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From Kant to Durkeim

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University of Kent

PhD

1985

From Kant to Durkheim

Abstract

This thesis concerns the relationship between Kant and Durkheim as expressed in the philosophy of Charles Renouvier. His 'Neo-Criticisme' presents itself as both a retention and critique of the principles of Kant's 'Criticisme'. And it contains the theoretical premises of Durkheim's sociology.

The thesis traces the transformation of thought effected by Renouvier to Kant's Critical Philosophy. In particular it is claimed that the Copernicanism which marks the interpretation of human reality for Renouvier and Durkheim, has its origin in the philosophical revolution in epistemology and morality effected by Kant.

Part One examines the historical and analytic preliminaries for the development of the ideas in Part II, III and IV. The development of Durkheim's sociology is seen as occurring during a period of thought marked by a return to Kant. Part One traces the development of Durkheim's idea of the sociology of knowledge as a form of post-Kantian Copernican science. The goal of this is to discover the principles involved in human knowledge: these are the categories which express the a priori in knowledge. For Durkheim the origin is social, whereas for Kant these principles are intellectual. Renouvier's critique of Kant

is seen as providing a transition between the two. Part III looks at the conflict of reasons in the Kantian system entailed by determinism and how Renouvier develops a non-deterministic conception of causality that is available to a human science, and through this reconciles the reasons split by Kant. This analysis reveals that for Renouvier and Durkheim in contradistinction to Kant, the necessity which governs all of human experience is a moral necessity. Part IV looks at the laws of the moral order: the principles of a Copernican morality are Duty, Unity and Autonomy.

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"From Kant to Durkheim":

A study of the relationship between Kant and Durkheim in the Critique of Kant in Charles Renouvier's philosophy of Neo-Criticisme.

Preface

Sidney Hook¹ in his "From Hegel to Marx" said "No two names are at once suggestive of both agreement and opposition ... To conjoin them is not so much to express a relationship as to raise a problem".

To link the names of Kant and Durkheim is to raise the problem of how the founder of scientific sociology can relate to the founder of transcendental philosophy. The science of social facts seems far removed from the concern with the epistemic and moral a priori that characterizes the work of Kant in his two Critiques.

But just as conservative idealism can be converted to revolutionary activism through philosophical critique*, so can the concerns of the philosophy of the

* I am not suggesting that philosophical ideas alone determine the foundation of either historical materialism or the science of sociology. It is clear that just as for Durkheim the need for a science of society arose in the context of the Third Republic and its search for political stability, so for Marx the actual progress of nineteenth century capitalism required a theoretical explanation. Philosophical ideas are an articulation of the needs of society for Durkheim and revolutionary praxis for Marx, not the sole ideational source of them.

a priori predicated on a universal rationality be transformed into a social science that recognizes the historical and cultural relativity of human worlds.

I discovered that just as the movement from Hegel to Marx cannot be understood without Feuerbach's humanism, neither can the movement from Kant to Durkheim be understood without Renouvier. But here the analogy breaks down for Marx uses Feuerbach's method of transformative criticism to provide his own critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' and thus to develop the incipient concepts of his later system, whereas I maintain the very terms and theoretical premises of Durkheim's sociology are contained in Renouvier's 'Neo-Criticisme'. The philosophical premises of Durkheim's sociology are identical with the terms and assumptions of Renouvier's thought. But further Renouvier's Neo-Criticisme is developed through an immanent critique of Kant's system. I say immanent because the critique of Kant is undertaken in terms of central positions of the Kantian system itself. It is tempting to say that Comte is Durkheim's Feuerbach: but Kant used the rule of phenomenalism. Renouvier's critique of Kant is undertaken in his "Premier Essai" in terms of Kant's inconsistency with the rule of phenomenalism and Renouvier cites Hume and Comte as thinkers whose works are consistent with this rule. But Kant made the rule of phenomenalism one of the essential premises of his Copernican Revolution. So, I am claiming that the very terms of Durkheim's sociology are developed in the critique of Kant's system by Renouvier, and this is in essence a process of turning Kant against himself.

The relationship between Kant and Durkheim as between Hegel and Marx is not one of linear development in the history of ideas. Ideas in the history of philosophy do not uniformly attach themselves to each other as links in a chain. We are dealing here with active processes of critique and retention from within social and historical positions which influence perceived significances. So the question of the significance of the Kantian system was raised in the latter half of the nineteenth century in France, in relation to the problems of intellectual and political instability. Philosophy in nineteenth century France was seen to have a central social and political role to play: following Comte French thinkers believed that intellectual stability preceded and formed social stability. The question was which philosophical system could best meet the needs of social stability. Hegelianism after the Paris Commune of 1870 and its association with revolutionary socialism and St. Simonianism could no longer be seen by the thinkers of the Third Republic to be the simple answer to the problems of social justice and stability. In this context the Kantian system seemed to point a way both to the foundation of science and the establishment of a system of action that pointed back to neither the utilitarianism of the political economists (and earlier to the revolution of 1789) nor to the revolutionary socialism that was reckoned to have failed to achieve a peaceful society up to the Third Republic. Here the Kantian system was of the greatest perceived significance. It was in this context that Durkheim's sociology developed.

But the Kantian system was seen to be divided and inconsistent. Renouvier was the earliest and the most influential of the Neo-Kantians and he began his reformulation and critique of Kant in the 1850s and by the 1870s his system of Neo-Criticism became widely influential. His critique of Kant forms the substantial body of this thesis. Yet he was continuing a tradition that Kant established. This is the tradition of Copernicanism.

So what kinds of questions can this thesis answer? Firstly it can answer questions in the history of ideas. At this level it charts the movement of ideas from Kant to Durkheim through the Neo-Kantianism of Renouvier. Renouvier's system is in this sense intermediary between the Kantian system and the development of sociology. Here the discovery of Renouvier's system and its significance for the interpretation of Durkheim will be as surprising to many of the interpreters of Durkheim as the discovery, for example, of the Paris manuscripts of 1844 were for the interpretation of scientific Marxism. In this are contained the answer to some of the puzzles of Durkheimian thought: what kind of science, for example, is sociology, and what is the Conscience Collective? It will be clear that this concept develops out of the principles of Kant's Copernican revolution and Renouvier's retention and critique of them.

Secondly this thesis answers questions about the philosophical presuppositions of Durkheim's sociology.

I shall claim that the terms Neo-Criticisme are the philosophical presuppositions of Durkheim's sociology. But in the context of this thesis the first type of questions are not distinct from the second type, for to answer questions of the first type is to answer questions of the second type. That is Renouvier's Neo-Criticisme as the intermediary between Kant and Durkheim becomes the philosophical premises of of Durkheim's sociology.

However since Neo-Criticisme itself is a critique of Kant, this thesis answers a third type of question: that is how intellectual transformations occur through critique. Kant's ideas through Renouvier's critique become the terms and conditions of a new discipline-sociology. The answer to this type of question forms the main body of the thesis. What is described as an active process of criticism and constitutes a part of the history of philosophy. Questions in the history of philosophy are indistinguishable from philosophy itself, for the principles of philosophical change are the terms of debate between philosophers at different periods and times.

There is a fourth type of question dealt with and this is analytic, and deals with the theme of Copernicanism in knowledge and morality. This concerns the necessity which is claimed to be a central feature of human experience. Knowledge is understood as a self-imposed necessity, through the categories and action is understood as a form of rational necessity. Durkheim's science of sociology is seen to be extending into the terms of a science of

society an investigation of the nature of conceptual and moral necessity. I take Kant's Copernican revolution in epistemology and morality as the origin of the ideas which Durkheim's science of sociology attempts to answer. I am thus treating Kant, Renouvier and Durkheim as thinkers related by a theme, which is established by the founder of the tradition - Kant.

My method has been to take certain positions in Durkheim's thought as the explanandum and the critique and transformation of the Kantian system by Renouvier as the explanans. This rests on the assumption that the perceived significance of the Kantian system was such that for thinkers in the latter part of the nineteenth century France (and especially under the Third Republic) all questions about knowledge and the basis of science and action and the question of morality must be addressed to the Kantian system.

Part I. Analytical and Historical Perspectives

This part is the propaedeutic to the main body of the thesis which is contained in Part II, III and IV. A thesis of this nature must inevitably involve two distinct perspectives - the analytic and the historic. To discover the terms in which a philosopher and a sociologist can be compared is an analytic question, whilst to discover the terms in which they were related is an historic question. However analytic and historic questions share the same field of enquiry when it is seen that the philosopher and the sociologist share concepts and principles in terms of which their work can be analysed.

In Chapter One, I look at the terms in which the relationship of Durkheim to Kant can be analysed and the thought of Renouvier is presented as the source of otherwise inexplicable elements of Durkheim's thought. And I introduce the Copernicanism that is the theme of this work, and that its two principles are the principle of idealism and the principle of naturalism.

In Chapter Two, I examine the relationship between philosophy and sociology, firstly in terms of the question of positivism and then in terms of the tension between idealism and positivism in nineteenth century French thought. The significance of Kantian thought is seen in relation to this.

Chapter III is a selective and inevitably highly sketchy account of philosophy in relation to nineteenth century French society. I examine philosophy under the Third Republic and Renouvier's role in it. And I look at philosophical developments after the French revolution as leading to movements of idealism and positivism expressed in the principle of idealism and of naturalism respectively.

Chapter IV concerns Renouvier's development of his philosophy of Neo-Criticisme, both as a rejection of Hegelianism and as a critique and retention of central tenets of Kantian thought.

Part I. Chapter I. Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism in Durkheim's thought.

From his earliest work 'The Division of Labour in Society' (1893) to his last uncompleted writing 'Introduction a la Morale' (Revue Philosophique, 1917), the theoretical aspect of Durkheim's sociology has the appearance of a sustained dialogue with Kant. There is an orientation to the Kantian philosophy which, whether in terms of agreement or disagreement, points to it as a source of inspiration for the principles of his sociology. Whilst it is the task of this thesis to unravel this relationship, it is the task of this Chapter to analyse the terms in which this relationship can be articulated.

Does this orientation to the Kantian philosophy justify Durkheim being called a Kantian? To do so, would be to ignore Durkheim's criticisms of Kant and his dismissal of a priori speculation in favour of scientific examination of social reality. But to stress the criticism would be to sever Durkheim's thought from Kant and would be to overlook the numerous points at which he incorporates Kant's definition of the nature and problems of knowledge and morality into his sociology. Without presupposing more of an affinity and more of a distance between Kant and Durkheim than can be later justified this relationship can be analysed in terms of different forms and degrees of intellectual debt. The first and clearest form of intellectual debt is where one thinker is a disciple of another and incorporates elements of the philosophy into the later system.

Secondly an apparently negative form of intellectual debt is where one thinker is a critic of another. Here attention to the authority and importance of a system in a critique of it, is stimulative of new theoretical insights. The third form of intellectual debt is where the later thinker is the successor to the earlier. That is, there is an acceptance of the problems and definitions given, but new answers are given in terms of a new discipline. The fourth kind of intellectual debt is where one thinker is a continuator of the earlier one: in this sense a later 'science' can be seen as confirming what counts as insights or a priori principles of a philosophical system. Lastly and most importantly there is the most complicated and subtle form of intellectual debt. This is where a later system developed in response to the contradictions and conflicts of an earlier philosophical position. This fifth form of intellectual debt is the subject of this thesis.

I shall examine these in turn.

Section I. Durkheim as disciple of Kant.

For Durkheim, knowledge consists of two elements concepts and percepts; these are connected with the distinction between the necessary and the contingent. Knowledge consists in the control of the contingent by the necessary; knowledge consists in the organisation of percepts by concepts.

"We understand only when we think in concepts"

(DHN, p 329)

The form of knowledge is provided by conceptual organisation and is an issue de jure, whereas the content of knowledge is provided by the senses and being contingent is de facto.

"A sensation or an image always relies upon a determined object ... and expresses the momentary condition of a particular consciousness ... when our sensations are actual, they impose themselves upon us in fact. But by right we are free to conceive them otherwise than they really are ... In regard to them nothing is forced upon us except as considerations of another sort intervene"

(E.F., p 14).

In contrast conceptual organisation in the categories is invested with

"An authority which we could not set aside if we would"

(E.F., p 13).

Here he is agreeing with Kant

"Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so but not that it cannot be otherwise"

(CPR B3).

Conceptual organisation which for both constitutes knowledge is a matter of necessity: in contrast to which stands the data of the senses which is contingent. Concepts have an authority which separates them from the sensory: the task of the sociology of knowledge, like Kant's conception of philosophy, is to account for the authority of concepts. In dealing with the issue of the authority of concepts, Durkheim's sociology of knowledge has the same subject as metaphysics for Kant.

"Metaphysics rests on concepts alone"

(C.P.R. B XIV)

Durkheim agrees with Kant

"That there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience ... it does not follow that it all arises out of experience"

(C.P.R. B1).

The stimulus of the sensory organism constitutes the occasion for knowledge, but is not the source of the central features of knowledge. For Kant there are two factors that culminate in human knowledge: sensibility and understanding

"There are two stems of human knowledge namely sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown root. Through the former, objects are given to us: through the latter they are thought"

(C.P.R. B 29 A 15).

The distinction between sensibility and understanding is associated with the distinction between the active and passive side of knowledge. The data of sensibility, acquired through the receptivity of the organism, is

organised by the active principles of the understanding - the categories.

"Receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity".

(C.P.R. A97)

For Durkheim the receptivity of the sensible organism is associated with the individual, in contrast to which stands the active side of consciousness which is social. Conceptual organisation in its generality and authority, demonstrates an origin distinct from the individual. Just as knowledge is possible for Kant because the active side of consciousness, concepts, control the passive side, precepts, so for Durkheim knowledge is possible because conceptual organisation produced by society, controls the fleeting and varying sensory impressions of the individual organism.

Social knowledge for Durkheim presents itself as a unified system of collective representations. For Kant

"Knowledge is a whole in which representations stand compared and connected".

(C.P.R. A97).

These representations are a synthesis of concept and percept. Knowledge as a system of representations is a result of synthesis, which for Kant is epistemic, whilst for Durkheim it is social. For Kant ultimately the source of the rules (although they are located in the human understanding) which produce the synthesis is mysterious. Durkheim agreeing that the process is a

synthesis, will not admit any inexplicable element.

"All creation, if not a mystical operation which escapes science and knowledge, is the product of a synthesis"

(E.F., p 44b).

For Durkheim the subject which explains the synthesis is social science, which can proceed by rules of observation and experience to satisfactorily account for this social epistemic procedure. For Kant, only transcendental philosophy can adequately account for the rules which produce the synthesis which is knowledge.

Kant asks the question

"For whence could experience derive its certainty if all the rules according to which it proceeds were always themselves empirical and therefore contingent"

(C.P.R. B5).

The answer to the question of the certainty of knowledge is the discovery of the a priori as the condition of the possibility of knowledge

"Necessity and strict universality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge and are inseparable from each other"

(C.P.R. B 4).

Durkheim builds these two characteristics of the a priori into his definition of categorial organisation.

"As a matter of fact they (the categories) are distinguished from all other knowledge by their universality and necessity. They are the most general concepts which exist because they are applicable to all that is real, and since they are not attached to any particular object they are independent of every particular subject, they constitute the common field where all minds meet. Further they must meet there, for reason which is nothing more than all the fundamental categories taken together, is invested with an authority which we could not set aside if we would. When we attempt to revolt against it and to free ourselves from some of these essential ideas we meet with great resistances. They do not merely depend upon us, but they impose themselves upon us. Now empirical data presents characteristics which are diametrically opposed to these".

(E.F., p 13-14).

In this Durkheim is drawing the distinction between the necessary and the contingent, which is essential to the Kantian system. And just as for Kant certainty in knowledge is the imposition of concepts on the data of experience, so for Durkheim the certainty of social knowledge, in the collective representations or categories, is contained in its necessity and its imposition on the data of experience. So following Kant Durkheim characterises certainty in knowledge by a necessity which is not derived from individual experience.

Durkheim characterises social knowledge as a synthesis and by its characteristics of the a priori, the universality and necessity. Thus it is what Kant called synthetic a priori knowledge. The concept of this is tied up with a distinct type of conceptual necessity and this in turn is tied to the system of categories. The necessity which characterises synthetic

a priori knowledge cannot be a product of experience for Kant and Durkheim follows him in this. Neither for Kant is it a result of logical truth which is characterised by analytic necessity (which is based on the law of identity). Kant in identifying a form of synthetic necessity which characterises human knowledge distinguishes himself from his rationalist and empiricist predecessors. In his development of this aspect, Kant freed the concept of necessity from its strictly logical location which both rationalists and empiricists had accorded it. The synthetic necessity of Kant is not the 'has to be' of analytical necessity, but the 'must be so' of transcendental condition. The concepts basic to human knowledge cannot be otherwise (must be so) for otherwise there is no coherence and order to experience and without these knowledge is not possible. The outlining of concepts (categories) and principles (laws of morality) without which human knowledge and action are impossible is central to the Kantian reform of philosophy. Conceptual necessity reveals itself in ordinary human knowledge of which science and morality are expressions. It is through Kant's freeing of necessity from its analytic moorings that Hegel could then make necessity a feature of the historical process, and Durkheim could make social knowledge have a necessity which is one of its definitive features.

Like Kant, Durkheim argues that the necessity which characterises categorial knowledge is not a subjective or relative matter, the categories of each society are

the conditions of thought and reality

"Society could not abandon the categories to the free choice of the individual without abandoning itself"

(E.F., p 17).

Necessity which characterises a priori knowledge for Kant cannot be derived from experience: it is part of the form experience must take and is contributed by the subject and not produced by the object in its (cumulative) effect on the subject. So for Durkheim

"The necessity with which the categories are imposed upon us is not the effect of simple habits whose yoke we could easily throw off with a little effort"

(E.F., p 17-18).

That which is the condition of knowledge, must therefore be the objective feature of knowledge and cannot be determined by feeling, experience or the individual alone.

For Kant

"All necessity without exception is grounded in a transcendental condition".

(C.P.R. A 106).

And for Durkheim

"Society could not abandon the categories to the free choice of the individual without abandoning itself ... If society is to live there is (not merely) a minimum of logical conformity beyond which it cannot go".

(E.F., p 17)

The central question of Kant's First Critique is "How are judgements synthetic a priori possible"? This is answered in the Transcendental Deduction by the

discovery in forms of history and society of categorial organisations. Just as it is the task of transcendental philosophy for Kant to uncover the forms experience must take, so for Durkheim the task of sociology is to discover the different forms categorial systems and classificatory schemes do take in social and historical reality.

For Durkheim, following Kant, the intelligibility of experience is dependent on the order that is introduced by the human subject. Kant said

"Thus the order and regularity in the appearances which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce".

(C.P.R. A125)

That which effects this order are the categories and comes from a different level of empirical awareness.

"Such connection in unity must therefore precede all experience ... the possibility of which lies in ourselves".

(C.P.R. A130).

So for Durkheim, society temporally precedes individual life and from it as a 'reality sui generis' come the categories, which impose order on the potential disorder of individual experience. For Durkheim the categories as the arbiter of order and intelligibility are the conditions of thought.

"They are like the solid frame which encloses all thought: this does not seem to be able to liberate itself from them without destroying itself, for it seems that we cannot think of objects that are not in time and space ... (they are) ... nearly inseparable from the normal working ... they are like the framework for the intelligence".

(E.F., p 9).

The categories for Durkheim are the condition of the possibility of agreement between minds and for a shared public world. In this they are the conditions for knowledge and reality

"If men did not agree upon these essential ideas at every moment ... all contact between minds would be impossible and with that all life together would be impossible".

(E.F., p 17).

Durkheim follows Kant in opposing any explanation of the characteristics of universality and necessity of the categories in terms of experience; he is opposed to any reductive analysis

"Forcing reason back upon experience causes it to disappear, for it is equivalent to reducing the universality which characterise it to pure appearance, to an illusion which may be useful practically, but which corresponds to nothing in reality: consequently it is denying all objective reality to the logical life, whose regulation and organization is the function of the categories. Classical empiricism results in irrationalism".

(E.F., p 14).

Thus he claims

"The a priorists have more respects for the facts".

(E.F., p 14).

Because they do not

"Systematically impoverish the categories by reducing them to the same nature as the senses".

(Op. cit.).

The other feature of the a priori for Kant is universality and Durkheim like Kant claims that concepts and moral principles share the feature of universalizability.

In contrast to sensory appetites,

"Conceptual thought and moral activity are on the contrary distinguished by the fact that the rules of conduct to which they conform can be universalized".

(D.H.N., p. 327).

For Durkheim, the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori and between the universal and necessary on the one hand and the empirical and the contingent on the other hand point to the essential duality of human nature.

"Our intelligence, like our activity, presents two very different forms: on the one hand, are sensations and sensory tendencies: on the other hand conceptual thought and moral activity".

(D.H.N., p. 317).

The science of social facts supports what has previously been expressed philosophically, above all by the Kantian system.

"The old formula homo duplex is therefore verified by the facts. Far from being simple, our inner life has something that is like a double centre of gravity".

(D.H.N., p. 328).

The two aspects of human nature, expressed both epistemologically and morally display an antagonism that is central to the conflict involved in knowledge and morality.

"We understand only when we think in concepts. But sensory reality is not made to enter the framework of our concepts spontaneously and by itself. It resists, and in order to make it conform, we have to do some violence to it, we have to submit it to all sorts of laborious operations that alter it so that the mind can assimilate it".

(D.H.N., p 329).

So also with morality

"There is not a moral act that does not imply a sacrifice, for as Kant has shown, the law of duty cannot be obeyed without humiliating our individual or as he calls it, our 'empirical sensitivity'".

(D.H.N., p 328).

For Durkheim

"Morality consists in a system of rules of action that determine conduct".

(M.E., p 24).

And the unique quality of moral rules for Durkheim is their categorial quality. He 'confirms' the Kantian account of morality in his conception of sanction. In so doing he builds the apodictic quality of moral law into the basic relationship between individual and society.

"The domain of morality is the domain of duty; duty is prescribed behaviour".

(M.E., p 23).

And with Kant and against the Utilitarians Durkheim insists

"It is impossible to derive obligation from the desirable, since the specific characteristic of obligation ... is to a certain extent the violation of desire".

(D.M.F., p 47).

And just as Kant claims that the Principle of Autonomy is supreme amongst moral rules, so Durkheim argues that the urge towards autonomy is an irresistible force in modern secular morality.

For Durkheim knowledge as a system of collective representations is unified in relation to a knowing subject, the 'Conscience Collective'. This is the source of the concepts that govern experience and the rules which

govern action, as well as being the subject in relation to which concepts and rules are articulated. This collective subject is the point in relation to which social experience is unified for social members. It is the source of concepts and rules whereby that social experience is rendered intelligible. So for Kant the intelligibility of experience is made possible because of what human reason contributes and is unified because the 'I think' of consciousness accompanies all experience.

It follows that for Durkheim and Kant a central feature of human knowledge is its self referentiality. The concepts and principles which make knowledge and action possible are based in the structure of human reason for Kant. It follows that philosophical analysis must uncover these as implied in all ratiocinative procedure and all human action. That is philosophical analysis must be able to account for the relativity of knowledge to a knowing subject and that from that subject stem the rules and principles whereby that subject's experience become intelligible. Kant's philosophy alone among the movements of realism, positivism and empiricism in the nineteenth century, recognises this central feature of human knowledge and accords it philosophical status in transcendental philosophy. Durkheim builds this feature of self-referentiality into his sociology of knowledge in the relativity of the social world to the Conscience Collective. Rules and concepts stem from society understood as the Conscience Collective and apply to society. That is

communities in a state of moral health are self-regulating. He accords this status to society by describing it as a 'reality sui generis': social rules and principles are not derived from individual interest or economic forces and they are not biological or psychological in origin. Similarly in a community which is not in a state of moral health (for example the anomic societies of industrialisation) rules and concepts must be authoritative over potential anti-social forces, particularly at the micro level over potential behavioural deviance, and at the macro level, the forces of economic self-interest, which are disruptive of communal organisation. These concepts and rules have authority precisely because they stem from the heart of society - the Conscience Collective. So for Kant moral principles have authority over desires and inclinations, because they stem from reason in the subject. However Durkheim claims that a fully satisfactory analysis of the subject of social experience the Conscience Collective and the processes of social knowledge can be made in terms of naturalistic analysis - in terms of law and function.

For Kant, the nature of knowledge and of morality thus involves an imposition of concepts and rules over percepts and inclinations. This view of knowledge and of the control of the potentially non-rational by the rational is transferred by Durkheim to the relationship between society and the individual in both its epistemological and moral dimension.

It is clear from the above analysis that what Durkheim takes from Kant above all else is the concept of the a priori. The a priori for Kant is that which precedes experience, not simply in a temporal sense, but in a logical sense. The a priori for Kant is found in the categories of the understanding in the ~~theoretical~~ sense and in the principles of pure practical reason in the moral sense. The a priori for Kant precedes experience as transcendental condition - as ground or condition. We could not have the experience we do have, epistemologically or morally without the rules of conceptual or moral ordering. Durkheim transfers these to society. So society precedes individual experience in a temporal sense, but also in the sense of providing concepts by which the world is articulated and rules by which action is determined.*

* Although this question is not central to the terms of my analysis, it is raised by it. In what sense can society be the source of the a priori? Kant distinguishes the relative and the absolute a priori: the former has temporal precedence whereas the latter has the logical independence of experience. Only this characterises the a priori as transcendental condition of experience. It is clear that while society has a temporal precedence of the individual, it has no absolute logical independence of the individual. Secondly, it is clear that for Kant part of what is meant by the a priori is the spontaneous capacity, central to rational beings, to conceptualise and organise. Now, while society may indeed provide the form experience takes, it is not all clear in what sense society provides the capacity to make sense of any world at all. This would seem to belong to the structure of human rationality and on this argument society is as much an expression of human rationality as vice versa. The unclarity in Wittgenstein's conception of a 'form of life' precludes me from comparing his argument to Durkheim. However Durkheim's definition of society is not free from ambiguity. It could mean, as used in the argument of the text, an epistemic or moral authority, any particular actual grouping, the totality of social relations per se or an ideal organisation which any group may be heading for. The transference of the a priori to society can only succeed on the first definition. And this is clearly a reworking of Kant's 'reason' in collective terms.

The features of the a priori that Durkheim builds into his conception of society are central to Copernicanism. Society imposes concepts and rules on its members: there is a necessity involved in this process: and social knowledge is reflexive in that it refers to the subject of social experience - the Conscience Collective. The Copernican Revolution was Kant's transformation of philosophy and distinguished it from realism, empiricism and rationalist dogmatism. It consists in a revolution in perspectives whereby knowledge and morality are shown to be possible through what the subject contributes to the act of knowledge and principles of action. The characteristics of objective knowledge, universality and necessity are introduced through reason as understanding in the theoretical dimension and pure practical reason in the moral dimension. Society for Durkheim is the source of the universality and necessity of concepts and principles of action. It is Durkheim's originality to have translated this to the collective dimension.

For Kant the a priori can only be adequately understood as transcendental condition of knowledge and action. It follows that only the transcendental method can satisfactorily analyse these. Durkheim appears to recognise the question of a transcendental condition and appears to incorporate this into his definition of society as the condition of possibility of experience and action. He claims that his hypothesis of the social origin of the categories answers the following question.

"For the real question is to know how it comes that experience is not sufficient unto itself, but presupposes certain conditions which are exterior and prior to it, and how it happens that these conditions are realised at the moment and in the manner that is desirable".

(E.F., p 15).

However it is clear that Durkheim misunderstands the meaning of transcendental for Kant.

"Possibly there is an eternal law of morality written by some transcendental power ... but this is a metaphysical hypothesis that we do not have to discuss".

D.L., p 423).

And

"In associating morality with a transcendental power, religion has made the authority inherent in moral principles easily represented".

(M.E., p 103).

Durkheim here reads transcendental as transcendent, that which is independent of experiential condition. For Kant the meaning of transcendental is compatible with experiential control, for both the idea of reason as restricted to experience and of the transcendental condition are central features of the Copernican Revolution. (This is discussed in Part II). Transcendental analysis is intended to uncover what is necessarily implied in all experience and does not refer to what transcends experience. The goal of transcendental analysis is the discovery of the categories as the necessary presuppositions of all experience. The important question to ask of Durkheim's analysis is why, when he incorporates so much

of the Kantian a priori into his definition of society, does he misunderstand the idea of the transcendental. And on the basis of this, is he justified at all in using the a priori in the context he uses it? Is it compatible with the naturalist methodology Durkheim uses? Is the a priori compatible with law and function as terms of analysis? He uses the term 'irreducible' in this context and ties it to society's status as a reality sui generis and as the condition of the coherence and intelligibility of experience. How does 'irreducibility' connect with transcendental condition and the a priori? This is raised in Part II.

Finally Durkheim maintain two principles of knowledge as contained in his definition of society. The first is the principle of idealism.

"Since the universe does not exist except in so far as it is thought of, and since it is not completely thought of except by society, it takes place in the latter".

(E.F., p 441).

Here he is making two claims. Firstly that the world exists relatively to consciousness - the central tenet of idealism. And secondly that society is the 'consciousness of the consciousnesses' in terms of which this takes place. The principle of naturalism is shown in Durkheim's claim that society is

"A natural realm which differes from others only by greater complexity".

And further he insists

"Reason is not a transcendent faculty: it is part of nature and consequently is subject to the laws of nature"

(M.E., p 113)

He is claiming that society must be simultaneously treated as a form of consciousness and as a fact of nature. Are these two perspectives compatible? It was Kant who originally insisted that the Copernican Revolution consisted in two principles: the relativity of the world to consciousness and the restriction of reason to experience. These two principles had of course been held separately historically by Descartes and Hume respectively. But it was Kant's Copernican Revolution that allowed the principle of idealism and naturalism to be held simultaneously: they are the principles of Kant's Transcendental Idealism. But as will be examined in Part II, certain transformations must have taken place in the interpretation of Transcendental Idealism, for them to take the form they do in Durkheim's thought.

From the above analysis it is clear that Durkheim's sociology developed in the context of post Kantian metaphysics. He answers questions about the necessity of concepts and the authority of principles in terms of the a priori - but not as part of reason, but as part of society. He is examining the conditions which make possible the necessity of knowledge and morality. And so far, it appears that what Durkheim adds to the Kantian analysis is the collective dimension. The interesting and important question is why Durkheim thinks that the

collective dimension can or need be added to the Kantian system; or conversely why central features of the Kantian system can be incorporated as central to the definition and analysis of the collective. Some illumination will be thrown on this question at the end of Part II, Chapter IV, Section 5 and Part III, Chapter IV, Section 3 respectively.

Section II. Durkheim as Critic of Kant.

Critique constitutes a form of negative intellectual debt. Durkheim like Hegel and Nietzsche, is a critic of Kant: and like Hegel and Nietzsche he is orientated to the problems posed by the Kantian philosophy. And as with Hegel and Nietzsche, the critique of Kant is itself a stimulus to new insights and the development of new philosophical positions.

In terms of epistemology Durkheim says that to explain the universality and necessity of the categories in terms of the human intellect is no explanation.

"Saying that the categories are necessary because they are indispensable to the functioning of the intellect is simply repeating that they are necessary"

(E.F., p 17).

And against Kant he argues that the categories are not universal

"These variations through which the rules which seem to govern our present logic have passed prove that far from being engraven through all eternity upon the mental constitution of men, they depend, at least in part, upon factors that are historical and consequently social".

(E.F., p 13).

It has been shown above that Durkheim criticises the idea of reason as transcendent faculty

"How can reason which is postulated outside of things and beyond reality, establish the laws of the moral order, if as we have established these express the nature of the concrete reality which is society".

(M.E., p 113).

In terms of morality Durkheim accuses Kant of

"A reality apart from the world, on which the world exerts no influence, and which reacting on itself, remains independent of the action of external forces".

(M.E., p 110).

In the Appendix to 'The Division of Labour in Society', Durkheim says Kant's method of deducing duties "is a game of concepts" (p. 412). In contrast what must be done is to establish the function of ethics in relation to social and historical realities, which is established through the observation of moral facts.

Kant in his definition of duty, makes obligation an 'adventitious' attribute of moral laws

"By themselves moral laws are not necessarily imperative: they take on this quality only when they exercise authority to overcome impassioned resistances. But this hypothesis is altogether arbitrary".

(M.E., p 113).

Rather for Durkheim

"Obligation is an essential element of every moral precept"

And the reason is

"Our whole nature has a need to be constrained, bounded, restricted - an intellectual as well as our emotional nature".

(M.E., p 113).

Like Hegel, Durkheim thinks Kant's definition of morality is one-sided and must be overcome. He says obligation must be supplemented by desirability.

"Kant's hypothesis, according to which the sentiment of obligation was due to the heterogeneity of reason and sensibility, is not easy to reconcile with the fact that moral ends are in one aspect objects of desire".

(D.M.E., p 456).

Kant's solution to the problem of autonomy in morality is "abstract and dialectical". The autonomy it confers is 'logically possible'. And because we are sensate as well as rational beings, there will always be conflict

And heteronomy will always be the rule in fact, if not by right".

(M.E., p 113).

Thus

"Kant is obliged to acknowledge that the will in so far as it is purely rational is not subject to the laws of nature". (But)

"If autonomy of the will must be purchased at the price of such a violent separation from nature, one might as well renounce all kinds of autonomy".

(M.E., p 113).

Finally Kant's system expresses the duality of human nature in terms of the distinction between reason and sensibility. But this is only an expression of the problem. The real question is how in the individual can there exist two such distinct spheres - the one orientated to the universal through concepts and principles, the other to the needs of the individual organism,

Thus the approach to questions perceived by Durkheim as unanswered by Kant is a stimulus to the

formulation of a science which is said to account for what is unanswerable in the Kantian system. This science deals with 'reality' and not 'transcendent reason'. It recognises the historical and cultural ~~relativity~~ of thought against Kant's universalism. As the intellect is only part of the social and historical world, it cannot be the unconditioned substratum of reality that Kant perceived it to be: it is thus not the final answer to questions of human knowledge. This science recognises the interpenetration between social reality and morality and supports the search for autonomy in the modern social consciousness and its compatibility with obligation. It is the form and nature of society alone that can guarantee this.

Section III. Durkheim as successor to Kant.

The third kind of intellectual debt can be classified under the term 'successor'. Durkheim can be seen as a successor to Kant in that he is concerned to understand the problems raised by Kant, but in a new light, and with new answers. In this sense he is extending Kantian concerns into a new discipline. Like Kant he is concerned to understand the necessity of concepts and the authority of moral principles, but insists that only a social origin can explain their distinctive characteristics.

"Thus sociology appears destined to open a new way in the science of man".

(E.F., p 447).

A new explanation of the distinctive characteristics of knowledge and morality is possible by recognising that beyond the individual is society

"A system of active forces"

(E.F., p 447).

This explanation Durkheim insists avoids the dangers of past methods.

"To conserve his distinctive traits, it is no longer necessary to put them beyond experience".

(Op. cit.).

It avoids both reductionism, the reducing of mind to matter and transcendent explanation, that is explaining the superior and specific faculties of men

"By a supra-experimental reality which was postulated, but whose existence could be established by no observation".

(E.F., p 447).

The hypothesis of the social origin of the categories, entails that the problem of knowledge is posed in new terms. It enables a reconciliation of a priorism and empiricism says Durkheim. To see the categories as collective representations preserves their qualities of universality and necessity. Whilst retaining them in the realm of science.

"Thus renovated, the theory of knowledge seems destined to unite the opposing advantages of the two rival theories, without incurring their inconveniences. It keeps all the essential principles of the a priorists: but at the same time it is inspired by that positive spirit which the empiricists have striven to satisfy. It leaves reason its specific power, but it accounts for it and does so without leaving the world of observable phenomena. It affirms the duality of our intellectual life, but it explains it and with natural causes".

(E.F., p 19) *

* Why does not Durkheim recognise that Kant also reconciles a priorism with empiricism in the concept of the synthetic a priori? Kant does not leave 'the world of observable phenomena'. Kant's aim is to retain a priorism within terms of the critical intention ie. reason as restricted to experience. I suggest that it is following Renouvier's critique of Kant that he was seen to retain elements as incompatible with the critical intention. It is Renouvier whose expressed aim is the reconciliation of a priorism with consistent phenomenalism. The terms in which Durkheim's sociological hypothesis reconciles the two theories are taken from Renouvier's Neo-Criticisme.

The nature of categories as collected representations explains the autonomy of reason.

"Collective representations are the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge. A special intellectual activity is therefore concentrated in them which is infinitely richer and complexer than that of the individual. From that one can understand how the reason has been able to go beyond the limits of empirical knowledge".

(E.F., p 16).

The necessity of the categories is the necessity of society requiring a minimum of logical and moral conformity.

And for Durkheim

"The same social character leads to an understanding of the origin of the necessity of the categories ... It is the very authority of society transferring itself to a certain manner of thought which is the indispensable condition of all common action ... This seems to be the origin of the exceptional authority which is inherent in the reason and which makes us accept its suggestions with confidence".

(E.F., p 17).

For Durkheim,

"To explain obligation in rules, it is sufficient to establish the nature of moral authority"

(D.M.F., p 47).

Society is the explanation both of the possibility of morality, but also of its distinctive characteristics.

"Kant postulates God, since without this hypothesis morality is unintelligible. We postulate a society specifically distinct from individuals, since otherwise morality has no object and duty no roots".

(D.M.F., p 52).

In the 'Division of Labour' he suggests

"Solidarity is not only a duty not less obligatory than others, but is perhaps the very source of morality".

(p 415).

For Durkheim

"Society is the end of all moral activity. Now i) while it transcends the individual it is immanent in him ii) it has all the characteristics of a moral authority that imposes respect".

(D.M.F. p 54).

It is society which establishes that moral rules have an obligatory character. To explain this feature of morality, Durkheim says, we must find a moral authority and only society can do this.

"Society then has all that is necessary for the transference to certain rules of conduct of the same imperative which is distinctive of obligation"

(D.M.F., p 56).

Society is the explanation for the authority of moral precepts and therefore their categorial form.

"Precisely because they are the echo within us of the great voice of the collective, they speak in our consciences with a tone quite different from that of purely individual sentiments. They speak to us from a higher level and by reason of their origin they have a force and ascendancy peculiarly their own".

(D.M.F., p 58).

The development of modern society explains why autonomy is the distinctive characteristic of morality, that Kant establishes as its supreme principle, the modern consciousness says Durkheim "an effective autonomy". It is "the principal differentiating characteristic of a secular morality".

And a secular morality implies

"That there is a human science of morality and consequently that moral facts are natural phenomena that emerge through reason alone".

Through this human science of morality, that is only adequately expressed in his sociology, Durkheim claims that we can see how the moral order is based on 'the nature of things'. Through the enlightenment that this science of morality will bring, we can conform to moral principles because we will understand their causes and conditions. Thus this subject will entail the reconciliations of the imperatival nature of morality with the autonomy of the modern consciousness. He asks, because

"The science of morality teaches us the reason for the imperative quality inherent in moral rules"

does it not follow that the rules thereby lose their imperatival quality, if we voluntarily conform to them.

"Are we not ourselves vulnerable to the criticism just levelled at Kant, that is to say, of sacrificing one of the essential elements of morality to the principle of autonomy"?

(M.E., p 117).

The science of morality through its analysis will establish "informed consent" and then

"It is no longer a humiliation and a bondage"

(M.E., p 118).

Sociology alone can adequately explain the "double necessity" (M.E., p 108) of morality: that is the imperatival nature of morality coupled with autonomy as its highest expression in modern society. Sociology will show

"Our whole nature has the need to be limited, contained, restricted - our reason as well as our senses".

(M.E., p 110).

This explains why

"Obligation is an essential element of the moral precept"

(M.E., p 110).

This is not incompatible with the impulse to autonomy characteristic of the modern consciousness. Understanding engendered through the science of morality mediates between the otherwise apparently incompatible concepts.

In arguing that society is the origin of both conceptual and moral rules, of both the form and content of these, he is arguing that society is the condition of the possibility of knowledge and morality. In this sense he is attempting to extend into sociology the Kantian concern for transcendental conditions. Categories he says

"As they express the fundamental conditions for an agreement between minds, it seems evident that they have been elaborated by society".

(E.F., p 439).

Society can achieve this because

"Society transcends the individual's consciousness"

both

"physically, materially and morally".

(D.M.F., p 54).

But while it transcends us

"It is immanent in us and we feel it as such".

(D.M.F., p 55).

Knowledge and morality come from society

"Civilisation ... is essentially a social product .. it is the congregation of the highest human values. Because it is at once the source and guardian of civilisation ... society appears to be an infinitely richer and higher reality than our own. It is a reality from which everything which matters to us flows. Nevertheless it surpasses us in every way, since we can receive from this storehouse of intellectual and moral values at most a few fragments only".

(D.M.F., p 54).

As the condition of knowledge and morality it is also the condition of our very humanity

"That which makes us real human beings is the amount that we manage to assimilate of this assembly of ideas, beliefs and percepts that we call civilisation. As Rousseau showed long ago: deprive man of all that society has given him and he is reduced to his sensations. Without language, essentially a social thing, general or abstract ideas are practically impossible as are all the higher functions".

(D.M.F., p 55).

Thus in this third sense, the intellectual debt Durkheim owes to Kant is that Kant outlined the central features of concepts and principles, which Durkheim claimed only a sociological analysis of the nature of society can give an adequate answer to.

However although Durkheim distances himself from Kant in using society as the explanation of the characteristics of knowledge and morality, it is clear that his definition of society is not at all free of Kantian ideas. It is an epistemic and moral authority. He says social being

"Represents the highest reality on the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation".

(E.F., p 16)

From it come all our concepts, principles, values and beliefs. It is the goal and end of all moral action, and whatever it commands is right. In this sense his definition of society is Kant's definition of reason as transferred to the collectivity. Is this an empirical definition? If not, can he say that he know it 'by observation'? Durkheim as a successor to Kant is posing Kantianism in new terms.

Section IV. Durkheim as Continuator of Kant.

The fourth kind of intellectual debt that the relationship of Durkheim to Kant can be analysed in terms of is of Durkheim as a continuator of Kant. In this sense Durkheim confirms Kant but from a different standpoint from that of Kant. Gellner argues that just as the behaviourists made empiricism testable in scientific terms, so Durkheim made Kant "ethnographically testable".¹ The success of post-Durkheimian anthropology is in this sense a confirmation of Kant. This view of Kant's relationship to Durkheim is in part Durkheim's own view of his relationship to Kant. Durkheim says

"We shall re-affirm, as a result of a purely empirical analysis, the notion of duty and nevertheless give a definition of it closely resembling that already given by Kant".

(D.M.F., p 36).

But from what point of view is Durkheim empirically confirming Kant? Is sociology as defined by Durkheim a science which is independent of Kantian philosophy and which can establish empirical confirmations of philosophical insights? Is Durkheim's view of science independent of Kant's philosophy? This is in part the issue of Part II of this work.

What kind of science is Durkheim's vision of sociology? Firstly it is a science of collective representations - it is a science of how things appear to

consciousness, in its collective dimension. What is the science of a collective epistemology? It will be clear in Part II that the idea of a science of representations is a re-working of Kantian epistemology. It was the Kantian philosophy which gave rise to the idea of a science of representations. It is a science which can deal with both appearances of things, known to consciousness and of the consciousness which knows them. Thus sociology studies what is known collectively in society - Collective Representations (myths, classificatory schemes, kinship systems) and that which knows them - the Conscience Collective. Both that which knows, the active side of the epistemological relationship, and that which is known, the object of collective consciousness, can be dealt with, Durkheim claims, in the scientific study of society. This scientific study of collective representations treats these issues as phenomena and laws: Durkheim insists that these are adequate methodological tools by which to give an exhaustive and satisfactory analysis of both the Conscience Collective and its representations.

Further, it is a science which can deal with action, its causes and conditions in social and historical terms. And it is a science which does not exclude evaluations: it is held to be adequate to express the values held in a society these can be treated as a basis of making evaluations about that society

"This science far from preventing us from evaluating reality, gives us the means by which we can arrive at reasoned evaluations".

(D.M.F., p 62).

"Here as elsewhere the science of reality, puts us in a position to modify the real and direct it. The science of moral opinion furnishes us with the means of judging it and the need of rectifying it".

(D.M.F., p 60).

In particular the impulse behind the normative aspect of sociology as a science is that it can determine unity for a society: whether or not a society has it and how it has it lost or not achieved it. (Hence Durkheim's critique of industrial society and its normlessness). It is a science which can thus deal with ideals. In Kantian terms, it is a subject which is coextensive with practical reason. Indeed not just with the product of practical reason - values, but also in so far as it itself determines ideals for society, this science of society is identical with practical reason itself.

This science, in so far as it deals with values, is also Durkheim says, dealing with facts. He quotes Janet, who claims that all science must rest on facts. For him, as against Kant there are moral facts and duty expressed in the social relationship of sanction is a primary moral fact that this science of social reality has to deal with.

"A general law of ethics can only be of scientific value by taking into account the diversity of moral facts".

(D.L., p 418).

This science can deal with representations and values on a par - as facts. How is this so? For a post-Kantian philosophy the interests of theoretical reason (which deals with appearances and their principles) and practical reason (which deals with action and its principles) must have been reconciled. These two were kept apart by Kant, as expressed in the Third Antimony. This is the subject of Part III.

It is already clear that the notion of science that Durkheim is calling on, is in no sense independent of the interests of theoretical and practical reason as defined by Kant. Thus the position from which Durkheim 'confirms' Kant is not itself independent of Kant. The interest of reason for Kant in its theoretical and moral dimensions is to achieve unity and order in knowledge and action. The aim of the science of society for Durkheim is to determine order and stability in a society threatened with disintegration in the nineteenth century.

Sociology as a science of collective representations and of moral facts is not independent of Kantian philosophy. In Part II I will examine how the idea of a science of representations develops out of a particular interpretation of the Transcendental Analytic of Kant's First Critique. Durkheim's science of collective representations is a particular application of this. In Part III I examine how the conflict between theoretical and practical reason in the Kantian philosophy are reconciled and attempted to be made compatible. In Part IV I will show how the idea

of a moral fact relates to the concept of morality as explained by Kant.

This analysis leads to the question that was a major stimulus behind this whole enterprise - why did Durkheim think he could confirm Kant? Or indeed that he needs to: that a science of representations and values can transform a priorism into a science? Scientific confirmation is strictly irrelevant to Kant's moral philosophy, as Durkheim must have known. And he recognised the irrelevance of 'empirical' confirmation in relation to the epistemology through his acceptance of the critique of 'classical empiricism'. What relevance then is the 'confirmation' of duty? Could it be that this science is not a science of empirical facts at all, but rather a moral science? In this confirmation is not a 'proof' in a natural scientific sense, but is a form of exhortation as entailed by the commands of practical reason? If so Durkheim's science far from confirming Kant from an independent empirical standpoint, is a continuation of Kant's sense of practical reason, which is developed into a science of principles of action for a damaged society. (This will be examined in Part III).

Section V. The Philosophical Premises of Durkheim's Sociology as the Résult of the Critique of the Kantian System.

The main body of this thesis does not concern itself with the above four types of intellectual debt. It is rather concerned with a fifth and more complex form of it, the unravelling of which is the task of this work. That is, the very theoretical terms of Durkheim's sociology are identical with the terms of a philosophical position which is developed in response to the contradictions and conflicts of the Kantian system. That is the philosophical premises of Durkheim's sociology are a form of Neo-Kantianism. They rework the philosophy of Renouvier, whose philosophy is presented as 'Neo-Criticisme' to Kant's "Criticisme", in terms of a science of the collectivity.

What kind of intellectual debt is this? In the most obvious sense, that unless the Kantian system was developed, then there could be no critique, no reworking of it. Intellectual debt is here due to contradictions and philosophical inconsistencies of Kant's system. But further, Renouvier presents himself as both a disciple and critic of Kant. He incorporates elements of Kantianism in his system, yet transforms other elements of it almost beyond recognition, always in the interest of being true to Kant's 'spirit', if not to his system. But to accept that Renouvier is always true to the spirit of Kant is to accept Renouvier's account of his debt to Kant. It is not at all clear that Kant would have drawn the conclusions Renouvier

makes on his behalf. Renouvier claims he would have done so if only he had not been so timid in his rejection of pre-Copernican metaphysics. And I think it will be clear at some points that what Renouvier claims to be doing is not so much a continuation as a denial of some of the essential elements of the Kantian spirit. Yet nevertheless in biographical and historical terms, Renouvier's system was seen by himself to be developed in response to real problems of the Kantian system.

What are 'the clues to the discovery' of the Neo-Kantian influence on Durkheim? I was driven to uncover and analyse Renouvier's system, by certain questions in relation to Durkheim's thought that I could not answer. The first question is why Durkheim thought he could confirm Kant. Why did he think Kantian a priorism could fit inside a science, particularly in its moral dimension? In relation to particular details of Durkheim's discussion of the categories in 'Elementary Forms of the Religious Life', why does he hold personality as a category? Why does he regard space and time as categories, whereas for Kant they are forms of intuition? Categories have a function he says and this is to envelop all other concepts (E.F., p 440). He says categories express relations - the most general relations which exist between things (E.F., p 17). These are not positions explicable from the Kantian system itself.

Why does he think a priorism and positivism can be reconciled - as answered in his new 'Science of Man'? Why does he think a source must be found for the a priori? This is a genetic question, which for Kant is irrelevant to a transcendental enquiry. And particularly why does he think a source can be found in terms of social relations? Most importantly, why does he think the a priority of the categories is compatible with the relativity of social and historical knowledge? Kant's universalism is indubitable. (This position is the cornerstone of Durkheim's sociology of knowledge, which is examined in Part II). What is the relationship of the a priori to the notion of irreducibility? Why is the relationship of the a priori to the a posteriori characterised by irreducibility? Why does he misunderstand the notion of the transcendental?

Most importantly why does he think that the necessity of the categories

"Is not a physical or metaphysical necessity but a special sort of moral necessity which is to the intellectual life what moral obligation is to the will".

(E.F., p 18).

This of all Durkheim's remarks puzzled me the most. And the enquiry into this stimulated the research behind Part III. Why against the German Neo-Kantians, for example, does he praise Kant for recognising that science and morals come from one source in reason? And why against Kant, does he say there is no antimony between science and morals? (E.F., p 445). This is also examined in Part III.

Thus, what is this science of representations that covers both facts and values? This question covers both Parts II and III.

Why is knowledge related to a Conscience and what is the Conscience Collective? How can this Conscience Collective be the answer to the question of the possibility of reality? That is when he misunderstands the transcendental, how can he treat his concept of the Conscience Collective as if it were a transcendental condition? And further how can he claim that it can be methodologically understood in terms of law and function? Why does he think philosophical questions about the authority and necessity of concepts can be satisfactorily answered by a science of facts concerned with law and function? These questions are addressed in Part II.

And finally how can society as the a priori, as the sum of the most general relations, be personalised?

"If society is something universal in relation to the individual, it is none the less an individuality itself ... being placed outside of and above individual and local contingencies, it sees things only in their permanent and essential aspects ..."

(E.F., p 444).

All these questions can be understood in relation to Renouvier's system of 'Neo-Criticisme' which is understood as a critique of Kant's 'Criticisme'.

Chapter II. The Relation between Sociology and Philosophy

It is clear from Chapter I that Kantian and Neo-Kantian ideas are woven into the fabric of Durkheim's sociology. Society is defined as an epistemic and moral authority and is the source of the a priori - the universality and necessity of the categories and of moral principles. Sociology as a science can deal with the theoretical and practical aspects of society. It explains the Conscience Collective and the Collective Representations through which society is both known and organised at social level and is available to analysis at the level of science. It is a science of collective representations. But further it is a science of practical reason and as such it deals with the 'moral necessities' which are part of social life. 'Sanction' which is the central conception of his scientific sociology, expresses the relationship between the individual and the collectivity and is a 'confirmation' of the Kantian notion of duty. Society is the source of the epistemic and moral a priori. Sociology as a science of collective representations and values, Durkheim insists is adequate to explain this in its methodology of law, fact, function and causal analysis. The naturalism of methodology which is a distortion of the Kantian position, Durkheim claims is adequate to the subject matter which is characterised by the quality of the a priori.

In this tradition, philosophy does not stand to sociology as the underlabourer clearing away logical rubble before the real business of science can begin. Since philosophical ideas are woven into the definition of both science and society, sociology is not independent of philosophy.

Durkheim himself never claimed the independence of philosophy that his later followers in the schools of empirical sociology did. For him, rather

"Sociology could only become conscious of itself within philosophical thought"¹

Whilst it is the task of this thesis to examine that philosophy, it is already clear that Durkheim's commentators who stress his positivism and his social realism (as though these were not in themselves philosophical positions) ignore the Kantian and Neo-Kantian bases of his thought. It could certainly be maintained in relation to the above quotation that sociology outgrows philosophy as it develops into a science. However Durkheim certainly doesn't think sociology as a science ever entirely leaves philosophy behind

"Philosophy is the Conscience Collective of Science"

(.D.L, p 364).

Exactly what the Conscience Collective is and how it develops is a main theme of Part II and Part III of this thesis. Without presupposing this analysis, I take Durkheim's statement as meaning that philosophy is a source

of inspiration and legitimation for the particular sciences of which sociology is one. It is an intellectual authority providing principles of knowledge and of action. The Kantian philosophy pointed to the categorial conditions of human knowledge and to duty as a principle of action. Sociology extends the analysis of these in terms of a science of social facts.

Durkheim does however present the analysis of social facts as a higher and more objective stage than philosophy defined as a priori speculation. For example in the Appendix to 'The Division of Labour in Society', Durkheim insists that all science must rest on facts and further that there is a science of moral facts of which sociology is an exponent. That sociology rests on facts, for Durkheim means it is in contrast to those philosophical positions which are not objective because not based on scientific truth.

This position of Durkheim encouraged the development of sociology understood as an empirical survey of human behaviour in its social and cultural aspects. Sociology understood as an empirical subject concerned with social facts is seen to be far removed in terms of scientificity and objectivity from philosophy when understood as concerned with the problem of meaning and the analysis of concepts. In this sense Durkheimian sociology and Kantian philosophy are far apart. However the central focus should here be on the sense of 'fact' which is used as the

basis of science for Durkheim. It is clear from Chapter I that 'fact' for Durkheim is not independent of the conditions of human representation, ie. the categories. 'Facts' are constituted by both the senses and the categories. In contrast 'classic empiricism' which relies on sense data alone to constitute knowledge 'results in irrationalism'. In this sense Durkheim's definition of fact is close to Kant's definition of meaning. For Kant questions of meaning must be determined in relation to two factors: firstly restriction to the realm of phenomena and secondly the categories. It follows that the 'fact' of Durkheimian sociology and this question of 'meaning' in Kantian philosophy are not distinct but closely tied.

This reflection can be extended to a deeper sense of identity between the two subjects. Philosophy in the Kantian sense can be understood as the explication of the epistemological conditions of human understanding and action. Durkheim's sociology can be understood as the study of the collective conditions of human representation and action in social and historical terms. Both these positions see an analysis of the epistemic conditions imposed by the human subject as a condition for the understanding of human reality. Durkheim extends the Kantian inheritance of a concern for the epistemic conditions imposed by the subject, to the collective dimension. Whilst Kant insists on the universal rational foundation of knowledge and action Durkheim insists on the social and historical dimension of this. In this sociology and philosophy share the theme

of Copernicanism, which comes from Kant.

It will be pointed out in Part II that Kant's Copernican Revolution consisted in two principles the rule of phenomenalism and the rule of a priorism. These are the principles of Naturalism and Idealism respectively. It is already clear that Durkheim maintains the a priori which is characteristic of the rule of a priorism in Kantian thought. This can be seen in Durkheim's theory of the categories and their universality and necessity, and in the irreducibility of morality to interest, and the retention of the notion of duty. He maintains a positivistic position however in his statements on method. All realms can be adequately analysed according to the method of naturalism - that is, in terms of observation of facts and laws. He has no doubt that this can satisfactorily accommodate the a priori. In Part II it will be argued that this position of Durkheim's stems from the central confusion of Renouvier's Neo-Criticisme.

An analysis of positivism is entailed by the question of the relationship between philosophy and sociology, since it is under the influence of positivism that Durkheim claims that sociology as a science is more objective than philosophy because it is based on facts.

Section I. The Question of Positivism

In a thesis of this nature an analytic discussion of positivism must logically precede the historical. So although Comte was the father of French positivism, I shall not discuss the law of the Three Stages nor the Hierarchy of the Sciences, for this would take the discussion out of the legitimate boundaries of this work. I shall concentrate the discussion of the positivistic elements of the thinking of Kant, Renouvier and Durkheim in terms of the criteria of positivistic thinking which Kolakowski establishes in his 'Positivist Philosophy'². He lists four principle characteristics. Firstly the rule of phenomenalism. Secondly the rule of nominalism. Thirdly, the refusal to characterise the normative as knowledge. And fourthly the insistence on the unity of the scientific method.

To discuss the rule of phenomenalism in Kant's philosophy is to discuss the idea of his 'Critical Intention'. This is to restrict reason to its 'bounds of sense'. This is essential to his reform of philosophy: to restrict reason to the bounds of sense, and thus to claim that knowledge cannot transcend the order of phenomena is to put metaphysics, for Kant, on the path of science. The critical intention was reformist initially of dogmatic metaphysics for Kant.

"Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of reason, without previous criticism of its own powers".

Kant's claim was that reason as it transcends its boundaries becomes contradictory. And he charts these philosophical mistakes which are the source of illusory knowledge in the Transcendental Dialectic of the First Critique. In this he established a criterion of significance that was an essential part of the return to Kant in nineteenth century France.

So Ravaisson³ shows that Renouvier's primary aim was to continue the critical intention of Kant. Renouvier interprets this as meaning that nothing can transcend the realm of phenomena if it is to constitute knowledge. It follows that for him there is no absolute, no infinite, no in-itself. Renouvier follows Kant in his reformist approach to traditional metaphysics and in this both align themselves with Comte, Littré, Taine and J.S. Mill. Renouvier however turns Kant's critical intention against Kant himself and accuses him of flagrant inconsistency of the rule of phenomenalism by the retention of the noumenon. Renouvier's central critique of Kant centres around the noumenon and thus Kant's compromise with traditional or pre-Copernican metaphysics. The unique and central feature of Renouvier's own system is that it is an attempt to develop a system of knowledge consistent with the rule of phenomenalism, yet preserving the concept of the a priori and the 'interests' of the noumenon. According to his own intention Renouvier's theory of Neo-Criticisme is the same of Kant without the thing-in-itself. Without this Renouvier claims the Kantian system becomes truly critical and thereby scientific.

Kant's critical intention, the restriction of reason to experience was the pivot of the return to Kant in nineteenth century France. Renouvier was the first in his 'Premier Essai' of 1854 to establish the significance of the critical intention of Kant for philosophy. For Renouvier it opposed the German post-Kantians: he opposed absolute idealism in the Hegelian system by insisting on the necessity of experience as a criterion of knowledge. That is, the system of the categories cannot be deduced from the a priori. He opposed the notion of Hegelian science not just in its conception of necessity, but also in its method of the dialectic. For Renouvier restriction to the realm of phenomena is the first criterion of knowledge and therefore science and the method of science must be observation. (It will be clear later in Part II that Renouvier disputes with Kant that the sensory is a primary source of experience and this is central to his critique of Kant's doctrine of the faculties. In insisting that experience must be defined by appearance he brings himself closer to Hegel than he would like).

It is clear that the version of science that Durkheim operates with has Kant's critical intention as a central feature. Firstly it follows that a system of knowledge can no longer be of the in-itself but of phenomena or representations. For Durkheim sociology is a science of collective representations. Secondly the means to an understanding of the nature and forms of human representation is an empirical examination of classificatory schemes in

their historical and cultural forms. The method of science thus consists in discovering the systems of representation that underlie human knowledge. It cannot be deductive or dialectical; it must be observational: all other methods are metaphysical in the proscribed sense.

The question then is how is experience to be interpreted? This brings one to Kolakowski's second criterion of positivistic thinking - the rule of nominalism. In this Kant, Renouvier and Durkheim disagree with the definition of experience given by Comtean positivism and classical empiricism. Experience does not consist in a set of isolated and discrete facts. The atomistic fact of empiricism in this Copernican tradition from Kant to Durkheim is a wholly invalid interpretation. Knowledge is limited to phenomena, but is not without foundation. For Kant, Renouvier and Durkheim, the categories are the foundations of knowledge. And for those who follow him Kant's critique of empiricism in his account of the categories constituted a revolution in the description of experience. For Kant experience forms a unified whole where the data of sensibility are related and organised through the categories and unified in relation to the 'I' which accompanies all experience. Durkheim rejects 'classical empiricism' which results in 'irrationalism' and argues that totality is one of the most important categories of social classification. Social knowledge is unified in relation to the Conscience Collective. The concept of the synthetic a priori stands opposed to the nominalist position through the idea that knowledge is

a synthesis according to rules which logically precede experience (understood as reception of sense data). The redefinition of experience is that phenomenal reality is not disjointed and atomistic as empiricism defines it but through categorial conditions becomes orderly and regulated.

Renouvier argues that Hume reduced the laws of experience

"A une sorte de formation accidentelle sous l'action de l'expérience".

(C.P., 1878, I 283).

Kant's reform of sensationalism in knowledge was one of his great achievements. And Renouvier claims following Kant, that representation only occurs under categorial conditions. Phenomena present themselves as related through categories. And experience is unified in relation to personality, under the category of Conscience. It follows for Renouvier we can only represent nature under the conditions of mind (L'Ésprit).

He further opposes positivism in his theory of representation. (This will be developed in Part II). For him representation has a double aspect: the 'représenté' (the 'object') and the 'représentatif' (the 'subject'). They are inseparable correlatives and all reality appears to consciousness under these two aspects. The 'représenté' connects to the external object but is known only in relation to the 'représentatif'. Positivism for Renouvier like materialism takes phenomena as defined independent of

consciousness and as given without the conditions of human representation. For Renouvier the sensory element is only part of the phenomenon: it is constituted, as known, through the conditions of representation. It follows for Renouvier realist materialism (which for him is the main source of positivist thinking ^{and} which postulates matter as primary), is refuted.

However Comte was Renouvier's teacher at L'Ecole Polytechnique. It is clear that he owes much to him, above all his consistent phenomenalism. It is in the name of Comte and of Hume that Renouvier criticises Kant's inconsistency in retaining the noumenon. But as Verneaux⁵ points out his fidelity to Kant in turn separates him from Comte. Comtean positivism did not take the critique of knowledge as the necessary starting point of all philosophy.

"Le positivisme a été motivé par le refus presque universel de comprendre le criticisme Kantien à tout le moins comme ayant établi la nécessité logique de placer en tête de la philosophie la critique de la connaissance".

(A.P. 1895, p 7).

Comte wants to replace philosophy which is metaphysical with science which is the totality of the particular sciences. But what is science? It cannot itself be 'positive' for it has no unique set of facts or method. It must then be a philosophy because it systematizes the principles of knowledge of the particular sciences. But it refuses to deal with its own foundations philosophically because philosophy is metaphysical. It is thus a

'bizarre' and 'scandalous' enterprise for Renouvier.

"La philosophie ... se laisse opprimer par le fastueux étalage de la 'science' qui n'est aucune science, qui n'est simplement qu'une autre philosophie à qui manque la conscience de ses incertitudes".

(C.P. 1878, I p. 151).

Whilst the critical intention has a negative aspect, for Kant it has a positive aspect.

"The dogmatism of metaphysics ... is the source of all that unbelief always very dogmatic, which wars against morality".

(C.P.R. B XXX).

Reason is restricted to experience in terms of knowledge, but not so in relation to action. The critical intention restricts what counts as knowledge to liberate practical reason. Thus for Kant although

"all possible speculative knowledge of reason is limited to mere objects of experience

(C.P.R. B XXVI)

... we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical employment of pure reason - the moral - in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility"

(C.P.R. B XXV).

Morality, stemming from practical reason, must be independent of phenomena, which are governed by the principle of causality; and thus relations between phenomena are deterministic. Freedom as the foundation of morality is excluded from the phenomenal. The real significance of the noumenon is found here, for only if there is something which escapes determinism can there be morality. In this Kant agrees with positivist

thought that normative judgements are not a matter of knowledge. Nevertheless Kant, unlike later Logical Positivism accorded morality the possibility of objectivity. Moral judgements have the characteristics of universality and necessity and are thus not private and relative; they are fundamental to rationality and the human condition.

Durkheim upholds the Kantian position on the universality and necessity of moral concepts, although he adjusts this to historical and social relativity. His position is this: the moral command of society, at any period/any society, are categorical and universal within that society and rightly viewed so because these are central to the moral health of a society. Their changeableness over time/culture does not affect this for Durkheim. In this he can be seen as attempting to reconcile the universality of concept and authority of principle of action with social change and historical diversity. Kant recognised factual diversity in human behaviour, and argued that this does not alter the true meaning of universality: that all people tell lies does not alter the rule that they ought not to. So for Durkheim the changefulness of social rules does not affect the social authority which backs them in each society and is the source of their universality and necessity. Morality is of central importance in social life for Durkheim. And in his idea of a science of ethics he envisages establishing a science which can determine the ethical code which is right for the level of development of the society. In this he clearly believes there is a form of moral knowledge. And further sociology as a science can deal with both representations and values.

In this he claims, there is no antimony between science and morals (this will be examined in Part III).

