In addition to this, as no distinct class or social group had been able to become socially dominant, it became quite clear that the struggle for the acquisition of political power would become the prevalent feature of Greek society throughout the nineteenth century. In this context, the state became the "apple of discord" among the elites which emerged during the war of independence. The importance of the state in Greece soon meant that its "colonization" by the contesting political elites of the early 19th century, would eventually turn into the "colonization" of the society by the state, as the logic of clientelism would gradually erode social life. The very nature of clientelism, based on the centrality of the state and its distributive capacities in Greek society was a major force which prevented the formation of autonomous social organizations and the consolidation of social practices and institutions that would resist the colonization of society by the state.

Eventually, the persistence of clientelistic practices and the centrality of the state became an important aspect of Greek political culture: social aspirations or dissatisfaction took the form of individual demands towards the state which were channelled through, and dealt with in the clientelistic networks. What is more, the "vertical" organization of clientelistic networks and the consequent fragmentation - or quite often, individualization - of

collective experiences rendered the development of forms of autonomous collective action and the formation of a strong network of voluntary associations characteristic of civil society almost impossible.

As Diamandouros remarked,

Prompted by this vacuum (of voluntary organizations), the state ... has stepped into much of the territory that properly belongs to voluntary associations. The result has been a pronounced state paternalism that, in turn, has severely impeded the development of autonomous voluntary associations. (Diamandouros 1985: 58).

These tendencies towards state paternalistic interventions in social life became a prominent feature of social and economic life after the end of World War II, and especially after the civil war.

The destruction of the pre-war clientelistic networks which constituted the predominant form of social and political integration provided the opportunity for a renegotiation and reorganization of the boundaries between the state and civil society. However, the civil war which followed the liberation of the country, and its prolonged consequences as they were reflected in the dominant political culture of the time (Tsoukalas 1981), facilitated and eventually led to, not only the restoration of the "ancien regime", but also to the establishment of new distributive, "social engineering", and social control tasks. As it has been pointed out above, the survival of the post-war regime

was dependent upon processes of political exclusion and economic integration which were both linked with increased coercion and control state functions on the one hand, and a new and expanded distributive, and more generally economic, role on the other.

The importance of the establishment of a social control state lay both in its ability to resort to the use of physical force against its opponents, or against "political deviance", and in its ability to legally impose and enforce restrictions on activities which could be considered to be subversive. In this context, the state denied cultural activities such as literature, arts, and other forms of communication, their autonomy by enforcing restrictive measures, monitoring cultural activity and the flow of information.¹⁸ Another manifestation of the social control function of the post-civil-war state was its paternalistic intervention in trade unions as the case of the notorious state involvement in the affairs of the Greek General Confederation of Labour indicates (Diamandouros, 1983: 58) which led to the fragmentation and neutralization of the labour movement.

As far as the distributive and economic role of the post-war state are concerned it could be argued that the necessity of creating consensus after the civil-war made imperative the achievement of rapid economic development, and especially, the distribution of its benefits to the

population. As it has already been argued, it was this necessity of the regime to achieve economic integration of through participation in the sphere of consumption that initiated, or rather accelerated the process of expansion of the civil service and of the state controlled sector of the economy, a persistent feature of contemporary Greece.

The fall of the dictatorship signalled the end of the coercive, exclusivist political structures, but did not affect the distributive role of the state. On the contrary, as the growth rates of the 1960s and early 1970s could no longer be sustained, the state attempted to maintain the consumption patterns of the population by offering employment or other clientelistic benefits and rewards, by suppressing the levels of unemployment through the assumption of control of economic sectors which were "deserted" by private investors and by undertaking responsibility for their debts, increasing in this way its involvement in social and economic life.

Greek Political Culture: some conclusions.

Using this brief analysis of some of the most important parameters of Greek social and political life, we can now proceed to a discussion of Greek political culture.

As I have suggested, one of the most significant aspects of a political culture is the relationship between the citizen and politics, that is, the way people understand,

define, and come into contact with the political sphere. As it has been pointed out (pp. 130ff), one of the main characteristics of modern Greek politics is what C. Tsoukalas has termed "the 'overpoliticization' of the Greeks, their pathos for politics and public affairs" (Tsoukalas, 1977: 100-105).

A recent survey of political attitudes and behaviour in the countries of the European South (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) provided empirical support for this conclusion as its findings indicated that among the countries of the European South (Mavrogordatos et al. 1988; Kafetzis 1988), Greece ranked top in terms of interest, understanding and positive orientations towards politics. What is more, as another attitude survey indicates, the levels of interest in politics in Greece are among the highest in the European Community (Eurobarometer, June 1983).

However, the validity of such an - unqualified - claim is doubtful, as these surveys have attempted to provide comparative data without taking into account the particular ways in which "politics" has become, and is, understood and actualized in each of the societies in question. In this way the unqualified term 'politics' is more mystifying than enlightening as it is used in survey questions as an a-historical, universal term, outside its particular cultural context.

As Tsoukalas points out, the interest of Greeks in

politics can be interpreted according to the particular way in which political power and political representation were developed in Greece (Tsoukalas 1977: 101). Although the initial relation between the population and the "alien" and virtually "artificial" establishment of centralized western political institutions was one of mistrust, it soon evolved into an "instrumental" relationship. Clientelism, and later bureaucratic clientelism reproduced the idea of the state as a neutral instrument, able to satisfy sectional and private needs and, indeed, a review of political practices since the 19th century provides ample evidence that this was the case. As competing elites saw politics as an essential activity for their survival, and the state as a domain that had to be conquered for this purpose, the rest of the population, through its incorporation in clientelistic networks, eventually came to realize that access to the protection of organized political power could guarantee security, and offer privileges, employment and status.

Thus, contrary to the ideology of liberal democracy, which has been an important element in cultural representations of the state in Western Europe and North America, in Greece the state has not been regarded as the expression of a social "contractual" relationship between citizens, as an expression of collective interests but rather as an instrument for the satisfaction of individual, private interests. The very nature of the prominent mode of political incorporation, that is, clientelism has played a significant

role in the "individualization" and "privatization" of political experience and practice, as the establishment of vertical relationships has constituted a serious obstacle for the formation of collective, interpersonal political or politically-related experiences and action.

In this way the understanding and actualization of politics, and the relationship between the citizen and political power acquire a particular meaning as politics becomes an essentially private activity, which however retains a formal semblance of publicness. Thus participation in public political occasions, such as elections, public meetings, electoral campaigns, debates or membership in political parties, could be interpreted as the "necessary" public manifestations of an essentially private activity, oriented towards private gains and benefits. It is on the basis of this particular nature of political experiences and practices, that we can understand the vague distinction between private and public sphere (Demertzis 1988b: 85), the "state fetishism" (kratolatria), the obsessive preoccupation with politics in everyday life and the excessive politicization of the press (Tsoukalas 1977: 102) which have been persistent features of Greek political culture.

It should also be emphasized that the "private" character of politics in Greek political culture perpetuates the heteronomy of the "isolated" individual and indicates

acceptance of the social and political status quo in principle, as participation in political life appears to constitute an attempt to make the most of the existing situation, but hardly indicate any willingness to alter it. This view is further reinforced by the low interpersonal trust which appears to be characteristic of modern Greek society (Demertzis 1990b: 94; Eurobarometer, June 1986; also Tsoukalas 1977: 103; Lipowatz 1988: 91-94) which appears to sustain the privatization and fragmentation of society and the limited scope for collective action and the formation of collective identities which might challenge aspects of the political and social status quo and end their "heteronomy".

Finally, it would seem to me, that another important aspect of Greek political culture, which has played a major role in the maintenance of a "closed" universe of discourse and more generally, political sphere, is the phenomenon of political party predominance over social life. As it has already been pointed out, the phenomenon of "party democracy" emerged in the period that followed the fall of the colonels' dictatorship. Taking advantage of the power vacuum that followed it, the political parties occupied crucial positions in the political system and in society which permitted them to adapt the traditional clientelistic system to their advantage and become mediators between their clients and the state. Thus their clientelistic practice continued in the form of bureaucratic clientelism, that is, through the transformation of the traditional clientelistic system which

had been based on the formation of personal relationships, into a system characterized by the predominance of party/member, or party/supporter relationships. Thus, clientelism continues to reproduce the "private" character of politics, and therefore to perpetuate actual political alienation, especially as political parties lack internal democratic structures that might make their activity accessible and intelligible to their membership.

As social and political integration is achieved through individual support and loyalty to political parties, the latter have managed to virtually dominate the political universe of discourse, the political communication channels and more generally to successfully overcome and eliminate alternative forms of social or political representation, or collective action which might constitute a threat to their dominant position in society (Haralambis 1989: 323). It could therefore be argued that the Greek political culture is characterized by increased interest in politics, and participation in political life. However politics, is understood and actualized as an essentially private activity aiming towards personal gain.

Although social life appears overpoliticized, politics is devoid of its social content, the universe of discourse is closed to discourses which might challenge the privatized character of politics, and threaten the political and social power relations. Thus, the Greek political culture has

discouraged grassroots political and social initiatives while it has encouraged the formation and reproduction of "parties of personalities", or mass parties under the tutelage of strong individual or collective leaderships operating within the framework of a clientelistic or bureaucratic clientelistic political system. In other words, according to the typology of political culture introduced by Mainwaring and Viola (see pp. 76-77 above), the Greek political culture is characterized by the predominance of "right authoritarian" and "left authoritarian" practices, values and interpretations of the political. "Political" experience is fragmented or individualized, and the degree of political alienation renders political action effectively incapable to alter the life conditions and to achieve some form of self-determination and autonomy of the individual. It is important to point out that 'political alienation' does not refer to low membership or party support levels, or to lack of participation in politics, it rather refers to the inability of the individualized citizens to realize the social and political role of the state and the political parties in the reproduction of relations of domination and exploitation.

CHAPTER 5

THE ATHENS DAILY PRESS; AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The development of the Greek Press in the 19th century

The publication of the first Greek newspapers did not take place in predominantly Greek-populated areas. In fact, the first Greek-language newspapers appeared in Central Europe (in the Austro-Hungarian Empire) at the end of the 18th century, and a little later in Western Europe, mainly in France and Britain (Karykopoulos 1984: 11-31; Koumarianou 1971: 3'-18'; Jusdanis 1991: 129-135). These first Greek-language newspapers were mainly literary or rather "cultural" papers, containing articles and commentary on cultural and language issues and providing a forum for philosophical debates. They were promoted by the Greek speaking intelligentsias which established the pre-revolutionary Greek-language press in Central and Western Europe, to spread the doctrines and ideas of western Enlightenment among the Greek speaking populations of the Balkans and Asia Minor, as well as of the diaspora, in an attempt to disassociate the Greek "nation" from Ottoman dominance and its Ottoman past and to "reintroduce Greece into the western 'civilized' world".

If we take into account the fact that these attempts to publish newspapers in the Greek language, and for Greek-speaking publics coincided with the outbreak of nationalist movements in South-Eastern Europe, and especially the Ottoman Empire, it is not surprising that this "westernist" stance of the Greek press was reflecting and, at the same time aiming at, the formation of a Greek national consciousness (Enepekidis 1965; Jusdanis 1991: 129-135).

When the Greek war of independence eventually broke out, the first attempts to establish newspapers in the liberated areas took place, though not always with a great success. In 1821 the first manuscript newspapers appeared in an attempt to mobilize the Greek speaking populations of Hersons Ellas against Ottoman rule (Koumarianou 1971: θ'-κ'; Karykopoulos 1984: 33), while at the end of the same year the first printed newspaper, "Salpinx Elliniki" [Greek Trumpet], was published in the Peloponnese. However, even though its publisher, Theoclitos Pharmakidis, was one of the very few intellectuals who had gained considerable experience and skills through his involvement in the publication of Greek-language newspapers in Central and Western Europe and who would guarantee the paper's success, the paper was published for only a short period. Mainly due to Pharmakidis's determination not to accept the measure of preventive censorship the local revolutionary government wanted to impose,¹⁰ the short lifespan of "Salpinx Elliniki" was by no means untypical of the emerging Greek press of the

early post-independence period. Indeed, the paper's closure was one of the first manifestations of the uneasy relationship between the emergent press and the administrations (see Koumariou 1971: kb'). Thus, subsequent attempts to publish newspapers seem to have had a similar fate to that of "Salpinx Elliniki", as similar obstacles drove important newspapers as "Ta Ellinika Chronika" [Greek Chronicles] and "I Efimeris ton Athinon" [Newspaper of Athens] to cease publication in 1826.

During the first decade of the independence war, the liberation of many relatively small regions and the establishment of several different local administrations, in conjunction with the tradition of "multicentrism" as the prevailing form of government in the Ottoman empire determined some of the characteristics of the press of the first revolutionary years. The newspapers of this period were not a voice for the liberated areas as a whole; they rather reflected the political fragmentation of the revolutionary and early post-independence administrations and the dependence of the emerging press on these authorities. The majority of the newspapers were affiliated, or linked in some way with the numerous local administrations the decisions and laws of which appeared regularly in their pages along with news about the developments taking place in the war of independence.

The dependence of the press on the regional authorities

was quite evident as the publication of most newspapers was discontinued, or their offices and equipment were relocated every time there was a change in the seat of a local administration. Although the impact war operations had on the operation of the press during the war years should not be underestimated, it should be pointed out that the relocation of the newspapers whenever the seat of a local administration was moved, is a strong indication that local societies in Greece could not "sustain" the press of the period, in the sense that the social conditions for its emergence did not exist at the time. It could be argued instead that the press was closely associated with the regional political and administrative bodies, the political elites, and the public sphere they sustained,¹⁹ and therefore its viability was dependent upon its (political and geographical) proximity to the centres of political and administrative activity.

In June 1827 the first national newspaper and, as Koumarianou argues, one of the best of the period, the "Geniki Efimeris tis Ellados" [General Newspaper of Greece] faced a serious crisis when its director Theoklitos Farmakidis, protesting once again against the lack of respect for the independence of the press by the administration, resigned (Koumarianou: 33'-06'). Apparently Farmakidis's resignation was due to the decision taken by the Third National Assembly of Troizina to appoint Count Ioannis Capodistrias as the first Governor of Greece but his objections were probably not directed towards the person of

Capodistrias, but towards his political project; the creation of a more centralized administration with a powerful executive.

In fact, it reflected the confrontation between the two main political projects of the time, in which the press quickly became enmeshed; that is, the confrontation between those supporting a less centralized model of government which would be more prone to "colonization" by personalities and political factions which had traditional local authority, or military or economic power, or which had gained political capital through their involvement in the independence war, and, on the other hand, those which would favour a more centralized state with a powerful executive at the expense of most of those politically aspiring persons and groupings. It is not surprising that the press had been deeply involved in these confrontations throughout the 19th century, given the association of newspapers with political factions in the context of the developing patronage networks which were soon to become a prominent feature of political and social life. As the establishment and international recognition of the boundaries of the Greek State and the consolidation of a central government during the governorship of Ioannis Capodistrias minimized the Ottoman threat and intensified the social and political divisions and conflicts, it became clear that the press would be a powerful weapon in the hands of these aspiring political elites against the governments of Governor Capodistrias, and, later, King Otto.

Thus, the establishment of a more centralised state by the first Governor, Ioannis Capodistrias, in the period 1827-1831 and the absolutist regime of King Otto which followed it, had important consequences as far as the development of the Greek press was concerned. First, the two regimes introduced new legislation which restricted the freedom of the press, provided for preventive censorship and confiscation of newspapers and established various obstacles for the publication of newspapers and books.²⁰ As a consequence of these measures, especially during the reign of King Otto, newspapers had to cope with continuous confiscations, while journalists had to face attacks and abuse, prosecutions, jail sentences or, as a last resort, they had to default and go into hiding.²¹

However, the temporary suspension of the constitution by Governor Capodistrias and King Otto's determination not to accept or grant a constitution provided a fertile ground for the expression of these conflicts through the "constitutional question"; a question which was bound to occupy the pages of almost every Greek newspaper, as well as political life in general, for years to come. It is during this period that the preoccupation with the constitutional problem and the underlying social antagonisms led to a progressive shift of emphasis from news reporting to political comment, or comment related to political personalities and issues. So profound was this change that the space dedicated to comment in the

newspapers soon became disproportionately larger than that reserved for news reporting. Comment, in its various forms (mainly "chronografima", political satire and caricature), became thus an integral and important characteristic of Greek newspapers. Its importance can be demonstrated by the huge expansion of commentary, political satire and caricature developed by literary figures - famous novelists, poets and artists.²²

The Emergence of the "Party-political Press".

The agreement of King Otto to grant the 1844 constitution and to respect the decisions taken by the newly established representative legislature and the parliamentary system as it has been developed during the reign of King George I, provided the political conditions for the development of what has been called "party-political press"; a phenomenon which can only be understood in the context of the general social and political changes which were taking place at that period as a result of the introduction of the parliamentary system and of the effort of several social groups to take advantage of it and use it as a vehicle for the foundation of their political power.²³

For it was the change in the political structures, notably, the constitutional concessions of King Otto and the establishment of parliamentarism in Greece that provided a unique opportunity for the realization of the primates' and

other elites' desire to survive as a powerful social group. It became the cornerstone of the construction of sophisticated clientelist networks and led eventually to the seizure of the state by the advocates of the primates' spirit.

It was therefore in this context of the adaptation of parliamentarism and representative institutions to clientelistic logic and practices, and of the formation of parties of personalities, that the press acquired its party-political role. Newspapers operated within patronage networks, and each paper came to assume the personality of its patron, as well as that of the party their patron supported.

It should be emphasized that the phenomenon of the party-political press appeared in Greece at a time when the political parties, far from being bureaucratic and centralized organizations, were mainly loose unions of members of parliament around a political leader, that is, parties of personalities and not parties of principles (Meynaud 1974: 26).

It follows that the press was only party-political in the sense that newspapers of the period - far from adhering to political ideologies or supporting certain policies, which might be advocated by a party with more or less concrete ideological principles or political programme - were in fact supporting, if not expressing, the views of particular

political personalities, and were enmeshed in the clientelist networks of the period. Instead of being known for their liberal, conservative or radical political orientations, Greek newspapers were recognized by their relationship to prominent politicians; such is the case of the "Ethnorylax" [Guard of the Nation] (1862) which was supporting Thrasivoulos Zaimis, the "Ethniko Pnevma" [National Spirit] (1868-1876) which expressed the views of Alexandros Koumoundouros, "I Efimeris ton Syzitiσεων" [The Newspaper of Debates] (1870-1893), faithful to Ep. Deligeorgis, the "Proia" [Morning] (1874-1904), eager supporter of Th. Diligiannis, and finally the "Ora" [Hour] (1875-1888) and "Oi Kairoi" [The Times] which had both been supporting Harilaos Trikoupis and advocating his innovative, for the period, policies. It should however be pointed out that while all those newspapers declined or even discontinued their publication as soon as the political career of the personality they supported had ended, in the case of "Oi Kairoi", the newspaper seems to have outlived H. Trikoupis's political end, and its commitment to innovative policies appears to have persisted as it welcomed the political changes brought about by the 1909 military intervention and as after 1910 it became a zealous supporter of Eleftherios Venizelos and his reformist policies.

The "Industrialization" of the Press.

During the 1870s, a combination of factors such as the spread of literacy, the creation of a transportation infrastructure, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press which had been introduced in the constitution of 1864 (article 14) and the beginnings of "modern" advertising created a more favourable climate for the activities of the press and eventually facilitated the economic and technological expansion of the press enterprises to such a degree that it has been argued - although with too much enthusiasm - that 1873 was the starting point of the "industrial period" of the Greek press (Mayer 1957; Karykopoulos: 85).²⁴

More precisely, in the period between the 1870s and the first decades of the 20th century, new advanced printing machinery and techniques were imported, cooperation between Greek newspapers and foreign press agencies such as Keuter, and Stefani was established, while the first Greek press agencies such as the "Spyros Tsagaris" newspaper agency (1875), the telegraphic agency "Stefanopolis" and the semi-official "Athinaikon Praktoreion Eidiseon" (Athens News Agency) were founded. These changes resulted in the improvement of the quality of news (in terms of speed of diffusion and accuracy of information), the specialization of the newspaper personnel, the increase of the number of pages

of newspapers and, finally, improvements in the size and format of the newspapers. What is more, new newspapers emerged,²⁵ the publication of newspapers became more frequent, and quite soon the majority of Athens newspapers were being published on a daily basis, while the average life span of newspapers became longer.

From an economic point of view, during this period the press was transformed considerably, mainly in the sense that since the 1840s, alongside newspapers which retained their traditional characteristics as publishing ventures which did not primarily operate under economic criteria, new press organizations with a more entrepreneurial character emerged; it is in those newspapers that the printing unit constituted a more or less economic unit needing and pursuing the attraction of capital and being enmeshed in relations of economic competition, while advertising - especially during the last years of the 19th century - emerged for the first time as an additional, but not yet fully explored and consequently decisive, source of income.

As these transformations were taking place, it could be argued that from the 1870s the traditional type of Greek newspaper - that is, one of a small personal or family business, with limited personnel (one or two editors, no journalists, free-lance or co-operating commentators, non-existent or limited capital) - began to retreat slowly, although it proved to be remarkably resistant. Alongside it,

a more commercial type of newspaper and newspaper operation was emerging; the internal structure, the content, and mode of operation of the most characteristic newspapers of this kind during this period (such as the "Efimeris" [Newspaper] published by D. Koromilas in 1873, the "Akropolis" [Acropolis] published by V. Gavriilidis in 1883, "I Estia" [Vesta] launched initially as a magazine by a group of writers and poets in 1876 until in 1894 its director G. Drosinis turned it into a daily newspaper, D. Kalapothakis's "Embros" [Forward] published in 1897 and Koussoulakos's "Scrip") illustrate the sea change that was taking place at the time.

Soon after the editing and printing innovations which were introduced by the "Efimeris", in an effort to catch up with their new competitors, other Athens dailies became involved in an unprecedented, for the Greek press, competition. Most influential in this formative period of the Greek press was the "Akropolis", a newspaper which has managed to survive throughout the 20th century and is still published today. In his attempt to create a modern newspaper, comparable with other leading European newspapers, its founder and director Vlassis Gavriilidis imported advanced technological printing equipment and was the first to introduce interviews, reportage and other forms of investigative journalism into the Greek press. At the same time, he was the first to foresee the importance of advertizing as a potential source of revenue for the press.

However, it should be emphasized that these changes did not affect the totality of the Greek press, but just a handful of innovative newspapers which were nevertheless obliged to operate under a climate in which the press was mainly an instrument for the realization of personal political ambitions ²⁶ in accordance with the general political climate of the period in which political cleavages existed between political personalities and not according to differences of principle.

Therefore, as the political agenda was still fluid, and political conflicts were not fought by parties of principle but by parties organized around a person whose purpose was to secure a clientele which would enhance their political position, newspapers constituted one of the means through which this could be achieved. In this sense the readership of a newspaper did not possess an economic value as such, but constituted a mainly political asset, as a larger number of readers became translated into more political power and additional benefits for the publisher, editor, or patron of the newspaper.

It is also true that the limited and weak commercialization of a part of the Greek press brought about an increasing awareness of the need to attract a larger readership and made necessary the expansion of the newspapers in terms of staff and contributors.²⁷ It is not surprising then, that during this period correspondents, regular

commentators and contributors in the *Athens dailies* were also some of the most important writers and artists. It is in this climate that political satire -verse and caricature - the two most developed genres in Greek journalism of the period, blossomed.

Political satire and caricature: The
hyper-politicization of the press

Political satire, in its various forms, that is, prose, verse and caricature has been one of the most prominent characteristics of the Greek press since the reign of King Otto. Initially, satire (in verse and caricature variants) - due to the capacity of verse and image to appeal to a mass, mainly non-literate, public - was a powerful means of expression of the political conflict between the forces supporting the absolutist and modernizing project of King Otto's administrations on the one hand, and the traditional social and political elites on the other.

As Kondogiorgis has argued (1985: 126-128), it was only after the 1870s that satire, and especially political caricature developed more "refined" and sophisticated techniques of representation and reflected the emerging social and political contradictions which became more apparent through changes which were brought about by the modernizing policies of the governments of A. Koumoundouros and, more importantly, H. Trikoupis.²⁰ As satire constituted

a key medium of political confrontation and criticism it is not surprising that many quality newspapers of the period began their publication as satirical papers. However, despite the qualitative changes which commentators note, and despite some exceptions which prove the rule, the techniques and themes of satire continued to be influenced by the traditional tendency to personalize political conflict - even at a time of deep and extensive social transformation - and, therefore, to reproduce elements of the hegemonic political culture. It is in this context that we could interpret the emphasis on personalities instead of issues, ideas and policies, the hyper-politicization of social life (including the press) to which Tsoukalas has drawn attention to (Tsoukalas 1977: 100-105) and which has been discussed in more detail in the previous chapter.

The 20th century; the first decades.

One of the most striking aspects of the development of the press in early 20th century Greece was the publication of numerous new dailies. In an already saturated market, where a limited number of readers was being offered an extremely high number of political dailies and magazines, new daily newspapers appeared throughout the first half of the century.

This period was characterized by continuous confrontation between the supporters of the traditional

political establishment which had gathered around the monarchy on the one hand, and social forces disillusioned by oligarchic parliamentarism. The latter gathered around the liberal politician Eleftherios Venizelos and made demands for economic, social and political change. This schism between "pro-Venizelists" and "anti-Venizelists" led to a succession of military coups, dictatorships, constitutional crises and changes which eventually resulted in the establishment of the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas in 1936, four years before Greece's entry into the Second World War. In this context of the national schism the personal character of Greek politics adapted to the new political reality as numerous personal political parties were formed, occupying a place in one of the two main opposing camps.

This political situation had significant repercussions as far as the press was concerned. Throughout this period newspapers had to face a renewal of restrictive practices such as preventive censorship, prosecution of publishers and journalists and sometimes even the anger of and intimidation by the supporters of the opposite political camp. However, what is more striking, and illustrative about the state of the Greek press is the fact that just as we can see the formation of numerous political parties, in the same way, we can see the publication of numerous new political newspapers with strong political attachments to specific political figures.

This tendency cannot be explained in terms of a high level of market demand as one might expect, or as the manifestation of the democratic sensitivity of certain publishers and journalists as Karykopoulos has suggested (1984). A more plausible interpretation would be based on recognition of the particularity of the Greek political press and the fact that in most cases newspapers were closely linked with the promotion of specific political interests, the expression of the views of certain political personalities and usually functioned as either apologetic or propaganda instruments for their political affiliates.

In this light, it is understandable why, with the proliferation of political personalities, more newspapers were published (see for example Peponis 1983: 114). There is a continuity between the 19th and the 20th century, in the tendency to perceive a newspaper not as an economic enterprise but as a political asset. The typical outcome was the publication of newspapers with no long term prospects, either because of the instability of the political situation, or because of the lack of any economic considerations that might ensure their survival.

By the end of the period 1922-35, the saturation of the market, which did damage even to the few dailies which were struggling to operate in a more entrepreneurial manner, made the publishers realize that their papers could not exist on the limited income they generated from the market and forced

them to seek alternative ways of securing financial resources. Since the most obvious and accessible source of finance was the state, the tendency for the press to become dependent on the state was gradually reinforced. Thus, the limited dependency already established during the premiership of H. Trikoupis,²⁹ through the mechanism of tax and duty exemptions, gradually increased and involved new forms of financial support of newspapers by the state and banking capital.

Thus, it could be argued that the trends which characterized the end of the 19th century continued to develop throughout the first decades of the twentieth century. Two distinct rationales concerning the function of the press appear to have coexisted. According to the first, emphasis should be placed on the pursuit of the organization and operation of newspapers on the basis of commercial criteria, away of strictly personal political allegiances; hence the adoption of and search for basic principles which would lead to the formation of a more or less stable readership. In contrast, the second rationale depended on traditional practices which continued to exist within the press, that is, the treatment of newspapers as mainly political ventures, not guided by purely economic interests. Newspapers were consequently viewed as a means to secure political benefits for their owners or their patrons, and were linked mainly with the promotion of specific personal

political interests.

In this climate of two contradicting rationales, characterized by the appearance, short life, and eventual demise of numerous newspapers, appeared some dailies such as "To Ethnos" [The Nation] (1913) by S. Nikolopoulos, the "Eleftheron Vima" [Free Tribune] by D. Lambrakis, "I Vradyni" [The Evening Paper] (1923) and "I Kathimerini" [The Daily] (1919) by G. Vlachos which, along with the "Akropolis", were successful. Despite temporary interruptions to their publication throughout the period, they survived, most of them to this day.

Another distinct case, in this period was the publication of the "Rizospastis" [Radical] (1929) as the official instrument of the Socialist Workers' Party of Greece (SEKE, later Communist Party of Greece or KKE). "Rizospastis" clearly displayed the emblem of the Communist Party next to its masthead and made clear it was the official instrument of the KKE. It could be argued that "Rizospastis" was the first newspaper in Greece to be consistent with the principles and official point of view of a political party.

The Post-War Trends: The Political
and Legal context

After the liberation of Greece from the Axis occupation and in the climate of the civil war (1944-49), most of the newspapers which had been forced to close during the German occupation were relaunched while several new dailies claimed their own share in the press market. As the defeat of the Communist and Left forces in the civil war had deprived them of any kind of participation in the political life of the country and had resulted in the banning of newspapers that might have been sympathetic to their views, the newspapers which were launched after the civil war did not reflect the whole spectrum of political views, but only those contained in the division between the conservative and centre forces, the roots of which could be found in the conflict between the anti-Venizelists and the pro-Venizelists which dominated the pre-war period. The sole exceptions to this, were the publication of the "Dimokratiki" [Democratic] (1951) and its successor "Avgi" [Dawn] (1952) which were expressing the views of the "Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera" [United Democratic Left], the only legitimate party of the Left. However, the constitution of 1952 introduced a series of restrictions which virtually silenced the voices of dissent. More precisely, while the constitution formally prohibited censorship or any other preventive measures, it did allow the confiscation of newspapers and other printed material, and

introduced a series of restrictions and prohibitions on the exercise of journalism. The reasons given to justify the confiscation of newspapers and printed materials were very vaguely defined but amounted to quite general restrictions. They included an insult to the person of the King and his family, or to the Christian faith, or to the established moral order, or, finally, the revelation of information regarding the position or movement of the armed forces. The constitution permitted confiscation in cases of publication of articles which could be considered to be an incitement to revolt, or a danger to the national integrity of the country, or incitement to commit treason (Constitution of Greece 1952, art. 14).

Furthermore, if the violation of these restrictions occurred three times, it could affect the legal capacity of the persons who were found responsible, to exercise the vocation of journalism and could lead to the temporary or permanent discontinuation of the publication of the newspaper. In view of these measures, it is not surprising that, any opposition could be easily suppressed, for in the context of post-civil-war exclusivist and coercive politics, any difference of opinion could be interpreted as subversion.

Characteristics of the Press in the post-war period.

As far as the characteristics of the press throughout the post-war period were concerned, it could be argued that the press was organized in accordance with, more or less, the same clientelistic rationality which had dominated its past, especially as political patrons restored and re-established their patronage networks, and clientelism became the dominant mode of political incorporation and integration. Once again, the phenomenon of the publication of a plethora of political dailies was repeated. However, it is worth pointing out that most of the new publications did not survive and it was the older newspapers which eventually came to dominate the press market. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the publishers of some of the older dailies not only succeeded in retaining the position of their newspapers, but also launched additional publications (as in the case of "Vradyni" [Evening Paper] whose publishers launched the financial daily "Nautemporiki" [Maritime-Commercial], or of "Kathimerini" [Daily] and its "sister" paper, "Mesimvrini" [Afternoon Paper], or even of "Eleutheron Vima" [Free Tribune] - now "To Vima" [Tribune] - and its evening counterpart "Ta Athinaika Nea" [Athens News]), it could be argued that one of the characteristics of the press of the period was a "cautious" pattern of expansion of already established publishing organizations.

After 1967, the persistent attempts of the colonels' dictatorship to curb the oppositional press through the

progressive abolition of the financial privileges and concessions of the newspapers (McDonald, 1983: 128-143), combined with the intensification of censorship and other forms of coercive control (Alivizatos, 1986: 642-649; McDonald, 1983: 95-128), led to the voluntary or forcible discontinuation of the publication of many newspapers, while the unfavourable and uncertain atmosphere it had brought about, temporarily halted the developments that had been taking place in the previous years; developments which, after the return to democratic government, would accelerate, especially as Greece made progress along the path of capitalistic development. It is significant that when the dictatorship collapsed, on July 24 1974, only six newspapers were being published; however, soon the number of the published newspapers increased substantially (McDonald, 1983: 180) to reach 22 daily papers in 1990. Indeed, the return to democratic government in 1974 restored the confidence of existing and prospective publishers and set the conditions for new developments in the Greek press.

The most important parameters shaping these developments have been the state and its role vis-a-vis the press on the one hand, and the realization of the potential economic value of participation in the press market by already existing, as well as aspirant publishers. Of course, apart from these two main parameters, other considerations would include the relationships between the publishers and the political parties and the attitudes of the latter toward the press as

a whole, or, in other words, the partisan role of the Athens press.

The State as a decisive parameter in the development
of the Press in Post-Dictatorial Greece.

The social significance of the state in Greece, that is, its decisive influence upon every kind of social, political or economic activity, left its impression on the press. Apart from its ability to intervene through the exercise of its legal and administrative power, the state, and to a certain degree the governing party(ies), have been able to play a major role, and sometimes to directly determine developments in the press.

First, the state has the power to control the sums and the terms of bank loans to press organizations (Kyriazidis, 1986: 31-36). In practice the criteria which usually apply in decisions concerning loans to press organizations have always been quite obscure, because the publishers have not been treated as ordinary enterprises. The extent and importance of this form of intervention is illustrated by the estimate that between 1974 and 1981 the amount lent to Athens' newspapers reached 1,600,000,000 drachmas while, according to unofficial estimates, by 1983 the total debt of the same newspapers had risen to 2,931,000,000 drachmas (Kyriazidis, 1986). What is more, there is evidence that the loans have so far been given selectively; for example, since PASOK took office in 1981, and by 1983 the loans received by the pro-opposition

dailies increased by only 26% while those of the pro-government papers rose by 104% (Kyriazidis, op. cit.) It is therefore very clear that the ability of the state to intervene and determine the details concerning loans to press organizations is an effective medium for exerting pressure, or even rewarding newspapers. In addition to controlling the loans to existing newspapers, the PASOK government decided to offer a substantial loan to G. Popotas, an aspiring political daily publisher. A similar, but much more ambitious governmental attempt to "create" an entire press organization which would have been sympathetic to the governing party, was made through the financial support - with public funds - of the "Bank of Crete" of the banker and aspiring press baron G. Koskotas.³¹ Although both ventures collapsed and this irregular spending of public funds has been referred to the courts, these cases prove that there are no adequate guarantees or restrictions concerning the limits of governmental intervention in the press.

Less conspicuous forms of state funding can be concealed under the pretext of transactions between state-owned or controlled organizations and publishing organizations. This possibility was clearly illustrated in 1985 by the decision taken by the "Agricultural Bank of Greece", a state-owned bank, to buy unwanted property from the "Lambrakis Press Organization" at a very high price and at a time when this organization was facing serious financial problems.