Renouvier sharply differentiates himself from Kant: for him liberty is the condition of knowledge. He criticises the association of objectivity in knowledge with scientific determinism. He attacks the conception of mechanical necessity as governing experience and attempts to reconcile Kantian dualism, not in the interest of intellectual necessity (expressed in science) but of practical necessity (expressed in morality). Thus for him freedom is not just the basis of action, but of certainty in knowledge. In this he is taking the part of the Critique of Practical Reason against the Critique of Pure Reason. He develops Kant's conception of practical reason into a science which has freedom as its foundation. In this he opposes the positivistic identification of knowledge with science and science in turn as identified with causal determinism.

Kolakowski's fourth criterion of positivistic thinking is the unity of scientific method. In the context of Kantian philosophy this must mean how far philosophy adopts scientific method as its method. For Kant one of the tasks of philosophy is to explain the possibility of science. He gives science a rational basis, but does not in this annex philosophy to science. Science has an a priori foundation in the structure of human understanding and the method which accounts for this is transcendental and not empirical. The a priori has a transcendental status for Kant and it follows that philosophical principles and method

which account for the a priori are not of the same order as the laws and methods of science.

Yet Kant insists that philosophy reformed through the critical intention becomes scientific. For Renouvier following Kant in this, insists that reformed philosophy is limited to the study of phenomena

"La philosophie doit se borner elle-même à l'étude des phénomènes et à la recherche de leurs lois, en tant qu'elle vise à se donner une constitution scientifique".

(C.P. 1884, II, p 135).

It will be clear that for Renouvier the principles of philosophy are logically of the same order as the laws of science - only of a more abstract nature. In this Renouvier is more positivistic than Kant.

However Kant gives prominence to the principle of causality as primary among principles of the understanding. It is through this that all objective explanation of events occurs. He builds into the definition of causality a mechanistic determinism which he takes from contemporary Newtonian science. In this he is taking science as a criterion of significance for human understanding. It is this definition of causality and its determinism as applicable to all phenomenal reality, that engenders the split in the Kantian system - between the interests of science and morality. Renouvier disputes this meaning of causality and takes his meaning not from mechanistic science, but from what is coherent in terms of Conscience. And

against Kant of the First Critique he develops the idea of science as a science of practical reason. For Kant understanding and action have different criteria: understanding is limited to phenomena, action as based on practical reason is based on the noumenon. Renouvier although he disputes the noumenon nevertheless takes the part of practical reason against theoretical reason and says all reason is fundamentally founded on practical reason. Freedom is the foundation of practical reason and therefore is the foundation of reason. It follows that freedom is the foundation of science. In this he disputes Kant's positivist identification of objectivity with science and thereby with causal determinism. In so doing he overcame Kantian dualism in the name of practical necessity and thus knowledge and action have the same condition - freedom. He thus develops the idea of a science of practical reason that leaves behind determinism as a condition of understanding. This is the subject of Part III.

Here I will argue that Durkheim follows Renouvier and not Kant, and that his science of sociology, although concerned with understanding the collective conditions of human action, is above all concerned with change. In this sociology is a science of practical reason and in its concern to foster moral renewal under the Third Republic, uses the criterion of practical necessity as basis of collective action. So Durkheim develops the notion of sanction, the empirical confirmation of duty, both as the

link between the individual and the collectivity and as the basic concept of scientific sociology. In the Kantian tradition duty expresses practical necessity. The science of sociology concerns sanction. It follows that science here means science of practical reason. And in this Durkheim extends the science of practical reason into a collective dimension.

This philosophical analysis of positivism demonstrates an ambivalence towards strict positivism. Renouvier and Durkheim hold to Kant's critical intention, and they agree with him against empiricism and positivism, that the rules which logically precede experience are conditions of experience. That is the categorial conditions of representation point to the a priori as the basis of experience. They agree with Kant on the 'Primacy of Practical Reason'. But Renouvier disputes that for practical reason to be liberated, knowledge must be restricted. He disputes the distinction between phenomena and noumena and consequently the split between fact and value in the Kantian system. Liberty is the condition of knowledge. In this rejection of fact/value split and the association of objectivity in knowledge with determinism, Renouvier distances himself from two positivistic positions in Kant. Durkheim follows in this and insists that the science of sociology can unify the theoretical and evaluative perspectives in a science of action in the collective dimension.

This analytic ambivalence in Durkheim's thought towards positivistic positions can be seen in historical terms in the conflict between idealism and positivism in nineteenth century France.

Section II. Positivism and the Idealist Reaction in
Nineteenth Century France.

A. Fouillée writing in 1896 in his 'Le Mouvement Idéaliste en France et la Réaction contre la Science Positive' says that French intellectual development had passed through the stage of positivism, characterised by Comte as the intelligence in insurrection against the heart, and was then in the stage of idealism - or a period Fouillée characterises as the heart in insurrection against the intelligence. The period Fouillée refers to began in 1870 with the beginning of the Third Republic. Fouillée characterises the movements of philosophical thought in nineteenth century France as a struggle between positivism which he characterises as coming from materialist metaphysics and idealism which came from spiritualist metaphysics.

The first half of the nineteenth century was dominated by humanistic positivism. This had two sources. Firstly the success of science which was developed and encouraged in the scientific centres set up in post-revolutionary France. And secondly the empiricist inheritance that came through the thinking of the Encyclopaedists and was supported by the Ideologists. This was a form of sensualist empiricism which held there is 'nothing in the mind which was not first in the senses'. In Kantian terms it maintained that knowledge is a posteriori, and that human knowledge can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of the product of the senses.

Together these two influences established the positivist approach which can be summed up in these assumptions. Firstly that knowledge is limited to phenomena and these are characterised as having a solely sensible origin. Secondly reality is equated with what is scientifically determinable and that deterministic laws govern phenomena and ensure the predictions of science. And thirdly that science can answer human problems of morality and society. Leaving aside his social system of positivism, his hierarchy of the sciences and his law of the three stages, positivist thinking was characterised by Comte's claim that there is no absolute knowledge and knowledge is limited to phenomena and observation is the unique method for science. Positivist assumptions developed in certain thinkers to a form of scientism: that science can answer all questions with certainty. This is exemplified in the thinking of Taine(1828-93) and his claim that since decisions are causally determined as are natural events, vice and virtue are products like vitriol and sugar. Berthelot, the chemist, claimed that the universal triumph of science will establish happiness and morality for humanity. Positivism thus can be characterised as the extension of science to all domains.

The Third Republic has been characterised as an age of idealism, and the Second Empire as an age of positivism. This is an exaggeration and oversimplification says D.G. Charlton¹ as there were thinkers of idealist

inclination working under the Second Empire (Renouvier was prominent amongst them), so also there were thinkers of positivist inclination working under the Third Republic. He² says it was at the end of the Second Empire that philosophical resistance to scientific humanism achieved coherence and importance. (It will be shown below that Renouvier was writing during the Second Empire and his works began to gain a wide acceptance under the Third Republic).

The beginning of the reaction against the most confident forms of scientism can be seen in the work of Cournot (1801-77) who challenged the equation of science with certainty in knowledge. He was influenced by Kant and he was concerned with the nature of knowledge especially scientific knowledge. Kant's notion of scientific law was too rigid. The development of science since Kant had showed that scientific laws can attain no more than probabilistic status. To aspire to complete certainty as Kant did is to end in scepticism. Cournot began his work on mathematical theories of chance and probability. For him the problem of knowledge, when it passes from observations to generalisations and inductions, lies in the evaluations of probabilities.

The critique of the dogmatic assurances of the scientists was reinforced by Jules Lachelier (1832-1918). In his 'Le Fondement de l'Induction' (1871) he challenged the status of scientific law by demanding to know how we ever induce a law of allegedly infinite and permanent

applicability from a number of finite observations. We can only do so through a principle of reason which is projected onto the world and which is not derived from sense experience. It follows that we do not know the world as it is, as Comte and other realists had asserted.

Emile Boutroux (1845-1921) a pupil of Lachelier, opposed scientism from a different standpoint. In his 'De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature' (1874) he challenged the assumption, without which scientific laws cannot claim universal reliability - that a strict determinism rules in the natural order. He argues that as we move through science from physical, biological to the human sciences we encounter an increasing area of contingency, indeterminacy and of liberty.

Thus after 1870, the influence of Comte, Littré and Taine had waned. And D.G. Charlton says that by the mid 1880s the more confident forms of scientific humanism increasingly appeared as fallen idols. The criticism of the ultra-scientific view from the inadequacy of the notion of scientific law moved to a dissatisfaction with the scientific view of the human agent and reality. It follows from Fouillée's³ definition (that positivism in France comes from materialist metaphysics and idealism comes from spiritualist metaphysics), that idealism reacted against reductive material explanations of the higher forms of consciousness and the denial of free will. Lachelier, Boutroux and F. Ravaisson (1813-1900) each stress a free creative reason independent of mechanism and causality.

Ravaisson attacked mechanism because it ignored spontaneity and creation. Reality can only be completely explained by combining mechanism with teleology. All activity in the universe is determined not by mechanical necessity, but guided by inner moral necessity, by final not efficient causes. Intelligence and free will are inseparable. For Lachelier the scientific method (la methode reductrice) can never satisfy human intelligence which requires finality rather than mechanism as the order of things. Lachelier sought to resolve Kantian dualism by subordinating mechanism to teleology, efficient causes to final causes. Boutroux, like Lachelier, was not content with Kantian dualism of mechanical necessity in the phenomenal world and freedom in the noumenal. He challenged not science, but that form of imperialism which claims science as the only source of knowledge. He distinguishes between reason and science. Science deals with facts, but reason demands that facts be given a relation to something which gives them meaning and intelligibility. Man's reason is free, supple, 'vivante' not determined by mechanical necessity but by an inner moral necessity. In pointing to that which precedes experience as its explanation, and to the autonomy of higher forms of consciousness and the freedom of the will, these French Idealists were stressing what in Kantian terms was the a priori: that which is independent of experience, which is revealed in the activities of theoretical and practical reason.

Fouillée characterises French Idealism as not the reduction of reality to ideas, nor the negation of external objects, nor simply an intellectualist representation of the world. Rather it is

"La representation de toutes choses sur le type psychique, sur le modèle des faits de conscience, comme seule révélation directe de la réalité"⁴

Following this definition Renouvier's thinking is one of the earliest and most influential exponents of French Idealism. It will be seen in Part II how against realism and positivism he maintains that reality is coextensive with Conscience and its principles or categories. And in Part III it will be shown against determinism he maintains that liberty is the condition not just of action, but also of knowledge. He was the first to oppose mechanism as a universal principle of reality. In his "Essaies de Critique Générale" of 1854 and 1858 he established the role of the a priori in experience, in the categories, and of freedom as fundamental to human reality. To stress his idealism is to falsify the picture however for in his Premier Essai he opposed subjective idealism as much as positivism and realism. He presented himself as reconciling Kant with Hume and in this sense we can see his philosophy as an attempt at the reconciliation of a priorism and naturalism or of idealism and positivism. His thought thus stands as the attempt to reconcile the two main strands of French thought. Despite his stress on the categories and on freedom of the will, with positivism he insists the knowledge cannot transcend the order of phenomena. But with the idealists, he disagrees with

the positivists on how phenomena can be characterised. In particular he disagrees that phenomena are unified by a principle of continuity characterised by determinism, and that phenomena are independent of the principles of Conscience. The restriction of reason to experience is the critical intention of his philosophy. Thus Renouvier characterises his own philosophy as Neo-Criticisme - an extension of modifications of Kant's 'Criticisme'. Renouvier's philosophy can be seen as critical idealism which is a reconciliation of the a priori and the a posteriori.

It was Kant who first pointed the way to the reconciliation of the a priori and the a posteriori, by showing that the categories are the condition of experience as we know it. It is in connection to the movements of idealism and naturalism in nineteenth century France that the significance of Kant became apparent. Renouvier was the first to 'revive' Kant and point his significance both to the interests of the analysis of knowledge and the establishment of morality.

Finally in connection to Fouillée's definition of French idealism, how can Durkheim's thought be characterised? In so far as he insists that social reality is articulated and organised by a Conscience Collective he can be characterised as an idealist. Parodi⁵ confirms this opinion and says, despite his social realism, he tends to idealism in his theory of representations. Parodi

says Durkheim gives a new sense to classical a priorism. This can be seen in his theory of the categories and the irreducibility of morality expressed in duty. But Durkheim insists on empiricism as a method and in this sides with positivism and naturalism. It has been shown in Chapter I how Durkheim insists on the principle of idealism and the principle of naturalism. Parodi says Durkheim reconciles empiricism and a priorism in favour of a new rationalism. This also is the stated aim of Renouvier.

Section III. The Significance of Kant for Nineteenth Century French Thought.

By 'significance' here I mean Kant's perceived significance for thinkers under the Third Republic. L.S. Crawford¹ points out that the critique of science outlined above was more in the spirit of reconciliation than antagonism. It is here that lies Kant's perceived significance. L. Levy Bruhl said Kant made the most powerful effort ever made to measure the scope of science and to reconcile its demands with morality.² E. Boutroux said that the philosophy of Kant "was one of the most important facts in the history of the human mind"³ because Kant answered the question about the foundation of science and of action. He asks of empiricism how experience alone can give us certainty and how can a law have purely experiential origin. Kant's answer to empiricism is in his doctrine of the categories. Kant's system is the answer to contemporary theories of action for

"It brings duty out from the very heart of experience and holds aloof from mysticism and utilitarianism alike"⁴

So Kant's answer to positivism is a stern dualism. He limits science and establishes morals in the domain opened up by this limitation. In this he gave a solution to the problem of the sovereignty of science and the question of the theoretical basis of freedom.

For Renouvier⁵ Kant's thinking is the corrective to both scientific and metaphysical pretense. It corrects the former through demonstrating the dependence of experience on the laws of understanding. And it corrects the latter by the rule of phenomenalism, it limits reason to experience.

I suggest that, as Durkheim's thinking developed in the intellectual atmosphere of the Third Republic, Kant's actual significance in the foundation of Durkheim's sociology is that Kant pointed to the reconciliation of idealism and positivism. He reconciled the principle of idealism - the relativity of the world to consciousness and its principles, and the principle of naturalism - the restriction of reason to experience. For Kant the rule of a priorism and the rule of phenomenalism unite in the Copernican Revolution. In this he establishes the idea of a Copernican Science which examines the conditions of knowledge, the origins of representation and the principles of human action. Durkheim's sociology offers an empirical extension of the examination of the nature of human representation and of action. That is he points to a new science, against empiricism and Hegelianism.

Boutroux points out that after Kant we can no longer form an ontological conception of the universe: Kant turned philosophy towards the condition of representation and judgement. Transcendental Idealism is the answer to the question of our relationship to the reality of things.

After Kant the task of philosophy is to examine the laws of thought by which phenomena are conditioned. To add to Boutroux's analysis, it is clear that the critical intention, the restriction of reason to experience, precludes both Hegelianism, the establishment of absolute processes by speculation, and the discovery of the a priori precludes a strictly empirical science. For now science must look for the rules by which reality is interpreted and experience is formed as it is. The reconciliation of the a priori and the a posteriori is found in the concept of the synthetic a priori, which is central to the philosophy of Transcendental Idealism. Knowledge does not transcend experience, yet experience displays features of the a priori - universality and necessity. Durkheim develops this into empirical analysis of the rules by which forms of knowledge and action are developed in social/cultural contexts.

In the conception of the Primacy of Practical Reason and Duty as the moral principle governing action, Kant pointed to a subject which establishes 'rules for the future' and establishes the definite principles which this subject can establish. So for Durkheim normative sociology establishes sanction as the relationship between the agent and collectivity. Kant pointed to a principle of unity for society that was neither a return to the revolutionary socialism of the neo-Hegelianism in France nor to the utilitarianism of the empiricists.

But the problem for the post-Kantians is that firstly Kant, against his own critical intention, retains the noumenon. And secondly his account of phenomenal reality is deterministic. The first contradicts the interests of Copernican science for it admits a wholly uncritical element. The second contradicts the interest of a theory of human freedom that is compatible with phenomenal reality. The impetus behind Renouvier's thought is to tackle these major problems of Kantianism. Boutroux says that French Neo-Kantianism as distinct from German Neo-Kantianism emphasises the importance of morality. It subordinates theoretical to practical reason and looks upon the will as the first principle of all certainty. It denies the noumenon and restricts knowledge to phenomena and allows room for freedom. All these positions Renouvier was the first to attempt in his First and Second 'Essai de Critique Générale' of 1854 and 1858.

Renouvier's thought is of central importance for the transition from pure Kantianism to the social Kantianism that is found in Durkheim. Like Nietzsche he disputes the idea of abstract impersonal reason. Following Kant's Copernican Revolution he establishes reality as relative to human awareness and action. He develops Copernicanism to a reform of philosophy itself. Philosophy must be an analysis of what is discovered within Conscience and its principles. In particular the problem of the absolute - expressed in the Kantian system as the noumenon -

will be resolved as being consistent with laws of phenomena known through Conscience. Like Nietzsche he argues human beings only find their own image at the bottom of things: the most objective science does not escape anthropomorphism. For Renouvier the analysis of Conscience is central to philosophy and thus the human being and what is knowable in terms of its principles becomes the object of philosophy.

"La philosophie enfin humanisée, trouve dans l'homme qui est à la fois son créateur et sa principale matière, le type, l'unique type connu de ce que l'être à d'inaccessible, de cette source des faits premiers qui partout ailleurs lui échappe, et qu'elle ne peut que vainement s'efforcer de définir en dehors de tous rapports par delà les bornes du monde intelligible".

(D.E., 1912 ed. p 82-83).

In addition he made philosophical questions admit of concrete, empirical solution. He takes Hume as the prototype for philosophical methodology, although he disagrees with his definition of reality. Following Kant he insisted on the connectedness of phenomena in human reality. His theory of phenomenalism leads to the idea of the initial plurality of Consciences (Part II, Chapter IV, Section V). Thus he builds the notion of a collectivity as a philosophical datum: it is the conclusion of his theory of representation. And later most importantly he establishes the idea of a Conscience Collective (Part III, Chapter IV, Section III).

Like Nietzsche he disputes the universality and necessity of the categories. He made the categories of

the understanding firstly relative and secondly empirically available. Like Nietzsche he returned to Hume for a critique of the Kantian notion of causality, but unlike Nietzsche the concept of causality does not stem from anxiety, but from human willing. Through his critique of Kant he made causality available for a human science. Like Nietzsche he disputes the distinction between theoretical and practical reason and says that Kant's real principle is moral. In this Renouvier extends the 'Primacy of Practical Reason' as a principle for all reality. In terms of this, like Nietzsche he denounces the idea of pure objectivity, but unlike Nietzsche he doesn't do so in the name of pragmatism but of moral necessity which governs human experience.

Further he insisted that as philosophers were primarily people, their philosophy represented above all an expression of their temperament, outlook, social and historical position. Following from this he insists that as reason is integrated in the human being therefore its pure and practical aspects must be united in philosophy as they are integrated in the human being. Thus he attempted to make noumenal interest compatible with the phenomenal order. And this is the precondition of normative sociology as understood by Durkheim.

Nietzsche presents himself as a critic of Kant, Renouvier however presents himself as a continuator of Kant.

It is in the interest of being more faithful to the true spirit of 'Criticisme' than Kant himself that Renouvier reforms Kantianism into Neo-Criticisme. The Premier Essai of 1854 is an attempt to render Kant consistent under the influence of Comte. But I maintain that it is more clearly Hume who influences Renouvier in his critique of Kant (particularly in the critique of causality in Part III) Verneaux maintains that in his Deuxième Essai of 1858 Renouvier is reforming Kant under the influence of Jules Lequier. This is undoubtedly true, but it is also clearly the Kant of the Second Critique that Renouvier turns against Kant of the First Critique. Neo-Criticisme is thus a debate in terms almost wholly undertaken in terms taken from Kant. I shall argue that the difference between Kant's 'Criticisme' and Renouvier's 'Neo-Criticisme' is the difference between a priorism understood in the light of transcendentalism and a priorism understood (if possible) in the light of naturalism. For what Renouvier takes from Kant is the idea of the a priori, but attempts to locate it in the context of the method of empiricism.

Finally then what is the answer to the question of the relationship between philosophy and sociology? It has been said

"Le Durkheimisme, c'est encore du Kantisme, revu et complété par du Comtisme"

It follows from this that Durkheim's theoretical position is identical with that of Neo-Criticisme. This is what I shall maintain. It is tempting to say that Durkheim added the collective dimension; But it will be clear, at the end of Part II and Part III that for Renouvier the collective dimension is implied by his theory of representation and by his theory of certainty.

So Durkheim's sociology is not merely philosophical in character. It is the logical extension of a philosophy which presents itself as both a continuation and critique of Kant. Durkheim presents the theoretical basis of his sociology in philosophical terms which were clearly known and accepted by his contemporaries. He shows no hesitation in presenting his sociology as a science of representations; knowledge as relative to a Conscience; no doubt that everyone understands what a Conscience Collective is, nor that this covers both facts and values equally as forms of representation. Nor that the human will is a force which can affect changes in history and society and that philosophy can accommodate this. These positions are the tip of an iceberg. This thesis attempts to uncover the rest in nineteenth century philosophical history.

Chapter III. Aspects of Philosophy and Nineteenth Century French Society.

Section I. Durkheim, Philosophy and the Third Republic.

Durkheim studied philosophy at the École Normale and he subsequently taught philosophy in the lycées.

Henri Peyre said

"Philosophy was his vocation from the start, but a philosophy that had political and social applications"¹

His philosophy teachers at the École Normale were Emile Boutroux and Ollé-Laprune. Both Neo-Kantians: he appeared to think little of the latter², but greatly admired the former. However George Davy said

"Renouvier ... qu'il lu pour la première fois dans le même temps, enthousiasme Durkheim et le marqua d'une empreinte qui ne devait jamais s'effacer. Son Renouvierisme fut d'ailleurs entretenu plus tard et accentué encore quand il connut à Bordeaux cet autre Renouvieriste, Hamelin, qui devait être pour lui un si grand ami".⁴

This influence is confirmed by the sociologist René Maublanc who wrote that when he first met Durkheim at the École Normale he was advised by him to devote himself to the study of a great thinker, to break down that thinker's system and discover its secrets. "This I did ... and my educator was Renouvier".⁴

The educational politics of the Third Republic was dominated by at least one prominent Renouvieriste. Louis Liard, a student of Renouvier, who was first a professor of philosophy, then in 1884 a director of higher education

in the Ministry of Education, and then Rector of the *École Normale Supérieure*. It was he who advanced Durkheim to the highest place in the university system. It was Liard who in 1887 created a course for Durkheim at Bordeaux in social science, in the *Faculté des Lettres*. And it was Liard who as Rector brought Durkheim to lecture at the *École Normale* on Philosophy and Education. As Peyre notes, if Durkheim's views had clashed with the Ministry of Education and the Rector of the *École Normale*, he would not have advanced himself and his subject to such prominence. The force of the state was behind the development of sociology.

The Third Republic was penetrated by *Renouvierisme*, such that it became the intellectual milieu of the time. His critic Fouillée says of Renouvier

"Par ses Essais dont le premier paru en 1854, les autres de 1859 à 1864, et surtout plus tard, par le fondation de la *Critique Philosophique* où se trouvent soutenu un néo-Kantisme intransigeant, mais de haute inspiration morale et sociale. M. Renouvier, penseur subtil et profond, avait fini par exercer sur les esprits une action de plus en plus étendue. Son action fini par se faire sentir dans l'université même, a laquelle il était étranger".⁵

R. Verneaux cites Ollé-Laprune who said in 1880

"Le Criticisme de M. Renouvier ne paraît avoir une importance capitale, et resumer et traduire en quel que sort l'esprit de l'époque présente".⁶

R. Verneaux⁷ said

"C'est un fait certain, pourtant, que ce philosophe étranger à l'Université a exercé une influence considérable sur la pensée française vers la fin di XIX^e siècle et du commencement du XX^e siècle".

And he cites that Jules Lachelier (1832-1918) after his career at the École Normale, remarked that most of his students had become disciples of Renouvier. F. Pillon and L. Prat were his disciples and collaborators.

Dauriac was converted to Neo-Criticisme after following Lachelier's lectures. Liard also turned to Neo-Criticisme in his work 'La Science Positive et la Métaphysique', after having been a disciple of Lachelier in his earlier work 'Les Définitions géométriques et les définitions empiriques'. Ollé-Laprune despite his protestations to the contrary, claims Verneaux, cannot have developed his work in independence of Renouvier's 'Deuxième Essai de Critique Générale'.

Hamelin was his most profound disciple. Durkheim refers the reader to Hamelin's 'Essai sur les Éléments de la Représentation' for an expansion of his own views of space and time in the 'Elementary Forms of the Religious Life'. The origins of this are to be found in Hamelin's earlier work 'Le Système de Renouvier'.

The critic Albert Thibaudet said Renouvier was the intellectual force who stood behind the ideals and values which constituted the Third Republic. Writing in 1930, he said that the intellectual history of the Third Republic had not yet been written, although Daniel Halévy and Robert Dréyfus have written political accounts. Halévy in his 'Fins de Notables' writes of the reactionary thought of Taine, Renan and Flaubert. But there is an aspect of the intellectual life of the Third Republic which has been ignored by Halévy.

And this is that around Renouvier "la plus forte tête philosophique de son époque" were grouped "cadres dreyfusians et republicans". Thibaudet says that it must be remembered that the Third Republic had succeeded and that this was an intellectual victory not of a Taine or a Renan, but

"D'un petit intellectuel de province, des cadres locaux, du professeur de philosophie à quatre mille francs, contre des cadres de notables, chefs militaires, hommes politiques au pouvoir ... De l'affaire Dréyfus sont sortis les nouveaux cadres republicains".⁸

From 1873 onwards there was a group of independent philosophers with protestant sympathies who based their thinking on Renouvier (the Catholics constituted the right-wing opposition to the Third Republic). They had a weekly journal 'La Critique Philosophique'^{*} which was edited solely by Renouvier and his 'fidèle second' F. Pillon. From his small private income Renouvier paid its regular deficit. The effect of this journal was to form a strong political influence.

"L'influence spéculative de Renouvier a été pendant trente ans extrêmement forte sur une centaine de philosophes, c'est à dire sur les cadres de pensée".

(Op. cit., p 543).

Renouvier's political thought in 1873 was as important as that of Taine and Renan, says Thibaudet, principally because it succeeded in forming the republican ideology and it continued to do so.

"Des 1872 Renouvier se déclare un des arrières politiques de la République en formation. Il milite pour elle".

(Op. cit. p 543).

Geran Therbron⁹ points out that Durkheimian sociology contributed actively to republican ideology, in opposition to the right wing ideology of the Catholic Church and the tradition of aristocratic authority. His thought helped

"to cement and diffuse secular and republican ideology"

(Op. cit. p 264)

Durkheim belonged to the radical republicans. Just as his sociology is penetrated with characteristic republican beliefs, so republican beliefs helped to found sociology.

For example both Liard and Durkheim shared the belief in the scientific study of society as founding a secular creed suitable for teaching in the state schools.

(This became Durkheim's lectures on 'Moral Education'). And it was Liard who advised Durkheim to go to Germany in 1886 to discover what was being done there to develop such an ethic.

After the history of France up to 1870 the compelling issue facing the Third Republic was that of social and political stability. The significance of sociology for Durkheim was that it attempted an answer to the theoretical and moral bases of social stability. Durkheim said that at the beginning of the Third Republic in 1870

"The country found itself faced with the same question as at the beginning of the century. The organisation or rather the facade, which constituted the imperial system had just collapsed: it was a matter of remaking another or rather of making one which could survive other than by administrative artifice - that is one which was truly grounded in the nature of things. For that it was necessary to know what this nature of things was:

consequently, the urgent need for a science of societies made itself felt without delay"¹⁰

Chapter III. Section II. Philosophy and the French
Revolution.

The French Revolution settled the question of philosophy for nineteenth century France: what philosophy can establish order, unity and justice? Renouvier said

"Le caractère dominant du XIX^e siècle est resté jusqu'à sa fin celui qui s'applique à la fin du précédent à la Revolution".

(P.A. de H. Vol. 4 Bk 14
Ch. I).

That questions of social stability and justice can be answered in philosophical terms point to a culture more rationalistic than English culture. The cultural importance of philosophy in France is undeniable: it is a compulsory part of secondary education in the state schools. And the educational reforms which established this were set up under the Third Republic. But there was as a cultural form a reverence for ideas as founding social practice that preceded this. And it goes back to the French Revolution.

This had demonstrated if not that philosophy is a final cause of social practice, at least that philosophical ideas were influential on social and political events. The thought of the Encyclopaedists had contributed intellectually to the French Revolution. Parisien intellectual life had been dominated for decades by the 'Parlour Bolsheviks' of the eighteenth century. The revolution

was impregnated with ideas which had dominated 'La République des Lettres' for fifty years. (However it is undoubtedly true that the philosophes were as blind to actual social conditions in France as the court of Louis XVI). Taine in his 'Ancien Régime' was the most severe critic of Les Lumières in precipitating not only the Revolution, but also in fathering the ideas and passions which lead to the Terror. Taine's analysis cannot point to any essential connection between utilitarianism, atheism, positivism and political massacre, for it demonstrated more a conservative reaction to the Revolution than to an analysis of ideology and social practice.

Renouvier¹ said one of the ideational causes of the Revolution was the substitution of 'rationalisme sensualiste' for Cartesian rationalism. He said that the authors of the Revolution thought they could judge social good and bad by 'Reason' (what they held to be reason) alone. This in turn lead to a certain post-Revolutionary reaction against 'Reason'.

In the main philosophical movements in post-Revolutionary France, we can see developing the positions of idealism and naturalism that dominate speculation in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The Ideologists were the immediate inheritors of the spirit of the Enlightenment, in particular Condillac (1715-80) had a strong influence. D. de Tracy (1754-1836),

Conte de Volnay (1757-1820) and Cabanis (1757-1808) were the group that constituted the Encyclopaedists and had two centres the Ecole Normale and the Institut National - both established in 1795. Condillac was the first follower of Locke in France: he was not a materialist, but sensationalist. He held that sensation is the basis of all consciousness, but physical phenomena are only the 'causes occasionelles' of our knowledge. Senses are the occasion of ideas, the soul is always something apart from ideas.

In this theory of sensationalism and the theory of the free activity of the soul, are contained simultaneously the positions of idealism and naturalism: that there is a free activity of the mind in which human reality is based and on the other hand knowledge is based in experience and its laws.

Comte represented positivism and Maine de Biran represented idealism, but both spring out of the thinking of the Ideologists.

In Maine de Biran (1766-1824) is found a prototype of the reaction against the positivist spirit in nineteenth century France. An insistence on the exclusive efficacy of scientific method precipitated a reaction against positivism which led to an emphasis on the power of human reason to transcend the limits of empirical knowledge.

Maine de Biran protested against the Traditionalists doctrines lack of spontaneity and freedom (actions are a result of divine revelation for the Traditionalists). In this he revived the spiritualist tendency of French thought present since Descartes. The notion of free activity of the soul is the main doctrine of his later thought and that which distinguishes him from the Ideologists.

There are active elements of consciousness which are distinguished from the passivity of sensations. This is shown in attention which results from the activity of will and a belief in human free will is incompatible with the fatalist domination of the sensations. Through this is developed the idea of the consciousness of self as a unique fact 'sui generis', for only in the human being's knowledge of self is the subject identified with the object of knowledge. We cannot construct humanity out of sensations, we must view the human being as a whole. He emphasized that will is the primary source of human activity - only by effort of the will is the self conscious of its existence.

For Main de Biran there were two ways out of the materialism of the Encyclopaedists - the one was rationalism, the other voluntarism. Reason as 'infallible' had led to the Terror, he said. Voluntarism stood opposed to materialism: 'volo ergo sum'.

There are three significant aspects of his thinking which were seized upon by later thinkers who in place of determinism and the quantitative identity of positive science,

substituted free creative reason and the contingency of physical nature. Firstly he insisted on the supremacy of final cause over efficient cause. Secondly he presupposed absolute beginnings, causes which are not effects of the same prior cause. And thirdly the emphasis on a free creative personality. He further emphasised not only the freedom of the will, but also its rational moral nature and its power to break the thread of mechanical continuity. He replaced the notion of mechanical necessity by an inner moral necessity, which through final rather than efficient causality guides action in relation to the invisible harmony of the world.

In this he developed the dominant themes of French Idealism. Felix Ravaisson, Charles Renouvier, Jules Lachelier and Emile Boutroux were influenced by his theories. Hippolyte Taine² said in 1888, that De Biran's thought had dominated French thought for the first quarter of the century and would probably do so for another.

The thinking of Comte represents the other side of the thinking of the Ideologists. Positivism as a theory of knowledge was not newly created by Comte, but states a well established position in relation to knowledge. As J.S. Mill³ remarked, positivism was the general property of the age. It goes back to Hume, the critical intention of Kant, Condorcet, Turgot and St. Simon.

Comte's definition of the third and final stage in the progress of the human mind has become a classic statement of the positivist position. He characterizes the stage which is to replace the theological and metaphysical in this way

"Le caractère fondamental de la philosophie positive est de regarder tous les phénomènes comme assujettis à des lois naturelles invariable, dont la découverte précise et la réduction au moins nombre possible sont le but de tous nos efforts, en considérant comme absolument inaccessible et vide de sens pour nous la recherche de ce qu'on appelle les causes, soit premières soit finales"⁴

Positive knowledge is restricted by Comte to knowledge of observed facts or phenomena and to the coordination of descriptive laws of phenomena. There is no attempt to find ultimate explanatory causes or to discuss the 'real' but unobservable inner essence of things. The list of phenomena for Comte is not taken by him to mean we know only sense impressions. Although he refers to Hume with respect his is not a sceptical philosophy. For him philosophy is concerned with 'good sense' and 'natural ideas'.

In these two tendencies it is clear that French philosophical thought was well prepared for the renaissance of philosophical thought that centred around Neo-Kantianism in the latter part of the century that Renouvier was the first to initiate. For Kant, the critical philosophy represents both the principles of idealism and naturalism and it was the retention and critique of these that was formative of Renouvier's Neo-Criticisme.

It was through the Revolution that Kantian ideas entered French culture. Kant is well known for his claim that the French Revolution was evidence of the moral tendency of mankind. It has been remarked that

"The Revolution, and even more the echo it set up in the world are to the Kantian ethics what the discovery of the circulation of the blood is to the mechanism of Descartes: a confirmation ... of the fundamental principles of the theory"⁵

Kant had a reputation for a certain Jacobinism, which is reflected in Heinrich Heine's comparison of Kant to Robespierre. But although it took the actual French Revolution to stimulate an interest in the ideas of Kant in France, it wasn't until fifteen years after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, that is in 1796, that interest in Kant grew through the mass of journals and publications that flourished with the liberty of the press allowed by the Directoire.* Kant's moral and political ideas seemed to some to be close to the ideals of the Revolution. In particular it seemed a philosophy capable of founding a moral order and providing principles for civil society, which would be neither a return to the Ancien Régime nor to the Terror. Nevertheless Jean Ferrari⁶ has pointed out that there was a certain naivety among those who wished to make Kantianism the official philosophy of post-Revolutionary France, for there is no

* In particular 'Le Magasin Encyclopédique', 'La Decade Philosophique' and 'Le Spectator du Nord'. In the first appeared the translations of 'The Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals' in 1798 and 'The Anthropology' in 1799. In the latter appeared the writings of Charles de Villiers who claimed to be the initiator of the thought of Kant in France.

evidence of any understanding of the critical intention of Kant. The first translations of Kant in France, suffering from the difficulty of translation and the new ideas contained in Kant's thoughts were greeted with sarcasms by the Ideologists. Ferrari says that overshadowed by the success of Hegelianism in Germany and Eclecticism* in France, it was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century France that Kantianism had a revival, and philosophical developments at that time constituted a return to Kant. This period Ferrari refers to, I can say, starts with Renouvier's 'Premier Essai de Critique Generale' of 1854, where Renouvier claims

"J'avoue nettement que je continue Kant"

(P.E. Pref. XV).

* Eclecticisme: under Victor Cousin (1792-1867) became the official philosophy of France under Louis Philippe. Cousin was the philosophical dictator of France, whilst Professor at the Ecole Normale between 1828-48. He excluded from teaching staff those he disapproved of - notably Renouvier and Comte. Renouvier was active in the revolution of 1848 (through his 'Republican Handbook') which unseated Cousin. He condemned Eclecticism for its lack of method and sincerity. It attempted to revive and reconcile elements of the history of philosophy: in philosophy as in politics Renouvier claimed it represented a philosophy of compromise.

Chapter III. Section III. Renouvier on the Philosophy of Nineteenth Century France.

Renouvier in his seminal article of 1867 (A.P.) "De la Philosophie du XIX^e siècle en France" asks the question whether the nineteenth century has got a philosophy in the sense that the seventeenth century was dominated by Cartesianism, and the eighteenth century by Empiricism. He argues against all contemporary movements of French philosophy

"La philosophie de notre siècle est la philosophie allemande" (p 5)

And he says although

"Hegel est incontestablement la plus grande figure philosophique du siècle", (p 39)

it is to Kant's Critical Philosophy that French thought must turn to find a philosophy that is capable of overcoming the problems of contemporary society.

He says those who are repulsed by the unfounded negations of positivism, those who are wearied by endless disputes based on arbitrary assumptions and who hate oppressive and mystical doctrines - for them the Critical Philosophy is the answer. It is the corrective against the double 'evil' of scientific and metaphysical pretense.

"La philosophie critique n'est pas la raison ... mais la philosophie critique a du moins le droit de se dire le rationalisme"

(p 105).

In relation to epistemology it establishes the critique of the faculty of knowledge as the prerequisite of all theories of knowledge. This is its alliance with science: to establish what it is possible to know as the precondition of objective knowledge. The critique of the faculty of knowledge is the answer to the scientific pretension of positivism. Whilst its insistence in its critical intention on the restriction of reason to experience answers metaphysical pretense. In relation to morality, it establishes liberty as the precondition of knowledge. And it establishes the thesis of the primacy of practical reason - in relation to which alone the interests of humanity can be established. It in this establishes a theoretical and moral revolution.

It is this latter aspect that Renouvier most especially puts against Hegel, who although widely influential among the philosophical sects of French society (above all the St. Simonians), has for Renouvier the essential disadvantage of making necessity the heart of his philosophy. Renouvier asks can all the philosophical problems of the last two thousand years be solved by a hypothetical necessity which governs thought and action, yet which is not based on evidence? He says the real subject of this article are "les doctrines nécessaires" of the nineteenth century. He is concerned with historical and socialist schools and claims determinist thinking is hostile to morality.

Proudhon, for example, is not really in earnest with freedom, because he subordinates it to conditions which deny it. He regards moral phenomena not as 'irreducible facts', but as a result of necessary forces which compose human groups. He puts necessity at the basis of everything and thus is to deny the reality of human freedom, which is identical with

"La production des faits non prédéterminées par leur antécédents"

(p. 73)

There is an opposition between the deterministic tendencies in general and the search for the rights of man and the principles of social order. These latter are not to be found in Revolutionary schools because

"Elle se laisse entraîner à la violence à l'injustice ... nous ne prendions pas une tempête pour une théorie"

(P. 103).

For RENOUVIER it was only because France was in a demoralized condition intellectually and morally that doctrines of necessity had come to have influence. France he said, after the events of the recent past, had no means of knowing itself intellectually or morally and no stability to establish a line of action for itself. Unable to attach itself to former traditions, nor to 'pure reason' which had led to the Revolution, France was a demoralized nation. It is in this condition that the concerns of philosophy and morality are replaced by those of history. He points out that there is no question of the undoubted



utility of history, but the issue is of the misuse of the historical spirit as applied to politics and morality. Conceptions of inevitability replace the consideration of rational truths. The conception of individual capacity is replaced by the idea of general movements and the evolution of humanity. Here liberty, responsibility and morality become trivial occupations. The past is glorified and the present ignored. Philosophy is replaced by the history of philosophy and the search for an ideal is replaced by the concern for material fact.

Against these doctrines, Renouvier says

"Le progrès n'est point organique et fatal ...
Le progrès est le mouvement de l'humanité libérale,
morale, justicière. Il a pour moteur la liberté". (p 71)

Renouvier in his article 'Le Progrès et la Morale' which is the first article in the first volume of *La Critique Philosophique* 1872, expands on this theme.. He says half a century has passed since the St. Simonians formulated their historical doctrine of the continued progress of humanity. In that interval France has had revolutions and counter-revolutions and innumerable political laws turning in a monotonous circle of liberal action and authoritarian reaction. Progress has become the first and last argument and theory. In reality not one step of progress has been achieved.

"Aujourd'hui, du fond de l'abîme de misère et d'impuissance où elle a brusquement roulé, elle est tenté de se demander si la croyance au progrès n'est pas pour un peuple le commencement de la décadence" (p 3)

Kant who had the right to be called the founder of morality as a science, did not see progress in a physical and mechanical manner characteristic of the St. Simonians. Human progress was not for him a fragment of continual progress - 'fatale de la matiere du monde'. It was not separate from morality. Progress consists in the growth of moral good and it is only through morality itself that we can assert this. Kant against the historical relativism of the St. Simonians has formulated an invariable moral law for the regulation of moral life.

"C'est l'observation plus exacte de cette loi qui peut seule caracteriser le progrès des relations tant publiques que privées, et tant international que publiques des hommes" (p 5)

This means progress is not a growth in knowledge followed inevitably in "une certaine marche des choses", but in "un travail actif de la raison", which is quite different. And this depends Kant says, less on what we do and the means of achieving it, than on what nature can do with us and in us, to constrain us to enter on a path which we wouldn't voluntarily. Moral progress does not rely on theoretical reason which culminates in utilitarianism, rather on the pure law of duty, which is demanded by practical reason.

"La croyance au progrès, la croyance au bien et la règle suprême de l'art social (ou science sociale, comme on voudra nommer la politique conforme à la raison) tout descend d'une même source qui est la loi morale et de laquelle aussi découle ce qu'il est possible d'obtenir de connaissances transcendentales, ou dépassent l'expérience des phénomènes". (p 7)

The evil that is besetting France says Renouvier, is a belief in force rather than right. The resurrection of the moral law can oppose this and its expression in German philosophy, which expresses an eternal evolution of the world, the mechanical progress of humanity and the notion of historical right ie. it expresses a philosophy of force, which is the negation of moral law. The doctrine of natural and inevitable progress makes the human being not interested in duty. And this is corrupting of the will to act, says Renouvier. For this reason he says the nineteenth century is "une siècle fatiguée".

The purpose of La Critique Philosophique, Renouvier's journal which propagated his ideas was to develop the principles of Kantianism to social and political reform, which in turn stem from intellectual reform.

Francois Pillon in the introduction to *L'Année Philosophique* (1867) says the significance of Criticism is

"Qu'il est également éloignée de l'idéalisme et l'empiricisme, du dogmatisme et du scepticisme, du spiritualisme et du materialisme du théisme, du athéisme, classiques et traditionnels". pV

The domain of La Critique Philosophique is wide; it concerns intellectual and political problems and social controversies. Its role is critical and for these principles are necessary.

"Nos principes sont ceux du rationalisme critique, dont Kant est le père mais du criticisme dégagé de ces impasses de la raison qu'on appelle les antinomies kantiennees et des idoles de la vieille métaphysique qu'on appelle l'infini, l'absolu la substance". (op cit p 5)

Chapter IV. Renouvier and the development of Neo-Criticisme

Section I. The Move towards Kant.

Émile Boutroux¹ remarked that 1867 marked a significant year in French philosophy. One of the main causes was the appointment of Jules Lachelier to the École Normale. Another was

"Une étude nouvelle de la philosophie allemande, notamment de Kant, étude visant à entrer, véritablement et profondément, dans la propre pensée des philosophes".

Georges Milhaud² said that 1867 was a significant date in the history of Neo-Criticisme, for it marks the beginning of its decided influence on university teachers. Renouvier's statement of the philosophy of Neo-Criticisme is contained in his two first "Essais de Critique Générale" of 1854 and 1858, (although as Verneaux wearily points out his total philosophical output amounts to more than fifty volumes). It is in these that he states the essentials of his Neo-Kantianism.

It is important however to see why Renouvier turned to Kant for in his youth he was a St. Simonian. He himself said that instead of attending to the philosophy lectures of M. Porot at the University of Montpellier, he read St. Simonian literature, whose ideas turned him away from academic philosophy.

"Je lisais le Globe pendant les classes: on m'avait persuadé que les croyances humaines allaient être entièrement renouvelées, que le vieil arsenal des connaissances et les amas des bibliothèques avaient déjà perdu toute valeur, que surtout rien de ce qui s'appelait philosophie ne renfermait des vérités organiques, et que la science et la société étaient appelées à se reconstruire a priori, dans le cours même de la génération à laquelle j'appartenais, conformément à un plan révélé, auquel ne pouvaient manquer de se rallier tous les membres de l'humanité. Cette folie ne tint pas chez moi jusqu'à la vingtième année; mais elle me laissa en héritage un cruel désenchantement et, en même temps, un goût maladif pour les synthèses absolues et un dédain puéril pour les procédés analytiques et les connaissances modestes".³

When he wrote his 'Manuel de Philosophie Moderne' of 1842 he was a Hegelian.

"La méthode de Hegel est irréprochable, la logique y apparaît dans toute son ampleur et avec un sens nouveau ... La contradiction est l'essence de la pensée, et si nous ne pouvons contredire et nier, nous ne penserions pas".⁴

What changed him such that in 1897 he could say that contradiction when elevated to a philosophical dogma confuses many otherwise distinguished thinkers

"Qui ont vu dans cette énormité la révélation d'une méthode"

(P.A.d H. Vol 4. p 19).

The philosophical crisis that Renouvier had around 1847 centred on critiques of the notion of infinity and necessity. The philosophy of Hegel, involving both these notions, was seen by Renouvier to be swept away through his critique of them.

Renouvier describes his conversion to 'finitisme' and voluntarism in this manner.

"Ch. Renouvier était loin, quand il commença à philosopher sur ce dernier sujet (the principle of infinity) des convictions qui triomphèrent enfin chez lui. Ses premiers ouvrages (manuels historiques, articles de revues) le montraient profondément imbu d'infinisme. Mais sa perplexité resté au fond la même question mathématique, qui doit nécessairement décider de tout parceque elle est catégorie".

(P.A. de H. Vol 4, p. 433).

He saw mathematicians (at that time) admitted an actual infinity and an indefinite infinity and these two were both contradictory. The first signifies a realised and completed whole, whilst the second is in principle uncompletable, because it can always by definition be prolonged by another term. Thus

"Leurs philosophies de mathématiques n'est que le paralogisme de la numération de l'innumérable"

(Op. cit., p 434).

He explains further; the idea of actual infinity is a whole. It is contradictory to separate totality and number, it follows that a totality has a number, and by definition a number is finite. The second definition of infinity falls because it is the indefinite and cannot therefore be represented in thought as a whole. That is, he says the partisans of infinity cannot take refuge from the contradiction involved in actual infinity by defining infinity as a number bigger than any fixed number. Because firstly, since it is indeterminable, it is not a number. And secondly, it follows that the

series of numbers has no end and thus it is contradictory to assert a number greater than any determinate one, because it follows all numbers can be added to.*

* It is not clear to me how fair Renouvier is to Hegel in extending his critique of mathematical infinity to Hegel's doctrines. Does Hegel's historical process entail either of the two definitions of infinity? Renouvier clearly holds that any doctrine which entails an infinite process is thereby corrupted as this is per se contradictory - as he does in his critique of the antithesis of the Kantian antinomies.. (See below Part II). Milhaud (La Philosophie de Charles Renouvier, Chapter 3, Vrin. 1917, Paris) argues that Renouvier is not justified in the authority over other concepts which he gives to the law of numbers. Milhaud questions the direct and necessary connection between mathematical conceptions and reality which is the premiss of Renouvier's argument. But I think actually the proof of the law of numbers is arrived at through the Principle of Contradiction, which is applicable both to mathematical ideas and conceptions of reality. On this interpretation it is Renouvier's unease with the logic of contradiction in the Hegelian system that predates his rejection of the notion of infinity.

The contradiction in the notion of infinity implies for Renouvier the principle of the finiteness of reality and this is expressed in his 'Loi du Nombre'.

"Toutes les fois que la réalité concrète nous donne l'occasion de compter les choses quelles qu'elles soient, ces choses ne pouvant être en nombre infini, ce qui serait contradictoire".⁵

The applications of this statement of the finiteness of reality have important consequences for Renouvier for certain philosophical positions. Firstly it entails the denial of materialist metaphysics. Space, time and matter cannot be things in themselves, for this would entail, for example, in relation to space, an infinite number of parts. Matter is not infinitely divisible; the universe is finite. Through this the concept of substance is denied: it is for Renouvier tied to the infinite. Substance is the thing in itself, it is the essence of realist metaphysics, for it is by definition beyond perception. It presupposes an unconditioned which is by definition out of relation to any mind. By this infinitism and realism are united for Renouvier. And by this rejection of Realism is implied in turn, his theory of phenomenalism. Reality as phenomena relative to a Conscience is by definition limited ie. finite..

It follows there is no sense in the idea of an "absolu commencement". We cannot conceive of something which starts without cause, without antecedent: we cannot

thus conceive of the beginning of the world. Neither can we conceive of the world as a total synthesis. (Again, it will be clear in Part II that this argument is important in his denial of the Kantian antinomies and Kant's conception of reason).

Renouvier explains that this perception of the contradictory nature of infinity became so strong that he decided that he must either stay writing timid realist metaphysics and 'demi-Hegelianism'

"Ou obéir sans hésiter aux exigences du principe de contradiction et des lors ... suivre fidèlement les plus extrêmes conséquences dans son application à la logique de la quantité".

(P.A. de H, Vol. 4 p 435).

It follows that for Renouvier, contradiction renders science impossible. Since infinity is seen by Renouvier to be the vehicle of contradiction, it follows that with the rejection of the notion of infinity, Renouvier rejects the notion of contradiction as being in any way attached to the concept of reality. It follows that he is rigorously attached to the Principle of Contradiction as the first and fundamental rule of thought and all judgement about reality. He establishes against Kant and Hegel jointly that reason in itself is not antimónial. It follows as Verneaux says

"La conversion de Renouvier au finitisme n'est qu'un aspect ou une conséquence de son conversion à la logique de l'identité".⁶

And in Part II, it will be clear how he substitutes a logic of correlation for a logic of contradiction.

(He is not in this, he claims, returning to former logic, because against this he maintains the necessity of both thesis and antithesis, but against Hegel he asserts that thesis and antithesis ^{make} sense only in relation to each other).

In his critique of necessity* he declares the influence of Jules Lequier which started in 1843. He is for Renouvier, the only French philosopher to have developed what Descartes only 'glimpsed' - that is the dependence of knowledge on liberty. It follows for Renouvier all necessity is the contradiction of knowledge. (This is developed in Part III). In his article on Fatalism in

* Brehier (History of Philosophy, Volume 7, Chapter V, University of Chicago) points out that there is no necessary connection between the doctrine of the finite and of free will. The doctrine of the finite may be perfectly consonant with the denial of free will, for the law of numbers states that a series of phenomena can be traced back to a starting point, not that this must be a free act. But Renouvier might respond to this that as all reality is known relative to Conscience, it is our experience of willing which gives us evidence of a first beginning and this is simultaneously a definition of free will. (See Part III, Chapter II, Section 3). In Renouvier's terms there is thus an essential connection between the two theses for further infinity is also the vehicle of determinism.

the "Encyclopédie Nouvelle"* he demonstrates the influence of Lequier. He says the individual has a power of freedom and choice

"Qui est en soi indifférente à toute motif, indépendant de tout object, supérieure à toutes des volitions, c'est a dire supérieure à elle-même, source seule efficace et décisive de toutes ses déterminations absolu dans sa spontanéité"⁷

Thus

"Le fatalisme s'affaiblit et s'éteint dans sa domination même, alors que l'homme se croit libre, alors qu'il veut et qu'il agit après pensée".⁸

In this article he expresses Lequier's idea that without liberty there is no knowledge for there is thereby no means to distinguish truth from error. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3).

But the essential thesis of Neo-Criticisme, the idea of free will as identified with a partial and relative first beginning amongst phenomena was slower to develop in his thought than either the thesis of free will and the negation of infinity. For in rejecting infinity Renouvier inferred the rejection also of absolute

* These articles were exceedingly hard to find at the Bibliothèque Nationale: the 'Encyclopédie Nouvelle' was edited by two St. Simonians, Jean Reynaud and Pierre Leraux: inevitable dissention meant the departure of Leraux to found 'La Revue Indépendante' with Georges Sand in 1841. The publication of 'Encyclopédie Nouvelle' became too erratic, under the auspices of Reynaud, for the cataloguers of the Bibliothèque Nationale and I only found this article through L'Abbé Foucher's 'La Jeunesse de Renouvier et sa Première Philosophie' Paris, 1927.

determinism. By implication he inferred 'hasard', spontaneity. But this is far from free will as a cause of phenomena. This is the central thesis of Neo-Criticisme and will be developed in Part III. Suffice it to note that by 1851, Renouvier's conversion to voluntarism was complete and he concluded that historical determinism is the negation of human 'Conscience'.

These considerations on infinity and determinism moved him against Hegel and the St. Simonians towards Kant. The advantages of Kantian philosophy over Hegelianism is that it is

"Une doctrine à la fois logique et morale, qui morte-née en Allemagne, a été reprise en France, soixante-dix ans après l'apparition de la Critique de la Raison Pure, et portée pour la première fois à ses justes conséquences"

(P.A. de H. Vol. 4 p 423).

It will be clear in Part II in the analysis of the categories that Renouvier insists against Hegel on the necessity of experience as the central foundation of knowledge: in this he separates his position from that of absolute idealism. The return to Kant in France centres largely around this point and constitutes an opposition to German post Kantianism. Nevertheless for Renouvier this does not per se constitute a complete return to Kant, because he sees the categories differently. But still there is retained in his phenomenalism an ideal of rationalism that is a relic of his erstwhile admiration for Hegel.

Section II The Contradictions of Kantianism

Renouvier in his "Critique de la Doctrine de Kant" in Chapter VI 'Les Disciples de Kant et le Principe de Contradiction', makes plain in what sense he is going to 'continue Kant' and how he separates from the German Neo-Kantians.

Renouvier holds that Kant's retention of the unconditioned, which appears as the noumenon, and the idea of the infinity of phenomena which is tied up for Renouvier with the determinism of phenomena are the two positions in Kant's thinking which he regards as incompatible with the true meaning of Kantian 'Criticisme'. They are also the source of the philosophical mistakes made by the German post-Kantians. These positions can be seen in examining the Kantian antinomies. Renouvier concludes that Kant regards two positions as above criticism.

"L'un est l'existence de l'inconnaissable inconditionné, l'autre, le procès à l'infini des phénomènes, soit dans leur composition actuelle, soit dans leur multitude en la vue rétrocessive du temps. Le premier est contraire au principe de l'entendement d'après lequel il n'y a d'intelligible (même dans les objets de l'intuition sensible) que des relations; le second est directement opposé au principe de contradiction".

(C.D.K., p 91).

The retention of these two principles means that the picture of reality on the Kantian system is divided into two realms. The phenomenal realm governed by determinism and the realm of the unconditioned, which is

in principle indefinable, yet is the source of freedom.

"Nous avons, pour nos données le monde des conditions et de l'enchaînement nécessaire universel des phénomènes, et, au dessus de ce monde, l'inconditionné dont toutes les conditions dependent par définition et par hypothèse".

(Op. cit., p 92).

Kant in retaining the unconditioned lays the foundation for the later dogmatism of Hegel.

"Hegel devait remédier à l'isolement de l'inconditionné Kantian par la fusion de ce principe avec l'être lui même, et par l'identification de l'être et du non-être, synthèse originaire de toutes les déterminations".

(C.D.K., p 70).

In four ways Fichte, Schelling and Hegel substituted dogmatism for criticism. Firstly, in terms of method they united transcendence and transcendentalism. By starting from an absolute self or absolute substance, they presumed to determine the undetermined of 'l'inconditionné'. Secondly: they attempted to start their systems from the unconditioned in various ways: they begin with an absolute I or a substance which carries the identity of difference or substance idealised as the being of non-being unfolding in the logical process of its evolution. For Renouvier the principal mistake in the thinking of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel is the attempt to determine the indeterminable or unconditioned. Thirdly, they substituted the idea of inevitable progress for the fall in Kant's original view of the relations between

sensibility and the passions (his thesis in 'Religion within limits of Reason Alone') and lastly as mentioned, they failed to keep a strict opposition between phenomena and things-in-themselves.

In contrast

"Schopenhauer a été le vrai continuateur de Kant, l'interprète de ses idées contre les prétendus disciples qu'il a poursuivis de ses sarcasmes"

(C.D.K., p 93).

Fichte, Schelling and Hegel had reverted to the old metaphysics and retained the idea of God as a kind of universal essence, as the unique source of being. Schopenhauer identified will as the origin of phenomena, in place of the idea of evolving substance. And in this he closely approximated to Kant's moral point of view. In this he did not separate the idea of being in itself from the rational moral agent.

For Kant, noumenal freedom is

"Un pont jeté entre l'inconditionné et les séries de conditions".

(C.D.K., p 94).

Schopenhauer in refuting Kant's theory of freewill, did not consider freedom except in the phenomenal order. And its exercise there is incompatible with the universal determinism of phenomena. These two criticisms of Schopenhauer's, become cardinal points of Renouvier's own critique of Kant.

Kant's views on the progress of humanity have generally been misunderstood by German post-Kantians. He regarded human nature as generally incapable of obeying the categorical imperative. Nevertheless theories of social progress must be subordinated to this. In this we can see why Neo-Kantianism in France, culminating in Durkheim's ^{sociology} sees social practice as moral practice, centering around the conception of duty. It is in opposition to the mistaken optimism of the Hegelians. Many thinkers have been mistaken, says Renouvier

"Par les théories de ses disciples optimistes, qui ont cru avec leur siècle, à une loi de progrès naturel et nécessaire".

(C.D.K., p 95).

For Renouvier the most important of the contradictions within Kant's philosophy is that between the phenomenal and the noumenal: between phenomena and the thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer pointed the way out of this by identifying 'l'inconditionné', the thing-in-itself with the phenomenal order. This is what Renouvier's Neo-criticism does.

Renouvier in the conclusion to his 'Critique de la Doctrine de Kant', written shortly before his death at 87, said the fundamental mistake in Kant's philosophy was to have misunderstood 'la loi du relatif'.

"Cette loi est le fondement de la méthode philosophique qui, n'admettant de connaissance réelle des phénomènes et de leurs lois, nous oblige à tenir toute idée d'un être-absolu pour chimérique".

(C.D.K., p 429).

The retention of this ghost of the absolute means that Kant firstly places the order and permanence of reality, not in law and its functions, but in an unknowable substance beyond the phenomenal. And he places freedom in a realm beyond the phenomenal. Both he does because of dogmatism: that is the retention of the thing-in-itself, the ghost of the old metaphysics, in a critical philosophy which proscribed it. Thus although Kant refuted dogmatism by his critical intention of restricting reason to experience, he himself retained dogmatism in the thing-in-itself. Further Kant refuted scepticism by his demonstration of the relativity of knowledge to the principles of the understanding, yet he retained a principle - that of the universal determinism of phenomena in the principle of causality - which is opposed to what is possibly known according to Conscience: determinism as defined by Kant transcends experience as defined by Renouvier. He thus turns against Kant precisely what Kant was so proud of: this refutation of dogmatism and scepticism. It is in terms of these that his critique of Kant is contained.

"Déterminisme, substantialisme, ces deux termes donne l'explication du criticisme avorté. Les deux principaux a priorismes de la métaphysique de Kant sont affirmés sans aucune droit, selon sa propre critique de la connaissance, et ils sont de plus en contradictions avec les postulats dont cette critique établit la légitimité".

(P.A.H., Vol. 4, p 425).

It is clear from the above analysis that the paradox for Kant's successors is that they must connect phenomena and noumena to heal the split within the Kantian system. But to do so in Kant's terms, is to negate the interest of the noumenon, which is in effect to deny freedom and morality. There are two paths. Firstly to start from the noumenon, this the German post-Kantians did, which (apart from Schopenhauer) is the path to absolutism and a new dogmatism for Renouvier. Secondly to start from the phenomenon, ie. to start from the relative, not absolute and to attempt to incorporate the interest of the noumenal into the phenomenal. This is what Renouvier did. This he states in the following and here outlines the principles of his Neo-Criticisme.

"La méthode relativiste est la vraie méthode, soit qu'il s'agisse de la recherche des lois des phénomènes par les organes d'une science consitututée et limité, soit des lois de l'entendement et de leur application pour la discussion et l'établissement des concepts et pour l'examen de leur validité objective. Les questions de psychologie rationnelle et de métaphysique ne s'éloignent plus du champ de la commune méthode quand on considère leurs objets comme des lois à etudier et à définir. Seulement, la première de ces lois et la condition de toutes se trouve alors être la loi constitutive de la conscience, principe de la connaissance et de l'être en tant que connu".

(C.D.K., p 440).

The criticism of Kantian substantialism is the theme of Part II, whilst the criticism of Kantian determinism is the theme of Part III. And in Part IV I will examine how for Renouvier Kant's significance is that uniquely in nineteenth philosophy Kant shows how to "construire une science générale d'ordre pratique" (D.E., 1912, II, p 6).

And in this

"Ces éminents mérites du criticisme Kantian sans au dessus de tout éloge. Ils sont transformé les problèmes philosophiques. Ils expliquent la place sans rivale qu'on accorde dans l'histoire de la philosophie, depuis un siècle, à un oeuvre si étrangère par sa côté spéculatif aux tendances positifs de notre époque".

(H.S.P.M., p 302).

So in what sense does Renouvier continue Kant?

In what sense is

"Notre école n'est autre que l'école de Kant".

(C.P. 1872, I, p 389).

Verneaux¹ suggests that he is simultaneously a disciple and a critic. Renouvier distinguishes between the Kantian system and spirit and claims that he is faithful to the Kantian spirit, whilst the Kantian system is corrupted with positions incompatible with consistent Criticisme. He is more faithful to the spirit of Kant, than Kant was in his timidity in relation to the former metaphysics. And in this, with clear conscience Renouvier develops relativism, phenomenism and through the union of pure and practical reason, the primacy of practical reason to cover all reality, not just moral action, as being consistent with the true spirit of Kantianism. Despite his hatred of the Hegelians, it is possible that what Renouvier was doing in his name made the sage of Königsberg turn more heavily in his grave than his German successors. Maybe Kant's reported remark on Fichtes philosophy, erected in his name - 'God preserve us from our friends', is as apposite to the French as to the German Neo-Kantians.

Nevertheless, Renouvier hands this advice to his followers in France.

"Quels que soient les reproches que le criticisme Kantian ait encourus, Kant n'en reste pas moins le plus grand des philosophes, et le dernier, celui dont l'oeuvre doit être le point de départ des travaux à entreprendre sur les questions de la certitude et de la méthode".

(D.E., 1912, II, p. 18).

Part II. From Transcendental Idealism to the
Sociology of Knowledge.

Introduction

In this part I locate Durkheim's sociology of knowledge in the tradition of post-Copernican metaphysics. It is intended to show how the presuppositions of Durkheim's sociology of knowledge developed out of Neo-Kantian thought in France. In Part I I showed how after 1870 in France, the Kantian system was seen as the major intellectual force in terms of the determination of principles of knowledge and the formulation of principles of action. Here I show how it was simultaneously the retention, challenge to and transformation of the main concepts of Kant's First Critique (in particular the Transcendental Analytic) in Renouvier's 'Premier Essai de Critique Generale' of 1854) that paved the way for the later development of the sociology of knowledge.

There are five positions which I take to characterize Durkheim's sociology of knowledge. Firstly: that knowledge consists in a system of representations, and that the concepts beliefs and actions of social life are expressed in representations.

"Without doubt collective life is only made of representations"

(S.F. in C19, p 16).

Secondly: that there is a science which satisfactorily and adequately explains these representations. Sociology is seen as a science of collective representations,

and in this is a particular application of a general science of representations.

"Science appears when the mind, setting aside all practical concerns, approaches them with the sole end of representing them".

(Op. cit., p 4).

And that the method of this science is empirical and the terms of it are phenomena and their laws.

"Social phenomena are natural, that is to say rational, like any other phenomena of the universe. By that we mean simply that they are bound to one another according to definite relations called laws".

(Op. cit. p 18).

Thirdly that the system of representations is relative to a Conscience which organizes and unifies experience. All knowledge for Durkheim is relative to a Conscience, which can be individual or collective. Social knowledge which is the subject matter of the sociology of knowledge, is characterized as a system of collective representations which is known and unified by a 'Conscience Collective'. It will be clear from what follows that Conscience here is not simply the French for consciousness - as many commentators of Durkheim assume - but a particular and important development of Neo-Kantian thought in response to the first principles of the Copernican Revolution. The 'Conscience Collective' in this sense expresses what Durkheim means when he says "Society is a synthesis of human consciousness" (E.F., p 431).

Fourthly: that knowledge is determined by social relations, thus his sociology of knowledge is characterized by the position of the social relativity of truth. By this I take Durkheim as holding to the cultural relativity of belief and value systems. As a matter of fact these will differ according to historical change and social type. Further in 'Elementary Forms' he argues against any criteria of truth that is independent of culture or society, in arguing that the principles of logic themselves have a social origin. He argues however that to:

"attribute social origins to logical thought is not to debase or diminish its value or reduce it to nothing more than a system of artificial combinations".

(E.F., p 444)

But this argument of the social origin of the forms of thought, although it recognises that they will differ according to society and history, is not thereby to argue for a radical epistemological relativism. For although Durkheim recognises the content will differ, such systems of belief are always collective representations which are known by a Conscience Collective. The formal properties of knowledge are thus shared universally.

Lastly and most importantly Durkheim's position is characterized by the claim that not only has knowledge a collective dimension, but that this is the axiom on which he builds his theoretical position and the collective dimension of knowledge and action is the principle from which he attacks tradition philosophical conceptions of knowledge and value.

The aim of this Part is to show how the theoretical assumptions of these five positions develop out of Renouvier's incorporation and critique of the Kantian system. I shall sketch here the genesis of each position and its location in the subsequent chapters.

Firstly: knowledge as a system of representations is explained initially by reference to Kant's Copernican Revolution in Chapter I and then in Chapter II by Renouvier's critique and subsequently his development of a reformed Kantianism in Chapter III. In the Copernican Revolution Kant transformed metaphysics from a concern with the absolute, to a concern with the epistemic rules embedded in reason immanent in the subject. It has been pointed out in Part I, Chapter I, how Durkheim builds the principle of idealism and the principle of naturalism into his account of society. In Part II, Chapter I, it will be shown how these are the basic principles of the Copernican Revolution; it is through the union of them that develops the concept of representation and out of Transcendental Idealism the claim that knowledge consists in a system of representations, relative to the 'I' of consciousness and not to the 'in itself'. The principle of Idealism demonstrates the relativity of the world to consciousness and its forms and principles. The principle of Naturalism claims reason as restricted to experience - as not transcending the order of phenomena. For Kant 'representation' is the union of the data of sensibility and the forms of understanding or the categories.

Metaphysics thus purified of the 'in itself' is concerned with representations and their ground in the subject. Thus it becomes scientific. Metaphysics becomes a Copernican science, whose goal is the uncovering of the categories - the principles involved in all knowing. The idea of a Copernican science in Kant's transcendental definition and in Renouvier's naturalist definition is a main theme of Part II.

In Chapter I, I outline the Copernican Revolution and its reform of metaphysics, and the philosophy of transcendental idealism. In Chapter II, I show how Renouvier responds to the Copernican Revolution. He interprets the principle of idealism and the principle of naturalism as the rule of a priorism and the rule of phenomenalism. Together these constitute the Principle of Relativity which for Renouvier is the essence of the Copernican Revolution and are the foundation of science. Renouvier accuses Kant of being inconsistent through his retention of the noumenon. His critique of the noumenon in Chap. II, Sec. III, is the pivot of Part II and recalls that in Part I, (Ch. III, Sec. II 'Renouvier and the Contradictions of Kantianism'), it was pointed out that substantialism is the first of the main contradictions of Kant's system. The critique of substantialism for Renouvier centres on the retention of the noumenon - the ghost of the absolute. Renouvier's critique of the noumenon extends into an attempt at eradication of all elements of the absolute in the Kantian philosophy.

In Chapter III and Chapter IV, I will show how Renouvier's 'Premier Essai de Critique Generale' (1854) is a reworking of Kant's Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason without any element of the absolute. In so doing he claims to have 'humanized' philosophy, that is, to have completed the transformation of philosophy that Kant undertook and did not complete.

"Cet absolu cherché de chimère en chimère, à travers les élucubrations théologiques, nous le trouvons au fond de notre nature, non qu'elle échappe à toute relation, mais parce qu'elle peut quelque fois les dominer toutes"

(D.E., 1912, p 82).

That is, a truly scientific philosophy will restrict itself to phenomena and the laws of representation and in so doing it will recognize knowledge as relative to the constitution of the human understanding.

So in Chapter III is contained the answer to the first two assumptions of Durkheim's sociology of knowledge - the science of representation and the subject which explains them. It treats 'representation' as the object of post Copernican metaphysics. And the subject which explains them is epistemology which is no longer metaphysical in the old sense, but is scientific because restricted to the realm of phenomena. Renouvier calls critical philosophy 'science', because, in his hands it becomes truly 'scientific' because it is purged of its 'element corrupteur'. The answer to the question of what is the science of representations is that it is reworking of Kant's Transcendental Analytic in terms of the object of knowledge 'representation' and critical philosophy as the subject which deals with them. The reworking takes

place in terms of a consistent phenomenalism which comes from Hume and Comte.

In Chapter III are contained the most important consequences of this. To eradicate the thing-in-itself is also for Renouvier to eradicate substance (for the thing-in-itself, is merely substance in disguise) Substance was the concept which answered the question about the stability of phenomena - it was that which underpinned them and provided their continuity. Renouvier in his consistent phenomenalism replaces this with 'function' which is later developed into the major form of inter-connections of social phenomena by Durkheim. Secondly in Sec. II to deny the absolute qua thing-in-itself entails a denial of Kantian dualism - in particular the distinction between sensibility and understanding. Phenomena appear to consciousness, there can be no priority in terms of spatial origin - as the idea of a faculty of sensibility suggests. And to eradicate the distinction between sensibility and understanding is to transform phenomenalism, so that it can incorporate ideas, belief and action as representations, which allows Durkheim later to treat aspects of social life as phenomena. In contrast phenomena for Kant are limited by spatial criteria imposed by sensibility as the bearer of space as the form of outer sense. Thirdly the denial of the absolute leads Renouvier to deny Kant's distinction between reason and understanding. (Sec. V). It is the eradication of these latter two distinctions which leads Renouvier to develop Conscience, which contains what Kant claimed the

three distinct faculties of reason, understanding and sensibility covered.

The concept of conscience is essentially bound up with the theory of representation.

"En prenant pour réalité fondamentale, le phénomène, la représentation, avec ses deux éléments inseparables, on n'applique plus sa raison qu'à l'apparence pour soi c'est à dire à la conscience, à la donnée même sans laquelle s'évanouirait toute connaissance et qui ne renferme rien que d'intelligible".

(D.E., 1912 ed. p 18).

The aim and object of a Copernican science or post-Kantian metaphysics, is the construction of the categories of thought. In Chapter IV, it will be seen how Renouvier extends his critique of Kant in terms of the principle of relativity to criticise Kant's system of the categories in terms of the category of relation. Stemming from this is developed the category of Conscience as the supremely important category. It is directly implied by the principle of relativity. In this is found an answer to the third characteristic of Durkheim's thought above: that experience is unified in relation to a Conscience.

In relation to the fourth assumption above, it is shown that the spirit of relativity in which the sociology

of knowledge is developed* is a result of Copernicanism. It will be clear that it is a result of Renouvier's interpretation of the Copernican Revolution. Renouvier opposes himself to any spirit of absolutism that Kant articulated in terms of reason as fixed and authoritative for all times. It is developed firstly as what Renouvier takes as the essence of the Copernican Revolution - the principle of relativity. Next relativism is seen as essential to phenomenalism and the connection is developed in Ch. III, Sec. III 'Phenomenalism and Relativism'. Renouvier extends the principle of relativity to a critique of the categories, where he argues relation is the basic form of the categories. From this he disputes Kant's 'Clue to the Discovery of all Concepts of the Understanding'. And thereby he disputes the metaphysical deduction where Kant fixes the form categorial understanding must take. However it will be pointed out that his theory of relativism does not affect the conclusions of Kant's Transcendental Deduction and that

*

Although Durkheim is not a relativist if Protagoras's statement 'Man is the measure of all things' is taken to mean individual man. Rather Durkheim would agree with cultural relativism entailed by interpreting 'man' as 'collective man'. In this sense Durkheim must be committed to a) recognition of cultural and historical diversity and b) the impossibility of establishing universal standards in terms of which collective representative systems and moral codes can be judged correct or incorrect. I say must be, because Durkheim is inclined to argue science, although he admits it is a collective representation, gains access to 'reality', where other collective representations do not. In this sense he does not apply the strict cultural relativism to his own 'science' that he applies to other systems of representations.

his misinterpretation of the 'transcendental' affects his interpretation of the meaning of relativity in Kant's thought and what can legitimately be grafted onto it. As I shall point out there may be a spirit of relativism, but there is not a radical epistemological relativism for all representations are relative to a Conscience. That is the form all knowledge must take is fixed in philosophical analysis, and in this it is not dissimilar to Kant's position which he undertakes to criticise. The difference between Renouvier and Kant is that against Kant of the Metaphysical Deduction, Renouvier does allow for the change of the content of representations.

His sense of relativity as essential to knowledge is really a critique of absolutism. For example, he gives a relative sense to being (in distinction to its absolute sense in substance) and defines being as 'copula' (Chapter III, sec. III). For Renouvier to say being is a copula, ie. a relation, is equivalent to say all is relative. His thesis of the nature of being is a demonstration of the principle of relativity. It is the philosophical forerunner of Durkheim's definition of social being as the totality of social relations.

Renouvier's relativism is an essential part of his idealism, which has three components. First his phenomenalism: that we know only phenomena. This is opposed to ontological realism - in particular the doctrine of the thing-in-itself in Kant. Secondly: relativism - the real is constituted for us through laws

which are the constant relations between phenomena. This opposes itself to absolutist realism - which for Renouvier is the definition of being out of all relation. Thirdly: a priorism: the general laws of representation are a priori. This opposes itself to empiricism or sensationalism, which wants to explain human knowledge by sensible impressions. These aspects of Renouvier's thought are covered in Chapters III and IV respectively.

So for Renouvier the essence of Kant's Copernican Revolution is relativity. It is the discovery of the principle of relativity as the essence of the Copernican Revolution which characterizes Renouvier's interpretation of Kant. Kant's 'Criticisme' teaches us the relativity of all knowledge to consciousness and its laws. (And it demonstrates the relativity of science to the forms of human understanding). This is the essential principle of Neo-Criticisme. Kant was timid in the application of his discovery and it was Comte who demonstrated the full implications of the principle of relativity. It is in its name that Renouvier banishes the thing-in-itself from any truly critical philosophy (Chapter II, Sec. III). For Renouvier the critical spirit is relativism. Renouvier claims that Kant turns the doctrine of transcendental idealism into a doctrine of transcendent idealism through the retention of the thing-in-itself. And finally relativism will bring the denial of the antinomies, and this is the bridge between Part II and Part III of this thesis. For if there is no absolute, says Renouvier, there is no distinction between reason and understanding. And if there is no such

distinction then there are no antinomies. His theory of relativism leads to Renouvier denying any validity to the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's First Critique (Chapter III, Sec. V).

Lastly, the collective dimension which is the axiom of Durkheim's thought, is analyzed as essential to a science of representations in Chapter IV, Sec. V. The collective element (or rather the essential plurality of Consciences) is seen as a necessary consequence of the relativism which characterizes Renouvier's theory of representation. By saying it is Renouvier who adds the collective dimension to Kantian thought, I am not thereby subscribing to the opinion of Lucien Goldmann who claims the Kantian philosophy is vitiated by its individualism. It is true that Kant did not glorify the collectivity or make as much as Goldmann would have liked of the concept of totality but this does not make him an individualist. The roots of human knowing lie in reason which is universal. It is instantiated in the individual: it is not born of individuality per se. Further in the moral dimension the Kingdom of Ends is a fundamental form of the moral principle. In this the collective dimension is essential to morality. Durkheim recognizes this

"Kant expresses the same sentiment... reason is that which is most impersonal with us. For reason is not my reason: it is human reason in general. It is the power which the mind has of rising above the particular, the contingent and the individual, to think in universal forms. So from this point of view, we may say that what makes a man a personality is that by which he is

confounded with other men, that which makes him a man, not a certain man".

(E.F., p 271)

Thus the collective dimension of knowledge and morality is assumed by Kant as consequent on his definition of reason. But it is Renouvier who develops the collective element as explicitly implied in his reformed theory of representation.

The above are the ideas which this part is intended to explain. The explanation is contained in the analysis of the philosophical arguments as set out by Kant in his Copernican Revolution and by Renouvier in his acceptance and critique of it. That is the logic of Part II follows the logic of philosophical ideas, their unfolding and critique.

Part II. Chapter I. Copernicanism and the Transformation
of Metaphysics

For Durkheim, sociology is a study of the rules which govern collective experience, which is expressed in collective representations. Thus sociology partakes of a Copernican science which consists of two elements: the rules for the organisation of experience and the representations in which knowledge consists. The discovery of the rules immanent in the subject is the discovery of the rules which govern experience: thus the goal of Copernican science is to establish the categories. This is the subject of Chapter IV. The representations are the subject matter of Copernican science and are dealt with in Chapter III. Both require the transformation of philosophical perspectives that is the Copernican Revolution. This is dealt with in Chapter I and in Chapter II is Renouvier's critique of it. The Copernican Revolution turns metaphysics from the 'in itself' to the study of the rules immanent in experience and how these rules organise experience into representations.

Here Kant, against empiricist scepticism shows how experience is possible because of the rules contributed by the subject. Against rationalist dogmatism he shows how knowledge requires the 'bounds of sense' to be objective and non-contradictory. The Copernican Revolution demonstrates the dependence of experience 'the a posteriori' on the rules which organise experience

'the a priori'. It has been shown in Part I, Chapter I how universality and necessity - the characteristics of the a priori - are central features of the social organisation of knowledge for Durkheim. The discovery of the a priori, as the organising principle of experience and as compatible with a science of its discovery is the result of the Copernican Revolution

Part II. Chapter I. Section I.The Copernican Revolution

The Copernican Revolution demonstrates the relativity of experience to reason and in this establishes a relationship between the conditioned (experience) and the unconditioned (reason). In so doing for Kant it shows the autonomy of reason. This is essential for the Kantian programme, for reason can only be the bearer of the interests of humanity if it has autonomy of the data of sense. However, in the epistemological side of the Copernican Revolution, it only has relative autonomy because although Kant demonstrates that experience is only possible as it is because of the forms reason in its role as understanding brings to it, he simultaneously demonstrates that reason cannot transcend its boundary in sense without becoming contradictory. The first is the principle of idealism and demonstrates the dependence of intelligible experience on the principles of the understanding. The second is the principle of naturalism which limits reason to experience and specifies a criterion of meaning and significance.

The Copernican Revolution is the dependence of the a posteriori on the a priori:

"Nothing in a priori knowledge can be ascribed to objects save what the thinking subject derives from itself".

(C.P.R. B xxiii)

Human knowledge, achieving theoretical expression in science is a synthesis of the data of sense and the

principles of the understanding. Experience without the ordering principles of the understanding is incoherent and fragmented: the orderly experience of commonsense reveals the ordering activities of the understanding. The principles of the understanding are the a priori whilst the data of sense are the a posteriori. Experience as we know it is a synthesis of these and thus constitutes the synthetic a priori. A priori here means not relative or temporal a priority but absolute a priority - a logical independence of any experience. For, by definition, if it is that which contributes to the formation of that experience, it cannot be derived in origin or nature from that experience.

This revelation of dependence of experience on understanding constitutes a revolution in perspectives for the relationship between the knower and the known in the act of knowledge. Kant compared this revolution in epistemology to the revolution in astronomy affected by the Copernican hypothesis.* Just as pre-Copernican astronomers could not explain the movements of the planets on the assumption that they all revolve around the earth,

* Bertrand Russell rightly points out that it is badly named for Copernicus shows that the solar system is heliocentric, whereas for Kant's analogy to carry consistently, he would have to have retained a geocentric astronomy.

so Kant claimed philosophers before him could not explain how objective scientific knowledge was possible on the assumption that knowledge was passive conformity to the object.

"Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the assumption that they all revolved around the spectator, he (Copernicus) tries whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest".

(B XVI C.P.R.)

This revolution in perspectives reversed the common-sense relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge. For realism, which expresses the position of commonsense, this established the counter-intuitive position that the object to be known must conform to the requirements of the subject. Knowledge is possible not because of what the object somehow forces on the subject, but because of what the subject brings to the object.

"Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects ... But all attempts to extend our knowledge ... on this assumption ... have ended in failure".

(C.P.R. B XVI).

In establishing that the knowability of the object depends on the activities and requirements of the subject, Heidegger¹ said that Kant raised the question of how subjectivity can establish objective experience. He established the issue of the metaphysics of the subject and in so doing he passed beyond 'the constitution of

of the being of objects' to 'the laws of human cognition' which 'prescribe the conditions for appearing within our experience'.

What the subject contributes are the principles of the understanding which become operative only on the stimulus of experience. They are thus distinct from innate ideas and the dogmatic a priori principles of Wolffian metaphysics. The characteristic of these principles is that no experience is possible without them and that they cannot be denied without contradiction. These principles are necessary and universal.

"Necessity and strict universality are the sure criteria of a priori knowledge and are inseparable from each other".

(C.P.R. B4).

In this Kant establishes that we have certain knowledge only of those characteristics which we have introduced into the object of knowledge. So Hintikka² identifies Kant as belonging to a tradition which identifies genuine knowledge as makers knowledge:

"Reason has insight into that which it produces after a plan of its own".

(C.P.R. B xiii).

It follows that the notion of objectivity in knowledge must be revised from the position of seeing it as the correlation between mind and its objects, to one where it consists in the qualities or characteristics of the knowledge by the subject. For Kant, *necessity* and strict universality are characteristics of objective knowledge.

The conception of knowledge entailed by the relativity of experience to the a priori is the synthetic a priori. In this Kant established against rationalist dogmatism that the characteristic of objective knowledge was not simply logical necessity, but that there is necessity of the synthesis of knowledge and this necessity does not rest on logical truth but on transcendental condition: that without which there is no knowledge. To deny this kind of knowledge does not involve a logical contradiction, but a *petitio principii* for any coherent reference to reality at all involves those very principles. Against empiricism he established that knowledge could not be reduced to constituent empirical factors firstly without loss of certainty in knowledge and secondly without denying principles which are implicitly involved in all reference to reality. Knowledge for Kant has certainty because it has necessity, and this is self-imposed, through the principles of the understanding on the data of sense. That these principles require the stimulus of experience establishes that knowledge has a synthetic necessity. Against the Rationalists he establishes that the centrality of experience in knowledge does not entail loss of necessity, for this is provided through the understanding in the concept of the synthetic a priori he provided a critique both of dogmatic metaphysics and scepticism and provided a new foundation for metaphysics.

Section II. Copernicanism and Metaphysics.

The rebirth of metaphysics for Kant is necessary:

"For the interests of universal human reason is too intimately interwoven with it".

(Prol., p 5).

The critique of dogmatic metaphysics

"is the effect of the natural judgement of the age which refuses to be any longer put off with illusory knowledge".

(C.P.R. A xii)

For:

"This is the age of criticism and to criticism everything must submit".

(C.P.R. A, xii)

This is a call to reason to establish a critique of itself, by which it can establish 'lawful claims' and dismiss 'groundless pretension'. But this critique is "the most difficult of all its tasks - that of self knowledge".

The critique of metaphysics in its negative sense means the critique of illusory knowledge by which philosophers thought they had attained knowledge by pure reason alone, unrestricted by experience. But there is a positive sense of the term metaphysics for Kant: the human mind has a natural tendency to raise problems of God, Freedom and Immortality. He says metaphysics as a natural disposition is actual and therefore must be possible: the task of the critical

philosophy is to put this on the right path. The task of the critical philosophy is:

"To put metaphysics on the secure path of science".

(C.P.R., B XIV).

It follows that post-Copernican metaphysics is coextensive with the critical philosophy. The task of it must be to outline the necessary presuppositions in all knowledge. And given the role of the a priori in knowledge, the tasks of metaphysics must be to outline the a priori and to distinguish it from the a posteriori. The central question of the First Critique is 'How are judgements synthetic a priori possible'? The answer to this will be found in the argument that we cannot think without the principles of the understanding. And as necessary they must be possible. The triumph of Copernican metaphysics will be the 'discovery' of the categories of the understanding or the forms of knowledge implied in all knowing. It follows that the concern with the categorial understanding is a new 'science'.

Copernican metaphysics can no longer concern itself with the 'in-itself' but concerns appearances and their relation to the subject. As it is the subject which contributes the principles by which these are synthesised as objective knowledge, it follows that this metaphysics is of the subject. Thus it is no longer concerned to add to experience in terms of transcendent truths, but of finding out what is implicit in human experience. As Cassirer says:

"Metaphysics can discover nothing: it can only make plain the pure fundamental interconnections in experience. It brings clarity and intelligibility into what is given to us as an obscure and complex totality and it makes its structure transparent to us".¹

Section III. Transcendental Idealism.

The principle of idealism and the principle of naturalism together for Kant constitute transcendental or critical idealism. In this position as Strawson explains:

"Kant says, he is concerned not only to curb the pretensions of dogmatic metaphysics to give us supersensible knowledge: he is concerned also to curb the pretensions of sensibility to be coextensive with the real".¹

It covers the claim of the unknowability of things-in-themselves as independent of phenomena; knowledge is thus limited to appearances. But these are relative to the understanding, which provides the a priori rules for the connectedness of experience.

This position contrasts with realism for it admits the relativity of knowledge to the forms of the understanding and thus precludes any direct contact between knower and object known.

"If the objects with which our knowledge has to deal were things in themselves, then we could have no a priori concepts of them".

(C.P.R., A128).

It also contrasts with subjective idealism, for Kant maintains that the a priori constitutes an objective foundation for knowledge. He says transcendental idealism is empirical realism. He argues that realism entails empirical idealism, because the existence of things-in-themselves cannot be demonstrated starting from the representations we have in our selves. Kant stated that

transcendental idealism is proved in the Aesthetic of the First Critique. It is because space and time are forms of sensibility that phenomena are representations and not things-in-themselves. But as conditions for the possibility of experience, this means that they are not simply subjective conditions of our intuition. It is the a priori in experience, for Kant, which distinguishes dream from reality. So Kant says Berkeley's dogmatic idealism, which says that space with its objects is impossible, so spatial objects are impossible, has no criteria of truth because he has given phenomena no a priori foundation. The a priori laws of the understanding in prescribing conditions for all possible experience establish the conditions of truth and objectivity and thus distinguish truth from illusion. Kant vigorously defended himself against the charge of empirical idealism and says that the existence of objects in space outside us is not put in question by the thesis of transcendental idealism.*

Transcendental idealism implies empirical realism in this sense. It is impossible to perceive or demonstrate

* Graham Bird 'Kant's Theory of Knowledge' (R.K.P., 1962, London) defends Kant against Pritchard's theory that for Kant the real world is one of things-in-themselves and phenomena connect the real world to the perceiving subject by representing the former, but by being in the latter. (Ch. I).

the existence of things external to us, if we understand by this things-in-themselves. There is no question of going outside consciousness, so the significance of the Copernican Revolution in the thesis of transcendental idealism, is that without our form of representation, matter, for example is nothing. The question of reality and objectivity enter with judgement and not simply perception. So for Kant, there is objectivity and truth only when representations are connected by categories as consciousness. The data of sense depend on sensibility and judgement on the understanding. The phenomenal is the synthesis of both. The distinction between dream and reality is not the relationship between representations and external objects, which for us can only be identical, but their association according to rules which determine the connectedness of representations in the concept of an object.

Transcendental idealism as central to the Copernican Revolution establishes the transcendental as the unique method for the discovery of the a priori. For Kant the discovery of the a priori as the grounds of the possibility of experience is only adequately understood in terms of a transcendental argument.* The structure of transcendental arguments in the two Critiques starts from

* I shall not enter the debate as to whether transcendental arguments are possible. I shall assume that in the context of C.P.R. they are actual and therefore possible.

certain agreed facts of human experience (science and morality) which are actual. The task of philosophy is to show how this is possible, by demonstrating, in the First Critique, the categories of the understanding as the condition of the possibility of science. In establishing that science is not possible without the categories (particularly that of causality) Kant concludes that the categories are justified as universally applicable to experience and therefore the condition of objective knowledge.

The uncovering of that which is the condition of not only empirical knowledge but all knowledge requires a unique kind of argument. It distinguishes itself from empirical argument which relies on the concept of observation, for by definition observation of reality must employ those principles that make possible this experience. In employing what it seeks, observation will not reveal these principles. Thus for Kant there is a sharp distinction between empirical and transcendental method. He recognised two distinct questions about concepts: questions of fact (how do I come to have this concept?) and questions of right (how am I justified in using this concept?). The question of the objective validity of concepts is a question of right. B. Stroud² points out that the central question of epistemology 'How is it possible to know anything at all?' is not answered by an appeal to fact. A central feature of transcendental arguments for Kant is that they show the sceptical challenge is impossible, by showing that certain

concepts are necessary for thought and experience to be possible at all. The sceptic in denying knowledge invokes those principles which he is denying. If we cannot think without these principles then the question of right is answered: the very necessity of them to any thinking at all answers the question of justification.

Hintikka³ brings out the feature of a transcendental proposition which for Kant 'makes possible the very experience which is its own grounds of proof'. It demonstrates the possibility of a certain type of synthetic a priori knowledge, by showing that it is due to those activities of ours by means of which the knowledge in question is obtained. This is the dynamic aspect of the transcendental, which is reflected in Kant's statement:

"The word transcendental with me, never means a reference to our knowledge of things, but only to the cognitive faculty"

(Pr ., p 294 Acad.)

It follows for Hintikka that not everything that is a priori is transcendental in this sense. Conceptual conditions or basic particulars in Strawson's⁴ sense, will not per se refer to this dynamic, constructive activity of human consciousness. So Strawson does not argue that the framework for the identification of objects is

"Produced by reason after a plan of its own"

(C.P.R., B xiii).

Rudiger Bubner⁵ argues that the central feature of transcendental arguments is self-referentiality for he says revealing the conditions for the possibility

of using certain concepts must simultaneously show how such revelation is possible. We cannot go higher than transcendental knowledge and we cannot step 'outside', so in terms of transcendental justification, in Bubner's terms, actual knowledge gains information about the structure of itself without abandoning its own sector. It follows that if self-referentiality characterizes a transcendental argument, that not everything which precedes acts of cognition is transcendental. A whole series of physical, societal and historical conditions can be adduced without which cognition is impossible. But mere antecedence does not qualify them as transcendental.

The final and most problematic aspect of the philosophy of transcendental idealism is the distinction between phenomena and noumena. It has been shown above that Kant thought objective knowledge is only possible on the assumption that it is not of things in themselves. This distinction is crucial to the Copernican Revolution, because Kant insisted that the idea of the imposition of the laws of the understanding can only be understood if nature is phenomenal and not a thing-in-itself. Kant argued that if empirical knowledge is regarded as knowledge of things in themselves, then metaphysics becomes contradictory. The revolution in perspective entails this distinction for Kant; and Copernican metaphysics cannot concern itself with the in itself but phenomena. Kant to secure the objectivity and necessity of science, says we only know phenomena. Phenomena are defined as

the data of sense ordered according to the principles of the understanding. That which is not phenomenal in this sense is not knowable: but Kant insisted that that which is not knowable according to the principles of the understanding, must nevertheless be retained in terms of the critical philosophy.

Chapter II. Neo-Kantianism and Copernicanism

In this chapter I examine in turn Renouvier's response to the main tenets of the Copernican Revolution. It is clear that the idea of the a priori together with the critical intention are taken by Renouvier as the main principles of his Neo-Criticisme. He attempts to incorporate the a priori into a larger sense of naturalism than Kant admits. And he attempts to do this without a coherent sense of the transcendental which has been pointed out in Chapter I is the logical link between the a priori and the a posteriori. Renouvier accepts the principles of the Copernican Revolution, but he disputes the distinction between phenomena and noumena. The critical intention means for him there are only phenomena. By his retention of the noumenon - the-thing-in-itself, Kant compromises his philosophical revolution and is ambivalent between reality-in-itself of absolutist metaphysics and reality-for-consciousness of post-Copernican metaphysics.

Section I. Copernicanism, Neo-Kantianism and Naturalism

That the a posteriori must be understood in relation to the a priori is the principle adopted by the French Neo-Kantians. For Renouvier the question of knowledge and objectivity lie no longer with the in-itself, but solely in relation to the subject and its laws of understanding and phenomena. He adopts the principles of a priorism and naturalism. He agreed with Kant on the necessary relationship between these two principles in knowledge, but he put a different stress on the latter aspect of the relationship. Under the influence of Comte and Hume he interpreted principle of understanding as a law of experience. The a priori is thus understood in the light of naturalism. In this he differs markedly from the German post Kantians who starting with Fichte stressed more strongly the autonomy of the a priori in establishing knowledge. But Renouvier insisted that he retained the interests of the a priori, whilst claiming that knowledge and its objects can be fully understood in terms of law and its conditions. So for Renouvier to find reason in experience is to find a relationship between the a priori and the a posteriori but the notion of the dependence of the latter on the former no longer bears the marks of Kant's transcendentalism but that of Humean naturalism. The central question thus becomes what the a priori can look like in naturalism⁸. Indeed, how compatible is a priori with naturalism? It is Renouvier's originality to have made the attempt and it is this which is the condition of Durkheim's sociology.

The difficulty inherent in Renouvier's philosophy is equivalent to the attempt to make the principles of the Humean and Kantian philosophy compatible. Renouvier often claims that he reforms Kant by Hume. In so far as he distances himself from Kant, he says Hume is the most consistent critical philosopher. But in the name of Kant he distances himself from what he regards as the unacceptable negative conclusion of consistent empiricism.

The very attempt to do this, raises the question as to the real compatibility of the two aspects of the Copernican Revolution - that is the compatibility of the principle of idealism and the principle of naturalism. Is demonstrating the relativity of the world to consciousness compatible with simultaneously demonstrating the restriction of reason to experience? They pull in different directions, the one towards the subject, the other towards the object. The relationship is difficult to understand and maintain unless understood in terms of the transcendental. And the a priori then is the transcendental condition of experience. Here they are mediated because experience is redefined in terms of what the subject brings to it. That is experience is the synthetic a priori and this is the reconciliation of idealism and naturalism. But if the transcendental is not understood as is the case with Renouvier then the relationship which is essential to this reform of philosophy becomes hard to maintain. And as proves to be the case naturalism engulfs a priorism and with that the authority of reason to regulate experience.

So it will be argued that in terms of the Kantian philosophy, the only coherent relationship between the a priori and the a posteriori is of the former as the transcendental condition of the latter. Without this, the very idea of the a priori becomes incoherent within terms of naturalism. Against Renouvier I will argue that the negative, sceptical conclusions of naturalism in Hume's hands, are the result of adopting a naturalistic method. Hume's philosophy is consistent between conclusions and method. In misunderstanding the transcendental method, Renouvier annexes it to the critical intention per se, the restriction of reason to experience. The question of explaining the a priori in a philosophy which sees law, understood as constant conjunction, and fact as the only terms of explanation is the central confusion of Neo-Criticisme. Yet he retains the idea of law understood as a kind of transcendental condition. This he hands on to Durkheim, who can claim that society is the condition of knowledge and experience and is adequately understood in naturalistic terms as a law of experience. If the a priori cannot logically appear in Renouvier's philosophy then neither can it in Durkheim's and it follows that the claims he makes for society as the epistemic and moral authority, also must fall.

It is in the terms of Neo-Criticisme that the notion of the a priori that Durkheim inherits is developed. The a priori in Renouvier's hands is ultimately expressed as Conscience whose status is a kind of super fact, available for observation by a science concerned with description and classification of facts. It will be

shown that its nature as a priori, is called by Renouvier 'sui generis' and its status vis à vis other facts of experience is 'irreducibility'. In Renouvier's hands Kant's philosophy of transcendental idealism becomes, in the light of Comte, critical phenomenism.

To understand the path to the development of critical phenomenism in Renouvier's hands, we can follow the reaction to the essential features of Kant's Copernican Revolution.

Section II. Renouvier and the Copernican Revolution

Renouvier praised the Copernican REvolution and claimed that the principles of his own philosophy derive from it. Kant establishes 'the Principle of Relativity' and this, for Renouvier entails two things: firstly the rule of phenomenalism: that there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves. And secondly the rule of a priorism, that all knowledge is relative to the principles of consciousness. It is from the understanding of the human being that the intelligibility of the known world derive. In so doing Kant had established what Renouvier called a science and this is the formulation of the general principles of knowledge. It is a Copernican science in the sense that the study of what is possible in terms of knowledge and action can be established by an examination of the consciousness and will of the human agent. The primary concern of this science becomes that of discovering what is implicit in human experience. As George Vlachos says:

"L'homme lui même est à l'origine le créateur du toutes ses représentations et de tout ses concepts et doit être l'auteur de tous ses actions ... Philosophie est une science de l'homme, de sa pensée et son action".¹

Renouvier accepts the first premise of the critical philosophy: that the critique of knowledge is the starting point of all enquiry concerning knowledge. The founding idea of Neo-Criticisme is:

"L'idée naturelle et logique, si tard venue pourtant, de considérer la critique de la raison comme le prodrome obligé de tout démonstration possible des verités qui ont la raison pour fondement".

Through this, R enouvier says 'Criticisme' is founded like a science and through its critique of the faculty of knowledge, it alone can found the particular sciences.

The critical intention for Renouvier means that we have no knowledge of things-in-themselves and that consequently our knowledge is limited to objects as they appear to us, that is to phenomena. But Kant compromises the critical spirit: he remained pre-critical in his system through the retention of the thing-in-itself. In so doing he compromises with the pre-Copernican metaphysics and restores the idol of the old metaphysics, substance, under the guise of the noumenon. Hume is the father of the critical spirit in his negation of all dogmatic claims to substance; he denied intelligibility to anything which transcends the order of phenomena. What characterizes the phenomenalism of Hume and thus of Renouvier is:

"L'affirmation des ph enom enes et le doute sur tout qui d epasse les ph enom enes ou leur coordination en une repr esentation mentale".

(C.P., 1878, I, p 276).

And he insisted that:

'Le criticisme Kantien, s'il  etait conforme a ses propres principes clairement  tablis, aurait  t e un ph enom enisme".^{2*}

* In this he argues the opposite of L.W. Beck who claims that if Hume had pursued his line of reasoning he would have reached a Kantian position.³

The idea of the a priori is what separates Renouvier* from Hume who:

"Admet et applique exclusivement les principes sensationnistes, et ne sait comment sortir de ses conclusions négatives".

(C.P. 1878, I, p. 277).

The result of this is to make the constitutive laws of experience

"Une sorte de formation accidentelle sous l'action de l'expérience".

(C.P. 1878, I, p 283).

The especial importance of Kant is that he continued the critique of empiricism initiated by Descartes.

"Kant a rendu l'ancien point de vue sensationniste impossible a soutenir pour tout homme au courant des travaux philosophique".

(C.P. 1872, I, p. 385).

Kant had demonstrated that empiricism rests on a *petitio principii*, because it is incapable of explaining order in experience by reference to experience alone: it is incapable of explaining the generation of laws by facts. Phenomena alone are incoherent and divided: to explain the coherence of experience, empiricists are forced to introduce tacitly a concept of order among facts.

* Georges Milhaud⁴ points out that the element of the a priori had always been strong in Renouvier's thought. In his early writings of 1842 there were two elements that he stressed. Firstly the clarity and intelligibility of ideas, which under his early Cartesian influence he saw as the foundation of science. Secondly the activity of spirit. The former diminished in importance and the latter came to include the Kantian a priori. His idealist element says Milhaud is shown in him attributing an element of autonomous activity to the human mind.

The a priori nature of the laws of representation separate Renouvier from Hume.

"Telle est la différence entre notre école, l'école actuelle de Kant, le criticisme, et l'école actuelle de Hume, l'empiricisme. Nous n'admettons pas qu'il soit possible a des moyens d'investigations et d'analyse quels qu'il soient, d'éviter la reconnaissance a priorique de certaines lois de la representation mentale".

(C.P., 1872, I, p 389).

So Renouvier says:

"En un mot, affirmer la nature a priorique d'une notion, c'est simplement remarquer qu'on ne peut sans petitio principii, lui assigner, lui faire concevoir une origine dans l'expérience".

(P.E., p 313).

Renouvier recognises that the action of the synthetic a priori is one of the great reforming points of the Kantian system:

"Kant a reconnu la necessite d'admettre des synthèses, oeuvre spontanées de l'esprit, irreductibles par l'analyse, ainsi que d'autres uniquement données par l'expérience entre des phénomènes dont on ne découvre pas autrement le rapport".

(C.D.K., p 2).

In so doing, Kant had simultaneously refuted dogmatism and scepticism.

However in terms of method Renouvier, says Verneaux, suffered from a misinterpretation of Kantianism that can be traced back to Victor Cousin's lectures on Kant given in the Sorbonne in 1820. Here Cousin identified transcendental analysis as a method of observation.

"C'est la méthode d'observation appliquée à l'âme humaine, ou la méthode psychologique".⁴

Cousin, although he recognised that the object of transcendental analysis was pure understanding, nevertheless maintained that a form of observation was satisfactory for the analysis of the internal laws of the subject. Cousin goes so far as to say:

"Kant l'applique comme Locke l'avait appliquée dans ses Essais sur l'Entendement Humain". (op cit)

The only difference consists in the profundity of Kant's analysis Renouvier adopted this position without question and it is one of the ironies of intellectual history that his interpretation of Kant should be vitiated by his enemy. It follows that for Renouvier there is no difference between the empirical and transcendental methods. Thus he said:

"Le phénoménisme de Hume subsiste toujours selon nous, comme l'unique méthode scientifique en philosophie".

(C.P., 1878, II, p 221).

Evidence of his misunderstanding of the transcendental, is his association of it with the transcendent.

(Kant gave) "Les choses en soi a un mode d'existence transcendentale dont l'idée est inaccessible a l'entendement non moins qu'a l'expérience".

(C.D. de K, p 269).

The problems of accommodating the a priori as the condition of experience to a form of internal observation entail for Renouvier the inevitable circularity of philosophical thought. In the Preface to his Premier Essai, he warns about the inevitable circularity

involved in trying to isolate the first principles of knowledge, for this is inevitably to invoke them. If he had understood the transcendental method he would have seen that as Bubner says knowledge can acquire knowledge of its own first principles without abandoning its own sector: and this does not entail a vicious circularity.

Renouvier says in this preface also

"Je veux déclarer ici, que j'accepte une formule fondamentale de l'école positiviste: la réduction de la connaissance aux lois des phénomènes".

(P.E., p X)

And he adds:

"Je le crois conforme à la méthode de Kant, quoi que ce philosophe, gêné par la tradition métaphysique, ne l'ait pas assez nettement dégagée ou suivi".

(P.E., p X).

According to Renouvier the Kantian method is an analysis of 'l'esprit' - of intellectual facts and laws of the understanding. Hume:

"En restant attachée à la méthode du pur empiricisme a laissé à son successor la gloire d'un vrai, d'un immense découverte, celle de l'application du principe scientifique des faits et des lois à l'étude de l'entendement".

(C.P., 1872 I, p 385).

The reform that Kant gave to Hume's empiricism:

"Laissent subsister la méthode phénoméniste".

(C.P. 1872 I, p. 385).

Kant's reform is achieved:

"Sans alteration essentielle pour les résultats acquis à la méthode criticiste, telle est déjà chez Hume"

(C.P. 1878 I, p 272).

Renouvier however disputes Kant's claim that his transcendentalism idealism is an empirical realism: Kant's philosophy for Renouvier was one of subjective idealism.

"L'idéalisme est ... très voisin de cet idéalisme, dit subjectif absolu, que Fichte lui donna pour interprétation toute naturelle".

(C.D. de K, p 6).

And it follows it is:

"Un dogme propre a Kant qui ne possède aucun titre à se présenter comme un resultat de sa critique de la raison, et qui contredit outrageusement les croyances naturelles et dépasse sans mesures, par sa transcendance, les vieilles doctrines métaphysique".

(C.D. de K, p 6).

It is the doctrine of the thing-in-itself retained within terms of the critical philosophy that turns it into a subjective idealism. For Kant, in retaining this is in effect saying that the ideas we have of things do not inform us of their real nature in themselves. And thus the necessary conceptions we have are only relative to our particular state and thus not the condition of objective knowledge.*

Verneaux says:

"Renouvier exclut l'idealisme transcendentale des thèses exigées par l'esprit critique: il englobe dans le système Kantian et il le

* Renouvier's critique here is reminiscent of Strawson's "the doctrine is not merely that we can have no knowledge of supersensible reality. The doctrine is that reality is supersensible and that we can have no knowledge of it". P 39, 'The Bounds of Sense', 1966, London.

rejette pour cause du substantialisme".⁵

It follows that for Renouvier only faith coming from practical reason allows Kant to transcend absolute subjectivism. (This will be developed in Part III).

It is in relation to Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena that Renouvier's criticisms of Kant are the most trenchant. In fact, the whole of Renouvier's critique of Kant ultimately stems from his retention of the thing-in-itself, for as has been seen this means substance, and for Renouvier this entails determinism and infinitism. For him the principle of naturalism and the principle of idealism together constitute the principle of relativity, which is the central tenet of Neo-Criticisme. And these two principles are the necessary and sufficient conditions of science and therefore of the particular sciences. The dependence of objects of knowledge in the principles or 'laws' of the understanding is the greatest Kantian insight. He defines the principle of relativity in this way:

"La dépendance où se trouve les objets de la connaissance à l'égard de la connaissance même ou de ses lois nécessaires".

(P.E. 1854, I p 114).

This entails two things for Renouvier: firstly that there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves. Our knowledge is limited to things as they appear to us ie. to phenomena. Secondly, phenomena depend on the laws of understanding, which rule experience as a priori: that is the principle of relativity entails phenomenalism and a priorism. These will be examined in Chapter III and IV respectively.

Section III. The Critique of the Noumenon and
Noumenalism in Kant's Philosophy.

For Renouvier, Kant remained pre-critical within his system. There is a contradiction in the heart of Kantianism in his retention of substantialism despite his phenomenalist principles. Renouvier claimed that the three concepts Kant uses, the unconditioned, the thing-in-itself, and the noumenon are all equivalent terms for substance or the absolute. Kant had destroyed pre-Copernican metaphysics through the principle of relativity. But he reinstated the metaphysic of the thing-in-itself.

"Ce noumène, cette chose en soi, élément corrupteur de la philosophie qui pour l'atteindre sont de sphère du concevable, est la concession du criticisme naissant à la métaphysique expirante".

(A.P., 1868, p 96).

To be consistent Kant should have constructed a relativist and phenomenalist system. But in staying non-relativist and non-phenomenalist, his system is pre-critical and is 'absolutist' and 'substantialist'.

Renouvier has three main arguments against the noumenon. Firstly it is against the principles of the Critique of Pure Reason. The conclusion of the transcendental analytic is that:

"All concepts and with them all principles, even such as are possible a priori relate to empirical intuitions, that is to the data of possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity, and in respect of their representations are a mere play of imagination or of understanding.

(C.P.R., B, p 298).

The categories as formal conditions of experience having their origin a priori in the structure of the understanding, are however restricted to use in experience ie. they cannot transcend the data of sense-intuition.

The principles of the understanding are"

"At the disposal of the understanding solely for use in experience".

(C.P.R., B, p 296).

It follows that there can be no knowledge of the thing-in-itself.

There is a strong and a weak interpretation of the noumenon and Renouvier rejects both as invalid in the sense that since nothing transcends the order of phenomena, one can neither make reference to anything which is said to, and one can further not make sense of any such idea. Whereas for Kant, the whole point of a critical enquiry is to determine what lies within and what lies without its proper sphere of understanding. It is here that the concept of the noumenon gains its significance in the critical philosophy:

"The doctrine of sensibility is the doctrine of the noumenon in the negative sense".

(C.P.R., B, p 307).

Noumenon in a positive sense, as an object of a non-sensible intellectual intuition is proscribed within terms of the critical intention.

Yet noumenon is 'problematic' for Kant, not as as for Renouvier 'contradictory'. This is his second

argument against the noumenon (in C.D. de K, p 362). We cannot think in terms of the thing-in-itself in terms of a consistent critical phenomenism, because as will be clear in Chapter III, to do so is to attempt to think outside of relations and this is in fact impossible. But for Kant it is not contradictory to think of an 'in itself'. Indeed for him the whole idea of the Copernican enterprise entails that we can distinguish between the mode in which we receive the manifold of intuition from things-in-themselves (C.P.R., B 306). Renouvier's point here is telling: what sense is there to the distinction given the Copernican Revolution and the argument that the a priori is the necessary condition of objectivity? In terms of reality ie. phenomenal reality, the union of understanding and sensibility, such a distinction is vacuous.

Yet Kant has a need for the noumenon that Renouvier sees no need for. It is 'a limiting concept' and serves to 'curb the pretensions of sensibility'. The negative employment is thus not arbitrary for Kant, because it is bound up with preventing sensibilities pretension to be 'coextensive with the real'. Yet Renouvier argues that there is no coherent sense of reality except that of phenomenism; or in Kant's terms the union of sensibility and understanding. But for Renouvier understanding and sensibility are not separate faculties (see Chapter III): phenomenism and a priorism constitute representations which appear to Conscience. If there is no logic to distinguish between

faculties in this, then there can be no understanding and no sensibility. Thus there can be no understanding which limits sensibility, in the sense Kant gave that the noumenon is a product of understanding (thought) - not correlated to sensible intuition which curbs sensibility. But for Kant understanding cannot operate without sensibility, but we can think beyond what the sense-intuitions offer us, but this cannot constitute objective knowledge.

The impact of positivism on Renouvier's thought is clear: that we cannot think beyond the order of phenomena: the activities of the thinking process itself are restricted to the order of phenomena, not simply in terms of what can constitute objective knowledge. And here one can agree with Kant against Renouvier that the idea of what phenomenal reality is not, is bound up with the idea of noumenon in the negative sense. But in so far as Kant says it somehow 'limits' sensibility, then Renouvier's critique that it is 'hors de relation' and thus unable to limit anything is quite correct.

Renouvier's third argument (Ch. XXX, C.D. de K) is against Kant's arguments at C.P.R. B 295-B315. Here Kant argues that if there is appearance, then there must be something which appears. He says Kant's position here is hopeless: he either falls into a contradiction or engages in an equivocation of 'to appear'. To know that the noumenon exists it must appear, but if it appears it loses all characteristics of the noumenon. This equivocation is characteristic of all 'absolutist

substantialism' that is by defining substance as without qualities or any phenomenal determination, it cannot be coherently argued that substance appears at all in phenomenal experience. But in assuming even the possibility of the noumenon, appearance thus presupposes the latent nature of the thing-in-itself.*

For Renouvier, the noumenon retains the function of substance as the substratum of reality and thus is somehow more real than human reality. It is a

"Substratum commun peut-être des objets
matériaux et des phénomènes mentaux".

(C.D. de K., p 370).

Through this, the known is put into relation with the unknown: the sensible conditioned is put into relation with the non-sensible unconditioned. The unconditioned appears as support for the known world. It becomes 'La condition universelle des choses'. By Kant not calling the noumenon a substance, we are lulled into forgetting that it functions just like substance.

In this we can see that Renouvier is accusing Kant of subverting his own Copernican Revolution. He is ambivalent between the reality-in-itself of

* This is reminiscent of Walsh's criticism of Kant's use of 'appearance' as a somehow defective aspect of human knowledge, whereas 'reality' lies behind it. ('Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics', Edinburgh UP, 1975, p. 162).

traditional metaphysics and the phenomenal reality of Copernican metaphysics. In this there is thus an equivocation over the meaning of reality; which is real, the 'in itself' or the 'for us'? Despite his arguments about Copernican objectivity, Kant sometimes talks of human conditioned reality as an imperfection which is a result of our being burdened with the senses, and thus in contrast to the 'in itself'.

Renouvier argues that because of the noumenon, Kant's transcendental idealism becomes a subjective idealism. The world of nature becomes a world of appearances. In this, Kant cannot distinguish his position from that of Berkeley in regard to the reality of sensible objects. For he must maintain that representations are produced in us by the action of subjects which do not belong to the sensible world. Because of the thing-in-itself somehow being the cause of appearance, Kant with Berkeley must hold that the reality of sensible representations exists in a subject which produces them. Whereas for Berkeley, God is the author of the universe, for Kant there remains the impression that the cause of representations lies in the noumenon (H.S.P.M., Ch XXXIII).

Why should have Kant retained this pre-Copernican position? Renouvier suggests:

"Il est probable que Kant a été jeté dans la fiction des objets transcendants par la difficulté qu'il épouvait, venant après la critique de la notion de substance dans l'école empiriciste à découvrir un emploi définissable pour des substances dans le monde phénoménal. Mais le recours aux sujets

transcendants extra-sensibles, loin de la faciliter supprimait le rapport entre les principes et leurs effets ou qualités produits dans le temps et dans l'espace: car le passage du noumenal au phénoménal est un rapport dont on n'a point d'idée".

(H.S.P.M., p 272).

The critique of the noumenon in Kantian thought takes three forms which will be the subject of the subsequent chapters of Part II and Part III.

"Les noumènes sont des êtres que Kant suppose exister en soi, hors de toute relation indefinissable, par conséquent, mais qui ne reçoivent pas moins de lui les fonctions capitales de cause et substance".

(H.S.P.M., p 268).

As substance, it is the substratum of phenomena: in rejecting noumenon, Renouvier establishes the connectedness and stability of phenomena in law and function. (This is examined in Chapter III).

As cause, Kant makes noumenon the real foundation of morality. The real point of the distinction between things-in-themselves and objects of experience is to determine the limits of phenomena and thus to avoid extending to things-in-themselves universal determinism. The split of the mind (l'esprit) into its conditioned ie. determined nature and its unconditioned noumenal nature is to avoid the contradiction between the interests of science in determinism and the interests of morality in freedom. (This is examined in Part III).

Finally the unconditioned appears in the faculty of reason. This has its origins in Kant's argument that although it is not possible to know the thing-in-itself, it is possible to think it.

"La raison, selon Kant, exige necessairement a juste titre, au bout de la série des conditions, la position d'un inconditionne qui la termine".

(C.P., 1878, p 375-6).

Renouvier criticises Kant's argument at B 364/A 307, that if the conditioned is given so is the unconditioned. The assumption of a faculty of pure reason is tied to this view. In rejecting the unconditioned, Renouvier rejects Kant's view of reason and its separation from understanding:

"Sous les noms de Relatif et Absolu, H. Spencer a reproduit l'argumentation fallacieuse de Kant. 'Le Relatif étant le corrélatif de l'Absolu, l'implique'. Mais c'est précisément parce qu'il en est le corrélatif abstrait qu'il n'énonce qu'un rapport et ne signifie rien quand a l'existence".

(H.S.P.M., p 270).*

To reject the unconditioned is to purify the Kantian system of its 'element corrupteur' and to outline a system of knowledge fully consistent with the principle of relativity. This is followed in

* Again this predates Walsh's criticism, that Kant treats the conditioned as implying the unconditioned as a synthetic principle which holds of things as opposed to thoughts. ('Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 175).

Chapters III and IV. But Renouvier retains within his phenomenalism the noumenal 'interest'. For Kant the noumenon as substance functions to give reality a permanence and stability. It is the source of moral action. Both of these, Renouvier is committed to find within phenomena.

Chapter III. Renouvier and the Science of
Representation

In this chapter is explained how for Renouvier

"Les données de la science ne peuvent donc se trouver que dans la représentation en général et ... appartient à la connaissance".

(P.E., p 93).

In this he says he is continuing Kant. Against the positions of philosophical schools in France, he says science rests on an empiricism whose foundations are unexamined. And rationalism borrows its dogmas from theology. Against empiricism and rationalism Renouvier says:

"Le critique est plus que scepticisme et moins que dogmatisme".

(P.E., p 88).

To continue Kant means to establish a critique of knowledge: a critique can establish a method and a limit to possible knowledge. In this, the Kantian philosophy points to the foundation of science. He continues Kant but reformed according to the basic premise of the positivist school - that knowledge is restricted to the laws of phenomena. He says he doesn't take any more from the positivists because they have a disdain for the question of first principles - that is - the notion of phenomena and law are not subject to exact analysis. Further they dogmatically deny the conception of free belief (which is Renouvier's version of Kant's rational faith and will be developed in Part III.)

The search for the first principles of knowledge and a philosophical method are tied to the idea of social renewal. Like Kant, for Renouvier the critical intention is tied to the emancipation of people. Renouvier says it is the impulse of people to want to believe more than they could know. A genuine critique will destroy chimeras to allow rational belief. In the context of the problems of French society, the search for a criteria of significance is acute for following Comte, Renouvier clearly holds that social stability is preceded and predicated on intellectual stability.

"L'incertitude et le desordre des opinions sont extrêmes dans la société. Les principes de la discussion manquent. On les cherche sans methode, on les affirme comme au hasard ou même on les invoque sans les connaitres".

(Pref. P.E., p VII).

To pursue the critical philosophy, but reformed of the thing-in-itself, is to develop a philosophy such that:

"Elle n'a rien de cette ancienne métaphysique dont les poursuivants pénètrent la substance, mesure l'infini, construisent l'absolu, affirment les contradictoires et ne croient pas tenus d'entendre leurs propres hypothèses".

(P.E., Pref. p. VI).

A critique which can establish a method and a limit to possible knowledge is science. And the task of the general criticism of knowledge is to establish new elements of a grammar of thought.

"La méthode de la science ou critique générale consiste donc en l'analyse des données de la représentation, considérées dans la plus haute generalité possible".

(P.E., p 94).

The path from knowledge to science Renouvier explains thus and makes clear the Copernicanism of the enterprise.

"Connaître, c'est posséder la synthèse naturelle et grossière des lois essentielles de la vie; étudier c'est s'attacher à démêler et à classer les éléments de cette synthèse; à savoir c'est le reconstituer distinctement, en assemblant par ordre de phénomène à phénomène et de loi à loi les éléments dont l'analyse a défini les rapports. En ce sens, on a pu dire justement que l'homme ne sait que la vérité qu'il a faite"

(P.E., p 86).

Thus for Renouvier:

"La critique achevée serait la vraie science".

(P.E., p 88).

In this section we see how Renouvier develops the principle of relativity as the essence of the Copernican Revolution. It consists of two elements: the rule of phenomenalism and the rule of a priorism. Together these constitute critical idealism and are the necessary and sufficient foundation of science. And out of the principle of relativity develops the concept of Conscience.

Section I. Transcendental and Scientific Philosophy

The central question which Renouvier's theory of knowledge is designed to answer is more of a Cartesian question about the basis of universal science, than is a Kantian question about the possibility of science per se. There is a difference between a rational foundation of science and a transcendental foundation of knowledge, and in this lies the difference between a scientific philosophy and a transcendental philosophy. The latter asks how science is possible, whilst the former sees the foundation of science and the foundation of philosophy as being one and the same. So for Renouvier:

"La science est la construction régulière des synthèses, après analyse préalable".

(D.E. 1859 p III)

Whereas for Kant the task of philosophy is to explain how these syntheses, which constitute knowledge expressed in the particular sciences, are possible. Transcendental philosophy demonstrates the role of the a priori in knowledge, which science uses. Whereas for Renouvier the process of philosophising is the same as the process of science, both record the essential laws of human understanding. And this can be achieved by an empirical method. All science and thus philosophy proceeds by analysis and synthesis, the subject matter of which is the phenomena (called, 'choses', 'representations' also).

"Unir et séparer des rapports, telle est donc la fonction de la pensée, tant usuelle que scientifique".

Explanation follows this pattern.

"Expliquer un fait, c'est le rattacher à d'autres, le mettre à sa place dans un ensemble défini de rapports de phénomènes c'est donc signaler une loi".

(P.E. p 87).

What then is the foundation of knowledge and therefore science for Renouvier?

"J'affirme que les représentations ... offrent à la science un fondement plus profond, plus sûr et le seul qui sont inébranlables".

(P.E., p 11).

Are representations also facts and thereby laws? They must be for Renouvier's particular brand of scientific philosophy to get off the ground. But it is clear that there is here a confusion between a principle of understanding and law of experience. Out of the choice of science having an epistemological foundation, and epistemology having a scientific foundation, he chooses the latter and in so doing separates himself from Kant. But nevertheless Renouvier retains the active, constructive aspect of Kant's epistemological principles of the understanding as essentially involved in the laws of experience. In this he merged two quite different approaches. Renouvier convinces himself that a scientific philosophy is quite adequate to examine the fundamental laws of thought. Facts and laws are adequate to explain facts and laws; and are further adequate to explain representation which is a basic problem of science and philosophy.

"La science a pour donnée premières les conditions universelle de la représentation envisagée dans l'homme".

(D.E., p V).

Nevertheless for both Kant and Renouvier the universal science is metaphysics, which cannot be a science of the in-itself, because knowledge is limited to phenomena. But, for both the denial of the 'in itself' does not equal the denial of metaphysics, only the metaphysics of the absolute. And for neither does the denial of the absolute leave knowledge without a foundation. For Kant, the foundation of knowledge lies in the a priori principles of the understanding, whereas for Renouvier, adopting the basic premises of the Comtean tradition, the laws of phenomena are the foundation of knowledge. For Kant metaphysics is the examination of the condition of the possibility of knowledge. For Renouvier, metaphysics is nothing more than the analysis and coordination of the fundamental laws of experience. For both the culmination of this Copernican metaphysics or science is the system of the categories.

In this Copernican science to be empirical or transcendental? Is it to be concerned with the discovery of the laws of experience or of the principles of the understanding? Renouvier merges the two questions and thus thinks in outlining the laws of experience he has answered a transcendental question about how knowledge is possible. Since the very idea of a law of experience involves the conceptual condition as expressed in transcendental analysis, he has not answered this question. His naturalism entails that all principles

and methods of this Copernican science concerned with representation, are understood on an analogy with observation. He conflates the interests and conclusions of transcendental analysis with naturalistic analysis.

Scientific philosophy is thus not concerned with the analysis of the transcendental conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but with the description of the laws of phenomena. He nowhere deals with the notion of a transcendental condition, but he incorporates its meaning into the idea of a law of experience. In describing a law of experience, albeit of an abstract nature, the question of the possibility of knowledge is being answered for Renouvier. Later, in Chapter IV it will be clear that he treats Conscience as a law or supreme fact and as the condition of the possibility of knowledge. His confusion over the transcendental method has already been pointed out and he annexes questions about the conditions of knowledge as satisfactorily answered in terms of a form of internal observation. The result is the confusion of principle of the understanding as condition of experience, with the laws of experience.

Section II. Renouvier's Phenomenalism

The Neo-Criticist theory of knowledge is according to Renouvier's intention the same as Kant's theory without the thing-in-itself. The exclusion of substance from the critical philosophy is the first stage in the development of a consistent phenomenalism. Dauriac¹ said:

"Le phéno^éménisme de Renouvier est essentiellement un anti-substantialisme".

This will be examined in this section. The second stage is the development of the full implications of the principle of relativity which is the essence of Kant's philosophy for Renouvier. But taking away the unconditioned or noumenon does not leave Kant's phenomenalism as it was, without the noumenon. Renouvier's version of phenomenalism is considerably different, and at times sounds far more phenomenological than phenomenalist.

"Les phéno^émènes sont, tel est le principe de la connaissance".

(P.E., 1854, p 45).

To distinguish reality from phenomena is an error founded on the dogma of substance. When it is established that 'la chose' equals 'phéno^émène', then there is no point in looking for an essence beyond.*

* In this Renouvier's position is different from A.J. Ayer. 'Phenomenalists aim to make the distinction between sense data and material objects as sharp as possible'.

'Foundations of Empirical Knowledge', p. 117.

"Les choses sont phénomènes quant à la connaissance, et les phénomènes sont les choses".

(P.E., p 43).

All language and science proceed by analysis and synthesis, the objects of which are 'choses'. These have the common characteristics of 'appearing' or of being represented. He defines representation thus:

"Cela qui se rapporte aux choses distinguées ou composés d'une manière quelconque et par le moyen de quoi nous les considérons".

(P.E., 1854, p 6).

The definition of 'chose' is not commonsensical.

It means:

"Des synthèses plus ou moins complexes de représentations que l'expérience nous a considérer de tous, sans recourir à aucune définition de l'être".

(P.E., 1854, p 7).

This circularity in 'choses' and 'representation' confounds itself in a third term 'phenomenon'. And phenomenon is defined by its characteristic of 'appearance'.

This is a characteristic of phenomenon more characteristic of phenomenology. It is an initial difference from Kant. For REnouvier as will be clear later, the phenomenon is relative to the representative side of knowledge, the highest function of which is Conscience. For Kant the phenomenon is already a synthesis of the manifold of sensibility and the principles of the understanding. The Kantian phenomenon is already a mixture of the sensible and the intelligible.

Does it follow for Renouvier that simply through appearing phenomena are thereby intelligible and have connectedness with other phenomena? For Kant the principles of the understanding guarantee these two qualities. Later phenomenology in Husserl's hands guarantees the connectedness and objectivity of phenomenon by 'essences'. For Renouvier there are neither essences nor principles of knowledge which precede experience (see below). How does he guarantee the order and intelligibility of phenomena?

In relation to Hume for example, he applauds his consistent phenomenalism, but will not go along with the universal 'disassociation' of ideas. Hume's criticism should have destroyed any 'chimères', not the connectedness of experience. For Renouvier it was the shadow of the absolute yet again, which made Hume search for the connectedness of experience, not in the principles of thought, but in sensory (ie. 'external') experience. Against Hume he is claiming that there can be a form of phenomenalism without atomistic reductionism, whilst with Hume maintaining the empiricist methodology.

However by defining 'phenomenon' by its capacity to appear, Renouvier sharply separates from Kant in this sense. Kant's 'phenomenon' is restricted through its origins in the manifold of sensibility: phenomena through the Transcendental Aesthetic are spatial and temporal. For Renouvier anything in so far as it appears to consciousness is a phenomenon.

"Le mot phénomène, appliquée par Kant aux objets de sens, peut se généraliser et s'étendre aux idées, sentiments au autre modes quelconques d'une représentation en tant que donnée. Bien plus les notions, les jugements soit simples, soit enchainés en raisonnements les assemblages de fait tant interne qu'externes sous les lois dont se forme en nous la pensée, tout cela est phénomène, et n'est que phénomène pourvu que nous l'envisageons sur ce théâtre unique d'une représentation ou il se constate actuellement par la perception et la mémoire".

(C.P., 1878, I, p 371).

This is a decisive stage in the development of phenomenonism. In this way, he paves the way for the possibility of a sociology of knowledge in that concepts, beliefs and actions can all be phenomena.

Representation has a double aspect for Renouvier: the representative (representatif) and the represented (représenté) the latter is what is usually called the object of knowledge and thus pertains to the 'objective' side of knowledge, and applies to all that is called nature of what is sensed or perceived. The former is what is usually called the subject or pertaining to subjectivity. But Renouvier reverses this and calls objective that which pertains to the 'subjective' or representative side and calls subjective that which belongs to the represented. In this he turns back from the Kantian position, to a Cartesian and scholastic approach, for here the represented is the subject and the representative is the object or Being. This reversal of Kant's relations between subjective and objective is in line with Renouvier's principle of relativity where things become objects of knowledge only in relation

to the laws of the understanding; so in terms of dependency the representative establish the conditions to which the represented must conform. And in this he is implicitly accusing Kant of not realising the full implications of his own revolution. (However he says that he would rather avoid the terms objective and subjective as they are not free from metaphysical fictions).

The duality of the nature of representation is essential to his theory. The representative and the represented are correlative functions and never exist without each other.

"La connaissance ne reçoit point de représenté sans représentatif, point de représentatif sans représenté et c'est dans une représentation qu'elle reçoit l'un dans l'autre".

(P.E., 1854, p. 38).

Just as in his demand that we look at phenomena without metaphysical preconceptions there is a similarity to Husserl's 'To the things themselves', so in the above characteristic there is a comparison to 'hesis' and 'noema' as aspect of judgement.

A phenomenon is thus always 'composé', because it consists of two elements, the representative and the represented. Examples of the latter are space, time, matter and movement. And examples of the former are memory, comparison, judgement and reasoning.

"Le plus complexe de tous les phenomenes representatif (est) cette Conscience dont la fonction est de rapporter une representation a un grand nombre d'autres representations agglomerees. (op cit p49)

The act of representation puts the subject and the object into relation with each other:

"Le sujet et l'objet, dans l'acte mentale, sont des termes d'un rapport. C'est ce rapport qui la Conscience ou personnalité, laquelle n'est pas une chose dans le sens habituel du mot chose".¹

The essential correlation of the two poles of representation mean the synthesis of subject and object in representation.

"La synthèse du soi et non soi est la Conscience la personne".

(P.E., p 263).*

Further:

"La Conscience est donc le soi du non-soi et pour ainsi dire l'un de ce multiple un tout".

(P.E., p 263, 1854).

Conscience is tied to the possibility of representation in the sense that it is the union of subject and object, and for representation to be possible the subject and object must be so closely related

"Ils se traduisent réciproquement l'un dans l'autre".

(Op. cit.).

In his theory of phenomenalism, Renouvier claims to refute idealism, materialism and dualism. His theory starts not with the self, but with representations.

"Ils n'existe pour le savoir que des représentations. Je dis des représentations et non mes représentations puisque je ne sais rien de moi ne de mes représentations que par des représentations".

(P.E., 1854, p 94).

* A fuller analysis of Conscience occurs below in Chapter IV.