Different but quite effective forms of intervention by

the government take the form of social security provisions, or of initiatives which reduce tension between workers and employers. In such an attempt, the 1981 PASOK government facilitated the transition to the new printing technology of photo-composition, by introducing new legislation which guaranteed employment for all printers who were likely to be affected by the changes and provided for the allocation of 2,000,000,000 drachmas for this purpose (Karykopoulos, 1984: 135). Finally, there are more trivial but still numerous opportunities for a government to finance the press indirectly. For instance, government ministries, state owned companies and organizations are estimated to spend 600,000,000 drachmas p.a. on advertising (Kyriazidis, 1986); as there have been no guidelines or regulations specifying how this amount should be spent, indirect state subsidy in the guise of selective advertizing has become the norm. Equally effective have been methods of direct state subsidy through a series of duty and tax exemptions (mainly the alleviation of duty on newsprint, and the introduction of preferential tax rates), a variety of concessions or "information subsidies" (Gandy 1982), the provision of exclusive information and low price services offered by the state to publishing enterprises.

Therefore, the state has the ability, and has regularly taken advantage of its ability to play a decisive role in the economics of the press by using a variety of overt or covert means; such is its economic power that it may not only

support or burden financially, but may even compete with the existing publishers by providing the necessary capital for the publication of totally new newspapers as it has attempted to do in the past when it feared losing effective control over the existing ones.

Athens Dailies as National Press.

Another important development in the post-war period, especially after 1960, was the progressive transformation of the Athens press into a "national" one, as the former gradually penetrated provincial Greece and eventually led to the decline of the provincial press. The first indications of these developments were provided by the findings of research conducted in Patras in 1965-67 (Carmocolias 1974), which showed that the daily circulation of Athens dailies in Patras (the third largest city in Greece) was twice as large as that of the combined circulation of the three local newspapers. It was also pointed out that in 1964, in terms of circulation, the newspapers of the centre (Athens and Thessaloniki combined) accounted for 72 per cent of the total newspaper circulation in Greece (Carmocolias 1974: 32-33).

These trends continued as the combination of economic and cultural underdevelopment of provincial Greece, and the centralized character of the Greek state, prevented the creation of conditions - such as adequate local and regional markets, local cultural life, or a local public sphere - that

would sustain a viable local or regional press. As a result, the existing press was mainly restricted - in terms of topics and readership - to the local level, and it was unable to acquire a regional, let alone a national role.

Data published in the National Statistical Yearbooks shows that the penetration of the Athens press in provincial Greece increased significantly after the restoration of democracy and during the 1980s. Thus, while in 1977, only 30.5 per cent of the Athens dailies were sold in provincial Greece, as opposed to 69.5 per cent sold in Athens, in 1986 the proportions of the sales were 45,2 and 54.8 per cent respectively.

The penetration of the Athens press in provincial Greece has been facilitated by its availability, and especially of its evening editions, in most parts of the country almost at the same time they appear in Athens news-stands (Peponis 1983: 127). What is more, the technological and organizational superiority of Athens publishing enterprises, have been considerable advantages in their competition with the smaller regional newspapers. The latter have been unable to provide the extensive coverage of national and international news offered by their Athens counterparts, and therefore have been unable to challenge the gradual but decisive transformation of the Athens dailies into national media.

The Greek Publishers; An Anatomy.

Another, extremely important, issue which has already been raised in the discussion on the role of the state, is that of the publishers, their political and economic role, the extent of their autonomy and their motivation. A categorization of the publishers/owners of press organizations in post-dictatorship Greece according to their backgrounds and political, editorial strategies and motivations is quite illuminating in this respect. A first, schematic, distinction that has been proposed is that between the "traditional" publishers, the Communist Party of Greece, and those entrepreneurs who have bought and invested substantial amounts on old newspapers or old titles (Kyriazidis, 1986).

The first group, the traditional publishers, comprizes all those who continue a family publishing tradition such as Ch. Lambrakis, owner of the "Lambrakis Press Organization", E. Vlachou, publisher of "I Kathimerini", or the Kyrrou family, publishers of "I Estia". The Communist Party of Greece, being the owner of the "Rizospastis", the morning daily of the party, and "Rizos" (short for "Rizospastis"), a weekly, and later daily, evening paper, should be considered as a special case. The third group, comprizes investors who entered the press market relatively recently by buying either existing newspapers, or the right to use the name of old discontinued newspapers.

Although there are some reasons which seem to justify the use of this distinction, such as the differences in labour intensity, printing technology and infrastructure or loans burdens between "traditional" and "new" enterprises, there are grounds for believing that this distinction underestimates the process of technological and organizational modernization which several "traditional" enterprises have undergone since the 1970s. It does not allow for the substantial differences between "traditional" press organizations which have introduced new technology and modes of operation and those which have not. Furthermore, it could be argued that there are several other criteria which might be equally illustrative of the state of the Greek press in different ways. Thus we could differentiate according to the economic importance of press organizations. We would then, for example see that the "Lambrakis Press Organization", owned by a "traditional" publisher and publishing two newspapers and numerous periodicals has equal importance - in terms of economic significance - with the relatively younger enterprises of G. Bobolas (Ethnos [Nation]) who entered the publishing market as an already successful businessman, owning several construction and manufacturing enterprises, and with the dynamic publishing enterprise of A & A Voudouris (Eleftheros Typos [Free Press]), or finally, with C. Tegopoulos's (Eleftherotypia [Freedom of the Press]). In this way, we could distinguish between an economically strong and dynamic group of publishers on the one hand, and a second

group, comprizing economically weak enterprises which are on the verge of closure.

However, economic criteria alone are not sufficient to comprehend the diversity of the Athens press. We should also take into account the long-term political motivations of the majority of the publishers. The most important examples of political motivation, though not the only ones, have been those of the Vardinoyiannis family, ship-owners, major shareholders of one of the major oil refining and distribution companies in Greece and of an Athens football club, and owners of the newspaper "Mesimvrini", and, for quite different reasons, the Kouris brothers, owners of several political and sports newspapers, and recently, of two radio stations and a TV channel.³²

In the case of the Vardinoyiannis family, it would seem that despite the fact that their newspaper "Mesimvrini" has been estimated to have been operating with an annual loss in excess of 175,000,000 drachmas p.a. (estimates of 1984),³³ they appear determined to subsidize its operation and continue its circulation. It could be argued that this choice made by its owners has been a result of their determination to be in a relatively influential political position. As the economic interests of the Vardinoyiannis family are closely linked with the state and its economic policies, the ownership of a newspaper could be considered to be a considerable political asset that could be used as an

additional instrument for exerting pressure on the government.

In the case of the Kouris family, strict secrecy has prevented an in depth analysis of their economic situation. It is known however, that during the past few years, they have been expanding their operations in the mass-media with the creation of an Athens morning and evening paper ("Dimokratikos Logos" [Democratic Speech] and "Niki" [Victory] respectively), a Thessaloniki evening daily ("Avriani tis Thessalonikis"), a sports paper ("Filathlos" [Sports fan]), two radio stations and a TV channel ("Kanali 29"), in addition to their original daily "Avriani". Although there is speculation that the Kouris brothers enterprise has been supported not only economically but also politically, through the reluctance of the PASOK governments to allow their prosecution for several failures to comply with internal revenue legislation, it is impossible to be certain of their actual economic circumstances. Their political dailies have been so influential that their very close relationship with PASOK in general, and with certain of its most prominent personalities, has not been one of subordination to party-choices; on the contrary, it would in some cases appear to be a relationship of inter-dependence. Finally, the fact that one of the two brothers, M. Kouris succeeded in becoming a member of parliament, in conjunction with his publishing practices, could indicate that they retain the essence of the clientelistic rationality, that is,

the effort to gain political and economic power through their participation in, and influence on the state and its apparatuses.

After the mid-eighties, a new situation arose, partly as a result of the restructuring and "globalization" of the media industries worldwide and of the new opportunities which emerged with the "privatization" and deregulation of broadcasting in most Western European countries, and partly, as a result of the lack of confidence of the then PASOK government in the pro-government press, and the party's consequent effort to either create new, sympathetic newspapers, or to reinforce one or two of the existing dailies. The publishers, who saw these moves as an attempt to bypass and isolate them, and saw a threat to their participation in the share of state benefits, as well as to their share of a promising market, appeared determined to limit their dependency on the state and to increase their economic self-sufficiency. This decision seems to have been the turning point which eventually led to the formation, for the first time, of a dynamically entrepreneurial culture in the press which will possibly determine the future developments in this and other areas of mass communication.

The Greek Press in Transition? Current Trends.

In the period 1970-80 the Athens dailies experienced important changes as the restoration of parliamentary democracy resulted in the increasing motivation of both

existing and prospective publishers to publish new titles, or re-launch several newspapers which had discontinued their publication during the seven-year-long dictatorship. Thus, the re-appearance of prestigious newspapers such as the "Kathimerini", or the launching of new "ambitious" - in terms of circulation - dailies such as, the "Eleftherotypia", combined with the increasing public interest in the political developments of the period could explain, to a certain extent, the increase in the circulation of Athens dailies which from 175,760,384 in 1970, rose to a peak in 1978 with an annual circulation of 240,957,471.

However, after 1978, there was a reversal of this pattern of growth and the total circulation of the Athens dailies fell to 205,266,177 in 1980 (National Statistical Service of Greece Yearbooks: 1970-85). The decline in the Athens dailies' circulation after 1978 appeared to be rather persistent and coincided with an increase in operational, printing and distribution costs (Dimitriou 1986). What is more, as the number of newspaper titles continued to increase,³⁴ their economic problems seemed to be deepening as an already limited market had to be shared by more aspiring publishers and more newspaper titles. In addition to these developments, the technological and economic weaknesses (see of most press organizations had made them vulnerable and dependent on the various forms of state financial support and funding with the expected consequences as far as the autonomy of the press was concerned. The information

contained in tables 6 and 7, indicates that - with the exception of relative newcomers in the press market such as "Ethnos", "Eleftheros Typos", "Eleftherotypia" - the majority of Athens dailies were characterized by a combination of low investment, low profitability or more often financial loss and considerable debts to banks and other financial institutions (most of which controlled or regulated by the state). The consequences of this situation would become very clear in the mid-eighties when the then government attempted - albeit unsuccessfully - to use its powers in order to control and direct the developments in the sphere of the press.

A new element was the increasingly competitive radio and, more importantly, television which threatened the survival and role of the print media, and especially the newspapers (Dimitriou 1986; Peponis 1983). The broadcast media tended to claim a part of the informative role which had been virtually monopolized by the newspapers a decade earlier, while by being accessible to large audiences they attracted a substantial share of advertizing expenditure (Tables 8 and 9). The inability of the newspapers, and of the press in general, to attract both readers and advertisers, and therefore to compete more successfully with the broadcasting media, deprived the press organizations of essential sources of income. The accumulation of these problems and the need for domination, or even survival, in the market, resulted in fierce antagonism between the news-

TABLE 6
Capital, Profits, Losses and Liabilities of
Athens Dailies (1985)

Newspaper	Profits Losses	Accrued Liabilities	Own Capital	Liabilities (a)	(b)	Property Plant
	(in million drachmas)					
Akropolis	-166.4	564.9	134.0	590.0	222.4	20.4
Apogevmatini	+7.8	-	14.0	484.6	316.0	212.2
Apogevmatini tis Kyriakis	+15.3	49.5	194.7	117.9	104.6	188.9
Vradyni	-56.4	-	47.4	172.6	89.0	11.9
Ethnos/ Ethnos tis Kyriakis	+101.3	-	211.1	939.9	-	179.2
Eleftheros Typos	-74.8	193.2	220.0	261.1	0.7	95.6
Elefthero- typia	-115.2	780.4	380.0	848.3	405.5	288.9
Kyriakatiki Elefthero- typia	-66.3	134.5	225.0	402.2	-	485.7
Eleftheri Ora/ Eleftheri Ora tis Kyriakis	-15.5	45.8	18.0	70.9	2.5	31.3
Mesimvrini	-169.6	499.2	475.2	403.6	196.6	68.4
D.O.L. ¹	-263.1	855.6	827.2	1,415.0	377.3	274.0
Rizospastis/ Typo- ekdotiki S.A. ²	+12.1	131.3	1,163.1	779.1	422.9	1,512.9
Total	-790.8	3254.4	3909.7	6485.2	2137.5	3,369.4

NOTES: Liabilities: (a) General. (b) Bank Loans. N. Kyriazidis claims that the real amounts owed to banks might be substantially higher (Kyriazidis, 1986).

1. Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki A.E. The Lambrakis Press Organization S.A. balance sheet includes details of the financial state of all its publications (Newspapers: Ta Nea, To Vima, To Vima tis Kyriakis, Magazines: Tachydromos, Oikonomikos Tachydromos, Archaialogia) and a Travel Agency (Travel Plan).

2. The information of the balance sheet of Typoekdotiki includes details of the economic performance of its daily newspaper "Rizospastis" and of its printing plants.

Source: N.I. Kyriazidis (1986).

TABLE 7

Profits and Losses of Athens' Dailies (1986-7)

Newspaper	Profits or Losses	
	1986	1987
	(in million drachmas)	
Akropolis	-213.2	-153.9
Apogevmatini	-0.6	-4.3
Apogevmatini tis Kyriakis	-0.3	+10.9
Vradyni	-87.5	-75.9
Ethnos/Ethnos tis Kyriakis	+308.0	+302.7
Eleftheros		
Typos	+11.7	+138.9
Eleftherotypia	+10.7	
Kyriakatiki		+165.7
Eleftherotypia	-45.9	
Mesimvrini	-150.1	-125.6
D.O.L. ¹	+5.7	+498.6
Rizospastis/ Typoekdotiki S.A. ²	+30.3	-91.4
Kouris Bros Papers	NI	+13.7
Total	-131.2	+679.4

NOTES:

1. Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki A.E. The Lambrakis Press Organization S.A. balance sheet includes details on the financial state of all its publications (Newspapers: Ta Nea, To Vima, To Vima tis Kyriakis, Magazines: Tachydromos, Oikonomikos Tachydromos, Archaialogia) and a Travel Agency (Travel Plan).

2. The information of the balance sheet of Typoekdotiki includes details of the economic performance of its daily newspaper "Rizospastis" and of its printing plants. Its poor economic performance might be due to the fact that it undertakes the free printing of Communist Party literature.

Source: N.I. Kyriazidis (1987 and 1988).

TABLE 8

Greece ; mass-media: Share of advertizing expenditure by medium (1979 and 1980).

Medium	Advertizing expenditure (in milion drachmas)			
	1979	%	1980	%
Television	1,731	47	2,155.6	49.6
Newspapers	1,039	28	1,125.2	25.9
Magazines	748	20	786.5	18.1
Radio	172	5	280.2	6.4
Total	3,690	100	4,347.5	100.0

Source: A. Peponis (1983).

TABLE 9

Greece and United Kingdom; advertizing expenditure: percentage by medium (1979 and 1980).

Medium	Advertizing expenditure (percentages)			
	1979		1980	
	Greece	UK	Greece	UK
Television	47.0	28.6	49.6	35.1
Newspapers	28.0	57.3	25.9	52.9
Magazines	20.0	11.0	18.1	9.2
Radio	5.0	3.1	6.4	2.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: For Greece, A. Peponis (1983); for the United Kingdom, my calculations from J. Tunstall (1983).

papers and their publishers, which not rarely took the form of defamatory campaigns and direct attacks between them (Kouloglou 1982: 35-39).

In view of these circumstances it has been widely accepted that the press in Greece has been undergoing a major crisis not only in economic terms, but also in terms of its quality (Peponis, 1983, Dimitriou, 1986, Kouloglou, 1982). Thus, it has been argued that the main symptoms of this "crisis" could be located in the progressive decline of income and profits from both circulation and advertizing, in the chronic dependence of the publishers upon the state and the state-controlled banking system, which perpetuated the newspapers' inability to become economically self-sustaining organizations, especially as an additional important factor of the "crisis" was the newspapers' long legacy of accumulated financial losses of the past, which, at the time, seemed extremely difficult to overcome.

However, it should be pointed out that the impact of the so-called "crisis" of the press was not felt in the same way by all newspapers. In fact, without underestimating the fact that the evening press was also affected, due to its inability to expand its readership, it was the morning press that bore the brunt. This could be explained to a certain degree by the convergence which had taken place in the time of circulation of morning and evening dailies, and in the weaknesses in the distribution system. More precisely, the fact that the "evening" newspapers were printed and

distributed before noon, in addition to the fact that their dispatch in many areas outside Athens coincided with the dispatch of the morning press made the latter less appealing to the public as the "evening" press contained up-to-date news.

Other, no less important, reasons for the declining attraction of the morning press were the lack of a morning home distribution scheme, which would make the morning press more accessible, and, more importantly, the rather long afternoon break in the working day (only recently abolished - although it is still in force in the summer months) which almost coincided with the distribution time of the "evening" press and thus provided the impetus for the expansion of the evening papers at the expense of their morning counterparts. As a result of this "crisis" publishers have very rarely, and rather unsuccessfully, attempted to publish a morning paper, while at the same time, existing publishers had to withdraw from, or reduce their presence in the sphere of the morning press.³⁶

While taking into account these unpromising developments in the sphere of the morning press, we should recognize the broader context. Instead of overemphasizing the crisis as such, we should view it as a stage of a longer process of reorganization and rationalization of the press organizations, and of the mass-media in Greece as a whole. The first step in this direction seems to have been the introduction of photosetting technology. Following the

example of "Ethnos" which was printed on Web offset presses in September 1981, "Rizospastis" and "Eleftheros Typos" adopted the new technology over the next two years, while the majority of the remaining dailies and Sunday papers joined soon. As the new technology which was adopted by the majority of the Athens' press was time-saving and certainly less labour intensive than its predecessor (based on the use of linotype machines), it was an important move towards the rationalization of the press organizations and certainly a decisive moment in the reorganization of the labour force and the pattern of capital-labour relations.

The decision to abandon the previous labour intensive technologies triggered a series of industrial disputes as a large number of print workers were threatened by the prospect of redundancy. In the summer of 1980, publishers responded to massive strikes with a lock-out. Fierce confrontations on the issue of new technology and the conditions under which it should be introduced were finally brought to an end when the government intervened to offer guarantees to print workers that their jobs would not be affected by the forthcoming changes. These guarantees were included in legislation introduced in the summer of 1981 which allocated substantial funds towards the costs of employment and retirement involved.

As in the case of the 1986-87 Wapping printworkers' dispute in Britain, it became evident that the transition to the new technologies had been just the starting point of

changes in the overall logic of the operation of the press organizations. Publishers were attempting to diminish the power and influence of the print unions, with the approval and, in some cases the help, of the government.³⁸ Another dimension of this transition was the progressive shift towards the use of freelance reporters and staff in the everyday operation of some newspapers, as publishers adopted a less unionized staffing policy at all levels in their organizations. These developments strengthened the position of the publishers, increased considerably their control over the editorial policy of their papers and gave ample space for their economic recuperation over the years.

Another aspect of the efforts to achieve economic recuperation, which was made possible by the new technological developments was the attempt to stabilize the existing readership and, if possible, to expand circulation by adopting a more attractive, tabloid format. The importance of the visual image was recognized and the traditional layout of the newspapers was revised to give greater prominence to photographs, especially colour photographs. In the quest for a larger readership, the contents of the majority of the daily press were extended to cover more topics of general interest such as sports, health and fitness, leisure or fashion, leading to close similarities with general interest magazines.

The economic developments in the field of the press over

the last few years indicate that the response of the publishers to the so-called "crisis of the press" has been successful from a commercial point of view. While in 1985 only 3 out of 11 papers were profitable (Table 6), in 1986 the majority of the Athens' daily and Sunday papers seemed to have overcome their financial problems, and in 1987 these trends seem to persist (Table 7).

Although the economic performance of most newspapers has been very bad, combining a low and unstable readership with increasing liabilities, in this period, the overall economic outlook for the Athens' dailies and Sunday papers has been more favourable. With the exception of "Vradyni", which has been facing the prospect of bankruptcy, and "Akropolis" and "Mesimvrini" which have been sustained because of the generous financial support of their owners (the Anastasopoulos family who have the control of two steel and metal processing plants, in the former case, and the Vardinoyiannis brothers, ship-owners, major shareholders of one of the biggest oil companies in Greece and of one of the most popular Athens football team, in the latter case), the major Athens press organizations have witnessed a period of relative growth, decreasing liabilities, increasing profits, stabilized circulation of their papers (Table 10) - despite several consecutive price increases - and, in some cases, even embarked upon expansion to other media areas.

TABLE 10

Average Circulation of Morning and Evening Newspapers published in Athens in 1981, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988.

NEWSPAPER NAME	1981	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
ELEFThEROS						
TYPOS	-	49,500	79,600	103,551	126,609	149,933
ETHNOS	90,321	201,800	202,900	171,260	159,463	146,111
ELEFThEROTYPIA	120,609	100,000	106,800	108,779	123,402	126,464
TA NEA	189,354	129,200	134,800	123,932	117,156	112,908
AVRIANI	75,743	98,000	154,500	NI	104,296	101,907
APOGEVMATINI	113,667	126,300	117,500	99,780	92,100	84,975
24 ORES	-	-	-	-	-	50,623
EPIKAIROTITA	-	-	-	-	-	44,305
RIZOSPASTIS	42,884	51,400	59,500	54,100	46,692	40,481
I PROTI	-	-	44,900 ¹	NI	35,500	34,599
I VRADINI	55,256	76,000	73,300	62,014	51,503	33,047
MESIMVRINI	22,228	29,600	42,100	35,971	35,182	30,387
I KATHIMERINI	19,143	NI	26,700	NI	24,749	22,503
ELEFThEROS	-	-	-	-	-	15,980
DIMOKRATIKOS						
LOGOS	-	-	10,800 ²	NI	10,588	10,147
AKROPOLIS	50,819	45,200	34,300	23,733	14,706	7,403
KATHE MERA	-	-	-	-	-	6,588
ESTIA	7,248	7,500	7,300	NI	6,713	6,487
I AVGI	9,054	8,800	9,200	NI	5,647	4,664
ELEFThEROS ³	-	-	-	-	-	2,413
ELEFThERI ORA	7,105	5,800	2,987	NI	1,346	1,329
TO VIMA ⁴	49,138	NI	27,600	-	-	-
ELEFThEROS						
KOSMOS	14,062	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	866,631	1,134,787		955,652	1,033,254	

1. Information based on the September 1985 average circulation.

2. Information based on the September 1985 average circulation.

3. ELEUTHEROS became an evening newspaper in 1988.

4. The publication of TO VIMA was discontinued between 1982-1984 while in 1984 it was re-published. In 1984, its daily edition was discontinued again while the Sunday VIMA (TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS) continued being published.

NI. No information

(Source: N. Kyriazidis 1982, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989)

In addition to the stabilization of their readership, it seems that the Athens papers benefited greatly from the advertizing boom in the Greek market. The growth of the advertizing market which took place in Greece during the 1980s reached extremely high rates after 1987. It has been estimated that in 1988 and 1989 advertizing expenditure increased by 90% (Kyriazidis 1990) while in accordance with the economic forecasts, in 1990 the growth rate was expected to reach 16% (Fishburn 1990: 114) despite the recession.

TABLE 11

Greece ; mass-media: Share of advertizing expenditure by medium (1988 and 1989).

Medium	Advertizing expenditure (in thousand drachmas)				
	1988	%	1989	%	Increase 89/88
Television	18,864,502	47.5	23,035,119	42.5	22.11%
Newspapers	6,892,667	17.4	10,172,965	18.8	47.59%
Magazines	10,671,096	26.9	16,575,356	30.6	55.33%
Radio	3,263,3545	8.2	4,366,200	8.1	33.79%
Total	39,691,620	100	54,149,640	100	36.43%

Source: Kyriazidis (1990).

In the same period (1988/89), the advertizing

expenditure increase in the Athens press (47.59%) exceeded that of the mass-media average (39.7%) thus constituting a major factor for the economic recuperation and growth of the Athens press organizations (Table 11).

From economic recuperation to expansion; The position of the Athens press in the changing patterns of ownership and control of the mass-media in Greece.

Having overcome the economic hardships of the first part of the 1980s, and due to a series of other factors which I shall try to outline below, the antagonistic relations among the major publishing organizations gave way to a less tense climate which occasionally permitted informal or formal cooperation amongst some of the Athens press publishers.

As, after 1986, the speculation concerning the deregulation of the broadcasting media in Greece turned into the strong likelihood that it would occur, and in anticipation of the potential penetration of the Greek media market by multinational capital as a result of the integration of Greece in the European Community, the Greek publishers soon took cognizance of the possibilities and challenges which were presented to them. More precisely they realized that, as events rapidly unfolded, they had to secure their position and possibly expand their activities in and beyond the sphere of the press in order to resist pressures from multinational capital or, at least, to become partners in the new markets.

An additional decisive factor which influenced the developments, at that point was the attempt of the Papandreu government to undermine the position of Athens press publishers by encouraging and financing the formation of a loyal media "clientele". The preferential treatment by the government of G. Popotas, and later the Kouris brothers, as well as the eventual marginalization of the existing publishers and the creation of the media empire of the banker G. Koskotas under the approval and encouragement of the prime minister and members of his cabinet precipitated the changes in media ownership patterns. It could therefore be argued that, among other things, the decision of several publishers to extend their activities to other areas of the mass-media was a part of their effort to render their organizations economically viable and less dependent on the decisions of the government.

In this way, throughout the second part of the 1980s, we can see the formation of several distinct strategies of multi- or cross-media expansion and development of daily and Sunday press organizations; one, chosen by the "Lambrakis Press Organization", involves the acquisition of magazine titles and even of whole publishing enterprises.³⁷ Another, based on different priorities, is the expansion strategy of banker G. Koskotas's "Grammi AE", or of the Press organization founded by the Greek Communist Party "Typoekdotiki AE" which was premised upon massive investment in new printing technologies.

Another significant opportunity for expansion and, possibly, concentration of media ownership in Greece was provided by the crisis of public service (state-supervised) broadcasting in Greece in the mid-1980s. The setting up of popular illegal municipal radio stations by the conservative mayors of Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus and, later, local TV stations by the latter two, as a weapon in their political confrontation with the socialist PASOK government in 1986 brought to the foreground of public debate the issue of "free" broadcasting. Early on, press organizations realized the opportunities arising out of the political crisis and launched a public campaign for the cause of "free" radio and television. Although in the context of the political confrontation between the conservative mayors and the government, the demand for "free" broadcasting referred to a re-distribution of communication resources among the main political parties, the press organizations seized the initiative by redefining "free" as private, commercial as well as municipal broadcasting. In 1987, while still lobbying for the allocation of a significant part of the emerging broadcasting industry to existing print-media enterprises, the Athens publishers took advantage of the steps taken by the government towards the legalization of private local radio and television, and of the lack of any anti-trust legislation, and started organizing their penetration to the broadcasting arena by establishing the first private FM stations which soon became extremely competitive to their

state and municipal counterparts, by creating the infrastructure for the establishment of, or participation in private television channels ³⁸ and by forming the first nationwide private broadcasting networks. It was precisely this prospect of private television broadcasting which dictated the cooperation between certain publishers because the cost of ventures of this type could not be carried by individual publishers.

Finally, in a venture which might prove to be most significant insofar as the developments in the media industry in Greece are concerned, the "Lambrakis Press Organization AE." also joined forces in 1987 with the Kourentis brothers, representatives of Silvio Berlusconi in Greece, by founding "Video-Star A.E.", a company specializing in the production and distribution of TV and radio programmes (Kyriazidis, 1988), which in turn bought 50% of "ATA EPE", a TV production company. If we take into account the restrictions in Greek law on the participation of foreign nationals or foreign companies in the ownership and control of television channels, it is obvious that such joint ventures constitute a "legal" channel of participation of international capital in the Greek media market.

It appears that the initiatives taken by the Greek press organizations which I outlined above indicate that their transformation from loyal political clients of the main political parties into competitive market-oriented

enterprises has been under way for some years. Although it is still very early to draw conclusions regarding the state of the media industry in Greece, it is obvious that the international trends, combined with the internal political and economic conjuncture of the mid-1980s, played an important part in the transformation of media industries in Greece. Alongside the intensification of competition between media enterprises, there are signs of concentration and cooperation in the highly fragmented media industry. It would appear that the transformations which the mass media are currently undergoing will continue - as they have already begun - to affect the relations of power between the mass media and the political parties.

Economic trends: some conclusions.

As explained above, the "crisis" phase of the Athens press during the late 1970s and early 80s was followed not only by its economic recuperation in the second part of the 1980s but also by its expansion into other mass media or other related areas, such as the printing industry, or radio and television programme production.

The anticipation of legislation permitting the establishment of private TV channels provided a strong compulsion for the coordination, and later cooperation and partnership between certain publishers; this could, in the long term, lead to a dominant pattern of

centralized-oligopolistic ownership in the mass media market in Greece more closely resembling the typical pattern in most Western European countries.

However, these remarks are not intended to suggest that the penetration of multinational capital in the quite profitable market of the mass-media in Greece has been particularly rapid. As a result of the restrictions imposed by the Greek legislation, this penetration has, until present, been indirect and limited. However, the unification of the European markets is expected to change this picture completely. Perhaps the integration of the Greek market within the unified European market will be the crucial test which will determine the future developments in the mass-media in Greece.

The structure of News organizations and news production.

An attempt to assess the role of mass media organizations in news production in Greece would have to confront the problem of the virtual lack of relevant research. However such an assessment is necessary as it would provide us with some insights concerning the impact of the organization, and of professional "culture" in the Athens press in the production of news.

Drawing upon a recent pilot research project on the internal structure and operation of 4 Athens newspapers (Serafetinidou, 1991) we can attempt a tentative

reconstruction of the power relations and professional ethics within the Athens press.

The research project, comprising interviews conducted with members of the staff of four Athens newspapers, provided information regarding the power structure within news organizations. More precisely, an analysis of the interviews indicates the existence and reproduction of clientelistic structures inside the newspapers: as, according to the interviewees, staff recruitment was based on personal acquaintance rather than on professional or educational qualifications, it would seem that bonds based on obligation are in existence, with all the consequences on news production this would entail. What is more, if we take into account the existence of a long combined probation/apprenticeship period after recruitment, we can see that, in addition to the pressures of clientelistic obligation, newspaper publishers and directors can control the work of new journalists and secure their conformity in the long run. The research indicated that the political profile of a newspaper was perceived by its staff as equivalent of its (usually meaning its publisher's or director's) party allegiance. Although many interviews contained contradictory views regarding the existence of a political line which influences news production, Serafetinidou detected the existence of latent and, to a degree unconscious, self censorship and conformity in three of the 4 papers included in the research project. More precisely, whereas occasional

slips during the interviews reveal the awareness and tacit recognition of reporters and other journalistic staff of the critical role played by their paper's political allegiance in news selection and production, it was not unusual for the interviewees to attempt to minimize the importance of this. Although this would appear to be an indication of a conflict between organizational pressures and a vague sense of professional integrity and ethics on the part of the newspaper staff, it should be noted that it confirms information about the lack of editorial autonomy within the Athens press (see for example Kominis 1985: 63-77). Indeed, the data gathered suggest that the publisher's political party allegiance is central in the selection and presentation of news while the saleability of news appeared to be another important factor in these processes.

Another important issue which permeates the interviews but which has not been raised by Serafetinidou, is that of the perceptions of "the political" by the staff of the Athens press. More precisely, it is striking how most interviewees equated "politics" with "party allegiance". Indeed, no other political concerns, for example a commitment to environmental issues, concern about minorities etc. appeared to be playing any role in the political identity of the papers, according to their staff. This is a very important point as it bears directly upon press representations of "the political" as I hope to show in the following pages.

The Athens Press and the "production" of consensus:
some tentative remarks.

It could be argued that the characteristics of the Greek political system and public sphere which I have outlined in the previous chapter, as well as the particular conjuncture in the field of press economics, affected the role and significance of the Athens press after the restoration of democracy in Greece. More precisely, the predominance of the political parties over political and social life after the fall of the 1967-74 dictatorship, the prevalence of clientelistic modes of political incorporation, and the economic crisis which the Athens press was undergoing between 1974 and 1986, contributed to the formation of the particular relationship between the press and the major political parties.

Although since 1974 only two morning dailies have been official party newspapers - "Rizospastis" has been the official paper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (KKE), and "I Avgi" was the official paper of the Communist Party of Greece-Interior (KKE esoterikou), most other Athens dailies had a clear - albeit informal - "affiliation" with the major political parties (Komninou 1990). Thus, it could be argued that in the period between 1974 and 1986, the Athens daily press was reflecting the structure of an essentially bi-polar party system, characterized by the confrontation between "right wing" and

"democratic" forces, in which the main opposing protagonists were the right-wing "New Democracy" party and the centre-left "PASOK", while the two communist parties occupied a secondary position in the political arena.³³

Thus, at the time, the majority of the Athens papers were aligned with one of the two major political parties or political camps, while the secondary position of the Left in the party system was also reflected in the "representation" of its discourse in the press. Operating within a society divided along the lines of an essentially rigid bi-polar political system and dependent upon the economic assistance of the state - and, therefore, of the major political parties - the Athens dailies reflected and reinforced the party-political divisions. As the press occupied a "subaltern" position primarily to the two major poles of the party system, and to a lesser extent to its "left/communist" component it could be argued that it effectively publicized and reproduced party discourses and, occasionally, the discourses of party factions.

However, the emphasis on the press representation of political division and confrontation between Right (mainly the centre-right "New Democracy" party) and Left (mainly the centre-left "PASOK") (Pezmazoglou 1984; Komninou 1990) overlooks the significant role the press played in the construction of the underlying consensus.

For, it could be argued that despite the

"confrontational" character of the political sphere, that is, the apparent lack of consensus in Greek politics, the seemingly irreconcilable differences among political parties, their political objectives, discourses and practices, or despite the "fragmentation" of society along these party divisions, there has been an underlying consensus regarding the political sphere and the political process.

More precisely, there is evidence that since the restoration of democracy, there has been a broad consensus regarding the centrality of political parties over social and political life and their role in the maintenance and reproduction of clientelistic practices and the mentality associated with them. As I shall attempt to show in the following pages, it is precisely this consensus, constructed and reproduced by the Athens press, by drawing upon "popular" feeling, "common" sense, and its "legitimate" party-political expression, which has been crucial in the preservation of the relations of political domination which prevailed after the restoration of democracy in Greece.

PART III
GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE
AND THE ATHENS POLITICAL PRESS

CHAPTER 6
POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN
GREECE: THE CASE OF THE "MARGINALS"

In the previous section it was argued that since the restoration of democracy in Greece, the relations of political domination have been sustained and reproduced on the basis of a broad consensus regarding the definition of politics and the recognition of its boundaries, of the main legitimate participants, and of the range of available options for political action. These widely accepted fundamental schemes of cognition, perception and practice upon which politics was, and is, actualized have constituted the core of the hegemonic political culture in post-dictatorial Greece.

The most significant features of the hegemonic political culture, as has been shown, include the essentially "private" character of politics, the fragmentation and atomization of political practices and experience under the domination of highly centralized political "party-patrons" with authoritarian internal political structures, and the centrality of clientelistic, statist and populist political practices in the definition of politics and in the setting of the boundaries of the universe of political discourse and action.

In this part I examine the relationship between this consensual basis of the Greek political system and the performance of the daily press of Athens, which, as has been seen, has virtually dominated the national print-media market in terms of circulation, competitiveness and dissemination of political information, and therefore has been a significant institution as far as the production and dissemination of "definitions of the situation", and the setting of the boundaries of the universes of political discourse and political action are concerned.