The self being a synthesis of phenomena is thus not external to representations. Subjective idealism is an illegitimate position because it requires a definition of self as a kind of substance independent of phenomena and preceding them. Equally realism is impossible, for here the object must come first and this is impossible for an object qua 'representé' must always exist relative to a subject qua 'representatif'.*

Through this he attempts to refute what he regards as Kantian dualism, and in this is another crucial amendment to the Kantian theory of knowledge. For Kant,

"There are two sources of knowledge, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding. Through the former objects are given to us: through the latter they are thought".

(C.P.R., A19 B 29).

For Renouvier these two factors are reduced to a single Conscience, which is the common characteristic of representations. Kant defines sensibility by receptivity and understanding by spontaneity. Renouvier says this is erroneous and is based on the fallacious assumption that relations between spatial objects are more sensible

* As Renouvier's thought develops, the action of representation becomes no longer so clearly identified with the phenomenal. In his later philosophy of Personalism, the activity of the 'representatif' becomes more important and relatively more autonomous. And in this sense his theory does not distinguish itself so clearly from subjective idealism.

than other categorial relations Kant should have seen that knowledge is adequately accounted for in terms of Conscience which is a kind of theatre in which representations follow each other without needing an origin in an 'outside'. In other words, the relation of representation to Conscience does not require that any have a particularly sensible origin.

"La séparation des domaines de la sensibilité de l'imagination et de l'entendement est tout a fait fictif, en ce qui ne touche que la nature des concepts".

(A.P., 1896 p 33).

But of course for Kant there is no independent knowledge between these two faculties: knowledge, that is the phenomenal realm, is a synthesis of the data of sensibility and the principles of the understanding. They are unified in the act of knowledge: it is only in philosophical analysis that they are separable. Renouvier's 'flattening' of what counts as knowledge in terms of appearance, shows that philosophical method is a form of description of what appears in consciousness and again this is close to phenomenology. And he clearly adds that philosophy can only record what appears in ordinary experience. Unlike Kant, for whom philosophy begins with commonsense, analysis is not restricted to description of the contents of consciousness.

To deny any distinction between sensibility and understanding is to eradicate the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity. In this he is either conflating intuitive and discursive knowledge or

denying that either have any real significance. But the eradication of this distinction makes a crucial difference to the meaning of the Copernican Revolution. If there is no spontaneity in the manner which understanding produces form, then there is no clear distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. In this philosophy is losing the distinction between the human contribution to experience and the data of sense. And this is crucial to the idea of the Copernican Revolution and for Kant and the idea of the imposition of form on the raw data of sensibility, which otherwise has no form. But in this, it is clear that Renouvier is denying what Hume and Kant assume, that sensible experience is inherently formless and that only the human contribution can provide form. In this again Renouvier identifies himself with the later phenomenology movement.

But is it the task of philosophy to simply describe what is presented in experience without analysis? Conscience appears (to itself) as a mixture of law and experience which are analytically separable which Kant would agree exists at the level of commonsense experience. But it does not follow that there is thus no distinction between the conceptual and the sensible, the discursive and the intuitive. For Renouvier there is no sense in an 'empty' form which precedes experience: but with Kant and against Renouvier it can be argued that if there is nothing which precedes experience in a logical manner, then there is nothing which can be

independent of experience and this is crucial to the role of a priori in the Copernican Revolution.

Dauriac² said that Renouvier has replaced the fetichism of substance by the fetichism of phenomena. He has worked on the concept of the phenomenon to transform its nature to accommodate what was originally attributed to substance. Law, which is itself a phenomenon replaces substance in providing the stability and permanence of reality. Being is a characteristic of the relativity of phenomena.

The definition of phenomenon entails that everything which appears is a phenomenon. The sound of a train passing and Conscience itself have thus the same status as phenomenon. But calling both phenomenon does not solve the problem of the different types of objects of knowledge involved here. In one sense, everything that appears to consciousness is a phenomenon of consciousness: but this does not exhaust either their nature or the real nature of the relationship to consciousness. Conscience is surely the condition of hearing a noise and recognising it, and as such it cannot be a phenomenon in the same sense. But in the logic of his phenomenism there are only phenomena: facts and laws which by 'appearing' become phenomena.

Dauriac says the secret of Neo-Criticisme is that at first sight it must be a Heraclitean flux, whereas it is an organised world. In this he wavers between contingency and rationalism: he only avoids

the extremes of empiricism and hegelianism by refusing to chose between them.

The problem intensifies in relation to the categories: how can one phenomenon regulate and determine another? Because one is an a priori fact, characterised by irreducibility: this is the cornerstone of his theory of categorial relation. If there is no longer any distinction between form and matter, how can there be any sense to the logical priority of the a priori over the a posteriori, which is the essence of the Copernican Revolution? These questions will be tackled in Chapter IV.

Finally it follows that if not everything can be accommodated to the status of phenomenon, it follows not everything can be treated by a method appropriate to phenomena.

Section III. Phenomenalism and Relativism.

The rejection of the noumenon as inconsistent with the principle of relativity entails phenomenalism. It also entails relativism.

Renouvier follows Comte in adopting the maxim that 'all is relative' is the only absolute principle. Comte's method of positivism consisted in substituting the determination of the laws of phenomena for the search for essences and causes.

"La mérite eminent de Comte a été d'enseigner le principe que les philosophes de l'école empiriciste pure, Hume et ses successeurs n'avaient pas su deduire clairement de leur méthode, le principe de relativité. Comte a reconnu la nature exacte de la méthode des sciences expérimentales ... qui consiste essentiellement a substituer à la recherche des essences et des causes la détermination des lois des phénomènes".

(H.S.P.M., p 395).

Renouvier agrees with this method and blames Comte for not taking it far enough.

"On peut dire qu'il ne fut pas trompé par le principe de relativité: mais au contraire qu'il n'en poussa pas assez loin l'application: car il avait évité son erreur si, par le critique de la connaissance et de croyance, il eut été, mis sur la voie de reconnaître la possibilité d'une doctrine générale de savoir qui ne placerait pas ses objets dans l'absolu mais dans l'esprit et dans ses lois"

(H.S.P.M., p 396)

It follows for Renouvier

"Tout est relatif, ce grand mot du scepticisme ce dernier mot de la philosophie de l'ambiguïté est le premier de la méthode et par conséquent de la science dont il trace la voie hors des ombres".

(P.E., 1854, p 50).

But

"La relativité des phénomènes est réglée et permanente et cela même est un phénomène que l'expérience constate autant qu'elle est consultée: un phénomène que l'ensemble de la représentation suppose, car chacun des éléments de la représentation est une relation, c'est à dire un ordre".

(P.E., 1854, p 52).

Law is an ordered relation

"Une loi est un phénomène composé, produit ou reproduit d'une manière constante, et représenté comme un rapport commun des rapports de divers autres phénomènes.

(Op. cit.)

The representative order is a synthesis of laws or 'rapports'. For example, particular acts, feelings or wishes are all 'rapports' and manifest laws ie. constant conjunction of phenomena. Law is a relation of enveloping between phenomena. Phenomena envelope others and laws envelope phenomena and some laws envelope others. So for example will is the total relation of acts of will and memory is a total relation of memories. All however unite under "une loi commune - la Conscience". Conscience is thus:

"Le dernier rapport et dernière loi. Or la conscience est bien le phénomène composé, produit ou reproduit d'une manière constante et représenté comme le rapport commun des phénomènes dans l'homme".

(P.E., op. cit., p 55).

Substance is banished and leaves being (l'etre).

Renouvier distinguishes two sense of the word being:

a relative sense and an absolute sense. The absolute sense

Corresponds to the idea of absolute existence of which the supreme example is substance. Although there does appear to be an absolute sense, being in fact is a sign expressing a relation between phenomena. It is a 'copule'. In determining the relations between phenomena, one is thereby determining being. So to say all is relative for Renouvier is to argue that phenomena are relative to each other, ie. that they are in relation to each other. "L'être est le rapport". This definition of being is in effect a demonstration of the principle of relativity.

So there is no representation which does not offer itself to us as a relation, both to Conscience and internally to other phenomena. Precisely what is wrong with the noumenon or absolute is that it is outside of all relations.

"Tout représentatif aussi bien que tout représenté implique des relations. Si donc nous posons la chose en soi, la substance, n'ont rien de commun avec la représentation et alors ne sont pas ou sont pour nous comme n'étant pas. Si au contraire nous posons des relations dans la chose en soi, ce qui conçoit point, nous ne sommes pourtant plus avancés, car alors ce n'est pas la chose en soi, mais les relations posées que nous connaissons".

(P.E. p38-9 1854).

Renouvier claims that the relativist method is essential to Neo-Criticisme. It is

"La première formule originaire du Neo-Criticisme".

It is central to Renouvier's Copernicanism.

"Toute annonce de vérité pour l'homme est relative à la constitution de l'entendement humaine".

(A.P., 1898, p 2).

Further the idea of relation is central to knowledge for Renouvier. Knowledge is a relation between subject and object: that the object pole is only known in relation to the subject pole constitutes their reciprocal relativity.

"Connaitre n'est que poser des relations".

(A.S.P.M., p 401).

In contrast the method of realism is to think out of all relations: Kant's thinking on the noumenon is an example of this. The failure of all systems of the absolute is that they cannot fail but to establish relationship with the phenomenal. The relativist method on the contrary is the method of reality: that is relations must be represented in some consciousness and in this consists their reality.

There are two senses of relativity that Renouvier uses in characterising the principle of relativity. The first is characterised by dependence, which characterises the Copernican Revolution: the mind dependence of the object of knowledge. The second sense is a form of internal relationism and is more characteristic of Leibniz than Kant. Neither of these in themselves are enough to constitute relativism. Certainly for Kant relativism is not entailed by his revolution: the forms of thought are absolute and universal. Neither would the second sense constitute a relativism were it not that for Renouvier the terms of the relations are not absolutes, but are themselves relations.

"Les termes ne sont intelligible que dans les rapports".¹

And

"Les termes sont eux mêmes données par d'autres rapports".

(Op. cit.).

Analysis of these internal relations does not lead to fixed points or absolutes, but it does discover what Renouvier calls 'premières synthèses' which have as their elements, correlative couples, part-whole, simple-complex. Because the terms only make sense in relation to each other, there is no absolute. So Conscience refers to all other relations and all relations imply it.

But the first sense of relativity does not entail the second sense of internal relationism. Indeed they are contradictory: why if phenomena are only related to each other are they also related to Conscience? It is either a fixed point or it is not. If it is a fixed point of reference then is Renouvier back in the position of admitting an absolute or an essence? If it is only a relation which is constituted through the particular relations of experience, why can he guarantee it is always present? To be truly relative, it is so only in relation to certain phenomena at a certain time/position. He cannot in his own terms establish that it is that which all relations imply. Either Renouvier is floating in a sea of phenomena, which exist relatively to each other or he is berthed beside a fixed point which takes him back to absolutes. He cannot both retain Conscience and the full meaning of the principle of relativity.

It is at this point that the relativism that characterises the later sociology of knowledge enters philosophy. And it is a conceptual mistake. Relativity to consciousness does not entail relativism: indeed for Kant it entails the opposites: the demonstration of the universality and necessity of the principles of the understanding guarantees the objectivity of knowledge. To say that the essence of Kant's revolution is the principle of relativity and to graft a quite different sense of relativity on to it, is to not only take Kant's theory beyond its legitimate bounds, it is also to give it a meaning far in excess of the legitimate critique of substantialism. Kant's forms of thought are not constituted through experience as are Renouvier's relations. As conditions for the possibility of knowledge at all, they are thus the conditions for Renouvier's 'premières synthèses'.

Verneaux² points out that relativism is the essence of Renouvierism and it was his theory which gave birth to the atmosphere of relativism in the 1870s and 1880s under the Third Republic. But inconsistent although he is in this, it is clear that an 'absolute' sense of the relativity of knowledge is not entailed by Renouvier's relativity. For Conscience is that in terms of which all relations are constituted. All relations are relative to Conscience, but other than this their internal relations can change and vary. It is in relation to this that Durkheim can accommodate the differences in content between cultures, but still see all knowledge and value systems as relative to a

Conscience Collective.

In terms of the two definitions of relativity, what is the status of Conscience? It is both that in relation to which phenomenon appear. But in so far as it can appear to itself, it is also a phenomenon. But it is nevertheless a phenomenon which links all other phenomenon; in this it cannot be relative. As the link of all phenomena it is the condition of their relatedness. But how can there be something which is simultaneously a phenomenon and the condition of the connectedness of all other phenomenon?

Section IV. Phenomenalism and A Priorism

Renouvier's phenomenalism must be able to accommodate the a priori; for this is what separates him from Hume and what constitutes the importance of Kant. But what does it look like in his phenomenalism?

Firstly, it cannot as with Kant be an anticipation of experience: there is no sense to this idea for Renouvier. The idea of form and matter together with the distinction between sensibility and understanding are eradicated and all is to be included under representation and its laws. Representation consists of phenomena and laws; but law itself is an ordered phenomenon.

"Une loi est un phénomène composé, produit ou reproduit d'une manière constante"

(P.E., p 54)

One of the functions of the a priori for Kant is to establish the orderliness of experience. But order for Renouvier is a general phenomenon

"Que l'expérience constate autant qu'elle est consultée"

(P.E., op. cit.).

It is not therefore imposed on the data of sensibility: it is a constant conjunction revealed by experience. But in what sense is order a phenomenon? There is no question that for Renouvier that experience is atomistic or unregulated. This is the undesirable consequence of empiricism. In Kantian terms Renouvier's phenomenon must be a conflation then of the intelligible and the sensible. But how? In a phenomenalism,

the intelligible must also be a phenomenon. For Hume, the links of phenomena are not themselves phenomena, but subjective habits imposed on impressions. But for Renouvier these in so far as they appear are also phenomena. So it is still a question of establishing how a phenomenon can establish the orderliness of others.

This raises the question of what the a priori can look like in a philosophy which wants to introduce the principles of Kantianism into the positivist movement. How can he account for the a priori in terms of his phenomenalism? He insists that he is in accord with Kant's notion of the a priori:

"Telle est la différence entre notre école, l'école actuelle de Kant, le criticisme, et l'école actuelle de Hume, L'empirisme. Nous n'admettons pas qu'il soit possible ... d'éviter la reconnaissance a priorique de de certaines lois de la représentation mentale".

(C.P. 1872, I, p 389).

Kant has shown that empiricism rests on a *petitio principii*:

"En un mot, affirme la nature a priorique d'une notion c'est simplement remarquer qu'on ne peut sans *petitio principii*, lui assigner une origine dans l'expérience".

(P.E., p 313).

The importance of the a priori for Renouvier is that it is this which separates his philosophy from the atomism and scepticism of Hume.

In the Premier Essai, the definition of the a priori is that of general phenomenon. Categories as laws are that which 'rule' experience. Renouvier has only retained the Kantian distinction between form and matter in terms of generality and individuality respectively.

Categories rule experience is so far as the general rules the particular. Categories in this sense are first in regard to their generality: as the most general laws of phenomena they are also the highest type of phenomena. But is the generality made up of individuality? If so, then the a priori threatens disintegration into the a posteriori, ie. the orderliness of experience is threatened. No, because categories are irreducible. Categories are irreducible to experience and also to each other.

"La doctrine a prioriste, à la bien comprendre est tout entière dans la these de l'irréductibilité des catégories".

(P.E., p 316).

(Milhaud¹ points out that the irreducibility of 'facts' to each other is entailed precisely through the denial of the thing-in-itself which would blur all such distinctions as substance).

But in what sense is this irreducibility a priority? We can take it as given that the irreducible is not derived from experience (although even this is contentious). But to be positively a priori they must regulate experience. For Kant the form of knowledge is pure: the transcendental conditions do not admit of anything empirical. According to Renouvier such a form of knowledge is substantialist. Here is clear Renouvier's misunderstanding of a transcendental condition, which is central to Kant's notion of the a priori.

In terms of his theory of phenomenalism, the a priori must be related to the représenté and représentatif. If the a priori is associated with the représentatif, in

what sense does this rule over the représenté? Since they are not separable, and are given in all experience simultaneously, there can be no question of the a priori of one over the other. In his later works, the feature of idealism, ie. the autonomy of the 'representatif' comes to the fore and is shown in the category of personality. (But after 1898, his work develops more in a Leibnizian frame than a Kantian).

It follows that for Renouvier the relationship between the a priori and the empirical is a relationship of degrees of abstraction. The categories are not discovered by reflexive analysis back to the conditions of the possibility of experience, but by abstraction from the particular 'données' of experience to the general relations which tie them together. As Verneaux² puts it:

"L'analyse est ainsi non pas reflexive mais abstractive, et l'observation 'positive' du catégories est comme une lecture de l'universel dans le particulier donnée empiriquement".

It follows for Renouvier, as will be clear in Chapter IV that the categories "ne sont pas a deduire".

The difference between Kant and Renouvier is well expressed by Milhaud on this point:

"Pour Kant il s'agit de conditions a priori que l'esprit humaine ... impose à tous les éléments matériels de la connaissance. Cette opposition de l'esprit et des choses n'a plus de sens chez Renouvier, qui ne se trouve plus en présence que des représentations; et les catégories sont seulement les lois générales, auxquelles nous constatons qu'elle sont soumises. Ce sont des faits généraux comparables a ceux que les sciences découvrirent dans les choses, ou bien dans les représentations vue du côté subjectif pour parler comme Renouvier. Si les catégories sont antérieures a l'expérience, c'est logiquement: comme la loi de gravitation universelle conditionne celles de

la chute des corps".

(Op. cit. p. 70-71).

For Verneaux³ the problem with this is that it presents itself as:

"Une véritable théorie de l'abstraction dans une contexte idéaliste".

He argues that it can present itself as a continuation of Kant without the thing-in-itself. For Neo-Criticisme, admitting only phenomena, has no need to trace back to the transcendental conditions of the subject, for the explanation of the possibility of an object, for laws are already integrated into phenomena. Thus Verneaux⁴ says:

"L'a priori glisse ainsi du plan purement transcendantal, ou Kant le suite, à un plan qui n'est pas certes, purement empirique, car ça serait contradictoire, mais que est a mi chemin entre les deux".

Renouvier accuses Kant of a game of concepts in talking of transcendental conditions constituting the object before it appears. Rather for him, the given constitute phenomena and laws. So he can identify the first laws of phenomena with the categories, and to discover them in experience by abstraction. Verneaux says the general is the legitimate substitute for the transcendental. But I dispute this, for the a priori, tied to the transcendental for Kant is characterized by universality and necessity. Renouvier can only thus establish that experience is that it is, not that it is necessarily as it is. The justification of knowledge is no longer a 'quid justii' but a 'quid facti'.

Further the a priori is the repository of human interest for Kant: the interests of reason are tied up with the a priori. If these are conflated with the idea of a general fact, the critical tension with actuality, central to Kant's version of reason, is lost. It can no longer be the yet to be achieved, central to reason in its practical aspect. It must always be realized in reality as presently constituted.

Finally, his anti-Kantianism is demonstrated in this. He says his Neo-Criticisme:

"Est un idéalisme qui ne sépare point des phénomènes, des lois par lesquelles s'opèrent les synthèses".

(H.S.P.M., p 455).

Section V. Renouvier on the distinction between Reason and Understanding

Renouvier claims that it follows from phenomenalism and relativism that Kant's distinction between reason and understanding must be abandoned. Or more precisely the faculty of reason as defined by Kant must be denied. Reason is the faculty of thinking the unconditioned and through its object it is rendered invalid for Renouvier. In this reason is exempt from the sensory conditions imposed on understanding, which although its activity is regulated by the categories, cannot transcend possible experience.

"La resumé de la doctrine kantienne de l'absolu, considérée quant à la méthode, n'est autre chose que le parti-pris métaphysique de n'admettre pas les catégories regulatrice de la connaissance comme faisant loi et forment limite pour la raison, ainsi qu'elles forment limite pour l'entendement".

(A.P., 1896, p 17).

To deny the noumenon, is to invalidate the faculty of reason.

"La question dépend de celle du Principe de Relativité. En admettant ce principe suivant le quel nulle existence n'est concevable autrement que pour une définition de relations on bannit l'Inconditionnée de l'existence pour la meme raison que la connaissance possible... Le distinction arbitraire de l'Entendement et de la Raison, dans la doctrine Kantienne prétend se motiver sur ce que l'Entendement donne a l'expérience ses règles, qui ne sont applicables que dans la sphère de l'expérience possible, au lieu que la Raison, faculte des principes, dépasserait ces limites. Mais la Raison avec le don qu'on lui supposerait de créer des idées absolues ne dépasserait pas seulement l'expérience mais l'intelligence possible".

(D.M.P. 1927, p 39-40).

Reason can thus be no more than understanding, which for

Renouvier means the realm of phenomena regulated by laws.

Renouvier's critique of the faculty of reason predates later commentators. W.H. Walsh said

"Reason seems to be a monster from the start, thought up for unworthy purposes and sustained in existence by little more than a series of sophisms"¹

Kant moves from his position in the Analytic where the intellect is exclusively the understanding and here the intellect blunders into metaphysics by mistake. Whereas in the dialectic Kant moves towards a definition of reason as a faculty having a set of a priori concepts of its own. J. Bennett calls Kants formal setting against metaphysical argument in the First Critique an 'artificial irrelevance' and dismisses the faculty of reason as of no philosophical importance.²

Kant seems to be deceived into thinking that reason:

"Since it contains within itself the source of certain concepts and principles, which it does not borrow either from the senses or from the understanding"

(C.P.R. A 299)

has therefore a logical use and thus a real use. Its principle in logical use is to find the unconditioned, for the conditioned knowledge obtained through understanding, which can give it unity. Walsh argues that because there are conditions, it does not follow that there is some final unconditioned. In this he echoes Renouvier: the idea of the unconditioned is central to pre-Copernican metaphysics.

But it is also characteristic of Copernican metaphysics in the sense that the idea of dependency on the mind entails the idea of that which is independent. Renouvier and Kant part company over this: for Renouvier the idea of forms of knowledge which are logically independent of experience is impossible. There is thus nothing in relation to which knowledge constitutes a unity, in the sense that Kant postulated reason as a goal of unity. Thus relativism is reinforced by his denial of Kant's faculty of reason.

For Kant it is Reason which provides the principles in terms of which the understanding orders the data of sense:

"Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the understanding under principles".

(C.P.R., B 359).

Renouvier, Bennett and Walsh argue that the coherence, intelligibility of experience is in no way threatened if the offending faculty of reason is simply removed. But for Kant this would leave understanding without any capacity of reflecting on itself, or of regulating itself according to higher principles than those operating to keep the senses in order. And without this the human capacity to reason would not just be tied to the data of sense; it would be imprisoned by them. Reason seems to guarantee a capacity to reflect on the rules which engender conceptual order. Without the unconditioned certainly

some support for reason falls away, but not its reflective capacity vis à vis the understanding.

Renouvier follows the implication of his reduction of reason to understanding: there is no principle of unity in terms of which all human knowledge can be coordinated. Most importantly however, is that because there is no reason, there is no conflict between the interests of reason and understanding, which are expressed in the antinomies. The denial of this distinction enables Renouvier to resolve the conflict between freedom and determinism. Further in place of impersonal and universal reason, Renouvier argues that freedom is the basis of knowledge and therefore choice is central, which reinforces the relativism of his outlook. This is dealt with in Part III. And because he makes reason lie in the human being itself Renouvier has affected a further Copernican Revolution of reason, to its roots in the living psychological reality of the humanbeing. Verneaux says:

"Il est la transposition en termes d'entendement ... du problème métaphysique que Kant réservait à la raison. Il est le substitut humain du problème qui ne pouvait être théoriquement résolu dans le système de Kant que par une intuition surhumaine"³

Chapter IV. The System of the Categories

In Chapter III, it was made clear that for Renouvier the problem of science is 'Critique Générale'. Here it will be shown that the task of 'Critique Générale' is to

"Construire le système des rapports généraux des phénomènes".

(.P., p 379)

This is the system of the categories.

Here I extend the analysis of the principle of relativity to the analysis of the categories. And here Renouvier shows how critical idealism can found a science which culminates in a system of categories. Supreme amongst the categories implied by the principle of relativity is Conscience. (Section II).

Lastly I will examine how Renouvier develops the idea of a science of representations with a concrete analysis of the details of human experience. And this is his rebuff to the idea of a Hegelian science. For him this science has necessarily a collective dimension (Section V).

Section I. Transcendental, Empirical Philosophy and
the Categories

Phenomenalism is one aspect of the principle of relativity: a priorism is the other aspect. A priorism separates Renouvier from Hume, who had reduced the constitutive laws of experience to a sort of accidental form under the action of experience. For Renouvier, Kant made sensationalism impossible by showing that empiricism rested on a *petitio principii*: it is incapable of accounting for the form of experience within empiricist principles alone.

Kant had triumphed over Hume in three ways for Renouvier. Firstly by discovering the forms of sensible intuition, space and time. For Renouvier, the Transcendental Aesthetic is the definitive statement of the nature of space and time, as the condition of internal and external experience respectively* . Secondly, in establishing that there are a priori concepts, giving a form for experience. Thirdly, in the discovery of the synthetic a priori judgements; this is one of the great reforming points of the Kantian system, for it points to the categories.

* However, against Kant he claims that they are categories and not forms of intuition: this is consistent with his denial of any distinction between sensibility and understanding. And this paves the way for Durkheim who regarded space and time as categories of society.

"C'est la clef du tout".¹

Kant is:

"Le premier génie catégoriste de l'ère moderne".

(P.E., p 395, 1854).

The construction of the system of the categories is the aim of Copernican science. For Kant, categories are the rules which provide for the classification of experience. These rules as the bearer of the a priori, in the theoretical sense are that which achieves the unification of experience, which is the aim of reason. The Copernican Revolution establishes for Kant that it is the rules immanent in the structure of reason, as understanding, which provide for the coherence and intelligibility of experience. The categories of the understanding are synthetic a priori propositions and the central question of the First Critique, how are synthetic a priori propositions possible, is answered in the discovery of the system of the categories and their transcendental deduction. Establishing them is the goal of Copernican metaphysics, for these are the ground of reality for the subject. However there is a clear distinction between Copernicanism understood as transcendentalism and as naturalism.

For Renouvier, the task of establishing the categories is a work of empirical science, not of transcendental deduction. Further the categories are laws of experience: they do not constitute a

unity. And they can change: it is up to each thinker to develop his/her own system, there is no fixed and absolute system of the fundamental rules of thought for all time. That is, he refutes Kant's absolutist claim for the system of the categories. But in terms of this he denies any validity to a 'deduction' of the categories, associating this with dogmatism. In this he disputes the question of right in the justification for the employment of the categories and substitutes questions of fact. Renouvier thus establishes the relativity of the categories and their factual nature. But in this he establishes Conscience as the categories of categories, and in this, it will be clear that he is not free from the kind of deduction ie. justification he has claimed to deny.

For him, the problem of science is to

"Construire le système des rapports généraux des phénomènes. Les rapports et les lois sont les seuls objets de la connaissance: ils ne sont données que dans la représentation: la représentation elle-même, en tant qu'expérience, elle vérifie et ne donne pas: donc les lois générales de la représentation sont les premiers éléments que l'architecture de la science à mettre en oeuvre et le plan de l'édifice demande résulterait de l'ensemble coordonné de ces rapports généraux que nous appelons des catégories".

(P.E., 1854 p. 379).

Thus for Renouvier:

"Une système de catégories complet, lumineux, si bien agencé que sa propre loi paraît lui serait de preuve ... constituerait une philosophie achevée".

(Op. cit.)

The construction of this 'Science de science' is a 'logique generale'. He claims that:

"Pour la première fois j'ai pu donner un caractère positif à l'étude de l'entendement".

(P.E. 1854, p 192).

Following his phenomenism and relativism the work of establishing the system is neither absolute nor transcendental, but relative and empirical.

Section II. Renouvier's Critique of Kant's Categories

The absolute haunted Kant in his construction of the categories, therefore it is an 'oeuvre manqué' (C.D. de K., p 279).

"La resumé de la doctrine kantienne de l'Absolu, considéré quant à la méthode, n'est autre chose que le parti pris métaphysique de n'admettre pas les catégories regulatrices de la connaissance comme faisant loi et formant limite pour la raison ainsi qu'elle forment limite pour l'entendement"

(A.P., 1896, p 17).

The principle of relativity as the essence of the Copernican Revolution, entails that relation is the basic form of all the categories. Kant should have established the constitutive laws of phenomena without leaving the sphere of relations.

"La catégorie de relation tirée par Kant des espèces de jugement en tant que catégoriques hypothétiques ou disjonctifs est une catégorie qui embrasse toutes les autres, puisque toutes expriment des relations et se distinguent par les genres de relations".

(C.D. de K., p 274).

He claims that his Neo-Criticisme alone can do justice to the nature of the categories:

"Le phénoménisme criticiste, relativiste et a prioriste à la fois, en ce qui touche la nature et l'origine des idées, admet les rapports et les synthèses logiques forment un système de catégorie de raison".

(A.P., 1896, p 66).

It conciliates between scepticism and dogmatism.

Scepticism is the result of the doctrine that experience alone, through constant repetition, gives us the 'rapports' of experience. Dogmatism is the result of pure a priorism, which tends towards a theory of necessary truths as inherent in 'l'esprit' itself. So it is the task of Neo-Criticisme to establish the fundamental relations of understanding. His critique of Kant is that he doesn't take categorial connections as relations. It follows that because he doesn't take relations as the basic categorial form, and therefore that which is common to all, that all the other categories are 'hors de relation'.

For Renouvier, the system of categories is transformed by the introduction of relation because it cannot stay as a simple category:

"Elle y entre comme la forme commune de toutes".

(A.P., 1896, p 18).

This together with phenomenalism is the radical reform by Neo-Criticisme of Kant's Criticisme. The credit for this in France must go to Comte, but ultimately back to Hume and his critique of substance, says Renouvier.

"Le Neo-criticisme a sauvé du naufrage de la métaphysique substantialiste les lois a prioriennes des phénomènes, qu'il a considérée comme des appartenances de la structure mentale".

(A.P., 1896, p 18).

Relativism is not just a theory, but also a method and it brings with it a characteristic procedure in all the categories: the ternary form of

the irreducible laws of knowledge. Renouvier praised Kant for having discovered the ternary form of the category relation and he uses the triad, thesis, antithesis and synthesis to establish the form of relations.

The thesis of relation is distinction: any discrimination of thought is made by distinguishing it from something else. In turn, the antithesis is the identification of one thing to another. The synthesis is a determination of thought, ie. distinction and identification take place under a relation. Relation is thus a correlation of initially opposed terms and thus relation envelopes an opposition. Affirmation and negation are involved in all relations. Is this a contradiction? If so then:

"La science aurait son tombeau dans les catégories"

(P.E., p 273).

With Kant and against Hegel he agrees that contradiction renders science impossible. Having renounced Hegel, he can no longer base science on a contradiction. Renouvier insists that distinction and identification are not contradictory but contraries, which are enveloped by relation. To be contradictory, they must entail contradictory propositions, which they do not. In this Renouvier substituted the logic of correlation for the logic of contradiction. And his originality lay in showing that thesis and anti-thesis only make sense in relation to each other. It follows for Renouvier:

"La constitution des catégories loin d'être incompatible avec le principe de contradiction ne fait que le répéter et le confirmer".

(P.E., p 274).

Relation envelopes contraries to form a unity. So for example the category of quantity is an application of relation in this sense. Representations imply multiplicity and as multiplicity the laws of phenomena are established as a unity or a plurality: these terms are correlative and the synthesis of them is a determined plurality or totality. That relation is the basic form of the categories and that the goal of science is the construction of the categories together demonstrate how syntheses are the first given of science: all the given of representations are syntheses.

"La science n'a qu'un but: c'est de composer distinctement les synthèses obscures de la connaissance".

(P.E., p 275).

Kantian absolutism shows itself in him basing his classification on the logical form of judgement. And in so doing he distances himself from Aristotle, for whom here Renouvier expresses a preference. Indeed Renouvier's system of categories as laws of experience is closer in kind, if not spirit to Aristotle's categories than to the Kantian. The categories of Aristotle are the fundamental relations of reason, not the a priori forms of the understanding which logically precede experience. However, says Renouvier, Aristotle had pointed to the idea of relation, but his failure was not to have demonstrated how his

essences are independent of it. The pivot of his classification is the concrete individual, but this is not a primitive irreducible notion for Renouvier. What constitutes individuality is distinction, an element of relation.

Renouvier is disputing Kant's clue to the discovery of all concepts of the understanding. Scholastic logic per se is a compromise with old metaphysics, but also he argues that since thought is more general than judgement, we are faced in the problem of constructing the system of the categories, with a problem as wide as human thought itself.*

"Son oeuvre est un tableau de l'esprit humaine".

(P.E., p 380).

It is because that they are laws of experience that they apply to judgement.

"Kant a prétendu la déduire d'une énumération des différentes espèces de jugement, au lieu de la poser simplement comme il est juste, a titre de relève des faits (car les lois essentielles constitutivement de l'entendement, sont des véritables faits mentaux) de l'application la plus universelle de l'intelligence aux phénomènes".

(C.D.K., p 273).

* D. Parodi maintained that given his intention, Kant was justified in using scholastic logic. For his method was to take knowledge as given by contemporary science and logic for granted. His critique consists in establishing the possibility of these and not overturning their doctrines. Since he departs from a situation of fact, he accepts traditional logic.¹

But it follows, through Renouvier's phenomenalism and the identification of being with laws of representation, that his version of the categories is closer to Aristotle than Kant. Although Aristotle has a realist theory of knowledge and in this distinguishes himself from a phenomenalist theory of knowledge, he nevertheless was the first to define and classify the irreducible and fundamental 'rapports' of representation. Categories for Aristotle are simultaneously logical and ontological, envelopping all possible objects of knowledge, and they derive from an abstraction of the general from the particular.

"Il résulte de notre étude, que la question des catégories, loin de n'être qu'une branche de la logique ... implique la méthode philosophique dans son entier et dans le plus grand extension".

(A.P., 1896, p 48).

Kant as a result, doesn't see the universal application of the concepts which accompany relation: identification, distinction and determination and places them instead under the category of quality. He thus neglects the real meaning of qualitative relation, which for Renouvier is that of type (espèce) to species (genre). Instead Kant uses the logical and grammatical notion of substance and qualities. Under quality, Kant groups reality, negation and determination and in so doing turns it into an ontology. The category of relation thus borrows terms from realist metaphysics, substance and accident,

causality and dependence. As a result substance whose only real meaning for Renouvier is a kind of relation, is figured as a type of object. Thus he holds the principles of substantiality, causality and community dogmatically and pretends they cannot be demonstrated. In the Analogies of Experience, he says that all phenomena have something permanent (substance) and something changing. And also that everything which begins to exist supposes something which it succeeds according to a rule. From this, he deduces the determination of phenomena according to necessary laws: he says the unity of experience demands it. The table of categories by its construction entails the metaphysical postulate of substance and a type of causality which demands the universal determination of phenomena.

The recognition of relation as the form common to categories thus changes the picture entirely from that of Kant. Kant's categories are these.

Quantity : Unity, Plurality and Totality.

Quality : Reality, Negation, Limitation.

Relation : Inherence, Subsistence

Causality and Dependence

Community.

Modality : Possibility, Impossibility

Existence and Non-existence

Necessity and Contingency.

Renouvier's list changed somewhat throughout his life.

In the Premier Essai of 1854 it was:

Relation, Number, Size (étendu), Duration,
Quality, Becoming, Causality, Finality and
Personality.

In 1896 (A.P. 'La Categories de la Raison et la
Metaphysique de l'Absolu') the list is:

Relation, Personality, Quantity, Quality,
Becoming, Succession, Causality, Finality
and Space.

And for Renouvier the categories are either static
or dynamic; the first four (of the latter list)
are static, whereas the latter four (except for space)
are dynamic.

Central to this list is the category of person-
ality or 'Conscience'; this is the next topic.

Section III. The Category of Conscience

Relation is the 'base and cement' of the edifice of the categories. Relation is the abstract aspect of this. Personality in the category of Conscience is the concrete living aspect of relation.

"Partant de la Relation en général, toutes les catégories aboutissent à cette relation particulière qui est la personnalité".

(P.E., p 262).

The anthropomorphism of his principle of relativity is shown most clearly in the development of Conscience.

"La matière de la connaissance est marqué du sceau du connaître, sous toutes ses formes, c'est à dire modelée sur les lois de la personne en qui seule les représentations sont données".

(P.E., p 262).

Against Kant's formalism and abstraction, he says:

"De tout notion, de tout jugement, de tout objet représente ... on peut demander en qui ils se manifestent".

(P.E., p 262).

As with all categories, Conscience is a synthesis of correlatives: in this case

"Le soi et le non-soi".

The self, however is not a thing, but a kind of boundary

"Une sphère de phénomènes posée comme être, comme acte, comme état ..."

(P.E., p 263).

The 'non-soi' is in contrast:

"L'ensemble indétermini, indéfini, de tous les phénomènes autres ou extérieurs".

(P.E., p 263).

It follows:

"La synthèse du soi et non-soi est la conscience, la personne".

(P.E., p 263).

The self is only a limit: as soon as Conscience tries to turn it into a representation, it becomes a 'non soi' and thus another 'soi' is required.* But soi and non-soi, confirm the logic of correlation, they only make sense in relation to each other: we do not understand self separate from not self. Self corresponds to the representative side of representation, whilst the not self corresponds to the represented.

Conscience encloses ('embrasse') and synthesizes the experience we acquire from all the other categories. And seeing these categories from the point of view of Conscience we get faculties.** As it is the quintessential expression of relation, Conscience distinguishes identifies and determines. It is also imagination, a memory and a judgement. All these faculties establish the function of understanding, which under the conditions of becoming, is thought.

* This is a mixture of Hume and Kant on the self. Kant's 'I' which accompanies all perceptions and Hume's analysis of the inexpressibility of self in impressions.

** Renouvier claims his theory of Conscience replaces the old psychology of faculties in terms of scientific philosophy ie. in terms of law, fact and function.

Conscience itself has a representative aspect and a represented. Understanding, will and feeling are part of the representative aspect. On the represented side we see what counts as the matter of representation or experience.

"Ces phénomènes, sortent du non-soi, se limitent dans le soi, reçoivent l'empreinte dont les lois catégoriques les frappent".

(P.E., p 266).

All experience thus comes to representation under a Conscience.

"L'expérience est aussi un nom de cette Conscience"

(P.E., p 267).

This aspect of Conscience is customarily called sensibility, ie. sensation as coming from 'le non-soi'. In perception, says Renouvier, we find the non-soi in the soi 'as a stranger'. So the association of ideas is constituted within Conscience, when the forms of Conscience succeed each other in a manner to form an experience distinct from external impressions. Categories are empty without sensibility providing the material.

"C'est l'expérience même qui constate que l'expérience est indispensable à la conscience et à ses formes".

(P.E., p 268).

Conscience offers a radical principle of individuality.

"La personne nous offre, réalisée à un degré eminent, le caractère d'individualité que nous avons vu appartenir à ces lois des phénomènes qui portent le nom d'êtres".

(P.E., p 269).

And

"Le principe de distinction impliquée dans les diverses catégories aboutit comme celles-ci à la conscience, et y trouvent un forme définitive, condition de toutes les autres, a notre point de vue".

(P.E., p 269).

From this individuality of Conscience derives its capacity to surpass any deterministic law of phenomena, and its capacity to generate new orders of phenomena.

(This will be developed in Part III.)

"Un ordre nouveau de phénomènes naît de la considération des personnes que le soi place dans le non-soi, comme d'autres soi des semblables. Les rapports entre personnes présentent les causes et les unies dans des synthèses particuliers. C'est là qui paraissent l'obligation, le droit et devoir termes corrélatives, en un mot, la loi de la moralité, d'où procède la loi politique"

(P.E., p 269).

(This will be examined in Part IV).

In 1896 (A.P. "Les Catégories de la Raison et Métaphysique de l'Absolu") Renouvier says that the principle of idealism must be added to the principle of relativity in establishing the categories. This principle is established by reflecting:

"Si la représentation mentale, si la conscience s'évanouissait, tous les objets et le monde disparaîtraient"

(A.P., 1896)

This is a modification from his earlier position of 1854 where his theory of representation constitutes a refutation of subjective idealism. In his later work the representative side centering on Conscience has a greater autonomy from the represented side

and in this he can no longer insist on the equivalent weight of the represented and the representative in knowledge. In this, is he not moving towards a position of absolute idealism that he condemns in Hegel?

The personalism of his later philosophy, although present in his early work is clear in his statement that Conscience is personality, when it is elevated to that degree where it is capable of forming concepts and knowing laws.

"Elle se présente en ce cas comme la catégorie vivante qui est l'assemblage de toutes les catégories, les possède et les applique à la multitude des rapports particuliers qui en sont dépendances".

(A.P. 1896, p 20).

Relation as the basis of the category is the abstract form of Conscience, which is the concrete aspect of relation. Verneaux points out that these do not entail two different systems of categorisation. The categories form a circle for Renouvier. He says in talking of the fundamental laws of thought there is no linear deduction. It is contradictory to demand a rational foundation for a system of the fundamental laws of thought. To attempt to deduce a first principle of knowledge:

"Ca ne serait la rien de moins de tout . démontrer sans tourner dans un cercle et sans commencer ou finir en posant quelque chose d'indémontrable. En effet les catégories sont des lois de la pensée distinctes et irréductibles".

(A.P. 1896, P 3).

Because they are irreducible, it is illogical to look for a further foundation. It is not however contradictory to look for a common element:

"Une loi commune aux lois d'ailleurs propres et mutuellement inassimilables qui les constituent".

(A.P., op. cit.)

Relation is the common form to all categories and Conscience is its living concrete corollary. It closes the circle at the same point that relation opens it.

"La cercle des catégories ouvert par l'être indéterminée, se renfermera au même point, par l'être complètement déterminé, après que les lois fondamentales avait été parcourus".

(P.E., 187).

There is only one principle of the unity of the categories, but two poles of unification, because the principle presents itself under two aspects. Under one it is the type (genre) which makes a unity of the categories because it is contained in all of them. Under the other, it is the theatre which because it contains them all, is also a unity:

"La seule unité de ces concepts est l'entendement lui-même la Conscience".

(A.P., 1896, p 3).

For Renouvier Conscience is thus that which answers the question of the unity of experience which for Kant is established in the transcendental unity of apperception. The unity of consciousness is anterior and posterior to the system of the categories.

Knowledge has a unity because it is a synthesis in relation to the 'I think' which accompanies all representation.

"Otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, that is equivalent to saying that representation would be impossible, or at least nothing to me"

(C.P.R., p 132).

Because it establishes the unity of the manifold in relation to one selfconsciousness

"the principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of knowledge"

(C.P.R. B 135).

The unity of knowledge for Kant belongs to an original unity of consciousness. But for Renouvier this is a 'Moi' which is distinct from representation.

"Il ne consent pourtant à conclure que le moi n'est qu'un pur phénomène: reste donc le pur inconnu".

(C.D.K. p 290).

To relate the unity of knowledge in terms of a self which is not a phenomenon or a law of phenomena, is to return to the absolute.

"Ce qui est sérieux, c'est qu'au delà des phénomènes, c'est à dire au delà des relations, il n'y a de sujet réel imaginable que le sujet unconnaisable, auquel Kant est toujours obligé à recourir, est ce trop d'appeler imaginable, car il ne l'est point et la personne elle-même ne se connaît nullement".

(C.D.K. p 289).

Thus he concludes that Kant's reasoning about the transcendental unity of apperception is

"Un sophisme qui consiste à exiger que dans l'acte de perception (qui logiquement ne peut-être qu'un rapport celui du percevant au perçu) l'entendement qui perçoit, se perçoive lui-même en tant que percevant, ce qui est contradictoire c'est l'oeil qui se voyant dans un miroir demanderait a s'y voir non en tant qu'il est et qu'il peut être vu, mais en tant qu'il voit".

(C.D.K. p 292).

There is thus not an absolute unity of knowledge but only a unity relative to the person.

"Est-ce que la loi de la conscience n'est point une forme de nos jugements tous et toujours relatif a la personne qui juge"?

(P.E. p 398).

But without any unity, how does this theory distinguish itself from empiricism which he recognises guarantees only disassociation of ideas and therefore scepticism? Is Renouvier not, in Kantian terms establishing only an empirical consciousness? Kant says:

"Empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations is itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject".

(C.P.R. B 133).

For Kant

"The unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is not, as regards what is given, necessary and universally valid".

(C.P.R. B 140).

Renouvier's reworking of the transcendental unity of apperception as a law of phenomena which is Conscience (the law of laws, 'un fait irréductible') compromises Kant's a priori precisely in what he wanted to retain from it. That is, its ability to oppose the atomism of empiricism.

"The empirical unity of consciousness, through the association of representations, itself concerns appearance and is wholly contingent".

(C.P.R. B 140).

In other words, Renouvier only retains empirical awareness in Conscience and this is not enough to establish it as providing even any kind of unity for phenomena. For as a phenomenon, how can it guarantee the unity of all other phenomena? It could only establish relations of generality to individuality as laws of experience do. But on what phenomenon is Conscience based? What kind of phenomenon is it? It is not spatial, temporal? It is not simply feeling, intelligence, will, it is all of these and more. Yet it is still a phenomenon? To be a phenomenon it must have some capacity to appear, but for Renouvier it disappears as soon as it is represented. If it is not a phenomenon, it is a law. But laws are composed of phenomena. We do not escape the problem this way.

What validity there is to Renouvier's theory of Conscience is that he has illegitimately annexed the notion of transcendental condition to this law of laws. Thus he is treating it as the condition of the possibility of knowledge. And when he says:

"Les faits d'ordre général ne sont pas à déduire"

we cannot treat this claim quite seriously. He claims against the notion of deduction (ie. justification) of a priori knowledge that he uses observation and fact.

It is clear it is an extremely subtle form of observation that lead him to establish Conscience as the law of laws, and thus the condition of the orderliness of experience. It is for him the final implication of the principle of relativity, that is the rule of a priorism and the rule of phenomenism. And these two are the result of philosophical analysis of what are the principles implied in all thought about reality. He is saying we cannot explain knowledge on any other terms. Hegelianism and empiricism are not adequate. In other words he is saying, Conscience is the condition for the possibility of knowledge. And this is close to a transcendental justification in Kantian terms. He presents this in a naturalistic context, which conceals under observation the argument he is really making.

Conscience thus reconciles reason, sensibility and understanding. In terms of Neo-Criticisism it is that which reconciles the a priori with the a posteriori. It unites the subject and the object pole of representation. As the relation of relations, it is the category which unites all others. But it can only achieve any of the above, if the definition of a priority is sufficient to establish its authority over the possible contingency of experience. Is the thesis of irreducibility sufficient to establish this?

In a philosophy which admits the relation between the general and the particular, via levels of abstraction, does it not threaten with dissolution into individual elements? Why is it not reductive to any of its parts or any other categories? Merely saying that

it is irreducible does not conceal the logic that it might not be. But to achieve any of the qualities of the a priori, to function as it does, must it not have a logical priority over other elements of representation? How is the abstract level a condition for the connectedness of phenomena at the concrete level when by definition the abstract is derived from the concrete? But the thesis of irreducibility only holds if the abstract level is the condition for the possibility of the concrete. Is this an answer to the question of the relationship of the a priori and the a posteriori, or a restatement of the problem?

In his terms to establish the priority of the category of Conscience, he must stress the representative side of the act of knowledge. He does this in his later theory of Personalism. To do this is to tip the balance of the relationship between the represented and the representative which for him constitutes a refutation simultaneously of realism and idealism. In this a conflict between idealism and positivism is clear. For the priority of the representative side cannot coherently be tied to a law which is itself a phenomenon.

In this sense we can understand Dauriac's¹ criticism, that Renouvier faces the dangers of either absolute Hegelianism or absolute empiricism.*

* His pupil and continuator Hamelin develops the principles of Neo-Criticisme, into a far more Hegelian form in "Essai sur les Elements Principaux de la Representation" P.U.F. 1952.

Dauriac says his originality is not to chose, but can he logically avoid the choice?

Finally, Seailles's² remarks are apposite.

Is Conscience really a category like all the others?

"Cette prétendue loi est une théorie, la théorie de l'anthropomorphisme universel, la suppression de la chose, l'affirmation qu'il n'y a que des représentations, par suite qu'il n'y a que des consciences".

Section IV. The Question of Method in Categorical Knowledge and the Problem of Objectivity.

The quality of irreducibility of the categories makes it contradictory to demonstrate them. In terms of the logic of Neo-Criticisme, demonstration is a process of analysis and synthesis. To demonstrate them would be to reduce them to either mere general laws or to one amongst them.

"Les verités de l'ordre le plus générale ne se prouvent pas: elles se verifient".

(P.E., p 192).

Thus Kant's deduction is impossible.

"Les catégories ne sont pas à deduire ... elles sont des faits intellectuels d'ordre général constitutif de l'entendement pour l'établissement des concepts et la règle des relations des objets que nous nous représentons".

(C.D. de K., p 224).

Renouvier clearly identifies deduction, not in its transcendental sense of justification of the possibility of knowledge, but an axiomatic sense of a deduction from a higher principle. Since he has rejected reason as a faculty focussing on the absolute, for him there cannot be a higher principle from which the categories are deduced. The laws of the understanding alone must be a sufficient explanation of phenomena. In rejecting reason, it follows for him that there is no difference between the faculty of principles and the faculty of rules. And further these rules are laws of experience. Principles of knowledge become laws of experience; and laws regulate experience. The justification of knowledge is simply

the observation of this. In this he substitutes the question of fact for the question of right. And in Kantian terms fails to satisfy the central question of the justification of knowledge; which is for Kant to show that we cannot think without the concepts we do have. Pointing out again that we have them is really to repeat the problem.

In rejecting the deduction of the categories, Renouvier is rejecting Kant's advice that induction or experiment can neither establish objectivity in knowledge, nor completeness in the table of the categories:

"When a science is an aggregate brought into existence in a merely experimental manner, such completeness can never be guaranteed by any kind of mere estimate. It is possible only by means of an idea of totality of the a priori knowledge yielded by the understanding: such an idea can furnish an exact classification of the concepts which compose that totality, exhibiting their interconnection in a system".

(C.P.R. A65 - B 90).

So for Renouvier:

"Kant se propose l'impossible en voulant prouver que ses catégories sont les véritables et qu'il n'y a ni plus ni moins qu'il n'en énumère. Il est de l'essence de toute analyse premier d'être vérifiable parce que la répètent et n'être point démontrable autrement".

(P.E., p 208).

From this he concludes that there is no universal system of the categories. Kant is wrong to assume that there is a universal and unchangeable system of categories that is exhaustive.

"Au philosophe qui présente un système de catégories, il ne faut pas demander de démonstration à proprement parler. Son oeuvre est elle un tableau de l'esprit humain ou le produit d'une fantaisie individuelle? Que le juge instruisse, délibère, prononce. Tout homme est juge, tout fait bien constaté est juge".

(P.E., p 192).

Renouvier cannot see how a logician can do other than submit his classification to others for them to verify.

Clearly he is here confusing the claims that are made in the Transcendental Deduction with the claims made in the Metaphysical Deduction. It is in the latter that Kant associates scholastic and Newtonian meanings to the particular categories that Renouvier objects to. And it is here that he gives the categories absolutist claims, in that he associates these meanings of the particular categories as true for all time. But as Körner points out one can distinguish the absolutist claims from transcendental idealism. This is compatible with "pluralistic assumption of alternative and even changeable systems of a priori concepts and judgements".¹ And to deny the absolutist claim made for any particular set of categories is not per se to deny that there are in any knowledge whatsoever, principles in terms of which it is made coherent. And thus relativism is not entailed: it is not up to the individual to chose.*

* Clearly Durkheim does not think it is up to the individual to choose. And in this he retains a position of cultural relativism. Each society establishes the categories for the individuals of that society. In this he mediates between Kantian absolutism and Renouvier's relativism by maintaining the social and historical difference of categories and the internal 'absolutism' of each categorial system for the society in question.

For Kant, knowledge as revealed in science, for example, has objectivity because he has established that the categories are the universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge. The Transcendental Deduction establishes that we cannot think without them. They are the necessary presuppositions of any coherent and intelligible experience. But Renouvier is simply annexing the notion of a transcendental condition to 'faits premiers' or 'irreducible' law eschews the whole idea of the justification of the notion of objectivity in the sense of conceptual necessity. If something is a law which governs experience, then it has objectivity within the Comtean tradition. But in no sense has he answered the question - how can we think without the categories? He assumes that we can't, for he agrees with Kant that experience without rules of classification is incoherent and divided. But his analysis does not demonstrate how or why this is so. In this sense he is annexing the transcendental condition to law, turning principle of understanding to law of experience, and is thereby illegitimately and covertly assimilating Kant's justification for objectivity. But he gives it a positivistic guise.

For Kant, the categories as providing the grounds of the possibility of experience, entails that they are of a logically different order from experience. If they are not, they cannot fulfill their function of guaranteeing objectivity. I have argued that the question of relating the a priori to the a posteriori is

particularly problematic when the notion of transcendental condition is not understood. Particularly when all must be phenomena what can guarantee this logical independence? Law for Renouvier is not logically independent of phenomenon. But it is clear that reference to law alone does not guarantee per se the objectivity of that law. For although we establish by reference to the law of gravitation that the apple must fall to the ground, we cannot justify the notion of a scientific law as a condition for explaining spatio-temporal events, by reference to any particular scientific law, of whatever degree of abstraction.

Kant's question, how is science possible, is not even answerable within terms of Renouvier's phenomenalism. But only if this question, that is, the transcendental question, is answered can the notion of the a priori as the condition of the possibility of experience make any sense. And it is clear that in Conscience he uses the a priori in this sense.

He can no longer say with Kant:

"Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances and therefore to nature, the sum of appearances".

(C.P.R., B 163).

This is the essence of the Copernican Revolution for Kant. In so far as the a priori is irreducible fact, in Neo-Criticisme, how can it control and contain the possibly relative and contingent nature of phenomenal experience?

The answer in Neo-Criticisme is really only found in a metaphor. He develops a personalist theory of knowledge in Conscience - as a personality. It is a subject which fuses experience into a whole. (The unity of apperception and the synthesis of knowledge appear under this guise). But as Conscience is itself a law, how can it be a theatre in which phenomena appear?

How does Renouvier answer Kant's statement:

"There are only two ways in which we can account for a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make experience possible".

(C.P.R. B 174).

In a sense Renouvier doesn't have to answer this question: the phenomenon blurs concepts and experience. But precisely because of this he can no longer see concepts as conditions of the possibility of experience. It has already been pointed out that he has eradicated the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity - and thus there is no autonomy left for the understanding.

Renouvier's theory of the categories falls apart under the concepts of necessity and contingency. Either they are necessary or they are contingent. They cannot be contingent because then they are not conditions of experience. But if they are necessary, then it follows firstly that it is not up to each individual to chose the categories. Does s/he have the choice not to choose? And if they are necessary they must precede experience as its logical condition. But by

hypothesis in his phenomenism, there is nothing anterior to phenomena. Conversely if the categories are phenomena themselves, by what right do they have any kind of logical anteriority to experience? As phenomena, their universality can be no more than generality, which results from induction. And how does induction confer more necessity than experience already contains, which according to Kant and Renouvier is none? (That is experience without the categories). But this process of induction presupposes precisely what should be explained - a synthetic a priori synthesis, which is the proper foundation of a category.

Does Neo-Criticisme conciliate a priori and a posteriori, necessity and contingency? That is, does he conciliate Hume and Kant, as he intended? All of the above seems to point to a return to Hume and thus rather than conciliating, is a return to contingency. And through this he seems to reverse the Copernican Revolution: phenomenism blurs principles and experience, so that the principles of philosophy figure alongside the laws of science. So for example the category of cause must figure alongside the phenomena it must regulate. The aim of the Copernican Revolution, to explain science in terms of the structure of human reason, falls for the principles of the understanding are no more than the laws of science themselves.

Renouvier has repudiated the Kantian universalism of the categories and against Kant he has claimed that the method by which they must be discovered is the same as the method of the sciences. He has established that categories are relations and that as systems of categories are not fixed and it is up to people to choose them, he has brought the idea of categories and persons very close. From this line of reasoning he poses a question that we can see Durkheim's sociology of knowledge answering.

"Le principe de relativité ... pose immédiatement au relativiste le problème de chercher la source et la nature des relations et de les définir pour la connaissance le plus général possible à obtenir de l'esprit ou du monde".

(A.P. 1896 p 49).

The conception of society as the source of relations or principle of relatedness in Durkheim's hands can be seen to answer the question within terms of Neo-Criticisme. But further Neo-Criticisme comes very close to sociology in this sense. Although says Renouvier 'Conscience gives 'un fond réel' for the categories:

"On pourrait les prendre sous un autre aspect, considérer les grandes données empiriques de l'être vivant et sensible et, et chercher à dégager les concepts impliqués dans les conditions de son expérience à mesure qu'il exerce ses fonctions naturelles fondamentales".

(Op. cit., p 43).

Section V. Conscience and Plurality: the collective dimension.

In Renouvier's Premier Essai, we have seen that for him the critique of knowledge establishes that the content of knowledge is phenomena, their general relations are laws and the categories are the most general of laws. This in his way, corresponds to Kant's Transcendental Analytic. Like Kant, it establishes that 'Science' (philosophy) is not metaphysical in the ontological sense ie. of the in itself, but is Copernican in the sense that it limits itself to laws of understanding and phenomena as relative to these. He has denied Kant's faculty of reason as that which focusses on the absolute. In this sense Renouvier has cut away the whole of the Transcendental Dialectic since there is no reason, it cannot fall into antinomies. It also for Kant establishes the ideal of a total synthesis of knowledge. But in cutting away reason, Renouvier does not think he has thereby obliterated the problem of the total synthesis.

His critique of the concept of the total synthesis is really an attack on Hegelian metaphysics, but in so doing he substitutes for the total synthesis, a primitive plurality of Consciences as necessarily implied by his theory of knowledge. That is, the question Renouvier feels he must deal with is this.* If

* Although the analysis takes eight pages in 'Premier Essai' - a very short substitute for the Transcendental Dialectic!

metaphysics is not of the in-itself, could it still not cover the total synthesis of phenomena? That is for Renouvier, if reason is not separate from the totality of the categories, could there not be a total synthesis of these which is the object of science?

He has established that science concerns representations, and that the aim of the particular sciences is the constitution of the syntheses of phenomena. These representations are relative to a Conscience. Thus:

"Le monde est la synthèse des phénomènes objets d'une expérience possible sous une conscience quelconque".

(P.E., p 276).

That is knowledge of the world for the particular sciences is the construction of particular syntheses which establish partial views of the world. Cannot there be one science, which is the construction of a single universal synthesis?

This must for Renouvier, logically take place under the categories, and the most obvious category is that of Conscience. Can the category of Conscience enclose completely the totality of phenomena ie. the world, as the object of metaphysics? Can Conscience establish a total science, in other words? Can Conscience enclose the law of universality and compose all past, present and future phenomena?

Renouvier says no. Because firstly, the total synthesis of phenomena bypasses any possible experience and secondly it is unthinkable in terms of any category. The principle of phenomenalism and the principle of a priorism together prohibit it, for it goes against the restriction of reason to experience and the relativity of the known world to consciousness.

Firstly he has established that to know a world we must establish a relation to it. The total synthesis of phenomena must include all possible relations. Since knowledge consists in relating something to something else, it follows to be known, all relations which constitute the world must be limited, in order to be known. But the total synthesis, by definition cannot be limited. If we know it by definition it is related to us and therefore not the total synthesis. The total synthesis by definition cannot be related to something outside itself. If we cannot relate it to us, we cannot know it. If we do not relate it to us, it follows it is not total. The law of number prohibits a first term which is preceded by nothing.

Secondly it follows for Renouvier that the notion of a world and the notion of a Conscience are identified:

"Sans conscience, la représentation est inintelligible; je ne dis pas sans ma conscience, mais bien sans les fonctions semblables que ma conscience envisage dans le non-soi, et puisque le monde est un ensemble de représentations, il est donc un ensemble de consciences".

To imagine a total synthesis under the category of Conscience, we would have to imagine a Conscience made large enough to include all past, present and future phenomena. But it could never establish that no phenomena had not escaped it. Secondly it would entail a 'soi-total' and this would mean that all distinctions between self and not self, essential to representation, all categorial relations and thus to representation, would collapse and with it the possibility of knowledge. That is, if Conscience is the world qua total synthesis then it follows that it is identical to the world. It ceases to have the features of Conscience because the opposition between self and not-self disappear.

He concludes that there can be no single Conscience in relation to which the world exists. He insists that although there is no evidence, he adopts the hypothesis of the primitive plurality of Consciences as more conforming to the requirements of logic and experience. But we can say nothing about their nature, relations, actions etc. As Seailles¹ said:

"On substitue de cette manière l'unité multiple, le tout à l'un pur idole des métaphysiciens".

That is Conscience implies a relation between soi and non-soi, and therefore a multiplicity as a given fact of experience. Through the principle of relativity and Conscience, we are led to establish

"Au point du départ des choses, une pluralité de consciences"²

It follows that for Renouvier, since the total synthesis is inaccessible, that metaphysics concerns the details of examining Consciences and their representations. And since there must be a collectivity of Consciences to constitute a world, it follows that there can be a science of collective representations. And that this answers the needs of post-Copernican metaphysics.

But compared to the absolute of Hegelian metaphysics, this concerns itself with 'Synthèses partielles'. But a science of collective representations will be superior to the particular sciences, not in its universality, but in its generality. Because it contains them all under a certain point of view.

"Ce centre même des représentations en tant que relative à l'homme: la conscience de l'homme".³

And we can now see that the human being, through the hypothesis of the primitive plurality must also be understood in the collective dimension.

It follows also against Hegelian metaphysics that the method of this science must be concrete as opposed to abstract or formal. To examine the system of categories formally is only to look at the skeleton for Renouvier. Hegelian formalism is only to construct an artificial and illusory system. Against it, Renouvier argues the necessity of

examining the concrete details of the living categories.

For Hegel on the other hand:

"La question ne fut pas pour lui de tracer des lois dont l'expérience seule donné la matière et le contenu, mais bien de dérouler le tableau de l'expérience elle même, les moments et les phases du monde et tous les êtres possible, par la simple exposition de la chaîne évolutoire des idées dans la connaissance".

(P.E. p 222).

It follows for Renouvier that post-Copernican metaphysics consists in examining reason as instantiated in experience. To do otherwise is to go against the critical intention itself. Post-Copernican metaphysics thus results in a concrete examination of experience to see the living aspects of the world according to a plurality of Consciences.

"C'est du contenu de l'expérience, de ce contenu de la représentation au moins possible, ou s'étendent ses formes régulatrices, mais qu'elles ne constituent point, c'est du monde que je dois m'occuper maintenant".

(P.E., p 7-8).

Durkheim's concrete examination of the details of collective representation and the laws of social being are not the opposite of metaphysical speculation, rather it is in the tradition of post-Copernican metaphysics. In so far as sociology examines the categories it examines the a priori. In so far as it examines them concretely as lived, and formulated in communities, it follows the critical intention

of restricting reason to experience. In this, Durkheim's sociology is the inheritor (within the tradition of naturalism) of the two basic principles of Kant's Copernican Revolution.



Part IIIFrom the Contradictions of Reason to Normative Sociology

In Part II, the philosophical presuppositions of sociology as a science of representations were explained. However, for Durkheim, sociology was primarily a normative discipline. It was concerned with fostering moral renewal and development in the tradition of French social thought which saw philosophy's main justification as the search for principles of social justice and stability. For Durkheim, the significance of sociology as a normative discipline was heightened by the problem of social integration under the Third Republic. Normative sociology is an aspect of normative science. This part examines how a normative science can be developed in the context of post-Kantian philosophy.

For Kant, the idea of a normative science is contradictory. Science for Kant is explained by theoretical reason and has the principle of causality as its expression. The principle of causality is interpreted by Kant specifying determinism in the events which it explains. The objectivity of scientific explanation consists in its uncovering necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the events to be explained. These conditions on the Kantian model precede and determine the subsequent phenomena. On the other hand, normative issues are the province of practical reason, which is based on freedom. Science implies determinism; morality implies freedom. A normative science is thus a contradiction

for Kant, if taken to mean the addition of science as interpreted by the first critique and values, the realm of freedom, as interpreted by the Second Critique^{*}; that is, a science which covers both explanation and prescription within the one perspective would be a contradiction in terms. Kant recognises the contradiction between his two critiques and, thus, the contradiction between the interests of science and morality and expresses this in the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason.¹ Here he attempts to solve the antinomy by the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Science and the search for objective explanation are limited to phenomena. (In this Kant can be seen as answering the question about the limits of scientific explanation). Moral questions are relegated to the noumenal sphere; science and morality are contradictory if taken as referring to the same action from the same perspectives. But the distinction between phenomena and noumena 'solves' this contradiction by pointing to two distinct ineradicable and incompatible perspectives on human action. The antinomy between science and morals is 'solved' by the highly problematic distinction between phenomena and noumena. The antinomy between science and morality expresses the conflict between pure and practical reason. It entails a split between fact and value and spells disaster for the idea of a normative science as a unified account of human action and value.

* I recognise, of course, that an axiological science can be based on the notion of practical reason. (Indeed, this is close to what subsequently Renouvier develops) where science is the determination of principles of action, rather than knowledge.

Durkheim has no doubts about sociology's role in fostering moral consensus and sees this as not incompatible with its status as a science:

"It is from reason alone, that is to say from science, that the means of re-making the moral reorganisation of the country are expected".

(S.F., p. 11)

He has no apparent problems in connecting science and ethics: indeed, sociology is the subject which achieves both an explanation of the causes of action and in fostering moral renewal.

"Reason thus understood is science, the science of morality".

(E.M.F., p. 67)

Further, it is clear that, for him, there is no sharp split between fact and value.

"There is not one way of thinking and judging for dealing with existence and another for estimating value".

(V.J.J.R., p. 95)

And against Kant he says:

"It is not at all true that between science on the one hand, and morals and religion on the other hand, there exists the sort of antinomy which has so frequently been admitted - for the two forms of activity really come from one and the same source".

(E.F., p. 445)

The transformations in the Kantian system that allowed Durkheim to make such claims, is the subject of this part. It is clear that science for Durkheim does not mean a science of theoretical reason in the Kantian sense - of uncovering causal determinism. As a normative science it is concerned to uncover the causes of action:

but it is also concerned to foster change by encouraging different types of action in society. It is a science which fosters moral renewal. Thus, it cannot simply be a science of facts, it must also be a science of will. And it is not a deterministic science because it is predicated on the possibility of changing and altering patterns of human phenomena. To foster moral renewal is to encourage people to act differently and to do this is to engage with their wills in a certain way. It is thus a science of will. In the post-Kantian tradition this is a science of practical reason.

Sociology as a science of practical reason is not based on the antithesis between will as practical reason and cause as understood by theoretical determinism. Rather it connects them. In understanding the causes of action, it is also uncovering the conditions of will. It is thus a science for which explanation and evaluation have the same root. I suggest that cause and will are connected for Durkheim through the conception of force. This is essential to Durkheim's definition of society:

"Society is a system of active forces".

(E.F., p. 447)

"Society is a collective force (it) is the most powerful combination of physical and moral forces of which nature offers us an example".

(E.F., p. 447)

And furthermore, the concept of force is essential to the definition of causality for Durkheim. The concept of causality, he says, is modelled on the collective force.

"It is the collective force which is the prototype of the concept of an efficient force - an essential element in the category of causality".

(E.F., p. 440)

It will be clear later that force is a result of Renouvier's critique of Kant's definition of causality.

Durkheim says:

"The first thing which is implied in the notion of the causal relation is the idea of efficacy... of active force... The cause is the force before it has shown the power which is in it".

(E.F., p. 363)

Force has a social origin and therefore so does causality.

"This constraining and necessitating action, which escapes us when coming from an external object, is readily perceptible here because everything is in us"

(E.P., p. 365)

Force is thus a conception of productive causality, that unites with the conception of will and is thus a causality compatible with the idea of the human science. Renouvier defined causality in contradistinction to Kant, by the concept of force which connects act and power (puissance

"La force, indépendamment de l'expérience, nous modelons le rapport de causalité de tous les phénomènes extérieurs enchaîné dans le devenir".

(P.E., p 222)

It is clear that in the post-Kantian tradition for cause and will to be identified, ie. for a science of practical reason to be developed, there must be a critique of the determinism in Kant's account, a re-working of the meaning of causality and the unification of pure and

practical reason: Renouvier undertakes these. The critique of necessity understood as causal determinism governing the phenomenal series is crucial to the development of a human science in the following senses. Firstly, for Kant, there is a radical split between phenomenal reality, governed by causality which is the realm of science and will which is the condition of morality, as based on freedom. On the Kantian model, will cannot intervene in the phenomenal series at all. Renouvier was faced with the problem of how action is possible on the Kantian model. It is impossible for will belongs to the noumenal sphere, whilst experience, and therefore the conditions of action (space, time and the laws of experience) belong to the phenomenal. The science of action theoretically is only possible if action is possible philosophically.

Secondly, a science of practical reason is only possible if will is available to scientific method, which, as noumenal, it is not. Renouvier has a theory of consciousness (the automotivité of consciousness) which attempts to make will coextensive with the laws of representation and thereby available to empirical analysis and description. For Renouvier this is to make noumenal interest compatible with the rule of phenomenalism.

Thirdly, for this science of practical reason to be able to foster a new moral consensus, the human will must be able to establish new series of phenomena, that is, new realities. This means that the human world must be somehow underdetermined in contrast to the natural world.

And, lastly and most importantly, only if will can intervene and change the phenomenal series is there the possibility of a science of practical reason. On the Kantian model, how there is any normative intervention in the phenomenal series is highly problematic. It will be clear in what follows that Renouvier identifies will and cause and thus is able to see will as intervening in the phenomenal series and as establishing new series of phenomena.

So it will be clear that for any science based on Renouvierism, explanation and evaluation have the same root: the human will is the foundation of causality. Causal explanation uncovers will as condition of action. Will is the basis of practical reason. Thus, if will is the basis of representation and value, then it is through will that fact and value are connected. So it is through will that the reconciliation of pure and practical reason is effected. This is what Renouvier undertakes to do.

He is able to do this through the conception of science that was developed in Part II. Science is a science of representations and their laws. The Principle of Relativity shows that representations are relative to Conscience, which is the most important of the laws of representation. Thus, Part II points to a science of Conscience, which, if it reveals will as the centre of Conscience, can reveal a science of practical reason.

To uncover will as the heart of conscience entails a critique of necessity understood as causal determinism, in the Kantian system. And it entails a critique of the

separation of laws of reality and laws of will that exists in the Kantian system, that was outlined as central to Renouvier's critique of Kantianism in Part I. It is the theme of this part of the thesis.

To criticise the Kantian notion of theoretical necessity is to establish a conception of causality without determinism. For Kant, causality and determinism are interconnected. Renouvier undertakes the critique of determinism without rejecting the idea of necessity as central to human experience. Renouvier and Durkheim accept the Kantian point that experience is governed by necessity and in this consists its certainty for the knower. It is central to the order of experience. But what necessity can it be if it is not the necessity of causal determinism? Durkheim says the necessity of the categories is:

"A special kind of moral necessity which is to the intellectual life what moral obligation is to the will".*

(E.F., p. 18)

(It was this remark of Durkheim's that was the impetus behind the research for this part).

The necessity of the categories as a moral necessity in the Kantian tradition? It will be clear in what follows that for Renouvier the critique of necessity understood as causal determinism leads to a critique of necessity understood as a form of intellectual necessity of conceptual control. That is, for him, the critique of determinism leads to a definition of will as the primary function of consciousness. In turn, this leads to the idea of freedom as the condition of knowledge, since will

* "They (collective representations) have within themselves a sort of force or moral ascendancy, in virtue of which they impose themselves upon individual minds"

(E.F., p 437)

is defined by Renouvier in the Kantian sense as practical reason. Knowledge is thus determined by practical reason, which in the Kantian sense, carries moral necessity as moral obligation. That is, for Renouvier, there is no intellectual necessity to knowledge, only practical necessity: it is this which governs the order of human experience. In this we find an explanation for Durkheim's statement:

"The imperatives of thought are probably only another side of the imperatives of action".

(E.F., p. 369)

(It will be seen in Part IV that Durkheim develops this conception of the necessity central to experience in the concept of sanction).

In pursuing Renouvier's critique of the intellectual sense of necessity in the Kantian system in Renouvier's "Deuxième Essai de Critique Générale" (1858) (which is the text for the subsequent chapters), I came across the central concept of Durkheim's sociology, the Conscience Collective. It developed out of Renouvier's critique of Kantian intellectualism. Although it does not strictly follow the critique of determinism, it arises out of the critique of the necessity (of Kant's First Critique) as a factor in knowledge: Renouvier annexes this critique of necessity understood as causal determinism. To follow his argument I am bound to place it in Part III.

So, I will examine Renouvier's critique of necessity in the Kantian system, firstly understood as causal determinism and, secondly, as universal and necessary truths established by pure reason. In Chapter I, Section I,

I examine how this is established through the central role of the category of causality in the Copernican Revolution in epistemology of Kant. It is central to the idea of objective scientific explanation. But its interpretation is deterministic. And, in Section II, I examine how this determinism forces a contradiction within reason in its theoretical and practical aspects. This contradiction is the source of the greatest anxiety amongst the post-Kantians; the reconciliation of it is seen as the task of some, whilst the reinforcement of it is seen as the task of others. Despite his antipathy to him, Renouvier, like Hegel, saw the reconciliation of the two reasons divided in the Kantian system, as the major task of his philosophy. This is in marked contrast to the German neo-Kantians who preceded Max Weber, who saw the split as the condition both of the objectivity of science and the autonomy of value-judgement. French Neo-Kantianism, represented in Renouvier as its most articulate and authoritative voice, insists on the union of theoretical and practical reason and only thus is there firstly an understanding of human action, and, secondly, the possibility of science. Renouvier, like Marx, insists on the union of theoretical and practical reason as a condition of action and theory, but, unlike Marx, insists on the primacy of practical reason understood in the Kantian sense as a form of moral necessity based on freedom.

In Chapter II, Section I, I examine Renouvier's analysis of the split between the reasons in Kant. In Section II, I examine his critique of the Kantian antinomy: his analysis of the conflict within reason is an extension

of this critique of the distinction between reason and understanding, which I examine in Part II. In Section III, his reworking of the concept of causality is seen as an extension of his critique of determinism. Like Kant, he insists it is basic to science, but, unlike Kant, he excludes determinism as inconsistent with Copernicanism (ie. the relativity of the known world to laws of Conscience). Here the influence of Hume and Schopenhauer can be seen in his criticisms of Kant. Against Kant, he argues that since we only understand through Conscience, it follows that the paradigm of causality itself is human force, which is will.

Section IV concerns the question of how, if will can intercept a causal series, can there be any necessity in experience. The centrality of will entails that there can be many series of phenomena. To allow will to intervene in the phenomenal order, against Kant, Renouvier establishes that there is a degree of contingency in experience. It follows necessity can no longer be understood as absolute causal determinism. But experience is not essentially contingent for Renouvier: this would be to return to the scepticism of Hume and pure empiricism. Experience carries the necessitation of will understood as practical reason. So, if will can establish new orders of phenomena, and moral necessity governs will, it follows that moral necessity governs new forms of the human world.

The critique of necessity understood as determinism is completed in Chapter III, where I outline the centrality of voluntarism to his theory of consciousness (Section I).

As consciousness qua representation for Renouvier equals the laws of representation, it follows that freedom is the supreme human law. Following Kant, Renouvier defines freedom as practical reason. And, in freedom, Renouvier says , we find the real source of the unconditioned: the false philosophical search for the unconditioned in substance is resolved by its discovery at the centre of the human being . (Section II)

How is this freedom discovered and is it real? In Section III, I discuss how, for Renouvier, determinism is contradictory and freedom can only be established by freedom itself and not as a necessary proposition. Freedom as the condition of knowledge, is also the condition of science.

The critique of Kantian necessity, as understood in the second sense, is taken up in Chapter IV, where Renouvier's criticism of Kant's intellectualism and the notion of necessity as central to knowledge is examined in Section I. It follows that, for Renouvier, if there is neither universal nor necessary knowledge, then truth is affirmed by each person as a matter of practical necessity (Section II). And, lastly, in Section III, I examine how Renouvier develops the notion of a Conscience Collective as a social criterion of agreement between Consciences, as a corrective to the isolation of establishing truth as a matter of freedom.

Thus this chapter gives a new perspective on what sociology as a science looks like for Durkheim. It is

not a science of determinism in the theoretical sense: it is a science of practical reason. And it can be a science of practical reason, because, for Renouvier, following Kant, will is practical reason. And he has identified will with representation, that is, the basic laws of experience. And it is as a science of practical reason, that sociology has a uniquely authoritative voice for Durkheim. It follows for Renouvier that since reality is not discovered as a determinism, it is affirmed by will governed by practical, ie. moral necessity. Therefore, to understand reality, for Durkheim, is to see how reality is affirmed by communities. And in cases of damaged, industrial communities, sociology as the voice of practical reason can encourage communities to affirm new moral realities for themselves. Its task is thus to foster moral consensus. This view of science is based on Renouvier's idea that science is grounded, just as knowledge is, in freedom. This, in turn, allows a science of freedom and of its conditions and how to achieve it. And, for Durkheim, following Kant, this freedom can only be moral: to which Durkheim adds the collective dimension as the condition of its possibility even at the individual level.

So it is clear that the Conscience Collective, which is author of social reality, as collectively affirmed, is also that which can change it. It is the bearer of practical reason in the collective sense. Sociology is the articulation of this collective reality and is thus the voice and the co-ordinator of practical reason. In this is made clear the moral, indeed, emotional significance of

sociology for Durkheim, for, as a science of the Conscience Collective it can regenerate social renewal by supporting what is immanent in the collectivity. It points to laws of practical reason and, in uncovering them, it simultaneously encourages them (it is clear that for Durkheim, like Kant, the task of theory is not to subvert or totally revolutionise human reality: it is to render explicit what is implicit in human reality). The laws of practical reason for Renouvier are rational faith, and it is clear that Durkheim's sociology demands a rational faith on the part of social agents for moral consensus to occur. Against Kant, thus for Durkheim, the laws of conscience are not incompatible with moral interest, because the laws of conscience are not only of the same order as laws of morality; but following Kant of the Second Critique and the 'primacy of practical reason', practical reason is the precondition of reason understood in the theoretical sense. That is, certainty, the foundation of knowledge and, therefore, of the categories, is based on free will, which is the condition of morality. Morality and knowledge have the same condition for Renouvier and also for Durkheim, and in this consists the possibility of normative science.

Chapter I The Copernican Revolution and the Conflict of Reason

In this chapter, I explain how the Copernican Revolution in epistemology contains determinism as involved in the principle of causality. This entails a conflict between theoretical and practical aspects of reason. A conflict at the centre of reason raises questions about the viability of the Copernican Revolution. It is only by departing from his critical intention that Kant 'solves' the Third Antimony of Pure Reason.

Section IThe Copernican Revolution and the Principle of Causality

In the Copernican Revolution in epistemology Kant had established that knowledge was possible because the data of sensibility is controlled by the categories of the understanding. We cannot think this data without the conceptual forms supplied by the categories. Experience for Kant is phenomenal and is the union of the data of sensibility and categories; there is no experience without categorial imposition. They are the guarantors of order and intelligibility in knowledge. Most importantly, however, the task of the Critique of Pure Reason is to show how science is possible. Kant shows this in the Copernican sense that if we cannot have experience without reason, then neither can we have science without reason. Human reason is the condition of the possibility of science. Kant shows this in the Transcendental Deduction of the categories. Science is possible because the a posteriori is dependent on the a priori: this is the revolution in perspectives which carries as much for science as common-sense. Science is an application of reason to experience, and although the supreme example of it, is still an expression of human reason. In the Transcendental Deduction he has answered his transcendental question: "How is science possible"? with the transcendental deduction of the categories:¹ we cannot think without them. In this, Kant has fulfilled his Copernican intention, in its theoretical aspect and has simultaneously justified science and philosophy as that which explains the possibility of science.

The category which most closely relates to science is that of causality. It is the category on which the order and intelligibility of the known world hangs and, thus, that on which the possibility of scientific explanation rests. It is supreme amongst the categories in terms of the epistemological weight it must bear, for both the possibility of science and the coherence of experience rely on it. The Transcendental Deduction demonstrates the conceptual requirements involved in ordered experience. In the Metaphysical Deduction, he gives the categories a particular definition. The meaning of causality is permeated with assumptions taken from Newtonian science and this gives it a mechanistic, deterministic interpretation. It is in relation to this that subsequent critiques of Kant's treatment of causality, including Renouvier's, are developed.

The problem of causality is the crucial test of Kant's critical philosophy: in relation to it alone is worked out the central argument about the objectivity and necessity involved in the conception of reality:

"The relation of cause to effect is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgements in respect of the series of perceptions, and so of their empirical truth: that is to say, it is the condition of experience".

(C.P.R. B 247, A 202).

Here Kant demonstrated his success over his predecessors. In terms of philosophy up to Kant, the principle of causality could not be regarded as self-evident, yet it was indispensable to science. The

rationalists tried to prove the necessity of it, despite the problems of its opposite not being contradictory, and the particular causal laws of nature not being a priori. The empiricists suffered from the difficulty of trying to establish universal and necessary propositions from experiential particulars. Nevertheless, Kant's definition of causality as having a synthetic a priori status retains elements from both his predecessors. The synthetic character of the causal nexus demonstrates Hume's influence,¹ it was his scepticism which broke through the rationalist assumption of the logical connection between cause and effect. Kant combined this with the Leibnizian view of human thought as legislating universally for experience and thus containing the condition of experience. Kant defined his problem as this: cause is essential to knowledge, but is not given in the data of sense.² Cause must be a law of thought, so what justifies its application to scientific reality? The answer lies in the character of the synthetic a priori: that which is not logically true, but is nevertheless true of experience (in the sense that experience is not possible without it) - thus must be a priori. And since its denial does not constitute a contradiction, it is not analytic and is therefore synthetic. The principle of causality is the condition of the possibility of experience: as such it is universal and necessary and therefore a priori. It is true of experience and not simply a logical law, therefore it is synthetic. The principle of causality is the clearest and most indispensable example of the synthetic a priori. In this Kant extended the notion of necessity from its restriction to logical use alone (with

the rationalists) to being central to the idea of coherent experience. Experience is coherent because there is central to it a self-imposed necessity. Against the empiricists, he regards himself as having refuted scepticism. Human knowledge is possible and not reducible to disordered sensations, because the conceptual necessity it involves is self-imposed and not derived from experience.

The proof of the principle of causality occurs in the *Analytic of Principles*, but it presupposes the *Transcendental Deduction*. Kant claims to simultaneously justify the fundamental presuppositions of science and ordinary life. He establishes that the indispensable condition to which all objects of experience must conform are necessary laws of connection which are contributed by the forms of understanding. The unity of experience in knowledge of succession, which refers to self-identity in consciousness on the one hand and knowledge of objects on the other, relies on the necessary laws of connection. If the results of the *Transcendental Deduction* are added to those of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* (that time is the form of inner sense, and therefore all phenomena are in time), then it follows that all phenomena are ordered in time, and that the objectivity of this order is tied to the category of causality. Kant's argument in the *Second Analogy* is that we cannot distinguish subjective and objective order in time without the category of causality. He argues that the fixed order of an objective event requires a fixed order of representations.

His argument against Hume is that unless we have some rule by which an impression can be taken as evidence of an event, then the distinction between objective and subjective is possible in relation to appearances.*

And that rule is the principle of causality understood as necessary determination. Knowledge of anything at all implies order:

"That which follows or happens must follow in conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in the preceding state".

(C.P.R. B 245, A 200)

This rule of sequential order for Kant is a necessary order. Strawson calls this feature of our perception of events - 'objective alteration' as lacking the feature of order indifference.³ That is, it is central to the notion of an event that it could not have occurred in any other order.

* Jeffrie Murphy argues that Kant was employing a Humean premise that he was intent to refute. Murphy argues that reversibility/irreversibility is not a criterion of the distinction between a state of affairs and an event. That distinction is made prior to the irreversibility sequence. The Humean concept of an event is presupposed by Kant because the imagination can juggle with impressions, but only 'a brute fact' can establish order. But this argument overlooks the point that 'order' is a judgement: we need a rule for interpreting 'brute facts' and thus the transcendental argument for the conceptual control of experience survives this empiricist challenge. So L.W. Beck seems to be right when he argues that Hume was employing a Kantian premise, and that if he had pursued his argument far enough, he would have discovered in his 'propensities' and 'passions' a role similar to the categories.

"If then my perception is to contain knowledge of an event, of something as actually happening, it must be an empirical 'judgement' in which we think the sequence as determined; that is, it presupposes another appearance in time, upon which it follows necessarily according to a rule".

(C.P.R. A 201, B 247).

For Kant, this necessity is only adequately expressed by causality understood as necessary determination by a previous event of a subsequent event. For this reason, causality understood as determinism is tied to the objectivity and unity of experience.

The idea of necessity, central to the possibility of knowledge, thus seems to involve causal determinism. Insofar as we understand anything according to Kant, we cannot but help employing the category of causality. And, in this sense, to understand means to offer theoretical explanations of events (occurrences in time) as causally determined. The theoretical success of the Copernican Revolution entails determinism.**

** See appendix II
'Conceptual and Causal Necessity'

Section IIThe Conflict of Reason and the Third Antimony

Reason is one faculty for Kant and theoretical and practical reason are different applications of it. The 'goal' of theoretical reason is science, which is its highest expression: the 'goal' of practical reason is action and its expression is morality. What is the relation between reason qua science and reason qua morality? Theoretical reason not simply entails, but requires determinism as causal law covering the phenomenal world. Practical reason requires firstly that action is possible and, secondly that the human agent can be responsible for its action for morality to be possible. How available to action is the phenomenal world as described by Kant? How can the agent intervene in the causal chain to either initiate a new series of events or to impose his/her will on events that exist? The requirements of morality are more stringent: we cannot be responsible for our actions if we are not free - if we are not free we cannot be moral. Since we cannot be free in the phenomenal world, then we cannot be moral in the phenomenal world. In the Kantian system the 'interest' of morality is in freedom and the 'interest' of science lies in determinism. It follows that if pure and practical reason operate on the same plane then they are in contradiction with each other. But they are both applications of the same faculty. It follows that reason is in conflict with itself. Kant calls this conflict within reason an antimony.

It is central to Kant's critical intention that reason falls into antinomies when it transcends its boundaries in sense. The Transcendental Deduction is concerned with charting such mistakes in philosophy and the natural illusions and dialectics of which reason, unrestrained by sense experience, can be lead to.* However, the conflict between theoretical and practical reason lies within the heart of the Copernican Revolution and demonstrates not a mistake in philosophy, nor an illusion of unrestrained theorizing, but rather Kant's two most deeply held philosophical concerns - that of science and morality. The transcendental questions how is science possible and how is morality possible are answered within the Copernican Revolution by the discovery of reason as that which provides for the possibility of both. The conflict within reason raises the question of the viability of the Copernican Revolution, for contradiction is not as with Hegel an indication of conceptual growth but of conceptual pathology for Kant. If reason finds this deepest conflict within itself, how can it provide a coherent and consistent account of knowledge and action?

If the compatibility of the two Critiques is taken as an answer to this question, there can be no unified account of knowledge and action. Although both based in reason, the laws of action and the laws of understanding are of two

* Kant thinks this is a propensity inherent in reason.

different types.* The laws of understanding and therefore explanation are causal and therefore deterministic in nature. Whereas the laws of action are based on freedom, the negative proof of which in the First Critique is the concept of spontaneity. Kant expresses this by saying that science requires a uniformity of sequences of causes and effects in time. Morality requires an uncaused first cause that the human will can initiate a new series of action. Will as practical reason must be able to be a cause of a new series of phenomenal events. The paradox is this: to be able to do this, will must lie outside the phenomenal series to be an uncaused first cause. But as soon as it 'enters' the temporal condition of the phenomenal series it will immediately be preceded and thus determined by an event of which it is not the cause. Thus will either does not relate to phenomena or it does and its autonomy is denied. The origin of action must lie outside time for Kant, whilst all understanding lies inside.¹

Kant 'resolves' this conflict in the Third Antinomy through the distinction between the appearances and things in themselves. The Copernican Revolution has a close connection with the distinction between phenomena and noumena, for the imposition of laws can only be understood if nature is regarded as phenomenal. Graham Bird² points

* Stuart Hampshire argues that the distinction between the humanities and the sciences rests on a fundamental distinction between reflexive knowledge and knowledge by observation, which both reside in the capacities of human beings to describe and plan actions. All things (including human beings) as being observed are subject to determinism. But the capacity of reflexive thinking (which is 'the power which gives us our sense of freedom') sets a limit to determinism. Hampshire thus preserves the ineradicability of the two perspectives.
 S. Hampshire "Freedom and Explanation" from 'Idea of Freedom' edited by Alan Ryan, OUP, 1979.

out that the Third Antinomy can be regarded as a conceptual experiment to test the Copernican hypothesis - whether the distinction between phenomena and noumena can solve a conflict of reason.

"For if appearances are things in themselves freedom cannot be upheld. Nature will then be the complete and sufficient determining cause of every event ... If on the other hand appearances ... are viewed ... merely as representations, connected according to empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds which are not appearances. The effects of such an intelligible cause appear and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality is not so determined ... Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature".

(C.P.R. A 563 - B564
A 537, B 565)

Through the distinction between appearance and the thing in itself Kant avoids the conflict between theoretical and practical reason. The laws of the understanding apply to nature understood as appearance. This is compatible with the Copernican hypothesis.

But is the 'causa noumenon'? This 'intelligible' is

"indeed the cause of those same actions ... as appearances, but that which does not itself stand under any condition of sensibility, and is not itself appearance".

And because

"natural necessity is to be met with only in the sensible world, this active being (noumenon) must in its actions be independent of, and free from all such necessity".

(A 539. B 567)

In this Kant flouts the restrictions on the use of the categories to sense, in attributing causality to an 'intelligibile' or noumenon. Secondly he goes against the criteria or significance in the Critique of Pure Reason,

such that he attributes characteristics to an unknown and unknowable being. Thirdly this becomes the foundation of morality. Thus the transition from theoretical to practical reason is effected on the basis of a fictional entity, which can only be imagined and not known, and whose existence is proscribed by the critical intention of his philosophy. He moves from a negative definition of noumenon - as the limits of the phenomenal, whose use is heuristic or regulative³ to a positive definition as an 'active being'.

Graham Bird⁴ claims that what Kant is doing here is not merely attempting the compatibility of concepts, but also a restriction of the language of determinism. In this sense he is extending Kant's argument that the antinomies are 'the most fortunate perplexity' into which reason could fall, because they demonstrate the limitations of theoretical reason. As L.W. Beck says:

"The antinomies strictly limit theoretical reason to the world of space and time, nullifying all speculative flights from the results of science and all attempts to use scientific method in speculation beyond the limits of sense. But their resolution permits an altogether different use of reason. The occurrence of the antinomies is indication of reason's broader competence as a faculty not exclusively devoted to cognition".⁵

The difficulty with Bird's account is the sense of 'compatibility', if the action in reference to which there is a purported compatibility is by definition temporal and thus subject to determinism. The meaning of action as taking place in the phenomenal order, involves determinism. There can be no compatibility when one

concept by its nature excludes another ie. the concept of determinism excludes freedom and vice versa. And, where one concept (freedom) can have no reference in terms of the criteria of significance laid down in the Critical Philosophy. That is, by definition it must transcend the bounds of sense, but to do so it leaves behind the conditions of significant reference. And in this sense how can the possibility of freedom limit the language of determinism? Kant claims that because we can say nothing of what transcends experience, then neither can we say it is determined according to natural causality. But that of which we can meaningfully say nothing, can equally well limit nothing.

Kant only avoids the conflict within reason by flouting the critical intention of his philosophy. And in so doing he compromises the Copernican Revolution for he must admit the existence of a thing to which reason does not and cannot apply. A positive definition of this being, whose existence is proscribed, is the only way of effecting a reconciliation between theoretical and practical reason.

Chapter II. Renouvier, the Conflicts of Reason and the Principle of Causality.

For Kant, science and ethics are antithetical perspectives on the human being. It follows that there can be no science of morality. Nor, more deeply, can there be a science of human action, for will, the cause of action must lie outside the temporal series. The task of reconciling the will to the phenomenal series, is the task for Renouvier of reconciling pure and practical reason. Only if this is achieved can there be a human science.

Renouvier criticises the seriousness of Kant's separation of the two reasons for its view of the human agent and the world s/he moves in. And what becomes of philosophy if it cannot underwrite a unity between theory and action that the human agent enforces in every action? [Sec. I] To overcome this it is necessary to refute the antinomies of pure reason as defined by Kant [Sec. II] This is to say that there is only a phenomenal order governed by the principles of the understanding, supreme amongst which is the principle of causality. The determinism of the definition of this for Kant, means that the reconciliation of practical and theoretical reason cannot be established on the phenomenal level, unless the definition of causality is changed to make it available to human will [Sec. III]

Finally, the notion of necessity is central to a Copernican sense of order in experience as a result of self-imposed rules. What is necessary in experience, if it is not determinism? This is the subject of Sec. IV.

Renouvier argues that pure and practical reasons are not antithetical. Indeed they operate in the same logical space, because one is the precondition for the other. The full implications of this cannot be examined until Ch. IV on the question of certainty. The logical steps by which Renouvier attempts to turn the Second Critique against the First, begin with the critique of the antinomies, the principle of causality and the idea of necessity. In this we see the initial steps by which Renouvier attempts to stand Kant on his head, by showing that the human will, rather than being relegated to a noumenal sphere is indeed the prototype of the law which governs the phenomenal realm - the principle of causality.

Section I. Renouvier on the Conflicts of Reason

Renouvier recognises the conflict between theoretical and practical reason as the most serious problem of the Critical Philosophy. He believed that they are united in the human agent and that the task of philosophy should be to underwrite this and not establish an artificial separation. This conflict is expressed in the contradiction between the theoretical and the practical philosophy.*

"Kant le metaphysicien a retiré d'une main ce que Kant le moraliste offrait de l'autre avec tant de force et d'éclat".

(C.P. 1878, p. 380)

It has been pointed out in Part II that for Renouvier it was a deeply engrained prejudice in Kant to have reinstated scholastic entities, despite his destruction of transcendent metaphysics. Renouvier's critique of Kant's separation of the two reasons extends his critique of substantialism. It is Renouvier's conviction that the separation of the two reasons derives from his substantialism. So with the rejection of the noumenon, the distinction between the two reasons should also disappear. Because then the Principle of Relativity

* He does defend Kant against the accusation of Eclectics who said that Kant methodologically gave to practical reason an authority to establish theses not available to theoretical reason. Renouvier argued that the thesis of practical reason - God, soul and immortality are postulates of rational faith and not demonstrations of theoretical reason. The Critique of Practical Reason gives us no knowledge of objects in the same sense as the First Critique. Free moral actions and rational beliefs are not definitions of essences or existences. C.P. 1874 "De la Contradiction Reprochée a la Doctrine de Kant".

will extend to all human reason, including practical reason. Then all reality will be dependent abstractly on the Principle of Relativity and concretely on Conscience. The practical side of the Principle of Relativity is the Principle of Belief (Croyance) that is, it must be shown that although the thing in itself has been rejected, that it does not re-appear in practical reason: that is, that belief does not develop outside of reason.

Renouvier accuses Kant of moral dogmatism and it consists in the ability to make certain claims, without the restrictions imposed on theoretical reason. Kant has given practical reason a privilege to establish belief independent of any reason to believe. (C.D.K., p. 217). In separating faith from reason, Kant employed a definition of faith that is not in agreement with common-sense:

"Il faut alors retablir le lien (qu'on a nié) des deux raisons ou bien la croyance devrait être quelque autre chose que ce que chacun entend par ce mot"

(C.D.K., p. 125).

Who is right - Kant or the common man? Renouvier opposes his sense of 'croyance rationnelle' to Kant's 'croyance' which is blind. And it is blind because he exempted moral notions from the critique he insisted on for intellectual ones. And in so doing he reintroduced metaphysical idols in his moral system.

If to refute the thing in itself is to extend the Principle of Relativity to practical reason and thus to make it scientific, conversely, Renouvier argues, this

is to extend the Principle of Belief to all knowledge. Thus from this critique of the separation of the two reasons, Renouvier develops a critique of pure reason itself in the Kantian system.

"Ce qu'il faut quand on a reconnu la vanité de la raison pure ou absolue, c'est d'introduire dans la science la croyance, en y déterminant sa signification et son rôle, et de rendre la croyance elle-même scientifique en s'arrêtant aux limites de l'universalité et de la raison dans la doctrine ce qui est inseparable dans l'homme qui la professe".

(D.E. II, p. 14-15)

Renouvier is arguing that to introduce knowledge into belief is to purify of its dogmatism and conversely to introduce belief into knowledge is to unify it to action. But of course it does not follow that if one is to make belief rational, that therefore all reasons must become beliefs. A fuller examination of this thesis, which is the heart of Neo-Criticism and is in effect Renouvier taking the part of the Critique of Practical Reason against the Critique of Pure Reason, must wait until a later Chapter. But it is clear that what Renouvier is arguing is that Kant had thwarted the Copernican Revolution. Firstly by retaining the noumenon and secondly by not recognising the full implications of the relativity of knowledge to the laws of 'Conscience'. For the laws of Conscience are practical laws. And against Kant he claims that this does not contradict science, because these laws are themselves the basis of science.

"Si Kant, cherchant pour sa morale une base ontologique, avait adopté franchement l'antropomorphisme, sans supposition de chose en soi et sans ramener les anciens notions transcendentes, on eût pu l'accuser de sortir de la science, mais non de se contredire".

(D.E. II, p. 16)

It will be clear that Renouvier holds that rather than science and morality being antithetical, they are united because they both have the same origin in practical reason. But, like Kant Renouvier argues that the basis of practical reason is freedom, and thus he agrees with Kant that we cannot be moral if we are not free, but against Kant he argues that if we are not free we cannot know.

"En effet l'union des deux raisons est fondée sur la part à faire à la croyance libre dans toutes les affirmations humaines, et sur la tentative impuissante du philosophe pour conserver, en faissant cette part, un certain domaine de la raison pure".

(D.E. II, p. 18)

So like Kant, he holds to the 'Primacy of Practical Reason', but unlike Kant does not see this as contradicting the interests of science. He does not "have to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (C.P.R B XXX) In taking the part of practical reason, it is clear what he means when he says that in his reform of the Kantian separation of the two reasons he is being a true Kantian.

"C'est en son nom que nous unissons les deux raisons, pour l'établissement de la certitude: en son nom que nous abandonnons la substance, comme étrangère à toute espèce de connaissance".

(D.E. II, p. 18).

And since freedom is the foundation of practical reason, Renouvier uses Kant to argue against the equation of theoretical reason with determinism. Determinism is the destruction of certainty says Renouvier and without certainty we cannot have knowledge. The denial of determinism is an essential part of the union of the two reasons. This union cannot be established simply by removing the noumenon, for in the Kantian system this is the sole source of freedom; to remove it would be to

leave a deterministic phenomenal order.

Because determinism is incompatible with knowledge, Renouvier turns the accusation of scepticism against Kant. He argues that action is the only response to the sceptic's challenge. And that in separating knowledge from action, Kant introduces scepticism into his system.

"La raison théorique et la raison pratique contractent de leur séparation un vice égal"

(D.E. II, p. 16)

The foundation of morality is left in an unknown and unknowable realm, whilst pure reason is left entirely unconnected with the most important expression of reason itself: its practical aspect.

"La séparation de la raison théorique et de la raison pratique, rigoureusement posée et maintenue par le philosophe ... a pour effet de placer la vérité dans un incompréhensible agencement de deux systèmes qui se détruisent mutuellement. Kant a fait de l'homme deux hommes en lui: un qui ~~croit~~ ^{doit} nier nécessairement, pour la logique, un autre qui veut affirmer librement, pour la morale).

(D.E. II, p. 15)

It is important to follow the steps by which this critique takes place. It begins with the question of the antinomies and next with the critique of the notion of causality. These will be the subject of the next two sections respectively.

Section II. Renouvier and the Question of the Antinomies.

For Renouvier, Kant's antinomies in thesis and antithesis respectively represent the interests of understanding and reason. Since there is no justification in distinguishing between reason and understanding, since reason is only distinguished by its object - the absolute, it follows that there are no antinomies. Understanding is not internally contradictory, and there is no good reason according to the Principle of Relativity to distinguish any other faculty than understanding. So although Kant specifies that there are four antinomies there is really only one antinomy in Kantian thought - the fundamental opposition between the absolute and the relative, the unconditioned and the conditioned.

"Il suffit donc pour les résoudre de constater que l'absolu n'appartient pas à la représentation, ou du moins ne s'y trouve que comme négation pure et qui n'establit rien".

(P.E., p. 601)

Renouvier claims that the radical critique of the thing-in-itself as incompatible with consistent phenomenalism entails the denial of the antinomies.

"Tout phénomène est relatif à d'autres relatives et toute série de rapports donnés se termine dans la représentation quelconque, sans qu'il existe aucune chose en soi; d'où la réfutation des antinomies".

(P.E., p. 596)

Together with the Principle of Relativity, the principle of contradiction denies the antinomies. He says that together with the unconditioned, Kant also regards the idea of an infinity of phenomena as above criticism. It is the dogmatic assertion of the notion of

an infinite process in the antithesis of the antinomies which supports the contradiction between reason and understanding. The understanding is governed by the principle of contradiction and this denies validity to the idea of an infinite process, therefore the understanding denies the antitheses. The idea of an infinity is beyond experience and thus the antithesis is not proved.

Renouvier notes, in line with modern commentators¹ that the Third Antinomy is not an antinomy at all, for in it Kant attempts a conciliation between two principles which he accepts.

"L'antinomie est donc résolue en acceptant les thèses opposées comme également vraies, et il est ainsi donnée satisfaction à la fois à l'Entendement et à la Raison. Une condition intelligible est admise, une condition inconditionnée, mais qui n'est pas un chaînon de la chaîne des phénomènes et il ne se produit ainsi aucune interruption dans le série empirique"

(C.D.K., p 69)

This conciliation has a double vice for Renouvier; it leaves morality without a foundation and conceals the real meaning of causality.

To make freedom the result of noumenal action means that moral action requires a miraculous intervention of a noumenal agent out of time in the phenomenal series in time. And this involved the old metaphysical idea of

"L'un supérieur à l'Être, car l'inconditionnée n'est pas autre chose"

(C.D.K. p 69)

And in this Kant is reverting to the Thomist idea of God as outside time, and the phenomenal series as not real and reality is contained in a divine eternal instant.

(C.P. 1878 p 381). The effect of making freedom the result of noumenal action is to eradicate the difference between dream and reality.

"Imaginer que l'action que je fais librement n'est point dans le temps, comme réelle, car si elle était dans le temps elle serait nécessaire et non libre, c'est penser que les choses du temps sont de simple apparences et que la loi de succession des phénomènes est une illusion. Telle est la signification de la doctrine qui admettant la liberté, en place la siège hors de phénomènes"

(C.D.K., p 68)

Rather than guaranteeing the morality and the freedom of action, the noumenal origin of free action loses the moral significance of action.

"En séparant les actes libres de ceux de la vie des sens et de l'expérience ... on les sépare inévitablement des conditions de la moralité, lesquelles sont bien dans le temps et ne peuvent que faire partie de nos phénomènes. Si la liberté, la première de ces conditions, n'appartient à l'expérience alors, dans l'expérience, la moralité ne trouve pas cette condition, et la raison pratique vient échouer au seuil d'une abstruse théorie. Le postulat perd sa signification pratique et devient illusion".

(C.P. 1878, p 383).

He criticises what Kant means by the causality of freedom, and distinguishes two senses of this. Firstly a causality which responds to our idea of cause. And secondly, a causality which has the character of not depending on an antecedent cause. Kant, says Renouvier, observed the second, but not the first. He defined this second sense as absolute spontaneity. But this is not freedom: we call facts of growth and development spontaneous, yet there are no voluntary, conscious actions involved. To claim that the causality of freedom concerns only absolute spontaneity is to formally stress the absence of action and will.

"Kant n'a pas assez songé à la différence profonde qui existe entre ce sujet du libre arbitre, qui nous connaissons et l'abstraction pure d'un pouvoir de spontanéité absolu, dont aucun sujet d'inherence n'est assignable"

(C.D.K., p 59).

It is the thesis of Kant's Third Antinomy that establishes the true sense of causality. (Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only one: the causality of liberty must be admitted). It establishes the idea of causality as a first beginning in time of a new series of phenomena. And this adequately satisfies what is central to the meaning of the principle of causality and its universal application to phenomena - that there are no phenomena without causes. It satisfies both the possibility of a first beginning which is central to the idea of free action and the universal reign of causality among the phenomenal order. Thus one can see that Renouvier is moving towards identifying the conception of causality and freedom within the phenomenal order. Kant had identified causality and freedom in the noumenon, but in this separated it from experience and science. It is Renouvier's originality to have attempted the reconciliation between causality and freedom within terms of a Kantian argument.

The next section concerns Renouvier's critique of the conception of causality such that it can contain the idea of will as practical reason.

Section III. The Critique of Causality

It is from the critique of the concept of causality that Renouvier turns Kant of the Critique of Practical Reason against the Kant of the Critique of Pure Reason. Through the determinism of the phenomenal order, causality and will, the seat of practical reason are radically split by Kant. Although Kant did define freedom as a causality of the will, it could belong only to the noumenal realm. Renouvier must show that first causes are phenomena and not noumena. To do this he must alter the definition of causality and the definition of reality. I shall begin with the critique of causality. And here it will be clear that he transforms the mechanistic causality incorporated into Kant's definition, into a productive causality of the will, which is the precondition of a human science as opposed to a natural science.

Like Kant, Renouvier claims that the principle of causality is:

"Le plus important et fondamental des jugements qui régissent l'expérience"¹

He retains after Kant, the Copernican idea that the regularity and orderliness of reality is the result of a rule imposed by consciousness. Order in experience is a matter of representation and the relationship of the the represented to the representative. He agrees with Kant:

"Experience itself, in other words the empirical knowledge of appearances, is thus possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances and therefore all alteration to the law of causality"

Renouvier is disputing not the conceptual ordering of experience through its categorial control. Nor is he disputing that there is a necessity involved in this ordering. What he is disputing is that this necessity is one of causal determinism.* It will become clear that the necessity involved becomes one of moral necessity for Renouvier, rather than of causal determination. So he agrees with Kant that

"The objective relation of appearances that follow upon one another is not determined through mere perception"

(B 234)

What he is disputing is:

"That it is a formal condition of all perceptions that the preceding time necessarily determines the succeeding"

(B 247)

Conscience, as the living aspect of the Principle of Relativity entails that we understand order in experience, expressed in the causal relationship, only on an analogy with human will. Order in experience is based on our experience of our own successful willfulness. The rules by

* In this Renouvier is in agreement with modern commentators on the association between determinism and the idea of conceptual order in Kant's analysis. Both A.C. Ewing (Kant's Treatment of Causality' (London, 1924) and Strawson 'The Bounds of Sense' (London, 1966) dispute this connection and say it is unnecessary to Kant's purposes. And although he doesn't explicitly say so, Renouvier's account must have been influenced by Schopenhauer's critique of Kant on causality (The World as Will and Representation translated E. Payne, Dover, 1966, USA. See Appendix 'Criticism of Kantian Philosophy esp. p. 473) who disputes particularly the connection between chronological sequence and determinism.

which we regulate nature are derived from our experience of ourselves as decision makers and actors. Will, in this sense, rather than being opposed to phenomenal causality, is the precondition of it.

In terms of what do we know will as the condition of the orderliness of phenomena? Does knowledge of willfulness stand alone as a conceptual criterion of order in experience? Is this internal experience of will a 'brute fact', which we know independently of, and prior to any other conceptual condition? This must be so if it is the condition of the principle of causality, which itself is the most important of the categories, as establishing order. But if the experience of will is known only through conceptual criteria of orderliness then it is these which are prior and not will. That is, if we can only identify will because we already have conceptions of order then will is dependent on these and is not a precondition of order itself. On either the Humean or the Kantian argument, this then is not per se a denial of determinism. For Hume our experience of order is thus the 'brute fact' of constant conjunction which as a matter of habit becomes necessity of causal sequence. For Kant we already have as a matter of conceptual necessity a necessary criterion of order by which we can identify any experiential order.

The misunderstanding of the transcendental method is clear here. For Renouvier assumes that by some kind of internal observation we can just see will operating as the condition of order. But it is not a matter of observation; it is a matter of judgement on Renouvier's part.

And the terms of the judgement do not reveal themselves in his argument.

Renouvier presents his analysis of causality as a reconciliation of Kant and Hume.* But he insists that he improves on both by his theory of will as a prototype for causal relations.

"L'idée originale de cause, son premier type, sans lequel nous ne l'eussions jamais appliquée à la nature c'est l'homme en acte, dans sa volonté libre"

(D.E. II, p 360).

It was Kant, he recognises, who combatted Hume's scepticism by his analysis of causality as a synthetic a priori. But he qualified this status with a form of theological dogmatism, and interpreted the principle of causality as 'Everything which begins has a cause'. This expresses more than a logical relation; it implies that everything which begins must have a prior determining cause and this is not in itself a first cause. He should have given the principle of causality a meaning such that the idea of a beginning and the idea of a cause can be identified. To search for a first beginning of the causal series is to put oneself outside the phenomenal series and therefore outside experience and thus beyond the categories. But only by doing this did Kant identify universal determinism

* L.W. Beck in 'A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant' (in Essays on Kant and Hume, Yale UP, 1978) argues that (despite the differences between transcendentalism and naturalism) there is room for greater comparability between Hume and Kant's analyses of the Principle of Causality than hitherto thought.

with the causal series. This is why for Renouvier Hume's analysis of causality is essential to understanding the meaning of causality, if not his conclusion. It is essential to search for the relation of causality only in relation to successive terms taken from the series of phenomena. And then we can see that the causal relation is a force - an act of power.

"Toutes les chimères dont la notion de causalité a été environnée s'évanouissent aux yeux du philosophe qui définit l'acte la puissance, la force, la cause par la simple analyse des rapports auxquels ces déterminations s'appliquent"

(P.E. p 217)

So he agrees with Hume that constant succession must be established before any relation of causality can be established. And he agrees with Kant that the principle of causality is a category of the understanding, but he illegitimately associated it with determinism.

"Ce déterminisme, appelé par Kant le principe de causalité mais qui supprime le vrai et naturel fondement de l'idée de cause était le plus arbitraire et le plus criante des prétentions dogmatiques chez un philosophe qui s'annonçait comme rejetant tout dogmatisme"

(P.A.H., Vol. 4 p. 426)

Kant had no right to regard the principle of causality abstractly as a universal law of nature. If he had restricted himself to what experience offers in terms of the connections of phenomena then he would have seen that given the relativity of phenomena to Conscience, then it is Conscience itself which produces the prototype of the connections of experience. The determinism is incompatible with the real method of 'Criticisme' and in his definition of causality Kant's analysis extends beyond

experience. Further it denies the anthropocentrism which lies at the heart of the Principle of Relativity. Renouvier's analysis is consistent with this.

Conscience is "la siége unique de pouvoir du vouloir et d'agir". And here we can see how causes produce effects directly. The psychological phenomenon of effort informs us of the true nature of the causal relationship.

"Les causes, les vraies causes ont sans doute aussi leur action directe et leur fonction dans la nature en dehors des effets que la volonté humaine y peut introduire, et qui ne la modifient que bien peu, mais elles doivent alors, suivant notre méthode être toute concues d'après l'analogie de conscience. Hors de la, on chercherait vainement l'application de la notion formelle de la causalité"

(A.P. 1896, p 26).

The idea of force, which is the essence of the mental act - the origin of causality for Renouvier overturns the conception of causality as substantive and transitive. Kant, says Renouvier, ties causality to substance in his classification of the categories by defining causality under relation. And in this way he paves the way for a form of physical realism in his definition. Causality for Kant thus entails not just determinism but also substance.

"Causality leads to the concept of action and thus in turn to the concept of force and thereby to the concept of substance".

(A204 B 249 C.P.P)

Kant makes substance the source of causality. It provides some principle of permanence in change for Kant:

it is that which remains whilst all else changes. It is thus substance which is the source of order in experience.

"Action signifies the relation of the subject of causality to its effect. Since, now, every effect consists in that which happens and therefore in the transitory ... its ultimate subject, as the substratum of everything that changes, is the permanent, that is, substance".

(CPRB 250, A 205)

Kant is thus relating change in the phenomenal world to the unconditioned as the supreme condition of the phenomenal order. But more seriously given the Copernican Revolution, he is locating the source of order in knowledge outside Conscience and thus outside the categories. He is in this contradicting both the principle of idealism (the relativity of world to consciousness) and the principle of naturalism (restriction of reason to experience). The only solution is to find causality in facts of experience relative to Conscience. This reveals 'force' as that character of the mental act which connects phenomena. The real meaning of the Copernican Revolution thus must be to find in human creation - willfulness - the source of order in the known world. It cannot without contradiction be related to that which is not known or knowable, external to Conscience.

Kant had never justified his assertion that the causal principle is given independent of all observation and thus of the laws of succession of phenomena. And in this sense he had not really answered Hume's question about the proof of the causal principle from experience. It was Hume who turned Renouvier towards looking for the seat of causal principle in the feelings (sentiment) of the human agent.

"L'idée de cause n'a pas pu passer, dans notre esprit, de son lieu d'application propre et originale, des rapports entre des phénomènes naturels, qu'a raison de l'analogie fondamentale qu'établir des deux côtés, le fait primordial qui leur est commun: le fait que tel changement étant donné dans une certaine relation de phénomènes, tel autre changement déterminé, toujours le même, positis ponendus, se produit ipso facto dans une certaine autre relation de phénomènes"

(C.D.K., p 336)

The only acceptable contemporary view on causality is that of harmony. That is an order of phenomena once instituted, then others happen by concomitance or consequence.

This is simply the mathematical idea of a function of variables, which is substituted for the conflict of phenomena. Given this, it follows that the last phenomena to appear before any given event is not uniquely causative in a transitive sense. He thus turns away from Kant to a Leibnizian view on causality as a form of corroborative harmony.

Since all reality is a synthesis for Renouvier of what is the category of causality of synthesis? It is a synthesis of action and power, which we call 'force'. Since this in turn is modelled on will, it follows that will is the prototype for causality. Thus will and causality are not contradictory phenomena for Renouvier. It follows that causality and freedom are not antithetical. In fact we require the notion of will as a first beginning of phenomena to understand the causal relationship. It is thus contradictory to describe causality as determinism because it is something we do not experience in our own capacity to will actions successfully. Thus it is not absurd to talk of a free cause in the phenomenal series.

Will as the prototype for causality entails that causality as ruling the phenomenal is not deterministic.

O. Hamelin says:

"Enfin prendre la causalité telle que M. Renouvier la donne, admettons que la causalité, c'est la volonté, et bien entendu, la volonté libre: la conséquence est claire: c'est que la causalité ne constitue pas un déterminisme".²

Having transformed the notion of causality such that it is a form of will, Renouvier must now treat the notion of necessity, which is central to Kant's version of determinism. Is experience without a deterministic law one without necessity? The answer for Kant is yes, but is no for Renouvier.

Section IV. Necessity, Contingency and the Order of Experience

In rejecting the Principle of Causality as meaning deterministic necessity, Renouvier does not thereby mean there is no necessity attached to experience. Experience is not essentially contingent, which for him is the position of pure empiricism. Kant had opposed the contingency of empiricist accounts of experience with the laws of the understanding. The Principle of Causality had a unique role amongst the categories of engendering order in experience. This is also so for Renouvier, but the order is not a deterministic order. Nevertheless for Renouvier:

"La nécessité est une forme attachée à toute actualité donnée dans la représentation"

(P.E., p 232)

What then is the meaning of necessity?

"Ce qui est, pendent qu'il est, ne peut pas ne pas être ... l'actuel est donc aussi le nécessaire et la nécessité est un autre nom du principe de contradiction". (op cit)

Like Kant, for Renouvier necessity is a matter of the self imposition of the rules of understanding.

"Les jugements synthétiques a priori viennent a la représentation comme des lois générales qui le régissent" (OE p 233)

But unlike Kant, this necessity is not universal. Representation is given in human beings and thus is not guaranteed to exist beyond them and their forms of knowledge.

"Leur nécessité ne s'étend pas à strictement plus loin que l'acte plus ou moins répété par lequel elle se manifeste"

(P.E., p 233)

Kant in the Second Analogy had identified the question of order in experience and the idea of an objective event with the rule of the understanding as determining the temporal order of experience. Renouvier also says that the Principle of Causality is unique among the laws of phenomena, in that it expresses necessity. But necessity is a constancy of law:

"Nous disons qu'il y a nécessité partout où il y a loi et constance dans l'ordre des phénomènes ... La nécessaire est alors synonyme du constant et reconnaît par terme opposé l'accidental comme inconstants".

(P.E., p 234)

For Kant, the constancy of empirical laws established by induction, would never be enough to establish the absolute necessity of a rule of the understanding which in the transcendental sense, is the ground of the possibility of order in experience. Renouvier's position here is far more Humean than Kantian and Kant would argue that in this version of necessity Renouvier eradicates the distinction between subjective and objective order in experience.

But this critique of necessity understood as determinism and of this as guaranteeing the order of the known world, is essential to Renouvier's purpose which is to oppose the Critique of Pure Reason with the Critique of Practical Reason. That is, to show that it is through

the laws of practical reason alone that the human world gains order and coherence. He cannot do this if purely conceptual rules imply the determinism of phenomena. For these would thwart the imposition and effectiveness of moral laws in the human world. And to this end he introduces the element of contingency into experience. The problem from Renouvier's position is this: since all phenomena to become objective must fall under categories ie. laws, it follows that the problem of establishing moral laws is the problem of the contingency of the laws of nature. The problem of moral laws and contingency are tried in the phenomenal order. For if the phenomenal order is determined by necessary laws, then there is no place for moral laws. That is Renouvier is saying that the Principle of Causality does not only find satisfactory explanation when understood as a form of necessity which excludes all indeterminism. That is for Renouvier, it would be absurd to talk of a free cause in the phenomenal series unless there was an element of indetermination.

"C'est sur le fait, réel ou faux, de cette ambiguïté de certains futurs dans un jugement et un acte inséparables que parte le véritable débat sur le libre arbitre". *

(P.A.H., p 427 Vol. 4).

* Just as Kant was expressing contemporary Newtonian science in his idea of causality as determinism, so for Renouvier the work of Laplace and Cournot in probability theory, aided him in replacing causal necessity with the idea of the probable.

So Renouvier's aim is to formulate the Principle of Causality, so that it is not opposed to the existence of future 'ambigus': it establishes between phenomena a correspondence of fact which doesn't exclude contingency.*

* Emile Boutroux (1845-1921) (to whom Renouvier dedicated his "Dilemmes de Metaphysique Pure" and 4th volume of Philosophie Analytique de l'Histoire") also developed a philosophy of contingency in his "De la Contingence des Lois de Nature" 1874. He challenges contemporary science of mechanical determinism. And like Renouvier he insists on the reconciliation of theoretical and practical reason, which Kant had separated because of the mechanical determinism ruling in the phenomenal sphere. Boutroux limits science by arguing that there is no absolute coincidence between the laws of nature as science sees them and the laws of nature as they really are. Science considers reality under a mechanical aspect which obscures the real order of reality, which expresses itself through contingency (in its negative aspect) and the liberty of human beings (in its positive aspect). The universe is governed by a moral necessity, not a causal necessity. Thus human actions are not determined. 'La Finalité' defined aesthetically and ethically governs reality.

Boutroux taught Durkheim at the Ecole Normale and he thus reinforced the idea of 'hasard' in phenomenal reality. Dauriac (Contingence et Rationalism, Paris 1924) says Boutroux and Renouvier 'probably' worked independently of each other. But I would suggest that as Renouvier wrote his P.E. in 1854 and Boutroux his twenty years later, that Renouvierism was the formative influence on French philosophical thought in this direction.

An abstract analysis of the Category of Causality alone cannot establish whether there is a universal reign of absolute determinism or contingency, says Renouvier. To establish this for causal necessity, it must be demonstrated that everything which 'becomes' are effects and that all effects are contained in anterior causes. But this idea of a causative capacity in phenomena is so obscure as to defy positive definition.

"Le partisan de nécessité se voit contraint ou de violer le principe de contradiction en se réfugiant dans le progrès à l'infini, ou d'admettre une première cause sans cause".

(P.E., p 237)

Equally if all is totally fortuitous, then induction from the past to the future is an illusion.

But if we turn to experience, we see here the idea of the probable:

"Si, dans le vrai tout est nécessaire nous devons reconnaître la présence dans l'homme d'une illusion, l'illusion du possible".

(P.E., 348).

All human affections, fear, hope and desire in principle imply possibilities and thus the idea of indeterminate futures.

"(Expérience) interprétée conformément à l'hypothèse d'un fondement véritable de nos affections, implique l'égale possibilité, l'indétermination réelle de divers phénomènes envisagés dans le future".

(P.E., p 348)



Renouvier thus replaces theories of absolute necessity and contingency with the theory of the probable. He agrees with Laplace that the first condition of a theory of probability is the notion of equal possibilities, such that the realisation of one is equal to the realisation of the other.* That is Renouvier is saying, that if A is given then C could just as well be established as B. But then the real law which governs phenomena is not correspondence, but accident. That is, if indetermination really occurs amongst phenomena in this sense, can we still talk of causality? That is Renouvier has reformulated the category of causality so that it is not opposed to future 'ambigus' and establishes a correspondence of fact, which doesn't exclude contingency. But why still speak of category of causality as establishing necessity in experience?

That is, is it possible to both insist on causality and contingency? When he insists on the impossibility of all 'enchainement' is he not putting a level of indetermination among phenomena, so that it is senseless to talk of categorial control of experience? And thus contingency does it not condemn us to an uncertainty in knowledge which leads back to the scepticism of Hume?

Further, Renouvier is claiming against Kant that

* Renouvier says in Kant's system "Il ne peut y avoir de possibles que les nécessaires". And he questions why Kant introduces the notions of the possible under 'the postulates of empirical thought'.

there is room in his phenomenalism for both law and contingency. The introduction of contingency is supposed to guarantee a place for freedom understood as a first cause of a new series of phenomena. In the logical coexistence of contingency and law in his phenomenalism thus exists the possibility of reconciling the antinomy of freedom and determinism. So he places one phenomena (unpredictable first cause) against another phenomena (predictable, part of a constant law). And this is the solution to Kant's antinomy, solved only by the distinction between phenomena and noumena? As George Seailles says:

"Comme Kant, Renouvier est avant tout préoccupé de ne rien sacrifier de l'homme à l'esprit de système, de justifier la morale et la religion comme la science, mais il reste dans l'ordre phenomenal, il met sur le même plan, dans la même monde, la contingence et la nécessité, le règle et l'exception, il juxtapose ou Kant superpose"¹

That is some phenomena are characterised by unpredictability which guarantees the possibility of freedom, whilst others have the characteristic of predictability because of the constancy of laws of nature. Does the coexistence of different types of phenomena resolve the antinomy between freedom and determinism or merely repeat it, albeit in a phenomenalist guise?

There is one sense in which Renouvier's argument can be saved from the attack of Seailles. And this depends on distinguishing between a positive and a negative sense of chance. Or rather distinguishing between

indetermination and ^{de}undetermination. If we read Renouvier's argument against causal determinism as an attempt to open up the way for new series of phenomena to be made, then all he has to establish is that there is not causal overdetermination of all series of phenomena in the sense established by Kant, but a form of causal underdetermination, in the sense that not all phenomena are a) predictable and b) necessary. And if so, then human will can intervene in the series of phenomena, which would, without interference, proceed in a predictable way. In this sense one can read Renouvier's arguments against determinism as saying that causal determinism is false interpretation of events, a form of *arrière-pensée* which casts a gloss of necessity over events once they have occurred which is not justified by the phenomena themselves. That is they could have been altered, and this is what his sense of contingency means. It does not mean the radical unpredictability of for example sub-atomic particles, but means a form of plasticity or availability to human will.

In this sense we can make sense of the following:

"La creation humaine donne lieu à des commencements premiers qui ne sont que relatifs: elle peut commencer des séries de phénomènes, qui viennent ex nihilo en un sens et sur un point seulement, mais qui assujettées à sortir du sein des données antérieures et s'adopter à un ensemble de rapports existents. Ce fait, que toutes les données et nécessaires de l'univers sont en partie subordonnées à celle qui n'est pas, mais qui se fait actuellement par l'homme, et qu'ainsi l'ordre du monde en cette partie, n'est jamais qu'un ordre en voie de formation".²

Thus in the order of facts there is no antinomy between the initiative of the human being and the constancy which natural science requires.

"L'ordre et les lois du monde subsistent concurremment avec la liberté et l'envelopent, l'enserrent de toutes parts, sans l'affecter quand à son essence".³

But it is in this possibility of a new beginning in the phenomenal series that lies the path to the sense of moral necessity that governs human reality for Renouvier.

"La liberté ne nie point l'ordre du monde et dans cette ordre meme, elle est le fondement et l'essence d'une loi spécialement humaine, de la loi morale".⁴

If all actions are equally possible, are none necessary?

"La raison est scandalisée par L'apparence du hazard"

(Boutroux)⁵

If it is not causal necessity which guarantees order in the world, the philosophical task is then to find out what does. For Renouvier it must rely on the human will and what it can establish. For will to establish new orders in the world, it is necessary that order be underdetermined. Renouvier in the interests of reconciling pure and practical reason has provided for this through the notion of contingency.

For Renouvier it is consistent with a fully developed Copernicanism that the world is relative to Conscience and its laws; and that these do not reveal mechanical determinism as a feature of human consciousness. We do not perceive ourselves as merely links in a causal chain beyond our control. And he is, in the above argument saying against Kant that causal determinism is

against Copernicanism. The task of a consistent Copernicanism is to find that order as producible through will, since it is now apparent that mechanical determinism is not essential to the orderliness of the human world. The task now is to establish what it is will can establish.

There is an important question raised by Kant and this is the question of conceptual necessity, which he associated with determinism. The question is whether will defined as practical reason can establish conceptual necessity. This for Renouvier is the question of certainty and will be discussed in Chapter IV.

Chapter III. Freedom, the laws of Representation
and the reconciliation of the reasons.

This chapter turns towards Renouvier's concerns in the Deuxième Essai 1858, the subject of which is:

"L'homme toute entier, en son unité ... et surtout dans l'ordre des faits représentatifs ... La question de liberté s'est présentée ... à ce nouveau point de vue sur l'ordre réel et intrinsèque du monde"

(D.E. 1858 II, p 367).

The fundamental principle of the understanding - causality - in the Kantian philosophy has given way in Neo-Criticism to practical reason understood as will. Practical reason governs the laws of representation and since the laws of representation are the a priori for Renouvier, it follows that it is will that is the a priori. The a priori is 'the bearer of the interests of humanity' in the Kantian sense, so it follows that will for Renouvier is the medium whereby these will be achieved.

Making will compatible with phenomenalism is to effect the union of pure and practical reason, since will is practical reason and phenomena and their laws are reason for Renouvier. But phenomena and their laws are only understood through Conscience, so his union of the two reasons can only be effected through his theory of consciousness. In his theory of the automotivité of consciousness Renouvier attempts to demonstrate how freedom is identified with the laws of representative order; indeed is the basic law of it, in this is also achieved his aim of making practical reason scientific for if

freedom, the principle of practical reason is identified with the representative order, then it is compatible with phenomenalism and available to scientific method. Renouvier's entire theory of freedom is in his theory of automotivité (Sec. I).

"La liberté des déterminations de conscience
est le pivot de la raison pratique"

(D.E., 1912, vol. II, p 16).

Will as the source of the a priori, means that it is the source of the human order. But it is that which is to be achieved, and not simply discovered. Through will, freedom is found as that which replaces substance. It is the human order of the universe. The constancy of persons replaces the constancy of things in Neo-Criticisme (Sec. II).

How can science represent the yet to be achieved? It can, if it is a free science. To make freedom the basis of knowledge is to make it the basis of science whose aim is action. In so doing Renouvier attempts to refute determinism as incompatible with science: against Kant he argues that freedom is not opposed to science, it is its precondition. Knowledge and action will be shown to be unified if they have the same origin, in freedom (Sec. III).

Section I. Will and the Automotivité of Consciousness

Since will is the prototype of causality, and since the category of causality is the most important category in its regulation of experience, it follows that it is will which determines reality for Renouvier. It is the pivot on which turns human destiny. It will be clear that on it depends the question of certainty (Ch. IV). And morality requires it. It is thus the human function par excellence and through it is found the union of pure and practical reason.

Will is connected to contingency and opposed to deterministic law in this way. We can see that acts of will can be observed as entailing a number of possible consequences and not a single and unique one. That is in deciding to do something, we can choose a number of different actions, and we cannot predetermine which one will be chosen. In this sense, will escapes a priori deterministic law and provides a rupture in the continuity of events.

But in escaping deterministic law, it does not follow that will is without law. Will is not spontaneity. Law, for Renouvier, as for Kant is the necessary condition for the objectivity of phenomena and will is no exception. The will Renouvier is talking about is not the spontaneous will Kant called 'Willkur' - the logical possibility of which Kant established in the Third Antinomy and which is defined by spontaneity, rather the

will Renouvier is talking about is 'Wille'¹ of the Second Critique. This is defined by moral law. And this will is identical with practical reason. It is the faculty of acting according to law. And it will be clear in the next Section that this is a law of autonomy: so will here means a will which is subject to no law except one of its own making.

Will is the pivot of Renouvier's critique of Kant's separation of the two reasons. But in so far as it is will defined as practical reason we can understand in what sense Renouvier says that it is in his name (Kant's) that he reconciles the two reasons.

Will is defined differently from Kant. Consistent with his critique of noumenal causality as freedom, Renouvier attempts to make will compatible with phenomenalism by repudiating the separation of will from experience that is central to Kant's account, by claiming that will is identical with representation.*

* This account is similar to Schopenhauer. But Renouvier criticises him for identifying will with the thing in itself. In beginning with the noumenon, he made will separate from representation. In this he is unfaithful to the spirit of Kant's criticism, in constructing a metaphysic like a science, but whose first principle is external to phenomena.

Will is not a power or faculty which lies behind phenomena. To separate will from representation and to see it as a thing which precedes action is to return to substantialism. To make will external to Conscience is to go back to the old metaphysical idol of the real cause lying outside representation.