Studies dealing with the performance of the press in Greece are extremely limited, in both number and scope (Pezmazoglou, 1984; Komninou, 1990). They have emphasized the polarization of the Athens press along the lines of the essentially bi-polar Greek party-system. Komninou in particular, has argued that until 1986 the press systematically publicized the particular "definitions of the situation" which were formed by the two major political parties, thus reproducing a bi-polar universe of discourse in which the achievement of consensus was impossible. It was the achievement of the independence of the press from the political parties which followed the economic recovery and restructuring of the print-media in the second part of the 1980s, Komninou argued, that opened the way for the production of consensus as the majority of the daily press progressively moved towards political positions close to the centre of the political spectrum.

These studies appear to overemphasize the divisions and conflict among the established political parties and their subsidiary organizations, especially as both analyses adopt institutional definitions of politics, and concentrate on party-political discourses and press performance just before the parliamentary elections of 1981 and 1989 respectively, periods in which confrontation among political parties was bound to be more intense. It would therefore seem to me that, the rather limited definition of the "political" adopted and the particular context in which these studies took place, as well as the lack of a satisfactory theoretical and methodological background, could explain why both studies failed to discern that even while the Greek press was reflecting the bipolar division of the party system, it was also playing an important role in the construction of consensus regarding the reproduction of relations of political domination, the centrality of the major political parties in politics and society, and the maintenance of their virtual monopoly in the universes of political discourse and political action.

In Part I, a case was presented for adopting a more flexible definition of "politics" that would transcend the boundaries of the conventional political sphere of a society - itself a product of political domination. The adoption of a more flexible definition of the "political" will enable us to take into account the processes of politicization and

depoliticization of social domains excluded from institutional definitions of politics, and allow us to refocus the analysis on the processes of construction of political domination, that is, on the antagonism between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects for the definition of the "political".

Thus, to return to the case of Greece, the struggle for the politicization and depoliticization of social domains should be an important concern in the study of Greek political culture, providing valuable insights into its relative openness or closure, flexibility or rigidity, and therefore its democratic or authoritarian character. Such an approach broadens the scope of the study of political culture by including in the sphere of politics new forms of political action and discourses as well as new actors, or potential actors, hitherto neglected by most studies in contemporary Greek politics. Among these forms of political action are social movements, political, social, ethnic and religious minorities or subcultures which have either been excluded from, or refused to be incorporated into the "political sphere".

According to this perspective the attempts of some groups to forge a distinct identity, often refusing to become assimilated to the "political sphere" should not be disregarded. The ability (or inability for that matter) of social minorities such as youth subcultures, or gay, lesbian,

and feminist groups, or ethnic and religious minorities such as the muslim or romany population of the country, immigrant and refugee communities, or finally, of more overtly political minorities such as the numerous extra-parliamentary political groups, to acquire the status of legitimate participants in public and political life, and to participate in setting the boundaries of political debate and action while retaining their identity and distinctiveness, is a crucial parameter of Greek political culture.

It goes without saying that this alternative definition of politics and of political culture, has important ramifications as far as the conflictual or consensual character of the political universe of discourse, and more generally, of the Greek political culture are concerned. More precisely, by regarding the party system and the institutionally sustained universe of political discourse as just a part of the political domain in Greek society, we are in the position to unveil the consensual core of Greek political culture which has been obscured by the conflictual character of the party system and of the party-dominated universe of political discourse.

For, the earlier discussion showed (p.p. 162-168), despite the apparently irreconcilable and confrontational character of the political sphere, the political parties and organizations of the "'democratic' or 'constitutional' space" and universe of discourse, to use Ferrajoli's terminology

(Ferrajoli, 1985: 37-39), appear united in their self-presentation as the sole legitimate holders of, or contenders for political power and in their resolve to impose their definitions of the situation, and to set the boundaries of political debate and the limits of political tolerance, by excluding and denying legitimacy to issues, actors and forms of political action which are opposed to their dominance. Therefore, as far as Greek political culture is concerned, it is important to note that, its consensual character is also complemented by its "exclusive" facet, that is, the exclusion of dissent and the low level of tolerance towards any radical or alternative political opposition. Central in this respect is the closure of the universes of political discourse and action, which have systematically inhibited and frustrated the formation of new, alternative and oppositional collective identities which might challenge the very relations of political domination which sustain them. Thus, non-conformist or even merely "different" social and political groups are not able to be "heard", while alternative and oppositional discourses, forms of social action and lifestyles are displaced and symbolically excluded.

This exclusive aspect of Greek political culture can be traced through numerous cases, where alternative or oppositional definitions, values and lifestyles of social and political minorities clash with, or merely differ from the hegemonic definitions. In such cases, difference is isolated,

repressed or symbolically excluded. Thus, the cultural isolation of, say, ethnic and religious minorities from the rest of the population and the ignorance of the majority of Greeks of the social and political conditions under which their muslim, romany or slav fellow citizens live does not necessarily mean that the latter have not attempted to communicate their experiences and grievances, but that the universe of public discourse, and in particular, the universe of political discourse has not been accessible to them.

Although the case of the muslim minority in north-eastern Greece is a sensitive one due to the turbulent relationship between Greece and Turkey and their conflicting regional interests and policies, and certainly cannot be comprehensively addressed here, it nevertheless offers a characteristic example. The almost hysteric reaction of Greek public opinion to the increasing tendency of the muslim minority of the area to represent itself as Turkish, and the outright delegitimation and symbolic repression of attempts of its members to give cultural and political expression to the "turkishness" of the minority are indicative of the exclusive character of Greek political culture. The 'definitions of the situation' produced within the minority not only differ considerably from their mainstream counterparts, but are also systematically displaced and excluded from the universe of discourse in Greece.

Similar conclusions could be drawn in the cases of

social minorities such as the discriminated-against gay and lesbian communities, or radical feminist groups which refuse to be incorporated in the relevant organizations of the main political parties, conscientious objectors' groups, or the more politically oriented extra-parliamentary left-wing, autonomist and anarchist groups, as well as, more recently, foreign immigrants and refugees. The political significance of the ability or inability of these minorities to gain access to the universe of public discourse and to participate in the production of definitions of the situation has been noted by Brodie and Jenson who argued that whether minorities create their own collective identity or not is a profoundly political outcome, dependent in large part on the activities of political parties and other organizations that alter the language of politics (Brodie and Jenson, 1980: chapter 1).

This is the reason why I intend to focus upon the press representations of one such minority, and, in particular, on the role mass communication plays in the reproduction of the dominant discursive field through processes of repression, marginalization and symbolic exclusion of minority dissent.

More specifically, I shall attempt to study the press representations of the confrontation between the state and a social/political minority, or rather a cluster of minorities, which has become known as the "marginals" (perithoriakoi). An important reason for the selection of this particular minority was the pronounced "political" character and

relative longevity of these groups; to the extent that the "marginals" attempted to develop and sustain their own distinct lifestyles, and more importantly, to the extent that their political strands resisted pressures to become integrated into the "democratic - constitutional" political sphere for over a decade, it could be argued that they constituted a counter-cultural milieu ² and therefore an actual - albeit negligible - challenge to the relations of political domination. Although the state responded to their "challenge" with attempts at physical repression such as the intensification of policing and the implementation of urban planning policies informed by law-and-order preservation objectives, it was clear that at that moment of confrontation, the politics of signification, that is the particular ways in which the "marginals", their repertory of political action, and their confrontations with the state were represented, became crucial, as signification became one of the battlefields in the struggle for political hegemony.

Thus, media representations of the "marginals" during the numerous confrontations between them and the state, constituted an important parameter in the struggle for the maintenance of political hegemony, as they mediated the publicizing of competing versions of political reality, and played a major role in facilitating or restricting access to the universe of public and political discourse. Indeed, it could be argued that the Athens daily press was the main source of information during the confrontations between the

authorities and the "marginals", and it therefore played an important part in mobilizing public opinion around the 'common' or 'popular values' of normality, law and order, and democracy, and against the threat of the "marginals".

The case studies and their background

The appearance of the "marginals" in the major urban centres of Greece after the transition from the authoritarian regimes of the period 1967-74 to democratic government, and especially in the 1980s became a matter of public concern and fuelled intense public debate around the issues of 'deviance' and 'terrorism'.

From 1973 onwards, many anarchist, autonomist and leftist groups were being formed in the main urban centres of Greece. They were normally formed by relatively small numbers of young people and constituted loose networks often based on relationships of friendship, and on common social and political concerns. They sought to challenge the dominant social values and to undermine the exploitative and repressive character of society. Thus, they derived their distinctiveness from their alternative values, visions and lifestyles; they emphasized the centrality of 'freedom', 'creativity' and 'imagination' in their lifestyles as opposed to 'traditional', 'common-sense', 'petty-bourgeois' values of 'restraint', 'responsibility' and 'pragmatism'. They were critical of a variety of aspects of social life such as its

hierarchical organization, the institution of paid work, the distinction between work and leisure, the repression of sexuality, formal schooling and education, academic authoritarianism at the university, psychiatric violence, materialist values, consumption and consumerism, the destruction of the environment, militarism and military service, and of what they interpreted as the subordination of social life to the political parties and their subsidiary organizations. In these respects, the 'marginals' conform to standard definitions of 'sub-' or 'counterculture'.³

Although the relationship between these groups and the political parties of the Left has always been one of hostility, as the latter attempted systematically to exclude the former from any political event, leftist and anarchist groups participated in or attempted to "infiltrate" political events and "movements", especially in the "student movement" which was dominated by the Communist and Socialist parties, and were always present in the annual marches for the commemoration of 'Polytehneio', the uprising of students of the Athens Technical University against the colonels' dictatorship. All these events provided the anarchist and leftist groups with the opportunity to assert their distinctiveness, to express their political positions and to voice their opposition to the domination of the students' and worker's movement by the political parties of the Left and Centre-Left. In addition to their participation in demonstrations and other events organized by the parties and

organizations of the mainstream Left and Centre-Left, in several occasions, leftists, autonomists and anarchists occupied University departments, demonstrated on their own, and resorted to unconventional, as far as Greek politics were concerned, forms of collective action such as the 1981 occupations of empty houses, the 1986 motorcyclists' demonstration against the use of nuclear power, or the 'symbolic' burning of the Athens hotel where the French National Front leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen addressed supporters of Greek far-right political organizations in 1984. In 1979, leftists and anarchists enjoyed widespread support among students when they played a significant role in the student occupations of the Athens Chemistry and Law Schools, and called students and workers to "rise against the state". However, in subsequent occupations and demonstrations they were more isolated as the Greek Union of Students (EFEE) was effectively dominated by the mainstream political parties.

Towards the end of the 1970s, Exarcheia, a central Athens borough in which were situated many private tuition schools (frontistiria) as well as the buildings of the National Technical University (Polytechnio) and of many departments and laboratories of the University of Athens, an area with a substantial student population, and a centre of left-wing political and cultural activity, progressively became the melting-pot in which leftist and anarchist groups, interacted with youth subcultures such as the rockers (rokades), the freaks (frikia), and the punks and formed the

social milieu which has been called the "margin" (perithorio). I am using the term milieu instead of sub-culture, or counter-culture, in order to emphasize both the connections and divergencies within the social space of the "margin".⁴ Far from indicating the existence of a unified group or movement, the terms "margin" and "marginals" should be taken to refer to a series of co-existing, essentially loose sub-cultural and, in many cases, counter-cultural networks, which have co-existed - in terms of territorial co-existence, cultural interaction and partial fusion - and have shared experiences of social and political marginalization. It should however be noted that apart from Exarcheia, similar convergences took place in several other areas of Athens and other cities of Greece, although Exarcheia, being an area where universities, schools, music-clubs, cinema theatres, and other leisure facilities were abundant, attracted young people from a variety of backgrounds, and provided a 'fertile' territory for the formation of subcultures and counter-cultures.

Although the "subcultural and counter-cultural milieu" of the "marginals" has attracted no interest other than the essentially negative and dismissive comments of the mass media, one should not underestimate its cultural-expressive aspects; the 'marginal' milieu has developed and sustained its own - not insignificant - cultural life with the organization of 'alternative events', the existence of two publishing houses and bookshops, the autonomist -

alternative 'Communa' (Commune) and the anarchist - libertarian 'Eleftheros Typos' (Free Press), as well as a multitude of 'alternative' periodicals, newspapers and brochures. Although many of them are published irregularly, or had to discontinue their publication due to their limited readership, some have survived and even attract a wider readership including readers outside the 'marginal' milieu.

Among the numerous periodical 'alternative' publications, the most significant have been 'Ideodromio' [Road of Ideas] which, apart from commentary on social and political issues, focuses on art, literature and cinema and has been influenced by the surrealist movement, 'Rixi' [Rupture] which has been influenced by the Italian 'autonomia' and is a forum for theoretical debate, and publishes articles, news and comments on politics, youth, ecological issues, feminism, and conscientious objectors' groups, 'Poli ton gynaikon' [City of the Women], a radical feminist periodical, 'Pezodromio' [Pavement], a publication of theoretical and historical articles, 'Ta theloume ola' [We Want it All], a youth 'counter-cultural' periodical, and 'Convoy', a periodical with a substantial readership from the broader Left, focusing on social, political, ecological and cultural issues, while 'I Anichti Poli' [Open City], 'I Mami' [The Midwife], 'O Anarchos' [Anarchic], 'Spartakos' [Spartacus] and the initially underground newspaper 'O Spastis' [Smasher] have also been widely read among leftists and anarchists. Despite their small

readership, these publications indicate the existence of some degree of political and cultural debate in the milieu which however has been ignored by the press during the coverage of events involving anarchists, autonomists or leftists.

In the political field, although the 'marginals' have been persistently represented as being obsessed with destruction of property, and disruption of everyday life, it should be noted that, apart from their violent confrontations with the authorities from which press stereotypes have mainly derived, they have also a history of political action that has been ignored or misrepresented by the mass media. More precisely, they have launched or participated in political initiatives which challenged - although, by no means threatened - the centrality of the mainstream political parties in the political process. Initiatives of this sort have been the formation of the 'Initiative against the visit of Jean-Marie Le Pen', a committee which organized public meetings and a demonstration in protest of the visit of the leader of the French National Front in Athens in 1984, and which assumed political responsibility for a 'symbolic attack' against the hotel where Le Pen addressed his supporters, or the 'Anti-nuclear Initiative', an ad hoc loose umbrella committee, which attempted to coordinate collective action against the use of nuclear power just after the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident in 1986.

The distinct lifestyles, and political, and occasionally

social, deviance of the 'marginals' provided the ground upon which processes of social exclusion were to be developed. The press played a very important role in the symbolic exclusion and paved the way for the intensification of 'law-and-order' policies such as 'cleaning-up' urban planning interventions, police raids and repressive policing methods or, as well as legal or paralegal restriction of civil rights under the excuse of the protection of law and order. Furthermore, alongside the 'difference' of the 'marginals', the violence which often characterized their confrontations with the police, provided the mass media with the opportunity to exploit commercially and ideologically the marginal groups. Although I am adopting the terms 'commercial' and 'ideological exploitation' which were introduced by Stanley Cohen in his discussion of deviance exploitation (Cohen, 1987: 139-143), I should emphasize that my application of the term 'commercial exploitation' refers to specific ways of using the deviant in mass communication for the pursuit of profit. By 'commercial exploitation' I mean mostly the Athens newspapers' attempt to increase their circulation by focusing selectively on specific aspects of the lifestyles and action of the 'marginals' which, provided they were presented in particular ways, were certain to attract public interest and therefore increased readership and circulation. On the other hand, by 'ideological exploitation' I refer to the "use of the deviant in communication, particularly public, to defend or announce an ideology ..." (Cohen, p. 139), or in the

particular case of Greece, the symbolic exclusion of the 'marginals' as an intrinsic part of processes of development, and reinforcement of the dominant political culture.

In the next chapter I therefore intend to focus upon the particular press representations of these marginal groups in a series of 'events' in which they were involved, and to explore the particular ways in which these representations are linked to the reproduction of the hegemonic political culture, and the relations of political domination in Greek society.

CHAPTER 7
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE 'MARGINALS' IN
THE ATHENS PRESS - CASE STUDIES

Preliminary notes on the research: selection of
case studies and newspaper samples

Although throughout the 1980s there have been numerous occasions in which public interest was focused on the 'marginals', it is obvious that for practical reasons only a limited number of case studies could be included in this work. As this study was made some time after the events had taken place, several obstacles had to be overcome, mainly in the selection of the particular case studies, of the newspapers, and of other relevant material that could be included in the research.

The limited availability of back newspaper issues and the difficulty in accessing them in public libraries was one of the major problems and, therefore, constituted one of the most decisive criteria, both for the selection of the 'events' that would form the basis of the case studies, and for the composition of the newspaper samples which were included in this study. A second problem was the rapid change which the Athens press was undergoing at the time. As noted in Part II, the late 1970s and 1980s was a period which

witnessed the launching of several new newspaper titles; however many Athens dailies of the period either had a very short life or had to be relaunched on a different basis (e.g. as evening or weekly papers). For this reason, particular efforts were made to ensure that, despite the instability and fluidity of the press market, the sample(s) were characterized by both the elements of continuity and change in the Athens press of the period, that is, both traditional and new newspapers were included whenever possible. What is more, particular care was taken to include newspapers which were representative of the widest possible range of political affiliations and opinions (Table 12), and to maintain the presence of both 'popular' and 'serious' papers in the sample.

TABLE 12
Political affiliation of newspapers included in the case studies samples

Far Left	Centre-Left	Centre-Right	Far Right
<u>KKE KKE(es)</u>	<u>P A S O K</u>	<u>Nea Dimokratia</u>	
	<u>Ethnos</u>		<u>Vradyni</u>
	<u>Eleftherotypia</u>		<u>Apogevmatini</u>
	<u>To Vima</u>	<u>Kathimerini</u>	
	<u>Ta Nea</u>		
	<u>Avriani</u>		

Finally, attention was also paid to the size of the readership of the selected newspapers, in order to ensure that the papers included in the sample had a sizeable combined readership and therefore constituted a source of information for a significant part of the public (Table 13).

Thus, on the basis of these criteria, the samples used in the analysis that will follow are fairly representative of the Athens press, as they are characterized by diversity of political opinion - or rather, of political party affiliation - and, at the same time, a high combined readership.

The newspapers selected are "Apogevmatini", a popular evening paper with conservative political affiliation, "Avriani", a populist evening paper supporting PASOK and striving to present itself as the voice of the moral majority of the "people", "Eleftherotypia", an evening daily which aspired to express a wide spectrum of views from the centre to the left, "Ethnos", a popular evening daily supporting policies advocated mainly by the Communist Party (KKE), and other left-wing parties and seeking to attract a left-of-centre readership, "Kathimerini", a serious centre-right morning broadsheet, "Ta Nea" and its morning, and later Sunday sister paper "To Vima", supporting PASOK, and "I Vradyni", a right-wing paper supporting the centre-right party of "Nea Dimokratia" but also ideologically associated with the extreme right.

As far as the case studies were concerned, it should be

TABLE 13
 AVERAGE CIRCULATION OF NEWSPAPERS INCLUDED IN THE CASE STUDIES SAMPLE

Newspaper	Circulation		
	1981	1984	1986
Apogevmatini	113,667	126,300	99,780
Avriani	75,743	98,000	NI
Eleftherotypia	120,609	100,000	108,779
Ethnos	90,321	201,800	171,260
Kathimerini	19,143	NI	NI
Ta Nea	189,354	129,200	123,932
To Vima ¹	49,138	NI	NI
Vradyni	55,256	76,000	62,014
Combined			
Circulation	713,231	731,300	555,765 ²

NOTES: 1. The publication of 'To Vima' was discontinued between 1982-84. In 1984 it was relaunched as a daily, and in the same year, it became a Sunday paper.
 2. The combined circulation of the 1986 newspapers included in the sample is higher, as the figures in the table do not include the circulation of the popular 'Avriani' as well as those of 'Kathimerini' and 'To Vima'.

Source: Kyriazidis (1982, 1986, 1987).

noted that throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, the Athens press focused on the 'marginals', their activities, and their lifestyles on numerous occasions. More precisely, a series of policing and control measures such as the imprisonment or temporary detention of 'marginals', the police operations in Exarcheia under the code-name 'Virtue', the combination of law-and-order and urban planning initiatives for areas of Athens, the 'public concern' regarding the 'marginals' mainly in the form of recurring lawlessness, drug and terrorism panics throughout the 1980s, or instances of collective action taken by the marginals such as hunger strikes, university building occupations, squatting, demonstrations, riots, or finally the "marginals'" campaigns against drug trafficking in the area of Exarcheia were prominently featured in the front pages of the Athens papers, while extensive special reports, files with 'background information' and 'debates' on the issue - or problem - of the 'marginals' often appeared in the press.

This 'interest' of the press however changed to some extent after its early formative stages, when the 'marginals' were first encountered by press and readers alike, and the first definitions of the situation, concerning the confrontation between the 'marginals' and the state, appeared. It was during this early phase of press coverage, that the inventory and the public languages, which would be used in future coverage of similar events and in press representations of the 'marginals', emerged, but later stages

of reporting of similar events, were characterized by the further mobilization and convergence of social anxieties which eventually took the form of 'moral panics'.⁶ Therefore, it could be argued that throughout the 1980s, the initial inventories and public languages used in the press representations of the 'marginals' were continuously transformed as new themes were mobilized and converged around the stereotypes of the 'marginals'.

It is for this reason that throughout the process of selection of the cases included in the analysis that will follow, particular attention has been paid to both the elements of continuity and transition, that is, to the processes of the emergence of the inventories and public languages used to publicize particular definitions of the situation, as well as to their later usage and development by the press.

However, the analysis which follows is not limited to the study of the particular languages and inventories in press representations of the marginals; more importantly, it constitutes an attempt to throw light on the question of how they are related to the reproduction of the hegemonic political culture of the society within which the former emerge. In other words, it attempts to link the 'text' of news coverage with the particular social-historical conditions, that is, the particular relations of power in which it is produced.

Thus, the analysis that follows will concentrate on the study of the particular narratives, structures of argument and, in some instances, syntactic structure of newspaper texts, in conjunction with the study of the social-historical conditions in which these are produced and employed. In this way, it is possible to treat the production of these texts as politically relevant, as an instance of the politics of signification, and thereby to discern the complex strategies of mobilization of meaning at work, and their links with processes of legitimation, delegitimation, and dehistoricization of forms and contexts of social action as well as of their actors.

The case studies

The analysis which follows will focus on four 'events' which attracted extensive press coverage and public interest. The first case study is based on the press coverage of a series of occupations of empty buildings in Athens and other cities by the marginals in November 1981. It seems to me that this particular case study is significant because the 'marginals' attempted to challenge the mainstream political organizations by resorting to a novel - for Greek society - form of collective action, and by addressing in a practical manner existing social problems such as those of homelessness, or the lack of cultural infrastructure, especially for young people. The issue of the occupations immediately became the focus of controversy as the local

authorities and residents of the areas concerned became 'vociferous participants in a war of statements with the squatters and sympathizers. The Athens newspapers provided an effective medium for the 'publication' of the debate and played a major role in the creation of public outcry against the occupiers by transforming a limited and localized event into 'national news' of high importance. The building occupations of 1981 were among the first extensively publicized events which brought the marginals to the foreground of public attention and were important in establishing the first definitions of the situation inventories and public languages in the pages of the Athens press.

The second case study is based on the press coverage of Operation Virtue - an ambitious policing operation for the cleaning up of Exarcheia in October 1984. Exarcheia, a central Athens borough which since the late 1970s had become a melting-pot in which leftist anarchist feminist and subcultural groups - including drug-users - co-existed' was the subject of public debate, especially as the government and the mainstream political parties perceived the presence of the marginals in the area as a pressing social problem. Indeed, several attempts had been made by the government to confront the marginals in the area through recourse of force intensification of policing, systematic persecution of political activists, or even ambitious special operations for the cleaning up' of the area) or by using the pretext of a

controversial urban planning intervention in the area, aiming at the 'restoration of balanced distribution of land uses' and providing for the limitation of practices which were associated with the presence of marginal groups in the area. It was in this climate of confrontation that 'Operation Virtue' was launched. The Athens press played a significant role by publicizing and amplifying particular 'definitions of the situation' and by employing strategies of signification which linked Exarcheia and the 'marginals' to the themes of drug-use and criminality, it represented them within the universe of public discourse as pressing social problems.

The press coverage of the occupation of the building of the department of Chemistry of the University of Athens (Chimeio) in May 1985 was the basis for the third case study. The occupation of Chimeio led to a prolonged siege of the surrounding area by police special forces, and to violent confrontation between the two parties. The press, almost unanimously, emphasized the lack of a strong state, able to confront effectively the 'marginal' occupiers. The Athens dailies mobilized fears of disruption and lawlessness in order to set in opposition the 'average' citizens/readers and the 'anti-social' 'marginals'.

Finally, the coverage of the events which followed the anti-nuclear demonstrations of May 1986 provided the material for the fourth case study. The police ban without any prior notice of two demonstrations against the use of nuclear power, organized by leftist, anarchist and ecological groups

and organizations, some days after the nuclear accident of Chernobyl, and police attacks against members of the organizing committees, led to incidents in the centre of Athens between anarchist demonstrators and the police. These events and their aftermath (i.e. the magistrate's hearings, and the trial of those arrested during the incidents) were covered by the press in detail. What is more, the press coverage of the events entered a second phase in which the incidents were treated as a mere manifestation of a much broader social problem, that of Exarcheia.

Occupations of Empty Buildings: 6 November 1981 -
13 January 1982.

On November 9, 1981 a group of mainly young people (anarchists, leftists, homeless, autonomists) occupied an empty, unused building in Valtetsiou Street, in the central Athens borough of Exarcheia. The participants in the occupation, which I shall be calling "occupiers", soon formed an occupation committee which issued statements regarding the reasons that led to this particular form of action and their plans about the use of the building. During the next few days one more occupation of an empty, unused building took place in the same street, while the committee said they were planning to renovate a third derelict building in the future, provided that there would be demand for housing and that the building's owner would not oppose to such action.

These occupations were followed by two more in the suburban area of Neo Irakleio, and in the Athens borough of Patissia, while on November 16, another building was occupied in the northern city of Thessaloniki. However, it should be pointed out that press coverage concentrated on the initial occupation in Exarcheia and, later, on the occupation of N. Irakleion, possibly because of the existence of rather vociferous opposition to them, by local residents in the former, and by local authorities in the latter.

The various committees which were formed in this series of building occupations, most of which were owned by the state or other public and charitable organizations stated that they had taken this kind of action in protest against the acute lack of housing and of spaces for social and cultural expression, and declared that they intended to repair and renovate the empty buildings and use them as housing space, and cultural centres for the promotion of free expression, which would be open to everyone.

After complaints by residents of the surrounding areas, the denouncement of the occupiers and of their actions by the major political parties' youth organizations, and their concerted condemnation by the majority of the press, the occupations came to an end on January 11, 1982 following a police operation during which special police forces entered the occupied buildings, expelled the occupiers and made several arrests.

The issue of the occupations immediately became the focus of controversy as the local authorities and residents of the areas concerned became a vociferous participant in a war of statements with the squatters and their sympathizers. Press performance has been highly significant, as Athens newspapers provided an effective medium for the "publication" of the debate, played a major role in the creation of public outcry against the occupiers and transformed a limited and localized event into "national news" of high importance.

It is important to note that the "novelty" of the phenomenon of the occupations and of squatting in Greece, after the initial surprize, generated controversy and guaranteed their prominent position in the news for a relatively long period.

At the same time, it appears that another important factor which influenced the way some newspapers covered the events, was the time at which the occupations took place. More precisely, as the first occupations took place just over 20 days after PASOK - a "newcomer" in modern Greek party politics characterized by a socialist rhetoric, and associated in the public feeling with the prospect of a more tolerant and democratic political practice than its conservative predecessors - took office, they were interpreted as a threat to the change of government by newspapers sympathetic to the new government which treated the events with caution and eventual hostility.

The majority of the press, regardless of political affiliation or orientation, treated the events, and more generally the issue of squatting, with hostility, emphasizing their novelty, "foreign origin", absurdity and anti-social character. As a climate of confrontation developed between the squatters and the residents of the areas concerned, generating a debate over the legitimacy or moral justification of the occupations, and the right of the local residents to demand the preservation of "normality" in their neighbourhoods, the press appears to have sided almost unanimously with the latter. The Athens dailies, immediately, or after a day of initial surprise that followed the occupations, became important participants in this public debate.

The coverage of the events occupied a prominent position throughout the period between November 1981 and January 1982. The newspapers that have been reviewed in that case are "Apogevmatini", "Eleutherotypia", "Ethnos", "Ta Nea", and "Vradini". The analysis that follows starts with the newspaper editions of November 9, 1981 and ends on January 14, 1982.

The common element among the newspapers reviewed, is their condemnation of the phenomenon of occupations, as well as of the groups that participated in them. The Athens newspapers, with the exception of "Eleftherotypia", represented the events in terms of a conflict between the

anti-social behaviour and way of life , "foreign" to Greek society, of the "vocal" minority versus the silent majority of "normal", law-abiding, hard-working citizens.

The press coverage of the occupations was very important and significant insofar as it comprized extensive reports of the events (an average of two pages per day) including several large size photographs and page 1 headlines and was marked by the emergence of specific techniques and styles of presentation of the events and of argumentation against the occupiers by each newspaper, which seem to be further elaborated and reemployed in future reporting of relevant events.

However, despite differences in emphasis and the emergence of specific styles of presentation, the majority of the newspapers reviewed (like the majority of the Athens dailies) seem to have adopted a variety of similar techniques which were directed towards the symbolic and ideological isolation and discrediting of the occupations as a form of acceptable action, and of the individuals and groups which participated in them.

Certain common signifying and symbolic strategies which were employed in order to discredit the occupiers. First, reports questioned, or rather rejected the occupiers' motivation and their justification of the occupations. Second, they mobilized and built upon public fears and social anxieties and, thus, cultivated collective phobias which

reinforced the "cultural lag" that already existed between the social majority and the occupiers.

The most prominent strategies that were used by the majority of the Athens dailies were intended to "undermine" the discourse of the occupiers. They were strategies aimed at questioning and denying any rational or moral, or rather, common sense, base in the discourse of the groups which participated in the occupations.

Thus, it can be shown that whenever the occupiers were able to gain access to the public discourse by issuing statements or giving interviews, their views and definitions were systematically represented in newspaper reports as partial, nonsensical, absurd and, therefore, delegitimated. This was quite obvious in the case of Ethnos, which adopted a hostile attitude against the occupiers and used a wide variety of discursive strategies in order to isolate and delegitimize their actions. In order to reinforce its rejection of the anarchists' actions it employed irony. It would appear that this introduction of irony into the text of the coverage of the events was intended to minimize the value of the "linguistic" or "symbolic capital" which the occupiers might possess. Thus Ethnos, doubted the alternative visions of anarchists and treated their declared goal, that is, an alternative way of life, as a sham: "the 200 anarchists who settled in it <the building> try to ... organize their lives" (November 11, 1981: 12) or "<the anarchists> sleep

and have fun" (p. 13). In the first case, the usage of ellipsis before the declared aim of the occupiers, that is, to organize their lives in their own way, is intended to express puzzlement and disbelief towards the anarchists and to stress the absurdity of their claim. In the second, the occupiers' motives were being questioned as the former were represented as persons motivated by "superficial" self-interest as their main preoccupation is sleep and enjoyment. The occupation was therefore not to be interpreted as an action of protest, or as an action with an alternative social proposal; it is simply an action of irresponsibility as it conflicts with "common sense" modes of behaviour.

"Vradyni" also attempted to doubt the sincerity of the occupiers' expressed motives, or their attempt to demonstrate their commitment and social responsibility through gestures, such as invitations to the press in order to explain their action, or their offer to help in repairs and renovations of empty buildings for the housing of more homeless people. This was mainly done through continuous use of explicit or implicit irony in its quotations of the occupiers' statements and its account of their activities. Thus on November 10, 1981 under the headline "The anarchists who occupied the uninhabited building ... <ellipsis in the original intended to express disbelief and irony> invite us in" the paper quoted a statement issued by the occupation committee:

" Anyone who would like to spend some time as a human being (?) <question mark in the original intended to express surprise, disbelief and irony> can come to the

building we have occupied.

.....
... while at the same time <the anarchists> make statements and declarations supporting the ... <ellipsis in the original intended to express disbelief and irony> homeless pointing out that:

* There are thousands of uninhabited buildings in very good condition. And it is unfair these houses that have been built by us (?) <question mark in the original intended to express surprise, disbelief and irony> for us, to remain unused when we need them.

And they conclude by saying (in Robin Hood style):

* We are ready to help in the occupation, repair and settlement in these houses by anyone who has a housing problem. "

(Vradyni, November 10, 1981: 5)

Throughout the coverage of the occupation the reporters of "Vradyni" systematically attempted to call into question any attempt by the anarchists to gain the moral high ground. The introduction of punctuation marks such as ellipses or question marks into quotations of statements issued by the occupiers and their slogans, constituted an indirect comment regarding the validity of the arguments, and the occupiers themselves. Thus, in the above quotation, the expressions "like a human being" and "houses that have been built by us for us" lost their significance as comments on alienation in modern societies, or on the asymmetrical relations of power and on the exploitation of workers by employers respectively, as the paper introduced question marks in them. In this way the expressions were presented as nonsense, as absurd enunciations which reveal the absurdity of the enunciators and of their actions in general. Similarly, the use of ellipsis before the word homeless, in the same article and

more generally throughout the paper's coverage of the occupations undermined the validity of the occupiers' claim that there was a problem of homelessness, and was therefore used in the context of a signification strategy aimed at divesting the discourse of the occupiers from any moral or rational basis. The same could be said about the use of the "Robin Hood" metaphor in the same text, as it also seems to have been a part of this strategy, as it appears to have been an ironic comment aimed at the occupiers' offer to help anyone in need of housing, thus doubting their real motives and intentions.

The occupiers stressed the housing problem and claimed that the issue of homelessness was one of the main reasons of their occupations, but most newspapers made efforts to keep the issue of homelessness out of the universe of public discourse, and of the political sphere by effectively denying its existence. There seems to have been a broad consensus among newspapers on the treatment of homelessness as a definitely non political issue; in some newspapers it was claimed that the problem of homelessness was merely fiction constructed by the occupiers in order to justify their actions, although it should be pointed out that the attitude of the press towards similar actions motivated by homelessness in western European cities was more tolerant, or even one of approval, as, it was alleged, the problem of homelessness was real and acute in these societies. What is more, even when homelessness was recognized as a problem, the

people who participated in the occupations, according to most newspapers, were not in need of housing, as they, allegedly, chose to leave their family houses. Thus, "Ethnos" condemned the occupations in an editorial on November 12, claiming that

"An acute housing problem - that could be the cause of arbitrary occupation of houses - does not exist in our country. ... Thus, one cannot accept the reason given by anyone who arbitrarily occupies houses, as in Valtetsiou Street and in Neo Irakleio. These 17-30 year-old young people, are not homeless, nor are they family-men tormented by adverse economic conditions, who are unable to house their families. On the contrary, they are children of families which have houses, and because of reasons that bear no relevance to the housing issue, leave their houses to live in communes ..."