"C'est une idole qu'on posera et on se fera au fond cette illusion de placer derrière l'homme incomplet, prive de volonté, un second homme complet, qu'on chargera d'être la volonté du premier"

(D.E.(I), 303-4).

This characteristic of will as present in consciousness, Renouvier calls the 'automotivité' of consciousness.

Consciousness is autonomous over its contents in that it has the capacity to call up or banish representations.

Seaille says:

"La thèse originale de Renouvier c'est de faire de la volition un phénomène complexe, tout à la fois intellectuel et volontaire, libre et motive, le motif se déterminant lui-même"²

Hamelin described automotivité as:

"La souveraineté de la représentation sur elle-même"³

This is evident in states of attention, abstraction and systematization, which Renouvier calls 'analyses automotives'.

It is shown in all decisions, but also in struggles with feelings. Volition is thus that characteristic of consciousness, which has the character of presenting an action, which once done as equally well not have been done. That is, we present action to ourselves as not necessary.*

* The analogy with Satre is marked here. The radical freedom of the 'pour soi' in his early Existentialism extends to a freedom over feeling, and is the freedom to deny any event as necessary.

This definition of will sharpens when it is clear that for Renouvier the relationship between representation as willing (voulante) and representation as willed (voulu) is a relationship of cause and effect. This is the true meaning of the relationship between cause and effect and it is only on a false analogy with the exterior and the physical that effects and causes are separated and turned into a form of determinism. For Renouvier cause and effect, understood as necessary and sufficient condition are simultaneous. Hamelin explains in this sense:

"Vouloir penser a quelque chose, n'est ce pas y penser?"⁴

Effort as the essence of volition is at one with consciousness and there are not two realities in consciousness, the one producing, the other produced. Thus consciousness has this characteristic of being its own cause, in that it can determine its own contents and activities.*

* Fouillée argues that Renouvier here swings between determinism and contingency without having effectively defined freedom. For example: if the will has a motive for calling up representation X and no other, then it is this antecedent motive which explains the representation. On the other hand, if the will has equal reasons for calling up one or another representation, then we are in contingency.

"Au lieu de supprimer l'indifference, l'indéterminisme phénoméniste la place au fond de la raison même et de la passion" A. Fouillée 'La Liberté et la Déterminisme' Paris 1884.

But against Fouillée one can argue that if the will is in principle unpredictable this is not per se contingency. Renouvier is not arguing that the will is without reason in its action: this is the effect of Kant's separation of will from phenomenal series not Renouvier's. Fouillée is accepting what Renouvier is refuting: that only a separate prior determining set of conditions is a satisfactory explanation of a rational will.

For Renouvier, observation and reflection are voluntary modes of representation, and it is this which makes them properly human. Reason, the systematic use of abstraction and specification, which makes science possible is also a voluntary mode of representation. Science for Kant is the highest aspect of theoretical reason, and is an expression of determinism - that is in explaining determinisms are uncovered. For Renouvier science can be an expression of will - as automotivité of consciousness and thus of practical reason. Explanation consists in uncovering will not as the cause of event not in the external physical way but as the condition of new orders. This is the precondition of a human science in the sense defined by Durkheim.

The importance of this identification of will with this characteristic of consciousness is that, as belonging to representation, it is therefore available to analysis and description by the empirical methods of the sciences. Since will is practical reason, this means that practical reason, as bearer of the 'interests of humanity' in the Kantian sense is available at the level of science for analysis, description and formulation. It is no longer relegated to the noumenal realm for its autonomy to be preserved. Knowledge in representation, is no longer antithetical to the interests of morality as it is with Kant. The interests of action and knowledge are united in consciousness defined as automotivité. We do not have to leave representation to discover the principle of new orders of reality. Representation reveals directive or determining representations which intervene in 'la vie

consciente et fait le caractère de la vie proprement humaine'.⁵ Through will all human functions transform themselves and become properly human.

"C'est le développement du vouloir, c'est le passage de la spontanéité simple à la spontanéité libre, qui marque l'avènement de la conscience humaine au sein de la nature"⁶

Section II. Freedom as the supreme human law.

Will is not subject to a superior or anterior law. It establishes laws and through this engenders new series of phenomena and it does this for Renouvier without noumenon and without substance. And this is compatible with consistent phenomenalism says Renouvier.

"L'étude des phénomènes de conscience nous a permis d'établir la liberté comme fait représentatif étroitement uni à certaines séries de la pensée"

(P.E., p 342)

Will is liberty for Renouvier; in defining will he says he has defined liberty.

The nature of liberty is as 'le fait du commencement' (D.E. 1912, Vol. II, p 107).^{*} And in this he is supporting liberty as defined in the thesis of Kant's Third Antinomy. But unlike Kant is is bound up with the automotivité of consciousness.^{**}

* The idea of liberty as a first beginning dominated speculations of Jules Lequier (see Sec. III). L'Abbé Foucher points out that this is the key to Renouvier's turn away from Hegel. It was Lequier's influence in 1843 which lead to the idea of free will and its conditions. L'Abbe Foucher says his conversion to 'libertisme' dated from his Premier Essai in 1854. But, freedom as a first beginning is found in Kant's thesis of the Third Antinomy. L'Abbé Foucher 'La Jeunesse de Renouvier et sa Première Philosophie' Paris 1927, Ch. 12.

** This for Renouvier is the only acceptable account of the relationship between motive and will in consciousness, for to separate will from motive is to introduce the problem of deterministic causality into free action. Liberty is thus not something essentially different from motive and action. The problem with this is that it seems to imply all actions are willed.

"Affirmer la liberté, c'est assurer que l'automotivité représentative est réelle dans les actes réfléchis et délibérés"

(D.E. 1912, Vol. II, p 102)

Liberty is a beginning in the series of phenomena in the world. But more profoundly than this as the highest function of consciousness and given the relativity of the world to consciousness, it follows that the world is not a pre-established order which the agent observes; rather the world is available to human creation. It is a world to be made.

"La véritable doctrine de la liberté nous fait considérer le monde comme un ordre qui devient et se fait, non comme un ordre préétabli qui n'a qu'à se dérouler dans le temps"

(D.E., op. cit., p 105)*

* Fouillée: Critical phenomenalism has suppressed the noumenon, but not eradicated it. It has mixed it into phenomena, so now there is a multitude of noumena, as many noumena as there are new beginnings.

"C'est une poussière de noumènes au lieu d'un lingot".

It rejects the thing in itself, but admits 'phénomènes en soi'. He characterizes the problem of Renouvier's phenomenalism thus:

"Il faut revenir à Hume, en gardent Kant; et alors au lieu de placer dans l'édifice le phénomène au rez de chaussée et le noumène à l'étage supérieur, il loge les deux contradictoires ... sur le même plan: il faut commencer absolument des relations"

'La Liberté et le Déterminisme' Paris 1927, p 137

But against Fouillée, these are not noumena in the Kantian sense: they are not outside the categories, and are not independent of space and time. Human decisions for Renouvier are not characterized by miraculous intervention in a causal series; they require laws (see below). Fouillée is criticizing Renouvier from a position that Renouvier has rejected: that only causal determinism guarantees order in experience. And he is not recognizing a point that Renouvier recognizes as logical to the Copernican position: that order in experience results from self-imposed rules. Clearly Fouillée cannot accept this or that these rules always have a moral character.

In so far as it is the source of order - of the world as becoming, it is thus the replacement of the doctrine of substance.

"A la place d'un substrat chimérique ou les philosophes ont tant cherché une permanence non moins imaginaire de l'être nous voyons le substrat réel, l'ensemble des phénomènes composants ... (et) par dessus celui ci, sa possession réfléchi et sa futurition par la liberté".

(Op. cit., p 107)

And in this we see the permanence of persons replacing the permanence of substance as a source of order in reality.

"La liberté à son tour fait la permanence de la personne, et aussi la rompt puisque c'est à elle qu'il appartient de créer l'homme nouveau contre l'homme ancien ... Telle est donc la véritable permanence: ici une loi dans le changement, la une conscience qui le domine. Tout autre serait incompatible avec les variations de la nature et de la personne humaine"

(D.E., Op. cit., p 108).

Through liberty, the human agent can transcend nature and in this demonstrate a radically different nature from the purely natural, which is content 'to be'; but for the human being 'to do' is the supreme imperative. And through this the human being becomes autonomous. And through this the human being is capable of individuation.

"Telle est la véritable et supreme individualité de la personne, qui cesse d'être un rouage du monde"

(D.E., Op. cit., p 350).

As the source of individuation, it replaces by a unified conception of the agent, the Kantian split of the agent into that which is contributed by reason and that which is contributed by feeling.

"La liberté est enfin le principe suprême de l'individuation, autrefois vainement assigné dans les incompréhensibles essences de la forme ou de la matière"

(D.E. Vol. 88 1912 p. 108).

Renouvier claims that liberty cannot be understood in the doctrine of substance for it firstly places the source of order beyond consciousness and secondly therefore entails a contradiction of the capacity of the agent to establish new orders. And it eradicates individuality for it is a form of monism:

"La théorie de la substance, en rendant les substances particulières impossibles, supprimait l'individualité et la liberté. La théorie de la liberté fonde l'individualité et remplace la substance"

(D.E., Op cit., p 350).

As a result, the scientific theory of phenomena and laws, through the central role of liberty looks very different from previous philosophy.

"Ces principes d'individuation et de permanence qu'il leur plaît de demander à la substance et de fonder sur des chimères nous les trouvons, on le voit dans la liberté et dans les lois de l'univers. Les lois posent le constant dans le variable: ce qui est la vérité d'expérience et de raison ...; et la liberté nous donne le sens positif le plus élevé de ce qu'on appelle une substance individuelle sans préjudice des lois physiques ou autre"

(D.E., Op. cit., p 109).

Through freedom, the human being achieves autonomy, essential to the condition of freedom is that:

"Il est l'auteur de lui même"

(D.E., Op. cit. p 82).

And in this, Renouvier claims is found the real absolute.

"Cet absolu cherché de chimère en chimère a travers les elucubrations theologiques, nous le trouvons au fond de la nature, non qu'elle échappe à toute relation, mais parcequ'elle peut quelque fois les dominer toutes"

(D.E., Op. cit., p 82).

And in this is achieved a philosophical revolution, the triumph of Copernicanism:

"La philosophie, enfin humanisée, trouve dans l'homme, qui est à la fois son créateur et sa principale matière, le type, l'unique type connu de ce que l'être a d'inaccessible de cette source de faits premiers qui partout lui échappe, et qu'elle ne peut que vainement s'efforcer de définir en dehors de tous rapports, par de les bornes du monde intelligible"

(D.E., Op. cit., p 82-83).

The significance and importance of freedom as 'la clef du vou^ute' of Neo-Criticisme is undeniable. On it is founded morality and as we shall see the question of certainty in knowledge. But what is freedom? Total indetermination does not entail freedom says Renouvier. Just as a spontaneous will is pure chance and has nothing to do with moral will, so indetermination cannot establish freedom proper. The fact of freedom as a phenomenal fact, consists in the possibility that another order is possible. But spontaneity and contingency are not proof of liberty in the moral sense: that is as a condition of praise and blame. Here he argues like Kant that the freedom required by morality is of a different order from the possibility of spontaneity in the phenomenal series.

Although Renouvier has a false sense of what a transcendental condition is, he here argues that we only know freedom as a condition of morality itself. For Kant, the only 'proof' of freedom is the reality of duty.

"Aussi est-ce encore la pratique, est ce la morale, qui va nous fournir les motifs à l'appui de l'affirmation de la liberté"

(C.P. 1878, p 86).

Renouvier calls freedom in this sense a postulate. Like Kant, for him freedom and practical reason are mutually implicative, as are practical reason and morality.

"Il suffit de renvoyer à Kant, qui a parle mieux que personne de notions de responsabilité et de devoir comme fondement du postulat, en d'autres termes comme vraies motifs de la libre affirmation du libre arbitre".

(C.P. 1878, p 86).

Renouvier in this sense, seems to be inconsistent with his phenomenalism. There is no room in this for a freedom which is implied by 'obligation' but does not reveal itself per se as phenomenon. And in this, is he not recreating a chimera of liberty and in so doing, risks returning to liberty as substance, ie. that which lies behind phenomena as the source of their reality? To be consistent he should have been satisfied with his theory of the automotivité of consciousness.

It is on this that hangs the whole coherence of his theory of freedom and thus the reconciliation of pure and practical reason. Is it a true description of consciousness? Is consciousness autonomous over its

own contents? Certainly it is not true that we are simply the repository of a flux of sensations, nor is our consciousness a partial reflection of a universal consciousness which unfolds with inexorable necessity. Renouvier rejects both Empiricism and Hegelianism in his theory of automotivité. But does the rejection of these entail the possibility of this radical autonomy of consciousness? The answer to this takes one outside the bounds of this thesis.

There is in this idea of the autonomy of consciousness an idea which may explain the essential connection between freedom and consciousness and thereby morality for Renouvier. And again it is a Kantian argument. It is only through the phenomenon of obligation that we can be sure we are author of our own actions and thus have an autonomy from the natural series, and thereby independence of natural necessity.

"La notion d'obligation quelle qu'en soit l'origine, existe actuellement en moi et (il) implique la possibilité ... d'être non maître et me diriger ... en chaque rencontre au deux voies opposées"

(C.P. 1878, p 86).

He agrees with his opponents however who say that obligation is no proof of autonomy since it itself is a result of precedents of experience. He agrees that there is a large portion of truth in this and:

"Il serait absurde de ne supposer actuellement et absolument indépendant ipso facto, par le fait de ma liberté"

(Op. cit.)

However if the objection is pushed to the limit then we must envisage a total predetermination. And here

"Je perds la propriété de moi même"

(C.P. 1878, p 87).

Obligation as a phenomenon of Conscience is a guarantee of freedom in the sense that through it alone can we be sure of independence of natural necessity.

Freedom as part of the representative order is not free from law. It is the principle of laws. It is the first of practical laws.

"La première des lois pratiques, avant ce qu'on appelle le bon usage de la liberté c'est l'usage même. Ce seul précepte: exerce ta liberté, s'il est suivi pose un premier fondement de la moralité des actes".

(D.E. 1954, Vol. II p. 75).

Rather than freedom consisting in freedom from any law, rather it requires laws.* It presupposes physical and psychological laws and also social laws.** Freedom

* Renouvier defends himself against Proudhon who in 'De la Justice dans La Revolution et dans L'Eglise' (1858) said:

"Des exceptions aux lois éternelles de l'univers!
Un regne des possibles en dehors du regne des
realities".

Renouvier makes plain what he is denying.

"L'ordre est a mes yeux multiple, divers, compose ...
Je me formule formellement la thèse d'une loi unique,
totale, éternelle, nécessaire, absolu.

Exception et loi sont des idées très compatibles:
ou pour dire plus et plus justement, avouer l'ex-
ception, c'est avouer la loi? Mais on parle des
lois déterminées et partielles. D'ailleurs je
n'en comprends pas d'autres".

Quoted L'Abbé Foucher, op. cit. p 201.

** Social pressure weighs heavily on agents, says Renouvier, and if it doesn't determine any particular act, the effect is shown in the totality of actions, which is available statistically.¹

is in fact causality, when it is understood as a first beginning in the phenomenal series.

"Le principe de causalité, qui se détruit lui-même, quand on le suit à travers un ordre de choses toutes nécessaires, nécessairement enchaînées regressives à l'infini, sans pouvoir jamais trouver un point d'arrêt, ce principe se fixe et trouve sa réelle application dans la cause libre, conforme à l'intime sentiment de l'activité capable de commencer et de terminer des séries de phénomènes".

(P.A.H., Vol. 4,
p. 430)

Free actions are not only compatible with causal analysis of science, they are themselves causes of new orders of reality. Thus against Kant, Renouvier argues freedom does have a cause and this is the human agent itself which is not only the answer to the search for substance but is also the principle of causality. Free actions have a cause and this is:

"L'homme dans l'ensemble et la plénitude de ses fonctions"

(D.E. 1859, ed. p 359)

This points to a central thesis of Renouvier against Kant: that freedom can only be understood in relation to the agent understood as a unified whole. It can only be adequately understood in relation to the complexity of human nature, which is not divided into faculties. So just as to separate will from judgment is to entail a freedom of 'indifference' and to see will as pure chance, so to separate freedom from intelligence is to turn it into caprice. The hypothesis of a pure will as a source of free action is a hypothesis which is incompatible with the demands both of practical and speculative life. And it is denied by the experience

of human action which testifies to the integration of will, feeling and intelligence in action.

So Renouvier's Copernicanism points to the human agent as 'source première de phénomènes'. And in this he has established that these phenomena can exist without preceding determining causes. In this he regards himself as having answered the divisions and problems of Kant's theory of freedom, as separate from the phenomenal order and unavailable to science. Ie. the laws of representation.

Has he in this demonstrated the reality of freedom? That is, is there a reality which corresponds to the belief that we are free? Is there a law which spells the total determination of phenomena, and like a card shark deals out the cards which we believe we freely pick up? That is, is determinism true?

Section III. The Problem of Determinism and the
Autoposition of Liberty

Renouvier argues paradoxically that the reality of freedom can only be established by the hypothesis of freedom itself. To argue from fact for freedom can only establish spontaneity or contingency. To argue in terms of a necessary proposition as the foundation of freedom is contradictory. It is a hypothesis, but not an arbitrary one, it is a hypothesis that is central to the human condition and to the possibility of knowledge. That freedom is required to establish freedom is a thesis in Neo-Criticisme called the autoposition of freedom, and is the central thesis of Renouvier's philosophy.

"Le criticisme vrai et sincère ne pouvait se fonder que dans la croyance à la liberté par la liberté même"

(P.A.H., Vol. IV, p 426).

He argues that both freedom and determinism are hypotheses. The principle of universal determinism is not evident a priori.

"Hume n'a vu a priori rien d'impossible ou d'illogique à admettre un commencement sans aucune cause antérieure, et Mill s'est laissé aborder par la supposition que des phénomènes, en quelque sorte étrangers à nous et à notre expérience, fussent produits en dehors du rapport de l'effet à la cause"¹

And neither internal nor external experience support determinism as established a posteriori. For example in the first case it is outside the reach of science to establish that events cannot be modified by will and that

without the intervention of will they constitute a necessary order. The only foundation of determinism experimentally is induction. But following Hume, Renouvier says induction can never establish logical rigour in any concept, for it is an irrational procedure.

The principle of universal determinism is thus a hypothesis. He defines determinism in this way.

"L'enchaînement universel invariable des phénomènes est l'hypothèse d'une loi de leur succession en vertu de laquelle, à un état antécédent donné des choses de tout nature dans le monde un seul et même conséquent peut repondre, dans toute la suite des temps ... en sorte que chaque phénomène ... est à chaque instant l'unique dont la production ait été possible dans ces circonstances".

"L'hypothèse opposée à ce déterminisme admet l'existence des contingents et des accidents, qu'elle qu'en soit la nature ou l'origine: ce sont des phénomènes à proprement parler possibles non nécessaires, dont le caractère est de n'exclure leurs contradictoires qu'après l'événement, tandis que en qualité de futur ils étaient indéterminés à l'être, ou même titre de leurs contraires"

(D.M.P., p 126)

Renouvier argues that we cannot without contradiction demonstrate freedom. For firstly, it concerns individuals alone, and reason concerns the universal and the abstract. And secondly freedom is subjective and reason is objective. And it is useless to base ^{ne} belief in freedom on a necessary judgement. Freedom intervenes in the judgement by which we claim to be free. Thus there is no proof of freedom by fact or logical demonstration.

Both freedom and determinism thus are hypotheses.

Renouvier develops Lequier's* dilēmma, and says that to solve the dilemma of freedom and determinism we must choose between the two hypotheses with one or the other.

There are four possibilities:

1. Necessity asserted necessarily.
2. Necessity asserted freely.
3. Freedom asserted necessarily.
4. Freedom asserted freely.**

* Jules Lequier (1814-1862) 'a solitary Breton' says Emile Brehier (History of Philosophy, Vol. 7, p 59, Chicago UP, 1969) and a friend of Renouvier's at Ecole Polytechnique. (See 'La Recherche d'une Première Verité', ed. Dugas, France, 1925). Renouvier published 'La Feuille de Charmille' and it is included in Vol. II, D.E., 1912 ed. He published little himself and completed nothing. Obsessed with the problem of freewill, as a positive condition of knowledge and in this sees himself as continuing Descartes's search for a final foundation of knowledge. See also L'Abbé Foucher 'La Jeunesse de Renouvier et sa Première Philosophie' 1927, Paris, Ch. 7.

** Roger Verneaux ('Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Connaissance' Paris, 1954, Ch. 3, Sec. II) argues that there is a double dilemma here for both content and modality. In relation to the content freedom and determinism constitute a classical logical opposition which cannot both be true together. Modality concerns the subject who affirms: the mode of affirmation will be free or determined according to which is chosen. Verneaux questions must we chose between them in terms of modality, by placing oneself in one or the other hypothesis. The symmetry is artificial which works for determinism because this encloses the subject which affirms it. But this does not carry for freedom which is not universal like determinism and thus does not envelope the act of affirming it.

We can eliminate the second and third immediately as intrinsically contradictory. If freedom is true, then its affirmation is true and cannot be necessary. If it is necessity which is true, then the affirmation is necessary. This leaves the first and the last.

The first is the hypothesis of pure determinism. Lequier argues that on this we must hold that truth and error have the same foundation in necessity for it is the law which governs all things.* Contradictory propositions in so far as asserted necessarily must both be true. Truth is thus indistinguishable from error. In particular, the statement that all is necessary cannot be distinguished from its contradictory that there are free actions. If there is no distinction between truth and falsehood, then knowledge is impossible. The hypothesis of determinism entails scepticism and any theory of knowledge which is built on it is rendered useless. This hypothesis renders science and morality impossible.

This leaves the fourth possibility. And although it lacks demonstration, it entails the capacity of the distinction truth and error in the judgement of the

*Renouvier makes plain that Lequier is talking of 'L'hypothèse du prédéterminisme absolu ou destin , dictant et enchainant tous ces actes, disposant de lui pour le bien ou le mal, actuellement, éternellement'

individual. To this dilemma:

"La solution la meilleure est d'affirmer la liberté en affirmant qu'on affirme que moyen de la liberté, tandis que ceux qui la nient ne cherchent qu'à affirmer quelque chose qui les force d'affirmer"

(Renouvier: P.A.H., Vol 4,
p. 430)

By this, Lequier has demonstrated the dependence of knowledge on freedom, for by this hypothesis alone is entailed the distinction between truth and error. In this Lequier has established a 'first truth'. It is the basic condition of knowledge and action and as such cannot be established nor proved by a higher hypothesis. For this reason, real 'criticism' can only find itself on a belief in liberty: for determinism can give the thinker no assurance of the veracity of his/her beliefs. In this Lequier has answered Descartes's search for a first truth, for Descartes's theory of evidence would not allow him to pursue this truth which he only glimpsed. Kant in retaining determinism in the principle of causality had at the heart of a system which was intending to refute scepticism, a sceptical base.

"Donner la croyance, et la liberté avec elle pour fondement à la première affirmation sortie d'une critique de la connaissance, c'est que Kant avait manqué de faire, dominé qu'il était par des préjugés métaphysiques, et c'est que, le premier, Jules Lequier a fait".*

(P.A.H., p 431, Vol. 4).

* Verneaux points out that just as in the Première Essai Kant was criticized through the influence of Comte, so in the Deuxième Essai, it was the influence of Lequier that engendered his critique. But as Verneaux argues the ground was well prepared by Kant himself. Indeed one may add that freedom is understood as practical reason and this is the foundation of knowledge.

(L'Idéalisme de Renouvier,
Paris, 1945, Introduction).

As the first condition of knowledge, it is also the basis of science.

"La liberté est la condition de la connaissance - la formule de science est faire. Non pas devenir mais faire et en faisant, se faire"

(Lequier, fragments quoted
Renouvier, op. cit.).

If knowledge requires freedom, so does science. But this entails a new view of science: it is not concerned primarily with discovery, but action. And in this action is also a principle of self development. (But more particularly in relation to sociology, if freedom is the basis of science, it follows there can be a science of freedom that also concerns the development of the human being. It is in this context that one can understand the significance of a science of social action that is also concerned with society normatively and the development of the human being. If the imperative of science is action, then the goal of a science of society is change according to practical reason. The laws of science, thus being concerned with human action are laws of the representative order and thus are laws of freedom; to discover it and foster its development in the wills of human agents.)

It is on practical reason alone that the validity of all reason rests. For if freedom is the condition of knowledge, it follows that reason requires it, not just in its practical but also its theoretical aspect. And through this the two aspects of reason are unified.

"C'est une affirmation morale qu'il nous faut, toute autre supposerait aussi celle-là. En d'autres termes la raison pratique doit poser son propre fondement et celui de toute raison réelle, car la raison ne se scinde pas: la raison n'est, selon notre connaissance, que l'homme et l'homme n'est jamais que l'homme pratique"

(D.E., 1858, II, p 322).

Practical reason here means the moral use of freedom.

And it is in this that we have a criterion of truth.

Each is responsible for *his/her* own errors. Freedom is not an absolute criterion of truth, but it is a method for reason.

"Cette méthode c'est la réflexion soutenue, la recherche constante, la saine critique, l'émination des passions nuisibles ... et la volonté prête à supposer ou à feindre la connaissance; c'est en un mot le sage exercice de la liberté"

(D.E., 1912, II, p 95-6).

At the centre of all reflection is the use of freedom shown in intellectual decisions and judgements. The thinker can give and withhold assent to arguments and this is the freedom that is central to intellectual life for Renouvier. But it is only the moral use of freedom that can finally guarantee truth: not in the sense of absolute truth - there is no independent objective guarantee of that - no guarantee independent of the decisions of the thinker. These decisions are not arbitrary whims, but are a result of long searches for truth which have a belief in the truth and the avoidance of error as their very possibility. Thus intellectual decision requires autonomy of any determination by necessary law, and finally for Renouvier the only guarantee of self mastery or autonomy is the notion of obligation.

The fundamental question of knowledge the veracity of our faculties and the veridity of the laws of knowledge thus rely on :

"L'hypothèse d'une just et legitime emploi de nos facultés personnelles pour observer, comparer, généraliser ou déduire, enfin conclure"

(C.P. 1878, p 87)

This hypothesis is ultimately:

"Une bonne nature mentale bien dirigée. Cette rectitude rien ne nous la garantit: on n'essaierait pas sans cercle vicieux de la démontrer, puisque toute démonstration impliquerait le juste emploi de ce dont l'emploi est a justifier. C'est donc, a vrai dire, un acte de foi philosophique et en d'autres termes un postulat"

(C.P.,1878, p 88).

It follows from this that the thinker is a true moral agent. And thus the right use of the understanding is inseparable from the form of the categories, ie. the synthetic a priori judgements of the general order.

In this sense:

"Le postulat de la veridicité de l'esprit peut prendre le nom des categories".

(Op. cit., 89)

Even the principle of contradiction is a postulat:

"Le Principe de Contradiction a été pour nous d'une application continuelle et plus en evidence qu'aucune autre ... que rien ne subsisterait de nos pensées ... si nous devions mettre ce principe en question. C'est neanmoins en un vrai postulat que nous en posons la verité certaine, aussi bien que nous demandons qu'on nous accorde la verité de tout autre principe mental, puisque nous rangons généralement de garantie pour la conformité des formes et des règles de l'entendement avec la nature et les relations réelles de ses objets qui nous croyons indépendents de lui".

(OP. cit., p 89).

What then is the meaning of 'postulate'? It is the moral use of freedom. All postulates depend entirely on the first: that of the assertion of freedom.

(Now it is clear why for Durkheim moral necessity is a precondition for logical necessity. Freedom is the condition of knowledge and freedom here is moral freedom, the character of which is explained by obligation, which is the necessitation of the will by practical reason.)

But how true is it that freedom is centrally involved in judgement? Is it true that free will is the explanation of error? Can it not be argued with Renouvier's critic Fouillée² that error is the result of violating the necessary laws of thought? And if adherence to the necessary laws of thought entails the distinction between truth and falsehood, then the thesis of Lequier and Renouvier is overturned.

If this is so, how true is it that freedom can found science? Fouillée³ retorts against Renouvier that the day an astronomer requires free will to see a new star, then astronomy will no longer exist. Seailles⁴ defends Renouvier and says that he holds that all opinion must justify itself by reference to laws of thought. It appears that Fouillée's critique is against freedom understood as whim or caprice, whereas it is clear that for Renouvier as for Kant freedom is far from arbitrary.

The thesis of freedom entering judgement understood as the wise use of liberty, is persuasive. If we cannot refrain from assertion to certain propositions in what does our agreement to them consist? But on the other hand if we cannot think without the principle of contradiction, in what sense is there any freedom at all in its acceptance; that is if there is any logical necessity at all in any law of thought, then the thesis of freedom as the condition of science is badly damaged if not overturned. And in this sense, rather than necessity making science impossible then it is necessity which makes it possible.

Renouvier's argument is that this version of science dehumanises the agent: it suppresses the human being. It is not the individual who thinks, it is ^{he} absolute or substance who thinks through them. Thinking on this model becomes a case similar to 'il pleut'. It is clear that the version of science as necessity that Renouvier is attacking is both Hegelianism and Spinozism. This is an attack on a form of historical determinism which presents itself as a science. And Renouvier clearly holds that only Kant's thesis of freedom understood as practical reason can bring back the dignity of the human being, both in terms of moral but also epistemic autonomy.

"Il y a, à l'ordre moral, qui démâchînise le monde, qui fait la dignité de la personne humaine, son individualité même et son essence".⁵

But if we distinguish from determinism in this absolute fatalistic sense, a form of determinism which is concerned with the determinations of knowledge ie. the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge that make even the act of choice possible, then we can see that freedom is not the basic epistemic condition *per se*. How and with what do we choose? In this sense it is the conditions of judgement that make the act of choice possible not vice versa. The hypothesis of necessity rather than eradicating the distinction between truth and error is the precondition of it. That is, if we must think with the principle of contradiction, in what sense is there any degree of choice at all attached to its role in knowledge?

In a sense Renouvier is transferring the central problem of Kant's ethics to epistemology. That is if I am free, why must I be moral: and if I must be moral, in what sense am I free? Now, with Renouvier's doctrine, if I must think in a certain way, which the whole Copernican doctrine of the categories entails, in what sense am I free? And if I am free, in what sense must I think in the way specified in categorial form? And if I can point out the necessary conceptual conditions for an act of choice, then I am laying down the conditions for freedom. And thus I am going some way to logically demonstrating freedom. And thus it is not simply illogical to demonstrate freedom, and thus its status is not a moral postulat.

Further if this postulate is central to the human condition, in what sense is it subjective and relative to the individual? Freedom is thus not demonstrable because it is subjective as Renouvier maintains, it is indemonstrable because it is so central to the human condition we cannot go beyond it. This however seems to be the kernel of Renouvier's thesis; what I am disputing is the personalism and the apparent relativism that Renouvier builds on the impossibility of demonstrating freedom.

That is I would agree with Renouvier that absolute determinism is the contradiction of consistent Copernicanism, because it is not something we know as part of Conscience. But the opposite of this is not that free will is the basis of knowledge: rather without certain conceptual conditions we cannot have freedom. And rather than these conceptual conditions excluding freedom as is the unacceptable thesis of Kant, rather against Renouvier these conceptual conditions are the basis of choice itself.

That is Renouvier cannot have it both ways: either choice is the basis of knowledge and then it is not impossible to choose any system of beliefs as true. Or it is impossible to choose any system of beliefs as true. In which case it is the criteria in terms of which one rejects one system as true and another as false that are the real foundation of knowledge. And is it true that these criteria are always moral - which is what Renouvier must finally argue?

These questions point to the problem of certainty which is the next logical stage in Renouvier's development of the thesis of practical reason as the source of all reason.

Chapter IV. Practical Reason and the Affirmation of Reality.

Kant is an intellectualist: judgement is an intellectual act, logical necessities impose themselves on the mind and determine judgements. Science is the collaboration of experience and understanding: scientific explanation consists in the uncovering of causal necessities.

Renouvier with his horror of the absolute challenges the notion of absolute logical necessity establishing truth. The dogmatism of evidence is tied to ontological substantialism. In Section I, I examine how Renouvier attempts to develop a conception of certainty in knowledge outside the notion of evidence.

This critique of Kant entails a critique of knowledge as treated in the abstract as establishing that which the actual person must believe. Renouvier insists that questions of human knowledge, although developed in the first instance in the abstract sphere, must be ultimately analyzed in relation to the knowing subject of experience. In the Premier Essai, the analysis of knowledge is abstract; whilst the Deuxième Essai is concrete and concerns the knowing subject. In passing from abstract to concrete, Renouvier passes from logic to psychology. This is not modern empirical psychology, it is the study of:

"L'homme - un certain centre, un point de concours de catégories parce qu'elles sont les lois enveloppantes en lui de tout ce qu'il connaît ou peut connaître"¹

The human being, like all beings is a law, or better a function, a constant relation which embraces and coordinates many relations. The human being is the synthesis of the laws of representation. Thus as Séailles says:

"La fonction de l'homme est d'embrasser toutes les catégories"²

He is thus studying the human being as implied by the categories. But following from Ch. III, he is studying the human being as a source of new series of phenomena: that is he is studying human beings under the laws of practical reason. He is studying the human being under the perspective of the Second Critique of Kant.* And it is in this context that he examines what certainty can look like for a human being firstly examined concretely in a living aspect, but secondly given freedom as the highest aspect of consciousness. So although Kant of the First Critique would object to the unnecessary psychologism of an account of knowledge, maybe the Kant of the Second Critique would be at least intrigued, if not horrified, at the role practical reason could be said to play in the affirmation of

* Verneaux argues against Dauriac that it is Kant who influenced Renouvier's critique of Kant's separation of the two reasons.

'L'Idealism de Renouvier' Paris, 1945.

reality. For him to make freedom the condition of knowledge and therefore science would be to deny the objectivity and necessity of knowledge. But Renouvier without a blush, still claims to be acting in Kant's name as he argues that we affirm reality for ourselves as a practical necessity and thus there is no universality and necessity to knowledge. (Sec. II). This new perspective entails a new view of science. In the Premier Essai, science was the study of the body of representations. From the point of view of the human being as living reality, science is a body of affirmations established by practical reason. It is practical reason which establishes what is certain for the person and therefore which is real for them.

In this Renouvier is extending his critique of Kant, both in terms of the dogmatism of reason and the scepticism entailed by it. There is here a split between reason and action and secondly a split between reason and the psychology of the person. Against Kant he argues that knowledge presented as a dogmatic, necessary system can establish no certainty for the agent. And secondly that certainty and therefore reality can only be established by affirmation based on practical reason. It is in this context that Renouvier develops the 'Conscience Collective' (Sec. III) as a source of agreement between Consciences, given the lack of any necessary intellectual truths as a source of shared experience.

In this Chapter, it is clear what Renouvier means when he undertakes:

"Le point de départ d'une étude des deux critiques, par laquelle j'arrivai à saisir le sens, presque universellement méconnu en France comme dans la patrie même de Kant, le sens de la suprématie donnée à la raison dite pratique pour l'établissement de tout ce qu'il est possible à l'homme d'atteindre de vérité au delà de l'ordre vérifiable des phénomènes"

(D.E., 1859, V.II, p 163).

Section I The Question of Certainty and the Problem
of Evidence.

If freedom is the condition of the possibility of knowledge, what then does certainty consist in? It can no longer consist in a necessary truth which constrains agreement to it. It follows that for Renouvier knowledge is not certain because it is necessary as for Kant. For Kant knowledge which cannot be doubted is the a priori: it cannot be doubted because knowledge is impossible without it. In theoretical understanding, the principle of causality alone guarantees the discrimination of ordered events. We cannot doubt this principle without risking the incoherence of experience. It follows that the principle of causality is necessary to human knowledge. There is the sense of necessity central to this principle as determinism. Renouvier has rejected this as central to the conception of necessity. But he goes further and rejects necessity as an absolute criterion of knowledge posing itself from 'outside' and constraining the thinker to agreement. There is thus no conceptual necessity per se; there is for Renouvier only necessity relative to affirmation, and this is itself based in choice. And it will be clear later (Sec. III) that universality as a characteristic of certain knowledge is relative to affirmation, shared amongst a community of 'affirmers'. He thus rejects universality and necessity as characteristic of certain knowledge.

Renouvier's problem in relation to the question of certainty is the question whether there is an infallible criterion of truth, constituting the basis of absolute certainty. For him this is the question of whether there is a form of evidence which is necessary for all minds and thus establishing their agreement to it. He regards it as a deep rooted prejudice that philosophers have always attempted to define certainty by necessity; commonsense corroborates this. On this model, one is certain because one cannot deny, because we feel constrained to affirm. Truth imposes itself: it 'dominates' consciousness. But Renouvier with the sceptics argued that one can doubt almost everything: outside the immediate phenomena nothing imposes itself necessarily.

"Les hommes et parmi eux les penseurs tout comme le vulgaire, tiennent à recevoir leurs convictions du dehors a se les juger de manière ou d'autres imposées".¹

In this conception of certainty Renouvier says the conception of evidence is central, because it carries the characteristic of necessity. In this we give a sort of existence to truth as external to consciousness, which it illuminates, as light illuminates a hitherto dark area. In this metaphor evidence is like truth become visible. This for Renouvier is a metaphor borrowed from vision, which maybe carries for sensible knowledge, but not for all forms of knowledge. And certainly not for the basic forms of consciousness which are the conditions of knowledge. He asks do we take science as a vision of the truth and do we take human consciousness as a mirror which reflects

the real and reflects what it sees in the act of knowledge? The use of this symbol can only turn against itself, for just as light itself only becomes visible in illuminating objects, so the mind is only apparent in its activity.

"La lumière ... ne se montre qu'en montrant des objets sans lesquelles elle serait insaisissable. Le principe de l'évidence est donc inévident. Or l'intelligence et la raison se comportent précisément comme la lumière. Les applications de leurs premiers principes sont saisies avec une grand clarté: mais en même temps ces principes n'apparaissent point, et quand nous parvenons à les formuler, ce n'est plus en qualité de choses visibles, c'est au contraire comme lois inhérentes à la conscience et conditions de toute visibilité pour elle".

(D.E., 1912, Vol. II, p 30).

So for example we only are aware of the principle of causality in the events which it orders, and so with all the categories which are only discovered in the phenomena to which they apply. Evidence thus does not demonstrate the principles without which there is no evidence. It does not reveal Conscience, but there is no evidence without it. What is demanded from evidence is the necessity of an impersonal truth which is irresistible and which imposes agreement on all. But Renouvier says we look in vain for impersonal and necessary truths that are accepted by everyone.

"Si la vérité était évidente touchant les choses qu'il nous importe de connaître en n'en rien disputerait pas. Contesté-t-on que le visible se voie?"

(D.E., 1912, Vol. II, p 188).

The history of philosophy and the divergence of systems itself argues against the existence of such a standard.

Since there is no necessary truth accepted by everyone as a matter of social, historical and philosophical fact, Renouvier argues against Kant's intellectualism as holding that pure reason can establish necessary truths. Determinism is central to this theory, for the principle of causality is central amongst the categories of the understanding and reason in its role as understanding for Kant entails determinism. But further Renouvier accuses Kant of assuming certainty in knowledge can be established by pure reason alone apart from all the other faculties of the human being. For him, the whole person is present in the state of certainty: and thus there can be no pure isolated intellectual fact.

"L'indissolubilité des fonctions humaines se substitue pour le philosophe à la chimère de l'entendement pur".

(D.E., 1858, II p 147).

For Kant it is possible to study knowledge, without studying belief: the result of the First Critique is to place belief beyond knowledge: judgement is properly intellectual. Understanding imposes logical and categorial necessity, without involvement of belief and practical reason. His argument against Kant is that the two reasons are indissolubly linked in the psychology of the person. Impersonal reason is a myth. Against this he establishes his thesis that firstly all judgement is a belief (croyance), which has intellectual feeling and voluntary elements united. And secondly that more

profoundly that all judgement is an affirmation, an act of will established freely. This voluntarism is central to Neo-Criticisme.

"C'est la prétention ancienne et tenace des partisans d'une certitude abstraite chimérique, et pour ainsi dire détachée de la nature humaine ... l'établissement d'une preuve de la certitude est impossible en dehors de l'individu qui pense la posséder. ... La certitude n'est donc pas et ne peut pas être un absolu. Elle est, ce qu'on a trop souvent oublié, un état et un acte de l'homme."

(D.E. 1958. Vol. II p 379, 380, & p 390).

His theory of certainty is thus a rejection of Kantian intellectualism; it is not a passive state of intelligence. Kant was timid in his critique of rationalism, because he admitted reason as sufficient to establish absolute truth and thus as able to constitute an 'apodictic' science. Against this Neo-Criticisme professes the personality of reason: the relativity of all judgements to the personality of the human being. Renouvier makes clear the difference in his approach to other philosophers in relation to the question of certainty.

"Constamment, et tout au contraire de tous ou presque tous les philosophes, nous avons été préoccupés de la délibération et de décision mentale d'une personne appelée à prendre parti sur la question vitale de toute pratique et de toute morale".

(C.P., 1878, p 85-8).

What is certainty for Renouvier? He examines it terms of what it is to be uncertain. We are uncertain when we cannot see something, when we don't know something, when we don't believe something. Belief at first sight seems to be an unstable foundation for certainty.

But at closer examination it is clear that when we are certain, it is because we believe that we know, believe that we see. It is thus basic to certainty. But we cannot be said to be certain of something that we have never doubted. Doubt is a sign of our capacity to reason.

"L'ignorant doute peu, le sot encore moins, et le fou jamais".

(D.E., 1858, Vol. II, p 389).

Doubt is the sign of will: we can resist or repel those things that we do not believe in. Will is the capacity to reject and to suspend belief.

"Le signe radicale de la volonté, la marque essentielle de ce développement achevé qui fait l'homme capable de speculation sur toutes choses, et l'élève à sa signité d'être indépendant et autonome, c'est la possibilité du doute".

(D.E. 1858, V. II, p 389).

So just as the concept of evidence is linked with the impossibility of doubting, for Renouvier the concept of belief, basic to certainty is paradoxically linked to the possibility of doubting.

Certainty thus is not a passive state: it requires all human functions, fundamental to which is will, as the basic feature of consciousness. Feeling and will enter with judgement into the state of certainty. No one is certain when they have merely reflected: belief and thus will is necessary to this state of mind. Certainty is not a constraint which imposes itself as evidence, it is a belief which is always relative to the individual.

"A proprement parler, il n'y a pas de certitude: il y a seulement des hommes certains".

(D.E., 1858, V. II, p 390)

Certainty is a state to be accomplished, not discovered.

Thinkers must:

"regarder leurs systèmes d'idées et de croyances comme une oeuvre qu'ils ont à accomplir en propre et dans la liberté avec le secours de l'expérience, de la tradition et de la réflexion".²

Through this critique, it follows that the foundation of science is not evidence, but certainty. But as Verneaux³ points out the opposition between beliefs as basic to certainty and evidence is false, for they belong to different orders of reality. Evidence is the relationship between an object and a faculty of judgement. Whereas certainty is a state of mind, which for Renouvier is also by definition independent of anything which constrains it externally. Certainty is a state of mind which consists in holding oneself to be right and thus has no implications for universality and necessity. It cannot logically replace all question of evidence. To extend Verneaux's question one can say that Renouvier is here in danger of replacing the dogmatism of abstract reason by the dogmatism of belief. When is belief rational for Renouvier? He thinks he has guaranteed this by the incorporation of intellectual factors with will. But how do will and intellectual factors relate in certainty? Are there not occasions when intellectual factors restrain will: is this to return to the tyranny of intellectualism? But unless he shows how will is controlled by the intellect is he not introducing will as irrational, as caprice? But if intellectual factors

do control will, there is then no reason for holding will as basic to certainty.

And if these intellectual factors do dominate the will, in a rational will, then is there no occasion to hold certainty to be a totally relative state, relative to the individual? Certainty in the psychological dimension is a phenomenon relative to the individual, but not in the sense that it replaces any conception of evidence which 'forces' agreement on different minds.

Renouvier in this critique also shows a confusion between necessity as central to theories of determinism and necessity as central to the possibility of knowledge. And this stems from his misunderstanding of the transcendental condition. For knowledge to be possible there are certain conditions which are necessary; as conditions of the possibility of any knowledge. This is the transcendental sense of necessity, which is central to the Copernican Revolution. This entails an agreement between different minds on the basis of which they can be certain of some things. It is the basis of the possibility of belief: ie, if we cannot think at all, we cannot will (except blindly). Renouvier appears to have thrown out this form of conceptual necessity with the other form of necessity, albeit associated by Kant himself with determinism in the Second Analogy. He rejects constraints as associated with transcendental condition with constraint as external necessitation. And in so doing has given a definition of certainty in knowledge, which for all its acceptable critique of pure rationalism

in knowledge, is unacceptably psychologistic and relativistic. For the opposite of pure abstract reason determining truth for all time is not a state where each individual alone determines what counts as certain. This is to replace the myth of impersonal reason with a more dangerous myth that of an entirely personal and relative reason, which is a contradiction in terms.

It follows from the above argument that it is fallacious to argue from the fact of the diversity of opinions and systems to any conclusion about the relativism of truth. For given the notion of a transcendental condition as the condition of the possibility of knowledge, it follows that this is what is shared amongst a community of knowers. And from this it follows that difference of philosophical opinion could be a result of philosophical mistakes about this. And the diversity of opinions in society and history again establishes nothing per se. They could all or mostly all be mistaken. Renouvier's position is equivalent to arguing that because the flat earth society and Copernican astronomy coexisted and contradicted each other, then there are no criteria of astronomical investigations that are shared, therefore there are none. From this it actually follows that one observed them and the other did not. His argument reveals a *petitio principii*: it is only by assuming the relativity of truth that one can see any conflict at all between the flat earth society and Copernicus. There is only a conflict if they are both assumed to be right. Again his argument reveals a Comtean prejudice - that the task of

philosophy is to unify opinions. And Renouvier concludes that since it fails to do this on factual or historical levels therefore there are no universal criteria that philosophy can establish.

Does Renouvier have to chose between the radical autonomy of consciousness and the categorial necessity implied in the laws of the understanding? He would say not, for it is practical necessity that governs both.

Section II. Practical Reason and Reality

There is only one incontestible fact of Conscience

"Le phénomène comme tel et au moment où il s'aperçoit".

Beyond this, everything is subject to doubt. But doubt doesn't imply uncertainty and therefore the impossibility of knowledge. Doubt is a sign of will: it is through will that doubt is overcome. Will as practical reason is the source of practice. All theoretical knowledge 'mere' reflection, beyond the immediate indubitable phenomenon is open to the sceptic's challenge. Doubt enters with memory and judgement. But the necessity of action implies the impossibility of the sceptic's position. And practice implies certain beliefs.

"Il n'y a pas de conduite possible sans croire ou sans faire comme celui qui croit".¹

The sceptic is forced through the necessity of action to bridge the gap between the immediate indubitable phenomenon and certain affirmations of reality. These, the sceptic can see as only illusion, but s/he is not free to avoid them. The practical necessity of action belies theoretical scepticism about reality.

The realm of certainty starts beyond the immediate phenomena. Will is central to certainty; we make our certainties, thus it follows that reality outside the phenomenon is affirmed. And since practical reason governs will, it follows that the characteristics of practical reason govern reality as affirmed by the believer. But before establishing the moral character of reality, there is a primary fundamental affirmation.

"Ainsi ma première affirmation si elle est philosophiquement réfléchi, sera une confirmation en moi de la volonté même d'affirmer sous certaines conditions"

(D.E., 1912, v. II, p 22).

That is beyond the phenomenon, I affirm a reality:

"Je peut, je dois, je veux affirmer quelque chose, la réalité de quelque chose, c'est à dire, au delà des phénomènes qui me touchent immédiatement, affirmer d'autres phénomènes liés aux premiers par des lois constant. Cette première affirmation est donc l'affirmation de la réalité, de cette réalité, dans le sens positif du mot, qui, par le groupement des phénomènes, établit des lois et des êtres: qui fait que l'immediat et l'actuel s'enchaînent au mediat, à l'absent au lointain, au possible ... C'est bien la, en effet, le commencement et la fin de toute science".

(D.E., 1912, V. II, p22-23).

The existence of other people, future and past events, the veracity of memory even rely on the affirmation of a law which connects the immediate to the mediate. There are two senses of reality here: the one is the actual phenomenon, the other the law which in enclosing a series of phenomena establishes possible terms, and allows prediction and verification. The passage from this first reality to this second, is the path from scepticism to science.

These primary affirmations are pre-reflective and spontaneous: they are based on what Renouvier calls, sounding Humean, a natural unalienable belief and are based on the most radical passion of all 'to live'. They are the foundation of the particular sciences and are the conditions of practical life. Without these affirmations the world has no reality for us.

"Le monde et la conscience ne seraient qu'illusion pour nous, si nous resistons à cette passion unique et radical et qui nous porte à affirmer la réalité des lois, conditions formelles du témoignage que nous nous rendons de notre existence et de tout connaissance possible".

(D.E., 1858, V. II, p 148-9).

The theses of reality are the following.

Firstly we affirm the reality of Conscience: that is its reality in time - that is the law of memory and thus also other functions which go beyond the immediate - judgement and reason. So we affirm the use of categories as veridical. Secondly: we affirm that we are not deceived to believe that there correspond to our sensations independent existences. Thus we affirm to put the external world into veridical relation to Conscience and its laws. Thirdly we affirm that among groups of phenomena established by law, exist other Consciences similar to us - 'Êtres pour soi'⁴. And fourthly we affirm that the world external to the laws of thought, corresponds to the laws of thought.

"Ainsi l'existence du monde de l'expérience externe, les existences individuelles, la conformité des lois de la conscience, et de celles du monde pour soi, sont les objets de cette affirmation radicale, naturelle, universelle, que l'homme, que le sceptique même est tenu d'embrasser, sous peine de suspendre et enfin d'arrêter le cours de son intelligence et de ses actes".

(D.E., 1912, V. II, p 27-28).

These affirmations Renouvier says, it is fair to call reason, understood as practical reason. Verneaux, in exasperation, remarks that Renouvier does not examine in great depth or at great length this basic natural belief which is the basis of reality. There are three factors

of it which are central. Firstly it is spontaneous; the theses of reality do not proceed from reflection, but they are necessary because they are affirmed directly by Conscience and this subjective necessity denotes an objective necessity because these judgements are 'les moins mediat qui soient possibles parmi ceux qui dépassent l'immediation des phenomenes'. Is not this spontaneity in conflict with the freedom that lies at the basis of all judgement? But for Renouvier, we submit freely to the necessity of these affirmations and freely take them on as instinctive criteria of reality. Scepticism is always possible.

The second characteristic of these natural beliefs is that ~~they are~~ universal. They impose themselves on sceptics as well. But they are not absolutely universal because there are certain 'négateurs persévérants'. Nihilisme is not impossible and anyone is free not to submit to these affirmations. But why is the sceptic forced to hold them? Because their necessity is practical. To act at all, one is forced to affirm them. So against Kant, Renouvier holds universality and necessity are united in practice as the foundation of certainty.

And finally their third characteristic is that they are reasonable, when reason is understood as practical reason. And because as Renouvier says, reason doesn't divide itself, in the human being or therefore in analysis, in this he has defined theoretical reason as well. Like Kant, he argues that practical and theoretical reason only differ by application. Thus it is the

necessity to live which founds reason: but because we can accept or reject this necessity (we can be nihilists), freedom still is the basis of reason. And freedom is understood as moral freedom not caprice or pure spontaneity, it follows certainty has a moral essence. 'C'est une assiette morale' says Renouvier.

But firstly how true is it that 'L'homme n'est jamais que l'homme pratique'? This thesis of reality as affirmed and not discovered by theoretical reason is based on this. Do we not think before we act? REflection alone is never sufficient to dispel sceptics doubts: only action is for Renouvier. But action understood in what sense? He clearly thinks it is not blind or simply impulsive. But how is action independent of theory? It must be, to be independent of the possibility of scepticism. So it must be the quality of action as pre-reflective and impulsive - in the deepest sense - that guarantees certainty for Renouvier. Is there no element of judgement which controls the practical interest which RENouvier is quite right to argue is involved in our sense of reality. But has he forced a split between theoretical reason and practical reason more severe than that entailed by Kant, by arguing that theory is never free from scepticism, whereas action per se is? For if theory now informs action it threatens to corrupt it with scepticism. If our action is without judgement then it is irrational. But if judgements inform action, and we act on the basis of judgement are we not then affirming the primacy of theoretical reason over practical?

Is he not in danger of making action irrational, rather than demonstrating the rationality of all practicality? What is then the connection between reason and action? If all reasons are equally doubtful, then action must be arbitrary.

Again if all action is practical why is it then guided by moral reason? Is Kant's argument about the mutual implication of practical reason and freedom sufficient to guarantee the moral ordering of practical realities? Why is action then not basically instrumental? This would satisfy the necessity to live. It is the transcendental argument of the Second Critique that haunts Renouvier's *Deuxième Essai* and gives it its plausibility. But he has no justification for retaining it.

Section III. Certainty and Conscience Collective

G. Milhaud said of Renouvier's theory of certainty

"Il faut accepter, en fait, parmi les elements de la certitude et dans une mesure assurément variable, des motifs tires d'une sorte de conscience collective".¹

A Conscience collective is implied by Renouvier's theory of certainty in the following manner. Certainty is a matter of individual choice and decision: once achieved by an individual it is a stable internal state within one Conscience, but not necessarily between Consciences. It varies. This variability of opinion and the basic necessity of choice creates a situation that is psychologically intolerable.

"La certitude réduite a l'individualité et à la croyance créeait une situation morale intolerable au commun des hommes, à qui manquent également l'énergie, le savoir et une inspiration propre".

(D.E., 1912, V. II, p 351).

The human being is thrown back on itself: belief based on freedom is individual and subjective in nature. There is no external, constraining evidence that all can agree on.

"Il y a donc une centre partie nécessaire de la certitude individuelle".

(D.E., 1912, V. II, p 351).

There is the pressing need to establish a kind of absolute, but where is it? Where can a universal consent be found? Beyond the minimal affirmations of reality that are pre-reflective and thus require no confirmation from others,

no universal consent on any matter of belief can be found. Can the consent of the greatest number replace the consent of all? It may be could, if the greatest number did not change. And without even a lengthy study of governments, sects and schools it is clear that it does.

"L'homme collectif change, comme l'individuel change, et qu'importe qu'il employe un temps plus ou moins long à passer de la foi au doute, on a quelque fois nouvelle! C'est la vie des nations".

(D.E., 1912, V. II, p 190-1).

Thus:

"Encore une fois, l'homme est ramené à son for intérieur. Il supporterait difficilement cette condition, même si la conscience dans laquelle il est enfermé lui parlait hautement, irrécusablement. Mais plusieurs, après qu'ils sont descendus en eux-mêmes, n'y trouvent que le désert ou le chaos, le silence ou mille voix comprises, et dans leur effroi, pressés de se fuir, se donnent au premier système qui passe. L'ombre de la certitude, une autorité extérieure leur tient lieu de conscience, et souvent ils pensent croire encore plutôt qu'ils ne croient. D'autres mais plus rares, en se sondant avec énergie et persistance, ont fait jaillir les sources vives de la certitude. Leur âmes sont d'abord pénétrées de joie: mais elles se sentent malheureuses jusqu'à ce qu'elles aient communiqué leur bien aux autres âmes. Il n'y a plus de repos pour elles dans l'isolement; il faut qu'une société se forme de toutes celles qui puisent aux mêmes eaux, il faut qu'une voix commune appelle à les partager toutes celles qui en sont altérées".

(Op. cit., p 191).

In this way religions and philosophies are founded: they are transitory systems, but reign in passing, ordering societies, establishing traditions and giving shelter for Consciences. For most human beings have neither enough strength to establish their own certainties and to stay with them. Nor are they so weak that they are shaken by each new thing.

"Incapables de convictions propres, défiants des pensées d'autrui, ce n'est qu'en se sentant appuyés et confirmé par tout ce qui les entoure qu'ils obtiennent une loi ferme et pratiquent une morale positive".

(Op. Cit. p 91).

For all, strong and weak it is an inestimable benefit to escape solitude and to share a common thinking with humanity. Although each person knows that the force of numbers and approval are uncertain foundations for knowledge yet the heart judges otherwise, and has aspirations to identify and to forge an ideal of unity.

Nothing can be absolutely certain, since each thinker produces his own certainties.

"Mais nous produisons la croyance par un effort de notre activité raisonnable et passionnée par laquelle le consentement d'autrui et l'accord même general ne sauraient être ni indifférentes ne nécessitants. La certitude ainsi produite cet accord, consentement, servent graduellement à la vérifier, à la confirmer".

(D.E., Op. cit., p 192).

Because 'la certitude est une assiette morale' the relationship between individual and collective Conscience implies a relationship between individual and society in terms of rights and duties. Certainty is a personal contract, between the individual and his/her own beliefs: against this is established a social contract which implies it.

"Toute société suppose un contrat social: je donne ce nom à l'ensemble des droits et des devoirs qui informent les consciences. C'est à dire à cette convention claire ou obscure, expresse ou tacite, explicite ou implicite, réfléchi ou instinctive, qui règle les rapports des hommes dans une communauté quelconque".

(D.E., Op. cit., p 193).

Although their personal contract logically precedes the social, this logical order is not the actual order of occurrence, because the moral person is not born in isolation "L'homme ne s'élève pas seul".

This social contract is the basis of families, cities, peoples: all are living forms of the contract.

"Le contrat fait le coutume et par elle nous entoure avant le berceau et nous enchaîne de mille manières pendant la vie".

(Op. cit.)

The principle of all social contract is to constitute an authority. But it is based on personal contract, thus each can re-establish their freedom against it. This the origin of civil liberty. It is based on consent, and is a synthesis of freedom and authority.

It is the basis of cities, philosophies and religions.* It is 'la loi vivante' of all communities and collective activity. Thus although individuals can assert their freedom against this collective authority

"Un homme ne peut se prendre pour le type unique, invariable de la vérité et de la moralité. N'est il pas fonction partielle de l'ordre social ou son existence développée? Ne tient-il pas toujours compte de l'esprit et des croyances d'autrui? Et ne pense-t-il pas se déterminer conformément aux lois générales de la conscience, c'est à dire sur le critère de l'autorité universelle, alors même qu'il résiste à l'autorité prétendu"?

(D.E., op. cit. p 193).

* As a principle of religion it presupposes human beings as united, as one. To give this authority power and sanction, ancient man devised a universal type of conscience, divine in origin, human in effect. (cf. Durkheim and religion.)

The Conscience Collective is developed as a criterion of agreement between Consciences, given Renouvier's critique of the notion of the necessary intellectual truth. For him against Kant there is no universal and necessary knowledge. Human beings find lack of agreement intolerable so they construct a social criterion of agreement in lieu of any shared truth. They ascribe an authority to this social agreement through their individual free affirmations and they seek this authority as having domination over them. And in this, they can establish a bond, a unity with others. But at the heart of this lies a freedom to accept or reject this social criterion of truth (Renouvier seems to be close to Sartre in recognising the morally intolerable nature of absolute freedom of consciousness). And because of this they ascribe authority to a social criteria which can then appear to establish what is true and right for them. But this Conscience Collective has authority over them because of their acceptance of it.

In philosophical terms this theory of an external social criterion of certainty is developed only in the context of the voluntarist, relativist theory of certainty which precedes it in terms of theoretical development. If this is false, then the notion of a Conscience Collective as that which secures agreement between Consciences is also false.

Fouillée² argued that we have shared experience, not because of an external criterion of collective agreement, but because our minds submit to the same internal and external laws: it is the laws of logic and the laws of experience that guarantee shared experience. And if this is so, there is shared experience as a natural human condition and not because of social authority. But for Renouvier this is to miss the Copernican point: that experience and its laws are intelligible precisely because of what Conscience contributes to them. Both Kant and Renouvier would say that we share experience because of what the laws of understanding, which are fundamental to the human condition, contribute to experience. That is, as laws they constitute the basis of agreement. But Renouvier disagrees with Kant that knowledge presents itself with any necessity and universality and because of this he must search for a social criteria of agreement. For Kant there is no question but that the principles of the understanding constitute the possibility of shared experience. And because of this, they are universal and necessary. But because Renouvier turns practical reason against theoretical reason and makes it author of all reason, it follows that there is no theoretically certain knowledge: there are only morally necessary actions to guarantee the orderliness of the human world.

This thesis has been questioned above. (Sec. II). If theoretical reason can have authority over practical, as judgement determining action, then it follows that

practical reason alone does not determine reality qua affirmation. It follows that if, human beings share concepts and categories in terms of what is basic to understanding at all, then they do not find the assertion of certainties a private and therefore intolerable situation. And they do not need to construct a social authority to establish agreement. Language for example, can establish a sense of shared experience and there is no choice about this, nor is there need to establish a Conscience Collective to be able to speak it. In the context of this line of reasoning, it is clear that the misunderstanding of transcendental condition has substantially altered what can count as certainty for Renouvier. For Kant, it is clear that we can be certain of the a priori - that without which we cannot think. This alone guarantees the possibility of knowledge and that it is shared. And what it is without which we cannot think, cannot be a matter of choice, even moral choice: it is a matter of conceptual necessity. And given this argument any social agreement set up to reassure us can have no epistemic authority. Rather it requires these very transcendental conditions that are inherent in the human intellect. The Conscience Collective is thus no intellectual authority. Even Renouvier admits it is no arbitrator of truth. There is no social relativism in Renouvier's argument. There is individual relativism but this is minimised by moral necessity. It follows there can be no sociology of knowledge based on it: a sociology of opinion, of necessary illusion maybe but not knowledge. It cannot arbitrate for truth, only for ~~collective~~ reassurance.

It is clear from Sec. II that what is at question here is not knowledge as discovery but knowledge as affirmation. The undertermination of reality established in the theory of contingency, ensures its plasticity to human will. REality can be made, it can be affirmed and now it is clear that it can be collectively affirmed. And since practical reason lies at the basis of affirmation for Renouvier, what they affirm are moral realities.

Thus, if philosophy is a science for REnouvier, it is clear that it is a science of practical reason. And for Durkheim, sociology is a science of practical reason. It uncovers the Conscience Collective as affirming collective realities expressed in collective representations. But on the back of these are carried collective values, which have as their goal or aim moral unity. And sociology as a science, stands to the collective will as practical reason stands to the individual will for Kant. It formulates principles of action which are implicit in reality, but clarified in theory. And with this theoretical formulation it encourages the community to affirm a new moral order for itself.

The laws of this moral order are the subject of Part IV.

Part IV. The Principles of the Moral Order.

In this part I examine the thesis of Copernicanism in its moral aspect. For Kant, Renouvier and Durkheim this is unquestionably the most important aspect of human reality. For Kant this is because in morality is found the true expression of human dignity and because in morality reason achieves its full autonomy of nature. For Durkheim it is through the moral aspect of society that the true integration of it can occur. Moral consensus lies at the heart of every healthy society. Morality is the expression of practical reason for Kant. Durkheim incorporates the moral a priori - practical reason - into his definition of society. It is from society alone that the rules, nature and end of morality are derived. In this he rehearses the thesis of Kant's moral Copernicanism that the form, nature and ends of morality are derived from practical reason itself. (The theme of moral Copernicanism is discussed in Chapter I).

At the centre of moral Copernicanism is the thesis of the Primacy of Practical Reason. This is discussed in Chapter II. However it must logically follow the establishment of morality as rational. For practical reason can triumph over theoretical reason only if it is rational. (Section I). Equally it can only do so if it is discovered. The claim of moral Copernicanism is that the principles and goals of morality can be discovered from the structure of human rationality itself. (For

Durkheim this is the structure of society). Thus the means of its discovery is crucial: hence the great importance of methodology to moral Copernicanism. In this context the discussion of transcendentalism versus naturalism is raised and continued in the discussion of how the moral a priori is to be discovered. The confusion of a priori principle with law of experience outlined in Part II is continued. Naturalism entails that there are moral facts which are facts of experience. But for transcendentalism there is only one moral fact and this is the reflexivity of practical reason itself. Yet the French Neo-Kantians, with Renouvier, start from the assumption that 'devoir faire volontaire' is a fact and as such a fact of experience, that can be formulated in terms of laws. It is in this context that Durkheim thinks he can verify Kant's sense of obligation. In Section III of Chapter II I discuss the thesis of the Primacy of Practical Reason as it appears in the thought of Kant, Renouvier and Durkheim.

That for each thinker, morality is an expression of practical reason, means that from practical reason is discovered the nature of morality, its form and its goal or end. For each, the relationship between the will of the individual and reason entails that the nature of morality is obligatory. The demands of practical reason confront the agent as necessitating. So obligation for Kant is the quintessential relationship between reason and will. For Durkheim, sanction expresses the moral

necessitation that lies at the heart of social experience. In 'sanction' is found the heart of Durkheim's social Kantianism. Society is practical reason writ large for Durkheim and its demands confront the agent as categorial and in this he writes the Kantian thesis of moral necessitation into the relationship between the agent and the collectivity. Thus Duty is the subject of Chapter III. For Kant, Renouvier and Durkheim the form morality takes is derived from the form practical reason has. For Kant this is the universality thesis. Reason is universal, but achieves its full realization in moral universalization for here it is not limited by the fragmenting conditions sense experience. Society as the moral a priori for Durkheim derives the form human action takes from the structure of society. So a healthy society achieves unity and as with Kant this unity is above all a moral unity, which is expressed in the concept of solidarity. Where this is not achieved, we have the pathology of society and this is the condition of modern industrial society, which he describes as suffering from 'an alarming poverty of morality'. The subject of Chapter IV is Unity.

And lastly for each the goal or end of morality is the autonomy of the person. In this concept, the thesis of Copernicanism received its denouement. The concept of self-legislation which is central to Copernicanism in its intellectual and moral aspects receives its fullest expression in autonomy - which is freedom understood as

self-legislation. For Durkheim modern societies above all express the autonomy of the person, which is expressed in the respect for person in the religion of humanity. And in this Durkheim reconciles freedom with necessitation. Society as the expression of moral reason reconciles necessitation with liberty in the imposition of laws from society as a reality sui generis onto the individual. Through the acceptance of moral law from society, which is following Rousseau ultimately a form of self-legislation, the full autonomy of the individual is achieved. In reconciling necessitation with freedom, Durkheim like Kant believes obligation and autonomy mutually imply each other.

So just as with Kant, the principles of morality are derived from the structure of reason so for Durkheim the principles of social order are derived from the structure of society itself. The rules (solidarity) the end (respect for the individual as autonomous) and the nature of morality (as obligatory) will all be derived from the collectivity if it is fully spontaneous and therefore self-regulating. And as for Kant this is only fully achieved in its moral sense. Just as for Kant the forces which militate against the full autonomy of practical reason are the forces of inclination, so for Durkheim the forces that militate against the spontaneous self-regulation of the community are the forces of economic self-interest. From this derives the force of the critique of political economy and utilitarianism in Durkheim's thought. For Durkheim utilitarianism is the intellectual expression of the pathology

of the collectivity. Durkheim's arguments against political economy reflect Kant's arguments against utilitarianism. (Chapter III, Section IV).

It was Renouvier who convinced Durkheim through his critique of Kant's formalism and dogmatism in retaining the noumenon as the source of moral freedom - that the laws of practical reason could be achieved in reality ie. in the phenomenal sphere. Renouvier's attempt to make noumenal interest compatible with phenomenalism thus achieves its fullest expression here. Given his thesis outlined in Part III that practical reason governs all reality, not just the sphere opened up by the noumenon, it follows for Durkheim that these are not just the laws of morality, but indeed cover all of human reality. The thesis of reality as affirmed (and not as discovered) that was outlined in Part III means that societies, groups of 'Consciences' can affirm new realities. Affirmation is based on the essential voluntarism of consciousness. This is governed by practical reason. Sociology is the voice of collective practical reason for Durkheim and in this has a unique role in articulating the affirmation of new social realities. Morality thus dominates human reality for Renouvier and for Durkheim: this is expressed in sanction as the mediating link between the individual and the collectivity. Renouvier's influence is crucial in transforming Kantianism into social and political terms through his critique of dogmatism in Kant.

Just as Renouvier is again simultaneously disciple and critic of Kant so also is Durkheim here. He is a disciple in retaining firstly the idea of the full rationality of morality. Moral phenomena represent a set of intelligible data. They express the workings of society: reason stems from society as reality sui generis and the science of sociology he claims is fully adequate to analyse the workings of society in moral terms. And secondly the thesis of Copernicanism in morality. Society draws its rules and goals from itself and imposes them on its members ie. itself. There is no authority beyond the collectivity. Sociology is the voice of the collectivity and this gives it its unique authority. It can only direct in so far as it guides, what is implicit in the community albeit often, in modern societies, in an undeveloped and damaged form.¹ A healthy community is self-regulating: it achieves order and stability by imposing its own rules and norms on itself. An unhealthy society is one that has lost this, eg. in industrial societies with the dominance of economic interests over moral interest. And thirdly the expressions of both, of practical reason is in duty, unity and autonomy. But he is a critic in his conception of society as the source of the a priori.

"How can reason, which is postulated as outside of things and beyond reality, establish the laws of the moral order, if, as we have established, such laws express the nature of the concrete reality that is society".

(M.E., p 113).

Rather against Kant he insists

"Society is not a stranger to the moral world ...
It is on the contrary the necessary condition of
its existence".

(D.L., p 399).

Is he in this rejecting the autonomous foundation for morality that is central to Kant's ethics? He is, if by autonomous is meant the separation of the noumenal from the phenomenal. But in following Renouvier and identifying noumenal interest with the phenomenal order, it does not therefore follow that the thesis of autonomy as central to morality is lost. The community must be spontaneous in its self-regulation says Durkheim: only if the community has autonomy over economic self-interest will the crisis of modern society be overcome. Durkheim reworks Kant's thesis of autonomy in terms of the spontaneity of the collectivity.

Durkheim is a critic of Kant in the relativism of his view of ethics. For Kant moral rules in so far as objective are right for all rational creatures. For Durkheim the content of moral rules will change according to society and history. But the nature and function of moral rules never varies for Durkheim: it is by their form and their nature (as universal and obligatory) that they direct moral life in the community. And from within each society, in periods of stability, these rules appear absolute in their demand and universally right. By the distinction between form and content, Durkheim reconciles the a priority of social rules with relativity of content.

So that there are social rules is essential to the life of the community: the change in content does not affect this. After Renouvier the post Kantians did not regard reason as universal in determining right conduct for eternity, but reason is now practical reason based on essential voluntarism of consciousness. This however is always determined by practical reason which is expressed in duty.

Lastly and most importantly he is a critic of Kant in terms of the method by which morality can be explained. It is part of the realm of 'historic and social causes' and not some 'transcendental realm'. The misunderstanding of 'transcendental' continues here and affects the post-Kantian interpretation of moral methodology. The dominance of naturalism entails that morality can be treated as a series of facts, which can appear in representation as any other aspect of human reality. This for Durkheim is the 'scientific' interpretation of morality as opposed to the transcendent.

The nature of the analysis changes somewhat in Part IV. Here the Kantian influence is so explicit, that it is no longer necessary to treat Durkheimian thought as the explanandum and Kantian thought as the explicandum with Renouvier as the intermediary. In Chapters III, IV and V I treat Duty, Unity and Autonomy as themes of discussion and analyse their treatment by each thinker respectively, in the context of Copernicanism. For example, in Chapter III I raise the question of whether the concept of ~~Duty is compatible~~ with moral Copernicanism at all:

and I treat each thinker as actually having failed to establish the concept as central to morality.

Chapter I. Copernicanism and Morality.

In this chapter I outline the main features of Kant's Copernican Revolution in ethics. In this he establishes that the principles governing morality stem from the rational will of the agent. In this he simultaneously demonstrates the autonomy and the rationality of moral action. Moral principles are not based on any heteronomous principles on any external authority or fact of experience.

It is this revolution in thinking about morality that allowed Durkheim to interpret the morality of a collectivity as self-derived and autonomous of individual interest or feeling. Morality is characterized by impersonality and this is derived from the collectivity. The rules that govern action are derived from the community. It is from the moral a priori that the principles governing action derive. Durkheim defines the community as the moral a priori. In this sense again, he is transferring the interests of reason to the collectivity. And in this he relies on the Kantian revolution in ethics for his definition of the nature of collective morality.

Section I. Moral Copernicanism and the Revolution in Perspectives.

Kant's moral Copernicanism is concerned with establishing morality as stemming from practical reason. It is the triumph of the Copernican Revolution for Kant in the following sense. There are two stages to the Copernican Revolution. The first was Kant's reaction against the prevailing naturalist view of the human agent, who as part of nature was viewed as subservient to its laws. It is clear from Part II that the revolution in perspectives in epistemology was to invert this order and to establish the dependency of nature, as known, on the human cognitive faculties. The second stage of this is to transcend this and to judge the natural world as unable to support the destiny of mankind. All laws for Kant have their origin in reason, but theoretical laws, outlined in the First Critique have a sensuous condition as a criterion of their significance, whereas moral laws do not. In this sense they point to the full autonomy of reason from factual conditions for Kant. Moral laws are not restricted to 'what is' and therefore can establish 'what ought to be'. Kant's position is that reason, which has its interest in unity and autonomy, does not find its demands satisfied in what is presented as actual: these demands can only be satisfied in a moral universe realisable through the will of the human agent. The discrepancy between what experience presents and what reason demands

appears as practical interest in moral law, which because it concerns what ought to be, cannot be satisfied in what is. The Copernicanism of this position is shown in that the rational claim on the action of the agent, stems from the reason of the agent. And for Kant it is an authoritative law of action only because it is self imposed. The will of the agent in moral action is not restricted in the drive towards the moral ideal by the restrictions of sense.

It has been pointed out in Part II that the Copernican Revolution had as its aim the unity of subject and object. In the revolution in perspectives on morality, Kant attempts to establish that ends or goals of morality are established by reason itself. John Silber¹ argues that the Copernican Revolution is essentially a relationship between the will and its objects, such that this is a necessitation without being a determinism. Pre-Copernican ethical theories could not explain the connection between the moral will and its objects except as relating either contingently or as causal determinant. The latter destroys freedom whilst the former shows no binding of the will. If the ends of morality are successfully derived from reason itself, then the search for the unity of subject and object which for Vuillemin is the heart of Copernican Revolution, will be found in this moral revolution in perspectives. In this sense, as George Vlachos² shows, the Copernican Revolution signifies a philosophical achievement such that the human being can no longer be seen to be passive in moral action, accepting as 'right' demands

from any external authority be it religious or political: the human agent is the author of its own actions. It is a conception of the relationship between the agent and its moral world as 'essentiellement cinétique'. This stands opposed to traditional static, social/political/ethical theories, which spell an authoritarian relationship between will and moral order. Here in contrast the moral order depends on the will and its laws.

This same line of reasoning can be examined in relation to the unconditioned and conditioned. The Copernican Revolution put the conditioned (experience) into relation with the unconditioned the forms of *be* understanding, which are ordered by reason as the faculty of principles. The unconditioned is the *a priori*, which here has only relative autonomy because of the sensory condition of knowledge. The interest of the Copernican Revolution is the autonomy of reason, the *a priori*, because only if it has at least some degree of autonomy over fact, can it order it, to establish knowledge. But practical reason because it does not depend on the data of sense for the foundation of principles, can achieve an absolute autonomy. So in Practical Reason we can find the unconditioned in relation to which the order of the moral universe is determined. And the unconditioned for Kant is the yet to be achieved.

It was outlined in Part II that Renouvier's phenomenalism disputes any unconditioned in terms of knowledge. There are facts and laws. relating in terms

of higher and lower levels of abstraction. There can be no fixed ie. pre-experiential, forms of human knowledge. In Part III, it was clear that following his aim to make noumenal interest compatible with phenomenal experience, he identifies will with consciousness in his theory of automotivité. Will points to freedom as practical reason as a source of order in the world; and this for Renouvier is a source of the unconditioned. In this, it is clear that Renouvier tackled the post-Kantian problem of relating the noumenal to the phenomenal, by altering the phenomenal such that it not only accommodated practical reason, but that practical reason became the source of all reason. It has been doubted whether this was successful, but in Renouvier's own eyes, it allowed him to support the Copernican Revolution in morality and to claim that only he had successfully carried it out. And it allows him to claim that he has had identified practical interest with human experience discoverable within the laws of experience; the unconditioned, in contrast to Kant, is discoverable within human experience. This is the precondition for the development of normative sociology. In this he has 'reconciled' science and ethics. Indeed practical reason is the foundation of science. This for him is the heart of the Copernican Revolution.

Renouvier identifies and supports the anthropocentrism of the Copernican Revolution.

"Il résulte de la que l'antropocentrism ... est une doctrine attachée aux postulats de la raison pratique".

The essence of the Copernican Revolution is the Principle of Relativity. The basic principle of Neo-Criticisme is the relativity of 'connaissance' to the a priori laws of the human spirit. In theoretical reason, it demonstrates the relativity of knowledge to consciousness and its laws. In relation to practical reason, it goes further again and establishes the relativity of metaphysics itself to the moral laws of Conscience. The Copernican Revolution signifies for Renouvier that ethics dominates metaphysics. The philosophical renewal that he sees in the Kantian system, the positive part of Criticisme, lies in the primacy of practical reason.

"Le Criticisme renouvelle la philosophie en faisant poser sur la raison pratique, c'est à dire sur l'ordre moral, les seules inductions rationnelles qu'il soit possible de tirer de la nature humaine que nous connaissons, à la destinée humaine ignorée et aux conditions générales de l'ordre du Monde".

(C.P., 1872 I, 2).

Thus the Copernican Revolution discovers the relativity of knowledge to Conscience and then the relativity of the laws of conscience themselves to the postulates of practical reason. Its essence for Renouvier is thus that postulates replace dogmas. This does not mean an insecurity in knowledge but greater security because now what is held to be right is based on what Conscience spontaneously demands. This is the true foundation of action and therefore all knowledge.

"En effet, les notions morales en tant qu'elles demandent certaines croyances parties de la conscience et étendues à l'ordre du monde donnent à ces dernières un fondement semblable

à celui qui reste seul aussi par les vérités de l'ordre logique, affirmées universelle et nécessaires par une philosophie qu'cherche dans les formes de l'esprit humaine le propre et le dernier appui de toute affirmation échappent au contrôle de l'expérience"³

Section II. Moral Anthropology.

Moral Copernicanism means that the ends and rules of morality are not derived from any external source or authority, but from the subject itself. This establishes the theme of moral anthropology which is a study of the rules immanent in the subject. This was initiated by Kant in terms of transcendental philosophy: the discovery of the rules immanent in the subject for a transcendental enquiry is to discover the answer to the question how is morality possible? For Renouvier, who rejected the transcendental with the noumenon, and associated Kantian method with an observation of the laws of ^{mind} ('l'esprit'), it follows that discovering the rules of the subject is a form of observation of the laws of experience as regulated by Conscience. The naturalism of this approach entails that these rules are forms of fact available at the level of experience for observation and analysis.

The significance of moral rules for Kant is that as a priori, they are supposed to regulate conduct at the level of experience through an unconditional demand of practical reason. Renouvier's reconciliation of noumenal interest with phenomenal experience entails that the noumenal is identified with the laws of experience. In this, it ceases to be unconditioned in the Kantian sense. And in this, does it follow that the demands of practical reason can still be represented in experience as an unconditional demand? The logic of

naturalism entails that as part of experience it can only be a fact or a law. And as such how can practical reason per se represent itself as an unconditional condition of action or a source of absolute moral authority? The authority of the voice of practical reason for Kant is its absolute independence of the conditions of sense. But for Renouvier, what autonomy do the laws of Conscience have over all the other conditions of experience, which they must regulate if will is to establish the moral order of the universe - the aim of the Copernican Revolution? The thesis of the irreducibility of the category of Conscience must bear the weight not just of the epistemological ordering of the world, but now of the moral ordering of the world. As irreducible, are the fundamental laws of Conscience (ie. practical reason) sufficient to establish the authority of will over experience? It has already been doubted in Part II whether the a priori can be distinguished from experience by the thesis of irreducibility. If laws are themselves general facts, which the logic of naturalism dictates, how then do they distinguish themselves from concrete particular facts which they should rule? This is a problem for epistemology, but a more severe problem for morality because the essence of Copernican Revolution is the relativity of experience to moral laws of Conscience. The autonomy of moral laws of Conscience must be established for this to be possible. But to appear in experience, they must become fact or law. And as such how do they acquire the necessary autonomy?

It could be argued against this, that Renouvier's theory has established that human experience is permeated by the interests of practical reason, through the arguments of Part III. That is he does not retain the definition of experience Kant did. For Kant experience without reason is ruled by contingency, in its theoretical sense and by inclination in the moral sense. And it is this that requires the intervention of reason and gives it its authority. For Renouvier, phenomenalism entails that there can be no reference to experience without the laws of Conscience. Experience thus presents itself to consciousness as already permeated by Conscience and its moral interest. It follows for Renouvier that experience must already have the qualities of practical reason. In which case it is already 'moralized'. Renouvier is now open to the question, what is wrong with the human condition if by definition it is sufficiently 'moralized'?

Kant in contrast can present the interests of his moral philosophy in encouraging the development of practical reason to control inclination. The point of Moral Anthropology for Kant is the discovery of the rules of morality as inherent in moral reason so that they can be articulated and formulated. And the point of this is that they can then help moral practice. The point of moral philosophy is to aid reason gaining autonomy over the forces of inclination. Renouvier could reply that the point of

outlining practical reason is to encourage the implementation of freedom, which although available is rarely acted on. But again, the confusion of principles with laws of experience could have the unfortunate conclusion for Renouvier, that if freedom is the law of all laws, it follows that all experience is free. More particularly it poses the problem as to when an experience is described as voluntaristic and when it is not.

This problem as to whether moral anthropology can be either transcendental and empirical as an enquiry entails a further and important question for the nature of the rules of morality as discovered within it. For Kant, the rules of morality as the a priori discovered within a transcendental enquiry establish themselves as the unconditional conditions of action. Duty is unconditional for example. But if these rules are part of experience itself, in what sense are these rules unconditional? This is particularly important for Durkheim who wants to present the demands of society as having an unconditional authority over the agent as a matter of the moral health of society. Why retain categorical as well as hypothetical and imperatives? These questions will be tackled in later chapters.

Chapter II. Reason and Action.

In this chapter I examine Kant's thesis of the rationality of action. In establishing that action is fully rational, he laid the first condition for a science of action and a science of ethics in particular. For Kant, of course, there could be no science of ethics, in the sense of science outlined in the First Critique. In the Third Antinomy he opposes morality and science as antithetical perspectives on action. In Part III I examined Renouvier's critiques of this and how for him there is no conflict between theoretical and practical reason as the latter is the condition of all human reason. It follows from his view of science that firstly science is based on action (as freedom is the condition of knowledge) and secondly actions can appear to Conscience; action is a fact of consciousness like any other fact. But in this he conceals the nature of such facts: for Kant there is fact of practical reason and this is its reflexivity. Renouvier's naturalism means this can only be another fact or law. Durkheim's Science of Ethics follows Renouvier in claiming that there are moral facts available to methods of science. And for him duty is one of these facts. In so doing he translates the reflexivity of moral experience into a fact or law of experience.

The problems of the methods of ethics for Durkheim stem from this attempt to treat morality as fact or phenomena like any other. But he builds the idea of reflexivity into his idea of the moral life of the community. As the science of reason, it determines rules and ends of action for itself and it applies these to itself. This it does because it is the a priori - the source of universality and necessity and the source of impersonality which characterises moral action. Again the question is raised how can the a priori be a fact of experience? The central confusion of Neo-Criticisme goes to the heart of Durkheim's science of ethics. And means rather than his Science of Ethics being the answer to the divisions and abstractions of Kantian ethics, it is to this we must return to understand fully what is meant by the reflexivity of moral experience and how it can be analysed.

Lastly in Section III I look at the thesis of the Primacy of Practical Reason, taken as the central platform of Renouvier's Neo-Kantianism.

Section I. The Rationality of Action

There are two senses of the rationality of action for Durkheim. Firstly, that morality is a rational social phenomena at the level of the collectivity itself. Secondly it is rational in that it consists in sets of intelligible relationships, which are available to the methods of science. This second sense I will deal with in the section of the methods of ethics.

For Durkheim there is a communal rationality which establishes both the rules and goals of action. It is the function of a healthy moral consensus to determine the rules and goals of action within a community. This appears to occur spontaneously in a primitive society where the collective unity is characterized by a tightly wrought Conscience Collective. It does not happen spontaneously in an advanced industrial society and this is its pathology. The point of sociology is to attempt to foster the conditions for its occurrence in a community. This collective moral rationality is practical reason at the communal level, and it is this which is the foundation of morality for Durkheim. In Kantian terms, this collective moral reason is constitutive of action. That is from itself alone, the community establishes rules and ends of action. It is not merely regulative of the ends of action determined by individuals or private interest; it is constitutive of action at the communal level.

This thesis of Durkheim rests on the Kantian thesis of the rationality of action and of the thesis of practical reason as constitutive of action and not merely regulative of ends set by desire. It requires of course Renouvier's critique for this thesis to become operable in terms of a human science.

Kant was the first in the European tradition to give reason per se a constitutive and directive role of both the form and content of morality. He was unique in claiming that 'rational' is not restricted in its use to 'cognitive'. He differentiated himself, for example, from Aristotle who claimed that reason alone cannot move us, and from Hume who believed that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. Durkheim's science of social action relies on the transformation of thought effected in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Sociology discovers the sources of action in social reason and gains its rationale in guiding the community in its search for principles and goals of action. For Kant the task facing a practical philosophy is the insufficient rationality of the human agent - that they are determined by 'inclination'. For Durkheim the problems facing the science of social action in its normative sense is that in modern society the forces of social rationality do not triumph over economic individualism. Central to Kant's aim in outlining the rationality of action is the liberation of the authority of reason. An essential preparation of this is the critique of those theories which compromise it.

For Kant this is mainly empiricism and in particular utilitarianism and his task in the Critique of Practical Reason is to show that empiricist theories of morality are insufficient to establish the principles of morality. So for Durkheim, the forces of political economy, with their theoretical expression in the work of the utilitarians, militate against the spontaneous development of rules and values by the collectivity.

"My major concern is to free morality from sentimental subjectivism which hinders its progress and is a form of empiricism or mysticism, two closely related ways of thinking".

(D.M.F., p 67).

The prime task of the Critique of Practical Reason is to show that reason can and does determine conduct of itself alone. Only reason can supply universal and necessary principles of action. The central question of the Critique of Practical Reason is this

"Is pure reason sufficient of itself to determine the will or is it only as empirically conditioned that it can do so?"

(C.P.R., p 15).

His effort in both the *Groundwork* and the Second Critique is to show that non-rational decisions for action are neither internally consistent, necessarily binding, nor universal in application.

How does Kant establish this? He attempts this in "Of the Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason". The objective reality of Practical Reason cannot be established by theoretical reason. However, he argues

that in the Third Antinomy of the First Critique, freedom had to be assumed to prevent reason falling into contradiction. The importance of freedom is that it replaces intuition as the condition of the applicability of concepts in the Second Critique. In terms of practical reason we are talking about the possibility of action and for Kant we cannot act at all unless we are free. Whereas sensory intuition is the condition of the objectivity of concepts in theoretical knowledge, freedom is the condition of the possibility of action. In a moral order, 'the will is the cause of its own objects'. Whilst in a natural system, the will is subject to them.

But to establish that reason can determine conduct, he needs more than a negative definition of freedom. The moral law adds the positive dimension: it is the proof for Kant that reason can be practical. There is a fact which demonstrates that pure reason can be practical.

"This fact is autonomy in the principle of morality by which reason determines the will to action".

(C.P.R., p 43).

But he admits

"How this consciousness of the moral law - or what amounts to the same thing - how this consciousness of freedom is possible cannot be further explained: its permissibility is established in the theoretical critique".

(C.P.R., p 47).

However he only establishes the possibility of freedom by the admission of the noumenon: that is freedom is only possible in terms of the First Critique by admission

of an intelligible causality, which transcends experience. He only establishes the rationality of action by flouting the criterion of significance of reason. Further he is using the moral law as a positive proof of the rationality of action when he has admitted in the Groundwork that moral consciousness may be illusory and duty a delusion.

Kant uses the idea of a fact of pure reason in this argument to establish the rationality of action. L.W. Beck¹ says there is a distinction between the consciousness of the moral law which can be said to exist and the moral law itself. Kant's argument is faulty because although we can admit there is consciousness of the moral law, this does not imply the law itself. But there is a sense of fact for practical reason that Kant can be said to be using. There are no facts for practical reason because there is no intuition. But there is a fact of practical reason as known reflexively. We know of practical reason through its operation alone. For Kant this is the sole fact of practical reason. Practical reason reflexively establishes that reason can be practical. This reflexive argument concerns the a priori grounds of normativity which cannot be reasoned about except by making appeal to those very conditions themselves. The practicality of reason is established in a transcendental argument which points to the reflexive character of practical reason.

Renouvier in rejecting the noumenon had rejected one of Kant's props of the practicality of reason. However he did not manage to reject or refute the argument about

reasons own reflexivity. For him the practicality of reason can be established by a form of internal observation.

He says there is a double foundation that is necessary and sufficient to establish morality.

"L'homme est doué de la raison et se croit libre"

(S.M., p 1)

The first condition of morality is reflection and deliberation. Reason is the capacity for reflection, comparison and judgement. It also includes the self consciousness of reason - that the agent knows s/he is judging or deliberating. In this Renouvier believes that he has retained the Copernicanism of Kant's position.

"L'agent a établi l'ordre en lui par sa raison et par sa volonté"

(S.M., p 29)

And he believes that this is a more consistent Copernicanism for he has eradicated the noumenon, the source of Kantian dogmatism, and an impossible foundation for morality.

Renouvier criticises the formalism of Kant's definition of pure practical reason and amends it such that all action is

"En vue du bien"

(S.M., p 2)

All action is towards an end that presents itself as desirable to the agent. He says this is not a condition per se of morality but that the concept of action is not understandable without it. He introduces the Principle of Finality which responds to the faculty of desire and of which the idea of good is an application. Renouvier says that Finality and Freedom are the two principles which dominate all critiques of reason. But he cannot make appeal to a notion of absolute finality, meaning transcendent final cause; he means ends which are the objects of our desires.

"La fin est identique au bien"*

(S.M., p 218, 1st edition, 1869).

Thus he combines the intellectual with the sensible and makes desire a rule fixed by reason.

In Part II, I showed that Renouvier criticized Kant's distinction between reason and understanding by the absolute nature of its objects. For Kant reason can establish a foundation of morality without the intervention of feeling, desire or conflict from theoretical knowledge. It has been argued above that Kant has the greatest difficulty in establishing the rationality of pure practical reason as an absolute foundation for morality. Renouvier in rejecting reason per se sidesteps these issues. But it is clear from Part III that practical reason is the foundation not just of morality but also knowledge. For him there is thus no special claim to be

* In this Renouvier is reversing what for Kant is the essence of the Copernican Revolution in ethics: that good is not determined independently of universal rules immanent in human reason. See J. Silber, op. cit.

made for the foundation of morality as distinct from knowledge. For him they are both sides of the same coin, phenomena and their laws

"Le principe de la loi, si son empire est reconnu, implique une double consultation, une double soumission. Nous avons d'un côté les catégories de la raison, de l'autre l'impératif: ce sont deux faces de l'ordre des relations à avouer et à respecter: l'une logique, l'autre morale".

(A.P., 1896, p 62).

It was argued that in this, Renouvier extended the categorical imperative as the foundation of knowledge, not just of morality. He was extending the circularity of Kant's foundation of morality to knowledge. We know morality is rational because of the moral law: yet the moral law can only be true if there is pure practical reason. (And I examined how this became the foundation of his theory of certainty).

So he takes duty, expressed in the moral imperative as a fact of Conscience, which it is the task of science to simply record: it is a phenomenon by its appearance to Conscience. But from the above critique of Beck it is clear that it is a fact of a special sort: a reflexive fact and this is obscured in Renouvier's phenomenalism.

The question for Renouvierism is what is the uniquely rational foundation of ethics that he insists on? Reason can no longer be the pure reason of Kant, applied to action. Human rationality itself relies on a moral hypothesis, we have seen in Part III this moral hypothesis rests without foundation. For Kant the

foundation of practical reason can only be reflexive. For Renouvier it rests on a free choice: a choice we could avoid if we were nihilists. But if we want to live we cannot avoid this choice. But we only know the reality of choice through the phenomenon of Duty.

The point is, in this context, there can no longer be an absolutely pure rational foundation of morality. As Fouillée² argues

"Ce que M. Renouvier entend par la raison, c'est simplement l'intelligence ... c'est l'entendement tel que Hobbes, Helvetius, Bentham l'admettent".

But reason on this view can no longer be constitutive of action it must now be regulative of ends fixed by desire. And Renouvier admits

"Elle intervient dans les actes humaines plutôt pour les régler que les inspirer"³

Renouvier insists that this critique leaves the characteristic qualities of the Kantian definition of morality intact and he insists that reason is the basis of action and its nature is synthetic a priori, which is compatible with its existence in the phenomenal order. But from Kant's point of view, if reason can no longer be constitutive of action in its practical aspect, then it cannot be a priori. A regulative reason, coordinating the ends fixed by desire would be the reasoning characteristic of utilitarianism. (In particular rule-utilitarianism).

And in this it would not be a foundation for duty or autonomy.

Durkheim following Renouvier holds that moral reason is evident in the phenomenal order and available to the methods of observation of science. But can science record the sense of morality meant by Kant in his definition of practical reason?

Section II. The Methods of Ethics.

The Copernican nature of morality entails a concern with methods of ethics as a paramount concern for a practical philosophy, for the question of finding out what reason, immanent in the agent, demands of the action of the agent is crucial.

In the last section I argued that Durkheim's sense of the rationality of the community carries the meaning of practical reason for Kant. The community engenders rules and norms of action which it imposes on itself and by this it regulates itself. The community thus has a self-legislative relationship to itself. The community controls itself through rules which it has itself developed. The morality of communal life has this unique capacity to develop stability and coherence that no individual action alone could establish. These moral rules have a reflexive character: they are developed by communal rationality and they refer back to the community and the demands of the community are perceived by the community as absolute.

How can a science record the nature of this characteristic of the community? The aim of science is to articulate which is revealed in social action: to transform into scientific terms what is spontaneous.

"The moralist works out the reasons methodologically thus all these speculations either are or aspire to be scientific. This differentiates them from the spontaneous judgement of the collectivity".¹

But what science is adequate to deal with this?

"Reason as I understand it is simply science, the science of morality".

(D.M.F., p 67)

The division of labour is an attempt

"To treat the facts of the moral life according to the methods of positive sciences".

(D.L., p 32).

He says by this he does not mean an attempt to deduce ethics from one of the positive sciences, ie. from the facts of psychology, biology or even sociology. He wants to establish a science of ethics 'which is quite different'. For Durkheim this means recognizing that ethics develops

"In history and in the realm of historic causes"

(D.L., p 33).

"The moral law, then is formed transformed and maintained in accordance with changing demands; these are the only conditions the science of ethics tries to determine".

(D.L., p 33).

In the Appendix to the Division of Labour he argues against both deductive and inductive methods in ethics. Both rationalists and empiricists are "summary and premature" in relation to the principles of morality. They begin with a concept of man and deduce ideals from it: but the criteria by which 'moral' is ascribed to phenomena must be based on scientific truth. What must be established is the function of ethics and this is established through the observation of moral facts (ie. the multitude of particular rules governing conduct). This will establish

that instead of 'moral verities', coming from a 'transcendental source'* there are relativities according to time and place.

The scientific criteria by which moral facts can be recognised is that they are rules of conduct to which a sanction is attached. Moral rules are thus obligatory as perceived in the normal conscience (ie. that which is most general in society). Sanction he says derives from the feeling of obligation: the sentiment of obligation is not the result of the sanction. It is because of this that it can symbolise it.

"And as this symbol has the great advantage of being objective, accessible to observation and even to measurement, it is a good method to prefer it to the thing it represents".

(D.L., p 426).

Following Renouvier Durkheim claims that

"Moral facts are phenomena like any other: they consist of rules of action recognizable by certain distinctive characteristics".

(D.L., Pref. p 32).

This follows from Renouvier's definition of phenomenalism where he extends Kantian definition of the phenomena beyond the criterion of sense intuition, so that anything which has the characteristic of appearing can be said to be a phenomenon. Thus morality in rules of action can be a phenomenon. Facts are groups of phenomena: it follows that moral facts are phenomena like any other. But are they facts like any other? No: the characteristic

* Note the misunderstanding of transcendental used as meaning transcendent.

of moral rules is their reflexivity centering on obligation as the unique feature of morality. Durkheim has built this Kantian characteristic into the meaning of a social moral rule: how can this be adequately represented in the science that records and analyses it?

For Kant, the method appropriate to the a priori nature of morality is the transcendental method, which he employs in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Groundwork. The starting point of this is the moral judgement of the ordinary man. Beck says that the moral judgement of every man is the true starting point of the Kantian moral philosophy. For Kant a characteristic of dogmatic moral thinking is to locate the origin of the moral law outside the will of the agent. Central to the Copernican position is the task of discovering what lies within the will of the agent as the origin of morality. For Kant this is to uncover practical reason as the condition of the possibility of morality.

In both the Groundwork and the Second Critique he starts with a problem presented by ordinary experience to philosophical analysis and reaches his conclusion by attempting to demonstrate that there is only one principle that is capable of rendering that experience intelligible. F.J. Benton² suggests that the essential features of transcendental arguments is that they appeal to the conditions of possible experience and these are framework questions. So what is established in Kant's transcendental argument for practical reason is that pure practical reason

in the form of the moral law, is the framework for moral action. Hintikka³ argues that transcendental arguments are concerned with establishing the constructive activity of consciousness. And in analyzing this constructive activity, one cannot help making appeal to that itself. This is elucidated by Bubner's⁴ argument that - Only that knowledge is transcendental in which knowledge is thematised concerning its specific qualities.

So for Kant practical reason reveals its own condition - freedom. The existence of the moral law reveals freedom as the condition of its own possibility. There are no non-normative grounds for explaining the existence of practical reason as the framework for all questions about moral action. We cannot move outside morality to 'deduce' (ie. justify) it: it has an autonomous foundation. The justification for practical reason is the moral law itself. The methodological aspect of Kant's Copernican Revolution in morality reveals self referentiality as basic to transcendental argument.

Durkheim although he clearly uses the idea of reflexivity as central to communal moral reasoning, does not adopt a method that can deal with it. And in this he follows Renouvier.

Renouvier follows Cousin in his misunderstanding of the method appropriate to analyzing the a priori: the transcendental method is a form of observation of

the laws of the human 'spirit'. It has already been analysed in Part II how a method of observation cannot establish the reflexivity of the transcendental method proper. Observation cannot establish the operations of the understanding for it employs these very operations. Only the notion of self-referentiality can stop the circularity entailed here. So observation cannot record how a community is capable of establishing norms by which it regulates itself. If social reason is reflexive, then the method of the science which analyses it must be so also.

Further Durkheim is clearly using the Conscience Collective as the moral a priori: it is that without which morality could not occur. As social reason it is the condition of the possibility of morality. How can observation alone record this? Just as in Part II, I argued that the method of empiricism is not adequate to deal with the a priori, so here I argue that the method of empiricism is not adequate to deal with the claims Durkheim is making about the nature of social morality. It is Renouvier who encouraged Durkheim into the incorporation of the above features into his definition of social morality and Renouvier who encouraged him into thinking these features are analysable in terms of a science dealing with facts. It is in Renouvier's 'Science de la Morale' that we find these confusions.

Here in 'Digressions sur la Morale en tant que Science' he argues that only Kant's 'Criticisme' and his own Neo

Criticisme confound morality as a science without being dogmatic, to establish

"Une doctrine qui n'est pas une doctrine".

Morality like the sciences is founded on fact, but of a more contentious nature. The fact on which morality is based is 'le devoir faire volontaire'. This fact points to practical reason and freedom: it is a fact which is a living act. Following from Part III, it is clear that this fact of voluntary obligation points to the foundation of morality as lying in a moral hypothesis. And this points to its method. The method of Neo-Criticisme is the recognition of practical reason alone as capable of establishing moral principles. Method thus is

"La Primauté dans la morale dans l'esprit humaine à l'égard de l'établissement possible ou non des vérités transcendentes desquelles on prétendit jadis, inversement, déduire la morale. Le Criticisme subordonne tous les inconnus aux phénomènes, tous les phénomènes à la conscience, et dans la conscience même, la raison théorique à la raison pratique".

(S.M., I, p 92 1st ed)

Kant in 'The Methodology of Pure Practical Reason' says

"We understand by methodology the way in which we can secure to the laws of pure practical reason access to the human mind and an influence on its maxims".

(C.P.R., p 155).

The Copernican method is an encouragement of those springs of action that it also uncovers as conditions. The point of moral methodology is to strengthen what it finds. So for Renouvier morality as a science demands

the construction of postulates not which are totally demonstrated as in geometry, but which will establish an agreement between 'Consciences' and this is made by action, not discovered by reflection. So when he says morality is independent of dogma, this means it must be independent of religious and metaphysical dogma.

In Part III, it was made clear how for Renouvier if freedom is the condition of knowledge, it is also the condition of science. Thus it is no surprise that for him following Kant, freedom is involved in this very foundations of morality. With reason it is one of the two necessary and sufficient conditions of morality. But as for Kant, freedom and practical reason reciprocally imply each other. When Renouvier talks of a scientific morality founded on facts, it must be born in mind that the basic 'fact' is that of 'devoir faire volontaire' and this is itself the only positive proof of freedom.

Liberty is thus at the foundation of the science of morality for Renouvier; what is needed in an undogmatic morality is a freer spirit, free of dogmatic prejudices whether of science or religion. And this sloughing off of prejudices is effected by practical reason. And to effect this a school concerned with morality as a science must be founded; and when this is done solidarity will be added to liberty as a foundation of a new scientific morality.* On this definition of morality

* In this Renouvier appears to be pointing forward to the establishing of the Durkheimian school as fostering solidarity as the condition of moral renewal in society.

as a science Renouvier claims he is justified in dealing with the nature of morality as elementary facts of Conscience. Duty and Autonomy are such 'facts'.

Before I pass to an examination of these 'facts' of moral conscience, it is necessary to look at what the thesis of the primacy of practical reason consists in.

Section III. The Primacy of Practical Reason.

For Durkheim it is morality alone that is capable of furnishing the consensus that is basic to the unity that society needs.

"Morality is the least indispensable, the strictly necessary, the daily bread without which society cannot exist".

(D.L. p 51).

The task of sociology is to discover the conditions for the autonomous functioning of moral consensus in the advanced division of labour. And it should support these conditions through its nature as a science and its educational status. Kant's sense of moral method as making the interests of reason practically effective receives its dénouement in Durkheim's sociology which teaches the importance of acting in terms of the collective interest.

The autonomous functioning of the moral conscience of the collective can only come about if it is relieved from the dominance of economic/material interests in society. The aim of his sociology is to argue for the subordination of economic needs to the moral needs of the collectivity. So just as Kant says that for moral progress to be possible, practical reason must have primacy over empirical maxims, Durkheim claims that the values of the Conscience Collective must have primacy over the forces of economic individualism for a healthy society to be possible. His work was necessitated by the crisis

of modern society and the central question of it was the conditions required for establishing a new moral order. Society is a composite of ideals

"Foremost among these is the moral ideal, which is its principal *raison d'être*".

(D.M.F., p 59).

The Dreyfus affair raised fundamental issues in modern society: it stimulated him to see the pathology of modern society

"The world is only feebly ruled by morality"

(D.L., p 4).

Civilization does not have a moral character.

"We would invoke the primacy of morality as a sweeping condemnation of the division of labour"

(D.L., p 54).

Durkheim's sociology is a moral science, intent in promulgating the primacy of morality at the social level as a corrective for the pathology of advanced division of labour. In this, he is as R. Bellah says

"The high priest and theologian of the civil religion of the Third Republic"¹

Is Durkheim in this, establishing a subject which reveals that the moral interests of humanity can be discovered in the social and historical process? Or is he using Kantian philosophy as the lens by which he analyses the problems of industrial society? I would suggest the latter and it is Neo-Kantianism in Renouvier's hands that led him to the position of the primacy of practical reason as an interpretive tool.

For Kant the primacy of practical reason represents in his thinking what L.W. Beck calls the Rousseauesque Revolution². In biographical terms it was Rousseau who turned Kant away from the Aristotelian position of the superiority of theoretical over practical reason.

"By inclination I am an enquirer. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge, the unrest that goes with the desire to progress in it, and the satisfaction in every advance in it. There was a time when I believed that this constituted the honour of humanity, and I despised the people who know nothing. Rousseau corrected me in this. This blinding prejudice disappeared and I learned to honour man. I would find myself more useless than the common labourer if I did not believe this attitude of mine can give worth to all others in establishing the rights of mankind".³

Moral reasoning for Kant, even in the simplest of human beings is more capable of establishing clear principles of morality, than the most cultivated intellect is of establishing non-contradictory metaphysical statements. This is one sense of the superiority of practical over theoretical reason: it is more successful in establishing principles.

But there is another sense of the primacy of practical reason that is more clearly influential over the French Neo-Kantians. And this is the primacy of morality over material interest. And what Kant says here must be understood in the light of his remarks 'On the Methodology of Pure Practical Reason' in the Critique of Practical Reason, that is, that it should be implemented as having primacy over non-moral or even immoral interests. And in so acting and in encouraging others so to act, we will be on the steps to moral progress. This is because,

as we have seen above freedom is the condition of action
ie. practical reason.

"By practical, I mean everything that is possible
through freedom".

(C.P.R., A800 B828).

It follows we do not discover practical reason, in the
same way as we discover theoretical reason. We realise
it in action. And in acting for the primacy of the
moral over the non-moral we realise the primacy of
practical reason. So for Durkheim if we act for the
collective interest, instead of against it, in private
self-interest we will establish the priority of the
collective moral consensus over the interests of political
economy.

It is in action that for Kant, that we have the
capacity to bring about what reason demands of us. This
is what Kant means by freedom qua practical reason being
constitutive of moral experience. And this entails the
primacy of practical reason for it is here that reason
can find its demand for unity satisfied. As Edward
Caird said

"Just because reason cannot find its ideal (of
necessity and universal systematic unity) realised
in the world, it seeks to realise that ideal
for itself".⁴

Reason in becoming practical, generates an ideal of a
world that through action can realise unity and in this
moral completeness.

"These highest aims, from the nature of reason,
have a certain unity, in order that they may,
as thus unified, further that interest of
humanity which is subordinate to no higher interest".

(C.P.R., A798 B826).

In other words, reason seeks an unconditioned principle: it cannot find this in theoretical reason. It can only find this in reason understood as a causality of the will in free action, and this is revealed to us in duty. It is in this that the interests of humanity can be determined.

It is undoubtedly true that the Kantian philosophy had the greatest interest in this thesis: it is also true that he had the greatest difficulty in establishing it. He can only establish the primacy of practical reason over theoretical if it extends beyond it, to base itself in freedom. To establish this, Kant says we must conceive of the *causa noumenon* as the ground of the moral will. In the well rehearsed problems of this as the foundation of morality, Kant leaves to his successors the problem of finding an adequate foundation for the primacy of moral interest.

For Renouvier Kant's greatest originality lay in the *Second Critique* in general and in the thesis of the *Primacy of Practical Reason* in particular. Neo-Criticisme takes its departure here in a positive sense. The Kantian doctrine is not a negative doctrine; it is a doctrine 'croyant' for Renouvier. And it is this alone which allows Kant to transcend the subjective idealism which characterises Kant's theory of knowledge for Renouvier.

For the *Sécond Critique*, says Renouvier

"Il n'est question ni de définir les essences, ne de démontrer les existences, mais seulement d'affirmer, par un acte moral de volonté et de croyance rationnelle, des relations sans lesquelles on ne peut satisfaire à l'idée de la destinée humaine écrite par la conscience".

(C.P. 1872, I, p 69).

This was Kant's greatest originality

"C'est la le plus grand pas que la doctrine des idées à fait depuis Descartes".⁵

This was to have subordinated metaphysics to ethics.

This is the central theme of the Copernican Revolution for Renouvier; postulates replace dogma. Kant turns the former speculative order on its head. The essence of the Copernican Revolution is relativity: all knowledge is relative to consciousness and its laws. In the sphere of action it establishes the relativity of metaphysics to the moral laws of Conscience. Kant in this made Criticisme positive and it rises above the negations of theoretical reason. Kant makes use of practical reason to establish what theoretical reason can never establish: he finds an extra-intellectual foundation for belief.

This is the essence of Kant's renewal of philosophy.

"Le criticisme renouvelle la philosophie en faisant poser sur la raison pratique, c'est à dire sur l'ordre moral, les seules inductions rationnelles qu'ils soient possible de tirer de la nature humaine que nous connaissons à la destinée humaine ignorée et aux conditions générales de l'ordre du monde".

(C.P. 1872 I, p 2).

Renouvier preferred the word belief 'Croyance' to faith, which is too closely tied to religion. He calls it rational belief to indicate its origin in practical reason. He insists that 'croyance rationnelle' must submit to the categories, to the principle of contradiction and to the phenomenalist method. In this he distinguishes himself from Kant's sense of faith, which is blind. He also calls it 'induction morale'. This indicates its synthetic nature: its foundation lies in the moral law and its mechanism like that of induction in the physical sciences is to "comblent les lacunes de la science des faits".

Belief we have seen in Part III does not only surpass subjective idealism, in allowing a foundation for moral affirmation, it overcomes scepticism. Renouvier contrasts the 'fideism' of Kant with the scepticism of Hume, which is a consequence of pure empiricism. Nevertheless Renouvier's idea of 'croyance rationnelle' takes its departure from Hume and his idea of belief as a lively idea, but he alters this in the light of Kant and the conception of the a priori. Belief is not a passive impression, as the empiricist maintains, but an act of conscience and a judgement: it is an affirmation of reality. Renouvier did not find in Kant an attempt to ground faith: the task of Neo-Criticisme was to found belief.

Renouvier analyses belief in relation to the concrete situation of the agent and sees how this belief arises as a result of a 'besoin vital'. The foundation of belief is a need which develops through life and in this form enters philosophical speculation. The psychological nature of belief is a state of dissatisfaction that the human being as a rational agent is placed in as a result of the limitation of knowledge to phenomena. Logically this 'besoin vital' is a fact, a kind of first fact which makes belief psychologically necessary and therefore legitimate.

Renouvier insists that in duty, we find the basic foundation of belief. Kant had established against Hume the a priori direction of ethics. In duty is discovered the basic a priori principle of moral conscience. In this Renouvier claims that Kant holds

"Que la raison fournit elle-même certain jugements fixes qui n'ont ni été déduits de jugements antérieurs, ni induits de l'expérience, mais inhérents de l'être raisonnable".⁶

Duty through its autonomous character gives reflection a foothold for the extension of human affirmation beyond the limits set by a science of phenomena. The foundation of croyance is duty and this establishes

"La réalité du devoir postule dans notre esprit celles de certaines conditions externes".⁷

Rational faith establishes for Renouvier that the world is a moral world: that there is a harmony between the world and man's moral conscience. And like Kant from

these he derives three special postulates. Firstly freedom as a condition of moral responsibility. Secondly, immortality as a condition of moral progress. And thirdly divinity as a guarantor of justice. It is now clear what the connection between the methods of morality and the primacy of practical reason is for Renouvier. All questions about morality must now be derived from the moral conscience itself, which provides spontaneous laws and principles, central to which is duty. And in this for Renouvier is guaranteed the autonomy of morality. Since the destiny of the human race is etched on Conscience, to subordinate theoretical reason to practical reason is to judge reality in terms of human moral interest - that is - duty.

It has been pointed out in Part III that for Renouvier there is no conflict between theoretical and practical reason. Indeed it is practical reason that establishes all human reason. In this he has given a unique slant on Kant's thesis of the primacy of practical reason.

For the critic Fouillée⁸, the primacy of practical reason is the reintroduction of dogmatism into reason: it means the domination of science by metaphysics. In practical reason we find the application of metaphysical beliefs and not scientific ones, for example, liberty and universality of end. Secondly: the primacy of practical reason is supposed to confer 'apodictic certainty' on moral interest that is lacking for both Kant in theoretical

reason and for Renouvier in science through its association with contingency. Fouillée argues that if the only difference between theoretical and practical reason is that one applies to action, then why should what results in action entail absolute certainty: why if acted on should an idea that previously had no certainty, suddenly get it? Against Fouillée, Renouvier is not claiming that action establishes theoretical truths; it is for him a source of certainty in a way that theoretical knowledge never can be. Fouillée argues from a position that Renouvier has rejected: the authority of theoretical reason alone to establish truth.

Further Fouillée argues that in making metaphysics or science the servants of morality is Renouvier not in danger of reasserting a new form of dogmatism, and thus making morality uncritical? Fouillée argues that in the Middle Ages this thesis would be 'What would become of morality without the belief in hell fire'? Against Fouillée one can reply that Renouvier's claim is that it is in relation to what is discoverable within Conscience, that moral beliefs must be established, not in relation to established practices or authorities.

What is problematic is why Kant, Renouvier and Durkheim insist that the unique feature of the moral conscience is duty. And this must be examined next. In terms of the logic of moral Copernicanism it is quite consistent to refer to all questions of action to what is immanent and spontaneous in moral conscience. Renouvier to be

consistent to his interpretation of relativism as the essence of the Kantian revolution, should have imposed no fixed form on the nature of moral conscience.

Chapter III. Duty

The significance of duty for a Copernican ethic is that it is a constraint that is self-imposed. For Kant moral laws are imposed on recalcitrant sensuous nature by the rational will: the subsequent tension is the phenomenon of moral constraint or obligation. It is for Kant the evidence of the reality of morality. For Durkheim it expresses the ideal of the relationship between the agent and the collectivity in a normal society. Moral demands are imposed by the collective moral authority on individuals who are tempted to avoid it. For Durkheim this constraint, confirmed in the notion of sanction, is evidence of the workings of society. The collective moral authority is the moral social a priori and acts in the interests of humanity. When constraint is exercised it is thus not a form of violence, for it is a form of higher will acting in terms of the interests of individual will. The influence of Rousseau and the general will as appealing to the general will in the individual is apparent in Durkheim's analysis.

The task of theory for both Kant and Durkheim is to attend to the necessity revealed in the phenomenon of constraint. The task of sociology is to explain how sanctions are possible. The task of moral philosophy for Kant is to explain how categorical imperatives are possible. The authority of the two subjects, sociology and philosophy hangs on their respective abilities to explain adequately this unique and significant feature of

human life. Both Kant and Durkheim accept constraint as given and as evidence, not of pathology or conflict, but of a permanent and essential aspect of the human condition. It is the task of theory not to subvert or deny this, but to analyse and record it. And in so doing, to strengthen for Kant the authority of moral reason and for Durkheim the authority of the collectivity.

Duty as self imposed implies order without external authority. The moral person regulates its conduct in terms of this constraint just as a community is regulated by the moral demands it imposes on itself. The essence of this order is self control, and is the pivot of the conception of order that emanates from duty as the central conception of moral life.

As self imposed duty is reflexive on character: it refers back to its origin in the agent or collectivity. For Kant this is expressible only in terms of transcendental analysis. Durkheim following Renouvier insists that duty is adequately analysed in terms of a science of facts. But it is for both Durkheim and Renouvier more than a fact: it is a basic fact on which the authority of society and indeed the evidence of the reality of the workings of society relies. Is there a reality which confirms this status for duty for the post-Kantians; and can the method of science adequately deal with it? These are the questions of this Chapter.

Section I. Durkheim and the Conception of Duty.

It is through the conception of duty that Durkheim explains the relationship between the individual and the collectivity. It has a pivotal role in his sociology: through this concept is expressed the authority of society and its ability to control the possible vagaries of individual behaviour. And it is the basic concept of the science which articulates this relationship in its normal and pathological manifestations. D. Parodi¹ notes that it is basic to Durkheim and the Ecole Sociologique to establish the notion of duty as central to social experience. In this Parodi argues that Durkheim is 'wisely conservative' in maintaining that the social rules must be obeyed simply because they are rules. His social conformism consists in seeing discipline as the essential condition of moral life.

Through the conception of duty, expressed in sanction, Durkheim claims to give an empirical confirmation of Kant's definition of morality. Like Kant, Durkheim claims

"Morality appears to us to be a collection of maxims, of rules of conduct"

(D.M.F., p 41).

Moral rules are defined

"By a special authority by virtue of which they are obeyed simply because they command"

(D.M.F., p 36).

This special characteristic is that of obligation.

"Obligation is one of the primary characteristics of the moral rule"

(D.M.F., p 36).

An analysis of moral rules can be made by comparing them with rules of hygiene. The result of a violation of a rule of hygiene is mechanically induced; it results in disease. The act once performed, sets in motion the consequences: by an analysis of this act we know in advance what the result will be. But the violation of a moral rule, for example against killing, will tell me nothing of the consequences. An analysis of the action per se will tell me nothing of the subsequent blame or punishment.

"Thus homicide condemned in time of peace is freed from blame in time of war".

(D.M.F., p 43).

So Durkheim concludes in relation to moral rules, it is impossible to discover analytically in the act of murder, the slightest notion of blame. The link between act and consequence is here a synthetic one.

It is not the intrinsic nature of the action that produces the sanction which follows, but the fact that the act violates the rule which forbids it. So it is the existence of the rule and the relation to it of the action which determines the sanction.

"Such consequences attached to acts by synthetic links I call sanctions".

(D.M.F., p 43).

His definition of sanction is thus,

"A sanction is the consequence of an act that does not result from the content of that act, but from the violation by that act of a pre-established rule".

(D.M.F., p 43).

It is through this analysis that Durkheim confirms Kant's definition of morality as concerned with obligation. But it is clear that he only confirms Kant by using Kant. He uses the notion of synthetic a priori as the nature of moral reasoning. Act and consequence are not analytically related, yet they appear necessarily related. Only the collective nature of the rules which connect them can explain this characteristic of a priority at the social level. He defined collective rules as having the characteristic of necessity and perceived at the level of the social agent, universality. That is social rules for Durkheim are the a priori: they are that without which society would not exist. It would lose its central moral authority if its rules of action lost their apodictic quality. But it is he who has defined them as this: he has not confirmed it empirically. Act and consequence are only linked necessarily by a rule which compels the enforcement of the rule, because he has defined social rules as imbued with collective authority. Thus he is not confirming Kant; he is using Kantian philosophy as a clue to the discovery of the nature of social rules.

"To explain the characteristic of obligation in rules it is sufficient to establish the notion of moral authority. A moral authority that is legitimate in the eyes of reason receives our submission because it is moral authority and we respect its discipline".

(D.M.F., p 47).

Durkheim explains the origin of moral duty in terms of collective rules, which are qualitatively different from any individual aspect of phenomena, and enjoy a unique prestige conferred on them; they exercise a sort of ascendancy over the individual will which feels constrained to conform to them. The constraint of these collective rules is central to morality.

"Morality compels us to follow a determinate path to a definite end ... whatever is obligatory is constraining".

(D.L., p 51).

Like Kant Durkheim holds that the constraint in obligation is not incompatible with freedom. Indeed it is the condition of the rational exercise of freedom.

"The rules do not have a constraining force which snuffs out free thought: but because they are made for us, and in a certain sense by us, we are free".

(D.L., p 408).

And more strongly in Moral Education he says

"Rules and Liberty are far from being antithetical: the latter is only possible by virtue of the former".

(p. 54).

In 'Moral Education' he widens the conception of obligation into that of discipline.

"The fundamental element of all morality is the spirit of discipline".

(M.E., p 31).

It has two elements: firstly consistency and regularity of conduct and secondly authority whereby we are constrained to act in a certain way. Again he reiterates it is not sheer constraint. Rather it allows two factors

which for him are essential to the development of stable human nature. Firstly it creates order and predictability and this constitutes the social function of morality. Secondly constraint establishes the well being of individuals. Without it individuals suffer endless frustration and disillusionment entailed by "unlimited aspiration". (M.E., p 40). Without this containment, human life suffers and suicide rates go up. (M.E., p 42).

However he says, in opposition to Kant, the notion of duty does not exhaust the conception of morality

"It is impossible for us to carry out an act simply because we are ordered to do so and without consideration of its content. For us to become the agents of an act it must interest our sensibility to a certain extent and appear to us, in some way, desirable".

(D.M.F., p 36).

Desirability, says Durkheim, is not 'simple pleasure' it is a form of self transcendence "a sui generis pleasure in performing duty".

How do these two constant and universal characteristics of morality relate? They coexist: there is no logical priority of one over the other.

"It is impossible to derive obligation from the desirable, since the specific characteristic of obligation is a certain extent the violation of desire".

(D.M.F., p 47).

But how justified is he in retaining the concept of duty in his science of society? It has already been suggested that he is not empirically confirming

Kant in terms of society because Kantian characteristics pervade his sense of society as a moral collectivity. Is there a wider justification for the central role of duty, in his analysis of the nature of society? In what definition of society can a conception of obligation be coherent? And what is the characteristic of obligation: is it to be recognised phenomenologically as a characteristic of moral experience at the individual level? Or is it to be inferred as the link between the individual and collectivity through the majorities conformity to the social rules? Ironically there appears to be a tension between what Durkheim wants of the relationship between individual and society and the nature of obligation.

For there to be obligation there must be some desire to do otherwise than what is demanded by the social rule. Constraint involves some necessitation, albeit for our own good. As Kant would say, angels experience no obligation for they have no inclination to act other than as reason commands. It follows for Durkheim that individuals must attempt to resist society's demands. Wallwork² argues that Durkheim's early writings leave the impression that society constitutes an external moral environment within which individuals function. This conception of society can support a conception of obligation for here society can constrain the individual because there is a part of human nature that is not subject to society's control. And obligation is then visible in the constraint individuals feel through the exercise of

collective rules. The conception of obligation is only a legitimate explanation of the relationship between individual and society when there is some degree of conflict between them. But this is not Durkheim's ideal: this is the Conscience Collective of primitive society where individuality is very minimal and the collective has complete moral authority. The problem compounds in advanced society where through the division of labour individuality is developed. What then is the characteristic of obligation? By definition in this condition, collective rules are weakened. This is potentially anomic, but still in this situation it is hard to see how obligation characterises the relationship between individual and society. For by definition, individuals in this society decide for themselves the right and the wrong way. Here collective authority cannot establish a central, constraining moral authority.

Wallwork argues that his early thesis is modified in his later writings by a theory of internalization. Collective rules through repeated observation become internalized. Then moral constraint is no longer due to the internal representation of external norms or the enforcement of these norms by society, for by then they have become a norm of character. Now society does not constrain the individual; the individual's own personality supplies the motivation to act in the socially approved manner. But here obligation no longer functions at the personal level to describe moral experience.

Further Durkheim nowhere in terms of ethno-graphic analysis or a broad empirical survey justifies his use of this concept to characterise all moral experience. Duty is a particularly protestant notion, expressing a relationship of demand between a moral conscience and a moral authority. As protestant it is characteristic of European post-reformation societies, and cannot be used to characterise all moralities in all cultures, without a legitimate charge of ethno-centrism being levelled at Durkheim.

It is the Neo-Kantian tradition that explains this characteristic in Durkheim's thought: here duty is the unique and basic fact of Conscience. It is through Renouvier that Durkheim derives the basic idea behind his sociology: that obligation expresses the relationship between the individual and the collectivity. And that this as a fact of Conscience is available to science for description and determination. And it is through Renouvier that he derives the idea that desirability must be added to obligation as moral characteristic.

Section II. Renouvier on Obligation

Renouvier praised Kant for being the first to see obligation as the sole foundation of morality and belief (croyance). But he criticises the formalism of his definition: in Renouvier's terms this critique of formalism is an extension of his critique of the separation of the two reasons and is thus the extension of the application of principle of rational belief to all reality beyond the immediate phenomena.

"Kant attribue à la formule de la loi morale une valeur et en quelque sorte une existence de forme pure, indépendante de tout objet proposé à la volonté, de toute matière emprunté à l'expérience".

(D.E., 1912 II, p 272).

For Kant an action to be moral must be established by duty independent of any heteronomous element, in particular any element of desire or feeling. And for Kant, duty establishes what is good. Good cannot precede the determination of duty: for Kant this would be heteronomy of the will for the will would be then determined by an object not of its own volition. Renouvier disputes Kant on both of these points.

It is not possible to admit that the will ever determines itself without a particular object or any element borrowed from experience. In particular it is impossible to imagine Conscience as touched by nothing but pure law. There are elements of feeling, considerations of consequences and feelings of the good (bien) which accompany moral beliefs.

But at a deeper level these are also the very conditions of the representation of duty in Conscience.

"Il faut donc avouer que le sentiment moral, la passion du bien, l'amour des êtres sont des éléments de la loi et des conditions de sa représentation".

(D.E., 1912 II p 229).

His theory of phenomenalism entails that duty is always accompanied by feeling and will. In particular we have a sense of duty, because we have a sense of good.

"La loi morale ne peut être comprise ni défini sans la notion du bien et du mal".

(Op. cit.)

Kant in so distinguishing duty from all element of experience is in effect compromising practical reason itself which must operate in the realm of experience.

"Si elle prétend s'établir dans l'apriori pur, sans élément tirés de l'expérience, et des impressions du sujet sensible, elle se rend étrangère à la raison pratique dont elle veut être l'interprète: elle ouvre dans la science une entrée aux chimères, inutilement bannies de la raison pure".

(D.E., op. cit.)

However he argues that morality is not thereby empirical: good cannot be reduced to utility. Morality must be universal and disinterested. But to separate this a priority from experience is to make it a stranger to practical reason. He wants to retain the absolute nature of duty, whilst making duty subject to the category of finality and subject to desire. How if determined

by desire, can duty be an absolute? This is the problem Renouvier faces and the one he hands on to Durkheim. If duty presents itself in experience alongside notions of feeling and good it cannot be the unique foundation of morality Renouvier claims it is. If duty is relative to end, then it is not an absolute. If ends are determined by duty, then Renouvier is back in the position of Kantian formalism. But if duty does not relate to end, it is ineffective in terms of human motivation. There can be no ends determined by pure reason alone for Renouvier, for there is no pure reason.

The paradox for Renouvier is this: all absolute law must be either noumenal or phenomenal. In the first case the foundation of morality is a mystery: he has repudiated this and it cannot function as a foundation. In the second case, it follows from the logic of phenomenalism that duty is a fact or a law. In neither case can it be an absolute. If it is a fact, how does it come to establish itself as the fact among facts: the fact on which rests the possibility of all other facts. (For 'devoir faire volontaire' is the foundation of morality and knowledge as shown in Part III). By what authority is it selected amongst all other facts of experience to have this unique role? And if it is a law of experience, it is characterised by constancy, not universality. It is clearly not an absolute foundation. In what sense is it a foundation at all?

In Part III, it was made clear that the phenomenon of duty, for Renouvier was the only positive evidence of freedom. And freedom was the condition of knowledge. The phenomenon of duty is the 'clef du voute' of Neo-Criticisme. As an a priori fact of experience, it follows it must be irreducible for Renouvier. Is the quality of irreducibility sufficient to establish the epistemic and moral weight this phenomenon must bear? The order of experience, even amended by Renouvier, does not tolerate elevating one fact to the status obligation is given by Renouvier. If morality must be founded in the order of experience, then there is no justification for the retention of an ethic of absolute obligation. And in this Renouvier logically cannot distinguish himself from Hume (where feeling is the foundation of morality) and the rule-utilitarianism where there is regulation of ends established by desire.

Section III. Kant's Account of Duty

Kant for all the formalism^d it, appears to provide a far more coherent account of the nature of duty than Renouvier. It is for him the result of the conflict between the demands of reason and the inclination of the senses. This conflict is what engenders the 'necessitation of the will' that duty characterises. Since for Renouvier there is no pure reason characterised by the absolute nature of its object, there can be no such absolute demand.

But on closer examination does Kant himself establish that the constraint experienced in morality is real? And secondly does he establish that the form it takes must be that of duty?

In the Critique of Practical Reason he has established that reason applies to action through the positive proof of the moral law. But what proves the reality of the moral law? That there is rationality in action is established through the reflexivity of practical reason in a transcendental argument. But nothing establishes that the form this practicality must take is that of duty.

There is no conceptual grounding for the notion of constraint in his system. For it to be possible the laws of pure practical reason must be able to assert some ascendancy over the laws governing sensibility. There must be some relationship between the agent qua noumenon and the agent qua phenomenon. But these are

governed by laws which are the contradiction of each other - causal determinism and moral freedom. Logically they cannot meet without contradiction. If the agent qua phenomenon ie. as subject to desire and inclination and thus determined, is united with the agent qua noumenon ie. free and author of moral laws, then one of two things could happen. Either the phenomenal overwhelms the noumenal, in which case there is only inclination and therefore heteronomy of the will and no morality. Or the noumenal overcomes the phenomenal, then there is freedom and morality, but no experience formulable in objective terms. In neither case is there any evidence of constraint. For this to be so, noumenal and phenomenal must be true simultaneously and be put into some kind of relationship. But what relationship and more importantly how can this be expressed in terms of the Kantian philosophy?

In relation to the second question it is clear that Kant nowhere 'deduces' the concept of duty ~~from~~ the practicality of action. He annexes it to the meaning of the practicality of reason. In the case of both critiques, the results of the 'Metaphysical Deduction' can be taken independently of the 'Transcendental Deduction'. In the First Critique the thesis that we cannot have ordered, intelligible experience without the categories as the a priori condition of the possibility of experience can be taken independently of the claim that only causal determinism is the adequate condition of order in experience. So in the Second Critique, the essential rationality of action, and its independence of non-rational empirical motives can be taken independently of the claim that only

dutifulness adequately expresses this.

Kant cannot escape the pertinacity of Schopenhauer's⁷ Critique: he disputes the basic assumption of Kantian ethics - that there are pure moral laws which command absolutely of themselves. There is no proof that there are such laws independent of human conditions and experience. There is no justification for a conception of absolute necessity in the conception of pure duty. Such a conception of duty, command and obligation have their origin in theological ethics, and separated from this context lose all meaning. There can be no ought without sanction. And if ought derives its meaning from threatened punishment, then to talk of absolute right or unconditional duty is a contradiction in adjecto (like cold fire).