(Ethnos, November 12, 1981: 6)

In conclusion, the occupations in Greece were condemned as an act of mimesis with no real causes, and the occupiers were denounced, as having no real housing problem - although no evidence was provided for this by the paper.

On November 10, 1981, TA NEA featured an extensive report on the issue of building occupations, in its regular column "The day's report", reserved for the most important events of the previous day. Under the headline "Occupation... Why? How the phenomenon of the occupation of a building in Exarcheia can be explained" the paper emphasized that the occupation was not a new phenomenon in Greek society but a simple imitation of the squatters in Western Europe.

"The action of the young people who occupied the

Valtetsiou Street building in Exarcheia four days ago is not original. A whole decade ago, in London groups of, mainly young, people started a series of building occupations. The same happened in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark ... (there are thousands of homeless people there)."

("TA NEA", 10 November 1981: 3)

Similarly, on November 12, the paper claimed that the occupiers who were "a bad imitation [sic] of the European 'squatters'", were not facing any prospect of homelessness:

"the overwhelming majority <of the occupiers> are not homeless. They are anticipating to assert themselves politically and socially in some way"

("Ta Nea", November 12, 1981: 5).

And on the same day, the analysis of "Ta Nea" concluded its extensive reportage by refusing to treat the occupations as a serious issue and suggesting that the occupiers had homes to return to:

"And the less attention one pays to them, the sooner they will return to their ... homes"

("Ta Nea", November 12, 1981: 5)

It would appear therefore that by denying any importance, or "newsworthiness" to the occupations, the paper effectively refused to introduce the issue into the public discourse as a serious issue of political significance.

"Vradyni" also tried to discredit the occupiers by refuting their claims, that is, by insisting that the "so-called" homeless occupiers were in reality, according to

the local residents, children of rich families who do not need to work as their parents provide them with money and housing, and, during the occupations with drugs and food! (December 15, 1981: 8) . Thus, they were represented as not politically or socially motivated but just as spoilt children of "bourgeois families" (cf. December 15: 8; also November 21: 5). Eleftherotypia was the only newspaper whose position on the issue was ambiguous; while on November 10, it recognized a linkage between the problem of homelessness and the occupations and carried a story on the impoverished and underdeveloped districts of Athens under the heading **"At the makeshift neighbourhoods of the plebeians. A life of terror, arrests, persecution"** which recognized that there was an actual and acute problem of homelessness. In the rest of its coverage the paper treated the phenomenon of the occupations as a mimetic act, as a poor imitation of the squatters' movement (cf. November 11, 1981: 11).

Another significant attempt to isolate and delegitimize the occupiers and their actions was made, mainly by newspapers sympathetic to the government, through their symbolic political marginalization and exclusion. "Eleftherotypia", "Ethnos" and "Ta Nea" treated the occupations with suspicion, remarking that actions of this sort constituted provocation to a three week old government, and might have been planned in order to achieve the destabilization of democratic life. "Ta Nea" argued that the occupiers, betting on the reluctance of the government -

which in the past had been a fierce critic of the authoritarian and control practices of the Greek state - to resort to violence, "felt free to disturb the area residents, obstruct traffic, and realize their own choices at the expense of the rights of the rest of the citizens" ("Ta Nea", November 12, 1981) while "Eleftherotypia" and "Ethnos" followed suit.

Further, on November 11, "Eleftherotypia" asked the youth political organizations of the major political parties to contribute to the debate on the issue of the occupations. The paper claimed that in the prevailing confusion over the issue, the voice of the political youth organizations would offer answers to the "young occupiers" (p. 11). Despite the political differences among them, the youth organizations denounced the occupations with remarkable unanimity. The reasons offered by most organizations were the "imported" character of the occupations, the fact that the occupiers did not really face any housing problem, the heterogeneity and the lack of any concrete political programme of the occupiers, while KNE, the youth organization of the Communist Party, expressed its suspicion of the concentration on issues related to the gay movement, to the conditions of prostitutes and to the occupations, at a time when the problems of the working people should be a priority. Similar statements were made to "Ta Nea" on January 14, 1982 in the context of a similar reportage. "Ethnos", on the other hand, accused the occupiers for their shallow ideology and lack of

any political and social programme, or proposals for the future (cf. November 10: 8), and aligned its position with those of the youth organizations. The representation of the occupiers as politically inadequate or even irrelevant by all three newspapers was also based on their refusal to associate themselves with one of the established political organizations. The alignment of press and youth political organizations could be interpreted in terms of what Elliott calls "political ritual" (Elliott 1980: 141-147) through which the unity of Greek youth, and the existing power relations within it, were reasserted in the context of their relation of opposition to the "occupiers", while the "political culture" of the latter, with its alternative and oppositional potential, unconventional political practices and virtually non-existent hierarchy, was marginalized and repressed.

The issue of the occupations was thus transformed from a potentially political one, highly pertinent to issues of public policies and political institutions, into the problem of a deviant, criminal and degrading practice.

As most newspapers did not leave any doubt as to the existence of a linkage between the European squatters' movements and the Greek occupations, and as there was general agreement on the certain failure of such forms of collective action, as the socioeconomic conditions in Greece were perceived to be considerably different from those in western

European societies and definitely did not warrant actions of this sort, the occupiers were effectively distinguished at the symbolic level from the rest of the "nation". Thus, most newspapers emphasized the "foreign" character of the occupations, and therefore, their unacceptability as a form of legitimate action,

"They used as their model the 'squatters' movement of some countries of the West and they attempt to propagate into our country a reality which has neither the dimensions - really huge - of the European models nor their motives.

("Ethnos", November 12, 1981: 6)

"Ta Nea" went even further and gave extensive publicity to parts of a rather xenophobic letter of complaint sent by residents of Exarcheia to the prime minister, which emphasized the "non Greek" and decadent character of such action:

"... The situation is very serious. Our patience has been exhausted. We believe that the ... Government has the courage and the power to confront such phenomena whose roots are in the decadent societies of the West and not in the proud history of our people ..."

("Ta Nea", November 10, 1981: 3)

It is clear that the logic of this nationalistic discourse entails the isolation, or rather, the effective exclusion of the occupiers from the "people" and the "nation". It should be pointed out that the qualifier "decadent", preceding "societies of the West", refers to both western societies and the occupiers, thus considerably

reducing the importance and the credibility of the latter. What is more, if we take into account the "anti-imperialistic" elements which were prominent in the discourses of Greek nationalism during that period 7 we possibly have some insight as far as representations of the occupiers within the context of this nationalistic discourse are concerned; the occupiers are perceived as one more example of cultural imperialism, an attempt to erode the Greek way of life.

At the same time, a parallel process of exclusion was in progress as the occupiers were represented as "different" from the rest of society in non-nationalistic terms. This construction of difference occurred through the particular ways in which the occupiers were represented in the press coverage. Although most of the images constructed are not easily distinguishable and in many cases could be considered as overlapping, we attempt to categorize them on the basis of the predominance of symbols of social decadence, bad appearance, disease or "abnormality".

In several reports of the events, "Vradyni" attempted to represent the occupiers as "decadent" by bringing to the foreground the issue of the occupiers' attitude to work. Building upon the declared opposition of the anarchists to "paid work" in their statements, interviews and graffiti, the paper ignored the fact that this antipathy referred specifically to "paid work" as a form of economic

exploitation, and attempted to generalize it; work as an important and respectable social activity, and the occupiers' attitude towards it became a prominent pet-theme of the paper. Thus the paper reporters represented the occupiers as idle and lazy persons who loathed work of any kind. The discrepancy which occurred when occupiers stated that they intended to work, and were seen to work in renovating the occupied buildings, was simply ignored. Work which would usually be considered as a positive activity was transformed into a negative one by the paper:

"The groups of anarchists have been working intensively, (although of course they loathe work and as <work> is ideologically incompatible with them) cleaning the rooms of the buildings they have occupied"

(I Vradyni, November 10, 1981: 5)

"Vradyni" drawing upon the centrality of "work" in the worldview of its mainly conservative traditional petty bourgeois readership, took every opportunity to exploit the themes of idleness and laziness in order to emphasize the irreconcilable difference between society and the occupiers. Thus, on November 13, the paper stressed with obvious revulsion the fact that some occupiers were sleeping at 3.00 pm., a time normally dedicated to work:

"... <a> long-haired and dirty occupier of villa 'Stella' who was not allowing us to enter - at three o'clock in the afternoon - 'because the girls are sleeping' (since last night)!"

("Vradyni", November 13, 1981: 5)

or on November 21, the caption of a photograph of an occupation committee meeting, stated:

"The anarchists are in conference. It is the only kind of 'work' they will do".

("Vradyni", November 21, 1981: 5)

What is more, "Vradyni" systematically used images representing the occupiers as dirty, long-haired, rude, posing a danger to public health and morality, drug-addicts, homosexuals, criminals, indulging in sex orgies, drug pushers and "inciting to homosexual behaviour" throughout the period under review. For example, characteristic of the compulsive use of pejorative qualifiers of the word "anarchist" was the heading of an interview which appeared on November 21: **"INTERVIEW WITH AN ANARCHIST, Dirty, aggressive, rude"** where the reporter seems to have felt compelled to give details about the appearance and behaviour of the interviewee in the headline. These qualifiers, being open to a multitude of negative significations of difference, revolt, deviance, criminality, disease, immorality, or abnormality, provided ample ground for an effective representation of the occupiers as the "threatening Other".

This construction of the "threatening Other" became clearer as the papers emphasized the physical and moral dangers of the "anti-social activities" of the occupiers, that is, the disruption of everyday life, and the negative influence of their alleged sexual and drug abuses upon the local residents' children. Reports represented the occupiers

as a threat to society that had to be removed:

"Dirt competes with recklessness and the use of drugs, and the transformation of those four houses into pigsties creates infestation of disease, physical and moral, a real gangrene which the ministry <of public security> refuses to confront ..."

("Vradyni", November 12, 1981: 1)

The medical metaphors, of infestation of disease and gangrene, appear to be suggesting both the urgency and the necessity for remedial action; while the reference to gangrene could also be perceived to constitute an implicit but also clear call for decisive action, as the usual remedy for it is amputation.

Similarly, "Ethnos" represented the occupiers as drug-users, provocative, vulgar, lazy and arrogant (cf. November 12-14), while "Ta Nea", apart from using a similar vocabulary (cf. November 12-14, January 13-14), emphasized that the occupiers were

"persons who face unresolved family, social, psychological and personal problems"

("Ta Nea", November 12, 1981: 5)

adding in this way "psychopathological" elements in their representation, and thus observing the social dimension of the occupations under the guise of an individualistic-psychologicistic explanatory schema .

Another prominent way of representing the occupiers was introduced by "Apogevmatini" on November 10 when, in an

oversize page 1 headline it represented the occupations in terms of a state:

**"The anarchists are founding
THEIR OWN STATE IN Exarcheia"**

while in the reportage that followed frequent references were made to the "state of Exarcheia" and its "expansion" through further occupations of other buildings. The usage of terms related to state, territory and boundaries continued throughout the coverage of the occupations, until January 13, 1982, the day it reported that the occupiers were expelled from the buildings by the police. In that day's reportage, "Apogevmatini" referred to the action of the occupation, and to the occupiers by using the words "invasion" and "invaders" respectively, while it characterized the police operation as "liberation" of the buildings (January 13, 1982: 1).

"Apogevmatini" was soon followed by "Ethnos" which, between November 11 and 14, compared the occupied buildings with "the state of the anarchists". On November 11, under the headline

"The anarchists founded a state of 10 rooms ..."

the paper carried a report in which relevant references were abundant. Thus, one could read that the occupiers wanted "to continue with new occupations and to expand its <=the state's> 'territory' beyond the area of Exarcheia" (p. 12), while the caption of a photograph informed the reader that bedrooms constituted a large part of the anarchist territory.

It could be argued that the two papers, by introducing metaphors of territory and statehood, achieved the "territorialization" of the "anarchist threat" and brought to the foreground the issue of "sovereignty" regarding the occupied buildings. They emphasized the loss of control and jurisdiction over the occupied properties by the legal owners and the police. Therefore the issues of law and order and of the restoration of legality, which had been suspended by the action of the occupiers were tacitly introduced to public debate through this process of symbolization. It should be pointed out that just after the expulsion of the occupiers from the buildings, "Apogevmatini" used the metaphor of "liberation", that is, of restoration of the jurisdiction of the police, and, eventually, of the legal owner. "Ethnos" on the other hand, referred to the possibility of further occupations using the expression "territorial expansion" which in fact exaggerated the "threat" which the occupations represented.

These strategies of representation of the occupiers were in fact simultaneously strategies of representation of "the society", and they provided the readership of the Athens dailies with schemata for interpretation of the events. These processes were most clearly epitomized approximately one month after the first occupation in the introduction of a retrospective reportage in "Vradyni", under the heading

"Occupations: First Month"

"With pockets full of ... bourgeois pocket-money from daddy, with stomach full of filet mignon and brains empty as a result of the side-effects of heroin. They do not represent any ideology. Not even - if you wish - that of anarchism. They are simply a pityful congregation of drug-addicts, homosexuals and criminals, whose presence threatens even ... the Public Health. They break the law and totally disregard the most essential human rights ..."

("Vradyni", December 15, 1981: 8)

The text included not only references to drug-addiction, homosexuality, criminality but also to their cause - according to the paper - that is, their bourgeois background and its degrading effect. It could be argued that "Vradyni" attempted to demarcate its own - traditional petty bourgeois - version of "popular" identity by excluding from the "people" both the occupiers and the bourgeoisie which is considered to be equally immoral and responsible for the situation. This form of populism became more obvious as "Vradyni", denouncing the reluctance of the police to intervene, emphasized throughout its coverage the right of the "enraged and disillusioned citizens" to intervene themselves, using force, and to re-establish order, despite the illegality -recognized by the paper- of such acts (December 15, 1981: 8). It is obvious that the order that the paper refers to, is not the 'legal' order but rather the 'moral' order which had been violated by the profound disrespect of the occupiers towards simple "family people", "small-shop owners" and "working people". It should be pointed out that references to the torment of "hundreds of

families", the "family man" or the "small shop owner" were abundant in the coverage of most newspapers, although no explicit reference was made to the possibility of "violent citizen reaction" by other newspapers.

The construction of the "decent people" through their subjection to the "abuse" of the "anarchists" and their provocative behaviour was quite clear in a passionate introduction to an extensive reportage of "Vradyni" on November 21:

"'HOMELESS', 'Autonomous groups', 'Anarchists', 'Tramps', 'Provocators'. Which of these 'labels' - <given> by the government, the Press and the Public Opinion - were [sic] the two-fronted hordes of youngsters who rushed to occupy the buildings of Valtetsiou Street and the villa of Neo Irakleio? Who are those 'children' which look at you from their stand of irony? Which mock your 'subjection' to the social authorities? Which criticize your 'consumerist frenzy'? Who burst out laughing at your ironed trousers?"

("Vradyni", November 21: 5)

Here, the reader is effectively interpellated, is invited to assume the identity of "the victim" of the occupiers. While the press had previously emphasized the local problems created by the occupations, that is, the tension and conflict between the occupiers and the local residents, or had represented the anarchists as challenging abstract, social norms, the series of connotations which are employed in this news article personalizes and transfers the experience of the victim to the reader him/herself. What is more, the reader is interpellated in his/her multiple

identities; he/she is identified as law-abiding citizen ("subjected" to the social authorities), as consumer ("consumerist frenzy"), as respectable person (ironed trousers) and more importantly as victimized, as the object of irony, mockery, criticism and ridicule. The first three identifications which are socially sanctioned and respectable, represent and reinforce the established social order, while the fourth, that is, that of the reader as victim, gives rise to perceptions of the occupiers as a threat to that order, and consequently to the reader who is inextricably linked with it at the symbolic level.

Operation "Virtue" in Exarcheia; October 1984

On the 27th of September 1984 the Athens police directorate launched a controversial operation, which became widely known as 'Operation Virtue', for the 'cleaning up' of Exarcheia square. The reasons which led the leadership of the Athens police to launch the operation were allegedly the complaints of residents and traders of the area about the presence of persons with 'antisocial' and 'provocative behaviour'.^e

The operation, consisting of the stationing of strong police forces in the area, intense policing of the square and frequent identity card checks resulted in minor incidents between September 27 and October 1. However, during the night of October 1, the operation was stepped up when the police

blocked the streets around the square, entered theatres and shops checking identity cards and making arrests, using indiscriminate force.

The incidents of that night attracted the interest of the Athens press throughout the next few days, until October 6, when the police director Mr M. Bosinakis promised to committees representing the residents of the area that he would withdraw his men, thus bringing to an end that phase of what was to turn into a lengthy and complex effort to eradicate or at least contain possible milieux of social dissent.

The newspapers which have been used in the analysis that follows are, "Apogevmatini", "Avriani", "Eleftherotypia", "Ethnos", "Ta Nea" and "To Vima".

Analysis of the texts reveals two main lines of interpretation of the incidents. On the one hand the 'popular' dailies, that is, "Apogevmatini", "Avriani" and "Ethnos" appear to employ techniques which emphasize the theme of violence and evoke a sense of horror and chaos and, at the same time, put special emphasis on the responsibility of 'anarchists' and/or 'punks' for the 'fights' or 'clashes' between them and the police.

On the other hand, "Eleftherotypia", "Ta Nea" and "To Vima", while exploiting the themes of violence, chaos and horror, appear to concentrate on the denunciation of police

behaviour and brutality during the incidents. It should however be pointed out that this distinction between the more 'popular' former three papers and the more 'serious' latter might be misleading, as in contrast to "Eleftherotypia", "Ta Nea" and "To Vima" adopted the government and police definition and treatment of Exarcheia as a problem area, and generally attempted to represent the issue of Exarcheia, and especially of the presence of 'marginal' groups there, as a "social problem", thus introducing it into public discussion in these terms. "Eleftherotypia" on the other hand appeared to be emphasizing the tactics and methods of the police and, on occasions, to question the official definitions of the events.

In the case of "Apogevmatini", "Avriani" and "Ethnos", headlines such as **"Brutal beating in Exarcheia"** (Ethnos, 2-10-1984), **"Night of terror in Exarcheia. With bombs, injuries and arrests"** (Apogevmatini, 3-10-1984), **"Scenes of violence in the streets"** (Apogevmatini, 4-10-1984), **"Fear and terror in Exarcheia"** (Avriani, 2-10-1984), **"Exarcheia once more in a state of chaos yesterday"** (Avriani, 3-10-1984) occupied a prominent place in the coverage of the events that took place during "Operation Virtue" by these newspapers. It could be argued that these headlines by drawing upon a negatively charged vocabulary and imagery of lawlessness and lack of order, were intended to target a readership which would identify emotionally with those who appeared to be suffering. This is especially so,

because in addition to the reference to tormented "residents" and "shop-owners", which is present in all these newspapers, there are specific references to figures which are very familiar and dear to the average Greek, that is "family-men" who are unable to provide for their families (Ethnos, 3-10-1984), "terrified widows", "old people" and "children" who cannot go out and play because of the terrorism of certain "criminal elements" (Avriani, 2-10-1984). By identifying the 'victims' of the 'marginals'' violence with categories of the population which, in the 'petty-bourgeois' or 'popular' imagination, are regarded as respectable, hard working people (shop-owners, family-men striving to provide for their families), or as being in need of social protection and help (widows, elderly people and children) the papers mobilize 'popular' disapproval and condemnation of the 'marginals'' breaking of these social norms. As the readership becomes increasingly concerned - and apart from the favourable consequences this entails as far as the newspapers' circulation is concerned - the ground is prepared for pinpointing the culprits and holding them responsible.

The process of "pointing the finger" at those who should be held responsible and, ultimately, confronted, is not identical in all of these newspapers and can range from a relatively straightforward to a more complex process. In the case of "Apogevmatini" this task seems to be quite straightforward as the group which is directly blamed

throughout the coverage of the events is the "anarchists" -with the exception of a single reference to "anarchists and punks" in its October 4 edition. According to the headline of October 2, **"Exarcheia was agitated during the night by the anarchists"**, while, one day later (October 3) under the headline **"Night of terror in Exarcheia. With bombs, injuries, beatings and unrest"** appeared the following text:

"Terror throughout the night in Exarcheia. Anarchists and policemen were engaged in a guerilla war with "Molotov" bombs, wood-sticks and stones..."

While, on October 4, according to "Apogevmatini",

"The anarchists 'kept' the centre of Athens for 3 hours. IN THE TRIAL OF THE 18 ARRESTED IN Exarcheia"

Further, in the text which followed under this headline, the details of the way in which the 18 arrested were brought to court ("they were led two by two, with strong police escort and handcuffed") and the exhaustive list of the charges they faced can be seen as a means to assert the poor quality of the character of these persons, demeaning them, and making them fit the paper's stereotype of the criminal.

Taking a further step in discrediting, indirectly, the accused, and their possible sympathizers, "Apogevmatini",

described the sympathizers who gathered at the court to support the accused in terms of their "unacceptable" behaviour:

"Around two hundred and fifty friends of the accused, who had gathered at the courtyard of the court and 50-60 more inside the hall of the magistrates court, started to disapprove and to abuse verbally the lawyers, the State, Justice and the Government."

It could be argued that in the case of "Apogevmatini", a sizeable conservative paper which at the time appeared to have no aspirations to attract its readership from outside its traditional, mainly conservative political camp, the use of complex processes of representation aiming at the ultimate discrediting and/or criminalization of the "marginals" is not necessary as, from the point of view of the paper's conservative readership, their selection as the undisputed object of fear, and the "a priori" certainty of their link with terror and the destruction of law and order, is "natural".⁹

"Avriani" and "Ethnos", on the other hand appear to employ more intricate methods of condensation of images and themes in their effort not only to identify those who had been "responsible" for the incidents in Exarcheia, but also, and more importantly, to "define" the "anti-social" or, even "extra-social enemy". For example, an article which appeared in "Avriani" on October 2, 1984, that is, in its first edition after the events in Exarcheia square under the

characteristic headline "AFTER THE ANARCHISTS AND DRUG-ADDICTS THE "PUNKS" ESTABLISHED THEIR OWN KINGDOM. Fear and terror in Exarcheia!" focused on the problems which the residents of the area faced because of the "punks" who gathered in the square:

"Wherever they happen to be, the punks spread terror, fear and panic to the residents of Exarcheia. The disturbances and clashes they cause in the area <are> an everyday occurrence, while, in a state of panic, the residents see the police remaining aloof and passive, facing the terrorism and anarchy of these peculiar people. The 'punks' have created their own terroristic kingdom in which the area residents are treated as outsiders, or <are tolerated insofar as> they <=the punks> can take money from them by strongly requesting it. ..."

In the subsequent paragraphs of the text, emphasis is put on the "antisocial behaviour" and appearance of "those peculiar people". The list that follows, although it is far from being exhaustive, is characteristic; "they annoy everybody, old people, children", "they ask people for money", "they swear", "they cause disturbances", "they fight", "they are closed in their own society, and do not contact or communicate with us. They live in their own world", "they light fires in the square, break bottles, street lamps, they cause damage", "they take their clothes off, they strip themselves", "they are revolting and have awful appearances", "their appearance annoys us, they are dirty, badly dressed, sickly".

From the abundant examples of selective overwording and repetitions throughout the article, it is quite clear that

the newspaper attempts to amplify characteristics of the lifestyles, behaviour and appearance of the 'marginals' which contrast sharply with the socially acceptable. Thus, we can detect the unfolding of processes of symbolic exclusion, of creation of press stereotypes ranging from those in which the 'marginals' are represented as "strange" in terms of appearance and behaviour, to stereotypes of which the 'otherness' of the 'marginals' is a prominent feature. Throughout the text, emphasis is placed upon the lack of interaction between them and the rest of the society ('they are closed in their own society, and do not contact or communicate with us', 'they live in their own world'), in an apparent attempt to stress, not only the difference, but also the 'otherness' of the 'marginals'. Viewed as anti-social and extra-social, these 'foreign' elements are constructed and situated in a relation of confrontation with society, its laws, morality and work ethic.

By reinforcing the impressions of confrontation and imminent threat, and thereby mobilizing fears and generating public disquiet, the article plays a significant part in the creation of a generalized moral panic. This is further reinforced by the presentation of a series of interview extracts from people with whom the average reader could identify or sympathize, such as residents, shop-owners, or a widow with two children (in capital letters in the original text). There are good reasons to question the authenticity of these interviews and the objectivity of the newspaper as

most of the interviewees are not named, and only small parts of the "actual" interviews find their way into the text.

It could therefore be argued that the Avriani article of 2 October 1984, which is not a mere account of events, but appears in the form of an investigation on the problems of the area of Exarcheia, and is therefore endowed with a quasi-scientific authority, constitutes an attempt not only to identify the problem(s) but also to construct the image of an enemy which threatens society, its norms and values.

This effort is best illustrated in the references to the successive "establishing of kingdoms" by "anarchists", "drug-addicts" and, most recently, "the punks". The use of the term "kingdom", in fact refers to the establishment of an independent unit, with set boundaries, its own internal organization and power, its own laws, its own identity. In other words, the territorialization of the "problem", or the "enemy", which appeared for the first time during the house occupations of 1981-82 and became a persistent feature in relevant news-reporting, gives to it a material dimension which in fact makes the preservation of its image in public consciousness more certain and durable. Further, it gives the impression of an enemy which is not simply anti-social, but also situated outside society, an extra-social enemy. The emphasis on the "succession" of Kingdoms could be interpreted as a suggestion of the existence of a long tradition of "anti-social" or "extra-social" subjects with "terroristic"

and "anarchistic" practices and deviant behaviour. Thus, a myth of Exarcheia as a "melting-pot" of counter cultures, anti-social and extra-social cultures and elements emerges, while, precisely because of this "syncretism" the identity of the perceived "danger" becomes blurred. This "confusion" surrounding the actual identity of the "rulers" of the kingdom(s) of Exarcheia is not restricted to this article alone; it can be found throughout the coverage of the incidents in the following days. That is exactly what the headline of October 3 indicates ("The torment of the shopkeepers and of the local residents by the Anarchists is continued") and the adoption and endorsement of the statement which the Athens Police director mr. M. Bosinakis made to "Avriani" which refers to the continuation of "the confrontation of the whole situation ... up to the point that the area is cleaned up from the drug-addicts and the other criminal elements". The use of terms such as "anarchists", "drug-addicts" and "criminal elements" interchangeably in the effort to identify the "problem" and to "define" the target of the whole police operation, shows the extent to which the "identity" of the "enemy" remains unspecified.

Avriani appears to be treating the events in Exarcheia as pathological symptoms, a social disease which must be cured urgently. Suggestions for alternative remedies could be traced in the selective presentation of parts of the statement issued by the under-secretary for Youth and Sport mr K. Laliotis which emphasize the need for the adoption of

the policies of his ministry "policies of action and not of words which ... offers another model of way of life" (Avriani, 4-10-1984). The newspaper, by referring to a specific part of mr. Laliotis's statement, in which the "violence and terrorism not of all young people, but of small and isolated groups" is denounced, is in fact indirectly accepting the under-secretary's attempt to identify the government and the mainstream political parties with the majority of the society and to sanction the political and cultural practices of the political party youth organizations, and to reject completely the way of life of those groups which are not integrated into the conventional, party-controlled political sphere. Thus, "Avriani" appears to endorse the policies of the ministry and of the party youth organizations as the "cure" for the problem. Another suggestion finds its way into the newspaper and is endorsed rather more strongly and dramatically on October 2, when part of an interview given by an unnamed interviewee with the initials "mr. G. M.", was published, along with the reporters' conclusions:

" <G.M.:> 'The ministry of Social Services should send some social workers to talk with the kids. Maybe the situation could be cured'.
<Reporters:> 'So those in charge should take measures before the terrorism of the punks worsens' "

and a few lines below:

" 'Before we reach the point of no return a solution must be found' "

(Reporters: S. Askeli, A. Lourandou)

In this passage, deviation from the social norms is perceived as a social or even psychological illness which should be urgently cured before it becomes uncontrollable. It is very characteristic that the people who are seen as suitable providers of the treatment are employees of the ministry of Health and Social Services.¹⁰ It is apparent that the paper's emphasis on terms related to pathology, which evoke images of abnormality, and implicit references to the healthy society being in danger from the 'marginals' who are in need of a cure, are instances of strategies of representation of the 'marginals' as persons with reduced social competence, and credibility, or as a 'problem' to be solved through the recourse to some kind of 'treatment' offered by psychologists and social workers. This attempt to discredit the 'marginals' has among other things important political consequences as far as the citizenship and the civic competence of these and other dissenting minorities is concerned.

The coverage of the incidents by "Ethnos" bears several similarities with that of "Avriani". As in the case of Avriani, Ethnos appears to be engaged in a complex process of defining the source of the "problem" which led to the events in Exarcheia. This is achieved by piecing together a multitude of diverse elements which are traced in various interviews, "authoritative" statements by prominent police

and government figures given editorial prominence by the paper and several photographs appearing in its pages.

A prominent feature throughout the coverage of the events is the use of terms such as "anarchists", "punks", "criminal elements", "suspicious persons", and "drug-addicts", almost interchangeably and in a rather imprecise way. This use of these terms by "Ethnos" instead of the term 'marginals', or any other term for that matter, facilitates processes of convergence between various themes and images which occur throughout the coverage. Drug addiction and criminal behaviour are introduced into the paper's inventory for the description of the 'marginals'.

In this way, on October 2, we read:

"Brutal beating was exchanged yesterday night in Exarcheia when strong police forces clashed with anarchists and 'punks' "

The effect of putting two rather distinct groups, anarchists and punks, as united in their opposition towards a second actor, namely the police, brings closer the possibility of a convergence, or of condensation of their rather distinct identities.

A similar process seems to develop as the reporter tries to explain the target and the rationale of "Operation Virtue":

It <=the area> will be cleaned up

THE TARGET is the 'punks' who gather and create

problems, and also the ... long-haired <persons> of every kind. The statement made by the police director mr. M. Bosinakis is characteristic: 'The operations will continue. The area must be cleaned of the criminals and the antisocial elements who have invaded it and for that to be achieved there is not any other way'

In this way the borderline between the "punks" and "long-haired persons" becomes unclear; similarly, by adopting the statement of police director M. Bosinakis, more "qualifiers" become available for the definition of the already existing actors. A final convergence takes place in this passage when the reason for the police operations is specified: the "invasion" of the area provides the catalyst which bonds together punks, anarchists, long-haired, criminals and antisocial elements as they now have something in common; they are a foreign body infesting the area which must be uprooted.

The stock of attributes which can be attached to this "foreign body" is enriched over the following days in more or less the same way. More precisely, on October 3, specific emphasis is put on the "strange character" of the "characters" of the square which "terrorize" the local residents as the headlines indicate:

**TERROR IN Exarcheia FOR THE REPRISALS OF THE
'STRANGE' CHARACTERS IN THE SQUARE.**

This "strange character" becomes enriched in the course of the reportage that follows as the "characters" are described as "idle persons and other characters" by the reporter

herself, or as "drug addicts, burglars and other suspicious persons", according to the minister of Public Order whose statement seems to share many of the reporter's concern.

The appearance of the young people who frequent Exarcheia Square becomes the object of scrutiny and provides raw material for the construction of a negative image. Crucial in this respect are the photographs and their ironic captions which complement the text of the reportage of October 3. In these photographs, various clothing accessories or specific ways in which people are dressed, hairstyles, or even a small pet are used as the basis for ironic and disapproving comments which cast doubt to the integrity, credibility and seriousness of the people featured in them.

For example, one of the photographs (Illustration 14) features a young girl which according to the reporter is 'sympathetic towards the marginals'. The caption underneath does not contain any information related to the incidents of the previous days; it rather contains a highly selective 'description' of the girl, apparently linking her appearance with her ideas: "The girl with the jacket on her shoulder. She did not tell us her name, she was sympathetic towards the marginals". The paper attempts to discredit the girl by drawing attention to her 'unacceptable' or 'undignified' appearance, and by extension, the 'marginals' in general.

It is therefore emphasized that the girl in the photograph is carrying her jacket on her shoulder, a 'deviance in dress'

worthy of attention. This description serves as a visual and verbal reminder of the unacceptability of breaking the dress code, and possibly attempts to link the appearance of the girl with the dress code of the 'manges', a sub-cultural group of the past which was also excluded from mainstream social life.¹¹ This symbolic isolation of the particular individual from the rest of society is subsequently generalized and applied to the 'marginals' through the connection between the former and the latter: "she was sympathetic towards the marginals". Similar emphasis on the deviance in 'appearance' is placed in the captions of three other photographs. Under the first (Illustration 15), featuring a young Punk, the caption focuses on his 'peculiar' belt with studs, and his boots, under the second (Illustration 16, featuring a young man with a cat on his shoulder, the caption reads "The ... animal-lover of the Square", while under the third (Illustration 17), featuring another young man, the paper makes ironic comments on his hairstyle: "Haircut ... indian-style". It is quite clear that the "Ethnos" article of October 3, 1984, implicitly contrasted the dress and hairstyles of the "marginals" with the "normal" dress codes. The "marginals" were represented as provocatively dressed as aspects of their dress and hairstyle which did not conform to the middle and working class codes (relatively plain clothes and short, combed hair) were emphasized and commented upon. The paper's ironic comment on these selected photographs has a potentially double effect:


First, it creates and amplifies impressions of difference, of non-belonging to the rest of "respectable" society, images of "abnormality" which are presented as both unacceptable and hilarious and second, it facilitates the severance of any possible channel of communication between the 'marginals' and the rest of the society. Thus, boots and belts with studs, haircut which the reporter describes as "indian-style" are not only taken to be silly, strange, unacceptable, abnormal, or different, but also discredit the 'marginals' and renders their opinions and voices (when interviewed) insignificant and ineffective.

"Eleftherotypia", "Ta Nea" and "To Vima" approach the events in a rather different mannner. While they, too, exploit the themes of violence and chaos as their headlines indicate - "In quarantine for a fistful of punks" ("Eleftherotypia", 2-10-84), "Exarcheia are 'free'" ("Ta Nea", 6-10-84), "The war of Exarcheia; 18 in handcufs and grave charges" ("Eleftherotypia, 3-10-84)- they do not do so to the extent of "Apogevmatini", "Avriani"and "Ethnos". What is more, they seem to share a concern about the attitude of the police, their "unacceptable" behaviour and indiscriminate action against innocent people.

Thus, in an editorial appearing on October 3, titled "Antisocial police..." the editors of "Ta Nea", argue:

"If then, the police is not an instrument for the

φοβόμαστε...



Μία υπομένη έξω από το Αμκασσάντερ.

Σκουλαρικής : δα ξεκαθαρίσει

ΠΟΛΛΑ παράπονα έγιναν στο Υπουργείο Δημόσιας Τάξης από συλλόγους, οργανώσεις και μεμονωμένα άτομα για την κατάσταση που επικρατεί στην περιοχή των Εξαρχείων και τα σοβαρά προβλήματα που δημιουργούν οι αργόσχολοι και άλλοι τυπικοί που συγχύζουν εκεί.

Όπως δήλωσε ο υπουργός Δημόσιας Τάξης κ. Γιάννης Σκουλαρικής, οι εξορμήσεις της Αστυνομίας γίνονται για να ξεκαθαρίσει η περιοχή από τα ύποπτα άτομα.

Επειδή ακόμη ο υπουργός ότι οι παραπονούμενοι και κυρίως οι οικογενειάρχες της περιοχής λένε ότι δεν μπορούν να βγουν από τα σπίτια τους, επειδή η γειτονιά εκεί είναι γεμάτη ναρκομανών, διαρρηκτών και άλλων ύποπτων ατόμων.

Ο αστυνομικός διευθυντής Αθήνας, πρόσθεσε ο κ. Σκουλαρικής, πήρε αυτά τα μέτρα και πιστεύει ότι θα ξεκαθαρίσει την περιοχή.

ΤΕΛΟΣ, ο υπουργός αναφέρθηκε και σ' ένα ακόμη υπόμνημα που του υποβλήθηκε πριν από το Δήμο Νέας Φιλαδέλφειας.

Με το υπόμνημα αυτό επισμαίνεται η αφόρητη κατάσταση που δημιουργείται κάθε βράδυ από τους καμικάζι που κάνουν σουζές, κόντρες και γενικά επικίνδυνους ελιγμούς. Δόθηκε εντολή από τον υπουργό στο διευθυντή Αστυνομίας Πόλεων της Πρωτεύουσας, ταξάρχη κ. Γιάννη Σταύρακα να εξετάσει το θέμα και να βρει κάποια λύση, ώστε γ' αλλαγή η περιοχή από τους καμικάζι.



Αυτό είναι το κάμαρο τρίγωνο της Πλατιάς, όπου συγκαταρτώνονται όλοι οι περιθωριακοί.


Illustration 14

Η κοπέλα με την καμπαρντίνα στον αίμο. Δεν μας είπε το όνομά της, συμπάθουσα τους περιθωριακούς.

Illustration 14

ΤΡΟΜΟΣ ΣΤΑ ΕΞΑΡΧΕΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΑ ΑΝΤΙΠΟ

Δεν μιλάμε, το



της Μελίως. Ζώνη με καρφία και μπότες.

Της ΚΑΡΙΝΑΣ ΛΑΜΨΑ

ΤΡΟΜΟΚΡΑΤΗΜΕΝΑ ήταν χτες τα Εξάρχεια, ύστερα από τα επεισόδια που έγιναν το βράδυ της Δευτέρας. Ιδιαίτερα φοβισμένοι ήταν οι καταστηματάρχες της περιοχής, που διαμαρτύρονται για τις ζημιές που παθαίνουν τα μαγαζιά τους, ενώ από την πλευρά τους οι πανκ αρνούνται τις κατηγορίες.

«Δεν μπορούμε πια να δουλέψουμε», λένε οι μαγαζάτορες. «Για μας η παρουσία αυτών των ανθρώπων στην πλατεία είναι σκέτη καταστροφή. Χτες, αναγκαστήκαμε να κλείσουμε όλοι από τις 11.30 το βράδυ».

— Τι ακριβώς συνέβη;

«Αυτό που συμβαίνει κάθε μέρα. Αρχίζουν να πίνουν ούζο από το πρωί... Σ' αυτή την πλατεία γίνονται πράματα που κανείς δεν τα φαντάζεται...».

— Γιατί φοβάστε να μιλήσετε επώνυμα;

«Αστειώμαστε; Έχουμε μαγαζιά εδώ και δεν διακινδυνεύουμε να τα βρούμε καμένα. Αρκετές ζημιές έγιναν χτες που γυρίσαμε και βρήκαμε τα τραπέζια μας σπασμένα. Και το πρωί, βρήκα πάντα κάποιον απ' αυτούς να κοιμάται στις καρέκλες μου. Το μίσω να μιλήσω».

Μια άλλη γυναίκα, που κρατάει με τον άντρα της κάποιο μαγαζί τροφίμων, λέει:

«Είδα χτες αυτά που έγιναν. Τι να σας πω; Όταν έρχονται εδώ να φανθούν, πληρώνουν... Αλλά εκεί που καθόταν, δημιουργούν πρόβλημα, ιδιαίτερα για τους γέροντες...».

Εκάνει έχουμε συνάντηση ανθρώπους τόσο τρομοκρατημένους.

«Δεν μπορώ να το κάνω αυτό», μας είπε κατηγορηματικά ένας νεαρός, όταν του ζητήσαμε να βγάλουμε μια φωτογραφία της πλατείας από τη βεράντα του. «Κι αν καταλάβουν από ποια άποψη είναι τραβηγμένη η φωτογραφία και βρουν το σπίτι μας».

— Μα φοβάστε τόσο;

«Βέβαια φοβόμαστε...».

«Μόνο τέτοια ώρα μπορώ να κάτσω εδώ», λέει μια γυναίκα που κάθεται στο καγκιτάκι και κλέβει.

«Υπάρχει μεγάλο πρόβλημα. Καλά έκανε η Αστυνομία. Δεν σας άνω όμως το όνομά μου, γιατί είμαι από χωριό κι αν όλα η οικογένειά μου που ζει, θα τρομάξει...».

Να φύγουν...

ΑΝΤΙΘΕΤΑ, η κ. Κατερίνα Τριανταφύλλου έχει το θάρρος της γνώμης της: «Πρέπει οπωσδήποτε να ληφθούν μέτρα και να φύγουν από την πλατεία... Είναι πολύ προκλητικοί και η ζωή μας έχει γίνει μαρτύριο. Αφού, να φανταστείτε, μας χτυπάνε το βράδυ τα κουδούνια, για να πάνε στην τουαλέτα».

● **«ΓΙΑ ΜΕΝΑ** η επίθεση της Αστυνομίας ήταν οδικοπολιτική», λέει ο κ. Αντώνης Νικολόπουλος. «Για 4-5 πανκ έρχονται εδώ τρεις κλοβές και αναστατώνουν τη γατοναία. Κι όλα αυτά επειδή κάποιος ανεύθυνος άτομο μπορεί να πετάξει κάποιο μπουκάλι».

Οι περισσότεροι κάτοικοι της περιοχής ζητάνε να φύγουν οι πανκ από την πλατεία και τους καταγγέλλουν για μια σειρά από «προκλητικές» και «επιθετικές» ενέργειες.

Μερικοί όμως αποκρούει: «Γιατί η Αστυνομία δεν συλλαμβάνει κι' αυτοφωρα τα άτομα που προκαλούν ή επιτίθενται, έτσι ώστε να μη δημιουργούνται καταστάσεις σαν την προηγούμενη».

Άλλοι πάλι έχουν διαφορετική άποψη: «Αυτά τα παιδιά χρειάζονται άλλη αντιμετώπιση», λέει μια κοπέλα, που αρνείται κι αυτή να δώσει όνομα. «Είναι 14 και 15 χρονών, είναι ταλαιπωρημένα από την κοινωνία, μερικά έρχονται από αναμορφωτήρια...».

ΤΙ ΛΕΝΕ όμως οι ίδιοι οι πανκ;

Αγανακτισμένοι από τα προχθεσινά επεισόδια, κάθονταν χτες στο στάκι τους, στην



ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑ: Δύο από τους 18 συλληφθέντες με χειροπέδες στη



Ο ...ζωόφιλος της Πλατείας.

πλατεία και μιλούσαν για «τρομοκρατία». «Δεν είμαστε εμείς χούλιγκανς. Δεν είμαστε τα παιδιά που σπάνε τις βιτρίνες. Αλλά η κοινωνία μας δείχνει έναν τρόπο ζωής που σιχαίνομαστε. Και στη βία της εξουσίας απαντάμε με βία».

— Δηλαδή;

«Εάν αν σε χτυπήσουν, δεν θα χτυπήσεις; Κατέβηκαν οχτώ δημοφίλοι. Οι μισοί ήταν με πολιτικά, οι άλλοι με στολές. Χτυπούσαν όποιον έβρισκαν μπροστά τους. Ενώς φίλου μας, του Ανάστη του Φάλλου, του παραμόρφωσαν το πρόσωπο. Ενώς άλλου του έσπασαν τη λεκάνη».

— Έτσι; Τι κάνατε;

«Τους βάρουμε κι εμείς, με πέτρες και με τις γροθιές μας. Αυτοί μας χτυπούσαν με πέτρες, με γκλομπς, με ξύλα από τις οικοδομές...».

Ολοι μαζί λένε:

«Είναι έξι μέρες τώρα που γίνονται επει-



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σοδία. Χωρίς να τους προκαλούμε, εκεί που καθόμαστε στα παγκάκια ή στις κρεμάτσες έρχονται και μας πίνουν».

«Γιατί αυτοί με τα πολιτικά κρατάνε γκλομπς;

Γιατί μπήκαν στα μαγαζιά, στις καφετέριες και χτυπούσαν τον κόσμο; Εμένα με λένε Γιάννη Μπιλλίδη και σας λέω πως όλα αυτά είναι τρομοκρατία».

— Εδώ όμως έχει δημιουργηθεί ένα πρόβλημα. Μήπως κι εσείς προκαλείτε τον κόσμο;

«Αυτά που γράφονται δεν είναι αλήθεια... Απλά, όταν είμαστε ζαλισμένοι, πετάμε τα μπουκάλια με την μπύρα κάτω. Δεν έχουμε επιθεθεί σε κανέναν. Και δεν κυκλοφορούμε πια ναρκωτικά στην πλατεία. Αν θέλουν να κάνουν κάτι, γιατί δεν χτυπούν τα ναρκωτικά εδώ στα Εξάρχεια, εκεί που πραγματικά κερδοσκοπούν».

— Μήπως μερικοί από σας δημιουργούν επεισόδια;

Οι πανκ...

«Όχι, κανείς... Οι πανκ γνωρίζουμε όλοι μεταξύ μας. Οι άλλοι τώρα δεν ξέρουμε τι κάνουν. Αλλά εμείς, αν συνεχιστεί αυτή η κατάσταση, είμαστε διατεθειμένοι ακόμα και να βγάλουμε φυλλάδια για να πληροφορηθούν τον κόσμο γιατί είμαστε και τι δεν γουστάρουμε να γίνεται στην πλατεία».

— Οι κάτοικοι της περιοχής θέλουν να φύγετε από δω...

«Να φύγουμε; Γιατί να φύγουμε; Και πού να πάμε; Πριν, είμαστε στη Δεξιαμένη...».

εδάλιο
ρα
που
τηκαν

Ο ΠΡΩΤΟΣ όροφος της Εισαγγελίας Αθηνών γέμισε χτες το απόγευμα κατηγορούμενους... Δεκαοχτώ τον αριθμό, όλοι τους νεαροί, δέμητοι ανά δύο με χειροπέδες.

Από τις 9 σήμερα το πρωί διαδίδονται στο Αυτοφωρο Τριμελές. Χτες το απόγευμα για να περάσει την εισαδο της Εισαγγελίας, χρειάστηκαν να δώσουν την αστυνομική τους ταυτότητα και να δέχτηκαν ύστερα βλέμματα, δολιχίζοντας δημοσιογράφους, διελγούς ή γονείς κάποιου κατηγορούμενου.

Το κλίμα ήταν εβραύχιο χτες το απόγευμα στο Αρματοστάθ. Απο ναυρία το τετράγωνο της Εισαγγελίας ήταν περιελακωμένο από αστυνομικούς.

Στις 7.30' περίπου δύο κλοβές φάνηκαν. Ήταν γεμάτες κόσμο. Σε λίγο και οι 18, που οι βάρος τους είχαν σχηματιστεί τα κατηγορητήρια από τους αστυνομικούς της Γενικής Ασφάλειας για τα προχθεσινά επεισόδια στα Εξάρχεια, είχαν σβηστεί στον πρώτο όροφο, έβω από τα γραφεία της Πανικής Δίωξης. Τα αστυνομικά μέτρα ήταν υπερβολικά για την περίπτωση. Κάθε δύο κατηγορούμενοι με... δέμητοι τα χέρια,

φωλάγονταν με μεγάλη προσοχή από τρεις αστυνομικούς! Κανείς δεν μπορούσε να τους πλησιάσει.

— Μετά την εισαδο τους στον εισαγγελέα θα τους μιλήσετε, απαντούσε στην ερώση των δημοσιογράφων ένας αξιωματικός. Ένα τεταρτο περίεργο οι 18 κλήθηκαν μέσα στο γραφείο της Δίωξης. Ο εισαγγελέας κ. Νικόλαος Φωτόπουλος έθεσε εναντίον των κατηγορούμενων ποινική δίωξη για:

«Αντίσταση κατά της αρχής, από την οποία προκλήθηκε κίνδυνος για τη ζωή αστυνομικών, οπισση με σωματική βία, απειλές, βιαιοπραγίες, επικίνδυνη σφοδρή σωματική βλάβη κατά σφοδρό, βαριά μη σκεπυμένη σωματική βλάβη σε βάρος αστυνομικών, εβύβριση κατά σφοδρό από κούνο, σφοδρή ή εβύβριση και πρόκληση κινδύνου δια λιθοβολισμού».

Μεταξύ των κατηγορουμένων βρίσκεται και ένας ανήλικος που θα δικαστεί με τους υπόλοιπους. Ο κ. Φωτόπουλος τους παρέπεμψε στο Αυτοφωρο Τριμελές. Στο μεταξύ όλη τη νύχτα χτες κρατήθηκαν στη Γενική Ασφάλεια.

ΑΙΜ. ΛΙΑΤΙΩΣ



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exercise of social policy, it is even more obvious that the siege of a whole area, or the attacks against innocent citizens do not constitute social policy - even with the use of the police."

and they conclude:

"And finally it would be difficult not to wonder if, through the operations in Exarcheia, certain police officers play another game with political repercussions which exposes to public opinion not only themselves but the government as well."

"Police brutality, the "siege" of a whole neighbourhood and attacks against innocent citizens" are denounced and are considered as being unacceptable. What is more, these actions could, in fact suggest - according to the newspaper - that certain police officers might be conspiring to expose the government to public criticism about its handling of the situation. Similarly, throughout the previous day's coverage of the events (October 2) the aggressive behaviour of individual policemen is brought to attention while the reportage of October 3 is fairly negative as far as the behaviour of the police is concerned, because special emphasis is placed on victims of police brutality. "To Vima" appears to have taken a similar position as its headline on October 4 indicates: "The under-secretary of Youth and a spokesman of Athens municipality, disapprove of the operation 'Exarcheia'". "Eleftherotypia" also exploits the theme of police behaviour by focusing on incidents of police aggression and attacks throughout its coverage of the events. Throughout the period in which the police operation and the Exarcheia incidents took place, its coverage included

investigations on allegations about police brutality, interviews from local people who had been critical of the police methods, as well as confrontations with police and government officials.

However, the similarities between these three papers seem to end there, as a closer inspection reveals basic differences between "Ta Nea" and "To Vima" on the one hand, and "Eleftherotypia" on the other.

"Ta Nea", and its sister paper, "To Vima" while denouncing the indiscriminate and violent actions of police against "innocent citizens" accept the principle which "necessitated" the police operation. In fact, one could argue that the police operations in the area might have been received with less unfavourable comment under certain preconditions, as both newspapers seem to share the same concern as far as the future of the area is concerned. More precisely, throughout the coverage of the events a deep concern seems to be expressed in both newspapers about the problems which the residents and traders of the area are facing: problems which are conceived as being grave and for which a solution should indeed be found.

It is in this context that on October 4 "To Vima", under the headline "Public dialogue on the problem of the Athens borough which tends to become marginal ghetto" refers to recent developments in the discussions on the future of Exarcheia:

"On the basis of information which 'To Vima' has, the ministry <of Public Order> intends to ask organizations and representatives of the community to propose specific solutions for the problem of the Athens borough, which tends to become 'ghetto' by a group of people with marginal ideology"

while a little later we read that the same solution is proposed "for other problematic areas of the capital and the rest of Greece as well." Probably based on similar information and from the same source in the ministry of Public Order, "Ta Nea" make similar comments on the first page of its October 4 edition in a text which focuses on issues of "responsibility" of groups and individuals:

".... the aim of these meetings, which are going to start from the Exarcheia area, is to tackle the problems faced by the residents as a result of the unrestricted activities of drug-dealers, the irresponsible actions of certain individuals, and to point out the responsibilities of all political and social organisations concerned, so that solutions could be found concerning such important social problems."

These passages illustrate the underlying preconceptions of these newspapers regarding the nature of the problem(s) of Exarcheia. First, it appears that Exarcheia is understood as an isolated area, a ghetto, in which its residents are forced to coexist with "groups with a marginal ideology" - however unclear this description might be - or, with "drug dealers", or "individuals acting irresponsibly". "Ta Nea" and "To Vima" then, accept in principle the jurisdiction of the ministry of

Public Order and, therefore, of the police, over the problem and the area, provided that, responsibility would be shared with representatives of the "community", so that there would be a guarantee that the actions of the police would not be "generalized" and, therefore would not affect "innocent citizens". However, the concept of "community" as it is viewed by both the ministry, and the newspapers seems to be rather restricted as it includes only residents and traders of the area, the local authorities and representatives of only party political youth organizations, that is, it excludes any groups or persons which have chosen to remain outside the suffocating institutional framework of these organizations.¹²

A parallel line of thought seems to be pursued in the rather extensive statement issued by the under-secretary of Youth and Sport, K. Laliotis, which is not only accepted by "Ta Nea" as a welcome and major contribution in the discussion, but also is incorporated in the text of the reportage of October 4, and enriched with several sub-headings which emphasize some of the points he makes:

We should not view the recent events as isolated incidents <which took place> in one night. They are rather the manifestation of a social phenomenon with a long history among certain youth milieux. In Exarcheia, which constitute a pole of reference and attraction for young people from all over the whole area of greater Athens, various models of attitudes, behaviour and practice develop. Because of this, it is natural and unavoidable that frictions, dissent and tensions are formed among young people themselves, but also among the local residents.

It is also known that sometimes very small groups of young people develop aggressive behaviour and terrorist practices. This behaviour and actions derive from a logic and inclination inherent to these small groups which are characterized by tendencies towards the imposition of themselves and intense authoritarianism. It is not surprising that such rationalities and practices create problems and contradiction not only to the local residents, but also to these young persons who do not tolerate violence in their own relationships, or their relationships with people around them.

Besides, recently there have been confrontations in Exarcheia square itself between young people who wish to retain their freedom and self-respect and small organized groups that seek to achieve the imposition of their own views and models -if they have any- by force in the surrounding area.

The presence of the police in Exarcheia followed complaints by local residents who repeatedly denounced the violence and terrorism, not of young people but of small and isolated groups,.... However terrorism is not exercised only by the state, and if we do not want the state to intervene, we must all assume our responsibilities regarding any form of terrorism which is exercised around us, possibly not by the state - but also actually existing.

The square must remain accessible ... <to everybody> ... with absolutely no toll of subjection to anybody. Which young person and which citizen can accept the idea of the square becoming ... a ghetto with "god-fathers" and "bosses" who seek to impose violently their own law?

Who can tolerate "seasonal" and dubious "anarchists" who aspire to transform the arbitrary power of their gang into terror for the local residents and to "protection ransom" for the traders of the area.

The under-secretariat for Youth and Sport with its own policies in both words and action secures the unrestricted expression of young people and creates the infrastructure and the possibility for an alternative way of expression and model of life. We adopt dialogue, pluralism, mutual respect, criticism, but also responsibility, both individual and collective as the only precondition and means towards this direction. <We do> not <adopt> cheap denunciation and infertile negativisms which lead to unavoidable impasses.

As in the previous passages, the statement of Mr.

Laliotis offers a definition of the problem, though in a more elaborate and extensive manner. He argues that the area of Exarcheia has become a ghetto, and attributes this to small, isolated groups which he characterizes as "agressive", "with terrorist practices" and "tendencies towards intense authoritarianism". He attempts to discredit them politically and to achieve their criminalization by characterizing them as "seasonal and dubious anarchists" as "gangs" of "godfathers" and "bosses". Mr. Laliotis proposes an alternative "model" of life, which the policies of his ministry promote, and which has much in common with the proposals endorsed by "Ta Nea" and "To Vima" for shared responsibility by the community, including youth political organizations.

Although "Eleftherotypia" takes a similar stance against the planning and execution of the police operation with that of "Ta Nea" and "To Vima", it could be argued that it does not share the fears expressed by other newspapers that the area of Exarcheia is under threat, as "ordinary" life becomes disrupted and disorganized; it rather recognizes that the fact that the area is frequented by young people, some of whom are expressing different or alternative views, is exactly what gives Exarcheia its particular character. "Eleftherotypia" does not seem to share the almost irrational fear of other newspapers towards "marginal" groups and the alleged transformation of the area into a "ghetto", or "problematic area", it is rather sober in its attitude

towards the area and the events that took place there.

The police operation, both in principle and in the way it was realized was subjected to constant criticism by Eleftherotypia, firstly through frequent references to the brutality of its execution, which becomes clear in a series of interviews with those who experienced it, and secondly, through its close scrutiny of statements and interviews by a number of police and government officials.

Characteristic in this respect is the coverage of October 2 which includes a series of interviews with victims of police actions, and an interview with the police director mr. M. Bosinakis in which the concern of the paper regarding the extent and the character of the police operation are expressed clearly through a series of questions which challenge effectively the official position of the police. In the coverage of "Eleftherotypia", the police assume the role of the villain, as their actions are frequently characterized as "raids", "brutal violence", "brutal beatings", "violence and terrorism of the police".

But the possibly most important element which distinguishes "Eleftherotypia" from other newspapers is the fact that it dedicates a considerable part of its coverage to statements issued by various groups of the extra-parliamentary left and youth organizations which normally are not given access to the mass-media. In this way, on October 1, just before "operation Virtue" reached its

peak, it published a joint statement made by the "Initiative of young people against police suppression" and the "Left Student Coalitions" (Aristeres Foititikes Syspeiroseis) who denounced the daily conspicuous presence of the police in Exarcheia and its terrorist practices. Again on October 4, it published statements by the "Left Movement of Lawyers", the "Left Students Coalition" and the "New Socialists".

On October 5, while other newspapers put special emphasis on the initiative of the government to open dialogue on the problems of Exarcheia, "Eleftherotypia" is again the only paper which under the somewhat ironical headline "Dialogue after the beatings" casts doubts on the motives and the sincerity of the government and on the duration of such an attempt:

"So, after yesterday's statement made by the minister of Public Order G. Skoularikis (the

solution of the problem will be pursued through dialogue), it seems probable that the tension will decrease and that the Exarcheia 'front' is going to close - at least temporarily."

while a little later, it refers to the contents of a discussion between a committee representing young people from the area and the police director mr Bosinakis which did not manage to find its way to other papers:

"... and they express the suspicion that 'there is a plan to transform Exarcheia square into a square of expensive entertainment, similar to Kolonaki and Fokionos Negri'"

It could therefore be argued that, as it is illustrated in table 18 below, the newspapers reviewed - with the sole exception of "Eleftherotypia" - in the coverage of 'Operation Virtue' and of the events which followed it reproduce the 'definitions of the situation' produced by the government and the mainstream political parties as they accept the distinctions drawn by these 'primary definers' (Clarke et al 1976: 75-79), and therefore, they represent the situation in Exarcheia as a continuous confrontation between the 'forces of normality', expressed mainly by mainstream political organizations, and the 'forces of disorder', that is 'small and isolated organized groups which terrorise and bring disruption to the life of the area.

TABLE 18

Presentation of "Operation Virtue" by the newspapers monitored (based on the newspaper texts)

	NORMALITY	DISORDER
Actors:	residents traders, shop-keepers innocent civilians 'ordinary' young persons political and social organizations	marginals, punks, anarchists irresponsible individuals drug-dealers, drug-addicts 'bosses', god-fathers seasonal and dubious anarchists small and isolated organized groups
Practices and ideology:	dialogue, pluralism, respect, responsibility	cheap denunciation infertile negativism imposition of own views and models, terrorism, violence, authoritarianism

It is obvious that what is missing from such representations is the social-historical background of the events which could possibly offer some justification for the confrontation between the 'marginals' and the police, and might increase the levels of tolerance of both the local community, but more importantly of the (national) readership of the Athens press.

The Occupation of the building of the Department of
Chemistry of the University of Athens (Chimeio); May 1985.

On 9 May 1985, less than a month before the general elections of 1985, extra-parliamentary groups of the left organized a rally in Exarcheia square and a protest march in order to demonstrate their opposition to the forthcoming elections and to the alleged oppressive methods and intensification of policing, especially in the area of Exarcheia.

However, just before the rally, and as the participants were already gathered in Exarcheia square, Athens police director Mr. Hohtoulas, accompanied by a magistrate and police forces arrived in the square and announced that the rally and march had been banned. Mr Hohtoulas ordered the crowds to disperse claiming that as the crowd "were not protected by the University asylum regulations", (referring to past events, especially occupations of university buildings, during which those involved claimed they were protected under the University asylum legislation) they would

be "arrested and smashed (sic)". These controversial statements seem to have sparked off the events which culminated in the occupation of the "Chimeio" and the incidents that followed it.

The incidents became immediately an important news-item which occupied several pages of the Athens dailies from May 10 to May 15. The following analysis is based on the texts of the coverage of the events, which comprize mainly reportage and some editorials. The newspapers selected for this part of the study are "Apogevmatini", an evening paper of conservative political affiliation, "Avriani", an evening daily supporting PASOK, "Eleftherotypia" which aspired to express a wide spectrum of views, from the left to the centre, "Ethnos" which at the time supported PASOK but was also sympathetic to KKE, "Kathimerini", a morning conservative broadsheet, "Ta Nea", supporting PASOK, its sister morning daily "To Vima", with almost identical political complexion and, finally, "Vradyni", a conservative paper sympathetic to both the centre-right party of Nea Dimocratia and the extreme right.

The reporting of the events in the various publications presents striking similarities which range from the vocabulary employed in them to the selective and imbalanced presentation of the information they contain. In the majority of the texts which have been analyzed, there are common, or similar signifying and symbolic strategies, designed to mobilize social anxieties and build upon collective memories

relating to a spectrum of historical events, which in the social imagination are closely linked to collective and individual experiences of fear, pain, deprivation and destruction.

More precisely, the "Chimeio" events were covered by the majority of the newspapers under review in a way which could very easily be applied to the coverage of actual situations of war and disaster. In some cases, it is reminiscent of the accounts of the Greek civil war, a confrontation which scarred post-war Greek society, and remained deeply rooted in the collective memory.

Thus, the words and expressions which frame these events in almost every newspaper come from a predominantly war and disaster vocabulary. It is interesting to note that throughout the texts there are frequent repetitions of words and expressions denoting military operations. What is more, the detail to which the reporters of the incidents enter in order to give an elaborate description of the "weapons" and "tactics" that were used throughout the confrontations between the police and the "marginals" is striking. The effect is to reinforce the "extra-ordinary" character of the situation.

The coverage of "Apogevmatini" is quite characteristic in this respect as on 10 May 1985, the paper covered the Chimeio incidents under the headline **"Battlefield the Centre of Athens for 5 Hours with the Anarchists"** while, during the next three days in the same paper, the incidents were

reported in a similar way:

**Bloody clashes with injured policemen
and civilians(p. 1)**

**The Anarchists "hold" the Centre of Athens for the
third day in succession, with barricades,
stone-throwing and bloody clashes. (p. 3)**

The anarchists "seized" the centre of Athens for the third day with barricades, stone-throwing, a march and clashes with outraged citizens, they paralyzed the traffic flow and then they fortified themselves in the "Chimeio."

("Apogevmatini", 11 May 1985)

**Battles in Athens. The anarchists attacked
with bombs in the night.**

Fierce battles throughout the night between the anarchists and the police upset the centre of Athens. Youngsters covering their faces and shouting against the police marched undisturbed in the central streets of the capital and then attempted to enter the "Chimeio" where their comrades are fortified for the fifth day in succession.

("Apogevmatini", 13 May 1985)

In fact, throughout the coverage of the events, the reporters of "Apogevmatini", in an obvious attempt to "sensationalize" the events, used excessively words and expressions which conveyed powerful images of destruction, injury and anarchy. The frequent recourse to words and expressions such as "blood", "bloody clashes", "injured civilians", "fierce battles", "bombs", "war", "missiles", "attacks", the extent of overwording and exaggeration of the events were aimed at raising social anxiety and at representing essentially local events taking place in the vicinity of the "Chimeio" as a generalized threat.

It should however be pointed out that it was not only "Apogevmatini" which made extensive use of these techniques. On 11 May, "Kathimerini" reported the day's events under an identical headline with that of the same day's "Apogevmatini": "Bloody clashes with injured policemen and civilians", while To Vima, under a more extensive but similar headline takes up the same themes on 10 May:

**As a result of the clashes dozens of people
have been injured while dozens of shops and
cars have been destroyed. Stone-throwing war
between anarchists and policemen**

The centre of Athens experienced the most damaging stone throwing war of the last years as it was transformed into a proper battlefield between the anarchists and the police forces which rushed up to help dozens of citizens.

(To Vima, 10 May 1985)

From these extracts it is quite clear that the coverage of these papers is equally characterized by the frequent use of words and expressions such as "fortify", "enforce blockade", "battlefield", "zone of fire", "charge", "attack", "trench war", "guerrilla warfare", "bombs", "battles", "clashes", "bloodshed", "stone-throwing fights", "molotov cocktails", "ammunition", "barricades", or "missiles".

The representation of the incidents of the period between 10 and 16 May 1985 as either war operations or criminal actions was reinforced by the style of the text, especially the detailed, step-by-step presentation of the marginals' "tactics" which resembled war communiques or police reports and had a highly dramatic effect. To Vima, on

10 May 1985 was characteristic in this respect:

"... The events started a little after 6.30 in the afternoon, when a group of about 100 anarchists, who had gathered in Exarcheia tried to make a "march in protest of the presence of MAT (=riot police) in the area" despite the relevant ban the anarchists ... saw a small group of policemen against which they charged ... From that moment the whole area resembled <an area> under siege ... Just after 7 the anarchists ... went on charging damaging cars and shop-windows ... This situation continued until 7.45 when the anarchists launched one more massive attack with a "rain" of stones and pieces of wood which they were launching against the MAT, but also against the citizens who were watching the incidents, inflicting injuries to several of them ... At 7.55 another attack of the anarchists took place ... At 8.15 the anarchists dropped from the roof a smoke bomb and the terrified people rushed to take cover ... "

(To Vima, 10 May 1985)

The "sensationalization" of the events is enhanced as the war vocabulary used by the papers is interwoven with a further emphasis on the themes of vandalism, damage and disruption. The special importance which has been attributed by most newspapers to emphasizing material damages, injuries and traffic chaos is clearly illustrated in texts such as the following:

**Occupation of the "Chimeio" and stone-
throwing war. The anarchists caused new
extensive incidents. Damages to cars
and shop windows.**

The most extensive incidents took place yesterday afternoon, caused by the well known group of anarchists, who after the occupation of "Chimeio", in Solonos street, started throwing stones to passers-by, cars and the police who intervened to disperse them. The incidents on the one hand, and at the same time the opening of the KKE polling centre in Omonoia Square on the other, resulted to the development of a traffic chaos in the centre of Athens. Dozens of injured from both sides, huge material damage to shop-windows and

cars which became the target of a ruthless stone-throwing war and many arrests were the final outcome of the incidents....

Protest March - Occupation

The incidents started at 7.00 p.m after a protest march against the methods employed by the police, "planned" by the anarchists several days before. Another group had, from earlier on, occupied the "Chimeio" and had gathered its ammunition (stones, construction planks, iron bars and flammable materials. Without any obvious reason the stone-throwing war started

When they run out of stones, the anarchists started breaking the marble from the cornice of the "Chimeio", while at the same time they were making molotov cocktails and bombs of other kinds using caustic materials found in the "Chimeio" and <started> throwing them to the police.

Anarchists caused the incidents

.... As far as the injured are concerned, the police stated that 9 policemen and one citizen have been injured, but according to other sources, the injured citizens are many, but they decided not to be hospitalized."

("Kathimerini", 10 May 1985)

In the case of "Kathimerini", the reporter takes the opportunity to establish an indirect connection between the occupation of the Chimeio by the "well known group of anarchists" and the opening of the electoral office of KKE (Communist Party of Greece) in the centre of Athens. The paper identifies both events as the cause of "traffic chaos", combining in this way the paper's traditional anti-communist stance with the condemnation of the incidents "caused" by the "anarchists". However, the main emphasis of the reportage was upon the disruption and destruction caused by the "anarchists", as the paper confirmed the belief of its conservative readership that the "anarchists" had undoubtedly

provoked the incidents. It should also be noted that the paper attempted to present the incidents not only as violent and destructive, but also as premeditated and planned well in advance. The use of "planned", in quotation marks in the text, despite the fact that no evidence backs the paper's allegation, denotes the certainty of the paper about the pre-meditated character of the incidents which is taken for granted later in the text.

"Apogevmatini" is equally engaged in an attempt to emphasise the destructive and disruptive character of the events which it attributes to the "marginals". Throughout its coverage it emphasizes, and often exaggerates, the extent of damage incurred during the incidents. Thus, on 10 May one could read among its headlines

**"They burned, they broke, they looted
and they spread horror."**

("Apogevmatini", 10 May 1985)

or on 11 May, the headlines refer to "banks" bombed by the "anarchists" in the previous night, while in reality, as it is acknowledged in the text that follows, only one bank was bombed by unknown persons.

**Athens into the hands of the anarchists.
They blew up banks during the night.**

"Athens in the hands of anarchists. After the Chimeio the Law-School fell into the hands of the anarchists as well, while yesterday night unknown persons blew up the whole facade of Citibank"

Despite the lack of any information implicating the "marginals" in "bank bombings", the paper premises its coverage on a single event, the bombing of one bank, and attempts to represent it as one among more similar events - "bank bombings", and to link it with the "marginals", maximizing in this way the impression of disruption and destruction caused by them.

"To Vima" and "Avriani" focus mostly on the material damages inflicted on shops and cars and emphasize the extent of vandalism:

"As a result of the clashes dozens of people have been injured, while dozens of shops and cars have been destroyed."

(To Vima, 10 May 1985)

"In the Chimeio the vandalism surpassed all expectation. Graffiti on the walls, destroyed furniture, damage, dirt, broken glass and objects were the toll of the damages ..."

(Avriani, 14 May 1985)

However, the theme of disruption is further and more effectively exploited by the papers as the majority of them focus on the problems faced by the residents of the area of the "Chimeio" during the occupation. "Kathimerini" emphasizes the disruption of everyday life of local residents and shop-keepers in the following text:

Area cut off.

Hundreds of shops remain cut off for a second

24-hour-period in the area of the "Chimeio", resulting to the infliction of huge <financial> damages to the traders, whose representatives went to the Athens Police Headquarters yesterday, and complained about the situation which is prevailing. Meanwhile, the residents of the blocks of flats who live in the "zone of fire", as they complained yesterday, have the essential problem of even going to work, and the housewives (two of whom dared to go out of their homes yesterday, were subjected to verbal abuse and stone-throwing) cannot supply their households with the necessary food supplies. It is characteristic that this morning they asked for the help of the policemen, who ... supplied the blocks of flats with food."

("Kathimerini", 12 May 1985, pp. 1 & 14)

In this text, disruption acquires a new dimension, as it is no longer represented as general, abstract disruption of activities, such as mere disruption of traffic or economic life but, rather as a threat to the survival of individuals and families. More precisely, although "Kathimerini" refers to the disruption of the economic life of the area of the "Chimeio" by pointing out that "hundreds of shops" in the area remained closed for the second day, it also lays particular emphasis on the problems faced by local residents who, according to the reporter, are "cut off", and are unable to venture out of their homes to go to work, or to buy the bare essentials for the survival of their households.