Schopenhauer's critique can be extended to the question why this theological form should be retained in a Copernican ethical system. In a theological system, the origin of duty rests on the assumption of the agent's dependence on another will, that both commands and punishes. The assumption of such a will is a settled affair for theology, but is a matter of compromise for Copernicanism. It accommodates this will which commands and punishes as the rational will. Thus the command no longer rests on an external authority, which for Kant would not establish autonomy of the will, and thus deny the autonomous foundation of morality. But the imparting of the rational will only answers the question of

heteronomy: it replaces external authority with an internal conflict between the rational and the sensuous, which is more enervating than liberating. And this justifies Hegel's² charge that such a position is not in earnest with morality, for morality requires and rests on a conflict which threatens to destroy the basis of ethics.

Finally the significance of duty for Kant is that it is evidence of autonomy: that human beings can feel themselves constrained to do what is right in the face of the sensuous demands of inclination, is for Kant the only positive evidence that there is an autonomy of the natural. Through the phenomenon of duty human beings reveal themselves as capable of rising above nature. I showed in Part III how Renouvier built this argument into the foundation of knowledge. And Kant retains this notion of duty's connection with autonomy in his idea of the reflexivity of duty. The practical necessity of duty, pertains only to the volition of free subjects: duty expresses a necessary relationship between a moral subject and its object of volition and represents a necessity of freedom rather than of determinism. If agents impose duty on themselves, it is not incompatible with freedom. Indeed for Kant this is the precondition of freedom in the positive sense. But it is only evidence of autonomy if the natural is already defined as a pathological foundation of action. For Kant, the natural, the sensuous is evidence only of the working of determinism. Anything that appears to point to the contrary of this must by definition point to autonomy.

But is constraint evidence of autonomy or of more
determinism? Why is it not evidence of a deeper pathology
within the human being?

Section IV. The Imperative Nature of Morality and the Critique of Utilitarianism.

"To explain the characteristic of obligation in rules, it is sufficient to establish the notion of moral authority. A moral authority that is legitimate in the eyes of reason receives our submission because it is moral authority and we respect its discipline".

(D.M.F., p 47).

The voice of moral authority is categorical and resides in the collectivity in a healthy society. That this should be categorical and not hypothetical is essential to Durkheim's view of a stable moral consensus. If its demands were perceived by agents as conditional on the satisfaction of private interest, then the central moral authority of society would soon collapse. It is this categorical quality of social demand that is lacking in a society characterised by anomie. And it is this quality that the utilitarians fail to account for in their explanation of the nature of morality and society. Spencer for example failed to understand the 'sacred' character of ought. The kind of society that they advocate in fact would not be a society, it would be an ordering of economic interest. The normative aim of Durkheim's sociology is to help advanced industrial society to subordinate economic motives to the moral and cultural needs of people in society.

"Social science must resolutely renounce those utilitarian comparisons in which it has too often been involved".

(D.L., Bk I, Ch. I

So in 'The Division of Labour' he attempts to show that the kind of individualism characteristic of utilitarian thought is an exceptional and pathological state of society. The pursuit of self-interest is not a 'natural' condition for human action but a result of a particular historical development. In 'Moral Education' he criticises the utilitarian notion of happiness as based on desire. On the contrary for Durkheim

"By means of discipline we learn the control of desire without which men could not achieve happiness".

(M.E. p44)

He rejects the utilitarians' conception of human nature and says there is a maximum of happiness that each individual can tolerate. In 'The Division of Labour' he refutes the classic explanation of the division of labour by the political economists: the need for happiness urges the individual to specialise more and more. As human beings capacity for happiness is limited, this can be no explanation of the division of labour.

"If the division of labour produces solidarity it is not because it makes each man an exchangeist as the economists say, it is because it creates among men an entire system of rights and duties, which link them together in a desirable way".

(D.L., p 406).

The basis of this system is the moral voice of the collectivity which alone has the authority to establish the legality of any contract.

At the heart of this theory of collective moral authority of Durkheim's is his view of the individual as 'sacred'. This is the goal of his 'Religion of Humanity' to establish that the human being is 'an-end-in-itself' and not a means to economic transaction. Against the negative individualism of the political economists he poses his positive individualism of the cult of the human person.

"This human person, the definition of which is like the touchstone which distinguishes good from evil, is considered sacred in the ritual sense of the word".

(I.I., p 47).

He is seeing the human being as an absolute end which draws on the distinction Kant established between relative and absolute end, which was associated with the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives.

"What is relative to universal human inclinations and needs has a market price, but that which constitutes the sole condition under which anything can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value ie. a price, but has an intrinsic value - that is dignity".

(Gr. Chapter II,
Section 78).*

The question is why is the science of collective representations capable of locating this unique feature of social authority and of preserving its categorial nature in explanation? To answer this question again it is important to look at Renouvier's analysis.

* R.P. Woolf claims that this is the most eloquent defense of the principle that persons are above price that is not even matched by Marx, in the Manuscripts of 1844 ('The Autonomy of Reason', Harper Torchbooks, 1973).

Renouvier despite his critique of the formalism of Kant's definition of duty, retains the categorical imperative as the basic form of moral judgement. But if all moral action is as relative to an end determined by desire should there be anything but hypothetical imperatives? To criticise the formalism of Kant, he repudiated the idea of a duty that is a duty in itself, and substituted the idea of duty as relating to an end. This analysis only supports hypothetical imperatives and as Kant recognised these are compatible only with utilitarianism.

These considerations lead one to think that despite Durkheim's hatred for political economy, his arguments are not an adequate critique of it: indeed they compromise with it. Firstly the categorical quality of societies demands are tempered with hypothetical imperative, for obligation goes together with desirability as a basic moral characteristic. In so doing Durkheim is admitting a partial truth to utilitarianism, for if ends are determined by desire then they constitute a hypothetical and not categorical imperative. And this quality of desirability, albeit not mere pleasure, is not established by society for desire is individual in nature. The concept of desire is logically tied to the notion of interest and thus also individual interest.

Secondly, how can a science of facts record absolutes? Social authority must be categorical in nature so that it

presents its demands to the individual as absolute and not relative to individual interest or desire. Society's authority must be de jure and not de facto. But as available to a science of facts it can only be de facto. He retains a definition of society that is at home in an a prioristic ethic, but expects it logically to fit into a science of facts. So with Kant and against the utilitarians, he argues for the a priori character of moral authority. But with the utilitarians and against Kant he insists on the method of observation as appropriate for ethics as well as knowledge. The normative interests of his theory are belied by his method, which can logically only allow him to retain the relativities of human action. Naturalism in method and idealism in theory do not match.

Is Durkheim's sociology recording this categorical authority as a fact or an ideal? For Durkheim, the collective moral authority of 'normal' society is rarely if ever seen outside primitive society. Kant also had to admit that there is little evidence that the categorical imperative ever actually ruled conduct.

Chapter IV. Unity.

In this chapter I argue that Durkheim attempts to realise Kant's moral universalization thesis in arguing for organic solidarity as the condition for social unity in industrial society. I argue this because the conception of solidarity in this argument relies on an individualism reconciled with collectivism and a humanism reconciled with universalism. Kant's definition of universality as tied to both a Kingdom of Ends and with respect for the human being as an end-in-itself are classic statements of this position on moral unity.

Kant was the first to define unity as realisable through moral action: and the form of moral action he saw as establishing the form of ethical community. This form was universality: universality was thus the form of ethical community. The interest of reason lies in unity for Kant and this is achievable through practical reason. In theoretical knowledge, unity is imposed on the otherwise disordered and separated data of sensibility, through the categories of the understanding. Nature is thus a unified system for the mind. But the objectivity of theoretical knowledge is tied to these conditions of sense which, ^{because} in themselves - disparate, entail ^{that} the unity of theoretical knowledge is never complete. Practical reason as concerning the ought to be, can aim for the complete realisation of unity.

Against the utilitarians he establishes that action can have a universal form independent of sensuous interest and against the moral dogmatists he establishes that this unity can be achieved through the will of the agent, not as imposed through a heteronomous authority.

"Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his conception of law".

(Gr. II, p 37).

The theme of unity for Kant is thus essentially connected with reason. Reason is universal and the form of reason in theoretical and practical aspects is universality. Unity is achievable only through universality for Kant. His Copernican Revolution argued that universality and necessity, the characteristics of objective knowledge are only explicable on the hypothesis that the human understanding contributes the form of knowledge. Universality is thus tied to the a priori and is the pivot of the Copernican ethic. The form of action, universality is contributed by the form of reason.

He linked universality to the form of human experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. But it is in the Second Critique that he shows that universality is the condition of moral action and that this is realisable through the will of the agent. This is the transformation of philosophy on which subsequent developments in the social sciences, both Marxian and Durkheimian depend.

For Goldman¹, Kant's genius lay in developing the concept of totality, expressed in the universality thesis, for in this he made the conception of community of significance for philosophical thought. The starting point of the Critical Philosophy for Goldman is not the distinction between sensibility and understanding but the question of the relationship of part to whole. In this Kant was the first to point the way out of an individualist culture whose limits he perceived, but could not transcend. He was the first philosopher to oppose 'totality' to empiricism. As totality is the form of community, Kant translated epistemology into issues for social and political determination. Through totality, community becomes an issue for philosophical thought, that is seen as realisable through the will of the agent. In this conception, Kant laid the foundation for German humanism; and it can now be added he laid the foundations for French humanism as realised in Durkheim's thought.

The fundamental question of Kant's philosophy, how are synthetic a priori judgements possible, means for Goldman how do human beings understand each other, and this in turn means what is the minimum of community in any dialogue? The moral synthetic a priori really achieves the hope for totality, in the concept of acting as though action were to become universal. In particular Goldman sees the formula of the end in itself as a radical critique of bourgeois society. But the moral synthetic a priori is 'tragic' because it is limited to 'universalis' - the noumenon - rather than 'universitas' - the concrete totality.

For Durkheim the search for community is the search for unity: the task of normative sociology is thus to delineate and stimulate the moral synthetic a priori implicit as potential in any social grouping. The collectivity is the source of practical reason: sociology is its voice. And in accounting for community as unity, it is stimulating the community to act towards unity and not against it as political economy dictates. And it is through the form of social rules that this unity can be achieved: hypothetical imperatives cannot establish this unity, because interest or inclination generalised will not establish unity.. So agents will establish community by acting towards it, rather than in their own self-interest. Unity is thus achievable in community through the action of social agents.

"The subordination of particular interests to the general interest, is indeed the source of all moral activity".

(D.L., Pref. 2nd ed. p 14).

Section I. Durkheim and Unity.

The possibility of society per se for Durkheim is tied to the possibility of unity. If society lacks the unity which is based on a common objective "then it is no more than a pile of sand".

(M.E., p 102).

Social unity is discovered through social rules

"In general the function of moral rules is to enunciate the fundamental conditions of social solidarity".

(D.L., Conc. p 398).

The function of moral rules is to ensure the regularity of conduct and this is consistency and constancy.

"Morality is basically a constant thing ... A moral act ought to be the same tomorrow as today ... Morality thus presupposes a certain capacity for behaving similarly under like circumstances".

(M.E., p 27).

And moral rules are characterised by their generality: it is their quality of generality that constitutes their morality. He praises Kant for having recognised that

"Immoral conduct can be recognised by the fact that it is closely tied to the actors individuality and cannot be generalised without manifest absurdity".

(I.I., p 45).

The critique of empiricist individualism is undertaken from the position that for there to be a society at all there must be unity. The explanations

of the political economists cannot establish society as more than a compound of self interest, therefore they cannot explain the possibility of society.

"A society cannot be coherent if there does not exist among its members a certain intellectual and moral community"

(I.I., p 51).

It is the task of sociology to enunciate the conditions for establishing unity in modern society. This he attempts in 'The Division of Labour'.

There is no problem of establishing the unity of 'lower' societies, whose ideal is an intense collective life, in which individuality is practically nil. The unity of primitive society is based on resemblance. The social molecules of mechanical solidarity can act together only in so far as they have no actions of their own: collective solidarity presupposes no individuality. (D.L., p 130). Durkheim has to show that in leaving primitive society, we have not left behind all possibility of solidarity. This he attempts to do in his conception of organic solidarity.

Here, just as the rules of primitive society 'express social similitudes', so the rules of modern society 'presume the difference between individuals'. Here differences in personality are required and encouraged through specialisation. It is necessary that the Conscience Collective leaves open a part of the individual conscience in order that special functions can be established that it cannot regulate. Durkheim attempts

to establish that the more this region is established, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this solidarity.

"Society becomes more capable of collective movement at the same time that each of its elements has more freedom of movement".

(D.L., p 31).

The growth of individualism per se does not militate against the possible unity of society.

"The more societies advance, the more profoundly they reveal the sentiment of self and unity".

(D.L., p 173).

History reveals not disintegration as the solidarity of primitive society recedes, but a greater preponderance to an organic type.

In 'Individualism and the Intellectuals' (1898) he outlines how individualism is compatible with social unity. Here he shows how for him universalism is reconciled with humanism. The Religion of Humanity must be the moral basis of modern society. Here

"Individualism, thus extended is the glorification not of self, but of the individual in general. It springs not from egoism, but from sympathy for all that is human, a broader pity for all sufferings, for all human miseries a more ardent need to combat them and mitigate them, a greater thirst for justice".

(I.I., p 48).

The humanism is the ethical system compatible with organic solidarity. As the division of labour advances

"Nothing remains which men can have and honour in common if not man himself".

(I.I., p 52).

As history progresses this universalistic humanism will be the bond between people.

"Thus we make our way, little by little, toward a state, nearly achieved as of now where the members of a single social group will have nothing in common among themselves except their humanity, except the constitutive attributes of the human person in general ... Hereafter to what can the collective sentiment cling?"

(I.I., p 51).

He makes plain that the positive individualism he applauds is that of Kant and Rousseau, who reconcile collectivism and individualism. The individual has moral right because of a universal moral rule which establishes the human being as an end in itself. So in an advanced society, a normal division of labour will engender a collective moral sentiment that reveres the individual.

He arrives at his definition of the pathology of modern society through the criterion of unity. The economic division of labour is the condition where it ceases to bring forth solidarity. The division of labour has a disintegrating effect only in abnormal circumstances. This is shown in the industrial and commercial crises and conflict between labour and capital which he says has been most intense since the seventeenth century and the development of large scale industry. In these economic relations, production has become limitless and breaks down the regulation which is contained in spontaneous moral laws. In the anomic division of labour regulation becomes constraint when regulation no longer corresponds to 'the nature of things'. The division of

labour only produces solidarity if it is spontaneous. He defines spontaneity here as that which entails no violence, and is 'the free unfolding of the social force that each carries in himself'. But he says

"Perfect spontaneity ... is a ... consequence of absolute equality in the external conditions of conflict... This is never met with anywhere as a realised fact".

(D.L., p 377-8).

The social forces of modern society only bring forth solidarity if there is equality.

"All external inequality compromises organic solidarity".

(D.L., p 379).

Durkheim thus admits the historical evidence for the modern division of labour as condition of solidarity is weak. He fails to find in the facts of social and economic life of advanced industrial society support for his thesis that unity can be achieved as the moral basis of modern society.

His thesis cannot thus be taken as description, but more as prescription. This confirms the definition of Renouvierist science as based on action and not simple discovery. The task of sociology is to foster action towards the collectivity: this will be the unity - not discovered, but achieved. However unity is still the yardstick by which he analyses industrial society and judges it to be deficient in its anomic relations. If this unity is not revealed by the facts of society, whence its justification as a tool of analysis?

The answer is that it is basic to the idea of a moral science as developed by Renouvier.

Section II. Kant and the Universalization thesis and
Renouvier's Critique.

The universalization thesis is directly connected to the rationality of action for Kant, and thus is fundamental to what later came to be the science of ethics in Renouvier's hands. For Kant, reason is universal in both its theoretical and practical aspects: but as action concerns the 'to be achieved', the practical universality represents the realisation of reasons search for unity. Duty expresses moral law and the form of all law is universality. If reason can be practical, then the form this practicality takes is universal.

"Assuming that pure reason can contain a practical ground sufficient to determine the will, then there are practical laws".

(C.Pr.R., p 17).

All action for Kant is on the basis of rules or 'maxims': all action is rational in the sense that it follows hypothetical imperatives

"The practical rule is always a product of reason because it prescribes action as a means to an effect which is its purpose".

(C.Pr.R., p 18).

Maxims can be subjective or objective: objective maxims are practical laws.

"If a rational human being can think of its maxims as practical universal laws, he can do so only by considering them as principles which contain the determining grounds of the will, because of their form and not their matter".

(Theorem III. C.Pr.R.,
p 27).

No material maxims can establish practical law; form alone determines the lawfulness of practical action.

"All practical principles which presuppose an object (material) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are without exception empirical and can furnish no practical laws".

(Theorem I, C.Pr.R., p 19).

Freedom and universality are connected for Kant: since any material maxim must contain a determination by the sensuous, it follows it is ruled by the law governing nature-causality. Practical action to be free can be determined by no end dictated by the natural /sensuous.

"Freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other".

(C.Pr.R., p 29).

But the precise meaning of Kant's universalization thesis is hard to specify. L.W. Beck¹ says it can be elucidated by looking at the Critique of Judgement where Kant distinguishes between the normative and social universality of aesthetic judgements. Kant, recognising the enormous variety of judgements on what counts as beauty, says aesthetic judgements can be said to have a normative universality and not social universality. Similarly moral judgements can be said to have normative universality. In this connection Beck distinguishes two questions in relation to the universality thesis. The first question is whether what I believe to be universally valid is in fact universally valid. The second question is whether what I believe to be universally

valid is universally believed to be valid, and is a quite different question from the first. It is easy to give a negative answer to the second question; but this does not imply a negative answer to the first question. In other words, questions about normative universality are independent of questions about social universality of moral judgements. What people believe to be universally true is independent of what is universally true. Kant's universalization thesis is independent of the variability of customs and practices. For Kant, even if the whole world told lies, it is still true that they ought not to.

This idea of normative universality can be extended in this way. For Kant reason has an 'interest' in moral action, that is irrespective of any specific desires or anticipated consequences. Since the interest of reason is in unity, it follows that this interest entails a vision of a system of laws governing human action. Normative universality in this sense would mean an interest in the universal system that could be founded on the will of the agent as founding moral action. The status of normative universality is the yet to be achieved: but achievable through the will of the agent, for will and practical reason are coextensive for Kant. The universality essential to normativity is the form of law achievable through the wills of rational agents. The status of the universality thesis, in the light of Kant's remarks on moral methodology, is as encouragement to act

more rationally in a form more fitting to a communal life. In this, thus Kant establishes the form of moral action and the form of rational communal life are one and the same.

This is a positive or constitutive sense of universality as opposed to a regulative aspect. The supreme formal principle of moral law states that a purely rational being would act on maxims that could be accepted as a law for all rational beings. To be moral and not merely legal, there must be a direct interest in establishing principles that are valid for all rational beings, not merely ones that do not contradict generalised material interest. The universality thesis thus has a positive constitutive sense of acting towards the form of rational community.

"Thus morality consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws, whereby a kingdom of ends is possible".

(Gr. 76, p 434).

In this sense it connects with the Kingdom of Ends, and has an essential link with the notion of the respect for the human being as an end in itself. (This distinguishes Kant's thesis from R.M. Hare's theory of universalizability, where the capacity to universalize alone is sufficient condition of its moral quality).

Kant connects his thesis of universality with community in two ways. Firstly in terms of principle: the first formulation of the categorical imperative, the

principle of universality, cannot be adequately understood without reference to the formula of the Kingdom of Ends:

"For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself. By so doing there arises a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws - that is a kingdom".

(GR., 75, p 433).

Secondly, his thinking on the universality thesis is tied to a conception of the world or community of rational agents: there can be a contradiction of will and not just rule if an agent wills something which s/he cannot live with. And a contradiction of rule cannot be a basis for communal action.

However charges of ethical formalism have been made against Kant: and largely depend on the misunderstanding of the notion of the a priori and the relation to it of the transcendental method. It is only in a transcendental argument that the form of law is seen as the condition of the possibility of moral action. It is discovered as the moral a priori: isolating the a priori for Kant meant discovering the form of action. It does not follow that all moral action must therefore be orientated only to formal principles. So Hegel accused Kant of giving "no immanent doctrine of duties".

"If the definition of duty is taken to be absence of contradiction ... then no transition is possible to the specification of particular duties".

(Philosophy of Right,
Section 135).

So Renouvier joins with his enemy in criticising Kant's formalism.

"Le parfaite scélératesse ne trouverait point un obstacle dans une loi abstraite qui précisément elle ne connaîtrait pas, puisque de sa nature elle pourrait vouloir ce que selon Kant, on ne peut pas vouloir".

(D.E., 1912, II p 228).

Kant's excessive formalism is a sign of his moral dogmatism. The purity of the form of universality as the ground of morality can only be retained because there is retained in Kant's ethics the absolute metaphysical sense of the noumenon. Kant can only claim that the form of moral law, ie. pure universality can determine action in itself, because the thing-in-itself is effective in moral action.

"L'être en soi ne pouvant revenir de lui-même, la loi en soi lui fraie le chemin. L'abstraction ontologique rentre à la suite de la morale érigée en abstraction logique".

(D.E., 1912, II, p 230).

Against Kant's pure formalism, he opposes the teachings of psychology: it is a fact that no one acts without feeling or having an aim of action. For the quality of universality to ever be effective it must be supplemented with ends determined by desire and made realistically available to action through recognition of human nature and conditions of society.

He agrees with Kant that the basic form of morality is found in the form of rules, but he amends Kant's pure universalization thesis to one of generalization.

For Renouvier abstraction and generalization are essential characteristics of science and morality. But there is no pure reason to establish absolute standards. Agents act on practical reason but this can no longer fix an absolute end in the form of action for the agent, for reason is ultimately the practical necessity to act as rooted in the choice of the individual. Maxims are motives generalized in a certain way: and ultimately maxims always concern the interests of agents. Laws are built on maxims but do not have an absolute form as end fixed by pure reason, but specify a common end agreed by agents. Generalization, through multiplying indefinitely the number of associates with a common end, leads to a non-formal definition of the categorical imperative.

"Agis toujours de telle manière que la maxime de ta conduite puisse être érigée par ta conscience en loi universelle".

(S.M., p 69)

For Renouvier following Kant, universality must be joined to the idea of the Kingdom of Ends. If human beings obey the law of their Consciences, and they join the idea to the real in their action, then there is established a world of reasonable beings. This is the Kingdom of Ends, which is a union of systematic reasoning creatures under common laws. This for Renouvier is a perfect association, which is founded on obligation, and can establish all the goods humanity could hope for.

This is consistent with his Copernicanism. Conscience imposes its duties, but not from an external point of absolute certainty. For it presupposes the will of agents. And the will of agents as rooted in choice is not a source of infallible criteria of absolute rectitude.

But if universalization is generalization of interest, in what sense has Renouvier retained the moral universalization thesis of Kant? Universality can no longer be unconditional reason, it is now a means of generalizing and in moral action it is a means of generalizing interest. Renouvier thus identifies moral right not with pure universality, but with general good. Is this not a form of rule-utilitarianism? This reform of Kantian dogmatism would indeed be a return to the rule-utilitarianism if Renouvier had retained the Kantian definition of what interest as established by a material maxim looked like. But his definition of experience is no longer what Kant holds it to be: experience for Renouvier presents itself to Conscience as the essential mingling of facts and laws. And the fundamental law which governs action in it is clear from Part III, is the law of practical reason. Human interest, for Renouvier is thus merged with moral interest. Experience per se is thus not simply associated with pleasure or desire as defined by Kant and the utilitarians. Human desire already has moral ends built into it. Thus Durkheim can say desirability is not mere pleasure, but a means of self transcendence

In Renouvier's eyes he has retained the universalization thesis of Kant, but purged it of its dogmatism, whilst retaining its Copernican character. He has restored it to the world of agents in space, time and history and made it accessible to the phenomenalist method. Durkheim thus inherited Kant's universalization thesis as realizable in a community of agents working towards a common end; and that this community can establish itself as a moral society through the form of action sanctioned by the moral authority of society itself.

Chapter V. Autonomy.

In this chapter I look at how Durkheim builds a definition of Autonomy, that is taken from Kant, into the definition of the modern conscience collective. Autonomy is the form morality must take in advanced societies. He claims to provide a more effective definition of autonomy than Kant and he claims this is found in the transformations of modern society.

Like other post-Kantians, Durkheim is thus dealing with the split between autonomy of the moral agent and the heteronomy of the world s/he must act in. Autonomy for Kant is a struggle of a nature divided against itself; by siding with reason we can lift ourselves above sensuous nature and achieve autonomy. Overcoming this split was one of the main tasks of his successors who were however orientated to his definitions of morality. For Hegel this split is eradicated through the transformations of history, whilst for Durkheim this split is achieved by transcendence of the empirical self through identification with the moral collectivity in the Conscience Collective. It is through identification with the moral rules of the collectivity that autonomy is achieved in modern society. Individualism is the result of social rules, so also is autonomy.

In transferring the interests of practical reason to the moral collectivity, Durkheim transfers Kant's definition of autonomy to his definition of advanced morality. He is thus in his own terms, not replacing Kant but extending the debate in terms set by Kant.

The question that faced the post-Kantians, as I have said, is how can the unconditioned appear in experience except as the conditioned? In this context, it is, how can autonomy be expressed in experience without being denied? One way is to say that social and historical experience is the condition for the realization of autonomy: this is an answer that both Durkheim and Hegel share. But Durkheim was influenced by Renouvier who interpreted experience as preserving spontaneity, which is a negative proof of liberty. It allows the intervention of will and will is practical reason. Autonomy thus can be reconciled with the phenomenal series for Renouvier without being annihilated. Indeed autonomy is only realisable through human interest at the phenomenal level. This critique of Renouvier's is the necessary transformation which allows autonomy as defined by Kant to be available for the terms of a human science.

Durkheim on Autonomy

"To be a person is to be an autonomous source of action"

(D.L., Conl. p 403).

Although Durkheim admits there may be some of the 'metaphysical attribute' of free-will in the person, this is not enough to constitute concrete personality, which is empirical and variable with individuals.

"This could not be constituted by the wholly abstract power of choice between two opposites, but it is still necessary for this faculty to be exercised towards ends and aims which are proper to the agent"

(D.L., op. cit.).

He argues that

"The very materials of conscience must have a personal character",

but this is the result not of a metaphysical attribute but is

"progressively produced as the division of labour progresses".

(D.L., op. cit.).

The development of what is called 'free will' requires the development of the division of labour. In primitive societies

"Liberty is only apparent and personality borrowed"

(D.L., p 404).

The effacement of the segmental type of society is required for the development of autonomy. And this together with the requirement of specialization constitutes

a "double emancipation". And it is the division of labour which "contributes to this enfranchisement".

"Thus the progress of individual personality and that of the division of labour depend upon one and the same cause. It is impossible to desire one without the other. But no-one today contests the obligatory character of the rule which orders us to be more and more of a person".

(D.L., p 405).

Autonomy is the main characteristic of the form of morality developing in advanced industrial society. There is a progressive autonomy which grows with individualism in the division of labour. Autonomy characterises organic solidarity in contrast to mechanical solidarity. In the latter the social molecules of mechanical solidarity act together only in so far as they have no actions of their own. Whereas organic solidarity

"Is possible only if each has a sphere of action peculiar to him: that is personality".

The autonomy characteristic of modern morality is an outgrowth of the division of labour.

"As work is divided more, the suppleness and liberty become greater"

(D.L., p 329).

The individual personality rather than being trammelled by it, develops with it.

Durkheim associates moral autonomy with the autonomy of reason

"This cult of man has as its primary dogma the autonomy of reason and as its primary rite the doctrine of free enquiry".

(I.I. p 49).

Intellectual rules and moral rules, which lie behind the conception of autonomy, imply each other.

"Rationalism is the intellectual aspect of individualism".

(I.I., p 49).

Science is the expression of rationalism and this supports the autonomy of the modern conscience. Progressive autonomy exists not only in the moral, but in the physical inverse through science.

"We are increasingly liberated from our direct dependence on things".

(M.E., p 114).

Science establishes understanding of the causes of things and this establishes the full sense of autonomy.

"Science is the well spring of our autonomy ... We liberate ourselves through our understanding and there is no other means of liberation".

(M.E., p 114).

It is through science discovered in the social and historical process that autonomy is developed. And it is through this that autonomy is reconciled with authority, because Durkheim claims that a full understanding of the reasons for things will lead to a free conformity. Autonomy based on knowledge leads to an enlightened allegiance to a

"Moral order which is founded on the nature of things".

(M.E., p 117).

In an imaginary world, he says, in which there is full scientific knowledge, the agent would understand the laws of reality and thus the reasons for the universal order. Science will establish a posteriori which religion establishes a priori, that is, that

"Everything is as it ought to be".

(M.E., p 115).

Conformity to this order is "enlightened allegiance" and replaces the "passive resignation of religion". (M.E., p 115).

In particular it is the science of sociology that leads to the development of autonomy through the understanding of the cause of social action and in particular the causes of social pathology. It is clear that here science means moral science: just as practical reason establishes autonomy for Kant, so science ie. moral science, establishes autonomy for Durkheim. Science can guarantee our autonomy because it is concerned with conditions of liberation and discovering those forces that lead to it. A science concerned with causes as mechanical determinisms could not establish it, but a science concerned with the conditions of practical reason as realised in history and society could. Again, this science essentially involves the will of agents, both as source of social activity, but also as source of change.

"It is wrong to reduce man to an inactive witness of his own history".

(D.L., p 340).

For Kant, autonomy is revealed through the phenomenon of obligation: indeed autonomy is possible through the constraint of moral rules as dominating the interests of inclination. For Durkheim, modern autonomy is the result of constraint: the pressure of societal rules which moves society towards the progressive autonomy of the rules of division of labour.

"Liberty is the subordination of external forces to social forces, for it is only in this condition that the latter can freely develop within it".

(D.L., Bk. III, Chapter II, p. 387).

Autonomy for Durkheim is a form of positive freedom, in Isaiah Berlin's^{*} sense of freedom to do, in contrast with freedom from outside interference. Positive freedom in modern autonomy is achieved through identification with the moral collectivity.

"Liberty is itself the product of regulation"

(D.L., p 3).

Autonomy thus is a form of freedom as self legislation. At the individual level, the higher social self rules over the lower empirical self. The laws of modern society, the drive toward progressive autonomy can be obeyed without loss of freedom, for it is they that are the condition of freedom. The autonomy of the modern division of labour thus has nothing to do with the mere empirical individuality of political economy and which is characterized in the thinking of utilitarians as 'freedom from'. Whereas for Durkheim, autonomy is the positive identification with the moral collectivity which is freedom to do.

"Two Conceptions of Liberty" in "Four Essays on Liberty" OUP London 1969

Autonomy is positive identification with social law for Durkheim, not freedom from any law. This autonomy is associated with the individualism that is compatible with solidarity. The freedom from outside interference of the political economists is the condition of the pursuit of self interest, but also the path to social breakdown for Durkheim. His theory of autonomy is the antithesis of negative individualism.

Again, like Kant, for Durkheim this autonomy is a form of independence. Firstly from the individual's own empirical individuality or what Durkheim calls the egoism of the organism. Through society the individual can learn self-transcendence. It is also freedom from dependence on nature: society preserves the human being from nature. And society also is a freedom from dependence on other wills seen as rules by private self interest. Like Kant and Rousseau, Durkheim argues that independence is equal dependence on rational law. Durkheim praises Kant for seeing the relationship between law and will as being one of dependence. (M.E., p 109). The social agent's dependence on the moral rules of the collectivity guarantee his/her independence. So in modern society autonomy is achieved through the rules of organic solidarity.

And like Kant, for Durkheim, autonomy is associated with the belief in the human being as an end in itself. Autonomy is associated with humanism and the 'religion of humanity'. Modern morality is characterized as

"A religion in which man is at once the worshipper and the god"

(I.I., p 51)

Modern morality is a cult in which the individual is both object and agent. This retains the characteristic of self referentiality of moral rules for Kant, just as above he has retained the characteristic of self-legislation of the conception of autonomy.

Durkheim in *Moral Education* (Chapter 8) praises Kant for his recognition of the double necessity of both the autonomous foundation of morality and its imperatival character. Kant had the 'keenest sense' of this. But Kant's solution to the apparent contradiction of autonomy with imperatival law is solved in terms of the dualism of our nature, where autonomy is the result of reasoned will, heteronomy of the senses. This solution says Durkheim makes obligation accidental, for moral law is obligatory only when in conflict with the senses. To conceive a pure autonomy of the will, Kant had to conceive of a will as purely rational as apart from the laws of nature. He created a world apart from reality. For Durkheim, the conclusion of Kant's conception of autonomy is that

"One might as well renounce all kinds of autonomy, if autonomy of the will must be purchased at such a violent separation from nature".

(M.E., p 113).

Kant's kind of autonomy is logically possible but has nothing to do with reality. The moral conscience does require an effective autonomy and this is progressively being realised through history.

Durkheim's analysis explicitly transfers the Kantian argument for autonomy to society. He can do this because he has argued that society is reason and thus just as for Kant practical reason establishes autonomy as a form of the categorical imperative, so for Durkheim autonomy is the form society imposed on modern morality. But his analysis requires Renouvier's transformations before it can be seen to be adequately accounted for in terms of the laws of reality.

Section II. Kant on Autonomy

For Kant, freedom as autonomy defines the will as subject to no law except one of which it is the author. Autonomy is for Kant, the positive definition of freedom and is covered by "Wille".

"Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational".

(Gr. Ch. III, p 446).

The negative aspect of freedom is spontaneity and is contained in "Wilkur". Kant established in the First Critique that it is not impossible to think of a causality independent of the determinism of the phenomenal series. Initially this is established negatively as a possibility: which is nevertheless required to prevent reason falling into contradiction. (the Third Antinomy). In the Second Critique he establishes that although there is a freedom from natural causation, he establishes that freedom is not thereby lawless. Freedom of "Wille" thus must be a causality conforming to 'immutable laws though of a special kind'.

The concept of autonomy establishes that a free will and a will under moral law are one and the same. Since

"Natural necessity is a heteronomy of efficient causes ... what else can freedom of the will be but autonomy of the will, that is the property which will has of being a law to itself".

(Gr. Ch. III, p 447).

The two analytically distinct aspects of freedom spontaneity in "Wilkur" and as self-legislation in "Wille", function together as the executive and legislative branches of action. Kant claims that will is only fully spontaneous when its action is governed by a law of pure practical reason and not when it accepts a rule given by nature for the accomplishment of some desire. That is "Wille" confirms positively what "Wilkur" only establishes negatively. And pure reason is only practical (ie. effective in action) upon the acceptance of its law as a motive by "Wilkur". "Wilkur" covers comparative freedom, shown for example in desire being subject to some rational control. This is in contrast to moral freedom expressed in "Wille", which is subject to no law of action except one that is universally valid for all rational beings. Moral freedom is absolutely independent of any determination by desire or any aspect of the sensuous side of human nature. "Wille" is never determined by an object, but always by a law formulated by reason. Thus just as empirical determinism can play no part in autonomy for Kant, neither can indeterminism. Moral freedom as autonomy is a pure (not based on any empirical elements) law (valid for all rational beings), which is self-imposed.

The proof that moral freedom is a property of the wills of all rational beings is not achieved by demonstrating it from "certain alleged experiences of human nature". Rather for Kant, the central moral fact of obligation reveals a totally different kind of necessitation from

the natural necessitation characteristic of causality. This is a self-imposed necessitation: freedom is the source of moral law and reciprocally moral law is the condition of freedom.

"Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independent of alien influences ... therefore as practical reason it must be regarded by itself as free".

(C.Pr.R., Theorem IV, p 33).

It is impossible to furnish a theoretical proof of freedom: the moral law compels us to assume it, he says, because the conception of freedom and that of the supreme principle of morality are so inextricably bound together, that practical freedom could be defined by the wills independence of everything except the moral law. So in the Second Critique, consciousness of moral law is evidence of freedom in the positive sense. Freedom and unconditional law reciprocally imply each other in the sense that the latter is the ratio cognoscendi of the former and this in turn is the ratio essendi of the latter.

The principle of autonomy has a unique place in Kant's philosophy. It is

"The sole principle of all moral laws and of all duties which conform to them ... the moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of pure practical reason; that is freedom: and this itself is the formal condition of all maxims and on this condition alone can they agree with the supreme practical law".

(C.Pr.R., Theorem IV, p 33).

T.C. Williams¹ argues that as the fundamental assumption on which the moral philosophy is predicated, it is logically different from other formulations of the principle of morality - the categorical imperative. The first formulation of this states the presupposition which must be true if morality is something real, namely that the rational will must be subject to universal law. And the third formulation - the principle of autonomy states the fundamental presupposition entailed in the idea of morality: that the rational will must not be merely subject to universal law, but must itself make that law. It alone establishes the objective validity of morality. Autonomy is thus the quintessential expression of practical reason and is the "summum bonum" of Kant's ethical theory. It establishes the 'usus realis' of reason, just as the First Critique established the 'usus logicus' of reason.

Freedom as autonomy for Kant, defined the will as subject to no law except that of which it is the author. The main aim of the Groundwork is to determine a law that the will can obey without losing its freedom. The law cannot be derived from nature for this would entail heteronomy of the will, as the will would be then subject to the causality of the phenomenal series. For Kant to establish that the will is independent of nature is to show that the will can and does follow a pure rationality distinct from empirical rationality. This is spontaneously derived from reason: reason legislates by its own nature.

The central characteristic of autonomy is self-legislation: the rational part legislates for the empirical or sensuous part of the agent. For Kant, law is not a limitation on freedom, but as unconditional moral law is seen as an expression of it. Thus freedom qua autonomy and unconditional law are coextensive. (Gr., 67N 448N).

It is in the concept of autonomy that Rousseau's influence on Kant is most clear. Following Rousseau, for Kant, autonomy is connected with the idea of independence. Kant distinguishes ~~this~~ from a natural dependence on things, through need or 'wantiness'. Here the agent is the administrator of nature, not its master. Kant says it is 'harder' and more 'unnatural' for a person to submit to the will of another. In this he echoes Rousseau's distinction between dependence on things, which is the work of nature and dependence on men which is the work of society. The former is 'non-moral' and begets no vices, whilst

"Dependence on men, being out of order, gives rise to every vice"²

Kant following Rousseau, recognised the indignity in the submission to another will. The principle of autonomy translates independence into a principle of pure reason. And this independence means not just independence of nature - including the agent's empirical individuality, but independence of other wills. In this sense self mastery is part of the concept - a higher rational faculty legislates for a lower irrational faculty. Isaiah Berlin holds that the positive sense of liberty derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.

The Copernican Revolution in ethics receives its dénouement in the concept of autonomy and the connection it specifies between freedom and law. For Kant, pre-Copernican definitions of obligation could not avoid the heteronomy of the will: in making the will, for example, subject to an external authority in being obliged, such theories made the will depend on something other than itself. But when the source of obligation is autonomous self legislation, there is no conflict between freedom and obligation. In the concept of autonomy the reflexivity which is central to moral experience for Kant is fully expressed. For in it is the idea of a will which is both the creator and executor of obligation, that is, a will which is both spontaneous and autonomous.

In this R.P. Woolf⁴ comments on the paradox of Kantian ethics - of his having begun the most complete subjugation of self to law in the history of modern ethics and of his ending with the complete subordination of law to self. Kant's central moral phenomenon is the restriction of the self by law: its explanation is the law giving of self or autonomy.

The authority of reason, central to the Critical Philosophy, receives its fullest expression in the principle of autonomy. In his moral philosophy, Kant would not surrender any element of authority of moral law. The First Critique established how he could do this: reason is the source of the laws of nature: law is not a passive recording of constant conjunctions, but a condition placed

by the understanding on experience as a criterion of its objective significance. If reason is the condition of the possibility of nature, its full expression can be realised in morality, where reason is no longer restricted to sensory conditions. Through the revolution in perspectives in epistemology, Kant claims to be able to locate the source of moral law in autonomous reason and to guarantee its objective necessity at the same time.

Kant establishes autonomy as the positive definition of freedom by a transcendental argument: freedom is the necessary presupposition of the moral framework of action. Through the phenomenon of obligation is proved the reality of morality and thus also that the human being is author of the law which s/he obeys. But as Renouvier shows Kant treats this implication of the moral as an access to a noumenal realm which is the real foundation of morality.

Section III. Renouvier on Autonomy.

"Il remarque d'abord, et avec raison, que la loi morale implique la liberté. Mais comment développe-t-il cette vérité? La loi morale étant pour lui pure absolue sans condition quelconque d'objet ou de matière, la volonté libre qui s'applique est à son tour liberté absolue, entièrement indépendante des phénomènes. Ce qui est très logique; et une telle volonté implique à tour une loi morale inconditionnée, puisqu'elle ne peut se déterminer par rien qui soit de domaine de l'expérience. Enfin cette liberté impossible, sans appui dans les phénomènes où la placer? Dans un être en soi, dans un noumène, cause intelligible comme elle, ou elle a sa réalité objective. Ainsi se trouvent rétablies les notions vides dont on ne saurait en aucune manière déterminer la nature".

(D.E., 1912, II, p 230).

To make the noumenon the foundation of the practical philosophy is to go back on the critical intention which inspired his philosophy, and it is to leave morality without a real foundation.

"Il est bien bizarre qu'un usage pratique puisse être fait d'une notion vide".

(D.E., op. cit.).

To give morality a fictitious foundation is to threaten not only morality but also the reality of freedom.

"La liberté envisagée dans un être en soi qui a ses lois propres, hors de l'expérience, séparée des phénomènes intellectuels et moraux dont la possibilité ambiguë constitue tout ce que nous savons d'elle, devient une chimère aussi et va s'évanouir".

(D.E., 1912, II, p 231).

The problem is of course for Renouvier that Kant placed freedom in substance.

"La raison en est que l'existence d'une liberté dans une substance est un assemblage de mots sans signification raisonnable. Mais que la substance soit abandonnée, tout change en face: on comprend alors la liberté comme l'existence même".

(D.E., op. cit., p 132).

Renouvier's critique here is similar in tone to Hegel, who said that Kant's conception of rational autonomy is only "a formal self-activity", and "because it reckons any content as a limit- and flees from it" it is "negative" and "abstract". (Phen. of Mind., I p 398). But Renouvier would profoundly disagree with Hegel that autonomy could be located in the self-activity of spirit revealing itself through the historical process. He may agree with Hegel that society and the state are the conditions in which freedom is realised. But history is not the locus of spirit, but rather of the wills of agents in society, and it is here for Renouvier that the foundation of freedom lies.

Again, Renouvier's critique of Kant's distinction between phenomenal causality and noumenal freedom as a Thomist solution, with a divine freedom outside space and time and compatible with temporal determinism is similar to Joseph Maier's¹ critique of Kant. He says Kant's theory of freedom is compatible with any condition of servitude or bondage. For Renouvier any talk of freedom outside the freedom of the phenomenal realm is entirely fictitious.

And as argued in Part III, it is the phenomenon of regret and remorse which point to the ambiguity inherent in the phenomenal order which allows the intervention of the will. (C.P., 1874, p 132). Like Kant this points to the possibility of freedom but this is not yet moral freedom. It is only the phenomenon of duty which points to autonomy as the positive definition of freedom. For Renouvier this is a postulate, a product of rational belief. This postulate can thus be said to take the place of Kant's transcendental argument for autonomy. It is in the moral law that the positive definition of freedom is found and in this, its reality is established, not simply possibility.

"On sait que le fondement théorique de la morale, à un autre point de vue ... de sa possibilité dans les conditions humaines, est, selon Kant, le libre arbitre humain, qui doit être réel, par cette raison que nous possédons la notion et que nous avons le sentiment d'obligation. Il serait en effet contradictoire que l'obligation fût réelle et que le pouvoir ne le fût point de faire, pour s'y conformer, autre chose, selon les cas, que ce qui serait arrêté d'avance par une loi d'enchaînement universel des phénomènes. Cette doctrine est aussi la nôtre, mais nous prenons pour le sujet de la liberté l'homme véritable, unique et réel du monde phénoménal auquel la loi des phénomènes antérieurs et ambiants laisse une sphère d'action libre dans l'application des lois, dans la génération et la destruction des phénomènes".

(C.D.K., p 20).

Freedom is the positive sense of autonomy in a postulate founded on duty: to found this on noumenal causality as Kant did is to make the postulate lose its significance. He maintains that in abolishing the noumenon and making freedom compatible with the phenomenal order through will,

he has supported more clearly the idea of liberty as a moral postulate. Thus he can talk of "Le postulat de la liberté comme réelle" that is "comme ayant un fondement dans l'ordre extérieur des choses". It follows that autonomy as defined by Kant has a foundation in the phenomenal order for Renouvier, and is thus subject to analysis, description and verification in the processes of history and society, where real liberty takes place.

Renouvier claims Kant's doctrine is his. It has been pointed out that Renouvier's whole philosophy is one of freedom and autonomy. This has been analysed in Part III. But in what sense can Renouvier be said to have retained the Kantian conception of autonomy?

Kant's doctrine relies on the autonomy of reason as a distinct faculty: in the theoretical sense, it is its autonomy which is the precondition of the imposition of laws on the data of sensibility. For Renouvier there is no reason distinct from understanding and thus no autonomy of the regulation of experience. Reason is the capacity to reflect, judge and compare: it is not an absolute, distinct from experience by the character of its object. Renouvier has criticised the notion of absolute or pure reason; reason for him is the human person. (Part III, Chapter IV). It follows that Renouvier understands autonomy as the spontaneity of the human person, which is seen in the fundamental capacity of free belief. Will is basic to the human agent and is expressed in free affirmation and will is practical reason. So the basic

principle of Neo-Criticisme is the primacy of practical reason and this expresses the autonomy of the person.

Will as the basic characteristic of consciousness, entails that the agent is not content to be, but to do: through the will the agent breaks with nature. The human being transcends nature. With the appearance of liberty, the human being

"Acquiere une existence incomparablement plus propre: il se distinguent, il se sépare: il était lui, il devient par lui".

(D.E., 1912, p 107).

The human being was under laws: now s/he is autonomous.

Thus for Renouvier the thesis of autonomy is achieved in the identity of will and liberty. He replaces the autonomy of reason with the autonomy of the person.

Conclusion

The Copernican Revolution in epistemology has given way to the Copernican Revolution in morality. The discovery that the laws immanent in the subject are the condition of knowledge in turn leads to the discovery of Conscience whose laws are laws of freedom. The full autonomy of reason sought by Kant is turned by Renouvier into the voluntarism of consciousness. Copernicanism for Renouvier means the relativity of world to Conscience and this overthrows the concept of substance. Conscience as voluntaristic in turn entails the denial of determinism. So Renouvier with Kant started with the concept of the new metaphysics of the laws of representation of the subject. Kant's compromise with the old is demonstrated in the retention of the in-itself, substance in disguise. The full implication of the metaphysics of the subject- of the laws that govern experience - is for Renouvier the discovery of freedom as central to human consciousness. The science of laws of representation in turn discovers the freedom of humanity.

"La doctrine scientifique des phénomènes et des lois, quand nous croyons à la liberté se présente à nous avec un caractère bien différent de ce que les philosophes imaginent communément. Ces principes d'individuation et de permanence, qu'il leur plaît de demander à la substance et de fonder sur des chimères, nous les trouvons, on le voit dans la liberté et dans les lois de l'univers".

(D.E., 1912, p 109).

The search for substance terminates with the discovery of the human essence - freedom. Freedom is the unconditioned.

The Copernican Revolution which can be characterized as putting the conditioned (experience) into relation with the unconditioned (reason) in Renouvier's hands, discovers the unconditioned not in the in-itself, but in the human being. In the autonomy of consciousness. What the human beings are confronting with the unconditioned or absolute is their own freedom.

"La liberté, n'est donc pas dans une substance, attribut d'une substance ou attribut d'un attribut: elle est dans l'homme inhérente à ce groupe des lois et de phénomènes qui est l'homme".

(D.E., 1912, p 103).

In a manner reminiscent of Feuerbach's humanistic criticism, Renouvier accuses traditional metaphysics of hypostatizing into unrelated abstractions of thought what is the basis of human action. Just as God is human need writ large for Feuerbach, so is the in-itself of traditional metaphysics, human freedom disguised^{by Renouvier}. The Kantian in-itself is the apotheosis of this type of thinking. As with naturalistic criticism so with Renouvier the proper role of philosophy is to replace the human being as the centre of metaphysical concern.

"Cet absolu cherche de chimère en chimère à travers les élucubrations théologiques nous le trouvons au fond de notre nature ... La philosophie, enfin humanisée, trouve dans l'homme qui est à la fois son créateur et sa principale matière le type, unique type connu de ce que l'être a d'inaccessible de cette source de faits premiers ..."

(D.E., 1912, p 83).

This critique also leads to a new view of science: a truly human science which philosophy must express is not a science of discovery but of action. It is a free science. It opens up possibilities of action, instead of pointing to the necessities of established structures.

"La véritable doctrine de la liberté nous fait considérer le monde comme un ordre qui devient et se fait, non comme un ordre préétabli qui n'a qu'à se dérouler dans le temps.

(D.E., 1912, p 105).

The doctrine of substance was a thesis about order in the universe: it was the unchanging substratum of change. Now with the recognition that substance is human freedom the idea of order is now a human order which is not based on being, but becoming. Renouvier's critique replaces the ontological permanence of substance with the human permanence of persons.

"La liberté à son tour fait la permanence de la personne, et aussi le rompt, puisque c'est à elle qu'il appartient de créer l'homme nouveau contre l'homme ancien ... Telle est donc le véritable permanence: ici une loi dans le changement; là une conscience qui le domine. Toute autre serait incompatible avec les variations de la nature et de la personne humaine".

(D.E., 1912, p 108).

The doctrine of substance and its remnants in Kantian philosophy gives way to the human order, which the concept society expresses in Durkheim's thought. The realisation of the human 'essence' can now only occur in this human order: it is in this that the laws of practical reason are developed. Autonomy is supreme among these. It is

"La nature humaine élevée à sa plus haute dignité, grâce à une énergique affirmation de la liberté ..."

(D.E., 1912, p 312).

Renouvier perceives himself to have united pure and practical reason in the thesis of automotivité, which is the identification of the voluntarism of consciousness with autonomy of the will. And in this he points to the creation of new human orders in the world of experience, which is the full realisation of the Copernican Revolution.

"Si c'est la liberté qui est vraie ... l'homme est créateur d'un ordre nouveau dans le monde, d'un ordre qui ne saurait jamais être donné tout entier, mais qui se fait perpétuellement et qui est par excellence le domaine humaine, son domaine".

(D.E., 1912, p 82).

Appendix I. Life and Works of Charles Renouvier
1815 - 1903.

Like his master Kant, the main events of Renouvier's life were intellectual ones. He led a quiet bachelor life, but of a remarkable intellectual fecundity. In his sixty years of philosophical output he produced, it has been calculated, more than fifty volumes. He had a small private income, which relieved him from the pressure of paid employment (and in this he was quite unlike his master). He was excluded from university teaching, as was Comte, by the eclectic Victor Cousin. Renouvier was politically active in the revolution of 1848 and his "Manuel Republicain de l'Homme et du Citoyen" (1848) caused the fall of the Minister of Education. He contributed much to Socialist literature, particularly to "La Feuille du Peuple" and to "L'Encyclopedie Nouvelle". But with the Coup d'Etat of 1851 Renouvier retired to the country to develop his ideas, which culminated in "Essai de Critique Generale".

He was born at Montpellier, the birthplace of Auguste Comte: his family was active in republican politics. His father had Jacobin sympathies and had a passion for Rousseau's thought. Renouvier thus grew up in an atmosphere of humanism and political preoccupation.

In 1829 he studied at the College Rollin where he was taught by a disciple of Victor Cousin (the leading Eclectic and the official philosopher of the reign of Louis

Philippe. Cousin was a philosophical dictator in France until the Revolution of 1848, when he was deposed).

In 1834 Renouvier entered the Ecole Polytechnique where Comte was a mathematics instructor. Here he was influenced by Comte's reputation of "La methode des entités" and he was introduced to "la methode relativiste". It was the reading of Descartes in 1839 that transformed his thinking and began his move away from the St. Simonianism and the 'demi-Hegelianism' which dominated his thinking until his crisis of 1851 (discussed in Part I, Chapter IV).

There are said to be three distinct periods in Renouvier's life. What we can call the pre-critical period: the period up until 1851, when he wrote his Manuals of Philosophy. This is his period of 'demi-Hegelianism'. From 1840 to 1850 he contributed numerous articles to socialist journals. During this period he became so deeply involved in politics, that it took the coup d'état to return him to philosophy. His second and most fruitful period is the period of Neo-Criticisme which is his Kantian period. The definitive statements of this are contained in his two Essais de Critique Generale. After 1858 his connection with Fant is broken, and he develops his later theory of personalism in a more Leibnizian mould.

Details of his life after 1854 are hard to find. I relied mainly on L'Abbe Fouché's "La Jeunesse de Renouvier et Sa Première Philosophie - 1815-1854", which covers his life and work up to the preparation of the first two

'Essais de Critique Generale'. For the next twenty years one can only guess that his life was marked by an intense intellectual production, carried on largely alone, but gradually gathering a group of sympathisers and disciples around him. He was a partisan of the Commune of 1871 and he became politically active again under the Third Republic with the establishment of his journal 'La Critique Philosophique', which supported republican politics as well as being a journal of philosophical and social issues. After 1890 this journal became 'L'Année Philosophique' which he co-edited with his 'Fidèle second' F. Pillon. He died in 1903 and his death-bed reflections on his life and philosophy have been published as 'Les Derniers Entretiens' (recollected by L. Prat., Vrin. 1930, Paris).

Here he feared for the state of philosophy in France - he foresaw a period of decadence. (He would have strengthened this judgement if he could have foreseen the return of Hegelianism to the French Universities after the First World War). By this he meant a period of philosophical reflection which lacked principle and method. He says

"Une doctrine ne s'élabore qu'à la condition de suivre une sévère méthode logique"

(Derniers Entretiens, p 83).

It was with this spirit that Renouvier tackled the problems posed by the Kantian system. It was by holding rigidly to the relativist method, that he pursued the ghost of the absolute through the Kantian system.

It was not until after 1870 that his thinking became well known, but it then became so influential that to some it seemed to express the very essence of that republic's thinking. Nevertheless his thought did not establish a school or a doctrine as Comte and St. Simon. He wrote voluminously but it is claimed by Proudhon, badly. His thought was concerned with traditional philosophical issues and as such defied simple formulation. He insisted that all questions in philosophy must be based on the critique of knowledge and in this he allied himself with Kant and Descartes.

I shall not detail every publication of Renouvier: I specify only the main publications - bearing in mind as R. Verneaux says that despite an output of nearly fifty volumes the basic elements of his thought are contained in the first two 'Essai de Critique Generales of 1854 and 1856'. I shall not list his contributions to journals, in particular to his own Critique Philosophique.

- 1842 Manuel de Philosophie Moderne. Paris. Paulin.
- 1844 Manuel de Philosophie Ancienne. Paris. Paulin.
- 1843-7 Numerous articles to 'L'Encyclopédie Nouvelle' ed. P. Leroux and J. Reynaud.
- 1848 'Manuel de Republicain de l'Homme et du Citoyen'. Paris. Pagnerre.
- 1851 Numerous articles to 'La Feuille du Peuple'.
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Appendix II. Conceptual and Causal Necessity

The idea that there is a necessity which marks the distinctive feature of knowledge is a position that is accepted in twentieth philosophy by thinkers like Wittgenstein and Simone Weil. In the nineteenth century, Hegel and Durkheim identified necessity with human experience, the former in the notion of historical necessity and the latter in the notion of social constraint. (Indeed Durkheim anticipates Wittgenstein's analysis of the relationship between authority and necessity, in his idea of social authority as the source of constraint).

Kant was the first to identify necessity not simply with the analytic necessity of logical contradiction (to which both the empiricists and rationalists had restricted it) but with the 'could not be otherwise' of human experience. The mark of the necessary is no longer strictly logical, but conceptual. We cannot think otherwise even though the denial of propositions which carry this necessity, does not constitute a contradiction. The necessity which characterizes human knowledge is a conceptual necessity. The task for the post-Kantians was to find the source of this conceptual necessity. However Kant identified it with causal determinism in the deduction of the principle of causality, as the epistemological principle which bears the order of human experience.

In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant claims at a stroke to justify the fundamental presuppositions of science and ordinary life, and to have discovered a new

method by which it is possible to prove a system of synthetic a priori principles and thus to establish a complete philosophy of all that concerns human experience directly. Kant established this by a logical analysis of what is involved in any possible experience: this cannot be reduced to any psychological/subjective factors, and its objectivity is thus entailed. The Transcendental Deduction has been rightly called the most important passage in the history of philosophy, for both the German Rationalists and the English Empiricists had failed to find a rational justification for such fundamental beliefs as the existence of a world independent of the senses, and particularly of the Principle of Causality - that every physical change must be caused. The Transcendental Deduction has as its conclusion that knowledge implies knowledge of an objective, human world. For the purposes of this argument the most important result of it is that all judgement and cognition imply objectivity and unity, and in the case of events, this objectivity and unity can only be interpreted in terms of necessity. This is fully developed in the Second Analogy.

Kant's main argument for the Principle of Causality also demonstrates the connection between objectivity and causal necessity. Our perception of events (objective alteration) lack the feature of order indifference, ie. they could not have occurred in any other order. Kant uses this to prove that the Principle of Causality holds of any objective events of which we can have any empirical

knowledge through perception. We could not empirically apply the notion of objective change without implicitly using the notion of a necessary order of perceptions, and that the feature of order indifference could have no application unless the principle of Causality applied universally and unexceptio to objects of perception.

The following critiques of Kant's argument establish that the conception of objective order, rightly described by Kant as necessary to any knowledge of the world, is not underwritten by the principle of causal necessity; indeed the type of necessity Kant needs for this argument to carry is conceptual, not causal and it can be argued that it is an element of positivistic thinking that makes Kant believe that only causal necessity is adequate to guarantee any kind of necessity in the known world. It can be argued that it is this element of ideological positivism that causes the problem of freedom and determinism in the form that Kant confronts it in the Third Antinomy, and that makes impossible the uniting of the theoretical and practical aspects of Kant's philosophy.

Strawson¹ argues that the use Kant makes of 'necessary order' is illegitimate. The feature of order/indifference establishes a conceptual necessity, but does not underwrite causal necessity. That is, it is conceptually necessary in the change from A to B that the observer's perceptions should have the order a b. But the conclusion of Kant's argument is the causal necessity of that change itself occurring. L. Beck² tries to rescue Kant from Strawson's challenge of a 'non-sequitur of nurbing grossness.' He quotes

Van Cleeve, who shows that Kant and Strawsons' perspectives are different: Strawson writes from a realist position - A and B are ontologically real, not phenomena 'under a law given by the understanding'. And in this position there is no way to go from perceptions to objects. Kant argued that the objective relation of appearances is not to be determined through mere perception, rather it is the positing of the Law of Causality that enables one to interpret A B irreversibly. Beck certainly saves Kant from a realist misinterpretation of phenomenal reality, but he has surely now revealed a vicious circularity in Kant's argument, because surely the justification of the application of causality is the irreversibility of temporal sequences.

Thus Strawson has challenged the connection between conceptual and causal necessity, and he is right to argue that the feature of order indifference is not enough to establish causal necessity.

A.C. Ewing³ criticises Kant for the connection he makes between temporal ordering and determinism. Ewing argues that precedent events in time do not determine the subsequent. We do indeed pass through an earlier period of time to reach the later: the past cannot be experienced as later than the present. But the only condition that phenomena must observe in order to conform to this characteristic is that a phenomenon that is past in reference to some other phenomenon cannot also be present or future in relation to the same phenomenon. The assymetrical

relationship of events in time does not support causal determinism. Further he points out that the relationship between temporal ordering and causality that Kant sets up is weakened by the consideration that causality is a synthetic relation, that is from the concept of the cause, one cannot infer the effect. But the relation of parts of time one to another is analytically true. That is just what we mean by past is that it is before the present.

Ewing further quotes from Schopenhauer who distinguishes between objective sequence and causal sequence. One event may succeed another without being caused by it. If the two types of sequence were identified then night would be said to cause day. Ewing defends Kant here by saying that Kant only argued that the sequence A B must be determined by some cause or other, but speaks unfortunately (at B 234) as though objective sequences are causal. But this is surely precisely what he meant, the tie up between objectivity and causality is so close he could not have meant anything else. Further if Ewing's defence is correct, then in what sense does Kant's argument, that causality relies on irreversibility, hold? Surely the Principle of Causality loses its specific grounding if in relation to the irreversibility of A B, if all Kant really means is that it is caused 'by some cause or other'. That is, in terms of actual human experience, the grounding for causality must be perceived temporal relations, otherwise it loses its grounding in experience and hence its objectivity. Ewing does admit that Kant's view comes very close to the view that if B necessarily succeeds A

then they are causally related, but his view is really that under given conditions B necessarily follows A, plus other relevant considerations which it is the task of science to find out. But the task of philosophy for Kant is to underwrite sciences itself; philosophical aims cannot then be saved by actual scientific discoveries: this would be to indulge in illegitimate shuttling between levels of analysis. This is similar to Schopenhauer's argument that Kant's admission that we can only discover particular causal laws by experience is inconsistent with the doctrine that we can only recognise a succession as objective by discovering the causal law which determined it. But Ewing argues that Kant's argument is that when we recognise a succession as objective we ipso facto recognise it as causally determined by some unspecified and unknown antecedents, not that we must find the particular causes by which it is actually determined. But again one can retort that unspecified and unknown antecedents are not enough to establish the conditions of objectivity found only in sense experience that Kant's critical philosophy demands.

Finally Schopenhauer argues that the distinction between objective and subjective events in no way hangs on causality: we can distinguish a real event from a phantom without acquaintance with the particular causes by which it is determined.

So, in what sense did Kant succeed in proving the universal and a priori status of the principle of causality in the Critique of Pure REason? Is causality central to objectivity, and further is causality central to objectivity, and does it really conflict with freedom in implying determinism?

Both Ewing and Strawson point out that Kant has not really proved as much as he thought he had. For Strawson Kant had only succeeded in establishing conceptual necessity. And Ewing argues that causality has lost a good deal of the content it has in ordinary usage. All Kant succeeds in proving is that all succession is necessary, but not causally necessary. That is he proves that necessity is involved in the idea of an intelligible world, but doesn't succeed in proving the form that necessity takes. So the results of the Transcendental Deduction stand, but not those of the metaphysical deduction, where Kant wrote Newtonian science and Aristotelian logic into his philosophical achievements. The inclusion of these is arbitrary, in that those forms of thinking are not themselves philosophically underwritten by the achievements of the transcendental deduction. This of course leaves open the question how the features of the conceptual world are to be filled out.

What is already clear is that the form of causality that Kant attempts to maintain is a form of quasi-mechanical necessity, which means the necessity of Newtonian physics. This with its laws of motion entailed a form of

determination making use of terms referring to motion and mass. These through the Metaphysical Deduction were written into the philosophical form of the Critique of Pure Reason. That is, it is the quasi mechanical sense of necessity, entailing the complete determinism of the phenomenal series, that causes the problems of freedom and determinism as they are spelt out in the Third Antinomy. Kant saw the main threat to freedom to lie in the phenomenal series, where every event in time is under the condition of what preceded it. The past is seen to assert some mechanical hold over the present. But if, as Ewing maintains Kant has not proved that every event must have a cause sufficient to determine it, the problem of freedom and determinism defined by Kant as contradictory concepts as applying to the phenomenal series, is no longer so acute. And he would not have to relegate freedom to the realm of things-in-themselves, for without the element of mechanical push from the past there is no reason why human intentionality cannot intervene in the phenomenal series.

We have here an example of how contemporary science can affect the formulation and solution of a philosophical problem. Newtonian science presented itself in the atmosphere of the Enlightenment as so overwhelmingly successful in explaining the natural world, that Kant turned what was a scientific success into a near philosophical disaster, for as a result of the Kantian system the study of nature and the study of man were further

apart than they need have been, and the interests of morality and science were articulated as antithetical. Thus positivism in Kant meant that ^{having} taken over wholesale the ideational structure of Newtonian physics, he was prevented from developing an epistemology that backed up his moral philosophy, and thus from uniting his theoretical philosophy. So deeply affected by Newtonianism was Kant that causal explanations are seen as sufficient to guarantee the intelligibility of the world. Further it is only this hold of contemporary science that makes Kant think that only causal explanations are sufficient to guarantee order and predictability in the known world.

Renouvier challenges Kant on these latter two assumptions. Firstly the equation of necessity with determinism and secondly the division of human experience into the conceptual and the moral. By pointing to moral necessity in practical reason, as the condition of all knowledge he not only denies the equation of determinism with conceptual necessity, but he identifies the conceptual and the moral. Indeed he makes the moral ought the guarantor of conceptual necessity. But is it sufficient to bear this weight? I have suggested that if the criteria by which we identify 'ought' involve any conceptual element, then it cannot be the unique source of the necessity which characterises human experience.

(It is interesting to note that Renouvier was helped in his critique of mechanical necessity by the work of Cournot in probability theory).

Renouvier's work establishes the role of will in certainty and this points forwards to a form of pragmatism. Indeed William Jones was influenced by Renouvier and contributed to his *Critique Philosophique*. But Pragmatism develops outside of the Kantian idea of moral necessity which covers certainty for Renouvier.

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