The report is characterized by exaggeration and selective information, as its estimation that "hundreds of shops" had to remain closed was greatly exaggerated, while it failed to make clear that an area extending far beyond the vicinity of the occupied building had been cut off by the police, allegedly for reasons of security, and not by the

marginals, as is apparently implied. The effect is to misinform readers about both the extent of economic disruption and the extent of the "marginals'" responsibility for it. What is more, the area referred to as "zone-of-fire", and the area cut off by the police for "security reasons", were in fact two distinct areas, although the paper attempted to represent them as one. The first, where disruption of everyday life because of the verbal abuse and physical threat by the "marginals" might have actually occurred, comprised the buildings facing the "Chimeio", while the second, the limits of which were determined by the police and where loss of trade occurred due to police restrictions on public access, extended far beyond the vicinity of the "Chimeio". However, in an attempt to sensationalize the impact of the occupation, "Kathimerini" did not make clear any distinction. Its readers were thus misled into believing that it was the "marginals" who totally isolated the area and brought everyday activities to a virtual halt.

The "sensational" imagery of war, violence, destruction and disruption conveyed by the vocabulary selected for the description of the events has multiple effects. As suggested, the "dramatization" of the events was aimed at evoking feelings of insecurity, extreme danger, and threat. Thus, the use of relevant metaphors can mobilize these feelings and prompt a unified stance by the public towards the danger. What is more, the fact that the recourse to metaphors of this sort has as its major effect the sensationalization of the

incidents, it could be argued that the coverage of the events along these lines shifts the emphasis from an effort to reflect upon the causes of the situation and to provide an analysis of the story's complexities, to the terrifying and, at the same time, "spectacular" confrontation.

In some cases, newspapers mobilized elements of collective memory by attempting to compare the Chimeio incidents with events of the past which had been emotionally charged and were possible to evoke painful feelings coming from deeply rooted memories or, in other cases, to draw upon quite recent events tightly connected with images of destruction and pain.

Thus, in the first page of "Kathimerini" of 12 May 1985, a text with a separate quite distinct headline of its own appeared as the caption of a photograph (Illustration 19):

Here "ends" the Greek state ...

"For the third day yesterday, the "Solonos street area" was presenting an image of "a short-December 44, without arms" - as an old Athenian said very characteristically. The photograph above was taken yesterday morning, at the level of the junction between Omirou and Solonos streets - at the background on the left, the Law-School, which was also occupied after the "Chimeio", by ... anarchists who managed to penetrate the police enclosure. The traffic warden and his motorcycle mark the ... border of the prohibited area for citizens and their vehicles."

("Kathimerini", 12 May 1985)

In that text, the situation is compared with the events of December 1944, known as "Dekemvriana", that led to the beginning of the civil war. The caption, as well as its



Εδώ «τελειώνει» τὸ ἐλληνικὸ κράτος...

Γιὰ τρίτη ἡμέρα χθές, ἡ «περιοχὴ Σόλωνος» παρουσίαζε τὴν εἰκόνα «ενὸς μικροῦ Δεκεμβρίου '44, χωρὶς ὄπλα» — ὅπως εἶπε, χαρακτηριστικῶς, παλαιὸς Ἀθηναῖος. Ἡ ἀνωτέρω φωτογραφία, τραβήχτηκε χθές τὸ πρωῖ, ἀπὸ τὸ ὕψος Ὀμήρου καὶ Σόλωνος — στὸ βάθος ἀριστερά, ἡ Νομικὴ Σχολή, ποὺ κατελήφθη μετὰ τὸ Χημεῖο καὶ αὐτὴ, ἀπὸ... διαφυγόντες τοῦ αστυνομικοῦ κλοιοῦ ἀναρχικῶς. Ὁ τροχονόμος καὶ ἡ μοτοσυκλέτα του, οριοθετοῦν τὰ... σύνορα τῆς ἀπαγορευμένης, γιὰ πολίτες καὶ τροχοφόρα, περιοχῆς! Μετὰ τὸ μεσημέρι χθές — βλεπε καὶ κατωτέρω ρεπορτάζ — οἱ αστυνομικοὶ ἀπεσύρθησαν, γιὰ ν' ἀφήσουν ἐλεύθερη τὴν ἀποχώρησιν τῶν καταληψιῶν ἀπὸ τὸ Χημεῖο καὶ τὴ Νομικὴ Σχολή — εἰς δέξαια ἀναρχικῶν οἱ τελευταῖοι.

(Φωτογραφικὴ Υπηρεσία ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗΣ — Β. Καραμανώλης)

ΜΕ ΠΡΩΤΟΒΟΥΛΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΑΚΟΥ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑΣ ΤΑΞΕΩΣ

Διακομματικὴ ἀντιμετώπιση τῶν ἀναρχικῶν τοῦ Χημεῖου

ΑΠΟΚΛΕΙΣΜΕΝΗ ΑΛΛΑ... ΗΡΕΜΗ Ἡ ΠΕΡΙΟΧΗ ΤΟΥ ΧΗΜΕΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ

headline implies that Athens has been divided into two zones in a way reminiscent of the division of the city in December 1944, when the communist-led "Popular Army" controlled most of Athens, with the exception of a small area of the city centre held by the British and Greek National Government forces. This metaphor appeals to the memories of that period, of a society divided by fear and suspicion, although, in contrast to "Dekemvriana" when the then "enemy" - the "communists" - had control over most of the city, now the "enemies", "the marginals" are in fact the ones under siege and at a disadvantage.

In this context, the traffic warden becomes not only the symbol of the boundaries between the free zone in which people are described as citizens (outraged or not) and the forbidden zone which is dominated by outlaws and non-citizens. In that second zone, as the headline reveals, no state exists. It should also be noted that this representation of territorial division constitutes a symbolic strategy - which I am going to refer to more extensively later - of "territorialization" of the "threat" represented by the "marginals", as a "territory" of lawlessness and destruction beyond state and social control is imagined.

Comparisons of this sort can also be found in Ethnos of 14 May 1985 where images of pain and destruction are mobilized through the equation of the Chimeio area to "destroyed neighbourhoods of Beirut". This comparison has the double effect of making the "Chimeio" incidents relevant, on

the one hand to the civil war of Lebanon and the suffering it inflicted, and on the other, to the deep scars associated with the experience of the Greek civil war.

Despite minor differences among the newspapers in the coverage of the events, there is an underlying unanimity as far as the representation of the anarchists and their actions is concerned. In fact the various themes which are employed - with different degrees of emphasis - by the newspapers seem to be more or less complementary to each other as they converge around the various "threats" to law and order which, according to the press, the anarchists represent.

This emphasis on the need to preserve law and order is present in the majority of the texts. "Vradyni", with the headline "State within the State", on 10 May 1985 as well as on 13 May 1985 emphasizes the abolition of the state and of law and order and, implicitly, expresses its concern. In the same paper, on 13 May we can easily find the identification between the actions of the anarchists and the destruction of law and order:

"The anarchists having created "a state within the State" continue to terrorize and upset Athens"

Similarly, in "Apogevmatini", on 10 May, the anarchists appear to have "abolished any notion of state ... in the centre of Athens":

"Exarcheia became Vietnam"

"The Anarchists abolished every notion of State in the centre of Athens yesterday night."

("Apogevmatini", 10 May 1985; p. 1)

What is interesting in this text is that the impression of the forceful abolition of the state and of law and order is emphasized by the comparison of the incidents of Exarcheia with the Vietnam war, and its connotations of massive destruction. On 11 May the same position continues to be supported:

**"Athens in the hands of the anarchists. They
blew up banks during the night"**

"Athens in the hands of anarchists. After the Chimeio the Law-School fell into the hands of the anarchists as well, while yesterday night unknown persons blew up the whole facade of Citibank"

("Apogevmatini", 11 May 1985)

Ethnos, taking up the same issues refers on 15 May under the headline **"The anarchists disrupt Athens again"** to the establishment of "the state of the occupants" of Chimeio and emphasizes the lack of law and order within its boundaries as the property of local shopkeepers was seriously damaged.

The subject of the threat posed to law and order and even the issue of the abolition of the state is eagerly dealt with by "Kathimerini", which on 12 May, under the headline **"Here 'ends' the Greek state"** refers to "anarchists who managed to penetrate the police enclosure" and to the existence of "the ... border of the prohibited area to citizens and their vehicles" which had been occupied. As

mentioned earlier (pp. 271-72), in this report, "Kathimerini" achieves the "territorialization" of the "threat" which the "marginals" represent. While the "marginals" are normally, though with some resentment, reported to frequent, or even occupy Exarcheia Square, "Kathimerini", by using the metaphor of "border" gives an additional "territorial" dimension to the perceived threat they pose, and appears to imply that the territory held by the "marginals" may quite possibly be expanded if they are not dealt with soon. While the notion of "border" could be interpreted as "containing" the threat, nevertheless, in this particular case it is rather used to emphasize the establishment of uncontrollable and inaccessible pockets in a territory where previously law and order prevailed and "normal" life was going on. The representation of the police line as "border" supports the ideology of "reclamation and defence of urban space" ¹³ which permeated the discourse and the imagination of urban planners and law-and-order experts alike in the 1980s. In the same context, on 14 May, Ethnos, refers briefly to the intervention of members of the academic staff of the University which secured "'unimpeded passage' <of the last anarchists to evacuate the Chimeio> to ... free Athens". The reference to "free Athens" introduces a dichotomy between two "territorial units", free and occupied Athens, and therefore underlines the paper's interpretation of the occupation of 'Chimeio' as an occupation of part of the city. This in fact misrepresents the extent of the "marginals'" control over the "city", as a single building occupied by the

"marginals" could hardly be described as "occupied Athens" as the paper appears to imply.

Finally, a similar process of "territorialization" also occurs in Avriani of 14 May, when it refers to the "territory of the anarchists". It was reported that the area had been sealed "by the police, as they had orders not to let even a 'mosquito' pass through". In this case the newspaper being sympathetic to the government, emphasizes the success of the operation aimed at the isolation of this "territory" and the containment of the danger it represents.

The "territorialization" of the "threat" of the "marginals" was also used by the majority of the monitored newspapers in order to support measures which would lead to an escalation of control culture and lead to the restoration of "law-and-order". Expressions such as "abolition of the state" ("Apogevmatini", 10 May and Avriani, 15 May), "the seizure of the centre of Athens" ("Apogevmatini", 11 May), "state within the State" ("Vradyni", 10 and 13 May) or "the boundaries of the prohibited zone" ("Kathimerini", 12 May) are exaggerations which serve to reinforce the impression that law and order are under threat. These exaggerated descriptions of the situation are, indirectly, criticisms against the weakness and inefficiency of the government and the police and can be interpreted as an appeal for the restoration of the authority of the state. It is in this context that the majority of the newspapers cover the actions of alleged members of the local community, or "the outraged

citizens" as they became widely known, in an approving and sympathetic way. It is worth pointing out that while in some newspapers such as "Eleftherotypia" (11 and 13 May 1985), Ta Nea (11 and 13 May) and Ethnos (11 May) the possibility that people seen to chase the "marginals" were policemen in plain clothes or fascist elements is not dismissed, other papers are persistently ignoring relevant allegations and prefer to refer to actions of outraged citizens who chose to oppose the "marginals" themselves.

Thus, according to "Apogevmatini" on 10 May:

"Together with the police they <the anarchists> were chased by the residents"

"Many residents of Exarcheia watching their property being destroyed by menacing youngsters reacted dynamically. They grasped hunting guns and started shooting to frighten them, while in many cases they chased them."

Similarly, on 10 May, "To Vima" emphasizes the demand of the local residents for the restoration of "order" in their area by stating that "...the citizens who were watching the events become angry and demand the cleaning up of the area", or "Avriani", on 14 and 15 of May refers to "citizens enraged by the situation" and "outraged citizens" demanding "the cleaning up <of the city> from the anarchists".

One interesting point in coverage of this type is the use of the term "citizen" when shopkeepers, "heads of family" or by-standers are described, as opposed to the "marginals" who are implicitly, although clearly, represented as

non-citizens and who in this way become even more marginalized.

Of course, while metaphors representing the events in the centre of Athens in terms of war, destruction or criminality seem to be dominant in the press, other ways of symbolically isolating the anarchists are used as well, depending on the assumed worldviews, social and political background of the readership of each paper. Very characteristic in this respect is the development of the particular "public language" developed by "Avriani", which has drawn upon rather different conceptualisations of "threat" in order to add some extra "sensation" in its coverage of the event and to isolate the anarchists in its own way. The following report which appeared on 14 May 1985 is characteristic of the paper's approach to the events:

"Son of a Jew is the alleged provocator and leader. Pre-planned provocation the anarchists' incidents in the "Chimeio". His father is a Hilton Hotel manager."

"Andreas Kanellidis, Jew, the son of the Hilton ex-manager is thought to be provocateur of the Chimeio incidents and leader of the barricaded anarchists. The above mentioned information which has been verified beyond doubt unveils the provocative role some persons played against public order as well as against the true anarchists of the Exarcheia area during the Chimeio incidents. It is certain that this information will upset and create feelings of discontent among the leftist "sympathizers" who - in a protest march yesterday night - ... demonstrated for their comrades.

(Avriani, 14 May 1985)

In this report, the paper introduces "ethnic" and

"economic" criteria by which it attempts to establish the "foreign", and "anti-popular" character of the anarchists, and thereby, to question their motives and practices. Although the paper's allegations concerning both the ethnic and economic background of the alleged leader of the occupation are questionable and unsubstantiated, what should be pointed out, is the paper's decision to introduce these criteria, regardless of their validity, in order to discredit the "marginals". By identifying the alleged leader of the occupation of the Chimeio as a "Jew" the reporter attempts to exploit the possible antisemitic sentiments of the paper's readership. Drawing upon popular antisemitic stereotypes,¹⁴ Avriani attempts to construct an image of "otherness" and threat which might appeal to its readers, in quite a similar way to the way other dailies did by drawing upon themes of war, crime, or destruction. Being a "Jew", the alleged leader of the "marginals" belongs to an ethnic and cultural minority which, in the popular imagination has been represented as separate, and often hostile to 'mainstream' society. Further, in popular stereotypes of Jewish people, the theme of Jewishness is closely associated with that of affluence and power, a theme which is also exploited by the newspaper. The disclosure of the occupation of the alleged leader's father might be interpreted as an attempt to discredit him on the grounds of his financial situation and his possession of power. Drawing upon "oppositional" elements of the "petty-bourgeois", or "popular" culture, notably, the popular disapproval of the unequal distribution of wealth and

opportunities, the paper attempts to mobilize them against the "marginals". Complementary to the themes of affluence/power and ethnic difference exploited by Avriani appears to be the indirect, yet almost certainly intentional, association of Andreas Kanellidis with a foreign multinational, Hilton International, via his father's alleged past employment with the firm. Although this detail is irrelevant as far as the events or the character of the alleged "marginal" leader are concerned, the paper appears very keen to include it in the coverage of the events. Indeed, it could be argued that "Hilton International" is introduced into the text because of its symbolic value, that is, its connotations of affluence, and more importantly, its association with the American economic and cultural influence in Greece, a very sensitive issue for the majority of the Greek population as has already been noted.¹⁵ In this way, the alien character of the "marginals" is reconfirmed, through the association of their alleged leader with the American presence in Greece, against a background of popular anti-americanism.

Thus, Avriani introduces a threefold scheme of difference/ confrontation by articulating aspects of popular culture in its exclusivist discourse. This scheme is premised upon the themes of "Jewishness", a powerful symbol of the "alien" character of the "marginals", of "affluence/power", an equally powerful symbol of the non-popular or anti-popular character of the "marginals", consistent with

paper attempts to represent the sympathisers and supporters of the "marginals" who occupied the "Chimeio" as deceived and bound to "repent"; in this way "Avriani" appears to be ruling out any possibility of political motives or motives of social solidarity existing behind the occupation of the "Chimeio", and to be attributing the expressions of solidarity and support by other "marginals" for the "occupiers" to the deception of the former by the latter.

Differing considerably from that of the other newspapers monitored, the coverage of Eleftherotypia could be considered to have been more "balanced". Although some of the paper's reports are characterized by a considerable degree of sensationalization of the events, and abound in the use of war metaphors, imagery of chaos, and evocations of destruction, the responsibility is not attributed to the "marginals" alone, but also to the police. Thus, emphasis is also laid on the "irrationality" and "brutality" of police action throughout the events, as on 14 May the police operation is represented as "occupation of the area by the police". On 15 May statements issued by minor political parties and the "marginal" "Initiative against State Repression" denouncing police brutality appear in the paper.

Finally, an interesting observation can be made concerning the selective use by the Athens newspapers of the sources of the "definitions of the situation" which were available to them. With the sole exception of "Eleftherotypia", the Athens dailies proved to be extremely

selective and used information about the incidents almost exclusively from individuals and organizations hostile to the anarchists. Typically, they gave a prominent position to statements issued by the police and state ministries, and "adopted" the statement released by the Ministry of Public Order calling for the reinforcement of Law and Order. This is illustrated by the conclusion of their coverage of the incidents on 10 May:

"<The Government> is determined"

"From the ministry of public order the following statement was released yesterday night:

"The ministry of public order considers today's incidents caused by a group of anarchists in the area of the "Chimeio" as unacceptable. The government is determined to crush any action violating the law; especially, during the pre-electoral period, the party rallies, the peace and safety of the citizens and their property are going to be safeguarded with increased vigilance - exactly in the way this was done by the police today.

It must be realized that the law will be enforced relentlessly"

Furthermore, all of the newspapers reviewed, publicized on several occasions the statements of mainstream party political youth organizations, party spokesmen and leaders, and the Greek Union of Students - dominated by the mainstream political parties - which condemned the "provocative" actions of the "marginals" and called for their isolation. The majority of the Athens papers mentioned paid little or no attention to alternative sources of information or "definitions of the situation", and attempted to play down the political aspects of the occupation and the actions of the "marginals" that followed it. As noted above the sole

exception was that of "Eleftherotypia". "Eleftherotypia", in contrast to the other papers, consistently publicized the views of the "marginals" and their sympathizers as well as the "official" (government or mainstream party) views in its pages. Probably, as a result of the paper's policy, the relative autonomy of its reporters and commentators from editorial control enabled the coexistence of different lines of interpretation and representation of the events. Thus, in the paper's pages can be found statements by mainstream political parties and party leaders condemning the occupation, or urging for a united party response to the events (14 May 1985), or the Greek Union of Students (EFEE) emphasizing the unity of the "student movement" against the "provocators" who occupied the "Chimeio" (11 May 1985) as well as statements issued by minor parties and "marginal" groups denouncing police violence (11 May 1985), a press release by the "occupiers of Chimeio" (13 May 1985), a joint statement issued by the editorial committees of prominent periodicals of the left and the "marginal milieu" denouncing police violence (13 May 1985). It could be argued that this more "pluralistic" coverage by "Eleftherotypia" is an indication of the paper's recognition of the existence of a spectrum of political, or politically relevant forces, which encompasses more agents than the mainstream political parties and organizations, although minor parties and "marginal" groups were not considered to be of equal political significance to their mainstream counterparts.

Anti-nuclear Demonstrations; May 1986

The events of May 1986 were triggered by the prohibition by the Athens police of two demonstrations against the use of nuclear power, organized by leftist, ecological and anarchist groups and ad hoc committees following the Chernobyl nuclear accident on the 26th of April 1986.

On the 9th of May 1986 the Athens police prohibited a demonstration and a rally against the use of nuclear energy which had been organized by the "Anarchist Initiative for Rally against Nuclear Power" (Anarhiki Protovoulia gia ti syngentrosi enantia sta pyrinika), an ad hoc committee of anarchist groups, created for the organization of anti-nuclear power events. Despite the police ban, the decision of some people to ignore the prohibition and to go to the place where the banned rally had been arranged to take place, resulted in 11 arrests on the grounds of civil disobedience. On the 12th of May, a demonstration of motorcyclists, organized by the "Antinuclear Initiative" (Antipyriniki Protovoulia), another ad hoc committee formed by ecologists and groups of the extra-parliamentary left, was also banned as it was going to start. As leading members of the "Antinuclear Initiative" approached the officers in charge of the strong police forces which had encircled the area in order to complain about the ban, they were beaten and

arrested. In the meantime, assembled motorcyclists were also attacked and arrested by the police, while traffic police confiscated virtually any motorcycle that was moving or parked in the centre of Athens and in the area of Exarcheia. As police patrols made several arrests of "suspects" in these areas, a group of people, probably anarchists, attacked a stationary police van in Exarcheia. Just after that, the police encircled the square, used smoke and tear gas grenades and made over 100 arrests.

Following the ban on its demonstration, the "Antinuclear Initiative" announced they were going to participate in the next day's demonstration organized by the "Non-aligned Peace Movement" (Adesmefti Kinisi Eirinis: AKE), an organization affiliated to the Communist Party of Greece-interior (KKE-es). Indeed, on May 13, the demonstration organized by the "Non-aligned Peace Movement" was attended by supporters and sympathizers of KKE-es and AKE, as well as by anarchist, ecological-green groups and supporters of the extra-parliamentary left. During the demonstration, a group of anarchists threw a molotov cocktail at a traffic police officer's motorcycle triggering minor incidents in the area, and a series of arrests by the police.

The events of the period between May 9 and 13 and their aftermath (Magistrate's hearings, trials, government statements) occupied several pages of the Athens press over the next fortnight. In fact the events proved to be the starting point of extended press coverage which quickly

reached a second phase in which the incidents were transformed into just an isolated expression of a wider "social problem" of lawlessness and anarchy; the so called problem of Exarcheia. This, second, aspect of media coverage found its extreme expression in the public "discussion" of the problem of the "state of the anarchists in Exarcheia" that was initiated.

The newspapers used for this case study are "Apogevmatini", an evening paper of conservative political affiliation, "Avriani", a popular evening daily supporting PASOK and representing itself as the "voice" of the moral majority, "Eleftherotypia" which aspired to express a wide spectrum of views, from the left to the centre, "Ethnos", a popular paper which represented itself as a progressive - socialist popular paper, and the pro-government "Ta Nea".

Analyzing the texts that have been reviewed it could be argued that all newspapers appear to employ more or less similar techniques in their coverage of the incidents. More precisely, one common element which can be traced in all five newspapers is the "sensationalization" of the incidents as particular emphasis is put on the presentation of the incidents as similar, in the worst case, to war, or, in the best case, to a violent, irrational outburst of extremist elements.

The words, metaphors and expressions used give a dramatic tone to the confrontation between the police and

the demonstrators, exaggerate the gravity and the seriousness of the incidents and, at the same time, suggest the unfolding of a situation in which the rule of law had, at least temporarily, been lost. The impression of a city plunged into chaos, violence and disorder comes through clearly in the coverage of every newspaper with the extensive use of images of fire, blood and destruction.

Another equally prominent feature in the coverage seems to have been the effort to represent the incidents as instances or manifestations of an all-out confrontation, which, in some cases is even equated to war. In any case, the effect of both these options is that by reinforcing the symbolic marginalization of a part of the population and by investing it with connotations of destructiveness, irrationality or lawlessness, it contributes to the maintenance and reproduction of already established social anxieties and stereotypes within Greek society.

Characteristic in this respect is the case of "Ethnos" which, exploiting the image of the destruction of a police motorcycle by a molotov cocktail, attempts to sensationalize the incidents by regular use of the imagery of fire and explosion (illustr. 21); thus the headlines of May 14, in page 12 read "Explosion in Athens - Fierce clashes - Street fights and 56 Arrests yesterday night in Exarcheia" and "The clubs ... were on fire ... Alongside the police moto <abbr. for motorcycle>", while, similarly, references to "fire" and "explosion", in both literal and figurative sense,

are abundant throughout the text. What is more, the use of a "dramatic" vocabulary - phrases such as "fierce clashes", "street fights", "merciless manhunt", "the truncheons were on 'fire'" - contributes to the creation of an emotionally charged atmosphere and reinforces the impression that violent and destructive confrontations plunged the heart of Athens into chaos, that an extraordinary and unacceptable situation was unfolding.

"Ta Nea" similarly, draw upon the image of the burning police motorcycle and extend it into further exaggerated imagery of fire and destruction; on May 14 two photographs taken during the incidents occupied most of the first page while the only text accompanying and explaining them was a prominent headline which read "THE ANARCHISTS BURNT EVERYTHING; with molotov <bombs> in Athens and Thessaloniki".

The first photograph focused on men of the special anti-riot units of the police (MAT) in full gear running among small objects on fire, scattered on the street (Illustration 22). The second, larger photograph, focused on a small group of people armed with wooden sticks next to a fire lit on a pavement, while in the background policemen and some people in plain clothes were giving the impression of retreating hastily (Illustration 23).

The main feature of the photographs seems to be an image of destruction and disorder, conveying a sense of chaos and

ΤΕΤΑΡΤΗ
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ΤΑ ΝΕΑ



ΕΚΔΟΣΗ: ΔΕΥΤΕΡΑ 1986
 ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΟΣ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΛΑΜΠΡΑΚΗ Α.Ε. • ΑΘΗΝΑ • ΕΤΟΣ 41ο • ΑΡΙΘΜΟΣ ΦΥΛΛΟΥ 12515 • ΤΙΜΗ ΦΥΛΛΟΥ ΔΡΑΧΜΕΣ 40

ΤΕΛ. 14-15

ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑ ΤΟ ΚΑΙΣΙΟ

Οι νέες μετρήσεις του «Δημόκριτου»

ΤΑ 'ΚΑΨΑΝ



Με μολότοφ
 σε Αθήνα και
 Θεσσαλονίκη
 οι αναρχικοί

ΡΕΠΟΡΤΑΖ ΣΤΙΣ ΣΕΛΙΔΕΣ 10, 11

ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΟ ΚΚΕ ε.σ.

ΑΡΧΙΕΡΕΥΣ:
 Ναι, σ' ένα
 νέο φορέα

ΚΥΡΚΟΣ:
 Ουσιαστική
 συμβολή στο
 διάλογο

ΣΕΛ. 2,3,7



Δύο φωτογραφίες από τα χθεσινά επεισόδια που έγιναν στο κέντρο της Αθήνας

uncertainty emerging from the combination of the feeling of continuous movement captured by the camera, with other elements such as the fires scattered on the streets, the men armed with sticks, people retreating in haste, and even details such as a policeman's cap abandoned on the pavement.

In both photographs, fire is a prominent element and is the theme taken up in the headline. The fire in the photographs is but the visual raw material which allows the imaginary reconstruction of what might have happened. At this point the headline plays a key role for the interpretation of the photographs as it transcends their visual meaning and extends their signification. The limited visual evidence of fire that is contained in the photographs is transformed into an imagery of deliberate destruction by fire as the headline informs the readers that the "anarchists" burned "everything" in Athens and Thessaloniki. It is important to point out that as no other text is provided in the first page that could be related to the photographs, the headline remains a significant source of information and certainly, alongside the photographs, shapes the first impressions of the reader as far as the incidents were concerned.

"Apogevmatini" appears to have adopted a similar line of presentation using imagery of blood, fire and destruction in its own coverage of the incidents. Thus, in an attempt to report the incidents in a highly dramatic way the reporter(s) use emotional vocabulary and metaphors; on May 14, the

anarchists are alleged to have "tried to cause a bloodbath in the two demonstrations" (pp. 1 and 3), to have "left nothing standing", and to have "attempted to set him <=a police officer> on fire", while his "motorcycle <was> in flames" (p. 1), or "became prey to fire" (p. 3). Going even further, "Apogevmatini", in which the theme of war is a familiar one when it comes to the coverage of public disorder, once more took the opportunity to represent the incidents in terms of war, as references to "battles", "battlefields", "attacks" or "guerrilla war" were abundant in the text.

It therefore comes as no surprise that on May 13, under the headline **"All-night-long clashes between police and anarchists"** we read

"All-night-long guerrilla-war between policemen and anarchists took place once more, yesterday in Exarcheia..."

("Apogevmatini", 13 May 1986)

Along the same lines is the coverage of the incidents on pages 1 and 16, as frequent references to "battles", "clashes", "fights with molotov <bombs>", "launching of molotov bombs" or the variety of "arms" used by both sides can be found. Similarly, as new incidents between police and demonstrators take place on May 13, "Apogevmatini" continues to find the theme of war a valuable source of vocabulary, metaphors and imagery for its coverage as on May 14, under its page 3 heading **"Battlefield the centre of Athens"** the war imagery is revived through a repetition of the metaphors

and vocabulary which was employed in the previous day's coverage

"Once more, the centre of Athens was transformed into a battlefield as a result of the violent confrontations between the anarchists and the police yesterday night. Using molotov bombs, stones, chains and truncheons, the anarchists attempted to transform the two anti-nuclear demonstrations which took place in Propylaia, into a bloodbath..."

("Apogevmatini", 14 May 1986)

It should be noted that, according to the newspaper, the centre of Athens became a war zone "once more". What is in fact implied at this point is that this kind of fierce confrontation, amounting to war between the police and the "marginals" is a repetitive and endemic "abnormality". The paper adopts a stance both hostile toward the "anarchists" and critical of the "inability" of the police to act and contain the incidents.

"Avriani" follows the same line of coverage as, on May 14, a series of metaphors and exaggerations add a dramatic flavour to its report of the incidents. Thus, the metaphor "the surrounding streets were turned into an arena", referring to the clashes between the police and the demonstrators in Omonia square, has the effect of linking the events that would normally take place in an arena with the incidents. In this way the clashes could be viewed as a confrontation to the end, both violent and spectacular. Throughout the text, images of explosion and fire are combined with images of blood and violence in an effort to

stress the dramatic and spectacular nature of the events:

" ... a molotov bomb which exploded on the motorcycle. Immediately the motorcycle was wrapped in flames ... A few minutes later the petrol tank exploded, spreading panic to everyone <in the area>. ... <the police> launched a merciless hunt against the anarchists a process which was accompanied by merciless beating as 'the blood was on fire'".

("Avriani" 14 May 1986)

Even in the case of situations that could not be characterized as "incidents", "Avriani" proves to be quite inventive when it comes to reporting them. For example, "Avriani", adopted a mixture of factual and distorted reporting of the events of May 14, when the police moved suddenly to the courtyard of the Athens magistrate's court and made several unprovoked "pre-emptive" arrests of people - mostly relatives, friends and supporters of those arrested during the incidents of the previous days- who had gathered there to hear about the magistrate's decision, on its May 15 issue. The account transforms the violent arrests by the police into violent incidents attributed to the anarchists through the distortion and reversal of the roles of the participants. Thus, according to the heading of that day's reportage

"They were led to the Magistrate and their hearing continues. The anarchists are charged with criminal offences. They face ten charges - They caused incidents in the court"

("Avriani", 15 May 1896)

The headline is based on factual information insofar as those who were arrested during the incidents of May 13 were

charged with ten offences each, though only three of them were criminal offences. It is equally true that certain events took place outside the Magistrates court, that is, the "pre-emptive" arrests by the MAT forces of people waiting for the magistrate's decision. The first distortion can also be found in the same headline and it is realised through the "blurring" of the acting subject. In this way, placing the sentence "They caused incidents in the courts" without specifying the acting subject, just after "The anarchists are charged with criminal offences. They face ten charges" in which the acting subject is clearly "the anarchists", "Avriani" allows the confusion over the subjects of the sentences to take place and, therefore, the first distortion to happen. Thus, while the acting subject in "They caused incidents in the courts" is in fact the police, in the newspaper the reader can only assume that it was "the anarchists" who caused incidents in the court.

In the text that follows the headline, the paper attempts to represent the events which took place outside the court as incidents, during which two parts were interacting, in an effort to both sensationalize and justify what happened by insinuating that the provoking actor was, once more, none other than the anarchists.

In this way, under the subheading "INCIDENTS" we read

Four Police vans carrying the anarchists who had been arrested appear in the court area at around 6.30 in the afternoon.

MAT forces which have already been there occupy specific positions around the Magistrate's court where the

accused are to be brought.

Groups of anarchists are in the courtyard of the court, scattered, waiting for "the results" (=the decision) of the Magistrate.

7.30 and the disquieting ... quiet in the court area, interrupts a sudden attack of the MAT forces against the scattered anarchists.

For over half an hour, the area resembles anything else but courts. The (men of the) MAT chasing, the anarchists running, parents, who had gathered to see their children, shouting, while those who couldn't run fast were dragged to the police vans despite their protests.

(Avriani 15 May 1986: 8)

While a careful reading of this text, would suggest that the only acting part in the court area was "the police", as it was "the police" who "occupied specific positions", "attacked", "chased" and "dragged" "the anarchists" and that "the anarchists" were in fact either inactive, "waiting", or passive, were "attacked", "chased", "running" and "dragged", "Avriani", presents the events as taking place in a span of time, during which a continuous interaction between the police and the anarchists reached its climax at 7.30 with the "disquieting ... quiet" of the courts, apparently blamed on the anarchists, being interrupted as the police attacked.

Expressions such as "groups of anarchists ... scattered" and "disquieting ... quiet" suggest that the actions, or rather, the inactivity of the anarchists was pre-planned, purposeful and probably dangerous. This interpretation is based by the paper's taken-for-granted association of the "marginals" with violence and cunning. Thus, in the first case the anarchists appear to be in groups, therefore possibly organized, or even scattered, possibly having

occupied "strategic" positions in the court area, while in the second case, even the lawful "quiet" becomes "disquieting" as it is in contradiction with the stereotype of "the anarchist". In this way, therefore, the paper justifies the action of the police by reversing the blame and transforming inactivity into provocation.

The coverage of the incidents by "Eleftherotypia" has similarities with that of the other newspapers in so far as it draws considerably upon "sensational" themes and exploits imageries of confrontation and violence (Illustration 24). Thus, during the days of the incidents, dramatic headlines appear such as

**"Battlefield <the areas of> Propylaia -
Exarcheia" (May 13: 14)**

**"Attack in Exarcheia. Battles after the
demonstration" (May 14: 1)**

"VIOLENT OUTBURST"

**"* Anarchists burn police moto <=abbr. for
motorcycle> * Molotov in police van * Beatings
by MAT and 60 arrests", "Tremendous charge and
sweep in the night" (May 14: 19)**

**"Drossogiannis threatens the 'state of
anarchists'. Harsh statements on
Exarcheia" (May 21: 1)**

**"Merciless with Exarcheia. Drossogiannis
determined to 'clean up' " (May 21: 40)**

Similarly, vocabulary and metaphors emphasizing the violent character of the incidents are used throughout the coverage of the incidents. However, in contrast to the other newspapers "Eleftherotypia" does not appear to attribute the lion's share of responsibility for the incidents to the




ΕΛΕΓΧΟΕΡΟΤΗΤΙΑ

Τετάρτη 14 Μαΐου 1986

Απογευματινή Αδέσμευτη Εφημερίδα Αρ. φύλλου 3.238 Έτος 11 - Δρχ. 40

**ΝΤΟΥ ΣΤΑ
ΕΞΑΡΧΕΙΑ**

Μάχες μετά την πορεία



ΑΝΩ: Μοτοσυκλέτα της Αστυνομίας καίγεται από «μολότωφ» στην Πεσμαζόγλου. ΔΕΞΙΑ: Διαδηλωτές παριστάνουν τον (πυρηνικό) θάνατο στην απογευματινή πορεία (ΑΚΕ, αριστε- ριστών κ.λπ.). Η άλλη πορεία (ΠΑΚΟΕ, ΠΕΑΚ κ.λπ.) ελεγχθηκε σε αντισοβιετική και αντικυ βερνητική διαμαρτυρία. ΡΕΠΟΡΤΑΖ ΣΕΛ. 19,20,21

Μολότωφ, συλλήψεις και τραυματισμοί



ΑΝΩ: Μοτοσυκλέτα της Αστυνομίας καίγεται από «μολότωφ» στην Πεσμαζόγλου. ΔΕΞΙΑ: Διαδηλωτές παριστάνουν τον (πυρηνικό) θάνατο στην απογευματινή πορεία (ΑΚΕ, αριστε- ριστών κ.λπ.). Η άλλη πορεία (ΠΑΚΟΕ, ΠΕΑΚ κ.λπ.) ελεγχθηκε σε αντισοβιετική και αντικυ βερνητική διαμαρτυρία. ΡΕΠΟΡΤΑΖ ΣΕΛ. 19,20,21

anarchists, as it adopts a more balanced approach to the events or even appears to be rather cautious about the role of the police in triggering the incidents, and in some cases highly critical about the tactics of violence and arrests exhibited by the police.

Characteristic in this respect is the editorial of "Eleftherotypia" which appeared on May 13, which comprized ironic comments and caustic criticisms addressed to the police and the leadership of the ministry of public order

"Chernobyl here!"

"Not even as ... side-effect of the nuclear cloud can be explained yesterday's over-functioning of the thirioid ¹⁸ of Mr Arkoudeas <ie. the police officer in charge of the police operations in the area of Greater Athens>, who transformed a peaceful demonstration against nuclear power, into a police explosion in the heart of Athens. And certainly the question is, did all this happen due to excessive zeal displayed by mr Arkoudeas and his men, or because of "a new spirit" in the ministry of public order.

<.....>

Of course the new political leadership of the ministry of Public Order understands what the developments after yesterday's incidents is going to be. New marches, new rallies, not anymore against Chernobyl but with a totally domestic content. And this is one more of our "successes". That is, we managed to transform Chernobyl into a domestic political problem.

<.....>

Or is it that the non-aligned and autonomist <citizens> are used for releasing the tension of the policemen so that they could not lose ... their temper in front of those who are mainstream party supporters?

(Eleftherotypia, 13 May 1986: 8)

In this ironic editorial "Eleftherotypia", taking the opportunity of the unprovoked escalation of police violence of the previous day, expressed its concern about the "confrontational" policies of the ministry of public order.

It could be argued that what is expressed in this editorial are fears that this confrontational attitude of the government might be the prelude to and cause of the escalation of protest. It should be pointed out that the anti-police stance and the adoption of a critical line vis-a-vis confrontational and suppressive governmental practices by "Eleftherotypia" do not reflect a "pro-marginal" stance of the newspaper but a more general commitment to political practices oriented towards consensus and negotiation rather than confrontation, consistent with its effort to represent itself as a newspaper of the "democratic left", committed to pluralism and tolerance. It is in this context that contrary to the attitude of the other newspapers, "Eleftherotypia" expresses rather different fears, that is fears for the marginalization of the area of Exarcheia, not so much because of the presence of "marginal groups" there, but because of the constant police presence, the continuous police operations and police violence.

Characteristic in this respect is the reportage which appeared on May 17 under the heading "EXARCHEIA, the residents and shopkeepers disturbed because of police occupation" which contained a series of interviews with residents, shopkeepers and people working in the area, in which the interviewees accused the police of disrupting everyday life, causing loss of trade for the shopkeepers of the area, terrorizing the residents and frequently resorting to violence and exhibition of power, and a further reportage

under the heading "The other Exarcheia. Operation 'Virtue' and the operation for profit from property <speculation>" in which the reporter argued that the area was treated as an experimental subject for testing new methods of police practices, that the issue of "Exarcheia" was being used as a means of distraction of the public from important issues, and linked the police operations in the area with the project of the ministry of environment and planning for a radical reconsideration of the planning of the area and its land-uses, and with alleged extensive speculation over land and property.

Therefore, while other newspapers express fears for the escalation of disorder, "Eleftherotypia" expresses its own fears for the disappearance of the character of the area, the deterioration of the quality of life of the residents as the state intervenes in the area with both its planning and policing apparatuses and opens the way for private property speculators to step in.¹⁷

The coverage of the incidents during this period proved to be the prelude to a shift in the interest of the press from the incidents themselves to issue of lawlessness and anarchy in the area of "Exarcheia" which was effectively identified as the source of the problem. In the context of this renewed preoccupation of the press with the "problem of Exarcheia", the term "state of the anarchists in Exarcheia" re-emerged once more in political discourse, and was taken up by an eager press and subsequently entered the domain of

public debate.

So, on May 14, extensive publicity was given in the Athens press to the statements made by the minister of Public Order Antonis Drossogiannis on the incidents of the previous day, during his routine weekly meeting with representatives of the media in which a wide range of subjects related to the activities of the ministry were normally discussed. In a remarkable uniformity, all of the newspapers monitored introduced selected parts of the press conference under similar headings:

"Final solution will be given to the problem, Drossogiannis pointed out. Decisive measures for the cleaning up of Exarcheia from the anarchists" (Avriani)

"Drossogiannis: The problem has gone too far. This is how I shall clean up Exarcheia" (Ethnos)

"Drossogiannis: I shall clean up Exarcheia" (Eleftherotypia)

"Cleaning up of Exarcheia is planned by the police" (Apogevmatini)

"Drossogiannis: 'No <anarchist> state in Exarcheia'" (Ta Nea).

All of the reports share an underlying common concern over the existence of a problem in the area of Exarcheia. That concern is most easily traced through the reporters' questions to the minister. Their main preoccupation was the "problem" of Exarcheia and more precisely the measures that the government had or planned to take in order to tackle it. Notwithstanding the - sometimes substantial - discrepancies

between the accounts of the ministry briefing in each newspaper. They all considered as important the parts of the conversation between the minister and the reporters concerning the existence of a "state within the state" in Exarcheia and the possible course of remedy to the problem. All with some variations, drew upon the points made by the minister on these issues. In "Ethnos" and "Ta Nea" the coverage of the press conference began with an almost identical - possibly verbatim from the press conference - combination of some of these points:

"The state is one. I cannot recognize in any area the status of a state within a state. You shall see that in time Exarcheia will become similar to all the other boroughs of Athens."

(Ethnos, 14 May 1986: 9)

"The state is one and I cannot recognize in any area the status of a state within a state. You shall see that in time Exarcheia will become similar to the other boroughs of Athens."

(Ta Nea, 14 May 1986: 11)

while "Avriani", after reporting that "drastic measures are going to be taken in order to eliminate completely the daily problem caused by the anarchists in the area" continued its coverage quoting the same points:

"I cannot accept in any case that the anarchists have established a "state" in Exarcheia. There is not any other state but the Greek. Soon, we are going to take a series of drastic measures so that in a while, Exarcheia will become similar to the rest of the areas of Athens."

(Avriani, 14 May 1986: 5)

"Apogevmatini" focused on these points as well; however probably because of its political support of the opposition

"Nea Dimokratia" party, its own account of the discussion between the minister and the reporters concentrated mostly on the issue of the government's inability to act and the lack of political will for decisive action, as a series of questions and answers which had not appeared in other papers were quoted.

- MINISTER: "There is no such issue. And concerning what you call 'state of Exarheia' there are no special privileges"
- REPORTER: "But the fact <state of Exarcheia> exists?"
- MINISTER: "You are going to see soon, that after the <new> measures are going to be implemented, the area will become similar to all other areas of Athens."
- REPORTER: "What are these measures?"
- MINISTER: "You are going to see them."
- REPORTER: "So the situation will be perpetuated, or are you going to adopt a harder line? What is your political will?"
- MINISTER: "What do you think. You are going to be persuaded soon."

(Apogevmatini, 14 May 1986: 2)

Concentrating on this part of the press conference, the newspapers appear to attempt to bring to the foreground of public debate the "problem" of Exarcheia. By publishing parts of the press conference referring to the "existence of a state within the state" in Exarcheia, despite their reporting of the categorical denial of the minister of public order on that matter, the newspapers have in fact re-introduced the issue into the universe of public discourse.

As the issue had, once more, been introduced into the universe of public discourse, the conditions for the renewal of public concern and, possibly, the mobilization of fears emerged. The reference to the existence of a "state" other than the "legitimate" one, although metaphorical, and its

placement in a specific territory, Exarcheia, gives a "material" or "objective" quality to the problem, and a sense of immediacy to the danger it is supposed to represent.

In this context, public disquiet and fears are generated by and can be channelled toward a more tangible threat which is defying the "legitimate" state and its rightful jurisdiction over a part of its territory. As the problem has been therefore identified, and "objectified", the newspapers accept at face value (Ethnos, Ta Nea, Eleftherotypia) or appear to anticipate (Avriani), or even to ask for harder measures doubting the political will and the resolve of the government to support sincerely the surgical-removal-type remedy assigned to the police (Apogevmatini).

CHAPTER 8

THE PRESS, MORAL PANICS AND THE REPRODUCTION
OF AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The analysis of the case studies in the previous chapter shows that the patterns of the coverage by the Athens daily press of forms of collective action by 'marginal' groupings and their confrontations with the authorities throughout the period 1981-86 share similarities with the phenomenon which Stanley Cohen has termed 'moral panic', that is, a process whereby

"A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly it appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in a way society conceives itself." (S. Cohen, 1980: 9)

The case studies show that the Athens press played an important part in the creation, and the convergence of a series of moral panics during the 1980s by publicizing

essentially localized events, involving mainly the "marginals", presenting them in stylized and stereotypical fashion, and redefining them as a threat to society, morality and democratic stability. During the periods of the perceived "crisis", definitions, diagnoses and solutions were sought by the Athens dailies from authoritative experts. Among them, state functionaries, the police, and representatives of the local communities which were affected were invited to give their opinions and thus helped in the shaping public opinion. However, the most crucial role was played by the mainstream political organizations, their leaders and spokesmen, who offered ritualistic definitions of the situation, defining simultaneously the boundaries of "deviance" and of the "political" and denying the "marginals" a political voice. The impact of the panics was not negligible; they not only remained in collective memory, but also had significant repercussions as far as aspects of legal and social policy were concerned. But more importantly, they had a significant impact in the reproduction of aspects of the Greek political culture, that is, in the ways the political is defined and instituted in Greek society.

Through the press coverage of the events, the uneven confrontation between the state, the mainstream political parties and the police on the one hand, and the 'marginals' on the other, or, at a higher level of abstraction, the competition between the hegemonic political culture and the alternative discourses and action of the 'marginal' milieu

were represented - and experienced by parts of the public - as a confrontation between helpless communities of 'ordinary' citizens and organized gangs of deviants, and eventually as a confrontation between society and an anti-social enemy. To be sure, these remarks are not intended to suggest that the "marginals" were arbitrarily labelled "deviant" or "criminals". What is important however is the fact that instances of politically meaningful action were misrecognized, or rather transformed into instances of deviant behaviour, and their anti-state and anti-partocratic discourses were represented as anti-social discourses, threatening the fabric of society.

Press representations of the "marginals" and of the events included in the case studies of the previous chapter, as well as of a series of similar events which took place throughout the 1980s such as the protests against the visit of Jean Marie Le Pen to Greece (December 1984), the killing of a 15-year-old youth by a policeman and the Polytechnic School occupation which followed it (November 1985), or the protest marches against the incarceration of anarchist and leftist citizens (November 1988) has been crucial in several respects. First, it provided a body of information on the basis of which social representations of the "marginals" were built. This information was not derived from the public's experience of direct contact with the "marginals"; rather, it was information processed by the press and therefore structured by the particular constraints under which the

Athens press had to operate. Indeed, throughout the coverage of these events, a multitude of commercial and political considerations, as well as cultural constraints - to which I referred earlier - were at play and influenced considerably press performance, and therefore the information diffused in the form of "news stories".

Second, it influenced, if not determined, later stages of societal reaction towards the "marginals" and, at the political level in particular, it played a major role in "undermining" their discourse, and divesting their actions of any rational or moral basis, or political motivation. What is more, it played a major role in the maintenance of the relations of political domination because by drawing on the definitions of the situation of the official discourse it re-affirmed the central position of the established participants in the sphere of political debate. Insofar as it provided information regarding the acceptable (or not acceptable) participants in the political process, the legitimate (or not legitimate) methods and modes of political action, the political or non-political character of issues, press coverage of the events constituted an important medium for the diffusion and publicizing of specific definitions of the situation, especially definitions of the "political". By effectively participating in the processes of the social construction of the political sphere, especially at a time when its boundaries were challenged by a social and political minority - the "marginals", the Athens press played a

significant role in the reproduction of elements of the political culture.

The remainder of this chapter explores the relationship between news production by the Athens press, and the reproduction of aspects of the Greek political culture, through the further development and interpretation of the assessment of press performance which I attempted in the previous chapter, paying particular attention to those aspects of the press response and societal reaction to the events, which are pertinent to the reproduction of the Greek political culture.

For the purposes of the analysis which will follow I shall distinguish three main processes of press response to the events which have been included in the case studies, and three corresponding sets of potential effects, or potential societal reaction (Table 16). As far as the press response to the events is concerned, we could distinguish the processes of (i) inventory formation and sensitization, (ii) undermining the discourse and action of the "marginals", and (iii) reproduction of the official discourse and definitions of the situation. These processes of press response had three sets of corresponding potential effects as far as the societal reaction towards the events was concerned, notably,

(i) increased public awareness of the events and activation of processes of societal reinterpretation and redefinition of the actors and the events,

(ii) elimination of the symbolic and political capital and symbolic isolation and exclusion of the "marginals", and

(iii) confirmation of the position and authority of the "legitimate participants" in political debate.

TABLE 25
Processes of press response and corresponding potential effects.

Press Response	Potential Effects
event	
(i) inventory formation and sensitization, mobilization of 'common sense' schemes of cognition, perception, and practice	increased public awareness of the events, activation of processes of reinterpretation and redefinition of actors and events
(ii) undermining/subverting the discourse and action of the "marginals" and divesting their actions of their rational or moral motivation	elimination of the symbolic and political capital of the "marginals", symbolic isolation and exclusion of the "marginals"
(iii) adoption of official discourse and of official definitions of the situation	confirmation of the position and authority of the "legitimate participants" in political debate, maintenance of their control over the universe of political discourse

It should however be emphasized that the processes of press response, as well as their effects, are not in practice clearly distinct; nor is the order in which they are presented here intended to suggest the existence of a

temporal sequence of actually distinct stages of press response or societal reaction to the events. In fact, the processes of press response, and their potential effects, should be regarded as overlapping and interdependent, as one complements and reinforces the other. Thus, the process of the reproduction of the official definitions of the situation and the process of undermining the discourse of the "marginals" cannot be clearly distinguished from that of the formation of the inventory as they are all synchronous in their emergence and interdependent in their unfolding.

Following the occurrence of the initial event, the press responded through the formation of the inventory, that is, the initial interpretation and presentation of the event, of its background and impact, and of the main actors involved in it.¹⁶ The importance of the inventory lies in the fact that it was this body of processed and organized information that constituted the basis of the public - mediated - experience of the events, and of the public reaction to them. What is more, the inventory provided the raw material for the construction of culturally identifiable symbols which further reinforced social perceptions of the "marginals" as different and peculiar, and set in motion processes of reinterpretation and redefinition of the events and the actors involved in them. More precisely, these processes of sensitization were in fact processes whereby events or situations which would have previously been regarded as neutral or ambiguous, were linked and reinterpreted as

potentially or actually threatening.¹⁹ In this way, events which would not normally have been the focus of public attention or, at least, not perceived as a threat to society, were reinterpreted, and the "marginals" involved in these events "redefined" as different, dangerous and threatening.

It is already obvious that the processes of inventory formation and of sensitization contained elements which prepared the ground for what could be called undermining of the discourse and of the moral or rational basis of the collective action of the "marginals". Despite the fact that the reported irrational behaviour of the "marginals" was not always, or entirely, a product of the imagination of journalists, it should be stressed that whenever the former attempted to criticize or challenge aspects of social and political life on the grounds of their "immoral" or "irrational" character, the press either disregarded, or attempted to refute their arguments. Thus, as it has been shown in the case studies, strategies undermining the credibility of the "marginals" were repeatedly employed. One of the most characteristic examples was the press coverage of the building occupations of November 1981, when all efforts of the "marginals" to get their message across were met with strategies of undermining the message's validity and the "marginals'" credibility (for example pp. 256-262). As far as the "political motivation" of the "marginals" is concerned, although their actions were not always primarily, or exclusively 'political' in character, it is equally true that during the coverage of the events, the symbols of

difference, peculiarity, and threat contained in the inventory were exaggerated and mobilized in such a way so as to diminish or eliminate the political aspects of the discourse and collective action of the "marginals". As far as the potential effect of this modality of press reaction is concerned, it could be argued that such processes led to the symbolic isolation and exclusion of the "marginals" from the domain of political and, more generally, public debate.

The third feature of press response to the events was the adoption, publicizing and reproduction of the "official" at the expense of alternative definitions of the situation". In this stage, the coverage of the events, confirmed the status quo as far as the relations of political domination were concerned. The emphasis of the press on the "peculiarity", and "strangeness" of the "marginals" and the virtual elimination of their capacity to participate in political discourse, or in any other form of public debate for that matter, left the field free for the state and the established, mainstream political organizations. Newspapers turned to government ministers, or to these organizations for interpretations of the situation, ritualistic condemnations of the "marginals" and affirmations of the hold of mainstream political organizations over social life. But more importantly, the recourse of the press to these "socially accredited" political actors for "authoritative comment" or information, was tantamount to their recognition, and representation, as the sole legitimate actors in the political sphere, the only acceptable mediators between

citizens and the state.

Primary Definitions and Press Languages

During the confrontations between the authorities and the "marginals", given the asymmetrical relations of power among the competing groups and definitions of the situation derived from their practices and discourses, the press relied and publicized those definitions of the situation offered by the socially accredited authorities, that is, the definitions which constituted the core of the statements made primarily by representatives of the government and the mainstream political parties and their subsidiary social and political organizations, opinions of spokespersons of the 'community' - local and national - and information and statements made by the police and their political superiors at the Ministry of Public Order.

Whereas it is obvious that these primary definitions constituted the 'raw material' which underlay the media coverage of the events, as the majority of the Athens press appear to have relied on, and been influenced by official accounts of the situation, it is also clear that newspapers 'translated' them in particular public languages.²⁰ It is in this context that we can make sense of the divergence in the language, narrative styles and imagery employed, and of the different positions adopted by each newspaper, without, at the same time, disregarding the significant underlying similarities in press performance.

These "languages" employed by newspapers are dependent upon two major factors: the particular paper's political party affiliation or sympathies, and on assumptions about its readership and their "language". Newspaper "languages" therefore are not simply distinct because of their particular grammatical, syntactic or stylistic aspects; they are also informed by the - assumed - collective social and political experiences, memories, traditions and practices of each newspaper's readership. Thus, whereas most dailies emphasize the anti-social character of the "marginals", each of them interprets this character in ways influenced by its political affiliation and its assumptions about the ways in which anti-social behaviour is 'understood' and 'defined' by its readers. The conservative papers analyzed in the case studies tended to operate within the cultural and linguistic boundaries set by the discourses of right-wing political organizations, thus emphasizing their opposition to the PASOK government, and criticizing its inability to restore order. At the same time, they employed the language and rhetoric derived from the assumed collective experiences, memory and ideology of their predominantly politically and socially conservative public; the ideology and practice of anticommunism, memories of the Civil War, and fears of left-wing insurrection, chaos and anarchy. Conversely, papers of the centre-left operated within different cultural and linguistic contexts set by the political parties of the centre-left, and the papers' assumptions about their readership and their 'language'.

However, these 'languages' were often overlapping to such an extent that the above remarks should not be construed as implying a polarization between watertight 'right' and 'left-wing' cultural contexts. On the contrary, most 'popular' - or even 'serious' - newspapers across the political spectrum have adopted a more or less populist 'language' and rhetoric derived from 'popular', 'common-sense' schemes of cognition, perception and practice and mobilized a sense of collective disquiet, and consequently a sense of community. This populist 'language' and rhetoric mobilized aspects of the 'popular imagination', that is, themes which the 'average' citizen could identify with regardless of political conviction. The roots of this populist 'language' and rhetoric in 'common-sense' combined with its articulation to the official discourse made imperative the support or even protection of the existing political arrangements and social order. Thus, populist 'language' and rhetoric brought to the fore shared experiences and memories of 'ordinary citizens', 'family people', 'working persons', 'small shop-owners', 'widows' and 'elderly people' as it has been seen in the analysis of the case studies, and constituted the raw material with which the press representations of the marginals were constructed. What is more, it was this popular language and rhetoric which provided fertile ground for the construction of - mainly imagined, in the sense of Anderson's use of the word (Anderson, 1983) - experiences of 'fellowship' and 'community' among the press readership and, more generally, the public.

Media Representations of the "Marginals"

If we examine how the particular events and, more generally, the issue of the "marginals" were interpreted and presented by the mass media we find convincing evidence of common, or at least similar, and repeated signifying and symbolic strategies.

First, it could be argued that the coverage of the events, or in some cases "non-events", by the majority of the Athens dailies was characterized by a considerable degree of over-reporting. Sensationalization, distortion and exaggeration appear to have been universal and newspapers were highly selective in their representation of the events, mostly focusing on particular, 'alarming' aspects of the collective action of the "marginals". The selective presentation, and the emphasis on "irrational" or "offensive" and "alien" aspects of the events were crucial in the creation of a series of stereotypes of the "marginals" which, in turn, were frequently employed in further press coverage. In this way, themes which amplified the sense of danger, impending disaster, or of disorder, lawlessness and chaos were routinely employed in order to convey to the public a sense of profound social crisis, of a continuous threat to the moral and political order.

Among the most important elements of the press inventory were the themes of violence, vandalism and disruption. It should be noted that a common emphasis on these themes could be detected in media representations of youth subcultures

such as the case of the British 'Mods and Rockers' in the 1960s, in which the British media focused on distressing images of blood and violence, or on exaggerated and rather distorted accounts of the disruption and damage caused by them (Cohen, 1980).

Throughout the coverage of the events particular emphasis was laid on the use of presentation techniques which amplified the impression of violence as newspapers attempted to attract and shock readers with stories of violence, destruction and disruption, by dwelling on the most "incomprehensible" feature of the behaviour of the "marginals". The theme of violence, complemented by those of destruction and disruption was central in the inventory of the events because of its capacity to capture the attention of the public and to sensitize it. Images of violence, destruction and disruption conveyed by detailed - and occasionally exaggerated - press descriptions of the confrontations between the "marginals" on the one hand, and the police, or outraged residents, on the other, of injuries inflicted, or of destroyed property were intended to increase public interest, and at the same time to reinforce the feeling of threat and the assumed "abnormal", antisocial character of the "marginals" and to increase the sense of distance between them and "ordinary people".

In this context, single events involving some form of violence, damage or disruption, were represented as a series of occurrences, as a generalized state of chaos. Similarly, incidents not apparently linked with the "marginals", such as

the bombing of Citibank in 1985 - a not very unusual event in Athens in the 1980s - were readily attributed to the "marginals" despite the lack of any evidence or concrete information. So one incident between the police and the "marginals" came to be routinely referred to as "incidents", or even as "all-out confrontation". One bombing by unknown persons would be reported under the headline "They blew up banks" - where "they" would refer to the "marginals". Even the lack of incidents or of violence was, on occasion, transformed into news stories linked with the theme of violence, or imminent violence at least. Characteristic of this, is the coverage of the court hearings of those arrested during the events which followed the anti-nuclear demonstrations of 1986 in which Avriani emphasized the danger which, it alleged, was inherent in the quiet outside the courts (Avriani 15 May 1986). In such instances, behaviour which did not appear to conform to the press stereotype of violence and threat, was interpreted in such a way so as not to contradict it while, conversely, any kind of behaviour that corresponded to the press stereotypes was immediately attributed to the "marginals" even when no evidence could justify such allegations.

Another recurrent theme in press representations of the "marginals" was that of conspiracy or of organized threat. The majority of the papers monitored shared conspiracy-centered interpretations of the events, as on several occasions press reports implied or explicitly stated that the "marginals" were in fact organized conspirators, following

plans of action and aiming to create maximum disruption.

In other reports, a theme closely related to that of premeditation was predominant, as the "marginals" were represented as "agitators" or "agents provocateurs" serving unknown interests, or seeking to "destabilize democracy". This emphasis on alleged premeditation, on the deliberate intent of the "marginals", or on the existence of secret plans of political destabilization, has no factual basis, as the groups of "marginals" were in fact loose and unstable collectivities, sometimes formed "on the spur of the moment". No evidence has been produced to back press allegations regarding the presence of structured groups, or of premeditated action, although some semblance of organization - albeit loose, fragile and spontaneous - appeared to emerge in the course of some of the events, for example the empty building occupations of 1981-82, or the occupation of the building of the Athens University Chemistry Department ("Chimeio"). In any case, the press allegations regarding the premeditated character of the events seem to be the product of distortion and exaggeration.

Another central element in press representations of the "marginals" is the theme of affluence, a theme which was also prevalent in mass media representations of youth subcultures and counter-cultures in other European societies during the 1960s. Indeed, apart from the case of the Greek "marginals", "affluence" appears to have been an important part of the signifying and symbolic strategies employed by the press.

More precisely, Cohen, in his analysis of the content of the mass media inventory of the "Mods and Rockers" phenomenon in Britain, included affluence in the ten main elements of the media inventory (Cohen, 1980: 35). Similarly, Lumley (1990: 74), in his study of the Italian social movements in the late 1960s, among other negative representations of the student movement which appeared in the Italian press, quotes a statement made by Pier Paolo Pasolini, a PCI sympathizer, which appeared in "L'Espresso" (16 June 1968):

"You have the faces of spoilt brats, and I hate you, like I hate your fathers When yesterday at Valle Giulia you beat up the police, I sympathized with the police because they are the sons of the poor." (quoted in Lumley: 74)

Although there is no express reference to affluence in this text, the contrast between the police (sons of the poor) and the "spoilt brats" (therefore sons of the affluent middle class) is a quite powerful one, linking the theme of affluence to the student revolt.

It could be argued that in all three cases, the emphasis on "affluence" played a very important role in the mobilization of specific elements of the 'common', 'popular' culture against the political or social "deviants". More precisely, the theme of "affluence" brings to the fore of public attention elements of popular culture through which the disapproval of the existing distribution of wealth and opportunities, and of the relations of exploitation within society by the subaltern classes and groups manifests itself.

The theme of "affluence" carries connotations of inequality, exploitation, or corruption, and is certainly linked with popular resentment.

In all three cases, the inclusion of the theme of "affluence" in the mass media inventories opened the way for the construction of symbols, which further reinforced social perceptions of difference: the "deviants", be they the British "Mods and Rockers", or the Italian students, or the Greek "marginals", were definitely "not of the people" as they were rich kids, or spoilt children of middle-class parents. Eventually, the possible ambiguity as far as the "status" of these groups was concerned, gave its place to certainty as the linkage of the theme of "affluence" to the particular groups which appeared to be socially or politically deviant, had as a result the re-orientation of popular disapproval from the abstract category of "the rich" towards them in all three cases.

To return to the case of the 'marginals' in Greece, it could be argued that the allegations, especially in the 'popular' press, that the leaders or the members of marginal groups were rich, or came from 'good families', were intended to stress the impression of "difference" of the "marginals" from the "people", and eventually to discredit and isolate them. This was achieved by the articulation within the "official" discourse of elements of the 'popular' culture through which was expressed the popular disapproval of existing inequalities in wealth and opportunities. Thus, in press representations, the alleged "affluence" of the

"marginals" became a symbol of difference on the basis of which the allegedly affluent marginals became the object of popular resentment. The negative connotations of exploitation and corruption, carried by "affluence" made the sense of difference more profound and eventually provided the ground for the second stage of press reaction to the "marginals", that is, the undermining of their discourse and actions. Through this emphasis on the non-popular character of the "marginals", the latter were discredited, their discourse was undermined, their actions lost any moral or rational basis they might have had, and consequently, they were set in opposition to "ordinary people".

Thus, the actual or potential political meaning of the actions of the marginals was effectively dissimulated and neutralized; most papers attributed the events to irrational behaviour of 'spoilt' children of bourgeois families (in a way reminiscent of Pasolini's ironic redefinition of the Italian students as "figli di papa"), and emphasized the disruption they caused to "ordinary" people, whereas they paid little or no attention to the predominant anti-status-quo discourses and action of the 'marginals'.

The antithesis between the 'marginals' and the "people" seems to have been enhanced by the representation of the former as "lazy" or "idle". Here again, in the alleged contempt for work of the "marginals", one can detect the mobilization of elements of the 'popular' culture, in which 'work' is a central everyday activity, a symbol of social status and respectability.

Premised upon this recognition, the press attempted to establish the difference between the "people" and the "marginals" by vindicating the value of hard-work identified with the "common people" and by denouncing the "marginals'" contempt for work. Thus, the contempt of the "marginals" for "paid work" on the grounds of it being a form of economic exploitation, was generalized by the press as it was represented as contempt for any kind of work, as a predisposition to laziness and idleness and proof of the "marginals'" irresponsibility, and was therefore construed as contempt for societal norms and popular values. This was achieved through the distortion, dissimulation and selective presentation of aspects of the discourse and action of the "marginals". For example, in order to justify the representation of the "marginals" as idle, lazy and irresponsible, most of the newspapers monitored had to play down or ignore the collective work of "marginals" for the repair of the empty buildings occupied during 1981-82 as it would undermine the assumptions built in the inventory.

Closely related to the theme of contempt for work appears to be the emphasis laid by the press on the centrality of "pleasure" in the slogans and the ideology of the "marginals". This theme also, was exploited by the newspapers in the context of the relationship of pleasure with "work" in the popular imagination. More precisely, as in the popular imagination, "pleasure" was assumed to be a reward for hard work, while, in the countercultural milieu of the "marginals", pleasure and spare time were thought to

have a value of their own, it was apparent that the "marginals" appeared to challenge the "natural" sequence. The Athens press was keen to take up this issue and to transform a cultural difference, a different evaluation of "pleasure" and of its relationship with "work", into an incomprehensible perversion, a threatening deviation, into contempt for social norms and popular values.

Another prominent theme in the press representations of the "marginals" was that of their foreignness as the majority of the Athens press laid particular emphasis on the "foreign" character of the "marginals" and their practices. From the implicitly xenophobic emphasis on the 'foreign' character of the occupations, to the overtly racist identification of the alleged leader of the Chimeio occupation as 'Jewish', there seems to be an underlying rejection of any links between the marginals and the 'people' or the 'nation'. For example, the majority of the newspapers monitored, treated the occupations of empty houses of 1981-82 as an imitative response to similar actions which had taken place in other European countries; they condemned the action as "alien" to Greek society and politics, refusing in this way to examine its political significance. Similarly, the alleged leader of the occupation of Chimeio in 1985, was "denounced" by "Avriani" as a "Jew", a member of an ethnic or religious minority, and thus an "alien" to the Greek, predominantly monoethnic/religious culture, apparently not entitled to protest.

The theme of foreignness, in any of its variations, was introduced for the mobilization of elements of "common sense"

xenophobia and prejudice incorporated in popular culture, and was employed by the Athens press in order to isolate the "marginals" by "symbolically" ostracizing them from the national - and political - community and, at the same time, to convey the sense of exaggerated threat to its readership as the element of "foreignness" in the representations of the "marginals" was interpreted as a threat against popular unity and identity.

However, the emphasis on the themes that have been outlined in the preceding pages, appears to be characteristic of the articulation of the broader populist rhetoric of the majority of the newspapers monitored with the official discourse. Thus, press discourses are characterized by the expression of suspicion of the existence of "parasitic" or "corrupting" entities "within", which are characterized by their generally anti-social behaviour on the one hand, and the creation of a "popular" community, the existence and interests of which were in need of defence, on the other.

The theme of anti-social behaviour underlay most elements of the press representations of the "marginals", but it was also introduced into public debate in an explicit way on several occasions through the identification of the milieu of the "marginals" with the criminal underworld. Criminalization of political opposition has been a persistent feature of Greek history, especially after the civil war, and the outlawing of the Communist Party and its allies. Under the shadow of this "tradition", the "marginals", refusing to become integrated into the political system, were therefore

associated with crime and their protest acquired connotations of violence and irrationality. By identifying the "marginals" with criminal gangs, drug-traffickers or terrorists, and their leaders with gang bosses and "godfathers", the press attempted to increase the tension that had already been created between "ordinary people" and the "marginals", who, according to the press coverage, not only failed to become integrated within "popular" norms and customs, but also were a "corrupting" agent and constituted a serious threat for law and order and the moral fabric of society.

In addition to their systematic representation as social outsiders, the "marginals" were also represented as outsiders in terms of spatial exteriority. This was achieved through the "territorialization" of the alleged threat of the "marginals" through which the division between "them" and "society" became sharper. As I have argued in my discussion of the case studies, press references to a "state" other than the "legitimate" one, and its association with a specific territory "objectified" the "problem" of the marginals and provided the basis for social distinction between insiders/outsideers.

Finally, the forms of collective action taken by the marginals in a variety of occasions, were de-historicized and thereby effectively rendered meaningless. The possible political significance of the marginals' collective action and expressive behaviour was effectively neutralized and symbolically repressed as their actions were represented as irrational, lacking any historical background, and therefore

as meaningless. While common sense operates on the basis of a "cause-effect" sequence of events, throughout the coverage of the events the Athens press, with the occasional exception of "Eleftherotypia", separated cause and effect. Thus, the "marginals" appeared to act unprovoked, and their action was rendered unintelligible for the newspaper readers. What is more, even when they were offered access to the mass media, the minimization, if not the virtual elimination of the symbolic capital of the marginals was the price they had to pay for this, as the Athens dailies in fact constituted an arena of discursive struggle where the relations of power were asymmetrical. Whenever views of marginals were carried, under the guise of 'impartial', 'objective' and 'pluralistic' information, their credibility, was eliminated through complex strategies including cynicism, or irony.

In this way, press coverage of the events provided the basis for representations of the "people", an idealized community, virtually identified with its political "expression" (i.e. the state, the political parties and democracy) being under threat by the "marginals". Indeed, despite the existence of serious party-political divisions among the established political parties, it could be argued that news-reporting played the role of "political ritual", asserting the unity of the "people", or of other similar "idealized" communities such as "youth", or the "student movement" over and beyond party lines. The Athens newspapers frequently employed a rhetoric of community, whereby "diversity", especially the perceived deviance of the

"marginals" was treated as a threat to its survival. What is particularly important at this point is the convergence of "community" and its legitimate organized political expression - that is, the political parties - in most of the texts analyzed. More precisely, the mainstream political parties, party youth or student organizations were treated as the legitimate and sole representatives of the "people", the "youth movement", or the "student movement". We can thus detect the unfolding of strategies of fusion between the "political" (as defined by the mainstream political parties) and the "social" in the coverage of the events. According to the press coverage, it would seem that society is represented or expressed through the mainstream political parties; other social or political identities which are potentially antagonistic to the former do not appear to be able to compete in terms of access to the mass media and therefore to public debate. This appears to be one of the reasons why the "marginals" were virtually excluded from public debate and could not express their political views. The under-secretary for youth was treated as the sole authority on youth problems, and his opinion was given the necessary authority to contradict "hard facts", notably youth dissatisfaction and alienation in the streets of Athens.

However, it would be misleading to suggest that press coverage was not characterized by some degree of diversity. As it has already been seen, apart from the case of "Eleftherotypia" which differed considerably from the rest of the press by allowing alongside more "orthodox" views, some

space to "heretical" statements from "marginals" or parts of the far left concerned about the intensification of state control, the coverage of the other Athens dailies varied only in terms of style and "press languages".

What is more, the "exception" of Eleftherotypia to the general pattern of press coverage could be explained by the fact that the paper recognized the need to balance its coverage in order to accommodate both the diverse views and backgrounds of its readership and the reproduction of some elements of the official discourse. Although the paper had to cater for a substantial part of its readership which was critically disposed towards official definitions of the situation, Eleftherotypia also had interests related to the reproduction of aspects of the Greek political system and therefore of aspects of the official definitions of the situation. This is why the imagery and linguistic/visual material used in the coverage of the events often resembled that of other newspapers (see for example illustration 24, p. 344) or the same socially accredited authorities recruited by other papers were also invited to offer their definitions of the situation in the pages of Eleftherotypia (see for instance the paper's coverage of the building occupations (pp. 263-64)).

According to the evidence presented here, the press played an important role in the reproduction and maintenance of the hegemonic political culture, including its internal contradictions. Thus, while it played a significant role in the maintenance of the boundaries of the "political", it also

reproduced the range of views which are acceptable within the latter. Important as it may be to reflect inter-party conflict in news coverage, this is not by itself a sufficient indication of a democratic political culture.

On the contrary, the analysis of press coverage of the "marginals" indicates that the Athens press contributed to the reproduction of a closed universe of political discourse, deterring the formation of new, alternative social and political identities and setting obstacles to the articulation of new political discourses. Throughout the coverage of the events, the Athens newspapers very often resorted to distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate political actors, ideologies and forms of political action. This application of what Agnoli termed "democratic distinction" was premised on an unconditional acceptance of the monopoly of the established political parties over the sphere of politics, and at the same time the rejection of attempts to create alternative political spaces, and to challenge the traditional clientelistic mode of political and social "representation". Thus, the phenomenon of the occupations which took place in 1981, or of the formation of an anti-nuclear umbrella organization were either treated with indifference, or, more often, denounced and dismissed as they constituted alternative forms of political and social action, albeit of limited popularity.

The Athens press, far from constituting a public space for independent debate and representation and negotiation, constituted a restrictive factor in the universe of political

discourse. Operating within the context of an authoritarian political culture where the answer to political deviance is exclusion, symbolic segregation and containment of political deviance, it maintained cultural closure by reproducing the hegemonic political culture.

CONCLUSIONS

In this discussion a case was presented for examining the relationship between mass communication and political culture. If we link the concept of political culture to post-Parsonian social theory, political culture can be interpreted as the product of the interplay between action and structure, and can be understood as the sets of cognitive, perceptual and practical schemata through which the "political" is constructed, understood and experienced by the members of a group or a society. I further argued that political culture should be seen as the outcome of continuous negotiation and social struggle for the definition of the political.

On the other hand, mass communication can be considered to constitute a domain of action, negotiation and social struggle with increasing importance in contemporary societies. It is through the mass media that our understanding of the political is mediated: the definitions of the political which determine which issues will enter the sphere of public awareness, discussion and collective action; the terms in which these issues are discussed; the criteria for legitimate participation in the public debate; and the parameters of the ensuing debates and discussions. It is therefore important to examine the role of the mass media in this process of construction and reproduction of the "political" in contemporary societies. In particular, this

examination of media representations of the "political" provides a means to assess the degree of openness or closure of the universe of political discourse and action in a society.

I have shown that the theories which emphasize the need for a "public sphere" (Habermas 1989, Curran 1991, Keane 1991), or of "public spaces" (Melucci 1989) for the democratization of developed societies, place great importance on the institutions or public spaces that define and constitute a public realm in these societies. Among these institutions are the mass media, as well as self-managed and voluntary associations, within which political debate can take place freely, unhindered by the state or organized economic interests.

This clearly makes the reconceptualization of political culture a very important task; the concept of the "public sphere" as a normative standard in contemporary political processes, and therefore as a normative dimension of this process of reconceptualization of political culture, is a significant element of the study of the "political" in contemporary societies. The study of political culture should focus on collective action and everyday practices and examine the ways they contribute to, or impede, rational or critical participation of social actors in the universe of political discourse or political action, that is, in the formation and preservation of a genuine public sphere in contemporary societies.

In this thesis it has been argued that a democratic political culture would comprize schemes of cognition, perception and practices which actualize a political domain characterized by a high degree of openness, publicity, plurality and solidarity, and which enable citizens to attain a high level of autonomy and self-determination, that is, to engage in political debate and action in a rational and critical manner. A democratic political culture therefore is characterized by its capacity to maintain an open universe of public and political discourse, the boundaries of which would be continuously redefined through collective action.

Following Melucci (1989), who argues that political democracy is characterized by its ability to "hear" and by the existence of public spaces for representation and negotiation in which conflicts and demands emerging in civil society could be expressed, it could be argued that a democratic political culture would promote the formation and maintenance of such spaces of independent debate and collective action. The existence of such spaces is crucial for the democratization of modern societies, as the expression of collective action through them renders power visible and negotiable. Through these spaces social actors should be able to express demands and achieve the politicization of issues raised by collective action. Access to these public spaces should be open to social actors while their individual or collective identities would not be compromised by their participation in processes of self-expression and collective action. The openness and

flexibility of these public spaces is inexorably linked with the existence and reproduction of a democratic political culture.

As it has been argued both here and elsewhere (Melucci 1989, Curran 1992), the mass media have the potential of being one of these spaces. I have argued that there exists an interrelationship between mass communications and political culture; mass communications are crucial in the reproduction and publicizing of the definitions of the "political" which are in turn informed by the political culture of a society and the power relations which shape it. An open-democratic political culture should therefore contribute to the development of a diversity of mass media with an active, representational and expressive role. It would enable them to help collectivities (political parties, trade unions, voluntary associations, minorities) to register protests and develop alternative definitions of the "political". This representational role of the mass media includes helping to create and maintain the conditions in which alternative viewpoints and perspectives can be effectively articulated and introduced into public debate. In this way, diverse social groups should be able to express alternative viewpoints, and participate actively in the setting of the parameters of political debate and action.

The arena of public debate which the public media constitute should be open to the diversity of values and perspectives existing in contemporary societies. By being open to and promoting a plurality of definitions and

interpretations, and accessible not only to the established or conventional political actors (political parties and pressure groups), but also to sub-cultures (including ethnic, political minorities), and different social strata whose distinctive interests and social experiences are only partly organized and articulated, the media should encourage and enable social actors to critically review their political experience, and to question the assumptions, ideas and practices which inform it.

By contrast, an authoritarian political culture tends to maintain or promote asymmetrical relations of power in society and therefore a closed universe of discourse, a restricted public sphere. It therefore restricts the viewpoints, definitions and interpretations publicized through mass media of communication. Under such conditions the mass media primarily reproduce a closed universe of political discourse, and enable only a limited number of social and political actors to register their views and protests and develop definitions of the "political". In this way, media representations of the "political" primarily conform to hegemonic definitions, whereas representations of social groups, discourses and practices which potentially or actually challenge the hegemonic discourse are negative and exclusivist.

This linkage between accessibility, openness and flexibility of the mass media and the democratization of contemporary societies raises two sets of issues: the first relates to the mass media as institutions or organizations,

and refers to the ability of diverse social groups to have access and a say in their operation. It is therefore related to the democratization of the media institutions, and of the socio-political context in which these operate. The second relates to the politics of signification, or to the role of the media in cultural reproduction, and refers to the ideology inscribed in cultural products. In this, second sense, openness in mass communication refers to the preservation of the "multivocality" or "polysemy" of cultural products. Systems of representation are the means of ideological struggle through which competing groups advance their interests, and thus different ways of mobilizing meaning or different versions of common sense sustain relations of power and promote the interests of some social groups at the expense of others. A democratic political culture would be reflected in and reinforced by creating conditions which would facilitate alternative or even oppositional readings of the same cultural product by its diverse audiences. However, it is important to emphasize that cultural products, despite their 'multivocality' or 'polysemy', may also incorporate cultural codes which facilitate a "preferred", restricted "reading". It is precisely this aspect of the politics of signification which would characterize an authoritarian political culture.

Mass - or rather public - communications are a very important parameter in the study of political culture. Analysis of them has to transcend mere content analysis and focus on the reproduction of particular cultural codes which

encourage and facilitate a preferred reading of the texts and other messages of mass communication. This attempt would also entail a broader social-historical analysis of the structural and institutional context in which the mass media operate and an identification of the relations of power and the elements of the hegemonic or alternative political cultures which are being reproduced in the cultural products under examination.

In this thesis I have attempted to specify the interrelation between mass communication and political culture by examining the representation strategies deployed in operations of journalistic story-telling. Concentrating in the case of the subcultural milieu of the 'marginals' in Greece, and their representations in the Athens press, I have focused upon the perspectives, themes and propositions which have been advanced by journalistic accounts of confrontations between the state and the legitimate political actors on the one hand and the "marginals" on the other. This was done by isolating and examining key elements employed in the construction of these themes and in their organization into apparently "adequate" and "coherent" explanations of the situation. In addition, attempts were made to align the explanations offered by the press with the "lived experience" and political culture(s) of press readers, in order to examine the interrelationship between mass communication and political culture.

The main hypothesis underlying this thesis was that the examination of systems of representation, especially of subcultures or minorities is very important in the study of

political culture. First, because they provide a clear indication of the degree of tolerance/intolerance of a society and second because they include definitions of the political and its limits, and set the boundaries of the universe of political discourse and action. In the case of the 'marginals' I tried to test this hypothesis and concluded that the Athens press played an important role in the reproduction and maintenance of the hegemonic political culture, including its internal contradictions. Thus, while it played a significant role in the maintenance of the 'official' boundaries of the 'political', it also reproduced the range of views which are acceptable within the latter. Important as it may be to reflect inter-party conflict in news coverage, I emphasized that this is not by itself a sufficient indication of a democratic political culture.

On the contrary, the analysis of the press coverage of collective action of the 'marginals' indicates that the Athens press contributed to the reproduction of a closed universe of political discourse. It did so by privileging certain actors who possessed the political and cultural resources which allowed them to gain access to the universe of political discourse, excluding or undermining dissenting voices, deterring the formation of new, alternative social and political identities and setting obstacles to the articulation of new political discourses. The Athens press very often resorted to distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate political actors, ideologies and forms of political action. This application of what Agnoli termed

"democratic distinction" was premised on an unconditional acceptance of the monopoly of the established political parties over the sphere of politics, and at the same time the rejection of attempts to create alternative political spaces, and to challenge the traditional clientelistic mode of political and social 'representation'.

The Athens press constituted a restrictive factor in the universe of political discourse. Operating within the context of an authoritarian political culture where the answer to political deviance is exclusion, symbolic segregation and containment, it maintained cultural closure by reproducing the hegemonic political culture. These conclusions have been reinforced by more recent research which shows that the systematic exclusion of political dissent and of ethnic and religious minorities from the universe of political discourse in Greece - to which both broadcast and print media have contributed - has maintained and enhanced the authoritarian aspects of the hegemonic political culture (Sofos and Tsagarousianou 1993).

My study of press performance and political culture in Greece indicates the importance of further research of the interrelationship between the press and its political and economic context, and in particular the relationship between the mass media and democracy or authoritarianism. Indeed, the relationship between the media and authoritarianism appears to be returning to the political and media studies agendas: there is an increasing theoretical debate on the relationship between the media and democracy, the public sphere and civil

society, including N. Chomsky's more empirical critique of authoritarian aspects of modern politics and the media in the West (Chomsky 1989, 1992) and on the authoritarian transformation of both mass media and political cultures in Eastern European post-communist societies (Splichal 1993, Tsagarousianou 1992). There is no doubt that much further research and theoretical elaboration is needed in order to throw more light on the interrelationship between mass communications and political culture and to develop new and innovative approaches to its study.

NOTES

Part I

1. See R. Looker (1978). Looker, referring to the "movement" of comparative politics, in which Almond and Verba could be included, pointed out that the US political system has been considered to be "the prescriptive standard of representative democracy". In the case of the "Civic Culture", one could legitimately extend his arguments to include the political process in the UK.

2. See below, pp. 30-44.

3. While in "advanced" societies these tasks have been assumed mainly within the framework of the "welfare state", in "peripheral" or "semi-peripheral" societies other forms of often informal and "extra-institutional" distribution might be more relevant as I shall try to show later in this thesis.

4. See the analyses of Gramsci (1971), also the more contemporary problematics in Offe (1984); Habermas (1989); Keane (1988a, 1988b), Melucci (1989: 171-4).

5. Cf. Epstein (1967); Kirchheimer (1966).

6. Cf. of Frankfurt school origin Marcuse (1969); Kirkheimer (1966), also Agnoli (1972); Ferrajoli (1985a; 1985b); Ferrajoli and Zolo (1978). Also see the analyses of corporatist politics cf. Schmitter (1974); Panitch (1976).

7. For a more detailed exposition of Carl Schmitt's critique of liberal democracy see Schmitt (1988), also Kennedy (1987). For Schmitt's influence in the German Left, see the special section in Telos, no 71, Spring 1987. Also, see Lavranou,

"Introduction" in C. Schmitt (1988) and Keane (1988a: 153-183).

8. It is in this context of symbolic and repressive discrimination and exclusion that the persecutions which took place during the 1970s against "terrorists" and their "sympathizers" in the civil service, the legal profession, the university, literary circles and the mass-media in the Federal Republic of Germany can be explained. The most repressive campaign of exclusion and discrimination was the outcome of the laws of 1972 (Berufsverbote) and 1975 which forebode the occupation of public office to anyone who could be considered as "enemy of the constitution. These laws targeted mainly members and sympathisers of extra-parliamentary groups of alternative, communist, or socialist character, and led to the persecutions of even liberal intellectuals, as Heinrich Boll, who opposed the repressive and regressive character of West German politics. The "openness" and the unwillingness of the social-democracy to represent specific collective interests is also pointed out by J. Agnoli (1972: 40-43). However, Agnoli argues that these characteristics cannot be attributed to the SPD alone but to the "political party of the constitutional state" in general (p. 42). It should be pointed out that "criminalization" is just one of the methods of repressive exclusion. One could also mention the "psychic separation of 'gifted' and 'ungifted' children in different types of schools" (Gransow and Offe 1982: 80) which has and is being used in the case of immigrant minorities.

9. Although Ferrajoli has been using the term "political culture" frequently, he has done so without attempting to

specify or qualify it sufficiently (Ferrajoli 1985a: 11, 18, 95, 105; 1985b: 21, 34, 50, 54, 59, 62). It appears that only Marcuse's analysis of "one-dimensional society and thought" (1991) constitutes a cultural analysis of modern western societies.

10. See for example the bibliography in Gibbins (1989: 8-11). Also Inglehart (1981: 880).

11. Although the book title refers to "political action", as Rootes has pointed out, the writers have been studying "attitudes" towards political action (Rootes, 1981).

12. J. Cohen (1982); Offe (1984); Keane (1988a; 1988b); Melucci (1989).

13. Pakulski (1991) observed that mass movements, especially those with ecological and peace orientations should in fact be viewed as "bifurcated movements", that is, as having two main orientations. Apart from the first, essentially democratic orientation, he distinguishes a second, anti-bureaucratic trend which he considers to be compatible with centralism and statism.

14. Although Almond and Verba (1980) was intended to provide a critical re-evaluation of the "civic culture" paradigm, it constituted an internal critique of a rather limited scope.

15. As it has been argued (Eagleton 1978: 33; Turner 1990: 57-8) the notion of the "structure of feeling" suffers from lack of clarity. Williams (1980c), referring to the concept, stresses the similarities between the "structure of feeling" and L. Goldmann's "genetic structuralism" (Goldmann 1975) without however elaborating upon this convergence. Eagleton points out that the notion of "structure of feeling" is in a

way reminiscent of a definition of ideology (Eagleton 1978: 33), while in an attempt to offer a more coherent description, Bennett argues that "structure of feeling" refers to "a shared set of ways of thinking and feeling which, displaying a pattern of regularity, form and are formed by the "whole way of life" which comprises the "lived culture" of a particular epoch, class or group" (Bennett 1981: 26). Finally Barnett's claim that the structure of feeling is "designed exactly to restore the category of experience to the world, as part of its mutable and various social history" (Barnett 1976: 62) might suggest the possibility that "the structure of feeling" could occupy the same space that E. P. Thompson reserves for his concept of "experience", that is, a level of consciousness that lies between the "non-cultural" actual conditions of existence and "culture". It should also be pointed out that the notion of "structure of feeling" has been used as the basis for approaches to political culture. Cf. Reimer (1989).

16. It should however be pointed out that the Gramscian notion of totality has been the subject of considerable debate; see Jay (1984: 150-174).

17. It is worth pointing out that even within the hegemonic culture, the processes of selection and reinterpretation are not "total", that is, elements antagonistic to the hegemonic culture that have been reinterpreted and incorporated in it are retaining a degree of their antagonistic character (Williams 1980b: 39).

18. This point has been carried even further by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) as they deny any sort of determination at all.

19. See especially the work of staff and students of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.

20. Cf. Cohen and Young (1973); Glasgow Media Group (1976; 1980); Hall et al. (1978).

21. Habermas (1987) introduces a distinction between emancipatory and protest potential of social movements which has been considered to be similar to the oppositional and alternative culture schema (Demertzis, 1985: 168, 265). However, it should be pointed out that while the latter distinction could be applied in the case of both "regressive" and "progressive" alternative or oppositional political cultures, Habermas's distinction cannot, as the "emancipatory" potential implies an additional criterion referring to the "progressive", "emancipatory" character of an oppositional, or even an alternative culture.

22. A more systematic approach along these lines has been attempted by Demertzis (1985 and 1989).

23. Melucci seems to envisage the possibility of such "post-industrial" democratic politics (1989: 165-179).

24. Of course the work of sociologists and political scientists in the field of Communist Studies, on the political culture of communist societies was based in mostly historical, structural and institutional analyses of these societies, although this was the result of any quantitative data for their analyses.

25. In an attempt to avoid the shortcomings of the "civic culture" paradigm Mainwaring and Viola (1984) proposed the development of an alternative notion and typology of political

culture that would be free from the constraints of its original association with the liberal democratic and developmental paradigm. In an effort to link political culture with behaviour, they suggested that political culture is not merely informing political behaviour, as Almond and Verba claimed; political culture and behaviour should rather be considered as mutually interacting. What is more, Mainwaring and Viola, in contrast to the "psychological" and "individualist" premises of the civic culture thesis, emphasized the social-historical dimension of political culture by stressing the fact that political cultures are "configurations of values which are formed historically" (p. 18). Rejecting the linear evolutionary principle upon which the civic culture thesis had been premised, they emphasized the possibility of regressive as well as progressive change of a political culture.

As far as their typology of political culture is concerned, they have proposed a classification of types of political culture in accordance to two main parametres: the first and principal parametre refers to political values which could range from authoritarian to democratic, while the second refers to social values ranging from elitist to egalitarian. Thus, five main types of political culture are derived from the particular combinations of these parametres: right and left authoritarian, semi-democratic, liberal and radical democratic.

Part II

1. See Keyder (1987), Mouzelis (1978). They both argue that peasants in the Ottoman Empire remained more or less independent, cultivating the land and paying an annual proportional tax to the Porte. Although in periods of crisis of the central government the local functionaries managed to become more powerful, appropriate the surplus and, in the last years of the Empire, claim the land and limit the rights of the peasantry, the overall structure of the society did not change considerably, either because these phenomena were restricted to relatively small areas, or because soon the Sultan's authority was restored, and the rights of the peasants reasserted.

2. Keyder uses the term to describe the practice of hiring the right to collect taxes in the Ottoman Empire.

3. See Kondogiorgis (1985: 93) especially on the issue of the dependence of the reproduction of the Greek notables as a social category on the fiscal system of the Ottoman Empire.

4. This type of property i.e. large inheritable estates mainly owned by muslims was called chiflik.

5. Attica and Euboea where chiflik-type ownership was predominant, were exceptions. See Mouzelis (34-35).

6. Indeed, one of the most important problems the owners of the ciftliks had to overcome was securing a permanent or regular workforce. See Petropulos (1968: 28) and Tsoukalas (1986: 268).

7. Between 1861-70 the landless peasants were under than 10% of the peasant population. See Tsoukalas (p. 267).

8. It has been argued that the introduction of Roman law in

Greece institutionalized the external control of the local societies and introduced an "administrative" version of community, while the Ottoman state safeguarded the cultural autonomy of the communities as well (Papataxiarhis 1990; Pantazopoulos 1990).

9. Fotopoulos (1975) emphasizes the role of remittances from migrants and of tourism in reducing the deficit in the balance of payments (94-99). He also points out that the massive migration to industrialized countries reduced considerably the level of unemployment, without however leading to full employment as he estimates that in 1961 approximately 24% of the economically active population were unemployed or underemployed (129-131). Negreponti-Delivani reaches similar conclusions as, according to her own estimates, the average rate of unemployment was 13.6% in the 1960s and 6.5% in the 1970s, although, if there had been no mass migration to industrialized countries, average unemployment between 1960-76 would have been 17.4% (Negreponti-Delivani 1979: 90).

10. Greece is the only Southern European country in which the majority of economically active population consists of self-employed and their family members (OECD, Labour Statistics, 1960-1983, Paris 1985, quoted in Vergopoulos 1986: 185). Haralambis commenting on this circumvention of the process of proletarianization of part of the population points out that it had resulted to the economic integration of the emerging petty-bourgeois strata without serious social tensions, which, different circumstances, i.e. of industrialization through large scale capital accumulation and

concentration might have given rise to (Haralambis, 1989: 188-89).

11. It should be pointed out that the post-war transformation of dispossessed, or poor peasant urban and rural populations into petty-bourgeois strata constituted in fact a form of social mobility. See Tsoukalas (1981), Haralambis (1989: 196). However, the possibility of upward social mobility beyond the petty-bourgeois strata was extremely difficult, as it has already been pointed out.

12. Karapostolis uses the term "consumption mobility" ("katanalotiki kinitikotita") in order to describe the relationship between limited social mobility opportunities and consumption as a means of mobility at the "symbolic" level. He thus argues that the consumption of specific products is intended to be noticed, conspicuous. It is therefore an activity which, apart from satisfying (material) needs, "asserts" the social status of the consumer, or - and this mainly is the case - "announces" the intention, or the persistent aim to occupy a prominent position, in this sense being a form of social hypostatization (Karapostolis 1984: 250-269). A similar argument concerning primarily Greek society in the 19th century has been developed in Dedoussopoulos (1985).

13. The modes of the army's involvement in post-war political life underwent considerable transformation as immediately after the German occupation and the civil war the inability of the new regime to operate in Greece made it almost entirely dependent upon the English and American military missions and the reorganization of Greek army under their auspices. As

social integration progressed however, foreign intervention and influence became increasingly mediated by internal social and political institutions. Thus, the army became the guarantor of the maintenance of the post-war balance of political power, as new centres of power developed within it for this reason. For a more detailed analysis of the role of the army see Haralambis (1985; 1989).

14. The most significant attempt to modernize the political system was made by the right-wing leader K. Karamanlis in 1961 when he presented his constitutional reform proposals, which led to his resignation (Haralambis 1985; 89). It should also be pointed out that the popular mobilizations in support of the Centre Union during the 1960s were characterized by demands for constitutional reform. It was the potential of mobilizations of this kind, demanding the activation of the existing, albeit defunct constitution, which led to the coup d' etat staged by the army in 1967.

15. On "partitocrazia" see Spotts and Wieser (1986: 4-6) or Sassoon (1986: 221-24). On the particularities of the Greek case, especially the transformations of the political sphere after the dictatorship see Karabelias (1989: 167-179), also Haralambis (1989: 293-302).

16. On the incompatibility of "populism" and the liberal notion of representation of interests see Sofos (1992).

17. On the conditions of formation, and the meaning of civil society see Keane (1988) esp. pp. 62-66).

18. The Second National Assembly in Astros, in March-April 1823, established the freedom of the press, under certain restrictions regarding the protection of Christian faith,

morality and the prevention of libel, as one of the political rights of the Greeks. However, D. Ypsilantis, a leading figure in the then revolutionary government attempted to implement a broad interpretation of those restrictions and to impose preventive censorship to the existing newspapers. See P. Karykopoules, pp. 37-39, also D. L. Kyriazis-Gouvelis (1977: 31-45).

19. On the "public sphere" in Western European societies see Habermas (1989).

20. Governor Capodistria with the Decree of the 26th of April 1831 extended the limitations of the freedom of the press which had been established in the constitutions of Astros and Troizina. In addition to the restrictions safeguarding the Christian-Orthodox religion, the established morality and preventing libel, new limitations are introduced prohibiting the publication of "any printed material insulting the beneficent to the Greek nation Powers and the foreign Royal Courts or defame their ambassadors and agents" or "incite towards the overthrowing of the temporary status quo as it has been established by the Argos National Assembly decisions or incite towards disobedience to the Laws" (article 2, para. c). The legislation which was introduced by the Administrations of King Otto (Law about the Crimes committed through the Abuse of the Press, 6(18)/9/1833 and Law for the Policing of the Press, 11(23)/9/1833, Libel and Press Law, 23/11(5/12)1837 extended the limitations imposed to the press to a frightening degree which intimidated publishers and journalists and discouraged public debate and any attempt to criticize public personalities, governmental policies or even

the decisions and actions of local authorities. Even more, this legislation covered, apart from the press, the publication of books.

21. It has been estimated that between 1836 and 1842, there were 56 trials for press-related offences before the Athens courts alone. See "Aion", no 419/1843.

22. Mayer states that comment constituted the cornerstone of Greek newspapers of the period. See Mayer (1957, A': 60).

23. On the complex relation between clientelist networks and parliamentarism in 19th century see Kontogiorgis (1985: 126), also Mouzelis (1978 and 1986).

24. In fact, as there was no appropriate infrastructure, and due to the fact that newspapers were mostly personal or family (small-scale) ventures, the "news" featured in the newspapers throughout most of the 19th century reached the newspapers rather late as they were taken from the pages of foreign newspapers, or from letters sent by Greeks who were living abroad, in the case of foreign news. As far as domestic news coverage was concerned, the main sources were information provided by the administration, or, again, letters, or, in the best case, reports from local correspondents which because of the lack of transportations and communications infrastructure, more than often failed to reach the newspaper in time. In this sense, the publication of Vlassis Gavriilidis's Akropolis constitutes an innovation in the Greek press.

25. If we accept the detailed lists compiled by Mayer (1957) between 1835 and 1862, 157 newspapers were published, of which 115 in Athens alone, while between 1863 and the end of the century they had reached the astonishing number of 789, of

which 402 were published in Athens. It should be added that, according to Mayer, during the latter period 195 periodicals had been published.

26. Six of the journalists of the "Efimeris" became prime ministers and 11 became ministers. See Karykopoulos (p. 94).

27. The fact that the need for more qualified journalists became more important could be illustrated by the wish of Gavriilidis - expressed in his will - to dedicate a part of his property to the funding of scholarships for young journalists.

28. Amongst the numerous writers and caricaturists of the period, Emm. Roidis, G. Souris and Th. Anninos have been the most influential. Emm. Roidis's satirical prose and G. Souris's caustic verse constituted outstanding examples of critical approach to political events through satire (Kondogiorgis 1985; also Karykopoulos 1984: 88-9; Peponis 1983: 112). On the other hand, Th. Anninos's work has been a turning point for political caricature in the sense that he has been the first to develop caricature into an influential kind of political and social satire of equal importance with political commentary. In contrast to the coarse and unrefined techniques employed in caricatures before him, T. Anninos by introducing refined techniques, clarity of expression and by paying attention to detail, managed to render caricature more accessible and interesting to a wider public which, because of the low literacy rate of the period, might have been excluded from other, printed channels of political debate.

29. The first reference to the problems of the press, and the demands of the directors of the Athens press for their

resolution has been recorded on the 15-1-1889, when a committee of the Union of Greek Journalists met with the prime minister Trikoupis at the ministry of economic affairs. One of the issues raised was that of the reduction of the price of printing paper, mail and cable tariffs. Trikoupis promised he would implement any necessary change in the tariffs (Genovelis n.d.: 34).

30. "Rizospastis" had initially been published as a "progressive-democratic" newspaper in 1908 by G. Philaretos, while in 1917 it had been published for a second time under the editorship of the socialist journalist N. Giannios. At that time it supported vaguely socialist principles. Finally, in July 1921 it became the official newspaper of SEKE.

31. G. Koskotas founded the publishing corporation "Grammi EPE" which published several weekly magazines and eventually launched one evening newspaper (24 Ores) and bought the morning paper "I Kathimerini".

32. The names of the Kouris brothers curiously do not appear in any official document of ownership of mass-media enterprises.

33. My estimations from statistical data provided by N. Kyriazidis in Anti, nos 306, 320, 334 and 402.

34. At the end of 1983, 14 daily political papers were published, in 1984, 15 and in 1986 there were 16.

35. The "Lambrakis Press Organization" had to discontinue the publication of its morning daily "To Vima" and continued to publish only its Sunday edition "To Vima tis Kyriakis". Ch. Tegopoulos was also forced to discontinue his morning daily "I Proini Eleftherotypia", while the advocate of the colonel's

regime "Eleftheros Kosmos", a morning paper too, closed down in the early 1980s. Finally, more recently "Eleftheros", a new morning paper, had to be relaunched as an evening daily in order to increase its average daily circulation from just under 2,500 to approximately 16,000 readers.

36. Industrial disputes had followed the dismissal of several union members from the newspapers "Avriani" (1982), "Ethnos" (January 1983) and "Ta Nea" (January 1983). In the case of "Ethnos" police cars were used to carry the master copy of the paper to the printing plant, as picket lines had made access to it virtually impossible.

37. In 1987, the "Lambrakis Press Organization" bought the "Theofanidis Publications Co" which publishes 3 popular magazines, while in 1988, it launched the Greek edition of Marie Claire.

38. The "Lambrakis Press Organization" established its own radio station, TOP FM (1987), "Grammi AE", in addition to its 3 papers and 5 magazines, launched its radio station, "Sky 104 FM Radio". "Typoekdotiki AE" followed with its "902 FM" and the Kouris brothers with their "Radio Athina". According to my estimates regarding the condition of the broadcasting industry in Greece, in 1992 there were over 1000 municipal, state and private local radio stations and over 30 TV stations without licences; some have near national coverage by means of networking.

39. The Greek political system is essentially bi-polar, despite the apparent existence of three poles (Right, Centre-Left, and Left) as centre-left PASOK managed to articulate elements of the discourses of the communist

parties, and to become the main opponent of the conservative New Democracy. As a result, communist parties retained a meagre combined electoral support of approximately 12%, and more importantly, accepted the hegemonic role of PASOK over the left, and became its minor partners and satellites. See also Mavrogordatos's interesting argument that the Greek political system is "a tripolar system with bipolar competition" (1983: 82), that is, a system where the third pole (the communist Left) has been either excluded or neutralized. In this way the contest for government power is restricted to the two main contenders.

Part III

1. Pezmazoglou's article lacks completely methodological and theoretical premises while his analysis includes a very limited number of texts. Both Pezmazoglou and Komninou fail to address issues of interpretation, or of the relation of text with its particular social context at the social and (media) institutional level. What is more, they take texts virtually at face value and do not attempt to "decode" or "deconstruct" it.
2. Examples of this exclusive character of Greek political culture are the total cultural isolation of ethnic and religious minorities from the rest of the population. Similar conclusions could be drawn in the cases of social minorities such as the gay and lesbian communities, radical feminist groups which refused to be incorporated in the relevant organizations of the main political parties.
3. For a discussion on the issues raised by the use of the

terms 'culture(s)', 'subcultures', 'counter-culture' and cultural 'milieu' see John Clarke et al. (1978).

4. Information on beliefs, focal concerns etc of these groups taken from several "marginal" and "alternative" publications and brochures as well as "To Vima", 19-5-85.

5. For the emergence and characteristics of moral panics see CCUS Mugging Group 1976; Hall et al. 1978; also Cohen 1987.

6. The headline is referring to the record of the previous, conservative government on the area of housing, and denounces the neglect and, sometimes, police harassment and legal prosecution of homeless people who built their houses without planning permission in impoverished areas of Athens.

7. PASOK, the governing party had fought the electoral campaign and won the 1981 election on an anti-American and anti-EEC platform, as far as foreign and defence policies were concerned. Similar anti-Western positions had been taken by the Communist, and to a lesser extent, the Eurocommunist parties. Even the president of the Republic, ex-leader of main opposition party, conservative and pro-Western New Democracy, had decided the withdrawal of Greece from NATO's military wing seven years earlier because of the powerful anti-western feeling in post-dictatorship Greece.

8. See letter which the director of Athens Police Mr. Bosinakis claimed that he had received from shop-owners of the area. See "Ta Nea", 6 October 1984.

9. It seems that "Apogevmatini" as well as the rest of what one could call traditional conservative newspapers, despite the competitive environment they have to operate in, seem unwilling to try to expand their readership beyond their

conservative camp. In fact, their stock of symbols and themes seems to be appealing more to their traditional clientele than to a wider readership.

10. Ministry of Health and Social Services. The recognition of its jurisdiction over the area of Exarcheia could be seen as an attempt to "medicalize" the problem of the area.

11. For the lifestyle of the "Manges" see Petropoulos (1990: 20-22).

12. Despite frequent references in political discourse to the "Youth Movement" and the "Student Movement", party political organizations in Greece function as mere branches of political parties. In fact, they rarely have any autonomy as they reflect the views of party leaderships and are normally unable to influence political decisions.

13. For a presentation of these discourses, see Stanley Cohen 1985: 197-235.

14. See the brief but extremely interesting discussion of notions of social space in the context of demonic symbolism in Greek folk culture in Stewart (1991: 164-172). Stewart argues that foreigners and members of other ethnic or religious groups are "strangers par excellence", and demonstrates the association of stereotypes of these groups with demonic symbolism. Thus, he draws attention to the various representations of Jews as demons, or the Devil himself. Although the importance of demonic symbolism as a coherent formal discourse has declined, these images have persisted and are still part of the popular imaginary, although possibly in different contexts.

15. See p. 404 above, endnote no 7.

16. In the Greek text the (non-existent) word "thirioeidis" <=monster-like from "thirio"=monster> is used instead of the expected "thyreoeidis" <=thyroid">. The expression "hyper-functioning of the thyroid" was used widely at the time as a result of the concern for the possible effects of the nuclear fallout of Chernobyl (cancer of the thyroid was one of the prominent dangers mentioned in various reportages, interviews and statements issued by health authorities). I here use the term "thirioid" as an equivalent to the Greek "thirioeidis".

17. The same concern over the activities of property speculators in Exarcheia was first expressed by "Eleftherotypia" on its October 4, 1984 reportage on the police "Operation Virtue".

18. For more details on the "inventory" see Cohen (1987).

19. On "sensitization" see Cohen (1987).

20. On "public languages" see CCCS Mugging Group (1976: 75). Public languages are used by the media in order to "adapt" primary definitions of the situation to the culture/language of their audience. They are therefore based on assumptions of media professionals about the language and cultural background of their audiences.

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